Ua 661 L756ti 1794 ^^B LIVERPOOL A DISCOURSE ON THE ESTAB- LISHMENT OF a NATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORCE IN ENGLAND 8 DISCOURSE ON THE ESTABL I SHMENT OF A NATIONAL and CONSTITUTIONAL FORCE IN ENGLAND. BT CHARLES LORD HAWKESBURY. =» LONDON: PRINTED FOB. JOHN STOCKDALE, PICCAD1LI.T, I794. [ Price Tvro Shillings anc^Six- pence- } I 1 5 . I 7 c // ADVERTISEMENT. Ti HE following Tract was firft publiflied in the year one thoufand feven hundred and hTty-feven, and notwithstanding it was ufhered into the world without a name, it had the defired effect. From the general fate of anonymous pamphlets, it has be- come extremely fcarce, and of courfe not to be purchafed at any price. Thofe who had it in their poiTefTion knew too well the value of the work to permit it to pafs out of their hands. The publisher has been induced, by the opinion of feveral gentle- men, to think that fuch a work, at this cri- tical time, may not be uninteresting to the public. It is but juftice to the writer, that the reader mould be informed, the book is re-printed without one word being altered, or the leaft addition made. The reader will bear in mind, that the dates ftand as in the \vork originally publiflied in 1757. Piccadilly, 48th February, 1794- 3021554 A DISCOURSE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT CF A NATIONAL and CONSTITUTIONAL FORCE IN ENGLAND. X HE Conftitution of every free Govern- ment is fubjecl from time to time to a fort of dangerous Crifis ; which demands the at- tention of all who are concerned for its pre- fervation ; a body, whofe parts are fo various, and fo nicely framed, is by nature liable to frequent difordcrs. The fluctuation of Pro- perty, the change of Manners, or difpofition in the People, and the fluffing of Power from one ( 6 ) one neighbouring ftate to another, mull; van- oufly affect it : in abfolute Monarchies, evils of this kind leldom happen, and are eafily removed by the interpolition of that Power, whofe Will is the iimplc and fole refource of fuch a Government ; but in the more com- plicated Machine of a free State greater cau- tion muft be ufed ; if the Constitution is only through Age impaired, it muft be called back to its firft principles ; but if fome new emer-, gency has arifen, a new Remedy muft be ap- plied ; fuch an one, however, is as agreeable to the nature of the Conftitution, and capable of being woven into the very fpirit of it ; left it ihould chance to form an intereil contrary to it, and in the event prove more fatal than the diforder. The Hiflory of this country abounds with more of thefe critical periods than anv other ; and it is owing to the proper, ufe our ancestors made of them, that our Government has long been advancing by various fteps towards perfection : they with- itood the repeated attempts both of Papal Innovation and Regal Oppreffion ; and though their itraggles frequently produced violent fevers in the State ; yet the Confti- 3 tution ( 7 ) tution always came forth in more perfect "health, and ibme new fecurity was obtained for our freedom : and whilft almoft every other nation of Europe, who, like us, de- fcended from one free and common ftock, long ago became the fubjects of arbitrary Power, and refigned their Liberty, this coun- try has always proved a faithful Guardian of that facred depofit, and has alone improved the Bleiling. Pofterity, however, owe a double portion of acknowledgement to thofe great Statelmen, who directed our affairs at the Revolution, for contributing more at that time than any other to the perfection and fecurity of our Conltitution : nothing fo much illuflrates the wife conduct of thefe men, as compar- ing their eftabliihments and regulations, with what was done at the preceding pe- riod of the Reftoration : — Then we find lit- tle more than meer temporary expedients, cal- culated juii to refettle the Exiled Family on the Throne ; the Rights of King and People were left unafeertained ; and what little was done in favour of Liberty, had no fumcient fecurity for its continuance ; the Wounds, that had been fo long bleeding, were ( 8 ) were fo poorly and fo ineffectually tampered with, that in a few years they opened again, and called for abler hands and more powerful remedies to heal them ; fuch was the work of the Revolution. — The wounds were then more deeply probed ; the caufes, that produced them, were endeavoured to be removed ; tail- ing (and I hope they will prove perpetual) Ordinances were eftablifhed, which fo juftly fettled the various claims of Power, that almoft feventy years have feen no farther difpute on that head : feveral of the regu- lations that were made at the Refloration were then repealed, fome as unconflitu- tional, others as ineffectual ; one Statute, however, whole purport was inadequate to the ufes for which it was intended, remained without amendment ; and by its deficiency rendered that happy fettlement not fully complete ; — the Militia Act, which pafTed the thirteenth of Charles the Second, was in it- felf a vague and ill-concerted fcheme ; and the detefl able policy of that, and a fubfequent reign, was to difarm the People ; and with the utrnoit art and application to render this Plan of a Militia ftill more ufelefs, and if any methods were propofed to make it ( 9 ) $t Serviceable, the Court would never fuffer them to be debated ; and fueli Officers as were more zealous tlian others in excrciiing their Companies were reprimanded, as Fomenters of Rebellion : — one could have wifhed there- fore that thole pcrfons, to whom we were, indebted for fo many wife regulations in the year 1688, had planned fomc new Militia Law, more capable of execution, and mora Agreeable to the temper of our Confiitution, than that, the defects of which they could not but have perceived ; fuch a work would hive completely crowned this alrnofr. perlecl: Eftablimmcnt ; Libert)' would then have relied fecure, whilft her own Votaries Held the fword> which gave her protection : and Britain, con- fiding in her own internal force, would have heard linalarmed of any attempt, which a Foreign Power might threaten againft her. I pay fo great a r'efpccl to the Patriots of that age, that I would willingly affign fomc cfceufc for this apparent neglect :- They might think, perhaps, that the Nation was not as yet fttrHcietmy calm to venture on putting antis in the hands of the People ; the late ftorms had been violent, and were but juft ovcrvj and many, who condemned B the ( io ) the conduct of the abdicated Prince, frill re- tained a ftrange attachment to his perfon — At that time alio France was juft entered into a war with all her neighbours ; and was likely to find fo much employment for her troops on her own frontiers, as not to be able to fpare any considerable number to invade this country : our ancestors, therefore, apprehen- sive of feme danger at that time in the attempt, and not convinced of its immediate neceSIity, might perhaps leave this defect to be reme- died, and more maturely confidered by their posterity, giving them this opportunity of fol- lowing their example, in framing wife re- gulations for the improvement of their coun- try, by conftituting fuch a Militia, as would be Sufficient for its defence, but in no re- Spcct dangerous to its constitution ; when- ever the nation fhould be in a better tem- per to receive it, and our Situation in re-* gard to -any foreign, enemy fhould require its Service. Such U our prefent Condition ; never was" a free people more .unanimous in their at- tachment to Government ; and whoever of fmpioious Principles yet remain, think it cither imprudent or unfafhionablc. to pro- fcis openly their opinions : we entered into 1 a War ( ,1 ) a^ War with univerfal Impatience ; and itand iingly againft a powerful Neighbour, who alone has frequently baffled the united force of Europe, and whole numerous and unem- ployed troops are now ready to take every Opportunity that may offer to invade our Country : To this we can oppofe a pow- erful Fleet, which will, I hope, be mmcient to keep the Danger at a Di trance ; and yet, when we contend for fo great a Stake, any pcrfon not liable to be alarmed with unrea- fonable Apprehensions, would with, that forae farther fecurity was provided, and that fomc internal Confiitutional Defence was cfla- blifhed ; which might prcferve us not only from the Evil, but from (what in a com- mercial kingdom eipccially is of no linall con- fequence) the frequent terrors of it ; — »can we rufficiently wonder, that a country like this, diftinguifhed by fuch a variety of blcflings, and where Commerce has heaped up fuch im- menie ft ores of wealth, lliould be lefs careful of its own fecurity, than almoft any other nation upon earth — lefs even than thole king- doms, the mileries of whole governments make them hardly worth preservation I — And yet, when we coniider the natural ad- vantages which it enjoys, we iliall find no B 2 Country, ( f ) Country, perhaps, more capable of its {;.wu (defence ; it abounds in natives ; and, as an ifland, is not flibjeifl to any fudden or un- expected attack ; it wants no garrifoncd Frontier to delay the approach of an enemy ; a lufficient time mult always be given it to put any well-concerted plan of defence into execution : as much,, however, as we have been engaged in wars for thefc lail feventy years, no fuch plan as this has as vet been eltablifhcd ;— fudden, temporary., ana* even- tually deftructive expedients have been the whole of our IMinifterial Conduct. We have jufl lived from year to, year, and all our Polk, itical art has been to deliver ourfelves in II19 la ft "Winter from the difficult •$ which we had laid ourfelves under ;n the preceding ; — To obviate, therefore, the plea or neceflity of this fluctuating conduct, a plan of National Defence wa:s propofeel in the lall Seffions of Parhameut; experience feemed then to fliew the neeeifity of it ; and our fituation required the immediate ufe of it ; we were at valt expences, and yet we neither did or fecrried able to do any thing: our Colonies were unprotected ; our Fleets were inactive, we even trembled for our Mother Country: jhc fate of this plan is too well known 3 it ob- 2. tarn ( '5 ) tajned t]ic unanimous conjfent of the Commoj^ of Great Britain, and pafled after various amende incuts and mature deliberations the lower Houfe of Parliament ; and juit as it was on the verge pf life, was crufnecj and rejected in the upper. I meddle not with the Proceedings of thofe great Aifemblics, to whole deciiipns I pay a pro- per deference, though I am unacquainted with their realbne; ; I fhall only confidcr thofe argu- ments, which I have lieard without doors urged againty this plan by thofe very few, who were not favourers of it. The firft and principal objection that has been made to this bill is, " that it will abridge *' the Prerogative of the Crown, to whom the I* Executive Power over the Militia is faid to *f have always belonged, by obliging the King 4 u before he calls it into actual fervice, to com-. " municate the occaiion thereof firft to Par-: f liament." I am forry by tliis objection to find a dilV pute again iturted ; which lb much dividet} the Lawyers and Antiquarians of the laff century, and was one great caufe of all the blood that was fhed in thofe unhappy quarrels ; eipecially as the various claims Power feena to be fairly compromised by this (laufe; ( 14 ) Claufe ; the command of the Militia being given neither to the Crown, nor to the Le- giflature feparately ; the principal part how- ever, of the execution being lodged in the King, fubjeel: in the cafe alone of calling them out, to one reftriction from the Parlia- ment : and if the fentiments of wifeft. men, unfupportcd by arguments, could iingly have any weight on a rational mind, I could fafely reft this point on the opinions of Mr. Seldon and Mr. Whiiloch, the foil of whom fpoke fo warmly in the Houfe of Com- mons againft the fole power that was claimed by Charles the Firft over the Militia, that the Court imputed to the influence of his argu- ments more than any thing elfe, the Vote that Was parTed againft them on that head ; and the latter as plainly declared in the fame place, " that the power of the Militia wag " not, according to Law, fol el y in the Crown, i( but in the King and Parliament jointly ; ' ! and yet thefe men were, not looked upon as over-violent fpirits in thoic days-, Charles had fo good an opinion of the former, that he deigned the higheft employment of the Law in his favour : and whoever perufes the fpecch of the latter, from whence the above ( IS ) above fentiment is extracted,* will be Tuf-- ficiently latisfied of his moderation. — That we may not however rely folely on the opi* nion of others, it may not be amifs to look a little into what accounts remain of the fe- veral forts of Militia, that have exifted in this Country : the fubje<5t is dark and ab- frrufe ; and yet ibme traces may perhaps from thence be diicovered of the refpective powers, that have in that particular been lodged either in King or People •, and though our inquiries on that head fhould not be fuc- cefsful, they will lead us at leait to the knowledge of thofe armies in which our an- ceftors placed their fafety ; and from whit difference of policy it has arifen, that this kingdom, when neither ib wealthy nor {o populous ao at prefent, had yet a greater in-> ternal force within it, and was more iecure from foreign Invasions. Our Saxon anceflcrs, as much as they arc ridiculed for their ignorance and barbarity, Were pofleflcd of one piece of knowledge, fuperior in real ufe to many modern refine- ments, I mean that of wifely constituting * See the fpeeeb in RnJlrMorth» civil ( i<5 ) 'civil focieties ; their military eftablifhmentj Were', however, the moil diftihguithing parts of their Governments ; by thefe they were nil bound to the defence of their country, whenever it Was attacked ; and the nature indeed of fociety feemS to require, that they, who enter into it for the prefcrvaiion of their property, mould equally join in repelling any attempt that might be made upon it ; this obligation, therefore, was the common fealty and allegiance which every native owed • and which, if neglected or refuted, accord- ing to the old Saxon Law, rendered the party guilty of High Treafon againil his Country, and his eii ate under the penalty of forfeiture: « — Thefe were called forth into fervicc aS often as occaiion Required, by the command , was to fleece his own creatures under pretence of lines and Compositions : thefe Statutes, however, continued no longer in force lhau bis Life. D 2 Thr ( 28 ) The next material particular that concerns the Militia, we meet within the Reign of Queen Mary, in the fourth year of which we rind that a new afieffment of Arms was made upon the People according to their PofTef- lions ; that, which had been made fo long ago as the thirteenth of Edward the Firft, remained itill in force ; the proportions of it were, how- ever, become very unequal, as Property had iince that time very much increafed in value, and paffed through various alterations. This laft Affeflmcnt purtiicd the fame plan as the former, and affefled not only the PofTefTors of Lands, but alio of Goods, and went fo low, that he, whole wealth exceeded not the va- lue of Ten Pounds in Chattels, was com- prehended in it ; but this Statute, by reafon of the too great proportions which it im- pofed, laired not long ; for, in the firft year of James the Firft> it was repealed ; and, by the twenty-fifth of the fame King, the thir- teenth of Edzvard the Firft was alfo taken away. So that this Species of a Militia feems by thefe repeals to have been wholly extin- paiihed ; and though that great obligation (which every member of fociety muft al- 3 way* ( "-9 ) ways be under, and which was one of the flrft principles of our Conititution), of being obliged. to defend the Community, whenever it was attacked, could not but ftill fubfift ; yet as no pofitive Law was left to direct the fubjecl in what manner he was to give his ailiftance ; the his power is without bounds ;— to do wrong, he has conftitutionally no power ; Co that in a political fenfe he may truly be faid, to be blefled with the knowledge of Good, with- out being curft with that of Evil ; whoever, therefore, would put him in a capacity of knowing the latter, h fo far from being a friend to his Prince, that he is his great Enemy and Seducer; one who would drive ftim from his ftatc of innocence and per- fection, ( 40 ) feel ion, and rob the Crown of its rrioft c!if- tinguifhing Prerogative ; which makes it more fceure and glorious to him that wears it than that of any abfolute monarchy can be. The iecond objection that has been made to the propofed fcheme was, " that it would " alter the difpolitions of the people of this <• Country — check the vein and inclina- * tion they Ihew at prcfcnt towards com- ic mcrce and manufactures — and convert a " rich and peaceable nation into a military, " and perhaps feditious people;" — I mall connder what opinion former precedents and reafon would inltrud us to entertain on this point. There is fomething in the conftrtutioa of every abfolute monarchy that prevents its making any very considerable progrets in Trade; in fuch States the enjoyment of property is too precarious; but I think it undeniable, that the Commerce of Spain and France arrived at the greateft height, of which the nature of fuch governments is capable, at the farae time that the dif- politions of their people were moll turned to war; and that the military and commer- cial glories of each Nation were nearly- at ( 4i ) their Vneridiari together: — when Spain pro- duced the beft foldiers in Europe, and her aim was Universal Empire, her commerce was alio exteniive ; the lame lpirit made her both brave and indnftrious, gave Courage to her Armies, and Life to her Manufactures, ex- tended her dominions on the European Continent;, and fent her to unknown climes in iearch of new wealth and new poflemons ; — but when the glory of her arms was ex- tinguifhed, her Commerce alfo decayed, and fhe became at once both lazy and unwar- like ; from the time of the Pyrenean Treaty, France gained the afcendant in power, and at the fame time received, as it were, from her rival an inclination towards trade; the chief pamon of her Natives teemed then to be martial glory, and her armies were more numerous than thofe of any other Nation ; and yet, during this conjuncture, for the fpace of about forty ♦years, fhe made her largcfl advances in Trade.— —I cuter not into the reafons of this at pre- terit ; the fact alone is fumcient to prove, tliat a military lpirit and a commercial diipolilion have fometimes met in the fame People. . , - F But ( 4* ) But, if \vc caft our eyes on the annals of Free States, which are more properly the nurieiics of Commerce ; we mall find the above truth illullrated in a ftronger manner ; no Country ever made in a few years fo great a progrefs in Trade as the United Provinces ; their Hupping was at one time computed to be more than what belonged to all the reft of Europe put together ; and yet their Wealth and Commerce mcreafed in this prodigious manner, while they were engaged in a war of fifty years continuance in the heart of their own country ; while moft of their trading towns were Fortreftes, ^arrilbned by Burghers, and while the natives of this Republic, from eighteen years of age- to iixty, were obliged by the Union of Utrecht, to be armed and trained ; but fince this firffc rftablifhcd Militia has been neglected ; fince they trufted their defence to Foreign Mercena- ries i and fince of late they have hardly been defended at all : their Commerce has been gra- dually on the decline. Sir William Temple ob- serves, that in his time it was pail its meridian ; and tome approaching period perhaps may fheir both this and their power fetting together. Wl lqever ( 43 ) Whoever alfo has but cursorily perilled the Hiitory of our own Country mult nave 6b- ferved, that thole reigns, in which the martial ipirit of our People has molt appeared, have been no lets diltinguifhed by the ad- vances, that were then made in Commerce ;— >- I fhall inftance only in the reign of Edward the the Third, when Scotland, France, and Spain, felt the fuccclsful efforts of our Arms ; when the National Militia was in vogue, often trained, and frequently called into fervice; when the Legiflature thought it an object worthy their attention, and palled feveral laws In its favour,— and what part of our annals can produce more good Statutes in fupport of trade ? Or, did Commerce at any time take larger itrides towards perfection ? — This cannot be better proved, than by ob- ferving, that in the twenty-eighth year of this King, our Exports were to our Imports, as. more than Seven to One ; this was a lur- prifing Balance of Trade \\\ oiu favour ; and jfhews that our Manufactures mult at that time have been in a flourifhing condition, that our people were by no means idle, and that their Military Accomplishments, which (hey were ready at all timci to exert in the Y z fervice ( 44 ) fervicc of the public, proved no obilruclion tq the attention they otherwife paid to their do r mcilic occupations. But we need not enter into a long deduc- tion of historical fa els to prove this ; lince Rcafon, a better guide, will teach us, that a certain degree of Military ftrength in a na- tion is abfolutely necefTary, as well for the Encouragement as the Prefcrvation of Trade. Commerce loves fecurity, not fuch as can arife from the protection of another, but fuch as places the power in her own hands ; and on which, fhe can fully depend, —No one will labour to " have," if he is not certain he fhall be, able to " hold." A precarious pofTeffion would be but a bad encouragement to dangerous voyages and painful occupations ; and no Merchant will with zeal and pleafurp apply himfclf to Trade, unlefs he has a good opinion of the wifdom and conduct of the /rate, that is to fecure his aequifitions ; — that it is eflablifhed on foundations which cannot ealily be fhaken, nor confequently in danger of any iudden Revolution ; and as he requires good Laws to proteel him from domeflic oppreflions, lb mufl he no lets ( 45 ) Jcfs have a well-conftitutcd internal force to fecure him from foreign invaiions. Betides, we may allp.w fome degree of rcafonable ambition to every honeft Trader; which ftimulates him in his pr-pfeflion, by the hopes he entertains of being qualified^ by means qf his acquisitions, to bear a fhare pne time or other in the government of his Country ; but if fuch a State is defpieable abroad, and defenceless at home, how much mult this laudable fting and encouragement be diminifhed, when the Government, by its ill conduct, is gpt below liis ambition, and when, long before the happy period of his pre-eminence can arrive, his Country and his own pofieffions may have perifhed {ogcther ? And if an internal Force was ever nccef- fary for the fupporl; of Trade, it is now more particularly ib, when our numerous and diftant Colonies demand the protection of our Navies — when our Commerce is vul- nerable in more parts than it was formerly, and our Fleets muft leave the head of our dominion, whofc defence was once their pnly occupation, to repel every attack that may be made on the exterior parts of it; ( 4* ') it ;-— they can no longer parade it in our channel alone ; the molt diftant coafts of the ' world demand their fervice ; and ex- perience convinces us of the neceffity of this dilemma, either that we mull ettablifli r»n internal Conftitutional Force for the De- fence of our own Country, and fend forth our Fleets for the Protection of our Colonies, or keep our Navy at home for the preiervation of the former, and leave the latter an eafy prey to the tirit enemy that fhall feize upon them. Allow, however, for once, the objection its full force, " that fuch an imtitutiop " would check the commercial difpoiitioh *f of our people." —But woultj it in fuch a cafe be wife to rifk the enjoyment of a iufficiency with fafety, for the fake of fome trifling acquiiiucn ? Shall we g;ve up our fe- curity, which was the principal motive of our entering into fociety, for the intereit of our Commerce, which is only the embellifh- ment of it ? Was not the deiign of Riches and Trade, to enable a community the -bet- ter to prefervc ;ts independence ? And thall wc, therefore, cultivate the means to that ;->trav3gant degree,, as abiblutcly to deftroy 3 <*W ( 47 ) the enetj for which they were eitablifhcd;- if we leave our Country defcncelefs, the more rich it grows, it becomes the more deiireable morfel, and tempts, as it were, its enemies to deftroy it ; Hufbandmen and Artificers muft turn Soldiers, when the conteft is, who ihall have the land and merchandise ; and though Plato and Arlf- totle liave julily blamed Lycurgus for hav- ing infrillcd too martial a fpirit into the. Laws of his Republic ; yet they would certainly have pafled no lefs a cenfure on that Lawgiver, who fhould frame the wifeil institutions to make a People free and wealthy, without eftablifhing a proper force for the fecurity of thofe Enjoyments. But tliib objection farther urges, * that, » " if fueh an Inftitution was neceffary againlt. " foreign Invafions ; yet by arming the Peo- " pie, they will be made feditious, and ** of courfe become dangerous to the inter- " nal frame of the Government." — I fee plainly from whence this apprehenfion firft arofe ; — Peribns, who perufe the hiitory of this Country, but who from an igno- rance of its Laws enter not fufficiently into the fpirit of its Institutions, have built this objection ( 48 ) objection on the civil difTeniions which tnc Barons were once able to raife by means of the Feodal Militia ; but it is certain that the People were not as principals concerned in thole Wars : not they, but the Barons were feditious ; they fought indeed for their refpecTtive Lords whenever they called upon them ; but it was not from any fpirit of Rebellion: it was, becaufe the Law of Te- nures commanded, and the neceffity of fubfiilence obliged them ; they were fome- times indeed in a moll unhappy Dilemma, when the Law of the Crown called them one way, and the obligation of their Fees another ; this inconvenience, however, ought not to be considered as the ill effect of a ,Militia ; but becaufe the command of it was lodged in improper hands : this I allow to be a point of moil ferious conlequence. — As luch, I have treated it in the former part of this Difcourfe, — in the propoicd Plan the command is given to thole, who can never ufe it to the deilruction of their Country ; over this Militia no undue or dangerous influence can ever be gained ; the parts, of which it confifls, will be perpetu- ally changing ; it is abfurd therefore to argue againft ( 49 ) againfl a thing in general, becaufe a parti- cular fpeeies of it has, through a defect iii the inftitution, been converted to illegal pur- pofes ; the moll facred things have fome- times been abufed ; and it Would be childifh to impute to any inftrument the ill effects that may be "produced by it, when a madman has got it into his pofleffion; . Look through the Annals of the World, and fee if any one inftance of a Militia can be produced, that was icditious of itfelf, or of a People, who, when the fword was put into their hands, converted it to their own deftruclion. — Free States have almofl al- ways been fubjedt to commotions, and the fame have generally been defended by a Militia ; but that the Military Eftablifh- ments of fuch a People were the caufe of their commotions can never be proved ; — ■ the Republic of Carthage is a lingular in- ltancc* of a free people, that owed their de- fence to mercenary foldiers ; and yet Hie was neverthclcfs fertile in diiTcnflons ; — and though Rome had as many Soldiers as Citi- zens, though her Senators and Plebeians had frequent contcfts for power, where the Balance was unequally adjuftcd, yet hef G People, ( 50 J fVople, when in the grcatcit. fury, and when" driven by injuiticc almofl to defpair, never once had rcoouffe to arms ; they urged their claims by fnpplications and feceffions ; and though disciplined and ready at all times to take up -arms, in the defence of- their Coun- try, they never lifted up a hand againft it ; for feveral centuries not a life was loft amidft all their Contentions ; and it was not until the nature of their armies was chang- ed, until their legions received pay, were tranfported into diftant Provinces, and never fuiFered. to return to their domeftic Occu-> pations; in a word, not until the honeft Militia-Men of Rome were changed into Standing Forces, that their contefts blazed out into civil wars deftruclive to the Common- wealth, The Miferics and Oppreffions, which feme States, have fufTered from the com- mon fort of armies, have made many ab- furdly apprehenlive, that a Firelock or a red Coat mull necefTa.rily alter the difpo- iltio.n of the perfons who have them ; they do . not obfervc, that thefe evils have arifen from fuch only, who have made war their profeffion ; it is the idle and diffolute man- ner ( 5> ) ncr of living, that alone debauches the Sol- dier's inclination, when without home, with- out indultry, and without occupation he mull fubiift either by pay or by plunder ; Armies compofccl of fueh as thcfe have fometjmes enflaved a Nation under pretence of doing themfelves jullice ; our Hiftory furnifhes a remarkable initance of this kind, which fhews clearly what it is that converts a Soldier into a Rebel, and makes him dan- gerous to his Country. As gallant an army as this Nation ever law, and which at the fame time was particularly ftiled the Modejl and Self-denying, conlifted of the Youths of London, who, though unufed to arms and drawn in ha lie out of Town, gave fignal proof of Courage through the whole Civil Wars, and at Lift defeated the Royal Ar- my by one decifive blow at Nafeby : If this Army of the Parliament, after they had done the bufinefs for which they were called out, had been fent back to their Trades, and had only been made ufe of, 03 there was occafion for them, they would then have been in the nature of a Militia, and there would have been no (i z dang ( 5* ) danger to have apprehended from them— but by keeping them for feveral years con- stantly in the field, after the war was over, by training them to idlenefs, and making them forget their Trades, and depriving them of the common methods of fubfif. tence, they were made not at all the bet, ter Soldiers, but became the worfe Citi- zens ; their difpofitions were totally per- verted ; their modefty changed to prefump- tion ; they grew imperious and feditious ; they refufed to go. to Ireland though they were commanded $ neither would they be diibanded, though the Parliament had no other occaflon for their fervice,— they petiti- oned r— they remonitrated — they rebelled — and at length deftroyed the Authority of that Parliament which at firit called them forth, and had performed fuch wonders by their aflilrance. I mail here, therefore, reft this point, and will only obferve, that whatever force there is in this lafl Objection, it mutt hold uni- verfally againft every fpecies of Militia ; for- if the people by being armed will be made idle and feditious (and without armin '§ ( S3 ) them to fome degree, no Militia, I am lure, can be cftablifhed) it will be a reafou againft every other Plan that fhall be of- fered ; and they who urge it, muft be againft the principle of a Militia itfelf, or they do not fully comprehend the force of their own arguments ; and when they accufe thofe as guilty of calumny, who on this account aflert, that they are againft that Constitutional Principle,, they mould consider whether they are not themfclvcs in fai I the calumniators, and whether their own words do not convict them of the reproach, which they \o much dread from the tongues of others. The next Objection that } have hcaffi urged againft a Constitutional Force of this fort is, " That it is not practicable in tins (i country ;" let any one reflect: that al- moft all the ancient Governments, and even this Kingdom, was once defended by a Militia ; let him alio observe, that fome nations owe at prefect their protection to it ; and he will need no other argument to convince him, that England cannot '•■ jfo peculiarly unfortunate, as to be alone in- ( a pubic <* ( 54 ) capable of fuch an inftitution ; Abfolute Mo- narchies would be glad of fuch a defence 4 but they feldom have it, becaule they dare not truft it ; the freedom however of this nation particularly fits it for a Militia ; and fhall we then reject an advantage, which the nature of our Government has given us over moft of the other ftates of Europe t But it will be faid, perhaps, that it is only meant, " that the prefent Plan is impraUi- " cable" — Let a better then be propofed. — — I argne not fo much for particular fchemes as for general Principles ; — or let them aflign fome reafons for this objection ; I never heard but one, which was, " that u the gentlemen of the country would not at- " tend to the execution of it : " I own, I have a better opinion of my countrymen; and I am fure, the Impatience they have fhewn for fuch an eilablifhment is a considerable prefumption in their favour ; and if they mould at length difappoint our expecta- tions, they will fhew thcmfelves unworthy our constitution, and difqualified for a itate of liberty ; and having thus failed in a point fo indifpenfably necefTary for the fecurity of ( 55 ) of a free Government, we had better openly at once refign it ; — but if they fhould in fome few particulars neglect their duty, the propofed Scheme has provided an adjutant and forty ferjeants to each batta- lion ; who are to be constantly paid and employed in training the men that arc un- der them ; thefe will probably be found alone fuflicient for that purpofe ; and arc not many lefs, perhaps, than contribute in reality - to the difcipline of any one batta- lion in our .fervice; and as to the fpirit of thefe. ruitic officers, when -called into the field, I cannot think that the love of li- berty, and the love of their country, arc yet. become Inch antiquated notion:-, and are lb entirely foreign to their breafts, that they will not animate their conduct in the fame manner, as they once did the conduct of their ancciiors ; and that they will not, on a proper occalion, awake in them that pub- lic-fpirited enthufiafm which inflames the mind, and kindles a glow of courage w**' 1 - in it, fupcrior to what the weaker motives of intcrcit, or even of honour, are able to infpire; in this refpect, however, our national character ( i« ) oiiaraclcr would at Icafl make us hope, what nothing but future experience can pofitivcly determine* I allow, indeed, that the talents and know- ledge which are requisite to form a great Ge- neral, muft he as cxteniive as any of which Vac human mind is capable— but I cannot think that the profeflion of a common foldier re- quires either much genius or application ; the' reft will cafily be acquired, if courage be not Wanting : and as nature has endowed man- kind witli different degrees of it, fo nothing Contributes more to improve and inflame it, than the hope of rewards and the fear of }3unilhmcnts ; — the firit of thefe motives will peculiarly afffcet the militia-man ; the prefer- Vation of whofe freedom^ whofe freehold, and whole family, will be the confequencet »nd reward of his victories J and if he ihould not difcharge his duty in the time of aciioii, he will be liable equally witli *he common foldier to all that the Military Law can inflict; and he will fuffer the ad- ditional punifhment of the lofs of all his pOlTeffions ; for if the public enemy ihould not happen to feizc upon them; the enjoy- ment ( 57 ) ?nent win ftill be loft to him, who rmift quit them through fhame, or live on them with difhonour. If they, who hold the force of liich an eftablifhment in contempt, would but penile the hillory of their own country, they would find that the BritiJ/j Militia was always fa- mous for a truly martial fpirit ; — in the bat- tles, where this alone was engaged, a much greater number loft their lives than what arc ilain in the lefs bloody encounters of the prefent ago, though the engines of war were then by no means fo dcflrucKvc as at prefent ; — can . greater diu inline be fhewn,. than when each man perifhes in his rank ? And can we doubt the courage of thofe armies, whole victories were generally fo complete, that one alone would often prove conclnlivc in favour of him who obtained it ? Is it that the fpirit of our people h decayed ? or aie tin; excrehes and evolu- tions of modern armies more difficult than the ancient ? or is more genius now re- quired to pull a trigger than formerly to draw a bow-ftring ? Can we no where at prefent find that Heady perfevcring fpirit. II which ( 5» ) which fp much diftinguifhcd the London Militia at the hattle of Newbury f And where is now that glowing courage, whic|x enabled fifteen hundred men of Inijkilling % almoft without arms, to defeat ten thou- sand regular troops entrenched in a bog, and take their General prifoner ? — I may be thought, perhaps, to degrade the military art, when I fay, that I can fee no reafon why a country-fellow may not as eaflly learn to handle his arms as to play at cricket ; and why, like this, it may not become his divcriion ; the public games of ancient go- vernments conhTted principally of martial entertainments; and why may not the Brl- ttflo Youth amufe themfelves in playing at foldiers, as well as the Grecian, the Ro- man ? All the heroic act's, with which the hif- tories of thofe Commonwealths abound, were performed by Militias ; they did not find it impoiTible to difcipline their own citizens ; and yet, if we may believe the modern writers on the art of war, the Tac- tics of thofe ftatei; had more of genius, and were more refined than the prefent ; — mofl ( 59 ) moft of the nations alio of Europe were till within thefe three centuries 'defended bv Militias ; — and did not Holland, when her own citizens were obliged to be train- ed, defend herfelf againlt the power of Spain ? Could the arms of Philip, con- dueled by the genius of the Prince of Parma } ever penetrate far into her country ? and did not the lieges of Harlaem, Alcamar, and Lcyden, when they were garrifoned only by their own Burghers, break the Spirit of the Spanijh veterans ? and yet this very country was over-run, and moil of her towns taken, in the fpace of a month, in the year 1672, when the defence thereof was en- trufted to 25,000 mercenaries : — It is ufelefs to cite any more examples ; — the very origin of Handing forces fhews, that they were not thought indifpenfably necefTary for the defence of a country ; they were full railed to fup- prefs rebellious fubjects, to command the un- willing fubjcclion of diftant and oppreffed provinces — or to extend the conquefis of fome nfpiring Prince into diltant countries, for Which he could not legally command the fet- \ ice "f the Militia. H a Iihali (.6o > ( ihall leave it to pcrfons who ave ikilled in military knowledge, to determine, whether the precife number of days that are appointed by this Plan for the training this Body of Men, is fufficient j— *if they are not, I am tare they ought to be aug- mented ; and the conli deration of fome trifling expenee, or fome little lofs in trade, ought not to be put iu the balance againft Security. The rotation, however, that is propofed, feems to be fo far from being an Objection, that Marfhal Saxe, in hi3 .Reveries, lias defcribed a method fomcthing like this, as the beit way of recruiting the French army ; he recommends that the whole People of France fhould be obliged to ferve for five years by turns ; this h© thinks would be the moft probable mcan$ of procuring good foldiers ; neither does he imply the leait doubt from the fhort time which each individual would in fuch a cafe ferve, that there would be any de- fect in the discipline of fuch an army. But I am ft ill more inclined to think, that the Regulations of the propofed Plan are fully adeijuate to the purpofes for which they are ( 6i ) arc intended, as they exactly eorrefpond with the rules of the befl-regulated Militia, that at prefent iubiiits in Europe. The re- gulations of Switzerland, and the propoled Plan, agree in forming the Militia of Part only of the people, and recruiting it out of the remainder. Both allow Pay in the Time alone of Service, with this only difference, that the Swift give their Officers double Pay for the iirlt month, to enable them to purchafe their Field-Equipages ; and this amend* ment might not be improperly adopted into our Plan — Both agree in (loathing their Militias in a Uniform — in providing a pub- Ik: Depofitory for their arms — in exercifing them alter divine Service on Sundays — and- in teaching them to hit a mark by (hooting at Butts. The S:i ifs have an Officer called a Com*' miflioncr of Arms ; whole employment i* v much the fame as that of the Adjutant in our Plan ; — Loth are to ride from one Com- pany to another, to fee that the Men arc properly trained, and that they take propel •.are of their Arm9 and Accoutrements ; — ■ the Swifs have a fuperioT Officer, called a j, < j rand ( 62 ) Grand Major, over every Diitrict, whofe em-" ployment refembles that of the Lord-Lieu- tenants of our Counties ; both command the Militia of their refpective Diviiions — are obliged at certain times to review them — and to fee that all inferior officers difchanre; their duty. Upon the whole, the two Plans differ only in a few particulars, in which the Ehglffi one teems to have the advantage. Four Serjeants are to be appointed to each Company of the Evgli/h Militia, and are td be veteran Soldiers draughted out of the re- gular Corps ; thefe are to be conftantly paid, that they may the better attend to the train- ing of the common men ; — nothing of this fort caa be found among the Swift regu- lation?, The Swift find their own arms, the Eng~ lljk are to be fuppllcd by the Public ; the latter will probably by this means be better and more uniformly armed. — Tho Szvifs have feveral regulations for giving a fudderi alarm in cafe of an unexpected Invasion, and for calling their Militia on any enaer- gency together ; but our happy Situation, ias an liland, renders all care of this fort unnecerTary> ( 63 ) uniieccflary, and puts it out of the power of an Enemy to make any cqnfiderable attempt upon us, without our having notice Sufficient to be prepared for it. It is by means of fuch an lnftitution as this, that the little country of Switzerland is able to call together fourfcore thoufand brave men at all times for its defence ; and fo fmall is the charge of maintaining them, that although the People qi this Republic lefs loaded with Taxes than thofe of any part of the world bciide, yet they arc able tq fave out of their common Revenue a niidcrable turn of money yearly, which they keep in their Treafuries againft any emergent occafion ; and the furpriiing acts of valour, which this Militia has performed have induced an ingenious Writer to draw a parallel between the military Achieve- ments of this little Collection of Cantons, and thole of the free States of Greece :• — 1 [e puts in competition with the Battle of Ma- rathon, that of Morgarten, where 1300 Swifs routed the Army of the Arch-Duke Leopold, coniiliins; of 20,000 men, and killed twi e their own number : — He conliders the Ac- Lion of Sempacb, where the fume Arch- Duke ( 64 ) Puke 1 oil his life, and 20,000 of his men, were routed by i6oq Swifs, as a more fiuv priiing Victory than that of Platen ; — and, to crown all, the Battle that was fought in tho Pafs of IVejhi) in the Canton of Glaris, is a Copy that exceeds its Original which was fought at 'Thermopylae : for as 300 Spartans tried to repel the army of Terfui 114- ibe-fo Streights, and all perifhed in the attempt ; u> in fuch another. Defile, 350 Swifs attacked at leaft 8000 Aujtrians, and gained the Field of Battle.—--It is furprifing, fays this Author, what a Spirit the remembrance of this Ac- tion inftils into this People^ they yearly celebrate it by a public Procelwon an the Spot where it was fought ; and where eleven Pillars, erecied for that purpofe, fhew the-' Places where thefe, Heroes eleven times rallied •;. at each Pillar they offer up Thanks to God, and when they come to. the laft, one of their belt Orators makes a Paneirvric in Praife of thefe three hundred and fifty men, ancj at the end of his Oration reads a Lift of their JS T ames in the fame manner as the Spartans- had the Names of thole who fell at low as to be inadequate to the purpofes"- fos < 6; ) for -which it is intended,— -or to raife it io high as to make it one time or other dan* serous to our Constitution ; for certain it is, that any number of Troops which will be fufficicnt to repel the itrength of France, will have the Power, if they fhould have the Inclination, to enflave us ; and that they who can defeat them, who would other- wife be fuperior to us, muft necefTarily have this country at their mercy.— —Or, if it was pofliblc to fuppofe, that an Army, thus modelled and powerful, could not be in- duced to defeat, by one baity blow, the public-fpirited labours of fo many Centuries and that it would be even wife in a free People, to rely on their virtue in this par^ ticular — may we not itijl have reafon to apprehend, that by the influence and de- pendancc of lo large a body, an intcrcfr may be created, dangerous and repugnant to the fpirit of our Government, — which may direct, the Legislature in an improper manner, though it may not at once fubvert it ; — which will operate infeniibly to our deilruclion ; and, though lefs violent in its progrefs than the former Evil, will be no \cis iatal to the {.'oniUtution ? | 2 Here, ( 68 ) Here, indeed, it may juftly be replied, that thefe dangers arc very far remote., and that we are not only fecure at prefent from ^ny apprchenfions of this kind, but that we alfo poflbfs a large flock of freedom in rcverfion ; fince there is an Heir to the Crown, whom nature has adorned with virtues, pe- culiarly calculated to make the people of this Country hereafter happy, and who will pro- long for many years the free fpirit of his Grandfather's Government : — But it is the duty of an EngUfhman to be even timidly fufpicious in the concerns of his liberty, and to labour for its continuance in his mofl re- mote poilerity ; to accept, with gratitude, the favours of good Princes, but to fecure him- felf with caution againit the oppreffions of the bad. — - — And, fhall we ,not be carelefs Guardians of our Country's Rights, if lulled aflcep by fome temporary advantage, we ihould not defcry a diftant danger, or through indolence ihould not labour to pre- vent it ? But, if there was no danger in this method., the expence of it is alone a fufficient rcafon to ■ • it : a Militia, conlifting of upwards of 60,000 men,, will colt, one year with another, under ( h ) under 160,000!. and will put the Nation to no further charge, but only during the time of an actual invafion : — A regular rianding Force, of the fame number, will exceed two, millions a year — 8000 Hejtans, with all the concomitant expences, for this fummer's fcr- vice only, will coft near $oo,oool, and the whole of the expence of the land forces for this year, (though we fhall have acted every where on the defenhye,) will probably exceed three millions ; and though the cfta- blifhmcnt of this- year will not be equal to the number propofed by a Militia, by fe- veral thoulands, it will furpafs it in expence by almoft twenty times the fum ; — I calculate only in the grofs, for my argument doc> not require exactnefs ; fince the experience of laft winter, and the difficulties which our Minifters found to difcover new Taxes, on which to borrow the money, plainly proves, that we iliall not long be able, in the time of war alone, to raiie a much lets fum than thefe calculations require; and we on to be at the fame expence to keep up thefe troops in the time of peace) if we mean to have them always ready, and to be to- tally freed from all apprehcalions ; the ra ignorant, ( 7° ) ignorant, however, mull know, that a con^ itant charge of this fort is beyond the abi- lities of this exhaufted Country. This alone would be fufricient for its deflruction, and would lave its enemies the trouble of an in- yafion, But let us fuppofe, " that there would be no * need of maintaining thefe troops but in " time of war, and that they might be ^ raifed juft as occalion requires.". But would they, for that reafon, be the lefs dan- gerous to our Conftitution ? Is it not at the evening of a war that thofe fatal firokes are generally given, when an Army flufhe4 with its victories, and proud of its achieve- ments, thinks its own merits never funi- ciently rewarded, and dreads its approaching jdi Ablution ? And, is the charge of new levies fo very inconfiderable ? Which Mon- ficucull (who undcrftood the detail of thefe things better than any man) obferved to be fo great, that he advifed his mailer on the principle of ceconomy, to keep the fame number of forces always on foot, rather $haa be at the expence of railing them afrelh at the conimcncement of every war j and would it not in fuch a lituation be in the power of our enemies, by a pretended i alarm, ( 7i ) alarm, to force us into luch an eXpencc, whenever they pleafed; and almoft to terrify us into our deilruclion, and to make us, like forttc timid animal, run ourfelves down with fright, when perhaps no real danger is ncar us ? r .\nd after all, can we cticem tliefe new levies, raifed in hafie and collected out of the dregs of the people, preferable to, or bet- ter difciplined than a National Militia, who will at lea ft bare learned fomctliinjr of their bufinefs before they arc called into fervice ? I fear, indeed^ that it is the inexperience of* thefe new levies, that makes England feldom fuccefsful at the beginning of a war ; and tha* it is tl>c great expence whieh they coft, and the great burden, which a Minifter muft nccef- laril) lie under on fuch an occafion, that make'? him never enter info a War lb focn as the tntereft of his Country requires. What a wretched fluttering living is 3 BritijJj Minifter at the eve of a War ? More' afraid of his private enemies than thofe of >iis Country; lie delays engaging with t • one, that he may avoid the attai k of the other; and that he may keep his em- power the longer unmo! I he lets the power of his Country he diminifhed, and her honour be intuited — at length, when ( f* ) the - enemy have had time to carry their point, and have already got pofleilion of what is contended for, compelled by cla- mour, he plunges into a war : — Confounded and irrefolute, he now pretends to guide the Helm of a great State through the ftorm, with hardly his own wits about him — his firlt ftudy and expence is to protect the Continent — his fecond to preferve himfelf, — his lait to defend his country — he is at a vail charge for new levies, which will be •railed, when they arc no longer wanted j and difciplined by that time they are to be broken; — and under the pretence of a neceffit} of his own creation he detains the Briti/h Fleet in port, after having expend- ed millions in equipping it with cannon that arc never to lire, and fails, that arc never to be unfurled. — Is this the art of government? This fenfelefs, deftmciive, ill-concerted piece of con- fuiion ? And lhall we prefer this to a Con- ftitutional Internal Force, on which a regular plan of action may be formed, which will make us always fecurc at home, and enable us to be victorious abroad ? One more method of defence remains to be confulercd, which is that in which we at ( 73 ) at prcfent place our truit, " the defence- of " foreign Mercenaries. 1 ' The expence of tlicle would alone be a fufrieient objection to them, which is greater in every parti- cular, than the charge of a ftanding army of native foldicrs ; for betides their fub- flftcncc, which they receive at the fame rate as our National Troops, we pa}- for them fubfidy-mony, — levy-money, — tranf- porting-moncy, — recruiting-money ; ever, one of wlrich Articles arc carried to a van: height ; and for feme of them we pay double what they coil the Prince who iupplies them ; — but the more materia*! arguments againit them is, that they are more dangerous even than a ftanding army- can be to our Conftitution. — I fhall here fpeak with caution; for if I was to urge all the objections which might be brought againft troops of this fort, efpeeially at a time when we are under the unhappy nc- ceflity of employing them, I may appear, 1 perhaps (what 1 am lure is not my inten- tion) dehrous of inflaming; my country- men may form fome idea of their danger from one or two inJianeos in their owiv hiftorv — frobps of this fort have always been unufefui or dangerous to whoever em-. K ploys ( 74 ) ploys them ; their conduct at firft has ge- m-rally been peaceable and enfnaring- — at lail feditious and deflruclive ; and thofc ftates, that have carried the points, 'which, they intended by their affiftancc, have ufually. in the event, been emlaved bv them ; Machiavelli fpeaks fully on this point, " lc ic Mercenarie, fono inutili & pericoloie, iC & fe uno^uomo ticne lo ftato fuo fon- iC dato in fu 1'armi Mercenarie non fara " mai fermo ne ficuro," and afterwards he afhgns the reafon, " la cagione di qnefto, il e, che non hanno altro amore nc altra cagione le tenga in campo, che un poeo di ftipendio, ilquale non e fufficiente a " tare, che ei voglino morire pe te." And after having produced a great number of examples out of the hiftory of the Italian ftates to prove this, he concludes " & fu " fempre opinionc &c fententia digli huo- " mini favii, che nicnte iia coii infermo & <: inftabile, come la fama dclla potenza non " fondata nelle ferze proprie." There is. alio a farther reafon, which Machiavelli was not aware of, that particularly difqualifics a free people for any army of this nature ; — the unreafonable jealouiies which Inch a Nation will contract concerning them, and ( 75 ) the ill-treatment they will in eonfequence thereof, perhaps, fhew to them, may pro- voke the molt regular and beft disciplined troops to do that through refentment, winch through inclination they never intended ; "never finely did troops behave thenilelves with more exacl difcipline than thofe which our Legiflature lias thought proper to invite at prelent to our aiftftanev ; and yet I would alk the good-natured part of my Countrymen^ whether, on this occafion, their own ardent and laudable love of liberty, through a miltake in the application of it, has not trefpafled a little on their humanity ? > — And if aH the above arguments were in- nifrieient ; it is certainly beneath the dig- nity of a great and independent Nation to rely upon thofe for its defence, whom they are not fare they can always obtain, when they want them, — or even keep, when their lcr\ ice 13 moll required. It remains, therefore, that a Notional Mili- tia is the only defence on which this coun- .try can fafelyrely, or which it can afford to keep ; the conrlant charge of* this will be im- material, and thru we fhall only be obliged to part with any conuderablc fum for its fup- poif, when the fafcty of the Whol is K 2 in ( ?6 ) ill danger ; and if we at the fame time keep up our ftanoing Force to fomcdiing more than the prcfent Eftablifhment in time of peace, thefe two bodies would be a mu- tual aid and check to each other ; the laft would be in the nature of the old feo- dal Militia, and would more immediately be under the command of the Crown ; the lirit would rcfemble the old National Militia, and would in a more cfpecial man- ner be the Army of the Legiflature — the one would repel any fudden infult ; the other any premeditated Invafion — the one might on a proper oceafion carry the glory of our Arms into diitant Countries ; the other iliew the liability of them at home ; . — the one would be our oftenlive Arms ; the other our defeniive ; — the one would be the fword of the Commonwealth ; the other its impenetrable Buckler ; and both together would form one uniform plan of Government, which would make us hardly ieniiblc of the eonfufions of war, and re- duce it almoit to the calmncfs of peace ; — the fame fleady 4 manly, . regular, con- duct would appear in both ; every temporal ry, and violent expedient would be made uri- ( 77 ) unnecefTary ; the exorbitance of Taxes would in time be reduced ; and we fhould then no longer be obliged to augment a debt, till at lail it dcitroys us, — though perhaps in the midit of fuecciTes ; which makes us, in (a£t, always weaker by our Conquefts, and poorer by our Acquifitions ; .and war would then no more be a Fever of the State, "which, let the event be good or bad, has conftantly preyed on the vitals of this Country. Upon the whole, therefore, if it has been furhciently proved, that in the Plan, which was laft year propofed for efiablifhing a Na- tional Militia, the command of it was placed in luch hands, as the Principles of our Conllfc- tution require, that the trade of this Coun- try will not be diminiihed at all by fuch -an Inftitution ; or if at all, no more than what i» -wbfolutely ncceffary for the fecurity of the re- mainder — that the fcfreme itfelf is capable of execution, and will in the event prove adequate to the purpofes for which it was intended ; — that the danger, without it, is imminent and confequcntly the nccdiity of it apparent ; I tlatter myfelf that no farther arguments need be brought in fuppprt of this Plan. — I hope therefore that c\cry lover of hig Country will ( oncur ( 78 ) concur in promoting it in this Scflion of the BritiJJj Parliament ; it cannot perhaps be brought in the firit inftance to perfection ; whoever has perilled our Statute Books muft have obferved, that every one -of our Institu- tions advanced gradually by various Laws and frequent amendments to their prcfent State ;— with what zeal will a wife Minifter encourage a fcheme, which will render all his future Toils plcafant and prosperous ? — And ought not all parties (who equally pretend the good of the whole to be their object) to join in embracing a Defign, on which the fafcty of the whole depends— Left therefore we ihould betray our want of that public Spirit, which we all fo loudly profefs, by rejecting the only means of preservation at this important Crifis, on account of Some ncceSTary -trouble in the execution, and lei! we ihould thereby expofe Ihofe facrcd trufts, in defence of which our Vnceitors fought and fell, and which are now coniigned to our care for the fake of ourfclves and our posterity. -Let us, like the cham- pion of Ifrael, reject the arms of another, for like him we have tried them ; they never can properly fit, and their weight may perhaps opprefs us, but with our own Slaves and our own ( 79 ) own weapons let us deftroy the enemy that defies us. Other inducements might ftill be urged in ilipport of this Plan, if I was inclined to mew at large the Misfortunes of mv Country at a time, when many too much defpair already of its Situation ; — its natives, though by nature brave, arc now defpifed and dejected — though wea thy, it is brought into Diftrefs — though powerful, it is become contemptible — its Fleets, though more numerous than at any Period of our Htftory, are now no longer victorious, — and its wealthy and populous Colonics arc every where infulted and in- vaded by the lei's powerful Settlements of it* Enemies ; — a fatal Charm feems to poflefs it, and defeats every advantage which the boun- tiful Hand of Nature has bellowed upon it. — This melancholy Prolpcct has made fome Pcr- fofis entertain a Sentiment unworthy of a Bri- tijh Spirit, that ihe Power of this Nation is fo far unequal to that of France, that we mud fubmit to'anv Terms of Peace which our Rival (hall impofc upon us. — Shall we, who have voluntarily entered into Co many Wars to fupport the Independency of Other Nations, at prefent defpond of our o\\ n ? And ( So ) And are we doomed now only to feel ouriclvcs* weak, when it is our own Caufc in which we arc to fight, and our own Country which de- mands Our protection ? — The want of Power is not the Caufe of our Misfortunes, it is the want only of a proper Method of exerting jt ; — this Nation has now more than double the ilrcngth which it had in the memorable year 1588 ; and the Houfe of Aujtr'ta was not then lefs powerful than that of Bourbon is at profent ; we were able, however, at that pe- riod, to fecure our own Coafls, to annoy thole of the Enemy, to defeat his Fleets, and de- itroy his Settlements in the Indies. Let us now, therefore, thew the fame wifdom, and exert the ilimc Ipirit, and w r e fhall extricate ourielvcs from our preterit difficulties, not only with fafety but with honour. Our firfl point mull- be to fecure ourfelves at home. This erFec~l ran alone be produced by the Eitablilhment of & National Force sufficient for our De- fence, BUT NO WAYS REPUGNANT TO THE Spirit of our Constitution — a ConfLitution, which having been preferved (though much in ruins) by. Providential Events from the en- croaching Spirit of the Tudors, — and again refcued by the virtue of our Auccilors from ♦ho more baity violations of the Stuarts, has now ( 81 ) now furvived-frr almoft feventy years, repaired, improved, but not wholly perfect ; its civil Inftitutions have been largely and wifely con- fidered, — its Militarv EiTablifhmcnts have been totally neglected ; and it has paid molt dearly for the neglect, by lofTes, by debts, by panics, by dishonour ; — its cafe is not as yet, however, totally irretrievable ; its may itill be able to fubfift in its prefent unnatural courfe, until its Inftitutions have taken effect, provided it haftens their accompliihment ; but they will require all our wifdom in the contrivance, and all our vigour in the execution ; and if the Ingratitude of thofe whom we endeavour to ferve, fhould fometimes make our labours unpleafant, we mufl remember, that the End we feek is the Prefervation of our Country. When this Ifland was frequently plundered, and almoil conquered by the Danes, the perfi- dious invaders of ancient times, the caufe of it was, that a proper attention had not been paid to the difcipline of the Saxon Militia ; and it is recorded among the wife Inftitutions of die virtuous Alfred, that by new regulations he brought back this once martial body to its firft ftate of perfection, and thereby relieved his kingdoms from the fury of Dunijb incurfions. — L HE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. 1584 \ 1 > . AA 000 482 954 / t t i I s # - I 193 PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS BOOK CARD — hibraryq*. ■i a ^ _ University Research Library S Ml ■ a H e H 1— 1= s: a s t| c it £ 6 K w K e u i"