ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO On the Consciousness of the Universal and the Individual A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE THOUGHT PROCESSES Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Science in the University of London BY FEANCIS AVELING Ph.D. (Louvain), D.Sc. (Lond.), D.D. LECTURER IN ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON ' In qtut lahorans mundus jam sennit, in qua plus tern- pons consumptum est quam in acquirendo et regendo orbis imperio consumpserit Caesarea domus.' — John of Salisbury, Polycraticus, vii. 12. MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 1912 COPYRIGHT Bi- c / / BIOLOGT EDUC. PSYCH. LIBRARY [From the Psychological Labc/ratory of the University of London^ University College.~\ PREFACE CORRIGENDA P. V, 1. 8, for Professor Alfred Michotte read Professor Albert Michotte. P. 36 note, 1. 3, for demonstration, ini instrument : read demon- stration ; pour verifier la demonstration, un instrument : P. 38, 11. 19, 20, for De Regulari Directione Ingenii read Rajulae ad Directionem Ingenii. P. 55, 1. 4 and note 2, and p. 246, 1. 17, for Die logische Unter- suckling read Logische Unter suchungen. P. 56, footnote, /or Erfiihlung read Ertiillung. UUV^J-I-LOV^X ' of investigation. The problem then involved was one of perception — rather than of conception, as in the present study. It was ascertained that the instruction given beforehand to the observers — that they were to perceive pictures of objects, or objects, exposed in the tachistoscope, as {a) individuals or 1 Notes of this study were published in the Journal of Psychology, vol. iv. part ii., September 1911, under the title "The Relation of Thought-Process and Percept in Perception." V 260751 BlOLOGir EDUC. PSYCH. LIBRARY [From the Psychological Laboratory of the University of London, University College.'\ PEEFACE The research which forms the subject of the present essay was undertaken on the completion of a pre- vious study, made in the Laboratoire de Psychologie Uxp&imentale of the Institut Sup&ieur of the University of Louvain, upon the function of generalisation.^ The points established in that previous research, carried out under the direction and with the help of Professor Alfred Michotte, were few in number, but of some considerable interest in themselves, and indicative of further possible lines of investigation. The problem then involved was one of perception — rather than of conception, as in the present study. It was ascertained that the instruction given beforehand to the observers — that they were to perceive pictures of objects, or objects, exposed in the tachistoscope, as (a) individuals or ^ Notes of this study were published in the Journal of Psychology/, vol. iv. part ii., September 1911, under the title "The Relation of Thought-Process and Percept in Perception." V 260751 vi CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL (yS') as generals (types) — had a pronounced effect upon the subsequent perception. It was further ascertained that this effect of the instruction can be counteracted, or minimised, by {a!) objective causes / (character of the stimuli) and (/30 subjective, or subjective-objective, causes (on the part of the observer). It was abundantly clear, however, that striking differences were to be observed in the structure of the percept, and in the related pheno- mena of consciousness, in the two cases of individual and general (typical) perception. Hardly a protocol was dictated, out of some 860, that was not clear as to the fact that the picture, or object, shown was seen either as a general or as a particular. There was seldom hesitation in the mind of the observers to assign each experience, whether conditioned by the instruction or not, to one or other of these classes. The research thus indicated a promising field for further investigation, which the work described in the present essay was designed to carry out. Before, however, describing in detail the ex- periments made, and analysing the introspective results obtained, it will be well to preface a rough sketch of the history of the problem with which we PEEFACE vii are occupied, to outline some of the solutions that have been put forward to meet it in its various phases, and thus to show what an extraordinary and important part it has played in the develop- ment of European philosophy. Our essay is therefore divided into three parts. The first briefly sets out the history of the develop- ment of the problem of the ' Universals,' with its metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological implications.^ The second presents the data of our present research with the conclusions thereon based. The third consists of a short Bibliography of works referred to in the text. ^ This part is written from a frankly selective stand-point, and is in no sense to be considered an exhaustive, or even a complete statement of the history of the subject. Its main object is to provide a point of view which we wish to adopt in the subsequent treatment of the experimental data afiforded by our research ; and for this purpose it is given as a suitable introduction to the main part of our essay. CONTENTS PAGE Preface v PART L— HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION SECTION I The Problem of the * Universals ' from Plato to the Renaissance 3 SECTION II The Problem of the 'Universals' from the Renais- sance TO the Present Day 32 SECTION III The Problem of the ' Universals ' in the new Psycho- logy 58 PART 11. —THE RESEARCH SECTION I The Setting of the Problem 75 § 1. Material 78 § 2. Procedure during the ' Learning Period ' . . 80 § 3. Observers and Date 85 ix CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL SECTION II PAGE Points arising during the ' Learning Period ' . .86 § 1. The Growth of Meaning 88 § 2. The Abstract Concept 98 § 3. The Relation of Mental Imagery to Thought . 137 SECTION III Functioning of Words learned in Judgements § 1, Procedure § 2. Phenomenological Conditions of * Universal ' and ' Individual ' Thought .... § 3. Conceptual * Overknowledge ' . . . § 4. Phenomenological Appearance of the Predicate in Logical Judgements ..... § 5. General Conclusions : Summary of Results . 174 174 176 201 221 240 PART III Bibliography of Works referred to ... . 245 Appendix 249 PAKT I HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION B SECTION I THE PROBLEM OF THE ' UNIVERSALS ' FROM PLATO TO THE RENAISSANCE There are three main aspects noticeable in the development of the problem of the ' Universals ' — the metaphysical, the epistemological, and the psychological; and, although the lines of interest in these cross and recross in a perplexing manner throughout the whole course of philosophic thought, we may separate it into three main periods, in which one or other of these interests was pre- dominant. The first period may be designated, on the whole, metaphysical, and considered to embrace the history of philosophy from Plato to the decadence of scholasticism. The teaching of Plato and of Aristotle with regard to our subject is too well known to necessi- tate our dwelling at any great length upon it here. For Plato, knowledge was of the Keal ; but the 3 4 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx. i real is to be found only in the Idea, which is beyond the world of sense — itself no more than a shadow of the ideal world.^ This real-ideal world exists, since we discover in consciousness intellectual presentations of objects characterised by universality, necessity, and immutability ; since to these intel- lectual presentations must correspond extra-mental objects having the same characters. The ' universal ' is a reality to which thought corresponds. This is the epistemological postulate. As did Parmenides, so Plato taught that real being must be universal, necessary, and changeless. This is the object of knowledge. But such being cannot be discovered in the world presented to sense. Here all is in flux ; for with Heraclitus, Plato held that this world of shadows of the ideal is a collection of particular, contingent, and instable beings ; and, as such, it follows that no true knowledge can be possessed of it. The psychological basis seems to be a datum of introspection. The postulate is that of dogmatic realism. The intellectual presentation corresponds to an idea known to the incorporeal soul in a previous state of existence. It is a memory, awakened anew in it — in its terrestrial banishment and bodily prison — by a sort of occasion- alism, on the contact of sense with its object. The idea is not the subjective result of the movement 1 Plato, Re})ubliCy vii. 514 D. §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 5 of consciousness in the process of abstraction. Plato, in common with all Greek psychologists, was of opinion that the content for ideas must somehow be given to the Soul ; but he put forward no theory that the activity of consciousness should itself concur in the production of the idea. Sharply contrasted with this doctrine is that of Aristotle. Where Plato neglected the study of phenomena, as the mere occasion of the revival of connate ideas, Aristotle investigated them for their own sake, as well as for the reason that phenomena alone constitute the original source of all our intellectual cognition. His theory of knowledge is consistent throughout. It is little more than an extension and application of his general theory with regard to vital activity. It is based on the assimila- tion of unlike to like, on psychical immanence, or intentional inexistence of the object of thought in the thinking subject. The sense, stimulated by its object and intrinsically determined by it, becomes the immanently sensible-in-act. So also the under- standing, potens omnia fieri, stimulated by its cognitive object reacts in knowledge. The exist- ence of the two orders of content (sensible and intellectual) would seem to be a matter of intro- spective analysis. But, for Aristotle, the abstract object of the understanding is not found as such in r, CONSCIOUSNESS OF TPIE UNIVERSAL it. i nature. All that is is singular, concrete, obnoxious to change. Whence comes, then, the impulse to which the understanding, naturally passive and indeterminate, yet potentially all things, reacts ? The answer to this question is given in the theory of the Active Intellect {vov(; TrotT^rtAco?), which renders the sensory image (the intelligible-in- potency) apt to determine the understanding to become the immanently intelligible-in-act ; and so to allow of its knowledge being of the universal, the necessary, the changeless. The relations of these two intellects (ira6rjTLK6 '^'"' dwadTi^, Kal d/xiyrjs rrj oialq. (bv ivepyelq.. ... 6 5^ iradrj-LKos vois (pdaprds, Kal dvev toutov ovdkv uoel. 18 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i to it in this aspect that they would find any satis- factory solution of it. There was no more a question of the real existence in nature of the ' universals.' It had become a matter of analysis and classification of mental processes, safeguarded always by the metaphysical presumption of the unity of the individual. St. Thomas Aquinas is indisputably the typical scholastic of the thirteenth century. His masterly grasp and treatment of the common doctrines — problems and their solutions — which together form the synthesis of scholasticism, make of him the accepted representative of the school. His ex- positions may be taken as the culmination of a philosophical spirit that, through a long spontaneous development from within, aided later on by the acquisition of the recently translated works of Aristotle, had at length taken definite shape and appeared before the world as a complete and in- tegrated system. Its very integration would warn the student to pause before he undertook an analysis of the philosophy of Aquinas under detailed, and necessarily abstract, heads or aspects. Fortunately, however, he has himself cast his work into sections. Questions Ixxv. to xc, for example, of the Summa Theologica form a complete treatise of psychology ; and could, without violence to the §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 19 text, be published as such apart from the rest of the work. His metaphysical commentaries and lesser treatises are in themselves separate works. He has nowhere in one place given ex frofesso a com- plete theory of knowledge ; though his teaching — penetrating, if in the modern sense to a considerable extent uncritical — can be formulated from his writ- ings as a whole. As the problem of the ' uni- versals ' was dealt with in the thirteenth century, these three points of view claim our attention. i. Metaphysically, the problem was regarded as already solved. The concrete individual alone exists in nature. The ' universal ' is formally ^ in the mind alone. But ii. The ' universal ' is fundamentaliter, has its ground, in extra -mental reality. This episte- mological doctrine can be stated in three postulates, {a') The known object is in the knowing subject as ^ The terms formally and fundamentally {fonnaliter, funda- mentaliter) mark the exact distinctions of this teaching. What is in nature is the individual, and this alone. But the individual is the ground and justification (epistemologically) of the ' universal ; ' since the latter is realised in the individuality of the former ; and can be distinguished from it by abstractive (as opposed to precisive) ab- straction. Thus, while only Peter, Paul, etc., are real men, while the universal ' man ' is not found except in so far as realised in Peter, or Paul, etc., each of these is a 'man.' That fact is looked upon as the foundation of the formal ' universal ' as it is discovered in mind. While his manhood cannot be separated from Peter {ahstractio prae- cisiva) it can be considered apart from all that makes him this man. This process [ahstractio abstractiva) does not falsify the concept. It defines it. 20 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i a determination, or mode, of the latter. (/3') All knowledge consists in an assimilation of the subject to the object. (7') The validity of knowledge de- pends upon the co-operation of both subject and object in the cognitive act. Although this solution of the epistemological problem is offered ill the form of postulates, it is clear from these that stress is laid upon the importance of the in- vestigation of the psychological conditions of know- ledge. While Aquinas never seems to suspect that the form of realism which he professes could be strengthened by further criticism, he can in no sense be called a dogmatist. For he insists upon a universal methodic doubt as the preliminary to any discussion of the validity of knowledge ; ^ and he proposes as necessary for any solution of the problem a rigorous examination of reason itself and of its nature.^ To this attitude of mind on his ^ The scholastics of this period cast their works into the form of a synthetic solution of * Doubts ' proposed. No one practised methodic doubt so completely as the doctors of the school. Aquinas is categoric on the point. " Aliae scientiae considerant particulariter de veritate, unde et particulariter ad eas pertinet circa singulas veritates dubitare ; sed ista scientia (Metaphysica) sicut habet universalem considerationem de veritate, ita etiam ad earn pertinet universalis dubitatio de veritate : et ideo non particulariter, sed siraul universalem dubitationem pro- sequitur." {Suj). Met. Arist.) 2 With Kant (cf. Kritik der reinen Vermtnft, Preface, p. 5 of original edition) Aquinas begins with reason knowing itself and its nature. " (Veritas) cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum ; non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNI VERS ALS' 21 part we owe the keen psychological analysis that he made. Of greater interest to us is the purely psycho- logical aspect of our problem as viewed by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century, and especially by St. Thomas. Senses and intellect are distin- guished as different ' faculties ; ' but it is of prime importance to remember that Thomistic psychology is 710^ a ' faculty psychology * in the usual sense of the term. Man, not the soul, is the subject matter of psychology ; and man is one concrete being in nature — not a congeries of separate entities. Hence the ' faculties ' are not entities, but principia quihus ; i.e., a series of potentialities, or potential activities of the conscious individual. They are in ordine essentiae, as opposed to that of esse and operatio. When an analysis is to be made, cate- gories must be discovered for purposes of classifi- cation. Here observed elementary psychological phenomena are taken as the basis of this classifi- cation ; and all other phenomena grouped under the headings of the ' faculties.' ^ In the psychology of sensation little was added ad rem ; quod quidem coguosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsins actus ; quae cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cujus natura est ut rebus con- formetur ; uude secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur." {De Veritaie, Q. i. a. ix.) ^ Cf. Sunnna Theologica, Pars 1, Q. Ixxvii. a. 3, c. 22 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i to the theories of Aristotle, by this time well known, except a distinct assertion of the existence of the (internal) cogitative (or, in animals other than man, the estimative) sense. This assertion was derived from the Arabian commentators. The function of the estimative sense is the cognition of the concrete as useful or harmful. Man, in whom the cogitative sense, radicatur in intellectu, can pass from concrete to concrete ^ in a kind of pseudo-syllogistic process, by its operation. Intellectual knowledge is derived by means of psychical processes from the original sense im- pressions. It differs from the latter in that all the individualising notes of the object of cognition are purged away by a higher activity than that of sense. The process in which this purging away of individualising coefficients from the mental content (object, as present to mind) is accomplished is abstraction : ^ and the theory of the active in- tellect is again advanced to account for this process. The theory is no doubt an obscure and difficult one ; nevertheless the character of the abstract produced by the active intellect is clearly asserted. This is nothing that can be described ^ Cf. Newman, An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. This work seems to be a treatise on the cogitative sense, rather than a com- plete psychology. '^ ' ' Coguoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia indi\'iduali, quam representant phantasmata. " {Summa Theologica, Pars 1, Q. Ixiv. a, 1.) §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 23 as a sensorial content ; though Aquinas maintains that it is never present in the absence of a phan- tasma ^ or image. It transcends the material from which it is abstracted. It does not shift and change, as do the phantasmata ; but is immaterial, universal, and necessary.^ It is this abstract that determines the possible intellect, which, like the sense, is a receptive ' faculty,' to its act of understanding. It is the species intelligibilis which transforms its potentiality into act. The understanding then cognises its object and forms in itself the word (verhum) ; which last is what it conceives of the object understood.^ We may here notice in passing that the uncer- tainty with regard to the active intellect in the theory of Aristotle is cleared up by Aquinas in a thoroughly psychological fashion. "Where the Arabians interpreted his text to mean that there is only one separated active intellect for the human species, thus advancing a purely meta- physical doctrine, Aquinas teaches that all the principles of thought are internal. For him, as for all the schoolmen, the active intellect is of the nature of a psychological hypothesis put for- ^ St. Thomas appeals to iutrospection in support of this observation. 2 Loc. cit., Q. Ixxxiv. a. 1, c. ^ "Id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus." {Loc. cit., Q. xxviii. a. 4, ad 1""^) 24 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i ward to give some account of the phenomena of understanding. The important point in the psychology of Aquinas, with regard to the ' universals,' is that he makes the sensorial content necessarily in- dividual ; both as a psychical content existing here and now in consciousness, and as the inter- mediary by which we are put in contact with an individual extra-mental reality. The intellectual knowledge, or thought element, as a psychical element is also individual, transient, here and now. But it is necessary and immaterial, in the sense that it truly expresses intellectually (i.e., intentionally) the nature which by it is known. And that nature, manifested in the concrete objects of the world of sense, is universal and necessary. Here we have been led back to metaphysics and epistemology ; but the psychological chapter could have stood alone. Thought is irreducible to sensorial imagery. The sensorial content is changeable, and has reference to one ' object.' The thought content is invariable, and indifferently referable to many. There is one inevitable conclusion of this doc- trine. The understanding is incapable of a direct knowledge of the individual. Its formal object is the ' universal ; ' and it is only by a species of (unexplained) reflection upon the pUantasma that §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 25 the individual can be said to be an object of in- tellectual cognition. To many this has proved to be a stumbling-block in the system of Aquinas : as, e.g.y to Scotus, Ockam, Suarez, etc., who claim for the intellect an immediate and intuitive though confused (Scotus) apprehension of the individual. St. Thomas's conclusion is metaphysical. It is the universale in re that is intellectually known in the act of the understanding. It is the concrete individual — the hoc cdiquid, hie et nunc — with all its individualising characteristics that is the object of the internal sense. Now, the ' universal ' in Thomistic metaphysics is the abstraction that is practised on the individual. It does not, as such, exist in nature. It is formally universal only in mind. But there is that in the individuals which justifies the abstraction. The nature, understood without its individualising * accidents,' is common to many.^ So much for the metaphysical position. But the psychological implication is important ; and, from the point of view of psychology, the diffi- culty would seem to be more apparent than real. It arises from the confusion, always obtrusive in analysis and classification, to which attention has ^ " Quod est commune multis nou est aliqui J praeter multa, nisi sola ratione ; sicut animal non est aliud praeter Socratem et Platouem, et alia auimalia, nisi iutellectu qui apprehendit formam animalis expoliatam ab omnibus individuantibus et specificantibus." {Contra Gentiles, I. caj*, xxvi. 4.) 26 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i been already drawn. ^ For St. Thomas, it is not the intellect that understands, but man. It is not the peripheric sense that feels, nor the central sense that perceives ; but, again, man. The reason why a ' faculty ' or potentia, capable of under- standing the ' universal,* is distinguished from that by which the individual is known, lies in the observable fact that both individual and 'universal' are given, in some form or another, in consciousness. We hnoio when one thing is present as the * object ' of our thought ; and we know when we mean that which is verified alike in a plurality of ' objects ' or experiences. But the characters — the this, the here, the now — that determine the one make it formally irreducible to that in which these char- acters are wanting. Consequently, on the principle of classification of psychical powers that he adopts, Aquinas differentiates intellect and internal sense. It is consistent, then, that he should deny to the intellect, which he has differentiated from sense precisely because its formal object is universal,^ a direct knowledge of the individual. Whatever knowledge of this may be called intellectual must be of such a kind as is compatible with the nature of the power. Hence the knowledge of the in- ^ Cf. p. 21, also infra, p. 35. 2 " Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisiuniversalium." {Summa Theologica, Pars I. Q. Ixxxvi. a. i. c.) §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 27 dividual which we have through intellect is indirect and " quasi ^ jper quamdam rejlexionem." Aquinas gives some indication of the process of this indirect method of knowing by saying that " since the intellect cannot actually understand, even after it has abstracted the intellectual determinants, except when it ' turns itself ' towards the images in which it understands these determinants, so ... it understands the individuals of which the sensorial contents are the images, indirectly." ^ Avowedly the Thomistic thought is not without diiiiculty in this connection : but it is mainly a metaphysical difficulty ; since for psychology the point is theoretically gained that thought and image are two irreducible contents of consciousness. Little or no advance that is of interest to us here was made in the scholastic line of thought after St. Thomas. Having reached the zenith of its movement, a decline rapidly set in ; and the un- ravelling of the triple strand in which the problem of the ' universals ' was twisted was not destined to be the work of the schoolmen of the following centuries. The great synthesis that had grown in the hands of so many philosophers towards com- ^ Qicasi, ill tlie terminology of Aquinas, usually indicates hesitation to pronounce a decided opinion. ^ Summa Tfieologica, Pars I. Q. Ixzxvi. a. i. c. 28 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx. i pletioii ceased to grow. Pliilosopliy, save for a few original thinkers, tended to become a stereotyped repetition of traditional theses. And the * auc- toritas ' of him who had taught that an argument based on human authority was of all arguments the most untrustworthy, was at length blindly urged as convincing, in the face of almost patent facts to the contrary. Scholasticism turned in the end to the weapons of the weak. It appealed to antiquated academic statutes and parliamentary decrees, and attempted to silence its enemies with these rather than to refute them by solid arguments. For a time it failed, and ignominiously. It could not withstand the rush of newer scientific thought and the onslaught of newer views. But it failed, as Professor de Wulf points out, " for want of men, not for want of ideas." The psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas is the highest level of mediaeval research and speculation. There was one later scholastic development, however, before the decadence, that merits our attention. This is the Terminism of Ockam. As a result of the excessive formalism of the Scotists, in which the hypostatisation of abstractions had grown beyond all limit, came an inevitable reaction. Already Durandus and Aureolus had denied the reality of the ' universals.' Ockam is more con- §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 29 structive in his simplified philosophy. As touching what regards us here, he advances new theories in the domain of psychology. Every cognitive repre- sentation is a sign (signum, terminus) of that for which it stands. Here are two implications : (a') an epistemological postulate ; (y8') the psychological observation of the cognitive contents of conscious- ness. Among these contents three are noted : {a) intuitive sense-knowledge ; (/3') intuitive intellectual knowledge of the individual ; and (7') abstract in- tellectual knowledge. This last has no extra-mental reality corresponding to it. It is purely a product of mind. Upon two counts the doctrine seems to differ from that of Aquinas : intellectual intuition of the individual ; absolute non-reality of the * universal.' And both of these questions are subject matter for epistemology. But if they may be abstracted from their setting and stated in terms of psychology alone, there would seem to be less disagreement. For both teachers the sensorial content differs from the imageless cognition ; and, as a consequence, the fundamental division of sense and intellect finds a place in the system of each. For both, the abstract concept is a mental term that has no actual counter- part in the extra-mental world. Aquinas calls this the ' universal,' and epistemologically refers it to the universale in re. Ockam calls it abstract know- 30 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i ledge {notitia abstractiva), and assigns as its direct object mental contents.^ The one is a moderate, or critical realist ; the other a conceptualist. Neither was entirely free from metaphysical presuppositions ; neither made use of systematic introspection. The obvious fact that we know the individual intellec- tually caused Ockam, as it had caused Scotus, to assert intuition without hesitation. Aquinas re- sorted to what seems to be a compromise in order to be consistent. Ockam asserts that the abstract concept is mental, and has no existence other than in mind. St. Thomas maintains that by it we know something that exists extra-mentally in its individualised plurality. The truth of the matter would seem to be that neither doctrine is adequate to meet the facts. The abstract concept, we shall bring evidence to show, is mental, and has no neces- sary reference to anything other than itself ; though it is capable of being referred to one or to many ' objects.' It may, or may not, express an extra- mental 'universal.' That is a question for the epistemologists. But for experimental psychology the concept is a content of intellectual character which forms a complex or fusion with its reference ; and so means for us one or several (objective) ex- ^ " . . . genus non est commune pluribus per identitatem in eis, sed per quamdam communitatem signi, quomodo idem signum est commune ad plura signata." {Expositio A urea : Praedicab. de Genera. ) §1 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 31 periences. In this view some reconciliation of the divergent opinions would seem to lie, as well as some explanation of the distinction to be drawn between the ' universal ' and the ' individual.' SECTION II THE PROBLEM OF THE ' UNIVERSALS ' FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT DAY In this very rapid survey of the problem of the ' universals,' as it has been presented in various schools of philosophic thought, there is little to claim our attention during the period that separated mediajval from modern philosophy. Humanism threw no new light upon the question, directly helped in no way to distinguish further the points of view from which it might be envisaged. On the contrary, the intricate and complicated thought movement of the Eenaissance served but to complete the work of a decadent scholasticism by thrusting out of sight the solutions that the latter had already allowed to become dead and stereotyped forms. But the revival of classical learning, and with it acquaintance with the original works of ancient philosophers, while it brought about a distinct opposition to mediaeval philosophy, was not at once able to break the continuity of 32 §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVEESALS' 33 mediaeval thought. As Professor Windelband points out ^ " the whole multiform process goes on within the bounds of ancient and mediaeval traditions, and strives in obscure longing towards a goal which is an object rather of premonition than of clear con- ception." Scholasticism had lost its vitality, but had not yet passed into the stage of complete dis- integration. Slowly the new thought forced men back from the received commonplaces and traditional doctrines to a fresh contemplation of nature ; so that, when the scientific movement took its rise, it was to emerge from the melting - pot of ancient systems untrammelled by the speculations of the philosophic past. As the rough and ready observations of the earlier Greeks, the poetic interpretations of the phenomena of nature, the popular myths put forward as explanations of permanence, succession, and change, formed the foundation upon which their first attempts at philosophical superstructure were raised, so the more extended and rigorous examination of the same phenomena was, later on, to prove the starting-point for a new investigation of the perennial problems of philosophy. It would be useless to attempt to draw any exact parallel between the development of Greek ^ Windelband (tr. Tufts), A History of Philosophy, p. 352. D 34 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i and post - medieval thought ; and yet, in many points, there seems to be a distinct parallelism. Both besan with the naive realism of Nature- philosophy, and ignored the indirect challenge of the epistemological problem raised by the sceptics. Both at once developed systems of metaphysics ; and both elaborated metaphysical psychologies. This should in no way be sur- prising, since, as has already been said, the problems are common to all philosophical specu- lation. But these problems were presented in new guise and under a new light which helped to make possible the analytic work that was reserved for modern thought : viz., the complete separation of the three aspects in which the problem of the ' universals ' may be viewed ; by which Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical Psychology become three distinct and practically autonomous branches of science. Modern philosophy matured rapidly in a pro- fusion of systems, the preponderating character of which is epistemological and psychological. The development of the former line of thought em- phasised the distinction to be drawn later between metaphysics, on the one hand, and psychology as a science on the other. Although the beginnings were marked with metaphysical prejudices and implications, it will §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 35 therefore be convenient to treat the modem period, as far as pertinent to our problem, principally from the point of view of epistemology. We shall adopt this point of view in the present section, and trace the gradual emergence of the purely psychological aspect from it. It is obvious that the abrupt divisions we are making are to a great extent arbitrary. The categories and abstractions under which the world is analysed and classified in the natural sciences and philosophical disciplines must always, from the nature of the case, be such. It is as impossible to speculate in metaphysics or psychology without some accepted, or tacitly presupposed, theory of knowledge, as it is to attempt to express in language the position of purely empirical psy- chology without the use of metaphysical terms, and an implied solution of the epistemological problem.^ With this caveat that the exposition which follows is largely artificial in arrangement on account of the method we employ, we may turn at once to the epistemological problem as stated ^ In current psychology these implications are in the main only verbal, and where more than verbal, provisional. For the writers of the period of which we are here treating, metaphysics was of the essence of their subject. It is consequently impossible to separate adequately and consistently from the outset their metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology, into three sharply marked topics without, at least to some extent, falsifying their more coherent thought. 36 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i after the Renaissance, and begin with a very brief account of the attempts made to meet it. The scepticism of Montaigne, Sanchez, Charron, was the natural outcome of the vigorous clash of opinions that characterised the transition from mediseval to modern thought. " Nature ! " — was the cry of the Renaissance — " not categories ! Things, not concepts ! " But the world was fixed in the old tradition ; and immediate adjustment between the slowly changing mentality of the age and its aspirations was impossible. Hence a conflict, not only between opposed systems, but also in the minds of individuals. To the thought- ful a polished scepticism seemed the only attitude to adopt. But it was a scepticism involved in the old metaphysical suppositions ; the answer to a problem mistakenly and prejudicially set. Im- possible, indeed, to know the correspondence be- tween thought and things, if things are posited before the problem is attacked. Impossible, again, to find a true solution if we start with an a priori conception of truth. Impossible to discover the criterion, if the problem is stated, as it was, in the terms of crude realism.-^ Sceptics and 1 " Pour juger des apparences que nous recevons des subjets, il nous fauldroit un instrument judicatoire : pour verifier cet instrument, il nous y fault de la demonstration;-% Hi - in stfttBaeal^ nous voyl^ au rouet . . . nous voyla i reculons jusques ^ I'infiny." (Montaigne.) §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 37 dogmatics alike approach it with the traditional conviction that truth is the thing-in-itself. How, then, since the subject is shut up within his own knowledge, is it possible to discover the relation ^ between things and thought ? Or how possible to accept any criterion by which this relation should be tested ? For the criterion must itself be a part of knowledge. And how, in that case, ascertain that it corresponds to reality ? So set, the problem is insoluble. But its setting did not prevent a fresh advance towards its ultimate solution. The old attitude of the e'iro')(ri, of suspended judgement, was asserted by Montaigne : " Que sgay-je ? " and by Sanchez : " Nescis ? At ego nescio. Quid ? " And thus the way was again ^ prepared for the examina- tion of human faculty as the indispensable condition of a theory of knowledge. It is to be remarked that this scepticism extended to the ' individual ' as well as the 'universal' — sense -impression equally with the content of thought. Setting out from that conclusion as his starting- point, Descartes, with dogmatic purpose, prosecutes his universal methodic doubt. Prejudiced, as it was, by a latent conception of truth (as the thing- ^ " Adaequatio rei et intellectus." 2 Cf. p. 20, footnote. 38 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i in-itself, of which knowledge is to be a copy) ; still further prejudiced by the antimethodic hypothesis of the malin gdnie, Descartes' enquiry took him a step further than the sceptics. There is one thing which admits of no doubt : " Gogito — Cogito : ergo sum." As a judgement it is indefensible, if the method proposed by Descartes is to be observed. Doubt is to be cast methodically even upon the worth of the judging reason. In making a proposi- tion upon the fact of thought, in inferring the metaphysical ego from the phenomenal conscious- ness, Descartes begs the whole question which he set out to solve, and passes from method to meta- physics. The fact would appear to show that his doubt was neither universal nor real. Nevertheless, in his method he approached the problem from the right side ; and so advanced the possibility of its solution. Elsewhere than in the Discours sitr la M4tliode he is more explicit and precise. In his De Regulari Directione Ingenii ^ he lays it down that we must examine our understanding, the instrument of our knowledge, since upon this the knowledge of ^ Regula viii. " Si quis pro quaestione sibi proponat, examinare veritates omnes, ad quarura cognitionem -humana ratio sufficiat (quod mihi videtur semel in vita faciendum esse ab iis omnibus, qui serio student ad bonam mentem pervenire), ille profecto per regulas datas inveniet nihil prius cognosci posse quam intellectum, cum ab hoc caeterorum omnium cognitio dependeat, etc. At vero nihil hie utilius quaeri potest, quam quid sit humana cognitio et quousque extendatur." (Opera, ed. Adam and Tannery, Tom. x. pp. 395 sqq.) §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 39 all else depends. Further we must investigate those other instruments of knowledge, fancy and sense, so that we may learn the limits of possible knowledge. The method of Descartes, with its rules of pro- cedure, was an imperfect criticism. It scarcely advanced beyond the first steps before it became transformed into a dogmatic realism, hardly less crude and uncritical than any that had preceded it. From the enthymeme standing at the head of his metaphysics (which has logical value only in virtue of the suppressed major premiss — omne cogitans est ^) he at once obtains the criterion of truth. Clear and distinct ideas are replicas of reality, the guar- antee of the validity of our knowledge. The ego, further, is an ego cogitans : — an assertion of metaphy- sical dualism that has had no inconsiderable share in shaping subsequent thought, as well in epistem- ology and psychology as in metaphysics. The assumption that the pineal gland is the organ of the res cogitans, the doctrine of reciprocal influx, give place later on, with Malebranche and Geulincx, to a theory of Occasionalism ; with Leibnitz, to pre- established harmony. In these latter theories the metaphysical implications of Descartes' original position are developed and made explicit. But nowhere is this more apparent than in the philo- ^ This involves the universal concept aud its relation to reality. 40 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL ft. i sophy of Spinoza. The cartesian criteriological principle of clear and distinct ideas is here formu- lated in the well-known axiom : Ordo et connexio idearum est idem ac ordo et connexio reruni. But the^rs^ idea is Being, or Substance. In that idea — God — the irreconcileable dualism of Descartes disappears ; and a complete monistic metaphysic is deduced from it in virtue of the criterion advanced. To these consequences the principles of Descartes are drawn by those who came after him. But his first step is unassailable. The instrument of know- ledge is to be examined, for upon this the knowledge of all else depends. This, in turn, was the starting-point of Kant. The knowledge of self (Selbsterkenntnis) is funda- mental ; and the critical problem is for the first time very exactly stated in the first preface to the Kritik. The preface to the second edition shows, however, that its solution was already hedged about by tacit prejudices and presuppositions : notably that all understanding can be deduced from an understand- ing of reason and its nature. This is an echo of the thought of Descartes. Kant's work, however, raises once more the problem of the ' universals ' in its true form. He is in no sense a subjectivist, as has well been shown by Cohen and Eiehl. He does not dream of ques- §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 41 tioning the objectivity of knowledge. His hypo- thesis (which, in the Kritik, becomes a thesis to be proved) is that objects conform themselves to know- ledge rather than that knowledge is conformed to objects. This hypothesis, he says, " already agrees better with the possibility desired of a knowledge a priori of these objects, which will establish something with regard to them before they are given . . . the objects or (what comes to the same thing) the experience in which alone they are given." ^ This hypothesis would evidently save the science of nature, the experimental knowledge of the world, as built up, in the forms and categories, out of the objects, or experience, given. That this experience is ultimate in itself is granted to Hume, the acquaintance with whose criticism had formed the turning-point in the mental development of Kant. But, while it is denied that the ultimate metaphy- sical realities — the Ding-an-sich — are objects of possible knowledge (as being beyond the purview of experience), the universal and necessary value of the principles of reason for the world of experience is maintained in Kant's hypothesis. Whatever is transcendent to possible experience is not subject matter for the pure reason. Nevertheless the uni- ^ Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernun/t ; Preface to second edition, xvi. and xvii. 42 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i versal judgements of natural science are justified. The individual objects — as immediate experiences — are admitted. Indeed, no amount of theorising, in any system, is able to explain them away. And the * universals ' are accounted for by the forms of synthesis of the understanding. Through these forms experiential perceptions are made objects of conceptual knowledge. What is denied is knowledge of noumena. And in this lies the distinctive part of the Kantian system. Unlike Aristotle, the schoolmen, and Descartes, Kant allows no intel- lectual (pure rational) knowledge of things-in-them- selves ; although, by a curious inconsistency, the forms of knowledge are known. Unlike Hume, whose stand-point he adopted, he introduces a universalising mechanism in the mind itself for the manifold of experience. What is most note- worthy, however, is the fact that his examination sets out from judgement rather than from the, at least logically, antecedent simple appre- hension.^ The whole epistemological theory of Kant stands, as do all innatist theories, in opposition to Empiri- cism. Of this school the most noteworthy professors derive ideologically from Locke. In his Essay con- ^ The research which forms the subject of this essay is concerned primarily with simple apprehension and reproduction, and only secondarily with judgement. §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 43 cerning Human Understanding Locke investigates the origin, certainty, and extent of knowledge, the grounds of belief, opinion, and assent. His peculiar use of the term,^ and his doctrine ^ of ideas, together with the fact that he starts from the position that nothing else than sensations is to be found in consciousness, lay the foundations of sub- jectivism and sensism. But Locke was neither a subjectivist nor a sensist. While denying innate ideas and deriving all knowledge from experience, external and internal, he nevertheless seems to allow a psychical activity that combines sensations into compound and complex ideas. As to the criteriological value of these contents of conscious- ness, Locke discriminates sensation from reflection. All sensations are simple subjective impressions ; but primary and secondary qualities are distin- guished ; and reality is attributed to the former independently of mind. As to reflection, this, together with external sensation, yields such ideas as power, unity, and so on ; while from it alone is given the idea of essence or substance. Reality is attributed to the sub- ^ Idea for Locke " being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." {Essay, Book i. cap. i. § 8.) 2 Knowledge is perception of agreement or disagreement of ideas. {Essay, Book iv. capp. i. -xi.) 44 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i stantial ' self ' and to objective substances in the same dogmatic way as to the primary qualities. These two illogisms of the system are traceable to the influence of cartesianism. As far as concerns the ' universals/ considerable confusion arises as to how Locke's teaching should be classified. The passage of the Essay that treats of this subject could be interpreted as a statement of realism. Windelband says that Locke was an adherent of nominalism. But his doctrine of ideas, and especially his statement that particular ideas become general " by considering them as they are in the mind abstracted from all other existences, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas," ^ would seem to point to his being a conceptualist. Here we have general ideas formally such ^ only in mind. But if Locke's * universals ' — " ideas taken from particular beings (which have) become general representatives of all of the same class " — are to be understood in the primary sense in which he defines * ideas,' phantasms, or sensorial contents, then we think that his nominalism is undoubted. What is certain is that those who continued the line of thought which he inaugurated developed nominalism in the exact sense of the word.^ 1 Essay, Book ii. cap. xi. § 9. 2 Qf^ p^ ^q^ ^ Locke's work had two important consequences in the development of thought. Its professed aim — to discover the origin, certainty, and extent of knowledge by empiric methods — was an advance on §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 45 Berkeley's version of the problem of the ' uni- versals ' is well known. His introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge is mainly concerned with a negation of their occurrence even as general ideas ; and he claims ^ to have traced what we suppose to be such " to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be Language." Words stand for ideas.^ " Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words," he says, " and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe that we shall acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.^ ... A geometrician . . . draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length : this, which is in itself a particular line, is never- theless with regard to its signification general ; . . . And as that particular line becomes general by the mathematico-metaphysical treatment of Descartes. It brought episteraology definitely into the forefront of important philosophical problems awaiting solution upon empiric lines. It also gave great prominence to empirical psychology, which, from that time onwards, has not ceased to grow in importance (i.) as an independent subject of investigation ; and (ii.) as, in the last resort, the ultimate ground of any decisive system dealing with the origin and validity of knowledge. ^ Berkeley, Principles of Human KnotoUdge, § 21. "^ Concrete mental pictures. We may therefore think in loords. 2 Fraser, in the notes to his edition of Berkeley's Works, here asks : " Does Locke intend more than this, though he expresses his meaning in ambiguous words ? " 46 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i being made a sign, so the name line, which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general."^ Berkeley denies objective reality as well to what Locke distinguished as primary qualities as to secondary. He concedes to all the phenomena of reflection no more than a purely subjective validity. The whole world, for him, is no more than a complex of ideas : esse est per dpi. Illogically, he admits spiritual substance. His nominalism is not merely epistemological — i.e., nominalism in the old accepted use of the term. It is psychological as well. James ^ has been misled by the altered connotation of the word. Nominalism, such as taught by Berkeley, was not the topic of controversy in mediaeval times. It was not " rediscovered " by the Bishop of Cloyne. The confusion arose with the ideological doctrine of Locke, and is here perpetuated. Where for the schoolmen the object of thought was the thing, for Locke and for Berkeley it is the " idea." Where for the mediaeval thinkers the objective content was envisaged by a reflex act — consciousness returning upon itself: intro-, retro-spection — for these philo- sophers the direct objects of knowledge are ideas and the connection that obtains between them. Epistemologically considered, the most consistent ^ Loc. cit., Introduction, § 12. ^ James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i, pp. 468 sqq. §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 47 and logical representative of this current of thought is Hume, who pushes the consequences of ' idealism * to their utmost and logical limit. He gives, in his Treatise on Human Nature} a full assent to Berkeley's doctrine upon general ideas. " A great philosophical thinker," he writes, " has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification. I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." ^ Logically consistent with the doctrine of ideas as stated by Locke, Hume denies, with Berkeley, the necessarily objective reality of both primary and secondary qualities. He goes further, in re- jecting spiritual, as well as material, substance ; and professes to account for our possessing ideas of these, as well as of causality, by a theory of habitual or customary association. Consistently with his nominalism he frankly admits that the basis of the natural sciences is destroyed, and even the exactness of mathematics impugned. There is neither ' universal ' in re, nor in intellectu. There is no ascertainable relation between facts of consciousness and a world of extra- ^ Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Part i. sec. 7. 2 This is a very clear declaration of nominalism. 48 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i mental realities.^ Where couceptualism provides a thought-world in which at least a subjective science is possible, thoroughgoing nominalism of this kind does away even with that possibility. We possess no general notions, even of ideas. There is, consequently, no science of things, nor of thoughts. There is only certainty with regard to actually present impressions or ideas. His epistemological stand-point, however, was one that proved extremely favourable to the develop- ment of empirical psychology; and, as continued by the associationists, may be said to have firmly established the foundations of that science. The line of English empiricists which we have been following reached its full development in Hume. And Hume's so-called scepticism, in the matter of the natural sciences no less than in metaphysics, is the logical outcome of the doctrines of Locke, whose incomplete sensism admitted illogisms that called for rectification. In France a similar independent development culminated in Condillac. Both philosophers ignore the distinction of sense from intellect ; and, denying to the latter several of the operations that had previously been admitted as characteristic of it, build up all mental life out of the rough material of sensations. To 1 Hume supplements his criticism by a theory of hdief. §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 49 this the new interpretation of the adage Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu had necessarily led. Where Locke had advanced this scholastic principle in its altered signification, Leibnitz had rejoined, as a corrective to it, nisi intellectus ipse. The two interpretations were in presence. The developed systems of the empiricist and the dogmatist, as put forward by Hume and Wolf, came into contact in the mind of Kant, and gave birth to Criticism. The acceptance of the empiric nature of all experience, the desire to safe- guard natural science even at the expense of meta- physics,^ were accorded in the theory of the a priori forms and categories. And it is in the light of the two antagonistic lines of thought that the synthesis of the critical epistemology of Kant is to be understood as a return to the old problem of the ' universals.' The members of the associationist school of psychology who followed the earlier empiricists — notably the positivists Mill, Bain, Sully, Taine, etc. — profess the same doctrine as well in regard to ' universals * as to individual realities external to mind. Their statements, however, are more cate- gorically in favour of the nominalism they profess than convincing in their context of supporting ^ Which was sacrificed. E 50 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i arguments. As has been repeatedly pointed out/ such writers deny the existence of general concepts, while allowing that " we may really, for a brief interval, have nothing present to our mind but the attributes constituent of the concept " (Mill) ; ^ or that " we are able to attend to the points of agreement of resembling things and to neglect the points of difference, as when we think of the roundness of round bodies " (Bain).^ This latter statement is incompatible with Bain's further asser- tion that " mental separation of one property of a thing from the other properties ... is impractic- able ; " and that general ideas have neither a counter- part in extra-mental reality nor mental existence. Few authors, again, have better expressed the distinction between the concrete image and the abstract idea* than Taine ; and yet it is Taine 1 Cf. inter alia, James, loc. cit. vol. i. pp. 470 sqq. ; Maher, Psychology, pp. 272 sqq. 2 Mill, An Examination of . . . Hamilton's Philosophy^ p. 393. 2 Bain, Mental Science, Book II. cap. 5. ^ Taine, De V Intelligence, Tom. i. pp. 37 sq. " Ainsi entre I'image vague et mobile suggeree par le nom et I'extrait precis et fixe note par le nom, 11 y a un abime. Pour s'en convaincre, que le lecteur considere le mot myriagone et ce qu'il designe. Un myriagone est un polygone de dix milles cotes. Impossible de I'imaginer, meme colore et particulier, a plus forte raison general et abstrait. Si lucide et si comprehensive que soit la vue interieure, apres cinq ou six, vingt ou trente lignes, tirees a grand' peine, I'image se brouille et s'efface ; et cependant ma conception du myriagone n'a rien de brouille ni efface ; ce que je con9ois, ce n'est pas un myriagone comme celui-ci, incomplet et torabant en ruine, c'est un myriagone acheve et dont toutes les §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 51 who writes " une id^e g(5n^rale n'est qu'un nom pourvu des deux caract^res du signe " — a name which is recalled by perception of any individual of the class, which is able to arouse in us images of individuals of that class only.^ It would be possible to multiply instances of similar incongruity, evidently traceable to the wish to reduce the elements of mind to a minimum ; which wish leads to the ignoring of the character of elements belonging to another order than that of sensation. It is not, however, necessary to multiply such instances here ; for the incongruity becomes greater as psychology develops its material and method. With Sully ^ the sensational basis adopted is frankly opposed by much of his doctrine on ' think- ing ; ' and the composite, typical, or ' generic image ' is clearly recognised as something quite different in kind from the general concept properly so called. It has been pointed out that, with Hume, the criticism of metaphysics definitely made room for the problem of epistemology, which thenceforward can be said to be developed as a science for its own parties subsistent ensemble ; j 'imagine tres mal le premier et je consols tres bien le second ; ce que je consols est done autre que ce que j 'imagine, et ma conception n'est pas la figure vacillante qui raccompagne. " ^ Taine, De V Intelligence, Tom. i. p. 26. '^ Sully, (hUlines of Psychology, capp. ix. x. 52 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i sake, especially by Kant. An interpretation of the Kantian theory of knowledge, however, especially manifested in France, gave rise to a number of systems and criteria that shifted the basis of the solution from the rational to the moral order. These systems and criteria, to which the general name of ' moral belief ' may appropriately be given, are of small interest to us here, except in so far as they may have played a part in shaping the empirical line of thought towards its most recent expressions in Pragmatism. Pragmatism, as far as epistemology is concerned, is a tendency rather than a definite and clear-cut system. It is of its nature to be provisional, and to suggest final systems that will emerge from it only to overthrow it. It is a via media, so professed by James ; ^ and, like most attempts of its kind, it is capable of development in opposite directions. On the one hand, consistently followed up, it might lead to solipsism ; ^ on the other to dogmatic ^ James, Pragmatism, Lecture i. 2 Ihid. Lecture vii. pp. 248-9. "What we grasp is always some substitute for (reality) which previous human thinking has peptonised and cooked for our consumption. If so vulgar an expression were allowed us, we might say that wherever we find it, it has been faked. This is what Mr. Schiller has in mind when he calls independent reality a mere unresisting ij\r], which is only to be made over by us." But 'previous human thinking,' 'faked reality,' and so on, are for us realities. Epistemology has no right to assume the truth of the point at issue. Pragmatically it will, of course, ' work.' But to §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 53 realism.^ But, as it stands, it evinces the honest desire of those who have put it forward, in one form or another, as a solution of the problem of truth, to meet the difficulties which beset the modern thinker. Its authors are not to blame if it is merely- provisional, if its criterion must inevitably lead to the idea of changing and growing truth. To them, in the face of a world of kaleidoscopic fact, Absolutism must seem as incredible as the Unity- Being of the Eleatics would have appeared to Heraclitus. Life's footsteps must be picked warily in a world so full of dangers as the world of facts is seen to be. Whatever coheres, works, is useful ; whatever " we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify " ^ is true. The meaning subsequently given to the definition shows that it is not to be understood in the ' intellectualist ' sense to which it so readily lends itself. But what is most highly significant is the previous discussion as to what we mean by reality.^ In all this, as Professor James says, " intellectualists can raise no protest." And in this we find a doctrine, so far as it goes, that is identical with that of moderate realists. We say ' so far as it goes ' because it evidently depends upon appeal to that criterion is to shut us up again within the confines of personal experience. ^ James, Pragynatism, Lecture vi. pp. 202 sqq. 2 Ibid. p. 201. 3 Ibid. pp. 206 sqq. 54 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i the point of view in which * realities/ ' objects,' ' things of common sense, sensibly present ' are envisaged, whether the conclusion be realist, or conceptualist, or nominalist ; because, also, the gloss that is later on put upon the definition precludes the system from being final and makes it one of expediency.^ As it stands, however, it is an attempt to define truth by, to erect a theory of knowledge out of, and to find a criterion in, the data of psychology. And, as such, it is the last word of the English empirical school. From Hume and Kant onwards, it will be observed that the epistemological problem has been treated more and more from the psychological stand-point ; although the impetus to this treatment was given, still further back, by Locke. This has made possible an examination of our problem from a purely psychological point of view. Just as the episte- mological succeeded the metaphysical, so the psycho- logical interest may succeed the former ; and we may ask ourselves in what the purely phenomeno- logical mental contents consist when we think ' universally ' or ' individually,' without reference to any extra-mental realities of which our thoughts are, or should be, the counterpart. ^ It is not necessary, in this brief epitome of opinions, to consider any other forms of pragmatism. Professor James' account may be taken as representative. For an admirable treatment of the whole subject, cf. Walker, Theories of Knowledge. §2 THE PEOBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 55 Before proceeding to this, however, there is one other epistemological theory, advanced from the stand-point of empirical psychology, that we shall consider. Husserl,^ in Die logische Untersuchung," arranges his theory out of the data of pure pheno- menology ; and defines truth as a result of, and not as a preliminary to, his examination of the facts of consciousness. We find upon introspection, he observes, a representative activity, and contents between which objective relations obtain ; and we express the latter fact by saying that certain judge- ments are evident.^ Act, and content with relations, are given in introspection. This is a commonplace of the school, the psychological work of which will be briefly discussed in the following section. Husserl, however, finds ample reason to admit the existence of universal ideas, which he calls " ideal species." These are not an individual, nor a collection of individuals, nor a simple name, nor a symbol. By direction of intention we regard a universal object. This constitutes an act sui generis, based upon intuitive ideas ; in the genesis of which Husserl distinguishes two processes — abstraction and generalisation. 1 Of the Austrian School of Psychologists. With him class Brentano, Messer, Blihler, Ach, Marbe, and Kiilpe (partially). - Husserl, Die logische Untersuchxmg, Halle, 1900-1 (2 vol.). ^ Evidence is not a feeling ; but objective. The feeling is certainty. 56 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i The theory of knowledge that he advances covers both the real and the ideal orders. An object is present to mind with the plenitude of intuition. When we ' think ' it, we separate by abstraction various moments that are given in it. We formally abstract, e.g., colour from shape. We may then unite, as we please, the abstracts. We may think a red square, or a blue circle, or a square circle, etc. But these syntheses of moments, or significations, tend towards the plenitude of intuition ; and only certain of them can be fulfilled. We are not free in the matter of their fulfilment.^ Thus a simple, or a synthetic signification, tending towards fulfilment, superposes itself, so to speak, upon an intuition ; or is incapable of being so superposed. When the plenitude is realised we live it. This is evidence, and founded on truth ; for truth is that which permits the superposition of the two, the adequation of the objective sides of the two acts. From this doctrine emerge distinctions as to various kinds of truth. There is the truth of intuition, underlying significa- tion ; and truth of signification fulfilled in intuition. The object conforms to thought and thought to the object. There are also synthetic intentions, as judge- ments, of which similar relations hold. The objective proposition conforms to thought, and thought to it. So also for the ' universal ' object which (if we 1 Erfiihlung. §2 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 57 mistake not the thought) conforms to " ideal species " and vice versa. This universal object is given in intuition (although intuition presents individuals only) because the individual is the ' universal ' plus whatever is neglected in it by reason of the process of negative abstraction, and thus made capable of a subsequent generalisation. The whole theory is built up upon the intro- spective material furnished by empirical psychology. It is thus to psychology that epistemology turns for the data with which to solve its own problem. SECTION III THE PROBLEM OF THE * UNIVERSALS ' IN THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY We have now traced the development of our problem, through its metaphysical and epistemological aspects, to empirical psychology. In the present section we propose to give some brief account of the experi- mental work that has prepared the way for an investigation of the question of the ' universals ' from a purely psychological point of view. All the systems of metaphysics and theories of knowledge to which allusion has been made in the foregoing sections have been based upon some sort of introspective evidence. But systematic experi- ment, devised to produce mental phenomena in order that they may be examined and analysed for their own sake, is of comparatively recent date. With regard to the problem of the ' universals ' — if we except the analogical application of the method of composite portraiture to abstract, or, as he prefers 68 §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 59 to call them, " cumulative ideas," made by Galton ^ — systematic introspection cannot be said to have been practised before the enquiry of Ribot.^ Ribot's work had to do with general ideas. His aim was to discover what is in consciousness when we think, hear, or read a general term. His method was, therefore, to present general terms to his observers, and to classify their introspective accounts as to the contents of consciousness evoked by them. He was thus able to frame the well-known schema of * mental types,' according to the kind of imagery reported by his observers. But many of these observers were unable — as were also many of the recipients of Galton's questionnaire ^ — to discover anything at all in consciousness other than the word itself. Notwithstanding this failure to find a content other than the word, Ribot argued that, since it is evident that this alone cannot be all that is in conscious- ness (for it would then have no meaning), there is de fa^to another content. Here Ribot theorises ^ Galton, "Inquiries into Human Faculty" (1883); "Generic Images " (in Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, April 25, 1879). Galton attempted to verify the analogy in his later investigation on Mental Imagery. His opinion seems to be that of Huxley {David Huine, 1879), who employs the same photo- graphic analogy to illustrate his associationist teaching upon the point. 2 Ribot, "Enquete sur les Idees Generales " (in Revue Philoso- phique, 1891, vol. 32) ; "L'Evolution des Idees Generales," 1897. ^ Of. Galton, Inquiries into Human, Faculty, Appendix E. Galton's words included both general and particular terms. 60 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i beyond his observed facts. He asserts that general ideas consist of the word that is clearly in conscious- ness (perhaps with imagery) plus an obscure, un- conscious element, which he does not attempt to define. It is surprising that the frequent absence of discoverable imagery did not suggest the probable presence of a third conscious element, involved in the understanding of the words, and irreducible either to word or image — an element which carefully planned experiment and delicate introspective analysis would possibly reveal. But the associa- tionist tradition was still too strong to allow of the hypothesis of a conscious imageless content which had not been actually observed. Experiments in psychophysics and psychophysiology were continued, were devised to explore memory and associative problems ; and mental imagery occupied for a time a prominent place in psychological investigation. But these topics evidently do not exhaust the field of psychological research ; and it was not long before a new orientation towards the problems concerned with the higher mental processes took place. Beginning with Marbe's ^ work in Germany, a very considerable number of experimental studies have been made upon the processes of thought, judgement, abstraction, and the like. Many of ^ Marbe, Experimentdl-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das Urteil, Leipzig, 1901. §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNI VERS ALS' 61 these studies have no direct bearing upon the work undertaken in our research ; but they have so admirably prepared the way for work of this kind that it will be necessary to refer to them briefly, and to note the main conclusions they establish in so far as they may have an interest for us. It is clear that psychology is here treated as an independent science in an even more radical way than it was as psychophysics and psychophysiology. Marbe's research was on judgement ; and his general conclusion a negative one : there are no psychological conditions of judgement. But in the course of his work he discovered a certain class of imageless contents (Bewusstseinslagen,^ attitudes of consciousness) which he distinguishes from percep- tions and images ; and, further, he finds that the perception of a judgement consists in a " Wissen," or knowledge that cannot be reduced to sensation, image, or feeling. Ach also, experimenting upon will and thought processes,^ finds contents reported by his observers as knowledge for which no qualitative determinants, in the shape of visual, auditory, or kinsesthetic ^ A terra first used by Mayer and Orth, "Zur qualitativen Unter- suchung der Association " (in Zeitschrift f. Psychologie und Physiologie, 1901, xxvi. p. 6). ^ Ach, Uher die Willenstdtigkeit mid das Denken, Gottingen, 1905. Cf. p. 210. 62 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx. i sensations, or reproductions, could be discovered. But the fact that none of these are discovered as clearly in consciousness does not, he thinks, negate the fact of their occurrence as tendencies to repro- duction. He is of opinion that these tendencies, awakened by the presence in consciousness of an idea with which they are associated, are sufficient to explain the consciousness of the meaning of the idea. If we understand this aright, the opinion is similar to that of Professor James which he advances in his doctrine of the ' fringe ' or psychic overtone. Meaning is given by the subexcitation of a mass of tendencies to reproduction : by " the influence of a faint brain -process upon our thought." ^ Both these theories have been criti- cised — the one by Moore,^ the other by Hoernle.^ Binet also in his study of the understanding * meets with the phenomenon. His investigation dates back to the end of 1900, and is independent of the work done in Germany. He insists upon the importance of employing the methods of experimentation and introspection for the elucida- ^ James, Principles of Psychology ^ Harvard, 1890. (Cf. vol. i. p. 258, Macmillan's edition, 1908.) 2 Moore, The Process of Abstraction, Berkeley, 1910. Cf. p. 181. 2 Hoernle, "Image, Idea, and Meaning" (in Mind, New Series, 1907, 16, p. 82). * Binet, L'Mude experimentale de V Intelligence, Paris, 1903. §3 THE PEOBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 63 tion of those higher mental processes that were found to be excited in experiments having directly only a psychophysical aim. His own experimenta- tion with his children as observers leads him to the conclusion that the complex processes of thought cannot be accounted for by visual images, internal speech, or any combination of these. A further interesting point, supported in a measure by our own experiments, lies in the theory which he advances in his discussion of abstract thought and images, viz., that the latter may be employed to represent either a ' particular ' or a ' universal.* The image thus becomes an arbitrary sign, an x, to which the individual observer gives either an arithmetical or an algebraical value or signification. The principal conclusion that Professor Kiilpe draws from his experiments upon abstraction ^ is that the differences caused by the tasks set for his observers ^ affected the apperception rather than the sensation of the stimuli. Entirely in accord with this is a conclusion easily drawn from our own work in the laboratory of Louvain, which we have ^ Kiilpe, Versuche vher Abstraction : Bericht iiber den I. Kongress f. experimentelle Psychologic in Oiessen, 1904 ; Leipzig, 1904. 2 To determine the (i.) mimber, (ii.) colour and positions, (iii.) figure made by the grouping, (iv.) maximal number with position, of four nonsense syllables, in four colours, variously grouped about a fixation point. 64 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i not especially underlined in the Notes that we published in the Journal of Psychology} Klilpe goes on to say that the distinction (between sensa- tion and apperception) must be drawn in something of the same way in which we distinguish physical phenomena and our consciousness of them ; and he asserts that " the inner sense with the involved idea of a distinction between the reality of consciousness and objectivity " should be maintained in psycho- logy. This is not the place for criticism ; but to this opinion we cannot see our way to give assent. For we take it that sensation, at any rate in the experiments Klilpe made upon abstraction, can be no more than an element, reached by analysis, of apperception ; that it never occurs alone ; and that therefore the two are incapable of intro- spective comparison, Klilpe, however, draws attention to the influence of the task set the observer upon his apprehension of the presented material. This point was later on investigated by Watt,^ who modified the old reaction experiments (in which the first word occurring upon presentation of ^ Aveling, "The Kelation of Thought-Process and Percept in Perception " (in Journal of Psychology, vol. iv. part 2, September, 1911, p. 213). 2 Watt, " Experimentelle Beitrage zu einer Theorie des Denkens " (in Archivf, die ges. Psychologie, iv., 1905, p. 289). §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 65 a stimulus word constituted the reaction) by deter- mining beforehand the attitude of his observers, and constraining them to certain prearranged kinds of reaction. In his experiments the task set was found to be the principal factor in the determina- tion of the associated term actually reproduced. Theoretically, the closeness of association is regu- lated by the number of times the associated terms have been present together in the psychical ' now,' by the recency of their simultaneous presence, the degree of attention paid to them, and so on. Actually, the tendencies to reproduction are limited by the predetermined mental ' set ' of the observer. This proof of Klilpe's observation is of great importance as determining a means ready to the hand of the experimental observer of the more complicated mental processes. The task produces a mental ' set ' in which the experimenter has at least the reasonable hope that it will be fulfilled. From the introspective accounts of his observers he can judge as to whether, in particular cases, it really exercised its influence upon the experiments performed or not. Watt concluded from his research that certain very indefinite images, found by his observers, are capable of functioning as ' universals.' He points out, however, that this fact does not preclude the existence of non-imaginal general ideas. A similar F 66 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i phenomenon was frequently found in our Louvain research, in which pictures exhibited tachistoscopic- ally with instruction given to the observer to perceive them as types of classes of similar objects, were, when so seen, notably less exact and faithful to the originals than when they were exhibited with the instruction that they were to be perceived as individuals. Our own study was then limited to a very narrow issue ; and in the Notes we made of it, we did not draw it out to theoretical con- clusions. But while fuller discussion of the point is reserved for the body of the present work, it may here be anticipated by the remark that the group of sensorial contents entering into the com- plex of the image is perceived as a type of this or that class, or as an individual of this or that kind (both more or less comprehensive) ; that, therefore, there is more implied in consciousness than the sensorial elements of the image alone. This Watt would admit ; for he allows the presence of word and image and concept in consciousness ; nor does he reduce the last to combinations or relations of the two former. The problem is really one of meaning, and is dealt with at length later on. There is a remarkable continuity in the studies of those psychologists from whose works the con- clusions we are noting are taken. "Watt was a §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 67 student of Kiilpe at Wlirzburg, and served as observer in the experiments of Messer, whose research ^ was based upon that of AVatt (method of constrained reaction). Messer also observed in his experiments the * general image ' to which we have just alluded. This is so indeterminate and so ill defined that it can function in consciousness as standing for a whole class. It puts the observer in presence of ' a bird/ for example, just as our Louvain ' type perceptions ' did. Messer remarks that there is an inverse variation between the perfection of imagery called up by a word and its generality of signification ; but at the same time he contends that signification is not necessarily dependent upon imagery. Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that he has met with no case in his experiments in which the understanding of the stimulus word was evidently dependent upon an image. In the case of the reaction words, meaning was frequently given in consciousness before a word appeared. Often the word when it came was in- adequate to express the meaning. At other times it appeared before its meaning. In all this we have an instance of the imageless thoughts, the existence or occurrence of which is so strongly ^ Messer, " Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das Denken " (in Archivf. die ges. Psychologic, viii., 1906, p. 1). 68 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rr. i asserted as a datum of consciousness by the scliool.^ By no one, perhaps, is the distinction of image- less thought and imaginal content drawn so clearly as by Buhler " whose experiments were planned to study thought as a whole. His conclusions are antithetical to those of the associationists. Thought moves in thoughts, in concepts, not in images. The ultimate elements of thought-processes are thoughts (Gedanken); and to them our thinking is related as is our seeing to visual sensations. Imageless thought, then, is all important — for it alone is thought in which understanding has a place, and in which meaning is known. The experiments devised by Marbe (Judgement), Watt and Messer (Influence of predetermined task ; Constrained reaction), and Buhler (Eelations of judgement and thought in general), were repeated in 1908 in the Geneva Laboratory by Bovet,^ who, in the light of his own experimentation, makes an ^ Cf. also Schultze, " Einige Hauptgesichtspunkte der Beschrei- bung in der Elemental- Psychol ogie. I. Erscheinungen und Gedanken " (in Archivf. die ges. Psychologie, viii., 1906, p. 241). 2 Biihler, "Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgange (in Archivf. dieges. Psychologie, viii., 1907, p. 297, and xii., 1908, p. 1). ^ 3 Bovet, " L'Etude experimentale du Jugement et de la Pensee " (in Archives de Psychologie, viii., 1908, p. 9). §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE 'UNIVERSALS' 69 excellent analysis of the work of these psychologists, defends the methods of research they employed, and finds ample corroboration of their conclusions as to the influence of task, imageless thought, individual differences, etc. The later work and results of the introspective school have also been subject to the severest criticism by Wundt^ and Titchener ; ^ the last named of whom presents in his Lectures a long analysis of the methods, experiments, and results claimed to have been established by the Wiirzburg psychologists. Von Aster ^ and Dtirr ^ have also offered criticisms ; but on the whole their contention comes to little more than this : that the ' thoughts ' (of Biihler) were not actually observed and described by his observers, but only experienced as something in- describable. Von Aster concludes that further work must be done in order to determine the phenomenological characters of ' thoughts ; ' and ^ Wundt, " Cber Ausfrageexperimente und iiber die Methoden zur Psychologie dea Deukens " (in Psychologische Studien, iii., 1907, p. 301). ■^ Titchener, Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes, New York, 1909. This work is especially valuable for the ])ibliograpliy given, passim, in the "Notes." ^ Von Aster, '* Die psychologische Beobachtungund experinientelle Uutersuchung von Denkvorgangen " [in Zeitschri/t /. Psychologie, xlix., 1908, p. 56). ■* Diirr, " Dber die experimentelle Untersuchuug der Deuk- vorgange" (in Zeitschri/t /. Psychologie, xlix., 1908, j). 313). 70 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL it. i Diirr finds a consciousuess of relation as a content of consciousness over and above sensations, to which he does not admit that it can be reduced. Replies to the criticisms of Wundt and Diirr were made by Biihler himself ; ^ and a useful contribution to the controversy is a valuation of the method of introspection in general made by Michotte ^ of Louvain. Perhaps the best of all replies to such criticism is, however, the fact that the method is being adopted so very generally in laboratories of psychology ; together with the further fact that, laborious as it must of its nature be, the introspective experimental method seems to be the only one that promises any even approxi- mately exact scientific results. While from Titchener we have a critical exposi- tion of this new psychology made by an avowed opponent to it, Moore's ^ admirable work on abstrac- tion is prefaced by a section on the literature of his subject, in which he gives an entirely sym- pathetic and considerably detailed account of the labours of the men who have built it up, in so far as their work is pertinent to his own problem. 1 Archiv f, die ges. Psychologic, xii., 1908, p. 93; and Zeitschrift f. Psychologies IL, 1909, p. 118. ^ Michotte, *' A propos de la M^thode d'Introspection " (in Revue Neo-Scholastique, November, 1907). ^ Moore, The Process of Abstraction (University of California Pub- lications), Berkeley, 1910. §3 THE PROBLEM OF THE * UNI VERS ALS' 71 Moore's experiments were made at Leipzig in Wundt's laboratory and at the University of California. His problem was to investigate the process of abstraction ; and for the purpose he employed groups of five geometrical figures (stand- ing for groups of qualities), in which one figure was repeated, in varying position with regard to the others, in each group. These groups were exhibited one after another during a quarter of a second, with intervals of the same length. The observer was told to look for the repetition of a figure, and to stop the exhibition apparatus when he was sure that one had been repeated. Intro- spections were, of course, taken. The analysis of the material obtained fell under four rubrics : (i.) the breaking up of the group ; (ii.) the process of perception ; (iii.) the process of memory ; (iv.) the process of recognition. With regard to percep- tion, the author maintains on the strength of his data that " a mental picture forms no essential part of our apprehension of a figure." As to the process of recognition, the experimental conclusion is reached that " assured recognition is not dependent upon perfect perception : " indeed, " can take place without the formation of any mental image of the thing that is recognised." It follows that : " A comparison of mental images is not necessary to the process of recognition." Moore 72 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. i concludes (i.) that " there exist imageless mental contents representative of a visible object. . . . They are the essential elements in the product of perception and abstraction." (ii.) " Perception is a process of assimilating the data of sense ex- perience to their appropriate mental categories." Finally, in connection with this brief re- capitulation of recent psychological research upon the higher processes of thought, mention must be made of the work of Dr. Betts ^ on mental imagery. This work, published in 1909, is of great value as an aid in any research made upon the repre- sentative processes ; and we have frequently had occasion to refer to it, as well as to Moore's Process of Abstraction^ in the course of the present essay. We have now roughly outlined the main histori- cal phases of the problem of the ' universals,' and indicated in what manner it may be treated in a purely psychological way. To sum up : the meta- physical question is, " Do the ' universals ' exist in nature ? " The epistemological problem is, " Do our universal ideas correspond to reality ? " Our own re- search is planned to answer a third and independent question : " What is discoverable in consciousness when %ue think the ' universal ' or the ' individual ? ' " ^ Betts : The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery, New York, 1909. PAET II THE RESEARCH SECTION I THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM The problem which we set out to solve is a circumscribed one. What is discoverable in consciousness when we think, for example, ' man/ * this man,' ' all men ? ' Are there any constantly different factors which determine these three thoughts ; and, if so, in what does their distinction lie ? The problem, as we have already pointed out, is one of the phenomenology of thought : the re- search undertaken is qualitative and belongs to descriptive psychology. Out of this apparently simple problem, however, others have arisen ; and several of these appeared to be so closely connected with it that some examination of them became evidently necessary. Among these are questions as to the growth of ' meaning,' the nature of abstraction, the thought-element in perception, and the relation of imagery to thought. The experimentally observed phenomena that bear upon all these points are noted ; and the 76 76 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. n theoretical conclusions towards which they seem to point are drawn out in the following paragraphs. Considerable light is there thrown upon our main problem, the ex professo consideration of which is reserved for Section III. Much corroborative evidence for the conclusions there drawn, however, is to be found in the text and notes of Section II. In order to obtain suitable introspective material for our undertaking, we attempted to devise con- ditions, differing as little as possible from those of ordinary life, in which meanings should be formed, and more or less loosely associated with arbitrary nonsense-words. Later on it would be possible, by the use of appropriate means, to cause the nonsense-words to function as ' universals ' or as ' individuals ' in logical judgements ; and so observe the mental complexes corresponding to their expression. In this way we hoped to obviate the difficulty that arises in the attempt to separate its meaning from a word of ordinary language.^ It was apparent, almost from the outset, that ^ " No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears," writes Berkeley, "but the ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds : in the very same instant the sound and the meaning enter the understanding : so closely are they united that it is not in our power to keep out the one except we exclude the other also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves." (Theory of Vision.) Works (ed. Fraser, 1901), vol. i. p. 151. §1 THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM 77 we had to do not only with contents expressed by such terms as * this man! ' «^^ ^^^^^ ' ; hut that a third was certainly to be discovered, viz., ' man! For this reason our original problem was extended to the form in which it is stated above ; and means were taken that the words corresponding to this concept should also be employed in the experi- ments. As a matter of fact, however, systematic investigation of this point in the second part of our experiments (Section III.) was rendered un- necessary by its being established on the data obtained during the learning period.^ The conditions in which the associations were made between the visual material we employed and the nonsense-words were very simple. The laboratory can never, perhaps, be without its influence on mental processes : the fact that the experiences are systematic and of the nature of experiments has a probable effect in modifying the normal course of psychical events, even when, as was the case with three of our observers, the whole work was carried on in a private study. Further, there would seem little ground for supposing that it is possible to create in adult consciousness a meaning that stands, so to speak, by itself, and is simple and ultimate. We shall have occasion to show that it is always immediately related to an 1 Cf. Section II. 78 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. n existing concept, or conceptual system ; ^ and to some such system the visual material presented was invariably referred in our experiments, from the beginning of the learning period. The experi- ments were thus concerned to a great extent with old meanings ; any newness these possessed con- sisting in a re -arrangement or modification of conceptual elements, to embrace the material pre- sented with each nonsense-word, and to limit its meaning to that material. In other respects the conditions were not far remote from those of the natural method of learning languages. In the second part of the experiments the nonsense-words learned were used as subjects in incomplete sentences, the predicates of which were supplied by the observers. The procedure is given in detail at the beginning of Section III. When anticipatory reference is made to this it will be termed * Completion of Part-Judgements.' § 1. Material. The material employed consisted of ten sets of small pictures and ten nonsense -words of two syllables each. There were five pictures in each set, mostly of ordinary subjects. All in each set were sufficiently alike to be easily designated by , 1 Cf. Section IL, par. 2. §1 THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM 79 some common name ; yet each possessed sufficiently notable characteristics as well, by which it could be singled out from the others. Eight of the sets were made up of chromolithographs, or three- colour -process pictures, such as are found in children's toy-books. These varied somewhat from one set to another in the amount of schematism of general form and of detail, and in correctness of coloration. The two remaining sets were com- posed of very simple single -line geometrical drawings, washed in with one, and each drawing with a different, colour ; but so chosen that they would not be easy, except perhaps for a geometrician, to generalise. All the pictures and drawings were roughly of about the same size, and mounted upon squares of white cardboard similar to those we used in our research upon perception at Louvain.^ Indeed, several of the Louvain pictures were included in this material. The nonsense-words were formed of three con- sonants separated by two vowels. They were printed on small white cards. Nine of these words were constructed with the intention of avoiding the formation of mnemonics. In one a somewhat ob- vious possible mnemonic was foreseen ; and allowed, in the hope that it might lead to interesting consequences. , ^ Aveling, loc. oil. 80 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. ii With four of our observers the entire material was employed. Two others, with whom we were unable to arrange for the total number of sessions (30), were experimented upon with five of the nonsense -words and their corresponding sets of pictures. The words, with their associated pictures, were the following: — A. Ferod : little boys running, jumping, etc. B. Tuben : birds. C. Funip : circles foreshortened and inclined at various angles. D. Digep : fruits of various kinds. E. Kumic : flowers. F. Robud : torsos of children. G. Goral : carpenters' tools. H. Lagoc : conic sections other than circles. J. Sorab : musical instruments. K. Tegam : receptacles for liquids. 8 2. Procedure during the Learning Period. The observers were divided into two classes : the first comprising those who learned in twenty sessions, the second those who learned in less time and in another manner.^ To all the nonsense-word was shown together with a picture. The instruc- tion given was to repeat the word aloud while regarding attentively both it and the picture above it. At each session the associations were made 1 Cf. Table II. §1 THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM 81 twice. The time allowed for each was, in the first instance, 15, and in the second, 10 seconds. Be- tween them came an interval during which the observer read or conversed with the experimenter on indifferent topics. The observers of the first class were shown at each session seven pictures with their corresponding nonsense - words ; other pictures of the series being substituted for the first, at subsequent sessions, according to the following table. The letter in this table indicates the series and the suffixed numeral the member of it. TABLE I 1st day . Ai Bi Ci ^l El Gi Ji 2nd day . . A2 B2 Ci Di E2 Gi J2 3rd day . A3 B3 Ci D2 E3 Gi J3 4th day . . A4 B4 C2 D2 E4 G2 J4 5th day . . A5 B5 C2 D3 E5 G2 J5 6th day . . Ai Bi C2 D3 El G2 Ji 7th day . A2 B2 C3 D4 E2 G3 J2 8th day . . A3 B3 C3 I>4 E3 G3 J3 9th day . . • A, B4 C4 D5 E4 G4 J4 10th day . . • A, B5 <^5 D5 E5 Gfi J6 This exhibits the first half of the table used to determine the order of exposition of the pictures. The second half was precisely the same, except that E, G, and J were replaced by the new nonsense- words and sets of pictures F, H, and K. Each horizontal line of the table shows the pictures G 82 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx. ii learned with the nonsense-words during one session. It will be observed that the various members of the different sets of pictures were not all exhibited the same number of times. The intention of this procedure was to secure varying strengths of asso- ciation between the nonsense - words and their acquired meanings. After an interval of about ten minutes, filled by- indifferent reading or conversation, the associated nonsense-words of the day were exposed as stimuli 0*75 sec. after a signal " Attention ! " The instruc- tion had been given beforehand to react, either by a tap upon the table or by the word " yes," as soon as the meaning of the word appeared in conscious- ness in any form. The time intervals between the exposition of the stimulus-word and the reaction were taken with a stop watch. An introspective account of the period was then dictated to the experimenter by the observer. After twenty such sessions, which constituted the learning period for each observer of the first class, ten sessions were given to experiments cal- culated to make the newly learned words function as ' universals ' or 'individuals' — Completion of Part Judgements (Section III.). For the observers of the second class another order of exposition was adopted during the learn- § 1 THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM 83 ing period. The five nonsense -words employed were associated with four whole sets and one partial set of pictures ; but all the pictures used in each set (except two) were given at every sitting. The observers thus learned the five nonsense-words with twenty pictures, in two repe- tition periods of 15 and 10 seconds. The intervals intervening between the learning of the material represented by each horizontal line of the accom- panying table (used to determine the order of exposition) were filled by indifferent reading or conversation with the experimenter. There was no interval between the learning of the nonsense- words and pictures shown in each horizontal line of the table. TABLE II 1st day . • Ai Bi Ci Di El 3rd day . A^ Bi C2 I>i E, 6th day . A3 B2 C3 Di E3 Etc. . • A4 B2 C4 Di E4 A5 B3 C5 D2 E5 2nd day . A, B3 Ci D2 El 4th day . A^ B4 C2 D2 E2 6th day . A3 B4 C3 I>2 E3 Etc. . • A, B5 C4 D2 E4 A5 B5 C5 Dl E5 At the close of each learning session the observers, having been instructed to react by say- 84 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rr. n iug " yes " as soon as they got any meaning for them, were shown the nonsense-words as stimuli. The time elapsing between exposition and reaction was taken with a stop watch. In all cases intro- spections which covered that period were dictated by the observers to the experimenter. One of the observers of this second class (R.) had eleven, the other (Fl.) thirteen learning sessions. The experiments in which the nonsense- words learned were caused to function as ' uni- versal ' or ' individuals ' were similar to those performed with observers of the first class (Com- pletion of Part-Judgements : Section III.). The learning of the nonsense-words and pictures by the present writer could not well be controlled, as he prepared and exposed the material employed in the research. He never intentionally associated the words with their appropriate pictures, but associations gradually became formed between them. He frequently made casual introspections during the learning period of his observers, which proved of great assistance to him in sorting and classifying the material furnished by the protocols. But his own introspections have not been used as data for any of the conclusions of this part of the research. §1 THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM 85 8 3. Observers. The observers who took part in the experiments were : Professor Spearman (Sp.) ; Rev. A. B. Sharpe, M.A. (Sh.) ; Miss Beatrice Gadsby, B.A. (G.) ; Miss Ferguson (F.) (Class I.) ; Professor Read (R.) ; C. Flugel, B.A. (Fl.) (Class IL). We desire to express our gratitude to them, and, in particular, to Professor Spearman for his untiring interest and help in the work undertaken. The research was carried out in the Laboratory of Experimental Psychology at University College, .London, during the session 1910-11. SECTION II POINTS ARISING DURING THE LEARNING PERIOD The period of learning the nonsense-words as the names of the pictures was one of association, of which the effect, according to the laws of the revival of experience, would be a reinstatement in consciousness of the picture, following upon a reinstatement of the nonsense -word. After the first session of the observers of Class I., however, divergent associations were formed with the words of sets A, B, E, J (also, in the second half, with that of set F). After the second session these were formed with the word of set D (also H) ; and after the third session with the words of sets C and G (as also H).^ For the observers of Class II. divergent associations, of varying revival value, were formed at the outset of the learning sessions.^ ^ Cf. Table I., p. 81, for relative strength of revival value, according to the position of given pictures in the series and number of times of repetition. 2 Cf. Table II., p. 83. 86 §2 POINTS DUEING LEARNING PERIOD 87 This process of the gradual formation and strengthening of associations is traceable in the protocols. For some time the nonsense -words function merely as antecedents to the reinstate- ment of the images, and are not recognised as ' having meaning ' ^ by our observers until a later period. They afterwards acquire meaning, and ultimately become class-names for the pictures of the various sets with which they had been severally associated. Between these two cases — mere associ- ative revival consequent upon the exhibition of the stimulus-word and meaningfulness — various inter- mediary stages occur, the introspective descriptions of which illustrate the growth of the meaning of the words. This point is of sufficient interest in itself to justify a study of our collected material in its regard. But the process of the growth of meaning is one that is also very intimately connected with the formation of the abstract (specific) concepts of the pictures included in the various sets. And for this reason its study is of very great importance. Finally, phenomena observed during this learn- ing period throw some light upon the problem of the relation of images to thought. This point is ^ ' Meaning * is here understood as the consequent reinstatement of the whole, or part, of the associated experience, or experiences, follow- iuK on the antecedent reinstatement of the nonsense-word. 88 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. ii also intimately connected witli the formation and modification of the concepts ; and is manifested in the process of the growth of meaning. The three topics are treated separately in the three following paragraphs : — ^ 1. The Growth of Meaning. With regard to the growth of meaning, it must first be noted that there is no regular and steady advance from protocol to protocol, or from session to session, in which a development from one of the type-cases, noted below, to another is seen to take place. The introspective material differs enormously from observer to observer, and from experiment to experiment. The type -cases that are classified in the present paragraph as last in order sometimes occur comparatively early in the learning period ; while those that are reckoned as genetically first occasionally (though very occasion- ally) crop up in later experiments.^ The occur- rence of mental ' sets ' that condition the psychical processes of an entire session, so that one intro- spection is the replica of another as far as the process of finding a meaning is concerned, render ^ From the introspections it is difficult to show that these cases do differ essentially from the earlier ones ; though this might be infer- entially maintained. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 89 any uniform progression from one type -case to another impossible. Add to this that there is apparently no hard and fast line to be drawn between the type -cases. One shades by almost imperceptible degrees into the next ; so that it is extremely difficult in many cases, and in some impossible, to decide from the protocol to which type -case the given experience should be assigned. These facts would seem to vitiate the possibility of any orderly classification. On the other hand, however, it is to be remarked that all the four type-cases, to which we have been able to reduce by far the greater part of our material, are found again and again in the protocols of the observers. They are definite and striking cases, between which varieties and shadings off are admitted to exist. Moreover, it must be admitted that a more or less arbitrary scheme of classification is necessary, unless it is to possess as many heads' as there are ex- periences to be classified. It may be, of course, that the present classification is incomplete ; that important intermediary type-cases are here omitted. But such we have not been able to find. The data of our protocols lead us to offer the following four type-cases as the more striking steps in the process in which a nonsense-word acquires meaning. We omit those cases in which reaction followed 90 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. n prematurely on a mere feeling of familiarity with the stimulus-word. ' Stage 1. : Type-case I. — There is an associative revival of the picture, or pictures, especially at the beginning of the learning period ; the observers sometimes reacting on a judgement, or assent, or feeling of certainty ^ that this picture was ex- hibited with this nonsense-word. Sometimes they react without such discoverable judgement or assent ; ^ though it is obvious that something of the kind is logically implied in the reaction. 1 "Very faint and confused image, and at the same time a convic- tion that it belonged to this word. It was equivalent to ' I'm quite certain that that picture was above this name,'" Sp. 2".6, i. 1 ; "Saw that picture of a yellow disc at the moment I saw the word. I think I'm right," F. 2".6, i. 6 ; "Immediately saw it as a picture. Was sure I was right," G. 2", i. 2; "Visual image at once. I recalled it distinctly. Consciousness that I was right," Sh. 3", v. 3; "Im- mediately fairly clear visual image of yellow oval. I then thought (judgement) ' that is the meaning of Funip,' " Fl. 2".2, ii. 5 ; "No confidence. On the whole, I identify that with boys running. The visual images are fading a little. It excites more or less the total experience. My confidence is now increased," R. 8".2, i. 2. [It is to be remembered that Fl. and R. form Class II. of the observers. Cf. Table II.] 2 " ' Goral,' a hammer. I saw it more precisely than yesterday," Sh. 4", ii. 6 ; "Nothing but this visual image came," Sh. 11", iii. 1 ; " A faint image of a round reddish-yellow disc. Then I reacted. The sense of purpose to react, if present at all, was very faint. Can't say I felt any definite relation between them," Sp. 1".6, ii. 6 ; "Just saw the picture and reacted. Did not think at all," F. — , i. 1. " Recalled image of hammer picture," G. 9", i. 1. ; "'Funip' brought me the picture ; but I did not perceive any connection. The word did not Tnean the disc," F. 3".6, iii. 2. [We can find no cases of this kind in the protocols of Fl. and R.] §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 91 What is promiuent at this stage is the revived image, the stimulus-word sometimes falling out of consciousness altogether.^ But the word does not yet mean the revived image or the original percept. Occasionally, however, later on, the observer asserts that the word meant the original percept. Stage II. : Type-case II. — The stimulus-word, the revived image, and the meaning (sometimes carried by a normal word) are discriminated in consciousness with (i.) a loose,^ and (ii.) a ^ "When image came, I was not conscious of the word," F. 3", ii. 1 ; " What I had in consciousness was not ' Goral ' after I had seen the word," Sh. 5", v. 1. 2 "Pliers came as a visual image. I said * This is instruments.' Tried to recall to-day's picture. Very vague visual image of plane arose. Couldn't decide," G. 17", x. 5 ; " I had a faint image of a hammer. Idea ' Now I must react * ; and perceived a certain relation between ' Goral ' and the image — a spatial relation ; also a very faint essential relation. ' Goral ' almost expressed the representation of the hammer," Sp. 1". 6, ii. 1 ; " I had a vague image and distinct ideoprefeentation of a flower. I also had an auditory representation of * flower. ' I think it followed some time after the ideopresentation," Sp. 1".2, ii. 5. " I saw the image of the violin at once, at the same time as I saw 'Sorab.' That gave me the meaning," F. 2".4, ii. 4. [Tliese cases are very rare in F.'s protocols.] " Came as one definite picture. ' Pincers ' came voluntarily to express the picture. But feeling of uncertainty as to what ' Goral ' meant," Sh. 10", iv. 1. " The first thing that came into ray mind was a tool. This was present as a vague visual image. It had no shape. Tlie word ' hammer ' came spontaneously ; as soon as I said it, I recognised it was the wrong word. I made an effort to recall the precise image in order to obtain the right word. Then perceived an image of blue 92 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. ir closer ^ and growing connection. The image is some- times vague, sometimes deformed or complicated pincers, but very indistinctly. What was in consciousness was the idea of pincers, separate from and much more distinct than the visual image," Sh. 4", vi. 1. ^ " There was a jumble of a very faint image and a meaning and a very faint verbal image of the word * musical instrument.' Much the clearest cut was the meaning," Sp. 1".6, iii. 1. " Very faint idea of a coloured disc, yellowish. I can't say if there was an image. It seemed, perhaps, a little nearer to * Funip ' than I've had before — in closer connection ; becoming nearer to the meaning of ' Funip,' " Sp. 1".6, iv. 5. " A vague ideopresentation of an instrument — a hammery instru- ment. No images to swear by. The ideopresentation seemed in rather close connection with the word. This is the nearest approach yet to the nonsense-word expressing the ideopresentation, " Sp. 1".2, v. 1; "Looked at 'Kumic' Then said, 'This is the flower whose name I don't know,' and saw the image at the same time. I saw the out- line, but no colour — only the markings," G. 1".4, v. 5. " Saw picture of carnations with buds. Then said, ' This is the word for flowers.' At this the picture disappeared, and an idea of flowers was present simultaneously with the auditory judgement," G. 5", viii. 1 ; "'Goral,' after seeing the pliers, meant instruments," G. 2" A, viii. 6 ; " I read ' Digep ' ; and very quickly had image. It meant that picture," G. 2", ix. 2. "These words all mean the picture," G. 1".6, xii. 4. " ' Pail ' came auditorily, and vague picture simultaneously. The image was not of any one of these pails, but a sort of compound of the lot, and more like a pail we have at home," G. 1".4, xiii. 1 ; " The word ' triangle ' came as a thought, simultaneously with a very clear image of the red triangle," G. 1".4, xiii. 2. " I had quite a distinct image ; but concurrently with it there came into consciousness the head and beak of another bird. But I had no doubt that it was the humming-bird. ' Tuben ' means to me always a sort of bird," Sh. 3", xii. 3. " Distinct visual image — colours very subordinate. It's more the s o POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 93 with elements borrowed from pictures exhibited with the same nonsense-word on previous occasions. It is generally, however, a fairly exact reproduction (making allowance for the individual imaginal reproductive power of the observer) of the picture which was learned on the day on which the intro- spection was taken. Stage III. : Type-case III. — The meaning of the . nonsense-word consciously precedes the appearance * of the revived image, which is described by the observers as exemplificative of, or instancing it. It adds nothing, however, to the meaning, which, on the contrary, it sometimes determines and re- stricts. There are a great many intermediary cases lying between that in which the arising of meaning is separated from the perception of the nonsense- idea of red cherries. I know they are red. I don't see it," Sh. 8", xiii. 2. ** An incomplete image of which I am conscious that I can at will fill up all the details. It is certainly not an outline, and certainly has no colour. It is not anything that can be defined. [Note] It is my opinion that this is a concept united with a symbol of so vague a character that I cannot specify it without having definitely looked for it. More or less from the beginning I have had a diflBculty in sayiug whether I had or had not a distinct visual image. I think that the explanation is that my consciousness was of the character just described," Sh. 4", xiii. 5. " I said the word as I looked at it. Visual image of hammer. Knew that was wrong. Trie o a S 2 P^ 5S+=> P S* eS a> ® « E3 2i o> 03 image — > concept — > reaction. '■* E.g. stimulus word -> concept -» reaction ; or stimulus word -> concept — > image —> reaction. 146 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii ing the sequence image ^concept ; and what is that expressing the sequence concept ^ image ? These we have not found. All that we are able to do is to point to the fact that the two sequences imager concept and concept ^ image are given. This looks like a statement of phantastico-noetic interaction. But such an inference is not the only possible one. A fourth hypothesis might possibly be advanced. It might be supposed that the sensorial part of images was ' epinoumenal * to their conceptual elements ; and that the series of concepts alone showed a causal sequence. The extreme improb- ability that any content could be present without exerting a modifying effect on simultaneously present or subsequent contents of consciousness would tell against such an hypothesis. An image (purely sensorial content + conceptual element) is not a concept ; and the one can certainly be discriminated introspectively from the other. It is in the highest degree improbable, therefore, that the effect of the occurrence of a concept upon conscious processes should be precisely the same as that of an image ; and we conclude in consequence that the purely sensorial part of an image, no matter how or for what reason it occurs, may exercise its effect upon those processes. Nevertheless we may advance the following §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 147 hypothesis in the light of the data obtained from our experiments. Thought sequences obtain mainly between con- ceptual contents. These are the important and only necessary elements of thought, by associations of which thought processes can alone be explained. Where images are revived as contents, in so far as they may be considered as purely sensorial, they are revived by reason of a conceptual element in virtue of which alone they can become present to consciousness as images. The purely sensorial elements may perhaps in many cases be considered as by-products of the conceptual elements with which they occur in consciousness. The main associations manifested in thought processes obtain between pure concepts and the conceptual elements of images. In this hypothesis we do not deny that associa- tions may also obtain between the sensorial elements of images and any other elements with which they may at any time have been present in consciousness. We assert that such associations are not a necessary condition of the thought process ; and that, on the contrary, concepts are essential, and the associations between them indispensable. We shall now proceed to develop our hypothesis, and to adduce evidence in its support. 148 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rT.ii I. Thought sequences obtain mainly between conceptual contents. These are the important and only necessary elements of thought, by associa- tions of luhich thought processes can alone be explained. We have, first of all, a number of cases ^ in which the thought process apparently proceeds from stimulus to reaction without the intervention of any imaginal content. The whole process, with the exception of the percept (stimulus word) at the beginning and the spoken reaction word at the end, seems to be entirely conceptual in char- acter ; and the successive presence of several concepts, or imageless representative thoughts, is observed. In most of the cases we shall quote our observers make no reference to images. With regard to these cases it might be objected that the fact that the presence of images was not reported is no certain indication of their absence. We would meet such an objection, however, by the following considera- tions : — (i.) The absence of mention of images in a very considerable number of protocols of several (four) ^ These cases are found in the protocols of the second part of our experiments, in which the observers were required to complete partially expressed judgments (as, e.g., "All Robud are ") by adding an adjective. The reaction word in the examples cited below is printed in brackets. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 149 observers is to be taken rather as a strong indica- tion of their absence than otherwise ; since in other cases images were duly noted and reported by the same observers. (ii.) If, notwithstanding, it should still be main- tained that images were present and not reported, we must suppose that they were so obscure or evanescent as not to be noticed or remembered. And in that supposition we must agree with Buhler ^ that images of such a character cannot be considered as the clear and concatenated content of thought. (iii.) But in either case we have shorter thought processes in which the absence of imagery, at any rate with regard to one term of the sequence of contents, is positively asserted.^ It is permissible to suppose that what can be true of one term can be true of several ; and so to maintain that absence of noted imagery in the protocols is good reason for inferring independence of imagery in the thought processes they describe. Using capital letters to denote concepts, small letters for conceptual elements of images, and Greek letters for their purely sensorial elements, we may ^ Bvihler, Tatsachen unil Probleme zu einer Theorie des Denkens, p. 3]9. ^ Cf. below, pp. 181, sqq. 150 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL PT. II schematise the thought sequences with which we are dealinsf as follows : — •o > B > C ^ D where ( T j is the printed stimulus, and f i ] the spoken reaction word. It is clear that the thought sequence B->C->D is conceptual. We maintain that concepts are therefore the only necessary contents of thought ; and that the associations between them can alone explain the sequence. Examples of such sequences are the following : — Sp. 4^', V. 6. Stimulus : " No Tuben is {four-footed)." Introspection : " I at once thought of my fat bird. Each of these series has got one representative now. Then I thought that they were not quadrupeds. I re- member the whole incident of before {i.e. a previous reaction). I had idea ' four-footed : ' and reacted." Again, Sp. 1''.8, iii. 9. Stimulus: "All Lagoc are {angular)." Introspec- tion : " I understood the sentence. ' Lagoc ' meant entity determined to the extent of being a flat geometrical figure ; and, I think, sHghtly contaminated by lake {lago). Then a condensed idea of previous experience (iii. 2) arose ; and I said with great con- fidence 'angular,' as satisfying the instruction — ' angular ' being constituent of that reminiscence." §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 151 Again, Sp. iii. 5. Stimulus: "No Goral is (living)." 5". 2. Introspec- tion : " I understood the sentence in the usual way of the word representing an entity. I had the idea ' dead ; ' and was just about to give utterance to it, when I suddenly had an impulse to consider the meaning of ' Goral ' again. Dwelt on idea of * Goral ' — and the idea of musical instrument came out, which suggested to me to say the opposite of * dead.' " Again, G. x. 1. Stimulus: "No Tegam is (living)." 6". 6. Intro- spection : " I knew what ' Tegam ' referred to and thought of the watering-can that comes in this series, and remembered that we had spoken about it last time. Then I wanted to think whether I should react some- thing stupid, like ' eats.' There was no idea present of what, or sensible. Then thought that you always got them so quickly, and something comic. Thought ' whatever I do I must be quick.' The word ' break- able ' came (motor) automatically. Rejected because I knew it was not true. Then 'living' came auto- matically (motor) ; and I reacted." Again, G. x. 5. Stimulus : " All Goral are (made hy man)." 6". Introspection : " I recognised the meaning of ' Goral,' and wanted to put words I had used before which came automatically as memories. Then thought of predicating something about their connection with pre- historic man. No word came. Then quite automatic- ally came what I said." Again, F. v. 7. Stimulus : " All Digep are (eatable)." 3". Inirospec- 152 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii tion : " ' Digep ' meant ' fruit ' in general. No image. I stopped to think about fruit. Had the idea of food in my head. That gave me the word ' eatable.' At first it came as a thought, I think. Then I reacted." Again, F. iv. 5. Stimulus : " No Goral is (small).'' 11". Introspection : "The idea I first had was I had had this before. Sur- prise or displeasure. Inhibition. Then I had the meaning ' carpentering tool ; ' and I thought of 'artistic' Rejected as having been used before. Then the idea of carpentering tools in my head made me think of size. I realised that none of them, in general, were small. I said ' small. > » Again, A. iv. 2. Stimulus: "No Funip is (squiggly)." 5". 6. Intro- spection : " Familiarity with word. Consciousness of tendency to mix up ' Funip ' with something else not present in consciousness. Then meaning (of ' Funip ') came clearly ; then a memory of what you had said in your introspection with regard to 'Funip.' Then idea ' square ' came : refused to use it. Then came the idea of the regularity of the figures. Reacted ' squiggly ' as being the contrary to this. The ' no ' was not in consciousness from an early point in the introspection period (but evidently influenced the reaction)." Again, A. iii. 9. Stimulus : " All Lagoc are (difficult for my subjects)." 9". 8. Introspection : "I got the meaning of ' Lagoc ' at once ; and then remembered the reactions of several of my subjects. Then I thought of myself making the pictures on the cards in a very vague, slow way. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 153 'Difficult for my subjects' came automatically in spoken words as the reaction." In none of the foregoing cases are any images noted between stimulus and reaction. II. Where images are revived as contents, in so far as they may he considered as purely sensorial, they are revived hy reason of a conceptual element, in virtue of which alone they can become present to consciousness as images. The purely sensorial elements may perhaps in many cases he considered as hy -products of the conceptual elements with which they occur in consciousness. We have already insisted upon this point. In no case does a * pure ' image or sensation occur in consciousness.^ A ' pure ' image or sensation is a part of a complex, considered as abstracted from the conceptual element in virtue of which it is consciously an image or sensation. Any one of these complexes is apt, according to the laws of association, to become the antecedent to the revival of any other. Further, any one can function as antecedent to a pure concept ; and such a concept can revive either a second concept or an image. What is not here a commonplace of psychology we have shown by the data of our experiments and by ^ It is perceived. Cf. Kiilpe, Bericht iiber d. 1. Kongressf. ezp. Psych, in Giessen, 1904, p. 67. Cf. also Moore, "The Process of Abstraction" {The Stages of Perceptioji), p. 132. 154 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii immediate inferences therefrom. But since the sensorial elements of an image cannot occur in consciousness alone, it is reasonable to suppose that they are revived by the conceptual element with which they are connected, and which constitutes their meaning. If we allow, as we shall see we have reason to do, that the images in these sequences of images and concepts enter the sequences by reason of their conceptual elements, we shall readily admit that their purely sensorial elements are not directly revived by the preceding concept or image, but are more or less by-products of that conceptual element with which they are connected in consciousness.^ III. The main associations manifested in thought processes obtain hetween pure concepts and the con- ceptual elements of images. We have already instanced the case of a thought sequence in which concepts alone are reported. In such a case, we have maintained, the main associa- tions evidently obtain between these concepts. ^ Cf. Betts, The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery, 1900. "... the measure of an individual's voluntary imagery is no sure measure of the amount of imagery which spontaneously appears in his thinking. We may go still farther and say that the amount of imagery which appears in his thinking is not necessarily a measure of the extent to which im&geTy functions in his thinking. For it might very well happen, indeed it is altogether certain, that our associative machinery may bring before the mind many elements which have no function in the thought of the moment, but are only incidents, by- products of the thought process " (p. 64). §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 155 Where images also intervene in the sequence we now further maintain that the principal associations are between their conceptual elements and the concepts. In evidence of this statement we have all the cases in which one term at least of the sequence is a pure concept. In these cases we observe that the complete, and apparently necessarily complete sequence obtains between the conceptual elements of the images and the concepts present. The sequence of purely imaginal elements is not neces- sarily a complete one. We therefore infer that the conceptual sequence is an essential one and the latter unimportant. Thus, for example, in B This represents : Nonsense-word->concept->exempli- ficatory image ; a frequent case in our experiments. The complete sequence is a->B->c ; the incomplete a-^ — 7. Or, again, in B (Nonsense-word->concept^reaction ' yes.') 156 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.h Our contention that the main associations in such thought sequences obtain between the con- ceptual elements of images entering into the sequences and concepts is supported by the follow- ing considerations : — (i.) We have shown that, absolutely speaking, sequences can be discovered which are purely con- ceptual in character. Hence the conceptual elements would be sufficient to explain those in which images occur. (ii.) Where at least one pure concept occurs in the sequence it is reasonable to suppose that it is the conceptual elements throughout which con- stitute the main sequence. (iii.) Thought processes, and in particular those which we have studied, are concerned with ' objects,' ' meanings,' ' relations,' and 'values.' None of these, as such, are images. Hence the thought processes cannot be explained by the sensorial elements of images which may be present. No image, as we have said, is itself a meaning. It means something other than itself; and it is with meanings that thought deals. These considerations hold good of thought sequences into which ' natural ' {e.g., visual) iinages enter. Indeed they would hold good also of sequences composed exclusively of such images. Similar observations obtain with regard to those §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 157 in which arbitrary images {e.g., verbal) occur. Here, however, we may further remark that if a ' natural ' image is not its own meaning, still less can a word with which it has been associated be said to be its meaning. For if the word means the image, then it is the mediate meaning with which thought is concerned. And that mediate meaning is the object, either abstract or concrete, with which thought has to do.^ Examples from protocols illustrating our point are the following : — " I had a distinct memory idea of a hammer with no image and no word. ' Goral ' was in consciousness at the time, but did not express the hammer. They existed co-ordinately." Sp. \'\ iv. 3. " Ideopresentation preceded very faint auditory image of 'bird.' I think I had later a very faint visual image of a fat bird." Sp. 1". 4, ix. 5. "The idea came first then. Then came an image ^ Professor James seems to have had some such conception in mind when he wrote, "Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, is hetweenmmGS thought of — it is things, notidea^, which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk of the association of objects, not of the association of ideas" {Principles of Psychology, yo\. i. p. 554). The language is unusual ; and, as it stands, open to misconception. What is probably meant is that objects as present to consciousness are the terms of associations. If so, James has to a certain extent adumbrated our own hypothesis. For the ideas (here images) according to James, are not the main terms of the associations. And the objects — the * things ' which, he says, are associated — are the meanings of images or words. These meanings, as we have shown, may be pure concepts. Where images (unassociated ideas) are present, they occur, more or less, as the by-products of associated meanings. 158 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii of a dark blue oval disc ; very faint, but greatly adding to the determinateness of the idea." Sp. 0-8", vi. 5. " The knowledge that ' Ferod ' meant ' running away ' came first of all. ' Running away ' was not present except as meaning of * Ferod.' (Afterwards) saw picture — wrong picture." G. 1", iv. 7. " I thought — did not see it — of a cornflower — then remembered the peculiar markings that the pansy tribe has, and got a quite clear visual image of the right one." G. 5", X. 2. "I repeated 'Funip' and thought of shape. No word was present. Then I saw the oval - shaped indigo figure . . ." F. 4". 4, viii. 4. " ' Digep ' meant fruit. Then I saw the picture clearly, of the nectarines, localised on the table." F. r'.6, X. 1. "The vague image of a brass pail was referred to the already formed idea, which, so far as I can tell, came first." Sh. I'U, xiv. 1. " I heard ' Lagoc ' and knew what it meant — the picture of a purple figure. It was distinctly not in consciousness as a visual image. It came when I willed it. Then I looked at it and saw it. This is absolutely certain." Sh. 5", xiv. 5. " I kept on repeating word ' Kumic' Feeling of blankness, as before, gradually increasing ; and a dis- agreeable feeling of helplessness. I said to myself ' I don't know this.' Thereupon the meaning ' flower ' came. I think an auditory-motor image came after- wards ; but I'm not sure. There was no visual image of any kind." Fl. 4". 6, ii. 3. "... Then, quite suddenly, came the meaning 'bird.' I could detect no image of any kind." Fl. 1".8, ii. 2. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 159 "Nothing except that I knew what it meant." (A visual image arose in the afterperiod.) R. 1", vii. 3. "... Although I had no image of any sort, I felt confident that I could produce them. I had know- ledge." R. 2". 6, vi. 4. Application of our Hypothesis to other Pheno- mena. — Our hypothesis would seem to cover not only the phenomena observed in our own experi- ments, but many others also. For instance : — (i.) It is well known that the reproduction of nonsense syllables is less faithful than that of words having logical meaning, the conditions of learning having been the same in both cases. According to our hypothesis this fact would be explained as follows. The relatively exact repro- duction of the words depends upon the associations formed between their meanings ; and these associa- tions make a conceptual sequence possible. Since the nonsense syllables have no meaning (other than that of ' entity,' ' nonsense syllable,' etc., which is common to all of them), a conceptual sequence is relatively difi&cult to establish in their regard. The nonsense syllables must be learned before they can be reproduced.-^ This ' learning,' we suggest, is their subsumption under concepts, or the providing of concepts for them, in virtue of which a conceptual sequence can be formed. ^ Doubtless, to a large extent mechanically. 160 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii (ii.) Although the theory of mental ' types,' in its original form, has been abandoned, there is no doubt that various individuals usually show a predominance of one or another kind of imagery in their thought processes. Some are markedly visual, others auditory, others kinaesthetic in tendency. In our own, as in all experiments upon reproductive representative processes, these typical tendencies, and combinations of them, are noticeable. Now, no matter what sort of imagery is found to have been present — or even if none is reported or discovered — the thought process seems to proceed without break (except, of course, in cases of inhibition) to its end. And the results, in all cases, are similar. The varied character of the imagery seems to have no marked effect upon the conceptual sequence.-^ It is therefore reason- able to suppose that the concatenation of the process is due in the main to the conceptual elements invariably present, and not to the vary- ing concomitant imaginal elements. (iii.) Our hypothesis would seem to cover the ^ E.g. a visual image of a boy's torso, or of the word 'Eobud,' or an auditory or a kinaesthetic image of ' Kobud ' or 'torso,' or any other form of images or combination of these might be observed to have been present while the meaning of * Robud ' entered into the main conceptual sequence. It is possible, of course, that in making a judgement on 'Robud' the kind of imaginal content might have determined the concept evinced by the reaction word. But it is just as arguable that it was the kind of concept that determined the imagery. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD ICl cases of reproduced ' general images ' observed by Watt/ Messer,^ and others. In these the sensorial elements are vague, fragmentary, indefinite. In our own experiments such contents were spoken of as " scratches," " vague colours," etc. Yet the conceptual elements present were often enough strikingly clear, complete and definite. It is incredible that these " scratches," " blurs of colour," " ghosts of images," should form the main terms of the sequence of thought, while there are evidently clear and definite focal contents present. Indeed it might be suggested that the ' general image ' is no more than the debris of sensorial elements of many percepts or images in constellation with a concept but divergently associated with each other, and vaguely reproduced by association whenever the concept is consciously present. (iv.) Watt's research^ (published 1905) de- finitely established the influence of the task set for his observers upon their subsequent mental processes. This is the principal conclusion Watt draws from his experiments. The chief factor determining the arising in consciousness of a re- action word in fixed relation to the stimulus word ^ Luc. cit. '^ Loc. cit. ^ Watt, " Experimentelle Beitriige zu eiiier Theorie ties Deiikens " (in Archivf. d. yes. Psychol, iv. , 1905, pp. 289 sijq.). M 162 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii is the instruction given to and accepted by the observer. The acceptance of the task constitutes a determinant tendency in which the reaction takes place. Now this determinant tendency would seem to be conceptual in character : first of all, since the instruction obviously must be understood before it can be supposed to exert any influence ; and secondly, because it conditions the arising of words that are not necessarily sensorially, but conceptually, related to the stimulus word. In our hypothesis the principal associations would obtain between the meanings of the words ^ as determined by the conditioning concept of the instruction. (v.) In general the facts observed by Henderson in his study of memory - appear to fit in very closely with our h}^3othesis. He finds that assimi- lation, condensation and modification of details characterise the reproduction by his observers of literary passages read to them. Under the head of ' condensation ' he notes that repeated ideas receive only one expression, unimportant words are omitted, etc. ' Modification ' includes the fusion of ideas into a new product, the modification of ideas to fit ^ Which Watt allows to be distinct from the words themselves as sensorial contents. ^ Henderson, "A Study of Memory, for Connected Trains of Thought " (Monograph Supplement to the Psychological Review, vol. v. No. 6, December 1903). §2 POINTS DUEING LEARNING PERIOD 1G3 a new context, etc. Now these phenomena would seem to find their best explanation in our hypo- thesis. The trains of thought followed in the narrative are remembered better, at least, than their sensorial expression. The meanings are connected by the associations formed between them, rather than the words by which those meanings were conveyed to the mind in the first instance, or the images which arose as understanding took place. As forgetting goes on "... the contents of the topic dwindle to a few representative details, then forgetting doubtless ceases to impair these save when it sweeps away all except an inarticulate sense of the larger meaning." ^ This process is " the resolution of the elements into condensed and generalised forms." " Further, " from the testimony of the subjects we are . . . fortified in our notion of the general meaning dominating recall, or better, resolving itself into the details that constitute recall."^ Suppose, as we suggest, that the main associations obtain between the concepts involved in connected trains of thought ; and we should expect to find all these phenomena to which Henderson alludes. The central concept once aroused would dominate recall. Ideas repeated verbally would be reproduced once. Unimportant words would be omitted , indeed the precise original ^ hoc. cU. p. 84. ^ lUd. 3 ji^i^ cf^ also p. 19. 164 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL ,.t.ii words would be unnecessary provided the meaning were expressed at all. We should look for fusion of ideas (concepts) and their modification to fit new contexts, rather than for any fusion or modification of verbal forms, or even imaginal contents ; though, doubtless, where these are reproduced fusion and modification would also be observed. But we should expect the central concept (" larger meaning ") and whatever other concepts arise in connection with it to be comparatively clear and distinct, no matter how modified : and we should look for the washed- out ' general ' imagery of which Henderson cites examples, " which plays so important a part in discussions of the general idea. 'J 1 (vi.) The foregoing instances have been of reproductive processes. Our own Louvain research shows evidence that conceptual preadjustment has a strong influence upon the perceptual process : and Moore has proved that a common diagram (" element ") repeated in the groups of diagrams shown to his observers is isolated and cognised as present hefore any imaginal element is to be found in consciousness. " The subject knew," he writes, " (a) that a common element of some kind was present, {h) He then knew that it was circular in form, (c) And finally he obtained the true mental ^ Loc. ci^ p. 19. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 165 image or at least a mental atate that enabled him to reproduce correctly the figure he had perceived." ^ Moore concludes, as we have seen, that " the mental image forms no essential part in the apprehension of a figure." " This conclusion reached by experi- ments on perception fits in very exactly with our own hypothesis. Where Moore asserts that imagery is not essential to apprehension, we maintain that it is not essential to reproduction. Indeed, the latter would seem a potiori to be true once the former is proved. In neither case, how- ever, are the purely sensorial elements of images excluded from having any function in the processes of thought. As we shall see, images on account of their sensorial character have an exceedingly important part to play in those processes. (vii.) Lastly, facts observed by Biihler in his experiments upon thought processes ^ seem to be explicable on no other hypothesis. Indeed Biihler, whose work stands in the forefront of all that has been done in this direction, himself explains the continuous thought processes by means of concepts, and refuses to allow that they can be accounted for ^ Moore, The Process of Abstraction, pp. 133 sqq. - Ibid. •^ Biihler, " Tatsacben und Problenie zu einer Theorie des Deiikens " (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychol, ix., 1907, pp. 297 sqq., xii., 1908, pp. 1 sqq. ). 166 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii by images. This is also our own hypothesis, supported not only by the evidence of our present research, but by that of a number of other experi- menters, and verifiable by application to other mental phenomena, instances of which we have placed before our readers. The Origin of Conceiots. — Two questions of considerable importance remain to be discussed in this connection. How does the concept originally arise ? What is the function of the sensorial elements of images ? Why have these latter not been dropped away, in virtue of some principle such as that of psychical economy, if thought can go on without them ? The first question raises the problem of the genesis of thought, into which, except in the most cursory manner, we do not here propose to enter; and this mainly because it forces us away from the phenomenological standpoint we have taken up. Nevertheless it is possible for us to indicate a line of speculation, the beginning of which may be found in observed facts. The thought, or conceptual element, we have said, is present in all perception. In our experi- ments, it was given in the first picture shown with the nonsense-word of each series. But it is given, not as something entirely novel, in the complex : it §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 167 is recognisable as something previously in conscious- ness. The observer repeating ' Tuben * saw a ' bird- picture : ' with ' Lagoc ' he saw a ' single line coloured picture,' or a ' geometrical shape p)icture' or a ' coloured surface picture ; ' and so on. Now this relating of the percept to an apperceptive mass is the subsuming of it under some appropriate concept, already abstracted from previous experience. And it is in virtue of the conceptual element in the image complex that this subsumption is possible.^ Now this conceptual element varies vastly, in its representative function. It may ' place us before ' a ' thing ' or a ' goose ; ' before an * it ' or a * musical instrument.' Is it, in each case, a simple concept, or a complex one ? Is the percept related to one apperceptive mass or to several — subsumed under one or several concepts — in perception ? This we have no means of saying. Psychologically con- sidered, the concept is not further analysable. Our observers have discriminated in it no parts or elements, as they were able to do with regard to the sensorial part of the complex. No matter what its logical implications may be, we have so far, from the phenomeuological point of view, no data from our experiments which will allow us to 1 This not only seems to be evident from the considerations we have already advanced, from the experiments of this research, and, in a greater measure, from tliose of the study we made at Louvain, but it is also proved by the results of Moore's research. Cf. luc. cit. i). 127. 168 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii analyse it. It may be complex. We are not in a position to bring evidence that it is, or is not. Still, whether simple or complex, as the purely conceptual element in adult perception and repro- duction how does it originally arise ? According to the hypothesis that we advance, the answer must be that it arises in the first perception.^ In this, sensation, or sensible percept, is given as content : but neither, as we have seen, is found in conscious- ness without a conceptual element. No matter what the first perception may be — light, darkness ; heat, cold ; sweetness, bitterness, etc. — its conceptual element will be of a character that will apply in- discriminately to all. It will be equivalent to the ' it,' the ' that thing,' the ' something,' of our experi- ments. The second perception will also involve the conceptual element — ' thing ; ' but the " transitive thought " of comparison and discrimination — thought as ' act ' — will give to each a certain defini- tion and precision. We are assisting here, in theory, at the birth of differentiated concepts, which develop from the original first perception in virtue of experi- ^ We say " the first perception." Ttoo cases may be supi^osed : (i.) that in which one object is present to mind ah exordio of mental life ; (ii. ) that in which no object is so present. In the first case, by ' ' the first perception " we mean the first change of object ; since to us an object changelessly present to mind ab exordio seems equivalent to no perception. In the second case we mean literally " the first percep- tion." Cf. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, vol. i., p. 147. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 169 ence and " transitive thought." Under such concepts, where it is possible, further experience will be sub- sumed, because of its conceptual element. Where this subsumption is not possible, modified concepts will arise ; and so on, until we come to the stage which our observers had reached when our experi- ments were performed ; at which it is hard to say if any wholly new concepts were involved at all. Of course this is theory ; and takes us beyond observable phenomena. None of us has the con- sciousness of that first concept. None of us remembers the stages by which it became differ- entiated. But we have experience, as we have shown, of such concepts, either in complexes with sensorial elements, or subsisting alone in con- sciousness ; and we have also experience of the " substantive thoughts " by which ' it,' or * some- thing ' is represented. The Function of the Sensorial Elements. — Thought processes according to the hypothesis that we have framed essentially involve the concept, as ' content,' and both " substantive " and " transitive thought " considered as ' act.' But these processes are generally such as to involve also the presence of the sensorial elements of images whenever con- ceptual " substantive thought " occurs. What is the function of these sensorial elements ; and why have they not long since disappeared from the 170 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx.ii thought processes ? The answer to such a question would seem to lie in the character of the thought process itself and in that of perception. (i.) With regard to the thought process, the fact that it is a changing process is sufficient to account for the usual presence of the sensorial part of the image complex. Thought is perpetually in process of becoming, in which process it passes beyond itself It is instable. But the image is a relatively stable formation ; ^ and as long as it is present, or can be maintained present in con- sciousness, its conceptual element will also tend to remain. Its relative stability may be said to confine into the concept. Thus when close atten- tion to anything is necessary, either an image is reproduced, or a percept is sought for and held in consciousness. Thus also, the concept having once been abstracted and associated with a word, the word is of the greatest use in keeping the concept relatively stable. So we can conceive why, when reading, speaking or hearing language, as a rule no, or poor, visual imagery is consciously discriminated ; while, if we stop to ask ourselves what an un- familiar word means, we generally discover that another word, or an image, is aroused as ex- emplificative of its meaning. ^ Cf. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 243. §2 POINTS DURING LEARNING PERIOD 171 (ii.) Secondly, in perception, as a rule ^ the sensorial elements and the conceptual are given to- gether in the complex percept. When, as is usual in ordinary life, this constitutes the representative content, the whole is at the focus of consciousness. It would follow that a strong reproductive tendency must always obtain between the concept (whenever and for whatever reason it is reinstated) and the sensorial elements with which it was associated. It would consequently tend to reinstate them." So also, when associated with a word or symbol, a similar tendency would obtain.^ Finally, if a ^ We say ''as a rule," since Moore's experiments show that the concept can be aroused in perceptual processes without the arousal of sensorial elements. " Cf. Betts, The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery 1009, "That imagery persists in the degree which it does is un- doubtedly in large part due to the permanence of association, which also accounts for the presence of so much imagery which is irrelevant " (p. 92). ^ Instances of these tendencies are the following : — "I knew what ' Robud ' meant without translating it into anything. T could have reacted on that knowledge ; but le,t picture come, and had a visual image, not very clear, of a boy or girl facing nie, with a big hat V. VI. 03 VII. VIII IX. 4i sa 03 ^ 03 Observer. a a S o er of e not d rom Pr s iary Pr by pun V a Si ,■0 -O :t-- c 'O— ■; ^ d"^ 3703 i '03 CO ea 5§S bfi r- iC a;'-' cs ® U) t! £ S ^ C4 s Con fron Ima Tim and min H «« ll Inte folk Con '3 a ^rt ^"^ G. . . 24% CO Si ® e8 , a g I O p I 9% 17% 8% 40% 15% 10% 56% 22% 16% 48% 61% 13% 5% 80%(=i) 29%(b) 34% 35-5% IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. 43 ^ Ot , o o: 1 OJ S-. « to 1 u 0) o a> a-u-tJ o o OS r of Coi not de om Pro a. 2£ ri CC O o G j^ ■; a 0-2 5 +3 tJ 'S o 5 c "■2s tc-S o rt~ ? oj > CS tH ? OJ rt r-H n! ~ Ol o "CU P rA S O O) !-, O a> .« V5 -tJ Observer, lage immediat esent and proi Consciousnes; ncept of Abst: thout Image f Individual M th Image. ncept of Abst th Image folio Individual M th Image. ncept of Abst thout Image f Individual M thout Image, i dividual Mean mediately pre thout Image. 1 ri CO 2 4-1 o 51 a ti '- o-r" >>-r o-r >»-r o-r >i-r c o c 1-1 ft.S O ^J3 s: O ^^ ?: O >P2 & HH .'" ^ p H-< G. . . 63% 29% 4%(b) 2% 2% 52 F. . . 38% 52% 6% 2% 2% 52 Sp. . . 69 7 W 14% (a) 2% 2% 12%(c) 42 Sh. . . 56% 0% 17% 28%(d) 18 A. . . 52% 26% 6% 6% 6% 3% 31 Fl. . . 40% 50% 5% 5% 20 R. . . 64% 21% 14% 14 Average 65% 25% 7% 2% 1% 7% Total . 55% 30% 5% 3% 1% 6% 229 • The cases included in these columns are dealt with at length in an appendix. Of. p. 240. (») In one case preceded by a mnemonic. (*•) In both cases said to be "typical images." (t) Of these three remained abstracts : task not fulfilled. ('») Task not fulfilled. The analysis of these protocols was made twice ; and the results are presented in two sets of tables. In the first set (Tables VI., VII., VIII.) the 180 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii presence of the * universal ' (or potential ' universal ') atiirmative and negative, as well as that of the ' individual,' is considered with regard to its con- nection with imagery. In the second set (Tables X., XI.) these are considered as consciously 'uni- versal ' or ' individual.' The results of the analysis of the phenomeno- logical presence of the meaning of the predicate, in ' universal ' affirmative, ' universal ' negative, and 'individual' judgements, are displayed in three further tables (Tables XII., XIII., XIV.). We have now to investigate the circumstances in which " substantive thought " as content is pre- sent in consciousness as ' universal ' or ' individual.' In paragraphs ii. and iii. of section ii. we noticed the presence of concepts, or imageless " substantive thought " contents ; and upon this data we based our considerations as to conceptual abstraction and the hypothesis that we advanced as to the relation of imagery and thought. We there found (cf. Table IV.) that concepts occurred during the learning period with no mention of sensorial contents in 45 cases (V % of the total). They occurred and were discriminated by our observers from accompanying sensorial contents in 226 cases (3 5 '5 %). Thus, in connection with and in the absence of sensorial contents such concepts were observably present in §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 181 4 2 '5 % of the total number of reactions (635) of the ' learning period.' These figures are strongly corroborated by the data from our experiments on the completion of the part judgements. Here we find that : (i.) the meaning of the subject of ' universal ' affirmative judgements in 31 % of the total number of cases is reported as a concept/ while in 37 % this was ^ Examples of meaning of subject given as concej)t without imagery in ' universal ' affirmative judgements. " ' Tuben ' meant birds in general. I saw no pictures : I thought of birds in general. Then I thought feathered : and said it aloud," F. 2". 2, viii. 6. " ' Sorab ' meant musical instrument. There was no image. The word ' noisy ' was then present as a mere recollection that I had used it before in connection with ' Sorab.' I reacted 'tuneful,' " F. 3". 6, iv. 8. " I read this (stimulus) and then knew lohat it meant. No image. Then I had the words 'hard to learn,' 'sonorous,' 'harmonious;' I rejected all those and said again to myself 'All Sorab are,' and waited. Then I had an idea, to which I did not put any words ' have a civilising tendency,' . . ." G. 3" iv. 8. " I recognised the meaning oi ' Goral, ' and wanted to put words I had used before which came up automatically (as a memory). Then I tJwught of predicating something about their connection with pre- historic man. No word came. Then quite automatically I reacted 'made by man,'" G. 6", x. 5. "I recognised the word 'Tegam,' and same moment recognised that it was what I'd said for ' Lagoc ' . . . Considered that to say ' what I meant by " Lagoc " ' would fulfil the instructions. Accepted (this) as a sufficient account of the whole matter. There were no images, except ' Lagoc ' auditorily (just before the reaction)," Sh. 7", i. 10. " I read through sentence without completely understanding, i.e. ' Robud ' did not contribute its part. When I tried to make it do so, it seemed obstructed by the fact that it seemed singiilar. When 1 182 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rr.ii observed and discriminated from accompanying sensorial elements.^ (ii.) The meaning of the subject of * universal ' negative judgements is reported as a managed to make it plural, the sentence at once became completely understood. It was quite universal. There was an ideoprescntation, but no images," Sp. 5". 6, ii. 3. " I had a collective idea quite distinct ; not a trace of any image. At the same time the idea was not in as close connection with ' Tuben ' as in ordinary language. There was, after the sense of familiarity, this meaning, 'birds,'" Sp. 2".2, i. 1. " Familiarity with the word ' Funip,' but could not get its meaning at all. Consciously tried to difterentiate it from that of another word which I could not get. Then got meaning of 'Funip.' The word * all ' was then prominent in consciousness. Thought of single-line figures and coloured figures : rejected these, . . ."A. 8", iii. 2. " Meaning of ' Kobud ' developed gradually as a general. The idea came 'cut in half (no image or word). Then word 'torso' came auditively with memory, . . ." A. 8", iii. 2. R. has only cases of pure substantive thought followed by imagery. "Again the mnemonic intervened. I was aware of it without its being internally articulated. Word 'edible' then occurred to me after which two specimens (of 'Digep') became visible, . . ." R. 11". 4, vi. 1. ' ' There I had to think in order to determine ' Kumic ' as against 'Funip.' This was done before any image occurred. None of ' Funip ' did occur. Then I had exemplificative sketch-images of two specimens of 'Kumic,' . . ." R. 11", vii. 5. "The first thing that occurred to me was 'either a boy or a girl.' This was a thought. Next thing was ' coloured ' — thought. Too fiat : and I'd given it before . . . My thought was 'actively employed.' " [Reaction word active\ R. 6". 2, vi. 4. ^ Examples of meaning of subject given as concept concomitant with imagery, but distinguished from it, in ' universal ' affirmative judgements. " ' Goral ' meant hammer first ; and with that meanmg I saw the picture of the hammer . . . meaning 'carpentermg instrument' cams, image still there, . . ." F. 6", v. 5. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 183 " I read (stimulus) and with a vague image of a hammer, which was clearly understood as a geueral " {i.e. all carpentering tools), " J had word ' useful' (kinaesthetic). Then said 'I've used that before.' Then ' handy ' came (kinajsthetic) with same meaning as useful, . . ." G. 3". 2, i. 5. "... Not quite sure which of two sets of figures this word meant ; but chose the moving figure, which was in my consciousness as a very vague image of dark floppy moving legs, with knickerbockers, etc., hanging about them. Had idea of moving, simply — which I expressed by reaction woril," Sh. 8".4, v. 2. " I had a 1 % image and a very clear idea (but not determinate) of a chubby-faced boy. For instance, he was side-faced, but I couldn't say which side. The judgement was made with strong conviction that ' rosy ' applied to them all, although only that one was determinate. I suspect that it derived from several," Sp. 2". 4, v. 3. " Had 2 % image of speckled yellow bird and idea that it was illustrating a whole class of my experiences. A conviction that all . . . were plump," Sp. 2", viii. 6. " The meaning came confused with the auditory image 'bird,' and the word ' alike ' arose auditorily. Was rejected consciously because it would do for any set . . . ' Bird ' was symbolic, I think, and the generalisation was consciously made from a typical idea," A. 4". 4, ii. 6. ' ' I got it at once. The word ' hammer ' was in consciousness (? auditorily). It had a conscious symbolical value of them all. It did not mean ' hammer ' ; and it did not give me the meaning, as far as I can tell. It meant ' tools ' absolutely in general — not the five pictures shown," A. 3".2, v. 5. " Took some time to get the meaning of ' Ferod, ' It arose very gradually, with a confused mass of visual images, . , ." Fl. 5", i. 4. ' ' Understood first * Tuben ' as abstract, with very vague visual image, then the whole sentence. Dwelt rather on the meaning * all Tuben : ' there were then no images. Very vague visual image came back again — only a vague mass of brownish feathers. Word ' bird ' arose, . . ." Fl. 2". 6, viii. 3. " I saw two or three of them. There was a confident knowledge there without a survey of all the individuals. I knew that * youthful ' would describe them all," R, 3", 6, iv, 4. 184 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.h concept^ in 33 ^ of the total number of cases; and in 47 J/ this was observed and discriminated ^ Examples of meaning of subject given as concept without imagery in * universal ' negative judgements. " I thoiifiht ' Nuisance, it's a negative one again. Then ihonqht that I must be careful to predicate Roniethiug that does not belong to ' Kumic' Blank in consciousness— quite a blank. No anxiety. After a time the idea (no image) of nastiness came. Then I had to think ' was it true?' and read 'No Kumic is nasty.' 1 decided itcould be true. Then I translated 'Kumic' into 'flowers' to test again," G. 14", ii. 5. " I knew what ' Tegam ' referred to and thought of the watering-can . . . series and nmiembered that we had spoken about it last time ..." (no images), G. 6".0, X. 1. "I read this ; and I just took a second to stop — to realise what ' Robud means. Then I knew what it meant (without images), and recalled the adjective I last had for it. . . . Then I saw the pictures of two of them, just vaguely, . . ." G. 4".4, iii. 3. "'Lagoc' just meant the series of those peculiar figures. The meaning had reference to all. I knew that none of them were round," F. 2".6, viii. 9. "The idea I first had was that I'd had this before. Surprise or displeasure . . . Then I had the 7/icanmg' 'carpentering instrument,' ' tool ; ' and I thought of 'artistic,' . . . " F. 11", iv. 5. "I was thinking of shape of 'Funip' as soon as I saw stimulus, before I was very clear as to meaning of ' Funip.' Words 'circular' and 'curve ' came into consciousness as ideas, . . . " F. 7". 6, iv. 2. " I at once thought of a little boy. Then I thought ' no Ferod is female,' " Sp. 1".8, iv. 10. " I at once thought of my ' fat bird.' [Each of these things has got one representative now.] Then I thought that they were not quadrupeds. Remembered the whole incident of before. Had irfea 'four-footed.' Reacted four-footed," Sp. 4", v. C. " I understood the sentence in usual way of word representing mere entity. I had the idea ' dead : ' was just about to give utterance to it, when I suddenly had impulse to consider the meaning of ' Goial ' again. Dwelt on idea of ' Goral.' Came out the idea of musical instruments which suggested to me to say the opposite," Sp. 5". 2, iii. 5 (Goral = tool). " Got the idea ' Lagoc' Word ' black ' came with knowledge that there was a black one. Knowledge that they were all coloured, ..." A. 4", v. 9. ".Familiarity with word. Consciousness of tendency to mix up 'Funip' with something else not present in consciousness (except as something else). Then meaning came clearly. Then a memory of what you have said in your introspection with regard to ' Funip.' Then the idea ' square,' which I refused to use. Then idea of the regularity of the figures. Reacted ' squiggly ' as being contrary to this idea," A. 5". 6, iv. 2. " I saw and heard the stimulus. Familiarity with ' Tegam ' before I got its meaning. Then prominence of ' no.' Then a very fleeting review of first three ' Tegams '—if visual images not discernible ; but I think I detect eye move- ments. Knowledge of what they were'for," A. 3", iii. 1. "Meaning arose gradually, first 'Kumic,' then 'no Kumic' Search for attribute not possessed by any ' Kumic' Words ' large ' and ' small ' arose and persisted. Rejected as inappropriate. Fluctiiating visual image of 'Kumic' — attention gradually changing from form to colour. White and cream colour were the most prominent. Suddenly the mcayiing ' brown ' occurred with visual and auditory image, ..." Fl. 10", viii. 5. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 185 from accompanying sensorial elements.^ (iii.) The meaning of the subject in * individual ' judgements was duMtaUy given without imagery in 4 ^ of the total number of cases.''^ Concept with sensorial "Some time fully iinderstandinK sentence. Understood, first 'Funip,' then * Funip is,' then 'no Funip is.' Period of confusion, owing to absence of set. Recalled task. Series of visual images : auditory image of word ' nice ' became very prominent, though it appeared to have no connection with the other contents of consciousness. Inhibited tendency to react 'nice.' Thought ' Nice ' must refer to ' Digep ' rather than ' Funip,' ..." Fl. 3". 2, x. 2. "There I clearly knew the meaning of ' Ferod ' before I saw any images : and the discovery of the adjective was mediated by a recollection of a former question in the opposite sense (every Ferod is). When this question was given that memory saved me the trouble of going through the series of mnemonics. I don't think 1 saw one of them before I reacted," R. 12", vii. 4. "At first great uncertainty as to what ' Kumic ' meant. Then I decided (on what grounds I am unable to say— by that state of judgement by which you feel sure). After the decision there was a series of images. I hesitated to reply, because I wasn't sure the list was complete, ..." R. 60", iii. 5. ^ Examples of meaning of subject given as concomitant concept discriminated from accompanying imagery in ' universal ' negative judgements. " I knew what it meant and saw a picture I'd made up for myself— a sort of typo of Lagoc, . . ." G. 8". 8, viii. 9. "That gave me the meaning of fruit and I saw the picture of the apple quite distinctly," F. 6". 8, ii. 7. "... I dwelt on ' Funip ; ' and two ideopresentations came. One was accompanied by a 1 % image of a vertical oval. The other was of very indeter- minate character, but different from the oval. Then I had the thought ' at any rate none of them is square,' " Sp. 3".2, i. 2. " Clear idea and 2 % image of a reddish fruit," Sp. 4", vi. 7. " I knov} they have no legs : but I see they have hats. The actual figures (i.e. visual images) are too vague to particularise. The only feature at all definite is a large tam o' shanter hat which keeps changing colour and position, ..." Sh. 3". 2, iv. 9. "There was certainly knowledge of ' Robud ' in general and what one might call a visual image of the first 'Robud,' extremely vague and absolutely nowhere. It was symbolical and did not mean itself," A. 3", vi. 3. " Meaning of 'Sorab ' developed gradually, with a vague visual image of the trumpet. There was present knowledge that this was yellow— and that none of the individual 'Sorabs' was white, . . ." A. 3".4, ii. 8. 'Very vague visual image of apple seemed to appear almost before tlie meaning of 'Digep,' some time before the meaning of the sentence, . . ." Fl. 3". 2, ix. 1. " I hafl one or two images— not all, and ven/ indistinct. Which was enougli to tell me that they were all running, or walking, or pulling something. That excluded the passive attitude," R. 2".t;, ii. 4. '^ These cases are discussed below. Cf. Appendix, p. 249. 186 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rr.n elements (image) occurred in these judgements 35 % times.^ We have also to record the presence ^ Examples of nieauing of subject given as concept in connection with imagery in ' individual ' judgements. "This immediately suggested the violin and the picture of the violin, . . ." G. 21". 4, x. 8. " I knew what it meant (general or universal) first. Thought I did not know the relative sizes — that, in the pictures, they were more or less equal. Then saw some of the pictures rather distinctly — par- ticulars to my mind. Decided goose was rather the largest, ..." G. 14". 4, X. 6. " There I knew ' the lirst Kumic ' immediately — a memory, I think it was. I did not see it all — or bother to see it all, / 07ili/ saw the little calix . . . It was particular from the beginning, " G. 3". 4, x. 4. " I had the idea of shape : then I saw the shape of the black ' Lagoc ' and the mauve one, one above the other. I compared the two : and the mauve seemed to be the largest, " F. 3", x. 9. " I got the meaning of ' Digep ' as fruit ; but could not understand what 'this Digep' means. Then heard the word 'cherries* and had visual image of apple, . . . " F. 34", i. 7. " I had a very distinct idea . . . and a very distinct 3 % or 4 % image of the black ' Lagoc,' " Sp. 4", vi. 9. " Momentary inhibition. I could find no meaning. Clear visual image of a hammer — colours and lines ; lines very prominent. No other images. Meaning at once," Sh. 7", v. 3. " Meaning of ' Digep ' came fairly clearly. Then very slowly developed the apple, one of the cherries, and the peach ... all located in space and very faint visual images," A. 10". 8, iv. 7. " Understood first ' Ferod : ' surprise at word ' cloaked ' of stimulus. Some little time realising its meaning. As soon as I got it, had vivid visual image of a ' Ferod,' with blue cloak, striding," Fl. 2". 4, viii. 4. " Meaning of sentence arose very gi'adually. Understood first ' Tuben,' then that it referred to a single ' Tuben ; ' for a moment, with visual image of this, that it referred to the largest ' Tuben ; ' and finally, ' the brightest. ' Search for brightest coloured. Obtained image of it, . . ." Fl. 9".8, iv. 3. "I knew what 'Kumic' was very distinctly before anything appeared — but not instantly. It took an appreciable time. Then §3 WORDS LEARx^ED IN JUDGEMENTS 187 of imagery noted by our observers as giving the meaning of the subject in all three forms of judgement. This phenomenon occurred in 24 % of the 'universal' affirmative judgements, in 16 % of the 'universal' negative judgements, and in 55 % of the ' individual ' judgements. We have already set forth our reasons for maintaining that, even in these cases, concepts were cle facto present and operative ; but they were not reported by our observers. Two striking and highly significant points are apparent in the figures just given. First, in relation to the subjects of ' individual ' judgements, we notice an extraordinarily marked falling off in the percentage of concepts reported as not accom- panied by sensorial contents. The 31^^ and 33 % ^ (reached on totals of 154 and 112 protocols respectively) for the ' universal ' affirmative and negative judgements, dwindles to 4 ^ ^ (on 229 protocols) for tlie ' individual ' judgements. Indeed, it may be maintained that there is no two or three specimens occurred ... a blue one, a yellow one. One seemed to be a rose which was red, . . " R. 20", vi. 5. " It was certainly a universal, as the word ' Digep ' first occurred to me — and at first was not connected with the mnemonic. Then, as the sentence refen-ed to a particular ' Digep,' I called up the images . . . yellowish -red nectarine-like body against a green leaf,. . ." R. 16".6, V. 1. 1 Cf. Table VI., column V. 2 cf. Table VII., column V. ^ Cf. Table VIll., columns V. and VI. 188 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii certain instance of an ' individual ' being thought without a connected imaginal or sensorial content ; for the protocols of all the cases that give us the 4 y seem to be dubitable. We shall discuss these /o cases at length in an appendix/ and advance con- siderations to show that they are to be explained either as descriptions of judgements that were not ' individual/ or as ' individual ' judgement's in which unreported faint sensorial contents actually occurred in connection with the concepts. If this conclusion be accepted, we have no single case of an ' individual ' judgement in which the meaning of the subject arises in consciousness in the absence of a connected sensorial content. Secondly, in ' individual ' judgements, experience associated with the subject as meaning was present in consciousness prominently as an image, no reference being made to accompanying concepts, in 55"/^ of the total number of cases. In the /o ' universal ' judgements this phenomenon is found in only 20 % ^ of the total number of cases. A comparison of these percentages clearly indi- cates and justifies the following conclusions. (i.) There is a tendency for the meaning of the subject in ' universal ' judgements to be phenomeno- 1 Cf. p. 249. 2 cf^ Table VIII., column II. 3 Cf. Tables VI. and VII., column II. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 189 logically present as a concept without sensorial content. The concept, associated with the subject, is revived by the ' universal ' form of the stimulus. (ii.) At the very least there is a tendency for the meaning of the subject in ' individual ' judge- ments to be phenomenologically present with a distinctly imaginal character. The 'individual* form of the stimulus revives an associated complex of sensorial content and concept, of which the con- ceptual element is, so to speak, in the background. In other words, when we think ' man,' ' all men,' ' no man,' there is a tendency to have imageless " substantive thoughts " or pure concepts. When we think a particular, definite, individual man, there is at least a tendency to have an image prominent in consciousness. These conclusions seem to be completely established by the intro- spections of our observers. We have not made a detailed analysis of the relative perfection and brilliancy of the imagery noted in columns III. and IV. of Tables VI. and VII., and compared these characters with those of the imagery noted in the same columns of Table VIII. That would be a labour of great delicacy and difficulty ; and we doubt if any analysis based upon the information given in our protocols would be very satisfactory. Nevertheless the general 190 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii tendeucy seems here also to be towards relatively- good images for the subjects of ' individual ' judge- ments ; and towards incomplete, vague, fleeting blurs, ' scratches ' and suggestions of images for the subjects of the * universal ' judgements. We may ask ourselves the question why these tendencies do not produce constant sequences — why the ' universal ' form of the stimulus part judgement is not constantly followed by imageless concepts, and the ' individual ' form by prominent images. To answer such a question we must look for indications of complicating circumstances in our protocols of the cases in which the tendencies are not observed. We must find the conditions present which interfere with their operation : other constant sequences, or laws, which annul them. (i.) We discuss at length in an appendix ^ the exceptional cases in the ' individual ' judgements. There we conclude that these judgements either were not in fact individual, or that some repro- duced sensorial content or actual sensation was present and directly connected with the concept. (ii.) In regard to exceptional cases in the ' universal ' judgements, we have found at least three conditions that may account for them.^ 1 Cf. p. 249. '^ There is a fourth condition which need not be illustrated from §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 191 (a) Images (visual, verbal, etc.) almost invari- ably follow upon inhibitions in either type of judge- ment ' universal ' or * individual.' We might call this the law of inhibition. Wherever an inhibition is evident in the ' universal ' protocols we may there- fore expect to find imagery noted. We submit excerpts from all classes of protocols in support of this statement.^ The fact has already been observed our protocols. Imagery had a greater tendency to emerge throughout {i.e. in all forms of judgements) when the stimuli were read aloud than when they were exhibited in a printed form. ^ (a) Images following on inhibitions in ' individual ' judgements. Stimulus : " The closed Goral is (useful)." (Goral = carpentering tools. ) Introspection : "Goral meant some kind of utensil. I was puzzled by the word 'closed.' Had a visual image of the concertina. Concen- trated attention on meaning of 'Goral.' I heard, then, the word ' hammer.' That suggested ' carpentering tool.' Thought of the plane. Ti'ied to apply ' closed ' to that and saw the picture of the plane not very distinctly. Then I saw the chopper, not distinctly ; after that the closed pincers, distinctly ; and they would not go away," F. 26", vii. 5. Stimulus: " The largest Kumic is (7'ec?)." (Kumic = flowers.) Intro- spection : "First idea was, what a horrible nuisance it was that stimu- lus was 'the largest,' since I can't see the pictures well. Then I saw vaguely the first picture (cornflower) ; then a yellow sort of flower. Then I thought of the rose and saw it . . . then came picture of the apple : and that would stick, though I quite knew ' Kumic ' didn't mean ' apple.' Then, with the picture of the apple, whicli I quite determined to think of as a rose, I wondered what to state that would not be contrary to instructions," G. 29". 6, viii. 4. Stimulus: "The firstKumic is {I can't rem ei)iber)." (Kumic = flowers.) Introspectio7i : " I couldn't trace any meaning in * Kumic,' except mere entity. It meant ' something.' Then I had the idea and, I think an auditory image of the word ' comic. * Then I twice had an idea >vith a 2 % image of a ruddy fruit, accompanied by a more or less confident conviction that that was not ' Kumic,' " Sp. 25", i. 4. 192 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii Stunulu^ : "This Funip is {pointed at both ends)." (Funip = fore- shortened circles. N.B. — Stimulus beginning with ' this ' always caused inhibitions ; and, after being employed several times, was discarded.) Introspection : " Frightful confusion of different images — of various images — successive, refused to be simultaneous. I tried to recall some- thing of the nature of a memoria technica associated with the last letter of ' Funip ' and the last letter of another word. Frightful confusion. By an effort of will, seized upon one of the images, viz. a blue elliptical figure. In doing so I got a fresh visual image, not in con- sciousness before, of a yellow elliptical figure, . . ." Sh. 38", iii. 8. Sti7mdus : "The first Funip is (red)." Introspection : " Conscious- ness of familiarity of ' Funip ' — absolutely no meaning. I repeated the sentence, auditory motor, three or four times. Meaning seemed to grow and I think I had a faint auditory image of the word 'triangle.' It appeared with quite clear knowledge that it was not a triangle. Consciousness that I had got the first of a series, but doubt as to correctness. Repeated * Funip ; ' and the faintest possible auditory image — ' flowers ' — arose. Inhibited this. Then a black triangular patch came, considerably larger than the little red figure which it meant. Reacted 'red,' A. 12". 4, ii. 2. Stimulus : " The largest Digep is {reddish yellow). " (Digep = fruits. ) Introspection : " There was a momentary difficulty in understanding the word ' Digep.' At first it was confused with the meaning of ' Tuben ' (birds). Then the mnemonic occurred to me, and with it some images, ..." R. 9", vii. 1. But images are found in all our certainly particular judgements. (j3) Images following on inhibitions in ' universal ' judgements. Stimulus: "All Funip are {geometrical)." Introspection: "I knew what it meant ; then saw some vaguely ... I wondered if I might reach * all Funip are not : ' decided no. Then I thought it was hopeless. I reverted to the negative — how much easier it would be to get something negative. Again I decided I wouldn't do it. Then, in despair, I saw them again very vaguely : and thought * I must say something.' Idea ' geometrical ' came ; then word 'geometrical,'" G. 36", ix. 2. Stimulus : "No Sorab is {enormous). " (Sorab = musical instruments. ) Introspection : ". . . Inhibition. Wondered if I would find a word or not ; and how difficult they were. Then I saw a sort of vague picture that might be any musical instrument. . . ." G. 17". 6, iii. 8. Stimulus: " All Funip are (circifZar)." Introspection: "I could not at first remember what ' Funip ' were at all. Then I saw the various §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 193 pictures ; not the first one, but the red one very persistently, then the green one, then the first orange one. Then I was hung up for a word. I knew there were others besides those I saw ; and consciously applied the meaning 'curved' to the lot. It suited them, . . . " F. 15".8, iii. 2. Stimulus: "NoTuben is {eating)." Introspection: " * Tuben ' meant * bird ' this time. Somehow or other meaning ' fruit ' came with 'bird.' Tlien I saw the picture of the grapes. Then came idea of eating, . . . ." F. 4", iv. 6. Sp. had only one inhibition in ' universal ' affirmative judgements ; and completed that by reacting " unknown to me," Sp. 7" vi. 4. We find also only one inhibition — " emotional shock" — in this observer's * universal ' negative judgements. This is followed by an ideopreseuta- tion (with no images) of the quality expressed by the reaction word — " No Robud is {harsh)." Sp. 4" iii. 3. Sh. nearly always has visual images ; but after inhibitions they are generally described as "vivid." Stimuhts : "All Lagoc are {plane figures)" (Lagoc = conic sections). Introspection : " I had first of all an inhibition : could recall no picture. Then I had distinctly the flat dirty-yellow figure, shaped like the top of an egg, as a visual image, ..." Sh. 13". 4, iii. 2. Stimulus : " No Kumic is {black)." Introspection : " Had an inhibi- tion of an obstinate kind. Then had a visual image of the green flowers, ..." Sh. 14". 6, iv. 1. This observer's almost constantly present imagery may possibly to some extent be due to inhibitions. Reference to the table given in Sec. II. § 4, p. 123, shows that Sh.'s learning was a comparatively slow process. Indeed, he seemed to be forgetting the meaning of the nonsense-words during the judgement experiments ; and to call it up by eff"ecting an image. Stimulus: " All Tegam are (6reaA;a5/e)." (Tegam = receptacles for liquid.) Introspection: " On seeing stimulus, attention immediately concentrated on ' Tegam. ' Vague knowledge of meaning came and developed. Then came word ' pail ' auditorily. Rejected because not an adjective. ' Pail ' all alone in consciousness. I knew that ' pail ' did not only mean ' pail,' but stood for other things of which I remem- bered three oc four. They were not in consciousness as ' things.' In- hibition caused by desire to react. ' Tin ' came auditorily — so ' break- able,'" A. 11". 6, ii. 1. There is apparently no case of this kind in A.'s ' universal ' negative judgements. As already noted, he is a very poor visualiser ; and, having made and exhibited the pictures and words to all other observers, knew them very well indeed. O 194 CONSCIOITSNKSS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii and insisted upon by Dr. Betts.^ " There are two points in our tliinkiug," he concludes from his experiments, " at which imagery has the greatest tendency to emerge. (1) At points where our thinking is baffled ; (2) at points where percepts would be of great assistance." Betts's ' first point ' coincides with what we have stated. Images follow upon inhibitions. Excep- tions to this rule are extremely rare in our protocols. We have not found, as did Betts, many cases in which such imagery is irrelevant ; but that is no doubt due to the material and method we employed. Stimulus : "All Kxmiic are {pretty).'" Introspection: "Under- standing of sentence followed by thought that I had had this sentence before and had found it difficult. Set to task with some misgiving. Series of two or three visual images, various features of xoMch I passed in review, . . . " Fl. 14". 2, v. 5. Stimulus : " No Funip is {large)." Introspection : " Some time fully understanding sentence . . . Period of confusion, owing to absence of 'set.' Recalled task. Series of visual images, auditory image of word "nice" became very prominent, though it appeared to have no con- nection with the other contents of consciousness, ..." Fl. 3". 2, x. 2. Fl. is, throughout these experiments, a fairly strong visualiser. The cases of inhibition in R. 's ' universal ' judgements present no features that differentiate them from the non-inhibited cases in which imagery appears. This observer has references to washed out, " scratchy " imagery in most of his protocols. ^ George Herbert Betts, Ph.D., The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery, New York, 1909, p. 94. " Imagery may and often does serve as a familiar background for the meaning with which we are dealing, but it cannot be said to be essential to meaning, except to the extent that meaning may inhere in a given percept as s? Contrary instance image causes rejection of word with meaning. Contrary instance image possible but does not arise. Total. Afl-. Neg. Aff. Neg. Aff. Neg. G. . . 3 1 3 l(a)(b) 1(b) 9 F. . . 4 2 3 9 Sp. . 1(c) 1 Sh. . A. . . Fl.. . 1(d) 1(d) 2 R. . . 2(<5' 1 3 Total . 10 3 6 1 2 2 ^^^ J 13 7 4 24 (a) Of this : " I knew it wasn't true," G. iii. 10. (t) Neither of these ideas were iu any way expressed by the reaction word when it came. (c) Present as an idea — not image. (ti) In both cases the original meaning was gi\ieu with imagery ; but image also emerged here on wrong reaction idea arising. (e) We cannot determine if word was present or not. In one case an image was present. We have gone through the 266 protocols with a view of finding the exact number of times an idea which (or word, the meaning of which) did not include all the pictures of each set arose. There §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 197 are 24 such cases. In 20 of these the observer rejected the meaning on account of the emergence of an image which could not be subsumed under it. In four cases the phenomenon is not noted. This gives us 83 % of the total possible number of times a ' contrary instance ' image could have arisen, in which it did arise. The data on which this statistic is based are, of course, very scanty ; but they would seem, none the less, to point towards the existence of a law, which we might call the law of contrary instance} ^ E.g. iSiivmlus: " All Robud are {young).'' Introspection: "'Robud' meant little children. Tlie idea of that made me want to say smiling, which was present as an idea only. That made me see the picture of the first one — his back turned to me. I rejected the idea of smiling. Then I heard the word ' children : ' was conscious of instruction, and rejected it as it was a noun, , . ." F. 16", v. 3. Stimulus: "All Funip are (cciZowrec?)." Introspection: " ' Funip ' meant all those figures, and in particular I had an idea of shape of the red one. I wanted to react pointed ; but remembered the round one. With this I had idea of yellow colour and I saw it. That gave rae the idea of colour for the rest of them, . . ." F. 13", ix. 2. .> Stimulus : " All Funip are (oval)." Introspection : " , . . said oval, thinking it would apply to all, as I saw nothing to contradict it. As soon as I said it, / saw a distinct picture of the circular one," F. 7", V. 2. Stimulus : " No Kumic is {groioing)" Introspection : " 'Kumic ' at once meant liower. Then I saw the picture of the card with the japonica on it, and noticed that the stem at the bottom is torn. That gave me the idea that it icas very much a picture, . . ." F. 6", v. 4. Stimulus: "Tegam is (J'or containing things)." Introspection: "The idea of useful at tea-time came to me. I've had the association of ' Tegam ' and tea-time before," (One of the Tegams was a'milk-jug.) *' This was in consciousness. This I rejected as not universal enough ; saw jug, pail, then other pail " G. 2''.4, vii, 1, 198 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii (7) In our experiments images tended always to characterise the thouglit processes of certain individuals ; and undoubtedly with the very great majority of concepts the sensorial elements of images are connected in normal life. We think in pictures or in words as a rule, we may suppose ; for words by constant use have become fused with their meanings, have long since reached the stage of carrying them. With difiicult or unusual words, Stiniulv^ : "All Tegam are {useful).'' Introspection : ". . . Thought of adding * round,' which was present kinsesthetically. Then I wanted to test if it were true. I discarded it when I saw the milk -jug, ..." G. 11", i. 1. Stimulus'. "All Jj3.goc ave (fasciiiating)." Introspection: "First came the feeling of the idea of the word, then the word came (fascinating). While vsaying it, I saw a bit of the black geometrical figure, quite clearly, no detail," G. 3". 2, iii. 9. Sthmdus : "All Kumic are {pleasingly coloured)." Introspection : ". . . I was inclined to say ' brightly coloured.' Then a dark-blue iiower presented itself (as an image), . . . " R. 6", v. 5. Stimulus : " All Tuben are {heavy on the iving)." Introspection : "No, that's not true: not heavy on the iving. Image (of another). I had an image of the guinea-fowl and an awareness of one or two others. There were one or two nascent images. Evidently the reaction was determined by the guinea-fowl," R. 4".8, iii. 3. Stimulus: "All Ferod are {mascidine)." Introsptection : ". . . Fluctuating visual image of the boys. Tendency to react ' running,' when suddenly I noticed in visual image that one was not running. The blue cap of this one attracted attention, ..." Fl. 6".2, vi. 4. Stimulus : " No Ferod is {sitting).''* Introspection : " . . . Rapidly changing visual image of boys seen. . . . Was about to answer * standing,' when ' sitting ' occurred as more distinctly opposed to what they were actually doing. Fairly distinct visual image of one of the ' Ferods ' sitting as I reacted," Fl. 2", ii. 2. \N.B. — Noneii^as sitting ; but one, intended to represent skipping, is in a posture that could be taken as sitting.] §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JtJD(?ri:MENTS 199 however, we are able to discriminate stages in which (i.) we read them ; (ii.) recognise them ; (iii.) reach their meaning ; and (iv.) finally perhaps get a visual image. In our experiments the nonsense -words were usually separated in consciousness from the arising of their meaning by so appreciable a time interval that this latter could be easily observed on its own account, as connected with the sensorial elements of images or not ; and, of course, being associated with definite pictures, we were enabled with some exactness to find out by their use in judgements whether they really functioned as ' universals,' potential ' universals,' or ' individuals.' This, we take it, would be more difficult even with unusual words of ordinary language. AVhat is evident, however, from our protocols is that some of our observers almost invariably get an image — visual, verbal, etc. — concomitantly with meaning. Others get meaning antecedently to image, or without imaginal content altogether. There is no absolute constancy in type for any one of our observers ; but there are certainly pre- dominances of type to be seen in some of them. Sh. notably is extremely inclined to have visual images, either of the pictures learned or of printed words. A. commonly has auditory images, perhaps connected witli kina3sthetic. Sp. in the majority of his protocols reports visual imagery 1 %— 5 % in 200 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL n -.11 strength, and occasionally notes verbal (auditory) images valued by him as high as 40 %. R has rather poor visual images — " obscure presentations almost too imperfect to be called images " — aware- ness of nascent imagery, etc. ; but no other sort than visual appears in his protocols. He is " a visualiser for whatever can be visualised." In Fl.'s introspections all sorts of imagery — kinsesthetic, olfactory, gustatory, tactual, etc., but principally auditory and visual — are mentioned. G. was strongly visual in type during the learning period. Gradu- ally she became less so, and developed a verbal (auditory-kinaesthetic) tendency ; but she had also olfactory and gustatory images occasionally. F. " sees pictures," but also " hears " words — the former predominating. The presence of imagery, then, differing in its character, is to some extent dependent upon the general type (or temporal ' set ? ') of the individual, as well as upon the particular kind of mental operation involved. This we might call the in- dividual tendency to imaginal preference. This would mean preference for meaning by way of image. It might also mean preference for a certain kind of imagery. To a very large extent the material of our experiments would explain the general tendency for visual imagery ; and the total past experience and mental habit of the observer § 3 W0KD8 LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 201 the preference for meaning luith image. But that meaning — imageless " substantive thought " or con- cept — may arise as a consequent to an antecedent nonsense-word is in any case clearly established : and the facts that this imageless content is strongly favoured by the ' universal ' form of the stimulus, and that imaginal contents are the consequents of the ' individual ' form are, we submit, proved by the evidence we have been able to adduce from our experiments. We may thus sum up the results of this analysis in the observation that the ' universal ' is pheno- menally present in consciousness, or tends to be so present, as pure concept or imageless " substantive thought ; " while the individual is present in con- sciousness as an image. § 3. Concei^ual ' Overknowledge.' In the data of our experiments a second point with regard to the phenomenological presence of the meaning of the nonsense-words, when these were used ' universally ' or * individually ' in judgements, is also apparent. We have already seen that this meaning may arise in consciousness in varying stages of con- nection with sensorial contents (imagery) or simply as an imageless concept. The protocols we have quoted contain descriptions of cognitive contents 202 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL n.ii which range from vivid and prominent imagery, through image and concept in indiscriminable time order of arousal, up to concept alone without a trace of imagery. We may suppose — indeed, for reasons pointed out above, we consider it necessary to suppose — that the conceptual element is present in all representative states of mind at all stages, even those in which imagery is most striking and the concept apparently absent : that cognition, in the absence of concept, would be impossible. We have shown that the only essential content in think- ing is the purely conceptual one ; and explained the presence of imagery — so frequent, so varied, and so easily observable — in conceptual thought sequences mainly by the fact that sensorial elements have always been associated with the concept in percep- tion ; and therefore tend, at least to some extent, to emerge whenever a concept is in presence. No matter, however, what the representative con- tent of consciousness may actually be — an imageless concept, a concept discriminable in introspection from its sensorial context, or an image in which the sensorial character is so obtrusive that the concept is obscured — we find also an "overknowledge" present to the effect that our observers in judging meant or intended either the ' individual ' or the * universal.' ^ ^ This overknowledge was also observed in the protocols of the earning period; but we have made no analysis of them in this connection. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 203 This overknowledge in the * individual ' judge- ments is simply an awareness that the individual is thought, or present to mind. It is not necessary to give any table of these cases ; but excerpts from protocols showing the overknowledge of individuality are cited below.^ With regard to these judgements we have already noted that the meaning of the subject as ' individual ' seems to have been auto- matically recognised upon, and essentially con- ditioned by, the emergence of an image.''^ But whether the overknowledge is conditioned by the arising of the sensorial elements of the image, or, vice vcrsa^ the imaginal character of the content conditioned by an overknowledge aroused by the grammatical form of the stimulus, we have no means of determining. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the image is the consequent of an antecedent overknowledge that comes into con- sciousness as the general meaning of the prefixed adjectives. And it is certain that the total stimulus {e.g., " The first Tuben," " The largest Lagoc," etc.) is the antecedent in ' individual ' judgements to both overknowledge and image — the mutual relations of which we are at present obliged to leave experimentally undetermined. ^ Cf. footnote to p. 213, sqq. - This seems certainly to be so in all cases except those dealt with in the appendix. The explanation given there would make the state- ment in the text above of universal application. 204 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii With regard to the overknowledge present in the ' universal ' judgements, the expressions used by our observers vary considerably ; and the phenomenal complexes with which it is connected still more. We have nevertheless been able to analyse the protocols and to group them into three classes. (i.) The first class contains cases in which the overknowledge is to the effect that there is no conscious reference to one or more ' things ' — i.e., prior or possible experiences. (ii.) In the second class are placed the cases in which there is a conscious inclusion of, or (reference to, all the possible things that could be * Tubens,' ' Lagocs,' etc. (iii.) In the third class are those cases in which reference to all, or some of the actual pictures associated with the nonsense - word used was asserted. Tables X. and XI. display the whole mass of the * universal ' judgement protocols classified under these heads. A footnote to them shows as well the number of " conscious generalisations from one or more examples." Unclassified cases and failures for each observer are also recorded. In this classification we have paid no attention to the presence or absence of imagery. Our justification for this method of procedure is our theory of §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 205 thought as already stated,^ and the fact that this overknowledge is given in the introspections of our observers in either of these cases. If an image was observed it was not what the nonsense-word meant ; and the overknowledge added something, not to the image, but to the meaning. (i.) Where the observer did not state that his thought was actually * universal/ ^ or consciously applied to several, or all, of the associated pictures, we have gone carefully through each protocol with a view to ascertaining from the expressions used whether it could be included in either of these classes. Whenever there was any doubt as to the presence of overknowledge of this sort, we have included the case in column 1 of Tables X. and XI., as " without reference to one or more." We have thus in this column cases in which the absence of reference to one or more has been consciously noted and asserted by the observer and cases in which no reference was mentioned. Together these give 35 ^ (affirmative judgements, 29 % : negative judge- ments, 41 ^) of the total number of protocols (266). In all these cases the judgement is based upon the essential or quasi-essential meaning ^ of the nonsense-word. This meaning is ideal, not real : ^ Cf. p. 147. 2 cf. below, p. 208. ^ The essential meaning, e.g., of " Lagoc " is "conic section : " its ^j<(w/-essential meaning might be "coloured patch" or "single-line figure." 20G CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL rx. n and the content which gives it is the conceptual abstract. With the exception of the experimenter and Sp., there seems to have been no suspicion in the minds of the observers that these judgements TABLE X Classification of Forms of Overknowledge in ' Universal ' Affirmative Judgements No. of Protocols analysed^ 154. Obaerver. Overknow- Reference r more. Overknow- inscious Re- all possible. Ovcrknow- mscious ' Col- Relerence.l Total. Negative ledge : n to one Positive ledge :C( ference t Positive ledge : C( lective ' on c 111 G. . 16% 36% 36% 12% 0% 25 F. . 28% 28% 28% 8% 8% 25 Sp.. 36% 8% 36% 8% 12% 25 Sh. . 11% 11% 44% 0% 33% 27 A. . 53% 21% 26% 0% 0% 19 Fl. . 35% 0% 60% 0% 5% 20 R. . 39% 8% 53% 0% 0% 13 Average 31% 16% 40% 4% 8% ... Total 29% 17% 39% 4.5% 9.5% ... 1 Of the percentages shown in this column the follo^ving represent the cases of conscious generalisation from one or more examples : G. 20 %, F. 8 %, Sp. 0%, Sh. 0, A. 10 %, Fl. 25 %, R. 30 %. were not actually (i.e., psychologically) ' universal.' Logically, of course, they are so, in the sense that they hold good for all the individuals potentially included in the concept. But logic is not psychology ; § 3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 207 and this case is introspectively distinct from that in which " conscious reference to all possible " occurs.^ In it there is simply an absence of reference, whicli TABLE XI Classification of Forms of Overknowledge in ' Universal ' Negative Judgements No. of Protocols analysed, 112. . 2 fcOtCo '53 _rP (U 'So tc'43 "o ^ ^'^ o o '^ >- O'O " a 'rt S?;iJ2 P,^<2 PL,_aj^ t3 P^ G. . 30% 22% 30% 13% 4% 23 F. . 43% 9% 44% 4% 0% 23 Sp.. 45% 12% 16% 12% 4% 24 Sh. . 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 5 A. . 65% 20% 10% 5% 0% 20 Fl. . 40% 0% 60% 0% 0% 10 R. . 29% 14% 57% 0% 0% 7 Average 36% 11% 31% 19% 1% Total 41% 14% 31% 13% 2% ... (<«) Of the percentages shown in this column the following represent the cases of conscious generali.sation from one or more examples: G. 26%, F. 22%, Sp. 4 %, Sh. %, A. 5 %, Fl. 50 %, 11. 43 %. is sometimes noticed and reported, this negative overknowledge. We might call ^ Cf. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 473. "Thecon- ceptiou of au abstract quality is, taken by itself, ueither universal nor particular. . . . Properly it is, in this state, a singular — I have ' singled it out ; ' and when, later, I universalisu or individualise its application ... 1 am . . . forming two new conceptions." 208 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii (ii.) In the cases placed in the second class what might be termed a positive overknowledge occurs. There is an average of 15"5 ^ (affirmative judge- ments 17 % : negative judgements 14 %) of these cases. The observer is aware that his thought extends to all possible cases in which his concept could be realised. In some sense all those possible cases are present to consciousness. But how ? In what does this positive overknowledge consist ? We suggest the following explanation. First of all there is phenomenologically present the con- ceptual element, or the imageless concept, which gives merely the essential meaning of the word. Then there is the coefficient of universality. This is the knowledge, or memory, that the concept has been frequently actual, has been met with in ex- perience, and the anticipation that it is to be met with again. It is the consciousness that whenever in the past or in the future an indi- vidual is consciously present, this can be subsumed under the concept. But all this, evidently, is not clearly and explicitly in consciousness. It has lono; since sunk to the level of a condensed knowledge, and thus presents all the difficulties of analysis which arise in connection with such simplified contents.^ ^ Some explanation of overknowledge, we suggest, may perhaps be found in the phenomena of condensation, noted by Henderson, " The §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 209 (iii.) A positive overknowledge is observable also in the cases grouped together in the third class. Of these we have an average of 35 % (affirmative judgements, 39 %: negative judgements, 31 %). They are those in which an individual, or several individuals, as such, were imaginally present to consciousness. But in these cases there was further an overknowledge to the effect that other individuals were meant or intended, and that only a limited number was so meant. Here the judge- ment, properly speaking, was not universal but collective. A collection of individuals was in- tended ; and in so far as these were consciously meant, the judgement was evidently a collective one. It is perhaps difficult to conceive how ' others ' could have been present to consciousness without as many images. Again making use of the hypothesis of condensation we suggest that meaning into which a group of connected ideas coalesces is often spoken of as a general idea of them. The expression is not inappropriate. It is a composite general idea, a product of the generalisation of its details, whether blind or intelligent, systematic or chaotic. Such a composite idea is not so different from an abstraction as we might think. When we eliminate diflerences and are left with identities, we have abstrac- tions. But the consciousness of such ideas need not be a barren thing. Indeed what makes the abstraction worth while is that it comes to us entangled in a mesh of experiences which it serves to systematise. The most valuable of general ideas is, therefore, the ooucretest of abstractions in the richness of the material which springs into the mind attentive to it." Henderson, A Study of Memory for Connected Trains of Thought (Monograph Supplement to the Psychological Review, vol. v., No. 6, Dec, 1903, p. 87). P 210 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii the content really was : (i.) an image, or images ; plus (ii.) overknovvledge referring the conceptual element of the images to several ' objects/ or prior experiences, which are generally and perhaps always revivable, or believed to be revivable in conscious- ness as individuals. The observer may not have all the specific pictures of a set actually before him ; but he generally knows, or believes, that he can call up images of them. He knows that he remembers them, and could recognise them again, etc/ Indeed definite statements are found in the protocols to the effect that the observer knew there were other individuals which he often felt he could call up, and restricted his thought to them. The following examples make this clear : — " No other image in consciousness at all ; but con- sciousness that I could produce others at will," Sh. " The three pictures stood for all the five, and I was conscious that my thought extended to the rest," F. " I was aware that I could develop images," R. " Then I saw the round red picture very clearly, and some ellipses. They would all have been there if I had wanted them to be," G. " This (vague image) was clearly understood as a general ; (but) I feel I could get all the others," G. "On realising full meaning of the judgement, tendency to react ' birds ' inhibited ; and I tried to ^ Best of all, obviously, if they became present as percepts. Cf. Betts, The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery, p. 94. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 211 pass the ' Tubens ' in review. Had difficulty in getting more than two," Fl. "Knowledge of the whole series of coloured symbols, with a sort of mental movement, as if passing them in review. No visual or verbal images — but probably equivalent eye-movements," A. " Idea that (a 2 ^ image) was illustrating a whole class of my experience ; and a conviction that all the rest were plump," Sp. " I knew there were others besides those I saw and consciously applied the meaning 'curved ' to the lot," F. In these excerpts from protocols we see that overknowledge is phenomenologically described as a " consciousness," an " awareness," a " knowledge," or an " idea," etc. All these expressions have been used before in connection with the description of " imageless thought ; " and the experience which our observers were recounting in the introspections from which the above examples were taken seems to have been remarkably like that of the well-known imageless by-thoughts, or by-remarks, so frequently noticed by other experimenters. In any case, what we have called overknowledge is, we submit, entirely conceptual in character, whether it occur in ' universal,' ' collective,' or ' individual ' judgements. Further evidence in support of the fact is to be found in the ex- cerpts from protocols printed in the foot-notes.^ Now this conceptual overknowledge may be ^ Cf. footnote on p. 213, sqq. 212 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii regarded either as act or as content. We consider it here, as we have considered meaning, concept, etc., from the point of view of content — " imageless thought " as in any sense representative of what we call a ' tiling.' Thus the mental complex, in the case of negative overknowledge, is the concept representative merely of entity 'plus certain deter- minations and abstracted from hie et nunc, etc. There is in this case no necessary objective refer- ence ; and the concept is no more than the ideal meaning of the nonsense-word subject. When, on the other hand, the overknowledge has a positive character, the content represents, or refers to ' the first Robud,' or ' the five Funips,' or ' All Lagocs,' etc., as the case may be. The overknowledge, at any rate in the experi- ments we have made, determines the " substantive " concept ; and it determines it substantively. The concept, or conceptual element of an image, with positive overknowledge simply represents an essen- tial, or g'was^-essential meaning, consciously applied to one, several, or all possible similar experiences. Is overknowledge then, we may ask, a separate conceptual element, forming a complex or a fusion with the concept that expresses essential meaning ? Or is it a mode of the concept ? Our observers knew perfectly well to what their thought referred. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 213 One, whose words we have already quoted, speaks of his overknowledge in several of his protocols as " coefficient of universality," " coefficient of in- dividuality " (Sp.). They find ' universal ' tlioughts becoming particularised, and * individual ' thoughts generalised ; and they note as descriptively as possible the changes consciously occurring during these processes.^ But there is rarely any categoric ^ Excerpts from protocols showiug descriptively the process of generalising from individuals. Stiimdus: *' All Kumics are(5o/0." Introspection: ". . . Regarded (blurred image of one of the ' Kumics ') trying to find some attribute in which to reply : thinking, toliat I find here will probably be true of all ^Kumics,' if I take a little care in choosing. . . . Suddenly had tactile image of a flower. Softness of it impressed me. Thought, '"nearly all floxoers are soft like this.' Reacted without any further reference to 'Kumics,' but with conviction that answer was suitable," Fl. 5". 6, vii. 5. Stiriudus : ' ' All Lagoc are {angular). " Introspection : " A ghost — 1 can't say there wasn't an image. That's all I can say. Clear idea of a figure with two angles at the bottom and one at the top. On this occasion I felt that what was true of that, at least in this respect, was true of all the other figures," Sp. 2". 4, iv. 9. Stimulus: "All Funips are (circular)." Introspection: "I had a 2 % image of an oval changing from something else which I can't remember. Neither of that pair coincided with my meaning, which was much more general and existed in the shape of a fairly distinct idea beside these images. The idea was very certainly collective. I think the collective aspect was facilitated by there having been a change from the one to the other. It meant more than two, and not particularly those two. I distinctly conceived them as being curved. I had the idea of several individuals ; and from that it spread to all in an inductive manner," Sp. 3". 4, i. 8. Stimulus : "A Tuben is {winged).'' Introspection : " I saw one or two specimens and observed its character in all of them The images (which came at once — there was no time for a ^/iOJ^^/i^-meaning before 214 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.h evidence in our protocols as to there having been anything which might be considered as a second they came) weren't very distinct. . . . but distinct enough for me to say that the predicate was determined by a comparison of things seen, just as if the objects were before me, . . ." R. 6", v. 3. Stimulus: "No Sorab is (white)." Introspection: "Meaning of * Sorab ' developed gradually with a vague visual image of the trumpet. Knowledge that this was yellow. Knowledge that no one of the individual ' Sorabs ' was white. * White ' came automatically after 'yellow'— both auditorily, . . ." A. 3". 4, ii. 8. Stimuhis: "A Lagoc is {yellow)." Introspection: "I thought I could not tell what the word meant. A visual image of the arched yellow figure. The very faint implication of other figures in a set which it represented. This did not amount to a visual image. I wanted to describe the figures, but had no word for it. I knew that I was generalising from a particular instance. ' Yellow ' was general" Sh. 3". 2, V. 7. *'A Tegam is {for containing things)." Introspection: "... Idea of ' useful at tea-time, ' with association of ' Tegam ' and Tea- time in consciousness, rejected as not general enough. I then saw jug, then pail, then other pail. Then idea came of containing things, with the reaction words," G. 25", vii. 1. Stimulus: "All Tegam are {empty)." Introsp)ection : "Tegam meant a receptacle for milk, and I saw picture of milk -jug and after- wards of the first ' Tegam. ' The idea of milk was present. I could not think of the other 'Tegams ;/ then I remembered all the five were empty," F. 3". 8, i. 8. Excerpts from protocols showing descriptively the process of particularising from a 'universal.' Stimulus: "The smallest Ferod is {striding)." Introspection: " Understanding of meaning of ' Ferod ' . . . unaccompanied by images of any kind. Then visual image of one of them in a blue cape, with knowledge that this was the smallest, . . . ' Fl. 5". 2, iii. 4. Stimulus: " The sweetest Sorab is {stringed)." Introspection: I thought that time of musical instruments as being- the meaning of ' Sorab.' A coefficient of universality came in. Originally, on reading the sentence it was apparently understood as an individual. Then I §3 WOKDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 215 conceptual element complicated, or fused with the first, and certainly distinguished from it intro- spectively. Sometimes, however, this does seem to have been the case.^ We are therefore inclined had au image, 2 %, of the harp, then another one of a concertina. Puzzled as to how these were sweet, and doubting if ' Sorab ' meant musical instrument at all. Stuck to my guns. Thought * sweet ' could be applicable to the harp," Sp. 7".8, viii. 8. Stitmiliis : " The first Digep was {reddish-yellow)'' Introspection : " It was clearly a universal. . . . Then, as the sentence referred to a particular 'Digep,' I called up the images, and tried to recall the order in which I had met with them, . . ." R. 16". 6, v. 1. Stimulus : "The blue Kumic is {the first)." Introspection : " Gradu- ally the meaning of ' Kumic ' came as a general. It was narrowed to ' the blue Kumic ' by the appearance of a quasi-visual image. Thought of its jaggedness in consciousness. Suddenly the words ' the first ' came, with certainty," A. 4", vii. 6. Stimulus: "The second Goral is {closed):' Introspection: "I had to put out of the way the idea * musical instrument. ' Then I saw the picture of the pliers, and felt sure that was the second one, . . ." G. 15". 6, viii. 3. Stimulus: "The moving Tuben is {small).'' I ntrosjjection : "Tuben meant 'bird' in general, with reference to the five 'Tubens.' From ' moving ' I got the idea of flying. With that I saw a very distinct image of the humming-bird. Reacted," F. 2". 6, ix. 6. * Excerpts from protocols exhibiting overknowledge as a separate thought element complicated with pure "substantive thought " (or with image). This comes out best when the particular meaning is reached from a ' universal ' and vice versa. " Understanding of meaning of ' Ferod ' . . . unaccompanied by images of any kind. Tlien visual image of one of them in a blue cape, with knowledge that this was the smallest. Ho was given to me as the smallest, . . ," Fl. b".'2, iii. 4. " Familiarity as I heard ' Tuben.' Knowledge that I could bring its meaning to consciousness. Then visual image of the larcjz hrown bird nmse, follow^ immediat<'ly by knowledge that 'Tuben' stood for 'these binls,' of which the brown one was one ; and thti bruwn one thereupon became symbolical of them all. ' Brown ' immediately occuired as an answer," Fl. 1".8, ii. 4. " Immediately on hearing ' Kumic ' had a visual image of a small white or yellowish Mower, which gradually became symbolical of flower in general. Recalled task ; ami became satisfied that the flower seen was tlu smallest one. 216 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii to the opinion that we have in this phenomenon a separate thought element ; and to explain the fact that it is not more frequently distinguished by our observers from the central concept giving meaning, on the ground that such distinction although I obtained no images of the other flowers ; nor could I think of wliat they were like," Fl. 3", i. 5. ". . . I /e/< that what was true of that at least in this respect (triangularity) was ti'ue of the other figures," Sp. 2".4, iv. 9. ". . . very distinct coeflScient of universality." There was present a 1 % image with ideopresentation of 'a' fat boy," Sp. 2", vi. 3. "There again at first some confusion with meaning of 'Kumic' Then it became clear to me what ' Funip ' were ; and I had obscure presentations, almost too imperfect to be called images — elements of colours and partial lines. This enabled me to know that all 'Funips' were bounded by curves : though I didn't see one of them completely figui^ed," R. 18", vii. 2. " There was confident knowledge there without a survey of all the individuals" (that 'youthful' would describe all ' Ferods '), R. 3".6, iv. 4. "Undoubtedly individualised by the selection" (of the smallest * Kumic ' from among tluee or four images)," R. 15" A, i. 5. " Tendency to get the general idea of ' Digep.' Then ' this ' became prominent in consciousness, followed by the idea of apple and its leaves. This was localised in time and space, a 1 % visual image. It was followed by a some- what stronger image of a peach, which took its place. These two oscillated, . , ."A. 6". 2, ii. 7 "A very vague knowledge of meaning of 'Lagoc' Tlien 'the smallest came into field of attention prominently. Immediately ' Lagoc ' meant the small yellowish parabola, accompanied by a vague visual image. It was localised in space and now, . . ."A. 3".4, ii. 9. "... I tested 'resonance' (reaction word) by the application of it to visual images of those two particular instruments ; and a general application, without any particular image, or particular reference to all possible musical instruments, came. The idea prominent in mind was vibration," Sh. 17".8, iii. 3. ". . . meant distinctly an individual " — a clear image of an apple, Sh. 5". 6, V. 4. "I thought that I did not know the relative sizes : that in the pictures they were more or less equal in size. I saw some of the pictures rather distinctly, and decided that the goose was rather the largest. It was a particular to my mind ; but the image afterwards became symbolical of goose in general, ..." G. 14". 4, X. 6. " I knew first what * Tuben ' means, and what I had to do with regard to it. The meaning was general. Then I cut it down by adding the meaning ' moving,' . . ." G. 19".6, ix. 6. " 'Robud' meant a child — indeterminately. I had an image then of the first one. This referred it to one of the pictures — the first. I don't know how to describe it," F. 8", ix. 3. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 217 would be of very great introspective difficulty.^ In the cases in which we find the two to some extent distinguished, the meaning of the nonsense- word and that of the adjectives (' all,' ' no ' ' the first,' etc.) seem to have consciously occurred in two separate and chronologically distinguishable moments. This is notably so with regard to the observer Fl. In other; cases the two meanings seem either (i.) to have arisen, as far as could be determined by introspection, simultaneously ; or (ii.) the meaning of the prefixed adjective seems to have vanished from consciousness, along with the consciousness of the adjective itself, before that of the nonsense -word arose. In the first case the distinction would not be easy to establish by introspection ; and in the latter it would seem to be even less so. With regard to this second case we may suggest that it is the effect in consciousness of the previous presence of the meaning of the adjective that conditions the arising of the meaning of the nonsense-word as ' individual ' or ' universal,' etc. Together with the general instruction to complete the part -judgement, these words condition the total reaction. But, unlike the nonsense -words, the prefixed adjectives are exceptionally familiar. * It does not follow from this statemeut, as we shall see, that oveiknowledge may not also in a certain sense be regarded as a mode of the central concept. 218 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii They are among the commonest words of ordinary language. May it not be supposed that, although they are not as is the general instruction the antecedents to a determinant tendency (in the usual understanding of the term), yet they function by perseveration, when neither they nor their meaning is consciously present, in much the same way? Thus the meaning of the nonsense - word would arise qualified by a reference to experience, or to possible experience ; and the complex would prove difficult of, if not entirely refractory to introspective analysis. Or it is possible that the familiar adjectives with their meanings would pass from the position of focal to that of marginal contents, while the meaning of the less familiar nonsense - word arose focally. Here again the meaning of the adjectives might appear to constitute a sort of setting or background in which that of ' Kumic ' or ' Ferod,' etc., develops. This might seem, perhaps, to be a mode of the central concept — concept qualified by reference. But de facto the representative content would be a complex or fusion resulting from concept 'plus a conscious reference. The obvious analogy here is that of tonal fusion. Overtones frequently cannot be dis- criminated in the compound clang; yet the experience of this is fundamentally different from §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 219 that of a pure tone. But the analogy must not be pushed too far. The elements of the clang are simultaneous. In the suppositions we advance, those of our conceptual fusion are not. The perseveration, or background, is already there for the meaning of the nonsense-word to develop in. The analogy, however, shows us how over- knowledge may perhaps be regarded as a mode of the central concept ; since, in a certain sense, a tone fused with indiscriminable overtones might be regarded as a mode of the pure tone. But the conceptual elements seem to be far more plastic or fluid than any sensorial ones ; and the com- pletest possible fusion apparently takes place between them.^ Genetically, therefore, overknow- ^ As au instance of such conceptual fusion we might take the meaning of any one of our nonsense-words. *Ferod,' for example, means a moving boy. Let us suppose an observer got this meaning 'moving boy' with negative overknowledge. That was his unique conscious meaning. But ' Ferod ' has also an enormous number of other meanings, as e.g., clothed boy, boy, animal, thing, etc. These meanings are implicit. They were not actually observed contents of consciousness. Any one of them might have been ; but de facto none was. They are not found introspectively to have been present as meaning ; but they are logically analysed out of the meaning that was present. How is this logical analysis possible ? Only, we suggest, on the hypothesis that they are all fused, like overtones with its fundamental but far more intimately, with the meaning that was observed. The concept ' moving boy ' is genetically built up out of an enormous amount of past experience in the shape of different con- cepts. It is like a chord with the overtones of its notes. And as the overtones are capable of being analysed out of the sum total by the use of resonators, so the fused concepts may be analysed out by logical processes. 220 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt. ii ledge may be said to be a conceptual element over and above the central concept. By inti- mate fusion it appears rather as a mode of this latter. This overknowledge is a further corroborative evidence for our theory of thought. When meaning is given by the arising of an imageless concept, there is, of course, no question of imagery ; since the overknowledge is as image- less here as the concept itself. And when the sensorial part of an image complex is so prominent in consciousness as to depress the conceptual element to a minimum of observability, the " co- efficient " overknowledge, we maintain, is still non-imaginal. It is not, as we have seen, the image ; nor can it, although it is connected with this, be easily supposed to be a function of the sensorial elements as such. To understand this we have only to consider the analogous case of the symbolic image, frequently observed. There is more than the sensorial elements in consciousness here. There is the conceptual element. There is also the symbolisation. Is this latter a function of the sensorial elements ? Or is it a coefficient, an overknowledge of the concept with which the sensorial part of the complex occurs ? The latter would certainly seem to be the preferable hypo- thesis ; since it is capable of covering all the cases §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 221 — those as well in which only an imageless central concept is given. We conclude, then, that what we have termed overknowledge is conceptual in character ; and that it, with the concept giving essential meaning, constitutes the represented ' object ' as present to mind. § 4. Plienomenological Appearance of the Predicate in Logical Judgements. Our experiments were planned with a view to ascertaining only the manner in which the meaning of the nonsense-word subjects was present to consciousness in ' universal ' and ' individual ' judgements. These words, as we have seen, were sufficiently well known to have meaning, and at the same time sufficiently unfamiliar as to be separated by a time -interval from the arising of that meaning in consciousness. This allowed of the examination of the meaning as a phenomenon on its own account. We have drawn attention in the preceding paragraphs to the connection of the meaning with imagery, and to the presence of overknowledge, by which conscious universality or individuality is secured. And there our task, as originally contemplated, might have ended ; for we gave no special instruction to our observers to 222 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii take notice of the mode of presence of the predicates with which they reacted. Indeed, it seemed that such an instruction would be rather prejudicial to the results hoped for than otherwise ; for the main endeavour of the research was to observe, with the greatest possible attention, a meaning which had been created, and more or less loosely connected by association with the nonsense -word. It was held that attention paid to more than this one point would render its observation less accurate ; and it was supposed that the words employed by the observers as reaction predicates, being normal words, would be with great difficulty, if at all, discriminated from their meanings. Nevertheless an examination of the protocols shows that, even with regard to the predicates, meaning and symbol (word) were not always so closely united as to be indiscriminable. Indeed the meaning to be expressed in the reaction word often arose in consciousness before the symbol. We are therefore able at once to divide our material roughly into two groups. In the first are the cases in which the meaning of the reaction word consciously preceded the appearance of the latter in consciousness.^ In the second are the cases in ^ Excerpts from Protocols showing presence of meaning (concept) antecedent to word more or less adequately expressing it. Stimulus: " The &TAt Lagoc is (sandy coloured)." Irdrospection : " I saw the picture there at once, not very clearly ; more the colour than the picture. The idea of pyramid then came : then the idea of sand. I reacted," F. 5", vii. 9. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 223 which meaning and word appear together ; or, at any rate, are not chronologically distinguished by the observer. Both these groups can be still further analysed. The first gives us two sub-groups. The first sub- group embraces those cases in which the predicate meaning arises without a concomitant word, and is followed by a reaction word which is more or less stimulus: "The best Digej) is (i knov) quite well)." Introspcitiun : "I was pleased that it wasn't 'Sorab,' wliich I expected. Felt I did know something about it. Visual images of the apple and the grapes ; but quite apart from seeing the pictures, 1 judged that the peach was tlie best. Saw the peach . . . wanted to react something about its softness. Rejected that idea, and thought I'd react something about its skin. I 'irieant 'velvety,' G. 14".6, X. 7. So G. uses : " Turned back " for the concept "having its back to me ; " "quite departed " for "colourless," etc. Stimulus: " No Lagoc is (quite rcnmcl)." Introsjyection : " I had usual image of black thing with corners at base. Then I remembered that they were dis- tinguished from the otlier class by having comers. Then the idea that they weren't round seemed to follow without further mediation," Sp. 3".S, viii. 9. Stimulus: "The smallest Funip is (v(S('W«)." IntruSj»;ction: ". . . recurred then to the idea that had first presented itself : and the word visible hadn't occurred first, but had been implied in the general notion of seeing it under a microscope in its mostminute form," Sh. 25".C, ii. 3. Stimulus: '^ All I>igei) are (endowed with)." Introspection: ". . . the words 'eatable,' 'luscious,' came. I would not use them. Then I thought of the amyl series. The word was not in consciousness, but the meanings ' organic ethers ' and ' fruit sugars ' were ; and I was going to say ' eudoweii with these ethers and sugars,' but could not get the right word. The meaning of ' Digep' was clearly there, but generalised, I think, from meaning of appl'.^s and grapes," A. 11".2, v. 7. So A. uses : " Blasphemous " for a concept — meaning " not flowers." Stimidus: "The first Digep is (jmrph)." Introspection: "Tendency to react cherry inhibited because it was a noun. I determined to answer with a colour. Could not find a name for colour for some time. Tlien obtained name ' purple ' auditory-motor ; but some hesitation as to its appropriateness (e.g., if the colour were not too blue). Pushed this aside voluntarily, and reacted 'purple,'" Fl. 10".ti, iv. 1. So, again : "... The smallness and narrowness of the tlowers impressed me ; and I answered ' small,' really meaning ' small-Howerud,' " Fl. 4".8, iv. 0. Stimulus: "The smallest Ferod is (playing with a rope)." Introsjiection : " He hasn't got a rope in his hands; but about to haul himself with it, . . ." R. 10". 7, iii. 4. 224 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii appropriate ; i.e., which more or less adequately expresses the meaning. The second sub-group contains the cases in which the predicate meaning arises as before, but is followed by a reaction word which is recognised by the observer as entirely incongruous ; i.e. which does not express the meaning.^ The second group of cases also admits of two sub-groups. In the first are placed the cases in which the aroused word is noted by the observer as appropriate because of its meaning and consciously applied to the subject of the judgement before he reacts. He knows on introspection that this conscious application occurred.^ In the second ^ One or two examples are given in the previous footnote. - Excerpts from Protocols showing concomitant predicate word and meaning consciously applied to subject before reaction. Sthmdus : "The largest Lagoc is {mauve)." Introspection: "I had the idea of shape. Then I saw the shape of the black 'Lagoc,' and of the mauve one — one above the other and slightly coloured. I compared the two ; and the mauve seemed the largest," F. 3", x. 9. Stimulus : " All Funip are (coloured).'" Introspection : " ' Funip ' meant all those figures ; and in particular to the idea of shape of the red one. I wanted to react ' pointed ; ' but remembered the round one. . . . With this I had the idea of yellow colour. That gave me the idea of colour for the rest of them. ' Colour ' had a general reference," F. 13", ix. 2. Stimulus'. "All Robud are {different sizes)." Introsp)ection -. "I read this and had a sort of doubt as to whether I knew what it meant. , . , Then I saw one picture clearly and auother behind it not clearly. Then this became clear and the other vanished. . . . Then I had the idea, for which no word came, of how they went in descending order of magnitude, and tried to think of one word for that idea. I reacted as above. It was perfectly universal for all those pictures," G. 24", v. 3. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 225 sub-group are the cases in which the observer is unable to discriminate any conscious application of So ". . . apropos of nothing, the word 'eatable' came motor. I tested it — put it into sentence and said it. I thought it was true of all but absurd," G. 9". 4, iii. 5. Stimulus: "All Robud are {rosij).'" Introspection: "I had a 1 % image and a very clear idea (but not determinate) of a chubby- faced boy — iudividual, as an illustration rather than a symbol. I had that ; and I thought of others too. He was side- faced, for instance, but I couldn't say which side. Judgement made with strong convic- tion that it applied to them all, although only that one idea was determinate," Sp. 2". 8, v. 3. Stimulus : " No Lagoc is (rounded).'' Introspection : *' I com- pleted the sentence with a thought plus a 1 % image of a thing with two angles and a base. Then I predicated rounded of ' No Lagoc ' — not merely of that one. I did not first say ' that one is not rounded,' and 'the others are not,' " Sp. 3".4, v. 9. Stimulus : " All Lagoc are (single line ^figures)." Introspection : "I had an image — a yellow figure, roughly semicircular. I knew there were other figures : could not recall any of them. At the same time I kne2o that they were all contained by a single line," Sh. 9", ii. 8. So "... I waited to make sure that it locts a qvulity of general application aud decided to accept it," Sh. 4", i. 1. Stimulus: "All Robud a-re (fat) " Introspection: ". . . 'Fat' came auditory -motor, with meaning 'chubby.' I don't know why, but I tried to inhibit it. Thought that ' fat ' would probably apply to the lot of them. It persisted a considerable time, and loomed large in consciousness. At last I reluctantly reacted," A. 7". 4, ii. 3. So also: "... recognition that 'metallic' was not quite what I meant, but that all tools are at least partially metal — at least in that series. This was all idea, . . ."A. 4", ii. 5. Stimulus: "All Ferod are (sunft)." Introspection : "... Recalled instructions. Word ' swift ' arose auditory-motor. Seemed applicable to all, as I reviewed images and noted each was quickly- moving," Fl. 6". 6, ix. 4. So also : " . . . thought ; ' Yes, but they all have some colour or other,'" Fl. 3".'J, vii. 2. Q 226 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii the predicate to the subject. Yet he is sure, we may suppose, that the predicate applies to the subject, since he reacts without hesitation. These are cases in which the predicate word seems to express merely an aspect of the subject — to be read off, so to speak, from a subject already present as an image.^ These cases are most frequent in connection with ' individual ' judgements. The results of this analysis are set forth in Tables XIL, XIII., and XIV. Stimulus : " All Ferod are {youthful).'' Introspection : "I saw two or three of them : and knew that that would describe them all. There was a confident knowledge there, without a survey of all the individuals," R. 3". 6, iv. 4. So also "... obscure presentations, almost too imperfect to be called images . . . enabled me to know that all ' Funips ' were bounded by curves : though I don't see one of them completely figured," R. 18", vii. 2. ^ " A quite definitely located in time and space quasi-image of a little brown tub. . . . Reacted ' brown ' with considerable confidence, . . ."A. 5".4, iv. 1. "... Its bright plumage attracted my attention — and I reacted automatically," Fl. 3", ix. 3. "... I had twice a 1 % image of a yellow, I think vertical, shape, which I now believe not to be the correct one. I suddenly realised I had to react by predicating, and said yellow," Sp. 2".8, ii. 2. "Visual image after an inhibition of a bunch of pale green flowers. Felt it was not right. Perfectly clear image. Nothing else. So reacted (pale green)," Sh. 13", iii. 6. " * Sorab ' meant ' musical instrument ' indeterminately. Image of violin came. I described it" (Reaction 'four-stringed'), F. 5".2, viii. 8. "... I saw the picture very definitely, going to the right . . . then noticed the little mountain-climbing hood. Reacted ('hooded also')," G. 5". 4, viii. 10. §3 AVORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 227 It is to be noticed that in order to separate out the predicate from the subject, as two conscious contents, the protocols were divided at the point where the predicate actually used in the reaction TABLE XII Phenomenological Occurrence of the Predicate of ' Universal ' Affirmative Judgements (No. of Protocols analysed, 154) ^va y^ 1 ^ >> ■Jl o a: c x.a a: o +-> cc 0+3 £ 8 Si a .2 bcS tt)-- -o 'G C« tH e3 ^ . & »: Observer. Is o a 73 fcOTS bCxJ ^ S ''0 • t: C a> ^ rr, .2 0-0 m ?-■ Meani follow word. Meani follow gruoui Reacti meani applie _3 4% t o G. . 36% (--i) 20% 40% 0% 25 F. . 36% 8% 44% 0% 12% 25 Sp. . . . 40% 0% 32% 28% 0% 25 Sh. . 37% 7% 30% 0% 26% 27 A. . 37% (a) 0% 58% 0% 5% 19 Fl. . 60% (a> 0% 30% 5% 5% 20 R. . 61% 0% 39% 0% 0% 13 Average 44% 5% 39% 5% 7% Total . 40% 8% 38% 5% 8% ... (») Several times preceded by reproduced sensations (for A, 5% ; for Fl. 15%; forG. 12%). first came, in any form, to the consciousness of the observer. This was done in all cases except those in which the reaction word was inconcfruous ; and in these cases the division was made at the point 228 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL PT. II where the meaning that failed to be expressed in reaction arose. TABLE XIII Phenomenological Occukrence of the Predicate of * Universal ' Negative Judgements (No. of Protocols analysed, 112) owed fthis i 1 13 o p t) 05 1 o ^ o a §£ 1 'o'bD 05 c fl — 1^ Observer. •2|g ■ 0% 4% 23 F. . . 48% 13% j 22% W 0% 13% (b) 4% 0% 23 Sp. . . 1 54% 4% 4%(b) 4% 13% (b) 17% 4% 24 Sh. . 1 80% .2 s o 4) Meani follow cxpres Word descri React out CO once t Uncla Faihn Total. G. . 44% 33%(a' 13% 2% 6% 52 F. . 0% 15% 77%(.M 4% 4% 52 Sp. . . . 12% 14% 45%(a) 12% 17% 42 Sh. . 6% n%(^) 0% 11% 11% 18 A. . 0% 19% 71% 6% 3% 31 Fl. . 0% 75%(c) 25% 0% 0% 20 R. . 0% 7% 79% 7% 7% 14 Average 9% 43% 44% 6% 7% Total . 13% 29% 46% 6% 7% (») The reaction word here describes the image, which had a meaning ante cedently to the occurrence of the word. Sp. in one case notes that the word was "predicated analytically in the Kantian sense." (b) Perhaps wonis were present, but the observer makes no mention of them in his protocols. (c) In three cases preceded by reproduced olfactory or gustatory images. arising in consciousness of the meaning of the subject. But even here the meaning expressed by the predicate develops subsequently to the appear- 230 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.h ance of the subject. It may be an aspect of the subject ; but, if so, it is singled out, and its degree of consciousness heightened. The implication is that it is subsumed under a conceptual abstract. Moreover, except in the few cases in which the instruction " to react with an appropriate adjective " was not observed, the meaning of the predicate never coincides with that of the subject. "We feel, therefore, that we were justified in arbi- trarily dividing the protocols at the point stated, and in constructing our tables from this analysis. Perhaps the most interesting result of this analysis is to be found in the relative distribution of the cases in which reaction word and meaning occur simultaneously, and those in which the meaning consciously precedes the word. The meaning consciously precedes the word, expressing it in our ' universal ' affirmative judgements 48 % times : {Table XII., columns 2 and 3) and in the ' universal ' negative judgements 63% times. {Table XII L, columns 2, 3, and 4.) ^ Averaged together, ^ It will be noticed in Table XIII. that the cases in which the meaning of the reaction word, or the meaning negated by the reaction word, arises before the word-symbol, are entered in three separate columns. We do not propose to make any detailed examination of the nature of negative judgements at present ; but it is interesting to note that in these judgements we have apparently two types. In the first type (cases entered in columns 2, 3, aud 5 of Table XIII.) an imageless meaning, or a word with meaning, which is only applicable affirmatively, §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 231 these ' universal ' judgements show this phenomenon 55'5 y times. The same phenomenon occurs in the 'individual' judgements 13 % times {Table XIV., column 2). The advantage, in this respect, of the ' universal ' over the ' individual ' judgements is seen to be of the value 42*5 %. Again, the reaction word arises with its meaning in the 'universal' affirmative judgements 38% times {Tahle XII., column 4) ; and in the * universal ' negative judgements 29 % tmiQ^{Tahle XIII., columns 5 and 6). The average of these percentages is 3 3 '5 y . The same phenomenon occurs in the 'individual' judgements 75% times (Tahle XIV., columns 3 and 4). Here the advantage is 41 '5 % in favour of the ' individual ' judgements. occurs tirst. This is then followed by a meaning, or a word negating it. The following is an example of this : Stimulus: "No Goral is (extraordinary)." Introspection: "I got the meaning almost at once. Word 'singular' came: rejected as inappropriate. The idea of the opposite of ordinary— usual — came. I let that rest in my mind until 'extraordinary' came explosively in reaction. No images," A. 9 ".2, iii. 5. In the second type, a meaning or a word negatively applicable to the subject occurs without any intermediary (cases entered in columns 4 and 6 of Table XIII.). An example of this type is : StimvZibs : "No Robud is (harsh)." Introspection: "I understood the sentence. Felt myself on the point of saying a negative right away. Emotional shock. The negative did not develop. Ideopresentation of 'harsh.' Then I said harsh— very like the well-known test of opposites," Sp. 4", iii. 3. Again : Stlinulu.i: "No Goral is (a sentient being)." Introf^pection: "I knew what it meant. Thought, ' Oh, this is jolly. lean react anythine'.' I had then idea of useful ; and felt that the whole wretched series of reaction words was going to come. All of a suddon as a delightful Hash the words 'a .sentient being' came— just came," G. 3".2, ix. 5. 232 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii We can suggest no other reason for these discrepancies than that the more prominent presence of the sensorial elements of the image given with the meaning of the nonsense-word subject in ' individual ' judgements, tends to have an effect upon the subsequent occurrence and prominence of verbal imagery. There is logically, so far as we can see, no reason for it. The fact that in 13 ^ of the 'individual' judgements the attribute appeared first as an imageless meaning, or concept, shows that the immediate occurrence of the predicate in a verbal form is not necessarily a feature of judgements of this sort. And the further fact that the predicate arises in verbal form in 33*5 // of the ' universal ' judgements shows that they are not necessarily characterised by concepts occurring ante- cedently to reaction words. We suggest that the effect of the antecedent sensorial elements is due to confluence. The sensorial part of the subject content perseverates and confines over into the predicate concept, thus in some way strengthening the tendency of its associated word-symbol to appear concomitantly with, or at least chronologically and introspectively indistinct from it. The more prominent the previous sensorial elements, the more indistinct would be the predicate concept from its symbol. This would explain the cases in column 6 of Table §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 233 XIII., and in column 4 of Table XIV. In these the reaction word occurs immediately ; i.e., with- out a discovered antecedent concept or meaning, and without a reference to the subject to test its applicability. It is 'read off' the subject. It expresses something seen in the image. This is reasonable enough in the case of ' individual ' judge- ments, where, as we have seen, comparatively good images usually appear. And as a matter of fact, we have the largest percentage for this phenomenon entered in the ' individual ' judgement Table. The 1 9 % in Table XIII. is easily explained on the same grounds : only the reaction here denies the predicate of the subject — 'reads something off' which is not seen. This is like the well-known test of finding opposites. Further than this suggestion, we have no evidence in our protocols upon which we can base any definite conclusion as to this point. We have next to ask whether the predicates of our judgements were ' universals ; ' and, if so, in what sense. We have seen that they first occur as imageless meaning, or as words with meaning. There is no evidence in the protocols of the ' individual ' judgements to show whether they were ' universal ' or not, other than logically. We may consider, for example, the following fairly typical case : — Stimulus : " The blue Funip is (thin and oval)." 234 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL r r. 1 1 Introspection : " The word ' blue Funip ' excited a 3 ^ or 4 ^ ^ image of a deep blue, oval, thin figure ; and I nearly predicated ' thin and oval ' at once. Qualms as to whether it were all right. Concluded it was ; and reacted with conviction," Sp. 6", vi. 2. In this case two concepts, ' thin ' and * oval,' are at once aroused with the reproduced image as qualities perceived. The sensorial elements are subsumed under both concepts ; just as a percept is subsumed under concepts in the act of percep- tion. But are ' thin ' and ' oval ' to be considered psychologically as ' universals ? ' They are not, apparently, recognised as being actually so ; though it is evident that, if other images of ' thin ' and ' oval ' figures were also present, they would all be referable to these same concepts, under which they might be subsumed. This subsumption would be the condition of their recognition as ' thin ' or as ' oval.' We are inclined to think that the logical requirements of the predicate are here verified, but not the psychological requirements of the true ' universal.' The concepts, or concepts plus words expressing them, are phenomenologically present in the same way as the ' universal ' meaning of the nonsense-word subjects when negative overknow- ledge is observed. These concepts giving meaning are potentially ' universal,' in the sense that they can apply to every individual of the class. They ^ A very liigh percentage for Sp. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 235 mediate the essential, or g'l^asi-essential meaning of the nonsense-word. And that is all that is, logically, required of them. For a true psycho- logical 'universal' more than this is necessary. We must have the positive overknowledge of ' uni- versal ' reference. And this we find noted by our observers in the protocols, though only occasionally, and that in ' universal ' judgements. For example : Stimulus : " All Goral are (useful)" Introspection : " The sentence was understood. ' Goral ' had a confused mixture of 'Gorilla' and 'Coral.' Then I stopped and dwelt on the word, and got up the idea of — I think it was — a hammer. . . . Thought (reminiscence) that there had been other ' tools.' Thought for an adjective to suit ' tools.' Reacted," Sp. 9".2, V. 5. Here it seems to be fairly evident that the " adjective to suit ' tools ' " must have been con- sciously referred to all possible : i.e. must have been the true psychological ' universal ; ' though, on the other hand, the concept ' useful ' may have been referred quite simply to the concept ' tool.' From other evidence given in the foot-notes we conclude, however, that the psychological ' universal ' was de facto sometimes observed, as a positive over- knowledge, or coefficient of universality, given with the concept expressed by the predicate.^ But of ' universal ' predicates in the logical sense — ' useful,' 1 Cf. p. 208. 236 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.i e.g. as poteutially applicable uot only to ' tools,' but to all actual and possible useful things universally — we find no trace in the protocols. Nor did we expect to find it. As a conclusion to this paragraph on the predicate we have, lastly, to present three tables. In the first of these (Table XV.) are recorded the number of cases in which there was no imagery of any kind reported in connection either with the predicate or the subject of the judgement. The mental process, beginning with the perception of the stimulus part-judgement and ending with the spoken reaction word, contains no imagery either visual or verbal. The following gives the percent- ages of these cases with their distribution for each observer and for either form of ' universal ' judgement. TABLE XV Observer, Universal Affirmative. Universal Negative. Average Total. F. . . . 32%(a) 17% 25% G. . . . 16%(b) 17% 17% Sp. . 16% 33% 25% Sh. . 0% 0% 0% A. . . . 32% 30% 31% Fl. . 0% 0% 0% R. . . . 0% 14% 7% Total Average 14% 14% 15% (a) There are also two doubtful cases not included in this number. (^) One doubtful case not included. § 3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 237 The next Table (XVI.) shows the cases in which only verbal imagery intervened between the per- ception of the stimulus part-judgement and the reaction word. Such imagery consisted either in (i.) irrelevant words, or (ii.) appropriate words which were not used as predicates, or (iii.) words naming the subject (nouns). TABLE XVI Observer. Universal Affirmative. Universal Negative. Average Total. F. . . . 16% 0% 8% G. . . . 24% 22% 23% Sp. . . . 20%(a) 13% 17% Sh. . 4% 0% 2% A. . . . 53%(b) 50%(°) 52% Fl. . 0% 0% 0% R. . . . 0% 0% 0% Total Average 17% 12% 15% (») There are also three doubtful cases not included in this number. (b) Nearly all cases of rejected but appropriate words for reaction. (c) In three cases words naming the subject (nouns). Since, in all the cases shown in this Table (except those in which the meaning of the subject was expressed by naming it) the meanings of the subject and predicate employed in reaction come to consciousness without images, we may neglect the intermediary verbal images. They, with their meanings, may be links in the chain of mental process. They may be reinforcing intermediaries. 238 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL ,.t.ii But the two important meanings — that of subject and predicate of the judgement — arise conceptually. Moreover, in the act of applying the predicate to the subject all the process intervening between the two seems to be de facto neglected by the observers. The necessary elements of the judge- ment are put together. Predicate-meaning is asserted of subject-meaning. We may, therefore, not unreasonably combine the figures of Tables XV. and XVI. with the following result : — TABLE XVII Observer. Universal Affirmative. Universal Negative. Average Total. F. . . . 48% 17% 33% G. . . . 40% 39% 40% Sp. . . . 36% 46% 41% Sh. . 4% 0% 2% A. . . . 85% 65% (a) 75% Fl. . 0% 0% 0% R . . 0% 14% 7% Total Average 30% 26% 28% (a.) We have omitted the three cases mentioned in note (-) to Table XVI. in order to get this figure. And we may conclude from the percentages of these three Tables, not only that a thought-process such as judgement may occur as a pure thought- process containing concepts only as contents, with- out the admixture of imagery of any kind, but §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 239 also that processes of this character have a tendency to take place when the thought is abstract ; that the ' universal ' form of the Stimulus is their antecedent. For while we find an average of 28% of cases of this character in Table XVI I./ we notice that they all occur in ' universal ' judgements. There is no column in these last Tables for the inclusion of similar cases found in the protocols of ' individual ' judgements, since in these no such cases were discoverable.^ 1 I.e. 15 % of Table XV. + 15 % of Table XVI.— the three cases mentioned in note f^' to Table XVI. ^ Excerpts from Protocols showing Pure Thought Processes : — Stimulus: "All Lagoc are {angular)." Introspection: " I under- stood the sentence. 'Lagoc' meant entity determined to the extent of being a flat geometrical figure ; and, I thi7ik, slightly contaminated by ' lake ' {lago). Then a condensed idea of a previous experience arose ; and I said with great confidence 'angular,' as satisfying — ' angular ' being constituent of that reminiscence. No images ob- served," Sp. 1".8, iii. 9. Stimulus : " No Goral is {living^ Introsjjection : " I understood the sentence in usual way of word representing an entity. I had the idea ' dead ' ; and was just about to give utterance to it, when I suddenly had impulse to consider meaning of ' Goral ' again. Dwelt on idea of ' Goral : ' came out the idea of ' musical instrument ; ' which suggested to me to say the opposite," Sp. 5", 2, iii. 5. Stimulus: "No Tuben is {fourfooted)." Introspection: " I at once thought of my fat bird. . . . Then I thought that they were not quadrupeds. Remembered tlie whole incident of before. Had idea 'fourfooted ; ' and reacted," Sp. 4", v. 6. Stimuhcs: "All Digep are (eatable)." Introspection: " ' Digep ' meant fruit in general. No image. I stopped to think about fruit. Had the idea of food in my head. That gave me the word ' eatable. ' At first it came as a thought, I think. Then 1 reacted," F. 3", v. 7, Stimulus: "No Goral is {small)." Introspection: "Tlie idea I first had was that I had had this before. Surprise, or displeasure. 240 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL pt.ii § 5. General Conclusions : tiummary of Results. We may now summarise as follows the general Inhibition. Then I had the meaning ' carpentering tool ; ' and I thought of 'artistic' Rejected as having been used before. Then idea of carpentering tools in my head made me think of size. I realised none of them, in general, were small. Said 'small,'" F. 11", iv. 5. Stimulics : "No Funip is [squiggly)." Introspection: "Famili- arity with word. Consciousness of tendency to mix up ' Funip ' with something else not present in consciousness. Then meaning of ' Funip ' came clearly ; then the memory of what you had said in your introspection with regard to 'Funip.' Then idea 'square' came. I refused to use it. Then idea of the regularity of the figures. Reacted ' squiggly,' as being the contrary to this. The 'no ' was not present in consciousness from an early point in the introspection- period — but evidently influenced the reaction," A. 5". 6, iv. 2. Stimulus: "All Lagoc are [diffiA^ult for my subjects)." Intro- spection : "I got the meaning of ' Lagoc ' at once ; and then remembered several of the reactions of my subjects. Then I thought of myself making the pictures on the cards in a very vague, slow way. ' Difficult for my subjects ' came automatically in spoken words as reaction," A. 9". 8, iii. ix. Stimulus: "All Goral are {made by man)." Introspection: "I recognised the meaning of ' Goral ; ' and wanted to put words I had used before, which came automatically as a memory. Then I thought of predicating something about their connection with prehistoric man. No words came. Then, quite automatically, I said ' made by man,' " G. 6", X. 5. Stiviulus : " No Tegam is {living)." Introspection : " I knew what ' Tegam ' referred to, and thought (no images) of the watering-can that comes in this series and remembered that we had spoken about it last time. Then I wanted to think whether I should react something stupid like ' eats. ' There was no idea present of what — or sensible. Then thought that you always got them so quickly — and something comic. Thought — whatever I do, I must be quick. Then word ' breakable ' came automaticallj", motor. Rejected because I knew it was not true. Then ' living ' came automatically, motor. Reacted," G. 6". 6, x. i. §3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 241 conclusions that we have drawn from the analysis of the data afforded by our experiments. 1. Nonsense - words (nouns) acquire general meaning gradually by a process of association with the objects denoted by them. In this process a concept is abstracted from the objects and associ- ated with the word ; or the objects are subsumed under an appropriate concept previously abstracted from experience which is associated with the word. This concept, which may or may not be accompanied by sensorial elements, when revived by the word gives the latter its meaning. 2. At a particular stage in the process of association of word and objects, the image revived by the word tends to become fragmentary and obscure ; though the associated concept is un- impaired, and the meaning is given as certainly, or more certainly, than before the phenomenon was observed. 3. Images are not necessary as contents for thought ; but thinking always involves concepts as contents. The sensorial elements of images function in holding concepts relatively stable in consciousness. They tend to appear as conse- quents of inhibitions, as " contrary instances " of B 242 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL FT. II inexact judgements, and, with some observers, habitually. 4. The ' universal ' is phenomenologically present, or tends to be present, to consciousness as a concept or imageless substantive content. We think, or have a tendency to think, ' man ' or * all men ' without images. 5. The 'individual' is phenomenologically present to consciousness as a concept in connection with sensorial contents (image). When we think ' this man ' we have imagery of some sort. The image best securing ' individual ' thought is the direct image, or percept. 6. There is an ' overknowledge ' content to the effect that a thought is of the ' universal,' of the * individual,' or of a collection of ' individuals.' This ' overknowledge ' is frequently a condensed knowledge. It is conceptual in character. 7. The meaning of the predicate of a judge- ment (attribute) may occur chronologically separ- able from the word that expresses it ; and it may appear in consciousness as a concept, or imageless thought. § 3 WORDS LEARNED IN JUDGEMENTS 243 8. A thought process, such as judgement, may continue from stimulus to reaction as a pure thought process, involving only imageless concepts as contents. 9. Where images are involved in such processes their sensorial elements are to be accounted for on grounds of association. PART III BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS REFERRED TO AcH. Uber die Willenstiitigkeit und das Denken. Gottingen, 1905. Aquinas. Opera, Parmae, 1852. Aristotle. Opera, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1619. AvELiNG, The Relation of Thought Process and Percept in Perception (in Journal of Psychology, iv. 2, September 1911). Bain. Mental and Moral Science (3rd ed.). London, 1872. Balmes (tr, Brownson). Fundamental Philosophy. New York, 1896. Berkeley (ed. Eraser). Complete Works. Oxford, 1901. Betts. The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery. New York, 1909. Binet. L'^tude experimentale de I'lntelligence. Paris, 1903. Bovet. L']£tude experimentale du Jugement et de la Pensee (in Archives de Psychologic, viii., October 1908). BiJHLEU. Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgiinge (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, viii,, 1907 ; and xii., 1908). Cohen. Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung (2nd ed.). Berlin, 1885. Logik der rcinen Erkenntnis. Berlin, 1902. Comte. Cours de Philosophic Positive. Paris, 1830-42. CoNDiLLAC. QLuvres (completes). Ed. Arnoux and Mousnier. Paris, 1798. Descartes (ed. Adam and Tannery). Paris, 1897. De WuLF (tr. CoH'ey). History of Medieval Philosophy. London, 1909. 245 246 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL DuRR. tJber die experimen telle Untersuchung der Denkvorgange (in Zeitschrilt f. Psychologie, xlix., 1908). Galton. Inquiries into Human Facultj^ (2nd ed.). London, 1907. Generic Images (in Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain, April 25, 1879). Composite Portraits, etc. (in The Journal of the Anthro- pological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, viii., 1879). Henderson. A Study of Memory for Connected Ti-ains of Thought. (Monograph supplement to the Psychological Review, vol. v., No. 6, December 1903.) HoERNLifi. Image, Idea, and Meaning (in Mind, New Series, xvi., 1907). Hume. Treatise on Human Nature. London, 1739-40. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. London, 1 7-18. HussERL. Die logische Untersuchung. Halle, 1900-1. Huxley. Hume. London, 1878. James. Principles of Psychology. London, 1890. Pragmatism. London, 1907. Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Sammtliche Werke, ed. Rosenkranz and Schubert, Leipzig, 1838-40). KiJLPE. Versuch iiber Abstraktion. Bericht liber den 1. Kongress fiir experimentelle Psychologie in Giessen, 1904. Leipzig, 1904. Leibnitz. Opera omnia. Genevae, 1768, Locke. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, new edition (in The World's Library of Standard Works). London, 1881. Maker. Psychology. London, 1890. Marbe. Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungeu iiber das Urteil. Leipzig, 1901. Messer. Experimentell-psychologische Uutersuchungen iiber das Denken (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, viii., 1906). Meyer and Orth. Zur qualitativen Untersuchung der Associa- tion (in Zeitschrift f. Psychologie und Physiologie, xxvi., 1901). BIBLIOGRAPHY 247 Bemerkungen zu meiner Experimentell-psychologischen Untersuchuiigen iiber das Denken (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, x., 1907). MiCHOTTE. A propos de la Methode d' Introspection (in Revue Neo-Scholastique, November 1907). Mill. An Examination of Sir "William Hamilton's Philosophy (6th ed.). London, 1889. Montaigne. Qiluvres. Paris, 1837. Moore. The Process of Abstraction (in University of California Publications, Berkeley, 1910). Newman. An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. London, 1870. RiBOT. Enquete sur les Idees Generales (in Revue Philosophique, xxxii., 1891). L'Evolution des Idees Centrales. Paris, 1897. RiEHL. Der philosophische Kritizismus (Bd. i.), 2nd ed., 1908. ScHULTZE. Einige Hauptgesichtspunkte der Beschreibung in der Elementar-psychologie : I. Erscheinungen und Gedanken (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, viii., 1906). Spencer. Principles of Psychology (3rd ed.). London, 1881. Stout. A Manual of Psychology (2nd ed.). London, 1901. Sully. Outlines of Psychology (new ed.). London, 1892. Taine. De rintelligence. Paris, 1870. Titchener. Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes. New York, 1909. VON Aster. Die psychologische Beobachtung und experimentelle Untersuchung von Denkvorgiingen (in Zeitschrift f. Psy- chologie, xlix., 1908). Walker. Theories of Knowledge. London, 1910. Watt. Experimentelle Beitriige zu einer Theorie des Denkens (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, iv., 1905). WiNDELBAND (tr. Tufts). A History of Philosophy. London, 1907. WuNDT. tlber Ausfrage-experimente und iiber die Methoden zur Psychologie des Denkens (in Psychologische Studien, iii., 1907). Kritische Xachlese zur Ausfragemethode (in Archiv f. die ges. Psychologie, xi., 1908). APPENDIX Examination of the Protocols in which no imagery was reported in connection with the meaning of the subject in ' individual ' judgements. There were altogether ten cases in which the mean- ing of the subject in 'individual' judgements ('indi- vidual ' or real meaning) may have been given without •jLiiy connected sensorial element. All these cases were classed as if this phenomenon had occurred, seven of them being included in column v., and three in column vi., of Table YIII. G. and Sp. have one case each ; F. and A. four. Together they make 4 /^ of the total number of 'individual ' judgements analysed. With regard to these cases we would first of all draw attention to the fact that they are very few in number. Further, some of them are almost obviously false reactions ; and, if these had been classed as ' failures,' the 4 y would have been still lower. Now 4 y or less /o /o is not a sufficiently large figure to warrant us in suppos- ing that the margin of introspective error, inaccuracy and omission (always possible factors in psychological investigations of this kind) is eliminated. We are 249 250 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL justified on this ground alone in refusing to admit the occurrence of the phenomenon ; and in concluding that, in the absence of further evidence, an image or sensorial content connected with the concept is always present when the ' individual ' is thought. But even if we were unable to make use of this summary consideration, a detailed examination of the protocols concerned will show us (a ') either that the mental process expressed in the judgement was entirely conceptual in character, and no true ' individual ' was thought ; (/?') or an ' individual ' was thought, but sensorial contents connected with the concept were over- looked, or not dictated, in the introspection. ^ We shall ^ The point with which we here deal makes it necessary for lis to define what we mean by ' individual.' The common-sense point of view divides mind from the objective universe. Everything that exists in the world of reality is individual, including mind itself and each phenomenon of mind. The ' universal ' is the substance or nature of the individual considered apart from its individualising characters. Thus it is in nature as the essence concretely realised in each indi- vidual ; and in mind as the abstract idea of that essence. Now here we prescind altogether from the question as to whether things do or do not exist outside mind. We are interested only in the phenomenology of mental processes. And from this point of view we may state that whatever is actual is ' individual,' and only the actual can be so. Thus a percept (or any part of a percept separated from the rest by what we have called sensorial abstraction), an image, etc., being actual is indi- vidual. This will readily be admitted by all. But the concept, as such, is not actual. As a mental process here and now it is indeed an actual and individual mental process ; but considered as concept it is distinctly non-actual. The thought 'man,' e.^., whether it be pure or accompanied by imagery, is a concept precisely because it is abstracted from actuality. It is not, as are percept and image, in a time and space perspective. It is neither ' this ' nor ' that man,' but simply 'man.' In order that thought should be 'individual,' the concept requires a substrate of actuality as given by a connected sensation or imaginal content. What such connection may be we are APPENDIX 251 therefore examine the protocols in detail ; and first consider the cases in column v. Case I. — Stimulus : " The best Digep is (hard).'' In- trospection: "'Digep' meant any apjjle. With meaning ' apple ' I had the idea of fruit. Then I went back to the idea of 'best.' I was thinking more of the fruit T like best than of the apple (which is the fruit I like best). ' Hard ' came as an idea ; and I reacted," F. 3", x. 7. Case II. — Stimulus : " The first Digep is (rgrf)," In- trospection : " ' Digep ' meant fruit in general. I couldn't remember which was the first of the series. Then I remem- bered I had used apple last time for ' Digep.' Tried to think of it as the first ; but it didn't seem to be the first. Couldn't remember any other, so decided it would do," F. 10", ix. 7. Case III. — Stimulus : " The first Kumic is {red)." Introspection : " ' Kumic ' meant any japonica. — Idea of red came. There was no image (and no consciousness of refer- ence)," F. 3", X. 4. In these cases it is to be noticed that the meanings at any rate were not at first individual, but potentially universal — ^^ any apple," " a?iy japonica," "fruit in general." In the first and third case we are strongly inclined to suppose that true ' individual ' judgement unable to say ; but we suggest that the iudivicluality of the sensorial element conjli'cs {to use a well-known expression) over into the concept. We must suppose some such process as continence in this case to explain the fact that a sensorial element may be present with the concept and yet the thought be ' universal,' or potentially ' universal.' The ' individual ' is then an actual content, or a content which is actualised by some sort of connection with, or confluence of actual contents. We have reached this conclusion jjartiully on logical grounds and partially on psychological ; but mainly upon the latter. The data of our experiments seem to point to it, no less than the necessity of explaining the apparent exceptions treated in this Appomlix. 252 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL was not made at all ; indeed, in the third case, this seems to be evident, "red" being predicated of " japonica " essentiall}'. In the second case we have a condensed memory of a previous experience without images (frequently met with in oui' experiments). We are of opinion that this case is to be classed with the next two we shall examine and explained as they are. Case IV. — Stimulus : " The largest Kumic is (I donH know)." Introspection: "First I had usual 'comic'; and at the same time remembered the whole experience of your showing me the flowers. Dwelling on that I developed it into vague ideas of images and flowers. Was unable to remember any as being larger than the others. Tried hard. Struck one that I was just about to infer about their large- ness. Then the previous experiment came into my mind ; and it struck me how different was the experience of inference from that of simple reminiscence. Came back ; and, to settle the matter, reacted as I did," Sp. 17", viii. 4. Here we have (a') ideas of images and flowers (concepts) ; (/5') idea of largeness ; (y') inception of an inference (" transitive thought ") ; (5') condensed ideo- presentation of previous experience ; (e') consciousness of experiential diff'erence between inference and reminis- cence; (?') reaction. Case V. — In its main features G.'s case is similar to this. Stimulus : " The first Ferod is {running)." Introspection : " I read this (and knew in foreperiod that it was ' Ferod.' Was quite pleased to think it was, and had thought of word as applicable, e.g., 'comic' 'Comic' came as stimulus was exhibited). Then I thought that was not necessarily appli- APPENDIX 253 cable to the first one. Then tried to recall image of the first one ; couldn't. But hmv he was running — that all were running, except one, and that one not the first. And so, since I could not recall image, reacted with knowledge that * running ' applied to the first. I got it as an individual from the general, although I could get no visual image," G. 7". 8, i. 10. Here we observe in order : (a') concept (inferred as present as meaning of ' Ferod ') ; (/?') thought of the ' first,' or percept of the words ' the first ' of the stimulus, and doubt as to applicability of ' comic ; ' {y) conation towards image ; (5') concept (expressing a common attribute) ; (e') syllogistic conclusion ("transi- tive thought"). We would again hold that in these two cases the mental process was of a purely conceptual character ; and that actual or potential universals alone are concerned in it as concepts. In other words, we are of the opinion that Sp.'s inchoate judgement and G.'s completed one were not true individual judgements. Our own first case from column v. is the following : Case VI. — Stimulus : " The first Ferod is {walking to right)." Introspection : " I had a sort of half perseveration and expectant attention. I knew that the idea would be easily awakened when I saw the word ; and I got the idea of 'Ferod' when it was shown. 'The first' was in conscious- ness ; and my general idea changed instantaneously into the idea of a boy whom I could recognise walking to the right — doubt if it were not to the left — with a yellow coat and a red scarf. Reaction without much certainty that it was the first — doubt that it might be the last. But it was certainly an individual localised in space and now," A. 4".8, ii. 10. 254 CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNIVERSAL We are quite confident that this case, together with our own two cases entered in column vi., is to be explained by the presence of kinaesthetic sensations, which we have frequently observed in ordinary life as giving ' individual ' meaning to words. We are able to detect these sensations, e.g., in reading or thinking " Wales." They are localised in the eyes and neck, principally, as if both were turning to the left. In- deed head and eyes actually do sometimes so turn. Now our own visual imagery is so faint and poor that we are nearly always doubtful as to whether we have images of this sort or not ; and it is plausible to suggest that these kinsesthetic sensations are substitutes for them. AVhen we read, therefore, " idea of a boy, whom I could recognise, walking to the left . . . individual localised in space and novj ;'' or Case VII. " again a localised direction towards an indi- vidual blue ' Funip ' which was inclined on a card," (vi. 2) j and Case VIII. " clearly localised intention. The black ' Lagoc ' very clearly in consciousness. Idea of its size. Clearly, quite clearly, individual," (vi. 9). We strongly suspect the presence of these kinesthetic factors. Case IX. — Our second case from column v. is as follows : — Stimulus: "The first Kumic is (blue).'^ Introspection: " A period of waiting for meaning to develop. Developed the meaning ' flower ' — ideal. This was certainly general. Followed a sort of mental movement in which idea of corn- flower was got. Very clear idea of its shape and size. Knowledge that this was the first flower. ' Blue ' came quite automatically," A. 4", ii. 4. This case might be interpreted in two ways. The APPENDIX 255 "sort of mental movement" might indicate kinesthetic setisation or imagery. Or the " idea of cornflower " may have been a potential universal and not an * indivi- dual.' We are persuaded, on account of a note made on the protocol at the time, that the latter interpretation is more probably the correct one ; and for that reason we should explain this case in the same way as those of Sp. and G. and F. Case X. — If the explanation given of these nine cases be correct, there remains but one (F. x. 2) in which an individual is ' present to mind ' without an image. The protocol is as follows : — Stimulus : " The yellow Funip is {round)." Introspec- tion: " 'Funip ' just meant the round object on the card. I didn't see a picture of it ; but I seemed to remember some- thing about * yellow Funip ' before. But no words came into my mind," F. 3", x. 2. In this case, " I seemed," says F., " to remember something about ' yellow Funip ' before." Now, as a fact, " The yellow Kumic is " was the Stimulus in ix. 4, where the reaction word of this observer was " large." 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