B R S v/. ! LIFE OF NAPOLEON. BY BARON JOMINI, General-in-Chief and Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia. "Je fus ambitieux; tout homme Test, sans doute; Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef, on citoyen, Ne congut an projet aussi grand quo le mien." VOLTAIRE, Mahomet. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH. WITH NOTES, BY H. W. HALLECK, LLJX, Major-General United States Army ; Author of "Elements of Military Art and Science;" "International Law, and the Laws of War," etc., etc. IN TWO VOLUMES. -WITH AN ATLAS. VOL. I. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. The following translation was made during a seven-months voyage from New York to California, in 1846. It was under- taken partly as a military study, and partly as an occupation during a long and tedious voyage round Cape Horn. After being completed, the manuscript was laid aside for more than sixteen years, and nearly forgotten. The present war has called attention to military books, and especially to the works of Jomini. No English translation of his ''Life of Napoleon" has ever been published, and it is very difficult to procure a copy in French. Under these circumstances, and to supply a public want, this translation is given to the press, a military friend having kindly offered to supervise the publication, the professional duties of the translator not per- mitting him to give it the proper personal attention. During the publication of the fourth volume of the original work, the author's manuscript of the twenty-second chapter was lost, and a very brief narrative of the campaign of 1815 was substituted. The manuscript was afterwards found, and pub- lished in another and more elaborate form. The substance of this second publication is incorporated in the translation, the spirit and character of the original chapter being preserved. With this exception, the translation is almost literal, only a few paragraphs being slightly condensed. These relate to subjects which at the present time are of very little interest. The translator is solely responsible for the Notes, those of the author being nearly all embodied in the text. Jomini's original maps and plans being deemed too ex- pensive for republication, those of A. K. Johnston's Atlas (which are mostly compiled from Jomini) are substituted. H. W. H. Washington, April, 1863. CONTENTS. VOL. I. SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF GENERAL JOMINI. . . .16 PROLOGUE 29 CHAPTER I. EARLY LIFE OF NAPOLEON; FROM HIS BIRTH TO HIS APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND THE ARMY OF ITALY. Plan of the Work Napoleon's Birth and Parentage Character and Edu- cation His first Appointment to the Army France before the Revolu- tion Summary of the Events of the Revolution Events of the 17th, 20th, and 23d of June, 1789 Grand Coalition against France Russia and Poland War with Austria The Prussians invade Champagne The Republic proclaimed Retreat of the Prussians Invasion of Bel- giumDeath of Louis XVI. War with Spain, Holland, and England Dumouriez driven from Belgium He treats with the Austrians Com- mittee of Public Safety Sieges of Mayence and Valenciennes Fall of the Girondists, May 31st England heads the Coalition Affairs of Poland The Ottoman Porte Situation of France Energy of the Con- vention Caruot appointed to the Committee of Public Safety Decree for a Iev6e en, masse Revolutionary Government Reign of Terror- Faults of the Allies They are driven from France 'Death of Marie Antoinette Political Results of the Revolution Napoleon appointed Chief-of -battalion His Republican Opinions Siege of Toulon He is made General of Artillery Conquest of Belgium, Holland, and the left bank of the Rhine Naval Battle of Ouessant Insurrection in Poland Fall of Robespierre Peace with Russia and Spain Fate of the Royal Family Napoleon employed at Paris New Insurrections The Quiberon Expedition Constitution of the Year III. Affair of the 13th Vendfimiaire Military Operations of 1795 Napoleon's Marriage to Josephine His Plan for the Invasion of Italy Appointed General- In-chief of the Army of Italy. 31. CHAPTER II. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY; FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE PEACE OF TOLENTINO. Napoleon takes Command of the Army of Italy State of Affairs in Italy Napoleon's Plan of Operations Position and Plan of the Allies Beau- lieu compromises his Left at Genoa His Centre pierced Napoleon attacks the Piedmontese Operations against the Austrians resumed CONTENTS. Double Combat of Dego Operations against Colli Napoleon's Proc- lamation to his Soldiers The King of Sardinia sues for Peace Armis- tice of Cherasco Napoleon marches against Beaulieu-rPassage of the Po at Placentia Armistice with the Dukes of Parma and Modena- Kattle of Fom bio March upon the Adda Bridge of Lodi Napoleon enters Milan The Directory proposes to divide Napoleon's Army; his Resignation His Address to the Army Revolt in Lombardy Defini- tive Peace with Piedmont Position of Beaulieu on the Mincio Pas- sage of the Mincio Difficult Position of Napoleon on the Adige Situ- ation and Policy of Venice Criticisms on Napoleon's Operations- Investment of Mantua Armistice with Naples Demonstrations against the Pope Armistice of Foglino Troubles in the Imperial Fiefs, etc. Occupation of Leghorn Siege of Mantua Austrians en- deavor to save that Place Approach of Wurmser from the Rhine- Battles of Lonato and Castiglione Quasdanowich surprised at Ga- vardo Attack upon Napoleon's Head-quarters Second Battle of Castiglione Second Passage of the Mincio Wurmser's Retreat into the Tyrol Close Alliance between France and Spain Wurmser re- sumes the offensive on the Brenta Objections to this Operation The Armies in Germany Battles of Mori, Roveredo, and Caliano March from Trent to the Gorges of the Brenta Affair of Bassano Wurmser Marches upon Mantua Affairs at San-Georgio Position of the Army about Mantua New Republics formed Political State of the Rest of Italy Discussions with Rome Definitive Peace with Naples Affairs of Piedmont Negotiations with Genoa New Troubles in the Fiefs- Affairs of Corsica The English occupy Porto-Ferrajo They evacuate Corsica Situation of the Armies on the Adige Alvinzi succors Man- tua with a new Army Vaubois thrown back on Rivoli Affair of the Brenta Passage of the Adige at Ronco Battle of Arcole Vaubois driven back from Rivoli Wurmser besieged at Mantua Reverses of the French in Germany Descent upon Ireland Useless Diplomacy- Reinforcements from the Rhine New efforts of Alvinzi to save Wurm- ser Joubert driven back on Rivoli Battle of Rivoli Provera marches on Mantua Close of the Campaign Capitulation of Wurm- ser at Mantua Expedition into Romana. 63. CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA; FROM THE CROSSING OF THE TAGLIAMENTO TO THE PEACE OF CAMPO-FORMIO. Preparations for a new Campaign The Archduke Charles takes Command of the Austrian Army Treaty with the King of Sardinia The Affairs of Venice Troubles with the States of Terrfrflrma Negotiations with Pescaro Armaments of the Senate Napoleon resolves to attack the Archduke before he can unite his Forces Plan of Operations- Passage of the Piave Affair of Tarvis The Archduke is reinforced by the Detachments sent from the Rhine Armistice of Leoben Oper- ations of Joubert In the Tyrol Veronese Vespers Victor suppresses the Insurgents Condition of the two Armies Preliminaries of Leo- CONTENTS, 5 ben Armies of the Rhine Destruction of the Venetian Republic Na- poleon goes to Milan Revolution of Genoa Change of Constitution- Provisional Government appointed The Disorders continue Negotia- tions of Udiha and Passeriano English Affairs Naval Battle of St. Vincent Naval Tactics Mutiny in the British Fleets Negotiations of Lille-Jnternal Affairs of France The eighteenth Fructidor For- eign Negotiations Resignation of Napoleon Cobentzel negotiates on the part of Austria Napoleon and the Directory Peace of Campo- Formio Conditions of this Treaty Its Results Revolution of La Valteline Negotiations with Germany at Rastadt The Passage of the Simplon asked of the Valois The Directory foments a Revolution in Switzerland Proclamation of the Vaudois Invasion of Berne- Helvetic Constitution Neutrality of Switzerland and Faults of the Directory Revolution in Rome Proclamation of the Roman Repub- licNapoleon leaves Rastadt His Reception at Parla General Remarks. 128. CHAPTER IV. EXPEDITION TO EGYPT; MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1798 AND PART OF 1799. Difficulties of Napoleon's Position at Paris Origin of the War In Egypt- State of Hindostan Projects of the Sultan of Mysore, and the Apathy of France State of the English Forces Object of the Expedition into Egypt Napoleon examines the Port of Antwerp The Continent again involved In hostile Preparations Napoleon departs from Toulon Capture of Malta Debarkation at Alexandria March on Cairo- Battle of the Pyramids Entrance into Cairo Naval Battle of Aboukir Results of this Battle Difficulties with the Porte Revolt of Cairo- Expedition into Syria Passage of the Desert, and taking of Jaffa- Resistance of St.-Jean-d'Acre Battle of Mont-Tat>or Continuation of the Siege of St.-Jean-d'Acre Raising of this Siege Return to Cairo- Debarkation and Battle of Aboukir Napoleon decides to return to France. 158. CHAPTER V. CAMPAIGN OF 1799; MILITARY OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, AND ITALY. Situation of Europe in 1798 Exorbitant Demands of , the Directory at Rastadt Russia in Favor of the Empire Negotiations of Prince Rep- nin at Berlin Embarrassments of Prussia Views of Austria Secret Convention between England and Naples Favorable Chances for Austria Alliance between Austria and Russia Policy of the Direc- toryAffairs of Switzerland Treaty of Alliance concluded at Paris The smaller Cantons refuse the Oath of Fidelity Expedition of Schau- CONTENTS. wembourg against Stanz The Grisons call upon the Austrians French Law of Conscription Consequences of tie Defeat at Aboukir and the Declaration of War by the Ottoman Porte Decree for a Levy of two hundred thousand Men Embarrassed State of the Finances- Negotiations drag along through the meddling of Spain State of the Negotiations at Rastadt England Russia Spain Portugal Sweden and Denmark War commenced by the Court of Naples Joubert seizes upon Piedmont and occupies Tuscany Ferdinand flies to Sicily Ohampionnet takes Possession of Naples Erection of the Partheno- peaii Republic The Russians advance toward Italy The Directory takes the Initiative without Preparation Massgna gets Possession of the Grisons The Archduke marches against Jourdan Battle of Stock- ach Reverses in Italy Retreat of the Army behind the Rhine Attack upon our Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt Tardy Enterprise of the Arch- duke Suwarrow in Lomibardy Grand Naval Expedition of Admiral Bruix Macdonald's Army evacuates Naples Suwarrow enters Turin Mass6na driven from the Grisons The Archduke penetrates into Switzerland Massena evacuates Zurich The Archduke paralyzed by Cabinet Orders Macdonald returns upon Modena Suwarrow attacks him .on the Trebia General State of Affairs Dissatisfaction against the Directory Political Operations of SiSyes Address to the Councils The Nomination of Treilhard is annulled Merlin and Larereill&re resign Consternation at the Result of the Battle of Trebia Formation of Clubs Talleyrand is replaced The Directory close the Manege New Plan of Operations proposed Joubert is charged with its Execution He debouches from the Apennines Battle of Nov' Mass6na recaptures the smaller Cantons Project of the Archduke New Plan of the Coalition The Archduke marches on Manheim Plan of Suwarrow Battle of Zurich Korsakof retires to the Rhine Suwarrow passes the St. Gothard and marches on the Muttenthal and Glaris Defeat of the Austrians in this Canton Difficult Retreat of Suwarrow Efforts of Korsakof on Winterthour Movements of the Archduke and Suwarrow Descent of the Anglo-Russians into Hol- land Lecourbe raises the Siege of Philipsbourg Efforts of Champion- net to save Coni. 182. CHAPTER VL CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801; FROM NAPOLEON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT TO THE PEACE OF AMIENS. Napoleon's Return from Egypt Necessity of a Change in the Government Si&yes had long meditated a Change Revolution of the eighteenth Brumalre Project of a Constitution Consular Government Napo- leon proposes Peace Fall of Tippoo-Sae'b Maritime Affairs Conti- nental Armies Plan of Campaign Pius VI. and VII. Project of the Allies on Genoa and Toulon Massfina blockaded in Genoa Napo- leon's Plan of Operations on the Rhine Oarnot Minister of War- Passage of the Alps The French Army arrested by Fort Bard Melas deceived Combat of Chiusella Napoleon marches on Milan Passage at the Tlclno Disposition of Melas Surrender of Genoa Passage or CONTENTS. 1 the Po Battle of Montebello Battle of Marengo Convention of Alex- andria Negotiations of General St. Julien Disapproved by the Cabi- net of Vienna Negotiations for a Naval and Military Armistice Kleber proposes to evacuate Egypt He Is forced to conquer at Heliopolis Important Convention with the United States The Eng- lish quarrel with Neutrals Rupture of the Negotiations of London- Conspiracy of Cerrachi Expeditious against Ferrol and Cadiz Resig- nation of Tihugut from the Ministry Occupation of Tuscany Prepa- rations on the Continent Plan of Operations Brilliant Success of the Army of the Rhine Armistice of Steyer Inaction of Brune Passage of the Splttgen Operations of Brune Junction of the Army of the Orisons Armistice of Treviso Infernal Machine The Neapolitans beaten in Tuscany Expedition of Murat against Naples Armistice of Foligno Peace of Luneville Campaign of 1801 English Expedi- tion against Copenhagen Naval Battle of Copenhagen Armistice with the Danes, and Death of Paul I. English Descent upon Egypt Resignation of Pitt Situation of France Necessity of a new Relig- ious System Best means of accomplishing this Change Chances In favor of the Reformation The Concordat Objections made to It Fault of my Successors Negotiations of London Preliminaries signed Peace with Russia and the Porte Acquisition of Louisiana The Infante of Parma, King of Etruria Expedition to St. Domingo and Guadeloupe Provisional Reunion of Piedmont Affairs of Switzer- land and the Cisalpine Republic Italian Republic The English Lord Cornwallis Envoy to Amiens Debates upon Malta The definitive Peace Its Reception in London and France The Tribunat abolished Consulate for Life The Principles of my Works Solemn Publication of the Concordat Reunion of Piedmont Counter-Revolution in Swit- zerland Friendly Relations with Russia Indemnities in Ger- many. 225. CHAPTER VII. CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804; FROM THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE ESTAB- LISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. Internal Affairs of France New Difficulties with England Mission of Lord Whltworth His Conference with Napoleon Hostile Declaration of George III. Napoleon's violent Language to the English Minister- English Ultimatum rejected Military Occupation of Naples Invasion of Hanover Effect of these Operations on the rest of Europe New Relations with Spain She declares War against England Portugal purchases her Neutrality The English in India^Chances of a Descent into England Preparations for this Descent Plots against the Life of Napoleon The Duke d'Enghein An hereditary and stable Govern- ment necessary to France Establishment of the French Empire- Impossibility of restoring the Bourbons Effects of this Establish- ment of the Empire General State of Europe Difficulty with Russia She refuses to recognize the French Empire It Is recognized by Austria Indecision of the Porte The Pope at Paris Napoleon's pacific Declaration He offers Peace to England Organization of the CONTENTS. Grand Army It prepares to embark Napoleon's Project compared with that of Caesar Concerted Movements of the French Fleets The Fleet of Rochefort The Toulon Squadron The Brest Squadron Nel- son sails for Egypt Villeneuve at the Antilles He returns to Europe- Nelson also returns to England. 301. CHAPTER VIII. CAMPAIGN OF 1805; FROM THE FORMATION OF THE THIRD COALITION TO THE TREATIES OF VIENNA AND PRESBURG. Origin of a new Coalition against France Pitt's Project to reduce her to the Limits of 1792 He negotiates with Russia Napoleon assumes the Iron Crown of Italy Alliance between Russia and England Hesita- tion of Austria Napoleon in Italy His Fortifications am* Camps of Maneuver there His Coronation at Milan Return of the French Fleets to Europe Villeneuve at Ferrol and Cadiz Consequences of his multiplied Faults Austria accedes to the new Coalition Mission of Nowosiltzof First Project of the Allies Their Definitive Plan Their Efforts to induce Germany to join the Coalition The Austrians enter Bavaria The French march from the Coast of the Channel to the Danube Organization of the Grand Army Passage of the Rhine Direction of the French Masses on Donawerth Mack awaits them on the Danube Napoleon turns his Right and falls upon his Rear His Confusion Napoleon Maneuvers to cut him off from Bohemia Mu- rat's Faults Mack attempts to Escape Combat of Haslach Napoleon returns to the Danube Operations of the Austrians They burn the Bridge of Elchingen Ney's Operations Battle of Elchingen Invest- ment of Ulm Ney's Attack Murat pursues Werneck Mack sum- moned to Surrender Ulm Conditional Capitulation Defeat of Wer- neck He Surrenders Surrender of Mack Fate of the Wreck of Mack's Army Russia threatens to join the Coalition Napoleon directs his Forces on the Inn Passage of the Inn, the Salza, and the Traun Re- marks on Napoleon's March on Vienna The Emperor Alexander at Berlin Masse" na's Operations in Italy His Instructions Passage of the Adige, and Battle of Caldiero Retreat of the Archduke Charles- Napoleon at Lintz Propositions for an Armistice Operations of Mu- rat and Davoust Kutusof passes the Danube at Krems Affair of Dirnstein Napoleon approaches Vienna State of that City Murat Captures the Bridge on the Danube Critical Situation of Kutusof Unskillfulness of Murat Combat of Hollabrunn Kutusof effects his Junction Napoleon at Schftnbrunn General Plan of Campaign The French Army at Brunn Operations in the Tyrol New Attempts at Negotiation Movements of the Allies Napoleon's Disposition for their Reception The Allies' Plan of Battle Napoleon's Grand Attack on their Center Soult's Success Check of the Enemy's Left Success at the Center and French Left Napoleon and Soult attack the Ene- my's Left He is cut off from Olmutz and thrown on Hungary Inter- view between Napoleon and the Emperor Francis Remarks on the Battle of Austerlitz Napoleon returns to Vienna Treats with Prussia Also with Austria Operations In Hanover The Dynasty of Naples ceases to Reign Napoleon's Orders to Villeneuve Nelson returns be- fore Cadiz Mutiny of the two Fleets Battle of Trafalgar. 338. CONTENTS. 9 CHAPTER IX. CAMPAIGN OF 1806; FROM THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF PRESBURG TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. Napoleon returns to France Crisis of the Bank Relations with England- Progress of the English Power in India Disastrous Maritime Expedi- tion of the French Continental Means of opposing England Diffi- culty of forming Alliances with the Great Powers System of Feder- ate States Reasons for the successive Additions to the French Empire Death of Pitt Blockade of Ports by a mere British Order In Council New Difficulties with Prussia The Cabinet of Berlin perverts the Treaty of Vienna Motives for this Step Negotiations of Haugwitz A New Treaty Discussion with Austria, for Cattaro and Wurtzburg A Federation substituted in place of the German Empire Napoleon crowns the different Members of his Family Joseph, King of Naples Louis, of Holland Eugene, Heir to the Throne of Lombardy Murat, Grand Duke of Berg Military Operations in Naples Siege of Gaeta Diversion in Calabria Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon as Protector Francis abdicates the Crown of Germany, and is proclaimed Emperor of Austria Sensations at Berlin Prussia entitled to the Presidency of the Confederation Interior State of the French Empire Mechanism of Napoleon's Government The Public Credit restored Conscription regulated Monuments Internal Improvements Mili- tary and Maritime Works State of Prussia Negotiations with Eng- land Treaty signed, but not ratified, with Russia Mission of Sebas- tiani to Constantinople Attack of the English on Buenos Ayres Rup- ture of the Negotiations with England Prussia abruptly decides on War Her extraordinary Ultimatum First Movements of the French Army The Position and Plan of Operations of the Prussians Napo- leon's Plan of Operations Faults of the Prussians Their Generals- Views of the Duke of Brunswick Napoleon cuts off their Communica- tionsHis decisive Maneuver Battle of Jena Battle of Auerstadt Extraordinary Results of these two Victories Combat of Halle- March an Potsdam and Berlin Visit to the Cabinet of the Great Fred- erick Entrance into Berlin Operations of Hohenlohe Fall of Span- rtau Dispositions against Hohenlohe Combat and Capitulation of Prenzlow Fall of Stettin Blticher retires on Mecklenburg Capitula- tion of Custrin Measures for taking possession of the Country be- tween the Rhine and the Qd^r Armistice with the Saxons Bliicher driven to LUbeck Fall of Ltibeck Capitulation of Bllicher Taking of Magdeburg Napoleon nt Berlin The celebrated Berlin Decree- British Orders in Council Armistice with Prussia, not ratified Napo- leon advances to the Vistula Immense Results of this Seven Weeks' War. 407. CHAPTER X. CAMPAIGN OF 1807; FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE RUSSIANS ON THE VISTULA TO THE TREATY OF TILSIT. Condition of the Enemy's Forces Poland Napoleon's Measure for secur- ing his Rear The King of Prussia rejects the Armistice The Russian 10 CONTENTS. Army Invasion of Moldavia Position of the Two Armies Napoleon takes the Offensive Combat of Pultusk Napoleon prepares for Win- ter Quarters Measures for securing hi's Position Continuation of the War between Russia and Turkey Benningsen takes Command of the Russian Army Affairs of Silesia Benningsen attacks Napoleon's Left Movements of the Latter His Project accidentally Discovered by the Russians Soult fights at Bergfried Combat at Landsberg Combat of Liebstadt Battle of Eylau The French Ariny resumes its Winter Quarters Combat of Ostrolenka Embarrassment of Napo- leon's Position Menaces of Spain Austria offers her Intervention for Peace Tihe English threaten Constantinople Passage of the Darda- nelles -Sebastian! rouses the Turks to defend themselves Retreat of the English Napoleon's Firmness Negotiations at the" Camp of Fin- kenstein Negotiations with England broken off by Perceval Treaty of Triple-Alliance at Bartenstein Operations in Pomerania Negotia- tions with Sweden Army of Observation on the Elbe English Expe- dition into Egypt Sieges in Silesia Siege and Fall of Dantzic Re- sumption of Hostilities Danger and Escape of Ney Napoleon Marches to -his Assistance Favorable Changes of Napoleon's Posi- tionBattle of Heilsberg Operations of Benningsen Battle of Fried- land The Russians recross the Niemen They propose Peace Inter- view of the Emperors at Tilsit The Peace Signed Prussia Condi- tions of the Treaty of Tilsit Revolution at Constantinople Projects on Turkey Special Stipulations at Tilsit. 476. CHAPTER XL CAMPAIGN OF 1808; FROM THE TREATY OF TILSIT TO THE INVASION OF PORTUGAL. Results of the Campaigns of 1806 and 1807 Origin of the Continental Sys- tem Its general Plan Its Influence on Commerce^-On Industry This System leads to War Its Influence on State Policy On Maritime Relations Measures requisite for its Execution Mediation offered by Russia to England English Expedition against Denmark Prepara- tions of the Danes for Defense Capture of Copenhagen and the Dan- ish Fleet Brune takes Stralsund and Rugen Russia declares War against the English Intercession of Austria Negotiations respecting Turkey Distribution of New Titles of Nobility Suppression of the Tribunat 538. CHAPTER XLL PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS OF 1807 AND 1808; FROM THE INVASION OF PORTUGAL TO THE TREATY OF EVACUATION. Affairs of Spain Napoleon decides to occupy Portugal Treaty of Fon- tainebleau Junot occupies Portugal Dissensions in the Royal Fam- ilyTalleyrand urges a War with Spain Affairs of Italy Napoleon's Interview with Lucien The Milan Decree Difficulties with the Pope CONTENTS. 11 Napoleon's vast Designs in Italy Projected Transfer of the Holy See to Paris Occupation of Rome Annexation of Tuscany to Franco Difficulties In the Royal Family of Spain The French occupy the Spanish Fortifications Alarm of the Spanish Court The pretended Project of removing it to Mexico Political Explosion In Spain The Revolution of Aranjuez Murat enters Madrid Napoleon's Instruc- tionsInterview with the Spanish Court at Bayonne He resolves to place a New Dynasty on the Throne Objections to Napoleon's Plans His Reasons for adopting them Operations of Murat Insurrection of the Second of May Spanish Junta convoked at Bayonne .Napo- leon's Conduct toward Ferdinand VII. General Insurrection In Spain Moncey driven from Valencia Insurrection In Aragon The Army of Galicia advances on Valladolid Joseph proclaimed King of Spain Dupont capitulates at Baylen Beginning of the Siege of Saragossa Retreat from Madrid Romana flies from Denmark Errors of the Campaign Junot's Position in Portugal General Interests of this Country Sacrifices imposed on the Portuguese General Insurrection in Portugal Landing of Wellington and the English Army Junot evacuates Portugal Military Operations in the North of Europe. 556. CHAPTER XIH. NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN; FROM THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL TO ITS RE-INVASION BY SOULT. French Reverses in Spain Military Preparations of Austria Difficulties and Chances of Napoleon's Position Conference of Erfurth Napoleon goes to Spain Supreme Junta Position of the Spanish Forces Napo- leon at Vittoria Character of the War Plan of Operations Affair of Burgos Defeat of Blake at Espinosa Battle of Tudela Battle of Sommo-SIerra Napoleon enters Madrid The English advance from Portugal Napoleon marches against them Moore retires on Corufia and Romana on Orense Battle of Corufia, and Embarkation of the Eng- lish Lefebvre on the Tagus Victor defeats Infantado at Ucles Oper- ations in Catalonia Salnt-Cyr recaptures Rosas and succors Barce- lonaAffair of Cordedeu Victory of Mollno-del-Rey Victories of Ca- pellados and Walsoh Second Siege of Saragossa Soult sent to Portu- gal Departure of Napoleon for Paris Intrigues of Talleyrand. 602. APPENDIX. THE BONAPARTE FAMILY.. 633 SKETCH OF THE Life and Writings OF QENERAL, JOMINI. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. General Anthony Henry Jomini was born in the small village of Payerne, Canton of Vaud, Switzerland, on the 6th of March, 1779. Ilis family was of Italian origin, but had for several cen- turies resided in the Canton of Vaud. Young Jomini received the usual education of young men of his class in Switzerland, and having a desire to enter the military career, steps were taken to place him in the military school of the Prince of Wiirt- emberg, at Montheliard; that school being transferred to Stuttgart, Jomini, at the age of seventeen, was placed in a bank- ing-house in Paris. Ini 1798 he was appointed aide-de-camp to Keller, who had distinguished himself in the affair of Ostend. Keller having been superseded by Repond, Jomini lost his posi- tion for a time, but was soon afterwards employed by the new appointee, and remained for some time in the employ of the Helvetic minister. After serving in the office of the Secretary of War, with the rank of captain, he wa promoted, in 1799, to the grade of chief of battalion. After the peace of Lune'ville. in 1801, Jomini returned to Paris to seek military employment, but receiving very little en- couragement, he accepted a position in a commercial house. In 1805 Ney gave him a situation on his staff, with the promise of appointing him an aide-de-camp, which promise was nfter- wards redeemed. He served with Ney in fhe campaigns of Ulm. Jena. Eylau, and Spain, and was promoted to the rank of chief of Ney's staff, for services in the field. In these campaigns he acquired a brilliant reputation as a staff officer, and as a strat- 16 SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS egist; but the reputation thus acquired, as is almost invariably the case, created jealousies, and made for the Swiss officer nu- merous enemies, at the head of whom was Berthier, the Major- General and Ohief-of-Staff of the Imperial Army. After the capitulation of Dupont at Baylen. in 1808, Na- poleon determined to direct in person the military operations in Spain, and ordered Ney to join him with the sixth corps d'armee. Colonel Jomini made preparations to accompany Ney in this new field; but the indiscreet admirers of his chief -of -staff had incited the jealousy of the Marshal's wife by reporting that Jomini had planned or advised Ney's most successful operations. This feeling made his position, for a time, anything but agreea- ble; nevertheless he served through the campaign, and was sent by Ney to Napoleon, at Vienna, to explain the Marshal's objec- tions to serve under Soult. After the battle of Wagram, he returned with Napoleon to Paris, where they met Ney. The latter was immediately ordered to return to his command, and Jo- mini was about to accompany him, when he found that Colonel Bechet had been selected by Ney in his place as chief-of-staff, Jomini being assigned to duty in the general staff under Major- General Berthier. Rather than serve under the Prince of Neu chatel, who had always been his enemy, Jomini tendered his resig- nation, intending to enter the service of the Emperor of Russia. But Napoleon refused to accept it, and placed him on special duty, in Paris, to enable him to write his history of the campaigns in Italy. The progress of his investigations, however, was much impeded in 1811, by Colonel Muriel, Chief of the Depot of Archives, who would not permit him to examine any paper with- out a special requisition and order, designating the particular paper to be inspected. Meeting the Emperor one Sunday, Napoleon made inquiries in regard to his progress in writing the history of the Italian campaigns. Jomini explained his embarrassine/nts, and was ordered to report in person the next day. He repaired to the palace at the hour appointed, and met the Mameluke Roustan passing from the apartment of the Empress to that of Napoleon, announcing the birth of the Prince Imperial. Jomini immedi- ately withdrew; but the Emperor sent for him and reprimand- ed him for not keeping his engagement. Jomini excused himself by saying that, under the peculiar circumstances, he had supposed his Majesty would be too much engaged to re- ceive him. Napoleon's reply was characteristic: "Your con- clusion was not logical. If the Empress had continued to suffer, the case would have been different; but as she was safely delivered, the best thing I could do was to let her repose, and OP GENERAL JOMJNI. 17 attend to my own business." At this interview Napoleon spoke of Berthier's dislike to him, and asked the cause of this ill-feeling. Joniini replied that he had done everything possible to conciliate the major-general, even offering to dedicate to him his "Treatise on Grand Operations"; that Berthier consented to accept a simple dedication, but no letter of dedication. "He showed bad taste," said Napoleon; "you would have done better to dedicate it to me; I should have been pleased to accept it." Jourini replied that he could not venture to take such a liberty. When the war of 1812 broke out between France and Russia, Jomini, not wishing to fight against the Emperor Alexander, who had previously offered him a high position in the Russian army, but which Napoleon would not permit him to accept, asked the pacific position of governor of a province, and was assigned to the governorship of Wilna. He was afterwards sent to replace General Barbanegre in the government of Smolensk, and ren- dered most valuable assistance to Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow, especially in the passage of the Beresina, at which place he was ordered to select, in conjunction with General Eble", the points for placing the bridges. He suffered terribly in this retreat, and several times very nearly perished. When almost on the point of death, he met General Guilleminot, the chief-of-staff of the Viceroy of Italy, who presented him to Eugene as an officer at his service. Eugene received him kindly, but with the significant remark: "What, my poor general, can I do with you, when I can do nothing with myself?" On his arrival at Stettin, he received orders to join the Emperor at Paris, to assist in the organization of a new army. General Negre, of the artillery, was the only other officer who received the honor of such an order. Joniini obeyed, but, on his arrival at Paris, his health was such as to confine him for three months to his bed. He rejoined the army on the day of the battle of Lutzen, and was appointed by Napoleon chief of Ney's staff. He reported to the Marshal, at Leipsic, on the 4th of May. The meeting was embarrassing to both, as neither had asked or expected the ap- pointment. But their old relations were soon renewed, and Jomini distinguished himself at the battle of Bautzen, by the judicious advice which he gave to move on the enemy's right instead of the left, an opinion subsequently confirmed by the receipt of orders from the Emperor, which had been miscarried. Ney, grateful for the services of Jomini, recommended his promo- tion to the grade of general of division; but the old hatred of Berthier prevented this and, instead of rewarding him for ser- vices rendered, the Prince of Neuchfttel charged him with incapao- 18 SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS ity and ordered Mm in arrest! This was a little too much for the proud spirit of Jomini, and he resolved to no longer serve under an ungrateful flag. He therefore left the French army, and repaired to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia, and was received into his service. The desertion of Jomini from the service of France caused much comment and discussion. His friends defended this act as perfectly justifiable. They said that, in the first place, not be- ing a Frenchman, or a French subject, he was under no obliga- tions of patriotism to France. He was simply a soldier of fortune, whose offers of service had been accepted, and that this obligation continued only so long as the two parties agreed. The service itself was not obligatory, nor the term of the engagement for life; that there could, from the nature of the case, have been no implied understanding, between the parties, of such a character. They said further, that when General Jomini tendered Ms resignation, and asked to retire from the French service, all obligations on his part ceased, and that subsequently he must be considered as an impressed foreigner, who had a right to desert on the first opportunity. The Emperor having refused to accept his resigna- tion, he remained an unwilling servant, until the ill-treatment of Berthier compelled him, from a sense of self-respect, to desert. That his leaving at the time and in the manner he did was in every respect justifiable, and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, entirely unavoidable. His enemies contended that, having once entered the French service, he had no right to leave it without the consent of the gov- ernment, and that, so long as that consent was refused, he was bound., to continue in service. That his leaving at the time and under the circumstances of the case constituted a real military desertion. Some, moreover, at the time, went so far as to charge him with virtual treason, alleging that he took to the enemy important documentary and parole infornjation. At this distance of time, and after a full examination of the evidence and arguments on both sides, it is not easy to agree entirely with either party. To hold that an officer who volun- tarily enters a foreign service is bound to remain in that service against his will and for life, is very unreasonable. On the con- trary, it is equally unreasonable to contend that he may leave at any moment he pleases ; for instance, to leave the field of battle, and join the ranks of the enemy. If Jomini, after the campaign in Spain, had insisted upon his resignation, and had declined any other voluntary duty in the French service, no one could have blamed him for leaving it on the first favorable opportunity. On the contrary, after Napoleon had refused to accept his resignation. OF GENERAL JOHINI. 19 he continued in the willing performance of the duties of his office. Moreover, he accepted promotion to a higher grade and a most confidential trust. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, if anything can ever justify an act like that of General Jomini, in 1813, it was excused by the refusal of his promotion, so earnestly solicited by Marshal Ney, for gallant and meritori- ous services at the battle of Bautzen, and bydWthier's unjust treatment, and especially by the disgrace of arrest and trial on unfounded charges.), On joining the service of the Allies, the conduct of Jomini was in every respect honorable, and proved that he fully appre- ciated the embarrassments of his position, Wihen asked by tho King of Prussia certain questions in regard to the position and numbers of the French troops, he politely declined to answer. The Emperor of Russia, who was present, justified his refusal, and openly approved his delicate sense of honor in regard to the service which he had just left. The absurd charge that Jomini conveyed to the Allies the plans of the Emperor was forever put to rest by Napoleon him- self, in his "Autographic Memoirs," dictated at St. Helena. In commenting upon tihe "History of the Campaign in Saxony," where this accusation was repeated, he remarked : "The author of this book is wrong in charging General Jomini with having conveyed to the Allies the secret of the operations of the cam- paign, and the situation of Ney's cprps. That officer did nol know the Emperor's plan ; the order of general movement, which was always sent to each of the marshals, was not communicated to him, and he did not know what it was. The Emperor never accused him of the crime which is here imputed to him. He did not desert his flag, like some others. He had great injustice to complain of, and was blinded by an honorable sentiment. He was not a Frenchman, and there was no love of country to retain him." During th-e remainder of the campaign of 1813, General Jomini rendered most valuable service to the Emperor of Russia, by his opinions in regard to military operations. On reaching the banks of the Rhine, he advised against the invasion of France, and in favor of a treaty of peace, honorable to both parties; but Teutonic exaltation at that time would be satisfied with nothing less than the conquest and partition of France. Jomini entered France with the Emperor of Russia, but, on his urgent solicita- tions, was permitted to return to Switzerland, and was of great service to his native country in saving it, through the influence of Russia, from the intended conquest and subjugation of Austria, 20 SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS After the occupation of Paris by the Allies, and the restora- tion of Louis XV1IL, General Jomini repaired) to Vienna in a politico-military capacity, as a Russian officer, and as a represent- ative of his native Canton of Vaud. In these negotiations he greatly exerted himself to secure the liberties of his native coun- try from the rapacity of Austrian diplomacy. It was fortunate for Switzerland at this period that Jomini, and several other distinguished Swiss, held high positions in the Russian army, and in the councils of the Emperor, who used his power and influence to protect their country. In 1815 he returned to Paris, with the Emperor Alexander, where he so warmly opposed the execution of Marshal Ney, that it was proposed to strike his name from the list of Russian gen- erals. This act of the Allies is a lasting disgrace to their char- acter and cause; and the course pursued by Jomini on that occasion constitutes one of the most praiseworthy incidents of his history. After the peace, Jomini accompanied the Emperor to Rus- sia, and was promoted to the rank of a general-in-chief that is, a general eligible to the command of an army a rank next to that of marshal in the Russian service, which no one can there hold who has not gained a battle. Thus, Prince Gortschakoff, notwithstanding his brilliant defense of the Crimea, could not be made a marshal, because he had won no battle. Jomini suc- cessively received the grand crosses of St. Anne, St. Waldimir, and St. Alexander; assisted the Emperor at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818, and at the Congress of Verona, in 1823; was made president of a committee for organiz- ing the Military Academy; and was afterwards charged with preparing plans for fortifying and defending the frontiers of the empire. On the accession of Nicholas to the throne, he received many proofs of the confidence of the new Emperor, was ap- pointed aide-de-camp general, and charged with directing the military education of the imperial heir. His health, much broken by his sufferings on the Beresina, was too delicate to withstand the rigors of the climate of St. Petersburg, and he had permission to spend much of his time in Paris and in the south of Europe. Jomini has two sons and three daughters. His eldest son was aid-de-camp to Marshal Paskewitz, and afterwards left the serv- ice to reside ht Payerne. The second is first Counsellor of State in the Department of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg. His eldest daughter is married in Russia, to a nephew of the Princess Orloff; the second, to a superior officer of the French corps of Engineers; and the third, to a proprietor on the Loire. OF GENERAL JOMINI. 21 NOTICE OF HIS WRITINGS. To the foregoing sketch of JominTs life we will add a brief notice of his published works. After studying the principal authors on the military art, and comparing their views with those developed by the campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon, Jomini made a scientific analysis of the principles which seemed to lie at the foundation of military operations, which resulted, in 1803, in the preparation of a work entitled a "Treatise on Grand Tactics," in which was set forth his views, with abundant illustrations, from the campaigns of Fred- erick and of the French Revolution. On reflection, he decided that such a work would not succeed, and in a fit of dejection he burned the manuscript. Adopting a new plan for the enuncia- tion of his views, he drew up his "Traite des Grandes Opera- tions Militaires" ("Treatise on Grand Military Operations"), the first two volumes of which were published in 1804. The fifth volume, including the wars of the French Revolution, was pub- lished in 1806, before the third and fourth volumes, in order to incite the interest of the readers, by a recital of recent operations. The other volumes were completed in 1810. The second edition was published in Paris, between 1811 and 1816, in eight volumes. A third edition appeared in 1818, in three volumes, the author having suppressed tlie first six campaigns of the Revolution, in order to include them in his "History of the Wars of the Revolu' tion," which he was then preparing. The fourth edition of this work appeared in 1857, in three volumes, with an atlas. This is considered by military critics the most important of all his works, as it embodies the main principles of the military art, with numerous illustrations drawn from the campaigns of the great captains of different ages. All succeeding military writers have borne testimony to the great ability displayed in this work. In 1811 Jomini began the publication of his "Histoire Crit- ique et Militaire des Ouerres de la Revolution" ("Critical and Mili- tary History of the Wars of the Revolution"), in fifteen volumes, with four atlases, containing in all 39 plates. /This was a work of immense labor, and in some respects it formed the basis of most histories of the same period which have followed since its publica- tion/ The analysis of campaigns and battles, and the critical discussion of plans and military operations, render it of great value to military readers. Its character is scientific, rather than literary or historical, and, notwithstanding the great ability 22 displayed in it, with general readers it is not popular. The nar- rative is clear, and the style perspicuous, but the minute details of scientific discussions render it somewhat tedious as an his- torical work. The publication was not completed till 1824. In 1827 Jomini published his "Life of Napoleon," under the title of "Vie Politique et Mililaire de Napoleon, racontee par lui-meme au tribunal de Cesar, d'Alexandre et de Frederic" in four volumes, with an atlas of 36 plates. Although published anonymously, the military character of the work plainly indicated its author. It is said that Jomini originally intended to make it a more com- plete history of the Wars of the Empire, as a continuation of his "History of the Revolution." He was deterred from this by several reasons. In the first place, his position as an old officer of the French army, and as aide-de-camp to the Emperor of Russia, rendered it embarrassing to appear as a public critic of the polit- ical and military acts of Napoleon. At least, these criticisms, whether favorable or unfavorable, would be likely to involve him in controversies. In the second place, he could not then have access to official documents, necessary for a full and elab- orate history of Napoleon's wars. An anonymous publication would enable him to avoid personal controversies, and to exercise more freedom in the discussion of these great political events. The other works of Jomini are his "Tableau Analytique" published an 1830; Ms "Precis de I' Art de la Guerre" published in 1837; and his treatise "Sur la Formation des Troupes pour le Combat" published in 1856. His translations, with valuable notes, of Lloyd and Tempelhoff's "History of the Seven Years' War," and the Archduke Charles' "Principles of Strategy," are standard works among military readers^ In addition to these works, Jomini has published a number of pamphlets on polemical subjects, and reviews of the military and historical writings of hi contemporaries. In all of these minor publications, he has exhibited great military knowledge, as well as accurate military criticism. As a military historian, Jomini has no equal; at least, not among the writers who preceded him. And the best of those who have followed him do not hesitate to acknowledge him as their model and prototype, ^he commentaries of Caesar are of no great military valuej for the art of war was then in its infancy, and strategy was very little understood, even by those who are now looked back upon as good generals. In military operations, as in everything else, strong common sense pointed out the same plans of operation as would have been decided upon after the most elaborate scien- OF GENERAL JOMINI. 23 tific discussion. Science testa and approves what genius origi- nates and suggests. The old military historians, Josephus, Herodotus, Thucyd- ides, Polybius, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Plutarch, Arrian, Maeh- iavelli, Montluc, Brantdme, Rohan, Montecuculli, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Conde", Feuquieres, Santa Cruz, Puysegur, and Frederick, described the events of the wars without under- standing or attempting to point out- the strategic relations of the several movements of the contending armies. Even Guibert, Meiiil-Durand, Lloyd, Tempelhoff, Warnery, La Roche Aymon, Billow, and Dumas discussed the military operations which they described in their relation to tactical movements rather than strategic combinations. The dictations of Napoleon at St. Helena, chefs-d'oeuvre in their way, are mere fragmentary discussions of historical events, grand in conception, but imperfect in execution. They are valuable studies for experienced generals, but not easily un- derstood by military students, and a mere dead letter to common readers. Napoleon, in criticising Jomini's works, spoke of him in the most complimentary terms; and Jomini, in writing of Napoleon, always held him up as a model of a greait captain. On questions of military science they were fully agreed. While Jomini stated his military problems in scientific language, Napo- leon solved them by practical experience. Since the earlier writings of Jomini first appeared, a very large number of military works have been published, some of them technical books of professional instruction, and others of an historical character. In the first class we may mention Xylander, Wagner, Decker, Hoyer, Valentini, the Archduke Charles, Miiller, Bismarck, Bou- tourlin, Okouneff, Clausewitz, Muffling, Rogniat, Gay de" Vernon, Jacquinot de Presle, Rocquancourt, Ternay, Dufour, Augoyat, Bardin, Chambray, Bugeaud, Lallemand, Barre Duparcq, Fallot, Paixhans, Chassaloup, Jacobi, Piobert, Soharnhorst, Thiroux, Choumara, Birago, Bousmard, Carnot, Douglas, Haillot, Carrion- Nisas, Ravichio de Peretsdorf, Macaulay, Noizet, Jebb, Laisne", Zastrow, Mahan, Saint-Paul, Mangin, Maurice de Sellon, etc. In the second class may be mentioned Dumas, Soult, Suchet, Saint-Cyr, Beauvais, Pelet, Koch, Vaudoncourt, Foy, Napier, Regnier, Marmont, Lamarque, Bellune, Charras, Thiers, Belmas, Kausler, Chambray, Savary, Se"gur, Fain, Siborne, Jones, etc. Nearly all recent military writers and historians have dis- cussed or criticised the theories and principles set forth in the 24 SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS works of Jomini. It must not, however, be inferred that all, or even a majority of these writers, clearly understood the ques- tions which they discussed, or the principals of the art which they criticised. Again, Jomini has experienced in his political career much of the fickleness of popular opinion and popular judgment. In his native country he was, at one time, the object of unmeasured abuse, and, at another, of unbounded praise. In France, for some years after he went over to the Russian service, his name was only mentioned with contempt. Afterwards, he was 1 not only honored by the French government, but courted by the literary and military savants of the French metropolis; and the French army, proud of his record of its glorious achievements, claim him as having belonged to its ranks. Few men of this century have a more wide-spread or well- earned reputation. His works are read and admired by the sol- diers of every country on the continent of Europe, and probably no other author is as much read and studied in the British and American armies. General Jomini is now about eighty-four years of age, but appears much younger than he really is. At least, such was his condition when the translator saw him in Paris, two or three years since. We will close this biographical sketch of the Life and Writ- ings of General Jomini with a characteristic anecdote, which will serve to show his remarkable knowledge of military strat- egy, or what the French call strategic intuition. Having been summoned to the imperial head-quarters, at Mayence, at the be- ginning of the campaign of Jena, Napoleon said to him : "I am delighted that the first work which demonstrates the true prin- ciples of war has appeared in my reign. No work like yours is taught in our military schools. We are going to fight the Prus- sians. I have called you near me, because you have written on the campaigns of Frederick the Great, because you know nis army, and have studied the theatre of the war." Jomini asked for four days to get his horses and equipages from the head- quarters of Marshal Ney, and added that he would join his Maj- esty at Bamberg. "Why at Bamberg?" said the Emperor. "Who told you that I am going to Bam'berg?" "The map of Germany, sire." "There are a hundred roads on that map," said Napoleon. "Yes, sire; but it is probable that your Majesty will make against the left of the Prussians the same maneuver which was made at Donawerth against the right of Mack, and by St. Bernard against the right of Melas." "Very well," said Napo- OF GENERAL JOMINI. 25 leon; "go to Bamberg, but don't say a word about it; no one should know that I am going to Bamberg." The foregoing biographical and bibliographical sketch is compiled from Major Leoomte'a "Life and Writings of General Jomini," Le Spectateur Militaire, Liv. 12fi, December 15th, 1861, and biographical dictionaries. OF NAPOLBON PROLOGUE. Long had the Elysian Fields resounded with the memorable events which marked the beginning of the nineteenth century. The shades of Pitt and Thugut, of K16ber, Moreau, Nelson, Lannes, and the many other heroes slain in battle, had already carried there a thousand different versions of the combinations to which were attributed so many victories and so many defeats. The illustrious inhabitants of these mysterious regions were waiting, with impatience, the arrival of the extraordinary man who had been the principal mover in these events, and who alone could explain them. Already the news of his exile to St. Helena, and of the bar- barous treatment he received there, gives warning of his ap- proaching end. Already homicidal Fate seizes her scissors * * *, inexorable Atropos cannot suffer so noble a victim to escape. Finally, the fifth of May, 1821, the clear sky of Elys- ium is suddenly covered with clouds; the angry waves of Ache- ron, lashed by the unchained winds, give notice of some extraor- dinary apparition. All, with a common sentiment of interest and curiosity, hasten to the shore. Soon the skiff of the sad and silent Charon is seen approaching; it carries the shade of Napoleon the * * * All press forward to see him; Alex- ander, Caesar, Frederick, are in the first rank, and they alone have the right of interrogating him. To the usual felicitations succeed the most weighty questions. Alexander, who from the 30 PROLOGUE. mountains of Macedonia penetrated into India and returned victorious, is astonishd at the retreat from Moscow, and seeks to know the cause. Caesar, who died invincible, asks an explana- tion of the disasters of Leipsic and Waterloo. Frederick, so great in reverses, and so measured in his enterprises, wishes an explanation of the prompt destruction of his monarchy, and of its brilliant resurrection in 1813. Surrounded by this noble Areopagus, Napoleon replies as follows: CHAPTER I. FROM THE BIRTH OP NAPOLEON TO HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF ITALY. Plan of the Work Napoleon's Birth and Parentage Character and Edu- cationHis first Appointment to the Army France before the Revolu- tion Summary of the Events of the Revolution Events of the 17th, 20th, and 23d of June, 1789 Grand Coalition against France Russia and Poland War with Austria The Prussians invade Champagne The Republic proclaimed Retreat of the Prussians Invasion of Bel- giumDeath of Louis XVI. War with Spain, Holland, and England Dumourlez driven from Belgium He treats with the Austrian* Com- mittee of Public Safety- Sieges of May.ence and Valenciennes Fail of the Girondists, May 31st England heads the Coalition Affairs of Poland The Ottoman Porte Situation of France Energy of the Con- vention Ca mot appointed to the Committee of Public Safety Decree for a levee en masse Revolutionary Government Reign of Terror- Faults of the Allies They are driven from France -Death of Marie Antoinette Political Results of the Revolution Napoleon appointed Chief -of -battalion His Republican Opinions Siege of Toulon He Is made General of Artillery Conquest of Belgium, Holland, and the left Bank of the Rhine Naval Battle of Oueseant Insurrection in Poland Fall of Robespierre Peace with Russia and Spain Fate of the Royal Family Napoleon employed at ParisNew Insurrections The Qulberon Expedition Constitution of the Year III. Affair of the 13th Vendemlalre Military Operation* of 1795 Napoleon's Marriage to Josephlner-His Plan for the Invasion of Italy Appointed General- In-ch1ef of the Army of Italy. PLAN OF THE WORK. I will not attempt a complete pict- ure of the important -and complicated events of my reign; this im- mense work cannot probably be undertaken till after the great personages who took part, either for or against me, have pub- lis-hed their memoirs, developed their views, and explained their actions; it must, therefore, be left to posterity, to some faithful disciple of the severe Clio. But I will now give an oat- line of my most prominent actions, of my political views, of my military combinations, in a word, present myself such as I really 82 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. was. From this it may be seen how much I have been disfigured by the passions and party spirit of my contemporaries.* NAPOLEON'S BIRTH, ETC. I was born on the 15th of Au- gust, 1769, at Ajaccio, in Corsica; my parents were noble, fortui- tous circumstance, to which I attach no importance. "A captain who renders his country illustrious, and by his own merit rebuilds the throne of Charlemagne, has no need of noble ancestry." The patrician family from which I sprung included in its number the Gonfalonier Buonaparte of St. Nicholas, who governed the Republic of Florence towards the middle of the thirteenth century. CHARACTER AND EDUCATION. My career has been so astonishing that my admirers have thought to find something ex- traordinary even in my infancy. They are mistaken. My early life indicated nothing at all remarkable. At ten years of age I was admitted to the school at Brienne, and afterwards to that of Paris. My early education was what is usually given in the mili- tary schools of France.f I succeeded in whatever I undertook, because I wished to do so. My will was strong, and my character decided; this has given me an advantage over all others. The nature of the will depends upon the genius of the individual; it is not every one that can be master of himself. If there has sometimes been an appearance of irresolution in my actions, it did not proceed from any indecision of character, but it was because my strong imag- ination presented to me, with the rapidity of lightning, all the various phases of the subject. At school I applied myself to studies that I thought might be most useful to me, particularly to history and mathematics; the former develops genius, and the latter regulates its action. >My intellectual faculties ex- panded without much effort; my conception was quick and lively, my memory strong, my judgment cool and decided. I thought quicker than others, so that I had always time for reflection. In this consisted my depth. My mind was too active to be amused with the ordinary diversions of youth. But I did not, as some have asserted, entirely avoid these juvenile recre- ations, though I generally found something else to interest me. *The author here acknowledges that he has copied several pages from the pretended manuscript from St. Helena. It is no plagiarism, but an avowed Imitation of the original. /fit is worthy of remark that Wellington, who was born in the same year with Napoleon, received his radll-tary education at the military school of Angers In France, about (the same thne that Napoleon was a pupil at Paris/ HI8 EARLY BISTORT. 83 This disposition often left me to the solitude of my own thoughts, and at length grew into a habit, which continued through all the vicissitudes of my life. FIRST APPOINTMENT TO THE ARMY. Being destined to the military service, I received the commission of lieutenant of artillery four years before the Revolution. I have never received any title with so much interest as I did this. It was then the height of my ambition to wear, at some future day, two epau- lettes a bouillons, and a general of artillery appeared to me the ne plus ultra of human greatness. But if I was not ambitious of power, I was already avaricious of renown; for I conceived the idea of writing a history of the war sustained by Corsica for her independence. I proposed this to Paoli, asking him for the necessary information. Probably a historian of eighteen years of age did not inspire him with much confidence, and he paid no attention to the proposition. My mortification at this result was soon indemnified by my promotion to the captaincy of a company. This was in 1789. When the Revolution broke out, my sphere of action seemed to enlarge. It would be superfluous to speak here of the impression first made on me by this great catastrophe; but for the better understanding of the course I afterwards pursued, it may not be amiss to give a simple sum- mary of the events which preceded my promotion to the com- mand of the army of Italy. FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. No reign ever commenced under 'such happy auspices as that of the virtuous Louis XVI. Ten years after the ridiculous war of 1756-63, France, by means of her alliances with Austria, Piedmont, Naples, and Spain, held the balance of power on the Continent, entirely con- trolled the Mediterranean, and disputed with the English the su- premacy of the ocean. And everything seemed to promise that, profiting by these close alliances with the half of Europe, she would soon obtain the first rank upon the seas. Her only rival here was England. The alarm has been sounded throughout Europe against my ambition; but my relative power was never so for- midable as tfaat of Louis XVI. I occupied more territory, it is true, but this occupation was a hostile one, since it was con- tested by the half of Europe, and even by 'a part of the people I had conquered; whereas, under Louis XVI., these same people were voluntarily the allies of France. COUP D'OEIL OF THE REVOLUTION. The glorious war iii America was the first result of this happy position of France; and most probably we should have broken the maritime sceptre of 34 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. England, had it not been for the imskillf illness of our octogenarian prime-minister (Maurepas), who knew better how to make puns and madrigals on naval battles than to direct affairs of state. But, in spite of our faults, England lost her fine American provinces, and was on the point of also losing the Antilles. Unfortunately, this war produced results which no one could an- ticipate. It occasioned debts, and to pay these, it was necessary to include as taxable property the immense wealth of the no- bksse and clergy. The ministry dared to advise this, but the clergy and nobility refused to submit Thus, by their own ego- tism, these noted defenders of the altar and the throne sapped the foundation of that throne for which they pretended so much devotion. M. Vergennes died at this time, and his successors permitted the English party to get the better of us in Holland, and lost all the advantages of our connection with Austria, by rejecting the projects of Joseph EL, and inducing him to form an alliance with Russia. These two errors destroyed all the influence which we had acquired in Europe, through the policy of Choiseul, and the feeble ministry made itself despicable both at home and abroad. The financial embarrassments growing worse, it was thought necessary to have recourse to the States- general Here were opposed the aristocratic classes, who were blinded by their privileges, and a tiers-etat who asked the aboli- tion, or at least a modification, of these privileges. From the clash of these interests, which ought to have been avoided, sprung the Revolution. Feudal rights could not be sustained against a tiers-etat as rich and enlightened as that of France, at the close of the eighteenth century. For twenty years the Revolution had existed in all minds; in the magistracy, in the nobility, in the army; even in the court itself. The government had become the target for all wounded vanities and petty am- bitions; some opposed to it the aristocratic pride of the Fronde; others, the democratic pretensions of the Niveleurs. But had it been in wise and able hands, this effervescence of heads could never have effected a revolution. The political horizon of France was covered with inflammable materials, which should have been carefully guarded from the slightest incendiary spark; govern- ment, on the contrary, itself applied the match. It brought together the opposing parties, and provoked them to a contest. It mortified the noblesse, irritated the people, disputed with the magistrates, humiliated the army, and, to cap the climax of folly, ordered the troops to allow themselves to be maltreated by the populace! When great public interests are at stake, and a revolution HIS EARLY HISTORY. 85 becomes inevitable, a skillful chief should place himself at its head, sacrifice his own life, rather than suffer it to pass certain limits. Revolutions spring from opinions of interests. When interests founded on justice and reason axe properly satisfied, opinions become calm of themselves (if we except religious opinions). But such were not the measures pursued by the min- istry of Louis XVL Opposed by the magistrates and the no- bility, it fell into tihe hands of Necker, who, to form a party for himself, doubled the representative power of the tiers-etat. This measure was a good one, but the mode of executing it dangerous. The court divided itself into two parties, forming two govern- ments; the one for Necker and reform, and the other opposing both. States-general, assembled with the duplication of the tiers-etat, and vote per capita in a single assembly, could not fail to produce the most fatal results. DECISIVE EVENTS OF JUNE 17, 20, AND 23, 1789. The three orders were to vote separately; the tiers-etat insisted upon their all voting together and by head, because, being now the most numerous body, this would give them a decided advan- tage over the others. The noblesse and clergy refused, the tiers- etat constituted themselves, on the seventeenth of June, the National Assembly. Their place of sitting was closed against them on the twentieth; they assembled in the Jeu-de-Paume, or Tennis Court, and took an oath not to separate until they had given a constitution to France. This was the turning-point of the Revolution. The King should have dissolved this body, which had now constituted itself the government, in violation of all the laws of the kingdom. If anything could have prevented the Revolution, it was tMs measure, executed with firmness, and accompanied with just and necessary reforms. His design was a good one, but he had not the courage to execute it. On the twenty-third, Louis XVI. goes in person to the A sembly, declares it illegal, and, while making some concessions, orders the deputies to dissolve. The King withdraws, but the deputies do not obey him. The grand-master of ceremonies summons them to leave the chamber. Mirabeau declares that they will leave only when driven out at the point of the bayonet. Instead of forcing obedience, the King permits them to remain, and even orders the clergy and nobility to join them. To Necker, who advised this measure, must be attributed all the evils result- ing from it. Many absurd things have been said about the iriftn- ence of "philosophers and philosophy" in producing the Revolu- tion. If Louis XVI. had taken Mirabeau at his word, it is prob- able that the States-general had gone home, like their prede- 86 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. cessors, and all the Yoltaires in the world could not have changed the face of France. But the Revolution was consum- mated the moment the throne trusted itseslf in the hands of an Assembly ruled by ambitious demagogues. Mirabeau, Sieyes, and the leaders of the Assembly, escaping the punishment due to state criminals, had only to demolish, stone after stone, the monarchical edifice; for them there was no retreat; they must conquer or die, and they conquered the more easily, as they un- dertook everything in the name of the government whose author- ity they had usurped, and by the hands of a mob which they had armed in all the forms of legality. Too much importance has been attributed, by those who mistake the effect for the cause, to the action of the people in this Revolution. A revolution is soon consummated; it continues but a few days. The mass of the people gradually adopt its measures in proportion as the factions are crowned with success, and menaces from abroad render desperate the situation of the insurrectionary leaders, and force them to unchain the furies of demagogism. // / had been a minister of Louis XVI., the Revolu- tion would have terminated on the twenty-third of June, 1789. With the same hand that overthrew the enemies of the throne, I would have restored right and justice to the nation. Victorious in the events of the seventeenth and the twenty- third of June, the chiefs of the tiers-etat had little difficulty in effect- ing the victory of July fourteenth. They were supported by a powerful army of National Guards, and, in a short time, by the troops of the line. Thus far, no great evil had been produced; on the contrary, the substitution of a national government, in the place of a system of court-favoritism, might have effected much good. But, unfortunately, the popular leaders now at- tempted to consolidate their own power, by reducing the royal authority to a mere shadow. This was the great fault which overthrew the state-edifice. There was more reason in attack- ing the prerogatives of the clergy and noblesse. The classes resisted, but were overthrown by the mass of the people; in this struggle they lost much that really belonged to them, but in- stead of trusting to time for a restoration of just rights, they imprudently called in foreign aid, arid thus denationalized their cause. It being rumored that the Court was collecting some of its faithful regiments at Versailles, the revolutionary leaders, fear- ing that the King might escape their power, determined to re- move him to Paris, and place him in a situation dependent on the populace. To secure this object, the insurrections of the fifth HIS EARLY HISTORY. 37 and sixth of October were incited. Lafayette, at the head of 20,000 National Guards, repaired to Versailles, and the dis- graceful excesses committed in the palace cast a stigma upon the character of the Revolution. The King was escorted from Versailles to the Tuileries, by Lafaytte, who was there directed to guard his person; for the French guards belonged to the fac- tions, and the body-guards were discharged, so that his guard was reduced to a single regiment of Swiss. The members of the Assembly, for the better attainment of their object, forbade any interference of the crown in the discus- sions upon the constitution, limiting it to the simple power of Veto. This unfortunate word was borrowed from the Polish Diets, and it is astonishing that the legislators of France had derived so little wisdom from the lessons of history. The Veto power was different in the two cases, but it led to the same result the subjugation of the crown to the tyranny of factions. During all these discussions, the good King, Louis XVI., remained at the Tuileries, a passive spectator of events more like a criminal than a sovereign. Persuaded by the solicitations of the emigres to join the foreign coalition, he fled from Paris, in April, 1791; but, with his queen and children, was arrested at Var- ennes; Bouille' offered to rescue him, but the vacillating mon- arch preferred being led back captive to Paris; he returned to the Tuileries a prisoner, his royal authority being previously suspended. His departure was an error, and his return a calamity. Having taken the first false step, the Assembly continued to wander further and further from the path of wise legislation. It formed the Jacobin clubs, and allowed their continuance after they were evidently dangerous to public tranquillity. When these took the helm of government, the throne was lost With great disinterestedness, the Assembly declared its members inel- igible to a reelection. This abnegation was worthy of Spartans, but was the height of folly. If eight hundred of the most influ- ential men of France were disfranchised from exercising all public functions, their successors could be found only in the low- est ranks. Against the formal attacks of the new Legislative Assembly upon the throne were arrayed the coalition and Coblentz; the one to maintain the throne, and the other to profit by its ruin. France was invaded. The revolutionary leaders responded by the cry of vengeance and death. GRAND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE. The origin of the grand coalition against France is still somewhat doubtful, though it is supposed to have begun in the conferences of the Em- 38 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. peror Leopold and the Count d'Artois, at Mantua. At first it was thought best to resort to an intervention of the princes allied to the royal family; that is, of Spain, Sardinia, and Austria. The Em- peror Leopold proposed a Congress of Nations; but the Assem- bly, influenced by patriotic pride, or perhaps yielding to a mere temporary effervescence, declared any Frenchman, who should consent to submit the laws of France to the decision of a foreign Congress, to be a traitor to his country. It was afterwards pro- posed to place Gustavus III., King of Sweden, at the head of the coalition, because, having received assistance from Louis XV. to rescue him from the usurped power of the Senate of Stockholm, he would be the most suitable person to render the same disinterested service to Louis XVI. But Gustavus having been assassinated, Frederick William of Prussia, for some un- accountable reason, was. placed at the head of the league. It would be difficult to explain why this monarch should wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France. England, of course, was enchanted at the embarrassment of her neighbor, for the greater the internal jMfficulties of France, the greater the ad- vantages which she could derive from them. Russia, also, re- joiced at this state of affairs, for it left her at liberty to pursue her aggrandizements in other quarters. She expressed a lively interest in the success of the league, but took good care not to appear in the affairs of the west till she had consummated the partition in Poland. RUSSIA AND POLAND. Towards that partition Catharine* now directed all her policy. The reformers in Poland acted upon principles the reverse of those in Paris. Instead of weaken- ing the power of the throne, which was proclaimed, on the third of May, 1791, hereditary in the House of Saxony, they endeav- ored to give it that importance which alone could effect its pres- ervation. Those very powers who opposed France for weak- ening the influence of the crown attacked Poland for endeavor- ing to increase it ; a contradiction that proves interest to have been the basis of all their actions. Some of the factious nobility, 'Catharine II.. Empress of Russia, was born at Stettin, in 1729. Her father was a Russian field-marshal. She was married in 1745, to Peter, the nephew of the Empress Elizabeth, whose successor he became in 1701. Peter III. soon (became estranged from his was then com- paratively simple; for the young men of fashion, whom he used to radl at so loudly, at that time wore their 'hair very long. He was very careless of his personal appearance, and his hair, which was ill-combed and ill-pow- dered, gave him the look of a sloven. His little hands, too, underwent a great metamorphosis. When I first saw him, they were thin, long, and dark; but he was subsequently vain of theJr beauty, and with good reason. In short, when I recollect Napoleon at the commencement of 1794, with a shabby round hat drawn over his forehead, and his Ill-powdered hair hang- ing over the collar of his gray great-coat, which afterwards became as celebrated as the white plume of Henry IV., without gloves, because 'he used to say they were a useless luxury, with boots ill-made and ill-blacked 68 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. MILITARY OPERATIONS OP 1795. This detention vexed me the more as our forces were experiencing reverses on the Rhine, through the incapacity or treason of Pichegru. The excesses of the Revolution had disgusted the conqueror of Holland, and he now entered into a correspondence with the emigres. He had been intrusted by the Committee with the supreme command. Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, and, advancing to the Mayne, laid siege to Mayence; Pichegru, who commanded ten divisions on the upper Rhine, crossed at Manheim with only two of these divisions, and advanced to Heidelberg, between the two Austrian armies of Wunnser and Clairfayt; they were de- feated and driven back upon Manheim, quite fortunate in not being taken prisoners. Clairfayt, being thus enabled to unite considerable forces, turned the left flank of the Jourdan, and forced him to repass the Rhine at Neuweid. The Austrians afterwards debouched from Mayence against the other three divisions, form- ing the left of Pichegru, forced their entrenchments, and drove them back upon the lines of Weissembourg. Jourdan had no other alternative than to fall back upon the Handsruck and form a junction with the army of the Rhine; but this had already retreated to Landau. It was thought that these faulty opera- tions of this army were due to treason, rather than the want of capacity in its general; perhaps both of these causes existed. In Italy our arms were more fortunate; there Scherer, at the head of a portion of the conquerors of the Pyrenees, executed the project which I had drawn up at Paris, in the bureau of military operations. The result was a signal victory at Loano, which put us in possession of the line of the Apennines as far as Savona, and of the sources of the Bormida; but our generals with his thinness and sallow complexion in fine, when I recollect him at that time, and think what he was afterwards, I do not recognize the same man in the two pictures." Much ridiculous nonsense has been written about Napoleon's destitute condition at this period of his life. There is not the slightest probability that he encountered any more inconvenience for the want of money than most young men without fortunes. Besides other small resources, he had the pay of a brigadier-general, which, notwithstanding the depreciation of the currency, mrust have been sufficient for a man of his prudent habits and simple tastes. We know that at this time he voluntarily supported bis brother L/outo, and paid his expenses at a provincial military school. Alison says, "that so low were the fortunes of the future Emperor, at this period, that he was frequently indebted to his friends for a meal, which "he could not afford to purchase himself." But on the very next page this historian says, "Above a hundred families, during the dreadful famine which fol- lowed the suppression of the revolt of the Sections, In the winter of 1795-6, were saved from death by his beneficence." HIS EARL7 BISTORT. 59 knew not how to profit by this successs. The new Directory had just been installed. To the necessity of having some member capable of directing military operations, Carnot* owed his re- appointment. Barrasf was elected by intrigue, and RewbelJ by would-be politicians; the other members were chosen at random. It is a little surprising that Sieyes, the author of this new system, should have been passed over in silence. NAPOLEON'S MARRIAGE TO JOSEPHINE. I was im- patient to see the new government organized so that I could be spared from Paris. While waiting here in inactivity, I became acquainted with the widow Beauharnais and married her. Many absurd stories have been told about my first acquaintance with Jo- sephine; the facts are these: After the disarming of the Sections, she sent her son Eugene, then fifteen years of age, to reclaim the sword of General Beauharnais. This interesting youth shed tears on receiving from my hand the sword of his unfortunate father; the scene affected me, and I went to speak of it to his *Carnot was born in Burgundy In 1753. Early exhibiting an uncom- mon taste for mathematics and military sciemce, he was appointed an officer of engineers. In 1791 he was appointed deputy to the Constituent Assembly. While a member of the Directory, he turned his attention wholly to military affairs, and, in the words of Napoleon, "orgaoJized vic- tory." Barras afterwards succeeded in effecting his overthrow and ban- ishment. He was recalled by Napoleon after the eighteenth Brumaire, . and made, for a time, Minister of War. He was a firm Republican, and both spoke and voted against Napoleon's elevation to power, tout being honest and consistent in his course, his conduct gave no offense. Napoleon did not estimate his talents as high as some others, but he had the highest regard for his character, and on various occasions assigned to him very important duties. In 1815 he was made a Count of the Empire, and a peer. He died in 1823. He left several scientific and professional works wliich have some merit. Thiers; Napoleon's "Memoirs." fBarras was born in Provence, In 1755. He was of a noble family. He entered the army at the age of twenty, and served in India. He spent his estate in dissipation, and in the Revolution became the most violent of demagogues. As Director, he was guilty of everything that was base and cruel. After the elevation of Napoleon, by the affair of eighteenth Bru- maire, he retired to his estate, and lived In obscurity; he died in 1829. En- cyclopedia Americana. JRewbel was born at Colmar, in 1746. He was a lawyer of eminence, and a man of honesty and Integrity. His talents as a politician were not great, tout he proved himself a useful member of the Directory. Thiera; Napoleon's "Memoirs." These were I>ar6veillere and Letourneur. The former was a native of Angers, and the latter of Normandy. Both are described toy Thiers and Napoleon as honest, well-meaning men, but of ordinary capacrty. Letour- neur was an officer of engineers. 80 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. mother; and became fascinated by the attracting graces which all Acknowledged that she possessed.* PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ITALY. I had occasion to see Carnot and speak with him about my old project on Pied- mont, which had been rejected in 1794, and also of the plan of in- vading Italy, which I had drawn up for Scherer. In examining the merits of these projects Carnot had an opportunity to judge of the character of their author. Being exceedingly anxious to ob- tain the command of an active army, I used every effort to gain the confidence of the government. I laid before the Directors and ministers the following summary of our foreign relations and the effects to be produced by my projected Italian campaign: Austria, England, the German Empire, Sardinia, Russia, the King of Naples, and the Pope were all leagued against us. Prus- sia and Spain had treated some months before at Bale, but their position was equivocal, and their present strict neutrality might be of short duration. Sweden and Denmark had rejected the pretensions of the cabinet of London, and maintained with much energy the true principles of maritime law. The definitive par- tition of Poland had blotted it from the book of nations. The Ottoman Port took no part in Europen affairs. Portugal, the tributary of England, had at first joined in the expedition of Toulon and the war with Spain in the Pyrenees, but since the treaty of Bale she had sought to withdraw from a coalition where she could gain nothing but defeats. Our superb colony of Saint Domingo was in a blaze, Martinique had fallen into the hands *AHson, to whose distorted vision no act of Napoleon can appear otherwise than criminal, represents his marriage to Josephine to have been founded upon motives of ambition. The charge is so grossly false, and, from the circumstances of the case, so perfectly absurd, as to be hardly worth refuting. No one, unless animated by feelings of the strongest ani- mosity and violent prejudice, could ever think of repeating It. If ever there was a marriage made from pure feelings of love and affection, unin- fluenced on either side by considerations of wealth or ambition, it was the union of Napoleon and Josephine. Alison here repeats indirectly a slander first found in the British and Bourbon presses of the lamest character, and afterwards promoted to a place in the no less abusive writings of Scott and Lockhart. The substance of these slanders is, that Barras, with his usual volatility, became tired of his mistress, and embraced an opportunity of disposing of her in marriage to Bonaparte. The latter, to secure the Influ- ence of Barras, consented to the arrangement, and received the command of the army of Italy as the dowry of the bride! Such stories repeated at this time do far more injury to their authors than to the memories of Napoleon and Josephine. It may be worthy of remark in this place, that at the time of Napoleon's marriage Barras was the enemy, rather than the friend, of Bonaparte. (Yide the proofs in Notes to Lee's "Napoleon") HIS EARLY HISTORY. 61 of the English; our maritime force had been destroyed by the battle of Ouessant, the loss of Toulon, emigration, and the troubles of La Vender. In India we had lost Pondicherry, our last hold in the East; and we had only our old ally, Tippoo-Saib, Sultan of Mysore, the formidable adversary of the English power. We had on our hands, at the same time, a continental and a maritime war. Perhaps Austria, satisfied with the valu- able acquisitions which she had made in Poland, might soon have followed the example of Russia and made peace with us, had not matter foreign from the original cause of dispute been introduced. A great state is always unwilling to relinquish any of its provinces. The recent vote of the Convention for a definitive reunion of Belgium and France, and the ill-success of Pichegru, both combined to render the Cabinet of Vienna less disposed for peace. The state of our affairs on the Rhine was not such as to authorize us to hope for decisive victories in that direction; nor would a war in the German Empire be likely to force Austria to yield to our terms. The most direct means, therefore, of reach- ing that power was through the states of Lombardy. Under such circumstances the invasion of Italy would be the preferable military operation; especially as it would enable us to humble the smaller princes of Italy who had leagued against us, and would at the same time relieve the Court of Turin, which seemed inclined to treat with us for a separate peace, from the dictation of Austria. APPOINTED GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF ITALY. This very simple plan was approved by the Directory, and I was charged with its execution, with the rank of General-in- Chief of the Army of Italy. It was arranged that I should man- euver by my right to descend by Montferrat upon Lombardy, and direct all my efforts against the Austrians, in order to detach Pied- mont from their alliance. The armies of Germany, being reorgan- ized, were to resume the offensive by the end of April, and to at- tempt the passage of the Rhine. Jourdan commanded seventy thousand men on the Lower Rhine, and Moreau about the same number in Alsace; the former was to invest Mayence, with thirty thousand men, and advance into Franconia with the other forty thousand; the latter was to cover Manheim and penetrate into Swabia. These forces were afterwards to unite in the heart of Bavaria. In the meantime I was to detach Piedmont from the coalition, or to dethrone the King of Sardinia, should he refuse to make peace, and then to advance upon the Adige. In fine, the instructions given to me by the Directory were mere copies of those which I had drawn up for the Committee some months 62 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. before, and whose execution had been so unskillfully attempted by Scherer.* *For a detailed account of the events of the Revolution, so briefly described in this chapter, the reader is referred to Thiers' "History," a work of great ability and impartiality. The great military work of General Jomini, on the Wars of the Revolution, in fifteen volumes, is unsurpassed "by any other history of this period. It has served as the basis of Thiers' military criticisms, and is probably the best military history ever written. Alison's work is written with the most virulent prejudice, and exhibits an utter disregard of fact and historical truth. CAMPAIGN OF 1196 IN ITALY. 63 CHAPTER II. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY TO THE PEACE OF TOLENTINO. Napoleon takes Conwnand of the Army of Italy State of Affairs la Italy- Napoleon's Plan of Operations Position and Plan of the Allies Beau- lieu compromises his Left at Gemoa His Centre pierced Napoleon attacks the Piedmontese Operations against the Austrians resumed Double Combat of Dego Operations against Colli Napoleon's Proc- lamation to his Soldiers The King of Sardinia sues for Peace Armis- tice of Cherasco Napoleon marches against Beaulieu Passage of the Po at Placeatla Anmistice with the Dukes of Parma and Modena Battle of Fombio March upon the Adda Bridge of Lodi Napoleon enters Milan The Directory proposes to divide Napoleon's Army; his Resignation His Address to the Army Revolt in Lombardy Defini- tive Peace with Piedmont Position of Beaulieu on the Minclo Pas- sage of the Mincio Difficult Position of Napoleon on the Adige Situ- ation and Policy of Venice Criticisms on Napoleon's Operations- Investment of Mantua Armistice with Naples Demonstrations against the Pope Armistice of Fogllno Trourbles in the Imperial Fiefs, etc. Occupation of Leghorn Siege of Mantua Austrians en- deavor to save that Place Approach of Wurmser from the Rhine Battles of Lonato and Castlgllone Quasdanowich surprised at Ga- vardo Attack upon Napoleon's Head-quarters Second Battle of Castiglione Second Passage of the Mincio Wurmser's Retreat into the Tyrol Close Alliance between France and Spain Wurmser re- sumes the offensive on the Brenta Objections to this Operation The Armies In Germany Battles of Mori, Roveredo, and Caliano March from Trent to the Gorges of the Brenta Affair of Bassano Wurmser Marches upon Mantua Affairs at San-Georgio Position of the Army about Mantua New Republics formed Political State of the Rest of Italy Discussions with Rome Definitive Peace with Naples Affairs of Piedmont Negotiations with Genoa New Troubles In the Fiefs Affairs of Corsica The English occupy Porto-Ferrajo They evacuate Corsica Situation of the Armies on the Adlge Alvlncl succor* Man- tua with a new Army Vaubols thrown back on Rlvoll Affair of the O V) i T 64 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Brenta Passage of the Adige at Ronco Battle of Arcole Vaubois driven back from Rivoli Wurmser besieged at Mantua Reverses of the French in Germany Descent upon Ireland Useless Diplomacy Reinforcements from the Rhine New efforts of Alvinzi to save Wurm- ser Joubert driven back on Rivoli Battle of Rivoli Provera marches on Mantua Close of the Campaign Capitulation of Wurmser at Mantua Expedition into Romana. NAPOLEON TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY. I left Paris to take command of my army about the middle of March. The reinforcements which it had received from the Pyrenees, after the peace of Bale, had been half destroyed, as much by the cam- paign of Scherer as by the maladies resulting from a rigorous win- ter, and the horrible privations to which they had been subjected, amid the arid rocks of Liguria. It counted sixty thousand men, but a third of this number was required to guard Toulon, Antibes, Nice, and the Col-de-Tende, so that its active force did not exceed forty thousand combatants, destitute of everything, except good will. 1 was now about to put them to the test: for three years they had been fighting in Italy, only because they were at war, but without any military object, and as if merely to satisfy their consciences. This ridiculous manner of carrying on war did not suit me. I wished to captivate general attention by some great achievement, and this I thought myself capable of accomplishing. STATE OF ITALY. At the risk of repetition, I will de- scribe, briefly, the situation of the peninsula which I was about to invade. Divided, since the fall of the Roman Empire, into twenty small rival states, jealous of each other, Italy existed only on the map. The good Victor Amadeus III. was King of Piedmont; the marriage of his two daughters to the brothers of Louis XVI., heirs to the throne, attached him, as much as his position, to the House of Bourbon. English subsides, fear of our doctrines, and his family relations had precipitated him into the coalition ; but the Austrian influence was generally unpopular at Turin, and the minister, Damian de Priocca, although attached to the cab- inet of Vienna, only wanted a good opportunity to withdraw from a contest where it was evident nothing could be gained. What, indeed, could the King of Sardinia hope if the coalition should succeed? Could he ask French provinces for the princes of his own family? On the contrary, if the coalition should be overthrown, would it not expose him to lose his states? As Spain, yielding to the irresistible force of national interests, had connected herself with us, it was to be expected that Piedmont would follow her example, as soon as it could be done with security. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALJ. 65 The Committee of Public Safety and the Directory had al- ready made two attempts to disengage this power from its al- liances; the latter especially, made through the intermediation of the King of Spain, had staggered the monarch, and caused the convocation of a council in which was discussed the question of a separate peace. The Marquis of Silva, a distinguished soldier, had endeavored to draw the council into our favor, by the strongest reas/ms of civil and military policy. But the King and the minister, Damian de Priocca, adhered to the alliance with the cabinet of Vienna, rather through fear of our doctrines than from any real attachment to the House of Austria. The Marquis d'Albarey described the dangers of the throne with so much warmth that he carried his point over his eloquent adversary. English gold was not without its weight in the balance, for they did not fail to remark that the English subsidies were worth more than all that could possibly be hoped from France. The House of Austria reigned over Lombardy. A prince of that family governed Tuscany. It was allied to the Duke of Modena, whose only heir had married the Archduke Ferdinand. A granddaughter* of Maria Theresa, sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, occupied the throne of Naples, by the side of the weak and inefficient Ferdinand IV. Her Austrian origin, and the outrage committed on the Queen of France, had exasper- ated Queen Caroline against everything French. The minister, Acton, born at Besanc.on, of an Irish family, and ex-officer of the French navy, partook of this hatred on account of some per- sonal misunderstanding which had occurred when he was in the French service. Nothing is more deplorable than to seo personal resentment opposing itself to the good of the state; but, unfortunately, nothing is more frequent. Influenced by Queen Caroline and his minister, the King of Naples, who had taken a feeble part in the coalition by sending three thousand men to Toulon, in 1793, and withdrawing them after the evacuation of that place, decided, after much hesitation, to send a strong con- tii'gent to the Austro-Sardinian army; a tardy resolution, some what difficult to reconcile with previous events, and, indeed, incomprehensible, after the peace which had just been concluded with Spain and Tuscany. The venerable septagenarian, Pius VI., wore the tiara, and occupied the chair of St. Peter. Our religious dissensions, and the destruction of the Catholic Church in France, had made him an enemy more formidable by his spiritual arms than by the mis- erable battalions which he could send against us. Evidently a misprint for "daughter," although It Is "petite-fille" In the original French edition. 8 66 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The republics of Venice and Genoa, after having disputed for several centuries the commerce of the Black Sea, the Bos- phorus, and the Levant; after having fought the memorable naval battles at Caristo, the Dardanelles, Cagliari, and Sapiensa, were now content to carry on a little coast trade under shelter of their neutrality. The first of these, inclosed in the talons of Austria, and having as much to fear from her protection as from our democratic doctrines, ardently desired the continuance of peace. It had just given the strongest proof of this desire by complying with the wishes of the Directory, intimated on the first of March, to order Louis XVIII. from the Venetian terri- tory. This prince had retired to Verona, and published from there, on the death of the Dauphin, a manifesto declaring his accession to the throne of his ancestors. This act of legitimacy, very innocent in itself, had excited the animosity of the Directory. It was much better for France that this prince should remain in the insignificant republic of Venice than to be a refugee in Eng- land, or present with the army of the emigres. Since France could not banish him from the European continent, it was best to place him either at Venice or Naples. But the Directory judged otherwise, and knowing the connections which he kept up with the committee of royalists in France, and consulting only its animosity, it demanded of the senate of Venice the same base act for which Louis XV. had been so justly blamed; that of ex- pelling the Pretender from his states. The procurator Pesaro, an energetic magistrate, worthy of presiding over a better people, alone resisted the mandate. It was carried, however, by an immense majority; and the Republic flattered itself that, by an act of causeless submission, it would secure itself from all danger. Louis, therefore, receiving orders to quit the Venetian states, left for the army of Conde", and after- wards went to Mittau, where Russia, for a time, gave him an asylum more secure than that of Venice. On leaving Venice, he charged the Russian ambassador, Mordwinoff, to erase the names of the Bourbons from the Golden Book of the Republic, and to reclaim the armor of Henry IV., which it had formerly received as a testimony of the affection of that great king. This act, dictated by fear, was no proof of the real sentiments of the Venetian government towards us, but it gave us to understand what we might exact from Venice if victory should ever conduct us to her gates. The Republic of Genoa, en-closed, as it were, within the theatre of war, had seen its port violated by the English, in 1793, CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 67 and its territory, near Oneille, overrun by the columns which, in retaliation, I had directed, in 1794, to turn Saorgio. These two oligarchies feared the principles which we were propagating, but the mass of the people, especially at Genoa, were much attached to France on account of the great commer- cial relations between the two countries. Austria had tried to stir up all the little states of Italy against us; she had endeavored to assemble their deputies at Milan for the purpose of forming an Italian League, over which she might gradually assume a patronage and influence still more pow- erful than what she then exercised over the Germanic Confeder- ation; but the Italian princes, aware of this design, had de- clined to act upon the question, and limited themselves to furnishing Austria with assistance in men, money, and muni- tions. Tuscany alone, although governed by an archduke, had reestablished relations of friendship with the French Republic, by treating with us immediately after the peace of Bale. It will be remembered that General Scherer had gained at Loano, the second of November, a victory over the Austrian army of General Devins; this was a brilliant achievement, due in part to my instructions, and -in part to Masse"na, but from which they were unable to draw any advantages. NAPOLEON'S PLAN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. I arrived at Nice on the twenty-seventh of March. Our recently vic- torious army was now in a precarious position; perched on the summit of the Apennines from Savona to Ormea, it was too scat- tered, and its line of communications with France, extending along the shore between the enemy's line and the sea, was everywhere too much exposed. There are two main routes from Nice into Italy; the one which turns to the north by Saorgiq, and crosses the great chain of the Alps at Col-de-Tende, is the great road from Turin to Coni; the other, placed on that part of the Apennines which in- clines abruptly towards the Gulf of Genoa, runs along the shore, and, between the waves and perpendicular rocks, is sometimes barely wide enough for the passage of a small carriage; this road leads to Genoa, and is called La Corniclie. The debouch from the coast of Genoa into Montferrat is by the great road of the Boehetta, which runs from Genoa to Alexandria. Between the two mountains, the Col-de-Tende and the Col-de-la-Bochetta, which form the great communications between the south of France and Italj*, is a third route, that from Oneille to Ceva by Garessio; it is good for artillery. Other more narrow and dif- ficult roads run from Loano and Savona to Dego, from Savona 68 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. to Sassello. and from Voltri to Campofreddo. As the army had been in possession of Col-de-Tende ever since my operations in 1704, it might have descended on Coni, and acted in concert with lhat of the Alps; but they still persisted in keeping it between Tende and Savona, on the arid rocks of Liguria, where it was impossible to provision it by sea, and where almost everything must be obtained from Genoa. This disposition of localities had caused a repartition of the army. The division of Maquart, three thousand men, guarded the Col-de-Tende. The division of Serrurier.* five thousand men, occupied the road from Garessio and Ceva. Those of Augereauj Masse'na,! and Laharpe, thirty-four thousand men in all, were * Serrurier (Count Jean Mathieu-Philibert), born in 1742, at Laon, was educated for the military service, and obtained the grade of lieutenant in 1755. He was a major at the commencement of the Revolution. Napoleon raised him to the highest 'military and civil ranks, imaking him marshal in 1804, and a senator. He voted for the Provisional Government in 1814, but declared for Napoleon on his return from Elba. He died in 1819. Napo- leon thus describes his character: "Personally he was brave to intrepidity, but as a general he was not fortunate. He had less enthusiasm than Massena or Augereau, but he far surpassed them both in the modesty ol his character, the wisdom of his opinions, and the safety of his inter- course.*' Biographie Universelle. fAugereau was the son of a poor fruiterer of one of the faubourgs of Paris. He was born in 1757. He entered the Neapolitan service at an early age; but, seeing no prospect of promotion, he retired in disgust and taught fencing at Naples. He was banished thence in 1792 with the rest of his countrymen. He afterwards served as a volunteer in the army of Italy; he distinguished himself in .1794 as general-of -brigade of the army of the Pyrenees, and was general-of-diviskm of the army of Italy in 1796. At the day of Castiglione he won many laurels, and afterwards derived his ducal title from that place. "That day," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "was the most brilliant of Augereau's life; nor did I ever forget it." He was made Marshal of France in 1804. In 1814 he was one of the first to desert the Emperor, but on his return from Elba in 1815 ne again offered his services, but Napoleon refused him as a traitor. Napoleon says that he a)ways maintained good order and discipline in his army, and on the field of battle fought with great intrepidity, but that from defective judg- ment or want of education he was unfit for a separate command. In poli- tics he was a wild anarchist, and his opinions merited no respect. He died in 1816, leaving a great but tarnished reputation. Biographie Universelle. JMassena (Andr6), born at Nice, in 1758. His parents were in moder- ate circumstances, but sufficiently well off to 'give him a good education. He entered the army at seventeen, and served as non-commissioned officer till 1786, fwhen he retired from the army and married a iwoman of property. On the breaking out of the Revolution* he again entered the army as an officer. His promotion was now rapid, and in 1793 he became general-of- division. Napoleon .made him Duke of Rivoli and afterwards Prince of Essling. He was made marshal in 1804. He was ever faithful to Napoleon. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 69 stationed in the environs of Loano, Finale, and Savona.* The latter division pushed its advance guard on Voltri as much to hold Genoa in check as to secure our communications with what the soldiers termed the nursing mother. The administrative head- quarters had remained for convenience at Nice, for the last four years; my first care was to remove with it to Albenga, by the difficult road of La Comiche, under the fire of the English fleets. This was sufficient to announce to the army that I was about to occupy myself with its wants and its glory. It was literally an army of Spartans: In spite of the utter misery to which it had been reduced, it breathed only love of country and military glory. Naked feet and clothes in tatters, far from discouraging our braves, only excited their hilarity. My plan was simple: I asked of the Senate of Genoa, in reparation for the outrage committed in their port on the frigate He died in 1817, less from disease than through chagrin at the conduct of royalists after the second restoration. Napoleon thus describes his char- acter: "He was of a robust frame, indefatigable, night and day on horse- back among rocks and in the mountains. In mountain warfare he was particularly expert. He was of decided character and of intrepid courage, full of ambition and self-love. His distinctive characteristic was obstinacy; he was never discouraged. But he neglected discipline, was inattentive to administrative service, and was therefore not beloved by his troops. His dispositions for attack were not skillful, and his conversation was uninteresting: But at the first sound of the cannon, in showers of bullets and in the midst of danger, his intellect acquired its proper force and clearness." Laharpe (Amedee-Emmanuel), born in Pays-de-Vaud, in 1754. He was a man of fortune and received a good education. In early life he served in the army of Holland, but afterwards returned to his home in Switzer- land. He was afterwards stripped of his fortune and exiled to France. He entered the French army In 1792, was made general-of-brigade in 1793, and general-of-dlvision in 1795. He was killed at Codogno, In 1796. He was a brave soldier, an able general, of generous feelings, and of unsullied character. *Thlers thus describes the principal generals under Napoleon's com- mand at this period: "Massfena, a young Nissard of uncultivated mind, but precise and luminous amid dangers, and of indomitable perseverance: Augereau, formerly a fencing-master, whom great bravery and skill in managing the soldiers had raised to the highest rank: L/aharpe, an ex- patriated Swiss, combining information with courage: Serrurler, formerly a major, methodical and brave: lastly, Berthler, whom his activity, his attention to details, his geographical acquirements, and his faculty of measuring with the eye the extent of a piece of ground or the numerical force of a column, eminently qualified for a useful and convenient chief- of-staff." 70 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. La Modeste,* that they should give us passage through that city and the liochetta, promising that on this condition I would re- move forever the war from their frontiers, and secure to them the alliance and protection of the French Republic. If the Senate accepted this offer, I would debouch by Genoa to overthrow the extreme left of the Austrians, throw them back upon Alex- andria, take in reverse all the defenses of Piedmont, thus detach her from the imperial alliance, rally upon myself the little army of Kellerman P t and pursue the isolated forces of Beaulieu into *The frigate La Modeste had anchored in the port of Genoa, and was moored against the quay. On the fifteenth of October, 1793, three English ships and two frigates anchored in port: an English seventy -four moored alongside of the Modeste. The imaster civilly requested the officer on the quarter-deck of the frigate to remove a boat which was in the way of the maneuvers of the English ship, which was readily done by the French. Half an hour after the English captain requested the commander of the Modeste to hoist the white flag, saying that he did not know what the tri- colored flag was. The French officer answered this insult as honor dic- tated; ibut the English had three platforms prepared, which they threw on the ship, and boarded her, at the same time commencing a (brisk fire of musketry from the tops and deck; the crew of the Modeste were unprepared for any attack; part of them threw themselves into the water; the English pursued the fugitives with their boats, killing and wounding them. The rage of the people of Genoa was unbounded. MontJwlon, Vol. I. tKellerman (Frangois-Christophe) was born In Strasbourg, In 1735. He entered the Conflans Legion in 1752, and served in it during the first campaigns of the Seven Years' War. He passed through all the grades up to the rank of marcchal-de-camp, which he attained in 1785. He served under Dtsmouriez in 1792, and distinguished himself at the celebrated can- nonade of Valmy. He next served under Custine, and on the arrest of this officer, Kellerman was also called to the bar of the -Convention. But he was more fortunate than his chief; in May, 1795, he was promoted to the command of the army of the Alps and of Italy; he was soon recalled on charges of inefficiency and detained some thirteen months, after which he was restored to his former command. During the campaign of 1796, his army formed the reserve in the Alps. None of his -military operations in Italy or in the Alps gave satisfaction, and he was removed from his com- mand and directed to organize the gendarmerie in the Interior. After the eighteenth of Brumaire, Napoleon made him senator, and, In 1804, Marshal of France, and conferred on him the title of Duke of Valmy. He held un- der Napoleon several important civil offices; d/uring the campaign against Prussia he organized provisional regiments at Mayence, in 1808 he com- manded the army of reserve in Spain, and in 1813 he collected all the re- serves of the army at Metz. His fame may be said to have .begun and ended at Valmy; as general-in-chief of an army, he exhibited no great ability. He died in 1820 at the advanced age of 85. After copying a brief notice of Kellerman from the Encyclopedia Americana, M. Herbert, the translator of Thiers' "Consulate and Empire," adds: "He was the real tcinner of the battle of Marengo, changing it, by a single charge of cavalry, from a rout to a victory. For this Napoleon CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITAL7. 71 tho Tyrol. But if they rejected the offer, they would undoubt- edly attempt to make a merit of it with the Allies, who would en- deavor, by extending their left, to cut us off at the Bochetta, This movement would place the mass of the enemy's forces at the two extremes, at Ceva and Genoa, and expose to our attacks an isolated and detached centre. POSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE ALLIES. The Allies had replaced Devins by Beaulieu, an old man almost eighty, noted for his courage and enterprise, but whose genius had never been brilliant. The reinforcements drawn from Lombardy, and levies made in the states of the King of Sardinia, had made up the com- plement of his army, and amply repaired the breaches of the preceding campaign. Moreover, the Neapolitan contingent would raise the number to eighty thousand men. The Allies flattered themselves that, with the aid of such enterpr ises as the British fleets and the Corsican division might make upon the Riviera di Ponente,* they would avenge the affair of Loano, and drive us from Liguria. Happily for us, their forces wort- ill distributed. More than twenty-five thousand Sardini- ans, under the Prince of Corignan, were so weakened by being scattered over all the heights of the Alps, from Mont Blanc to the Argentiere, as to be completely held in check by the little army of the Alps under General Kellerman. The army 'of Beau- lieu and of Oolli, from forty-eight to fifty thousand strong, was never forgave him." And afterwards he [Napoleon] did not recompense Kellerman [for his services at Marengo]. No other officer of his distinction but was made Marshal of France far earlier that he." It would be difficult to crowd a greater number of errors within the same limits. Frangols- Christophe Kellerman was not at the battle of Marengo, and unless his absence both from the army and from Italy could have exerted a most magical influence, it would be difficult to determine how Be was the real winner of the victory of Marengo. With respect to Napoleon's influ- ence in preventing his promotion, it may be sufficient to remark that Kel- lerman was general-in-chief of an army when 'Napoleon was a mere sub- altern. He held several important commands under Napoleon, but never served under him in the field. But for the services which he had rendered France previous to the opening of Napoleon's military career, the latter loaded him with honors. He was created marshal among the very first that were made; was one of the very first appointed to the Senate under Napoleon's Consulate; afterwards -made Duke of Vahny, and both himself and family were the objects of Napoleon's kindest regards during his whole life. The Marengo Kellerman will be spoken of in connection with that battle. *The states of Genoa, on the gulf, were divided into three parts, called rivieras: the Riviera di Ponente, the Riviera di Genoa, and the Riviera di Levante. 72 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. scattered from Coni, and the foot of Col-de-Tende, to the Bo- ohetta, towards Genoa. The general-in-chief himself had just marched, with the left, upon Voltaggio and Ovada. The centre was encamped at Saseello, and the Piedmontese, who formed the right, were at Ceva. Simple common sense dictated that thi spider- web should be pierced by the centre. I made my disposi- tions accordingly; they were wise, and fortune wonderfully as- sisted their execution. BEAULIEU COMPROMISES HIS LEFT AT GENOA. Beaulieu, urged on b.y the AuLic Council, had determined to take the offensive; and, either informed of my project upon Genoa, or designing himself to get possession of that city, to enter into com- munication with Nelson and Jervis, who were in these waters with an English squadron, he resolved to move his forces upon that place. The idea was good in itself; and he could have executed it more certainly, and have forced us into a precipitate retreat, had he operated in mass by Ceva against our left. But Beau- lieu, who never comprehended a stratagem, resolved, on the contrary, to march directly upon Genoa, with the third of his army, while the remainder annoyed us in front. As early as the 10th of April he himeslf descended the Apennines, by the Bochetta, at the head of his left wing. I allowed him to drive our little advanced guard from Voltri, while I collected my forces against his centre, which had advanced from Sassello upon Monte- notte. Three redoubts covered this important spur of the Apen- nines, which here slope down to Savona. Argenteau assailed these works at the head of ten thousand picked men; he had al- ready taken two of them, and was attacking the most important with great impetuosity, when the commandamt, Colonel Rampon, administered to its garrison, the 32d demi-brigade, the celebrated oath to bury themselves in its ruins rather than to surrender. He, in fact, maintained himself there all day, in spite of numer- ous assaults, which cost the enemy dear; and he was finally rein- forced in the night by the whole division of Laharpe, which biv- ouacked in rear. The divisions of Masse"na and Augereau prepare to disengage it.* HIS CENTRE IS PIERCED. On the 12th Argenteau, who *In this defense Rampon had only 1200 men, with which he repelled a force nearly ten times as numerous. If the fort had been taken, the army of Napoleon had been cut in two, and "the fate of the campaign, and of the world, might have been changed." Fortifications, though small and unimportant in themselves, if Judiciously placed and properly defended, may have a decided Influence upon the active operations of an army in the field. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 78 commanded the centre, was attacked in front and rear by superior forces. He was beaten and thrown back upon Dego. This first success was the more important, as it disconcerted the enemy; but, in order to gather the full fruits of it, we were obliged to redouble our activity. My whole army was already beyond the Apennines; of the four divisions which composed it, those of Laharpe, Masse'na, and Augereau marched with me; Serrurier was left at Garessio, to check the Piedmontese. NAPOLEON'S ATTACK UPON THE PIEDMONTESE. I determined to turn upon these last, in order to effect their entire separation from BeauLieu, and to push them vigorously. The mass of their forces, under the orders of Colli, still held the camp of Ceva, and General Provera, posted in an intermediate position be- tween Colli and Argenteau, occupied the heights of Cosseria. I marched against him at the head of the divisions of Massena and Augereau, leaving Laharpe to observe Beaulieu. On the 13th Augereau carried the gorges of Millesimo, and Provera, beaten and cut to pieces on all sides, was forced to take refuge in the ruins of the chateau of Cosseria. All attempts of the Piedraontese to rescue him having failed, he surrendered on the morning of the 14th, with the fifteen hundred grenadiers under his command. OPERATIONS RESUMED THE DOUBLE COMBAT OF DEGO. I was, however, obliged to suspend my march against the Piedmontese, for the Austrians, alarmed at the defeat ofMonte- notte, now sought to concentrate on Dego ; But they did it un- skillfully; Beaulieu, leaving Genoa and the coast, hastened to Aqui, and sent a part of his left directly across the mountains to join the remains of Argenteau's forces near Sassello. I was not disposed to permit this; after having established Augereau in front of the Piedmontese, I conducted the divisions of Laharpe and Mas- se'na on Dego, and attacked it with vigor. The troops of Argen- teau fought bravely, but we were too strong for them; so that they were finally obliged to give up the contest, and retire in disorder on Aqui, leaving twenty pieces of cannon and many prisoners in our hands. Scarcely had we finished with Argenteau, when a new Austrian corps gave us battle on the same ground. It was the corps of General Wukassowich, who was hastening from Vorffjfljby Sassello, with the intention of rallying on Argenteau. whom he supposed to be still near Dego. The brave Illyrian, surprised at finding our troops in the place of those which he ex- pected to join, instantly formed his plan, like a man of activity and courage: far from thinking of retreat, he fell upon the guards of the redoubts of Magliani, carried the work, and drove back the 74 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. frightened garrison upon Dego. Our troops thought only of pur- suing the flying enemy in the direction of Spigno, and had no expectation of being thus attacked on their right and rear. This attack was followed by a moment of disorder, of which Wukas- sowich boldly took advantage; but his five battalions were in- sufficient to retrieve the fortunes of the enemy. Masse'na suc- ceeded, by means of his reserve, in rallying the fugitives and bringing them back to the fight; the division of Laharpe, burning to avenge this momentary reverse, fell in turn upon the enemy, who, being charged by the mass of my forces, was easily over- thrown; the shattered remains of his forces considered them- selves particularly fortunate in being able to join the debris of Argenteau at Aqui.* OPERATIONS AGAINST COLLL Having thus disposed of the Austrian^,! again turned upon the Piedmontesewith the divis- ions of Augereau, Masse'na, and Serrurier. I established Laharpe at San. Benedetto, to protect my right and hold Beaulieu in check. Colli, pressed in front by superior forces, and threatened on his left by the movement of Augereau, who descended the left bank of the Tanaro, was forced to evacuate the camp of Ceva; not- withstanding a momentary success, at the combat of St. Michael, he was driven behind the Cursaglia and the Elero. I closely pur- sued and defeated him at Vico, near Mondovi, and drove him be- hind the Stura as far as Carmagnole. On the twenty-sixth my three divisions united at Alba. One decisive battle would now put me in possession of Turin, from which we were only ten leagues. Nevertheless, the situation of the enemy was far from desperate: it was not, as has been pretended by the poetical Botfa, a small river; a brave but conquered army; one place tenablt and the other dismantled, forming the barriers of Pied- mont; it was the fine position of the Stura, flanked on the right by the important fortress of Coni, on the left by Cherasco, which was secure from a coup-de-main, where Colli might have rein- forced his army by twenty thousand men, now scattered in the adjacent valleys, and by an equal number from the wrecks of Beaulieu 's forces. The Allies might have repaired their for- tunes by two days of vigor, activity, and resolution ; at all events, there was the formidable place of Turin at hand, to receive, in case of reverse, a beaten army, and to that place Austria could certainly have sent assistance. We feared that they would *"In this action Napoleon was particularly struck toy the gallantry of a cMef-of-battallon, whom he made a colonel on the spot, amd who ever after was tffe companion of his glory. His name was Lannes, afterwards Duke of Montebello. and one of the most heroic marshals of the Empire." CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITAL7. 76 pursue this course, the more because Turin could easily brave any means of attack that we possessed, and greatly embarrass us by a prolonged resistance. At this crisis, I sought to incite my army to new victories, to restore its discipline, and strike terror in the hearts of our enemies. NAPOLEON'S PROCLAMATION TO HIS SOLDIERS. The following proclamation was designed to accomplish this triple object: "Soldiers! In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one colors, fifty pieces of cannon, many strong places, conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have taken fifteen thousand prisoners, killed or wounded ten thousand men. Destitute of everything, you have supplied all; you have gained battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked often without bread; republican phalanxes alone are capable of actions so extra- ordinary! "The two armies which just now attacked you with audac- ity, are flying before you; perverse men, who rejoiced at the idea of ^ ictory to your enemies, are confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, I will not deceive you; you have done nothing, since much remains to be done. Neither Turin nor Milan are yours: your enemies still trample on the ashes of the conquerors of the Tarquins. "Yon were destitute of everything at the beginning of the campaign; you are now abundantly provided. The magazines taken from your enemies are numerous. The siege artillery hab arrived. Your country expects great things of you. You will justify these expectations; you all burn to spread afar the glory of the French people, to humble the haughty kings who thought to put you in chains, and to dictate a glorious peace, which shall indemnify your country for all the sacrifices she has made. When you return to the bosoms of your families, you will say with pride: / was of the conquering army of Italy. "Friends, I promise you this conquest; but there is one con- dition which you must swear to fulfill: it is to respect the people whose fetters you burst asunder; dt is to repress all pil- lage made by wicked men incited on by our enemies. Should you not do this, instead of being the liberators of nations, you would be their scourge. The French people would disown you; your victories, your courage, the blood of your brothers slain in combat, all would be lost, and above all, honor and glory. For myself and the generals who have your confidence, we would blush to command an army that knows no law but force. But, O Kl r 76 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. invested with the national authority, I will compel the small number of heartless men to respect the laws of humanity and honor which they trample under foot; I will not permit brigands to soil your laurels. "People of Italy! the French army comes to break your fetters; the French people are the friends of the people every- where. Come with confidence to our colors; your religion, your property, your customs, shall be religiously respected. We make war like generous enemies; we war only against tyrants who oppress you." To give greater weight to these measures, the Piedmontese democrats organized at Alba a committee for distributing ad- dresses among the people of Piedmont and Lombardy, threaten- ing some and encouraging others. KING OF SARDINIA SUES FOE PEACE. The result ex ceeded my hopes; the capital was overwhelmed with confusion and terror. The court, regretting its adhesion to the coalition, felt that our impetuous approach threatened it with the most serious dan- ger, by stirring up the numerous partisans of a democratic revolu- tion in Turin and the other cities of Piedmont. It viewed this dan- ger through the medium of fear. Although Beaulieu had marched from Aqui to Nizza to join Colli, it thought itself lost beyond hope, and determined to surrender to our mercy; an aide-de- camp came on the part of the King, to ask for peace. This was agreeable news to me; for, in truth, I was somewhat uneasy respecting the course of events at Turin. But I knew the King had hesitated how to act upon the propositions made by France through the mediation of Spain, in the preceding year, and I felt authorized in believing that, our presence would increase the credit of our partisans. The same question, again considered ou the approach of our victorious phalanxes, was warmly op- posed by the Marquis of Albarey and the minister, but Cardinal Costa, the Archbishop of Turin, carried the majority of votes, and decided the King for peace. It is worthy of notice, that the vote of an archbishop accomplished what the military and political .arguments of the Marquis of Silva were unable to effect. This precipitate step of the Court of Turin not only flattered my vanity and ambition, but it extricated me from real difficulty. My success had been brilliant, but the pillage inseparable from the total want of magazines had given offense to the Piedmont- ese peasants, and relaxed the reins of discipline in my army. If the King, withdrawing from the Alps a part of the troops of Prince Corignan, had shown himself firm at Turin, as did his ancestor, Victor Amadeus, in 1706; and if the Austrians, re- CAMPAIGN Or 1796 IN ITALY. 77 inforced by their garrisons in Lombardy, had seconded his efforts, I might have been driven back upon the sea, and placed in a situation exceedingly critical. Even supposing that I had maintained my position in Piedmont, arrested by the fortresses of Turin, Alexandria, and Valentia, which I was not in a situation to besiege, it would have been impossible for me to advance another step; and the enemy's forces, increased to one hundred thousand men by reinforcements from the Rhine, would have driven me from Italy. But the impetuosity of my march, and my proclamations, striking terror everywhere, gave success to the party which favored peace. I considered every consequence that could result from this measure of the King of Sardinia; the distance which now sepa- rated me from Mantua and the Adige seemed but a step easily taken. Peace with Piedmont decided everything. If I alone had conquered the two armies united, what could Beaulieu, deprived of his allies, hope to effect against me, when I was reinforced by a part of Kellennan's army of the Alps? The fate of Italy was no longer doubtful; I already contemplated with satisfaction this beautiful country subjected to my laws. I no longer re- garded myself as an ordinary general, but as a man called to influence the destinies of Europe; I discovered the immensity of the part prepared for me by Fortune; I already lived in history. ARMISTICE OF CHERASCO. I was not authorized, how- ever, to treat for peace, and it was necessary to refer the conclu- sion of the affair to Paris; but not to suffer my prey to escape, I en- chained it by an armistice, which might be regarded as a prelim- inary treaty; this established us in the heart of Piedmont, by giving us possession of the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Ceva, The King agreed to withdraw from the coalition, and sent the Count of Revel to Paris, to settle the definite conditions of the treaty. Impatient to accelerate this important matter, I gave the Count of St. Marsan, the King's envoy near nu-, to understand, that so far from desiring to overthrow thrones and altars, we would protect them if they would cease their hostility to France; in a word, that he would gain more by an alliance with us than by his devotion to the Court of Vienna, Unfortu- nately, their minds were not ripe for such overtures. I had already done more in fifteen days than the old army of Italy in four campaigns; but my hopes were not yet real- ized. To rescue this classic country from the Germans, to give the lie to the old proverb, that Italy was the tomb of the French: this was a task worthy of me. I hesitated the less to under- take it as the armistice exposed to our attacks the isolate d army , 78 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of Beaulieu, which had already proved too feeble to arrest me in Lombardy, notwithstanding the reinforcements it had found there. ~T NAPOLEON MARCHES AGAINST BEAULIEU. The next day, after the signature of the treaty, I marched my four divisions upon Alexandria, Beaulieu had already repassed the Po at the bridge of Valencia, which he had destroyed. The mass of the Austrian forces took position at Valeggio, on the Agogna, and pushed forward detachments upon the Sesia, and the left of the Ticino. PASSAGE OF THE PO AT PLACENTIA. Wishing to de- ceive Beaulieu respecting my intentions, I had inserted in the arm- istice a clause which allowed me to cross the Po, with my troops, in the environs of Valencia. This stratagem succeeded to perfec- tion. Beaulieu, thinking me foolish enough to attack him in front on the Ticino, when I could act with greater advantage on his rear, directed his whole attention upon the space between the Agogna and Valencia. In order to confirm his error, I pushed forward a detachment upon Said; making a feint to pass the Po at Cambio. Under cover of these demonstrations, the army turned to the right, and rapidly descended the river. To accelerate this march I myself conducted the advanced guard. We arrived at Pla- centia on the 7th of May, closely followed by our divisions in echelons. I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise, in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and deep as the Khine, is a barrier difficult to overcome. We had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embark- ation which we found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes,* chief-of-brigade, crossed in the first boats with the advanced guard. The Austrians had only two squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overthrown. The passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. If I had had u good pontoon equipage, the fate of the enemy's army had been "Cannes (Jean) was 'born at Lecture, France, In 1769. He received a good education In the college of his native city, and was infended for the bar or the church; but his father having lost his property by be- coming security 'for a friend, young Lannes began the trade of a dyer. On the first requisition of 1792 he was sent to the army of the Pyrenees, with the rank of sergeant-major. This changed his career. After the peace of Bale, in 1795, he returned to his home with the rank of chief- of -brigade; but at the opening of the campaign of 1796 he Joined Na- poleon as a volunteer. His life now became a continual scene of actions the most brilliant, which won for him the love of his general, the gratitude of his country, and the admiration of the world. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 /.V ITALY. 79 sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive em- barkations saved it. This enterprise, though, for the above reason, it did not entirely succeed, was not one of the least re- markable circumstances of my first campaign. ARMISTICE WITH DUKES OF PARMA AND MODENA. This passage lasted two days; but I profited by the delay to con- clude an armsitice with Parma, by which the Duke purchased hia neutrality at the price of ten* millions of francs, munitions and horses for the artillery and cavalry, provisions for the army, and, what was of greater value, a good number of chefs-d'oeuvre of paint- ing and sculpture, selected from his galleries, f The Duke of Mo- *Thls is probably a misprint for Uoo, the actual amount of the rs/\ contribution levied. tAn immense amount of ink has been wasted by English writers in defamation of Napoleon for the course pursued towards the Duke of Parma. It will -be sufficient to remember that this prince had re- peatedly rejected offers of peace made by France, and was now to be punished as a vanquished foe. Under the circumstances, this punish- ment was not severe. The Spanish ambassador, whose offer of media- tion had been rejected by Parma, confessed that the French had 'been very moderate. Alison, following Scott and Lockhart, says "It is Im- possible to condemn too strongly" these forced contributions from the galleries of the arts. His reasoning is not founded on fact. In the first place, very ferw of the master-pieces taken from Italy were In their original places, or in the possession of their original owners. We need hardly mention the Apollo Belvidere the Dying Gladiator, the Venus, the Laocoon; the Bronze Horses, first carried from Corinth to Constantinople, thence to Venice, etc. In the second place, they were as safe, and certainly as accessible, in the public galleries of the Louvre, as scattered through the palaces of the petty princes of Italy. In the third place, works of art which, by private individuals, are made com- modities of bargain and sale, and transported according to their ca- price or interest, could hardly suffer indignity by being made the sub- jects of treaty stipulations. As for their being taken as exotics where they would not be rightly appreciated or understood, as asserted by Alison, It is needless to refute so absurd a reason. Alison quotes Napoleon's words at St. Helena as a confession of guilt. By following Alison's reference, it will be found that Napoleon's remarks are wholly in justification' of the course he pursued! Lee, In his "Life of Napoleon," deems these forced contributions not only justifiable by the laws of war, but as highly creditable to Bona- parte. "This measure," says he, "lent a grace and refinement to his warfare, which, reflecting lustre on the French arms, harmonized the rudeness of military fame with the softer glories of taste and Imagina- tion. The homage of other conquerors for the master-pieces of art had been shown by seizing with avidity, or leaving with indifference, such specimens as the chance of war placed within tBeir reach. The arm of victory had transferred from Corinth to Constantinople, and thence to Venice, the famous horses of bronze. In later times, Frederick 80 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. dena had fled to Venice, but the regency which he had instituted hastened to conclude an armistice with me on the same condi 1 - tions as Parma. These conditions were rather hard, especially on the Duke of Parma, whose quality of Infante of Spain seemed to entitle him to a better treatment. But he had turned a deaf ear to all the overtures made to him, even after my victories of \/ Montenotte. We now punished him for his attachment to our enemies. BATTLE OF FOMBIO. Beaulieu, receiving intelligence of my passage at Placentia, maneuvered to oppose it. This octogena- rian .general, instead of falling with vigor on that part of my forces which had already crossed the river, took only half-way measures, which were entirely insufficient to accomplish his object. He rested his left on the Adda without abandoning the Ticino, on which he rested his right. On the eighth of May, General Liptay, who commanded his left, established himself at Fombio opposite my advanced guard. I supposed that Beau- lieu was advancing with his corps de bataille. It was therefore necessary to attack Liptay immediately, to avoid having at once on my hands the great mass of the enemy's forces. I gave the order to General Lannes, who executed it with that vigor and impetuosity which has siince so illustrated his glorious career. Liptay was defeated, separated from Beaulieu, and thrown back on Pizzighettone. On the very night following this affair, Beau- lieu arrived on the ground where his lieutenant had just been defeated, and attacked the division of Laharpe at Codogno. The advanced posts were surprised, and the generate beaten at Co- dogno: in the confusion which followed, General Laharpe* was the Great, though twice in military possession of Dresden, left untouched, and almost unnoticed, the objects collected in the royal gallery. The live- lier sympathy of Bonaparte for the efforts of genius rendered i>t impossi- ble for him to desecrate or neglect its creations. What had hitherto been subjects of military rapine, princely exchange, selfish display, or private acquisition, he elevated into considerations of national compact, and means of public relief and refinement, receiving, as compensation for territory which he might have occupied, and treasure which he could have exacted, a small selection of Italian paintings. This proceeding, which evinced equal respect for talent and humanity, and opened a higher sphere of glory for the arts, made the magic of Oorreggio's pencil turn aside from his coun- try the ravages of war." *Laharpe was an officer of distinguished bravery and much beloved by his troops. "It was remarked," says Hazlitt, "that during the action of Fom- bio, on the evening preceding his death, he had appeared absent and de- jected, giving no orders, seemingly deprived of his usual faculties, and overwhelmed by some fatal presentiment." The whole army mourned his loss. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 7.V ITALY. 81 killed by some of his own troops, but not before the Austrians had been compelled to retire. Beaulieu, not satisfied with hav- ing divided up his army, now so scattered his own corps be- tween the Po and the Adda that he had only three battalions of disposable troops. Seeing himself in presence of superior num- bers, he thought to concentrate has whole army on Lodi, where the Adda was crossed by a bridge. His right, which was still at Pavia, had to gain Cassano. This he could not have accom- plished, had it not been for the unfortunate delay in the passage at Placentia, caused by the want of a proper pontoon equipage. MARCH UPON THE ADDA. Although the road to -Milan was now open to my troops, the possession of this important city could not be otherwise than precarious, so long as the enemy maintained himself behind the Adda.* It was necessary, there- fore, first to drive him to a greater distance. I marched on Lodi with my grenadiers and the divisions of Massena and Augereau. One division was left before Pizzighettone to mask this place and cover my right. Ignorant that the enemy had already withdrawn the forces on the Ticino to the main body in rear of the Adda, I directed Serrurier to march on Pavia to secure my left. THE BRIDGE OF LODI. We arrived at Lodi on the tenth. Leaving General Sebottendorf with ten thousand men to defend the Adda, Beaulieu had already retired to Crema with the main body of his forces. The enemy had secured the bridge of Lodi, wliioh was over one hundred yards in length, by twenty pieces of cannon placed at the extremity. The occasion furnished an op- portunity for stamping by some bold stroke the character of my individual actions, and I did not let it escape. The affair might be attended with the loss of a few hundred men, but even should I be defeated, it could not have the least influence upon the result of the campaign. We easily routed a battalion and some squad- rons of the enemy from Lodi, and pursued them so closely as to prevent their destroying the bridge. I immediately formed my grenadiers in close column and threw them upon the bridge. But, assailed by a murderous storm of grape, they were staggered for a moment, when my generals threw themselves at the head of the columm, and carried it by their examples. At the same time a number of the soldiers let themselves down from the bridge upon an island, where they were less exposed to the *"Alison says, "on the tenth Napoleon marched towards Milan, but, before arriving at that city, he required to pass the Adda." This betrays great ignorance of the theater of war. Napoleon was already on the same side of the river as Milan, but he turned his back upon that city, 1n order to drive the enemy beyond the Mincio. 82 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. fire of the enemy, and, finding the second a , m of the river ford- able, they deployed as tirailleurs to turn the Austrian line. The main body of the grenadiers now charged across the bridge, overthrew everything that opposed its passage, captured the bat- teries, and scattered the battalions of the enemy. Sebottendorf retreated on Crema with a loss of fifteen cannon and two thou- sand men. This was merely an affair of a rear guard, but still it was a brilliant one.* NAPOLEON ENTERS MILAN. The immediate conse- quences of the combat of Lodi were the occupation of Pizzighet- tone,-and the retreat of Beaulieu upon the Mincio. I pursued Mm no further. For the past month my troops had been inces- santly in motion, and they now required repose. Moreover my presence was necessary at Milan. I therefore established the division of Serrurier at Cremona and with the remainder of the army took the road to the capital, where I made my triumphal entrance on the fifteenth of May. A deputation, headed by the respectable Melzi, came to meet me at Lodi, and I was received by a numerous National Guard dressed in Lombard colors, and commanded by the Duke Serbelloni, lining the streets quite to my quarters. Joy seemed universal; and France herself could not have paid me higher honors even by voting me a triumph. For the security of our conquests it was essential to estab- lish the republican system there, and to connect these countries with France by common principles and common interests. In other words, the ancient regime was to be destroyed and equality substituted in its place, for that is the entering wedge of revolu- tion. I myself was not tainted with the doctrines of our propa- gandism, but as they made us enemies of the few, I thought also to make with them friends of the multitude. But the Italian no- bility were so much less removed from the people than in most other states that it was not impossible to reconcile them to po- litical equality. I feared the clergy and their retainers, and, fore- seeing resistance from this quarter, I resolved either to conciliate them by concessions or to crush them by military power, but without any insurrections of the people. PROJECT FOR DIVIDING THE ARMY; NAPOLEON'S RESIGNATION. On hearing that I had marched upon Milan, *Historians, Ignorant of the military art, have sought to magnify the importance of this affair of Lodi. As a mere trial of skill and personal bravery, it was one of which Napoleon and his soldiers may well have been proud, but as a piece of generalship it does not deserve to be mentioned with the days of Arcole. It had no strategic relations with the campaign, and merely served to encourage the French soldiers and give them confi- dence in the Individual bravery of their general. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 88 the Directory transmitted an order to divide my army into two parts, giving the command of that in Italy to Kellerman, to ob- serve the Austrians on the Mincio, while I, with twenty-five thousand men forming the army of the South, was to march upon Rome and Naples. This division of the forces, just as we were about to encounter the vast resources of the House of Austria, was the height of absurdity. I refused to submit to it, and, to save the army from certain destruction, tendered my resignation. But while waiting for the action of the Directory upon my letter, I determined to drive Beaulieu into the Tyrol. ADDRESS TO THE ARMY. Calling upon my troops for new enterprises, I addressed to them the following proclamation, which is too intimately connected with the history of the times to be omitted here: "Soldiers! you have descended like a torrent from the sum- mit of the Apennines; you have overthrown and dispersed every- thing that opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has yielded to its natural inclination for peace and for a French alliance: Milan is yours, and the republican standards wave over the whole of Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generos- ity. The army which menaced you with so much pride no longer finds a barrier to protect itself against your arms. The Po, the Ticino, and the Adda have .not checked your progress a single day; these boasted bulwarks of Italy have been crossed as rap- idly as the Apennines. Such a career of success has carried joy into the bosom of your country; fOtes in honor of your victories have been ordered by the national representatives in all the com- munes of the Republic; there, your parents, your wives, your sis- ters, your lovers, rejoice at your success, and glory in their con- nection with you. "Yes, soldiers! you have, indeed, done much; but much still remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew how to conquer, but not how to profit by a victory? Shall it be said that we found a Capua in Lombardy? I already see you run to arms; for you, days of repose are but days lost to glory and to honor! Let us march! We have yet enemies to conquer, laurels to gather, injuries to revenge! Those who sharpened the poignards of civil war in France, who basely assassinated our ministers, burnt our vessels at Toulon, let them tremble; for the hour of vengeance has struck! "But the people of all nations may rest in peace; we are the friends of every people, and especially of the descendants of Bru- 84 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. tus, Scipio, and the other great men whom we have for models. To restore the capital, to replace there with honor the statues of heroes who have rendered it immortal; to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery such will be the fruit of our victories; they will form an era in history; to you will belong the immortal glory of having changed the face of the most beautiful part of Europe. "The French people, free, and respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace; which will indemnify her for all the sacrifices she has made for the last six years ; then you will return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say of each of you in passing, He was of the army of Italy." I well understood the men with whom I had to deal. I knew that eloquent words would excite unbounded enthusiasm in the ardent minds of the French soldiers. I knew that they would produce at Rome and Naples the same effect as they had already produced at Turin, animating the courage and heroism of my men, while they petrified my adversaries with fear. Before beginning new exploits promised to my soldiers, I at- tended to the interior administration of Lombardy. The citadel of Milan, from its proximity to the city, had not only a powerful influence on that city, but, so long as it remained in the hands of the enemy, rendered our position in Lombardy more or less de- pendent upon the success of our arms in the field; I therefore determined upon its reduction. Before leaving Milan for Lodi, I caused the material for this siege to be prepared at Alexandria and Tortona, and to be immediately directed upon Lombardy. REVOLT IN LOMBARDY. My triumphal reception in the capital gave me good reasons to think that the Italians would really second my operations. I had caused the churches and the property of the nobility to be carefully respected, and I therefore had a right to expect some gratitude from these two privileged classes. But I soon learned that my moderation had calmed neither their fears nor their hatred. The very day that I left Milan to march against the Austrians the tocsin was sounded in rear of my army. The peasantry of the country, excited to fanat- icism by their priests, rushed to arms, seized upon Pavia, and the citadel in which I had left a garrison. The least hesitation on my part might have caused a general insurrection. I instantly turned about, and, with three hundred horse and a battalion of grenadiers, marched in all haste to Pavia, which had now become the head-quarters of the rebellion. Having in vain summoned them, through the Archbishop of Milan, to return to order, and to give up the guilty, our grenadiers forced the gates and entered CAMPAION OF 1796 IN ITALY. 85 the city, which was now given up to pillage. Here clemency to the insurgents would have been criminal towards my army. It is sometimes necessary to shed a little blood in order to prevent a greater effusion; to have pardoned these perfidious wretches, who had seized the poignard, even before the sounds of their ac- clamations had died away, would have exposed my brave soldiers to the horrors of new Sicilian Vespers.* I caused the municipal- ity to be shot, and order was restored. In the meantime the army had continued its march against the Austrians on the Mincio. DEFINITIVE PEACE WITH PIEDMONT. I had just learned that a definitive peace had been signed at Paris on the fifteenth of May, with the King of Sardinia. The latter had engaged to leave us in possession of Alexandria and Tortona during the war, to raze Susa, La Brunetta, and Exiles, and also to establish a line of posts by Mont Cenis and I/ Argerutiere. I wished to connect this prince to the Republic by the ties of inter- *Under the reign of Charles of Anjou over Naples and Sicily, a project for the expulsion of the French -was formed between Giovanni di Procida, a noble of Salerno, Pope Nicholas III., King Peter of Aragon, and Palseolo- gus, Emperor of Constantinople. To favor this project, an insurrection was incited among the Sicilians. March 30th, 1282, at the hour of vespers, on Easter Monday, the inhabitants of Palermo flew to arms, and fell upon the French, who were all massacred. Women and children were not spared, and even the Sicilian women with child by Frenchmen were murdered. Messina and other towns followed the example of Palermo. This massacre is called the Sicilian Vespers. To prevent a repetition of these horrible massacres, Napoleon resorted to the severe but decisive measures mentioned in the text, and for which he has been so much censured by the English historians. Alison compares the conduct of the inhabitants of Pavia to that of the French peasantry in 1814, when Napoleon called upon every citizen to take up arms in defense of his country. The cases are essentially different. Pavia had already submitted to the French, and exhibited for them every mark of friendship. While treating them in this way they drew the poignard of the assassin. But the French peasantry rose in open -war to repel the invaders of their country the right and duty of every people. There is not the slightest justification for their cold-blooded execution by the Allies. The inhabit- ants of Pavia undoubtedly deserved severe punishment, but this did not entirely justify the pillage of the city. "Pavia," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "is the only place I ever gave up to pillage. I had promised the soldiers twenty-four hours; but at the end of three, I could bear it no longer, and put an end to it. Policy and morality are equally opposed to the sys- tem." Thlers says, that being scarcely a thousand men, the French, in the short time allowed them, could do no great mischief in so large a city as Pavia. The houses of two illustrious votaries of science, Volta and Spallan- zani, were purposely spared from plunder an example honorable to both parties. 86 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. est and alliance, so as to strengthen our hold in Italy and enable ns to act with more vigor against the Austrians. But it was difficult to induce Victor Emmanuel to desert his ancient allies so abruptly, and we, therefore, were obliged to satisfy ourselves with removing him from the list of our opponents, leaving the rest to the action of time. In less than one month I had turned the line of the Alps, gained three battles, detached Piedmont from the coalition, taken twelve thousand prisoners, opened a direct communication with France by Savoy, and obtained possession of a fortified base for future operations; but all this was only the introduction to still greater victories. POSITION OF BEAULIEU ON THE MINCIO. After the defeat of Lodi, Beaulieu did not venture to halt either behind the Oglio or the Ghiesa. The strong line of the Mincio, however, flanked as it was on the left by the fortress of Mantua, and on the right by Lake Garda and the Tyrol mountains, seemed to him a sufficient barrier for his protection, and he there established his army, its left at Goito, its centre at Valleggio, antd its right at Peschiera, a small place belonging to the Venetian's. As the wings were supported by fortifications, it would not have been prudent to direct the attack upon them; I therefore resolved to force the centre at Valleggio, and, in order to induce the enemy to draw off his forces from this point, I at the same time made a demonstration upon Peschiera, threatening his line of communication with Austria by the Tyrol. PASSAGE OF THE MINCIO. On the thirtieth of May, I arrived at Borghetto with the main body of my forces. The en- emy's advanced guard on the left of the Mincio was repulsed, and driven across the bridge of Borghetto, one arch of which they destroyed. I ordered its immediate repair, but, being exposed to the fire of the enemy, the work necessarily advanced slowly. The grenadiers became impatient and some fifty of them threw themselves into the Mincio, and, holding their fire-arms over their heads, began to wade with the water up to their shoulders. Fearing n repetition of the affair of Lodi, the enemy retreated towards the Tyrol, giving us an uninterrupted passage of the river. I followed him with the division of Serrurier on Villa- franca, and Augereau directed his division by Oastel Nuovo to turn Peschiera, while Masse'na remained at the bridge of Bor- ghetto. Beaulieu still endeavored to remain firm upon the heights between Villa-franea and Valleggio; but, upon learning the movement of Augereau's division on Peschiera, he thought that I purposed cutting him off from the Tyrol, and in conse- CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALY. 87 quence retired beyond the Adige, ascending the right bank of that river, by Dolce, as far as Caliano. A part of his left, ascend- ing the Miiu-io, suddenly appeared at my head-quarters, where I had only a feeble guard. I had merely time to save myself by the gardens and to rejoin the troops of Mass&ia, who soon; swept away the enemy, in turn very much astonished at the sudden appearance of our forces. The remainder of this wing detached at Goito entered into Mantua, whose garrison was now increased^ to more than thirteen thousand men. INVESTMENT OF MANTUA. However great my desire t>> pursue the fragments of Beaulieu's army, I did not deem it snfe to do so, for I was not sufficiently strong to enter into the heart of the Austrian States, while our other armies still re- mained beyond the Rhine. 1 had run over, rather than con- quered Italy, and the possession of Mantua alone could consoli- date our establishment here. DIFFICULT POSITION ON THE ADIG-E. Although nothing had thus far been able to arrest my victorious march and the expulsion of Beaulieu from Lombardy, nevertheless all might yet change; the enemy's forces seemed to increase in pro- portion as mine diminished. I had swept over this vast basin of the Po, which separates the Apennines from the Maritime and Tyrol ese Alps, more rapidly even than I had hoped, and now my impetuous arrival on the Adige presented a crowd of new com- binations. The petty princes of Italy, dazzled by the brilliancy of our achievements, had subscribed to armistices moat flattering to us; but the King of Sardinia and the Duke* of Modena and Placentia had not, in laying down their arms, become our friends. The people of Lombardy were far from unanimous in our favor; the Court of Borne was stirring up rebellion in our rear; and Naples might second these operations by thrusting forward its army upon Ancona or Siena. Corsica was in possession of the English, who were stirring up discord on the continent; and, although Tuscany had signed a treaty with us at Paris in 1795, it was to be feared that the cabinet of St. James might throw ten thousand men into Leghorn to rally in our rear this imposing mass of enemies. 1 had only forty-five thousand combatants; Mantua had a garrison of over twelve thousand Austrinns; Beau- lieu and the Tyrolese had thirty thousand men in the valley of the Adige, and thirty thousand on the march from the Rhine upon Innspruck to form a junction with the others. SITUATION AND POLICY OF VENICE. To this picture, w r hich is far from being overdrawn, it must be added that Venice alone could incline the balance against us. She had granted ! 88 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. a military road to the Austrians from the Tyrol to Milan, and in pursuing our enemy we had encroached upon her territory; of this she had no right to complain; but in seizing and arming the arsenal of Peschiera and the fortress of Verona, and in mak- ing requisitions upon her provinces for the support of our army, and in propagating sentiments of independence, we had neces- sarily given offense to the Venetian government. This was no fault of mine; circumstances forced it upon me; I had no other means to' support my army, and self-defense rendered necessary the occupation of the posts which I had seized. If Venice had really wished to preserve her neutrality, she ought, as soon as Beaulieu had retired behind the Po, to have formed a cordon of twenty thousand men on the Mincio, abandoning the right bank to the operations of the belligerents, and declaring war u>pon the first who should trespass upon the remainder of her territory. Pesaro proposed this, and urged the Senate; to form an armed neutrality. But this ancient queen of the Adriatic, and entrepot of the East, that in the League of Cam- brai had singly braved all Europe, and in the wars of Charles VIII., Louis XII., and Francis I. had held the balance of power in Italy, for the last two centuries had been buried in a leth- argic sleep. Its maritime power had been on the decline ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, and its land power since the surrender of the Morea to the Turks by the peace of Passarowitz. The population of the Republic was three mil- lions, and its revenues some thirty millions; its land forces con- sisted of seven regiments of infantry and six of cavalry, amount- ing to twelve thousand men; the people of the mainland were, like the Swiss, organized as militia; but, umlike the soldiers of Alviana, these miserable troops could be compared with no others than those of the Pope. The Republic trusted mainly for its security to foreign mercenaries whom its wealth enabled it to keep in pay. Its fleet consisted of fourteen ships-of-the-line, and six of the second class lying at Corfu and Venice; and from the superb arsenal and ship-yard of the latter place ten other vessels could have been immediately prepared and armed. But if, instead of this navy, which had been prepared against the Turks, Venioe had now possessed a good army, events might have as- sumed a very different aspect. This proud oligarchy, which once thought to honor Henry IV. by inscribing his name upon the Golden Book of its nobles, was fallen into decay. It feared our democracy not less than our bayonets, and had equal dread of Austria, whose eagle was already enclosing it in his talons. It vainly hoped to save the vessel of state by allowing it to CAMPAIGN OF 1196 Z.V ITALY. 89 drift at will, between two dangerous rocks a course utterly absurd in such times of great peril. Although this enemy was not very dangerous in itself, yet as an auxiliary to a strong Austrian) army, and as a place of refuge for an English squadron, it was of much greater consid- eration, and I felt considerable anxiety respecting the part Venice would take. The Senate rejected th.e noble proposition of Pesaro, and, by resolutions characteristic of its unworthy spirit, appointed two proconsuls, Foscarini and Sanfermo, with full powers to govern the provinces on the mainland, and to main- tain relations of friendship with the two belligerents. The disgraceful surrender of Verona, two days afterwards, proved \1/ the wisdom of the Senate in the choice of its agents! V CRITICISMS ON NAPOLEON'S OPERATIONS. Some eloquent writers have blamed me for not having masked Mantua and pursued Beaulieu into the Tyrol. If I have ever merited blame, it is not for having been too circumspect. I have already mentioned the dangers we encountered on our arrival upon the Adige viz.: eighty thousand Austrians and Tyrolese, including the garrison of Mantua and the corps approaching from the Rhine; the Pope and his influence; Naples, as yet undecided, but capable of bringing thirty thousand men to the attack; the Eng- lish Corsican division, threatening to debark in Tuscany; the King of Sardinia, dissatisfied with a peace precipitately signed; Venice, still discussing the question of peace and war; such were the obstacles I had to encounter, with a force of less than fifty thousand combatants. It is somewhat amusing that my crit- ics, in spite of all this, would have me rush into the heart of the Austrian monarchy. Charles XIL, with all his rashness, would never have attempted such foolhardiness. I adopted the only suitable course, that of imposing on our enemies, and confirming our doubtful allies, by assuming the attitude and language of a conqueror. This required much activity and decision of charac- ter, and no one ever exhibited these qualities in a higher degree than I did on that occasion. INVESTMENT OF MANTUA. I directed all my attention Upon Mantua, convinced that its fall alone could render my army available, and enable me to assail Austria without danger from the south of Italy. Our siege artillery being still employed against the citadel of Milan, we merely made an investment of the place. To do this effecutally, it was necessary to be master of the whole course of the Adige. The fortress of Verona was the key to the river, and the base of any system of operations upon this line. The Austrians had, either by permission or by 90 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. force, obtained possession of Crema and Peschiera, two places which', like Verona, belonged to the Venetians. As an offset to this, I summoned Verona, and the feeble Foscarini, making use of his full powers, surrendered up the place on the first of June. This precious acquisition secured to us three fine bridges across the Adige; and the bastioned work, and two strong castles perched on the last heights of the Tyrol, hermetically closed the valley on the left of the river. While waiting for artillery neces- sary for the siege of Mantua, I closed the debouches from the fortress, so that eight thousand men could secure its investment; while Serrurier was charged with this operation, Augereau re- mained as a corps of observation on the lower Adige towards Legnago. ARMISTICE WITH NAPLES. Fortunately for us at this crisis, our political horizon began to clear up. Ferdinand IV., of Naples, wearied with a war which was bringing him large pe- cuniary losses without any real advantages, and induced by the example of the King of Sardinia, and the solicitations of the King of Spain, now asked to treat, and sent for this purpose Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli to my head-quarters. He arrived just after the defeat of Beaulieu, in the plains of the Mincio. I granted him an armistice, on condition that the Neapolitan contingent immediately withdrew from the Austrian army, and returned home. The details of the treaty were to be settled at Paris, be- tween the Directory and the Neapolitan minister. These negoti- ation?, for reasons of which I am ignorant, were protracted for more than six months. The peace was, nevertheless, very im- portant to us, for our embarrassments would have been very great had this prince, whose states could furnish and support fifty thousand troops, continued to act against us. The geographical position of his kingdom enabled him to attack us with advantage; in the same country, and under less favorable circumstances, Han- nibal had made war for ten years against the Roman Empire; but, fortunately for us, Naples now produce* no Hannibals. DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE POPE. After the treaties of peace with the kings of Sardinia and Naples, our only enemy in Italy was the Pope. With Naples against us, I had opposed any attack being made upon florae, but now a single col- umn might be sent against Ancona with perfect safety. I therefore determined, during the blockade and siege of Mantua, to humble the majesty of the Tiara before that of the Republic. The division of Augereau passed the Po at Borgoforti, and marched upon Bologna, where I arrived on the 19th of June. With a population of only sixty thousand, this city contained CAMPAIGN OF 1196 IX ITALY. 91 more learned men than any other city in Italy. Had the remain- der of the peninsula possessed the same intelligence and energy of character as the citizens of Bologna, Italy would have become, ere this, a very respectable power. I promised its Senate the in- dependence, territory, and consideration of which it had been stripped by the Pope. The whole city seemed intoxicated with joy. In fifteen days it organized a National Guard of three thou- sand men, who were often of great use to us. Ferrara, also, gave in its submission without the least opposition. ARMISTICE OP FOLIGNO. While these things were oc- curring at Bologna and Ferrara, a second column left Placentia. and entered Tuscany: The Court of Rome was in the utmost consternation at these demonstrations. It solicited an armis- tice, which was granted, the 24th of June, on condition that it yielded to us the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and received a garrison in the citadel of Ancona, This peace was of vital im- portance to France, but I made it in violation of the orders of tht Directory, who never calculated either distance or obstacles, but expected, at the same moment, to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Florence; and, with seven or eight battalions, to conquer all Italy. What it now directed me to undertake, with only fifty thousand men, itself attempted, three years after, with one hun- dred and twenty thousand men, and ended in the loss of all our Italian possessions. Having terminated the affair with the Pope, Augereau was directed to return to the Adige, after first having punished the inhabitants of Lugo and its environs, who, at the instigation of the priests, had taken arms against us, to the number of three or four thousand. TROUBLES IN THE IMPERIAL FIEFS. Troubles also occurred, at this time, in the Imperial Fiefs, and in the states of Genoa, Bandits organized between Alexandria, Novi, and the Bochetia, and, joined by Austrian prisoners who had effected their escape, attacked and massacred our soldiers. I directed Faypoult to demand satisfaction for these things, and to cause the Marquis of Girola, who was suspected of being the agent of this mischief, to be driven from Genoa. Arquata had now be- come the focus of the revolt, and Lannes was sent there, with a few battalions, to destroy the rebels and sack the place. OCCUPATION OF LEGHORN. The presence of our troops in Tuscany gave me an opportunity to execute the Directory's orders for the occupation of Leghorn. It was executed with so much rapidity and secrecy, that fifty loaded vessels were sur- prised in the port. And even bad this prize escaped us, we 92 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. should still have made a rich capture in the goods of English merchants. As Tuscany had. strictly preserved her neutrality, nothing but extreme necessity could justify so high-handed a measure. As this port, directly opposite Corsica, and occupied by ten thousand British troops, could readily become a point d'appui to the English, and enable them to stir up a revolt in our rear, and to cut off our communications, self-security required these severe and decided measures. I garrisoned Leghorn with my own troops; but I treated the Grand Duke with all the respect due to his noble character anid to his rank as a prince of the House of Austria and heir of the good Leopold.* These expeditions much strengthened our influence in the interior of the country; and the fall of the castle of Milan, on the twenty-ninth of June, confirmed the wavering Lombards in our favor. " SIEGE OF MANTUA. The capture of several fortified towns, in these expeditions, and the reduction of Milan, had fur- nished 'us with a sufficient park of artillery to undertake the siege of Mantua, and I therefore directed my entire attention to that object. The trenches were opened on the eighteenth of July. Serrurier's division, ten thousand strong, was charged with the works of the siege. The remainder of the army con- stituted the corps of observation between the Adige and Lake Garda, Augereau, with eight thousand men, formed the right at Legnago; Mass^na. with fifteen thousand, constituted the centre at Rivoli and Verona; General Sauret, with four thousand, formed the left at Salo; while the reserve, of six thousand, was posted between the right and centre. These dispositions enabled me, by interior concentric movements, to bring the whole of my troops to bear upon either side of the Mincio, according as the enemy should develop his forces. His numbers had been too much increased to expect him to longer remain inactive. EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA TO SAVE MANTUA. The Cab- iuet of Vienna, justly alarmed at my progress, resolved to put a stop to it, by sending against me a new army and a new general. Marshal Wurmser left Manheim with twenty thousand men of the elite, and superseded Beaulieu. The Austrian combined "The view taken of this affair by Alison is entirely erroneous. The neutral power, being unable to protect itself from the operations of the English at Leghorn, Napoleon was perfectly justifiable in the course he pursued. Such is the law of war. The Grand Duke took no offense at the occupation of the French. His minister, Monfredini, acknowledged that the English had been more masters of the port than the Grand Duke himself. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALY. 93 army, assembled at Trent the last of July, amounted to sixty thousand combatants. This superiority of numbers seemed to insure victory, and my adversaries began to triumph at my ap- proaching overthrow. Their calculations seemed well formed, but the result proved that they had left out the relative value of the two commanders-in-chief an important item in the estimate. APPROACH OF WURMSER FROM THE RHINE. Wurmser debouched from the Tyrol the last of July. Quasdan- owich carried twenty-live thousand by the right of Lake Garda on Salo and Brescia; while the marshal, with the remaining thirty-three thousand, descended the Adige in three columns. I learned at the same time, that Sauret had been thrown back upon Desenzano, and Massena expelled from Rivoli. This information, discouraging as it might seem to one less familiar with the science of war, gave me the strongest hopes of success. The en- emy, by dividing his forces, gave me an opportunity to penetrate between the two parts of his army, and beat them separately. But the success of this depended upon the utmost promptness; the slightest hesitation on my part would have given Wurmser an opportunity to unite with Quasdanowich on the Mincio. I left everything in order to prevent this reunion. I raised the siege of Mantua, leaving one hundred and forty cannon in the trenches: and I soon had to rejoice that I had taken this meas- ure in spite of the prejudices which existed against it. A gen- eral of artillery might make it as much a point of honor to pre- serve his battery as his flag; but the point of honor for a general- in-chief is success. A council of war was assembled to discuss this measure. In all armies there are some generals intelligent, but timid; others brave, but uneducated; the truly valuable are those who unite these two qualities. In this council there was the usual difference of opinion; Kilmaine and the more discreet ad- vised against the project; but, Augereau, animated by a noble ardor which he never after exhibited, declared that he would not rest till he had given battle with at least his own division. En couraged by this, I determined to risk everything for success, and accordingly gave orders to attack the Austrian column, which had just taken Brescia. The divisions of Mas?6na and Augereau, with a reserve, on the evening of the thirtieth, united between Peschiera and Goito. One half of the division of Serrurier on the left of the Mincio rejoined Augereau, and the other half passed the Oglio at Marcaria. BATTLES OF LONATO AND OASTIGLIONE. The next day I passed the Mincio to attack Quasdanowich. The enemy was repulsed from Lonato, Brescia, and Salo. I established my 94 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. army on the CMesa, and Quasdanowich fell back upon Gavardo. The faults of the Austrians could have been repaired by Wurm- ser, on the thirty-first of July, after the taking of the Montebaldo, had he passed the Mincio under Peschiera to reach Lonato. He then would have effected a junction) with Quasdanowich, and have forced me to regain, in all haste, the Ticino or Placentia; after this, he could easily have made a victorious entry into Mantua. But the Austrians never knew the value of time. They devised wise projects, and then failed by wrong calculations of time and distance. Wurmser, instead of joining Quasdanowich, went first to make a triumphal procession at Mantua, and crossed the Mincio at Goito, as late as the evening of the second of August, on his way to Castiglione. This gave me full time to defeat his lieuten- ant, and drive him from Ponte San Marco, Lonato, and Bresicia. But I could not cut him up very much, on account of the mount- ains of Gavardo, which favored his retreat. I hoped to take my revenge on Wurmser himself. The third of August, Augereau carried his division and the reserve on Castiglione; Massena di- rected his division on Lonato, and at the same time, to induce Quasdanowich to continue his retreat, I ordered General Guyeux to defile on Salo and threaten his communications with the Tyrol. The operations of this day were somewhat singular, but, on the whole, favorable to us. I had thought to direct my attack upon Wurmser, but, on the contrary, it fell upon the left of Quasdau- owich, who was trying to renew his junction by Lonato. For this purpose he had resumed the offensive, and, as usual, in sev- eral columns. That of the Prince of Keuss had to descend by Salo; Oeskay "matched from Gavardo direct uipon Lonato; Ott on Desenzano. General Ocskay attacked the advanced guard of Masse"na and caused him some loss. My arrival with the main portion of the division restored the equilibrium. We carried Lonato. and lively pursued the retreating enemy. Happily for them, the Prince of Reuss, who had reached Salo before Guyeux, finding no one there, fell back upon the road taken by Ocskay, and assisted in rallying his men. But this fortuitous accident worked wonderfully in our favor the next day. Quasdanowich resumed his first position at Gavardo with all his columns, ,ex- cept some detachments which had lost their way, and remained in the mountains near Lonato. The same day Augereau attacked and defeated the advanced guard of Wurmser, at Castiglione. QUASDANOWIOH SURPRISED AT GAVARDO. I had yet gained only a partial success, but this had strengthened my central position and afforded means to renew my operations. I reserved my strongest efforts for Wurmser, who was advancing CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 95 by Gurdizzolo on Castiglione. But, as his march was slow, and as 1 had still to wait for Serrurier from Marcaria, I resolved to employ the day of the fourth in more completely routing Quas- danowich. General Despinoy K reinforced at Brescia with three thousand men from the army of the Alps, received orders to ad- vance by Sant-Ozetto on Gavardo. St. Hilaire was detached from Massena to assist Guyeux, who was to remove from Salo on Gavnrdo. The effect of these attacks surpassed my most sanguine hopes; the Austrians, hearing that the Prince of Beuss had found no one at Salo the night before, thought themselves secure on tihis side, and directed all their attention upon the road to Loiiato. Favored by this circumstance and by the nature of the ground, Guyeux and St. Hilaire got in the rear of the enemy without being perceived. Assailed thus unexpectedly in reverse, the Austrians retreated by the road of the Val-Sabbia upon Riva. This movement relieved me for the time from all attacks of this corps. ATTACK UPON NAPOLEON'S HEAD-QUARTERS. But if fortune had greatly favored my operations at this important juncture, it had also exposed me to great personal danger at my head-quarters. I had remained, at Lonato, with only one thou- sand two hundred men, after the departure of the division of Massena. Suddenly the city was surrounded by a corps of the enemy, who summoned me to surrender. Fortunately, I pre- served my presence of mind, and determined to substitute audac- ity for strength. I made so many threats to the enemy's general that he immediately laid down his arms and surrendered with his two thousand men and four cannon. This was the advanced guard of Qnasdanowich, which, in making a reoonnoissance for forming a junction with Wurmser, had crossed the columns of St. Hilaire and Sauret This occurred at the very instant that my troops surprised the enemy at Gavardo; but the results were different in the two cases: the first was the capture of the attack- ing force without loss; the other the retreat of twelve or fifteen thousand Austrians from a most important position. SECOND BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE. The first success of these operations was to be decided on the fifth of August. Wurmser, still wedded to the system of detachments, had sent one in the direction of the lower Po and left another to blockade Peschiera. With the remaining twenty-five thousand men he took post between Solferino and Medolano. The divisions of Massena and Angereau, and the reserve which I bad united at Castiglione, together formed a force equal to that of the enemy. Tho arrival of the division of Serrurier inclined the balance in our 96 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. favor. In order to give time for this last division to debouch by Gurdizzolo on the enemy's rear, and reach the field of battle, I at first merely sought to preserve my line without giving any decided character to the affair. As soon as the troops of Ser- rurier came in sight near Oavriana, I seriously engaged my right and center. His left being outflanked and on the point of being driven back upon Lake Garda, Wurmser deemed it best to order a prompt retreat, and to repass the Mincio, leaving in my hands cwenty pieces of artillery.* SECOND PASSAGE OF THE MINCIO. A junction with Quasdar.owich was the only thing Wurmser wanted to establish himself firmly on the Mincio and to maintain his communications with Mantua. In order to prevent these- results I resolved to attack the enemy again the next day, notwithstanding the bar- rier which separated us. While the main body of my army checked the Austrians on the Mincio towards Valeggio, Masseim crossed this river at Peschiera, and fell upon the enemy's right wing opposite this place. WURMSER'S RETREAT INTO THE TYROL. The en trencbments which the enemy had just commenced were soon carried and his troops put to flight. Wurmser, seeing his right wing forced and his communications with the Tyrol threatened, abandoned the Mincio and retreated up the Adige as far as Alia. He left in Mantua a garrison of fifteen thousand fresh troops. We pursued him to the Tyrol, and by the twelfth of August re- gained possession, of all the posts on Lake Garda, which we had last by the offensive movement of Wurmser. The division of Serrurier resumed the operations of Mantua, but, having lost all our siege artillery, we could only maintain the blockade. Wnrm- ser had now resumed his position in the Tyrol with a loss of ten or twelve thousand men and fifty cannon. The theatre of his defeat was the same as that where Prince Eugene had so well succeeded over Vendftme in the celebrated campaign of 1705. If the operations in the two cases be compared, it will be found that I maneuvered much more skillfully than the general of Louis XIV. Although he had Mantua on his side, while it was against me, he operated eo unskillfully as to lose his footing on the Adige and the Mincio, and to allow Prince Eugene to turn It 'has been said that during these extraordinary six days Napoleon never once took off his boots, nor lay down upon a bed. He -was almost constantly on horseback, and Thiers says that he billed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust any one with the execution of his orders, he was determined to see everything, to verify everything, to animate all by his presence. CAMPAIGN OF 1706 IN ITALY. 97 his left by transporting bis infantry in boats across Lake Garda on Gavardo; this movement required not less than six days, and in half that time I should have destroyed an army attempting such an enterprise in my presence. CLOSE ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN. France now began to gather the fruits of these victories. The government of Spain was not satisfied with a mere treaty of peace with ua. Seeing the danger to which Spain would be exposed if England should triumph upon the seas, they desired to preserve our colonial and maritime power as a safeguard for other nations. Should we fall, it was evident that Spain could no longer support her colonies or maritime influence, but would be- come, like Portugal, a mere tributary to proud Albion. Ani- mated by these wise and politic sentiments, the Cabinet of Ma- drid was willing to forget the natural sentiments caused by the Revolution, and form with France a treaty of offensive and de- fensive alliance. A treaty containing nearly all the clauses of the celebrated family compact was signed at San-Ildefonso on the nineteenth of August, 1796. This event contributed to our advantage in many respects, particularly in its influence upon the conduct of the Sardinian and Neapolitan governments. WURMSER RENEWS THE OFFENSIVE UPON THE BRENTA. No sooner had the Austrians entered the Tyrol than they received reinforcements sufficient to again outnumber us. Under these circumstances it was not to be expected that they would suffer us to quietly continue the siege of Mantua. Wurmser had received positive orders to relieve that place, and he now thought to accomplish this object by simple maneuvers. Davido- wich was to cover the Tyrol with twenty thousand men scattered from the enivirons of Feldkirch to Roveredo, while Wurmser him- self, with the remaining twenty-ix thousand, should descend the valley of the Brenta to debouch on Porto Legnago and the rear of my array. FAULTS OF THE PLAN. The Austrian general, suppos- ing my views as narrow as his own, judged that the only course I could pursue would be to fall back behind the Mincio, and that he would in this way liberate Mantua, by the single effect of his combinations. But I was not a man to be intimidated by vain demonstrations; and I could have outgeneraled him, even if his unfortunate blunders had not immediately placed him in my power. My good fortune rendered no great efforts on my part necessary. Having received a reinforcement of six thousand men, at the moment the enemy began his false maneuver by the -7 98 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. left, I resolved to penetrate into the heart of the Tyrol, and effect a junction with the army of the Rhine, conformably to the proposition I had made to the Directory, after the peace with Piedmont. THE ARMIES IN GERMANY. Emboldened by my victo- ries, and the success of the armies of the Rhine and of Sambre- et-Meuse, at the opening of the campaign, the Directory had re- newed the plan of 1703, in which Louis XIV. and the Elector of Bavaria had failed. This of the Directory was still more dif- ficult than that of Louis XIV., for then Bavaria was closely al- lied with France, and the French army, not, as now, foolishly scattered from the Danube to Bamberg, was seconded by the valiant Charles Theodore and his brave troops, and opposed only by Prince Eugene of Savoy and Maryborough, the German arm- ies acting merely as auxiliaries; the operations of Louis XIV. were, therefore, more excusable than those proposed in 1796. In order to execute this plan of the Directory, Jourdan ad- vances from Dusseldorf and Neuwied, on the Lahn, so as to draw the enemy on the lower Rhine; he gains two victories at Alten- kirchen. The Archduke hastens to meet him, and forces Jourdan to fall back, at the moment when my victories induce the Cabinet of Vienna to withdraw Wurmser from the upper Rhine, and to send him into Italy. Moreau, being now opposed only by the corps of Starray, passes the Rhine at Kehl, on the twenty-fourth of June, and on the twenty-eighth beats the Austrian general at Renchen. The Archduke returns in all haste from the lower Rhine, gives battle on the sixth of July at Ettlingen, is turned by the left, and forced to continue his retreat to the Danube ; he again attacks Moreau at Neresheim, but, his line being too much extended, be is defeated, and crosses the Danube, at Donawert, on the thirteenth of August. During this interval, Jourdan. favored by the success of Moreau and the departure of the Arch- duke, has again advanced upon Frankfort, and, leaving General Moreau to observe Mayence, with twenty-five thousand men. has continued his march up the Main by Schweinfurth and Bamberg. This direction was too eccentric, and it soon became necessary for him to fall back by Nuremberg, towards Amberg, in hopes of forming a junction with the army of the Rhine. This last army, after the battle of Neresheim, advanced on Ulm and Munich. Tt now had to extend its left, to form a junction with Jourdan, and to throw, by its right, a strong detachment on Innspruck. To require a single army to pursue two objects, so far separated, was the height of absurdity; for, after these two eccentric detach- ments, Moreau had hardly a skeleton of an army. If Jourdan CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 00 had fallen back from Aschaffenburg upon Donawert, and Moreau had carried his forces, en masse, upon the Lech, between Augs- burg and the mountains, we might have swept the Tyrol in concert, and all three have united on the Inn. But there was no concert of action; the Archduke Charles fell upon the isolated army of Jourdan, and defeated it, on the twenty-third of August, at Amberg, and, on the second of September, at Wurtzburg; and Moreau, whose right was already near Bregentz and Leut- kirch, compromised by the retreat of the army of the Sambre-et- Meuse, instead of penetrating the Tyrol, was compelled to seek safety in retreat. COMBATS OF MORI, ROVEBEDO, AND CALIANO. I was still ignorant of Jourdan's defeat, and Wurmser's move- ment on Bassano, when I advanced against him in the valley of the Adige. I directed on Roveredo the divisions of Augereau and Massena, which were now posted at Verona and Rivoli; these were to be joined on their march by the division of Vaubois, de- bouching from Salo by the west shore of Lake Garda. These forces could hardly fail to defeat the single corps of Davido- wicb. which was guarding the Tyrol, and scattered in many de- tacLments. On the fourth of September Wukassowich, who commanded his advanced guard, was driven from Mori by the maneuvers of Vaubois and Massena, and compelled to fall back, first upon Roveredo, and afterwards upon Caliano, where he united with the main body of the corps. Davidowich himself, assailed by superior numbers at Caliano, was forced by my brave soldiers to yield this formidable pass. Seeing that nothing could withstand our impetuous attacks, the enemy sought safety in flight, leaving in our hands twenty-five cannon and two thousand prisoners. Davidowich having rallied his forces behind the La vis, as it was important to remove the enemy from the vicin- ity of Trent, I ordered him to be attacked by. Vaubois. The Austrians attempted in vain to defend the passage of the Lavis, and \vere driven upon Salurn and Neumark. MARCH FROM TRENT 'BY THE GORGES OF THE BRENTA. I now learned, for the first time, of the movement of Wurmser, on the Brenta. So far from being intimidated by this, I derived the strongest hope of a decisive victory. An army, separated into two parts, whose centre I cut, overthrow its right, and turn its isolated left ! ! f What better could I desire? The occupation of Trent was so much the more important as it opened to us the head of the valley of the Brenta, and exposed 100 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the rear of Wurmser. I took care not to let so floe an opportu- nity escape me. Instead of attempting to form a junction at Ions pruck with the right of Moreau (from whom I had received no intelligence), I determined to profit by tthe enemy's false move- ment, and prevent his destroying the remainder of our troops be- fore Mantua, On the sixth, I directed Masee^na and Augereau by Levico, in the valley of the Brenta, in order to mask this move ment and check Davidowich; Vaubois remained on the Lavis. On the morning of the seventh the advanced guard of Augereau encountered at Primolan a detachment of three battalions of the enemy, closing the passages of the gorges of the Brenta. After a pretty close contest, this detachment, driven from Primolan and Fort Covolo, and outstripped by a -regiment of dragoons which closed the defile, was surrounded and forced to surrender. We advanced as far as Cismona. AFFAIR OF BASSANO. Wurmser had already reached Bassano; but seeing that, instead of trembling for my own com- munications, I had marched to cut off his, he was at a loss whether to advance or recede. Of all parts he chose the worst possible that of waiting the event at Bassano. His army was established on, the heights in front of the city, with the advanced guard at Solagna and Campo-Lungo. At seven o'clock on the morning of the eighth, we attacked this advanced guard, and drove it back in disorder on Bassano, and carried the town by force. The enemy knew not which way to turn; Wurmser, with the left of his corps-de-latailk, retired on Fonteniva, where he passed the Brenta, and marched upon Vicenza. Quasdanowich, with the right, being unable to reach the Brenta, directed his course toward Friouli. In this affair we captured two thousand prisoners, thirty cannon, and an immense train. WURMSER MARCHES UPON MANTUA. Wurmser now had remaining only fourteen thousand men, entirely disorganized, and scattered through a country whose communications were all in our hands; under such circumstances, I hoped to compel him to surrender; I therefore maneuvered to close all the out- lets. Augereau marched on Padua; Masse"na on Vicenza; and General Sahuguet, who commanded the division of Serrurier, received orders to take advantage by the difficult topography of the country between Legnago and Mantua, to prevent Wurmser from approaching that place. My measures seemed well taken ; but a fault of Sahuguet prevented me from obtaining complete success. Wurmser had gone from Vicenza to Legnago; not im- agining that my troops, after the great fatigue they had endured, CAMPAIGN OF R96 IX ITALY. 101 conld ]x>ssibly make other forced marches, he thought it safe to allow his troops to repose at Legnago during the day of the tenth. This delay ought to have been fatal to him; Massrinn had passed the Adige at Ronco, on the evening of the tenth, after encountering the greatest difficulties for want of a suitable equipage.* He succeeded at last in putting himself in a posi- tion where he could cut off the Austrian* from the road to Nogara. This advanced guard set off on the morning of the eleventh; but, deceived by a guide, instead of going directly to Sanguinetto, where it could have easily anticipated the enemy's column, it was conducted to Cerea. It there encountered the ad- vanced guard of Wunnser. who had begun his march on the morning of the eleventh, after having first left a garrison of seventeen hundred men at Legnago. The Austrians being the most numerous, our troops were repelled with loss, and Wunn- ser succeeded in marching his column without further obstacle on Xogara. I was somewhat vexed at this check, but still was satisfied that Wunnser could not escape; I knew that Sahuguet was at Castellaro, with the most positive orders to destroy the bridges of the Molinella. and by this means arrest the progress of the enemy. Unfortunately, he forgot the bridge of Villa- Impenta: Wunnser took advantage of this last means of escape from the certain ruin I had prepared for him, and shut himself up in Mantua. I never pardoned Sahuguet for so gross a fault, which deprived me of all the fruits of the victory of Bassano. The garrison of Legnago, blockaded on the left bank of the Adige by the division of Augereau, and on the right by a brigade of Masse'iMu capitulated on the twelfth. AFFAIRS AT 8AN-OEORGIO. Wurmser had flattered himself that be would raise the siege of Mantua at the head of twenty -six thousand men; be was now driven with twelve thou- sand vanquished troops to seek refuge there, and he himself to submit to a siege. At first he encamped his troops between San- Qeorgio and the citadel. This position would enable them to act offensively against our besieging army, and to make sorties for provisions. I therefore determined to force them to enter within the walls of the town, from which they conld not easily, on account of the topography of the environs, debouch M g*m*t us. The main body of my forces was therefore directed on Man- tua. Some partial advantages gained over Sahugoet and Mas- se*na on the thirteenth and fourteenth inspired them with a fatal This Is the second Important operation of Napoleon that faded for want of good bridge-equipage, Placentla was the first. \i 102 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. security. A general sortie being made by all the garrison on the fifteenth, I attacked them with all my forces: on the right Bahu- guet was posted at La Favorite; on the left, the division of Auger- eau marched from Governolo by Castellaro, on San-Georgio ; OJDI the centre, Mass6na took a covered position near Due-Castelli. Wurmser, seeing himself assailed on the two wings, supported them with strong detachments from the centre; seeing this part weakened, I suddenly threw forward the division of Masseim, which, meeting no serious resistance, penetrated as far as San- Georgio, and carried that place at the point of the bayonet. This cut off the retreat of the Austrian right, which now sought safety by penetrating in the direction of the citadel. Wurmser, having lost two or three thousand men, shut himself up within the walls of the place. POSITION OF THE AEMY ABOUT MANTUA. Entrust ing the blockade of Mantua to General Kilmaine,* who had under his orders the old division of Serrurier, eight thousand strong, I placed the rest of my army in observation before the Tyrol; it would have been useless and imprudent for me to penetrate into this region after Jourdan- had fallen back under the cannon of Dtisseldorf, and Moreau under those of Kehl; this useless imva sion would have allowed Wurmser to escape. I then, stationed Mass6na, with ten thousand men, at Bassano; Augereau, with nine thousand, at Verona; while Vaubois, with ten thousand, re- mained on the Lavis. Add to these my reserve of cavalry, and it will be seen that my available force did not exceed forty thou- sand combatants. The presence of a small army in Mantua ought to augment the trophies we hoped to gain from this conquest; but the re- verses which our arms had encountered on the Rhine gave us good grounds to fear that the Austrians might reinforce their *Kihnaine (Charles Jennings) was iborn In Dublin, of a noble family. He emigrated to France with his father, when very young, and entered the army at the age of fifteen. He was exceedingly fond of military studies, and early distinguished himself for his knowledge of the military art. He came to America with M. de Baron as lieutenant, and served In our Revo- lutionary War. He saw much service in the earlier wars of the French Revolution, and received rapid promotion. He greatly distinguished him- self In the campaign of 1796. He died in 1799. Napoleon thus describes his character: "He was an excellent cavalry officer, possessing coolness and coup-d'ocil, and was well suited to command on parties of observation, and all such delicate commissions as required discernment, sagacity, and presence of mind. In the campaign of Italy he rendered important services to the army, of which, but for his ill-health, he would have been one of the principal generals." CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 108 ariny in the Tyrol and the Friouli, and renew their efforts to deliver it. In that case, the presence of Wunnser with twenty thousand men in 1 , our rear might become an object of much so- licitude. As a climax to our ill-luck, my army encountered the autumnal fevers of the marshes about Mantua; and the southern horizon of Italy began to be overcast. NEW REPUBLICS FORMED. Convinced, however, that Austria would not immediately trouble me, I gave all the month of October to the interior organization of Italy. The threaten 1 - ing invasion of Wurmser had again revived the hopes of Rome, and they no longer troubled themselves with executing the con- ditions of the armistice of Bologna. To * disembarrass ourselves of this power, it was necessary in turn to negotiate and threat, en. Ercole III., Duke of Modena, had fled to Venice with hia treasures. This last descendant of the house of Este* belied his uarne in every respect. He was a man of breeding and tasto, but a sordid avarice obscured all his faculties. The Archduke Ferdinand was his heir, and this of itself was enough to make him our enemy. The regency instituted in his absence was hos- tile to us, and I, therefore, determined to destroy it; the people of Reggio were on our side, and required no stimulus to revolt. We occupied without obstacle the fortified place of Modena, and our troops effected a revolution there. 1 felt the necessity of creating a new state in Italy; but my plans for the regeneration of that country were not yet matured. Nothing is more difficult than to unite ten states of separate in- terests into one. The simple question of choosing the capital would excite local feelings and interests. For the time, it would have been sufficient for my purpose to revive the Lombard power, in order to oppose an antique Italian glory to the House of Austria. But to speak of a kingdom, or even a duchy, to the Rewels and Barras. had been to compromise me without any advantage; these gentlemen wished to republicanize everything. *ThIs was one of the most Illustrious families of Italy, and traced its origin to those petty princes who governed Tuscany in the time of the Car- lovingians (tenth century). In the contests of Guelfs and G-hibfrlines the Marquises of Este became leaders of the Guolf party, and acquired the territories of Ferrara and Modena. The house was afterwards celebrated for its magnificent patronage of distinguished men, and several of its dukes acquired the reputation of statesmen and warriors. Alfonso I. and his wife, Lucretia Borgia, both occupy a prominent position In the history of the sixteenth century. Ercole III., the last Duke of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, married his only daughter, Maria Beatrice, to the Archduke Ferdinand. The House of Este was definitely deprived of Its sovereignty by the treaty of Campo-Formip, October 17th, 1797. 104 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. I therefore laid the basis of several provisional republics, the Cisalpine, the, Cispadane, and Transpadane. They were democ- racies, for it would then have been imprudent to speak to my sol- diers about founding aristocracies; but I succeeded in preserving something of preseance to the nobility and clergy, in order to con ciliate these classes. Bologna and Ferrara formed a Transpa- dane Republic, Modena and Reggio united formed the Cispadane. It was best to give them this organization for the present, be- cause it suited the contracted notions of the plebeians of these cities, and facilitated the arrangements necessary to secure peace. Milan gradually adopted the idea of a general regenera- tion in Italy. The fear of being given up to Austria on a treaty of peace cooled the Lombards, and, in fact, I did not wish to compromise too seriously the people of these provinces; it was enough to sow the seed, in order to gather the fruit after the war. It was sufficient for me that Lombardy should organize some paid legions, which, with the National Guards of the repub- lics of the Po, would preserve order in the interior, and render available a part of the garrisons which I had left there. POLITICAL STATE OF THE RE8T OF ITALY. These measures were the more prudent as the affairs of the remainder of Italy presented an aspect not very encouraging. The negotia- tions with Naples were still under discussion, and the policy of Piedmont uncertain. Victor Amadeus might remember the in- fluence which his ancestor had acquired, by declaring, in 1705, against Louis XIV., when his armies were on the Adige against those of Prince Eugene. The same motives now existed, and, the circumstances being the same, he might hope to obtain likf results. The environs of Genoa were far from quiet, and the Sen ate, beset, it is said, by the solicitations of Faypoult, had some hand in the troubles of the Imperial Fiefs. The Pope, recovered from his terror, no longer thought of peace. Venice, by declar* ing against the new republics, could give a dangerous turn to the war. Fearing to arouse the Lion of St. Mark. I sought, in :oneort with the Directory, by propositions skillfully UTered, to attach to us the old republic, whose slightest effort, in the crit- ical situation of affairs, was capable of inclining the balance on the side of our enemies. Who knew but the present Doge, in imitation of the Morosini, Dandolos, and Alvianis, might put himself at the bead of twenty thousand men and assist the Im- perialists in expelling from Italy that handful of men who had just excited so many conflicting interests? Would not such an act have decided the fate of Mantua, encouraged the King of Naples, and also the King of Sardinia, whose country, covered CAMPAIGN OF 1790 IA T ITALY. 105 with a triple line of posts, was ill-disposed towards us? To de- termine the vacillating Senate to throw itself boldly imto the arms of France, by painting to it in turn the dangers to which it was exposed on the one side by propagandism and on the other by the ambition of Austria; and, in case of refusal, to quiet it with promises and to prolong its lethargy by protestations of friendship, till it could be overthrown by a popular revolu- tion; such were the means to which I resorted in order to accom- plish my objects. But the result did not answer to my first hopes. In vain did the Minister Lallement exhaust all the ar- guments of diplomacy; neither the proposition of a quadruple alliance with the Porte, Spain, and Naples, nor the fear of the encroachments of its redoubtable neighbors, nor the dependence of Austria and England, could break the impassable policy of a body already struck with paralysis in all its parts. Trusting in its own weakness, it required all the entreaties of such men an Pesaro to induce the Senate to order a levy of Sclavonic soldiers, and the armament of a flotilla for the defense of its lagoons; measures of interior security of which no foreign power had a right to complain, but which in the present state of affairs caused us much anxiety. The coincidence of these armaments with the refusal of the Pope to sign the treaty of peace, and the arrival at Rome of the Marquis del Vasto, charged by the King of Na- ples to form an offensive and defensive alliance between the two states, caused me to think that I should soon have to contend with an Italian league, unless the Directory hastened its negoti- ations with Naples. I urged it to make peace with that power at any price, as it was the only means of forcing the rest of the Peninsula to terms. DISCUSSIONS WITH ROME. Pius VL continually pro- tested his love of peace, but he partook too much of the hatred which the cardinals and secretary of state had vowed against our democratic principles, to willingly close the negotiations with the severe conditions which I had imposed upon him; he pro- longed them, in hopes of finding, sooner or later, an occasion for breaking them off with eclat. The first success of Wurmser, and the momentary raising of the blockade of Mantua, revived the hopes of the pontifical government; it confided in these teni- porary successes so much as to charge the prelate Tagreca to endeavor to retake Ferrara, and succeed, under different pre- texts, in eluding the articles of the armistice. It had been speci- fied that no ecclesiastic should be sent to treat definitively of peace; but, in violation of this clause, the prelates Petrarchi and Vangel- isti had been sent to Paris. Such a want of faith on the part of 106 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Rome was calculated to destroy all confidence, and the French government, refusing to recognize these two agents, ordered them to quit Paris in twenty-four hours. The nuncios and leg- ates of Ancoim and Romana conducted themselves as declared enemies of the French army. Finally, the Holy See was negoti- ating a close alliance with the Cabinet of Vienna and asking of it officers for the papal troops. Informed of these malevolent dispositions, I was preparing to put an end to them, when the operations of the imperial armies forced me to dissemble my re- sentment and to turn my whole attention to the Adige. The Pope, after the dismissal of his agents, sought to renew negotia- tions at Florence. The prelate Galleppi, the Dominican Soldati, and the Chevalier d'Azzara, the Spanish ambassador who had just been mediator in the ill-observed armistice, presented them- selves to the commissioners Salicetti and Garreau, but .it was im- possible to come to an understanding. These last required the Pope to withdraw and declare null the bulls published agaiust France since the Revolution; that he should close his ports to the English, and make reparation for the murder of Basseville.* Car- rying their inflexibility to the last degree, they presented to his plenipotentiaries a treaty in sixty-four articles, declaring that it must be adopted or rejected as it was, as they were not authorized to enter into any discussion. This method of treating, wholly unprecedented even in the revolutionary diplomacy of 1793, pro- duced an injurious .effect. Gralleppi returned to Rome. So pow erfully had the success of the Austrians operated upon all minds that the pontifical government, thinking the deliverance of Italy near at hand, not only rejected the propositions submitted to it, but suddenly passed to hostile preparations; the armistice was disregarded; the money sent to pay the contributions wa recalled, and new amounts raised in all the states of the Church. The novenas, prayers, processions, bulls in a word, all that could influence the hatred of an ignorant and superstitious multitude was put in operation in order to increase the recruits of the papal army. But these means, so powerful in the fifteenth century, had now lost their magic; the mass of the people limited themselves to the offer of vows and prayers for the success of so just a war! Some of the princes, through fear of losing their privileges, were *In 1793 a popular commotion was caused in Rome by the display which some young French artists made of the tri-colored flag; the carriage of Basseville, the French envoy, was attacked In the street, his house was broken into, by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. He was thrust through the abdomen with a bayo- net, and dragged through the street, holding his bowels In his hands. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALY. 107 compelled to join in the preparations. The Constable Colonna raised a regiment of infantry, the Prince Gustiniani offered one of cavalry. But these were not sufficient to form an army; in- deed, they could hardly raise eight thousand men; but they flat- tered themselves that Naples would raise thirty thousand. In the meantime Chevalier d'Azzara, interposing the media- tion of Spain, succeeded in retarding the explosion, and, in these trying circumstances, rendered us eminent services. The French envoy, Cacault, on his side, contributed, by his impassable coun- tenance, to avoid an open rupture, which at this epoch might have had for us the most fatal results. DEFINITIVE PEACE WITH NAPLES. These trouble* were at last happily dissipated by the definitive treaty signed at Paris, the tenth of October, beween the French Republic and the Court of the Two Sicilies. The conditions were very mild, com pared with those imposed upom the Pope and Piedmont. This moderation was due, without doubt, to the great distance of the kingdom of Naples, the difficulty of carrying on war against it, and to the urgency of getting rid of an enemy whose army alone ex- ceeded my own. If we had continued hostilities, the Neapolitans could have sustained Borne, and, in concert with the English divi- sion of Corsica, advanced upon the Po with forty thousand men, rendering the conquest of Italy still doubtful. But, after the treaty, they would no longer trouble themselves about Lombardy; Borne would be left to its own troops; the English would not alone attempt anything in Tuscany, and nothing would interfere in the ulterior military operations against Austria. The Di- rectory, yielding at last to my solicitations, supported by Carnot, abated its pretensions, in order to facilitate the treaty. The Court of Naples merely engaged to remain neutral, to ferret out the authors of the crime of 1793, to promise to France a recip- rocal treaty of commerce, to recognize the Batavian republic, and to renew with it ancient relations. AFFAIBS OF PIEDMONT. If the definitive peace con- cluded with Ferdinand, on the tenth of October, rid us of a trouble- some neighbor, the death of the King of Sardinia, about the middle of the same month, seemed likely to produce a vexatious change in the policy of the Court of Turin. The new king, Charles Emman- uel, had declared for peace, and had favorably received the. prop- ositions of alliance made by Poussielgue, but he had put in a condition that they should cede to him Lombardy, and the Di- rectory had obstinately refused every arrangement of this nat- ure. It was therefore to be feared that this prince, desirous of signalizing his accession to the throne, would seek to restore the 108 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. lustre of his power by acquisitions equal to the provinces lost by his predecessors, in this war. The refusal of France, leaving him no hope of obtaining indemnities in that quarter, he would naturally join the coalition as soon as there was any hope of his recovering his lost provinces. This resolution seemed so much the more probable, as the lesser powers usually range themselves on the strongest side, especially where fear is united with the manifest interest of the state. This uncertainty of our relations with Piedmont made me strongly sensible of the necessity of making sure of Genoa. If Piedmont should change her policy, we would then have neither a base of operations nor a line of re- treat ; the possession) of Genoa would, procure both. I was not now in a situation to obtain this by force, and, moreover, we had no motives for hostile measures with that power. NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENOA. The first success of our arms had closed the port of Genoa against English vessels, in reprisal for hostilities committed by them, in 1793, against French ships. The Senate refused, for a long time, to recognize the Count de Girola, the envoy of the Emperor, under the pre- text that he had excited insurrection in the Imperial Fiefs. The Genoese people were well-disposd towards France, on account of the intimate commercial relations between the two countries, and the Senate had given such proofs of its moderation as ought to have satisfied us; but this was not sufficient for my safety, or the ambition of the Directory; we wished Liguria to make decid- edly common cause with France. The presence of the English minister, Drake, the reports he circulated respecting the designs of the English upon the rear of our army, the seizure of the frigate La Modeste, and other offenses, of which Genoa was not guilty, seemed plausible grounds of complaint. Thinking it best to assume an imperious tone, I dispatched, at the moment when embarrassments of all kinds were troubling me on the Adige, an aide-de-camp to the Doge, with a list of grievances, for which I asked reparation; threatening, in case of refusal, to march on Genoa. But the moment was not propitious. Fay- poult demonstrated that an untimely explosion might spoil all; besides, the news that the Directory were treating at Paris, with the republic, turned aside the blow; and, waiting for a proper time for the execution of my designs, I exacted new sums of money. On the ninth of October a treaty, stipulating the pay- ment of four millions, the shutting of the port to the English, free passage to our troops and convoys destined for the armies of Italy, transformed Genoa into a French plaee-of-arms. TROUBLES IN THE FIEFS. The peasants of the Imperial CAMPAIGN OF 1793 IN ITALY. 109 Fiefs, instigated, as some say, by the agents of Faypoult, and, ac- cording to others, by Count Girola, opposed this treaty, and or- ganized new insurrections. The Fiefs of St. Marguerita, situated advantageously in the valley of the Scriva, was the focus of the revolt. They had assembled there escaped prisoners of war and deserters, for the purpose of afterwards sending them to the Tyrol, by Sestri di Levante. There was a depot of arms and mu- nitions, which they drew in secret from Genoa. Wurmser, in- formed of their movements, wished an officer should be charged with their direction; but, again, on this occasion, he was antici- pated. The French sent some movable columns into the Fiefs, scattered the assemblage, took hostages, and got possession of the arms. With the exception of the Barbets, who disturbed the passage of the Apensnines, all the north of Italy was tranquil, thanks to the presence of the little army of Kellerman. AFFAIRS OF CORSICA. The possession of Corsica be- came daily more difficult and onerous to the English. The dec- laration of war by Spain rendered their situation in the Med- iterranean perilous, and exposed this colony to the attack of two powers well provided with the m^ans of making descents; moreover, they had much to fear from the inhabitants, the ma- jor part of whom remained sincerely attached to France. Even the Paolists, deceived by England, had already committed many acts of hostility against the viceroy. ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF PORTO-FERRAJO. Lord Elliot, convinced that it was not the interest of Great Britain to preserve, by force of arms, a station where the population was so irritable, had been for some time preparing to evacuate the island. Hearing of the occupation of Leghorn by the French troops, and the preparations made at Toulon for an expedition, he felt the urgency of the English occupying Porto-Ferrajo. This maritime, military, and commercial station, for England, united almost all the advantages, without the inconveniences, of Corsica, The Tuscan commandant was therefore summoned on the tenth of July; and in retaliation for our occupation of Leg- horn, he permitted the English to occupy the forts in conjunc- tion with the troops of the Grand Duke. EVACUATION OF CORSICA. Elliot soon .had reason to congratulate himself on this arrangement. The discontent of the Corsicans continued to increase; the glory reflected upon them by my victories, and the reception of the Corsican patriots in France, contrasted too strongly with the treatment received by their compatriots from the English, to say nothing of the old na- tional hatred, not to incite all the inhabitants to throw off their 110 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. yoke. The number of these patriot refugees at Marseilles and LeghoFL increased daily, and the intelligence they maintained with those who at first ranged themselves under the banners of England, announced that the moment oi insurrection had como. An order of evacuation from the admiralty to the governor pre- vented an actual outbreak. In the meantime I myself was endeavoring to lend assistance to my compatriots; I charged General Gentilli to make at Leg- horn secret preparations for an expedition. On the other hand, the government had directed at Toulon the preparation for an armament necessary for this enterprise; the Spanish squadron of Langara, leaving Carthagena with twenty-five vessels, seemed certain of success. As soon as Gentilli got wind of the disposi- tions of the English for a retreat, he embarked General Casalta with a small detachment of troops-of-the-line, and some armed refugees. This officer, braving the enemy's cruisers, and combat- ing the elements, arrived, in spite of every obstacle, in Corsica, on the nineteenth of October. The next day he was joined by a considerable number of patriots, with whose assistance he at- tacked Bastia. Master of the heights commanding the city, and protected by the inhabitants, he summoned the garrison of the fort to surrender; the English reached their vessels, but their rear guard, composed in part of the regiment of Dillon, lost several prisoners. Saint Florent and Ajaccio were soon sur- rendered, and in a few days the island returned to the empire of which it formed a part. SITUATION OF THE ARMIES ON THE ADIGE. These political revolutions, armistices, and interior expeditions filled up the interval between the combat of San-Georgio and the bat- tle of Arcole. The main body of the French army remained dur- ing these two months about Mantua, and in observation on the Brenta and the Adige. Epidemic fevers had filled my hospitals, and diminished considerably the number of combatants; rein- forcements arrived too slowly to enable me to make any advance. The Austrians, on the contrary, made vast preparations for a new trial of arms. ALVINZI COMES TO SUCCOR MANTUA. By the middle of October, the forces of Davidowich's corps were increased to near twenty thousand men. The corps of Quasdanowich, which after the defeat of Bassano had retired to Gorizia, was also in- creased to about twenty-five thousand men. The permanent or- ganization of the Croats into regiments had produced a part of these forces, and the rest had been drawn from the northern Tyrol after the retreat of the armies of the Rhfhe. or had been re- CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALT. Ill cruited in the interior. General Alvinzi, appointed commander- in-chie of all these forces, repaired to the corps of Quasdano- wich and took the offensive, directing himself by Bassano on Verona, where >he hoped to effect a junction with Dav'dowich, who had received orders to descend the Adige. My position was ex- tremely difficult; I could not advance to meet Alvinzi without leaving Verona, and consequently enabling Davidowich to drive back Vaubois, to unite with Wurmser under Mantua, and thus establish on my rear an army superior in number to all the forces which I could, collect. On the other hand, I could not concen- trate the mass of my forces on Boyeredo without leaving open to Alvinzi the road to Mantua, which, in an inverse sense, would effect the same results. Nor could I well concentrate on Verona, for the communications between Alvinzi and Davidowich would then be reestablished by the valley of the Brenta, It was al- most as necessary for me to prevent the junction of these two generals, as the union of one of them with Wurmser. I there- fore was obliged to adopt a middle course. VAUBOIS DRIVEN BACK ON BIVOLI. Vaubois was too inferior in numbers to effectually defend the access to Trent. By making him take the offensive, I thought to intimidate Da- vidowich: I was deceived. The second of November Vaubois obtained some advantages at St. Michael, in the valley of the Adige; but turned himself on the right by the valley of the Lavis, he was obliged to fight in retreat the next day, in" order to reach Oaliiano. Davidowich entered Trent on the fourth. The same day the army of Alvinzi arrived at Citadella and Bassano. At the approach of the enemy, Massena fell back by Vicenza tc, Montebello. The communication between the two parts of the enemy's army now seemed certain; but as in changing their gen- eral the Austrians had not changed their system of strategy, they still continued to act separately. Davidowich marched on Caliano, and Alvinzi prepared to attack Verona, by Vicenza. I determined to repeat, from right to left, the maneuver which, from left to right, had succeeded so well against Wurmser; that is, I determined to defeat Alvinzi and drive him behind the Piave. and then ascend the Brenta to assail the rear of Davidowich. AFFAIRS OF THE BRENTA. I advanced towards the Brenta with Augereau and Massena; I already found the enemy on this side of the river. On the sixth Massena attacked, at Carmignano, the left of Alvinzi, which was commanded by Pro- vera. His right, under the orders of Quasdanowich, was attacked the same day at Lenova by Augereau. We obtained only a partial success. Provera repassed the Brenta and Quasdanowich 112 LIFE OF NAPOLEOX. approached Bassano without our having been able to seriously injure them. The enemy was stronger and better prepared to receive us than I had expected. On the other hand, 1 learned that he was closely pressing Vaubois in the valley of the Adige. It was necessary to renounce my projects, for I felt the import- ance of calling to me Vaubois and Kilmaine. On the seventh, I took the road to Verona, Alvinzi followed me and arrived on the eleventh at Villa-Nova. Vaubois, attacked at Caliano, sus- tained a hard fight. On the sixth and seventh he maintained his position ; but, fearing to be turned by the right, he retired on the night of the seventh and eighth to Corona. I hastened with all speed to this division, harangued the 39th and 85th, which had failed at Caliano, and threatened to inscribe on their flags that they were no longer worthy to be of the army of Italy. They swore to conquer or die. COMBAT OF OALDIERO. In the meantime I was closely pressed; and I determined to fall again on the army of Alvinzi. On the eleventh I left Verona, with Masse"na anid Augereau, and the next day attacked the enemy in position at Caldiero. A vi- olent northeast hailstorm in the face of our soldiers, and the strong position of the enemy, rendered our efforts utterly useless ; we were repelled with loss. PASSAGE OF THE ADIGE AT KONCO. I returned to Verona in a critical condition; my forces were everywhere too weak. Fortune seemed decidedly against us. But I had hereto- fore profited by her favor; I now wished to prove to the world that I could conquer with fortune against me. Any other gen- eral would have repassed the Mincio, and lost Italy. But my future hopes would have died with the loss of my conquests. It was necssary to risk all for all. I resolved to pass the Adige be.- low the left of Alvinzi, in order to threaten his rear. This was a hazardous course; but it was the only one that left me any chance of success. Alvinzi, in advancing upon Verona by the route of Caldiero, had, on his right, impracticable mountains; on his left the Adige; and in front, a strongly fortified town. The ground which he occupied was thus inclosed on three sides, and offered no other outlet than the defile of Villa-Nova. In cross ing to Ronco I approached this outlet, and forced the enemy to fight with his line faced to the rear, in order to open to him- self a passage; finally, I placed my inferior army in marshy ground, where the enemy could give battle upon three dikes, and where I had all the advantage of the defensive, joined to the individual superiority of my soldiers. BATTLE OF ARCOLE. I withdrew General Kilmaine from CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 118 the blockade of Mantua, with two thousand men, and confided to him the defense of Verona, which place it was indispensable for us to maintain, in order to close the passage of the valley of the Adigeto Alvinzi, and prevent him from joining Davidowich. With the divisions of Massena and Augereau, and the reserve of cavalry, in all about twenty thousand men, I left Verona on the. four- teenth for Ronco, where I threw a bridge across the Adige. Some have thought that I ought to have crossed at Albaredo, in order to avoid the Alpon, its marches, and the defile of Arcole. It is true I should, in this way, have more easily gained Villa- Nova, but I was not strong enough to recklessly throw myself upon the only route of Alvinzi; I could merely threaten it^without quit- ting the support of the Adige; and at the same time, it was neces- sary for me to maintain my connection with Verona and the divis- ion of Vaubois. The movement by Albaredo was too long to ac- complish this triple object, and it was by far too dangerous to give battle on the Alpon, at Villa-Nova, with my front to the rear, in order to face Verona. I therefore passed the Adige at Ronco, on the fifteenth of November. The ground which separates it from the Alpon was entirely inundated: over this there were only three dikes. Massena took the one on the left, which runs nearly parallel to the Adige, as far as Porcil. Augereau took the centre dike, leading to the bridge of Arcole, over the Alpon. A brigade of Croats, detached as flankers from the left, defended this last point. These troops made the best use of the advan- tages of ground to repel the attacks of Augereau. This circum- stance, which I could not foresee, was near becoming fatal: the resistance of the Croats gave Alvinzi time to hasten to their as- sistance. The Austrian general, fearing that hiis- retreat might be cut off, sent Provera, with six battalions, against Masg^na, to Porcil, and, with the main body of his army, fell back upon San-Bonifacio. This unforeseen opposition at Arcole did not prevent me from persevering with my project. If I could not reach Villa-Nova by the left bank of the Alpon. I could act by Porcil more directly on Alvinzi's line of retreat; but it was neces- sary to be master of the village and defile of Arcole, in order to secure my right, and to avoid being taken myself in this cul- de-sac. I again tried to carry the bridge. The greater part of my generals had been wounded in leading on their men. I now threw myself at the head of my grenadiers; but it was all use- less. Possibility had limits even for my troope. The head of the column was broken, and most vigorously repulsed. In the midst of this disorder I was thrown from the dike into the mo- rass, and ran imminent risk of being made prisoner: Belliard 8 114 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. charged with a company of grenadiers and rescued me. Towards evening the Austrians abandoned Arcole, at the approach of a brigade which I had thrown across the Adige, by the ferry of Albaredo, and which* advanced by ascending the left of the Alpon. But it was now too late, and I did not wish to run the risk of passing the night with my troops crowded together in the mo rass, and exposed to the enemy's army, which was now deployed between San-Bonifacio and San-Stefano. Moreover, it was pos- sible that Vaubois might be driven to Bussalingo, and, in that case, it would be necessary for me to make a forced march in the night, on the Mincio, in order to join him at Mantua; but this I could not possibly accomplish without taking the precaution of repassing to the right of the Adige, in the daytime. This I did leaving on the left bank troops merely sufficient to guard the bridge. It was mow too late to act upon the rear of Alvinzi ; but I had, at least, succeeded in removing him from Verona. This circum- stance only postponed my defeat, unless I could throw him com- pletely back upon the Brenta. This it was necessary to effect at any sacrifice. Certain that Vaubois had not been molested, on the fifteenth, by Davidowich, we repassed to the left of the Adige on the morning of the sixteenth. The Austrians having occupied Albaredo, Arcole, and Porcil, now advanced against our bridge; we drove them back. Massena entered Poroil, and, throwing back one of his brigades on the centre, cut off, on the dike, a column of fifteen hundred men, Augereau again advanced upon Arcole; here the operations of the previous evening were repeated, and we sustained considerable loss, without being able to carry the bridge. At night we recrossed the Adige, for the same reason as on the previous day. But all this ill success did not discourage me. Davidowicb had attacked the Corona on the sixteenth, and got possession of Rivoli. Vaubois had retired in good order on Jiussalingo and Castel-Novo. It was now very important for me to force Alvinzi to retire beyond Villa-Nora, so as to open a direct communica- tion with Verona, for the assistance of Vaubois. The third time I renewed the attack; and I would have renewed it ten times more, if I had not succeeded. I felt that the preservation of Italy was necessary for my political existence. I preferred dying at the head of my army, to commencing a retreat which I knew would destroy all the fruits of my preceding exploits. On the seventeenth, at the break of day, my troops again took the road to the bridge. Fortune seemed decidedly opposed to me. At the moment of effecting the passage one of the boats of the bridge CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 115 sunk. This unfortunate accident would have deprived me of all chance of success had not the address and zeal of my ponton iers extricated me from the difficulty. When the bridge wa> repaired, my army crossed the river and again drove back th< enemy to Porcil and Arcole. But as this was no longer the prin cipal point of attack, I now limited myself to sending General Robert against it with a demi-brigade of Massena's division. Massena himself moved with the other demi-brigade against Porcil. The rest of the division remained in reserve near tht bridge. If the enemy should profit by his superiority over Rob- ert, I was ready to make him repent it. Augereau's division had orders to throw a bridge over the Alpon near its mouth, in order to act against the left of the Austrians and take Arcole in reverse. The Austrians, being reinforced at Arcole, took the offen- sive, routed General Robert, and pursued him quite to the bridge This was just what I wished, for it was important to cut up tho enemy's forces as much as possible before attempting the pas- sage of the Alpon. Their deep column, proud of a first suc- cess, encountered the main body of Massena's division, at the same time that the troops I had concealed in the reeds fell upon the flank of the column, cutting off three thousand men and driv- ing the remainder back in disorder upon Arcole. This was the decisive moment. The divison of Augereau, having at last suc- ceeded in constructing its bridge, crossed the stream and came up in front of the left wing of the Austrians, which rested its left on a morass. I had expected to turn this obstacle by means of eight hundred men from Legnago; but as they had not yet made their appearance, I thought to impose on my enemies by making a feint against the flank. I therefore ordered an of- ficer to gain the point of the Austrian wing with twenty horse- men and some buglers. This ruse produced its effect. The Aus- trian infantry lost that aplomb which they preserved till then. Augereau profited by this to force it back, and the opportune appearance of the small garrison of Legnago in rear of the enemy, precipitated his retreat towards San-Bonifacio. The di- vision of Massena then debouched by Arcole and St. Gregorio. Alvinzi, who had not been able to arrest us upon ground the most favorable for the defensive, did not attempt to risk a battle in an open country with an army already reduced to about fifteen thousand combatants. On the eighteenth he retired to Monte- bello.* I had lost almost as many men as the enemy; I had not *In speaking of this movement, Alison says: "It was so apparent to all the Austrian army that this retreat was the result of a secret under- 1J6 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. defeated him, but I had gained the means of turning against Davidowich. VAUBOIS DRIVEN FEOM RIVOLI.-This general, who for eight days had amused himself before the entrenchments of the Carona, had at last attacked Vaubois on the sixteenth. He gained no great advantage on the first day, but on the sec- ond Vaubois, threatened to be turned by the light, evacuated his position, and fell back behind the Mincio, crossing the river at Peschiera. On the eighteenth Davidowich advanced to Castel- Novo, and I now resolved to make him pay dearly for his slight suc- cess. T sent my reserve of cavalry in pursuit of Alvinzi, and with the main body of my infantry fell back from Villa-Nova to Verona and made a triumphal entry into that city by the gate of Venice, three days after having left it mysteriously by the gate of Milan. The inhabitants, and my soldiers, astonished at maneuvers which they could not comprehend, regarded me with equal admiration. Masse"na recrossed the Adige at Verona and marched upon Villa-Franca, where he expected to meet Vaubois. who had again crossed the Mincio at Borghetta, These tw6 di- visions were to attack Davidowich in front, while Augereau marched from Verona by the mountains on Dolce in order to cut off his retreat. Davidowich barely escaped a complete overthrow by hastening to regain Roveredo; his rear guard was much cut up. Alvinzi, on his side, seeing that he was pursued by cavalry only, returned to Villa-Nova. But I had now finished with Davido- wich, and was preparing to debouch anew by Verona on the left of the Adige. Alvinzi, being isolated, did not venture to take the field, but fell back behind the Brenta. WURMSER BESIEGED IN MANTUA. During these stir- ring events upon the Adige, Wurmser had remained quietly in Mantua. Alvinzi, at the beginning of his operations, had calcu- lated that he could not arrive before Mantua till the twenty- standing with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now pending, that they openly and loudly expressed their indigna- tion. One colonel broke his sword in, pieces, and declared he .would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his troops. Certain it is that Alvinzi, during this dreadful strife at Arcole, had neither exhibited the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoleon." The object of these remarks is evidently to di- minish the glory acquired by Napoleon in this victory. Never was a battle harder fought by the Austrians, and to attribute Alvinzi's retreat, after seventy-two hours' fighting, to a secret understanding with Napoleon, is too absurd to merit comment. Alison's account of this 'battle 1s wholly chimerical, but where errors so abound, It 1s hardly worth while to point out the details. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 117 third, and had engaged Wurmser not to make a sortie till that day. But as things did not turn out exactly as the enemy had hoped, he found that Kilmaine had already returned before the place. The besiegers were therefore in a situation to repel any jr- operations of the besieged. r REVERSES IN GERMANY. These events were the more fortunate for France, as the armies in Germany had been forced to retreat to the Rhine. I have already said that the Archduke Charles had wisely resolved to throw the main body of his army on Jourdan, certain that, if he beat him at Franconia, he would force him upon Mayence, and compromise Moreau, who had ad- vanced as far as Munich. With these dispositions he could hardly fail of success. And if, after his victory at Wurtzburg, on the third of September, he had thrown himself on the com- munications of Moreau, sending only some twenty thousand men in pursuit of the debris of Jourdan, the army of the Rhine must have been lost. Moreau, but feebly troubled, made his retreat in good order, while the Archduke was operating on the Lahn. Our armies prepared to defend Kehl and Dusseldorf ; the Archduke concentrated all his means on the upper Rhine, to retake Kehl. but Moreau and Desaix most skillfully defended it till the mid- dle of January. As a climax of contrariety, the Directory re- placed Jourdan* by Beurnonville,f a man very much inferior to his predecessor. Although reinforced by twenty thousand men from the superb troops which for two years had occupied Hol- land, and by twenty-five thousand who had blockaded Mayence, he remained inactive for two months, with eighty thousand men against twenty-five thousand Austrians. This inaction was the more censurable as it took place in November and December, *Jean-Baptiste Jourdan was born at Limoges, France, in 1762. He en- tered the military service in 1778, and fought in America. He distinguished himself in the early wars of the French Revolution, and in 1793 became jreneral-of-divlsion, and held several Important commands, but (was soon after promoted by Napoleon to the office of governor of Piedmont. In 1803 he was made genera 1-in-chief of the army of Italy, and in 1804 Marshal of France. He served in many of Napoleon's wars, and espoused his cause In the final struggle of 1815. He was an honest, upright man, and showed considerable ability as a general, but never gained a very high reputation. lie died in 1820. Encyclopedia Americana. tPlerre Kiel de Benrnonville -was born in 1752, at Champlgnole. He was made general in 1792. He saw much service, -but never distinguished himself as a general. Between 1791 and 1793 he is said to have been present in no less than one hundred and seventy-two engagements. Napo- leon employed him principally on diplomatic services. He died In 1821 Bioprapliie Modcrne. 118 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. when the affairs of Moreau and myself were the most critical; I had them just experienced my severe losses upon the Brenta, at Caliano, and at Arcole. DESCENT UPON IRELAND. Venice having rejected our alliance^ it became necessary to adopt some plan to relieve our- selves from our critical position. I most strongly urged the Directory to send forces sufficient, not only to support myself, but to overthrow Wurmser, and attack the heart of the Austrian monarchy. The Directory, at first, sent me one division, drawn from the army of the Atlantic coast ; but the troubles excited in the south, by the royalist reaction, caused a part of them to be retained in Provence, and General Rey brought to me hardly six thousand men, while they might easily have sent me twenty- five thousand, had it not been fop the expedition which was sent, at this inopportune moment, against Ireland. My object now being merely to speak of what concerns myself, rather than to trace a history of the events which took place at a time when I was not at the head of affairs in France, I will not stop to investigate what was then occurring in Ireland, nor to give the details of Lord Malmesbury's negotiations at Paris. I will merely say that the Directory, meditating an expedition of twenty-five thousand men under Hoche, in order to give to four millions of Irish Catholics a point of support which might shake the English power, neglected, for this important but untimely object, to send me the reinforcements which might have been withdrawn from the coast. Nothing was more natural than to attempt this expedition to Ireland, after having made peace witli Austria ; but it was imprudent, with our small forces, to attempt to dictate terms at the same time at Vienna and Dublin. Hoche left Brest on the fourteenth of December, but his squadron was dispersed by storms; his isolated vessels had the good luck to escape the English and regain their ports; his soldiers, debarked at the beginning of the following campaign, went to restore victory to the banners of the armies of Sambre-et-Meuse, and, after one whole year's delay, joined the army in Italy. There is a division of opinion respecting the degree of im- portance, and chance of success, of this expedition to Ireland. There is no doubt, however, that an expedition of this kind, seri- ously occupying England, might have prevented her from send- ing forces into the two Indies. Many military men have thought that the object was to maintain a long and determined contest with a nation full of energy and patriotism, rather than merely to land a few divisions; and that France had no chance of success while inferior upon the sea; that the feeble army of Hoche, after CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN IT ALT. 119 having forced the Court of St. James to resort to the national levies, and finding itself consumed by a hundred battles, would have been obliged to sign a treaty of evacuation or to reeiiiba.rk its scattered forces. Admitting this supposition as the most probable, it follows, that instead of retaining twenty-five thou- sand of the elite of Brittany for so long a time, and turning them afterward upon the coast of Ireland, it would have been more wise to send five or six thousand of them, with skillful chiefs, to Tippoo-Saib, and the other twenty thousand to me, so as to secure the defeat of Wurmser and Alvinzi, under whose attacks I had three times been reduced to the very brink of destruction. The elements of an Irish insurrection would continue for a long time, so that there was no reason why the Directory might not adjourn its projects to a time when, freed from the continental war, it could attempt an expedition without compromising the success of its arms. In the actual state of things, it seemed more urgent to deliver India, and to dictate peace to Austria, than to excite a civil war on the banks of the Shannon. USELESS NEGOTIATIONS. The protracted negotiations with Mahnesbury could lead to no conclusions, for England would not sanction the change of government im Belgium till the con- sent of Austria was obtained. Clarke was therefore sent to ask at Vienna the conclusion of an armistice, and to propose sending negotiators to Bale or Paris. He presented himself for this purpose at my head-quarters, but the success of the Archduke in Germany had so raised the hopes and pretensions of the House of Austria, that they would not permit him to pass the outposts. An event of the highest importance, which had just occurred in the north, might also change the state of affairs on the con- tinent. The great Catharine had, by sudden death, on the seven- teenth of November, closed her long and illustrious career; her son, Paul I., succeeded her. This prince, singular in every- thing, might adopt a policy entirely opposite to that of his mother, either profiting by the commotions in the west to make war upon the Turks, or taking part himself in the affair* of France. In the uncertainty that then existed on these questions, the Cabinet of Vienna thought best to send the Baron de Vincent to meet Clarke. They commenced a discussion on the fourth of January, at Vicenza, on the proposition of opening negotiations, and on the necessity of first concluding an armistice for the armies of Germany and Italy. Peace presented too many subjects for dis- cussion to be settled definitely at an outpost, and the conditions of an armistice offered in the case no less difficulties. I showed Clarke that if any communication was allowed with Mantua, all 120 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the advantage would be on the side of Austria, for famine must soon force its surrender; but Austria insisted that the garrison should be supplied with provisions during the suspension of hostilities. Of course they could not agree. M. de Vincent, a negotiator without powers, returned to Vienna to submit the prop- ositions of France, and his cabinet sent Clarke to the Imperial Minister near the Court of Turin. In this interval, Malmesbury, not having been able to agree to the first article of the negotia- tion, left Paris, under the suspicion of having been sent merely to learn the object of the preparation made at Brest for the expedition to Ireland. We therefore now had only to think, on our part, of maintaining ourselves in our present position till the arrival of reinforcements, and on the side of Austria, to redouble activity and energy to save Wurmser. REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE RHINE. The govern- ment, which undoubtedly had little hope of success in the nego- tiations of Clarke, convinced by my picture of the dangers of my position, and by the contest at Arcole, that I was within a hair's breadth of being driven from Italy, determined to take more decided measures: the five divisions of Bernadotte and Del- mas, drawn from the armies of the Rhine, and directed ia mid- winter across the Alps, would increase my army to seventy-five thousand men. This grand detachment would in no way compro mise the armies of Germany, which had now retired under the cannon of Strasburg and Diisseldorf, and besides had been strongly reinforced by fresh troops from Belgium and Holland. Moreover, this would remove the decisive theatre of war to the point where the enemy was most vulnerable. In waiting the realization of these fine but far-off hopes, I employed the month of December in hastening the organization of the interior of Italy, and guarding against Venice, which seemed more and moie ill-disposed toward us as our dangers increased by the unfavor- able changes of the war. I felt that, since I could not per- suade her to join our interests, it was the wisest course to embar- rass her to such a degree as to deprive her of the means of injur- ing us. For this purpose, and at the same time to cover Ihe left flank and rear of my army on the side of the Valteline, I caused to be occupied the important chateau of Bergamo, which is perched on the last slope of the Alps toward Lombardy. Pa- triotic societies, established at Brescia, Bergamo, and Crema, scattered everywhere the seeds of democracy, always so flattering to the multitude. I had gone to Bologna to regulate the affairs of the two little Cispadane and Transpadane Republics, and to menace the Pope, and force him to execute the articles of the CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALY. 121 armistice, when I learned that Alvinzi had advanced with a new . J army to raise the siege of Mantua. NEW ATTEMPT OF ALVINZI TO SAVE WURMSER. My work seemed as unstable as that of Penelope; its destruction seemed the natural result of the constant reinforcements sent by the cabinet of Vienna to the army in Italy, and of the as constant neglect of the French Directory to sustain my efforts. They treated me at Paris as Hannibal was treated by the Carthaginian Senate. At the end of December, Alvinzi's forces were again increased to more than forty thousand men, and it was necessary to contend a fourth time for the possession of Mantua. While waiting for the promised reinforcements from the Rhine, I learned that Alvinzi had resumed the offensive, and I therefore flew to the Adige. My army occupied the following positions: Serrurier's division before Mantua; Augereau on the Adige, from Verona to Legnago; Masse'na at Verona; Joubert, with a fourth division, at the Corona and Rivoli. Each of these four divisions numbered about ten thousand men. General Rey was at Desen- zano with a reserve of four thousand men. The enemy advanced at the same time upon my centre and both wings by Roveredo. by Vicenza, and by Padua, Not knowing on which of these routes Ihe enemy had directed the main body of his forces, I de- termined to remain in my present position until he should de- velop his projects. On the twelfth of January the column which had advanced by Vicenza approached Verona, and drove back the outposts of Masse'na. But the main body of this general's division having debouched by St. Michael, the enemy was re- pulsed with loss. This fact convinced me that this could not be the" main body of Alvinzi's army. JOUBERT IS DRIVEN BACK ON RIVOLL- The next day, in the afternoon, I received the news that General Joubert, pressed in front by superior forces, and menaced on both flanks by strong columns, had been obliged in the morning to evacuate the posi- tion of the- Corona, and fall back upon Rivoli. whence he expected to continue his retreat upon Castel-Novo. I had no longer any doubt of the enemy's plans. It was evident that the column of Vicenza, and that which had beeni directed on the lower Adige, were merely diversions made to facilitate the march of the principal corps on the valley of the Adige. It was neces- sary, therefore, to oppose to this corps the mass of my army. I left Verona immediately with the divisions of Masse'na, leaving at that place o01y about two thousand men to check the column of Vicenza; I, at the same time, sent orders to Rey to move from Salo on Rivoli, where I had resolved to cllect the mass of my 122 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. forces. I was convinced, from Joubert's report, that Alvinzi, following the usual foolish plan of the Austrians, and not con- tent with weakening his forces by the detachments thrown on Verona and Legnago, had also divided those he had with him. L knew that in occupying the plateau of Rivoli, where the different paths through this mountainous country united, I should be able to act in mass against columns separated by insurmountable ob- stacles. Not to lose the advantages of such a position, I ordered Joubert to maintain himself at all hazards in advance of Eivoli till my arrival. I had not been deceived respecting the disposi- tions of Alvinzi. On leaving Ba&sano, this general had sent Provera with eight thousand men on Legnago, and Baj alien with five thousand on Verona, while he himself, at the head of thirty thousand men, debouched by Roveredo, on the Corona. This force was now subdivided into six columns. Three of these, forming in all twelve thousand men, attacked Joubert in front, while General Lusignan, with another of four thousand men, was to turn our left by passing the western slope of the Monte Baldo. Quasdanowich, with a fifth column of eight thousand men, was to assail our right, he moving along the road on- the right of the Adige; the artillery and cavalry, as they could not be employed in the mountains, were directed to follow this last column. Finally, Wukassowich, with the sixth column of four thousand men, descended the left bank of the Adige, and moved on Chiusa. To form an idea of these absurd movements, it should be remembered that the crest of Monte Baldo cut off all communication between the column of Lusignan and those of the centre, that these were equally cut off from the column of Quas- danowich by the impracticable summits of San^Marco, and that the Adige separated Quasdanowich and Wukassowich.* More- over, all these columns were obliged to pass the mountains with- out cannon, while I, placed on the plateau of Rivoli with artil lery, could receive them as they arrived in succession. It was evident that, if the slightest accident should prevent them from all arriving at the same moment, I should be sure of victory. *Alison, in speaking of these dispositions of the Austrians, says: "The plan was ably conceived, and had nearly succeeded; with a general of inferior ability to Napoleon, and troops of less resolution than his army, it unquestionably would have done so." How admirably qualified such a judge of strategy must be to criticize the military operations of Napoleon! In support of this absurd opinion, Alison refers to "Thiers, viii., 5, 13; Na.poleon, 111., 414; Jominl, ix., 275." Now it happens that each of the three authorities here referred to .condemns most unequivocally the positions of the Austrian general. In fact, there is not the slightest 'foundation for the opinion of Alison. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IX ITALY. 128 BATTLE OF RIVOLL When my orders reached Joubert, near midnight, he was in full retreat; but he immediately re- turned to his position at Rivoli, which, very fortunately, the en- emy had not had time to occupy. I arrived there after mid- night ; the weather was clear and beautiful, and, as the unclouded moon silvered the precipices of Monte Baldo, we could distin- guish the lights of the five separate camps of the enemy. On the morning of the fourteenth I made my dispositions: the main body of Joubert's division marched on Caprino, San-Giovanni, and San-Marco, against the Austrian centre, while a demi- brigade, placed in the intrenchments in rear of Osteria, covered my right and held Quasdanowich in check. Massdna, who was rapidly advancing, received orders at the same time to debouch a demi-brigade in order to oppose Lusignan. The combat now became warm; Joubert was too weak, and his left began to fall back Seeing this, the right, under General Vial, also retro- graded; but the 14th of the line kept its place admirably at the centre, and enabled me to reestablish affairs. I hastened to the left and directed to its support the column of Massena, which had just arrived. The enemy was repulsed, and our left estab- lished on the heights of Trombalora. But the critical moment was not yet over: my right was hotly pursued by the Austriaus, who descended the heights of San-Marco. Quasdanowich had at the sium* time forced the intrenchments of Osteria, and his col- umn began to descend the plateau of Rivoli. On the other side Lusignan, master of Coserman, was moving by AflS upon my rear.* *Alisou says: "At this perilous moment the presence of mind of Xapoleon did not forsake him. He instantly, in order to gain time, sent a flag of truce to Alvinzi, proposing a suspension of arms for half an hour, as he had some propositions to make in consequence of the arrival of a courier with dispatches from Paris. The Austrian general, ever Impressed with the idea that military were to be subordinate to diplomatic opera- tions, fell into the snare; the suspension, at the critical moment, was agreed to; and the march of the Austrians was suspended at the very moment when the soldiers, with loud shouts, (were exclaiming, 'We have them! we hnve them!' Junot repaired to the Austrian headquarters, from whence, after a conference of an hour, he returned, as might have been expected, without having come to any accommodation; "but meanwhile the critical period had passed; Napoleon had gained tfane to face the dan- ger, and make the movements requisite to repel these numerous obstacles." In confirmation of this statement he reiers to "Jomini, vili., 282, 283: Thiers, viii., 518; Napoleon, HI., 416." Neither of the authors referred to confirms, in any degree, this statement; Indeed, their accounts of the battle preclude any possibility of its truth. It fs a pure Invention of a prejudiced mind, wishing to diminish the brilliancy of the victory by making It the result of petty trickery. Alison's account of this battle is unworthy of the slightest confidence. He was either incapable of understanding it, or will- fully misrepresented the facts. 124 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. I was now completely surrounded, but, far from losing cour- age, I saw that, if I could overthrow Quasdanowich, I should have nothing to fear from Lusignan, who would advance only to his own destruction. Quasdanowich was obliged to defile by a very deep ravine enfiladed by our batteries. No sooner had the head of his column appeared upon the plateau than it was assailed on the flanks by infantry and in front by cavalry, which the intrepid Lasalle led to the charge. The enemy was broken and thrown back into the ravine. The disorder had already be- come great when one of our shells blew up a caisson in the mid- dle of the ravine, which was crowded with Austrians; this pro- duced the most frightful scene of confusion; infantry, cavalry, and artillery retreated pell-mell by Incanale. Having disposed of Quasdanowich, I directed all my efforts to sustain Vial, who was now in full retreat. The Austrians had pursued with too much imprudence. Two hundred horsemen, which I threw against them, so completely routed them that Alvinzi could rally the broken remains of the centre only behind the Tasso. This is a striking example of what marvelous effects may be produced by the smallest troop if engaged at the proper moment. My victory was decisive; but to make it still more so, I desired the destruction of Lusignan. This general, fearing no serious resist- ance, had established himself on Monte Pipoli in order to com- pletely cut off my retreat. I had secured my rear by opposing to him a part of the division of Mass^na, who kept up the com- bat till the arrival of Key. The head of Key's column having finally debouched by Orza on Lusignan's rear, this last general found himself surrounded at the very moment that he had thought to envelop me: his corps was completely destroyed, and he re- gained Monte Baldo with only a few hundred men. PROVERA MARCHES ON MANTUA. The very night of this battle, I learned that Provera, forcing the centre of Auger- eau's division, which was scattered along the Adige, had suc- ceeded in crossing the river at Anghiari on the evening of the thirteenth, and marched toward Mantua. It was very important to prevent him from raising the siege of that place. Thinking Joubert and Rey strong enough to oppose the broken remains of Alvinzi, I immediately set off with the division of Masse"na for Roverbella, where I arrived on the evening of the fifteenth. On the fourteenth Provera had reached Nogara without encount- ering any opposition; but Augereau, having had time to unite the main body of his division at Anghiari, had fallen upon his rear guard and cut it to pieces, and at the same time burnt the bridge over the Adige. On the fifteenth Provera arrived before Man- CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 125 tua; he thought to enter by the faubourg of San Georgio, but finding it intrenched and occupied by us, he could open no com- munication with the place. Not yet despairing of being able to open a passage, he, the next day, made an attack on the side of the citadel. But I had here prepared for him an unexpected reception. On the sixteenth, at five o'clock in the morning, Provera attacked the post of La Favorita, and Wurmser that of St. Antonia. Serrurier, aided by the reinforcements which I had sent him, succeeded in defending these posts. Wurmser retired into the place, but Provera did not get off so cheaply; at- tacked in front by Serrurier, on the left by the garrison of St. George, on the right by a part of the division of Mass^na, which I had directed against him, while the division of Augereau, de- bouching by Castellaro, appeared on his rear, and, finding no means of escape, he laid down his arms with the five thousand men he had left. While these events were taking place at Man- tua, Joubert, on the fifteenth, moving some columns rapidly by the reverse of Monte Magnone and Monte Baldo, succeeded in turning the. flanks of Alvinzi's retreating army. These centre columns, deprived of the assistance of Quasdanowich and Lu- signan, with their line of retreat cut off, and hemmed in by the precipice of the Corona, were almost completely destroyed be- fore reaching Ferrara: nearly five thousand men were taken prisoners. CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. After having finished with Provera, I moved upon the Adige. Alvinzi had lost more than half his army. The remains of his forces were marched behind the Piave, and the defense of the Tyrol entrusted to General Lan- don with about eight thousand men. The Austrian rear guard was everywhere defeated. At the beginning of February my army had resumed the same position it had occupied previous to the battle of Arcole: Joubert on the La vis, Masse*na at Bassano, and Augereau at Citadella. Such was the celebrated battle of Rivoli, in which we made twenty thousand prisoners with only thirty thousand combat- ants. Our legions had crowned themselves with glory, and had surpassed the so much vaunted rapidity of the legions of Caesar. The same troops which had left Verona and fought near St. Michael on the thirteenth, had marched all night to reach Rivoli, fought there all the next day of the fourteenth in the mountains, returned to Mantua on the fifteenth, and raptured Provera, who thought them defeated amid the rocks of the Corona. WURMSER CAPITULATES AT MANTUA. Mantua capitulated on the second of February; the starving garrison had 126 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. already consumed the flesh of all their horses, and large num- bers had been carried- away by disease. There were still remain- ing about thirteen thousand men under arms, who, having sur rendered as prisoners of war, were conducted to Trieste to be exchanged. The number of sick was not less than seven thou- sand. We here found the siege artillery which we had abandoned \ before the battle of Castiglione, and three hundred and fifty other \ pieces upon the ramparts and in the arsenal. EXPEDITION ON ROMAGNA. While I had been engaged with Alvinzi, the Court of Rome, seduced by the instigations of my enemies, had broken the armistice made in June last, raised extraordinary armaments, and given the command of them to General Colli, who was sent for this purpose by the Cabinet of Vienna. It was now necessary to punish Rome, both as an example to others and to get rid of a troublesome enemy. For this purpose I formed a new division, giving the command of it to Victor. It reached Imola on the second of February. The campaign was neither long nor bloody. A corps of four thou- sand of the papal troops attempted to defend the Senio, but was overthrown with great loss. On the ninth Victor arrived at Ancona, and captured twelve hundred more prisoners. Our advance guard took possession of Notre Dame Loretto and its famous treasure. On the eighteenth we advanced to Tolentino. All was now consternation at Rome. I was master of all the states of the Church, but I did not wish to entirely destroy the power of the Pope; indeed, in the present situation of our af- fairs, this would not have been so easy as some have imagined. We were obliged to pursue a cautious course of conduct toward the Courts of Madrid and Naples, both of which were interested in preserving the power of the Pope; independently of this con- sideration, it would have been imprudent to weaken our army by detaching from it the forces requisite for garrisoning our con- quests: and I was not foolish enough to commit such a fault, when about to begin a decisive campaign into the heart of Aus- tria. I therefore wrote to Rome to propose a settlement of our differences. They were eager to send me plenipotentiaries. The negotiations were short, inasmuch as they had merely to sign such conditions as I saw fit to dictate. The peace was concluded at Tolentino on the nineteenth. The Pope confirmed the cession of Avignon, of the Comtat, of the Legations of Ferrara and Bo- logna, and of Romagna, and agreed to pay a contribution of thirty millions of francs. These conditions were too humiliating to the Head of the Church not to make it an irreconcilable enemy; and still not hard enough to destroy its power to injure us. I CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 127 knew this well, but it was not in my power to do otherwise; state policy then belonged to the Directory, who wished to humble the Pope and brave the thunders of the Vatican, without once reflect- ing upon the advantage of converting it into an ally or an instru- ment: and considering my present critical situation on the Adige, 1 deemed it best to carry out the views of the government and relieve my army of a troublesome neighborhood.* "This campaign of Napoleon is minutely described in Jomini's "Wars of the Revolution," in Thiers' "History," In Napoleon's "Memoirs," dic- tated at St. Helena, and in Lee's "Life of Napoleon," a work of much merit, li.v a young American. It is greatly to be regretted that Mr. Lee left his work incomplete. Alison pretends to give due credit to Napoleon for the great military genius displayed in this campaign, but the praise is faint and most uuwill- iugly and grudgingly given. The results are attributed, he thinks, in a great measure, "to the admirable character, unwearied energy, and indo-m- i table courage of the troops which composed his army." The condition of the army at the beginning of the campaign, when Napoleon took the command of it, seems to have been forgotten. The success of the repub- lican arms is evidently very annoying to this staunch royalist; but he takes consolation in looking forward to the events of 1814 and 1815, and closes his remarks with the reflection that "aristocratic firmness, in the end. asserted its wonted superiority over democratic r iff or; the dreams of republi- can equality have been forgotten, but the Austrian government remains un- cMnged, the French eagles Jiave retired over the Alps, and Italy, the theatre of so much bloodshed, lias finally remained to the successors of tlte Casars." 128 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. CHAPTER in. FROM THE PEACE OF TOLENTINO TO THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797. Preparations for a new Campaign The Archduke Charles takes Command of the Austrian Army Treaty with the King of Sardinia The Affairs of Venice Troubles with the States of Terra-firma Negotiations with Pescaro Armaments of the Senate Napoleon resolves to attack the Archduke before he can unite his Forces Plan of Operations- Passage of the Piave Affair of Tarvis The Archduke is reinforced by the Detachments sent from the Rhine Armistice of Leoben Oper- ations of Joubert in the Tyrol Veronese Vespers Victor suppresses the Insurgents Condition of the two Armies Preliminaries of Leo- ben Armies of the Rhine Destruction of the Venetian Republic Na- poleon goes to Milan Revolution of Genoa Change of Constitution- Provisional Government appointed The Disorders continue Negotia- tions of Udina and Passeriano English Affairs Naval Battle of St. Vincent Naval Tactics Mutiny in the British Fleets Negotiations of Lille Internal Affairs of France The eighteenth Fructidor For- eign Negotiations Resignation of Napoleon Cobentzel negotiates on the part of Austria Napoleon and the Directory Peace of Campo- Formio Conditions of this Treaty Its Results Revolution of La Valteline Negotiations with Germany at Rastadt The Passage of the Simplon asked of the Valois The Directory foments a Revolution in Switzerland Proclamation of the Vaudois Invasion of Berne- Helvetic Constitution Neutrality of Switzerland and Faults of the Directory Revolution in Rome Proclamation of the Roman Repub- licNapoleon leaves Rastadt His Reception at Paris General Remarks. PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN The brilliant victory of Rivoli, the fall of Mantua, the evacuation of Corsica by the English, the treaties of peace with Naples and Rome, and the approach of large reinforcements, had at last completely changed the face of affairs in Italy. Having now the means of definitely securing the possession of the country, I determined to make the Emperor tremble even in his own capital. The divisions of the army of the Rhine having arrived in the course of the month CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A U STRIA. 1 29 of March, I saw myself at the head of seventy-five thousand men. It required, however, about twenty thousand men to garrison the fortifications and to observe the south of Italy. With the re- mainder of my forces I moved forward. In order to second my operations, the Directory ordered Moreau to repass the Rhine at Kehl, and Hoche, after having reorganized the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, to advance anew on the Main. ARCHDUKE CHARLES COMMANDS THE AUSTRIAN ARMY. The Cabinet of Vienna had adopted the same idea as ourselves about transferring the theatre of war into Italy; but not till after the taking of Kehl by the Archduke Charles and the defeat of Alvinzi at Rivoli. It was therefore the middle of Janu- ary when this illustrious prince and able general set out to cross the Tyrol, with three divisions of select troops, to oppose me in Italy.* TREATY WITH THE KING OF SARDINIA. The events which I have just narrated had rendered our position as strong, comparatively, as it had formerly been precarious and hazardous; but it must, nevertheless, be observed, that the King of Sardinia, who was not our ally, might, on the least reverse to our arms, be- come our enemy. 1 had often urged the Directory to offer him conditions sufficiently advantageous to induce him to form with us a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. I had myself taken the responsibility of signing, at Bologna, on the sixteenth The Archduke Charles (Louis de Lorraine) of Austria, son of the Emperor Leopold II.; was born at Vienna, in 1771. Already, at the age of twenty-two, he had acquired a high military reputation under ^he Prince of Ooburg, in the campaign of 1793. In 179G he was made field-marshal of the German Empire, and took command of the Austrian army on the Rhine. An outline of his operations in that campaign is given in the text. When sent against Napoleon, in 1797, the latter remarked to Maes- field: "Your cabinet has sent against me three armies without generals; now it sends a general without an army!" After the campaign of 1799, the Archduke was, by intrigue, removed from the army and sent into Bohemia, in a kind of honorable exile. After the disasters of Hohenlinden and Marengo, he was recalled to favor and placed at the head of the Wai- Department. In 1805 he opposed Massfina in Italy, but was absent from Germany at the overthrow of the Austrian monarchy on the field of Aus- terlitz. In the campaign of 1809 he commanded the Austrian army, and was wounded at the battle of Wagram. He was afterward made gov- ernor and captain-general of Bohemia, and retired to the country. He was the ablest of all the generals that opposed Napoleon. His many virtues and noble character endeared him even to his enemies. Napoleon always spoke of him in terms of high admiration. He ranks high as a military writer. His principles of strategy, Illustrated by the campaigns of 1796 and 1799, were published in Vienna in 1813 and 1819, In seven volumes, with valuable maps and plans. Biographic Universelle. -9 130 . LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of February, a treaty with the Count of Balbo ; but the Directory, jealous of its prerogatives, refused to ratify it, and the whole mat- ter was referred to General Clarke at Turin. The arrangement was not terminated till the eighth of April, after the armistice of Leoben had rendered it unnecessary, and even then it was not ratified at Paris. Had we obtained a timely succor of ten thou- sand Piedmontese, my army would have been increased, by the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, to ninety thousand men, aiid my rear perfectly secured as far as the Adige by the troops of our allies. THE AFFAIRS OF VENICE. Venice was the only power whose restless spirit gave us cause for apprehension; war was rav- aging her states of terra-firma, and the people, excited against us, were only waiting for an opportunity to rise. But democratic ppopagandism had proselytes, both at Brescia and Bergamo. The patriots of these cities demanded to be united with Lombardy, and a revolution broke out there just as I was about to enter the Friouli. This revolution, enkindled by Adjutant-General Lan- drieux, was rather the work of the Directory than of myself; but, as it suited my purposes, I did not interfere with it. The reason of this was obvious: should the democrats succeed, they would reinforce my army and fight for my party; should they fail, the hostility of the oligarchy would justify me in destroying it. I was ready to adopt whatever course was best calculated to secure our hold in Italy. If I loved France, I nevertheless had not en- tirely forgotten my Italian origin; my heart was fixed upon regen- erating a nation o interesting from its ancient reminiscences. But to obtain peaceably the cession of the Milanese by Austria, who had already yielded Belgium, it was absolutely necessary to have some equivalent to offer her for at least one of these coun- tries. Should Venice give us cause for declaring war against her, she might possibly serve as the victim of our combinations of state policy. TROUBLES IN THE STATES OF TERRA-FIRMA. The government of Venice weighed less heavily on the lower than on the higher classes. There is no domination so absurd as for a single city to rule a whole nation, at least when that city gives the notables of the country no suitable part in the government. In this case it was not an odious oligarchy, like that of Berne or of the city of Venice; it was an aristocracy like that which existed at Rome after the right of citizenship had been given to the Latins; in a word, it was the only reasonable form of a republic. If the Senate had made a timely grant of some thirty new places of senators to the influential families of Brescia, Bergamo, Ver ona, Vicenza, Padua, and Treviso, we should have lost our influ CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 131 ence over the people of the states of terra-firma. But. instead of scattering the impending storm by timely concessions, they op- posed all changes, excited the peasants of the mountains of Salo against Brescia, and sent to their support General Pioravanti. Salo fell into the hands of the enemy, but was soon retaken by the patriots, with the aid of our soldiers and the Cisalpines. At the same time the Senate armed eight or ten thousand Sclavonians, reinforced its troops, and equipped a formidable flotilla to cover the lagunes. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ROME. In the present situation of our affairs, it was necessary to either attach Venice to our- selves, or else to paralyze her power. The Senate sent Pesaro to me to enter into explanations respecting the troubles of Brescia. I endeavored to prove to him that it was for the interest of Venice to frankly accept our alliance, and make certain modifications in the government ; I gave him to understand that it would be use- less to side with our enemies, by declaring for Austria, for, in leas than a fortnight, I could drive the imperialists from the Friouli, and invade La Carinthia. THE SENATE PREPARES FOR DEFENSE. The Senate had decided upon its course. It hated us too much to embrace our cause; and it had too great a fear of our power and dread of Austrian influence to throw itself into the arms ofAustria. Its courage was that of the poltroon: it thought to impose upon us by preparations for defense and by stoutly swearing its absolute neutrality. I was not fool enough to be duped by this neutrality, which would last so long as victory inclined on our side, but on the slightest loss in the Noric Alps, twenty thousand Venetians, with a levee-en-masse of peasants, would fall upon our rear, destroy our depots, and cut off our retreat. I should have felt no alarm at this state of things, if the Directory had settled the treaty with the King of Sardinia; for, in that case, the Piedmontese contin- gent would enable me to leave ten or twelve thousand French troops to neutralize Venice. But the Court of Turin wished to have guaranteed to it all or a part of Lombardy, and the Directory was unwilling to bind itself so as to be obliged to m;ik<- t his a sine qua non of peace with Austria. This conduct was childishness, for such a clause is always eventual: a Vimpossibh nnl n'est tenu; and we had on the right bank of the Po the means of indemnity in case of need. v NAPOLEON TAKES THE INITIATIVE AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE. In the meantime the Archduke had repaired in person to the Piave, and was there waiting for three divisions which he expected from the Rhine by the Tyrol or the valley of 132 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the Drave, but which were still afar off. Bernadotte and Delmas had joined my army some eight days, when the Austrian succors were still crossing Bavaria. Thus finding myself prepared for action before the enemy, I deemed it best to profit by the circum- stance, and to begin the attack without waiting to settle matter with the Venetians. Victor,* whose division still remained at Ancona superintending the execution of the treaty with the Pope, received orders to return to the Adige, where he could cover my communications. I now entered the field with the divisions of Mass^na, Bernadotte, Serrurier, and Augereau (the latter being at this time commanded by General Guyeux), amounting in all to thirty-eight thousand men. I gave to Joubert the divisions of Delmas, Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and that which he himself had com- manded at the battle of Rivoli; these together amounted to seven- teen thousand combatants. PLAN OF OPERATIONS Starting from the Mincio as a base, there were two lines of operations which could be pursued against the hereditary states of Austria: the first, to the north by the valley of the Adige, or the Tyrol ; the second, to the east by the Friouli and the Carniole. These two lines formed a right angle with its vertex at Verona. As the enemv occupied both of these lines, it was impossible to confine myself exclusively to either without being exposed in flank and rear to the enemy's corps de- scending the other. As the Tyrol was the most favorable for de- fense, and led less directly into the heart of the hereditary states; and, moreover, as its narrow valleys would not permit me to de- velop my forces, I chose the line of the Friouli. Nevertheless, it *Victor (Perrin Claude), Duke of Belluno, was born at La Manche, in 1766. He entered the army in 1781, and received his discharge in 1789. In 1792 he .served as a volunteer, and was promoted to the grade of chef-de- bataillon. In 1793 he distinguished himself under Napoleon, at the siege of Toulon, and served under him in the campaigns of 1796-7, where he acquired a brilliant reputation, and was promoted successively to the grades of general-of-brigade and general-of-division. In 1799 his division rendered important services on several occasions. At the ibattle of Marengo he commanded a corps-d'armte, and for his gallant services on this occasion he received a Sabre of Honor. He immediately afterward passed to the Bataviau army, and in 1805 was sent as amlbassador to Den- mark. He Joined the army in Prussia In 1800, and was wounded at Jena; in 1807 he was promoted to the command of the first corps-d'armte, and contributed 'mainly to the victory of Friedland. Napoleon made him a Marshal of France on the field. After the treaty of Tilsit, he was made governor of Berlin and most of Prussia. In 1808 he commanded the first corps-d'armee, in Spain. He greatly distinguished himself in the campaigns of -1812, 1813, and 1814. After the restoration of the Bourbons, he held several important offices, and continued in favor till the overthrow of their government in 1830. CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 183 was impossible to advance on Udina without being exposed in rear to an- enemy debouching from the Tyrol. It was therefore preferable not to form a permanent double line of operations, but to push a strong corps upon the upper Adige to check the enemy in the Tyrol; and then to draw their corps toward the main army by the Valley of the Drave, which Nature seemed to have traced for such a movement. But the extent of these movements ren- dered the operation very delicate and complicated. If, however, this configuration of the country had some chances against us, it also had some in our favor; for should the enemy wish to defend the Friouli by parallel positions behind the Piave, the Taglia- mento, the Isonzo, his line would then rest on the coast near his left wing, and his only line of retreat would lie in rear of the right wing., Therefore, the slightest maneuver turning this right wing would cut off his line of rereat, and drive him into the Adri- atic. On these facts I based my plan of operations. The greater portion of Alvinzi's scattered forces had taken position on the Tagliamento; the corps of the Tyrol, commanded by Generals Kerpen and Laudon, was behind the Lavis and the Noss; in the centre, the brigade of Lusignan, at Feltre, kept open the communi- cation between the two principal corps. The total of the Aus- trian army did not then amount to more than thirty-five thousand men, the reinforcements of the Rhine not having yet arrived; there should be added, however, to this number a few thousand Tyrolese armed for the defense of their firesides; but these fought only on their own mountains PASSAGE OF THE PIAVE. My army began to move on the tenth of March. With the main body of my troops I advanced directly toward the Tagliamento. Mnsse'na marched on Feltre in order to drive back the brigades of Lusignan, and threaten the right wing of the Archduke. Lusignan retired, ascending the Piave; on the thirteenth his rear guard was attacked and over- thrown at Longaro and he himself taken prisoner. Hasina, satis- fied with having thrown the Austrian brigade on Cadora, fell back on Spilimbergo and Gemona, so as to turn, nearer, the right of the Archduke and to get possession of the important route of Poteba, of which I feared the enemy might profit to retire on Villaoh. On the sixteenth I reached Valvasone, on the Tagliamento. The Archduke had already begun a retreat, leaving merely a rear guard on the river, which was fordable. My columns rushed into the stream, overthrew the enemy, and pursued him on the road to Palmanova. The Archduke divided his forces: he himpelf fell back on Goricea; one of his columns, commanded by generals Gontreuil and Bayalitsch, with a great part of the material, moved by Cividale and the valley of Natisona on Caporetto; Gen- 134 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. eral Ocskay, who commanded the brigade of Lusiguan, covered the road from Villach to Ohiusa-Veneta. The Isonzo, from its source to Goricea, runs between two chains of mountains almost impracticable on the side of Krainburg. Could I succeed in there inclosing Be army of the Archduke, I would make it for him the Caudine Forks. For a moment I had strong hopes of doing so. Masse'na, in ascending the Fella, was in position to drive Ocskay beyond the Tavis and get possession of the debouches of Isonzo on Villach. 1 myself maneuvered against the left flank of the Archduke, to push him into the valley of the Isonzo, the two ex- tremities of which were in my possession. The enemy's left was covered by the city of Gradisca, which was then occupied by four battalions. On the seventeenth, Bernadotte attacked this place in front, while Serrurier, passing the Isonzo between thati city and Montfalcone, took it in reverse; the garrison capitulated. 1 then ascended the left bank of the Isonzo with Serrurier and Bernadotte; Guyeux moved by Cividale on Caporetto. Inclining to the right by the valley of Vippach, I hoped to cut the enemy off from the road to Czernita, or to force him to plunge into the valley of the Isonzo, by Canale or Caporetto. AFFAIR OF TARVIS. The first object of the Archduke was to avoid any decisive battle till after the arrival of his troops from the Rhine; he therefore took good care not to wait for me to complete my movement, but fell back in all haste by Czernita and Adelsberg on Laybach. I sent Bernadotte in pursuit, and turned my own efforts against the column of Gontreuil and Bay- alitsch. This, at least, could not escape me. Embarrassed by the convoy that accompanied it, and pursued by Guyeux and by Ser- rurier, who was ascending the Isonzo, it was also checked in front by Masse'na. This general had forced the gorges of the Ponteba. occupied Tarvis, and driven Ocskay on Wurtzen. Gontreuil tried in vain to open a passage by Tarvis; and was driven into the gorges of Ober-Preth, where he and Bayalitsch were surrounded, and forced to lay down their arms. We captured nearly four thousand prisoners, twenty-five cannon, and four hundred baggage- wagons. On the twenty-eighth I united at Villach the divisions of Masse'na, Guyeux, and Serrurier. Bernadotte had pursued the Archduke by Laybach; as a flank movement to our march, he pushed forward some light troops on Trieste to seize upon the resources of that flourishing city, an acquisition of value for further operations. ARCHDUKE REINFORCED FROM THE RHINE.-The Archduke, who, from Laybach, had marched by Klagenfurth on St. Veit, was there joined by the first reinforcements from Ger- many. I wrote a letter from Klagenfurth to this prince, deplor- CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 136 ing the calamities of a war which could uo longer be justified, and sought to incite in his noble heart a desire for peace. He replied that he had no power to make treaties, but that he had no less desire than myself to put an end to the horrors of the war. ARMISTICE OF LEOBEN. The Archduke, however, did not consider himself strong enough to give battle. At my ap- proach he retired to Neumark, and on the thirtieth I arrived at St. Veit. On the second of April Masse'na forced the gorges of Diernstein and beat the enemy's rear guard at Neumark and Hundsinark. The grenadiers which had come from the Rhine were defeated in these two rencontres. The Archduke continued his retreat on Vienna. On the fifth I arrived at .Tudenburg. Two days after, the Austrians, who had had time to send my letter to Vienna and receive an answer, asked an armistice for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. I consented to it with joy; my position was more brilliant than solid. I did not consider myself strong enough to attempt decisive measures against the Austrian mon- archy; for the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-et-Meuse, not- withstanding the superiority they had acquired since the depart- ure of the Archduke, did not move from their cantonments on the left of the river, and I therefore could not, for a long time to come, hope for any assistance from them : at the moment I believed they designed to sacrifice me by leaving me alone to fight the combined armies of the enemy; and, moreover, I had much reason to fear for my communications. OPERATIONS OF JOUBERT IN THE TYROL. Joubert began with success: after having beaten Kerpen and Laudon separately, the first on the Lavis the twentieth of March, and the second at Neumark on the twenty-second, he had advanced to Brixen. Kerpen fell back on Sterzing, and Laudon into the val- ley of Meran. But the picture was soon changed. The Tyrolese are a warlike, independent, and religious people; the Austrian government had taken good care to convince them that we were the enemies of religion; moreover, the ravages inseparable from war had greatly exasperated them against us. At the call of Count Lehrbach they had rushed to arms. More than ten thou- sand of these now joined Laudon and enabled him to resume the offensive by descending on Botzen in tho valley of the Adige. Jou- bert was strong enough to fight them, if he had wished to fall back; but, after the affair of the Tagliamento, I had sent him orders to retire on La Carinthia. Although surrounded by ene- mies, he thought it time to unite with me by passing through the valleys of the Rienzi and the Drave. On the fifth of April he left Brixen and moved by Prunecken and Lientz on Villach: a bold march, which he executed through an insurgent country, and 136 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. without loss. The Tyrol being now evacuated by us as far as Trent, Kerpen marched by Rattenberg and the valley of the Salza on Muhrau in order to form a junction with the Archduke. Lau- don, reinforced by the Tyrolese militia, descended the Adige, overthrew the feeble detachments which covered it, and moved toward the terra-firma of Venice, where all was in fermentation. VERONESE VESPERS. The Senate, exasperated by the events at Brescia, which I have already mentioned, thought only of vengeance. The approach of Laudon was the signal for a general insurrection of the peasantry, whom the oligai-chists, and more especially the priests, had incited against us. A repetition of the Sicilian Vespers took place at Verona ; all Frenchmen found in the city were massacred. General Balland, who commanded there, retired into the castle, with three thousand men. He was there besieged, on one side by Laudon, and on the other by the insurgents and a corps of Sclavonians, commanded by General Fioravanti, whom the Senate had sent from Venice. But when Laudon heard of the armistice of Judenburg, he returned into the Tyrol. VICTOR REDUCES THE INSURGENTS. The Venetians, abandoned to themselves, were unable to resist a corps of about fifteen thousand men which General Victor had collected, by unit- ing his division and the several garrisons of the posts in Lom- bardy, under the orders of Kilmaine. Fioravanti surrendered, and the insurgents were all dispersed. CONDITION OF THE TWO ARMIES. In the meantime I was ardently endeavoring to conclude a treaty of peace. Inde- pendently of the above-mentioned events, which gave me just ap- prehesions for my communications, I saw with uneasiness that the fate of the war was to be decided under the walls of Vienna, by a battle, where the chances would not be in our favor. It is true that the junction of Joubert and Bernadotte had again given me an army of fifty thousand combatants; but the armies of the Rhine were still inactive one hundred and fifty leagues in my rear; the Archduke, sustained by the levee-en-masse of Hungarians, and the volunteers which the danger of the capital could not fail to rally to his aid, would still be able to oppose me with superior forces. PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN. I had a greater reason for not wishing again to jeopardize my reputation, as, at this junc- ture, the glory of making a general peace would be greater than that of a triumphal entry into the capital of the Emperor. I de- termined to negotiate for peace, and in this I was fully seconded by the Cabinet of Vienna. The precipitation with which it en- CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 137 tered into these negotiations plainly showed the fear with which I had inspired it. I took advantage of this fear to dictate terms. On the eighteenth of April the preliminaries were signed at Leo- ben, where I had established my head-quarters. ARMIES OF THE RHINE. At this very time Hoche passed the Rhine at Neuwied, at the head of a superb and well- organized army. After a series of victories over the inferior army of Werneck, he entered Frankfort on the twenty-third of April. Moreau passed the Rhine at Kehl, with the same success, and Stan-ay, unable to arrest his progress, was driven back to Ra- stadt. Had these two passages been executed a month sooner, they would have given a decisive turn to the war, by carrying one hundred and twenty thousand men on the Inn; which would have secured to the Republic a still more advantageous peace, and, per- haps, have saved Venice. DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE. I now evacuated the hereditary states, and marched my army into the Venetian territory. This movement had the air of being made as a mark of good feeling toward the Emperor; but, in fact, I was anxious to secure my communications. The hostile proceedings of the Senate of Venice, much as they had annoyed me previous to the armistice, now were truly fortunate for me. At Leoben I had promised Austria indemnity for the loss of Belgium and Lom- bardy; but I should have been at a loss for the means of doing this had not the hostility of the Venetians furnished an occasion for making a conquest of a part of their states. On the sixteenth of May my troops occupied Venice, through the assistance of a democratic revolution, instigated by Villetard, the secretary of legation. The oligarchic government was dissolved. The Vene- tian patriots flattered themselves that I would permit them to establish a democratic government. But it was now too late; their fate was subordinate to the progress of the negotiations for a definitive peace. I had at first hoped to preserve the republic by selecting indemnities in the Friouli; but the turn of the nego- tiations did not permit it. At most I hoped it would be merely a loan to Austria, and that, on the first opening of hostilities, we could obtain its restitution. If this be weighed in the balance of severe justice, it can not be denied that the Venetians were sacri- ficed. But the scales of Themis are not the usual test s of national policy. Venire had rejected our alliance; her hatred of us had not been disguised; to the intrigues of Brescia she had responded by a horrible insurrection: war was declared; and the conquest was legitimate. If the question had been merely to occupy the states of ierrn- firma, the war had been declared and ended in a single day; but 138 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the situation of Venice, surrounded as she was by water, secured her from our attacks. Two hundred armed boats or galleys and numerous frigates prevented our approach. It was necessary to proceed with caution lest we might cause Venice to throw herself into the arms of the English, and make of this place a port im- pregnable in the hands of the Islanders. Our only hope of suc- cess was to neutralize, by the aid of party spirit, all its disposi- tions for defense. Such was the object of the movement insti- gated by Villetard and resulting in the provisional government. This ruse was intended to spare the blood that would necessarily be shed in a forcible conquest, and to prevent Venice from falling into the hands of maritime enemies. In this light it should be judged of by posterity. Our detractors have represented it as an act of felony. The manes of our soldiers butchered at Verona, and of Captain Laugier assassinated by the Sclavonians in his own vessel in the port of Venice, will pardon, or at least palliate, our conduct, especially when it is remembered that we entered Venice with the intention of preserving the Republic by giving it some compensations on the right bank of the Po. Moreover, Venice could not be more astonished at being transferred into the hands of Austria, than were the Republics of Dantzic, Elbing, and Thorn at being made Prussians. The declarations of moralists do not change the course of events in this world. The historian Botta, after quoting with admiration the philippics of the priests, calling upon the people to assassinate us, reproves us for treating these men as enemies! Such is history! NAPOLEON GOES TO MILAN. After these events, I es- tablished my head-quarters at Passeriano, near Udina, where I waited for the Emperor's plenipotentiaries, in order to arrange the definitive conditions of peace. I had signed at Montebello, on the twenty-fourth of May, with the Duke of Gallo, a preliminary convention, in order to accelerate the progress of the negotiations. The Cabinet of Vienna having refused to ratify this, I repaired to Milan in order to hasten the organization of the Cisalpine Repub- lic, annexing to it all the countries that naturally belonged to it, and thus to show to Austria her limits. Modena, Reggio, Ber- gamo, Ferrara, and Bologna were annexed to Lombardy, forming together a single state of nearly three millions of inhabitants. I was satisfied with the indications of a revival of public spirit; already the Italians began to consider themselves as good soldiers as the Germans; I had elevated their moral character in calling upon them to share the glory of our destinies. REVOLUTION OF GENOA. I profited by my sojourn at Milan to direct the democratic revolution which overthrew the Genoese oligarchy and made the Ligurian innovators entirely de- CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 139 pendent upon us; the Valteline was added to the Cisalpine Re- public, whose existence was solemnly proclaimed on the ninth of July. Three centuries' constant intercourse between France and Genoa had made the latter a kind of French port; we had more partisans there than in any other city. The oligarchists alone, from fear of democratic tendencies, inclined to our enemies. The Directory, desirous of destroying aristocratic influences in all the surrounding states, could not overlook Genoa, the nearest and most important of all. In July, 1796, it directed me to demand satisfaction for certain griefs which it pretended to have against the Senate; but being then too much occupied with Wurmser, I was obliged to content myself with pecuniary satisfaction. Nevertheless, the agents of the Directory, instigated by the am- bassador Faypoult, neglected no opportunity to extend the influ- ence of the democratic party, whose progress was so rapid that the Genoese Senate soon saw itself threatened with the same fate as that of Venice. A tennis party became the subject for a popular insurrection; on the ninth of May, the multitude disarmed the troops of the line, took possession of the gates, and appointed a committee to demand reforms of the Senate, which, too weak to make resist- ance, promised such changes in the constitution as should be deemed necessary. Some patricians, more bold than others, eight days afterwards, stirred up an insurrection among the colliers and peasants of the neighboring villages; a violent reaction followed: the parties fought in the streets, and the Senate triumphed. I had gone from Montebello to Milan when I heard this news. I re- garded Genoa as the most important acquisition which could be made to France for the consolidation of my work in Italy. This great fortress, perched upon rocks against which it would be exceedingly difficult to construct regular works of siege, might be the key of Lombard. y. as we possessed neither Piedmont nor, as yet, the rnutf bif the Simplon. It was then of Uttle consequence tp me whether Genoa was ruled by a patrician Doge, or by a band of plebeian conspirators; what I wanted was that French influence should predominate, and, as our banners were the banners of democracy, it was necessary to side with that party. I sent one of my nids-de-camp to Genoa to consult with Faypoult and take cognizance of all the details of the affair. CHANGE IN THE GENOESE CONSTITUTION. Called upon by thedeputiesof the Senate to decide these matters.I at first demanded the liberation of the French and the chiefs of the revo- lutionary party, and the arrest of the leaders of the reaction. Some days after, the deputation of the Senate, accompanied to Milan by Faypoult, signed with me at Montebello a convention putting an end to the Genoese oligarchy. This singular compact. 140 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. in which the French Republic appeared as the mediator between the Senate and the Genoese people, contained twelve articles, the first of which recognized the sovereignty of the people. The legis- lative power was confined to two representative councils, one of three hundred, and the other of one hundred and fifty members. The executive devolved upon a Senate of twelve members, with the Dodge at its head. These latter, and the senators, were nom- inated by the two councils. Until the new government should be installed, the authority was confided to a commission of twenty- two members, presided over by the present Doge. This form of government was not at all appropriate to the situation and character of the Genoese. Indeed, it was impossible for this little republic to be governed by a representative body of four hundred and fifty unpaid members, without substituting the aristocracy of wealth (which is the most objectionable of all aris- tocracies) for that which we had just abolished. But I then paid but very little attention to these matters; I regarded Liguria as an indispensable addition to France, and these changes in its con- stitution as temporary, and calculated rather to facilitate this an- nexation than permanently to ameliorate its condition. Never- theless, the little council the next day ratified the convention of Montebello by a vote of fifty-seven to seven. From that moment the council and the colleges ceased their functions and sur- rendered their authority to the Doge and the provisional commission. NAPOLEON APPOINTS A PROVISIONAL GOVERN- MENT. Nothing was said in the convention of Milan about the appointment of the provisional government, but, as I was not in the habit of leaving things half done, I myself appointed the mem- bers, selecting the most distinguished democrats ; and on the thir- teenth of June the Doge was required to convoke this commission. THE DISORDERS CONTINUE. Although there was still some fermentation among the lower classes, a part of whom were still armed, yet the revolution was effected with order; in the evening the Golden Book was burnt by the democrats on the place of Aquaverda. The next day a decree of the provisional govern- ment abolished the noblesse and all feudal rights; the armorial bear- ings on the doors of hotels were destroyed, and, as such popular movements are never exempt from excesses, sacrilegious hands dared to break the colossal statues of those Dorias who were formerly the pride of the Genoese name. While the legislative commission was engaged in forming a constitutional compact, I directed General Duphot to organize a corps of six thousand Ligurians to be added to the number of our auxiliaries. But the oligarchists were not yet completely re- CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A V STRIA. 141 duced: a committee assembled at Pisa organized in the month of September the insurrection of the Riviera di Levante, and of the Bisagno. General Duphot marched against the insurgents, but was driven back into Genoa; they even got possession of Fort Eperon. But, reinforced by the inhabitants of the Ponente, the Genoese democrats, and some French troops from Tortona, Duphot finally triumphed over all their efforts, notwithstanding the instigations of the Durazzos, the Dorias, the Spinolas, and the Pallavicini. This was the last effort of a government really pru- dent, and friendly disposed toward France. The victim of revo- lutionary dogmas, some have thought it might have avoided its ruin by admitting, in 1796, a tenth part of plebeian senators and forming an alliance with France. It owed a slight sacrifice to the opinion of the age; and if, after the concession, it had fallen, the odium of it would have rested upon its enemies. Neverthe- less, the Directory looked as much to its independence and neu- trality as to its form of government. We desired Genoa as a base for our operations in Lombardy, so long as the direct passes of the Alps were not in our possession. NEGOTIATIONS OF UDINA AND PASSERIANO. The congress with Austria was first appointed to meet at Berne, but was afterwards changed to Udina, where I treated with Meerfield and Gallo. The Directory, jealous of its prerogatives, sent Gen- eral Clarke as an adjunct in these negotiations, and gave me orders which must have been a great obstacle to an agreement, had not the Cabinet of Vienna itself retarded the negotiations im- mediately after the preliminaries had been signed. The counter- revolutionists, with Pichegru, Villot, and Imbert-Colomes at their head, had so far succeeded in the elections as to have a strong party in the councils. A violent contest took place between the executive and legislative powers; the latter, instead of assisting the operations of the government, threw all possible obstacles in its way. These internal difficulties revived the hopes of our enemies. AFFAIRS OF ENGLAND. The situation of our affairs with England also exercised a considerable influence upon the negotiation. The great genius of its prime minister could not save this power from receiving rude shocks in the course of this year. Ireland was in insurrection; and although Hoche's expedi- tion failed to attain its object, still it raised the hopes of the insurgents to such a degree as to render it necessary for the gov- ernment to employ force to repress them. Truguet was not dis- couraged by the ill-success of Hoche. The peace of Leoben had restored all his activity. He had at Cologne a superb army, which in a few weeks could be upon the shores of the Channel.^ They 142 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. thought to make the English tremble for their own firesides. The assistance of Spain and Holland, with their respectable naval forces, seemed to give promise of success. Spain, especially, might have added much weight to the scale, if the gold of Mexico had sufficed to procure good workmanship in her ship-yards, and a better organization and stronger emulation among her sailors. Those colossal men-of-war, the pride and predilection of Span- iards, were, for the most part, bad sailors, and required better officers than theirs to maneuver them. BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. Nevertheless, the junc- tion of the combined fleets in the Channel could not fail to produce great results ; for the bond of union between Ireland and England was on the point of rupture. The British admiralty made every exertion to extricate itself from this embarrassment. Lord Brid- port blockaded Brest; Duncan watched the Texel; and Jervis, who was in the Tagus, watched the movement of the Spanish fleet. This fleet of twenty-seven ships and ten frigates, under Ad- miral Cordova, an officer celebrated in the war of American in- dependence, sailed from Carthagena, passed the strait, and raised the blockade of Cadiz. Jervis had only fifteen vessels, but, full of noble confidence, he met the Spaniard half way. The battle was fought off Cape St. Vincent. The English admiral surprised the enemy, pierced his line, cut off nine of his vessels, defeated them, and captured five of his large men-of-war. Nelson, to whom much of this 1 victory is attributed, signally distinguished himself in this battle. NAVAL TACTICS. The Spaniards, eighteen of whose ves- sels had not even entered into the engagement, shamefully fled to Cadiz. Jervis owed his triumph to the application of the same principles which I had adopted at Montenotte, Castiglione, and Rivoli. On land, as on the sea, the first talent of a commander is to paralyze a part of his adversary's forces, and concentrate all his own on the decisive points. It is astonishing that no French ad- miral ever knew how to apply this simple rule, and that all of them fought in parallel order, vessel to vessel, which is in formal opposition to the first principles of the art. Suffern is the only one who made the proper maneuver, and he owed it to chance. After this check, the Spanish naval power was completely paralyzed. Jervis, with his force increased to twenty-one ves sels, swept the Mediterranean, and the English even blockaded and bombarded Cadiz. / Nelson attacked Teneriffe, but was re- pulsed, with the loss of an arm/ In the Antilles, Admirals Harvey and Abercromby captured from the Spaniards the important post of Trinidad, which offered a point for attacking the continent of CAMPAIGN OF 1797 /A* AUSTRIA. 143 South America. But less fortunate at Porto-Rico, the latter offi- cer was repulsed with loss. MUTINY IN THE BRITISH NAVY. Thus all things were not prosperous with proud Albion; but even at the moment of victory; she was on the brink of ruin. A frightful insurrection broke out in the two great fleets of the Nore and the Texel. The mutiny was carried to such a pitch that the sailors took command of some of the vessels; and the fear of punishment, getting the bet- ter of their patriotism, might have induced them to steer for our ports for safety. Fortunately for England, no one thought of it, and this mutiny, produced by a discussion about pay, was sup- pressed by a wise union of force and concession, supported by all the powerful resources of discipline and patriotism. NEGOTIATIONS OF LILLE. These events, so well cal- culated to cause terror in London, joined to the certainty that Austria was in favor of peace, and that Holland and Spain might yet concert with our fleet at Brest a descent upon Ireland all these things combined to stagger the English government. The suspension of specie payments by the bank, and the rejection of the fiscal measures of Pitt, added much to the effect produced by the mutiny in the navy. Under these circumstances the minister deemed it necessary to gain time and to negotiate a treaty of peace, afterward either executing or breaking it, as might best suit his purpose. He sent Malmesbury, on the fourth of July, to Lille, to enter into negotiations with Maret, Letourneur, and Pleville-Lepelley. The first named of these alone conducted the negotiation and met with unexpected success; the instruc- tions of the minister, Charles Delacroix, were an almost incredible tissue of absurdities. They demanded the restitution of the vessels taken at Toulon, or an equivalent; and also, under the name of restitution, the surrender into our hands of Jersey, Guernsey, and even Gibraltar. Besides this, it was necessary to treat for France, Spain, and Holland, which rendered the nego- tiation a very delicate and complicated affair. Maret had too much intelligence to undertake such a mission till a change in the Directory had replaced Delacroix by Talleyrand, who left the negotiator without restraints. Thanks to his moderation and skill, the affair was most ably conducted; and he obtained for France the restitution of all her colonies, an indemnity for the vessels taken at Toulon, and even the renunciation of the title, 7?oi de France. These two last concessions were mere bagatelles, but they flattered the spirit of the time. He obtained for Spain the restitution of all her colonies except Trinidad. As to Hol- land, the restitution of all her colonies, without exception, was promised, but Malmesbury having observed that he could not re- 144 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. turn to the English people without preserving, for the sake of appearance, some of their trophies, it was agreed that the port of Trincomale should be declared neutral and be occupied alternately by an annual English and Dutch garrison. The English garrison was then in possession, and it was understood that no change would take place. It is w r orthy of observation that in this discussion Malmesbury wished to retain the Cape of Good Hope, and offered St. Helena in exchange, but Maret declined the offer. He corre- sponded with me through the intervention of Clarke, and we should have effected a general peace, had it not been for the tricks of Rcwbel, the avowed leader of the war party. AFFAIRS OF THE INTERIOR 18TH FRUCTIDOR. I was no less thwarted by the obstacles constantly thrown in my way by the minister, Rewbel, than by the influence exercised by the councils upon the resolutions of the Cabinet of Vienna, fore- seeing the possibility of a new rupture, I urged the ratification of the treaty made some six months before with the King of Sar- dinia, and which the Directory, contrary to all reason, had re- jected. But I was again disappoined; and in my discontent I complained bitterly to those whom I thought my friends in the Directory. It was represented to me that the republican party was likely to fall even by the hands of the constituted authorities, who, transformed into blind instruments of the reactionnaires, were divided into two distinct factions. Each party sought to attach to itself a distinguished general. The royalists had gained Pichegru and were now maneuvering to secure Moreau. Another party sought Hoche. My glory having excited the jealousy of many members of the Directory, they were desirous of raising up one of my rivals to balance the influence which I had acquired with the public. I determined to side with the republicans, and sent General Augereau to the Directory at Paris to take command of its troops there. Barras and his colleagues, who were in a position to know these things, assured me of the existence of a plot to overthrow the republic, and papers found in the porte- feuille of Count d'Antragues, minister of Louis XVIII., seized at Venice, confirmed these reports. The more I engaged in political affairs, the more I was convinced of the necessity of terminating and regulating the revolution; it was the offspring of the age, and could not retrograde without the cost of oceans of blood and the humiliation of France. I therefore fully concurred in the affair of the eighteenth Fructidor, which destroyed the constitution of the year III., the offspring of Utopians, who, as a balance of power, had introduced into the state a system of perpetual squab- bling, which must necessarily impede the progress of affairs. If this coup-detat led to the exile of Carnot, Barthe'lfmy, and the CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 146 fifty-three Deputies, and the gratification of mere personal ani- mosities under the cloak of public good, the fault is to be attrib- uted to those who deceived me; it did not depend upon me to direct its course and lead it to more beneficial results. FOREIGN NEGOTIATIONS. The newly organized Direc- tory, with Talleyrand* in place of Charles Delacroix, as minister of foreign affairs, did not show itself much more skillful or pacific than before. The first result of the change was the breaking off of the negotiations at Lille, where Treilhard and Bonnier had suc- ceeded Maret and Letourneur. They imperiously refused all the demands of England, and revived the discussion of subjects which had already been agreed upon by their predecessors. Thus the swaggering vanity of Rewbel and Merlin rejected the only opportunity that occurred of arresting, by a favorable maritime peace, the threatening increase of English power on the ocean. A similar result was near being produced at Passeriano. The eighteenth Fructidor produced, on the part of France, no other change in the negotiations than tlfe recall of Clarke,f and my being left in sole charge. The Directory refused to ratify the alliance with Sardinia, as if this treaty was to rescue a victim from its ambition. This body now opposed the cession of Venice, on the ground that it might increase the maritime power of Aus- *Oharles Maurice de Perigord, Prince of Talleyrand, was born at Paris, in 1754. At the 'breaking out of the Revolution, he -was bishop of Autun, but he soon left his profession and became one of the 'most rabid politicians of that age. His first diplomatic mission was to England; after this he was eriled, but returned as soon as the decree of banlsBment was repealed. He filled many important diplomatic missions under Napoleon, who raised him. in 1M05, to the dignity of sovereign prince of Benevento. In 1814 and 1815 he favored the Bourbons, and at the Congress of Vienna did everything in his power to unite the Allies against Napoleon. He joined Louis XVIII. at Ghent, and returned with him to Paris. In 1830 he was sent to London as ambassador from the new government of Louis Philippe. He died in 1838. His diplomatic talent was very great, but his reputation for intrigue is much higher than that for honesty.~- Encyclopcdia Americana. yClarke (Henri Jacques Ouillamne), Duke of Feltre, was born at Lan- drecies, in 1705. He was educated at the Ecole Militaire of Paris, and entered the army in 1782, and attained the grade of general In the early wars of the Revolution. Under Napoleon he acted mostly in a diplomatic character, and was rewarded for his services with the title of Dtfke of Feltre. He was an industrious, laborious man, and a good administrator. After the restoration, he became a servile flatterer of the Bourbons, and enjoyed considerable favor at court. His chief foible was pride of descent; he spent much of his time in hunting up old family documents, and sought to prove himself related to half of the faubourg St. Germain. His conduct as minister of Louis XVIII. did much to blnst the reputation he had pre- viously acquired under Napoleon. He died In 1818. Biographic Universellf. 10 146 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. tria, whereas it had formerly assented to this, in the hope of gain- ing Mantua. It even carried its pretensions so far as to refuse all indemnity in Italy. NAPOLEON RESIGNS. Disgusted with the opposition and apparent distrust >of the Directory, I sent in my resignation on the twenty-fifth of September, a few days after having notified the plenipotentiaries that if peace were not signed by the first of October, I would then treat only on the basis of uti possideiis. Un- certain what result would be produced by this declaration, I sought to detach Bavaria and Wurtemberg from Austria, and sent to them, under different pretexts, General Desaix, whom curiosity had brought into Italy. But, surrounded as he was by the agents of Austria, it was impossible for this officer to succeed in his mission. COBENTZEL TAKES PART IN NEGOTIATIONS. Tho moment the imperial deputation received the news of the eight- eenth Fructidor, they dispatched General Meerfield in all haste to Vienna. As the Emperor could no longer hope anything from a royalist reaction, he immediately sent Meerfield back with Count Cobentzel, who was furnished with more positive instruc- tions. Henceforth the negotiations progressed with less inter- ruption. But Austria did not appear any more pliant; far from renouncing Mantua, which had been asured to her in the prelim- inaries, she now demanded Venice, the Legations, and the line of the Adda. Indignant at such pretensions, I contested even Dal- matia and Kagusa, of which she had already taken possession. The Directory did not confine itself to these menaces: it formally declared as its ultimatum, to limit Austria by the Isonzo, and to send her for an indemnity to the secularizations in Germany a circumstance that seemed to render the rupture inevitable. NAPOLEON AND THE DIRECTORY. In the mean time the Directory, seeing the danger of accepting my resignation after the services I had rendered the public, sent an agent to me to enter into satisfactory explanations. Having determined to continue the war, it felt that it still had need of my sword, and it now con- ceded everything which it had formerly refused. The army of Italy was reinforced by three demi-brigades and a regiment of cavalry; more than eight thousand requisitionnaires joined the skeletons of my infantry; I was also promised a remonte of sixteen hundred horses; it also submitted the treaty of alliance offensive and de- fensive with Piedmont for the ratification of the councils; finally, as a proof of its condescension, Kellerman was removed and the ambassador Cacault was recalled from Naples, because I had previously shown dissatisfaction at their conduct. CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A U STRIA. 147 PEACE OF CAMPO-FORMIO. I did not wait the effect of all these resolutions; but, encouraged by the secret mission of Bot- tot, and pretty certain of the sanction of the Directory, I deter- mined not to limit myself by the instructions of the ministers, who would have produced the same results at Passeriano as at Lille. After the usual form of high demands, made with the design of more easily obtaining the object desired, I decided abruptly to close without any further authorization. Many reasons contrib- uted to produce this result. Our army in Italy was in a flourishing condition, and had a good base of operations in Osoppo and Pal- manova ; but the season was too far advanced for a campaign in Carinthia, and by allowing the Emperor the winter for organiz- ing his forces, we would risk all the advantages of the initiative, Besides, the position of the respective armies was not in our favor. The Austrians were near the center of their power, in the neigh- borhood of their magazines and depots, with their flanks secured on the one side by Croatia or Hungary, and on the other by the Ty- rol, all warlike provinces, ready at a moment's warning to second military operations. \Ve,on the contrary,had everything tofearf or our rear; Naples was ready to embrace the first opportunity to give vent to her hatred; Venice wished to remove us from her neighborhood; and the King of Sardinia, whose treaty of alliance had been rejected by the council, might take this occasion to de- clare against us. -Moreover, Austria had opposed to me the main body of her forces, while the mass of ours was still on the Rhine, some two hundred leagues behind my army, which, for a month or more, would be obliged to sustain the whole weight of the war. In fine, the rupture of the Directory with England, the incoher- ence of the plans adopted by the government in case of war, made it my duty to be less exorbitant in my demands, and to consent to the double cession of Venice and Salzburg. Therefore, on the seventeenth of October, when everybody was expecting a renewal of hostilities, peace was signed at Campo-Formio.* *When the .French ultimatum was made to Cobentzel, he positively refused to receive it, preferred a new trial of arms, and charged to Napoleon's obstinacy the blood that would lx- shed In the new contest. Upon this, Napoleon, with great coolness, although hi> was much irritate! >t this attak, arose, and took from a -mantelpiece a little porcelain vase, which Count Cobentzel prized as a present from the Empress Catharine. /Well." said Napoleon, "the truce is at an end, and war is declared; but remember, that before the autumn I will shatter your monarchy as I shatter this porcelain." Saying this, he dashed It furiously down, and the carpet was instantly covered with its fragments. He then >bowed to the congress and retired. The Austrian plenipotentiaries were struck dumb. A few moments afterward, they found that as Napoleon got into his car- riage he had dispatched an officer to the Archduke Charles, to Inform him 148 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. CONDITIONS OF THE TREATY. The treaty consisted of twenty-five articles patent, ceding Belgium and Lombardy (Mantua included), and consenting to the limits of the Rhine and the Alps; the states of Venice were ceded to Austria as far as the left bank of the Adige, with the fortress of Verona and a fixed arrondissement. The provinces of Brescia and Bergamo, situated on the right bank, were given to the Cisalpine Republic, and the Ionian Islands to France. Fourteen secret articles, more im- portant in some respects than the treaty itself, specified the limits of the Republic and the disposition to be made of the resulting territory. Should the Diet refuse the cessions on the left of the Rhine, the Emperor promised to give no support to the German Empire: the free navigation of this river and of the Meuse was promised: France consented to the acquisition by Austria of the country of Salzburg, and that she might receive Innviertel from Bavaria, and the city of Wasserburg on the Inn. Austria ceded the Frickthal to be given up to Switzerland, the Imperial Fiefs for Liguria, and the Brisgaw to the Duke of Modena in exchange for his states which had been amalgamated with the Cisalpine Republic. France agreed to yield the Prussian states between the Rhine and the Meuse. Indemnity was promised in Germany ^to the princes who had been dispossessed on the left of the Rhine, the same as to the Stadtholder. In fine, Article VH. left an open- ing for still further partitions, in stipulating that if one of the con- tracting powers should make any acquisitions in Germany, the other might make equivalents. RESULTS OF THE TREATY. This was a glorious peace, and might have been lasting; it was glorious inasmuch as it se- cured to France Belgium, the line of the Rhine and of the Alps, Mayence, great influence in Italy, and the Ionian Islands an im- portant possession which might secure to us the key of the Levant and afford immense maritime advantages; it might have been last- ing because it gave Austria ample compensation for the provinces she had ceded to us. Being now separated from Piedmont by the Cisalpine Republic, Austria had suffered to pass into our hands that the negotiations were broken off, and that hostilities would com- mence in twenty-four hours./ Count Cobentzel, seriously alarmed, sent the Marquis of Gallo to Passoriano, with a signed declaration that he consented to the ultimatum of France. It was on signing the treaty on the following day, October 17th, that Napoleon directed the first article, acknowledging the French Republic, to be stricken out. "The French Republic," said he, "is like the sun; they who cannot see it must be blind. JJhe French people are masters of their own country; they formed a repub- lic; perhaps they may form an aristocracy to-morrow; and a monarchy the day after. It is their imprescriptable right; the form of their govern- ment is merely an affair of domestic law." Montholon. CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A U STRIA. 149 the influence over the House of Savoy and northern Italy; but her own territory, contiguous to the Adige, with Verona, Legnago, and Venice, gave her a much better base for future operations against this part of Italy. Peace ought, therefore, to have ap- peared to her so much the more advantageous as she had, as it were, been rewarded for her defeats. Beaten at Jemappes, Fleu- rus, Juliers, Loano, Ettlingen, Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Bas- sano, Arcole, Rivoli, she had, nevertheless, rounded off her terri- tory by an addition of three millions of inhabitants; she had ex- changed her distant provinces of Belgium for Galicia, which was bordering on her own frontiers; she had received the states of Venice in exchange for Lombardy, with which she could hold no communication except by passing through foreign territory; she had exchanged the port of Antwerp, blasted and ruined by the closing of the Scheldt, for that of Venice, which was much more advantageous to her commerce and to her political power. As to France, she had additional reason to rejoice at this peace, inasmuch as the English had just gained a great naval victory; Duncan had, on the eighteenth of October, at Camperduyn (Cam- perdown) on the coast of North Holland, beaten and destroyed half of the Dutch fleet, and this important success might raise an additional obstacle to a maritime peace, and also increase the difficulty of trading with Austria, But the highest passions were excited, and they did not fail soon to involve the two hemispheres in a new conflagration. The mania of propagandises which had seized upon the Directory, the want of any fixed system in our foreign policy, the hatred borne by all foreigners to our republi- can institutions, could not fail, in a short time, to provoke a new war. DEVOLUTION OF LA VALTELINE. Scarcely had the treaty of Campo-Formio been signed, when new elements of dis- cord began to rise : the revolution of the Valteline was the begin- ning. This country, subject to the Ligues-Grises, had strong mo- tives for wishing its emancipation ; it was properly a part of Italy, as it spoke the same language, was situated on the southern slope of the Alps, and drew all its grain from Italy. Its inhabitants, ex- cluded from all political functions, very naturally desired an order of things that would give them some part in the government. An insurrection was incited against the Orisons; these called for the mediation of France. France answered by annexing the Valte- line to the Cisalpine Republic. The sterile advantage of extending the territory of this republic to the high Alps caused the danger of this junction of the Valteline to an Austran province to be overlooked. In fact, the French Republic, certain of the friend- ship of the Swiss, ought not to have given to a state, whose ex- 150 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. istence was as precarious as that of the Cisalpine, rights which might some day revert to the ancient possessors of Lombardy. The Valteline, united to the Grisons, closed the access of Switzerland on the side of the Tyrol, diminished the influence of Austria over the Helvetic valleys, secured the Cisalpine frontier, and perfectly covered the line of French troops called to fight on the Adige. To unite this province to a state formerly Austrian was to establish a direct contact between the upper Tyrol and the communications of the French army, to open the route of the Tonal and the Breglio by Sondrio on Milan in fine, to give the key of the Rhetian Alps to Austria, if she should ever regain possession of the Adda. NEGOTIATIONS AT RASTADT. Austria had made peace only on her own account; it was still necessary to treat with the Empire. This crowd of petty German principalities were of them- selves incapable of carrying on the war, and a treaty with them would have been a mere formality, had it not been necessary to obtain their assent to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine in favor of France, and of Salzburg and Innviertel in favor of Aus- tria. Moreover, it was necessary to indemnify the princes who had lost territory by these arrangements. A congress was as- sembled at Rastadt to settle these minute and complicated ques- tions. I repaired thither as the head of the French legation ; the other members were Bonnier and Treilhard; but I soon perceived that the discussions, being no longer supported by victory, were taking a deplorable turn, which did not at all suit me. I was too much accustomed to decide authoritatively to have sufficient patience for a long and minute investigation. I therefore left Rastadt, having first provided by a military convention for the execution of the treaty of Campo-Formio, so far as concerned the transfer of Mayence to our troops and the evacuation of the other places of the Rhine by the imperialists. PASSAGE OF THE SIMPLON ASKED OF THE VALOIS. To consolidate as much as possible the 3 r oung republic which I had created, I had, on leaving Italy, demanded of the Valois free passage by the Simplon for the troops returning to France. I was desirous to possess this upper valley of the Rhone, which offered us the most direct communications with Milan, especially at a time when Piedmont, still independent, might range herself on the side of our enemies. The Swiss very properly declined ac- ceding to a demand which destroyed the system of their neutral- ity. The Directory, already designing to revolutionize that coun- try and to draw it within its own meshes, was now only the more inclined to execute its imprudent project. DIRECTORY FOMENTS REVOLUTION IN SWITZER LAND. Rewbel and Talleyrand had formed the project, it is CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A V8TRIA. 151 said, of surrounding France by petty democratic republics, either to cover our frontiers by separating them from Austria, or to form a federative system capable of balancing new coalitions. They flattered themselves by this singular means to create a new system of political equilibrium, not between the masses of powers, but between the dogmas of governments! To think of defending the French Republic against European monarchies by surround- ing it with a girdle of petty democratic states was a piece of Uto- pian diplomacy destitute of the first principles of common sense. These feeble states, instead of avoiding points of direct contact with Austria, would keep us in continual altercation; as they could only exist under the protection and patronage of France, we would be obliged to mingle in all their frontier difficulties with Austria. A Cisalpine custom-house officer could, therefore, bring about a war as easily as the nez coupe of the English Jeffreys had between George II. and Louis XV. Our alliance with Spain and our friendly relations with Prussia showed -that it was very easy to acquire weight in the real balance of Europe without attaching to it any doctrinaire ideas: these in international policy have but little weight, and are more often a pretext than an object. Conformably to this absurd project of the Directory, Men- gaud was charged with stirring up at Bale, Arau, and Zurich a revolution in which France could interfere as she had done at Genoa. Mangourit was doing the same among the Valois; and similar effects were easily produced in the Pays de-Vaud, which had been ceded to the canton of Berne, in 1565, under the guar- antee of France. RECLAMATION OF THE VAUDOIS. With better foun- dation for their demands than the Valtelines, or the bourgeois of terra-firma, and all those who demand their part of inalienable po- litical rights, the Vaudois wished to obtain from the Bernese the same prerogatives which they had enjoyed under the Dukes of Savoy. This was no body of politicians demanding equality ; it was an enlightened people demanding for their notables the part in public affairs which belonged to them by treaties. France was the guaranteeing power, and therefore she possessed the right of intervention; but, instead of doing this nobly and in good faith, she did it in a reprehensible and underhand way. INVASION OF BERNE. The Vaudois rose in insurrection, drove away the Bernese magistrates (bailies), and called to their aid the division of Masseiia, which was then cantoned in Savoy, on the banks of Lake Geneva. This division entered the coun- try in the early part of January, under the orders of Brune, and advanced as far as the borders of the Pays-de-Vaud. The Bernese assembled in all haste a corps of twenty thousand militia on the 152 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Sarine. The Senate of Berne, distracted by internal dissensions, and paralyzed by a powerful French party, decided to make con- cessions: it promised to revise its constitution in the course of a year, and to admit a number of deputies representing the ancient subjects of Vaud and Argovie. The more reasonable of the Vaudois were disposed to accept these concessions, bat the major- ity rejected them: in times of revolution, everything is suspected and unsatisfactory; and these advantages, which really exceeded their most sanguine hopes at the outset, now appeared insuffi- cient to the sectaries of liberty and equality, who wished all or nothing. Moreover, pacific concessions did not at all suit the views of the French Directory, who wished to profit by the frenzy of its partisans to subject all Switzerland to its influence, and to establish a central government which should be under its own dom- ineering control. It required Berne to disband its army and to give pledges of its sincerity. The old avoyer, Steiger, a venerable magistrate, very different from the degenerate oligarchists of Venice and Genoa, preferred the resort to arms. Berne, showing herself as great in the moment of danger as she had been moder- ate in the beginning of the difficulties, most nobly answered to this appeal. The combat soon began: Schawembourg penetrated from Bienne on Soleure and on Berne with a division of the army of the Rhine, while that of Brune was driven back on the Sarine. They nevertheless formed a junction the next day at Berne. A superb arsenal and a treasure of twenty millions became the prey of the avaricious conquerors, who were much more occupied in enriching themselves with the Bernese spoils than in sustaining the political rights of the Vaudois, for which they pretended to fight. HELVETIC CONSTITUTION. A uniform constitution was concocted by Talleyrand,.Ochs, and Laharpe, to bind into one bundle the uncivilized democrat of the little cantons and the proud oligarchist of Berne. It was necessary to employ artillery to impose upon the Swiss this pact of the united Helvetic Republic. I had been a warm partisan of the Vaudois ; I had even advised that their just demands be sustained by diplomacy, and by an im- posing demonstration ; but I was indignant at the ulterior conduct of the Directory toward the Swiss. In driving these mountain- eers into the arms of Austria, we lost all support to our armies on the Adige, and Italy became subject to the masters of the Rhetian Alps, which take in reverse all the lines of the Adige, the Mincio, and the Ticino. yWe were certain to pay dearly for this error, which cost us, in 1799, all Italy to the Var. NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND. The question of Swise neutrality was connected with the highest combinations of CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN A USTRIA. 153 European policy. The German Empire, Austria, France, and Italy were equally interested in preserving this neutrality. Without it the line of the Rhine was a vain barrier, and the Alps no longer secured France and Italy f rjom invasion. By possessing Switzerland, France weakened instead of strengthening her pow- er; for the slightest success of the Austrians on the banks of the Var opened to thjem the access of the Jura, and enabled them to attack the soil of France by the only vulnerable point of her fron- tier. The same reasoning applies to Italy; with the neutrality of Switzerland, France, then mistress of Mantua, of Pizzighettone, and the fortresses of Piedmont, had a very decided advantage over the imperialists, reduced as they were to the walls of Verona and to the ramparts of Palma-Nova. But destroy the prestige of this neutrality, and the least success obtained in Switzerland by an imperial army would destroy all defense in Italy, and force the French army to fall back in order to arrest the enemy on the con- fines of Dauphiny, or on the banks of the Rhone. The plans of the Directory, in destroying the neutrality of Switzerland and violat- ing that territory, were, all things considered, the height of folly. In considering the increase thus given to the French line of de- fense, we are not to regard the mere circular extent of a hundred leagues, but the permanent contiguity of a line running from Venice by Trent and Lake Constance to the marshes of Friesland and the North Sea. This space being cut by the mass of the Alps, and the centre neutralized, each of these isolated fractions would necessarily present an independent line of operations. One might, therefore, select on either of these wings a strategic point most suitable for his operations, without being troubled with what was passing at the accessories. For example, operations by the left to cover the Rhine would be carried on between Strasburg and Mayence without any danger to the other extremity along the sea or on the neutral line. If operations were directed by the right for the protection of Lombardy, the defense would be entirely con- fined to the line of the Mincio or the Adige. If, on the contrary, the Swiss territory be included in the front of operations, the line of defense would extend from the Adriatic to the mouths of the Yssel, and for this entire extent of three hundred leagues every point would be exposed to an attack. The lines of the Adige and the Rhine (between Strasburg and Mayence) would then be only secondary fractions, subordinate to other operations; and, should the combatants be drawn into Switzerland, the occupant of this country, reduced to defend himself there, would be obliged to cover Bale, Schaffhausen, Rheineck, St. Gothard, the Simplon, and Mont-Cenis, without being able to dispense with imposing 154 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. forces on the Rhine and the Po. Thus the defensive power, hav- ing its forces cut up into twenty separate corps, would be greatly exposed to an active and enterprising opponent, who, by the rap- idity of his movements, might multiply his assailing forces. In- deed, the following campaign did not fail to prove that, although the salients Schafthausen and the Simplon offer strategic advan- tages for a simple passage, Switzerland, as a field of operations, should never be included in the plan of a campaign. This truth is fully demonstrated by the events of 1799, and the operations of 1805 and 1809. With my title of mediator, and the powerful in- fluence I possessed in Switzerland, I cduld have taken possession of that country with impunity, but interest directed me to leave it intact. However highly I valued two or three debouches, I knew how to render them subordinate to the calculations of policy, and 1 have proved that a route may always be found for maneuvering on the communications of the enemy, without trampling under foot national rights, and destroying the equilibrum of European states. REVOLUTION IN ROME. A few days before the fall of Berne, Rome had surrendered to Berthier. My brother Joseph had been named ambassador near the Holy See. All Italy was then in a fever: it was a strife who should plant the first tree of lib- erty. Naples was also in fermentation, and the prisons were in- sufficient to contain all who were arrested on suspicion. Rome could not, in this revolutionary excitement, forget entirely her former greatness: all who, in the country of Cicero, of Emilius, and of Brutus, could read their alphabet, threw off the monastic and pontifical yoke to bring back the glorious days of the consular gov- ernment, and, strange as it may seem, a part of the clergy partook of these sentiments. Since the peace of Tolentino, harmony had been but partially established: Joseph felt that he must act with prudence. The partisans of France exhibited a desire to reestab- lish the Roman Republic, but he persuaded them from the project. Being afterward indirectly informed that a conspiracy would break out on the twenty-sixth of December, he thought to give proof of his loyalty to the Holy See by frankly reporting the facts to the Cardinal Secretary of State, Doria. But these princes of the church were too much prejudiced against us to appreciate such an act of kindness. They redoubled their watchfulness and severity, but, in spite of all their precautions, an insurrection actually broke out on the twenty-eighth, in the vicinity of the palace of France; the multitude invaded the enciente of its jurisdiction, crying out: Long live the Roman Republic ! Long live the French Re- public! Charged upon by the gendarmes and the trabans of the Pope, this crowd took refuge under the portico of the palace, CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 155 which it was impossible to prevent. They were pursued and fired upon, even in the courts. PROCLAMATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. This act was a violation of the law of nations. Young General Duphot, an officer of merit, affianced to one of my sisters, rushed out, sword in. hand, to defend an asylum regarded as sacred, and was basely murdered, being pierced with many balls. The qual- ity of the offender adds to the heinousness of the offense. Such an act on the part of the sbirri of the Pope could not be passed over unpunished. Berthier marched upon Rome, and encamped, on the tenth of February, at the head of two divisions under the walls of the castle St. Angelo. Five days after, at the foot even of the Quirinal, was heard the cry of Roman Liberty, a cry that had not been uttered in the vicinity of the capital since the famous conspiracy of Rienzi. The people assembled in the Forum, like their illustrous ancestors, drew up a declaration of their enfran- chisement, and proclaimed their consuls, a senate, and tribunes. It was a ridiculous parody of the Rome of the Scipios; but these magic words struck the minds of the rest of Europe, and if the Directory had been more skillful, and better advised in the choice of its agents, it might have drawn immense advantage from it. Berthier, yielding to the wishes of the people, marched at the head of his grenadiers to the capital, and there proclaimed the recogni tion of the Roman Republic. The Pope had no other alternative than to abdicate; and, what was exceedingly annoying to Pius VI.. this revolution took place on the fifteenth of February, the twenty- fifth anniversary of his pontificate, and three days after, to return thanks for the abolition of his sovereignty, and the reestablish- nient of the Roman Republic, a solemn Te Deum was chanted in St. Peter's by fourteen cardinals! On the twentieth of February the Pope left Rome, never to return; Berthier gave him an escort. He repaired to the Carthusian monastery of Pisa, where he re- mained till the thirtieth of April, 1799, when he was transferred to France. The conquest of Rome became an unfortunate affair by the ulterior faults which followed it, and the great extension it gave to our line of operations. The government of Rome should have been organized, and a small corps left for its defense, the rest of the army being withdrawn to the line of the Adige. This rich city was overrun by military chiefs, who were not very delicate in their distinctions of meum and tiium, and more particularly by numerous depredating civil agents, who fell upon the treasures of St. Peter like a cloud of vampires. The army was left without food or pay, while these rascally civilians were swimming in gold; it mutinied, as the British seamen had done a year before, and if a military revolt is ever susceptible of excuse, it certainly was 156 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. under such circumstances. Massena, who had succeeded Ber- thier, was forced to leave the army, which he could not recall to duty, and which accused him (unjustly, perhaps) of not only tol- erating these abuses, but even of participating in them. Two such events as the invasion of Borne and Switzerland were more than sufficient to put an end to the peace of Campo-Formio ; in- deed, under the circumstances, that treaty could be little more than a truce. NAPOLEON'S EECEPTION AT PARIS'. While these events were preparing a new storm, my new title of general-in-chief of the army of England, and still more, the project of an expedition into Egypt, called me from Rastadt to Paris. I could not better celebrate my return to the capital than by bringing there the rati- fication of peace. Therefore, I was received with transports bor- dering on delirium. All hearts opened to hope; the wounds of La Patria were about to be healed; with her glory raised to the clouds, France was about to reestablish her political relations on both continents, and, sooner or later, force England into a peace which would secure our conquests; industry, the arts, commerce, would then take the impetus which the Revolution seemed cal- culated to impress: in a word, every thing seemed to promise a rich and prosperous future. The Directory, giving me a formal audience on the tenth of December, at the Luxembourg, pro- claimed me the man of Providence, one of those' rare prodigies which Nature bestows upon the human race only at periods far remote. France did not fail to echo the pompous eulogy of its president. I was forced to take refuge under the modest garb of a member of the Institute in order to escape the importune acclamations of a peo- ple always enthusiastic in its admiration and ever ready to change its object. The authorities were emulous in giving testimony of national gratitude. A committee of the Council of Ancients passed an act presenting me with the estate of Chambord and a grand hotel in the capital; but the Directory, alarmed at the proposi- tion, refused its assent. GENERAL REMARKS. During the two years that I had commanded in Italy, I had filled the world with the eclat of my victories; the coalition had been dissolved; the Emperor and the princes of the empire had formally recognized the French Repub- lic; all Italy had submitted to our laws and influence; two new republics, like the French, had been created; England alone re- mained in arms, but she had manifested a desire for peace, and the fault of its not being signed rested with the Directory. To these great results in the external relations of the Republic, must be added advantages gained in its interior administration and in its military power. At no time had the French soldiers shown CAMPAIGN OF 1797 IN AUSTRIA. 157 so decided a superiority. It was due to the influence of the vic- tories in Italy, that the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-et- Meuse had been able to carry the French standards to the banks of the Lech. At the beginning of 1796, the Emperor had one hun- dred and sixty thousand troops on the Rhine, ready to invade France. Our brave but undisciplined armies were then scarcely capable of securing the fortified lines of defense, much less of making conquests. The victories of Montenotte, of Lodi, etc., carried the alarm to Vienna; they forced the Aulic Council to re- call from its armies in Germany Marshal Wurmser, the Archduke Charles, and more than sixty thousand men, thus establishing the equilibrium there, and enabling Moreau and Jourdan to re- sume the offensive. More than one hundred and twenty millions of extraordinary contributions had been raised in Italy; one half of this had supported my army, and the other half, transmitted to the treasury of Paris, had assisted in providing for the expenses of the interior and the support of the armies of the Rhine. In addition to all this, the treasury owed to my victories an annual saving of seventy millions, which, in 1790, was required for the support of the armies of the Alps and of Italy. Considerable pro- vision had also been made in hemp and ship-timber, and the ves- sels captured at Genoa, Leghorn, and Venice had greatly in- creased our naval force at Toulon. The National Museum had been enriched by chefs-d'oeuvre of the arts from Parma, Florence, and Rome, which were valued at more than two hundred millions. The commerce of Lyons, Provence, and Dauphiny had begun to revive the moment the great debouche of the Alps was opened. The naval forces at Toulon, reorganized and reinforced by the squadrons of Spain, now ruled the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Levant. Happy days seemed assured to France, and for these she was indebted to the conquerors of Italy. 158 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. CHAPTER IV. NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. Difficulties of Napoleon's Position at Paris Origin of the War in Egypt- State of Hindostau Projects of the Sultan of Mysore, and the Apathy of France State of the English Forces Object of the Expedition into Egypt Napoleon examines the Port of Antwerp The Continent again involved in hostile Preparations Napoleon departs from Toulon -Capture of Malta Debarkation at Alexandria March on Cairo Battle of the Pyramids Entrance into Cairo Naval Battle of Aboukir Results of this Battle Difficulties with the Porte Revolt of Cairo- Expedition into Syria Passage of the Desert, and taking of Jaffa- Resistance of St.-Jean-d' Acre Battle of Mont-TaborContinuation of the Siege of St.-Jean-d'Acre Raising of this Siege Return to Cairo- Debarkation and Battle of Aboukir Napoleon decides to return to France. DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION AT PARIS. My brilliant reception in the capital was sufficient to flatter the vanity of the most modest, and to incite the least ambitious. It was evident that I could aspire to everything in France. Never- theless, the moment had not yet arrived to profit by this popular- ity; it was necessary to wait until the Directory should entirely destroy its own influence. France had proclaimed me her hero ; but this was not sufficient, and to become the head of the state, it was necessary to be its savior and restorer. However great my claim to the national gratitude, it did not give me the right of overthrowing an established government to which I owed my rapid advancement and a part even of my glory: it would event- ually destroy itself by its own incapacity and the disasters it would bring upon France; then only could I appear on the stage as the savior of my country. I knew well what would be the in- evitable course of events. It was only necessary to leave the silly heads of the Directory to their own measures; for, independently of the weakness of the individuals composing this body, it could not, from the nature of things, continue a long time. Either the Directory would attempt to seize the dictatorship, like the Com- mittee of Public Safety, or it would itself fall a prey to anarchy, EXPEDITION INTO EG7PT. 150 like the Executive Council of 1792; in either case, its fall wan inevitable. ORIGIN OF THE WAR IN EGYPT. Nevertheless, the part I had to play was embarrassing. They had conferred upon me the pompous but illusory title of general-in-chief of the army of England. This was a mere bugbear, by which the Cabinet of Lon- don was not to be duped; there was nothing* prepared at that epoch to give to the project any reality; all that could possibly be done was to throw some twenty or thirty thousand men into Ire- land: an enterprise, advantageous without doubt, but not suited to my ambition. I was too important a personage to remain with folded arms at Paris. Although the Directory had mingled its acclamations with those of all France, I knew that Rewbel and Merlin were secretly opposed to me: under a pretext of a hier- archy, of powers, they censured the resolution which I had taken of my own accord; they accused me of having treated with Aus tria instead of marching upon Vienna, which, in their opinion, would have secured the revolution of Germany, and given Rewbel the pleasure of fabricating a few democratic republics from the debris of the Holy Empire ! This was, according to them, the most infallible means of securing the triumph of the principles and the preponderance of France over all her neighbors. They supposed an empire like Austria could be revolutionized as easily as Rome or Milan, or rather, they were ignorant that no one could be less disposed in favor of their Utopian theories than the subjects of the Court of Vienna. Their shallow declamations against mo were scandalous. It was necessary for me to take some step; for every day the most opposite factions knocked at my door: now, the royalist agents sought to demonstrate to me the impossibility of continuing the republican system in France, and to induce me to restore the monarchy; now, the most ardent sectaries of the Republic came to complain of the assaults of the Directory upon liberty, and to urge me to act the Gracchus. I was therefore obliged to make common cause with the Directory, or to join in the conspiracy against it. I was unwilling to do either. The only reasonable course for me to pursue was to absent myself, and to do so with eclat. 1 knew that to keep the public attention fixed on me it was necessary to attempt something extraordinary. Many anonymous letters, very well written, had already been ad- dressed to me, warning me of the difficult part which I had to play in France. One of these letters advised me to form a state for myself in Italy, as Dumouriez had thought to do in Holland. But I was not foolish enough to do this. I shall allude to this proposi- tion again. I had spoken vaguely during the negotiations of Campo- 160 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Formio of a project on Egypt, although I had then no idea of tak- ing charge of it myself. Talleyrand had also mentioned it. On my return, I offered to put it in execution. As the results might be immense, the enterprise seemed worthy of my ambition. Of course the majority of the Directory received with delight a prop- osition for ridding themselves of a pacificator whose popularity they feared. They were therefore enchanted to see me thus an- ticipate their wishes by a voluntary exile. Some statesmen wished to retain me, endeavoring to convince me that I was called by the circumstances of the time to take the helm of affairs. I replied that the pear was not yet ripe, and that I was going to win new titles to their confidence. We had no very accurate idea of what was passing in the East, for the loss of Pondicherry and the European embarrass- ments of the Republic had withdrawn attention from that quar- ter. But we remembered that Tippoo-Saib, chief of the empire of Mysore, founded by Hyder-Aly with the assistance of France, had proposed to Louis XVI., in 1788. to drive the English from India, if France would assist him with eight thousand European troops, and with a good number of officers to lead his forces ; and that Louis XVI., on account of the internal troubles of France, had not accepted a proposition which would have embarrassed him with a maritime war at the moment when he Was threatened with a revolution. Finally, we knew that the English, to punish Tippoo for this message, had assisted the Nizam against him, and, having besieged him in Seringapatam, had forced him into a treaty in 1792, stripping him of half his dominions. We there- fore had reason to expect some support from the Sultan of Mysore. We also knew that the Mahrattas, although enemies of the Mogul and Mussulman race, were equally hostile to the English East India Company, and that it might be possible to find among them the elements of a powerful alliance. But to appreciate fully thi? expedition into Egypt, it will be necessary to speak more particu- larly of the real state of India prior to that epoch. STATE OF HINDOSTAN. The Tartar prince Aureng-Zeb, contemporary of Louis XIV., extending the conquests of his pred- ecessors, founded in the centre of India the Mogul empire., with a population of not less than fifty millions, a revenue of nine hun- dred millions, and an army of eight hundred thousand men. This immense empire was divided into numerous provinces, governed by Subadars and Nabobs. This conqueror died in 1707; and such is the miserable condition of the despotic dynasties of the East, that his successors, in the short space of forty years, harassed by their own vassals and attacked by the Persians under the terrible Thamas Kouli-Kan and by the Mahrattas, were compelled to ask EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 161 the aid of Europeans, and to surrender to them several provinces. The stories of the revolutions and counter-revolutions that have taken place within the last fifty years in the presqu'ile of the Ganges seem more like Arabian tales than history. Passing over the details of these contests, we will look merely at the gen- eral results. It was not till the middle of the eighteenth century that the British East India Company, appreciating the system proposed by the skillful Dupleix for France, began to take part in the quar- rels of the native princes. Here, as in Europe, the British policy was to divide and conquer. At one time sustaining the Hindostan princes against Mussulmans of the Mogul dynasty, and at another taking the part of the latter against the natives, if these seemed too strong, this Company succeeded in appropriating to itself the most important parts of the territory of both its proteges and its enemies. At the epoch of the French Revolution, India was divided into five principal states: 'those governed by Mussulman princes were at the south; Mysore, subject to Tippoo-Saib; at the north, Mogul, subject nominally to Schah-Alloun, but in fact to his principal officers; still further north, Zeman-Schah reigned over the Afghans, who inhabited Candahar and Cabal. By the side of this kingdom lay that Of Beloochistan, inhabited by a war- like and savage people. In the centre of the presqu'ile was the empire of the Mahrattas, founded by Sevaji, an Indian prince, who, having maintained himself in possession of the kingdom of Sattara, afterward succeeded in capturing the greater part of the conquests of the Moguls in the Deccan. Soon after his death all the petty tributary princes rendered themselves independent of the great rajahs who succeeded him, and whose authority was suc- cessively circumscribed to the fortress of Sattara. Feigning to recognize the right of this family to the crown, the Peishwah, its prime minister, obtained absolute power over the northern part of the presqu'ik, where he founded the kingdom of Poonah. Mad- aji-Schindiah did the same in the north and east. This able man, conquering the army of Ismae'l-Beg, and succoring Schah-Alloun against the ferocious Golaem-Cadir, succeeded in reestablishing the preponderance of the Mahrattas in the states of Mogul, where he exercised supreme authority in the name of the Emperor, to whom he left only the palace and a small income; sole heritage of the colossal power of Aureng-Zeb. Madaji-Schindiah had been seconded in his operations by a European corps, or one organized and instructed in the European manner by a Savoyard officer named Boigne. This celebrated Mahratta died in 1794; and his nephew, Dowlut-Row, without inheriting his talents, pursued his system, preserved his preponderance over the Mogul, and succeed- 162 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. ed in extending it, in 1796, as far as the states of the Peishwah, placing Bodje-Row, whom he held entirely under his tutelage, on the throne >of Poonah. General Peyron had succeeded Boigne in the command of the army of Schindiah, composed of five brigades of European organization, thirty-four thousand well-disciplined infantry, and a very large force of cavalry. A third Mahratta state, governed by the Rajah of Berrar, extended to the north of the Deccan : although less powerful than the two preceding, it was one of the most formidable members of the confederation. The family of Holkar reigned over Malwa, and twenty other petty feudatory princes, independent of these, had diaghirs, a kind oi' dotation. It thus appears that the Mahratta people formed a numerous confederation, much like the German Empire, differing from it only in the nature of Eastern organization and Eastern in- stitutions. The Hindoo confederation presented, in fact, the singular spectacle of a great hereditary rajah possessing vast dominions without authority, and surrounded by two great digni- taries, who, not satisfied with making their power hereditary, did not scruple to divide among themselves the domains of the prince from whom they received the investiture. Still more to be pitied, the Emperor of the Moguls distributed crowns without the power of retaining one, for, properly speaking, he was a sovereign with- out subjects; a despot incapable of making himself obeyed, he sold to adventurers the right of exercising absolute authority in his provinces; poor, though all the money of Hindostan was stamped with his image, he prided himself in having great kings for his tributaries, though he depended upon their generosity for his own support. The finesse of Lord Clive, the profound Machiavellism of Hastings, and the wise policy of Lord Cornwallis had successively been directed to connect the Company with the complicated inter- ests of these states, and to intermeddle in their differences with an appearance of loyalty. Always appearing upon the scene as an umpire, .this Company was enabled to arrange the conditions of treaties to suit its own interests; it aided the weaker power against the stronger for the double purpose of profiting by the spoils of the latter and of removing all obstacles to its own ambi- tion. Thus, by the aid of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, it had, in 1792, conquered Tippoo-Saib, whom it could not forgive for hav. ing sent ambassadors to Louis XVI. with proposals for expelling the English from India. Two years after, the Mahrattas in their turn attacked the Nizam, overrun the country with two hundred thousand men, without any efforts on the part of the English Com- pany to succor this prince, whom it held under its tutelage. Either dissatisfied with this conduct of the Company, or aspiring EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 163 to independence, he had confided to an officer named Raymond the care of organizing, in the European manner, an army of fifteen thousand men, and gave him, for their pay, the revenue of a rich province. PROJECTS OF THE SULTAN OF MYSORE. Tippoo- Saib, since the unfortunate treaty of Seringapatam, which had de- prived him of half his empire, had thought only of vengeance. France, distracted by anarchy and discouraged by the loss of Pondicherry, seemed to have forgotten the advantage it might derive from the hostile disposition of the people of Hindostan against the English Company. Not a vessel, not a man had been sent to India; and from the carelessness of the governors of the Isle-of-France, one would s"uppose that the very existence of the two presqu'iles of the Ganges had been entirely forgotten. At the end of 1796, Truguet had thought of sending assistance to the Sul- tan of Mysore, but his project was based on the possibility of form- ing battalions of negroes in the plantations of the Isle-of-France, and its execution was never even begun. A few adventurers were on the eve of doing what Louis XVI. and the Committee of Public Safety had neglected. Rippaud, a Corsican, cast away on the coast of Mangalore, was taken to Tippoo-Saib, and by relating the victories of the Republican armies in Europe, excited in that chief the hope of obtaining succor from the ancient allies of his father. He sent an ambassador to the Isle-of-France with a proj- ect of alliance to be submitted to the Directory; a project so well combined that it would have done credit to the best European diplomatist. The reply of Governor Malartie shows that it was not appreciated by him; he, however, sent to the Sultan thirty non-commissioned officers, artillerists, and artisans, who were es- timated at a high price, but who disgraced the French uniform by their revolutionary extravagances, and furnished a pretext to the English Company to assail the Sultan of Mysore. We have rea- son for believing that the Directory were never well informed of what took place on this occasion. Nevertheless Tippoo did not stop here: seeking to allay the rivalry of the Mahrattas, he sought to arm the Peishwah and Schindiah against the Company; and, carrying his views still further, he sought the alliance of Zeman- Schah. The joint forces of these several states might amount to fifty thousand men armed and disciplined as Europeans, and three hundred thousand soldiers of the native organization. If the tumultuous impetuosity of the Mahrattas, the chivalric bravery of the Rajpootas, and the unbridled ambition of the chiefs, had been so directed as to act in concert for the deliverance of India, no doubt this formidable coalition would have soon triumphed over the English, particularly if a French division, commanded by an 164 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. able general, had served to regulate the operations of these com- bined forces. STATE OF THE ENGLISH FORCES. The English East India Company had then for allies only two or three subaltern nabobs and the Nizam; still this last, in sending the English bat- talions of its guard to throw themselves into the hands of Ray- mond, gave reason to think that it would return sooner or later to the policy of its predecessor, who had fought under the flag of Hyder-Ali. But the Company had now become redoubtable in itself, for each of the three Presidencies of which it was composed formed veritable empires. The first of these, including Calcutta, Bengal, the coast of Orissa, and the rich valley of the Ganges as far as Oude, was the centre of the general government, and was equal to the mother country in power and wealth. The second, composed of the possessions of the Deccan about Madras, had its seat of government in that city. The third, established at Bom- bay, united the establishments of Malabar and Surat to the fac- tories of the Persian Gulf. The joint forces of these Presidencies amounted to twenty-five thousand Europeans and sixty thousand well-organized Sepoys. OBJECT OF THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. Such was the state of India when I undertook to open a direct communi- cation with that country. I was convinced that this was the shortest way to reach the heart of England, for at this epoch India was everything to her, excluded as she was from the greater part of the American continent. The expedition to Egypt had three objects: 1st. To establish on the Nile a French colony, which, without resorting to slave labor,/might supply the loss of St. Domingo and all the sugar islandsV2d. To open to our manufac- turers new outlets in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to furnish to our commerce all the productions of this part of the world ; 3d. To furnish a base of operations for moving an army of fifty thousand men on the Indus, and of raising the Mahrattas, the Hindoos, the Mussulmans in a word, all the oppressed people of these vast countries. -An army, one half of Europeans and the other half of the people of the burning climates of the tropics, transported by ten thousand horses and as many camels, carrying with them provisions for fifty or sixty days, and water for five or six, and a doubly furnished train of artillery with one hundred and fifty field-pieces, would reach the Indies in four months. The desert is no obstacle to an army abundantly supplied with camels and dromedaries. This expedition would give an exalted idea of the French power; it would draw public attention to its chiefs; it would surprise Europe by its boldness-Xthese motives were more than sufficient to induce me to attempt it. EXPEDITION INTO EQJPT. 166 Egypt, it is true, was tributary to the Ottoman Porte, who was one of the oldest allies of France, and who, since the age of Francis I., had made common cause with her. But the Mameluke being the true master of the country, and in open revolt against the Grand Seigneur, we had reason to believe that the Divan, already fully occupied with war against Passwan Oglu, Pacha of Widdin, and against the Wechtabies, and so weak as to be unable to reduce a large body of insurgent pachas, would not blindly join our enemies for the mere shadow of suzerainty, which, if nec- essary, we could acknowledge as well as the Mamelukes. We had every reason to expect, with a skillful negotiator, to succeed in convincing the Divan of our friendly disposition. NAPOLEON INSPECTS THE PORT OF ANTWERP. Full of confidence in the results of my mission, I urged forward the preparations for my departure. But in order to distract the attention of the enemy from the ports of the Mediterranean, where everything was in full activity, I profited by my title of general-in-chief of the army of England to make an inspection of the ports of the coast. Having gone as far as Antwerp, I saw in the superb basin of the Scheldt the important advantages that might one day be derived from this position : it had upon me the same effect as the beautiful Neva had upon Peter the Great. NEW TROUBLES ON THE CONTINENT. In the mean- time the political horizon of the continent was again overcast. After my departure from Rastadt, the congress had broken off the discussions upon the conditions of peace with the German Em- pire. The French plenipotentiaries had difficulty in obtaining the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, for it overturned the con- stitution of that empire by absorbing the three electorates of May- ence, Troves, and Cologne. But the great powers, having tasted the benefits of secularization, hoped to make acquisitions at their convenience. Austria thought to secularize the archbishoprics of Salzburg, Passau, and Trent; Bavaria, the bishoprics of Fran- conia (Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Aichstedt); Prussia, those of Mini- ster, Paderborn, etc. These powers, therefore, definitely agreed to the line of the Rhine. It was a vain formality, for the Direc- tory, in its presumptuous career of propagandism, was already embroiling the whole continent in new difficulties. England took advantage of these difficulties to form a new coalition, and sound- ed the alarm at the same time at St. Petersburg, at Vienna, Berlin, Turin, in Tuscany, and at Naples. It was generally believed that the Empress of Russia, at the moment of her death, wa* about signing a treaty of subsidy with England. Already an imperial ukase had ordered a levy of one hundred and thirty thousand re- cruits ; whether these preparations were intended for taking part 166 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. in the continental contest, or for the conquest of Turkey, or to punish the young Gustavus of Sweden for his rupture of the con- tract of marriage with the Grand Duchess Alexandrina, they an- nounced the approach of great events. But the Emperor Paul, in ascending the throne, instantly changed the affairs of the North. He revoked the levy, and directed his whole attention to the in- ternal affairs of his vast empire. These pacific demonstrations had an immediate influence upon the Russian finances, the price of paper money even exceeding its nominal value. But the whim- sical character of the Emperor gave hope to the Cabinet of London that he might yet be induced to join in the war against France, and no means for obtaining this object were left untried. At this time an event took place at Vienna which might serve, in some degree, as an index of the popular feelings of the Austrians, and of the present sentiments of the government. Bernadotte, our am- bassador at Vienna, had raised the tricolored flag on his hotel in celebration of a victory over the Austrians. The hotel of the em- bassy was attacked by an irritated populace, and the flag seized and burnt; Bernadotte left Vienna the next day. The Directory at first wished to declare war, and to place me in command; but 1 persuaded it from such a course, demonstrating that Bernadotte was in the wrong, and that Austria, if resolved on war, would have avoided such a hasty and immature act. Nevertheless, there were other circumstances which indicated new difficulties. I, therefore, wished to defer my departure, but the Directory, having settled the affair of Bernadotte, insisted; and, placed in the alter- native of ruin or obedience, I complied. The Directory, delighted at getting rid of me, granted all my requests. I prepared my de- parture in profound secrecy; this was necessary for its success, and added to the singular character of the expedition. Never were such formidable preparations better disguised. DEPARTURE FROM TOULON. I repaired to Toulon on the tenth of May, 1798. On the nineteenth, I set sail with thirteen ships of the line, six frigates, and transports for twenty- five thousand troops. I was joined at sea by the squadrons from Bastia, Genoa, and Oivita-Vecchia, with seven or eight thousand men who also belonged to the expedition. On the ninth of June, we reached Malta. TAKING OF MALTA. I had maintained an understand- ing with a small number of French officers, more devoted to their country than to this knighthood, already falling to decay; the Order had made no preparations for defense; nothing was ready to oppose us, and if we had not taken possession, it is certain that the English would have done so, for this post was essential for our communications with France. I feared lest some measure of EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 167 their former glory might induce the knights to defend themselves which might have retarded, and perhaps defeated, my expedition : fortunately for us, they surrendered more readily even than I had hoped, and thus placed in my hands one of the strongest works in Europe. DEBARKATION AT ALEXANDRIA. After having left a good garrison at Malta with the necessary instructions for its defense, I continued my voyage with rare good luck. The Eng- lish fleet in pursuit crossed our course without meeting us. It arrived at Alexandria before us; but Nelson, hearing that we had not been there, went in search of us on the coast of Syria. We reached Alexandria on the evening of the thirtieth of June. I commenced the debarkation the same night at the anchorage of Marabou, and the next day I marched on Alexandria with the part of my army which had already debarked. A column followed the shore of Marabou, and made an attack on the side of the New Port. Two others turned the city, and assailed it on the side of Pompey'sr Pillar and the gate of Rosetta. A numerous population manned the walls and the towers of the city of the Arabs. My artillery had not yet been landed; nevertheless, our columns carried the first enciente by assault; the new city and the forts capitulated the same day. The possession of Alexandria gave me a secure footing in Egypt. The debarkation continued without obsta- cle. My army, thirty thousand strong, was divided into five divi- sions under the orders of Generals Kl^ber,* Desaix,f Reynier,J *K16>ber (Jean-Baptiste) >was born at Strasbourg, in 1754. His parents were poor, but his early education was attended to (by the curate of a vil- lage of Alsace. He was admitted, while still young, Into the military school of Bavaria, where he completed his education and -was commissioned In the army of the Electorate. He afterward resigned and returned to France. He entered the French army in 1792 and distinguished himself at the defense of Mayence. He served In the following campaigns, and had al- ready acquired a brilliant reputation when he started on this expedition, which has immortalized his name. fDesalx (Louis Charles Antoine) was born at St.-Hilaire-d'Ayat, in 3768. He was educated at the military school of Effiat, and at the age of fifteen entered the army as sub-lieutenant. He early distinguished him- self for his enthusiastic love of study. His promotion was very rapid, for we find hhn a brigadier-general in 1793; in 1794 he was made general-of- division and greatly distinguished himself with the northern army, and also, In 1796, with the army of the Rhine. He joined Napoleon in Italy in 1797. A mutual attachment was instantly formed, which continued till the death of Desaix on the field of Marengo/ JReynier (Jean Louis Ebenezer) was born at Lausanne, In 1771. He received a scientific education to prepare him for the profession of engineer. He entered the military service in 1792, and was made general-of -brigade in 1794. He had greatly distinguished himself previous to the campaign In 168 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Bon,* and Menou;f my cavalry, amounting to three thousand men, had only three hundred horses; the remainder were to be mounted in this country. MARCH ON CAIRO. To give the Mamelukes no time to concert means of defense, it was essential to push forward rapidly the conquest of Egypt. The elite of their forces was composed of cavalry, the most redoubtable in the world; their infantry were merely militia, inferior in every respect to our soldiers. Success depended on the rapidity of our attacks and the consternation produced by our victories. The Crusaders had failed against Egypt because theirs was a war of religion, carried on against the entire masses of Islamism. This danger was now to be avoided. Thanks to the revolts and independence of the Mamelukes, the Mussulman population was divided ; we came as the friends of the Porte and thus gained a good part of the Turks. Victory is always the surest means of making partisans; by offering at the same time the laurel and the olive, we might gain those who were inclined to peace, and whom the violent administration of a war- like horde rendered very unhappy. St. Louis had required four months to reach Cairo, and had there halted; I would reach there in fifteen days, and immediately push forward to other conquests. I left Alexandria on the sixth of July ; and directed my march across the desert upon Bahmania, where I was rejoined by Kle- ber, who had marched by Rosetta, taking possession of this place. On the way we first encountered the Mamelukes, a part of whom Egypt. He served in the south of Italy during the campaigns of 1805 and 1806. He served in Spain, and also under Napoleon, in the campaigns of 1809, 1812, and 1813. He -was made prisoner at the 'battle of Leipsic, and died in the beginning of 1814. He was the author of several works on Egypt. *Bon (L. A.), born at Romans, in 1758, first entered the army in 1775, but, after some years' service in the colonies, retired to civil life. He again entered the army in 1792, and in 1794 was made general-of^brigade. He distinguished himself in the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and won great admiration by his bravery and skill in Egypt. S&e was killed at the siege of St.-.Tean-d'AcreX His widow and family were afterward most lib- erally provided for by Napoleon. TMenou (Jacques Frangois) was toorn in Touraine, in 1750. He was of a noble family and was a marfahal-de-camp in the army before the Revolu- tion. He was a politician of some distinction, but had seen little service; he owed his place in the army of Egypt rather to political influence than to military merit. After the death of KleVber, foe became the commander-in- chlef. but was utterly incompetent for the duties of his station. After his return to France, he received from Napoleon several political appointments, but was no longer employed on military service. He died in 1810. Biogra- phie Universelle. EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 169 were repulsed by my advanced guard under Desaix. We now ascended the Nile, and pressed forward toward Cairo. COMBAT OF CHEBREISS. But, before reaching the capital of Egypt, it was necessary to fight. On the thirteenth of July we encountered Mourad-Bey, the most courageous of all the Mameluke chiefs, who was posted, with four thousand horsemen, near the village of Chebreiss, with his right flank covered by a flotilla. Nothing can compare with the beauty of the coup-d'oeil presented by this African cavalry; the elegant figures of the Arabian horses, relieved by the richest trappings; the martial air of the riders, the variegated brilliancy of their costumes, the superb turbans enriched with their plumes of office; all together presented to us a spectacle new and peculiar. The Turkish cav- alry, which is really very fine, is, however, far from equal to that of the Mamelukes. The combat began between the flotillas; ours, which, in ascending the Nile, kept pace with our march, was first attacked by the enemy. To disengage it, I attacked Mourad-Bey. I adopted the order of battle used by the Russians against the Turks, each division being formed in squares enclosing the equi- pages, and the few cavalry which I possessed. These squares were disposed in echelons so as to flank each other. In vain did the Mamelukes present themselves against the different sides of the squares; at last, harassed by the fire of my artillery, they fell back toward the capital. BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS. On the twenty-first of July we arrived in sight of Cairo; we had seen the pyramids for some days. The aspect of these wonderful monuments of an- tiquity, braving the storms of ages, and now surrounded by the superb cavalry of the Mamelukes caracoling in the plain, excited in the breasts of my soldiers a mingled feeling of astonishment and pride. I profited by this to raise their enthusiasm to the highest pitch, addressing ,them in words as lasting as the Pj'ra- iii ids themselves. "Soldiers! you have come to rescue Egypt from barbarism; to bring civilization into the East; anjiHo save this beautiful land from the yoke of England/' Forty centuries are looking down upon you from the tops of these monuments!" Mourad-Bey had armed the village of Embabeh with artil- lery, and the intrenchments with militia, supported by six thou- sand Mameluke and Arabian cavalry. I advanced with my squares. Desaix and Reynier were to extend their line, the right in advance, so as to cut off all communication from Embabeh to the upper valley of the Nile, while the divisions of Bon and Kleber should attack the front of the intrenchments. The Mame- 170 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. lukes seeing Desaix in march, attacked him in great numbers; but all their brilliant charges failed against the intrepidity of the French squares. Never were charges better made, or better sus- tained : but the vigor and ardor of these famous Mameluke horse- men even augmented the disorder in their own ranks;- unable to penetrate our squares, they sought to die in the attempt. At the left the intrenchments of Embabeh were carried by our troops, and the enemy, seeing himself shut in between our line of squares and the Nile, fled toward Upper Egypt, except fifteen hundred men who were drowned in the river; and their camp and forty pieces of artillery fell into our hands. NAPOLEON ENTERS CAIRO. This brilliant victory cost me only two hundred men hors de combat, and it opened to me the gates of Cairo, which I entered on the twenty-fifth. Ibrahim-Bey, who commanded the Mamelukes of the right bank of the Nile, fell back on Belbeis. Mourad-Bey, with those of the left bank, took the road to Upper Egypt. I sent Desaix in pursuit. This able general with his small force established himself in Upper Egypt, and checked the operations of Mourad-Bey, who, always beaten, but never discouraged, renewed his attacks with admir- able constancy. To complete our conquests it was necessary to dispose of Ibrahim-Bey. I left Cairo on the seventh of August with the divisions of Reynier, Menou, Kle"ber, and the cavalry, directing my march on Belbeis. Ibrahim retired toward the desert of Syria; I continued the pursuit. On the eleventh my cav- alry overtook and defeated his rear-guard at Salchich. Ibrahim escaped, with about a thousand cavalry, across the desert to Gaza. I left Reynier at Salchich with orders to fortify this post as a pro- tection to Egypt on the side of Syria, The division of KleT>er was directed on Damietta, the possession of which rendered me mas- ter of all the shore. With the division of Menou I returned to Cairo. NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR. But all my hopes were marred by the fatal event at Aboukir, which was caused by neg- lect to obey my orders. I had several times directed that our fleet should be withdrawn into the old port of Alexandria, or, if that could not be effected, to immediately set sail for France. It was pretended that the canal leading to this port was too shallow for our vessels of the line, but the soundings made bymy ordersproved that a seventy-four-gun ship could pass. Brueys thought the operation hazardous, and preferred the open sea to a possible blockade in port. He, therefore, made preparations to sail for Corfu or Toulon. While ranged in close order in the harbor of Aboukir, he was attacked on the evening of the first of August, /kelson pierced his ill-arranged line, and destroyed the left, while EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 171 the right was obliged to remain an idle spectator of the combat. The battle continued thirty-six hours, and ended in the destruc- tion of three-quarters of our fleet. Admiral Brueys, by a glori- ous death, expiated his fault, which proved so fatal to the French navy.* Alison endeavors to attribute to Napoleon all the faults of the battle of Abouklr, but, notwithstanding his erroneous statements and garbled quotations, his documents prove the very reverse of what he asserts. The account given by Jomini, in the text, is perfectly correct. Napoleon urged upon Brueys, time and again, the importance of securing his fleet In the harbor of Alexandria; he sent engineers to make the soundings at the entrance, suggested to the naval commander the use of water camels or butts on which to float his larger ships over the bar; Brueys wished to take position In Aboukir Bay, where he could secure his line by land batteries. But on the twenty-sixth of July he iiad determined to follow Napoleon's advice, and wrote to him that he would enter the port. On the thirtieth Napoleon wrote to Brueys, "I am induced to believe that you are by this time safely In the port." The battle was fought on the first of August. With respect to Alison's charge, "that the only real culpability In the case Is imputable to Napoleon, In having endeavored, after Brueys' death, to blacken his character," in his report to the Directory, It may be remarked that it is not true. The report states nothing but what is given in his previous correspondence with Brueys. He says that the Admiral had neg- lected his advice, which was actually the case, but he speaks of his error in the mildest possible terms. Indeed, he and Brueys were personal friends, and it was to this friendship that Napoleon attributes Brueys' unwilling- ness to sail for Corfu till he could hear from him at Cairo. This looks much more like excusing his faults than like "blackening his character." The following is Napoleon's letter to Madame Brueys on her husband's death: "Your husband has been killed by a cannon >ball, while fighting on his quarter-deck. He died without suffering; the death the most easy and the most envied by the brave. I feel warmly for your grief. The moment which separates us from the object we love is terrible; we feel alone on the earth; we almost experience the convulsion of the last agony; the faculties of the soul are annihilated; the world Is seen only through a vail which distorts everything. We feel as If nothing longer binds us to life; that it were far better to die: but when, after these first and unavoidable throes, we press our children to our hearts, tears and more tender sentiments arise; life for their sakes becomes tolerable. Yes, madam, they will open the fountains of your heart; you will watch their childhood, educate their youth ; you will tell them of their father, of your present grief, of the loss which they and the Republic have sustained in his death. After havln-g resumed the interest In life by the cord of maternal love, you will, perhaps, feel some consolation from the friendship and warm Interest which I shall ever take In the widow of my friend." For further Information on this subject, the reader Is referred to Gour- mand, vol. ii., Norvins, vol. 1., and to Thlers' "History of the Revolution." Alison rests his assertions on such absurd authorities as Bourlenne, and an anonymous work called "ffifmolres expedition were exploring this antique cradle of civilization; scientific establishments, formed under their direction at Cairo, contributed to drive away the ennui which one is so apt to feel in a strange land; some of these learned men assisted in forming armories, foundries, powder manufactories, and all the military resources furnished by the arts. But the rupture with the Porte clouded our happy prospects. REVOLT OF CAIRO. The news of this event now spread through Egypt and caused a general fermentation. The chiefs of the Mussulmans having declared against us, we were now only Christian dogs, and to exterminate us was meritorious service. A serious revolt broke out at Cairo on the twenty-second of October, "eneral Dupuis, who commanded there, and some three hundred of our officers and soldiers, were strangled^ It became necessary to resort to severe punishment; my troops who were encamped about the city penetrated there and made a great carnage of those who were found armed. After two days of massacre, tranquillity was restored, and the quelling of the sedition seemed to consoli- date our power in Egypt. Desaix had just completed the sub- jugation of Upper Egypt, gaining over the remains of the Mame- lukes the victory of Sediman/' EXPEDITION INTO SYRIA. Our repose was not of long duration; I learned that the Turks were assembling an army in Natolia to enter Egypt by marching along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Djezzar, Pacha of St.-Jean-d'Acre, was al ready collecting magazines for this army, and preparing to fur- nish it a reinforcement of troops collected in Syria. The best means of disconcerting these projects was to destroy th<. prepara- tions before the Ottoman army could come to the support of Djezzar. I therefore resolved to march into Syria with such of 174 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. my troops as were not absolutely necessary to guard the coasts, and to maintain tranquillity in Egypt during our absence. On the tenth of February I left Cairo with the divisions of Bon, Lannes, and the cavalry. On the seventeenth I reached El-Arich, where I found the divisions of Eeynier and Kle"ber, which had come from Salchich and Damietta. Beynier had already carried the village of El-Arich Jt>y assault, but the fort still held out. This little fort might, for a long time, have resisted our means of at- tack, but, fortunately, the garrison capitulated on the twentieth. CAPTURE OF JAFFA. Although the total force of my ex- pedition did not exceed thirteen thousand men, still I was obliged to make them march by isolated divisions across the desert which separated us from Syria, so as not to exhaust the wells, our only resource in this arid country. After forty-eight hours of the most fatiguing march, we reached the plain of Gaza. All the army united near this city, which had been evacuated by the enemy, leaving us in possession of its great magazines. On the third of March we reached Jaffa. The garrison was numerous and disposed for defense. I established batteries against the outer wall. On the seventh the breach was found practicable, and the city carried by assault. We captured on this occasion two thousand prisoners, who very much embarrassed me. The weakness of my army did not allow me to detach an escort to guard them; on the other hand, they oould not be released on parole, for they did not consider it binding; moreover, a part of them had already been discharged at El-Arich, on their promise not to again serve against us, and were now taken in arms. Know- ing of no other course to pursue, I caused them to be shot/ I did this with great repugnance; but as the barbarians treated Chris- tian prisoners in this way, and gloried in sending their h'eads to Constantinople, I felt the less scruple in the course I was forced to pursue. My enemies have not failed to reproach me with this action, which, judged of by the rules of civilized warfare, is not justifiable, but which the laws of retaliation, and of necessity, in the difficult circumstances in which 1 myself and my army were placed, will perhaps excuse it in the eyes of posterity.* *Thiers, in speaking of this event, says, "that when Napoleon sum- moned the commandant of Jaffa to surrender, the latter replied by cutting off the head of ttic messenger! The place was then carried by storm after extraordinary exertions, and having no means of disposing of the prisoners without allowing them to return and swell the enemy's ranks, he decided on a terrible measure, the only cruel act of his life. Transported into a bar- barous country, he had involuntarily adopted its manners." Alison gives the following version of this affair: "When the prisoners were assembled, a council of war was summoned to deliberate on their fate. For two days the terrible question was debated, What was to be done with these cap- ' EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 175 RESISTANCE OF ST.-JEAN-D'ACRE . Djezzar-Pacha had taken every means for the defense of St.-Jean-d'Acre, which place was invested on the eighteenth of March. The fortifications of the place consisted in a wall flanked by towers and surrounded by a ditch. But our means of attack were not even sufficient for the reduction of these slight obstacles, for Sidney Smith, com- manding the English cruisers, had captured the siege-train which I had sent from Alexandria by sea, and put it in battery against us. The trench was opened on the twentieth of March. Djezzar, under the direction of a French engineer and a French artillerist, made a most desperate defense. My first assault on the twenty- eighth having failed, the hopes of the besieged were increased. BATTLE OF MONT-TABOR. From my posts of observa- tion at Saffet and Nazareth, I received intelligence of the ap- proach of an army from Damascus and Palestine. To check this tives? and the French officers approached it without any predisposition to cruel measures. But the difficulties were represented as insurmountable on the side of humanity. If they sent them back, it was said, to Egypt, a considerable detachment would be required to guard so large a body of captives, and that could ill be spared from the army in its present situation; if they gave them their liberty, they would forthwith Join the garrison of Acre, or the clouds of Arabs who already hung on the flanks of the army; if they were incorporated unarmed in the ranks, the prisoners would add grievously to the number of mouths, for whom, already, it was sufficiently difficult to procure subsistence. No friendly sail appeared in the distance to take off the burden on the side of the ocean; the difficulty of maintaining them became every day more grievous. The committee, to whom the mat- ter was referred, unanimously reported that they should be put to death, and Napoleon, with reluctance, signed the fatal order. It was carried into execution on the tenth of March." These circumstances greatly palliate, though, of course, they can not fully justify, the act. The opportunity thus offered to Alison to blacken the character of Napoleon is too good to be lost, and he accordingly proceeds to give him what he calls "his deserts"; such phrases as "atrocity," "foul deed, 1 ' "iniquitous and atrocious act," "execrable deed," etc., are most unsparingly applied. It may be interesting to the unprejudiced reader to compare Alison's remarks In this place with his labored defense of Hastings for the cold- blooded murder- of Nuncomar, for the horrible Rohilla war, carried on under his direction, and for the cruel treatment and robbery of the prin- cesses of Oude. In the former case, Macaulay says, "a man was unjustly put to death in order to secure a political purpose." In the second case, "Mr. Hastings put down by main force the brave struggles of innocent men, fighting for their liberty; he folded his arms and looked on, while their villages were burned, their children butchered, and their women vio- lated." "More than a hundred thousand people fled from their homes to pestilential Jungles, preferring famine and fever and the haunts of tigers to the tyranny of him to whom an English and a Christian government bad, for shameful lucre, sold their substance and their blood, and the honor 176 LIFE OF NZPOLEON. hostile force, I dispatched toward the Jordan two small corps of observation: Kteber, with his division, to Nazareth; and Murat, with a detachment of about two thousand men, to Saffet. A few days afterward I learned that the enemy had passed the Jordan at the bridge of Giz-el-Mesania, and that Kteber would be at- tacked. I flew to his assistance. I left the camp before St.-Jean- d'Acre, on the fifteenth day of April, followed by the division of Bon and the cavalry: the next morning I arrived near Mont-Tabor in sight of the enemy, who, with the great mass of his infantry, occupied the village of Fouli. Their cavalry of about twenty thousand horse inundated the celebrated plain of Esdrelon, where the division of Klel)er, formed in two squares, and entirely surrounded, maintained its position with admirable bravery. My of their wives and daughters." "The finest population of India was sub- jected to a greedy, cowardly, cruel tyrant." To extort money from the prin- cesses of Oude they were seized and imprisoned at Tyzabad. "Their two male attendants," continues Macaulay, "were, by orders of the British government, seized and imprisoned, ironed, starved almost to death, in order to extort money from the princesses. After they had been two months in confinement, their health gave way. They implored permission to take a little exercise in the garden of their prison. The officer who was in charge of them stated, that if they were allowed this indulgence, there was not the smallest chance of their escaping, and that their irons really added nothing to the security of the custody in which they were kept. He did not understand the plan of his superiors. Their object In these inflic- tions was not security, but torture; and all mitigation was refused. Yet this was not the worst. It was resolved by an English government that these two infirm old men should be delivered to the tormentors. For that purpose they were removed to Lucknow. What horrors their dungeon there witnessed can only be guessed. Food was allowed to enter the apart- ments of .the princesses only in such scanty quantities that their female attendants were in danger of perishing with hunger. Month after month this cruelty continued, till at length, after twelve hundred thousand pounds had been .wrung out of the princesses, Hastings began to think that he had really got to the bottom of their revenue, and that no rigor could extort more. Then at length the wretched men who were detained at L/ucknow regained their liberty. When their irons were knocked off, and the doors of their prison opened, their quivering lips, the tears which ran down their cheeks, and the thanksgivings which they poured forth to the common Father of Mussulmans and Christians, melted even the stout hearts of the English warriors who stood by." These are the words of an impartial English writer, long years after the events -had transpired. Alison justifies these proceedings on the ground of the "overbearing pressure of state ne- cessity." Hastings, he says, "did evil that good might come of it," and he, therefore, has no words of censure for him, only the most unbounded praises for his "firmness and ability," his "great achievements," his "far- seeing .wisdom and patriotic disinterestedness." His deeds, he says, "orig- inated in overbearing necessity." Verily, circumstances alter cases! /"It is your bull that has gored my ox " EXPEDITION INTO EGYPT. 177 arrival was a thunderbolt to the enemy: already discouraged by the invincible resistance of Kle"ber's squares, they did not venture to fight my fresh troops, but precipitately fled. We carried the village of Fouli with the bayonet, and the Ottoman army, utterly routed, fled across the Jordan at the bridge of Giz-el-Mesania, and retired on Damascus. This singular victory had such a marvel- ous effect upon the enemy that he did not venture to trouble our army again during the siege. I left Klel)er at Nazareth, and with the rest of the troops returned to Acre. CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE. The siege was pushed with obstinacy, but with little success. The Turks, directed by Philippeaux* and Tromelin, and assisted by the English of the squadron of Sidney Smith, defended themselves with great valor. The place had already sustained five assaults when a flotilla, fitted out at Rhodes, and having on board the famous corps of Hussein- Pacha, came to reprovision the port. Seeking to anticipate this succor, I directed, on the eighth of May, the sixth assault to be made. Again we were repulsed. There seemed no further hope of carrying the place. By obstinately continuing the siege, I might risk the safety of my little army. I was therefore obliged to prepare to retreat. But I was so little accustomed to reverses that I could not retire from this enterprise without making one more attempt. KleTjer had just rejoined me; his troops wer^ fresh; I flattered myself that they might assist me in carrying a place whose open breaches presented some chances of success. On the morning and evening of the tenth of May, I renewed the attack for the seventh and eighth ' imes. The ardor of my troops seemed to have acquired new strength; but nothing was capable of shaking the obstinate intrepidity of the besieged.f *PhIlippeaux was an emigrant engineer-officer of great merit and dis- tinction; he had .been a schoolmaster of Napoleon at Paris, and had studied with him the science of engineering. Trotnelin was an artillery officer, also in exile. He afterward returned to France and asked service under Napo- leon. The latter gave him a colonel's commission, saying to him, "I only ask you to injure my enemies as much as you did me in Egypt." tNnpoleon received during the siege an affecting proof of devotedness. While he was in tne trenches, a shell fell at his feet; two grenadiers, who observed It, immediately rushed toward him, placed hhn between them, and, raising their arms above his head, completely covered every part of his body. Happily the shell respected the whole group; nobody was Injured. One of these brave grenadiers afterward became General Dumesnil, who lost a leg in the campaign of Moscow, and commanded the fortress of Vln- cennes, at the time of the invasion in 1814. The capital had been for some weeks occupied by the Allies, but Dumesnil still held out. Nothing was then talked of in Paris but his obstinate defense and humorous reply whea summoned by the Russians to surrender: "Give me back my leg, and I iciU ffive up my fortrets." (Las Casas.) i* 178 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. RAISING OF THE SIEGE. On the twenty-second of May I raised the siege and directed my march to Egypt On the way we laid waste all the country, both to supply ourselves with pro- visions for crossing the desert, and to deprive the/Turks of the means of following us to the frontiers of Egypt. /I was obliged to leave behind all who could not follow us. There were fifty men sick of the plague who could not move with the army, and who must be left to the ferocious Djezzar/ I caused opium to be ad- ministered to them to relieve them from their sufferings. In this I did wrong: but, yielding to a natural feeling of humanity, I did to them what, in similar circumstances, I could wish done to my- self. In this action, from which I could derive no possible ad- vantage, I had no idea that I was furnishing to my enemies matter for calumnious interpretations.* I ought to have left these un- fortunate men to the mercy of the Turks, since such was the hard lot which destiny had reserved for them. RETURN TO CAIRO. Returning into Egypt, I marched to Cairo with the main body of my forces, and reached that place on the fourteenth of June. Kle~ber returned to Damietta. I left a *It is believed that the author 'has here fallen into an error, which does not appear in his great scientific "History of the Wars of the French Revolution." In the retreat from Syria, Napoleon showed every care for his sick, giving up, for their transportation, the horses of his artillery and his staff; he himself gave the example to his officers of marching on foot. From Jaffa, three separate detachments of siok were dispatched for Egypt; the first under Colbert, by sea, directed on Damietta, the other two by land, on Gaza and El-Arich. About fifty or sixty, declared incurable, could not be taken with the army, for warn of means. Napoleon suggested to his 'physician, Desgenettes, that it would be more humane to give them opium than to leave them to the cruelties of the Turks./But the proposition was rejected and not again alluded to. Napoleon said at St. Helena, that he would have advised this course if the case had been that of his own son. This circumstance furnished grounds for believing that opium was actually administered, and the report was most industriously circulated by the English. But it has since been disproved 'by the highest authority and indisputable evidences. Even Alison dares, not venture to 'assert its truth, but expresses a fear that it may have 'been so. His language is as follows: "At Jaffa he visited the plague hospital, inviting those who had sufficient strength to rise, to raise themselves on their beds, and endeavor to get into litters prepared for their nines in order to descend into the plain. He thought to unite the thirty-four thousand men of Macdonald with the sixteen thousand which he had in Liguria. In thus resuming the line of the Po with fifty thousand men, he hoped at least to relieve Mantua, which the scattered position of the enemy's troops rendered not impossible. Nothing is more likely to cause an injudicious dis- semination of troops than rapid conquests over an enemy who is himself too much scattered. The Allies experienced this: at the moment that Macdonald descended from the Apennines on Mo- dena, Kray was before Mantua, Hohenzollern and Klenau toward Bologna, Ott at Parma, Seckendorf and Wukassowich toward Ceva and Montenotte; Froelich was observing Coni; Lusignan was near Fenestrelles; Bagration had just subdued Suza; Su- warrow with the corps-de-batailk of Melas, and the division of Kaim, was besieging the citadel of Turin; finally, Bellegarde, hav- ing descended from the Valteline on Milan, was going to swell the forces of the Russian general in the central plains of the Bormida, and Haddick, left in the Valois, was guarding the Alps against the right of Masse'ua. As soon as the Allies heard of Macdonald's approach, they sent against him the detachments of Klenau and Hohenzollern, who marched on Modena, and were separately beaten on the twelfth of June: the latter, quite seriously cut up, was driven behind the Po, and the former fell back in a little bet- ter order on Ferrata. SUWARROW ATTACKS HIM ON THE TREBIA.-Suwar- row, hearing these events, left Kaim at Turin to blockade the cita- del, and hastened, by forced marches, to join Ott at Placentia, he CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 207 directed Kray to leave only a small division at Mantua, and also to march by Mezzana-Corte on the Po, where he hoped to col- lect fifty thousand men independently of "Bellegarde, who re- mained near Alexandria to observe Moreau. Suwarrow arrived on the Tidone, the fifteenth of June, found Ott closely pressed, but relieved him and repulsed Victor. Macdonald, the next day, con- centrated his scattered columns and attacked the enemy. Kray not having yet arrived, Suwarrow had collected only thirty-three thousand men, so that the two armies were about equal. A most sanguinary combat took place between these forces, animated on the one side by the remembrance of ancient victories, and on the other by that of recent advantages. Macdonald, who was wait- ing for Moreau at the foot of the Apennines on the left, committed the fault of directing his efforts in the opposite direction and along a river without bridges, where his army might be repulsed. Suwarrow, with better judgment, directed his efforts against the opposite wing, certain that if he repulsed the left of the French he would obtain great results. After a most memorable contest of three days, the French army, with half its number hors-de-combat, was driven back upon Tuscany. Its loss seemed certain; but Moreau having beaten Bellegarde in the plains of Alexandria, the army of Suwarrow being itself turned, and Kray having by the positive orders of the cabinet remained quiet at Mantua, the Russian marshal, disgusted with the conduct of his allies, left Macdonald time to return by the Corniche from Pontremoli, and to bring his army back to Spezzia; it was truly in a deplorable state, but to save it at all was accomplishing much. This disaster destroyed all hope of repairing our affairs in Italy. ' Suwarrow, victorious at the Trebia, had first designed to fall upon Genoa and complete our total expulsion from Italy, but the Emperor had given positive orders to the Austrians,to limit themselves to the sieges of Mantua, Alexandria, and Tortona. GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. In lees than four months from the opening of the campaign, the French armies had been driven from all their conquests and some leagues from their fron- tiers. Notwithstanding the one hundred thousand conscripts which had been incorporated in the different regiments, there remained scarcely two hundred thousand men exhausted by fatigue, discouraged by twenty defeats, in want of every thing to oppose the victorious Austro-Russian armies, seconded as they were by the people of Italy and Switzerland, who had by this time become fatigued and disgusted with the tyrannical yoke of the Directory. Everywhere fortune seemed to have deserted the Republican standards; the army of the East, forced -to raise the 208 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. siege of Acre after sixty days of open trench, had returned to Egypt; in India the English had carried by assault the capital of Mysore, dividing with the Nizam this kingdom of the ancient ally of France. The King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany returned to their capitals; the King of Sardinia was recalled by Suwarrow. The coalition was triumphant, and England, who was its soul, impatient to accelerate the downfall of the French Republic, signed a treaty with Russia for an expedition to drive the French from Holland. The ascension of the Prince of Brazil to the throne of Portugal, which he had in fact occupied for the last seven years under the title of Regent, in consequence of the mental alienation of the Queen, left this kingdom not less subject to English policy. THE FRENCH DIRECTORY. Such, in few words, was the situation of the belligerent powers; but France had other vicissi- tudes than the fate of arms; and the Directory, even had it been able to overcome the external opposition caused by its absurd system of foreign policy, could hardly have dispersed the storm which was collecting against it in the very heart of the Republic. After the eighteenth of Fructidor, arbitrary power and immoral- ity seemed to have been its only rules of conduct. It had inher- ited the embarrassments of the Committee of Public Safety, without being heir to the dictatorial power from which that body had derived its strength. In seeking to extend its control over the people, it had lost the public confidence; the nation regarded each step of the Directors in the career of power as an act of insupport- able tyranny, formally opposed to the object of the Revolution. The legislative body took advantage of these difficulties to oppose the Directors. It accused them of "having violated the laws of nations in attacking, without manifesto or declaration, Switzer- land and the Ottoman Empire; of having suppressed the primary assemblies, erected bastiles, banished whoever had the misfor- tune to displease them; of holding seats of justice in Holland, Italy, and Switzerland, and attempting to reduce the representa- tives to a state of continual servility." Under such a state of pub- lic feeling, all attempts of the Directory to carry the elections proved abortive, and the new Deputies arrived with a firm resolu- tion to overturn a tyranny which the dangers of the country and the hope of victory alone had thus far sustained. POLITICAL OPERATIONS OF SIEYE8. The nomination of Sieyes in place of Rewbel confirmed the Deputies in their proj- ect. This new Director, having perceived that Merlin and Treil- hard. imbued with the doctrines of their predecessors, completely CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 209 controlled the feeble Lare>eillere, felt the importance of destroy- ing this majority, and conferred on this subject with my brother Lucien and Genissieux, the leaders of the Councils. It was now determined to seize the first occasion to eliminate these Directors by a coup-d'etat like that which had been made on the eighteenth of Fructidor, to get rid of obnoxious legislators. ADDRESS TO THE COUNCILS. To this effect, addresses from several of the departments were sent to the Councils. The leaders attacked in a special manner the administration of the Directory, which, with seven hundred and twenty-five millions of taxes, let each branch of the public service suffer for want of funds; they accused the minister of war of having sold at prices below their value, for purposes of speculation, one hundred and thirty thousand fire-arms from the arsenal of Paris. La Vende'e was in insurrection, and Belgium was opposing, with an armed hand, the levies of men and taxes. Each day's session brought the most virulent attacks against the mediocre chiefs of the exec- utive power. TREILHARD'S NOMINATION ANNULLED. The contest might have been uncertain so long as the threatened Directors acted in concert. It was therefore necessary to begin by destroy- ing this triumvirate; but how to do this without a direct viola- tion of the constitution? In seeking to overthrow it, would not a pretext be given this body for attacking the national representa- tion? In this perplexity a Deputy recollected very opportunely that Treilhard had been elected three days sooner than the law allowed: the two councils seized upon this pretext to annul his nomination. It is said that Treilhard himself acknowledged the illegality of his appointment, and left his colleagues with more pleasure than regret. This operation for some days completely paralyzed the Directory by the division of the four remaining members. But the number was soon completed by the appoint- ment of the minister Gohier, who inclined the balance in favor of the reform party. MERLIN AND LABEVEILLERE RESIGN. Still it waa only a half victory, for it was yet necessary to get rid of Merlin and Larereillere. These at first attempted to make way against the storm, but being menaced with charges against them at the tribune, they sent in their resignation on the night of the sixteenth and seventeenth of June. Their condescension disarmed the vio- lence of the legislative body, which was satisfied with merely load- ing them with sarcasms. They were called mere ciphers, men of small capacity, of small passions, and petty vengeances! In their -14 210 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. places were appointed Roger-Ducos, an old conventional, and gen- eral Moulins. Sieves still remained leader of the Directory. Ber- nadotte was appointed minister of wary . No sooner were these changes effected than the news of the evacuation of Zurich and Moreau's retreat upon the Apennines showed the necessity of more vigorous measures. It was no longer the question to investigate the deficit of the finances, but rather to devise means to supply this deficit. Jourdan proposed a forced loan of one hundred millions levied on the wealthy classes: a disastrous measure always repugnant to public opin* ion, and which the urgency of the circumstances alone could justify. All classes of the conscription were placed at the disposi- tion of the Directory, and if the levy had been executed without obstacle, it would have furnished a reinforcement of two hundred thousand men. Time and money were alone wanting. Bat- talions of national guards were placed as garrisons in the frontier fortifications, so as to render all the regulars disposable, and to prepare for the dangers of an invasion. CONSTERNATION AT THE NEWS OF THE BATTLE OF TREBIA. Hardly were these measures adopted, when the news of the battle of Trebia came to add to the public distress. So many disasters, justly merited, affected the different parties very differently: the good and patriotic French were sorely grieved at them, the republicans were enraged, internal enemies rejoiced, but all, with one accord, agreed in pronouncing anathemas against the government which had brought them upon the coun- try. Where then are the conquerors of Turcoing, of Fleurus, of Rivoli, of Castiglione? was heard from all parts. Are not the armies composed of the same soldiers and commanded by the same generals who formerly carried the glory of France from the Noric Alps to the confines of Bohemia? In reflecting more attentively upon the causes of former successes, it was perceived that they were produced by masses skillfully directed upon important points, rather than by mere valor and love of country, as had been supposed. Although moments of crisis and of popular excite- ment are ill calculated for reflection, it was, nevertheless, per- ceived that results had been attributed to general causes, which, in reality, were due mainly to individual skill. A universal clamor rose against Rewbel and Talleyrand for the impolitic administration and usurpation of the government Even those who were the least capable of pointing out what course ought to have been pursued, saw evidently that the government had been ill administered. FORMATION OF CLUBS. The public calamities led to the CAMPAIGN OF 1199. 211 formation of new political clubs. A society, worthy offspring of the Jacobins, was formed at the Manege; there, at the very door of the Council of Ancients, they declaimed about the ignorance and stupidity of the administration. ' To avoid the law against societies directed by presidents, they appointed Drouet regulateur des debats. These ardent republicans, without wishing for the tri- umph of the proletaires, thought to turn these leaders to their own account, and soon the club of the Manege equaled that of the Cor- deliers. France was threatened with an anarchy more horrible than that of 1793, for then the dictatorial power of the Com- mittee of Public Safety, sustained by victory, remedied in some degree the vices of a mere popular government; but as no such authority now existed, there seemed no barrier to protect the nation from plunging into the gulf of anarchy. Already the trib- une of the Manage resounded with accusations against .those who directed the administration of affairs, and the populace only waited for the signal for beheading them. After Rewbel and Scherer, the conduct of Talleyrand was most severely condemned : he was formally accused of projecting the fatal expedition to Egypt, the cause of all their misfortunes. Compelled to seek some means of justification, he declared that the expedition had been planned before he came into office. This threw the responsi- bility upon Charles Delacroix, who, to exculpate himself, declared that although the project might have been agitated before the Revolution, it never had been made a question of discussion while he held the portfolio. TALLEYRAND IS SUPERSEDED. The justification of Talleyrand not satisfying his opponents, the Directory, in defer- ence to public opinion, appointed Reinhard minister of foreign affairs, Robert Lindet to the finances, and Cambacerfes as minis- ter of justice. But a change of ministers could not immediately effect a change of foreign policy, as there was no chance of nego- tiating a peace, and the dismissal of Talleyrand was not sufficient to dissolve the coalition. In looking at the past, they found good reasons to bitterly regret the extravagances of 1798. How differ- ent would have been the results if they had applied themselves to consolidating the influence of the Republic in Italy, in interesting Spain in it by the aggrandizement of the infant Duke of Parma, and the House of Savoy by just indemnities, instead of alienating the courts of the peninsula by the revolutions of Genoa, Rome, Mont- ferrat! To raise a power in favor of the son-in-law of Charles IV. would have been an excellent means of proving to the Queen of the Two Sicilies and to Charles Emmanuel of Piedmont that we knew how to estimate the alliances of princes who frankly entered into 212 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. friendly relations with us^ it would have induced Spain to re- double her efforts at sea, and at the same time to furnish for the common guard of Italy the contingent stipulated at San Ildef onso. By this means, instead of having need to -send Macdonald to Naples, and Gauthier to Tuscany, we should have had one hun- dred and forty thousand French, Spanish, and Italian combatants to oppose the imperialists on the Adige. THE MANEGE CLOSED. But the time for recriminations was passed. To preserve our power in Italy was no longer the question; the means of saving France were now to be looked after. The attention of the Directory was now turned to the in- terior of France, where the ravings of the society of the Manege threatened a general anarchy. Such disorders at the very door of the legislative palace became intolerable; the society, driven from their place of sitting, installed themselves in the Rue du Bac, under the presidency of the regulateur Augereau. The debates became daily more stormy; the eulogy of Babceuf, pronounced from the tribune of the society, proved that it was time to strike. Sieyes appointed Fouche' minister of police; this ancient procon- sul, whose business energy no one can deny, hastened to close this den of Jacobinism, at the same time that the Directory prohibited the abuses of the public press. NEW PLAN OF OPERATIONS. This was all well enough for the interior; but something else was requisite to arrest the enemies of France. Certain of obtaining by the new law the two principal elements of war, the Directory now occupied itself with devising the means of repelling the threatened invasion on the east. It directed the topographical bureau to draw up a plan of operations against the allied armies on the supposition of Mas- se'na's being driven from Switzerland, and to indicate the natural and artificial obstacles which might in this direction be opposed to a great invasion. Although a military officer of distinction had pointed out in a luminous memoir its natural direction in the trough of the Jura and the Vosges, General Clark, chief of this bureau, persisted in maintaining that it should be directed by Switzerland and the coast Alps on Lyons. He consequently pre- sented a long work, pointing out all the measures to be taken for covering the frontier of the Alps. These views consisted princi- pally in forming an army for guarding the two St. Bernards, the Simplon, Mont-Cenis, Mont-Genevre, and the Col de 1'Argentiere; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive to prevent the siege of Coni and raise that of Mantua, and the army of Helvetia should operate a powerful diver- sion on the Limmat. CAMPAIGN OF 1799, 218 JOUBERT IS CHARGED WITH ITS EXECUTION. The new Directory feeling the necessity of some brilliant stroke to save its credit, Joubert, a, young general of much promise, was appointed to replace Moreau in Italy, while the latter was destined for the command of the army of the Rhine. -Joubert was to reor- ganize an army of forty-five thousand men in Liguria and to advance anew on the Po, to relieve Mantua. Championnet, put on trial for having dared to brave the proconsuls of the Directory at Naples, descended from the prisoner's box to take command of an army of thirty-four thousand men which had been organized in the Alps. If the proximity of Grenoble and Chambery was a sufficient motive for this army, instead of sending the troops by Provence to Genoa, there certainly was no sufficient reason for appointing two chiefs to these armies and assigning to that of the Alps a part principally defensive. Mantua, but weakly blockaded for some months past, had been more strongly invested since the fall of Peschiera, and, all the preparations being made, Kray was to open the trenches on the fifteenth of July: Latour-Foissac capit- ulated on the thirtieth. At the same time Chasteler and Belle- garde besieged still more vigorously the citadel of Alexandria, which capitulated on the twenty-second of July, after seven days of vigorous attack, in which the Austrian artillery very much dis- tinguished itself. HE DEBOUCHES FROM THE APENNINES. Joubert ar- rived about the beginning of August and debouched from the Apennines on Novi, on the twelfth. He was accompanied by Moreau, who, called to the command of the army of the Rhine, nevertheless wished to remain with his young friend till after the battle. They hoped to have only some forty thousand men to oppose*. It had been rumored that Mantua had capitulated, but they did not believe it. On the evening of the fourteenth of August, the right and centre had united on the superb plateau of Novi, at the foot of the Apennines, where they learned the sad news that not only had Mantua surrendered, but that Kray's corps, which had besieged it, was united to Suwarrow, ready to receive them in the plain. It hardly seemed credible that a place which had resisted me ten months should, in three, have been re- duced by the Austrians. But Latour-Foissac had made a very poor defense. Admitting that it had been attacked more regu- larly and that the means of defense were much inferior to those of the Austrian marshal, nevertheless it is certain that he might have prolonged the defense for at least a fortnight, which had been time enough to save it. BATTLE OF NOVI. They received, during the evening, a 214 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. confirmation of this disaster which placed the matter beyond the possibility of doubt. There remained now no object for our army to risk a battle against a superior enemy. It was necessary to return to the Apennines and concert some new project with Cham- pionnet; but occupying so good a position, expecting the left to join them the next morning, they did not deem it necessary to make a precipitate retreat, for it did not seem probable that the enemy would attack so formidable a position, when it was for his interest to draw them into the plain. But Suwarrow > thought differently, and directed the attack to be begun on the morning of the fifteenth of August at break of day, by his right under the orders of Kray. Already the Austrian columns were climbing the slopes of the eminences which were covered with vines, and de- bouching upon the plateau. Joubert hastened to the threatened point, put himself at the head of the thirty-fourth regiment, re- pulsed the enemy, but was himself killed at the first discharge:* it was scarcely six o'clock in the morning. Morean, who seemed in this campaign to be destined to direct all the unfortunate con- tests, took command of the army, which was now engaged con- trary to its wishes and without any object } he at first succeeded in repulsing the enemy. The battle had continued on our left ever since three o'clock, when, at nine, Suwarrow debouched against the centre at the head of the Russian corps, and seemed deter- mined, at all hazards, to -carry the front of Novi and its heights. St-Cyr, defended himself with great bravery; twice the enemy, repulsed and taken in flank by Watrin, was driven quite to Poz- zolo-Formigaro. At last Melas with the reserve, or rather with the left of the allied forces, arrived at two o'clock from Rivalta, .moved along the Scrivia, made eight battalions of grenadiers ascend the reverse of Monte-Rotundo where runs the road from Genoa to Gavi, and thus turned the position. Suwarrow and Kray seconded this operation by a new effort. Retreat now be- oame both inevitable and difficult. It was at last effected by cross- roads on Pasturana, where the defile becomes almost impassable. *The following Is Napoleon's portrait of Joubert: "He was a native of Aln. He studied law, but the Revolution made Mm adopt the profes- sion of arms. He served In the army of Italy, and was there made briga- dier and general-of-dlvislon. -He was tall, slender, and naturally of a feeble constitution. But he had strengthened It In the toll of camps, and In mountain warfare. He was Intrepid, violent, and active. He was sin- cerely attached to Napoleon, who, In 1797, charged him to present to the Directory the colors of the army of Italy. He fell gloriously, at the battle of Novi, when he was yet young, and had not acquired sufficient experi- ence. He possessed qualities -which would have raised him to great mili- tary renown." He was of the same age as Napoleon. CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 215 Perignan and Grouchy, in order to give time to the column to pass the defile, fought in front of it against quadruple forces which the enemy brought against them from all points of a circle. They were wounded and taken prisoners with five or six thousand brave men, who shared their fate; a good part of the artillery fell into the enemy's hands. This fatal day irrecoverably fixed the fate of Italy. MASSENA RETAKES THE SMALLER CANTONS. Masse~na, more fortunate, gained about the same time (August fourteenth) a signal advantage. By a singular chance he had recaptured the line of the high Alps which he had lost in June, at the very moment that theArchduke Charles, reinforced at last by Korsakof, had intended to resume the offensive on the opposite side. PROJECT OF THE ARCHDUKE. The Archduke wished to concentrate his army below Bruck in order to cross at once the lines of the Aar, the Limmat, and the Reuss rivers, all consider- able streams, which united near this city. From Bruck to Arau, it was only four leagues, and on the same day the Archduke might pass three important barriers and seizB the heights of the Jura which separated Arau from Bale. This movement would have compromised, in a great degree, the safety of the French army, which was extended on the Albis as far as Glaris. The Directory, wishing to urge forward the enterprises of Joubert and Mass^na, had pressed the latter to resume the offensive. Lecourbe, having been reinforced, attacked the corps of Simbschen, got possession of the Grimsel, the Furca, the St. Gothard, and the Crispalt, and took four thousand prisoners. The division of the Valois drove Rohan from the Simplon. Soult and Chabran attacked the can- ton of Glaris, and the left of the Linth. These partial successes, instead of being fortunate, would have led to the ruin of the army, had not the project of the Archduke failed. Thirty thousand Austrians and as many Russians had united, on the sixteenth of August, opposite the village of Dettingen, The single division of Ney covered Bruch and the Frickthal: there were only six battalions to dispute the passage. Such is the inconvenience of having immense lines and numerous points to guard. The one hundred and twenty-two battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons which composed the armies of the Rhine and the Danube would have formed, if Switzerland had been neutral, an imposing army between Ulm and Strasbourg; while now, compelled to cover everything from Geneva to Dflssel- dorf, they presented an active force of only seventy or geventy- flve thousand men, scattered along a line of one hundred leagues; 216 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. there were only eight thousand at the enemy's point of passage. The Austrians, neglecting the ordinary precautions, hoped to throw across their bridge under the protection of forty pieces of cannon which swept the bank, without passing over troops to cover the pontoniers. The brigade of Quetard, which assembled at the noise, was soon forced to retire; the Austrian howitzers set fire to Dettingen. A battalion of carbineers of Zurich threw themselves into the ruins of the houses, and by means of their excellent carbines, these brave and skillful marksmen cut off many of the enemy's pontoniers. Moreover, the rocky bottom of the Aar prevented the ponton anchors from taking hold. Many hours passed in this way. Ten thousand French, under the orders of Ney, having had time to collect near the point of passage, the Archduke became discouraged and renounced his project. This failure of the Archduke to establish his bridges was the greatest piece of good fortune for the French ; for had his pontoniers been successful, it is hardly possible to calculate the immense disasters that would have followed. Mass^na was then with the reserve in the Muttenthal, and half of his army must have been lost. NEW PLANS OF THE COALITION. The Allies, intox- icated with their victories, had seen their line for a moment com- promitted by dissensions between Suwarrow and the Cabinet of Vienna. The Russian marshal, on his arrival in Turin, had strongly urged the recall of the King of Sardinia to his capital. But Thugut, a more wily diplomatist, wishing to form, no conclu- sions as yet on the future fate of Piedmont, strongly opposed this. He had already sold at Selz some of the Piedmontese provinces, and perhaps he wished to make, on the return of the King, a specu- lation to obtain from him the Novarais as a condition of peace, and thus to divide with the House of Savoy the title and functions of portier des Alps. This policy displeased Suwarrow, who, thwarted also by the inaction of Kray at the epoch of the Trebia, complained with so much bitterness as to threaten serious dis- sensions in the camp of the Allies. The Cabinets of London and Vienna agreed to propose to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg a new project; it was agreed: 1st. That all the Russian troops of Suwarrow and Korsakof should unite in Switzerland to form the centre, and to penetrate into Franche-Comte" in concert with a corps of Anstrians; 2d. That the Archduke Charles should move with the mass of his army on Manheim, retake this place, pass the Rhine, both to assist Suwarrow and to favor an Anglo-Russian expedition which was to make a descent upon Holland ; CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 217 3d. That the expedition, under the Duke of York, composed of twenty-five thousand English, and fifteen thousand Russians under General Hermann, should deliver Holland, and, aided by the troops of the Stadtholder levied there, as well as by the diver- sion of the Archduke, drive the French from Belgium; 4th. That Melas should command the Austrians, now left arbiters of Italy, and complete our expulsion from Liguria and Piedmont; 5th. That the Russian fleet, after having subdued Corfu, should assist the attack on Ancona, which was confided to the corps of Froelich; 6th. That the English should aid the Neapolitans in the re- duction of the garrisons left in Naples, Rome, Civita-Vecchia, etc. THE ARCHDUKE MARCHES ON MANHEIM. As Suwar- row was to leave Italy and debouch into Switzerland, the Arch- duke had to effect his own movement on the lower Rhine. He commenced his march on the thirty-first of August; but, unwill- ing to leave Korsakof alone exposed to the blows apparently de- signed for him by the Cabinet of Vienna, he left the corps of Hotze, of about twenty-five thousand men, in the smaller cantons, and that of Nauendorf, of ten thousand men, at the junction of the Aar with the Rhine, so as to cover the Black Forest and the Rus- sian right. The Archduke, hearing at Doneschingen that General Mu Her had passed the Rhine at Mnnheim with eighteen thousand men, and was then bombarding Philipsbourg, directed the corps of General Starray to the assistance of that city, and marched himself, with fifty-five thousand men, to sustain him. Muller did not wait for him, but hastily repassed the Rhine, leaving the fee- ble division of Laroche to guard Manheim. The Archduke at- tacked it on the seventeenth of September, penetrated by the tete-du~pont of Neckerau, and, in spite of the efforts of Ney, gained possession of the place and fifteen thousand prisoners. SUWARROW'S PLAN. Suwarrow had a difficult task; the attempt of Moreau to raise the blockade of Tortona had induced him to defer his departure till the eleventh of September, eleven days after the Archduke, whereas, to concert matters well, he ought to have set out first. Departing from Asti three roads offered themselves to his choice; he could debouch by the Valois in the Pays-de-Vaud to effect a diversion, but it exposed him to be beaten without a chance of cooperation; he could cross the St. Gothard without artillery, debouch on Schwitz, and unite with Hotze, while his material went by Coire; finally, he could, from Oomo, take the route of the Splugen and effect his junction by the 218 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Orisons without fighting. He preferred the St. Gothard as more certain than the first, and as shorter than the third. BATTLE OF ZURICH. Informed by Suchet of the depart- ure of Suwarrow for Switzerland, and knowing that the Archduke had moved the mass of his army on Manheim, Mass^na determined to fight Korsafcof before the arrival of the marshal; for if he waited for the conqueror of Novi, he would in all probability be driven on the Jura. He assembled about thirty-eight thousand men, and determined to make the attack on the twenty-fifth of September. Soult passed the Linth at Schonis. Hotze and his chief-of-staff being slain at the first fire, his corps became dis- ordered and was driven on the Toggenburg with the loss of five thousand men hors-de-conibat. Mortier attacked Zurich on the left bank' of the Limmat. Lorges and Menard passed the Limmat at Fahr, in order to turn Zurich, and assail the Zurichberg. Korsakof had received notice from Suwarrow that he would be at Schwitz .on the twenty-sixth, and his corps-de-bataille was ly- ing in front of the little town of Zurich to attack the Albis, when the cannon of Foy and Lorges thundering in the direction of Fahr gave notice.of the danger which threatened it. In the mean time the Russian general, not liking his position, pushed his left be- tween the Zil and the lake, and repelled the false attack of Gen- eral Drouet. It was not till the arrival of Masse"na and Lorges at the north of Zurich that he saw the perils of his position. He had a division opposite Bruck, but was cut off from it by the passage of Masse'na at Fahr: it was necessary to decide immediately either to penetrate by the Albis and join Suwarrow in Schwitz, or to attack Lorges with all his forces and drive him across the Lim- mat. Korsakof did not know how to act; the fear of disobeying Suwarrow made him reject the only wise course which he could pursue, that of falling on Lorges with his entire force. The news of Hotze's death and the defeat of -his corps increased his em- barrassment; he persisted in maintaining himself with half his forces between the Zil and Zurich, where Mortier and the grena- diers' of Klein fought him all day without any decided results. But Oudinot and Lorges were already cannonading the gate of Winterthour, and crowned the heights which commanded Zurich on the north, the only retreat which remained to the enemy. KORSAKOF RETIRES ON THE RHINE. Korsakof de- cided, during the night, what course to pursue. His whole army crossed Zurich and debouched on the morning of the sixteenth, to recover the road to Schaffhausen, which" it succeeded in doing after having repulsed the division of Lorges. But the latter, on receiving a reinforcement, resumed the attack, and cut off the CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 219 enemy's columns, while Mortier penetrated the little town of Zurich, now guarded by only a few tirailleurs. Korsakof suc- ceeded in reaching Schaffhausen, abandoning to us five thousand wounded, two thousand prisoners, and all his artillery. He had more than ten thousand men hors-de-combat, and Hotze at least five thousand. SUWABBOW PASSES THE ST. GOTH ARD. Hardly had MassSna completed this brilliant victory, when\he received the news of Suwarrow's success at the St. Gothard. The marshal, delayed three days at Lucerne, had not been able to attack Airola and the southern slopes of the mountain till the twenty-third and twenty-fourth. Assisted by Strauch, he dislodged Gudin, forced him to retire on the Furca, and bivouacked at the Hospice. A column of six thousand Russians, under Rosenberg, was to march across the rocks, the snows, and the precipices of the Crispalt to descend on Urseren, and to strike Lecourbe, should he venture to make a stand at the Devil's Bridge. This march, as audacious as difficult, attained its object: Lecourbe, hearing at the Hospice of the arrival of the enemy at Urseren, took his resolution in despera- tion, threw his cannon into the Reuss, climbed the almost inac- cessible mountains of Geschenen, followed along their sides, and redescended to Wasen; but he learned here that another Austrian column from the Grisons was already in possession of the valley toward Amsteg; while Suwarrow, on his side, had forced the rear guard at the Devil's Bridge, after a bloody combat, and had effected a junction with Rosenberg. The audacity of Lecourbe increased in proportion to his danger; he attacked the Austrian column without hesitation. The latter, threatened on the other side by the reserve which was coming from Altorf to meet Le- courbe, thought itself very fortuna/te in effecting its escape by opening a passage to Leoourbe. He then crossed the Reuss at Seedorf, destroyed the bridge, and supported himself against the mountains of Surenen and the canton of Berne. Suwarrow then descended without obstacle on Altorf and Fluelen, but this was the termination of any practicable road, and it was necessary to embark on Lake Lucerne, which was the only means of communication between this canton and that of Uri. The position was a critical one: Lecourbe had an armed flotilla, and, moreover, had seized upon a small number of the barks found there. The Russian general had no time to hesitate; he climbed the steep precipices of the mountains of Kesseren in the Schachen- thal, where no trpops had ever passed before, and which even Le- courbe had considered impracticable: he lost there the few pieces of mountain artillery which he had with him, many men and 220 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. horses, and arrived exhausted in the Muttenthal on the twenty- eighth, three days later than he calculated. Hearing of Kor- sakof's disaster, he hoped at least to be seconded by two divisions of the right of Hotze, who, in the general plan, was to get pos- session of Glaris and secure a communication with him. DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS. These divisions, under the orders of Jellachioh and Linken, had, in fact, attacked the sin- gle brigade of Molitor on the twenty-fifth. Jellachich debouched on Wesen by the difficult path which runs along the lake of Wal- lenstadt. Molitor imposed on him by the stand which he took, and the Austrian general, hearing of Hotze's defeat and thinking himself lost if he remained where he was, in a coupe-gorge, retired on Wallenstaxit. The next day Linken, debouching from the Orisons in three columns by the defile of Engi and the Todiberg, descended the valley of Sernst, carried off one of Molitor's battalions isolated in the mountains, and advanced on Glaris; but Molitor, having disposed of Jellachich, opposed to him the same resistance; and the Austrian general, hearing of the fate of his colleagues, and fearing that he himself would be captured, returned to the Ori- sons. It is to be remarked that Molitor, with four French and two Swiss battalions, had thus routed twelve thousand Austrians, at the very point of their junction with Suwarrow. The localities favored it, it is true, but his firmness, activity, and resolution are not the less worthy of the highest praise. DIFFICULT RETREAT OF SUWARROW. Suwarrow soon marched from Mutten toward the Bragel, a difficult moun- tain, where he still found the advanced guard of Molitor; this convinced him that the Austrians had disappeared from Glaris, and as a climax to his embarrassment, Mortier and Mass4na, with the conquerors of Zurich, had just arrived at Schwitz, and the grenadiers of Klein at Einsiedlen. The least hesitation would have lost all. Auffenberg and Bragation fortunately forced the little advanced guard of Mortier at Kloenthal, on the thirtieth, and descended 001 Glaris. Suwarrow followed them with Der- felden. General Rosenberg, left with four battalions in the Mut- tenthal, was there attacked, on the first of October, by Mortier, whom he drove in the most glorious manner on Schwitz. The rear guard, relieved by this success, reached the Bragel without loss. Molitor had fallen back to Neffels, behind the Linth. Bagration was directed to attack him on the first of October. They fought on both sides with fury; the little troop of Molitor did wonders; the enemy was not behind in bravery; at last.the arrival of Soult's division, returning from the pursuit of the wrecks of Hotze into CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 221 the Orisons, decided the victory. This incident aggravated still more the difficulties of Suwarrow, who had not a minute to lose. He threw himself by the path of Panix and Engi that is, by the flanks of the Todiberg into the Grisons, a route frightful in the best season, but which was then the more difficult and dangerous from being covered with snow. The few horses and mules which he had left were abandoned at the bottom of this gulf; many hun- dreds of men perished among these precipices. No language can describe the horrors of this retreat. /Glory is not the exclusive price of dangers and victories, it belongs equally to those who brave the elements, nature, and privations, In this view of the subject, there are few events more glorious for both parties in this memorable war. EFFORTS OF KORSAKOF ON WINTERTHOUR. During this time Korsakof had been reinforced by some Bavarians and by the little army of Conde", who had just come from the interior of Russia with three or four thousand emigres to conquer France! This general felt that to efface the stain of Zurich, it was neces- sary at any price to relieve his general-in-chief from his present difficult position. For this purpose he had advanced from Lake Constance and Busingen on Winterthour; but, attacked here by the reserves and the divisions of Lorges and Menard, he was forced to retire behind the Rhine and destroy his bridges. MOVEMENTS OF THE ARCHDUKE AND SUWARROW. The Archduke Charles had moved, as has been already said, on Manheim, by order of his cabinet; he there soon received news of the disaster of Zurich, which induced him to renounce all other projects than that of saving the army; he therefore returned in all haste to Doneschingen. He proposed to Suwarrow to come and join him so as to re-enter Switzerland by Schaffhausen; Su- warrow preferred to enter from his side by Rheineck. The Aus- trian general opposed this double operation, and the old marshal became irritated and took the road to Bavaria, where he put his troops in cantonments. DESCENT ON HOLLAND. In the mean time the English and Russians had executed their projected invasion of Holland. Abercrombie landed in North Holland, on the twenty-seventh of August, with three thousand English, and the next day was fol- lowed by twelve thousand more. He found no other opposition ihan the small division of Daendels. The English squadron of A nral Mitchel entered the Texel, and the Dutch sailors, incited bj* e Orange party, broke out in insurrection, and forced Admi- ral btory to raise the Stadtho-lder's riag and surrender his 222 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. squadron to the English. The choice of the narrow presqu'ik of North Holland, well suited for the protection of the first debarka- tion, was also favorable to- the defense of Brune. This general collected at Alkmaer the French divisions of Gouvion and Van damme, and the Batavian divisions of Dumonceau and Daendels ; which together formed an army of about twenty-two thousand men. On the tenth of September he attempted to force the advan- tageous position of Abercrombie at Slaper-Dyc and was repulsed. The Prince of Orange showed himself at the same time on the frontiers of Friesland, but his partisans were not numerous, and would do nothing in his favor. The Russians and English, on the sixteenth of September, landed the remainder of the troops under the direction of the Duke of York; which increased their number to thirty-five thousand. Brune also had reinforcements which carried his to twenty-eight thousand. On the nineteenth of September the Allies attacked Brune at Alkmaer; the principal effort was made by the Russians near Ber- gen, and the English, instead of sustaining this effort, threw the mass of their forces into the lagunes of the Zuyder Zee. The Rus- sians divided into two columns; that of Hermann attacked Van- damme and drove him behind Bergen; but Gouvion and Rostol- land, having rendered him timely succor, the v Russian column, attacked in front and flank, was overthrown; Hermann himself, with two thousand men, was taken prisoner; the rest perished or were dispersed. Essen, who had advanced more to the left, be- ing attacked in front and threatened in rear, fled behind the Zyp. Dundas, assisted by a Russian brigade, had at first beaten Dumon- ceau at Schoorldam; but the reinforcements which Brune sent there soon forced him to retire with loss. At the center, Pultney gained an important advantage over Daendels, but soon returned to his position. On the left, Abercrombie, finding only feeble de- tachments at Hoorn, fatigued his troops by marching over difficult roads without any result. A new attempt was made on the second of October, at Eg- mont-op-Zee. But, after several unimportant contests, the Allies were again repulsed with considerable loss. Their army was now shut up in the lagunes of Zyp; the autumnal rains increased the difficulty of their position; the disaster at Zurich left them no hope of succor from the Rhine; the Orange party did not move*, England had accomplished half her object in the capture of tho Batavian fleet. The Duke of York, therefore, resolved to return to London, and secured a safe retreat by an inglorious treaty of evacuation. This treaty was signed on the eighteenth of October. Such was the state of our affairs when I arrived in Paris. CAMPAIGN OF 1799. 223 Switzerland and Holland had just been happily delivered, at the very moment when the projected union of the Russian forces in the center of operations was calculated to menace the French soil with invasion. But the successes of the Allies in Italy still threat- ened our departments at the south, where reactionary passions began to foment in a manner truly alarming. The state seemed more than ever exposed to the rule of anarchy. LECOUEBE RAISES THE SIEGE OF PHILIPSBOURG. The departure of the Archduke from Manheim to the assistance of Suwarrow caused orders to be given to Lecourbe to recross the Rhine and lay siege to Philipsbourg; he succeeded in making the investment, but Starray twice forced him to give up the attempt. An armistice put an end to this enterprise without any direct re- sult on the fate of the war. EFFORTS OF CHAMPIONNET TO SAVE CONL An operation of still greater importance had also failed in Italy. Championnet, who had succeeded Joubert and Moreau as com- mander-in- chief in the Alps and in Italy, took advantage of Su- warrow's absence to endeavor to relieve Coni. In order to otter an obstacle to a siege by Melas' troops, more than fifty thousand men were put in motion from Spezzia and the Bochetta, by the Argentiere, quite to Mont Cenis. Six or seven scattered corps could not easily succeed against the army of Melas, concentrated on the Stura between Turin and Alexandria, and capable of mov- ing in any direction he might desire. It was exactly a repetition of the battle of Rivoli, on a scale ten times larger. Championnet, repulsed near the end of September in a first attempt on Mondovi," made a more serious attack at the end of October; the same fault necessarily produced the same result. St.-Cyr, with the right wing, gained a very glorious success in front of Novi on the twenty- fourth of October; but the division of the center, acting without concert on Fossano, were beaten, the third of November, by thirty- four thousand Austrians. Another combat took place on the tenth, when the French were so scattered that the siege of Coni was carried on by the enemy without further opposition; it surren- dered on the fourth of December. While the center was driven into the Alps, Kray forced St.-Cyr on the Bochetta, and Klenau debouching from the coast, attempted to carry Genoa. While Melas was thus crowning a glorious campaign by maneuvers that did him honor, General Froelich had been directed to reduce Ancona, where General Monnier had kept the field not- withstanding the approach of a Russian fleet, and a corps of observation, composed of Russians, Turks, and insurgent peasants. 224 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The siege was finally begun on the first of November, and, not- withstanding the good defense of Monnier and his little garrison, the place surrendered on the twelfth; the garrison of two thou- sand seven hundred men, covered with laurels, returned to France on parole. Such was the issue of this celebrated campaign of 1799, so rich in events, of which I have merely traced an outline to show the state of affairs at the time of my appointment to the Consulate. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 A2VZ) 1801. CHAPTER VL THE CAMPAIGNS OP 1800 AND 1801. Napoleon's Return from Egypt Necessity of a Change in the Government Sieyes had long meditated a Change Revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire Project of a Constitution Consular Government Napo- leon proposes Peace Fall of Tippoo-Saeb Maritime Affairs Conti- nental Armies Plan of Campaign Pius VI. and VII. Project of the Allies on Genoa and Toulon Massena blockaded in Genoa Napo- leon's Pftam of Operations on the Rhine-JCarnot Minister of Wax- Passage of the Alps The French Army arrested by Fort Bard Metes deceived Combat of Chiusella Napoleon marches on Milan Passage ot the Ticino Disposition of Melas Surrender of Genoa Passage of the Po Battle of Montebello Battle of Marengo Convention of Alex- andriaNegotiations of General St. Julien Disapproved by the Cabi- net of Vienna Negotiations for a Naval and Military Armistice Kl 6ber proposes to evacuate Egypt He *n forced to conquer at Heliopolis Important Convention with the United States The Bug lish quarrel with Neutrals Rupture of the Negotiations of .London Conspiracy of Cerrachi Expeditions against Ferrol and Cadiz Resig- nation of Thugut from the Ministry Occupation of Tuscany Prepa- rations on the Continent Plan of Operations Brilliant Success of the Army of the Rhine Armistice of Steyer Inaction of Brune Passage of the Splugen Operations of Brune Junction of the Army of the Grisons Armistice of Treviso Infernal Machine The Neapolitans beaten hi Tuscany Expedition of Murat against Naples Armistice of Foligno Peace of Lunevllle -Campaign of 1801 -English Expedi- tion against Copenhagen Naval Battle of Copenhagen Armistice with the Danes, and Death of Paul I. English Descent upon Egypt- Resignation of Pitt Situation of France Necessity of a new Relig- ious System Beet means of accomplishing this Change Chances in favor of the Reformation The Concordat Objections made to it- Fault of my Successors Negotiations of London Preliminaries signed Peace with Russia and the Porte Acquisition of Louisiana The Infante of Parma, King of Etrurta Expedition to St Domingo and Guadaloupe Provisional Reunion of Piedmont Affairs of Switzer- land and the Cisalpine Republic Italian Republic The English Lord 15 226 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Cornwaffis Envoy to Amiens Debates upon Malta The definitive Peace Its Reception in London and France The Tribunat abolished Consulate for Life The Principles of my Works Solemn Publication of the Concordat Reunion of Piedmont Counter-Revolution in Swit- zerlandFriendly Relations with Russia Indemnities in Germany. NAPOLEON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT. In tracing out the preceding campaign, I have anticipated events: we will now return to the vessel which sailed from Alexandria on the twenty- fourth of August, bearing my destinies and those of Europe. Our passage, though long, was fortunate, and, the sixth of October, I landed at Frejus. My presence excited the enthusiasm of the peo- ple. My military glory reassured all those who had been alarmed at the idea of a foreign invasion. My journey resembled a tri- umph, and I saw on my arrival at Paris that France was at my disposal, for every thing seemed ripe for a great change.* NECESSITY OF A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT. After a revolution which had completely destroyed the social edi- fice, creating new interests and habits, a government, desirous of putting an end to the irregularities and license of popular commo- tions, should not only endeavor to improve the laws springing from these factions or enthusiastic commotions, but should estab- lish a charter fixing invariably the basis of organic laws, and the *Thiers thus describes Napoleon's reception in France: "The inhab- itants of Provence had, for three successive years, been apprehensive of an invasion by the enemy. Bonaparte had delivered them from this fear in 1796; but it had recurred with more force than ever since the battle of Novi. On learning that Bonaparte had anchored off the coast, they fan- cied that their savior had arrived. All the inhabitants of Frejus thronged to the beach, and in a moment the sea was covered with boats. A multi- tude, intoxicated with enthusiasm and curiosity, stormed the vessels, and, breaking through all the sanatory laws, communicated with the new com- ers. All inquired for Bonaparte all were anxious to see him. It was now too late to enforce sanatory measures. The Administration of Health was obliged to dispense the general from quarantine; otherwise It must have condemned the whole population, which had already communicated with the crews, to the same precaution. Bonaparte Immediately landed, and resolved to set out the same day for Paris. '/The telegraph, speedy as the winds* had already spread along the road from Frejus to Paris the extraordinary tidings of the landing of Bonaparte. The most confused joy immediately burst forth. The news, proclaimed in all the theatres, had produced an extraordinary excitement there. Patriotic songs everywhere superseded the theatrical representa- tions. Baudin, deputy of the Ardennes, one of the framers of the consti- tution of the year III., a wise and sincere republican, passionately attached to the Republic, and deeming it undone unless a powerful arm should come to uphold it, died of joy on hearing of this event." THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 227 principles of public liberty; leaving to time and experience to draw up the detailed laws requisite for the administration of the government, and to determine the rights and duties of the citizens. Every intelligent magistrate saw that the constitution of the year HI. was detestable, and the authorities it had produced, destitute of capacity ; but they were not so well agreed as to the remedies proper to be applied. It was very difficult to determine these. At first sight it might seem most proper to intrust the legislative body with reforming the constituional part. Nevertheless, it was to be feared that this body, jealous of all executive power, would endeavor to increase its own authority at the expense of the other, thus destroying the fundamental principles of the primitive insti- tutions. If it were given, on the other hand, to the executive power, it was equally to be feared that, under the pretext of public safety, this would be equally inclined to increase its own preroga- tives at the expense of the legislative body. If, to avoid these two rocks, the protection or reform of the constitution were confided to a third authority, the desired object seemed but little more likely to be attained, for the same contests would continue, not- withstanding a change of name in the contending parties. Much cruel experience had shown that any important reforms, in a rep- resentative government, are attended by great danger to public liberty, and the vices introduced are frequently greater than those attempted to be extirpated. There was one other means of reform, not less terrible than the three already mentioned, but which is not fatal to the nations which are compelled to resort to it; I mean the force of the bay- onet. Whatever mere politicians may say upon this subject, many instances may be cited where a resort to this remedy has saved the nation from worse calamities, such as the dissolution of the parliament by Cromwell, that of the senate of Stockholm by Gustavus in., and the coup-d'etat of the eighteenth Brumaire. It may very well happen, however, as it frequently does, that these remedies are worse than the disease itself. It is not my present intention to enter into any minute discussion of these revolu- tionary reforms, but merely to make a few observations necessary for appreciating the course which I pursued in the important event about to occur in France. At this epoch every body in France desired a revision of the constitution and the abrogation of the laws passed by the Assem- blies. The general opinion was against the Directory, whose ad- ministration for the last two years had produced only disasters, whose despotic authority had shown, in the events of the eight- eenth Fructidor and the twenty-second Flore'al, but whose ineffi- 228 LIFE OP NAPOLEON. ciency and absolute nullity had been laid bare on the thirtieth Prairial. The people were equally tired of the scandalous debates which daily occurred in the Councils; and their state of perma- nent hostility to the executive power caused a desire for a more just balance between the principal authorities of the Republic. PROJECTS OF SIEYES. Sieyes, occupying a place for the last three months in the supreme magistracy, had attentively ex- amined the progress of public opinion. Advantageously known by the success of his diplomatic missions, as well as by his admin- istrative talents, and still enjoying the popularity acquired by his earlier writings, he conceived the project of substituting, in place of the existing authorities, a government of more force and unity, and especially guaranteeing the property and rights of citizens. He was the more interested in this, inasmuch as the Jacobins, en- raged at the closing of the Manege, had already openly denounced him in their journals and demanded that the Councils should annul his election as unconstitutional; some pretended that he had projected the calling of a prince of Brunswick to the throne of Prance, and that his mission to Berlin was for this object alone; others thought this crafty constitution-maker had reserved for himself the presidency for life of the Republic an office which he thought to establish. This project was possible, though not ex- empt from danger; all France was in fact conspiring for the over- throw of the present system, and even the Directors themselves, though each in his own way, were working with ardor for the ruin of the edifice which they felt themselves incapable of sustaining. Many of the legislators soon adopted the project of Sieyes, particu- larly the members of the Council of Ancients. But the Council of Five Hundred, notwithstanding the changes of Floreal, still contained many old republican zealots who had opposed all the recent changes of the government. Nevertheless, my brother Lucien, president of this Council, had here formed a powerful party. One of the men upon whom Sieyes most relied was Talleyrand, under whose orders, as minister of foreign affairs, he had acted while ambassador to Berlin. Besides a conformity of views, Talleyrand was as desirous as Sieyes to revenge himself for the vociferations of which a few months before he had been the object. A brilliant triumph was the only thing that could restore his former reputation, and to obtain this, no sacrifice was too great. But a revolution of this character could not be consummated with- out the assent of the troops; it was, therefore, necessary to gain over some military chief of renown, but docile enough to follow the course which they might mark out, and to stop when they THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 229 should command him. Generals Moreau and Joubert were those upon whom they first fixed their attention; the first had inspired some distrust by his equivocal conduct on the eighteenth Fructi- dor, and death snatched away the second at the moment when they flattered themselves that he would gain by victory sufficient consideration to accomplish this great enterprise. EFFECT OF NAPOLEON'S BETURN.-Such was the state of affairs and of public feeling when I arrived at Paris amid the general acclamations of the people. Sieyes, thinking he could do nothing without me, hastened, with Lucien, to place in my hands all the threads of the conspiracy; it was now agreed that my sword must achieve what they had conceived and prepared. Never, per- haps, were circumstances more favorable for the accomplishment of a project of this nature. The majority of the Directory was composed of three men of no importance; Barras, the only one who had any celebrity, owed his importance entirely to the day of Vendemiaire, and to some services rendered in the navy. If these three Directors had been men of any influence or skill, they might easily have baffled the conspiracy by the weapons which the consti- tution had placed in their hands ; but their own stupor left them plunged into a state of inertia. Besides, they were not fully agreed, and Barras himself was the first to favor a change in the state, provided that he should be permitted to play a part in it. Although the Directory had changed three of its members since the day of Prairial, still it had no authority. The leaders of the Councils knew that no one would raise a voice in favor of the majority of the Directory. Neither from abroad nor from the army could the triumvirs expect any support. The victories of Masse'na in Helvetia, and of Brune in Holland, were compensated by the defeats of the army of Italy, whose exhaustion and feeble- ness had opened the frontier of the maritime Alps. The ordinary levies were made with greater difficulty from day to day, and the state of penury in which the recently formed auxiliary battalions were left discouraged the conscripts from joining their colors. The patriotic enthusiasm of 1792 had disappeared with the cir- cumstances which gave rise to it ; and the conduct of the govern- ment had completely extinguished its last sparks. Add to this that the victories of the enemy had again lighted up the fires of civil war in the departments of the west, and that the vocifera- tions of 1793, renewed at the Club of the Manege, had provoked the odious law requiring hostages from the nobles, the relatives of the emigres, and the principal proprietors of the cantons designated as royalists. This unfortunate measure, far from attaining its object, had renewed the civil war and massacres in Poitou and 230 . LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Brittany. The finances were squandered, the public credit de- stroyed, and the sources of public income dried up. Thus the weakness of the government and the faults of its institutions had united to place France upon the very brink of ruin. Everybody seemed desirous to rescue the country, and each had his favorite plan. In these projects they all made me a confidant. They all counted on me, because they deemed my sword necessary to carry their projects into execution. But I counted on no one, and there was nothing to prevent my selecting the plan which I might think the best. Fortune was about to place me at the head of the state; I was called to rule the Revolution, to prepare the future destiny of France, and perhaps of the world. I could not choose respecting a change of government; the rule of the Directory was already vir- tually at an end. It was necessary to place in its stead some im- posing authority, and there was none more truly imposing than military glory. The Directory must therefore be replaced, either by me or by anarchy. France could not hesitate between the two. The republicans, who had at first received me with so much empressement, distrusted my projects. Even the presence of Sieyes did not satisfy them. He undertook to draw up a constitution ; but the Jacobins feared my sword even less than the speculative pen of an abbe\ REVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE. All parties now ranged themselves under two banners those opposed and those favorable to my elevation. Nevertheless, it became necessary to employ the bayonet in effecting the revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire, though I at one time had hoped that it might be made by acclamation. The signal was given in the Coun- cil of Ancients, where we had on our side all moderate men, intelli- gent magistrates, the crafty and the ambitious, and some of those political alchemists, called doctrinaires, who sought for a balance of power as they would seek for the philosopher's stone. Bu t, fearing a strong opposition, we had procured the calling of an extraordi- nary session, at eight o'clock, for the morning of the eighteenth Brumaire (November ninth), taking care to notify our friends first. The majority, one hundred and fifty members, met at the ap- pointed time and voted a transfer of the Councils to St. Cloud, where they would be secure from the mob which the partisans of the Directory might incite against us. I was at the same time in- vested with the command of the troops, and all authority neces- sary for securing the transfer of the Councils and the mainte- nance of the public tranquillity. The measures were taken with precision; the Council of Five Hundred, when notified of the THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 231 decree of transfer, began to murmur at it, but Lucien, the presi- dent, declared the session closed, and the Council adjourned to meet again the next day at St. Cloud. Immediately on being invested with the command, I estab- lished my head-quarters in the Tuileries, where a force of eight thousand men was soon collected. I passed them in review and harangued them. The most important posts were intrusted to the generals most devoted to my interests. All those who were dissatisfied with the Directory, and Moreau, one of the first, came to offer me their services and to soliciFa command. High-sound- ing proclamations were issued to the Parisians, inviting them to remain quiet, and promising public tranquillity and security. I sent to the Directors, Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, an imperative invitation to hand in their resignations. The two militaires obeyed, but the lawyer refused. Barras sent me his resignation by his secretary, hoping that our former relations might induce me to give him a place in the new government. But I knew him too well to make a colleague of him. His message was received in the Tuileries, where a committee of Ancients, the minority of the Directory (Sieyes and Eoger-Ducos), and the greater part of the military chiefs were assembled. 1 took advantage of the occa- sion to influence the minds of my troops and all others present. Replying briefly to the messenger of Barras, I added with a loud voice: "What have you done with that France which I left so brilliant? I left you peace, I have found war; I left you victories, I have found defeats; I left you the millions of Italy, I have found despoiling laws and wretchedness. What has become of the hun- dred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew? all my companions in glory? They are dead!. . . .Such a state of things can not possibly last; in less than three years it would lead us to despotism It is time to restore to the defenders of the country that confidence to which they have such strong claims. We wish no better pa- triots than those brave men who have been mutilated in the ser- vice of the Republic." The next day the legislators removed to St. Cloud, preceded by five thousand soldiers, who guarded the avenues and ^ates of the chateau. TheAncients had their session in theancient gallery.and at the orangery. The preparations for the accommodation of the members delayed the session for a couple of hours, so that tho republicans had time to concert a plan of resistance, or rather of attack. The sessions were begun in a strong manner. I first en- tered the meeting of the Ancients, and proved to them the exist- ence of a conspiracy, denouncing to them the overtures made to me by Barras and Moulins to strike a coup-d'etat in their favor. I 232 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. demanded prompt measures to save the Republic; they opposed to me the constitution, and I showed that, violated on so maiiy occasions, it had become a mere collection of words, utterly use- less, except as a cloak to factions. After strongly urging the majority not to disappoint the expectation of France, I cried out: "Shall I tremble before factionists! I whom the foreign coalition could not destroy! If I am guilty of perfidy, be ye the Brutuses; and you, ye brave grenadiers who have accompanied me here let those bayonets,' with which we have so often triumphed together, be instantly pointed at my heart. But if any orator, paid by for- eigners, dares to pronounce the word outlaw, let the thunderbolt of war instantly crush him. Recollect that / march accompanied by the god of fortune and by the god of war!" It was Mahomet speak- ing to his faithful Seides! These words, although addressed to my soldiers, were also intended for my opponents. I was now engaged in the contest, and I must either conquer or die. There was no middle course. But it was not from the Council of Ancients that I had most to fear; my most formidable adversaries were sitting in the Council of Five Hundred. At the opening of the session of this body, Oaudin, one of the secretaries, was charged with proposing the formation of a committee of seven members to report on the public danger, and on the means of obviating this danger. His speech was the signal for the tempest; cries of Vive la constitution, a bos les dictateurs! drowned his voice. In the midst of this tumult Delbrel moved that, first of all, the representatives should renew their oath of fidelity to the constitution of the year ILL ; his motion passed unanimously. Lucien saw himself compelled, though un- willingly, to swear first. The republicans had succeeded in pro- ducing a momentary enthusiasm, and in gaining over to their party those who had not been admitted into the secret of the con- spiracy. But they did not know how to profit by their first suc- cess; and, instead of declaring the country in danger and adopting a vigorous course, they consumed three hours in taking the oath and in vain debates on the resignation of Barras. At this mo- ment I descended from the hall of the Ancients to that of the Five Hundred. I had been informed of what was passing there, and presuming that the scene would not be very tranquil, I had put the troops under arms and directed a detachment of grenadiers to be ready to aid me if necessary. These precautions were not useless; for hardly had I crossed the threshold of the door, when they raised the cry of outlaws. The deputy Bigonnet sprang to the tribune, and, apostrophizing me, directed me to retire. Some crowded around the tribune, and THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 233 others, by their threatening looks and gestures, manifested their intention of making me suffer the fate of Caesar. In vain did I endeavor to make myself heard; my most furious enemies, among whom I noticed Ar4na and Destrem, advanced against me (it is said) armed with poignards. Seeing that nothing could be ef- fected in this way, I left this assembly, of which an angry sea lashed by the winds gives but a feeble image, and took refuge among my soldiers. But my departure did not restore order; Lu- cien, left alone to make head against the storm, had to support the invectives of a great number of the representatives, who accused him of being my accomplice, and insisted upon his declaring me an outlaw. Every moment the disorder increased; opposite proposi- tions were made from the different corners of the hall, and the president tried in vain to restore tranquillity. This violent state could not long continue: Lncien, seeing his command disre- garded and his voice drowned by the vociferations of the most fiery members, stripped off his insignia of office and left the hall in the midst of a detachment which I had sent to his rescue. I only waited for this signal to avenge myself for the insults I had received. But to give my conduct all the forms of legality, Lucien harangued the troops, telling them that the national repre- sentation was exposed to the poignards of a band of assassins, and, in his quality of president, requiring their aid to drive these factionists from the council halL To these words, closing with the usual phrase of Vive la Republique, the soldiers responded by Vive Bonaparte! Twenty grenadiers advanced toward the hall, and the superior officer, who preceded them, summoned the depu- ties to retire. Prudon, Digonnet. and General Jourdan invoked the constitution and apostrophized the grenadiers; these, aston- ished at such words from one who had formerly led them to vic- tory, opposed only their force of inertia; the slightest incident might have destroyed our projects. But Murat soon decided everything by declaring that the legislative body was dissolved. The charge was beaten, new troops approached, and in an instant the hall was abandoned by the representatives. Some fled to the Council of Ancients, and denounced, at the bar of the Council, the act of their expulsion. But the Ancients paid little attention to their complaints, and were occupied with the report of the com- mittee on the formation of a provisional consular government. At nine o'clock they succeeded in collecting together a con- siderable number of deputies in the orangery, and Lucien de- clared the Council in majority and opened the session. Most of the opposition members were absent, and the few that were present were too much frightened to make any formal opposition. The 234 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. project of Chazal passed unanimously. Its principal features were the abolition of the Directory, the appointment of myself, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducoe as Consuls of the Republic, the expulsion of sixty-one deputies noted as demagogues, the adjournment of the legislature for three months, and the appointment of two tem- porary committees of the two Councils, the one to make the neces- sary changes in the organic principles of the constitution, and the other to remodel the civil code. This law was soon sanctioned by the Ancients, and, after receiving the oaths of the new administra- tors of France, the two Councils, at five o'clock in the morning, closed their long and stormy session. During the two days of these debates the inhabitants of the capital remained perfectly tranquil. Accustomed to political storms, and giving no faith to the promises of liberty given by a party of demagogues, they rejoiced at an event which promised them more quiet and happy times. No one took any interest in a constitution so frequently violated by its pretended friends. The authorities of the former government had lost all influence or con- sideration; all hope was placed in the coming administration. Natural partisans of a regime somewhat monarchical, the nobles and priests now looked for the end of their misfortunes; land- holders for the resurrection of credit; holders of national property for the guarantee of their possessions; the army for an end of its disasters; in fine, the whole population looked for a new era of happiness and security. The abolition of the odious laws of host- ages and of forced loans soon justified a part of these hopes; and public confidence, which seemed to have departed forever, insensi- bly pervaded all classes of the nation. In this revolution Morean had volunteered his assistance, and, commanding a battalion un- der my orders, had marched to the Luxembourg. This course of conduct does not very well accord with the title of Seide of Repub- licanism, to which he frequently laid claim, nor with his pretended projects for restoring the Bourbons in 1813! PROJECT OF A CONSTITUTION. After the dissolution of the Councils, they were replaced by a legislative commission, and a committee was charged with drawing up a new constitution. Sieyes amused us with the project of a Grand Elector, who should appoint two consuls, with the power of absorbing them in case they ventured to exceed their powers. One of these consuls was to be charged with the foreign policy and war, and the other with the affairs of the interior. It was the height of absurdity to think of dividing the public administration between two consuls inde- pendent of each other, as if the internal and external affairs were THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 235 entirely disconnected; but what seemed still more ridiculous was an elector, without authority and without disposable forces, charged with directing and even impeaching a consul who had at his disposal an army of half a million of men! It was evident that Sieyes intended himself for the office of absorbing elector, so as to govern without either the trouble or responsibility of doing so. This kind of Grand Lama for a ruler did not at all suit a war-like nation, like the French, much less a people plunged into all the embarrassments of a great revolution, and an internal and exter- nal war to which history hardly furnishes a parallel. CONSULAR GOVERNMENT. I demonstrated these faults, and proposed a first consul, chief of the state, and two other con- suls as a consulting Council. This project was approved, to the great displeasure of the disappointed Lycurgus. The first place in this trio belonged of right to me; and, to avoid all rivalry, I took good care that my rivals should be neither military men nor men of ambition. I caused Cambacerfes and Lebrun to be chosen. The first was a jurist celebrated for his erudition, the second had been an enlightened administrator; both were men of business, but without energy in fine, just such colleagues as I desired. The ministry was composed as follows: Berthier, minister of war; Talleyrand, of foreign affairs; Barbe*-Marbois and Gaudin, of finance; Bourbon, Forfait, and D6cres, successively, of the navy; Abrial, then Regnier, of justice; Laplace, my brother Lucien, then Chaptal, of the interior; the inevitable Fouchd, of police; the important post of secretary of state, which served as a kind of center to all the other branches of the government, was given to Maret, who united the talents of a statesman to a thorough knowl- edge of diplomacy, and who passed through the Revolution with a reputation unsullied.* *Hugues Bernard Maret was born at Dijon, In 1763. After complet- ing his studies, he repaired to Paris, and at the sittings of the States Gen- eral became reporter for the Bulletin de VAssfmblie, and afterward for the Moniteur. His first diplomatic post iwas secretary of legation to Hamburg; he was afterward promoted to Brussels, and In 1792 received the important mission to London. On his way to Italy as minister to Naples, he was arrested by the Austrians and cast Into prison, where he was confined for nearly two years. He distinguished himself at the negotiations of Lille with Lord Malmesbury. After the eighteenth Brumalre, his career became inseparable from that of Napoleon, who sent him on many Important mis- sions. He was made Duke of Bassano In 1809. On the return of the Bourbons in 1815, he was banished to Gratz, in Syria, but in 1820 was per- mitted to return to France and settle upon his estates In Burgundy. He has been described by all historians as a man of much Intellience and a most unshaken fidelity. He enjoyed the utmost confidence of Napoleon, and never betrayed It. 236 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The public voice had given to me the first place in the state. The resistance which might be opposed to me did not trouble me, because it only came from those who were ruined in public estima- tion. The royalists had not yet appeared. Had they come, they would have been instantly seized. The mass of the nation had confidence in me, for they knew that the Revolution could not have a better guarantee than mine. My strength consisted in placing myself at the head of the interests which it had created, for by making it retrograde I shoud have found myself on the ground of the Bourbons. It was necessary that the nature of my power should be wholly new, in order that all ambitions should there find the means of living; but there was nothing definitive in its nature. Men of theories, who wished something definitive, found fault with it. This, however, was its great merit, for it was a dictatorship in disguise, a kind of government most suitable for times of crisis and in a transitory order of things. Perhaps it would have been better to have boldly seized the dictatorship; every one would then have seen my power; this would have been of much advan- tage. The dictatorship would have prejudiced nothing for the future, would have left opinions in suspense, and have intim- idated the enemy by showing him the firm resolution of France: but the name was objectionable, and the time for a definitive order of things had not yet come. If by the constitution I was only the first magistrate of the Republic, I had for the baton of command a sword more formid- able than the sabre of Scanderberg. There was an incompatibil- ity between my constitutional rights and the ascendency which resulted from my character and my actions. . The enlightened public felt this as well as I did. Things could not long continue so, and were naturally tending to changes which would give force and stability to the state. The public will placed me at the head of the state. I had on my side a large body of the people; my opponents were mostly men who had lost the public confidence. In assuming the reins of power I found more courtiers than I wished; my ante-rooms were crowded.* *Thiers, an ardent republican, and staunch friend of republican gov- ernments, writes as follows on the overthrow of the Directory, and the establishment of the Consulate: "Such was the revolution of the eight- eenth Brumalre, on which such opposite opinions are entertained, which is regarded by some as an outrage which annulled our struggling liberty, by others as a daring but necessary act, that put an end to anarchy. What may Justly be said of it is, that the Revolution, after assuming all the THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 237 NAPOLEON PROPOSES PEACE. The present situation of France gave me uneasiness. Notwithstanding my chances of suc- cess, I preferred peace. I could then offer it in good faith, for .the preceding disasters were not of my making. I could come for- ward unembarrassed by the differences of the former administra- tion. Mr. Pitt refused it: and never did this statesman commit so great an error, for this moment was perhaps the only one when the Allies could have made peace with security. France, in ask- ing peace, acknowledged herself vanquished, and the people re- lieved themselves of all their misfortunes, except that of being onder the yoke of adversity. By this refusal, the English minis- ter forced me to redouble my efforts, and in this way I extended my empire over the west of Europe. The form of this refusal was not less extraordinary than the thing itself: I had addressed my- self directly to the King of England: the letter remained unan- swered; the secretary of foreign affairs wrote one to Talley- rand in which he indicated the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of ending the war in Europe. It was curious to see a government which had twice, in the treaties of Lille, recognized the Republic and the Directory, now characters, monarchical, republican, and democratic, at length too* the military character, because, amid that perpetual conflict -with Europe, it was requisite that it should constitute itself in a strong and quiet man- ner. The republicans deplore so many useless efforts, so much blood spilt to no purpose, in order to found liberty in France, and they are grieved to ee it immolated by one of the heroes whom It had brought forth. But here the noblest sentiment leads them into error. The Revolution, whlcfh was to give us liberty, and which has prepared everything for our enjoy- ing it some day or other, -was not of itself, neither could it ibe, liberty. It was destined to be a great struggle against the old order of things. After conquering in France, it was requisite that it should conquer in Europe. But so violent a struggle admitted not of the forms or the spirit of liberty. For a moment, and but a brief one, the country possessed liberty under the Constituent Assembly; but when the populace became so menacing as to intimidate public opinion; wh*en It stormed the Tulleries on the tenth of August; when, on the second of September, it sacrificed all those of whom it felt distrust; when, on the twenty-first of January, it forced every one to compromise himself with it by imbruing his hands In royal 'blood; when, in August, 1793, it obliged all the citizens to hasten to the frontiers, or to part with their property; when itself abdicated its power, and re- signed it to that great Committee of Public Safety, composed of twelve Individuals was there, could there .be, liberty? No, there was a violent effort of enthusiasm and heroism; there was the muscular tension of a wrestler engaged with a potent antagonist. After this moment of danger; after our victories, there was a moment of relaxation. The latter end of the Convention and the Directory exhibited moments of liberty. But the struggle with Europe could be only temporarily suspended. It soon recom- 238 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. refuse to treat with an authority much more firmly established, and made illustrious by victory. It was, in fact, the very vacillat- ing and temporary character of the Directory which- constituted its merits, for, in the estimation of England, that was best which was best calculated to injure France. At the same time that I proposed peace to England, I sought also to treat with Russia. Paul I. was indignant at the reverses sustained by his troops in Holland, and cast the blame of it upon the English. Suwarrow also complained of the Austrian general for abandoning the smaller cantons at the moment that he entered them. Irritated by his disastrous but honorable retreat, he afterward disagreed with the Archduke Charles, in consequence of which the Russian army separated from the Austrians and retired into Bararia. Profiting by this occasion, I endeavored to conciliate the Emperor Paul; I sent him back, without exchange or ransom, five- or six thousand prisoners with a complete new outfit. This was not lost: no treaty was concluded, it is true, but the Russians took no further part in the coalition, and their army soon returned to Poland. Although its force was reduced to thirty or thirty-five thousand, its retreat was nevertheless an important event. The menced, and, on the first reverse, all parties rose against a too moderate government, and invoked a mighty arm. Bonaparte, returning from the Bast, was hailed as sovereign, and called to supreme power. It is absurd to say that Zurich had saved Prance. Zurich was but an accident, a respite; it required a Marengo and a Hohenlinden to save her. It required something more than military successes. It required a powerful reorgan- ization at home, of all the departments of the . government, and it was a political chief, rather than a military chief, which France needed.. The eighteenth and nineteenth of Brumaire, were, therefore, necessary. All we can say is, that the twentieth is to be condemned, and that the hero made a bad use of the service which he had Just rendered. But we may be told that he came to perform a mysterious task, imposed, without his being aware of it, by Fate, of which he was the involuntary agent. It was not liberty that he came to continue, for that could not yet exist. He came to continue, under monarchical forms, the Revolution in the world; he came to continue it, by seating himself, a plebian, on a throne; by bringing the pontiff to Paris to anoint a plebeian brow with the sacred oil; by creating an aristocracy with plebeians; by obliging the old aristocracies to associate themselves -with his plebeian aristocracy; by making kings of plebeians; by taking to his bed the daughter of the Caesars, and mingling plebeian blood with the blood of one of the oldest reigning families in Europe; by blending all nations; by introducing the French laws in Ger- many, in Italy, and in Spain; by dissolving so many spells; by mixing up together and confounding so many things. Such was the immense task which he came to perform; and meanwhile the state of society was to consolidate itself under the protection of -his sword; and liberty was to follow some day." THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 239 refusal of England and Austria left me no choice; I sought peace, bat they forced me into war; it was therefore necessary to prepare to prosecute it with vigor. Although European affairs fixed so much of my attention, I nevertheless neither forgot the army which I had left in Egypt, nor the maritime means necessary for its succor. FALL OF TIPPOO-SAEB. Great events had occurred in the East : at the moment that I raised the siege of St-Jean-d'Acre, our ancient ally, Tippoo-Saeb, fell in India. As soon as the English ministry had learned the certainty of my descent in Egypt, it with- drew from the Tagus, Gibraltar, and other ports, all the disposable forces, and set sail in all haste with a corps of five thousand men for India. The Marquis of Wellesley resolved to profit, without de- lay, by these reinforcements to strike a decisive blow against Tip- poo-Sae"b, so as to deprive us of the powerful support which this Mussulman warrior might afford us in the center of Hindoostan. Ce'rtain of the alliance of the Nizam, and of the neutrality of Schin- diah and the Mahrattas, the sworn enemies of the Mussulman caste, the English, under Generals Harris, Stuart, and Wellesley (afterward Wellington), attacked the states of the Sultan, and, after several combats more or less disputed, laid siege to Seringa- patam, which was breached and taken on the third of May, 1799, after an assault more celebrated than bloody. Tippoo, faithful to his glory, buried himself beneath the ruins of his palace, and his estates were divided between the English company and its creatures. This important and decisive blow, joined to the prob- able fall of Malta, which had been blockaded by the English for two years, rendered the situation of our army in Egypt extremely precarious, but not yet desperate. MARITIME AFFAIRS. I directed Gantheaume to leave Brest and carry to Egypt reinforcements of arms and munitions. The Spanish fleet being still confined to Brest, where (it will be remembered) it had returned with Bruix, and that of Holland not yet recovered from the disaster of Camperdown, I did not see, for the moment, any thing that could be done at sea. Ireland no longer offered the same chances as formerly under the Directory; England, taking warning by the descent of General Humbert's little detachment, had concentrated there a powerful army under Lord Cornwallis: more than forty thousand men had been suc- cessively transported to Ireland, and the greater part of the insur- gents, deceived by promises which were never realized, had laid down their arms. Since 1796, the affairs of St. Domingo had taken a more favorable turn: Toussaint L'Ouverture having de- 240 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. clared, with his blacks, in favor of the Republic, reestablished order in the culture of the fields, defeated the mulattoes, shut up the English in St. Marc, where General Maitland, despairing of success, proposed to recognize him as sovereign of Hayti. The Directory had sent He'douville to him, but the adroit and jealous Toussaint had forced him to return to France, and in the hope of avoiding an open rupture with us, he declined the proposition of our enemies and affected the most entire devotion to the Republic. Guadeloupe supported itself with success. Martinique had for six years been in the possession of the English; the Dutch colonies of Surinam and Essequibo, on the South American continent, had fallen into their power, as well as the island of Curacoa. CONTINENTAL ARMIES. If the maritime war offered few opportunities for my activity, the continental war occupied me so much the more seriously. The army of Italy, reduced to thirty thousand active men, had taken refuge on the rocks of Genoa. Ten thousand others were guarding the Maritime Alps and Dau- phiny. The army of the Rhine, which amounted to one hundred thousand combatants, was cantoned in Alsace and Switzerland, from Strasbourg to Schaffhausen. Our troops did not venture to recross the Alps in presence of the superior forces which the ene- my had collected in the basin of the Po. It was necessary for us either to enter Germany and Italy at the same time, or to strike such decisive blows on the Danube as to enable me to reconquer the peninsula, by dictating peace to Austria, It was necessary to recapture Mantua, Alexandria, and Milan, at Vienna. This was my plan. I called in the conscripts; I caused arms to be forged; I woke up the sentiment of national honor, which had only slumbered in the breasts of Frenchmen. I collected an army, young, it is. true, but full of enthusiasm. Our reverses had again lighted up the fires of civil war in La Vendee. I sent there two divisions of the army of Brune, which had been so victorious in Holland. The approach of these troops and a more moderate course on the part of the government caused the insurgents and the royalist chiefs to lay down their arms. These forces were now disposable for operations in the south of France. Miserable as was the condition of the army of Italy, that of the Rhine, united with the army of Helvetia, was in all respects good; I gave the command of it to Moreau, sending him a sufficient number of recruits for completing his corps and enabling him to take the offensive. The remainder of ray disposable troops were collected at Dijon, where I organized an army of reserve of forty THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 241 thousand men, which, from this central position, could march into Bwabia, Switzerland, or Italy, as circumstances might require. The divisions which had just suppressed the insurrection in La Vende"e formed the nucleus of this army. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. The possession of Switzerland gave us an opportunity to take in reverse the enemy's lines of operation in Italy and Swabia. My first thought was to leave on the defen- sive the army of Masse*na in the Apennines, and to move those of the reserve and of the Rhine into the valley of the Danube. The constitution of the year VEEI. not allowing a consul to command an army in person, my intention was to give the command of the reserve to a lieutenant, and to leave the grand army to Moreau; bat in following the headquarters of the latter, I could direct the operations of both. I wished Moreau to cross at Schaffhausen, take Kray in reverse, and drive him into the angle of the Main and the Rhine, cutting him off from Vienna; in a word, effecting against the left of the Austrian general the same operation which, five years after, I effected against the right of Mack at Donawert: we might afterward march without obstacle against Austria and reconquer Italy at Vienna, But it was impossible to overcome the obstinacy of Moreau, who wished to play some brilliant part on his own account. He at first refused to command under me, if I came to his army; and he afterward objected to my plans, pretending that the passage at Schaffhausen was dangerous. I was not yet sufficiently firm in my position to come to an open rupture with a man who had numerous partisans in the army, and who only wanted the energy to attempt to put himself in my place. It was necessary to negotiate with him as a separate power, as indeed, at that time, he really wae. I therefore left him the command of the finest army which France had seen for a long time, and allowed him to move upon the Danube at his pleasure. I myself decided to conduct my conscripts by the St. Gothard into Lombardy, secur- ing the concert of Lecourbe. as soon as Moreau should gain his first success. Our affairs in Italy at this time seemed ruined be- yond hope. England was preparing to act there with an army; Naples, Tuscany, Rome, encouraged by our past reverses, might make great efforts against us. PIUS VL AND PIUS VTL In evacuating Italy, the Direc- tory had caused Pius VL to be removed to France. This was cer- tainly a great error, if nothing more. They certainly could not at -16 T 242 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. that time expect to transfer the Holy See into France,* and the Directory could not hope to entirely destroy its influence. The aged Pius VL had already one foot in the grave, and he expired at Brianc.on, a few days after his arrival. He appointed at his death the celebrated Chiaramonte, Bishop of Imola, who was proclaimed Pope, at the beginning of 1800, under the title of Pius VH. He was an excellent pontiff, and professed for me senti- ments which never belied themselves. We both regretted, more than once, that our respective positions placed us in opposition. But the Church wishes to rule. . . .it is exclusive; the policy of the Vatican has always been the same since the time of Gregory : if it has sometimes slept under moderate and philanthropic popes, still it has always woke up under the more ambitious, and Europe should never cease to watch it. PROJECT OF THE ALLIES ON GENOA AND TOULON. England, who had never neglected an occasion to expel us from a maritime port, had concerted with Austria a project to drive us even from Genoa! General Abercrombie, after his unsuccessful expedition to Holland, was directed to assemble a corps of twenty thousand English at Minorca, to assist the imperialists. It is probable that the views of the Cabinet of London were not con- fined to Liguria, and that, full of confidence in the success of the fine army of Melas, it hoped to carry the standards of the coalition even to the walls of Toulon. MASSENA BLOCKADED IN GENOA. The Austrian gen- eral, who had an army three times as numerous as that of the French, had succeeding in penetrating, April sixth, from Cairo to Savona, and in this way cutting in two our line of defense. Mas- se~na, with the right of the army, twelve thousand strong, had been obliged to shut himself up in Genoa. Melas caused this place to be invested with thirty-five thousand Austrians under Ott, while Kaim covered Piedmont, and he himself, with the re- maining thirty thousand men, moved against the left of the French army commanded by Suchet. The latter, with only eight or nine thousand, pressed in front by superior forces, and con- stantly turned by the left, was obliged to fall back and cover him- self behind the Var. NAPOLEON'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS. The news of these events, vexatious as they were in themselves, assured me that /*The transfer of the Pope to Paris, toy Napoleon, was a different affair. Rome was then a part of his possessions, and the removal was merely a change of the Holy See from one of his capitals to another. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 243 Melas had directed his attention exclusively to the vicinity of Genoa, and would not be prepared to parry the blow which I was preparing to strike. I felt that the propitious moment hud arrived for invading Italy on the side where I was least expected. But as it was necessary to hasten to the rescue of Genoa, and as the march by the St. Gothard was a long one, I resolved to attempt the St. Bernard, leaving the first of these routes to the corps which was to march from the Rhine. I set out from Dijon about the first of May. FIRST OPERATIONS ON THE RHINE. In order to accel crate the arrival of the reinforcements which Moreau was to send me, it was necessary to wait for him to take the initiative; his \ army began to move about the last of April. It was more than one hundred thousand strong, without including the garrisons of May- ence, Strasbourg, and the other places of the Rhine. Kray, who was opposed to Moreau, had as large a force, but the Aulic Coun- cil had paralyzed his left by ordering it to remain in the moun- tains of the Voralberg. Favored by this circumstance, which se- cured him the superiority of disposable forces, Moreau made dem- onstrations by his left toward Kehl, moved with the half of his army from Bale on Engen, and there effected a junction with Le- courbe, who had just passed the Rhine at Schaffhausen at the head of the army of Helvetia, which was to form the right wing. Kray r encamped at the sources of the Danube, near Doneschingen, in- atead of operating to prevent the junction, fell into the snare, and poshed his right toward Kehl. While returning, hia army encoun- tered that of Moreau at Engen, when it was too late; it was beaten OH the third of May. Lecourbe contributed most to this success by carrying Stockach, a decisive point which menaced the enemy's line of retreat. Kray was not more fortunate at Moskirch,two days later, although he had been rejoined by his right wing before the arrival of Moreau's left; he now retired on Ulm in two columns; one of these was defeated at Biberach, on the eighth of May. Hav- ing sustained great losses, he took refuge in the vast intrenched camp at Ulm. CARNOT MADE MINISTER OF WAR Berthier having been made commander-in-chief of the army of reserve, the port- folio of war was given temporarily to Oarnot. As soon as I thought the battle of Engen had been fought, I dispatched this minister to detach twenty thousand men by the St Gothard on the TIcino; I myself at the same time set out from Dijon for Geneva. Moreau was greatly offended at the mission of Carnot; neverthe- less, after what had passed on the subject of the plan of the cam- 244 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. paign, how could I throw myself headlong into Lombardy before being certain that the detachment would be made without some difficulty or delay? PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. On the eighth of May, I arrived at Geneva, from whence I ordered demonstrations to be made toward Dauphiny, while the columns of the army of reserve were already defiling by Lausanne toward the lower Valois. The pas- sage of the high Alps presented many difficulties, but I knew that they were not insurmountable. I threw my principal column, thirty-five thousand strong, on the Great St. Bernard: General Chabran, with a division of four thousand men, took the road by the Little St. Bernard; General Moncey, with a corps of fifteen thousand men,, detached from the army of the Rhine, received orders to descend from the St. Gothard on Belinzona; a small column under the orders of General Bethencourt was to pass the SimploD, directing itself on Domo-Dossola; finally, in order to dis- tract the attention of the enemy and deceive him with respect to my movements, I ordered General Thureau to assemble about five thousand men, drawn from the places of Dauphiny, and to de- boucM on Suza by Mont Cenis and Mont Genevre. These well-combined movements produced the most happy results. Melas, kept in uncertainty by my stay at Geneva and the demonstrations of Mont Cenis, prolongs his stay at Ventimiglia. First thinking to march with twenty thousand men into Pied- mont, he now changes his opinion, and marches later with only two strong brigades. His army is distributed as follows: Wn- kassowich, commanding the right wing, holds the upper Ticino, at the foot of the St. Gothard;' Laudon guards the debouch of the Simplon; Briey covers the valley of Aosta with three thousand men; Haddick and Kaim occupy, with twenty thousand men, the plain of Piedmont, the debouch of Ivrea, the valleys of Suza, Tig- nerol and Coni: the main body of the army is fighting in Liguria and on the Var. The seventeenth of May, General Lannes, who commanded my (advanced guard, leaves the town of St. Pierre and marches on the Great St. Bernard. The baggage and cannon are dismounted, and the latter drawn upon troughs or pieces of tim- ber hollowed out and fitted to receive them. My presence and the grandeur of the enterprise animate the soldiers to overcome all obstacles.* *Thlers thus describes Napoleon's personal passage of the Alps: "The arts have represented him bounding across the snowy Alps on a flry charger; but here Is the truth unvarnished. He ascended Mount Saint Bernard In the gray greatcoat which he always wore, conducted by a TEE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 245 In penetrating these gorges of the Alps I felt the most happy presentiments. The shouts of my soKLiers, echoed back by the mountains, announced to me a certain victory. I was returning to Italy, the theatre of my first arms. My grenadiers, after hav- ing reached the summit of the St. 'Bernard, threw up their caps with their red plumes into the air, and uttered shouts of joy, the ordinary precursors of victory. A halt was made at the Hospice, where, through my care and that of the good monks who here de- vote themselves to the cause of humanity, refreshments were pre- pared for the columns. After a short repose, they gayly resumed their arms and descended the mountain, whose southern slope offered the most smiling aspect, astonishing the eye and animating the courage of my soldiers. The Alps were crossed, and we de- scended like a torrent into Piedmont. We were all young, gen- erals and soldiers. We feared neither fatigues nor dangers; we cared for nothing but glory. guide of the country; displaying, in the most difficult paths, the abstrac- tion of a mind occupied elsewhere; discoursing with the officers whom he met here and there on the road; and then, at intervals, conversing with the guide who accompanied him, making him talk of his life, his pleasures, and his troubles, like some idle traveler who has no ibetter occupation. The guide, who was quite young, laid before him, with ingenuous simplic- ity, the particulars of his obscure life, and, above all, the grief he endured for want of a little money, which rendered him unable to marry one of the maidens of the valley. The First Corfsul, now listening to him, now ques- tioning the passengers, with whom the mountains were alive, arrived at the hospital, where the good monks received him with great eagerness. Hardly had he alighted, before he wrote a note, which he handed to his guide, desiring him to give it without delay to the administrator of the army, who had remained on the other side of the Saint Bernard. Tn the evening, when the young man returned to Saint Pierre, he learned with surprise how mighty was the traveler he had conducted in the morning; and also that General Bonaparte had given him a field and house; in fact, the means of marrying, and realizing all the dreams of his modest ind moderate ambition. This mountaineer died recently in his own country, proprietor of the field which had been given to him toy the ruler of the world. "This singular act of benevolence, at a moment of so mneh preo<>cupa- tion, 1s worthy of attention. If it had been the mere caprice of a eon- qtieror, distributing at random good and evil, Alternately crushing an em- pire and building up a cottage,)even such a caprice were worth the record- ing, if it should merely ibe to tempt .the masters of the earth to do likewise. Bnt such an act reveals something further. The human soul, in the moment when It burns with ardent wishes, is Inclined to benevolence, and does good, as it were, to merit that good which, Itself, it seeks at the hands of Providence." The First Consul halted a few minutes with the momks; thanked them for their cares toward his army; and made them a splendid gift, to be applied to the consolation of travelers and the poor. 246 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. THE AEMY ARRESTED BY FORT BARD. Nevertheless, an obstacle, whose importance we had not properly estimated, was near arresting us at the very threshold of our career! The army descended the valley of the Doria, after routing, at Chatillon, a small corps of the enemy, which was too feeble to oppose our march. But on reaching the little fort of Bard, which, situated on an impregnable rock, was garrisoned by only four hundred men, we found our passage closed. It refused to surrender at our summons, and resisted all our attempts at an escalade. Lannes, with the infantry, succeeded in effecting a passage by the moun- tains of Albaredo; but neither horses nor cannon could pass! It was almost maddening to see one's self arrested by a mere handful of men ! I caused a new road to be cut through the rocks for my cav- alry. My soldiers, like those of Hannibal, debouched by a road cut out with their own hands. But if the Carthaginian general was embarrassed by his elephants, I was no less so by my cannon. Seeing no other means of extricating myself from this dangerous position, I resorted to stratagem. Covering the wheels of the car- riages with straw so as to prevent all noise in their movements, we drew them, in the night, while the garrison was asleep, through the streets of the faubourg directly under the guns of the fort! This bold but perilous operation was attended with perfect suc- cess, and full of hope, we continued our march on Ivrea.* Lannes *Napoleon was still at Martigny when the couriers of Berthier came to Inform him of the difficulties of passing the Ifttte fort. "This announce- ment," says Thiers, "of an obstacle considered insurmountable at first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that if one of the loftiest mountains on the globe had failed to arrest his progress, a second- ary rock could not be capable of vanquishing his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be taken by fbold courage; if it could not IM? taken, It still could be turned. Besides, if the infantry and the cavalry could pass by it, with but a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivr6a at the mouth of the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could follow them. And if the heavy guns could not pass the obstacle which had arisen, and if, in order to get away, that of the enemy must be taken, the French infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the A nst rians and take their cannon. "Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a num- ber of Italian officers; and learning from these that many other roads led from Aosta to the neighboring valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and pointing oat to him, with wonderful precision, what recon-noissances should be made around the fort of Bard. He 'would not allow himself to see any serious danger, except from the arrival' of a hostile corps, shutting up the debouch THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 247 had already taken this place, and driven the Austrians on Romano. There were only three thousand of the enemy in the valley of Aosta, at the time of our passage; but more than thirty thousand were scattered in the valleys of the Ticino and the Po. MELAS IS DECEIVED. Melas had not comprehended my maneuvers. On learning that the army of reserve was marching toward Genoa, he imagined that our only object was to make some demonstration toward the north of Piedmont, in order to turn his attention from Genoa and relieve Mass^na and Suchet. He deemed it merely necessary to detach from Vintimille on Turin a corps of seven thousand men. However, he soon followed himself at the head of another division, leaving Ott to besiege Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, and Elsnitz to cover the Var with eight- een thousand more. Still thinking that we were merely making of Ivrea; he instructed Berthier to send Lannes as far as to Ivrea by the path of Afrbaredo, and make him take a strong position there, -which should be safe from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. 'When Lannes guards the entrance of the valley,' added the First Consul, 'whatever may happen, it is of little consequence; the only result may be loss of time. We have enough provisions to subsist ourselves awhile, and, one way or other, we shall succeed in avoiding or overcoming the obstacles which now de- lay us.' " The details of the several unsuccessful attempts to carry the place are too long for insertion. The final operation is thus briefly given by Alison: "In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers sur- mounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division tra- versed, one by one, the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillery-men succeeded In drawing their can- non, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, b> spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and 'wrapping the wheels up so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition wagons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before day- light a sutticient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to con- tinue its march, and an obstacle which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise was effectually overcome. During the Bucceeding night the same hazardous operation was repeated with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horses cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely pro- ceeding on the road to Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the fifth of .1 uiic. and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success In tbe campaign was at an end." 248 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. a diversion, and deceived by Thureau's attack on Suza the twenty- second of May, Melas sent Kaim from Turin to oppose this little column, and moreover, assigned to him the greater part of the reinforcements which he had brought from Nice; he marched, on the twenty-fourth of May, to Savigliano. He thus had, to oppose the sixty thousand men I was leading into Lombardy, only eight- een thousand scattered in three corps under Wukassowich, Lau- don, and Haddick. I reached Ivre'a the very day that Melas was at Savigliano. Ghabran was left to continue the siege of Fort Bard. Thureau, after forcing the pass of Suza, established himself at Bussolino, whence he could menace Turin ; Moncey, descending from the St. Gothard, penetrated into the Italian > bailiwicks ; Bethencourt moved against Fort Arona. My plan developed itself majestic- ally, and the enemy was still ignorant of it ! COMBAT OF CHIUSELLA. General Haddick had marched from Turin on the Chiusella, where he received the troops driven by Lannes from Ivrea; these forces together formed a coi-ps of ten thousand men. Lannes attacked him on the twenty-second, forced the bridge of Chiusella, and threw the enemy on Chivasso. He entered here the next day, and Haddick retired to Turin and rejoined Melas. NAPOLEON MARCHES ON MILAN. I had pushed my advanced guard on Chivasso merely to make the enemy believe that Turin was my object; but I took good care not to move in that direction. To secure the execution of my projects, which tended to nothing less than to seize all the communications of the Austrians, it was absolutely necessary to maneuver on Milan: this was a thunder-clap that would act on the opinion of the people of Italy, and strike terror into the enemy's army, at the same time that it accelerated my reunion with the fifteen thousand men whom Moncey was conducting from the army of the Rhine. I marched from Ivrea, by Santhia, Vercelli, and Novara, toward the Ticino. PASSAGE OF THE TICINO. The advanced guard under Lannes, now the rear guard, masked my movement by marching by Crescentino, Trino, and Mortara on Pavia. The new advanced guard, commanded by General Murat, forced the passage of the Ticino at Turbigo, on the thirty-first. General Laudon had assem* bled some troops for the defense of this river; but he was beaten and lost fifteen hundred men hors-de-combat. General Wnkasso- wich, hastening from the upper valley of the Ticino to his assist- ance, arrived too late, and merely had time to save himself on the THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 249 Adda. The Austrians threw two thousand men into the castle of Milan, and fell back, to the number of six thousand, to the banks of the Mincio. I entered Milan on the second of June. DISPOSITIONS OF MELAS. Melas, not yet knowing the character of the army to which he was opposed, at first thought of passing the Po at Casale, in order to attack me in rear; but on learning from Haddick and Wukassowich that I had at least sixty thousand men in Lombardy, he renounced the plan, and thought it necessary to draw to himself the forty thousand men of Ott and Elsnitz before hazarding a battle. Elsnitz had been left at the Var with seventeen thousand men, and having, in spite of his superiority in number, been unable to force the position of Suchet on the right of that river, received orders to retreat so as to gain the head of the valley of the Tanaro, and to descend as far as AstL Ott was directed either to close the affair with Masse'na imme- diately, or to raise the siege of Genoa, repass the Bochetta, and fly to the defense of the Po toward Placentia. The retrograde move- ment of Elsnitz begun on the twenty-eighth of May. Suchet, whose corps had been increased by reinforcements to twelve thou- sand men, closely followed him to the Tanaro, and by skillful maneuvers against his right, anticipated him at the Col-de-Tende, cut his center, and subjected him to a loss of eight thousand men hors-de-combat. The following days Suchet, advancing by Finale on Savona, marched to the assistance of Genoa, but was too late. SURRENDER OF GENOA. Massena capitulated on the fifth of June, after sustaining a close blockade and a horrible famine for sixty days. After the third of May he had several con- ferences with General Ott, when the latter received orders to make him a bridge of gold if he would surrender immediately, or to raise the siege, should he appear disposed to prolong it. This incident spared Mass^na from resorting to the act of desperation upon which he had decided, rather than to surrender a prisoner of war. He had resolved to throw himself into Tuscany at the head of his famished column ; the orders of Melag spared him this. The eight thousand men still remaining of the French garrison obtained free egress; but only six thousand rejoined Suchet in the environs of Savona. Ott, proud of his conquest, hastened to throw a strong garrison into Genoa, repass the Bochetta, and march by the valley of the Scrivia on Tortona, with the intention of disputing our pas- sage of the Po; but he was too late, for a double passage had been effected at the same time, on the sixth of June, by Lannes, at San- Cipriano, and Murat at Nocetto, near Placentia, after having eas- ily defeated the detachments sent to oppose them. 250 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. PASSAGE OF THE PO. Matters were now hastening to a crisis. I had already established myself on the enemy's rear; but he could yet escape by the right bank of the Po by descending as far as Borgo-Forte, opposite Mantua. It was therefore necessary to cut off this last resource. I decided to cross the river with the division of Watrin, Chambarlhac, Gardanne, Monnier, Boudet, and the cavalry of Murat, forming a total of thirty thousand men; the remainder were charged with securing my own communications with Switzerland and guarding the left bank of the Po. The divi- sion of Chabran, made disposable by the capitulation of Fort Bard, moved to Vercelli, and occupied Ivr6a, Chivos, Crescen- tino, and Trino. Bethencourt continued to blockade Arona; Moncey remained in the Milanais. One of his divisions was posted at Pavia, another blockaded the castle of Milan, and the third occupied Crema and Brescia, so as to check the Austrian troops which were posted on the Mincio. The division of Loison blockaded Pizzighettone and the Castle of Placentia, observed the Lower Po, and covered the rear of my army. I confess that this position was too much disseminated, and that the attempt to en- velop Melas by wishing to cover all was a little hazardous. It had been more wise to unite fifteen thousand men on Tortona, because, if Melas had defiled upon the Mincio by Milan, I should neverthe- less have conquered all Italy by a single march, and, by uniting myself to Massna, have had no further need of my communica- tions by the St. Bernard: but success intoxicates, and I wished all or nothing. ' Moreover, I had hoped that Massna would hold out s"ome days longer, and that, debouching by Tortona, we should be able to form a junction by NovL BATTLE OF MONTEBELLO. It has just been said that the corps of Ott marched in all haste from Genoa to take part in the defense of the Po: he could not arrive in time, and only reached Montebello, where he encountered the corps of Lannes. Being very desirous to reach Placentia, and thinking that he had to oppose only a detachment of my army, Ott precipitated himself upon the burg of Casteggio, contrary to all the principles of war; concentration being now his only hope, all partial combats were to be avoided by the Austrians. Lannes received the enemy at the head of the division of Watrin and Chambarlhac ; he even took the offensive, in order to turn him by the heights which com- manded this burg and all the country to the Po. The Austrians fought with intrepidity; victory was doubtful, when the arrival of Victor with the division of Gardanne decided the battle in our favor. The enemy, with both his wings turned, was completely THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 261 defeated; his center, driven to the bridge of Casteggio, was over- thrown: he lost six cannon, five thousand prisoners, and three thousand killed and wounded. Ott threw two thousand men into the citadel of Tortona and fell back on Alexandria, where Melas was concentrating his forces. This event was of the greatest im- portance, inasmuch as it diminished the enemy's forces by eight thousand men at the very moment when he was obliged to effect a passage, and animated the courage of my soldiers on the eve of a decisive battle. BATTLE OF MARENGO.-^I continued my march on Alex- andria. The twelfth of MMdnwe passed the Scrivia and de- bouched into the plain of San Giuliano. A rear guard left by Ott at Marengo was routed by the division of Gardanne and obliged to repass the Bormida. I placed my army in echelons on the road from Tortona to Alexandria. The division of Gardanne estab- lished itself at Pedrabona, opposite the tete-du-pont which the Aus- tria ns had preserved on the Bormida. It was supported by Vic- tor with the division of Chambarlhac at Marengo, and by Keller- man's* brigade of cavalry. In rear of Victor was Lannes, de- *Kellerrnan (Francois-Etienne) was born at Metz, in 1772. He was the son of Francois Christophe Kellerman, the victor of Valmy. In 1790 he was attached to the French Embassy to the United States of America, and returned to France in 1793. In 1797 he served with Napoleon in Italy and was adjutant-general; he distinguished himself at the passage of the Tagliamento, and, as a reward for his bravery, was sent to Paris with the colors captured on that occasion; he was also promoted to the rank of briga- dier-general. He also distinguished himself in Italy, in the campaign of 1799. In 1800 he crossed the Alps with Napoleon, and commanded a brig- ade of cavalry under Murat, which, at the battle of Marengo, numbered fonr hundred and seventy men. In the first period of this battle his com- mand had suffered greatly and was reduced to two hundred and fifty men, when Bonaparte ordered him to be reinforced with one hundred and fifty more. With this force he greatly distinguished himself in the final attack, and his brilliant charge contributed greatly toward the victory of Marengo. He was immediately promoted to the rank of general-of-division and joined the army of Brune with the command of three brigades of heavy cavalry. In 1805 he commanded a division under Bernadotte, and was wounded at the battle of Austerlitz. In 1808 he served in Portugal, but the operations here were unfortunate, and he concluded to sign the famous treaty of Cintra. In 1809 he succeeded Bessieres in the command of north- ern Spain. In 1813 he distinguished himself at the battle of Lutzen, and was wounded on the eve of the battle of Bautzen. He also served with credit in 1814. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, he joined the stand- ard of his former general and was appointed to the Chamber of Peers. At the opening of the campaign he received a command in the army, and again fought with great bravery at the head of the fourth corps of cav- alry. On the second restoration of the Bourbons he was eliminated from the Chamber of Peers. 252 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. ployed near San Giuliano with the division of Watrin and Cham- peaux's brigade of cavalry. Finally, the division of Monnier formed the last echelon at Torre-di-Gafaralo. Rivaud's brigade of cavalry, posted at Sale, observed the lower Tanaro and the Po on the right of the army. On our left I sent General Desaix with the division of Boudet to Rivalta, in order to prevent the enemy from defiling by his right toward Novi. Desaix was in this way to endeavor to secure communications with the army of Italy, which was descending the valley of the Bormida by Dego on Aqui. I thought that I might safely do this, as the enemy, from his in- difference in the defense of the plain of San Giuliano, seemed not to wish a battle, and, on the contrary, was seeking so to maneuver as to fall back on Genoa, and afterward gain Parma and Mo- dena. Moreover, I was deceived by the false information of a spy whom I believed in our interest, but who, it appeared, was acting a double part. This error came near costing me dear. Melas had not finished assembling his army till the thirteenth. The next morning at break of day he passed the Bormida at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and attacked us with vigor. The division of Gardanne was forced to retreat : Victor rallied it to the right of the division of Chambarlhac, which formed a line from the village of Marengo to the Bormida. General Haddick, with the right of the Austrians, deployed in two lines opposite the position of Victor; Kaim, who formed their center, placed him? self obliquely to the left of Haddick; Ott was thrown on Castel- Ceriolo ; the reserve under the orders of Elsnitz remained in rear of the right, on the road from Marengo to Alexandria ; but two- thirds of his cavalry was most untimely detached to the south of Alexandria on the road to Aqui to observe Suchet and Mass^na, We were not prepared to receive battle. I hasten to arrange my echelons in such a way that they may sustain themselves, and to recall Desaix from Rivalta on San Giuliano. At ten o'clock in the morning I am obliged to push forward Ijannes, and put him in line at the right of Victor, whose flank Kaim is preparing to turn. Victor defends with vigor the passage of the rivulet of Barbotta, which runs to Marengo: a murderous and well-sustained fire is kept up on both sides: the Austrians sustain considerable logs; Melas engages half of the cavalry of reserve which remained after iis foolish detachment. This isolated brigade is precipitated into the marshy rivulet, and the enemy, who had double the number of cavalry, sees himself from the beginning of the action deprived of the aid of that arm at the very moment when it might decide the victory. Lannes succeeds in resisting the attack of the enemy's THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 253 center; but in the mean time Ott, having passed beyond Gastel- Ceriolo, and assisted by the cavalry of the center under the orders of Frimont, threatens to take our right in reserve. I oppose to him my grenadiers of the guard. These eight hundred brave men ad- vance into the plain between Castel-Ceriolo and Villa-Nova and form there a square like an impregnable redoubt, against which are spent the reiterated efforts of the Austrian squadrons. Prof- iting by the glorious resistance of this troop of the elite, I direct on Castel-Ceriolo five battalions of Monnier's division, in order to ex- pel the light infantry of the enemy. Unfortunately, a vigorous charge of the Austrians on the left of the division while on march, separates General Monnier from his troops, forces him to throw himself toward Lannes, compels the brigade of the left to retreat, and obliges that of Cara St.-Cyr to follow the movement of the line, at the moment when his tirailleurs are penetrating into Castel-Ceriolo. Nevertheless, the instantaneous occupation of this village gives a.point-d'appui to my right and reestablishes my affairs on this wing. But on the other wing we are less fortunate: Victor, after having resisted the enemy for several hours, can sustain himself no longer; his left yields and loses the support of the Boriuida; his center is pierced, and his entire corps is driven back on San Giu- liano. The defeat of the left exposes the flank of Lannes and forces him to retreat; he effects this in good order across the plain in the direction of La Ghilina. Already the Austrians utter shouts of victory. My generals, Berthier in particular, think the battle decidedly lost. Desaix and myself do not yet despair. This general advances rapidly on San Giuliano; the six thousand fresh troops which he brings me can, under such a chief, effect miracles. I direct my.whole atten- tion to prolonging the movement of retreat on the left, in order to gain time for Desaix to arrive on the field of battle. The enemy, after a short halt, advances with new vivacity; but the want of cavalry, which had been foolishly directed against Suchet and Mas- f*-ii;i. prevents him from profiting by the advantages of his posi- tion; if a part of his cavalry could be thrown against Victor, it would complete the rout of the army, and decide the victory against us. At last, near five o'clock in the afternoon, Desaix debouches from San Giuliano, and forms in advance of this village; Lanne establishes himself obliquely between the right of Dpsaix and Villa-Nova; the square of my guard connects its right with Caatel- Ceriolo. The cavalry of Champeaux forms in rear of Desaix. and 254 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. that of Kellerman in rear of the interval between Desaix and Lannes. Victor endeavors to assemble his battalions in rear and to the left of Desaix. The enemy advances, extending his line on both flanks. His left, under Ott, already reaches Villa-Nova; his center, after making a halt at the high ground of Guasca, directs its course on San Giuliano, and the right debouches from Cassina Grosa, Melas thinks himself so certain of victory that he goes to Alexandria to dispatch the news of my defeat to Vienna and Genoa, while his chief-of-staff, Zach, is to advance in column by the great road to Tortona to gather the fruits of victory. The latter has so little doubt of his success, that he marches by ech- elons separated by considerable intervals. The first, composed of five thousand men of the elite, which he conducts in person, is fol- lowed at the distance of a quarter of a league by three other corps under Kaim, Bellegarde. and Elsnitz. At the moment when the head of the column reaches San Giuliano, my artillery of reserve is unmasked and pours in its deadly volleys; at the same time Desaix attacks with impetuosity; unfortunately, one of the first balls strikes this brave man in the center of his breast, and de- prives France of one of her ablest defenders, and me of one of my dearest companions in arms. Our troops, exasperated at the death of their illustrious chief, redouble their efforts. Our ene- mies, who thought victory certain, are staggered by these attacks. Kellerman* seizes the moment to charge them in flank with four *The English translator of the American edition of Thiers' "History of Napoleon" makes this Kellerman the same as the one that gained the victory of Valmy, and, to do this, makes an incorrect translation of Thiers' remarks on this affair. He then adds in his notes: "He (Keller- man) was the real winner of the battle of Marengo, changing it by a single charge of cavalry, from a rout to a victory. For this, Napoleon never for- gave him." Again he contradicts Thiers, in saying that Napoleon recom- pensed all his generals for their services at Marengo, and says: "He (Napoleon) did not recompense Kellerman. No other officer of his distinc- tion but was made Marshal of France far earlier than he. It has been always stated, heretofore, that after Desaix's fall, Zach's men were rallied, had assumed the offensive, and that the French footrwere again in disorder, when Kellerman charged, without orders, and retrieved the fight." Alison makes a similar statement to the above, and then remarks: "United with the great qualities of Napoleon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent Jealousy of any one who had either effect- ually thwarted his designs or rendered him such services as might dimin- ish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying Jealousy of Wellin: ton ! ! ! ! was an indication of his first weakness; his oblivion of Keller- man's inappreciable services are instances of the second. * * * The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellerman was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterward enjoyed the favor of the chief, on whose brow he placed the diadem.'' Any one at all familiar with French history must be forced to smile THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 255 squadrons. The column is broken; the head, crushed and sur- rounded, surrenders. Profiting by this advantage, our troops push forward. Kellerman leaves it to the infantry to collect the pris- oners, and advances against the division of Kaim, who is follow- ing Zach a quarter of a league in rear; the same disorder is car- ried here by a brilliant and timely charge of the cavalry. The Austrians, in consternation, retreat. In vain their reserve at- at the innumerable absurdities into which these two writers have been car- ried by their English prejudices; the American, however, "will feel morti- fied to see such absurd notes attached by the Enylish editor of the American edition of so Impartial and generally correct a history as that of Thiers; and he will be not a little astonished, upon examining the original text, to find it has been incorrectly translated so as to make it support one of the foregoing statements respecting Kellerman. The passage we allude to Is this: "The brave Kellerman, who this day added much to the glory of Valmy. attached to his name, dashed upon the squadrons," etc. This is made to read in the J.n/io-American edition, "The brave Kellerman, who on this day added so greatly to the glory lie had won at Valmy, dashed," etc. Thiers, translated in this way, is made to support statements which he is very far from doing in the original. The elder Kellerman, to whom the translator of Thiers here alludes, was not at the battle of Marengo, but for his victory of Valmy, won while Napoleon was a mere captain, Napoleon made him a Marshal of France among the very first that were made. No one was made Marshal "earlier than he." The younger Kellerman, his son, never was made Marshal./-- The charge of Napoleon having neglected him Is absurd. For his serv- -Ices in 1797 he made him a brigadier-general, and honored him with the colors taken at the passage of the Tagllamento. In 1800 the cavalry was commanded by Murat, and consisted of the three brigdes of Rivaud, Champeaux, and Kellerman, that of the latter being much the smallest one. For his valuable services on the field of Marengo he was made a general-of-division, aud attached to the army of Brune, with the com- mand of three brigades, numbering two thousand one hundred. Rivaud was also made a general-of -division, but his command was not increased" to the same degree as that of Kellerman. Champeaux was killed at Marengo. Kellerman did good service at Marengo, for which he deserved and received great credit. But It is absurd to call him the "real winner" of the battle. On this subject Thiers very justly remarks: "Some detractors have sought to attribute to General Kellerman the gaining of the bat- tle of Marengo, and consequently all the results which this memorable day brought In Its train. But if General Bonaparte is to be despoiled of the glory of that day, why not attribute it to that noble victim of the hap- piest inspiration, to that Desaix, who, divining the orders of his chief be- fore he had received them, brought him the two-fold offering of the vic- tory and of his life? Why not attribute it again to that Intrepid defender of Genoa, who, by detaining the Austrians on the Apennines, gave General Bonaparte time to descend from the Alps, and handed them over to him already half defeated? So speaking, Generals Kellerman, Desaix, Mas- sena, could all be the true conquerors of Marengo! all except General: Bonaparte! But In this world It Is by the voice of the people that glory is decreed; and it was by the voice of the people that he was proclaimed con- queror of Marengo; who, discovering by the glance of genius, what ad van- 256 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. tempts to sustain itself at Marengo: nothing can resist the im- petuosity of our soldiers. The enemy retreats across the Bormida in the greatest disorder, leaving in our hands eight colors, twenty cannon, and six thousand prisoners. General Ott, who in the mean time had advanced to Chilina, thinks himself fortunate in regaining Castel-Ceriolo, already occupied by our tirailleurs, and at last, with difficulty, reaches the tete-du-pont of the Bormida. tage might be taken of the upper Alps to burst down upon the Austrian rear, had, during three whole months, deceived their vigilance; who had brought into existence an army which ha3 before no being; who had astounded Europe by the miracle of that creation; who had crossed the St. Bernard without any 'beaten road; who had swooped suddenly upon the midst of startled Italy; who had surrounded .his unfortunate adversary with unequaled art; who had, to sum the whole, delivered a decisive battle, which, if lo'st in the morning, was gloriously recovered in the even- ing. And certainly, had it not been won that .night, it would have been on the ensuing morning; for independent of the six thousand men of De- saix's division, the ten thousand men from the Ticino, and the ten thousand posted on the lower Po, presented Infallible means for the destruction of the enemy's army. Let us suppose a case. Let us suppose that the Austrians, conquerors on the fourteenth of June, had entangled themselves in the gorge of the Stradella; that they had found at Placentia Generals Duhesme and Loison, with ten thousand men to dispute the passage of the Po, with General Bonaparte in their rear, reinforced by Generals Desaix and Moncey what would these Austrians have done in this nar- row gorge, blocked by a well-defended river, pursued by a superior army? They would but have experienced a disaster more serious than on the plains of Bormida. The true conqueror of Marengo, therefore, is a, and all Paris knew it. Fouchd 264 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. came to inform me that the conspirators, for want of a capitol, had chosen the corridors of the theatre for the execution of their bloody design. 1 was urged not to go. I did not follow a course so unworthy, but took the necessary measures for securing the guilty. Cerrachi and Arena were taken with poignards and arms with which they intended to assassinate me: they were tried, and condemned. EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FERROL AND CADIZ. Eng- land, in the midst of the disputes to which she had given rise, re- doubled her audacity and activity to secure all the advantages to be derived from the existing state of things; and to make the Eng- lish people forget the horrors of a famine which was desolating the three, kingdoms, she carried her victorious flag to all parts of the globe) It seemed as though the English government only wanted garrisons to take possession of half the world* The loss of these colonies reacted on the policy of the European states as well as on their marine; to deprive a commerc'al people of distant trade takes from a nation the first elements of a military marine, and deprives it of the means of sustaining its colonial system. For six months past Holland had been deprived of the colo- nies of Surinam and Demarara on the American continent; the islands of Curagoa and St. Eustacia had followed the same fate. Admiral Popham had just set sail with an expedition for the South Sea. A considerable armament, the troops of which were to be commanded by General Pultney, was preparing in part to join Abercrombie upon some important enterprise. A great mar- itime power threatens all at once, without the enemy's knowing where to expect the blow; it can strike when and where it pleases. The expedition of Pultney might intend a descent upon Ho land, which we had stripped of troops to form the army of the reserve, and afterward the Gallo-Batavian army, which was assembled by Augereau at Mayence; it might attack Antwerp, Flushing, or Boulogne ; it might insult Spain, or descend upon Egypt. I assem- bled a corps at Amiens under the orders of Murat, with the im- pression that the attack was to be directed upon Holland. This corps was composed, in part, of grenadiers collected from all the garrison battalions in the interior. But Pultney sailed toward the coast of Spain, where he thought to do with the fleet of the Ferrol what Abercrombie and Mitchel had done in the Texel with the Batavian fleet. Pultney landed on the twenty-fifth of August, attacked Fort St. Philip and the heights of Brion; but Admiral Moreno, having landed a part of the equipages of his squadron, baffled a project which appeared to have been based on the hope of THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 265 a surprise, and on the ordinary negligence of the Spaniards. Pult- ney, having faaled in this project, made sail for Cadiz. At the same time Abercrombie, the armistice rendering his forces use- less in Italy, had received orders to (appear before Cadiz; the junc- tion of the two squadrons was effected at Gibraltar. At the head of this new armada Lord Keith appeared, on the sixth of October, before the rich city of Cadiz, then a prey to the ravages of the yellow fever, and deserted by a considerable part of its inhabitants. Less audacious than the celebrated Essex, he at first confined himself to bombarding the city; General Morla, who was in command, opposed him with a firm countenance. At last Abercrombie decided to land a part of his troops at the point of San Lucar, but they were soon reembarked, because (it was alleged) of the fear of the pestilence. Perhaps with greater en- ergy, these two enterprises would have been successful; it is in- comprehensible that such immense -means should be expended upon mere demonstrations. THUGUT RETIRES FROM THE MINISTRY. While the maritime war was pushed with so much activity, nothing was yet decided upon the continent. Thugut, who in 1797 had resigned from the ministry rather than treat with us, again pretended, on the fourth of October, to yield the portfolio to Count Cobentzel; but the latter, having left Vienna in a few days for Lunerille, where a congress was to be assembled, the portfolio was trans- ferred to Count Lehrbach, under whose name Thugut continued to direct affairs. He still flattered himself that he would be able to deprive us of Italy. His army was reinforced on the Mincio. The Neapolitans, having terminated their intestine wars and juridical massacres ordered by the Queen, and barbarously exe- cuted on board the vessels of Nelson, advanced to the confines of Tuscany. Abercrombie might, at any moment, make a descent at Leghorn with the little army which he carried from Minorca to the coast of Tuscany and thence to Gibraltar. The Grand Duke was organizing his militia to aid an Austrian corps commanded by General Sommariva. OCCUPATION OF TUSCANY. I resolved to frustrate the junction of these stormy elements. General Dupont received orders to enter Tuscany, disarm the militia, and occupy Florence and Leghorn; which he executed on the sixteenth of October after the slight combats of Barberino and Arezzo. PREPARATIONS ON THE CONTINENT. The activity of political negotiations during the months of July, August, and Sep- tember had not prevented the two parties from continuing their 266 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. military preparations. I had sent into Switzerland a second army of reserve, formed at Dijon by Macdonald, of about fourteen or fifteen thousand men. Augereau assembled at Mayence a little Gallo-Batavian army of the same force. These two corps were intended to relieve my two principal armies of those accessories which trouble the flanks, divide the forces, and form the pretext of all the faults of mediocre generals. Macdonald would cover, at the same time, in the Tyrol, the left of Brune and the right of Moreau; he might become the corps of maneuver against the ene- my and connect the two armies. Augereau would sweep the left of the Danube, check the forces which the enemy was assembling in Bohemia, and leave Moreau's fine army entirely free in its movements. The Austrians had also profited by this interval. The Arch- duke Palatine had gone to Hungary to renew there the levee-en- masse of 1797. The Archduke Charles, who had been most un- justly deprived of the supreme command, urged forward, in the government of Bohemia, which had been conferred upon him, the organization of legions of ten or twelve thousand men, who were soon to enter into the line. Recruits were collected from all the hereditary states for completing the regiments. The little army of Cond6, changed from the service of Russia to that of England, andafine Bavarian contingent, further reinforced the imperialists. The Emperor Francis, himself, repaired to his army to revive their patriotism and love of glory. Yielding to considerations for which it would be difficult to assign any cause, he deemed it his duty to replace Kray by the Archduke John, a young prince, in- structed in the military art, but having neither the experience nor the genius of his brother, the Archduke Charles. They gave him for counsellors the same generals, Lauer and Weyrother, who had been the guides of Wurmserand Alvinzi in th?, great days of Ba<- sano and Rivoli, and who, notwithstanding all their erudition, Always maneuvered very well to secure their own defeat; for nothing is worse than erudition without correct principles. After these preparations, Austria thought it would be base for her to surrender to us Mantua, of which she was still in possession. It is rare that a state makes peace after a defeat, without renounc- ing some of its lost possessions as a recompense for the sacrifice of the others; a nation, preserving its self-respect, is seldom seen yielding more than it has already lost, when in a condition for self- defense. It will be hereafter shown how these natural maxims were misconceived in the conditions which they attempted to im- pose on me. All hope of peace having disappeared, I decided to THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 267 break the armistice, in the middle of November, notwithstanding the rigor of the season. Should we give Austria the advantage of a whole winter's repose, the chances would be entirely against us; Moreau and Brune, therefore, received orders to resume hostilities. PLAN OF OPERATIONS. I had conceived a very bold proj- ect for outflanking the army of Bellegarde on the Mincio, by making Macdonald cross the Rhetian Alps so as to debouch on Trent and throw the Austrians back on the lagunes of Venice, at the same time that Brune attacked them in front. In order to execute this the more certainly, Murat was directed to march from the camp of Amiens for Italy, as soon as the destination of Pult- ney should render his corps disposable. I, for a moment, thought of marching with eighty thousand men by the Noric Alps on \ f ienna, at the same time that Moreau would arrive tftere by the valley of the Danube. I decided, however, not to go in person to the army of Bruiie, which, by the turn of events, would only be an near Monzauibano; the right, under Dupont, was to make a sec- curred at Paris at the epoch of Marengo. The party conquered at the eighteenth Brumaire was not yet dead: at the first news of the success of Melas, brought by a commercial courier, the Jacobins, thinking me conquered, proposed to Carnot, the minister of war, it is said, a coup-d'etat against me. We can only guess what course he would have taken if an hour afterward my courier, announcing a decisive victory, had not changed the face of affairs. I deemed it more wise to direct matters from the interior of my cabinet, and Berthier resumed the duties of minister of war. Macdonald found his task impossible of execution, and his means disproportionate to the end; he sent his chief -of -staff to bring me his objections. After listening attentively to the expose of this officer, I interrogated him on the presumed force and posi- tions of General Hiller's corps on the side of Germany, and of the divisions of London, Dedowich, and Wukassowich, which covered the Italian Tyrol. Taking a coup d'oeil of this mass of the Great Alps between the Rhine and the Adige, I analyzed the different hypotheses which this vast theatre presented formy combinations, and then replied: "We shall carry, without opposition, this im- mense fortress of the Tyrol; it is necessary to maneuver on the flanks of the Austrians, to threaten their last point of retreat; they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will, in no respect, change my plans. Return immediately; I am about to break the armistice: Tell Macdonald that an army passes always, and in all seasons, wherever two men can place their feet: the army of the Grisons must be at the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the 268 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Adige," within fifteen days after the resumption of hostilities ; let the report of i'bs arms be heard on M'ount Tonal, .which separates them; and on reaching Trent, let it form the left of the army of Italy, and maneuver in concert with this last on the rear of Belle- garde. I shall be able to reinforce them as soon as necessary: it is not on the numerical force of an army, but rather on the object and importance of the operation, (that I estimate the importance of the command." BRILLIANT SUCCESS OF THE ARMY OF THE RHINE. Hostilities recommenced toward the end of November. A few days after, Moreau gained the decisive battle of Hohenlindeni The Archduke John, wishing to take the initiative, instead of awaiting us behind the formidable position of the Inn, threw him- self into the woody country between this 'river and the Iser, in or- der to debouch on Munich, while the corps of Klenau, with a good part of his cavalry, debouched by Ratisbon and joined him at Dachau. The Archduke, by Weyrother's advice, on the third of December, penetrated into the great forest of Hohenlinden in four columns. Three of these columns marched by roads difficult at best, but now rendered almost impassable by a deep snow. The principal column, composed of the center of the army with all the parks and reserves, passing along a fine road, debouched two hours before the others, on Anzing, fell into the midst of Moreau's divi- sion, and met a warm reception. By a chance not less fortunate, Richepanse, going into the forest, engaged the left of the Aus- trians, which had been much retarded, thus got possession of the road, and took the center of the Archduke en flagrant delit, by attacking him in reverse in a defile of which Moreau was disput- ing the outlet. Assailed on all sides in this coupe-gorge, the Arch- duke John, after having lost one hundred pieces of cannon and twelve thousand men, was exceedingly fortunate in regaining the Inn. This victory was so much the more fortunate as it had b^en gained without the right wing under Lecourbe, or the left under Collaud, taking part in it; Moreau had called them to him as soon as he heard of the march made by the enemy on the offensive, but they had not had time to arrive. The victorious army pur- sued with impetuosity the frightened foe. The heads of our ool- nmns, led on by Lecourbe, Richepanse, Decaen, young warriors, full of activity and ardor, scarcely waiting for repose, pursued the enemy with that vigor of which I had given an example in 1796. The imposing barrier of the Inn, notwithstanding the three tetes- de-pont which had been entrenched during the armistice, and the THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 269 fortified place of Brannau, could not arrest them more than a day. The faulty position of the enemy permitted Moreau to menace the right, and to pass the Inn on the extreme left near Rosenheim. The Austrians made a stiand in advance of Salzburg, and Le- courbe came near being engaged there alone on disadvantageous terms : his firmness gave ihim -time to remedy the evil. The Salza, the Traun, and the Enns were crossed with the same vigor. Richepanse operated with great skill, and succeeded in carrying off several of the enemy's rear guard. General Klenau, who had gone to cover Ratisbon with a pretty numerous corps, particularly in cavalry, paralyzed by the rout of the principal army, could do no better than to join General Simbechen and the legions of Bo- hemia, to fall upon the little .army of Augereau, who, after having reduced Wurtzburg and invested its citadel, was advancing toward Nuremberg. But the slight advantages gained by the Austrians on this secondary point did not prevent the main army from being driven back to St. Polten in the greatest disorder. Riohepanse, Deoaen, and Lecourbe in this short campaign cov- ered themselves with glory, particularly in the passages of the Inn and the Salza, and the combats of Sohwanstadt, Vocklabruck, and Lambach. The Archduke Charles took from the hands of his brother the command of a defeated and disheartened army, which in twenty days had lost twenty-five thousand men hors-de-combat.oue hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand carriages. Com- ing without reinforcements and without any. immediate hopes, how could he be expected to immediately restore confidence and victory? ARMISTICE OF STEYER. He proposed an armistice. Moreau had orders 'to consent to it only on condition that Aus- tria would agree to separate her cause from that of England, and to treat separately, and without delay. Forty-eight hours were required for an answer from Vienna; but Moreau refused to sus- pend his march, certain that the results of anterior movements would give him a number of prisoners and a quantity of baggage. Finally, the Cabinet of Vienna consented to everything, and Gen- eral Grune signed, on the twenty-third of December, an armistice at Steyer, for the army of Germany only. INACTION OF BRUNE. The army of Italy had remained wholly inactive. Brune had no interest in hurrying on affairs, for he was waiting for Macdonald and Murat. On the other side, Bellegarde, ignorant of the destination of the two last generals, waited only for a cessation of the autumnal rains to render his 270 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. movements less difficult in the lagunes of the Oglio and the lower Po. PASSAGE OF THE SPLUGEN. The army of the Orisons, obedient to my orders, rushed, full of ardor, across the snows and glaciers of the Spltigen, at an epoch when even the traveler trem- bles to expose himself there with all the ordinary precautions to secure his safety. Drifted masses of movable snow, concealing frightful precipices, threatening avalanches, and a thousand dan- gers of all descriptions, were insufficient to arrest the brave men accustomed to despise death. The columns, after extraordinary efforts, debouched at last on the smiling shores of Lake Como. But this was not all ; food was required, and the Valteline was in- capable of furnishing it; it was necessary to seek supplies for the army in Lombardy. Macdonald crossed the secondary and abrupt chains of the Col d'Apriga, less elevated than the Splugen, but more difficult, perhaps, for an army. He proposed to Brune to send him his left wing, in order to render more decisive his attack by the mountains. The latter feared that, by weakening his forces in the plain, he would expose himself to be defeated by Bellegarde; and if he were beaten and driven back behind the Adda, that the army of Macdonald would be lost in the gulfs of the Tyrol. In some respects both were right; it was well to act by the left, but not to act in a partial manner. If I had been there, I should have marched with my left and the corps-de-bataille to join Macdonald, and treat Bellegarde as I did Wurmser in 1796 at Bassano, leaving only a light corps on the Adige. Macdonald, piqued at Brune's refusal, went away to attack the Tonal, whose icy crests now bristled with the enemy's intrenchments, and was repulsed. OPERATIONS OF BRUNE. The passage of the Mincio took place on the twenty-fifth of December; it was to have been made near Monzambano; the right, under Dupont, was to make a sec- ondary attack at Volta. A delay caused a counter-order to be given to the center and left; Dupont did not receive it till he had effected his passage, and thus the demonstration became the main attack. This wing had to sustain all the efforts of Bellegarde against Pozzolo. Suchet came to his assistance without consult- ing Brune, and our troops maintained themselves, by miracle, on the left bank. The next day Brune passed at Monzambano; the enemy yielded every where to the efforts of our army, whose vic- torious march was retarded but for a moment by the Adige. The left, under Moncey, ascended the river by Roveredo. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1800 AND 1801. 271 JUNCTION OF THE ARMY OF THE GRISONS. Mac- donald, on his side, after having left the half of his little troop under Baraguey-d'Hilliers at the sources of the Adige, passed the rocks of fche Val d'Apriga, and descended on Breno, so as to com- municate with the brigade of Lecchi, which Brune had sent to meet him. Repulsed, as has been said, at the attack of the Tonal, he had to fall back by Pisogno and the Col de San-Zeno on Storo, cutting a passage through the thick ice, as he had done through the deep snows of the Spltigen. This short campaign was mem- orable, especially for the fatigue of all kinds which the troops sup- ported, and the natural obstacles overcome by their resignation, courage, and devotion. History will transmit it to posterity as one of the monuments of our glory. Macdonald, at last, effected his communication with Moncey on the fourth of January; on the seventh he debouched by the Col de Vesagno on Trent, where he was joined by Vandamme, who descended the valley of the Noss as soon as the enemy had evac- uated the Tonal. The right of Bellegarde, caught at Calliano between Moncey and Macdonald, seemed lost. General Laudon saved it by deceiving Moncey with a false report of an armistice. The Austrians passed by the Brenta to rejoin Bellegarde. Mon- cey, who thought to enter Trent in consequence of the arrange- ment made with Laudon, was greatly surprised to find Macdonald already there. Piqued at having been the dupe of so old a strata- gem, though almost always repeated with success, he followed Laudon and Wukassowich by the gorges of the Brenta. Macdon- ald followed, by Botzen, the trail of the Austrian division, which had covered the Grisons and the upper Adige, and which Bara- guey-d'Hilliers was pushing on Meran. He was on the point of surrounding it, when the armistice of Treviso tied his hands, at the very moment when he was about to collect at least some tro- phies of his hard and toilsome campaign. ARMISTICE OF TREVISO. Brune, who had advanced without energy to Treviso, took it upon himself to conclude an armistice, leaving Mantua to the Austrians and granting a free exit to the garrisons of the Forts of Verona, Legnago, Peschiera, and Ancona, which they evacuated tohim; this was a double folly; for Mantua was to become the decisive point of the coming nego- tiation with the Cabinet of Vienna, and the garrisons which he allowed to escape would soon have been compelled to surrender prisoners of war. I had foreseen this, and ordered Brune, three days before, not to treat without obtaining Mantua. This order reached him two days too late. This strange convention was so 272 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. much the more absurd on our part, as Murat was at this very moment descending into Lombardy, and arrived on the Po with a fine corps of the elite of twelve thousand men. I ordered Brune to immediately break this armistice, and push forward, at least till he obtained the cession of Mantu hostile object. I might have sent there twenty-five thousand men to assist the Porte in driving out the English, whose presence authorized me to do so ; but, whatever desire I might have had to estab- lish a colony there, I have not done so, because it was not worth the whik to troubk the peace of the world and make myself the aggressor, in order to conquer a country which must sooner or later fall into the hands of France, either by a dissolution of the Turkish Empire or by an arrange- ment with the Porte" These were indiscreet remarks, which the adroit Whitworth did not fail to repeat, and of which England took advantage in order to justify her own conduct. After showing him that I desired peace, I enumerated the reciprocal chances in a war: I frankly spoke of a descent and the dangers which it presented; but as there was at least one chance in a hundred, this would be sufficient for me to undertake it. I reminded him that I had four hundred and eighty thousand men in arms, ready at a moment's warning; that Europe no longer de- sired to ally itself with England, and to sacrifice itself for her in- terest; that, nevertheless, I desired peace. "I am the most pow- erful on land; you rule the seas: together, we can govern the world, but the least difference between us will involve the whole universe. If I had not, on every occasion, experienced the ani- mosity of England, I should have done every thing to conciliate her; participation in indemnities; continental influence; treaty of commerce ; I would have yielded every thing to a power which had shown me consideration and good will, while, on the contrary, I could yield nothing to implacable enemies." HOSTILE DECLARATION OF GEORGE III. This long conference was far from adjusting our differences: the English would see in it only my desire to colonize Egypt, as authorizing them to retain the possession of Malta, and to prepare to take the CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. 807 initiative in the war. The King's speech to Parliament on the eighth of March left no further dou'bt on this subject. The alle- gations contained in this declaration were unjust. Can distant and supposititious projects of one cabinet toward a province belong- ing to another be a legitimate cause for a rupture with a third? England can not deny that under Walpole and George I. she had designs upon South America: would this vague desire of her minister to form an establishment in South America have been a legitimate motive of rupture for France? NAPOLEON'S VIOLENT LANGUAGE TO THE ENGLISH MINISTER. I could not dissemble my resentment to Whit- worth at his next visit to the Tuileries; I addressed to him, per- haps with too much vivacity, the following words: "We have already carried on a war for ten years, and you wish it for ten years longer; you force me into it!" Then turning toward the other ambassadors, I said to them: "The English desire war; if they compel me to draw the sword, I shall not be the first to return it to the scabbard. // they will not respect treaties, they must be clothed in black" Thinking that perhaps I had gone too far, 1 again addressed Whitworth in these terms: "Why all these war- like preparations? against whom are these armaments? I have not a single ship-of-the-line in the ports of France; if you wish to fight, I shall fight; you may destroy France, but you will never intimidate her. You say that you desire peace; then execute your treaties. Woe to those who will not respect treaties; they shall answer for the consequences to all Europe." I here broke off the conference, lest my feelings should carry me too far. ENGLISH ULTIMATUM REJECTED. Nevertheless, my ministers haying offered to agree to any arrangement that might satisfy the English respecting Egypt, they feigned to give up Malta as their own property, but reserved to themselves the right of occupying this place for ten years! Moreover they demanded, 1st, that the island of Lampedosa should be ceded to England by the King of Naples; 2d, that my troops should evacuate Holland and Switzerland ; 3d, that an indemnity in Italy should be secured to the King of Sardinia. On these conditions they would recog- nize the King of Etruria and the Ligurian Republic. Firm in my resolution not to deviate from the conditions of the treaty of Amiens, I rejected these separate articles, and a new resort to arms became the consequence. I confess that this was exposing much for a little gain; but could I, without disgrace and without 908 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. danger, admit these propositions, which perhaps, after all, were not sincere?* MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NAPLES. I conld not carry on a war without securing, in compensation for the colonies which I would lose, some maritime country which might enable us to sus- tain this contest. To anticipate the enemy in the occupation of the presqu'ile of Tarentum, and to close the ports of the peninsula against the English commerce, I directed my troops to reSnter the kingdom of Naples. Saint-Cyr concluded a new convention to this effect, and occupied the Abruzzos. INVASION OF HANOVER. My troops, reinforced in Hol- land, crossed the Rhine, and, under Mortier, took possession of Hanover. The Hanoverian troops collected to the number of about fifteen thousand on the lower Elbe, capitulated at Alten- burg, and were disbanded on condition of returning peaceably to their own homes. EFFECT OF THESE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE. These movements were certainly to our advantage, but they gave offense to the other powers; Russia had some interest in the fate of Hol- land, and Austria was not pleased to see the Gtermanic soil vio- lated by the invasion of Hanover. But as the Cabinet of Vienna knew that we were at war with King Greorge, it could not object to reprisals upon his states; it therefore contented itself with ex- changing some insignificant diplomatic notes. The peace of Lune>ille, although imposed on Austria, left her so powerful that she had no desire to risk the uncertain chances of a new war. Thugut had resigned the ministry to Cobentzel, a statesman of more moderation ; and I could hope to maintain with this court our *English writers have sought for *>very possible pretext to justify their government in refusing to execute the treaty of Amiens, and in again dis- turbing the peace of Europe. But even Alison now admits that France was not chargeable with renewing the war. He says: "In coolly review- ing the circumstances under which this contest was renewed, it is Impossi- ble to deny that the British government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that so far as the two countries were concerned, they [the English] were the aggressors." Napier says: "Up to the peace of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive; for the bloody contest that wasted the continent for so many years was not a struggle for preeminence between ambitious pow- ers not a dispute for some accession of territory nor for the political ascendency of one of other nation but a deadly conflict to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments" Thlers, in his "Consulate and Empire," has discussed at great length, and with great fairness, all the circumstances attending the rupture of the peace of Amiens. CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. 309 relations of amity. Prussia had no motive to violate her neutral- ity. Russia observed me, and interposed in favor of Holland, Naples, and the King of Sardinia. Italy was nearly in accord with my system. NEW RELATIONS WITH SPAIN. Spain had some objec- tions to take part in a new war which might injure her ports and her colonies; she thought to avoid the conditions of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and preserve her neutrality. This subject was dis- cussed from the sixth of June to the middle of October, 1803. I was not anxious, at the time, that the Spanish navy should unite with ours, and I was not unwilling that the commerce of Spain should prosper under shelter of her neutrality, for France would always receive a greater part of the profits. But, in order not to renounce the advantages which France might derive from the treaty, I substituted for the stipulated contingent an annual sub- sidy of sixty millions, which was agreed upon in the convention of Madrid, on the nineteenth day of October, between Beurnonville and Cevallos, the minister of foreign affairs. ENGLAND PROVOKES HER TO DECLARE WAR. Eng- land got an intimation of this treaty, for she soon assumed a threatening tone. In fact, this state of things did not suit the British ministry; it required, according to the absolute neutrality of Spain, at least the admission of English commerce Into her continental ports; if she were to be excluded from these, war would be preferable. The negotiation continued one year, and assumed a hostile character as soon as the ministry had learned, through Admiral Cochrane, that a squadron of ten or twelve French vessels from St. Domingo, which had taken refuge in Fer- rol, were to be armed and repaired in that port, and that the Span- iards were preparing for hostilities. The war party had, at London, many advocates. The decline of the Spanish marine dispensed with the fear of any serious in- jury from its hostility; it added little to the material forces of France, but, during the war, all the possessions of Spanish Amer- ica would be at the mercy of English expeditions, or of English agents who would there foment the spirit of independence; the vessels and galleons would become the prey of their cruisers and their armed vessels. This interest was too evident not to lead to a rupture. The Cabinet of London gave orders to its vessels to attack the Spanish, and several frigates returning from Mexico, with from fifteen to twenty millions in piastres or ingots of gold, were attacked and captured by Admiral Moore, without any previous declaration of war. This was pronounced piracy; Eng- 810 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. land sought to justify herself on the grounds that Spain was an ally of France, and furnished her assistance. Spain now formally declared war, which she had vainly hoped to avoid by preserving amicable relations with the English government. PORTUGAL PURCHASES HER NEUTRALITY. Portu- gal had also purchased her neutrality by an annual tribute of six- teen millions, stipulated by the treaty of December twenty-fifth, at Lisbon, between General Lannes and the Portuguese minister. The rest of Europe were equally on good terms with us. To draw still closer the bonds of friendship with the United States of America, I ceded to them Louisiana for the sum of seventy mil- lions. I preferred placing it in their hands to running the risk of its falling into those of the English, on account of its vicinity to the United States and Mexico, from which countries I also de- sired to exclude British commerce. GREAT SUCCESS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA. Hardly had the war commenced, when England began to gather the fruits of her former conquests. She doubled her power in the East by the conquest of Hindoostan. The death of Tippoo had rid her of a dangerous rival; but there was still a more powerful adversary, in the Mahratta race the celebrated' Schindiah. He had just regained the power over the Mohammedan caste of Schah-Alloun : he, in fact, held the sceptre of Mogol. So long as this empire existed, the English power would be doubtful. The capitulation of the French army in Egypt had, it is true, diminished this dan- ger. No sooner was this known in India, than Wellesley was em- boldened to attack the army of Schindiah. According to the cus- tom of this Company, it now supported the interests of the Mussul- mans against the Mahrattas, as it had formerly sustained the in- terests of the natives and of the Nizam against the Mussulman Tippoo. The troops which had been disciplined by Peyron on European principles deserted the Mahratta prince, who was de- feated by Lake and Wellington in the decisive battle of Assey. Delhi and Agra fell into the power of the English, who, masters of the rich empire of Mogol, at length extended their dominion over forty millions of Hindoos. This event furnishes the best apology that can be given for my expedition to Egypt, the main object of which was to prevent this result; unfortunately, this blow was irreparable, and, al- though under Louis XVI. it would have furnished a subject for desperate war with England, I had not the means of opposing it, so much were circumstances changed. Besides, these vexatious events were not known in Europe till the beginning of 1803, at the CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. 811 moment that England proclaimed the rupture of the peace of Amiens. General Decaen, whom I had sent to take possession of the Isle of France and the poor trading establishment of Pondi- cherry, could do no great thing in the midst of that colossal power; he was soon constrained to abandon this feeble post on the continent, and to limit himself to the defense of the Isle of France. CHANCES OF A DESCENT UPON ENGLAND. The con- tinent exhibiting as yet no symptoms of an immediate attack upon France, I profited by the occasion to menace England with inva- sion. Although difficult, this operation has always been regarded as possible; the descent once made, the capture of London was almost certain. The capital once occupied, a powerful party would be created against the oligarchy. Perhaps we should have encountered some dangers; but Hannibal, in crossing the Alps, or Caesar, in landing in Epirus, in Africa, or in England > did they look back? London is but a few miles from Calais; the English army, scattered along the coast, could not unite in time to cover the capital. Of course this expedition could not be attempted by a mere corps-d'armee; but its success was pretty cer- tain with one hundred and fifty thousand men presenting them- selves before London within five days after landing. Flotillas were the only means by which these one hundred and fifty thou- sand' men could be landed in a few hours, and possession be gained of all the shallow waters. It was under protection of a squadron collected in the Antilles, and coming from there with all sail to Boulogne, that this passage was to be effected. If this reunion of the squadron could not be accomplished one year, it might another year. Fifty vessels sailing from Toulon, Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient, Cadiz, would unite at Martinique. Their departure would make England tremble for the two Indies, and while the British fleets were in search of them at the Cape of Good Hope and in the sea of the Antilles, those vessels would unite before Boulogne and secure the landing upon the English coast Ten hours only would be required for landing one hundred and fifty thousand disciplined and victorious soldiers, upon a coast destitute of fortifications and undefended by a regular army. It has been thought that English patriotism would have caused a levee-en-masse for the defense of their country, and that the retreat of my army would have been impossible. This patriotism would have been an obstacle under any circumstances, but preceded by a declaration of democratic principles, we should have found parti- sans enough in England to effect a disunion, sufficient to paralyze the rest of the nation. If the system of propagandism was ever 312 LIFE OP NAPOLEON. an instrument of success, it certainly would have been on this occasion. But experience alone could decide this question; it has never been tried. A motive more powerful than the difficulty of its execution might have prevented me from attempting this enterprise; this was the equivocal situation of my relations with the continent, and especially with Russia. Austria, at the instigation of Russia or England, might renew the war the moment that I should set foot on the British Isles, and we might, by this doubtful expedi- tion, lose the fruits of ten years of victory. It is certain that such an expedition would never be prudent, without the alliance of one of these powers, and this consideration contributed not a little to my marriage some years afterwards. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS DESCENT. At all events, as the menace would cost nothing, since I had no other employment for my troops, I could garrison them on the coast as well as any- where else. This simple demonstration would compel England to make defensive preparations at a ruinous expense. This would be so much gained. In 1803 and 1804 I covered with camps the coasts of Boulogne, Dunkirk, and Ostend; consider- able squadrons were prepared at Brest, Rochefort. and Toulon; the shipyards of France were covered with prams, shallops, gun- boats, and other craft; and innumerable hands were employed in preparing the ports of the channel for receiving these flotillas. On the other side, England prepared for the contest. Pitt, far from being discouraged by the imminence of the danger^ deemed it his duty to resume the reins of government under these difficult circumstances: he did not confine himself to his famous bill of defense (June 18th, 1804), but, leaving the peaceful duties of the exchequer, he put on the military uniform, and dreamed only of machines of war, battalions, forts, batteries. The aged and venerable George TIT, left the royal mansion, and daily re- viewed his troops; camps were formed on the downs of Dover, and in the counties of Kent and Sussex. The English army, which in 1792 had numbered only seventy thousand men, was suc- cessively increased to one hundred and fifty thousand, including the regular militia, but exclusive of the forces employed without the limits of the three kingdoms. The public danger had caused three hundred thousand volunteers (fencibles) to be organized in regiments. Independently of a naval force of four hundred and seventy vessels, a flotilla of eight hundred guns covered the coasts- of England and Ireland. The two armies were in sight of each other; they were separated only by the narrow strait. The CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. 813 preparations cost England dear, but it must be confessed that they revived the military spirit of the inhabitants, and prepared them for fighting me on land. EXTRAORDINARY PLOTS AGAINST NAPOLEON. Notwithstanding these immense preparations for defense, the English ministers were apprehensive of the result of my menaces; to make a diversion, plots were organized against me. In order to have a greater chance of success, they put in motion a multi- tude of conspirators. But we were informed of them in twenty- four hours, so rapidly are such secrets carried. But as I wished only to punish those who should commit a state offense, I was obliged to wait till indisputable proofs could be collected against them. Pichegrn was at the head of this machination : this man, who had more bravery than talents, wished to act the part of a Monk; it suited his character. These projects gave me little trou- ble, for I knew their extent, and that public opinion at that epoch was against them. Had the royalists succeeded in capturing and murdering me, they would have been no nearer their object. There is a time for all things. Factions, although still stirring, had lost their force; the fear which they had of each other had attached all reasonable men to my cause. The royalist chiefs, wholly forgotten since the pacification of La Vendee, now sought to reappear on the political horizon. This was the natural conse- quence of the increase of my authority. I was rebuilding a mon- archy; this was intrenching on their grounds. They supposed that my monarchy was the same as theirs. Mine rested wholly on great achievements ; theirs on hereditary rights. Theirs was founded wholly on ancient usages; mine had no connection with these; it moved in unison with the spirit of the age; theirs made useless efforts to check that spirit. The republicans were alarmed at the height to which circumstances raised me: they feared the use that I might make of this power. They trembled lest I might rebuild the old royalty by the aid of my army. The royalists be- lieved this report, and took pleasure in representing me as a fool- ish imitator of the old monarchs. Others, more adroit, reported that I was restoring the institutions of the country merely to pre- sent France to the Bourbons, as soon as it could be prepared for an offering. Mediocre minds, who were incapable of appreciating me, gave faith to these rumors. This caused the increase of the royalist party, and injured me in the estimation of the people and of the army; both began to doubt my attachment to their cause. This opinion was calculated to produce disunion. It was neces- sary to undeceive, at any cost, France, the royalists, and the rest 814 LIFB OF NAPOLEON. of Europe, with respect to my intentions. To attack these designs in detail would have produced only an ill effect, because it would not have reached the root of the evil. Moreover, this could not be done. I soon learned that Moreau was connected with these con- spirators. It was necessary to deal carefully with this man, for he had an immense popularity. It was important to gain him over to my side. His reputation was too great for us to live as good neighbors. The plan of the campaign of 1800, which he did not understand, or was un-willing to appreciate, had thrown between us the apple of discord and unveiled his pretensions. He deemed himself too important a character to give passive obedience to me. It was necessary to find some fair means of separating him from me: he chose to effect this by taking every opportunity of censur- ing the measures of .my government, and by rejecting all my ad- vances to attach him to my party. It has been said that I was jealous of him: this was untrue; but he was very jealous of me. I esteemed him as a good soldier; he had as partisans all who were jealous of me, and they were numerous. These men would have made a hero of him had he perished; I wished him to be no more than he really was a sec- ond-rate man. In this I was perfectly successful: his absence effected his ruin; his friends forgot him, and he was no longer thought of. THE DUKE D'ENGHEIN. But an incident of much greater importance was connected with this famous proces. My exterior police had received positive information of a plot formed against me at London by Georges, Pichegru, and other royalist agents, and at the same time, at Stuttgart, by an English agent, named Drake. The relation between these projects was not fully proved. At the same epoch, the Duke d'Enghein appeared on the borders of the Rhine, and it was said that Dumouriez had just arrived there. This created a great stir among Fouch6's people; to them there seemed no doubt that this prince was the soul of the whole plot; if such were not the case, would a Bourbon prince show him- self at the gates of Strasbourg, on neutral soil it is true, but where he must inevitably encounter great danger? Could it be otherwise than that his presence there, and that of Georges and Pichegru at Paris, was a concerted affair? By concentrating the Revolution in myself, I had rendered more easy the project of its overthrow. It seemed to them that, the First Consul being dis- posed of, they had only to present the white flag to effect a restora- tion. In this they were mistaken: nevertheless, all the circum- CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804- 818 stances of this event tallied wonderfully with those which were urging me to determine definitely the opinion of France. The desire of pleasing me incited the chiefs of the secret police to unravel this plot. Some letters which had been seized contained sufficient information to determine me to seize this prince, convinced, by the reports which I had received, that we should find in his papers a thousand proofs of his projects. It was important, on one side, to silence the clamors of the party who had wished the Revolution without anarchy, but who now feared a royalist reaction, and, on the other side, to check the royalist chiefs from inciting new troubles in France. I there- fore resolved to strike a decisive blow, which was indispensable to fix the opinion of the two millions of Frenchmen who had ad- hered to and fought for the Revolution. Orders were therefore dispatched to Strasbourg to send a small column, in the night, to Kehl, to surround the village of Ettenheim and seize the Duke d'Enghein,and all other foreigners found at Offenburg, and conduct them to Paris. My aid-de-camp, Caulaincourt, was the bearer of these orders, and was directed to justify their execution to the Grand Duke of Baden, upon whose territory these captures were to be made. Dumouriez was not there; they had been deceived in the names, the Count Thumeri was mistaken for him. In all other respects the orders were for- tunately executed. The police continued to give assurances of a grand plot, and the capture of several trunks of papers which would prove every thing. I designed to establish a high national court, forming it of a part of the Senate, the chief magistrates, and the highest of- ficers of the army, and to get from it a deliberate and solemn judg- ment I gave orders to this effect. Colonel Pre>al of the cuir- assiers, an officer of distinction, was called from Compiegne, to make a report of the affair in conformity with existing laws. As his father had once been under the Duke d'Enghein, colonel of the same regiment, he very properly declined the duty. In the mean time the police had examined the papers of the prince ; they found no proof of the conspiracy. It was now necessary to renounce the idea of a solemn judgment by a high national court, for the acquittal of the prince would only increase the odium of violating the territory of the Empire. There were two courses still to pur- sue: the first and most reasonable one was to detain him, as a measure of state policy, till the general peace, on the charge of in- citing troubles in Alsace; the second, of giving him up to a mili- tary commission to be tried as an emigre who had taken up arms 816 LIFE OP NAPOLEON. against France, and, should he be acquitted by the commission, to retain him till the close of the war. On the advice of the principal functionaries, I adopted this last course. It has been seen that in this affair I was led on by a kind of fatality; for if I had known that no trace of a conspiracy would have been found, of course I should have avoided violating the territory of Baden, an action that would appear against me whatever were the issue. The fatal reports of my secret police produced all the evil. If the trunks of papers which were announced by the police had been taken, and the guilt of the prince had been proved before a high national court, all would have been in accordance with the strict- est justice toward the accused, and my first design. It is well known that this military commission condemned the prince, on his own confession, for invading, in 1793, the terri- tory of France, with an armed band. It is also well known that I was left ignorant of the appeal which lie made to me, and also of the letter which he wrote to me, till after the execution of the sentence of the court, which, according to military usage, takes place during the session of the court. I was left ignorant of the afflicting details which accompanied this catastrophe; it is enough to be responsible for the principal event his capture and trial. In this I was drawn on by the perfidious suggestions of my admirers, by false reports, and by the force of events. Con- sidered as a coup-d'etat, this was calculated to strike terror among the partisans of the restoration of the ancient monarchy, to si- lence internal discords, and to give to three millions of French- men, who had raised me to power, a pledge of an eternal rupture with the Bourbons.* The trial of Moreau and the conspirators was conducted with more formality, and was prolonged for several months. Morean was banished. The other criminals required a severer punish- ment. They were all old offenders, often engaged in conspiracy, and it was necessary, once for all, to purge France of these char- acters. In this we succeeded, for these plots ended here. Pichegru was found strangled in his bed. Some did not fail to say that this was by my orders. I was totally a stranger to this *This account of the execution of the Duke d'Enghein is free from the passions and prejudices which disfigure so many of the pretended his- tories of the affair. Alison is entirely carried away by his prejudices and his desire to fix the whole blame of this unfortunate affair upon Napoleon. His account resemble* that of a feed lawyer endeavoring to make out his case, more than that of an historian seeking for truth. Any one must be convinced of this by comparing Alison's quotations from Savairy with Sayary'ei own account. CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. 317 event. It would be difficult to conceive why I should snatch this criminal from judgment He was no better than the others, and the tribunals were there to judge him, I have never in the whole course of my life done any thing without some object.* GOVERNMENT NECESSARY FOR FRANCE. These events produced much discussion on the course which I ought to pursue at this decisive epoch. Each one made comments accord- ing to his own views : some wished me to destroy the hydra of the Revolution and prepare a bed of roses for the return of the Bour- bons; others wished me to connect the interests of the Revolution with my own, as First Consul for life, which, in their opinion, would have secured the Republic and Liberty, and at the same time have given a suitable stability to the first magistracy. Had this question concerned myself alone, I should have been well satisfied to remain at the head of the state, with the title I then held; but it was one which concerned the interests of France, and I loved France too well to form for her an elective government which would be more dangerous even than the recall of the Bourbons. An elective government gives place to eternal convulsions. These elections lead to civil wars, and open the way for foreign influence. It is fortunate if each new consul does not cause the loss of a province, a colony, and a portion of the national independence. If England had been elective after Crom- well, Louis XIV. and the Stuarts would have subjugated the country and divided it between them. Many thousand volumes have been written on the maxims of government, and on the institutions most suitable to be adopted by states; but really there has been but very little new on this subject since the time of Xenophon. These controversies will probably continue to agitate the world for a long time, for thes** discussions are not carried on in good faith on the one side, nor by men of experience on the other. The impracticable theorists Alison's account of the trial and death of Pichegru is also full of the grossest errors and misrepresentations. He says it "was impossible that Pichegru committed suicide. "Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that Its prospect had hardly ever led to self-destruction." All- son seems to have forgotten his own description of the Reign of Terror and of the 'horrors of the "Revolutionary army." "To such a degree did the torture of suspense prey upon the minds of the prisoners that they became not only reckless of life, but anxious for death." "If a knock was heard at the door, every one. in agonized suspense, expected his fate. Unable to endure such protracted misery, numbers committed suicide." "The love of life was almost extinguished In every heart," etc., etc. This, however, Is only one of the numerous instances In which Alison contradicts, himself. 818 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. would risk every thing else for a chimerical hope of what they call enlarging the liberties of the people; a phrase which each one interprets to best suit his own interests or passions. Some of these mad theorists have believed in the possibility of a government wholly of the people, or in a pure democracy. Others have preferred an aristocratic government, under the patrician form in republics, and under the form of nobility in monarchies. These have their Jacobins who, under the mask of defending public prerogatives against the throne, merely defend their own feudal privileges at the expense of the administrative power. Such were the Senate of Stockholm, the Polish Diets, and the French Parlements. A third party advocate absolute power. They either think this best for the direction of public affairs, or, like the ambitious priests, they advocate it as the best means of enlarging their own authority. Much may be deduced, both from history and reason, in favor of each of these forms. Democracy exists only where the people choose their rulers directly from their own ranks, and where these chiefs return immediately to this rank at the expiration of their office. This government has never existed but in name, or in small states, peculiarly situated; even at Borne it was merely temporary. The people, led on by ambitious demagogues, have always in a very short time fallen into the hands of the aristocracy. In Europe at this day, no great state exists with this form of govern- ment; even the little Swiss cantons can barely sustain them- selves; past experience in Europe tends to prove the truth of Cor- neille's verses: "Mais quand le peupie est maitre on n'agit qu'en tumulte, La voix de la ralson Jamais ne so consulte; Les honneurs sent vendns aux plus ambitleux, L'autoritfi Iivr6e aux plus sfidltleux," etc. A republic has no means of escaping great dangers but in form- ing an absolute power, like that of the Committee of Public Safety; there is no man of sense who would not prefer a mon- archy of limited authority, but strongly organized, to such a power. Theorists refer to the United States as proof that these evils are not necessary to a republican form of government. To this it may be replied that the weakness of the American govern* ment was such in 1814. that, with ten millions of inhabitants, it suffered the disgrace of having its capital captured and sacked by a single division of troops coming by sea! This fact would seem good proof of the want of internal strength in such a government. The United States, with a strong government, would ere this have CAMPAIGNS FROM 1802 TO 1804. MS become masters of the whole American continent, or, at least, of all north of Panama. Bat, be this as it may, no comparison can be formed between that country and France : their situations are essentially different. A nation which has for neighbors only weak tribes of Indians, or European provinces separated from their central governments by three thousand miles of ocean, has nothing to fear from its ene- mies: it will be the dominant power, whatever may be the ele- ments of its government. But the United States, placed in the center of Europe, could not have existed ten years after the peace of 1783. With a new and unprejudiced people, laborious, agri- cultural, free from proletaires, without a nobility, having no dangerous neighbors with such a people a democratic regime may flourish. But this case is very essentially different from Prance at the period of which I am speaking. Spartans and Ro- mans can not be immediately formed of an old monarchy. An aristocracy has the advantage of a government more strong and concentrated, but it is always egotistical, exclusive, jealous. A monarch ennobles plebeian merit, but an aristocrat treats it with contempt; a patrician of Berne or of Venice is more vain and exclusive than a duke, or a peer, or\a grandee of Spain. Besides, with an elective aristocracy a great state is exposed to almost certain ruin. How many civil wars have resulted in Germany from the elections of its emperors? How often has Prance, Rus- sia, and Sweden given kings to Poland under its elective system? A hereditary monarchical government holds the reins of state with a firmer grasp, is most capable of effecting internal tranquillity, and of carrying out, with a stronger hand, a good system of external policy: it is, therefore, best suited to a great nation, placed in the center of Europe. The rise or the fall of empires is never the immediate result of internal disorders, or of institutions more or less popular: this comes from external relations. The Greek Empire, with itt effeminate emperors and its scullion nobility, might still exist, if Mahomet It. had never come to Constantinople; the degenerate Romans might still govern Italy with their base princes and bad laws, if the Attilas and Genserics and Theodorics had never en- tered there; Poland might still enjoy its anarchy and its liberum veto, if its neighbors had never parceled out its territory among themselves. Exterior policy is, therefore, the most important consideration of all, in forming the government of a state. Prom these considerations, I concluded that the government best suited for France, in 1804, was a strong hereditary govern- 320 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. ment, of a single individual, administered with reference to the general interest of the nation, and not for the advantage of a priv- ileged coterie; this head of the nation to be assisted by consulting assemblies (assemblies consultatives), which should have all the power requisite for a good council, but not sufficient to enable them to arrest the car of state for the sake of Utopian theories or personal ambition. To this fundamental basis was to be added: 1st. A well-matured system of election, which would secure a proper system of representation in the Chamber of Communes, giving a suitable influence, in the making of laws, to the inter- ests of property, industry, and the a/dministration. It is absurd to suppose that any administration can proceed when it is de- prived of all influence in the discussion of laws. 2d. The equality of all citizens in the eye of the law, and in their eligibility to the public offices. 3d. A nobility, or rather a notability, for life, founded on services rendered to the state, admitting no hereditary nobility but the peerage of the eldest sons of chiefs who, by illustrious vic- tories or eminent statesmanship, have acquired claims to the na- tional gratitude; and even limiting this peerage to three genera- tions, so as to keep the ranks open for new services, and to com- pel the sons of peers to earn their own importance. 4th. The independence of the tribunals (courts), and guaran- tees of individuals, except in cases of high treason. 5th. A good penal code for the press, and a tribunal of cen- sure composed of just and worthy men, not subject to removal from office. 6th. A national religion entirely independent of any foreign priesthood. Of course this system was imperfect, for all human systems are so; but such a government I deemed best suited to the condi- tion of France in 1804; calculated, at the same time, to promote the security and grandeur of the nation, anwere filing past, I consoled them on the vicissi- tudes of war; I deplored the blindness of the cabinet which had sent them to their destruction for the interest of England alone. Entirely devoted to my projects of making a descent on England, I asked nothing of Austria; it was vessels, colonies, commerce that I wanted. What interest then could Austria have in shield- ing from my blows a power which caused all the troubles of tho continent? So far it was well enough, 'but, drawn on by my sub- ject, I accompanied these remarks with some indirect threats against this imperial house: "Every empire," said I, "has its end, and the Emperor may have reason to fear that the time of 386 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the House of Lorraine has already come." I had good reason to speak proudly after events so glorious, which were entirely due to the skillfulness of my combinations; but this sentiment had no suitable place in my discourse. I wished to give the alarm at Vienna and to dictate peace. I have always been full of con- fidence in my superiority, but I was never blinded by pride. Nevertheless, this sortie, made for a pardonable object, gave of- fense by its phraseology, and I felt that it might as well have been omitted. FATE OF THE WRECK OF MACK'S ARMY. Of Mack's entire army, the corps of Kienmayer, the Archduke Ferdinand, with three thousand horse, and the division of Jellachich, had alone been able to avoid destruction; this last division, having escaped from Ulm on the road to Fussen, and, stopping to guard these defiles of the Tyrol, was also soon surrounded. The Arch- duke, after having abandoned Werneck to his fate, followed at first the road to Nuremberg, then fell back on Altmuhl and Donawerth, to gain the road to Cham. He directed his rear guard to take the road to Nuremberg in order to deceive Murat; he thus succeeded in effecting his escape, and reached Bohemia with two or three thousand horse. Posterity, more enlightened than we are respecting the com- binations of Mack and of the Cabinet of Vienna, will assign to each the blame which properly belongs to them. It has been said that Mack had in his army a party more powerful than him- self, and that he was opposed and disobeyed, and his army scat- tered in spite of himself. This is all very possible; but a general- in-chief should never consent to become the instrument of the destruction of his army; when placed between dishonor and glory, between the safety of the state and the loss of his army, he should be capable of taking a part worthy of himself. Mack, after being shut up within Ulm, might at least have attempted a sortie to fol- low Jellachich toward Fussen; it is always shameful to capitulate without an effort to escape. An army of eighty thousand men was thus destroyed at a sin- gle blow without any great battle, and without its having cost me six thousand men. This commencement of the campaign was truly brilliant, but nothing could be decisive until we had beaten the Russians, who were approaching by forced marches to the assistance of their allies. Even before Mack had surrendered Ulm, I directed Soult to march for Landsberg and Munich; Lannes and Murat took the same direction immediately after the /defeat of the Archduke Ferdinand. V CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 867 PRUSSIA THREATENS TO JOIN THE COALITION. Not- withstanding all our successes, my position was becoming more complicated. The King of Prussia, who, on the eighth of Sep- tember, had ordered out sixty battalions and as many squadrons to make demonstrations against the Russians on the Vistula, had just received the news of the violation of his territory of Anspach by our troops. The policy of the last ten years is in- stantly abandoned; a general cry for vengeance is raised in all his monarchy. The Prussian cabinet orders the formation of four corps at Hof, Heldesheim, Miinster, and the reserve at Ber- lin. One division enters Hanover, now abandoned by the troops of Bernadotte, and reestablishes there the government of the Elector; at the same time notes are addressed to me demanding satisfaction for the violation of neutral territory. Nevertheless, the entire destruction of Mack's army suspends for a moment this warlike order of Prussia. I rather expected this result; I felt certain of the success of my operations as soon as Mack had taken position near Ulm, and I thought, in authorizing the march of my troops, that I should have plenty of time and means to satisfy Frederick William, should my plan succeed. NAPOLEON DIRECTS HIS FORCES ON THE INN. To scatter the storm. which was gathering about us, it was more urgent than ever to profit by the immense advantages which I had just gained, and the ascendency which they were calculated to give me over the first Russian army, which, by the disaster of Mack, was to be exposed in the same manner to our blows. In fact, Kutusof had just arrived with forty thousand men at Braunau on the Inn, where he formed a junction with the corps of Kien- mayer which Bernadotte and Wrede had pursued and cut up in two combats. General Merfeldt had joined it with some rein- forcements and taken the command. The first movement of the enemy was to advance on Haag; but the news of the capitulation of Ulm did not long leave them under the comfortable illusion of being able to resume the offensive. I had no sooner finished the directions for sending our prisoners to France, and for for- tifying Augsburg sufficiently to secure it against an attack, with a good tete-de-pont on the Lech, than I left post-haste, on the even- ing of the twenty-fourth, for Munich. After remaining here three days, I hastened to the Inn with the well-founded hope of treating Kutusof as I had done his predecessor. Of course I ex- pected a greater resistance, but the disproportion of the means was such that I could not doubt the result Soult and Marmont had also taken the road to the Inn. Lannes, whom the sur- 868 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. render of Werneck had rendered disposable, soon fell back on Bavaria, and Murat, although he had gone to Nuremberg in pur- suit of the wrecks of Prince Ferdinand, threw himself with his usual activity by Neumarkt on Ratisbon, and arrived, almost as soon as I did, on the Inn. PASSAGE OF THE INN, THE SALZA, AND THE TRAUN. Augereau had passed the Rhine at Hunigen on the twenty- sixth of October; I left to this marshal and Ney, in concert with the Bavarian division of General Deroi, the task of destroying the corps remaining in the Tyrol. Every thing being prepared for the passage of the Inn, we advanced, on the twenty-eighth of Oc- tober, in three columns. Bernadotte, sustained by Marmont, passed at Wa/sserburg, and directed himself on Salzburg, whose defense had been assigned to the corps of Merfeldt. Da- voust found the Russians at the bridge of Mtihldorf, which they had burned; he restored it and reached the Salza at Burghausen; but, having no bridge for passing this river, he was obliged to stop and repair the one which had been destroyed ; this gave the Allies two days' march the start of him. The reserve and Soult fol- lowed the same road. Lannes, at the left, marched from Land- shut on Braunau. Everywhere the enemy, seeing the danger to which he would be exposed by a general engagement, retired before our columns, after exchanging a few rounds of cannon. He evacuated, without resistance, the post of Braunau, whose bastioned enciente had not even been armed, so confident had the Austrians been of invading France, instead of seeing us at Vienna. Braunau was an excellent post for securing a base on the Inn, in concert with Salzburg, which also was respectably fortified, although its works were commanded by the surrounding heights. We might then regard the Salza and the Inn as an excellent base of operations, since Bavaria, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and all the in- terval to the Rhine was within our possession or in our favor. Having passed the Sajza and the Inn, Murat took the lead of the pursuit with his cavalry; on the twenty-ninth, he had an en- gagement at Ried with the rear guard of Kienmayer; the thirty- first, a more serious affair took place at Lambach ; we here found ourselves engaged, for the first time, with the Russian infantry; a corps of four thousand men wished to keep their possession on this side of the Traun, in order to give their equipages time to pass this defile. The division of Bisson assailed them; the Sev- enteenth of the line wished to avenge itself for the affair of Tre- bia, and it did so with glory; it nevertheless found worthy ad- versaries; it was only after a severe fight, in which Bisson was CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 369 wounded, that the enemy, while beginning the retreat, saw him- self driven back with great loss. NAPOLEON'S MARCH ON VIENNA. I resolved to pursue my march on Vienna. Certain critics have blamed this; they think I should have rested on the Inn till I could collect new forces; they do not hesitate to pronounce my march on Austerlitz an extravagance. The principal reason given for this opinion is that a Prussian army was threatening to move on the upper Danube. For the satisfaction of these critics, I will say that I always fully considered these movements. Time was requisite for an army to come from Berlin to Ulm, especially as this army had begun to move against the Russians on the Vistula, and, benumbed by ten years' peace, was incapable of immediately tak- ing the field. The rule of war the most indisputable is, to strike an enemy who is unprepared. Kutusof had exposed himself to my blows, and it was necessary to punish him. By remaining on the Inn, I should have permitted the Archduke Charles, Ferdi- nand, Kienmayer, and Kutusof to unite in upper Austria with the army of Alexander, and two (hundred thousand men, well pro- vided with every thing, would then have been opposed to me; with- out including the Prussians, whom my position on the Inn would not have prevented from advancing to the upper Danube. Might they not as well have advised me to return to Strasbourg? In fact, if I had remained at Passau, there was nothing to oppose the march of the Duke of Brunswick by Nuremberg on Ulm. To prevent such an operation it was necessary either to retreat be- hind the Rhine, or to anticipate the enemy by attacking the Rus- sians; the one course was disgraceful, the other glorious; there could be no hesitation. I judged more wisely than my critics in deciding that it was for my interest to fight successively those distant corps. I was superior in battles; I ought therefore to seek them. If I lost a battle, I might then fall back to the Dan- ube or subinit to the mediation of Prussia, whom I should then render arbiter of negotiations. By occupying Vienna, I would intimidate Berlin; I would profit by the immense resources of Austria; I would destroy all concert between the Russian army and that of the Archduke Charles; I would become master of all the movements. It re- quires a very strong desire for aspersion to draw conclusions as false as those who have censured me for this project. If the Prussians marched into Swabia, the Archduke Charles into up- per Austria, and the Emperor Alexander on the Danube, to take position on the Inn was to select a point such that all these three 94 370 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. masses might concert their actions and from some common object. Grant that this position had been advisable, if the motive had been to secure ourselves from being turned by the Prussians; but then we should have been turned on the Inn, as well as at Vienna, after the enemy had placed himself on the upper Danube and on our communications with France. Besides, when I decided to march on Vienna, I did n*ot yet know what part Prussia would take. She had talked very loud, but when one wishes to go to war, he makes less noise about it; moreover, I knew that Prussia really wished to obtain her object by threats. I intended to offer her reasonable satisfaction; but there was still time enough, for it was not till the middle of November that she appeared seri- ously disposed to join our enemies. THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER REPAIRS TO BERLIN. The Emperor Alexander, informed of the sensation produced at the Court of Berlin by the affair of Anspach, thought proper to repair in person to that city, certain of engaging, by his seduc- ing manners, a prince who had resisted all the seductions of his diplomacy. A treaty was signed, on the third of November, be- tween these two powers; but I did not know of this before the arrival of Count Giulay at my head-quarters at the gates of Vienna. We will return to my movements on this capital. I followed, with the mass of my forces, the right bank of the Danube. Two corps marched by the mountains, as much to cover the march as to turn the large rivers that intersect this route. We pressed the enemy so close that, in spite of his excellent position on the Traun, he did not arrest our march for a single moment, but abandoned to us the city of Lintz with its fine bridge over the Danube. It was not difficult to see the advantages to be derived from this. I immediately resolved to send across a corps of twenty thousand men commanded by Marshal Mortier,* with orders to descend the left bank, so as to threaten the Russians? with the loss of their communications with Moravia, and thus force them to surrender to us without opposition the strong posi- tions which defended the approaches to Vienna. Should they persist in maintaining their position, this corps would get pos- session of their bridges, cut them entirely from Moravia, and thus complete their investment. To make sure of this operation, Cap- tain Lostanges, of the navy, was directed to form a considerable *Thls corps, as has already -been said, was composed of the division of Dupont, detached from Ney's corps, that of Gazan, from Cannes' corps, and the Batavlan division of General Dumonceau, detached from the sec- ond corps. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 871 flotilla of boats on the Danube, and descend this river at high- water. MASSENA'S OPERATIONS IN ITALY. While my vast designs were developing themselves with a success that even astonished myself, my army in Italy was no less fortunate, and had accomplished with the same precision the task which had devolved on it. The Austrians had committed three capital faults in their plan of campaign ; the first, in engaging offensively their weak point; the second, in remaining inactive in Italy with their strong force; the third, in employing an army in the Tyrol, where it remained, waiting its turn, a mere spectator of the defeat of the others. The Archduke Charles had above one hundred thousand men, without including the garrisons and the corps of the Tyrol. It is probable that this army was not prepared at the beginning of the campaign; otherwise it would be difficult to see why it did not cross the Adige the very day that Mack passed the Inn. Perhaps the Archduke waited for the junction of Kut- usof and Mack on the Lech; this would have been a no less false combination. In war it is always necessary to act wherever you are better prepared and stronger than your enemy. The Archduke, by taking the initiative, had thrown Massena behind the Mhicio, and perhaps behind the Po. If this success had not saved Mack, even if it had increased the distance which this prince had been com- pelled to pass over to come to the assistance of the threatened monarchy, it would nevertheless have* made a happy diversion by the beginning of October, and the Archduke, informed by the Tyrol of the disaster of Ulm, might have fallen back on La Carin- thia more at his ease, and without being pressed, as he actually was. But instead of taking the initiative, they gave this advan- tage to Mass^na. The armies were separated by the Adige, which, since the treaty of LoneriHe, had formed the boundaries between the two empires; the city of Verona was cut in two parts; we occupied that on the right bank, and the Austrians the other half, with the strong castles. They had cut two arches of the bridge. INSTRUCTIONS TO MASSENA. At the moment of the passage of the Rhine by my army, I thought that Mack would either be destroyed or driven back on the Inn, and that, sooner or later, the Archduke would be forced to make a retrograde move- ment. To deprive him of the passage of the Adige, or at least to be better prepared ourselves for an attack, I had directed Mas- sena to get possession of that part of Verona which belonged to Austria, to rebuild the bridges and establish himself at St Michel, in a position closed in by the Adige and the mountains, 372 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. where the numerical superiority of the enemy would be of little advantage to him; at least so that he would not venture to pass the Adige lower down; to do this would have been one of those audacious movements, which we were not accustomed to see on his side. Massdna acquitted himself perfectly in the delicate task; he got possession of Verona and the bridges, on the seven- teenth of October, and debouched conformably to my orders. The Archduke, more occupied with his own security than with the conquest of Italy, had covered with intrenchments the celebrated position of Caldiero and Colognola, formed, as is known, by the spur of the Tyrol mountains, which blocks up the road to Vicenzn, and slopes down insensibly to the Adige. These heights, bris- tling with vines, trees, rocks, and redoubts, seemed impregnable: Masse'na remained before them from the eighteenth to the twenty- ninth of October; and the Archduke, seeing that the events in Swabia took away all hopes of success in Italy, thought it un necessary to sacrifice his men in driving him beyond the Adige. PASSAGE OF THE ADIGE AND BATTLE OF CAL- DIERO. Masseiia, hearing, on the twenty-eighth, of the capitu- lation of Ulm, and the destruction of Mack's army, applied him self to the execution of my orders, which he accomplished with as much audacity as skill. Fearing that the Archduke might gain a march or two of him by means of the formidable position which he held, Masse'na drove in his outposts on the twenty-ninth, and ventured to attack him there the next day. Convinced that all hopes against the centre would be useless, he thought to turn the left by throwing across the Adige the division of Verdier,* reinforced near Zevio, while, at the opposite extremity, Molitorf gained the mountains. Masse'na, with the divisions of Duhesme and Gardanne, attacked Caldiero; the division of Serras at the extreme left was guarding Rivoli and the space between Lake Garda and the Adige. To assail eighty thousand men in their en- trenchments with forty thousand was more than rash; neverthe. *Jean Antoine Verdier was born at Toulouse In 1767, and entered the French army at the age of eighteen. He served with distinction in all of Napoleon's campaigns, and was noted for being wounded in nearly every battle. He was promoted through the different grades to the rank of lieu- tenant-general, and in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 commanded the Franco-Italian corps-d'annte under the Viceroy Eugene. He was always conspicuous for his bravery. tGabriel Jean Joseph Molltor was born at Huningen in 1770. He first entered the army as a volunteer, and was made captain In 1791. He rose to the grade of general at the age of twenty-nine. He served with distinc- tion in most of Napoleon's campaigns, and rose to the rank of lieutenant- general. He won the baton of marshal in the campaign of 1813, in Spain. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 378 less it was near proving successful. Verdier could not execute his passage; Molitor was forced back after heroic efforts. Our soldiers, electrified by the news from Ulm, wished to show that they were in no way inferior to the grand army. The center fought with fury. The Austrians debouched offensively between their works with a strong mass of the .elite. Mass&ia attacked the head of the column with grape, and assailed it in flank; ex- posed to cruel losses, without being able to penetrate the ranks of our braves, it was forced to retreat, and very much cut up: the carnage ended only with the approach of night. The next day Verdier was more successful in effecting his passage; but isolated in the midst of the enemy, he considered himself very fortunate in effecting a junction with Duhesme, but not without being vigorously assailed and harassed by the left of the Austrians. On the thirty-first there was a repetition of these bloody scenes scenes glorious to both sides, but without any results proportioned to the devotion and the animosity of the. combatants. Our troops slept, as it were, during these three days, at the foot of the enemy's ramparts. This affair had cost us more than six thousand men; the Austrians had lost at least as many, for at the centre their column had cruelly suffered; two thousand prisoners had been taken. RETREAT OF THE ARCHDUKE. The Archduke had sent away his impedimenta; he began) his march on the first of Novem- ber, leaving Frimont to cover his retreat. To favor this opera- tion they pushed forward the brigade of Heister from the heights of Colognola in the direction of the forts of Verona, As soon as Mass^na perceived the movement of retreat, he made disposi- tions to profit by the sacrifices he had made so as not to let the enemy escape. Frimont was cut to pieces and driven back behind the Brenta. The brigade of Heister, which had exceeded its in- structions in advancing to the fortress of Verona, was surrounded and taken prisoners to the number of four thousand men. Whatever may be the numerical superiority of the army in retreat, the duties of the rear guard are none the less difficult; for it is always singly exposed to all the efforts of the enemy; as the army seeks to accelerate its retreat, it is never disposed to delay its movements to come to the assistance of its engaged corps. The Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, the Isonzo. facilitated the retreat of the Archduke, who finally reached Laybach without having been very seriously cut up, but always hemmed in so close that he could not move with all the celerity demanded by the circumstances. The only serious trouble that he experienced was 374 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. that the corps of his right, engaged in the mountains of Sette- Comuni and in the gorges of the Brenta, were for a moment cut off, and had to throw themselves by Belluno and Primolan to gain the valley of the Drave. A very lively combat of the rear guard took place, on the twelfth of November, at the passage of the Tagliamento. The Archduke halted there to decide whether he should march by Tarvis and Villach in order to join the Arch- duke John, and move with him on Salzburg; but the news of our impetuous march on Vienna had decided him to take the road to Laybaeh. The Archduke had thrown into Venice a strong garri- son, which, by its advantageous position, might give much trouble to Mass^na. The corps of Saint-Oyr coming from Naples to the Adige fortunately supplied him with the means of observing this place, and of continuing his march. The grand army pursued its march with an ardor which seemed to redouble with its fatigues, although the cold had now become pretty severe, and from Lam- bach the ground and the roads were covered with snow. NAPOLEON AT LINTZ. I stopped at Lintz two days, for several motives: the first to dispatch Mortier across the Danube with his corps; the second, to await the Elector of Bavaria. We had moved with so much velocity that this respectable prince, a refugee, as it were, at Wurtzburg, had not been able to meet me on his return to Munich. He now came to congratulate me on the triumphs I had gained, and to which he had contributed his share, and at the same time to concert with me respecting future operations. I engaged him to unite some detachments for ob- serving the western frontier of Bohemia, in concert with Bara- gney d'Hilliers.* The division of Deroy, charged with the reduc- tion of Kufstein, was afterward to take posession of the Tyrol conjointly with Ney. A point more delicate claimed all my solic- itude. The Russians, English, and Swedes had just landed in Hanover, and Prussia, instead of covering us on that side, was assuming a menacing attitude. We had in those countries merely the single garrison of Hameln, and it was to be feared that Holland might become the object of the coalition. I an- nounced with great formality the organization of an army of the *Lon1s Baraguey d'Hilliers -was born at Paris in 1764. He was an officer at the breaking out of the Revolution, and served as brigadier- general under Custine and Menou, but afterward fell into disgrace. In 1796 he joined the army of Italy, and In 1797 was made e general-of-dlvlslou. In 1804 and 1806 he commanded the cavalry of the reserve, and distin- guished himself in the brilliant operations of the campaign of Ulm. He afterward served in Italy, Spain, and the campaign of 1812, In Russia, but died during the retreat. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 875 North, under my brother Louis, -which -was to be composed of six divisions, independently of the corps of Augereau, who would leave Swabia to march to the Low Countries by Mayence. I even circulated the report that I myself was going to Amsterdam, and had directed a palace to be prepared for my reception. PROPOSITIONS FOB AN ARMISTICE. While at Lintz, I also received a message from the Emperor of Austria ; this prince, informed by Count Qiulay of what had taken place at Ulm, and my conversation with Mack, and of the demoralization of his armies, and the disasters caused to the country by the war, sent this general to me to demand an armistice and to propose peace. The Emperor himself came to Molk to accelerate negotiations. This step might be sincere, but I had reasons to doubt it. How could I grant a suspension of arms which would allow the Allies to unite their three armies on the Danube, and give Prussia time to enter Bohemia or Bavaria? How could I trust to the sincerity of a pacific overture under such circumstances? To inspire me with a confidence so blind, there was only one means: that of giv- ing by the armistice certain pledges, by agreeing immediately upon the preliminaries of peace, and by sending away the armies whose reunion might become threatening to me, if I did not profit by the advantages of my position to prevent it. I required that the Russians should return to Poland, that Austria should dis- band the levees-en-masse in Hungary, and yield to me Venice and the Tyrol; otherwise I should be forced to continue my opera- tions on Vienna. Great astonishment was manifested at these propositions, as though I had left my camp at Boulogne to fly with one hundred and fifty thousand men to the Inn and destroy a powerful Austrian army, and then return just as I had come, without gaining the slightest advantages. Certainly, if Aus- tria had been willing to instantly quit the enemy's ranks and place herself among the number of my allies, and renew the treaty of 1756, with only such alterations as the change of circum- stances required, I should have been unjust to strip her of her territory; I ought, under such circumstances, to have left her the Tyrol and Venice. But such was not the case; Austria left the enemy's ranks merely to gain time and to recruit herself, until a more opportune moment for recommencing the war. Perhaps I might have joined to the demand of these two provinces the proposition of afterward increasing the territory of Austria, if she had consented to the alliance. In fact, these conditions, though not at all out of proportion to my success, appeared rather hard to the Cabinet of Vienna, which was expecting* the assistance of* 376 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the grand Russian army, and of the armies of the Archdukes Charles and John, without including the support which Prussia was promising to the coalition. Nevertheless, this negotiation did not retard our march for a single moment. OPERATIONS OF MURAT AND DAVOUST. The enemy had abandoned to us the Ems; Murat, Lannes, and Soult pushed him lively on Amstetten. Here the Prince of Bagration* made an obstinate stand, on the sixth of November, in order to give Kutusof time to file past. A combat took place in the woods, hand to hand, between the Russian grenadiers and those of Oudinot. Our soldiers, more intelligent, more impetuous, more alert, and better armed, triumphed over the bitter obstinacy of their valiant adversaries; these, being forced to retreat, were overthrown by the hussars, who cut off several hundred prisoners. On the seventh Murat pushed them on as far as Molk, which place the Emperor of Austria had but just left. The valley of the Danube, closed in at the south by the mountains of the Tyrol and Styria, offers only one great road below Lintz; this road runs along the river at a greater or less distance from the stream. A lateral road runs by the foot of the mountains on Steyer and Waydhoffen; but here it turns to the left toward St. Polten and rejoins the great road so as to avoid the terrible chain of the Wilde-Alpen, a spur of which forms the Wiener- Waild, a woody chain which cuts the valley transversely between St. Polten and Vienna, extending quite to the Danube. The first of these cities is therefore situated this side of the Wiener- Wald, and at the mouth of the defiles; a sharp angle, closed in by the river Trasen, offers to an army the best position for covering Vienna on this side. I had every reason to believe that the enemy would receive battle here, especially as the sec- ond Russian army could here effect a junction by Krems. In order to turn this position, I directed Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte on the road from Steyer; but, on learning the difficulty of the route and the scarcity of provisions for an army in so wild a country, the latter returned to the valley of the Danube; Marmont received orders to descend from Steyer to Leoben, and Davoust to continue his march as far as Lilienfeld in order to descend on Vienna. This marshal ascended with great dif- *Prlnce Bagration was of Georgian origin, and first distinguished him- self under Suwarrow, of whom (in the words of that marshal) he after- ward became the right arm. He won great reputation in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807. In 1812 he commanded the second corps of the Russian army. He was wounded at the battle of Moskwa, where he was greatly distinguished, and died soon after from the effects of his wounds. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 377 ficulty the rocky mountains which separate the St. Gaming from Mariazell, a real chamois country, which name it bears; his ad- vanced guard fell unexpectedly upon the columns of Merfeldt, who had undoubtedly taken the road to Leoben for fear of falling near St. Polten into the midst of my army. To fall on this column, cut it in two, drive one part on Neuhaus, and capture three thousand prisoners, was for the braves of the first corps but the work of an hour. The wreck of Merfeldt regained Neu- stadt in the greatest confusion. KUTUSOF PASSES THE DANUBE. The battle which I expected at St. Polten did not take place. Kutusof,* whose troops were cut up and reduced to thirty-five thousand men, thought, and most correctly too, that by passing the Danube at Krems he would get rid of a hot pursuit which daily cost him some of his brave troops, and besides would shorten some four days the distance he had to march in order to reach Brunn. He, therefore, recrossed the river at Mautern, the ninth of Novem- ber, on a fine wooden bridge of twenty-eight arches, the only one existing between Lintz and Vienna, and this he burnt after his passage. Murat, finding no enemies before him, moved on with still greater ardor beyond St. Polten, and pushed, on the tenth to Burkersdorf, to within four leagues of Vienna. Soult, who had received no orders to pass St. Polten, allowed himself to be drawn on to Sigartskirchen. I had remained at Molk with my guards. Bernadotte, returning from Steyer, had reached St. Polten. AFFAIR OF DIEKNSTEIN. Kutusof, having rid himself of us for a moment, went to fight Mortier, who, as will be remem- bered, was moving along the left bank of the river below Lintz. Here the chances were in favor of the Russian general, for he knew that he was going to attack with the mass of his forces an isolated corps whose rapid march had considerably separated its troops. Mortier, wholly occupied with cutting off the enemy when he should pass the Danube to take the road to Moravia, promptly debouched, on the eleventh of November, from the de- *Kutusof, Prince of Smolensk, was born at St. Petersburg, in 1745, and entered the Russian army In 1759. He distinguished himself In the wars against Poland and the Turks, and after the storming of Ismail, in 1789, was made lieutenant-general. He served in several campaigns against the F^rench, and In August, 1812, after the resignation of Barclay de Tolly, wfls made general-ln-chief of the Russian army. He displayed excellent Judgment in his dispositions, but was Inactive in his pursuit of the retreat- ing enemy. He was opposed to prolonging the WAT, and died in 1813. Kutusof had a fine education, and was regarded as one of the most accom- plished soldiers In the Russian army. 378 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. files of Diernstein,whose castle is made memorable by the deten- tion of Richard Coeur-de-Lion; he had with him only the division of Gazan and a brigade of dragoons; the division of Dupont was following at an interval of a march, and the Dutch still farther in rear. After having passed Diernstein, Mortier encountered the advanced guard of Miloradowich, whom he drove quite to the gates of Stein; but this success, which produced him a few hun- dred prisoners, was almost fatal; for at this moment the division of Doctorof , led on by General Schmidt, the ablest of the Austrian chiefs of staff, descended by the mountains behind Diernstein, and closed the gate of this terrible defile, at the same time that General Essen reinforced Miloradowich with his reserves and threw himself in front on the plateau of Loiben; nothing but a miracle could now save Mortier. He had gone to meet the divi- sion of Dupont, ordering it to accelerate its march ; on returning to the division of Gazan, he found it completely hemmed in by the enemy, and had great difficulty in cutting his way, sword in hand, to rejoin it. Placed in the alternative of cutting a way out or of dying there, he decided to force an issue. But this was no easy matter; the road from Loiben to Diernstein passes between two high walls which occupy a part of a very deep defile formed by the mountains and the Danube; the battalions of Doctorof, col- lected in this gulf in very deep columns, offered no means of forcing his way through; it was exceedingly difficult to pass either to the right or to the left, on account of the mountains and the river. Major Henriod, at the head of the One Hundredth regiment, threw himself against the head of the enemy's column ; they fought with the bayonet; two of our pieces charged with grape swept the whole length between the walls, and did the greater execution as the Russians had not been able to bring a single cannon with them, and now had no other arm than the bayonet. General Schmidt was killed by one of these discharges. Doctorof was not a man to allow himself to be easily taken ; but the brigade which he has detached up the Danube to secure his own communications in this coupe-gorge is soon attacked by tho division of Dupont. Doctorof now finds himself between two fires, in the same situation in which he thought to place Mortier; he has but a few minutes to escape through the very ravine that he had followed in descending from the mountains; for if Dupont penetrates as far as the entrance to this ravine, it is all over with the Russian column, which has no artillery. It retreats in all haste; Mortier drives back his rear guard with a facility that surprises him, and hardly has he passed Diernstein than, instead CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 379 of the enemy, he encounters the column of Dupont. One can easily imagine the electric effect produced on our soldiers by the, sight of their comrades and liberators. Those who have, in war, been placei in similar situations, can alone fully appreciate the scene. This junction enables Mortier to repel Essen and Milora- dowich, who are pressing him in rear. After this warm work, being in want of provisions, munitions, and artillery, my lieu- tenant deems it prudent to repass the Danube at Spitz by means of our flotilla; considering himself fortunate in escaping with the loss of fifteen hundred men. The Allies lost as many, and suf- fered still more sensibly in the death of General Schmidt, the friend and companion-in-arms of the Archduke Charles; he fell as a brave man in the attack of Loiben. NAPOLEON ENTERS VIENNA. This affair of Mortier in no respect changed the state of things. I had in some measure foreseen it; for, on arriving at Molk, I arrested the march of Murat and Lannes, who, exceeding my instructions, rushed on toward Vienna more rapidly than I wished. I even made Soult retro- grade from Sigartskirchen to Mautern; Bernadotte remained at Molk; but after I had. learned at St. Polten, on the twelfth, the issue of this affair and Mortier's return to the right bank, I promptly took such measures as were then required. The ad- vanced position of Murat on Vienna, and the certainty that none of the enemy's corps covered the approaches to that city, gave me hopes of effecting an abrupt entrance, of surprising the great bridges of the Danube, and of debouching by the road to Moravia, before Kutusof could reach there from Krems. I was the more stimulated to this course by the return of Count Giulay to my head-quarters on the twelfth; instead of bringing me the adhesion of his sovereign to the conditions which I had offered, he came to announce that Prussia had finally de- cided, on the third of November, to make common cause with Russia and Austria. I well knew the tardiness and irresolution of this cabinet; I was prepared to strike an important blow, and to spread terror through Europe, by the capture of Vienna; this of itself would suffice to allay the storm. Moreover, the pos- session of this capital would force the Archduke Charles to march toward Hungary, and thus open my communications with Mass&ia; I would then have no further trouble about our commu- nications in Swabia, if they should be threatened by the Prus- sians. For the success of this bold design it required the con- currence of unusual circumstances; fortune exceeded my hopes. I removed my head-quarters to Burkersdorf, on the thirteenth; 880 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Murat and Lannes arrived before Vienna, conformably to my instructions. STATE OF THAT CITY. Built in the superb basin formed by the Styrian Alps on the south, the Crapack mountains on the east, and on the west by Mount Bisamberg, the chain of Bohemia and the secondary mountains of upper Austria, Vienna is per- haps, next to Constantinople and Naples, the most agreeably situated capital in Europe. Having long served as the barrier of Germany against the kings of Hungary and the Turks, it had always been a military post, and well fortified. Taken by the Hungarians in the middle of the thirteenth century, it had after- ward resisted all its enemies; every one knows the famous siege it sustained in 1683 against the Turks, when, notwithstanding the bravery of its defenders under Count Stahremberg, it must have eventually fallen before the Vizier Kiuperli, if the Poles, under the great Sobieski, had not gone to its assistance, and en- tirely defeated the Ottoman army in a great battle under the very walls of the city. For this event, which saved Europe from the Crescent, as Charles Martel had delivered it from the Moors on the plains of Tours, the Poles deserved.no little gratitude on the part of Austria, The old enceinte of Vienna was well bastioned, even on the side next the Danube; it contained about one hun- dred thousand inhabitants; but the city had outgrown these walls, and the immense suburbs, covering a space of eight thousand toises, contained double the population of the old town. These exterior portions had been covered with intrenched lines as a security, probably, against the invasion of the Turks; but these lines, having only a slight relief and an insignificant ditch, were incapable of defense; the enceinte of the place, however, required a regular attack ; my whole army could have made no impression upon it without siege artillery. Vienna, with Prague, was the grand arsenal of the Austrian monarchy ; and, with the exception of some of the English arsenals, was the largest in Europe. It contained two thousand pieces of brass cannon, six hundred of which were of siege caliber, one hundred thousand firearms, etc., etc. MURAT SURPRISES THE GREAT BRIDGES OF THE DANUBE. The corps of Merfeldt had crossed the city in order to reach the left bank of the Danube; his rear guard held the bridge with every thing prepared for its destruction. If this rear guard and the militia of Vienna had raised the drawbridges of the fortifications and armed the ramparts, we should have been under the necessity of passing the Danube somewhere else, and CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 881 of renouncing these immense captures; moreover, this passage would have been no easy thing, and have required time and means which we did not have at hand. The Emperor Francis, in leav- ing Molk, had passed through Vienna on his way to Presburg, and, after having closed there the session of the Hungarian Diet, he departed for Brunn in order to join the Emperor Alex- ander, whose army was to concentrate at that place. The Aus- trian monarch had recommended the inhabitants of his goodly city to Count Wurbna, his grand chamberlain, whom he left there as governor; instead of inciting the inhabitants of Vienna to im- itate their ancestors, this good courtier preached to them submis- sion, and even threatened to punish any who by partial resist- ance should disturb the good order of the city. Moreover, the greater part of the nobility had taken refuge in Hungary. The tender solicitude of a prince for his capital and its inhabitants is certainly very commendable; but is this the highest of his duties? Were these pathetic homilies of M. Wurbna well-timed, when a resistance of ten days might have saved the monarchy? With such dispositions we could encounter no very great obstacles, for the Regency, without even waiting for our sum- mons, hastened to send Count Zinzendorf to meet me with pro- posals for the surrender of the city. Murat had already received orders to accelerate his march. At break of day on the morning of the thirteenth, at the approach of the dragoons of Sebastiani, the gates were opened; our astonished soldiers traversed this superb city: the grenadiers of Oudinot followed; the enemy hastened to the bridge; the staff made signs to the artillery officer who was stationed with a piece in the middle of the bridge, for defending its approach, and giving, at the proper time, the signal for its destruction. A report of the pacific mission of Count Giulay had been circulated; this officer and the Prince of Auers- berg believed that a parley had taken place and an armistice been signed; our soldiers approached them and surrounded the officer and his troop; our column was on the bridge. Prince d'Auersberg, undecided, had now other resource but flight, and our soldiers, still more astonished at the easy capture of this magnificent bridge of two hundred and fifty toises in length than at that of Vienna itself, rushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. Prince d'Auersberg was tried by a council of war, but his carelessness had caused an irreparable evil. Hearing at Burkersdorf of this strange event, I hastened, at midnight, to examine the bridge and determine what course I should now pursue; I bivouacked there for the night; I hastened the arrival of my troops; I threw Murat 882 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. by Stockerau on the road to Znaim, and returned with my guard to establish my head-quarters in the beautiful palace of Schon- brunn, the Versailles of Austria. CRITICAL SITUATION OF KUTUSOF. Kutusof, having left Krems on the thirteenth, in order to gain the great road to Moravia, heard the next day of the passage of the Danube and the march of Murat. He thus found himself engaged between the two roads that lead from Vienna and Krems to Znaim, a situ- ation the more difficult as I had ordered Mortier and Bernadotte to cross the Danube at Mautern by means of the flotilla, to harass his rear. The Russian general had but little hopes of reaching, before Murat, the direct road to Hollabrunn, and even if he did, Mortier might still force his march and arrive by Schrattenthal at Znaim as soon as the enemy. Kutusof decided with promptness; he threw Bagration with a corps of the elite on Hollabrunn with orders to defend it to the last extremity, and he himself crossed directly on Schrattenthal. To maintain himself with nine thou- sand men against Murat and Lannes, two days' march in advance of the army, was a difficult task; as a climax of embarrassment, General Nostitz, who covered the retreat of the Austrian corps on Znaim, summoned by Murat to separate himself from the Rus- sians, under the pretext of an armistice, was so inconceivably simple as to open the road to our cavalry columns, which appeared suddenly and unexpectedly before Bagration; they were soon supported by the grenadiers of Oudinot; a most terrible combat ensued; the Russians were forced to retreat on Schongraben. NEGOTIATION OF MURAT. Murat, who was hurrying to reach Znaim before Kutusof, since on this might depend the fate of the war and the ruin of the Russian army, thought to neutral- ize Bagration as he had Auersberg and Nostitz; he therefore sent him a messenger, but this time the ruse turned against him- self. Kutusof was particularly distinguished for his great finesse: hearing of the arrival of a French messenger, he thought to save his army by sending General Winzingerode* to Murat to enter into *Baron Whixingerode was born In 1769, in Wtirtemberg. He first served In the Austrian army, but afterward Joined the Russian army, and, being a great favorite of the Emperor, he was rapidly promoted. He, how- ever, was never greatly distinguished as a general. Being a bitter enemy of France, he had much Influence in shaping the policy of the Russian gov- ernment, and in .negotiations with foreign powers, against Napoleon. In the campaign of i812 he attempted to enter Moscow after this city had been occupied by the French, being still Ignorant of such occupation. On seeing the mistake, his command deserted him and fled, and he was sur- rounded and captured. He displayed a white handkerchief and claimed to be the bearer of a flag of truce. For this attempted violation of the laws of war in regard to a flag of truce, he was placed under guard and sent to Metz for confinement, but was rescued while on the way. He died In 1818. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 383 negotiation and conclude an armistice. Winzingerode was aid- de-camp to the Emperor Alexander; he took upon himself to stip- ulate in the name of this prince. The Russian army was to retire into Poland by easy marches; the French, on this condition, were to suspend their march on Moravia; the respective armies were to remain in position till I should ratify the arrangement! Murat thus fell into the same snare which, within three days, he had twice set for the enemy; Kutusof could not save Bagration, who was in sight of our videttes, but he pushed forward his army by a forced march while the courier flew to Schonbrunn to obtain my approval. Better advised than my lieutenant, and certain that he had been deceived, I reprimanded him severely, and ordered him to attack instantly. COMBAT AT HOLLABRUNN OB SOHONGiRAJBEN. Soult's corps having joined Murat, the destruction of Bagration seeemed inevitable; on the evening of the sixteenth our columns rushed forward to the attack; Oudinot, Vandamme,* Murat's dragoons, vied with each other as to which should have the honor of being first on the field. The right of the Russians was turned and the centre pierced, in spite of the most honorable resistance; they fought hand to hand amid the smoking ruins of the village of Grund. The enemy's left was cut off; nevertheless, by means of the night and a surprise, they succeeded in effecting a passage through our columns, and escaped, leaving us, as a trophy, a village filled with dead and a few hundred prisoners. One third of the corps of Bagration had fallen in this contest, which con- tinued until eleven o'clock at night; but he had the glory of carrying off the remainder, safe and sound, from the midst of forty thousand men by whom he was in a measure surrounded. KUTUSOF EFFECTS HIS JUNCTION. Having rejoined Murat, we arrived at Znaim on the seventeenth. Kutusof had already departed for Brunn, and no further obstacle preventing his junction, he effected it on the nineteenth at Wischau. Se- bastiani pushed the enemy's rear guard, and captured many stragglers. MEASURES TAKEN AT 8OHONBRUNN. I had passed ^Dominique Joseph Vandamme was born at Oassel In 1771. He en- tered the army when very young, and In 1793 was made a torlgadler- general. He was made general-of-dlvlslon In 1799. He was afterward promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and made peer of France. He died in 1880. Vandamme was regarded as an excellent officer, and served with distinction In most of Napoleon's campaigns. In addition to his mili- tary promotion, he was highly honored by the Emperor, and received Important commands and employments. 884 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. two days at the palace of Schonbrunn, but this delicious abode had not been a Capna for me; many imperious motives had re- tained me there, and never had I displayed more activity than during these two days. I was not merely waiting for definite information of Kutusof ; I had yet to regulate the administration of Austria, and provide for the future wants of my army. A contribution of one hundred millions was levied for this purpose. Moreover, I caused Marmont to reconnoiter the road to Styria, to gain information of the armies of the Archduke Charles and of the Archduke John. I had also to provide for the security of Hungary, a powerful kingdom, whose Diet had just ordered great levies: I pushed Davoust on Presburg to hold this country in check. Mortier, with the eighth corps, occupied Vienna. Berna- dotte, passing the Danube at Mautern, marched on Bohemia with the first corps and the Bavarian division of Wrede; they advanced on Iglau to check the Archduke Ferdinand, who had again col lected twelve or fifteen thousand men. This apparent dissemina- tion of my forces will astonish tacticians who preach concen- tration of massess; it was, nevertheless, indispensable, and a proof of my familiarity with war. I knew that it would require ten or twelve days for Kntusof to join the Russian army and re- cover from the fatigues of so difficult a retreat To show my corps-d'armee at Presburg, at Iglau, and at Leoben was to act at the same time on the morale of the Hungarian nation, on the Archduke Charles, who was coming from Italy, and on the Arch- duke Ferdinand, who was defending Bohemia; I could afterward recall my corps when it should be necessary to strike. The sub- limity of the art consists in knowing how to divide, to pursue, to act on minds, to intimidate, to deceive the enemy, and to unite when necessary to fight! Never has any general pushed this art as far as I have. To be convinced of the rapidity and impetuosity of my system, it is enough to remember that on the eighteenth of October I was at Elchingen treating with Mack for the sur- render of Ulm, and one month after I found myself at Brunn, hav- ing crossed the Inn, the Salza, the Trann, the Enns, and the Danube, having fought at Amstetten, at Mariazell, at Krems, at St. Polten, and at Hollabrunn. My combinations perfectly fulfilled their object; not only did Davoust receive from the Hungarian deputies the assurance that this kingdom should not trouble the combinations of my army, if I would not overrun the territory beyond Presburg; some even went so far as to propose to declare the independence of CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 385 Hungary, if I would afford them protection.* Bernadotte ex- plored the road to Iglau, and satisfied himself that the enemy was not in condition to trouble us on that side. Marmont made a useful diversion in favor of Massena, and facilitated his opera- tions by occupying Bruck; I knew very well that he was not in sufficient force to contend with the Archduke; this was not the object; my purpose was to show to this prince a strong head of column in the mountains of Styria, and to turn him from a direct march on Vienna to the longer but securer road to Hungary. I thus increased the interval which separated him from the Russian army; I very much retarded the epoch when they could act in concert; this was employing a detachment to a good purpose; finally, when the time should arrive, Marmont would again re- turn to Vienna, uniting there with Mortier, and permit me to mass my forces between the Danube and Brunn, and to act as I might wish on the two armies, or to choose my line of retreat. In the mean time Davoust was to carry one of his divisions to Neustadt, in order to sustain the second corps if it should be obliged to fight in the gorges of Sommering. REMARKS ON THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. I more and more appreciated the wisdom of my resolution to push on to Vi- enna and afterward to ascend into Moravia. This second move- ment was a consequence of the first; for, to be successful, it was necessary to increase the interval between the two allied armies, and to enlarge my base of retreat, by rendering it more easy on Passan. Prussia was not yet prepared to act immediately: 1st, because she was awaiting the troops with which she had formed the cordon of the Vistula; 2d, because she preferred to accomplish her objects by negotiation rather than to engage in the war. The Cabinet of Berlin was very formal; and notwithstanding the Em- peror Alexander's visit to the tomb of Frederick at Potsdam, King Frederick William had made only a conditional engage- ment He wished to try once more to make an arrangement with me. THE FRENCH ARMY AT BRUNN. On the twentieth I removed my head-quarters to Brunn. On arriving at this city, I was utterly astonished to find that the Austrians had not even put the smallest garrison in the citadel, a well-fortified place, which could be taken only by a regular siege. I am willing *For this proposition to take up arms for the independence of his country one of the most distinguished of the Hungarians was, after the peace, condemned by the Austrian government to twenty-one years' imprisonment 386 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. to admit that too many fortifications enfeeble active armies, and cannot of themselves save an empire; but under the present cir- cumstances the occupation of Brunn was too important not to have left there a garrison of two 'or three thousand men; they could not have been better employed. It is true that the place was not in a complete state of defense, for it was not expected that it would be so soon surrounded by our battalions. Never- theless we could only have blockaded it, and it was strong enough to hold out a week, which was sufficient to accomplish its object. The corps of Lannes, Soult, and Murat cantoned be- tween this city, Austerlitz, and Wischau. We here had some days' repose, the first which my troops had enjoyed since they left Boulogne. In three months we had flown from the coasts of England to the confines of Moravia, destroyed an army, and captured the capital of proud Austria. Our soldiers had found wine and provisions, but their shoes were in a horrible condi- tion; they marched with their naked feet in the snow. This repose was demanded both to recruit my troops and by the situ- ation of the respective forces. We will profit by this moment of respite to look back to what had been passing around me within the last month; for, drawn on by the rapidity and increasing interest of my march, I have deferred speaking of the operations of the secondary corps which I left in our rear. OPERATIONS IN THE TYROL. While I advanced with so much impetuosity on Vienna, Ney and Augereau had obtained no less success in the Tyrol, ft is known that this mountainous country, forming, as it were, a bastion which commands both Italy and Germany, has always been regarded by the Austrians as the key of those two countries. They thought that, the mount- ains rendered them masters of the plain; and if this axiom be true in tactics, it was reserved for me to show its falsity in strategy. Five principal roads debouch from the Tyrol into Ger- many, cross the chain of the Alps, and are closed by the same number of forts at Feldkirch, Reiti (Fussen), Scharnitz, Leiten, and Kufstein. The Archduke Jolin here commanded, at first, forty-five or fifty thousand men. A part of these had been with- drawn to second Mack in Swabia, on the one side, and the Arch- duke Charles in Italy on the other. Nevertheless, he still had, including the militia, thirty-five thousand men. Ney, leaving Ulm, with only ten thousand, presents himself toward Scharnitz, on the fifth of November. A Bavarian division threatens Kuf- stein, or rather observes this fort and covers Bavaria; Augereau, who has just crossed the Rlhine at Hunninguen, advanced by the CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 387 Black Forest on Kempten, where he finds himself in presence of the division of Jellachich, who left Ulm the evening of the com- bat of Elchingen, and sought safety in the Voralberg. Ney, unac- customed to count the number of his enemies, attacks the bas- tioned fort of Scharnitz, which closes the gorge; he is repulsed, one of his columns climbs the rocks, turns and carries the little fort of Leutasch, descends to Seef eld in rear of Scharnitz, which ie closed only on the side toward Germany, forces the garrison to seek safety in flight, captures five or six hundred prisoners, and then audaciously advances to Innspruck, into the very centre of the enemy's corps. The Archduke John concentrated his forces on the Brenner to cover the retreat of Jellachich and the Prince of Eohan, one of whom was at Meran and the other in the Voralberg; he ordered them to fall back in all haste on Botzen. They were too late. Jellachich, surrounded at Dornbiren by Augereau, was obliged to lay down his arms with five thousand men, and was taken back to Bohemia on condition of not serving again for a year. The Prince of Rohan, more fortunate, at first drove back the posts of Loiseii at Botzen, on the nineteenth of November; but, after having passed this city, he found the debouches on La Carinthia occupied by the French troops; the Archduke John, fearing for his own rear, which the retreat of the Archduke Charles had left entirely exposed, thought best to abandon Brenner on the night of the fifteenth, in order to retreat by Villach and Klagenfurth on Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother. Rohan, isolated in the midst of the Tyrol mountains, still hoped to effect his escape on the side toward Italy, by passing in rear of Mas- sena and reaching Venice; he descended by the gorges of the Brenta on Bassano. Saint-Cyr, who was blockading Venice, at- tacked and defeated him at Castel-Franco. The Prince of Rohan, seeing no further resources, surrendered on the twenty-fourth of November with about five thousand men. Massena, who was at this time on the Isonzo, detached in haste his reserve of grena- diers to second Saint-Cyr in this operation; but every thing was decided before their arrival. After these events, Augereau placed himself near Ulm to observe Prussia; Ney turned the Tyrol over / to a Bavarian division and marched to Salzburg. NEW ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATIONS. We will return to my army, which we kept cantoned, from the twenty-second to the twenty-eighth of November, between Wischau and Brunn, within two or three leagues of the Russian army, which was waiti -*r"~ ing, under Olmutz, the arrival of its guards and reserves. I had 'V 388 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. profited by this interval to send, on the twenty-fifth, General Savary, to the Emperor Alexander, less to carry him new pro- posals of peace than to learn from him what conditions the Allies would agree to. The Austrians sent me in return MM. Stadion* and.Giulay to learn from me what were my pretensions; they hoped that the adhesion of Prussia, the march of the Archduke Charles on Vienna, and the union which had finally been effected between the Russian and Austrian forces, would make me abate the conditions which I had proposed at Molk. Never, however, were we further from an agreement, for the Allies demanded noth- ing less than the famous project of Pitt; they merely allowed me to infer that possibly they might deign to leave me Belgium, but that I must certainly evacuate all Germany and Italy; on the other hand, I determined not only to keep what I had, but I also demanded of Austria, Venice for the kingdom of Italy, and the Tyrol for the Bavarians. Cannon alone could bring us to an agreement. I, however, proposed an armistice; the envoys of Austria having observed that it depended on the Emperor of Russia, and that they were not authorized to agree to it, I in- duced them to repair to Vienna, where they could continue the negotiation. The next day, the twenty-eighth, Count Haugwitz, the Prus- sian minister, arrived at my head-quarters; he brought me the complaints of his master, which I had seen for a month in all the gazettes of Germany; he demanded satisfaction for the violation of his territory, and the entire evacuation of all the German soil. These conditions contained nothing objectionable, since they made no question of Italy and Holland; but the other Allies would not agree to them. We were engaged in this discussion when it was announced to me that the Russian army had just broken up its camp at Olmutz, and carried the post of Wischau, which covered my can- tonments. I showed Haugwitz that it was necessary for me to leave him to provide for the security of my army, that very prob- *Cotint Jean Philippe Stadion was born at Mayence in 1763. After re- ceiving a most liberal education, he repaired to Vienna and obtained em- ployment in the diplomatic corps under Prince Kauntz, rwho was then prime minister. From that time forward he took a prominent part in all the diplo- matic discussions in Europe till the fall of Napoleon. In 1813 he was made minister of finance, which office he continued to hold till 1818, when he was sent as the representative of Austria to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. He then retired to private life, and died in 1824. His elder brother, Count Fred- eric Stadion, born in 1761, also filled several diplomatic offices, and the two are often confounded. The latter represented Mayence and Wttrtemberg at the Congress of Rastadt. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 889 ably we should be engaged in a fight, and that our affairs could be better arranged at Vienna, with Talleyrand, than in my bivouacs; I persuaded him to go to this capital, assuring him that I was ready to do every thing calculated to lead to an adjust- ment of our difficulties. I prepared to give him a more cate- gorical answer from the field of Austerlitz. MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIES. The Russian guards and reserves, under the orders of the Grand Duke Gonstantine, having arrived on the twenty-fifth, the enemy's army commenced opera- tions on the twenty-seventh, and easily carried our advanced post of Wischau. We were not ready for them; for the difficulty of supplying so large an army in position had induced me to defer as long as possible the concentration of all my forces. Besides, it was important, as has already been said, to keep Bohemia and Hungary in check, and I had calculated that by means of Brunn I should always have three days for drawing to me the corps of Bernadotte and Davoust; I had made every preparation by direct- ing them to echelon toward me so as to diminish the distance. I accordingly ordered Murat, Lannes, and Soult to break up their cantonments and assemble in the rear of Brunn; but so as to cover that place. Bernadotte received orders to leave the single Bava- rian division at Iglau, and to join me by forced marches. Davoust was to move in all haste on Nicolsburg; Mortier was to give Vi- enna to the division of Dumonceau (of Marmont's corps), and also to direct himself on Brunn ; Marmont himself had been instructed to leave Neustadt to approach Vienna. The forces which I had in hand on the twenty-ninth did not exceed fifty thousand men; the Allies had eighty thousand, and it was, therefore, for their interest to push me closely in order to force me into battle. It is true, that by means of the good positions of the fortified place of Brunn and its environs, which the enemy had so generously surrendered to us, I should not have fallen back very far; never- theless, it was for the interest of the enemy to seek either to cut me up or to force me to battle; in war every thing ought to be at- tempted that conforms to military principles; Fortune does the rest. I was not without anxiety respecting the course which the enemy might pursue; the reputed obstinacy of the Russians gave some apprehensions; they had fought at Hollabrunn as they had in the time of Frederick at Zorndorf ; but the Emperor Alexander, having no experience in war, distrusted both himself and his gen- erals, most of whom had fought only against the Turks; he was now merely the auxiliary of the Austrians; these latter under- 390 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. stood their own country better than he did, and he depended on them to guide him. Nothing could be more fortunate for me; at the head of their projectors was the same Weyrother whom 1 had used so admirably at Boveredo, Bassano, and Bivoli, and over whom Moreau had gained so cheap a victory at Hohenlinden. The reports of Savary and the conversations of an aid-de-camp whom the Emperor of Bussia had just sent to me with him, had already given me the measure of his councillors; I saw that they were disposed to do many foolish things, if I would only afford them an opportunity. After they had taken their first steps, they deceived them- selves respecting the state of affairs. The retreat of my advanced guard induced them to believe that, instead of venturing to give battle, I only thought to escape by retreating on Vienna. Acting under this impression, instead of attacking us boldly, they amused themselves with extended movements by their left, and by throwing themselves into the cross-roads in order to cut off our retreat on Vienna. This was a gratuitous fault; for a little reflection should have convinced them that I would not retreat in the direction of the Archduke Charles, where I might find the bridges of the Danube destroyed, while I had in my rear Bohemia, a fertile country, through which passes the most direct road to Bavaria. It is true they had some interest in maneuvering in the direction of Hungary to prepare a junction with the Archduke; but it was too soon to do this; that prince was still in Carniola, and the Bussian army was waiting the corps of Essen at Olmutz ; it was therefore not the time to abandon this road to throw them- selves inconsiderately on that of Goding. NAPOLEON'S DISPOSITIONS FOB THEIB BECEPTION. On the twenty-ninth the enemy made a short march of two leagues and a half from Wischau to the heights of Kutchreau. This march, though short, indicated a determination to direct themselves toward Auspitz; but with them the plan of the even- ing was never the plan of the following morning. Benounc ing the project of maneuvering strategically in order to entirety gain our right, they again moved directly on us. But they still advanced timidly. On the thirtieth they bivouacked at Hogieditz. I spent the day in riding over the environs; I saw that I had only to support my right and frustrate the enemy's project by occupy- ing in force the plateau of Pratzen from the Santon to Kreseno witz to check them in front. But this would only lead to a con- test with equal chances; I wished something better than that. The inclination of the Allies to gain my right was manifest; I CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 891 thought I could strike a decisive blow by allowing them to extend their left, and therefore placed on the heights of Pratzen only a detachment of cavalry. On the first'of December the enemy, debouching from Auster- litz, took position opposite us at Pratzen, his left extending toward Aujest Bernadotte arrived from Bohemia, and entered into line; Davoust reached the Abbey of Raigern with one of his divisions; that of Gudin bivouacked at Nicolsburg. The reports which reached me from all directions of the march of the enemy's columns confirmed me in my opinion. At nine o'clock in the evening I passed along the whole length of my line, for the double purpose of judging the direction of the enemy's forces, and of animating my troops. I had just made them a proclamation, not only promising them victory, but even explaining to them the maneuver by which I was to obtain it. This is undoubtedly the first time that a general ever confided to his whole army the combination by which he expected to secure a victory; I had no fear that the enemy would be informed of it; if he had been, he would not have put any faith in it. The news of my presence before the front of the corps-d'armee, passing from one to the other like electricity, reached the extremity of the line with the rapidity of lightning; by a spontaneous movement all the divisions of infantry, raising bundles of blazing straw on the ends of long poles, gave me an illumination whose imposing and novel appear- ance had in it something majestic. It was the first anniversary of my coronation! The aspect of these fires reminded me of the vine faggots with which Hannibal deceived the Romans, and the bivouacs of the camp of Liegnitz, which had saved the army of Frederick by deceiving Daun and Laudon. As I passed before each regi- ment, the cry of "Vive I'Empereur!" made and repeated far and near by each corps, carried to the enemy's camp proof of the en- thusiasm which animated our soldiers. Never did any scene on the field of battle present a pomp so august and imposing; every soldier partook of the confidence with which these proofs of devotion inspired me. The line, which it took me till midnight to pass, extended from Kobelnitz to the Santon. Roult's corps formed the right, placed between Sokelnitz and Puntowitz; he was opposite the enemy's centre; Bernadotte bivouacked behind Girskowitz; Murat at the left of this village, and Lannes in a position commanding the road to Brunn; my reserves were established in rear of Soult and Bernadotte. By placing my right under the orders of Soult, 392 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. it was evident that on him would fall the greatest weight Of the battle. But in order that his movement should produce the promised result, it was necessary to begin by removing the ene- my's troops 'which debouched toward Blasowitz and by the road to Austerlitz; it was probable that the Emperor's and the general head-quarters would be found there, and that it would be neces- sary to strike there first and then fall on their left by a change of front; this, moreover, was the way to cut off their left from the road to Olmuitz. Ithereforedetennined to second at first the move- ment of Bernadotte's corps on Blasowitz with my guards and the reserve of grenadiers, to turn back the enemy's right and then turn against the left, which would find itself so much the more com- promised as it had advanced past Telnitz. My project had been determined on the night before, as I announced it to my soldiers; the essential point was to seize the right moment. I had passed the night in bivouac; the marshals were assembled about me to receive my final orders. I mounted my horse at four o'clock in the morning; the moon had gone down, and the night was cold and dark, though the weather was fair. It was important to know whether the enemy had made any movement during the night which might derange my plan. The reports of my guards confirmed the opinion that the movement had been from the enemy's right toward his left; his fires appeared to extend further in the direction of Aujest. At the break of day a light fog slightly obscured the horizon, especially in the valleys; sud- denly this fog disappeared, the sun begins to gild with his rays the tops of the hills, while the valleys are still enveloped in a vapory cloud. We see very distinctly the heights of Pratzen, recently covered with troops, and now abandoned by the enemy's left; it is evident that he has followed out his plan of extending his line beyond Telnitz. I readily discover another mass march- ing from the centre toward the right in the direction of Holubitz. It is now 'perfectly certain that the ememy's center, stripped of Its forces, is exposed to the blows which it may please me to strike. It was now eight o'clock in the morning; Soult's troops were concentrated in two lines of battalions in column of attack in the valley of Puntowitz. I asked this marshal how long it would take him to gain the heights of Pratzen; he promised to do it in less than twenty minutes. "We will wait then," I replied; . . "when the enemy is making a false movement, we must be careful not to interrupt him." Soon the firing begins more lively in the direction of Sokelnitz and Telnitz; an aid-de-camp comes to an- nounce that the enemy debouches in large forces. I was only CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 898 waiting for this; I give the signal; Marat, Lannes, Bernadotte, Soult, ride at fall gallop for their respective corps. I also mount and ride toward the center; in passing before the troops I incite them anew, telling them : "The enemy has just imprudently exposed himself to your attacks; close the campaign by a clap of thunder!" Cries of "Vive YEmpereur!" attest that I am understood, and become the true signal for the attack; before describing this, we will notice what has occurred in the army of the Allies. DISPOSITION MADE BY THE ALLIES FOR THE BAT- TLE. If we are to believe the disposition projected by Wey- rother, their design was to act tactically on the same plan which they had first wished to execute by strategic maneuvers; that is, to act with their reinforced left so as to gain my right, cut me off from the road to Vienna, and throw me back beaten on Brnnn. Although my fate was not connected with the road to Vienna, for, as has been said, I proposed that to Bohemia, never- theless, it must be confessed that this plan offered to the Allies some chances of success; but to give it success required something more than the action of this isolated left; it was essential to sup- port it successively by the center and the right, which would have been prolonged in the same direction. Weyrother, as he had done at Bivoli, maneuvered by both wings, or at least such appears to have been his project. The left, under Buxhowden, composed of the advanced guard of Kienmayer and of the three Russian divisions of Doctorof, Langeron, and Pribichefski, numbered thirty thousand men; it was to advance in three columns from the heights of Pratzen by Aujest on Telnitz and Sokelnitz, to cross the little stream which forms two lakes at the left, and fall back on Turas. The fourth column, under the orders of Kolowrath, with which the head-quarters moved, formed the center; it was to advance by Pratzen toward Kobelnitz a little iu the rear of the third; it was composed of twelve small Russian battalions under Miloradowich, and fifteen Austrian battalions newly levied. The fifth column, formed by eighty squadrons under Prince John of Lichtenstein, was to leave the center, in rear of which he had passed the night, and to second the right by marching toward the road to Brunn. The sixth, on the extreme right, composed of the advanced guard of Bagration, numbering twelve battalions and forty squadrons, was destined to attack on the great road to Brnnn the heights of the Santon and Bosenitz. The seventh, composed of the guards under the Grand Duke Constantino, formed the reserve of the right wing, on the road to Brunn. 394 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. It is evident that the enemy wished to turn my right, which he supposed to extend to Melnitz, while my army was collected in mass between Schlapanitz and the road to Brunn, ready for any event. In accordance with this plan, Buxhowden, already more ad- vanced than the rest of the army, commenced this movement before the other columns; moreover, the cavalry of Lichtenstein had moved from the centre to the right, so that the heights of Pratzen, the key of the whole field of battle, were left defenseless. NAPOLEON'S GREAT CENTRAL MOVEMENT. The mo- ment I give the signal, all my columns move. Bernadotte crosses the defile of Girskowitz and advances on Blasowitz, sustained on the left by Murat; Lannes moves with equal rapidity on both sides of the Brunn road; my guards and the reserves follow some distance in rear of Bernadotte, ready to move on the center, if the enemy carries his forces in that direction. Soult moves like lightning from Kobelnitz and Puntowitz, at the head of the divi- sions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme, sustained by the brigade of Levasseur. Two other brigades of Legrand's division are left as flankers to mask and dispute the defiles of Telnitz and Sokelnitz against Buxhowden. As it is evident that he will force them, Marshal Davoust receives orders to move from Raygern with Friant's division and General Bourcier's division of dragoons, to check the heads of the Russian columns till we can engage them more seriously. SOULT'S SUCCESS. No sooner has Soult ascended the heights of Pratzen than he makes an unexpected attack on the column of Kolowrath (the fourth), which was marching to the center in irear of the third, and which, deeming itself secured by the one which preceded it, was advancing in column of route by platoons. The Emperor Alexander, Kutusof, and his staff are with it. Every thing that occurs unexpectedly at the head-quar- ters astonishes and disconcerts; Miloradowich, who is in front, hardly gets time to bring the battalions into combat as they are formed; he is overthrown, and the Austrians who follow him experience the same fate. The Emperor Alexander shows much coolness, and exposes himself in rallying his troops, but, thanks to the ridiculous dispositions of Weyrother, there is not a single disposable division to serve as a reserve. The allied troops are driven toward Hostiradeck. Kamenski's brigade, which belongs to the third column, assailed on its right flank, succeeds in rees- tablishing their affairs for a moment; but this succor can not resist the combined efforts of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and Levas- CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 396 seur; the line of Kolowrath, threatened to be thrown into the marshy valley of Birnbaum, falls back on Waschau, as was pre- scribed by the disposition. The artillery of this column, stuck fast in the half-frozen mud, is abandoned to us, and the infantry, deprived of cannon and cavalry, can do nothing against the vic- torious Soult. CHECK OF THE ENEMY'S LEFT. At the same moment with this decisive blow, the two columns of the right of Bux- howden are crossing each other and becoming entangled about Sokelnitz, from which place they debouch, notwithstanding the efforts of Legrand's division; Buxhowden himself also debouches from Telnitz, four battalions alone being insufficient to arrest him. Davoust now arrives from Raygern, and Friant's division drives back on Telnitz the enemy's advanced guard; as the contest is taking a more serious turn toward Sokelnitz, Davoust leaves only the dragoons of Bourcier before Telnitz and ascends the stream as far as Sokelnitz with the division of Friant. A combat of the warmest kind takes place at this point; Sokelnitz, taken and retaken, remains a moment in possession of the Russians. Langeron and Pribichefski even debouch against the heights of Marxdorf ; our troops, disposed in crescent form, charge sev- eral times on their flanks with success. This bloody contest being, however, only an accessory, it is enough to check the enemy without repelling him; indeed, there would result no incon- venience even if he should advance still further. SUCCESS OF THE CENTER AND FRENCH LEFT. While things were taking such a favorable turn on our right, we were no less fortunate at the center and left The Grand Duke Con- stantine and the Russian guards here met precisely the same fortune as had already happened to the head-quarters and to the fourth column; they were to' have been in reserve, but were the very first engaged. Bagration extended by the right toward Dwaroschena in order to turn and attack the position of the San- ton. The cavalry of Lichtens-tein, called from the center to his assistance, was crossed in route by the other columns, so that the Grand Duke and the guards arriving first near Krug, found themselves in the first line the moment when Bernadotte ad- vanced on Blasowitz and Lannes on both sides the road to Brunn; the fight soon became hot. Having at last arrived, after* a long march, on the right of the Grand Duke, the Prince of Lichtenstein was beginning to form, when the uhlans of the Russian guard, drawn on by their hot valor, threw themselves between the divi- sions of Bernadotte and Lannes in order to reach the light cavalry 396 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of Kellerman, who fell back before them. Victims of their own ardor, they were charged by the reserves of Murat, overthrown and driven under the fire of onr two lines of infantry, where half of them were destroyed. In the mean time our progress in the direction of Pratzen had forced Kutusof to recall Lichtenstein to the assistance of his center; and this prince, equally threatened on the right and left, knew not to whom to listen or where to render his first assistance; he hastened to send four regiments of cavalry, which arrived in time to witness Kolowrath's defeat. General Ouwarof was established with thirty squadrons between Bagration and the Grand Duke; the remainder of the cavalry was placed on the left. On his side the Grand Duke, seeing the French columns of infantry penetrate into Blasowitz and debouch from that place, determined to descend from the heights and meet them half way. This movement seemed to him necessary as well for his own security as to relieve the center, for which they began to have fears. While a furious combat of infantry takes place between the Russian guards and the division D'Erlon, the Grand Duke's mounted guards (a regiment of cuirassiers) charge the right flank of this division, which is formed by the fourth regiment of the line detached from the division of Vandamme in order to cover the interval. The Russian cuirassiers fall upon this regiment, over- throw one battalion, but pay dearly with the lives of their braves for the honor of carrying off the battalion eagle. This hot con- test, being isolated, was not dangerous; nevertheless, as it was possible that the enemy might send other forces to sustain it, I determined to direct on this point Marshal Bessieres with the cavalry of my guard. It being necessary to end the matter, I ordered him to charge. The Russian line, after the most honor- able defense, was obliged to yield to the united efforts of Berna- dotte and Bessieres. The infantry of the guards, incapable of a longer resistance, fell back on Kresenowitz. The mounted guards, which arrived at this instant from Austerlitz, attempted in vain to reestablish affairs; this regiment of the elite could do nothing more; being itself charged by my mounted grenadiers, which I advanced under the orders of Rapp, it was overthrown, and all the center then took the road to Austerlitz. In the mean time Murat and Lannes had attacked with success the corps of Ba- gration and the cavalry of Ouwarof, which sustained it. Our cuirassiers had overthrown the left of this wing pressed by the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli. Every where victory crowned our combinations. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 397 NAPOLEON UNITES HIS RESERVE WITH SOULT. Certain that Bernadotte, Lannes, and Murat would be more than sufficient to dispose of the enemy on this side, I fell back to the right with my guards and the reserves of Oudinot, to aid Soult in destroying the left wing, which was now taken in reverse and compromised among the lakes. It was two o'clock when Soult, incited by our approach, united the divisions of St. Hilaire and Legrand to take Sokelnitz in reverse, while the troops of Davoust assailed it in front; Vandamme threw himself on Aujest; my guard and the grenadiers followed in rear, to reinforce, in case of need, these different attacks. The division of Pribichefski, surrounded in Sokelnitz, lays down its arms; a few fugitives only escape to tell this disaster. Langeron, pushed in his turn, is not more fortunate, and only one half of his troops succeed in joining Buxhowden. The lat- ter, who had spent five or six hours with the column of Doctorof in a useless skirmish near Telnitz, instead of falling back at ten o'clock on Sokelnitz, at last thought it time to provide for his own security; he put himself in march between two and three o'clock to return to Anjest and escape from the trap, by moving along the valley between the lakes and the heights. He was debouching from the village in column when Vandamme threw himself with impetuosity on his flank, penetrated into Aujest, and cut his column in two. Buxhowden, not being in condition to turn to the assistance of the others, continued his retreat with the two leading battalions to rejoin Kutueof ; but Doctorof and Langeron, with the twenty-eight other battalions, found themselves inclosed in the gulf between the lake* and the heights crowned by St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and my reserves. The head of the column on the side toward Aujest, escorting the artillery, attempted to escape across the canals formed for draining the lake; the bridge broke under the weight of the cannon. These brave men, hoping to save their pieces, now sought to cross the extremity of the lake, which was frozen over, but the ice, cut up by the fire of our bat- teries, broke under the weight of this mass, engulfing both men and cannon; more than two thousand were drowned. Doctorof had no other means of escape than to march along the shore of the lake to Telnitz under our fire, and to gain the dike which separates the lake of this name from that of Melnitz. He suc- ceeded, but not without enormous losses, in gaining Satschann under the protection of Kienmayer'B cavalry, which made the most praiseworthy efforts. They together took the road to Czeitsch by the mountains, hotly pursued by us. The few piece* 398 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of artillery which the enemy had saved from the center and left were abandoned in this retreat, made by horrible roads, which the rain of the night before and the thaw rendered almost impassable. THE ENEMY, CUT OFF FROM OLMUTZ, IS THROWN ON HUNGARY. The position of the enemy was exceedingly dif- ficult; I had gained the road to Wischau, which his troops could no longer reach. He was therefore forced to take the road to Hun- gary; but Davoust, one of whose divisions had reached Nicolburg, could, by a flank march, first reach Goding, while we were warmly pressing him in rear. The allied army, weakened by the loss of twenty-five thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners, and one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, besides a quantity of stragglers, was in the greatest disorder. r- THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA ASKS AN INTERVIEW. jy\ The Emperor of Austria was unwilling to trust the fate of the monarchy to a final battle, which might lose all. He sent to me Prince John of Lichtenstein to ask an interview; it took place the next day in a bivouac, on the bank of a ditch. We had no dif- ficulty in coming to an understanding; I had strong reasons for ending the matter; the Archduke Charles was approaching the Danube; Hungary, incited by his presence, might rise; the enemy's reserves were approaching from Olmutz; the Archduke Ferdi- Tnand was driving from Iglau the Bavarian division of Wrede; Prussia was threatening to debouch from Saxony into Franconia with one hundred thousand men. In truth, all these were bu: distant difficulties, while I had in hand trophies certain and im- mediate. I convinced the Prince of Lichtenstein that, in consent- ing to an armistice, I was forgetful of the interests of the victori- ous soldier to prove my desire for peace. I also persuaded the Emperor of Austria of this, showing him that it would have been better to have permitted me to pursue my project against Eng- land than to have troubled its execution. The armistice was concluded, by which the Russians were immediately to retire to Poland, and negotiations were to be resumed at Presburg to treat for a definitive peace. REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. Never was there a more brilliant success, .and, I venture to say, never was there one better deserved. Victory had been announced the evening before; it was certain after ten o'clock in the morning, for.Soult was then master of Pratzen, and Bernadotte of Blaso- witz. Undoubtedly it was facilitated by the blind obstinacy with which Buxhowden marched to meet him according to the plan, CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 399 without allowing himself to be turned aside by the attacks on the center. If, on hearing the thunder of the cannon in his rear, he had immediately directed his sixty battalions on Kobelnitz by the left of the rivulet, we should have been a little embarrassed ; nevertheless, concentrated about Schlapanitz, we should have received battle with the advantage of concentrated forces over a divided enemy; victory would not in that case have been so brilliant: but I should nevertheless, in all probability, have gained the field of battle. It would, however, be absurd to attrib- ute to Buxhowden a reverse which was due only to the faulty disposition projected by Weyrother a disposition which left the army without a center, and which placed the head-quarters in the first line, and in the interval where was the decisive point of the whole field. The Allies had but two means of assailing me with any possibility of success: one was to successively sustain the attack of the left by the rest of the army, renouncing the road to Olmutz and basing themselves on Hungary, which could have been done without violating the rules of strategy, since the Archduke Charles was approaching in that direction; the other was to close the left on the rest of the army in order to preserve the road to Olmutz in their rear. To effect this, Buxhowden should have debouched by Sokelnitz and Kobelnitz on Marxdorf, instead of extending so far toward Telnitz. Such was the famous day of Austerlitz; of all the pitched battles which I have gained, I pride myself most on this, both on account of the enemy over which I triumphed, and on account of the perfect success of all my combinations; this success was as perfect as though I had commanded the two armies and the ma- neuvers had been previously agreed upon. Ulm, Marengo, Jena. Ratisbon, were victories as brilliant, but they were the result of strategic maneuvers and a series of combats. The most remark- able of my tactical battles are those of Austerlitz, Bivoli, and Dresden. ^ NAPOLEON RETURNS TQ VIENNA. After the armistice, I hastened my return to Vienna, to accelerate negotiations and to put in order the internal affairs of my army; I had also an answer to give M. de Haugwitz. Augereau was still in Bavaria; Ney's corps, after leaving the Tyrol to a Bavarian division, had gone to Salzburg. Mas- sena and Marmont were debouching on Vienna, The army which had conquered at Austerlitz also approached the capital; I was thus about to find myself fully prepared to strike heavy blo-ws, if the coalition should take a fancy to continue the war. 400 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. They still possessed powerful means; but they were scattered. The Archduke Charles was too far off to act effectively with an army demoralized by its long retreat, and by the defeat of the other forces of the monarchy. He would, moreover, be exposed at the same time to the whole of my victorious army, reinforced by Massena, Marmont, and Mortier; the Russians were for a certain time out of reach. The Prussians we will not anticipate their disaster, but for a moment consider their negotiations which were interrupted by the events of Austerlitz. TREATY OF VIENNA WITH THE PRUSSIANS. Haug- witz now felt that the time for menacing me was past; I pro- posed to him to overlook the violation of a territory which in 1796 and 1800 had been no better respected by either belligerent, offering him the electorate of Hanover in exchange for Anspach, Cleves, and the principality of Neufchatel. Prussia would, by this arrangement, gain too much for her minister to hesitate; moreover, it was the most honorable way for her to replace tlie sword which she had drawn too late from its scabbard. Haug- witz iaccepted it unhesitatingly, happy to carry to his master the news of an aggrandizement instead of a formidable war; I also gained by it, since I avoided a war with a natural ally, and com- promised Prussia with England. TREATY OF PRESBURG WITH AUSTRIA. This treaty, signed on the fifteenth of December, and that with Austria con- cluded at Presburg the twenty-sixth, put an end to the third coalition against France. Austria paid pretty dearly for it; I de- manded of her the Venetian states to reinforce my Italian king- dom and my maritime system; she also yielded the Tyrol and the Innviertel to Bavaria. In order to attach to myself irrecoverably these brave allies, I erected Bavaria and Wtirtemberg into king- doms, and the margraviate of Baden into a grand duchy. The Pays de Salsbourg, ceded to the Grand Duke of Tuscany by the peace of Luneville, was accorded to Austria. The Grand Duke of Tuscany obtained Wurtemberg, which put him more in my de- pendence. In exchange for Wurtzburg and the duchy of Berg, which the Elector yielded to me, Bavaria received Anspach, in addition to the Innviertel of the Tyrol. I, at the same time, pro- posed peace to the Russians, but Alexander refused it; this refusal was noble, for in accepting it he would have accepted the humiliation of his allies. In refusing, he exhibited firmness in reverses, and confidence in fortune; this refusal showed me that the fate of the world was dependent on us two. Nevertheless, we CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 401 could no longer carry on war, for we were separated by neutral countries. The Russians returned to their homes. OPERATIONS IN HANOVER. While I was directing the thunderbolts into the ranks of our enemies, they were amusing themselves with a ridiculous war in the North. To turn to ac- count the knight-errant humor of Gustavus IV., King of Sweden, and to induce him to direct his forces to the continent, Russia and England had given him the command of an army, to which he added fifteen thousand Swedes. After uniting in Pomerania with Tolstoy's corps of about ten thousand men, he passed the Elbe near Lauenburg and advanced into Hanover. At the same time the Hanoverian troops and some English battalions de- bouched under General Don near Stade, and Lord Cathcart with another English corps soon followed. These forces, which amounted to more than forty thousand men, after having swept Hanover, where I had only the garrison of Hameln, were intended to operate against Holland. Although I had foreseen this dan- ger, sending my brother Louis to this latter country with the cadre of what I called the army of the North, it required no less than the victory of Austerlitz to ward off the storm, for the still doubt- ful attitude of Prussia complicated matters. Happily, the folly of Gustavus came to my assistance. Furious against his allies, who reproved his impolitic and threatening tone toward Prussia at the very moment that the Emperor Alexander was at Pots- dam treating with this power, the King of Sweden returned to Pomerania, threw up the command of the army, and thus de- stroyed the entire operation. After a discussion of three weeks, Gustavus went to Lauenburg; but there Tolstoy's corps was put at the disposition of the King of Prussia, who negotiated to take charge of the security of the north of Germany. This separa- tion gave new displeasure to Gustavus, and Tolstoy went into Mecklenburg, wihence he departed to return to Russia, when peace with Prussia had rendered his presence in Hanover wholly useless. The English also reembarked, and Gustavus, to com- plete his romantic operations, sent his troops back into Pomera- nia, leaving only five hundred men to guard Lauenburg. THE DYNASTY OF NAPLES CEASES TO REIGN. The Court of the Two Sicilies had given, by its inconceivable conduct, the measure of its hatred toward me. I had concluded, on the twenty-first of September, a convention of neutrality with the Marquis of Gallo, the Neapolitan minister at Paris; this treaty, which was to remove far from his country the scourge of war and to put at my disposition Saint-Cyr's corps of occupation a *6- 402 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. treaty advantageous to both parties was ratified by the King on the eighth of October. This transaction, which seemed well cal- culated to save the kingdom of Naples, put its government in a false position. Before it was signed, Queen Caroline had moved heaven and earth to interest England, Russia, and Austria in her fate; the plan of the Allies had stipulated the landing of twelve thousand Russians and six thousand English, to unite with twenty-five thousand Neapolitans, in order to advance on the Po for the deliverance of Italy. These forces appeared about the middle of November at the roadstead of Naples. To receiye them, in violation of the engagements recently entered into with me, was to expose himself to my just anger; to repel the Allies after having solicited them, was no less disloyal. Ferdinand, as usual, hesitated, and the malignant feelings of the Queen pre- vailed; not satisfied with receiving the Allies, she did all in her power to induce Ferdinand to unite his army to their troops. A plan of operation was formed to carry these combined forces into Tuscany, and to take in reverse my army in Italy. Eugene, in order to oppose this new enemy, was obliged to collect what he could of the Franco-Italian troops and national guards of the kingdom, on the frontiers of the march of Ancona. Thus drawn on by a blind hatred, the Queen sacrificed her people, her family, her crown, for the single hope of injuring me. Every impartial man will agree that by this conduct she author- ized, in advance, whatever I might please to decide respecting her fate. If I had been beaten, this unexpected hostility had given me great embarrassment in Italy; victorious, I was not vexed at having a good pretext for ending the matter by getting rid of this implacable enemy, and of thus procuring a crown for one of my brothers. The kingdom of Naples ought to enter frankly into the system of France and Spain, as it had done at the epocji of the family pact of the Bourbons. As the Queen was the only obstacle to the adoption of thte system, it was necessary that she should suffer the consequences of her course of conduci. The very next day after the treaty of Presburg, December twenty- seventh, I hurled my decree of anathema on this inconsiderate court; / declared that it had ceased to reign. Massena had already received orders, immediately after the armistice, to increase St.- Cyr's corps to thirty thousand men, and to direct it on Rome; after the peace, I ordered him to reinforce this corps and to take the command himself. We will leave him to his easy triumph and direct our attention to the maritime war. whose operations had not been less decisive than on land, but in a sense directly the reverse. CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 403 NAPOLEON DIRECTS ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE TO RE- TURN TO TOULON. It will be remembered that Villeneuve, leaving Ferrol at the head of thirty-three ships, had returned, contrary to my instructions, to Cadiz, instead of making sail for Brest, and that this circumstance, in connection with the conti- nental war, had decided me to renounce the descent. Being very justly dissatisfied with the conduct of this admiral, I ordered him to be replaced by Rosily, and the combined fleet to immedi- ately set sail for the Mediterranean, to raise the blockade of Carthagena, to capture the small English station before Naples, to land the ten thousand men it had on board to reinforce St.-Cyr at Tarentum, and to thus enable him to conquer Naples. Ville- neuve was afterward to return to Toulon, to take in supplies and refit; then to send his cruisers in all directions in the Mediterra- nean and the ocean. I especially directed that one be established at St. Helena in order to capture the return ships from India. Lit- tle di<^ I then anticipate the misfortunes that awaited me on this rock! I hoped, by thus exciting the fears of England respect- ing Egypt, to force her to keep large squadrons in the Mediter- ranean. This system was well calculated to form good sailors, to paralyze the enemy's forces, and to injure his commerce; It, moreover, was particularly suited to the supposition that conti- nental affairs might, for many years, force me to renounce the project of a descent. A proof of its advantages is the success obtained by Admiral Lallemant. It will be remembered that this brave seaman, being unable to effect a junction with Villeneuve, had cruised between Ireland and the Bay of Biscay till the end of December, and had then entered Rochefort in triumph, with one captured ship-of-the-line, a great number of prizes, and twelve hundred prisoners a success the more remarkable as it had been gained in the very waters of England, and on a sea crossed in every direction by the merchant vessels of that nation. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that this system exposed our naval forces to partial combats; perhaps it would have been preferable to leave our fleet at Cadiz, which is a favorable port for a sortie, and very difficult to blockade, as in a heavy sea, produced ordinarily by southwest winds, the blockading forces are exposed to all the fury of the waves on a dangerous coast. Thirty vessels in Cadiz would have cost the enemy dearly, and they would have been more free to act in all directions than when at Toulon. The excessive expense which they would have oc- casionel us in one of the dearest ports of Europe, and the objection to spending so much money in a foreign port, were the motives 404 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. for directing the departure of the fleet. My orders being im- perative, it was the duty of Villeneuve to leave; nevertheless, if he was blockaded by twenty-nine ships, it was optional with him either to leave or to remain at Cadiz; he chose the former course. NELSON'S RETURN BEFORE CADIZ. While, by a too lit- eral execution of this order, he was going to his own destruction, the English admiralty, informed of his return to Cadiz, had or- dered Nelson to leave Portsmouth in all haste and take the com- mand of all the British forces in these waters. He was not a man to delay, and he left instantly with two or three ships which he found ready. This great sailor joined on the seventeenth of October the fleet of Admiral Collingwood and took the command. MEETING OF THE TWO FLEETS. Villeneuve set sail on the nineteenth, with thirty-three ships and nine frigates. It is probable that he thought he was opposed only by the twenty- one ships of Collingwood and Calder; it is said he had been in- formed the night before of Nelson's arrival, but that, following the advice of a merchant captain, he did not believe it. As I had blamed pretty strongly his want of activity at Martinique, and as he wished to wash out the recollection of his inaction at Abonkir and his return to Cadiz, he undoubtedly thought he would be forever dishonored if he did not give chase with superior forces. Full of this idea, and knowing that the grand operations in the Channel no longer depended on the course he might now pursue, he decided to fight Every circumstance seemed to con- spire against us; the same admiral who had feared to advance toward Brest to fight an inferior and divided enemy, now, by a misplaced and untimely energy, was about to engage with equal forces against the best sailor of the age; if he deemed himself authorized to deviate from my orders in an operation as delicate as that of a junction with the fleet of Brest, why should he not venture to interpret them, when acting in a single sortie without any essential object to be accomplished? BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. The fatal rencontre took place on the twenty-first of October, off Cape Trafalgar, a little south- west of Cadiz. Villeneuve might still have repaired his fault, if he had taken the proper measures to secure a victory; but repos- ing on his order to all his captains to come into action, and ob- stinately pursuing the old errors of forming in parallel order, he waited for his adversary to treat him as he had already treated the squadrons of Brueys at Aboukir. When one violates his in- structions, he ought at least to know how to maneuver, and to CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 406 conquer or die. Nelson,* more skillful than his adversary, took advantage of the northwest wind which was blowing at the time, formed in two columns, cut the centre with fourteen ships, sep- arating it from the right, while thirteen others defeated the left by successively passing along the line; this was sufficient to secure certain success; our fleet was totally defeated; sixteen ships were lost, in one of which Villeneuve was taken prisoner; the others made sail for our ports; but four of these, under Du- manoir, surrendered to equal forces under Admiral Strachan near Kochefort. Nelson, more fortunate than I, fell dead in the arms of victory. Gravdna died of his wounds; he was a man of genius an dmerited all our regrets. Villeneuve,f sent back to France on parole, fearing the results of a trial by a council of war, committed suicide at Rennes. This battle, which was more fatal to us than that of the Hogue, and which*perhaps decided the empire of the world, if that empire depended on England or France, cost the victors only six- teen hundred men killed and wounded; a remarkable example of the difference of war on sea and on land. The smallest combats of an advanced guard, between 1805 and 1815, cost more lives than this naval victory. In the battles of Eylau and Moskwa thirty thousand men were sacrificed, without giving any other advantage than the possession of the field of battle that is, a few acres of ground. After this epoch, our fleets were no longer able to show them- *Horatio Nelson was born In Norfolk In 1758, and entered the navy at the age of twelve as midshipman. In 1779 he was promoted to the rank of post-captain, and distinguished himself In the Gulf of Mexico, and after- ward in the Mediterranean, toeing an eye at the siege of Calvi. For the victory off Cape St. Vincent, in 1797, he was raised to the rank of rear- admiral. For the victory of Abouklr he received the title of Baron Nelson of the Vile, with a pension of two thousand pounds. At the 'battle of Trafalgar he received a musket-shot in the back, and shortly after expired. His career in the navy was characterized by energy, boldness, good Judgment, and great bravery. As a man, his reputation was tarnished by his cruelty at Naples and his disgraceful conduct with Lady Hamilton. tPlerre Charles Jean-Baptlste Sylvestre Villeneuve was born at Val- ensoles in 17G3, and entered the navy at the age of fifteen. His promo- tion was rapid. In 1793 he was made captain of a ship; In 1796, rear- admiral; and In 1804, vice-admiral. He was a brave man, and prior to the battle of Trafalgar was regarded as one of the most promising officers In the French navy. After the defeat and on his return from England after his release as a prisoner of war. he reported to the minister of marine. The reply 'was said to be so mortifying to the unfortunate admiral that he com- mitted suicide, his body being found next morning In his room, pierced with six wounds Inflicted by his own hand. He died at the age of forty-one. 406 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. selves at sea, and the remainder of my reign was spent in making preparations for a new contest with the English leopard. I received this news during our march on Vienna, and all my aston- ishing success at Ulm and Austerlitz was requisite to console me for this disaster, which forced me to adopt a system of policy entirely new. THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 407 CHAPTER IX. THE WAR OF 1806, OR CAMPAIGN OF JENA. Napoleon returns to France Crisis of the Bank Relations with England- Progress of the English Power in India Disastrous Maritime Expedi- tion of the French Continental Means of opposing England Diffi- culty of forming Alliances with the Great Powers System of Feder- ate States Reasons for the successive Additions to the French Empire Death of Pitt Blockade of Ports by a mere British Order in Council New Difficulties with Prussia The Cabinet of Berlin perverts the Treaty of Vienna Motives for this Step Negotiations of Haugwltz A New Treaty Discussion with Austria, for Cattaro and Wurtaburg A Federation substituted in place of the German Empire Napoleon crowns the different Members of his Family Joseph, King of Naples Louis, of Holland Eugene, Heir to the Throne of Lombardy Murat, Grand Duke of Berg Military Operations In Naples Siege of Gaeta Diversion in Calabria Confederation of the Rhine, -with Napoleon as Protector Francis abdicates the Crown of Germany, and is proclaimed Emperor of Austria Sensations at Berlin Prussia entitled to the Presidency of the Confederation Interior State of the French Empire Mechanism of Napoleon's Government The Public Credit restored Conscription regulated Monuments Internal Improvements Mili- tary and Maritime Works State of Prussia Negotiations with Eng- landTreaty signed, but not ratified, with Russia Mission of Sebas- tian! to Constantinople Attack of the English on Buenos Ayres Rup- ture of the Negotiations with England Prussia abruptly decides on War Her extraordinary UltimatumFirst Movements of the French Army The Position and Plan of Operations of the Prussians Napo- leon's Plan of Operations Faults of tne Prussians Their Generals- Views of the Duke of Brunswick Napoleon cuts off their Communica- tionsHis decisive Maneuver- Battle of Jena Battle of Auerstadt Extraordinary Results of these two Victories Combat of Halle- March on Potsdam and Berlin Visit to the Cabinet of the Great Fred- erickEntrance into Berlin Operations of Hohenlohe Fall of Span- dau Dispositions against Hohenlohe Combat and Capitulation of Prenzlow Fall of Stettin Blticher retires on Mecklenburg Capitula- tion of Custrin Measures for taking possession of the Country be- tween the Rhine and the Oder Armistice with the Saxons BlUcher driven to Ltibeck Fall of LObeck Capitulation of Blticher Taking 408 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of Magdeburg Napoleon at Berlin The celebrated Berlin Decree- British Orders In Council Armistice with Prussia, not ratified Napo- leon advances to the Vistula Immense Results of this Seven Weeks' War. NAPOLEON RETURNS TO FRANCE. As soon as this double peace with Austria and Prussia had reestablished the re- pose of Europe, at least for a time, I hastened to return to France, where cares not less important required my presence. My return to Munich was a real triumph: ever since the wars of the brave Charles Theodore, the ally of Louis XIV., and since the project of Austria, in 1778, to get possession of their country, the good Bavarians had nourished an inveterate hatred against the ambition of the Cabinet of Vienna; they received me with acclamations so sincere and touching that never did I experience sentiments more grateful. The nation, appreciating what it was to gain in power and consideration by the royal crown which I placed on the head of a prince cherished for his virtues, could well see how different were these benefits from the designs of Austria. Some old cannon, taken from the electoral troops in 1703, which we found in the arsenal of Vienna, sent by my di- rection to Munich with a goodly number of Austrian pieces, taken in expiation, were conducted back with all possible military pomp. A patriotic excitement seemed to electrify the Bavarians from one end of the kingdom to the other. The national colors were unfurled by all the citizens with an enthusiasm that re- minded me of the first days of 1790. I profited by these dispositions to strengthen our relations by a family alliance. Prince Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, mar- ried the Princess Amelia, eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria; and Berthier, whom I had just placed in the rank of sovereigns, by giving him the principality of Neufchatel, married a niece of the King. My sojourn at Munich was celebrated by grand fetes: public joy was at its height. I did not expect so warm a recep- tion at the Court of Wtirtemberg, whose Elector, a prince of noble character, did not profess the same sentiments toward us. He had merely yielded to force in joining me, at the beginning of the campaign; but from his being the maternal uncle of the Emperor Alexander, and from the position of his states, I felt obliged to treat him in the same way as I had Bavaria: I hoped, by elevat- ing him to a throne, to attach him to me irrevocably. I was not deceived in this calculation. My return to Paris was a succession of uninterrupted THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 409 triumphs; the spectacle of the bridge of Kehl was particularly imposing, from the immense concourse of people on both banks of the Rhine, drawn together to see my passage. Louis XIV. had once pretended that there were no more Pyrenees between him and Spain; with more truth might I now say that there was no longer the barrier of the Rhine between France and Germany. I had been preceded in the capital by the deputation of the Sen- ate, which had come even to Vienna to congratulate me on two victories unparalleled in the annals of France, and which washed out so gloriously the bloody defeat our navy had just sustained at Trafalgar. They were preparing for me at Paris a most bril- liant reception; but I returned in the night in order to escape cere- monies which wearied me, but of which I could give a striking example when it suited my projects.* CRISIS OF THE BANK. New cares awaited me at the Tuil- eries. The first which I had to attend to resulted from an event entirely unexpected: at the moment when I was founding the power and glory of France on a basis apparently immovable, the state was near being overwhelmed by an unexpected bankruptcy. Barb&Marbois had taken it into his head to improve the funds of the treasury by exchanging one hundred and forty millions for *Napoleon toad previously sent home the flags captured in this war. Thlers thus describes the reception of the colors sent to Paris by Napoleon: "These colors passed through Paris on the fifteenth of January, 1806, and were borne triumphantly along the streets of the capital, to be placed under the roofs of the edifices which were to contain them. An Immense concourse collected to witness this spectcale. "The cool and unimpaesioned Cambacgrds himself says, in his grave "Memoirs," that the joy of the people resembled intoxication. And where- fore, indeed, should they rejoice, if not on such occasions? Four hundred thousand Russians, Swedes, English, and Austrians were marching from all points of the horizon against France, two hundred thousand Prussians promising to join them, and all at once, a hundred thousand French, starting from the coasts of the ocean, traversing in two months a great part of the European continent, taking the first army opposed to them without fight- ing, inflicted redoubled blows on the others, entering the astonished cap- ital of the ancient Germanic Empire, passing beyond Vienna, and going to the frontier of Poland, to break In one great .battle the (bond of the coali- tion; sending back the vanquished Russians to their frozen plains, and chaining the disconcerted Prussians to their frontiers; the dread of a wax which might be expected to last long, terminated in three months; the peace of the continent suddenly restored, tfie peace of the seas justly hoped for; all the prospects of prosperity given back to France, delighted and placed at the head of the nations for what ahould people rejoice, we re- peat, if not for such miracles? And as at that time none could foresee the too speedy end of their greatness, or yet discern, in the too fertile genius that produced it, the too ardent genius also that was destined to compro- mise It, one sympathized In the public happiness without any mixture of sinister presentiments." 410 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Spanish bonds on Vera Cruz, which could not be realized. He was forced to have recourse to the bank to meet the expenses of the government; the bank was in its turn embarrassed, and its notes, which had braved all the revolutionary storms, lost their credit to such a degree that a panic-stricken multitude be- sieged its doors to get them exchanged for specie. Never was there a financial crisis more singular or more inopportune. Arriv- ing at the Tuileries at nine o'clock in the evening, I passed the night in examining the accounts of the treasury, and at eleven o'clock the following morning a council of finance was convoked to devise means to remedy the evil. I had -at this time no secret treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries; some resources were requisite to meet our immediate wants; we happily succeeded in obtaining them; confidence was gradually restored, and all Paris recovered from the panic. This crisis proved to me that the credit of a state is not always equal to its wants, and made me sensible of the necessity of providing a special fund ready for future events.* *Napoleon's manner of dealing with the United Merchants, whose spec- ulations had so embarrased the public treasury, is thus described by Thiers: "Napoleon instantly summoned a council to the Tuileries, and desired to be furnished with a detailed report of the operations of the company, which were still obscure to him. He required the attendance of all the ministers, and also of M. Mollien, director of the sinking fund, whose man- agement he approved, and whom he thought to possess in a much higher degree than M. de Marbois the dexterity necessary for the administration of funds on a great scale. He sent an authoritative order to Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, and to the clerk who was accused of having deceived the minister of the treasury, to come to the Tuileries. "All the persons wfio attended were intimidated by the presence of the Emperor, who did not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois began reading a long report which he had drawn up relative to the subject under dis- cussion. He had not read far before Napoleon, interrupting him, said: 'I see how it Is. It was with the funds of the treasury and those of the bank that the company of United Merchants calculated on providing supplies for France and Spain. And, as Spain had nothing to give but promises and piastres, It Is with the money of France that the wants of both countries have 'been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy, and It is I who have fur- nished her with one. Now Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard must give up to me all they possess; Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I will shut up those gentlemen in Vincennes and send an army to Madrid.' "Napoleon appeared cold and stern toward M. de Marbois. 'I esteem your character,' said 'he, 'but you have been the dupe of men against whom I warned you to be upon your guard. You have given up to them all the effects in the portfolio, over the employment of which you ought to have been more watchful. I regret to find myself obliged to withdraw from you the administration of the treasury, for, after what has happened, I cannot leave It to you any longer.' Napoleon then ordered the members of the company who had been summoned to the Tuileries to be Introduced. Mee- THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 411 RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. To this crisis succeeded new political difficulties; the great events which had marked this campaign of 1805, both on land and sea, had entirely changed the respective situation of the two rivals who were disputing the commerce and influence of the world. The battle of Trafalgar had given the sovereignty of the sea to the English; it was neces- sary to adopt some new system to counterbalance these deplor- able effects. It is an old adage that he who is master of the sea is also of the land. However paradoxical this may seem, it will not be denied that it has in it some truth, when we reflect upon the importance acquired by some of the smallest states, by the great extension of their navy, and the rapid increase of the Roman power as soon as it got rid of the rivalry of Carthage. The dis- covery of America and the invention of the compass doubled the importance of the navy, and the power which it successively gave to the Dutch, Spanish, and English had daily given force to this prejudice. I fully appreciated the influence due to this empire of the seas; but I nevertheless thought, with reason, that the prin- cipal cause of this influence was due to the divisions of the conti- nental powers, and that the adage would become false, if ever these powers should come to a proper understanding. Fully con- vinced that France could never reach the apogee of her prosperity and power if she remained inferior to England on the seas, I re- solved to do every thing in my power to build up our navy and to find, in the results of the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz, the means of saving America, of delivering India, of freeing Europe from a yoke which would ruin its commerce. PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA. The English power in India had increased three-fold since the time of my expe- dition to Egypt; the fall of Tippoo, and the successive defeats of sleurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, though the least reprehensible, melted into tears. M. Ouvrard, who had compromised' the company by 'hazardous speculations, was perfectly calm. He endeavored to persuade Napoleon that he ought to permit him to wind up himself the very complicated affairs in which he had involved his partners, and that he should bring over from Mexico, by way of Holland and England, considerable sums, and far superior to those which France had advanced. "It is probable that he would have managed the winding up of these affairs much better than any other persou; but Napoleon was too much In- censed, and too Impatient to get out of the hands of speculators, to trust to his promises. He left M. Ouvrard and his partners the alternative of a criminal prosecution or the immediate surrender of all they possessed, whether stores, paper securities, immovables, or pledges received from Spain. They submitted to this cruel sacrifice. "This was sure to prove a ruinous liquidation for them, but they had rendered themselves liable to it by abusing the resources of tEe treasury." 412 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Schindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, at Delhi, at Lassavary, and at Assey by Lake and Wellesley, and the submission of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, and of Holkar, had increased the subjects of the English company to forty millions, and their disciplined forces, including Sepoys and Europeans, to two hundred thousand men! Here was a power threatening the subjugation of Asia. All Europe took up arms to prevent the union to France of some valleys of the Apennines; but no one troubled himself about the progress of the English power in the East and in the Gulf of Mexico! To obtain my object, required time and peace; but an honor- able peace: one that would not deprive France of the means of accomplishing her ends. This could hardly be hoped for, when we think of the violent hatred against me breathed by the English journals, whose inevitable result was to embitter my feelings of hostility. I had not, like Hannibal, sworn in my infancy eternal war against the enemies of my country, but I had to avenge my- self for the numerous personal attacks which had been instigated by the English government. I felt that their attacks were di- rected against my person as much as against France; that I had to prepare for a contest without end; in a word, that I must make my cause triumph or die; the future grandeur of France was not less interested in it than my own honor and my repose. MARITIME EXPEDITIONS OF THE FRENCH. Not being able to contend with her either by great fleets or by means of a descent, I determined to strike England wherever I could reach her. Encouraged by the operations of Villeneuve in the Antilles, I ordered to sea one half of our fleet at Brest in two squadrons; the first, under Vuillaumez, was to go to the assist- ance of the Cape of Good Hope, and to throw in there a garrison of French troops; the second, under Leissegues, was to do the same at Santo Domingo, where General Ferrand had alone sustained, for three years, all the efforts of the blacks and mulattoes. After doing this, these two squadrons were to cruise for prizes. The last reached its destination and landed the troops; but, attacked by Admiral Duckworth in the roadstead where the ships were repairing, it was taken en flagrant delit; the superb ship Imperial. of one hundred and thirty guns, assailed by three hostile ships, was defeated; to prevent her being taken, they ran her aground. The Diomede suffered the same fate; three others fell a prey to the English. Vuillaumez, hearing* during his passage, that the Cape of Good Hope had fallen after eight days' attack into the power of THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 418 Popham and Baird, who bad landed there, made sail for Martin- ique : my brother Jerome served with him as capilaine de vaisseau. Soon afterward, chased by the three squadrons of Warren, Stra- chan, and Lewie, Admiral Vuillaumez detached the Veteran, om- manded by my brother, to return to France to inform me of his position and the- loss of the Cape. This ship made rich prizes off. the Azores, but was overtaken by a part of the enemy's cruisers on the coast of Brittany, near L'Orient. Vuillaumez's squadron encountered a violent storm and was dispersed; the admiral reached Havana with his ship; three others were cap- tured or burnt, and only one returned to our ports. More fortunate in the Indian seas, Admiral Linois there captured rich prizes, and for a long time sustained the Isle-of- France. But in returning to Europe after the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, he fell, by night, into the midst of a squadron of the enemy and was taken, after a brave defense, with the Marengo, which he commanded. MEANS OF OPPOSING ENGLAND ON THE CONTI- NENT. The unfortunate issue of these last naval operations confirmed me in the opinion that it was necessary to resort to more powerful means against England. It was necessary to find on the continent the means of striking her power and her com- merce; in subjecting to my influence the coast countries, I might some day have sailors and ships; and in the mean time by the possession of these coasts I would close all access to the monopoly of my enemies. The surest means of effecting this was by close alliance with the continental powers; but how could I hope to effect this, with any unanimity, against the commercial interests of some and the ambition of others? The latter, humiliated by our victories, sought only for vengeance; the former prospered only by their maritime relations and the benefits of their neutral- ity. This want of unanimity rendered necessary the alliance of at least one of the powers of the first rank. I had just acquired proof that we could not grapple with the British Colossus, with- out some continental counterpoise against the coalitions which the Cabinet of St. James plotted against us, every time that it saw itself seriously threatened. It was only by this counterpoise that I could make auxiliaries of our continental forces, and direct a great part of the population and revenues of France to a mar- itime war. DIFFICULTY OF FORMING ALLIANCES. The alliance of 1756 with Austria had been formed by Louis XV. for this special object; and the family treaty with Spain, so creditable to 414 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. M. Choiseul, and soon extended to the reigning houses of Naples and Sardinia, had perfected the federal system of France. The treaty with the Cabinet of Madrid had been renewed; it was also essential to renew that with Austria. But could we attach to ourselves this power, beaten in a hundred combats and stripped by us of her preponderance in Germany and Italy? Had not the war of the Revolution established between these two ancient allies a rivalry, if not eternal, at least of long duration? Ought 1 to end this rivalry by stripping France of the fruits of her victo- ries, in order to enrich a rancorous power whose interests might have been the same as those of Louis XV., but whose principles and views were now so much opposed to ours? Russia, on whom England could inflict much injury, feared also the more immediate ascendency with which I threatened Europe, and armed herself against me; I could not now seek. her alliance, for we were at war. Prussia, enriched by her neutrality, hoped to see all the storms pass around her without being herself exposed to them; moreover, she alone would not have been sufficiently powerful to form the desired counterpoise. With her seven millions of inhabitants we could not oppose both Austria and Russia, without also em- ploying all the resources of France; but this would not accomplish my object. Although this power as an ally was utterly insuf- ficient to secure the continental equilibrium in a maritime con- test with England, yet in my contest with the North, as will be shown hereafter, Prussia was the most desirable ally to render us arbiters of Europe. The situation of France in the two cases was entirely different, as also was the influence to be exerted by Prussia. SYSTEM OF FEDERATE STATES. What course then re- mained for me to take? By surrounding France with many small states of the second order, united in a federation and interested by benefits received from us to fight for our cause, she would acquire a sufficient preponderance on the continent to render Austria and Russia less disposed to run risks of war; this would eventually enable me to direct all my power against England alone, and all my influence against her commerce. ADDITIONS TO THE FRENCH EMPIRE. Such were fhe true causes of the successive additions to my empire, and of the kingdoms given to the members of my family. It was not in- crease of territory that I desired, but the elements of power to oppose the power of the English and of their allies. In propor- tion as the British squadrons destroyed our fleets, or captured some colony in the two Indies, in the same proportion did I declare THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 415 the reunion of some province, to convince England that she would gain nothing by prolonging the war, and that each of her acquisi- tions would only tend to the increase of mine. This system was undoubtedly contrary to the principles of international law, as understood by publicists, which forbid conquests except where successions or marriages give legitimate claims; but it was not I who first set at nought these rules; Frederick the Great and Catherine 'had, forty years before, shown how they regarded the matter; and many others had done the same before them. More- over, the English claimed the right to do on the sea whatever Europe could not prevent As the most abusive force was the only public law which they acknowledged, why was I not entitled to reprisals on the continent? If the sea belonged exclusively to the power that had the greatest number of ships, why should not the land belong to the power that possessed the greatest number of battalions, and knew best how to use them for the general interest of nations? In accordance with the considerations here given, I resolved to profit by my great success in the campaign of 1805, to give a marked preponderance to my federate system! The kingdoms of Naples and Holland and the Confederation of the Rhine were the result. DEATH OF PITT. At the moment that I was laying the foundations of these new systems in consequence of the treaty of Preburg, I learned, on returning to Paris, the sudden death of the celebrated Pitt (January 23d). It has been said that the end of this great man was accelerated by the disappointment caused by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, which promised long prosperity to the empire which he had flattered himself would be overthrown. Be this as it may, the selection of his successor by the King proved that England required a change of system. Fox was placed at the head of the new administration. The choice of this orator, the well-known advocate of peace, was a good augury, although the position and individual opinion of a statesman is not always a sure criterion to judge of his conduct as a minister. Louis XU. once said that the King of France did not avenge the injuries of the Duke of Orleans; a minister taken from the ranks of the opposition would be unworthy to hold the reins of government, if he could say that the opinions of the orator at the tribune should be those of the chief of the adminis- tration. Pitt had also figured on the benches of the opposition before taking the helm of affairs. Nevertheless, the colleagues 416 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. given to Fox (Erskine and Grey) were also reckoned among those who had constantly inclined toward peace.* BLOCKADE BY A SIMPLE ORDER IN COUNCIL. How- ever moderate might be the views of these new ministers, they were, nevertheless, English; and by their side sat Grenville, Wind- ham, and Moira, whose sentiments were very different. One of their first measures was to declare, by an order in council of May 16th, the blockade of the ports of the Channel from Antwerp to Havre. This new idea of blockading ports by a simple order in council was absurd; it was the more untimely as I then had no forces on this coast I should have ordered immediate reprisals for this Algerine legislation, if new negotiations with the Cabinet of St. James had not determined me to postpone my vengeance v .t NEW DIFFICULTIES WITH PRUSSIA. The state of the continent was not so pacific as was thought; indications of a new storm, though distant, were seen at all points of the horizon. I had already received at Munich the unexpected news that the *Charles James Fox "was born In 1748, and was the second son of Lord Holland, so long the rival and opponent of the Earl of Chatham, father of William Pitt It is a little singular that the second sons of these great par- liamentary leaders should have inherited the talents, rivalry, and distinc- tion of their fathers, while the elder sons, who inherited the titles and estates, were men of inferior ability. Fox was Carefully educated and en- tered Parliament in 1768, before he was of legal age. In 1770, he was made one of the lords of the admiralty, and the next year a commissioner of the treasury. His early parliamentary efforts gave little promise of his future career; but in the debates on the war with America he displayed the high- est talents, both as a statesman and orator. From that time to his death, he acted, both in Parliament and In the ministry, as one of the great party leaders. William Pitt was born in 1759, eleven years after ibis great rival. He was carefully educated and entered Parliament very young. At the age of twenty-three he was appointed chancellor of the exchequer, and at twenty- four was made prime minister. He continued from this time to his death one of the party leaders, both In and out of Parliament Pitt died on the twenty-third of January, 1806, and his rival, Fox, on the fifteenth of the following September. fThis British order in council was not only a violation of international law, as determined by the publicists of Europe, but was in direct contra- diction to the definition of a blockade given by Great Britain In her treaties with foreign powers. In the convention of 1801 with, Kussla, it was stipulated that a blockaded port must have ships stationary or suffi- ciently near to constitute "an evident danger in entering." The same defini- tion is implied in treaties previously made between Great Britain and the Baltic powers, and with the United States; and in 1804 the board of ad- miralty Instructed the naval commanders and judges of the vice-admiralty courts la the West Indies, not to consider a port as blockaded unless It was actually invested. Halleck's Int. Law, ch. xzTIl., 7. Wheaton's Ulem. Int. Law, pt. lv., ch. ill., 28. THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 417 King of Prussia was unwilling to ratify the treaty of Haugwitz, without exceptions which totally destroyed its character. It waa true that, by an excess of excusable zeal, Haugwitz had acted contrary to his instructions, and perhaps had misinterpreted the orders of his master. The position of the King was very critical; he had just formed with England an agreement to protect her troops in Hanover, on condition that they would assist him if he should be attacked by France; this convention was even posterior to the treaty of Vienna, the latter having been signed on the fif- teenth of December, and the former concluded at Berlin on the twenty-second. Haugwitz did not reach Berlin with his treaty till the twenty-fifth, three days after the convention. The Em- peror Alexander proposed to the King to place at his disposal ail the Russian army, as had been agreed upon at Potsdam. To throw himself into my alliance, in violation of engagements just made, was not worthy of the character of Frederick William; he, therefore, gave Haugwitz a cold reception; but state interest overcame his scruples; it was necessary to decide either to accept the treaty or to sustain all alone the weight of my anger. THE CABINET OF BERLIN CHANGES THE TERMS OF THE TREATY. Influenced by his counsellors, the King took one of those intermediate courses which, instead of arranging matters, usually make them worse. He ratified the treaty on condition that he should temporarily occupy Hanover until peace; but that he would not yield his three provinces till England should sanction this acquisition. This was so unexpected that I had already ceded Anspach to Bavaria as an indemnity for the duchy of Wurtzburg, which had been exchanged with the Grand Duke of Tuscany for Salzburg, the latter having been given to Austria. It would have been better to wait for the ratification at Berlin before disposing of the ceded provinces; but the evil had already been done, and there was no remedy. In giving to the King a rich electorate far small provinces detached at a great distance from his monarchy, I had given to him three times the population and revenues which he had given to me; he would be no longer in contact with our frontiers, and thus exposed to be drawn into any new war which we might have with Germany or Russia. This certainly was the most ample reparation which I could possibly offer him for the violation of his territory. Could I have done better had I punished Bernadotte for obeying my orders? Was it necessary that I myself should go to Berlin with a rope about my neck, as formerly the emperors of Germany went to make the amende-honorable to Rome? It seemed to me 418 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. more simple for us to say, "We are natural allies; Hanover be- longs to me by right of conquest; in yielding it to Prussia, I shall aggrandize her at the expense of my most bitter enemies, the provokers of all coalitions; the interest of the monarchy and of France were in this case the same, and it was better to accept such satisfaction than for Prussia to expose herself to my victori- ous army, at a time when Austria was incapable of rendering her assistance, and the Russians too distant to act in time." MOTIVES OF THIS STEP. The moral reasons of Frederick William for refusing to accept the spoils of George III., with whom he was in the state of alliance rather than of war, were creditable to him. It was also evident that this acquisition could not be permanent, unless sanctioned by England at the declaration of peace. Occupation is the result of conquest; but the possession is made legitimate only by treaties or by long and undis- puted occupation. The country which Frederick William was to receive for his three provinces was certainly the most valuable; but then he might not be able to obtain an undisputed title, and might thus involve himself in permanent hostilities with England. NEGOTIATIONS OF HAUGWITZ. This disagreeable al- ternative resulted from the fault of Haugwitz, who, blinded, by the apparent advantages of his treaty, had not given sufficient care to drawing it up. He should have stipulated that if the cession of Hanover became a positive obstacle to the conclusion of a gen- eral peace, and the welfare of Europe required its retrocession to England, an equivalent indemnity should be given to the King of Prussia. This clause having been neglected, the King might still have proposed it to me, and it is probable that I should have ac- cepted it. If, on the contrary, I had refused it, the King would have had the option between war with me and the uncertain chance of 'having it with the English. If he had adopted the first course, he ought instantly, but silently, to have sent a negotiator to St. Petersburg to recall the Russians into Silesia, and to have treated with the Austrians; if he adopted the second, he should have accepted the treaty as it was, observing to me that if this determination brought on war between Prussia and England, the Cabinet of Berlin, decided to run all chances with me, would conclude an alliance offensive and defensive, which would secure to it a part of these chances if they should be favorable. But it was unable to decide, and of all parts it chose the one most ob- jectionable to me and least advantageous to Prussia, By a caprice still more incomprehensible, at the very moment when this cabinet was, by this conditional ratification, involving THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 419 its position toward me, it entered Hanover with one part of its army, and reduced the remainder to the peace complement, thus disbanding half its forces. It thought to arrange every thing by sending Haugwitz to me at Paris, to plead a cause which could not be sustained either in appearance or in reality. If the refusal which he brought me had been accompanied by a declaration of war, I should have understood it; but to accept the odium of an invasion of Hanover, and, notwithstanding this, to put every thing in question with me, was a proceeding which the most acute would find it difficult to explain. This incident, taken in con- nection with the progress of the anti-French party at Berlin, and the credit enjoyed by Hardenberg, a well-known partisan of Eng- land, whose subject he was (being a Hanoverian), and a thou- sand other circumstances, convinced me that, notwithstanding the noble character of Frederick William, I ought hereafter to be on my guard with Prussia. Except the cabinet, every thing at Berlin took a hostile aspect; the army, ashamed, it said, of the silly part it was made to play, demanded war at all hazards; numerous groups of officers had insulted the hotel of the pacific minister who had preferred the aggrandizement of his country to an untimely war; lieutenants of hussars wished to decide upon the great interests of the state.* A NEW TREATY. Far from allowing myself to be imposed on by this new event, I saw instantly the use I might make of it in my present situation and that of Europe, to strike a master blow; it was requisite that Prussia in fifteen days should enter into my new system and under my direct influence,, or fall before *Chrlstian Heiiry Charles, Count of Haugwitz, was born In Silesia In 1758. lie early engaged in diplomatic affairs, and succeeded Hertzberg as minister of foreign affairs and president of the Prussian cabinet. He was greatly distinguished as a diplomatist, but retired from public life after the battle of Jena, of which he was a witness. He died in 1828, after having been blind for some years. Charles Augustus, Prince of Hardenberg, was born at Hanover In 1750. In 1778 he was made privy councillor, and in 1790 minister of state. In 1795 he signed the treaty between Prussia and the French Republic. From that period till Haugwitz retired from public life, these two statesmen were at the head of parties: the latter, of that which favored an alliance with France; and Hardenberg, of that which opposed It After the overthrow of Napoleon, he represented Prussia In the Congress of Paris, and the Con- gress of Vienna, In 1814 and 1815. He was created a prince, and made president of the Council of State. He was present In 1818, at the Con- gress of Aix-la-Chapelle; In 1819, at Carlsbad; In 1820, at Vienna, at Troppau and Verona. Although opposed to the liberal party In Prussia, and in his latter years considered aa "the active agent of the Holy Alli- ance," he nevertheless deserved much credit for the abolition of feudal privileges in Prussia. He died in 1822. 420 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. my attacks. It was evident that the treaty of Vienna, mutilated of ten lines which destroyed its character, was null and void; I declared to Haugwitz that his cabinet had destroyed itself, and that matters must be submitted to a new negotiation. I required the instant surrender of the provinces which Prussia had given me in exchange, as I had already ceded Anspach; I obliged her to renounce the cession of twenty thousand inhabitants which Bavaria was to make her ^finally, I forced the Cabinet of Berlin to close its ports to the English. The same ministers who had rejected the treaty of Haug- witz negotiated between equal powers with reciprocal advan- tages, having no longer an army in hand, were too happy to treat even with these onerous conditions. I expected this result, for I had seen at a glance the position into which these wealr coun- sellors had precipitated the King; I, nevertheless, was surprised at their eagerness to commit this new act of condescension : I had constantly found Frederick William pursuing a course of wise policy; although the treaty of Potsdam had abruptly followed the 'hostile demonstrations of the Prussians on the Vistula, still there were sufficient motives for it in a violation of their ter- ritory, thus giving it the appearance of a well-marked policy; it even denoted a decision of character strong enough to promise a rupture instead of a denouement so favorable to my views; this victory of the pen in the treaty of Vienna had surpassed all my hopes. I had taken Europe without its cuirass, and the question now was to profit by this circumstance; an occasion soon pre- sented itself. OATTARO AND WURTZBURG. Hardly had the new treaty of February 15th been ratified at Berlin (eight days after), than new difficulties, resulting from two grave events, were likely to embroil me with Austria ; the Cabinet of Vienna, in ceding to me the Venetian Dalmatia, had engaged to give me the important port of the mouths of the Cattaro; it had merely withdrawn its own garrison from this place, and the Russians of the fifteenth division, stationed in the Seven Isles, having thrown in there a detachment reinforced by Montenegrins, so that we could get possession of it only by a resort to force. I demanded that Aus- tria should put me in possession of this port ; and, as I could not go by land from Venice to Dalmatia without passing by Trieste and Croatia, I claimed the right of passage which Austria had always given tto the Venetians. An event of a different nature in Germany was near embroiling us; the Austrians had sent their troops to take possession of Wurtzburg, which had been ceded to THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 421 the Grand Duke of Tuscany, not to the Cabinet of Vienna. This movement might have suited the ancient usages of the German Empire, but it did not at all agree with my projects for Germany. I ordered the march of the prisoners who were crossing Swabia to be suspended ; I incorporated in my army the battalione of the depots which formed the corps of reserve of Lefetovre and Keller- man,* winch increased it above the complement; I directed the Prince of Neufchatel (Berthier), whom I had left in Bavaria, not to turn over Braunan to the Austrians, and to capture such of their battalions as should dare to enter Wurtz-burg after receiv- ing notification to retire. A FEDERATION IN PLACE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE. My course was decided; certain of the alliance of Prussia, I wished to throw myself at the head of two hundred and fifty thou- sand men on Austria, who was now without an army, or to profit by my attitude to force her to execute her treaties, and, at the same time, to renounce the German Empire.f The firmness of my attitude and the completion of all the corps of my army im- posed on her so much the more as hers was in the greatest dis- order, and she had vainly waited for the arrival of the prisoners of Mack's army to effect its reorganization. The weak condition of this he must not employ threats or force, if her alliance should meet with opposition. In addition to the dissatisfaction which these obstacles gave to Prussia, the English, on the closing of the ports, had captured three hundred Prussian vessels; the ports were blockaded by Anglo-Swedish squadrons; the commercial class was in consternation, the mili- tary vociferated more and more; statesmen deplored the loss of that important article; the improvement of the linen fa/brics has been the object of constant solicitude; veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners; a code is pre- paring for the regulation of commerce; the school of arts and mechanics at Compiegne flourishes, and has been transferred to Chalons; others on a similar plan are in the course of formation; Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry; the war, changed 'into a contest for commercial inde- pendence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry; every one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encour- agement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the Emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendor so glorious a destiny. At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another a second is commenc- ing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through cen- turies, the successive ages of Francis I., of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., restored to life by the voice of Napoleon; fountains without number flow night and day In all parts of the cily, testifying, even to the humblest classes, the care which the Emperor bestows on their most trifling accom- modations. Two triumphal arches are already erected, or founded: one in the center of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory; the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest olty in the world. The tomb of Dessaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection In the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valor. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvas the glorious explofts of our armies, while the mind of the Emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has .selected for his antagonist the Demon of Ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the Empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge In the most essential subjects of public instruction.' " THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 487 Germany. If the government had attempted to stifle all the germs of discontent, it would have needed the revolutionary tribunal of Fauquier Tinville. Frederick William opposed to this torrent a firm and unshaken will; he could do nothing more. A single spark in this mine was sufficient to cause its explosion: this spark was soon furnished by my negotiation with England. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND. While laboring to enlarge the basis of my power, I did -not lose the hope of consoli- dating so many glorious works by a maritime peace, without which which my edifice could have no durable basis. The first overtures were the result of a fortuitous event, which was a good augury. One of those monsters who spring from civil wars; one of those wretches who think that the spirit of party or of sect justifies any crime; in a word, a French fanatic, ventured to pro- pose to Fox to assassinate me, and for this purpose to purchase a house on the avenue of St. Cloud, where I passed daily in a car- riage. Fox, more generous than the instigators of Georges Ca- dondal, expelled this man from the kingdom, and notified me of his infamous proposition. The resulting correspondence led to reciprocal explanations. There was much difficulty at first re- specting the form of negotiating, England wishing to treat in concert with Russia.; but it seemed to me improper to introduce a third power, with whom I had no particular difficulties to settle, especially as that power might throw its whole weight in the negotiation against me; I therefore declined the proposition; an intermediate course was agreed upon, by the Emperor Alexan- der's consenting to send, on his part, a negotiator to Paris. He sent me D'Oubril under pretext of an exchange of prisoners. In the mean time, Fox had demanded the release of Lord Yarmouth, who had been detained at Verdun in consequence of reprisals for French vessels seized before the war, and whose cargoes (not military) had been detained. In passing through Paris on his return to London, Talleyrand manifested to him the desire which we all had for peace; he told him, among other things, that we demanded nothing of the English, and that they could hope nothing of real interest from a war. Lord Yarmouth re- turned with instructions, and conferences were opened. It seemed that an arrangement would be made; the English them- selves proposed the state of uti-possidetis, and appeared satisfied with keeping Malta and the Cape of Good Hope;* they exhibited a disposition to give up the rest of the captured colonies. Unfor- *Thls place was taken from the Dutch By Admiral Popham and Gen- eral Balrd, on the 8th of January. 438 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. tunately, Fox was taken sick; Lord Spencer took the portfolio, and under pretext that Yarmouth had indiscreetly divulged the contents of his instructions, they added Count Lauderdale to the legation. The negotiation immediately began to retrograde. It was pretended by the English that in the first conferences the state of respective possession had been admitted, with the ex- ception of Hanover, which was to be restored to England. If the question had been settled in this way, I should have left every thing to the English; Malta, the Cape, Surinam, Demarara, Ber- bice, Tobago, and moreover, have restored Hanover, without ob- taining any thing in return! I declared these conditions incom- patible with my honor; and as I had just placed my brother on the throne of Holland, I could not begin his reign by stripping the Dutch of all their colonies. The case of Joseph was similar; I might as well recall him from the throne of Naples as to de- prive him of Sicily, the gem and the granary of that kingdom. I confess that I did not sufficiently appreciate what Eng- land would have to sacrifice in recognizing the basis of uti- possidetis of both France and her allies. I at length yielded the question of the colonies and of Hanover; but in exchange I in- sisted on Sicily. Perhaps I committed a grave error. I might have taken the English at their word of uti-possidetis except Han- over; and have immediately sent a skillful negotiator to Berlin to propose to the King to second me in the desirable work of peace, by accepting a compensation. It would have been suf- ficient that England promised not to interfere in the arrange- ment of this continental affair, provided her electorate were re- stored. But Lord Lauderdale would certainly have found some pretext for withdrawing the proposition when he found it accepted with so much haste on my part; indeed, he found suf- ficient excuse for contestations in the interpretation to be given to the basis of uti-possidetis. There was reason to believe that an attempt might be made to confine it to the French Empire, prop- erly so called, excluding all the states dependent on France. In fact, the English negotiator, in a moment of indiscretion, when discussing the affair of Sicily, said that so far from yielding this country, he had orders to demand the restoraton of Naples to Ferdinand IV. TREATY WITH RUSSIA. In the mean time M. D'Oubril had arrived at Paris to treat in the name of Russia; as we had no *Mr. Alison attempts to give to these negotiations a character and col- oring essentially false. The published correspondence Is very far from supporting hl assertions, which eeem to spring from Gals own prejudice, rather than a Just appreciation of the facts of history. THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 439 colonies for mutual cession, it was not difficult for us to agree; I demanded the restitution of Cattaro, which belonged to me, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Seven Isles; I promised the evacuation of Germany. A secret article authorized the exchange of Sicily for the Balearic Isles. The treaty was signed July 20th. The Emperor Alexander strongly reproved the conduct of his negotiator; D'Oubril was disgraced; the Council of the Empire declared that he had exceeded his powers, and the Emperor re- fused his ratification, without alleging any other motives. This refusal wounded me, for it disappointed my hopes. My journals made loud complaints. These are instruments used for produc- ing momentary effects. It would be absurd to judge of my senti- ments from the paragraphs of the gazettes; it is not in newspapers that history is written. If I had formed vast projects for the grandeur of France and of my empire, I was not so simple as to expect that these projects could be executed without exciting the enmity of my neighbors, who were interested in opposing the part which I wished to play. We have accused each other of ambition and exaggerated pre- tensions: this was a matter of course; but now, as the interest of the moment is past, it is well to render unto Csesar the things that are Caesar's. I doubt not, the Emperor of Russia in my position would have acted as I did; had I been in his place I should unhes- itatingly have opposed the projects of the French Empire on Ger- many. It was, perhaps, the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine that caused the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to refuse its sanction on the twenty-fourth of August. This pact had been formed on the twelfth of July, but it had not been published when D'Oubril signed his treaty on the twentieth. It was not till the first of August that a notification of it was given at Ratisbon. The Emperor Alexander judged correctly that, although we had no provinces for retrocession, he nevertheless could not re- main indifferent to the fate of states with which he was inti- mately connected. If the first duty of a state is its own security, the second is the security of neighboring powers whose existence is necessary for its own preservation. This rule is true, whatever may be the opinion of old writers on international law. The Emperor of Russia had, like me, guaranteed the acts of the deputation of the empire in 1803 ; he had been the guaranteeing power for the integ- rity of this empire since the treaty of Teschen in 1779; it could therefore hardly be expected that he would ratify a treaty con- cluded after the destruction of this empire, and therefore giving to 440 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. that act his implied sanction. Moreover, on the twentieth of June I had placed my brother Louis on the throne of Holland, and the Bussian policy might see in this something opposed to its future interests. It would be impossible to deny that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was interested in the independence of these north- ern traders who had so many relations with its ports, especially if the commerce of neutrals should ever again be respected. Be- sides, Russia had no particular interest in making peace, as war could not reach her. It has been said that D'Oubril declared that he signed the treaty of peace to save Austria, who was threatened with danger. I had ordered Berthier,on the sixteenth of July, to march my army on the Inn, if Austria should refuse to ratify the Confederation of the Rhine. It appears that this order, secret as it was, came to the knowledge of the Russian negotiator; but, what is not less remarkable, the treaty which he signed, reaching Vienna at the same time as the act of confederation, contributed not a little to produce the abdication of the Emperor of Germany; it there- fore had for me all the advantages of a real peace an effect di- rectly the opposite, undoubtedly, to what was anticipated. The motive of D'Oubril, as has been alleged in his justification, was wholly new; it certainly was a singular method of delivering Aus- tria from immediate danger, by binding the Russians for a certain time so as to prevent them from marching to her assistance. There is a mystery connected with this which time alone can clear up. MISSION OF SEBASTIANI TO CONSTANTINOPLE. Be- fore the conclusion of this treaty and before knowing what decis- ion might be taken at Vienna and at St. Petersburg relative to the Confederation of the Rhine, and under the apprehension of a new general conflagration on the continent, I had seen the ad- vantage of opposing to Russia a powerful diversion on the Dnies- ter. The thing did not seem easy; for it will be remembered that our relations with the Porte were near being compromised at the event of my coronation, and that Marshal Brune had returned from Constantinople without being able to obtain an open recog- nition of me as emperor. The corruption of the Divan, the recol- lection of our expedition into Egypt, and English influence had raised up obstacles which time alone could remove. Neverthe- less, the campaign of Austerlitz had very much increased our credit with the Porte, and given a high idea of what they might undertake with our support. Selim Til, loved France; he was more enchanted with our success, if possible, than the French THE CAMPAIffN OF JENA. 441 themselves, and resolved to send me an ambassador to congratu- late me on my ascension to the throne. Anxious to learn what advantage could be drawn from this disposition, I sent as envoy to Constantinople, General Sebastian!, an adroit, skillful, enterprising man, whose agreeable manners perfectly fitted him for a negotiator, and who, in the quality of a military officer, might be doubly useful in this mission if Turkey should eventually be drawn into the war. I, nevertheless, recom- mended to him great prudence, and gave him instructions re> specting his negotiation. These instructions, wholly pacific, di- rected him, however, to use his address to obtain the dismissal of the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, who were mere agents of Russia. I considered this not only the first step toward the restoration of our influence at Constantinople, but one well calculated to lead to war. I had no reason to repent it, for Se- bastiani perfectly accomplished this part of his mission, and the treaty of D'Oubril having been rejected, it procured me the de- sired diversion more happily and completely than I had antici- pated. The clause of the treaty which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire contributed, without doubt, to giye him more credit than his predecessors, and he deserved it. The .'occupation by MJarinont's corps of the little republic of Ragusa, a tributary to the Porte, was directed at this epoch; it was necessary for the occupation of Venetian Dalmatia and the mouths of the Cattaro, and to secure us from the attacks of the Greek population of Montenegro, incited by the Russian division of Corfu to take up arms against us; Marmont received orders to cause it to be occupied by the division of Lauriston. This step was represented by our enemies as a new act of hostility against the Porte; but it affected that power too indirectly, and was of too little importance, to be weighed against the advantages to be derived from an alliance with me. ATTACK OF THE ENGLISH ON BUENOS AYRES. Dur- ing these negotiations the maritime war was still going on; but the English, who had no rivals on the ocean after the battle of Trafalgar, made no very important enterprises this year. That of Admiral Popham against South America, without the orders of the ministry, was not carried on by means sufficient to produce any results. After the reduction of the Cape, Popham, having first received some reinforcements at St. Helena, landed Beresford at Buenos Ayres. This key of the River La Plata surrendered without resistance, on the twenty-seventh of July, and the Eng- lish captured some rich prizes; but two Frenchmen, in the service 442 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of Spain, organized the inhabitants, and, in concert with some royal troops which had retired into the environs, assailed the Eng- lish in the city and forced them, after a rude combat, to capitu- late on the twelfth of August Popham, two months afterward, attempted to take revenge by attacking Montevideo, but was repulsed. RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.- The news of these events had not yet reached Europe when the negotiations with England were broken off. As soon as Lauder- dale ascertained that Russia had refused to ratify the treaty, he demanded his passports, certain of having me embroiled with Prussia respecting Hanover, and perhaps with Spain for the Balearic Isles. The discussion on some of the accessories was continued till the end of September. Fox died on the thirteenth. Had he lived, it probably would not have changed the face of affairs, for I was placed, by the Confederation of the Rhine, on grounds where I could no longer hope to treat without making more concessions than had at first been demanded. Notwithstanding all the fine hopes to which it had given rise, never, probably, was there a negotiation more fallacious and more incomprehensible than this. Any one will be convinced of this by examining with a little attention what had preceded it, and what followed. The grand project of Pitt which had set Europe on fire in 1805, looked, according to the diplomatic notes themselves, at nothing less than the reduction of France to the limits of 1792. This was nearly the same as that proposed to me at Chatillon in 1814, when the enemy was at the gates of Paris. The battles of Ulm and Austerlitz had undoubtedly defeated this grand proj- ect, and changed the state of affairs on the continent; but, on the other hand, the battle of Trafalgar had placed England in a posi- tion relatively as advantageous as before. How then can we believe that the state of uti-possidetis could possibly enter into the head* of an English minister, only one year after this famous proj- ect, which in twenty lines disclosed the entire policy of the Cab- inet of St. James for twenty years? A government at the head of which figured Grenville and Windham, which in 1805 had re- fused to allow me the limits of the treaties of Amiens and Lun& ville did that government propose, in good faith, to recognize the annexation of Piedmont and Genoa to France? Did it con- sent that Holland and Naples should become, though not an internal part of my empire, yet subject to it like grand feuda- tories, whose sovereigns were not only members of my family, but THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 448 also high dignitaries of the French Empire, and in that quality subject to its jurisdiction? Finally, did they recognize the crown of Italy on my head, they who had wished to discuss the smallest changes made in 1800 in this peninsula? No, they never intended this in good faith! If any one has the least doubt on this subject, let him recol- lect the treaty of Bartenstein, signed in April, 1807, between Rus- sia and Prussia, and participated in by England. I had then in my power the entire monarchy of Frederick; I was in an attitude more formidable still than in 1806, and yet Russia and Prussia, allies of England, agreed never to lay down their arms till Ger- many should be delivered from my forces and my influence, and the crown of Italy placed on some other head. It is true that Fox thought neither as the minister of 1805, nor as those of 1807,' for at this last epoch it was Canning who directed the department of foreign affairs; but Fox could not make a peace against the wishes of the whole English nation: he treated neither for him- self only, nor by himself alone. Notwithstanding these views and motives of England, the truth of which can not be contested, I frankly confess that I man- aged my part of this negotiation unskillfully; even at the risk of giving but the half of Naples to Joseph, and of restoring the whole of it to Ferdinand, I ought, if possible, to have procured from Russia and England the recognition of my empire and of the establishments bestowed on my other brothers. I acted ill toward Prussia, by pronouncing several times on the fate of Han- over without even consulting her. Accustomed to success, I had no fears of a war with her; and, to tell the truth, the Confedera- tion of the Rhine appeared to me so important and the moment so opportune, that I was determined to brave the efforts of all Europe rather than renounce it. The English would perhaps have declined all question relative to the recognition of our es- tablishments in Italy, as they had already done at the peace of Amiens; but, I repeat it, this would have been a more just cause for continuing the war than the demand made for Sicily. PRUSSIA ABRUPTLY DECIDES ON WAR. Although the propositions relative to Hanover had no results, they never- theless produced at Berlin an explosion like powder. The Queen, Prince Louis of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Baron Hardenberg had been, since the treaty of Potsdam, at the head of the war party. They now had no difficulty in influencing the King, who had been able to calm public opinion only by the ad- vantages of the acquisition of Hanover in exchange for all the vexations which he had suffered. 444 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. They profited by these appearances of felony to incite all minds against me, without inquiring whether I would really de- mand back Hanover, and if, even supposing that I did, I would not have given Prussia ample compensation. They pretended to see in me only an ally of bad faith, who took back with one hand what he had bestowed with the other; a violator of territory, who arbitrarily disposed of what did not belong to him. They went even so far as to publish that I had bribed D'Oubril, and that, to induce his master to make peace, and to recognize me as emperor, I had proposed to him the partition of Prussia, giving Warsaw to the Grand Duke Constantine! It was not necessary to resort to such absurd stories to com- pletely turn heads which for a whole year had been in ebullition. Suddenly the Prussians recollect that they are the depositories of the glory of the great Frederick: the government which had restrained these impulses now sets the example. The King can see in this apparent loss of Hanover only the real loss of his mon- archy, of the last pledge of his security, of the personal honor of the King himself. It only remained for him to fall gloriously, or become disgraced as a coward. The general cry, "To Arms!" is heard from Potsdam to Konigsberg; war is decided on without even waiting for the cooperation of Russia. An alliance is nego- tiated with her, but they were unwilling to wait for her troops, as a war of honor allows of no delay. HER EXTRAORDINARY ULTIM ATUM. This long torpor is followed by romantic rage. General Knobelsdorf, who has replaced Lucchesini as ambassador at Paris, remits me an extra- ordinary ultimatum, wanting in the proper respect due to a great power. They summoned me: 1st, to evacuate Germany, commenc- ing on the day when the King could receive my answer and continuing without interruption; 2d, to detach Wesel from my empire; 3d, to send my answer before the eighth of October to the head-quarters of the King! Assuredly Scipio before Carthage would not have held more imperious language to the conquered! Any one would have thought that this was the day after the battle of Rosbachl The Cabinet of Berlin acted the more foolishly toward me in this matter, inasmuch as its interest was to gain time. If it had demanded, in suitable terms, the evacuation of Germany within a reasonably stipulated period, it would have acted rightly, and thrown on me all the odium of the aggression. In attacking me when I was engaged with the Russians and Austrians, the Prus- sians could have done me much injury; but to thus, unreason- ably and alone, declare war against me, was so extraordinary that THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 445 I could not, for some time, believe it. Nothing, however, was more true, and it became necessary to prepare for the campaign. FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY. I knew that the Russian army, cantoned on the Niemen, would be an in- evitable auxiliary; but this required time, and I might reach Ber- lin before it could; moreover, I hoped that Sebastian! would suc- ceed in inciting Turkey to war; for a treaty signed between Eng- land and Russia had given to the latter Moldavia and Wallachia, as the price of the efforts which she would make against France. But I was not a man to wait for the uncertain cooperation of Selim HI. before falling on my adversaries, who were now fully exposed to my attacks; I ordered the assembling of my army, and departed for Mayence. The sixth of October I arrived at Barn- berg. My army was one hundred and eighty thousand strong. The main body, composed of the five corps of Bernadotte, Davoust, Soult, Ney, Lannes, and the cavalry of the Grand Duke of Berg, assembled at Coburg and at Bamberg; my guard, under Lefe'bvre, took the road to Bamberg; Augereau left Frankfort to threaten the road to Cassel and then to incline to the right; Mortier assem- bled the eighth corps on the confines of Westphalia; my brother Louis, with fifteen thousand Gallo-Batavians, took the direction of Wesel; Marmont remained in Illyria with the second corps, charged with covering Ragusa, occupying the Cattaro, etc. POSITION AND PLAN OF THE PRUSSIANS. The Prus- sians had advanced into Saxony and induced the Elector to unite hi* troops with theirs. The Elector of Hesse-Oassel prepared to do the same. They posted themselves on the northern side of the forest of Thuringia. The corps of Ruchel of twenty thousand men formed the right at Eisenach. The principal army, of fifty thousand men, commanded by the King, and under him by the Duke of Brunswick, took position in the environs of Erfurth. The army of the left, commanded by the Prince of Hohenlohe, of about fifty thousand Saxo-Prussians, was concentrated on Blank- enhayn; a corps of this army was detached under the orders of Tauenzien, in order to cover the extreme left at Schleitz. NAPOLEON'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS. There were only three plans by which we could operate against Prussia: the 1st, by my left, debouching from Mayence and Wesel on Westphalia; but this would have been absurd; the 2d, to act in mass at the center by the road to Eisenach on Cassel or Leipsic; the 3d, to throw myself in mass by my right, to turn the enemy's loft nnd cut off the Prussians from Berlin by Hof and Gera, as I had cut off Mack from Vienna by Donawerth, and Melas by Marengo. It 446 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. was evident that this last was not only the best, but the only feasible plan. FAULTS OF THE PRUSSIANS. To avoid the catastrophe, there remained to the Prussians only two courses: that of falling, by the middle of September, on my cantonments which were scat- tered through Franconia, or of awaiting me defensively, with their forces concentrated on the upper Saale, supporting their left on the frontiers of Austria. I might have beaten them in front; but then they would have had a secure retreat on Dres- den and Silesia. They could have united with the Russians on the Oder, and thus have saved their monarchy. On the con- trary, they pushed forward their right to Eisenach, set down their center under Erfurth, and permitted their isolated left to remain in the environs of Schleitz. This was precisely what I desired. THEIE GENERALS. The King, in putting himself at the head of his army, had exhumed, as it were, the old generals of the seven years' war to serve him as guides; the Duke of Bruns- wick and Mollendorf were to lead the army to victory. The former, a vanguard general under his father, the great Ferdinand, had never, since that period, fought, except at Kaiserslautern against Hoche, where he had bravely defended his camp. A good administrator, valiant in combat, but timid in council, he had learned nothing during the past fifteen years, although these years had been rich in lessons for every military man capable of profiting by them. Mollendorf, not less brave, was equally un- skillful; age had paralyzed within him those qualities which had formerly given him so great a reputation, but age had not given him genius; genius is never the fruit of age or of experience. The Prince Hohenlohe and Massenbach, his right arm, had just enough mind and knowedge to select the false in war. In a word, there was not, in all that brilliant circle of the counsellors of Potsdam, a single individual who sufficiently comprehended my system of war to judge of the three simple hypotheses which I have men- tioned, and to conclude that it was by Coburg and Hof that I would turn my army, if they ventured to cross the Saale. They ran to their own destruction with a presumption that can hardly be described. Plunged in a lethargic sleep for the last ten years, they were so certain of driving us back to Mayence, that they made no preparations for putting in a state of defense the fortifications of their first line, not even those situated within a few marches of our cantonments; while I was piling up bastion upon bastion THE CAMPAIGN OP JENA. 447 at Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single camion at Spandau! On the other hand, their army was fine, well armed, and ad- mirably disciplined; the artillery was excellent, the cavalry had not yet forgotten Seidlitz and his immortal lessons; the staff was well instructed, but instructed in details, to the neglect of prin- ciples; so that, in fact, this army, so superb in appearance, was a body without a soul. VIEWS OP THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK. The Duke of Brunswick, in pushing forward his army to Eisenach, hoped to hurry along the Elector of Hesse, who had already assembled a contingent of twenty thousand men to reinforce the army. His project was afterward tc cross the debouches of Franconia on three points so as to fall on my line of the Main, where he imag- ined I would remain on the defensive. This was judging very singularly of my character, my position, and my former practice. How was it possible for him to suppose that a captain, who had thrown himself, with the rapidity of the eagle," before the united forces of Austria and Russia, would gc to sleep in rear of the Main, when opposing the isolated forces of a power of the second rank, especially when there were such strong motives for acting vigorously before the arrival of the Russians, and before the Aus- trians could be aroused to action? At the news of my first movements on Coburg, the Duke recovered from an illusion which proved all his simplicity of char- acter; he renounced the offensive, and resolved to concentrate his army near Weimar in order to await us in front. This con- centration was wise, but it should have been made on the left of Hof, instead of drawing this left wing to the corps-de-lataille, and thus opening the road which led directly to my object. NAPOLEON SEIZES THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATIONS. My plan was very soon decided on when I arrived at Bamberg and learned what had taken place about Erfurth. An ordinary general in my place would have been satisfied with defeating the enemy; I carried my views still further, and resolved to effect their total destruction. I arranged my plan to cut off their army from the heart of the Prussian monarchy, to turn them by the left, and establish myself between them and the Elbe. It was true' that in acting thus on their communications I should somewhat expose my own; but this could be done without danger, since we were superior in numbers, and by inclining from Gera to the west, I could cover the roads of Hof, Nordhalbein, and Coburg, which in case of reverse would carry me to Franconia. 448 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. My army penetrated Saxony on three routes: at the right, Soult,Ney,and a Bavarian divisioamarcJied from Baireuth by Hof on Plauen; at the center the Grand Duke of Berg, Bernadotte, and Davoust marched from Bamberg by Cronach on Saalburg; at the left, Lannes and Augereau, setting out from Schweinfurt, took their direction by Coburg and Groffenthal on Saalf eld. The first engagement took place on the eighth of October. A Prus- sian detachment which attempted to defend the Saale at Saal- burg was driven away by the Grand Duke of Berg; the next day my column of the center, pursuing its way, found at Schleitz the corps of Tauenzien. Bernadotte attacked it, gaining a decided victory. My left also began with success. On the tenth, Lannes attacked, at Saalfeld, the advanced guard' of the army of Hohen- lohe, commanded by Prince Louis of Prussia. The enemy was beaten and lost a thousand men and thirty cannon. Prince Louis, a young man of great promise, not wishing to survive the shame of a defeat, preferred being slain : he had lived as a valiant knight, and he died like a hero. After having been my admirer this prince became my sworn enemy, because he deemed me dangerous to Prussia; his patriotism carried him astray, and not- withstanding what he did against me, I am happy to do him justice. I had expected greater resistance. The recollection of Fred- erick, of Seidlitz, of Leuthen, of Prague, had given me the "highest opinion of this army, and I had remarked to one of my officers at Mayence, that this campaign would not be like that of Ulm; that we should have earth to move in this war. These first victories undeceived me; they were a good augury for the campaign. I then felt that I could cheaply dispose of the Prussian army, which did not exhibit sufficient consistency to sustain tht weight of a great reverse. DECISIVE MANEUVER. By these first movements we had succeeded in turning the enemy's left by anticipating him on the twelfth at Gem; it was now my object to cut him off en- tirely. For this purpose my left served as the pivot for a grand change of front of the whole army. The thirteenth we occupied the following positions: Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat, with his light cavalry only, moved on Naumburg, where he captured considerable magazines intended for the Prussian army; Soult was in march from Gera on Jena; Ney at Roda; Lannes at Jena; Augereau at Kahla; a Bavarian division flanked my right by es- tablishing itself at Plauen. Before leaving Gera on the twelfth, 1 wrote a letter to Fred- THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 449 erick William to offer him peace. I intrusted this letter to an officer of staff, Montesquiou, with directions to take it to the King. This step was ill-judged; Montesquiou, if we are to believe Prince Hohenlohe, was arrested on the night of the thirteenth, by the outposts, traveling alone and without the usual precautions of a flag of truce; the Prince took him for a spy, and retained him near himself, sending the letter to the King, who did not receive it till the battle. It must be confessed that it was now rather too late, and difficult to avoid war. I nevertheless had two chances in writing this letter; either the King would make peace by subscribing to all my conditions, or he would persist in the resolution taken on leaving Berlin, to conquer or die. In either case it might serve to keep him in suspense on the night of the thirteenth, and the morning of the fourteenth, so that he might not having time to decide on making a forced march by night to avoid being taken in reverse. This was a justifiable ruse-de-guerre. I appeared the friend of peace while advancing to my object. This letter was not the worst maneuver of the campaign; if the King had received it as I had supposed, it would not have prevented him, whether he accepted peace or not, from marching with all his army on Freiburg. It then depended on him to save him- self militarily and politically. The date of this letter written at Gtera was sufficient to tell him to hasten his retreat and escape from the embarrassment by answering it. BATTLE OF JENA. The enemy, concentrated in the en- virons of Weimar, had no apprehension of my maneuvers till after their success; but at last, seeing that we were already masters of the road from that city to Leipsic, and of the magazines of Naum burg, he resolved to retreat in order to reach the Elbe before us. On the evening of the thirteenth, the King and the Duke of Brunswick, with the principal army, moved toward Sulzi. The Prince of Hohenlohe, charged with covering this m-irch, remained near Cappellendorf on the height of Jena; he was supported by the corps of Ruchel, which fell back to Weimar. I took care not to give the enemy time to escape. Already in possession of his communications, I resolved to secure his ruin, by giving him battle. Although the defile of Jena, through which we had to debouch, was difficult, it was not an obstacle to us who had crossed the St. Bernard and passed the rock of Bard; Lannes. in pursuing the advanced guard of Tauenzien toward Jena, had had the audacity to climb the mountains of Landgrafenberg, and to place himself on the summit opposite the Prussian army, which I myself discovered encamped on three lines. I did not know 450 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. that it was divided; I believed that it would fight in one body ac- cording to the system of Frederick. I hurried the march of my guard, and made it climb, at ten o'clock in the evening, a very steep path to the plateau of Closwitz, which it was important for us to occupy as a kind of tete-de-pont, to enable us to ascend the mountain and debouch from this chasm; Soult followed near by; he arrived during the night on my right, and Augereau on my left; Ney bivouacked at Roda. Supposing the entire army of the King to be collected on this point, and that his left extended in the direction of Apolda, I ordered Bernadotte to march to Dornburg, and Davoust to move from Naumburg by the left of the Saale on Apolda, in order to fall on the extremity of the enemy's line and take him in reverse. Murat joined me at Jena with his light cavalry. These disposi- tions were good for the position I supposed the enemy to occupy; but if I had foreseen that the King of Prussia would attempt to pierce by Naumburg, and that Bernadotte had already reached there, I should not have exposed Davoust alone to sustain th< shock of the mass of the enemy's forces, and have sent Bernadotte away to Dornburg, where he was equally useless to me and to Davoust. On the fourteenth, at break of day, the combat began. The night had been cold; a thick fog obscured the horizon; we could hardly see two steps before us: this was a double good fortune to us, since the enemy could not discover whether we were yet in readiness on the plateau. I mounted my horse at eight o'clock, and, riding in front of Suchet's division, I exhorted his battalions in these words: "Soldiers! This proud Prussian army is turned, like that of Mack at Ulm; it will now fight only to find means to retreat; the corps which shall allow it to escape will be dis honored!" The advanced guard of Prince Hohenlohe was driven back by Lannes, from the defiles of which it still held the head; we possessed Lutzerode and Closwitz. At the noise of this com- bat, Hohenlohe raised his camp of CarpelLendorf and advanced to meet us on Vierzehnheiligen. For two hours I satisfied myself with this feeble success, merely keeping up the combat till the arrival of my cavalry and the three corps which I was expecting, ey, by a deplorable excess of zeal, dissatisfied at being in reserve in rear of Augereau, attacked alone, with three thousand men of the elite, the whole Prussian line of Vierzehnheiligen; he suf- fered for an hour the whole fire of the enemy, and forced me to sustain him by Lannes. This premature attack v^xed me the more, as I still supposed that we were dealing/with the entire TUB CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 451 army of the King, concentrated on this point. At length, the columns of Soult and Augereau having at last debouched, as also the main body of Ney's corps, I renewed the attack: the Duke of Dalmatia threw himself on the left of Hohenlohe, Ney and Lannes on the center toward Vierzehnheiligen, and Augereau on Iserstedt. The victory was not for a moment doubtful ; the whole Prus- sian line was completely routed. Ruchel, arriving from Weimar with the reserve, out of breath, had not sufficient coup-d'oeil to perceive that affairs' were in too bad a state for him to repair them with his twenty thousand men. Instead of limiting himself to covering the retreat of Prince Hohenlohe, he had the impru- dence to engage himself against the main body of my army, and being unable to take us in flank he met us in front. His troops were defeated and he himself severely wounded. His defeat only added to the enemy's losses. The flying foe was closely pursued and thrown beyond the Ilm, which they passed below Weimar. This city was occupied by our troops the very night of the battle, though situated six leagues from where it had commenced. BATTLE OF AUER8TADT. While we are gaining the vic- tory at Jena, Davoust obtained at Auerstadt a no less signal suc- cess against the army of the King. The latter had put himself in march the night before to gain Naumburg and Freyburg. The division of Schmettau, which led the march, advanced to Ger- stadt, and his reconnoitering parties, pushed into the defile of Kosen, made prisoners of a similar reconnoitering party sent out by Davoust. The Duke of Brunswick, being informed of the pres- ence of this marshal's corps at Naumburg, persisted in the opinion that it was merely a detachment of partisans; instead of pushing forward Schmettau to Kosen the same night, he left him in posi- tion and caused to bivouac the two other divisions and the reserve between Eberstadt and Ranstet; the head-quarters were at Auer- stadt. It may be inferred how little the King expected the fate that awaited his army, when it is known that the Queen even remained there, with an inconceivable security; he had great dif- ficulty in inducing her to return to Weimar. In the mean time the Duke of Brunswick, informed of the existence of a corps of our troops at Naumburg, and knowing that there was a road from the plateau of Kosen directly to Freyburg on the Unstrutt, hoped to reach that city without being obliged to fight his way through our troops. He ordered, for the next day, Schmettau's division to establish itself on the heights 452 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of Kosen, and to protect the march of the four other divisions which would defile in its rear. This was very well for his escape, if Davoust had remained immovable at Naumburg; but even sup posing the King's army had thus effected its escape, what must have become of Hohenlohe's corps of fifty thousand men, thus deserted in the midst of our army? If they had wished to steal away, ought not Ho'henlohe to have been directed to march in the night on Suiza with his infantry in order to effect a junction there with the King and to render the operation more certain? This was the only means by which the army could be saved from im- pending ruin. The division of Tauenzien and all the cavalry of Hohenlohe should have remained in the camp of Capellendorf to mask the march, and even if the ten battalions should be com- promised alone, they ought still, at daylight, to have taken the road to Erfurtih, or even have followed ithe King by that of Eckartsberg. It is evident, however, that the Duke of Bruns- wick understood much better how to get an army into difficulty than to devise the means of extricating it?) v<^ The King's army moved at break of day; the fog, of which we have already spoken, retarded its march. Nevertheless, the division of Schmettau, arriving near Hassenhausen, encountered the division of Gudin which Davoust had sent during the night to secure his debouch from the defile of Kosen. An hour more, and it would have been too late; our troops, crowded into the defile, would have never been able to effect a debouch, but would have been roughly handled. Davoust, having reconnoitered the ground the night before, and having received my orders at two o'clock in the morning, proposed to Bernadotte to march with him by Kosen on Apolda, and even offered him the command of the two corps. The order of the Prince of Neufchatel to Davoust was to the effect that if the first corps had already joined him, they should march together; but this phrase toad not been repeated to Berna- dotte. The latter insisted on the literal wording of his order, to march on Dornburg. All that his colleague could say to convince him was useless; he in fact took the road by Camburg. This ob- stinacy, which it is difficult to explain, was very near compromis- ing the corps of Davoust and preventing the success of the battle, as we shall soon see. The King of Prussia had repaired in person to the division of Schmettau, and, impatient at the fog which prevented him from seeing what was going on around him, he directed Bliicher to advance with two thousand five hundred horse and charge the troops which had debouched on the plateau. Gudin had just THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 453 arrived with his column near Hassenhausen; our light cavalry op- posed itself to the superior cavalry of Bliicher and was forced back; but the brigade of Gauthier now had time to form its squares; the King ordered them to be charged; but the artillery placed on the road, and sustained by the infantry, rendered vain all the efforts of Bliicher and his squadrons. This unexpected resistance frightened the Duke of Bruns- wick; he wished to put his army in battle array and wait the clear- ing up of the fog. The old general, Mollendorf, pretended that we had there only a flying corps, and that it ought to be driven back into the ravine of Kosen. The King, being of the same opinion, ordered the divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange to cross the ravine of Auerstadt. It was a great fault that, after having resolved to take the initiative, they did not cause this defile to be passed during the night; the Prussian army would have then reached, in good order, our columns while in march. Wartensleben, who debouched on the first, formed on the right and attacked the left of Gudin. At the same time Bliicher, having advanced on Puucherau, found himself in rear of our right flank, and charged it with as much vivacity as the fog, which had begun to clear up, would permit. The moment was decisive. Davoust, placing his squares checkerwise, assisted by Gudin and the heroic firmness of his infantry, repelled several successive charges. Bliicher had his horse killed under him; his squadrons, finding in all directions a barrier of iron and a murder- ous fire which strewed the ground with their brave men, took in disorder the road to Eckartsberg. The arrival of Friant's divis- ion on the right secured our success on this point. But Gudin was soon assailed on the left by the troops of Wartensleben; Schmettau, who had already lost half his men, was sustained on the two flanks by the Prince of Orange. It was now nine o'clock; the Duke of Brunswick resolved on a general attack on our left; he put himself at the head of the divis- ion of Wartensleben. The immovable Gudin held firm against this new effort, notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers. The attack was not very vigorous, though courageously made; the Prussians sought too much to preserve their lines and dis- tances, as though they were on parade. Our soldiers, squatting behind the hedges, the little ditches, the willows, nnd the gardens which surrounded Hassenhausen, poured into them a murderous fire of musketry. Several battalions fell back, and the Duke of Brunswick, in endeavoring to rally them, was mortally wounded; Schmettau experienced the same fate; Wartensleben had his 454 LIFE OF NZ.POLEON. horse killed under him. Deprived of its chiefs, the Prussian line hesitated and halted, but did not fall back. Gudin was likely to be defeated, when the division of Morand appeared on the plateau, and directed itself to our left. This powerful reinforcement of fresh troops, ardent for the fight, was decisive. The Prussians, having been driven out of Hassenhausen and unable to make a stand in rear of that place, the King resolved to make another charge of cavalry like that of Bliicher in the morning. Prince William executed with courage several charges against the troops of Morand, arranged in squares by battalion and disposed check- erwise. The devotion of this prince, carried to obstinacy, failed against the formidable front presented by our brave infantry; arrested in his progress by the close array of our bayonets, and exposed to a murderous musketry and the grape of our batteries, the Prince, himself being wounded, was unable to check the dis- order of his squadrons; a part fled on New Suiza and a part on Auerstadt. Friant, on his side, penetrated as far as Tauchwitz, turned the left of Prince Henry and the extremity of the enemy's line. No sooner was Morand clear of the enemy's cavalry than he threw himself on Eehausen. The King was found in the hottest of the strife; one horse had already been killed under him; showing great courage and sang-froid, he himself directed a part of his reserve against our left, but, beaten in flank by the artillery and infantry with which Davoust had crowned the Sonuenberg, it was impossible for him to restore the combat and prevent Morand from carrying RehP'isen. Disorder and confusion were beginning to appear in the Pi issian infantry. Davoust judged that this was the moment to strike the de- cisive blow: the heights of Eckartsberg commanded the enemy's left; the possession of this gave us at the same time the tactical and strategic point of the field of battle, since it secured the direct road to Freyburg and closed the enemy's only line of retreat. Gudin's division marched there by Tauchwitz and Gernstadt; that of Friant, by Lisdorf. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of their attack. The aged Mollendorf, being wounded by a ball, gave the command to Kalkreuth; but, as the last remaining portion of his reserve had been unable to check the attack on Eckartsberg, there was now not the slightest hope of restoring the combat; his trot>ps passed in disorder the deep ravine of Auerstadt. The King, ignorant of Prince Hohenlohe's defeat, ordered the retreat on Weimar; the ruin of his army would have been THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 465 complete if Bernadotte had executed even one half of what there was for him to do. Leaving Naumburg at three o'clock in the morning and arriving at Camburg toward six o'clock, he could still debouch from that place on Suiza, attack the King, and completely cut off his retreat; he preferred to continue his march on Dornburg, where the ravine of the Saale is much more difficult, so that he did not reach the environs of Apolda till night. Never- theless, his unexpected appearance on these heights, which at a distance flanked the road to Weimar, and the rencounter of the stragglers of Hohenlohe's corps, completed the despair of the Prussian troops, who fled in all directions. The King received in the midst of this catastrophe the letter which I had sent him on the twelfth from Gera, by M. Montesquieu, to avoid the war. A glimmer of hope seemed for a moment to animate his torn heart; he sent me Count Denhof, his aid-de-camp, to propose an armistice; but I could not now stop in my victorious career; the war, begun with a thunderbolt, would place Prussia at my feet, and I could treat only at Berlin. Such was the issue of the celebrated battle of Auerstadt. Frederick William could say with Francis L: "All is kst save honor" Although beaten by a corps inferior by one half, he could attribute it only to the inexperience of his troops and of his generals. Three, hundred and twenty-four officers slain or wounded, ten thousand men hors-de-combat, the Duke of Bruns- wick, Marshal Mollendorf, Prince William, Generals Schmettau and Wartensleben wounded or slain, proved that if they maneu- vered badly, they nevertheless fought heroically. The division of Gudin had alone three thousand five hundred men and one hundred and thirty officers hors-de-combat, an enormous loss, being one half the force present. No better proof can be given of the intrepid countenance which it opposed to the successive efforts of the enemy; Davoust and all his other soldiers rivaled them in glory; they won indisputable claims to the admiration of posterity. No battle in all the wars of the Revolution offers a contest so disproportionate, with a success so brilliant. I could hardly believe the reports, which I regarded as very exagger- ated, but which the Prussian accounts proved to be moderate. Davonst had purchased this victory with the blood of seven thou- sand brave men; but happily a good number of them were only slightly wounded, and more than half returned to the ranks.* Alison, In giving an account of this battle, with tola usual disregard of facts, and readiness to accuse Napoleon of falsehood and meanness, nays: "Napoleon's official account of this battle of Jena, In the fourth bulle- tin of the campaign [It was the fifth bulletin], Is characterized by that 456 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. EXTRAORDINARY RESULTS OF THESE VICTORIES. The night following this double battle was not less fatal to the Prussians than the battle itself. The army of the King, taking, in disorder, the road to Weimar, met near Buttelstedt the fugi- tives of the army of Hohenlohe, and the confusion was then at its height. Prince Hohenlohe had reached Wipach almost alone. Nothing had been provided for the retreat. To make no provis- ions for the case of a retreat is one of the greatest faults which a general can commit; even where one can gain battles as I did, this neglect is hardly pardonable. Undoubtedly he ought not to render these dispositions public, but he ought to prepare a rally- ing-point for a corps which may be momentarily cut off. The two chiefs were hors-de-combat, the third in flight; there was no one to remedy the evil. The different corps crowded upon each other, mingled together, and then dispersed; never was there so deplorable a scene, except the night after the battle of Waterloo. Some took the road to Erfurth; others to Colleda, the main body reaced Sommerda, but in horrible confusion. Blucher, coming from Colleda to Weissensee with six thousand horse, found himself anticipated there by Klein's division of dragoons; but he saved himself by declaring that an armistice had extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and increasing jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, wliioh, in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible." After pointing out his meanness, jealousy, and neglect of Davoust, he quotes the bulletin itself as proof of these charges, thus: "On our right the corps of Marshal Davoust per- formed 'prodigies.' Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a run- ning flf/ht for three leagues," etc., etc. Now what will the reader think of Mr. Alison's veracity when he flnds that not only are his charges in this case utterly untrue, but that he has falsified the language of Napoleon in order to give plausibility to his malignant accusations? The sentence which he translates, "but maintained a running fight for three leagues," etc., is in the original, "mais mena battant pendant plus de trois lieues," etc. Instead of treating Davoust with neglect, he mentioned him with unqualified praise In his short and hasty bulletin, placing ihis name before all the other mar- shals, made him Duke of Auerstadt for his heroic conduct on that occasion, and to honor him still more, designated him as the first to enter the Prus- sian capital thus showing to the whole army his right to the precedence. Moreover, a few days afterward, in reviewing his troops on the road to Frankfort, he called Davoust and his officers around him and addressed them in terras of the highest respect and admiration. Davoust, deeply nffected by the approbation and generosity of the Emperor, replied: "Sire, the soldiers of the third corps will always be to you what the Tenth Legion was to Caesar." Both he and his corps showed in many a hard-fought field how much they were gratified with the manner which Napoleon had taken to prove his "falsehood," "unceasing Jealousy," and "reprehensible mean- ness," and we doubt that there was a man in the whole army who would not have been delighted at similar 'proofs of neglect. THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 457 been concluded. Kalkreuth, hotly pressed at Greusen by Soult's corps, tried to use the same stratagem, but he was attacked and defeated; he gaine.d Sondershausen in a deplorable state. Hohen- lohe there rejoined the remains of his forces. Mollendorf, who had taken refuge at Erfurth with six thousand men and eight thousand wounded, was there surrounded by Murat and Ney. The governor of this place, susceptible of a good defense, capitu- lated the next day, and even surrendered the two citadels which commanded it. The operations of a single day had decided the fate of the Prussian monarchy; we already had in our hands sixty coloTrs, two hundred pieces of field artillery, and twenty-five thousand prisoners. But to give the enemy no time to reorganize his forces, it was necessary that we should not give him a moment's rest; I took my measures accordingly. Although the Duke of Brunswick had manifested the design of concentrating his forces, he had either not done so, or had begun to do it so unskillfully that his army had been taken en flagrant delit. While one half of- his army had fallen at Jena and another had fought in retreat on Freyburg and Naumburg, two other corps under the Duke of Weimar and General Winning were marching on the other side of the forest of Thuringia and to Eisenach; a fourth corps of fourteen thousand men formed a reserve under the Duke of Wiirtemberg, at Halle. The thunder- bolt which had just struck the Prussian army, thus situated, would have consequences the more grave as there was no chief, and the King himself had not a moment to lose if he hoped to regain the capital and the Oder; each of his corps had to save itself as well as it could. Here Bulow could have found a fine model of eccentric retreat! Hohenlohe and Kalkreuth saved themselves by Hartz on Magdeburg. The first was there to take the command in chief, rally all he could find, and march on the Oder toward Stettin; but he was forced to describe the arc by Magdeburg, and, as we held the chord of this arc, we could have anticipated him at any point, had it not been for the difficulty of passing the Elbe. While Murat, Soult, and Ney followed him on Nordhausen, where his rear guard was cut to pieces, I took, with Bernadotte, Lannes, Davoust, Augereau, and my guard, the road to Dessau, in order to pass the Elbe at that place, to direct myself on Berlin, to cut off the enemy from the Oder, and at the same time to seize on the enemy's capital and communications. The result of these marches, well combined, and rapid as light- ning, ought to find favor even with the detractors of my glory; 458 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. but how can we expect that blind men should appreciate my sys- tem of war, when even the Duke of Brunswick could not under- stand it? COMBAT OF HALLE. Bernadotte encountered, at Halle, on the seventeenth of October, the corps of reserve under the Duke Eugene of Wiirtemberg. This prince had just received indirect news of the battle of Jena, with circumstances so terrible that he could not believe it. He was waiting for two thousand men of his corps who were on the march from Magdeburg on the left bank of the Saale by Sandersleben; whether he was surprised, or Whether he could not venture to cut the bridge on the Saale be- fore the junction of this detachment, he was so abruptly driven back by Dupont's division that he had not time to complete his dispositions to gain Magdeburg as he had intended. To assail the battalions left at the bridge of the Saale, to enter pell-mell with them, was, for pur troops, the work of but fifteen minutes; the main body of the Prussian corps, encamped in rear of the city, committed the foolish act of attempting its recapture; a very warm combat ensued. Dupont debouched by the Leipsic gate, sustained by Rivaud and the cavalry of Tilly, which attacked the enemy in the direction of Neumarkt, and gained possession of the road to Magdeburg. The enemy could not long hold out against the superiority of Bernadotte, who, to complete the victory, en- deavored to cut off the road to Dessau; the Duke exerted himself to save this last communication; he succeeded in doing so, and put himself in retreat, closely pursued by the columns of Dupont and Rivaud. He passed the Elbe at Dessau, and, after having imperfectly burned the bridge, reached Magdeburg, weakened by the loss of thirty pieces of cannon and five thousand men. The regiment, which was approaching by the left of the Saale, com- pletely surrounded in the defile of Krollwitz by Drouet and the cavalry of Tilly, were made prisoners. This contest of twelve thousand Prussians against the supe- rior forces of Bernadotte was favored by the excellence of the post, but the result did no great honor to its defenders. The Duke would have done much better by sending to the absent reg- iment an order to save itself at Magdeburg as best it could; he could then have destroyed the bridges of the Saale, and retaken, untouched, the road to Dessau and Wittenberg. This would have retarded our march for two or three days, and have saved the corps of Hohenlohe and Blticher, and the place of Stettin. MARCH ON POTSDAM AND BERLIN. At the same time Davoust, who had entered Leipsic on the eighteenth,. took* the THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 459 direction to Wittenberg, and my head-quarters followed to the same place. Considerable captures of English merchandise were made in this rich city. Lannes marched to Dessau; Bernadotte descended the Saale as far as Bernburg and Achersleben, and received orders to throw a bridge across near Zerbst, so as to cut off the corps which he had just beaten, but which had already- taken refuge under Magdeburg. Lannes caused the bridges of Dessau to be restored, and Davoust, followed by Augereau, en- tered Wittenberg, on the twenty-third, without resistance. A feeble Prussian detachment found there had the mal addresse to set fire to the bridge without burning it. We immediately di- rected our march on Potsdam, and entered this place on the twenty-fourth. VblT TO THE CABINET OF FREDERICK THE GREAT. It would be difficult to describe my feelings in ascending the steps of the palace of Frederick, and in visiting, at Sans-Souciv the places immortalized by the great king. For seven years he had resisted the attacks of half of Europe; in fifteen days his mon- archy had fallen before my eagles: thus move the affairs of nations, according to circumstances and the men who preside over their destinies. I found in his cabinet his music-desk, and another on which was the "Art of War" by Puisegur. The book was open at the chapter entitled du port de I'epee: it was here, un- doubtedly, that Frederick had been reading. My surprise was extreme at finding here the gorget, the sword, the belt, and the grand-cordon of his orders, which he had worn in the seven years' war. Such trophies were worth a hundred flags, and to forget them is proof of the disorder and stupor which reigned through- out Prussia on hearing of the disaster which had befallen their army. I sent them to Paris to be deposited in the Hotel dea Invalides; many of these old soldiers were contemporaries of the disgraceful defeat of Rosbach; I was proud to s<>nd them these proofs of the signal vengeance I had taken for that defeat* *Tlie following is Thiers' description of Napoleon's visit to Potsdam and Sans-Soucl: "Having waited to allow hl corps-d'armfe to get the start of him a little* Napoleon set out on the twenty-fourth of October, and passed through Kropstadt on his way to Potsdam. Performing the journey on horseback, he was caught In a violent storm, though the weather had continued very fine ever since the opening of the campaign. It was not his custom to stop for such a reason. However, he was offered shelter In a house situ- ated amid woods, and belonging to an officer of the hunting establishment of the court of Saxony. He accepted the offer. Some females, who seemed from their language and dress to be of elevated rank, received, around a great flre, this group of French officers, whom, from fear as much as out 460 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. On the twenty-fifth of October, Davoust entered Berlin, where we found a superb arsenal and immense stores of provisions. Our march had been so impetuous that the capital had not re- ceived a single courier from the army, and was in nearly the same state as when the King departed. They had carried off the ar- chives, but they had left all the instruments of war. The same day the fortress of Spandau, which they had been so imprudent as to leave unarmed, surrendered to Marshal Lannes. They found eighty pieces of cannon in the arsenal and one thousand two hun- dred men as the garrison. I marched at the head of my guards of politeness, they treated with much civility. They seemed not to be aware who was the principal of these officers, around whom the others respectfully ranged themselves, when one of them, still young, seized with a strong emotion, exclaimed, 'That is the Emperor!' 'How came you to know me?' asked Napoleon, dryly. 'Sire,' she answered, 'I was with your majesty in Egypt.' 'And what were you doing in Egypt?' 'I was the wife of an officer, who has since died in your service. I have solicited a pension for myself and my son, but I was a foreigner, and could no't obtain it; and I am come to live with the mistress of this house, who has kindly received me, and intrusted me with the education of her children.' The countenance of Napoleon, who was displeased at being recognized, stern at first, all at once assumed a soft expression; 'Madame,' said he, 'you shall have a pen- sion; and as for your son, I charge myself with his education.' "The same evening he took care to affix his signature to both these resolutions, and said, smiling, 'I never yet met with an adventure in a for- est, in consequence of a storm; here is one, however, and a most agreeable one.' "He arrived in the evening of the twenty-fifth of October, at Potsdam. He immediately went to visit the retreat of the great captain, the great king, who called himself 'the philosopher of Sans-Souci,' and with some reason, who seemed to wield sword and scepter with a jeering indifference, as if in mockery of all the courts of Europe, one might venture to add, of his own people, if he had not taken so much pains to govern them well. Napoleon went through the great and little palace of Potsdam, desired to be shown Frederick's works, crowded with Voltaire's notes, sought to dis- cover in his library on what books he was accustomed to feast his great mind, and then went to the church of Potsdam, to Inspect the modest tomb where rests the founder of Prussia. At Potsdam -were kept the sword of Frederick, his belt, his order of the Black Eagle. Napoleon seized them, exclaiming, 'What a capital present for the Invalides, especially for those who have formed part of the army of Hanover! They will be delighted, no doubt, when they see in our possession the sword of him who beat them at Rosbaoh.' Napoleon, in seizing these precious relics with so much respect, most assuredly offered no affront either to Frederick or the Prus- sian nation. But how extraordinary, how worthy of meditation is that '-mysterious concatenation which binds, blends, separates, or brings togeth- er the things of this world;! Frederick and Napoleon met here In a very strange manner. That philosopher king, who, unknown to himself, had been from his elevated throne one of the promoters of the French Revolu- tion, now lying in his coffln. received a visit from the general of that Revo- lution, become emperor and conqueror of Berlin and Potsdam! The victor at Rosbach received a visit from the victor at Jena! What a sight! Un- fortunately, these reverses of fortune were not the last." THE CAMPAIGN OF JENA. 461 to Charlottenburg to sustain Lannes; I remained there the twenty- seventh, in order to direct measures for the pursuit of the corps of Hohenlohe. NAPOLEON ENTERS BERLIN. I made my entrance into Berlin on the twenty-eighth; I had already made a triumphal entrance into Milan, Cairo, and Vienna; but nowhere had I been received with so much empressement as by these Prussians Who had so much declaimed against me without Baking the trouble to ex- amine the causes of these complaints. They received me rather as a liberator than as a conqueror,,/ In truth the lourgeoise class, so numerous and respectable in the German states, regarded me as the defender of the principles which had triumphed in the Rev- olution; jealous of the pretensions of the nobility, this class had taken no part in those petty and absurd stories that had provoked the war.* *Thlers, speaking of Napoleon's sojourn at Berlin, says: "There was in Berlin Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great Frederick and father of Prince Louis, as well as the Princess his wife. There was also the widow of Prince Henry and two sisters of the King, one lying-in, the other 111. Napoleon went to visit all these members of the royal family, with all the signs of profound respect, and touched them By testimonials coming from so high a personage, for there was not then a sovereign whose attention had so great a value as his. In the situation to which he had attained, he knew how to calculate his slightest tokens of kindness or severity. Exer- cising at this moment the right belonging to all generals in time of war, that of intercepting correspondence, to discover the movements of the enemy, he seized a letter from the Prince de Hatzfeld, In which he ap- peared to Inform Prince Hohenlohe of the position of the French army around Berlin. The Prince de Hatzfeld, as head of the municipal govern- ment established in Berlin, had promised upon oath not to attempt any thing against the French army, and to attend solely to the quiet, safety, and welfare of the capital. It was an engagement of loyalty toward the conqueror, who suffered an authority which he could have abolished to subsist for the benefit of the conquered country. The fault, however, was very excusable, since It proceeded from the most honorable of sentiments, patriotism. Napoleon, who was apprehensive that other burgomasters would imitate this example, and that, In this case, all his movements would be revealed from hour to hour to the enemy, resolved to Intimidate the Prussian authorities by an act of signal severity, and was not sorry that this act of severity should fall upon one of the principal members of the nobility, accused of having been a warm partisan of war, but accused falsely, for the Prince de Hatzfeld was of the number of the Prussian nobles who had moderation because they had understanding. Napoleon sent for Prince Berthler, and ordered Marshal Davoust, on whose severity he could reckon, to form a military commission, which should apply to the conduct of the Prince de Hatzfeld the laws of war against eaplonnage. Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution adopted by Napoleon, endeav- ored In vain to dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulalncourt. and Savary, not presuming to hazard remonstrances which seemed misplaced from any other lips than those of the major-general's, were alarmed. Not knowing to what means to resort, they hid the Prince In the very palace, 462 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. OPERATIONS OP HOHENLOHE. The campaigns of Jena and of Ulm will some day serve as models to teach generals the art of concentrating their forces at the proper time, and then to divide them after the blow has been struck. The destruction of the Prussian army was so extraordinary that to explain it I shall be obliged to enter into details. While I was marching on Berlin, Murat, Soult, and Ney had pursued the debris of the Prussian army on Magdeburg. The King, correctly judging their desperate condition, took the road.to the Oder, and left the command-in-chief to Prince Hohenlohe, with the care of reorganizing the army under the cannon of this im* portant place. The thing was impossible without his being be- sieged there; for Soult had followed with so much impetuosity that the rear guard had scarcely entered the camp under Magde- burg when Legrand's division threw itself on the enemy, driving every thing within the place, where there reigned the greatest confusion. Prince Hohenlohe here learned the issue of the combat of Halle, and my march on Dessau and Wittenberg; he nevertheless upon pretext of 'having him arrested, and then informed the Princess de Halzfeld, an interesting person, and who was then pregnant, of the danger which threatened her husband. She hastened to the palace. It was high time; for the commission, having assembled, was applying for the evidence. Napoleon, returning from a ride in Berlin, had just alighted from his horse, the guard beating the march; and, as he crossed the threshold of the pal- ace, the Princess de Hatzfeld, conducted by Duroc, appeared all in tears before him. Thus taken by surprise, he could not refuse to receive her; he granted her an audience in his cabinet. She was seized with terror. Napo- leon, touched by her distress, desired her to approach, and handed her the Intercepted letter to read. 'Well, madame,' said he, 'do you recognize the handwriting of your husband?' The Princess, trembling, knew not what to reply. Presently, however, taking care to cheer her. Napoleon added, 'throw that paper into the fire, and the military commission will have no evidence to convict upon.' "This act of clemency, which Napoleon could not refuse after he had seen the Princess de Hatzfeld, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice for him, be- cause II was part of his design to intimidate the German nobility, particu- larly the magistrates of the towns, who revealed to the enemy the secrets of his operations. He learned subsequently to know the Prince de Hatz- feld, appreciated his character and his understanding, and was glad that he had not given him up to military Justice. Happy the governments that have discreet friends, who contrive to delay their severities! It is not necessary that this delay should be long, before they have ceased to pur- pose acts upon which, at first, they were most resolutely bent." Alison's account of this affair is discolored by prejudice, and full of errors. He says that Napoleon ordered Prince Hatzfeld "to be seized and executed before six o'clock that evening." On the contrary, Napoleon ordered him to be tried by a military commission for violating the laws of war. Again, Alison says: "If the Prince had been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm vre had been within reach, I should have marched on Tapian, and placed the enemy in a frightful situa- tion ; but the rest of my army, with the exception of Ney's corps, had suffered so much that I deemed it more prudent to give it repose and wait the reduction of Dantzic, before resuming the offensive. Bernadotte entered into line two days after, and also the cuirassiers of Nansouty. The corps of Lef6bvre, directed on Osterode, might already be considered as a reserve. Independ- ent of these reinforcements, I still expected the ten thousand grenadiers which Oudinot was marching from Warsaw on Pul- tusk and Willenberg. Such was the cruel battle of Eylau, so interesting in the extraordinary circumstances that accompanied it, and so little decisive in its results. At eleven o'clock, Soult had suffered much, and Angereau's corps was comparatively destroyed. All had been lost but for the stand which I made for three hours at the cemetery of Eylau, at the head of my guard, my cavalry, and my artillery, which I directed myself. The army will not THE CAMPAIGN OF 1807. 497 refuse to bear me witness that I was not the least moved by the critical position in which we were placed until the arrival of Davoust. I could have wished -to see by my side, on this occa- sion, those of my detractors who liave- accused me of wanting courage and presence of mind.* THE FRENCH GO INTO WINTER QUARTERS. The en" emy had forced me to leave my winter quarters. I had no desire to make a winter campaign. I was waiting for reinforcements, and especially for a supply of artillery and munitions. I, there- fore, returned to my cantonments. The Passarge covered our left; the center was on the Alle, from G-uttstadt to Allenstein, and the right by the Omulef. I established my head-quarters at Osterode, and afterward at the chateau of Finkenstein. Ber- nadotte, on the left, occupied Holland and Braunsberg; Soult encamped at Wonndit, Liebstadt, and Mohrungen; Ney was iu advance on the Alle, at Guttstadt, and Allenstein; Davoust OD the right at Hohenstein and Gilgenburg. The cavalry was dis tributed among these corps, the better to cover the cantonments. Lef^bvre returned to the investment of Dantzic. *LQ speaking of the results of the battle of Eylau, Alison evidently seeks to exaggerate the French loss and to diminish that of the Russians. His statements are exceedingly erroneous, and are not sustained by relia- ble authorities. He estimates' the Russian loss at twenty-five thousand, and that of the French at thirty thousand. Thiers estimates the Russian loss at seven thousand killed, twenty thousand wounded, and three or four thousand prisoners; and that of the French at three thousand killed and seven thousand wounded. The following is his note explaining these estimates: "It is seldom that one can state the losses sustained in a battle with such accuracy as one Is enabled to do for the battle of Eylau. I undertook a careful examination, in order to arrive at precfsion, and here follows the truth, at least as nearly as it is possible to attain it in such a matter. The inspector of the hospitals certified the same evening, at Eylau, the exist- ence of four thousand five hundred wounded, and next day, after going his rounds In the adjacent villages, he increased the total amount to seven thousand and ninety-four. His report has been preserved. The reports of the different corps make the number of men more or less severely wounded amount to not fewer than thirteen or fourteen thousand. This difference is explained by the manner In which the authors of those reports under- stood the word "wounded." The chiefs of corps Include even the slightest contusions, each of them naturally striving to make the most of the suffer- ings of hla men. But half the men set down as wounded never thought of applying for any attendance, and this is proved toy the report of the director of the hospitals. A month afterward a curious controversy was kept up by letter between Napoleon and M. Darn, who could not find more than six thousand wounded in the hospitals of the Vistula. This appeared dis- putable to Napoleon, who conceived that there must be more, especially if there were included in this number the wounded- of the battle of Eylau and those of the actions which preceded It. after the breaking up of the cantonments. However, after minute examination, there were never found 3* 498 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. COMBAT OF OSTROLENKA. At the moment when I was establishing myself in rear of the A lie, the divisions which the enemy had left on the Narew, reinforced by that of Moldavia, attacked my right. Lannes was sick; Savary commanded his corps; fortunately for him, Oudinot, who was in march to^join me by Willenberg, had orders to sustain him in case of need, and arrived at the required point. A Russian division was mov- ing along the right bank of the river; Savary, seconded by Suchet, met and drove it back. At the same time two other divis- ions attacked Ostrolenka by the left bank. The enemy pene- trated momentarily into the city; our troops drove him out, and debouched to give him combat; the affair turned to our ad- vantage. The Russians retired with the loss of seven cannon and one thousand five hundred men, among whom was young Suwarof. This was the last event of this winter's campaign. DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION. I wished to profit by the inaction rendered necessary by the unfavorable season, to reduce the places which I had left in rear, and thus to strengthen me in my position. I had consumed almost all my artillery munitions; they were brought by post from Magdeburg and Custrin; it required time to replenish them. The superiority of the enemy's artillery had induced me to send to France for all the disposable companies of artillerists, and I had given them Prussian pieces, in order to use the ammunition which we had found in the Prussian arsenals. I even directed French pieces to be cast to the Prussian calibers, for the same purpose. I also expected more than fifty thousand men from my depots, and from more than six thousand and some hundred, and fewer tlian six thousand for Eylau Itself, which, taking account of the deaths that supervened, agrees exactly with the statement of seven thousand and ninety-four furnished toy the director of the hospitals. We think, therefore, that we are near the truth in computing the losses of the battle of Eylau at three thousand killed and seven thousand wounded. Napoleon, speaking in the bulletin of two thousand killed, and five or six thousand wounded, had, as we may see, Bot warped the truth much in comparison with what the Russians had done. One may even assert that, in the evening after the battle, he was founded in supposing that there were not more. As for the losses of the Russians, I have adopted their own amounts and those which -were certified by the French. We found seven thousand dead, and in the surrounding places five thousand 'wounded. They must have carried away a much greater number. Both, a German, says that they carried to KOnlgsberg fourteen thousand nine hundred wounded, who almost all died .from the cold. He admits, moreover, that they had seven thousand killed, and left five thousand wounded on the field of battle. Add three or four thousand prisoners, and you arrive at a total loss of thirty thousand men, which *can scarcely ibe disputed. General Benningsen, always very Inaccurate, admitted in his statement a loss of twenty thou- sand men." THE CAMPAIGN OF 1807. 499 my allies of the Confederation of the Rhine. This epoch of repoee in the middle of old Prussia and Poland is one of the most remarkable of my life; it was not the least critical, nor the least glorious. The visit of Baron Vincent and General Neuperg, envoys of Austria to Warsaw, to speak of mediation, gave me real appre- hensions lest she might send one hundred and fifty thousand of these mediators on the Elbe, which would have rendered my position very embarrassing. I saw my danger, and more than once regretted having allowed myself to be drawn into these distant and inhospitable countries, and having rejected the ad- vice of those who wished to turn me from it. The Cabinet of Vienna had, at this epoch, a more certain and honorable occa- sion to reestablish its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813. Buit it knew not how to profit by the occasion, and my firm attitude saved me. MENACES OF SPAIN. Even, Spain, on whom I had reck- oned with so much certainty, now added to the dangers to which I was exposed. At the very moment when I was hurling my thunderbolts against the Prussian army at Jena, Spain was threatening a rupture with me. The Cabinet of Madrid, which had to complain of my selling Louisiana to the Americans, and proposing to exchange the Balearic Isles with Sicily, was the less favorably disposed toward us, as the battle of Trafalgar had de- stroyed all hopes of advantage from our alliance. The Prince of Peace had been severely reproached by the Spanish merchants, who had suffered from the closing of the seas and the loss of their commerce with America; he now hoped, by a change of policy, to regain his popularity. This minister,* ignorant, as are most favorites at court, very *Don Manuel Godoy was born at Badajos, in 1764, of a noble bat poor family. He entered the body-guard of Charles IV., and soon became noted In the /talons of Madrid for his fine person and great talent for music, espe- cially bjfl skill on the guitar accompanied by his own voice. He owed to this talent his Introduction to the Queen, of whom he ever after continued a favorite. His advancement was now most rapid, first In the army, and afterward In the council of state, to which he was transferred. He was soon made prime minister, and received the title of Duke of Alcudla. After the treaty of Bale, In 1775, he was made Prince of Peace, and loaded with wealth and honors. The Queen compelled him, against his wishes, to marry one of the royal family, the Infanta Maria Theresa, daughter of Don Louis, the brother of the King. After the exile of Charles IV., Godoy accom- panied the royal family to Rome, where, he took up war became popular with the people. The English no longer entrusted their pro- tection to foreigners; they now took the matter into their own hands, and again appeared with strong armies on the continent. They were to have for auxiliaries all those whose interests were momentarily affected by my system, and this class was large. If a great maritime commerce is one of the first elements of wealth and prosperity, the freedom of the seas becomes the most neces- sary and valuable of all things, for every nation on the globe. This freedom of the seas was the main object of my Continental NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL B7STEM. 648 system; but people who preferred their present enjoyments could see, for the moment only the closing of their ports and the cessation of their traffic; future benefits were scarcely con- sidered. This explains the general hatred which was unchained against my system. Not only were all the ooaet countries tired of the war and the sacrifices it imposed on them; this feeling extended even to the heart of the continent. The clothe of Silesia and the fabrics of the confines of Bohemia went no longer to Cadiz, to be carried by Spanish flags to Mexico. The North no longer sold its grains to Holland, or purchased wines of us. The silks of Lyons could reach Prussia only by land; England and Sweden were reached in trade only by Archangel. The true cause of this evil was the maritime despotism of an insular power, which had the means of placing so many obstacles to the general welfare of the continent I had now grappled with this colossus, but the people whom it oppressed, instead of momen- tarily submitting to sacrifices in order to second my efforts, im- puted to me all the evils from which I was seeking to deliver them; so 'true is it that great national policy is above the under- standing of the merchant and stock-jobber. ITS INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY. The political branch of this Continental system offers, like the commercial branch, two points of view of equal importance: the first con- sisted in effecting with the neighboring powers, by means of alli- ances, treaties, and leagues, what I (had effected in France by de- crees the exclusion of English commerce; the second consisted in preparing, by the same alliances, the maritime and military means for attacking more directly the British colossus, when the favorable moment should arrive. We could attack in India by means of Russia, Persia, and Turkey; we might reach it in the Antilles, from Spanish America and the United States. Finally, we could attack it in Europe by the union of all the states inter- ested in overthrowing its maritime despotism. The treaty of Tilsit had not absolutely provided for all the combinations conducive to this result; but it had, nevertheless, done much in that direction. Since the English refused to re- spect neutrals, it was necessary that no one should be neutral; every one had necessarily to decide for England or against Eng- land ; our engagements, made on condition that this power reject- ed the mediation of Russia, would oblige the maritime nations to act in concert with us. Spain was at war with the English ; Tur- key had just declared war against them; Italy, with the excep- tion of the Court of Rome, which still held out, was subject to 644 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. my laws. Prussia had just broken with them. There was then only Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope to bring to terms, in order to entirely interdict to them all access to the continent, for we hoped that Denmark would hasten to join our system. Austria, indeed, offered more difficulty, but she 'had only the single sea- port of Trieste. From Venice I could control all vessels ap- proaching that port; and the Seven Isles rendered me master of the Adriatic. Moreover, Austria would hardly expese herself to a war with Russia and France for relations that concerned her less than any other continental power; she had neither colo- nies to regret nor products for maritime exportation. I could give her promises to indemnify her for any losses. If I should finally enter into the project of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Servia and Bosnia might serve as the price of her con- descension. I determined to bring her into my Continental system. ITS INFLUENCE ON MARITIME RELATIONS. In case England should refuse the Russian mediation for peace, it would be necessary not only to close against her all access to the con- tinent, but also to turn against her all the resources of the mari- time powers. Europe could still oppose to her one hundred and eighty ships of the line viz., sixty French, forty Spanish, twenty- five Russian, fifteen Swedish, fifteen Dutch, fifteen Danish, and ten Portuguese. In a few years this force could be increased to two hundred and fifty. By the aid of these means and our im- mense flotilla, it was not impossible to conduct a European army to London. One hundred ships, employed in the two hemi- spheres, would draw away a great part of the British naval forces, while eighty of the best vessels, united in the Channel, might secure the passage of our flotilla and avenge the outraged law of nations. Such was the fundamental principles of my system, which writers in English pay have taxed with folly ; the want of success of the project resulted, perhaps, from faults committed in its execution with respect to Spain. How is it possible to judge fairly of a project which was not adopted till the end of 1807, and failed the following year by the misfortunes which opened to the English on the peninsula and the American continent? Had it not been for the war with Spain, the whole continent of Europe and all the Spanish colonies would have been interdicted to English commerce; the naval resources of all the continental powers would have been directed against England ; I should have resumed my project of a descent from Boulogne with much greater chances of success. NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 645 MEASURES FOB ITS EXECUTION. The first means of reaching my object, in this double political and commercial re- lation, was to occupy militarily all the maritime countries where England had great influence, and where no sincere accession would be given to our system. Sweden, Portugal, and Home were of this class; Denmark was to be invited to accede to this system, and, in case of her refusal to be occupied like the others. England, who had eyes and ears everywhere, and whose gold discovered the most profound secrets of foreign cabinets, was informed of these dispositions as soon as they were made. In- stead of yielding to the tempest, she prepared herself to master it MEDIATION OFFERED BY RUSSIA. In the mean time the Emperor of Russia had hastened to send to London the offer of his mediation for peace, announcing that he had agreed with me, that I, on my side, would accept it, provided that England did the same within a month from the ratification of the treaty. The Cabinet of London consented to the mediation, bat would make no reply to the proposition till it should see the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit! It was in vain objected, on the side of Russia, that these articles were eventual, temporary; that the Emperor could not communicate them, inasmuch as he had promised secrecy, but that they were in no way prejudicial to England, since they ceased to have any force the moment the Cabinet of St. James decided on peace. The matter rested here, when the news of the English attack on Copenhagen filled Eu- rope with alarm. ENGLISH EXPEDITION AGAINST DENMARK. The great armament so long promised to the coalition was just ready to sail for the Baltic when peace was signed. Perceval and Can- ning deemed the moment opportune to employ this imposing force, now useless on the continent, against Denmark, who had opposed the pretensions of England, but was at peace with her. If a debarkation on the continent was impossible, such was not the case with the island of Zealand, where they could attack Copenhagen in spite of our legions, whose passage the English fleet might intercept by the Belt The expedition was, there- fore, directed against that city, and its success was deemed the more certain because Denmark, surrounded by belligerent troops on the side of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, had directed all her attention and forces on the side of Holstein, in order to secure her territory from insult The Cabinet of St. James alleged, as the motive of this un- just aggression, its knowledge of the secret conditions of the 35 546 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. treaty of Tilsit, in which we (France and Russia) had stipulated the conditional closing of the ports of Denmark, and the exclu- sion of the English from the continent. A fleet of twenty-nine ships, twelve frigates and five hun- dred transports set sail, on the twenty-seventh of July, entered On the fourth of August a port in the Sound and a port in the Belt, and landed an army of thirty-two thousand men, including the Hanoverians before sent to Stralsund. Lord Cathcart com- manded this expedition. /Under him was Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterward Lord Wellington/ This conqueror of Sohindiah and the Mahrattas, recalled from India by the laws of his country, here performed his first service on the European continent. An immense equipage and select troops furnished these chiefs the means of a successful enterprise. Jackson was sent to .Christian "VTL to propose to 'him a close alliance with England, and to de- mand the surrender of his fleet, to be taken to English ports, as a pledge of his sincerity! It was a repetition of the infamous demands made upon the Turks, but supported, this time, by more powerful means. The King, the Prince Royal, and the two Bernstofs, had too high a regard of their own dignity to accept what tthe Turks had repelled with indignation. If England had denounced the stipulations of Tilsit, and proposed to Denmark to join her in the defense of her territory, declaring war against her in case of her refusal, this step would have been more natural; but to impose on her the obligation of committing an act of base cowardice was rather too much ! On vague rumors, and a mere suspicion of what had taken place at Tilsit, the English were about to assail a government which had armed itself on the shore of the Trave, to oppose us. PREPARATIONS OF THE DANES FOR DEFENSE. The Danish government, though taken unprepared, showed itself no less noble than in 1801. The Prince Royal, who was in Holstein, flew to Copenhagen, through the midst of the English cruisers, induced the King to retire to G-luckstadt on the continent, con- fided the defense of Zealand to General Peymann, organized the provincial militia for the succor of the capital, then returned to the army of Holstein to hasten its arrival. During the com- munications between the authorities of the two parties, and while the English were constructing and arming their land batteries, these militia, numbering about ten thousand, advanced toward Kiogge; but being surprised there on the twenty-ninth of August, NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 647 by twelve thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, they were beaten and dispersed.* CAPTURE OF COPENHAGEN. The efforts of the English negotiator and generals having failed to accomplish their object, they declared, on the second of September, that they would bom- bard the city. Genera! Peymann had only a small number of troops of the line, but the bourgeoise militia of Copenhagen had taken arms with the same enthusiasm as in 1801. But this force could do nothing against the thunders of the enemy's fleet and land battalions; this beautiful city was soon set on fire; in three days six hundred houses became a prey to the flames, and a capitulation was the only means of saving the city from total destruction. In the mean time the Prince Royal had hastily assembled the army cantoned in Holstein, and marched it to the coast of Fionia. Vain hope! Tlhe passage of the Belts was cut off, the capital had already fallen, and the English had carried away their fleet of eighteen ships and twenty-one frigates or brigs. Not content with despoiling all the maritime arsenals, they de- stroyed the Danish ship-yards and all the utensils and machines used in building ; then, with their important but odious trophies, they returned to the Thames. The exasperation of the Danes was such that the Prince Royal sent an order to General Pey- mann to burn the squadron rather than surrender it. But the officer who carried this order was taken in his attempt to pene- trate into Copenhagen. Far from being discouraged by this misfortune, the King of Denmark, indignant at suoh treatment, swore desperate war against the English, closed his ports against them, ordered the cessation of all relations with them, and seized *This attack upon Copenhagen, without amy previous declaration of war, and without any just cause of complaint against the conduct of Den- mark as a neutral power, has been condemned by every impartial writer on that event. The English themselves do not attempt to Justify it on any other ground than that of expediency, a word so "frequently employed to cover injustice, dishonesty, and crime, by states as well as Individuals. The reply of the Prince Royal to the demand of the English to sur- render into their hands his entire naval force was a noble one: "No exam- ple Is to 'be found in history of so odious an aggression as that -with which Denmark is menaced; more honor may now be expected from the pirates of Barbary than from the English government" The injury to Copenhagen before the surrender -was very great. The principal churches and public buildings were In ruins; eighteen hundred houses were destroyed; fifteen hundred inhabitants lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. About three thousand five hundred pieces of artillery were captured, and the prize-money distributed to the British troops was about four million and eight hundred thousand dollars. 548 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. upon British subjects and property throughout all the kingdom. This venerable prince never returned to his capital, but died shortly afterward at Rendsborg, and it is thought that the chagrin he felt at these reverses contributed to accelerate his end. Assuredly, if the interest of state is sufficient to legitima- tize such an aggression, and if the Cabinet of London can, on this principle of great state policy, justify itself in the eyes of Eu- rope, it would have been just, at least, to treat my enterprises with more indulgence than has been done; for no one of them was so unpardonable as this, and none but were as necessary for the interests of my empire as this was for England. BRUNE TAKES STRALSUND AND RUGEN. As soon as I heard of the approach of the enemy's squadrons, I directed Brune to do every thing in his power to assist the Danes. After the peace of Tilsit, it was no longer for the interest of Sweden to remain in close alliance with England against France and Rus- sia combined; this was to expose herself to certain ruin. But Gustavus IV., consulting only his passions, and influenced by the success of the English against the Danes, whom he hated, did not fear to brave the threatening thunders, by himself breaking the armistice of Schlatkow. It is said that the promise of Nor- way and a part even of the Danish territory led him to adopt this extravagant resolution. , I ordered Marshal Brune to get possession of Stralsund. This place, easily supplied by sea, was capable of a long defense. Ghasseloup was charged with this siege, the means being sup- plied from the arsenals of Magdeburg, Berlin, and Stettin. The attack, begun on the fifteenth of August, on three fronts, was pushed with uncommon activity. The recollection of the fine de- fense of this place by Charles Xn., whom Gustavus pretended to imitate, was a powerful motive for him to hold out to the last extremity; but this prince possessed only the rashness of his an- cestor, not his genius. The Swedes complained, moreover, of the obstinacy of their sovereign. Abandoned by the English, who had concentrated their forces in Zealand, and touched by the remonstrances of the magistrates, he ordered the place to be evacuated, and Brune took possession of it on the twentieth of August, finding four hundred pieces of cannon and the forti- fications untouched. Fifteen days after, the island of Rugen was also ceded to us, in virtue of a capitulation requiring the Swedish army to retire to its own country and the fleet to leave the coasts of Germany. Stralsund was of no use to me for a continental war, but if I restored it to the Swedes, it might be NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 649 made a place of debarkation for the English ; I therefore directed Brune to dismantle it. RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST THE ENGLISH. The affair of Copenhagen was the most insulting answer that could be given to the Emperor Alexander's offer of mediation. Justly indignant, he declaimed with energy against this infrac- tion; but all his efforts being unable to prevent the spoliation of the fleet and the arsenals, it only remained for him to break off all relations with England, which he did by his manifesto of the seventh of November. After a long enumeration of griefs, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg broke off all communication with England, recalled its legation, interdicted all relations between the two countries, proclaimed the principles of the armed neutral- ity, and declared that it would reestablish nothing without first obtaining satisfaction for Denmark; it finally closed. with these words: "When the Emperor shall be satisfied on all pending points, and especially on that of peace between France and England, without which no part of Europe can hope for real tranquillity, His Imperial Majesty will then willingly resume with Great Britain the relations of friendship, which, under the circum- stances, the Emperor has already preserved, perhaps, too long." England replied by specious arguments, but without mani- festing any sincere desire for an accommodation. War was now inevitable. INTERCESSION OF AUSTRIA. The Cabinet of Vienna had already offered its mediation when the continental war was at its height in Poland. Invited to enter into the general league, it thought best to add its influence to that of Russia to induce England to make peace. If she should accept the proposition, it was thought at Vienna that this alone-would dissolve the for- midable league established under my influence. Two or three years of maritime peace would overthrow all the supports of this league, for it would then have no object. If, on the con- trary, England should refuse, and Austria should be drawn into a rupture, the Cabinet of Vienna flattered itself that it would obtain, on my part, a just indemnification; and to stimulate this expectation, I had already proposed to Francis L such parts of the Turkish provinces as he might desire. Consequently the Count of Stahremberg, Austrian minister at the Court of St. James, made strong efforts to induce the English cabinet to make concessions. 550 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING TURKEY. In the mean time matters took a more favorable turn for ue at Constantinople than I had anticipated, .which placed me in an embarrassing posi- tion in regard to Russia. The factionists who had dethroned Selim Boon disputed among themselves for the spoils. The mufti triumphed over the eaimacan by the aid of this same Cobak- chi, who, from an obscure chief of Yamacks, became for a time the regulator of the empire. Sebastiani was sufficiently adroit to secure hie support, so that he soon exercised over Mustapha part of the influence which he had had over Selim. The issue of the enterprises of the English against Egypt, and of the naval combat of Lemnos, was calculated to increase this ascendency. As soon as the war with England had been formally declared, the new captain-pacha, Seyd-Ali, desirous of distinguishing him- self, made 'Sail with a squadron of nine ships, passed out of the Dardanelles, and, on the first of July, offered battle to his adver- saries near Lemnos. The engagement was warm; the Russians, better instructed in naval tactics and better disciplined, broke the enemy's line, captured a vessel, and forced the captain^paciha to return into the Dardanelles ; but having suffered themselves, they returned to Corfu, where they soon learned of the peace o? Tilsit and of the armistice of Slobodza, Colonel Guilleminot, sent to the army of the vizier to nego- tiate this armistice, had concluded it on the twenty-fourth of August. Michelson was dead; his successor agreed to two articles which the Emperor Alexander rejected. Nevertheless, the evacuation of the principalities had commenced; the Turks violated the armistice by passing the Danube at Galacz, and by executing some Moldavian authorities established by the Russians. The latter, informed of the refusal of the Emperor to ratify the armistice and of the infraction of the treaty, promptly reoccupied the left bank of the Danube. But the treaty of Tilsit had completely changed the policy of the Cabinet of London in regard to Russia and the Porte; it immediately ordered the evacuation of Alexandria, and at- tempted to reestablish its relations with Turkey. Lord Paget endeavored to be admitted at Constantinople, but Sebastiani suc- ceeded in procuring his rejection. On the other hand, the Turks had accepted my mediation. I therefore was obliged to decide uipon the course I was to pursue. The good dispositions of the Divan 'had somewhat calmed my resentment against the perse- cutors of Sellm. Sebastiani, whose opinion I had asked respect- ing a partition, opposed the project with specious arguments; NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 561 should I renounce it, it would then be for my interest to act as mediator in order to conciliate the interests of the two nations from which I could derive equal advantages against my irrecon- cilable enemy, either to close the Black Sea, or to open to our- selves the gates of the East I felt that, perhaps, I had gone too far in my conversations at Tilsit; I directed Savary, who was on a mission to St. Petersburg, to enter into explanations respecting the future fate of Moldavia and Wallachia, and in regard to their evacuation, which the Turks insisted upon as a preliminary to any negotiations. The Emperor Alexander opposed to him my promises; the Chancellor Romanof objected on account of the effect which this evacuation would have on public opinion, wihich was already very unfavorable to the treaty of Tilsit; the cession of these two princi- palities was the only satisfaction which they could give to the nation for the sacrifices which this treaty had imposed. The po- sition was becoming delicate. If the expulsion of the Turks from Europe often excited my imagination, as an enterprise both chivalric and philanthropic, I also felt that state policy rendered this project somewhat difficult. I thought that the care and profit of it should not be left to Russia alone; and that if I did not participate in it, I ought not to encourage it. On the other hand, I was of opinion that, with the concurrence of these two powers, we could close the Black Sea and the Levant against the English. To attain this great object, I could not sacrifice the Porte to Russia, nor could I fully and openly espouse the cause of the Turks against Russia, with whom I had just so intimately connected myself at Tilsit Statesmen will comprehend the difficulty of attaining my objects with means so heterogeneous. The Cabinet of London, it is true, had succeeded, in 1799, in effecting this monstrous union of opposing elements, but all had then a common object the prevention of our establishing ourselves in Egypt and all old resentments were hushed till that object could be accom- plished. But my position was very difficult; I could only pro- pose my good offices to bring about a peace. This, however, was no easy matter; the Emperor Alexander persisted in demanding the principalities, and the Turks refused to discuss the subject so long ae the cession of these provinces was spoken of. It was to be feared that the mere proposition of abandoning the princi- palities would throw the Divan into the arms of England, al- though this power had promised them to Russia in 1806. In state policy, the past is forgotten, and only the present is considered. 552 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The entire year was passed in discussions on the single question of the place of negotiations; Russia wished to have them con- ducted in Moldavia; and I preferred to treat by myself at Paris. My object was to gain time, till I had executed my projects on Rome, Portugal, and Spain. If these projects should succeed, I should then be better prepared to pursue toward Russia the course which might seem preferable. DISTRIBUTION OF NEW TITLES OF NOBILITY Be fore relating what took place in these countries, it may be well to say a few words in regard to France and the new nobility which I had just instituted. I was induced to this measure by powerful motives. The scenes of Jena, Auerstadt, Pultusk, Eylau, Heilsberg, and even the victory of Friedland, had terribly thinned the ranks of my veterans of Boulogne; only the souvenirs of them existed in the regiments. The skeletons (cadres) were filled with young soldiers. I thought to stimulate them to new exertions by giv- ing a just recompense to their predecessors for the glory acquired by so much courage and resignation. Moreover, the position of my throne required that I should leave to my successor a respecta- ble class, interested in its maintenance. If a nobility be a doubt- ful support of thrones, and if it be true that nobles and priests are as factious as plebeians, at least this is not applicable to a new dynasty sustained by a nobility of its own creation. Equality of ranks, in an old state demoralized by luxury, is a monstrous idea; and, as I have said before, I had resolved to destroy this deplorable result of the Revolution; but, in establish- ing social supremacies which were demanded by good morals and good sense, I sought to maintain equality of rights, without which there is only abuse and injustice. The institution of my nobility could not injure this equality of rights. The right of transmitting from father to son the souvenirs of services ren- dered to the state is derived from the principle of property and is nothing more than justice. Why is it permitted to transmit in this way wealth, often unjustly gained, and not to transmit the most valuable of all riches honor? The establishment of an hereditary nobility was calculated to reconcile, in time, ne,w France with Europe and with old France. It was substituting a nobility acquired by illustrious services, for one which was founded only on feudal rights. All Europe was governed by nobles who were armed against the French Revolution, and we found them an obstacle wherever we sought to introduce our influence. It was important to bring NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL 878TEM. 553 this contest to an end. To secure the fusion of the two nobili- ties, I wished to reconstitute the old; I was ready to stipulate that any family which had had among its ancestors a marshal of France, or a minister, should be susceptible of obtaining ducal letters; an admiral, a lieutenant-general, an archbishop, wonld have established claims to the title of count, etc. It was sufficient to constitute the necessary majorats. This historical nobility would have combined the past, the present, and the future. A Montmorency would have been a duke, not because he was a Montmorency, but because one of his ancestors had been constable. Every citizen who faithfully served the state could aspire to the same grade and to the same title. This idea, like that of the Legion of Honor, was essentially liberal; the people attached to it no other meaning than that of reward for services rendered. Every one could merit it by services; all could obtain it at the same price; it was offensive to no one. The spirit of my empire was a movement upward an ele- vation. Such, indeed, is the character of all revolutions. This spirit pervaded the whole nation; it had taken up arms in order that it might rise. I placed at the head of this movement, and as its object and reward, great recompenses. They were the re- sult of public gratitude. They were to be kept in conformity with the spirit of equality, for the lowest soldier could obtain them by great deeds. The statutes of March 1st, which accorded titles, were pro- mulgated and produced a great sensation in France as well as in the army. I have never had the slightest reason to regret this measure. Perhaps the nominations were made too much in mass, and some of them without due consideration. If I had at first named only the marshals, and a hundred distinguished generals and colonels, reserving to myself the right of granting new titles and dotations, either after a battle, or every year at some great national festival, I should have possessed a strong means of stim- ulating powerful exertions; but this would have produced dis- satisfaction, and my object would not have been so well accom- plished. Nevertheless, I repeat it, the distribution was too gen- eral, and it was intrusted too much to deputies. The secretaries of Berthier became the dispensers of glory; they appointed by the Imperial Almanac, and there were found among the elect the names of colonels who had been killed a year or two before; certain generals, through accidental or intentional error, re- ceived double dotations. This depreciated, in public estimation, one of my finest institutions and one of my noblest conceptions. 654 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The Faubourg of St.-Germain did not fail to ridicule these nobles of new creation. Even the army was less pleased with the measure than I had anticipated. Some attached little value to titles against which they had contended with so much success; they pretended to accept them merely as an act of obedience; others regarded them as a burden difficult to be borne; and the nomination being made by grade, it was looked upon as a system rather than a personal distinction. The same objection had been made to the Legion of Honor. But this latter had a very differ- ent object; it was intended as a distinction for all kinds of merit; those who had gained this distinction had an incontesta- ble right to it; it was not a favor. It must be confessed, how- ever, that after an extensive distribution of this cross, I ought to have instituted one purely military. This I .thought to do by instituting the order of Trois-Toisons, a project which was after- ward abandoned. There are great differences in the several European systems of reward for public services. All have their abuses. Austria and England are sparing in their use; Russia is prodigal. The best is a medium between these extremes. I abandoned the order of the Trois-Toisons because the plan was objectionable. Ney, Davoust, and many other brave generals who were not present at my three entries into Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid, but Who had covered themselves with glory at a distance of fifty leagues, would have been excluded; this would have been un- just. Moreover, this institution would have awakened the dis- agreeable recollections of these powers which had now become my allies. But I might have instituted an order of merit ex- clusively military, in three classes, like the Legion of Honor; this would have been more acceptable to the army. SUPPRESSION OF THE TRIBUNAT. During this year the tribunat was suppressed.* Having already lost its considera- *The following history of the French tribunat is copied from the Encyclopaedia Americana: "The French constitution of December 15, 1799, projected by Bona- parte and Si&yes, committed the legislative power, though more in appear- ance than in reality, to a body (corps legislatif) of three hundred men, and a triltunat of one hundred members chosen by the conservative senate, from the three lists of candidates proposed by the departmental colleges. To the three consuls was reserved the right of Initialing laws; to the tribunat, that of deliberating on subjects thus proposed, and to the legislative body, that ot accepting or rejecting measures thus proposed by the first, and discussed by the second. The members of the council of state, as the mouth-pieces of the government, had a considerable influence in each body. The tribunat had also the privilege of expressing its wishes, and making representations to the government, and sometimes ventured to exercise this right. A trlbun NAPOLEON'S CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 565 tion by the elimination of its most distinguished members, this assembly was of no advantage to the progress of state affairs. The legislative body was sufficient for the discussion of projects of laws, and for afterward voting for their adoption or rejection. The senate, as an upper house, preserved the initiative of all great changes in public institutions, and a control over the meas- ures of the lower house. It was indeed a mute government, but experience had somewhat disgusted ue with the declamations of the tribune. France in 1814 and in 1815 lhas shown whether I was right in distrusting large deliberative assemblies, where passion rules more than reason, and which are always basely servile in flattering authority, or visionary and imprudent in opposing it was to be twenty-five years old, and .have a yearly income of fifteen thou- sand francs. The tribunal -was renewed every five years, by the reelection of one-fifth of its members yearly. The last voice of freedom in the tribunal was Carnot's speech in opposition to the election of Bonaparte, as emperor, in 1804. By the senatus-consultc organise of May 18, 1801, its general meet- ings were abolished, and it was permitted to meet only by sections, of which there were three (for legislation, home affairs, and finance). In 1807 the tribunal was suppressed." Many have supposed that the suppression of the tribunal was virtu- ally a prohibition of the liberty of discussing the laws prepared by the government. Such was not the case. It was simply a transfer of the right of discussion to the legislative body, which, under the constitution of 1799, voted silently and without any discussion whatever. By the present change that body recovered the faculty of speech, and was permitted to discuss the projet* de lots submitted by the government A part of the members of the suppressed tribunal were transferred to the legislative body, and the others provided with places in the various administrative departments. The details of these changes are very fully given in Thiers' "Consulate and Empire." 556 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. CHAPTER XIL AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL; FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE PENINSULAR WAR TO THE CONVENTION OF C-INTRA. Affairs of Spain Napoleon decides to occupy Portugal Treaty of Fon- tainebleau Junot occupies Portugal Dissensions in the Royal Fam- ilyTalleyrand urges a War with Spain Affairs of Italy Napoleon's Interview with Lucien The Milan Decree Difficulties with the Pope Napoleon's vast Designs in Italy Projected Transfer of the Holy See to Paris Occupation of Rome Annexation of Tuscany to France Difficulties in the Royal Family of Spain The French occupy the Spanish Fortifications Alarm of the Spanish Court The pretended Project of removing it to Mexico Political Explosion in Spain The Revolution of Aranjuez Murat enters Madrid Napoleon's Instruc- tionsInterview with the Spanish Court at Bayonne He resolves to place a New Dynasty on the Throne Objections to Napoleon's Plans His Reasons for adopting them Operations of Murat Insurrection of the Second of May Spanish Junta convoked at Bayonne 'Napo- leon's Conduct toward Ferdinand VII. General Insurrection in Spain Moncey driven from Valencia Insurrection in Aragon The Army of Galicia advances on Valladolid Joseph proclaimed King of Spain Dupant capitulates at Baylen Beginning of the Siege of Saragossa Retreat from Madrid Romana flies from Denmark Errors of the Campaign Junot's Position in Portugal General Interests of this Country Sacrifices imposed on the Portuguese General Insurrection in Portugal La/nding of Wellington and the English Army Junot evacuates Portugal Military Operations in the North of Europe. AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. It is time to direct our attention to the Iberian Peninsula, where a frightful revolution was about to take place. The negotiations opened with Portugal, in con- sequence of the treaty of Tilsit, did not prove successful; I ex- pected this, and my measures were prepared to terminate the matter with this vassal of England. Relying on the weakness of Godoy, I also had good reason to count on Spain, and de- termined to attach her more irrevocably than ever to my inter- AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 557 eats.* For this purpose it was necessary to give a new basis to our relations, so as not only to induce her to adopt the Con- tinental system with all my commercial regulations, but also to secure myself from any new hesitations on her part The famous and imprudent proclamation of the Prince of Peace had proved that this power adhered to France from fear, rather than from that strong community of interests which had presided at the family pact of 1762, and the treaty of San Ilde- fonso. If she made the least retrograde step from the system which she had heretofore followed, I might expect at any mo- ment to see her in the arms of England. What would then have been the result of all the efforts which I had made for the last ten years? It is true, as has already been said, that the Cabinet of Madrid had some reason for complaints respecting the Balearic Isles, and that the battle of Trafalgar had already disposed them to regret this alliance. The English party had daily gained strength since these events; of this I was not ignorant All who resided in the seaports, or who had an interest in Spanish Amer- ica, wished for peace with England. My difficulties with the Pope influenced the opinion of the clergy. Nevertheless, public opinion was still on my side, and all the public animadversions fell on Godoy. Although he had repaired his error toward me by sending the corps of Bomana to the North, I nevertheless felt convinced that I could not venture to count too much on the continuance of his blind devotion. These extraordinary threats of the Cabinet of Madrid had English and Spanish historians state that Napoleon's attempt to sub- Jugate Spain was planned at Tilsit. On the contrary, there seems to have been mo such design on his part; he was drawn Into It step by step by the political events which occurred from time to time. Thters, who has had an opportunity to examine unpublished French and Spanish documents on this subject, says: "I declare that all the historians who have represented the origin of Napoleon's designs upon Spain as dating so far back as Tilsit are mistaken; that all those who have supposed that Napoleon assured himself at TJlslt of the consent of Alexander to what he projected respect- Ing Madrid, and that he was In haste to sign the peace of the North, In order to return the sooner to the affairs of the South, are equally mistaken. At Tilsit Napoleon settled nothing but a general alliance, which guaranteed the adhesion of Russia to all that he should do on his part, on condition that Russia should be suffered to do what she pleased on hers. At this period, he did not at all consider it urgent to Interfere in the affairs of Spain; he was full of resentment on account of the proclamation of the Prince of Peace, promised himself to express his sentiments upon it some day, and to secure himself, but thinking at his return of nothing but Imposing peace upon England, by threatening her with complete exclu- sion from the continent, and of making use of the Cabinet of Madrid to bring the Cabinet of Lisbon into his projects." 568 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the advantage of discovering to me the precipice, not before perceived, but whose depth I now might sound. Not only my Continental system, but still more my maritime system, would fall, if Spain should ever join the interests of England. I had reason to fear this sooner or later, and especially so since what had just occurred. Not only was the prosperity of France warmly interested in this, but also my own dynasty. If Charles IV. had abandoned the Bourbon interest in France, what guar- antee had I that his successor would do the same, and that Godoy would not renew the foolish enterprise of 1806? What would become of me if, while in the heart of Pioland with all my forces, a French prince, assisted by one hundred thousand Anglo- Spaniards, should present himself at Bordeaux? Even suppos- ing thart there was no danger of such an attempt during my life, what a powerful motive. would be left for future troubles if even, after my death, the peninsula should become the point of support for some new pretender, assisted by England! It was the lever of Archimedes which would overthrow my empire, If I had at first intended to dethrone the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, and this had been my only object, I should have profited by my alliance at Tilsit, and the grounds of com- plaint afforded by the proclamation of the Prince of Peace, to openly declare war. This would have been the most loyal course, and one which best accorded with my character; but it -would have produced precisely what I wished to avoid; at the first sound of cannon, all the ports of Spain and Spanish America would have been open to the English, and the English influence would have 'been established for a long time at Madrid,, Cadiz, and Mex- ico. An idea, much less chivalric, but much more expedient, naturally presented itself to my mind ; this was to secure for ever my ascendency and my influence in the peninsula by ceding Port- ugal to Spain and demanding of her in exchange the provinces between the Pyrenees and the Ebro. This was all I could desire to completely secure my control even to the heart of the monarchy, to make it dependent on me, and to break forever the English connection with Portugal, and consequently with Spain.* * Several historians, Spanish, Portuguese, and English, have stated that the determination of the Prince Regent to emigrate to Brazil was fixed by the British ambassador's communicating to him a decree of Napoleon In the Moniteur of November llth, "that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign." Alison repeats this story, but says the ominous line appeared in the Moniteur of November 13th. Thiers says that no such phrase can be found In the Moniteur of these or any posterior or anterior date. But in an article of the Moniteur of the twelfth, commentating on the conduct of the AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 569 NAPOLEON DECIDES TO OCCUPY PORTUGAL. Portu- gal presented itself naturally as the first step for attaining the object of my enterprise. England had reestablished here all her influence and her monopoly. The first step taken in accordance with the treaty of Tilsit to oblige the Prince Regent to enter into this grand alliance had no other results than to confirm England respecting the tenor of the secret articles of this treaty. It was to London that the Prince Regent went to ask what response he should make to my summons! I had judged, by the negotiations of 1801, the interest taken by the Cabinet of St James in its rela- tions with this country, since the mere approach of General Le- clerc's army had done more to decide them to sign the prelimi- naries of peace than any thing else that took place at that epoch in Europe. I knew, therefore, that the occupation of Portugal would give a marked blow to British commerce and British policy. The same lesson of the past convinced me that the Prince Regent, yielding to the rule of necessity, would promise for the moment whatever I might desire. But we could never count on his sin- cerity, for his course was already determined on; he would pre- fer to transport his residence to Brazil rather than enter frankly into my alliance. He had been preparing himself for this for the last four years, and avowed it formally by his proclamation of the second of October. When the storm threatened him more nearly, he indeed offered to close his ports to the English; but so little dependence was to be placed on his promises, that two days after (October 22, 1807) his envoys signed, at London, a more close alliance with England ! It was evident that he merely wished to gain time enough to secure the emigration of all his court, with the archives and the superior employees of the government. Moreover, the mere expulsion of the British flag had not pre- vented, under a borrowed flag, Portugal from being used as an English colony by English factors established in Portugal, and by companies having the exclusive trade in the wines of Oporto. I, therefore, demanded the expulsion of the English, and the con- fiscation of their property and merchandise. The Prince Regent, who had not the same motives for hatred and vengeance as I had, could not agree to these conditions ; had he promised, his people would not have suffered him to accomplish it. English at Copenhagen and Constantinople, It Is remarked that these Eng- lish intrigues In Portugal, if persisted In, might produce the downfall of the House of Braganza. It is quite probable, however, that Lord Strang- ford did make the statement, as represented, In order to influence the Prince Regent to leave Portugal. 660 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. The formal refusal of this prince determined me. I saw that it required a power as formidable as mine to effect an entire change in the future relations of Portugal. I decided on the partition of this kingdom, and the expulsion of the House of Braganza. There was, it is true, more violence than justice in this measure; but I hoped from it the eternal expulsion of the English from the peninsula; an immense result for the accom- plishment of my projects, and for the_future greatness of my em- pire. Of course I 'had the same right to this usurpation as the English had to burn Copenhagen and carry off the Danish fleet. If they did not keep that country, it was merely because they had not forces sufficient to maintain themselves in it. The formal occupation of the kingdom of Portugal enabled me either to dis- pose of it at my pleasure, or to exchange it for Etruria and the provinces from the Pyrenees to the Ebro; it might moreover serve as an introduction to the eventual occupation of Spain itself.* TREATY OF FONTAINEiBLEAU. The better to attain my objects, I proposed to the Cabinet of Madrid the partition of Lusitania. A treaty to this effect was concluded at Fontaine- bleau on the twenty-seventh of October, 1807. It procured me the possession of Etruria, and the Infante of Parma received in exchange the province of Minho; Godoy, the Algarves and Alentejo; the remainder was to be sequestered till peace, and Charles IV. proclaimed emperor of the (Spanish) Americas. The Court of Madrid entirely adopted my views; it not only granted a passage to our troops, but placed a corps of the elite at my dis- posal in order to secure the success of the enterprise. JUNOT OCCUPIES PORTUGAL. At the approach of the army commanded by Junot,f the Prince Regent promised every This is not good logic. The conduct of the English at Copenhagen did not justify the seizure of Portugal by the French. The only tenable ground for Justifying the Invasion of Portugal was, that by the long de- pendence of this government upon England, and its entire submission to English dictation, Portugal had 'become a mere vassal state, and had there- by lost her rights as a sovereign and independent power. She, therefore, could not, in a war with England, claim the rights of a neutral state. There can be no doubt that Portugal at this time was as much under the domin- ion of England as any of her dependencies in Asia, Africa, or America, and had about as little claim to the rights of neutrality. But great conquerors, like Napoleon, pay little regard to the forms or principles of international law. tAndoche Junot. Duke of AbrantSs, was born in 1771, at Bussy-les- Forges. He first studied law, but afterward entered the army, and at the siege of Toulon was made Napoleon's secretary. Just as he had finished a dispatch during this siege, a shell which fell near him covered him with AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 661 thing that was desired of him; but .such had always been the case. Nevertheless, my lieutenant, having orders to occupy Portugal at all events, continued to advance. The terrified court embarked for Brazil, and left me its kingdom, by transporting a European dynasty to an American throne. Informed of this project by the proclamation of the second of October, I had directed Junot to make all haste to prevent the embarkation; but my declaration of November fifteenth, an- nouncing that the House of Braganza liad ceased to reign, inserted too soon in the Moniteur, reached Lisbon, by way of London and the sea, in eight days.* The Prince Regent, dethroued by my decrees, was relieved from further uncertainty respecting the course he should take, and deemed it prudent not to await the approach of my troops. He embarked on the twenty-seventh of November, and took with ihim a treasure of five hundred millions, and a fleet of eight ships, three frigates, four brigs, leaving be- hind five ships, five frigates, and twelve schooners, which he was unable to take away. Contrary winds retained them two days in the Tagus; our troops were within two leagues, and the next day entered Lisbon, Junot had marched with such precipitation that he had crossed, without the slightest precaution, the sterile country from Alcantara to Castelbranco and the frightful mountains which separate this city from Abrantes, where his army was near perishing. He reached Lisbon with only two or three thou- sand men, who resembled specters more than conquerors. This rapidity was requisite to prevent the emigration of the govern- ment. Junot deemed this object so important that he entered Lisbon with only a feeble escort, and even fired at the departing squadron with the Portuguese batteries, so great was the terror which preceded him. He nevertheless was too late, and this im- prudent and precipitate march contributed not a little to our ulterior reverses in this country, by exhibiting to the Portuguese our young and famished conscripts as adversaries not very for- midable a first impression which was never effaced. The his- dust. Turning to Bonaparte, he coolly remarked: "This conies just in time, I wanted some sand to dry my writing." This gave the general a high opinion of his courage, and he appointed him aid-de-oamp. He accompanied .Napoleon to Italy and Egypt, and served in most of his cam- paigns, receiving numerous wounds. For his early success in Portugal he received the title of Duke of Abrantes, but his subsequent operations proved Ills utter want of capacity to command a separate army. In 1812 he com- manded the eighth corps and distinguished himself at the battle of Valou- tina. He died In 1813. *Vide note on page 558. 662 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. tory of the miseries endured by this army would have turned me from my projects, if I ihad not been entirely deceived respect- ing the character of the nations which I wished to subdue. While Junot was thus making his adventurous march to Lisbon, the Spanish General Taranco took possession of the provinces of the Douro, and the Marquis of Salano penetrated by Alentejo to Evora and Setuval; a Spanish division, under General Oaraffa, had followed Junot to Lisbon. DISSENSIONS IN THE ROYAL FAMILY OF SPAIN. At this epoch, domestic quarrels of a scandalous nature disgraced the family of Charles IV. The Prince of Peace, abusing his in- fluence, humiliated the heir to the throne; and the latter, seeking shelter from the vexations of the favorite, authorized by his father, had asked of me the hand of a princess of my house, with the hope of securing my protection. Unfortunately, I then had at my disposal none but the daughter of Lucien. Her father had so ill conducted himself toward me that I could hardly re- ward him for it by giving a throne to his daughter, over wihom he would exercise more influence than I could. Moreover, I had no great confidence in this step of Ferdinand. This prince had married, as his first wife, the daughter of Queen Caroline of Naples, the most implacable of mj enemies; I knew that this connection had influenced his political sentiments, and that his hatred to Godoy had alone caused his proposed connection with France. Nevertheless, the false steps recently taken against me by the favorite and the demand of a princess of my house by Ferdi- nand was sufficient proof that the hatred of this prince was sus- ceptible of change; he called me in his letter, the great man of the age. But was this step of the Prince of the Asturias legal? An hereditary prince, who, without the consent of his king, establishes relations with a foreign dynasty, is the most guilty of state criminals. I deferred answering him. It was neces- sary first of all to have some explanations with my brother Lucien. TALLEYRAND URGES WAR AGAINST SPAIN. Talley- rand, whose pride equaled his ambition, had left, at the end of 1807, the department of foreign affairs, in the quality of Vice- Grand Elector, an office which had been created for him, as that of Vice-Constable had been for Berthier. A base jealousy actu- ated this vain diplomatist, and a question of the antechamber made him leave a post where he had more importance and power, in order not to suffer the proximity of a rival whom he detested. AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 563 Skillful in directing an intrigue, Talleyrand was a man of busi- ness rather than a statesman. He had an easy and luminous way of presenting things. His work suited me, and I did all 1 could to turn him from the ridiculous change which he solicited. He was replaced by Ohampagny. At the time of the ordinary trip to Fontainebleau, and of the dissensions in the royal family of Spain, he had already begun to regret having left the ministry ; he was tired of inaction, and thought that I might consent, perhaps, to give him a kind of supreme control over our foreign relations, and also allow him to retain his new dignity. With this object, he overwhelmed me with memoirs, notes, and conversations, tending to prove that I had only to show myself with thirty thousand men to sub- jugate Spain. Europe was strangely deceived in this matter, for it deemed him, on his own word, to have opposed the war. AFFAIRS OF ITALY. Far from adopting his views, I wished to begin by securing to myself the line of the Ebro, and then to wait the course of events. After the signature of the treaty of Fontainebleau, I repaired to Italy. I had several ob- jects in view in this journey; I hoped that my presence in this country might decide Austria to enter frankly into our grand alliance against England. This object was accomplished, for the Cabinet of Vienna soon directed Count Stahremberg to quit London, if his mediation should 'be rejected; and, in fact, this am- bassador left England the early part of February. Moreover, 1 imposed on the Pope, and made him enter into an Italian Con- federacy like that of the Rhine, composed of Naples, Etruria, the kingdom of Italy, jind the states of the Pope, under my protectorate. INTERVIEW WITH LUOIEN. I afterward wished to come to explanations on the proposition made by the Prince of the Asturias. Lucien had been ambassador to Madrid, and was well acquainted with this court; by placing his daughter* on the throne, he would have been* able to serve my policy; but I de- manded, as a pledge of his obedience, that he should separate from his wife, whose conduct was far from irreproachable and who had lived with him publicly as his mistress.! I wished to ally my brother to one of the greatest sovereign houses in En- rope. And the act of obedience which I required would have *Thls daughter was by Mademoiselle Boyer, Lncien's first wife. fThls was the widow of the banker Jouberteau, whom Lucien had married at the end of 1803. This marriage greatly enraged Napoleon, and was the foundation of the misunderstanding between the two brothers. 564 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. been in my estimation a sufficient pledge of his future senti- ments, and have redoubled the honor of my family. We had an interview at Mantua. Lucien consented to the marriage of his daughter, but -refused the conditions which I made to a reconcili- ation; I had everything to apprehend from a brother who gave to Europe this dangerous example of scorning my wishes; of a madman, who was sacrificing to his base inclinations the throne of Spain, and the destinies of France; a deplorable blindness, since it had great influence on my own disasters as well as those of Spain! ! THE CELEBRATED MILAN DEGREE. It was on my return from this interview that I issued my famous Milan decree, in reprisal for the new pretensions of England. When near the accomplishment of my grand system, I received the British Order in Council of November llth, declaring that all countries occupied by our troops, or excluding the English flag from their ports, should be considered in a state of blockade; and that every vessel destined for such countries should be subject to visit, stopped in the open seas, taken to English ports, and made to pay such an imposition as should be fixed by law of Parliament. This was subjecting our commerce and that of Europe to an infamous tax, since it admitted a kind of suzerainty and right of control in the English over all foreign goods crossing the high seas; this was stamping the seal of infamy on all powers which should willingly submit to such a code. I opposed to it the Milan decree of December 17th. It declared: 1st. That every vessel which should conform to the British Order in Council should be denationalized, treated as an English vessel and a good prize, whether taken in the ports of the continent or captured on the high seas. 2d. That the British Isles should be declared in a state of blockade, on land and on sea, and that any vessel sailing to or from these islands, or their colonies, should be a good prize. Thus one abuse led to another,' in this fatal career in which we were urged by our bitter hatred; nevertheless, this corsair legislation would have resulted in the detriment of our enemies, had it not been for the lamentable event which opened to the English the ports of Spain and of Spanish America. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE POPE. At this epoch a quar- rel, not very serious in appearance, but which might, however, have led to serious results, took place between me and the Pope. Since the articles reglementaires which I had added to the con- cordat, or, rather, since the return of Pius VIE. from my corona AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 565 lion without having obtained the restitution of the provinces as he had hoped, the Holy See had commenced a little underhand war, which had become the most bitter at the epoch of 1805. The Court of Rome complained that, in its temporal relations, I had required it to enter into this Italian confederation. An English and Russian squadron was then preparing to effect a landing in Calabria and even in Naples. The French corps-d'armee, placed in the presqu'ik of Otranto, would have been lost if the Pope had consented, through worldly ambition, to ally himself with heretics. I demanded of the Holy See that it should receive a garrison in Ancona, and conclude an offensive and de- fensive alliance against the coalition, with the Viceroy of Italy and the King of Naples. It refused to do this. A f ter the peace of Presburg, a French army entered Naples, and it became more necessary than ever for me to communicate with my army through the Roman states. In the mean time, without troubling himself with the condition of Austria, the Pope had surrendered himself to English councils. Agents were exciting the people to revolt; everywhere, from Ancona to the frontiers of Naples, they murdered our soldiers. General Bent- inck had organized a focus of insurrection in Sicily, and his great laboratory was in Rome. I warned the Pope of this, and sum- moned him to close his ports to the enemies of. France, to drive them from Rome, and to frankly make common cause with us. I renewed these demands at the time of my journey to Milan, and my proposition for entering into the Italian confederation was no better received. The Holy See responded by menaces which would hardly have been pardonable in the time of Gregory VII. This was to completely annul my position in Italy, and to permit a handful of degenerate Romans under the mo- nastic yoke to oppose all that I could do to aggrandize this penin- sula; such a state of things could not continue. Lombardy already began to appreciate the effort* .which I was making for the regeneration of that country. The army was naturally the main object of my care; no means were neg- lected to revive a military feeling in this people, debased by three centuries of foreign domination; I revived the love of glory by constructing great monuments. The Forum-Bonaparte, an en- terprise worthy of the Romans, was to be built on the ruins of the citadel of Milan. The project had been traced out by the celebrated Antolini, but its execution was deferred till peace; in the mean time a magnificent arena and a circus which -would have done honor to the most 'glorious era of Rome were raised in a portion of this same ground. The superb triumphal arcn 666 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. of the Simplon, projected on the avenue of Domodo&sola, was to carry to the remotest ages the memory of the campaign of the St Bernard and the resurrection of the Italian Republic. Meas- ures were also taken to encourage letters. Some have re- proached me with having imposed chains on literature, or with having degraded it to such eulogies as I ordered; this is absurd; to repress abuses is not to oppose an obstacle to belles-lettres under a glorious reign; and if eulogies were pronounced upon the great things which I undertook, it was because there could be no better theme for letters than in celebrating immortal works. NAPOLEON'S VAST DESIGNS IN ITALY. I moreover had vast designs on Italy. This long presqu'ile, with Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily, presented a sea-coast of not less than one thousand two hundred leagues; it had once ruled the world by its armies, and it seemed not the less intended by nature to rule the seas. Too narrow and deep for a continental power, it did not offer the necessary surface for maneuvering easily on either slope of the Apennines; the invading armies have always been obliged merely to attack the defensive forces in front. An enemy, coming from the north, and making himself master of Rome on the one side and Pesaro on the other, would be in quiet possession of all the country in his rear, for the Italian army, driven back into Calabria, could only act by debarkations. As a maritime power, on the contrary, Italy would be formidable. The Genoese and Venetian sailors for three centuries dis- puted the commerce of the East, and they would have played a much greater part had not their country been divided up into twenty smaller states. Magnificent roadsteads, like those of Spezzia, Tarentum, Cataro, Ragusa; considerable ports, as Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Ancona, Venice, Ragusa, Corfu; an abundance of sailors; a proximity to Macedonia, Bosnia, and Albania, whose vast forests furnished the finest ship-timbers; and to Hungary, from which copper could be obtained with, facility; such are some of the innumerable advantages presented by Italy for equipping large fleets. Time and money were only necessary to equip, in this country, a naval force of fifty ships and as many frigates, and, in concert with Spain, France, and Holland, to put an end to English supremacy. TRANSFER OF THE HOLY SEE TO PARIS. The first step toward the regeneration of Italy was to put an end to the temporal power of the Pope. The possession of the Roman states was essential in order to connect Naples, that i eight millions of southern Italians, with the kingdom of Italy, Tuscany, Genoa, AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 667 Piedmont, Cisalpine, or the eight millions of northern Italians. To take possession of the Roman states and still leave there the spiritual power of the Pope was a difficult matter, as it would have been forging arms against myself. I found a unique and admirable means of attaining my object, in executing a double project which would leave me free arbiter of the Roman states, and at the same time reinforce my authority by all the influence left to the Holy See in Europe. This was to transfer the head of the Church to Paris, and afterward to unite the people of Italy as a single nation. It was with this object, and on the news of the agitation which reigned at Rome, that I resolved to make an end of the matter. A few days after my victorious entrance into Vienna, and four days previous to the battle of Essling, I issued my decree, annexing Rome and the states of the Church. What immense results would have sprung from this project if I had succeeded in it! I should have rid the empire of all ultramon- tane intrigues; I should have procured for it, by the influence of the Pope, a great ascendency over the Catholics of Poland, Hungary, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. And by retempering the descendants of the ancient Romans, and putting them in the same mould with the Neapolitans and Lombards, I might mako Italy a respectable maritime power, since she would have as much coast and as many ports as France. The Pope would also have gained more than he lost by this project, for instead of being a petty prince of Italy, he would have become the second person- age in Europe. OCCUPATION OF ROME. Perhaps I committed an error in hastening too much the execution of this design. It was im- portant for me to spare the Pope as much as possible, at the moment when I was dealing my blows in Spain and Portugal; but, drawn on by the moral effect produced on me by the hostile course of the Roman pontiff, at the moment when the alliance of Tilsit gave him up to my discretion, I ordered, at the end of January, 1808, a corps of six thousand men to enter Rome, and I demanded the cession of the Marches, and a frank adhesion to the Italian league. The Pope, proud of being placed on his own field of battle, thought to defend his temporal power by replying to me with the thunders of the Church. Briefs,* bulls, com- *A brief la distinguished from a bull, In being more concise, written on paper, sealed with red wax, and Impressed with the seal of the fisherman, or Peter In a boat A bull is more ample, written on parchment, and sealed with lead or green wax. 568 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. plaints, menaces, were redoubled. His brief of March 27th, 1808, especially, held language to which I was little accustomed; it threatened me with excommunication; I replied to it by a decree annexing Ancona and the Marches to the kingdom of Italy. ANNEXATION OF TUSCANY TO FRANCE. These partial reunions were, as I have said, only a prelude to a more vast design; some weeks after, having given a part of the Roman states to the kingdom of Italy, I pronounced the reunion of Tuscany and the duchy of Parma with France. The treaty of Fontainebleau had given me this country in exchange for a part of Portugal. It was important for me to hasten to take posses- sion of it, and, by transporting the limits of my empire to the Ombrone, I should give a more solid basis to my influence over Naples. NAPOLEON RENOUNCES THE ALLIANCE WITH FER DIN AND. I returned from Italy to France more indignant than ever with Lucien, and very little disposed to satisfy the wish of Ferdinand. I had not so replied to him; this was a fault with which posterity will reproach me, although it was not exclusively mine. It was the result of circumstances. But what would have been said of me if, justly distrusting Ferdinand and his counsellors as I did, I had moreover placed Lucien, in the quality of his father-in-law, at the head of the opposition against me? FERDINAND ARRESTED BY HIS FATHER'S ORDERS. Events soon became so complicated as to render it uncertain what course I ought to pursue. Godoy, hearing of the proposi- tion which Ferdinand had made to me, to marry a princess of the imperial family, and of the conferences which this prince had had on the subject with the ambassador, Beauharnais, thought ttiat his own; existence depended on his preventing this union, which would secure the triumph of the heir to the throne, on whom he had cast so many indignities. Trembling at the consequences of such an event, he induced Charles IV. to consider this intrigue as a serious matter, and to have his son tried, as a state criminal, by the high court of the Council of the Indies and of Castile; he was made prisoner in the palace (October 29th), and there was every probability that this prince would experience the same fate as the unfortunate Don Carlos, who was condemned by Philip II. I succeeded in saving him; Charles IV. pardoned his son, but proceeded against his counsellors. NAPOLEON OCCUPIES THE SPANISH FORTIFICA- TIONS. The occupation of Portugal required a line of posts across Spain; this arrangement accorded very well with my views. AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 569 Under pretext of sustaining Junot, I had pushed Murat on the Ebro, with fifty thousand men. Duhesme entered into Catalonia as if merely to cross and rejoin Murat. He succeeded in placing garrisons in Figuieras and into the citadel of Barcelona; Murat also succeeded, by subterfuge, in garrisoning Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. I shall not undertake to justify these steps, though they will appear less censurable if it be remembered that these places were to fall to me in the projected exchange of Portugal for the provinces of the Ebro. By occupying them I wished to prevent all idea of resistance on the part of the Spaniards, and to more easily remove all scruples that might oppose this exchange; history had taught me that, in great enterprises, success justifies the means; the result of my enterprise was to be so immense that I sacrificed every other consideration to its success. I deemed myself the more certain of becoming the arbiter of Spain, as the elite of the Spanish army was with Romania, near Den- mark, and twenty-five thousand men had just entered Portugal with Junot. An unexpected revolution soon gave a different aspect to affairs. ALARM OF THE SPANISH COURT. There being no fur- ther reason for delay, and Portugal being agitated by the rumor of a partition, I directed Junot to take possession of the whole country in my name. This step was a natural prelude to the projected cession, for before ceding away a country it is necessary either to establish a claim to it or to gain possession of it as a right of conquest. This apparent violation of the treaty of Fon- tainebleau was a thunder-clap to Godoy and his partisans, who did not comprehend its motive. Combined with the clandestine occupation of the fortresses, this measure discovered to him the abyss which was opening beneath his feet. He remembers his proclamation, the trial of Ferdinand, the marriage project, and trembles at being exposed to my vengeance. He persuades Charles IV. that I am going to treat him as I had done the Prince Regent of Portugal. With this idea he induces him to transfer the court to Seville, where he can defend himself on the left bank of the Tagus, or, if beaten, fly to America. PROJECT OF REMOVING IT TO MEXICO. Godoy has been accused of contriving with me the removal of the royal fam- ily to Mexico, the same as the family of Braganza had taken refuge in Brazil. Two circumstances will be sufficient to demon- strate the folly of these allegations: the first, is the importance attached by England to the departure of John VI. to Rio Janeiro, and her interest in having Charles IV. imitate his example; the 570 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. second, is the opposition made by my ambassador, Beauharnais, to this departure. I, indeed, blamed him for it afterward, but the course he pursued is proof that no such project had been pre- viously concerted; I merely reproached my minister for not allow- ing them to execute this unexpected resolution, which would have simplified this question and rendered me absolute arbiter of Spain, instead of plunging me into the inextricable embarrass- ments of a revolution. If the emigration of Charles IV. to America had been my original object, it might very properly be imputed to me . as a fault; I knew too well the hazard of presenting myself to the Spaniards as the arbiter of their destinies, bringing, as its first pledge, the separation of their colonies. The progress of affairs might lead to this result, but it never entered as a basis in my projects. As an alternative, I should prefer to see the Bourbons in Mexico than in Madrid. Moreover, it was possible that Oharles IV., placed on the throne of Mexico, might connect him- self by a good treaty with the mother country, and that this vast trans-Atlantic empire, revivified, under a direct and concen- trated government, might at least sustain the independence of its flag and of its commerce. If I attained neither of these two ob- jects, I might at least give a strong impulse to the interior of Spain, and give her more vigorous institutions, in order to direct all her energies to a maritime war. At all events, it is certain that, if England preserved the universal empire of the seas, America would sooner or later fall into her dependence, lut the only means of disputing this empire with her was to secure the resources of Spain. If, ty the aid of these resources, I should succeed in reestablishing the maritime equi- librium and the liberty of commerce, the emancipation of Spanish Amer- ica would profit French industry as much as the English. POLITICAL EXPLOSION IN SPAIN. Be this as it may, the news of the departure of the court to Seville, spread through Spain, became an electric spark, which occasioned a sudden and terrible explosion. Public opinion in this country had not kept pace with the rest of Europe. The lights of intelligence had not penetrated either the highest or the lowest class, but was con- fined to the middle classes of the petty .nobility, men of the robe, and the secular clergy. These felt the degradation of their coun- try and blushed to obey a government which was conducting it to its destruction. They were called liberals. REVOLUTION OF ARANJUEZ. The rumor of my proj- ects, amplified and interpreted to suit party passions, set every thing into fermentation. The monks, fearing for their influence, AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 571 deemed themselves lost if my government should be extended to Spain, for the Catholicism of the concordats was not what suited them. The liberals felt the humiliation of their country; all thought to prevent its ruin by a conspiracy. In the night of the nineteenth of March, 1808, the people of Madrid go in a crowd to Aranjuez and demand the head of Grodoy ; the army, and even the body guards, as at Paris, place themselves at the head of the revolution. The Prince of Peace, concealed in a granary, escapes from search; happily for him, he was not discovered till afterward, and they then satisfied themselves in securing his person, after having maltreated him. The old King, frightened by the cries of the multitude and the insinuations of the conspirators, abdicated in favor of his son. The Spaniards gained nothing by this change, for the son whom they placed on the throne would have conducted matters no better than his father. But they rid themselves of an execrated favorite, and this was much in the eyes of the multitude, who do not look below the surface of things. MTJRAT ENTERS MADRID. Murat, on hearing of the troubles of Aranjuez, immediately directed himself on Madrid with thirty thousand men who were cantoned in Castile; he en- tered this capital on the twenty-third of March. A few days after, Charles IV., recovering from his etupor, and incited by Godoy and the Queen, retracted hie abdication, and declared that it had been drawn from him peluna; but a whole month passes before they can begin a regular siege. THE ARMY OF G ALICIA ADVANCES ON VALLADO- LID. In the mean time the storm increased in the west. The junta of Oviedo had received promises of assistance from Eng- land, and embarkations were preparing in all the ports of Great Britain. Fifty thousand firearms were immediately sent with Colonel Doyle to encourage the levies of Galicia which assembled at Lugo, and were reinforced by the corps of Taranco from Portu- gal. The exasperation of these troops was carried so far as to massacre the respectable General Filangieri, who had been desig- nated to command them, and whose only crime was his having given offensive advice. This army, debouching on LAstorga, under the orders of Blaike, united on the Esla to that of Cuesta, and advanced om Medina-del-Rio-Seco, with thirty-five thousand men, and thirty pieces of cannon. Bessieres, hearing at Burgos of this threatening assemblage, and being timely reinforced by Mouton's division of troops from Poland, decided to march against the enemy, though inferior in numbers by one half. JOSEPH PROCLAIMED KING OF SPAIN. At the same time the junta which was assembled at Bayonne adopted the constitution of the kingdom, on the sixth of July, and proclaimed my brother Joseph, as it were in derision, King of Spain and of the Indies. This constitution, modeled after that of the Em- pire, and preserving strong powers for the executive, contained all the generous principles which were calculated to secure a better future to Spain; it does much credit to the Duke of Bas- sanio, who was one of its principal framers; but the reforms con- tained in it contributed not a little to augment the number of our enemies. It was too liberal for the monks, and not enough so to satisfy the radical party. Joseph entered Spain at the moment that Bessieres was marching to meet Cuesta and Blake. If these were victorious, the fate of our army in Spain had been sealed; for they would have been in possession of our line of retreat, and all had been lost. The rencounter took place the fourteenth of July at Medina - del-Rio-Soco ; the Spaniards, formed in two lines at too great an interval, were impetuously attacked in front by Merle and Mouton, while Lasalle charged them in flank. The first line was broken and routed; the second now took the offensive; while Mouton received its attack in front, the division of Merle assailed it in flank and spread terror and death everywhere. This vie- AFFAIRS OF 8PATTT AND PORTUGAL. 587 torv, which procured us four thousand prisoners and fifteen pieces of cannon, and saved the army, was glorious, for the Span- iards fought with courage, but without experience. Generals Guilleminot and Mouton distinguished themselves. Joseph arrived at Madrid, preceded by the news of this ead victory over the people whom he was called to govern. Bes- sieres, though reinforced, did not pursue the enemy's generals, between whom there was much discord; he might easily have advanced into Galicia, and even have shown my victorious eagles on the banks of the Portuguese Douro, so as to disengage Junot. who was then attacked 'by numerous enemies. But perhaps it was fortunate that he did not do this, for the bloody check which he received a few days after at Baylen had probably turned against us the momentary success which had conducted this marshal to the gates of Corufia. DUPONT CAPITULATES AT BAYLEN. Dupont had been detached on Seville and Cadiz, to reduce these two important places. One half of Ms corps-d' 'armee being employed on second- ary expeditions, 'he passed the Sierra Morena at the head of only eight thousand men; reaching Andujar about the first of June, he carried the bridge of the Guadalquiver at Alcolea, after having beaten a corps of twelve thousand men under General Bchevari, and carried Cordova by a coup-de-main on the seventh of June. He was seconded by the division of Wedel, which had at first been destined for another expedition, but had afterward received orders to join him. Dupont, hearing at Andujar that at the order of the supreme junta at Seville, all the south of Spain was ris- ing; that Solan o's troops of the line, returned from Portugal, and joined by the garrison of Cadiz and the regiments dispersed in Andalusia or at the camp of Saint Roche, formed a mass of forty thousand men, deemed his mission impossible, and waited behind the Guadalquiver for further orders and reinforcements. Savary, to whom Murat in his illness had momentarily confided the command, having directed him to keep in rear of the Guadal- quiver so as not to draw the fire of the insurrection on this side of the Sierra Morena, Dupont had taken position at Andujar and directed Wedel to guard Baylen, so as to cover himself on the side of Baeza, when Castafios presented himself with his army before him, and maneuvered to gain his left. Dupont, who had shown so much presence of mind and vigor on the Mincio in 1800, and before Ulm in 1805, is here completely confused; he demands one of Wedel's brigades. The latter repairs to Andujar, on the sixteenth of July, with his entire division, leaving at 688 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Baylen only a detachment under General Gobert. Castafios sends there twelve or fifteen thousand men, under the orders of Gen- eral Reding; the ford of Merigibar, on the Guadalquiver, is forced; the enemy penetrates between our divisions, and sustains this movement. Dupont imagines that he can avoid the embarrass- ment by ordering Wedel to return to Baylen, to dislodge the en- emy, and after securing this post, to again join him at Andujar, whence he was to fall, in concert with him, on the divided corps of the enemy. But if such was really the project of Dupont, since Wedel was already united with him, why again separate and send him away to Baylen? Why not attack the enemy, with his united forces, first at Baylen and then at Andujar, if Cas- tafios should venture to cross the Guadalquiver? The position of Dupont was about the same as mine at Castiglione, in 1796, when the enemy took possession of Brescia, on my communica- tions; he should have followed my example, and first beaten the corps which threatened his retreat and then have overthrown the other. Dupont committed the fault of dividing his forces at the critical moment, and his lieutenant committed another not less grave. Wedel, finding Baylen evacuated by the troops of Gobert, who had been wounded in fighting Reding, went as far as Caro- lina to rejoin him, thus enabling the enemy to reoccupy Baylen after his passage. The entire corps of Reding established itself here without obstacle. Dupont, hearing of this event, deter- mined, too late, to march on the same point himself, and to open a passage; he made three or four fruitless attempts to accomplish this on the nineteenth; his attacks were repulsed. He flattered himself that Wedel, hearing the sound of his cannon, would re- turn, and that their combined efforts would restore the victory. Vain hope! Instead of learning the return of his lieutenant, he learned that Castafios had taken advantage of his departure from Andujar to get possession of that place and to send in pursuit of him a strong division under General La Pena. Du- pont, seeing himself surrounded and repulsed, proposed a treaty of evacuation. Reding referred him to the general-in-ohief, Cas- tafios, at Andujar, but consented to a suspension of arms. I had charged the inspector-general of engineers, Marescot, to follow Dupont to Cadiz, and to examine the fortifications of this place, where I supposed my troops would enter without oppo- sition. This general, being personally acquainted with Castafios, having been engaged with him in marking out the frontier line after the peace of Bale, offered to go and negotiate with him, in AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 689 hopes of obtaining better conditions. This was on the twentieth of July. In the mean time Wedel had returned to Baylen, had at- tacked Reding and captured some cannon and six hundred pris- oners. Reding, now placed between two fires, in the position that he had thought to put Dupont, succeeded in extricating himself by announcing that an armistice had just been concluded. After being assured of the truth of this assertion, Wedel estab- lished himself above Baylen and waited for orders. The report of a treaty, or rather of a capitulation, spread among the soldiers who had been so recently victorious, and whose courage had been restrained by the orders of their superiors. These brave men became indignant and mutinied; they wished to renew the at- tack and pierce even to Dupont and save him at least from the disgrace of a capitulation by securing his retreat. Their assem- bled officers assented to the project, and one of them was des- patched to the general-in-chief for his authorization; but he re- plied that he could not authorize an attack at the moment when they were treating for an honorable capitulation, and while an armistice still existed. The division indignantly withdrew to Carolina. The Span- iards demanded that the general-in-chief should make it return to Baylen, threatening to attack him if this was not instantly executed. The position of Dupont was certainly critical; he had just deprived himself, by his refusal, of the cooperation of Wedel; he could no longer hope for that cooperation, except by perfidi- ously charging the officer who should be sent to direct his re- turn, to concert, on the contrary, an attack with this general. If such a course was repugnant to Dupont, and he preferred trusting himself to Spanish loyalty (which he should have dis- trusted in these times of revolution, when even their own gen- erals lost their heads for exhibiting the least sign of modera- tion toward the French), how could he decide to treat for troops who had an open line of retreat on Madrid? Was he ignorant that even among the Turks, the Grand Vizier in such circum- stances has a right to treat only for himself? Dupont had but one course to pursue; he should have signified to Reding and Castafios that a general surrounded by an enemy can give no orders to one of his lieutenants who has an open retreat; that if they demanded of him so humiliating a step, it only remained for him to conquer or die, and to immediately give the order for bat- tle. He would, perhaps, in that case, have been made prisoner on the field ; but then he would have fallen like a brave man. I 590 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. should not have reproached him for his other faults. Instead of this, he had the weakness to obey the injunctions of Castanos, and thought to cover his responsibility by stipulating that his division should be regarded as prisoners and transported to France, but not to serve till regularly exchanged ; that the divis- ion of Wedel should defile with its arms, and deposit them in stacks, till the moment of their embarkation for France. Fif- teen thousand Frenchmen were thus to lay down their arms, when the half of them were free to retreat on Madrid, and only thought of vengeance and battle!* *We extract the following interesting passages from Thiers' "Con- sulate and Empire" on this capitulation: "At length, on the twenty-second, that fatal capitulation was brought from Andujar to Baylen, to General Dupont. He hesitated several times before he signed it. The unhappy chief struck his forehead and flung down the pen; then, urged by those men who had all been so brave under fire, and who were all so weak out of fire, he wrote his 'name, once so glorious, at the foot of that document, which was destined to be the everlasting torment of his life. Why had he not fallen at Albeck, at Halle, at Fried- land, or even at Baylen? How deeply he regretted it subsequently, before judges who inflicted on him a dishonoring condemnation! * * * "Such was that famous capitulation of Baylen, the name of which, in our boyhood, rang in our ears as frequently as that of Austerlitz or Jena. At this period, the ordinary persecutors of misfortune, judging of that deploraible event without knowledge and without pity, imputed to coward- ice and to anxiety to save the wagons laden with the spoils of Cordova the terrible disaster which bef el the French army. Thus it is that the base- ness of courtiers, ever rancorous against those whom power gives it the signal for immolating, is accustomed to judge! There were many faults, but not a single infraction of honor, in that deplorable campaign of Andalusia. * * * "A serious error of Napoleon's in regard to Spain, a military position ill-chosen by General Dupont, too great delay in changing it, an ill-planned battle, false movements of General Wedel, demoralization of generals and soldiers such were the causes of the cruel reverse of Baylen. All that has been said in addition is mere calumny. The long file of baggage, it has often been repeated, brought upon us all our misfortunes. Supposing that a general had been capable of so stupid a calculation as to sacrifice his honor, his military profession, the marshal's baton that was reserved for him, for a few hundred thousand francs, a sum far inferior to what Napo- leon gave to the least favored of his lieutenants, eight or ten wagons would have carried all the pretended riches of Cordova in gold and silver- plate, and the question related to several hundred carriages, the extraordi- nary number of which was evidently occasioned by the moral state of the country, in which not a sick or wounded man could be left behind. At last, as we have seen, those famous baggage-wagons were plundered, and the chest of the army carried off; it contained not more than three or four hundred thousand francs. All that can be said, in short, Is, that General Dupont, Intelligent, capable, 'brilliant under fire, had not the indomitable firmness of Massena at Genoa and Essling. But he was ill, wounded, exhausted by a heat of forty degrees; his soldiers were boys, worn out with fatigue and hunger; disasters followed close upon disasters, accidents upon accidents; and if we sound this tragic event to the bottom, we shall see AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 591 It is well known how the Spaniards violated this capitula- tion, and how, undei the r pretext of reprisals for my conduct toward them, they threw these unfortunate men into the pontons, where most of them perished from want and despair. This sad catastrophe taught Europe that we also might be forced to surrender our arms; it ruined, for a long time, our af- fairs in the peninsula; it exalted even to frenzy the enthusiasm of our enemies. Dupont and Marescot, who had negotiated this treaty, were arrested on their return to France, and kept as pris- oners till my first abdication. I had ordered them to be tried, as an example. This trial lingered along without being brought to a close; it has been said that I feared the issue; there certainly was no reason for this. If Admiral Bymg was condemned for not having conquered at Port Mahon, what punishment was not mer- ited by those who signed a treaty which was near causing the destruction of all our troops in Spain? The desperate position in which Dupont had been placed was certainly a fault; he might have been taken; this would have been a misfortune; but he ought at least to have caused himself to be taken, like Francis L, at Pavia. A general-in-ehief, to save that the Emperor himself, who placed so many men in a false position, was not in this case the most irreproachable. Still we must add, for the interest of military morality, that, in these extreme situations, the resolu- tion to die is the only worthy, the only salutary resolution; for certainly, on General Wedel's arrival, the resolution to die in the attempt to cut a passage through Reding's division would have enabled the two parts of the French army to Join, and to get triumphantly out of the scrape, instead of finding themselves humbled and prisoners. By sacrificing on the field of battle one-fourth of the men who afterward died in a cruel captivity, one might have transformed into a triumph the most signal of the reverses of that extraordinary period." But if Dupont's conduct at Baylen was less blamable than was sup- posed at the time, and if Napoleon treated him and his officers with undue severity, his course of conduct after the restoration fully justified every thing that had previously been said or written against him. From a pre- tended friend of Napoleon, to whom be owed an his wealth and position, he became his most bitter enemy and denounced him in terms of unmeas- ured animosity. Thus it often Is. that weak men, unjustly accused of offenses of which they are not guilty, smarting under the accusation, com- mit the very crime of which they are accused; General Dupont was tried by a high Court of Honor, each of the members giving his separate opinion. Three copies of the proceedings of this court were made and ordered to be deposited, one in the dfpot of war, one in the Senate, and one in the High Imperial Court. Smarting under the sentence of this Court of Honor, Dupont procured an ordinance from Louis X VI1T., directing the destruction of the three copies of the proceedings. Two were destroyed, but the third could not be found, as the "High Imperial Court" was never organized. Fortunately, this has been preserved, and it furnishes the best defense extant of his conduct at Baylen! If It had rested with him, he would have destroyed his only possible justification hi the eyes of posterity. 582 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. an entire army, may sign treaties of evacuation, as Melas did at Marengo; he secured the safety of seventy thousand men at the price of some fortresses; but a lieutenant-general, commanding a portion of an army, ought never, under the vain pretexts of hu- manity, to sign capitulations in an open country, to preserve some battalions more to his country; these capitulations, far from being advantageous, on the contrary, compromise the entire army, and the moral influence acquired by ten years of victory. Dupont tarnished in this operation, in a moment of weakness, a career made illustrious by decided talents and brilliant feats of arms.* *The violation of the capitulation of Baylen by the Spaniards was one of the many disgraceful acts of that government and people during the Peninsular War. The following is Thiers' description of the march of Dupont' s army' to Cadiz: "The French troops were immediately marched off for San Lucar and Rota, where they were to be embarked for France in Spanish vessels. Their route was made to avoid the two great cities of Cordova and Seville, In order to withdraw them from the popular fury, and lay through" the less Important towns of Brijalance, Bcija, Carmona-Alcala, TJtura, and Lebrlja. In all these places the conduct of the Spanish populace was atrocious. Those unfortunate French, who 'had behaved like brave men, who had made war without cruelty, who had suffered, without revenging, the mas- sacre of their sick and wounded, were pelted with stones, and often attacked with knives, by men, women, and children. At Carmona, at Ecija, the women spat in their faces, and children flung mud at them. They trembled with rage, and, though disarmed, were more than once tempted to take a terrible revenge, by seizing such as they could lay hands on and making weapons of them; but their officers restrained them, in order to prevent a general massacre. Care was taken to make them pass the night outside villages amd towns, and to collect them in the open field like droves of cattle, to spare them still more cruel treatment. At Lebrija, and in the towns near the coast, they were stopped and doomed to tarry, upon pre- text that the Spanish vessels were not ready. But they soon learned the cause of this delay. The junta of Seville, governed by t&e lowest dema- gogue passions, had refused to acknowledge the capitulation of Baylen, and declared that the French should be detained prisoners of war, under various pretexts, all illusory, and false even to impudence. One of the rea- sons alleged by this junta was, that they were not sure of obtaining the consent of the English to the passage by sea a false reason, for the Eng- lish, notwithstanding their animosity, manifested a generous pity for our prisoners, and, as we shall see, soon suffered other troops, which they would have been greatly interested in detaining, to pass by sea. Our officers addressed themselves to the captain-general, Thomas de Morla, remonstrating against this unworthy violation of the law. of nations, but received from him only the most Indecorous answers, to the effect that an army which had violated all laws, divine and human, had forfeited the right of appealing to the justice of the Spanish nation. "At Lebrija the furious populace broke, in the night, into a prison, In which was one of our regiments of dragoons, and slaughtered seventy- five, of whom twelve were officers. But for the clergy, they would have put all of them to death. Lastly the generals, who had committed the the serious fault of separating themselves from their troops, in order to AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 698 SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA. While this was passing in the south, the siege of Saragossa was prepared with all the activity which the nature of the country and the obstacles to be en- countered would permit. Lefe^bvre-Desnouettes was reinforced by Verdier, who took the command. I charged my aid-de-camp, Lacoste, with the direction of the siege.. But eight or nine thou- sand men were insufficient to invest a city of seventy thousand on the Ebro; communications were kept up between Saragossa and the surrounding country. All our means were concentrated, on the fourth of August, to batter in breach the convent of Santa Engracia and the gate Del Carmen. The breach being practical, the assault was made, the two posts carried, and our soldiers spread through the city. They already deemed themselves masters of the place, when the defenders, concentrated in the Oorso, fell on them, a part in deep column, a part scattered through all the houses, on the terraces of the roofs, the windows, and the balconies, whence they poured on us" a shower of balls. Our troops were driven back to the posts which they had car- ried, with the loss of a thousand men. travel apart with their baggage, were severely punished for having thus withdrawn themselves. No sooner had they arrived at Port St. Mary, with their wagons exempt from examination, than the people, unable to con- tain themselves at the sight of those vehicles, crammed, as they said, with all the riches of Cordova, fell upon them, broke them In pieces, and plun- dered them. Men belonging to the Spanish authorities were not the last to assist In this pillage. But, though these wagons contained the whole of the savings of the officers, and even the chest of the army, no more was found In them than eleven or twelve hundred thousand reals, according to the Spanish newspapers themselves; that is to say, about three hundred thousand francs. That was the whole result of the sacking of Cordova. The French generals had well-nigh been slaughtered, and they escaped the fury of the populace only by throwing themselves into boats." Alison says that for the "violation of the capitulation no sort of apolo- gy can be found." * * * * * "Instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, that very few remained at the conclusion of the war. Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France, but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept in lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained In one hulk, who overpowered their guards during the night, and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen, three years afterward, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country. This frightful act of Injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful." The translator has not found, in the whole course of .his military and historical reading, an example, among civilized nations, of conduct so utterly disgraceful as this of the Spanish authorities and the Spanish peo- ple toward the French troops who -were Included in the capitulation of 594 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. RETREAT FROM MADRID. The news of the disaster of Baylen rendered the&e efforts useless. Joseph, havimg just en- tered Madrid, was forced to evacuate it, in order to concentrate hia forces behind the Ebro, arid await reinforcements. Generals LefeT)vre-Desnouettes and Verdier, constrained to raise the siege of Saragosaa, fell back uipon Tudela, and united with Moncey, who formed our left. / ROMAN A PLIES FROM DENMARK. To cap the climax of this strange war, the half of the corps of Romana, which had been imprudently left on the coasts of Holstein in communication with the English, embarked, unknown to Be-rnadotte, and landed on the coast of Biscay. ERRORS OF THIS CAMPAIGN. Three errors were com- mitted in this first period of the expedition' to Spain, which com- promised its success, if in other respects the success was possible. The first was, in not having sacrificed Godoy to the general hatred,' by causing Charles IV. to send him into exile; the second, in hav- ing sent into Spain only raw conscripts; the third, in not having paid liberally for the support of my troops, as they were quartered in the country, even in not having required all of them to encamp out. The Spaniard is proud and detests trouble; the quartering Baylen. Every obligation Imposed by international law, and every obliga- tion of military and national honor, as well as the solemn stipulations of the convention, and the common laws and usages of (war, were violated. Alison, while he condemns the acts of the Spanish authorities, seeks to clear the skirts of the British government from all responsibility in this matter, by quoting the opinion of Sir Hew Dalrymple, given at the time, that Spain was bound to carry out in good faith the conditions of the capitulation, by sending the prisoners to France, and the offer to transport them in British ships. But, unfortunately for the reputation of Mr. Alison as an historian, and for his government, there is abundant proof that the English authorities not only connived at, but actually advised the junta of Seville to retain these French prisoners of war in this terrible and infa- mous captivity. Even as late as 1811, when the commander, Suchet, after the fall of Tarragona, overlooking the violation of the conditions of the convention at Baylen that these French prisoners were to be sent by sea to France, offered to exchange his Catalonian prisoners, the best soldiers in Spain, for those taken at Baylen men utterly ruined in constitution by their cruel captivity and when the Spanish general was willing to accept the proposition, the Regency, at the request of Wellesley, the British envoy and brother of Wellington, peremptorily forbade the exchange; and the French prisoners therefore remained, says Napier, "a disgrace to Spain, and to England, for If her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to Insist that thousands of men, whose prolonged captiv- ity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed on a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched." It was by such conduct as this that England earned her 'appellation of Perfidious AlMon! AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 505 of troops on him seems to him insupportable, on account of hid pride and his interest; for the Spanish people are penurious and generally poor. Some millions expended d propos had probably weakened the discontent. Our troops lived by requisitions which were promised to be paid, but these promises were never worth the ready money. This means alone was. of course, in- sufficient to insure the success of the enterprise; but order, dis- cipline, and exact distributions would undoubtedly have dimin- ished the hatred and resistance; they would have secured the mass of supplies, and have doubly reacted on the military opera- tions. I had given all the orders necessary for this purpose, as is shown in my instructions to Murat ; but the events did not allow us time to establish magazines every where, and, after the insur- rection broke out, the thing was impossible. POSITION OF JUNOT IN PORTUGAL. There was want- ing only one more misfortune to complete the ruin of this expe- dition ; and of all those which befell our arms, the least probable actually occurred; Junot had fallen beneath the blows of the English in Portugal. In fact, this general was ill-suited for a mission so delicate; endowed with much activity, bravery, and energy, he stained these qualities by rudeness of manners aud harshness of character. It required an administrator supple, adroit, insinuating; if a man like Suchet had been there, at this epoch, he would have created for himself a party. Undoubtedly the thing was not one of the easiest, or at least it could not have been durable; for here the question was not a simple change of dynasty, but the entire existence of Portugal. Although my projects on this country were suited to my system against Eng- land, of course it did not suit the Portuguese that I should threaten the loss of Brazil, the total closing of their ports, and a reunion with Spain. I, therefore, was not deceived with re- spect to this matter; I did not expect to succeed, except by forcf. GENERAL INTERESTS OF PORTUGAL. We had, in the intelligent class of Portuguese, partisans, who saw, with regret, their country used as a British province, for the profit of the Eng- lish, and who desired reforms. Portugal, on whom Nature had ap- parently exhausted her favors, intersected by mountains whose smiling aspects yield in no respect to the most renowned localities of Switzerland and Italy, favored by % a superb climate, tempered at different zones by the progressive elevation of these same mountains, possessing the finest ports and the richest colonies of Europe Portugal, I say, would have been the real El Dorado, had not the monks degraded ttie people, and the English pre- 598 LIFE OF NAPOLEOX. vented the development of their industry. We might free her from both these evils, and many people would have rejoiced at it, for they were not indifferent to the dependent situation in which this country had been placed toward England. England purchased her wines and her fruits, but poured in upon her the products of her own manufactures, and thus carried away all the profits and all the specie of the country. Nevertheless, there was no country better able than Portugal to live independ- ent of others. If her people, placed under so fine a sky, had applied themselves to industrial pursuits, the population of their cities would soon have been doubled, and the manufacturing portion of this population would, by furnishing the agriculturists the products of their labor, have consumed the fruits, and the wines of Oporto, without resorting to the British islands and paying so dearly in return. Brazil alone, vivified by an indus- trial mother-country, would have been sufficient for the con- sumption of these wines. SACRIFICES IMPOSED ON THIS COUNTRY. But the introduction of such a system required half a century; and the Portuguese saw, for the moment, in their separation from Eng- land, only the closing of their ports, the interruption of all com- merce with Brazil, the loss of the only outlet for their territorial produce, and the privation of all objects of manufacture neces- sary for habitual consumption. Add to this the hatred of the clergy, the fanaticism of the -people, the contributions levied in money and supplies, the expense of military quarters to which they were unaccustomed, and, finally, the rumored project of a partition which threatened the existence of a proud nation, and it will appear less astonishing that the public feeling changed so suddenly. The annunciation of the projected partition pro- duced a general fermentation. The taking possession in my name, which was done on the first of February, occasioned an explosion, and it was necessary to resort to force to restore order. Nevertheless, we succeeded in disbanding one half of their army, and in taking the other part under the Marquis of Alorna, into my pay and sending it into France under the title of the allied contingent. These measures made matters still worse, and the cessation of all exterior commerce completed the despair of the Portuguese. The Spaniards in that country, informed of what was occurring in Spain, added to the elements of the tempest. The divisions of Taranco and of Solano evacuated the provinces which were to have fallen to Spain in the partition, seizing all the French AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 597 that they could in the passage. Junot could no longer regard those who remained as auxiliaries, for their soldiers and ours were at war. It was necessary to strike a blow of vigor, and disarm the division of Garaffa, which had been united with our troops. GENERAL INSURRECTION IN PORTUGAL. The de- parture of the Spaniards was the signal for insurrection in all the provinces which they left; but they waited for the succors promised by England before organizing open resistance; but as soon as these appeared, the restrained torrent burst forth only the more furiously. Oporto had only waited for this to raise the standard of independence. A junta or regency, established under the presidency of the bishop, hastened to London to de- mand assistance, by the aid of which they flattered themselves that they would be able to deliver the kingdom. The disbanded regiments were reorganized and the militia called out Junot, hoping to impose on them, detached General Loison from Al- meida on this city; but on ascertaining the certainty that his means were insufficient, this general decided to fall back on Al- meida, before being surrounded. He here received the new order to repair to Lisbon, and commenced his march by Gnarda and Alcantara on Abrantes. Junot, justly uneasy at the events which were threatening him on all sides, thought to prepare for the danger. The landing of an English division near Faro, at the extremity of the Al- garves, had just occasioned an universal rising. Every where our feeble detachments scattered through the kingdom are as- sailed; nevertheless, with the exception of a single battalion taken at Faro, all succeed by their good conduct in effecting a passage. Maransin brings away from the Algarves, as by a miracle, a thousand men, and sacks Beja, where the insurgents oppose his march. Even at Lisbon they take up arms; all the banks of the Mondego are in arms; the mountaineers even de- scend towaird A brant rs and Santarem; a Spanish division, de- bouching from the Gnardiana, threatens Kellerman at Elvas, foments insurrection even at Evora and Estremoz, and forces the recall of this general on the Tagns. Under these critical circumstancee, Junot decides to assem- ble all his means and to hold Lisbon as long as possible, then to open a passage by Elvas to rejoin Mnrat at Madrid or Valladolid. Loison, on his return to Lisbon, is detached on Leyria against the insurgents of Coimbra; but, Kellerman having already attacked them with success, the presence of Loison is deemed more neces- 598 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. sary at Evora, where the support of a Spanish division had caused a threatening insurrection. He inarches there at the head of four thousand men. The enemy, confident in numbers, ventures to meet him outside the city; he attacks them with im- petuosity and defeats them with great loss; they return within the walls. Loison summons them to surrender, but they refuse ; he then prepares for an assault. In the midst of the tumult the Spaniards, established near the gate of Elvas, succeed in effect- ing their escape, but not without sensible loss. The attack con- tinues on both sides; finally our soldiers penetrate into Evora, where a frightful butchery is continued for several hours. The fight goes on from street to street, and from house to house; every one taken in arms is massacred without mercy. The city is com- pletely sacked; and our soldiers, wearied with the carnage, cap- ture some two or three thousand prisoners, the remains of eight thousand militia and armed citizens. This bloody execution secures to General Loison a sad celebrity in these countries; it, for a moment, causes terror throughout Portugal ; but not being followed up by farther victories, it eventually becomes a motive of reprisals and vengeance in the irascible heart of the Portuguese. LANDING OF WELLESLEY WITH THE ENGLISH ARMY. The succors promised by England were not long in making their appearance. The Cabinet of St. James had made great preparations on the first invitation of the Spanish juntas. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had distinguished himself at Copen- hagen and in the Indies, had embarked for Galicia; but difficul- ties being made in regard to his reception at Corufia, he soon came to Portugal, where he united at first fifteen thousand of the best English troops. He was soon followed by fifteen thou- sand more under Generals Moore and Dalrymple, the latter taking the command. Learning the spirit which animated the Portuguese, and certain of a powerful support, Wellesley (whom we shall here- after designate by the title of Lord Wellington) resolved not to await his chief, but to win for himself the glory of delivering Portugal. Having landed, on the second of August, at the mouth of the Mondego, he passed this river at Coimbra and marched toward Leyria. JUNOT DEFEATED AT VIMIERA. His calculation was correct. Junot, forced to watch the entire population of Lisbon, to defend the forts and batteries of that city, and to guard the disarmed Spaniards, could oppose him with only ten or twelve AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 599 thousand men, and even for this he was obliged to wait for Loisou's arrival from Evora. In the mean time General Laborde opposed the English with three thousand men, and even had the audacity to receive battle at Rolica, where he fought with glory against quadruple forces, and retired only after having caused tfie enemy great losses. Loison having arrived, Junot marched against the English general, who had united sixteen thousand men, exclusive of the Portuguese. But, defeated at Vimiera on the twentieth of August, and surrounded by innumerable ene- mies, Junot deemed himself fortunate in signing at Cintra a treaty of evacuation more honorable than that of Baylen. At least this was respected. One of the vexations results of this con- vention was the loss of the Russian squadron under Admiral Saniavin. It had held the Archipelago since the campaign of 1805, and after the declaration of war by Russia against the English, had taken refuge in the Tagus. Compelled to partake the fate of our arms, it was sequestered till peace; the equipments only were restored to Russia. Dalrymple, who had just arrived, signed this convention, and incurred the blame of England for having allowed to escape a prey still more secure than that of Baylen. Even Wellesley was recalled to London to render an account of his conduct, and it required all his talents and the credit of his family to save him from disgrace. On the other hand, Junot incurred from me the reproach of having left too many troops to guard Lisbon and Santarem, antl the left bank of the Tagus, and of having attacked Wellesley in parallel order on the center instead of turning his left by a move- ment at night. Nevertheless, supposing Junot had acted ac- cording to my wishes and had driven Wellesley back to the mouth of the Mondego, the arrival of the troops of Moore and Dalrymple, the general rising of the Portuguese, and the state of affairs in Spain, would have cut off all hope of retreat. Under these circumstances I was compelled to regard as fortunate a treaty which restored to me an army whose loss seemed certain. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE. While these things were occurring in the south, Russia had declared war against Sweden, which still persisted in remaining in the paws of the English leopard. The impetuous descendant of Charles XII. had resisted all our efforts to induce him to de- clare war against the English. Some say that he pursued with chivalric obstinacy the course which he had imposed on himself after the death of the Duke d'Enghein, which had involved us in 000 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. hostilities; others think that the catastrophe of Copenhagen and the hope of gaining Norway retained him in his connection with the Cabinet of St. James. England paid him subsidies; the Swedish flag was allowed to float on the seas, by submitting to the British code. Gustavus deemed /this order of things ad- vantageous to his commerce and conformable to his principles. So long as he exposed only Pomerania and Stralsund, this sys- tem may be accounted for, but, after the declaration of the Em- peror Alexander, it is difficult to conceive how he could venture to contend against the two greatest powers on the continent. The Cabinet of St Petersburg 'had for a century coveted Finland, an important province at the very gates of the im- perial capital, and which was more precious to Russia than to Sweden, as the latter was separated from it by the Gulf of Both- nia and the deserts of the polar regions. The ninth of Febru- ary, 1808, notwithstanding the excessive cold, General Bux- howden entered Finland at the head of twenty thousand Rus- sians. After some insignificant skirmishes, he gained possession of HelsingfoTS, left a corps of observation before the important place of Sweaborg, and fell 'back on Tawasthoue, in order to an- ticipate the enemy at Wasa, and to cut him off, if he should at- tempt to defend Abo and the coast. These dispositions effected a part of the desired success. If the roads and the snows did not permit him to reach Wasa before the enemy, they at least accel- erated his retreat and prevented the occupation of all the prov- inces, by forcing him to retire in disorder on Sweaborg. Buxhowden had in the mean time reduced the forts of Schwartholm and Kangout, and blockaded Siweaiborg on the ice. This Gibraltar of the Baltic, which can give an asylum to the largest fleets in the world, is built on seven rocky islands which close the entrance to the Gulf of Helsingfors. As an anchorage, a fortress, and arsenal, this maritime establishment is inferior to no other. The channels are a little difficult for large squad- rons, but for the forces employed in the Gulf of Finland it leaves nothing to be desired. Admiral Cronstadt commanded there about three thousand troops of the line and as many Finland militia. After a blockade executed on the ice of the gulf and a simulacrum of bombardment which continued from the eighth to the twenty-fifth of March, he basely surrendered the place at the very moment when the approach of spring gave him reason to expect to be freed by the melting of the ice from the siege on the water side, and when the success of the Swedes at Brahestadt over the division of Touczkof might have changed the state of AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 001 affairs on the land. He defiled on the twenty-fourth of April, and surrendered himself a prisoner. This important conquest secured to the Russians two thousand pieces of cannon, and a con- siderable amount of stores, besides the prisoners and an impreg- nable fortress. It was now impossible for the Russians, whose numbers were increased to forty thousand men, to be driven from Finland. My own forces in the north were not inactive; recognizing the difficulties to be encountered by the Russians in turning the Gulf of Bothnia, I resolved to second them by threatening Gus- tavus in the center of his power, in directing my army to enter Zealand in concert with the Danes. The English fleets could not keep the sound in the winter, and only a few hours were requisite to make a descent on Scania, The bare possibility of such an event would force the Swedes to guard this coast and thus effect a useful diversion for our allies, even if it did not force the ob- stinate Gustavus to yield to the imperious law of state interest. Bernadotte, who had replaced Brune, entered Zealand at the head of thirty thousand men, including one of the Spanish divis- ions of Romana;* the other division had remained in Fionia and Holstein with other French troops. The English, hearing of this event, and fearing that we might treat Sweden and her fleet as they had the Danes, hastened to dispatch General Moore with ten thousand men to Gothenburg (May the 17th). The events in Spain induced the English government to recall this corps in order to employ it more usefully in the peninsula. We have seen that it arrived in time for the deliverance of Portugal, and we shall soon meet it again in the plains of Castile. *Romana (Marquis de la) was born In the island of Majorca. He was of illustrious descent and received a very liberal education. Having early entered the army, he served with distinction in the campaigns of 1783 and 1795. In 1807 he commanded the Spanish division of ten or twelve thou- sand men in Zealand and Jutland. Learning there the events at Madrid, he entered into negotiations with the commander of the British fleet, and in August, 1808, embarked with most of his forces for Corufia. From this time he took a prominent part in all the operations of the Peninsular War, till his death, which occurred in January, 1811. fl02 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. CHAPTER AFFAIRS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN 1808; NAPOLEON'S CAM- PAIGN IN THE SPANISH PENINSULA. French Reverses in Spain Military Preparations of Austria Difficulties and Chances of Napoleon's Position Conference of Erfurth Napoleon goes to Spain Supreme Junta Position of the Spanish Forces Napo- leon at Vittorla Character of the War Plan of Operations Affair of Burgos Defeat of Blake at Espinosa Battle of Tudela Battle of Sommo-Sierra Napoleon enters Madrid The English advance from Portugal Napoleon marches against them Moore retires on Corufia and llomana on Orense Battle of Corufia, and Embarkation of the Eng- lish Lefgbvre on the Tagus Victor defeats Infantado at Ucles Oper- ations in Catalonia Saint-Cyr recaptures Rosas and succors Barce- lonaAffair of Cordedeu Victory of Molino-del-Rey Victories of Ca- pellados and Walsoh Second Siege of Saragossa Soult sent to Portu- galDeparture of Napoleon for Paris Intrigues of Talleyrand. RESULTS OF THE FRENCH REVERSES IN SPAIN. At the news of the catastrophe of Baylen, Europe was as much con- vulsed as though I myself had sustained a complete defeat, and my empire had been shaken to its foundation. Austria and Prus- sia made no efforts to conceal their joy; all my enemies were in raptures, and there were few countries where I had not a goodly number of them. Austria had been impatient to repair the losses which she had sustained in the last three wars. Count Stadion, who was then prime minister, was a man of talent and one of my most f ormidable enemies. MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF AUSTRIA. As soon as the news of the insurrection of the second of May, and of the ris- ing of the provinces, had proved to him that the occupation of Spain would be attended by an effusion of blood, he ordered (June 9th) the organization of the landwehr, which, in a short time, would put the army on a respectable footing. Republican France had given to Europe the example of great national levies, and it is astonishing that Austria, in 1805, did not resort to this means, the only one that can save a state in times of great danger. The Archduke Charles, president of the Council of CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN. 60S War, applied himself with great industry and activity to the re- organization of the army of the line; that of the landwehr pro- gressed with no less rapidity. I heard of these military prepara- tions while at Bayonne, and demanded explanations of Count Metternich, then minister at Paris. He replied with common- place remarks on the necessity of placing the military institu- tions of Austria on the same footing as their neighbors. Bavaria not only adopted the system of conscription, but she organized her militia on the basis of the national guards of France, which put her in condition to march to the field a hundred thousand men. The alleged motive was specious; I was not duped by it. Affect- ing, nevertheless, an entire confidence, I invited the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to form an encampment with their contingents. DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION. But I was not altogether easy about the part that Europe might take; nor was I less embarrassed about the course which I myself ought to pursue. I had arrived at the decisive epoch in my career. My position was a delicate one. I had evidently mistaken the char- acter of the war in Spain; and what immense advantages might not England derive from this error! I could reestablish my affairs only by going there in person, or by sending there a great part of my army. Whatever course I might pursue, I should risk upon the continent every thing that I had accomplished during the last ten years; I should give to Austria an opportunity to resume the scepter of Germany, and perhaps that of Italy also. HIS CHANCES. The new interests which I had created in the Confederation of the Rhine formed a powerful counterpoise to the Cabinet of Vienna. A hundred thousand Frenchmen, aided by the Confederates, would be sufficient to oppose all its efforts. But if Prussia, which had much to avenge, should arm against me, she might decide the question. My alliance with Russia was, therefore, my most reliable resource, at least for preventing war by holding Prussia and Germany in check. But could I count on this alliance when its effects would be to ruin the maritime commerce of Russia? Fortunately, at this moment, the open and frank conduct of Alexander and the sagacity of Caulainconrt removed all doubts from my mind as to the course I was to pursue. We had agreed at Tilsit that I should occupy Portugal ; but not that I should dispose of the throne of Spain. Alexander might not agree to what had been done; he had not recognized my brother Joseph as king, and Count Strogonoff, his minister at 604 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. the Court of Madrid, had received no instructions on the subject, Caulaincourt seized the fit occasion to ask the Einperor to give me a pledge of Ms favorable dispositions by recognizing my brother. Alexander felt that a refusal might destroy all that had been done at Tilsit; 'he unhesitatingly accepted the proposi- tion, and this recognition, which I did not hope to obtain without making some concessions to Russia, proving to Europe the in- timacy of our relations, gave me all the advantages of a victory, for it imposed on my enemies. Nevertheless, it was only a preliminary step toward extri- cating me from my difficulties ; I had now to choose between two chances of final success in my Spanish enterprise. The first con- sisted in withdrawing the army of Murat to the Pyrenees, and sending back Ferdinand to Madrid, at the same time declaring that I had only intended the regeneration of the nation by vigorous insti- tutions, but that I would now abandon it to its own fate, inasmuch as it did not desire my assistance; the second consisted in forcibly carry- ing out my project of regeneration, and intrusting the peace of the continent and my dearest interests there to my ally, the Em- peror Alexander. The first seemed the more prudent course; but the fear of a retrograde step which might destroy the prestige of my invincibility, and more than all, the certainty that Spain would throw herself, a corps perdu, into an alliance with England, induced me to prefer the second. I had undertaken this enter- prise, not merely through ambition, but because it was necessary to me in sustaining the maritime contest in which I was engaged, and moreover was important in taking from the Bourbons their last support in Europe. This double motive was sufficient to de- termine my choice. I confess that there was a little temerity in intrusting the fate of my empire to Russia, and the vulgar, who always judge superficially, will blame me for it. But the plaus- ible reasons already cited determined my course; moreover, I thought that eighty thousand men of my old troops would, with the fifty thousand already there, suffice for the subjugation of the peninsula, and the levy of a double conscription would place my army in Germany on the same footing as it was before this great detachment. I said to myself, moreover, if Austria feared to de- clare against me after Pultusk and Eylau, how could she venture to do BO after Russia had joined me? I was not so simple as to suppose that Russia would prefer my interests to her own, or that, should I experience reverses, she would repair them. But I knew that a power having self-respect does not immediately pass from the position of an ally to that of an enemy. It was CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN. 605 sufficient, for the present, that Russia should feign to render me the promised assistance; .time and a preliminary success was of great importance to me at this juncture; with time and a nation as active as the French, all things are possible. Short-sighted politicians, looking only at the result of the enterprise, have found fault with my course, without at all com- prehending the chances of my position. Of course it would have been better to recognize Ferdinand as king and give him a prin- cess of my house 'than -to drive him from the throne with an armed force; but, the war once begun, how could I abandon Spain and Spanish America to the English leopard? To judge by the event, I admit that it would have been more prudent to withdraw my army on the Pyrenees and leave Spain under the yoke of its monks; civil war would soon have burst out But who could have foreseen the difficulties which I encountered? and what statesman could, with sang-froid, have seen the commerce of Vera- Cruz, of Lima, and of Cadiz take its way to the Thames the infal- lible result oif this retreat? To save Spanish America, it was important to resuscitate old Spain, and give her a fleet and an army; and, to accomplish this result, it was necessary that the garb of a monk should no longer rank first in the state; it was indispensable to reform public feeling and remodel national insti- tutions. To accomplish this object it only required a firm band and strong will. CONFERENCE OF ERFURTBL Having decided to go my- self to the peninsula, I thought I ought first to confer with my powerful ally on the position of our affairs in Europe. We met at Erfurth about the middle of September. I there ex- posed to Alexander my intentions with respect to Spain; I explained to him my plan of rescuing America from the English, and of afterward striking, by Turkey and Persia, a mortal blow at their possessions in India. Alexander had views sufficiently extended to appreciate my project; but he also knew that it would require time to execute it, and that I had too many obsta- cles to encounter in Europe to make aay progress if he should make the least opposition. He was willing that I should engage in this peninsular contest, for his empire would profit by any turn which affairs might take. This policy was wise and natural, for to know how to wait and profit by time and opportunity is every thing in politics. I proposed to leave him Moldavia, Wallacihia, and Fin- land; he promised to guarantee the state of Europe as had beeii decided at Tilsit, and our defensive alliance was made more close. Before separating, we resolved to renew offers of peace to Eng- 606 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. land, and we addressed in concert a pressing letter to George I V. r urging him, for the sake of humanity, to put an end to the war. But the Cabinet of St. James, little pleased with this direct appeal to the feelings of the sovereign, answered evasively. It was evi- dent that the war in Spain and the report of the great Austrian levies had raised too high her hopes of success to expect from her a moderation which she had not shown after the treaty of Tilsit, when her cause had been abandoned iby the rest of Europe. Now, however, she might very well prefer the chances of war, for they were all in her favor. Nevertheless, I felt quite confident of a con- tinental peace, for the Emperor of Austria had just contributed to remove my remaining doubts and fears. This prince, after having unsuccessfully attempted to get Metternich admitted into the conferences of Erfurth, wrote me a letter from Presburg, on the eighteenth of September, by Baron Vincent, in which he ex- pressed his desire to maintain peace. I believed him, because I thought Austria not strong enough to contend with France and Russia united; that she bad put a good grace upon the recall of Count Stahremberg and the rupture with the English; and especially because I felt capable of defeating her, should she take a fancy to renew the war. NAPOLEON SETS OUT FOB SPAIN. Having nso further uneasiness about the peace of the continent, I directed the disso- lution of the camps of the Confederation of the Rhine, and re- solved to set out immediately for Spain with my guards, preceded by three corps of my old army, those of Ney, Mortier, and Victor. I had no idea that a city populace who with the militia amd a few soldiers of the line had driven away the conscripts of Murat could a long time hold out against soldiers that had defeated the finest armies in Europe. I was far from foreseeing that a sub- lime despair would 'pervade all classes of a nation which had been painted to me in unfavorable colors, but which, in its misfor- tunes, showed itself equal even to the Romans. Such resistances do not .belong to our age; and they almost induce us to believe that fanaticism is a stronger motive than patriotism and glory. SUPREME JUNTA OF ARANJUEZ. The retreat of Jo- seph from Madrid had given the Spaniards an opportunity to cen- tralize the action of their government, by naming a supreme junta; but instead of sending deputies direct from the provinces, with powers proportional to the dangers to which the country was exposed, the provincial juntas sent two of their members to the central junta, restricting the powers of these members so as to preserve, as much as possible, their own authority. The CAMPAIGN OF 180S IN SPAIN. 607 supreme junta assembled in the palace of Aranjuez, under the presidency of Count Florida Blanca, a venerable statesman, whose name carried with it the public confidence. The selection was a remarkable one, as Blanca's old attachment to the French alliance ought to have caused him to" be suspected. A council of war, in which figured Generals Castafios, Morla, and the Marquis of Castellar, directed all the disposition for the levies and the de- fense of the kingdom ; the repairs and armaments of the fortifica- tions, the disposition of the resources of the kingdom, and the succors sent from England. Tarragona, Tortosa, Gerona, Bada- jos, Ciudad-Rodrigo, were put in a state of defense; works were also ordered at Saragossa and at Valencia. POSITION OF THE SPANISH FORCES. The Spanish forces were formed in four armies. On the left, Blake with the army of Galicia, forty-five thousand strong, had passed Bilboa, and was now marching on Mondragon, with the intention of de- bouching in rear of Vittoria; in the center, the army of Estrama- dura, of twenty thousand men, commanded by Count Belvedere, occupied Burgos; on the right, Oastafios, with the army of Anda- lusia, of thirty thousand men, extended along the Ebro from Cala- hora to Tudela; and Palafox, at the head of twenty-five thousand men of the army of Aragon, occupied the left bank of the Aragon. Besides, the Spaniards had a corps of reserve of ten thousand men, in advance of Madrid. In Catalonia, General Vives was blockading Duhesme in Barcelona. Finally, an English army of thirty thousand combatants, coming partly from Portugal by Salamanca, and partly from Corufia, was to unite at Valladolid under the orders of Moore. NAPOLEON JOINS JOSEPH AT VITTORIA. I repaired, in November, 1808, to the head-quarters of my airmy at Vittoria. The corps of Moncey formed its left wing at Taffala, extending along the Aragon ; the corps of Ney was at Vittoria; that of Soult at Miranda and along the Ebro; the corps of Victor was on the march from Vittoria to Orduna; at the extreme right, the corps of LefeTbvre occupied the heights of Durango ; my guard was with me at Vittoria. The corps of Saint-Cyr, which had assembled at Perpignan, penetrated into Catalonia to relieve Duhesme at Bar- celona. I still expected the corps of Mortien* and that which Junot had brought back from Portugal after the convention of Vimiera; but I felt strong enough already to take the offensive with what troops I had in hand. CHARACTER OF THE WAR. In forming my plans for subjugating Spain, I had to choose between regular and method- 008 LIFE OP NAPOLEON. ical operations and a war of a more irregular character. By tBe first system, provisions must be carried in the suite of the army, or be regularly purchased and paid for from the inhabitants. No great detachments could be made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps to the fast- nesses of the mountains. In fine, effecting a military occupation of Spain without its subjugation. By the second, war would be made to support war. To march rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day, upon the local resources, as we had done in Italy, 'Austria, and Prussia, sparing our reserve* for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces tibia mode promised more prompt and decisive results. The individ- ual losses rendered still more disastrous by the flight of the civil authorities, caused by this method, made us numerous enemies. Nevertheless, in spite of these unavoidable excesses and the ven* geance taken by the insurgents in reprisal, we should finally have succeeded in restoring order and peace, had it not been for the English cooperation, the 'position of Portugal flanking our line of operations, and the advantages which her maritime ally derived from her eight hundred leagues of coast. By sacrificing three or four hundred millions of money for the subsistence of my troops, and devoting two Whole years to overrunning Spain, it is possible that the first method would have succeeded. By maintaining good order and discipline among my troops, and by distributing the money necessary to support them among a people poor and interested, would have gradually made us many partisans. We could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But, great as were the advantages of this system, it must >be confessed that its application was very difficult. The thing had been very easy with an army of fifty thousand men, as was done by Venddme under Louis XIV.; then three quarters of the nation were for us and for Philip V. But we had mow almost the entire nation in arms against us; we could not suppress euch an insurrection, and at the same time oppose the Anglo-Portu- guese, with less than two hundred thousand men; but how was it possible to make regular provision for this number in a country where there was no means of organizing administrative authori- ties whose requisitions would be respected? Suchet and Soult partially succeeded with this system for a time, with small forces and in a more favorable part of the country. By the second sys- tem I had always succeeded ; it led more directly to the destruc- tion of the enemy's armies; and avoided the enormous drafts upon the treasury of Prance which would have been required, CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN. 609 under the other system, for the armament, clothing, and support of two hundred thousand armed men, in a foreign country. It will be said, undoubtedly, that only a year's advance from the French treasury would have been required, as, at the end of that time, regular contributions could have been levied and collected in Spain. Nothing can be more absurd; those who know the diffi- culties experienced by the Spanish government in collecting suffi- cient for its ordinary expenses will agree with me, that it would have been impossible for King Joseph to effect with that impov- erished nation what Charles III. failed to do in the glorious epoch of his reign, and the golden age of unhappy Spain. To these motives, quite sufficient, we must add, that the war was not pop- ular enough with the French to justify any great sacrifices by France. Besides, the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable means of transport rendered problematical the possi- bility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurgent country. I therefore determined to adopt the same course that I had already pursued with so much success. It caused great excesses, but this was rather the fault of the chiefs who tolerated them. Had I succeeded, I should have indemnified the mass of the people for their losses, by the sale of the great wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the Church more dependent on the government, and caused a more just division of the riches of this world; thus the evils of the war would have been for- gotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over that of an ambitious and exclusive clergy. PLAN OF OPERATIONS. Having determined to carry on the war of invasion upon the same principles by which I had gained success in former campaigns, I prepared to attack the Spaniards with our accustomed impetuosity. My plan of cam- paign was marked out by the faulty positions of the hostile forces. Their center, too weak to oppose a serious resistance, would bo easily overthrown; then the two wings, separated and turned, would be in a very critical situation. The army of Blake, in par- ticular, having ventured past Bilboa, might be entirely cut off and driven into the sea. Unfortunately y4he aged Lef^bvre, urged forward by the impetuous ardor of youth/ did not even wait for my arrival at the army before attacking Blake, whereas he should have maneuvered to retain him in advance of Bilboa, On the thirty-first of October, Blake had been driven from this city, which was now occupied by our troops. The seventh of November, Lefel)vre attacked him again at Guenes, and obliged him to fight, retreating on Espinosa. 30 610 LIFE OF NAPOLEOy. On the other hand, the events of Baylen had given me a higher idea of the resistance to be opposed by the Spanish troops in line, and as the road from Bayonne was my only communica- tion, I did not wish to penetrate too far beyond the Ebro, before having secured this route from the enterprises of Blake. I had sent, for this purpose, the corps of Victor, to reinforce Lefe'bvre, with directions to push the army of Galicia as soon as Soulnes. Reding, having received reinforcements from all sides, deemed it the proper time to resume the offensive, hoping to be able, should he succeed in driving Saint-^Cyr from Catalonia, to fly to the assistance of Aragon. If Reding had understood strategy as well as he did fighting, he might here have played an important part. A slight success on the right flank of Saint-Cyr would have paralyzed his whole corps; but Reding thought his superiority authorized him to envelop our troops. Forming four columns several leagues apart, he marched to the right with the elite of his forces on the direct road to Vendrel, while hi left, under Wimpfen, was 'to descend from Lacuna and Igualda on Villa Franca. This was a double fault; Reding should have allowed Saint-Cyr to move on Vendrel and Tarra- gona, while he himself was defiling with thirty thousand men ou Capellados and Martorel, so as to turn our right and cut us off from Barcelona. Saint-Cyr took the wisest course which could be adopted in such a case; he concentrated his forces on the cen- ter at Lacuna, the sixteenth of February, overthrew his adver- sary's center at Capellados, and drove it back on Oervera and Manresa. To complete his task, Saint-Cyr drew back from the right toward the left (from Igualda on San Magi), so as to repeat on the enemy's right wing the operation he had just executed on the center. Souham was to cooperate by effecting his junction CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN. 627 at Villa Rodona; but the difficulty of sending orders prevented him from obtaining the desired result from this movement. Nev- ertheless, the junction was effected, and a French corps took pos- session of Walsch. Reding thought, by an inverse movement, to connect Himself by Monblanch with the troops of Wimpfen near Igualda. He thus found himself cut off from the division which he had left in advance of Tarragona, and resolved to attack our troops and reestablish his communication. Saint-Cyr marched to encounter him; the meeting took place on the twenty-fifth of February, near Alcover. The enemy's defeat was complete; Red- ing, who was himself wounded, regained Tarragona, after losing more than three thousand five hundred men hors-de-combat. The handful of braves who gained these brilliant victories were, never- theless, subjected to great want and its attendant maladies. The enemy repaired his losses by the continually increasing animosi- ties of the population. SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA. Success, though much better contested, had also crowned our arms in Aragon; the mod- ern Numantia, half buried in its own ruins, had capitulated. It will be remembered that after the battle of Tudela, Palafox had retired upon Saragossa with thirty thousand men. A multitude of peasants, driven before our columns, had also taken refuge there. An ancient tradition made this city an object of peculiar veneration; it was the sanctuary of the Virgen-del-Pilar, the palladium of Spanish liberty, and all were resolved to save it or to die in the attempt. Priests, monks, citizens, peasants, as well as the military, were enflamed with unbounded enthusiasm. Never were so many different passions directed to the same object. Pride, patriotism, fanaticism, national and military honor all the most powerful motives of human action were put in play to render the defense a desperate one. Marshal Moncey had given to Junot the command of the third corps, which first began the investment. Mortier had joined it wfth the fifth corps after Ney had received orders to move on Madrid. Marshal Lannes was placed in command of this army, and directed to proceed to the siege; General La Coste, my aid- de-camp, and Colonel Rogniat* directed the engineers, and Gen- eral Dedon commanded the artillery. *Joseph Rogniat was born at Vienne, In 1767, and entered the service at the beginning of the Revolution. He served under Moreau, in 1800, as captain of engineers. He served in the campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807. and was made a colonel after the siege of Dantzic, in which he rendered valuable aid to General Chasseloup Laubat. In the Peninsular War he directed several important sieges, and was promoted to the grades of 628 LIFE OP NAPOLEON. Situated in one of the most fertile plains, with a population of sixty thousand inhabitants, Saragossa is built partly of brick and partly of granite; though not regularly fortified, it is sur- rounded by a thick wall. Since the first siege, they had strength- ened the weak parts of this wall, erected parapets, and con- structed barricades across the streets, so that, the wall being forced, a new enceinte, as it were, would be formed in each street; the place was well armed with one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon. Moreover, after the first siege, the English general, Doyle, had gone to Saragossa, levied a corps of troops, and fur- nished a large number of English muskets and military munitions for arming the Aragonese. The houses being principally con- structed of masonry without the use of wood rendered the usual incendiary projectiles utterly useless. It would, therefore, be necessary to resort to a bombardment, or to attack the place by mines, should the enemy not be forced by assault to capitulate. Both means were finally employed. Houses were attacked and de- fended like so many bastions in a regular fortress; and buildings, blown up by the mines, still found defenders who furiously dis- puted the scattered fragments. It would require the pen of a Ho- mer to describe the heroic scenes of this siege, where art and well- directed courage finally triumphed over the strength and energy of despair. They disputed the possession of their houses, story by story, defending the rooms, the cellars, and the terraces, like so many demilunes, covered ways, and counterscarps. The garri- son multiplied its numbers; each point of attack was sustained by peasants and armed citizens who assembled at the sound of the tocsin in the different quarters to serve as a reserve. When an isolated post was not defended in a manner to suit the mob, the unfortunate officer who commanded was either massacred or sentenced to be shot. At the end of two months, the enceinte of the city had been carried in many places, and one-fourth of the houses reduced by sword and torch. The population, half buried in their cellars, had been swept off by a horrible epidemic. Fifteen thousand sol- diers and thirty thousand inhabitants had perished by fire, pesti- lence, and famine; and when the place capitulated, it presented to our brave army, seized with admiration and horror, the aspect of a vast charnel-house. Palafox, who was sick, had given the brigadier-general and general-of -division. In 1813 he directed the defenses of the capital of Saxony, and in 1814 commanded at Motz. He was after- ward made lieutenant-general, and employed on important works of fortifi- cation. He was the author of several valuable books on military and politi- cal subjects. CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IV BPAJN. 629 command to a distinguished French emigrant (St. Marc), but the latter goon threw his weighty responsibility on a junta of defense. This junta, yielding to the clamors of the majority, consented to capitulate, notwithstanding the opposition of fanatics who wished still to prolong the defense. My aid-de-camp, Lacoste,* had directed the siege till the moment of his death; Dedon was still spared; Lannes had distinguished himself, as he always did; as also had Mortier, Suchet, and the intrepid Gazan. Our loss did not exceed five thousand men. Manes of so many brave men ! Providence had made you friends and allies, but a deplorable political error forced you to slay each other ! 8OULT IS SENT TO PORTUGAL. I had hoped -that Eng- land would be so disgusted with the catastrophe of Moore that she would mate no new efforts in the peninsula; and my first idea was to avenge Junot by placing my eagles anew on the tow- ers of Lisbon. The Portuguese army, a part disbanded and a part sent into France, no longer seemed in condition to dispute our entrance. The return of our victorious troops, announcing a superiority which no force could oppose, seemed calculated to give confidence to onr partisans and to induce them to declare boldly for our cause. Although they were not the most numerous party, they nevertheless counted in their ranks men high in pub lie esteem. The feeble part taken by the Portuguese previous to the de- feat of Jnnot deceived me respecting the state of feeling in the interior of the country, where exasperation was afterwards raised to the highest pitch. The English army, to which alone I had attributed the loss of Portugal, had disappeared at Corufia, and I flattered myself that my chances of success were better than be- fore. My calculations proved erroneous, because my enemies displayed greater resources than I had supposed. The Prince Regent of Portugal had even outdone Barrere and the Committee of Public Safety, in his measures for national defense; he had ordered, by the decree of December llth (1808), a hvec-en-masse of all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty years; every indi- vidual refusing to march against the enemy was to be shot; every village that did not oppose all possible resistance was to be burnt. There is no parallel to this in the code of 1793. Count N. Lacoste was an officer of the corps of engineers, end rose to the rank of colonel. In the campaign of 1807. He distinguished himself at the siege of Pantzlc, and was made aid-dt-tnmp to the Emperor, with the rank of general-of-brlgade. San Gents, the chief engineer of the defenses of Saragossa, fell at nearly the same moment at Lacoste. 630 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Beresford,* who had been made a Portuguese marshal, was entrusted with the general command. He organized twenty-four regiments under English pay, and with English officers for all grades above that of captain. Other regiments, entirely Portu- guese, were also organized at the same time. The regular militia, instituted some half-century before, and the reserve, known under the name of ordonanzas, were all put under requisition. A re- gency, composed of the Patriarch of Lisbon, the Marquis de Las Minas y de Monteyre Mor, was invested with unlimited powers, yet subordinate to the English general, who was the true dictator of the monarchy. Moreover, General Craddock, who remained English governor at Lisbon, on the departure of Moore, had re- ceived reinforcements, among which was the division of Mac- kenzie. The English sought to introduce this division into Cadiz, under the charitable pretext of defending that place from our troops, from whom, however, it was not in the slightest danger! But the Spaniards were not to be duped by such a pretext; and Mackenzie, very properly refused admission into a place from which it had been as impossible to eject him as from Gibraltar, resumed his anchorage in the Tagus. Soult received orders at Ferrol to march on Lisbon with the second and eighth corps, whose effective strength a month before was near forty thousand men, but which had been reduced by sick- ness and losses during the campaign to about twenty^four thou- sand. I hoped that .these troops, reinforced by ten thousand con- valescents and seconded by the corps of Victor, who was to de- scend the Tagus, and the division of Lapisse, who was to debouch toward Almeida, would suffice for the subjugation of a kingdom which I considered already nearly disarmed. DEPASTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR PARIS. I had not yet received any news from this expedition into Portugal, when important matters recalled me to France. Austria was arming in great force ; and I inferred thait -there must be some grand proj- ect forming against me in Germany and in -the north of Europe. I set out from Valladolid for Paris about the middle of January. *Slr William Beresford served with distinction in the Peninsular War, and was afterwards made a baron of the United Kingdom. For his services In Portugal he received the titles of Duke of Blvas and Marquis of Campo Mayor. The Prince Regent of Portugal made him generalissimo of his armies, but the severity with which he punished a conspiracy of General Freyre, in 1817, against the British domination in Lisbon, rendered him so odious to the Portuguese that the Cortes afterwards dismissed him. In 1826 he again appeared at Lisbon, at the head of the British forces sent to quell the rebellion. CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN. 681 In leaving the peninsula I was greatly embarrassed in select- ing a successor. Joseph did not understand the art of war; but his title gave him command over the marshals, who were unwil- ling to obey the orders of any one ef their colleagues. He had remained with his court at Vittoria; and I was undecided about sending him back to Madrid, when a deputation of the grand func- tionaries of the state came to formally request his return. This request resulted from the fear of the Spaniards, lest they might be conquered and the kingdom dismembered; but the throne of my brother and the constitution of Bayonne would at least be a guarantee of the integrity of their monarchy. This deputatioa decided me; and my brother made his formal entry into his cap- ital at the very moment when I was enteririg the gates of Paris, January 22d. I left him in command, giving him Marshal Jourdan for an adviser; the conqueror of Fleurus had a name; he alone had commanded a hundred thousand men; this would necessa- rily give him influence. I must confess that my choice was not a fortunate one; Jourdan was a good soldier, but his system of mil- itary operations was erroneous; he was a good administrator, laborious and methodical, but he was incapable of giving motion to this vast machine. Indeed, the task was exceeding difficult, on account of the contentious spirit of the marshals, the almost utter impossibility of communicating with the different corps-d'armee, and the necessity of covering the capital. To ensure success, it was necessary, first of all, to keep consantly united a force sufficient to fall day and night on the English, without being troubled about Madrid; but, with a king at head-quarters, seeking to control a vast kingdom, this was a difficult matter. Nevertheless, at the time of my departure from France, I left my brother great chances of success, for in three months I had greatly advanced our cause; the destruction of three Castilian armies, the occupation of Madrid, the overthrow of Moore, the fall of Saragossa, the defeat of Vives and Reding, the occupation of Galicia, the assault of Oporto had struck Spain and Portugal with terror. The English division left at Lisbon under Craddock was already preparing to follow the wreck of Moore's army, as soon as Victor should advance by the valley of the Tagus. It seemed to require but the slightest effort to complete the enter- prise. This appearance, however, was deceitful. In a country so vast, where the slightest thing may be converted into a serious obstacle, the absence of a firm and single directing mind must necessarily be felt sooner or later; and obstinacy, which forms the distinctive trait of the Spanish and Portuguese character, was 682 LIFE OF NAPOLEON. calculated to eventually wear out the unconnected efforts of my lieutenants.* INTRIGUES OP TALLEYRAND. On my return to Paris, I was not a little surprised to find the capital full of rumors on the inconveniences of the Spanish war, and on the pretended coun- sels of Talleyrand, which would have prevented it, had they been followed! I had good reason to be astonished and indignant at so incorrect a rumor, the object of which was too evident to be misunderstood. I now saw what I had to expect from a man who could lend himself to such an intrigue. I should probably have undertaken the war in Spain without his advice, but certainly his counsel contributed not a little to draw me into it. Deeming it best not to resort to too severe measures against him, I con- tented myself with reproving him in presence of the deputation of all the great bodies of the state, who had come to welcome my return to the Tuileries, reproaching him with these untrue stories which could have originated only with himself. I had already had occasion to observe his want of principle in pecuniary mat- ters, and especially in the affairs of the princes of Germany and of the House of Orange, but I had not deemed him capable of such an act as this. The rather severe reproof -which I here gave him was not the cause of the war which h declared against me, but it was the signal for hostilities. *Napier's account of this campaign and his criticisms on the opera- tions are well worthy the attention of the military student. APPENDIX. APPENDIX TO VOLUME I. THE BONAPARTE FAMILY. We have already mentioned several members of this family in the foot-notes. But aa the extraordinary career of Napoleon, and the recent elevation -of his nephew, Louis Napoleon, to the imperial throne of France, has directed public attention to the origin and history of the Bonaparte family, the following sketch has been prepared by the Translator. It is compiled mainly from Appleton's "New American Cyclopaedia," ithe "Encyclopaedia Americana," and "Biographie des Contemporains." Some writers have attempted to trace the origin of the Bona- parte family to Emmanuel IL, a Greek Emperor of the House of Comnenus, whose two sons, after the fall of Constantinople, fled to Italy under the name of Bonaparte. It is historical fact that a Bonaparte family was distinguished among the nobles of Italy in the middle ages. The names of Bonapartes appear among the Florentine patricians in the "Golden Book of Bologna," and are also inscribed in the "Golden Book of Venice," in the nobility records of Treviso. When Napoleon's ancestors first settled in Corsica is uncertain, but is supposed to have been during the con- tests between the Guelphs and Ghibellines. Charles Maria Bonaparte, Napoleon's father, was born in Ajaccio, March 29th, 1746. He called himself a Florentine noble and patrician, and was educated as a lawyer in the university of Pisa. He became one of the most popular advocates in Corsica. He fought with Paoli for the independence of Corsica against the Genoese, and wished to accompany him into exile, but was pre- vented by the tears of his young wife. On the annexation of Cor- sica to France, he became assessor of the Royal Court of Justice. Count Marboeuf, the French commissioner, retained his name on the register of nobles, and also procured for his son Joseph a place at the school at Autun, and for Napoleon at Brienne. In 1779 he was the deputy of the Corsican nobility to Paris. On 834 APPENDIX. account of his health, he subsequently retired to Montpelier, where he died February 24th, 1785. He was buried at that place.. Maria Letitia Ramolino, his wife, was born ait Ajaccio, August 24th, 1750. She was of Italian origin. He fell in love with her at the age of fourteen, but as her parents were of the Genoese party, while he was a Paolist, their marriage did not take place till several years later. She bore him thirteen chil- dren, eight of whom survived their father and attained majority. The names of these eight follow in the order of their birth: viz., Joseph, Napoleon, Lucien, Louis, Eliza, Pauline, Caroline, and Jerome. Madame Bonaparte, after the death of her husband, re- sided with her children in their country-house on the sea-shore near Ajaccio. It was owned by a bachelor uncle, who lived with the family. He was wealthy, but very parsimonious. Anec- dotes are told of the means resorted to by Napoleon and his broth- ers to wring money from the miser. Although the young Bona- partes enjoyed all the necessaries of life, their mother's means were not such as to afford them money for the purchase of those thousand little luxuries which every boy covets, but which it is often better he should not have. When the English conquered Corsica in 1793, she fled with her mother and family to Mar- seilles. After the 18th Brumaire (1799), she went to Paris, but not till after Napoleon's elevation to the imperial dignity was she distinguished as Madame Mere. She was appointed general pro- tectress of charitable institutions, and in dot