GDWARD J. MGHC 
 
* 
 

 BADGER'S STUDIES IN SCIENCE 
 
 THE HIGHER USEFULNESS OF 
 SCIENCE 
 
 By William Emerson Ritter 
 
 THE UNITY OF THE ORGANISM 
 
 By William Emerson Ritter 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF SCIENCE 
 
 By Edward J. Menge 
 
 THE PROBABLE INFINITY OF 
 NATURE AND LIFE 
 
 By William Emerson Ritter 
 
 RICHARD G. BADGER, PUBLISHER, BOSTON 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF 
 SCIENCE 
 
 Biologically and Psychologically Considered 
 
 . By 
 
 EDWARD J. MENGE, M.A., PH.D., M.Sc. 
 
 Professor of Biology in the University of Dallas 
 Author of "Backgrounds for Social Workers" 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 THE GORHAM PRESS 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1918, BY RICHARD G. BADGER 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Made in the United States of America 
 
 The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 
 
TO 
 
 MY WIFE 
 
 WHOSE CONSTANT ENCOURAGEMENT 
 AND NEVER-WAVERING CONFIDENCE 
 HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF THE 
 AUTHOR'S MOST FRUITFUL STUDIES 
 
 / *<* f } t* *v o 
 
 <L U J V i 
 
PREFACE 
 
 IT is now some ten years since the need of a volume in non- 
 technical language, describing the relationship between 
 Philosophy and the Laboratory Sciences, was brought home 
 to the author, and with the end in view of filling that need, 
 he began the series of studies which have made this book 
 possible. 
 
 Six of the chapters have already appeared in print in the 
 University of Dallas Quarterly Bulletins during the past 
 few years, while much of the remaining material has been 
 used in class-room and public lectures. 
 
 Students from all schools have seemed so one-sided in their 
 viewpoint, that the desire to make them realize that many 
 varying conclusions may often be drawn from the same facts, 
 with just as much validity, has led to the often repeated 
 stressing of this fact throughout these pages; and, having 
 noticed that most students lose the thread of their reading 
 when too many foot-notes are employed, we have tried, where- 
 ever possible, to embody what is usually placed in foot-notes, 
 in the main portion of the paragraph. 
 
 Contrary to most volumes written on any subject, we have 
 tried to present both sides when there were two, or more 
 should that be the case. We have likewise tried to show where 
 much error may be found in the teaching of both high-school 
 and college students, in that not sufficient stress is laid on 
 the all-important difference between FACTS and INTER- 
 PRETATIONS on the varying and often contradictory be- 
 liefs of writers on Evolutionary Science on the deplorable 
 
 9 
 
10 Preface 
 
 lack of logical and philosophical thinking on the fallacy of 
 permitting the student to assume that because an hypothesis 
 A is necessary for experimental purposes, it must be true ; and 
 that because every teacher in a given school may uphold a 
 doctrine, it does not follow that all men hold it, for the head 
 of the department usually employs only those teachers who 
 think along similar lines, or very often are the result of 
 his own training, they having been his own pupils. 
 
 W. H. Mallock has well said that the laboratory man has 
 had to go to school to philosophy, and it is this point we 
 wish to emphasize more than any other. 
 
 We have therefore tried to present NECESSARY STUDIES, 
 which must form the foundation of any vab'd inter- 
 pretation of any facts found, by placing a goodly list 
 of books and articles in our chapter on "Suggested Read- 
 ings" that will bring home the ideas expressed in this Preface 
 and permit a far more comprehensive knowledge of LIFE in 
 general than any course or courses the average student is 
 likely to get at any institution, unless he specialize for many 
 years. 
 
 In other words, the object and aim of the author has been 
 % to show what is necessary for a broad, logical, and clear- 
 cut view of Life; what theories are held by able men in all 
 v the various walks of life; where and how they agree and 
 where and how they do not agree to give perspective. 
 
 Great pains have been taken to make every statement, date 
 and reference accurate, but should any errors have crept in, 
 the author will consider it a favor to have his attention 
 called to them. 
 
 Thanks are due to all the members of the faculty of the 
 
 University of Dallas for their ready assistance and kindli- 
 
 \ ness, but especially to the Reverend Peter P. Finney, C.M., 
 
 Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, whose kindly suggestions 
 
Preface 11 
 
 and wide knowledge in his chosen field have been of untold 
 assistance. 
 
 Thanks are also due to my assistant, Mr. Fred Rich,, 
 B,A., for the careful drawings he has made for these pages. 
 
 EDWARD J. MENGE 
 
 University of Dallas, Texas. 
 
 April 6, 1917. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES . , . . . 15 
 
 II. PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORIES . . . SO 
 
 III. GENETICS . . * . . . , , 47 
 
 IV. METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY . . . , 66 
 V. LOGIC . . . . . . ; .>.-' * . 84 
 
 VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OP EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSO- 
 PHY . * :.'. . . . ' 1 * 99 
 
 VII. THEORIES OF EVOLUTION . . . . ' 119 
 
 VIII. VITALISM . . . . . . . .151 
 
 IX. THE IDEAL . . . . . . . . 187 
 
 X. AUTHORITIES .' . . . . . . 196 
 
 XI. SUAIMARY ,. . . . * . . v 220 
 
 XII. SUGGESTED READING . . . . ., 231 
 
 INDEX . 245 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF 
 SCIENCE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES 
 
 The Reason for Their Existence 
 
 MORE and more the classics are being neglected for 
 the modern scientific courses : class-room is converted 
 into laboratory and the subjects of interest to a past gen- 
 eration of college men and women seem to have gone from 
 the halls of learning and left in their stead but echoes 
 echoes which are ever and ever growing fainter until some- 
 times it seems that even they will shortly cease. And then 
 come the questions: "Why has the college and high-school 
 curriculum so changed?" and "Of what value are the new 
 studies?" Questions which ever and ever become more in- 
 sistent in their demand for an adequate answer. 
 
 The student, when challenged, quite naturally wishes to 
 defend himself, but how often he fails we know too well ; men 
 and women, though long since away from the class-room, who 
 yet find their interests along scientific lines and possess that 
 faculty of wanting to know a "why" for everything ; parents 
 who cannot understand why their children should not pass 
 through the same training as did they ; and that great mass 
 of boys and girls who find themselves unable to attend any 
 
 15 
 
16 , The Beginnings of Science 
 
 of our schools of higher learning, but spend their leisure 
 moments in working, and dreaming, and yearning for the 
 time when better things await them, and who now treasure 
 every scrap of scientific wisdom and fact, but, who, unable 
 to explain the practical value of it all, find heartaches which 
 so often come from being condemned and misunderstood by 
 those at home for all these this little volume is written, and 
 it is hoped that what is herein contained, may stimulate to 
 efforts along lines that will make its readers capable of 
 knowing "WHY." 
 
 It is well at the outset, to bear in mind that practically 
 every discussion has at least two sides, and often many more. 
 An example that comes to mind is the public library. There 
 are those who insist that the object of a library must be to 
 furnish those particular books which people wish to read; 
 yet certainly something may be said for those who believe 
 that only a few of the wished-for volumes should be kept, 
 and these but incidentally only in order that they may lead 
 men and women to wish for those that are really worth-while 
 just as an introduction to the literature that means some- 
 thing that has been written in the sweat and blood of the 
 great and wondrous of all ages and whose pages throb with 
 life, and show that human nature is ever the same ; that the 
 same hopes, the same longings, the same loves and hates, the 
 same sorrows, and the same bitterness as well as the same 
 contentment and glory have ever been with us all may it 
 not be that the latter school have some right to their view 
 also? 
 
 In the educational world, the two schools may be said to 
 consist of those who believe in "culture" for its own sake, 
 and those who, being more in harmony with their time, insist 
 on "usefulness." The former believe that men and women 
 who have had the opportunities of gathering that which is 
 
Biological Laboratories 17 
 
 best in the world mentally, should form a class by themselves, 
 and by their higher standards and ideals, cause others to 
 follow; the latter, that, as most pupils leave school some- 
 where around the sixth grade, and but one out of every hun- 
 dred enters college, our educational system should be made 
 to fit the many, thereby making them better able to cope 
 with their fellows in the economic struggle. 
 
 It would seem that the very fact of these two extremes 
 being defended, there might be something said as to a third 
 school, which should attempt a happy medium, and try to 
 give what culture it could, yet not neglect the "bread and 
 butter side." 
 
 From a purely reasonable viewpoint, the proper way of 
 overcoming the difficulty would be to adopt something of the 
 German method, and assign the different children to different 
 schools those who are to enter the cultural fields taking one 
 course, and those who are not, another, but the difficulties 
 attending any reasonable adjustment are self-evident in a 
 democracy, for no parent would be willing to say that his 
 sons or daughters attended the "common" schools while his 
 neighbor's attended one of the "cultural" type. And then, 
 further, it necessitates the parent's choosing what career his 
 child shall follow, and should the child himself later have 
 something to say in opposition to the parental idea, the two 
 schools would not lend themselves very well to an exchange 
 of credits for actual work done. 
 
 But there may be a slight unbending on the part of both 
 parties, and the new entries into the curriculum are the re- 
 sult of such unbending. French and German as well as 
 Spanish have found a place side by side with the classical 
 Latin and Greek, and the natural sciences with their labora- 
 tory work, as well as the vocational studies, have shown us 
 that sojnething quite practical can be accomplished, while 
 
18 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 yet holding to ideals that are not low. 
 
 There is little objection to the modern languages, but 
 every once in a while anathemas are hurled against the 
 laboratory and the shop; not that these in themselves are 
 bad, but that they do not do the work so well as could be 
 done under trained hands after leaving school and at much 
 less expense, and because the laboratory tends toward a one- 
 sidedness and toward a materialistic bias that is not pleasant 
 for those who look to other ideals. 
 
 But it must not be forgotten that to mankind at large the 
 most positive and satisfactory evidence possible, is "to see" 
 actually to have the thing to be studied and understood, 
 placed before one, felt, and handled, and seen for with "see- 
 ing" and at least one additional sense being brought into 
 service, such as touch, the evidence is supposed to be con- 
 clusive, and from that moment the individual's faith in the 
 correctness of his belief is unshaken. 
 
 The laboratory has taken advantage of this sensible evi- 
 dence; in fact, that is the laboratory's justification. It 
 furnishes understandable evidence for the thing the instruc- 
 tor wishes to prove (sometimes, seemingly a great deal more 
 as well, but we are only speaking of the facts found, and not 
 the interpretations that may be drawn from these laboratory 
 findings), by actual handling and personal observation. It 
 forces each student to visualize the things studied; to call 
 his attention to the wonderful world that he has daily passed 
 unseen, until his eye has been trained to note the minutest 
 detail; to understand that the so-called big things of life 
 are really but a very small part of life after all, and lastly, 
 it gives him the advantage over an opponent, in drawing his 
 examples and his proofs from actually existing things which 
 he himself has handled, and which by that very handling and 
 the personal conviction resulting therefrom, carry convic- 
 
Biological Laboratories 19 
 
 tion in their turn. 
 
 Now, if the only proof any of us are willing to accept is 
 laboratory proof (proof that the senses bring), it needs 
 must follow that for the philosopher as well as the natural 
 scientist, laboratory work is of greatest importance. We 
 are not suggesting, nor are we willing to maintain any such 
 thesis, that the laboratory alone is of greatest importance 
 in the curriculum, but we do insist that it is of the utmost 
 importance for the proper understanding of our modern 
 school system, and for the proper understanding of most of 
 our modern literature. 
 
 Laboratory-work means the class-work of the science- 
 student, and the laboratory is but the class-room fitted with 
 the modern equipment necessary for weighing and measuring, 
 for taking apart and analysing the various objects that are 
 to be studied. And by natural science we mean "knowledge 
 gained and verified by exact observation and correct think- 
 ing, especially when methodically formulated and arranged 
 in a rational system," * or as Professor Huxley put it, "clas- 
 sified common sense." It is the latter definition which will be 
 easier of remembrance than the one preceding it, and it is 
 a sufficient definition for most practical purposes. But the 
 point upon which we wish to lay especial emphasis is this, 
 that science consists of KNOWLEDGE which we have suc- 
 ceeded in forcing from nature by constant and close observa- 
 tion, and that then, we have taken the -facts thus -found and 
 through our intellect have formulated them into a system, 
 and read a meaning into them. So that were the writer asked 
 as to what studies should and must form a thorough back- 
 ground for any scientific training, he would unhesitatingly 
 say that Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics, after at 
 least a thorough understanding of the "problems of philos- 
 
 a Standard Dictionary. 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 
 ophy" had been mastered, are absolutely essential; for, cer- 
 tainly observation and laboratory-work mean but the gath- 
 ering of facts; then to use these facts in the classification of 
 ideas and thought processes, the laws of thought and of 
 knowledge must be known. And if these laws were more often 
 known than they now are, a wondrous mass of hopeless mis- 
 understanding, which results only on account of the loose- 
 ness of thought, and ignorance of Logic and First Principles 
 which underlie correct thinking, would be obviated. 
 
 That these problems of philosophy differ from those of 
 science, but are nevertheless built upon them, as a house of 
 brick must needs have a foundation of at least as solid a 
 material, is self-evident. Professor Hibben well expresses 
 the difference between these studies, and the reader can 
 readily see the necessity for them both to make a complete 
 man, by carefully weighing his words : "the problem of 
 philosophy differs from the problem of science. It is the 
 problem of science as John Stuart Mill puts it, Ho discover 
 what are the fewest number of phenomenal data, which being 
 granted, will explain the phenomena of experience.' Phi- 
 losophy probes deeper. It seeks to reveal the raison d'etre of 
 these fundamental data, and their relation to the thinking 
 self which observes them, and reasons about them, as well 
 as their relation to the power which constitutes and directs 
 their elemental energy. The philosopher should be the 
 'synoptic' man, one who sees the verities of life in their true 
 relations, properly co-ordinated and subordinated, and who 
 in particular pursuits, however absorbing, does not ignore 
 the unity of the whole, nor overlook the universal aspect 
 even of the commonplaces of life." 2 
 
 It is then the duty and the ultimate pursuit of the labora- 
 tory-student to gather facts, whether to substantiate a new 
 2 Problems of Philosophy, by John Grier Hibben (Scribner's). 
 
Biological Laboratories 1 
 
 theory or to break an old one, but it must always lie with the 
 philosopher who is familiar with the laws of thought and who, 
 like the general on the battle field, can stand on an eminence 
 and overlook the entire field of vision, rather than with him 
 who keeps his eye glued to the microscope, to give us the ac- 
 tual results in terms that are meaningful, though, even here 
 it is most essential that he who is the general must know the 
 work of all of his subalterns before he himself is competent 
 to pass such judgment. 
 
 It can be said, that any natural science teaches the student 
 the value and the necessity of the closest observation, so that 
 no detail escapes him, and alone can give him that sensible 
 proof for any statement he may make. This is its disciplin- 
 ary side and so ranks with mathematics and kindred dis- 
 ciplinary studies. 
 
 Now as to the practical value of natural science: we shall 
 take Biology as our example; not because it may be of 
 greater value than any other from this viewpoint, but be- 
 cause embracing as it does the entire study of everything 
 that possesses life, it covers a wider field, and is therefore 
 more applicable to what we are attempting. 
 
 Biology comes from the Greek words "Bios" and "Logos." 
 The former meaning "life" and the latter "a discourse" ; or 
 as we usually say, "ology" means "science of". So then, we 
 have Biology meaning the "science of life", that is, the study 
 of all living things, both plants and animals. In fact the 
 usual preliminary course in Biology consists of Botany (the 
 study of plant life) and Zoology (the study of animal life), 
 while under these headings we have as principal divisions, 
 such subjects as Anatomy (the study of every separate divi- 
 sion of the plant or animal body as displayed after death by 
 dissection), Physiology (the study of the functions of the 
 living plant or animal), Embryology (the study of the plant 
 
22 The Begmrwngs of Science 
 
 or animal from the moment of conception until the time it is 
 ready to lead a more or less independent existence as an in- 
 dividual), Taxonomy (the study of classification, so that 
 one may at a moment's notice know how to arrange any new 
 structure found, though never having seen it before), Path- 
 ology (the study of diseased tissues), Histology (the study 
 of the cellular structure of normal tissues), Bacteriology 
 (the study of minute plant life), Psychology (the study of 
 mental phenomena), and Sociology (the study of group for- 
 mation, or social organization). 
 
 Probably it will be readily acceded to, that for those who 
 study medicine, or follow similar lines of investigation, a 
 course in biology is and must be of supreme importance ; but 
 why should a man who is to become a lawyer or a merchant, 
 or any one of the host of other professions which our com- 
 plex life offers, spend time in mastering the details (for the 
 whole study is practically a mass of detail-work) of a science 
 which seemingly he cannot use in his chosen work? 
 
 The answer is, that as Biology is the study of all things 
 living, a knowledge of it is more than essential to a complete 
 understanding of oneself physically and mentally; in other 
 words a thorough knowledge of what Biology can present, 
 means that we have fulfilled the command, as completely as 
 it is possible to fulfill it, "Know Thyself." 
 
 All too often we forget that a chosen "career" is but the 
 outcome of what he who makes the "career" happens to be 
 physically and mentally it is but an expression of his Bio- 
 logical make-up, and surely, if this is true, it means much to 
 KNOW what the study of all things biological can show us 
 as to our weaknesses and our strength in everything we are, 
 or can be. And just as it is the knowledge of his engine that 
 makes a good engineer, it is the knowledge of himself that 
 makes the man who makes the "career". Is it any more un- 
 
Biological Laboratories 23 
 
 reasonable then, to suggest to each that he understand him- 
 self and know how he works (always using our terms to in- 
 clude both the physical and the mental) than it is to have 
 one who only knows how to pull a lever, handle an engine, and 
 suggest that if anything goes wrong, he call the doctor? Is 
 it any moVe unreasonable to ask a man to know what not to 
 do, so as to prevent misfortune occurring to himself, than it 
 is to insist on an engineer's knowledge of what is harmful to 
 his engine and thereby prevent misfortune? 
 
 Certain foods do not agree with some people. They learn 
 this from actual experience. This is nature's laboratory 
 method. To experiment on every detail of life would take 
 far more time than is given to any one man on earth, and 
 so instead of using nature's laboratory in this way and work- 
 ing out every detail, great numbers of men work on certain 
 problems for years and outline representative experiments 
 which may be performed by each individual, thereby giving 
 to each a sort of condensed experience of the world's life. 
 
 When it is realized that at least one-half of all deaths not 
 due to old age, are caused by plants, namely bacteria, it will 
 be seen that for any one not particularly caring to shorten 
 his life by one-half or more, it might prove of value to pay 
 at least a little attention to bacteriology. 
 
 One of the great German materialists said that a "man is 
 what he eats" and when we realize that there is very little 
 we eat except salt and water, that we do not get from plants, 
 even though these plants are first eaten by animals and 
 converted into meats, we get some idea of the importance of 
 what the study of plant-life might mean to us. 
 
 To the stock-breeder and the animal lover a knowledge of 
 the very fundamentals of life's process certainly must be of 
 value ; and to the agriculturist, the gardener, the rancher, 
 or the farmer, the reasons why plants thrive better in one 
 
24t The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 place than another, the reasons why disease kills crops and 
 prevents the mortgage from being absolved, Biology must 
 readily commend itself. 
 
 The merchant whose customers leave him because his sup- 
 ply of meat and eggs are not what is wanted, whose store's 
 appearance prevents the best customers from coming, might 
 quite readily learn the "why" of it all did he become inter- 
 ested in what Biology can tell him in this regard. 
 
 The family who has seen one after another of its members 
 droop from some supposedly inherited disease, constantly 
 adding to the list of preventable deaths, might realize what 
 it would have meant to them, had some member of the family 
 known a little about the subject. 
 
 And lastly for those who appreciate to the fullest, scrupu- 
 lous cleanliness, both mentally and bodily, there is some 
 satisfaction in knowing "why" they feel such pleasure. 
 
 But Biology has its drawbacks. Taught by those who 
 have had little or no philosophical training; who are inca- 
 pable of grasping deep and underlying factors which the 
 superficial never can grasp or understand, the great mass of 
 men and women take only the seen, and forget that "not to 
 see a thing" does not mean the same as "it isn't there." 
 There are a great many things we cannot see that are exist- 
 ent, as is so well exemplified by the fact that when the micro- 
 scope was invented thousands of objects were displayed to 
 the eye that up to that time had never been dreamed of, and 
 the microscope is very, very far from letting us see all there 
 is. Let us not then fall into so crass an error as denying 
 what cannot be seen. Let us rather put it more truthfully 
 and more scientifically, by saying "it has not been seen and 
 that is all we can say". 
 
 The unlike training of philosophical and scientific students 
 causes a breach that is difficult to overcome, for neither one 
 
Biological Laboratories 25 
 
 understands the other. Both sometimes forget that there 
 are minds which we might term "legal" whose possessors re- 
 quire an absolute law, definitely stated with no possibility of 
 an exception, or life is by no means sweet and perfect, while 
 to another type of mind, the impossibility of definite and 
 concentrated formulations causes that vague "feeling" that 
 things are as they should be, but, unable to defend these feel- 
 ings, their possessors cease in time even to care to defend 
 them, and assume that unless another feels the same way, 
 the idea of an explanation is absurd; while men of still an- 
 other type, realizing their own inability to delve deep and 
 long into a chosen study, and probably too, realizing their 
 own shortcomings in the possibility of making up their own 
 minds when the evidence may appear nearly equal on both 
 sides, insist on authority alone. 
 
 We have then, three types of mind to consider, the Legal, 
 the Emotional, and the Authority-seeking, and each of these 
 requires a separate manner of handling. They might all be- 
 lieve and hold the self-same doctrines and yet be hopelessly 
 at outs with each other because the same words carry differ- 
 ent meanings to each. 
 
 Of the three types mentioned, the average student is what 
 we have called the Authority-seeking. He is inclined to say 
 to himself, that so and so KNOWS and he will ask him. He 
 refuses to do his own thinking. If his physician tells him a 
 thing should be done, he supposes the physician knows, in- 
 stead of getting a reasonable explanation, and finding for 
 himself whether the rules of correct thinking and common 
 sense are being followed. 
 
 So in the lower school-grades the pupil is very definitely 
 told that a thing is either so or not so, as the case may be. 
 He is to believe without questioning. In high-school, some 
 thought is permitted, but not much; in college there is still 
 
86 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 a little more broadening out, and some one has said that 
 graduate work is for the sole purpose of learning that the 
 things one's previous instructors had taught were not so. 
 In other words, in graduate work, a man is supposed to have 
 the fundamentals of knowledge ; to know the laws of thought ; 
 to be able to detect fallacious reasoning, and to be able to 
 distinguish the false from the true, and consequently he is 
 given all the arguments for and against a given problem and 
 has to make up his own mind. Very often he may study with 
 the same master for years and yet not know what are this 
 instructor's personal views on a given subject. 
 
 It may be stated that the same person may be of the legal, 
 emotional and authority-seeking type of mind at the same 
 time, or possess any degree of any one or all of them, or in 
 his developmental period may be one for a time, gradually 
 going into one or both of the others, or he may have certain 
 prepossessions on which he thinks only emotionally while 
 using either of the other types of thought on all other sub- 
 jects. 
 
 It may be that one may have been perfectly satisfied with 
 the emotional state, that is, feel content to simply know what 
 one thinks is so, but being unable to tell others in clear-cut 
 language why the feeling of knowledge is there, and meet- 
 ing some one who has excellent and telling arguments against 
 the idea under discussion, the individual being unable to de- 
 fend himself, realizes that there is something, after all, in the 
 legal type, and then and there he would give much to be able 
 to tell exactly what he -feels and why he feels it. 
 
 It may be that one of the authoritative type may have 
 the utmost confidence in one whom he thinks knows, but find- 
 ing the "knowing-one" unable to cope with an adversary, 
 sees all foundation taken from under his own feet, and then 
 he faces the interesting and perplexing question of who is 
 
Biological Laboratories 27 
 
 to be his authority, for having found himself wrong in the 
 one case, how can he tell he will not be wrong again? 
 
 Does it not all revert back to the legal type? To the one 
 who KNOWS and KNOWS THAT HE KNOWS and can definitely 
 and in understandable language give a reasonable account 
 for his beliefs? 
 
 And should one be of the legal type, or ultimately become 
 so, and further, should one likewise desire consistency in the 
 search for truth, one must try to find some First Principles, 
 for one cannot build without building material, and First 
 Principles are the first things we must have in order to be 
 able to do any thinking or any constructive work whatever. 
 Of course, we cannot find any First Principles or first causes 
 in Biology, but we can find material on which to build a first 
 cause; after all, we have to speak and think in terms of 
 the sensible and sensible things are those that come under 
 the senses laboratory evidence. 
 
 So, then, as far as we know, spirit or life never shows 
 itself except through some bodily form. Every thought we 
 have must be based on physical experience that is, there 
 can be nothing in the mind that has not got there through 
 the senses. We find that different states of the body seem 
 to affect our mental state, such as when we have been work- 
 ing arduously we cannot think clearly, or as a philosopher 
 has said, "One cannot hoe cabbage and philosophize at the 
 same time". And yet there is a very large school of men 
 who deny even this, that the body can have any effect what- 
 ever on the mind or the mind on the body. They have very 
 many good arguments to sustain their views and they draw 
 them largely from Biology. The opposite side also draws 
 its arguments from the same source, so that, it is absolutely 
 impossible for any one accepting either side of the argument 
 to be able to defend his own view or legitimately to find flaws 
 
28 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 in the opposing one, unless he is familiar with the very fount 
 from which both sides have drawn their evidence. 
 
 If the view is correct which many hold, that the ultimate 
 beginning of things is wholly independent of any spiritual 
 cause, and is simply the mechanistic working out of some 
 fundamental substance, then the support for those who con- 
 tend that there is such a thing as absolute right and wrong 
 is withdrawn. In other words, if to obey the ten command- 
 ments, for example, is right, because a Supreme Being has 
 given them to humanity, if there be no Supreme Being, quite 
 naturally He could not have given any commandments, and 
 no commandments having been given, it is absurd to assume 
 the obeying of something which doesn't exist, is or can be 
 right. 
 
 This chain of argument could be followed out indefinitely, 
 but the point to be made is simply this, that the viewpoint of 
 many very able men is materialistic, the reasons being, in all 
 probability as Dr. Martineaux suggests, that as long as our 
 education is one-sided, and men are more under the influence 
 of the seen than the unseen, this condition will continue to 
 flourish; but that does not change their view, and if one 
 wishes to feel positive that one is right, it is most essential 
 that a defense can be given to all one's beliefs, and no matter 
 to what school a person belongs, if he wishes to do this he 
 must know something about the natural sciences, and prefer- 
 ably some of the laboratory work of Biology. 
 
 If then, Biology is so far-reaching, that with it, and upon 
 its findings we may apparently destroy every vestige of our 
 reasons for morality, as just shown in the downfall of the 
 theory of right and wrong; if the only evidence we accept 
 in proof of any theory is laboratory evidence; if every act 
 that is done, every plant that is grown, every thought that 
 the mind can hold, every impulse that nerve-arcs may bring 
 
Biological Laboratories 29 
 
 forth, every movement we may make, every disease we may 
 have, every emotion we may feel, comes under the study of 
 LIFE, and if Biology is the Science of Life in all of its many 
 manifestations, is it not worth our study? 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORIES 
 
 THIS chapter aims to do three things and only three, 
 and these are to be treated as briefly as possible, con- 
 sistent with clearness and simplicity. 
 
 It aims to give a short survey of why men's interests have 
 gone from the problems of the mind to the gathering of 
 observational facts ; to show some of the practical aspects of 
 Modern Psychology ; and lastly to point out that it is Mod- 
 ern Psychology that may yet prove the via media by which 
 the thinker of to-day may be brought back into his own, 
 while yet not lessening the standing of the sorely needed ob- 
 server as well. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance that the distinction between 
 observer and thinker be thoroughly understood. The former 
 attempts to find the actually existent and to describe it, the 
 latter, too, is interested in all things that actually exist, but 
 this is not the end he has in view, for, to him there are 
 ^ REASONS for all things, and his end and aim is to find those 
 reasons. It is so often the case that because some one has 
 described something, that many assume that it has been ex- 
 plained, but the difference between a description and an ex- 
 planation is too self-evident to escape any one who will give 
 the matter the slightest attention. 
 
 To be an observer, then, requires a vast quantity of pa- 
 tience and accuracy. To be a philosopher requires likewise 
 these accomplishments, but in addition thereto, one must 
 have the ability to detach oneself from oneself and to think 
 
Psychological Laboratories 31 
 
 not only of the facts found, but to think of one's own 
 thoughts; to analyse, to classify, and to see the vast mass 
 of thought in its relation to everything else connected with 
 it. It requires sustained mental effort. 
 
 And it is right here that we cross the line of demarcation 
 that separates knowledge from wisdom. The knowing man 
 is he who accumulates a quantity of facts ; the wise man is 
 he who knows how to explain them to fit these same facts 
 in their respective places accurately and well, and who can 
 then tell why they fit in those particular places and no other. 
 In other words, the former seeks to perceive as much as he 
 may, the latter to tell what it all means after the perceptions 
 have been gathered. 
 
 The wise men of the ancients were philosophers ; the think- 
 ers of all times who have changed the course of thought on 
 this earth of ours, have always and ever been philosophers. 
 President Hibben of Princeton University means this when 
 he says, "The standards of every age, individual, social and 
 political, have been modified to a greater or less extent by 
 the influence of philosophical discussion. The doctrines of 
 the schools become at last the maxims of the crowd. The 
 eighteenth century philosophers cannot wash their hands of 
 the blood of the French Revolution." * 
 
 Bearing in mind that for over three thousand years the 
 wise man the great man the really worth-while man 
 was the philosopher, it is interesting to note what causes 
 brought about this change and why only during the last 
 century men have turned from the realms of philosophy to 
 the realms of perception. But even though this change of 
 interest be a fact, we must not forget that the value of the 
 thinker is no less among the learned, nor has it ever been, but 
 it is only to mankind at large, untrained to note fine distinc- 
 
 1 Problems of Philosophy. 
 
32 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 tions, that the philosopher has come to be almost an unknown 
 figure. 
 
 There must be a reason for this, and we infer that it is 
 probably due to the rapid increase in the number of schools 
 taking place about the same time that the microscope, tele- 
 scope and other revolutionizing instruments were being per- 
 fected. There are so many things in this world of ours 
 our interests are so varied and so multitudinous that such 
 an instrument as the microscope, offering as it did, the ex- 
 citement of new discoveries of findings that men had not 
 even dreamed of brought forth such a host of investigators, 
 who constantly sought for new wonders with which to as- 
 tonish the world. The many new schools that were opening 
 in all parts of the world found, that to be abreast of the 
 times they must needs install one or more of these investi- 
 gators. Students who being unable to sustain the strain of 
 constant philosophic thinking in the abstract, and having 
 been brought up amidst surroundings that led to no thought 
 of anything except the material, knew not what "soul" or 
 "spirit" meant. To them there was only the "seen world" ; 
 this alone was real. Three or four generations of such train- 
 ing and always we shall have the same result. Men became 
 
 accustomed to the evidence of the senses and would listen to 
 
 % 
 
 nothing else. All must begin with the senses. Philosophy 
 had not yet had time to manage itself and adopt the new 
 terms, and the excitement was so intense, that it probably 
 would not have mattered anyway, at that time. 
 
 But starting with the senses was the way the thinker had 
 always begun. The philosophy of the past had always in- 
 sisted that there could be nothing in the intellect that did not 
 come through the senses ; but the new men in the field of ob- 
 servation used the terms of the past in so totally a different 
 way that he who knew philosophy could no longer converse 
 
Psychological Laboratories 33 
 
 with a colleague in terms that meant the same to both, and 
 so it became necessary for the philosopher to step down from 
 his century-old throne and walk far afield in order to bring 
 back those who had strayed from their ancient home. He 
 had, and still has, to use the most commonplace examples, to 
 make his thoughts understandable to the observer. But what 
 cared the observer for abstract thought? He was an ex- 
 plorer on the then great unknown sea of minute observation 
 and he was ever finding something new with which to astonish 
 the world and bring to himself enconiums and emolument. 
 The world was at his feet; men wrote of him; spoke of him; 
 honored him and above all paid him. But, just as the in- 
 dividual becomes tired when kept at a task too long, so, too, 
 does the race. And when volumes had been given man with 
 one new discovery after another when the eye had told us 
 what could be seen here and there when magnified from a 
 hundred to several thousand times the question formulated 
 itself well, what of it? We admit what you see; what you 
 say may be there, but what of it? 
 
 It was the old, old yearning implanted in every man to 
 feel a conviction that the things he says or does actually 
 mean something. What of it? We had gathered thousands 
 of facts and now we wanted to know what was to be done 
 with them. That became a vital question. 
 
 The great wave that carried upon it so many men into 
 observational fields quite naturally carried with it also a few, 
 who, having broken loose from their anchorage in the thought 
 of the past, and who, having had the philosophical training 
 which bound them to that past, could observe and interpret 
 as well. To these men we owe both the good and the bad 
 that has had any lasting influence in the scientific world. 
 Trained as they were in the laws of thought, they were often 
 wonderful logicians and carried out their thoughts with an 
 
\ 
 
 34 The Eegmmmgs of Science 
 
 inexorableness that is more than marvelous. But we must 
 never forget that logic teaches us only the rules of correct 
 reasoning. It does not guarantee a true conclusion. It 
 only guarantees a correct conclusion from the premise 
 originally adopted. That is, one may come to a very er- 
 roneous conclusion, but be perfectly correct in one's reason- 
 ing, because the thing with which one started was incorrect. 
 
 Starting then as did these men, with many and many a 
 premis& that we have since learned cannot be substantiated, 
 they built up logically a wonderful edifice, all of which has 
 crumbled into dust because the foundation upon which they 
 built has been demolished by later investigators. 
 
 This is then a short sketch of how and why the great 
 changes we are recounting, took place, and why it is, that 
 now, no matter what our subject may be, aside from the First 
 Principles of Knowledge, we must produce laboratory evi- 
 dence for anything we wish to have accepted, for it is still 
 true that the great mass of students in our colleges and uni- 
 versities receive practically no training whatever in the 
 grammar of thought, Logic, but are let run loose over the 
 entire intellectual field without a single law to guide them. 
 Is it to be wondered at that so many absurd theories are 
 afloat? 
 
 Now, philosophy means to love wisdom and a philosopher 
 is one who loves wisdom, and "the problems of philosophy 
 are really the problems of life, the burden and the mystery 
 of existence, the origin and destiny of man, the relations 
 which he sustains to the world of which he is a part, and to 
 the unseen universe which lies about him. Though they may 
 not be couched in philosophical language such questionings 
 of heart and of mind we cannot wholly silence." 2 
 
 And one of the greatest branches of philosophy the one 
 
 2 Problems of Philosophy. 
 
Psychological Laboratories &5 
 
 solving the great problems of the mental world is what 
 we call Psychology; the "science of the soul" as it was 
 originally called by the Greeks, but which we now call the 
 "science of mental phenomena." Again it will be observed 
 that there is an attempt made to bring down the realms of 
 the unseen to the laboratory. The "science of mental phe- 
 nomena," meaning nearly always the actual seeable and 
 hearable in fact, all sensitivity that can be studied in the 
 laboratory. 
 
 Not the thing that is behind all sensitivity; not how and 
 why we have this sensitivity ; not what it is for ; but what can 
 we bring under the senses and then what theories can we 
 advance on our findings. This is what we mean by saying 
 that the philosopher has had to go far afield to bring back 
 the wandering son. 
 
 It is upon Psychology then, that philosophy largely rests, 
 for certainly if there be no "mind" that is, no thinking 
 self we could have no philosophy at all. So nearly three 
 thousand years ago the Grecian sages saw with their "mental 
 eye" that there was something beyond the physical alone. 
 They realized that the physical eye could but throw an 
 image; that the object itself at which one looked did not 
 enter the eye only the image did that. They found that 
 more or less rapid movements of air were converted into 
 sound when the ear was normal, and they set about trying to 
 find why this was so. 
 
 This was the birth of Psychology, as a defined part of 
 Philosophy, but what we now qualify by calling Rational or 
 Philosophical Psychology. It merely tried to explain through 
 the process of reasoning and not by experiment, and this 
 method has come down to us through the ages, honored by 
 the greatest minds of all times, and still dominating the great 
 mass of men and women. But, while experimentation has not 
 
36 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 been able to overpower reason, the methods of the past have 
 fallen into neglect and so we, who place reason on the high- 
 est pinnacle, must experiment, in order that the truths of the 
 past doctrines may not be lost. Men do not often accept 
 a priori reasoning now. They want to see the evidence. They 
 cannot sustain the great mental lengths of the past and 
 reason it all out. It must be placed before them in as simple 
 a form mentally as we explain physical things to the infant, 
 so that some have thought that by actual non-use of our 
 reasoning powers we are as a people, descending in the 
 realm of the intellect while ascending in the realm of the ap- 
 plication of the things we do hold. 
 
 And so Modern Psychology, or Experimental Psychology, 
 or Physiological Psychology, all meaning practically the 
 same thing, was born in the laboratory. It should rather 
 be said thai the laboratory was its mother and insanity its 
 father, for if, as Dr. Henry Smith Williams contends, Mod- 
 ern Psychology was born in the year 1795, when Dr. Pinel 
 removed the shackles from the insane in Paris, and if, as will 
 be observed in his statement of that event, all the past was 
 to be heartily condemned, we can read into it all, it would 
 seem, the ideas of one who is not very familiar with either 
 what the past stood for or attempted, but whose view, never- 
 theless, is the prevailing one ; he says : "And so it chanced 
 that in striking the shackles from the insane, Pinel and his 
 confreres struck a blow also, unwittingly, at time-honored 
 philosophical traditions. The liberation of the insane from 
 the dungeons was an augury of the liberation of psychology 
 from the musty recesses of metaphysics. Hitherto, psychol- 
 ogy, in so far as it existed at all, was but the subjective 
 study of individual minds : in the future it must become ob- 
 jective as well, taking into account also the relations which 
 the mind bears to the body and in particular to the brain 
 
Psychological Laboratories 37 
 
 and nervous system." 3 
 
 If the laws of Genetics mean anything, we know that the 
 offspring of one or both parents who are insane, may be 
 and usually are far from sane, may it not be possible to ap- 
 ply these same laws here and suggest that if insanity was 
 the father of Modern Psychology that that accounts for so 
 many near-insane applications suggested or ideas promul- 
 gated by insufficient experimentation and almost half-witted 
 evidence? But we must not forget that the working out of 
 the same laws which may render men dead to one sense may 
 also increase another faculty and make him a genius, and so, 
 too, from this experimentation during but a comparatively 
 few years we have obtained benefits that mean more to us 
 and have a more far-reaching effect than many of the 
 thoughts we have been quarreling over for centuries. 
 
 It is in this abnormal field that we have found so much 
 that throws light on the normal, so that for any one desirous 
 of knowing anything about alienism, it is absolutely essential 
 that a knowledge of both normal and abnormal psychology 
 be thoroughly mastered, notwithstanding that there are 
 those who contend that the mind is but the sum-total of the 
 expression of the individual's entire complex life, and does 
 not exist at all as such; and that the mind is but an emana- 
 tion of the brain and nervous system as the light is an emana- 
 tion of the match, so that one writer has said that the mind 
 can no more affect the body nor the body the mind, than a 
 piece of "beefsteak placed in a sausage machine" could be 
 expected >to come out a moonlight sonata. And crass as this 
 statement appears, it is the conclusion to which one must 
 come if he accept the parallelist doctrine that mind and 
 matter are totally and constantly inseparable functionally. 
 
 8 The Century's Progress in Experimental Psychology, by Henry 
 Smith Williams, M.D., Harper's Magazine, September, 1899. 
 
38 The Begimiings of Science 
 
 To this the interactionist demurs. He acknowledges that 
 both are found side by side, but does not believe that one 
 can thereby argue that the one cannot influence the other. 
 The proof for this latter viewpoint seems to be with us in 
 our daily experience, so that even the parallelists, as Profes- 
 sor John Watson of Johns Hopkins says, use language that 
 shows they think in terms of interaction, though speaking 
 and writing in terms of parallelism. 4 
 
 Now what was it that the abnormal field gave us that is of 
 so much importance as not only to lead to more than wonder- 
 ful results as shortly to be recounted, but which again led 
 men back into the realm of the mental from which they had 
 departed, seemingly for all time? 
 
 First, it was through observation, especially by aid of the 
 microscope, that it was found that the two pairs of nerves 
 attached to the spinal cord and leaving it between each ver- 
 tebra were two pairs of dissimilar nerves as far as function 
 was concerned. The two anterior ones being motor and the 
 two posterior, sensory. That is, the anterior nerves never 
 carried any impulse except from the spinal cord to some 
 muscle of the body and the posterior nerves only carried a 
 sensation from some part of the body to the spinal cord. 
 Here probably was born the idea that every nerve in the body 
 had a definite function to perform and could perform no 
 other. Up to this time, also, the brain was considered more 
 or less a unity of tissue. Now it was found that there were 
 millions of cells in the brain and still later that each cell 
 of a nerve in any part of the body had several processes, but 
 it took a long time with wonderfully contrived methods to 
 find where these processes ended and what they did. One 
 of the very important discoveries along this line was that 
 
 4 Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, by John 
 B. Watson. 
 
Psychological Laboratories 39 
 
 when a nerve was cut in any way, the part between the in- 
 jured portion and the outside of the body would cease to 
 function and would degenerate, while the part extending 
 from the cell itself would often grow again. 
 
 It was only by this process of degeneration by cutting 
 various nerves on the smaller animals that the degenerated 
 part could be followed completely and the entire course of 
 the nerve discovered. 
 
 Next came the finding that no nerve connected directly 
 with another. Usually the end of a nerve running toward 
 the spinal cord had a tiny arborization that surrounded an- 
 other nerve cell, but did not come in actual contact with it, 
 and then came Ramon y Cajal's theory of how the nerves 
 function, namely, very like a telephone system, and just as 
 each cell is stimulated and acts, it extends one or more of 
 these little processes and really reaches out and touches the 
 cell or processes of the cell to which it is to carry its im- 
 pulse. 
 
 But of greater value than these discoveries is the one which 
 has meant so much in the practical field, and which is so 
 well and succinctly put by Dr. Stephen Smith, himself a man 
 who has done more to effect the banishment of cruelties from 
 the insane in this country than probably any other man. 
 He says : "The lessons which the illustrations of the anatomy 
 and physiology of the nervous system teach have a wide ap- 
 plication to our treatment of the dependent classes. We learn 
 that the mental attributes of every person depend ultimately 
 upon the physical state of the cell, over which we have almost 
 absolute control both in its individual and collective capac- 
 ity. If its texture is feeble from heredity or disease, we may 
 make it strong by nutrition, exercise, pure air, and medica- 
 tion ; if it is undeveloped, we can develop it by applying ap- 
 propriate stimulus and suitable nourishment; if it is unduly 
 
40 The Begwmmgs of Science 
 
 developed and hence overactive, we can reduce it to a rudi- 
 mentary and inactive state by removing every form of stim- 
 ulant and reducing its nutrition; where neither the regula- 
 tion of the stimulant nor nutrition accomplishes our pur- 
 pose, we can rely upon specific remedies. 
 
 "The logical and inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that, 
 if we thoroughly understood the exact function and the 
 functional relations of all the cells of the nervous system, we 
 could, beginning with the child, control in a large measure 
 the development of his character, and in the adult modify 
 existing attributes by stimulation of one class of nerve-cells 
 and the repression of another to any extent that we desired. 
 Nothing can be more thoroughly practical than the appli- 
 cation of the proper remedial measures by which the equilib- 
 rium of these centers is secured." 5 
 
 It may be argued that what we have discussed is Neurol- 
 ogy and not Psychology, and this is perfectly true; but as 
 "mind," in so far as we know it, does not work in the human 
 sphere except encased in the body, so, having by common 
 experience since the beginning of time found that the dis- 
 eases of the body do affect the mentality, and having further 
 found that the highest center of mentality, the brain, is es- 
 pecially affected by nervous diseases, and still further having 
 found that the brain itself, the organ of intellection, is a 
 mass of thousands of millions of tiny cells, each with its own 
 nerve-processes that may and do connect with others, we 
 find we must have this neurological setting for any thorough 
 knowledge of the mental processes. We do not by that be- 
 come neurologists, but we do wish to know all the neurologist 
 can tell us, that will aid in the better understanding of WHY 
 a mental reaction is what it is. 
 
 And so the psychologist of the present works upon this 
 
 Who is Insane? by Stephen Smith, A.M., MJD., LL.D. 
 
Psychological Laboratories 41 
 
 background of biology and neurology by tracing from the 
 earliest beginnings the marks of sense perception and the 
 peculiar reactions that animals give when various stimuli 
 are applied, under the heading of animal or comparative 
 psychology, both for its own sake, which is the mark of the 
 true scientist, and for the practical effect it may have in 
 throwing light on the processes of the child especially, and 
 this is what we call genetic psychology, so insistently studied 
 by those aiming to teach, and which has already done so 
 much for the growing child. No longer is every child con- 
 sidered the equal of every other and all treated alike. We 
 are trying to get away from the machine-like pattern of 
 similarity and getting to look at each as an individual, so 
 that many of the larger private schools have their consulting 
 psychologist who measures the ability and intelligence of 
 each child and classifies him accordingly. 
 
 We have through this study become better acquainted with 
 the psychology of learning so that we know much more now 
 than we did a few years ago as to the better method of learn- 
 ing more thoroughly and in less time than formerly. We 
 have found the diurnal movement, for example, that passes 
 through the nervous system and makes it easier to remember 
 two days after a thing is learned than immediately after the 
 task is completed. And in line with this, an interesting side- 
 light was thrown on the differences in the working of normal 
 and subnormal children in London, where Mr. Philip B. 
 Ballard performed a great number of experiments on school 
 children ranging in age from five to fifteen years, and found 
 that the subnormal child could remember very much more 
 after some time had elapsed than he could at the moment of 
 finishing the memory test, while the normal child knew more 
 than did the subnormal at the time of learning, and not so 
 
4 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 much later. 6 This might be interpreted that it was not less 
 ability on the part of the one than the other, but that there 
 was a difference. The subnormal being slower in the procuring 
 of his memory work but greater in his retention afterward. 
 And it may be that the very reason for the child's being con- 
 sidered subnormal was merely due to the longer time it took 
 him to memorize. Should this be the case, as it no doubt has 
 been time and again, it may be found that many of our great- 
 est men, who had to study hard and long before they were 
 able to grasp the subject at which they were working, but 
 who then never forgot it, were classified by their teachers 
 as below the standard and not of much value. 
 
 Under social psychology we study the "herd instinct" as 
 it is often called. The desire of men to live with others and 
 form a community. In other words it is the study of genetic 
 psychology taken from the individual and applied to the 
 nation or group, while under racial psychology we go still 
 farther afield, gather the myths, the superstitions, the beliefs 
 and the forms of worship of all peoples and try to co-ordi- 
 nate them, and weave them into a meaningful whole. 
 
 We have a psychology of history and a psychology of re- 
 ligion, both of which are more or less self-explanatory, while 
 in the practical field the best known is probably applied 
 psychology, which usually and largely means advertising. 
 That is, to find what methods are best to attain the ends one 
 wishes, through newspaper, magazine and salesman. In fact 
 the commencement and successful operation of scientific- 
 salesmanship schools and the great number of industrial 
 houses which now have departments of training for their 
 men is a direct result of the interest in applied psychology. 
 
 And then there is another psychology, which has not yet 
 
 "Obliviscence and Reminiscence, by Philip B. Ballard, M.A. Vol. 
 I. No. 2, British Journal of Psychological Monograph Supplements. 
 
Psychological Laboratories 43 
 
 been given a name except that it has been called "sex psy- 
 chology," though this does not label it exactly as it should 
 be labeled. We refer to the mental differences between men 
 and women. It is through experimentation that we are seek- 
 ing to find what differences actually exist mentally between 
 the sexes, and whether they are fundamental or whether 
 they are due only to different methods of training. 
 
 The writer has taken some eleven thousand mental 
 measurements of men and women and has found a seeming 
 similarity among women of their dislikes, but they do not 
 agree so well on what they like, whereas the reverse can be 
 said of men, they usually agreeing on what they like but have 
 very varied dislikes. 
 
 But throughout these experiments it was found that al- 
 ways the great mass of both men and women agree some- 
 where near an average, that is, the thing nearest like to the 
 things with which they are familiar or which are not too 
 original, are admired most. Great originality does not come 
 in for many enconiums. 
 
 And always one can see the predilection and prejudice 
 under which the person is laboring, for it almost always 
 shows in his judgment; very, very few passing an opinion 
 solely on the merits of the case. 
 
 And most interesting of all the experiments is the one that 
 compares the judgment of a single individual given many 
 times on the same subject with the same number of judg- 
 ments passed once by a number of people, for the individual 
 differs more from his own judgments than do the many from 
 each other. In other words, a jury of fifty people would 
 pass a more correct opinion than would one individual pass- 
 ing an opinion fifty times on the same case, provided, always, 
 of course, that it could be passed on such matters where 
 memory would not enter. The experiments here mentioned 
 
44 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 were performed only with the sense of touch and sight. 
 
 One can readily see that here we have a very vast field in 
 which to work and many interesting and valuable findings 
 may be made. 
 
 Then there is a psychology for medical students ; for legal 
 students; for engineering students, and in fact for every 
 walk of life. But of all the branches of experimental psy- 
 chology, the most far-reaching in its practical results is in 
 all probability that of abnormal psychology. Within this 
 field may be found actual and definite results, immediate re- 
 lief, and often cures in thousands of otherwise hopeless* cases. 
 Heartaches have been removed and many subnormal chil- 
 dren have been trained until they can hardly be dis- 
 tinguished from many persons not so unfortunate. Schools 
 for training them have been established and successfully 
 carried out. It has taken intelligence, and constant fighting 
 to overcome obstacles and opposition to the suggestion that 
 the feeble minded could be made self-supporting. But suc- 
 cess has been demonstrated. Psychopathic hospitals and 
 institutes have been opened where those who are com- 
 mitted for various offenses by the state may have intelligent 
 care and attention, and often be made into most excellent 
 men and women, for, often the original reason for the fall 
 of these people has not been an inherent evil disposition and 
 desire to commit wrong, but an entire lack of training which 
 made them incapable of knowing what right and wrong 
 meant. 
 
 A systematic classification of the idiot and feeble-minded 
 has led to excellent results and better care ; and a knowledge 
 of the ultimate material product of our bodies, the cell, as 
 the lines before quoted of Stephen Smith so well exemplify, 
 has led to an attempt, proven more successful than even the 
 promoters had dared to hope, of not only helping, but actu- 
 
Psychological Laboratories 45 
 
 ally bringing back to sanity by proper training of the 
 nervous system about twenty-five per cent of all commit- 
 ments to insane asylums, and there is little doubt that when 
 all the states realize, as some of them do now, that not a 
 physician should have charge of these homes, but an alienist, 
 thorough in his work, who puts into practice the findings of 
 the other members of his staff, consisting of a physiologist, 
 a pathologist and a psychologist, that this twenty-five per 
 cent will be materially increased. The last three members 
 of the staff, mentioned, are research men who discover the 
 laws and the reasons for these laws, while the alienist puts 
 them into practice. 
 
 And in the field of criminology our eyes are opened when 
 we make mental tests of a whole series of so-called criminals 
 and find them rated by our tests as averaging from eight to 
 fifteen or sixteen years in mental age, regardless of what 
 their years on earth may have been. 
 
 It is no small thing for one science to be able to point out 
 that it has revolutionized several others and those very 
 ancient and important studies ; it is no small thing to be able 
 to say that this same science has restored many, many to 
 their reason from supposedly hopeless insanity; has made 
 self-supporting men and women where there were only de- 
 pendents before; it is no small thing to have taken the 
 shackles from the insane and the convict and to have helped 
 remove cruelty in the world in those places where it was 
 most practiced and mostly thought necessary. And lastly, 
 it has, through its acceptance of the laboratory ; through its 
 use of physical evidence, from which it then draws its con- 
 clusions, brought back many, yes very many, to a realiza- 
 tion of the fact that after all, life is not all material, and 
 the spiritual also is there. It has been and is a sort of con- 
 necting link uniting the materialistic biologist of the present 
 
46 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 with the spiritual philosopher of the past, drawing them 
 closer and closer together, exposing the crass mechanism of 
 a day happily past, showing a prospect of hope and glory, 
 that in so far as it has already had so glorious a history 
 during the few decades of its existence, may yet lead to 
 greater things and make the name of psychology shine forth 
 where it belongs, as a necessary star in the constellation of 
 all that is good and true in the world of learning, and as the 
 one connecting link which unites the observer the gatherer 
 of facts with the thinker the philosopher the interpreter 
 thereof. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 GENETICS 
 
 GENETICS is the study of the origin and development 
 of everything and anything that may throw light upon 
 the child. It is the study of heredity and development of the 
 infant. It aims to collect every fact, whether it be anecdotal, 
 observational, statistical or philosophical ; then to take these 
 facts, segregate them, study them in turn, and finally to in- 
 terpret them for the same reason that one gathers and in- 
 terprets facts in any science, namely to control and 
 prophesy. 
 
 There are two great viewpoints from which this new 
 science may be considered, namely, the Biological and the 
 Psychological. The former takes into consideration pri- 
 marily the pre-birth state. It amis to ascertain reasons why 
 children are born with the particular equipment they possess, 
 both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
 
 As scientists and philosophers have always known that 
 men are not born equal, it develops upon the Biologist to 
 ascertain WHY, but from the physical side only the as- 
 sumption being that with a good healthy body the psychic 
 part will care for itself. 
 
 Little progress had been made in this field, because men 
 had found no laws of heredity which could be applied in even 
 a majority of cases, much less in all. The methods of in- 
 vestigation were really not investigations at all, but simply 
 collections of what is known as anecdotal evidence; that is, 
 some one observed or thought he observed one or more cases 
 
 47 
 
48 Tltie Beginnings of Science 
 
 of a given type without knowing any of the details of that 
 case, or the reasons for the individual's being as he was, and 
 by hasty generalization (the bane of all scientists) formu- 
 lated a theory which gained sway among friends and dis- 
 ciples of the theorist. It never seemed to dawn upon the 
 pronouncer of the theory, or any of his disciples, that fifty 
 per cent of the results of any suggested theory is more than 
 likely to be true if there are only two alternatives, or if 
 more, the same proportional truth will find its way, even in 
 an erroneous theory. So that, so far as evidence (sic) is 
 concerned, there is no theory that cannot find such pro- 
 portion of substantiating facts as we have mentioned, and 
 which is called chance. What is needed, however, is much 
 more than chance. We must find, let us say, more than 
 seventy-five per cent of the cases under consideration show- 
 ing the thing we are seeking, or our theory has little or no 
 value. 
 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, men working in the 
 natural sciences, especially in Biology, were more interested 
 in trying to find a definition for each separate thing which 
 should show a reason for keeping it apart from some other 
 group or individual than they were in finding a relationship 
 between them. Let us give an example. The interests of 
 scholars of that day lay in trying to define species so that 
 the definition would be exclusive. That is, they tried to lay 
 down a rule saying that everything that had this or that 
 feature, belongs to this or that species, and everything that 
 does not possess the peculiar characteristic in question, was 
 simply to be excluded; so that, should there be found so 
 strange a creature that might possess one-half of both the 
 necessary features of two separate species, that particular 
 creature was doomed not to be studied and classified but 
 mercilessly to "perish beneath the boot-heel" of the investi- 
 
Genetics 49 
 
 gator as an anomaly, and therefore was not to be considered. 
 He was a disturber and should be cast into the darkness. 
 
 The reason we now begin evolutionary discussions with 
 Lamarck and Darwin is because they reversed this order. 
 It is not because of the theories of these men particularly, 
 for the theories of both are largely discarded now, as will 
 be shown in our chapters on "The Present Status of Evolu- 
 tionary Philosophy" and "Theories of Evolution," but be- 
 cause after their time, there was a change in the old order, 
 men then insisting that the important subject for study 
 was not differences which kept species apart, but similari- 
 ties which showed a relationship. This opened up an entire 
 new world of thought, and no doubt some of us, after seeing 
 some of the things it brought forth, think that it might just 
 as well have remained unopened, but be that as it may, the 
 fact remains that we are now no longer interested in the lines 
 of exclusive but of inclusive demarcation. Now we want 
 to know why it is that nearly every bird and animal is a 
 pentadactyl, that is, why they have five fingers and five toes ; 
 in birds the fingers being represented by the divisions into 
 which the wings fall. These are clearly discernable in such 
 wings as those of the bat and many birds as well; while in 
 some types of birds we find by close examination the several 
 fingers have grown together, the bones however showing a 
 sort of separation. We find this same condition in the vari- 
 ous types of animals. We want to know why all these living 
 things are so much alike, and not what differences keep them 
 apart. 
 
 Botanists claim certain minute organisms as plants while 
 Zoologists claim these same organisms as animals. 1 If it 
 be possible to have a living thing so closely resembling both 
 
 1 Hsematococcus, for example, a little single-celled organism, con- 
 taining chlorophyll (which is the usual test of whether the individual be 
 
50 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 plant and animal, that men who spend their lives in the 
 study of just such matters cannot even decide on whether 
 to call it a plant or an animal, one can easily see what a 
 vista is opened to those of speculative inclinations. 
 
 And from this gradual seeming rise of the plant and 
 animal in the scale of worth, it was easy to assume, because 
 new things were daily being found by the aid of the micro- 
 scope, that there must be still smaller things than the lowest 
 forms of plant-life which would unite the living and the non- 
 
 Haematococcus Motile Stages (after Parker). 
 
 living. This is one of the assumed purposes of the bacteria. 
 And again there came forth the theory of spontaneous 
 generation that we might be able to take a small quantity 
 of hay, for example, boil it until it was completely sterilized 
 (and therefore could contain no life whatever), then per- 
 mitting it to stand, actually see it produce life. This was 
 a fascinating doctrine and when investigators announced 
 that this had been done there was great rejoicing in the 
 materialistic world. However, it was but a short time there- 
 after that other investigators taking far more care than 
 
 a plant or not) and possessing flagella (little tails by which they move 
 about). These are often included under the Algae or lower green 
 plants. (See Parker and Haswell's Text-book of Zoology, Vol. I, 
 Page 72.) 
 
Genetics 51 
 
 lad the first to prevent the intrusion of living organisms 
 after the sterilization, found that no life was so produced, 
 and at the present moment there is no investigator or 
 biologist who will admit that spontaneous generation has 
 been demonstrated in the laboratory and the great scien- 
 tific formula now universally accepted is that there is "no 
 life except from a previous life" and "no cell except from a 
 previous cell." 
 
 As all things have their cycle and ultimately come to a 
 close, the origm of species ceased to hold men's minds in 
 thrall as it had during the last half of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, and a great body of men drifted into specialization of 
 one or another of the many branches of natural science. 
 There were in a short time investigators of the nervous 
 system Neurologists ; of the general structure of the body 
 Anatomists ; of the development of the individual before 
 birth Embryologists ; of the plant world Botanists ; of 
 the animal world Zoologists; of mental phenomena Psy- 
 chologists, and a host of others. This will but serve to 
 show the possibilities of the subject. And then there had 
 to be a co-ordinating of the findings of all these individual 
 workers. Each one found something unknown up to that 
 time each interpreted his finding in the light of his own 
 individual knowledge and viewpoint, only to find that in 
 some other field of endeavor the opposite conclusion could 
 be reached and often was reached from just as thorough 
 evidence. 
 
 So that now, with a vast body of facts in our possession, 
 the principal matter under consideration is to find correct 
 meanings for these facts, always considered in the light of 
 all the knowledge in all related subjects. 
 
 We find then, that the interest is no longer primarily, in 
 the origin of species, but in. the origm and development of 
 
52 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 the individual. This subject, too, has had its devotees in 
 all ages, but we of the present insist on laboratory proofs 
 if we are to credit the many theories propounded. We are 
 not interested in what Edison thinks about heaven, as sev- 
 eral newspaper men of a few years ago thought, but we are 
 interested in any definite laws he may have discovered, or 
 proven, that may be used by all. It is for this reason that 
 an inventor is not a scientist. He does not discover laws 
 that others may profit by he applies the laws of men who 
 have found them, and these latter, the ones who found 
 them, are the real scientists. 
 
 There was a man, some years since, who received no title 
 of "Wizard" ; who lived in a little village in Austria during 
 all of this great period of scientific upheaval which we have 
 been discussing and who died some thirty years ago ; who- 
 was not even known outside of his immediate province and 
 hardly known there until some years after his death, but 
 who has profoundly influenced the whole scientific world. 
 It is safe to say that in the Biological realm there is no 
 name that ranks superior to that of Father Johann Gregor 
 Mendel, of Briinn, Austria, of whom Castle has said: 
 "Mendel had an analytical mind of the first order which 
 enabled him to plan and carry through successfully the most 
 original and instructive series of studies in heredity ever 
 executed." 
 
 Mendel followed out the principles insisted upon by every 
 experimentalist, namely, that he perform his experiments 
 under similar conditions that may be controlled, and then 
 definitely record his facts. 
 
 His great work consisted in the scientific breeding of 
 peas. 
 
 The theory now known as the Mendelian would require 
 entirely too much space for a book of this nature, were it to 
 
Genetics 53 
 
 be stated in all its fullness, but should the reader become 
 sufficiently interested to wish to read further, he will find 
 in the chapter on "Suggested Reading" the names of the 
 volumes which will give him a complete and comprehensive 
 account thereof. We shall state here only so much as is 
 essential to an understanding of what follows. 
 
 Mendel found that by crossing tall and dwarf peas, re- 
 gardless of sex, all of the offspring were tall. Tall, breeding 
 in this way he called DOMINANT, while the dwarfness was 
 labeled RECESSIVE. Further, he found that when any of the 
 peas were crossed with each other or were self-fertilized, 
 which amounts to the same thing, they would produce in the 
 proportion of 3 to 1. That is, the dominant type (tallness) 
 would have three plants to every one of the recessive 
 (dwarf). On still further breeding, the dwarf peas would 
 always breed true, which means that there would never 
 again appear a tall one among them; but among the tall 
 plants there were two kinds one-third of them always pro- 
 ducing tails, and the other two-thirds, known as hybrids, 
 giving a proportion of three tall to one dwarf, like their 
 parents. 
 
 For our purpose it is necessary that we remember one 
 thing in particular; the second generation where all were 
 tall, had inherited one-half of whatever they were from their 
 mother and one-half from their father. Tallness was domi- 
 nant, but we must not forget that dwarfness was also there y 
 but covered and dominated by the tallness. There was no 
 blending. The offspring were not intermediate between the 
 two parents as to height they were either tall or short. 
 Another point to observe is that in the third generation 
 some were short and some tall, but, that notwithstanding 
 this fact the short ones always bred true thereafter and 
 one-third of the tall ones did likewise. The supposition 
 
54 The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 being that in the original fertilized germ-cell the tallness 
 is present and is dominant ; so, if the germ-cell of its mating 
 partner is likewise tall, there will always be tall offspring 
 which can never produce a dwarf, while if tallness meet with 
 the germ-cell of dwarfness, tallness being dominant, tallness 
 will likewise result, but with this difference, that the dwarf 
 character is also there, though lying dormant for the time 
 being. As each plant produces a great quantity of germ- 
 cells and an egg-cell is only fertilized by a single sperm-cell, 
 if the sperm-cell is of the dwarf type and mates with an 
 egg-cell of the same type, we have a dwarf as the result. 
 In other words, each plant produced if a hybrid both tall 
 and dwarf types of germ-cells, and if any egg-cell becomes 
 fertilized with any sperm-cell of its own kind, it naturally 
 produces its own type, and if not, it produces tall; but, 
 the tall which has met with a tall, always breeds tall and 
 the tall or dwarf which has mated with its opposite type 
 also produces tall, but the offspring of the next generation 
 may be either tall or dwarf depending upon whether it be a 
 pure egg-cell mating with its own or its opposite type, and 
 so on ad infinitum. 
 
 This, as will be observed, is based on the law of chance, 
 for, as we have shown, any events allowed full and uncon- 
 trolled sway are bound to result in appearing one-half the 
 time on one side and one-half on the other, if there be but 
 two alternatives, and proportionately, should there be more. 
 In this case we have four alternatives, and only four: 
 
 A tall may meet with a tall. 
 
 A dwarf may meet with a dwarf. 
 
 A tall may meet with a dwarf. 
 
 A dwarf may meet with a tall. 
 
 This sketch shows the possible occurrences in the mating 
 of dwarf and tall, graphically. Tall meeting tall and dwarf 
 
Genetics 55 
 
 with dwarf are what is known as "pure," while dwarf with 
 tall, and tall with dwarf produce "hybrids," these hybrids, 
 however, are all tall, but capable of producing both tall and 
 dwarf offspring. One-half are pure, it will be observed, 
 and one-half mixed showing this law of chance of which we 
 have spoken. 
 
 And now we may suggest the great usefulness to which 
 the Mcndelian theory may be put. We can, in advance, if we 
 know one or two generations of ancestors, be able to foretell 
 
 Ta ^ Dwarf 
 
 TaU-(Dxuarfs) 
 Tall 2 TaU-COiuarfs) 
 
 / I 
 
 Tall Tall Tall- (Dwarfs) 
 
 TaU Tall Tall 2 Tatt-(Duia.Tf s) Dwarf Dwarf Dua.rf 
 
 the ratio of the appearance of what is called a "unit of in- 
 heritance." 
 
 We have been speaking primarily of one characteristic 
 tallness, or the lack of it. This tallness we shall call one 
 unit. It is, of course, possible to complicate matters by 
 taking two units. We may take a green wrinkled pea and 
 a yellow smooth one and from this combination produce a 
 yellow wrinkled one and a green smooth one. Having four 
 factors we should not, however, have four possibilities, for 
 we found four possibilities where only two factors were 
 present, so in this case we have four times four possibilities 
 
56 The Begiimmgs of Science 
 
 appearing and so on, with each increase in the number of 
 factors. 
 
 The difficulties and the immense number of possible com- 
 binations which may occur in the human form with the 
 hundreds of unit characteristics may readily be inferred 
 from this. But to show what has been done, so we may not 
 be discouraged with what the future may hold for the science 
 of Genetics, it is possible even now, to predict the ratio of 
 children with curly hair; whether it be light or dark; the 
 color of the eyes and whether or not color-blindness will 
 appear. These are, of course, but minor examples to show 
 what is meant by the prediction of the appearance or non- 
 appearance of unit characteristics. 
 
 Father Mendel's work has turned all eyes to this great 
 principle of chance with its dominant and recessive char- 
 acters, so that now we have untold numbers of investigators 
 in the various fields of heredity, experimenting, searching, 
 gathering evidence and interpreting it. In the plant world 
 especially has much been done, and we have the Botanists 
 to thank for the greater part of our knowledge on the sub- 
 ject. Then the similarity of plant and animal world and 
 the impossibility of telling where the one ends and the other 
 commences, causes the application of the same theories to 
 the animal field and to the human ; for after all, aside from 
 animal and plant-breeders, the greatest interest lies in 
 whether or not we can, by intelligent forethought, cause the 
 child to be better equipped at birth than he now is. 
 
 We mean then, by Genetics, the study of the Biological 
 and Psychological inheritance and the development to 
 maturity of the offspring in all the world of life, but espe- 
 cially as applied to the human child. And every fact that 
 can be brought to bear upon a subject so vital of such 
 concern to every teacher every parent and every indi- 
 
Genetics 57 
 
 idual who has, or ever expects to have anything to do with 
 ihildren needs to be considered. It is the study of Indi- 
 /iduality as contradistinguished from the study of Species. 
 
 From the biological standpoint then, the great outstand- 
 ing factor is this, that "Structure determines Function." 
 We cannot perform any act whatsoever, unless we have an 
 organ with which to perform it ; but we must not forget that 
 Function in turn modifies the Structure, as we can readily 
 see in the massive muscular development of an athlete. 
 
 From the psychological point of view so simple a thing 
 as looking at a printed word and reading it, is a very com- 
 plex process, requiring not only the image thrown upon the 
 retina of the eye, but from there through the optic nerve 
 the image must be carried to that particular portion of the 
 brain which functions with the eye, and still further, through 
 the psyche or mind must then be translated into meaning. 
 And when it is remembered how long it took the child to 
 learn the alphabet how long it took then to learn to write 
 it actually to form words and lastly to get a meaning 
 out of these words and make them stand for actual sounds 
 and thoughts, one may with little imagination realize how 
 complex even simple acts are, and how extremely complex 
 the higher mental processes must be. 
 
 Everything we are, think and do, is determined to a very 
 large extent by what we are born with. This is what the 
 Psychologist means by a "biological setting." In other 
 words, if we did not have a good nervous system for every 
 act, no matter how simple or complex it may be, is perform- 
 able only through the nervous system at large, and the 
 co-ordinating organ, the brain, in particular it would be 
 impossible to learn anything well or do anything well, for 
 practically every seeming simple act is complex and it is 
 necessary for our central nervous system to co-ordinate all 
 
58 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 the many nerve arcs that enter in the action to be per- 
 formed. 
 
 Another way of putting the matter would be to say that 
 all we are and can be is determined by our instincts and our 
 habits, if we define instincts as being the sum total of every 
 tendency of the nervous system to function with which we 
 are born, and every habit, the acquirement of everything we 
 do after birth, never forgetting that a habit can only be 
 formed upon a tendency that is already present and capable 
 of performing. 
 
 We are born with certain nerve-arcs ready to function 
 in certain ways, which we have designated as "tendencies to 
 act," and that these tendencies be all normal ? we must have a 
 normal nervous system, which means in turn that we must 
 have a normal biological inheritance. 
 
 One of the findings of recent years is that different 
 people do not react to the same stimulus in the same way; 
 that each nervous system has a particular tendency to react 
 in certain ways to certain stimuli, and this divergence, or 
 variation of tendencies to react in certain ways, is the re- 
 sultant of Mendelian unit characteristics; that is, that just 
 in so far as a certain unit tendency was present in the 
 dominant parent, will it appear, not blending, but singly 
 and definitely, or be absent altogether. 
 
 The Psychologist is trying to build upon this biological 
 background, by finding out definitely what tendencies are 
 present in the child and developing these; or taking a rival 
 tendency and developing it, so that this latter may become 
 the stronger; for development or learning simply means the 
 bringing about of a habit founded upon an instinct that is 
 already there. It means that the strongest tendency will 
 always be the one chosen and that true learning, using the 
 word now as synonymous with education, means the choos- 
 
Genetics 59 
 
 ing, and by active usage, the developing of those mental 
 and moral tendencies which we wish to foster, so that these 
 will become the stronger and come naturally to the fore- 
 front at any given moment ; to force these desired tendencies 
 into active acting so often and so constantly that the whole 
 physical makeup responds even subconsciously in the man- 
 ner that we would have. As an example we may cite the 
 instance of a child just beginning practice on the violin. 
 The fingers on the left hand are pointed downward in readi- 
 ness to press upon the particular string in the particular 
 position required, but, very often the little finger points 
 almost directly toward the zenith instead of downward. 
 This is a natural tendency, for nature apparently did not 
 have the violin in mind when our hands were fashioned. 
 But notwithstanding instinct as here displayed, there is 
 also a tendency to bend the finger, though in this case 
 not so strong as is the tendency to lift it. Were there no 
 tendency to bend, we could not acquire the ability of which 
 we are speaking. So the teacher insists on bending the 
 finger into the desired position and though the student often 
 forgets and the finger will again assume an erect position, 
 still, by constantly insisting and forcing the finger, we 
 can bring about the condition in time that we wish, so 
 that after years of practice, the older tendency which was 
 really the stronger at first the one lifting the finger sky- 
 ward has been entirely superseded by the downward posi- 
 tion, and it is very difficult to make the finger follow out 
 the original tendency without considerable effort. This 
 is what the Germans call "einiibung" to drill into and 
 can only come by actual DOING and not reading about it. 
 It is from this principle that our laboratories have sprung, 
 so that students may themselves perform the experiments, 
 the tests mentioned, and feel the convincing power of actual 
 
60 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 DOING. 
 
 It has been well said, that an education is of no value 
 unless it makes one -feel differently in regard to the things 
 one sees, hears, and does, from what one did before having 
 such training. This means that any training must first, 
 through direct conscious effort, become so part and parcel 
 of the individual that it will in time become subconscious. 
 
 As an example of a training of this nature by actual 
 doing, though not directly applicable to school and class 
 work, an amusing occurrence came to light the other night 
 in one of the dormitories of the University. One of the 
 boys, formerly employed by an express company, sprang 
 from his bed as the passing train whistled, grasped a chair 
 and, using it as a truck, threw his neighbor's clothes thereon 
 and pushed his supposed truck around the bed several 
 times. Here the association of pushing a truck with the 
 whistle of the incoming train, having been so often con- 
 nected, started his muscles going through the entire process 
 of the work to which he had been accustomed. 
 
 When we make our training not a matter of memory, but 
 an association of this nature; when we are able to make 
 the individual adapt himself to his surroundings, or shape 
 his surroundings to himself, then we have performed our 
 task of training thoroughly. 
 
 It may be said that all the foregoing is self-evident, and 
 having been written in non-technical language it seems so. 
 Yet we are prone to forget that the simplest and most self- 
 evident things are just the ones that receive least attention 
 as a rule. 
 
 We are entirely too much inclined to accept a prominent 
 characteristic as the significant one. Just an example: 
 take Dementia Precox, a type of insanity to which youth 
 is prone. The child may be deeply interested in geography 
 
Genetics 61 
 
 and nothing but geography. He seems unable to become 
 satiated with his subject. He has no other interests. The 
 proud parents, not knowing otherwise, assume they have a 
 veritable prodigy. Suddenly he changes to some other 
 form of study or amusement just as whole-heartedly. He 
 must be a genius, they think, if he can become so terribly 
 engrossed in two different subjects, but just the reverse 
 is true. It is not astonishing that he knows so much about 
 one subject as it is astonishing that he cares so little for 
 anything else. In a short time the child knows practically 
 nothing and stops growing mentally, remaining at the men- 
 tal age of seven, nine, ten or whatever it may be, for the 
 rest of his days. 
 
 It is to be remembered that we have already laid stress 
 on the fact that an education is for the purpose of making 
 one feel differently toward things. Here then is the crux 
 of the entire subject. Our lives with few exceptions are made 
 up of emotions, not reasons. We like or dislike an in- 
 dividual, and should he whom we dislike do anything of 
 value, we assume he must have had some ulterior motive, 
 while he whom we love must have been sorely tempted to 
 do anything of which we disprove. We wish to demon- 
 strate this by calling attention to the fact that the parent 
 or teacher who loves the child most is the one least likely 
 to be of service to him. We all know that the physician does 
 not treat his own family in anything of a serious nature. 
 He calls in one to whom the patient is only a "case." There 
 must be no emotion in serious matters. 
 
 All of us have heard the statement "that if I hadn't seen 
 this with my own eyes, I should not have believed it," when 
 the speaker should have said, "I have seen this, but until 
 some one who is trained in this matter has passed judgment 
 I will not believe it." For one is very often deceived by 
 
68 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 confusing feelings with facts. Often people say they see 
 when in reality they do not, but only feel, or even only as- 
 sume the object to be as it seems to be. This is well 
 illustrated when we attend a picture show, where, though 
 we gaze at the screen for an hour and a half, the picture is 
 only actually before us about twenty per cent of that time, 
 but we really see something ah 1 the rest of the time we are 
 looking at the hero who has enraptured us. This seems more 
 or less absurd and yet it is true, for there is a tiny shutter 
 that keeps on closing the lens constantly and for much 
 more time than it remains open. For it takes a certain 
 length of time for an image to be seen after it is looked 
 at, and also, after the object has been removed it takes 
 some time before the image that was thrown upon the retina 
 fades away. In other words, one never knows the precise 
 moment when one begins to see anything, nor do we stop 
 seeing it when we stop looking. All these things are easily 
 demonstrable in the laboratory, but the point we are making 
 is this, that it requires a training, if one wishes to be sure 
 of his ground, even in the simplest matters, and this training 
 is what we mean by education, which, together with environ- 
 ment and heredity, form the triangle that constitutes the 
 basis of genetics in all its fullness. 
 
 Heredity, by some considered the greatest factor, is the 
 fulfillment of Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes' dictum that the 
 proper time to begin right living is two hundred years 
 before one is born, while environment and training, closely 
 related as they are, if used in their broadest sense, fulfill 
 the thought expressed by the proverb, "tell me with whom 
 you go, and I'll tell you what you are." 
 
 Education is not a natural process, but an artificial one, 
 based on natural tendencies. The natural way would be 
 to follow one's instincts regardless of what they were. And 
 
Genetics 63 
 
 we must not forget that we have both right and wrong 
 instincts and either can be made stronger than they are at 
 birth. In some, the right ones are already strong while 
 in others the reverse is true, and the important point to 
 be emphasized is that we can, through inheritance, see to 
 it that one or the other is already given the child at birth, 
 so that the terrible effort of changing them will be ma- 
 terially lessened or entirely overcome. 
 
 The next point is that the emotions are not the same in 
 every individual when the same thing is seen, heard or 
 touched. We must not judge others by how we feel, or think 
 we should feel under the same circumstances. It does not 
 follow that because a full grown individual reads something 
 evil into a picture play, that a child does likewise. And 
 from this we may infer that it may not be correct to judge 
 a child by our standards, but realize that he is in a process 
 of development, and the judging standard is relative. "Does 
 he do as well or better than the average of that particular 
 age?" is the criterion, and not "Does he do as well as I?" 
 
 And. lastly we must remember that it is in MEANINGS 
 in interpretations that we find our difficulties. We can 
 only interpret in terms of our own knowledge and experi- 
 ence, and so when we see men at a great distance, we know 
 they are of average size just the same, but in reality we 
 do not see men of average size, but very small men. The 
 child has not had this experience, and so he says actually 
 what is true, that he sees very tiny men, when viewed from 
 a distance. We older people usually tell him he is wrong 
 and insist upon his telling what he saw in terms of what 
 we know to be there. The child is often thought untruthful 
 by his elders, whereas it is they who are in error in their 
 statement that they can see men of average size at a dis- 
 tance. 
 
64 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 We have attempted to show some of the angles from 
 which Genetics can be viewed. We have not attempted to 
 answer any questions, but to state in as simple a language 
 as possible what is now held in this field. Some say that 
 the answers to the many questions that can be raised in this 
 study lie with Biology; others believe that Psychology can 
 do more, and yet others think that the Statistician holds 
 the key, in that he gathers all the facts with their relative 
 frequency and passes judgment upon them. Of the Psy- 
 chologists there are various factions, represented primarily 
 by the introspectionists on the one hand and the behaviorists 
 on the other ; the former believing that self -introspection may 
 throw light on our mental processes, while the behaviorists 
 believe that introspection is worthless, and that the child 
 must be studied as objectively as the animal of lower type 
 would be. That is, consciousness must be left out of the 
 question altogether, and a definite problem, fitted to the 
 child's organism, must be presented, and then an exact rec- 
 ord of the reaction resulting taken, and when every possible 
 act has been studied in this manner we shall have a quantity 
 of statistical matter from which we may be able to draw 
 up a theory that will give us what we seek. 
 
 As the matter now stands, the word "soul" no longer 
 appears in the psychological literature; "mind" was sub- 
 stituted for it some years back, but that, too, has been 
 relegated to the refuse heap of obsolete terms, to be replaced 
 by "psycho-physical reaction," words of "learned length 
 and thundering sound" that mean little. 
 
 The definition of Psychology itself has changed from 
 the "science of the soul" to that of the "science of con- 
 sciousness" and when it was later discovered that maybe 
 there was really more in the subconscious than in con- 
 sciousness itself, we have it defined as the "study of mental 
 
Genetics 65 
 
 phenomena," where it now stands. 
 
 Man, too, was supposed to have arisen in several ways, 
 one being from a hairy ape, from whom by a step-brother 
 removed, he parted company. But since Professor Hugo de 
 Vries, the great Dutch naturalist, brought forth his theory 
 of "sports in nature," and that these are often of the 
 dominant type and breed true, it has led the modern psy- 
 chologist and behaviorist, Professor John Watson, at least 
 to say that no one any longer looks for a missing link, 2 
 for we know that somewhere in the scale of evolution, Man, 
 by an immeasurable distance, separated himself from the rest 
 of the animal world. 
 
 Can we not see in this but another way of coming back 
 to our older and supposedly disproven doctrines? 
 
 But "stay," says the Alchemist to his weeping wife, in 
 Balzac's powerful novel, "stay, I have decomposed tears. 
 Tears contain a little phosphate of lime, some chloride of 
 soda, some mucus and some water." 
 
 Is that all that constitutes a tear? Is a mere reaction 
 to a stimulus, what we mean by life? 
 
 a Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, by John 
 B. Watson. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 THERE are three factors with which we constantly have 
 to deal in finding our starting point in any science : ( 1 ) 
 The "Fact" or observation itself; (2) The ability of the 
 scientist who announces an observation, or states a theory, 
 and (3) The honesty of such person in giving his views 
 to the world, for, it is perfectly conceivable that one who 
 knows more than any other man on a given subject may 
 still not be honest in his pronouncements, due to a desire 
 to bolster up some favorite theory, or to a so-decided idea 
 of his own correctness at all times, that but a single side 
 of what the observations may mean can be grasped. 
 
 In our chapter on "Authorities," we shall examine into 
 the method of ascertaining who is and who is not capable 
 of passing judgment in the fields of science that we are 
 here discussing. In this chapter we wish to show why it is 
 that we lay so much stress on the two branches of philoso- 
 phy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, which are absolutely 
 essential to any thorough understanding of any science. 
 
 Taking the first mentioned philosophical branch, we quote 
 the following from Professor William James' Briefer Course 
 in Psychology published in 1913, page 460. 
 
 What the word Metaphysic means. In the last chapter 
 we handed the question of free-will over to "metaphysics." 
 It would indeed have been hasty to settle the question abso- 
 lutely, inside the limits of psychology. Let psychology 
 frankly admit that for her scientific purposes determinism 
 
 66 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 67 
 
 may be claimed, and no one can find fault. If, then, it turn 
 out later that the claim has only a relative purpose, and 
 may be crossed by counter-claims, the readjustment can be 
 made. Now ethics makes such a counter-claim; and the 
 present writer, for one, has no hesitation in regarding her 
 claim as the stronger, and in assuming that our wills are 
 "free." For him, then, the deterministic assumption of psy- 
 chology is merely provisional and methodological. This is 
 no place to argue the ethical point ; and I only mention the 
 conflict to show that all these special sciences, marked off 
 for convenience from the remaining body of truth, must 
 hold their assumptions and results subject to revision in the 
 light of each others needs. The forum where they hold dis- 
 cussions is called metaphysics. Metaphysics means only an 
 unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consist- 
 ently. The special sciences all deal with data that are full 
 of obscurity and contradiction: but from the point of view 
 of their limited purposes these defects may be overlooked. 
 Hence, the disparaging use of the same metaphysics which is 
 so common. To a man with a limited purpose, any discus- 
 sion that is over-subtle for that purpose is branded as 
 "Metaphysical." A geologist's purposes fall short of under- 
 standing Time itself. A mechanist need not know how 
 action and reaction are possible at all. A psychologist has 
 enough to do without asking how both he and the mind 
 which he studies are able to have cognizance of the same 
 outer world. But it is obvious that problems irrelevant 
 from one standpoint may be essential from another. And 
 as soon as one's purpose is the attainment of the maximum 
 of possible insight into the world as a whole, the meta- 
 physical puzzles become the most urgent ones of all. 
 Psychology contributes to general philosophy her full share 
 of these. 
 
 It has been deemed best to quote this entire paragraph, 
 as Professor James is without doubt one of the most quoted 
 of men and one deemed by his compeers as being as worthy 
 of being quoted in his field as any other American writer. 
 
68 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 What he says is simply another way of saying that if a 
 man does not want to become a "specialist" in the sense 
 that the late Elbert Hubbard defined, as being "A man who 
 only knew enough to know one thing," it is more than nec- 
 essary to go a little beyond the physical world, which is 
 all that Metaphysics means (meta meaning beyond, or after 
 physics, that is, it is the discussion that follows the physical 
 sciences and gives the grounds on which they rest, and with- 
 out which they could not be possible), i. e., going further 
 back deeper down than the merely sensible (those things 
 that come under the senses) and finding a starting point 
 that is more than a mere supposition. In other words, he 
 should, if he really deserves the title of a thoroughly edu- 
 cated man and scientist, know that, while it is interesting 
 for the painter to examine very closely the grain of the 
 wood going into a building and for the mason to examine 
 the stone-work, still we have the entire building to con- 
 sider, and only in so far as these details of stone-work and 
 lumber and grain contribute toward the fullness and beauty 
 and value of the entire structure is it Vorth anything in 
 the final analysis. And so any science is but a special branch 
 of life, and its work, no matter how interesting in and of 
 itself, must be looked at from the world-viewpoint to find 
 its exact place and fitting value. Each one of the sciences 
 is sorely needed, and every detail of that science may result 
 in any quantity of value, but it must be balanced with all 
 the other sciences, and this balancing is always the work 
 of philosophy and not that of the laboratory man. For 
 philosophy means to find ultimate causes. Whenever a man 
 thinks, he philosophizes, and whenever he observes, that is, 
 whenever he only sees a thing and finds that he can always 
 see the same thing under the same circumstances he is what 
 is at least popularly known as a scientist. The moment he 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 69 
 
 puts his observations together and tells what they mean, 
 he enters the field of philosophy. 
 
 We do not accept the definition that we are here stating, 
 for we contend and hold that the only true science is philos- 
 ophy, and it is no very difficult matter to look at any ency- 
 clopedia or other work of similar nature and note that 
 every man who stands at all well in any scientific specialty, 
 obtained that standing by his philosophizing and not by his 
 science, using the term "science" in the sense which men 
 at large use it, that is as a worker with laboratory objects 
 that come under the senses. We wish likewise to show that 
 every objective discovery that means anything, has to be 
 thought about, for meanings can only be given through 
 thought-processes, and thought-processes by no means come 
 under the senses. 
 
 Further, every fact, whether physical or otherwise, must 
 rest in the final analysis on what we call "First Prin- 
 ciples.," and "First Principles" are what we find as self- 
 evident; they cannot be proved. These principles must be 
 accepted and are, by every educated man in every walk of 
 life, for without them the entire world of intellect and 
 thought would be hopeless chaos and could not exist at all. 
 These principles, we say, illumine the intellect, that is, with- 
 out their acceptance there could not be anything at all 
 that would mean anything to the human mind. There 
 could be no science, no connected speech, no thought, no 
 telling another what one meant or felt or thought. It is 
 the light that makes all that we have possible and under- 
 standable. But -to say that First Principles can be ex- 
 perimented on in the laboratory is absurd. First Prin- 
 ciples are not sensible things and what is not sensible 
 cannot come under the senses, and what cannot come under 
 the senses surely cannot be tested in the laboratory, for all 
 
70 The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 that physical science means is the testing of, and finding 
 laws in the world of things that do come tinder the senses, 
 so that even in Psychology as used by Professor James in 
 the passage quoted, he has separated that science into two 
 parts without any connecting link. He is speaking of 
 Physiological Psychology only, that is, the effects of the 
 physical states of the body on the mind and vice versa; 
 not the study of the mind in itself, this latter is called 
 Rational Psychology. 
 
 To show what a few of these necessarily accepted Prin- 
 ciples are, we may mention the necessity of assuming that 
 what we see, actually corresponds to what is actually be- 
 fore us: i. e., that the senses do not lie. We must accept 
 that when we hear anything, there is a sound that we hear 
 and that it must be akin to what we actually do hear; 
 we must accept that we are capable of thinking, and that 
 speech is capable of telling our thoughts to another, and 
 that those to whom we tell them are constituted as is the 
 speaker, so that the telling means the same to one as to 
 the other. 
 
 The very fact that we think, shows a thinking individ- 
 ual and a thing thought about. This brings about the 
 idea of relationship, for, if we are conscious of thinking and 
 of something thought about, we immediately understand that 
 here are two totally separate things, which bear more or less 
 relationship to each other. And there are many things 
 in every-day science that we accept only on a showing of 
 this relationship, without ever being able to find, or bring 
 under any of the senses the things themselves of which we 
 are absolutely positive. For example, this is true of atoms 
 and molecules and electrons, which no one has ever seen 
 and yet all accept. It is true of gases, which can be 
 known only through their relationships, for our senses ca.n- 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 71 
 
 not distinguish them, except through such relationship; 
 and so also, electricity is known only by its effects, which 
 is another way of saying, by its relationships. 
 
 Now, if we accept Rene Descartes' philosophy, and it 
 is this philosophy which most men of science seem to hold, 
 we must begin as he began, with the statement, "I think, 
 therefore, I am." But here again we find what we have just 
 been insisting must be done, namely, to accept something as 
 a foundation that cannot be proven, and this little state- 
 ment of Descartes is his First Principle. It is on this 
 First Principle that he and his followers build their theory 
 of knowledge (a theory of knowledge is all that Epistemol- 
 ogy means) which may be summed up like this: that if 
 one has a clear and distinct perception of a thing, then it 
 must be true. De Lamennais in his "Defense" of an essay 
 he had written, gives an amusing account of a supposed 
 dialogue between a lunatic and a Cartesian ( as the followers 
 of Descartes came to be called). The lunatic claimed to be 
 Descartes himself, and the Cartesian insisted that this was 
 impossible because Descartes had then been dead some 
 hundred and fifty or two hundred years, to which the lunatic 
 responded, by asking how the Cartesian knew that he him- 
 self existed. Receiving the answer, of course, that he 
 "thought" and therefore knew that "he existed," as well as 
 having a "clear and distinct perception" of that fact, the 
 lunatic called to the Cartesian's attention that he (th.e lu- 
 natic) also , "knew" himself to be Descartes himself, be- 
 cause, he, too, "thought and had a clear and distinct" 
 idea that he was what he claimed to be. The Cartesian 
 walked away slowly murmuring, "I was right, the poor fel- 
 low is mad what a pity! Still he is none the worse Car- 
 tesian for that." 
 
 To the philosopher then the statement that a man ac- 
 
72 The Begwrwngs of Science 
 
 cepts nothing but facts that can be proven in the laboratory, 
 this whole procedure savors hugely of a joke, and yet daily 
 we hear these same empty remarks passed about. 
 
 There is no doubt that two friends, unable to agree on 
 politics, may yet discuss all other subjects with perfect 
 equanimity, and that, knowing their shortcomings in the 
 realm of political discussion, agree among themselves not 
 to mention the forbidden subject. This is exactly the 
 situation with laboratory men. They cannot agree on any- 
 thing whose evidence does not come from and through the 
 laboratory, so they have simply agreed not to discuss any- 
 thing outside of the evidence so obtained. This does not 
 imply that there is nothing beyond the laboratory, or that 
 that which is beyond is not of more value than is that 
 which comes from the laboratory, any more than the case 
 cited of the friends and their non-discussion of politics ar- 
 gues for their being no such thing as politics or that that 
 subject may not be of vastly more importance than the 
 trifles they may discuss constantly. It is svmply an agree- 
 ment ', and has nothing whatever to do with lightness or 
 wrongness, or with better or worse, and it is only those 
 who, through ignorance, or a desire to make capital out 
 of the ignorance of others, use this as an argument that 
 scientists are opposed to the things they do not discuss, 
 such as religion, for example. One can easily see that 
 to come to such a conclusion, the facts are neither known nor 
 used. 
 
 It is no wonder, then, that many have come to a sim- 
 ilar conclusion, i. e., that Metaphysics is worthless because 
 it is not discussed in the laboratory, and have assumed 
 that there must therefore be something in laboratory evi- 
 dence which has disproven it, that there is nothing beyond 
 what the sensible evidence can present but we think Pro- 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 73 
 
 fessor James' paragraph makes this viewpoint untenable. 
 
 Further, we must not forget that Faith means only the 
 acceptance of evidence on the authority of another, and 
 without Faith, no science would be possible, for no single 
 individual can possibly work out the details of every prob- 
 lem that confronts humanity. One must take a thousand 
 things on Faith and Faith alone, for every detail of life 
 for which one finds the evidence for oneself ; and if we carry 
 this idea, here slightly developed, to its logical conclusion, 
 we should have to say that in as much as many people 
 accept such statements as we have just condemned on pure 
 faith, and if superstition means anything it means just 
 that accepting a lot pf untruths, simply because one 
 wishes to believe surely these people who say they accept 
 nothing on faith are the most hopelessly superstitious of 
 any people known, in that they do not even have the justi- 
 fication of the men in ages past, who believed that an all- 
 powerful God could and did perform miracles, whereas these 
 latter assume that the magic wand of "so-called science" 
 can do the very things they condemned simple people for 
 believing an Infinite Agency could perform. 
 
 Note that we say "so-called science," for it is not science 
 that tells us any such foolish things, but those men who, 
 having a smattering of scientific terms, and a superficial 
 knowledge of one branch of that immense subject, or who, 
 having some pet doctrine to bolster up, constantly write 
 and publish their writings, until the poor layman, unable to 
 pass judgment, and seeing the vast flood of literature on 
 the subject staring him in the face from every newspaper 
 and magazine, concludes that because this man knows how 
 to advertise himself and keep himself before the public, 
 therefore he must be a very great man in his field, and 
 consequently accepts his doctrines as the truth. Most! 
 
74 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 often, however, the man of science is hardly known out- 
 side the immediate circle of workers in his chosen realm. 
 
 This is well exemplified in the naming of America. All 
 of us are familiar from our school histories that there was 
 a man called Americus Vespucius, who wrote on the sub- 
 ject of our land, then newly discovered, and that another 
 man, also a writer, not knowing of Columbus, and only 
 having read the works of Americus, assumed that he must 
 be the truly great man, and therefore in his volume, the 
 name of America was given to the New World. If our very 
 land was christened in this erroneous manner, we ought to 
 have a good example constantly before us, of how not to 
 get our scientific dicta. 
 
 Most people forget that it was not so many centuries 
 ago (five or six) that all the English speaking people in 
 the world were not many more than the inhabitants of Chi- 
 cago number at present. They forget that in the four- 
 teenth century a great reign of disease called "the black 
 plague" overran the land and killed over half of these, and 
 that from these few people, inhabiting a very small island 
 away from the continent of Europe, isolated from the 
 great world at large, we draw most of our ideas of history, 
 of religion, of law and of science. 
 
 That is, this land of England, had a more circumscribed 
 view of the world at large than other lands had, yet, 
 because we in this land of ours speak English, we feel, 
 through the bonds of Language, the false idea that whatever 
 is written in our own tongue must be best. We forget, for 
 example, that immediately after Henry VIII's time it was 
 only possible to write things praiseworthy regarding the 
 state church, because this was the acknowledged religion, 
 and that for over three hundred years, Englishmen could 
 discuss anything and everything but religion in a historic 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 75 
 
 spirit. 
 
 It requires no great intellect to understand that if through 
 three hundred years the generations of children born and 
 bred in England were forced to listen to fulsome praise of 
 their own sect, and never a good word regarding an insti- 
 tution that gave them the very civilization and strength by 
 which they upheld that civilization, that these children would 
 form an intense hatred for a Church thus condemned, and 
 that for no other reason than because they accepted on faith 
 that which was in turn taught them. Bear in mind these 
 people were not dishonest. They were the result of dishon- 
 esty, but the point to be insisted on here is that in matters of 
 history (because the Church was the maker of history dur- 
 ing the Middle Ages), any one not being able to read any lan- 
 guage other than English any one in England, during these 
 three hundred years, unless he was able to smuggle in vol- 
 umes from other lands, could not get a correct account 
 of history- or religion for many, many centuries, and this 
 is why we, who speak English, are at a greater disadvan- 
 tage, unless we go to other nations, than possibly any other 
 race under heaven, to get at a just valuation of the past. 
 
 This is mentioned in the interest of philosophy and not 
 of religion, for we cannot get a broad world-view unless 
 we have a proper perspective, and that we can get only 
 if we realize that to us, who speak English, has been lost 
 for three hundred years an intellectual ancestor with whom 
 we must again become acquainted, and that from reliable 
 sources. 
 
 The average laboratory worker as well as the average col- 
 lege student assumes that if he start on the subject of Meta- 
 physics or any other branch of philosophy, he will get noth- 
 ing tangible nothing that he can grasp. He assumes it 
 will all be vague and not like the experiments he has been ac- 
 
76 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 customed to perform, and because he has seen the many 
 conclusions that can be drawn from the same premises, the 
 very bewilderment of it all, the immensity of the subject, 
 the vast quantities of literature on philosophy, all frighten 
 him into the easier path, of total neglect. And some who 
 wish to go on, fear for themselves, knowing, for example, 
 that the Scholastics used their philosophy to prove the va- 
 lidity of the Catholic position, and not wanting to have 
 anything to do with Catholicity, they will not even inves- 
 tigate the only system of philosophy that has held mil- 
 lions in sway for over seven hundred years and which 
 to-day is coming back into its own, as witness, Professor 
 De Wulf of Louvain, now at Harvard; and Johns Hopkins 
 University offering a Professorship in Scholastic Philosophy 
 to the Jesuits, which latter, however, was declined. 1 Wit- 
 ness also the statement of Professor William James, written 
 shortly before his death, that he would have to accept the 
 Scholastic viewpoint or throw all logic to the winds. 2 
 
 It is, of course, permissible to start anywhere, provided 
 all parties to the discussion are agreed. It is perfectly 
 legitimate for the Mormon elder to start with "you all 
 agree that Joseph Smith was the chosen leader of God," 
 provided all his hearers already accept that view, but it 
 would likewise be very unreasonable to begin in that way 
 
 1( rhe Catholic Educational Association Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 2, 
 February, 1913. Page 21. 
 
 2 "I saw that I must either forswear that 'psychology without a 
 soul' to which my whole psychological and Kantian education had com- 
 mitted me, I must in short bring back distinct spiritual agents to know 
 the mental states, now singly, now in combination, in a word bring back 
 scholasticism and common-sense or else I must squarely confess the 
 solution of the problem impossible, and then either give up my intel- 
 lectualist logic, the logic of identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) 
 form of rationality, or finally, face the fact that life is logically irra- 
 tional. . . . Those of us who are scholastic-minded, will smile at the 
 elaborate groans of my parturient mountain resulting in nothing but this 
 mouse." Page 208, of the "Pluralistic Universe," by Wm. James. 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 77 
 
 to a crowd of people who ridiculed Joseph Smith and con- 
 sidered him an impostor. So there is no fault to be found 
 when men agree to limit the work under discussion, but 
 where fault is to be found, and that most strenuously, is 
 where, because after a few generations of such training, 
 the new student is taught to accept the doctrine that because 
 men of the physical sciences start at a given point, there 
 can be nothing beyond that point. Men who permit students 
 to accept this viewpoint are neither scientists nor philoso- 
 phers and would deserve scant treatment were it not for the 
 fact that some of them occupy high places, and by virtue 
 of their positions, can, and do, mislead many, for it seems 
 to be a characteristic of human nature, to follow men 
 who know much in one line, assuming that because of this 
 they must know much in every line. 
 
 Enough, then, has been said to show that the very basis 
 of science rests on a necessary assumption, pure and simple. 
 In other words, we start somewhere, and that on unproved 
 truths in every science and in every piece of work that man- 
 kind does. In both philosophy and in science we begin 
 with what are called First Principles, or self-evident truths. 
 It is of the utmost importance that this be clearly under- 
 stood that every science and every philosophy must begin 
 with some accepted Principles, that is, with certain definite 
 truths that cannot be physically proved. Every suggestion 
 that a materialist makes, every "fact" he mentions, can be 
 proved only on the basis of these First Principles, which 
 are not "facts" at all in accordance with his definition. 
 They are only the starting point, and as they cannot be 
 proved, he must admit that in the final analysis he must 
 depend on totally unproved points to give any validity to 
 his further philosophizing. 
 
 Now, if every starting point must be a series of accepted 
 
78 The Begwwimgs of Science 
 
 truths that is, First Principles we can and must have 
 a branch of study, call it philosophy or science, whatever 
 you will, that aims to formulate a "theory of knowledge," 
 i. e., a study, that gives us a validity for our reasoning, 
 that tells us what we can know, and how we can know it, 
 and weighs the continuity and universality of the First 
 Principles thus found. This is called Epistemology, and 
 means only that we try to sift to the ultimate all that we 
 can know; for surely, if we admit that we can know any- 
 thing, we ought to be able to tell what we can know, and 
 just how we can be sure that we know it. It aims to give us 
 criteria. In other words, Epistemology attempts to answer 
 x the question, "What can I know, and how can I be sure 
 that my answers are correct after I get them?" 
 
 One often feels one knows a thing, but from a scientific 
 standpoint this is worthless ; one must know, and be able 
 to give an intelligent reason for that knowledge, and that 
 can be given only on the proof of First Principles. 
 
 Truth is absolute in the Scholastic Philosophy. It is 
 not in the Pragmatic, but the meanings of the same word 
 are changed in the two schools. Because some "so-called 
 truths" are not absolute, it does not follow that no truth 
 is absolute. But surely it is much wiser to continue the 
 older method of defining truth as "the correspondence be- 
 \: tween the idea one has of a thing, and the thing itself." 
 This does not mean that it is necessary to see life from 
 two sides only that things must be on one side or the 
 other that is, that there are only two alternatives. Life 
 is entirely too complex for any such viewpoint, and any 
 mind that only sees two points of view is entirely incapable 
 of passing judgment on any subject that requires a wide 
 range of vision. 
 
 Professor James says that "Metaphysics means only an 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 79 
 
 unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistent- 
 ly." The Scholastic would say that as Metaphysics means 
 the study of that on which all physical science depends, 
 it obstinately -forces one to think correctly and consist- 
 ently. 
 
 It is the almost hopeless confusion caused by not think- 
 ing clearly and consistently, as well as the lack of a stand- 
 ard use of words, that give rise to most of our difficulties 
 in the realm of thought. An excellent example and one 
 bearing directly on the subject so frequently met with is 
 the varying meanings given by different writers to the word 
 "law." By some it means a custom of the people crystal- 
 lized into a written code, the breaking of which is the oc- 
 casion of punishment of the offender. The law itself having 
 been formulated by a law-giver, whether a single individual, 
 such as Moses or Lycurgus, or by a body of legislators. 
 Then there is the other law which we are constantly using 
 in the realm of science, and which, because it is the same 
 word, is so constantly confused, and the meaning of the 
 word, as explained above, given to it, when it is as different 
 as day is from night, for a "law" in the physical universe 
 means only that, in so far as we know, a particular following 
 of one thing after a similar antecedent under the same con- 
 ditions, has no exceptions. This kind of a "law" has abso- 
 lutely nothing whatever to do with the kind of a law men- 
 tioned first. The first "law" is a moral affair, telling what 
 is right and wrong in the moral order; the second hasn't 
 a thing in the world to do with right and wrong it is 
 totally disconnected with any moral bearing of any kind. 
 It is merely an order of happenings to which we as yet 
 know no exceptions. It means the arrangement of a suc- 
 cession of events or phenomena, and is found by observa- 
 tion; and, it may be that at some future time an exception 
 
80 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 may be discovered, and then it will cease to be a "law." 
 Though of course a law in either sense used above implies a 
 reason for that law or, as often said, any law demands a 
 law-giver. This was even admitted by Professor Plate, a 
 very decided Monist, in the famous biological discussion 
 which took place in Berlin in 1907. 3 
 
 Now all science is based not only on First Principles 
 (remember not on physical facts), but also on the further 
 supposition that every regular succession of events from 
 antecedents similarly conditioned .implies a law, and always 
 follows in the same path, under the same conditions that it 
 does now. In fact, there could be no laboratory evidence 
 at all no physical science if we thought that the same 
 event or phenomena would not always take place in the same 
 way under exactly the same conditions; in other words, if 
 we thought that different effects could come from exactly 
 the same causes under the same conditions. 
 
 It must be admitted, even without proof, that every effect 
 needs a cause, and there could be no science at all without 
 this belief. It must be further assumed that the same causes 
 have always led to the same effects, do now and will so 
 continue; always, of course, the same conditions being like- 
 wise assumed. That is, we have observed during historic 
 time that the same effects have always flown from the same 
 causes under the same conditions, and on this continuity 
 and perpetual law, we have formulated other laws. But ev- 
 ery scientist admits that things were not always as they now 
 are. Life was not always upon the earth. If we suppose 
 the earth to have once been a very hot mass of matter, so 
 hot that it was molten, we know that even if there had been 
 living matter then it was killed, for no germ, even of the 
 most persevering type, has been able to stand much more 
 
 'The Problem of Evolution, by Erich Wasmann, S. J. (Herder). 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 81 
 
 than a temperature of 165 degrees Centigrade, so surely, 
 when the heat ran into thousands of degrees, life was not 
 there. It does no good to suggest that meteors and other 
 falling bodies, or dust from other planets may have brought 
 life to this globe of ours, for these other planets were once 
 molten also, so it is only pushing the problem back farther 
 but not giving any answer. IT MUST HAVE STARTED 
 SOME WHERE AT SOME TIME. But we know from all 
 our evidence that Life comes only from Life. No one 
 has yet been able to show that life can come from non-living 
 matter, and yet we are confronted with the fact that as we 
 have life now but did not have, at some remote age of the 
 past, life must have come from non-living matter, or a 
 creation must have taken place. But the point here made 
 is that we have a break in the very law, at the outset, on 
 which all our science is based. For we must never forget 
 that without continuity of laws, there are really no laws, 
 and if there are no laws we have no science. We want to 
 impress most firmly these very first things necessary to a 
 proper understanding of science and its limits. 
 
 Again calling attention to Professor James' paragraph, 
 and to what we have said above, in all physical science 
 we must start at some point on which all are agreed, regard- 
 less of whether there is more evidence -for some other pomt 
 or not. For, as Professor James says, he accepts deter- 
 minism for his science, though believing that his opponents 
 are more correct in not accepting it. But there are two 
 distinct sciences here involved, one Ethics, the other Phys- 
 iological Psychology, and for Physiological Psychology we 
 can, by accepting determinism as merely relative, and capa- 
 ble of being dropped at any time, deem it of considerable 
 value in working out our problems of Psychology on a purely 
 physical basis. Yet in Ethics, we must accept the opposite 
 
82 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 doctrine or we soon cease to have any Ethics, for this sci- 
 ence is in turn a branch of Rational Psychology. 
 
 To the lay mind this may seem like a hopeless muddle, 
 and it is just this that puts the philosopher in a world 
 by himself and makes him so thoroughly misunderstood by 
 those who are unfamiliar with the mass of detail that he 
 tries to weave into a meaningful whole. He is often ridi- 
 culed for his nice distinctions, and yet, through all this 
 ridicule, the man who KNOWS, has through all the ages 
 been respected and also feared and, as shown by our quota- 
 tion in an early chapter, from President Hibben, his ideas 
 have at last become the "maxims of the crowd." He has 
 been ridiculed; for the man with lesser intellect, being un- 
 able to grasp great depths, or unwitting to put forth the 
 years of effort required to understand a subject fully, wishes 
 always to justify himself, and thinks the easiest way is that 
 of condemning and ridiculing what he can not understand; 
 but always in an emergency he calls on the man who knows. 
 It has ever been so, and the leading weapon of objectors 
 has always been ridicule, for they work on the principle 
 of the elder attorney giving the young one the advice, that 
 when the law was on his side, to quote the law; when the 
 facts were on his side, to quote the facts and forget the 
 law; but, when neither facts nor law were on his side, to 
 ridicule his opponent. 
 
 When, then, there is an incapacity for understanding, 
 ridicule is resorted to, and it calms the qualms of him who 
 resorts to it, by making him feel he has the best of the 
 argument. 
 
 Summing up, we may say, we start all scientific work on 
 First Principles, which means only an assumption of things 
 that are self-evident. Then we agree to start on some 
 theory and work it out, contrary to the usual belief that 
 
Metaphysics and Epistemology 83 
 
 the evidence is first sifted and then the theory propounded. 
 So, having our First Principles and our Theory, we are 
 ready to experiment, or to observe. Then we check up, and 
 find, metaphysically, whether our First Principles are ac- 
 ceptable or not ; whether there is or was any possible chance 
 for wrong observation; whether, under the same circum- 
 stances the experiment varies ; whether a thousand and one 
 things were just as they should have been, including our 
 instruments, the atmosphere, the eye-sight of the worker, 
 etc., and whether the observer's theory has blinded him to 
 anything but favorable results ; for, knowing the answer he 
 seeks, he all too often like the schoolboy, who, knowing 
 in advance what the answer to his problem may be, obtains 
 the results expected but by a most marvelous complexity 
 of invalid work. 
 
 * Then, and then only, after finding that other observers' 
 findings agree with his own, has he the material with which 
 to work. But now he must produce his links in the chain 
 that he is forging. Only the crude iron has so far been 
 found, now it needs hammering, and changing, to be welded 
 into links, and these separate links, in turn, must be joined 
 together to make the perfect chain. The bare -facts are only 
 the metal; the separate sciences (called also the special sci- 
 ences) are the links, and the chain is the logical whole, 
 welded together with a proper regard for every separate link, 
 with a pounding here and a pressure there, discarding, wait- 
 Ing for further material to make a link still stronger and 
 greater so it may truly fit with the remaining ones, some- 
 times missing a link, but trying to make each as symmetric 
 as possible, so that the whole chain forms that true mark of 
 workmanship that every man hopes -for, when he works to 
 obtain perfection, and this Is all the work of that other 
 great branch of Philosophy called LOGIC. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 IX>GIC 
 
 MR. BALFOUR, in his volume on philosophy, pub- 
 lished in 1896, makes the very definite statement that 
 "A sound epistemology is at the basis of all science. 1 This 
 we have tried to show in our immediately preceding chapter, 
 but as this is not a text-book of the special sciences, nor 
 of philosophy, but a statement of their value, we shall not 
 enter into any more detailed study of this particular branch, 
 but furnish a list of volumes at the end of our work, so 
 that he who wishes may delve as deeply as he likes in any 
 of the special sciences mentioned. He will thus learn that 
 there are men equally intelligent, who hold decidedly con- 
 trary doctrines on nearly every subject, though usually 
 these doctrines are formulated from the same facts. This 
 chapter will therefore take up the method of formulating 
 theories and doctrines. 
 
 We wish to quote another line from Mr. Balfour's work. 
 "The argument from 'an authority' or 'authorities' is al- 
 most always useless as a foundation for a system of belief." 
 And commenting on this, Professor St. George Mivart says, 
 "More than this : it is and must always be not only useless 
 but absurd. Every system of belief must repose (1) upon 
 self-evident principles; () upon our conception of the fact 
 of our continuous existence, and (3) on the evident validity 
 of our logical reasoning." 2 
 
 ir The Foundations of Belief, by Arthur Balfour. 
 3 "Balfour's Philosophy," by St. George Mivart, American Catholic 
 Quarterly Review, January, 1896. 
 
 84 
 
Logic 85 
 
 This bears out what we have been insisting upon in our 
 previous chapters, namely, that all science starts with self- 
 evident principles; that to go on from here we must ac- 
 cept the doctrine that all data and theories would be worth- 
 less were we not positive that every effect must and always 
 does follow the same cause under the same circumstances and 
 conditions in other words, we must accept the doctrine of 
 continuity, and lastly, we must accept the third part of the 
 triad, that all theories, all proofs, all arguments must be 
 logical, and it is to this subject we shall devote this chap- 
 ter. 
 
 For the mere facts gathered, whether in the schools or 
 from the experiences of life are but the crude material 
 from which to construct our chain. The separate sciences 
 are the individual links, and now, having these, we must 
 try to stand on an elevation where we can see the result 
 of all the special sciences woven together we must try to 
 be philosophers, and, as such, weld our chain from the 
 separate links at our disposal. That is the object of Logic, 
 and it must be understood before any one in any science 
 can make his work mean anything. For surely it will be 
 conceded that if one has spent the years in merely accu- 
 mulating brick, it is a reasonable question to ask what is 
 going to be done with the gathered material; and just so 
 reasonable is it to ask of an observer, after his note-books 
 are filled with the facts he has accumulated, what he is 
 going to do with them all. 
 
 We may readily admit that the things he has seen are 
 interesting, just as the wonderful Chinese figures and writ- 
 ings are interesting, but what do they mean? And this is 
 where all the wranglings come in. We all agree on the 
 "facts 19 ; we do not agree on what these same facts mean. 
 No man can be even reasonably sure, intellectually, of any 
 
86 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 opinion he passes on any subject unless he knows some- 
 thing about Logic. He may be able to reason correctly and 
 may do so, but he has no rides by which he may KNOW 
 that he is reasoning correctly, without such knowledge. So 
 that, in lines of work with which he is pre-eminently familiar, 
 his opinions may be worth a great deal, though he cannot 
 tell why he thinks as he does, but the moment some one tells 
 him something of some other line of work, or he reads an 
 article on a subject of which he knows little, it is an easy 
 matter to state fact and fancy side by side, and he will 
 not know "which is which." This is Logic's great value, 
 for, even in the daily walks of life, it enables one, though 
 the opinion be passed in totally unfamiliar fields, to stop the 
 speaker, and ask w r hat the "facts" the observed facts 
 really are and what proof there may be for them. Then 
 to be able to point one's finger at the weak place in the argu- 
 ment and say, "But here is where the facts end ; now you are 
 philosophizing, and I want to follow step by step. I do 
 not want your assumptions or opinions, I want to know 
 HOW YOU GET THAT OPINION by what process and that 
 every successive step taken to build it is valid!" Logic is 
 used daily in the market-place, in the forum, in the physi- 
 cian's office ; without it no reasoning could be done ; no busi- 
 ness transacted; no thought uttered that would mean any- 
 thing; and it is due to the ignorance of the laws of Logic 
 that so many people are misled by untruths; by erroneous 
 reasoning, into paths from which they fain would extricate 
 themselves. 
 
 It does not follow from this that each and every one 
 knows Logic. Few do. But men use it, just as the child 
 speaks its mother tongue long before it learns its gram- 
 mar, and Logic is the grammar of thought. As grammar 
 is the method of permitting the child to check himself up 
 
Logic 87 
 
 and find whether or not he is correct in the usage of his 
 language, so also, while the child may speak a perfect Eng- 
 lish because he is always with those who do speak correctly, 
 and while some may reason correctly because they are con- 
 stantly associated with those who use good reasoning meth- 
 ods, still, even then such a one could not be considered at 
 all educated, for, to be able to do a thing without being 
 able to explain why and how one does it, does not speak 
 for intellectuality; and so any one wishing to be able to 
 do his thinking well and correctly, must, if he care at all 
 to know that he is correct, study his Logic. 
 
 The reason for this will be made the more evident when 
 the ending of the preceding chapter and the beginning of 
 the present one are remembered. For to weld our chain 
 we must build up our matter step by step, until we have 
 made it into a complete whole. 
 
 That is, every scientific theory, every scientific law, every 
 thing that amounts to anything, whether good or bad, in 
 science, philosophy, religion, business, law, medicine or any 
 other walk of life every thought that is formed on another 
 thought, every series of ideas, every opinion on any sub- 
 ject, and every judgment passed, must be logical to be 
 worth anything. 
 
 We must start with a premise. We start with something 
 on which both sides are agreed. This premise may or may 
 not be correct m itself, but one can get nowhere without 
 this starting-point. Logic does not assure us that our 
 premise our starting point is correct. That lies with 
 First Principles and with Epistemology with Certitude. 
 Logic only shows us how to reason correctly after we have 
 established what we are going to reason about. 
 
 This is all in the "abstract," as contradistinguished from 
 the "concrete." In other words, we have nothing tangible, 
 
88 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 nothing that comes under the senses. It is all a matter of 
 mental processes, and therefore these studies are very dif- 
 ficult to the majority of men and women, who can think 
 only in terms of the sense-world. But as we have just shown, 
 that while we must use the sensible things on which to build, 
 yet our superstructure must come from the mental part of 
 ourselves. One must either admit this or cease thinking. 
 There is no alternative, and there is no dispute among the 
 learned on this point. No one insists that thought itself 
 is material, though some have thought it was a direct ema- 
 nation from the material, one ardent materialist even going 
 so far as to think it a secretion, such as the gastric juice 
 from the stomach or the bile from the liver, but gastric juice 
 and bile are both material substances while thought is not. 
 
 It is just because it requires sustained mental effort that 
 so few enter philosophical fields, yet we shall show that 
 every man considered a scientist and acknowledged as such 
 by his fellow workers, is acknowledged as such on account 
 of his reasoning that is, on account of his Logic, which 
 again is philosophy that there has never been a man in any 
 walk of life who has won any regard from his fellow-men, 
 which did not come from his philosophy from his manner of 
 thinking. There is no case on record, so far as the author has 
 been able to find, where any scientific work has ever been done 
 by man that was not the result of thought somewhere ex- 
 pressed, and all thought is under the dominion of philosophy. 
 
 This is so true that Professor Huxley, considered by any 
 number of men as one of the great men of science, has gone 
 , on record as saying that he regrets that the term "applied 
 science" was ever invented. That the men who invent, 
 who do things, are not scientists at all, but simply work- 
 men putting scientific ideas into practice. Yet the aver- 
 age man, were he asked who the greatest scientists were, 
 
Logic 89 
 
 would, in all probability, point to such men as Thomas Edi- 
 son and Luther Burbank, as well as others who by their 
 genius and patience have brought a few more material 
 comforts to mankind. But no scientist would even suggest 
 that these men be called scientists. The true scientist is, 
 what the man of the street would think of as a philosopher 
 he is one who finds underlying "laws" natural laws and 
 formulates methods so that others who come after him may 
 profit thereby. Edison, Burbank and others working in 
 "applied science" could not have done the things they did, 
 without the work of many men who have gone before, and 
 so it is the one who out of his own inner consciousness can 
 put together the ideas, the mental abstractions into a mean- 
 ingful whole who is the real scientist. 
 
 Let it be asked at any of our universities who the great 
 scientists of the past century were, and Darwin, Wallace, 
 Huxley, Tyndall will come to mind. Mendel will take his 
 place first in the list now, as shown by our chapter on 
 "Authorities," but he wrote then only for a local audience 
 and it was not until the year 1900 that his great work was 
 discovered, which has been mentioned in the chapter on 
 "Genetics," and whose theory is now one of the predominat- 
 ing ones in the scientific world. 
 
 Yet all of these men, though they did much observing, 
 would not have been known except as other men are known, 
 were it not for the theories which they advanced and fought 
 for. It was an idea again, and not a "fact," for which they 
 fought. It was a "theory," built up logically from their 
 premises. Many there are who do not accept these premises, 
 but Darwinism remained in force for almost two genera- 
 tions or until the philosophers showed the errors in its logic 
 as well as the groundlessness of the premise with which the 
 theory started. 
 
90 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 This part of our subject will be discussed in our chapter 
 on "The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy," as 
 well as in the chapter on "Evolutionary Theories," but we 
 wish here to point out that every one of these men con- 
 ceded to be a great scientist by those who know, was a 
 philosopher, and it was through his philosophy and not 
 through his observations that he is so acknowledged. 
 
 Much of the looseness of discussion on this whole matter 
 is again merely a matter of definitions of words. Men of 
 the street and even of the schools, who have achieved pop- 
 ularity, tell us that science has explained everything, that 
 science can do nearly anything. But the men acknowledged 
 as the great scientists condemn all such statements and in- 
 sist that those who make them are not scientists at all but 
 mere workmen using the materials some one else has formed, 
 and then not even using these materials justly. There is 
 then a looseness in the reasoning process, for surely, if the 
 men who themselves are greatest in this field do not ac- 
 knowledge these men whom most people consider scientists, 
 it is something of an anomaly for those who are not scientists 
 to consider them such. 
 
 Were one to ask most men what science has done, they 
 would unhesitatingly say it made the telephone, the tele- 
 graph, the ocean liners, the railroads, and a host of other 
 things, from rocking chairs to chewing gum, but ask the 
 scientist himself what the outstanding achievements of the 
 last century are. Let us see what Professor Huxley says: 
 "There are three great products of our time. One of these 
 is that doctrine concerning the constitution of matter which, 
 for want of a better name, I will call 'molecular' ; the second 
 is the doctrine of the conservation of energy; the third is 
 the doctrine of evolution." 
 
 The average man is here inclined to throw up his hands 
 
Logic 91 
 
 in despair, unable to get anything out of it all. Well, the 
 average man will never get anything out of it. Only a man 
 who studies will, and can, and ought, to get anything out 
 of it, and the average man does not study. He is interested 
 in "popular science" as it is found in the Sunday news- 
 papers, with their glowing headlines of "Science tells why a 
 baby sucks its toes," "Science tells why men play baseball," 
 and other equally enlightening accounts, but surely not sci- 
 ence in any sense of the word. Some man who calls himself 
 a scientist tells us something which may, or may not, be 
 true, but that doesn't make it science. It may be interesting, 
 as it no doubt is, but if any one accepts such matter as 
 science, it shows very conclusively that that man has sore 
 need of Logic. 
 
 And it is just because the average man has never been 
 able to make much out of science that the popular writer 
 appeals to him. Unable, or unwilling, to spend years in 
 the study of scientific subjects; unwilling or unable to 
 think in terms that are not tangible; unable or unwilling 
 to follow a consecutive argument through its logical entan- 
 glements, and unable to hold anything in his mind that isn't 
 sensible for long periods, and think back on his own 
 thoughts, he cannot get anything out of science, except to 
 feel that somewhere, vaguely, and in some way, it is ac- 
 complishing something. And so he is willing to contribute 
 toward the support of its professors, whom he cannot 
 understand, yet, because he hears it said that Science is 
 doing such wonderful things, he assumes that it must 
 be producing something of value. To tell a man anything 
 in his own department that is manifestly untrue will im- 
 mediately get him to distrust you, but in a subject where 
 everything and anything is called Science, and of which the 
 average man knows so very little, it is by no means difficult 
 
9 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 to "pull the wool over his eyes." Of this we have an excel- 
 lent example in one of the most flagrant cases in recent 
 years, by a man whom thousands of people swear by, and 
 one whom they consider a scientist above all others. 3 That 
 
 "This reference is to Professor Ernst Haeckel of the University of 
 Jena, whose falsification of various illustrations to establish his own 
 theories, was shown by Professor Wilhelm His, in 1874. "In a book 
 entitled Unserer Korperform und das physiologische Problem ihrer 
 Enstehung, His shows how Haeckel in the first edition of naturliche 
 Schdpfwngsgeschichte, wishing to show the likeness of embryos of dif- 
 ferent species, gives on page 242 figures of the egg, one hundred times 
 magnified, of man, the ape and dog; and on page 248 also three figures 
 of the embryo of the dog, of the chick and of the turtle. He points 
 out quite amusingly certain features of the resemblance in the three 
 figures of these two series. Not only are these figures identical in out- 
 line but in nonessentials also. Thus it happens that the granules in a 
 certain part of the dog's egg are coarser than in the other parts, and 
 there is absolutely identical arrangement in the eggs of the man and 
 of the ape. Very remarkably the first vertebra in the embryos of the 
 dog, chick and turtle is a little more rounded on the right side, and the 
 ninth a trifle narrower than the others. In short to make the pretended 
 similarity as striking as possible, Haeckel used in two instances the same 
 figure and gave it three diiferent names. This fraud was pointed out by 
 Professor Riitimeyer in Archw fur Anthropologie, Bd. Ill, s. 301. Pro- 
 fessor His remarks that one would expect a retraction and excuse for 
 the mistake; but no. 'Instead of this Haeckel in the preface of his 
 later editions heaped heavy insults on Professor Riitimeyer, equally 
 untrue in their substance as dishonorable in their form' (p. 169). He 
 however saw fit to omit the duplicates. But the exposure did him no 
 good. Professor His tells us that in the fifth edition of the same work 
 of Haeckel's there is a copy from Bischoff of the figure of an embryo 
 of a dog and from Ecker of one of a human embryo, both assumed 
 to be of four weeks. He points out certain peculiarities of these 'copies' 
 well worthy of notice 'or,' he asks, 'is it through a mistake of the litho- 
 grapher that in Haeckel's dog embryo, precisely the frontal part of the 
 head is three and one-half millimetres longer than BischofTs, but in the 
 human embryo the forehead is shortened by two millimetres, and at the 
 same time, by the pushing forward of the eye, made narrower by fully 
 five millimetres?' In short, what purported to be copies of figures by 
 leading authorities and respectable men were falsifications made to show 
 a similarity which does not exist between the embryos of man and dog. 
 His then points out other false dealings by Haeckel in the matter of 
 illustrations, some of which he declares to have been invented 
 (erfunden), and remarks very justly that this play with facts is far 
 more dangerous than his play with words, inasmuch as it requires an 
 expert to denounce it. He charges that Haeckel well knew the influence 
 that he exercised on a large circle. 'Let then others honor Haeckel as 
 an efficient and reckless party leader; according to my judgment he has 
 forfeited through his methods of fighting even the right to be counted 
 as an equal in the company of serious investigators' (p. 171). There is 
 
Logic 93 
 
 is the only reason why he is mentioned here, and our foot- 
 note shows where the evidence of his falsifications is to be 
 found. 
 
 It is very easy to assume that a man who commits a mur- 
 der must be a very evil personage, while one who teaches a 
 false doctrine is only an imbecile. We think no one will be- 
 lieve such a teacher, but we forget that the murderer is no- 
 where nearly as bad as he who teaches erroneously, for the 
 murderer kills but one or two individuals. The teacher who 
 falsely instructs, let us suppose he has only one class of 
 ten pupils each year and that he teaches twenty years (mak- 
 ing a total of two hundred individuals, who, marrying, will 
 add two hundred more people to the list, and as families 
 average about three children this will make six hundred more, 
 
 only to add that Haeckel, in spite of plenty of subsequent exposures, 
 has not reformed his ways," (pp. 22-23; Thoughts of a Catholic Anatom- 
 ist, by Thomas Dwight, M.D., LL.D. Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.) 
 And in a note Dr. Dwight adds, "If any one would know what the 
 late Alexander Agassiz, whom we all honor as a scholar and a gentle- 
 man thought of Haeckel, let him consult Agassiz' report on the expedi- 
 tion of the 'Albatross' in the Bulletin of the Museum of Comparative 
 Zoology, at Harvard College, Vol. XXIII, 1892, p. 32 to p. 40. His tone 
 is not that of one arguing with an equal, but of one exposing a knave." 
 
 See also, "Facts and Theories," by Sir Bertram Windle, M.A., M.D., 
 Sc.D., LL.D., F.R.S., K.S.G., Published by Herder, 1916, pages 18 to 
 27, on 'Bias', who quotes Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S., "Life and Matter." 
 "He (i.e. Haeckel) writes in so forcible and positive and determined a 
 fashion from the vantage-ground of scientific knowledge, that he exerts 
 an undue influence on the uncultured amongst his readers, and causes 
 them to fancy that only benighted fools or credulous dupes can really 
 disagree with the historical criticisms, the speculative opinions, and phil- 
 osophical; or perhaps unphilosophical, conjectures thus powerfully set 
 forth." (p.135.) 
 
 Also refer for an account of Haeckel's falsifications to "Brass and 
 Gemelli, L'Origine dell 'Uomo e le Falsificazioni di E. Haeckel; also 
 Wasmann, Modern Biology and the Problem of Evolution (inter alia., 
 pp. 511, seq.). See also Gerard, The Old Riddle and the Newest 
 Answer." 
 
 Our object in giving this lengthy note is this, that although Haeckel's 
 work has often been objected to, it was rather difficult for the average 
 reader to point directly to the very page and place where these falsifica- 
 tions could be found, and to cite his authorities. 
 
94 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 or one thousand people who will be affected in one genera- 
 tion alone by a single teacher), will through the years af- 
 fect a great number of people, who, in their turn, will 
 teach others what is false, making a never ending chain ; 
 and, as most men cannot think without putting their thoughts 
 into practice, it can easily be seen that many, many mur- 
 ders as well as other crimes can be traced to nothing else 
 but erroneous principles inculcated during the plastic period 
 of life. It is for this reason that so much argument has 
 been spent on whether man descended from one of the lower 
 animals or not. This is really the crux of the whole matter 
 with moralists, for if the only evidence that man had for 
 assuming that he was especially created was, let us say, 
 the bible, and he believes that the bible is the sole rule of 
 faith, there is only one outcome for such a man, and woe be 
 unto him and his children if they attend any of our schools 
 now, for such a child brought up to accept such a theory 
 gets his only validity for his morals from the one fact alone, 
 that the bible teaches him his code of action. If it can be 
 demonstrated that man was not created in exactly the way 
 this particular individual has pictured it to himself, then 
 all the ground is taken from under his feet, and, having 
 no further evidence for his original belief, because the bible 
 and the bible only was his sole rule of faith, he has no 
 moral code left him, and so it must follow that, in accordance 
 with this reasoning, that man not having been originally cre- 
 ated a full-fledged man, there is no evidence that any of the 
 rest of the matter contained in the scriptures is true, and 
 consequently he rejects consistently the moral precepts as 
 well. Again, if he is at all reasonable, he can also see that if 
 man is but a piece of protoplasm, highly developed, only a 
 little more developed than other animals, there can be no 
 reason whatever for his not accumulating all the pleasure 
 and wealth possible, caring nothing at all about what it 
 
Logic 95 
 
 ;osts his fellow-man. It is for this reason that those 
 vho opposed one of the evolutionary theories, namely, that 
 nan descended from an animal ancestor, became so violent 
 a,t times, and it is for this reason that we still hear so 
 much of its echoes, about Science and Religion, or Science 
 vs. Religion, or Science and Faith, etc. The upholders of 
 the descent doctrine felt no different morally, as a rule, 
 than they had before they defended it, because they had 
 the inheritance in all its fullness of their moral code, and 
 had trained themselves in accord therewith, so that in as 
 much as they had passed the plastic period of their lives, 
 they could not understand how men could think that de- 
 scending from the animal world could destroy morality ; but 
 their children, and men at large the great majority 
 being untrained in what it all meant, could only know this, 
 that the bible in which they had placed infinite confidence 
 was torn away from them. There are very few human beings 
 who can stand alone mentally or morally. Nearly all seek 
 assistance and desire to lean upon the theories of some 
 tangible philosophy of life, and pinning their faith without 
 rhyme or reason to some man who is an interesting writer 
 or speaker (though by no means necessarily a scientist) they 
 feel that as they have lost the philosophy of life they for- 
 merly held, they must follow him who was instrumental in 
 bringing about that loss. Having, then, come into an at- 
 mosphere where no moral training at all is given, there are 
 no distinct ideas of what morality means and, as it is per- 
 fectly true that in and of itself no act is either good or bad 
 if no law can be apprehended (for only a law can possibly 
 tell good and bad in the moral order), there is no reason 
 why men should not follow every impulse that tends to give 
 pleasure, regardless of what it might cost others. 
 
 We are here using the term "law" as an expressed or 
 
96 The Begwrwngs of Science 
 
 implied statute given by one who has authority to give 
 and enforce that law in conscience. We are not speaking 
 of a physical law or of a statute made by a community. 
 
 The French Revolution brings home an example of what 
 we are trying to make clear. The writers of that day taught 
 that the people were supreme that there was no higher 
 power. Now it is well known that the great mass of man- 
 kind will, whenever they have a thought, try to put that 
 . thought into action in other words, men cannot only think, 
 * they must act out their thoughts and in the example of the 
 French Revolution we see what terrible bloodshed resulted 
 from carrying out the thoughts which the writers of that 
 day propounded. This is the direct result of the doctrine 
 that there is no power of absolute authority above the 
 people, which means, of course, that, the people being su- 
 preme, everything they do must be right. Will any contend 
 that the murder of thousands as accomplished during this 
 reign of terror was right? No one was to blame for it but 
 those teachers who taught these false doctrines and in- 
 flamed men's minds to fury. This is but one of many ex- 
 amples of what the erroneous teacher does. His crime lives 
 on to poison thousands, while the individual criminal injures 
 only himself and the few on whom the immediate injury 
 is inflicted. 
 
 If what is taught matters so much, one can understand 
 why those of broader vision see the results long before 
 their occurrence and begin fighting them, usually only to be 
 condemned by their contemporaries. We now condemn the 
 burning of witches, but do not think that there weren't men 
 and women of the past who also condemned the practice. 
 But others had power for the time being, and as always, the 
 passing years have shown most conclusively that those who 
 saw farther than their neighbors were right but unpopular, 
 
Logic 97 
 
 while the most popular teaching was entirely in error. 
 
 If, then, every thought, every idea, everything that has 
 changed the history of the world, is but a series of thoughts 
 built up from some few facts into a meaningful whole, it 
 behooves man to study that most important of all subjects 
 by which he may test himself and try out his reasoning, 
 and check himself up, so he may feel reasonably assured 
 intellectually that he is correct in his findings, and, not only 
 "feel" he is right ; and to do this, he must study Logic. 
 
 An example that illustrates this chapter comes to mind 
 from the pages of history. Cardinal Richelieu, the great 
 minister of France under Louis XIII, fought the Protestants 
 in his country with extreme vigor. This is a fact. None 
 will deny it. Now to know that much without having several 
 additional facts would lead one into erroneous conclusions, 
 for, it could be said, that as Richelieu was a Catholic he 
 might wish to exterminate those who were of another belief. 
 But and here we show that additional observations make 
 considerable difference (bear in mind, not on the first fact, 
 but) on the conclusion. We also learn that Gustavos Adol- 
 phus, King of Sweden and a Protestant, was assisted by 
 Cardinal Richelieu in exterminating the Catholics of that 
 country. Now we may draw other conclusions. But with 
 only these facts before us, we are still at a loss. So we need 
 a broader view of the whole range of the times. This is 
 what we mean when we say that the isolated facts gathered 
 by the special sciences must be woven into a complete whole 
 before they give that true insight into what it is all worth, 
 and what it all means. And we must know all this before we 
 can pass a valid judgment on Life, and, after all, that is 
 'what our studies are for, and just in so far as we fail to 
 do that which we are attempting, we are failures. 
 
 To read further in history then, we easily see that the 
 
98 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 Church and the State had been most intimately interwoven; 
 in fact so much so that it was almost impossible for men 
 of that day to concede that a state could exist without 
 such union. We have grown accustomed to the separation 
 we have been born into it all, and so it seems a matter of 
 course to us, but it was all so different to these men who 
 never even dreamed such things possible. Religion and 
 Politics meant almost the same thing, or, we may say, two 
 sides of the same question, and so Religion had nothing 
 whatever to do with what Cardinal Richelieu did. It was 
 politics pure and simple. The Catholics were the political 
 party in power in France. The Protestants were similarly 
 the political power in Sweden and one reigning house helped 
 the other. This, then, changes our entire conclusion, though 
 it is based on exactly the selfsame facts with a little broader 
 knowledge. 
 
 And the argument would run something like this, among 
 men who know nothing about the matter, except one of the 
 facts mentioned : "Well, isn't it a fact that Cardinal Riche- 
 lieu killed the Protestants, at least all he could?" And the 
 one to whom the question is addressed admits it, when 
 the answer comes quite regularly as it always does in such 
 cases, "Well, then, where's the argument? Doesn't that 
 prove my point that he was a narrow-minded bigot, and 
 would even resort to murder to get rid of his religious 
 opponents?" Let the reader judge whether it proves the 
 point or not, and see for himself what value Logic may have 
 for him in one of the many like predicaments in which he 
 so often finds himself and in which without it he cannot meet 
 his opponent's "facts." 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE PRESENT STATUS OF EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ALL that we are and all that we can be is summed up 
 in what Inheritance plus Environment in its widest ap- 
 plication determines what each shall and must be. And 
 if this be true, and none will deny it, Evolution is one of 
 the most insistent and important factors with which we 
 have to deal, for, since Evolution has come into our schools, 
 and it has been there for over a generation now it has 
 not only revolutionized our educational system, but there 
 is no department of human study, from theology to stock- 
 breeding, that has not been materially affected by it in 
 other words, Evolution has reversed our educational view- 
 point entirely. 
 
 The thing that Darwin did in 1859, by the publication 
 of his epoch-making book, The Origin of Species, was the 
 turning over of our educational system. This is the all- 
 important fact to remember and the one on which all the 
 stress is to be laid. 
 
 Up to that time men were interested in dividing and 
 separating everything and anything into separate camps 
 into separate species into separate families and groups 
 of various kinds. After that time just exactly the reverse 
 viewpoint was stressed, namely, that in all learning, the 
 object sought for was the connecting link which should ,/ 
 bind all things together. And if there be anything of most 
 importance in one's study, it is the viewpoint with which one 
 starts and which so thoroughly and indelibly colors all 
 
 99 
 
100 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 one's findings. 
 
 The story is told of a missionary and a hunter meeting 
 at a mutual friend's home, both being surprised to find 
 that each had been in the same region of Africa during 
 the same period. The hunter expressed his amazement at 
 their not having met before, but the missionary immediately 
 asked whether the hunter had met any missionaries dur- 
 ing his African sojourn; receiving a negative answer, he 
 continued, "Well, I presume you saw any number of lions 
 and tigers?" The hunter admitted that he had, to which 
 t the clergyman made answer, "Yes, you were looking for lions 
 and tigers. I, however, saw none of these during my fifteen 
 years' work in the region, but I did see any quantity of 
 missionaries, for I was looking for them. We each found 
 exactly what we were looking for." 
 
 This psychological point is so often lost sight of in sci- 
 entific investigations. So many students forget that facts, 
 in and of themselves, are of no value, for which reason Dr. 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes said that if there was any one thing 
 
 ' that never made an impression upon him, it was a "fact." 
 It is the meanings the interpretations of the facts that 
 count not the facts themselves. Facts are only the foun- 
 dation stones on which to build. 
 
 Walter Bagehot probably also had this beginning view- 
 point (we may term it) in mind, when he said that the 
 moment a man becomes famous he also becomes a nuisance, 
 for he carries so many of his earlier prejudices over into 
 
 ' the maturer life with him. And, of course, by virtue of his 
 position, does untold damage, for most men assume that if 
 an individual knows much of one thing, even though that 
 be but one of the minor details of life, he must likewise 
 be an authority on all other things, even though, about 
 these other things he may not only be ignorant, but, what 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 101 
 
 is worse, hopelessly prejudiced a condition due to that 
 ignorance. 
 
 For this reason also we find nearly every volume written 
 on such a subject as Evolution, either giving only the 
 points that help to bolster up the particular theory the 
 writer upholds, or the particular points that demolish or 
 attempt to demolish an opponent. To read a book of this 
 kind, and even to follow out all the references cited, only 
 strengthens one's prejudices, for it is self-evident that in the 
 writing of such a volume the author has only given the ref- 
 erences to those writers who hold largely with himself, in- 
 / stead of showing the various viewpoints of opposing workers 
 in his particular field. 
 
 To have read a volume, then, no matter by whom, and 
 no matter how worthy in itself to have followed every 
 reference stated to have read every volume in the bibliog- 
 
 * rapy cited, may very easily mean a narrowing instead of a 
 broadening to the one who reads. It is most essential that 
 the reading be done on both sides, not so much to realize 
 that there are opponents, for every theory can produce 
 these, but to obtain perspective to be able to stand far 
 enough away so that the battle cries of each opposing force 
 may be heard and weighed and, above all, to realize how 
 
 * the very same facts can produce such totally different con- 
 clusions. It must not be forgotten that the facts are not 
 disputed all the arguments and wranglings come from what 
 these facts mean, and meanings are and must always remain 
 in the realm of philosophy that is, they must be logically 
 drawn. On this point also there is no dispute. All writers 
 admit the necessity of logic, though by no means all use 
 it. 
 
 Let us observe, then, the various viewpoints with which 
 men begin their science: the theologian, starting with the 
 
10,?, The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 idea of a God and a separate creation, insists that his facts 
 be interpreted in the light of such a premise, while the op- 
 posing force may be well illustrated by the lines of Pro- 
 fessor Vernon Kellogg in discussing a theory (and that by 
 a non- theologian), when he says, "Nageli's automatic per- 
 fecting principle is an impossibility to the thorough-going 
 evolutionist seeking for a causo-mechanical explanation of 
 change." 
 
 Of course it is. Starting with the idea or premise that all 
 things must be explained by a causo-mechanical action, is 
 just as valid and just as invalid as starting with the the- 
 ologian's viewpoint. If that is the idea with which one 
 wishes to start, and if, as here implied, everything is to 
 j be thrown out that does not fit in with such a theory, one 
 can readily see that there isn't any science about it at all. 
 It is simply reaching up in the air and picking out a start- 
 ing point that is more or less agreeable to the one doing 
 the reaching. And yet, perfectly obvious as all this ap- 
 pears, the writer has hardly met a single student at any 
 of the schools where he has studied, who even remotely 
 thought of this. 
 
 To the student thoroughly ingrained with the idea that 
 the bible is to be used as a text for every subject under 
 the sun, this has become so part and parcel of him, that he 
 does not know that he has never found a reason or justifica- 
 tion for his viewpoint. He has simply been among people 
 who have always considered this viewpoint true, and conse- 
 quently he has accepted it. But is there any more reason 
 why this man, so unscientific, is to be condemned than he who 
 takes the causo-mechanical viewpoint simply because he has 
 been thrown in an atmosphere of those who hold it and, find- 
 ing these men in whom he has confidence, upholding that doc- 
 trine, he, without rhyme or reason, accepts it, just as did the 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 103 
 
 biblical acceptor? It is just this point that must be im- 
 pressed upon the student and it is here he must be shown 
 the value of Epistemology and Metaphysics. It is this lack 
 of valid reasons for the Beginnings or starting point of 
 most laboratory men, that separates people at large into 
 camps of thinkers and camps of observers, both with a mu- 
 tual distrust of each other with an undercurrent of smil- 
 ing indulgence and tolerance, but implied contempt of one 
 side for the other, and which to the writer's mind is haz- 
 ardous to the student's true conception of either observa- 
 tion or philosophy. 
 
 The very surfeit of examples that come to mind must 
 be culled, and only one produced to bring home this most 
 vital and important feature. In the Unpopular Review of 
 about a year ago, in a series of articles on Psychical Re- 
 search, the author quotes Professor Wm. James' discussion 
 with a well-known psychologist who insisted that, even if a 
 psychic force could be found, it should be denied by all 
 scientists, as it would throw into disrepute so many theories 
 that are now held necessary for scientific explanations. 
 
 When it is thoroughly realized by students that all of 
 our science rests on theories which in turn can only be held 
 by acceptmg certain unprovable first principles, a different 
 viewpoint will be had. This fact is brought home in the 
 passage from Professor Kellogg, where he says, in speaking 
 of both Darwinism and an opposing theorist, that "after 
 all the Darwinian interpretation is proved only in so far 
 as it possesses a high degree of plausibility and makes a X" 
 convincing appeal to our reason. Of exact proof, in the 
 nature of observed fact or result of experiment, or of math- 
 ematical demonstration, there is little in the case either of 
 the Darwinian or the Korschinskian interpretation." 1 
 
 Darwinism To-day, by Vernon L. Kellogg. 
 
104 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 Professor Kellogg is a very thorough-going evolutionist, 
 and his book Darwinism To-day from which we shall quote 
 in this chapter in so far as it pertains to the purpose in 
 hand, is a masterful summary of the various systems and 
 theories of evolution so far propounded, though furnishing 
 no proof, as usual, for logical beginnings, while yet saying 
 very definitely that "the evidence for descent is of satisfying 
 but purely logical character." The italics are ours. 
 
 And, speaking of intemperate anti-Darwinians as he does, 
 it seems hardly just that such an intemperate paragraph 
 as the following should come from the pen of one who so 
 heartily condemns the very thing of which he himself is 
 guilty. 
 
 Now all these millions of kinds of animals and plants can 
 have had an origin in some one of but three ways ; they 
 have come into existence spontaneously, they have been 
 specially created by some supernatural power, or they have 
 descended one from the other in many-branching series by 
 gradual transformation. There is absolutely no scientific 
 evidence for either of the first two ways; there is much 
 scientific evidence for the last way. There is left for the 
 scientific man, then, solely the last; that is, the method of 
 descent. The theory of descent (with which phrase organic 
 evolution may be practically held as a synonym is, then, 
 simply the declaration that the various living as well as the 
 now extinct species of organisms are descended from one 
 another and from common ancestors. It is the explanation 
 of the origin of species accepted in the science of biology. 
 (The natural question about first species or the first several, 
 if they appeared simultaneously, will receive attention later ; 
 the theory of descent explains the origin of kinds of life, 
 not the origin of life.) If such a summary disposal of the 
 theories of spontaneous generation and divine creation is 
 too repugnant to my readers to meet with toleration, then, 
 as Delage has pertinently said in connection with a similar 
 statement in his great tome on "Heredity," my book and 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 105 
 
 such readers had better immediately part company; we do 
 not speak the same language. (Page 11.) 
 
 In other words, he might just as well have made it much 
 shorter and said, "As long as this is MY starting point 
 that's all there is to it. It must be right because it is mine. 
 There is absolutely no proof needed to establish my premise. 
 I have said it. Take it or leave it, but I'm right." 
 
 It can very readily be seen that any other kind of a be- 
 ginning would be just as valid and just as absurd, if no 
 further facts than these were brought for evidence. It 
 would be a little fairer probably to put it in still another 
 way, and this is really the accepted viewpoint in some 
 scientific circles that, though there are those who differ 
 from us, we are going to accept as our starting point a 
 causo-mechanical explanation, and everything which does 
 not fit in with this theory is to be discarded, and all those 
 who do not accept this statement are unscientific, super- 
 stitious, and incapable of being scientists anyway, so we 
 might as well come to an understanding now. You who do 
 not accept this theory are wrong, for we must be right. 
 
 Again let us notice the philosophical regions drawn upon 
 when proof is needed, but rejected when proof is demanded 
 by those outside the causo-mechanist's fold for the very 
 causo-mechanical theory upon which all the later building 
 rests. 
 
 What may for the moment detain us, however, is a refer- 
 ence to the curiously nearly completely subjective character 
 of the evidence for both the theory of descent and natural 
 selection. (Page 18.) The italics are ours. 
 
 We wish the reader to understand fully and completely, 
 as most of our college students do not, what the evidences 
 for the various theories of Evolution are. And we have used 
 
106 The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 s Professor Kellogg's volume because it is a sort of classic in 
 the biological world and is read and recommended in prob- 
 ably most, if not all of our schools to-day. We are not using 
 it as a text, but as a worthy reference work, so that the 
 causo-mechanists may be represented by one of their ac- 
 cepted writers. And we are trying to impress upon the reader 
 the fact that all the evidence is logical; this being so, every 
 theory must fall flat that cannot be upheld by that self- 
 same logic that is invoked as evidence. 
 
 We must here differentiate between "True" and "Logical." 
 To get at the truth of anything, ALL THE FACTS must 
 be known, and we must be able to PROVE OUK PREMISE. But 
 to be logical means only to argue in accordance with the 
 rules of logic from a premise already accepted, regardless 
 of whether that premise be false or true. 
 
 Further, it requires no biologist to show the fallacy of an 
 argument, but a logician, though conversely, it does not 
 require a logician but a biologist, with a very considerable 
 knowledge of his own and related sciences to formulate a 
 biological theory that is of value, though he must of course 
 know his logic also. This is well put by Herbert Spencer 
 when he says : 
 
 Judging whether another proves his position is a widely 
 different thing from proving your own. To establish a 
 general law requires an extensive knowledge of the phe- 
 nomena to be generalized ; but to decide whether an alleged 
 general law is established by the evidence assigned merely 
 requires an adequate reasoning faculty. Especially is such 
 the case when the premises do not warrant the conclusion. 
 
 With all these facts before us, we may say that if we 
 accept the facts that laboratory men have found, and 
 use our logic in analyzing and deducing therefrom, any 
 man capable of reasoning may show where errors creep in. 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 107 
 
 In other words, the recluse in his cell is just as capable of 
 this as is the best observer that ever lived, so that it seems 
 strange that Professor Kellogg should permit the following 
 statement to appear on the pages of his book: 
 
 I have however, assiduously sought out (with the help of 
 librarians and my indefatigable Leipzig book-dealer friend 
 Bernh. Liebisch), and perused the original pourings-forth of 
 criticism and villification even to the reading of some matter 
 written by certain Roman Catholic priests with a consider- 
 able amateur interest in natural history and a strong pro- 
 fessional interest in anti-Darwinism! (p. 30). 
 
 The implication here being that if any one happens to 
 have a decided leaning away from a preferred interpreta- 
 tion, one's writings are worthless, for no other reason than 
 that one's leanings are not those of the particular author's ; 
 and most heinous of all offenses is the fact that one 
 does not make his living by the matter under discussion 
 that is, is not a professional for that is all the word 
 amateur means, though by implication it means much more 
 and is a subtle way of poisoning especially youthful minds. 
 Would it not be just as fair to ask how Professor Kellogg 
 who has a very decided leaning away from the majority 
 of anti-Darwinians, by that leaning, could pass a valid 
 judgment on them? 
 
 It would seem that the whole matter rests on an equal 
 footing, but surely if a fact be a fact, it ought stilLto be 
 a fact whether found by a Roman Catholic Priest, or by 
 any other amateur, or by Professor Kellogg ; and by way of 
 passing, it might be suggested that of all biologist's names 
 contained in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Bri- 
 tannica, the Abbot Mendel, a Roman Catholic priest and 
 amateur scientist, occupies the greatest quantity of space, 
 and when one realizes that Father Mendel was an Aus- 
 
108 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 trian that is, was German and the British national pride 
 is considered, if with all this in mind we find an English 
 book compiled by the leading scientific University of Eng- 
 land, giving him more space for a description of himself 
 and work than any other biologist that ever lived, it might 
 even imply that he deserved still more credit than was given 
 him. And in the realm of insect life and evolutionary 
 philosophy Father Erich Wasmann, another German Roman 
 Catholic priest and amateur scientist, is one of the best known 
 and ablest of men. This is practically acknowledged by Pro- 
 fessor Kellogg, but what we are trying to drive home is 
 that even where an acknowledgment of this nature is made, 
 implications that are subtle and invidious, poison the mind of 
 our students, making them neither scientists nor philoso- 
 phers. We must give them freely, frankly and openly the 
 evidences as they are. We must have them obtain perspective, 
 and have sufficient background ; then, and then only, can they 
 understand the necessity for constant watchfulness to pre- 
 vent emotionalism and desire from overpowering logical 
 judgment. 
 
 We wish, then, with this foreword to give a sort of synop- 
 sis of the various theories of Evolution, for it is well known 
 that the average college man and woman of to-day accepts 
 Evolution, but does not know why. Ask the first dozen 
 you meet and note the conflicting answers. So we shall 
 attempt to define what we mean by the terms we are using, 
 especially the two most in evidence, namely, "evolution" and 
 "species." It must be admitted that these two terms carry 
 such different significance to different people that prob- 
 ably no two students from two different colleges would get 
 the same meaning out of a volume containing them. This 
 explains why, often, the argument as used by an author may 
 be true while in reality the whole theory may be false, for 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 109 
 
 the facts do actually demonstrate that the thing one man 
 means by "species" is actually produced from the same com- 
 mon parent, while in the other sense of the word it is not 
 and cannot be demonstrated, for the very definition of the 
 word forbids such possibility. We may say, then, that the 
 same fact may give rise to any number of theories as to 
 how that fact came to be what it is ; we may further say 
 that until we have all the facts we have not the truth, 
 and any fact may change our interpretation, and then we 
 may even go further and say that by meaning a different 
 thing by the same word, the same fact may not be the same 
 fact at all, but found by two different people, each one 
 assuming the other means exactly what he does by his terms, 
 each has called two different facts by the same name. 
 
 Professor Kellogg defines Evolution as being synonymous 
 with the theory of descent in the plant and animal world 
 that is, 
 
 The various living as well as now extinct species of organ- 
 isms are descended from one another and from common 
 ancestors, (p. 11.) 
 
 Bear in mind that this says nothing about FIRST forms. 
 Something has evolved, but we are not told WHAT it was 
 that evolved, nor is there any agreement among biologists 
 themselves as to HOW it all occurred. All the theories of / 
 Evolution are attempts to tell us HOW things came to be 
 what they are. But what we are prone to forget is that 
 we have to have something to evolve before it can begin 
 evolving. That is, Evolution attempts to explain only HOW 
 the many species of plants and animals we now have came 
 to be what they are. 
 
 It is a very decided dictum in science now that no life 
 can come from anything non-living. We have living things 
 
110 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 on the earth now. We all know it was not always so. Life, 
 then, must have come from the non-living at some time. 
 There is, of course, not one vestige of observational or 
 experimental proof. All we have is our logic to fall back 
 on, and this tells us that no science or knowledge of im- 
 portance is possible unless we have a continuity of the ac- 
 tion of what are termed laws of nature, but we have just 
 shown that the laws of nature are not now what they have 
 been, so we have nothing left but the two remaining theories 
 Professor Kellogg cites Creation and Evolution. But even 
 accepting Evolution, as we do, it surely is not an alternative 
 as the book quoted states, but both are pretty nearly the 
 same thing, for in the one case it is implied that Creation 
 must mean every given thing was created just exactly as it is 
 to-day, and in the other that changes have come about 
 throughout the ages which, however, still leaves us in the 
 dark in regard to the first forms that evolved. 
 
 This latter problem is just as unsettled now as it has 
 ever been. All the whole argument does is to drive the 
 matter back a little further it doesn't change anything at 
 all. But those who object to the causo-mechanical way of 
 thought, suggest that as all the evidence its defenders have, 
 is logical, they must be logical to the very end, and adhere 
 to their own principles and, assuming as they do, that noth- 
 ing occurs without a cause, then if there be any value in 
 their arguments they must admit a first cause and define 
 and explain that. This they fail to do. 
 
 But this is what they must do to live up to the very prin- 
 ciples they themselves have laid down, and if they do come 
 to this conclusion, as many of them now have, it means 
 that the cause which conditions what we are and what 
 we can evolve into, is an inner driving force, as Nageli 
 has well shown and as the growing school of Neo-Vitalists 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 111 
 
 are constantly insisting upon. We must come to this con- 
 clusion, and even the causo-mechanists who are still stern 
 in their faith of a causo-mechanical explanation of things 
 are running dangerously near the shoals with their ortho- 
 genetic theories that most of them have now included among 
 the factors of organic evolution. These theories will be 
 explained a little farther on, here we wish to stress impor- 
 tant points that mean everything in the study of any sci- 
 ence. 
 
 By Evolution then we mean this and this only, that some 
 present-day forms of plants and animals are different from 
 their parents, and sufficiently different to consider them 
 thoroughly unlike their parents, or at least unlike some more 
 distant ancestor. In other words, a present-day form of 
 plant or animal need not necessarily have had ancestors that y 
 were just like itself. 
 
 That is all Evolution means. We must not confuse this 
 word with a THEORY of Evolution. This latter is an 
 explanation of HOW this change mentioned came about, 
 and nearly every worker has one or more pet theories of 
 his own. Evolution must not be confused with Darwinism, 
 for the latter is only one of the Theories of Evolution. 
 
 Now to explain what is meant by SPECIES. It is safe 
 to say that, taken by and large, there are really two view- 
 points in this matter, one, that so long as plants or animals 
 can interbreed do they belong to the same species, provided 
 they give birth in turn to fertile and similar possible-inter- 
 breeding offspring. That no matter what difference there 
 might be in appearance, such as having one more or less 
 stripe; or a different shade of color, the general form and 
 type is always true, and these are true species. Any de- 
 cided change in make-up or appearance among such inter- 
 breeding types these men would call "variations" and the 
 
The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 plant or animal possessing these variations would be known 
 as "varieties." Of course, one can readily see that there 
 would be and could be no possibility of new species arising 
 under such a definition, for every parent form would always 
 be the "Species" and any variation from such parent would 
 not be a Species but a "Variety." This being so, it is most 
 essential that one ascertain what any given author means 
 by the term, before passing judgment. 
 
 Those opposing, define Species as being any decided dif- 
 ference that is carried down from parent to offspring and 
 displayed in the physical form of such offspring. And in 
 accordance with this explanation there is some evidence that 
 new Species are formed. 
 
 The evidences for Evolution are drawn primarily from 
 the fossil remains of ancient forms now extinct ; from the 
 life of plants and animals before birth (embryology) ; from 
 comparative anatomy, physiology and the related sciences. 
 
 Accepting as a fact that we have some evidence for the 
 formation of new species, in accordance with the second 
 definition given above, the question arises as to whether ALL 
 present forms are different from their parent forms and 
 the still more important query will not be banished, as to 
 whether all of these forms came from ONE SINGLE parent 
 form, or whether the animals came from a common an- 
 cestor, the plants from a common ancestor, or both from 
 a common ancestor, or whether each had a particular parent 
 form somewhere in the dim, distant past, and last but of 
 most vital importance can Mind ever come from Matter 
 can man's intellect have arisen by mere physical accretion? 
 
 And we must not forget that St. Augustine, many cen- 
 turies ago, suggested the possibility of Evolution 2 and 
 
 a See Augustinism in History, Catholic Encyclopedia, under V. St. 
 Augustine of Hippo. 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 113 
 
 Lamarck and Geoffrey St. Hilaire did likewise about a 
 half century before Darwin's time, but they obtained no 
 very ardent disciples to carry forward their work and so 
 the world had to wait until the arrival of Charles Darwin 
 to have its principles accepted by the schools at large. And 
 here an interesting observation may be made, ' that Dar- 
 winism is a Theory of How Evolution came about, and 
 while Evolution is stronger in its entrenchments now than 
 ever before, Darwinism is constantly losing ground, as we 
 shall presently show. 3 
 
 Darwinism means that principally if not entirely, Natural 
 Selection is the cause of the origin of species, but as will 
 be shown, Natural Selection can only kill off plants and ^ 
 animals and can never originate anything, so that even the 
 title of Darwin's volume, "The Origin of Species," is a 
 misnomer. 
 
 All too often men give a description of a phenomenon, 
 call it by a name, and assume they have explained it, but 
 there is a world of difference between a description and an 
 explanation. 
 
 And lastly an important factor appears in that we may 
 ask whether or not, as many now hold, most forms would 
 not have evolved just as they have regardless of all ex- 
 ternal factors. If that is true, there is an inner something ^ 
 
 3 It is interesting to note that Professor Huxley was not himself 
 convinced of the theory he constantly and most valiently defended, 
 though as Professor Poulton says he believed so thoroughly in fairness 
 that he would take up a defense of a thing just to oppose unfairness. 
 See Huxley Memorial Lectures to the University of Birmingham (1904- 
 1912). (Cornish Bros. Ltd., 1914) as reviewed in Vol. XIII, Page 924, 
 The Hibbert Journal. "Professor E. B. Poulton discussing in the second 
 lecture of Huxley's relation to the theory of Natural Selection, says 
 one or two things which will be new to the ordinary reader. 'Although 
 no one fought so nobly, and against such odds, in its favour, although no 
 one had ever fought the battle of science with such success, he was never 
 a convinced believer in the theory (Natural Selection) he defended from A/ 
 unfair attacks' (p. 45)." 
 
114s The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 in the plant and animal, that determines to a large extent 
 what it is to become. This is the growing view of most 
 biologists and this theory is called Orthogenesis. The fur- 
 ther question presents itself, is there any purpose in what 
 is done, or is it all merely accidental and promiscuous ? And 
 this, Teleology answers. 
 
 Having covered the field swiftly and shortly, we may 
 add, that the remaining point to be covered is whether or 
 not in its application Evolution must cover all living things 
 or is limited? Does it apply to the human family? Is 
 there any difference between the lower animals and the hu- 
 man being sufficient to be able to state definitely and con- 
 vincingly that they could not have been related at any 
 time past? And we must note this point, that the whole 
 argument rests on the similarity in the physical bodies of 
 man and the lower animals among those who uphold this 
 viewpoint, and on the great difference in the mental portions 
 of the two, among those who take the opposite side of the 
 question. And it is more than interesting to observe that 
 nearly all of our animal psychologists and our human psy- 
 chologists, by constant observation and thorough experi- 
 mentation, have come to the conclusion that there is an 
 unfathomable difference between the two. It is almost uni- 
 versally agreed that animals work entirely by instinct and 
 association, and human beings, though working largely by 
 instinct also, may, however, use reason. Somewhere Pro- 
 fessor Wm. Wundt, the greatest living Experimental Psy- 
 chologist, has said Animals never reason, Humans but sel- 
 dom. This immense difference in the mental realm, to- 
 gether with man's speech, separates man entirely from the 
 brute world. 4 
 
 *John B. Watson's Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psy- 
 chology. 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 115 
 
 Summing up, then, we may say that Evolution means that 
 some present-day forms of living things come from dis- 
 similar ancestral forms, many intervening forms having dur- 
 ing the years become extinct so that we cannot trace con- 
 nections between those of the present day and these extinct 
 ancestors. 
 
 That the evidence for this belief is not absolute, but 
 purely logical. 
 
 That "It is necessary, even in the study of the Natural 
 Sciences to have something of the nature of a creed, an abid- 
 ing belief in some fixed principle, which may regulate and 
 give coherence to the mass of information and ideas which 
 we accumulate in the course of our studies. Without such 
 a belief to guide us we embark on our journey of investiga- 
 tion without rudder, compass, or pilot. 
 
 "In those sciences which occupy themselves with the ex- 
 planation of the existing order of things on the earth, the 
 fundamental beliefs are, firstly, that the course of Nature 
 has been uniform that is to say, that in past times the same 
 forces have operated, possibly with varying intensities, but 
 always in the same manner as those that are in operation 
 to-day. Secondly, that which is, is the outcome of that 
 which has been, and is the forerunner of that which will be. 
 The history of the world and its inhabitants presents itself 
 to our imaginations as an unbroken series of successive 
 states, each differing somewhat from its predecessor and 
 successor, but as truly derived from its predecessor as the 
 child is derived from its parent,, and as truly the antecedent 
 of its successor as the parent is the antecedent of the child. 
 This belief is what we express by the word Evolution." 
 
 That we have accepted the conclusion even though the 
 natural selection theory on which our conclusion was based 
 has been thrown aside, and are now seeking new evidences. 
 
 'Comparative Anatomy of Animals, by Gilbert C. Bourne, M.A., 
 D.Sc., F.R.S., F.L.S., F.Z.S. Yol, I, Page 1. 
 
116 The Begwwngs of Science 
 
 That the evidence we so far have, is drawn from many 
 related sciences which up to the present has not been suf- 
 ficiently stressed, for it is not generally known that the 
 paleantologists favor one system of evolution, the patholo- 
 gists another, the embryologists another, and so on. 
 
 That Darwinism is only the name of one theory of how 
 evolution came about. It must not become confused with 
 Evolution, and it is almost entirely discarded now, because 
 it is absolutely unable to explain how a single species orig- 
 inated. 
 
 That it all depends on the Creed mentioned by Dr. Bourne, 
 quoted above, as to what viewpoint one is to make use of to 
 begin with. That is, whether one accepts the Theistic or 
 the Causo-mechanical Creed and then insists on making his 
 facts fit such preconceived idea of what he thinks ought to be. 
 
 That Evolution takes no account of the BEGINNINGS 
 OF LIFE, but attempts only to explain what caused our 
 present many types of plants and animals. 
 
 That the very continuity of which Dr. Bourne speaks 
 is broken somewhere in that we have no life coming from 
 lifeless matter now, and yet we know there was a time when 
 there was no life on earth. We are forced to one of two 
 alternatives, namely, that we must find a starting point for 
 v Life or we must acknowledge that we are starting in the 
 middle of things with everything important unexplained and 
 unexplainable, and, not knowing whether our hypothesis 
 are then true, there being no ultimate starting point, we 
 cannot know whether our conclusions are true. 
 
 That to be fair and honest with our students we must 
 bring these matters home to them. We must show them that 
 these beginnings rest with philosophy and that it is only 
 as practical scientists that we are forced to do our work 
 and "necessarily so, upon the principle that for all practical 
 
The Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy 117 
 
 purposes one is justified in using any assumption as a f 
 working hypothesis, if everything happens just as if it were 
 true." 
 
 That while Evolution is accepted, it must not be confused 
 with the various theories that have been brought forth to 
 establish it, nor must it be applied further than the evi- 
 dence warrants. 
 
 That the outstanding difference between man and brute 
 is speech and rationality, a totally different kind of a dif- 
 ference than that existing between other animals or be- 
 tween plants and animals. Therefore no application of any 
 theory of Evolution has yet been found that is accepted by 
 biologists themselves, and as a consequence it is extremely 
 hazardous and very unscientific to apply a theory still un- 
 proven to a condition which leaves out of question the very 
 differences on which the distinction between brute and ani- 
 mal depend, remembering what has been said, that the the- 
 ories of Evolution are based on the physical and not on the / 
 mental differences, .and that all who have studied the mental 
 in addition to the physical are inclined to accept this view- 
 point. 
 
 That the Teleological argument has not lost its force, and 
 that when such men as Nageli, Driesch, and many others 
 pre-eminent in their fields have come back to it, though start- 
 ing from an opposite viewpoint and being convinced by the 
 physical evidence alone, we can understand the reason why 
 Orthogenesis is the most important factor now. 
 
 That nearly all biologists admit Orthogenesis in some 
 form though they apply it differently, and feel, depending 
 upon their prepossessions, that it possesses a varying worth. 
 And that, lastly, but of greatest importance, it depends 
 on whether the premise with which one starts is true, for, 
 if this should not be, there is little likelihood of erecting 
 
118 The Begwmings of Science 
 
 a logical structure of worth thereon. In other words, shall 
 we begin with just what is before us and insist that every- 
 thing that does not look favorable to a Causo-mechanical 
 explanation shall be cast aside, or shall we weigh and meas- 
 ure in truly scientific manner every detail, every thought 
 and thing, coming from whomsoever it may, professional 
 or amateur, so long as it be pertinent to the matter in 
 hand, suspending our judgment until all the evidence is in? 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THEORIES OF EVOLUTION 
 
 REMEMBERING what was said in our chapter on the 
 Present Status of Evolutionary Philosophy, we shall 
 here consider very briefly the various theories which bi- 
 ologists have propounded to show HOW Evolution has 
 come about, and, lest our interpretation of what the vari- 
 ous theories actually mean be questioned, we have quoted 
 the very words of one of their ablest defenders wherever 
 possible. 
 
 In its modern aspect Lamarck and Geoffrey St. Hilaire 
 were the founders of a theory, which was much more philo- 
 sophical than was Charles Darwin's, in that it actually at- 
 tempted to give an account of the reasons for the varia- 
 tions that we see all about us. Darwin merely accepted 
 them and built his theory thereon. He made no attempt 
 to explain WHY there are variations to start with. 
 
 Lamarck's theory may be simply stated by calling it the 
 working out of the principle of "use and disuse." In other 
 words, should an organ be used to any considerable extent 
 it would become better developed than any other part of 
 the body, or should it be used but little or not at all, it 
 would atrophy, and this extra development, or this wasting 
 away of the organ would be carried from parent to off- 
 spring, so that the offspring, again using the over-devel- 
 oped organ a little more, or neglecting the under-devel- 
 oped organ a little more, and carrying it on to its off- 
 spring in turn, would in the long run develop a race of in- 
 
 119 
 
120 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 dividuals that would be distinguished from other races by 
 this particular over-development or a particular under- 
 development or entire loss of the organ in question. 
 
 Darwin accepted the transmission of acquired character- 
 istics, as explained in the above paragraph, but attempted 
 to explain HOW new species came into existence by Natural 
 Selection. Probably a simple way of showing what was 
 meant by this would be to give an example. Suppose some 
 of us should journey to the Tropics to make our home; 
 many would succumb to the fevers and other tropical dis- 
 eases ; however, some would survive, and these would produce 
 offspring many of which would likewise perish, but, still, 
 some of these would again survive, and so on, until there 
 was left only the offspring of those who had been able to 
 withstand the particular conditions there existing. After 
 long years of such weeding out of those who could not 
 withstand the ravages of tropical diseases, we should have 
 a race that could live without any degree of uncomfortable- 
 ness. And this principle would be called the "survival of 
 the fittest," but as Professor Cope has well said, "Of course 
 the fittest survive"; we all know that. This only tells us 
 which ones do not die. And this is called Nature's way 
 of selecting, but we can easily see that this does not tell 
 us how anything came mto existence that is, it does not 
 tell us anything at all about the Origin of Species. And 
 this is what is meant by Darwinism, pure and simple that 
 the Origin of Species came about by Natural Selection. We 
 must not forget, however, that while this is Darwinism, it 
 is not Charles Darwin's doctrine; it was his disciples who 
 carried it to the extreme. Darwin himself believed that while 
 / Natural Selection was the mam cause of the Origin of Spe- 
 cies, it was not the ONLY one. But we can readily see 
 that in selecting from what is already in existence we can 
 
Theories of Evolution 
 
 only show which survive, but can never show how any new 
 races originated. 
 
 And it is just this failure to do the very thing the name 
 of the volume which sets forth these ideas, would lead 
 one to believe was done; namely, to show "The Origin of 
 Species," that has led to such widespread objection to the 
 Darwinian idea of explaining anything except survivals. This 
 is readily shown when such a lecture as "The Decline of 
 Darwinism" l is delivered at an institution like the Univer- 
 sity of Chicago, and such a book appears as Professor 
 Vernon Kellogg's Darwinism To-day. This volume, written 
 by a man who is more than willing to render to the Dar- 
 winian side all and probably more than most men would 
 be willing to render, and whose work is one of the rec- 
 ognized books of reference on this subject in the great 
 universities, we shall use from which to quote in this chap- 
 ter. We suggest a reading, however, of the entire volume 
 so as to be able to see that Darwinism that is, Natural 
 Selection has signally failed to show how anything orig- 
 inated. 
 
 Before entering into a detailed description of the many 
 theories that have arisen to explain how Evolution comes 
 about, we may call the reader's attention to the fact that, 
 after all, they can be classed in two great divisions. First, 
 the Darwinian, or Natural Selection plan, together with 
 the many auxiliary ones that tend to support it, and second, 
 an alternative type, which is intended to replace more or 
 less entirely the selection theories. 
 
 In regard to the first, or Natural Selection theories, it 
 must be remembered that in addition to the selection part 
 
 ir The Decline of Darwinism, by Elliot Rowland Downing, Ph.D., De- 
 livered during the Summer Session, 1914. See list of Public Lectures, 
 for that Summer, published by the University of Chicago. 
 
The Begwmmgs of Science 
 
 of the plan itself, there grew up also the idea that there was 
 something adaptive about everything any living being did; 
 i. e., any a,ct or movement any plant or animal performed, 
 was adapted to some end, and was useful to its possessor 
 as a help in surviving. This does not mean that every ac- 
 tion was done for a definite purpose, in the sense of "pur- 
 pose" meaning in accordance with an intelligence situated 
 outside of itself ; but that, when any movement of any kind 
 whatsoever was performed, the plant or animal performed 
 it because it had a survival value, for, if it wasted its energy 
 in movements that were not of actual service in survival, 
 the one that did not waste such energy would quite naturally 
 develop parts that the other one did not and thus become 
 stronger and more able to survive. 
 
 Now, Lamarckism, or the principle of "use and disuse," 
 would really explain most of these things better than Dar- 
 winism, but unfortunately for both theories Professor Au- 
 gust Weismann, a most ardent Darwinian himself, inves- 
 tigated the matter and found that there was not a particle 
 of experimental evidence to show that any acquired char- 
 acteristic was ever transmitted from parent to offspring. 
 To put this in other words, any change produced in the 
 parent during his lifetime by his own efforts would not be 
 given to the child ; so, one might come from a race of black- 
 smiths, but the children of such over-developed muscular 
 parents would not have any larger or better developed mus- 
 cles than would a child from the same type and size of 
 parents who had not developed their arms. 
 
 And as Professor Weismann was a sort of spokesman 
 for the Darwinian school, his word is of more importance 
 on their side than practically any other man, save Charles 
 Darwin himself, and yet he had to admit that Natural Se- 
 lection could not explain everything, and that it was un- 
 
Theories of Evolution 123 
 
 able to "initiate new lines of development or descent" (p. 
 189) 2 even going so far as to at least apparently ap- 
 prove of the orthogenetic viewpoint which will shortly be 
 explained that when a particular development once started, x , 
 it often kept right on even to the point of killing the or- 
 ganism itself. 
 
 Professor Weismann's other contributions are the idea of 
 "Panmixia" which he, however, himself discarded, so we shall 
 not enter into a discussion of it, and Germinal Selection, the 
 latter being explained as follows: As the unit in the study 
 of all biology is the CELL, and as every living thing from 
 the lowest plant to the highest type of life in the animal 
 world starts growth from a single cell, this single unit, only 
 visible under the very high powers of the microscope, must 
 have within its tiny self all the possibilities of producing the 
 wonderful, complex structure that is later to develop. This 
 being so, this tiny mass of protoplasm, as it is called, though 
 looking so much alike under the microscope, must be made 
 up of a very complex substance. To explain, then, how 
 this little cell could reproduce such a wonderful structure 
 
 as we see in adult forms of life he assumed that there must 
 
 j\ 
 
 be thousands of little particles, each very elemental, and 
 which he called biophors, and that these biophors unite in 
 different kinds of groups and thus cause different types of 
 later development. Professor Kellogg, commenting on this, 
 says that each biologist seems to have made a theory for 
 himself. 
 
 This is not all, however; there must be a further as- 
 sumption of "determinants" for each kmd of cell, but 
 not for each cell. (There are certain definite kinds of cells 
 
 2 Darwinism To-day, by Vernon L. Kellogg, Professor in Leland 
 Stanford, Jr., University. Published by Henry Holt & Co., 1907. All 
 pages mentioned are from this volume. 
 
, 
 
 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 that go to make certain definite tissues in the body, and 
 these tissues then unite to form organs, bones, skin, nerves, 
 muscles, etc.) Remembering that there is a variation all 
 through nature, no two blades of grass being exactly alike, 
 so also no two atoms or molecules are exactly alike, and 
 this being so, no two would get exactly the same quantity, 
 or exactly the same quality of food, and the one waxing 
 stronger would determine the greater strength of cells into 
 which it would later develop. This food supply might be 
 entirely fortuitous, but the determinants being in the Germ 
 Cell will go from one generation to another. That is, there 
 is here a something that is not an acquired characteristic, 
 in the sense used above, of being due to some deliberate, or 
 external, exercise or use, that over-developed some part of 
 the individual and was then carried on; but, in view of 
 the fact that we are what we are, simply on account of what 
 we get from our parents and as we know we do resemble 
 our parents somewhat whatever resemblance we may pos- 
 sess must come from the mere egg of the mother and sperm 
 of the father, which of course forms the germ cell from 
 which each individual develops, so that any change in the 
 growth and movement and environment of the egg and sperm, 
 will affect the germ cell from which we are built, and, in 
 that way, whatever we are born with we get from our 
 parents, and in this way we may account for the cause of 
 any variation that we may have from our parents. This 
 variation, however, would be along definitely fixed lines, and 
 would have nothing to do with personal selection, because 
 we cannot control the environment of ova and sperm. Nat- 
 ural Selection then steps m and kills off those that cannot 
 survive the obstacles in a given locality or environment. But 
 this very principle vitiates one of the principal arguments 
 for Selection; namely, that it could establish new species. 
 
Theories of Evolution 125 
 
 To quote Professor Kellogg, this theory consists of two 
 purely speculative basic assumptions: First, Weismann's 
 particular theory of the ultimate structure of the germ- 
 plasm ; namely, the theory of biophors and determinants ; and 
 secondly, the assumption that there is a struggle for food 
 among determinants. There is no proof of pure observa- 
 tion or experiment for the theory, and there is some proof 
 directly against it. And yet the great need of a working 
 hypothesis for the causo-mechanical explanation of de- 
 terminate variation makes us give such a pure speculation 
 more attention than it might otherwise get. Unfortunately 
 the attention thus given to this particular theory seems to 
 have resulted in the bringing forward of some rather ser- 
 ious objections to the possibility of the truth of the theory 
 (p. 199). 
 
 Roux's theory, sometimes called the "battle of the parts," 
 is based on somewhat similar lines to Weismann's theory of 
 biophors, except that it does not assume tiny particles 
 such as the biophors, but attempts to explain, by assuming 
 a difference between outer and inner adaptiveness ; the theory 
 being primarily applied to the inner portion of the organ- 
 ism, and attempts to account for the marvelous adapta- 
 tions there found. The competing parts in Roux's the- 
 ory 
 
 are the chemical molecules composing the cells them- 
 selves, groups of tissues or cells, and even whole organs. 
 The spurs to the competition for food are functional 
 stimuli, whose result is to set up a special demand and 
 necessity for more food (pp. 201-8). 
 
 This means that the determining factors are largely due 
 to the "hazard of position," a part being more advanta- 
 geously located receiving a greater stimulus to do more 
 work, thereby gaining an advantage. The theory is in 
 reality based on functional adaptiveness which Kellogg says 
 
126 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 is proved, but not explained. 
 
 This idea of Roux's is like all the other theories pro- 
 pounded held by some, and entirely rejected by others, and 
 if we are to accept his theory it will mean we must 
 accept the idea of the "inheritance of acquired character- 
 istics" which is not held at present by practically any bi- 
 ologist, as all the evidence is against it. But Professor 
 Kellogg considers it valuable because it does present "a 
 mechanical explanation of the possibility of initiating cer- 
 tain fine and delicate inner adaptations" (p. 208). "Or- 
 ganic Selection" is the name of another theory, and means 
 that by it we can explain why there are some acquired 
 characteristics apparently transmitted by suggesting that 
 ontogenetic selection (individual selection as contradistin- 
 guished from the selection principle applied to an entire 
 race of plants or animals) may explain how each individ- 
 ual may be born with a tendency to vary; that is, there 
 may be a congenital tendency to vary from the parent. 
 Another way of putting it might be to say that the germ- 
 plasm or egg cell from which the individual springs already 
 possesses this tendency, and so, of course, the 'off spring re- 
 ceives the tendency, it being part of the germ-plasm itself. 
 This would not be acquired, it will be observed, for it was 
 in the germ-plasm of the parents and always descends, the 
 parent himself being unable to change it. But the individ- 
 ual having such tendency may build thereon and thus make 
 it show forth very definitely, and sometimes prominently, dur- 
 ing life. 
 
 The causo-mechanists, however, reject this, for it is too 
 much like assuming that there is some vital principle 
 some inner factor that causes the tendency of which we 
 have spoken, and this would be fatal to causo-mechanism. 
 There remains in our first division of Natural Selection and 
 
Theories of Evolution 127 
 
 Auxiliary theories only the following then, which we have 
 not yet discussed: Geographical, Sexual and Physiological 
 theories, which, under a single grouping, are classified as 
 
 ISOLATION THEORIES. 
 
 Professor Kellogg says : The varying importance attrib- 
 uted by different biologists to the theories explaining 
 means and results of isolation is notable. While by some 
 the species-forming influence of isolation is held to be as 
 effective as selection itself some deem it more effective, 
 others attach but little importance to it, indeed see no 
 effects of consequence. These latter men are likely to be 
 morphologists, cytologists, and laboratory men generally; 
 the former are systematists, students of distribution, and 
 so-called field naturalists (p. 
 
 While he himself says he will take the middle path. Now 
 all that is meant by isolation is, of course, that, due to 
 various reasons, few or many, as the case may be, a given 
 species of plant or animal being cut off from the rest of 
 the same species (for example, by the sinking of a neck 
 of land once existing between two continents, leaving part 
 of the race in one region, part in another) that these, by 
 inbreeding, will produce a type of individual that will prob- 
 ably be different from those which have not been so iso- 
 lated, the particular environment allowing congenital varia- 
 tions to come forth in varying degrees. The non-geo- 
 graphical forms of isolation mean 
 
 some sort of segregation of individuals of the same species 
 into groups inside of each of which mating takes place, 
 and among which little or no cross-breeding occurs, because 
 of varying habits, or unusual sexual aversion or attraction, 
 or physiological or morphological variation affecting mat- 
 ing. For example . . . Plate points out that there are 
 twelve species of albatrosses in the southern hemisphere, of 
 which nine or ten belong to the Australian zoo-geographical 
 
128 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 realm and intermingle throughout most of their range. At 
 breeding time, however, these different species become segre- 
 gated in restricted and separate localities so that mating is 
 always accomplished among different individuals of the same 
 species, although hybridisation could doubtless obtain suc- 
 cessfully along these closely related albatross forms. Thus 
 the species characters are kept pure: the species distinct 
 (p. 
 
 The theories now to be taken up are for the direct pur- 
 pose of setting aside Darwinism; there are three general 
 ones proposed by various biologists as substitutes for the 
 Selection theories to account for evolution. 
 
 Lamarckism has already been touched upon, but as this 
 theory requires the assumption of the inheritance of ac- 
 quired characteristics and as we have seen that this is not 
 accepted in the scientific world at present we shall not 
 enter into any further explanation thereof. 
 
 The other two theories being those of Orthogenesis of 
 Nageli, Eimer, Jaeckel, and others, and 
 
 Heterogenesis suggested by von Kolliker, definitely form- 
 ulated by Korschinsky, and most recently and importantly 
 by de Vries. Few biologists would hold any of these theories 
 to be exclusively alternative with natural selection; de Vries 
 himself would restrict natural selection but little in its 
 large and effective control or determination of the general 
 course of descent. But all these theories offer distinctly 
 substitutional methods of species-forming, and one of them 
 includes certainly the most favored explanation, next to 
 selection, of adaptation, while the authors or later up- 
 holders of some of them actually deny any constructive, 
 that is, adaptional, species-forming or descent-controlling, 
 influence of natural selection (p. 262). 
 
 One of the principal criticisms of the natural selection 
 theory is that of the impossibility of explaining the be- 
 ginnings of advantageous modification and the beginnings of 
 
Theories of Evolution 129 
 
 new organs, by the selection of fluctuating individual varia- 
 tion, and of explaining the apparent cases of the existence of 
 determinate variation and the admitted cases of forthright 
 development along fixed lines not apparently advantageous, 
 and finally of explaining the definite cases of ultra-develop- 
 ment of parts and species beyond the point of advantage 
 even to such unfavorable degrees as lead to death and 
 extinction (p. 274). 
 
 We have, then, Orthogenesis, which means only this, that 
 there is a particular something that causes an organism, 
 once it has started to follow a change along a certain path, 
 to continue in that path, and that path only, even if it 
 kills it to do so. Then there are several camps among the 
 Orthogenetists themselves, Nageli being a Vitalist, and as- 
 suming a vital principle that cannot be accounted for by 
 any causo-mechanical force, and Eimer, who "finds ortho- 
 genesis produced and controlled by the directly working ex- 
 ternal factors of climate, food supply and environment gen- 
 erally." 
 
 In fact, probably a majority of biologists entertain a 
 conviction, often not clearly defined and generally unac- 
 companied by any satisfactory conception of a mechanism 
 for achieving what they believe to exist, of the actuality 
 of an influence on organic modification and descent directly 
 exerted by those various external factors or conditions of 
 organic life which we call, collectively, environment (p. 
 277). 
 
 Nageli's theory of orthogenesis depends upon the assump- 
 tion of his so-called principle of progressive development 
 (Vervollkomungsprinzip), a something inherent in the or- 
 ganic world which makes each organism in itself a force 
 or factor making towards specialization, adaptation, that 
 is, towards progressive evolution. Other authors who ac- 
 cept such a theory of an inherent driving force in organ- 
 
130 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 isms speak of this factor variously as "an inner directive 
 force," and "inner law of development," or an "intrinsic 
 tendency toward progress," etc. Nageli believes that animals 
 and plants would have developed about as they have even 
 had no struggle for existence taken place and the climatic 
 and geologic conditions and changes been quite different 
 from what they actually have been. Korschinsky says : "In 
 order to explain the origin of higher forms out of lower it 
 is necessary to assume in the organism a special tendency 
 towards progress." That is, to be believers in this kind 
 of theory of orthogenesis organic evolution has been and 
 is now ruled by unknown inner forces inherent in organism, 
 and has been independent of the influence of the outer world. 
 The lines of evolution are immanent, unchangeable, and ever 
 slowly stretch toward some ideal goal. It is needless to say 
 that but few biologists confess to such a belief. However 
 much in the dark we may be regarding the whole great 
 secret of bionomics, however partial and fragmentary our 
 knowledge of the processes and mechanism of evolution, such 
 an assumption of a mystic, essentially teleologic force wholly 
 independent of and dominating all the physico-chemical 
 forces and influences that we do not know and the reactions 
 and behavior of living matter to these influences which we 
 are beginning to recognize and understand with some clear- 
 ness and fulness such a surrender of all our hardly won 
 actual scientific knowledge in favor of an unknown, un- 
 proved, mystic, vital force, we are not prepared to make. 
 As Plate well says, such a theory of orthogenesis is op- 
 posed, in sharpest contrast, to the very spirit of science 
 (p. 278). 
 
 In other words, the latter part of this paragraph means 
 simply that any assumption that does not uphold this view- 
 point the causo-mechanical is unscientific and invalid 
 but any assumption that does uphold it is at least to be 
 given the benefit of the doubt. 
 
 Eimer's theory may be said to be some determining law 
 affected by environment or 
 
Theories of Evolution 131 
 
 evolution by natural selection would occur along all sorts 
 of heterogeneous and radiating lines which is, according to 
 Eimer, actually not the case. A few definite lines obtain 
 from which occasional branches are given off, the whole 
 building the familiar phyletic or genealogical tree. That 
 these main lines and branches are not themselves the result 
 of selection is proved by the fact that much evolution and 
 modification of organisms is not directly useful, a majority, 
 indeed, of the characters distinguishing different species not 
 being characters of utility. Only when a character or line 
 of evolution becomes of a life-and-death determining dis- 
 advantage can selection interfere with evolution by ortho- 
 genesis. And this interference is always and only of the 
 nature of a stamping out, never of the character of the 
 creation of new characters or lines. Eimer believes in the 
 inheritance of acquired characters, believes in a consid- 
 erable species-forming influence of geographical isolation, 
 that is, finds such isolation very helpful to the general basic 
 organic growth evolution principle and finds the actual 
 causes of orthogenesis, "to lie in the effects of external influ- 
 ences, climate, nutrition, on the given constitution of the 
 organism." 
 
 He denies positively any capacity on the part of nat- 
 ural selection to create species, finding it effective in break- 
 ing the continuous organic chain, that is, separating it into 
 species, only when aided by geographical isolation. The 
 actual species-forming, that is, the breaking up into spe- 
 cific units of the orthogenetic lines of change instituted by 
 his dynamic factors, he finds to depend on three chief mo- 
 ments : viz., a standing still or cessation of development 
 (EntwicklungsstUlstand) ; a sudden development by leaps, 
 called halmatogenesis (which is almost exactly the funda- 
 mental idea in Korschinsky's and de Vries's later hetero- 
 genesis theory) ; and, third, a hindrance or difficulty in 
 reproduction (which is the essential factor in Romanes's 
 theory of physiological selection proposed ten years later). 
 It is of interest to note Eimer's claim to the original con- 
 ception of species-forming both by heterogenesis and through 
 physiological selection, with which two theories the names 
 
132 The Begin/Flings of Science 
 
 of de Vries and Romanes, respectively, are commonly asso- 
 ciated as those of the original proposers (pp. 282-283). 
 
 We should not omit mention, in connection with Eimer's 
 theory of a point upon which he lays great stress, and that 
 is that his theory is not the result of pure speculation, but 
 is the unavoidable conclusion arrived at by long years of 
 specific observations and study of the facts obtaining in 
 the case of relations, conditions, and of course evolution 
 of certain groups of organisms. Eimer made careful and 
 extended studies of the wing-patterns of two large groups 
 of butterflies, and of certain lizards and birds, and it is 
 on the basis of these studies in particular that his theory 
 is formulated. It is certainly to be admitted that his ex- 
 haustive and most suggestive account of the relations of 
 species and patterns in the swallow-tailed and certain other 
 butterflies makes a very strong argument against the va- 
 lidity of natural selection as an explanation of these con- 
 ditions. And the example of Eimer's prolonged and minute 
 study of actual facts as a basis for his theory and hypothe- 
 sis building is one which has not always been followed by 
 biological generalisers. It is to be regretted that the polem- 
 ical and personal character of much of Eimer's writing 
 has tended to make his whole work less regarded than it 
 ought to be by biologists. 
 
 That Eimer's theory does not include in any degree the 
 assumption of an inner directive or progressive force the 
 following quotation from Eimer himself shows: "According 
 to my investigations the chief cause of transformation (of 
 species) is that determined definitive organic growth (or- 
 ganophysis) whose expression is a definite determined de- 
 velopment (orthogenesis), which is imposed on the plasma 
 by constant outer influences, climate, and nourishment. . . . 
 Apart from the fact that the Nagelian assumption of a 
 definite determined development is a hypothetical one, not 
 proved by facts, the zoologist can hardly accept the exist- 
 ence of such a dominant inner factor ever pushing toward 
 advance, when he recalls the host of regressive structures 
 he has to see. This tendency to progress based on the as- 
 sumption of 'inner growth laws' contradicts flatly the as- 
 
Theories of Evolution 133 
 
 sumption of outer influences as causes of change. . . . And 
 it is my belief that it is precisely these outer influences, 
 and the physiological phenomena dependent on them, which 
 are the determining factors in the phyletic development just 
 as they are in individual development" (pp. 284-285). 
 
 Recently Whitman, the Nestor of American Zoologists, 
 has declared himself strongly as an adherent of the actuality 
 of orthogenetic evolution. For many years Whitman has 
 been studying variations and inheritance in pigeons, and 
 through his work in particular he has become convinced that 
 species-forming variation does advance in definite direction 
 as well as in various directions. He says "natural selection, 
 orthogenesis, and mutation appear to present fundamental 
 contradictions ; but I believe that each stands for truth, and 
 reconciliation is not distant. The so-called mutations of 
 CEnothera (Evening primrose) are indubitable facts; but 
 two leading questions remain to be answered. First, are 
 these mutations now appearing, as is agreed, independently 
 of variation, nevertheless a production of variations that 
 took place at an earlier period in the history of these 
 plants? Secondly, if species can spring into existence at a 
 single leap, without the assistance of cumulative variations, 
 may they not also originate with such assistance? That 
 variation does issue a new species, ano^jbhat natural selection 
 is a factor, though not the only factor, in determining 
 results, is, in my opinion, as certain as grass grows, al- 
 though we can not see it grow. Furthermore, I believe 
 I have found indubitable evidence of species-forming varia- 
 tion in a definite direction * ( orthogenesis ) , and likewise of 
 variations in various directions ( amphigenesis ) . If I am 
 not mistaken in this, the reconciliation for natural selection 
 and orthogenesis is at hand" (pp. 288-289). 
 
 Jaeckel, the Berlin paleontologist, has formulated a the- 
 ory that is a sort of transition between orthogenesis and 
 heterogenesis, in that he believes that there is a definite or- 
 thogenetic progress among the race itself, but that individual 
 species spring forth suddenly. These species at various 
 
134 The Begiwimgs of Science 
 
 times, may sexually come to a standstill, and thus continue 
 a definite race from thence forward (p. 289). Pfeffer fol- 
 lows somewhat along Nageli's lines, in that he insists that 
 
 life consists of the capacity (more exactly exercise of this 
 capacity) of consciously permitting and consciously influ- 
 encing (that is, actually producing) through physico-chem- 
 ical phenomena changes in the matter or form of the fundv 
 mental life-stuff (p. 320). 
 
 The theory of "heterogenesis," also called the "theory of 
 mutations" or "saltations," and sometimes "discontinuous 
 variations," takes its very latest ground largely from 
 Professor Hugo de Vries, the Dutch botanist. Such names 
 as von Kolliker, Gait on, Dall, Bateson, Emery, Scott and 
 Korschinsky deserve mention in connection with it also 
 as de Vries was not the originator of theory. The Abbot 
 Mendel as far back as 1865, six years after Darwin's "Ori- 
 gin of Species" was given to the world, published an ac- 
 count with some very logical conclusions thereon, in a little 
 journal which was given out by the Brunn Natural History 
 Society. 
 
 It was not until 1900 that three separate students of bi- 
 ology found this work of Mendel's and gave it to the world. 
 Had those words of his been known a half century earlier, 
 there is no doubt it would have changed much of our dis- 
 cussions on the "Origin of Species." And it is well to 
 note here that when Professor Plate says that to accept a 
 view such as Nageli's we should have to give up so much 
 that had been gained by hard-fought battles, and Profes- 
 sor Kellogg says that it is needless to say that not many 
 biologists hold to Nageli's views, it must not be forgotten 
 that on matters of TRUTH it doesn't matter in the least 
 
Theories of Evolution 135 
 
 how many men hold it, for, if it be true, it remains such, 
 regardless of a majority. 
 
 A newspaper clipping comes to mind of some years ago, 
 when Dr. Robert Koch, of Vienna, was lecturing in this 
 country. The reference is lost, but it comes to mind some- 
 thing like this: A convention for the study of tubercu- 
 losis had the famous bacteriologist lecture to it, and among 
 other things he said, was that he was not yet positive, but 
 in so far as his experiments had shown, he was inclined to 
 believe tuberculosis from an infected cow would not be 
 transmitted through milk. Objections were raised, and 
 finally a vote was taken as to whether the doctor was 
 right or not, the delegates voting him wrong. Of course 
 that settled the matter! Disease was so carried, because it 
 had been voted thus ! It is just as reasonable to accept a 
 thing because many men hold to it. The evidence is what we 
 seek, and not the vote. 
 
 "Heterogenesis" is the theory with which de Vries's name 
 is mostly associated and means that, sometimes (though not 
 often), we have a freak, a monster, or "sport," as it is 
 called, born from apparently perfectly normal parents and 
 these sports then breed true and thus produce a new spe- 
 cies. 
 
 Korschinsky, the Russian botanist, goes much further 
 than does de Vries, who admits selection as a factor in evo- 
 lution. Korschinsky 
 
 
 says plainly that the struggle for existence and selection 
 have either no influence in species-forming and descent, or, 
 if any, a hindering and antagonising influence, a retarding 
 nd nullifying influence (p. 333). 
 
 I 
 
 He has set down in parallel columns his views (pp. 334- 
 
136 
 
 The Begimwngs of Science 
 
 According to the transmu- 
 tation theory: 
 
 1. To all organisms there 
 belongs a capacity for varia- 
 tion which is called into play 
 partly through inner, partly 
 through outer causes, 
 through use and disuse, etc. 
 This capacity for variation 
 regularly finds its expression 
 in the appearance of slight 
 and unnoticeable individual 
 differences. 
 
 2. As a result of this 
 struggle for existence and se- 
 lection, those individual vari- 
 ations which prove them- 
 selves useful become fixed and 
 accumulated, while the non- 
 useful ones disappear. All 
 characteristics and peculiari- 
 ties of a species must, as a 
 result of a prolonged selec- 
 tion, stand in harmony with 
 the outer conditions, and be 
 useful to the organism. 
 
 3. Through prolonged se- 
 lection and accumulation of 
 characteristics all species 
 undergo a persistent change, 
 whereby they are gradually 
 transformed into new species 
 without, however, sacrificing 
 their normal physiological 
 relations. 
 
 According to the theory 
 of heterogenesis : 
 
 1. To all organisms there 
 belongs a capacity for vari- 
 ation, which is a fundamental 
 inner peculiarity independ- 
 ent of outer conditions, and* 
 which remains usually in the 
 latent conditions, retained 
 by heredity, but which now 
 and then finds its expressions 
 in sudden changes. 
 
 2. These sudden changes 
 can, under favorable condi- 
 tions, be the beginnings of 
 persistent races. These new 
 characteristics, having ap- 
 peared independently of out- 
 er conditions, are sometimes 
 useful to the organism, but 
 they may also stand in no 
 harmony with outer condi- 
 tions. 
 
 3. All once-formed species 
 remain unchanged, although 
 new forms occasionally split 
 off from them by heterogene- 
 sis. Such newly arisen forms 
 have, as the result of a dis- 
 turbed heredity, a deranged 
 constitution, which reveals 
 itself in a lessened fertility 
 and often in a generally 
 weakened condition of the 
 
Theories of Evolution 
 
 137 
 
 4. This process can take 
 place everywhere and under 
 all circumstances. The hard- 
 er the outer conditions and 
 the sharper the struggle for 
 existence, the more energet- 
 ically selection works, and 
 therewith the quicker the_de- 
 velopment of new forms. 
 
 5. The chief requisite for 
 evolution is, therefore, the 
 struggle for existence, and 
 the selection which results 
 from it. 
 
 6. If there were no strug- 
 gle for existence, no selec- 
 tion, no survival of the 
 strongest, there would be no 
 evolution and no specialisa- 
 tion, for adapted species 
 would have no advantage 
 over unadapted ones, and as 
 a result of crossing with the 
 latter, they would sacrifice 
 
 organism. The new forms, 
 becoming constant races, 
 gradually recover their con- 
 stitution. 
 
 4. The organ of new forms 
 can, however, occur only un- 
 der favorable conditions of 
 existence for the species, and 
 the more favorable these con- 
 ditions, that is, the less se- 
 vere the struggle for exist- 
 ence, the more energetically 
 can evolution go on. New 
 forms do not arise under 
 hard external conditions, or, 
 if any do, they go quickly to 
 ground. 
 
 5. The struggle for exist- 
 ence, and the selection that 
 goes hand in hand with it, 
 constitute a factor which 
 limits new forms and hinders 
 further variation and is, 
 therefore, in no way favor- 
 able to the origin of new 
 forms. It is a factor inim- 
 ical to evolution. 
 
 6. If there were no strug- 
 gle for existence, there would 
 be no killing out of newly 
 arising or already arisen, 
 forms. The world of organ- 
 isms could then grow to a 
 mighty tree, whose branches 
 could all persist in blooming 
 condition, and the most 
 aberrant, now isolated, spe- 
 
138 
 
 The Begmnings of Science 
 
 their useful characteristics. 
 
 7. The so-called advance 
 in nature or the perfecting 
 of organisms, is nothing else 
 than a more complex, more 
 complete adaptation to out- 
 er conditions, and it is 
 reached in a purely mechan- 
 ical way through selection 
 and the accumulation of 
 characteristics useful under 
 the existing outer conditions. 
 
 cies would be connected with 
 all others through intermedi- 
 ate forms. 
 
 7. The adaptation which 
 comes to exist through the 
 struggle for existence is not 
 at all identical with an ad- 
 vance, for higher, more spe- 
 cialized ( vollkommenere) 
 forms are by no means al- 
 ways better adapted to outer 
 conditions than the lower 
 ones. One cannot explain the 
 evolution of organisms in a 
 purely mechanical way. In 
 order to explain the origin of 
 higher forms out of lower it 
 is necessary to admit a spe- 
 cial tendency, in organisms, 
 for advance, which is nearly 
 related to, or identical with 
 the tendency to vary, and 
 which compels organisms to- 
 ward perfectness as far as 
 external conditions allow. 
 
 This theory of Korschinsky and de Vries is not based on 
 any belief that sports or large variations are any more 
 numerous, nor of any more worth as the beginnings of new 
 species, than now generally recognized, but it assumes sud- 
 den radical changes in the organism which, if not visibly 
 large as regards obvious quantitative conditions, are large, 
 or at least comprehensive as regards qualitative conditions. 
 T,he mutation or variation assumed by the theory of hetero- 
 genesis affects many organs and parts, structurally and 
 physiologically; it produces a radical change throughout 
 the organism. And this change is the result of an influence 
 wholly intrinsic, inherent, and has no reference to external 
 
Theories of Evolution 139 
 
 conditions, except in that the stimulus for it may come 
 partly or chiefly from specially favorable conditions of nu- 
 trition. This change is at once definitive and fixed; it is 
 transmitted unimpaired to the offspring of the organism 
 showing the mutation, only the capacity for the production 
 of offspring: i. e., the reproductive fertility, is often weak- 
 ened (p. 336). 
 
 The theory does not call for "sudden and large changes 
 or variations," although it does for "sudden and fixed ones." 
 
 De Vries insists that instead of "variations which are 
 changes in a linear direction, the transf oration to be called 
 mutations constitute divergence in new directions. They 
 take place as far as experience goes, without definite direc- 
 tion." And even if transition forms exist between the spe- 
 cies produced by mutations, they are no evidence against 
 the mutations "for," says de Vries, "the transitions do not 
 appear before new species, at most only simultaneously with 
 this, and generally only after this is already in existence. 
 The transitions are therefore no intermediates or prepara- 
 tions for the appearance of the new forms. The origin 
 takes place, not through them, but wholly independent of 
 them" (p. 338). 
 
 While de Vries admits that recorded mutations are few: 
 "mutations under observation are as yet very rare; enough 
 to indicate the possible and most probable ways but no 
 more"; yet he strongly maintains that there is no scientific 
 proof of the origin of species in any other way than by 
 mutation and that there is such proof of their actual mu- 
 tational origin. He says: "I intend to give a review of 
 the facts obtained from plants which go to prove the asser- 
 tion that species and varieties have originated by mutation 
 and are at present not known to originate in another way" 
 (p. 339). 
 
 But in any consideration of de Vries' work and theories, 
 one must have clearly in mind the distinctive meaning which 
 de Vries attaches to the word species. However little biolo- 
 gists agree on any absolute definition of species, the term 
 
140 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 nevertheless is consistently used to refer to differentiated 
 organic types between any two of which there is consid- 
 erable obvious describable difference, either qualitative or 
 quantitative. If two types of such obvious difference in 
 one or several characteristics (usually external or at least 
 externally noticeable differences are the ones used) are con- 
 nected by a series of connecting gradatory forms existing 
 either in the same territory or in other regions, the two 
 forms are not referred to as distinct species but as varie- 
 ties ; at least the form at one end of the series is called 
 a variety from the other end. By de Vries species and 
 varieties are of different stuff. Specific distinctions with 
 him are based on differences in aggregation of the element- 
 ary units, the Einheiten, that go to compose the specific 
 types. P 
 
 With de Vries, then, species mean two different things; 
 first, the systematic species, which florists and systematists 
 use, and which should be retained as such, lest a new classi- 
 fication hopelessly confuse students, by the immense addi- 
 tions that would have to be made to our lists, and second, for 
 our purpose we must find through "pedigree culture" any 
 form which "remains constant and distinct from its allies" 
 and this form is then to be considered the elementary spe- 
 cies (p. 340). 
 
 A statement made by de Vries must be recorded on ac- 
 count of its value from an orthogenetic viewpoint; as he 
 shows that it is already within the seed that the muta- 
 tions-possibilities must be sought. Here is what he says : 
 "Obviously the mutations must be decided withm the seed." 
 The italics are ours. 
 
 As Professor Kellogg says, On the whole the theory has 
 been warmly welcomed as the most promising way yet out 
 of the difficulties into which biologists had fallen in their 
 attempts to explain satisfactorily the phenomena of the 
 
Theories of Evolution 141 
 
 origin of species through Darwinian selection. And espe- 
 cially has been welcomed the fruitful idea of unit species 
 characters, and of the indivisibility and the distinctness of 
 such characters, in inheritance. But with all the interest 
 aroused by de Vries' presentation of his theory, and with 
 all the eager scrutiny of species and records of species ap- 
 pearing an output of new evidence amazingly small (when 
 one stops to consider the publicity gained for the theory 
 itself and its obvious need of more confirmatory data of 
 observation and experiment) has resulted. Even though the 
 answer may be that experiment takes time, the lack of new 
 observational evidence of the occurrence of mutations, and 
 of the origin of new species through mutations in nature, 
 is significant. It is my belief that a reaction against the 
 curiously swift and widespread partial to complete accept- 
 ance of the mutation theory as the sufficient 'way out' of our 
 troubles to explain the origin of new species will soon occur 
 (p. 348). 
 
 Conklin well says, "The mutation theory is a theory of the 
 evolution of organisms through the evolution of their germ 
 cells." 
 
 Bateson has suggested that mutations may be Mendelian 
 recessives coming forth, and to understand this we suggest 
 the reading of our chapter on Genetics. Simply stated it 
 means that after breeding, a certain proportion of the off- 
 spring will show after the second generation, certain unit 
 characters, let us say, the color of the hair. Three out of 
 four of the offspring will have the color known as "dom- 
 inant," the other one the "recessive" and if these reces- 
 sives are bred together the color of the non-dominant will, 
 of course, be predominating. 
 
 It is interesting to note the excerpts from the addresses 
 delivered before the American Society of Naturalists at Phil- 
 adelphia, December 28, 1904, when distinguished men in 
 various fields of biological work spoke in regard to the 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 mutation theory. Castle said: 
 
 On the whole, it appears that the formation of new 
 breeds begins with the discovery of an exceptional individ- 
 ual, or with the production of such an individual by means 
 of cross-breeding. Such exceptional individuals are muta- 
 tions (p. 362). 
 
 Dwight said: 
 
 It is to my mind impossible to find any support for a 
 theory of evolution by minute changes from the study 
 of anatomical variations. I should not venture to say, 
 on the other hand, that they give any support to the 
 theory of mutation; but at least they are not in disaccord 
 with it (p. 363). 
 
 And Wheeler : 
 
 It seemed necessary to discuss ethological characters at 
 some length for the purpose of vindicating their importance. 
 Having attempted this, I may say that these characters 
 seem to me to offer even fewer difficulties than the mor- 
 phological characters to the acceptance of the mutation 
 theory, for the reason that the ethological and psychological 
 processes are conceived primarily as qualities and not quan- 
 tities. Thus the psychical elements, i. e., the simple feel- 
 ings, cravings, and sensations, are disparate qualitative 
 processes which cannot be derived from one another or from 
 some more undifferentiated process. This is still more 
 evident in the case of the complex psychical phenomena. 
 Similarly, instincts, with which ethology is most concerned, 
 when resolved into their simplest components, are seen to 
 consist of discrete reactions which can not be shown to 
 rise from one another. Although, on the other hand, the 
 measurable intensities and durations, of the reactions are 
 analogous to the fluctuating structural variations, it is 
 even more difficult for the psychologist to conceive of a par- 
 ticular feeling, craving or sensation of some other psychic 
 
Theories of Evolution 143 
 
 process, than it is for the morphologist to conceive of the 
 origin of new characters from the fluctuating variations of 
 structure. 
 
 Mutation is even more urgently demanded for the ex- 
 planation of many other instincts, especially those of sym- 
 biotic or parasitic species and of species with profound 
 and sudden metamorphosis. In these cases, a particular 
 activity, on which most often depends the life of the indi- 
 vidual or of its progeny, has to be performed with a high 
 degree of proficiency at its very phylogenetic inception or 
 it can be of no advantage to the individual or the race. 
 Such cases, with which you are all familiar, have ever been 
 the insurmountable obstacle to the evolution of instincts on 
 the theory of fluctuating variations and natural selection. 
 The theory of organic selection seems to be merely to 
 conceal but not to overcome the difficulties. The mutation 
 theory frankly avoids the difficulties even if it fails to throw 
 any light on the origin of the mutations and bundles this 
 into the germ-plasma. It is of course no objection to the 
 theory that it leaves something under the heavens to be 
 accounted for. This is rather to be regarded as one of 
 its chief virtues. As working naturalists we have reason 
 to be most suspicious of the theories that explain every- 
 thing (pp. 363-364). 
 
 And lastly we have the neo-Vitalists regarding whom 
 Kellogg, who differs radically from them, says : 
 
 The position of the new Vitalists is perhaps best to be 
 taken from that of Driesch, an extremely able present-day 
 biologist, whose first belief was in a radical mechanical ex- 
 planation of all life phenomena, and whose brilliant experi- 
 mental work has furnished many of the examples referred 
 to in the text-books of the modern study of the mechanics 
 of development. But Driesch's present position is an un- 
 compromising belief in the impossibility of explaining life- 
 forms and life-functions on the basis of ever so complex 
 a combination of purely physico-chemical and mechanical 
 conditions and factors. Put positively, neo-Vitalism de- 
 
144 The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 mands the assumption of an extra-physico-chemical factor 
 (called "psychoid," according to Driesch's nomenclature), 
 which is an attribute of, or essential kind of potentiality per- 
 taining to, organized living substance, and not found in nor 
 influencing inorganic bodies. 
 
 Biitschli has well pointed out that neo-Vitalism is really 
 only a return to the old "vital principle" belief, and that 
 we are now and have been ever since our practical giving 
 up of the vital principle notion, making steady progress 
 in the explanation of life-forms and life-functions on strict- 
 ly mechanical and physico-chemical grounds. While we 
 have by no means explained all life attributes in this way, 
 Biitschli holds that our progress has been such as to make 
 no demand for the introduction as yet of a new vital 
 principle under a pseudo-scientific guise. 
 
 Other neo-Vitalists, one of whom G. Wolff is a type, 
 lay chief stress on the inexplicableness of the Zweckmassig- 
 keit in organisms by any of the known biological facts and 
 factors, and see in the determination or very existence of 
 this Zweckmassigkeit the chief revelation of a vital factor, 
 wholly distinct from anything found in the inorganic world. 
 Wolff's argument is clever and suggestive, and brings home 
 to one strongly the indissoluble relationship between living 
 matter and its adaptivity. In its fundamental character life 
 is adaptivity ; the indispensable relation between living mat- 
 ter and the rest of nature is the pliability, the adaptiveness 
 of the living matter (p. 
 
 These are the various theories as Professor Kellogg sees 
 them and it will be agreed by the majority of biologists 
 that he has done his work well and that there is a great 
 breadth of reading and an almost unbelievable familiarity 
 with the many systems or theories propounded to account 
 for evolution. This work appeared in 1907. We have be- 
 fore us the August number (1916) of The American Nat- 
 uralist, in which Dr. Chas. B. Davenport, the geneticist, 
 gives what he calls "The Form of Evolutionary Theory That 
 
Theories of Evolution 145 
 
 Modern Genetical Research Seems to Favor." In which he 
 shows quite conclusively that from experimental researches 
 the "Internal changes are chiefly independent of external 
 conditions," and that this theory has the support of work- 
 ers in the many fields that can and do throw light upon 
 the matter. 
 
 Wasmann has well summed up the whole matter when 
 he says that in discussing evolution it is necessary to 
 
 distinguish (1) between the theory of evolution as a sci- 
 entific hypothesis and as a philosophic speculation; (2) 
 between the theory of evolution as based on theistic prin- 
 ciples or as based on a materialistic and atheistic founda- 
 tion; (3) between the theory of evolution and Darwinism; 
 (4) between the theory of evolution as applied to the vege- 
 table and animal kingdoms and applied to man. 
 
 As a scientific hypothesis, the theory of evolution seeks 
 to determine the historical succession of the various species 
 of plants and animals on our earth; and with the aid of 
 paleontology and other sciences such as comparative mor- 
 phology, embryology, and bionomy, to show how in the 
 course of the different geological epochs they gradually 
 evolve from their beginnings by purely natural causes of 
 specific development. The theory of evolution, then, as a 
 scientific hypothesis, does not consider the present species 
 of plants and animals as forms directly created by God, 
 but as the final result of an evolution from other species 
 existing in former geological periods. Hence, it is called 
 "the theory of evolution," or "the theory of descent," since 
 it implies the descent of the present from extinct species. 
 This theory is opposed to the theory of constancy, which 
 assumes the immutability of organic species. The scientific 
 theory therefore does not concern itself with the origin of 
 life. It merely inquires into the genetic relations of sys- 
 tematic species, genera, and families and endeavors to ar- 
 range them according to natural series of descent (genetic 
 trees). 
 
146 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 How far is the theory of evolution based on observed 
 facts? It is understood to be still only an hypothesis. The 
 formation of new species is directly observed in but a few 
 cases, and only with reference to such forms as are closely 
 related to each other. . . . There is, in fact, no evidence 
 whatever for the common genetic descent of all plant and 
 animal forms from a single primitive organism. Hence, the 
 greater number of botanists and zoologists regard a poly- 
 genetic (polyphyletic) evolution as much more acceptable 
 than a monogenetic (monophyletic). At present, however, 
 it is impossible to decide how many independent genetic series 
 must be assumed in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. 
 This is the gist of the theory of evolution as a scientific 
 hypothesis. 
 
 As to the theory of evolution considered philosophically: 
 
 The history of the plant and animal kingdoms upon our 
 globe is but a small part of the history of the entire earth; 
 similarly, the geological development of our earth consti- 
 tutes but a small part of the history of the solar system 
 and of the universe. The theory of evolution as a philo- 
 sophical conception considers the entire history of the 
 cosmos as an harmonious development, brought about by 
 natural laws. This conception is in agreement with the 
 Christian view of the universe. God is the creator of 
 heaven and earth. If God produced the universe by a single 
 creative act of His will, then its natural development by 
 laws implanted in it by the Creator is to the greater glory 
 of His Divine power and wisdom. St. Thomas says : "The 
 potency of a cause is the greater, the more remote the effects 
 to which it extends" (Summa c. Gent. Ill, LXXVII) ; and 
 Suarez: "God does not interfere directly with the natural 
 order, where secondary causes suffice to produce the in- 
 tended effect." (De opera sex sierum, II, c.x.n. 13.) In 
 the light of this principle of the Christian interpretation of 
 nature, the history of the animal and vegetable kingdoms 
 on our planet is, as it were, a versicle in a volume of a million 
 pages in which the natural development of the cosmos is 
 
Theories of Evolution 147 
 
 described, and upon whose title page is written: "In the 
 beginning God created heaven and earth." 3 
 
 We have already shown the value of a scientific hypoth- 
 esis, in a previous chapter, and have there called attention 
 to the fact that such hypothesis is essential in all experi- 
 mental work, and that we are justified in accepting it as a 
 working hypothesis regardless of its being true or not y if 
 our experiments work out as though it were true. 
 
 We have further shown that it is then necessary philo- 
 sophically, that is, from the rules of logic, to establish 
 (after we have found our first principles) the hypothesis 
 on solid grounds before it can be accepted as truth. 
 
 This is what Wasmann means in the citation given above 
 in his first division. Likewise, we have taken his second point 
 and shown that it is necessary to start somewhere and 
 with a definite viewpoint or a "creed," as Dr. Bourne puts 
 it, and this we have stated in his own words. That is, 
 there are really two schools of thought involved, the one 
 like Professor Kellogg, who insists on starting with a causo- 
 mechanical viewpoint, or creed, and throwing out of court 
 all things that do not fit in therewith, the other school in- 
 sisting on an original creative act, and as the causo-me- 
 chanists have not yet been able to formulate a single valid 
 reason for actual BEGINNINGS of anything, the latter really 
 have the best of the argument. 
 
 The difference between Darwinism and Evolution we have 
 made clear in this very chapter, for, after all, that is prac- 
 tically what this whole chapter is written for. 
 
 And lastly, the difference between the animal world at 
 large and man is really not a difference of the physical at 
 all, except to a very small extent. The argument should, 
 
 "Article, "Evolution" Vol. V. Page 654, Catholic Encyclopedia. 
 
148 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 and must, he carried into the thought world mto the realm 
 of philosophy and psychology, for it is in the field of 
 thought and of spirituality that the difference is found, so 
 that men, such as Professor Wm. Wundt, the greatest living 
 experimental psychologist; Professor Wheeler and Profes- 
 sor Wasmann, world-renowned authorities on the supposed- 
 ly most intelligent of animals, the Ant, have all come to the 
 conclusion that there is an immeasurable difference between 
 the "reasons" of animals for performing the acts they do, 
 and the reasons men perform similar ones. 
 
 Here is the battleground of the future, for already much 
 of our interpreting of the physical facts has fallen to the 
 ground as worthless, as witness, for example, many of the 
 supposedly vestigial or rudimentary organs, among which 
 the ductless glands were originally considered, but which 
 we now know have a most valuable use in forming minute 
 particles which in turn permit other glands to function 
 properly. 
 
 Professor Haeckel's theory that man passes through the 
 same stage as did the race, that is, first becomes a fish, then 
 going on through other forms, until he shows in his em- 
 bryonic development, every form through which his ances- 
 tors have passed, is a theory which Professor Kellogg well 
 says is now only a skeleton on which to hang exceptions, 
 and as has also been said by another Biologist, that there 
 is a big difference between saying that because a human 
 being passes through a similar stage as does the fish, that 
 therefore the human must have been a fish once upon a 
 time, when aJl that should be said is that the human and 
 the fish pass through the same stage. 
 
 No fossil remains have disclosed a missing link of any 
 description. A jaw has been found, part of a skull, or a 
 tooth, but to build up a whole theory on a single part of 
 
Theories of Evolution 149 
 
 the body is extremely hazardous. 
 
 And the argument that because men and animals are so 
 similarly built physically, the former must therefore have 
 sprung from the latter has always seemed to the writer 
 most specious reasoning, for it assumes that because the 
 Creator did not build a totally different form in each case 
 and show how many things He could make, therefore He 
 didn't have anything to do with any of the things He did 
 make. Continuing with the article quoted above by Pro- 
 fessor Wasmann : 
 
 That God should have made us of natural, evolutionary, 
 original causes in the production of man's body, is per se 
 not improbable and was propounded by St. Augustine. 4 
 
 The actual proofs of the descent of man's body from 
 animals is, however, inadequate, especially in respect to 
 paleontology. And the human soul could not have been 
 derived from that of the brute, since it is of a spiritual 
 nature; for which reason we must refer its origin to a 
 creative act on the part of God. 5 
 
 In reading such a volume, then, as Professor Kellogg's 
 we are confronted by the indisputable fact that among the 
 men who have the facts before them there is a most hopeless 
 mass of irreconcilable theories. How many hold to either 
 side or to any particular theory no one knows. There is 
 Professor Fleishmann, of the University of Erlangen, a 
 most noted Biologist, who absolutely denies that any Evo- 
 lution of any kind has been demonstrated. 6 It is true that 
 he is the only one of the recognized Biologists who take 
 this extreme view, but it throws a light on the so-called 
 "evidence" at least that is furnished for proof. Then there 
 
 4 See Article "Augustinism in History," under V. Saint Augustine 
 of Hippo, Catholic Encyclopedia. 
 
 5 Article, "Evolution," Vol. V. Page 654-655. Catholic Encyclopedia, 
 6 See Page 8, Darwinism To-day. 
 
150 The Begwvnwgs of Science \ 
 
 are the ever-growing numbers of workers in biological fields 
 who have accepted Orthogenesis, that is, an inner driving 
 force of some nature, though as shown, one school explains 
 this is a physico-chemical manner, the other in a vitalistic. 
 But all admit that nothing has as yet been explained as to 
 origins of organic matter; a growing number are constantly 
 coming to Nageli's and Driesch's viewpoint of Vitalism, 
 recognizing the immeasurable distance between the living and 
 the non-living and between the highest form of animal and 
 the lowest of human-kind. 
 
 But it must ever be remembered that new names are given 
 to old doctrines, and often a description answers where an 
 explanation should be found, so, that as Sir Bertram Windle 
 has well said, it is exactly this orthogenetic and vital- 
 istic doctrine that the most intense defender of the "soul" 
 theory ever contended for, yet many, if not most of these 
 men who actually hold these self-same doctrines, would 
 rather perish than give this "something," which is the inner 
 driving force, so antiquated a name as "the soul." Here we 
 have the interesting spectacle of a great number of scien- 
 tists being perfectly agreed on a subject but most insistently 
 fighting over its name. 
 
 So that we may say with the last writer quoted above, 
 that as long as men who have all the known facts before them 
 cannot come to a decision, the average man would do well to 
 ponder long before he jumps at conclusions too abruptly. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 VITALISM 
 
 ROUGHLY speaking, we may divide the curriculum of 
 any school attempting to embrace universal knowledge, 
 into three great divisions : ( 1 ) the study of non-living mat- 
 ter, (2) the study of living matter and (3) the study of the 
 thought-world. 
 
 Everything we know everything that we can possibly 
 study or think about must come under one of these great 
 classifications. 
 
 We have shown in our chapter on Metaphysics and 
 Epistemology that nothing can be known at all, unless we 
 begin with self-evident and unprovable First Principles, and 
 in our chapter on Logic we have shown that from these 
 principles it is necessary to build up, step by step, the super- 
 structure of theories or truths we are seeking to demon- 
 strate. 
 
 First, we wish to call attention to the Non-living part of 
 our universe, or as it is usually termed in technical language, 
 the Inorganic. Such studies as Physics, simple Chemistry, 
 Geology, and Astronomy come under this Inorganic head- 
 ing. "Physics" attempts to find the physical laws of the uni- 
 verse by which men may be able to tell in advance what effect 
 a given thing will have when set in motion, for in the last 
 analysis, Physics deals with Motion, and Motion only, while 
 "Chemistry" attempts to find the laws by which it may tell 
 what given combinations of irreducible substances, called 
 elements, will produce a given result, there being two general 
 
 151 
 
The Begvrmmgs of Science 
 
 ways of going about it ; one, takes a compound apart so as 
 to find what simpler compounds or elements entered into the 
 matter analysed, and the other experiments with various 
 simpler compounds to ascertain the result obtained by their 
 mixing. This first method is known as "analytic," while the 
 latter is called "synthetic." "Geology" in its broadest sense 
 means the application of the laws found in Physics and 
 Chemistry to our own earth, while Astronomy applies the 
 same laws to other worlds than ours. 
 
 Under the study of the Living, we have one science that 
 embraces everything: namely, Biology, but this is divided 
 again into the Plant world and the Animal world. And 
 Man considering himself as the highest form of living 
 things naturally attempts to apply all laws that are found 
 in any of the other fields of study to himself. This is what, 
 after all, makes other branches of learning interesting. In 
 and of itself, if no application whatever could be made to 
 man from the findings, it is doubtful whether many would 
 make the attempt of ascertaining these now-so-interesting 
 laws. And decidedly the most interesting and most valuable 
 discussion in all scientific fields centers around the applica- 
 tion of the physical and chemical laws to actual LIFE. 
 Can Life be explained on the basis of the laws of Motion 
 and the laws of Chemistry? In other words, what evidence 
 is there that would lead us to answer this question in the 
 affirmative or the negative ? Is there any need of postulating 
 anything beside these laws? And if so, what can be postu- 
 lated, and is there any evidence for the postulate? 
 
 It is true that it is very difficult for most men and women 
 to look at this question fairly on account of their training 
 and their prepossessions, but, if one is to pass judgment 
 well and worthily on any subject, it is more than necessary 
 to throw out all manner of emotional desire and face the 
 
Vitalism 153 
 
 facts as they are definitely demonstrated in the laboratory 
 and the logical conclusions that must be based on such find- 
 ings. 
 
 First, then, we may say that those who hold that the 
 physical and chemical laws can alone explain living mat- 
 ter, are called Causo-mechanists, while those who oppose this 
 view we shah 1 call Vitalists. 
 
 We have explained what the Causo-mechanists are and 
 now shall attempt to give definition to what Vitalists hold, 
 but it must not be forgotten that the Vitalists, just as well 
 as the Causo-mechanists accept as freely and as fully, all 
 the physical and chemical laws that have been established. 
 The Vitalist insists, just as definitely as does the Causo- 
 mechanist that these same physical and chemical laws are 
 found to be working in all living things. He even accepts 
 the machine theory of life which the Causo-mechanists con- 
 stantly use in their explanations, but he does not stop there. 
 He insists on driving the matter still further home. And 
 in doing this, the great outstanding problem is that known 
 as Teleology, which in turn means that there is a definite end 
 toward which all living matter tends and which it usually 
 succeeds in attaining, at least partially. In other words, the 
 problem hinges on whether or not there is "purposiveness" 
 in life, and here again a further problem arises as to what 
 is meant by this word "purposiveness." It is quite probable 
 that many fighting each other have come to grief in regard 
 not only to the meaning that is to be attached to the word, 
 but also how it is to be applied to life. That there is some 
 purposiveness in life no one denies ; for example, that the 
 eye in each individual develops for the purpose of the use to 
 which it is put, is self-evident; that food is eaten for the 
 purpose of nourishment and that it fulfills its purpose in 
 health is likewise accepted, but this kind of purposiveness, 
 
154 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 while interesting as a problem in itself is not the problem 
 with which and on which our interest centers in discussing 
 whether the physical and chemical laws are sufficient to 
 explain life. What we are after is this: to show the dis- 
 tinction between two different kinds of purposiveness. The 
 one materialists accept is that the body of a living thing 
 is a machine-like structure and that just as any machine 
 made by man, is made for a definite purpose, and, when 
 properly managed and run, will turn out the kind vf work for 
 which it was intended, so does the living machine, but the 
 other, to which Vitalists call attention, is not this kind of 
 teleology or purposiveness, but, just as in the analogous 
 case of the man-made machine, so in the living machine, the 
 question propounds itself, what is the reason that the 
 machine has become a machine? And with this important 
 question arises another one, namely, why is it that there 
 is no machine that has ever been made that will turn food 
 into nutrition for itself, that will re-grow a lost part, that 
 will produce other machines like itself, and most interesting 
 of all, that will, if three-fourths of it be cut away, no matter 
 what parts of it these may be, produce with perfect pre- 
 cision, though on a smaller scale, the whole machine; and, 
 lastly, there is no machine that has yet been able to adjust 
 itself to a different environment than the one in which it 
 has been placed; e.g., it will always and invariably, so long 
 as it is in good working order, do only the same thing under 
 the same conditions ? Why also is it that a machine will not 
 grow larger, no matter what nutritive things may be given 
 it, but works, rather, on exactly the reverse methods, by 
 commencing to wear away from the very moment it is first 
 put into use, whereas the living body increases through its 
 own inherent ways of building of growing from the most 
 minute germ-plasm to a full and complete living adult, 
 
Vitalism 155 
 
 reproducing, and then beginning its downward path, that 
 leads to dissolution? 
 
 We see, then, two types of teleology must be kept in 
 mind if we are to make any progress in our discussion. 
 First, the machine type of teleology and secondly, the re- 
 productive, growth, and regenerative as well as adaptive 
 type. In other words, we may say, the first attempts to ex- 
 plain why the machine turns out the work it does after the 
 machine is made, the latter, how the machine came to be 
 made and what the purpose was in making it. Or as Pro- 
 fessor Hans Driesch, one of the ablest Biologists, of the 
 present day, has put it : 
 
 The main question of Vitalism is not whether the processes 
 of life can properly be called purposive; it is rather the 
 question if the purposiveness in those processes is the result 
 of a special constellation of factors known already to the 
 sciences of the inorganic, or if it is the result of an autonomy 
 peculiar to the processes themselves. 1 
 
 Vitalism is concerned with the Organic world, because 
 it is concerned with processes that are especially adapted 
 toward certain ends, or processes that at least have a posi- 
 tion among objects in a system that may be working toward 
 a certain end, and where as far as we can see, the driving 
 force that keeps the adaptiveness working is contained 
 within the living thing itself as contradistinguished from the 
 inorganic where the only force that causes any change of any 
 kind whatsoever is from the outside. And then we have the 
 further important thing to consider, that always the same 
 process is performed in all similar organisms under the 
 same conditions, when no injury has taken place to the 
 
 x The History and Theory of Vitalism, by Hans Driesch (Macmillan). 
 All explanations and quotations in this chapter up to Note 4, are from 
 this volume. 
 
 
156 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 organism. 
 
 And Professor Driesch also makes a very excellent dis- 
 tinction in his brilliant discussion of the subject by calling 
 attention to the fact that we are dealing with processes and 
 processes only. That a machine as a thing is not a pro- 
 cess. The machine made by human hands is made for 
 processes and every single process in a machine is pur- 
 posive. 
 
 It is the result of purposive action, of human action, 
 but it is the fact that it is made for processes that dis- 
 tinguishes it from other human artefacts, from works of art 
 for instance. 
 
 There are, then, inorganic things, namely, those made by 
 men, which show us processes deserving the predicate pur- 
 posive. It is clear that here the purposiveness of each 
 single process rests on the specific order of the specific 
 parts of the machine, and is determined by this order. In 
 other words, each single effect in a machine is only purpo- 
 sive in so far as it is part of a higher specific whole; and 
 this is in virtue of the constitution or structure of that 
 whole. 
 
 Our reasoning has now brought us to a point at which 
 the problem which we have described as the fundamental 
 problem of biology presents itself for consideration. We 
 are confronted by the all important question: are these 
 processes in the organism, which we have described as pur- 
 posive, perhaps only purposive in virtue of a given structure 
 or tectonic, of a "machine" in the widest sense, on the 
 basis of which they play their part, being purposive there- 
 fore only in the sense in which processes in a machine are 
 purposive; or is there another special kind of teleology in 
 the realm of organic life (p. 4) ? 
 
 The usual use of the word "Teleology" is only descriptive. 
 It does not really mean anything explanatory, biologically 
 considered, as it is used ; it 
 
Vitalism 157 
 
 leaves the most important point still open, for life in par- 
 ticular this question: are the processes of life to be judged 
 teleological only in virtue of their given order, only because 
 a given mechanical form lies beneath them, while every single 
 one is really a pure physical or chemical process or are 
 the processes of life purposive because of an unanalysable 
 autonomy ? 
 
 And this is called the machine type or "static Teleology" 
 while the deeper processes which lead to the making of the 
 machine, Professor Driesch calls the "dynamic Teleology." 
 He insists that it is the "static" type that leads to the 
 mechanistic theory of the organism: that is, 
 
 the process of life and its order is only a special case of 
 those laws which are valid elsewhere and of the general 
 order of the world. The constellation of all the single 
 cosmic elements just happen^ to be of such nature that 
 we also get amongst them those processes which are grouped 
 together as "life." According to this view life is only dis- 
 tinctive as a combination and not because of its own laws. 
 The question whence comes the given order with which static 
 teleology operates is insoluble; arid it is precisely owing to 
 this circumstance that the life-machine does appear to be 
 something different from technical machines whose origin 
 we know, even if the kind of purposiveness is the same in 
 both cases. 
 
 Dynamic teleology leads us to what is generally called 
 Vitalism ; it leads us to the recognition of the "Autonomy of 
 vital processes." 
 
 As we have shown in our chapter on Logic, it is from this 
 subject that we obtain the validity for all our reasoning ", 
 and if the laws of Logic fall, we can know nothing validly, 
 for it is, and can only be through Logic that we gather 
 knowledge and arrange it in an orderly manner so it will 
 
 >ssess a meaning. 
 
158 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 First, then, we wish to summarily put together the main 
 points so that he who has had no logical training, may yet 
 see why we lay such stress on the subject. 
 
 It will readily be admitted that in the study of living 
 things there are the two great divisions the physical and 
 the psychic the difference between contending parties being 
 entirely as to the connection or difference between these 
 worlds, never that we know them as separate entities now. 
 
 So then, we know, that all proof, all ability of every 
 kind whatever, to prove anything must rest with our 
 thoughts, for one who can not think, can not explain any- 
 thing, and one who can not think can have nothing explained 
 to him. We must have thought ; but to think, means to have 
 something to think about. As soon as we think of some- 
 thing we know that the mere fact that we ourselves are 
 thinking and that we are thinking about something, proves 
 to us there are two totally different existences in the world. 
 One is the thinker, the other the thing thought about. But 
 we also know from this that when we are describing the thing 
 thought about, let us say an orange, we pull it to pieces 
 mentally, we say, we see "yellow," we see "roundness," etc. 
 We are only taking parts of it at a time in our thought, but 
 still the orange being the sum total of all these attributes 
 we are describing, we get a notion of a WHOLE and its Parts. 
 Now if what we have in our mind is an image and if this is 
 an exact representation of what is actually before us in the 
 physical world, we think of this agreement as TRUTH. And 
 the object itself, of which .we have the image is what we 
 mean when we speak of the "physical" or of "Nature" 
 
 Further, in our analysis of thought we find that we have 
 something in mind that is now before us, or we may think 
 of something that has just now happened. But we may 
 also think of things that have happened in the past, and 
 
Vitalism 159 
 
 some even that may occur in the future. In other words, we 
 know what is present as being Now, and that which has 
 occurred in the past as before Now, or even "earlier than' 9 
 some thing else. This gives us what we call a relationship. 
 But during this whole process of Now, and what happened 
 in the past and what may happen in the future we still 
 always use the pronoun "7" in speaking. "7" am seeing 
 this ; "/" saw this yesterday ; "7" shall see this to-morrow. 
 There is then the underlying knowledge that "7" exist as 
 an individual, and notwithstanding the past or the future, 
 it is always "I" that am the same; it is my thought that is 
 changing. This idea of change is often called "Becoming. 9 ' 
 
 And if we are positive that what we have thought in the 
 past has resulted in our thinking what we do at present, 
 that is, if we know that we could not feel and think as we 
 do now if we had never had the experience we have had in 
 the past, we have the theory of "Causality" in its simplest 
 definition. All we mean by this is that every thought we 
 have has come to us because we have had other thoughts 
 before that have caused the result. 
 
 It is important to remember that if these things are not 
 true then there is no truth, for it is the only way we have 
 of arriving at a truth, and if by truth we mean an agreement 
 between what actually exists in the physical world and the 
 impress of it in its fullest signification in the mind, we must 
 always seek this agreement between the physical and the 
 mental to arrive at the truth. That is we can find this prin- 
 ciple of causality in Nature very readily, for, in accord- 
 ance with the laws of mind we have just drawn, everything 
 that we have in the physical world, or what we call Nature, 
 is the direct result of forces of some kind that have gone on 
 in the past which have caused the present things to be what 
 they are. 
 
160 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 So far, we shall in all probability have no objections 
 offered. All this is self-evident, but essential, in order that 
 the meaning of our words be understood. And as it was the 
 "I" that endured in the thought world, so "Substance" is 
 what we say "endures" in the physical. Now, Nature or the 
 physical world occupies space. It is impossible for us to 
 imagine anything in the physical world about us that does 
 not occupy some space, BUT, about earlier changes, we can- 
 not say definitely that the changes themselves, which are the 
 cause of our present world-forms, necessarily occupied 
 space. They may have done so, but it is neither necessary 
 to assume that, nor could it probably be proven one way or 
 the other. 
 
 Let us take a physical law to which we have never been 
 able to find any exceptions; namely that "Nothing can rise 
 higher than its source" without an outside agency adding 
 additional power of some kind. Or as Professor Driesch 
 puts it, "that which forms the reason" for anything "must 
 always be richer in content; i.e., richer in attributes than 
 the other which is its consequence." This richness or mani- 
 foldness means that there must be a greater 
 
 number of different irreducible (elementary) characters 
 than in the result that the cause produces. We have then 
 the law, "The degree of manifoldness of a natural system 
 can never increase of itself, i. e., without a cause as its 
 quasi-sufficient reason" (pp. 196-197). 
 
 This merely means that if any given cause produces a 
 result that is more complex than itself, that complexity or 
 additional matter that caused it must have come from the 
 outside and not from itself. 
 
 In the non-living world all growth is by accretion by 
 adding to the outside of the object; in the living, just the 
 
Vitalism 161 
 
 reverse method takes place, all living 1 things growing from 
 the inside outward. 
 
 It is of course, easily conceivable that between two given 
 moments "the number of elementary material constituents 
 (atoms) of a system might increase without there having 
 been a passage of atoms into the system from 'outside' in 
 the spatial sense," and if this be true, either our thought 
 means nothing, or we must accept "thing-creating agents 9 ' 
 which have made these atoms. 
 
 Then another possibility presents itself; namely, that a 
 thing which has not been changing, may at a given moment 
 begin to change, and yet we can find no moving cause. 
 "Change-creating agents must have been at work in such a 
 case." But we may admit that we have not found these two 
 types actually in the physical world, though they may be 
 there, for it does not follow that what has not yet been 
 found, is non-existent and if they should be there, they may 
 some day actually be brought to light. 
 
 Then there is still another type of change which may 
 take place. Let us suppose we have four rows of four dots 
 each, such as in the drawing, with different relations between 
 them. 
 
 Now it is very easily understood that there may be a 
 change within this that does not really affect space, that is, 
 there may be a change in the relationship of the different 
 dots. Let us say that these may continue to remain in the 
 position and relationship they are in, up to a certain 
 moment, and then, no matter under what conditions we find 
 
168 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 them, a change in the number of different kinds of relations 
 may take place. In such a case, there would be immaterial 
 or non-spatial agents at work, or again there is no founda- 
 tion for the becoming or change at all, on a logical basis. 
 In other words, there has been a sufficient reason in space 
 for "becoming" in general, i.e., there has been a supply of 
 spatial energy for what has happened ; but it is with regard 
 to the peculiarities of becoming that there is a lack of suffi- 
 cient reason in spatial change. "There must have been 
 non-spatial agents of a controlling type, so to speak" (p. 
 200). 
 
 The most important form of this type of change would 
 be where a distribution in one system that is really a sum, 
 is transformed into a distribution that would be in some 
 sense a unity or totality, without any spatial mechanical 
 predetermination of this totality. 
 
 Using this figure of Professor Dreisch's of sixteen points, 
 an arrangement that may be defined by very few terms, 
 because it is of a very low degree of manifoldness, may 
 be transformed into an arrangement such as this: 
 
 without spatial preformation. There are sixteen things in 
 each case, but the first arrangements of these things is 
 clearly a sum, whereas the second resembles a "fish." 
 
 We shall call this type of becoming, unifying or individ- 
 ualising causality. 
 
 If a system passes through several phases of becoming 
 
Vitalism 163 
 
 in succession, all controlled by unifying causality, we may 
 speak of the evolution of the system, 
 
 and every single unity of becoming that leads to unity as the 
 final end may be called purposive or teleological. 
 
 And we wish to impress upon the reader that it is this 
 "unifying causality" that "is the prototype of biological, 
 i.e., vitalistic becoming" (p. 201). 
 
 Vitalism proper, then means that there is an autonomy of 
 the processes of Life. 
 
 It is not necessary to assume, nor is it assumed, that this 
 autonomy creates any matter or energy or any of the pre- 
 requisites of change as such, just because we say there is a 
 unifying agency at work. All we need say is that this auton- 
 omy or unifying causality, for that is all it is, is regulative, 
 or we might say that it controls the particular way in which 
 the energy manifests itself. 
 
 There is here no breaking of the law of the conservation 
 of Energy, nor of the principle that all change is due to a 
 difference in intensity of energy, such as heat, cold, etc. 
 
 Now, all that is claimed for this autonomous principle 
 which is called the "entelechy" is that, due to it, there may 
 be a suspension of any particular happening as is possible 
 on the basis of pre-existing differences of intensity and as 
 would occur without such suspension. Suspending possible 
 change and relaxing suspension would then be the two 
 modes of "action" of the bearer of individualizing causality 
 and this is what is called "entelechy." 
 
 In regard to the figure, the points stand for sixteen sys- 
 tems equal one to another and each endowed with endless 
 "possibilities" (in the form of given differences of energetic 
 intensities), we can understand how this homogeneous dis- 
 tribution of possibilities may be transformed into a hetero- 
 
164 The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 geneous distribution of realities, as in figure 2. In order 
 that this may happen, it is only necessary that "entelechy," 
 which is supposed to have suspended all possibilities so far, 
 relaxes its suspension for each system in a different way. 
 This avoids the argument advanced against Vitalism that 
 this life-principle should be omnipotent. It is only regulative, 
 and as such can create nothing. It merely controls that 
 which already exists. And it is important that we remember 
 that "entelechy" or "any other individualizing agent, if such 
 there be, is itself neither an 'energy' nor a 'material sub- 
 stance' of any special kind, such an assumption would lead 
 to absurdities. Entelechy is an agent sui generis, non- 
 material and non-spatial, but acting 'into' space, so to 
 speak; an agent, however, that belongs to nature in the 
 purely logical sense in which we use the word" (p. 204). 
 
 And here we wish to impress the point that this has noth- 
 ing whatever to do with the origm of life. It is simply 
 another way of saying what Dr. Ward says in the article 
 on Psychology in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia 
 Britannica, that "Life must be regarded as either inherent 
 in matter, or as the result simply of a particular material 
 configuration, or as physically inexplicable. But, for the 
 present at all events, it cannot be explained physically ; nor 
 are we even within measurable distance of such an explana- 
 tion: so much is beyond cavil" (p. 601, vol. 22). 
 
 From the purely materialistic viewpoint, only that is per- 
 mitted to be discussed which can find its way for demon- 
 stration purposes in the laboratory. Science consists in 
 describing phenomena; it cannot, and never has explained 
 anyihmg. It cannot answer a WHY, it can only tell us HOW 
 some results can be obtained by doing certain things, but 
 WHY these particular results are obtained when this par- 
 ticular thing is done remains unanswered. And as Science 
 
Vitalism 165 
 
 has not been able to explain Life, many biologists, prominent 
 among whom stands Professor Hans Driesch, who like many 
 others started with intense materialistic and causo-mechan- 
 istic ideas, have reversed their position and come to the con- 
 clusion that no progress toward truth can be made unless 
 some "unifying principle" be accepted. This is a necessary 
 hypothesis, for without it we cannot explain how the little 
 fertilized germ-cell, by constant dividing develops always 
 and ever, one part into the digestive tract, another into the 
 heart, another into a particular gland, etc., until the whole 
 adult form of the individual is reached. To apply the 
 machine theory here, would be doing so with a vengeance, 
 for first, we have a complete little machine the fertilized 
 cell this divides into many parts, each becoming exactly 
 what every similar part in every similar cell becomes, and 
 goes right on developing into its adult form, and when each 
 part working along entirely separate paths has finished its 
 growth, we find each organ fitting in most harmoniously into 
 the whole completed and complex adult form. 
 
 So the "entelechy" is not an explanation of the origin of 
 Life ; it is an explanation of how each part comes to "unify," 
 to make a complete organism, and it for this reason and this 
 reason only that we have to postulate a unifying causality. 
 
 And as we have shown in another chapter we must have 
 an hypothesis on which to work. There has been no other 
 theory that has proven at all satisfactory, so, as this theory 
 does "explain" and as all of our experiments do work out as 
 though it were true, we are justified in making use of it. 
 
 So much for our hypothesis. Now let us review some of 
 the facts of both observation and experiment as they 
 actually exist in Nature. 
 
 In embryology we find many of our most interesting 
 examples. We may take and deprive a very tiny organism 
 
166 
 
 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 of most of itself, not exceeding three-fourths, and each part 
 will develop into a complete whole, though in miniature. This 
 means that every quarter of the organism has the possibility 
 of becoming a complete adult, yet under normal conditions 
 it only becomes one instead of four individuals. On the sea- 
 urchin, on which the experiment was performed, the growth 
 
 Planaria. A. Planaria entire. B. Head growing new body after cutting 
 off body proper. C. Body growing new head. D. Central part of 
 body growing new head and tail. E. After splitting head and part 
 of body, each half has regrown. (A. after Shipley and Mac- 
 Bride.) 
 
 of the organism was permitted to go on some distance before 
 the separation into parts was made, and still the above 
 results were obtained. 
 
 By "regeneration" or "restitution" we mean the power of 
 restoring some part of itself which has become lost, after the 
 animal has more or less completed its growth, and as an 
 example of "unifying causality" at work, we may mention the 
 
Vitalism 167 
 
 common Crayfish, which will grow another eye when the 
 original one has been removed, sometimes growing several, 
 and then developing a sort of "feeler" in its place, should it 
 be destroyed again. The little flat-worm, called planaria, 
 will, if its head be removed, grow a new head on the body 
 and a new body on the head. 
 
 The branchial apparatus (gills) of the Ascidian Clavel- 
 lina is able to arrange itself into a complete little organism 
 without any formation of new cells, and any part of this 
 apparatus will do likewise, "cut it how you will." 
 
 From these examples alone, it is plain what is meant by 
 the teleology of which we are speaking, i. e., that there is an 
 inner cause that forces some part, never under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances growing into more than one particular thing, into 
 whatever is needed for the protection of the individual who 
 has lost a part of himself, that is, that these things are 
 adapted to an end. 
 
 As Professor Driesch says, it was legitimate, before we 
 had any of these experiments, to assume with Weismann 
 that there was a machine inside of the harmonious system 
 that caused all this. But experiments have shown "that 
 any part of the system however large and wherever taken, 
 may be cut away from it without disturbing proportionate 
 development. This proves that a 'machine' cannot be the 
 basis" of this harmonious arrangement of which we have 
 spoken, for every part seems to have equal possibilities with 
 every other part. In other words, were it a "machine" it 
 would have to possess a specific arrangement of physico- 
 chemical things and agents, and it could not "remain itself, 
 if you take from it whatever you please, and the organism, 
 or better, the non-developed harmonious system does remain 
 'itself,' with regard to" the form-producing faculties, "after 
 any operation whatever." 
 
168 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 This "harmonious system cannot" then "be a machine," 
 but is in fact "a something that is governed by this" unify- 
 ing causality, and this is what "entelechy" as, a non-mechan- 
 ical agent does. 
 
 The best argument for Vitalism, is of course, the one we 
 have given of the harmonious arrangement of separate 
 parts, growing from the same cell, and always making up 
 any lost part, so as to insist, as it were, on keeping the 
 completeness with which it was instinctively endowed. 
 
 And one of the most interesting points established comes 
 from the study of the ovary. This organ has come from a 
 single cell and this cell has divided and re-divided "innum- 
 erable times" until finally we have the many eggs we find 
 therein. "How could a machine be divided innumerable 
 times, and yet remain what it was? No machine therefore 
 can be the test of embryology." 
 
 For those who lay greatest stress on the mental side, one 
 might mention that the phonograph also reacts to a given 
 stimuli, but only specifically gives forth what has been given 
 it, while in the thought-world, man, though acting also on 
 what has been given him, never reacts exactly alike twice 
 during an entire lifetime. Then there are also the more 
 scientific but also more difficult to be understood "indicia" 
 such as the forming of anti-bodies, etc., but these require 
 considerable scientific knowledge before they can be ex- 
 plained in understandable language. 
 
 Summing up Professor Driesch's work along the line under 
 discussion, we may say, "A sum (of possibilities of happen- 
 ing) is transformed into a unity (of real results of hap- 
 pening) without any spatial or material preformation of 
 unity," and this means in ordinary language that the CAUSE 
 of living things growing as they do and becoming what they 
 become, is non-material that is, does not take up any 
 
Vitalism 169 
 
 space. 
 
 Up to here we have been discussing individual unity. But 
 there is also a larger unity. We must conceive of the entire 
 universe as one complete whole, logically. "Nature is to be 
 conceived as the one order of natural objects; only if con- 
 ceived of in this way, can nature be said to be "understood" ; 
 for to understand is to conceive as an order." But, this 
 destroys all difference between mechanism and Vitalism, "for 
 it abolishes mechanism." For, surely there can be no "singu- 
 larity" if everything is one order in nature. It also destroys 
 the concept of the law of nature. 
 
 All so-called "laws," i. e., all connections of natural prin- 
 ciples with regard to being or becoming which are realized 
 in so many "cases" appear, at any rate, as nothing but 
 features of the behaviour of that agent which orders "the 
 nature," as features of the behaviour of the natura naturans. 
 And these features have no guarantee in themselves of being 
 immutable, as certainly as nature is a something m evolu- 
 tion. All natural becoming is like one great embryology; 
 but in biological embryology we know that the "law" of 
 mere cleavage, for instance, holds good for, say, ten cell- 
 divisions and is then followed by the "law" of organ forma- 
 tion. 
 
 Every singularity of being and becoming has its own par- 
 ticular place in the order of nature so runs our postulate 
 in another form. 
 
 Now, this does not entail so great a disadvantage to 
 science as would be supposed, for in banishing the concep- 
 tion of "law" it also banishes the worst of scientific enemies, 
 namely chance or contingency 2 which Professor Driesch 
 says is the "greatest enemy of thought," for there "is no 
 contingency where there is order." 
 
 2 Professor Driesch uses "chance" and "contingency" as synonymous 
 terms. 
 
170 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 We cannot, of course, solve in a final way whether there 
 is complete unity in Nature or not, but from what we do 
 know we can always reason in this way: 
 
 Certainly, what we know and are even able to know about 
 nature does not form one order if taken altogether; there 
 is chance, contingency, non-teleology in what we know. 
 But this is our fault and not the fault of nature. For we 
 have imagined we had the whole of nature where we had 
 only a part; and only that part which is such as to be 
 accessible to our form of apprehending reality. We can 
 only receive the one part of reality which appears to us 
 under the signs of spatiality. But only what we call inor- 
 ganic becoming is completely accessible to us in the form 
 of spatial signs ; even in individual organic becoming as 
 studied in biology, is marked to us only by some spatial 
 results but not as becoming; for it is not spatial, i. e., in 
 space, as becoming. And who can say how many kinds of 
 being or becoming there may be in reality which are abso- 
 lutely inaccessible to us, because they are not marked by 
 spatial signs at all? And might it not be that nature would 
 appear to us as the one order we are in search for, if only 
 we knew all those parts of it which, by our mental organisa- 
 tion, we are absolutely incapable of knowing? 
 
 But Nature shows that there is some chance, and yet we 
 can get nothing out of either Nature or Thinking unless 
 we have recourse to the dictum that there is a monism of 
 order, though there may be some chance in Nature. And 
 the only way we can accept this which must be accepted if 
 we wish to retain any validity to thinking at all, is, by 
 accepting this principle, that there may be certain areas of 
 reality which have no spatial signs, as above explained, for 
 without this, not "even the biological problem" can be solved 
 satisfactorily. 
 
 So much, for the very complex but highly interesting and 
 valuable contribution to Vitalistic literature made by Pro- 
 
Vitalism 171 
 
 fessor Driesch, whose classic experiments have found their 
 way into most of our standard text-books, and whose ability 
 is not limited to but one side of the question, for he is not 
 only a Biologist of world-recognition but also a philosopher 
 of note, being, therefore, able to speak from a more perfect 
 understanding and a greater breadth of view than are most 
 writers on either side of these two great subjects. 
 
 It is interesting to note, that if the causo-mechanical 
 viewpoint, is correct there is an end to all our sciences 
 except Physics and Chemistry, for, if everything can be 
 resolved into a few chemical elements, and, through Physics 
 we may find the laws by which these various compounds 
 then work, there is not only no further need of any other 
 science, but all things have already been explained, which, 
 however, we know is not the case. 
 
 Professor Wilson, probably the greatest authority on 
 "The Cell" tells us "the study of the cell has on the whole 
 seemed to widen rather than narrow the enormous gap that 
 separates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic 
 world." 3 
 
 Von Bunge, the celebrated German organic chemist, in- 
 sisted that "the mechanical theories of the present are urg- 
 ing us surely onwards to the vitalistic theory of the fu- 
 ture." 
 
 And we are reminded of Professor Kellogg's remarks in 
 his Darwinism To-day, that the workers in different bio- 
 logical fields are inclined to accept different evolutionary 
 theories, when we note that it is in Germany and in America 
 the thinkers and workers are doing most of the writing on 
 Vitalism, in some form or another, while practically none 
 of it comes from England. This may be due, as Sir Bertram 
 
 8 The Cell in Development and Inheritance, by Edmund B. Wilson, 
 Ph.D., Professor of Zoology, Columbia University. (Macmillan.) 
 
The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 Windle 4 thinks, "to the fact that the Germans and Ameri- 
 cans are doing more research work along the study of the 
 individual, while the English have, due to the stimulus of 
 Darwin, been working along racial lines." 
 
 The puzzling thing to many if not most students, is found 
 in the many different names writers use for practically the 
 same thing, for example: Driesch uses "entelechy" which, 
 of course, means "a vital principle" ; Williams, however, calls 
 it "genetic energy," Henslow, "the property of self-adapta- 
 tion," Cope "growth" or "bathmic force," Eimer "direction" 
 and Professor B. Moore "biotic energy," but if one will weigh 
 and compare the definitions given to these names by their 
 respective god-fathers, it will not be very difficult to dis- 
 cover the same things traveling under many aliases. 
 
 And as we have given the more difficult theories of Pro- 
 fessor Driesch, in as non-technical language as possible, we 
 shall here attempt to give in the simplest possible form, the 
 very interesting details of experimental and observational 
 FACTS from which many of the foregoing and all of the con- 
 cluding ideas of have been drawn. 
 
 Frog's and sea-urchin's eggs always behave in a definite 
 manner. We know exactly how they will hatch, as well as 
 when, and it is easy to give a very excellent account of their 
 life-histories. After the fertilised egg commences to divide, 
 it forms a sphere, consisting of a single layer or sheet of 
 cells. Suppose we place the egg between two pieces of glass 
 so as to squeeze it considerably. Quite naturally, the sphere 
 that develops becomes flattened. This cannot be continued 
 too long or the animal would die for sheer lack of space, 
 but when it is released, after this abnormal arrangement, 
 
 4 What is Life? a study of Vitalism and Neo-vitalism, by Sir Bert- 
 ram Windle, M.A., M.D., Sc.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.S.A., President of 
 Queen's College, Cork. (Herder.) All quotations from here on are 
 from this volume. 
 
Vitalism 173 
 
 the development goes on exactly as though nothing out of 
 the ordinary had occurred, and we get a larva of frog or 
 sea-urchin, and finally a fully and completely perfect animal. 
 
 That is, a frog or sea-urchin has been developed by means 
 of a series of events which one may safely say had never oc- 
 curred before, a tolerably clear proof that there is within the 
 egg a power which is able to steer it even through seas before 
 unsailed by any egg (p. 66). 
 
 Professor Wilson performed an experiment on the eggs 
 of nereis and annelid. 
 
 It is a little difficult to describe this experiment without 
 becoming highly technical, so that those who are familiar 
 with the real facts of the case must deal leniently with the 
 writer if he endeavors to make the circumstances clear by 
 simplifying things to the utmost extent. In the normal 
 development of nereis, then, it is known that certain cells 
 will develop into certain parts of the later organism and 
 others into different and distinct parts. 
 
 Now, if the egg be allowed to develop under pressure as 
 in the experiments above detailed, the lines of division are 
 vertical in all cases, so that the segmented egg finally forms 
 a plate, a flat plate of eight cells. Now if these cells, thus 
 formed into a plate, are released from the pressure under 
 which they have been developing they at once again divide 
 in an approximately horizontal plane, so that sixteen cells 
 now make up the congeries. The subsequent course of the 
 development of these shows that some of the cells with, of 
 course, their included nuclei, which would under normal cir- 
 cumstances have been worked up into one part of the body, 
 are, under the altered conditions, actually converted into 
 another. The significance of this experiment will be obvious 
 to any one who considers it, but that significance will be 
 increased when it is remembered that the results negative 
 certain views that were held as to the specific character of 
 the nuclei. It was held by some that the nucleus of each 
 cell was of a specific character and could produce a cell 
 
174 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 of one type and of one type only. Even if this were the 
 case it would not have helped us very far along the road 
 towards an explanation of the powers of the cell, for we 
 would still be ignorant of how the nucleus succeeded in so 
 modifying the cell as to make it lead to the development of 
 a liver or some other part of the body. But this experiment, 
 and many others of a similar kind might be cited, seems 
 to show that the nuclei of the various cells during develop- 
 ment, at any rate, have no specific character, but are 
 capable, to put the matter colloquially, of turning their 
 hands to any job in the gradually rising edifice of the body 
 (pp. 66-68). 
 
 Professor Wilson also performed the following, which has 
 since been corroborated by other experimenters, on what is 
 called "amphioxus," but more commonly known as "lance- 
 let": 
 
 Let us suppose that at the eight-celled stage the group 
 is put into a test-tube with water and violently shaken. 
 The result is that eight cells are shaken apart and become 
 completely separated from one another. Then a very re- 
 markable thing happens. Most people would imagine that 
 the immature creature must have been killed by such rough 
 treatment, but such is not the case. Each of the eight cells, 
 undaunted by what it has been through, sets itself to work, 
 begins to divide on its own account and finally builds up a 
 complete amphioxus. Let us consider what this means. A 
 single cell, from the eight-celled groups, would under nor- 
 mal circumstances have constructed, one may roughly say, 
 one-eighth of the future amphioxus. It might have been 
 worked up into its tail, into one of its internal organs, into 
 a variety of positions of the body. But under the altered 
 circumstances it is able to construct and does construct an 
 entire and complete new amphioxus. It was the considera- 
 tion of phenomena of this kind which led Driesch, one of 
 the greatest workers in this line, to declare that the egg 
 seemed to act like an intelligent being. And the same thing 
 
Vitalism 175 
 
 is admitted by Wilson in the preface to his great work 
 where he says : " 'One is sometimes tempted to conclude,' 
 was recently remarked by a well-known embryologist, 'that 
 every egg is a law unto itself !' The jest, perhaps, embodies," 
 he continues, "more of the truth than the author would 
 seriously have maintained, expressing, as it does, a growing 
 appreciation of the intricacy of cell phenomena, the diffi- 
 culty of formulating their general aspects in simple terms, 
 the inadequacy of some of the working hypotheses that have 
 been our guides" (pp. 65-69). 
 
 Experiments of this kind are what lead men in the biol- 
 ogical fields, especially in embryology, to the belief that, if 
 a cell will follow out a certain path which always leads to a 
 very definite destination regardless of hindrances, there 
 must be something besides pure chemistry and physics work- 
 ing within its tiny body. 
 
 Virchow, the father of modern pathology, said as long 
 ago as 1887, "Never has a living being, or even a living 
 element let us say, a living cell been found, of which 
 it could be predicated that it was the first of its species. 
 Nor have any fossil remains ever been found of which it 
 could ever be likely that it belonged to a being the first 
 of its kind, or produced by spontaneous generation" (p. 76). 
 
 And Hertwig, the eminent biologist, has recently said, 
 
 In the existing condition of science there is little hope 
 that any worker will be able to produce the simplest man- 
 ifestation of life in any artificial way from non-living mat- 
 ter. He has certainly no more chance of success in his 
 endeavors than Wagner, in Goethe's "Faust" had of brew- 
 ing Homonculus in his retort (p. 76). 
 
 And as Sir Bertram Windle then adds, that though all 
 are agreed that at present there is no evidence whatever that 
 life comes from the non-living, still, 
 
176 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 Suppose we grant that living matter has always come 
 from living matter, where did the first living matter come 
 from? The world was once so hot that no living thing 
 could exist upon it. It cooled down and a time arrived when 
 life could exist. Where did it come from? It has been 
 suggested that living matter might have been brought to 
 this world from some other by means of a meteorite, but 
 this view, even if likely, which is not the case, does not 
 help us one bit towards the origin of life, since the living 
 thing which travelled on the meteorites must have come 
 from somewhere and the life to which it belonged must have 
 had its commencement somewhere, somewhen. 
 
 Faced with this difficulty many men of science, unwilling 
 to admit the possibility of a Creator, have claimed that, 
 though spontaneous generation does not take place or can- 
 not be proved to take place nowadays, yet it must have 
 taken place at some former period, when conditions on the 
 earth were far different from what they now are (p. 81). 
 
 And Professor August Weismann, one of the most dis- 
 tinguished biologists who recently passed away (1914), said 
 "that spontaneous generation in spite of all vain efforts to 
 demonstrate it, remains for me a logical necessity" (p. 82). 
 
 This is extremely interesting, in that the only reason 
 there is a logical necessity in this instance, is of course, 
 because the only alternative possible is to admit of a 
 Creator. In the words of Reinke: 
 
 If we agree that living matter has at some time come 
 from inorganic substances then, in my opinion, the Creation 
 hypothesis is the only one which meets the necessities of 
 Logic and of Causality and therewith answers to the needs 
 of a prudent seeker after nature (p. 83). 
 
 Now let us look to the meanings of several words that are 
 very prominently used in all scientific discussions. The 
 word "adaptation" is so often used as an explanation, but 
 this is doing about the same thing as making a personal 
 
Vitalism 177 
 
 god out of Evolution, as, for example, when it is said "that 
 Evolution explains this" "Evolution explains that." 
 "Evolution" isn't anything at all. It is the name of a 
 process which we assume is the method by which certain 
 changes took place. It doesn't exist by itself. It is simply 
 the name of a PROCESS. 
 
 To make this distinction rather clear, we may use the 
 story of a one-legged man of taciturn disposition sitting 
 in the same seat with one of opposite temperament. Riding 
 together for some time the talkative one asked how the other 
 lost his leg, being told that only on one condition would 
 the answer be given, and that was that no further questions 
 were to be asked. Agreeing to this, the one-legged-man said 
 "it was bit off." And if we substitute the word "Evolution" 
 we get a very clear idea of what we mean by a process not 
 being an explanation. 
 
 And so, when Professor Weismann, in trying to explain 
 certain behaviour on the part of tubularia, says: 
 
 This also appears to us to be adaptive, and does not 
 surprise us, since we have long been accustomed to recognise 
 that what is adapted to an end will realise this if it be 
 possible at all, 
 
 and another time he says, "It was not worth Nature's while 
 to make such adaptations" (p. 88), we have an explanation 
 like the story cited above. It gives a name to something 
 that happened and calls it an explanation. Any machine 
 made for a certain purpose will, of course, perform that 
 purpose, but WHY was the machine made for that purpose 
 and what caused all the parts to be made as they were, in 
 order that they would unify and always work out that pur- 
 pose? 
 
 Remember that the mechanically constructed thing always 
 
178 The Beginnmgs of Science 
 
 performs the same act in the same way, while the living 
 thing never. The latter has considerable discriminative 
 power even in the lowest forms, as witness, what Pauly 5 
 says regarding tiny, one-celled animals that pick always a 
 certain kind of food among the many sea-plants about, and 
 though some might suggest this is due to a chemical attrac- 
 
 B 
 Regeneration and grafting in Hydra. 
 
 A. Seven-headed Hydra made by splitting distal ends lengthwise. 
 
 B. A piece of Hydra regenerating an entire animal showing various 
 stages in the process. 
 
 C. Part of one Hydra grafted on another. 
 
 (Hegner A. after Trembley. B. after Morgan. C. after King.) 
 
 tion of some kind, to be logical, they would have to extend 
 this idea to its ultimate end and apply it to the human 
 family, but surely few of us would be willing to concede 
 that our food-likes and dislikes are to be explained on the 
 basis of pure chemical attraction. 
 
 In "regeneration" and "repairing," sometimes also called 
 "restitution," we have a most interesting concourse of won- 
 
 1 Darwinismus und Lamarckismus, by Pauly (Munchen 1905). 
 
Vitalism 179 
 
 derful results obtained from various experiments. 
 
 The hydra is a little fresh-water creature described in 
 practically all elementary zoological texts. If this animal 
 is cut into two pieces, each becomes a complete hydra again. 
 
 If it is cut in many pieces, under favorable circumstances, 
 each piece becomes a complete individual. If the head-end 
 is bisected, we have a two-headed hydra, and the Abbe 
 Trembley who performed these experiments found that he 
 could continue this until he had an eight-headed hydra, with 
 a single stalk or lower portion. 
 
 Salamander. 
 
 Later on Spallanzani found that the common earthworm 
 would regenerate a new head or tail if cut transversely, but 
 that it will die if it is divided longitudinally. While with the 
 salamander, the same experimenter found 
 
 if the tail was cut off a new one would grow which would con- 
 tain vertebrae new vertebrae, of course just like those which 
 had formed the skeleton of the original appendage. Further, 
 he showed that if a leg, or even all four legs, were cut off, it 
 or they would grow again and that this process might be re- 
 peated time after time (p. 101). 
 
 He actually cut off the legs and tail of one salamander 
 six times and each time they all grew during three summer 
 months. And the last time they grew with just as great a 
 rapidity as the first, so that 
 
180 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 Spallanzani calculated that during these three months the 
 animal under experiment had made for itself no less than 
 647 new bones, not to speak of all the muscles, nerves, and 
 arteries which formed with the bones in question the vari- 
 ous parts which were restored (pp. 101-102). 
 
 And in addition to this, the salamander can also regen- 
 erate his upper and lower jaws. This animal is a vertebrate, 
 that is a back-boned animal ; the hydra is an invertebrate, 
 that is, one who does not have a back-bone. The vertebrate 
 cannot be cut in little pieces, though in a more limited way, 
 it has the same powers that force the animal to become what 
 it was intended to become, regardless of its injuries. 
 
 Wolff's experiment on the water-newt should also be kept 
 in memory. Here only the lens of the eye was removed, and 
 though originally the lens grows from a totally different 
 layer of the developing organism, now it actually grew a 
 new lens from the outer layer of the iris, that is, the colored 
 curtain, which in our eyes is blue, or grey or brown. This 
 means that here is a case in which a lens came from a layer 
 of cells from which no lens had ever come before, so far as 
 any one knows. 
 
 The planarians or flat-worms, have a most wonderful 
 power of regeneration, for in these one may cut off tail and 
 head, and from the mid-piece thus left, there will emerge a 
 new head and a new tail, while the head grows a new body 
 and tail, the tail a new body and head. 
 
 Comparing this with a machine, we should have to pro- 
 duce a mechanical arrangement that 
 
 had a bad breakdown, setting to work to grow for itself 
 a new wheel or to construct a new connecting-rod. Or we 
 may picture a lathe which has had a wound inflicted in its 
 side setting to and producing a new chuck from the in- 
 cision (p. 106). 
 
Vitalism 181 
 
 This would be wonderful enough and is hard enough to 
 imagine, but still more difficult of mental imagery would 
 be the state of affairs in which the wounded locomotive 
 would resolve itself into its constituent steel and brass, 
 and having done so should then, by the force of its own 
 intrinsic powers, reconstruct a full, complete and working 
 railway engine. Yet this is what is done in another form 
 and the whole chain of occurrences is so remarkable and 
 so forcible an example of the powers of living matter, as 
 well as of their differences from those of non-living objects, 
 that it may be given here at length. 
 
 Professor Driesch has made this experiment- on clavellina 
 lepadiformis, a 
 
 tolerably highly organised creature belonging to the class 
 of ascidians placed by zoologists very near the lower ver- 
 tebrates in the scale of animal life. It is about an inch in 
 length and divided into three portions ; the uppermost of 
 which forms an extraordinarily large, basket-like gill, pro- 
 vided with an entrance and an exit for the water. 
 
 To this succeeds a small connecting body portion which 
 contains part of the intestines and finally there is the so- 
 called intestine-sac with stomach, intestine, heart, repro- 
 ductive organs, etc. If we divide the body of a clavellina 
 at the level of the connecting portion, so that the gill- 
 basket and the intestinal-sac are separated from one an- 
 other, either or both of these portions can in three or four 
 days complete itself into an entire organism, since by means 
 of true regeneration proceeding from the incision, the gill- 
 basket makes itself an intestinal-sac and the intestinal-sac 
 a gill-basket. 
 
 But the interest here lies in the manner in which this is 
 brought about, which is totally different from the way any 
 of the preceding examples have re-built themselves. 
 
 The organisation of the gill-basket, its ciliated clefts, its 
 openings, etc., all gradually dwindle away. At the end of 
 
182 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 five or six days no more organization is to be seen in these 
 parts, which appear like white spheres, in fact, the describer 
 states that when he first saw this condition he came to the 
 conclusion that the clavellina was either (Read or on the 
 way to death. It was not so, however, for though the crea- 
 ture remains or may remain in this condition for two or 
 three weeks, at last the day comes when it begins to clear 
 and to stretch and then, after the end of two or three 
 days, it is found that amorphous mass has once more be- 
 come a complete ascidian with gill-basket and intestinal-sac. 
 It has become a perfectly new organism which has no con- 
 tinuity with the parts of the earlier organisation, though 
 it has with its material. "Its gill-basket is not a derivative 
 of the old one ; it is very much smaller and fewer and smaller 
 openings. What has happened is that the old organised gill- 
 basket has returned to an ( indifferent substance and then, 
 from this indifferent substance on embryological lines, a 
 new smaller individual has been constituted. But this is not 
 the whole story, for it is not merely the isolated gill-basket 
 which can restore itself by means of this roundabout process, 
 but, after having isolated the basket, it can be itself divided 
 either into an upper and lower portion or into an anterior 
 and a posterior bit and each of these portions will then go 
 through the same process, that is, each of them will fir^t 
 of all return to the indifferent condition and then from 
 that re-constitute itself into a new small ascidian (pp. 106- 
 108). 
 
 The example of a locomotive falling apart into its con- 
 stituent elements and then rebuilding itself as suggested 
 is a fair comparison. 
 
 Surely there is something that makes all this happen in 
 this way, and whatever that SOMETHING is we call the "Vital 
 Principle." Is there any wonder that nearly all biologists 
 now accept, as Professor Kellogg says, some parts of an 
 Orthogenetic doctrine, that is, that there is an inner driving 
 force ? which if logically followed out, becomes this "Vital 
 
Vitalism 183 
 
 Principle." 
 
 We wish to call attention to two words not yet men- 
 tioned, which are likewise often used as explanations but 
 which are in reality only names for something we know 
 nothing about, namely "immanent" and "inherent." To say 
 that certain forces or what-not, may be inherent or im- 
 manent within some other object, tells us nothing whatever 
 about what the forces are, nor where they came from. 
 
 But in objecting to "verbal explanations" the objection 
 may be raised that a "Vital Force" is also only a verbal 
 explanation. However, we may suggest that there is such 
 a thing as "gravity," which is a "force," and there is such 
 a thing as "ether" though we cannot see it. We can, however, 
 know it by its manifestations by what it does. As Pro- 
 fessor Duncan says "ether is not visible to the eye of sense ; 
 it is visible to the eye of the mind which is much less liable 
 to err" (p. 123). So that we might also say, that if the 
 "vitalistic explanation is verbal only, so also is the theory 
 of gravitation and so the existence of ether," or as Dr. 
 Haldane, the distinguished physiologist has said: 
 
 It is frequently urged that Vitalism amounts to nothing 
 more than the mere assertion that a physico-chemical ex- 
 planation of vital phenomena has not been found ; and that 
 even though this assertion be correct, the only possible way 
 to advance in physiology is by the further application of 
 the principles of physics and chemistry, since there are and 
 can be no other kinds of explanation but the causal ones 
 which these sciences afford. This argument m its widest 
 form is undoubtedly based on the metaphysical assumption 
 that the universe, interpreted as it is m the physical sciences 
 as a universe of matter and energy, corresponds to absolute 
 reality, and is for this reason incapable of any further in- 
 terpretation. The work of modern philosophy since Berke- 
 ley and Hume has shown that tha, assumption in question 
 is without foundation. The italics are ours (pp. 123-124). 
 
184 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 Regarding Energy, we may define it by saying it is the 
 capacity for doing work, and is of two kinds, "Kinetic" or 
 actual motion, as a running train, for example, and "Poten- 
 tial" energy meaning, the power to do work due to position, 
 such as the weights in an old-fashioned clock, when the 
 clock is "wound up" ; and we have found through our physi- 
 cal experiments two so-called energy laws." 
 
 (1). That the sum of the kinetic and potential energies 
 of any system of bodies remains constant; and 
 
 (). That the sum-total of the energy in the universe 
 remains the same. 6 
 
 6 Scholasticism and Modern Thought, by Rev. P. Coffey, Ph.D., Irish 
 Theological Quarterly, October, 1909. Footnote, Page 459. 
 
 "Cf. Rickaby, Scholasticism, p. 100: The hope of Scholasticism as a 
 philosophy for the future seems to rest on its alliance with Physical 
 Science. Let scholastic metaphysicians be physicists, or with the physi- 
 cists, and they may yet win back the sceptre from Hegel. Nor are the 
 two families unconnected. The true ancestors of the physicists of to- 
 day are not the Humanists of the Renaissance, but the Schoolmen of the 
 thirteenth century. For scholasticism did make its endeavor by its own 
 method and according to its own notions and opportunities to inquire 
 into nature. Moreover, our physical science sadly needs the co-operation 
 of some sound metaphysics; for though the two provinces be distinct, yet 
 they are adjoining, and professors of physical science are continually 
 making incursions into metaphysics, not always with the happiest re- 
 sults." As an interesting illustration of such incursion we may quote the 
 following sentences from Professor R. K. Duncan's fascinating volume, 
 The New Knowledge (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1907, p. 263, 8vo. 
 Price 6s net) : "If the universe is running down its available energy 
 into uselessness, there must have been a precise moment of time, how- 
 ever far back we may place it, when the energy was all available, and 
 when it was initiated in a sudden beginning by a single creative act. 
 Consequently, there must have been a time behind which our present 
 laws did not operate. Also there must be a time in future when the uni- 
 verse will have grown to a definite exhaustion and death. The death 
 will come gradually, but the beginning must have been sudden and due 
 to a creative act. If, on the contrary, the waste of energy is replaced 
 by growth, the universe is immortal and eternal, both in the future and 
 in the past. If the old conception is true, it is necessary to say, 'God 
 made it, and started it at a definite time to run its course.' If fhe 
 second conception is true, we may say, 'The Universe i* God in one 
 phase of Him, and it possesses His attribute of eternal duration.'" 
 (p. 245). May we? About such a world the most we could infer (from 
 the premises) would be its co-eternity as a creature with God, and 
 dependently on Him as Creator: and such participated eternity of a 
 
Vitalism 185 
 
 It is essential that we again call attention to the word 
 "law" as here used. This does not mean a "law" at all, in the 
 usual sense pertaining to matters of "right and wrong" ; it 
 merely means that, in as much as we see certain occurrences 
 follow each other constantly, we have given this series of 
 "following-occurrences" the name "law." It means only, that 
 as yet we have found no physical experiment that has 
 proven an exception to this series of occurrences. 
 
 And it is here that the opponents of Vitalism probably 
 base their most insistent claim. We have shown how Pro- 
 fessor Driesch overcomes it, but here is still another way. 
 Sir Oliver Lodge says : 
 
 The term "energy" itself, as used in a definite sense by 
 the physicist, rather involves a modern idea, and is itself 
 a generalisation. Things as distinct from each other as 
 light, heat, sound, rotation, vibration, elastic strain, gravi- 
 tative separation, electric currents, and chemical affinity, 
 have all to be generalised under the same heading (of the 
 Conservation of Energy) in order to make the law true. 
 Until "heat" was included in the list of energies, the state- 
 ment could not be made; and a short time ago it was some- 
 times discussed whether "life" should or should not be in- 
 cluded in the category of energy. I should give the answer 
 decidedly No, but some might be inclined to say Yes; and 
 this is sufficient as an example to show that the categories 
 
 creature is very different from the essential eternity of the Necessarily 
 Existing Deity. "This (pantheistic conception), to most people of 
 scientific training, is (the author continues) the more acceptable con- 
 clusion." If so, it is because their "scientific training" is so narrow and 
 so specialised as to make them oblivious to the evidences for Theism 
 and Creation to be found in the phenomena of the religious, moral and 
 social sciences, apart altogether from Physics; and possibly because it 
 has been the fashion in recent times to assume (without proof) that 
 physical hypotheses point ultimately to Pantheism. The author himself 
 seems, nevertheless, to recognise the existence of a Transcendent Deity 
 as Creator of the Universe. "Meanwhile" (he writes, p. 257), "we feel 
 that we know this 'In the beginning God created' and in the midst of 
 His creation He set down man with a little spark of the God-head in 
 him to make him strive to know . . ." 
 
186 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 of energy are not necessarily exhausted; that new forms 
 may be discovered; and that if new forms exist, until they 
 are discovered, the Law of the Conservation of Energy, as 
 now stated, may in some cases be strictly untrue, though 
 partially and usefully true; just as it would be untrue, 
 though partially and usefully true, in the theory of ma- 
 chines, if heat were unknown or ignored (p. 131). 
 
 This may all be summed up, by repeating what we have 
 already said elsewhere, that a truth can only be arrived at 
 after ALL THE FACTS have been gathered. A fact must not 
 be confused with TRUTH. It is only part of Truth, and ariy 
 fact may thoroughly upset any quantity of our specula- 
 tions, though every one of these same speculations may have 
 been just as true as possible from the viewpoint of the facts 
 we then had at our disposal, but, they were not the Truth. 
 And our conclusions? The last word has not yet been 
 said. In other words, all the facts are not yet in, so we had 
 best hold our affirmations of pet theories in abeyance until 
 they are. 
 
 Summing up both Professor Driesch's complex but very 
 scholarly arguments, and Sir Bertram Windle's far more 
 simple ones, we must and can only come to the conclusion 
 from the facts we now possess that from the Scientific 
 investigations so far made, after we have dissected and 
 observed and analyzed, after we have applied every physical 
 and chemical law we know, we find there is a "something 
 over" which we have not explained, and from all appearances 
 cannot be explained from, through, nor by purely physical 
 laws. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE IDEAL 
 
 AS we have shown in the chapter on Logic as well as in 
 the Chapter on Vitalism, all ability to prove anything 
 must come from the world of THOUGHT; further, whenever 
 we do any thinking at all, we must have Something to think 
 about, which immediately presents to our consciousness the 
 fact of a Thinking Subject and an Object thought about. 
 We also called attention to still another fact, namely, that 
 whenever we describe anything, for example, an orange, we 
 speak of Attributes only, and that when we analyse this, we 
 find that Attributes are only certain characteristics that the 
 orange possesses that is, there is a REAL something that 
 possesses these characteristics and this gives us the idea 
 of Relationship, for, we always think of the orange as a 
 Whole and its Parts. 
 
 Having got this idea of a Relationship from our analysis 
 of our description of any object, we may call attention to 
 another Relationship that of time which we obtain, not 
 by thinking of a sensible object, but by thinking back on 
 our own thoughts, for we may think of an event that is now 
 taking place and one that has taken place, or even that 
 may take place, which upon analysis, gives us a Relation- 
 ship of time. 
 
 The distinction between thinking of objects that come 
 under the senses and thinking back on our own thoughts, 
 must always be held in mind in all philosophical discussions. 
 
 By Truth we mean the correspondence between our idea 
 
 187 
 
188 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 of an object and the object itself, and all of these things 
 together we call the common-sense viewpoint in philosophy, 
 as contradistinguished from the doctrine of Empiricism^ 
 which insists that only those things can be known which one 
 has already materially experienced, and the doctrine of 
 Idealism, which simply casts aside the material world en- 
 tirely. 
 
 We do accept, however, with the empiricist, that all 
 our Intellectual ideas must have first come through the 
 senses, but we believe that our idea of an object actually 
 corresponds to what the object is that is, that we can 
 actually know the thing before us. 
 
 Further, we can see, from what has been said of attri- 
 butes, that, they being characteristics of an object, we must 
 necessarily have an object to which they belong, whenever 
 we have any attributes. 
 
 Another way of saying this more philosophically, would 
 be to suggest that as we find everything we know any- 
 thing about, dependent on something else we have the idea 
 of "contingency" which means that coming into our mind 
 at the same time with every thought we may have, if we 
 analyse that thought, we find a division into the two "cate- 
 gories" as they are called, of dependency on something else, 
 which we call "contingency" and an "independent" something 
 which is dependent on nothing else; for it is unthinkable to 
 assume that there could be something dependent on some- 
 thing else that was in turn dependent, and so on indefinitely. 
 Somewhere we should have to draw the line and find some- 
 thing that was not dependent, and then of course, we should 
 have something "Independent" or what is often called 
 "Necessary," for this Independent something must be abso- 
 lutely Necessary or our very thoughts are worthless, and if 
 this should be so, then we must accept the only conclusion 
 
The Ideal 189 
 
 possible, namely, that we can never know anything. 
 
 From Professor Driesch's argument we have already 
 shown that scientifically considered, nothing can possibly be 
 greater than the thing from which it sprang in other 
 words, the egg-cell that is to develop into a complete human 
 being, must already have the possibility of that development 
 within its tiny body. 
 
 But this little egg-cell came from an adult body, that is, 
 from a much more highly organised individual than it is 
 itself, and driving this argument home, we must come to the 
 conclusion that the very first living cell that ever existed, 
 must have had within itself all the possibilities to which it 
 ever has arrived or ever can arrive ; and if this be true, then 
 this first living cell, due to these possibilities, must have been 
 at least as complex, if not more so, than any cell of the 
 present time. 
 
 May this not be the reason why "protoplasm" which scien- 
 tists originally considered one of the simplest, elemental 
 compounds, has now come to be regarded as one of the most 
 complex substances we know? 
 
 No one has yet been able to tell us what protoplasm is 
 and it may be of interest to know that so simple a thing as 
 water is not yet thoroughly known, notwithstanding the fact 
 that the most elementary classes in chemistry assume such 
 knowledge. 1 
 
 1 See Chapter on "The Physical Chemistry of Protoplasm," in 
 Mathew's Phyysiological Chemistry. (Published by Wm. Wood & Co., 
 New York, 1915.) 
 
 "What is water? It is a singular fact that the exact composition of 
 this abundant substance, a sine qua non of life, is not yet known. That 
 water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen and that there are nearly, 
 if not exactly, two volumes of hydrogen liberated to one of oxygen is 
 common knowledge. Also, it is certain that water is formed by the 
 union of hydrogen and oxygen. The simplest formula which can be 
 written for water is H 2 O, H-O-H, and this generally given as its 
 formula, but there are many facts which show that water as it exists 
 in the liquid and solid form and probably in the form of its vapor even 
 
190 The Begmnmgs of Science x 
 
 Again, we have been taught that higher forms come from 
 lower ones in the biological world, but it would seem, from 
 the reasoning above, that the reverse viewpoint would be 
 the more logical, as this so-called "higher form" is only 
 apparent and not "real." 
 
 We have shown also that the machine-theory cannot hold 
 in any way whatever, and that there is a purpose displayed 
 as shown by the study of the mere physical facts of re- 
 generation to which we called attention. 
 
 But we know, also, that to take the simplest forms of raw 
 material and produce a machine that will in turn produce 
 anything, requires a very high type of intelligence, and if 
 re-generation shows so conclusively that the object for 
 which the thing in question was apparently designed, will 
 again and again grow to fulfillment when injury has come 
 to the organism, we certainly shall have to admit some in- 
 telligence somewhere or procure a new definition for the 
 word. 
 
 So, if the first germ-cells had all the possibilities within 
 them to which any of their descendents attained, there must 
 have been an Intelligence behind it all, for, we must not 
 forget that no thing can come from anything that is less 
 than itself, so that this Intelligence must therefore be 
 greater than all the Intelligence combined that now exists 
 in the forms we know, for it follows, that all human intelli- 
 gence must have been present in the first Human germ-cell 
 as a possibility. 
 
 at 365, which is its critical temperature, has a more complex formula. 
 Its high critical temperature, cohesion, refractive, index and boiling 
 point all show that the formula is more complex than H 2 O. The mole- 
 cule of water would be very light were the above formula true; it should 
 boil at a low temperature, and have a low surface tension. Instead it 
 has a very high surface tension, much higher than any of the hydro- 
 carbons. Hence it is certain that the formula is more complex, at least 
 at temperatures lower than 400 C." p. 190. 
 
The Ideal 191 
 
 The arguments here used have been built up logically, 
 just as all scientific discussions must be, from evidence pre- 
 sented in the laboratory, and in order that they may the 
 more easily be kept in mind we shall group them in con- 
 venient form. 
 
 There has been no scientific advance toward an explana- 
 tion of the origins of life. 
 
 No fact is of value, except in so far as it can be defined 
 in terms of meanings. 
 
 Logic means correct reasoning. 
 
 Reasoning makes use of thoughts. 
 
 Analysing our thoughts we find: 
 
 A thinking Subject and an Object thought. 
 
 To describe, we must tear our object to pieces mentally, 
 thus giving us the idea of the Relationship of the whole to 
 its parts. 
 
 The descriptive parts are always attributes, never the 
 thing itself. 
 
 Attributes cannot exist unless something exists which has 
 them. 
 
 We have never been able to find anything that is not 
 dependent on something else, in so far as this world of ours 
 is concerned. 
 
 We, ourselves, are dependent on thousands of things. 
 
 But, driven far enough, we must come to some place in 
 our thought, where something is found that is not dependent, 
 for there can be nothing dependent unless there is something 
 on which to depend, as we have just shown. 
 
 The abstract idea of this dependency on something else 
 is called "Contingency." 
 
 But it is impossible to think of anything "contingent" 
 without something "Necessary" on which the thing under 
 discussion is contingent. 
 
 But, if this Necessary something were dependent on any- 
 thing else, in any way, shape or manner, it, too, would be 
 contingent, which would be a contradiction of terms and 
 absolutely unthinkable. 
 
The Beginnings of Science , 
 
 Therefore, there must be something that is Necessary and 
 alone necessary, for, were there two or more necessary 
 things, one would be limited by the existence of the other, 
 and consequently, being limited, would again be contingent, 
 and therefore not necessary. 
 
 Now, if there is anything necessary in this sense, it must 
 always have been necessary, for surely, if everything, every- 
 where, depends on something independent something neces- 
 sary then there could have been no beginning to this 
 necessary something, nor, so long as anything whatever ex- 
 ists, can there be an end. And this is what we mean by 
 "eternal." 
 
 The Laboratory has given us our scientific law, that 
 no thing can come from anything that is less than itself. 
 
 We have found a Unifying Causality which insists on 
 making any part of the body become what it apparently 
 was intended for, regardless of environmpnt; that is, we 
 have found an Inner Driving Force, which brings into ac- 
 tuality whatever was purposed. 
 
 We know that we ourselves are very complex adult forms 
 and that we are intelligent, so that in accordance wjth 
 what has gone before we must come to this final conclu- 
 sion: 
 
 The First Cause must possess in an eminent manner, all 
 the intelligence, all the complexity, all the purpose, there 
 is in existence. 
 
 We find then, that though we may not be able to give 
 any complete description of this First Cause, we must accept 
 it as a logical necessity for all scientific reasoning, for with- 
 out it, there is no science possible, because the only way we 
 know anything at all is by taking the various attributes 
 we find and then going back far enough to find what pos- 
 sesses them. So having established by laboratory proof and 
 pure logic that there is a Necessary, Intelligent, Eternal, 
 First Cause, let us see what more can be said from the 
 purely experimental side. 
 
The Ideal 193 
 
 We must not forget that all we are and can be comes to 
 us only through that with which we are born (inheritance), 
 plus what we obtain after birth (environment and training) ; 
 consequently all the subject-matter of thought possible 
 comes from our environment, though colored by our training, 
 and reaches us only through the senses, for, not being born 
 with thoughts, we must get our subject-matter for them 
 after birth, and as we have shown, this can only come from 
 environment and training, consequently through the senses. 
 
 Now, suppose we look at an object, be it picture, book, 
 statuary, building, or what-not, immediately, we know that 
 this object at which we are gazing is not the most perfect 
 thing of its kind possible. We have, however, not been born 
 with Perfection in us ; we have not experienced Perfection in 
 any form, nor have we been trained to know Perfection yet, 
 notwithstanding all this, we do know that there can be a 
 more perfect thing than the one we are then perceiving, and 
 this we call the "idea of the Ideal." But, we must get this 
 idea from somewhere, and the only thinkable way of having 
 obtained it, is that it is an attribute of whatever it is that 
 has made each of us possible; and, knowing that we have 
 this idea, it must follow that the cause of this Perfection 
 of which we have but a hazy notion, though our conviction 
 of having it is clear enough, no existence being greater 
 than its cause must be absolute Perfection itself. 
 
 As will be observed, we have made use of Laboratory 
 Science and Pure Logic only that is, Pure Science, and 
 this has led to the conclusions just mentioned, namely, that 
 while we cannot know all about the First Cause, yet we are 
 far from not knowing anything about it, for we can, by 
 observation and experimentation and analysis, learn much 
 about the attributes that this First Cause must possess, and 
 from this, if thoughts and logic mean anything, draw con- 
 
194 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 elusions for a valid and legitimate Philosophy of Life. 
 
 It will not be difficult for the student of the Sciences to 
 follow our reasoning, but he will find his troubles in having 
 schooled himself to think only in terms of the seeable and 
 hearable, and, consequently, trying to translate this Ideal 
 First Cause into some Physical Form. But this he cannot 
 do any more than he can bring down a thousand and one 
 things to physical forms. He must not make Professor 
 Haeckel's mistake of thinking it necessary to assume a 
 "gaseous vertebrate." All he must do is to know a logical 
 and necessary CONCLUSION, without attempting to formulate 
 this conclusion into some form that is seeable or hearable. 
 
 We need not say a God is impossible because we cannot 
 imagine such a being, for the very simple reason that noth- 
 ing that cannot be seen or heard or come under the senses 
 in some way is imaginable; the very word means to be able 
 to have an image, and an image is a copy of something that 
 has come under the senses, and is then thrown on the screen 
 of the mind. An electron, an atom and a molecule are un- 
 imaginable, though by no means unthinkable. In fact we 
 have to think them or much of our science ceases. 
 
 Let us not forget either that to think along one pathway 
 only soon brings about a state that makes it practically 
 impossible to think along any other. This is well exempli- 
 fied by Charles Darwin himself, who regretted that in his 
 later years he lost all appreciation of music and the finer 
 things of life, because he had permitted his mind to dwell 
 so long on only one line of thought. We call particular 
 attention to this fact because many are wont to draw the 
 conclusion in other fields that because one can no longer 
 appreciate certain forms of thought they are non-existent; 
 but surely, none would say that because Darwin could not 
 appreciate music, there was no such thing as music appre- 
 
The Ideal 195 
 
 elation in existence, and so we must not forget that the 
 more difficult things to hold in mind, such as attributes and 
 relationships, because they are difficult, and with some per- 
 sons, seemingly impossible, are not on that account, however, 
 non-existent. 
 
 Ether, now considered by many, the ultimate "substance" 
 can be known only through its attributes and relationships, 
 and the ultra-violet rays as well as the infra-red rays, which 
 every scientist knows from laboratory evidence exists, can- 
 not be seen by the eye, though they are colors. 
 
 Our very word Evolution means something immaterial */ 
 that is it means "Becoming." It does not exist as a potato 
 or a carrot exists; it exists as the process by which the 
 potato or carrot comes to be what it is, exists. It would 
 be well for the student to use the word "Becoming" instead 
 of "Evolution" for a time, so as to bring this important 
 distinction home to him. 
 
 And lastly, it is just as absurd to imagine that a single 
 brain-cell of ourselves could have a complete understanding 
 of our entire organism of which it is such an insignificant 
 part, as it would be for any one of us, who probably do not 
 even occupy so important a place in the universal scheme 
 of things, as does the single brain-cell in the scheme of our 
 body, to assume that he could understand or know all about 
 the First Cause. 
 
 And thus far, and thus far only, it seems to the writer, 
 can Science plus Logic go, and to this conclusion must it 
 come. From here on the province belongs to Revealed 
 Religion, and Science has no more to offer, 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 AUTHORITIES 
 
 IT is a common belief and one that is expressed all too 
 often, that men have ceased to rely on Authority in our 
 day and age and now insist on procuring all the evidence 
 for themselves. But like so many popular ideas, this is very 
 far from the truth. All that is meant by those who are 
 capable of intelligently discussing this phase of philosophi- 
 cal argument is that the PAST simply because it is past, 
 is not sufficient authority for anything, and further, that 
 this is only in the Natural Science Realm, and only on such 
 things as can be definitely proven in the laboratory. It has 
 nothing to do with another order of things, such as Morals 
 and Theology. This must always be remembered, and we 
 have here an actual application of what our entire volume 
 has been attempting to make clear, i. e., that simply because 
 a certain individual is an authority in one field of work 
 does not imply that he is at all proficient in another. 
 
 So, when we read of men who set aside "Authority in 
 Science" all that is meant is that they refused to accept 
 what had always been taught as true, unless there could be 
 proof brought to substantiate it; in other words, that they 
 refused to believe that because men had always done a thing 
 in a certain way, or believed a certain thing from time im- 
 memorial, it has on that account been true. And all of us 
 are indeed glad that this kmd of authority was broken up. 
 But as to Real Authority, we must make use of it daily, 
 for no man, no matter what his span of life might be, is 
 
 196 
 
Authorities 197 
 
 capable of proving every detail of life for himself, and so 
 he must, by the very exigencies of life, accept thousands of 
 things on the Authority of others. And in view of this fact 
 it behooves us to find who is an authority so we may feel 
 positive that we are not following false teachers. And it 
 is just this interesting problem in the Biological field, that 
 this chapter attempts to answer as objectively as possible. 
 
 The usual plan of writers is to quote only those who agree 
 with them. This book has tried to quote both sides, letting 
 the student come to his own conclusions. And so we have 
 taken every name that is entitled to recognition for dis- 
 tinctive work in Biology and compiled a list for comparative 
 purposes. 
 
 First, we have chosen for our guide the Eleventh Edition 
 of the Encyclopedia Britannica,, for this work has been 
 edited and arranged under the supervision of the University 
 of Cambridge, England, which institution is without doubt 
 the most famous, and deservedly so, of all scientific schools 
 in the English-speaking world. We have thus the advantage 
 of having our Authorities in Biology chosen by the most 
 eminent living scientists themselves, and observing what 
 space they felt should be accorded to each. 
 
 Second, we have taken Professor Wm. Locy's book, 
 Biology and Its Makers, the most complete standard work 
 of its kind in the English language, and have procured from 
 this a list of all names there mentioned, so we could be 
 certain that none was neglected. 
 
 Third, we have taken the amount of space accorded each 
 in the Britannica and placed all names in the relative order 
 of importance, taking"space accorded" as an objective guide. 
 
 Fourth, we found, definitely stating the finding place, 
 whether or not each of these men was a "believer" or not, 
 as we wished to make this list of ALL biologists as valuable 
 
198 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 to each reader as possible. 
 
 There have been articles and books written, picking out 
 a certain number of scientists for or against some indi- 
 vidual creed or belief, but as any side of any argument can 
 produce several important names in its support, these writ- 
 ings have always seemed quite valueless. So, to overcome 
 this narrower viewpoint, we have quoted them all, thus 
 making valid comparisons possible. 
 
 As we have already stated in a previous chapter, the 
 number of individuals for or against a thing has absolutely 
 nothing whatever to do with the truthfulness of it, for, to 
 come to the conclusion that because all men of science are 
 "believers" or "non-believers" therefore the "believer" is 
 right or the "non-believer," as the case may be, is just 
 about as valid as having the ice-man lay out the diet for the 
 family table and calling him in to prescribe when any mem- 
 ber becomes ill. Religion and the Laboratory have nothing 
 whatever to do with each other, and a Laboratory man has 
 no more right to speak on Religion than has the ice-man 
 on diet, and the reverse is also true, that Religion has no 
 right to speak on whether a fact has or has not been found 
 in the laboratory. That requires a laboratory man, BUT, 
 after the fact is found, and we begin to discuss what the 
 fact MEANS, then the Laboratory man is finished with his 
 task, unless he also be a Philosopher, for this is the work 
 of the Philosopher and the Philosopher alone. 
 
 And as very few of us are even remotely capable of unit- 
 ing even two fields of learning, much less the three immense 
 ones that we have just mentioned, Authorities loom up very 
 large on our horizon, for, on every belief we have, we must 
 know whom to look to as an Authority, first, as to whether 
 our facts are correct, second, as to whether our meanings 
 are valid, and third, as to whether the Creed we have laid 
 
Authorities 199 
 
 out for ourselves is properly supported by legitimate First 
 Principles and a sound Metaphysics. Which means that 
 there isn't a thing we can accept as true unless we have 
 three Authorities in three totally different fields pass judg- 
 ment. We are, of course, here speaking of any belief we 
 hold that is founded on fact, and not fanciful, imaginary 
 visions. We must have an Authority for every Fact found ; 
 we must have an Authority for the Logic of our Meaning; 
 we must have an Authority for our Metaphysics, or First 
 Principles. 
 
 And as all of us are doing our very best to obliterate su- 
 perstition we are very anxious that none should adopt that 
 most absurd of all superstitions of accepting as an Au- 
 thority in one field a man who is only an Authority in an- 
 other, for, after all, that is about all superstition means, 
 namely, accepting something that isn't true on the Author- f 
 ity of some one who isn't an Authority. 
 
 Professor Joseph Jastrow has well said that people often 
 wonder why experts disagree, when in reality they seldom 
 do, but many and many a man calls himself an "expert" 
 who is not, and disagreement is to be expected in that case. 
 
 So these tables will show who the HEAL EXPERTS are, 
 and a letter written by Professor Helmholtz, one of the 
 greatest scientists of the just past generation, will make 
 still clearer what we have here been attempting to bring 
 home to the reader, that those who advertise themselves as 
 great experts and able scientists and who obtain many fol- 
 lowers, are not considered worthy at all by those who ac- 
 tually are capable of passing judgment. 
 
 This letter was written to Professor Helmholtz's father 
 from the University of Berlin, on just such a subject. 
 
 "From your letter it appears to me that you entertain 
 some suspicion that I endorse the trivial tirades of Vogt 
 
200 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 and Moleschott. Not in the least. I must also earnestly 
 protest against your ranking these two among the repre- 
 sentative scientists. Neither has as yet proved by any sci- 
 entific special research that he has acquired that regard 
 for facts and that calmness in his conclusions which were ob- 
 tained in the school of natural science. A cautious scientist 
 knows full well that, because he has gained a somewhat deeper 
 insight into the complicate working of the natural forces, 
 he is for this reason not a bit more justified than any other 
 man to give a verdict against the nature of the soul." 
 
 Croat Mam in RinUrrr Columns of Space Accorded in the Eleventh 
 
 areat Names in Biology Edition Q{ | Encyclopedia Britannica 
 
 Mendelism, (Mendel was an Augustinian Monk) .... 9% 
 
 Harvey, ( Vitalist) 9% 
 
 Huxley, (Brought up his children in the Anglican 
 
 Faith) 71/ 2 
 
 Darwin, (Was in doubt as to a God or not. See state- 
 ment below.) 7 
 
 Spencer, (The beginnings of things were all accounted 
 
 for by his "unknown") 5 
 
 Lister, 4% 
 
 Oken, (Vitalist) 4 
 
 Servetus, (Christian. See Catholic Encyclopedia) . . 3% 
 
 Pasteur, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia)... 3% 
 
 Agassiz, (Believer. See Encyclopedia Americana).. 3 
 
 Wallace, (Spiritualist. See his own writings) 2% 
 
 Linnaeus, (Christian. See Heroes of Science, Lon- 
 don) 21/2 
 
 Ray, John, (Christian. See Heroes of Science, Lon- 
 don) 21/2 
 
 Koelliker, 2% 
 
 Owen, 2% 
 
 Tyndall, 8% 
 
 Virchow, (Believer. See sketch in Encyclopedia Brit- 
 annica) 214 
 
 Bell, Charles, (Believer. See sketch in Encyclopedia 
 
 Britannica) 2 
 
Authorities 201 
 
 Columns of Space Accorded in the Eleventh 
 Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica 
 
 Berengarius, (Catholic. See sketch in Encyclopedia 
 
 Britannica) 2 
 
 Haeckel, Ernst 2 
 
 Lamarck, (Catholic. See Heroes of Science) 2 
 
 Bois-Reymond (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 Bonnet, (Vitalist. See Article "Life" in Catholic En- 
 cyclopedia) 
 
 Buckland, (Christian. See Bridgewater Treatises or 
 article under this heading in Encyclopedia Britan- 
 nica) 
 
 Cuvier, (Christian. See Heroes of Science) 
 
 Haller, (Christian. See Kneller's Das Christenthum 
 u.d. Vertreter d. Neueren Natur Wissemchaft, 
 
 Herder.) 
 
 Lyell, (Christian. See Heroes of Science) 1% 
 
 Buff on, (Christian. See Heroes of Science) 
 
 Cohn, (Non-conforming Jew. See Jewish Encyclo- 
 pedia) 
 
 Gray, Asa, (Christian. See Encyclopedia Britannica) 
 
 Galen, (Ancient Roman.) 
 
 Malpighi, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia) . . . 
 Smith, Wm. (Christian. See Heroes of Science) .... 
 Baer, von. (Believer. See Kneller's Volume, quoted 
 
 above) 1 
 
 Bichat, (Vitalist. See Table of Vitalists, following) 1 
 
 Brown, Robt 1 
 
 Darwin, Erasmus, 1 
 
 Gesner, ( Christian. See Heroes of Science) 1 
 
 Goodsir, 1 
 
 Hooke, Robt. (Christian. See Encyclopedia Britan- 
 nica) 1 
 
 Leeuwenhoek, (Vitalist) 1 
 
 Ludwig, 1 
 
 Mohl, von 1 
 
 Suarez, ( Catholic Priest. See any encyclopedia. ) . . 1 
 Bernard, Claude (Became an infidel but later became 
 a Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 
 r-.of WoTvoa ; n R;/>i nm Columns of Space Accorded in the Eleventh 
 
 Great Names in Biology Edition Q J Encydopedia Britannica 
 
 Quatrefages, (Christian.) % 
 
 Galton, 34 
 
 Romanes, (Looked at the Christian side far more fav- 
 orably as he grew older. See Tables further on.) % 
 Schwann, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia)... % 
 Spallanzani, (Catholic Priest. See Catholic Encyclo- 
 pedia.) % 
 
 Balfour, (Christian. See any of his Philosophical 
 
 Writings.) % 
 
 Boerhaave, % 
 
 Koch, Robt % 
 
 Gegenbauer, % 
 
 Caesalpinus, (Christian. See Catholic Encyclopedia) % 
 Cope, (Believed in a Creator. See Encyclopedia 
 
 Americana) % 
 
 Schleiden, 1/3 
 
 Schultze, Max 1/3 
 
 Swammerdam, (Christian. See Heroes of Science). . % 
 
 Whitney, 1/3 
 
 Aldrovandi, (Christian. See Catholic Encyclopedia) % 
 
 Carpenter, (Christian. See Encyclopedia Britannica) % 
 Ehrenberg, (Christian. See Kneller's Volume, already 
 
 cited) y 2 
 
 Grew, 1/2 
 
 Marsh, O. C 1/2 
 
 Milne-Edwards, % 
 
 Mivart, St. George, (Catholic. See Encyclopedia 
 
 Britannica) % 
 
 Miiller, Johannes, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclo- 
 pedia) 1/2 
 
 Weismann, % 
 
 Zittel, 1/2 
 
 Fabricus, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia).. % 
 
 Fallopius, (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia).. % 
 
 Siebold, von, % 
 
 Steno, (Catholic Bishop. See Catholic Encyclopedia) % 
 
 Wolff, (Vitalist. See List of Vitalists) % 
 
Authorities 03 
 
 Table of Biologists who have done valuable work, but, 
 up to 1910 have not been deemed worthy of a separate 
 article in the Eleventh Edition of the Encyclopedia Bri- 
 tannica. 
 
 de Bary, H. A. 
 
 Ramon y Cajal 
 Calkins 
 
 Carpi (see Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 Castle 
 
 Columbus (see Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 Davenport 
 Dufour, Leon 
 Dujardin 
 
 Dwight (Catholic. See his "Thoughts of a Catholic Anato- 
 mist") 
 Geer, de, 
 Eimer 
 
 Hertwig, Oskar. (Opponent of Weismann) 
 His, Wm. 
 Johnston 
 
 Klein (see Jewish Encyclopedia) 
 Kowalevsky 
 Lacaze-Duthiers 
 Leidy 
 Lesser 
 Leuckart 
 Ley dig 
 Loeb 
 Lyonet 
 
 Mecket, J. Fr. 
 Miiller, Fritz 
 Nageli (Vitalist) 
 Needham (Catholic Priest) 
 Newport 
 Osborn 
 Pander 
 Pearson, Karl 
 Pouchet 
 
04 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 Purkin j e 
 
 Rathke 
 
 Reaumur (Christian. See Heroes of Science) 
 
 Redi (Christian. See Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 
 Remak (Jew. See Jewish Encyclopedia) 
 
 Roesel 
 
 Saint Hilaire (Christian) 
 
 Schaudinn 
 
 Schultze, Franz 
 
 Severinus (Pope) 
 
 Strauss-Diirckheim 
 
 Vesalius (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 
 Vicq d'Azyr 
 
 Vinci, Leonardo (Catholic. See Catholic Encyclopedia) 
 
 Vries, de, Hugo 
 
 Willoughby (Christian. See Heroes of Science) 
 
 Wyman, Jeffries 
 
 Wasmann, Erich (Catholic Priest) 
 
 Wheeler (Vitalist. See his writings) 
 
 Table of Vitalists as per Professor Han Driesch's History 
 and Theory of Vitalism. 
 
 The names that follow are the most representative Vital- 
 ists, that is, are the names of those who are convinced that 
 Life cannot be explained by a causo-mechanical process. 
 They insist on a "Vital Principle," which, however, many of 
 them call by different names, such as "Entelechy," "Genetic 
 energy," "Property of self-adaptation," "Growth," "Bath- 
 mic force," "Direction," "Biotic Energy," or, as the older 
 writers called it, a "Soul," though it must be observed that 
 most of these writers, as Sir Bertram Windle hag well said, 
 would rather perish than give it that antiquated name. 
 
 Aristotle 
 
 Helmont, van J. B. (1577-1644) 
 
 Harvey, Wm. (1578-1657) 
 
 Stahl, George Ernest (1660-1734) 
 
 Buff on, George, Louis, Leclerc (1707-1788) 
 
Authorities 205 
 
 Maupertius (1698-1759) 
 
 Needham, Tuberville (1713-1781) 
 
 Wolff, Caspar, Friedrich (1733-1794) 
 
 Blumenbach, J. F. (1752-1840) 
 
 Bichat (1771-1802) 
 
 Keyserling 
 
 Hegel (1770-1831) 
 
 Schelling (1775-1854) 
 
 Cuvier (1769-1832) 
 
 Goethe (1749-1832) 
 
 Humboldt, von Alexander (1769-1859) 
 
 Oken, Lorenz (1779-1813) 
 
 Reil, J. Ch. (1759-1813) 
 
 Treviranus, G. R. (1776-1837) 
 
 Autenrieth, M. F. (1836- ) 
 
 Tiedemann, F. (1830- ) 
 
 Burdach, K. F. (1835- ) 
 
 Baer, von Karl E. (1792-1876) 
 
 Wagner, R. (1805-1864) 
 
 Magendie, F. (1816- ) 
 
 Miiller, Johannes (1801-1858) 
 
 Liebig (1846- ) 
 
 Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860) 
 
 Hanstein, von J. (1880- ) 
 
 Wigand, Albert 
 
 Hartmann von Eduard (1842-1906) 
 
 Liebemann, Otto (Regards Vitalism as a Possibility) 
 
 Pfliiger (Partly a Vitalist) (1877- ) 
 
 Goetz (Partly a Vitalist) (1869- ) 
 
 Busse 
 
 Montgomery, Edward 
 
 Roux, W. 
 
 Ehrhardt, F. (1890- ) 
 
 Wolf, Gustav 
 
 Cossmann, P. Nikolaus 
 
 Reinke, Eugen 
 
 Noll, Fritz 
 
 Pauly (absurd theory, but Vitalistic) 
 
 Schneider 
 
206 The Beginnings of Science x 
 
 Ostwald 
 
 Gurwith 
 
 Bergson 
 
 Lotze 
 
 Bunge, von G. (Problematic Vitalist) 
 
 Bernard, Claude (Vitalist, but is seemingly inconsistent) 
 
 Descartes 
 
 Leibnitz 
 
 Bonnet 
 
 Haller, Albert 
 
 Spallanzani 
 
 These last five, however, do not believe there is any mu- 
 tual interaction between soul and body. 
 
 Special Tables of the Most Important Biologists 
 Professor Wm. Locy's summaries of great names. 
 
 Aristotle Lamarck 
 
 Galen von Baer 
 
 Vesalius Miiller, Johannes 
 
 Harvey Schwann 
 
 Malpighi Schultze, Max 
 
 Linnaeus Darwin 
 
 Wolff Pasteur 
 
 Cuvier Zittel 
 Bichat 
 
 From our Table compiled from the Encyclopedia, it 
 will be seen that all of these except Schultze and Zittel, 
 regarding whom we could find nothing as to their beliefs, 
 were "believers" and Darwin is doubtful. 
 
 And here is another list of FOUNDERS of the various 
 branches of Biology. For to these men all that has come 
 after their time is due, for, as Professor Locy well says, of 
 those that came after Vesalius, they "had the advantage of 
 the sketches made under the direction of Vesalius. Pioneers 
 and Pathbreakers are under special limitations of being in 
 
Authorities 207 
 
 new territory, and make more errors than they would in 
 following another's survey of the same territory; it takes 
 much less creative force to correct the errors of a first sur- 
 vey than it does to make original discoveries." 
 
 Founders of Biological Divisions 
 
 Malpighi, founder of Pathology. 
 
 Virchow, founder of Modern Cellular Pathology. 
 
 von Baer, founder of Embryology. 
 
 Miiller, Johannes, founder of Modern Physiology. 
 
 Schwann, founder of the Cell Theory. 
 
 Pasteur, founder of Bacteriology. 
 
 Bichat, founder of Histology. 
 
 Lamarck, founder of Modern Evolution. 
 
 Darwin applied this to man. 
 
 Cuvier, founder of Modern Comparative Anatomy. 
 
 Linnasus, founder of Modern Botany 
 
 Again, it will be observed that every one was a "believer," 
 with Darwin alone doubtful. 
 
 Tables of Modern Scientists in Various Fields of Research 
 
 Physicists (from Kneller's volume and Schwickerath's Article) 
 
 Benjamin Thompson, American, afterward Count Rumford 
 
 of Bavaria 
 Sir Humphrey Davy 
 Robert Mayer 
 Joule 
 Him 
 Clausius 
 Thompson (Lord Kelvin) 
 
 The first five established the "mechanical theory of heat 
 and the law of the conservation of energy" while the last 
 two drew the "conclusions from these laws which bear on 
 the whole universe." 
 
 In regard to their views on religion, Every One of them 
 
08 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 has in his writings shown not only unmistakable evidence 
 of a firm faith in Christianity, but from their writings one 
 can in all truth say, went out of their way to let people 
 know it. 
 
 Not one of the establishers of this great law was a 
 defender of materialism, though Ernst Haeckel considers 
 this same law "paragraph I of the monistic religion," so 
 we must with Father Schwickerath, from whom we quote, 
 say, "we must suppose, and Haeckel should suppose as well, 
 that these men knew a little more, and certainly not less, 
 about the bearing of this law than Haeckel himself." 
 
 Mathematicians 
 
 Cantor (died 1783) 
 
 Gauss (died 1855) 
 
 Cauchy 
 
 Vicaire 
 
 Binet (died 1856) 
 
 Puiseux (1883) 
 
 Hermite (1901) 
 
 Buoncompagni 
 
 Professor Weierstrass of the University of Berlin (1897) 
 
 All illustrious mathematicians and every one a believer; 
 several of them extreme defenders of the Faith and most 
 of them Catholics. Cauchy wrote a pamphlet in which he 
 said: "I am a Christian, i. e., I believe in the Divinity of 
 Christ with Tycho Brahe, Copernicus, Descartes, Newton, 
 Fermat, Leibnitz. Pascal, Grimaldi, Euler, Guldin, Bos- 
 covich, Gerdil; with all the great astronomers, with all the 
 great physicists, with all the great mathematicians of the 
 past centuries. I am a Catholic, a sincere Catholic, as 
 were Corneille, Racine, La Bruyere, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, 
 Fenelon." 
 
 Among Astronomers we have: 
 
 Father Piazza, who discovered Ceres, the first of the plane- 
 toids, which discovery is really a very important one in 
 astronomy. 
 
Authorities 209 
 
 Father Oriani. 
 
 Inghiraini, a member of the religious order of the Piarists. 
 
 Cecchi, also a member of the same order. 
 
 Denza, a member of the Barnabites. 
 
 Roller, a Benedictine. 
 
 Reslhuber, a Benedictine. 
 
 de Vico. 
 
 Perry. 
 
 Secchi, all three being Jesuits. 
 
 Gibers. 
 
 Bessel, both of whom speak in their letters of God so that 
 
 all idea of materialism must be excluded. 
 John Frederick William Herschel was a believer and thor- 
 
 oughly pious. (See article in the Dictionary of National 
 
 Leverrier (1877) Discoverer of Neptune. 
 
 Faye, the distinguished French astronomer (1902). (See 
 
 his work, Sur VOrigme du Monde, where he speaks of 
 
 biblical creation.) 
 Lament. 
 
 Kreil, both devout Catholics. 
 Professor Heis of Minister (1877) ardent Catholic and de- 
 
 fender of the faith. 
 
 In Electricity 
 
 Galvini Ohm 
 
 Volta Siemens 
 
 Ampere Oersted 
 
 Faraday Maxwell 
 
 Coulomb de la Rive 
 
 Nearly all the great men in electricity were Christians 
 and most of them Catholics. (See Catholic Encyclopedia, 
 and Dr. James Walsh's Makers of Modern Electricity.) 
 
 Father Kneller, in his volume, from which we have been 
 quoting, says most eloquently: "The half-educated man 
 who is smoothly borne along the street in an electrical car, 
 who from his room converses with his friend miles distant 
 and recognizes his voice, who sends a message to America 
 
The Begwwwngs of Science 
 
 from Australia, far in advance of the fastest train or steam- 
 er, this man often smiles with a superior and sneering look 
 when he sees an old woman telling her beads, or when the 
 conversation turns on priests and the church, and he thinks 
 that the great discoveries of this age of electricity have 
 given the death blow to the old religious prejudices. But 
 by so thinking he betrays his own ignorance ; he forgets that 
 the great intellects to whom, in the first place, these great 
 modern achievements are due, have humbly meditated on, 
 and bowed before, the truths of Christianity. And in the 
 clever hands under whose touch the hidden forces of elec- 
 tricity first manifested themselves have often closed in hum- 
 ble prayer, and in the instance of Volta and Ampere, have 
 even not disdained to hold the beads." 
 
 Maxwell, who died in 1879, said to Mr. Colin Mackenzie, 
 "Old chap, I have read up many queer religions : there 'is 
 nothing like the old thing after all," and "I have looked into 
 most philosophical systems and I have found that none of 
 them will work without God." 
 
 In Optics 
 
 Fresnel 
 
 Fraunhofer 
 
 Foucault 
 
 Ketteler of Minister (died 1900). All believers. 
 
 In Natural Science 
 
 Biot 
 
 Regnault 
 
 Desains 
 
 Becquerel 
 
 Plateau 
 
 Tait 
 
 Jolly. 
 
 All of whom were Christians. 
 
 Chemistry 
 
 D alt on 
 Berzelius 
 
Authorities 
 
 Chevreul 
 
 Dumas 
 
 Liebig 
 
 Chaptal 
 
 Schonbrin of Basle 
 
 Wurtz 
 
 Klaproth 
 
 Friedel 
 
 Henry 
 
 Deville 
 
 All but one Christians and not even he was a materialist. 
 Liebig "mercilessly condemned the attempts at utilizing the 
 natural sciences as props to materialism. He says that such 
 attempts are not made by the real scientists, but by 'dilet- 
 tanti who from their promenades on the borderlines of sci- 
 ence think themselves justified to expound to the ignorant 
 and credulous public how the world and life in it have orig- 
 inated, and how wonderfully man has progressed in the ex- 
 ploration of the sublimest things. And the ignorant and 
 credulous public believes these people and not the real sci- 
 entists.' " 
 
 Geographers 
 
 Ritter 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Maury 
 
 Freycinet 
 
 d'Abbadie 
 
 Hauy (called the father of scientific crystalography) 
 
 Fuchs of Munich 
 
 Beudant 
 
 Hausmann 
 
 All believers and Hauy was a priest. 
 Geology and Paleontology 
 
 de Luc 
 Cuvier 
 Fuchs 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 
 Buckland 
 
 de Derrer 
 
 Miller 
 
 Hitchcock 
 
 MacCulloch 
 
 Pfaff 
 
 Dana 
 
 Waagen 
 
 Every one of whom tried to show a harmony between reve- 
 lation and geology. Some even went entirely too far in their 
 attempts. 
 
 Conybeare (an Anglican Clergyman) 
 
 Sedgwick (an Anglican Clergyman) 
 
 Beaumont 
 
 Bischof 
 
 Fraas 
 
 Studer 
 
 Quenstedt 
 
 Daubree 
 
 Dumont 
 
 Barrande 
 
 d'Omalius 
 
 Lessen 
 
 L apparent 
 
 All of whom were believers. 
 
 In Physiology 
 
 Johannes Muller (the greatest Physiologist of all times) 
 
 Schwann (founder of the Cell Th/eory) 
 
 Wagner 
 
 Volkmann 
 
 Vierordt 
 
 Claude Bernard (became a Catholic before his death) 
 
 Flourens (also a free-thinker for a time, but returned to 
 
 his faith, Protestant, before his death) 
 Pasteur (father of Bacteriology) 
 Carnoy (the Begian biologist, was a priest) 
 
Authorities 
 
 Ehrenberg (pioneer in microscopic zoology, thought that 
 materialism was a "humbug and a fantastic, sickly tend- 
 ency of our time, which parades under the name of sci- 
 ence") 
 
 von Baer (one of the most versatile of great scientists, 
 father of Embryology, noted in zoology, geography, eth- 
 nography and anthropology, always a firm believer in 
 teleology, for a time a pantheist, but later coming back 
 into the fold) 
 
 Agassiz 
 
 Van Beneden 
 
 Altum (Zoologist and priest) 
 
 David (Zoologist and priest) 
 
 Heude (Zoologist and priest) 
 
 Latreille (Entomologist and a priest) 
 
 von Martius (Botanist who ordered a green cross to be 
 placed on his shroud because, as he said, "A cross, be- 
 cause I am a Christian; green, in honor of botany") 
 
 Kielmeyer (Botanist) 
 
 von Schrank (Botanist and priest) 
 
 Leunis (Botanist and priest) 
 
 Castracane (Botanist and priest) 
 
 In Evolutionary Science Particularly 
 
 Lamarck 
 
 Saint Hilaire, both of whom founded the theory of Evolu- 
 tion in its modern form, and the latter of whom saw 
 in it a "further step towards a deeper knowledge of God." 
 
 Ampere 
 
 d'Omalius 
 
 Waagen 
 
 Lessen, all of whom were Catholics, defended it strenuously. 
 (They did not, however defend Darwinism, and as we 
 have shown in our chapters dealing with this problem, 
 Darwinism is not held in very high esteem in the scientific 
 world, so these men were more nearly correct than were 
 the more rabid defenders of the theory that swept so 
 many off their feet.) 
 
The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 Darwin, "vacillated between atheism and theism," as shown 
 by what the Duke of Argyle says regarding him: "In 
 the course of that conversation, I said to Mr. Darwin, 
 with references to some of his own remarkable works on 
 the 'Fertilisation of Orchids,' and upon 'The Earth- 
 worms,' and various other observations he made of the 
 wonderful contrivances for certain purposes in nature 
 I said it was impossible to look at these without seeing 
 that they were the effect and expression of mind. I shall 
 never forget Mr. Darwin's answer. He looked at me 
 very hard and said, 'Well, that often comes over me 
 with overwhelming force; but at other times,' and he 
 shook his head vaguely, adding, 'it seems to go away.' ' 
 
 Asa Gray, a firm believer and he actually wrote a book to 
 show that Natural Selection did not oppose Natural The- 
 ology. 
 
 We had intended giving only a complete list of all Biol- 
 ogists, so that the percentage of believers and non-believers 
 could be observed at a glance. We have done this, but 
 found so many interesting names in other fields, and some- 
 times the same name, appearing in several of the sciences, 
 that we thought these added pages would serve some pur- 
 pose in at least acquainting those who are unfamiliar with 
 either the names or the sciences with an excellent list that 
 could be used as a sort of foundation for a "reading course." 
 
 We wish to call particular attention to the list of Bi- 
 ologists. It is especially among workers in this field that 
 men who do not know are always telling us, all the recruits 
 for materialism, atheism, and causo-mechanism are found. 
 We have made as thorough an investigation as was within 
 our means, and have not found over four instances in which 
 any of the entire list there cited actually stated that the 
 causo-mechanistic explanation was sufficient to account for 
 Life. We have not been able to find anything whatever 
 regarding many of the names as to their religious belief 
 
Authorities 
 
 and conviction, but if among those accorded a separate 
 account under their own name, we find so vast a majority 
 believers, we can apply the same percentage to those for 
 whom we could find no biographical sketch, and surely the 
 result is astonishing to us all. 
 
 There is, of course, an objection that can be raised, and 
 that is that there were many able men who did defend ma- 
 terialistic views, such as Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, Ber- 
 thelot and others, but it is again astonishing to note how 
 many of the scientists who in the beginning defended such 
 views came to change them as they grew older and the first 
 excitement of youth had given way to maturer judgment. 
 "Haeckel has recently lamented such a change in the case 
 of prominent naturalists of the materialistic camp. As 
 instances of such 'psychological metamorphosis,' he quotes, 
 besides Kant, such naturalists as Virchow, Du Bois-Rey- 
 mond, and Wundt. He states with regret that Virchow, 
 originally a materialist, who in 1856 expressed his convic- 
 tion that he would never change his opinions in this re- 
 spect, by his subsequent actions showed that his 'former 
 conviction was a grave error; for twenty-eight years after- 
 ward he defended radically different opinions.' Wundt 
 styled the first edition of his Lectures on the Soul of Man 
 and Animals, thirty years later 'the sin of his youth,' 
 and in the second edition he advanced entirely different 
 views. The first edition was purely monistic and material- 
 istic, the second purely dualistic and spiritualistic. It is 
 possible that Haeckel's expressions are exaggerated, but 
 they prove this much, that these eminent scientists became 
 the more cautious in condemning the 'spiritualistic' views, 
 the more they advanced in the knowledge of psychological 
 phenomena." 
 
 Here is still another list of Scientists who were also de- 
 
216 The Begwnwgs of Science 
 
 voted churchmen, compiled by Professor J. A. Zahm, of 
 Notre Dame University. 
 
 Catholics 
 Astronomers 
 
 Leverrier 
 Faye 
 
 Father Secchi 
 Father Denza 
 Father Ferrari 
 Father Perry 
 Father Searle 
 Father Hagen 
 
 Botanists 
 
 Tulasne Greene 
 Edward L. Greene 
 
 Geologists 
 
 Barrande 
 
 Gaudry 
 
 Dumont 
 
 d'Homalius d'Halloy 
 
 Collet 
 
 de L apparent 
 
 de la Valles, Poussin 
 
 Charles Sainte-Claire Deville 
 
 Chemists 
 
 Barf 
 
 Renard 
 
 Dumas 
 
 Berthelot 
 
 Chevreul 
 
 Henri Sainte-Claire Deville 
 
Authorities 217 
 
 Mathematicians 
 
 Chasles 
 
 Puiseux 
 
 Cauchy 
 
 Gilbert 
 
 Hermite 
 
 Prehistoric Archeologists 
 
 Abbe Hamard 
 Abbe Delaunay 
 Abbe Beroud 
 Abbe Bourgeois 
 Abbe Ducrost 
 Abbe Arcelin 
 Abbe Cau Durban 
 Marquis de Nadaillac 
 
 Protestants 
 
 James Clerk Maxwell 
 
 Gabriel Stokes 
 
 P. G. Tait 
 
 Sir William Thompson 
 
 Asa Gray 
 
 J. D. Dana 
 
 Quatrefages 
 
 Dawson 
 
 Joseph Henry 
 
 Fresnel 
 
 Liebig 
 
 Mayer 
 
 Sir David Brewster 
 
 Dr. Whewell 
 
 Adam Sedgwick 
 
 Sir Roderick Murchison 
 
 E. Hitchcock 
 
 Sir John Herschel 
 
 Michael Faraday 
 
218 The Begwvnmgs of Science 
 
 Taken from Catholic Science and Catholic Scientists, by 
 Rev. J. A. Zahm, C.S.C., Professor of Physics in the Univer- 
 sity of Notre Dame, pub. by H. L. Kilner & Co., 1894, Phila- 
 delphia. 
 
 In comparing the "believers" with the "non-believers," we 
 have found six who can without hesitancy be classified as 
 believing that the Causo-mechanistic idea is alone suffi- 
 cient to explain life, and these are: Spencer, Huxley, 
 Haeckel, Ludwig and Loeb and Weismann. That there are 
 others is to be conceded, but we have not found them. We 
 have, however, been able to find that among those whose biog- 
 raphies were contained in separate articles, that is, among 
 the GREATEST of all biologists, the overwhelming majority 
 were and are believers. 
 
 Many of the biographies have touched but little on bi- 
 ology, for often the same man did most exceptional work 
 in one field that is stressed on that account, and is barely 
 mentioned in the field we are considering, which makes the 
 list arbitrary, as all such lists are bound to be, but, neverthe- 
 less, the method we have used in compiling our names is 
 the only objective one we know. 
 
 John Hunter has 10% columns assigned him, but Men- 
 del's account is entirely on biology and Hunter's is not, 
 so that Mendel has a greater space accorded him than 
 Hunter in Biology, or for that matter than any biologist 
 who ever lived. 
 
 This list will prove interesting when one contemplates 
 what is usually written by those who do not know, regard- 
 ing the non-belief of scientists, especially in the biological 
 world. 
 
 We believe with Professor Swift of Washington Uni- 
 versity that styles in thought like other decrees of fashion 
 are set by the leaders of the groups of men with whom 
 
Authorities 19 
 
 one is accustomed to associate. When erroneous scientific 
 statements are made, it is therefore easy to grade the kind 
 of intellectual associates with which the speaker is fa- 
 miliar, for he has obtained his information and his thoughts 
 from the popular magazines and Sunday papers, or sim- 
 ilar "non-authorities" in regard to science. The reader of 
 such articles assumes that, because the article and the 
 journal or paper is well advertised, that therefore the ar- 
 ticles must be authoritative, is working entirely in the prin- 
 ciple expounded in The Hunting of the Snark where some- 
 one says, "What I tell you three times is so." 
 
 Repetition and constant seeing or hearing a name in con- 
 nection with a science carries with it the conviction to most 
 men that such an individual must be very important in 
 that particular field. 
 
 We do not believe that these lists prove anything what- 
 ever as to the validity or its opposite of any religious views, 
 and, so far as we can see, it is only of interest as a guide 
 showing whom to accept as an Authority, and to refute 
 the popular but nonsensical ideas that scientific men are 
 opposed to religion or are even non-religious. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
 SUMMING up the chapters that have gone before, we 
 may point to the following important facts that we have 
 attempted to impress upon any student of the Sciences: 
 
 Why the Philosopher, who was the acknowledged great 
 man of the past is no longer so considered by men at large. 
 
 Why we now accept laboratory evidence alone for our 
 Facts. 
 
 Why Facts must never be confused with Meanings 
 that is, there must be no confusion between the Fact itself, 
 and what the Fact stands for. 
 
 That Meanings are all Mental, and therefore do not 
 come under the Natural Sciences at all, but can come 
 only under that branch of Philosophy called Psychology. 
 
 That Psychology is divided into two parts, the Rational 
 or Philosophical, and the Experimental, sometimes also 
 called Physiological. 
 
 That no one, therefore, who does not know both the 
 Factual evidence and the Philosophical interpretations, or 
 at least the Philosophical method of checking up interpreta- 
 tions, has any moral right to an opinion on the subject in 
 question. 
 
 That a laboratory man, such as a Biologist, Chemist, 
 Physicist, etc., may and should speak with authority on his 
 findings, but that after he has developed a theory, he must, 
 because every theory to be worth anything must be logical, 
 we repeat, he must go to the Logician to find whether his 
 theory is sound and whether it has been validly drawn from 
 the facts at his disposal. 
 
 That even after doing this, he must go to the General 
 
 220 
 
Summary 
 
 Philosopher to find whether he has started with correct 
 First Principles, for, even though his facts and his theory 
 be correct and logical, he may find that there were no 
 grounds for his original premises. 
 
 That a theory is first originated, and then experiments 
 are performed to find whether there are any exceptions to 
 it, and not as is usually supposed, the facts found first and 
 then the theory propounded, for every deliberate experi- 
 ment ever performed, has been performed with the idea 
 of proving something, or trying to find out whether some- 
 thing is true in other words to demonstrate a the- 
 ory. 
 
 That, in view of the fact that Psychology has come down 
 to the laboratory, and attempted to test the reactions of 
 the nervous system under particular circumstances, we have 
 found a sort of middle ground by which we have a con- 
 necting link between the Observer and Experimenter and 
 the Philosopher. 
 
 That through Genetics we have been able to find and 
 have been able to prove by laboratory evidence, that all 
 men do not respond to the same stimuli in the same way, 
 and that just because there is a difference between them, 
 it does not mean that one is any better or worse than the 
 other. 
 
 That we must therefore never make the error of assuming 
 that just because two things are different, one must on 
 that account be superior to the other. They are simply 
 different. 
 
 But, that this being true, we must go about presenting 
 even our facts differently to different types of people, if 
 we wish them to see the same thing, and consequently 
 
 That it is absurd to condemn another manner than one's 
 own in presenting facts, provided always they be facts, as 
 is so often done by both sides, especially in biological and 
 theological treatises. 
 
 That simply because one's teachers have all agreed on a 
 certain point does not make that point of view true or un- 
 true, for one is more than likely to find at one school only 
 those men who think very much alike, because the head of 
 
The Begwnmgs of Science 
 
 the department usually, if not invariably, sees fit to employ 
 or recommend only those who agree with him. In fact often, 
 it would probably be found that those in the same depart- 
 ment come from the same schools or were pupils of the very 
 man in charge. 
 
 That to find references in a volume, on no matter what 
 subject, usually means only references to other writers who 
 agree with the author who quotes them, and therefore to 
 read a hundred such volumes may be narrowing, rather than 
 broadening. 
 
 That there is no viewpoint that does not have its oppo- 
 nents, and that just because a thing is popular does not 
 make it true. 
 
 That Truth means the agreement between our idea of a 
 given thing with the object itself. 
 
 That a Fact is only one very small portion of a truth 
 and must never be confused with it. 
 
 That until all the facts are in, we cannot have the proper 
 correlation of truth. 
 
 That it does not follow that because we cannot know 
 all about anything we can know nothing about it. 
 
 That the gathering of facts is of value only in so far as 
 we can find meanings for them, and then apply them to 
 humanity at large. 
 
 That as Professor James says, as soon as we get away 
 from the very narrow work of just hunting for a few facts 
 along one line, we must try to obtain a world-viewpoint, 
 and as soon as we do this, the biggest thing that looms 
 up before us, is the problem of Metaphysics. 
 
 But, this does not imply that we must cast our hypotheses 
 to the winds. 
 
 Nor does it imply that our hypotheses are true. 
 
 We must accept a working hypothesis to be able to ac- 
 complish anything in laboratory work, regardless of wheth- 
 er it be true or not, just so long as our experiments work 
 as though it were true. 
 
 That the student must be shown, that it is only on ac- 
 count of the immense amount of disagreement between men 
 at large on all problems, we have come to an agreement as 
 
Summary 228 
 
 to where we shall start our sciences, But this agreement 
 has nothing whatever to do with whether there is anything 
 beyond that starting point. It means only, that we shall 
 not discuss it m the laboratory, because it is beyond the 
 laboratory. In other words, because we have agreed as lab- 
 oratory men only to discuss what we can find presented to 
 our senses in the laboratory does not show, nor has it 
 anything whatever to do with WHY our senses perceive 
 things as they do, nor on what grounds we accept the evi- 
 dence of our senses. All of these things are left for the realm 
 of Philosophy, where they rightfully belong; for these 
 things are Psychological and not sensible, and the labora- 
 tory cannot deal with things which do not come under the 
 senses. 
 
 That, after all, Facts make little difference to any of us 
 in and of themselves. The MEANINGS are what count 
 and these lead to the propounding of our many theories. 
 
 Theories, then, are what actually count, because every fact 
 we try to find or have found every thought we think or 
 have thought, has been for some theoretical purpose. 
 
 But, Theories must be LOGICAL if they are worth any- 
 thing, and Logic must be rigorously adhered to if we ex- 
 pect to be reasonable in our interpretations of facts. 
 
 So that to demolish any theory, all that is required is 
 that it be shown to be illogical, and no laboratory man is 
 needed for this purpose, but a Logician. 
 
 We all agree that each man must and can pass judgment 
 validly on subjects propounded in his own field. We right- 
 fully resent a theologian telling us about a biological fact, 
 unless he be a biologist also, and so we must as justly resent 
 a biologist telling us anything about philosophy and theolo- 
 gy unless he be trained in these sciences as well. 
 
 That this is best exemplified in Evolutionary Science 
 where so much is written on both sides without much foun- 
 dation in fact, and where theories are so often illogically 
 drawn. 
 
 That we can readily understand why, this being an age 
 of "specialization," the average laboratory worker has had 
 practically no training at all in philosophy and so cannot 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 
 draw up a theory in accordance with the rules of that sci- 
 ence, though we must not forget that all writers insist 
 that every particle of evidence must be Logical, that is 
 Philosophical. 
 
 That most biologists, with the exception of Professor 
 Fleishmann, agree that there is Evolution. 
 
 That, notwithstanding this agreement, very few agree on 
 HOW it all has come about. 
 
 That Evolution must never be confused with a THEORY OF 
 EVOLUTION, for "Theory" here means only one way of HOW IT 
 CAME ABOUT, and does not mean the same thing as Evolution. 
 
 That Evolution is a PROCESS and not an Object, in other 
 words that it means BECOMING. 
 
 That Darwinism must not be confused with Evolution; 
 for Darwinism is only one Theory of How Evolution came 
 about. 
 
 That Charles Darwin was not a Darwinian. 
 
 That Darwinism is not held by very many biologists now. 
 
 That Huxley, the greatest defender of the Darwinian 
 Theory was himself not a believer in it, but defended it 
 against unfair attacks. 1 
 
 That de Vries' theory of Mutation is probably accepted 
 to a greater extent than any other single evolutionary the- 
 ory. This holds that any changes which have taken place 
 have usually come by sudden leaps or bounds rather than by 
 slow continuous growths. 
 
 That this being so, it is and always has been absurd to 
 look for a missing link, seeing there could be no missing 
 link when there were no links in the process. 
 
 That there is not one particle of evidence that Man came 
 from an animal ancestor. 
 
 That all evidence on this score has been one-sided in that 
 it took only physical comparisons, leaving out the psychical. 
 
 That practically all Animal Psychologists have come to 
 the conclusion that there is a decided difference between 
 animals and men on the psychical side and that by no process 
 yet come to light can this difference be bridged. 
 
 That animals never think, but work by instinct and asso- 
 
 1 See Footnote 3, Chapter VI. 
 
Summary 
 
 ciation, and always react in very nearly the same way to the 
 same stimuli, and that all animals of one species always do 
 everything in practically the self-same way, and have ever 
 done so. 
 
 That man responds in various ways, and that there has 
 never been one particle of evidence that an animal ever 
 formed a concept of a thing as a whole. 
 
 That Professor Haeckel himself has noted the tendency 
 amongst biological workers who have also studied the psychi- 
 cal side of life, to reverse their viewpoint from that which 
 they originally held regarding a purely mechanistic ex- 
 planation of life. 
 
 That Orthogenesis is now accepted in some form or an- 
 other by nearly all biologists, and means that there is an 
 inner driving force that makes the living organism do what 
 it does. 
 
 That more and more the Vitalistic doctrines of a separate 
 Life-Principle comes to the fore and is being accepted by 
 an evergrowing number of scientific men. 
 
 That we are as far away from explaining life as we have 
 ever been, as shown by Dr. Ward's statement. 
 
 That to account for the wonderful regenerative processes 
 mentioned, there must be an Autonomous Life-Principle 
 assumed. 
 
 That this same Vital-Principle has been given many dif- 
 ferent names by different writers, but in the last analysis 
 it means the SOTJL. 
 
 That if we analyse our every thought, we readily see that 
 we have a thinking self and an object thought about. 
 
 That we also find a relationship between the Whole and its 
 Parts. 
 
 That from what we have shown, it is seen that no attri- 
 butes can exist unless they be attached to something on 
 which they are dependent, thereby illustrating what is 
 meant by the two words "dependent" and "independent." 
 
 That what is not independent must be dependent on some- 
 thing else. 
 
 That we know ourselves to be dependent on thousands of 
 things, and must therefore be dependent on something 
 
The Beginnings of Science 
 
 greater than ourselves, 
 
 For, nothing can come from anything else that is less 
 than itself. 
 
 Showing, that a Cause must virtually contain all that it 
 ever can produce; in other words, that that into which a 
 thing ultimately develops must have been present in the 
 very first Germ as a possibility, so that the first Germ was 
 in reality more complex than the last development, though 
 seemingly the reverse is true. 
 
 That as nothing can possess anything within itself that 
 was not already present in its Cause as a possibility, there- 
 fore, as we have intelligence, the Cause which produced us, 
 must be intelligent. 
 
 That as we KNOW perfection though never having ex- 
 perienced it, we must also have obtained this from the 
 Cause which must have possessed it in order that it could 
 be given. This Cause for want of a better name, we call 
 the First Cause. 
 
 That thus far and thus far only can Logic and Labora- 
 tory science go. 
 
 From here on Natural Theology and Revealed Religion 
 take up the thread and continue in logical order to develop 
 their theses, while the biologist's and psychologist's work is 
 done. 
 
 Here are several things that it is very important to bear 
 in mind in any study: 
 
 We must obtain all the facts from all the different 
 branches of science so as to check up our findings and com- 
 pare them, lest the facts found in one deny those of an- 
 other; witness, for instance, what Professor Kellogg says 
 that Paleontologists accept one theory of evolution, Path- 
 ologists another, Embryologists still another, and so on. 
 
 That probably no one man can co-ordinate all the 
 sciences, for there are so very many branches now, and that 
 just for this reason, we cannot now and probably never can 
 (for there will in all probability be still more divisions of 
 our present branches in the future) be able to arrive at any- 
 where near a consistent co-ordination of truths in a purely 
 scientific way, for, to know the Truth one must know all 
 
Summary 
 
 the facts, and as we have just shown, this is practically 
 impossible. We can know these things tentatively but every 
 new finding may change our views, so that, as Professor 
 Kellogg well says, biology (and he might have named other 
 branches as well) is not in such a state that any theories 
 can yet be built upon it. He believes that only one truth 
 has been brought out of biology so far, about which there 
 can be no disputation, and that is "Evolution," but as we 
 have shown, Professor Fleishmann an equally eminent 
 biologist denies even this. 
 
 That as it is acknowledged by all biologists that there 
 are very few biological facts that can be made use of as 
 truths on which to build theories for the training of children, 
 for Social Psychology, etc., it will be seen that practically all 
 volumes on these subjects which began their theorizing on 
 biological grounds that have not yet been established, and 
 as Kellogg mentions, were even more shakily established 
 than many others that have not been used, are almost 
 worthless. 
 
 That most people work on an emotional and not a reason- 
 able basis, and desiring a thing to be true, they read into 
 various facts all manner of meanings that are not true, 
 well illustrating the proverb, "The wish is father to the 
 thought." 
 
 That any number of writers use different names for the 
 same thing, while others call different things by the same 
 name, so that one must be positive of the word's meaning 
 before attempting an interpretation, and that on this 
 account, many men who are fighting each other in print, 
 are probably agreed on what they actually believe, but due 
 to a different training and a different nomenclature, they 
 themselves believe they differ from each other. 
 
 That if we do not give the student a training in Logic 
 he cannot know that his reasoning is correct even though 
 he may be fairly accurate in its use, and that he must have 
 Logic though he wished to prove that he doesn't need it, 
 for even then, there would have to be the assumption that 
 he could set his facts opposing this idea in logical order. 
 
 That what the man on the street means by a Scientist is 
 
The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 one who "applies science," but a real Scientist never thinks 
 of including such a one under that title. The true Scien- 
 tist is he whom the average man would consider a Philoso- 
 pher. 
 
 That no Scientist has ever won acceptance and renown 
 except through his philosophising. 
 
 That in Science we cannot explain a single WHY of any- 
 thing. All we can do is to show HOW to do certain things 
 in order that something else may occur. But WHY this does 
 occur, we do not know. 
 
 That there are two kinds of Law. The one referring to 
 the Moral Order and dealing with Right and Wrong, the 
 other a Physical Law, meaning only that two or more 
 occurrences always follow in the same order in so far as we 
 have yet been able to prove. This Physical Law has, of 
 course, nothing whatever to do with Right and Wrong in 
 the Moral Order. 
 
 That in Ethics, unless we accept Free- Will and a Creator, 
 we cannot have any Ethics, for each individual would neces- 
 sarily have to do the things he does, and it would be perfectly 
 absurd to deny any one the "right" to do that which he 
 couldn't help doing, and to punish him therefor. 
 
 That there can be no valid reason why man should live 
 a decent life if there be no absolute Right and Wrong, which 
 means that a Superior Being established certain laws that 
 must be obeyed, for if man be but a piece of protoplasm de- 
 veloped from the primitive nebulosity until he has become 
 what he is due to purely Physico-chemical laws, Might is 
 Right, and there is no valid reason why he should not pro- 
 cure all he can for his own gratification and care nothing for 
 the injury he may do others. 
 
 That if it be objected, that each man seeks happiness, and 
 that injuring his neighbor would cause him unhappiness, it 
 might be answered that that is exactly the point we are 
 making, namely, that there has been impressed upon his 
 conscience by an outside intelligence, an idea of Right and 
 Wrong as well as an idea of Happiness, for if we remember 
 that nothing can be greater than its cause, we must come to 
 the conclusion that the cause of having a Conscience at all 
 
Summary , 
 
 must have been a very great and good intelligence, or we 
 could not have our notions of Intelligence and Good. 
 
 That by far the overwhelming majority of great men in 
 biology were "believers" in a Supreme Being, and were like- 
 wise quite religious. 
 
 That Alfred Russell Wallace, co-founder of the Theory 
 of Natural Selection with Darwin, said in his last book, that 
 there had been absolutely no moral progress since the 
 history of man began. 
 
 That Kohlmann, the German Anthropologist, says that 
 "Man has not changed his racial characteristics since the 
 glacial period." 
 
 That Kohlbrugge, a great German Biologist, speaking of 
 our knowledge of Evolution says "We do not know anything 
 distinct about the great problem of evolution as yet. We 
 have not quite even seen its face. All must be done over 
 again." 
 
 That even Huxley, the great agnostic, had St. Thomas 
 Aquinas, the greatest philosopher of the Scholastic school, 
 as one of his favorite authors. 
 
 That this same Professor Huxley had his children brought 
 up in the Anglican Church, because, as Dr. Walsh says, "he 
 thought that Christian principles would protect them 
 through dangerous periods and if later they wanted to 
 choose for themselves, they might do so." 
 
 And it is well to remember several of Dr. Walsh's "Scien- 
 tific Don'ts." 2 
 
 Don't forget that Huxley's "Romanes' Lecture" shows 
 how conservative he became in his later years, and remember 
 that Herbert Spencer in his last book retracts many of his 
 earlier views on religion. 
 
 Don't forget the remarks Dean Stanley made as he lay 
 on a sick bed from which it was thought he would never 
 rise : "Life looks very different when viewed from the hori- 
 zontal." Life and Philosophy look very different viewed 
 from the gathering shadows of the end of life. 
 
 Don't forget Francis Bacon's well-known expression "A 
 
 J Fifty "Don'ts" of Science, by James J. Walsh, M.D. Ph.D., The Cath- 
 olic Mind, Vol. XIII. No. 6, March 22, 1915. 
 
230 The Beglnnmgs of Science 
 
 little philosophy" by which he meant natural philosophy 
 or, as we call it, science "inclineth man's mind to atheism, 
 but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to 
 religion." 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 SUGGESTED READING 
 
 OUR object throughout this book has been to give to 
 the reader PERSPECTIVE, in order that he may thereby 
 obtain a more comprehensive view of LIFE; and as a small 
 volume of this nature cannot enter into the details of 
 the many subjects discussed, we are here suggesting a 
 "course" of reading that we believe will be both instructive 
 and profitable to all who will follow it out honestly and 
 thoroughly but, as probably very few will have had the 
 same training, we shall suggest first a list of books for those 
 whose schooling has been but little, and who on that ac- 
 count cannot immediately delve into volumes that will prove 
 more difficult reading. 
 
 This first list must be purchased so that the student can 
 go through the works mentioned, thoroughly and constantly, 
 until completely mastered. They must be STUDIED, not 
 merely read. 
 
 Logic, by Wm. Turner, S.T.D. (Catholic Educa- 
 tion Press, Washington) $ 1.25 
 
 Dr. Turner is Professor of Philosophy in the 
 Catholic University at Washington, D. C., and 
 his book is the very simplest possible. 
 Truth and Error, by Aloysius J. Rother, S.J. (B. 
 
 Herder) 50 
 
 Certitude, by Aloysius J. Rother, S.J. (B. Herder) .50 
 
 Being, by Aloysius J. Rother, S.J. (B. Herder). . .50 
 
 The author of these little books is professor of 
 philosophy in St. Louis University. 
 
 231 
 
232 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 Psychology, by Michael Maher, S.J., D.Litt., M.A., 
 
 (Longmans, Green & Co.) 2.00 
 
 Dr. Maher is professor of Psychology at Stony- 
 hurst College, England, and his volume is a vast 
 store-house of all things psychological, both 
 from the Rational and the Experimental side. 
 Problems of Philosophy, by John Grier Hibben 
 
 (Scribners) 1.00 
 
 Dr. Hibben is president of Princeton University. 
 
 Backgrounds for Social Workers, by Edward J. 
 
 Menge, M.A., Ph.D., M.Sc. (Richard G. Badger 
 
 1918) 1.50 
 
 General Biology, Sedgewick and Wilson (Henry 
 
 Holt & Co.) 1.75 
 
 Dr. Sedgewick is professor of biology in the 
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dr. 
 Wilson is professor of zoology in Columbia 
 College, New York. 
 
 These volumes, if thoroughly mastered, will lay a solid 
 foundation for all future reading. 
 
 Should one, however, have had some philosophical train- 
 ing and be able to read more difficult work with under- 
 standing, we would suggest that the list of volumes im- 
 mediately following be made a part of one's library, as 
 well as all of the books in the outlined course, which follows 
 this list, that the student can afford. 
 
 A Manual of Scholastic Philosophy, by Cardinal 
 
 Mercier, 2 volumes, (B. Herder) $ 7.00 
 
 This is a very complete philosophy covering prac- 
 tically all problems that may arise in the 
 student's mind. 
 Problems of Philosophy, by John Grier Hibben, 
 
 (Scribners) 1.00 
 
 General Biology, by Sedgewick and Wilson, (Holt 
 
 & Co.) 1.75 
 
Suggested Reading 233 
 
 A Text-Book of Zoology, by Parker and Haswell, 
 
 (Macmillan), 2 volumes 9.00 
 
 This is the most complete work on the subject in 
 
 the English Language. 
 
 Stonyhurst Series of Philosophy, (Longmans, 
 Green & Co.). There are eight volumes in this 
 series not all of equal value. They are written 
 by the professors of Stonyhurst College, Eng- 
 land, and treat Scholastic Philosophy from a 
 modern viewpoint as does also the work of Car- 
 dinal Mercier, quoted above. It is not neces- 
 sary to have both Mercier's Manual and these 
 eight volumes, but Maher's Psychology should 
 be had, on account of the vast field it covers. 
 
 Natural Theology, by Bernard Boedder, S. J 2.00 
 
 Logic, by Richard F. Clarke, S. J 1.50 
 
 Political Economy, by Charles S. Devas, M.A 2.25 
 
 Psychology, by Michael Maher, S. J., Litt. D., 
 
 M.A 2.00 
 
 The First Principles of Knowledge, by John Rick- 
 aby, S.J 1.50 
 
 Moral Philosophy, by Joseph Rickaby, S.J 1.50 
 
 General Metaphysics, by John Rickaby, S.J 1.50 
 
 Theories of Knowledge, by Leslie J. Walker, S.J. . . 2.75 
 
 The outline we are here suggesting has been formed with 
 the idea of presenting both sides of the question, so a 
 rather varied list of articles and books are cited, but we 
 would have the student remember that as these articles and 
 books were not especially written to form a course of 
 connected reading, there will be some repetition and often 
 a running off into by-paths that have little to do with 
 the subject, but that is a fault one must always find in the 
 collateral reading one may follow. 
 
 We also wish to call attention to the fact that with the 
 Encyclopedia Britannica and the Catholic Encyclopedia 
 there are excellent index volumes, which should always be 
 
234 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 consulted first when looking up any subject whatever, for 
 often the thing sought may be part of an article listed under 
 a totally different name and in a totally different volume 
 from what one might suppose. 
 
 Further, it must be borne in mind that until the three 
 important Encyclopedias we mention have been consulted 
 on every article under discussion, the student must not con- 
 sider himself free from a one-sided viewpoint, remembering 
 that a fact will be the same in each case though each fact 
 may be viewed from a vastly different angle. 
 
 Then it is well to remember that the Encyclopedia Bri- 
 tannica is written largely by Protestants, the Catholic En- 
 cyclopedia by Catholics and the Jewish Encyclopedia by 
 Jews, thus giving one an authoritative account from these 
 three angles. 
 
 Outline of Study 
 
 Philosophy and Common Sense, by Dr. Orestes 
 Brownson, Vol. 1, Page 1, of Brownson's Col- 
 lected Works, which can be found in any large 
 library. 
 
 Problems of Philosophy, by John Grier Hibben. 
 
 Logic. 
 
 Dante and Aquinas, by Philip H. Wicks teed, (Dut- 
 
 ton & Co.) $ 2.00 
 
 This little volume will prove an interesting and 
 valuable introduction to those desiring to famil- 
 iarize themselves with the viewpoint and ter- 
 minology of Scholasticism. 
 General Biology, by Sedgewick and Wilson. 
 Scholasticism, Old and New, by M. M. C. J. de Wulf 
 
 (Benziger) 2.00 
 
 Professor de Wulf was formerly at the University 
 
 of Louvain and is now at Harvard. 
 
 Christian Philosophy, by J. T. Driscoll (Benziger) 1.25 
 The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nine- 
 
Suggested Reading 235 
 
 teenth Century, by Joseph Louis Perrier, Ph.D. 
 
 (Columbia University Press) 1.75 
 
 Mercier's Manual of Scholastic Philosophy or 
 The Stonyhurst Series of Philosophical Studies. 
 History of Philosophy, by Wm. Turner, S.T.D. 
 
 (Ginn & Co.) 2.50 
 
 Biology and Its Makers, by Wm. A Locy, (Henry 
 
 Holt & Co.) 2.75 
 
 Darwinism To-Day, by Vernon Kellogg, (Henry 
 
 Holt & Co.) . 2.00 
 
 Essays in Unnatural History, by John Gerard, 
 
 S.J., F.L.S. (Herder) 1.25 
 
 This volume having been written in 1900 refutes 
 much that needs no refutation to-day, but 
 nevertheless it is good reading on the history 
 of the development of many so-called scientific 
 ideas that are no longer accepted. 
 Studies in American Philosophy, The Modern 
 
 Schools: Evolutionism, by the Rev. J. B. Ceule- 
 
 mans, Ecclesiastical Review, Sept.1912, page 258. 
 
 The First Principles of Evolution, by S. Herbert, 
 M.D., M.R.C.S. (Eng.) L.R.C.P. (Lond.) (Mac- 
 
 millan) 1.60 
 
 Easy to read and covers both inorganic and 
 organic evolution, BUT one must not forget 
 one's logic, for the author often arrives at con- 
 clusions that are not exactly sound, logically. 
 Facts and Theories, by Sir Bertram Windle, M.A., 
 M.D., Sc.D., LL. D., F.R.S., K.S.G., President of 
 
 University College, Cork, (Herder) .45 
 
 The Problem of Evolution, by Erich Wasmann, 
 
 S.J. (Herder) 1.60 
 
 This is an account of a most interesting public 
 discussion held in Berlin, in 1907, between dis- 
 ciples of Professor Haeckel and Professor 
 Wasmann himself, who, by the way, is one of 
 the great authorities, if not the greatest on Ant 
 Life. 
 
236 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 What is Life? by Sir Bertram Windle, (Herder) . . .75 
 
 The Conservation of Energy and Voluntary Activ- 
 ity, by the Rev. Michael O'Kane, O.P., in Amer- 
 ican Catholic Quarterly Review, July, 1903, Page 
 588. 
 
 A Recent Argument against Vitalism, by the Rev. 
 A. M. Schwitalla, S.J. Ecclesiastical Review, 
 Feb. 1913, Pages 136-149. 
 
 The Life in Separated Human Tissues, by Austin 
 O'Malley, M.D., Ecclesiastical Review, October, 
 1914, Page 464. 
 
 Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, by 
 
 Erich Wasmann, (Herder) 4.50 
 
 Genetics, by Herbert Eugene Walter, (Macmillan) 1.50 
 
 Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom, 
 
 by Erich Wasmann, (Herder) 1.00 
 
 Brain and Personality, by Wm. Hanna Thomson, 
 
 (Dodd, Mead & Co.) 1.20 
 
 For those whose interests lie in the biological realm, and 
 who wish to read more extensively along their chosen line, 
 we suggest: 
 
 Origin of Species, by Charles Darwin. 
 Voyage of the Beagle, by Charles Darwin. 
 Text-book of Zoogeography, by Frank Evers Bed- 
 
 dard, (Putnams) $ 1.50 
 
 Behavior of the Lower Organisms, by H. S. Jen- 
 nings, (Columbia Univ. Press) 3.00 
 
 Heredity, in its relation to Eugenics, by Chas. B. 
 
 Davenport, (Henry Holt & Co.) 2.00 
 
 Ants, by Wm. Morton Wheeler, Ph.D. (Columbia 
 
 Univ. Press) 5.00 
 
 Species and Varieties, by Hugo de Vries, (Open 
 
 Court Pub. Co.) 5.00 
 
 Mendel's Principles of Heredity, by W. Bateson, 
 
 (Putnams) 3.50 
 
 Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, by Thomas 
 
 Dwight, M.D., LL.D., (Longmans, Green & Co.) 1.00 
 
Suggested Reading 237 
 
 On the Psychological side, read : 
 
 The Century's Progress in Experimental Psychol- 
 ogy^ by Henry Smith Williams, M.D., Harpers 
 Magazine, September, 1899, Page 512. 
 
 Fact and Fable in Psychology, by Joseph Jastrow, 
 
 Ph.D., (Houghton Mifflin Co.) 2.00 
 
 Professor Jastrow is head of the department of 
 Psychology in the University of Wisconsin. 
 
 Genetic Psychology, by Edwin A. Kirkpatrick, B.S., 
 
 M.Ph., (Macmillan) 1.25 
 
 Psychology for Teachers, by Charles H. Judd, 
 
 (Appleton & Co.) 1.20 
 
 Education of the Central Nervous System, by Reu- 
 ben Post Hallack, (Macmillan) 1.00 
 
 From the animal side of psychology, we have 1;hese excel- 
 lent books : 
 
 Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psy- 
 chology, by John B. Watson, Professor of Psy- 
 chology in the Johns Hopkins University. 
 (Henry Holt & Co.) 1.75 
 
 Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, by 
 
 Wilhelm Wundt, (Macmillan) 2.60 
 
 The Animal Mmd, by Margaret Floy Washburn, 
 Ph.D., Professor of Psychology in Vassar Col- 
 lege, (Macmillan) 1.60 
 
 Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom, 
 by Erich Wasmann, S.J. (Herder) Already 
 quoted 1.00 
 
 Comparative Studies m Psychology of Ants and of 
 
 Higher Animals, by Erich Wasmann, (Herder) 1.00 
 
 Founders of Modern Psychology, by G. Stanley 
 Hall, President of Clark University. (D. Apple- 
 ton & Co.) 2.50 
 
 Rather difficult reading unless one is familiar with 
 philosophy. 
 
 All that have been cited so far are, of course, a part of 
 the literature that makes for a general knowledge on the 
 
238 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 subjects discussed, but the following books are especially 
 interesting as they deal more with the philosophy of biology 
 direct. 
 
 The Freedom of Science, by Joseph Donat, S.J., 
 
 D.D., (Joseph F. Wagner, New York) $2.50 
 
 Dr. Donat is a professor in Innsbruck University. 
 
 The Great Enigma, by W. S. Lilly, (D. Appleton 
 
 & Co.) 3.60 
 
 The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, by 
 Hans Driesch, Ph.D., Professor in the University 
 of Heidelberg, and Gifford Lecturer in the Uni- 
 versity of Aberdeen for 1907-1908. 2 volumes, 
 (Macmillan) 6.00 
 
 The Problem of Individuality, by Hans Driesch 
 (Macmillan). 
 
 The History and Theory of Vitalism, by Hans 
 
 Driesch, (Macmillan) 1.75 
 
 Quite difficult reading unless one is familiar with 
 both biology and philosophy. 
 
 Mechanism, Life and Personality, by J. S. Haldane, 
 M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., (London). 
 
 Continuity, The British Association Presidential 
 Address, 1913, by Sir Oliver Lodge, D.Sc., F.R.S. 
 (London, 1913). 
 
 Some Intimations of Immortality, by the Rt. Hon. 
 Sir Edward Fry, G.C.S., (London, 1913). 
 The last three volumes differ with Professor 
 Driesch to a very considerable extent and will 
 therefore prove quite interesting. 
 
 See The Hibbert Journal "Reviews," Vol. XII, Page 
 706, for a review of these three and Vol. XIII, 
 page 438 for a review of Professor Driesch's vol- 
 umes, both reviews are by O. W. Griffith. 
 
 Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Berg- 
 son, by Hugh S. R. Elliot, with preface by Sir 
 Ray Lankester, K.C.B., F.R.S. , (Longman's, 
 
 Green & Co.) 1.60 
 
 This book challenges the "right of philosophy to 
 
Suggested Reading 239 
 
 intrude into the sphere of science," but is in 
 turn answered by 
 The Limitations of Science, by Louis T. More, 
 
 (Henry Holt) 1.50 
 
 The following articles in various Journals, easily obtain- 
 able at any Library of importance, are also of interest: 
 
 Mind and Matter, a Hylozoistic View, by Fleet-surgeon 
 C. Marsh Beadnell, R.N., Hibbert Journal, Vol. XIII, Page 
 605. 
 
 A Physiologist's View of Life and Mind, by D. Noel Paton, 
 Professor of Physiology in the University of Glasgow. Hib- 
 bert Journal, Vol. XIII, Page 367. 
 
 A Recent Work on Primitive Revelation and Modern 
 Science, by the Rev. John D. Folghera, O.P. Ecclesiasti- 
 cal Review, April, 1914. 
 
 Science in "Bondage," by Sir Bertram Windle, The Catho- 
 lic World, February, 1917. 
 
 Religion as a Credible Faith, by W. H. Mallock. This 
 book is quite interesting on account of the attempt the 
 author makes to harmonize supposedly conflicting facts. 
 Published by Macmillan in 1903 ; it should be read and then, 
 the answer to that part dealing with Maher's Psychology, 
 will be found in the 1914 edition of Maher's Psychology; 
 also read these criticisms immediately following the reading 
 of the volume: 
 
 Mr. Mallock on Science and Religion, by Rev. S. Fitz 
 Simons, The American Catholic Quarterly Review, January, 
 1904. Vol. XXIX, Page 74. 
 
 Mr. Mallock as a Defender of Natural Religion, by E. R. 
 Hull, S.J., The American Catholic Quarterly Review, July, 
 1896. Vol. XXI, No. 83. 
 
 The Problem of Evolution, by Erich Wasmann, S. J. Al- 
 ready quoted, is reviewed and objected to by the article: 
 
 Father Wasmann on Evolution, by Rev. S. Fitz Simons, 
 American Catholic Quarterly Review, January, 1910. Page 
 12. Vol. XXXV. No. 137, Page 12. This is a good sum- 
 mary by one who absolutely refuses to accept any evolution 
 
240 The Begmnmgs of Science 
 
 whatever. 
 
 History of the Warfare of Science "with Theology in 
 Christendom, by Andrew Dickson White, (D. Appleton & 
 Co.) 2 volumes, $5.00. A work whose reading is suggested 
 at many of our great schools, but it should be read in 
 conjunction with the following: 
 
 Critique of White's "Warfare," Vol. 16, Page 597. Ecclesi- 
 astical Review and 
 
 Christian Faith and Modern Science, by the V. Rev. John 
 B. Hogan, SS. D.D., American Catholic Quarterly Review, 
 April, 1897, Vol. XXII, Page 382. 
 
 For Draper's works though thoroughly discredited, but 
 often referred to, see article "Science" Catholic Encyclope- 
 dia. See also the following articles in the three Encyclope- 
 dias mentioned. 
 
 Biology, Evolution, Medicine, Life, Cell, Vitalism, An- 
 atomy, Physiology, Instinct, Heredity, Eugenics, Psychol- 
 ogy, Botany, Zoology, Biogenesis, Abiogenesis, Autogeny, 
 Ethics, Science. 
 
 See also Reading Lists on Biology and Philosophy, in 
 both Encyclopedia Britannic a and the Catholic Encyclo- 
 pedia, in the last volume of each. 
 
 Consult the "Periodical Index" found in any library for 
 special articles appearing in the various journals; but re- 
 member that in reading these articles when a statement is 
 simply made without evidence adduced to support it, though 
 it be quoted until it is known by nearly every one, the state- 
 ment need not be true; for, often one man, wholly irre- 
 sponsible, has said something which others have copied until 
 the very fact that it is so often quoted gives it a semblance 
 of truth. 
 
 Consult the annual index or semi-annual index of the fol- 
 lowing high grade journals, for many interesting articles: 
 
 The North American Review, 
 
 The Atlantic Monthly, 
 
 The Hibbert Journal, 
 
 The American Catholic Quarterly Review, 
 
 The Catholic World, 
 
Suggested Readmg 
 
 The Dublin Review, 
 The Unpopular Review. 
 
 This list is by no means exhaustive and its aim has 
 been to open up a world of broader vision for the student 
 than he would be likely to obtain by the usual suggestions 
 given him. 
 
 As we have stated in our chapter on "The Ideal," it 
 is the province of Religion to begin where we have left off. 
 So we would suggest the following two volumes for reading 
 in this region. 
 
 Constructive Natural Theology, by Newman Smyth, 
 
 (Scribner) $ 1.00 
 
 From the Protestant viewpoint, and 
 Natural Religion, by Franz Hettinger, D.D. (Fr. 
 
 Pustet & Co.) 2.00 
 
 From the Catholic side. Dr. Hettinger was pro- 
 fessor of Theology in the University of Wurz- 
 burg. 
 
 We have given only those articles and volumes which 
 are written in the English language. There are of course, 
 many more than we have cited, and in German and French 
 even a great many more than there are in English, but for 
 those who can read either of these languages in the original 
 the references and notes in the volumes cited will furnish suf- 
 ficient material for a most extended effort. 
 
 There is one more point that we must not fail to men- 
 tion, and it is that of Vestigial or Rudimentary Organs and 
 those similarities of structure known as Homologies be- 
 tween Men and Animals. We cannot treat so vast a sub- 
 ject very fully here, but we can show the student where 
 he may find the references he wishes: 
 
 Evolution of Man, by Jas. Walsh, M.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., 
 etc. Article in The Catholic World, May, 1916, pp. 207- 
 
242 The Beginnings of Science 
 
 218. 
 
 Regarding Haeckel's Biogenetic Law, that is, that each 
 individual passes through the same stages that the race 
 has passed through. See, 
 
 Wasmann's Biology, page 456 and 445 and 446. 
 
 Wasmann's Biology, (English Translation) in the Ap- 
 pendix, I.e. page 503 and 487. 
 
 Kellogg's Darwinism To-day, Page 21, where he says 
 the "Recapitulation theory is mostly wrong." (This is Haeck- 
 el's Biogenetic Law) and in another place he adds that this 
 theory now forms only a skeleton on which to hang excep- 
 tions. See also page 130, where Professor Kellogg says 
 that Haeckel still continues to cling to discredited theories. 
 
 Ranke's Der Mensch, (Third Edition) I. page 311-314, 
 and the whole of section 306 to 314. Ranke is an authority 
 so no one need fear quoting him. 
 
 T. Thesing's Experiment elle Biologie, II. (Volume 337 of 
 the collection Aus Natur wnd Geistes Welt. 
 
 Biologwche Zentralblatt, XXXVI, 1906, No. 21, pages 
 754-768. Article, "Neuerere und Neueste Schilddruesen- 
 forschung" by O. Schulz. Consult any Medical Library for 
 this. Wasmann cites it, I. page 446. 
 
 Stimmen aus Maria Laach, 1911, No. 4. This covers 
 Evolution as it applies to man, by Karl Frank, S.J. See 
 page 16 for the mention of Rudimentary Organs. 
 
 Neueres zur Abstummungslehre, in Revue Luxembour- 
 geoise, 1910, No. 2, by E. Wasmann. 
 
 In regard to rudimentary organs, we are daily finding 
 reasons for their existence. A few years ago the ductless 
 glands were so considered, but now we know they produce 
 some substance that other glands must -have to continue 
 their work, and similarity of structure does not denote 
 similarity of ancestry any more than dissimilarity denotes 
 that the organisms possessing it sprang from different par- 
 entage. 
 
 At any of the larger universities a great number of tech- 
 
Suggested Reading 
 
 nical journals may be found, usually in the departmental 
 libraries, on all Biological, Psychological, Philosophical and 
 other branches of Science, and we suggest consulting these 
 also. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abnormal psychology, 37, 44 
 
 Acquired characteristics, 120, 122 
 
 Adaptiveness, functional, 125 
 
 Adaptation, 122 
 
 Adaptation, definition of, 176 
 
 Adaptation, Weismann on, 177 
 
 Advertising, 42 
 
 Agassiz, 200, 213 
 
 Aldrovandi, 202 
 
 Altum, 213 
 
 America, naming of, 74 
 
 Americus Vespucius, 74 
 
 Ampere, 209, 213 
 
 Amphigenesis, 133 
 
 Anatomy, 21 
 
 Animal Life, 21 
 
 Animal as contradistinguished 
 
 from man, 65 
 Animal psychology, 41 
 Anti-Darwinians, 104, 107 
 Apparent chance, 170 
 Applied psychology, 42 
 Applied science, 88 
 Aquinas, Thomas, 146, 229 
 Arcelin, Abbe, 217 
 Archeologists, table of, 217 
 Argyle, Duke of, 214 
 Aristotle, 204, 206 
 Ascidians, 167, 181 
 Assumptions, 70 
 Astronomers, 208, 216 
 Augustine, Saint, 112, 149 
 Autenrieth, M. F., 205 
 Authority, real, 196 
 Authority in science, 196 
 
 Authority-seeking type of mind, 
 
 25 
 Autonomy of vital processes, 157 
 
 Bacon, Francis, 229 
 Bacteriology, 22 
 Baer, von, 201, 206 
 Bagehot, Walter, 100 
 Balfour, 84, 202 
 Ballard, Philip B., 41 
 Balzac, 65 
 Barf, 216 
 Barrande, 212, 216 
 Bateson, 134, 141 
 Bathmic force, 172 
 Battle of the parts, 125 
 Beaumont, 212 
 Becquerel, 210 
 Becoming, 158 
 Bell, Charles, 200 
 Behaviorists, 64 
 Belief, system of, 84, 199 
 Berengarius, 201 
 Bergson, 206 
 Berkeley, 183 
 Beroud, 217 
 
 Bernard, Claude, 201, 206, 212 
 Berthelot, 215, 216 
 Berzelius, 210 
 Bessel, 209 
 Beudant, 211 
 Bichat, 201, 205, 206, 207 
 Binet, 208 
 
 Biological science, founders of, 
 207 
 
 245 
 
246 
 
 Index 
 
 Biologists, 200 
 
 Biologists, most important, 206 
 
 Biology, 21 
 
 Biology and its makers, 197 
 
 Biology, far-reaching, 28 
 
 Biophors, 123 
 
 Biot, 210 
 
 Biotic energy, 172 
 
 Birth of psychology, 35 
 
 Bischof, 212 
 
 Blumenbach, J. F., 205 
 
 Boerhaave, 202 
 
 Botany, 21 
 
 Botanists, table of, 216 
 
 Bois-Reymond, 201 
 
 Bonnet, 201, 206 
 
 Boscovich, 208 
 
 Bossuet, 208 
 
 Bourdeloue, 208 
 
 Bourgeois, Abbe, 217 
 
 Bourne, Dr. G. C., 115, 116, 147 
 
 Brahe, Tycho, 208 
 
 Brewster, Sir David, 217 
 
 Britannica, Encyclopedia, 107, 
 
 164, 197 
 
 Brown, Robt., 201 
 Briinn Natural History Society, 
 
 134 
 
 Bruyere, La, 208 
 Buckland, 201, 212 
 Buffon, 201, 204 
 Bunge, von, 171, 206 
 Burbank, Luther, 89 
 Burdach, K. F., 205 
 Busse, 205 
 Butschli, 144 
 
 Caesalpinus, 202 
 Calkins, 203 
 Cantor, 208 
 Career, 222 
 Carpenter, 202 
 Carnoy, 212 
 
 Carpi, 203 
 
 Castle, 52, 142, 203 
 
 Castracane, 213 
 
 Catholicity, 76 
 
 Catholic, Roman priests, 107 
 
 Catholic scientists, 216 
 
 Cauchy, 208, 217 
 
 Causality, 159 
 
 Causality, unifying is regulative, 
 
 163 
 Cause always richer in content 
 
 than product, 160 
 Cause, first, 192 
 Cause of change not necessarily 
 
 spatial, 160 
 Causo-mechanism, brings an end 
 
 to all sciences save physics and 
 
 chemistry, 171 
 Causo-Mechanists, definition of, 
 
 153 
 
 Causo-mechanists, list of, 218 
 Ceechi, 209 
 
 Cell, effect of study of, 171 
 Cell, develops toward an end, 175 
 Certitude, 87 
 Chance, 48 
 
 Chance, abolished, 169 
 Chance, apparent, our fault, 170 
 Change from philosophy to labora- 
 tory sciences, 30 
 
 Change in methods in schools, 48 
 Chaptal, 211 
 Chasles, 217 
 
 Chemists, table of, 210, 216 
 Chevreul, 211, 216 
 Clausius, 207 
 Cleavage, law holds good up to a 
 
 certain point only and then 
 
 changes, 169 
 Coffey, Rev. P., 184 
 Cohn, 201 
 Collet, 216 
 Columbus, 203 
 
Index 
 
 247 
 
 Commandments, Ten, 28 
 
 Comparative psychology, 41 
 
 Conklin, 141 
 
 Conservation of energy, 90, 163, 
 185 
 
 Constancy, theory of, 145 
 
 Contingency and necessity, 188 
 
 Conybeare, 212 
 
 Cope, 120, 172, 202 
 
 Copernicus, 208 
 
 Corneille, 208 
 
 Cossmann, P. N., 205 
 
 Coulomb, 209 
 
 Crayfish, 167 
 
 Creed, need of in science, 115 
 
 Criminology, 45 
 
 Culture, 16 
 
 Curriculum of universal knowl- 
 edge, 151 
 
 Cuvier, 201, 205, 206, 207, 211 
 
 d'Abbadie, 211 
 
 Dall, 134 
 
 Dalton, 210 
 
 Dana, 212, 217 
 
 Daniel, 211 
 
 Darwin, Charles, 49, 89, 99, 113, 
 
 119, 172, 194, 200, 206, 207 
 Darwin, Erasmus, 201 
 Darwinism, 103, 111, 116 
 Darwinism, decline of, 121 
 Darwinism losing ground, 113 
 Darwinism to-day, 103 
 Daubree, 212 
 
 Davenport, Charles, 144, 203 
 David, 213 
 
 Davy, Sir Humphrey, 207 
 Dawson, 217 
 de Bary, H. A., 203 
 de Derrer, 212 
 Delage, 104 
 de Lamennais, 71 
 de Lapparent, 210 
 
 de la Rive, 209 
 
 Delaunay, Abbe, 217 
 
 de la Valles, Poussin, 216 
 
 de Luc, 211 
 
 Dementia precox, 60 
 
 de Nadaillac, Marquis, 217 
 
 Denza, 209, 216 
 
 Desanis, 210 
 
 Descartes, 71, 206, 208 
 
 Description not an explanation, 30, 
 177 
 
 Determinants, 123 
 
 Determinism, 66 
 
 Development and origin of the in- 
 dividual, 52 
 
 Deville, 211, 216 
 
 de Vries, 65, 128, 131, 134 
 
 de Vico, 209 
 
 de Wulf, 76 
 
 d'Homalilus d'Halloy, 212, 213, 216 
 
 Direction, 172 
 
 Discontinuous variations, 134 
 
 Did human beings spring from 
 animal ancestors? 114 
 
 Difference between humans and 
 animals psychic and not physi- 
 cal, 114 
 
 Differences between man and 
 brute, 117 
 
 Difference between proving one's 
 own point and showing the lack 
 of proof in another, 106 
 
 Doctrine of the schools at last be- 
 come the maxims of the crowd, 
 31 
 
 Dominant, 53 
 
 Downing, E. D., 121 
 
 Driesch, 117, 143, 150, 189 
 
 Driesch, see entire chapter on vi- 
 talism, 151 
 
 Driesch's experiment on clavellina 
 lepadiformis, 181 
 
 Du Bois-Reymond, 215 
 
248 
 
 Index 
 
 Ducrost, 217 
 Dufour, Leon, 203 
 Dujardin, 203 
 Dumas, 211, 216 
 Dumont, 212, 216 
 Duncan, Professor, 183, 184 
 Durban, Abbe Cau, 217 
 Dwight, 142, 203 
 Dynamic teleology, 157 
 
 Edison, Thomas, 52, 89 
 
 Education not natural, 62 
 
 Educational literature largely 
 worthless, 227 
 
 Egg cell more complicated than 
 adult form, 189 
 
 Ehrenberg, 202, 213 
 
 Ehrhardt, F., 205 
 
 Eimer, 128, 130, 172, 203 
 
 Electricity, 209 
 
 Embryology, 21 
 
 Emery, 134 
 
 Emotional types of mind, 25 
 
 Empiricism, 188 
 
 Energy defined, 184 
 
 Energy, laws of, 184 
 
 Energy, as used by Lodge, 185 
 
 Energy, store of being run down 
 constantly, 184 
 
 English language, 74 
 
 Environment, 99 
 
 Entelechy, definition of, 163 
 
 Entelechy, vital principle, 172 
 
 Epistemology and metaphysics, 103 
 
 Ethics, 67, 81, 228 
 
 Euler, 208 
 
 Evidence, anecdotal, 46 
 
 Evidence, for evolution purely log- 
 ical, 104 
 
 Evidence, laboratory, 18 
 
 Evolution, 90, 99 
 
 Evolution, evidence subjective, 105 
 
 Evolution, evidence for, 112 
 
 Evolution defined, 109 
 
 Evolution, a process, 177 
 
 Evolution as a personal god, 176 
 
 Evolution as a scientific hypothe- 
 sis, 145 
 
 Evolution means becoming, 195 
 
 Evolution due to environment, 131 
 
 Evolution not due to environment, 
 130 
 
 Evolution, causo-mechanical start- 
 ing point, 102 
 
 Evolution, exact proof wanting, 
 103, 104 
 
 Evolution, external factors effect 
 on, 113 
 
 Evolution, limitation of, 114 
 
 Evolution, monogenetic, 146 
 
 Evolution, monophyletic, 146 
 
 Evolution not to be confused with 
 a theory of, 111 
 
 Evolution; only one thing proven 
 in, 227 
 
 Evolution philosophically consid- 
 ered, 146 
 
 Evolution; points to be remem- 
 bered in a summary of, 145 
 
 Evolution, polygenetic, 146 
 
 Evolution, polyphyletic, 146 
 
 Evolution, theological starting 
 point, 101 
 
 Evolution, thought of by St. Au- 
 gustine, 112 
 
 Evolution, theories of, different for 
 various sciences, 116 
 
 Evolution, theory of, 111 
 
 Evolution turned over educational 
 methods, 99 
 
 Evolutionary theory favored by 
 genetical research, 144 
 
 Evolutionary scientists, table of, 
 213 
 
 Evolutionary work must largely 
 be done over again, 229 
 
Index 
 
 249 
 
 Experimental psychology, 36 
 Experimental psychology, birth of, 
 
 36 
 Experts disagreeing, 199 
 
 Facts agreed upon by all, 85 
 Facts, interpretation of, 98 
 Facts vs. interpretations, 100 
 Facts, all necessary before truth 
 
 can be ascertained, 226 
 Facts, same ones produce different 
 
 conclusions in different persons, 
 
 101 
 
 Facts vs. truth, 109 
 Faith, definition of, 73 
 Fabricus, 202 
 Fallopius, 202 
 False teaching, 96 
 Faraday, 209, 217 
 Faust, Goethe's, 175 
 Faye, 209, 216 
 Fenelon, 208 
 Fermat, 208 
 Ferrari, 216 
 First cause, 192 
 First principles, 27 
 Fleischmann, Professor, 149, 227 
 Flourens, 212 
 Fossils, none ever found that were 
 
 first of its kind, 175 
 Foucoult, 210 
 Fraas, 212 
 Frauenhofer, 210 
 Freaks in nature, 135 
 Free will, 66 
 
 Free will necessary to ethics, 228 
 French revolution, 31, 96 
 Fresnel, 210, 217 
 Freycinet, 211 
 Friedel, 211 
 Frog's eggs, 172 
 Fuchs, 211 
 
 Galen, 201, 206 
 
 Galton, 201 
 
 Galvini, 209 
 
 Gaudry, 216 
 
 Gauss, 208 
 
 Geer, de, 203 
 
 Gegenbauer, 202 
 
 Genetic energy, 172 
 
 Genetic psychology, 41 
 
 Geographers, table of, 211 
 
 Geographical selection, 127 
 
 Geologists, table of, 211, 216 
 
 Germinal selection, 123 
 
 Gerdil, 208 
 
 Gesner, 201 
 
 Gilbert, 217 
 
 Goethe, 175, 205 
 
 Goetz, 205 
 
 Goodsir, 201 
 
 Gray, Asa, 201, 214, 217 
 
 Greene, Edward L., 216 
 
 Greene, Tulasne, 216 
 
 Grew, 202 
 
 Grimaldi, 208 
 
 Growth, 122 
 
 Growth adapted to an end, 167 
 
 Guldin, 208 
 
 Gurwith, 206 
 
 Gustavos Adolphus, 97 
 
 Habit, 58 
 
 Haeckel, Ernst, 148, 201, 218 
 Haeckel's biogenetic law, 242 
 Haeckel, falsifications of, 92 
 Haeckel, gaseous vertebrate, 194 
 Haeckel, lament on change of atti- 
 tude by prominent naturalists, 
 215 
 Haeckel, paragraph I of the Mo- 
 
 nist religion, 208 
 
 Haematococcus, 50 ; 
 
 Hagen, 216 
 Haldane, Dr., 183 
 
250 
 
 Index 
 
 Haller, 201, 206 
 
 Halmatogenesis, 131 
 
 Hamard, Abbe, 217 
 
 Hanstein, J. von, 205 
 
 Hartman, Edward von, 205 
 
 Harvard, 76 
 
 Harvey, 200, 204, 206 
 
 Hausmann, 211 
 
 Hauy, 211 
 
 Hazard of posii'on, 125 
 
 Hegel, 184, 205 
 
 Heis, Professor, 209 
 
 Helmholtz, 199 
 
 Helmont, J. R. von, 204 
 
 Henry, 211, 217 
 
 Henslow, 172 
 
 Herd instinct, 42 
 
 Hermite, 208, 217 
 
 Herschel, 209, 217 
 
 Hertwig, 175, 203 
 
 Heterogenesis, 128, 133, 134 
 
 Heterogenesis vs. transmutation, 
 136 
 
 Heude, 213 
 
 Hibben, 20, 31, 82 
 
 Hirm, 207 
 
 His, Wm., 203 
 
 Histology, 22 
 
 Hitchcock, 212, 217 
 
 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 62, 100 
 
 Hooke, Robt., 201 
 
 Hubbard, Elbert, 68 
 
 Human being and fish pass 
 through same stage, 148 
 
 Humanists not ancestors of physi- 
 cists, 184 
 
 Humboldt, Alexander von, 205 
 
 Hume, 183 
 
 Hunter, John, 218 
 
 Hunting of the snark, 219 
 
 Huxley, 89, 90, 200, 218, 229 
 
 Huxley's children brought up in 
 Anglican faith, 229 
 
 Huxley, conservative in later years, 
 229 
 
 Huxley, not convinced of Darwin- 
 ism, 113 
 
 Hydra, 178 
 
 Hypothesis justified if it works, 
 116 
 
 Idealism, 188 
 
 Idealism cannot be given physical 
 form, 194 
 
 Idea of the ideal, 193 
 
 Immanent, 183 
 
 Inclusive demarcation, 49 
 
 Independent and dependent, 188 
 
 Inghirami, 209 
 
 Inherent, 183 
 
 Inheritance, 99 
 
 Inner directive force, 130 
 
 Inner law of development, 130 
 
 Interactionist doctrine, 38 
 
 Instinct, 58 
 
 Interpretations, 63 
 
 Intrinsic tendency toward pro- 
 gress, 130 
 
 Introspectionists, 64 
 
 Inventors not scientists, 52 
 
 Isolation theories, 127 
 
 Jaekel, 128, 133 
 
 James, Wm., 66, 70, 76, 78, 81, 103 
 
 Jastrow, Joseph, 199 
 
 Jesuits, 76 
 
 Johns Hopkins, 76 
 
 Johnston, 203 
 
 Jolly, 210 
 
 Joule, 207 
 
 Kant, 215 
 
 Kellogg, Vernon, Ch. VI, VII. 
 
 Kellogg, biology has proven only 
 
 one thing, 227 
 Ketteler, 210 
 
Index 
 
 251 
 
 Keyserling, 205 
 
 Kielmeyer, 213 
 
 Klaproth, 211 
 
 Klein, 203 
 
 Kneller, 207, 209 
 
 Know thyself, 22 
 
 Knowledge vs. wisdom, 31 
 
 Koch, Robt., 135, 202 
 
 Kohlbrugge, 229 
 
 Kohlmann, 229 
 
 Koller, 209 
 
 Kolliker, von, 128, 134, 200 
 
 Korschinsky, 103, 128, 130, 131 
 
 Kowalevsky, 203 
 
 Kreil, 209 
 
 Laboratory's justification, 18 
 La Bruyere, 208 
 Lacaze-Duthiers, 203 
 Lamarck, 49, 113, 119, 122, 201, 
 
 206, 207, 213 
 Lament, 209 
 Lapparent, 212 
 Larger unity, 169 
 Latreille, 213 
 Law, 79, 95, 185 
 Laws of energy, 184 
 Laws, moral and physical, 228 
 Laws of nature, concept destroyed, 
 
 169 
 
 Learning, 58 
 Leeuwenhoek, 201 
 Legal type of mind, 25 
 Leibnitz, 206, 208 
 Leidy, 203 
 Lesser, 203 
 Leuckart, 203 
 Leunis, 213 
 Leverrier, 209, 216 
 Leydig, 203 
 Libraries, 16 
 Liebemann, 205 
 Liebig, 205, 211, 217 
 
 Life, cannot be explained physi- 
 cally, 164 
 
 Life from another planet, 176 
 
 Life, origin of, 164 
 
 Life, philosophy of, 194 
 
 Life, plant, 21 
 
 Life-principle not omnipotent, 164 
 
 Life, science of, 21 
 
 Living machine, 154 
 
 Living matter, 151 
 
 Living things, study of, physical 
 and psychic, 158 
 
 Linnaeus, 200, 206, 207 
 
 Lister, 200 
 
 Locy, Professor Win., 197, 206 
 
 Lodge, Sir Oliver, 185 
 
 Loeb, 203, 218 
 
 Logic vs. truth, 106 
 
 Logical summary, 191 
 
 Lessen, 212, 213 
 
 Lotze, 206 
 
 Louis XIII., 97 
 
 Louvain, 76 
 
 Ludwig, 201, 218 
 
 Lycurgus, 79 
 
 Lyell, 201 
 
 Lyonet, 203 
 
 MacCulloch, 212 
 
 Mackenzie, Colin, 210 
 
 Magendie, F., 205 
 
 Malpighi, 201, 206, 207 
 
 Man has not changed his racial 
 characteristics, 229 
 
 Man as contradistinguished from 
 animals, 65 
 
 Man, synoptic, 20 
 
 Many passing judgment more cor- 
 rect than a single person pass- 
 ing it, 43 
 
 Marsh, O. C., 202 
 
 Mathew, Professor, 189 
 
 Martineaux, 28 
 
252 
 
 Index 
 
 Martins, von, 213 
 
 Mathematicians, table of, 217 
 
 Matter, constitution of, 90 
 
 Maupertius, 205 
 
 Maury, 211 
 
 Maxwell, 209, 210, 217 
 
 Mayer, 207, 217 
 
 Meanings, 63 
 
 Mechanism abolished by order in 
 nature, 169 
 
 Mecket, 203 
 
 Men and women, mental differ- 
 ences, 43 
 
 Mendel, 52, 89, 107, 134, 200, 218 
 
 Mendelism, 200 
 
 Mendel's experiment on peas, 53 
 
 Mendelian theory, 52 
 
 Metaphysics, usual type accepted 
 by scientists, 183 
 
 Mental effort, sustained, 31 
 
 Mental phenomena, science of, 35 
 
 Microscope, invention of, 32 
 
 Middle ages, 75 
 
 Mill, John Stuart, 20 
 
 Miller, 212 
 
 Milne-Edwards, 202 
 
 Mind, 35, 37, 40, 64 
 
 Mind, types of, 25 
 
 Mivart, St. George, 84, 202 
 
 Modern psychology, 36 
 
 Mohl, von, 201 
 
 Molecular theory, 90 
 
 Moleschott, 200 
 
 Monism of order, 170 
 
 Monist, 80 
 
 Montgomery, Edward, 205 
 
 Moore, Professor B., 172 
 
 Moral order, 79, 196 
 
 Moral order and law, 95, 228 
 
 Moral progress, none since man's 
 
 history began, 229 
 Mormons, 76 
 Moses, 79 
 
 Miiller, Fritz, 203 
 
 Miiller, Johannes, 202, 205, 206, 
 
 207, 212 
 
 Murchison, Sir Frederick, 217 
 Mutation theory, 134 
 Mutations may be Mendelian re- 
 
 cessives, 141 
 
 Nageli, 102, 110, 117, 128, 130, 
 150, 203 
 
 Natural science realm, 196 
 
 Natural scientists, table of, 210 
 
 Natural selection, Huxley not con- 
 vinced of, 113 
 
 Nature, definition of, 158 
 
 Nature conceived as one order, 
 169 
 
 Necessary being, 188 
 
 Needham, 203, 205 
 
 Neo-vitalists, 110, 143 
 
 Nerves, 38 
 
 Neurology, 40 
 
 Newport, 203 
 
 Newton, 208 
 
 Noll, Fritz, 205 
 
 Non-living matter, 151 
 
 Observer, 30, 103 
 
 Oersted, 209 
 
 Ohm, 209 
 
 Oken, 200, 205 
 
 Olbers, 209 
 
 Optics, table of workers in, 210 
 
 Organic selection, 126 
 
 Oriani, 209 
 
 Origin and development of the in- 
 dividual, 52 
 
 Origins of life, possible, 104, 164 
 
 Origin of species, 51, 99, 104 
 
 Originality not admired, 43 
 
 Orthogenesis, 114, 117, 128, 133, 
 150 
 
 Orthogenetic theory, 111 
 
Index 
 
 253 
 
 Osborn, 203 
 Ostwald, 206 
 Ovary, 168 
 Owen, 200 
 
 Paleontologists, table of, 211 
 
 Pander, 203 
 
 Panmixia, 123 
 
 Pantheism, 184, 185 
 
 Parallelists, 37 
 
 Pascal, 208 
 
 Past as past not sufficient author- 
 ity, 196 
 
 Pasteur, 200, 206, 207, 212 
 
 Pathology, 22 
 
 Pauly, 178, 205 
 
 Pearson, Karl, 203 
 
 Perfection, how obtained, 193 
 
 Perfection never experienced, 193 
 
 Perry, 209, 216 
 
 Pfaff, 212 
 
 Pfeffer, 134 
 
 Pfliiger, 205 
 
 Philosophy and common sense, 188 
 
 Philosophy, definition of, 34 
 
 Philosophy differs from science, 20 
 
 Philosophy, through it all great 
 scientists have become great, 88 
 
 Philosophy, problems of, 34 
 
 Philosophical summary, 191 
 
 Physicists, table of, 207 
 
 Physiological psychology, 70, 81 
 
 Physiological theories, 127 
 
 Physiologists, table of, 212 
 
 Physiology, 21 
 
 Piazza, 208 
 
 Picture show, 62 
 
 Pinel, Dr., 36 
 
 Planaria, 166, 180 
 
 Plant life, 21 
 
 Plate, Professor, 80, 130, 134 
 
 Plateau, 210 
 
 Plausibility not proof, 103 
 
 Popular science, 90 
 
 Pppularity vs. right, 96 
 
 Pouchet, 203 
 
 Poulton, Professor E. B., 113 
 
 Practical scientists, 116 
 
 Pragmatism, 78 
 
 Property of self -adaptation, 172 
 
 Prominence not to be confused 
 
 with importance, 60 
 Protestant scientists, 217 
 Psychical research, 103 
 Psychology, 22, 35 
 Psychology as the connecting link 
 
 between thinker and observer, 45 
 Psychology, abnormal, 37, 44 
 Psychology, animal, 41 
 Psychology, applied, 42 
 Psychology, genetic, 41 
 Psychology of history, 42 
 Psychology, philosophical, 35, 70 
 Psychology, physiological, 36, 70, 
 
 81 
 
 Psychology, racial, 42 
 Psychology, rational, 35, 70 
 Psychology of religion, 42 
 Psychology, sex, 43 
 Psychology, social, 42 
 Psychological viewpoint of life, 
 
 164 
 
 Psychoid, 144 
 
 Psycho-physical reaction, 64 
 Psychopathic hospitals, 44 
 Puiseux, 208, 217 
 Purkinje, 203 
 Purposiveness, 153 
 
 Quatrefages, 202, 217 
 Quenstedt, 212 
 
 Racine, 208 
 
 Ramon y Cajal, 39, 203 
 
 Rathke, 204 
 
 Ray, John, 200 
 
254 
 
 Index 
 
 Reaumur, 204 
 
 Redi, 204 
 
 Reading must be done on both 
 sides if one is to obtain an ac- 
 curate basis for comparison, 101 
 
 Real authority, 196 
 
 Reason the machine has become a 
 machine, 154 
 
 Reasons why men have gone from 
 philosophy to the laboratory, 33 
 
 Recessives, 53 
 
 Regeneration, 166 
 
 Regeneration of hydra, 178 
 
 Regnault, 210 
 
 Reinke, 176 
 
 Reil, J. Ch., 205 
 
 Reinke, Eugen, 205 
 
 Relationship of whole to its parts, 
 187 
 
 Relaxing suspension of change, 163 
 
 Religion and the laboratory, 198 
 
 Remak, 204 
 
 Renard, 216 
 
 Repairing, 178 
 
 Reslhuber, 209 
 
 Restitution, 166 
 
 Revealed religion, 195 
 
 Richelieu, 97 
 
 Rickaby, 184 
 
 Right and wrong, 79, 185 
 
 Right and wrong, support of, 28 
 
 Ritter, 211 
 
 Roesel, 204 
 
 Romanes, 131, 202 
 
 Roux, 125, 205 
 
 Rudimentary organs, 241 
 
 Saint Hilaire, Geoffrey, 113, 119, 
 
 204, 213 
 
 Salamander, 179 
 Saltation, 134 
 Schaudinn, 204 
 Schelling, 205 
 
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 205 
 
 Schneider, 205 
 
 Scholasticism, 184 
 
 Scholastics, 76 
 
 Scholastic philosophy, 78 
 
 Schonbrin, 211 
 
 Schoolmen of the 13th century an- 
 cestors of physicists, 184 
 
 Schrank, von, 213 
 
 Schultze, Franz, 204 
 
 Schultze, Max, 202, 206 
 
 Schwann, 202, 206, 207, 212 
 
 Schwickerath, 207 
 
 Science, applied, 88 
 
 Science, authority in, 196 
 
 Science of consciousness, 64 
 
 Science, definition of, 19 
 
 Science of mental phenomena, 64 
 
 Science depends on metaphysics, 79 
 
 Science finds its basis in epistemol- 
 ogy, 84 
 
 Science answers to "how" but 
 never to "why," 164 
 
 Science, pure, 193 
 
 Science of the soul, 64 
 
 Science, starting point of, 77 
 
 Science, what it has done, 90 
 
 Scientist, practical, 116 
 
 Scientist, true, 89 
 
 Scott, 134 
 
 Sea urchin, 166, 172 
 
 Searle, 216 
 
 Secchi, 209, 216 
 
 Sedgwick, 212, 217 
 
 Selection, geographical, 127 
 
 Selection, germinal, 123 
 
 Selection, natural, 105, 113 
 
 Selection, natural, substitute theo- 
 ries for, 128 
 
 Selection, organic, 126 
 
 Selection, sexual, 127 
 
 Self-evident truths, 77 
 
 Servetus, 200 
 
Index 
 
 255 
 
 Severinus, 204 
 
 Smith, Joseph, 76 
 
 Smith, Wm., 201 
 
 Smith, Dr. Stephen, 39, 44 
 
 Siebold, von, 202 
 
 Siemens, 209 
 
 Social psychology literature largely 
 
 worthless, 227 
 Sociology, 22 
 
 Soul, 32, 35, 64, 149, 150, 225 
 Spallanzani, 179, 206 
 Species, definition of, 111, 140 
 Species, de Vries' definition of, 
 
 139 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, 106, 200, 218, 229 
 Spirit, 32 
 
 Spontaneous generation, 176 
 Sports in nature, 65, 135 
 Stahl, George Ernest, 204 
 Stanley, Dean, 229 
 Starting points in evolution, 102 
 Static evolution, 157 
 Steno, 202 
 
 Stokes, Gabriel, 217 
 Strauss-Diirckheim, 204 
 Structure determines function, 57 
 Struggle for existence no influence 
 
 on species-forming, 135 
 Studer, 212 
 Suarez, 146, 201 
 Substance, 160 
 Superstition, 73 
 Survival of the fittest, 120 
 Survival values, 122 
 Suspending possible change, 163 
 Swammerdam, 202 
 Swift, Professor, 218 
 
 Tait, 210, 217 
 Taxonomy, 22 
 Teleology, 114, 117, 153 
 Teleology, two kinds of, 155 
 Theology, 196 
 
 Theory of constancy, 145 
 
 Thinkers, 30, 31, 103 
 
 Thomas, of Aquinas, 146, 229 
 
 Thompson, Benjamin, 207 
 
 Thompson, (Lord Kelvin), 207,217 
 
 Thought-world, 151, 187 
 
 Tiedemann, F., 205 
 
 Transmutation vs. heterogenesis, 
 136 
 
 Trembley, 179 
 
 Treviranus, G. R., 205 
 
 True vs. logical, 106 
 
 Truth, 158, 187 
 
 Truth does not depend on majori- 
 ties, 134 
 
 Tyndall, 89, 200 
 
 Types of mind, 25 
 
 Ultra-development, 129 
 Understanding of nature, 169 
 Unimaginable vs. unthinkable, 194 
 Universe, death of, 184 
 Universe as a logical whole, 169 
 Universe as God, 184 
 Unpopular review, 103 
 Use and disuse, 119, 122 
 Usefulness, 16 
 
 Van Beneden, 213 
 Variations, 111 
 Varieties, 112 
 Vestigial organs, 241 
 Vesalius, 204, 206 
 Vicaire, 208 
 Vicq d'Azyr, 204 
 Vierordt, 212 
 Vinci, Leonardo, 204 
 Violin playing, 59 
 Virchow, 175, 200, 207, 215 
 Vital force as a verbal explana- 
 tion, 183 
 Vital principle, 144 
 
256 
 
 Index 
 
 Vital principle, different names 
 
 for, 172 
 
 Vital processes, autonomy of, 157 
 Vitalism, 150 
 
 Vitalism, best argument for, 168 
 Vitalism, Driesch's definition, 163 
 Vitalists, definition of, 153 
 Vitalists, 143, 204 
 Vogt, 199 
 Volkmann, 212 
 Volta, 209 
 
 von Baer, 201, 205, 206, 207, 213 
 von Bunge, G., 171, 206 
 von Hartmann, Eduard, 205 
 von Humboldt, Alexander, 205 
 von Martius, 213 
 von Schrank, 213 
 von Siebold, 202 
 Vries, de, Hugo, 65, 128, 131, 134, 
 
 204 
 
 Waagen, 212, 213 
 
 Wagner, R., 205 
 
 Wagner (physiologist), 212 
 
 Wallace, 89, 200, 229 
 
 Walsh, Dr. James, 209, 229 
 
 Ward, Dr., 164 
 
 Wasmann, Erich, 108, 145, 147, 
 
 148, 204 
 Water, chemical composition not 
 
 yet known, 189 
 
 Watson, Professor John, 38, 65 
 Weierstrass, 208 
 
 Weismann, 122, 123, 167, 202, 218 
 
 Weismann on adaptation, 177 
 
 Weismann's logical necessity, 176 
 
 What of it? 33 
 
 Wheeler, 142, 148, 204 
 
 Whewell, Dr., 217 
 
 Whitman, 133 
 
 Whitney, 202 
 
 Wigand, Albert, 205 
 
 Williams (biologist), 172 
 
 Williams, Henry Smith, 36 
 
 Willoughby, 204 
 
 Wilson, Professor, 171, 173, 174 
 
 Windle, Sir Bertram, 150, 204 
 
 Wolf, Gustav, 205 
 
 Wolff, G., 144 
 
 Wolff, Caspar Friederich, 202, 205, 
 206 
 
 Wolffs experiment on the water- 
 newt, 180 
 
 Words mean different things to 
 different people, 227 
 
 Worms, flat, 166, 180 
 
 Wundt, Professor Wm., 114, 148, 
 215 
 
 Wurtz, 211 
 
 Wyman, Jeffries, 204 
 
 Zahm, J. A., 216 
 Zittel, 202, 206 
 Zoology, 21 
 Zweckmassigkeit, 144 
 
BACKGROUNDS FOR SOCIAL WORKERS 
 
 BY EDWARD J. MENGE, M.A., PH.D., M.Sc. 
 
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