'- ^ jv_& ,U 
 
 I 
 
 y tfria&jfecg&fe5iate8^ 
 
 moerstttt of d^ 
 4 4 California * 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS 
 DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
HonDcm : C. J. CLAY and SONS, 
 
 CAMBRIDGE UNIVEESITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, 
 
 AVE MARIA LANE. 
 
 (JTambritige: DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO. 
 3Uijifl: F. A. BROCKHAUS. 
 
Cambtitijje $tetorfraI aEssaps. $.0. I 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS 
 
 DURING THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 L. WHIBLEY, M.A., 
 
 FELLOW OF. PEMBROKE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 PRINCE CONSORT DISSERTATION, 1888. 
 
 SECOND EDITION 
 
 eambntfge: N ^i22^ 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 
 ii 
 
 [All Rights reserved.] 
 
^ 
 
 &* 
 
 ^v 
 
 Deckels 
 
 PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS, 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
PKEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 npHE following dissertation was published at 
 the beginning of this year in accordance with 
 the terms under which the Prince Consort Prize is 
 awarded. In preparing the second edition I have 
 made few changes of importance. 
 
 The subject was originally chosen by myself and 
 approved by the Adjudicators. The purpose I have 
 kept in view is to describe the state of politics and 
 political parties in Athens, without discussing the 
 separate and successive events of political history. 
 Certain questions, which do not directly bear on 
 the history of politics, are treated at some length, 
 either on account of the intrinsic interest of those 
 questions or on account of the obscurity in which 
 they are involved. 
 
 A list of the chief modern historians whose 
 works I have consulted is prefixed ; I have also 
 quoted in the notes the source from which im- 
 
 109423 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 portant suggestions or conclusions have been derived. 
 In particular I wish to acknowledge how much I am 
 indebted to Dr Beloch, whose work "Die attische 
 Politik seit Perikles " contains a most able discussion 
 of the political life of Athens. 
 
 In preparing my dissertation for publication I 
 had the advantage of many criticisms and sugges- 
 tions from Mr R. A. Neil of Pembroke College, to 
 whom I offer my heartiest thanks. 
 
 L. WHIBLEY. 
 
 Pembroke College, Cambbidge, 
 November, 1889. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Athenian Constitution and Empire . . . 14 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Division and Composition of Parties .... 35 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Parties in detail. Their Organization and Policy . 47 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Parties in relation to the War. Party Government in 
 
 Athens 104 
 
 Index 135 
 
LIST OF THE CHIEF MODERN WORKS 
 QUOTED AND CONSULTED. 
 
 Beloch (J.), Die attische Politik seit Perikles. 
 
 Die Bevolkerung der griechisch-romischen Welt. 
 
 Zur Finanzgeschichte Athens (in the Rheinisches 
 
 Museum, xxxix. 1884). 
 Bockh (A.), Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener (Dritte 
 
 Auflage herausgegebeu von Max Frankel). 
 Buchsenschiitz (B.), Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen 
 
 Alterthume. 
 Curtius (E.), The History of Greece (translated by A. W. 
 
 Ward). 
 Droysen (J. G.), Bemerkungen iiber die attischen Strategen 
 
 (in Hermes, ix). 
 Frankel (M.), Die attischen Geschworenengerichte. 
 Freese (W. L.), Der Parteikampf der Reichen und der Armen 
 
 in Athen. 
 Gilbert (G.), Beitrage zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeit- 
 
 alter des peloponnesischen Krieges. 
 
 Handbuch der griechischen Staats-alterthiiiner. Erster 
 
 Band. 
 Grote (G.), A History of Greece (the edition of 1870 in 12 
 
 volumes). 
 Hertzberg (G. F), Alkibiades. 
 KirchhofF(A.), De Republica Atheniensi (in the Abhandlungen 
 
 der k. Pr. Akademie, Berlin 1878). 
 Kohler (U.), Urkunden und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte 
 
 des delisch-attischen Bundes (ib. 1869). 
 Muller-Strubing (H.), Aristophanes und die historische 
 
 Kritik. 
 
 Der Staat der Athener (in Philologus, Supplement- 
 band iv.). 
 Oncken (W.), Athen und Hellas. Zweiter Band. 
 Scheibe (K. F.), Die oligarchische Umwalzung zu Athen am 
 
 Ende des peloponnesischen Krieges. 
 Vischer (W.), Kleine Schriften. Erster Band. 
 Wilamowitz-Mollendorff* (U. von), Philologische Untersu- 
 chungen i., Aus Kydathen. 
 
UNiVtkotTY 
 
 OF 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 In the history of Athens the period of the Pelo- The period 
 ponnesian war deserves and admits of special atten- ^^ 
 tion. Not only have we fuller materials, scanty as nesian 
 these are, for this epoch than for any other part war ' 
 of Athenian history, but the period has a unity 
 and an interest of its own. The years before are 
 differentiated by the ascendency of Pericles, which 
 overshadowed the ordinary forces of politics; the 
 years succeeding 404 show us Athens completely 
 transformed by the struggles and sufferings she had 
 gone through; and finally the war itself was of 
 critical and decisive importance, for all states of 
 Greece were involved in it 1 , and the history of 
 Athens is for the time not the history of a single 
 commonwealth but broadens into the history of all 
 Greece. 
 
 Herein lies the historical importance of the 
 period, and on this account the political movements, 
 the composition and organization of parties, the 
 subjects on which they were divided, and the policy 
 they pursued possess an interest greater than usually 
 attaches to political history. 
 
 1 Thuc. i. 1, emphasizes its importance in this respect. 
 W. 1 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Inade- But if the study of Athenian politics in this 
 
 bUuofthe P er id has special importance, it has also special 
 original difficulties. The original authorities for political 
 ties. events are very inadequate, and this deficiency of 
 
 original materials has led to the multiplication of 
 modern works, since the absence of certain informa- 
 tion leaves a wide field to be filled up according to 
 the views of individual writers. Hence the most 
 widely divergent and even contradictory theories find 
 supporters, and between these theories it is some- 
 times impossible to decide. Our investigations often 
 fail to attain to any positive result, and many ques- 
 tions remain in the realm of complete uncertainty or 
 at best of mere probability. 
 
 Besides the deficiency of available materials there 
 is another general characteristic of the original 
 authorities which must not be left out of view. The 
 bias, which must have influenced them in writing 
 on political events, is variously estimated, and this 
 is largely responsible for the differences of modern 
 writers. 
 Oldviewof The old school of historians represented by Bockh 
 fomcs an and K - F - Hermann, and caricatured by Mitford, 
 accepting without question the blame cast on the 
 democracy by ancient writers, and in some cases 
 intensifying it, passed on it a verdict almost wholly 
 unfavourable. While Pericles obtained from most of 
 this school almost more than his due meed of praise, 
 the people he had led and those leaders who followed 
 in his footsteps were visited with condemnation. 
 The people as well as the demagogues lacked every 
 political virtue and committed every political fault. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 Grote employed a new method, which led to new Grote and 
 conclusions. No contemporary authority must be writers. 
 implicitly trusted without allowing for the political 
 sympathies and antipathies he entertained. This 
 critical treatment threw a new light on political 
 questions, and led to a revision of the former verdict. 
 Conclusions favourable to democracy were deduced, 
 conclusions which were coloured by Grote's own 
 enthusiasm. The effect of his work has been per- 
 manent, no later historian has been able to dis- 
 regard it: many have accepted his views and ex- 
 tended their application 1 ; others have disagreed with 
 many of his conclusions, but have had to justify 
 their dissent by sounder arguments than had been 
 hitherto accepted. The present tendency leans to 
 a more moderate estimate of Athenian democracy, 
 less unfavourable than that of the early school, but 
 not so enthusiastic as that of Grote 2 . 
 
 The uncertainty of our conclusions on political Bias of 
 subjects, which is due to the inadequacy and bias of \^ 01 ?Hi es 
 the original authorities, requires us to review those against de- 
 authorities, with especial reference to these two points. 
 At the outset it must be admitted that they are ^ 
 in the main unfavourable to the democracy 3 . Our 
 histories all come from one side, and scarcely give 
 us more than half the truth ; at best the leading 
 democrats have to be whitewashed 4 , and it is im- 
 
 1 e.g. Oncken, and in the main Miiller-Striibing. 
 
 2 Beloch and Gilbert are representatives of this tendency. 
 
 3 This is true not only of the historians but of the poets 
 and philosophers, such as Aristophanes, Euripides, Plato and 
 Socrates. 
 
 4 As Cleon has been by Grote. Oncken, Athen und Hellas, ii. 
 
 12 
 
dides. 
 
 4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 possible to realize how far we should have to revise 
 our conclusions, if any work written from the demo- 
 cratic standpoint had come down to us. 
 Thucy- Of all authorities Thucydides is by far the most 
 
 important, but this is because the other authorities 
 are so lamentably meagre. Thucydides was not 
 writing the history of a period, but of an event, 
 the Peloponnesian war. He carefully avoids home 
 politics 1 , and leaves out of view all subjects which 
 were not more or less closely connected with the 
 causes and progress of the war. Hence, except in 
 the eighth book, we get but little light on politics 
 from Thucydides, and Muller-Strubing 2 is justified 
 in asking "Is there another representation of the 
 history of a period, written by an able, well in- 
 structed contemporary, from which we get so little 
 definite information on constitutional development, 
 political party struggles, the motives of the events 
 described, intellectual movements or the inner life of 
 the people?" 
 
 p. 205, says that the only reference to him in ancient writers 
 which is not unfavourable is in Plut. Praec. reip. ger. 13. To 
 this we may perhaps add Dem. 40, 25, where he is referred to 
 without depreciation or apology as an eminent general. 
 
 1 Among important events not mentioned by Thucydides are 
 the raising of the tribute in 425, the raising of the dicast's fee, the 
 ostracism of Hyperbolus (only incidentally referred to at a later 
 date). His account of affairs after the mutilation of the Hermae 
 is very confused, and his description of the measures taken after 
 the Sicilian expedition is exceedingly indefinite. 
 
 2 Aristophanes, p. 386. It is true that the speeches in Thu- 
 cydides, whatever view be taken of their authenticity, throw great 
 light on the political ideas Of his time; but even when he does 
 describe some important debate, he does not usually distinguish 
 the political parties by name. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 We are on more dangerous ground in discussing 
 the bias of Thucydides: with some writers it has 
 been the fashion to accept everything that Thucy- 
 dides wrote, almost as if he were verbally inspired ; 
 but even in his case personal prejudice must have 
 had an unconscious effect 1 . His known aristocratic 
 sympathies and his condemnation by the democracy 
 are sufficient to account for his bias, which appears 
 in his favourable judgment of Antiphon 2 , compared 
 with his description of Hyperbolus 3 , as well as in 
 the severe condemnation of Cleon 4 , which is not 
 justified by his own account of that demagogue. 
 As Oncken 5 says, we may implicitly trust Thucydides 
 for statements of fact, but must exercise our own 
 judgment in criticizing his comments on events. 
 
 Xenophon takes up the history where Thucydides Xenophon. 
 leaves off. He gives a full account of the trial of 
 the generals in 406 and of the break-up of the rule 
 of the Thirty, but both accounts are coloured by the 
 most extreme prejudice ; and his contributions to 
 the history of politics (and there are scarcely more 
 than these) are as far below those of Thucydides, 
 as he himself is inferior as an historian. 
 
 Aristophanes is of far greater importance, but we Aristo- 
 get little more from him than isolated references to p nes ' 
 
 1 A. Schmidt quoted by Muller-Striibing, ib. p. 482, says, "The 
 man who thinks Thucydides impartial is in error. Theopompus' 
 partiality was gross and evident, but Thucydides' is so carefully 
 concealed, that we can only discover it with immense trouble and 
 luck." 
 
 2 viii. 68. 3 viii. 73. 
 
 4 He sums up his career in v. 16, but he never mentions him 
 without some unfavourable description, iii. 36, iv. 28, 39. 
 
 5 Athen und Hellas, ii. p. 231. 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 single characters or events. Even these must be 
 received with great caution. His political views 
 made him an opponent of the extreme democrats, 
 and the antagonism was embittered by personal feel- 
 ing, for we are told of at least three occasions, on 
 which Cleon attacked the poet or his representative 1 . 
 But apart from his political prejudices, he was, as a 
 comic poet, not bound by any canons of historical 
 truth*. In his representation of public men Aristo- 
 phanes employs paradox as frequently as exaggera- 
 tion. Hence there are many passages in which we 
 must interpret him by contraries; in particular I 
 think that this interpretation serves to explain 
 many details of Cleon's character in " the Knights." 
 His treat- It has been pointed out 3 that Cleon, as he appears 
 ment of j n Aristophanes, differs essentially from the picture 
 that we have of him in Thucydides. For the 
 passionate orator, overawing the people, who appears 
 in the pages of the historian, the poet has substituted 
 a cringing flatterer and servant of the Demos. This 
 opposition can be traced in detail throughout the 
 play. Thus Cleon is charged with neglect of military 
 duty (dcTTparelaY, a reproach appropriate enough in 
 Cleon's mouth against Nicias, but absurd as applied 
 to the victor of Pylus : he is charged with plotting 
 with the Spartans 5 , another paradox, when we re- 
 member that in the year before he had objected to 
 
 1 The first three plays of Aristophanes were brought out in the 
 name of Callistratus, against whom, therefore, Cleon's first attack 
 must have been directed. Muller-Strubing, ib. p. 72. 
 
 2 See Muller-Strubing, ib. pp. 3 and 5. 
 
 3 By Oncken, ib. p. 226. 
 
 4 443. 5 465. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 treating with them at all : again he is charged with 
 receiving bribes from Mytilene 1 , an impossibility 
 when we remember the sentiments Thucydides puts 
 into his mouth in the debate on the treatment of 
 Lesbos, but a charge actually made by Cleon against 
 his opponents 2 : lastly with advocating peace 3 . When 
 we consider that many of these charges have been 
 laboriously explained by scholiasts, both ancient and 
 modern, as referring to actual incidents in Cleon's 
 career, it is worth while pointing out that the poet 
 is simply turning against Cleon charges which the 
 demagogue constantly brought against his opponents/^ 
 These gained their piquancy from their very in- 
 appropriateness to him, and we may conclude that 
 we have here to deal not with exaggeration but with 
 paradox. 
 
 Aristophanes' treatment of public men may be His treat- 
 tested in cases where we have other evidence. He p^.^ 
 condemns Pericles 4 , though not so severely as he 
 does Cleon ; but every one now rejects his authority 
 in the case of Pericles, because that statesman is 
 redeemed by the testimony of Thucydides 5 . It is 
 
 1 834. 2 Thuc. iii. 38. 
 
 3 669. 
 
 4 See passages quoted in the next note. In Vesp. 715, which 
 apparently refers to Pericles, no distinction is drawn between him 
 and the other demagogues; but in Eq. 191, 283 he is favourably 
 contrasted with Cleon. 
 
 6 Hermann, Staatsalterthumer, 164, is strikingly illogical. 
 After quoting Aristophanes (Ach. 525, Pax 605) on Pericles, he 
 admits " it would be partial to ascribe such views to Pericles," 
 but immediately afterwards he gives an unfavourable description 
 of the later demagogues, the details of which are unsupported 
 except by isolated references to Aristophanes. 
 
tion. 
 
 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 obvious that Aristophanes' treatment of Cleon is 
 of no more value, as a piece of impartial evidence. 
 From these reasons it will be seen that it is necessary 
 to use Aristophanes for historical purposes with the 
 utmost care. We may accept the rule laid down by 
 Yischer 1 " For the judgment of individual character, 
 for the discovery of single facts, we must regard the 
 old comedy as an entirely unreliable authority, which 
 can only be justified in connection with other sources, 
 and not always then." 
 The work A valuable contribution to our knowledge of the 
 
 Athenian Athenian democracy and empire, as well as a most 
 Constitu- trenchant criticism of it, is contained in the work on 
 the Athenian Constitution, which was for a long time 
 ascribed to Xenophon. The view that it came from 
 his pen is now generally given up, and although the 
 authorship cannot be determined, there is good 
 reason for fixing the date at which it was produced 
 between 424 and 41 4 2 . It has, therefore, exceptional 
 value from the fact that it was written at a time 
 before the Athenian power had suffered any grave 
 diminution, and lacks the morbid sense of its defects, 
 which were subsequently regarded as the causes of 
 disaster. 
 
 1 Kleine Schriften, i. p. 184. 
 
 2 Kirchhoff (Abhand. der Akad. Ber. 1878, pp. 124), ascribes 
 it to the former date, as he thinks it must have been written 
 before Brasidas' march to Thrace. Miiller-Strubing (Philologus, 
 Supplementband iv. p. 74), dismissing this consideration, thinks 
 415 the most likely date. He sees in the work the attempt of an 
 extreme oligarch to combine the different sections of the oligar- 
 chical party in a common policy against the constitution. He 
 thinks the tone of the work is consistent with what we know of 
 Phrynichus, whom he concludes to be the author. 
 
INTRODUCTION. V 
 
 Throughout the work there is a contrast between The 
 
 what the author regards as the ideally best con-^^ nt 
 
 stitution 1 oligarchy, and the constitution which of the 
 
 . writer. 
 
 Athens had adopted democracy. To him oligarchs 
 
 are ^prjo-Toi 2 , democrats Trovrjpol, and the Athenian 
 constitution favours the base at the expense of the 
 good. His fondness for oligarchy is carried so far 
 that in his eyes the possession of oligarchic sym- 
 pathies is equivalent to virtue and wisdom 3 , men 
 of his party are ol /3e\Tio~TOL, in all states to 
 jBekTLo-rov is ivavrlov rfj SrjfjLOfcpaTLq 4 ', and evvofxia 5 
 according to his standard would involve the over- 
 throw of democracy and the enslavement of the 
 people. These quotations will suffice to show the 
 extreme and undisguised prejudice, which he en- 
 tertains for oligarchy, and which deprives his work 
 of all claim to judicial criticism ; but he also shows 
 clearly enough that granting the imperfections of 
 democracy, the Athenians pursue the end most 
 desirable for 6 themselves, i.e. to be free and rule 7 , 
 and take the best means to preserve the con- 
 stitution 8 . I have discussed the standpoint of the 
 writer at some length, because I shall have occasion 
 to refer to his opinions again, and it will be 
 useful to remember then that he is no friend to the 
 democracy. 
 
 1 i. 8. 
 
 2 i. 1. These terms jSArtorot, xPVvtoI, rrownpoi are all used in 
 their quasi-political sense. 
 
 3 i. 7. 4 i. 5. 5 i. 9. 
 
 6 i. 6. b...irov7)pbs O-evplfficet rb ayadbv curry re koI roh bfiolois 
 avr$. 
 
 7 i. 8. 8 i. 1. 
 
10 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Lysias and 
 Andocides. 
 
 Aristotle, 
 Plutarch 
 and 
 Diodorus. 
 
 Inscrip- 
 tions. 
 
 The other authorities may be briefly dismissed. 
 Lysias and Andocides give us a certain amount of 
 information on political events, the latter being 
 especially useful for the years 415, 410, 404-3. 
 
 Coming to authors who were not contemporary, 
 we find Aristotle's contributions of no very definite 
 value. Most of his statements are general, and even 
 when he evidently has Athens in view, his criticism 
 is often more appropriate to his own age than to the 
 earlier period 1 . Plutarch and Diodorus add little 
 to our knowledge ; we are indebted to them for some 
 information, which they derived from authors, whose 
 works are now no longer extant. Of these the most 
 important were Ephorus and Theopompus. The 
 difficulty of criticism is increased, when we get the 
 authorities only at second hand. 
 
 I have now discussed the materials of direct 
 historical importance, with the exception of inscrip- 
 tions. On constitutional points these often give us 
 valuable information, but they are far from filling 
 up the deficiencies of our authors. I have endea- 
 voured to show that our only extant historians, 
 Thucydides and Xenophon, give us absolutely no 
 information on many political events, so that we 
 often have to rely on non-historical writers, orators, 
 philosophers and poets ; and that even from the 
 sum of all these materials we cannot get a continu- 
 ous history of politics. 
 
 1 Aristotle was not favourable to extreme democracy (Pol. 
 1312 b, 5). His ideal was a [xtari iroKireia and according to 
 Plutarch (Nic. 2) his favourite statesmen were Thucydides, Nicias 
 and Theramenes, men of moderate views. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 The consequence is that politics in Athens ap- No cow- 
 pear to us in a series of dissolving views : some few t l nuous 
 r o history of 
 
 events can be clearly understood, but we are generally politics. 
 left to our own resources for the causes and con- 
 sequences of them. It is the same with the actors ^ 
 on the political stage. Some few men stand out 
 vividly before us ; Thucydides and Aristophanes 
 together enable us to realize Pericles, Cleon and 
 Nicias : but other characters must have played a part 
 of hardly less importance, and they appear to us only 
 once or in one scene. To take an example, what 
 part did Diodotus take in Athenian politics ? We 
 may conclude from his one appearance in Thucydides, 
 that he was not only a statesman of ability but in all 
 probability the leader of the moderate party at this 
 juncture 1 , but we never hear of him again. Who 
 was Thudippus who proposed the most important 
 financial measure in this period, the increase of the 
 tribute in 425 2 ? We only know of his existence 
 from the inscription containing his proposal, and yet 
 he must have been a prominent member of his party 
 to be entrusted with so important a duty. The case 
 is the same with Demostratus 3 who proposed the 
 enrolment of forces for the Sicilian expedition, with 
 Thessalus 4 who prosecuted Alcibiades, and with many 
 others. 
 
 Nor is our knowledge of institutions and events Uncer- 
 more satisfactory. The absence of any account of^^ 
 
 tional 
 
 1 Thuc. iii. 41 ff. The words ocnrep Kal iv rrj irpoTtpq. tKKK-qaiq. points. 
 avrtXeye k.t.X. point to his having taken the lead on this occasion. 
 
 2 C. I. A. i. 37. 
 
 3 Ar. Lysist. 391. 
 
 4 Plut. Ale. 22. 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the constitution at this period admits of the widest 
 difference of opinion on constitutional points. To 
 take a few instances: some historians have developed 
 a theory of the constitution in which the premier- 
 ship is held by a state treasurer 1 , whom other autho- 
 rities will not allow to exist ; another historian 2 has 
 argued with great ability that there was absolutely 
 no change in the laws between 460 and 411, and this 
 theory, while it lacks sufficient confirmation to be 
 accepted, cannot be satisfactorily disproved. These 
 are typical cases, and it would be easy to cite many 
 others, in which directly contradictory opinions are 
 maintained between which it is impossible to 
 decide 3 . 
 Uncer- This uncertainty and difference of opinion are 
 
 IhTmb'ect e( l ua % manifest on the subject of political parties. 
 of political Original authorities give us little definite informa- 
 par ies. ^^ Qn ^ e division of parties, on their policy, or on 
 the political standing of prominent men. Hence 
 there results a great confusion of ideas ; some modern 
 historians talk of two parties, others of three ; and 
 the same men are variously described as aristocrats, 
 oligarchs and democrats. It is only possible to ob- 
 
 1 Miiller-Strubing's great theory of the ra/nlas tt}s koivtjs Trpoad- 
 dov. Bockh, i. p. 200, regarded this officer as the head of Athenian 
 finance. Most historians believe that this office was not instituted 
 before Euclides. 
 
 2 Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, p. 52, thinks that there was no 
 process of legislation in this period. 
 
 3 Some are discussed below, see pp. 20, 64 n. 2, 69 n. 1, 
 122 n. 1. In particular we have no evidence to determine whether 
 institutions, known to exist in the fourth century, were part of 
 the constitution before the archonship of Euclides, e.g. the po/ho- 
 dtrai and iinxeipoTovla. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 tain more definite conceptions by realizing as far as 
 possible the conditions of political life at Athens, 
 and the motives of political action ; on this account 
 it is necessary to discuss the Athenian constitution 
 and the Athenian empire in so far as they directly 
 concern the study of politics, while we may neglect 
 details indifferent to this purpose. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Athenian Constitution and Empire. 
 
 Necessity The Athenian constitution was an extreme de- 
 
 %acyin mocra cy, and it was impossible that it should be 
 
 Athens. otherwise. The internal history of Athens, the 
 
 policy of her statesmen, the influence of events in 
 
 Greece, contributed to make this the only form of 
 
 government possible, while it was certainly the only 
 
 form which corresponded to her highest interests. 
 
 Aristotle 1 admits that in a large city any other 
 
 ^ibrm of constitution than democracy is an anomaly. 
 
 The history of Athens in the fifth century is the 
 
 history of her rise as a commercial and maritime 
 
 power, and it is unnecessary to argue that in Greece 
 
 there was a close connection between democracy and 
 
 sea power and trade 2 . 
 
 This tendency, which was at first natural, was 
 fostered by her statesmen ; Pericles and Themistocles 
 directed their efforts to make Athens exclusively a 
 sea power, and the attention paid to her fleet and 
 
 1 Pol. 1286 b, 20, e7re 5 /cat /xel^ovs elvai avfx^^rjKe ras 7r6Xeis 
 icrcos ovd pfydiov ti yiveadai irokiTeiav ertpav irapb, drj/jLOKpariav. 
 
 2 See Muller-Striibing, Aristophanes, p. 82. Cf. Aristot. ib. 
 1304 a, 22, 6 vclvtikos 6'xXos ac.t.X. Kesp. Ath. i. 2. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 15 
 
 fortifications rendered the city almost an island 1 . 
 While internal circumstances demanded this con- 
 stitution, the position of Athens in Greece had an 
 equally strong influence in this direction. I shall 
 endeavour to prove below that the confederacy of 
 which Athens was the head was held together by 
 community of democratic feeling and interest, and \^~ 
 that on this account democracy was necessary to 
 maintain the alliance. We see in the history of this 
 period that democracy was for Athens a state of 
 stable equilibrium ; any disturbance of this could be 
 only temporary and was always followed by a return 
 to the former state. It was impossible even to 
 introduce a less extreme form of democracy ; a 
 moderate democracy is only possible as a step in 
 development, but cannot be artificially created from 
 an extreme democracy 2 . 
 
 The Athenian constitution rested on the two Principles 
 principles of freedom and equality 3 . Speech and {-fc^ % 
 opinion were free, and all citizens were equal before mocracy. 
 the law. From this equality of the citizens it resulted 
 
 1 Eesp. Ath. ii. 14. Thuc. i. 143, Attica falls short of being 
 an island in only one particular the liability to ravages. 
 
 2 Eesp. Ath. iii. 8, 9. The lines of Aristophanes referring to 
 Alcibiades (Ranae 1431) may be referred appropriately enough to 
 such a constitution, 
 
 ov XPV Xtovros (TKTjfivov kv iroXei rptyeiv, 
 rjv 5' eKTpa<pri tis, Tots rpoirois virTipereiv. 
 
 3 The principles of Xev9epla and Icrovofxla (cf. Oncken, Athen 
 und Hellas, ii. p. 41). Thuc. iii. 82 (icrovofila ttoXitikt) is the 
 democratic watchword). Dem. Mid. 124 talks of t<rrryopla and 
 iXevdepla as the birthright of Athenians. The speech of Pericles 
 (Thuc. ii. 37), discussing the constitution, dwells on t6 Uov and 
 rb iXetidepov. 
 
16 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 that the majority had absolute control of the govern- 
 ment, for all power was vested in the citizen body 
 assembled in the i/cfcXrjala, where every question was 
 decided by a majority of votes, without check or 
 appeal 1 . 
 All power The people had all powers of government, and 
 
 P TPYP1 RP(m 
 
 by the exercised them either directly or indirectly. The 
 people. on i v apparent exception is in respect to judicial 
 duties, which were surrendered to the dicasts, the 
 only magistrates who were irresponsible 2 , and whose 
 action was not subject to appeal. But potentially 
 and in theory every Athenian citizen of mature age 
 was a dicast 3 (though all did not choose to exercise 
 their right), so that the decisions of the courts were 
 regarded as those of the people. Legislative, execu- 
 tive and deliberative powers were also not directly 
 exercised by the public assembly, but here the people 
 retained the right of ultimate control. Legislation 
 was in the main conducted by a standing board (of 
 vofioderauy, subject to the approval of the assembly 
 in each case. The executive power was in part sur- 
 rendered to boards of magistrates, but the assembly, 
 besides directing the executive, appointed the magis- 
 trates, and exercised the most jealous control over 
 them, being competent to suspend them at anytime 5 , 
 
 1 The establishment of the irpofiovkoi in 413 with a power of 
 veto was such a check. 
 
 2 Ar. Vesp. 587. 
 
 3 This is Franker s theory (Die Attischen Geschworenengerichte, 
 p. 20), ' Jeder Athener liber dreissig Jahre von selbst Heliast war.' 
 
 4 Supposing the vofiodirai existed before 411, a point in dispute, 
 see above, p.* 12 n. 3. 
 
 5 If iirixeipoTovla existed in the 5th century. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 17 
 
 and compelling them to render a strict account of 
 their office. 
 
 The council (ftovXt]), it is true, had extensive Powers of 
 powers both administrative and executive ; it formed e(nme (i t 
 a committee of public safety, meeting every day, and 
 performed duties for which the assembly was un- 
 fitted by its size, such as the transaction of current 
 business and the discussion of details. Hence the 
 council prepared all matters to go before the as- 
 sembly, which accepted, rejected or amended the 
 proposals. This constituted its importance as a 
 deliberative body, but it had besides independent 
 functions of considerable extent. It saw to the 
 execution of the decrees passed by the assembly and 
 controlled the magistrates; it watched over the 
 military and naval forces of the state and managed 
 the business of the Athenian confederation ; lastly it 
 formed the most important financial authority, super- 
 intending the budget of the year and raising the 
 necessary funds. 
 
 From this varied activity the council attained 
 a certain importance, and was the special sphere of 
 many politicians, but from the fact that its members 
 were chosen by lot and from its real subordination 
 to the assembly its political powers were never really 
 great. From its constant meetings, its comparatively 
 small numbers, as well as from the fact that its 
 members sat for a y ear, it must have had great in- 
 fluence on the administration ; but on important 
 questions of policy the real decision lay with the 
 sovereign assembly, and the council had simply to 
 anticipate or to follow its wishes. 
 
 w. 2 
 
18 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Direct As with the council, so with the other branches 
 
 powers of f government ; the assembly retained the ultimate 
 assembly, decision and control, even when it delegated its 
 authority. But for the consideration of party politics, 
 the direct powers of the assembly are more im- 
 portant. Its action in all departments of state 
 business was supreme and omnipotent : in theory it 
 was supposed always to be in submission to the law 
 of the constitution 1 , but in course of time the belief 
 gained ground that the demos was infallible, and 
 the assembly overrode or suspended the laws, and 
 realized that extreme development described by 
 Aristotle in which " decrees are sovereign and not 
 the law 2 ." This direct supremacy of the assembly, 
 in which every one had an equal voice and vote, 
 and the most important question was irrevocably 
 decided by a bare majority, made the Athenian con- 
 stitution at once the most extreme and the most 
 real democracy which has ever existed. 
 Powers of The omnipotence of the assembly tended to re- 
 thema- ^uce th e magistrates also to a dependent position ; 
 
 gistrates. , jr r ? 
 
 but just as the dicasts and the council were entrusted 
 with some independent powers, so in financial and 
 military matters there were magistrates possessed of 
 
 1 The theory prevailed that the laws were sacred and eternal. 
 Cf. "Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, p. 3 and p. 47. The ypa^i) irapa- 
 pb/xuv was introduced to prevent change except under the most 
 rigid precautions. 
 
 2 Pol. 1292 a, 4, Zrepov eldos 87)fj.oKpa.Tia$...Kijpiov 5' elvcu rb 
 tt\tj6os kclI jxt) rbv vbfxov. tovto S ylvercu tirav rot, ^(pifffxara Kijpia rj 
 dXXd pvq b vofios. Andoc. 1. 87 points to decrees having overridden 
 laws during the Peloponnesian war. Wilamowitz, ib. (pp. 54, 57) 
 points out that the Athenians inflicted the greatest injuries on 
 themselves by breaking down legal restraints, as in 415, 411, 406. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 19 
 
 real authority. Most magistracies were filled up by- 
 means of the lot ; and this method, while it required 
 the duties to be such as could be undertaken by 
 the average citizen, deterred men of eminence from 
 offering their services ; while conversely, the chief 
 elective offices involved important functions and were 
 keenly competed for. Thus the board of Helleno- 
 tamiae transacted considerable financial business, and 
 as a consequence we find leading Athenians serving 
 on it 1 . But this magistracy involved more trust 
 than power, and so was not the object of political 
 contention in the same way as that of the generals. 
 
 The generals were not only the supreme military Powers 
 officers, but they had powers which raised them g ene ral8. 
 almost to the level of a cabinet or ministry of the 
 present day. As military officers they had command 
 over all the forces of the state, both military and 
 naval. They provided for the safety of the land, the 
 protection of the coasts, and the food supply of the 
 town. They conducted the levy and raised funds for 
 war purposes. They appointed the trierarchs. As 
 the chief executive magistrates they had the right 
 to summon the assembly, usually through the me- 
 dium of the prytanes ; they were expected to pro- 
 tect the state against treason and to maintain the 
 democratic constitution. They had also the conduct 
 of foreign affairs, and represented the state in its 
 relations with other communities, arranging for the 
 
 1 The Hellenotamiae were probably elected (Gilbert, Handbuch, 
 i. p. 236). Sophocles was a member of this board (Hicks, Manual 
 of Inscriptions, 30), and the younger Pericles (Dittenberger, 
 Sylloge, 44). 
 
 22 
 
20 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Theory 
 that one 
 general 
 was com- 
 mander- 
 in-chief. 
 
 conclusion of treaties and the fulfilment of obligations 
 so incurred 1 . 
 
 The important powers exercised by the board of 
 generals gave it the position of the executive govern- 
 ment,, so long as it retained the confidence of the 
 assembly. On this account prominent politicians 
 strove to obtain a seat on the board, and we shall 
 see below that the elections of generals were events 
 of great political importance. 
 
 There is good reason to believe that the generals 
 were not all equal in authority, that there were dif- 
 ferences of rank within the board, and that one man 
 in particular had a superiority both of dignity and 
 of power to the rest. This theory has only been 
 formulated within the last few years and is still 
 disputed 2 ; it is so important for the right compre- 
 hension of the Athenian constitution and history 
 that it is worth while to summarize the evidence 
 for it. 
 
 The theory is that all generals were not, as has 
 hitherto been thought, of equal rank, sharing the 
 duties of chief command by alternation or by lot, 
 but that one general was the president of the board 
 for the year TrpvravLs twv aTparrjyoov and had 
 powers greater than those of his colleagues. Again 
 on every expedition, on which a number of generals 
 went, one of them was always entrusted with the 
 
 1 The above summary is taken mainly from Gilbert's Hand- 
 buch, i. pp. 222 4. 
 
 2 Oncken, Athen und Hellas, ii. p. 46, vaguely recognized the 
 existence of such a commander-in-chief ; Droysen, Hermes, ix. pp.. 
 9 16, first stated the theory explicitly; Beloch, Att. Pol., Anhang 
 i. pp. 280 8, discusses it at length and gives the evidence. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 21 
 
 chief command, the president himself naturally as- 
 suming this position, whenever he went on active 
 service. 
 
 There is scarcely sufficient evidence to enable us Arguments 
 to decide confidently either for or against the theory 1 , fthe 
 but the balance of probability seems strongly in its theor V- 
 favour. We know that in the Persian wars a single 
 general was elected to take supreme command of the 
 Athenian forces 2 ; and the appointment of a com- 
 mander-in-chief is also attested for the latter part of 
 the fourth century 8 . There is nothing to disprove 
 the existence of a similar institution for the inter- 
 vening period. On the contrary, the efficient conduct 
 of the Peloponnesian war and the obstinate resist- 
 ance on the part of Athens point to a strongly or- 
 ganized military system 4 , which could not possibly 
 have existed had military operations been entrusted 
 to a board of generals with absolutely equal powers. 
 
 1 One or two phrases in Plutarch point to differences of rank. 
 Thus in Per. 13, Menippus is mentioned as virocTpaTrry&v to Peri- 
 cles ; and in Nic. 12, Nicias is chosen general irpuros for the Sicilian 
 expedition, on which he seems to have had a superiority of rank ; 
 on the other hand the only statement which conflicts with this is 
 the mention by Diodorus (xiii. 97, 106) of the command alternating 
 day by day. This however is only an incidental reference, is quite 
 unsupported by other authorities and is improbable in itself. 
 Diodorus is probably transferring to this date the institutions of 
 the 6th century, (Hdt. vi. 109.) 
 
 2 This magistrate is called 6 'Adyvaiup (TTparTjybs in Herodotus ; 
 Themistocles, Aristides and Xanthippus all held this post (Hdt. 
 viii. 4, 131, ix. 28). See Gilbert, Beitrage, p. 65, and Busolt, 
 Griechische Geschichte, ii. p. 334. 
 
 3 He was then called 6 (TTparTjybs 6 iiri rb. 6ir\a, see Gilbert, 
 Handbuch, i. p. 222. 
 
 4 Droysen, ib. p. 15. 
 
22 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Assuming then that there were differences of rank 
 we have literary authority for them in the phrase 6 
 Becva teal %vvapyovres which frequently occurs in 
 inscriptions 1 and for which Thucydides' expression 
 6 Belva Sevrepos, Tp/To?...Se/caTo? airro? 2 is evi- 
 dently the equivalent. There must be some reason 
 why one man is singled out by name, while the 
 others are simply mentioned as his colleagues; the 
 prominence thus given probably denoted a superi- 
 ority of rank. Where the phrases are used with 
 reference to single expeditions, on which three or 
 four generals are employed, the officer named is not 
 necessarily the president of the board 8 ; but where 
 all generals are obviously included, the reference 
 must be to the irpvTavi^. The appointment of such 
 a president would have been quite consistent with 
 the symmetry of Athenian institutions, as nearly all 
 magistrates formed boards of ten, of which one 
 member was usually president 5 . Perhaps these argu- 
 
 1 C. I. A. i. 273 (Dittenberger 29) 'iTnroKp&Trjs XoXapyebs /cat 
 ZvvdpxovTes. The same phrase is used in the same inscription of 
 the racial rijs deov, of the rafxiai rdv &Wwv deuv and of the 
 'EWrivora/xiai. Cf. also C.I. A. i. 1803 (Dittenberger 36), C.I. A. 
 i. 188 (Dittenberger 44). 
 
 2 Cf. Thuc. i. 61 and 62, where KaXX/as -rri/nrTos afobs is 
 repeated as Ka\\Las...Kal oi ^vvdpxopres. It is used also of am- 
 bassadors, Thuc. v. 4, Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 17. 
 
 3 In Thuc. ii. 79, iii. 3, iii. 19, the general evidently commanded 
 the expedition, but certainly was not irptiravis. It is noteworthy 
 that when the commander-in-chief of an expedition died he was 
 not succeeded by one of his colleagues on the expedition, but 
 another general was sent from home to take his place ; see Thuc. 
 i. 634. 
 
 4 Thuc. i. 116, ii. 13, HepiKXijs d^Karos auro's. 
 
 5 The evidence for such a presidency is in most cases the use 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 23 
 
 merits would not be enough to establish the custom. 
 There is evidence of a more direct nature in the fact 
 that again and again in our authorities we find single 
 generals spoken of as exercising the most important 
 powers individually, without reference to their col- 
 leagues 1 ; while in many cases only one general is 
 mentioned where evidently many or all were em- 
 ployed 2 . The general exercising these powers must 
 have been at least de facto president, and the other 
 
 of the phrase 6 detva ical i-vv&pxovres, which is applied to many 
 boards of magistrates. Thus Gilbert (Handbuch, i. p. 234) assumes 
 the existence of such a president for the Ta/xicu rrjs deov solely from 
 the use of this phrase, although he refuses to draw a similar 
 inference in the case of the generals. Hauvette-Besnault (Les 
 strateges ath Aniens, p. 52), who argues that there was no regular 
 commander-in-chief, says " The title 6 detva icai ^vvdpxovres was 
 usually applied to the president of a board of magistrates, but 
 does not imply anything as to the duration of the office. It was 
 employed to denote the annual chief of the rafiiai twv lepwv 
 XPW& T(av '> ^ is n0 l ess often applied to the presidents of the Helle- 
 notamiae, who constantly change." The change of presidents 
 within this latter board is established by C. I. A. i. 188, in which 
 five different names occur followed by the words koL ^vvdpxovres. 
 The reason however for the* change of presidents on a board 
 entrusted with the control of the revenue of the state is obvious ; 
 and the fact that we do not find a change of presidents similarly 
 attested in the case of the generals, is negative evidence that one 
 man held that position for a year. 
 
 1 Thus Pericles seems to have been entrusted with full powers 
 on more than one occasion (Thuc. ii. 22, 55). Similarly the 
 conduct of Nicias in connection with the command at Pylos 
 can only be explained on the theory that he was in supreme 
 control of military affairs (Thuc. iv. 27, 42). See Droysen and 
 Beloch, 1. c. 
 
 2 In Thuc. ii. 31 the Athenians go out vavdrjfiei nepiKXtovs 
 arpaTryyovvTos ; the other generals must have gone too. In v. 52 
 Alcibiades leads a large force to the Peloponnesus, but he was 
 probably not the only general. 
 
The posi- 
 tion of 
 Athens as 
 a power in 
 Greece. 
 
 24 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 evidence will be enough perhaps to prove that he 
 was also so de jure 1 , 
 import- , If, then, we may assume the existence of such a 
 position \ president, he must have been the most important 
 man in the state. In dignity he was formally raised 
 above all other citizens, he was practically "President 
 of the Republic." In power he was the head of the 
 most important board of magistrates, and if we may 
 compare this board to a modern cabinet, we may 
 look upon him as a prime minister. The preemi- 
 nence of this position made it the highest prize in 
 the state, and it had great influence on politics. 
 
 There is one other subject which cannot be passed 
 over, the position of Athens as a power in Greece. 
 To discuss the division of parties we must know the 
 subjects on which they were divided, and as during 
 the period of the Peloponnesian war very few ques- 
 tions of home policy arose, and foreign affairs were all- 
 important, it is necessary to understand the relation 
 in which Athens stood to the other powers of Greece, 
 in order to realize the attitude of parties to the dif- 
 ferent questions of foreign policy. 
 
 Athens and Sparta divided between them the 
 Empire of Greece. Athens was preeminently a sea 
 power. She was the mistress and leader of the 
 sea states, as Sparta was of the land powers. Any 
 pretensions she had to land empire she renounced in 
 445, and by this concession she obtained the recog- 
 
 1 Gilbert (Beitrage, pp. 38, ff.) rejects the theory of a irp^ravis: 
 he believes that in all cases where generals have superior authority 
 they had been appointed avTotcparopes. It is unreasonable to sup- 
 pose that this extraordinary power was conferred so often. See 
 Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 2856. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 25 
 
 nition of her dominion of the sea. Here she was 
 absolute : the sea was regarded as part of her terri- 
 tory, and as late as 419 it was regarded as a violation 
 of her right for ships of war to cross it without her 
 consent 1 . At the beginning of the war all the sea 
 states with few exceptions were her subjects or allies 2 . 
 
 This alliance was the source of her power. The Athens and 
 relation of Athens to the confederacy of Delos had L^racv 
 passed from that of leadership to that of dominion 3 ; of Delos. 
 the original allies had with few exceptions become 
 subjects 4 . 
 
 This process was the inevitable result of circum- 
 stances. If the league was to continue at all, the 
 strongest power was bound to come to the front and 
 the weaker states to renounce their independence 5 . 
 To maintain the efficiency of the league for its original 
 purposes it was necessary to retain unwilling members, 
 forbid retirement and punish revolt 6 . For the same 
 
 1 Thuc. v. 56, the Argives complain to the Athenians, 6'n, 
 yey pa /j. fjiivov ev reus o-rrovdcus 5ia rrjs eavrQv ckcuttovs fx-q idv 
 TToXe/jdovs dutvcu, idaeiav Kara OdXacraav TrapairKevaai.. The , 
 Athenians regarded this action of the Lacedaemonians as a 
 violation of their alliance. The toll levied by the Athenians in 
 the Bosporus is another instance of the same claim on the part of 
 Athens to the exclusive control of the sea. 
 
 2 All the eastern colonies of Greece, either on the islands or 
 on the coast at a distance from Central Greece (e.g. Macedonia, 
 Thrace, and Asia Minor) were members of the alliance. 
 
 3 The rjyefjLovia had without design on her part become an 
 apxh- See Grote, v. pp. 146152, cf. Thuc. i. 9799. 
 
 4 The members of the confederacy originally tyfi/xaxoi, were 
 now vttt)kooi; Thucydides calls them 5ov\oi. See Gilbert, Hand- 
 buch, i. pp. 392 and 405, and Thuc. i. 98, iii. 10, vi. 76. 
 
 5 See Muller-Striibing, Aristophanes, pp. 81 2. 
 
 6 Grote, v. 154. "The confederacy was perpetual and peremp- 
 tory, not allowing retirement or evasion." 
 
26 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 reason it was a matter of military expediency to 
 strengthen the weak spots in the frontier of the 
 league, to fill up the gaps, and to constrain indepen- 
 dent and neutral states to join against their will, that 
 they might not offer a place of vantage to the foe. 
 The want of one link might weaken or destroy the 
 7 whole chain. It was a question of self-preservation 1 ; 
 and the Athenians were only carrying this theory 
 to a logical conclusion in seeking to win Thera and 
 Melos. This is the argument underlying the Melian 
 debate, although the selfishness of the policy is there 
 presented with an exaggeration of brutality, that 
 probably surpassed the truth 2 . 
 
 The relation of Athens to her subjects was based 
 
 on the power of the stronger, and perhaps justified 
 
 the title of rvpavvk, which was employed by both 
 
 friends and enemies to describe it 8 . 
 
 Control of Athens alone controlled the policy and adminis- 
 
 Athens tered the affairs of the league. The members were 
 
 over the m , 
 
 affairs of subject to a direct tax, assessed by Athens, paid 
 
 into her treasury, and administered by her officers. 
 
 Athens also interfered to a considerable extent with 
 
 the constitution of some of the states 4 , watched over 
 
 1 Thuc. vi. 83, ira<ri 5Z dvewicpdovov ttjp irpo<rr)Kovo-av aoir-qpiav 
 iKTropLfrtrdai. Cf. also vi. 85. 
 
 2 Cf. v. 99, rb avdyKaiov rrjs apxv*- v - 91 (Athens is acting 
 iir dxpeXlq. tt)s i)fMT4pas apxv* KaL W (rcoTTjpiq,). v. 97 (besides the 
 extension of the empire, the Melians would give a sense of security 
 5id to KaTao~Tpa<p7Jvai). 
 
 3 Pericles, Thuc. ii. 63. Cleon, iii. 37. The Mytilenaeans, iii. 10. 
 
 4 Such interference chiefly took place after revolt, when the 
 guilty oligarchy naturally gave place to a democracy. But there 
 was no complete uniformity of constitution, and oligarchies were 
 tolerated in the independent states (Lesbos and Chios), and 
 
 the allies. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 27 
 
 their civil administration by means of eVtWoTrot \ 
 occasionally put garrisons in under <f>povpapxoi 2 , and 
 required all lawsuits of importance to be settled in 
 the Athenian courts. 
 
 The subjection of the allies put Athenian power 
 on an artificial basis, for it was opposed to the Gre- 
 cian ideal of autonomy for each single state 3 . This 
 violation of Greek national feeling, combined with 
 the practical hardships of tribute and compulsory 
 jurisdiction, naturally created enemies for Athens 
 in the subject states ; but it will appear from a con- 
 sideration of the circumstances that the discontented \y 
 were a comparatively small body, and that the 
 bulk of the allies were sincerely attached to the 
 Athenian alliance. 
 
 The tribute was chiefly irksome from the method Tribute, 
 in which it was raised and administered ; a common 
 fund was a necessity, and the allies purchased by 
 their contributions immunity from service which 
 was undertaken by Athens. The amount of these * 
 contributions was never excessive, but the burden of 
 it bore most heavily on the rich men 4 and they , 
 alone were offended. 
 
 possibly in some of the subject states (Samos, according to Grote's 
 theory, vii. p. 218, n. 2). 
 
 1 These were extraordinary officers, see Wilamowitz, Aus 
 Kydathen, p. 16 and p. 75. 
 
 Wilamowitz, ib. p. 73. 
 
 3 It was with a view to this feeling that Sparta professed to 
 undertake ttjv iXevdtpwaiv rrjs 'EXXaSos. The enslavement of the 
 Athenian allies and the possible subjection of the rest of Greece 
 are prominently brought forward by the enemies of Athens. Cf. 
 Thuc. i. 68, 122. 
 
 4 It is probable that in most states it was assessed on a 
 graduated scale like the Athenian el<x<popd. 
 
28 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Compul- Of the grievance caused by the compulsory juris- 
 
 S diction lS ' Miction of Athens we hear much more both from 
 ancient and modern writers 1 . It is usually regarded 
 as a piece of unqualified despotism, due in part to 
 the desire of Athens to interfere with the allies in 
 peace as well as in war, in part to the litigious 
 instincts of the Athenian people' 2 . In reality, as 
 Grote points out, it arose from the necessity (which 
 is common to all political unions) of having some 
 judicial authority to decide disputes within the 
 league. 
 
 When different states combine there must be 
 some tribunal to which differences may be re- 
 ferred, which would otherwise result in war. Conse- 
 quently we see a provision for this purpose inserted 
 in most treaties 8 . So in the Delian confederacy the 
 disputes between two members of the league, at first 
 referred to the common synod at Delos, were brought 
 to an Athenian court : this practice gradually be- 
 came extended to disputes between individuals of 
 
 1 In this argument I am following Oncken, Athen und Hellas, 
 ii. pp. 110127, who has worked out Grote's theory with great 
 ability. 
 
 2 Thuc. i. 77. Resp. Ath. i. 16. 
 
 3 Cf. Thuc. i. 77 (the Athenian jurisdiction took the place of 
 violence in other empires, without inflicting injustice). Arbitration 
 within leagues was always regarded as of great importance, and, 
 as to-day, as a substitute for war. It was the refusal of Samos to 
 submit to arbitration which led to the Samian war, Plut. Per. 
 25. So Corcyra offers to submit to arbitration, Thuc. i. 28. 
 Cf. v. 27 (in the Argive- Corinthian alliance any state may enter 
 rjris avTovo/uos ri kcrri koX 5i/ccts facts Kal 6/jLoias didwai). Arrange- 
 ments for submitting possible disputes to arbitration are almost 
 the only subject of the Argive and Lacedaemonian alliance, 
 Thuc. v. 77. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 29 
 
 different states, finally to the more serious disputes 
 between members of the same state 1 . 
 
 It seems highly probable that the purpose under- 
 lying this was the prevention of political conflicts and 
 civil war. It was in the interests of the league 
 generally that the members should not be weakened 
 by o-racns, and that one political party should not be 
 able to oppress the other, and then abuse the pro- 
 tection of the law to punish its opponents. 
 
 It was expedient that there should be some 
 authority, standing above the disputants, to decide 
 between them : and this they had in the Athenian 
 courts. We may assume that the greater number 
 of the charges brought to Athens for trial were for 
 political offences 2 ; and as the oligarchs were usually 
 ill-disposed to Athens, that the trials were for con- 
 spiring against the democracy. 
 
 The oligarchs in this respect also can alone have 
 felt injured by the system. We may therefore con- 
 clude that the jurisdiction of Athens over the cities 
 of the league was beneficial to the greater number 
 
 1 That this was the result of a gradual process is proved by the 
 fact that there were no universal regulations compelling disputes 
 between citizens of the allied states to be tried at Athens. The 
 constraint depended on no general principles but on separate 
 treaties in each case. See Frankel, n. 641 to Bockh. 
 
 2 This is supported by a number of passages in the Eesp. Ath. 
 which can only refer to trials for political offences, i. 16, roi/s fikv 
 rod drjfiov <r<J)ovo~i, toi>j 5' ivavrlovs diroXXOovaiv tv rots 8iica<TT7iptois 
 k.t.X. Cf. i. 14. Cf. also Aristophanes, quoted below p. 66, n. 1. 
 That there was ground for these charges is proved sufficiently by 
 the fact that the oligarchs were always the moving force in revolt 
 from Athens : and that it was a matter of political principle with 
 them to work against and overthrow the democracy. 
 
30 POLITICAL PAKTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 of the allies. Not only was there a settled state of 
 peace within the league, but there was a security of 
 person and property, and a protection for the people 
 against the oppression of the rich oligarchs and 
 against the injustice of Athenian officers. 
 Attach- The democracies in the different states had good 
 
 democrats reason to be attached to the alliance, and they were 
 to the /probably actuated by a warmer feeling than tllat of 
 alliance. , indifferent acquiescence, which Grote thought charac- 
 teristic of them 1 . There was a community of interest, 
 a solidarity of democratic feeling which supported 
 the confederacy. ' The Athenian empire is in its 
 essence the alliance of Hellenic democrats against 
 the internal enemy the oligarchy which is always 
 conspiring or ready to conspire with the barbarians 2 .' 
 From this point of view the confederacy was in 
 the main as much a voluntary league in the time of 
 the Peloponnesian war, as in the days of Aristides. 
 From the fundamental principle of democracy (the 
 government in most of the states), if the people 
 wished to have what they regarded as the benefits 
 of Athenian government protection from external 
 and internal foes at the cost of tribute, the alli- 
 ance was of mutual advantage 3 . The Athenians 
 found in it a chief cause of their strength, the 
 allies found protection and enjoyed security of com- 
 
 1 Thuc. iii. 47, vvv fikv yap v/uuv 6 dij/uos ev iraacus rats -rroXeatu 
 euvovs iffriv. This is emphatic testimony. Cf. also viii. 48, rbv 5e 
 5i]/xou (T(pQv (allies) re KaracpvyrjP elvat Kal iKeivuv (oligarchs) cucppo- 
 PMrryv. 
 
 2 Oncken, Athen und Hellas, ii. p. 116. 
 
 3 Isocr. Paneg. 103 ff. lays stress on the benefits of the Athenian 
 Empire. , ' 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 31 
 
 merce and maritime traffic, as well as peace and 
 order at home. 
 
 It was otherwise with the oligarchic minority. Discontent 
 They had reason to hate the dominion of Athens, oligarchs. 
 It was they who bore the burden of the tribute, and 
 who were liable to prosecution at Athens : and in 
 addition to these two grievances, they felt the dis- 
 content common to the oligarchs in all Greek states, 
 because they were deprived of the privileges and 
 powers of government, to which on their principles 
 their wealth and birth entitled them. On this account 
 they were ready to combine with the enemies of 
 Athens and to break from their allegiance ; and just 
 as there was a solidarity of democracies throughout 
 Greece, so there was a network of oligarchic com- 
 bination between the different states an " Adels- 
 kette" embracing Athens and most of the allies, 
 always ready, if opportunities were favourable, to 
 combine with Sparta, and to overthrow the demo- 
 cratic government 1 . 
 
 There was, indeed,- an inseparable connection 
 between oligarchy and disloyalty to Athens on the 
 part of the allies. As soon as the allies broke from 
 Athens, the oligarchs got the upper hand 2 , so that 
 
 1 Cf. Miiller-Strubing, Aristophanes, pp. 8384. " Sparta was 
 the proper centre of reaction against Athenian dominion, but 
 even in Athens there was a link of the 'Adelskette.'" In Thuc. 
 viii. 48 Phrynichus says that the oligarchs had promised the allies 
 oligarchical constitutions in the event of the Athenian empire 
 being overthrown. This must refer to previous communications 
 between oligarchs in Athens and the allied states. 
 
 2 The oligarchs were always responsible for the revolt, and 
 Sparta supported them against the democracy. Thus, after the 
 
32 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 revolt was the first step in establishing their in- 
 fluence ; and conversely as soon as the oligarchs got 
 power, the alliance was broken off 1 . 
 Connec- r Democracy was, therefore, the bond of union be- 
 tweenthe tween Athens and her allies: while oligarchy was 
 
 demo- almost synonymous with revolt. On this account 
 cracy, the . J 
 
 alliance the continuance of the alliance depended on the 
 and the maintenance of the Athenian democracy. The alli- 
 ance and the democracy were mutually indispen- 
 I sable. For while the alliance would be shattered by 
 oligarchy, the democracy of Athens was supported 
 by the alliance, which was the main source of her 
 strength 2 . Many of the allies served in the armies 
 and on the fleet of Athens, and in addition to the 
 tribute contributed in this way to her power. More- 
 over the empire of the sea ensured Athens complete 
 control of trade 3 , which was of vital importance to 
 her as a commercial community. 
 
 In the same way the war was equally necessary 
 
 general revolt which began in 412 we hear that Lysander used his 
 influence in favour of the oligarchs. Plut. Lys. 5. 
 
 1 In the earlier part of the war the movement for revolt is 
 always initiated by the oligarchs. The case of Lesbos was typical ; 
 Thuc. iii. 47 (Diodotus says the people do not join the oligarchs in 
 revolt, implying that the latter were always to blame). Cf. Eesp. 
 Ath. i. 14 (if oi ir\o6<noL Kal ol laxvpol rule in the cities, 6\tyi<TTov 
 Xpovov r\ dpxv <=<ttcu rod drjfxov rod ' A.d-qvri<ri) . This is supported by 
 Thuc. viii. 64, (he describes Thasos as revolting as soon as 
 oligarchy was established, doKelv 84 fioi Kal h AXkois iroWoh rd>v 
 vtt7)k6u)i>). Chios forms an exception to this, as it remained faith- 
 ful till 412, even under an oligarchy; but the revolt then proceeded 
 from the oligarchs. 
 
 2 Thuc. i. 143, ra twv ^vmaolxuv 86ev lax^ojxev. iii. 13, 8l r\v i) 
 'Atti/o7 o>0eXeirai. iii. 46, iffx^ofiev 5 irpos roi>s rroXe/xlovs r<5e. 
 
 3 Bockh, i. p. 69. 
 
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION AND EMPIRE. 33 
 
 to maintain the alliance. The war was forced on 
 Athens by Sparta with a view to break up the 
 alliance, and the main cause of it was the jealousy 
 felt by Sparta for the growing power of Athens 1 . 
 Other causes naturally contributed to it, and chief 
 among these the antithesis between democracy and 
 oligarchy, which had divided the states of Greece 
 from the time that Athens first formed a counter 
 alliance to Sparta 2 . Hence the war became in 
 course of time a conflict of political principles ; com- 
 munity of feeling and interest joined democrats on 
 the one side against oligarchs on the other ; advan- 
 tage was taken of internal differences 3 , and the area 
 of the war became extended as states hitherto neutral 
 entered on it in support of those with whom they 
 were politically in sympathy. Consequently, as in 
 the case of the Athenian confederacy, a change of 
 constitution carried with it a change of side, and a 
 change of side was usually accompanied by the over- 
 throw of the existing constitution. This is well 
 illustrated by the conduct of Argos, who joined the 
 Athenian alliance, as a democratic state 4 , but with 
 the rise of oligarchic feeling went over to Sparta, 
 and soon established an oligarchy 5 . This government 
 
 1 Thucydides is careful to insist on every possible occasion that 
 the real (as opposed to the pretended) cause of the war was Sparta's 
 fear of the growth of the Athenian empire. See Thuc. i. 23, 33, 
 86, 88, 118, 140. 
 
 2 Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 16. Thuc. iii. 82. 
 
 3 Cf. the attack on Plataea, Thuc. ii. 2 ; on Boeotia, Thuc. iv. 
 76. See Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. p. 78. 
 
 4 They regarded Athens as tt6\lv re ofylai <pCklav dirb iraXaiov 
 kclI $T)}xoKpaTovfxht)v ui<nrep Kal avrol, Thuc. v. 44. 
 
 5 Thuc. v. 76, (the motives of the oligarchs were to obtain 
 
 w. 3 
 
and 
 oligarchy. 
 
 34 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 was overthrown by a democratic reaction and the 
 
 alliance with Athens was restored. 
 
 The Pelo- The waj was therefore not only a trial of strength 
 
 ponnesian . ' n ~. . t 
 
 war a between the two great powers of Greece, it was a 
 
 conflict Yife and death struggle between the principles of 
 democracy oligarchic and democratic government 1 . The danger 
 threatened even the constitution of Athens as well 
 as her empire ; for there were many of her citizens 
 who would gladly have seen oligarchy established at 
 the price of submission to Sparta. 
 
 These men as soon as they attained power began 
 to treat with Sparta 2 : and there was some ground 
 for the democratic feeling that peace with Sparta, 
 except on terms which would be a compensation for 
 the past and a guarantee for the future, was likely to 
 lead to the rise of philo-Spartan influence, and bring 
 the danger to democracy all the nearer. 
 
 I have argued that the democratic constitution 
 and the war were both necessary to maintain the 
 alliance ; and that to a certain degree the continu- 
 ance of the war to a decisive end was demanded in 
 the interests of the democracy. These are the car- 
 dinal principles of democratic policy, and we shall 
 not wonder that without flinching the democratic 
 party maintained them for twenty-seven years. 
 
 alliance with Sparta, koX ovtws rjdr] t$ drjfup iTnridecrdcu) ; cf. 
 c. 81. 
 
 1 This is true in the main throughout the war ; it was fully 
 proved at the end of the war, when Lysander established 
 oligarchies in every town. 
 
 2 In 411. The peace made in 404 was largely due to oligarchic 
 intrigue and was followed by an overthrow of the democracy. 
 
 Principles 
 of demo- 
 cratic 
 policy. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Division and Composition of Parties. 
 
 The antithesis between democracy and oligarchy, Demo- 
 which ranged all the states of Greece in different c Juqarchy 
 camps, appeared also within these states, and was as P r - 
 
 . ... ciples of 
 
 one of the most important causes of party division 1 , party 
 Hence in Athens, as elsewhere, we find men of cer- dim8i on. 
 tain political sympathies described as oligarchs and 
 as democrats : and the reality of these distinctions is 
 established not only by the general agreement of our 
 authorities, but by the events of 411 and 405, when 
 the two parties came to blows for their political 
 principles. 
 
 But apart from the academic preference, which Parties 
 most men must have had for one form of constitution questions 
 or the other, these principles do not form a satis- of policy. 
 factory ground for the classification of parties. The 
 difference between the champions of the two extreme 
 forms of government admitted of no compromise; 
 the dispute, when once raised, had to be fought out 
 to the bitter end ; and at Athens to advocate any 
 
 1 Cf. Plut. Per. 11, y\v fikv yap i apxys dnrXdrj tis uttouXos, dxr- 
 irep iv aidripip, diacpopav viroafjixaivovaa 5r)/j.0TiKf)s Kal api<TTOKpaTiKr)s 
 -rrpoaipfoews, rj 5' iKelvcov a/u\\a Kal <}>CkoTip.La twv avdpwv ^aOvrdr-qv 
 toix7]v refjLovaa TTJs 7r6\ews r6 ixkv dfjfiov rb 5' dXLyovs iroli]<T /caXetaflcu. 
 
 32 
 
36 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 A third 
 political 
 party. 
 
 proposal injurious to the democracy was an act of 
 high treason. In cases like this, at least until issue 
 is joined, men in pronounced antagonism to the ex- 
 isting constitution do not usually form a political 
 party, but work in secret, seeking to gain advantage 
 from the ordinary course of practical politics. So at 
 Athens, except for the brief intervals of revolutionary 
 movements, the oligarchs generally kept their pro- 
 jects in the background, and parties were divided 
 [not so much by fixed principles, as by the ordinary 
 politics of the day and questions of administration 1 . 
 Of these in the period under consideration the ques- 
 tion of war and peace was by far the most important. 
 
 We may conclude, therefore, that as a cause of 
 party division, the democratic policy had much more 
 weight than the democratic constitution ; and in 
 order to understand how political parties were ranged, 
 we must find out who supported and who opposed 
 a particular policy. If we consider the democratic 
 policy during the war, we shall find that the oligarchs 
 did not form the bulk of the opposition; many of 
 them may have taken an active part in resisting it, 
 while others of them held aloof from politics ; but 
 the majority of the standing opposition was formed, 
 so far as we can see, of men of moderate views, 
 indifferent but not disloyal to the constitution. 
 
 If this conclusion is right, there is a third political 
 party to be considered. Such a party scarcely receives 
 explicit mention in our authorities 2 , a fact which may 
 
 1 Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 1 and 13. 
 
 2 In n. 1 p. 92 I have discussed the passages in which this 
 party is referred to. 
 
DIVISION AND COMPOSITION OF PARTIES. 37 
 
 be attributed in part to the deficiencies which cha- 
 racterize them, in part to the vagueness of party- 
 division: but its existence is, I think, satisfactorily 
 demonstrated by the history of political events. 
 
 If we look to the early history of Athens, the Rise of 
 rise of this party can be traced. From the begin- thts P art y- 
 nings of political conflict in Athens, there had al- 
 ways been a considerable party in opposition to the 
 democrats and their policy; and every step in the 
 progress of reform was opposed more or less vehe- 
 mently by the aristocrats, though the force of events 
 and in particular the commercial development of 
 Athens had ensured the triumph of the democrats 
 on every occasion. 
 
 From the year 460 the aristocrats had no more 
 privileges to defend against the advance of demo- 
 cracy, and could only carry their principles into effect 
 by reaction 1 . The political victory of Pericles over 
 Cimon broke the force of the aristocracy for a time, 
 but Thucydides, the son of Melesias, united the 
 opposition in a strong party 2 , and the straggle was 
 renewed. In the resort to ostracism in 444 Thucy- 
 dides was defeated, and the old aristocratic party 
 was dissolved 8 . 
 
 Henceforth politics were transformed; for the 
 
 1 Cf. Plut. Cim. 15, (Cimon wished to restore the "aristo- 
 cratic " government of Clisthenes). 
 
 2 Plut. Per. 11. Miiller-Strubing, Aristophanes, pp. 295 7, 
 thinks that this party was largely composed of the peasants, as 
 Thucydides would not have challenged ostracism without strength 
 of numbers, and that we have here the frequent opposition between 
 town and country. 
 
 > Plut. Per. 14. 
 
38 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 time Pericles was supreme and above all parties, 
 and during his life the opposition was hopelessly dis- 
 organized. After his death, when political struggles 
 were renewed, and party divisions again became pro- 
 minent, we find the opposition to the democratic 
 policy organized under the leadership of Nicias. 
 The history of the succeeding years shows us a large 
 body of men, combined under recognized leaders 
 and following a consistent policy. 
 
 This body may on these grounds be fairly re- 
 garded as a political party in opposition to the demo- 
 crats. Its members were, however, quite distinct from 
 the oligarchs; they were not hostile to the constitution, 
 / and though they may have criticized its defects, they 
 I were not eager to change it ; they were men of 
 moderate views opposed to the democratic policy. 
 Three poli- We can therefore distinguish three political par- 
 wrties ^ es > ^e two extremes of oligarchy and democracy 
 and the intermediate section, corresponding to the 
 modern divisions of right, left and centre. These 
 political sections were not sharply divided; parties 
 were more or less in solution and had a tendency to 
 merge in one another. The oligarchs, especially, as 
 they could not declare their aims, but pursued them 
 secretly, attached themselves to whatever policy they 
 thought would best advance them, and only on rare 
 occasions organized themselves for a decisive effort. 
 With these qualifications we may distinguish the 
 / three parties 1 as (1) The democrats proper, or the 
 democrats from conviction, shading off into (2) the 
 
 1 I am indebted to Dr Beloch (Att. Pol. p. 13) for the titles 
 " democrats from conviction," and " opportunist democrats." 
 
\ 
 
 DIVISION AND COMPOSITION OF PARTIES. 39 
 
 middle party, mainly composed of moderate or oppor- 
 tunist democrats, but including also some moderate 
 oligarchs, who serve as a link to (3) the oligarchs 
 proper, opposed by conviction to democracy and 
 eager to overthrow it, but not as . a party taking a 
 prominent part in ordinary political life. 
 
 Having settled the main lines of party division, Composi 
 the subject, which naturally suggests itself for discus- par ties. 
 sion, is the composition of the different parties, or 
 the relation in which they stand to the different 
 sections of the population considered from the point \ 
 of view of wealth and occupation. 
 
 I have argued that as a cause of division ques- \ 
 tions of the day were of more importance than the 
 permanent principles men entertained on the subject 
 of the constitution. On this account we must de- 
 termine w 7 hat policy was in accordance with the inte- 
 rests of the different classes, before we can understand 
 how the parties were composed. Generally speaking 
 a man's political position is mainly determined by 
 his class interests, and, in the case of Athens the 
 importance of economic considerations has been gene- 
 rally recognized. Thus Bockh 1 says, "the great war 
 between aristocracy and democracy always going on 
 in Greece was largely a war of possessors and non- 
 possessors," while other writers 2 regard the conflict of \/ 
 parties as nothing else than a war of rich against poor. 
 
 1 Bockh, i. p. 182. This too is Plato's description, (Hep. iv. 422 
 e). " Each city is composed of at least two cities, hostile to each 
 other rich and poor." 
 
 2 This is the main argument of W. L. Freese in his book "Der 
 Parteikampf der Reichen und der Armen in Athen " ; cf. Beloch, 
 Att. Pol., pp. 1, 2. 
 
40 POLITICAL PAKTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Popula- In order to understand and apply this conclusion 
 
 Attica. ** * s necessary to have a clear view of the population 
 of Attica in its economic aspect. 
 
 The total population at the beginning of the war 
 may be regarded, at the most probable estimate, as 
 about 250,000 1 , made up as follows: 35,000 citizens 
 of full age, representing a total citizen population of 
 about 105,000; 10,000 metoecs, who with their families 
 amounted to about 30,000, and about 100,000 slaves. 
 Agricuitu- Of the Athenian citizens at the beginning of the 
 majority" war * ne g rea ter number lived in the country culti- 
 vating their own farms. This fact we have on the 
 explicit statement of Thucydides 2 , and there seems 
 no reason to reject his statement, as we know that 
 the land of Attica was very much divided. Not- 
 withstanding the war, which must have had a 
 disastrous effect on population and property, we are 
 told that even in 403 out of a probable total of 
 20,000 citizens there were only 5000 who owned no 
 land 3 . 
 
 Of these landowners all did not live on their 
 
 1 This is the estimate of Beloch, Bevolkerung, p. 73, and is in 
 sharp conflict with that of Bockh, which is double this number 
 (i. p. 51). For a discussion of the grounds on which the former 
 is based I would refer to Dr Beloch's work. To me his arguments 
 appear conclusive. 
 
 2 ii. 14 and 16. 
 
 3 Dionysius in the argument to Lysias 23. It is somewhat 
 difficult to believe that three-fourths of the population were even 
 then possessed of landed property. Muller^Striibing (Philologus, 
 Supplementband, iv. p. 62) thinks that the 5000 represented more 
 than half the citizens, but the total of 20,000 has been accepted 
 by Bockh, Biichsenschutz and Freese, as well as by Beloch in 
 his examination of the population of Attica, ib. p. 99. 
 
DIVISION AND COMPOSITION OF PARTIES. 41 
 
 estates ; many of the richer men especially resided in 
 the town, either leasing their property or having it 
 worked by slaves 1 . 
 
 From these considerations we may conclude that 
 in spite of the commercial changes fostered by 
 Themistocles and Pericles the class interested in 
 agriculture must have formed a majority of the 
 population. 
 
 Of the rest of the citizens many of the richer men 
 either were engaged personally in industry and com- 
 merce or at least profited by them, in lending their 
 capital at a high rate of interest ; but the bulk of the 
 inhabitants of the town and the Piraeus must have 
 been poor men, as much reduced to the necessity of 
 manual labour 2 as the poor aliens and slaves, who 
 with them formed the industrial class. 
 
 Such was the division of classes according to\Distribu- 
 occupation ; on the distribution of wealth we have'jj^^ 
 not such definite information. At the beginning of 
 the war there were about 15 to 16,000 Athenians 
 of at least hoplite census, as opposed to 19 to / 
 20,000 Thetes 3 . The classes owning a substantial 
 property formed therefore almost half the citizens ; 
 but the Thetes must not all be considered as I 
 poor men. Many owned small plots of land, which 
 raised them above our standard of poverty 4 , and 
 
 1 Bockh, i. p. 53. 
 
 2 lb., i. p. 58 ; cf. Plato, Rep. viii. 565 a. 
 
 3 Beloch, ib. p. 70. In the use of the term Thetes, I have 
 assumed that all property was taken into account in arranging the 
 classes for the da<popd ; Bockh, i. 189, argues that in the time of 
 the Peloponnesian war other property than land was so included. 
 
 4 Thus Freese, ib. p. 28, points out that Antipater and Cassander 
 
42 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Theory 
 that many 
 Athenians 
 lived on 
 state pay. 
 
 Bockh's 1 estimate of the national wealth (which he 
 puts roughly at 1 talent on the average to each 
 citizen) points to a general state of well-being. We 
 may assume that a large majority of citizens were 
 either possessed of a fair amount of property, or were 
 in a position to earn their living without trouble. 
 
 In connection with this subject I cannot pass by 
 a theory of which we hear so much from some his- 
 torians, that Athens supported by means of pay for 
 state services a large mob of professional idlers. 
 We have just seen that this mob could only have 
 been composed of those inhabitants of Athens and 
 the Piraeus, who had neither land nor capital to 
 support them, and who, presumably, preferred the 
 meagre contributions from the state to the wages 
 they might earn b}^ honest labour' 2 . The ordinary 
 rate of industrial wages (as of interest) was high in 
 
 in excluding the poor from citizenship required a minimum of 10 
 or 20 minae, a sum which in the altered value of money and inte- 
 rest we should consider high. 
 
 1 i. p. 146. Each talent would bear interest of 700 drachmae a 
 year. 
 
 2 This is the central idea of Freese's book. He argues (pp. 
 35 41), in opposition to Bockh, that the number of citizens en- 
 gaged in manual labour was utterly inconsiderable, and that almost 
 the whole of the work was done by metoecs and slaves. It is, of 
 course, impossible to say what proportion of poor Athenians had 
 a trade or handicraft ; but even accepting his own statement of 
 the distribution of landed property, there can scarcely have been 
 more than a fourth of the population, to whom state pay offered 
 any attraction, so that the institution cannot have had the far 
 reaching effect, which he attributes to it. The question, whether 
 the wages for state services were bufficient to compete with the 
 rewards of industry can be more easily discussed, and the conclu- 
 sion is equally unfavourable to Freese's theory. 
 
DIVISION AND COMPOSITION OF PARTIES. 43 
 
 Athens, in spite of the competition of metoec and 
 slave 1 . On the other hand, the ordinary wages for 
 those state services with which we are chiefly con- 
 cerned were low and in great part precarious. The 
 wages in question are those for the army and fleet, 
 those for the council of the Five Hundred and those 
 for the law courts 2 . 
 
 The wages for the army scarcely concern the argu- Pay of the 
 ment. Obviously an idle city rabble could not de- army ' 
 pend on military wages in time of peace, and even 
 in war the men usually enrolled as hoplites belonged 
 to the higher classes, and the Thetes were only ex- 
 ceptionally employed. Again, the wages both for 
 army and fleet were not so high as those that could 
 be got in industrial production. Service on the fleet, 
 moreover, was the concern of metoecs and foreigners 
 rather than of citizens. The latter manned the two 
 state galleys, and served as marines, but the rowers 
 were, at least in the period under discussion, mainlyj 
 either metoecs or foreigners 3 . 
 
 1 Bockh, i. p. 148, says "from the extreme cheapness of the 
 necessaries of life, the wages of labour must have been lower than 
 to-day : the number of competitors in the market for labour, 
 Thetes, metoecs and slaves must have produced a greater di- 
 minution." But Frankel, n. 202 to Bockh, I.e. (on the authority of 
 inscriptions recently discovered) puts wages as high as 1 and 2 
 drachmae a day ; and the fact that metoecs were attracted to Athens 
 points to wages being higher there than elsewhere, while slaves 
 were simply a commercial investment, so that competition would 
 not be carried beyond the limit of a satisfactory return. 
 
 2 The argument that many people lived on state pay loses much 
 of its force in the light of later investigation, which has shown that 
 pay for the assembly did not exist before Euclides. (Frankel, n. 
 427 to Bockh.) 
 
 3 The proportion of marines to rowers was about 10 to 190. 
 
44 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Pay of the The council consisted of 500 men, and as its duties 
 council. a ]3 Sor k ec i the whole of their time, they received a 
 wage of one drachma a day. As this, like the pay for 
 the army, was in return for definite services, it was not 
 likely to encourage idleness, while as only five hun- 
 dred men were concerned, the bulk of the poorer 
 citizens could not have been interested in it. 
 Pay of the There remains for consideration the pay of the 
 icas s. dicasts. Leaving out of view the number of dicasts 
 usually employed, and the number of days in the year 
 on which they were likely to receive pay 1 , the amount 
 at which it was fixed made it only a contribution to 
 the expenses of life 2 , and it certainly was not enough 
 to relieve the recipient from all necessity to labour. 
 Though a better remuneration than the nominal jury 
 fee of to-day., it can scarcely have been a temptation 
 to perpetual idleness, and as a matter of fact the 
 judges are usually represented as old men 3 , whose 
 working days are over. 
 
 The authorities on the composition of the fleet are quoted by 
 Gilbert, Handbuch, i. p. 234, and Adolph Bauer in Miiller's Hand- 
 buch Gr. Alt., p. 282. See Thuc. i. 121, Resp. Ath. i. 12. 
 
 1 From Ar. Vesp. 360 it has been supposed that 6000 dicasts 
 were chosen every year and all employed 300 days. Aristophanes, 
 however, does not say this, and Frankel (Die attischen Geschwo- 
 renengerichte pp. 10 19) throws great doubt on the conclusion. 
 He thinks that the number of dicasts employed was much smaller, 
 and that there were not more than 240 days a year when judicial 
 business was possible. The importance of the dicasts' pay to 
 the democracy is discussed below, p. 70. 
 
 2 Bockh, i. p. 152. The fee was usually 2 obols, raised tempo- 
 rarily from 425 to 3 obols to compensate for the rise of prices 
 caused by the war. 
 
 3 As the chorus in Ar. Vesp. ; cf. Ach. 375, Eq. 255. Through- 
 out the Vespae emphasis is laid on the small amount of the pay, 
 see especially 702 ff. 
 
DIVISION AND COMPOSITION OF PARTIES. 45 
 
 To sum up, we may conclude that the theory of 
 an idle city rabble living on state pay is a gross 
 exaggeration, not supported by facts ; that the number 
 to whom the system could have offered any induce- 
 ment was comparatively small 1 , the number to whom 
 regular employment other than military service was 
 open was still smaller, and the pay offered could not 
 have competed in attraction with the average wages 
 of labour. State pay existed as a partial compensation 
 to the ordinary citizen for his loss of time, not as a 
 means of subsistence for the idle and improvident. 
 
 We may now return to consider the relation which 
 classes bore to political parties. To repeat my former 
 conclusions, the population may be divided into (1) a 
 class of rich men living on their land, on the interest 
 of their capital or by trade ; (2) a large middle class, 
 composed of men of hoplite census ; and (3) the class 
 of Thetes, comprising a certain number of farmers, 
 safely removed from poverty, but ranking in this 
 class, and a considerable industrial section without 
 capital depending for subsistence on the produce of 
 their labour. 
 
 To compare these with the political parties dis- Connec- 
 
 tinguished above, it is immediately obvious that between 
 
 there is a broad analogy between the rich and the cla f, ses a ] ld 
 OJ . 'political 
 
 oligarchs, the poor and the democrats, and the middle parties. 
 class and the middle party 2 . 
 
 1 The number of those who could not support themselves by 
 labour must have increased in the latter part of the war, when 
 agriculture was at a standstill, but at that time the population had 
 seriously diminished and the army and fleet made constant and 
 increasing demands. 
 
 2 This analogy is borne out by the titles given to the different 
 
46 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 This analogy corresponded approximately both to 
 the actual state of the parties, and to their respective 
 interests. Without going into details, which will 
 have to be discussed in a closer examination of the 
 different parties, the rich men had a natural incli- 
 nation to an oligarchical form of government, in which 
 privileges and power compensated them for the bur- 
 dens they bore ; the poorest classes realized the ad- 
 vantages of democracy, in which every man was 
 equal and taxation was proportional to wealth, while 
 the middle classes were not enthusiastic for either 
 extreme. 
 
 Similarly it will be found that in the main the 
 policy of the oligarchs favoured the rich, and that of 
 the democrats the poor, while the middle party pur- 
 sued the ends determined by their interests. 
 
 To this broad analogy there were of course many 
 exceptions, as the circumstances or convictions of 
 individuals separated them from the rest of their 
 class; it is sufficient to point out now that the 
 position of the average man was determined by the 
 interests of the class to which he belonged. 
 
 parties (these are discussed in the next chapter). Thus the 
 oligarchs are called bwaroi and 7r\oi/<noi, the democrats oi iroWoi 
 and irivrjTes. The identity is assumed by Euripides (Supp. 
 238 ff.), where he speaks of three parties in the state, oi 6\f3ioi, oi 
 oiic %x 0VTS > V v P&mp fioipa. In Aristotle the ixiaoi. are both the 
 middle class and the middle party. Pol. 1295 b. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 Parties in detail. Their Organization and 
 Policy. 
 
 1. The Democratic Party. 
 
 The first party to be considered is that of the Titles of 
 democrats proper, the ' democrats from conviction,' &iff erent 
 who are so called in contrast to the middle party, parties. 
 the members of which, though for the most part 
 democrats, formed a separate party. Some infor- 
 mation of the way in which the democrats were 
 regarded by their contemporaries may be obtained 
 from the titles applied to them. As these titles were 
 usually invented and employed by writers in oppo- 
 sition to the democracy, the complimentary title 
 was naturally chosen by the oligarchs, and the term 
 of abuse applied to their opponents. 
 
 The first and most common title of the democrats 
 is neutral ; they are called 6 Brjfios 1 , i.e. the popular 
 party, to ttXyjOos or ol iroXKoi, the numbers of the 
 democrats appearing great in proportion to those of 
 the 6\tyoL 
 
 1 These titles are so well known and occur so often that it is 
 unnecessary to quote the evidence for their use. Freese, Partei- 
 kampf der Reichen und der Armen, pp. 24 5, gives most of them. 
 
48 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Secondly, the oligarchs are frequently called tt\ov- 
 crioiy Bvvarol, and though the term is not used as a 
 party phrase Xenophon talks of 6 Brjfios as ol Trevrjres 
 tcov itoXltouv 1 . 
 
 A third class of names points to the contrast 
 with respect to birth and culture. The oligarchs 
 assumed the titles of tcaXol /cdyaOol, /3e\rcaToo, 
 yvcopcfjbot, and above all of ^pijo-rol, while the demo- 
 crats were styled irovrjpol, jio^Orjpol and the like 2 . 
 
 1 Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 37. Cf. Resp. Ath. i. 2, and Plut. Per. 7, 
 where iroWol ko.1 TrivrjTes is opposed to 6\iyoi /cat ttXovo'iol. 
 
 2 The application of uncomplimentary terms to denote political 
 opponents has always been frequent. Such terms, at first em- 
 ployed in mere abuse, gradually obtain literary recognition and 
 come into use as ordinary party titles. There is some significance 
 in the words chosen to describe the Athenian democracy. The 
 opposition of XPW 1 - an( ^ Trovypol occurs throughout the Respub- 
 lica Atheniensium ; the author uses other words to describe parties 
 (e.g. drjfxos, irtvrjTes, and Stj/jlotlkol are contrasted with yevvcuot and 
 TrXotiaioi, i. 2), but none so frequently as irovr)pbs and its opposite. 
 The use of irourjpbt in connection with the Athenian democracy is 
 very general: see especially Thuc. viii. 47 (where Alcibiades uses 
 TTovrjpia as synonymous with drj/xoKparia), Ar. Eccl. 176 (where the 
 antithesis between xpvvrbs and wovrjpbs is brought out), and Eur. 
 Supp. 243 (in which the poet refers to irovrjpol irpocrTaTai, a phrase 
 which ocurs also in Ar. I.e.). In Aristot. Pol. 1294 a, 2 irovrjpo- 
 Kpareiadcu is contrasted with apurroKpaTeiadcu. The word p.oxdrjpbs 
 is not so frequent in a political sense, but it is found in several 
 passages as a substitute for irovypos with exactly the same mean- 
 ing. Thus in Ar. Eq. 1303, Thuc. viii. 73, Plut. Arist. 7, Nic. 
 11, it is employed to describe Hyperbolus, while in the same 
 passages in Thuc. and Plut. Nic, in Plut. Ale. 13, and Ar. Pax 681 
 irov-ripbs is used of the same man. Similarly Xen. (Hell. i. 4. 13) 
 in describing the prosecution of Alcibiades in 415 talks of ol /ao%- 
 B-qporepa Xiyovres as having driven him out, an expression which 
 recalls Thuc. vi. 89 (where Alcibiades speaks of those ol iirl rb\ 
 irovypdrepa i^rjyov rbv 6'xXoj/). Cf. also Ar. Lys. 576, and Ran. 421, 
 Aristot. Pol. 1320 a, 34 (/iox^pd drj^oKpaTia). The choice of these 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 49 
 
 Separating from these titles the abusive associa- Democra- 
 tions connected with them, they point to the fact ^K? y 
 that the Brjfjuos was largely composed of the poorer composed 
 classes, who were reduced to the necessity of manual classes. 
 labour in agriculture or trade, and who could not 
 afford the education and leisure considered essential 
 by the rich. This inference is supported by the con- 
 clusion arrived at in the last chapter that the demo- 
 cratic party found its chief support in the poorer 
 classes, although there were many of the middle 
 and richer classes, especially among the merchants 
 and manufacturers, who gave an enthusiastic alle- n 
 giance to the democracy and its policy 1 ; in fact 
 both the leading politicians and the leading gene- 
 rals were usually men of some degree of wealth 
 and often of birth, whose attachment to the demo- 
 cracy, though it depended in part on the power and 
 distinction conferred upon them 2 , was mainly a 
 matter of conviction. 
 
 The peasant farmers of small property, whose 
 income ranked them with the poorer classes, must 
 have been sincerely devoted to the democratic con- 
 particular terms may possibly have had some connection with their 
 original meaning of laborious (cf. Ar. Vesp. 466 irducjp irovrjpi), and 
 the application of them may have arisen from the idea, common to 
 the philosophy of the age, that manual labour was degrading in 
 itself and fatal to a life of culture or political activity. Cf. Socra- 
 tes in Aelian, Var. Hist. x. 14 (tj apyia ade\<pr) rijs iXevdepias), 
 Aristot. Pol. 1269 a, 34 (on the necessity of axoXr] in a well-ordered 
 state), and ib. 1278 a, 8 (the best constitution excludes the fidvav- 
 aos from citizenship). 
 
 1 Lysicles, Eucrates, Cleon, and Hyperbolus all came from the 
 trading class. 
 
 2 This is the motive attributed to them by Thuc. viii. 73. 
 
 w. 4 
 
50 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 stitution, for any other would have excluded them 
 from political privileges, but in their attitude to the 
 war they must at first have been at one with the 
 rest of the agricultural class. These men, therefore, 
 while sincerely attached to the democracy, cannot 
 always have regarded the democratic policy with 
 favour, and probably formed a floating element, 
 changing with the course of events from the middle 
 party to the democrats, until by the loss of their 
 property and their adaptation to new circumstances 
 they became identified with the demos of the town. 
 Strength The constant supporters of the democratic policy, 
 
 of the g0 ar ag we can judge from the course of events 1 , 
 party. formed almost half the citizen body. Consequently 
 the accession of a comparatively few men from the 
 less decided political sections sufficed to give to this 
 party an effective voice in the assembly On matters 
 of administration and of less political interest the 
 democrats could often command a chance majority, 
 inasmuch as the greater part of their supporters 
 dwelt in the town and the Piraeus, while the other 
 parties were more scattered, and were not so careful 
 in attending the assembly. 
 Organiza- For both these reasons it was necessary for 
 democratic ^ n ^ s P artv to be well organized under recognized 
 party. leaders. Organization was comparatively easy ; they 
 were for the most part men of similar sympa- 
 thies and aims, and they alone of all parties were 
 firmly united in the pursuit of a consistent policy. 
 
 1 I have discussed in the next chapter the struggle of parties, 
 and have endeavoured to show that for a time at least they 
 were almost equally divided. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 51 
 
 Besides organization they needed men to represent 
 their interests and give voice to their policy. The 
 demagogues were the party agents of the demo- 
 cracy. Of these one had a special preeminence and 
 so appears more frequently in our authorities. This 
 was the irpoaTam]^ tov Bt/julov 1 . 
 
 * At one time it was thought that this title de- The 
 noted a magistrate with definite powers, but Arnold J2JaJu2J 
 and Grote have shown that it is purely unofficial, and 
 was only used to describe the leading demagogue, 
 who acted as guardian and representative of the 
 demos, as the ordinary Trpoo-rdrr)^ did of the metoec. 
 It was equivalent to 8r) pay coy 6s 2 with a notion of 
 primacy. His power was entirely dependent on the 
 support of the assembly 3 , but his position compared 
 with that of other speakers was recognized as special 
 and preeminent 4 . J 
 
 We may therefore follow Grote in his denial that Grote's 
 
 t n nn theory 
 
 the 7rpocrTacna conferred any official power or respon- wrong. 
 
 1 This phrase or its equivalent occurs often, especially in 
 connection with Athenian politics. Thuc. ii. 65 (Pericles' succes- 
 sors quarrelled irepl ttJs tov drjfiov irpoa-Taa-ias). vi. 89 (Alcibiades 
 speaks of 77 irpocrTao-la tov drj/xov). viii. 65 (of Androcles). viii. 
 89 (of the oligarchic leaders bidding for popular favour). Ar. Eq. 
 1128 (Demos says he likes to keep ha irpoo-T&TTjv) ; cf. Pax 681, 
 Ran. 569, Eccl. 176, and Lys. 13. 7. 
 
 2 In Thuc. iv. 21 Cleon is called d-rjfjiayuyos ; cf. Ar. Eq. 191, 
 where 77 5v pay coy La is evidently equivalent to 77 irpoaTao-la. 
 
 3 See Grote, vii. p. 303, also Gilbert, Beitrage, p. 78. 
 
 4 Cf. the passages quoted in n. 1, which show that the posi- 
 tion was regarded as definite and open to competition. Cf. also 
 Ar. Eq. 128 30, where in discussing the succession of demo- 
 cratic leaders, he speaks of Eucrates os irp&Tos gc rr}s 7r6\ews to. 
 irpdyfiaTa. to. Trpdyfiara is used elsewhere of official power, and 
 it evidently imputes great influence to the irpoo-i uttjs. 
 
 42 
 
52 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 sibility, but his own theory of it is open to great 
 objection. From the fact that men of birth were 
 usually elected to the generalship, and from the 
 important part the demagogues took in criticizing 
 the administration, he developed the idea that the 
 irpocrraTrj^ led the opposition to the government of 
 the rich oligarchs. 
 
 This theory is based in part on the false idea 
 that all opponents of the demagogues were of neces- 
 sity oligarchs 1 . As a matter of fact the oligarchs 
 did not regularly take part in ordinary politics, and 
 men of known oligarchic sentiments even if elected 
 would have been rejected at the official examina- 
 tion (BoKLfiaala) ; most of the generals even if not 
 keen democrats, were certainly not antidemocratic. 
 As I hope to show, the government, in the sense of 
 the chief executive magistracy, was the subject of 
 party contention and frequently changed hands. The 
 democrats proper (the war party) and the moderates 
 or middle party (usually inclining to peace) had a 
 fairly equal share of office. Hence it is obvious that 
 the leader of the demos was as often on the side of 
 the government as on that of the opposition, and 
 inasmuch as he could generally command the at- 
 tention of the assembly, " leader of the house " would 
 be as fair a description of him as "leader of the 
 opposition." 
 The dema- Nor is it true that the demagogues were always 
 
 1 Grote regards all men who do not act with the democrats as 
 oligarchs, even Nicias. See vol. vi. p. 65, " The principal person 
 of what may be called the oligarchical party." I have pointed 
 out in the last chapter that the middle party does not show any 
 trace of oligarchic leanings. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 53 
 
 excluded from the generalship 1 . Pericles (who was gogues and 
 certainly Trpoardrrj^) held the generalship almost ra \^i?~ 
 continuously. Of his successors 2 , Eucrates was 
 general for the year 432/1 3 , at a time when he was 
 doubtless a prominent member of his party, Lysicles 
 in 428/7 4 . Cleon, apart from his extraordinary com- 
 mand in 425/4, was general in 424/3, and 422/1 5 . 
 
 We do not know that Hyperbolus was ever elected 
 to the generalship ; his activity seems to have been 
 employed in another sphere, but Alcibiades, who 
 aspired to lead the demos, was eager for military 
 command. Androcles, the demagogue, was probably 
 general in 414/3 6 . Cleophon, who succeeded to him, 
 is thought to have been general in 406/5, 405/4 7 . 
 The lament of Eupolis for the good old days when 
 generals came ire rdov fjieylo-rcov ol/a&v 8 must refer to 
 the admission of men of no birth to the generalship. 
 
 Naturally from their social position (which might 
 
 1 This was also the view of Curtius, vol. iii. p. 88 (English 
 Trans.), "Thus one of the most important changes that occurred 
 at this time (after the death of Pericles) consisted in the separa- 
 tion of the office of general from that of popular leader." 
 
 2 Ar. Eq. 12838 gives Eucrates, Lysicles and Cleon as the 
 three successors to Pericles. 
 
 3 C. I. A. iv. 179. The general of that name, who is men- 
 tioned there, is probably identical with the demagogue. 
 
 4 Thuc. iii. 19. 
 
 5 For the first year, Ar. Nub. 581 94 is our authority; the 
 inference is disputed, but see Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 305. For the 
 second, Thuc. v. 1. 
 
 6 So Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 63. 
 
 ' For Cleophon, see Schol. to Ar. Ran. 679, Lys. 13. 12. The 
 dates are uncertain; the evidence is discussed by Beloch, Rhein. 
 Mus. xxxix. pp. 255 6. 
 
 s Frag. 117 (Kock). 
 
54 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Combina- 
 tion of 
 military 
 
 have debarred men like Cleon and Cleophon from 
 continuous military training), as well as from the 
 time they spent in the assembly, the demagogues 
 were not so well qualified for active service as men 
 who made war their profession. They may have 
 usually stood for the generalship in order to gain a 
 share of the powers conferred by that office, but they 
 probably did not take the field so often as the mili- 
 tary members of the board, and on this account we 
 do not find them mentioned so frequently in our 
 authorities. 
 
 We see then that the leading demagogue (who 
 was also the leading statesman of the democratic 
 " P rr S^l P ar ty) ft en ne ld military office ; and this introduces- 
 influence, the consideration of a special position open to such 
 a man. When the office held was that of president 
 of the generals 1 , and when it was continued for some 
 years, together with the favour and support of the 
 assembly, the holder was then not only "leader of 
 the house," but "first minister" (to apply modern 
 designations), and united in himself the chief civil 
 and military power, as well as the direction of state 
 policy. 
 
 This combination of official power and political 
 influence deserves especial consideration from the 
 possibilities it offered to ambitious men of practically 
 establishing a personal government. Democracies 
 and tyrannies have always been closely related, and 
 demagogues have frequently developed into tyrants 2 . 
 
 1 irpijTavis tQiv <TTpaT7)yQv, see above p. 24. 
 
 2 Aristot. Pol. 1305 a, 8 (iirl yap tQv apxaiuv, ore yhoiro a 
 avrbs drjpiayuybs koX crparnybs, els rvpavvlda fier^aWov). Cf. Plata 
 Eep. viii. 565 d on the rise of the tyrant from the irpoaTarvs. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 55 
 
 From the unwieldy character of democracy, the Democracy 
 difficulty of inducing a multitude to show energy in t V ran - 
 the pursuit of a consistent policy, and the possibili- 
 ties of corruption and abuse, it often happens that 
 the direction of state-affairs is entrusted to a dic- 
 tator, who raises himself to power as the champion 
 and deliverer of the sovereign people. Such a result 
 may be achieved without revolution ; a practical 
 abrogation of the constitution under legal forms may 
 take place by the conferment of almost autocratic 
 power on a statesman; and at Athens we find such an 
 informal tyranny established by more than one man. 
 
 To go into detail, the first essentials for this 
 autocracy were the favour of the people and the 
 command of the assembly, which were implied in 
 the position of irpo<TTaTr)<; rod Btj/jlov. The holder of 
 this position acquired the requisite official power by 
 becoming Trpvravis tcov crrparTjyoov. To establish 
 his authority firmly, nothing else was needed 1 but 
 continuity, and this element was ensured by the 
 habitual practice of reelecting the generals 2 . This 
 combination of influence and power made the holder 
 first and permanent minister of the state, as well as 
 leading demagogue. 
 
 1 The conferment of extraordinary powers on the general 
 ((TTpaTiryLa avTOKparcjp) was not necessary to this position, and was 
 usually a temporary measure adopted for a particular expedition. 
 
 2 Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, pp. 59 ff. says, " The possibility 
 of a continuation of the generalship did away with the responsi- 
 bility. For the reelected general, until the people reject him, 
 there is no account to be rendered." He thinks there was only 
 a nominal process of etidvvai. before the deaixodirai. This is dis- 
 puted, but in case of reelection it is probable that both evdvvcu 
 and 8oKifxa<ria were little more than formal. 
 
56 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Pericles. Such an autocracy was established by Pericles, 
 
 during the period subsequent to the ostracism of 
 Thucydides, son of Melesias. For he was general 
 all this time 1 , and in all probability president; he 
 was also TrpoaTarr)*;, and had almost the sole direc- 
 tion of Athenian policy. We have good evidence 
 I that he possessed powers superior to those of ordi- 
 nary magistrates 2 , and Thucydides describes the 
 constitution of the period as personal government 
 under the forms of democracy 3 . 
 
 Alcibiades The Athenians, in spite of their morbid fear of 
 tyranny 4 , were ready to submit to a legalized dic- 
 tatorship, and the position won by Pericles was open 
 to any man of sufficient ability and popularity. This 
 possibility seems to offer a key to the career of Al- 
 cibiades, and to explain many actions of his, which 
 otherwise seem hopelessly inconsistent. I believe 
 that throughout his public life he was emulating 
 Pericles, and that the position held by the latter 
 formed his constant ideal. In two particulars he 
 was immeasurably below Pericles as a statesman. 
 Alcibiades was impatient of restraint and devoid of 
 that moderation (crcotppoavvr)) 5 , which was so marked 
 
 1 Plut. Per. 16. 
 
 2 He is described in Thuc. twice as difcaros atirbs a-rparTjyos (see 
 above, p. 22, n. 4). After his fall the people again (avrbp) cTpar^ybv 
 e'lkovTO Kal irdvra ra Trpdyfiara iirirpexf/av (Thuc. ii. 65). Diod. 
 xii. 42 describes Pericles as arpaTriyds <x>v Kal rrjv 6\r}v -rryopLovlav 
 (cx^v. The passage of Teleclides, quoted by Plut. Per. 16, probably 
 refers to this position of his. 
 
 3 Thuc. ii. 65, eyiyvero \6ycp [xtv brjpLOK parta, Zpyip d viro rov 
 irpsjJTOV dvdpos a-pxh- 
 
 4 Cf. the panic in 415, Thuc. vi. 53, 60. 
 
 5 See Vischer, Kleine Schriften, p. 106 ; Thuc. vi. 15 talks of 
 his rrapapofita. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 57 
 
 a virtue in Pericles, while he substituted for the 
 pure and highminded patriotism of the latter a 
 selfish ambition for his personal advancement 1 . 
 
 The democratic party could alone enable him to His career. 
 reach the goal before him, and on this account he 
 attached himself to it. Of his early life we know 
 little, but we may conclude that, in spite of his 
 temporary attempt to outbid Nicias for the Spartan 
 7rpoj;evla 2 , he began public life as a democrat 3 . His 
 anti-Spartan policy was based on democratic tradi- 
 tions, and was urged in his own interests, as war 
 would give him a chance of military distinction. He 
 found himself thwarted by the influence of Nicias 
 and by the even balance of parties in the state, and 
 on this account he challenged ostracism. Fearing 
 the result of this he combined with his chief political 
 rival to get rid of Hyperbolus, who stood in his way 
 as a competitor for the leadership of the demos. 
 
 For a time his influence was diminished, and to 
 recover his former position he advocated the Sicilian 
 expedition, which would, if carried to a successful issue, 
 have assured him not only overwhelming popularity, 
 but the military position and prestige necessary for 
 his purpose. In fear of such an issue, the extreme 
 democrats under Androcles, and the oligarchs under 
 Thessalus, combined to overthrow him. 
 
 From 415 to 411 his plans were interrupted by 
 his compulsory exile. After trying without success 
 to establish his influence in Sparta and Persia by 
 
 1 Plut. Ale. 2, to (frikoveiKov nal to (pikoirpuTov. 
 
 2 Thuc. v. 43. 
 
 3 The evidence is collected in Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 50. Cf. 
 especially Thuc. vi. 89. 
 
58 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 services rendered against Athens, he made his recall 
 the immediate object of his life. To secure this end 
 he was not scrupulous about the means employed, 
 and had no hesitation in working against the de- 
 mocracy. For his fall had been mainly due to the 
 democrats, and his return, while Androcles was chief 
 demagogue, was impossible. On these grounds he 
 initiated the oligarchic movement of 411, foreseeing 
 that his opportunity would come, as it did, in the 
 confusion caused by the revolution. He took this 
 step however from no love for the oligarchs, from 
 whom he broke as soon as possible, while they for 
 their part saw clearly enough that he was a man 
 " unfitted for oligarchy 1 ." 
 
 Apparently the sincerity of his democratic pro- 
 fessions was not doubted when he was recalled by 
 the army at Samos 2 , and entrusted with supreme 
 power 3 . His advocacy of the rule of the 5000 was 
 entirely due to motives of expediency 4 , as it started 
 a division in the ranks of the Four Hundred, 
 which was the cause of their overthrow; and the 
 restoration of full democracy in 410 was probably 
 
 1 Thuc. viii. 63. Cf. also 68, and 70 (the oligarchs do not 
 recall the exiles because of Alcibiades). 
 
 2 Thuc. viii. 81. 
 
 3 Thuc. viii. 82, arpaT^ov e'i\ovTO...Kai rd irpdyfidra iravra 
 dverldecrav. He had got the coveted position at Samos, and had 
 now only to have it confirmed at Athens. 
 
 4 Thuc. viii. 86, diroKpivdjAevos 6'ti...toi>s fj.kv irevTaKtax 1 '^ ^ 
 ov kwXijol dpxew. Some have thought on the strength of this pas- 
 sage that his ideal was a moderate democracy. This evidence in 
 itself is insufficient. Alcibiades found his chief support in the 
 fleet ; and the fleet would have nothing to say to a limitation of 
 the franchise. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 59 
 
 due to the fleet, in which Alcibiades' influence was 
 paramount. 
 
 After this he proceeded cautiously ; he wished to 
 strengthen his claim on Athens by military services, 
 before taking advantage of his recall from banish- 
 ment. When he did return, he came as the deliverer 
 of Athens and the hope of the future, and at last 
 it seemed as if the long desired reward was to be 
 his. He had apparently been elected Trpvravis rdov 
 arparTjyoov 1 before his return, he now had full 
 powers conferred on him (dvapprjOeU dirdvTwv yye- 
 fjLwv avroKpdroop 2 ). With some classes he enjoyed 
 an unbounded popularity 3 , and it only needed a 
 continuance of popular favour and the successful 
 conduct of the war on his part to give him a 
 position in the state as strong as that of Pericles. 
 But, before his power was firmly established, his 
 enemies raised the charge that he was aiming at 
 the tyranny, and this suspicion combined with his 
 mismanagement of the war caused his final over- 
 throw, and deprived Athens of the only man who 
 of all her citizens might have effected her salvation. 
 
 I have summarized Alcibiades' career, because I Aims of At 
 
 cilyiciclss 
 
 think the most satisfactory explanation of it is afforded 
 by the supposition that he was striving to follow in 
 Pericles' footsteps and establish a personal govern- 
 ment on a constitutional basis. 
 
 It is usually assumed that his aim throughout 
 life was to overthrow the democracy and establish 
 
 1 See Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 2867, for a discussion of this. 
 
 2 Xen. Hell. i. 4. 20, cf. Diod. xiii. 67, Plut. Ale. 3*3. 
 
 3 Plut. Ale. 34 and 35. 
 
magogues. 
 
 60 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 himself as tyrant, that he was in the main equally 
 indifferent to oligarchy and democracy 1 , while some 
 claim him as an adherent of the moderate democrats 2 . 
 If the explanation I have suggested is right, the 
 object he pursued was perfectly legal and within the 
 constitution 3 , and his consistency of purpose is evi- 
 dent through the apparent vacillation of his conduct. 
 He attached himself to democracy, not for its own 
 sake, but because his interests were bound up with 
 it, as the only form of government which could grant 
 his wishes ; and for the democratic constitution and 
 party he worked, except for the interval of his banish- 
 ment, throughout his life * v 
 Lesser de- I have discussed the position of the leading de- 
 magogue, and the opportunity it offered him of at- 
 
 1 As Phrynichus (Thuc. viii. 48) said. Thucydides endorses 
 the remark, and it may be true of Alcibiades' philosophic stand- 
 point, but prudential motives attached him to democracy. 
 
 2 Chiefly on the strength of Thuc. viii. 86, which I have dis- 
 cussed above, p. 58, n. 4. 
 
 3 The suspicion was certainly entertained in 415 and 407 that 
 he was aiming at tyranny. (Thuc. vi. 15, Plut. Ale. 34 35.) The 
 very fact however that both in 415 when he might have appealed 
 to the army with a good hope of success, and in 407 when he had 
 so excellent an opportunity, he did not take the decisive step seems 
 to argue that he purposely avoided any illegal or revolutionary 
 method. 
 
 4 This would explain the constant hatred of the oligarchs to- 
 wards him, which is abundantly proved. On the other hand, the 
 other demagogues had no love for him. He was a man out of 
 sympathy with them, a rival claimant for the people's favour, 
 whose success would throw them completely into the shade. This 
 explains his conduct to Hyperbolus, the action of Androcles and 
 others. Thuc. ii. 65 refers to the rivalry of demagogues, in con- 
 nection especially with the Sicilian expedition ; vi. 15 he traces 
 his fall to the fear and envy of his greatness. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 61 
 
 taining almost monarchic power ; there were how- 
 ever many demagogues contented with a much 
 humbler position. These are usually cast into the 
 shade by the greater men, and so do not receive the 
 attention they deserve. Our authorities seldom 
 mention more than the leading demagogue; we can- 
 not fill up the gaps, but we must not forget that 
 they only exist owing to the deficiency of our in- 
 formation, and were this complete we should see the 
 political stage crowded with figures. 
 
 The mention of a few names from Aristophanes 
 and other sources will give us some idea of these 
 lesser politicians. Pisander 1 (if he may be ranked 
 as a true democrat) is the constant object of Aristo- 
 phanes' abuse. Hyperbolus 2 appears in Aristophanes 
 long before the historians mention him. We hear 
 of Theorus, Aeschines and Phanus 3 as three com- 
 panions of Cleon, who were probably humble poli- 
 ticians, of Thudippus who proposed the raising of 
 the tribute 4 , of Demostratus who took a prominent 
 part in advocating the Sicilian expedition 5 . From 
 Andocides we hear of Demophantus proposing a 
 democratic oath, probably on the restoration of full 
 democracy in 410 6 ; from Lysias of Cleisthenes, 
 Epigenes, Demophanes as active democrats in 410 7 , 
 and from Xenophon of Archedemus, Timocrates 
 
 1 Babyl. fr. 81 (Kock), Pax 395, Lys. 490. 
 
 2 Ach. 846, Eq. 1303, Nub. 623. 
 
 3 Ar. Vesp. 1220, cf. Ach. 134, Eq. 1256. 
 
 4 C. I. A. i. 37. 
 6 Ar. Lys. 391. 
 
 6 Andoc. 1. 96. 
 
 7 Lys. 25. 25. 
 
62 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 and Callixenus as prosecutors of the generals in 
 406 1 . 
 
 This list, incomplete as it is, will suffice to show 
 at once how many active politicians there must have 
 been, and how little we know of them. 
 Sphere of Demagogy was a profession, with a method and 
 magogues. sphere of its own. The object of it was to protect 
 the interests and to gain the favour of the people by 
 zealous devotion to their service. There were three 
 places in which the demagogue could do this, the 
 public assembly, the council, and the law courts. 
 Of these the assembly was the most important. All 
 business of state was under its control, by it the 
 policy of the commonwealth was decided, the ad- 
 ministration was carried on and the magistrates were 
 criticized and directed. In proportion to the import- 
 ance of the assembly the power of the orator rose, 
 and oratory was an essential part of the demagogic 
 art' 2 . The business side of the demagogue's duty 
 in the assembly was to propose and support the 
 decrees, in which all state business was embodied, 
 and hence the ifrr/cpicr/jLa was regarded as his special 
 weapon 3 . 
 
 Any business introduced in the assembly required 
 
 1 Xen. Hell. i. 7. For Archedemus cf. also Ar. Ran. 420. 
 
 2 The importance of oratory appears in the prominence given 
 by Thucydides to the speeches of public men, and in the complaints 
 of Pericles and Cleon that the people allow themselves to be carried 
 away by oratory. Cf. Thuc. ii. 43, iii. 38. In Ar. Eq. 860 Cleon 
 says to Demos firj tov Xiyovros iadi. Possibly this was a constant 
 reproach of Cleon's, but it may be a reminiscence of the actual 
 speech reported by Thucydides 1. c. 
 
 3 Cf. Ar. Eq. 1383, Nub. 1428, Aves, 1035, and see Gilbert, 
 Reitrage, p. 79. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 63 
 
 the previous sanction of the council, and on this 
 account it was necessary for the democrats to be 
 well represented there. The lesser men of the 
 party and the rising demagogues tried to get a place 
 on it. Possibly the competition for a seat there was 
 not very keen, and in spite of the uncertainty of 
 the lot many of the demagogues, including Cleon 1 , 
 Hyperbolus 2 and Androcles 3 , were members of the 
 council at some period of their career. 
 
 Coming to the actual part taken by the dema-Vma/ice. 
 gogues in political affairs, there are some subjects in 
 which they took a special interest and displayed par- 
 ticular activity. These were the administration of 
 finance, the criticism and prosecution of magistrates, 
 and the prosecution of suspected oligarchs. Legisla- ' 
 tion on financial matters belonged to the assembly, 
 administration to the council 4 , while we have seen 
 that the generals, also, had some financial duties. 
 Failing a post on the board of generals or on the 
 council, the demagogues' influence must have been 
 unofficial ; but in some way nearly all demagogues 
 concerned themselves with finance. As Bockh 5 
 say : " Some statesmen occupied themselves with 
 it exclusively ; and all the great demagogues en- 
 deavoured to obtain either direct or indirect in- 
 fluence over it." Pericles is known to have con- 
 
 1 Ar. Eq. 774 (Cleon says t)vLk epotiXevov) refers probably to a 
 fact. Cf. Gilbert, Beitrage, p. 82, Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 335. 
 
 2 According to Gilbert, Beitrage, p. 81. 
 
 3 Andoc. 1. 27 (Androcles appears as acting on behalf of the 
 
 J30V\7)). 
 
 4 Bockh, i. 183. 
 ib. 
 
64 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 trolled the financial as well as the general policy of 
 Athens. Cleon 1 followed his example. Cleophon, 
 who in many ways was Cleon's political heir, devoted 
 his attention to finance, and for years took a leading 
 part in financial administration, apparently with great 
 success 2 . 
 Criticism The demagogue also undertook the censure and 
 
 tutionof' if necessary the prosecution of inefficient or corrupt 
 
 magis- magistrates. The assembly must have been the fre- 
 
 trates. . 
 
 quent scene of complaints against official mismanage- 
 ment, and here Cleon criticized Nicias' conduct in the 
 command at Pylos 3 f The demagogues did not always 
 confine themselves to criticism, and the prosecution 
 of generals was constant. 
 
 The idea that power involved responsibility was 
 
 1 Ar. Eq. 774 (on the povMj). Gilbert, Beitrage, pp. 13342, 
 thinks Ach. 5 refers to an endeavour of Cleon's to reduce the Kara- 
 <rra<ns of the knights. For his financial policy see below, pp. 70 
 and 73. He is credited with the raising of the tribute and of the 
 dicast's fee. 
 
 2 Lys. 19. 48, 7roXXa 2ttj btex^-pt-ae to. rijs 7r6Xews, ib. 21. 3. 
 The first passage seems to refer so explicitly to a definite office, 
 that Beloch (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. pp. 249 259) has argued that 
 Cleophon must have been president of the board of -wopiaral 
 (which we know to have existed in this period), and that this 
 office was instituted in 413 to control the whole financial adminis- 
 tration. This is perhaps supported by Thuc. viii. 1, tQv re Karh. 
 rrjp irokiv tl h evreXeiav auxfrpoviaai, which might be taken as a 
 vague description of this reform. Such an indirect allusion would 
 be quite characteristic of Thucydides, as he does not mention the 
 appointment of the 7rpo/3ouXoi directly, but refers to dpxv tis 
 irpecrfivTipuv avdpoov. Against the theory Ar. Lys. 421 may per- 
 haps be urged, where the TrpofiovXos speaks of himself as having 
 the duties which this theory assigns to the iropuxTaL. 
 
 3 Thuc. iv. 27, 28. Cf. Ar. Eq. 288 (SiajSaXcS *' ihv arpaTrjyrjs), 
 and 355, 358, which evidently refer to this. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 65 
 
 accepted and carried out with the utmost complete- 
 ness in Athens. If a magistrate accepted the trust 
 he did so with the knowledge that his failure if in 
 any degree culpable would be visited with severe 
 punishment ; as a matter of fact failure in any case 
 was too often followed by prosecution 1 . 
 
 Hence there is an almost continuous series of 
 prosecutions directed against generals, nearly all of 
 which may be traced to the action of the democrats. 
 Pericles, Phormio, Paches, Eurymedon, Pythodorus, 
 Sophocles, Thucydides, Eucles, Phrynichus and 
 Scironides, and the conquerors of Arginusae all 
 suffered condemnation. Demosthenes, Nicias and 
 Alcibiades preferred to escape popular resentment 
 by absenting themselves from Athens. Laches 
 alone serves to prove that an Athenian law court 
 could acquit an unsuccessful general 2 . 
 
 The demagogue also employed his talents in Proem- 
 bringing to trial those who were suspected of oli- suspected 
 garchic designs and conspiracy against the constitu- oligarchs. 
 tion. The Athenians lived in constant fear of such 
 plots, and probably had good reason for their sus- 
 picions, as the oligarchs were thoroughly disloyal to 
 the constitution. We can infer from Aristophanes 3 
 
 1 Magistrates were frequently prosecuted on standing their 
 evdwai (cf. Ar. Eq. 259, 825), but it is disputed whether generals 
 had to submit to any real account. See above, p. 55, n. 2. 
 
 2 This is not the place to discuss how far the condemnations 
 were justified. In cases where we have reliable information, as in 
 that of Thucydides, we see that there was strong evidence against 
 the generals. In spite of the risk of condemnation the office of 
 general was eagerly sought after. 
 
 3 Cf. Equites 235, 257, 278, 452, 475 ; Vesp. 344, 488. In the 
 last passage Bdelycleon says, 
 
 w. 5 
 
66 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 the frequency with which such charges were bandied 
 about, and the history of events after the mutilation 
 of the Hermae and the revolution of 411 shows how 
 eagerly the demagogues undertook the exposure of 
 conspiracies and the prosecution of treason. 
 
 This prosecution was not confined to citizens. 
 Suspected allies were summoned to Athens and put 
 on trial for similar charges of treason 1 . As I have 
 argued above, in most cases where the allies were 
 prosecuted in Athens, the prosecutions were for 
 political offences, and the discontent of the oligarchs, 
 attested by every revolt from the confederation, shows 
 that there was just ground for the charges. 
 
 The prosecution of magistrates and of suspected 
 oligarchs was properly a political duty undertaken 
 by the demagogues* Some of them paid especial 
 attention to the law courts, and probably many of 
 the younger democrats won their spurs in this way 2 . 
 This will account for the frequency of the charges of 
 crvKocpavrla 3 brought against the demagogues. The 
 
 cos array d' vfuv Tvpavvls iari Kai ^wcopLorai 
 
 tjv re fiel^ov r\v t ZXarrov Trpayfia tls Karyyoprj. 
 
 Cf. also Plato Eep. viii. 565 b (from the frequency of charges of 
 oligarchic conspiracy, men are forced against their will into being 
 oligarchs). 
 
 1 Cf. Resp. Ath. passim, discussed above, p. 29 n. 2, Ar. Pax 640. 
 The passages in Aristophanes in which the demagogues are repre- 
 sented as having power over the allies probably refer to this. Eq. 
 170, Pax 642, &c. 
 
 2 Cf. Ar. Ach. 680 (young orators prosecute old men). The law 
 courts were Hyperbolus' special sphere of action, Ach. 846. 
 
 3 This word implies a professional prosecutor who hopes to 
 gain honour and reward by threatened prosecution, or at least to 
 be bought off by his threatened victim. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 67 
 
 accusation must have had a substantial basis in fact, 
 and there were probably many utterly unscrupulous 
 characters who used such methods of intimidation; 
 but without definite evidence it is impossible to say 
 how far the leading demagogues were guilty 1 . 
 
 Having considered the composition of the demoA Supposed 
 cratic party and the character of the leaders underfe^ 6 ^ 
 whom it was organized, we have still to consider the nocracy. 
 chief points in its policy,, It is usually assumed 
 that politics and politicians changed for the worse' 
 after Pericles. There was cause enough for de- 
 generacy in the plague, perpetual war and financial 
 difficulty, but it is possible to exaggerate the actual 
 effects. Curtius 2 gives a picture which is too highly 
 coloured. "The age was degenerate.... A discon- 
 tented and turbulent mob was formed in Athens, 
 craving for excitement, idle and overbusy, babbling 
 and curious. A new demagogy sprang into ex- 
 
 1 The Athenian law courts from their organization laboured 
 under the disadvantage of being open to political appeals, and it 
 would be possible to represent every prosecution for political 
 offences as a malicious attack on opponents. Muller-Strubing, 
 Aristophanes, p. 355, thinks that every attempt to constrain the 
 magistrates to observe the laws was described as avKocpavria, and 
 that the action of the demagogues in this respect was innocent and 
 praiseworthy. We do not know that <rvKo<pai>Tia was limited to one 
 party. The oligarchs may have endeavoured to use it against their 
 opponents. Lys. 12. 4 calls the Thirty Trovrjpoi /cat avKo^avrai, and 
 the Zvvco/jLoatcu eirl Skats may not have been entirely defensive. On 
 the other hand the Athenian courts were at this date apparently 
 singularly free from corruption. So also in all probability were 
 the orators. No definite evidence can be brought against them, 
 and we have positive testimony in the case of Cleophon of his 
 innocence, Lys. 19. 48. 
 
 2 Vol. iii. pp. 813 (English Trans.). 
 
 52 
 
68 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 istence. Pericles' successors were the people's ser- 
 vants and flatterers." 
 
 There is in the above description this amount of 
 truth that there was no one like Pericles to succeed 
 him. The talents which Pericles possessed were not 
 found united in any other man. As a consequence 
 political life was not kept at the high level at which 
 it had been before ; and men of less refinement took 
 the lead 1 , partly no doubt because the development 
 of democracy had opened up a career to all and ex- 
 tended political education, partly because there were 
 no great statesmen in the ranks of birth and wealth. 
 But though this imported a certain amount of coarse- 
 ness and passion into political life, we must be 
 careful to distinguish between the character of the 
 politicians and their aims. While we may admit a 
 change in the method pursued, there was, except in 
 one particular, no great change of policy. 
 Objects The democrats throughout the war always kept 
 
 democrats. ^ wo g rea ^ objects in view, to defend the democracy 
 and to maintain the empire. This purpose is referred 
 to by the author of the work on " the Athenian Consti- 
 tution," when he says that, " the demos do not wish 
 to live as subjects in a well ordered city but to be 
 free and rule 2 ;" and the watchwords of democracy 
 and empire appear no less prominently in the funeral 
 oration of Pericles 3 . To the maintenance of the 
 democracy and the alliance, as I have argued above, 
 the continuance of the war was regarded as indis- 
 
 1 Cf. Ar. Eq. 191 (an implied comparison between Pericles 
 and Cleon). 
 
 2 i. 8. 
 
 3 Thuc. ii. 36 and 37. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 69 
 
 pensable. We thus arrive at three principles of de- 
 mocratic policy which were inseparably connected. 
 The democrats were determined to defend the demo- 
 cracy, to maintain the alliance, and on this account 
 I to prosecute the war with all possible vigour to a 
 decisive end. These principles Cleon and his suc- 
 cessors held in common with Pericles, and it was 
 only in the application of them that they neglected 
 his advice. 
 
 The objects of the democrats fall naturally into Defence 
 the two divisions of home and foreign policy. On the i e U cracyt 
 first head little need be said. It is a statement 
 which requires no proof, that the democrats were 
 attached to the democracy, and the history of the 
 period shows how ready they were to defend it 
 against every attack. There was only one interval 
 during which the constitution was modified and the 
 change was abnormal and temporary. The reforms 
 of 413 were the inevitable result of a reaction against 
 extreme democracy, which was regarded as respon- 
 sible for the Sicilian disaster. The reforms then 
 introduced prepared the way for the revolution of 
 411. This was only effected in the absence of a 
 large number of the citizens keenly attached to the 
 democracy, and by a system of terrorism and assassi- 
 nation which stifled all opposition* The oligarchy of 
 the Four Hundred was an unnatural product, and 
 was soon superseded by a mixed constitution, which 
 only served as an intermediate step to the restora- 
 tion of full democracy- 1 . 
 
 1 There is no direct testimony for this restoration, except 
 perhaps the psephism of Demophantus. The point, though long 
 
70 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 The di- There is one point in particular in which we can 
 
 cast's fee. trace the consistent effort of the democrats to defend 
 the constitution in all its principles. It is in the 
 resolve to maintain the system of paid jury courts. 
 The jury fee was in itself neither a heavy charge on 
 the revenue 1 , nor sufficient to compete with the 
 remuneration of ordinary labour. It was a partial 
 compensation to the dicast for his sacrifice of time. 
 As such it was absolutely necessary to the system of 
 large jury courts, which were regarded as an essen- 
 tial part of the democratic constitution. Without 
 some compensation it would have been impossible 
 to induce a sufficient number of citizens to under- 
 take judicial duties. The abuse lavished on this fee 
 was doubtless meant for the institution which re- 
 quired it, and it is obvious that without it the system 
 of popular jurisdiction must have broken down. 
 
 About 425 this fee was raised from two to three 
 obols, and the increase, which in all probability was 
 proposed by Cleon 2 , was occasioned by the general 
 rise of prices consequent on the war 3 . In 411 all 
 
 disputed, has been established in detail by Vischer, Kleine Schrif- 
 ten, pp. 205 38, and is scarcely any longer a matter of doubt. 
 
 1 At its highest when the fee was three obols (425 411) it was 
 not more than 150 talents. This amount is derived from Ar. 
 Vesp. 660, which Frankel regards as absurdly exaggerated (see 
 above, p. 44, n. 1). Beloch (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. p. 244) thinks the 
 total amount required for the three obol fee was about 100 talents, 
 of which about a third came from the court fees, while from 410 
 onwards, after the revolt of the allies, for a two obol fee scarcely 
 more than 33 talents were required. 
 
 2 This appears from Ar. Eq. 255. 
 
 3 Miiller-Stnibing, Aristophanes, pp. 149157. It was rendered 
 possible by the increase of the <f>6pos, which took place about the 
 same time. See below, p. 72. 
 
[ 
 
 PARTIES IN DETAIL. 71 
 
 state payments were abolished by the oligarchs, and 
 the powers of the jury courts passed to the council. 
 We do not know what arrangements were made for 
 the next year or two 1 ; but after the overthrow of 
 oligarchy, perhaps simultaneously with the return to 
 full democracy, as soon as the measure was finan- 
 cially possible, the pay was restored ; apparently at 
 the lower fee of two obols*. This is sufficient to 
 show the importance attached by the democrats to 
 popular jury courts and to the system of pay which 
 alone rendered them possible. 
 
 The foreign policy of the democrats includes two Foreign 
 subjects, closely connected with one another, the ^2^ 
 alliance and the war 3 . With reference to these democrats. 
 Pericles had carefully marked out the policy he con- 
 sidered essential to success in three principles 4 . The 
 first was to make no co ncession tO -Sparta. to conclude 
 no peace that did not leave Athens mistress of the 
 situation 5 . The second was to keep a strictjiand over 
 the allies, for herein was the source of Athenian power 
 (and, ns a corollary to this, to pay attention to the 
 fleet and avoid lan d pngRgmrmnts) 6 . The third was 
 to at tempt no fre sh conquests 7 . It was in the last 
 
 1 During the moderate democracy of 411 10 powers of govern- 
 ment including probably judicial administration were entrusted to 
 men of hoplite census, who of course did not need the dicast's fee. 
 
 2 Ar. Ran. 1466, quoted by Beloch, ib. p. 239, and discussed 
 by him. 
 
 3 The relation of the democrats (and the other political parties) 
 to the war is discussed at length in the next chapter. 
 
 4 See Oncken, Athen und Hellas, i. pp. 3027. 
 
 5 /XT] diceip JleXoTrovvrjaioLs, Thuc. i. 140 141. 
 
 6 tol tCov Zv/jLfjL&xui' Sia x L P s ^X 6 "'* Thuc. ii. 13 ; cf. i. 143. 
 
 7 o>yV ri brucratBeu, Thuc. i. 144 ; cf. Plut. Per. 20. 
 
72 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 L 
 
 point only that his advice was disregarded; the 
 other two principles were upheld without compro- 
 mise by Cleon and his successors against Nicias and 
 his party. 
 Treatment In their conduct to the allies the democrats were 
 allies certainly following the rules laid down by Pericles ; 
 but they carried out those rules with unnecessary 
 harshness and brutality. This appears in their pro- 
 posed treatment of My til en e, their actual treatment 
 of Chios and Scione, as well as in their action towards 
 Thera and Melos. 
 
 The general attitude of the democrats to the 
 allies has been already discussed 1 ; they maintained 
 that the relation was one of tyrant and subject, and 
 to a certain extent they realized their theory. For 
 the present, however, there is one important measure, 
 affecting the allies, which requires attention. 
 Baising The tribute of the allies, which at the beginning 
 
 tritot of the period did not exceed 600 talents 2 , was at 
 some later period doubled. For this fact there has 
 always been satisfactory authority 3 , but the date 
 
 1 See above, chapter I. p. 26. 
 
 2 Thuc. ii. 13. Diod. xii. 40 (from another source) and [Andoc] 
 4. 11 give the tribute as 460 talents at this time. Inscriptions 
 support them, and Beloch (Ehein. Mus. xxxix. pp. 35 ff.) thinks that 
 Diodorus is right, and that, while he gives the <j>6pos only, Thucy- 
 dides is reckoning the total receipts from the allies, including 
 indirect taxation and the toll from the Bosporus. 
 
 3 Andoc. 3. 9, Aesch. F. L. 337, both say that more than 1200 
 talents came in yearly during the peace of Nicias. Plut. Arist. 24 
 wrongly says that the tribute was gradually raised to 1300 talents 
 by the demagogues. Cf. also Ar. Vesp. 655 ff., where the total 
 revenue of Athens is put at 2000 talents, pointing to a large 
 increase. Grote, v. p. 269, n. 2, argued that these passages were 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 73 
 
 was not known until the examination of inscriptions 
 proved conclusively that it took place in the year 
 425 \ 
 
 The many passages in the Equites 2 , in which 
 Aristophanes dwells on the oppression of the allies, 
 point to some such measure, and evidently bring it 
 into connection with Cleon and his party. The 
 actual proposer, Thudippus, is an unknown man and 
 can only have acted as the agent of the democrats ; 
 one statement 3 , in itself of very doubtful authority, 
 makes Alcibiades the moving spirit ; but though he 
 doubtless supported the proposal, and may have been 
 on the commission of assessment, it is probable that 
 he did not take a leading part. Cleon was fresh 
 from his triumph at Pylus, and was then at the 
 height of his power. There can scarcely be a doubt 
 that he was responsible for it 4 . 
 
 Whatever view we may take of the justice of this The in- 
 step, it was absolutely necessary. The expenses of nece ssity. 
 war 5 , which may usually be regarded as extraor- 
 dinary, had become permanent; the reserves had 
 been exhausted, and Athens had herself to submit 
 to a property tax (el<r<f>opa). In addition to this it 
 had been determined to take the offensive against 
 Sparta, and it may have seemed that the need for 
 the increase would be only temporary. 
 
 not sufficient to outweigh the silence of Thucydides ; but their 
 substantial accuracy is established by Kohler's investigations. 
 
 1 Kohler, Abhand. der Akad. Berl., 1869, pp. 14253. 
 
 2 313, 802, 1034; cf. Vesp. 671. 
 
 3 [Andoc] 4. 11. 
 
 4 Kohler, ib. p. 151. 
 
 5 See below (chap. IV.) on the financial history of the war. 
 
74 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 The The amount in itself does not seem excessive. 
 
 excessive. If Athens alone raised a tax of 200 talents, a sum of 
 1100 or 1200 talents was not out of proportion for 
 the whole of the allies. If we may assume that the 
 allies felt the confederation to be for their interest, 
 it was just that they should make pecuniary 
 sacrifices in return for the active service undertaken 
 by Athens. 
 
 It is also possible that the increase did not 
 involve any violation of the original terms of the 
 alliance arranged by Aristides. We know that the 
 league was gradually extended, that the number of 
 members in the alliance in 476 was far smaller than 
 it was after the Persians had been driven from the 
 Aegean, and that many states which originally sup- 
 plied ships subsequently contributed money 1 . More- 
 over we have the explicit testimony of Thucydides 2 
 that the original contribution amounted to 460 talents. 
 To produce this amount the states then in the 
 alliance must have paid at a higher rate, than they 
 did later; and as time went on and fresh states 
 joined the confederation, we find that the total 
 
 1 The original extent of the league is a matter in dispute. 
 Kirchhoff (Hermes, xi. pp. 1 ff.) argues that the league owed its 
 great extension to the battle of Eurymedon. In this he is 
 followed by Frankel (n. 626 to Bockh). Beloch (Rhein. Mus. 
 xliii. pp. 104 ff .) attacks this theory, but it cannot be disputed that 
 the league gained many new members in the fifth century. 
 
 2 i. 96. Kirchhoff (ib. p. 30) regards this amount as impossible. 
 In this opinion he is followed by many historians (Busolt, Griech. 
 Gesch. ii. p. 352, Gilbert, Handbuch, i. p. 396). Kirchhoff 's 
 explanation of the passage in Thucydides is not satisfactory, nor 
 is it safe to regard it as an interpolation, as Diod. xi. 47, Plut. 
 Arist. 24, and Nep. Arist. 3 are in agreement with Thucydides. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 75 
 
 revenue was not increased, and individual contribu- 
 tions were lowered 1 . Thus the tribute of those 
 states which had contributed from the first must 
 in time have been considerably reduced, and the 
 increase of 425 may only have restored the average 
 rate of the original assessment 2 . 
 
 It is hard to apportion fairly the burden of taxa- 
 tion between different classes or different parts of an 
 empire ; it is probable that, considering the military 
 exertions of Athens, she had more to bear than the 
 allies, and did not get a fair return for the sacrifices 
 she made 3 . 
 
 In their war policy the democrats were at one War 
 with Pericles in insisting on an active prosecution of ^^ 
 the war and refusing all concession to Sparta. They democrats. 
 regarded the feud as irreconcileable, and hence when 
 Athens was in a position to impose terms they would 
 only have such as would place Sparta at a permanent 
 disadvantage 4 , and when the course of the war was 
 
 1 Frankel, n. 629. The quota lists show that the rate of tribute 
 was lowered in 450 and 446. 
 
 2 I have omitted to consider the change in the method of 
 levying the tribute, effected by the introduction of the efoocrr^ in 
 413. We know neither the motives for nor the effects of this 
 change, and have not much ground for regarding it as a part of the 
 democratic policy. 
 
 3 Cf. Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, pp. 27, 28. "The value 
 of money was overestimated (i. e. in allowing the allies to purchase 
 immunity from service). Athenians of means contributed at a 
 higher rate than the allies, and the charge that Athens exacted 
 more than she needed is untrue." Cf. Plut. Per. 12 (Pericles 
 argued that the Athenians owed nothing to the allies, whom they 
 protected from Persia without calling upon them for service). 
 
 4 They were not content to return to the status quo; Athens 
 wa3 to be in a position of definite superiority to Sparta. Hence 
 
76 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 unfavourable to Athens they would consent to no 
 peace which involved the slightest diminution of 
 Athenian power. 
 
 But in their desire to crush Sparta, they neg- 
 lected Pericles' advice as to the plan of war to be 
 followed ; they carried the war into the enemy's 
 camp by vigorous land campaigns, and endeavoured 
 by alliance and by distant conquest to strengthen 
 themselves against the foe. 
 Plan of In the first place they were not satisfied with the 
 
 war ' purely defensive system of Pericles. They would 
 
 not wait for Sparta to be weary of war, they wanted 
 to inflict injury on her and reduce her to submission. 
 Hence they effected the blockade of the Peloponnesus, 
 and attempted the investment of Boeotia, which 
 ended so disastrously at Delium. 
 Alliance From the same motive they sought alliance with 
 
 jj-qos. the enemies of Sparta, in order to strengthen them- 
 selves against her. Argos had been Sparta's great 
 rival in the Peloponnesus; she had formerly been 
 allied with Athens against Sparta, and was the most 
 powerful democracy in Greece next to Athens. There 
 was therefore every motive for an alliance between 
 these two powers. The truce between Argos and 
 Sparta prevented any immediate action; but in all 
 probability Athens anticipated its expiry, and the 
 democrats made overtures to Argos 1 . These over- 
 after Pylos irXelovos, fieifaw wptyovro (Thuc. iv. 21, 41). The 
 terms Cleon demanded in 425 would have made Athens as a land 
 power almost a match for Sparta. 
 
 1 Ar. Eq. 464 5, speaking of Cleon, otitcovv fi kv 'Apyelots 
 a irpaTrei Xavddvei \ irpotpaaiv /jlv 'Apydovs rjpuv iroiei k.t.X. This 
 probably had some foundation in fact ; see Gilbert, Beitrage, 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 77 
 
 tures were not however carried to any conclusion, 
 
 and the accession of the peace party to power in 421 
 
 and the alliance with Sparta defeated this project. 
 
 As soon as Athens and Sparta began to draw apart, 
 
 Alcibiades pressed on the alliance with Argos, and 
 
 from that time (with the interval of the oligarchic 
 
 revolution at Argos) Athens found in her a true ally. 
 
 The desire of the Athenians for the extension of The 
 
 the empire, connected with their wish to strengthen Slcll n 
 
 expedi- 
 
 t hem selves against Sparta, led not only to the at- tion. 
 tacks on Thera and Melos, but to the fatal Sicilian 
 expedition. This project, which arose from the arro- 
 gant assumption that Athens, as mistress of the sea, 
 should include within her dominion all islands in- 
 habited by Greeks, had been mooted in the time of 
 Pericles 1 . Athens had real interests in Sicily 2 , to 
 protect which she sent forces thither as early as 427, 
 and her interference had been constant down to the 
 year 424. The expedition of 415 was the resump- 
 tion of a previous plan on a larger scale, and owing 
 to the fact that Athens was not actually engaged in 
 war 3 elsewhere its prospects seemed favourable. The 
 proposal was probably due to the ambition of Alci- 
 biades ; but when once started, it met with enthusi- 
 
 188 90. The approaching expiry of the truce was a great motive 
 with Sparta for the conclusion of the war. 
 
 1 Plut. Per. 20. 
 
 2 If the Ionians succumbed to the Dorians, the latter might 
 send aid to Sparta (as they did after 413), Thuc. iii. 86. Cf. ii. 7. 
 It is important to remember that commercial interests were 
 involved in the expedition. Many merchants sailed with it in the 
 hopes of making a profit (Thuc. vi. 31), and the conquest of Sicily 
 would have caused a vast extension of Athenian trade. 
 
 3 Except in Thrace. 
 
78 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 astic support. The only opposition, which must 
 have been of a very half-hearted character, came 
 from Nicias and his following; and though all sec- 
 tions of the population were eager for it, the demo- 
 cratic party must bear the responsibility. 
 
 The conquest of Sicily was no impossible feat. 
 The failure of the attempt was due to incompetence 
 and mismanagement on the Athenian side, combined 
 with the greatest skill and courage on the part of 
 their opponents 1 . But admitting that the prospect 
 was good, the expedition was a great blunder from 
 the democratic stand-point. The struggle with Sparta 
 had not been fought out, a renewal of the contest 
 was inevitable, and Athens was doing what she could 
 to hasten it. 
 
 Had her force not been wasted in Sicily she 
 would have been a match for Sparta when the 
 struggle was renewed. But for this misguided piece 
 of aggression, the democratic policy was as sane as it 
 was consistent. Their constant effort was to maintain 
 the constitution and the alliance, and on this account 
 to offer an uncompromising resistance to Sparta, 
 whose hostility threatened both. 
 
 1 Time. ii. 65 says the Sicilian expedition was not an error of 
 judgment, but failed because those at home did not, owing to 
 political dissensions, take proper measures to support it. It is hard 
 to see to what he refers, as the Athenians sent overwhelming forces 
 to Sicily. The loss of Alcibiades, and the action he took in obtain- 
 ing help for Syracuse, were of great effect, but Nicias was really to 
 blame. Thucydides' narrative makes it painfully evident that he 
 missed every possible occasion, that Syracuse (and with it Sicily) 
 might have been speedily reduced, and that his early mistakes 
 might have been repaired by a slight display of energy. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 79 
 
 2. The Oligarchical Party. 
 
 In the general obscurity and uncertainty of the 
 political history of Athens the democratic party and 
 its policy appear to us in comparative distinctness 
 owing to the prominence given to them by the con- 
 temporary authorities. Of the other political sections 
 we have not such definite information, and we are 
 therefore reduced to inference and conjecture, so 
 that our knowledge is both less complete and less 
 reliable. 
 
 A feeling of opposition to an extreme democracy Opposition 
 must have been excited in the minds of many Athe- ^^ 
 nians, and to this feeling the education of the day couraged 
 contributed not a little. Aristotle insists on the philosophy 
 importance of the adaptation of general education J the da y- 
 to the constitution 1 ; but at Athens the teaching of 
 the philosophers was directly antagonistic to the ex- 
 isting government. 
 
 The Athenian constitution depended on the sov- 
 ereignty of law 2 , and there was a tendency to over- 
 estimate the value of institutions, which were regarded 
 as sacred and almost perfect : the philosophy of the 
 period, on the contrary, was sceptical, took nothing 
 for granted, and put every institution on its trial. 
 
 The caricature of Aristophanes 3 is equally appli- 
 cable to the Sophists or to Socrates : 
 
 1 Ar. Pol. 1310 a, 12 fiiyiaTov d ttclvtuv irpos to diafi^eiv rcis 
 7ro\iTelas . . .to 7rcu5euecr0cu irpos rds 7ro\tre/as. 
 
 2 Wilamowitz, Aus Kydathen, pp. 47 ff. 
 
 3 Nub. 13991400. 
 
80 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 The oli- 
 garchs a 
 disloyal 
 faction. 
 
 W9 r)hv /catvoL*; TTpccyfjuaaiv zeal Sef^ot? 6/jnXeiv 
 teal twv KaOearourcov vojxcov virepfypovelv Bv- 
 vaaOcu. 
 
 While Socrates 1 contrasted the existing constitu- 
 tion with the ideal state of his philosophy, and found 
 it wanting, the Sophists 2 , so far as we can attribute 
 to them any unity of thought, decried the acceptance 
 of anything on tradition and exalted the individual 
 above the state. 
 
 Both brought the blemishes of the constitution 
 into prominence without proposing any positive or 
 practical reform. The consequence was that while 
 many regarded the constitution with critical eyes ? 
 but were content to put up with it, others found in 
 this teaching a justification of their own feelings 
 against the democracy, and made it their one poli- 
 tical object to attack or undermine it. From this 
 class came most of the oligarchic leaders. 
 
 The oligarchs as a whole were a disloyal faction 3 , 
 
 1 Cf. Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. p. 102. " Socrates' influence 
 was not of a nature to form practical statesmen. His just discon- 
 tent with the existing democracy, and his method of criticizing 
 everything, had the effect of teaching his pupils the defects of the 
 state and making them estimate it lightly, without positive results. 
 No good Athenian statesman of importance came from his ac- 
 quaintance, but many a mischievous one." See also Hertzberg, 
 Alkibiades, pp. 33 36, and Grote, viii. p. 198, on Plato. 
 
 2 Cf. Vischer, ib. p. 155. " The principle that the individual 
 exists only in the state is reversed, the state is now the tool to give 
 power and weight to the individual will." Cf. Muller-Stnibing, 
 Aristophanes, p. 244. This exaltation of the individual was the 
 result of the general philosophic movement of which the Sophists 
 were the representatives. 
 
 3 They come under Bolingbroke's definition, "National inter- 
 ests would be sometimes sacrificed and always made subordinate 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 81 
 
 for neither their methods nor their objects entitle 
 them to be regarded as a party. They not only 
 rejected the obligation to obey the laws, but they were 
 traitors to their country, for they intrigued with the 
 national enemy against it ; their ends were always 
 selfish and treasonable, and were pursued by means 
 of conspiracy and terrorism. 
 
 They formed, as their name 1 implies, a small mi- 
 nority of the state, and were for the most part men 
 of wealth 2 , or political adventurers who saw possi- 
 bilities of their own advancement in the chance of 
 revolution. In particular many of the young aristo- 
 crats 3 , who looked with contempt on the rule of the 
 lower classes, and were anxious to overthrow it, 
 joined their ranks. 
 
 The motives which put the rich men in oppo- Natural 
 sition to the constitution are obvious. Political fti ie rich 
 struggles in most states are between the privi- 
 leged few and the excluded many, who suffer from 
 
 to personal interests ; and that, I think, is the true characteristic 
 of faction." 
 
 1 6\iyot, the most general title. 
 
 2 For the natural opposition of the rich to the democracy and 
 its policy, which I have discussed above, there is direct evidence. 
 Thuc. viii. 47, 48 (the trierarchs and rich men wish to get power 
 into their own hands) ; ib. 63 (they resolve to go on with the revo- 
 lution ws ovk^tc d'XXoiS rj (y<pi<nv avroTs TaXatirajpovvTas)', ib. 65 (the 
 exclusion of the poorer classes from power was their great object). 
 Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 40 (Thrasybulus addresses the supporters of 
 the Thirty, if/xeis 5 7r\outuwTepot ir&vruv oVres iroWa Kai aiVxpct 
 %veica KepUuv ireiroi-fiKare). These passages suffice to prove the con- 
 nection between the richer classes and the oligarchs. 
 
 8 The Knights were regarded as champions of anti-democratic 
 feeling. Cf. Ar. Equites. They supported the Four Hundred 
 (Thuc. viii. 92), and the Thirty (Xen. Hell. iii. 1, 4, Lys. 16). 
 
 W. 6 
 
82 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 the oppression of the government, or wish to reform 
 it in the direction of equality. Athens had, however, 
 passed out of this stage, and the political conflict 
 was reactionary, the rich striving to regain the 
 powers they had lost and to protect themselves from 
 the oppression of the ruling poor. 
 
 At one time the rich alone had been qualified for 
 high office, and had controlled the government in 
 their own interests; they had then been ready to 
 make sacrifices in order to enjoy these privileges, 
 and to contribute to the revenue in proportion to 
 their wealth. Now, while their burdens had in- 
 creased, their privileges had vanished. They had 
 seen the basis of government gradually widened, and 
 at every step had vainly attempted by any means to 
 prevent the change. 
 
 They felt a natural resentment against a consti- 
 tution, under which they not only had to support the 
 burdens of the state, the property-tax, the trierarchy 
 and other liturgies, but had the additional grievance 1 
 that for all their sacrifices they got no return, and 
 had not a whit more power than the meanest citizen. 
 History of Hence they had always been at war with the 
 chical 9 ' democracy which had brought this to pass, and the 
 party. motives under which they acted in 411, were the 
 same as their motives in 479, when, as Plutarch 2 
 
 1 Cf. Ar. Pol. 1295 b, 13, ol fxh kv inrepoxcus etiTvxw&ruv &j>ts, 
 iV%(5os Kal tXoijtov Kai <pi\wv nal tCov aWwv twv tolovtwv, dpxeadaL 
 otfre fiovkovTai oifre eirlaravTaL. Cf. with this Thuc. iii. 45, rj 5' 
 e^ovcria V(3pei rrjv ir\e overlay {irap6x ov<ja ) KaL Qpovqixari. Ar. Pol. 
 1303 b, 6 is still more appropriate, iv 5 rah d-qtioKpariaLs (a-raaid- 
 $ov<xiv) ol yvdopifJLOi 8tl /j.Tex<>vo~i tQp Urw ovk tuoL 6vTes. 
 
 2 Plut. Arist. 13; cf. Muller-Striibing, Aristophanes, pp. 244 ff. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 83 
 
 tells us, men of noble families and great property, 
 becoming impoverished by the war, and seeing their 
 political power and reputation in the state vanishing, 
 while others got the honours and controlled the 
 government, conspired against the democracy. 
 
 This attitude they maintained throughout the 
 fifth century, opposing the progress of democracy both 
 by legitimate methods and by conspiracy ; but after 
 the ostracism of Thucydides open opposition was 
 abandoned for intrigue 1 . Henceforth their objects 
 were treasonable, and this circumstance shaped both 
 their action and their organization. 
 
 They could not openly advocate their proposals, Organiza- 
 but had either to withdraw altogether from political ^. 
 life, as many of them did, or dissemble their convic- 
 tions 2 , and under the guise of democrats work 
 against democracy. For the same reason their po- 
 litical associations were in the first place secret, and 
 in the second place separate, for combination would 
 have brought suspicion on them. 
 
 For this purpose they combined in political clubs Oligarchic 
 called eraipelaL*. Politicians of all parties seem 
 to have adopted organizations of this nature to ^\ 
 strengthen their position, but they were especially 
 favoured by the oligarchs. Their original purpose \ 
 seems to have been mainly defensive : the men who * 
 
 1 See above, p. 37. 
 
 2 Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 13. 
 
 3 For these see Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. pp. 153 204, 
 who collects all the available information on this subject, and 
 endeavours to trace their influence on history. See. also Scheibe, 
 Die oligarchische Umwalzung, p. 5. They are called ^ww^ocrtat in 
 Thuc. viii. 54. 
 
 62 
 
84 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 gathered this band of helpers round them used their 
 assistance in law-suits and elections 1 ; and as oligarchs 
 were especially liable to prosecution, and as they 
 needed close organization to compensate for their 
 deficiency of numbers, these clubs came to be regarded 
 in time as oligarchic institutions, although they were 
 not confined to one party 2 . Of their constitution we 
 know little: they were naturally secret 3 ; many of 
 the clubs were centred round a single individual 4 , to 
 whose interests they were devoted; and though 
 usually independent of each other 5 , they might be 
 united, whenever there seemed a good opportunity 
 of taking steps to carry their wishes into effect. 
 Thus the oligarchic clubs, if not essentially treason- 
 able, were adapted to treasonable ends 6 . 
 
 Con- It is probable that these associations were kept 
 
 nection of 
 
 these i Thuc. 1. c. Zvvufxoaiai iirl diKais Kal d/)%a?s. Cf. Plato Theaet. 
 
 173 D, eraipelai iir dpxds. 
 
 2 Thus Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades each had his hetaery, 
 see Vischer, ib. pp. 163, 169, 174. 
 
 3 Plato Eep. ii. 365 d, iirl yap rb \avddveiv ^vvcj/noaias re Kal 
 iraipelas ^vvd^o/jiev. 
 
 4 Thus we hear of the hetaeries of Phaeax, Euphiletus, Alcibia- 
 des, &c. 
 
 6 Thuc. viii. 54 (Pisander induced the clubs to combine 8wws 
 %v<TTpa<pvTes Kal Koivrj povXevad/xevoi KaraXixrovai rbv 5rjfji.ov). Vischer, 
 ib. p. 171, "The opponents of democracy split into a number of 
 different clubs, which did not follow a common end, but each 
 their own advantage, now combining, now contending with each 
 other." 
 
 6 Thuc. iii. 82, otf yap (/.era tu>p Keifitvoip vofiuv (b<pe\ias al rot- 
 avrai %vi>o5oi, aXXa irapa roi>s KadearCoTas ir\eove%lq. The combina- 
 tion of hetaeries at Samos (to iraipiKov) is called a %vi>wfAo<ria 
 Thuc. viii. 48. Cf. the oligarchic oath in Aristotle Pol. 1310 a, 9, 
 (not especially referred to Athens), Kal r< dij/j-cp KaKovovs Zo~ofj.ai Kal 
 povkevcro} 6 tl dv Zx 03 xaKbv. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 85 
 
 in communication with one another 1 , and with si- clubs with 
 
 milar clubs among the allies 2 , by periodical meetings Mother 
 
 of their leaders to decide on the course of action & **** 
 
 demanded by circumstances. In the political events 
 
 of the period common action on the part of the 
 
 oligarchs can often be traced, and for the purpose 
 
 of uniting and instructing the ordinary members of 
 
 the party this organization must have been of the 
 
 utmost service. 
 
 With this network of combination the oligarchs Hostility 
 
 worked persistently against the constitution. To this garc ] ls to 
 
 end everything was subordinated 3 , and their attitude th f C07l ~ 
 
 f* -,.. mi it stitutton* 
 
 on questions of ordinary politics generally depended 
 
 on a calculation of how their cause might be best 
 
 advanced. Besides the method of direct attack on 
 
 the democracy, there was another method by which 
 
 1 There is little evidence for this. Miiller-Stnibing (Der Staat 
 der Athener, Philologus, Supplementband, iv. pp. 71 ft) argues 
 that it was usual for delegates to meet and discuss the policy to 
 be adopted. He sees a probable allusion to this in Thuc. viii. 54, 
 and 48 (Uttws m (TTatnaauviv), where the warning against disunion 
 points to common action. 
 
 2 Cf. Thuc. viii. 48, where he refers to promises made to the 
 allies : this correspondence must have been secret. Muller-Striibing 
 1. c. thinks that the delegates from the allies, who visited Athens at 
 the time of the great Dionysia, would confer with the Athenian 
 oligarchs. 
 
 3 There were natural reasons, why they should have been op. 
 posed to war (see ch. iv.), but it seems possible that on some occa- 
 sions they were anxious that Athens should renew the war, in the 
 hope that the victory of Sparta might further their plans. They 
 probably supported the Sicilian expedition ; and Muller-Striibing, 
 ib. p. 86, sees in the invasion of Lacedaemonian territory (Thuc. 
 vi. 105), which led to the renewal of the war, a manoeuvre of the 
 oligarchs in command of the Athenian forces. 
 
86 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 ultimate success might be assured. This was by an 
 insidious interference in political life to employ their 
 influence in embarrassing the democratic govern- 
 ment, in weakening and discrediting it, in depriving 
 it of its champions and alienating its supporters. 
 They were anarchists, not only striving to effect a 
 revolution, but secretly working against the public 
 peace and endeavouring to render all government 
 impossible until their end was attained. 
 
 With these objects they shrunk from no means, 
 however disloyal or unscrupulous, and were ready to 
 effect their purpose by a treacherous understanding 
 with the national enemy, or by a system of terrorism 
 in which assassination played a prominent part. 
 
 Their treachery to Athens and indeed to Greece, 
 in combining with Sparta, Boeotia and Persia, is 
 established by a long catalogue of crime, which 
 begins with the action of Isagoras in inviting Spartan 
 aid and is continued down to the alliance of the 
 oligarchs with Lysander in 405 \ 
 Bevolu- During the war, unless we are to recognize a 
 
 Hon of deliberate plot against the democracy in the mutila- 
 tion of the Hermae 2 , their first direct attack on the 
 
 1 For the different instances of oligarchic treachery, see Vischer r 
 ib. pp. 158 164. See also Eesp. Ath. ii. 15. The author admits 
 the treacherous intentions of the oligarchs. If the Athenians lived 
 in an island, he says, they would be relieved of all fear, firjd^Trore 
 Trpododrjvcu ttjv wdXiv vir 6\iywv firjde irtiXas dvoixd?ivai M^ ToXe- 
 filovs iTTL(nre<Tecv..,vvv fxev yap el (TTaa-idaaieu, \tL5<x dv e'x ovTS 
 ev Toh TToXefiiois (rTaaidaeiav, ws Kara yrjv iwa^Sfievoi. 
 
 2 I have discussed one aspect of this event below, p. 90. Most 
 modern authorities regard it as the comparatively innocent act of 
 a band of drunken revellers: I think, however, that the evidence 
 of Andocides is too explicit and direct to be neglected, and that 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 87 
 
 constitution was in the oligarchic revolution of 411. 
 This, although carried out with due observance of 
 legal formalities 1 , was only effected after the assassi- 
 nation of opponents had thrown Athens into a 
 state of hopeless panic. After they had obtained 
 power the oligarchs abolished all constitutional 
 government, ruled with violent illegality 2 , and were 
 ready to surrender the city to Sparta, rather than 
 give up their power. 
 
 There is good evidence that treachery played Treachery 
 some part at Aegospotami 3 , and the action of Ly- m * 
 sander in delaying to reduce Athens, and of Thera- 
 menes in protracting his embassy, can only be 
 explained on the theory of a secret understanding 
 between the Spartan general and the Athenian oli- 
 garchs, a theory fully borne out by Lysander's action 
 in helping to establish the government of the Thirty 4 . 
 
 The means to which the oligarchs resorted were Method 
 no less criminal than the ends for which they worked: j^L^.^, 
 they employed a system of terrorism to stifle oppo- 
 
 the act was the result of a deliberate plot, of which the purpose 
 now is not clear". 
 
 1 This possibly, as Miiller-Strubing (ib. p. 91) thinks, was a 
 concession to the moderate doctrinaire members of the party. 
 
 2 Thuc. viii. 70, hefxov Kara Kpdros ttjv tto\lv. The govern- 
 ment of the Thirty was worse, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 21. 
 
 3 For a discussion of this see Grote viii. p. 11. Vischer, ib. p. 
 199 and Scheibe, ib. pp. 21 2 accept the evidence as conclusive. 
 
 4 There seems to have been an oligarchic plot, and if so, 
 Theramenes was probably concerned in it, for he played a leading 
 part, as soon as any definite steps were taken. It is extremely 
 hard to explain his action as entirely and loyally dictated by 
 patriotism, though Pohlig (Jahrbuch fur class. Phil., Suppl. ix. 
 pp. 284 ff.) endeavours to defend him. Lys. 13. 9 charges him with 
 deliberate treachery, but that statement is not unbiassed. 
 
88 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 sition. Thucydides 1 describes how in 411 all oppo- 
 nents were removed at Athens, until the people was 
 panic stricken, and dared take no action. Similarly 
 the ground was cleared in 404 by the removal of 
 Cleophon 2 , and by the conspiracy against the generals 
 and other officers who still opposed the peace 3 . 
 Covert But it was not often possible for the oligarchs to 
 
 ft ft ft On ^ i 
 
 on the make an open attempt at revolution. From motives 
 democracy. f policy they were obliged to conceal their real pur- 
 pose ; until they could declare it, their best course 
 was to undermine democracy that it might fall the 
 more easily. This side of their action is really more 
 important than the other; their efforts here must 
 have been continuous, and from their subtlety diffi- 
 cult to discern. The Athenians were always ready to 
 scent oligarchic plots, sometimes perhaps groundlessly; 
 but we may be quite sure that the oligarchs took ad- 
 vantage of every crisis, combined with any party and 
 supported any proposal to embarrass and weaken the 
 democracy, by showing its weakness, inconstancy and 
 instability, and depriving it of its proper defenders 4 . 
 To carry out this purpose effectively the oligarchs, 
 who took a leading part in any political intrigue, 
 had to conceal their convictions, and to play the part 
 of enthusiastic democrats. 
 
 1 viii. 66. 
 
 2 Lys. 13. 12, 30. 1213. This must have been a judicial 
 murder. 3 The conspiracy of Agoratus, Lys. 13. 
 
 4 The action of the Whigs at the beginning of the reign of 
 James II. affords an exact parallel. Cf. Macaulay, History of 
 England, ch. 4. " The Whigs were a small and disheartened 
 minority. They therefore kept themselves as much as possible 
 out of sight, dropped their party name, abstained from obtruding 
 their peculiar opinions on a hostile audience, and steadily supported 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 89 
 
 Thucydides 1 says that at the beginning of the Oligarchs 
 oligarchic movement at Athens in 411 people were ^So- 
 astonished at some of the men who declared for wats. 
 oligarchy. He is probably thinking especially of 
 Pisander, Charicles and others like them, who 
 took a prominent part in the Hermae investigation. 
 Having thus secured a reputation for democratic 
 zeal they now took a leading place in the oligarchy. 
 These men may have been mere political adven- 
 turers, on both occasions playing for their own hand, 
 and throwing in their fortunes with democracy or 
 oligarchy indifferently; but it is conceivable that 
 they were all along agents of the oligarchy, pretend- 
 ing loyalty to democracy in order to overthrow it 2 . 
 
 To enter into detail, we may fairly assume that Survey 
 the oligarchs joined with the other extremists in act ( e ^ 1 
 bringing about the overthrow of Pericles, that they 
 were among those who forced the command at Pylus 
 on Cleon in the hope of being well rid of him, and 
 that there was a leaven of oligarchic disloyalty in 
 Cleon's mutinous hoplites at Amphipolis 3 . 
 
 It is not so easy to estimate their part in the 
 events of 415. It is best however to leave the crime 
 itself out of consideration, and look only at the 
 events resulting from it ; and we can do this with less 
 
 every proposition tending to disturb the harmony which as yet 
 subsisted between the Parliament and the Court. " 
 
 1 viii. 66, iurjaav yap kclI oi)s ovk av irork ns ipero is dXiyapxiw 
 r pair tad at. 
 
 2 There is certainly great difficulty in accepting this theory in 
 the case of Pisander, who throughout Aristophanes is ridiculed 
 as one of the war party. Though he may have really changed 
 sides, there must have been many oligarchs in the disguise of 
 democrats. 3 Droysen, Hermes, ix. p. 16. 
 
90 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 difficulty, because the most important consequence, 
 the banishment of Alcibiades, was not directly con- 
 nected with the mutilation of the Hermae, but only 
 resulted from the state of panic into which the city 
 was thrown. It is impossible to suppose that the 
 oligarchs took no part in these proceedings. The 
 banishment of Alcibiades was ascribed to them by 
 Isocrates 1 , and we know that Thessalus, who was pro- 
 bably an oligarch, drew up the information against 
 him. Besides this it is obvious how much they 
 gained by it. The state was enervated by the fever- 
 ish state of panic and suspicion that was kept up, 
 the civic body suffered the loss of many citizens who 
 were banished, and the democracy lost its ablest 
 leader in Alcibiades 2 . It cannot be denied that real 
 demagogues, such as Androcles, played an important 
 part, but it is probable that they were urged on by 
 oligarchs who used the mask of democratic senti- 
 ments to carry out their plans 3 . 
 
 1 Isoor. 16. 2 ff. This of course is not an impartial statement. 
 
 2 Miiller- Strutting, ib. pp. 81 ff., thinks that advantage was 
 taken of the state of affairs to endeavour to introduce the enemy. 
 Alcibiades was removed, the vclvtikos oxAos was far away in Sicily, 
 Athens was panic-stricken, and just then we hear of movements of 
 the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians on the frontier. Thuc. vi. 
 61, Andoc. 1. 45. 
 
 3 Gotz (Jahrbuch fur class. Phil., Suppl. viii. pp. 551 ff.) thinks 
 that Pisander, Charicles &c. were oligarchs at this time. He 
 traces the various informations to the intrigues of the oligarchs 
 and the counter moves of Alcibiades' friends. Thus the oligarchs 
 extended the scope of the enquiry to include Alcibiades. Hence 
 they procured the information of Andromachus ; this was answered 
 by the information of Teucrus which was called up by the iraipeia 
 of Alcibiades. The attack of Androcles on Alcibiades was answered 
 by Alcibiades the Phegusian, who, evidently in the interest of his 
 namesake, suborned Dioclides. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 91 
 
 They may also have contributed to the condemna- 
 ion of the generals after Arginusae. Granting that 
 the indignation aroused then was mainly natural 
 and not factitious, it is probable that the oligarchs 
 used their influence to foment the popular feeling 
 and so bring about the downfall of the generals, who 
 had done so much for the state and might do so 
 much more. 
 
 We cannot trace the action of the oligarchs any 
 further. Even in the conjectures which have been 
 put forward we are on no sure ground, for it is 
 impossible to obtain any certainty about a party 
 whose workings were designedly secret. We can 
 only infer that, as whenever they declare themselves 
 in politics their action is treacherous and baneful, 
 their veiled movements must have been no less 
 hostile to the constitution. 
 
 Their organization could not have been main- 
 tained in efficiency without constant exercise, and - 
 though the occasions were rare on which they decided 
 on a plan of united action, the separate oligarchic 
 clubs must have been constantly on the alert, and 
 their indirect influence on politics was probably more 
 important than their open attempts. 
 
 3. The Middle Party. 
 
 In discussing the lines of party division in Athens, A third 
 I argued that besides the two extreme sections oi^f^ cal 
 oligarchs and democrats, there was a third political 
 party to be taken into account. This party was com- 
 posed of men of moderate views, who, though they 
 might criticize the constitution, were not disloyal to 
 
live title. 
 
 92 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 it, and formed the regular opposition to the demo- 
 cratic policy. Their existence, although not brought 
 into prominence by our authorities, was, I thought, 
 sufficiently established by the history of the period. 
 On this account it demands the same discussion as 
 the other political sections ; but in studying this 
 party we are not on such sure ground, and can only 
 deduce its character from the course of politics, and 
 from the views held by individual members of it. 
 Nodistinc- Modern historians have used different terms to 
 describe members of this party, such as "moderate 
 democrats," and "moderate oligarchs," and we are al- 
 lowed this latitude because they do not seem to have 
 had a distinctive title \ If, however, we are to have a 
 
 1 This is scarcely to be wondered at. The historians assume a 
 general knowledge of politics, and do not explain the composition 
 of parties. Thucydides occasionally mentions 5?7//,os and 6X1701 in 
 a political sense, but usually attributes the action of the state to 
 the Athenians as a whole, cf. ii. 59, iii. 36, 49, &c. In iii. 41 he 
 does not mention the section to which Diodotus belongs, though he 
 has distinguished Cleon as 6 r< drincp iridaviOTaros. With the 
 author of the Resp. Ath., every one who is not a xPV a " ro ^ is a 
 irovrjpbs, and he draws no distinctions. Still there are a few 
 traces of this party in history. Thuc. iii. 82 talks of rot, fitcra 
 tG)v ttoXltwv, after discussing the 5rj/j.os and 6X170*. In viii. 75 he 
 talks of oi 5ta [xteov. Similarly Euripides, Suppl. 244, talks of 
 the party i) V ixtay. Aristotle in discussing the ^0-01 is thinking 
 of them more as a class than a political section, but he practically 
 assumes the identity. These references justify the title of centre ' 
 party ; there are passages where they seem to be distinguished as 
 the ' moderates.' Thus Alcibiades in his speech at Sparta (Thuc. 
 vi. 89) says that he and his family, while tolerating democracy, 
 tried to be fierpubrepoi ttjs Trapovvqs aKoXaalas. Thuc. iv. 28 calls 
 the opponents of Cleon oi adb^poves. This word seems to have 
 had a special political sense, as in viii. 53, el pr) 7roX1.TeijaoiJ.e1/ re 
 o-hxppoveo-Tepov, refers to the proposed reform of the constitution 
 in 411, and in 64, o-u<ppocnjvr) is used as equivalent to oligarchy. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 93 
 
 denomination suitable to the party as a whole, I 
 think the neutral title of " the middle party " is 
 best, inasmuch as the party was united not so 
 much by political sympathies as by the fact of their 
 difference from both the extreme sections. 
 
 This party met with most favour from the middle This parti/ 
 class, who are generally in all states inclined to knitted 
 moderation in politics, and especially from the farmers from the 
 of moderate property (Aristophanes' ideal character). c i ass . 
 The policy of the party as a whole was in the in- /\ 
 terests of the agricultural class, and on this account, 
 as I have pointed out above, must have sometimes 
 commanded the support of the small farmers, who 
 wavered between this party and the democrats. The 
 accession of this class probably gave them a majority 
 in the assembly, for we find that on several occasions 
 the middle party were in control of the government 
 and able to carry their wishes into effect 1 . 
 
 It is probable that the party was first organized History of 1 
 under Nicias ; it held together firmly during the first faring the 
 part of the war, and was able to carry its policy into war - 
 effect in 421. During the years of peace the bonds 
 of party discipline were relaxed ; the policy of con- 
 ciliation with Sparta, recommended by Nicias, was 
 discredited by the treacherous conduct of that state, 
 and the discredit reacted on the middle party. As a 
 consequence the advocates of war returned to power, 
 until the disaster at Mantinea once more restored 
 the influence of Nicias. Soon after his party seems 
 
 The word was probably not a stereotyped political designation, 
 but was used to point to the rash character of democracy. Cf. 
 Diod. xiii. 53, ol iTrieiK^araTOL. 
 
 1 This is discussed below in chapter IV. p. 128. 
 
 CrJ 
 
 r 
 
94 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 to have broken up, as he was almost alone in oppos- 
 ing the Sicilian expedition 1 . 
 
 Henceforth the middle party had neither a dis- 
 tinct policy of its own, nor indeed a separate exist- 
 ence, as its members attached themselves to one of 
 the other two parties. This result was natural ; the 
 position of a middle party is at all times precarious, 
 but when politics become involved in passion and 
 violence, and the political issue is narrowed, it is 
 impossible to hold an even balance between the 
 extremes, and men must declare for one side or the 
 other 2 . 
 
 At Athens this tendency was accelerated by eco- 
 nomic changes brought about by the war. Agricul- 
 ture was ruined ; the richer landowners and farmers 
 0\S Y of property were naturally opposed to war, and, as 
 time went on, joined the oligarchs in their desire at 
 all costs and by any means to overthrow the power 
 of the democrats and reverse their policy : on the 
 other hand the small peasant proprietors must have 
 gradually accustomed themselves to the conditions 
 of town life, and have joined forces with the demo- 
 crats. From the year 410 we cannot trace the 
 existence of a middle party, but in the ranks of both 
 the democrats and the oligarchs we can distinguish 
 men of moderate political views. 
 The mid- To discuss the middle party in detail, I propose 
 
 and the 1 to consider first their attitude to the constitution, 
 constitu- an d then their general policy. As we have seen, the 
 
 1 Thuc. vi. 24, i-pus eveireae rots iracnv ofiolcos eKirkevaau Cf. 
 Plut. Nic. 12. 
 
 2 Possibly it is to this that Thucydides is referring in iii. 82 
 when he says, to. 5e fxeaa tup ttoKltuv U7r' &fJL<poTepu)v...5ie(pdeipoPTo. 
 
> 
 
 X 
 
 PARTIES IN DETAIL. 95 
 
 party shaded off on the one hand to the democrats, on 
 the other to the oligarchs. It included men of keen 
 democratic feeling, who, however, must be ranked with 
 this party as being in opposition to the democratic 
 policy, as well as men who would have preferred a 
 moderate form of oligarchy. But these, and indeed 
 the bulk of the party, usually accepted the con- 
 stitution as it was and worked loyally under it. 
 They were opportunists 1 on this point, and so long 
 as the constitution in existence was not guilty of 
 flagrant excess, and ensured a general security, they 
 were content. Hence they went with the stream, 
 and acquiesced, in democracy, till the current of 
 events set in the direction of oligarchy, when they 
 made no attempt to resist the movement. 
 
 Many men, indeed, who usually acted with this \ 
 party, desired to see a moderate oligarchy established, 
 and the revolutions of 411 and 404 were both carried / 
 out with their help. They did not, however, take 
 sufficient precautions to prevent oppression and 
 secure moderation, and on both occasions they broke 
 from the oligarchs, when they saw the character of 
 their government. 
 
 As I have said, the party was not homogeneous, Reforms 
 and so did not pursue one ideal of government: we ^ s } red ^V 
 can see, however, by their action, when placed in 
 
 1 See Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 13. Cf. Eur. Suppl. 2445 (speak- 
 ing of this party), 
 
 rpiuiv 5 fioipQv 7) V fieacp aivfei 7r6Xets, 
 k6<jh,ov (pv\d<raova outiv' hv r&j-r) tt6\is. 
 Aristotle, Pol. 1296 a, 8, seems to refer to the opportunism of 
 the fxkaoi, on 5' i) pear) (3e\TL<TTr), (pavepbv ' fxovr) y&p aaraaiaaTOS. 
 
n 
 
 96 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 power, what were the principles which commanded 
 their united support. They desired a limitation of 
 democracy in two particulars 1 . They wished (1) to 
 \ limit the absolute power of the people, either by 
 restricting the franchise, or by defining the powers 
 \ of the assembly: (2) to abolish pay for state ser- 
 vices (except in the army). 
 Limita- There is a necessary connection between these 
 
 powers I/ tw0 re f rms > f r & tne franchise were limited to men 
 the people, of a certain amount of property, they would be able 
 to serve the state without requiring pay, while it 
 was only the system of pay which enabled the demos 
 to take part in some functions of government. In 
 412 there was a reaction against extreme democracy 
 and in consequence the government passed to the 
 moderates ; it was probably owing to their influence 
 that the powers of the assembly and council were 
 limited by the institution of the 7rp6fiov\oi, who 
 were themselves men of the middle party 2 . In 411 
 those of the middle party who supported the oligarchic 
 movement did so in the hope that a government based 
 on a limited franchise would be introduced 3 , and it 
 
 1 I have omitted to discuss the objection that some individuals 
 who may be ranked with this party (e.g. Socrates) had to the lot, 
 but the question was more one for philosophers than for practical 
 politicians; and the system does not seem to have caused any 
 general dissatisfaction. 
 
 2 So far as we can judge from the little we know of them; 
 Hagnon and Sophocles (identified by many historians with the 
 poet) were members. 
 
 3 The proposal to entrust power to the Five Thousand in 411 
 was probably put in as a blind to attract the moderates, cf. 
 Thuc. viii. 65, 67, 72. They laid great stress on making this ele- 
 ment a reality, and their disappointment was the cause of the 
 split, ib. 89, 92, 93. 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 97 
 
 was their disappointment in this respect that caused 
 them to break with the extreme oligarchs. They v 
 were then able to overthrow the oligarchy and esta- 
 blish a government after their own heart, based on 
 the two essential conditions of a limited franchise 
 and the abolition of pay 1 . 
 
 The same thing happened in 404 ; those of the 
 middle party who supported the institution of the 
 Thirty did so in the hope that they would establish 
 a constitution on a sufficiently broad basis 2 while 
 avoiding the blemishes of democracy. They were 
 again disappointed, and Theramenes for a second 
 time led the malcontents, but he was no match for 
 the extreme oligarchs. 
 
 On questions of general policy this party formed, The middle 
 at least for the first half of the war, the regular Qfr^%^ 
 position. They were during all this time the peace cratic 
 party 3 , and though they were not ready like the oli- 
 garchs to accept peace at any price, and so to betray 
 Athenian interests to Sparta, they were anxious to 
 bring the war to a conclusion, so long as peace in- e,\jtL 
 
 volved no loss of honour or empire. On this as on I 
 other subjects they took up a position intermediate 
 between the two parties, set themselves against ex- 
 treme tendencies in either direction, and became the 
 
 1 Thuc. viii. 97. 
 
 2 Thus Theramenes (who probably desired a more restricted 
 franchise than most of the middle party), objected to the limit of 
 3000 being fixed, Xen. Hell. ii. 3, 19. His own ideal is expressed 
 ib. ii. 3, 48 ; he was opposed to ol 5ov\oi /cai oi 6l diroplav SpaxM* 
 dv dirodofxevot. rrjv ttoKlv, being admitted to citizenship: on the 
 other hand he objected to the tyranny of an absolute council. 
 
 3 See chapter iv. p. 119. 
 
 w. 7 
 
 'policy. /\ 
 
^yt 
 
 98 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 advocates of compromise. On this account their 
 
 / policy always seems negative, and Nicias' attitude 
 
 was one of monotonous opposition to the democratic 
 
 proposals. In fact it would be possible to deny to 
 
 this party any positive merits in statesmanship, were 
 
 it not that it is redeemed by a few men, for whose 
 
 \ proposals the party may claim credit. 
 
 Aristoplm-^ Above all others Aristophanes may be regarded 
 
 Tentative 6 ' as ^ e representative man of this party, and I think 
 
 of the we can trace in his works a definite and consistent 
 
 par y ' policy, which he constantly advocates 1 . He stood 
 
 midway between the extreme democrats and the 
 
 oligarchs; while severe on the faults of democracy 
 
 and castigating the evil side of the assembly and 
 
 of the law courts, and the system of state pay 2 , 
 
 he had no sympathy with the oligarchs 3 , and was 
 
 1 Aristophanes was a partisan, and, as I have argued above, his 
 delineation of character did not always keep on truthful lines ; but 
 this did not hinder him from having genuine political ideas, and 
 seriously advocating them. Th. Kock (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. pp. 
 118 ff .) insists on the serious purpose of Aristophanes. " The 
 Aristophanic dramas," he says (p. 125), " are closely connected with 
 the movements of popular feeling in politics and education, 
 religion or art, with the practical aim of affecting the movements 
 by conviction ; they are distinctly didactic." 
 
 2 The evils of the KK\r)<ria were the power of the demagogues 
 and the abuse of xf/rjcpifffxaTa. The evil side of the law courts was 
 the system of avKo<pavrla. Aristophanes' attacks on these and on 
 txi<rdo<popa are too well known to require illustration. The Equites 
 in particular is directed against demagogy, as impersonated in 
 Cleon. 
 
 3 This we may see in Lys. 577, where he attacks rovs avpiara- 
 nkvovs (a passage significant from the date at which the play was 
 produced). He also attacks individual oligarchs, in cases where the 
 motive of his attack seems political, Aves 126 (Aristocrates). 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 99 
 
 really loyal to the demos and eager for its pros- 
 perity 1 . 
 
 The treatment of the allies advocated by Aris- Party 
 tophanes and other members of his party was in JjJJJ JJ* 
 accord at once with the highest statesmanship and allies. 
 humanity. I have argued that the allies suffered 
 few practical hardships from their subjection to 
 Athens, and that for this reason the demos in the 
 allied towns was really loyal, while the oligarchic 
 minority for selfish reasons was anxious for revolt. 
 So long, therefore, as Athens' power was unim- 
 paired, this connection was likely to be maintained, 
 but all the while the struggle between parties was 
 going on in all the states of the alliance; and the 
 decline of Athenian power and the growth of Spartan 
 influence in the Aegean strengthened the anti- 
 Athenian party and enabled them to carry out their 
 plans. The general revolt in 412 was due to the 
 feeling that Athens could not maintain the struggle 
 against Sparta for another year' 2 . 
 
 It was, therefore, in accordance with the deepest 
 interests of Athens to convince the allies that the 
 bond of union was not one of force and fear, but that \ 
 it was to their common interest to combine against ' 
 the common foe 3 . This the democrats did not see ; 
 their policy was to maintain the alliance on the \ v 
 existing basis, to assert their right to control the \ 
 allies, and to severely punish revolt : the oligarchs 
 
 1 There is no trace of antidemocratic feeling in his works. 
 The Demos in the Equites is more sinned against than sinning. 
 
 2 Thuc. viii. 2. 
 
 3 This community of feeling was established with Samos 
 (Thuc. viii. 75), which remained faithful to Athens till the last. 
 
 72 
 
100 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 on the other hand were working indirectly for the 
 dissolution of the alliance. The best men of the 
 middle party seem, however, to have realized the 
 necessity of respecting the rights and feelings of the 
 allies, and of guarding against any unnecessary op- 
 pression. This purpose we can trace in the speech 
 I of Diodotus 1 , as well as in the constant protests, 
 which Aristophanes raises against injustice to the 
 allies 2 , and the appeals he makes for gentler treat- 
 rnent 8 . 
 Proposals I Aristophanes, however, went further than this, 
 qtAristo- an( j ac j voca ted a scheme of "imperial federation," 
 
 plumes for r 
 
 confedera- at a time when many of the allies were breaking off 
 their allegiance, and others were preparing for revolt. 
 In the passage of the Lysistrate (which was produced 
 in 411) where he is talking of the evil plight of the 
 state and the means of salvation, he laments the ' 
 isolation and disconnection of the allied states, and 
 proposes a union of allies, citizens, and aliens under 
 one great government 4 . It is scarcely possible to 
 
 1 Thuc. iii. 42 8. The speech, whether authentic or not, 
 must have represented the views of many statesmen. 
 
 2 The Babylonii was apparently written expressly to show up 
 the defects of the Athenian dominion, cf. Ach. 642. The oppres- 
 sion of the allies is referred to in Eq. 1070 (a protest against pijes 
 apyvpoXoyoi.), ib. 802 (probably a reference to the cpopos), and Pax 
 639, 644. 
 
 3 Eq. 1309, the opponent of Cleon is called reus vrjcois iiriKovpe. 
 
 Pax 759, Aristophanes calls himself the champion of the allies. 
 
 ib. 935, he advocates a gentler treatment of them, w<rr iaofieda, 
 
 Kal toictl crvfj./J,&xoicri irpqoTepoi ttoXjj. 
 
 4 Lys. 582 6. The passage is worth quoting : 
 Kal V7) Aid rds ye 7ro\eis, ottovcli rrjs yrjs rijad' eicrlv olttoikoi, 
 Siayiyv&GKeiv 6'ri ravd' rjpXv wo-irep r& KaTa.yp.aTa KecTai, 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 101 
 
 overestimate the significance of this passage. It 
 contains a recognition of the weak spot in the Athe- 
 nian empire, and proposes a remedy of the broadest 
 statesmanship. It came too late, but to have for- 
 mulated such a proposal is, in itself, a proof of deep 
 political wisdom. 
 
 This feeling for Hellenic unity found expression Feeling for 
 in other ways. Aristophanes, who is here at one Mnity. 
 with the rest of the middle party, was constant in 
 his advocacy of peace 1 and alliance 2 with Sparta. 
 Nicias and Laches were, in this respect, reviving the 
 traditions of Cimon's policy 3 , which was to maintain 
 the friendship of Athens and Sparta, with mutual 
 regard for each other's dominion. In 421 they 
 seemed to have attained their goal ; but the jealousy 
 of the rival powers was too great for the settlement 
 to last, the national party both in Athens and Sparta 
 asserted itself, and the selfishness and bad faith of 
 Sparta soon broke up the agreement. 
 
 The policy of union revived another principle of & ree e and ^ 
 Cimon's policy, the principle of peace among the 
 Greeks and war with Persia. It was obvious that 
 the struggle between Athens and Sparta, which in 
 
 Xupls 'tKaaroV Kcyr' o\iro toijtuu it&vtwv to Kdrayfxa \aj3oi>Tas 
 devpo ^vvayeLv kclI crvvadpoi^eiu els $v, K&irevra Trotrjcai 
 ToXvirrjv /xeyd\r)v, Kar K ravrvs ry A-^/xy xKalvav v<prjmi. 
 The devpo vvdyeiv kclI avvadpol^eiv eh h can only refer to a 
 common council of the alliance at Athens. 
 
 1 Aristophanes wrote seven plays with the express purpose of 
 advocating peace. (See Kock, ib. p. 119.) 
 
 2 Cf. Pax 1080. 
 
 3 See Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 48, Duncker, Griech. Gesch., Neue 
 Polge, i. p. 91. 
 
 a**- 
 
102 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 A/ 
 
 Warning 
 of Aristo- 
 phanes. 
 
 time brought all the Grecian states into conflict, 
 could only result in weakening Greece to the advan- 
 tage of Persia. That the war was for the benefit of 
 Persia alone is abundantly evident from the effects 
 of the peace of 404. Not only were the Ionian states 
 surrendered to the enemy of Greece, but for a time 
 all the states of Greece were simply vassals to the 
 great king, and the supremacy of Persia only gave 
 way to that of Macedon. 
 
 From the beginning of the war this prospect was 
 manifest. Sparta was constantly sending embassies 
 to Susa, Athens was not guiltless, and the degrading 
 submission of both states to Tissaphernes, Pharna- 
 bazus and Cyrus in the latter part of the war was 
 ominous enough. 
 
 The danger must have been recognized by the 
 more far-seeing Athenians, and operated as a power- 
 ful motive for peace. Peace, however, on terms which 
 left the old state of rivalry and suspicion was not 
 enough ; there must be a real Panhellenic union, in 
 which all the Greeks should give over their animo- 
 sities and through mutual concession be united " by 
 the elixir of friendship." Here too Aristophanes 
 represents the best policy of his party, in constantly 
 insisting on the folly of the civil war, on the danger 
 of calling in Persia, and the glorious prospects which 
 Panhellenism offered 1 . 
 
 1 He attacks embassies to the great king Ach. 62 130, 613 y 
 647. Cf. Thuc. ii. 67, iv. 50. The danger from Persia is alluded 
 to in Pax 108, where Trygaeus proposes to indict Zeus for betraying 
 Greece to the Medes, cf. 408. He appeals to Panhellenic feeling in 
 
 Pax 302, 
 
 c5 HavtWrjites (3o7]dr)<r<i}/JLev etirep irdjirore, 
 
PARTIES IN DETAIL. 103 
 
 There is, therefore, much to praise in the policy These 
 advocated by Aristophanes, and inasmuch as he can- J^JJ^L 
 not have stood alone, and his views are in logical the middle 
 connection with the views of the middle party, we pai *' 
 may credit that party with a leaven of the most 
 exalted political ideas. 
 
 But here their claim to admiration is exhausted. 
 The exalted views of individuals did not obtain 
 sufficient support to affect practical politics, and the 
 party having no definite objects to pursue lacked 
 solidarity. It is not enough to say that their actions 
 fell short of their aspirations ; so far as we can see, 
 the practical statesmen of the party made no effort 
 to realize their political ideas or to initiate a policy, 
 except in the one particular of persistently advo- 
 cating peace. They were fatally disposed to op- 
 portunism and compromise, they were content to u 
 wait upon events without energy to anticipate them. 
 
 The position of a party between two extremes is 
 always difficult, and usually compels them to criticize 
 and oppose, not to initiate and produce. The en- 
 thusiasm of carrying a consistent policy into effect 
 belongs to the wings, the centre is cursed with 
 barrenness. 
 
 where the Scholiast says pug. Trpoffrjyopiq. avrotis "rrepUXa^e cfyXcSi' 
 t6 (rvyyevks. lb. 996 he advocates a union of the Greeks, 
 pu%ov 5' Tjfias rods "EWrjvas 
 tt&Xlv ig apxys 0i\fas x u ^V> k.t.X. 
 When the danger had been realized in 411, he blames the 
 Greeks. Lys. 433, 
 
 fyOpuv TTCLpovruv j3ap(3ap<j0v a-Tpare^fxari 
 "EWyvas avdpas /cat 7ro'\ets dwoWvre. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Parties in relation to the War. Party 
 Government in Athens. 
 
 The war I have reserved to the last the discussion of the 
 
 question of war so ^ ar as ** divided parties at Athens. This is 
 
 politics, a subject which requires special consideration; for 
 
 no other event possessed half the political importance 
 
 of the war, which served for this period as the test 
 
 question of politics. During the earlier years parties 
 
 were almost equally divided on the subject, so that, 
 
 although there was a constant state of warfare, there 
 
 was usually a party advocating peace, now and again 
 
 with success. 
 
 The in- The relation of the different parties to the war 
 
 terests of depended on the interests of the classes composing 
 
 classes zii 
 
 the war. those parties ; this subject must accordingly be con- 
 sidered first. It is necessary for this purpose to look 
 at the matter from two aspects. The interest of 
 classes in the ultimate issue of the war and in the 
 questions at stake is an entirely different question 
 from the immediate profit or loss, which fell to their 
 lot from the actual continuance of the' war. With 
 respect to the first point I have argued that it was 
 in the interests of the democracy to continue the 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 105 
 
 war, until a balance of advantage had been attained, 
 and on this account the democratic party was re- 
 solved to carry it to a decisive conclusion. I shall 
 have to return to this point below: but for the 
 present I wish to discuss the immediate effects of 
 the war. It is obvious that in this connection we 
 must consider not only the wealth and poverty of 
 the different classes, but the source of their wealth 
 and their means of livelihood. The war had not the 
 same effect on agriculture and trade ; but in the 
 long run, though different classes suffered in different 
 degrees, no class directly profited by it. 
 
 Some historians dismiss this question by a sweep- Theory 
 ing generalization. They assume that demagogues war b J lgm 
 
 and democrats alike found in the war a source offi ted the 
 
 Iowbt 
 profit, and that both in beginning and continuing it clone*. 
 
 they were actuated solely by self-interest. In the 
 case of the demagogues the charges of Aristophanes 1 
 are quoted and accepted 2 as conclusive proof, al- 
 though there is no other evidence against them. It 
 is more important to discuss the interests of the 
 democratic party in general ; and the case against 
 them is stated in an extravagant form by Freese 3 . 
 
 " The rich men," he says, " desired peace in order Freese's 
 to be relieved of the trierarchy, the country people eoiy ' 
 to leave their quarters in the town and return to 
 their fields: the industrial class desired peace, for 
 slaves were harder to manage and deserted: all 
 
 1 Pericles Ach. 535, Pax 605. Pisander Babyl. fr. 81 (Kock), 
 Lys. 491. Cleon Eq. 801, 864, &c. 
 
 2 E.g. by Hermann, Staatsalt. 164. 
 
 3 Der Parteikampf der Reichen und der Armen, p. 70, refer- 
 ring to the second part of the war. 
 
106 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 whose income depended on the allies desired peace, 
 for the war was causing their revolt every day." 
 This is excellent as a description of the natural 
 interests all men had in a state of peace, and at first 
 sight seems to be intended for an enumeration of 
 the whole body of citizens in their several divisions. 
 We are led to wonder what was the obstacle to 
 peace ; the explanation comes in the next line : 
 " Yet those who had nothing wanted war." We are 
 obliged to assume that the destitute poor were able 
 to carry their wishes into effect, against the com- 
 bined strength of the rich, the middle class (admit- 
 ted by the writer to form a majority), the country 
 people, the industrial class in the town, as well as 
 the indefinite class " whose income depended on the 
 allies." This in itself is a sufficient strain on our 
 credulity; it is worth while to see what reason he 
 assigns for the attitude of the poor. "They could 
 lose nothing by war, in which they found oppor- 
 tunity for service. The equipment of the fleet occu- 
 pied them, service on it gave them pay 1 ." Lastly 
 this has to be reconciled with a further proposition 
 of the same writer that "the citizen wished not to 
 work, but to live for the state and to be maintained 
 by it 2 ." Surely he would have more chance of a 
 leisured existence in a time of peace, when he might 
 live presumably on the tribute coming in from the 
 allies 3 , instead of earning his bread by fitting out 
 
 1 Der Parteikampf , p. 16 ; the latter statement is hardly cor- 
 rect. 
 
 2 lb. p. 35. 
 
 3 Perhaps this is the class "whose income depended on the 
 allies." 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 107 
 
 the fleet. On the theory that citizens were usually- 
 maintained out of the revenues of the state, we are 
 obliged to assume that war made life not only less 
 luxurious but more laborious 1 . I think it is evident 
 that one theory destroys the other 2 . 
 
 The main conclusion of this writer is at least Effects of 
 
 i 1n , t , the war. 
 
 m some degree generally accepted ; it is necessary 
 therefore to examine the actual consequences of the 
 war, and then to estimate the loss suffered by the 
 different classes of the community. We may divide 
 the results of the war into the loss in men, the loss 
 in money, the effect on agriculture and trade, and 
 the general discomfort produced by a continual state 
 of war. It will be enough to summarize here the 
 facts which are admitted, without discussing the 
 evidence on which they are based. 
 
 Taking the population generally there was an Decline of 
 almost continual decline 3 . At the beginning of ihe^?^ la ' 
 war there were (not including the families of the 
 citizens and metoecs) 
 
 35,000 citizens, 10,000 metoecs, 100,000 slaves ; 
 
 from the effects of the plague these numbers de- 
 
 1 For this compare the aversion of the really idle and state- 
 supported democracy of the fourth century to undertaking war. 
 
 2 I have discussed the argument of Freese at some length, 
 because it is based on theories commonly accepted by writers on 
 the subject, but not generally stated so definitely as to admit of 
 adequate criticism. Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 27, says, "The war be- 
 came the basis for a new division of parties, in which it was 
 above all the personal interests of individuals that determined 
 their place in politics." 
 
 3 I have taken the figures from Beloch, Bevolkerung, p. 99. 
 The numbers are only approximate and proportional. 
 
10S 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 clined about 25 per cent, and there were 26,000 
 citizens, 7000 metoecs, 70,000 slaves. From 421 
 there was a slight improvement 1 , which was how- 
 ever more than counterbalanced by the Sicilian 
 expedition and the Decelean war (the latter causing 
 the loss of a large number of slaves) ; and the num- 
 bers at the end of the war may have been about 
 20,000 citizens, 5,000 metoecs, 65,000 slaves. 
 Taking the military forces 2 separately, there were in 
 431 about 20,000 hoplites and cavalry, composed of 
 about 16,000 citizens and 4000 metoecs. By the 
 plague and war these numbers were reduced to 
 about 12,000 and 3000 respectively. After 41 2 3 
 there were scarcely more than 9000 citizens, and 
 2000 metoecs of hoplite census, and at the end of the 
 war the citizen hoplites were about 8000. 
 
 Finance was of scarcely less importance than 
 Athens could not put land forces in 
 the field with the same ease as Sparta, for most 
 of her allies had purchased immunity from service. 
 She required pay not only for her own soldiers, 
 but for mercenaries (especially for light-armed 
 troops and rowers employed on the fleet). The 
 fleet, in fact, entirely depended on the revenue; 
 the promise of higher pay induced the sailors to 
 change sides 4 , and in the latter years of the war 
 
 Import- 
 ance of 
 
 finance to population 
 Athens. 
 
 1 Thuc. vi. 12. 
 
 2 Beloch, ib. p. 71. The number at the beginning of the war 
 may be open to dispute, but the losses are fairly well known. 
 
 3 In the Sicilian expedition 2700 hoplites 4k KaraXSyov, 1500 
 heavy-armed Thetes, 250 knights were employed, most of whom 
 perished. Beloch, ib. p. 67. 
 
 4 Plut. Lysand. 4. 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 109 
 
 Athens was on this ground unable to maintain an 
 efficient fleet 1 . The war resolved itself into a mone- 
 tary contest, the sources of Athenian revenue were 
 destroyed, and in spite of spasmodic efforts to raise 
 money by booty and forced contributions, she was no 
 match for the Persian subsidies, which were freely at 
 Sparta's disposal. 
 
 Coming to details of finance, there was an enor- Effect of 
 
 i , ,, v, the ivar. 
 
 mous and permanent increase in the expenditure, 
 which the increased revenue was not sufficient to 
 meet. After a time the revenue declined, the most 
 important sources were completely cut off, individual 
 citizens were impoverished, and the reserves accu- 
 mulated from surpluses in time of peace were ex- 
 hausted. 
 
 The annual revenue from ordinary sources at the Revenue. 
 beginning of the war is said to have been about 
 1000 talents 2 , of which 600 came from the allies. 
 In the course of the war, by the increase of tribute 
 and other changes, it was raised to about 2000 
 talents 8 . From 413, owing to the occupation of 
 Decelea and the revolt of the allies, it was enor- 
 mously reduced. 
 
 The ordinary expenditure of the peace establish- Experi- 
 ment bore no relation to that required by the war. ture ' 
 
 1 Thus Conon reduced his fleet from 100 to 70 ships because 
 he could only man this number, Xen. Hell. i. 5. 20. 
 
 2 Xen. Anab. vii. 1. 27. 
 
 3 Arist. Vesp. 657. The increase of tribute would not account 
 for the difference between this amount and that given by Xenophon, 
 and as Aristophanes does not mention the d<r<popa, we must 
 assume that they are not reckoning the same items of revenue. 
 Possibly Aristophanes is exaggerating, as his argument requires a 
 large revenue. 
 
110 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 The former is estimated by Boekh 1 at about 400 
 talents a year, an amount which other writers think 
 unduly high. It was, however, vastly below the 
 revenue, as the large surpluses accumulated in peace 
 testify. 
 
 From our knowledge of these surpluses and of 
 the ordinary revenue, and from the general accounts 
 of the treasury, which have been preserved in in- 
 scriptions, we are able to calculate the expenses of 
 the war. I summarize the results of the latest in- 
 vestigation 2 . 
 Financial For the first nine years of the Archidamian war 
 
 J/!fS-. 0/ from 431 / t0 423 / 2 the funds employed for war 
 purposes were approximately as follows : 
 
 The loans from the temple treasures amounted to 
 5000 talents 3 . The receipts from the allies, at the 
 rate of 600 talents for the first six years, and 1200 
 for the next three, amounted to 7200 talents; be- 
 sides this a property tax (etV</>opa) of 200 talents 
 was raised for six years from 428/7, which brought 
 in 1200 talents. The other revenues would more 
 than suffice for the ordinary expenses of administra- 
 tion. This therefore gives us a total of more than 
 13,000 talents, or an average expenditure of 1500 
 talents a year on the war. 
 
 This expenditure had exhausted the treasury, and 
 the war for the next two years had to be supported 
 out of the ordinary revenues. This may account for 
 the remissness of the Athenians in Thrace, and must 
 
 1 i. p. 320. 
 
 2 Beloch, Rhein. Mus. xxxix. pp. 244 9. 
 
 3 About 4150 talents from 431 to 427/6, and about 800 from 
 then to 423/2. 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. Ill 
 
 have been a most urgent motive for concluding peace, 
 though Thucydides does not mention it 1 . 
 
 During the years of peace the finances naturally 
 recovered, and we have it on fair authority 2 that 7000 
 talents were stored in the Acropolis. The loans from 
 the temple began again in 415, and in consequence 
 of the Sicilian expedition the treasury was emptied 
 (with the exception of the reserve of 1000 talents) 3 . 
 
 For the ten years from 422/1 to 413/2 we may 
 reckon that more than 12,000 talents were spent on 
 war purposes 4 . After this we have no accurate 
 data of either revenue or expenditure, as the tribute 
 was superseded by indirect taxation and the extent 
 of the Athenian dominion varied. The reserve of 
 1000 talents was spent, a property tax was twice 
 imposed, and extraordinary contributions were levied. 
 We are reduced to speculation, and the average of 
 1100 talents 5 for the last seven years may not be far 
 from the truth. This makes the total public ex- 
 penditure on the war about 35,000 talents 6 , without 
 
 1 In v. 14 where he gives the Athenian motives. 
 
 2 Andoc. 3. 8, which Beloch I.e. thinks exaggerated, as Athens 
 had still to meet the cost of operations in Thrace, Melos and 
 the Peloponnesus. 
 
 3 Thuc. viii. 15. 
 
 4 The tribute of the allies alone during that period would have 
 produced this amount. 
 
 5 This Beloch (ib. p. 249) thinks the minimum, as certain sums 
 omitted from consideration above must be added (e.g. expenditure 
 of 405/4). 
 
 6 In the present value of money, according to Beloch, about 
 30,000,000. I have throughout accepted his figures without 
 discussion, as for the purpose of the argument strict accuracy 
 is not essential. It is probable, that he has, if anything, under- 
 stated the expenditure, as he assumes that the <p6pos alone of the 
 
112 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 reckoning the expenditure of individuals (e.g. on the 
 
 trierarchy), which we know to have been considerable. 
 
 Effect of The expenditure of the state on the war, enormous 
 
 Onagri- as {t was ' P roDabl y fel1 short of the los ses suffered 
 culture, by individual citizens owing to the ruin of agri- 
 culture and the disturbance of trade. In the first 
 years of the war it was part of the Spartan military 
 plan to invade and ravage Attica, sweeping off her 
 crops, and rendering agriculture almost impossible. 
 The extent of the ravages varied with the duration 
 of the invasion, but the effects in any case were 
 disastrous. The capture of the Spartan prisoners 
 at Sphacteria prevented invasion for a time ; but 
 the evils were intensified to an enormous extent by 
 the occupation of Decelea 1 , which made invasion 
 permanent. Agriculture was out of the question, 
 all agricultural property was lost, large numbers of 
 slaves deserted, and almost the whole of the food 
 supply had to be imported 2 . 
 Com What this must have involved we may judge 
 
 supply. f rom t k e g Lct t k at - n or( j mar y years 800,000 medimni 
 
 of corn were imported 3 , while Attica produced at the 
 lowest estimate the same amount 4 . Athens, there- 
 ordinary revenue was employed for war purposes, while if Aristo- 
 phanes (referred to above) is correct, there was an income of 2000 
 talents down to 412 against an expenditure for ordinary purposes of 
 only 400. 
 
 1 For the effects of this, see Thuc. vii. 278. 20,000 slaves 
 deserted, the live-stock was lost (the cattle can scarcely have been 
 seized by the Spartans, it seems likely that they were sent to 
 Euboea). 
 
 2 lb. 28, t<2v T6 TT&VTiav bfjLoloos eircLKTUv edecro rj ttoXls. 
 
 3 Bern. Lept. 32. 
 
 4 Bockh's estimate of the corn produced in Attica (i. pp. 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 113 
 
 fore, had to import at least double the ordinary 
 amount of corn, both in the earlier period of the war, 
 and after the occupation of Decelea, while in the 
 latter period the cost of transport must have risen 
 steadily 1 . 
 
 On the decline of Athenian trade we have no Conditions 
 direct information. It is a natural and obvious in- f an ^dl. 
 ference that a long war, which involved so great a 
 loss of men and property, which ruined agriculture 
 and the agricultural classes and completely trans- 
 formed the conditions of life, must have caused a 
 serious disturbance of trade. This conclusion is con- 
 firmed by a consideration of the nature of Athenian 
 commerce. It seems probable that under ordinary 
 circumstances the products and manufactures ex- 
 ported by Athens were inconsiderable in proportion 
 to her imports. Apart from the precious metals, 
 which were either found in Attica or contributed by 
 her allies, the deficiency must have been made good 
 by the important carrying trade with the rest of 
 Greece, which Athens enjoyed 2 . To maintain her 
 
 97 ff.) is 2,400,000 medimni, a stupendous amount required by 
 his theory of population, and indeed the great argument against it. 
 But taking the lower estimate of population Attica would have to 
 produce at least as much as she imported. In 412, when popula- 
 tion had declined and there were no cattle to feed, perhaps there 
 would not be so large an amount of corn required, but other food 
 must have been scarce and there must therefore have been a larger 
 consumption of corn per head. 
 
 1 Thuc. vii. 28, ij re tuv kinT^eliav TrapaKOfu.^...irpl 2ovviov 
 /caret dakaacrav TroXureX^s iyiyvero. 
 
 2 Gilbert, Handbuch, i. pp. 3178. Bockh, i. pp. 756, lays 
 stress on the importance of this branch of trade, and the high 
 profits derived from it. 
 
 W. 8 
 
114 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 position in this respect Athens required on the one 
 hand the command of the sea, and on the other 
 freedom of traffic with other nations. 
 Effect of To apply these considerations to the circumstances 
 
 In trade ^ tne Peloponnesian war, Athenian merchants had 
 to look forward from the first to the loss of their 
 market in the Peloponnesus and in parts of Northern 
 Greece. At the beginning of the war the building 
 and equipment of the fleet and the increased impor- 
 tation of corn must have given a great impulse to 
 trade in the Aegean. But the profit derived from 
 this quarter cannot have afforded at all adequate 
 compensation for the loss of trade in Greece. More- 
 over, the abnormal expenditure of the state and the 
 direct taxation of the richer men diminished the 
 available capital, and at the same time the increase 
 of tribute reduced the purchasing power of the allies. 
 This state of things continued until the peace of 
 Nicias. During the following years much of the 
 lost ground was doubtless recovered. But from 415 
 the decline of trade was constant. The Sicilian 
 expedition had been regarded as a good investment 
 for capital, and its failure involved the loss of all 
 that had been invested. The revolt of the allies 
 and therewith the loss of the chief Athenian market 
 followed close upon this disaster, while the exertions 
 of Athens' enemies at sea rendered her supremacy 
 uncertain and contributed to the insecurity of trade. 
 j The final result of the war was for the time as 
 i ruinous to trade as it was to agriculture. 
 General Meanwhile there must have been a general rise 
 
 distress f p r i ceSj an d m0 st of the poorer classes lost their 
 
 x 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 115 
 
 ordinary employment in trade or agriculture, while and dis- 
 the army chiefly and usually employed the men f com f ort - 
 hoplite rank, and at a wage below that which was to 
 be gained industrially. We must also take into 
 account the removal of the farming class from the 
 country to the town. Men who were accustomed to 
 live in the fields were cramped in small, unhealthy 
 dwellings in a city which usually accommodated 
 only half- their number. This state of discomfort 
 was partial in the first part of the war, but per- 
 manent in the Decelean war, though the decrease of 
 population and the large numbers employed on the 
 standing fleet must then have afforded some relief. 
 
 To recapitulate, while the successful conduct of General 
 the war depended on efficiency of troops and equip- e e e c ^r 
 ment, and the issue came to depend on the possession 
 of the longest purse, the Athenians had to suffer a 
 decrease of population and of military forces, as well 
 as a decline in revenue, and an enormous increase 
 in expenditure. These losses were aggravated by a 
 total ruin of agriculture, a serious disturbance of 
 trade and a rise of prices, at a time when the people 
 had to endure all the dangers and discomforts of a 
 besieged city 1 . 
 
 In these circumstances it is difficult to under- 
 stand how any class can have profited positively by 
 the war, when the losses of all are so obvious. 
 
 The rich had most to lose, and they had to bear Losses of 
 the burdens of war. If their interests were com- the nch ' 
 mercial, they suffered in the loss of trade ; if on the 
 
 1 These evils were only fully developed after 413, but none of 
 them (except the decline in revenue) were altogether absent in the 
 first part of the war. 
 
 82 
 
116 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 other hand their property was in land, they must 
 have seen their country estates wasted and destroyed 1 . 
 They had to contribute the greater share of the pro- 
 perty tax, which for some time was regularly imposed, 
 and the trierarchy was a permanent and exhausting 
 burden. The loss they suffered is attested by the 
 institution of a divided trierarchy in the latter years 
 of the war 2 , as well as by the impoverishment of 
 formerly rich families 3 . 
 Losses of The middle class were, for the most part, engaged 
 
 ^auf ddU in agriculture, and therefore suffered the most direct 
 loss. The richer members had to contribute to the 
 property tax, and to undertake the hoplite service 
 at pay that was not fair remuneration for them. 
 The small farmer was ruined by the break up of 
 agriculture, while he was unfitted and indisposed for 
 a town life with the discomfort it involved. 
 Sufferings Lastly the poor without land or capital were not 
 ofthepoor. exempt< Although from the fact that they could 
 not lose much, they recovered more quickly from 
 the effects of war, they were the first to feel the pinch 
 of poverty 4 . The rise of the prices of necessaries 
 affected them more keenly than it did other classes, 
 and at the same time they had not the same oppor- 
 tunities of earning their living, owing to the decline 
 
 1 Cf. Pericles' speech, Thuc. ii. 62, and ib. 65, ol dt dwaroi 
 Ka\a ACT^jU,aTa...a7roXajXe/c6res, k.t.X. 
 
 2 Isocr. 18. 59. See Gilbert, Handbuch, i. p. 351. 
 
 3 Lys. 19. 47, 26. 22. Xen. Mem. ii. 8. 1. See also Beloch, 
 Att. Pol. p. 6. 
 
 4 We have positive testimony of their suffering from the war 6 
 fiep Stj/jlos ort air eXaacrovojv opfMUifievos iffriprjTo Kal tovtuv, Thuc. ii. 
 65. 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 117 
 
 of trade and the increased competition \ To them, 
 too, the loss of their ordinary pleasures and the state 
 of discomfort in which they had to live must have 
 forcibly appealed. 
 
 I think we are justified in concluding that there Parties 
 was no class to which the war in itself appeared ad- political y v 
 vantageous, and that in the constant support of the wmric- 
 war during this period men were actuated by political 
 convictions, and not by personal interests. 
 
 A consideration of the objects for which the war Questions 
 was waged, and of the great questions involved in it, in the war ^ 
 will show on what basis these convictions rested. 
 The war was undertaken by Sparta with the in- 
 tention of breaking up the Athenian alliance and 
 reducing Athens from the position of a great power. 
 As the war went on still greater things were at 
 stake. Down to the peace of Nicias, Athens was on 
 the defensive ; that convention settled none of the 
 questions in dispute 2 , and practically restored the 
 state of affairs which had formerly rendered war 
 inevitable and now made its renewal almost certain. 
 After this had actually taken place, the situation was 
 entirely altered by the Sicilian disaster, and the 
 Athenians, who had fatally over-estimated the pro- 
 bability of success, saw themselves with largely 
 diminished forces compelled to meet the alliance of 
 
 1 Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 27, thinks that the people of the town found 
 their gain in the congregation of the country people in Athens, 
 while the latter were reconciled to the loss of their farms by main- 
 tenance at state cost. The theory of state compensation I have 
 discussed above. The advantage to the former class would be 
 neutralized by the rise of prices and the increased competition. 
 
 2 See Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. p. 94. 
 
118 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Sparta, Persia and Syracuse. The war then became 
 NV a struggle for Athens' existence as an independent 
 state 1 , and from the magnitude of the question at 
 issue, as her prospects of victory declined, her 
 resolution to resist to the last became firmer. In 
 this contest Athens was fighting the battle of Greece, 
 for Persia was on the other side, striving to reassert 
 her old dominion. 
 War sup- The objects at stake in the war were, in them- 
 
 bythe selves, sufficient to decide the democrats in favour of 
 democrats. a vigorous resistance, even without the reflection 
 that concession to Sparta might endanger the demo- 
 cratic constitution 2 . These considerations induced 
 many men, whose personal interests separated them 
 from the bulk of the democratic party, to give a 
 vigorous support to its policy. There was also a 
 strong military party who, though not properly poli- 
 ticians, saw clearly enough that Athens' best interests 
 were threatened by Sparta, and who were therefore 
 . enthusiastic for the war. 
 Military To this class generals like Lamachus and De- 
 
 party. mosthenes belonged, men who took no part in po- 
 litical life, but devoted their services loyally to a 
 vigorous prosecution of the war. Such men were 
 the trierarchs at Samos, who gave the first check to 
 the oligarchic movement in 41 1 3 , or the generals and 
 
 1 Vischer, ib. p. 95, says, "In the Archidamian war the struggle 
 was more for the maintenance or loss of the Athenian hegemony, 
 than for the subjugation of one state by the other. In the second 
 war Athens is fighting more for existence than sovereignty, and 
 the war became for her one of desperation." 
 
 2 See above, p. 34. 
 
 3 Thuc. viii. 73. 
 
PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. 119 
 
 taxiarchs, who offered so obstinate a resistance to 
 peace, even after Aegospotami, and had to be 
 treacherously removed by the oligarchs 1 . "The 
 twenty-seven years of the war," says Droysen 2 , " show 
 on the part of Athens an obstinacy of resistance and 
 a versatility always ready to meet the growing power 
 and passion of the foe with well ordered strength 
 only possible under a firmly established military 
 organization." 
 
 On the other hand the oligarchs were not en- other 
 v thusiastic for the empire or the constitution, and were f^T^r^ 
 prepared to sacrifice both to the enemy. As rich 
 I men, whose* property was largely invested in agri- 
 culture, they wished to be rid of the burdens and 
 losses of war, and were always ready to accept peace 
 on moderate terms, and sometimes on no terms at 
 all. But the oligarchs from their small numbers and 
 neglect of ordinary political methods were not so im- 
 portant representatives of the peace policy as the 
 middle party. This body, composed for the most 
 part of the middle class, were not so keenly interested 
 in the war as the democrats, while they suffered 
 more directly than any other class in the destruction 
 of agriculture 3 . Consequently in the first years of 
 
 1 Lys. 13. 
 
 2 Hermes, ix. p. 15. 
 
 3 This appears in the plays of Aristophanes, who so constantly 
 contrasts the delights of peace with the evils of war. His hero is 
 usually the honest farmer of moderate property, cf. Ach. and Pax 
 passim and Menander fr. 719 (Kock), 
 
 dpi\vr) yewpybv kclv irtrpais 
 rpi(peL KctXuis' 7r6\e/xos 8k kclp Tredl(p kclkus. 
 See also Resp. Ath. ii. 14, Ar. Eccles. 197 ff. 
 
120 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 the war they formed the constant advocates of 
 peace ; but in the Decelean war their influence does 
 not seem to have been so keenly exercised in this 
 direction, probably because they saw that good terms 
 could not be obtained. 
 
 Lastly there must have been a large body of men 
 who, though not permanently attached to any party 
 
 K and in no constant relation to the war, shaped their 
 action according to events, ready to carry on the war 
 in prosperity and in distress anxious for peace. As 
 neither the war party nor the peace party could of 
 themselves command an absolute majority 1 (in the 
 
 ){ Archidamian war at least), this shifting section held 
 the balance between them. If we are to decide to 
 what class this section belonged, I think it would be 
 safest to identify it with the peasant farmers of small 
 property, who felt both the advantages for which the 
 war was waged, and the evils which accompanied it. 
 By the transfer of their support, they were probably 
 responsible for the peace negotiations initiated by 
 Athens, when the war was going ill, as well as for 
 the rejection of the proposals of Sparta, when the 
 fortunes of Athens were in the ascendant 2 . In the 
 later course of the war, they had by the loss of their 
 property become absorbed in the democratic party, 
 
 1 This is evident from the course of events. See below, p. 128. 
 See also Beloch, Att. Pol. 28. 
 
 2 Ar. Pax 211 9, refers to the rejection of peace proposals by 
 the victors, whenever any success was gained on either side. 
 To the action of this class, we may ascribe the vacillation of 
 policy, which Thucydides regards as characteristic of democracy. 
 In three passages, where he describes a reaction of feeling or a 
 change of policy, Thucydides uses the phrase 6irep <pi\& drj/xos, 
 6xXos or ofxiXos 7roieiv (ii. 65, iv. 28, viii. 1). 
 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS. 121 
 
 and hence were more constant supporters of the war 
 policy. 
 
 The test-question of party division was for the War ax / 
 time not oligarchy and democracy, but peace and war. question. 
 The opposition between the advocates of the rival 
 policies appears first in the debate about the ad- 
 mission of Corcyra to the Athenian alliance, when, as 
 Thucydides tells us 1 , on the first day the Athenians 
 approved the Corinthian arguments, but in the next 
 assembly decided to support the Corcyraeans. This 
 critical decision was only taken after a close party 
 struggle, which was maintained throughout the first 
 stages of the war. The representatives of the rival 
 policies renewed the contest again and again with 
 alternating success, and we are able to trace during 
 this period the variations of party government, and 
 their effects on politics. 
 
 It is always dangerous to compare ancient politics Party 
 to modern, because in the former the government of ment^t 
 the people was direct and not representative ; but I Athem. 
 think the contest of parties in Athens for political 
 power justifies us in talking of party government. 
 
 We have seen that the two elements in the con- Import- 
 stitution entrusted with real power were the popular ^lectionof 
 assembly and the board of generals. Now a party, generals. 
 which had a majority on the latter and could command 
 the support of the former, was in practical control 
 of the government. But the generals were elected 
 by the assembly 2 , and accordingly the party pre- 
 dominating on the board of generals must have had 
 
 1 Thuc. i. 44. 
 
 2 The assembly elected the generals, whether it voted in a 
 body or Kara <f>v\ds. See note on next page. 
 
122 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 the support of the people at the time of the election, 
 and retained it until events brought their opponents 
 into favour. Even then the generals had a certain 
 degree of power, until their year of office expired, for 
 they had the control of military operations, and their 
 rivals could not take the initiative. As therefore the 
 generalship was the most important office, election 
 to it was keenly contested, and when a choice had to 
 be made between alternative policies, the result of 
 this election must have been for the time decisive 1 . 
 
 1 There are some minor points in connection with the election 
 of the generals which I have left out of consideration. 
 
 1. The time of election has been much disputed. There is 
 now a strong balance of opinion that the generals were chosen 
 towards the end of Munychion (April) and entered on office in 
 Hecatombaeon (July); see Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 265 ff.; he dis- 
 cusses the question at length and quotes other authorities. If 
 this date is correct there was an interval of about three months 
 between election and entry on office, so that generals might hold 
 office for three months after their policy had been condemned by 
 the election of their opponents. 
 
 2. The method of election is quite unknown and there is the 
 widest diversity of opinion. See Beloch, Att. Pol. pp. 276 ff. Gilbert, 
 Beitrage, pp. 16 24, Droysen, Hermes ix. pp. 1 ff. The two 
 latter writers think that the generals were elected by the whole 
 people, but that in the election regard was had to the tribes as far 
 as possible, in order that each tribe might usually but not without 
 exception be represented on the board. Beloch thinks that the 
 -jrpvTavis was elected by the whole people from any tribe, but his 
 nine colleagues by the separate tribes, one tribe losing by lot or 
 rotation its right of election. This would answer to the facts well 
 enough, as we occasionally find two generals elected from the same 
 tribe, but the other eight are always, so far as we know, from eight 
 other tribes. The subject is too obscure for a certain decision. 
 There is one consideration pertinent to the political aspect of the 
 strategia. If each general was elected e air&vTwv (Poll. viii. 87) 
 and by all, it would naturally result that one party having a 
 majority of votes, would carry all the ten candidates. This is 
 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS. 123 
 
 If then we know the generals of any year, and Lists of 
 the policy advocated by the majority, we have a clue 9 enerals - 
 to the state of parties at the time, and can discover 
 which of them was in control of the government. 
 We are seldom able to obtain a full list for any year. 
 We have usually to depend on the chance mention of 
 three or four names in Thucydides and Xenophon, 
 occasionally supplemented by information derived 
 from inscriptions relating to the financial business 
 and military operations of the year. These sources, 
 however, usually contain enough to enable us to trace 
 the transfer of power in successive years. The lists, 
 so far as we know them, have been drawn up 1 , and 
 justify us in concluding that on most occasions the V' 
 election of the generals was a political conflict of 
 great importance, in which the parties put forth 
 their utmost efforts. 
 
 The constant changes of policy and magistrates False 
 which we see represented in this way throw a clear Athenian 
 light on the politics of the period, and enable us to politics. 
 dispose of some fallacious theories which have hitherto 
 been accepted. Of these the most important is, 
 that, whatever may have been the strength of the 
 different parties, the democracy alone took any im- 
 portant part in politics. Some trace this to the 
 
 clearly disproved by the lists of generals, for in years when political 
 feeling ran high, we find men of opposite parties elected, e.g. Nicias 
 and Lysicles, rival party leaders, in 428/7, so Nicias and Cleon 
 in 424/3. The minority must have had some means of obtaining 
 representation. 
 
 1 By Beloch, Att. Pol., Anhang i. pp. 289 ff., where he gives a 
 list of generals with a commentary quoting the authorities on 
 which the list for each year is based. See also Gilbert, Beitrage, 
 who discusses the generals elected each year. 
 
124 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 terrorism established by the demagogues 1 , others to 
 the want of a representative system 2 . The first ex- 
 planation scarcely requires consideration, the second 
 is worth discussing. Every decision of the assembly 
 is regarded as the voice of the mob ; when a change 
 of policy occurs, it is traced to the fickleness of the 
 popular will, because, it is argued, the respectable 
 citizens did not as a rule attend the assembly, and 
 their voice was not heard owing to the lack of repre- 
 sentation. We are told 8 that "the size of Attica 
 rendered the difficulty of attending the assembly so 
 great that those who lived at a distance did not 
 usually attend, and political power was in the hands 
 of the proletariate. It was really the inhabitants of 
 the town and Piraeus who filled the assemblies, passed 
 decrees, made laws, elected and deposed magistrates." 
 This may be true of the ordinary work of administra- 
 tion, at which no one was very anxious to attend 4 ; 
 but we cannot suppose that the middle class let every- 
 thing go by default. It is reasonable to conclude 
 that the country people nocked in 5 to vote on any 
 great question (such as proposals for war or peace), as 
 
 1 e.g. Curtius, vol. iii. p. 115 (English Trans.). His argument 
 is discussed and disproved by Miiller-Striibing, Aristophanes, pp. 
 4967, and Oncken, Athen und Hellas, ii. pp. 212 ff. 
 
 2 The complaint is frequent. See Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 7, 
 (although his statement there is general, and does not refer to 
 the fifth century in particular). 
 
 3 Beloch, I.e. 
 
 4 Cf. Ar. Ach. 19, which shows the reluctance of citizens 
 to attend the iia<\r}<Tla. 
 
 5 Even the obstacle of distance did not exist for the greater 
 part of the war, for the whole of the citizens were resident within 
 the walls, and had equal facilities of attending the iKKXrjaia. 
 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS. 125 
 
 well as at the annual elections. Apart from the in- 
 herent improbability of one class, and that a minority, 
 controlling policy and legislation, we have direct and 
 positive evidence in the elections of generals and 
 the changes of policy, to show that government did 
 actually change hands, and was shared almost equally 
 between the war and peace parties. Moreover at 
 debates in the assembly of which we have any de- 
 tailed account, both sides are usually represented, 
 and often with nearly equal votes 1 . 
 
 The conflict of parties, the alternate triumph of Summary 
 different policies, and the general attitude of the history. 
 state to the war, can be best illustrated by an out- 
 line of political events, as concrete facts are so much 
 more convincing in this case than general conclu- 
 sions. In drawing up this outline I have only given 
 a bare record of the most important events, without 
 describing circumstances which qualified their general 
 tendencies ; but for the purpose in view, the election 
 of generals each year, and the success or defeat of 
 the war and peace parties are sufficient. As the 
 names of the generals are not completely known, 
 and many individual generals are men of no political 
 importance, I have usually only given the name of 
 the chief general, whose party was in power, the 
 party to which he belonged, their action on the 
 subject of war and peace, and other political events 
 of primary importance 2 . 
 
 1 Thuc. i. 44. See above p. 121 ; cf. iii. 49 (the debate on Mity- 
 lene) iytvovro h rr} x^i-poroviq. dryxwytiaXoi, Xen. Hell. i. 7. 34. 
 
 2 In the summary of Athenian policy, which follows, I have 
 consulted Beloch, Att. Pol., and Gilbert, Beitrage passim. I have 
 not thought it necessary to quote the original authorities. 
 
U BJM 
 
 O 
 
 lis 
 
 ^^ 
 
 lis 
 
 .2 TS 
 
 ill 
 
 8 h r 
 
 4-i r^ 5 
 
 111 
 
 a Jl ft 
 
 CO """- 
 
 p p co 
 
 |S|3 
 
 P 5F r> 
 
 3 CD 5 
 
 CD i l CO 
 fQ CO CD 
 
 o p 
 a l; 8 
 3 s 
 
 O cc 
 CD _, 
 
 ci 5 
 CD O 
 
 ?3 
 
 "^Pw 
 
 1 -s 
 
 ^ 
 
 CD *4 > 
 
 B Ohl. 
 
 to a 
 
 ,2 s- 
 
 2 s 
 
 5 O 
 O CO 
 . CD 
 
 ll 
 
 O CD 
 
 173 CD < 
 
 nfe CD 
 
 5 a 
 
 M " 
 
 . o. CD CO C3 
 
 5 1* 2 g 
 
 43 .2 3 2 
 
 g.9 o ^.2 
 SSI'S 
 
 fll ** m "-* 
 
 co s-i a 
 
 83.1 
 
 Pw Ph 
 
 M ' 
 
 m CD H CO c3 
 
 1 * .2 J O 
 
 I ft.S S 2 2' 
 g 0.2 ft'Ss 
 
 ~S ^^3 P - 2 
 
 I O P^ 
 
 fe rt 
 
 11.1 8J 
 
 CD _!_?>? . 
 
 1*3*81 
 
 ^ P co M 
 
 CD 
 
 .1 
 .5 
 
 
 "-3 gsz; l-S &"^ fe-S 
 
 * 
 
 A 
 
 CQ 
 O 
 
 4B 
 
 as, 
 
 co CsD 
 
 11 
 
 a 
 
 GQ 
 
 81 
 M 
 
 Ph 
 
 3 < 
 
 i 1 
 
 P 
 
 B * 
 
 rdlS 
 
 Ii 
 
 1 *! 
 
 * r2 
 
 CC 
 
 s 
 
 o 
 
 
 3 J 
 
 a 
 
 a a 
 
 I ft"S^S 
 
 ?!>!* & 
 
 E 8 C3T3 B 
 
 w o .y -^ -a t5 ^ 
 
 CO o d rfl <D 
 
 ^= 0.2-57 ^ 5 
 * -43 o s e3 o pq 
 
 h5 ^j ^pq 
 
 
 
 ft *43 
 
 "S << 
 
 H3 
 
 s 
 
 y 
 
 ^^ 
 
 rT3 d 
 H 
 
 g 
 
 g d 
 
 > 
 
 CO Q 
 
 12 d 
 
 ft|1 
 
 b 3 o 
 
 c3m o 
 
 
 
 
 la 
 
 ^ 
 
 P-: 
 
 P^^ ^ 
 
 CD O 
 
 cPh 
 
 do 
 S ,2 
 
 O PM 
 
 CO Sh 
 
 9 J is 
 
 03 Ph. 2 
 ' CC Ph O 
 
 3 
 
 if 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 Ci 00 
 <9 ^ 
 
 CN <M CM 
 
 CC <N 
 CQ CM 
 
 1-13- a 
 
2 a 
 
 3 S 
 d .2 
 
 f^ o o 
 
 O '43 ?3 
 
 'ago 
 
 m CO 
 
 ^ O rd 
 
 -g 0+ 
 
 Ss 
 
 ?H rd +* 
 
 CD d <d 
 
 ^ c3^h 
 
 H 
 
 > CD 
 
 o 
 
 CD ^3 
 
 d 
 
 ^rd 
 
 2 s 
 
 2 
 ft-d 
 
 t-.S 
 i i 
 
 CD 
 
 to & 
 &S 2 
 
 B H 
 o3^ 
 
 S.& 
 J J 
 
 ."S a ^ 
 
 * 550 O 
 
 I|l 
 S 2 
 
 5=1 d^ 
 
 t3 h 
 ,d g 
 
 '^ 2 
 .5 a * 
 -S o.S 
 
 5 
 
 a, g 
 
 .2 o 
 
 go 
 
 CD 2 ** 
 
 B 
 
 ^ * oq 
 
 4* ew "9 
 
 M a 9 
 03 I 2 
 
 ^a a 
 
 -l l^H "S 
 
 o S 
 - kJ 
 
 ft rd -^ 
 
 o3 +2 ^ 
 
 CO 
 CD CD P< 
 
 ^ 550 <D 
 
 03:2 
 
 a i 
 
 S O ri 
 ill 
 
 SI 
 
 / 
 
 s *? 
 
 ^ w gft 
 a p ,3 
 
 M E 
 8*3 > 9 o3 
 
 ^ ft 550 03 ?* 
 
 H O 
 
 R 03 
 .2 S CD 
 E 9 9 ^ 
 
 >>US d 
 
 S 550 03 CQ ---i 
 
 If If J 
 
 d ^3 r] S 
 r& +-( CD 3 
 
 s d^3 
 
 S2^|o 
 
 a pci 
 
 o .5 -i 3 
 
 Ph. q 
 
 "- rjj i^i 
 55C 3 *h 
 fl'^O 
 
 "S'S 
 
 03 rP CD 
 
 03 ^5 -S 
 CD ^'+3 
 
 Pw CO 5h 
 
 ^.S & 
 
 -^ 'fl CD 
 
 $ 
 <<^ 
 
 +3 CD 
 
 d 
 
 O O 03 CO 
 
 ^, J9 CD d co 
 
 d^ I ffi a 
 
 ^^rd.2 S 
 
 ^^ol| M 
 -^ 03 - - 
 
 ei_i O CS rg 
 O O "^ CD 
 
 || 
 
 d.SoQ2 
 Eh B3 
 
 o 
 
 Ph 
 
 S 
 
 0Q 
 
 o3 
 
 O 
 
 
 
 
 CO 
 CD 
 
 o3 
 to 
 O 
 
 CQ 
 
 Ph 
 
 CO 
 
 O 
 
 c3 
 
 f-i 
 
 ,0 
 
 ft 
 
 a 
 
 CD 
 
 ft 
 d^ 
 
 ft 
 
 OQ 
 
 ft 
 
 I 
 
 a: 
 I 
 
 H >-, o3 13 
 
 CD CO 2 q.'s! -S 
 
 03^ & .- a 
 
 a S 2-^-2 1 
 
 g 43 ft^ -g o 
 
 o co O '^3 
 
 8-3 bail 
 
 < ft^a O Q, . ^ 
 
 *h S 2 2 d' 
 
 O O SH QJ 
 
 Pm ft 
 
 J 2 2 2 p 
 
 ^^ * * 
 
 T3 <rs 
 
 9 9 
 
 r= is 
 
 9 q 
 
 s 1 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 a 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 K 
 
 CD ^> 
 
 * rd 
 
 03 o 
 
 ^O 
 
 T -1 'O T* 
 
 H -? 
 
 OS 4SO3 
 
 CO CM S o "3 rH O 00 t^ D 
 
128 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Conclusion Such a map of political events enables us to 
 rived from rea ^ ze vividly the energy and persistency with which 
 these facts, the struggle of parties was kept up in Athens. The 
 constant changes of government and of policy are 
 sufficient proof that parties were sharply divided and 
 equally resolute in the pursuit of their political ends. 
 We may, therefore, reject the theory that the mob of 
 the town had any monopoly of political activity. A 
 brief review of the different periods of the war will 
 show this more clearly. 
 Different The war falls naturally into three parts, the first 1 
 
 'periods of p er i 0( j going down to the peace of Nicias, the second 2 
 covering the years of peace, and the third 3 lasting 
 from the renewal of the war to the surrender of 
 Athens. Each of these periods has distinct charac- 
 teristics; the struggle of the rival parties varied 
 greatly in the first and last years of the war, and in 
 the second period, which was one of nominal peace, 
 the situation was complicated by the prominence 
 of political questions other than those of war and 
 peace. 
 Party In the first years of the war parties were fairly 
 
 \ f^the es matched and had an equal share of office. The ad- 
 first part vocates of peace and war controlled the government 
 ' in turn, and each party endeavoured to use their 
 influence in the assembly to carry their policy into 
 effect. The changes of government were largely due 
 to the course of events and the temporary success 
 or failure of the rival parties. Thus the sufferings 
 caused by the second invasion in 430 and the losses 
 of Athens in 428-7 led to peace negotiations being 
 
 1 431421. 2 421413. 3 413404. 
 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS. 129 
 
 opened in those years 1 . Similarly the success of 
 Brasidas in 424 induced the Athenians to consent to 
 an armistice, and the peace of Mcias was rendered 
 possible by the defeat of Cleon. There were, there- 
 fore, at least four occasions on which the peace party 
 took definite steps to realize their policy, while the 
 war party, profiting by their own good fortune or the 
 blunders of their opponents, procured the rejection 
 of Spartan proposals in several instances 2 . Generally 
 speaking a change of government was followed by a 
 change of policy ; but on other occasions the peace 
 party were entrusted with office owing to the failure 
 of their opponents to conduct the war successfully, 
 and they were expected to continue military opera- 
 tions until the state had a favourable opportunity 
 for concluding peace 3 . 
 
 During the years succeeding the peace of Nicias Party 
 the political situation was changed. The peace was !owf 421 
 nominally preserved until 413, and in this interval, to 413. 
 as compared with the previous period, the position of 
 parties was inverted; the peace party endeavoured 
 to maintain the existing situation, and the war party 
 to disturb it. The government was again shared 
 between the two parties, and for the first few years 
 neither party had a decisive superiority, so that the 
 policy of the state was marked by vacillation and 
 
 1 For the peace negotiations of 430 see Thuc. ii. 59. The 
 peace proposals mentioned in Thuc. iv. 21 and Ar. Ach. 653 4 
 are generally referred to the year 427 ; see Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 34. 
 
 2 After Pylus the Spartans sent embassies on several occasions 
 in vain ; Ar. Pax 665 7 evidently refers to these. 
 
 3 Apparently in 428 and 425, although the peace party were in 
 power, they were not allowed to initiate peace negotiations. 
 
 w. 9 
 
130 POLITICAL PAKTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 compromise. The history of the period is so involved 
 that it is worth while to review it briefly in detail. 
 
 The advocates of peace did not retain their po- 
 sition for long ; a reaction of popular feeling brought 
 Alcibiades into power, and he was able to bring about 
 the alliance with Argos, which led Athens into in- 
 direct hostilities with Sparta 1 . This unsatisfactory 
 state of affairs, in which Athens was attacking a 
 power with whom she was nominally allied, reached 
 a climax in the battle of Mantinea. Nicias, who was 
 in office, was able to prevent any effective force being 
 sent against Sparta, while Alcibiades, who accom- 
 panied the expedition, managed to involve the 
 Athenian arms. This intolerable balance of power 
 caused the resort to ostracism in 41 7 2 . The rival 
 leaders agreed to submit their claims to the decision 
 of the whole state with some hope that for the future 
 the policy of one or the other might be carried out 
 vigorously and consistently. The intervention of 
 Hyperbolus led to a change of plan and to the com- 
 bination of the former rivals. For the time Nicias 
 seems to have gained ground and Alcibiades took a 
 less prominent position 3 . In order to recover the 
 influence he had lost he advocated the Sicilian ex- 
 
 1 Alcibiades could not get either the peace or alliance with 
 Sparta renounced by Athens; but he procured a formal declar- 
 ation that Sparta had broken the truce, Thuc. v. 56. 
 
 2 The ostracism of Hyperbolus took place in some year be- 
 tween 418 and 415; on the whole there is more authority for 
 the date 417, and I have adopted Beloch's explanation of the 
 events connected with the ostracism (Att. Pol. pp. 54 5). 
 
 3 Although both were generals, the policy of Nicias was carried 
 out; see Beloch, ib. p. 57. 
 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS. 131 
 
 pedition, and during his exile and the absence of 
 
 Nicias Androcles and the extreme democrats brought 
 
 about a renewal of the war. 
 
 After the disaster in Sicily there was no longer Party 
 
 an even division of parties, and, except for the in- till the 
 
 terval of the oligarchic revolution, the war was e J} d f 
 & the war. 
 
 always vigorously supported by the government 1 . 
 The preponderance of the war party was due to two 
 causes, which I have discussed above. On the 
 one hand the social changes brought about by a 
 long-continued war had altered the composition and 
 relative strength of the different parties 2 , and on 
 the other the Athenians realized the importance of 
 the war to Athens and to Greece, and were obsti- 
 nately determined not to give way 3 . During the 
 oligarchy of 411 three embassies were sent to Sparta, 
 but with this exception the policy of resistance to 
 the last was invariably maintained. The Spartan 
 proposals were rejected whenever they were offered 4 , 
 and even after the crushing and hopeless defeat of 
 Aegospotami the spirit of the Athenians was not 
 broken, they refused every suggestion of concession 
 and only yielded to the inevitable necessities of 
 famine. 
 
 1 The peace party, although in a minority, was not extinct. 
 Its existence may be traced in Diod. xiii. 53, where he says that 
 some Athenians advocated the acceptance of the Spartan propo- 
 sals after Cyzicus. 
 
 2 See above, p. 94. 
 
 3 See above, p. 118. 
 
 4 In 413 (Thuc. vii. 18), 410 (Diod. xiii. 53), 408 (See Gilbert, 
 Beitrage, pp. 3612), 406 (Schol. to Ar. Ran. 1533), 405. The 
 proposals of 408 and 406 do not rest on good authority and are 
 open to doubt ; see Grote viii. p. 1 for the latter. 
 
 92 
 
132 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 Final con- Finally this survey of political events strengthens 
 three important conclusions which I have already 
 accepted on somewhat insufficient evidence. In the 
 first place we may conclude that the conditions of 
 political life at Athens were normal, that there was 
 \- a balance of political forces which practically re- 
 sulted in party government. There were regular 
 principles of party division; parties were distinctly 
 and not unequally divided, and they sought to obtain 
 official power in order to carry their principles into 
 ' effect. In the second place the great cause of party 
 division was not the preference which men had for 
 particular constitutional forms, but the one great 
 political question which overshadowed all others. 
 During the whole war, except for an interval of four 
 months, the democratic constitution was maintained, , 
 almost without modification 1 ; but the contest about 
 war and peace was never suspended, the advocates of 
 the rival policies were always confronting each other, 
 and enjoyed in turn success or failure. Lastly the 
 resolution of the Athenians to make no terms with 
 Sparta rose, as their prospects of victory became 
 more distant 2 and as their losses and sufferings were 
 
 1 Reforms limiting the powers of the democracy were intro- 
 duced in 413 (see above p. 96), and after the overthrow of the 
 oligarchy full democracy was not immediately restored (see p. 97) ; 
 but these modifications were due to exceptional circumstances and 
 were merely temporary. 
 
 2 The two critical disasters in the latter part of the war were- 
 the defeats in Sicily and at Aegospotami. After the first edoicei 
 XPV VCU M v8i6vcu (Thuc. viii. 1); and after the second the 
 Athenians immediately prepared for a siege, and as time went on 
 in spite of famine ov dieXtyovro irepi didWayrjs (Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 4 
 and ii. 2. 11). 
 
CONCLUSION. 133 
 
 every day aggravated. We may therefore conclude 
 that the general determination of a majority of the 
 citizens to carry the struggle to a decisive end was 
 founded not on a calculation of personal interest but 
 on political convictions. It was recognized that the 
 power of Athens and her dominion over other states, 
 even her independent existence, depended on a suc- 
 cessful issue of the war. It is the merit of the de- 
 mocratic party that from the first they realized the 
 tremendous interests involved in the war and never 
 swerved in their resolve to defend those interests 
 without concession. And they must not be con- 
 demned for the result ; the duel for the supremacy 
 between Athens and Sparta was a life and death 
 struggle, and it was impossible for Athens, at least, 
 to draw back. 
 
 "The Peloponnesian war was begun by Sparta 
 under vain pretexts and with guilty conscience ; but 
 the Athenians themselves do not deny that for years 
 before they had gathered all their forces together and 
 braced themselves for a decisive contest. And the 
 moral responsibility for the war, in which this glori- 
 ous nation consumed itself, Athens must bear. She 
 can bear the burden, for national unity is a treasure 
 on which a nation may stake its existence, and for 
 the sake of the Hellenes it Avas the duty of Athens 
 to fight the Dorians to the death. It was, therefore, 
 no vulgar ambition, no purposeless beating of the air, 
 when Athens undertook and carried on this war with 
 all her forces and with unexampled self-sacrifice ; and 
 he who understands this will admire the Athenians 
 more in misfortune than prosperity. 
 
134 POLITICAL PARTIES IN ATHENS. 
 
 " We do not quarrel with history. The doom of 
 Athens was inevitable and not undeserved. But yet 
 it was the conquered cause that pleased the gods; 
 and we, mortals of a later day, cannot reflect without 
 regret on the fall of this wondrous nation, which 
 nature meant for the political ideal but nature 
 missed the mark 1 ." 
 
 1 This passage is adapted from the concluding words of 
 Wilamowitz's Festrede "Von des attischen Eeiches Herrlichkeit " 
 (Aus Kydathen, pp. 44 5). He lays more stress on the claim of 
 Athens to dominion over the other Greeks than I have done ; but 
 the passage seems on the whole so true that it may fairly be 
 quoted in support of my argument. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Eeferences in all cases are to Athenian politics and institutions. 
 
 Agriculture, majority of population 
 engaged in, 40 ; ruined by the war, 
 94, 112 
 
 Alcibiades, prosecuted by Thessa- 
 lus, 11; eager for military com- 
 mand, 53; compared with Peri- 
 cles, 56; career of, 57; aims 
 of, 59; attached to the demo- 
 cracy, 60; connection of, with 
 doubling of the tribute, 73; ad- 
 vocates Argive alliance, 76, 130; 
 proposes Sicilian expedition, 78, 
 131 ; banishment of, 90 ; and the 
 mutilation of the Hermae, 90, 
 n. 3 ; at the battle of Mantinea, 
 130 
 
 Allies, see Confederacy; subjection 
 of, to Athens, 26 ff. ; treatment 
 of, by democrats, 72, 93 ; by the 
 middle party, 100 ; proposals of 
 Aristophanes with regard to, 100 
 
 Andocides and Athenian history, 10 
 
 Androcles, demagogue and general, 
 53; helps to overthrow Alcibi- 
 ades, 57, 90; on the council, 63 
 
 Argos, relations of, to Athens and 
 
 Sparta, 33; alliance of, with 
 Athens, 76, 130 
 
 Aristocratic party at Athens breaks 
 up, 37 
 
 Aristophanes and political history, 
 5 ; political prejudice of, 6 ; 
 attacked by Cleon, 6; paradox 
 and exaggeration in works of, 6 ; 
 his character of Cleon, 6, 8 ; his 
 treatment of Pericles, 7; advo- 
 cates a definite and consistent 
 policy, 98 ff. ; proposals of, for 
 confederation, 100; feeling of, 
 for Hellenic unity, 101 ; recog- 
 nises the danger from Persia, 102 
 
 Aristotle, as an authority on Athe- 
 nian politics, 10 ; political views 
 of, 10 n. 1 ; on necessity of demo- 
 cracy in a large city, 14 n. 1; 
 definition of extreme democracy 
 by, 18 n. 2 
 
 Army, The, numbers of hoplites in, 
 41, 108 ; pay of, 43 
 
 Assembly, The, all power vested in, 
 16, 17, 121; control of magis- 
 trates by, 16; control of all 
 
136 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 branches of government by, 18; 
 direct power of, 18 ; demagogues 
 in, 62; importance of oratory in, 
 62; not dominated by the mob, 
 124 ; struggle of parties in, 125 
 Athens, as a commercial and mari- 
 time power, 14, 24; almost an 
 island, 15 n. 1 ; as a power in 
 Greece, 24; absolute dominion 
 of sea held by, 25 n. 1 : and the 
 confederacy, 25; relation of, to 
 her subjects, 26; contributed more 
 than the allies, 75 n. 3 ; and Ar- 
 gos, 33, 76 ; existence of, at stake 
 in the war, 117 ; responsible for 
 the war, 133 
 
 Chios, faithful to Athens even under 
 an oligarchy, 32 n. 1; harshly 
 treated by the democrats, 72 
 
 Cimon, 37 n. 3 ; policy of, 101 
 
 Classes, relation of, to political par- 
 ties, 39, 45 ; effects of war on, 115 
 
 Cleon, whitewashed by Grote, 3 n. 4 ; 
 description of, by Thucydides, 5 ; 
 attacks of, on Aristophanes, 6; 
 as represented by Aristophanes, 
 6 ; made known to us by Thucy- 
 dides and Aristophanes, 11; mem- 
 ber of the trading class, 49 n. 1 ; 
 as general, 53; on the council, 
 63; and finance, 64; raises di- 
 cast's fee, 70; follows Pericles in 
 foreign policy, 72 ; responsible for 
 raising the tribute, 73; attacked 
 by oligarchs, 89 ; in the Equites, 
 98 n. 2; defeat of, made peace 
 possible, 129 
 
 Cleophon, demagogue and general, 
 53; interest of, in finance, re- 
 moved by the oligarchs, 88 
 
 Confederacy, The, held together by 
 democratic feeling, 15; most sea 
 powers included in, 25 n. 2; 
 source of Athenian power, 25, 30, 
 71; change in the relations of 
 Athens to, 25 nn. 3 6; affairs 
 of, controlled by Athens, 26 ; tri- 
 bute of, 27 (see Tribute); com- 
 pulsory jurisdiction within, 27; 
 attachment of democrats to, 30 ; 
 practically a voluntary league, 30 ; 
 hostility of oligarchs to, 31 ; ne- 
 cessity of, to Athenian democracy, 
 32; policy of Pericles with re- 
 gard to, 71 ; treatment of, by de- 
 mocrats, 72 
 
 Constitution, The Athenian, author- 
 ship of work on, 8 n. 2 ; uncer- 
 tainty of our knowledge of, 12 ; 
 extreme democracy, 14; princi- 
 ples of, 15 n. 3; laws of, re- 
 garded as sacred, 18 n. 1; threat- 
 ened by the war, 34, 118; defence 
 of, by the democrats, 69; de- 
 pended on the sovereignty of 
 law, 79 ; hostility of oligarchs to, 
 85 ; attitude of middle party to, 
 95; maintained throughout the 
 war, 132 
 
 Com Supply, 112; how affected by 
 the war, 113 n. 4 
 
 Council, The, powers of, 17; pay 
 of, 44 ; demagogues on, 63 
 
 Demagogues, party agents of the de- 
 mocracy, 51; the chief, 51 (see 
 Trpoararns) ; the lesser, 60 ; ob- 
 jects of, 62 ; in the assembly, 62 ; 
 on the council, 63 : concerned 
 with finance, 63; prosecution of 
 magistrates by, 64; prosecution 
 
INDEX. 
 
 137 
 
 of suspected oligarchs by 65 ; 
 prosecution of allies by, 66 ; sup- 
 posed interests of, in the war, 
 105; supposed terrorism exer- 
 cised by, 124 
 
 Democracy, original authorities un- 
 favourable to the Athenian, 3 
 n. 3 ; a necessity at Athens, 14 ; 
 bond of union between Athens 
 and the allies, 32; a cause of 
 war, 33; a cause of party divi- 
 sion, 35 ; and tyranny, 54, 55 ; 
 restored at Athens by Alcibiades, 
 58, 69 n. 1 
 
 Democrats, The, principles of policy 
 of, 34, 68 ; policy of, opposed by 
 the middle party, 36 ; triumph 
 of, during the fifth century, 37 ; 
 as a political party, 38 ; and the 
 poorer classes, 45 ; titles applied 
 to, 47, 48 n. 2 ; largely composed 
 of poorer classes, 49 ; leaders of, 
 usually men of wealth, 49; 
 strength of, 50 ; organization of, 
 50 ; supposed degeneracy of, 67 ; 
 objects of, 68 ; defence of demo- 
 cracy by, 69; and the dicast's 
 fee, 70 ; foreign policy of, 71 ; 
 treatment of the allies by, 72; 
 war policy of, 75 ; plan of war 
 recommended by, 76; their po- 
 licy consistent, 78; and the 
 allies, 99 ; resolve of, to carry 
 on the war, 105, 118, 133 ; sup- 
 posed interest of, in the war, 
 105 
 
 Demophantus, as a demagogue, 61 
 
 Demosthenes, supporter of the war 
 policy, 118 
 
 Demostratus, and the Sicilian expe- 
 dition, 11, 61 
 
 Diodorus, and Athenian history, 
 10 
 
 Diodotus, leader of the moderate 
 party, 11 ; on the revolt of the 
 allies, 32 n. 1 ; treatment of the 
 allies advocated by, 100 
 
 Dicasts, irresponsible, 16 ; in theory 
 all Athenians, 16 ; pay of, 44 ; 
 pay of, necessary to system of 
 popular jurisdiction, 70 ; increase 
 of pay of, 70 ; total expenditure 
 on, 70 n. 1 ; pay of, abolished in 
 411, 70 ; pay of, restored, 71 
 
 Elff<popd, imposed during the war, 
 
 73 ; amount of, 74 
 ''EirixeipoTovia, 12 n. 3, 16 n. 5 
 
 ''ETTlffKOTTOL, 27 
 
 Eucrates, member of the trading 
 class, 49 n. 1 ; Trpoffrarvs, 51 n. 4; 
 general, 53 
 
 Finance, managed by the Council, 
 17; supervision of, undertaken 
 by the demagogues, 63 ; import- 
 ance of, to Athens, 108 ; history 
 of, during the war, 109 
 
 Four Hundred, The, established by 
 means of terrorism, 69 ; institu- 
 tion of, formally legal, 87; il- 
 legal rule of, 87; connection of 
 middle party with, 95, 96 
 
 Foreign policy, importance of, 24 ; 
 of the democrats, 71 ; of the 
 middle party, 101 
 
 Generals, The, powers of, 19; chief 
 executive magistrates, 19 ; politi- 
 cal importance of, 20, 121 ; theory 
 of differences of rank among, 
 20 (see Trpiravis twv ffTparvyuiv) ; 
 
138 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 office of, often held by dema- 
 gogues, 53; evdwcu and doKLfia- 
 cria of, 55 n. 2 ; frequent prosecu- 
 tions of, 64 ; importance of elec- 
 tion of, 122 ; time and method 
 of election of, 122 n. 1 ; lists of, 
 123 
 
 Hellenotamiae, financial business 
 of, 19 ; probably elected, 19 n. 1 j 
 presidents of, 22 n. 5 
 
 Hermae, Mutilation of, possibly an 
 oligarchic plot, 86 ; effects of, 90 
 n. 3 
 
 'Ercupetcu, especially adopted by the 
 oligarchs, 83; not confined to 
 one party, 84 n. 2 ; usually sepa- 
 rate, 84 n. 5 ; often took com- 
 mon action, 85 
 
 Hyperbolus, ostracism of, 4 n. 1, 57; 
 description of, in Thucydides, 5 ; 
 member of the trading class, 49 
 n. 1 ; as a demagogue, 61 ; on the 
 council, 63 
 
 Lamachus, supporter of the war 
 policy, 118 
 
 Laiv Courts, special sphere of the 
 demagogues, 66 ; open to politi- 
 cal appeals, 67 n. 1 ; necessity of 
 pay in, 70 
 
 Legislation, method of, 12 nn. 2, 3; 
 conducted by vofxodhcu, 16 
 
 Lesbos, revolt of caused by oligarchs, 
 32 n. 1 
 
 Lysias and Athenian history, 10 
 
 Lysicles, member of the trading 
 class, 49 n. 1 ; as general, 53 
 
 Magistrates, the executive power, 
 16 ; controlled by assembly, 16 ; 
 
 appointed by lot, 19; others by 
 election, 19 ; usually formed 
 boards of ten with a president, 
 22 n. 5 
 Melos attacked by Athens, 26, 72 
 Middle Party, The, formed the 
 chief opposition to the democrats, 
 36, 92 ; rise of, 37 ; distinct from 
 both democrats and oligarchs, 
 38 : and the middle class, 45 ; no 
 distinctive title of, 92 n. 1 ; chief- 
 ly supported by the middle class, 
 93 ; history of, during the war, 
 93; organized by Nicias, 94; 
 broken up during the years of 
 peace, 95 ; usually loyal to the 
 constitution, 95 ; included some 
 moderate oligarchs, 95; and re- 
 forms of government, 96 ; advo- 
 cates of compromise, 97, 103 ; 
 and the allies, 100 ; Aristophanes 
 as a representative of, 103 ; atti- 
 tude of, to the war, 119 
 
 Nicias, made known to us by 
 Thucydides and Aristophanes, 
 11 ; organizes the opposition, 38 ; 
 and Alcibiades, 57 ; opposes the 
 Sicilian expedition, 78 ; to blame 
 for its failure, 78 n. 1 ; organizes 
 the middle party, 93; policy of, 
 discredited, 93 ; opposition of, to 
 the democratic policy, 98 ; philo- 
 Spartan, 101 ; peace of, 117, 129 
 
 NofModerai, 12 n. 3 ; 16 n. 4 
 
 Oligarchs, The, connection of, with 
 oligarchs in other states, 31 n. 1 ; 
 generally kept in the background, 
 36 ; and the other political parties, 
 39 ; and the rich, 45, 81 n. 2 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 139 
 
 titles applied to, 47, 48 ; and 
 Alcibiades, 58 ; prosecuted by the 
 demagogues, 65 ; deficiency of our 
 information on, 79 ; and the phi- 
 losophic movement, 79 ; a dis- 
 loyal faction, 80 n. 3; treason- 
 able objects of, 81, 83 ; history 
 of, during the fifth century, 82 ; 
 secret organization of, in erat- 
 peccu, 83; hostility of, to the con- 
 stitution, 85 ; anarchists and 
 traitors, 86 ; and the revolution 
 of 411, 87; treachery of, at 
 Aegospotami, 87; alliance of, 
 with Lysander, 87 ; criminal ac- 
 tion of, 87 ; often disguised as 
 democrats, 88 ; secret attacks on 
 the democracy, 88, 91 ; share of, 
 in banishment of Alcibiades, 90 ; 
 and the trial of the generals in 
 406, 91 ; worked for the break up 
 of the confederacy, 100 ; anxious 
 for peace at any price, 119 
 
 Oligarchs in the Confederacy, 
 brought to trial at Athens, 29, 
 66 ; treachery of, 30 ; discontent 
 of, 31 ; connection between, in the 
 different states, 31 ; disloyal to 
 Athens, 31, 32 n. 1, 66 
 
 Oligarchy, as a cause of the war, 
 33 ; as a cause of party division, 
 35 
 
 Party Government, existence of, 
 appears in election of generals, 
 121; existence of, proved by 
 changes of policy and magis- 
 trates, 123, 128 ; resulted from a 
 balance of political forces, 131 
 
 Peloponnesian War, The, impor- 
 tance of the period of, 1 ; all states 
 
 of Greece involved in, 1 ; neces 
 sary to maintain the alliance, 33 ; 
 forced on by Sparta, 33 ; a wai 
 of political principles, 33, 34 ; as 
 a cause of party division, 36 ; 
 the test question of politics, 104, 
 121 ; interests of classes in, 
 104 ; effect of, on population, 
 107 ; effect of, on finance, 109 ; 
 effect of, on agriculture, 112; 
 effect of, on trade, 114 ; general 
 effects of, 115; effect of, on the 
 different classes, 115 ff. ; ques- 
 tions at stake in, 117; attitude 
 of the different parties to, 118 
 ff. ; different periods of, 128 ff.; 
 general determination of Athe- 
 nians to carry on, 133 
 
 Pericles, ascendency of, 1, 37; con- 
 demned by Aristophanes, 7 ; re- 
 deemed by Thucydides, 7 ; made 
 known to us by Thucydides and 
 Aristophanes, 11 ; endeavour of, 
 to make Athens a sea power, 14 ; 
 on the Athenian constitution, 15 
 n. 3 ; victory of, over Cimon, 37 ; 
 irpoaTdT-rjs and general, 53 ; per- 
 sonal government of, 56 ; com- 
 pared with Alcibiades, 56 ; and 
 finance, 64 ; successors of, 68 ; 
 political principles of, 69 ; foreign 
 policy recommended by, 71 ; over- 
 throw of, brought about by ex- 
 treme democrats and oligarchs, 
 89 
 
 Persia, war with, Cimon's policy, 
 101 ; advantage of, from the war, 
 102 ; communication of Athens 
 and Sparta with, 102 ; allied with 
 Sparta against Athens, 118 
 
 $povpapx<><; 27 
 
140 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Phrynichus, work on the Athenian 
 Constitution ascribed to, 8 n. 2 
 
 Pisander, as a demagogue, 61; pos- 
 sibly a disguised oligarch, 90, 
 n. 3 
 
 Plutarch and Athenian history, 10 
 
 Political Parties, uncertainty and 
 difference of opinion on, 12 ; di- 
 vided by political principles, 35 ; 
 divided by questions of the day, 
 36 ; three in number, 38 ; com- 
 position of, 39, 45; struggle of, 
 throughout the war, 121, 125, 
 
 128 ; fairly matched in first part 
 of war, 128 ; government shared 
 between, during peace of Nicias, 
 
 129 ; division of, based on regular 
 principles, 132 
 
 Politics, Athenian, importance and 
 difficulty of study of, 2 ; inade- 
 quacy and bias of original au- 
 thorities on, 2, 3 ; old view of, 2 ; 
 Grote's view of, 3 ; present esti- 
 mate, 3; no continuous history 
 of, 10 ; foreign politics more im- 
 portant than home, 24; false 
 theory of, 123 ff. 
 
 Population of Attica, at the begin- 
 ning of the war, 40 ; numbers of 
 different classes of, 41 ; decline 
 of, owing to the war, 107 
 
 HopiaTal, 64 n. 2 
 
 Hp6j3oiAoi, appointed in 413, 16 
 n. 1, 96 ; not directly mentioned 
 by Thucydides, 64 n. 2 
 
 Hpoo-TaTrjs tov dr/fiov, chief dema- 
 gogue, 51 ; position of not offi- 
 cial, 51; Grote's theory of, 52; 
 not "leader of the opposition," 
 52 ; often held military command, 
 53 ; did not often take the field, 
 
 54 ; position open to, if also gene- 
 ral, 54 
 
 ILpvTavis r<2v (rrpaTrrycou, theory of, 
 20 ; evidence for existence of, 21 
 n. 1, 22 nn., 23 nn. ; importance 
 of office of, 24 ; combination of 
 powers of, with political influ- 
 ence, 55 
 
 tyrjcpKr/jia, special weapon of the 
 demagogue, 62 ; 98 n. 2 
 
 Sicilian Expedition, The, advocated 
 by Alcibiades, 57; part of the 
 democratic policy, 77 ; motives 
 of Athenians in undertaking, 77 ; 
 cause of failure of, 78 n. 1 ; ex- 
 haustion of treasury consequent 
 on, 111 ; regarded as a commer- 
 cial investment, 114; altered the 
 situation of Athens, 117; advo- 
 cated by Alcibiades, 131 
 
 Socrates, and the Athenian Consti- 
 tution, 80 n. 1 ; objection of, to 
 the lot, 96 n. 1 
 
 Sophists, The, and the Athenian 
 Constitution, 80 n. 1 
 
 Sparta, professions of, in under- 
 taking the war, 27 n. 3 ; supports 
 oligarchs against Athens, 31 nn. 
 1, 2; objects of, in forcing on the 
 war, 33, 117 ; and Argos, 33, 76 ; 
 allied with Persia and Syracuse, 
 118 ; to blame for beginning the 
 war, 133 
 
 State Pay, importance of, exagge- 
 rated, 42, 45; condemned by 
 Aristophanes, 98 
 
 Themistocles, efforts of, to make 
 
 Athens a sea power, 14 
 Thera, Athens seeks to gain, 26, 72 
 Theramenes, probable treachery of, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 141 
 
 in 404, 87 ; breaks with the oli- 
 garchs, 97 ; ideal of government 
 of, 97 n. 2 
 
 Thessalus, prosecutor of Alcibiades, 
 11, 57, 90 
 
 Thirty, The, violent rule of, 87 n. 2; 
 and the middle party, 97 
 
 Thucydides, son of Olorus, as an 
 historian, 4 ; avoids home poli- 
 tics, 4 ; bias of, 5 ; treatment of 
 Antiphon, Hyperbolus and Cleon 
 by, 5 ; does not distinguish poli- 
 tical parties by name, 92 n. 1 
 
 Thucydides, son of Melesias, orga- 
 nizes the opposition, 37 ; is os- 
 tracized, 37 
 
 Thudippus and the increase of tri- 
 bute, 11, 51, 73 
 
 Trade, Athenian, depended on em- 
 pire of sea, 32; conditions of, 
 
 113 ; how affected by the war, 
 114 
 
 Tribute of Confederacy , a necessity, 
 27 ; raised and administered by 
 Athenian officers, 27 ; amount of, 
 at beginning of the war, 72 n. 2 ; 
 doubled in 425, 73; amount of, 
 not excessive, 74 ; original assess- 
 ment of, 74 n. 1 ; reduction of, 
 at different times, 75 n. 1 ; change 
 in method of levying, 75 n. 2 ; as 
 a source of Athenian revenue, 
 110 
 
 Trierarchy, a burden on the rich, 
 82 ; duty of, divided, 116 
 
 Xenophon, contributions of, to his- 
 tory of Athenian politics, 5 ; 
 work on Athenian constitution 
 ascribed to, 8 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
APR 
 Lo 
 
 LOAN DEPT 
 
 i^-b&i W5,t*S - date due. 
 
 _l___j^JOjimmed iare reca]1 
 
 f 
 
 ~?Ennsrnbn*-nT-mit ^ 
 
 oSSSfejsaa, 
 
 General library 
 
A, 
 
 y 
 
 
 u 
 
 ' 1 
 
 1 0942;