THE 
 
 DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA. 
 
COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. 
 
 Frontispiece to " The Decisive Battles of Indi 
 
THE 
 
 DECISIVE BATTLES OF 
 INDIA 
 
 FROM 1746 TO 1849 INCLUSIVE: 
 
 HY 
 
 COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. 
 
 AUTHOR OF " THE BATTLE-FIELDS OF GERMANY." " HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN"," " FINAL FRENCH 
 
 STRUGGLES IN INDIA AND ON THE INDIAN SEAS." " HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA," 
 
 " AMBUSHES AND SURPRISES FROM HANNIBAL TO THE INDIAN MUTINY. " ETC. 
 
 jUrta ©Dttion. 
 
 WITH A PORTRAIT OF THE AUTHOR, A MAP, AND 
 FOUR PLANS. 
 
 " Nullum numen abest si sit prurientia ; nos te, 
 Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam "— Juvi nai.. 
 
 LONDON: 
 REEVES & TURNER, 83 CHARING CROSS ROAD, W.C. 
 
 MCMXIV 
 
 [All Bight* Reserved.] [Fourth Edition.} 
 
1914. A Re -issue with corrected Index. 
 
 
 Pointed hy The yew Temple Press, 1? Urant Road, Croydon. 
 

 TO 
 
 St. Jtog's College, »nton, 
 
 IN WHOSE CLASSIC HALLS 
 
 I NURTURED THAT LOVE OF LITERATURE 
 
 WHICH HAS BEEN THE JOY AND CONSOLATION OF MY LIFE, 
 
 AND ON THE HILLS IN WHOSE VICINITY 
 
 I LEARNED TO FIGHT MY "DECISIVE BATTLES," 
 
 THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED 
 
 WITH REVERENCE AND AFFECTION. 
 
 779 
 
 lb 
 
PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION.* 
 
 SINCE this work was first published in 1883 two large editions 
 of it have been exhausted, and the demand for it still con- 
 tinues. Under these circumstances the publishers have asked 
 me to prepare for the press an edition which, from the smaller 
 size and lesser price of the volume, should bring it within 
 reach of those who may hitherto have been deterred from read- 
 ing it. I have responded to this wish with the greater pleasure 
 in that a critical re-perusal of the work, and a careful re-com- 
 parison of its contents with the authorities upon which it is 
 based, have convinced me that in no other history is the story 
 of how we won India told with more attention to the real 
 causes of our action, and with a greater resolve to tell the 
 whole truth without respect of persons. That in this latter 
 object I have succeeded is, I venture to think, proved by the 
 fact, that although the twelfth and thirteenth chapters of the 
 book refer to events which happened within the memory of 
 living men, some of whom acted therein a very considerable 
 part, not a single line of those chapters, during the five years 
 they have been under the eyes of the public, has been impugned 
 or even questioned. The reason is that the narrative rests upon 
 the sure foundation of facts; is supported by evidence which 
 is irrefutable; and is therefore absolutely proof against attack. 
 This remark applies not only to the chapters I have mentioned, 
 
 * This in reference to the third edition. 
 
Vlll 
 
 Preface to I he New Edition. 
 
 but to every chapter in the book. Never have I taken more 
 pains to be certain that the pages of a work bearing my name 
 contain no statement which cannot be verified. 
 
 With reference to the remarks made on the Russian advance 
 to India in the preface to my second edition, I may be per- 
 mitted to state, that since those remarks were penned (June 
 i S 8 5 , the Government of India, wisely directed by Lord 
 Dufferin, has taken steps to render our road to Kandahar easy, 
 and the frontier on that side impregnable. 
 
 (i. B. Malleson. 
 %th May, 1888. 
 
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 WHEN the first edition of this work appeared, two years ago, 
 the dark cloud new threatening our Indian Empire was but a 
 little speck on the horizon, no bigger than a man's hand. The 
 book simply — to use the expression of the critics — told the 
 story of how we had won India. We are now entering upon 
 a period when we shall be called upon to defend the Empire 
 we so greatly gained. Upon this point let there be no mistake 
 in the public mind. Let us at least be honest to our own con- 
 sciences. A great Power does not go to enormous expenditure 
 to conquer merely sandy deserts. Every previous conqueror 
 of the deserts which Russia has subdued has aimed at the 
 subjugation of the fertile lands beyond them. The rulers of 
 Russia are not less intelligent than were Alexander, Mahmoud 
 of Ghazni, Chengiz Khan, Taimiir, Eabar, Nadir Shah, and 
 Ahmad Shah Durani. Since the days of the first Peter they 
 have pursued a steady and persistent course towards a definite 
 end. Russia is now at the very gates of Herat. No one can 
 peruse the admirable paper by Captain Holdich, R.E., which, 
 written on the spot, was read at the Royal Geographical Society 
 on the 23rd March last, without being convinced that the pre- 
 sent vacillating rulers of India have avowed her to take pos- 
 session of the several points which command the passes leading 
 to that city. The acquisition of such positions is the natural 
 
x Preface to the Second Edition. 
 
 step to the possession of Herat itself. Nor should any man 
 delude himself with the belief that the possession of the valley 
 of the Herirud will satisfy the ambition of Russia. Why 
 should it? It did not satisfy the greed of the conquerors in 
 whose footsteps she is treading. When those conquerors had 
 seized the outer gate of India, they naturally passed through 
 it. Much more readily will Russia do so, when she notices 
 that we have neglected to secure the inner gate — the gate of 
 Kandahar — which, if strongly barred and defended by men 
 the equal of those whose exploits are described in this volume, 
 would yet check her advance ! 
 
 It is, then, at a time when we may at any moment be called 
 upon to defend the great Dependency of Hindustan, that I 
 offer to the public the second edition of a work which has 
 endeavoured faithfully to describe the mode in which that 
 Dependency was acquired. The thoughtful reader will not 
 fail to discern an enormous difference between our method 
 and the method of Russia. In the tenth chapter of another 
 work, now about to appear, "AMBUSHES AND SURPRISES," I 
 have indicated Russia's principle. I have shown how she 
 watches, intriguing with its principal inhabitants, on the border 
 of a doomed country till she feels herself strong enough to 
 step across it. No sooner does she achieve complete success 
 than she intimidates the aboriginal inhabitants by wholesale 
 slaughter. Thus did she act towards the Tartars of the 
 Crimea ; towards the Circassians of the Caucasus ; towards the 
 Nomads of the Kizil Kiini and the Kara Kum ; thus, within the 
 last five years, towards the Akhal Turkomans. Not in this 
 way did the British behave towards the races of India. In 
 all their onward progresses they had the assent and support 
 of the populations "who desired to maintain law and order. 
 The decadence of the Mughul rule was proceeding rapidly 
 when Clive first landed in Bengal. Then the buffalo was to 
 the man who held the bludgeon. These pages show how, under 
 English rule, the buffalo is the property of the man, woman, 
 
Preface to the Second Edition. xi 
 
 or child who has the legal right to possess it. We have shed 
 no blood except on the battle-field, and the blood we have shed 
 there has been the blood of the oppressors of the people. 
 
 1 am anxious to take this opportunity of expressing my ac- 
 knowledgments of the very kind manner in which this work 
 has been received by the Press, and by the Public. The verdict 
 of the former has been unanimous in its favour. Two days 
 after it was ushered into the world the Times honoured it 
 with a leading article. The reviews of the journals more par- 
 ticularly devoted to literature were equally encouraging. I 
 have taken advantage of some of these to correct one or two 
 errors which had escaped me in the first reading. I have pro- 
 fited, likewise, by a well-founded suggestion made by the 
 Athoucum, to add a chapter containing an account of the two 
 sieges of Bharatpur. This chapter is based mainly upon 
 Thorn's "War in India," and the "Memoirs of Viscount 
 Combermere." 
 
 One word more. Heretofore the invader from the north, 
 who, holding Herat, has endeavoured to penetrate into India, 
 has invariably succeeded. He had to contend either against a 
 feebler race or degenerated descendants from his own parent 
 stock. That is no longer the case. India is held by men who 
 have in no way degenerated from their forefathers. Some oi 
 the Englishmen now in India helped to fight the four last 
 battles recorded in this book. The men who won India, and 
 their comrades not one whit inferior to them, can, if not 
 thwarted by timidity at home, successfully defend India. 
 This is a conviction which, I am confident, will not fail tc 
 force itself upon the minds of every one who shall read and 
 ponder over the great record contained in this volume ! 
 
 G. B. MALLESON. 
 
 2; West Cromwell Road, 
 1st June, 1885. 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 
 
 THIS volume contains the story of the conquest of the several 
 races of India by our countrymen. To this purpose are de- 
 voted eleven out of the twelve chapters of which it is composed. 
 The remaining chapter, the first in order in the book, is the 
 key to all others; for it records an event, but for the occur- 
 rence of which the battles which follow might have been in- 
 definitely postponed. It was the victory of Paradis on the 
 Adyar, over the army of the native ruler of the Karnatak, 
 which inverted the position of the Europeans on the eastern 
 coast, and of the children of the soil. 
 
 The battles which illustrate the story were all, in the truest 
 sense of the term, decisive battles. It cannot be denied that 
 some of them showed a small list of casualties, and, in many, 
 the numbers on one side at all events were few. If I may 
 judge from some criticisms which have appeared, this fact 
 alone would be held to be sufficient to remove those battles 
 from the category I claim for them. There are some critics 
 who judge of the importance of a battle solely by the amount 
 of slaughter produced on both sides. There is no need for 
 me, I am certain, to point out to the intelligent reader that the 
 criterion thus set forth is altogether a false one. The status 
 of a battle can be decided only by its results. If those results 
 prove decisive — decisive, that is, of the campaign, decisive as 
 
Preface, xiii 
 
 to the consequences, decisive as to the future permanent posi- 
 tion of the combatants — then, though the casualties be ever 
 so few, that battle is a decisive battle. Take, for example, 
 the first battle described m this book, that between the French 
 and the Karnatak troops at St. THOME. The French num- 
 bered 230 Europeans, and 700 sipahis. Their loss did not 
 exceed 20 men. Yet that battle changed the face of southern 
 India. It made the European traders the masters, whose aid 
 was eagerly sought for by the native princes who had previ- 
 ously despised them. 
 
 That battle brought the French and English face to face 
 in the Karnatak. The contest took, almost at the outset, the 
 form of a duel between two men, both men of consummate 
 genius— Give and Dupleix. The ability of Give to carry 
 out himself the conceptions of his teeming brain — an ability 
 denied to his rival — gave him an advantage which turned the 
 contest in his favour. That contest cannot be said to have 
 been decided by the splendid defence of Arkat, for, a few 
 weeks later, the French had re-occupied the province of which 
 Arkat was the capital. But it was decided at KAVERIPAK, a 
 battle passed over with singular neglect, relative to its im- 
 portance, by such historians as Mill and Thornton, by a bio- 
 grapher such as Malcolm, and even by Macaulay. Yet it is 
 not to be questioned but that the victory of Kaveripak, 
 promptly followed up, caused the surrender of the French army 
 before Trichinapalli, and gave the British a preponderance 
 which they never after entirely lost. 
 
 That battle, won by the daring, the coolness, the resolution 
 of Give, against numbers greatly superior, settled for the time 
 the pretensions of the French in southern India. In Bengal, 
 the intervention of the conqueror was called for a few years 
 later, to avenge the cruelties inflicted by the native ruler upon 
 his countrymen. Those cruelties were avenged at PLASSEY, 
 one of the most decisive battles ever fought. Plassey gave 
 the English a position in Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa, akin to that 
 
 1 c 
 
xiv Preface. 
 
 of overlord. The native ruler whom they appointed paid them 
 homage, and agreed to undertake no foreign enterprise without 
 their approval. 
 
 But other European nations had planted settlements in 
 Bengal, and, after the capture of Chandranagar, the chief of 
 these was the Dutch. That people, jealous of the advantages 
 which Plassey had gained for the English, made a great effort 
 tc surprise and trip them up. But Clive, cool and ready, was 
 too much for them, and the decisive battle of BlDERRA quenched 
 for ever their aspirations. 
 
 Then came another, a very desperate and final struggle for 
 the possession of the three provinces. The native troops, led 
 fact that Durand's article was unsigned, and that it criticised 
 by men with their hearts in the national cause, fought better 
 than they had ever fought before. But again were the Eng- 
 lish, commanded by a warrior of the first class — the careful 
 and daring John Adams — too much for them. The battles 
 of Katwa and Gheriah, and finally the decisive battle of 
 U'NDWAH NALA, attested the superior discipline of the British 
 soldier, the more skilful leading of his general. 
 
 U'ndwah Nala decided for ever the fate of the three pro- 
 vinces, and brought the English frontier to the Karmnasa. 
 There it touched the territories of the vassals and tributaries 
 of the Nuwab-Vazir of Awadh Oudh). The contact pro- 
 duced war — a war unsought by the British, who desired nothing 
 so much as to consolidate the territories they had but just 
 acquired — but a war caused solely by the desire of the Nuwab- 
 Vazir to aggrandize himself at their expense. After some 
 fluctuations of fortune, the result of the hesitations of Carnac, 
 that war was terminated by the brilliant victory gained by 
 Munro at BAKSAR. Baksar advanced the English frontier to 
 Allahabad, and even to detached positions beyond it. 
 
 The scene had shifted, even before this, to southern India. 
 The French there had made a desperate effort to recover their 
 fallen fortunes. Not only did the attempt fail, but, by a 
 
Preface. xv 
 
 stroke of genius, Clive, through his lieutenants, wrested from 
 them, by the victory of KONDUR and the storming of MACHHLi- 
 P AT AN AM, a province the importance of the possession of which 
 could not be too highly estimated ; for the manner in which 
 that province was gained, more, even, than the actual gain, 
 secured for the English an influence at Haidarabad which has 
 ever since gone on increasing. 
 
 But the British hold on southern India was not yet secure. 
 In the decay of the Mughul empire, an adventurer of low 
 birth, but of commanding talents, had usurped authority in 
 the Hindu kingdom which had existed on the highland plateau 
 overlooking the Karnatak towards the east and the sea-coast 
 towards the west. Having by degrees absorbed all the petty 
 native states within his reach, and having measured his strength 
 — not, on the whole, unequally — with the English, that ad- 
 venturer determined at length to make a supreme effort to 
 become the arbiter of India south of the Krishna. The war 
 that ensued became, then, a war of life and death for the 
 foreigners who had by degrees constituted themselves the pro- 
 tectors of the Karnatak. Never were the English in such 
 danger. But for the obstinacy of one solitary Frenchman — 
 the Chevalier D'Orves — they must have succumbed. Saved for 
 the moment by that obstinacy, they were still forced to risk 
 the fate of their dominion on the issue of a single battle. It 
 was the hard-fought victory of PORTO NOVO which, giving the 
 first check to the conquering career of Haidar Ali, secured 
 for the English time to accumulate their resources, and eventu- 
 ally to baffle his aims. Those aims once baffled, the invader 
 once forced to retire within the limits of his dominions, his 
 entire subjugation became the object which no Governor of 
 Madras could omit from his political calculations. When, at 
 last, the opportunity did offer, this object was achieved without 
 much difficulty. 
 
 The overthrow of the Muhammadan dynasty in Maisiir, 
 made possible by Porto Novo, brought the English face to 
 
xvi Preface. 
 
 face with the Marathas. The aggressive action of those hardy 
 warriors had, even in the time of Aurangzib, shaken the Mug- 
 hul empire to its very basis. After the death of that sovereign 
 they, too, began to dream of universal dominion. Everything 
 seemed to favour them. They gradually absorbed the larger 
 part of western and central India, and made rapid strides 
 towards the Jamna. Suddenly they met with an unexpected 
 opponent in the shape of Ahmad Shah Durani, the leader of 
 the Afghan invaders. The hotly-contested battle fcught at 
 Panipat (1763), gave the Marathas their first decisive check. 
 Gradually, however, they recovered from that terrible over- 
 throw, and, under the leadership of a very remarkable man 
 who had fled from the field, not only reconquered all they 
 had lost, but gained infinitely more. Masters of the imperial 
 cities of Dihli and Agra, of the north-western provinces as far 
 as Aligarh, they at length beheld before them only two possi- 
 ble rivals — one of them indeed, the Sikhs, almost too young 
 to be seriously regarded as a rival — and the English, ruling 
 from the mouths of the Ganges to Kanhprir, and possessors of 
 Bombay and Madras. The inevitable contest with the more 
 powerful of the two rivals, preceded by circumstances which 
 not only deprived the Marathas of their great leader, but 
 which paralyzed one, and forced to temporary inaction another, 
 of their four great confederacies, came at last. It was a fight 
 for supremacy throughout India. For southern and western 
 India the question was decided at ASSAYE; for northern India 
 at LASWARi. Though further lessons became necessary, no 
 serious question of rivalry for empire between the British and 
 the Marathas was possible after Laswari. 
 
 The victorious issue of the Maratha campaign extended the 
 English frontier virtually to the Satlaj. For forty years the 
 great sovereign who ruled beyond that river recognized, often 
 sorely against his will, the policy of keeping on terms with 
 his powerful neighbours. His death, and the anarchy which 
 ensued in his kingdom, broke the spell. It is hard to say how 
 
Preface. xvii 
 
 Ranjit Singh, had he been then alive, and in the prime of life, 
 would have acted during the Kabul disasters of 1840-41. In 
 a military point of view, lie would have been master of the 
 situation. Fortunately for the English, the Sikh chieftains 
 were, at the critical time, occupied with intrigues for power; 
 they had no guiding mind to direct them, and the occasion 
 was allowed to pass. But, from the day of Ran jit's death, 
 the contest between the two nations had become inevitable. 
 For four years before the invasion occurred, warnings of its 
 certain proximity had been incessant. The English had made 
 such preparations to meet it as were possible without exciting 
 the jealousy of a high-spirited people. When at length, in- 
 spired by chiefs who only desired to ensure their own safety 
 by the destruction of the Praetorians who threatened them, the 
 Sikh army crossed the Satlaj, and the English hurried up their 
 troops to meet them, the greatness of the danger was recog- 
 nized. Two things alone, at this conjuncture, preserved India 
 to the English. The first was the unaccountable halt of 
 the invaders for several days on the south bank of the Satlaj ; 
 the second, the detachment of a few troops only instead of a 
 whole army to Miidki. There was even then time to repair 
 mistakes. Rut the splendid valour which had all but won 
 FiRUZSHAHAR on the first afternoon of the fight, was neutral- 
 ized by the treachery of the Sikh leaders. The battle which 
 might have been a victory became a defeat ; a defeat which 
 virtually decided the campaign, for SOBRAOX was but the com- 
 plement of Firiizshahar. 
 
 The peace which followed was but a patched-up peace. The 
 Sikh nobles had been gained over, but the Sikh people had 
 not been subdued, and they knew it. Resolutely they bided 
 their time, seized the first opportunity to rise, and fought their 
 old enemy once more; this time not for empire, but for inde- 
 pendence. How the contest, undecided by CHILIANWALA, was 
 brought to a final issue at GujRAT I have told at considerable > 
 but I hope not unnecessary, length, in the last chapter. 
 
xviii • Preface. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that this book has for its aim to describe 
 the steps by which the English, after subduing their Euro- 
 pean rivals, conquered, one after another, the several races 
 which inhabit India; how Bengal, the provinces north of the 
 Karmnasa, the Maisur, the Maratha confederacies, the Panjab, 
 received the blow which paralyzed them. Sometimes the para- 
 lyzed territories were swallowed up at once; sometimes they 
 were left paralyzed to be swallowed on the first fitting oppor- 
 tunity. But there they were, harmless, impotent as far as 
 rivalry was concerned; capable of making, indeed, a blow for 
 defence, but never again striking for victory. Such was the 
 state of the Bengal of Mir J'afar after Plassey; of the Bengal 
 of Mir Kasim after U'ndwah Nala; of southern India north 
 of the Krishna after Machhlipatanam ; of the same region 
 south of that river after the peace which followed Porto Novo; 
 of the Maratha confederacies after Assaye and Laswari; and, 
 I may say, notwithstanding Chilianwala, of the Sikhs after 
 Firuzshahar. 
 
 One word more regarding the method of the book. The 
 reader will perceive that whilst each chapter describes the par- 
 ticular battle which gives it its name, it is linked informally, 
 yet very really, to the chapter which precedes it. Further, 
 that wherever it has seemed necessary — in the chapters, for in- 
 stance, describing the battles of Plassey, of Baksar, of Porto 
 Novo, to a certain extent of Assaye, and of Firuzshahar and 
 Sobraon — I have given a sketch either of the previous history 
 of the people, or of the family which gave political existence 
 to the country they inhabited. This is especially the case with 
 the chapters referring to Haidar Ali and the Sikhs. 
 
 In writing this book I have gone as far as possible to ori- 
 ginal documents, or to the writings, published and unpublished, 
 of contemporaries. Thus, for the first chapter, that on St. 
 Thome, and for the third, that on Kondur and Machhh'pata- 
 nam, I have relied on the memoirs of Dupleix and Moracin, 
 with the correspondence attached to each {pieces justified tives^, 
 
Preface. xix 
 
 on Orme, on Colonel Stringer Lawrence's Memoirs; for the 
 second chapter, relating to IMassov and the early history of 
 Bengal, and for the fifth, Biderra, I have consulted Stewart's 
 ' History of Bengal," Orme's " Military Transactions," the 
 " Siyar-ul-Muta'akherin," Caraccioli's "Life of Clive," Ive's 
 "Voyage and Historical Narrative," Grose's "Voyage to the 
 East Indies," Holwell's "Indian Tracts," and Broome's "His- 
 tory of the Bengal Army"; for the sixth, U'ndwah Nala, and 
 for the seventh, Baksar, the "Siyar-ul-Muta'akherin," Vansit- 
 tart's "Narrative of Transactions in Bengal," the "Asiatic 
 Annual Register," Williams's "Bengal Native Infantry," 
 Francklm's "Life of Shah Aulum," Verelst's "English Govern- 
 ment in Bengal," Wheeler's "Early Records of British India," 
 and Broome's "History of the Bengal Army"; for the eighth 
 chapter, Porto Novo, 1 have relied mainly on Wilks's "History 
 of Southern India," on " Transactions in India," on " Memoire 
 cle la derniere guerre," on Grant Duff's " History of the 
 Marathas," and on information acquired during a residence of 
 seven years in the Maisiir country ; for the ninth and tenth, 
 Assaye and Laswari, I have depended on the despatches of 
 the two Wellesleys, on Grant Duff's History, on Thorn's "War 
 in India," on the "Annual Register," and on the "Asiatic An- 
 nual Register. - ' I am indebted likewise to the writer, whose 
 name I have been unable to ascertain, of an article in the Cal- 
 cutta Review, on the Duke of Wellington's career in India, 
 for many useful indications. 
 
 The eleventh chapter demands a more special notice. The 
 portion relating to the rise of the Sikh nation is based upon 
 Cunningham's "History of the Sikhs"; the account of the 
 battles on Cunningham's History, on an article in the Calcutta 
 Review (vol. vi.), by the late Sir Herbert Edwardes, on private 
 letters, and on minute personal investigation. I dismiss the 
 despatches of the day as utterly unreliable, abounding in ex- 
 aggerations of all sorts; worthy, in that respect, to be classed 
 with the bulletins of Napoleon. But Cunningham is a great 
 
xx Preface. 
 
 authority. His History is a very remarkable one. Joseph 
 Davey Cunningham belonged to the corps fruitful of great 
 men— the Bengal Engineers.* His talents early attracted the 
 attention of Lord Auckland, anxious to select a young officer 
 to train for the work of a political agent on the Satlaj fron- 
 tier; and, without any solicitation on his part, he was ap- 
 pointed assistant to Colonel Wade, then in charge of the 
 British relations with the Panjab, and the chiefs of Afghan- 
 istan. Holding that office, Cunningham was present at the 
 interview which took place, m 1838, between Lord Auckland 
 and Ranjit Singh. In 1839 he accompanied Shahzadah 
 Taimur and Colonel Wade to Peshawar, and he was with them 
 when they forced the Khaibar pass, and laid open the way to 
 Kabul. In 1840 he was placed in administrative charge of the 
 district of Lodiana ; towards the end of that year, he, then 
 under the orders of Mr., now Sir George, Clerk, the agent for 
 the Governor-General, once more traversed the Panjab to 
 Peshawar; during part of 1841 he was in magisterial charge of 
 the Firuzpur district; and towards the close of that year he 
 was, on the recommendation of Mr. Clerk, deputed to Thibet 
 to see that the ambitious rajahs of Jamii surrendered certain 
 territories which they had seized from the Chinese of Lhassa, 
 and that the British trade with Ludakh was restored to its old 
 footing. He returned in time to be present at the interview 
 between Lord Ellenborough and the Sikh chiefs at Firiizpiir 
 (December, 1842). Appointed subsequently personal assistant 
 to Mr. Clerk's successor, Colonel Richmond, and then employed 
 in important duties in the Bahawalpiir territory, Cunningham, 
 very studious by nature and greedy of knowledge, was able to 
 acquire a fund of information regarding the Sikhs, unequalled 
 at the time in India. It was by reason of this knowledge that, 
 
 The names of the first-class men, whom I have known personally, 
 rise at once to the recollection : men, for instance, like Lord Napier of 
 Magdala, Sir Henry Durand, Baird Smith. George Chesney ; but the 
 list is too long, for other names remain. 
 
Preface. xxi 
 
 when the Sikh war broke out, Sir Charles Napier ordered him 
 at once to join his army then occupying Sindh. For the same 
 reason, Sir Hugh Gough, after Firiizshahar, summoned him to 
 join his head-quarters; detached him to accompany Sir Harry 
 Smith to Badiwal and Aliwal, and retained him near his 
 person on the day of Sobraon. 
 
 Cunningham, then, had enjoyed peculiar opportunities of 
 knowing the Sikhs. He had lived with them for eight years 
 during a most important portion of their history. He had 
 enjoyed intercourse, under every variety of circumstances, with 
 all classes of men, and he had had free access to all the public 
 records bearing on the affairs of the frontier. It had even 
 been one of his duties to examine and report upon the mili- 
 tary resources of the country; and, being essentially a worker, 
 a man who, if he did a thing at all, could not help doing it 
 thoroughly, he had devoted to the task all his energies and all 
 his talents. 
 
 No one, then, was more competent than this honest and ex- 
 perienced officer to write a history of the Sikh people — a his- 
 tory which should tell the truth, and the whole truth. Cir- 
 cumstances favoured the undertaking of such a task by Cun- 
 ningham. As a reward for his services he had been appointed 
 to the political agency of Bhopal in central India. He found 
 the life in that quiet part of the world very different to the 
 all-absorbing existence on the frontier. To employ the leisure 
 hours forced upon him then he conceived the idea, as he knew 
 he had the means, of writing a history of the Sikhs. This 
 intention he communicated to superior authority, and he cer- 
 tainly believed that his plan was not disapproved of. The 
 work appeared in 1849. Extremely well written, giving the 
 fullest and the most accurate details of events; the book pos- 
 sessed one quality which, in the view of the Governor-General 
 of the day, the Marquis of Dalhousie, rendered the publication 
 of it a crime. It told the whole truth, the unpalatable truth, 
 regarding the first Sikh war : it exposed the real strength of 
 
XX11 
 
 Preface. 
 
 the Sikh army ; the conduct of, and the negotiations with, the 
 Sikh chiefs. 
 
 The book, if unnoticed by high authority, would have in- 
 jured no one. The Panjab had been annexed, or was in the 
 process of annexation, when it appeared. But a despotic 
 Government cannot endure truths which seem to reflect on the 
 justice of its policy. Looking at the policy of annexation 
 from the basis of Cunningham's book, that policy was un- 
 doubtedly unjust. Cunningham's book would be widely read, 
 and would influence the general verdict. Now, Lord Dal- 
 housie was not only a despot, but a despot who hated the ex- 
 pression of free opinion and of free thought; he would be 
 served only by men who would think as he bade them think. 
 That an officer holding a high political office should write a 
 book which, by the facts disclosed in it, reflected, however 
 indirectly, on his policy, was not to be endured. With one 
 stroke of the pen, then, he removed Cunningham from his 
 appointment at Bhopal. Cunningham, stunned by the blow, 
 entirely unexpected, died of a broken heart ! 
 
 Lord Dalhousie could crush Cunningham, but he could not 
 crush his work. The truths given to the world by this con- 
 scientious and faithful historian will for ever be the basis upon 
 which a history of the Sikh war, worthy of the name of history, 
 will be written. In my chapter on Firuizshahar and Sobraon, 
 then, I have adopted the view which Cunningham put for- 
 ward, and which my own subsequent investigations absolutely 
 confirmed. The conclusions arrived at regarding the Sikh 
 leaders obtain a strong support, moreover, from the fact that, 
 after the war, the men who received the largest rewards, and 
 the greatest share of the British confidence, were Lai Singh 
 and Tej Singh, the two leaders who, nominally at the head of 
 the war party, had betrayed their followers ! 
 
 With respect to the actual fighting, I have consulted, I 
 repeat, and to a great extent followed, the narrative of the 
 campaign written by Sir Herbert Edwardes in 1846, in the 
 
Preface. xxiii 
 
 Calcutta Review. The article has since been republished with 
 the name of the author attached to it.* 
 
 I have relied on the same authority (Edwardes's "Year on 
 the Panjab Frontier") for the true story of the events which 
 preceded, and which immediately followed, the rebellion of 
 Mulraj in 1848. The campaign which ensued was described 
 and criticised at the time by one who took a part in it — the 
 late Sir Henry Durand. A cool, able and impartial critic, 
 favouring no one and blaming where blame was deserved, 
 Durand has left a record which it is impossible to ignore. 
 The article, which appeared in the Calcutta Review for June, 
 185 1, and which has since been republished with the name of 
 the author attached ("Selections from the Calcutta Review"), 
 must be consulted and studied by every one who would wish 
 to understand events as they actually happened. Indeed, 
 Durand's article bears the relation to the second Sikh war 
 which Cunningham's book bears to the first. One remarkable 
 fact in connection with it is that both articles were written by 
 Engineers, and both were written at Bhopal. Durand suc- 
 ceeded Cunningham as political agent at that place ! The 
 fact that Durand's article was unsigned, and that it criticised 
 only military manoeuvres, saved him from any open expres- 
 sion of the wrath of the Saturn who had devoured his pre- 
 decessor ! 
 
 The military dispatches of the second Panjab campaign are 
 as unreliable and as worthless as those of the first. They 
 were denounced at the time, in the most uncompromising 
 manner, by the Indian Press. Some other contemporary 
 memoirs are not much better. But I have studied very care- 
 fully for the purposes of this, as I did for the purposes of 
 the first Sikh campaign, the letters of officers written at that 
 time. I have likewise made considerable use of a little work 
 written on the campaign, some five years ago, by an officer 
 
 * "Selections from the Calcutta ~Rcv\ew." Calcutta: Thos. S. Smith. 
 
xxiv Preface. 
 
 formerly in the 24th Foot — Captain Lawrence-Archer,* and 
 which appears to me to be a model of the style in which such 
 a work should be written. 
 
 It remains now to add that these decisive battles have, 
 during the past twelvemonth, appeared as articles in the pages 
 of the Army and Navy Magazine; that the actual fighting 
 details of one of them, Plassey, occur in my "Life of Lord 
 Clive." In the same work appears also a description of the 
 battle of Kaveripak; but, in this volume, many details have 
 been added to it. The other battles have been compiled and 
 written expressly for this series. 
 
 I have found it difficult to obtain reliable plans of the 
 earlier battles. I have given, therefore, but three, relating to 
 those not of the least importance — Plassey, Chilianwala and 
 Gujrat. To supply, as far as possible, the omission, I have 
 arranged that the map accompanying the book shall contain 
 the name of every important place mentioned in its pages. 
 
 * "Commentaries on the Panjab Campaign of 1848-49." London; 
 W. H. Allen and Co. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 — *+^ 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface to New Edition ... ... ... yii 
 
 ,, Second Edition ... ... ... ... ix 
 
 ,, First Edition ... ... ... . . ... xiii 
 
 CHAPTEB I. 
 
 St. Thome 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Kaveripak 18 
 
 CHAPTER J 1 1. 
 
 * PlasseyJ 35 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 • Kondur am) MachhlipatanamV ... ... ... ... ... 72 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 • BiderraV 108 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 p U'ndwah Xai.a ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 125 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Baksab 163 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Porto Novo ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 208 
 
XXVI 
 
 Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Assaye ... ••• ■•• ••• ••■ ••■ ■•• 257 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Laswabi ... ... ■•• ••• ■•• •• ••• 280 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Bharatptjb ... 293 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Fir rzs ii aha it and Sobraon 335 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Chilian wala and Gujkat 377 
 
 Index 439 
 
LIST OF PLANS, MAPS, ETC. 
 
 Portrait ...... to face title page 
 
 Map of India. .... at end. 
 
 Plan of the Battle of Plassey . . to face page 59. 
 
 „ Fortress of Bh.ara.tpur ,, 313. 
 
 „ Battle of Chilian wala ,, 414. 
 
 Gujrat . ,. 429. 
 
THE 
 
 DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ST. THOME. 
 
 THE story of the rise and progress of the British power in 
 India possesses peculiar fascination for all classes of readers. 
 It is a romance sparkling" with incidents of the most varied 
 character. It appeals alike to the sympathetic qualities of the 
 heart and the colder calculations of the brain. Whilst it lays 
 bare the defects in the character of the native races which made 
 their subjugation possible, it indicates the trusting and faith- 
 ful nature, the impressionable character, the passionate appre- 
 ciation of great qualities, which formed alike the strength and 
 the weakness of those races — their strength after they had 
 been conquered, their weakness during the struggle. It was 
 these qualities which set repeatedly whole divisions of the 
 race in opposition to other divisions — the conquered and the 
 willing co-operatcrs to the sections still remaining to be 
 subdued. There are few studies more alluring than the study 
 of the habits and manner of thought which made this process 
 possible. The student will most certainly discover faults, 
 
 B 
 
2 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 indigenous and imported, the former the result mainly of an 
 over-refinement of civilization, the latter pertaining to or de- 
 rived from the Muhammadan invader. But in the combination 
 of astuteness with simplicity, of fearlessness of death and 
 conspicuous personal daring with inferiority on the field of 
 battle, in the gentleness, the submission, the devotion to their 
 leader which characterized so many of the children of the soil, 
 he will not fail to recognize a character which demands the 
 affection, even the esteem, of the European race which, chiefly 
 by means of the defects and virtues I have alluded to, now 
 exercises overlordship in Hindustan. 
 
 Of the different sections of the story of the rise and progress 
 of the British power not one so well illustrates the qualities I 
 have referred to as that which relates the earlier phases of the 
 conquest of the country. In those earlier days the position of 
 the European trader and the native of India was the direct 
 converse of the position of the present day. Then, the Euro- 
 pean trader was the vassal, holding his lands as a rent payer, 
 and on condition of good behaviour, recognizing the native 
 ruler of the province as his overlord. It was a consequence 
 of this well-recognized position that, when, in 1744, war broke 
 out between France and England, and the governor of Madras 
 made preparations to attack the French settlement of Pondi- 
 chery, the governor of that settlement, M. Dupleix, appealed 
 to the Niiwab of the Karnatak, not, indeed, to afford him aid, 
 but to command his English tenants to renounce the threatened 
 attack. It never entered into the head of the Madras governor 
 either to question the right of the Niiwab to issue the order, 
 or to dispute it. Nay, more: when the English governor, pro- 
 fessing his readiness to obey the Niiwab as far as his own 
 power extended, expressed a regret that his authority did not 
 reach the English fleet, which, he stated, was under the separate 
 orders of the English commodore, and when the Niiwab 
 answered that he should expect all English officers who came 
 to the Koromandal coast to respect his government, the Eng- 
 
St. Thome. 3 
 
 lish governor, far from remonstrating, hastened to prevail 
 upon the commander of the fleet to abstain likewise from all 
 attack upon the French. Such was the state of affairs in 
 Southern India so late as the year 1745. The European trader 
 was simply the permanent occupier, on a fixed rental, of a 
 portion of the lands of the lord of the country. He possessed 
 the right only to claim the protection of that overlord when 
 he might be attacked. 
 
 In one year — I might almost say in a few months — this posi- 
 tion became practically inverted. The marvellous combination 
 of circumstances by which this result was attained is known 
 to every student of early Indian history. Until recently, how- 
 ever, the majority of students have cared only to examine the 
 action on the part of the rival European traders which precipi- 
 tated the change. But few have taken into consideration the 
 workings of the native mind which enormously aided it. Had 
 all classes of natives been able to combine as the inhabitants 
 of a European country invaded by a foreign foe would com- 
 bine, such a resolution would, at that time at all events, have 
 been impossible. I may go even further, and affirm that if 
 the English had been the only settlers on the coast, the revolu- 
 tion would not even have been thought of. It is a remarkable 
 fact, but a fact which cannot even be questioned, that the 
 English owe their empire in India to two causes — the first, 
 French ambition; the second, that combination of virtues and 
 defects in the native character of which I have already spoken. 
 
 How French ambition acted as a main factor in the events 
 which followed the assertion, in 1745, by the Niiwab of the 
 Karnatak of his supreme authority over all the Koromandal 
 coast and in the waters of the Indian seas adjacent to that 
 coast, has been told by every writer of Anglo-Indian history. 
 The subject has been treated as a matter concerning princi- 
 pally the two European nations. Undoubtedly it did greatly 
 concern them. Although subsequently to 1746 the French and 
 English fought as the partisans of rival chiefs struggling for 
 
4 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 supremacy, they became within a very few years the arbiters 
 of the position. The dynasties and chiefs under whose 
 shadow and on whose behalf they fought have for the most 
 part disappeared or been despoiled — -despoiled in course of 
 time, after success had been attained, by the very European 
 race enlisted in the beginning to support their claims. Tanjur, 
 the Karnatak, Trichinapalli, Madura, all tell the same story. 
 Rightly, then, in one sense, have English historians of the 
 period treated the subject as a matter affecting principally the 
 rival European traders who, under the shadow of native chief- 
 tains, were really fighting for predominance, I might even say 
 for supremacy, in Southern India. 
 
 Sufficient attention has not, I think, been paid, hitherto, to 
 the train of thought which influenced many of the natives of 
 that and of later periods, nor has it been duly considered how 
 the combination of the qualities I have referred to, their 
 fidelity to their temporary masters, and their appreciation of 
 heroic qualities displayed by those masters, contributed to 
 bring about the result. These are questions which must be ex- 
 amined in connection with the scenes which occupy the most 
 prominent position in the drama — the scenes in which the 
 Europeans fill a prominent place. In each successive scene of 
 each successive drama there was always one decisive point. 
 Round that point were grouped the hopes, the wishes, the fears,, 
 the secret ambitions of thousands. In those days, and even 
 to the present day in India, the decisive point of each scene 
 was and is a battle. Whether it were a battle of giants or a 
 battle of pigmies, whether the slain were many or were few, 
 that battle, when it was decisive, changed the destinies of 
 princes and of peoples It has appeared to me, then, that a 
 short and succinct account of the decisive battles of India — - 
 decisive as they affected the predominance of one European 
 race, first over its European rival, and secondly over the 
 children of the soil — would afford an opportunity to bring 
 into prominence those qualities of the natives to which I have 
 
St. Thome. 5 
 
 so often alluded. The battles 1 have selected mark, each 
 one, a new epoch, some of them even a revolutionary epoch, in 
 the history of India, and contain within themselves a full and 
 complete explanation of the sudden and remarkable trans- 
 formation of which I have spoken— the transformation 
 within a few short months of a vassal tenantry into 
 a position of virtual sovereignty. They will explain even 
 more than that; they will explain how it was that the natives 
 of India worked freely, loyally, with their eyes open, and with 
 all their might and main, for their own subjection to a foreign 
 power. 
 
 By a striking example I have shown how the relative posi- 
 tions of the native rulers and the European traders towards 
 each other were from the beginning placed on a distinct and 
 well-defined basis. The established order of things which 
 forced the governor of the English settlement to obey, sorely 
 against his inclination, the command of the Nuwab of the 
 Karnatak to abstain from all hostile action against the French, 
 revealed relations between the two races which were not, appar- 
 ently, lightly to be shaken. That command, and the obedience 
 paid to it, made it abundantly clear that the European settlers 
 occupied towards the ruler of the country a position precisely 
 analogous to that now maintained by the native princes of 
 India towards their European overlord. The European 
 settlers were allowed then, as the native princes are allowed 
 now, complete administrative action within the territory held 
 by them, but they, like the native princes of the present day, 
 were prohibited from waging war against each other. For 
 defence against an enemy the native ruler had then, as the 
 European overlord has now, to be trusted to. The principle 
 acts well now, because the European overlord really possesses 
 the power to carry it out. It failed on the Korcmandal coast 
 because, on the first attempt to enforce his authority, the native 
 ruler was baffled. His failure manifested itself in the first 
 pitched battle between the European settlers and the native 
 
6 The Decisive Battles of 1 ndia. 
 
 overlord. The battle was perhaps more than any, certainly as 
 'much as any, ever delivered, a decisive battle. It was fought 
 on the same lines as subsequent battles between the Europeans 
 and the natives of India have been fought ; it showed the dis- 
 cipline, the skill, the inventive power of the few, opposed to 
 the bad generalship, the untutored valour, the want of cohesion, 
 the absence of patriotic feeling, of the many. Eut it was the 
 first of its kind. It broke a spell which, unchallenged, might 
 have exerted its influence for many years. It inverted, almost 
 immediately, not openly, yet most really, the positions of the 
 vassal and the overlord. From the day on which it was gained 
 
 supremacy in Southern India became the fixed idea in the 
 brain of the illustrious governor of the people who had won it. 
 In the course of time the idea passed, almost unconsciously, to 
 his successful rivals. They certainly had not dreamed of it 
 in the earlier days. That it finally became a part, though for 
 long years an unwritten part, of their creed, was, however, the 
 certain and logical consequence of the battle which first con- 
 veyed to the native rulers of Southern India the conviction 
 that the Europeans, whom they had allowed to settle on their 
 coasts, were able to dictate terms even to them. Thenceforth 
 the position of vassal and overlord, recognized as binding in 
 1745, was broken, never to be re-imposed. 
 
 It happened in this wise. The English, ordered by the 
 Niiwab in 1745 to abstain from all hostilities against their 
 French rivals, had obeyed; but in 1746, the French finding 
 themselves superior on the coast to the English, possessing a 
 fleet which had driven away that of their rivals, an army 
 largely outnumbering theirs, deemed the moment too opportune 
 to be lost. The clumsy action of the English governor came 
 to aid their endeavours to persuade the native overlord, the 
 Niiwab of the Karnatak, to allow them power of unrestricted 
 action. That governor, warned of the French intentions, had 
 appealed to the Nuwab to issue to his rivals the prohibition 
 which had been imposed upon himself the preceding year; 
 
St. Thome. 7 
 
 but, whether from ignorance or from thoughtlessness, he had 
 committed the grave offence of sending his messenger empty- 
 handed into the presence of the Niiwab. The latter was still 
 smarting under this barbaric insolence, as he considered it, 
 when there arrived, laden with choice and costly presents from 
 Europe, a messenger from M. Dupleix, Governor of Pondi- 
 chery. The Niiwab was an old man, and he had the reputa- 
 tion of being a capable man; but on this occasion he allowed 
 his feelings to dictate his policy. One word from him, and 
 the French preparations would have been stayed. He would 
 not speak that word. Whilst his better instincts withheld him 
 from giving absolute sanction to the plans of the French, his 
 preference for that people, and his anger against the English, 
 combined to stifle the prohibitory sentence which would have 
 enforced his true policy. The silence was fatal to him and to 
 his race. Unfettered by prohibition, the French sent an ex- 
 pedition against Madras (September, 1746). Before the place 
 had actually fallen, the Niiwab, recovering from his infatua- 
 tion, had dispatched to Pondichery, on a swift dromedary, a 
 messenger bearing a letter to Dupleix, in which he expressed 
 his surprise that the French should have waged war in his 
 territories, and threatening to send an army to enforce his 
 orders unless the siege were immediately raised. Dupleix was 
 too accustomed to deal with the natives of India to hesitate as 
 to the reply he should give to this citation. His main object 
 was to expel the English from Madras. Whether that place 
 should fall permanently to the French or to the Niiwab was a 
 matter, for the moment, of only secondary importance. He, 
 therefore, replied that his object in attacking Madras was to 
 secure the interests of the Niiwab, as on its conquest the 
 English would gladly pay him a large ransom for its restora- 
 tion; that for that purpose the French would at once make it 
 over to him on its surrender. These were mere words intended 
 only to gain time. Before the Niiwab could form a decision 
 
8 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 to act, or not to act, Madras had surrendered to the French 
 (21st September, 1746). 
 
 As soon as the Niiwab learned that Madras had fallen he 
 dispatched his son, Maphuz Khan, a': the head of 10,000 
 men, mostly horsemen, to take up a position in the vicinity of 
 the fort, so as to be ready to receive it when the French should 
 be ready to evacuate it. But when one week, then two, three, 
 and even five weeks passed, and the French still answered all 
 his demands for the surrender with evasions, the suspicion that 
 he had been duped began gradually to take possession of the 
 mind of the Asiatic ruler. Up to the end of the fifth week the 
 French had been able to offer an excuse for their conduct, 
 which had, at all events, the appearance of validity. The 
 disputes between La Bourdonnais and Dupleix — the former 
 pledged to restore Madras to the English for a consideration, 
 the latter resolved to keep it for his nation — had — La Bourdon- 
 nais being in possession — tied the hands of Dupleix. But 
 on the 23rd October the departure of La Bourdonnais left 
 Dupleix free to act. Still he did not keep his promise to the 
 Niiwab. He had no intention of keeping it, for he had 
 resolved to risk rather the fury of his overlord; he had trans- 
 mitted orders to his lieutenant, Duval d'Espremenil, to hold 
 Madras at all hazards, and against all enemies whatsoever. 
 
 The Niiwab, for a long time cajoled, lost patience at last. 
 Two days after the departure of La Bourdonnais he directed 
 his son, Maphuz Khan, to lay siege to Madras, and to drive 
 out the French just as the French had driven out the English. 
 He had no idea whatever that this would be a matter of any 
 difficulty. The French had always carried themselves so 
 humbly, they had professed so much respect for himself, for 
 his officers, and for his people, that he had believed that this 
 behaviour was but the outward expression of conscious in- 
 feriority. He knew that their white soldiers numbered from 
 five to six hundred, and that their native levies were as 
 numerous His son commanded ten times that number, and 
 
Si. Thome. 9 
 
 many more levies were marching to support him. He had, 
 then, but to demand admittance within the fort. Who would 
 venture to refuse to comply ? 
 
 Sharing such thoughts, Maphuz Khan presented himself, on 
 the 26th October, before the town. Entrance having been 
 refused, he took up a position commanding its water-supply. 
 The French governor, M. Duval d'Espremenil* father of the 
 politician who made himself so prominent in the last of the old 
 French farlemcnis, had not been bred a soldier, but he pos- 
 sessed courage, cemmonsense and energy, which, against such 
 an enemy, mere than supplied the want of military training. 
 Under instructions from Pondichery he had, on the approach 
 of Maphuz Khan, drawn the whole of his troops within the 
 walls of the fort, determined to offer only a passive resistance 
 to the army of his suzerain. But when Maphuz Khan showed 
 himself very earnest in the attack, when he began to erect a 
 battery, and when he occupied a position which cut off the water- 
 supply cf the town, then d'Espremenil found it necessary to 
 abandon his passive attitude. At first he ventured only to 
 fire upon the men engaged in erecting the battery ; but though 
 this act of vigour drove away the assailants from the mound 
 on which they were working, it did not affect those engaged 
 in diverting the water, for these were out of range. More 
 decisive measures were thus forced upon him. It had become 
 a question either of unconditional submission to a suzerain 
 who had been irritated and defied, or of an attack upon his 
 troops. D'Espremenil wisely chose the second course. On the 
 night of the 1st November he made all the preparations for a 
 
 * Duval d'Espremenil was likewise son-in-law of Dupleix, and second 
 member of the Council of Pondichery. He possessed, to a degree which 
 would be considered rare even in these days, a knowledge of the people of 
 Jndia, their language and their customs. In 1747 he had the hardihood 
 to disguise himself as a Brahman, and visit the most famous temples and 
 pagodas of India. He succeeded, without being discovered, in pene- 
 trating the holiest recesses into which no one but a member cf that 
 sacred caste was allowed to enter. 
 
io The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 sortie. Early on the following morning- 400 men with 
 two field-pieces sallied from the fort to attack the portion 
 of the besieging force which was guarding the spring which 
 supplied the town. As this handful of men advanced, the 
 guns behind their centre, on the point previously indicated, 
 the enemy's horsemen, who had mounted in all haste, moved 
 towards them with the intention of charging them. The 
 French at once halted, extended from the centre to allow T their 
 guns to move to the front, then, when the enemy had come 
 within range, they opened hre. 
 
 That the reader may understand the feelings which animated 
 the horsemen of Maphuz Khan before the French guns had 
 fired at all, and the bewilderment which came over them after 
 the second discharge, it is necessary I should state that the 
 practice of artillery, as understood by European soldiers, was 
 not at all comprehended in Southern India. It is true that 
 the native chiefs possessed guns, but not only were these guns, 
 as a rule, uncared for, or so_old_tha±_i t was a pos itive risk to 
 fire them, but the nati ves were, so iuT ^ijfnT_ in their manage- 
 ment thaFTKey thought they had done welLwhen they dis- 
 charged them once in a quarter of an hour. Never having 
 been engaged~m warfare with^ufopeans^they had no idea 
 that it was possible to hre the same piece five or six times in a 
 minute. Their invariable practice, then, was to await the first 
 discharge of an enemy's artillery, then, in the full belief that 
 they had a good quarter of an hour before them before the fire 
 could be renewed, to advance boldly and rapidly. 
 
 Their feelings, then, when the French guns opened upon 
 them on the occasion of the sortie I am describing, may be 
 easily imagined. That discharge killed two or three horses 
 only. What other thought could then have possessed the 
 Indian horsemen but this, that at the expense of those horses 
 they had the enemy in their power ? Amongst themselves 
 cavalry could always ride down infantry ; and now the infantry 
 before them had thrown away their one solid support. They 
 
St. Thome. 1 1 
 
 were preparing to use to the best advantage the quarter of an 
 hour thus, in their belief, foolishly granted them, when 
 another flash from the same guns, followed with great rapidity 
 by another and another and another, came to show them that 
 they had been living in the paradise of fools, that they had 
 before them a new kind of enemy, an enemy of whose strange 
 and fearful devices they knew nothing. More even than the 
 sight of the emptying saddles in their midst, the contempla- 
 tion of the unknown process came to weaken their morale. 
 Imagination added horrors to visible slaughter. After a few 
 moments' hesitation they turned and fled in disorder. 
 D'Espremenil had not only regained his water-supply — he had 
 not only forced the enemy to raise the siege — lie had gained a 
 victory over the minds and imaginations of the Indian soldiers 
 the consequences of which were permanent. He had driven in 
 the thin end of the wedge which was to bring to the ground 
 the whole fabric of the Mughul empire. 
 
 There was needed, however, a stronger, a more decided blow 
 of the mallet to drive in the wedge a little further, to prevent 
 the close of the fissure caused by the first. A comparatively 
 few men of the army of Maphuz Khan had witnessed the 
 magic power of the French guns. Those few men had been 
 panic-stricken; they had communicated their panic to their 
 comrades ; their comrades had fled they knew not why. The 
 original fugitives when questioned doubtless varied their 
 replies. No one could positively declare the actual number of 
 hostile guns. After all, they began to argue, the victory might 
 have been the result of skilful management. They came by 
 degrees to the belief that the French must have had several 
 guns, and that they had fired only two at one time, then two 
 more, whilst the others were reloading. This would explain 
 much of the mishap. At the end of a few hours, after the 
 subject had been well ventilated, and the heroes of the flight 
 had recovered their equanimity, it probably was so explained. 
 At all events, the dismay of the native soldiers evaporated. 
 
12 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Maphuz Khan had lost seventy men by the fire of the French 
 guns. He had raised the siege, and had taken up a position 
 two miles to the westward of Madras. He was there when, on 
 the day following his discomfiture, he learned that a French 
 force, marching from Pondichery to Madras, would arrive at 
 St. Thome, four miles to the west of that place, the following 
 morning. By this time big talk and bluster had succeeded the 
 panic of the previous morning. Maphuz Khan, who had not 
 been one of the fugitives, and who probably attributed the 
 defeat of his soldiers to a sudden but ordinary panic, was 
 burning to avenge himself on the audacious Europeans. He 
 immediately, then, took a step worthy of a great commander. 
 Resolving to intercept the approaching force before i': should 
 effect its junction with the garrison of Madras, he marched 
 that evening (3rd November) on the town of St. Thome, and 
 took up a strong position on the northern bank of the river 
 Adyar, at the very point where it would be necessary for the 
 French to cross it, and lined the bank with his guns. 
 
 The detachment which was approaching consisted of 230 
 Europeans and 700 sipahis. There were no guns with i:. But 
 its commander, Paradis, was a man to supply any deficiency. 
 A Swiss by birth, and an engineer by profession, Paradis had 
 been selected by Dupleix, in the dearth of senior officers of 
 the military service, for command in the field. Paradis 
 amply justified the discernment of the French governor, for he 
 had been born with the qualities which no soldier can acquire — 
 decision of character, calmness and energy. 
 
 The movements of Maphuz Khan had not been so secretly 
 carried out as to escape the notice of the French within Madras. 
 Aware of the approach of Paradis, and divining the motives 
 of Maphuz Khan, d'Espremenil had at once dispatched a 
 messenger to the former, recommending him to defer an 
 engagement with Maphuz Khan until the garrison of Madras 
 should have time to operate on his rear. But events would 
 not allow Paradis to delay the contest. At daybreak on the 
 
St. Thome. 13 
 
 morning of the 4th November that officer approached the south 
 bank of the x\dyar. He beheld the whole space between the 
 north bank of that river and the town of St. Thome — a space 
 about a quarter of a mile in length — occupied by the hostile 
 army, the bank itself as far as eye could reach lined with 
 their guns, each gun well manned. There they were, horse, 
 foot and artillery, more than 10,000 in number, barring the 
 road to Madras. 
 
 If Paradis entertained any doubt as to the motives which 
 swayed the leader of the masses on the northern bank a dis- 
 charge of artillery directed against his advancing troops 
 quickly dispelled it. Under such circumstances, to await on 
 the south bank the promised co-operation appeared to him a 
 proceeding fraught with peril. A halt where he was would 
 be impossible, for he was under the fire of the enemy's guns; 
 he must fall back, even though it should be only a few hundred 
 yards. Such a movement would, he thought, expose him, un- 
 provided with guns, to a charge from the enemy's horsemen, 
 eager to avenge their defeat of two days previously. His 
 Europeans were fighting for the first time on Indian ground, 
 his native troops were raw levies. With such material could 
 he, dare he, encounter the risk of retiring ? On the other hand, 
 a bold advance would inspire his men and discourage the 
 enemy. 
 
 Such thoughts coursed through the bram of Paradis as his 
 men were advancing under fire. His resolution was immedi- 
 ately taken. His bold spirit had solved in an instant the 
 problem as to the method to be pursued when European 
 troops should be pitted against the natives of India. That 
 method was, under all circumstances, to advance to close 
 quarters. With a cool and calm decision, then, he plunged 
 without hesitation into the waters of the Adyar, and led his 
 infantry to attack the three arms of the enemy, ten times their 
 superior in numbers. 
 
 Up to the moment of reaching the south bank of the Advar 
 
14 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the French force had not suffered very much from the fire of 
 the enemy's guns. The aim had been bad and the guns had 
 been ill-served. They were still, however, dangerous, and the 
 troops felt that their capture would decide the day. Without 
 drawing trigger, then, they followed Paradis to the bank of the 
 river; then, wading through it, delivered one volley and 
 charged. The effect was electric. The Indian troops, unaccus- 
 tomed to such precipitate action, gave way, abandoned their 
 guns, and retreated as fast as they could into the town. The 
 walls of the town had many gaps in it, but the Indians had 
 taken the precaution to cover these on the western face with 
 palisades. Behind these palisades they now took refuge, and 
 from this new position opposed a strong front to the advanc- 
 ing force. The French, however, did not allow them time to 
 recover the spirit which alone would have made a successful 
 defence possible. Advancing, and always advancing in good 
 order, and firing by sections as they did so, they forced the 
 enemy to abandon these new defences. The defeat now 
 became a rout. Falling back on each other in the narrow streets 
 of the town, the enemy's horse and foot became mixed in hope- 
 less confusion, exposed, without being able to return it, or to 
 extricate themselves, to the relentless fire of the French. 
 Maphuz Khan himself, mounted on an elephant, had made his 
 escape early in the day. His troops were less fortunate. 
 Their very numbers impeded their movements. When, at last, 
 m small bodies, in twos and threes, they made their exit from 
 the northern gate and attempted to hurry away with the bag- 
 gage and camp equipage that yet remained to them, they 
 found themselves face to face with the body of Europeans 
 sent by d'Espremenil from Madras to co-operate with Paradis. 
 Then they abandoned everything, baggage, horses, oxen, rams, 
 even hope itself, and fled across the plain in wild confusion. 
 The French were too much occupied in plundering their camp 
 to pursue them further. But the terror which had struck into 
 their souls was proved by the fact that they made no attempt 
 
St. Thome. 15 
 
 to unite in masses till they had covered many miles in the 
 direction of Arkat, and then only to fall back with all possible 
 speed upon that capital of the Karnatak. 
 
 Such was the decisive battle of St. Thome. "It was now," 
 writes Mr. Orme, the contemporary historian of that period, 
 "more than a century since any of the European nations had 
 gained a decisive advantage in war against the officers of the 
 Great Mughul. The experience of former unsuccessful enter- 
 prises, and the scantiness of military abilities which prevailed 
 in all the colonies, from a long disuse of arms, had persuaded 
 them that the Moors were a brave and formidable enemy ; 
 when the French at once broke through the charm of this 
 timorous opinion, by defeating a whole army with a single 
 battalion." 
 
 "It may be well asserted," writes another author,* in lan- 
 guage which I now reproduce, "that of all the decisive actions 
 that have been fought in India there is not one more memorable 
 than this. Not, indeed, that there has not since been displayed 
 a daring equal to that of Paradis, or that numbers as dispro- 
 portionate have not, within the memory of the living, achieved 
 a victory as important. The circumstance which stamps this 
 action as so memorable is that it was the very first of its kind, 
 that it proved, to the surprise of both parties, the overwhelm- 
 ing superiority of the European soldier to his Asiatic rival. 
 Up to that moment the native princes of Southern India had, 
 by virtue of their position as lords of the soil, or as satraps of 
 the Mughul, arrogated to themselves a superiority which none 
 of the European settlers had ever thought of disputing. With 
 the French, as we have seen, it had been a maxim of settled 
 policy to avoid the semblance of hostility towards them. We 
 have noticed how Martin and Dumas and Dupleix had toiled 
 to effect this end. When at last Dupleix, to avoid a more 
 dangerous contingency, accepted the dreaded alternative of 
 
 * •• History of the French in India." 
 
1 6 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 hostility, he did so more in the hope that he might find some 
 means to pacify the Nuwab whilst the siege was in progress 
 than in any expectation of routing him in the held. And now, 
 suddenly, unexpectedly, this result had been achieved. From 
 being the suppliants of the Nuwab of the Karnatak, the vassals 
 whose every movement depended upon his licence, the French, 
 m a moment, found themselves, in reality, his superiors. The 
 action at St. Thome completely reversed the positions of the 
 Niiwab and the French governor. Not only that, but it in- 
 augurated a new era, it introduced a fresh order of things, it 
 was the first decided step to the conquest of Hindustan by 
 European power. Whe'rher that power were French or English 
 would depend upon the relative strength of the two nations, 
 and even more on the character of the men by whom that 
 strength should be put in action. The battle which introduced 
 this change deserves, then, well to be remembered ; and, in 
 recalling it to our memories, let not us, who are English, forget 
 that the merit of it is due, solely and entirely, to that great 
 nation which fought with us the battle of empire on Indian 
 soil, and did not win it." 
 
 I find it difficult to add anything to this true description of 
 the consequences of this most decisive battle. It was the 
 prelude to many more resembling it in results. But not one of 
 those which followed was fought under circumstances precisely 
 similar. Prior to the sortie of d'Espremenil from Madras, 
 which may be taken as the first part of the battle which so 
 quickly followed it, the prestige, the morale, were on the side 
 c f the children of the soil. The humble traders had, before 
 1746, never thought of questioning the authority, or of doubt- 
 ing the power, of the satraps of the Indian provinces. It was 
 the striking, the momentous, I might almost say the eternal, 
 consequence of those two acts of the same drama that the 
 prestige and the morale were transferred from the natives — 
 from chief and follower alike — to the European settlers. Of 
 
St. Thome. 17 
 
 almost every subsequent battle between the European and the 
 Asiatic it may be said that, in consequence of that transfer, it 
 was half won before it had been fought. This was the magic 
 power which the France of the Bourbons won in November, 
 1746, and which she subsequently transferred, not willingly, to 
 En el and. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 KAVERIPAK. 
 
 THE results of the decisive victory gained by Paradis at St. 
 Thome were soon manifested. The influence of the French 
 became supreme in the Karnatak. Three years after that event 
 the governor of Pondichery was able to establish the prince 
 whose cause he had espoused in the Subadarship of the Dakhan, 
 a position greater than that now occupied by the Nizam. 
 Another nobleman, likewise protected by him, he had pro- 
 claimed Nuwab of the Karnatak, with the possession of the 
 whole of that province except Tanjiir and Trichinapalli. The 
 time had not arrived when a European power could openly 
 assert supreme dominion, but in January 175 1 almost the 
 whole of south-eastern India recognized the moral predomin- 
 ance of Pondichery. The country between the Vindhayan 
 range and the river Krishna, including the provinces known as 
 the Northern Sirkars, was virtually ruled by the French general 
 whose army occupied the capital of the Subadar of the Dakhan. 
 South of the river Krishna the country known as the Karnatak, 
 including Nellur, North and South Arkat, Madura and Tinne- 
 velli, was ruled virtually from Pondichery. The only places 
 not subject to French influence were Madras, restored to 
 England by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; Fort St. David, 
 
Kdvcrlpdk. 19 
 
 within a few miles of Pcndichery, held by the English ; 
 Tanjur, whose Rajah had not acknowledged the supremacy of 
 the French nominee; and Trichinapalli, held by a rival candi- 
 date for the Nuwabship, supported by the English. Madras and 
 Fort St. David were, under the circumstances of the peace with 
 England, unassailable; but everything seemed to point to the 
 conclusion that Trichinapalli and Tanjur would speedily fall 
 under the supremacy which had successfully asserted itself 
 over the other portions of the Karnatak. A large army, sup- 
 ported by a French contingent, was marching on Trichinapalli. 
 The English, by the loss of Madras, by the failure of an 
 attempt made in 1748 to capture Pondichery, and by the ill- 
 success which had attended them when opposed to the French at 
 Valkunda, had gained the unhappy reputation of being unable 
 to fight. There seemed to be no power, no influence, capable 
 of thwarting the plans which the brain of Dupleix had built 
 up en the firm base of the victory gained by Paradis at St. 
 Thome. 
 
 Xor, had the French possessed a real soldier capable of 
 conducting military operations — had their troops been led by a 
 Clive, a Stringer Lawrence, or even by a Paradis — could those 
 plans have failed of success. It happened, however, for their 
 misfortune, tha': at this particular epoch their forces were com- 
 manded by men singularly wanting in the energy, in the 
 decision, in the rapid coup (V ceil essential to form a general. 
 At first it seemed that this misfortune would not be necessarily 
 fatal; fcr if it were true that their army besieging Trichina- 
 palli was led by men who would dare nothing, the English 
 allies of the defenders possessed commanders of mental calibre 
 certainly not superior. As the French were vastly superior in 
 numbers it was clear that, the commanders on both sides being 
 equal, the victory must 111 the end be with them. But they had 
 made no provision either for time or for the unforeseen. When 
 their plans seemed gradually verging towards success, and the 
 fall cf Trichinapalli — by the slow process of famine— seemed 
 
20 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 to loom in a not very distant future, a young Englishman, not 
 yet a soldier, though endowed by nature with the talents which 
 go to form a finished commander, had suddenly burst into the 
 province of Arkat, had seized the capital ; then, resisting for 
 fifty days, and finally repulsing, a besieging native army, 
 aided by Frenchmen exceeding his own European garrison in 
 numbers, had proved conclusively to the world of Southern 
 India — to use the actual words used 'by the famous Maratha 
 leader, Murari Rao — "that the English could fight." 
 
 The splendid diversion made by Robert Clive in northern 
 Arkat was not in itself decisive of the fate of Trichinapalli. 
 The French and their native allies continued to press the siege, 
 though in the same slow and perfunctory manner as before. 
 The fate of Southern India depended upon the fall of that 
 place. The time employed to besiege Clive in Arkat gave the 
 French precious opportunities to take it. They threw them all 
 away. They attempted nothing. Fancying that Clive was, at 
 Arkat, in a trap whence he could never emerge to trouble them, 
 they still trusted to the slow process of starvation. They were 
 aroused from their fools' paradise by the intelligence that the 
 young Englishman had forced the besiegers to retire; had sub- 
 sequently beaten them in a pitched battle, and was then engaged 
 at Fort St. David in raising troops to march to the relief of 
 the besieged Trichinapalli. 
 
 Fortune, however, had not yet abandoned the French. The 
 blind goddess was content to give them one more chance. 
 Whilst Clive was preparing a force to march to the relief of 
 Trichinapalli, the energetic governor of Pondichery incited his 
 native allies to raise a fresh army, and to send it — well sup- 
 ported by French soldiers — not only to reconquer north Arkat, 
 but to threaten Madras itself. He argued, and argued soundly, 
 that such a diversion would, in the attenuated condition of the 
 English garrisons, render it imperative on Clive to forego his 
 march on Trichinapalli, and hasten to the defence of the 
 threatened posts. These— if the French and their allies would 
 
Kdveripdk. 21 
 
 only display energy and resolution — might be captured. The 
 fall of Trichinapalli would not fail to follow. 
 
 At first events fully confirmed the anticipations of Dupleix. 
 No sooner had Riza Sahib, the Indian chief whom Clive had 
 repulsed from Arkat and defeated at Ami, felt that the pro- 
 vince was relieved from the awe inspired by the presence of the 
 young Englishman who had conquered him, than re-uniting 
 his scattered troops, and calling to him a body of 400 
 Frenchmen, he appeared suddenly at Punamalli (17th January, 
 1752). The only English troops that could possibly oppose 
 him were shut up, to the number of about a hundred, in Madras ; 
 about 250 were in Arkat. The allied French and Indian forces 
 were, therefore, practically unopposed in the field. Using 
 their advantages — I will not say to the utmost, for, placed in 
 their position, Clive would have employed them far more 
 effectively — the allies ravaged the territory belonging to the 
 East India Company down to the very seaside; burned several 
 villages, and plundered the country houses built by the English 
 at the foot of St. Thomas's Mount. The fact that peace existed 
 between France and England probably deterred them from 
 attempting an attack upon Madras. They worked, however, as 
 much damage in its neighbourhood as would affect very sensi- 
 bly the revenues of the country, and then, marched on Kanchi- 
 puram (Conjeveram). Having repaired the damages which the 
 English had caused to the fortified pagoda of this place only 
 a very short time before, they placed in it a garrison of 
 300 native troops; then moving to Vendalur, twenty-five 
 miles south of Madras, established there a fortified camp, from 
 which they levied contributions on the country around. 
 Although the forts of Punamalli and Arkat invited attack, they 
 attempted no serious military enterprise. Their aim was so to 
 threaten the English as to force them to send all their available 
 troops into the province of north Arkat, and thus to procure 
 for the French besiegers of Trichinapalli the time necessary to 
 capture that place. They were to run their heads against nc 
 
22 
 
 The Decisive Baltics of I nd'ia. 
 
 walls, to keep their troops fresh for the emergency which was 
 certain, when it should come, to demand all their energies, and 
 then suddenly to strike the one blow which would secure the 
 supremacy of the French in Southern India. It was an ex- 
 tremely well-devised plan, and it very nearly succeeded. 
 
 In the outset it met with the success which had been hoped 
 for. It procured a respite for Trichinapalli. Clive, engaged 
 at Fort St. David in making preparations for the relief of that 
 place, was suddenly ordered to proceed to Madras, and to use 
 there to the best advantage the means he would find at his dis- 
 posal. Clive set out, reached Madras early in February, found 
 there about ioo Europeans and a few half -drilled native 
 levies, and expectations of the daily arrival of about the same 
 number of Europeans from Bengal. A few days later these 
 expectations were fulfilled. The interval had been employed 
 in ordering up four-fifths of the Europeans and 500 of the 
 sipahis forming the garrison of Arkat, in drilling the native 
 levies, in raising others, in laying in stores for a campaign, and 
 in obtaining information regarding the enemy. Clive soon 
 learned that the allies lay still at Vendaliir, apparently waiting 
 to receive him there. On the 20th February the troops from 
 Bengal arrived; on the 21st Clive received information that 
 the garrison of Arkat would march in, the following morning. 
 No time was to be lost if Trichinapalli were to be saved. On 
 the 22nd, then, Clive set out from Madras, and, joined that 
 day by his old soldiers from Arkat, marched at once in the 
 direction of Vendaliir. His united force consisted of 380 
 Europeans and 1,300 sipahis, with six field-pieces. Marching 
 all night, he hoped to be able to surprise the enemy early the 
 following morning. But it formed no part of the French plan 
 to await the arrival of Clive in their camp at Vendaliir. Well 
 served by their spies, they were acquainted with all the move- 
 ments of their enemy. On the night preceding the day, then, 
 on which Clive set out from Madras, the French and their 
 allies, acting on a plan preconcerted to puzzle the English 
 
Kaveripak. 2 3 
 
 leader, quitted Vendalur, and marched in different directions. 
 Re-uniting at Kanchipuram, they hurried by a forced march 
 to Arkat, hoping to surprise its reduced garrison. With this 
 object in view they had corrupted some of the native soldiers 
 within the fort, and had pre-arranged with these to make a 
 signal, to which, if all were satisfactory, their friends were to 
 reply. They entered the town of Arkat very early in the morn- 
 ing, and made the signal. Receiving no response, they con- 
 cluded — what was the fact— that the plot had been discovered. 
 Then, reverting to their tactics of marching away in different 
 directions, they quitted Arkat, only to re-unite at Kaveripak 
 and occupy there a position, in which it had been pre- 
 determined, even should the attempt on Arkat succeed, to 
 receive Clive. They had marched fifty-eight miles in less than 
 thirty hours. 
 
 The French plans showed very skilful calculation. It will 
 be clear to the reader that their object had been to alarm Clive 
 regarding their real aims, to draw him on by forced marches 
 towards a position where he could only fight at disadvantage. 
 The attempt on Arkat would, they knew, incite the English 
 leader to desperate exertions. They divined, moreover, that 
 pressing to its relief, and marching by night, he would fall 
 into the trap they had laid for him, for marching on Arkat he 
 must traverse the town of Kaveripak. Before he could reach 
 it they would have several hours for rest and preparations. 
 Their anticipations were realized almost to the letter. 
 
 Clive, we have seen, had set out from Madras on the 22nd, 
 with the object of surprising, by a forced march, the hostile 
 forces at Vendalur. He had not proceeded quite half-way, 
 however, when intelligence reached him of their sudden dis- 
 appearance from that place and their dispersion in different 
 directions. The second portion of the intelligence left him no 
 option but to push on to Vendalur with all speed, to make there 
 the necessary inquiries. He arrived there about three o'clock 
 in the afternoon to find the enemy had disappeared, no one 
 
24 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 knew, or no one would say, whither. A few hours later certain- 
 intelligence reached him that they were at Kanchipuram. That 
 place was twenty miles distant. It was nine o'clock; his men 
 had that day marched twenty-five miles; but they had had a 
 rest of five hours, had eaten, and were in good spirits. Clivc, 
 therefore, pushed on at once, and by a forced march, reached 
 Kanchipuram about four o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, to 
 find that the French and their allies had been there only once 
 again to disappear. He felt certain now that they would 
 attempt Arkat. Without positive intelligence, however, and 
 with troops, who, for the most part, without any previous train- 
 ing, had marched forty-five miles in twenty-four hours, he felt 
 it unadvisable to move further. Contenting himself with sum- 
 moning the pagoda, which surrendered on the first citation, he 
 ordered his troops to rest. A few hours later his conjecture 
 was confirmed by positive information that the French were in 
 full march on Arkat. Certain that a crisis was approaching 
 which would demand all the energies of his men Clive did not 
 disturb their slumbers. 
 
 Arkat is twenty-seven miles from Kanchipuram. Although 
 Clive entertained no doubt whatever that the former place 
 would resist successfully the attempt which, he now felt sure, 
 the French and their allies would make upon it, he was natur- 
 ally anxious to reach it with as little delay as possible. 
 Accordingly, after granting the troops a few hours' sleep and 
 a meal, he started a little after noon, on the road to Arkat. 
 Towards sunset his troops had covered sixteen miles, and had 
 come within sight of the town of Kaveripak. They were 
 marching leisurely, in loose order, totally unsuspicious of 
 danger, when suddenly, from the right of the road, from a 
 point distant about 250 yards, there opened upon them a brisk 
 artillery fire. That fire proceeded from the French guns. 
 
 That the reader may clearly understand the position, I pro- 
 pose to return for a moment to the French and their allies. I 
 have already related how, in the early part of this very day, 
 
Kchcripdk. 25 
 
 their combined forces, after having vainly attempted Arkat, 
 had marched on Kaveripak, and taken up there a strong posi- 
 tion, barring the road to Clive. In numbers they were superior 
 to him, but mainly only in cavalry. Clive had no horsemen 
 with him. His enemy had 2,500. In other respects they ex- 
 ceeded him only slightly, having 400 Europeans to his 380, 
 2.000 sipahis to his 1.^00, and nine guns and three mortars to 
 his six guns. I have searched the French records in vain to 
 find the name of their European commander. In this respect 
 he has been fortunate, for the conduct he displayed on this 
 occasion was not of a character to evoke the gratitude of his 
 nation. The commander of the natives, and nominal com- 
 mander of the whole force, was Riza Sahib, son of the titular 
 Nuwab of the Karnatak. 
 
 The position they occupied had been extremely well chosen. 
 A thick grove of mango-trees, covered along its front on two 
 sides by a ditch and bank, forming almost a small redoubt, 
 fortified on the faces towards which an enemy must advance, 
 and open only on the sides held in force by the defenders, 
 covered the ground about 250 yards to the left of the road 
 looking eastward. In this the French had placed their battery 
 of nine guns and a portion of their infantry. About a hundred 
 yards to the right of the road, looking eastward, and almost 
 parallel with it, was a dry watercourse, along the bed of which 
 troops could march, sheltered, to a great extent, from hostile 
 fire. In this were massed the remainder of the infantry, Euro- 
 pean and native. The ground between the watercourse and 
 the grove and to the right of the former was left for the cavalry 
 to display their daring. The allies were expecting Clive, and 
 were on the alert. They had hoped that, marching unsus- 
 piciously along the high read, he would fall into the trap they 
 had laid, and that what with the guns on his right, the infantry 
 on his left, the cavalry in his front, and his own baggage train 
 in his rear, escape for him would be impossible. 
 
 We have seen that Clive did fall into the trap. Marching 
 
26 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 unsuspiciously along the high road, the fire from the guns in 
 the grove on his right gave him the first warning of his danger. 
 That fire, fortunately, was delivered a little too soon, before 
 the infantry had reached a corresponding point in the water- 
 course. Still his position was full of peril. He was thoroughly 
 surprised. Before he could bring up his own guns many of 
 his men had fallen, whilst the sight of the cavalry moving 
 rapidly round the watercourse, and thus menacing his rear, 
 showed him that the danger was not only formidable but 
 immediate. 
 
 It was ever a characteristic of Clive that danger roused all 
 his faculties. Never did he see more clearly, think more accur- 
 ately, or act with greater decision than when the circumstances 
 were sufficiently desperate to drive any ordinary man to despair. 
 He was true to his characteristic on this eventful evening. 
 Though surprised, he was in a moment the cool, calculating, 
 thoughtful leader, acting as though men were not falling 
 around him, and the difficulties to be met were entirely under 
 his control. As soon as possible he placed three guns in a 
 position to reply to the enemy's fire. Detecting at the same 
 time the use which might be made of the watercourse, both for 
 him and against him, he directed the main body of his infantry 
 to take shelter within it. Then, to check the movement of the 
 enemy's horsemen round the watercourse, he hurried two of his 
 guns, supported by a platoon of Europeans and 200 sipahis, to 
 a position on his own left of it; whilst at the same time, to 
 clear the space around him, he directed that the baggage carts 
 and baggage animals should march half a mile to the rear 
 under the guard of a platoon of sipahis and two guns. Giving 
 his orders calmly and clearly, with the air of a man confident 
 in himself and in his fortunes, he saw them carried out with 
 precision, before the enemy, using badly their opportunity, had 
 made much impression upon him. 
 
 Still the chances were all against him. He could net advance 
 under the walls of that mango grove fortress bristling with 
 
Kaveripak. - ) 
 
 guns. He could not retreat in the face of that cavalry. He 
 must fight at great disadvantage on the ground he occupied. 
 The truth of the last proposition soon made itself apparent. 
 On his left, indeed, his men in the watercourse just held their 
 own. They exchanged a musketry fire with the French ad- 
 vancing from the other end, but neither party cared or dared 
 to have recourse to the decisive influence of the bayonet. 
 Beyond that, the enemy's cavalry were kept in check, for 
 though they made many charges against the infantry and two 
 guns on the English left of the watercourse, and even against 
 the platoon in charge of the baggage, they made them in a 
 manner which showed that the morale of the European gave 
 him a strength not to be measured by numbers. In a word, 
 they did not dare to charge home. But though he held his 
 own in the other parts of the field, Clive was soon made to feel 
 that on the right he was being gradually overpowered. The 
 vastly superior fire from the guns in the grove fortress came 
 gradually to kill or disable all his gunners and to silence 
 his guns. 
 
 It was a situation which, Clive felt, could not be borne long. 
 
 Those guns must be silenced or else . The historian of 
 
 that period, Mr. Orme, says that "prudence seemed to dictate 
 a retreat." If prudence so counselled, it was that bastard 
 prudence, the bane of weak and worn-out natures, the dis- 
 regard of which gained for Clive all his victories, which alone 
 made possible the marvels of the Italian campaign of 1796, 
 the too great regard to which made Borodino indecisive and 
 entailed all the horrors of the Russian retreat. Such prudence, 
 we may be sure, presented itself to the minds of many fighting 
 under the orders of Clive, but not for one single instant to the 
 mind of Clive himself. Without cavalry, to abandon the field 
 in which he had been beaten to a victorious enemy largely 
 furnished with that arm, would be to court absolute destruc- 
 tion. And the destruction of Clive's army meant the fall of 
 Trichinapalli, the permanent predominance of French in- 
 
28 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 fluence throughout Southern India. That was the stake 
 fought for at Kaveripak. 
 
 No, there was no alternative. It was ten o'clock. The fight 
 had lasted four hours and his men were losing confidence. 
 The grove fortress must be stormed—but how? If the enemy 
 possessed a real commander it was impossible. The experience 
 of Clive in warfare against the combined forces of the nations 
 then opposed to him had, however, led him to the conclusion 
 that confidence often produced carelessness. What if the 
 grove fortress could be entered from the open faces in its 
 rear It was just possible that, m the confidence inspired by 
 having to meet an enemy advancing only from the front, the 
 French might have left these unguarded. It was a chance, 
 perhaps a desperate chance, but worthy at all events of trial. 
 Thus thinking, Clive, selecting from the men about him an 
 intelligent sergeant, well acquainted with the native language, 
 sent him, accompanied by a few sipahis, to reconnoitre. After 
 an interval which, though brief, seemed never-ending, the 
 sergeant returned with the happy intelligence that the rear 
 approaches to the mango grove had been left unguarded. The 
 incident which followed showed how completely Clive was the 
 master-spring of the machinery. He had decided — should the 
 report of the sergeant prove satisfactory — to take 200 of his 
 best Europeans — that is considerably more than half, for by 
 this time nearly forty of the 380 had been killed and more 
 had been wounded — and 400 natives, and lead them, preceded 
 by the sergeant as guide, on the desperate enterprise. He so 
 far carried out his scheme that he withdrew the men, to the 
 number and of the composition mentioned, from the water- 
 course, and marched stealthily m the direction indicated by 
 the sergeant. But the departure of this considerable body, 
 and above all, the departure of the leader himself, completed 
 the dismay of the troops left behind in the watercourse. They 
 suddenly ceased firing, and made every preparation for flight. 
 Some of them even quitted the field. The sudden cessation 
 
Kdveripdk. 29 
 
 of firing revealed to Clive — when he had already proceeded 
 half way on his expedition— that his presence was absolutely 
 required on the spot he had recently quitted. He, therefore, 
 made over the command of the detached party to the next 
 senior officer, Lieutenant Keene, and returned to the water- 
 course. He arrived there in the very nick of time. His men, 
 confused, dispirited, and disheartened, were running away. 
 Fortunately the enemy had taken no advantage of their de- 
 moralized condition. Clive went amongst them, and succeeded, 
 though with difficulty, m restoring order and in inducing them 
 to renew their fire. To ensure the success of the other move- 
 ment, it was only necessary that they should impose on the 
 enemy at this point. Influenced by the presence of Clive they 
 did this, but it is doubtful whether they would, in their then 
 state, have ventured, even under his leading, upon anything 
 more daring. To induce them to act as they did act it was 
 absolutely necessary that Clive should remain with them. 
 
 Meanwhile Keene's detachment was proceeding on its 
 perilous enterprise. Making a large circuit, that officer reached 
 —at about half-past ten o'clock — a position immediately 
 opposite the rear of the grove, and about 300 yards from it. 
 He then halted, and calling to him one of his officers who, 
 fortunately, understood French perfectly (Ensign Symmonds), 
 directed him to advance alone, and examine the dispositions 
 made by the enemy. Symmonds had not proceeded far when 
 he came to a deep trench, in which a large body, consisting of 
 native soldiers — whose services had not been required in the 
 watercourse — were sitting down to avoid the random shots of 
 the fight. These men challenged Symmonds and prepared at 
 first to shoot him, but deceived by his speaking French, they 
 allowed him to pass. Symmonds then made his way to the 
 grove and boldly entered it. The sight that met his gaze was 
 eminently satisfactory. The guns were manned by men en- 
 gaged in directing their fire against the English position on 
 the high road. Supporting these guns and gunners were about 
 
30 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 a hundred French soldiers, whose attention was so entirely 
 absorbed by the events in front of them that they paid no 
 attention to their rear, which was entirely unguarded. It now 
 became the object of Symmonds not only to return, but to 
 return by a way which should avoid the sipahis in the ditch, 
 as much to ensure his own safety as to find a clear road for his 
 own countrymen. Fortune came to the aid of his calm and 
 cool self-possession. Taking a direction to the right of that 
 occupied by the sipahis in the ditch, he rejoined his party 
 without meeting a single person. Success was now certain. 
 Keene at once gave the order to advance. Proceeding by the 
 path by which Symmonds had returned, he marched unper- 
 ceived to within thirty yards of the enemy's Europeans. 
 Halting here, he poured into them a volley. The effect was 
 decisive. Many of the Frenchmen fell dead; the remainder 
 were so astonished that, without even attempting to return the 
 fire, they turned and fled, abandoning guns and position ; 
 every man anxious only to save himself. In the heedlessness 
 of sudden despair many of them ran into a building at the 
 further end of the grove which had served as a caravanserai 
 for travellers. It was running into a trap, a trap, moreover, 
 in which they were so crowded that they could not use their 
 arms. The English followed them up closely, and seeing 
 their defenceless condition offered them quarter on condition 
 of surrender. These terms were joyfully accepted, and the 
 Frenchmen coming out one by one delivered up their arms 
 and, to the number of sixty, constituted themselves prisoners. 
 Many of the sipahis escaped. 
 
 The battle was now gained, for though the troops in the 
 watercourse — ignorant of the events passing in the grove — 
 continued their fire some time longer, the arrival of fugitives 
 soon induced them to abandon their position and seek safety 
 in flight. The field being thus cleared, Clive re-united his 
 force, and halted on the field under arms till daybreak. Sur- 
 veying the horizon by the light of the early morn not an enemy 
 
Kaveripak. 3 1 
 
 was to be seen. Fifty Frenchmen and 300 of their native 
 soldiers lay dead on the field; besides these there were many 
 wounded. He had captured nine field-pieces and three 
 mortars, and he had sixty prisoners. On his own side he had 
 lost in killed, mainly from the fire of the enemy's guns, forty- 
 Europeans and thirty sipahis. A great number of both were 
 likewise wounded. 
 
 But the guns he had captured and the prisoners he had made 
 constituted but an infinitesimal portion of the real advantages 
 Clive had gained on this well-fought field. Sir John Malcolm 
 attributes to the battle of Kaveripak the distinction "of 
 restoring," or "rather," he says, "of founding the reputation 
 of the British arms in India"; for before that "no event had 
 occurred which could lead the natives to believe that the Eng- 
 lish, as soldiers, were equal to the French." That was most 
 undoubtedly its moral effect. D'Espremenil's sortie from 
 Madras and the victory of Paradis at St. Thome had revo- 
 lutionized the relative positions of the natives and the French 
 settlers. It had given the latter a moral preponderance, fore- 
 shadowing supremacy, in Southern India. In that moral pre- 
 ponderance the English had, at first, a very light share. They 
 had fallen back before the greater daring and energy of their 
 European rivals. They had done little to impress, generally, 
 the minds of the natives. The famous Maratha leader ex- 
 pressed the prevailing opinion of his countrymen when he 
 stated that prior to Clive's heroic defence of Arkat he had 
 been convinced that the English could not fight. But even 
 the favourable impression created by that brilliant feat of 
 arms had been partly neutralized by the fact that another and 
 a larger body of Englishmen had allowed themselves to be 
 cooped up and besieged in Trichinapalli. Had the English 
 lost the day at Kaveripak there can be no doubt but that the 
 favourable impression created by Arkat would have been re- 
 placed by the feelings which had preceded it, and the defence 
 of that fortress would have been universally regarded as the 
 
32 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 exception which proved the rule. The moral effect of Clive's 
 great victory, then, was greater even than to confirm the belief 
 created at Arkat that the English could fight. It produced 
 the conviction not only that they could fight, but that they 
 could fight better than the French. It transferred to the 
 English, in fact, the moral preponderance which d'Espre- 
 menil and Paradis had gained for the French at Madras and 
 St. Thome. In the history of decisive battles it becomes, then, 
 the logical sequence of Paradis' victory. Its material results 
 were not less important. On the mode in which it was decided 
 depended the possibility of the relief of Trichinapalli by the 
 English before that place should succumb by famine or by 
 arms to its French besiegers. On the successful defence of 
 Trichinapalli depended whether English influence or French 
 influence was to predominate in Southern India. Had that 
 place fallen, French influence would have been assured for 
 ever. That nation virtually ruled the dominions now known 
 as those of the Nizam, including the districts called the 
 Northern Sirkars. They only wanted Trichinapalli and 
 Tanjur to complete their control of Southern India, the inde- 
 pendent kingdom of Maisiir alone excepted. Had Clive been 
 defeated at Kaveripak it would have been impossible to relieve 
 Trichinapalli. The French power would have received so 
 great an accession of strength, moral and material, that the 
 English would have found sufficient employment for their 
 soldiers in the defence of their own possessions. Trichina- 
 palli, even if it had not been attempted, would have been 
 starved into surrender. 
 
 Materially, then, as well as morally, may the victory gained 
 by Clive be classified amongst the decisive battles of India. 
 It was a very decisive battle. Materially, as well as morally, 
 it caused the transfer of preponderance in Southern India 
 from the French to the English. It made possible the relief 
 of Trichinapalli, and ensured the surrender of the largest 
 French army which had till then fought in India. That sur- 
 
Kaveripak. 33 
 
 render gave the English a position, which, though often 
 assailed during the thirty years that followed, they never 
 wholly lost, and which extending year by year its roots, can 
 now never be eradicated. 
 
 In other respects the battle of Kaveripak is well worthy of 
 study. The French lost that battle by their neglect to guard 
 the weak points of their position. Had they possessed a com- 
 mander who knew his business they might have won it before 
 Clive made his forlorn attempt against that point. With their 
 immense superiority of artillery on their left, in a secure posi- 
 tion there, they had but to advance their centre and right, 
 strengthened with every available man, to have forced Clive 
 from his position. Their numerous cavalry would have com- 
 pleted his discomfiture. Not possessing a daring leader, they 
 waited in their grove fortress for the slower but apparently 
 not less certain process; for the consequences sure, under 
 ordinary circumstances, to result from a superior artillery fire, 
 with cavalry handy to complete its effect. Adopting this 
 slower process, knowing the character of the leader opposed to 
 them, they should have guarded with more than ordinary care 
 the weak points of their own position. Neglecting to do this, 
 they gave that leader a chance which ruined them in the very 
 hour of their triumph. 
 
 On the other side, this battle revealed, more than any of his 
 previous encounters, the remarkable characteristics of Clive as 
 a commander. Granted that he was surprised. On this point 
 I will simply remark that a general unprovided with cavalry, 
 pursuing an enemy well furnished with horsemen, compelled 
 by circumstances outside his own immediate sphere of action 
 to strike boldly and to strike at once, can with difficulty avoid 
 walking into a trap such as that laid for Clive at Kaveripak. 
 But mark his readiness, his coolness, his decision, his nerve, his 
 clear head and his calm courage, when he found himself com- 
 promised. Without even the shadow of hesitation he acted as 
 though he had no doubt as to the issue. Inspiring his men 
 
 D 
 
34 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 with a confidence in himself which may be termed absolute, he 
 moved them as a player moves his pawns on a chess-board. 
 Doubtless his death would have been followed by disaster. 
 This became apparent when for a few moments he left the men 
 in the watercourse to superintend the decisive movement to his 
 right. But there is not a single great commander to whom the 
 same remark might not apply. Deprived of its head, the body 
 will always become inert. At Kaveripak the discord caused 
 by the short absence of the leader from his accustomed place 
 on the field, and the restoration of confidence produced by his 
 return, proved very clearly how the spirits of the men rested on 
 him, how without him their confidence would have vanished. 
 Victory is to the general who makes the fewest mistakes. 
 Granted, as I have said, that Clive committed one great initial 
 error by being led into a trap. That was his only error. He 
 repaired it in a manner which deserves to be studied as an 
 example to all commanders. But for the enemy who, having 
 caught him, let him go — for the want of enterprise displayed 
 by their cavalry — for their supineness, their neglect of ordinary 
 military precaution — for the marked absence of leadership on 
 their side — the historian cannot find words too strong to ex- 
 press condemnation. They thoroughly deserved their defeat. 
 It is a curious fact that the darkness, which in the outset 
 seemed to favour their plans, ultimately gave opportunity for 
 their overthrow. Clive could not have made his turning move- 
 ment by daylight. So much the more worthy of condemnation 
 is the carelessness which gave opportunities to a leader who 
 had proved himself on other fields to be as enterprising and as 
 daring as he was tenacious and fertile in expedients. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 PLASSEY* 
 
 IN the year 1644 there was a great commotion in the palace of 
 the Great Mughul at Agra. The clothes of a favourite 
 daughter of the reigning Emperor, Shah Jahan, had caught 
 fire, and the princess had been severely burnt before the flames 
 could be extinguished. In vain did native physicians of great 
 learning and celebrity employ their skill and devote their time 
 to effect a cure. To soothe the anxiety of the sorrowing father, 
 some courtiers reminded him of the reputation which certain 
 settlers from a distant country, carrying on their trade at 
 Siirat, had acquired for proficiency in the healing art. Catch- 
 ing at the idea, Shah Jahan dispatched forthwith a messenger 
 to the town on the Tapti, bearing a request that the foreign 
 settlers would place at his disposal one of their most skilful 
 practitioners. The settlers hastened to respond, and deputed 
 
 * Long usage has, in this case, as in the cases of Calcutta, Pondichery 
 and Bombay, sanctioned an incorrect spelling. The proper rendering 
 of the name of this place is Palasi, from the palas tree (Butea frondosaj, 
 which used to abound in the vicinity. The " A'in-i-Akbari " makes 
 special mention of the palas as the wood of which the balls for the game 
 of changdn (hockey) by night were made in the time of Akbar. ''His 
 Majesty also plays at changdn on dark nights, which caused much 
 astonishment, even among clever players. The balls which are used at 
 night are set on fire. For this purpose pal/is wood is used, which is very 
 light, and burns for a long time." — Blochmann's A'in-i-Akbari, page 
 298. 
 
36 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Mr. Gabriel Boughton, surgeon of the East India Company's 
 ship Hopewell, to attend the bidding of the ruler of India. 
 
 Mr. Eougri'ion reached Agra, and succeeded in completely 
 curing the princess. Asked to name his own reward, the 
 patriotic Englishman allowed the opportunity of enriching 
 himself to pass, and preferred to the Emperor the request that 
 he would issue a firman granting permission to the English 
 to trade in Bengal free of all duties, and to establish factories 
 in the province. The firman was granted, and Mr. Boughton, 
 taking it with him, set off at once to Rajmahal, where the 
 Viceroy of Bengal, Sultan Shuja, second son of the Emperor, 
 held his court. 
 
 Seven years before the event just recorded the Surat mer- 
 chants had obtained a firman which permitted them to trade 
 in Bengal, but which restricted them to the port of Pipli, in 
 the province of Orisa. The trade to this port had been opened, 
 but the results had been so unsatisfactory that in 1643-4 the 
 question whether the establishment at Pipli should be main- 
 tained or broken up was under the serious consideration of 
 the Court of Directors. 
 
 The question was still pending when Mr. Boughton arrived 
 with the revivifying firman at Rajmahal. His good fortune 
 accompanied him to that place also. One of the royal ladies 
 of the zenana of Sultan Shuja was lying ill; in the opinion of 
 the native physicians hopelessly ill. Boughton cured her. 
 Thenceforth the gratitude of the prince was unbounded. It 
 displayed itself during the twelve years that followed in the 
 assistance afforded to the Englishman in carrying out his 
 scheme for establishing the trade in Bengal on an efficient and 
 a permanent basis. Under his protection factories were estab- 
 lished at Hugh', and agencies at Patna and Kasimbazar, and a 
 little later at Dhakah and Baleshwar (Balasore). 
 
 The privilege of free trade throughout the provinces of 
 Bengal and Orisa was likewise granted for the annual nominal 
 payment of Rs. 3,000. 
 
Plassey. $"] 
 
 The violent changes which occurred in the native dynasties 
 during the forty years that followed did not practically affect 
 the position thus secured to the English. But in the beginning 
 of the year 1689, in consequence of the tyrannical conduct of 
 Niiwab Shaista Khan, governor of the province for the Em- 
 percr Aurangzib, the Company's xA.gent-in-Chief, Mr. Job 
 Charnock, quitted Hugli with his subordinates, and sailed for 
 Madras. Fortunately for English interests, Shaista Khan was 
 succeeded during the same year by Ibrahim Khan. This man, 
 known to our countrymen of that period as "the famously just 
 and good Niiwab," invited the English to return. Mr. Charnock 
 complied (July 1690), but instead of proceeding to his old 
 quarters at Hugli he established the English factory at the 
 village of Chatanati, north of the then existing town of Cal- 
 cutta,* twenty-seven miles nearer to the sea than the station he 
 abandoned. Mr. Charnock survived the removal only eighteen 
 months. 
 
 At this time the English settlers had no permission to fortify 
 Chatanati, and their military establishment consisted of only 
 100 men. A rebellion against the Niiwab which broke out in 
 Bengal in 1695, under the leadership of Siibah Singh, a Hindu 
 zamindar of Bardhwan, forced them to solicit, and enabled 
 them to obtain, permission to defend themselves. They pro- 
 ceeded at once to erect walls of masonry, with bastions or 
 flanking towers at the angles, round their factory. The bastions 
 were made capable of bearing guns, but in order not to excite 
 the suspicion of the Niiwab, the embrasures were built up on 
 
 * Calcutta, or, as it was spelt by the natives, "Kalikata," is men- 
 tioned in the " A'in-i-Akbari of Abul Fazl, written in 1596." The 
 village of Chatanati extended from the present mint to the Soba bazaar. 
 For these and other details regarding the making of Calcutta I would 
 refer the reader to a very remarkable pamphlet, "Calcutta during the 
 Last Century," written and given as a lecture by the late Professor 
 Blochmann, M.A., whose untimely death in 1878 was a deadly blow to 
 Oriental investigation. The little pamphlet, which ought to be pre- 
 served, was printed by Mr. Thomas Smith, City Press, Bentinck Street, 
 Calcutta. 
 
38 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 the exterior with a facing of wall, one brick thick. This was 
 the origin of the old fort, also called Fort William. It covered 
 the site of the localities now known as Fairlie Place, the Custom 
 House, and Koilah Ghat Street. Before the walls had been 
 quite completed an attack was made upon it by the insurgents, 
 who had set fire to the villages in the neighbourhood, but they 
 were repulsed.* 
 
 On account of the rebellion Ibrahim Khan was removed by 
 the Emperor, who, after a short interval, sent his grandson, 
 Prince 'Azim u'sh Shan, to govern the province. From this 
 prince, by means of a present of Rs. 16,000, the English ob- 
 tained a grant of the three villages of Chatanati, Gobmdpur, 
 and Calcutta, with the lands adjacent to their fortified factory. 
 As the wall of fortification occupied a portion of the ground 
 appertaining to the village of Calcutta, that name was, for 
 the first time, applied to the whole settlement (1699). The 
 Company by this cession came to occupy the position of a 
 zamindar, possessing administrative powers within the limits 
 of the grant, and paying a yearly rental to the overlord. In 
 consequence of these acquisitions the Bengal settlement was 
 raised to the rank of a Presidency, with a governor, or, more 
 correctly, a president in council, independent of Madras. The 
 council of the new president was to consist of five members, 
 inclusive of himself, t 
 
 In 1699 a new English company made a settlement at Hugli, 
 in rivalry with the old company. The seven years which fol- 
 lowed were principally marked by negotiations between the 
 servants of the two companies. These terminated in 1706-7 
 by their fusion under the title of the United Company of 
 Merchants of England trading to the East Indies. Hugli was 
 
 * Mr. Wheeler states that the rebels were " routed by fifty English 
 soldiers in front of the factory at Chatanati." Early Records of British 
 India. 
 
 f These were— the president, a vice-president and accomptant, a 
 warehouse-keeper, a purser of marine and a receiver of revenues and 
 general manager 
 
/Hassey. 39 
 
 abandoned, and the strength of the United Company was con- 
 centrated within the limits of the three villages I have men- 
 tioned. Thenceforth, and for the ten years which followed, 
 the contention was between the English settlers and the native 
 lords of Bengal, the former persistently striving to extend 
 free commercial intercourse with Bengal and to strengthen 
 their fortifications, the latter constantly endeavouring to exact 
 larger revenues from the English zamindars. 
 
 A circumstance, not dissimilar to that which had procured 
 for the English the permission to establish factories and to 
 trade freely in Bengal, came about this time to improve their 
 fortunes and to extend their influence in the province. In 17 13 
 the President of the Council despatched to the Court of Dihli 
 an embassy composed of two European gentlemen, an 
 Armenian interpreter, and a surgeon. The name of the surgeon 
 was William Hamilton. 
 
 When the embassy reached Dihli, Farrakhsiyar, great- 
 grandson of Aurangzib, had but recently, by the defeat at 
 Agra of his uncle, Jahandar Shah, obtained the throne of the 
 Mughul. This prince had been suffering for some time from 
 a complaint which had baffled all the skill of his physicians, 
 and which compelled him to defer a marriage upon which he 
 had set his heart, with a Hindu princess of Rajputana. 
 Hamilton cured him. To show his gratitude, the Emperor, 
 after the manner of Shah Jahan, requested him to name his 
 reward. Hamilton, as patriotic and as careless of self-interest 
 as Boughton, asked that the privileges granted to his country- 
 men in Bengal might be extended, and that they might be 
 relieved from the exactions and oppressions of the Governor 
 of Bengal. The Emperor promised to comply, and, after 
 some delay, issued (1717)* a firman confirming all previous 
 grants to the English company, authorizing them to issue 
 papers which, bearing the signature of the President of the 
 
 * Hamilton d'ed that same vear at Calcutta. 
 
40 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Council, should exempt the goods named therein from exam- 
 ination or duty, and bestowing upon them the grant of thirty- 
 eight villages about and below Calcutta, on both sides of the 
 river, on payment of an annual ground-rent. He likewise 
 placed the use of the mint at Murshidabad at their disposal. 
 
 These privileges and this grant greatly increased the pros- 
 perity of Calcutta. For the ten years that followed its 
 progress was enormous. Its trade rapidly developed, the 
 shipping belonging to the port increased to 10,000 tons, and, 
 what was of very great importance, the town attracted the 
 wealthy natives of Bengal. These, by degrees, built houses 
 in and near to it, and brought the influence of their wealth to 
 sustain and increase its prosperity. It should be added that 
 the firm rule of the Nuwab of the province, Murshid Kuli 
 Khan, contributed not a little to this result. Originally op- 
 posed to the new favours extended to the English settlers, 
 especially to that portion of them which would have given 
 them the command of both sides of the river, he had forced 
 them to agree to a- compromise which, whilst it did not inter- 
 fere with their trade, prevented them from obtaining a position 
 dangerous to the interests of the Mughul. He likewise insisted 
 that the free passes should neither be transferable, nor used 
 for the purposes of inland trade, but should be strictly con- 
 fined to the goods of the Company intended for export. These 
 trade rules were insisted upon, not only by Murshid Kuli Khan, 
 but by his son-in-law, Shuja d'd din Khan, who succeeded him 
 on his death, in 1725, and who administered the province for 
 the fourteen years that followed. The firm hand of the 
 Nuwab, and the strict compliance with his reasonable regula- 
 tions on the part of the settlers, combined throughout this 
 period to augment the influence and increase the wealth of 
 the Company. 
 
 Shuja d'd din Khan was succeeded in Bengal in 1739 by his 
 son, Sarfaraz Khan, a debauchee. During his incumbency 
 there occurred that terrible invasion of Nadir Shah, which gave 
 
/'lasscy. 41 
 
 the most fatal blow to the stability of the rule of the Mughul. 
 The subversive feeling, the result of this catastrophe, extended 
 even to Bengal. Ali Vardi Khan, who had risen from the posi- 
 tion of menial servant to the Niiwab of that province to be 
 Deputy-Governor of Bihar, rose in revolt. The despotic con- 
 duct of Sarfaraz Khan had alienated the wealthy and respect- 
 able classes of the province. The great mercantile family of 
 the Seths, the Rothschilds of Bengal, favoured the rebel. His 
 very generals betrayed him. When he marched to crush Ali 
 Vardi Khan with a force vastly superior, they arranged that 
 the guns should be loaded with powder only. The conse- 
 quences were such as might have been expected. When the 
 decisive battle ensued at Ghiriah m January 1741, Sarfaraz 
 Khan was slain, and his nobles and soldiers at once saluted 
 Ali Vardi Khan as Niiwab of the three provinces of Bengal, 
 Bihar, and Orisa. 
 
 The blow dealt by Nadir Shah at Dihli had so crushed the 
 power of the Mughul that this revolution passed unnoticed. 
 Ali Vardi Khan transmitted a handsome offering in money to 
 the Emperor, Muhammad Shah, and was confirmed as Niiwab 
 of Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa, just as any other adventurer who 
 might have supplanted him, and have forwarded a like sum 
 of money, would have been equally confirmed. It was, in fact, 
 the recognition of force — the same recognition which was 
 claimed, and fairly claimed, by the people who afterwards, 
 also by force, supplanted the successor of Ali Vardi Khan. 
 This prince ruled the three provinces for fifteen years, from 
 1741 to 1756. His reign was a continued struggle. He had 
 scarcely succeeded to the position gained on the field of 
 Ghiriah when he was called upon to make head against a 
 Maratha invasion. This invasion was the prelude to many 
 others. They occurred every year from 1742 to 1750. They 
 brought with them terror, desolation, often despair. Ali Vardi 
 Khan resisted the invaders gallantly, and defeated them often. 
 But in the end their numbers and their pertinacity wore him 
 
42 The Decisive Battles of India, 
 
 out; and when, in 1750, they had mastered a great portion of 
 Orisa, he was glad to conclude with them a treaty whereby he 
 yielded to them Katak, and agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 
 twelve lakhs of rupees for Bengal and Bihar. 
 
 These invasions had not, however, interfered with the rising 
 prosperity of the English settlement. Its security, m fact, in- 
 vited more wealthy natives to take up their permanent abode 
 within its bounds. Ali Vardi Khan, whilst continuing the 
 privileges granted by his predecessors, had merely called upon 
 the English, as he called upon all the zamindars of Bengal, to 
 contribute to the expenses of the defence of the province. But 
 such was their prosperity, that in one instance, when the Nuwab 
 was hard pressed, they had paid him without difficulty three 
 lakhs of rupees. Not but that the alarm caused by the 
 Maratha invasion did not reach even Calcutta. But the Eng- 
 lish, prescient in their policy, took advantage of the universal 
 feeling to ask for permission to dig a ditch and throw up an 
 intrenchment round their settlement. The permission was ac- 
 corded and the work was begun; but when three miles of it 
 had been completed, and there were no signs of the approach 
 of the Marathas, its further progress was discontinued. The 
 work, some traces of which still remain, gave a permanent name 
 to the locality, and to this day the slang term "the ditch" is 
 often used to express the commercial capital of Bengal. Per- 
 mission was granted at the same time to erect a wall of masonry 
 with bastions at the corners, round the agency at Kasimbazar. 
 
 From the peace with the Marathas to 1756 nothing occurred 
 to disturb the tranquility of the English. On the 9th of April 
 of that year, however, their protector, Nuwab Ali Vardi Khan, 
 died, and was succeeded by his favourite grandson, Siraju'd 
 daulah. 
 
 This prince, who has been painted by historians in the 
 blackest colours, was not worse than the majority of Eastern 
 princes born in the purple. He was rather weak than vicious, 
 unstable rather than tyrannical, had been petted and spoilt by 
 
Plassey. 43 
 
 his grandfather, had had but little education, and was still a 
 minor. Without experience and without stability of character, 
 suddenly called upon to administer the fairest provinces of 
 India and to assume irresponsible power, what wonder that he 
 should have inaugurated his accession by acts of folly ? 
 
 Surrounded from his earliest youth by flatterers, he had 
 been encouraged to imbibe a hatred towards the foreign settlers 
 on the coast. Their rising prosperity and their wealth, in- 
 creased largely by rumour, excited, there can be no doubt, the 
 cupidity of these brainless flatterers, and these, in their turn, 
 worked on the facile nature of the boy-ruler. 
 
 The result was that Siraju'd daulah determined to inaugur- 
 ate his reign by the despoiling of the English settlers. 
 Charging them with increasing their fortifications and with 
 harbouring political offenders, he seized their factory at 
 Kasimbazar, imprisoned the garrison, and plundered the 
 property found there (4th June, 1756). Five days later he 
 began his march towards Calcutta with an army 50,000 strong, 
 attacked that place on the 15th, and obtained possession of it 
 on the 19th June. 
 
 I would willingly draw a veil over the horrors of the Black 
 Hole. That terrible catastrophe was due, however, not to a 
 love of cruelty on the part of Siraju'd daulah, but to the system 
 which inspired the servants of an absolute ruler with a fetish- 
 like awe for their master. There can be, I think, no doubt that 
 the Niiwab did not desire the death of his English prisoners. 
 Mr. Holwell himself acquits him of any such intention, and 
 attributes the choice of the Black Hole as the place of confine- 
 ment to the ill-will of the subordinate.* As to the catastrophe 
 
 * "I had in all three interviews with him (the Niiwab), the last in 
 Darbar before seven, when he repeated his assurances to me, on the word 
 of a soldier, that no harm should come to us ; and, indeed, I believe his 
 orders were only general that for that night we should be secured ; and 
 that what followed was the result of revenge and resentment in the 
 breasts of the lower jemadars to whose custody we were delivered, for 
 the number of their order killed during the siege." Mr. HohcelVs 
 Narrative. 
 
44 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 itself, its cause was the refusal of the subordinates to awaken 
 the Nuwab. That refusal might have been caused either by 
 fear or by ill-will; but it was their refusal, not the refusal of 
 the chief, who was actually asleep. Thus much, but no more, 
 may, in bare justice, be urged on behalf of Siraju'd daulah. 
 For his conduct after the catastrophe not a word can be said. 
 It is not upon record that he resented it. Most certainly those 
 about him made him believe that the action had been planned 
 with the best motives to draw from the English a confession 
 as to the place where their wealth and treasure were hidden. 
 His first act when he saw Mr. Holwell was to insist upon such 
 confession being made. He expressed no regret, he extended 
 to the captives no compassion, he spoke only of hidden 
 treasures and their place of concealment. By his conduct he 
 placed himself in the position of an accessory after the act. 
 
 The political result of the capture of Calcutta was the 
 uprooting of the English settlements in Bengal. Of those 
 who formed the garrison of Calcutta some had been killed, 
 others had been removed as prisoners to Murshidabad* the 
 remainder had taken refuge on board the English vessels which 
 were waiting, at Falta, the arrival from Madras of the troops 
 who should avenge their wrongs and restore the fallen fortunes 
 of the Company. 
 
 The news of the surrender of Kasimbazar reached Madras 
 on the 15th July. Five days later a detachment of 230 Euro- 
 pean troops, commanded by Major Kilpatrick, of the Com- 
 pany's service, sailed from Madras. They reached Falta on 
 the 2nd August. On the 5th of that month only did the story 
 of the capture of Calcutta and its attendant consequences 
 reach Fort St. George. Although the forces at the disposal 
 of the Coas: Presidency were not more than sufficient to meet 
 the attack from the French which was believed inevitable — 
 France and England being on the brink of a rupture — it was 
 
 * These were subsequently released, and joined the fleet at Falta. 
 
Plassey. 45 
 
 resolved, after some hesitation, to despatch with all convenient 
 haste a fleet and army to restore British fortunes in Bengal. 
 The discussions leading to this conclusion, and afterwards 
 those relating to the choice of a commander, caused very great 
 delay, and it was not till the 16th October that the fleet con- 
 veying the little army sailed. The first ship reached Falta on 
 the nth December. All the others, two only excepted, arrived 
 on or before the 20th. Of the two exceptions, one, the Marl- 
 borough, laden with stores, was so slow that she reached Cal- 
 cutta only towards the end of January; the other, the Cumber- 
 land, grounding off Point Palmyras, was compelled to bear 
 away to Vishakpatanam (Vizagapatam), and reached the river 
 Hugli in the second week of March. 
 
 The commander of the military force was Robert Clive. 
 The victory gained by this officer at Kaveripak had produced 
 the most decisive results. It had enabled the English to relieve 
 Trichinapalli, to force the surrender of the entire French army, 
 to bestow the Niiwabship of the Karnatak upon their own 
 nominee : in fine, it had caused the transfer of the predom- 
 inance in Southern India south of the river Krishna from the 
 French to our countrymen. In January 1753 Clive put the seal 
 to his victories by the capture of the fortresses of Kovilam 
 and Chengalpatt. In the following month he sailed for Eng- 
 land. There he was received and feted as a hero. Of the 
 same age as Bonaparte when Bonaparte made the marvellous 
 campaign of 1796, he had acquired for his country advantages 
 not less solid than those which the great Corsican was to gain 
 in that campaign for France. After a sojourn of more than 
 two years in his native country, Clive, holding the commission 
 of lieutenant-colonel in the King's army, was sent to the Koro- 
 mandal coast as Governor of Fort St. David. For a while his 
 services were diverted to Western India, where, in conjunction 
 with Admiral Watson, he attacked and reduced the piratical 
 stronghold of Ghiriah. Thence he proceeded to Madras in 
 
46 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 time to be selected as the commander of the troops who were 
 to conquer Bengal. 
 
 Clive's force, consisting, exclusive of the men in the Cumber- 
 land, of 800 Europeans, 1,200 native soldiers, and a due pro- 
 portion of artillery, joined the remnants of Major Kilpatrick's 
 detachment, which had been much reduced by disease, on the 
 20th December. Just seven days later the fleet ascended the 
 Hugli. On the 29th the enemy were dislodged from the fort 
 of Bajbaj. The action which took place there, whilst in its 
 details it reflects no credit on the generalship of Clive, was yet 
 so far decisive in its result that it terrified the enemy's general 
 into the abandonment of Calcutta. That place, left with a 
 garrison of only 500 men, surrendered, without attempting a 
 serious resistance, on the 2nd January. Prompt to strike, and 
 anxious at once to terrify the Nuwab and to replenish the 
 coffers of his countrymen, Clive, three days later, dispatched a 
 force to storm and sack Hugli, reputed to be the richest town 
 within a reasonable distance of Calcutta. On the 9th the place 
 was taken. The victors found, to their disappointment, that 
 the more valuable of its stores had been, in anticipation of the 
 attack, removed to the Dutch factory at Chinsurah. 
 
 But Siraju'd daulah had not yet been terrified. Raising an 
 army said to have consisted of 18,000 horse, 15,000 foot, 10,000 
 armed followers, and forty guns, he marched on Calcutta. 
 Clive, who was encamped at Kasipur, observing, on the 2nd 
 February, that advanced parties of the Niiwab's army were 
 defiling upon the plain to the right of the Damdam road, and 
 there taking up a position threatening Calcutta, made an in- 
 effectual attempt to hinder them. The Nuwab arrived with his 
 main body on the 3rd, and encamped just beyond the general 
 line of the Maratha ditch. The following morning Fortune 
 directed to the happiest results an action which seemed at first 
 pregnant with destruction to the English. It had been the 
 intention of Clive to surprise the Niiwab's army and to seize 
 his person; but, misled by a thick fog, he found himself at 
 
riassey. 47 
 
 eight o'clock in the morning in the middle of the enemy's camp 
 and encompassed by his troops. He extricated himself by 
 simply daring to move forwards. The intrepidity of the 
 attempt so intimidated the Nuwab that he drew off his army, 
 and on the 9th February signed a treaty, by which he restored 
 to the English more than their former privileges, and promised 
 the restoration of the property seized at the capture of Calcutta. 
 
 But Clive was not yet satisfied. War had been declared 
 between France and England. His experience in Southern 
 India had shown him how dangerous to English interests 
 would be an active alliance between the French and a strong 
 native power. In the Karnatak he had been able to balance 
 one native force against another. In Bengal such a policy was 
 impossible, for the Nuwab was supreme, and his great officers 
 had not as yet shown themselves impressionable. Then, again, 
 Clive's orders had been to return with his little army to Madras 
 as soon as he should have reconquered Calcutta. But how, in 
 the face of the possibility of an alliance between the Nuwab 
 and the French, could he abandon Calcutta ? To do so would 
 be, he felt, to court for the English settlement permanent 
 destruction. The French general, Bussy, was supreme at 
 Haidarabad, possessed in real sovereignty the northern Sirkars, 
 and rumour had even then pointed to the probability of his 
 entering into negotiations with the Nuwab of Bengal. Under 
 these circumstances the clear military eye of Clive saw but one 
 course consistent with safety. In the presence of two enemies 
 not yet united, but likely to be united, he must strike down one 
 without delay. He would then be able to oppose to the other 
 his undivided forces. 
 
 On this policy Clive acted. In spite of the prohibition of 
 the Nuwab, he struck a blow at the French settlement of Chan- 
 dranagar (Chandernagor), intimidated or bribed to idleness 
 the Nuwab's general marching to its relief, and took the French 
 fort (March 23rd). 
 
 This high-handed proceeding filled the mind of Siraju'd 
 
48 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 daulah with anger and fear. It is impossible for a fair- 
 minded reader to examine the circumstances which surrounded 
 this unfortunate Prince from the time when Clive frightened 
 him into signing the treaty of the 9th February until he met 
 his end after Plassey, without feeling for him deep commisera- 
 tion. His attitude was that of a netted tiger surrounded by 
 enemies whom he feared and hated, but could not crush. 
 Imagine this boy, for he had not yet seen twenty summers, 
 raised in the purple — for his birth was nearly contemporaneous 
 with the accession of his grandfather to power— brought up in 
 the lap of luxury, accustomed to the gratification of every 
 whim, unendowed by nature with the strength of character 
 which would counterbalance these grave disadvantages, in- 
 vested with a power which he had been taught to regard as 
 uncontrollable — imagine this boy set to play the game of 
 empire against one of the coolest and most calculating warriors 
 of the day, a man perfectly comprehending the end at which he 
 was aiming, who had mastered the character of his rival and 
 of the men by whom that rival was surrounded, who was 
 restrained by no scruples, and who was as bold and decided 
 as his rival was wavering and ready to proceed from one 
 extreme to another. But this does not represent the whole 
 situation. The boy so unevenly pitted against the English- 
 man was further handicapped by a constant dread of invasion 
 by the Afghans from the north and by the Marathas from the 
 west. He was afraid, therefore, to put out all his strength to 
 crush the English, lest he should be assailed on his flank or on 
 his rear. This dread added to his native uncertainty, and 
 caused him alternately to cringe to or to threaten his rival. 
 But he was more heavily handicapped still. I have said that 
 his rival was restrained by no scruples. The truth of this 
 remark is borne out by the fact that whilst the unhappy boy 
 Nuwab was the sport of the passion to which the event of the 
 moment gave mastery in his breast, the Englishman was 
 engaged slowly, persistently and continuously in undermining 
 
Plassey. 49 
 
 his position in his own Court, in seducing his generals, and in 
 corrupting his courtiers. When the actual contest came, though 
 individuals here and there were faithful, there was not a single 
 great interest in Murshidabad which was not pledged to 
 support the cause of the foreigner. The Nuwab had even been 
 terrified into removing from his capital and dismissing to 
 Bhagulpur, a hundred miles distant, the one party which 
 would have been able to render him effectual support, a body 
 of Frenchmen commanded by M. Law ! 
 
 The final crisis was precipitated by a curious accident. 
 Whilst the wordy contest between the Calcutta Council and 
 the Nuwab which marked every day of the three months which 
 followed the capture of Chanadrangar was progressing, 
 Siraju'd daulah, always distrustful of the English, had located 
 his army, nominally commanded in chief by his prime 
 minister, Rajah Diilab Ram, and supported by a considerable 
 corps under Mir J'afar Khan— a high nobleman who had 
 married his aunt — at Palasi, a town in the island of Kasim- 
 bazar — called an island because whilst the base of the triangle 
 which composed it was watered by the Ganges, the western 
 side on which lies Palasi is formed by the Bhagirathi, and the 
 eastern by the Jalanghi. Palasi is twenty-two miles from 
 Murshidabad. 
 
 Clive and the Calcutta Council had taken great offence at 
 the location of the Nuwab's army at Palasi, and had affected 
 to regard it as a sign of hostile intent towards themselves. 
 When the relations between the two rival parties were in a 
 state of great tension, a messenger arrived in Calcutta, the 
 bearer of a letter purporting to come from the great Maratha 
 chieftain of Birar, and containing a proposal that he should 
 march with 120,000 men into Bengal and co-operate with the 
 English against the Nuwab. 
 
 For once the clear brain of the director of the English policy 
 was at fault. Clive could not feel quite sure that the letter 
 might not be a device of the Nuwab to ascertain beyond a 
 
 E 
 
50 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 doubt the feelings of the English towards himself. Various 
 circumstances seemed to favour this view. But if his vision 
 was for a moment clouded, the political action of Clive was 
 clear, prompt, decided and correct. Treating the letter as 
 though it were genuine, he sent it to Siraju'd daulah, ostensi- 
 bly as a proof of his confidence, and as the ground for a re- 
 quest that he would no longer keep his army in the held. The 
 plan succeeded. The letter was genuine. The Niiwab was 
 completely taken in. He recalled his army to Murshidabad. 
 For the first time since he had retreated from Calcutta he 
 believed the friendly protestations of the English. 
 
 Never had he less cause to believe them. At that very time 
 the Seths, the great financiers of Murshidabad, were committed 
 against their native ruler; Mir J'afar had been gained over by 
 the English; the Dewan, Rajah Dulab Ram, was a party to the 
 same compact. The bargain with the two latter had been 
 drawn up, and only awaited signature. 
 
 The conduct of Siraju'd daulah himself gave the finishing 
 touch to the conspiracy. Up to the moment of the receipt of 
 the Maratha's letter his fear of the English had somewhat 
 restrained the tyrannical instincts in which he had been wont 
 to indulge at the expense of his own immediate surroundings. 
 But the frankness of Clive in transmitting to him that letter 
 had produced within him a great revulsion of feeling. That 
 revulsion was accompanied by a corresponding change of con- 
 duct. Secure now, as he believed, of the friendship of the 
 English, he began to threaten his nobles. Mir J'afar, the most 
 powerful of them all, was the first intended victim. But this 
 chief, quasi-independent, would not be crushed. Taking 
 refuge in his palace, and summoning his friends and followers, 
 he bade defiance to the Niiwab. Whilst thus acting towards 
 his master, he urged upon Mr. Watts, the English agent at 
 Murshidabad, to press that the English troops should take the 
 field and commence operations at once. 
 
 The treaty by which Clive and the English Council had 
 
 I 
 
Plassey, 51 
 
 engaged to raise Mir J'afar Khan to the quasi-royal seat of his 
 master, on condition of his co-operation in the field, and of his 
 bestowal upon them of large sums of money, had by this time 
 reached Calcutta, signed and sealed. Clive then had no 
 further reason for temporizing. He boldly then threw off the 
 mask, and marched, on the 13th June, from Chandranagar. 
 
 The same da)- Clive dismissed from his camp two agents of 
 the Niiwab, instructing them to notify to their master that he 
 was marching on Murshidabad, with the object of referring the 
 English complaints against him, which he enumerated, to a 
 commission of five officers of his Government. He gave the 
 names of those officers. They were the men who had con- 
 spired with him against their master. 
 
 Mr. Watts, the English agent, had received, previously, in- 
 structions to leave Murshidabad the moment he should con- 
 ceive the movement opportune. He and his subordinates fled 
 from that place on the 13th June, and reached Clive's camp in 
 safety. The evasion of Mr. Watts caused the scales to fall 
 from the eyes of the unhappy Siraju'd daulah. He saw on the 
 moment that the English were in league with Mir J'afar. 
 Always in extremes, he was as anxious now to conciliate, as an 
 hour earlier he had been eager to punish, his powerful vassal. 
 His overtures caused Mir J'afar to make a show of submission, 
 whilst he secretly warned Clive. The other conspirators made 
 similar pretences. The Niiwab then ordered the army to march 
 promptly to take up its former position at Palasi. But here 
 again he was met by unlooked-for opposition. W'hen the 
 leaders of an army are disaffected, indiscipline almost invari- 
 ably permeates the rank and file. So it was now. Large 
 arrears were owing to the men, and they had no great inclina- 
 tion to risk their lives for a personal cause. For it had come 
 to this. The cause did not present itself to their eyes as one in 
 which the national interests were concerned, as one which in- 
 volved the independence of Bengal. To the vast majority it 
 seemed merely to balance one chieftain against another — 
 
52 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Siraju'd daulah, the grandson of a usurper, against Mir J'afar, 
 the most powerful noble of the province. It took three days to 
 restore order among the soldiers, and this result was effected 
 only by the distribution of large sums of money, and of pro- 
 mises. The delay was unfortunate, for the army did not reach 
 its position at Palasi till the 21st (June). 
 
 Meanwhile, Clive, marching from Chandranagar on the 13th, 
 arrived, on the 16th, at Palti, a town on the western bank of 
 the Bhagirathi, about six miles above its junction with the 
 Jalanghi. Hence he dispatched, on the 17th, a force composed 
 of 2CO Europeans, 500 sipahis, with a field-gun and a small 
 howitzer, under Major Eyre Coote, of the 39th Foot, to gain 
 possession of Katwa, a town and fort some twelve miles dis- 
 tant. The occupation of Katwa was important, for not only 
 did the fort contain large supplies of grain and military stores, 
 but its position, covered by the little river Aji, rendered it suffi- 
 ciently strong to serve as a base whence Clive could operate 
 against the island. The native commander at Katwa surren- 
 dered the place to Eyre Coote after only a show of resistance. 
 Clive and the rest of the force arrived there the same evening, 
 and at once occupied the huts and houses in the town and fort. 
 It was a timely shelter, for the periodical rainy season opened 
 with great violence the very next day. 
 
 A few miles of ground and the river Bhagirathi now lay 
 between Clive and Siraju'd daulah. Since his departure from 
 Chandranagar the former had dispatched daily missives to 
 Mir J'afar, but up to the time of his arrival at Katwa he had 
 received but one reply, dated the 16th, apprising him of his 
 reconciliation with the Niiwab, and of his resolve to carry out 
 the engagements he had made with the English. On the 20th, 
 however, two communications, bearing a more doubtful signifi- 
 cance, were received. The first was the report of a messenger 
 returned from conveying a message to Mir J'afar. This man's 
 report breathed so uncertain a sound that Clive wrote to the 
 Select Committee in Calcutta for further orders, expressed his 
 
Plassey. 53 
 
 disinclination to risk his troops without the certainty of co- 
 operation on the part of Mir J'afar, and his resolution, if that 
 co-operation were wanting, to fortify himself at Katwa and 
 dwait the cessation of the rainy season. 
 
 The second communication, received the evening of the same 
 day, was in the form of a letter written by Mir J'afar himself 
 the previous day, just as he was starting from Palasi. In this 
 he stated that he was on the point of setting cut; that he was 
 to be posted on one flank of the army ; that en his arrival at 
 Palasi he would dispatch more explicit information. That was 
 positively all. The letter contained no suggestion as to con- 
 cert between the two confederates. ^>/ 
 
 This letter did not go very far to clear away the embarrass- 
 ment which the communication of the messenger had caused 
 in the mind of the English leader. The questions "how to 
 act," "whether to act at all," had to be solved, and solved 
 without delay. Could he, dare he, with an army consisting, 
 all told, of 3,000 men, of whom about one-third only were 
 Europeans, cross the Bhagirathi and attack an army of some 
 50,000 men, relying on the promises of the commander of less 
 than one-third of those 50,000 that he would betray his master 
 and jcin him during the action? That was the question. 
 Should he decide in the negative, two alternatives presented 
 themselves : the one, to fortify himself at Katwa and await 
 the cessation of the rains; the other, to return to Calcutta. But 
 was either feasible? After having announced to all Bengal 
 his intention to depose Siraju'd daulah — for his plans had 
 been the talk of the bazars and of the camp — -could he, dare 
 he, risk the loss of prestige which inaction or a retreat would 
 involve? Could he, dare he, risk the cooling of his relations 
 with his native confederates, their certain reconciliation with 
 their master, a possible uprising in his rear ? Advance without 
 the cc-operation cf Mir J'afar seemed to be destruction; a halt 
 at Katwa would be the middle course — so dear to prudent men 
 — involving always a double danger; the third course, the 
 
54 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 retreat to Calcutta, meant an eternal farewell to the ambitious 
 and mercenary hopes that had been aroused. Balancing the 
 pros and cons in his mind, Clive, keenly alive to the import- 
 ance of producing an impression upon the minds of the natives 
 by display and by numbers, dispatched that evening a press- 
 ing letter to the Rajah of Bardhwan, begging him to join him, 
 if only with a thousand horsemen. He then summoned all 
 the officers in his camp above the rank of subaltern to a council 
 of war. 
 
 There came to that council, including Clive, twenty officers, 
 some of them, such as Eyre Coote, of the 39th, and James Kil- 
 patrick, of the Madras army, men of capacity and mental 
 power. The question Clive put before them was whether, 
 under existing circumstances, and without other assistance, 
 the army should at once cross into the island of Kasimbazar, 
 and at all events attack the Nuwab; or whether they should 
 fortify themselves at Katwa and wait till the monsoon was 
 over, trusting then to assistance from the Marathas, or some 
 other native power. Contrary to all custom, Clive gave his 
 own vote first, and invited the others to follow his example in 
 order of seniority. Clive voted against immediate action. 
 
 On the same side voted Major Kilpatrick, commanding the 
 Company's troops, Major Archibald Grant, of the 39th, Cap- 
 tains Waggoner and Corneille, of the same regiment, Captain 
 Fischer, Bengal Service, Captains Gaupp and Rumbold, 
 Madras Service, Captains Palmer and Molitor, Bombay Service, 
 Captain Jennings, commanding the Artillery, and Captain Par- 
 shaw, whose service I have been unable to ascertain. Major 
 Eyre Coote took a view totally opposed to theirs. That 
 gallant soldier showed the capacity for command which he 
 possessed, and which he displayed throughout a long and 
 distinguished military career, when he declared in favour of 
 immediate advance, on the following grounds. First, he 
 argued, they had met with nothing but success; the spirit of the 
 troops was high, and that spirit would be damped by delay. 
 
Plassey. 55 
 
 Then he urged that delay would be prejudicial in another 
 sense, inasmuch as it would allow time for the French leader, 
 M. Law, who had been promptly summoned from Bhagalpiir 
 to join the Niiwab, to arrive; that his arrival would not only 
 greatly strengthen that ruler, but would impair the efficiency 
 of the English force, because the French who had been enlisted 
 into its ranks after the fall of Chandranagar would take the 
 first opportunity to desert. Finally, he protested with all his 
 force against the half measure of halting at Katwa. If, he 
 declared, it were thought not advisable to come to immediate 
 action — though he held a contrary opinion — it would be more 
 proper to return to Calcutta at once. He dwelt, however, on 
 the disgrace which such a measure would entail on the army, 
 and the injury it would cause to the Company's interests. 
 Major Eyre Coote was supported in his view by Captains 
 Alexander Grant, Cudmore, Muir and Carstairs, of the Bengal 
 Service; by Captain Campbell, of the Madras, and by Captain 
 Armstrong, of the Bombay Service. The majority against 
 him, however, was thirteen to seven. By nearly two to one the 
 council of war decided not to fight. 
 
 The members of the council separated, and Clive was left 
 alone. The decision had not relieved the anxiety which 
 pressed upon him. Strolling to a piece of ground shaded by a 
 clump of trees, he sat down, and passed in review the argu- 
 ments which had been urged on both sides. A thorough 
 soldier himself, a man who had proved on more than one field 
 that boldness was prudence, and that bastard-prudence carried 
 within it the germs of destruction, he could not long resist the 
 soundness of the views which had been so forcibly urged by 
 Eyre Coote and his supporters. At the end of an hour's re- 
 flection all doubt had disappeared. Fie was once more firm, 
 self-reliant and confident. Rising, he set out to return to his 
 quarters. On his way thither he met Major Eyre Coote. 
 Simply informing him that he had changed his mind, and 
 
56 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 intended to light, Clive entered his quarters and dictated 
 orders for the passage of the river the following morning. 
 
 Deducting the sick and a small guard left at Katwa, the 
 army directed to march against the Niiwab consisted of 950* 
 European infantry and ico European artillery, 50 English 
 sailors, a small detail of native lascars, and 2,100 native troops. 
 The artillery was composed of eight 6-pounders and two small 
 howitzers. Obeying the orders issued the night before, this 
 little force marched down the banks of the Bhagirathi at day- 
 break of the 22nd June, and began the crossing in the boats 
 which had accompanied it from Chandranagar. It encoun- 
 tered no opposition, and by four o'clock the same afternoon it 
 was securely planted on the left bank. Here Clive received 
 another letter from Mir J'afar, informing him that the Niiwab 
 had halted at Mankarah, a village six miles from Kasimbazar, 
 and there intended to entrench himself. The Mir suggested 
 that the English should march up the eastern side of the tri- 
 angle which forms the is^nd and surprise him. 
 
 Such an operation would have cut off Clive from his base, 
 which was now the river Bhagirathi, and have entailed a march 
 round the arc of a circle, whilst his enemy, traversing the chord, 
 could sever him from all his communications. It was not very 
 hopeful to receive such advice from a confederate, himself a 
 soldier who had commanded in many a campaign. Clive met 
 it in the direct and straightforward way calculated to force a 
 decision. He sent back the messenger with the answer that he 
 would march towards Palasi without delay; that the next day 
 he would march six miles further to Daudpur; but that if, 
 reaching that village, Mir J'afar should not join him, he would 
 make peace with the Niiwab. 
 
 The distance to Palasi from the camp on the Bhagirathi, 
 whence this message was dispatched, was fifteen miles. To 
 accomplish those fifteen miles a little army marched at sunset 
 
 * In these were included two hundred men of mixed native and Portu- 
 e;uese blood. 
 
Plassey. 57 
 
 the same day, the 22nd, following the windings of the 
 Ehagirathi, up the stream of which their beats, containing their 
 supplies and auxiliary stores, were towed. After eight hours 
 of extreme fatigue, the overflow of recent inundations causing 
 the water to rise often up to their waists, whilst a deluge 
 poured upon them from above, they reached, weary and worn- 
 out, at one o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, the village of 
 Palasi. Traversing this village, they halted and bivouacked 
 m a large mango grove a short distance beyond it. Here, to 
 their surprise, the sound of martial music reached their ears, 
 plainly signifying that the Niiwab was within striking distance 
 ot them. 
 
 The mango grove which formed the bivouac of the English 
 force was, in fact, little more than a mile from the Niiwab's 
 encampment. It was 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, 
 and was surrounded by an earth-bank and ditch. In its length 
 it was diagonal to the river, fcr whilst the Bhagirathi flowed 
 about fifty yards from its north-west angle, four times that 
 distance intervened between it and the south-western corner. 
 The trees in it were, as is usual in India, planted in regular 
 rows.* Just beyond the grove stood a hunting-box belonging 
 to the Niiwab, surrounded by a masonry wall. Of this Clive, 
 as soon as the sounds of martial music to which I have adverted 
 reached his ears, detached a small force to take possession. It 
 is now time that I should explain how it was that such music 
 came to be in his close vicinity. 
 
 The reader will recollect that in consequence of the mutiny 
 of his troops at Murshidabad the Niiwab had been forced to 
 delay his march from that place till the 19th June. On that 
 day he set out, but on that same day he heard of the arrival of 
 the English army at Katwa. Judging from his knowledge of 
 the character of their leader that they would cress the Bhagi- 
 rathi and march on Palasi without delay, he came to the con- 
 
 * The last of these tre?s, Mr. Hastwick informs us, fell some years ago, 
 and has been eaten by white ants. Murray's Handbook of Bengal, 1882. 
 
8 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 elusion that he had been forestalled at that place, and that it 
 would be better for him to halt at Mankarah and watch thence 
 the course of events. But when, on the 21st, he learned that 
 Clive was still halting at Katwa, his resolution revived, and he 
 marched at once to his old encampment near Palasi, about one 
 mile to the north of the grove of which I have spoken. He 
 had taken his post here twenty-six hours before the English 
 reached the grove. 
 
 His army was strong in numbers. It consisted of 35,000 
 infantry of all sorts; men not trained in the European fashion, 
 but of the stamp of those which may be seen in the present day 
 in and about the chief towns of the territories of native princes 
 of the second or third rank. They were, in fact, men imper- 
 fectly trained and imperfectly armed, and, in the rigid sense 
 of the word, undisciplined. His cavalry, said to have 
 amounted to about 15,000, was better. They were mostly 
 Patans from the north, the race of which the Indian irregular 
 horse of the present day is formed, excellent light cavalry, well 
 mounted, armed with swords or long spears. His artillery 
 was better still. It consisted of fifty-three pieces, mostly of 
 heavy calibre, 32, 24 and 18-pounders. But what constituted 
 its greatest strength was the presence with that arm, to support 
 the native gunners and to work and direct their own field- 
 pieces, of forty to fifty Frenchmen — who had been allowed to 
 remain when Law with the main body had been dismissed — 
 commanded by M. St. Frais, formerly one of the Council of 
 Chandranagar. These men were animated by a very bitter 
 feeling against the Englishman who had despoiled their flour- 
 ishing settlement. 
 
 This army thus strong in numbers occupied likewise a strong 
 position. The entrenched works which covered it rested on 
 the river, extended inland in a line perpendicular to it for 
 about 200 yards, and then swept round to the north-east at an 
 obtuse angle for about three miles. At this angle was a re- 
 doubt mounted with cannon. Three hundred yards east of 
 
BATTLE of PLASSEY 
 June, <LS 7A 2757 
 
 Manyc 
 
 Scale, 2fz vnch^j -JmU*, 
 
 REFERENCE. 
 
 A Position of the British army at eight in the morning. 
 
 B Guns advanced to check the fire of the French. 
 
 C Niiwab's army in three divisions. 
 
 I) The tank occupied up to 3 p.m. by the French supported 
 
 rear by Mu din Khan. 
 E F The redoubt and mound taken at half past four o'clock. 
 ii The Niiwab's hunting-box. 
 
 their 
 
Plassey. 59 
 
 this, and in front of the line of entrenchments, was a hillock 
 covered with jungle, and about 800 yards to the south, nearer 
 the grove occupied by the English, was a tank, and 100 yards 
 still nearer a larger tank. Both of these were surrounded by 
 large mounds of earth at some distance from their margins. It 
 is important to keep the mind fixed on these points when 
 following the movements of the two armies. 
 
 At daybreak on the 23rd the Nuwab's army marched out of 
 its entrenchments and took up the following positions. The 
 French, with four field-pieces, took post at the larger tank, 
 nearest the English position, about half a mile from it. Between 
 them and the river, and in a line with them, were placed two 
 heavy guns under a native officer; behind them again, and 
 supporting them, were the Nuwab's best troops, a body of 5,000 
 horse and 7,000 foot, commanded by his one faithful general, 
 Mir Miidin Khan, by the side of whom served the prince's 
 Hindu favourite, Mohan Lai. From the rearmost position of 
 Mir Miidin the rest of the army formed a curve in the direction 
 of the village of Palasi, the right resting on the hillock covered 
 with jungle, of which I have spoken, the left on a point cover- 
 ing the south-eastern angle of Clive's grove, at a distance of 
 about 800 yards from it. The intervals were crammed with 
 dense masses of horse and foot, artillery being interspersed 
 between the masses or columns. The troops forming this curve, 
 numbering about 45,000, were commanded by the traitor con- 
 federates, Rajah Diilab Ram, Yar Lutf Khan and Mir J'afar. 
 The first was on the right, the second in the centre, Mir J'afar 
 on the left, nearest the English. The position was a strong 
 one, for the English could not attack the point which barred 
 their progress — that occupied by the French and Mir Miidin 
 Khan — without exposing their right to a flank attack. In 
 fact, they were almost surrounded, and, unless treason had 
 played her part, they had been doomed. 
 
 From the roof of the hunting-box Clive watched the move- 
 ments, as they gradually developed themselves, of the army of 
 
6o The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Siraju'd daulah. As Mir Mudi'n took up his position, as the 
 corps of ]\Iir J'afar, Yar Lutf and Dulab Ram poured out 
 their myriads until not only did they outflank the mango grove 
 his men occupied, but threatened, with the extreme end of the 
 arc they formed, to even overlap his rear, he could not conceal 
 his astonishment at the numbers against whom he was about to 
 hurl his tiny band. "What if they should all be true to their 
 master!" was a thought which must more than once have tra- 
 versed his brain as he witnessed that long defiling. It was too 
 late to think of that, however, and Clive, true to his military 
 instinct, which in the time of danger was always sound, 
 resolved to meet this bold display by a corresponding demon- 
 stration. Accordingly he ordered his men to advance from 
 the grove, and drew them up in line in front of it, their left 
 resting on the hunting-box, which was immediately on the river. 
 In the centre of the line he placed his Europeans, flanked on 
 both sides by three 6-pounders; on their right and left he 
 posted the native troops in two equal divisions. He detached 
 at the same time a small party with two 6-pounders and two 
 howitzers to occupy some brick-kilns about 200 yards in front 
 of the left (the native) division of his little army. 
 
 By eight o'clock in the morning of this memorable day the 
 preparations on both sides were completed. The French under 
 St. Frais opened the battle by firing one of their guns, which, 
 well directed, took effect on the British line. The discharge 
 of this single gun was the signal for the opening of a heavy 
 and continuous fire from the enemy's whole line, from the guns 
 in front as well as from those in the curve. The English guns 
 returned the fire with considerable effect. Still, however true 
 might have been the aim of the English gunners, the disparity 
 in numbers, in the weight of metal, and in guns, was too great 
 to allow the game to be continued long by the weaker party. 
 Though ten of the enemy's men might fall to one of the 
 English, the advantage would still be with the enemy. Clive 
 was made to feel this when, at the end of the first half-hour, 
 

 Plassey. 61 
 
 thirty of his men had been placed hors de combat. He accord- 
 ingly determined to give his troops the shelter which the grove 
 and its bank would afford. Leaving still an advanced party 
 at the brick-kilns, and another at the hunting-box, he effected 
 this withdrawal movement in perfect order, though under the 
 shouts and fire of the enemy. These were so elated that they 
 advanced their guns much nearer, and began to fire with greater 
 vivacity. Clive, however, had now found the shelter he desired, 
 and whilst the balls from the enemy's guns, cutting the air at 
 too high a level, did great damage to the trees in the grove, he 
 made the bulk of his men sit down under the bank, whilst 
 small parties should bore holes to serve as embrasures for his 
 field-pieces. From this new position his guns soon opened fire, 
 and maintained it with so much vigour and in so true a direc- 
 tion that several of the enemy's gunners were killed or 
 wounded, and every now and again explosions of their 
 ammunition were heard. The protection afforded by the bank 
 soon diminished the proportion of the casual ities of the Eng- 
 lish, whilst there was no abatement of those of the masses 
 opposed to them. Still, at the end of three hours, no great or 
 decisive effect had been produced, the enemy's fire had shown 
 no signs of slackening, nor had their position varied. No 
 symptoms of co-operation on the part of Mir J'afar were visi- 
 ble, nor, in the face of such enormous masses of men, who had 
 it in their power, if true to their prince, to surround and over- 
 whelm any party which should attempt the key of the position, 
 held by Mir Miidfn Khan, did any mode of bettering the con- 
 dition of affairs seem to offer. This was certainly the opinion 
 of Clive, when, at eleven o'clock, he summoned his principal 
 officers to his side. Nor could he, after consultation with them, 
 arrive at any other conclusion than this — that it was advisable 
 to maintain the position till after night-fall, and at midnight 
 try the effect of an attack on the enemy's camp. 
 
 The decision was sound under the circumstances, especially 
 as it was subordinate to any incidents which might, in the long 
 
62 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 interval of twelve hours, occur to alter it. Such an incident 
 did cccur very soon after the conference. There fell then, and 
 continued for an hour, one of those heavy pelting showers so 
 common during the rainy season. The English had their tar- 
 paulins ready to cover the-ir ammunition, which in consequence 
 sustained but little injury from the rain. The enemy took no 
 such precautions, and their powder suffered accordingly. The 
 result was soon shown by a general slackening of their fire. 
 Believing that the English were in a similar plight, Mir Miidin 
 Khan advanced with a body of horsemen towards the grove to 
 take advantage of it. The English, however, received him 
 with a heavy grape fire, which not only drove back his men, 
 but mortally wounded their leader. 
 
 This was the crisis of the day. As long as Mir Miidin lived 
 the chances of Siraju'd daulah, surrounded though he was by 
 traitors, were not quite desperate. The fidelity of that true 
 and capable soldier might, under any circumstances, save him. 
 But his death was a loss which could not be repaired. It is 
 probable that some such conviction penetrated the heart of the 
 unfortunate young prince when the news of the calamity 
 reached him. He at once sent for Mir J'afar, and besought 
 him in the most abject terms to be true to him and to defend 
 him. He reminded him of the loyalty he had always dis- 
 played towards his grandfather, Ali Vardi Khan, of his rela- 
 tionship to himself; then taking off his turban, and casting it 
 on the ground before him, he exclaimed, "J'afar, that turban 
 thou must defend." Those who are acquainted with the 
 manners of Eastern nations will realize that no more pathetic, 
 no more heartrending, appeal could be made by a prince to a 
 subject. 
 
 Mir J'afar Khan responded to it with apparent sincerity. 
 Placing — in the respectful manner which indicates devotion — 
 his crossed hands on his breast, and bowing over them, he pro- 
 mised to exert himself to the utmost. When he made that 
 gesture, and when he uttered those words, he was lying. Never 
 
Plassey. 63 
 
 had he been more firmly resolved than at that moment to betray 
 his master. Quitting the presence of the Niiwab he galloped 
 back to his troops, and dispatched a letter to Clive, informing 
 him of what had happened, and urging him to push on immedi- 
 ately ; or in no case to defer the attack beyond the night. That 
 the messenger did not reach his destination till too late for 
 Clive to profit by the letter detracts not one whit from the 
 baseness of the man who, fresh from such an interview, wrote 
 and sent it ! 
 
 But Mir J'afar was not the only traitor. The loss of his 
 best officer, coinciding with the unfortunate damping of the 
 ammunition, had completely unnerved Siraju'd daulah. 
 Scarcely had Mir J'afar left him when he turned to the com- 
 mander of his right wing, Rajah Diilab Ram, for support and 
 consolation. The counsel which this man — likewise one of the 
 conspirators — gave him was of a most insidious character. 
 Playing upon his fears, he continually urged him to issue 
 orders to the army to retire behind the intrenchment ; this order 
 issued, he should quit the field, and leave the result in con- 
 fidence to his generals. In an evil hour the wretched youth, 
 incapable at such a moment of thinking soundly and clearly, 
 followed the insidious advice, issued the order, and, mounting 
 a camel, rode — followed by 2,000 horsemen — to Murshidabad. 
 
 The three traitorous generals were now masters of the posi- 
 tion. Their object being to entice the English to come on, 
 they began the retiring movement which the Nuwab had sanc- 
 tioned. They had reckoned, however, without St. Frais and 
 his Frenchmen. These gallant men remained true to their 
 master in the hour of supreme peril, and declined to quit a 
 position which, supported by the troops of Mir Miidin, they 
 had maintained against the whole British force. But Mir 
 Miidin had been killed, his troops were following the rest of 
 the army, and St. Frais stood there almost without support. 
 To understand what followed I must ask the reader to accom- 
 pany me to the grove. 
 
64 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 I left Clive and his gallant soldiers repulsing the attack 
 which cost the Nuwab his one faithful commander. The 
 vital consequences of this repulse never presented themselves 
 for a moment to the imagination of the English leader. It 
 never occurred to him that it might lead to the flight of the 
 Nuwab, and to the retirement of his troops from a position 
 which they had held successfully, and from which they still 
 threatened the grove. There can be no doubt but that, at this 
 period of the action, Clive had made up his mind to hold the 
 grove at all hazards till nightfall, and then, relying upon the 
 co-operation of Mir J'afar and his friends, to make his supreme 
 effort. Satisfied that this was the only course to be followed, 
 he had entered the hunting-box and lain down to take some 
 rest, giving orders that he should be roused if the enemy 
 should make any change in their position. He had not been 
 long absent when Major Kilpatrick noticed the retiring move- 
 ment I have already described. He did not know, and pro- 
 bably did not care, to what cause to attribute it; he only saw 
 that the French were being deserted, and that a splendid 
 opportunity offered to carry their position at the tank, and 
 cannonade thence the retiring enemy. Quick as the thought he 
 moved rapidly from the grove towards the tank with about 250 
 Europeans and two field-pieces, sending an officer to Clive to 
 explain his intentions and their reason. 
 
 It is said that the officer found Clive asleep. The message, 
 however, completely roused him, and, angry that any officer 
 should have dared to make an important movement without 
 his orders, he ran to the detachment and severely reprimanded 
 Kilpatrick. A glance at the situation, however, satisfied him 
 that Kilpatrick had only done that which he himself would 
 have ordered him to do had he been on the spot. He realized 
 that the moment for decisive action had arrived. He sent back 
 Kilpatrick, then, with orders to bring on the rest of the army, 
 and continued the movement which that officer had initiated. 
 
 St. Frais, on his side, had recognized that the retreat of the 
 
Plassey. 65 
 
 Niiwab's army had compromised him, and that he was quite 
 unable, with his handful, to resist the whole British force, 
 which, a few minutes later, he saw issuing from the grove in 
 his direction. Resolved, however, to dispute every inch of the 
 ground, he fired a parting shot, then, limbering up, fell back 
 in perfect order to the redoubt at the corner of the intrench- 
 ment. Here he planted his field-pieces ready to act again. 
 
 Meanwhile, two of the three divisions of the enemy's army 
 were marching towards the intrenchment. It was observed, 
 however, that the third division, that on the left, nearest to 
 the grove, commanded by Mir J'afar, lingered behind the rest, 
 and that when its rearmost file had reached a point in a line 
 with the northern end of the grove the whole division wheeled 
 to the left and marched in that direction. Clive had no means 
 of recognizing that these w T ere the troops of his confederate, 
 but, believing that they had a design upon his baggage, he 
 detached a party of Europeans with a field-piece to check 
 them. The fire of the field-piece had its effect, in so far that 
 it prevented a further advance in that direction. But the 
 division continued to remain separate from the rest of the 
 Niiwab's army. 
 
 Clive himself, meanwhile, had reached the tank from which 
 St. Frais had retreated, and had begun thence a vigorous can- 
 nonade of the enemy's position behind the intrenchment. What 
 followed can be well understood, if it be borne in mind that 
 whilst the leaders of the Niiwab's army had been gained over, 
 the rank and file, and the vast majority of the officers, were 
 faithful to their master. They had not been entrusted with 
 the secret, and being soldiers, and superior in numbers to the 
 attacking party, they were in no mood to permit that party 
 to cannonade them with impunity. No sooner, then, did the 
 shot from the British cannon begin to take effect in their ranks, 
 than they issued from the intrenchment — -cavalry, infantry, and 
 artillery — and opened a heavy fire upon the British force. 
 
 The real battle now began. Clive, seriously incommoded 
 
 F 
 
66 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 by this new move on the part of the enemy, quitted his posi- 
 tion and advanced nearer to the mtrenchment. Posting then 
 half his infantry and half his artillery on the mound of the 
 lesser tank, the greater part of the remaining moiety on a rising 
 ground 200 yards to the left of it, and detaching 160 men, 
 picked natives and Europeans, to lodge themselves behind a 
 tank close to the intrenchment, he opened from the first and 
 second positions a very heavy artillery fire, whilst from the 
 third the musketry fire should be well sustained and well 
 aimed. This masterly movement, well carried into execution, 
 caused the enemy great loss, and threw the cattle attached to 
 their guns into great confusion. In vain did St. Frais ply 
 his guns from the redoubt, the matchlockmen pour in volley 
 after volley from the hillock to the east of it, and from the 
 intrenchments. In vain did their swarthy troopers make 
 charge after charge. Masses without a leader were fighting 
 agains a man whose clearness of vision was never so marked, 
 whose judgment was never so infallible, whose execution was 
 never so decisive, as when he was on the battle-field. What 
 chance had they, brave as they were, in a battle which their 
 leaders had sold? As they still fought, Clive noticed that 
 the division of their troops which he had at first believed had 
 designs on his baggage still remained isolated from the rest, 
 and took no part in the battle. Suddenly it dawned upon him 
 that it must be the division of Mir J'afar. Immensely relieved 
 by this discovery, inasmuch as it freed him from all appre- 
 hension of an attack on his flank or rear, he resolved to make 
 a supreme effort to carry the redoubt held by St. Frais, and 
 the hill to the east of it. With this object he formed two 
 strong detachments, and sent them simultaneously against the 
 two points indicated, supporting them from the rear by the 
 main body in the centre. The hill was first gained, and 
 carried without firing a shot. The movement against the re- 
 doubt was not less successful, for St. Frais, abandoned, 
 isolated, and threatened, had no resource but to retire. The 
 
Plassey. 67 
 
 possession of this position decided the day. Thenceforward 
 all resistance ceased. By five o'clock the English were in the 
 possession of the whole intrenchment and camp. The victory 
 of Plassey had been won ! It had cost the victors seven Euro- 
 peans and sixteen native soldiers, killed, thirteen European 
 and thirty-six natives wounded. 
 
 Plassey was a very decisive battle. The effects of it are felt 
 this day by more than two hundred and fifty millions of 
 people. Whilst the empire founded by the Mughuls was 
 rapidly decaying, that victory introduced into their richest 
 province, in a commanding position, another foreign race, 
 active, capable, and daring, bringing with them the new ideas, 
 the new blood, the love of justice, of tolerance, of order, the 
 capacity of enforcing those principles which were necessary to 
 infuse a new and a better life into the Hindustan of the last 
 century. There never was a battle in which the consequences 
 were so vast, so immediate, and so permanent. From the very 
 morrow of the victory the English became virtual masters of 
 Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa. During the century which followed 
 but one serious attempt was made, and that to be presently 
 related, to cast off the yoke virtually imposed by Plassey, 
 w 7 hilst from the base it gave them, a base resting on the sea, 
 and, with proper care, unassailable, they were able to extend 
 their authority beyond the Indus, their influence amongst 
 peoples of whose existence even Europe was at the time pro- 
 foundly ignorant. It was Plassey which made England the 
 greatest Muhammadan power in the world ; Plassey which 
 forced her to become one of the main factors in the settlement 
 cf the burning Eastern question; Plassey which necessitated 
 the conquest and colonization of the Cape of Good Hope, of 
 the Mauritius, the protectorship over Egypt ; Plassey which 
 ^ave to the sons of her middle classes the finest field for the 
 development of their talent and industry the world has ever 
 known ; to her aristocracy unrivalled opportunities for the 
 display of administrative power; to her merchants and manu- 
 
68 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 facturers customers whose enormous demands almost com- 
 pensate for the hostile tariffs of her rivals, and, alas ! even of 
 her colonies; to the skilled artisan remunerative employment; 
 to her people generally a noble feeling of pride in the great- 
 ness and glory of the Empire of which a little island in the 
 Atlantic is the parent stem, Hindustan the noblest branch ; it 
 was Plassey, which, in its consequences, brought consolation to 
 that little island for the loss of America, and which, whilst, in 
 those consequences, it has concentrated upon it the envy of 
 the other nations of Europe, has given to her children the sense 
 of responsibility, of the necessity of maintaining a great posi- 
 tion, the conviction of which underlies the thought of every 
 true Englishman. 
 
 Yes ! As a victory, Plassey was, in its consequences, perhaps 
 the greatest ever gained. But, as a battle, it is not, in my 
 opinion, a matter to be very proud of. In the first place, it was 
 not a fair fight. Who can doubt that if the three principal 
 generals of Siraju'd daulah had been faithful to their master 
 Plassey would not have been won ? Up to the time of the 
 death of Mir Mudin Khan the English had made no progress; 
 they had even been forced to retire. They could have made 
 no impression on their enemy had the Nuwab's army, led by 
 men loyal to their master, simply maintained their position. 
 An advance against the French guns meant an exposure of 
 their right flank to some 40,000 men. It was not to be thought 
 of. It was only when treason had done her work, when 
 treason had driven the Nuwab from the field, when treason had 
 removed his army from its commanding position, that Clive 
 was able to advance without the certainty of being annihilated. 
 Plassey, then, though a decisive, can never be considered a 
 great, battle. 
 
 There was that about the events preceding it, occurring 
 during its progress, and following it, which no honourable 
 man can contemplate without disgust and repulsion. Not one 
 actor in the drama was free from the stain which connection 
 
Plassey. 69 
 
 with dishonour always entails. The bargaining of Clive and 
 the Calcutta Council with Mir J'afar and the other traitors, 
 the episode with Omichand, though they form no part 
 of the military history of the battle, cannot be wholly 
 ignored when considering its consequences. The greed 
 for money, the ever increasing demand for the aug- 
 mentation of the sum originally asked for, the dis- 
 honouring trick by which a confederate was to be baulked of 
 his share in the spoil ; these are actions the contemplation of 
 which makes, and will always make, the heart of an honest 
 man burn with indignation. Then, to single out one, the 
 chiefest of the conspirators, Mir J'afar Khan. This man had 
 possessed honourable instincts. Ten years before Plassey had 
 been fought AH Vardi Khan had removed him from his com- 
 mand because he had retreated before the Marathas. The 
 officer who replaced him advanced and defeated those war- 
 riors; then coming to Mir J'afar, offered to make him governor 
 of Bihar if he would aid in deposing Ali Vardi. Mir J'afar 
 refused then : — but in 1757 we see this man — -then so loyal — 
 conspiring with a foreign people, of whose power he was con- 
 scious, to seat himself on the throne — for virtually it w r as a 
 throne — of his master. To accomplish this selfish personal 
 end he hesitated not to become a perjurer of the deepest dye; 
 to doom to a violent death the nephew to whom he had sworn 
 obedience, and to sacrifice the future of his country. If the 
 people of India do indeed writhe under the sway of their 
 foreign conquerors they have to thank this Mir J'afar Khan, 
 this man who sold their three richest provinces to the English 
 that he might enjoy the mere pageantry of royalty. 
 
 It was indeed the merest pageantry. Soon was he made to 
 learn that bitter truth that, by his own act, dominion in Bengal 
 had departed from the Mughul. A tool, a cipher in the hands 
 of the foreigners for whom he had betrayed his master, he was 
 allowed to rule, never to govern. Well for him that he did 
 not possess the power to dive into futurity and behold the 
 
jo The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 representative of his name and office, an unhonoured pensioner 
 of the people he had called in to subdue his country ! 
 
 The name of Siraju'd daulah has been justly held up to 
 obloquy in connection with the catastrophe of the Black Hole. 
 Although, as I have shown, the Nuwab had not designed the 
 death of our countrymen, still he made himself an accessory 
 after the act, and must, therefore, bear the blame of the deed. 
 Yet the hearts of those who condemn him most will scarcely 
 steel themselves to the pity which the contemplation of his 
 subsequent fate inspires. From the time when Clive beat up 
 his quarters before Calcutta, to the hour of his death, the life 
 of Siraju'd daulah was one of constant alarm and dread. He 
 knew not whom to trust. He felt that he was betrayed, but 
 he could not feel sure by whom. Confident one day that Clive 
 was his enemy, believing the next that he was his friend — he 
 could not resolve to offer him decided opposition, or to disarm 
 in his presence. His vacillation, the child cf uncertainty, com- 
 pleted his ruin. The body of Frenchmen w T hom, to please 
 Clive, he had sent to Bhagalpur, might have saved Plassey. 
 When he could no longer resist the conviction that Clive was 
 his bitter, his irreconcilable enemy, he called to his councils 
 the very men who had sworn to betray him ! Could there be 
 a harder fate than this for a young boy suddenly raised to 
 power, and not yet satiated with the follies of youth ? At 
 Plassey, again, he was betrayed ; betrayed at the moment when, 
 had he been loyally supported, he might have rid himself for 
 ever of the hated English. Inexorable fate still pursued him. 
 Fleeing from the field, he reached Murshidabad that night, 
 only to learn in the early morn of the defeat of his army. 
 Terrified by the prospect before him, he embarked at dusk, 
 accompanied by his favourite wife, on a boat prepared for 
 him by one still faithful adherent, hoping to reach the French 
 advancing under Law from Bhagalpur. But at Rajmahal the 
 strength of the rowers failed them, and he took refuge for the 
 night in the buildings of a deserted garden. Here he was 
 

 Plassey. 71 
 
 discovered and betrayed — again betrayed — and brought, bound 
 like a common felon, into the presence of Mir J'afar. 
 Trembling and weeping, he implored his life. It was a scene 
 which recalls to the English reader another scene acted some 
 seventy years previously between Monmouth and James II. 
 Mir J'afar was as inexorable as James. That night, by the 
 express order of his son, Miran, Siraju'd daulah was stabbed 
 to death in his cell. 
 
 He was more fortunate, and certainly still less to be despised, 
 than was Mir J'afar. Whatever may have been his faults, 
 Siraju'd daulah had neither betrayed his master nor sold his 
 country. Nay more, no unbiassed Englishman, sitting in 
 judgment on the events which passed in the interval between 
 the 9th February and the 23rd June, can deny that the name 
 of Siraju'd daulah stands higher in the scale of honour than 
 does the name of Clive. He was the only one of the principal 
 actors in that tragic drama who did not attempt to deceive ! 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 KONDUR AND MACHHLIPATANAM * 
 
 I HAVE already shown how the battle of Kaveripak virtually 
 decided the fate of India south of the river Krishna. There 
 still remained north of that river and south of the Vindhayan 
 range the large territory belonging to the Subahdar of the 
 Dakhan, covering almost the entire northern portion of the 
 peninsula, bounded on the west by the Western Ghats, and 
 on the east only by the sea. This important territory was then, 
 and was likely to remain, under French influence, that influence 
 being maintained by the presence at Haidarabad of a con- 
 siderable body of French troops, commanded by an officer of 
 rare intelligence and capacity, the Marquis de Bussy. It was 
 soon made to rest on a basis still more solid. In 1753, an i n " 
 trigue, set on foot by Sayud Lashkar, Minister of the Subah- 
 dar, to rid his master of the French, had been completely 
 defeated by the energy and resolution displayed by the French 
 general. Marching on Aurangabad, where the court of the 
 Subahdar held high revelry at the time, Bussy had virtually 
 dictated his own terms. These terms comprehended the 
 cession, with zamindari rights, to the French, of the provinces 
 
 * The English of a hundred and thiry years ago chose to call this 
 place, which is written and pronounced by the natives Machhlipatanam, 
 or the " town of fish," Masiilipatam, a name which conveys no meaning 
 whatever. The " Machhli " was evidently first corrupted into " Masli " ; 
 later on the "Masli" became "Masiili." This barbarism has been con- 
 tinued down to the nresent day. 
 
Kondur and Machhlipatanam. 73 
 
 of Elur, Shrikakolam (Chicacole), Kondapilli, and Murtazan- 
 agar,* the guardianship of the person of the Subahdar, and 
 the transfer to Bussy himself of an authority very similar to 
 that now exercised by a British Resident at a native court. By 
 this arrangement the French were relieved of the necessity of 
 relying upon the favour of the Subahdar— the cession of so 
 important a territory making them practically independent. 
 
 The districts so ceded, inclusive of the territories in and 
 about Machhlipatanam, previously granted in 1750, covered 
 470 miles of sea-coast from the Chilka lake to the south bank 
 of the Gundlakamma. It stretched inland to distances varying 
 from thirty to a hundred miles, was watered by the Krishna, 
 the Gundlakamma, and the Godavari, and contained the im- 
 portant towns of Ganjam, Shrikakolam, Vijiyanagaram, 
 Vishakpatanam (Vizagapatam), Koringa, Yanun, Machhli- 
 patanam, Elur, and Xizampatanam. It possessed an area of 
 about 17,000 geographical miles, and yielded an annual 
 revenue of four hundred thousand pounds sterling. The 
 forests within its limits abounded with teak. One of its dis- 
 tricts was famous for its manufacture of cloths, another for 
 its growth of rice. Nor was it wanting in capabilities of 
 defence. Resting on the sea on the one side, it was covered on 
 the other by a chain of mountains running at unequal distances 
 nearly parallel with the coast. These mountains were covered 
 with forests, then almost impenetrable, and traversed by three 
 or four passes capable of being held by a very few men against 
 an army. In fine, to borrow the language of Mr. Orme, "these 
 territories rendered the French masters of the greatest 
 dominion, both in extent and value, that had ever been pos- 
 sessed in Hindustan by Europeans, not excepting the Portu- 
 guese at the height of their prosperity." 
 
 * The names of these districts underwent subsequently a partial re- 
 vision. Shrikakolam was divided into Ganjam, Vishakpatanam and 
 Rajahmahendri. Machhlipatanam absorbed Elur and Kondapilli ; 
 Murtazanagar became Guntiir. 
 
74 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 From December, 1753 to July, 1758 these territories were 
 administered, under the general supervision of Bussy, by a 
 French agent residing at Machhlipatanam, M. Moracin. At the 
 disposal of this official Bussy placed a force of 150 Europeans 
 and 2,500 native troops. He farmed the revenues to Vijiyaram 
 Raji, Rajah of Vijiyanagaram, a man conspicuous for character 
 and ability. Of the manner in which the country was administered 
 under this high official, one of the greatest of the English 
 authorities, the late Captain Grant Duff, wrote in terms of 
 high praise: — "The rent was moderate, enforced without 
 rigour; accurate accounts were prepared, and most of the here- 
 ditary officers, if not those possessing rent-free lands, were 
 confirmed in their property — facts which do Bussy and his 
 nation great honour." 
 
 One of the first cares of Bussy, after obtaining possession 
 of his new districts, had been to expel the few English from 
 the places they had occupied in and near Machhlipatanam. 
 This was a matter of policy for one who held it to be danger- 
 ous that a rival European interest should take root within the 
 borders of Franco-Indian territory. During the four years and 
 a half that followed nothing occurred to affect the stability of 
 the French rule. In the various intrigues by which Bussy was 
 occasionally hampered at Haidarabad the possession of the 
 northern Sirkars proved to be of all the value he had antici- 
 pated. They became the seat of French power, from which 
 Bussy was enabled on more than one occasion to turn the 
 tables on his enemies. Never did the French hold upon them 
 appear more secure than in the beginning of 1758. But never 
 was the French hold upon them in greater danger than at that 
 particular period. At the end of April of that year, a con- 
 siderable French force, commanded by the Count de Tally, 
 had arrived at Pondichery with the avowed intention of ex- 
 pelling the English from Southern India. From the moment 
 of his landing to the period of his embarkation as a prisoner 
 on board an English vessel Tally's movements were character- 
 
Kondur and Machhlipaianam. 75 
 
 ized by a rashness, by a contempt for the Indian experience 
 of others, which seem the peculiar property, even in the present 
 day, of men possessing ability and reputation, but whom 
 Nature has endowed with one-sided minds. An initial success 
 did indeed attend his first movements. He expelled the Eng- 
 lish from Fort St. David. The next move he contemplated 
 was against Tanjiir. But before he set out on this expedition 
 he despatched an order to Bussy to repair at once to Arkat, 
 leaving no French troops at the court of the Subahdar, and 
 only as many in the northern Sirkars as would suffice to main- 
 tain them. The command of these and the general supervision 
 of the province he directed Bussy to entrust to the Marquis de 
 Conflans, an officer new to Indian affairs, but just arrived from 
 Europe; and, as if still further to embarrass French interests 
 in the province, he removed Moracin at the same time. 
 
 This letter of recall painfully affected alike Bussy and the 
 Subahdar. It called upon the former to renounce, for an un- 
 certain issue, the work of the best years of his life, to leave the 
 province he had won for France a certain prey to the victors 
 in the struggle which was then beginning. Not so would he 
 have acted had the supreme direction been entrusted to fns 
 hands. Whilst fighting for the Karnatak, he would never have 
 relinquished his hold upon provinces the possession of which, 
 combined with the influence over the Subahdar which it 
 assured, would have compensated for defeat even in the 
 Karnatak. But, as he wrote to Lally, there was one thing 
 which he had always known how to do better than anything 
 else, and that was to obey. Five days after he received the 
 order, after a painful parting with the Subahdar,* he set out 
 from Haidarabad at the head of 250 European and 500 native 
 troops. He reached Waiiir, on the north bank of the Krishna, 
 on the 3rd of August. Here he made over the charge of the 
 
 * " Salabat Jang," writes Mr. Orme, "took leave of Bussy with the 
 utmost despondency, called him the guardian angel of his life and 
 fortune, and foreboded the unhappy fate to which he would be exposed 
 by his departure." 
 
jb The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 northern Sirkars to M. de Conflans. The next day he turned 
 his back for ever on the provinces which he had gained for his 
 country by the exercise of firmness, energy, intuition, and 
 knowledge of native character, such as have been rarely 
 equalled, even in India. 
 
 His successor, M. de Conflans, younger brother of the general 
 who commanded at the same period the French army of Ger- 
 many, had, up to that time, placed on the record no achieve- 
 ment to illustrate his family name. A courtier in a corrupt 
 court, he lacked the talents and the experience which were 
 necessary to succeed in a task which had taxed all the great 
 qualities of Bussy. From the moment of his taking charge 
 his difficulties began. At first he had to deal with a people to 
 whom he was a stranger, who were strange to him, and always 
 ready to test the qualities of a new administrator; a little 
 later he had to meet the combined dangers of insurrection and 
 invasion. 
 
 Very soon after Conflans had taken charge of the northern 
 Sirkars a rumour reached those districts that the main French 
 army, which was to reconquer Southern India, had been com- 
 pelled to beat an ignominious retreat from before the walls of 
 Tanjiir. The rumour, promptly confirmed, gave birth to a 
 conviction m the minds of one or two disaffected nobles that 
 the time had arrived when an attempt to shake off the foreign 
 yoke might be successfully made. Prominent amongst these 
 nobles was Anandraz Gajapati, son and successor of the chief, 
 Vijiyaram Raji, who had administered the provinces with 
 marked ability. The son had not, however, inherited the pre- 
 dilections of the father, and, dissatisfied at certain changes 
 which Bussy had introduced on the death of Vijiyaram, he 
 had from that moment become a conspirator. Before the 
 departure of Bussy had even been contemplated, Anandraz 
 had made overtures to the English in Madras, and when he 
 became convinced that the paucity of their troops would not 
 allow him to hope for any assistance from that quarter, he had 
 
Koudur and Machhlifatanam. ;j 
 
 transmitted similar proposals to Bengal. Before he could 
 receive a reply, the discomfiture of the French army before 
 Tanjiir, following on the departure of Bussy, induced him to 
 strike a blow on his own account. Summoning all his retainers, 
 and enlisting as many men as it was possible to attract to his 
 standard— amounting in all to about 3,000 — he suddenly (2nd 
 September, 1758) marched upon and took possession of Vishak- 
 patanam, hauled down the French and planted the English 
 flag, made prisoner the French chief, and plundered the French 
 factory. Having done this, he dispatched a second messenger 
 to Calcutta, charged to inform the chief of the Bengal Presi- 
 dency of all he had accomplished, to assure him that the 
 native chiefs of the country were unanimous in their desire to 
 be rid of the French rule; and that, with the assistance of a 
 very small body of Englishmen, he would engage to drive 
 them out of the country. 
 
 This messenger reached Calcutta early in October. The 
 letters which he carried, and the message of which he was the 
 bearer, were duly laid before the Calcutta Council. To every 
 member of that Council, with one exception, his schemes 
 seemed rash, chimerical and dangerous. Bengal was threat- 
 ened at the time by an invasion from the Shahzadah, eldest 
 son of the Great Mughul, and the feeling of the Murshidabad 
 darbar was unmistakably hostile. To denude the Presidency, 
 at such a conjuncture, of a large body of troops, in order to 
 support the revolt of a chief who had been able to muster only 
 three thousand followers, seemed in the eyes of the majority, 
 to be little short of madness. The exception to these views was 
 the Governor, Robert Clive. The experience in the Madras 
 Presidency of this ruler of men induced in his mind the con- 
 clusion that, although the weakening of the British force in 
 Bengal would entail some risks, yet the prospects opened out 
 by the letters of Anandraz were so brilliant, and promised 
 results so decisive, that sound policy counselled closing with 
 his offers, and acting upon them without delay. Clive realized. 
 
7 8 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 in fact, that the success of an expedition sent from Bengal 
 would transfer from the French to the English not only the 
 valuable districts on the coast, but the predominant influence 
 till then exercised with so much effect by the former at the 
 court of the Siibahdar of the Dakhan. A diversion of this 
 nature would likewise prevent the French in the northern 
 Sirkars from aiding Lally in the designs which, it was known, 
 he was about to put in action against Madras. Whatever 
 might be the result of the struggle then waging in the Karna- 
 tak, the transfer of those districts and of that influence would 
 compensate for disaster, or add enormously to the solidity- of a 
 victory. 
 
 It was impossible that he should go there. He must remain 
 to ward off the evils threatening Bengal. But he had at hand 
 an officer not second even to himself in capacity on the field of 
 battle. This was Lieutenant-Colonel Forde, an officer who 
 had risen to the rank of Major in the 39th Foot, and whom, by 
 reason of the coolness and ability he had displayed under 
 many trying circumstances, Clive had recently summoned from 
 Madras to command the Company's troops in Bengal. It was 
 a characteristic of Clive, that he was entirely devoid of military 
 jealousy. He always sought out the best men he could find, 
 and trusted them implicitly. He trusted Forde on this occa- 
 sion. Having first carried his point in Council, he made over 
 to him 470 Europeans, 1,900 native troops, six 6-pounders and 
 a small battering train, and bade him sail for Vishakpatanam, 
 disembark his troops, and drive the French from the northern 
 Sirkars. Forde sailed on the 12th, and arrived at Vishak- 
 patanam on the 20th October. 
 
 Meanwhile Conflans had been doing little to re-establish his 
 outraged authority. Having under his orders a force com- 
 posed of 500 seasoned European troops, men trained by Bussy, 
 and inspired by the recollection of many a victory — of 4,^,00 
 native troops, and a brigade of artillery, he might by marching 
 with all speed on Vishakpatanam have crushed this rebellion 
 
Koudur and M aclildipatanam. 79 
 
 m the bud. When the news of the revolt of Anandraz reached 
 him he was at Machhlipatanam, about a hundred and eighty 
 miles from Vishakpatanam. An easy march of five days 
 would have taken him to Rajahmahendri; thence, to Vishak- 
 patanam, twelve days would have sufficed to march with ease 
 and comfort. The rebellion had broken out on the 2nd Sep- 
 tember. Making every allowance, then, for difficulties, Con- 
 flans should have been able to reach Vishakpatanam some days 
 before the English force under Forde had even sailed from 
 Calcutta (12th October). But instead of using speed, the 
 French leader displayed a hesitation which it is possible to 
 explain only on the grounds that he believed himself to be 
 face to face with a formidable insurrection, and that he feared 
 to commit himself without assistance. Instead, then, of 
 marching at all, he sent messenger after messenger to Lally, 
 then straining every nerve to undertake the siege of Madras, 
 begging him to send troops to strengthen him. It was only 
 when he received an intimation from Lally that he had directed 
 Moracin to proceed with 300 men to support him, but that 
 meanwhile it behoved him to act with vigour, that he marched 
 at all on Rajahmahendri. 
 
 This delay had been of enormous advantage to Anandraz. 
 Ore proof of the little vitality of his rebellion is to be traced 
 in the fact that, notwithstanding all his endeavours, he had in 
 six weeks been able to increase his force to a strength of 5,000 
 men, and these for the most part a very miserable rabble. But 
 few of them had fire-arms; the large majority only spears and 
 bows and arrows. His main strength consisted in a body of 
 forty Europeans, deserters and renegades of all nations, to 
 whom he had entrusted four field-pieces. But neither these, 
 nor the rabble with which they were associated, would have 
 withstood for half an hour the force of Conflans had Conflans 
 only chosen to advance. 
 
 This delay gave the English their opportunity. To herald 
 the approach of Forde, these had dispatched an agent with 
 
8o The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 several assistants to Vishakpatanam, alike to encourage the 
 revolted Rajah, to re-establish their factory, and to prepare 
 the place for the reception of an armed force. Forde arrived 
 off the coast on the 20th October, and without delay disem- 
 barked his troops and stores. This operation and the provision 
 of bullocks and means of transport took up some days, and it 
 was not before the 1st of the following month that his army 
 was able to move. Meanwhile the English agent was endeav- 
 ouring to negotiate a treaty with the Rajah on the terms which 
 he subsequently subscribed to. The main points of this treaty 
 were that the Rajah should pay all the extra expenses of the 
 British force while it should co-operate with him; and, in the 
 event of success, he should assign to the English all the coun- 
 try between Vishakpatanam and Machhlipatanam, whilst the 
 territory inland belonging to native chiefs in the French interest 
 should be transferred to himself. 
 
 Meanwhile Conflans — forced into action by letters from 
 Lally — had reached Rajahmahendri. The day after his arrival 
 there he learned that an English force had landed on the coast. 
 Conscious that the opportunity of crushing the rebel Rajah had 
 escaped him, he resolved to take up a commanding position, 
 difficult to assail, if not impregnable, and to await in it the 
 movement of the combined forces. For this purpose he selected 
 a position about forty miles from Rajahmahendri, within sight 
 of the fort of Peddapiir, and commanding all the approaches 
 from Vishakpatanam. Here he entrenched himself. His force 
 consisted of 500 Europeans, 5,000 native infantry and about 
 500 native cavalry; his artillery amounted to thirty-six pieces 
 of sorts. He was still in this position when, on the 3rd 
 December, Forde, who had at length surmounted the many 
 difficulties to which I have referred, came in sight of it. The 
 numbers on both sides were about equal ; for whilst Forde had 
 under his own orders 470 Europeans and 1,900 sipahis, with 
 six guns, Anandraz accompanied him with his 40 Europeans, 
 his ragged rabble of 5,000 men, 500 horsemen and four guns. 
 
Kondur and Machhlipatanam. bi 
 
 Forde, after reconnoitring the French position, came to the 
 opinion that it was too strong to be attacked. He, therefore, 
 took possession of a village called Chambol, between three 
 and four miles from the French camp, and almost as strong 
 and commanding. 
 
 For four days the two armies remained watching each other ; 
 the leaders on both sides thinking the position of the other 
 unassailable. On the 8th December, however, it occurred alike 
 to Forde and Conrlans, almcst simultaneously, to make an 
 attempt to place his enemy in a false position. The plan of 
 Connans was to send six guns, guarded by a respectable force, 
 to occupy a small height which had been neglected by Forde, 
 but which, Connans had been assured by an intelligent deserter, 
 commanded his camp. Of the confusion which the sudden 
 opening of a fire from these pieces would cause Connans would 
 hold his army in readiness to take advantage. He fixed the 
 night of the 8th for the carrying out of this project, so that 
 the guns might open fire at daybreak on the 9th. Forde, on his 
 part, designed another plan for the same morning. Tired of 
 looking his enemy in the face without attacking him, he had 
 arranged with Rajah Anandraz, also on the 8th, that the whok 
 force should quit the encampment at Chambol, at a quarter past 
 four o'clock the following morning, and move to a point whence 
 it would be easy to reach, by a short cut, the main road leading 
 to Rajahmahendri. The march was to be a short one; only 
 three miles, to the village of Kondur. 
 
 It will be noticed that if the two rival plans had been 
 carried out at the same moment, and with the same order and 
 exactness, the English plan would have foiled the French plan. 
 The French guns, in that case, would have reached the coveted 
 eminence only to bombard a post which had been vacated. 
 Rut, as it happened, of the three parlies to the two transactions, 
 one was unpunctual. This one was the Rajah. The French 
 guns started for their destination at night, and reached it before 
 daybreak. At daybreak their whole force was under arms, 
 
 G 
 
82 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 ready for any emergency. Forde marched in the direction of 
 Kondiir at a quarter past four o'clock, but the Rajah and his 
 troops had no thought of starting for two or three hours to 
 come. It resulted from this delay that a few minutes after 
 daybreak he and his followers were unpleasantly aroused from 
 their slumbers by the deadly messengers dispatched by the six 
 French guns which commanded their camp. 
 
 The fire of these guns was indeed most deadly and effective. 
 The panic and confusion which it caused amongst the Rajah's 
 half-armed followers is not to be described. Terrified out of 
 his wits, the Rajah sent messenger after messenger to Forde, 
 begging him to return. These met Forde — who had been 
 equally surprised by the fire — hastening to the Rajah's rescue. 
 The latter and his followers had meanwhile bestirred them- 
 selves to hurry on in the direction Forde had taken. The 
 allied parties, therefore, met ; then turning, they hurried on to 
 Kondiir, which they reached in safety. 
 
 The partial success achieved by the French guns was fatal to 
 Conflans. Ignorant of the exact state of affairs, he became 
 confirmed in his belief of the truth of the story told him by 
 the deserters, that the English force was composed of raw 
 levies, and he was satisfied now that his guns had frightened 
 them from their position at Chambol. He resolved to take 
 instant advantage of their panic, as he believed it to be, and to 
 act with his whole force. 
 
 About midway between the new position taken up by the 
 English and the position occupied by the French was a small 
 village. Whilst the troops of Forde were entering Kondiir, 
 those of Conflans were approaching this village, and taking up 
 such a position that Forde could not advance without fighting, 
 nor fall back without exposing himself at a disadvantage. 
 Conflans, however, did not content himself with obtaining this 
 good position. Still under the belief that the English force 
 was composed of panic-stricken raw levies, he marched on 
 towards Kondiir. Forde had not been half an hour in that 
 
Kondut and M achhlipatanam. 83 
 
 place before he discovered first the enemy's native troops, and 
 presently their whole line, at a distance of about a thousand 
 yards from his left flank, moving on him in good order. 
 
 It was then half -past eight o'clock. Forde instantly pre- 
 pared for the inevitable battle. He placed the Rajah's troops, 
 not yet recovered from the morning's panic, on the extreme 
 right and left of his line; next to them he disposed his trained 
 native soldiers, and in the centre, the English, including the 
 Rajah's forty Europeans, with the guns equally divided on 
 their flanks. He then advanced to take up a good position. 
 Before, however, he had advanced far, the enemy's guns opened 
 fire. Forde then halted his line in a position the centre of 
 which was covered by a field of Indian corn which had grown 
 so high as to conceal his Europeans entirely from the view of the 
 advancing enemy. Connected with this fact was another, 
 apparently of no moment whatever, but which combined with it 
 to exercise a very decided influence on the battle about to ensue. 
 This was, that whereas in the contests in Southern India 
 between the French and English the native troops in the service 
 of both nations had been dressed in white, it had become the 
 custom in the colder climate of Bengal to assimilate them in 
 respect of clothing to their European comrades. The native 
 soldiers, then, whom Forde had brought from Calcutta wore 
 red coats. It was the first time that the French had met native 
 soldiers so attired. 
 
 Conflans, meanwhile, had advanced in an oblique line 
 towards the English with the intention, apparently, of turning 
 their left flank. But when he noticed the movement in advance 
 of which I have spoken, he halted, and directed his guns to 
 open fire. This fire was very soon after replied to by the 
 English, and was kept up on both sides for about forty minutes. 
 At the end of that time Conflans, impatient for a more decisive 
 result, ordered his army to renew its oblique advance, and to 
 fall upon the troops on the left of the field of Indian corn, 
 whom he believed to be Europeans. His orders were obeyed 
 
84 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 to the letter. His men advanced with great alacrity, and 
 attacked the red-coated sipahis simultaneously in front and on 
 their flank with so much vigour that, notwithstanding all the 
 exhortations of Forde, they broke in disorder, many of them, 
 headed by the Rajah's followers, running for shelter as far as 
 Chambol, pursued by the enemy's horse. 
 
 This easy success over an enemy who was not the enemy he 
 was believed to be was fatal to the French. Believing that this 
 first shock had won the battle for him, Conflans, with the im- 
 petuosity worthy of a Rupert, resolved that it should be 
 decisive. Without stopping to inquire whether there might not 
 be other enemies behind the field of Indian corn, he detached 
 several platoons of his European force to join in the pursuit. 
 These platoons started off, and were marching in haste without 
 order, when they were suddenly confronted by the whole line 
 of English troops, moving solidly to take up the position from 
 which the red-coated sipahis had been driven. 
 
 The positions of the two armies were at once reversed. 
 Between the solid and compact array of the English, and the 
 surprised and scattered platoons of the French, the contest could 
 not be doubtful. In vain did the latter endeavour to reform, 
 to get together. Whilst they were still endeavouring, in the 
 manner of men taken suddenly at a disadvantage, to bring 
 about this result, the English line had opened a rolling fire, 
 beginning from the left and reaching gradually to the right. 
 The effect of this fire was so decisive that before the last 
 musket on the right had been discharged the French had 
 broken their ranks, and were running as fast as they could, 
 without order or formation, to regain their guns, which were 
 about half a mile in their rear. 
 
 Whilst matters had been thus progressing on the English left 
 and centre the French sipahis on their left had been pressing 
 the English right, and, for the moment, with some show of 
 advantage. Forde, however, well aware that the contest in 
 that quarter would be decided by the action of the Europeans 
 
Kondut and Machklipatanam. 85 
 
 in the centre, paid little heed to that part of the held, but, the 
 moment he observed the French run in the manner I have 
 described, he pressed on his Europeans, supported by the 
 sipahis who had just given way, but who had now rallied, in 
 hot but orderly pursuit. This was the more necessary as the 
 ground was open, the enemy's field guns were sufficiently 
 numerous, counting thirteen, and, with a little time at their 
 disposal, the French might yet have turned the fortunes of the 
 daw He pressed on so vigorously, that although the French 
 reached the shelter of their guns, they had time only to fire one 
 or two rounds before his men, charging home, drove them from 
 their pieces. 
 
 The day was thus virtually gained. The attack of the 
 French had been repulsed, they had lost thirteen guns; the 
 English were masters of the ground on which the battle had 
 been fought. War has produced leaders who would have been 
 satisfied with a result so brilliant. Not of such a school was 
 Forde. He belonged to the class of men who believe that no 
 satisfactory result has been achieved if anything yet remains 
 to be accomplished. The French had been repulsed ; they had 
 not been thoroughly beaten. Forde resolved to improve his 
 advantage by attacking their camp. 
 
 He halted till al 1 his own sipahis, and possibly the Rajah's 
 troops, should join him. Regarding the former, there was 
 little delay. The native left wing had, we have seen, rallied 
 after their first defeat and had rejoined him. The contest on 
 his right had been decided in the manner he had anticipated ; 
 the French sipahis had fallen back when they had seen their 
 centre and right routed; their retreat enabled the English 
 right wing to rejoin Forde. The Rajah's troops, however, 
 could not be induced to come on. To his cavalry, who, it was 
 thought, might be useful in the pursuit which every one now 
 considered certain, message after message was sent, "but" — to 
 use the language of the contemporary historian, Mr. Orme — 
 
86 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 " they could not be prevailed upon to quit the shelter of a 
 large tank, at that time dry, in which they, his foot and him- 
 self" — Rajah Anandraz— "in the midst of them, had remained 
 cowering from the beginning of the action." 
 
 Forde, however, cared little for the Rajah and his rabble. 
 As soon as his own sipahis had all joined, and he had made all 
 his preparations, that is, about one hour after the capture of 
 the French field-pieces, he advanced to attack the French camp, 
 leaving, that nothing might retard his march, the field-pieces, 
 which were drawn by bullocks, to follow. 
 
 A deep hollow way traversed the country leading to the 
 French camp. Eehind this all their troops had rallied, and 
 their heavy guns had been planted so as to defend the passage 
 of the hollow way. Several shots from these were fired as the 
 English approached. These pressed on, however, and the 
 defenders, not yet recovered from the effect of their defeat in 
 the plain below, did not stay to meet them. As the English 
 halted to give their fire, the French went suddenly to the 
 right-about, abandoned their camp, and retreated, every man 
 seemingly as he listed, in the utmost confusion, in the direction 
 of Rajahmahendri. The English then took possession of the 
 camp with all its ordnance, ammunition, stores, tents and camp 
 equipage. The only things which the French succeeded in 
 preserving from their hands were four small pieces and two 
 camels laden with money and papers, which Conflans had 
 dispatched to Rajahmahendri, there to await his orders, on the 
 first repulse of his force. Conflans himself, accompanied by 
 his commandant of artillery and staff, fled without making 
 any attempt to rally his troops, and, riding hard, reached 
 Rajahmahendri before midnight. In the first and second 
 divisions of the fight, and in the pursuit, he lost thirty-two 
 pieces of cannon, and a hundred and fifty-six men, including 
 officers, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides a number of 
 native soldiers. The English loss amounted to forty-four 
 
Kondur and M achhlipalaiuwi . 87 
 
 Europeans, and five officers killed and wounded, in addition, 
 likewise, to many sipahis.* 
 
 Such was the battle of Kondiir, written then, incorrectly, as 
 was the custom of our countrymen — one of those clinging 
 customs which men find so difficult to shake off — Condore ; a 
 battle won solely by the genius and resolution of the English 
 leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Forde. It was with design that 
 that officer had placed his red-coated sipahis in a position to 
 attract the first attack of the French. Knowing the character 
 of that nation, he had dared to risk the defeat of his left wing, 
 in order that he might the more surely and with the greater 
 effect smite the enemy when, scattered and careless, they would 
 least expect him. He succeeded because he dared ; he dared, 
 because he had full reliance, first, on himself, on the coolness 
 and calmness with which he could, in the storm of battle, 
 direct a well thought-out movement ; and, secondly, on the 
 troops who had shown themselves during their service in 
 Bengal thoroughly handy, amenable to the guidance of a 
 skilful leader. Forde displayed, likewise, on that day a 
 second quality, the possession of which is rarer than is gener- 
 ally supposed. He showed that he knew how to follow up a 
 victory. Many a man would have been satisfied with the re- 
 pulse of the first attack and the capture of thirteen guns. On 
 Forde the repulse of the first attack had the effect of bringing 
 him to the resolution that within the limit of the northern 
 Sirkars there should never be a second; that he would turn 
 this repulse into a defeat which should be decisive and irre- 
 trievable. Of such stuff are made the leaders of men who 
 never know failure, and of such stuff was Forde. 
 
 The defeat was made irretrievable. The very same day 
 Forde dispatched a battalion of sipahis under Captain Knox 
 to follow up the enemy and to prevent their rallying. Knox 
 pressed on so vigorously that he reached the vicinity of Rajah- 
 
 * Cambridge's "War in India," second edition, published in 1762. 
 
H 
 
 88 The Decisive Battles of India, 
 
 mahendn on the evening of the 9th. He was reinforced during 
 the night by two more native battalions. The fugitives had 
 entered that town before him, but the spirit which had induced 
 them to abandon their camp had entered with them. The 
 sight of the red-coated sipahis, undistinguishable from Euro- 
 peans, deprived them of whatever nerve they had till then 
 retained. Although Rajahmahendri occupied an elevated 
 position on the north bank of the Godavari, and contained 
 within its walls a mud fort in which were stored considerable 
 supplies and some guns, the French had no thought of defend- 
 ing it. Their sole hope was to escape. The sight in the dis- 
 tance of the red-coats stimulated this hope. No sooner had 
 darkness set in than they began to give vitality to it by evacu- 
 ating the place. The Godavari, however, presented great diffi- 
 culties to the operation. This noble river, which, at Rajah- 
 mahendri, has in the rainy season a width of nearly two miles, 
 was in those days not crossed without much previous arrange- 
 ment. Confusion, the child of panic, added on this occasion 
 to the natural difficulties of the passage. The result was that 
 when, at daybreak on the 10th, Knox forced his way into the 
 town, he found fifteen Europeans hovering on the bank, 
 eagerly expecting a return boat. Pie distinguished another 
 party just landing on the southern bank, and about to disem- 
 bark the guns and stores which their boat contained. His 
 action was prompt and decisive. Making prisoners of the 
 fifteen Frenchmen, he opened a fire from the guns in the fort 
 on those who were landing on the opposite bank ; and although 
 it is certain that the missiles did not reach them, yet the boom- 
 ing of the guns and other demonstrations added so to the 
 terror of the fugitives that they fled for dear life, leaving their 
 guns behind them. These Knox at once secured. Forde, with 
 the remainder of the force, reached Rajahmahendri the follow- 
 ay. Conflans and his troops fled to Machhlipatanam. 
 But Forde was not yet satisfied. The large plan which had 
 loomed before Clive, and which he had adopted — the plan 
 
 mg^d 
 /Bui 
 
Kondur and M achhlifatanamfy 89 
 
 which would secure for the English in the northern Sirkars 
 and in the councils of the Siibahdar of the Dakhan the place 
 which till then had been occupied by the French — could not be 
 carried out so long as a single Frenchman remained in the 
 former. Now the French still held Machhlipatanam and the 
 districts adjoining. Machhlipatanam was by far the most 
 important place in the province. Situated en the north side 
 of the mouth of a branch of the river Krishna, on the western 
 shore of the Bay of Bengal, it was in those days famous for 
 the various branches of industry which it supported and en- 
 couraged. In its trade it rivalled Madras. Its cession to the 
 French in 1750, and the subsequent expulsion from it of the 
 English agents, had been regarded as a great misfortune. In 
 fact, the possession by the French of Machhlipatanam and 
 of the towns dependent on it, Kondapilli and Eliir, gave that 
 nation a base whence it would be easy to move, on a con- 
 venient opportunity, to the recovery of the more northern dis- 
 tricts. So long, then, as Machhlipatanam remained to the 
 French, Forde's work was but half done. Forde was not the 
 man to leave his work unfinished. But it was necessary for 
 him to strike quickly. The state of affairs in Bengal and at 
 Madras was such that at any moment he might be recalled. 
 
 His main difficulty was the provision of funds. He had 
 no money; but before moving from Vishakpatanam the Rajah, 
 Anandraz, had promised to supply him. But in the flush of 
 the success, towards which he had contributed nothing but 
 intense personal fright, Anandraz would not only give no 
 money, he even declined to refund twenty thousand rupees 
 which Forde had in the earlier days advanced to him. It was 
 only after six weeks' negotiation, under considerable pressure, 
 on the giving of a solemn undertaking that all the sums ad- 
 vanced by the Rajah should be considered as loans, and that 
 the revenues of all the districts south-west of Godavari which 
 might be reduced should be divided equally between the 
 Ccmpany and the Rajah, that the latter at length relaxed his 
 
go The Decisive Battles of I ndia. 
 
 purse-strings. Much precious time, however, had been lost. In 
 fact, the end of the third week of January had arrived before 
 Forde — who, the better to bring his influence to bear on the 
 Rajah, had fallen back to the fort of Peddapur — could make 
 arrangements for the forward movement he had so long 
 contemplated. 
 
 But on the 28th of January he, though with great trouble, 
 completed those arrangements and did move. Crossing the 
 Godavari, he marched on and occupied Eliir '6th February), 
 an important provincial capital near the great Kolar lake. But 
 here he was forced to make another halt. The Rajah, pro- 
 crastinating according to his wont, had not yet brought the 
 promised supplies. It was necessary to wait for the Rajah. 
 Forde, however, was not the man to allow time to slip away 
 unemployed if he could find the means of utilizing it. He 
 set to work, therefore, to ascertain how far he could disturb 
 the preparations which the French had made to hinder his 
 further progress. 
 
 Conflans, fleeing from the field of Kondur, had reached 
 Rajahmahendri, and had as speedily left that place without 
 making any attempt to rally his forces, without even paying 
 any heed as to their fate. He did not deem himself safe, in 
 fact, till he reached Machhlipatanam. When, however, he 
 found that Forde did not follow him across the Godavari, that 
 he had even fallen back on Peddapur, he recovered part of 
 his courage, and turned his attention to the defence of the 
 country that still remained to him. He was by no means 
 destitute of resources. Notwithstanding his losses at Kondur 
 he still had under his own personal orders upwards of seven 
 hundred men, the gaps made by those losses having been more 
 than replenished by the garrisons he had left behind him; he 
 had the certainty that Moracin, at the head of three hundred 
 men, was coming by sea to his assistance; and, in consequence 
 of his urgent entreaties, Salabat Jang, Siibahdar of the 
 Dakhan, was marching with an army to support him. Re- 
 
Kondur and Macfiklipafanam. 91 
 
 garded from the point of numbers, then, the prospects of the 
 French were very promising. They required but one thing to 
 make success for them an absolute certainty — that was the 
 possession of a man to command them. Unfortunately for 
 them, in Conflans they had a leader who could not lead, a 
 man whose lack of mental capacity was only equalled by his 
 deficiency in the lower quality of personal courage. 
 
 The crisis which was now approaching offered to a man pos- 
 sessing any pretensions to capacity a rare opportunity. The 
 chiefs of the country south of the Godavari were still French 
 in their sympathies; the country abounded in places capable 
 of offering stubborn resistance to an invader ; armed assistance 
 was approaching. To throw every possible difficulty in the 
 progress of the invader till that assistance should arrive, or 
 — what was of scarcely less importance — till Anandraz should 
 grow tired of furnishing him with supplies, was the course 
 which would have recommended itself to a man of even 
 average intelligence. 
 
 But Conflans possessed neither average intelligence nor 
 average courage. He ordered the abandonment of Elur, which 
 possessed a very strong mud fort, and was in other respects 
 advantageously situated. He remained himself shut up within 
 Machhlipatanam. The utmost of which he was capable was 
 to send into the field, under the command of an officer named 
 Du Rocher, a force which he called "an army of observation," 
 composed of two hundred European and two thousand native 
 troops, with four field-pieces, to watch the strong places in 
 which he had allowed garrisons to remain. One of these 
 strong places was Narsipiir, twenty miles south-east of Elur. 
 This place was garrisoned by one hundred European and 
 about three hundred native troops, under the command of M. 
 Panneau, chief of the French factory there. 
 
 To understand clearly the position, the reader will bear in 
 mind that Elur, in which Forde and his army were now halt- 
 ing, waiting for Rajah Anandraz, lies forty -eight miles due 
 
92 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 north of Machhlipatanam, held by Confians; that Narsipur 
 lies twenty miles south-west of Eliir, on the north bank of 
 the mouth of the Godavari; whilst Du Rccher's "army of 
 observation" had taken up a position nearly due west of Elur, 
 and thirty miles distant from it, with the object, apparently, 
 of giving a hand to the army of the Siibahdar. Narsipur, 
 then, was isolated, more distant from Confians and Du Rocher 
 than from Forde. Noting this, Forde resolved to take it 
 before it could be relieved. 
 
 With this object, taking first the precaution to secure, by a 
 threat of destruction in case of refusal, the neutrality of the 
 zamindar of the district, Forde despatched, a day or two after 
 his arrival at Elur, a battalion of sipahis, under his best officer, 
 Captain Knox. Panneau appears to have been a man formed 
 in the mould of Confians. The moment he heard that the 
 English sipahis were marching against him, and that the 
 zamindar of the district had been "got at," he caused to be 
 sunk or destroyed all the ammunition he could not carry away 
 abandoned Narsipur, and marched off to join the army of 
 observation. Knox found in the place only a few old guns. 
 
 At length Rajah Anandraz arrived, and Forde was able 
 (ist March) to march. Crossing the great Kolar lake, which 
 was then nearly dry, he arrived on the 3rd in the vicinity of a 
 small but strong fort, called Konkal, garrisoned by thirteen 
 Frenchmen and two companies of sipahis, commanded by a 
 sergeant. This sergeant was a man of a higher natura 1 stamp 
 than either Confians or Panneau. He had received the day 
 previous a letter from Du Rocher, requiring him to defend the 
 fort to the last extremity, and promising to march to his relief. 
 The sergeant did defend the place to the last extremity, re- 
 pulsed two attacks, and only gave way when the gates were 
 battered in and the English rushed in in overwhelming num- 
 bers. The small relieving party sent by Du Rocher, learning 
 in time of the disaster, fell back to rejoin him. Forde pushed 
 on from Konkal, and on the 6th March arrived before 
 
Koudur and Machhlipatanam. 93 
 
 Machhlipatanam. Conflans up to that day had occupied a 
 very advantageous position in the town, about two miles from 
 the fort of Machhlipatanam. He had here five hundred Euro- 
 peans and two thousand sipahis, whilst close at hand was Du 
 Rocher's army of observation, which hitherto had observed 
 nothing. It was important to the French to maintain their 
 position in the town, as it contained an abundant supply of 
 water, whereas there was none in the fort, except a certain 
 amount hoarded up in cisterns. The position would have been 
 difficult to attack, and a retreat from it, had a retreat been 
 necessary, would have been covered by the guns in the fort. 
 But Conflans had not forgotten Kondur; he would not risk a 
 second action. When Forde approached he retired behind the 
 defences of the fort. 
 
 That fort was well capable of offering a prolonged defence. 
 An irregular parallelogram, with an average length of about 
 eight hundred yards, and a breadth of from five to six hun- 
 dred, it stood nearly a mile and a half from the sea-shore, on 
 the edge of a sound or inlet of the sea, upwards of five hun- 
 dred yards in breadth, and was surrounded on the three other 
 sides by a morass of considerable extent. This morass varied 
 in depth in different parts, from three to eighteen feet. The 
 outline of the works consisted of eleven bastions of various 
 sizes and shapes, connected by long curtains; round the whole 
 was a palisaded berm and a wet ditch, but no glacis; the 
 escarp and the counterscarp were earth faced with masonry. 
 
 The reader will not fail to observe that the face of the fort, 
 which rested on the inlet of the sea — the southern face — was 
 practically unassailable. Nor did the three other faces fail 
 to offer extraordinary difficulties. A range of sand-hills ex- 
 tended on the western and eastern sides of the fort to about 
 half a mile inland. On the eastern side they approached to 
 within eight hundred yards of the fort, and — the morass lying 
 between them and it, and a creek running between the two — ■ 
 they formed here the nearest point whence the place could be 
 
94 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 assailed. The town which Conflans had evacuated, lay nearly 
 two miles to the north-west of the fort, and was also sur- 
 rounded by the morass. The mode of communication between 
 the two was by means of a narrow raised causeway, about two 
 thousand yards in length, leading to the north-west bastion 
 of the fort, in which was the only gateway. The last hun- 
 dred and twenty yards of this causeway were formed into a 
 long caponniere, which, at the part furthest from the fort, 
 terminated in a strong ravelin. 
 
 On the 7th March Forde invested this strong place with a 
 force inferior in Europeans to that which defended it. Regu- 
 lar approaches being out of the question, he took up a position 
 on the sand-banks I have described as being within eight 
 hundred yards of the eastern face of the fort. Here he began 
 to erect his batteries. 
 
 From the 7th to the 25th March Forde was engaged in 
 erecting these batteries. During this period he was exposed 
 to difficulties and obstacles sufficient to madden any man. 
 Scarcely had he sat down before Machhlipatanam when Du 
 Rocher's army of observation woke into sudden life and acted 
 on his communications. Du Rocher's movements towards 
 Rajahmahendri, and the threats, which he took care should be 
 reported, that he would make a raid upon the ancestral 
 domains of Rajah Anandraz, so terrified the latter, that he 
 closed his hands, and refused to advance money to his allies, 
 or to pledge his credit on their behalf. The effect of this, 
 coming at a moment when the British treasure-chest was empty, 
 and when Forde depended for its replenishment on supplies 
 known to have arrived at Rajahmahendri, or, failing them, on 
 Anandraz, was most disastrous. To add to his troubles, 
 certain intelligence reached him that the Siibahdar of the 
 Dakhan, the ally of the French, with an army forty thousand 
 strong, was approaching. 
 
 Was it possible for a position to be apparently more hope- 
 less than that of Forde at this conjuncture (18th March)? 
 
Kondur and Machhlipatanam. 95 
 
 He was besieging an enemy who, strong in their superior num- 
 bers and the mud walls behind which they fought, literally 
 laughed at him. His communications were cut off, and the 
 supply of money on which he depended to pay his troops 
 was threatened by the enemy; his native ally was abject with 
 terror, and ready to betray him ; the overlord of the country 
 was marching at the head of an army forty thousand strong 
 to force him to raise the siege. That was his position on the 
 1 8th March — a position full of despair, not offering one ray 
 of hope. But his cup of troubles was not yet full. 
 
 Up to that date Forde had managed to subsist his army 
 by using the prize-money gained by the troops, but not yet 
 distributed, by expending all his own private funds, the 
 private funds of his officers, and the money which otherwise 
 would have gone to pay his soldiers. One consequence of 
 this was that his troops were several months in arrears of 
 pay. This alone was a hardship ; but when they saw, for they 
 could not help seeing, that their hard-earned prize-money had 
 disappeared, that nothing was left, that their food was bad 
 and insufficient, that they were engaged on an impossible 
 enterprise — they, too, lost heart. On the 19th the European 
 troops broke into open mutiny, and, turning out with their 
 arms, threatened to march away. Forde, by a mixture of 
 firmness and tact, succeeded in quieting them, and assuring 
 them that their money was on its way from Bengal, persuaded 
 them to return to their duty. Four days later the money, 
 which had reached Rajahmahendri, was, to preserve it from 
 the French, hurriedly shipped on board boats to be conveyed 
 to the coast town of Kakinada, and was thus lost for the time 
 to the English. The next day Du Rocher entered Rajah- 
 mahendri, and made as though he would march on Vishak- 
 patanam. The day following (25th March), the English 
 batteries were sufficiently completed to enable Forde to open 
 fire. The bombardment which then began continued to the 
 6th April, without any substantial result. It is true that it 
 
96 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 demolished many houses :n the fort and made many breaches 
 in the bastions. But not only were the breaches made by day 
 repaired by night, but the French, erecting- a battery on the 
 unapproached side of the inlet, poured in during this time a 
 fire which, taking the English batteries in flank, caused con- 
 siderable damage. To add to Forde's embarrassment, the day 
 after his batteries had opened, the Subahdar of the Dakhan, 
 Salabat Jang, arrived at Baizwara, forty-four miles from 
 Machhlipatanam, and sent an express to Rajah Anandraz 
 ordering him to quit the English camp and join his standard. 
 These items of intelligence reached the English camp on 
 one and the same day. They appeared to bring the mis- 
 fortunes of Forde to a climax. Rajah Anandraz showed his 
 appreciation of their importance by marching off the next 
 morning, without notice, in the direction of his territories. 
 When, however, it was pointed out to him that between him- 
 self and his territories there was Du Rocher, and that his 
 only chance of prosperity, perhaps even of existence, lay in 
 contributing as far as he could to the success of the English, 
 he returned. Meanwhile, Forde himself opened out negotia- 
 tions with Salabat Jang. The result was a ray of light. 
 Salabat Jang consented to receive an English envoy in his 
 camp, and, meanwhile, to remain at Baizwara. 
 
 But this ray of light was soon succeeded by a darkness 
 blacker even than that which had heralded its appearance. 
 On the 5th April there fell heavy rain, which added greatly 
 to the swampy nature of the morass. The following day 
 intelligence arrived that Salabat Jang had broken up his 
 camp at Baizwara, and w r as marching on Machhlipatanam, 
 and that Du Rocher, retracing his steps from Rajahmahendri, 
 was hurrying to effect a junction with him. That morning the 
 senior artillery officer reported to Forde that not more ammuni- 
 tion than was sufficient for two days' service of the batteries 
 remained in store ! 
 
 The issue had now greatly narrowed itself. It had become 
 
Koudur and M achhlifatanam . 97 
 
 a battle to the death between two men, Forde and Conflans, 
 with every advantage on the side of the latter. However 
 greatly though Forde might dare, Conflans had only to 
 remain firm to baffle him. Let him but display ordinary in- 
 telligence, ordinary courage, ordinary forethought, and he had 
 him safe and secure in the hollow of his hand. According to 
 every rule of war Forde, in fact, was lost. With fewer than 
 four hundred Europeans and about fourteen hundred sipahis, 
 he had before him a fortress which defied him, behind him an 
 army which he could not beat; his ammunition, his supplies, 
 his funds were alike exhausted. Never was a commander, not 
 even Wellington before Talavera, in a position so radically 
 false. He was in a trap, apparently lost. 
 
 If Forde had been Conflans he had been lost indeed, with- 
 out redemption. It is too much to say, looking at the record 
 of the men who were his contemporaries, of men such as Clive, 
 as Eyre Coote, as Caillaud, as Munro, and as Adams, that if 
 he had not been Forde he had been lost. But this, at least, 
 may be asserted, that if he had not held a double first-class 
 degree in the university of nature, if he had not possessed to 
 a supreme extent the qualities which mark men amongst their 
 fellow-men, and if, it must in fairness be added, he had not 
 been opposed to a leader who in all qualities, soldierly or 
 other, ranked as much below the ordinary humanity of the 
 age as Forde ranked above it, he could not have emerged 
 from the crisis in which he found himself with success, or 
 even with credit. As it was, his conduct stands out a brilliant 
 example to all men beset by difficulties. He faced them with 
 coolness : he met them with a calm determination to conquer 
 them. 
 
 No sooner had Forde become aware that the avenues behind 
 him were closing up, and that he had but two days' ammuni- 
 tion left, than he determined to bring matters to an issue by 
 attempting to storm Machhlipatanam. Success there would 
 be success everywhere. Defeat there would be no greater 
 
 H 
 
98 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 calamity than the calamity which stared him in the face on 
 the sand-hills on which he stood. 
 
 Resolved, then, to make a supreme effort to conquer — to 
 venture all to obtain all — Forde, on the morning of the 7th 
 April, opened a fire from his batteries so fierce, so continued 
 and so concentrated, as to surpass all his previous efforts. Cal- 
 culating that the tide would be at its ebb about midnight, 
 that then the depth of the water in the ditch of the fort would 
 net exceed three feet, he ordered the whole of his force to 
 be under arms at ten o'clock. To mislead the enemy as to the 
 intended point of attack, he directed the fire equally upon 
 all the bastions, and, to prevent their repair, he continued it 
 to the latest moment. He had resolved to make the real attack 
 on the bastion mounting ten guns at the north-east angle of 
 the fort, but — again to mislead the enemy — he ordered that 
 Captain Knox should distract them by making a demonstra- 
 tion, to be converted, if necessary, into a real attack, against 
 its south-west angle, between the bastion resting on the sound 
 and that to the north of it. At this point the broad swamp, 
 bounded externally by a small rivulet, served the purpose of 
 a ditch, and rendered the face apparently impregnable; but 
 Forde had discovered, on the night of the 6th, that the passage 
 through the swamp, though difficult, was practicable. In a 
 desperate attempt desperate efforts must be resorted to, and 
 i 4 . was considered possible that this point, considered impreg- 
 nable, might be left comparatively unguarded. Still further 
 to distract the attention of the garrison, it was arranged that 
 Rajah Anandraz, with all his following, should proceed along 
 the causeway and make an attack upon the ravelin covering 
 the caponniere. 
 
 At ten o'clock that night the various attacking parties were 
 under arms awaiting the signal. As the party led by Captain 
 Knox, comprised entirely of sipahis, seven hundred in number, 
 destined to wade through the swamp and attack the south-west 
 angle, had a longer distance to traverse, thev started first. 
 
Kondur and M achhlipatanam. 99 
 
 The main attack, formed in three divisions, and composed 
 of three hundred and twelve European infantry, thirty gunners, 
 thirty sailors, and seven hundred sipahis, was to set out about 
 half an hour later, but some time was lost in waiting for the 
 officer appointed to command it, Captain Callender, and even- 
 tually the party started without him. The camp was then 
 left in charge of Rajah Anandraz. It was arranged that he 
 and his followers should remain halted there till they should 
 hear the sound of attack from one or the other quarter — it 
 having been settled that neither attack should begin before 
 midnight, but that each party was free to act the moment the 
 gengs of the fort should strike twelve — and that then they 
 should advance to the attack of the ravelin. 
 
 Precisely at twelve o'clock the sound of firing from the 
 direction of the southern face of the fort proved that Knox 
 had begun operations. Rajah Anandraz at once sent his men 
 along the causeway, whence they opened a musketry fire on 
 the ravelin, which served at least to distract the attention of 
 the defenders. Leaving them at this task, I propose to follow 
 the main attack. Setting out a good half-hour late, this party 
 — lead by Captain Fischer — proceeded across the morass from 
 a point opposite the bastion they intended to storm. Not- 
 withstanding all their efforts, the unfortunate delay in starting 
 interfered with the symmetry of the projected assault, for 
 before they could reach the ditch they heard the fire indi- 
 cating that Knox had begun his task. Rendered more eager 
 by this sound they marched on as fast as they could, up to 
 their knees in mire, across the swamp, and up to the middle in 
 water and mud in crossing the ditch. The first division had 
 just waded through the latter, and were engaged in tearing 
 up the palisades on the berm, when the French, who had dis- 
 covered them only just before they had reached the palisades, 
 gathered on the breach, whilst other of their troops opened an 
 artillery and musketry fire from the next bastions on their 
 right and left. This opposition, however, only increased the 
 
ioo The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 ardour of the assailants; and whilst the first division, com- 
 posed of Europeans and sipahis, led by Captain Fischer, 
 attacked the breach, the second, composed only of sipahis, 
 under Captain Maclean, replied to the fire from the bastion 
 on their right; and the third, composed only of Europeans, 
 led by Captain Yorke, answered that pouring on them from 
 the left. Several men were killed, however, before Fischer 
 succeeded in gaining the breach; but no sooner had he accom- 
 plished this feat than Yorke's men, ckimbering up, joined 
 him, and the united parties, turning to the left, seized the 
 bastion whence Maclean had been fired upon. This left a 
 clear way to Maclean's party. But before his men could 
 clamber up Fischer turned along the ramparts to the right to 
 secure the bastions in that direction. Leaving hmi for a 
 moment, I must follow the fortunes of Yorke. 
 
 Fischer had but just set off when it was reported to Yorke 
 that one of the guns was on the bastion he had gained, ready 
 loaded. Yorke at once brought it to bear along the southern 
 face of the rampart, and was preparing to follow in the same 
 direction, when he beheld a body of French sipahis advancing 
 between the foot of the rampart and the buildings of the 
 town, with the object of reinforcing the Frenchmen on the 
 bastion, of the capture of which they were evidently not aware. 
 With rare courage and presence of mind Yorke ran down to 
 the detachment, and, seizing the French officer who commanded 
 it, bade him order his men to lay down their arms, as the 
 defences of the place had been gained. Surprised and half 
 stupefied, the officer obeyed; his men laid down their arms 
 and were sent as prisoners to the conquered bastion. Yorke, 
 observing that the way below the bastion was free from inter- 
 ruption, and broader than the rampart, then brought his men 
 down and pushed along it parallel to the rampart. He had 
 successfully reduced and secured two out of the three bastions 
 which still remained on that face when an event occurred 
 which had almost marred the success of the whole plan. 
 
Kondur and M ' achldipatanam. 101 
 
 Yorke's men had followed him at first with alacrity, but as 
 they pressed on in the darkness, separated from their comrades, 
 towards unknown dangers, their leader had discovered, not 
 only that their alacrity had vanished, but that it was difficult 
 to urge them on. This difficulty became more marked after 
 the second bastion, counting from that by which the stormers 
 had entered, had been gained. Many of them held back when 
 Yorke, after securing his prisoners, urged them to advance. 
 They had yielded, however, to his threats and persuasions, 
 when suddenly they came upon a small building close to the 
 rampart. It was simply an expense magazine; but some of the 
 men who had stopped from curiosity to examine it, discovering 
 that it contained gunpowder, called out "a mine, a mine!" 
 The words had scarcely been uttered before the whole division 
 ran back panic-stricken, leaving Yorke, who was marching at 
 their head, alone, with two native drummer-boys, who con- 
 tinued to beat the Grenadiers' March. In vain did they beat ; 
 not only would not the men advance, they ran back to the 
 bastion by which they had entered, and, disregarding their 
 officers who tried to rally them, began to debate whether they 
 should not leave the fort. They were discussing this question 
 when Yorke, whose patience had been exhausted, appeared 
 amongst them. Infuriated at what he heard, he jumped to the 
 breach and threatened to kill the first man who should offer to 
 come near it. Yorke was an old 39th officer, and there were 
 some men in the grenadier company he was leading who had 
 served in that regiment. These, ashamed of their previous 
 behaviour, at once sided with him; their example became con- 
 tagious, and in a minute Yorke found thirty-six devoted men 
 ready to follow him. At the head of these, and leaving the 
 others to follow as soon as their officers could bring them 
 round, Yorke started off, always with the two native drummers 
 at his side, to resume his task. 
 
 But the delay caused by this blind panic had given the 
 enemy time to rally. The officer who commanded the third 
 
102 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 and last bastion, towards which Yorke had been advancing 
 when his men recoiled in the manner I have described, had 
 brought down a gun loaded with grape and pointed it towards 
 the roadway along which the English were advancing. When 
 they arrived within a few yards of it he fired it. The effect 
 was most disastrous. Yorke himself, always in front of his 
 men, was struck down with a ball through each thigh ; the two 
 native drummers were killed at his side; several of the men 
 were killed, and sixteen were wounded. The survivors carry- 
 ing with them their wounded captain, fell back to the breach 
 and to the two bastions beyond it, where Forde was with a 
 small reserve. There they awaited the result of the movements 
 of Fischer. 
 
 I have already recorded that when, on gaining the breach, 
 Yorke had moved along the rampart to the left, Fischer had 
 moved to the right. He gained without difficulty two bastions 
 in that direction. The third was connected with the caponniere 
 covered by the ravelin which Rajah Anandraz was feebly 
 assailing. But feeble as was his assault, the effect on the 
 French garrison was just as great as if it had been made with 
 vigour. The French officer who commanded at the ravelin, 
 losing all thought of the common danger, and treating as 
 serious an attack which the slightest perception would have 
 shown him to be a simple demonstration, allowed himself and 
 the hundred men with him to be isolated — to be kept from the 
 important part of the field of action; for Fischer, advancing 
 from the second bastion, and taking in at once, as he 
 approached the third, the position of affairs, promptly closed 
 the gate leading to the ravelin. Just as he had done this, 
 Captain Callender, whose want of punctuality had, it will be 
 remembered, delayed the advance for more than half an hour, 
 appeared on the scene and assumed command ; as the party, 
 however, advanced to the fourth bastion, a stray shot from 
 that post killed him, and Fischer resumed it. 
 
 Whilst matters were thus progressing to the right and left of 
 
Kondur and Machhlipatanam. 103 
 
 the breach, where was Conflans? Roused from his slumbers 
 by the musketry discharge of Knox's false attack, that officer 
 had not quitted his house, but had increased the general con- 
 fusion of the garrison by sending to the various posts repeated 
 and contradictory orders, based on the exaggerated reports 
 which reached him every minute. Never very strong in his 
 head, he was driven wild by the fact that the attack was made 
 on four different faces of the fort, and he had not the sense to 
 distinguish the feigned from the real. First, Knox's attack 
 had alarmed him. He had met that by sending to his southern 
 face the greater part of his reserves, when a very few only 
 would have been sufficient, for Knox had been unable to cross 
 the swamp, and his men had no ammunition beyond that 
 which they carried in their pouches. Then, Rajah Anandraz, 
 as powerless to cause him evil as was Knox, had disquieted his 
 nerves. It would have been easy for him, on the first alarm, 
 to send to the ravelin, and ascertaining how feeble was the 
 attack, and how easily the position could be held by twenty 
 men, to have drawn off the remainder to meet the only assault 
 which w r as really formidable; but he did nothing of the sort, 
 and thus another hundred men were isolated. Again, when 
 the breach was stormed, the fact that the rampart was assailed 
 on the right and left simultaneously completed his mental 
 prostration. A few reserves well in hand might yet have 
 retrieved the day, might have converted the repulse of Yorke's 
 men into a defeat, and might have checked the advance of 
 Fischer. But, as I have said, the double attack of the storm- 
 ing party, combined with the continued rattle of musketry 
 from the assailants of the southern face, and of the ravelin, 
 finished him. Believing that all was lost, he sent a messenger 
 to Forde to propose to capitulate on honourable terms. This 
 happened just at the moment when the ammunition of Knox's 
 party was all but exhausted, when Yorke's men, repulsed, were 
 bearing their wounded leader back to the breach whence they 
 had started, when Callender, dropping from the clouds, had 
 
104 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 been shot dead. Forde, who had joined Maclean's men on the 
 rampart, was eagerly watching Fischer's advance, upon the 
 progress of which the fate of the fort seemed to depend, when 
 he received the offer of capitulation. He answered it in a 
 manner becoming one who felt it necessary to complete the 
 discouragement of his foe. The surrender, he replied, must be 
 a surrender at discretion : the garrison must instantly lay 
 down their arms, and constitute themselves prisoners. Con- 
 flans acceded — and the contest ceased. The garrison laid 
 down their arms. The most important stronghold of the 
 French fell into the hands of our countrymen. 
 
 Mr. Orme has well remarked that "the improbability of 
 the attempt" on Machhlipatanam "was the principal cause of 
 its success, for its garrison from the beginning had regarded 
 the siege with mockery, and, being in daily expectation cf the 
 arrival of a body of troops which were coming by sea from 
 Pondichery, had concerted that the army of observation, 
 joined by this reinforcement, and a great detachment if not 
 the whole of Salabat Jang's army, should then surround and 
 attack the English army." Yes — but admitting that mockery, 
 the result, but for the incapacity of their leader, would un- 
 doubtedly have corresponded to their anticipations. It would 
 have been so if a Forde had occupied the place of Conflans; 
 it would have been so if a man of ordinary intelligence had 
 occupied the position of the French leader. 
 
 After all, the work was the work of one man. It was the 
 consequence of a display of daring, of calm courage, of cool 
 calculation, not surpassed in the history of the world. Imagine 
 once more the position of Forde, his gun-ammunition reduced 
 to a supply barely sufficient for two days, facing a fortress 
 garrisoned by an army superior to his own, cut off from his 
 resources, two armies behind him, and another expected daily 
 on the coast. All way of retreat for him by land was cut off; 
 to remain where he was was impossible. He might, it is true, 
 have embarked his troops on board the ships which were on 
 
Kondtir and Machhlipatanam. 105 
 
 the coast, but such a course he rejected as dishonourable. In 
 whichever direction he might attack, he must meet a superior 
 force. In a moment of supreme danger Forde chose the 
 straight, direct and simple course, which, not in war only but 
 in every other circumstance of life, it becomes a man to follow. 
 He followed it, and won ! 
 
 At the storming of Machhlipatanam Forde lost twenty-two 
 Europeans killed and sixty-two wounded, among the former 
 two officers. Of the sipahis, who vied with the Europeans in 
 courage, fifty were killed and a hundred and fifty wounded 
 He captured a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, besides 
 many military and ether stores. The garrison which surren- 
 dered numbered five hundred Europeans and two thousand, 
 five hundred and thirty-seven natives, the latter all capable of 
 bearing arms, but of whom only a proportion were trained 
 sipahis. 
 
 When he stormed the place the army of Salabat Jang was 
 within fifteen miles of it; Du Rocher's army of observation 
 was still nearer. A week later, ships conveying a corps of 
 three hundred Frenchmen under Moracin appeared off the 
 coast. Had he failed, then, Forde would have left few traces 
 of his enterprise behind him. 
 
 His success, well earned, gained for England the five dis- 
 tricts which had constituted the most valuable possession of 
 France in Hindustan — the districts constituting the province 
 of the Northern Sirkars, and including those now known as 
 Ganjam, Vishakpatanam, Rajahmahendri, Machhlipatanam 
 and Guntur. Salabat Jang, after a little bluster, signed, on 
 the 14th May, a treaty conferring upon the English, as a free 
 gift, the whole Sirkar of Machhlipatanam with eight districts, 
 as well as the sirkar of Nizampatanam, and the districts of 
 Kondavid and Wakalmannar. 
 
 Three years after this date, Nizam Alf, who had succeeded 
 Salabat Jang, offered the whole of the Sirkars, with the ex- 
 ception of Guntiir, to the English, on condition of their aiding 
 
io6 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 him with troops. They declined, but, four years subsequently, 
 the grant of the whole, made at the instance of Clive by the 
 Court of Dilhi, was confirmed by the Subahdar, then and ever 
 subsequently known as the Nizam. The right of the English 
 to those Sirkars has never since been questioned. 
 
 But the cession of the Northern Sirkars was not the most 
 important result obtained by the storming of Machhlipatanam. 
 From the date of that capture the paramount influence at the 
 Court of Haidarabad was transferred from the French to the 
 English. By the treaty made by Salabat Jang on the 14th 
 May the French were not only expelled, they were forbidden 
 to have a settlement in that country. The corps of Moracin 
 which had landed at Ganjam was, after a few fruitless efforts 
 to disturb the new arrangements, completely dispersed. Du 
 Rocher, it ts true, lingered some time longer. But the fiat had 
 gone forth. The victory of Forde laid the foundation of that 
 predominance at the Court of the Nizam which, placed some 
 forty years later on a definite basis by Marquess Wellesley, 
 exists at the present day. 
 
 Rightly, then, may Kondiir and Machhlipatanam rank 
 among the decisive battles of India. Few battles have pro- 
 duced more brilliant results. If Kaveripak was the turning- 
 point in the contest between the French and English for the 
 possession of Southern India south of the Krishna, the capture 
 of Machhlipatanam most assuredly secured for them the 
 authority they now command and the influence they now exer- 
 cise in the provinces lying between that river and the Vind- 
 hayan range. 
 
 One word regarding the man who gained for his country 
 that splendid position. Forde had been recommended by 
 Clive to the Court of Directors for the command of the Com- 
 pany's troops in Bengal. The recommendation was not 
 listened to. Nor, though immediately after his expulsion of 
 the French from the Northern Sirkars, Forde proceeded to 
 Calcutta to gain, in the vicinity of Chinsurah, another victory 
 
Kondur and Machhlipatanam. 107 
 
 over another European enemy of superior force, did he receive 
 any proof of the gratitude of the corporation he had served so 
 well. In spite of this neglect his name has descended to this 
 generation, and it will descend to posterity, as the name of a 
 great Englishman, of one who nobly upheld the honour of his 
 country, and who, by the display of a calm and cool courage, 
 aided most materially in laying the foundation of the British 
 Empire in India. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 BIDERRA. 
 
 Of the five great maritime powers of the sixteenth and seven- 
 teenth centuries Holland was the second to enter into com- 
 mercial communication with India. Not less the spirit of 
 adventure than the desire to snatch for their country the trade 
 and to injure the resources of her Iberian enemies animated 
 her children in this great enterprise. Spain was her first 
 enemy, but in 1580 Portugal had been united to Spain. From 
 that date all the efforts of Holland, in the East, were directed 
 to transfer to herself the position and the influence which had 
 been acquired in that part of the world by the latest component 
 portion of the empire of her mortal foe. 
 
 She succeeded almost beyond her hopes. In the Chinese 
 seas, in the Malay peninsula, in Java, in Sumatra, in Ceylon, in 
 India, her troops gradually prevailed. The hostility, once 
 excited, survived the severance of Portugal from Spain. In 
 1646 Holland had planted an agency at Chinsurah on the 
 river Hugh', twenty miles north of Calcutta. But, fourteen 
 years later, in one year, she expelled the Portuguese from theii 
 possessions south of Goa on the western coast, and from Naga- 
 patanam,* and all the others on the eastern. 
 
 * ; 'The city of snakes," so called from " Naga " (a snake), and 
 '• patanam" (city). With their usual carelessness regarding the correct 
 
 108 
 
Bidcrra. 109 
 
 The general affairs of the Dutch in the East were not, how- 
 ever, directed from the soil of India. In 1619 they had built 
 in Ja^a/ a city which they called Batavia, and which they 
 destined to be the capital and head-quarters of all their pos- 
 sessions in that quarter of the globe. Gradually, as they 
 settled in Bengal, as they seized the possessions of the Portu- 
 guese, and established themselves in Ceylon, in Sumatra, and 
 in the Malay peninsula, this plan assumed consistency. In the 
 beginning of the eighteenth century Batavia had become the 
 recognized capital of all the Dutch establishments in the East. 
 There resided the Governor-General and the Council of the 
 Dutch Indies, and to them all the other possessions, great and 
 small, were subordinate. These possessions were ranked in 
 grades, some being ruled by a governor, some by a chief or 
 director; some by a commandant, some simply by an agent. 
 On the Malabar coast of India, Kochin, properly called Kuchi, 
 was the head-quarters of the Government. On the eastern 
 coast, Nagapatanam first, afterwards Palikat, occupied a simi- 
 lar position. In Bengal Chinsurah was the head-quarters of 
 a director presiding over all the other factories on that side of 
 India. 
 
 This arrangement was in force at the time when Siraju'd 
 daulah sacked Calcutta in 1756. The Dutch and the French 
 at Chinsurah and at Chandranagar had purchased immunity 
 from a similar catastrophe, by the payment each of a large 
 sum.* They had no idea at the time that, from the misfortune 
 of their rivals, there would be a rebound which, in its course, 
 would likewise overwhelm them. 
 
 rendering of Indian proper names, the English of a century and a half 
 ago transmuted this singularly expressive name into Negapatam — 
 placing the accent on the last syllable — a name utterly meaningless. 
 The barbarism continues at the present day. 
 
 * The Dutch paid 450,000 rupees; the French, 350,000— the difference 
 in favour of the latter being a consequence of their having furnished the 
 Niiwab with two hundred and fifty chests of gunpowder. 
 
no The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 How the English repaid the Niiwab for his attack on Cal- 
 cutta, and how the rebound affected the French at Chan- 
 dranagar, has been already related. We have seen how Mir 
 J'afar succeeded Siraju'd daulah. From that date English 
 influence, gradually but steadily progressing, became para- 
 mount throughout the three provinces. In vain did Mir J'afar 
 struggle against the yoke he had imposed upon himself. He 
 could not shake it off. To purchase English aid he had mort- 
 gaged the resources of the State. The assessments which 
 were imposed to pay off that mortgage alienated many of his 
 most influential followers, and turned against him the hearts 
 of his people. In spite of himself, he was forced, on every 
 emergency, to call in the aid of the English. He had to invoke 
 that aid first against his people, then against some of his 
 nobles, and finally against an attack from the north. Of 
 course he had to pay for it. New trading advantages, new 
 concessions, news transfers of land, followed each transaction. 
 He felt that he was more and more involving himself in a net 
 from which there was little hope of extrication; that his allies 
 were becoming every day more and more his masters. But what 
 was he to do ? In his secret council-chamber, conferring with 
 his son and his intimates, he bewailed the fatal necessity which 
 forced him to be the suppliant of the race to which he owed 
 his throne, and implored them to suggest a remedy. For long, 
 not even the astutest among them could point to one. Sud- 
 denly, however, a faint wail from the Hugli was wafted to his 
 ears. At first it attracted no attention, but as it increased in 
 volume and persistency, and changing its tone, finally resolved 
 itself into a suggestion, he turned to it with increasing eager- 
 ness, until he became satisfied that he had at last discovered 
 the plan which would rid him of his foes. 
 
 The wail came from the Dutch at Chinsurah. The conces- 
 sions granted by Mir J'afar to the English, more especially 
 the monopoly of the saltpetre trade, the right given to them 
 to search all the Dutch vessels coming up the Hugli, and to 
 
Biderra. 1 1 1 
 
 prevent the employment of other than English pilots, had 
 caused great exasperation in the Dutch colony. Their trade, 
 likewise, had been seriously affected. That of the English, on 
 the other hand, festered by the Niiwab, had at the same time 
 proportionally increased. 
 
 The position may thus be described. The English, in virtue 
 of the consequences of Plassey, were prospering to an extra- 
 ordinary degree; the Dutch, in virtue of the same consequences 
 were declining in influence and wealth; the Niiwab was 
 anxious to shake off the yoke imposed upon him by the Eng- 
 lish. It was not long before the feeling of resentment enter- 
 tained by the two last produced a firm understanding against 
 the first. The Niiwab first listened to the remonstrances of 
 the Dutch against the privileges he had, to their detriment, 
 granted to their rivals. In return he questioned them about 
 their power, their resources, their ability to carry out a great 
 plan. This exchange of questions led to confidence, and a 
 secret agreement was arrived at in virtue of which the Dutch 
 promised to procure from Batavia a force sufficient, in men and 
 ships, to expel their rivals from Bengal ; whilst the Niiwab, 
 concealing his complicity, should secretly prepare his army to 
 co-operate with them at the opportune moment. The arrange- 
 ment embodying this plan was arrived at in November 1758. 
 The time for action seemed to the contracting parties to be 
 singularly favourable, for m the preceding month Clive had 
 despatched a great number of his available troops, under 
 Forde, to the Northern Sirkars. For the defence of Calcutta 
 and the British factories in Bengal, and to assert the British 
 influence at the court of Mir J'afar, there remained, then, in 
 Calcutta, little more than three hundred English, and two 
 weak battalions of native troops. It is true that Clive was 
 there as governor, but Clive was so little suspicious of danger, 
 so confident in himself, and so bent on using all his resources 
 to aid in the defeat of the French, then threatening Southern 
 
1 12 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 India, that he was despatching all the reinforcements from 
 England, as fast as they arrived, to Madras. 
 
 No moment, then, could be more opportune for the con- 
 spirators. Conscious of this, the Dutch war-party at Chin- 
 surah, which then enjoyed an ascendancy in the councils of the 
 director, pressed their plans on the supreme Government at 
 Batavia, and urged immediate action. In the meanwhile, and 
 before Batavia could respond, Mir J'afar had been forced, 
 sorely against his will, to appeal once again to the protecting 
 arm of Clive. Threatened by an invasion from the north, led 
 by the rebellious son of the Emperor of Dihli, Mir J'afar, 
 doubtful of his own followers, had invoked the assistance of 
 the English. Clive had speedily repelled the invasion. As 
 a reward, the Nuwab had bestowed upon him a large personal 
 jaghir, and in the month of June following (1759) had accom- 
 panied him to Calcutta. Whilst there he received from the 
 Dutch a private intimation that their plans were approaching 
 maturity. Mir J'afar stayed then but a short time in Cal- 
 cutta; but he returned to that place in the October following, 
 professedly again to visit Clive, really to be near at hand when 
 the expected crisis should occur. Meanwhile, as far back as 
 August, rumour had spoken of the expected arrival of a 
 large Dutch force. During that month, in fact, a Dutch 
 vessel, having on board a considerable number of Malayan 
 soldiers, had arrived at the mouth of the Hugli. Clive 
 at once informed the Nuwab of the event, whilst he took 
 precautions to prevent alike the passage of the ship up the 
 river and the landing of the soldiers. The Dutch authorities, 
 called upon to explain, declared that the vessel was really 
 bound for Nagapatanam, and had been driven to the Hugli by 
 stress of weather; that as soon as she could provide herself 
 with water and provisions she would resume her voyage. She 
 did so, eventually, although a clandestine attempt of the 
 Dutch master-attendant to convey eighteen of the Malayan 
 
Hid err a. i 1 3 
 
 soldiers to Chinsurah in his official barge - an attempt dis- 
 covered and frustrated — threw some doubt on the explanation. 
 
 But, in the October following, whilst Mir J'afar was in Cal- 
 cutta, the real attempt was made. In that month seven armed 
 ships, full of troops, European and Malayan, arrived at the 
 mouth of the Hugli. Clive hastened to inform the Nuwab of 
 this invasion. The Nuwab, forewarned, affected to treat the 
 matter lightly, and announced his intention of proceeding at 
 once to his own town of Hugli, to summon thither from Chin- 
 surah the Dutch authorities, and to insist upon their at once 
 dismissing their ships, or in case of their refusal, of chastising 
 them and driving them out of Bengal. Mir J'afar did proceed 
 to Hugli; he did summon to his presence the Dutch authori- 
 ties. What actually passed in secret conference cannot be 
 known, but the historian has the authority of Clive himself 
 for asserting that Mir J'afar "received them in a most gracious 
 manner, more like friends and allies than enemies to him and 
 to his country." A few days later the Niiwab wrote to Clive 
 to inform him that he had granted the Dutch some in- 
 dulgences with respect to their trade, and that they had en- 
 gaged to leave the river with their ships and troops as soon 
 as the season would permit. 
 
 The occasion was one of those which brought into the 
 strongest light all the higher qualities of Clive. In the 
 presence of danger his intellect was always clear, his judg- 
 ment always unerring, his actions always prompt and resolute. 
 Not for a moment was he taken in by the specious letter of the 
 Niiwab. Reading between its lines, he saw not only that the 
 Dutch had no intention of sending away their ships, but that 
 they had obtained the Niiwab's assent to bring them up to 
 Chinsurah. He at once resolved, to use his own emphatic 
 words, that they "should not" bring them up. The events of 
 the few days immediately following came to justify his 
 prescience. Certain information reached him that the Dutch 
 ships had weighed anchor, and were moving upwards, that 
 
 I 
 
1 14 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Dutch agents were actively engaged at Chinsurah, at Kasim- 
 bazar, and at Patna, in raising troops, and that at these acts 
 the Nuwab was conniving. 
 
 The position was such as would have driven an ordinary 
 man to despair. On board the Dutch vessels in the river were 
 seven hundred Europeans and eight hundred Malay troops, 
 well armed and equipped; at Chinsurah were a hundred and 
 fifty Dutch soldiers, and native levies daily increasing in num- 
 ber ; behind the Dutch was the Nuwab, as ready now to act as 
 he had been at Plassey, the moment Fortune should seem to 
 declare in their favour. To meet this enemy Clive had at 
 Calcutta three hundred and thirty Europeans and twelve hun- 
 dred sipahis. It is true that he had other detachments 
 scattered over the province, but the nearest of them was too 
 distant to be available at the crisis then impending. But in 
 this hour of danger Clive was cool, calm, self-reliant, even 
 confident. He took at once every possible precaution. He 
 sent special messengers to summon all available men from 
 the outposts; he called out, to defend the fort and the town, 
 the militia, amounting to three hundred men, five-sixths of 
 whom were Europeans; he formed half a troop of horse of 
 some twenty to thirty volunteers, and enlisted as infantry 
 nearly a similar number of men who could not ride. Of the 
 four English vessels then in the Hugli he despatched one, the 
 smallest, with an express to Admiral Cornish, then cruising on 
 the Arakan coast, asking for immediate aid; the three others 
 he ordered up to aid in the defence of the town. The batteries 
 which commanded the most important passages of the river 
 near the town, Tannah fort and Charnock's battery,* were 
 greatly strengthened : heavy cannon were mounted at each, as 
 well as on the face of the new fort, Fort William, commanding 
 the river. Just at this moment Colonel Forde, fresh from the 
 
 * The fort of Tannah was five miles below Calcutta, on the right bank 
 of the river; Charnock's battery was nearly opposite to it. 
 
Bidcrra. 1 1 5 
 
 storming of Machhh'patanam, arrived, accompanied by Cap- 
 tain Knox. To the first Clive assigned the command of the 
 whole available force; to the latter that of the parties at 
 Tannah fort and Charnock's battery. 
 
 These preparations were made not a moment too soon. In 
 the second week of November, the Dutch, finding further delay 
 wouM not screen them, threw off the mask, and forwarded to 
 Calcutta a long remonstrance, recapitulating all their griev- 
 ances, and threatening vengeance and reprisals unless the 
 English should renounce their claim of the right of search 
 and all opposition to the free progress of their ships and their 
 vessels. Clive replied, with a specious audacity, that the Eng- 
 lish had offered no insult to the colours, had not attacked the 
 property, and had infringed no privilege of the Dutch; that 
 if their boats had been stopped and searched, and the advance 
 of their troops opposed, it had been by the express direction 
 of the Nuwab, acting with the authority of the Emperor. He 
 concluded by referring them to the Niiwab, and by offering 
 his services as a mediator on the occasion. Notwithstanding 
 the tone of this reply, Clive — as he records himself — was not 
 a little embarrassed as to the course he should adopt in case 
 the Dutch, continuing to advance, should pass the batteries 
 below Calcutta. The responsibility of commencing hostilities 
 against an ally of England was very great, and Clive and the 
 Council felt grave doubts as to whether the Court of Directors 
 would hold him justified in incurring it. 
 
 From further anxiety on this head he was saved by the con- 
 duct of the Dutch. The reply of Clive, containing, as it did, 
 expressions which, though true in the letter, were the reverse 
 of true in their plain signification,* exasperated them to a 
 
 * Though Clive had the authority of the Nuwab for the acts com- 
 plained of by the Dutch, it was an authority which he had himself 
 solicited for the protection of British interests ; and the Nuwab, who 
 had given him that authority, had encouraged and even implored the 
 Dutch to pay no regard to it, as having been extracted from his necessi- 
 ties, and being therefore void. 
 
1 16 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 degree beyond endurance. Without attempting further dip- 
 lomatic intercourse, they attacked and captured seven small 
 English vessels, lying off Falta, tore down the English colours, 
 and transferred the guns and stores they carried to their own 
 ships. Amongst the captured vessels was the despatch-boat 
 carrying Clive's letter to Admiral Cornish asking for assist- 
 ance. At the same time landing troops at Falta and Riapiir, 
 they burned the houses and effects of the English agents 
 stationed there. Their ships then stood up the river. Having 
 no pilots, however, their progress was necessarily slow. This 
 action on the part of the Dutch reassured Clive. He at once 
 sent a despatch to the Nuwab, apprising him of the acts of 
 violence which had been committed, and stating his wish that 
 as the quarrel lay only between the Dutch and the English it 
 might be fought out between those two nations alone. Whilst, 
 however, asking no direct assistance, he added that the Nuwab 
 would convince him of his sincerity and attachment if he 
 would " directly surround their (the Dutch) subordinates, and 
 distress them in the country to the utmost." Whilst thus 
 writing to the Nuwab, Clive directed Forde to take possession 
 of Barnagar (Barnagore); to cross then the river with his troops 
 and four field-pieces to Shirirampiir (Serampcre) ; and to 
 march thence on Chandranagar ; the object being not only to 
 strike terror into Chinsurah, but to be ready to intercept the 
 Dutch troops in case they should endeavour to gain that place 
 by land. I shall describe in its proper place the manner in 
 which these instructions were executed. 
 
 Meanwhile the Dutch ships were moving upwards. On the 
 2 1st they anchored in Sankral reach, just below the point of 
 the fire of the English batteries. The next day they landed 
 their troops — seven hundred Europeans and eight hundred 
 Malays — on the right bank of the river, with directions to 
 march to Chinsurah. They then dropped down to Melancholy 
 Point. 
 
 This action cleared the ground for Clive. He had now two 
 
Biderra. i 1 7 
 
 distinct objects before him, each to be met on its own ground. 
 The landing of the Dutch troops had severed them from their 
 base, the ships which had conveyed them. To attack and 
 overthrow these troops before they could gain a new base 
 that at Chinsurah being the only possible one — and at the same 
 time to attack and destroy the old base — the Dutch ships — 
 these were the clear and definite objects at which he aimed. 
 Sending information to Forde of the landing and march of 
 the Dutch troops, and directing Captain Knox, with the parties 
 at the batteries, to join that officer with all possible expedition, 
 he proceeded to deal with the Dutch ships. 
 
 I have stated in a previous page* that before the commence- 
 ment of hostilities dive had but three ships of any size at 
 his disposal, and that he had directed these to come up close 
 to Calcutta, so as to aid in the defences of the town. They 
 were three Indiamen — the Duke of Dorset, 544 tons, Captain 
 Forrester; the Calcutta,) 761 tons, Captain Wilson; the Hard- 
 wicke, 573 tons, Captain Sampson. They all carried guns. 
 When the senior officer, Captain Wilson, who acted as Com- 
 modore, received the order to bring his ships nearer to Cal- 
 cutta, the Dutch squadron had already passed him. He had 
 therefore followed it up steadily, anchoring some distance 
 below it. But when, on the 23rd, the Dutch squadron, after 
 having landed its troops, fell back to Melancholy Point, 
 Wilscn made as though he, in his turn, would pass them; but 
 the Dutch commodore, noticing his intention, sent him a 
 message to the effect that if he persisted in the attempt he 
 would be fired upon. Wilson, having no orders to engage, at 
 once desisted, but sent a report to Clive. Clive's answer was 
 clear and determined. He directed Commodore Wilson to 
 send at once a despatch to the Dutch commodore, demanding 
 immediate restitution of the vessels, property, and British sub- 
 jects he had seized, a full apology to the English flag, and his 
 
 * Page 114. 
 
1 1 8 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 immediate departure from the river. If these terms were not 
 complied with, Wilson was directed to attack the Dutch 
 squadron. 
 
 To understand the nature of the task which Clive had im- 
 posed upon this brave sailor I may mention that whereas 
 Wilson had at his disposal only three vessels, each capable of 
 carrying at the most thirty guns, the Dutch squadron was 
 composed of four ships, the Vlissingen, the Bleiswyk, the Wel- 
 gcleegen, and the Princess of Orange, each carrying thirty-six ; 
 of two, the Elizabeth Dorothea and the Waereld, each carrying 
 twenty-six ; and of one, the Mossel, carrying sixteen guns. It 
 was a force which exceeded his own by nearly two to one. 
 
 On the 24th Commodore Wilson transmitted his demand. 
 It was promptly refused. Upon this Wilson weighed anchor 
 and stood for the Dutch squadron. Captain Forrester, in the 
 Duke of Dorset, the best sailer of the three, took the lead, and 
 soon laid his ship alongside the Vlissingen, which bore the 
 flag of the Dutch commodore. He had scarcely taken up this 
 position when the wind changed, and his consorts were unable 
 for some time to come near him. With great gallantry, how- 
 ever, Forrester attacked his antagonist, and though the mark 
 himself for the first half-hour of other ships in the Dutch 
 squadron, he stuck to her, and, after a contest which lasted 
 two hours, forced her to strike. But before this had hap- 
 pened the Hardwicke and the Calcutta had succeeded in 
 approaching the other ships. So well were they managed, and 
 so hot was the fire they maintained, that in a very short time 
 two of their smaller adversaries cut their cables and fled, 
 whilst a third was driven on shore. The other ships main- 
 tained the contest till the Vlissingen had struck, when, with 
 one exception, they followed her example. The exception was 
 the Bleiswyk, the captain of which made his way to Kalpi, 
 the English ships being too crippled to follow him. He was 
 not, however, destined to escape. At Kalpi he met two Eng- 
 lish ships, the Oxford and the Royal George, which had 
 
Biderra. 119 
 
 arrived at the mouth of the Hugh' two days before, and were 
 now hastening upwards. They made an easy capture of the 
 last of the Dutchmen. 
 
 In this most brilliant action the loss of the English in killed 
 was very slight. The Duke of Dorset, though riddled through 
 and through, though ninety shot were in her hull and her 
 rigging was cut to pieces, and though many of her crew were 
 wounded, did not lose a single man. The Dutch lost, in 
 killed and wounded, upwards of a hundred men. On the 
 Vlissingen alone thirty were killed and more than double that 
 number wounded. It was an action worthy to be compared 
 with the best achievements of the British navy. 
 
 Thus successfully had been carried out one of the two clear 
 and distinct objects which Clive had determined to accom- 
 plish. I turn now to record the manner in which he dealt with 
 the other. The reader has seen that Clive had no sooner heard 
 of the debarkation of the Dutch troops, and of their march 
 towards Chinsurah, than he sent information to Forde, and 
 directed Captain Knox to join him with the troops manning 
 the two river batteries. I proceed now to examine the manner 
 in which those two officers improved their opportunities. 
 
 Obeying the first orders transmitted to him on the 19th 
 November, Forde, at the head of a hundred Europeans, four 
 hundred native troops, and four guns, had the following day 
 attacked and captured the Dutch factory of Barnagar. Cross- 
 ing the river to Shirirampur, he marched thence towards 
 Chandranagar, and encamped, on the night of the 23rd, in the 
 French gardens south of the fort. It had been his intention 
 to march the next morning and take up a position nearer Chin- 
 surah, which lies only three miles north of Chandranagar. But 
 the Dutch had not noticed in vain the advantage which taking 
 initiative gives to fighting men. They did not take into con- 
 sideration the fact that about fifteen hundred of their own 
 troops were marching on Forde's rear, and that if they could 
 onlv hold their own in Chinsurah till their arrival they would 
 
120 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 place Forde between two fires. They resolved to anticipate 
 them. They therefore sent their whole available force, amount- 
 ing to a hundred and twenty Europeans and three hundred 
 native soldiers, from Chinsurah on the evening of the 23rd, 
 and bade them take up a position in the ruins of Chandranagar, 
 and hinder the further progress of the English. In that posi- 
 tion, supported by four field-pieces, Forde found and attacked 
 them on the morning of the 24th. The numbers were about 
 equal on both sides, but on that of the English the soldiers, 
 native and European, had been inured to Indian warfare. The 
 result was never doubtful. Forde drove the Dutch from their 
 position up to the very walls of Chinsurah, and captured their 
 guns. That evening he was joined by Knox. This junction 
 raised his numbers to three hundred and twenty Europeans 
 and eight hundred native infantry and fifty European volun- 
 teer cavalry. The Nuwab had also placed about one hundred 
 horsemen at his disposal, not to fight, but to spy. 
 
 From the prisoners he had taken, and from other sources, 
 Forde learned that same evening that the Dutch force landed 
 from the ships would certainly arrive the following day. He 
 at once sent off an express to Clive, stating that he thought he 
 had a fair prospect of destroying the enemy, but that he re- 
 quired explicit instructions as to the course he should pursue. 
 Clive was engaged in playing whist when this note reached 
 him. He read it; then, without quitting the table, he wrote on 
 the back of it in pencil, "Dear Forde — Fight them immedi- 
 ately. I will send you the Order in Council to-morrow," and 
 dismissed the messenger. 
 
 Armed with this authority, Forde, early on the morning of 
 the 25th, took up at Biderra, about midway between Chand- 
 ranagar and Chinsurah, a position commanding the road to 
 the latter place. His right rested on the village of Biderra, 
 his left on a mango-grove, both of which he occupied; his 
 front was covered by a broad and deep ditch. Securely 
 planted behind this, his guns commanded the treeless plain 
 
Biderra. 1 2 1 
 
 in front of it. It was the very best position that could have, 
 been taken, for whilst very defensive, it commanded all the 
 approaches. At about ten o'clock in the morning, the Dutch 
 force, led by Colonel Roussel, a French soldier of fortune, was 
 seen advancing across the plain. As soon as the enemy arrived 
 within range the four guns of the English opened fire ; but, 
 notwithstanding the gaps they made, the Dutch pressed on. 
 At last they reached the ditch. This obstacle, of the existence 
 of which they were ignorant, stopped them. The halt caused 
 great confusion, as the men in the rear, ignorant of its cause, 
 continued to press on. This confusion, and the exposure, at 
 the same time, to a concentrated fire of small arms from their 
 enemies, some posted m the village, some in the grove, were 
 fatal to the Dutch. After many gallant endeavours to sur- 
 mount the difficulty, they fairly turned. Forde used the first 
 moment of their wavering to launch at them his English 
 cavalry. The small number of these was not at the moment 
 apparent to the enemy, and the charge, made at an opportune 
 moment, forced their masses back m disorder. Seeing the 
 effect produced, that the Dutch were fairly beaten, the cavalry 
 of the Nuwab, who had not responded to the invitation to 
 accompany their European comrades in the first charge, dashed 
 forward and completed the defeat. The Dutch and Malays, 
 fresh from the confinement of shipboard, the latter unused to 
 fight cavalry, were ridden over in their efforts to escape. No 
 victory was ever more decisive. Of the seven hundred Euro- 
 peans and eight hundred Malays comprising the Dutch force, 
 a hundred and twenty of the former and two hundred of the 
 latter were left dead on the field ; three hundred in about 
 equal proportions of both were wounded; whilst M. Roussel, 
 fourteen of his officers, three hundred and fifty Dutch, and 
 two hundred Malays were made prisoners." Some sixty 
 
 * I have followed, in the main, the account of tin's contest given by the 
 Dutch East India Company. Vide Gros.se's "Voyage to the East 
 Indies," vol. ii, page 376. 
 
122 The Decisive 11 allies of India. 
 
 •Dutchmen and two hundred and fifty Malays escaped, and of 
 the former only fourteen eventually succeeded in finding their 
 way to Chinsurah. 
 
 In this brilliant manner did Forde carry out the second dis- 
 tinct object aimed at by Clive. The policy of the latter had 
 been carried out to the letter. By vigour, decision, and daring, 
 a danger greater than any which since January 1757 had 
 threatened the British settlement in Bengal, had been encoun- 
 tered and overthrown. Of the secret understanding between 
 the Dutch and the Niiwab there can be no doubt whatever. 
 Clive entertained none. The Nuwab, in fact, groaning under 
 the restraints imposed upon him by the British connection, was 
 anxious to substitute for a foreign master a foreign ally. His 
 troops were ready for action. Had the Dutch squadron beaten 
 the three English ships in the river, and had Forde been van- 
 quished at Biderra, these troops would ha\e joined the Dutch 
 in an attack upon Calcutta. If that attack had succeeded, 
 the Nuwab, grown wise by experience, would have arranged 
 with the Dutch terms far less galling to himself than those 
 which had made him little more than a pageant sovereign 
 guided by English counsels. 
 
 This conspiracy had been defeated by the calm decision of 
 Clive, by the gallantry, skill, and daring of Forde and of 
 the officers and men, sailors as well as soldiers, who were en- 
 gaged. The victory on the Hugli, and the victory at Biderra, 
 brought the Dutch, hitherto so threatening, to the feet of the 
 English governor; not only for mercy, but for protection. 
 They sorely needed the latter. Three clays after the battle, 
 Miran, the son and heir of the Niiwab, arrived from Murshid- 
 abad with six thousand horse. Up to that moment the great 
 opponent of the English alliance, the secret instigator of the 
 intrigues with the Dutch, Miran had come down in the hope of 
 dictating his own terms, if, as he hoped, the English had been 
 beaten. But finding them victorious on all points, the Dutch 
 broken — -almost annihilated — he, with characteristic versatility, 
 
Bldcrra. 123 
 
 at once changed his tone. The yoke of the English must still 
 be borne. His policy must be to ingratiate, not to offend. In 
 this view he spoke of nothing less than the extermination of 
 the Dutch, of expelling the remnant of them from Bengal. 
 To protect themselves from the consequences of these threats, 
 the Dutch implored the aid of the enemy whom they had so 
 gratuitously provoked. Clive displayed a mastery of states- 
 manship, the greater inasmuch as it bore the appearance of 
 signal generosity. After the victory of Biderra, he had 
 responded to the submission of the Dutch by ordering Forde 
 to cease all hostilities. He now proceeded to Chinsurah, and 
 succeeded in effecting an accommodation between the Dutch 
 and the Niiwab. But the terms of the accommodation bore 
 the impress of the practical mind of a man who was resolved 
 that no opportunity should ever again be afforded to the Dutch 
 to wage war against the English in Bengal. For, whilst he 
 persuaded the Nuwab to confirm all the trading privileges pre- 
 viously accorded to that people, and gave them permission to 
 maintain a hundred and twenty-five soldiers for the protection 
 of their factories at Chinsurah, at Kasimbazar, at Patna, and 
 at Baleshwar (Balasore), he compelled them to send away their 
 squadron with those prisoners recently taken by the English, 
 who would not serve the conqueror; to discharge all the native 
 soldiers whom they had raised; and to agree never to carry on 
 hostilities, to enlist or introduce troops, or to erect fortifica- 
 tions, within the limits of the three provinces. 
 
 The other terms of the accommodation were not less satis- 
 factory. The Dutch agreed to disavow the conduct of their 
 fleet, to acknowledge themselves as the aggressors, and to pay 
 three lakhs of rupees to cover all the losses sustained by the 
 English, and the expenses of the war. This decision was sub- 
 sequently approved by special commissioners of the two 
 nations appointed in Europe to examine into the whole ques- 
 tion. The conduct of Clive was declared by this impartial 
 tribunal, to have been marked by a prudence, a judgment, and 
 
124 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 a generosity such as to entitle him to unqualified com- 
 mendation. 
 
 For us — judges after an interval of more than a hundred 
 and twenty years — there remains something more than a mere 
 confirmation of this verdict. We have to render justice to 
 the hand as well as to the head, to the scholar as well as to 
 the master. Without detracting for one instant from the 
 supreme qualities manifested by Clive at this crisis, we must 
 not fail to render homage to the man who, fresh from the 
 storming of Machhlipatanam, decisively foiled, with a force 
 inferior in numbers, the attempt to establish an Indo-Batavian 
 empire, on the field of Biderra. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 UNDWAH NALA. 
 
 THE secret alliance of Mir J'afar with the Dutch had been one 
 of the consequences of Plassey. That battle had given the 
 new Niiwab, bound hand and foot, into the hands of the Eng- 
 lish. They were henceforth his masters. Mir J'afar was in 
 all external affairs but a pageant ruler. To satisfy the de- 
 mand of his allies he had pledged his credit and oppressed 
 his people. The alliance with the Dutch was an attempt to 
 shake off a galling yoke. How, thanks to the prescience of 
 Clive and the skill and valour of Forde, it failed, I have 
 described. Thenceforward Mir J'afar gave up the secret 
 struggle. He resigned himself to his fate. 
 
 Very soon after the attempt of the Dutch to replace the 
 English in Bengal had been foiled at Biderra Clive quitted 
 India. For the moment he made over charge of his govern- 
 ment to Mr. Holwell ; but a few months later the real suc- 
 cessor, Mr. Vansittart, selected by Clive himself, came round 
 from Madras and assumed the reins of office. A very few 
 days after his arrival Mr. Vansittart was called upon to decide 
 in Council an important question vitally affecting the immedi- 
 ate future of Bengal. The decision at which the Council 
 arrived, and the policy which followed that decision, im- 
 perilled, and went very far towards undoing, the great work 
 of Clive. 
 
 Almost immediately after Clive had quitted India the 
 provinces ruled by Mir J'afar were assailed by a formidable 
 
126 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 army under the prince who had previously invaded it as 
 Shahzadah, but who had just become, by the death of his 
 father, King of Dihli and titular Emperor of India. This 
 change in the position of the invader made the attempt far 
 more formidable than that which had preceded it. The 
 Niiwabs of Tirhut and of Purnia, and many lesser nobles, dis- 
 contented with the existing rule, declared in his favour; and, 
 to add to the danger, a considerable body of Maratha horse- 
 men joined him. 
 
 But, formidable as seemed this invasion, the skill and de- 
 cision of the English officers, Major Caillaud, Captain Knox 
 (distinguished at Machhlipatanam and Biderra), and others, 
 and the valour of their men, sipahis as well as soldiers, com- 
 pletely foiled it. Hostilities were begun in February 1760. 
 Before the end of July the Emperor and his allies had been 
 twice defeated on the field, whilst an attempt was made by 
 the former to take Patna by storm, though aided by a body 
 of Frenchmen under M. Law, had been decisively repulsed. 
 The campaign would have been still more fruitful of results 
 but for the supineness and refusal to advance displayed by 
 the young Nuwab, Miran, only son and declared heir of Mir 
 J 'afar, who commanded the Bengal forces on the occasion. 
 Towards its close it had become evident that Miran was in 
 communication with the Emperor, and a strong opinion pre- 
 vailed that he was awaiting only a favourable opportunity 
 to betray his allies. 
 
 For him the opportunity never came. On the night of the 
 2nd July, 1760, a day following many in which the young 
 Nuwab and his followers had shown extreme reluctance to 
 follow up the retreating enemy, Miran was struck dead by 
 lightning. His death raised primarily the question of the 
 succession. Mir J'afar had other sons, but they were illegiti- 
 mate, and of tender age. The opening of the question of the 
 succession led, it will be seen, to the consideration of another 
 question, still more fruitful in consequences. 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 127 
 
 Three weeks after the death of Miran, Mr. Vansittart arrived 
 in Calcutta to assume the government of Bengal. The gravity 
 of the crisis, which had been minuted upon by his acting pre- 
 decessor, Mr. Holwell, and by his colleagues in Council, forci- 
 bly impressed him. He at once summoned Major, now 
 Colonel Caillaud from the army to add the weight of his 
 advice as to the proper course to be followed. 
 
 In the discussion which followed the arrival of Colonel 
 Caillaud opinions were divided. That officer supported the 
 policy recommended by Mr. Holwell, to the effect that the 
 opportunity should now be seized to reduce the Nuwab of 
 Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa from his quasi-independent position 
 to his proper status of Subahdar, subordinate to the Court of 
 Dihli; that the Company should become the Diwan of the 
 Emperor with complete financial control ; that the monetary 
 transactions between Calcutta and Murshidabad should be 
 settled, the Company receiving certain districts in lieu of the 
 money due; and that the Niiwab should be made to discharge 
 the large rabble army which consumed his revenues. This 
 opinion was not without its recommendations in the eyes of 
 the Council, and, but for the opportune arrival of an envoy 
 from the Nuwab, a man of great tact and ability, charged to 
 congratulate the new governor, it might have prevailed. The 
 envoy from Murshidabad, admitted to the secret deliberations 
 of the Council, managed, however, to bring its members to a 
 decision beneficial alike to his own private interests and to 
 their own. 
 
 The new envoy was Mir Muhammad Kasim Khan, generally 
 called Mir Kasim, son-in-law of Mir J'afar. Mir Kasim had 
 become, by the death of Miran, the most prominent personage 
 in the three provinces. The Nuwab had not seen more than 
 sixty summers, but he was older than his years, for the worries 
 of the preceding four years had told upon a constitution which, 
 since his accession to power, had been tried by dissipation. 
 His eldest surviving son was scarcely thirteen. Under these 
 
128 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 circumstances Mir Kasim, forty years old, a man of iron will, 
 quick decision, large views, and free from scruples, stepped 
 naturally into the place to which his relationship to the Nuwab 
 entitled him. Once in that place, he determined to use it to 
 his own advantage. 
 
 Mir Kasim had, in common with many other nobles of 
 Murshidabad, recognised with intense dissatisfaction the fact 
 that the battle of Plassey had bound the Niiwab, hand and 
 foot, to the English alliance, and that the English alliance 
 meant the transference to Calcutta of the secret rule over the 
 three provinces. Every transaction since Plassey — the sup- 
 pression of the risings within, the repulse of the two invasions 
 from without, the crushing of the Dutch — had confirmed and 
 strengthened the predominance of the English. Mir J'afar 
 had become simply a tool in their hands, an unwilling tool, it 
 is true, but a tool whom the circumstances of every year forced 
 to be more submissive. Against this position the whole soul 
 of Mir Kasim had revolted. But up to the time of the death 
 of Miran he had been powerless. The jealousy of his weak, 
 vicious, and dissolute brother-in-law had excluded him, 
 latterly, from all influence. A thunderbolt, however, had re- 
 moved that obstacle from his path, and Mir Kasim, on the 
 steps of the throne, without a rival, resolved at once to stretch 
 out his hand to clutch the sceptre falling from the grasp of 
 his enfeebled father-in-law, and, having secured it, to take such 
 measures as, in a short space of time, would restore the lost 
 power of the Nuwabs, and make him, in very deed, ruler as 
 well as governor of the best portions of the three provinces. 
 
 Such was the man who, in September 1760, came to Calcutta 
 to congratulate Mr. Vansittart on his assumption of the office 
 of governor. Admitted to the deliberations of the English 
 councillors, Mir Kasim, feeling his way carefully, soon came 
 to the conclusion that there was not one amongst them who 
 could not be bought. His father-in-law had bought their pre- 
 decessors : he would ascertain their price and buy them. 
 
U'ndwah Nala. 129 
 
 Bringing, then, to bear on the discussions the arguments, at 
 once skilful and temperate, of an accomplished man of the 
 world ; admitting and condemning the laxity displayed by 
 Mir J'afar with regard to his monetary engagements; insinu- 
 ating, gradually even asserting, how, by the pursuance of a 
 different method, it would be easy for a ruler of the three 
 provinces to carry out engagements still more onerous, and to 
 gratify to the full any personal aspirations, Mir Kasim at 
 length won ever the Calcutta Council. They came at last to 
 the conclusion to discard the scheme propounded by Major 
 Caillaud, and to accept in its stead one which had been 
 shadowed out in the course of the discussions by the clear- 
 headed but unscrupulous envoy of Mir J'afar. On the 27th 
 September they signed with that envoy a treaty in virtue of 
 which it was arranged that all the real power in Murshidabad 
 should be transferred at once to Mir Kasim, the title and its 
 honours, with a considerable income, being secured, during 
 his lifetime, to Mir J'afar; that a firm friendship should exist 
 between the English and Mir Kasim, his enemies being their 
 enemies, and his friends their friends; that whenever required, 
 the English would be ready to support Mir Kasim in the man- 
 agement of his affairs with troops; that for all the charges of 
 the Company, of their army, and of provisions in the held, 
 Mir Kasim should assign them the districts of Bardhwan, 
 Midnapiir, and Chatgaon (Chittagong), and should grant 
 sanads for the same; that certain advantages in the purchase 
 of chunam in the Silhat district should be secured to the Eng- 
 lish; that the jewels pledged by Mir J'afar should be redeemed 
 by cash payment; and that no agreement should be made with 
 the Shahzadah (then titular Emperor) without the joint coun- 
 sels of the contracting parties, those counsels to be directed 
 to the point of preventing him from gaining a footing in the 
 three provinces. Such were the open stipulations. Those of 
 a private nature were advantageous only to the members of 
 the Calcutta Council. In fact, as the price of the foregoing 
 
 K 
 
130 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 treaty, Mir Kasim had promised to pay, as soon as possible 
 after his installation, the following sums: — To Mr. Vansit- 
 tart, five hundred thousand rupees; to Mr. Holwell, two hun- 
 dred and seventy thousand; to Messrs. Sumner and MacGuire, 
 each two hundred and fifty-five thousand ; to Colonel Cail- 
 laud, two hundred thousand;* to Mr. Culling Smith and to 
 Captain Yorke, one hundred and thirty-four thousand each. 
 He pledged^himself likewise to advance five hundred thou- 
 sand rupees on loan to the Company for the expenses of the 
 war on the coast. Three days after the signature of this treaty 
 Mir Kasim set out for Murshidabad to prepare for the part 
 that would soon devolve upon him. Mr. Vansittart followed 
 two days later to break the decision to Mir J'afar. 
 
 In the interviews which took place on Mr. Vansittart's ar- 
 rival at Murshidabad, 15th, 16th, and 18th September, Mir 
 J'afar showed a not unaccountable disinclination to relinquish 
 any portion of his authority, and to accept Mir Kasim as chief 
 minister. Mir J'afar was, in fact, in the hands of the Hindu 
 financiers, and these, divining the ambitious schemes of his 
 son-in-law, had resolved at all hazards to baffle them. Mr. 
 { Yansittart appears to have been touched by the pleadings of 
 the old Nuwab, and under their influence to have been more 
 than half inclined to leave matters as he had found them. But 
 Mir Kasim was at his elbow to remind him that he had gone 
 too far to be able to retrace his steps, to insinuate that the 
 promise of the stipulated douceurs was based upon the per- 
 formance of a defined contract, and to declare that if there 
 were any alteration in the scheme which was to invest him 
 with absolute power he must withdraw from Murshidabad to 
 
 * It is but just to the memory of Colonel Caillaud to state that he had 
 adhered to his own proposal, had voted against the treaty with Mir 
 Kasim, and had left India before he was aware that any sum had been 
 stipulated for on his behalf. The money was paid to Mr. Vansittart, 
 and Colonel Caillaud first learned from his agents in England that a 
 sum to that amount was standing at his credit. It may be presumed 
 that he then accepted it. 
 
U'nd iv ah N did, 131 
 
 provide for his own safety. These considerations decided Mr. 
 Vansittart to adhere to the compact. 
 
 Mir J 'a far had been, on the 1 8th, granted only twenty-four 
 hours to consider the proposals which the English governor 
 had made him, to constitute Mir Kasim as virtually mayor of 
 the palace. When, on the expiration of that period, Mir J'afar 
 had vouchsafed no reply whatever, the English troops and 
 the division commanded by Mir Kasim surrounded his resi- 
 dence. Well, indeed, on that eventful morning, might the 
 thoughts of the old man have carried him back to a period 
 little more than three years distant, when, on the field of 
 Plassey, he, too, in secret compact with these same English, 
 had betrayed his kinsman and master to obtain the seat which 
 another kinsman was now by similar means wresting from 
 him. What to him had been the power thus basely and dis- 
 honourably obtained ? All the agonies of the preceding fifty- 
 eight years of his life paled before those which he had suf- 
 fered during the three years he had ruled as Nuwab in the 
 usurped palace of Siraju'd daulah. He could not but contrast 
 his position, threatened by the men to whom he had sold his 
 country, with that which he would have occupied if, at Plassey, 
 he had been loyal to the boy relative who had, in the most 
 touching terms, implored him to defend his turban. W T ith the 
 prestige of having been the main factor in the destruction of 
 the insolent foreigners who had since dictated to him, and who 
 now threatened to dethrone him, he would have wielded a real 
 power; his name would have been honoured; his country would 
 have been secure. But now: — a glance from the window of 
 his palace showed him the red-coated English soldiers rally- 
 ing round the standard of his kinsman in revolt against him. 
 Would Mir Kasim show him more mercy than he had shown 
 to Siraju'd daulah? The recollection of the fate to which 
 he had abandoned his kinsman and master must have passed 
 through his mind when, after having first threatened to resist, 
 he declared to the English Commissioners who waited upon 
 
132 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 him, that under no circumstances would he place his life in 
 the power of Mir Kasim. As the only possible alternative he 
 declared his readiness to resign the administration entirely, 
 and to retire to live, as a private gentleman, in the territory 
 of the Company. The alternative was at once agreed to. De- 
 claring that he would not trust himself to Mir Kasim for a 
 single night, the Xiiwab then and there placed himself under 
 the protection of a European guard, and started the following 
 morning for Calcutta.* 
 
 Mir Kasim had now attained the height of his ambition. 
 He was ruler of Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa. But he had not 
 enjoyed his new authority many days before he, too, experi- 
 enced the enormous difficulty of having to satisfy from an 
 empty exchequer the demands of a grasping ally. Mir Kasim 
 found the treasury of Murshidabad exhausted; the accounts 
 in a state of inextricable confusion. The demands upon him 
 were at the same time most pressing. He had, above all things, 
 to satisfy his own army, then greatly in arrear; to pay the 
 English troops engaged at Patna in showing front to the 
 Emperor; to furnish the English with at least a portion of 
 the promised loan. It must be admitted that he displayed 
 under these circumstances, considerable energy and a great 
 force of character. He made the Hindu financiers, who had 
 fattened on the absence of control in the time of his pre- 
 decessor, disgorge their gains; and he introduced a simple and 
 rigorous system into the treasury department. By these means 
 he was able, in a very brief period, to pay his own and the 
 English troops, and to remit to Calcutta half the promised 
 subsidy. 
 
 Into the details of the contest which followed between the 
 allied troops of the English and the Niiwab and those of the 
 Emperor, and which terminated by the peaceful investiture of 
 Mir Kasim by Shah Alam at Patna as Niiwab of the three 
 
 * Here he took up his residence at Chitpur, two houses in that suburb 
 having been provided for himself and his suite by the Company. 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 133 
 
 provinces (March, 1761), and by the subsequent withdrawal of 
 Shah Alam to Dilhi, I do not propose to enter. It will suffice 
 to say that the brunt of the fighting fell upon the English, 
 and that the conduct of his own troops whenever they were 
 brought under fire convinced Mir Kasim of the necessity of a 
 reform in his army as stringent as that which he had intro- 
 duced into his treasury. 
 
 Mir Kasim was a man of a stamp very different to that of 
 his father-in-law. The pliant disposition which had caused 
 the latter to bend on every decisive occasion to the will of his 
 European masters did not belong to his nature. He had from 
 the very first resolved to be master in his own house. He had 
 used the English to procure him power; but he never trusted 
 them as Mir J'afar had trusted them. In a short time he came 
 to hate them with all the intensity of bitter and brooding 
 hatred. He had full reason to do so, for the annals of no 
 nation contain records of conduct more unworthy, more mean, 
 and more disgraceful, than that which characterised the Eng- 
 lish Government of Calcutta during the three years which fol- 
 lowed the removal of Mir J'afar. That conduct is attribut- 
 able to one cause, the basest and meanest of all, the desire 
 for personal gain by any means and at any cost. It was the 
 same longing which has animated the robber of the northern 
 clime, the pirate of the southern sea, which has stimulated 
 individuals to robbery, even to murder. In point of morality, 
 the members of the governing clique of Calcutta from 1761 to 
 1763, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Warren Hastings excepted, were 
 not one whit better than the perpetrators of such deeds. 
 
 On the 20th October, 1759, Colonel Clive, writing to Mr. 
 Vansittart, then his destined successor, used the following 
 words: "The expected reinforcements will, in my opinion, put 
 Bengal out of all danger but that of venality and corruption." 
 Clive had reason to write thus. After his departure, a venality 
 and corruption such as he even had never dreamt of, came 
 
134 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 almost to destroy the work which he had founded. I will 
 briefly state how. 
 
 I have already mentioned that Mir Kasim had covenanted 
 to pay certain sums to the members of the Calcutta Council to 
 support his ambitious plans. Mir Kasim performed his 
 covenant. But he had scarcely done so when the majority of 
 the members of Council whom he had bought either retired or 
 were removed, and their places were filled by men greedy of 
 gain, careless how they obtained it, and deeming that the 
 shortest road to their end lay in compassing the ruin of Mir 
 Kasim, in order to make a market of his successor.* These 
 men were at the end of 1761 in a majority in the Council, and 
 controlled its policy. Mr. Vansittart had but one steadfast 
 supporter, Mr. Warren Hastings. The policy which led to the 
 crisis I am about to describe was not the policy of those two 
 gentlemen. 
 
 Before describing that policy I must trace in a few words 
 the earlier measures taken by Mir Kasim. His first resolution 
 was to be master in his own domains. As soon, then, as peace 
 had been concluded with the Emperor, he removed Ramnarain, 
 Governor of Patna, a staunch adherent of the English, but who 
 had amassed enormous wealth by plunder and peculation. 
 Then, to strengthen his own position, and to be further from 
 the English, he removed his capital to Munger.f a place on the 
 right bank of the Ganges, three hundred and seventy-one miles 
 by the river route from Calcutta, and containing a fort regarded 
 in those days as of great strength. To this strength Mir 
 Kasim made additions. His next task was to pay off all his 
 obligations to the English, the failure to do which had, he 
 well knew, proved the bane of his predecessor. This, by strict 
 
 * This actually was done in 1763, and again in 1765. 
 
 f Incorrectly spelt "Monghyr" by many Englishmen, though whence 
 they derive the letter "h" it is hard to say. The superfluous introduc- 
 tion of this letter is, however, a common failing with some classes of our 
 countrymen. 
 
U'ndwah /Vdld. 135 
 
 financial control, by insisting upon regular payments, and, as 
 I have already stated, by compelling those to disgorge who 
 had taken advantage of the disorder of the State to fill their 
 pockets, he accomplished. At the close of 1762 he h^cl not 
 only paid off all the debts of the State, but his revenue returns 
 showed an excess of income over expenditure. Free on this 
 point, he next turned his attention to the formation of an 
 army on the European model. He had witnessed the point of 
 excellence to which it was possible to bring the sipahis by sub- 
 mitting them to the European system and the European dis- 
 cipline, and he well knew that without such training no native 
 army would ever stand against the English. To bring about 
 such a result amongst his own troops he set to work to re-form 
 a large portion of his army on the model which had excited 
 his admiration. He sought out everywhere European adven- 
 turers, especially Frenchmen and foreigners whose dislike to 
 the English he could not doubt. To these adventurers he en- 
 trusted the remaking of his army. He bestowed upon them 
 high grades, and assigned to them large salaries. Amongst 
 the wandering outcasts, eager for service and adventure, came 
 the Alsatian Remhard, better known as Sombre orSamru, and 
 the Armenian, Markar; both of them men of ability, but in 
 both of whose natures the love of life and the love of gain 
 had quenched every noble aspiration. For the moment, how- 
 ever, these men and their associates applied themselves to their 
 task with an assiduity which promised the best results. Before 
 the clcse of 1762 Mir Kasim had, ready for action, armed, 
 trained, and disciplined in the European fashion a force of 
 twenty-five thousand infantry, and a regiment of excellent 
 artillery-men. Provident in all things, he had during the 
 training of these men set up a large foundry for casting 
 cannon, and this foundry had provided him with guns as 
 serviceable as any which could be brought against him. 
 
 These preparations, his move to Munger, his repairing and 
 strengthening of the fortifications of that place, the reform of 
 
136 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 his revenue system, had been inspired by one motive — distrust 
 of the English. Good reason had Mir Kasim for that dis- 
 trust. Less than two years after the departure of Clive, the 
 Council of Calcutta had become a hot-bed of "venality and 
 corruption." Those two kindred vices, which Clive had with 
 prophetic insight denounced as the only two evils which could 
 undermine the British edifice in Bengal, reigned there supreme, 
 unchecked by all save by Vansittart and Warren Hastings, 
 and checked inadequately for all practical results even by 
 them. The cheek of every honest Englishman must burn with 
 shame as he reads the account of the policy adopted by the 
 leading men amongst his countrymen in India a hundred and 
 twenty years ago, towards the native ruler who had bought 
 from the Calcutta Council his position, and whose only subse- 
 quent fault in their eyes was his endeavour to protect his 
 subjects from European extortion. The sad story may be 
 summarised in a few words. 
 
 To enrich themselves and the Company, the Council of Cal- 
 cutta had passed an enactment in virtue of which country 
 goods supplied with European passes should be allowed to 
 descend the river free of transit duty, whilst goods unprovided 
 with such passes should pay a heavy tax. The English flag 
 flying over a boat or a fleet of boats, and the appearance on 
 board of natives dressed as English sipahis, were sufficient to 
 exempt the boat or boats from search. 
 
 This system, originally intended to enrich a few high-placed 
 Englishmen, had been so abused that the whole system of 
 trade had become disorganised. It had been bad enough when 
 the civil servants of the Company had practically in their own 
 hands the monopoly of the trade. But, in course of time, these 
 sold their rights to others, until matters had arrived at such a 
 point that it was impossible to discover who had, or had not, 
 the right to use the British flag and employ men dressed as 
 English sipahis. Whenever the revenue officers of the Niiwab 
 made an attempt to stop the traffic, however illegal it might 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 137 
 
 be, they were seized by the nearest English agent and punished. 
 The results of this shameful and oppressive system were that 
 the respectable class of native merchants were ruined, whole 
 districts became impoverished, the entire native trade became 
 disorganised, and the Nuwabs revenues from that source 
 suffered a steady and increasing declension. In vain did Mir 
 Kasim represent, again and again, these evils to the Calcutta 
 C( uncil. In vain did Mr. Vansittart press upon that Council 
 the necessity of reform. Supported only by one member, he 
 was powerless to repress the rapacious instincts, already 
 whetted by enjoyment, of his colleagues. The evil at length 
 reached a height when it was necessary to do something. After 
 many stormy discussions it was agreed that Vansittart should 
 visit the Nuwab at Munger, and agree to a compromise which 
 should meet the views of both parties. 
 
 Armed, as he believed, with full powers, Vansittart visited 
 the Xiiwab at Munger. It should be borne in mind that 
 although the conference which ensued took place between two 
 men both honest in their intentions, both convinced of the 
 radical vices of the existing system, and both anxious to arrive 
 at a compromise which should at least contain the elements of 
 fairness and equity, yet that one, the Englishman, was heavily 
 handicapped by the knowledge that the views of the majority 
 of his Council went far beyond his own. It is not, under these 
 circumstances, surprising that the compromise which was ar- 
 rived at contained provisions not only greatly, but unduly, 
 favourable to the English. The high contracting parties, after 
 much discussion, agreed to terms, beyond which Mr. Vansittart 
 would not — possibly, with the knowledge of the Council behind 
 him, could not — yield. They agreed that whilst the English 
 should pay nine, the natives should pay twenty-five per cent. 
 on all goods passing the borders of the Nuwab's dominions; 
 that, to prevent abuses, the English passes should be signed 
 by the English agent and countersigned by the revenue officer 
 of the Niiwab through whose circle the goods should pass. It 
 
138 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 is but fair to add that the Nuwab acceded to this compromise 
 with great reluctance. He considered its provisions quite in- 
 adequate to check the evils. At the earnest request of Van- 
 sittart, however, he promised to give it a fair trial, warning 
 him, at the same time, that if it should fail he would have no 
 choice but to throw the whole trade open and give his own 
 subjects an equal chance with the servants of the Company. 
 
 But the Council of Calcutta would not allow the scheme 
 even a fair trial. Greedy of gain, careless of the public in- 
 terests, they refused to ratify the agreement, insisting that the 
 trade carried on by and for the English should — the article 
 of salt alone excepted — be subjected to no duty whatever. 
 Upon salt they expressed their willingness to pay a duty of 
 two-and-a-half per cent., but they declared that in all disputes 
 which might occur between their own people and the Nuwab' s 
 officers the English agents should hear and decide. Mir 
 Kasim, incensed at the nature of the English demands, well 
 aware that compliance with them would bring ruin upon his 
 own subjects, replied by a decree which put into action the 
 alternative of which he had warned Yansittart. He abolished 
 all import duties whatever, and established free trade 
 throughout his territories. 
 
 This bold and prudent measure — for, even if judged by the 
 result, defeat and ruin in a righteous cause were preferable 
 to the lingering torture to which the policy of the Calcutta 
 Council would have subjected Mir Kasim — roused all the 
 worst passions of the corrupt clique ruling in the English 
 capital. Declaring that their own trade was affected by the 
 edict, and that the action of the Nuwab was tantamount to a 
 declaration of war, they made preparations to resist it. 
 
 Prominent in urging a decided course, in treating the Niiwab 
 as though he had no more title to a fair consideration than 
 an underling caught in an act of flagrant disobedience, was 
 Mr. Ellis, one of the new members of Council, a man of 
 violent passions, who had recently been appointed to the 
 
U'ndwah A' did. 139 
 
 agency of Patna. But if Mr. Ellis took the lead, other Mem- 
 bers of Council — Mr. Amyatt, Mr. Hay, Mr. Smith, and Mr. 
 Verelst — were not slow to follow. These, one and all, had 
 come to the conclusion that when an independent Nuwab of 
 Bengal should dare to move in a direction contrary to that 
 which had been urged upon him from Calcutta, there was but 
 one remedy, and that remedy was force. 
 
 For the moment, however, it was determined, in deference 
 to the strong representations of Vansittart and Warren 
 Hastings, to endeavour, in the first instance, to persuade. A 
 deputation, composed of Messrs. Hay and Amyatt, proceeded 
 accordingly from Calcutta to wait on the Niiwab. They 
 found him, whilst firmly resolved to adhere to the policy which 
 he declared with the most perfect truth was the only policy 
 capable of saving the industrial classes of his dominions from 
 absolute ruin, yet anxious, almost painfully anxious, to avoid 
 hostilities. 
 
 Whilst negotiations were yet pending, information reached 
 the Nuwab that Mr. Ellis was making preparations to seize 
 his city of Patna, and that a fleet of boats laden with ammuni- 
 tion and other stores to enable him to effect that purpose was 
 just then touching at Munger. Under these circumstances 
 Mir Kasim pursued the only course which, in his position as 
 Viceroy of the three provinces, under no bond of service to 
 the English, was open to him. He refused to allow the hostile 
 convoy to proceed; he required that the two English members 
 of Council should not leave Munger; and he sent an envoy to 
 Calcutta requesting the Governor to disavow the conduct of 
 Mr. Ellis, and to direct the removal of the detachment of 
 English troops and sipahis from Patna to Munger, at which 
 place, in the presence of his own army, they would not be 
 prepared to commit any sudden act of hostility. 
 
 The Council at Calcutta not only refused to comply with 
 this request — they treated the making it as an act of hostility. 
 They sent instructions to Messrs. Hay and Amyatt to leave 
 
140 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Munger forthwith, and either to return to Calcutta or to pro- 
 ceed to Patna, as they might find practicable. They decided, 
 further, that as soon as the safety of these gentlemen had been 
 assured they would employ their only remedy. 
 
 But before these instructions had reached Hunger, Mir 
 Kasim, still anxious for peace at any price short of sacrificing 
 his own independence and the happiness of his people, had 
 requested Mr. Amyatt to proceed to Calcutta to represent to 
 the Council the cruel position in which the open and undis- 
 guised warlike preparations of Mr. Ellis had placed him ; 
 that he was still anxious for peace, but that if war were forced 
 upon him he must defend himself and his people. Pending 
 the return of Mr. Amyatt, Mr. flay and the subordinate mem- 
 bers were detained as hostages for the safety of the officers of 
 the Nuwab then in Calcutta. They were treated with great 
 civility and respect. 
 
 Before, however, Mr. Amyatt could reach Calcutta Mr. Ellis 
 had precipitated the crisis. Believing that Messrs. Hay and 
 Amyatt had left Munger, and inferring that their departure 
 permitted him to avail himself of the permission to take 
 aggressive measures should he find the Niiwab bent upon 
 making war, that gentleman marched from the English factory 
 with all the British troops he could collect, early on the morn- 
 ing of the 25th June, hoping to surprise the city of Patna 
 before the reinforcements, which he knew to have been sent 
 from Munger, could reach it, and whilst its people and its 
 garrison were sleeping the sleep of profound trust and con- 
 fidence. He so far succeeded that he gained possession of 
 the city, with the exception of a large building, built of stone, 
 within it, and of the citadel. The English troops, flushed 
 with their easy success, dispersed to plunder, whilst Mr. Ellis, 
 equally delighted, returned to his camp to breakfast, and to 
 pen the usual magniloquent despatch, announcing a great 
 victory over men who had not fought. 
 
 Far differently did those whom by his action he had made 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 141 
 
 enemies employ their time. Whilst some of the Nuwab's 
 troops, recovering from their surprise, were using every means 
 to strengthen their position, their leader Mir Mehdi Khan, 
 hastened towards Hunger to represent in person to the Niiwab 
 the outrage to which his city had been subjected. On his way 
 thither Mir Mehdi met, at Fatwa, the advanced-guard of his 
 master's troops, of the trained brigade, in fact, commanded 
 by Markar, the Armenian, to whom I have already made 
 allusion. Fatwa lies only eight miles from Patna, and Mar- 
 kar, learning that the two strong places in the city still held 
 out, and that the English had dispersed to plunder, determined 
 to hasten up his men, then to push forward and recover the 
 city. He carried out his plan with great gallantry, charged 
 and captured the English guns posted at the gate of the city 
 and bearing on the road by which he advanced, drove his 
 panic-stricken enemy out of the city, and, pursuing his advan- 
 tage, laid siege to the English factory. Mr. Ellis and the 
 officer commanding the troops, Colonel Carstairs, finding, after 
 a few days' experience, that it would be impossible to defend 
 the factory against a determined enemy, evacuated it on the 
 night of the 29th June, and, crossing the Ganges, commenced 
 a movement towards Chapra in the hope to gain Awadh 
 (Oudh). They had defended the factory, however, just long 
 enough to render their escape impossible. The Niiwab had no 
 sooner heard of the re-capture of Patna by Markar, than he 
 had despatched his other trained brigade, under Samru, to 
 Baksar, to cut off retreat in case the English should retire. 
 With an enemy in front pursuing — for Markar followed them 
 on the 30th — and another enemy barring their retreat, the case 
 of the English force, harassed, moreover, by the severe rainy 
 season, was desperate. The resources to which they might 
 have trusted with any hope of success, these of daring and 
 energy, appear to have been conspicuous by their absence. 
 They had but one chance of escape — that was to make a 
 daring onslaught on one or other of the divisions of the 
 
142 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 enemy's army. Looking at the subsequent events of the cam- 
 paign, it is not too much to say that such an attack, ably 
 planned and energetically carried out, must have succeeded. 
 The detachment, however, preferred to await the attack of the 
 enemy. The result was never doubtful. Though, on this 
 occasion (1st July, 1 763), the men individually displayed their 
 wonted bravery, they fought without plan and without 
 cohesion, and when their commander, Colonel Carstairs, and 
 eight other officers had fallen, the survivors, hopeless of a 
 successful resistance, laid down their arms* They were con- 
 veyed by the victors prisoners to Patna. 
 
 In anticipation of the capture or defeat of the English 
 party, the Nuwab had prepared a protest, dated 28th June, 
 the accusing character of which was the more galling because 
 the allegations it contained were absolutely true, against the 
 conduct of Mr. Ellis. This protest, as soon as his anticipa- 
 tions were realised, he forwarded to Calcutta. In it Mir Kasim 
 charged Mr. Ellis with having attacked his city of Patna like 
 a robber in the night ; with having plundered the bazaars, 
 robbed the merchants, and slain the unoffending citizens. For 
 this — sarcastically observed the Nuwab — Mr. Ellis himself 
 had personally given him satisfaction by supplying him with 
 the arms and ammunition of which he stood in need. But 
 that satisfaction still left the Company his debtor. From it 
 the Nuwab demanded a reparation similar to that which Cal- 
 cutta had claimed for the treatment accorded to it in 1756. 
 Passing from that single action, he next reviewed the policy 
 of the Company, as represented by the Calcutta Council, 
 towards himself. He charged upon that Council that, after 
 
 * Colonel Broome, in his '"History of the Bengal Army," states that 
 "judging from two official returns of the force shortly prior to its 
 destruction, it appears that nearly 300 Europeans and upwards of 
 2,500 natives must have been killed or surrendered on this occasion, and 
 that seven officers of artillery and twenty-nine officers of infantry were 
 slain on the field, died of their wounds, or were made prisoners, or 
 subsequently perished." 
 
U'ndwak Ndld. 143 
 
 having made with him a treaty, "to which they had pledged 
 the name of Jesus Christ," by virtue of which he had made 
 over to them three districts for the avowed purpose of paying 
 the expenses of an army which should support him and pro- 
 mote his affairs, they had used that force for his destruction. 
 He called upon them, therefore, to return to him the three 
 years' rent which they had misapplied, to restore the three 
 districts, and to make compensation, likewise, for the violences 
 and oppressions exercised during the same time by the English 
 agents within his territories. 
 
 This letter reached Calcutta on the 7th of July. A day or 
 two prior to its arrival the air had been filled with rumours 
 to the effect that a great disaster had befallen the British 
 arms. Mir Kasim's allusion to the fate of Mr. Ellis went far 
 to confirm those rumours. The Calcutta Council then pro- 
 ceeded to put into action the arrangements which they had, 
 during the few days preceding, been negotiating with the late 
 Niiwab, Mir J'afar Khan. 
 
 The terms upon which Mir Kasim had bought the Subah- 
 dari of the three provinces from the Company's agents have 
 been stated in a preceding page. It was his misfortune that 
 some of the members of Council who had profited so largely 
 from his liberality and punctual payment had left the country 
 some twelve months after he had been installed, and had been 
 succeeded by men whose love of gain had been whetted by 
 the sight, almost, of transactions in which they had had no 
 share. These men looking about for plunder, and gauging 
 the character of Mir Kasim, had clearly seen that the only 
 chance which could possibly occur to gratify their ravenous 
 instincts during his lifetime was to provoke him in such a 
 manner as to afford them the opportunity of selling his office 
 to another. This was the instinct which had animated them 
 from the very first. It was to provoke a contest which could 
 only have such a result that Mr. Ellis had attacked Patna. 
 It was to attain it that the Calcutta Council had refused to 
 
144 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 ratify the liberal concessions which the Niiwab had made to 
 Mr. Vansittart. One strong proof of these assertions is to 
 be found in these two facts; one, that in the middle of the 
 preceding April they had given instructions to the commander 
 of their forces how to act under certain circumstances, all 
 connected with hostilities against the Niiwab; the other, that 
 so far back as that date, when the only question between the 
 Company and Mir Kasim was the question of commercial 
 duties, which Messrs. Amyatt and Hay were then discussing 
 at Munger, they had begun to enter into negotiations with 
 Mir J'afar. 
 
 That veteran intriguer was found to be ready once again to 
 betray his country. The three years' miserable experience he 
 had had of office without authority had not sickened him. He 
 had still children, and for them, in his eyes, a degraded in- 
 heritance — also probably to be purchased— offered greater 
 attractions than the repose of an everyday life. Mir J'afar, then, 
 clutched at the offers which were made him. He agreed to 
 confirm the cession of the three districts made by Mir Kasim ; 
 to levy the ancient duties on all but the English traders, who 
 were to be free of all duties excepting one of two-and-a-half 
 per cent, upon salt; to maintain a force of 12,000 horse and 
 12,000 foot, and pay thirty lakhs of rupees for the expenses 
 of the war; further, to make a donation of twenty-five lakhs 
 to the army and half that sum to the navy; and, finally, to 
 indemnify private individuals for all losses they had suffered.* 
 
 * It was stated at the time this clause was agreed to that the amount 
 would not exceed five lakhs of rupees. Eventually it amounted to fifty- 
 three lakhs. " So strong/' writes Colonel Broome, "was the prevalence 
 of personal interest over public duty, that although" (at the conclusion 
 of the war) "the claims of the Company were still undischarged, more 
 than half these amounts for compensation were extorted from the 
 Xiiwab, and the money immediately lent to Government at 8 per cent 
 interest by their own servants, who — however regardful of private 
 advantage— were rapidly sinking the pecuniary affairs of the Company 
 into a state of ruin. According to Mr. Scrafton, the Niiwab was in fact 
 no more than a banker for the Company's servants, who could draw 
 
U'ndwah A' did. 145 
 
 Having obtained from the low ambition of Mir J'afar the 
 advantages which the patriotism of Mir Kasim had refused to 
 them, the Calcutta Council on the ;th July — the date on which 
 they received the protest I have referred to — issued a declara- 
 tion of war against Mir Kasim, and invited all his subjects 
 to return to their allegiance to Mir J'afar. From that date it 
 was a war for existence between Mir Kasim and the English. 
 Victorious, he would extend to them neither mercy nor con- 
 sideration; defeated, he knew he could expect neither. Let us 
 pause for a moment to consider the chances of the combatants. 
 
 On the one side was Mir Kasim, wielding the resources of 
 three rich provinces, possessing a well-stocked treasury, an 
 arm)' 40,000 strong, trained to a great extent on the European 
 svstem, and large supplies of ammunition and materiel. He 
 was ready for war, his troops were flushed with the first vic- 
 tory gained in the open field in Bengal by purely native troops 
 over Europeans. Added to this, he was a man of clear head 
 and strong character, who thoroughly understood his position, 
 who knew full well that not to be victorious was to be beaten, 
 and that defeat meant utter and absolute ruin. On the other 
 side the English began the war under a demoralized Govern- 
 ment ; a Government each component part of which cared a 
 great deal for itself, very little for the general weal. Thus, 
 whilst the senior members of the Government were rich, the 
 Government treasury was empty. When the war broke out, it 
 was found difficult to furnish the military chest even with the 
 insignificant sum of 10,000 rupees. Though the army had 
 been placed on a war footing the preceding April, the force 
 ready to take the field in July did not number more than 850 
 Europeans and 1,500 natives. Though it possessed abundant 
 supplies of ammunition and small arms, yet in guns it was 
 far inferior to the enemy. It will be seen, then, that whilst 
 the force with which the English began this campaign was 
 
 upon him as often and to as great an amount as they pleased." — 
 ffistoi I/ of flic Bengal Army, page 497. 
 
 L 
 
146 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 smaller than that which fought at Plassey,* that of the enemy 
 was far stronger, far better trained, and far more united, than 
 that which had succumbed, less to English arms than to 
 treason, at that memorable fight. 
 
 The comparison between the rival combatants would not be 
 complete if I were to omit from consideration the generals on 
 both sides. Here the English had an advantage which com- 
 pensated for every other deficiency. Mir Kasim Khan, clear- 
 headed though he was on the political scene, had no genius 
 for leading an army. Some writers have even questioned his 
 personal courage. Others,t again, have recorded their opinion 
 that policy dictated his leaving the command to his generals. 
 If that were the case, I cannot help thinking it was a mis- 
 taken policy. In more than one contest in the war the presence 
 on the field of a great personage would have produced a unity 
 of action, the want of which was fatal. After a careful study 
 of all the evidence, I dismiss as utterly unworthy of credit 
 the charge of want of courage. Having regard to the great 
 talents and clearness of vision of Mir Kasim, I cannot think 
 that any consideration would have kept him from the place 
 where he believed his presence would be useful. I am forced, 
 then, to the conclusion that, like many other men of supreme 
 ability in the cabinet, he had no genius for war, and felt that 
 his presence on the field of battle would interfere with the 
 independent action of his generals. It was a misfortune— as 
 the result proved a fatal misfortune. 
 
 The leader of the English army, Major John Adams, was 
 on the other hand, a man possessing supreme capacity as a 
 leader. Trained in the school of Clive, Adams had suc- 
 
 * At Plassey the English had 950 European and 2,100 native troops. 
 
 f The able writer of "Transactions in India from 1756 to 1783," 
 himself a contemporary, states that Mir Kasim was inured to the hard- 
 ships of the field; "that he united the gallantry of the soldier with the 
 sagacity of the statesman," but that "he did not hazard his own person 
 in any engagement where his officers might have made a merit of their 
 treachery in betraying him." 
 
U'ndwah Xdld. 147 
 
 ceeded to the command of the united forces of the Crown and 
 the Company in Bengal on the departure of Major Caillaud 
 (1762). Xo one could have been more fitted for the position. 
 To calmness and coolness on the held of battle Adams united 
 great decision of character, a clearness of vision not to be sur- 
 passed, a power of impressing his own will upon others. He 
 could plan a campaign and lead an army. He knew how to 
 maintain the strictest discipline and to win the love of his 
 men. It is not too much to say that never has the British 
 army produced a soldier more capable in all respects. Had 
 he lived he would undoubtedly have risen to the greatest dis- 
 tinction. In the few years of his active life he illustrated the 
 art of war by a campaign which has been placed by a military 
 writer* on a level with the most famous campaigns of an- 
 tiquity, and which will not lose from comparison with any in 
 the world. 
 
 Such were the leaders under whom the war began. On the 
 5th July, acting under orders from the Council, Major Adams 
 had directed the detachments forming the component parts 
 of the force I have enumerated to march from their several 
 cantonments in the Mednipiir and Bardhwan districts, so as 
 to form a junction at or near Murshidabad. But long before 
 they could reach that city Mir Kasim's irregular troops had 
 forced the English troops occupying the factory there to sur- 
 render. The victorious army, reinforced immediately after- 
 wards by a trained brigade which had marched upwards from 
 Birbhum under the command of Muhammad Taki Khan, one 
 of Mir Kasim's best generals, had marched then on the village 
 of Palasi, and had taken up a position there with the view 7 of 
 intercepting the detachments of the English force as they 
 should arrive, or, if need were, of the entire English force. 
 
 Major Adams, meanwhile, marching slowly, reached Katwa 
 — famous in the story of Clive's march six years before — 
 with the bulk of his force on the 16th July. The next morning 
 
 * The late Colonel Arthur Broome, ;i History of the Bengal Army." 
 
148 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 he crossed the Bhagirathi, and took post at the village of 
 Agardip. There, on the 17th, whilst waiting for a convoy 
 under Lieutenant Glenn, he was joined by the newly-installed 
 Xiiwab, Mir J'afar. 
 
 On the same day, the first encounter, subsequent to the 
 declaration of war, took place. Glenn's detachment, which 
 was escorting a convoy of cattle, grain, and treasure, and 
 which was composed of a battalion of native troops and six 
 guns, was attacked on the morning of the 17th, near the banks 
 of the A'ji river, by a large force of irregular troops, mostly 
 cavalry, despatched for that purpose by Muhammad Taki 
 Khan. Contemporary historians* rate the number of the at- 
 tacking party at 17,000 men. Fortunately, they had no guns. 
 Glenn, who, besides his European sergeants and a small detail 
 of gunners, had no Europeans, offered to this attack a most 
 determined resistance. Again and again did the enemy, eager 
 for the plunder, charge home. The ground was not favour- 
 able for them, and his sipahis behaved with the most splendid 
 courage. Three times, however, did the enemy capture the 
 guns and treasure, but three times did the sipahis, returning 
 to the charge, force them to let go their hold. At length, after 
 a fight which lasted four hours, the enemy drew off, repulsed 
 and baffled. Glenn's loss had been severe, but theirs had been 
 enormous. Glenn did not content himself with merely re- 
 pulsing the enemy. He marched straight from the field of 
 battle on Katwa, only to find the town evacuated by Adams 
 and the fort occupied by Mir Kasim's troops. Without the 
 smallest hesitation he attacked and carried the latter, the gar- 
 rison making only a feeble resistance. The next day he 
 joined the main force, bringing with him not only the convoy 
 he had escorted, not only grain and cattle found in the fort 
 of Katwa, but the prestige of the first victory. 
 
 Meanwhile, Muhammad Taki Khan had advanced from 
 Palasi towards Agardip, and had taken up a position on the 
 
 * C'araccioli's "Life of Clive " : the " Sayar-ul-Muta'akhkhirin." 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 149 
 
 left bank of the Bhagirathi, nearly opposite Katwa, barring 
 the road to Adams. Owing to some jealousy on the part of 
 their commanders, the irregular troops, which had been so 
 maltreated by Glenn on the 17th, refused to join him, but took 
 up a position in rear of his left flank, too far off to render him 
 support. Major Adams, on the morning of the 19th, advanced 
 to attack him. The battle which followed was one of the 
 bloodiest and best contested of the whole war. Muhammad 
 Taki himself and the Rohilahs and Afghans, of whom he had 
 formed a chosen corps, behaved with unsurpassed courage. 
 Long the issue was doubtful. At one time it seemed as though 
 the English were about to succumb. Muhammad Taki, who 
 possessed just those qualities in which Mir Kasim was de- 
 ficient, perceived, or thought he perceived, a wavering in their 
 ranks, and, to confirm it, charged their flank with his chosen 
 horse. At the very point selected however, Major Adams had 
 placed a party in ambuscade. A timely volley from the men 
 so placed, just as the hostile leader was making a charge 
 which he believed would give him victory, decided that day. 
 That volley laid low, with a bullet through his brain, the 
 gallant Muhammadan leader and many of the brave band 
 which followed him. Victory was then assured to Adams. 
 He captured the enemy's camp, all their guns, their cattle, 
 and their stores. He bivouacked that night on the field of 
 battle, within sight of the shooting-box so famous in the story 
 cf the batt 1 ^ of Plassey. The irregular horsemen, who had 
 fought Glenn the day before, and who might have decided 
 the victory, and with it the war, in favour of Mir Kasim, took 
 no part in the action, and retired after it had been decided. 
 The history of India abounds in instances of such unpatriotic 
 conduct. Indeed, it may be affirmed that few things have 
 more contributed to the success of the English than the action 
 of jealousy of each other of the native princes and leaders 
 of India. 
 
 Adams halted for three days on the field of Katwa — for 
 
150 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 such was the name given to the battle — then, following the 
 route which Clive had pursued in 1757, marched- on Murshid- 
 abad. The remnants of the beaten army had, however, taken 
 up a strong position two miles south of that city, their front 
 covered by a large tank called Motijhil. Eut well posted as 
 they were for defence, the troops of Mir Kasim were still under 
 the influence of the defeats on the A'ji and of Katwa. When 
 vigorously attacked they gave way, and hastened to join the 
 army which, comprehending the brigades trained so carefully 
 on the European model, Mir Kasim had caused to assemble 
 at Suti. The day following Adams escorted Mir J'afar, more 
 than ever a pageant Nuwab, in triumph into Murshidabad. 
 
 The town of Suti lies thirty-seven miles from Murshidabad, 
 on the direct road from that place to Danapur. It was at this 
 place that Mir Kasim had resolved to fight his decisive battle 
 — a battle which should drive the English into the sea, or be 
 the certain precursor of his ruin. The position had been ex- 
 tremely well chosen. Strong by nature, it had been rendered 
 still stronger by art. Intrenchments covered his whole front, 
 whilst the nature of the country guarded it from being easily 
 turned. To it Mir Kasim had sent his best troops. The 
 brigades Samru and Markar were there; the trained cavalry 
 of Assad'ullah was there; the rocket-men of Mir Nasir Khan, 
 fresh from the recovery of Patna, were there; the survivors 
 of the men who had fought so bravely at Katwa were there, 
 eager now to wipe out the recollection of their defeat. Alto- 
 gether, there were assembled in that camp of Suti 28,000 fight- 
 ing men of a good stamp, 8,000 of whom were cavalry.* This 
 force was supported by a powerful artillery, manned in a 
 great measure by Europeans and Eurasians. It wanted but 
 one man, a skilful leader, such a man as the Muhammad Taki 
 Khan, whom they had lost at Katwa, to make success, humanly 
 
 * Many writers placed the numbers higher but the contemporary 
 evidence of the author of " Transactions in India " seems decisive on the 
 point. 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 151 
 
 speaking, absolutely certain. It had not that man; it was not 
 even inspired by the presence of the prince for whom it was 
 fighting. Mir Kasim, who might have calmed the jealousies 
 of rival commanders, and have directed a decisive movement 
 on the field of battle, remained throughout this important part 
 of the campaign, at Munger. 
 
 Perhaps it was owing to the absence of Mir Kasim, perhaps 
 to the confidence of his generals, who wished, probably, to 
 engage on a plain in which the enemy might not only be re- 
 pulsed, but annihilated, that the decisive battle was not fought 
 at Siiti. The English army, strengthened to 1,000 European 
 and nearly 4,000 native troops had, marching northwards, just 
 crossed the Bansli, near the point where that river joins 
 the Bhagirathi (2nd August), when it found itself in 
 face of Mir Kasim's troops drawn up to oppose them. The 
 position chosen by the latter betokened alike over-confidence 
 and stern resolution to achieve a decided result. For whilst 
 it allowed the English the advantage of having their flanks 
 covered by the two streams, it ensured their destruction in 
 case of defeat. The streams which guarded their flanks 
 would equally bar their flight. This, doubtless, was the reason 
 which decided the enemy to quit the intrenched camp; from 
 that they might have repulsed the enemy, here they hoped to 
 annihilate him. 
 
 The position taken up by the Bengal army barred the road 
 to the English. In the centre were the trained brigades of 
 Samrii and Markar; on the right was Mir Assad'ullah Khan 
 with his trained cavalry and 12,000 irregular infantry; the 
 rocket-men were on the left of the trained brigades, and on 
 their left again was a small brigade commanded by Shir All 
 Khan, flanked on his left by the river. The village of Gheriah, 
 about a mile distant from the scene of action, gave its name 
 to the plain. 
 
 Major Adams had no sooner recognized the presence of the 
 enemy in force, than he formed his line of battle and ad- 
 
152 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 vanced. He placed his Europeans, composed of the 84th and 
 Bengal European Regiment,* in the centre, with three bat- 
 talions of sipahis on each flank, the guns in the intervals, and 
 one battalion of sipahis as a reserve. The action began with 
 a discharge of artillery from both sides. Under cover of 
 this, the infantry advanced, and the European troops in the 
 centre were soon engaged with the trained brigades of Samrii 
 and Markar, slightly, at first, to the advantage of the former. 
 No sooner, however, had Mir Assad'ullah observed the battle 
 joined in the centre, than he hurled his cavalry against the 
 left wing of the English. So well-directed was the charge, so 
 impetuous the onslaught, that the English wing was rolled up 
 and broken. Their sipahis fought well, but the force of the 
 shock had been too great ; the wing was forced back, and the 
 men of the left portion cf it were cut to pieces, or driven into 
 the Eansli. Major Adams had noticed the charge and its 
 result without being able to avert the evil which he foresaw. 
 He had hastened, however, to take measures to repair the 
 mischief by ordering to the spot the reserve and two guns, 
 under Major Carnac. But before this reinforcement could 
 arrive, the leading division of the enemy's cavalry, led by a 
 very gallant officer, Badru'dm Khan, had, pursuing its victori- 
 ous career, made an intervention to favour Samrii and Markar, 
 by attacking in the rear the troops with whom they were main- 
 taining an almost equal combat. Charging with the same 
 impetuosity as when their comrades broke the left wing, the 
 enemy's horsemen captured two of the English guns, and caused 
 great confusion in their ranks — a confusion which was aug- 
 mented by a simultaneous attack made on their front by the 
 rocket-men of Mir Nasir Khan. Although, whilst this was 
 happening in the centre, Carnac had, .with the reserve, suc- 
 ceeded in rallying some of the remnants of the broken left 
 wing, and in restoring the semblance of order, the position of 
 
 * Xow the Royal Minister Fusiliers. 
 
U'ndwah Ndld. 153 
 
 the English was now extremely critical. Their left wing was 
 virtually gone, their centre was in extreme danger, their 
 reserves were exhausted. One vigorous attack on their right, 
 and all was over with them. Fortunately for them, however, 
 the commander of Mir Kasim's left wing, Shir A!i Khan, pos- 
 sessed neither the dash, the intuition, nor the knowledge when 
 to strike, which had characterised the other leaders of the army. 
 He made his attack so cautiously and so feebly, that Adams, 
 divining how he could be dealt with, left half a battalion to 
 oppose him, and moved the remainder of his right wing, with 
 great rapidity, to support the endangered centre. This timely 
 aid, and an opportune movement made simultaneously by the 
 rapidly-recovering left, enabled the 84th and the Company's 
 regiment to disengage themselves. In a timely charge they 
 recovered the two guns, wounded Badru'din, and so imposed 
 upon Assad'ullah Khan, who was advancing, as he believed, to 
 complete his victory, that he wavered and fell back. Major 
 Adams took advantage of the first retrograde step which this 
 leader took to order an advance of his whole line. This charge 
 decided the day. The enemy's cavalry fell back before it 
 with increased rapidity. In vain did Mir Nasir Khan, placing 
 his rocket-men in the bed of a small nala, attempt to check the 
 progress of the pursuers; he was driven from his position. 
 Samrii and Markar, the leaders of the trained brigades, had 
 fought fairly well as long as victory seemed inclined to shine 
 upon them; but they were evidently deeply imbued with the 
 principle that it was better to live to fight another day than 
 to sacrifice themselves and their men, for, as soon as the 
 English centre had shown a disposition to rally, they had 
 begun to withdraw from the field. They withdrew, however, in 
 good order, and their attitude imposed a check on the ardour 
 of the pursuers. 
 
 The victory, however, was gained. Seventeen guns and a 
 hundred and fifty boats laden with stores fell into the hands 
 of the conquerors. They bought their triumph dearly. Their 
 
154 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 actual loss in numbers I have not been able to ascertain, but it 
 is stated to have been greater than on any previous encounter 
 between the Europeans and the natives of India. Certainly, 
 never was a battle more fiercely contested ; never at one period 
 of its duration did defeat seem more assured; never were native 
 cavalry better led; never did men show greater courage. The 
 coolness of Adams and the steadfastness of the Europeans 
 combined with the want of vigour of Shir Ali Khan and the 
 selfish instincts of Samni and Markar to snatch victory out of 
 the fire. — 
 
 The battle of Gheriah was a battle which well deserves to be 
 remembered. It inflicted a blow, a very heavy blow, on the 
 enemies of England. But it was not decisive. The enemy 
 quitted the field, but not in disorder; they quitted it to take up 
 a stronger position, well prepared to receive them, and already 
 occupied by men whose numbers would do more than fill the 
 gaps already made in their ranks. 
 
 This position was called the U'ndwah Nala, a small stream 
 giving its name to a strong pass leading into the hilly districts 
 of Rajmahal. In the plan of campaign he had drawn up, Mir 
 Kasim, whilst calculating on the preponderating chances of a 
 decisive victory at or near Palasi in the first instance, or, in 
 case of a reverse there, at Suti, had not forgotten that the 
 chances of the field of battle were uncertain, and that it might 
 be necessary, for a third time, to grapple with his foes. But 
 regarding the issue of the third contest there should, he was 
 resolved, be no doubt whatever. He had, then, carefully 
 selected a position of amazing strength, which could be held 
 by a few against many, which could not be turned, and which 
 it would be necessary for his enemy to attack in front. 
 U'ndwah Nala offered such a position. The rivulet, which at 
 that season of the year, July and August, was swollen to the 
 dimensions of a river, drained a deep morass to the right and 
 left of the road, which formed a sort of narrow causeway 
 across it. This road was entirely commanded by the pass. In 
 
U'ndwah A' did. 1 55 
 
 the view of a possibility of a defeat at Suti, Mir Kasim had 
 fortified this pass in a manner so as to render it all but 
 impregnable. In front of the rivulet and on the extreme left 
 of the position, he had thrown up an intrenchment, which, rest- 
 ing on the Ganges, and running thence in a south-westerly 
 direction for about a mile, abutted upon a steep, isolated hill 
 which he had likewise strongly fortified; from this point the 
 intrenchment branched in a more southerly direction across the 
 road and round the main spur which formed the right side of 
 the pass, and terminated amid ravines and scarped precipices 
 far beyond it. He had made the ramparts of this intrenchment 
 sixty feet thick and ten feet high ; he had surmounted them by 
 a parapet eighteen feet thick and seven feet high, and along 
 the entire front on the plan he had caused to be dug a ditch 
 sixty feet wide and twelve feet deep. To reach this ditch the 
 morass had still to be traversed. Under his instructions 
 batteries had been erected at convenient intervals, and upon 
 them he had mounted more than a hundred pieces of cannon. 
 Some distance to the rear of this intrenchment was the old line 
 of works — which it had in a measure superseded — and the 
 U'ndwah Nala, the steep banks and swollen waters of which 
 formed a natural defence. This nala was crossed on the line 
 of the road by a stone bridge, to guard which a strong detach- 
 ment had been told off. Such was the position, between the 
 rivulet and the new intrenchment, to which Mir Kasim, on 
 learning the result of the battle of Gheriah, had ordered his 
 reserves, composed of a brigade 4,000 strong, trained in the 
 European fashion, commanded by an Armenian named Ara- 
 toon, and three irregular brigades, mustering in all about 12,000 
 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery, commanded by the best 
 officers who still remained to him, Mir Najaf Khan, Mir 
 Himmat Ali and Mir Medhi Khan. As a measure of security, 
 and to be ready for every emergency, he dispatched his family 
 and treasures to the strong fortress of Rotasgarh, on the Son, 
 but he himself still remained at Munger. 
 
156 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Gheriah had been in a certain sense a surprise to Mir Kasim. 
 He had fully counted upon victory; but the battle, fought in 
 the open and in a position more favourable to the English than 
 to his own troops, had only just been lost. At U'ndwah Nala 
 he could oppose to them a stronger position, a greater number 
 of troops, and a far more numerous artillery. There did not 
 seem a single flaw in his arrangements. If the small body of 
 English and English-trained natives could force that pass m 
 the face of the 40,000 men who, on the arrival of the army 
 beaten at Gheriah, would be there to defend it, no strong 
 places, no opposition, no army in the world could stop them. 
 On the other hand, repulse to them would mean destruction. 
 On the battle about to ensue, then, he deliberately placed the 
 issue whether the three provinces should belong to a Nuwab 
 ruling independently of the English, or to the English. If he 
 were beaten he could offer no resistance that could possibly 
 avail ; if the English should be beaten the result of Plassey 
 was undone, the labours of Clive were rendered fruitless. 
 
 Two days after the battle of Gheriah, the beaten army of the 
 Nuwab joined, behind the intrenchments of U'ndwah Nala, 
 the reinforcements he had sent thither from Munger. Mean- 
 while Adams, indulging his troops with a two days' halt, 
 marched on the 4th, and on the nth arrived at Palkipur, a 
 small village about four miles from the enemy's position. In 
 front of that village, and in a line nearly parallel to that 
 position, Adams formed his camp. Here he remained about 
 three weeks, busily engaged in constructing fascines and 
 gabions, in erecting batteries, in landing heavy guns, and in 
 repulsing the harassing attacks of the enemy. Even when, on 
 the twenty-fourth day, he opened fire from the three batteries 
 he had constructed, the nearest of which was about three 
 hundred yards from the enemy's intrenchment, he found, that 
 though manned with siege guns, the fire produced little or no 
 impression on the massive ramparts which Mir Kasim had 
 thrown up. A very small breach had, indeed, been effected 
 
U'ndwak Wild. 157 
 
 close to the gateway near the river, but it was very imperfect. 
 Nearer he could not advance his guns, nor on the other face 
 could he move his infantry, for the morass, saturated at that 
 time of the year, covered the position. The difficulties which 
 presented themselves on all sides were, indeed, sufficient to 
 make the bravest despair. Not even Massena, before the lines 
 of Torres Vedras, felt more acutely than did, on this occasion, 
 the English leader, the hopelessness of his position. 
 
 But a chance denied to the Prince of Essling, was granted to 
 Adams. In the brilliant novel of " Coningsby," Sidonia lays 
 down the aphorism that an individual, even against a vast 
 public opinion, is divine. The aphorism is true, although the 
 conditions under which it operates are sometimes startling. It 
 was the act of a single individual which converted the despair 
 of the English into confidence; it was the consequence of that 
 act which changed the confidence of Mir Kasim's army into 
 despair. 
 
 The individual who on this occasion performed the divine 
 function for the English army was a repentant deserter. This 
 man, originally in the service of the Company, had, for some 
 unknown reason, deserted to Mir Kasim, and now, either from 
 a desire to re-ingratiate himself with his old masters, or from 
 a love of treachery for its own sake, he prepared to betray him. 
 Creeping out of the defensive position on the night of the 4th 
 September, he made his way to the English camp and offered, 
 on condition of pardon, to point out a ford in the morass by 
 which the troops might cross and attack the rampart defending 
 the isolated hill which commanded the enemy's position. 
 Adams, persuaded that the representations made by the deserter 
 were correct, resolved to take advantage of them without delay, 
 and fixed the following morning for the purpose. That night 
 he made the necessary preparations, told off the assaulting 
 parties, arranged the signals to be made under all eventuali- 
 ties, and prepared for every possible misadventure. Three 
 hours before daybreak the storming party, composed of the 
 
158 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 grenadiers of the 84th and the Company's European regiment, 
 and of two battalions of sipahis, the whole commanded by 
 Captain Irving, set cut to cross the morass; at the same time 
 the bulk of the remaining force, led by Captain Moran, moved 
 into the trenches for the purpose of distracting the enemy by a 
 false attack, to be converted, if necessary, into a real one. 
 Another portion of it, formed into a reserve, under Major 
 Carnac, was held in readiness to move rapidly on any point 
 where its presence might seem desirable, whilst a fourth, and 
 much smaller party, was left to guard the camp. I propose 
 first to follow Captain Irving and the stormers. 
 
 The deserter had correctly represented that the morass 
 might be forded, but neither he nor the English leader had 
 sufficiently appreciated the difficulties which fighting men 
 carrying their muskets and ammunition would experience in 
 the operation. So deep was the ford that the men, moving 
 through it with difficulty, were compelled to carry their 
 muskets and pouches on their heads, whilst the scaling-ladders 
 necessary to effect their purpose were similarly conveyed by 
 the native followers. Had but one of the defenders been on 
 the alert, the entire storming-party must have been destroyed. 
 Fortunately for those who composed it, not a sign of life 
 appeared in the enemy's works, and the storming-party suc- 
 ceeded in reaching the base of the ramparts without being 
 discovered. Irving had given strict orders to move as silently 
 as possible, and to use only the bayonet. A few of the enemy 
 were found asleep under the parapet. To dispatch these with 
 the bayonet, to plant the ladders, to begin the ascent, was the 
 work of a few seconds. Before, however, the leading files 
 could reach the summit the alarm had been given, and the 
 enemy rushed in confusion to ascertain the cause of the dis- 
 turbance. But before they could collect their ideas the 
 stormers had gained the rampart, and, driving the enemy 
 before them, had taken possession of the stockade on the 
 summit of the isolated hill ! The history of war cannot show 
 
U'ndwak N did, 159 
 
 an achievement more ably planned, more effectively carried 
 out ! 
 
 The light of a torch suddenly kindled and held aloft in the 
 centre of the most important position of the enemy gave the 
 signal to Moran in the trenches that the first act in the drama 
 had been successfully played. It was for him now to make his 
 attack a real one. Preluding it with a heavy fire from the 
 guns in the advance battery, Moran, under the cover of its 
 smoke, moved as rapidly as possible towards the imperfect 
 breach of which I have spoken. At length he reached, and 
 with great difficulty crossed, the ditch. Even then he seemed 
 at first to have gained little, for the breach was found to be 
 very steep, and wide enough only for one person. Had the 
 enemy displayed the smallest conduct, or the faintest courage, 
 the attack on this point must have failed. But it is a pecu- 
 liarity of the Oriental nature that surprises, sudden attacks, 
 and attacks made in the night, so completely discompose it, so 
 interfere with the power of thought, that for a long time after 
 the shock one instinct, and one only — that of self-preservation 
 — is able to assert itself. On this occasion the combined 
 suddenness and daring of the shock added to the mental con- 
 fusion which the sight of the burning torch on the summit of 
 the isolated hill had caused. The enemy were in no real 
 danger had they kept their heads. But utterly distracted, 
 they allowed the English, baffled at the breach, to plant 
 scaling-ladders against the rampart. By these a few men 
 entered and opened the gate to their comrades. Then all was 
 ever; Moran's party, feeling to the right, gave their hand to 
 Irving's party descending from the hill, and the two, combin- 
 ing, swept all before them with irresistible fury. The enemy's 
 troops were incapable, by circumstances, of flight; by mental 
 paralysis and confusion from making an effective resistance. 
 Flight was denied them, because a guard of their best troops, 
 posted on the bridge crossing the nala (stream), had received 
 positive instructions to fire upon any troops who should 
 
160 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 attempt to cross it. This order, issued with the design of 
 forcing the native troops to fight to the last, was carried out 
 to the letter. The result was most disastrous to Mir Kasim's 
 army. Attacked in front by the British, fired upon from the 
 rear by their own men, and suffering, as I have said, from 
 moral and mental paralysis, his troops were shot down in 
 hundreds. The passages which might have served as an issue 
 were speedily blocked up by the dead. In despair many 
 threw themselves into the river and were drowned. Some tried 
 to cross the U'ndwah, but the steepness of its banks barred 
 their flight. Many threw down their arms and begged for 
 quarter, which was not refused them. But the loss of life was 
 terrible. It was computed at the time that I 5,000 men perished 
 either during the attack or from its consequences. Those who 
 did escape from the assailed points stole away in twos and 
 threes, skirting the hills and hiding in caverns. The reserve in 
 the old lines, composed of Samrii's and Markar's brigades, 
 attempted a show of resistance, but it was only a show. They 
 soon sought safety in flight, the only portion of the splendid 
 army of the previous day that was not absolutely broken ! 
 
 Such was the battle of the U'ndwah Nala — one of the most 
 glorious, one of the most daring and most successful feats of 
 arms ever achieved. It was, in every sense of the word, a most 
 decisive battle. Adams did not merely defeat the army of Mir 
 Kasim, he destroyed it. The blow had been so great that a 
 rally thenceforth was impossible. In one morning, with an 
 army 5,000 strong, of whom one fifth only were Europeans, 
 Adams had stormed a position of enormous strength, defeated 
 40,000 and destroyed 15,000 men, captured upwards of a 
 hundred pieces of cannon, and so impressed his power on the 
 enemy that they had no thought but flight. They made no 
 attempt to stop at Rajmahal, which was fortified, or to defend 
 the passes of Sikrigali and Tiriahgali, both of which were 
 naturally as strong and as defensible as that from which they 
 had been driven. Mir Kasim, on whom adversity had the 
 
U'ndwah .Wild. 161 
 
 effect of developing the cruel side of his nature, had shown his 
 resentment at the result of the battle of Gheriah by consigning 
 to death the native noblemen whom he held in confinement. 
 He displayed his passionate rage at the total defeat of 
 U'ndwah Xala by threatening the slaughter of the English 
 prisoners he still retained at Patna. He carried out this 
 threat as soon as he heard of the surrender of Hunger. 
 
 A few lines yet to show how decisive had been that morning's 
 achievement. Marching from the field of battle, Adams cap- 
 tured Rajmahal on the 6th September, occupied Munger, which, 
 though strongly fortified, made no resistance, on the ist 
 October, and recovered Patna en the 6th November. On the 
 fall of Patna Mir Kasim quitted Bihar, and proceeded, with 
 the followers who still remained to him — the most important 
 had submitted to the English — to implore the protection of the 
 Nuwab cf Awadh (Oudh). 
 
 One wcrd mere with respect to the hero of the war. In little 
 mere than fcur months Major Adams had begun and brought 
 to conclusion a campaign which did more than confirm the 
 advantages which Clive had gained for his country by the 
 victory of Plassey. Contending with a comparatively small 
 force against a prince whose soldiers had been drilled after 
 the European fashion, who was served for the most part by 
 officers of tried ability, who was well furnished with cannon 
 manned by Europeans, and with supplies ; who, moreover, was 
 supported by the sympathy and affection of his people — 
 Adams, in the short period I have stated, defeated him in three 
 pitched battles, drove him from his dominions, virtually re- 
 conquered Bengal and Bihar, the capital of which he stormed, 
 captured 400 pieces of cannon, and carried the Company's 
 arms to the banks of the Karamnasa. Regarded as a military 
 achievement it can compare with any in the history of the 
 world. It was possible only on the condition of the display of 
 military conduct of the highest order, of gallantry, devotion 
 and tenacity en the part of the troops. All these qualities 
 
 M 
 
1 62 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 were displayed to a degree which never has been surpassed. 
 Whether we look at the genius of Adams, the tenacity of 
 Glenn, the conduct of Knox, who again greatly distinguished 
 himself, of Irving, of Moran, and the other officers, and of the 
 men who served under them, we fail to find a flaw ; we can see 
 only that which is worthy of admiration. 
 
 Nor were the political results less important. If Plassey 
 made the Subahdar of the three provinces a pageant ruler under 
 the influence of Clive, the campaign of Major Adams gave 
 those provinces to the English. Thenceforward there was 
 only a titular ruler possessing no real power — a prince who, 
 until he was still further to be despoiled, was, to repeat the 
 expressive language of Mr. Scrafton, "no more than a banker 
 for the Company's servants, who could draw upon him as 
 often and to as great an amount as they pleased." The cam- 
 paign concluded by Adams at the Karamnasa, subsequently 
 continued by Carnac, and victoriously concluded by Munro 
 against the Nuwab-Vazir of Awadh, assured more than the 
 predominance, it assured the absolute supremacy, of the 
 English. 
 
 It is painful to add that the great soldier who had produced 
 the results I have recorded did not live to return to his native 
 land. The climate, the fatigues and anxieties of the cam- 
 paign, had so told upon him that after the expulsion of Mir 
 Kasim from the three provinces he made over his command to 
 Major Carnac, and proceeded to Calcutta. He died, unhappily, 
 just as he was about to embark for England, 16th January, 
 1764, leaving behind an unsurpassed reputation as a soldier. 
 Those who may study the history of his great achievements 
 will, I am confident, endorse and confirm this verdict of his 
 contemporaries. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 BAKSAR. 
 
 How the battle of U'ndwah Nala completely destroyed the 
 power of Mir Kasim; how, skilfully and promptly followed 
 up, it forced him to evacuate Patna, and, crossing the frontier 
 of Bihar, to throw himself into the arms of the Nuwab-Vazir of 
 Awadh (Oudh) ; how the most influential nobles of the country 
 then submitted to the British : has been already told. By his 
 great victory Major Adams had brought the British standards 
 to the Karamnasa; but in bringing them to that border-line of 
 Bihar, and in forcing the defeated ruler of the three provinces 
 to cross it, to receive a hearty welcome from the powerful 
 satrap of the Mughul Empire whose dominions he would then 
 enter, Major Adams had come upon a new enemy, an enemy 
 not at all disinclined to look him in the face, to dispute with 
 him the possession of the three provinces, to conquer which 
 from Mir Kasim had required three pitched battles, several 
 minor combats and a siege. 
 
 The province of Awadh 'Oudh) had not escaped the great 
 Muhammadan invasion of the twelfth century. The decisive 
 victory gained in 1194 by Shahab'u'din Muhammad over 
 Jaichand Rai the Hindu sovereign of Kanoj,had been followed 
 by the complete conquest of the neighbouring provinces. 
 Thenceforth Awadh had become an integral portion of the 
 empire ruled by the sovereign of Dihli, when, then, in the last 
 quarter of the sixteenth century, the illustrious Akbar welded 
 into one compact whole the provinces which had been con- 
 
164 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 quered by Muhammadan invaders of various races, Awadh 
 came naturally into the general system. It was reckoned as 
 one of his most important provinces, for it virtually included 
 all the districts watered by the river Ganges, from Shah- 
 jahanpiir to the Karamnasa. 
 
 In the disruption of the Mughul empire which followed the 
 death of Aurangzfb, in 1707, the powerful nobles, each fighting 
 for his own hand, had sought to secure for their respective 
 families, in permanent possession, provinces or districts which 
 they might claim as their own. Whilst cne family appro- 
 priated the large territory known as the Dakhan, another the 
 Karnatak, a third Bengal and Bihar, the representative of a 
 fourth looked with longing eyes upon Awadh. This was 
 Saadat Khan, an adventurer of a Khorasani family of traders 
 who had but recently come to Dihli, at the Court of which he 
 struggled for paramount influence with the famous Chin 
 Killich Khan. In 1722 Saadat Khan, then Yazir of the empire, 
 procured his own nomination to the government cf the province 
 he had coveted, under the title of Nuwab-Vazir. He began 
 immediately to employ all the means in his power to render 
 the office hereditary in his family. He succeeded. On his 
 death in 1739, his nephew and heir, Abdu'l Mansur, better 
 known under the name of Safdar Jang, succeeded him in both 
 offices; and on Safdar Jang's death, seventeen years later, his 
 son, Shuja'u'd daulah, assumed his title and position without a 
 murmur from any quarter. 
 
 The accession of Shuja'u'd daulah to the rule ever Awadh, 
 in 1756, was contemporaneous with the accession of Siraju'd 
 daulah to the Subahdari of Bengal. The new ruler of Awadh 
 had not been an inattentive observer of the events which had 
 followed, in that province, the proceedings of its young and in- 
 experienced Nuwab. He had noticed how he had run his head 
 against a race of foreigners from beyond the sea, and hew that 
 race of foreigners had in return deposed him. For the moment 
 he was too much occupied with his own affairs to eive very 
 
Baksar. 165 
 
 touch attention to the events passing outside his own domains. 
 But when the death of the Emperor Alamgir II, m 1759, had 
 enabled him to achieve the project contemplated by his great- 
 uncle, of establishing himself, on a basis secure and permanent, 
 in the province over which he ruled as Nuwab-Vazir, ShujaVd 
 daulah began to inquire more narrowly into the events which 
 were passing in the provinces adjoining his own dominions. 
 There did not then (1760) seem very much to disturb him. The 
 foreigners from beyond .the sea appeared to acquiesce in the 
 rule of the N'uwab of their own making. But an ambitious 
 Muhammadan ruler is always glad to foment disturbances in 
 the dominions of a neighbour. When, therefore, the war broke 
 out between Mir Kasim and the foreigners, the attention of 
 Shuja'u'd daulah, till then spasmodic, became fixed. Ideas of 
 aggrandisement for himself began to flit through his brain. 
 Whichever of the two rivals might conquer, the victor must be 
 weakened : th~n would come his turn. It would be no slight 
 achievement, after having secured his own independence in 
 Awadh, to add three fertile provinces to his dominions. Full 
 c f these ideas, Shuja'u'd daulah levied an army at Lakhnao, 
 and summoned his vassal, Balwant Singh, Rajah of Banaras, 
 whose dominions adjoined Bihar, to prepare for the campaign 
 which he declared to be impending. 
 
 The result of the battle of U'ndwah Nala had made it clear 
 to Shuja'u'd daulah that it was with the English, and not with 
 Mir Kasim, that he would have to fight for Bengal. He made 
 preparations accordingly. He deemed it of especial import- 
 ance to have Mir Kasim in his camp, not only because he repre- 
 sented, from a Muhammadan point of view, the cause of 
 national independence, nor even, although that was of no little 
 importance, because he disposed still of the trained battalions 
 of Samrii and Madoc — but because he had still money. The 
 treasures which, after the battle of Gheriah, Mir Kasim had 
 dispatched to the strong fortress of Rotas, were still at Rotas, 
 rctween Rotas and the northern bank of the Karamnasa the 
 
1 66 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 communications were as yet uninterrupted. But they might 
 not be so for long. It was of the greatest importance to act 
 with vigour and promptitude. The fall of Patna rendered the 
 situation still more difficult. Mir Kasim had, in anticipation 
 of that event, sent to Rotas for his family and for his treasures. 
 Any delay in their arrival would be fatal. Fortunately for 
 the common cause, no such delay occurred. When the convoy 
 from Rotas reached Mir Kasim, the English were still two 
 days' march in his rear. Mir Kasim mounted his retinue and 
 his property on camels, and started for the Karamnasa. Just 
 before reaching its banks, an opportune letter, dispatched by 
 the Niiwab-Vazir reached him. In that letter, and in the fly- 
 leaves of the copy of the Koran which accompanied it, 
 Shuja'u'd daulah promised him protection and support. The 
 receipt of an invitation so solemn decided Mir Kasim, against 
 the advice of many of his friends, to throw himself into the 
 arms of the Niiwab-Vazir. He accordingly crossed the 
 Karamnasa. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, events had happened in North-Western 
 India and in Bundelkhand which had modified, if they had 
 not altogether changed, the intentions of the Niiwab-Vazir. 
 Although by the death of Alamgir II, Shah A'lam had become 
 titular King of Dihli and Emperor of India, he had not, up to 
 this time, been able to seat himself on the throne of his 
 ancestors. His capital was still occupied by some of the 
 Afghan victors of Panipat, and an attempt made by Shah 
 A'lam, about this very time, to recover it, had resulted in signal 
 failure. His army had, in consequence, gradually so dwindled 
 down that it could only be regarded as a body of followers, 
 without discipline, without proper arms, without organisation. 
 Of all the sections of his subjects, the Rohilahs alone had 
 remained faithful to him. This anomalous condition of affairs 
 — the capital occupied by foreigners, and the King a wanderer 
 — had stimulated the ambition of many a powerful noble to 
 follow the example which had been set by the rulers of the 
 
Baksar* 167 
 
 Dakhan, of the Karnatak, of Awadh, and of Bengal, to create 
 for his own family an independent kingdom from the now 
 separating portions of the Mughul empire. Amongst the first 
 to adopt this course was the Rajah of Rundelkhand. 
 
 Bundelkhand, the country of the Bundela Rajputs, was 
 separated solely by the river Jamna from the dominions of the 
 Nuwab-Vazir of Awadh. The independent action of the 
 Rajah of that country would, under any circumstances, have 
 affected him. It affected him very considerably indeed, when 
 the Rajah, not content with independence, proceeded to aggres- 
 sion ; when at the head of an army deemed by himself to be 
 irresistible, he crossed the Jamna and began to overrun the 
 districts of his neighbour. It became, then, a matter of very 
 serious consideration with the Niiwab-Vazir whether he should 
 not renounce his designs upon Bengal, and march, rather, 
 against the invader from Bundelkhand. Whilst he was yet 
 pondering over the course he should adopt, he was visited at 
 Lakhnao by the fugitive Emperor, Shah A'lam, who, bestowing 
 upon him the flattering title of Protector of the Empire, 
 earnestly besought him to espouse his cause. Nothing was 
 further from the mind of the Niiwab-Vazir than to render to 
 the Emperor the only assistance he reaHy wished for — the 
 assistance of an army to recover Dihli; but the ruler of Awadh 
 was far tco sensible of the advantages which would accrue to 
 himself from the presence in his capital, and in his camp, of 
 the representative of the authority of the Mughul, to reject his 
 advances. He welcomed Shah A'lam, therefore, with great 
 respect and heartiness, and persuaded him to accompany him 
 on the march he was then about to undertake to Allahabad. 
 
 Before quitting Lakhnao, the Nuwab-Vazir had dispatched 
 to Mir Kasim the letter and the Koran of which I have already 
 spoken. A little later, however, there came to give him grave 
 cause for reflection, first, the news of the invasion of the Rajah 
 of Bundelkhand, and, secondly, letters from Mir J'afar inform- 
 ing him of the collapse of Mir Kasim and his party, and most 
 
168 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 earnestly beseeching his friendship and alliance. The con- 
 sideration that the friendship of the last would enable him to 
 deal effectually with the first, caused the Niiwab-Vazir to 
 repent that he had given so pressing an invitation, accom- 
 panied by a safe-conduct, to Mir Kasim. However, his pre- 
 parations had been made, and he set out for Allahabad. 
 
 But when he arrived at that city, he found that Mir Kasim 
 had preceded him thither. It was necessary that he should 
 pay his guest the first visit. Accordingly, with great ceremony, 
 and escorted by io.coo horsemen, the Niiwab-Vazir, the very 
 day of his arrival, proceeded to the camp of Mir Kasim. As 
 he entered the camp he saw, drawn up to do him honour, the 
 battalions and the artillery of the trained brigades of Samru 
 and Madoc, the men well set-up, well armed, uniformly dressed 
 — the gunners smartly arrayed after the manner of the English. 
 The Niiwab-Vazir had never seen European troops. The sight, 
 then, of sipahis clothed and drilled according to their fashion, 
 and presenting a striking contrast to the soldiers of his experi- 
 ence, made a deep impression upon him. He had entered Mir 
 Kasim's camp all but resolved to dismiss him from his 
 dominions; he left it, after the interview, all but resolved to 
 use him for his own purpose. 
 
 His mind, however, was not absolutely made up. In concert 
 with the Niiwab-Vazir, and with his entire concurrence, the 
 Emperor had already dispatched a letter of congratulation 
 and of friendship, with a dress of honour to Mir ['afar. This 
 friendly missive had persuaded the latter that he had nothing 
 to fear from his rival, that Mir Kasim would enter the 
 dominions of the Niiwab-Vazir enly to be expelled from them, 
 and he had persuaded the English that it was unnecessary to 
 challenge the enmity of an independent prince by pursuing 
 their defeated enemy across the Karamnasa. But Mir J'afar 
 had not given sufficient weight to the consummate ability of 
 his son-in-law. We have already noticed the impression which 
 the skilful array of his troops produced upon the mind of the 
 
Baksar. 1 69 
 
 Nuwab-Vazir. Mir Kasim hastened to confirm and strengthen 
 this impression. We have seen how, three years before, he had 
 bought the members of the Calcutta Council. He still had 
 plenty of money. With that money he now bought the 
 ministers and favourites of the Niiwab-Vazir and of the 
 Emperor. He did even more. Setting forth, in a plain un- 
 varnished statement, the proceedings of the foreigners from 
 beyond the sea; showing the Niiwab-Vazir how, in six years, 
 they had risen from the position of humble and dependent 
 traders to be masters of the three richest provinces of the 
 Empire; and reminding him that, according to the ideas of an 
 aggressive race, the process of absorption never is complete so 
 long as anything remains to be absorbed; that the frontier of 
 the foreigners now touched the domains of his vassal, the 
 Rajah of Banaras, and that, therefore, he himself would most 
 certainly be the next victim : he induced Shuja'u'd daulah to 
 return to his earlier idea — that which had for its aim the con- 
 quest of Bengal, the expulsion of these foreigners. 
 
 But one difficulty remained to bar the full acceptance of this 
 policy ; and that was the invasion of the Rajah of Bundel- 
 khand. Mir Kasim was equal to the occasion. He offered to 
 proceed at once, with his own troops only, against the Rajah of 
 Bundelkhand, provided that on his return successful from the 
 enterprise the Niiwab-Vazir would at once invade Bihar. 
 Shuja'u'd daulah closed immediately with the offer. 
 
 Mir Kasim promptly marched to the banks of the Jamna and 
 attacked the army of the Bundelkhand Rajah. The enormous 
 relative superiority of soldiers disciplined after the European 
 fashion to the irregular armies of the native princes at once 
 asserted itself. W T e have seen how in their desperate struggle 
 for the three provinces the soldiers of Mir Kasim had suc- 
 cumbed to the English. The very same soldiers gained an 
 easy victory over the Rajput warriors of Bundelkhand. The 
 campaign was short but decisive. Beaten in two pitched 
 battles, the invading- Rajah hastened to retreat within his own 
 
i;o The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 borders; nor did Mir Kasim relax his hold until he had 
 rendered his enemy incapable of pursuing further the contest, 
 and had forced from him a renunciation of all his ambitious 
 plans. Mir Kasim then returned to Allahabad, to find the 
 Niiwab-Vazir dazzled by his exploits and eager now to afford 
 him the assistance which he desired. 
 
 The terms of the co-operation were speedily settled. Mir 
 Kasim, whose wealth was far from being exhausted, agreed to 
 pay his powerful ally eleven lakhs of rupees a month, from 
 the day that his army should cross the Ganges. In return he 
 received a promise that as soon as the English should have 
 been beaten, Mir Kasim should be restored to the Subahdari, 
 on the condition of paying a yearly tribute to the Emperor and 
 cf maintaining a body of disciplined troops ready always to 
 aid the Nuwab-Vazir. It was further arranged that the 
 treasures and property of the English and of Mir J'afar should 
 be divided between the contracting parties. 
 
 There were no more delays. The combined armies set out at 
 once, reached Banaras on the /th March (1764), and immedi- 
 ately made preparations for throwing a bridge of boats across 
 the Ganges. Whilst they are engaged in that operation I 
 propose to trace the movements of the enemy they were march- 
 ing to encounter. 
 
 Various causes combined to offer to the enterprise of the 
 Nuwab-Vazir and Mir Kasim many chances of success. The 
 first of these was the change in the English command. After 
 driving his enemy across the Karamnasa, Major Adams, whose 
 abilities had so much contributed to the success of the cam- 
 paign, had been forced by the state of his health to proceed to 
 Calcutta. He had been succeeded for the moment by Major 
 Knox, one of the heroes of Machhlipatanam and Biderra; but 
 the fatigues and exposure of the campaign had told upon 
 Knox, and he was forced in a very few weeks to resign the 
 command to Captain Jennings. Jennings was an artillery 
 officer who had served through the Plassey campaign. He 
 
Baksar. 1 7 l 
 
 possessed considerable merit, but he laboured under the dis- 
 advantage of knowing that he held the chief command only 
 till his successor should be appointed. This knowledge ren- 
 dered him unwilling to assume any unforeseen responsibility. 
 
 Jennings was the less disposed to cross the Karamnasa in 
 pursuit of Mir Kasim, because of the hopes entertained by Mir 
 J'afar, and communicated by him to the Calcutta Council, that 
 his rival would receive no assistance from the Nuwab-Vazir. 
 The interchange of compliments and assurances between the 
 courts of Lakhnao and of Murshidabad fully justified Mir 
 J 'afar, veteran intriguer as he was, in entertaining such a belief. 
 He could offer more than could Mir Kasim, he could offer peace 
 and alliance whilst the Nuwab-Vazir should march against the 
 Bundelas; he never dreamt that Mir Kasim would render a 
 service which could bind the Niiwab-Vazir to him by the ties of 
 confidence. This illusion constituted the second cause which 
 gave to the projected invasion its greatest chance of success. 
 
 The third cause arose from the undermining process adopted 
 by the agents of Mir Kasim. That Nuwabhad left in the 
 provinces he had quitted a large number of partizans — men 
 who preferred an independent prince of their choice to a ruler 
 dependent upon, under the control of, and upheld by, the 
 foreigner. Amongst these partizans were men of great ability, 
 who, seeing the collapse of force, endeavoured to obtain their 
 end by ruse and intrigue. They submitted, then, to the in- 
 evitable, acknowledged Mir J'afar, and then proceeded to work 
 in the dark for the restoration of his rival. The great obstacle 
 in their way was that army of Englishmen and of English- 
 trained sipahis which had driven Mir Kasim across the border. 
 But the English portion of that army contained not only some 
 Englishmen who were discontented; it contained likewise 
 many foreigners, some the remnants of the Dutch beaten at 
 Biderra, others Frenchmen driven from Chandranagar, and 
 others, adventurers from other parts of Europe. Upon the 
 
172 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 lower stratum of the natures of these men, and upon the sipahis, 
 the conspirators set instantly to work. 
 
 After Mir Kasim had crossed the Karamna^a, the English 
 field force remained for some time encamped at and near 
 Sawant, a small town en the river Durgawati.* Here, on the 
 26th January, it was joined by a reinforcement from 
 Eardhwan, commanded by Captain Maclean. With this re- 
 inforcement there came also two French companies from 
 Madras, who had formed part of the expedition sent from 
 that presidency against the Manillas, and who had there dis- 
 played many symptoms of indiscipline. On arriving at the 
 camp on the Durgawati, these two companies were broken up 
 and reformed into three. 
 
 A leng halt in a country which offered no field for employ- 
 ment ; the presence in the camp of an unusually large number 
 of foreigners — for, in addition to the three French companies, 
 to the Dutch, the Germans, and other adventurers, there was a 
 fourth French company, commanded by Lieutenant Claude 
 Martme, subsequently the founder and endower of the 
 Martiniere in Lakhnac — afforded to the friends of Mir Kasim 
 the opportunity for which they had been waiting. They had, a 
 few weeks earlier, made proof that the English soldiers were 
 not above temptation, for, just before Major Knox resigned 
 his command, they had induced three of them to quit their 
 colours. These men had, indeed, been recaptured, but, owing 
 to the confusion resulting from a change of command, they 
 had escaped the punishment they had merited. Their good 
 fortune was not likely to act as a deterrent to ethers. The 
 conspirators now set to work on a more systematic principle. 
 
 They were immensely aided at this crisis by the conduct of 
 the English Government. In the earlier days of the campaign, 
 when everything depended upon the devotion, the valour, the 
 endurance of the English soldiers and their native comrades, 
 
 * The Durgawati joins the Karamnasa about twenty-seven miles above 
 the point where the latter empties itself into the Ganges. 
 
Baksar. 173 
 
 Mir J 'a far had premised the men of the Bengal army that, 
 should they emerge victorious from the campaign, they should 
 receive a handsome donation. This promise had, with the 
 sanction of the Calcutta Council, been communicated officially 
 to the army. Yet when the campaign was over, when tne devo- 
 tion, the valcur, and the endurance of the English and the 
 English-trained sipahis had won for Mir J'afar all that he 
 had demanded, the Calcutta Council withheld the promised 
 reward. Mir J'afar was ready enough to pay it, but his 
 finances were under the virtual control of the Calcutta Council, 
 and its members, always ready to help themselves, closed their 
 ears to the just demands of their soldiers. 
 
 The first manifestation of the ill-feeling caused and nur- 
 tured in the manner I have described, took place on the 30th 
 January (1764), when the European troops, assembled under 
 arms on the parade ground, refused to obey the word of com- 
 mand. Captain Jennings, who then commanded, was told on 
 the spot by one of their ringleaders that the conduct of the 
 men was prompted by the want of faith of the Government 
 in the matter of the donation promised by the Nuwab ; that 
 they had performed their allotted task, had, after a campaign 
 of extraordinary severity, seated Mir J'afar en the masnad; 
 that two months had since elapsed, spent in idleness on the 
 banks of the Durgawati; that they saw no signs of the pay- 
 ment of the promised reward; that, considering themselves 
 aggrieved and defrauded, they had resolved to refuse further 
 service until their wrongs should be redressed. 
 
 For the moment Jennings pacified the men, and induced 
 them to return to their duty by'promising to write to Calcutta 
 and support their claims, and by assuring them that, to his 
 kncwledge, a sum of money was then on its way to the camp, 
 and that from this he would pay an instalment of the pro- 
 mised donation. And, in fact, on the day following, he issued 
 an order, in which, whilst exhorting the men to emulate by 
 their gcod conduct in camp their gallantry in the field, he 
 
1 74 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 pledged his word of honour that the verbal assurances he had 
 given them should be carried out as soon as possible. Three 
 days later Jennings endeavoured to check the spread of the 
 mutinous feeling by detaching the companies in which it had 
 chiefly manifested itself on command to the Karamnasa. 
 
 But the evil had taken too deep a root to be eradicated 
 either by smooth words or by paltry expedients. It should 
 always be borne in mind that amongst the Europeans now 
 remaining in camp the foreign element was largely repre- 
 sented. That element, indeed, comprehended two-thirds of 
 the entire number, and the men composing it had been worked 
 upon by the agents of Mir Kasim ! When, then, after the 
 lapse of twelve days, the promised payment had not been 
 made, these men persuaded their comrades to act. At their 
 suggestion the entire European infantry turned out, and elect- 
 ing from their own ranks a commander bearing the name of 
 Straw, with the title of Major, compelled the lascars to draw 
 out six field-pieces and place them in position on the flanks 
 of the battalion. It was only by extraordinary exertions on 
 the part of their officers that the sipahis were induced to refrain 
 from joining their European comrades in this movement. 
 Jennings acted on this occasion with promptitude and vigour. 
 Riding up to Straw, he seized him by the collar, and an- 
 nounced his intention of carrying him to the quarter-guard 
 as the ringleader of the mutiny. The mutineers forced him, 
 however, to let go his hold, and declared their intention, as 
 they saw no prospect of receiving their money by remaining 
 where they were, of marching to Patna, taking up on their 
 way their comrades who had been detached to the Karam- 
 nasa. A long parley followed, Jennings using all his efforts 
 to pacify the men, and even promising to raise a portion of 
 the money from the private funds of the officers. To his 
 advice and promises they paid, however, no regard ; finally, 
 to end the matter, Straw gave the order to march to the Karam- 
 nasa. The men set out at once in that direction ; but to reach 
 
Baksar. 175 
 
 their destination, they had to pass through the camp of the 
 Nuwab. Mir J'afar, forewarned of all that was going on, 
 met the mutineers as they were entering his camp, and pro- 
 mised to pay them a lakh of rupees on the spot, the balance 
 before one o'clock of the following day, if they would return 
 to their duty. At this crisis, however, the influence of the 
 foreigners and of the men whom Mir Kasim had bought, came 
 into play. These persuaded their comrades to disregard the 
 offer of Mir J'afar and to carry out their original intention. 
 The mutineers, therefore, pushed on for the Karamnasa. 
 
 But Jennings did not yet despair of bringing them to reason. 
 Ordering the officers and non-commissioned officers to follow 
 the mutineers and to reason with them, he galloped across 
 country to the camp on the Karamnasa, and detaching thence 
 the Europeans encamped there in a direction nearly opposite 
 to that by which their comrades were approaching, turned out 
 the two battalions of sipahis with the two 6-pounders in the 
 camp. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, events were happening in the ranks of 
 the mutineers which gave a new colour to the transaction. 
 Obeying the orders of Captain Jennings, the officers and non- 
 commissioned officers had followed the men, and, mingling 
 with them, had all but persuaded the English portion of them 
 to listen to reason. This was far from suiting the purpose of 
 the foreigners. They threatened to drive the officers from 
 their midst, and at length induced their English comrades to 
 persevere in their design. Upon this some of the officers de- 
 sisted; others, however, continued to persevere. Amongst the 
 latter was a French lieutenant, to whom I have already made 
 allusion, Claude Martine. As Martine continued to exhort 
 his countryman, one of the mutineers, likewise a Frenchman, 
 took him aside, and told him that his exhortations were use- 
 less, that the men had made up their minds that the plea of 
 the money and of the march to Patna was only a blind, that 
 they had pledged themselves to the Niiwab-Vazi'r of Awadh, 
 
i 76 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 and were now on their way to cross the Karamnasa and enter 
 his dominions. He concluded by assuring Martine that if 
 he would put himself at their head, he should be their general ! 
 
 Astounded at this revelation, Martine gave an evasive reply, 
 and made his way back to the camp in search of Jennings. 
 Net finding him there, he took the same way across country 
 which that officer had followed, reached the Karamnasa before 
 the mutineers, and communicated the information he had re- 
 ceived. He had hardly done so when the mutineers arrived, 
 and seeing that the sipahis had no serious intention of op- 
 posing them, took possession of the two field-pieces. 
 
 Again did Jennings harangue them, this time with fuller 
 knowledge of their real intentions. His serious tone, his ex- 
 posure of the real aims of the men who were misleading them, 
 produced a marked effect upon the English portion of his lis- 
 teners. Straw himself, the whilom commandant of the band, 
 was one of the first to recognise that he had been duped. Not 
 only did he admit his fault, but he exerted himself to his 
 utmost to induce his comrades to return to their duty. The 
 consequence of Jennings's exhortations, of a promise of free 
 pardon, and of the exertions of repentant sinners like Straw, 
 was soon visible. By two and threes the English came over 
 to stand or fall by their commander. Impatient at this, the 
 foreigners, fearful of further desertions, broke off the con- 
 ference, and, giving the order to advance, to the number of 
 300 crcssed the Karamnasa. They were accompanied by 
 about 600 sipahis, amongst whose battalions, whilst Jennings 
 was haranguing the Europeans, the Mughul horsemen, devoted 
 to a man to Mir Kasim, had been extreme 1 ^ busy. 
 
 But the English officers had not abandoned the task of per- 
 suasion. Some seven or eight of them followed the mutineers, 
 and, mixing in their ranks, induced about 80 Europeans and 
 300 sipahis to return. Conspicuous in these efforts, so long- 
 as the English officers were present was a Sergeant Delamarr, 
 a man born in London of French parents, and who, as a ser- 
 
Baksar. 1 7 7 
 
 geant of the 84th, had so greatly distinguished himself during 
 the recent campaign that Major Adams had promised him a 
 commission. Major Adams had died, and the promise had 
 not been kept. Delamarr had seen other non-commissioned 
 officers who had rendered far inferior services promoted and 
 provided for, whilst he was still kept in the background. 
 Dissimulating his resentment, he, under the cover of zealous 
 sympathy with his officers, became the soul of the mutiny. 
 So much did the officers trust him, that on this critical occasion 
 one of them had lent him a horse to follow and use his per- 
 suasions with the men. Delamarr did follow with the seven 
 or eight officers to whom I have referred, but when they had 
 left with their repentant following, he put himself at the head 
 of the remainder, and declared he would show them the way 
 to fortune and glory. 
 
 If the Nuwab-Vazir had been close at hand to receive and 
 to encourage the malcontents as they crossed the Karamnasa, 
 the situation would have been serious indeed. But the march 
 into an unknown country, where no welcome awaited them, 
 acted upon a large number of the mutinous soldiers as a 
 plunge into a cold bath acts upon a drunken man. It com- 
 pletely sobered them. The further they advanced the more 
 did their confidence vanish. The cautious German element 
 was especially affected by considerations which grew stronger 
 every moment. By degrees every man of that nationality 
 fell out and retraced his steps. Of the whole force there 
 finally joined the Nuwab-Vazir at Allahabad a hundred and 
 seventy-three deserters, of whom only three were Englishmen. 
 The remainder were almost all Frenchmen. The majority of 
 them joined the brigades of Samrii and Madoc. The more 
 intelligent were received into the special service of the Nuwab- 
 Vazir, and were subsequently entrusted with subordinate 
 commands. 
 
 Meanwhile, with the return of the repentant deserters, order 
 had been restored in the British force. The receipt of a lakh 
 
 N 
 
178 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 of rupees from Mir J'afar enabled Captain Jennings to make 
 a timely distribution of a part of the promised donation, and 
 his men, touched by this liberality, and free from the pressure 
 of their French comrades, evinced not only shame for their 
 conduct, but a desire to atone for it by some striking act of 
 service. 
 
 An opportunity soon presented itself. In his distribution 
 of the Nuwab's money Jennings had paid the European 
 soldier more than six times the amount he had allowed to the 
 sipahi.* The gross unfairness of the proportion produced a 
 marked effect upon the minds of the men who had to a very 
 great extent resisted the pressure put upon them by their 
 European comrades and by their co-religionists to desert. To 
 them it appeared in the light of a premium upon revolt. They 
 resolved, therefore, to obtain their rights by the means which 
 in the case of their European comrades had proved so suc- 
 cessful. Accordingly, on the morning of the 13th February, 
 the day after the issue of the order directing the distribution, 
 the sipahis turned out in tumultuous order on their parade- 
 grounds. Jennings at once ordered the European battalions 
 and the artillery under arms. He had no need to incite them 
 to do their duty. He found them only too eager to wipe out, 
 by an attack upon the men who had presumed to follow their 
 example, all recollection of their contumacy. An extra- 
 ordinary scene followed. The Europeans occupied a position 
 which cut off one native battalion from the other. For a time 
 no movement was made by either party. Suddenly, however, 
 the sipahi battalion on the extreme left advanced in a tumultu- 
 ous manner towards the Europeans. Rightly conjecturing that 
 the object of the sipahis was not to make an assault but to 
 effect a junction with their comrades, and especially anxious 
 
 * The proportions were — to all sergeants, and to corporals and bom- 
 bardiers of the artillery, 80 rupees each ; to corporals of infantry and 
 gunners, 60 rupees each; to private soldiers and drummers, 40 rupees 
 each ; to havildars (native sergeants), 12 rupees each ; to naiks (native 
 corporals), 9 rupees each; to sipahis 6 rupees each. 
 
Baksar. 1 79 
 
 to avoid a contest which, however it might terminate, could 
 not fail to prove fatal to English interests, Jennings, with 
 great presence of mind, controlled his troops so far as to force 
 them to refrain from drawing a trigger. The moment was 
 very critical, for the discharge of a single piece must have 
 precipitated a conflict. The sipahis came on in tumultuous 
 order, passed through the Europeans, and joined their com- 
 rades en the other flank. Two of the native battalions then 
 marched towards the Karamnasa; of the other two present, 
 one, though clamorous and excited, was restrained by its 
 officers; the fourth showed no disposition to mutiny; a fifth, 
 on duty in the camp of the Niiwab, was kept under control ; 
 two others were on detached duty on the Karamnasa; and it 
 was to join these, which had already displayed disaffection, 
 that the two revolting battalions now marched. 
 
 Jennings and his officers followed them, and by premising 
 them the same concessions which had been accepted by the 
 other battalions, he succeeded in inducing them to return to 
 their duty. Similar concessions ensured the loyalty of the 
 two battalions on the Karamnasa. The concessions were that 
 the share of the native rank and file should be increased from 
 less than one-sixth to one-half of that awarded to their Euro- 
 pean comrades. 
 
 It is strange that a revolt, which, in the cases alike of the 
 Europeans and the sipahis, might have been attended with 
 the most serious consequences, should have been precipitated 
 by the conduct of the authorities, and that, in both instances, 
 it required the breaking cf the bonds of discipline to force 
 those authorities to consent to an act of simple justice. The 
 delay in carrying out a solemn obligation in the one case, and 
 the insult offered to the sipahis in the other, imperilled without 
 necessity the British hold upon Bengal. 
 
 Captain Jennings, hoping that a change of quarters might 
 have the effect of effacing the recollection cf the scenes of the 
 previous fortnight, marched, as soon as order had been 
 
180 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 restored, to Sahasram (Sasseram). Here he remained for a 
 fortnight and then moved to Hariganj on the Son. On the 
 5th March Major Carnac arrived at that place to take 
 command. 
 
 Major Carnac was not one of the glorious illustrations of 
 the old Indian army. He possessed few of the qualities which 
 are required in a general. Careful of his own comfort, ab- 
 sorbed by a love of the acquisition of money, then very pre- 
 valent amongst the high officials of India, he displayed neither 
 energy nor enterprise. With far greater means at his disposal 
 than had been possessed by Major Adams, he accomplished 
 much less. He paid but little attention to the comfort of his 
 troops, who, however, disliked him less on that account than 
 for the distrust he evinced on many occasions of their capacity 
 to beat the enemy. The intense dislike felt towards him by 
 his officers and men, and which can be traced in all the corres- 
 pondence of the time, was increased by the semi-regal state 
 with which, whilst careless for others, be shrouded himself. 
 It was his delight to pitch his camp at some distance in the 
 rear of that of his army, and, whilst living in it a life of 
 luxury and ease, to leave the details of his command to sub- 
 ordinates. That his officers and men gauged his military 
 capacity aright was shown some years later, when his conduct 
 in the campaign against the Marathas imperilled Western 
 India.* 
 
 The first act of Major Carnac after assuming command gave 
 evidence of the want of enterprise which was his besetting 
 fault as a general. I have already described how, after the 
 fall of Patna, Mir Kasim had proceeded to the fort of Rotas, 
 and, mounting the members of his family and all his portable 
 treasure upon camels, had succeeded in escorting both across 
 the Karamnasa. But many valuables, not to be transported 
 in that easy manner, had been left at Rotas. To secure these 
 
 * T allude to the conduct which Led to the shameful convention of 
 Wargaon. 
 
Baksar. 181 
 
 likewise, Mir Kasim had dispatched in February, from Alla- 
 habad, one of his ablest officers, Shekh Ishmail Bey, with a 
 chosen body of troops and a supply of cattle. The enter- 
 prise had not been so secretly conducted but that it came to 
 the knowledge of Mir J'afar. Mir J'afar communicated the 
 information to Jennings, and Jennings, on the 2nd March, 
 had despatched a party to intercept the convoy, and, if 
 possible, to take possession of Rotas. 
 
 Three days later Carnac assumed the command. His first 
 act was to recall the intercepting party, at that time within a 
 few miles of its destination. 
 
 Carnac had found ready to his hand a force consisting, in 
 spite of the recent desertions, of 750 European infantry, 150 
 artillery-men, about 70 cavalry, some three or four hundred 
 native cavalry and seven battalions of native infantry, a total 
 strength of about 6,000 men. He knew well, moreover, that 
 reinforcements of both races were on their way to join him, and 
 that the Europeans would arrive some time in April. With- 
 out counting these, he had an army larger than that with which 
 Clive had fought at Plassey, numerically stronger than that 
 other at the head of which Adams had conquered Katwa, at 
 Gheriah, and at U'ndwah Nala, and he was, moreover, sup- 
 ported by the army, 12,000 strong, of Mir J'afar. His own 
 men were especially eager for the fray. They were tired of 
 inaction, and they greatly longed for an opportunity to wipe 
 out, by gallantry in the field, every recollection of their in- 
 subordination on the banks of the Durgawati. 
 
 Their hopes in this respect were, however, soon dispelled. 
 Although, on his way to join, Carnac had received precise 
 information regarding the movements of the Niiwab-Vazir 
 and Mir Kasim, knew that they had quitted Allahabad, and 
 had calculated that they would reach Banaras a day or two 
 after his assumption of the command of the British force, he 
 remained for some days unaccountably idle. In another way 
 he pursued a line of conduct not less irritating to his troops. 
 
1 82 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 As though he distrusted them, he ordered his own tent to be 
 pitched, not in the camp of his army, but in the camp of his 
 ally, Mir J'afar, separated from that of his army by the river 
 Diirgawati. To lessen the inconveniences which might arise 
 from such a course, he — two days after his arrival — issued an 
 order directing that all reports were to be made to his second 
 in command, Major Champion, "who, when there is anything 
 extraordinary, will report to the Commander-in-Chief." 
 
 This conduct, and the apparent determination of Carnac 
 not to move, caused considerable discontent, and for a moment 
 there appeared symptoms of the renewal of the disturbances 
 which had only recently been subdued. Prompt measures — 
 amongst them the despatch to Calcutta of Claude Martine's 
 French Company, and the disbursement of the remainder of 
 the Niiwab's donation — -checked these for the moment, and 
 the brooding discontent was further dissipated by the issue, 
 on the 1 2th, of an order to move forward. On the 17th the 
 army reached Baksar. 
 
 The delay of more than a week, however, had given the 
 enemy — who had, we have seen, reached Banaras on the 7th — • 
 time to prepare and throw across the Ganges a bridge of beats. 
 If we may form a conclusion from his correspondence, Carnac 
 had never intended to anticipate them at that place. He had 
 formed a resolution to halt at Baksar; to await there the nego- 
 tiations which Mir J'afar was carrying on with the Rajah of 
 Banaras, and which, according to the calculations of those 
 days, were likely to be pecuniarily more profitable even than 
 a successful campaign, and it was with a feeling of relief that, 
 two days after his arrival at that place, and when the tracing 
 of the intrenchments with which he designed to cover his camp 
 had been begun, he learned that the enemy had successfully 
 placed their bridge of boats, and were engaged in crossing 
 the Ganges. He resolved to await them where he was. 
 
 This Fabian conduct by no means corresponded to the views 
 of the Calcutta Council. Whatever opinion we may form of 
 
Baksar. 18 
 
 6 
 
 the moral character of the gentlemen who formed that Council, 
 we are bound to do justice to their political foresight. These 
 men, the colleagues of Clive and of Adams, had, though not 
 soldiers themselves, gleaned from the action of those leaders 
 a very clear view of the manner in which a war with a native 
 prince ought to be conducted. They had noticed that, alike 
 in Southern India and in Bengal, Clive had been successful 
 because he had attacked. Adams had followed the same 
 system. What faith, then, could they place in a plan, the 
 principle of which was entirely opposed to that with which 
 unbroken success had made them familiar? If Carnac was 
 right, they argued, Clive and Adams had been wrong. To 
 argue that Clive and Adams had been wrong was an absurd- 
 ity ; therefore it was the new system which was defective, and 
 must be abandoned. Full of this conviction, the Council sent 
 orders to Carnac to cross the Karamnasa and proceed to act 
 against the enemy. 
 
 Carnac received these orders on the 24th. He at once 
 despatched an officer to arrange for throwing a bridge across 
 the Karamnasa, and wrote to the Council that their orders 
 would be obeyed as soon as he should have collected a suffi- 
 cient supply of grain. This collection of grain, however, was 
 a mere excuse to evade the orders he had received. For the 
 next twelve days he remained encamped at Baksar, and when 
 on the 3rd April he received another despatch from the Council 
 urging more decisive measures, he called a council of war. 
 
 A council of war never fights. Carnac forced a decision 
 favourable to his own views by proving that the army had 
 not a supply of provisions sufficient to permit them to advance. 
 He did not tell them that the army might have had a suffi- 
 cient supply of provisions if he had made serious efforts to 
 obtain it. Some of the members of the Council did not shrink 
 from expressing that opinion. But it was declared to be now 
 too late, and, although the enemy's army was marching upon 
 them, the Council decided to retreat on Patna. 
 
184 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 On the followng day, the 4th, the army fell back, and on 
 the 13th reached Danapur. On the 14th the European rein- 
 forcements, augmenting the army by nearly 200 Europeans 
 and as many sipahis, reached Patna. The Europeans at once 
 joined the army in the field. 
 
 At Danapur, Carnac halted five days. The murmur of his 
 troops, and certain information that the enemy were approach- 
 ing the Son — a river most difficult to cross in the face of an 
 enemy — induced him to announce his intention of marching 
 to prevent them. But again he was too late. The very day 
 after he had set out he had a rough proof that the enemy had 
 been beforehand with him; for his own tent, pitched as usual 
 at a distance from the camp, was threatened by a detachment 
 of their cavalry, and he himself was roused from the occupa- 
 tion of a game of whist to run for refuge amongst his own 
 sipahis. This adventure, which reflected little credit on the 
 intelligence department,* had the effect of inducing Carnac to 
 abandon the unmilitary habit of encamping at a distance from 
 his men. 
 
 Certain now of the proximity of the enemy, Carnac dis- 
 patched his European cavalry — consisting of about seventy 
 men inclusive of officers — under Captain Hay, with instruc- 
 tions to engage them, then suddenly to retire and draw them 
 into an ambuscade. Hay had not even set out when Carnac 
 changed his mind, without, however, informing Hay of the 
 change. The consequence may be imagined. Hay obeyed 
 orders literally ; engaged the enemy at so great an advantage, 
 that the latter sent forward considerable bodies of troops to 
 support their broken advance-guard ; then fell back, drawing 
 the enemy's masses after him to the grove, to which the in- 
 fantry intended for the ambuscade should have been sent. To 
 
 For secret-service money, attendance, and table-money, Major 
 Carnac drew the unprecedented^ large allowance of Rs. 11,291.8.0 per 
 mensem, a sum greatly exceeding those drawn by his predecessor and 
 successor for similar purposes. 
 
Baksar. 1 85 
 
 his amazement, not a man was to be seen, and Hay, recklessly 
 abandoned to his fate, had great difficulty in extricating 
 himself from his false position. 
 
 The near approach of the enemy forced the British army, two 
 days later, to fall back on Patna. After a harassing and 
 disorderly march, it reached that place on the 25th, and took 
 up an intrenched position, part of which was already occupied 
 by the army of Mir J'afar. The left of this position rested on 
 the Ganges, then made a sweep round the eastern side and a 
 portion of the southern side of the city, then, receding, ran 
 parallel to its western side. It was thus covered for three 
 parts of its extent by the guns mounted on the city walls. Its 
 front was defended to the same extent by a low rampart and 
 a deep ditch. Mir J'afar's army occupied the left portion of 
 the intrenchment, the extremity of which rested on the Ganges; 
 the English sipahis, the part covered by the south-west bastions 
 of the city wall, and protected by the intrenchment ; the 
 Europeans, the most vulnerable portion of the line, running 
 parallel to the western side of the city, not covered by the 
 rampart guns, and open towards the front. The force occupy- 
 ing this intrenchment numbered — including Mir J'afar's army 
 of 12,000 men and about 1,000 Europeans and English sipahis 
 within the city — 19,000 men. It was the largest force ever, till 
 then, put into the field against an enemy in Bengal ; it was 
 certainly the first that had allowed itself to be beleaguered. 
 Leaving their commander, Major Carnac, engaged in com- 
 pleting his preparations for its defence, I propose to return to 
 the Niiwab-Vazir and Mir Kasim. 
 
 We left those potentates entering Banaras on the 7th March, 
 and we have heard of them quitting that city by the bridge of 
 boats they had thrown over the Ganges on the 17th. The 
 object being to reach Patna, the direct route led the army to 
 Baksar, a distance of sixty-two miles. The passage of the 
 Ganges proved, however, to be an operation far longer than 
 had been anticipated ; indeed, had Major Carnac displayed 
 
1 86 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the smallest enterprise, it might have proved fatal to the in- 
 vaders. When rather less than one half of the force had 
 crossed to the opposite side, the bridge suddenly gave way. 
 What an opportunity for Carnac ! At this very time he was 
 frittering away his energies at Baksar ! Some days elapsed 
 before the bridge could be repaired, and it was not till the 2nd 
 April that the enemy's army, reunited on the southern bank, 
 was in a position to march towards Baksar. The information 
 that it had marched compelled Carnac, as we have seen, to 
 make a hasty retreat towards Patna (4th April). 
 
 The Niiwab-Vazir reached Baksar on the 9th April, and, 
 learning the somewhat erratic movements of Carnac, resolved 
 to make an effort to cut him off from Patna. He pushed on, 
 therefore, w r ith all speed, crossed the Son unopposed, on the 
 17th and 1 8th, and sent to the front the reconnoitring party 
 which, as we have seen, surprised and almost captured Carnac 
 on the 20th. Whilst Carnac was planning the counter-attack 
 which he failed to support, the Niiwab-Vazir detached on the 
 2 1st, a considerable body of troops to cut off his army from 
 Patna. This operation, which if carried out in its entirety 
 might have produced serious results, was frustrated only by 
 an accident. Carnac being in want of provisions, had ordered 
 a battalion of sipahis and three guns, to escort, on the 22nd, 
 a convoy from Patna to his camp. Captain Smith, who com- 
 manded this escort, happened to receive information during 
 his march, of the approach of the enemy's detachment. He 
 was on the line by which the enemy must advance, and close 
 to an extremely strong position formed by the bed of a tank 
 with mud embankments on every side. He promptly took 
 possession of this natural fortress, and when the enemy 
 approached, gave them a reception so unexpected and so warm, 
 that, imagining their purpose had been discovered, they re- 
 nounced the enterprise and rejoined the main army. 
 
 How Carnac fell back from that army, and after a some- 
 what disorderly retreat, took up a strong position under the 
 
Baksar. 18; 
 
 walls of Patna, has been already told. The next day the 
 armies of the Emperor, the Niiwab-Vazir and Mir Kasim, 
 about 40,000 strong, of whom, however, not more than 12,000 
 were regular troops, and the larger proportion of the remainder 
 cavalry, took up a position fronting him. The Emperor, 
 Shah A'lam, was on the right opposed to Mir J'afar; Mir 
 Kasim, with his trained brigades, and having his head- 
 quarters at Bankipur, opposed the right wing of Mir J'afar 
 and the left wing of the English; the Niiwab-Vazir, with his 
 head-quarters at Lohannapur, occupied the ground facing the 
 south wall of the city, and opposed the right wing of the 
 English. 
 
 It was altogether a new position for the contending parties; 
 an English force 19,000 strong, thus bearded in their camp by 
 an enemy whose troops, though exceeding them in number by 
 nearly two to one were, for the most part, of a quality greatly 
 inferior. But prestige — the prestige gained at Plassey, at 
 Katwa, at Gheriah and at U'ndwah Nala — still fought for 
 the English. That prestige had so impressed their enemies 
 with their prowess, that for a week they hesitated to attack. 
 During that period the English and their allies remained 
 passive behind the trenches. 
 
 On the 2nd May, however, information reached the Nuwab- 
 Vazir which forced a decision of some kind. He learned that 
 a detachment of English troops between two and three hundred 
 strong, commanded by Captain Wemyss, was approaching 
 Patna. It was already too late, even had it been possible, to 
 send a force to crush them ; Patna, and the army under its 
 walls, barred his way; he resolved, therefore, to attempt to 
 crush that army before the reinforcements should arrive. 
 
 At daybreak of the following day (May 3rd), he made the 
 attempt. The English being the most formidable of his 
 enemies, and the most exposed, he formed up his line of battle 
 so as, if possible, to overwhelm them, whilst, by a feigned 
 attack, he should prevent Mir J'afar from detaching troops to 
 
1 88 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 their aid. The English, it will be recollected, occupied the 
 right of the line parallel to the southern face of the city, the 
 left touching the troops of Mir J'afar under the south-western 
 bastions of the city. It should be added that their strongest 
 point was a slight eminence close to, and under the fire of, the 
 south-west bastion. 
 
 Leaving the troops of the Emperor to amuse Mir J'afar, the 
 Niiwab-Vazir ranged his own army in the following order. 
 On his right, nearly opposite the mound of which I have 
 spoken, he placed his own choicest soldiers, supported by 3,000 
 Rohilah horse; immediately to the left of these, the divisions 
 of his Minister, Behni Bahadur, and of the Rajah Balwant 
 Singh, of Banaras; to their left again, a body of 5,000 fanatics, 
 all perfectly naked, and covered with paint and ashes. Formed 
 next to these troops, and facing the English line, where it 
 receded and ran parallel to the western face of the city, were 
 the troops of Mir Kasim. Samru occupied, with his Europeans 
 and five battalions of regular sipahis and sixteen guns, the 
 post of honour on the right, touching the 5,000 fanatics. Next 
 to Samru were the cavalry and irregular infantry, flanked by 
 the rocket-men of Mir Kasim. The Niiwab was in the rear 
 with the reserve. 
 
 A distant cannonade naturally preluded the attack. Under 
 cover of its fire the Nuwab-Vazir advanced, and, sheltered by 
 some buildings which served as intrenchments, opened and 
 maintained for some time a musketry-fire on the enemy. The 
 task allotted to Samru was more difficult. His men had no 
 cover, and they were called upon to beard the British troops in 
 the open. They advanced with great precision, but no sooner 
 had they come within range than they were received with so 
 hot a fire, that after several attempts to induce them to press 
 on, Samru drew them off to the protection of a hollow way, 
 nearly half-a-mHe from the intrenchment. On the enemy's 
 left, affairs had not progressed much better. It is true that 
 Mir Kasim's horsemen made several gallant charges, and, 
 
Baksar. 1 89 
 
 supported by their infantry, did their utmost to storm the 
 eminence in advance of the English line, held by Captain 
 Wilding with a company of sipahis; whilst at the same time 
 his rocket-men used every effort to turn the extreme right of 
 their line. Though they did not succeed, their attack pro- 
 duced the effect of occupying the attention of a large portion 
 of the English force, and thus gave an opportunity to the enemy's 
 leader to concentrate all his efforts on another part of the line. 
 The Nuwab-Vazir, in fact, noticing how thoroughly Mir 
 Kasim's troops were occupying the English on their left, 
 resolved to make one determined effort to crush their right. 
 For this purpose he brought up his guns close to the intrench- 
 ment, and opened a very heavy fire, sending word to Mir 
 Kasim to send either Samru or his reserves to support him. 
 The fire was continued for some time with great vigour, but 
 the Nuwab-Vazir looked in vain for the support he had 
 solicited from Mir Kasim. Irritated at last beyond measure, 
 he despatched a peremptory message to his ally. But Mir 
 Kasim, great in council, had no head on the battle-field. There 
 he was incapable of even issuing an order. In vain did the 
 message reach him; he neither sent his own troops nor gave an 
 order to Samru. Compelled to rest solely on his own re- 
 sources, the gallant ruler of Awadh ordered then the 5,000 
 naked fanatics to attack the angle of the intrenchment — a 
 point where it was defended solely by Europeans. The fana- 
 tics rushed forward with great impetuosity, with wild shrieks 
 and gestures, presenting a very formidable appearance; but 
 the English received them with a volley so well directed, that 
 many of them were laid low and the remainder scattered in 
 disorder. They had scarcely cleared the way, however, when 
 the Rohilah horsemen galloped at full speed to accomplish the 
 allotted task. These gallant men met, however, no better suc- 
 cess. The solid fire from the unbroken line of unconquered 
 Englishmen emptied many a saddle, and compelled the sur- 
 vivors to fall back to rally- 
 
190 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 It was now half-past two. The attack, begun at noon, had 
 been foiled at all points. Still the Niiwab-Vazir did not 
 despair. He had fought with great vigour; the cavalry and 
 the rocket-men on his right had displayed signal courage, but 
 the rest of the army had scarcely fought at all. Neither from 
 Samru, from Behni Bahadur, nor from the Rajah of Banaras, 
 had he received any support. As for Mir Kasim's reserves, the 
 English artillery-fire, passing over the hollow in which Samru 
 lay esconced, had put them to flight long before. The Niiwab- 
 Vazir, then, did not feel himself beaten because his first attack 
 had failed. He resolved to make one more bid for victory. 
 Forming up in line his own troops and those of his immediate 
 dependents, he made a gallant advance, still unsupported 
 either by Samru or Mir Kasim, against the British line. So 
 gallantly did his troops charge home, that, for a moment, it 
 seemed as though victory were about to crown his efforts. The 
 English line wavered, a part of the intrenchment was forced, 
 and some prisoners were made. One effort more, and victory ! 
 A similar thought crossed the minds of the English. With 
 calm determination they closed their ranks and presented a 
 new front to the advancing foe, this time not to be broken. 
 Just at this moment, too, the guns from the south-west bastions 
 of the city opened fire with great effect on the enemy's line. 
 The soldiers of the Niiwab-Vazir displayed, notwithstanding, 
 prodigies of valour. They did not retire until the battle had 
 gone irretrievably against them. 
 
 Beaten but not disgraced, the Niiwab-Vazir fell back, send- 
 ing, as he did so, a contemptuous message to Mir Kasim, to 
 the effect that he should renew the action the following day 
 with troops more to be depended upon than those led by him- 
 self and by Samru. The English were anxious to pursue him, 
 to turn the repulse into a complete defeat, but were withheld, 
 to their great indignation, by Carnac. The victory, then, was 
 almost barren. The Niiwab-Vazir carried off all his guns, left 
 no prisoners, and returned to the position he had occupied 
 
Baksar. 191 
 
 before the fight. The losses on both sides were never certainly 
 stated ; but there can be no doubt but that the enemy suffered 
 far more than the English. 
 
 Though the reinforcements commanded by Captain Wemyss 
 safely reached Patna, Carnac still remained on the defensive. 
 He sent, indeed, parties, one to put down insurgents, into the 
 Saran district, and ventured upon one or two skirmishes; but, 
 judging from the reasons he himself assigned, he dreaded, 
 though at the head of the largest force till then employed by 
 the English in Eengal, to attack the enemy in their intrench- 
 ments, lest the attack should fail. Possibly his inaction was 
 due to the fact that whilst the armies faced one another before 
 Patna, he himself was carrying on negotiations with the 
 Niiwab-Vazir and the Emperor, and that, as the result showed 
 a year later,* he found negotiating more profitable than 
 fighting. 
 
 The approach of the rains at last forced the Niiwab-Vazir 
 to retreat. On the 30th May he broke up his camp, and, not 
 pursued by Carnac, though Carnac was at a very early hour 
 made acquainted with the movement, fell back upon Baksar, 
 where, with fertile provinces behind him, and resting upon the 
 river, he resolved to await in an intrenched position the ap- 
 proach of the English army. Leaving him there, I return to 
 relate the very important measures which now began to affect 
 that army. 
 
 On the 28th June, Major Carnac was, by an order of the 
 Court of Directors, removed from the Company's service. His 
 removal was due to causes which bore no reference whatever 
 to his conduct of the campaign, at that time unknown in Eng- 
 land. But it was, nevertheless, a great satisfaction to the Cal- 
 cutta Council, who had lost all confidence in him, and an 
 intense relief to the officers under his command. 
 
 * In 1765, when again at the head of the army, Carnac wrung from 
 the improverished Emperor a donation, for himself individually, of two 
 lakhs of rupees. 
 
192 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 His successor was Major Hector Munro. Munro, who 
 belonged to the 89th Foot, was on the point of embarking for 
 England with the officers and men of his regiment, who had 
 not volunteered for the Company's service, when he received 
 the intimation that his services were required to command the 
 army in Bengal. Taking with him the remnant of his own 
 regiment and of the 90th, he proceeded to Calcutta, and ar- 
 rived there at the end of May. He remained there a short time 
 at the request of the Council; acquainted himself, as far as 
 he could, with the views of its members, and with the state of 
 affairs generally; had interviews with Major Carnac and with 
 Mir J'afar, who had likewise quitted the field ; then started 
 off and joined the army, strengthened by the arrival of fresh 
 troops, on the 13th August. 
 
 Munro was the very opposite of Carnac. Not a great tac- 
 tician, he was a daring, dashing warrior, always on the alert, 
 ready for any enterprise, however foolhardy it would appear. 
 He disdained the ceremonious pomp and stately ceremony in 
 which Carnac had delighted. To him danger, privations, diffi- 
 culties, were as nothing. To set out stealthily with a lightly 
 equipped force, and dash without warning upon an enemy, 
 was a warfare after his heart. Time was to show him, in 
 another part of India, that such tactics might be turned against 
 himself by a resolute and watchful enemy; but in Bengal, the 
 prestige acquired by the English allowed them to dare greatly 
 with impunity. 
 
 But Munro had his difficulties likewise. Scarcely had he 
 joined when the sipahi battalions displayed, in a worse form, 
 those mutinous symptoms which had with difficulty been re- 
 pressed a few months previously, on the Diirgawati and the 
 Karamnasa. After some less important manifestations, re- 
 pressed without difficulty, the men of Captain Galliez's bat- 
 talion, the oldest corps in the service, rose at Manji, imprisoned 
 their officers, and declared their intention of serving no longer, 
 as the promises made to them had not been kept. A battalion 
 
Baksar. 193 
 
 stationed at Chapra, the 6th, commanded by Captain Tre- 
 vannion, was at once despatched to Manji to bring the mutineers 
 to reason. The 6th proved, as Captain Trevannion believed 
 they would prove, loyal to their colours; and the mutineers, 
 taken by surprise, surrendered themselves as prisoners to their 
 native comrades. They were at once embarked upon rafts 
 and conveyed to Chapra. 
 
 Munro was awaiting their arrival at that place. Having 
 received information of the date and of the hour on which 
 he might expect them — eight o'clock on the morning of the 
 13th — he had assembled the troops of the station, European 
 and native, on the parade ground. The prisoners were at once 
 landed and drawn up in front of their loyal comrades. Their 
 own commanding officer then, at Munro's request, selected fifty 
 of the ringleaders. From these fifty he again picked out 
 twenty-four, and these Munro brought at once before a general 
 court-martial on capital charges of mutiny and desertion. The 
 court found them guilty, and sentenced them to be blown from 
 guns. 
 
 Munro was a humane man, averse from bloodsheddmg unless 
 in cases of absolute necessity. But the times were critical. 
 Misplaced leniency would, he felt, endanger the whole fabric 
 of British dominion in Bengal. The easy condonation of the 
 events on the Karamnasa had alone rendered possible the 
 mutiny of Manji. He accordingly directed that the sentence 
 of the court should be carried into effect. 
 
 The sentence was about to be executed — four of the con- 
 demned mutineers were being tied to loaded guns, when four 
 of their comrades stepped forward and declared that as they 
 belonged to the grenadier company, and had occupied the 
 post of honour on the field of battle, they claimed their right 
 to it on the present occasion. The request of these gallant 
 men was complied with; they were tied to the guns and blown 
 away ! 
 
 The action of these men, the calmness with which they met 
 
 O 
 
194 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 their fate, their tragic end, produced an immense effect upon 
 the spectators. There was scarcely a dry eye on the parade 
 ground. Detestation for the crime had been effaced by admir- 
 ation for the romantic heroism of the criminals. On the loyal 
 sipahis the effect was different. They could not bear to assist 
 at the slaughter of men of their own blood — sent to that 
 slaughter for a cause with which in their hearts they sympa- 
 thised. The murmurs in their ranks became irrepressible, and 
 their commanding officers, stepping forward, interpreted those 
 murmurs by declaring to Munro that their men would not 
 allow the execution to proceed. 
 
 Again was the moment critical. Any faltering on the part 
 of Munro would have made the sipahis masters of the situa- 
 tion. Fortunately he was equal to the occasion. Directing the 
 officers of the artillery to load their guns with grape, he drew 
 up the marines on one side of them and the European grena- 
 diers on the other; dismissed the commandants to their regi- 
 ments, and gave orders to the sipahis to ground their arms. 
 Instinctively they obeyed him. Firmness and decision are 
 qualities which can always command Asiatics ! The execution 
 then proceeded. Sixteen of the remaining men were blown 
 away ; the remaining four were sent to Moniah and executed 
 in a similar manner in the presence of the two battalions there 
 stationed, who had recently evinced a disposition to mutiny. 
 
 Having, by this decided conduct, weeded his army of the 
 <: perilous stuff " which might have ruined it and him, and 
 having reorganized his force, Munro issued, on the 6th October, 
 the welcome order to advance. Bearing in mind the great 
 superiority in cavalry possessed by his opponent, he resolved 
 to leave a considerable body of men to protect Bihar, whilst 
 with a select and lightly-equipped force he should execute his 
 favourite manoeuvre of beating up the enemy. The force he 
 selected for this purpose consisted of nearly 900 Europeans 
 — artillery and infantry — eight battalions of sipahis, and the 
 Mughul horse, now increased to a thousand men. Of this 
 
Baksar. 195 
 
 force two sipahi battalions and about a hundred Europeans 
 were at Chapra. Whilst he himself, then, should advance 
 from Bankipiir by the direct route, Munro directed that the 
 Chapra force should set out from that place under Major 
 Champion, and form a junction with him at Kalvarghat on 
 the Son, en the 10th. At the same time a ninth sipahi bat- 
 talion (Captain Goddard's), was ordered to surprise Rotas, and 
 then join the main body at the same point. 
 
 These arrangements having been completed, Munro set out 
 en the Qth October from Bankipiir. He reached Kalvarghat 
 en the 10th, only to find the opposite bank of the Son occupied 
 by the enemy. A passage which might have been extremely 
 difficult was rendered easy by the timely arrival of Major 
 Champion. That officer was more than true to his appoint- 
 ment, for he had marched up the west bank of the Son, and 
 was therefore in a position to take in flank the enemy sent to 
 oppose the advance of Munro. The enemy, not liking the new 
 position, resolved to reserve their energies for another day, 
 and, after a demonstration against Champion, fell back in the 
 direction of A'rah. The British force then crossed and halted. 
 The following day it was joined by Goddard. 
 
 The army being completed by this arrival, Munro divided it 
 into three divisions, assigning them to Majors Champion, 
 Pemble, and Stibbert. On the 13th he again advanced. He 
 found A'rah evacuated; but as he pressed on, his advanced 
 guard, commanded by Champion, came upon a body of the 
 enemy's horse drawn up on the further bank of the Bonas 
 nala, close to the spot where, ninety-three years later, Vincent 
 Eyre gained his ever-memorable victory. Champion easily 
 dispersed the horsemen, but, following them up too quickly, 
 was led, about a mile beyond the nala, into a village in which 
 the enemy had planted an ambuscade. The leading files, 
 suddenly assailed from the houses, turned rein and galloped 
 back, pursued by the enemy, who emerged not only from the 
 village but from the groves in the neighbourhood. Following 
 
196 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 up their advantage, the enemy charged and put to flight the 
 Mughul horse, notwithstanding the efforts of their European 
 officers. They then dashed across the bridge, sabring all who 
 came in their way; but noticing, a few hundred yards beyond 
 it, two companies of sipahis drawn up to receive them, they 
 fell back, contented with their morning's work. They had 
 killed or severely wounded seventy-two of their adversaries. 
 They themselves, though not unscathed, suffered far less. 
 
 This surprise caused a greater exhibition of caution on the 
 part of the English. Thenceforth they strengthened the 
 advance-guard by the addition of two companies of Europeans 
 and two guns. On arriving at their ground every day they 
 were practised likewise in the order of battle to be observed 
 in the event of being attacked in camp or on the march. Their 
 further progress continued to be harassed by cavalry attacks, 
 but the presence of the guns prevented a recurrence of the 
 disaster of the bridge over the Bonas nala. 
 
 At length, on the 22nd October, Munro reached the plain of 
 Baksar, and beheld the enemy's army drawn up in front of 
 their intrenchments. The two armies remained in presence 
 for a short time, neither prepared to attack. At the end of an 
 hour, the Nuwab-Vazir withdrew his troops within their lines, 
 whereupon Munro moved into the position marked out for his 
 men, and convened a council of war. While they are deliber- 
 ating, I propose to record the events which had occurred in 
 the camp of the Nuwab-Vazir, subsequent to his arrival at 
 Baksar. 
 
 The army which had fought against the English at Patna, 
 and which, repulsed before that place, had retreated on Baksar, 
 had had three nominal leaders, but only one directing head. 
 The Emperor was virtually a state prisoner, lending only to 
 the cause the halo of the imperial title. Mir Kasim had held 
 an independent command in the attack on Patna. But his 
 conduct in that engagement had brought the Nuwab-Vazir to 
 the resolution to rid himself of him altogether. He acted to 
 
Baksar. 197 
 
 this end with the cunning which, in an oriental nature, occu- 
 pies the place of prudence. Mir Kasim still had money; he 
 still possessed a certain amount of influence. Until that 
 money should be spent and that influence be dissipated, the 
 Nuwab-Vazir would seek, by the means dear to an Asiatic, to 
 prepare to become possessor of his property and to inherit 
 that influence. The day at last arrived when, whilst they were 
 in the intrenchment at Baksar, Mir Kasim's treasures became 
 exhausted. Then, in conformity with his plan, the Niiwab- 
 Vazir treated him with marked and studied insolence. After 
 some by-play, the whole truth burst upon Mir Kasim. He 
 discovered that his troops, the trained brigades of Samru, his 
 Europeans, had been secretly bought by his ally ; that all his 
 friends except one solitary attendant were prepared to desert 
 him. The very same day he was robbed, by the Nuwab-Vazir's 
 orders, of the few valuables that remained to him, confined 
 as a prisoner, and the day after the appearance of the English 
 force at Eaksar, placed upon a lame elephant, and dismissed, 
 as one who had brought bad luck to any. cause, from the camp.* 
 Undisputed master, now, of the legions, possessing courage 
 and no inconsiderable military skill, Shuja'u'd daulah might 
 fairly hope to give a good account of the comparatively small 
 force which was about to assail him in his intrenchments. Fie 
 could still dispose of some 40,000 men, one-third at least of 
 whom were trained warriors, and this time they would not be 
 assailing men behind intrenchments covered by a fortress — 
 they themselves would have the advantage of the cover. His 
 position was really a strong cne, the left flank covered by the 
 Ganges, the right by the Torah nala, and the whole front 
 covered by earthworks. Well might he calculate that, before 
 
 * The story is told in detail in the " Sayar il Muta'akkhirin." Mir 
 Kasim eventually found his way to Rohilkhand, where, after many 
 ■vicissitudes, he became a pensioner of the upright and virtuous Najib'u'd 
 daulah. Left by his death without a protector, he eventually died in 
 Dilhi in extreme poverty, his last shawl being sold to pay for his winding 
 sheet. — Asiatic Annual Register. 
 
198 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 his right flank could be turned or his centre forced, the weight 
 of his greatly superior numbers would tell. 
 
 There is an impulse, however, in the nature of the Latin and 
 the Oriental races which makes it impatient of delay, which 
 upsets all the calculations of prudence. At Dettingen, at 
 Talavera, and on many other fields, the French have volun- 
 tarily flung to the winds the natural advantages which would 
 have secured to them victory. We have seen how, at Gheriah, 
 Mir Kasim's army, leaving its strong intrenchments, marched 
 into the open to meet the English. And now, at Baksar, the 
 Nuwab-Vazir pursued the same course. He had sighted the 
 English army on the morning of the 22nd. He had waited 
 for them in his intrenchments all that day. As they did not 
 attack him, he resolved to attack them on the following morn- 
 ing. At daybreak he moved out of his intrenchments 
 accordingly. 
 
 We left Munro, meanwhile, presiding at the council of war 
 which he had summoned after dismissing his troops on the 
 morning of the 22nd. There were officers present who, during 
 the stay of the army at Baksar under Carnac, had gained a 
 thorough knowledge of the ground; two, even, who had sur- 
 veyed the position now occupied by the enemy. After a brief 
 consultation it was resolved to give the main body of the 
 troops a rest on the 23rd, and to attack the mtrenchment on 
 the 24th; that a strong detachment should endeavour then, to 
 turn the right of the position, whilst the main body should 
 assail it in front; that, meanwhile, trenches and false batteries 
 should be thrown up on the 23rd opposite the enemy's left, so 
 as to delude them with the idea that the English intended to 
 proceed by regular approaches. 
 
 The Nuwab-Vazir disconcerted all these arrangements by 
 boldly challenging a combat on the 23rd. His army was dis- 
 covered, soon after daybreak, marching in battle array towards 
 the English camp by Major Champion, who had been detached 
 with a party to prepare the false approaches of which I have 
 
Baksar. 199 
 
 spoken. Champion at once sent word to Munro, and Munro, 
 after galloping to the front to reconnoitre, ordered his men 
 to form up in the order of battle in which he had practised 
 them during the line of march, and which would enable them, 
 if threatened by cavalry, to form, on the moment, an oblong 
 square. 
 
 That order was in two lines. In the front line the Royal 
 troops, composed of the Marines, and details of the 84th, 89th, 
 and 90th Regiments, commanded by Captain Wemyss, occu- 
 pied the right centre; four companies of the Company's Euro- 
 pean troops — two belonging to Bombay, and two to Bengal — 
 commanded by Captain Macpherson, the left centre. Flank- 
 ing these two centres, on the right and on the left, were two 
 battalions of sipahis. In the intervals between these four 
 battalions were two six-pounders; in the intervals between the 
 Royal and the Company's Europeans were four six-pounders; 
 on the extreme flanks were one twelve-pounder and two six- 
 pounders. 
 
 In the second line, about 200 of the Bengal European Bat- 
 talion occupied the centre, with two battalions of sipahis on 
 either flank, two six-pounders filling up the spaces between 
 the Europeans and the natives, and two being posted on either 
 flank. The cavalry was divided into two divisions. One of 
 these, supported by four companies of sipahis taken from the 
 battalions in the second line, was posted at a village to pro- 
 tect the baggage; the other, commanded by Captain Hay, occu- 
 pied a position fifty paces behind the centre of the front line, 
 supported by a reserve composed of the European grenadiers. 
 The force numbered, exclusive of officers and sergeants, 857 
 Europeans, of whom 71 were artillerymen, and forty cavalry; 
 5,297 sipahis, and 918 native cavalry (Mughul Horse); or a 
 total of 7,072. It had twenty-eight guns. The right wing 
 of the front line was commanded by Major Champion, and 
 the left by Major Hibbert. Major Pemble commanded the 
 second line; Captain Hay, as I have said, the cavalry, with 
 
200 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the reserve; and Lieutenant Vertue the cavalry and sipahis 
 guarding the baggage. 
 
 It remains only to describe the position. To the left and 
 in front of the left wing was an extensive morass, and beyond 
 that a village; in front of the right wing a large grove, between 
 which and the village on the left the space was clear; to the 
 right of the grove, beyond the extreme right of the line, was 
 another village. These points, the villages and the grove, had 
 been occupied by the enemy before the English line could 
 be formed. 
 
 The Niiwab-Vazir had been allowed, indeed, plenty of time 
 to consider the ground upon which he now resolved to fight ; 
 and it must be allowed that in his choice he had displayed 
 considerable skill. His position was, indeed, formidable. His 
 left, which, resting on the Ganges, occupied the fort and vil- 
 lage of Baksar, was composed of the division of Behni 
 Bahadur, several native battalions officered by the foreigners 
 who had deserted from the Karamnasa in the preceding Febru- 
 ary, supported by a chosen body of horsemen raised by the 
 Niiwab-Vazir in Awadh, and known as the Shekhzadi,* com- 
 manded by Shekh Gulam Khadar. In the centre were the 
 trained brigades of Samrii and Madoc, consisting of eight 
 battalions of sipahis and eight field-pieces worked by Euro- 
 peans, and supported by a mixed body of horse and foot, 
 6 } ooo strong, commanded by Shuja Kuli Khan. In this centre, 
 on either flank of the trained battalions, were powerful bat- 
 teries of heavy guns, worked by trained native gunners under 
 European superintendence. The right wing was composed of 
 the division of the Rajah of Banaras, a large body of Rohilahs, 
 horse and foot, and 5,000 Afghan cavalry, known as the 
 Durani horse, from the fact that the majority of them had 
 served under Ahmad Shah Durani at Panipat. The reserve, 
 composed mainly of cavalry, was posted in the rear. The 
 
 * Literally, the sons of the Shekh. 
 
Baksar. 201 
 
 Nuwab-Yazir, though he commanded the whole army, took 
 especial direction of the right wing. 
 
 The Niiwab-Vazir advanced slowly towards the English 
 force until, judging himself within range, he halted and 
 opened fire from h.s heavy guns in the centre. He had judged 
 correctly, and Munro, finding that his own guns were not of 
 sufficient calibre to reach the enemy's lines, whilst his men 
 were a target for theirs, gave the order to advance. This for- 
 ward movement was especially trying, as the morass in front 
 of the left wing was unfordable and had to be turned, and 
 this under a heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rockets. 
 But never did British troops behave more steadily than on 
 this trying occasion. Calmly and deliberately as on the 
 parade ground they accomplished the manoeuvre. Meanwhile, 
 as they advanced within range, the guns of their centre and 
 of their right wing opened fire, with a better aim than that of 
 the enemy. The morass at length cleared, the line was re- 
 formed, and the advance continued. Just at this moment the 
 Durani Horse, gaP-oping up, threatened the left flank. Again, 
 as on parade, the two British lines executed the manoeuvre to 
 which they had been accustomed, and promptly forming into 
 an oblong square, poured in a fire of grape and musketry so 
 galling that the Duranis recoiled. An attempt by the same 
 horsemen made immediately afterwards, in conjunction with 
 the Shekhzadis, on the baggage, was more successful. The 
 whole of this fell into their hands. 
 
 Flushed with this success, the two bodies of horsemen 
 charged impetuously the rear line of the British. The charge, 
 though repelled, was repeated and repeated, the enemy be- 
 having with the greatest gallantry, many of their men falling 
 in hand-to-hand contest in the very ranks of the assailed. 
 Amongst these was their heroic leader. Not even his loss, 
 however, checked their ardour, nor did the survivors retire 
 until the heaped-up bodies of their comrades, dead, and dying, 
 
202 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 convinced them of the impossibility of breaking down the 
 solid British wall before them. 
 
 Whilst his cavalry were thus maintaining their reputation 
 on the rear of the British lines, the infantry of the Niiwab- 
 Vazir were, under his own personal directions, using every 
 endeavour to gain the victory which should make him master 
 of the three provinces. A battery of heavy guns had been 
 moved to the village overlapping the right of the British line, 
 beyond the grove immediately in their front, and the fire from 
 it had already produced something like a wavering in their 
 right wing as it advanced. Munro, perceiving this, recog- 
 nized that the critical moment had arrived when, if he did 
 not wish to allow the conviction to steal over his men that they 
 were overmatched, he must achieve some striking success. He 
 accordingly ordered a battalion of sipahis to charge the vil- 
 lage. This feat was performed with great gallantry and skill 
 by Lieutenant Nicoll, Adjutant-General of the sipahis. This 
 officer, making a detour, surprised the enemy, and drove it 
 out at the point of the bayonet. No sooner had this been 
 accomplished than Munro, sending another battalion to support 
 Nicoll, directed him to carry his success further, and attack 
 the grove. The enemy, however, was by this time on the alert, 
 and they received Nicoll with so much resolution, and with 
 numbers so superior, that they forced him back. An oppor- 
 tune charge of cavalry completed his discomfiture. 
 
 A decisive moment had now arrived. If the enemy could 
 maintain themselves in the grove, the ultimate victory must be 
 with them. Samrii and Madoc were at least holding their own 
 in the centre; on the right the Nuwab-Vazir had not lost an 
 inch of ground. Could he repulse the English once mere from 
 the grove, and then overwhelm them with a charge of cavalry, 
 the day w r ould be his own. No one recognized the position 
 mere clearly than Munro. He felt that unless he could carry 
 the grove he was beaten. He resolved, therefore, to carry it at 
 all hazards. 
 
Baksar. 203 
 
 That there might be no mistake this time, Munro supported 
 the battalions already in advance, and which he further 
 strengthened, with his entire right wing, and directing them to 
 trust only to the bayonet, sent them forward. Had the enemy 
 only shown resolution, the contest might have been doubtful; 
 but the pertinacity of the English daunted them; they could 
 not view with firmness the sight of the dark masses advancing 
 against them. As soon, therefore, as the English entered the 
 grove, the enemy gave way, leaving twenty-seven guns behind 
 them. A volley from the victors hastened their retreat, but 
 they formed up again on the left of the line, and presented 
 there an unbroken front. 
 
 Still the battle, though more favourable to the English, was 
 not yet decided. A mistake made by the commander of the 
 mixed horse and foot, Shuja Kuli Khan, who was supporting 
 the brigades of Samru and Madoc, came, however, opportunely 
 to give the final touch to the impending catastrophe. This 
 officer had no sooner heard the volley which the English had 
 poured upon the infantry retreating from the grove, than, 
 elated as he was with the promising aspect of affairs, he came 
 to the unfortunate conclusion that they were the troops of the 
 Niiwab-Vazir who had fired it — the retreating English who 
 had received it. The moment, then, had arrived, he thought, 
 to complete the victory. Without communicating with anyone, 
 then, he moved round the skirts of the morass, and charged the 
 English left wing in front and in flank. But here again 
 English steadiness, never more conspicuously displayed than 
 on this memorable day, baffled the gallantry of the enemy. 
 The men on the left wing, natives and Europeans, repulsed 
 charge after charge, and at length compelled the baffled sur- 
 vivors of the enemy, who had lost their gallant leader, to retire 
 broken and in disorder. That leader had paid more than his 
 life for his mistake. His discomfiture was the signal for the 
 retreat of the whole line. 
 
 Munro at once gave orders for a general advance. Kiding 
 
204 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 to the head of his troops he thanked them for their conduct, 
 told them that the victory was now in their hands, and, taking 
 off his hat, gave three cheers, to which the men responded. The 
 battalions then broke into columns, and pushed on to improve 
 their success. 
 
 Fortune again favoured them. The Niiwab-Vazir, who was 
 formed of a good fighting material, and who had not spared 
 himself during the battle, had, on seeing the victory on which 
 he had counted escape from his grasp, taken up a new position 
 to check pursuit and, if possible, to restore the battle. He 
 would probably have succeeded in doing the first. But, un- 
 fortunately for him, Behni Bahadur, who had occupied the fort 
 and village of Baksar, had not heard of the defeat of the main 
 body. Himself dismounted and his men in loose order — 
 chatting, probably, regarding the victory they believed had 
 been gained — they were surprised by the sudden apparition in 
 their midst of the English soldiers. To mount, to flee, all in 
 disorder, was the simultaneous thought of several thousands of 
 men. The consequent rush of terrified fugitives was fatal to 
 the new dispositions taken up by the Niiwab-Vazir. 
 
 Thenceforward all was over. There was nothing for it but 
 flight — or pillage. The Durani horse, true to their Afghan 
 instincts, chose the latter alternative, and set to work with a 
 gcod will to plunder the camp of the master for whom they 
 had fought. The Niiwab-Vazir himself succeeded in crossing 
 the Torah nala with his regular brigades, his moneys and his 
 jewels; but no sooner had he seen them on the opposite bank 
 than, like Napoleon after Leipsic, he ordered the bridge of 
 boats to be destroyed. The rear of the force and all the 
 camp-followers were thus exposed to destruction. Still they 
 pushed on ; some into the stream, elephants, camels, horses, 
 men and bullocks all mixed together, the same animal instinct 
 inspiring them all. The result was terrible. In this struggle 
 for life, writes the native chronicler, so many perished that at 
 last a bridge, three hundred yards long, was formed of their 
 
Baksar. 205 
 
 bodies, over which the survivors escaped ! It need scarcely be 
 added that across that bridge the victors did not follow them. 
 
 Such was the battle of Baksar; a battle in all respects a test 
 battle, won by courage, endurance and, above all, by discipline 
 and steadiness. If we may say that the English were fortunate 
 in possessing as a leader a man so cool, so enterprising, and 
 yet so firm and decided, as Hector Munro, we must also admit 
 that never before had they encountered an enemy in all 
 respects so formidable. Shuja'u'd daulah, Niiwab-Vazir of 
 Awadh, was the most skilled native leader of soldiers in India. 
 Contemporary writers declare that if he had lived in the palmy 
 days of the Mughuls, his force of character, his astuteness, 
 and, above all, his qualities as a general, would have placed 
 him in the very front rank. The same writers proceed, whilst 
 lamenting the fortune which brought him, at a critical period, 
 in contact with a race physically superior, and which had 
 attained a higher standard in the practice of arms, to point to 
 the statesmanlike wisdom which admitted defeat, recognized 
 that the conqueror was not to be withstood, and eventually 
 bound him towards himself and his family by ties of friend- 
 ship. Such a leader was no unworthy opponent even of 
 Munro; and the most critical will admit that he fought the 
 battle with skill and resolution. He cannot be held responsi- 
 ble for the mistakes of Shuja Kuli Khan and of Behni Bahadur 
 — mistakes, the first of which ensured his defeat, and the 
 second made of the defeat a rout. Again, his men, especially 
 his cavalry, fought most bravely. Witness the charges on the 
 second line of the English, the first defence of the grove, the 
 firm attitude of the disciplined brigades. But for the wonder- 
 ful steadiness of the English those charges would have 
 brought them victory. It was that steadiness, as conspicuous 
 here as it was on the hill of Albuera and on the field of 
 Waterloo, which not only saved Bengal, but gained for our 
 countrymen the north-west provinces of India. 
 
 For those were the stakes. The English risked tr » three 
 
206 The Derisive Bailies of India. 
 
 provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orisa; the Niiwab-Vazir the 
 north-western provinces from Shahjahanpur to the Karamnasa. 
 They fought to decide to whom both should belong. That 
 was the practical issue. Had the English been badly beaten — ■ 
 and defeat would have meant annihilation — Shuja'u'd daulah 
 would not have stopped short of Calcutta. What were the 
 consequences of his defeat? Baksar was fought en the 23rd 
 October, 1764. By the following February the English had 
 subdued the country as far as Allahabad, including Banaras 
 and Chunar; in March they had overrun Awadh, occupied 
 Faizabad and Lakhnao, beaten the enemy at Karrah, again at 
 Kalpi on the Jamna, and finally forced the Nuwab-Vazir — a 
 "houseless wanderer" — to throw himself upon their generosity. 
 The extent of the territory conquered alone prevented the 
 English from, at the time, taking the fullest advantage of 
 their victory. From motives of policy they restored to its 
 owner the greater part of the stake, all of which, nevertheless, 
 the victory of Baksar, well followed up, had won for them. 
 Clive, who arrived from England in time to negotiate the 
 treaty, would have given back nearly the whole cf it. But 
 circumstances were too strong for him. The victory of Baksar 
 advanced the English frontier practically to Allahabad.* 
 
 That victory cost the English 847 in killed and wounded ; 
 of these 101 were Europeans, and nine of these, again, were 
 officers. The enemy's loss was more severe. Upwards of 2,000 
 men lay dead on the field, and many more were wounded. The 
 victors captured 133 pieces of artillery, the standing camp, and 
 all the personal effects of the enemy. Exclusive of the number 
 of articles plundered, the booty, when sold, realised upwards 
 of twelve lakhs of rupees ! 
 
 Whether regarded as a duel between the foreigner and the 
 
 * The English held that place nominally for the Emperor till 1771, 
 when they sold it to the Nuwab of Awadh for fifty lakhs of rupees. They 
 continued, nevertheless, to garrison it. It was formally transferred to 
 the English in 1801. 
 
Baksar. 207 
 
 native, cr as an event pregnant with vast permanent conse- 
 quences, Baksar takes rank amongst the most decisive battles 
 ever fought. Not only did the victory of the English save 
 Bengal, not only did it advance the British frontier to Allaha- 
 bad, but it bound the rulers of Awadh to the conqueror by ties 
 of admiration, of gratitude, of absolute reliance and trust, ties 
 which made them for the ninety-four years that followed the 
 friends of his friends and the enemies of his enemies. For 
 that constancy of friendship England repaid them in 1855-6 ! 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PORTO NOVO. 
 
 THE present Kingdom of Maisiir* (Mysore) is bounded on the 
 north-west by Dharwar, in the Bombay Presidency, and by the 
 Portuguese territory of Goa; on the north-east and east by the 
 districts of Ballari, Kadapa and the Karniil : on the south- 
 west by the province of Kurg ; on the south-east by Arkat ; and 
 on the south by the Nilgiris. At the time when the genius of 
 its Muhammadan ruler made its name formidable to the Eng- 
 lish, Maisur comprehended an extent of territory far greater. 
 Not only did it include southern India as far as Travankur, 
 but its ruler held likewise a portion of south and north Arkat, 
 and made his influence felt sometimes even to the very walls 
 of Madras. For a moment it seemed even possible that Madras 
 itself might be swallowed up. It is of the campaign which 
 forced him to relax the firm grip he had taken of the Karna- 
 tak, and which so far as related to the danger of the pre- 
 dominance of Haidar Ali in southern India was decisive, that 
 I propose now to write. 
 
 Very little is known of the early history of Maisur. Accord- 
 ing to the preserved tradition two young men of the tribe of 
 
 * The name Maisur is abbreviated from " Mahesh A'sur " — the buffalo- 
 headed monster — said to have been slain by the goddess Kali, who, 
 under the title of Chamundi — the discomfiter of enemies is an object 
 of special worship in the country. 
 
Porto Novo, 209 
 
 Yadava left the court of Vijayanagar in search of adventure, 
 at a time when the influence of the Rajahs of Vijayanagar 
 extended over nearly the whole of southern India; reached 
 the little fort of Hadava, a few miles from the site of the 
 present town of Maisiir, and rescued from a marriage which 
 would have disgraced her the only daughter and heiress of 
 the petty lord of the soil. The elder of the two then married 
 her, and became the founder of the Hindu dynasty which still 
 governs the province. 
 
 Such is the tradition. The little domain acquired by the 
 marriage enjoyed for many years that followed the inestim- 
 able advantage of attracting no notice from its larger neigh- 
 bours. It is known, however, that in 1524 a descendant of the 
 Yadava intruder, Kam Raj by name, moved the capital from 
 Hadava to Maisiir, and that in 1571 another successor, Hira 
 Kam Raj, not only refused to pay tribute to Vijayanagar, but 
 took possession cf Shrirangapatam (Seringapatam), and 
 greatly enlarged his borders. From the date of his rule the 
 enlargement became progressive. In the course of a few years 
 (1638), the hero of the race, Kanti Reva Narsi Raj, whose ex- 
 ploits are to this day, far more than those of the Muhammadan 
 Haidar AH, the favourite themes of the bards and story-tellers 
 of Maisiir, and whose stone bed is still preserved in the royal 
 palace, came to increase further the ancestral territories. In 
 the reign of his successor, Diid Deo Raj, those dominions 
 assumed the dimensions of a kingdom. It was this rajah who 
 placed on the hill overlooking Maisiir, popularly known as 
 the hill of Chamundi, the colossal figure of Shiva's bull, which, 
 for the beauty of its design and the skill with which it had 
 been executed, commands to this day admiration. 
 
 By this time the kingdom had become sufficiently large to 
 attract the notice and the jealousy of the neighbouring poten- 
 tates. We hear of one rajah levying tribute from Trichina- 
 palli; of another attacking Madura, of the son of another 
 defeating the Marathas in a pitched battle. It was on the 
 
 P 
 
210 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 strength of this victory that the descendant of the Yadava 
 adventurer, Chik Deo Raj, felt emboldened to send an embassy 
 to the great Aurangzib. The Mughul emperor rejoiced to 
 welcome as a friend one who had been able to defeat his 
 bitterest enemies, received the embassy with great cordiality 
 (1700), conferred upon the Rajah many titles of honour, and 
 conceded to him the right of sitting upon an ivory throne. 
 
 The descendants of Chik Deo failed, however, to maintain 
 by force of arms the position which that sovereign prince had 
 acquired. We find his grandson, Dud Kishen Raj, compelled, 
 in 1724, to buy off, by the payment of a million sterling, the 
 attack made upon him by the Niiwabs of Karnul, Kadapa and 
 Savanur, and the Maratha chief of Gutti. Two years 
 later the Marathas extorted a similar price for their 
 forbearance; and, although the money expenditure was to a 
 large extent made good by the capture, in 1728, of Savendrug, 
 the accumulated treasures of which fell into the hands of the 
 Maisiir Rajah, still the Hindu dynasty never recovered from 
 the blow which the payment of the money for release from 
 the demands of a conqueror always inflicts. 
 
 It was about this time that the power of the Rajahs of 
 Maisiir glided from their hands into the hands oT their heredi- 
 tary ministers, the Dalwais. It was a custom not unknown to 
 Hindu races. In had prevailed in the great Maratha dynasty 
 enthroned in western India. Whilst the descendants of Sivaji 
 was a pageant sovereign, the Peshwas descending in an heredi- 
 tary line exercised all the power. And now the principle took 
 root in Maisiir. The Dalwais were said by tradition to be 
 descended from the younger of the two Yadava adventurers 
 who had laid the foundation of the kingdom. The same tra- 
 dition affirms that the right to hold in perpetuity the office of 
 prime minister had been made, at that early period, hereditary 
 in their family. It was only, however, when the royal dynasty 
 began to show signs of decrepitude and decay that the right 
 was offensively asserted. In 1736 the representative of the 
 
Porto Novo. 211 
 
 Dalwai family, Deo Raj, was a man of remarkable ability. 
 The reigning prince being distinguished for his vices, Deo Raj 
 deposed him, placed on the throne a distant relative to exercise 
 the ornamental functions of royalty, whilst he himself, as 
 mayor of the place, should really govern. 
 
 This Dalwai, Deo Raj, restored the fortunes of Maisiir by 
 defeating in a pitched battle the army of Dost Ali, Nuwab of 
 the Karnatak. When he felt his strength begin to decay, he 
 made over his power to his brother, Nanjiraj, a man whose 
 abilities were but little inferior to his own. Under the com- 
 mand of Nanjiraj, the Maisurians stormed the stronghold of 
 Deonhalli, and took a prominent part in the contest, nominally 
 between Chanda Sahib and Muhammad Ali, really between 
 the French and the English, for supremacy in the Karnatak. 
 Alike in the storming of Deonhalli, and in the contests which 
 followed, Nanjiraj was greatly assisted by the skill, the 
 valour and the enterprise, displayed on every occasion by a 
 Muhammadan soldier of fortune whom he had enlisted under 
 his banners, and to whom, after a time, he entrusted very high 
 commands. 
 
 The name of this soldier of fortune was Haidar Ali. Haidar 
 Ali was the second son of Fateh Muhammad, a naik or com- 
 mander of peons, or irregularly-armed infantry, in the service 
 of the Niiwab of Sera. Fateh Muhammad, after a career 
 which might be termed successful, for he had been able to 
 attach to his name the coveted title of " Khan," and to receive 
 the jaghir of Budikota, was slain in one of those sanguinary 
 contests which followed the attempt of the Siibahdar of the 
 Dakhan to found an independent principality in southern 
 India. At that time his elder son, Shabaz, was nine years old ; 
 the younger, Haidar, was seven. The death of the father 
 obliterated the recollection of his services. Under the pretext 
 that some moneys had not been accounted for by the deceased 
 naik, the son of the man for whom that naik had given his 
 
212 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 blood demanded payment from the widow and her children, 
 and, when compliance with the demand was evaded, he did 
 not hesitate to apply torture, in its most cruel and ignominous 
 form, to the two boys, and probably, it is said, to their mother. 
 Young as he was, Haidar neither forgot nor forgave the in- 
 dignity; nor did he fail to avenge it. 
 
 The death of his father and the subsequent misfortunes of 
 his family deprived Haidar Ali of the advantages of educa- 
 tion. To the end of his life he had never mastered even the 
 faculty to read and write. His character as a young man was 
 peculiar. He was always in extremes. Impatient of restraint, 
 he would absent himself for weeks from his family, and pass 
 his time in voluptuous riot ; then, suddenly awaking, would 
 proceed to the opposite extreme of abstinence and excessive 
 exertion. The political disorders of the age at length forced 
 him to take a decided part. His brother, Shabaz Sahib, had, 
 some time previously, through the kind offices of a Hindu 
 officer of rank, obtained a position as a subordinate officer of 
 peons in the service of the Dalwai. By good conduct he had 
 gradually risen to the command of two hundred horse and a 
 thousand peons, and at their head he formed part of the army 
 which, in 1749, was besieging Deonhalli. Haidar, tired of an 
 aimless life, joined that body of men as a volunteer. 
 
 His service at the siege settled his future career. Daring, 
 cool and resolute, Haidar distinguished himself as the first on 
 the held of danger, the foremost in every fray. He did more 
 than that. It was Haidar who suggested the plan by which 
 the enemy was to be baffled, the manoeuvre which was to pre- 
 lude success. He attracted the attention of the all-powerful 
 Nanjiraj ; and Nanjiraj, always eager to attach talent to him- 
 self, appointed him, on the fall of Deonhalli, to command a 
 body then consisting of fifty horsemen and two hundred foot- 
 men, gave him orders to recruit and augment it, and placed 
 him in charge of the principal gate of the conquered fortress. 
 
 From this time the rise of Haidar was assured. We find 
 
Porto Novo. 213 
 
 him in the following year combating the Marathas, and, by a 
 visit to Pondichery, laying the foundation of that regard for 
 the French which lasted to the end of his days. In 175 1 -2 we 
 hear of him, his corps augmented to a thousand, fighting 
 before Trichinapalli, and distinguishing himself in every 
 encounter. The following year he was appointed by Nanjiraj 
 to take charge of the important fortress of Dmdigal, ceded by 
 Muhammad Ali. At this time his command was increased to 
 1.500 horsemen, 3,000 regular infantry and 2,000 armed foot- 
 men, with four guns. It is generally believed that at this 
 period of his life his mind first conceived those ambitious 
 designs which he afterwards so effectually carried out. 
 
 It would take too long, and it would be foreign to the pur- 
 pose of this work, to narrate the means by which Haidar Ali 
 gradually built up for himself an enduring position in the 
 Maisur State. It must suffice to state that his wonderful 
 knowledge of men, and the address which was born of that 
 knowledge, soon made him the most popular man in southern 
 India; that, aided by a confederate, Kande Rao, whom he 
 placed at Maisur to watch the proceedings of the court, to 
 furnish him with information, and to support his demands, he 
 made himself in a very short time necessary to the Dalwai; 
 that when, in 1758, the Dalwai, Deo Raj, died, and the Maisur 
 army mutinied to obtain its arrears of .pay, Haidar Ali, by 
 means peculiarly his own, settled their claims; that having thus 
 assumed the character of a general benefactor of the State, he 
 took care that his troops should take all the guards of the 
 fortress of Shrirangapatam; that he then compelled the 
 Marathas who had invaded Maisur to quit the country and to 
 renounce their claims on the territories previously ceded to 
 them in pledge ; that, on his return, he was received by the 
 pageant Rajah, and now, by his means, the almost pageant 
 Dalwai, in full darbar, and greeted with the title of Bahadur, 
 or hero, which was ever afterwards affixed to his name; that, 
 having felt his power, he then, acting under the shadow of the 
 
214 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 name of the Rajah, turned all his influence against his original 
 benefactor, the Dalwai, Nanjiraj, forced him to relinquish all 
 his appointments, to proceed in retirement to Kunniir, some 
 twenty-five miles west from Maisur, and appointed his own 
 adherent, Kande Rao, under the name of Diwan, to fill the 
 vacated post; that Kande Rao having a little later, in collusion 
 with the Rajah, turned against him, and even defeated him in 
 the field, Haidar, by an artifice which did great credit to his 
 imaginative powers, crushed his enemy and more than recovered 
 his position ; that, as a consequence, he assumed charge of the 
 whole country, assigning three lakhs of rupees for the personal 
 expenses of the Rajah, and one lakh for those of Nanjiraj ; 
 that he then increased the dominions of Maisur, by the defeat 
 of Murari Rao, the conquest of Bednur, of Bellari, the submis- 
 sion of many independent chiefs, the extension of his terri- 
 tories to the Malabar coast; more than doubling the extent and 
 more than quadrupling the resources of the kingdom, which 
 was now virtually his own. In 1/66, the pageant Rajah 
 having died, Haidar, after a mock installation of his successor, 
 resumed the grant of three lakhs, plundered the palace of its 
 jewels, and confined the Rajah within its four walls. Thence- 
 forth he was supreme. 
 
 In the course of these events, of which I have given the 
 briefest possible summary, Haidar Ali had never come in con- 
 tact as a principal with the English. He had met them in the 
 field before Trichinapalli, and that was all. The time was 
 now approaching when his experience of them was to be more 
 varied. The English, after the position gained by their 
 decisive victory over the French in southern India had been 
 confirmed and established by the peace of Paris (ioth Febru- 
 ary, 1763), had proceeded on lines widely different from those 
 on which they had travelled in Bengal. There they had effec- 
 tually asserted themselves, and controlled the policy of the 
 puppet they had set up. But in southern India they had been 
 content with playing "the secondary part in politics, the first 
 
Porto Novo. 215 
 
 in the field." They allowed, in fact, the puppet whom they 
 had placed en the semi-regal throne of the Karnatak to pursue 
 his own foreign policy, and they were content blindly, and 
 without inquiry, to fight fcr that policy. Now, Muhammad 
 A!i, whom British efforts alone had placed in a position of 
 power, had entertained a great jealousy of the rising power 
 of Haidar, and he had formed an alliance to crush him with 
 Nizam Ali, Subahdar of the Dakhan, and with the Marathas. 
 In the campaign which they contemplated, both Muhammad 
 Ali and the Subahdar designed to place the English in the 
 front line of battle. The English, no longer under the direc- 
 tion of a guiding mind, were not unwilling. They were con- 
 tent — to use the words of the contemporary historian, Colonel 
 Wilks — "to engage in the contest in the exclusive character 
 of dupes." 
 
 Haidar Ali was equal to the occasion. He possessed one 
 great advantage, that he fought for one hand, and that hand 
 his own. His enemies were animated by four interests, all 
 really opposed the one to the ether. By the payment of thirty- 
 five lakhs of rupees, and the cession — intended only tc endure 
 until he was able to re-occupy it — of some territory, he bought 
 off the Marathas. He then cajoled the Subahdar, Nizam Ali, 
 to renounce his alliance with Muhammad Ali, and, conjointly 
 with himself, to invade the Karnatak. Entering that country, 
 Haidar fought — 3rd September, 1767 — with the English at 
 Changamah a battle, which, whilst it was so far a victory for 
 that people, inasmuch as they repulsed every attack, was fol- 
 lowed, two hours later, by their retreat to Trinomalli from the 
 position which they had victoriously maintained. To Trino- 
 malli Haidar and his ally followed them. He might then 
 have starved them into surrender, for his own position before 
 it was unassailable. Pressed by his ally, however, he again 
 tried the fortune of war, and on the 26th September moved 
 into the plain to attack his enemy, led, as on previous occasions, 
 by Colonel Joseph Smith; attacked him; and was defeated 
 
2i6 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 with great loss of men and of material. One result of this 
 defeat was recrimination between the two allies, each casting 
 the blame of the mishap on the other. The formidable char- 
 acter, up to this point, however, of the invasion may be realized 
 from the consideration of the fact that, whilst the battle was 
 being fought, Tipii (Tippoo), then a boy of seventeen, under- 
 going for the first time "the baptism of fire," was engaged, 
 under the guidance of an experienced officer, Ghazi Khan, in 
 plundering the country houses of the Members of the Council 
 of Madras.* 
 
 The defeat of Trinomalli was a blow, but it was not a de- 
 cisive blow. It warded off for a time Haidar's meditated 
 attack upon Madras. For a month after its occurrence Haidar 
 remained encamped at Kallimodu, in the district known as 
 Baramahal, watching the movements of the English army. He 
 soon ascertained that the English leader was adopting a 
 system of which he would be able to take advantage, the system 
 of cantoning his army in three places, each at a great distance 
 from the other — Kanchipuram, Wandiwash, and Trichinapalli. 
 The moment he ascertained that the distribution had been 
 completed, Haidar broke up his camp, captured Tripattir and 
 Vaniambadi, and laid siege to Ambiir (15th November). 
 
 Ambur was a strong place, situated on the summit of a 
 mountain of pure granite, accessible only on one face, termin- 
 ating the valley of Baramahal, on the north, and overlooking 
 the fertile valley which, forming a right angle with Baramahal, 
 extends to the eastward down to Velur and Arkat. It is about 
 a hundred and ten miles from Madras. When Haidar ap- 
 proached it, it was garrisoned partly by the troops of the 
 native Kiladar, or commandant, partly by a small body of 
 English troops under Captain Calvert. 
 
 Again did British skill and British valour baffle Haidar. 
 Calvert, despite of the discovered treachery of his native ally, 
 
 * The houses on the Advar and in other localities outside the fort. 
 
Porlo Novo. 2\~ 
 
 the Kiladar, made an excellent defence, and kept Haidar 
 before the place a time sufficiently long to enable Colonel 
 Smith to re-collect his scattered forces and advance to his 
 relief. Then came the turn of Haidar to fall back. He 
 effected this operation with considerable skill; covered with 
 his own army the retreat of the more disorganized forces of 
 his ally, the Siibahdar; risked a skirmish, to gain this object, 
 with the English at Vaniambadi; then, abandoning that place 
 and Tripatiir, fell back on the previously prepared and 
 strongly fortified position of Kaveripatam. 
 
 The fortifications of Kaveripatam were so formidable that 
 Smith, who had closely followed up Haidar, would not, under 
 the circumstances, have ventured to attempt them. But the dis- 
 cord, the divisions, the perplexities, which reigned in the camp 
 of the allies, came soon to relieve him from all anxiety. Haidar 
 maintained a bold front only until his own heavy guns and 
 baggage, and the greater portion of the army of Nizam Ali, 
 with Nizam Ali himself, had had time to re-ascend the ghats 
 leading to the elevated plateau of Eangalor. As soon as he 
 heard that this ascent had been safely accomplished, he fol- 
 lowed himself, leaving behind him only a strong division, 
 chiefly cavalry, to watch the English. Again, unwittingly, had 
 he lost an opportunity. He had lost the chance which comes 
 always to those who know how to wait. For the two days 
 previous to his retirement the English army had been without 
 food ! His retreat alone enabled them to fall back, in security, 
 to search for it ! 
 
 The campaign effectually detached Nizam Ali from Haidar. 
 That potentate returned to his alliance with the English. It 
 had further the result of giving birth to a hope of inde- 
 pendence amongst the recently subdued chiefs on the Malabar 
 coast. To crush this nascent feeling, Haidar, with great skill 
 and promptitude, transported his army by forced marches 
 before Mangalur (May 1768}; compelled the bulk of the Eng- 
 
218 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 lish garrison* who had been sent to feed the insurrection, to 
 take refuge in their boats; the remainder, consisting of the 
 sick and wounded, to surrender. Having, by this vigorous 
 action, crushed every spark of rebellion on the coast, Haidar 
 re-ascended the ghats, and prepared on the Maisur plateau for 
 the campaign he intended to inaugurate on the cessation of 
 the rainy season. 
 
 Meanwhile the English army, divided into two divisions, led 
 respectively by Colonels Smith and Wood, had been engaged, 
 preparatory to an ascent of the plateau, in driving the garri- 
 sons of Haidar from the strong places occupied below the 
 passes, from Vaniambadi on the north to Dindigal and Pal- 
 ghat en the south-east and south-west. On the 8th June, an 
 advanced division, commanded by Colonel Donald Campbell, 
 ascended the pass to Budikota, reduced Venkatagadi, and 
 thence opened out the pass leading to the vale of Velur. 
 Campbell next bribed the Kiladar of the strong fort of Mal- 
 wagal, one of the strongest in the country, and with the con- 
 nivance of that traitor took possession of it. Colonel Smith's 
 main division then advanced, and, joined by Colonel Camp- 
 bell, took Baghir on the 28th June, and Hussiir (Ossoor) on 
 the nth July. At this place the army halted, waiting partly 
 for the recovery from sickness of Muhammad Ali, Niiwab of 
 the Karnatak, who was with it, partly for the appearance of 
 Colonel Wood on the south-western surface of the plateau, 
 and the junction of Murari Rao, from whom a promise of co- 
 operation had been obtained. Murari Rao joined with 3,000 
 horse and 2,000 irregular footmen on the 4th August. The 
 very same day saw Haidar All, returning from his victorious 
 expedition to the western coast, march into Bangalor. 
 
 The two principals in the contest were now within striking 
 distance — for Hussur is but twenty-four miles from Bangalor 
 
 ' These who thus embarked consisted of 241 Europeans and 1,200 
 sipahis. The sick and wounded amounted to eighty Europeans and 180 
 sipahis. 
 
Porto Novo. 219 
 
 — nor did any great length of time elapse before their troops 
 came in contact. Having ascertained that Murari Rao was 
 encamped about half a mile to the right of the English posi- 
 tion, Haidar, on the night of the 22nd August, made an at- 
 tempt to beat him up. The attack failed. Haidar then, having 
 made sufficient provision for the safety of Bangalor, resolved, 
 with the instincts of a great commander, to move with great 
 rapidity to the eastward and overwhelm Wood before that 
 officer could have notice of his approach. 
 
 Meanwhile Wood, having completed the conquest of the 
 strong places to the south-west, had returned to Baramahal, 
 and, unsuspicious of danger, was marching through a long- 
 defile to Budikota. Haidar, endeavouring to conceal his move- 
 ments from Smith, and believing that that officer would be 
 content to await Wood's arrival at Malur, two marches short 
 of Budikota, had taken up a position whence he could open 
 an enfilading fire on Wood's men as they should emerge from 
 the defile. He had not calculated, however, on the energy of 
 Colonel Smith. That officer, divining Haidar's plans, far 
 from halting at Malur, had marched not only to Budikota, 
 but beyond it, and had taken up, unknown to his enemy, a 
 position on the other side of the defile. Haidar, then, was 
 effectually baffled. Indeed, but for the ill-advised action of 
 Colonel Wood,* which informed him of the vicinity of Smith, 
 and enabled him to make a precipitate retreat, he could scarcely 
 have escaped a great disaster. 
 
 The English, after the junction, marched to Kolar, whilst 
 Haidar made a circuitous march, at once to recruit his army 
 and to overawe the vassals whom his ill-success had incited to 
 acts borderjng on rebellion. At length he, too, considerably 
 reinforced, approached Kolar. He was not very eager for 
 
 * On emerging from the defile Wood, who had just received private 
 intimation of the close vicinity of Smith, halted to fire a fcu-dc-joie. 
 This gave the alarm to Haidar and enabled him to escape. Smith so 
 severely reprimanded Wood, that the latter resigned his command. He 
 was replaced by Colonel Lang. 
 
220 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 combat. In every encounter in the field with the English he 
 had been worsted. But something he must attempt. One 
 half of his territories and a large number of his strong places 
 were in the possession of the enemy. Those territories and 
 strong places he must recover. But how ? 
 
 The answer was not very clear at the moment. Still in the 
 prime of life, he never questioned the possibility of success. 
 But many things made him anxious for a speedy settlement, 
 and, influenced by the hope to obtain one, he made advances 
 to the English. He proposed to pay ten lakhs for the ex- 
 penses of the war, and to cede to them the country below the 
 passes, known as Baramahal — the country intervening between 
 the passes and the dominions of Muhammad Ali* — between 
 Vaniambadi and Palghat. The English, however, flushed 
 with victory, and eager for money, pressed upon Haidar the 
 necessity of his paying the entire expenses of the war, cal- 
 culated at a very extravagant rate, of his yielding tribute to 
 Muhammad Ali, of making concessions to Murari Rao, and 
 of surrendering a territory very much larger than Baramahal. 
 Haidar, indignant at these demands, broke off the negotiation, 
 and appealed to the God of armies. 
 
 The appeal was not made in vain. Rarely have rapacity 
 and extortion met with a prompter punishment. Driven to 
 bay, the wild and untutored genius asserted itself. I have 
 already told how, corrupting the Kiladar, Colonel Campbell 
 had by a strategem mastered the strong mountain fortress of 
 Malwagal. Adopting the same process of corruption, Haidar 
 now recovered it. Knowing that the English would not per- 
 mit such an important place to remain in his hands, Haidar 
 then, selecting his choicest troops, moved at their head, un- 
 perceived, into a position from which he could operate on an 
 advancing enemy in such a manner as, humanly speaking, to 
 ensure their destruction. His first anticipations were realized. 
 
 * Now constituting the northern portion of the Shelam (Salem) 
 districts. 
 
Porto Novo. 221 
 
 The English, eager to recover Malwagal, detached a force 
 under Colonel Wood, now restored to command, to retake it. 
 From his lair Haidar watched his enemy engage himself in 
 the difficult ascent, capture the lower fort, and attempt in vain 
 the stronghold on the summit. The next morning he sent a 
 small and apparently isolated party to skirmish near the Eng- 
 lish position, with orders to fall back if they should be 
 pursued. Wood fell into the snare, followed the light horse- 
 men who challenged him, until suddenly Haidar was upon 
 him. Never did the soldiers of Maistir behave better. Em- 
 boldened by a confidence which their numbers, their splendid 
 position, the isolation of their enemy, gave them, their in- 
 fantry charged home with the bayonet — -and with effect. They 
 carried point after point, drove the English from one position 
 to another, and were on the very verge of consummating their 
 triumph, when, suddenly, an act of heroism — a strategem in- 
 spired by genius — baffled them. On the English side all was 
 lost, when Captain Brooke, who had been left, wounded, to 
 guard with four weak companies the baggage, the sick, 
 wounded, and followers, in the lower fort, noticing the im- 
 pending disaster, conceived a plan which, carried out with 
 spirit and vigour, might avert it. He had observed a flat-sur- 
 faced rock, rising at the edge of the jungle on the left flank of 
 the enemy. To this rock he moved silently through the jungle 
 with every man who could crawl, and two guns. Unperceived, 
 he mounted the two guns, loaded with grape, on its summit. 
 Then, suddenly discharging them on the dense masses of the 
 enemy, he showed his detachment, the men waving their caps 
 with joy, and shouting "Smith! Smith!" each shout followed 
 by a hurrah. Haidar's troops, to whom the name of the com- 
 mander-in-chief of the English army was familiar, seeing 
 the shouting soldiers, rushed to the conclusion that the main 
 army had come up to relieve their comrades. Wood's men 
 drew the same conclusion. The result was a sudden pause in 
 the till then victorious attack, on the one side, a return of 
 
222 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 confidence on the other. Wood drew his men together, took 
 up a stronger position, and opposed a new front to the enemy. 
 Haidar, who had soon discovered the strategem, was unable 
 to recover the advantages of which its exercise had deprived 
 him. The moral superiority which surprise had given him 
 had vanished. After some more desperate efforts to break 
 the English, he gave up the attack. He had lost, it was sur- 
 mised, about 1,000 men; but he had killed eight officers and 
 229 of his enemy, and had captured two guns. Both sides had 
 expended nearly the whole of their ammunition. 
 
 Though he had not succeeded in destroying Wood, Haidar 
 drew good augury from the events of the day. He had num- 
 bers on his side, numbers which the resources of the country 
 enabled him to maintain, and he felt that a few more such 
 battles as that of Malwagal would place him in a position to 
 dictate rather than to ask for terms. He maintained his posi- 
 tion then, until fresh supplies of ammunition should reach him. 
 
 Meanwhile the conduct of the English was marked by the 
 vacillation which accompanies a divided command. The 
 presence with the army of the Nuwab of the Karnatak, and the 
 position which he assumed as supreme director of the opera- 
 tions, in which the English were to play the part of allies sub- 
 ordinate to himself, had greatly embarrassed Colonel Smith. 
 The embarrassment now reached so great a height that that 
 officer wrote to represent to the Council at Madras the impos- 
 sibility of carrying on successful operations on such a system. 
 The result was that Muhammad Ali was invited to Madras, 
 avowedly to consult with the Council regarding the plan of 
 the campaign. To deprive the invitation of its real signifi- 
 cance, Colonel Smith was asked to accompany him. The com- 
 mand of the army was thus left (14th November) with Colonel 
 Wood, who, being a fair specimen of the class which succeeds, 
 on the strength of vigorous self-assertion and small successes, 
 in establishing a great reputation, was believed by the Council 
 to be their only general. 
 
Porto Novo. 223 
 
 Meanwhile Haidar, taking advantage of the inactivity which 
 these changes had caused in the English camp, had, after one 
 or two demonstrations, marched rapidly on Hossur and be- 
 sieged it. Wood, now commander-in-chief, proceeded at the 
 head of about 4,000 men, of whom 700 were Europeans, with 
 the usual proportion of artillery and two brass 18-pounders, 
 to relieve the place. He reached Baglur, about four miles 
 short of it, on the 17th. Leaving in this walled town all his 
 baggage, his stores, his camp-equipage, and the two brass 18- 
 pounders, he set out the same night with the intention of sur- 
 prising the enemy's camp. But Haidar had been a close ob- 
 server of his movements. Learning or divining his adversary's 
 expectations, he had withdrawn his troops from the siege, and 
 taken up a position to the north-west of Hossur. No sooner 
 did he notice that Wood's advanced guard was entering that 
 place, than, masking his operations by a cloud of cavalry, he 
 interposed his whole army between the main body of the Eng- 
 lish and Baglur, and, still covered by his cavalry, dashed 
 against that place. 
 
 Baglur was styled a walled town. But its walls, made of 
 mud, were from fifteen to twenty feet high, and but eighteen 
 inches thick at the summit. It was garrisoned by one of 
 Muhammad All's best native regiments, commanded by Cap- 
 tain Alexander, and encumbered with the baggage, not yet 
 arranged, which had been left behind by Colonel Wood. 
 Against it, thus in a state of disorder, Haidar dashed with 
 the full strength of his artillery and infantry. He did not 
 dash in vain. The two brass 18-pounders, left outside because 
 the gate was too narrow to admit them, fell first into his 
 hands; the town and the greater part of the baggage followed. 
 Alexander and his regiment had but just time to make their 
 way into the fort. Haidar made no attempt upon that. All 
 his care was directed to see that the captured guns and the 
 spoils were promptly despatched on the road to Bangalor. 
 This done, he followed, knowing well that Colonel Wood, on 
 
224 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 discovering the ruse to which he had been a victim, would 
 promptly retrace his steps. 
 
 It was so, indeed. Some hours elapsed before Wood had 
 ascertained the direction taken by Haidar's infantry and 
 artillery, but the moment the conviction flashed upon him he 
 returned to Baghir. He arrived there to see in the extreme 
 distance Haidar's army en route to Bangalor, driving before A 
 his two heavy guns, some 2,000 of his draught bullocks, and 
 nearly the whole of his stores, baggage and camp equipage. 
 He could not follow him. Uncertain how to act, he threw the 
 stores and ammunition that remained to him into Hossiir and 
 then marched — the evening of the 21st — -to Alya, on the road 
 to Kolar, where there was a small further supply. On his 
 march thither, Haidar, who had safely disposed of his trophies, 
 suddenly attacked him. Wood, whose dash and energy up to 
 this point had led him into misfortune, now tried opposite 
 tactics, and, when a vigorous charge might have forced a pas- 
 sage for himself and his men, contented himself with a 
 defensive attitude — an attitude which, without bettering his 
 position, cost him before nightfall 7 officers, 20 Europeans and 
 200 sipahis. But Haidar had not finished with him. Know- 
 ing the real character of the man, he, as soon as the shades of 
 evening fell, made a show of retreating to a distant position. 
 Wood, deceived as to his real intentions, thought the moment 
 opportune to complete the movement he had begun in the 
 afternoon. Accordingly, about 10 o'clock at night, he gave 
 the order to advance. Scarcely, however, had he cleared the 
 ground on which he had fought, than Haidar was upon him. 
 All night long was he engaged in repulsing attacks on his rear 
 and on his flank. When day broke a fresh column of the 
 enemy appeared in his front. W T ood was now compelled to 
 halt and place his men amongst the rocks, with which the 
 country abounded, their faces to the enemy. Here for several 
 hours they offered a gallant and successful resistance. About 
 noon, however, their ammunition all but exhausted, utterly 
 
Porto Novo. 225 
 
 worn out, they were on the point of succumbing, when Haidar, 
 apparently to them without cause, drew off his troops. Good 
 cause, however, had Haidar. A relieving force, gallantly led 
 by Major Fitzgerald, appeared on his flank. Leaving his work 
 unfinished, he drew off his troops, and returned towards 
 Bagliir. 
 
 Fitzgerald's movement was one of those brilliant deeds 
 which stamp an officer. It was entirely spontaneous. Rumour 
 had brought to him, at Venkatagadi, where he was posted with 
 a small force, intelligence of the surprise at Baglur. Deeming 
 that Wood's position might be critical, he called in all his 
 detachments and marched in the direction he thought it likely 
 he would take. The firing on the morning of the 22nd fixed 
 that direction beyond a doubt. He pushed on, and arrived 
 just in time to save the British force from destruction. 
 
 The events of those four days had completely shattered the 
 only general of the Madras Council. On the representation 
 by Fitzgerald of the state of the army, Wood was removed 
 from command, and was replaced by Colonel Lang. Haidar, 
 who was kept well informed of all the movements in the 
 British camp, no sooner learned than an officer other than 
 Smith* had succeeded Wood, than he prepared to execute the 
 plan he had long meditated, the plan which of all others com- 
 mended itself to his natural genius, that of carrying the war 
 into the enemy's country. 
 
 Most effectually did he pursue that plan. Remaining for 
 the moment himself on the plateau of Maisiir, he dispatched 
 his best general, Fazal Ullah Khan, with instructions to burst 
 upon the lowland country by the gateway of Koimbatur 
 (Coimbatore). That officer, feeling his way, set out in 
 November at the head of a well-organized party of 7,000 in- 
 fantry and cavalry, well provided with guns, forced the passes 
 
 * Haidar was in the habit of saying that he would always avoid, if 
 possible, fighting with Smith, but that he would fight Wood wherever he 
 might meet him. 
 
226 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 of Kaveripuram and Gujalhati, occupied Koimbatur on the 
 4th December, and, pushing on south-eastwards to Darapuram, 
 drove the sipahi garrison, commanded by Captain Johnson, 
 from that place to the very gates of Trichmapalli. Haidar 
 himself, on learning from his lieutenant that Koimbatur had 
 been secured, descended eastward by the passes of Pallikod 
 and Tapur into Baramahal. He was preceded by crowds of 
 emissaries, who spread the information far and wide that he 
 had destroyed the Eritish army, and was now marching to the 
 conquest of Madras. The ruse completely discouraged the 
 garrisons, consisting mostly cf the Niiwab's sipahis, of the 
 strong places, and these fell before him with a rapidity scarcely 
 surpassed by that which characterised the yielding of the 
 garrisons of the strong places of Prussia after the defeats of 
 Jena and Auerstadt. Lang, as soon as he had received in- 
 formation of the movement, had dispatched Fitzgerald with a 
 well-equipped corps of 5,000 men, of whom one-fifth were 
 Europeans, to follow the daring ruler of Maisiir. Fitzgerald, 
 notwithstanding his rapid marches, could for a long time only 
 trace the course of Haidar by the places which had surrendered 
 to him. At one time he arrived almost within striking distance 
 of him; but Haidar, by a skilful movement, induced his 
 adversary to march to Trichinapalli, in the belief that he him- 
 self was about to attack that stronghold; then, profiting by his 
 adversary's error, he took possession of the considerable town 
 of Kariir, and pressed forward thence to invest the more 
 strongly garrisoned Yirod (Erode). 
 
 Then occurred an event previously unparalleled in the his- 
 tory of English wars in India. On his march to Yirod, Haidar 
 intercepted, attacked and completely destroyed a detachment 
 of 50 Europeans and 200 sipahis, sent from that place to 
 procure supplies from Kariir. Flushed with his victory, he 
 pressed on to Yirod, and, displaying a flag of truce, demanded 
 the services of an English surgeon. The surgeon came, 
 dressed the wounded, and returned. Haidar then, again under 
 
Porto Novo, 227 
 
 a flag of truce, requested that Captain Orton, the commandant, 
 would come out to confer with him regarding the capitulation 
 of the place, promising him that he might return if terms were 
 not agreed to. Orton, who, it is said, had dined, complied. At 
 the interview which followed, Haidar pointed out to Orton 
 that the officer second to him in command, Captain Robinson, 
 had violated his parole, by carrying arms against him after 
 having given his word not to serve during the remainder of 
 the war; and added that the dereliction in this respect of 
 Robinson absolved him from the maintenance of his own 
 promise. He therefore required Orton to write an order to 
 Robinson for the surrender of the place, engaging- in that case 
 for the safe conduct of the whole garrison to Trichinapalli. 
 Orton resisted for twenty-four hours, but in the end he yielded 
 to pressure, and Yirod surrendered. 
 
 Having thus, by his daring march, recovered, in the space of 
 six weeks, the whole of the country which it had taken the 
 English two campaigns to wrest from him, two untenable 
 places excepted, Haidar dispatched the corps of Fazal Ullah 
 to operate from Dindigal upon the provinces of Madura and 
 Tinneveli, whilst, crossing the Kaveri, he directed his own 
 march to the eastward, along the northern bank of that river. 
 It was whilst he was engaged m this march (January, 1769) 
 that the Madras Government, bitterly regretting the insanity 
 which had prompted them to refuse the fair terms pressed 
 upon them by Haidar in the month of August preceding, made 
 advances for an accommodation. 
 
 Negotiations followed. Captain Brooke, an officer of high 
 character and ability, was deputed to the camp of the great 
 warrior, and was at once accorded an interview. The con- 
 versation which followed was of a most interesting character. 
 Haidar, who could be frank and straightforward when it 
 suited his purpose, opened his whole soul to his visitor. He 
 told him plainly that their ally, the Nuwab of the Karnatak, 
 had been alike the cause of the war, the cause of the rejection 
 
228 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 of his offers in August, and that he would be the cause of its 
 continuance; that he had ever wished and tried to be on terms 
 of solid friendship with the English, but that Muhammad Ali 
 had always baffled his efforts. Proving his case by references 
 to facts which could not be denied, he expressed his willing- 
 ness still to make peace with the English, if they would exclude 
 Muhammad Ali from their councils, negotiate for their own 
 interests only, and send Colonel Smith, or a Member of 
 Council, with full powers to treat. He added that the moment 
 was especially critical ; that the Marathas were at the very 
 moment contemplating an invasion of southern India; that he 
 would much prefer to ally himself with the English against 
 that marauding people; but that he could not consent to be the 
 victim of both; if the English refused his alliance, he was 
 bound to accept that of the Marathas. Captain Brooke found 
 it difficult to gainsay any of these assertions; but he had no 
 power to treat on so broad a basis. He could only forward to 
 Madras a detailed account of the conversation, and await 
 instructions. The result, after a vain attempt to induce 
 Haidar to accept terms falling far short of his own proposals, 
 was the dispatch to the British camp of Colonel Smith and 
 Mr. Andrews, the former to assume command of the army, the 
 latter to proceed to Haidar's camp to negotiate. After some 
 tedious delays, Mr. Andrews agreed to convey personally to 
 Madras the terms beyond which Haidar would not give way, 
 and a truce of twelve days was agreed upon to await the reply 
 of the Council. That reply proved unfavourable, and hostili- 
 ties were resumed on the 6th March. 
 
 Haidar was equal to the occasion. Knowing that the 
 Madras Council, alarmed for the safety of Madras, had, in 
 the manner of the Aulic Council, invested Colonel Smith with 
 very restricted powers, he resolved to strike a blow which they 
 should feel. After some manoeuvres designed to puzzle the 
 enemy, he marched with his whole army southward, to draw 
 away the English. Smith, believing it to be Haidar's inten- 
 
Poiio Novo. 229 
 
 tion to march southward, then to turn suddenly and pounce 
 upon Madras by the route followed by Paradis in 1746, felt 
 bound to follow his army. No sooner had the rival forces 
 reached a point nearly 140 miles south of Madras, than Haidar 
 struck his blow. Directing his main body to retire through 
 the pass of Ahtur, as if marching westward, he, with a select 
 body of 6,000 horsemen and 200 of his choicest infantry,* 
 dashed suddenly at the Presidency town. Marching 130 miles 
 in three days and a half, he found himself with his cavalry, on 
 the 29th March, within five miles of Madras.! He at once 
 dispatched a letter to the Governor, stating that he had come 
 for peace, and requesting that Mr. Dupre, whose character he 
 esteemed, might be sent to him to negotiate. The Governor 
 complied, and Mr. Dupre was sent to St. Thomas's Mount, 
 where Haidar had his quarters. Orders were at the same time 
 transmitted to Colonel Smith to abstain from hostilities, and 
 to halt at a fixed distance — in excess of thirty miles — from 
 Haidar's main army. 
 
 Haidar, in fact, was master of the situation. The native 
 town and the private houses of Madras were at his mercy. In 
 the panic which his arrival had caused, the fort itself might 
 have fallen. He was in a position to dictate his own terms, 
 and, virtually, he did dictate them. 
 
 The main provisions of this treaty were as follows: 1st, 
 That all hostilities should cease between the contracting 
 parties and their allies; 2nd, That in case of either of the con- 
 tracting parties being attacked, they should, from their 
 respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the 
 enemy out; 3rd, That the treaty should include the Presidency 
 of Bombay; 4th, That all prisoners taken en both sides should 
 be promptly released; 5th, That all conquests made on both 
 sides should be restored, except the fort of Kariir and its 
 
 * Formed of men such as are now in the Maisur palace who can run 
 their ten miles in the hour. 
 
 t The infantry arrived the following morning. 
 
230 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 districts, which would be held by Haidar. With the Niiwab 
 of the Karnatak, Muhammad All, Haidar persistently refused 
 to negotiate. The difficulty was solved by the English 
 negotiating in their own name, for their own possessions and 
 the Karnatak — Muhammad AH agreeing officially to signify 
 his consent to the procedure — a promise which, by the way, he 
 did not keep. 
 
 I must pass lightly over the next eleven years. In their 
 course, Haidar was invaded by the Marathas; invoked, and 
 was refused, the assistance of the English; made, after a bad 
 defeat, a disadvantageous peace with the invaders; then con- 
 quered and annexed Kurg (Coorg) ; then avenged himself on 
 the Marathas, and recovered more than he had lost; seized the 
 Ballari districts and Gutti; extended his dominions south- 
 wards; discussed with the Marathas a scheme for a general 
 alliance against the English; but, his clear vision recognising 
 the certain ascendancy of that people, offered to them an alli- 
 ance whereby, yielding to them on the east, for a sum of 
 twenty lakhs of rupees, the lowland districts of Baramahal, of 
 Shelam (Salem), and of Ahtiir, he should keep for ever the 
 Maisur plateau, and the country to the coast on the west. The 
 rejection of these terms made him resolve to drive the British 
 from southern India. With this view he turned his earnest 
 attention to the French — now recovering their influence — and 
 between whom and the English hostilities were now impending. 
 
 In 1778 the expected war between the rival European nations 
 broke out in India. Before Haidar w 7 as ready to intervene, 
 Pondichery, beleagured on the 8th August, had fallen (18th 
 October). Flushed with their victory, the English sent their 
 fleet to attack Mahe. 
 
 The conquest by the English of a town such as Pondichery, 
 on the eastern coast, separated by large tracts of territory 
 from his own possessions, had only caused to Haidar the 
 regret which is naturally produced in the mind of a man by 
 
Porto Novo. 231 
 
 the strengthening of his enemies and the weakening of his 
 friends. But the case of Mahe was far different. On the 
 western coast, contiguous to his own dominions, the possession 
 of Mahe by the English would be a standing threat to himself. 
 It would give them an eye to see, a base whence to strike at his 
 very heart. When, therefore, the Governor of Madras inti- 
 mated to Haidar his intention of sending an expedition to 
 reduce Mahe, the ruler of Maisur replied explicitly that he 
 should regard such an attack as a breach of the understanding 
 which had placed the possessions of the European powers on 
 the western coast virtually under his protection, and that in 
 the event of the Governor carrying out his intention he should 
 retaliate by detaching a body of troops to lay waste the 
 province of Arkat. Undeterred by this declaration the 
 Governor of Madras persisted in his determination. The 
 English fleet sailed, and, in spite of the fact that Haidar dis- 
 played the Maisur standard on the walls of Mahe, took pos- 
 session of the place (March, 1779). As soon as Mahe had 
 fallen, the Governor, to still the resentment of Haidar, dis- 
 patched an envoy to offer explanations and excuses. The 
 envoy selected was Mr. Gray, formerly of the Eengal Civil 
 Service. Whilst in his selection of that gentleman no fault 
 can be found with the Governor and Council of Madras, it 
 must be admitted that the offerings with which he was charged 
 were of a nature to convey at once insult and contempt. To 
 the powerful prince, accustomed to receive handsome presents, 
 the Madras Government sent only a saddle and a gun; the 
 former not only made of pigskin, and therefore totally un- 
 suited as a present to a Muhammadan, but of such a shape 
 that to ride upon it would have been a trial. Nor was the gun 
 much better. It was made to load at the breech; but the 
 ammunition sent with it could only be used, and used ineffec- 
 tually, in the ordinary manner. Haidar, who, in his reception 
 of Mr. Gray, had displayed considerable temper, returned 
 
232 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 these valuable presents. In the interview which followed,* he 
 plainly told the British envoy that he had satisfied himself 
 that the English were a people to whom no treaties could bind ; 
 that in 1769 he had come to terms with them, and that they had 
 promised to aid him in case he should be attacked; but that 
 when, the following year, he was attacked by the Marathas and 
 demanded the promised aid, it was refused him ; that, since 
 then, the English had conquered Tanjiir, though that place 
 had been guaranteed by treaty ; on various occasions had 
 afforded aid to his rebellious subjects; and, with respect to 
 Mahe, had deliberately chosen a course which they knew must 
 lead to war. Haidar concluded with these significant words : 
 " Formerly I was of opinion that the English excelled all 
 other nations in sincerity and good faith; but, from late ex- 
 perience, I am convinced that they have no longer any pre- 
 tensions to those virtues." ■ Mr. Gray was dismissed without 
 further audience. 
 
 Once resolved on war, Haidar determined it should be war 
 with a vengeance — a war which should exterminate his enemies. 
 He assembled at Bangalor an army, 83,000 strong, extremely 
 efficient m all its departments, attached to it a corps of 400 
 Frenchmen, and in June set forth on his expedition. Of all 
 the wars undertaken against the foreigner in southern India, 
 this was the most popular. For its success, fervent prayers 
 were offered alike in the mosques of the Muhammadans and 
 the temples of the Hindus. The inhabitants of the villages 
 through which his army passed turned out to help the national 
 leader, to invoke for him the protection of Heaven. In the 
 person of Haidar were concentrated the hopes of the popula- 
 tions of southern India. 
 
 Descending the passes, and marching through the terri- 
 tories below them, Haidar maintained the most perfect order 
 
 * It was not, properly speaking, an interview, for Haidar declined to 
 see Gray. A confidant of Haidar's conveyed to Haidar the envoy's 
 explanations, and to the envoy the replies which Haidar dictated. 
 
Porto Novo, 233 
 
 and discipline. It was only when he entered the country 
 which formed the semicircle of which Madras was the centre — 
 the country peculiarly British — that he marked his advance by 
 merciless desolation, by the burning of towns and villages, 
 and the deportation of the population. The English, so bold 
 in their action regarding Mahe, had made no preparations to 
 meet the war, of the breaking out of which— if they should 
 persist in that action — Haidar had fairly warned them. 
 Almost before they had made a single movement in their 
 defence, Haidar had established his head-quarters at Kanchi- 
 puram (Conjeveram), forty-two miles from Madras. 
 
 Information that Haidar, with his centre and part of his 
 right wing, was at Kanchipuram; that his left wing, com- 
 manded by his son, Tipii Sahib, was proceeding by forced 
 marches towards Guntur; that a portion of his right wing, 
 under his second son, Karim Sahib, had penetrated to Porto 
 Novo, some twenty-five miles from Fort St. David, reached 
 Madras on the 24th July. At that date the forces at the dis- 
 posal of the Government at Madras and in its immediate 
 vicinity, consisted of the 73rd Highlanders, the Madras Euro- 
 pean Regiment, four regiments of sipahis, and some artillery- 
 men, in all 5,209 men. But at Guntur, 225 miles from Madras, 
 Colonel Baillie was stationed with a corps amounting, of all 
 arms, to 2,813 men, and, on the first news of the outbreak of 
 hostilities, orders had been transmitted to him to march with 
 all haste to Kanchipuram, at which place he would be joined 
 by the whole available English force from Madras. Yet, so 
 dilatory had been the proceedings of the English, and so 
 rapidly had Haidar moved, that the latter had occupied the 
 place appointed for the junction, Kanchipuram, before Baillie 
 had set cut from Guntur, whilst Tipii Sahib was on his way to 
 that place, and before an English soldier had moved from St. 
 Thomas's Mount ! 
 
 Here was a dilemma ! Who were the men at Madras cap- 
 able cf meeting it ? 
 
234 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army was the 
 Hector Munro whom we have seen so daring, so eager to court 
 danger, so ready in resources, so calm and cool under fire, 
 when combating the Nuwab-Vazir of Awadh at Baksar. When 
 I introduced him en that occasion to the reader, I stated that 
 the daring tactics which were admirably adapted to the occa- 
 sion then under record, might be turned against himself by a 
 resolute and watchful enemy. The occasion had now arrived 
 for Munro to show whether to the brilliant qualities of the 
 dashing leader he added the cautious skill of the tactician, 
 whether acting with vigour he could act also without passion. 
 
 It so happened that the then existing law required that the 
 Commander-in-Chief should remain at Madras itself, to com- 
 plete the complement of the Members of Council. Were that 
 law to be enforced, the command of the troops in the field 
 would devolve upon Lord M'Leod, an officer who had just 
 arrived from England in command of the 73rd; and, in fact, 
 this officer did receive the order to proceed to Kanchipuram, to 
 effect there the designed junction with Baillie. But Lord 
 M'Leod was far too clear-headed a man to carry out, without 
 remonstrance, a military movement which, in his opinion, would 
 involve the English force in a destruction extending possibly 
 to Madras Itself. In a remarkably able and judicious letter 
 he pointed out the inevitable consequences to Baillie of still 
 insisting upon the junction at Kanchipuram, and urged that 
 that officer should be at once directed to change his course to 
 Madras. This opinion so nettled the Commander-in-Chief 
 that he resolved to assume the command himself, and to prove 
 practically that his own opinion was correct. An illegal ar- 
 rangement was made to complete the quorum in Council, and 
 Sir Hector Munro assumed the command of the army in the 
 field. Before setting out, he directed Colonel Braithwaite, who 
 commanded at Pondichery, to move with his force of 1,500 
 men of all arms to Chengalpatt, and thence to Madras; and 
 Colonel Cosby, who was at Trichinapalli, to march with his 
 
Porlo Novo. 235 
 
 force of 2,000 sipahis, two regiments of the Nuwab's native 
 infantry, and two guns, from the north bank of the Kolrun, 
 to act on the enemy's communications. We shall see that the 
 dispositions of Haidar rendered it impossible for either of 
 these officers to carry out their orders. Having issued them, 
 and equipped his force, Munro set out, on 25th August, for 
 Kanchipuram. 
 
 Meanwhile, Haidar had not been idle. Leaving Kanchi- 
 puram, he had, on the 12th August, invested Wandiwash, a 
 town to the south-west of Madras and Chengalpatt, distant 
 from the former seventy-two miles, and from Arkat thirty- 
 eight. Its central position thus invested it with a vast im- 
 portance, and Haidar was so sensible of its value that he had 
 purchased its native commandant, who had agreed to deliver 
 it up on the appearance of Haidar's army before it. 
 
 But, this time, the presence of mind and daring of a single 
 Englishman baffled Haidar. The record is remarkable, though 
 happily not unique, in the history of our country. Colonel 
 Braithwaite, who, we have seen, had received orders to march 
 from Pondichery to Chengalpatt, was well aware that the occu- 
 pation of Wandiwash by the enemy would checkmate him, and 
 that the only chance he had — a slender chance at the best — 
 of preventing that occupation was to detach an officer, upon 
 whom he could depend, to replace the Kiladar in the command. 
 He selected for this purpose Lieutenant Flint, an officer whose 
 name betokened his resolute and daring character. Flint, ac- 
 companied by a hundred sipahis, made a rapid and fatiguing 
 march across unfrequented paths, successfully avoided the 
 enemy's army, then hovering round the place, and reached the 
 vicinity of Wandiwash the forenoon of the nth August. Fie 
 at once sent a message to the Kiladar announcing his approach, 
 and demanding admission. The Kiladar, already bought by 
 Haidar, returned for reply that he would be fired upon if he 
 should attempt to come within range of the fort's guns, and 
 sent a party to stop him at the verge of the esplanade. Flint, 
 
236 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 however, advanced, and meeting the party, used the influence 
 which prestige had already secured for the European in India 
 to persuade the officer in command of it that he had mistaken 
 his orders. He continued to advance, pending a reply to the 
 reference made to the Kiladar; again, when that reply was 
 unsatisfactory, pending an answer to the second, until he had 
 arrived within musket-shot of the ramparts, which were lined 
 with troops; the gates, also, were shut. Flint then halted, and 
 sent a message to the Kiladar to the effect that he had a letter 
 from the Nuwab, his master, which he was authorized to de- 
 liver into his hands only. The Kiladar, after some hesitation, 
 agreed to receive the letter in the space between the gate and 
 the barrier of the sortie. To this space Flint was admitted 
 with four attendants; men whom he had fully instructed as to 
 his intentions. He found the Kiladar seated on a carpet, at- 
 tended by his officers, thirty swordsmen, and a guard of a 
 hundred men. After the usual compliments, Flint admitted 
 that he had no letter from the Nuwab, but merely the order 
 of his own Government written in communication with 
 Muhammad All, which was fully equivalent to a letter; and 
 that the order directed him to assume command of the place. 
 The Kiladar treated the pretension with derision, and, angry 
 at having been, as he perceived, duped into a conference, 
 ordered Flint to return whence he came. 
 
 But Flint was equal to the occasion. As the Kiladar, his 
 wrath rapidly increasing, was in the act of rising to his feet, 
 Flint suddenly seized him, and declared that he would kill 
 anyone who dared to wag a finger on his behalf. The four 
 sipahis backed the movement by bringing their bayonets to 
 the charge. The suddenness of the action, its daring, the sur- 
 prise it caused, and, above all, the prestige of the European, 
 paralyzed the followers of the Kiladar. Before they could 
 recover from that paralysis, the English sipahfs admitted their 
 comrades, and the fort was won ! 
 
 No single act in the war contributed so such to save southern 
 
Porto Novo. 237 
 
 India as this act of Lieutenant Flint. Had Wandiwash then 
 fallen, it had gone hard, after the events I am about to describe, 
 with Madras. For Flint, on the eve of the investment of the 
 place, not only seized it, he, the only Englishman behind its 
 walls, held it for seventy -eight days — -from the 12th August, 
 1780, to the 1 2th February, 1781 — against the flower of Flaidar 
 All's army. He found it in a ruinous state, with many guns, 
 indeed, but with no carriages and little gunpowder, and with- 
 out one artilleryman. His energy supplied every want ; he 
 repaired the works, constructed carriages, manufactured gun- 
 powder, trained gunners, raised a corps of cavalry for exterior 
 enterprise, and not only fed his own garrison, but procured 
 supplies and intelligence for the main British army. Flint 
 effected for Wandiwash what Eldred Pottinger effected foi 
 Herat in 1839. His work was, practically, even more beneficial 
 to the interests of England, inasmuch as Wandiwash was 
 nearer the heart of her possessions. It was the shield which 
 protected Madras.* 
 
 Haidar, baffled by this gallant Englishman, left the flower 
 of his troops to prosecute the siege of Wandiwash, and pro- 
 ceeded with the remainder to Arkat. This place he invested 
 on the 2 1st August. He was still engaged before it when he 
 received intelligence which determined him to strike a blow 
 such as would make the English reel. 
 
 Somewhat uncertain as to the route which Baillie would 
 take from Guntur, and never anticipating that so experienced 
 a commander as Sir Hector Munro would leave him without 
 support, Haidar had recalled to the main body the corps under 
 Tipii Sahib, and that corps, composed mainly of the elite of 
 
 * Colonel Wilks, who is my principal authority for the details in the 
 text, states that for the immensely important service rendered by Lieu- 
 tenant Flint — a service which in these modern days, if one may judge by 
 the rewards showered upon men for doing their simple duty, would 
 obtain crosses and distinctions without number — that officer had the 
 barren glory of receiving letters, written with his own hand, from Sir 
 Eyre Coote, full of affectionate attachment and admiration. The 
 Court of Directors refused even to bestow unon him a brevet ! 
 
238 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 his cavalry, was with him before Arkat. On the 29th, how- 
 ever, information reached him that whilst Munro was march- 
 ing on Kanchipuram, and would probably reach that place 
 that very day, he had held out no hand to Baillie, but had 
 directed him, when he had arrived six miles south of Gumadi- 
 pundi, almost under cover of Madras — within twenty-seven 
 miles of it in fact, and two easy marches from his own camp- 
 ing ground — to proceed by a circuitous route, a route covering 
 upwards of fifty miles, and which would sever him entirely 
 from the main army, to Kanchipuram. There were no advan- 
 tages, speculative or other, to be gained by this deviation. The 
 only explanation that has ever been offered for it is that Sir 
 Hector Munro had declared that a junction at Kanchipuram 
 was feasible; that to demonstrate that proposition he had 
 placed himself, ultra vires, at the head of the army; and that 
 he had resolved that the junction should take place at Kanchi- 
 puram, and nowhere else. In the presence of a skilful tactician 
 like Haidar, it was playing with edged tools, and Haidar soon 
 made him feel it. 
 
 The very instant he heard it, Haidar, exclaiming, "At last I 
 have them!" broke up his camp, and detaching his sen Tipu, 
 at the head of 5,000 regular infantry, 6,000 horse, twelve light 
 and six heavy guns, to intercept Baillie, moved with his main 
 body to Kanchipuram, and on the 3rd September encamped 
 within six miles of Munro's army, which he thus held in check. 
 Munro, in fact, had exhausted his supplies, and the Niiwab's 
 agents having refused to procure any for him, he was in a 
 manner chained to the vicinity of Kanchipuram. 
 
 Haidar maintained his position before the English army 
 for nearly two days. On the afternoon of the second day a 
 dispatch from Tipu reached him, to the effect that en the 
 following morning, the 6th, he should attack Baillie. Haidar 
 then broke up his camp, and, with the view of interposing his 
 main army between Munro and the combatants, made as 
 though he intended to turn the English right. Munro, com- 
 
Porto Novo. 239 
 
 pletely deceived, refused his right wing, and thus allowed 
 Haidar, without striking a blow, to interpose his whole army 
 between himself and his lieutenant. 
 
 Meanwhile Baillie, obeying the orders he had received from 
 Munro, had quitted his encampment near Gumadipundi on 
 the 25th, and marched nearly eleven miles to the river Korti- 
 laur. The bed of this river being nearly dry and little more 
 than 300 yards wide, Baillie might easily have crossed it. But 
 deeming that to be always feasible which at the moment was 
 easy, he carelessly pitched his camp on the left or northern 
 bank. Rightly was he punished. During the night a storm 
 arose, the rains of the north-eastern monsoon fell with more 
 than their wonted force, and, when the day broke, the bed 
 which had been nearly dry the previous evening was covered 
 by a rearing torrent. For ten days Baillie was chained by 
 this torrent to the northern bank. On the 4th September he 
 crossed, and en the morning of the 6th reached Parmbakam, 
 fourteen miles from Munro's position at Kanchipuram. 
 
 The reader will understand the position. The left of the 
 English force at Kanchipuram ; its right at Parmbakam, with 
 Haidar between the two, ready to fall upon the left a moment 
 it should show the smallest indication to assist the right, round 
 which Tipii Sahib was hovering. Haidar had, in fact, exe- 
 cuted one of these manoeuvres which twenty-four years later 
 were to characterise the first campaign of the greatest general 
 the world has ever seen ! 
 
 Meanwhi'e Tipii, covered by a cloud of cavalry, had fol- 
 lowed the movements of Baillie from the banks of the Korti- 
 laur, waiting only for a favourable moment to attack him. On 
 the 5th he wrote to his father that the English would encamp 
 the day following at Parmbakam, and that as the ground 
 there offered peculiar facilities for the movements of cavalry 
 he would attack him. At eleven o'clock that day he kept his 
 word. 
 
 Had Tipu attacked with the vigour and energy displayed 
 
240 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 invariably by his father, there had been an end, then and 
 there, of Baillie's detachment. But, it is strange, just as the 
 bigoted Aurangzib has left a far deeper and more lasting recol- 
 lection in the minds of the Muhammadans of northern India 
 than his infinitely greater ancestor— the wise and liberal Akbar 
 — so in southern India the memory of the cruel, narrow-minded, 
 and bigoted Tipii Sahib is revered much more than the 
 memory of his able and liberal-minded father. The reason is 
 not far to seek. Akbar and Haidar were very lax in their 
 religious exercises. The descendant of the one and the son of 
 the other were narrow-minded bigots. Bigotry rules the 
 Muhammadan world. And though the bigots lost the empires 
 which their far-sighted and liberal ancestors had won, the 
 Muhammadan world has pardoned the temporal loss, and, 
 whilst it pays no heed to the great qualities of the founders, 
 still venerates the piety of those who undid the founders' 
 work ! 
 
 Tipu, cruel and vulgarly ambitious, possessed none of the 
 great qualities of his father. He was a poor soldier; never, as 
 had been the w r ont of Haidar, inspiring his soldiers by personal 
 leading. He did not lead, he sent his soldiers to the attack. 
 
 On this occasion, at Parmbakam, he fought as though he 
 dreaded a hand-to-hand encounter. His cavalry charged and 
 charged, but did not charge home. They charged, expecting 
 that the English would give way. But when, after three hours' 
 fighting, they did not give way; when to every charge they 
 replied with a volley; Tipu renounced the attack, and sent to 
 his father to say he could do nothing without reinforcements, 
 that he had lost from 200 to 300 men and had made no impres- 
 sion. The position of Baillie was scarcely improved. He 
 had, it is true, repulsed the attack; but he had lost about 100 
 men; he could not move in the face of the overwhelming 
 cavalry force of Tipu. He wrote at once to this effect to 
 Munro, and begged him to march to his assistance. 
 
 Now, this was just the one thing which Munro conceived he 
 
Porto Novo. 241 
 
 could not do. Haidar barred the way with an army enormously 
 superior. That army he could not attack with any chance of 
 success. Besides, he could not move without sacrificing his 
 heavy guns and the supplies he had stored in the pagoda of 
 Kanchipuram, and for which he had not sufficient carriage. 
 But he could not leave Baillie to his fate. Whilst, therefore, 
 he opposed a bold front to Haidar, he detached — on the even- 
 ing of the day on which the letter was received, the 8th Sep- 
 tember — four companies of Europeans and eleven of sipahis, 
 111 all 1,007 nien, under the command of Colonel Fletcher, to 
 effect a junction with Baillie. He hoped that this movement 
 would escape the vigilance of Haidar. 
 
 Haidar, well served by his spies, knew that Fletcher's detach- 
 ment was about to set out long before it had left the camp ; he 
 knew to a man its strength and its composition, and he had 
 taken care to provide guides upon whom he could depend. He 
 allowed it, then, to march, without making any corresponding 
 movement, feeling sure that his own guides w T ould lead it into 
 a position in which he could overwhelm and destroy it. He 
 had calculated every eventuality, save one : he had not taken 
 into account the natural intelligence of the British officer. The 
 critics of modern days have said some very hard things against 
 the officers of the unreformed British army. But history has 
 never recorded actions displaying greater intelligence, greater 
 devotion and greater courage, than those which in India and 
 on the continent of Europe secured for those officers an eternal 
 renown. 
 
 Colonel Fletcher was a fair type of the officers of the unre- 
 formed army. Before setting out, he had reconnoitred the 
 position held by Haidar; had noted in his mind the bearings 
 of the country. Riding in front with the guides he observed 
 that, after a time, they took a road which, he felt sure, must 
 lead him into the heart of the enemy's camp. Divining at once 
 the treachery intended to be practised, he took upon himself 
 to change the route, then, making a detour, passed unperceived 
 
 R 
 
242 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the outlying parties of the enemy, and reached Baillie's camp 
 earl}- on the morning of the 9th. It was no slight feat thus to 
 have outwitted Haidar ! 
 
 This reinforcement raised Baillie's force to 3,720 men, and 
 inspired Baillie himself with the fullest confidence. He 
 allowed the new arrivals to rest during that day, whilst he 
 made preparations to march an hour after sunset, so as to 
 accomplish the fourteen miles which separated him from his 
 chief before daybreak. Whilst he is making those prepara- 
 tions, I propose to return to Haidar. 
 
 That veteran soldier recognised very soon that Fletcher had 
 outwitted him. Although furious at his disappointment, he 
 did not allow the circumstance to disturb him. Again did he 
 review his position. In front of him was the weakened force 
 of Munro, now less than ever capable of fighting him. Four- 
 teen miles away to his left was the augmented force of Baillie, 
 watched by Tipu's horsemen. But Tipii had proved unequal 
 to Baillie before the latter had been reinforced, and it seemed 
 to Haidar probable that if he himself should attempt to crush 
 Munro, Baillie, beating aside Tipii, might be upon him before 
 he had succeeded. On the other hand, should he send his in- 
 fantry to reinforce Tipii, Munro, informed of their departure 
 might attack him. Under these circumstances he endeavoured, 
 by various means, to fathom the intentions of Munro. Soon 
 there accumulated in his mind evidence sufficient to convince 
 him that Munro had no intention of separating himself from 
 his heavy guns and supplies in Kanchipuram. This conviction 
 decided him. That night (the 9th) he detached the bulk of 
 his infantry to reinforce Tipii. At four o'clock in the morning, 
 noticing that Munro had not taken the alarm, he followed 
 himself. 
 
 The very same hour which saw his infantry set out, wit- 
 nessed the departure of Baillie from Parmbakam, harassed and 
 cannonaded, but not closely attacked, by Tipii. Baillie had 
 already covered six miles out of the fourteen, when, suddenly, 
 
Porta Novo. 243 
 
 without any reason, and in opposition to the earnest and 
 repeated advice of his second in command, Colonel Fletcher, 
 he gave the order to halt for the night. It has been conjec- 
 tured that this order was prompted by Baillie's desire to 
 exhibit his troops fresh, and with all their equipments, at 
 Kanchipuram in the morning; that, judging from the manner 
 in which he had baffled the opposition offered during the first 
 six miles, he felt he need entertain no apprehension regarding 
 the remainder. He reckoned, however, without Haidar. 
 Scarcely had his men piled their arms, when the trained in- 
 fantry dispatched by the latter, joined Tipu. Tipu spent the 
 remainder of the night in concerting with the commander of 
 these troops, with the senior French officers M. de Lally and 
 M. Pinorin, and, by means of messengers, with Haidar himself, 
 the mode of attack for the morrow. 
 
 The plan they adopted was as follows : To occupy in force 
 a strong position about two miles in front of the English posi- 
 tion, and commanding the road which they must traverse. That 
 road lay through an avenue of trees on to a plain, three quarters 
 of a mile beyond which was a village. They proceeded 
 further, then, to place the main body of their infantry in that 
 village, whilst they erected batteries to command the road 
 leading from the avenue across the plain. Ignorant of these 
 preparations, Baillie marched from his bivouac at daybreak, 
 traversed the avenue, and debouched on to the plain. Scarcely 
 had his columns emerged when, for the first time that morning, 
 an artillery-fire opened upon them. Baillie, instead of press- 
 ing en to the village, which might have yielded to a charge, 
 halted his troops, and returned the fire with his guns. Finding, 
 however, very quickly, that the enemy's fire was superior to his 
 own, he sent to the front ten companies of sipahis to storm the 
 battery which specially annoyed him. This feat the sipahis, 
 led by their English officers, performed with great gallantry 
 and success. They stormed the battery and had spiked three 
 of the guns, when the Maisur cavalry, dashing from the flank 
 
244 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 and threatening to cut off their retreat, forced them to fall 
 back. The English troops, forming into an oblong square, as 
 it is styled, then made a forward movement. They had pro- 
 ceeded but a short distance, however, when, covered by the 
 cavalry, the Maisur infantry and artillery advanced, and, 
 after a short interval, from three sides — from the front, from 
 the right, and from the rear — poured upon them a deadly fire 
 of all arms. The fierceness of the attack proved that Haidar 
 himself had joined his son. 
 
 Still the English square — the sick, the baggage and the am- 
 munition in the centre — moved slowly on; its human walls 
 repelling every assault. Its behaviour compelled the admira- 
 tion of the Frenchmen who fought with Tipu* So stern was 
 the resistance, that Haidar, dreading every moment lest Munro 
 should appear on his rear, resolved to retreat, and sent orders 
 to his cavalry to cover the movement. 
 
 But just at this moment two events happened which induced 
 him to recall the order. The first of these was the blowing up 
 of two tumbrils in the English square; the second, the almost 
 instantaneous charge, on the face most affected by the ex- 
 plosion, of 1,000 Maratha horse, led by a man to whom Haidar 
 had attributed the blame of Colonel Fletcher's escape, and who 
 was determined to retrieve his good name or perish. That 
 charge, though fatal to its leader, was decisive. It broke the 
 face of the square.f The remainder of the enemy's cavalry 
 
 * One of the French officers present thus recorded liis opinion : — "In 
 the whole of this trying day the English preserved a coolness of 
 manoeuvre which would have done honour to any troops in the world. 
 Raked by the fire of an immense artillery, the greatest part of the action 
 within grape-shot distance ; attacked on all sides by not less than 25,000 
 horse, and 30 battalions of sipahis, besides Haidar's European troops, 
 the English column stood firm, and repulsed every attack with great 
 slaughter; the horse driven back on the infantry, the right of our line 
 began to give way, though composed of the best troops in the Maisur 
 army." 
 
 + A large painting of this stage of the fight, done by his own express 
 orders, adorns, to the present day, one of the walls of Tipu's summer 
 palace, close to Shrirangapatam. 
 
Poiio Novo. 245 
 
 followed it up in so decisive a manner as to render all rallying 
 impossible. The Europeans, indeed, closing their ranks, 
 attempted for some time longer to resist. But the attempt was 
 vain. After a time, Colonel Baillie, seeing further resistance 
 fruitless, ordered his men to lay down their arms, and 
 surrendered. 
 
 The loss of the English had been very great. Of the entire 
 force of 500 Europeans, 200 only remained alive, and many 
 of these were wounded. The sipahis suffered in at least equal 
 proportion. Of 86 officers, 36 were killed and 34 were 
 wounded. But the loss in killed and wounded was insignifi- 
 cant when compared with the loss of prestige. 
 
 Whilst this desperate fighting was going on, where was 
 Munro ? 
 
 We have seen that Munro had remained quiet during the 
 whole day and night of the 9th. Soon after daybreak on the 
 10th, he perceived that Haidar had given him the slip. He at 
 once broke up his camp and took the road to Parmbakam. 
 •After marching two or three miles lie saw in the distance the 
 smoke of the battle ; about a mile further, a still greater 
 smoke, evidently that caused by the explosion of the tumbrils. 
 Munro was then about three miles distant from the battle-field. 
 Obviously, he should have pushed on with all speed. We have 
 seen that that was the very movement which Haidar most of 
 all dreaded. Munro was at first inclined to pursue this course, 
 but almost immediately afterwards he was sensible of a lull 
 in the artillery-fire, succeeded by desultory discharges of 
 musketry, x^t this conjuncture he would seem to have lest his 
 head. Coming to the somewhat arbitrary conclusion that the 
 sounds which reached him betokened a victory on the part of 
 Baillie, he checked his forward march, and moved in every 
 direction but the right one, until, when it was too late to alter 
 the result, he learned the truth from a wounded sipahi. Then 
 — to use the words of his own dispatch "for the security of 
 the army, he retired to Kanchipuram," having spent his day 
 
246 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 very much in the same unsatisfactory manner in which, in the 
 next century, Count d'Erlon was to spend his, on the 16th 
 June, 1 81 5, and with the same unsatisfactory result. Munro 
 reached Kanchipuram at six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 But he did not deem himself safe at Kanchipuram. Having 
 spent the day in fruitless marching and counter-marching, he 
 passed the night in throwing his heavy guns, his military 
 stores, and the supplies he could not carry away, into a deep 
 tank. Early the following morning, the 11th, he set cut 111 
 the direction of Chengalpatt, where, annoyed and harassed by 
 Haidar's light troops on the march, and forced, in consequence, 
 to sacrifice the greater part of the stores still remaining to him, 
 he arrived on the mcrning of the 12th. He was cheered there 
 by the sight of Colonel Cosby's detachment, which, having 
 been unable to execute the orders given to it to act upon the 
 enemy's communications, had cut its way to the same place. 
 This happy junction saved Madras. Munro felt strong 
 enough now to march to St. Thomas's Mount. He arrived 
 there on the 14th, and moved the next day to the securer posi- 
 tion of Mamillamma (Marmalcng), where, with a river cover- 
 ing his front, he deemed himself safe from all attack. 
 
 Haidar, on the nth September, had Madras at his mere} - . 
 The direct road to it lay open, and there was not a soldier in 
 the place. He was only forty-two miles distant from it. He 
 knew the line of Munro's retreat, and he could easily so inter- 
 pose his cavalry as to hinder, if not absolutely to prevent, that 
 officer's march from Chengalpatt, thirty-six miles south-west 
 of Madras. But one thing prevented him from making this 
 decisive movement, and that was the holding cut of Wandi- 
 wash. The flower of his army was still detained before that 
 place, and he hesitated to make the decisive movement till it 
 had fallen. His reasoning would not have commended itself 
 to a really great captain. A master of the art of war would 
 have told him that the greater contains the less; that the surest 
 way of compelling the fall of Wandiwash was to make a dash 
 
Porto Novo. 247 
 
 — before it could be covered, before the panic caused by his 
 victory over Baillie had subsided — upon Madras. But age 
 was beginning to tell upon Ilaidar. Shrinking from a course 
 at which ten years before he would have clutched, he pro- 
 ceeded to invest Arkat 
 
 Arkat, invested on the 19th September, fell — though garri- 
 soned by English troops -on the 3rd November; Ambiir sur- 
 rendered en the 13th January : the sieges of Vekir, of Parma- 
 kol, of Chengalpatt, and of Wandiwash, were vigorously 
 prosecuted, when on the 1 8th, Haidar heard that en the previ- 
 ous morning the English arm}-, commanded now by Sir Eyre 
 Coote, had quitted Madras. 
 
 The Madras Government, in fact, on learning Baillie's 
 defeat, had dispatched a swift vessel to Bengal, with letters 
 stating their misfortunes and their pressing need of immediate 
 succour. Fortunately for them, Bengal was then ruled by an 
 administrator whose guiding principle was, above all things, 
 the maintenance of the honour and greatness of his country. 
 Though embarrassed by the financial pressure resulting from 
 Maratha wars, from the necessity of providing for the defence 
 of the British possessions in Bengal and Bombay, Warren 
 Hastings at once raised the menev sufficient to meet the emer- 
 gency ; called upen Sir Eyre Coote once again to place 
 himself at the head of an army, and dispatched him with 
 every available soldier to Madras. Not content with doing 
 things by halves, Warren Hastings suspended the Governor 
 of Madras, Mr. Whitehill, appointed a mere vigorous adminis- 
 trator in his place, and entrusted to Sir Eyre Coote complete 
 and independent charge of the military operations. 
 
 Coote readied Madras on the 5th November, only to find the 
 resources of the Presidency so exhausted that ten weeks were 
 required to equip his arm}' for the field. It was not till the 
 17th January that he was able to set out. His design was, to 
 march southward, reHeve the places besieged in that direction 
 
248 The Decisive Halites of India. 
 
 by Ilaidar, and then to advance on Pondichery — which the 
 French had reoccupied — drawing- Ilaidar after him. 
 
 (note's first efforts were successful. On the early morn of 
 the 2 1 st, a detachment of his army stormed the strong fortress 
 of Karungalli; on the 23rd he raised the siege of Wandiwash, 
 and on the 25th began his march for Parmakol. On that day 
 he heard of the presence of a French fleet off the coast. Being 
 indifferently provided with provisions, Coote's first idea was 
 to return to Madras; but the desirability of recovering Pondi- 
 cherv and of destroying the boats which might aid in the 
 landing of French troops, decided him to push on towards 
 the French capital. 
 
 Haidar, meanwhile, had watched, with eager and searching 
 eyes, every movement of his enemy. As soon as he heard of 
 the direction his army had taken, he raised the siege of Yelur, 
 and, acting m concert with the French authorities at Pondi- 
 chery, massed his army, and followed him. On the 25th 
 januarv he, too, learned that a French fleet, commanded by 
 the Chevalier d'Orves, had been sighted near Guclalur (Cudda- 
 lore\ This event raised his hopes to the highest degree. 
 Whilst he should sever Coote's communications with Madras, 
 the fleet would blockade the coast ; and Coote, shut out from 
 the grain-producing country, would be starved into surrender. 
 
 Whilst Haidar and his French allies were carrying out this 
 plan with great skill, Coote was marching further and further 
 into the trap. On the 8th February, Haidar having made as 
 though he would attempt Giidaliir, Coote, thoroughly taken in, 
 moved with his whole army to cover that important place. 
 This movement enabled Haidar to seize a strong position which 
 quite severed his enemy from Madras. In Guclalur itself 
 there were but three days' supp"!y of food. Both the rival 
 leaders could see the French fleet, unthreatenecl, guarding the 
 coast. In vain did Coote offer battle to the Maisiir chief. 
 Haidar was content to occupy an unassailable position which 
 barred Coote from the grain-producing country. 
 
Porto Novo. 24:; 
 
 Coote himself recognised all the danger of his position, the 
 fault he had committed in allowing himself to be severed from 
 his base. Unless supplies could reach him, he knew that he 
 was lost. But as long as Hakhir and the French should main- 
 tain their respective positions, no supplies could reach him. 
 
 Uaidar maintained his. But from some cause, to this day 
 unexplained, d'Orves was false alike to his reputation and to 
 his country. In another work* 1 have dwelt at some length 
 on the crime perpetrated by a Government which commits the 
 command of its fleets to men deficient in decision and nerve. 
 Never had France such an opportunity of revenging herself for 
 the defeats of Dupleix and Lally. There was no doubt about 
 the issue. D'Orves had only to remain off the coast to see the 
 last army possessed by the English starved into surrender. 
 Haidar, in constant communication with him, pressed him to 
 remain, if only for a week longer; or, at all events, to land the 
 one French regiment he had on board. D'Orves would do 
 neither. On the 15th February, to the intense relief of Sir 
 Eyre Coote, and to the indignation of Haidar, he bore away 
 for the islands. The English at once obtained supplies from 
 Madras. 
 
 Five weary months then elapsed; Coote, to a certain extent 
 blockaded at Gudalur, forced to look to the sea for his 
 supplies : Haidar watching him, and whilst watching him, 
 obtaining the surrender of many of the strong places behind 
 him. At last, on the 16th June, Coote, realising that the onlv 
 possible mode of retrieving his position was to force an action 
 on his wary enemy, quitted Gudalur, crossed the river Vallar 
 on the 1 8th, and that night attempted to surprise and storm 
 the strongly-fortified pagoda of Chelambram. Haidar's 
 garrison, however, composed of nearly 3,000 good troops, 
 repulsed the English sipahis with serious loss, and even cap- 
 tured one of their guns. Baffled in this quarter, Coote drew 
 
 * ''.Final French Struggles in India." 
 
250 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 off his arni\' in the night, and, after a hesitation which lasted 
 four days, recrossed the Yallar, and encamped near Porto 
 Novo, a village on its northern bank, close to the sea, and only 
 seven miles from Chelambram, which pUice he at once made 
 preparations, in concert with Admiral Hughes, to besiege. 
 
 Perhaps it would have been as well if Haidar had been 
 content to reinforce the garrison of Chelambram, to strengthen 
 its defences, then to count upon the action of the monscon on 
 the fleet, and of his army on the besiegers. But the repulse of 
 the English before that pagoda, the details of which were con- 
 veyed to him in a greatly exaggerated form, had so elated him, 
 that, believing the English army would prove now an easy 
 prey, he resolved to strike a decisive blow. Quickly coHecting 
 his forces, then, he crossed the Kolrrin; moved rapidly to the 
 north, then making a sweep to the eastward, interposed his 
 whole army between Giidaliir and the English, having marched 
 a hundred miles in two days and a half. On the 27th June, 
 when Coote had all but completed his arrangements for an 
 attack on Chelambram, he was suddenly informed that Haiclar, 
 with his whole army, was fortifying a position within three 
 miles of him. 
 
 Coote caP.ed a council of war. The issues which he put 
 before that council were simply these : The declining of a 
 battle meant the conducting of military operations at a great 
 disadvantage, the incurring of a liability to be attacked 
 suddenly, when one part of the force should be already occu- 
 pied; an unsuccessful battle meant destruction, for it would 
 entail the less of Madras and, with it, of southern India ; a 
 successful battle, on the other hand, meant relief from all 
 difficulties; and, not until they had compelled Haidar to move 
 off, would they be in so good a position, with regard to 
 numbers, to fight a successful battle. The council with one 
 voice voted for fighting. 
 
 At 7 o'clock, then, on the morning of the 1st Jul)-, Coote 
 marched towards the enemy— his army formed in two lines. 
 
Porto Novo. 251 
 
 His whole force consisted of 8,476 men, cf whom 2,070 
 were Europeans. It was difficult to reconnoitre the enemy's 
 position, as Haidar, with his usual craft, had covered it 
 with swarms cf cavalry, whilst ("cote was deficient in 
 that arm. We, however, who are behind the scenes, 
 may state that the position selected by Haidar was a 
 very strong cne. His army numbered 40,000 men, and these 
 occupied three villages, and were spread over a line which, 
 crossing the read to Gudalur, extended from commanding 
 grounds en the right to a point on the left which rested on a 
 range cf sand-hills following the line of the seashore. The 
 ground en his front and en his right flank was intersected in 
 every direction by deep ditches and watercourses. Embrasures 
 for his heavy artillery had been cut in mcunds of earth 
 formed from the hollowing cf ditches. These batteries pro- 
 tected at ence the front and the right flank. 
 
 It was not until Ccote had marched a mile and a half that 
 he was able to gam a view of this formidable position. He 
 halted, and spent an hour in minutely examining every point 
 of it, expesed throughout that time to an incessant cannonade 
 from guns advanced from the front of the enemy's position, 
 and from their left flank. His own guns, to economise their 
 limited supply cf ammunition, made no reply. 
 
 At 9 o'clock the English general had made his decision. 
 He recognised that the weak point of Haidar's position was 
 his left, fcr the sand-hills had not been fortified, and could be 
 turned. He directed, then, General Stuart, who commanded 
 his second line, to move by columns, under cover — first, of the 
 front line, and afterwards of the sand-hills on the coast — to a 
 point beyond these sand-hills, and, turning them, to march on 
 till he should reach an opening which would enable them to 
 take the enemy in flank. Whilst Stuart was engaged in this 
 operation, Coote himself would make a strong demonstration 
 against the enemy's front, taking care not to commit himself 
 
25- The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 to a serious attack until the success of Stuart's movement 
 should be assured. 
 
 Rarely has a planned military manoeuvre been carried out 
 with greater precision than was this. Haidar, bent on making 
 his right and centre proof against attack, had deferred fortify- 
 ing the sand-hills, especially as he deemed it to the last degree 
 improbable that an enemy would, as it were, cut his army in 
 two to attempt to turn him on that flank. No longer the active 
 man whom we have known, seizing victor}' or staving off 
 defeat by personal prowess, he was compelled, in these days, 
 to watch, motionless, the movements of the rival forces. On 
 this occasion he sat, cross-legged, on a stool which had been 
 placed for him on an eminence, immediately behind his centre. 
 From this point he commanded the field. As soon as he 
 caught sight of Stuart's manoeuvre, recognising its importance, 
 he dispatched some of his best troops to strengthen his left, 
 and sent orders to his cavalry to hold themselves in readiness 
 to take advantage of the smallest check given to the enemy. 
 Before these orders could be received Stuart, marching with 
 great rapidity, had turned the position of the enemy, dis- 
 covered a road made between two sand-hills, and led his men 
 to gain it. But Haidar's troops, well on the alert, repulsed a 
 first attack, and a second. Just at this period Haidar's orders 
 reached the commanders of the two wings of cavalry. He of 
 the right wing, deeming the moment opportune, charged the 
 first line led by Coote, and was repulsed only after a most 
 desperate encounter. But it was upon the action of the com- 
 mander of the left wing that everything depended. Could he 
 fall successfully upon the twice-repulsed troops of Stuart the 
 battle was over. But in this quarter fortune frowned on 
 Haidar. The commander, Mir Sahib, one of Haidar's best 
 officers, was about to give the order to charge, when he was cut 
 in two by a round shot. Almost at the same moment a broad- 
 side from an English schooner, which had been worked close 
 
Porto Novo, 253 
 
 to the shore, made terrible havoc amongst the drawn-up squad- 
 rons. A panic ensued; the charge was never made. Availing 
 himself of the panic, Stuart promptly made his third attempt 
 on the gap, and succeeded. 
 
 The simultaneous advance of the first line, whilst the second, 
 though still strongly opposed, was working steadily from the 
 left flank towards the centre, convinced those about Ilaidar 
 that the day was lost. Ilaidar himself, however, refused to 
 believe that the fruit of exertions so earnest, so well thought 
 out, had been lost by one mistake and one freak of fortune. 
 He refused to quit the field, constantly uttering regrets that 
 he could no longer by his own exertions retrieve mishaps. At 
 last, about four o'clock in the afternoon, the danger had 
 become so imminent that a favourite groom seized his legs, put 
 on his slippers, and with the words, "We will beat them 
 to-morrow, meanwhile mount," helped him on to his horse. 
 The whole army followed in full retreat, taking with them all 
 their guns. They had lost many men, how many can never be 
 known. The English had lost 306, and had gained only the 
 ground on which they had fought. 
 
 Such was the battle of Porto Novo, called also the battle of 
 Chelambram; assuredly one of the most decisive battles ever 
 fought in southern India. To the English, defeat would have 
 meant not only expulsion from Madras, but the absorption of 
 the Karnatak by the ruler of Maisur. The English had but 
 that one army. To provide that army, Bengal had been 
 exhausted. Bombay was fighting for her own hand. A few 
 months later the arrival of Suffren deprived the English of 
 supremacy in the Indian seas. To fight under the circum- 
 stances was a desperate remedy ; but it was the only possible, 
 and, as it proved, a successful remedy. 
 
 Haidar, it is true, fought some more desperate battles with 
 the English, and even gained some partial successes; but the 
 spell was broken. The battle of Porto Novo had decided not 
 only the fate of Madras, it had given a death-blow to the 
 
254 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 exterminating projects of Haidar. It might be said, indeed, 
 that it did more. Mushroom kingdoms, like that of Haidar 
 Ali, depend for their vitality on the constant activity of their 
 ruler. When that ruler ceases to conquer, his power and his 
 influence alike wane. In this sense Porto Novo was a check 
 from which the dynasty of Haidar Ali never recovered. 
 
 It is true, as I have said, that Haidar fought again. After 
 Porto Novo, Coote marched forward along the ccast to meet 
 reinforcements which had been sent from Bengal. But so 
 demoralised was Haidar, that though many opportunities 
 offered he never attacked his enemy, but allowed a junction — - 
 which added one-third to that enemy's strength—to take place 
 at Palikat without striking a blow to prevent it (2nd August). 
 On the 22nd of the same month, he had the mortification of 
 witnessing the storming of Tripasor, in the presence of his 
 whole army. On the 27th, Coote, at the head of 12,000 men, 
 attacked his forces, raised now to 70,000 men, and strongly 
 posted on the acclivities of a range of hills near Parmbakam; 
 after a desperate conflict, stormed the plateau on the left, 
 gained a position which was the key to the right of his defence, 
 and thus compelled Haidar to abandon the field, and to 
 retreat to Kanchipuram during the night. One result of this 
 action was the revictualling of Velur, and the recovery of the 
 fort of Chittiir, by the English. 
 
 A transient gleam of sunshine played over the fortunes of 
 Haidar when, on the 18th February, 1783, his son, Tipii Sahib, 
 compelled the surrender, after a three days' contest, of an 
 English detachment commanded by Colonel Braithwaite; 
 when, also, on the 8th June following, he enticed into an 
 ambuscade and nearly destroyed, in the presence of Sir Eyre 
 Coote, a body of English horse. But none of his smaller 
 triumphs made up for the defeat of Porto Novo. That battle 
 was his Leipsic. Thenceforth he ceased to be an aggressor; 
 he endeavoured only to retain the places he had gained. 
 
 It is due to him to add that, in his later operations, Haidar 
 
Porto Novo. 255 
 
 was much hampered by his French allies. These, badly led, 
 displayed a caution and backwardness as foreign to the char- 
 acter of their nation as it was uncongenial to the nature of 
 Haidar. 
 
 Six months after his last successful skirmish with the 
 English (the /th December, 1783), Haidar All— become prema- 
 turely old, for he was but sixty-five— passed away. The war 
 languished after his death; continued with varying fortunes* 
 for fifteen months, when it was concluded by the Treat}- oi 
 Mangalur (nth March, 1784), which stipulated for the restitu- 
 tion of all places, and the liberation of all prisoners, taken by 
 both parties during its continuance. 
 
 It has ever been the misfortune of Eastern dynasties that an 
 Amurath can never secure that he shall be succeeded by an 
 Amurath. Haidar All, a man of genius, of energy, a born 
 warrior, was succeeded in the vast territories he had made a 
 kingdom, by a passionate and narrow-minded bigot ; a man 
 who, in fact, had inherited all the passions of his father 
 without one scintilla of his genius. The consequences were 
 such as might have been predicted. Tipii Sahib lest all that 
 Haidar Ali had gained. Notwithstanding the peace cf 
 Mangalur, he did not cease to molest his neighbours. At last 
 he had the temerity to attack a protected ally of the English, 
 the Rajah of Travankiir. War followed 1790). Bangalor 
 fell into the hands of the English. Shrirangapatam was in- 
 vested ; Tipii in despair sued for peace. He was able to 
 obtain it only by the sacrifice of one half of his dominions, 
 and the payment of upwards of £3,030,000 (19th March, 1792). 
 
 To recover the lost moiety of his territories, Tipii, six years 
 later, intrigued with the French Republic. When, informed of 
 his conduct, the Marquess Wellesley demanded of him 
 securities for his good behaviour, Tipii treated the demand 
 
 * An account of those varying fortunes has been given by the Author 
 in a book entitled " Final French Struggles in India " (1878). Towards 
 its close, those of the English were at a very low ebb indeed. 
 
256 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 with contempt. The Governor-General then declared war, 
 and, in alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas, sent an 
 army, under General Harris, into Maisur. The strong places, 
 no longer defended by the genius of Haidar, fell in quick 
 succession. On the 3rd April, General Harris invested 
 Shrirangapatam; on the 4th May he stormed it. In defend- 
 ing it, Tipii Sahib was killed, and the remnant of Maisur — for 
 some slices of it were taken to satisfy the English and their 
 allies — was restored to the Hindu dynasty which Haidar All 
 had dispossessed. 
 
 That this result was possible was a consequence, though a 
 later consequence, of the battle of Porto Novo. Had Haidar 
 All won that battle, he would have expelled the English from 
 Madras, and would, for a season, have been master of southern 
 India. That he would have retained it is scarcely probable. 
 But that the danger was great, that the fear which existed was 
 widespread, is shown by all the contemporary records of the 
 period. The terror survived his death, survived the cam- 
 paign, survived even the first defeat of Tipii Sahib. It was 
 the recollection of the danger which the Muhammadan 
 dynasty of Maisur had brought home to the English winch 
 was a main factor in the policy by which Marquess Wellesley 
 was actuated in dealing with Tipii. To the battle fought near 
 Porto Novo, then, no Englishman can look back without a 
 feeling of pride. That battle crushed the aggressive schemes 
 of Haidar, forced him to act on the defensive, and paved the 
 way, after his death, to the destruction of the mighty power 
 he had created. Under his rule Maisur had become a robber's 
 stronghold, a stronghold the existence of which was only possi- 
 ble when the paramount power was inert. The British never 
 effected a work more truly beneficial to the people of India 
 than when they destroyed that stronghold, and, expelling the 
 dynasty of the robber, substituted the mild sway of the Hindu 
 ruler for the empire of the sword ! 
 

 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ASSAYE. 
 
 MADHAJI SlNDIA was the greatest man India produced in the 
 last century. He towered above his contemporaries. He was 
 a greater warrior and a more far-sighted statesman than 
 Haidar AH of Maisiir; he possessed none of the cruelty or the 
 habitual and senseless perfidy of Nizam All of Haidarabad ; 
 amongst the Marathas not a single man equalled him in intel- 
 lectual power. Alone amongst his countrymen he detected the 
 necessities of the English position, the alternative of further 
 conquest or annihilation which lay before them, the life 
 struggle which must ensue between them and the princes of 
 India. To prepare for that life struggle, to avoid internecine 
 national quarrels, to effect a union amongst all castes and 
 races against the ever-encroaching foreigner, had been for 
 many years the aim of his policy, the darling desire of his 
 life. At one time he had contemplated the bringing of Haidar 
 Ali and the Nizam within the confederacy. He had been 
 forced to wait, however, till his own position should be con- 
 solidated, his own influence in Western India supreme, before 
 he could give the final touch to the scheme. Before that time 
 arrived Haidar had died, after a vain attempt to accomplish, 
 single-handed, that which a combined effort on the part of all 
 the races of India might have secured; and Tipu, foiled in 
 another unsupported effort, had been shorn of half his domin- 
 
 s 
 
258 The Decisive Battles of I ndia. 
 
 ions. But in June, 1793, Madhaji had attained the summit of 
 his wishes. He swayed the destinies of Central India, and, 
 as far as and including Aligarh, of North-western India; his 
 troops, trained and commanded by Frenchmen and other Euro- 
 peans, occupied the strong places from Ujjen to Agra and 
 Dihli; his only possible rival in Central India, Tukaji Holkar, 
 was at his feet; and at Piinah, the capital of the Peshwa, he 
 was rapidly gaining a supreme influence. He wanted but a 
 few short years to work out his dream. He had not seen quite 
 sixty summers, and had lived a temperate and active life. 
 The expectation that a brief time might yet be granted to him 
 was not extravagant. It proved, however, to be fallacious. 
 When yet on the last step of the pedestal he had spent the 
 preceding thirty years to attain, he was struck down by fever, 
 and died. With him perished the last hope of unity of action 
 against the foreigner. 
 
 The direction of the fabric which Madhaji Sindia had raised 
 with so much patience, so much skill, and so much forethought, 
 devolved upon a boy of fifteen — a boy possessing a character, 
 which, if still unformed, had displayed waywardness, inde- 
 cision and a dislike of control. 
 
 This boy was Daolat Rao Sindia. He succeeded very 
 suddenly to a position which demanded all the qualities of a 
 ripened statesman. The influence he had inherited was pre- 
 dominant at Piinah, and events very shortly happened which 
 called upon him to exercise it. Unhappily he was too young 
 or too wilful to take up the large scheme bequeathed to him 
 by Madhaji; and when events convinced him of its wisdom 
 and forced its principle upon him, he had descended many 
 steps from the height to which Madhaji had attained. 
 
 The first great event which demanded his prompt action was 
 the sudden death of the Peshwa. On the 25th October, 1795, 
 Mahadeo Rao Narayan, the last but cne who bore that title, 
 threw himself, in a fit of profound melancholy, from a terrace 
 of his palace, and two days later died frcm the effects of the 
 
Assay e. 259 
 
 injuries he then received. When this event happened, Daolat 
 Rao, marching at the head of his army towards Gwaliar, had 
 reached Jamgaon. Recognising the importance of the situa- 
 tion he promptly replied to the invitation sent him by the 
 minister of the late Peshwa, and returned to Piinah, arbiter, if 
 his capacity had been equal to his power, of the destinies of 
 Western India. 
 
 His capacity was not, however, equal to his power. He 
 allowed himself to be hoodwinked, deceived and led in lead- 
 ing-strings by a man who, at the age of twenty-one, had gained 
 the reputation of being the most consummate intriguer of the 
 day— a man at that time under surveillance in his own camp — 
 the cousin of the late Peshwa — the notorious Baji Rao 
 Raghunath. By the influence he managed to exercise upon 
 Daolat Rao, Baji Rao became Peshwa. He immediately began 
 to intrigue for the departure of his too powerful patron. 
 
 In the hands of the new Peshwa Daolat Rao was a mere child. 
 By degrees Baji Rao undermined his influence, raised enemies 
 against him even 111 his own household, stirred up Holkar to 
 attack him, until at last, Daolat Rao, wearied and disgusted, 
 saw himself forced to quit Piinah to defend his own dominions 
 from attack (November, 1800). 
 
 He was but just in time. Before he could muster his forces 
 in full strength Jeswant Rao Holkar had inflicted two succes- 
 sive defeats on detachments he had sent for the protection of 
 Ujjen (June, 1801). The following month his great park of 
 artillery was saved from falling into the hands of the same 
 daring rival, by the gallantry of an Englishman in his service, 
 named Brownrigg. But in October he was ready, and on the 
 14th of that month he inflicted upon Holkar a crushing defeat 
 m front of his capital, Indiir, which, as a consequence, fell into 
 his hands. Had Daolat Rao followed up his victory there had 
 been an end for ever to the career of Jeswant Rao. But not 
 recognising the importance of the situation he preferred to 
 negotiate. Again was he duped. Jeswant Rao, whose intel- 
 
260 The Derisive Battles of India. 
 
 lect was subtle and whose insight was keen -who was, in fact, 
 an intriguer of intriguers — amused Daolat Rao till, with the 
 marvellous recuperative power always displayed by the Mara- 
 thas, he had recruited his army. He then suddenly broke off, 
 renewed hostilities in Khandesh, and defeated Sindia's army, 
 led by his general, Sheodaseo Rao, near Piinah (25th October, 
 1802). 
 
 This defeat was productive of the most disastrous conse- 
 quences to the Marathas. It broke up for ever the Maratha 
 Confederacy. It was one of those incidents which, slight in 
 themselves, yet suffice to change the course of events. The 
 defeat of one Maratha power by another Maratha power 
 brought upon the scene, in a manner as marvellous as it was 
 unexpected, the power which was destined to control them all. 
 The result was due mainly to the obstinacy and shortsighted- 
 ness of Daolat Rao. 
 
 The defeat of Sindia's army near Piinah on the 25th October, 
 1802, caused the Peshwa, Baji Rao, to flee in trepidation from 
 his capital. From Suwarnadurg (Severndriig), where he took 
 refuge, Baji Rao addressed pressing solicitations to Sindia, 
 then in camp at Ujjen, to come to his aid. It is not too much 
 to say that the fate of India was, at that moment, in the hands 
 of Daolat Rao Sindia. Had he marched to the aid of his 
 suzerain he would have regained by force of arms the position 
 he had lost by intrigue; there would have been no treaty of 
 Bassein; the Maratha Confederacy would have presented an 
 unbroken front to the foreigner. 
 
 But Daolat Rao had not yet grasped the full conception of 
 his astute predecessor. He cast away the opportunity never 
 to recur, and declined to march to the assistance of the Peshwa. 
 The Peshwa in despair threw himself on the protection of the 
 British. The result was the treaty of Bassein. 
 
 The Treaty of Bassein was the greatest diplomatic triumph 
 which the world has ever witnessed. On the eve of a contest, 
 impending, which could not have been long delayed, between 
 
Assay e. 2b i 
 
 the Maratha Confederacy and the British, it broke up the 
 Maratha Confederacy : it relieved the English of the danger 
 which had long threatened them of having to face at one and 
 the same time the united power of a league whose territories 
 comprehended the north-west provinces of India, Central India, 
 and the greater part of western India; and allowed them to 
 meet and to conquer each section of that league singly. Above 
 all, it paralysed the vast influence which attached to the name 
 and to the authority of the Peshwa. 
 
 By the Treaty of Bassein, negotiated under the orders of 
 Marquess Wellesley by Sir Barry Close, the Peshwa engaged 
 to admit the thin edge of the wedge of British protection, that 
 wedge always fatal to the independence of a native dynasty. 
 He engaged to receive from the British a subsidiary force of 
 six battalions, with guns, and to cede certain districts for 
 their payment; to refer to the British Government all his dis- 
 putes with the Nizam and his claims against the Gaikwar. 
 The British, on their part, undertook to restore the Peshwa to 
 his dominions, to defend him against all hostility or aggres- 
 sion whatsoever " in the same manner as the rights and terri- 
 tories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and 
 defended." Other articles bound the Peshwa even more closely 
 to his foreign defenders. 
 
 The news of the Treaty of Bassein and the information he 
 received as to its nature, roused Daolat Rao Sindia to a sense 
 of his errors. In that treaty he saw plainly not only a bar 
 to a complete Maratha Confederacy, but a threat against him- 
 self. Then, probably for the first time, he fully grasped the 
 statesmanlike plans of Madhaji, at the very moment when the 
 realization of those plans had been rendered impossible for 
 ever. Then he bestirred himself. He refused, after some 
 hesitation, the invitation he received to become a party to the 
 defensive portion of the treaty ; and then, as an earnest and 
 active as he had been vacillating and dilatory, he strove to 
 unite the Marathas against their one dangerous fee. But he 
 
262 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 was too late. The Peshwa had been bought off by the British, 
 and Jeswant Rao Holkar, though he recognized as clearly as 
 did Daolat Rao the gravity of the situation, allowed his policy 
 to be overruled by his personal jealousy. It is more than 
 possible that that jealousy was whetted by the conviction that 
 the contest between the British and Daolat Rao would be pro- 
 longed, that it would leave the rival combatants exhausted ; 
 and that he, Jeswant Rao, would then step in — the master of 
 the situation. At all events, he refused his aid. 
 
 With Raghuji Bhonsle, Raj all of Barar, Daolat Rao was 
 more successful. That Maratha prince, equally penetrated 
 with the danger of the situation, agreed to bring all the in- 
 fluence and power of the Bhonsle to support the national 
 cause. 
 
 The two allies proceeded at once to make preparations for 
 war. But though they masked their designs with secrecy, those 
 designs did not escape the penetrating glance of the Governor- 
 General ; and he, on his side, prepared for the inevitable 
 struggle. Not content with that, as soon as his own arrange- 
 ments had been well advanced, he demanded of Sindia an 
 explicit declaration of his intentions. Sindia, not yet pre- 
 pared, replied that it was necessary, before he could answer, 
 to consult with his ally, the Rajah of Barar. He marched at 
 once with his own troops to take up a position in proximity 
 to the position occupied by that ally, close to the western 
 frontier of the territories of the Xizam. 
 
 Long negotiations followed the meeting of the two chief- 
 tains, negotiations protracted on their side by the hope that 
 Holkar might yet be tempted to unite his cause with theirs. 
 Wearied at last of continued evasions, General Wellesley, who 
 commanded the main English force in that quarter, proposed 
 as a test ultimatum that the armies of the several Powers should 
 retire within the boundaries of their own territories ; engaging, 
 for his part, that if Sindia would retire to the Xorth-West 
 Provinces and the Bhonsle to Barar, he would withdraw everv 
 
tssaye. 26 
 
 j 
 
 British suldier within the limits of British territories. Find- 
 ing it impossible to evade a reply to this practical proposal, 
 the two chieftains rejected it. As a consequence, the British 
 Resident withdrew from their camp, and war ensued. 
 
 Marquess Wellesley, with that thoroughness which was a 
 marked characteristic of his Indian administration, had made 
 preparations to attack his enemies simultaneously on more 
 points than one. Whilst, then, the commander-in-chief of the 
 army in India, General Lake, marched from Kanhpur, on the 
 5th August, at the head of about 8,000 men, to drive Sindia's 
 troops from the North-West Provinces; whilst a smaller force 
 of 3,500 assembled at Allahabad to act on the side of Bundel- 
 khand, and another of 5,216 marched to the eastward to con- 
 quer the districts of which Katak (Cuttack) was the capital ; 
 other, and, taken altogether, larger armies had been made 
 ready to move in western and southern India. It is with these 
 armies alone that we have to do just now. 
 
 In the Dakhan and Gujarat the forces assembled by Lord 
 Wellesley's orders amounted to 35,596 men. Of these, 3,595 
 were assigned for the defence of the cities of Ptinah and 
 Haidarabad. To cover these places General Stuart, who com- 
 manded in chief in this part of India, at the head of 7,826 
 men, occupied a central position between the rivers Krishna 
 and Tungabhadra. In advance of this covering army were 
 three field forces; one, of 8,930 men, commanded by General 
 Wellesley, was at Walki, eight miles south of Ahmadnagar; 
 another, of 7,920 men, led by General Stevenson, but subordin- 
 ate to Wellesley, was some miles to the east of Jalnah. The 
 third field force was in Gujarat. It was composed of 7,352 
 men; but as 3,071 of these were required to garrison the strong 
 places in that province there remained available for field oper- 
 ations only 4,281 ; these were commanded by Colonel Murray, 
 who was subject to the control of General Wellesley. 
 
 But if the number of the British troops was considerable 
 — enormous, in fact, if. we compare it with the handful of men 
 
264 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 whom we have seen struggling, under Clive and Adams and 
 Munro, to lay the foundations of empire — the forces wielded 
 by their enemies were greater still. The combined forces of 
 Sindia and the Bhonsle have been estimated at 100,000 men; 
 and of these 30,000 were troops trained and armed after the 
 European fashion, disciplined and, in many instances, officered 
 and led by Europeans. About two-thirds of these trained 
 sipahis occupied, however, Sindia's possessions in the North- 
 West Provinces and in the more north-eastern parts of Central 
 India. Besides the 10,000 of these regular troops, the allies 
 had in south-western India some 40,000 horsemen, a splendid 
 park of artillery, extremely well manned, and a mass of match- 
 lockmen, very irregular infantry, formed on the old native 
 system, which had degenerated into being no system at all. 
 This army, when hostilities broke out, occupied a position 
 below the Ajunta pass, on the frontiers of the Nizam's domin- 
 ions, about fifty-five miles from Jalnah. 
 
 Before I proceed to give a detailed account of the events of 
 the war, I propose to glance for a moment at the characters 
 of the rival leaders. Of Daolat Rao Sindia the reader will by 
 this time have formed an opinion. A man possessed of a slow 
 brain and a vacillating nature can never be a great general. 
 Throughout his life Daolat Rao was in leading-strings; he 
 was the puppet of the man who for the moment had acquired 
 the greatest influence over him. At this particular moment 
 that influence was possessed by his ally, Raghuji Bhonsle. 
 Raghuji was but a poor counsellor in difficult circumstances. 
 He understood war, however, in the sense in which war was 
 understood by the great founder of the Maratha empire. Ac- 
 cording to him, war meant the ravaging of the country over 
 which his enemy must march; the hanging on his flanks and 
 rear; the avoiding of a general action; the cutting off his 
 supplies. Raghuji impressed these counsels upon Sindia, and 
 so long as he was by his side Sindia was disposed to conform 
 to them. But the two chiefs could not always be together, 
 
Assay e* 265 
 
 and, when Raghuji was absent, Sindia was swayed by men 
 who dilated on the excellence of his trained troops, of his 
 cavalry, and of his artillery, of his superiority in numbers, 
 of the great advantage of striking a decisive blow. The 
 result was an attempt to combine two opposite systems, an 
 attempt which could not but end in failure. 
 
 The commander of the advanced British forces in south- 
 western India, General Arthur YYellesley, was the very last man 
 in the world in whose presence operations of the nature I have 
 described could be carried out with impunity. Born in the 
 year 1769, Arthur Wesley — as he was then called — had entered 
 the army at an early age and had, in the days when every- 
 thing was possible to a young man of good birth, very soon 
 attained the command of a regiment. We find him, even in 
 1794, commanding with spirit and intelligence a brigade in 
 the rear-guard which covered the retreat of the Duke of York's 
 beaten army from Holland. In 1/95, his regiment, the 33rd, 
 was ordered to the West Indies. A succession of tempestuous 
 weather accompanied by contrary winds, tossed the fleet for 
 six weeks in the waters of the Atlantic, and compelled it 
 finally to return to England. It became necessary to land the 
 33rd, and before it could be re-embarked, its destination was 
 changed to India. Wesley, prevented from accompanying it, 
 followed a few months later, and landed in Calcutta in 
 February, 1797. 
 
 At that time the Governor-General was Sir John Shore, 
 afterwards Lord Teignmouth, a man distinguished amongst 
 his other high attainments for his keen perception of char- 
 acter. It is said that after Wellesley — for his family shortly 
 afterwards adopted this form — had retired from their first 
 interview — which took place at a levee — Sir John Shore turned 
 to the gentlemen who surrounded him, and exclaimed, "If 
 Colonel Wesley should ever have the opportunity of distin- 
 guishing himself he will do it — and greatly."* 
 
 * '• Life of Lord Teignmouth/' 
 
266 The Decisive bailies of I ndia. 
 
 Shortly after Wellesley had rejoined his regiment he was 
 called upon to take part in an expedition against the Manillas. 
 He seized the occasion to submit a recommendation to the 
 effect that prior to such an attack the Dutch settlements of 
 Java should be destroyed. The expedition sailed, and had 
 reached Penang, when it was recalled to India in consequence 
 of the hostile dispositions of Tipu Sahib. For the moment, 
 however, these dispositions did not lead to warfare. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, 17th May, 1798, Colonel Wellesley had 
 the gratification of welcoming the arrival in Calcutta of the 
 greatest of the many great men sent from England to govern 
 India — his brother, the Earl of Mornington — better known as 
 Marquess Wellesley. Lord Mornington's arrival was coinci- 
 dent with the last effort made by the ruler of Maisiir to recover, 
 in alliance with the French Republic, the position which his 
 great father had gained prior to the battle of Porto Novo. The 
 occasion was critical ; for the French, led by the most briPiant 
 general of the age, occupied Egypt, and that general was 
 already in communication with Tipu. The great Marquess — 
 it may be convenient to style Irm by the title which he soon 
 afterwards assumed — displayed on this occasion the acumen, 
 the force of character, the resolution which mark every act of 
 his career. He gave Tipu every opportunity to prove the 
 honesty of his intentions, emd it was only when the last of 
 these had been treated with contempt that he sent an army 
 into his dominions. 
 
 That army conquered Maisiir and slew Tipu defending his 
 last fortress. With it served Colonel Wellesley. On the 
 morrow of the successful assault of that fortress, Welles 1 ^}' 
 was appointed to command it, and he was shortly afterwards 
 joined with other distinguished officers in a commission to 
 regulate the affairs of the whole country; and when this work- 
 had been concluded by the re-formation of a Hindu kingdom 
 under a sovereign of the ancient royal race, Welleslev was 
 
. Issaye. 267 
 
 appointed to organize and command the army necessary to 
 defend it. 
 
 Wellesley fulfilled the duties of this post— amongst which 
 may be enumerated the successful extirpation of a very formid- 
 able band of freebooters — for upwards of a year. He was 
 recalled from them towards the close of 1800 to command an 
 expedition ordered to assemble at Tinomalli, and to proceed 
 to the conquest of Java. The destination of the force as- 
 sembled for this expedition was shortly afterwards changed 
 to Egypt, and the command was given to a senior officer, Sir 
 David Baird, under whom Wellesley was to serve as second. 
 This change, which he bitterly regretted at the time, was one 
 of the most fortunate occurrences of a very fortunate life. 
 In two ways did Fortune display her favours. Fever pre- 
 vented Wellesley at the last moment from accompanying the 
 expedition. Firstly, the vessel in which he was to have sailed, 
 and on board of which he had sent his baggage, the Susannah, 
 was lost with all hands in the Red Sea; secondly, his enforced 
 stay in India rendered him available for command in the war 
 against Sindia and the Bhonsle. 
 
 Recovered from his fever, Wellesley was (April, 1801) re- 
 appointed to the command of the forces in Maisur. He held 
 this command nearly two years, was promoted to the rank of 
 Major-General, and in March, 1803, was appointed to the 
 command of the advanced corps of General Stuart's arm}*, and 
 directed to move through the Southern Maratha country, to 
 confirm the dispositions of the well disposed, and to march 
 leisurely to Piinah, to establish there an order of things favour- 
 able to the return of the Peshwa. This mission Wellesley 
 successfully accomplished, re-established the Peshwa (13th 
 May, 1803) and set out from that place on the 4th of June to 
 occupy the position facing the armies of Sindia and the 
 Rhonsle, in which I left him when I turned aside to digress 
 upon his earlier career. 
 
 On the 7th August, 1803, the Governor-General issued a 
 
268 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 proclamation declaring that he had, on the day previous, 
 directed the levying of war against the two Maratha chief- 
 tains. On that day General Wellesley was at Walki, eight 
 miles south of Ahmadnagar. Heavy rains prevented him from 
 at once moving against that fortress, but on the 8th he set out 
 to attempt it. Ahmadnagar is distant from Piinah but seventy- 
 three miles. The fortress, formidable in appearance, bore the 
 reputation of being impregnable. Wellesley has left upon 
 record that it seemed to him, next to Veliir, the strongest place 
 in India. It was surrounded by a mud wall, and this again 
 was defended by a ditch twenty feet in depth and forty in 
 breadth. Arab soldiers, considered the best soldiers in western 
 India, formed its garrison. Against it Wellesley at once 
 raised his batteries, opened fire on the ioth, and forced its 
 surrender on the 12th. His loss had amounted to twenty-eight 
 killed and twenty-two wounded — of these, six were officers. 
 
 The capture of Ahmadnagar was a most important event, 
 inasmuch as it secured the British communications with Piinah, 
 afforded a secure depot for stores, and severed the connection 
 of the allied chieftains with the Dakhan. Leaving there a 
 garrison, Wellesley (18th August) marched northwards, through 
 a country wasted, in accordance with the suggestions of the 
 Bhonsle, by the Marathas, crossed the Godavari on the 24th, 
 and reached Aurangabad on the 29th. On the same day on 
 which Wellesley crossed the Godavari, the Maratha cavalry, 
 covered by crowds of predatory skirmishers, ascended 
 the Ajunta pass, and making a detour to avoid the camp of 
 General Stevenson, reached Jalnah the day after Wellesley 
 had arrived at Aurangabad. The distance between the two 
 places is only forty miles, and by a proportion of that distance 
 the Marathas were nearer to Haidarabad. Hoping, then, to 
 steal a march on their enemy, they stayed only a day at Jalnah, 
 and then set off in a south-easterly direction. 
 
 The first care of Wellesley, on learning the course taken by 
 the enemy, was to move so as to protect the country on which 
 
Assay c. 269 
 
 he greatly depended for supplies, and to ensure the safe arrival 
 of the convoys of grain which had been despatched to him by 
 General Stuart from the Krishna. Directing Stevenson, then, 
 to secure Jalnah without delay, he moved down the Godavari. 
 The action of the enemy on discovering this move proved that 
 they had no guiding mind to direct them. It was still in their 
 power, regard being had to their vast majority in cavalry, to 
 push on to the heart of the Nizam's country. But the move- 
 ment of Wellesley down the Godavari, whilst Stevenson, 
 pressing after them, was endeavouring to bring them to action, 
 greatly disturbed them. They at once renounced the projected 
 movement on Haidarabad, abandoned their chance of preda- 
 tory warfare, and manoeuvred to avoid an action until the 
 whole of their infantry should come up. In this they suc- 
 ceeded. Though surprised by Stevenson, who in the mean- 
 while had taken Jalnah, on the 9th September they managed 
 to avoid a general action, and finally, on the 20th September, 
 effected a junction with their infantry and artillery. The 
 united army took up a position the day following at Bokardan, 
 not far from the town of Jafarabad. 
 
 The very same day, the 21st, Wellesley and Stevenson, who 
 had been following the enemy on different lines, met at Bad- 
 napiir, a little more than eleven miles from Jalnah, and on the 
 road between that place and Aurungabad. At a conference 
 which ensued between the two generals, it was agreed that 
 their two corps should continue to move on separate lines, and 
 should simultaneously attack the enemy from opposite points, 
 on the morning of the 24th. The separation was necessary, 
 not only because both divisions could not traverse the same 
 defiles in one day, but because the roads through the hills re- 
 quired to be occupied to prevent any attempt on the part of 
 the enemy to avoid the action by retiring. With this under- 
 standing they separated, and on the following morning each 
 set out to perform the task allotted to him. It is necessary 
 that I should first record the movements of Wellesley. 
 
2 jo The Decisive IJ allies of India. 
 
 That general, leaving Badnapiir on the 22nd, reached the 
 village of Kalni on the morning of the 23rd, and was about to 
 pitch his camp when the scouts brought him the information 
 that the combined army of the enemy was encamped on the 
 banks of the river Kaitna, within six miles of him; that they 
 had notice of his approach, and were preparing to move off. 
 Apprehensive lest an adherence to the agreement made with 
 Stevenson would allow them to escape, Wellesley resolved to 
 attack at once. Sending word of his intention to Stevenson, 
 who was within eight miles of him, and leaving a strong guard 
 in his camp to protect the baggage, he set forth at the head of 
 his army, numbering now only 4,500 British and native troops 
 —of whom one regiment of cavalry and two of infantry were 
 Europeans — and 5,000 Maisiir and Maratha (the Peshwa's) 
 horsemen. After marching about five miles, Wellesley, who 
 was with the advance in front of the army, beheld from the 
 summit of a rising ground the enemy's army drawn up in a 
 vast line extending along the northern bank of the river Kaitna, 
 near its junction with the Jewah. Their infantry and artillery, 
 formed in dense masses on their left, rested on the village of 
 Assaye, whilst their numerous cavalry, 30,000 strong — the 
 famous horsemen who had dealt the death-blow to the empire 
 of the Mughul, and had bidden defiance to Aurangzib in all 
 his glory — completely filled the spaces on the right. Of the 
 infantry, 10,000 had been trained on the European system, 
 and the artillery was for the most part magnificent. 
 
 It was a sight to arouse all the warrior instincts in the breast 
 of the young general — then in his thirty-fourth year — about 
 to fight his first bat^.e. He gazed long and eagerly, slowly 
 advancing as he did so, on the array before him, examining 
 with piercing glance every disposition. The instincts of a 
 soldier soon told him that the true point of attack was on the 
 flank which rested upon the enemy's line of retreat. To reach 
 that he would have to increase the distance which separated 
 him frcm Stevenson. Not for a moment did the fear of 
 
„ issaye. 271 
 
 responsibility check his audacious genius. Exclaiming "They 
 cannot now escape us," he moved rapidly round to their left 
 flank, crossed the Kaitna by a ford which the enemy had neg- 
 lected to guard, close to its junction with the Jewah, and 
 formed his infantry in two lines, in an open space between 
 the two rivers, his cavalry forming a third line in the rear. 
 Just as he was forming up his troops, information reached 
 him that the cavalry of the Peshwa intended to betray him 
 and join Sifidia. Confident that they would join the victor, 
 whoever he might be, Wellesley did not allow this information 
 to affect his dispositions. 
 
 Meanwhile the enemy, noting the action of the British, had 
 changed their front in consequence. They had moved up 
 their three arms from the position the}' had occupied along 
 the Kaitna, and had extended them in a line facing the Eng- 
 lish between the two rivers; but as the space was not sufficient 
 to accommodate their entire masses, they had formed of those 
 who were superfluous a shorter line running at a right angle 
 to the first. The left of both these lines rested on Assaye, 
 in which their artillery had been posted. 
 
 The preparations of the two Maratha leaders had been com- 
 pleted whilst Wellesley was crossing the ford, and his order 
 of battle had therefore to be made under a continuous fire 
 from the artillery posted in the village of Assaye. No sooner, 
 however, had it been arranged than he gave the order to ad- 
 vance. His plan was of the simplest. The enemy's right wing, 
 resting on the Kaitna, was their weakest point : he would 
 attack that, force it back upon the Jewah, and then use the 
 advantage which a small body of disciplined troops employed 
 against masses huddled together in a space too small for their 
 operations always bestows. 
 
 The 74th Regiment occupied the right of the line. The 
 order given was that whilst the skirmishers in front of this 
 regiment should cover a very slow advance, sufficient only to 
 draw the entire attention of the troops massed in Assaye, the 
 
272 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 78th and the native regiments on the left should press forward 
 rapidly and perform the work assigned to them. But whether 
 it was that the order was imperfectly comprehended, or that 
 the fighting instincts of the British soldier would not be re- 
 strained, the right, notwithstanding the very severe cannonade 
 to which they were subjected, dashed forward at the same pace 
 as the rest of the line. But so great was the execution of the 
 enemy's guns that, before the line had made one half of the 
 distance, the bullocks attached to the English light batteries 
 had been killed. The forward movement of the guns was 
 therefore rendered impossible ; and the men, staggered for the 
 moment by this accident, and by the terrible fire to which they 
 were exposed, halted, whilst the officer commanding despatched 
 an orderly to report the mishap to his guns. " Tell him to get 
 on without them," was the brief and emphatic reply It was, 
 indeed, too late to think of anything else; there was absolutely 
 no alternative; anything but advance meant destruction. 
 
 The leaders of the Maratha army had, however, noticed the 
 hesitation, the halt, the apparent confusion, in the ranks of 
 the English. It was just the sort of hesitation to which, in 
 their wars against each other, they had been accustomed, and 
 to take advantage of which they were prepared to use their 
 cavalry. Instantly, then, Daolat Rao ordered his famed horse- 
 men to the front, and directed them to change the check into 
 a defeat. But Wellesley saw the impending movement, and, 
 a born leader of soldiers, took on the spot the only possible 
 means to anticipate a charge which, made under the actual 
 circumstances, could scarcely fail of being successful. As 
 quick as thought, and quicker, fortunately, than the enemy, 
 he brought up from the rear the 19th Light Dragoons, and 
 ordered them to meet at full gallop the advance of the Maratha 
 horsemen. The Dragoons, who drew only 360 sabres, came up, 
 followed by the 4th, 5th, and 7th Madras Native Cavalry, 
 passed with a loud huzza through the broken ranks of the 
 74th, and dashed at full speed at their enemy. Under the 
 
. issaye. 273 
 
 terrible shock which followed the swarthy troopers of Western 
 India reeled. They had been assailed before the speed of 
 their horses had roused their excitement to fever heat, and 
 iK w their very numbers impeded them. They offered, then, 
 but a slight resistance to the impetuosity of the British, and 
 were glad to take refuge, baffled, behind their infantry. The 
 charge of the dragoons had given the infantry the cover and 
 the breathing-time they wanted. During its continuance the 
 artillery-fire had ceased, and the British left and centre, under 
 the personal direction of Wellesley, had rapidly pushed for- 
 ward. When the space cleared again Wellesley charged the 
 enemy's right on the Kaitna, and pushed them before him back 
 on to their second shorter line, which was formed up almost 
 resting on the Jewah. Simultaneously the victorious cavalry 
 charged the village of Assaye. The 74th came up to support 
 them. The village, after a long resistance, was carried, and 
 the rest of the line pressing simultaneously forward, drove 
 the enemy before them step by step until they forced them, at 
 the point of the bayonet, into the Jewah. 
 
 So far success had crowned the efforts of the British com- 
 mander ; he had driven the enemy from the battle-field. But 
 success not followed up is, in war, but the shadow of success. 
 And there, now, were the enemy, their numbers but little dim- 
 inished, on the ground beyond the Jewah, infinitely more suited 
 for their peculiar mode of warfare than that from which they 
 had been driven. It was clear that they recognised this fact, 
 for they began, as soon as they had reached the opposite bank 
 to rally and to make new formations. Wellesley, with the 
 keen instinct of a great commander, anticipated here, as in the 
 earlier part of the battle, their intentions. At a word from 
 him the British cavalry, dashing across the rivulet, charged 
 the infantry and pursued them with so much vigour that all 
 thought of rallying was dispelled. The only troops who made 
 good their retreat were the trained battalions. 
 
 The enemy's cavalry, however, still looked dangerous. They 
 
 T 
 
274 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 had been but little engaged, their self-love had been sorely 
 wounded, and they numbered 30,000. Just at this moment, 
 too, masses of the enemy who had thrown themselves on the 
 ground as if dead, jumped suddenly to life and turned their 
 guns on the British rear, now advanced beyond them. So 
 effective was their action, that to stop it Wellesley was forced 
 to charge them with the 78th and some native cavalry. The 
 British cavalry then dealt with the Maratha squadrons and 
 with some of the fugitive infantry which had taken shelter 
 under its wing. Led by Colonel Maxwell they again charged 
 the masses before them — so effectually, that though Maxwell 
 fell, the enemy, their pride completely abated, quitted the 
 field, and did not halt till they had covered a distance of 
 twelve miles. 
 
 Such was the battle of Assaye — in very deed a general's 
 battle ! For its result was due even more to the brain of the 
 commander than to the valour of the men. It may be taken 
 as certain that under an inferior commander the issue would 
 have been different. Whether it was wise to engage in the 
 battle with so small a force, when another was within eight 
 miles of him, is a point which may be fairly argued. It was 
 simply a question whether the political circumstances of the 
 time rendered it advisable to risk much in order to gain much, 
 or to witness, quiescent, an action which would have entailed 
 disastrous consequences. Doubtless the " prudent " school 
 would not have fought. To avoid risking a British army they 
 would consequently have witnessed the uprising of the Dak- 
 han, the union of the Nizam with the Marathas, possibly also 
 the rising of the Peshwa, and of Holkar, and the great injury 
 of British interests in southern and western India. 
 
 From such issues Wellesley saved India. The battle, I 
 repeat, was a General's battle. He "gave," wrote Munro, 
 "every part of the army its full share: left no part of it un- 
 employed; but supported, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes 
 with infantry, every point that was pressed, at the very time 
 
Assay e. 275 
 
 it was necessary." The flank march to cut off the enemy from 
 his communications before the battle, and the advance of the 
 British cavalry to repel the Maratha horsemen in its very crisis, 
 were sufficient to establish his title to be a great commander. 
 His readiness, his coolness, his quick and sure glance, his firm 
 and decided action, were conspicuous throughout the day ! 
 
 The casualties were heavy. The English lost, in killed, 23 
 European officers, 175 European and 230 native soldiers; in 
 wounded, 30 European officers, 412 European and 696 native 
 soldiers. Of the enemy 1,200 were left dead on the field of 
 battle; their wounded were scattered all over the field. 
 Ninety-eight pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors. 
 
 Of the leaders on both sides it deserves to be recorded that 
 whilst Wellesley was foremost in the fight, himself led two 
 charges and had two horses shot under him, Raghuji Bhonsle 
 gave an example to his men of unsurpassed cowardice; after 
 having by that example paralysed their action, he quitted the 
 field. He was followed by Daolat Rao as soon as the defeat 
 of his cavalry had been pronounced. Thenceforward the 
 soldiers of the latter fought without a leader, and many of 
 them by their gallantry proved that they deserved a better. 
 
 The evening of the day after the battle Stevenson came up 
 and at once proceed in pursuit of the enemy. He soon found 
 that the beaten army, after reaching the village of Anwah, 
 had turned suddenly westward, apparently in the hope of 
 gaining the southern Maratha country by Tal Ghat and 
 Kasara. Wellesley, on receiving this information, directed 
 him to continue his march northward to reduce the important 
 city of Burhanpur and the fortress of Asirgarh, whilst he him- 
 self, south of Ajunta, should watch the movements of the 
 enemy. These measures were successfully accomplished. 
 Stevenson captured Burhanpur without opposition (19th 
 October), reduced Asirgarh— considered the key of theDakhan 
 —after battering it for an hour (21st October), and received, 
 as a consequence, the submission of the independent districts 
 
2/6 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 of Khandesh. Wellesley, who up to that time had acted 
 strictly on the defensive, no sooner heard that Asirgarh had 
 fallen than he dashed after the Bhonsle, who had quitted 
 Sindia to proceed on a predatory expedition to the south. So 
 greatly did the presence of the conqueror of Assaye terrify 
 Raghuji, that to avoid him he changed his camp five times 
 in less than forty-eight hours, and finally beat a hurried 
 retreat to his own territories. He had been sickened of 
 fighting. 
 
 Wellesley then turned northwards to cover Stevenson on 
 the march to besiege the strong fortress of Giialgarh. Gual- 
 garh, 170 miles to the north-east of Aurangabad, was a place 
 of considerable importance, inasmuch as it commanded the 
 main road across the mountain range which divides northern 
 from southern India. It consisted of two forts built on the 
 southern declivity of that range, and these owed their strength 
 as much to the formidable nature of their works as to the fact 
 that it was only with extreme difficulty that guns could be 
 transported into a position to open upon them with effect. 
 The capture of this stronghold would place the dominions of 
 the Bhonsle at the mercy of the conqueror. On his way thither 
 Wellesley received information that the Bhonsle's army, led 
 by his brother, Manii Bapii, was encamped at Pahtarli, six 
 miles from the village of Argaum, and that Sindia's army lay 
 within four miles of it. Wellesley, despite of the entreaties of 
 Sindia's envoys who were pressing upon him terms of accom- 
 modation, sent instant word to Stevenson to join him at Pahtarli. 
 and there attack the enemy. The junction was effected on the 
 29th September. The enemy had but that day decamped, and 
 Wellesley with troops tired from a long and fatiguing march, 
 did not think proper to pursue them. The enemy, emboldened 
 by this unwonted quiescence, sent forward parties of horse 
 to beat up the surroundings of the English camp, and as these 
 met with but a slight opposition from the Maisiir horse, they 
 supported them with many squadrons. Uneasy at this demon- 
 
. Issaye. 277 
 
 stration, Wellesley directed the pickets to advance to the sup- 
 port of the Maisiir horsemen, and following them himself he 
 discovered the combined armies of Smdia and the Bhonsle— 
 horse, foot, and artillery — drawn up in order of battle in the 
 extensive plain which covers the village of Argaum. Their 
 position was well chosen. Their line, which was five miles 
 in length, rested on the village of Argaum and the extensive 
 walled enclosures adjacent to it, whilst to attack them the 
 English would have to traverse a plain intersected by water- 
 courses. Sindia, whose troops consisted wholly of cavalry, 
 commanded on the right; Manu Bapii, who had under him 
 men belonging to the three arms, including a powerful artil- 
 lery, on the left. It was past four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 The British troops had had their food and some rest. It was 
 impossible to decline the combat. Wellesley then ordered his 
 men to turn out, moved them forward in column till they 
 arrived within range, then deploying the infantry into line, 
 and having the cavalry behind as a support, advanced to the 
 attack. The guns of the enemy were, however, well served, 
 and their fire, directed by accident or design at the three native 
 regiments, produced upon these so great an effect that the men 
 composing them, men who had behaved well at Assaye, turned 
 and ran. Fortunately Wellesley was on the spot, and suc- 
 ceeded by his influence and example in rallying the fugitives 
 and inducing them to resume their place in the line. He then 
 urged on his right, somewhat thrown forward, in order to 
 press upon the enemy's infantry and guns. It was soon clear 
 that the enemy meant fighting. As the English line advanced, 
 a body of infantry, 500 strong, called Persian, but really 
 Arab, the chosen corps of the army, dashed forward to meet 
 them. The 74th and 78th received them with steadiness, and 
 marching calmly forward, swept them, almost to a man, into 
 eternity. This movement had evidently been designed to 
 engage the European troops, whilst the cavalry should deal 
 with the sipahis, whose conduct had not been unobserved. 
 
2 7-S The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 Accordingly, whilst the Europeans and Arabs were struggling 
 for dear life, the enemy's cavalry, in dense masses, directed a 
 charge towards the left of the British line. Before, however, 
 they could reach it, the three regiments of Madras native 
 cavalry, led by Wellesley in person, galloped from the rear 
 and met them in full shock. The contest was neither long 
 nor doubtful. The famed Maratha horsemen recoiled dis- 
 heartened and in disorder before the British-led troopers of 
 Madras ! This charge, and the simultaneous destruction of 
 the Arab cohort, decided the battle. The enemy's long line 
 broke and fled ! 
 
 The sun was setting as the Maratha host fled in disorder 
 from the field of Argaum. The pursuit was continued by 
 moonlight. "If we had had daylight an hour more," wrote 
 Wellesley, "not a man would have escaped." As it was, they 
 lost everything — thirty-eight pieces of cannon, their camp 
 equipage, their confidence, their hope. The army dispersed 
 never again to re-unite. Argaum, won with the loss of 15 
 Europeans and 31 sipahis killed, and less than 200 wounded, 
 was the complement of Assaye. It finished the war in southern 
 and western India. The strong fortress of Gualgarh was 
 stormed on the 15th December. Two days later Raghuji 
 Bhonsle signed a treaty with the British, by which he yielded 
 the provinces of Katak (Cuttack) and Barar; renounced all 
 his claims on the Nizam, and agreed to refer all disputes 
 between that potentate and himself to British arbitration. 
 
 The treaty with Sindia, the treaty known as Surji 
 Anjangaon, was signed thirteen days later. I shall consider 
 its terms after I shall have described the great battle which 
 not less than Assaye and Argaum forced it upon Daolat Rao 
 — the battle of Laswarf. What Wellesley effected for 
 southern and western, Lake achieved for central and north- 
 western, India. Complete as were the operations of each in 
 themselves, each required the other to produce a perfect result. 
 Assaye decided the war in south-western India ; Laswari and 
 
Assay e. 279 
 
 the actions which preceded Laswari decided it in the more 
 northern parts. But taking a comprehensive \ iew, it may be 
 affirmed that neither without the other would have produced 
 the result actually obtained. It is necessary, then, before 
 summarising the results of the war, that the reader should 
 accompany me to the camp of General Lake at Kanhpur. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 LASWARI. 
 
 WHEN Marquess Wellcsley issued instructions to his brother 
 to commence hostilities against the two Maratha powers in 
 south-western and western India, he had not been unmindful 
 of the fact that the great bulk cf the trained soldiers of Sindia, 
 armed and officered by Europeans, held the North-Western 
 Provinces; that they occupied Aligarh, the imperial cities of 
 Dihli and Agra, and that a considerable portion of them 
 were scattered over central India. Simultaneously, then, with 
 the instructions given to his brother, he had directed the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in India, General Lake, to mass his troops 
 at Kanhpur, and to cross the frontier as soon as war should 
 be declared. 
 
 The objects which the great Marquess had in view, and to 
 accomplish which he had put forth all the resources of the 
 British power in India, were worthy of his comprehensive and 
 enlightened mind. Face to face with the Maratha Con- 
 federacy, whose avowed object was the expulsion of the 
 British from India, he had realized that but one course was 
 open to him. He must strike, and strike at the heart with a 
 force which should be irresistible ; break for ever the power 
 for aggressive purposes of the great Maratha chieftains; pre- 
 vent Sindia, on the one side, from extending his possessions 
 
Laswdri. 281 
 
 southwards, and rescue from his grasp, on the other, the two 
 imperial cities. It had devolved, in fact, on Marquess Welles- 
 ley to do that, for the security of the British tenure in India, 
 which five and thirty years previously the great Lord Clive 
 had denounced as a policy certain to entail ruin on British 
 interests. Clive would have retained the frontiers of Alla- 
 habad and cultivated amicable relations with the Marathas. 
 As a permanent policy, such a course was impracticable. What 
 the Nuwab-Vazir of Awadh had been to Clive and his con- 
 temporaries, the Marathas had become to his successors. Again 
 was it a duel upon the issue of which depended the main- 
 tenance of the British power in India. 
 
 Lake, in pursuance of his instructions, issued from Kanhpur, 
 at the head of an army numbering 5,000 infantry, 2,500 
 cavalry, and the usual proportion of artillery, on the 5th 
 August, 1803, and crossed the British frontier about four 
 miles to the south of Koil, the town protected by the fort of 
 Aligarh, and separated from it by a plain, on the 28th. 
 
 The Maratha troops in Koil were not much more numerous 
 than the British army. They counted but 2,cco infantry, 
 8,000 cavalry, and the usual proportion of guns. They were 
 commanded by a Frenchman named Perron. Perron, who had 
 risen to this position from that of a common sailor, was not a 
 very strong man. He had arrived at that phase in the life 
 of the adventurer who serves a foreign master when the in- 
 terests of the master are subordinated to the interests of the 
 servant. Daolat Rao Sindia, the master, had detected the 
 arrival of this phase in the career of Perron, and had already 
 made arrangements to replace him by one of his own country- 
 men, Ambaji Inglia. Perron, aware that his disgrace was 
 probably but a question of weeks; that Dudrenec, who was 
 marching from Ujjen to Aligarh, was devoted to Ambaji; 
 that Bourquin, who commanded two brigades under his orders, 
 was not to be depended upon; thought far more of making 
 terms with the British than of opposing to them a stout resist- 
 
282 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 ancc. When, then, on the 29th August, General Lake marched 
 upon Koil, and in that operation exposed his flank to the 
 enemy, Perron, who might have taken him at disadvantage, 
 gave no orders. His men, waiting for those orders, were para- 
 lysed by the reserve of their leader, and when, a few seconds 
 later the British galloper guns opened upon them, they lost 
 heart and fled in all directions. Perron himself escaped to 
 Mathura, and from that place made terms with the English. 
 
 There remained the fort of Aligarh, which, garrisoned by 
 2,000 trained infantry, commanded by a good officer, a French- 
 man named Pedrons, seemed capable of offering a long re- 
 sistance. Summoned to surrender, Pedrons flatly refused. 
 To undertake the siege of the place would have interfered 
 very much with the English General's plans regarding Dihli, 
 as it would have given time to the enemy's forces, then rapidly 
 hurrying up from Central India, to concentrate for the defence 
 of the place. Lake then carefully examined Aligarh. He 
 found it very strong, but with one weak point. This weak 
 point was a narrow passage leading across the ditch into the 
 fort. But, weak as it was, it was guarded by a strong gate- 
 way, covering three other gateways behind it. It presented 
 a forlorn chance. Such as it was, however, Lake, who made 
 it a rule of life never to do things by halves, and who ever 
 declared that boldness was prudence, resolved to attempt it 
 and to try a coup de main. It was a bold resolve, for failure 
 would give the Maratha troops the morale which they wanted. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 4th September the British 
 troops stormed Aligarh. It was a deed of splendid daring 
 — for the defences were strong, the enemy watchful and brave. 
 It cost in killed and wounded 260 men, but it electrified India. 
 To use the words of an officer then in the service of Sindia : 
 " It was a mortal blow to the Maratha war ; it struck a panic 
 into the minds of the natives and astonished all the princes of 
 Hindustan; it gave them dreadful ideas of European soldiers 
 and European courage." 
 
Laswdti. 
 
 **>6 
 
 From Aligarh Lake marched towards Dihli (7th September). 
 On the 11th, after a very fatiguing march, he had, at eleven 
 o'clock, just reached the banks of the Jehna Nala, six miles 
 from the imperial city, when the Maratha force, consisting of 
 twelve battalions of trained infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 70 
 guns, the whole commanded by a Frenchman, named Louis 
 Bourquin, was upon him. Bourquin was an inferior specimen 
 of a class generally inferior. Lie was little fitted to lead an 
 army, and, if we may draw conclusions from his career, Nature 
 had not even endowed him with the animal virtue of courage. 
 A great opportunity was here offered him. At the head of a 
 superior force he had surprised— for he had done nothing less 
 — the English troops, tired after a long march. Llis position, 
 too, was a strong one, for his front was covered by a line of 
 intrenchments previously prepared ; each flank was covered 
 by a swamp, and the position of his guns was concealed by 
 the long grass which covered the ground between him and 
 the British camp. Lake, reconnoitring, noticed all this, the 
 strength of the position, the impossibility of turning it. His 
 own men were tired ; man)' had undressed ; many more were 
 scattered. But Lake was essentially a man of action. He 
 resolved to draw the enemy from their position, with his 
 cavalry, and then rever them from their intrenchments and 
 pounce upon them. 
 
 He carried out his plan to the letter. Sending the cavalry 
 in front at a trot, he moved his infantry slowly forward under 
 cover of the long grass. The cavalry made a feigned attack 
 on the intrenchments and then fell back as if beaten. This 
 brought out the enemy with loud shouts from the intrench- 
 ments, and, as the British cavalry continued to fall back 
 further and further, the enemy's infantry hastened to follow 
 them. At last they reached a point within charging distance 
 of the British infantry. Then the order was given; the cavalry 
 opened out from the centre, and the infantry marching 
 through, led by the Commander-in-Chief in person, made a 
 
284 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 dash at the mtrenchments. They halted but once, within 
 eighty yards, to fire one volley ; then, despite of the showers 
 of grape and round shot from the enemy's guns, they dashed 
 forward with so much impetuosity, that the enemy gave way 
 and fled. No sooner had this end been achieved, than the 
 infantry formed into column of companies to allow the cavalry 
 and galloper guns to pass through and finish the work. This 
 was successfully accomplished. Never was a victory more 
 complete. The enemy, who fought well, suffered heavily, for 
 many of those who did not perish on the field were drowned 
 in the Jamna. The English lost 486 killed and wounded. 
 Bourquin was the first man to leave the held. He surrendered 
 with five other foreign officers, three days later, to the 
 conqueror. 
 
 One important consequence of this victory was the capture 
 of the city of Dihli. On the 14th September General Lake 
 entered the city and released from confinement the blinded 
 King, Shah A'lam — the same whom we have seen, as Shah- 
 zadah and as Emperor, the opponent of Clive and the ally 
 of the Niiwab-Vazir of Awadh, and who had subsequently 
 been deprived of his sight by the infamous Ghulam Kadir 
 (1788).* It was a pleasure to the English general to restore 
 the venerable monarch to his throne, and to make arrange- 
 ments for the peaceful enjoyment of his freedom and his 
 dignities. 
 
 On the 24th September Lake set out with his army for 
 Agra. He arrived there on the 4th October, and encamped 
 within long cannon-shot of the fortress. Agra was then gar- 
 risoned by 4,500 men, under the nominal command of George 
 Hessing, an adventurer of Dutch extraction. The garrison, 
 however, had noted the facility with which Perron, Bourquin, 
 and other foreign officers had surrendered to the English; 
 had conceived, consequently, a distrust of Hessing; and had 
 
 * The reader is referred to Mr. H. G. Keane's graphic history of the 
 fall of the Moghul Empire. 
 
Laswdri. 285 
 
 placed him and the six European officers with him under 
 restraint. Besides this garrison, there lay, encamped under 
 the walls of the fortress, three battalions of the army which 
 had been defeated near Dihli, and four battalions of Perron's 
 5th Brigade, just arrived from the Dakhan with twenty-six 
 pieces of cannon, the whole under the command of Major 
 Brownrigg. The garrison had refused to admit these troops 
 within the walls, because they feared that their admission 
 would give them a claim to a participation in the twenty-five 
 lakhs of rupees which formed the contents of the treasure- 
 chest. In addition to these, again, twelve battalions of 
 trained sipahis, led by Dudrenec, from Ujjen, the flower of 
 Smdia's army, occupied a position on the right rear of the 
 British force, with the view, it was supposed, should the siege 
 last long enough, of recovering Dihli. 
 
 General Lake, having taken complete cognizance of the 
 state of affairs, resolved, with his usual dash and energy, to 
 dispose of his three enemies separately. The first he went 
 against was the enemy outside the fortress, the remnants of 
 Perron's and Bourquin's armies. These he attacked on the 
 10th October with so much energy that, with a loss of 213 in 
 killed and wounded on his part, he inflicted upon them a 
 severe defeat, placed 600 of them hors de combat, captured 
 all their guns, and so dispirited the remainder that, two days 
 later, 2,500 of them passed into the British service. Pro- 
 ceeding with the same vigour, he opened his batteries against 
 the fortress, and compelled its surrender on the 1 8th. By 
 this capture he not only became possessor of the cherished 
 twenty-five lakhs, but he secured a line of defence along the 
 left bank of the Jamna. 
 
 There now remained for him to deal with only the twelve 
 battalions, about 9,000 strong, the flower of Sindia's army, 
 led, for the most part, from Ujjen by the Chevalier Dudrenec. 
 Unfortunately for Sindia, the conditions offered by the British 
 Government to foreign officers to quit the service of their 
 
286 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Indian master had been so much appreciated that Dudrenec 
 himself and all the officers of the force had entered British 
 territory. The flower of the army, the men victorious on many 
 a field, were, then, led by their own countrymen. Supreme 
 in command was Abaji, a Maratha of great pertinacity and 
 not without military talent. On realizing the fall of Agra, 
 Abaji had moved leisurely into the Jaipur country, with the 
 intention of taking post in the hilly country of Mewat, the 
 only pass into which could easily be made impregnable. 
 
 Thither, on the 27th October, Lake, at the head of three 
 regiments of dragoons, five of native cavalry, one regiment of 
 European infantry the 76th), and four battalions of sipahis, 
 followed him. So eager was he to catch him, that when he 
 found that the heavy state of the soil, saturated with ram, 
 retarded his progress, he came to a decision to leave the greater 
 part of his artillery behind him, and to press on with his 
 cavalry and infantry. Making forced marches with these, he 
 reached, the night of the 31st, the ground which Abaji had 
 quitted that very morning. As this ground was but thirty- 
 three miles distant from the pass into the Mewat country of 
 which I have spoken, Lake, viewing the enormous importance 
 of anticipating the enemy, resolved to push on with his cavalry 
 alone, and encounter, if necessary, the Marathas with that arm. 
 
 At midnight, then, he set off with his three cavalry brigades, 
 leaving the infantry to follow. Pushing on without a halt, he 
 came up at sunrise with the enemy, strongly posted about the 
 village of Laswari. On that village itself their left rested, 
 whilst their right was covered by a rivulet, the banks of which 
 were steep and dmcult ; between these two points lay their 
 centre, concealed from view by long grass, and defended by 
 a most formidable line of artillery. Partly in consequence of 
 this long grass, partly to the clouds of dust blown towards the 
 British, General Lake did not at once realize the extreme 
 strength of the enemy's position, and full of the idea that 
 they intended to seize the pass in the Mcwati hills, from which 
 
Laswdri. 
 
 -°/ 
 
 they were now but eight miles distant, he resolved not to wait 
 for his infantry, but attack them at once. Accordingly, he 
 formed up his cavalry, and placing himself, as was his custom, 
 at their head, directed successive charges from the advanced 
 guard and first and second brigades on the left of the enemy's 
 position, whilst the third brigade should turn their right. The 
 charges on the left, where, it will be remembered, the Marathas 
 were massed about Laswari, were executed with great pre- 
 cision and success; the enemy were driven into the village, 
 several guns were taken, and, in some instances, their line was 
 penetrated. The want of infantry to complete that which the 
 cavalry had begun was, however, severely felt, for it enabled 
 the enemy to re-form and recover their guns. The charge on 
 the right was as brilliant and as resultless. The 3rd Brigade, 
 which made it, was formed of the 29th Dragoons and the 4th 
 Native Light Cavalry. They had been directed to turn the 
 enemy's right. To enable them to take up a position to carry 
 out this manoeuvre, they had to ride along the front of the 
 enemy's line, exposed to the fire of seventy-four guns, hidden 
 from them by the long grass. Heedless of this fire, they gal- 
 loped to the position marked out for them, then formed up 
 as steadily as if on parade, and charged the hostile batteries. 
 Here, again, the want of infantry was felt. The cavalry rode 
 over the guns only to find the enemy's infantry securely pro- 
 tected by an intrenchment, from which they poured a galling 
 fire. After they had vainly made heroic efforts to surmount 
 the difficulty, the General, perceiving the inutility of persever- 
 ing further, recalled his cavalry. If the attack had served to 
 show the great strength of the enemy's position, it had at least 
 also had the effect of preventing them from reaching Mewat 
 At noon the infantry came up, eager, notwithstanding their 
 forced march of twenty-five miles, for the attack. The 
 General, however, ordered them, in the first instance, to take 
 their morning meal. An hour later he ranged them for the 
 battle. 
 
288 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Meanwhile, the enemy had been busy in strengthening their 
 right, already the objective point of the British attack. Aware 
 of the additional strength obtained by the occupation of 
 houses they now caused it to fall back slightly on and about 
 the village of Mohalpiir, in which, also, they concentrated 
 many of their guns. Their preparations had just been com- 
 pleted when they became sensible of a movement on the part 
 of the British. 
 
 This time the English General had resolved to attack the 
 enemy's right seriously with his infantry, and, whilst one 
 brigade of cavalry should threaten his left, the other two 
 brigades were to be handy to support the infantry attack. 
 That attack was made in two lines, in column. No sooner, 
 however, was the movement of the first line, composed of the 
 76th and two native regiments, and led by the General in 
 person, noticed by the enemy, than their infantry fell back, 
 and from their guns in Mohalpiir, on its right, and on its left, 
 there opened a concentrated fire on the advancing troops. 
 Terrible as were its effects, great as was the slaughter, Lake 
 was only impelled to press on the more quickly, careless, under 
 the circumstances, of the fact, that, from some cause or other, 
 the advance of the second line had been delayed. The de- 
 cisive point in his eyes was the guns, and those, at any rate, 
 must be captured. The gallant warrior, conspicuous on his 
 horse, then led his men forward in face of a fire which, for 
 intensity, has rarely, if ever, been surpassed. But the enemy 
 were worthy even of him and his soldiers. Led only by their 
 own countrymen, they did credit to the careful training they 
 had received at the hands of Dudrenec and de Boigne. So 
 firm was their defence, so steadfast their bearing, that the 
 British troops could make no impression upon them. Just 
 at the critical moment, too, when the English column was 
 struggling forward under all the difficulties I have recorded, 
 Abaji, with the true eye of a general, dashed his cavalry 
 against them. The charge was repulsed, and Lake, whose 
 
Laswdri. 289 
 
 mental energies, like those of Massena, always redoubled 
 under the roar of cannon, then directed the British cavalry to 
 make a counter-charge. As the men were forming up for this 
 purpose, the horse of the General, who had ridden up to them 
 to superintend it, was shot under him : the next moment his 
 son,* who had dismounted to offer him his own, was shot by 
 his side and severely wounded. This affecting incident, wit- 
 nessed by all the troops preparing to charge, inspired them 
 with enthusiasm. When, a few seconds later, the order was 
 given, they clashed forward with an elan which was irresistible. 
 In vain did seventy guns pour shot and shell into their ranks; 
 in vain did the dense masses of the enemy spring forward 
 to repel them. Nothing stopped them ; they carried the guns. 
 Then Lake, with his infantry handy, dashed forward and 
 secured the greater number of them. Still, however, the enemy 
 fcught on, disputing with a valour and a pertinacity not to 
 be exceeded every inch of the ground. Nor did they quit the 
 field till they had been driven from every position and had 
 lost every gun. 
 
 In the desperate valour with which it was contested on both 
 sides, in the equality of the numbers engaged, and in the pro- 
 portion of the numbers lost, the battle of Laswari ranks above 
 all others in which the British troops had been engaged in 
 India. To rival it we must cast our eyes forward more than 
 forty years till they rest on Firuzshahar and the Satlaj. A 
 contemporary writer, who took part in the action, and to whose 
 spirited narrative I am indebted for many of its details,t 
 records that from the commencement of the conflict early in 
 the morning to the close of the general action in the evening 
 the enemy discovered a firmness of resolution and a contempt 
 of death which could not fail to command the admiration of 
 
 * Afterwards, when Lieutenant-Colonel of the 29th Foot, killed at the 
 battle of Roleia fJ7th August, 1808), just when, at the head of his regi- 
 tnent, he had forced the pass, the possession of which decided the day. 
 t Thorn's "War in India." 
 
 U 
 
290 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 their opponents. It was well that it was so ! They were 
 righting for empire. To their master defeat meant more even 
 than the failure to obtain empire; it meant the loss of the 
 independent position which the House of Sindia had gained 
 by the sword ! 
 
 Yes — the war provoked by Sindia and the Bhonsle was a 
 war in which they had staked that independent position to 
 fight for empire. They lost the stake. First, the blow de- 
 livered by Wcllesley on the 23rd September at Assaye ruined 
 their aspirations with respect to south-western and western 
 India — the early cradle of their power. But the blow dealt 
 at Assaye did not affect the vast countries north of the Yind- 
 hayan range. In those — from Ujjen to Gwaliar, from 
 Gwaliar to Agra, to Dihli, to Aligarh, and, it may be said, 
 generally in Rajpiitana — Sindia was still master. In those 
 were concentrated his best troops, his best guns, his best gen- 
 erals, his strongest places. By a succession of rapid 
 manoeuvres, and a rare display of fighting power, Lake wrested 
 these strong places from him one after another, and then 
 finally dealt a most decisive blow — the most decisive blow 
 of the whole war — at Laswari. It was the fairest, the most 
 equally matched, and the most hotly contested battle ever 
 fought between the British and the natives of India. It had 
 the most important consequences. The battle of Laswari 
 brought to the ground, crumbled and trampled in the dust, 
 all the dreams of Madhaji Sindia. From its effects the great 
 Maratha family never recovered ! 
 
 To gain it cost the victors 838 in killed and wounded, or 
 one man out of every five engaged. The enemy's loss in the 
 actual battle was probably not so great, but in the pursuit 
 which followed it they suffered terribly. 
 
 Though Laswari was fought twenty days before Argaum, 
 it was not Argaum but Laswari which decided Sindia to 
 accept the terms offered by Marquess Wellesley. Argaum was 
 a rout, the Maratrui troops engaged in which had been beaten 
 
Laswdri. 291 
 
 before they had fought. Laswari had taken the fighting 
 stuff out of every man in the Maratha dominions. 
 
 Its result, coming immediately after Argaum, was the treaty 
 of Surji Arjengaon. By this treaty Daolat Rao ceded to the 
 British and their allies his territories between the Jamna and 
 the Ganges, as well as those situate to the northward of Jaipur, 
 of Jodhpur, and of Gonad ; the forts of Ahmadnagar and 
 of Bharuch (Broach), and the districts adjoining; his posses- 
 sions between A junta Ghat and the Godavari. He renounced, 
 likewise, all claims on the Mughul Emperor, on the Peshwa, 
 on the Nizam, on the Gaikwar, and on all the rajahs who had 
 assisted the British. There were other minor concessions, but 
 these were the principal. 
 
 Though the final blow dealt at the Maratha empire was 
 not dealt till fourteen years later, when the Peshwa was ex- 
 tinguished and Sindia and Holkar were still further reduced, 
 the conditions of their existence never resumed the importance 
 that had attached to them prior to the campaign of 1803. It 
 may be said, indeed, that that campaign virtually decided 
 beforehand the war which immediately followed with Jeswant 
 Rao Holkar, and which forced that potentate, a fugitive hope- 
 less of aught but of his life, to throw himself on the mercy 
 of the conqueror with the touching admission that "his whole 
 kingdom lay upon his saddle's bow." The two Maratha chief- 
 tains allowed themselves to be dealt with in detail, and there 
 can be no doubt that, in spite of some accidents of the second 
 war, such as Monson's retreat and the failure at Bharatpur, 
 Holkar's soldiers suffered throughout the campaign from the 
 effects of Laswari ! 
 
 One word regarding the general who fought it. General 
 Lake was a man whose influence with his soldiers was un- 
 bounded, whose calmness in danger, whose self-reliance, and 
 whose power of commanding confidence have never been sur- 
 passed. He had but one way of dealing with the native 
 armies of India, that of moving straight forward; of attack- 
 
2Lj2 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 ing them wherever he found them. He never was so great as 
 on the battle field. He could think more clearly under the 
 roar of bullets than in the calmness and quiet of his tent. In 
 this respect he resembled Clive. It was this quality which 
 enabled him to dare the almost impossible. That which in 
 others would have been rash, in Lake was prudent daring. 
 
 If success justifies a general, then was Lake fully absolved 
 from the criticisms of men who took not into consideration his 
 peculiar qualities. With a force at no time exceeding 8,000 
 men, he, between the 29th August and the 1st November, 
 destroyed the thirty-one battalions which French adventurers 
 had trained and disciplined for the service of Smdia; stormed 
 a strong fortress, captured Agra, and "entered as a conqueror 
 the imperial city of Dihli; captured 426 pieces of cannon, and 
 defeated the enemy in four pitched battles — the last of them r 
 for the results it produced, one of the most decisive battles 
 ever fought. There must be some credit due to the man who 
 accomplished such great results in a period exceeding two 
 months by only three days. What he might have accom- 
 plished had he lived to be employed against the soldiers of 
 Napoleon no man can say. He died a victim to the climate 
 of India. Lie left that country in February 1807, reached 
 England in the September following, and died in February 
 1808. He had been created a viscount for his brilliant 
 services. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 BHARATPUR. 
 
 I MENTIONED towards the close of the last chapter that the 
 victory over Sindia virtually decided the war which immedi- 
 ately followed with Jeswant Rao Holkar. That war was, 
 however, marked by two events which for a time shook the 
 prestige of the British. These were the retreat, still known 
 in history as " Monscn's retreat," and the abortive siege of 
 Bharatpiir, commonly called Bhurtpore. The first of these 
 was completely avenged the very year of its occurrence. The 
 renown of the second continued for twenty years to point the 
 moral to the malcontents and intriguers who flecked about the 
 courts of native princes. These never failed to impress upon 
 their masters that there was a limit to British prowess; that 
 behind stone walls and earthworks they could be defied with 
 impunity. To repress this growing feeling, to convince the 
 natives who traded upon it that the ''incident" of 1804 was 
 but an " accident," a second siege was needed. The second 
 siege, undertaken by Lord Combermere a 1825, terminated 
 successfully for the British. In its result it decided the ques- 
 tion as to the capacity of British troops, and native soldiers 
 led by British officers, to prevail against stone walls and 
 earthen ramparts. The story of both sieges may fairly claim 
 a place, then, in a work which relates those military events 
 
 293 
 
294 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 which decided the question of British supremacy in India. 
 For it must never be forgotten that though we won India by 
 the sword we hold it mainly by opinion — by the conviction in 
 the minds of the natives that we are strong enough to main- 
 tain law and order within its borders, to protect them against 
 all enemies from without. 
 
 When Sindia and the Bhonsle had entered into that war 
 with the British, the most striking incidents of which are re- 
 lated in the last chapter, Jeswant Rao Holkar had held aloof, 
 and, as the war proceeded, had watched with complacency the 
 defeats of the two Maratha princes. There was a feeling, 
 additional to the feeling of jealousy of Sindia, which nour- 
 ished this complacency. Jeswant Rao was, in his way, a man 
 of very considerable natural capacity. High-spirited, cour- 
 ageous, a splendid horseman, he was the very man to lead the 
 Marathas in the charges for which they were so renowned. 
 Against Daolat Rao he had grave cause of complaint. The 
 son of the last Holkar by a concubine, he was a prisoner at 
 the capital of the Bhonsle when Daolat Rao, in the hope of 
 obtaining possession of all the territories of the Holkars, mur- 
 dered the rightful heir, Mulhar Rao, a prince of great promise, 
 and imprisoned his only legitimate brother, Khasi Rao, a man 
 of weak intellect, whom he proposed to use as a tool. This 
 treacherous action was resented by the followers of the 
 Holkars, and they instinctively turned their hopes to Jeswant 
 Rao. Informed of what had happened, the young chief es- 
 caped from his place of confinement and assumed the reins 
 of sovereignty at Indur in 1798. To avenge himself upon 
 Sindia he invaded his territories shortly after, and, in June 
 1 80 1, completely defeated his army at Ujjen. In the July 
 following he made a daring attack upon Sindia's great park 
 of artillery on the Narbada, and, though he was repulsed, so 
 thoroughly alarmed Daolat Rao that that Maharajah advanced 
 at once in great force on the capital, Indiir. In the hotly-con- 
 tested battle which followed near that place Sindia was the 
 
Bharatpur, 295 
 
 victor. But, by his dilatorincss, he cast away all the fruits of 
 victory; allowed Ilolkar time to gather together a new army, 
 at the head of which he plundered Rajputana, devastated 
 Khandesh, and, defeating, the 25th of October, the army of 
 Sindia near Puna, occupied that capita!, and terrified the 
 Peshwa into signing with the British that treaty of Bassein 
 which was the virtual abdication of his power! 
 
 Roused to a conviction of the danger which might await 
 each of themselves from the fate which had attended the 
 prince who had been, nominally at least, the lord of their 
 confederacy, the three Maratha chiefs, Sindia, the Bhonsle, 
 and Holkar, forgot for -a moment their jealousies of each 
 other, and agreed, in the manner related in the last chapter, 
 to band together against the British. But when the time for 
 action arrived Jeswant Rao held aloof, hoping, it is believed, 
 that when the combatants were exhausted, he would be able 
 to step in and dictate his own terms ! 
 
 How the contest between the British and the two other 
 Maratha princes, Sindia and the Bhonsle, terminated, I have 
 told in the last chapter. Jeswant Rao had watched, I have 
 said, the course of the contest with complacency. The sudden 
 collapse of his former associates, the fact that within a period 
 of little more than two months the English in northern and 
 central India had taken Aligarh, Dihli, and Agra, and gained 
 the battle of Laswari ; whilst in the south-west they had 
 triumphed at Assaye and Argaum, gave him, however, con- 
 siderate cause for reflection, and he hesitated long as to 
 whether he should attempt to plunder Sindia, weakened by 
 his losses, or, cementing an alliance with him, turn his arms 
 against the British. For a short time he seemed inclined to 
 the former course; and it was only when he learned that 
 Sindia, apprehensive of such action on his part, had agreed'' 
 to become a party to the defensive alliance subsisting between 
 the British Government, the Peshwa, and the Nizam, on con- 
 
 * Treaty dated 27th February, 1804. 
 
296 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 dition that the British should maintain a subsidiary force of 
 six battalions for his defence, that he reconsidered his posi- 
 tion. With the cunning habitual to a Maratha he resolved at 
 last to play a double game : to endeavour, on the one hand, 
 to induce Sindia to join him against the British; on the other, 
 to solicit permission from the latter to allow him to deal as 
 he might choose with Sindia. In both these attempts he over- 
 reached himself. Sindia, smarting under blows the severity 
 of which he greatly attributed to the abstention of Holkar, 
 communicated to the British the overtures made to him. The 
 perusal of the documents containing these, combined with 
 the haughty tone of the letters addressed by Jeswant Rao to 
 the British generals, satisfied the Governor-General that 
 Holkar was bent on war. Instructions were at once despatched 
 to Lord Lake, who was encamped with his army at Biana, 
 fifty miles south-west from Agra, opposite the pass leading 
 into the dominions of the Rajah of Jaipur, to resist any attempt 
 which Jeswant Rao Holkar might make on the territories of 
 Sindia. 
 
 Before he had received this communication, Lord Lake, de- 
 sirous to avoid unnecessary complications, had despatched a 
 letter to Jeswant Rao warning him of the consequences of 
 making war upon an ally of the British, and strongly urging 
 him to remain quietly within his own territories. But already 
 the mind of Jeswant Rao was made up. On the receipt of 
 Lord Lake's letter, he sent for an English adventurer in his 
 service, named Vickers, one of his best officers, a man whose 
 coolness and powers of leading had contributed largely to 
 the victory gained over Sindia near Piina (the 25th October, 
 1802); informed him of his determination to fight the Eng- 
 lish; and asked him if he was ready to join in battle against 
 his own countrymen. The reply of Vickers was clear and 
 decided. He would fight against any other people, but not 
 against his own countrymen. Holkar then summoned two 
 other Englishmen in his service, Tod and Ryan, and put to 
 
Bharatfur. 2t)j 
 
 each the same question. They gave the answer which Vickers 
 had given. Then Holkar ordered that the three men should 
 be slain. Their heads were at once severed from their bodies 
 and placed on three poles in front of his camp, whilst a crier 
 proclaimed that such would be the fate of every European 
 who should fall into the hands of Holkar ! 
 
 This barbarous murder, the discovery about the same time 
 of correspondence on the part of Jeswant Rao with the 
 Rohilahs and the Sikhs, and the threatening attitude which 
 the troops of Holkar were assuming with respect to Jaipur, 
 determined Lord Lake to advance into the territory of that 
 Rajah. Accordingly, having previously sent back his heavy 
 guns to Agra, he broke up, the 9th February, 1804, from Biana, 
 and marched leisurely twenty-one miles to Hindaon, in Jaipur 
 territory. Hence, as the negotiations still proceeding with 
 Holkar seemed every day to assume a more unsatisfactory 
 tone, he proceeded, the 8th March, to Ramgarh, still in Jaipur 
 territcry, forty-one miles, north-west by west, from the capital 
 of that name. He was here when he received letters from 
 Holkar, to the haughty tone of which I have referred in a 
 previous page. Haughty as was that tcne, it was as nothing 
 in comparison with the bearing of the messengers who con- 
 veyed the letters. These openly avowed that their master 
 had concluded a treaty with the Rohilahs and with the Rajah 
 of Bharatpiir; declared that a war with Holkar could never 
 bring any profit to his opponents, since he was a marauder 
 by profession; could dispose of 150,000 cavalry, at whose head 
 he would be able to inflict terrible punishment on his enemies, 
 whilst defeat in one place would not prevent reappearance in 
 another. They boasted, likewise, of a secret understanding 
 with Sindia and of an alliance with France ! 
 
 Lord Lake contented himself with advising the emissaries 
 of Holkar and Llolkar himself to be more moderate in then- 
 language. On the 23rd he moved to Balahara, still in Jaipur 
 territory. There he received a copy of an insolent letter which 
 
298 1' lie Decisive BattleS'of India. 
 
 Holkar had addressed to General Wellesley. A few days 
 later he heard that Holkar had invaded and plundered the 
 dominions of the Rajah of Jaipur. He at once applied to 
 the Governor-General for instructions. Marquess Wellesley, 
 in reply, directed Lord Lake to treat Holkar as an enemy. 
 
 Still Lake was unwilling" to do more than protect the princes 
 who naturally looked to the English for defence. Of these 
 the Rajah of Jaipur was one. The territories of that prince 
 had been plundered, and his capital was in danger. To pro- 
 tect that capital, then, Lord Lake despatched from Deosar, 
 which place he reached on the 17th, a small force under Colonel 
 Monson. The distance to be traversed was fifty miles. 
 
 Colonel Monson had a very good reputation in the army. 
 He had led the storming party at Aligarh, but the severe 
 wound he had received on that occasion had not allowed him 
 to take any further part in the campaign. From that wound 
 he had but recently recovered, and it was to compensate him 
 for his enforced absence from the fields of Dihli, Agra, and 
 Laswari, that Lord Lake now gave him an opportunity of 
 distinguishing himself. The force entrusted to him consisted 
 of the two battalions of the 12th Regiment N.I., the 2nd Bat- 
 talion 2nd N.I., a few European gunners, some native cavalry 
 levies, and a small contingent of Sindia's troops under Bapiiji 
 Sindia, a relative of Daolat Rao. 
 
 With this force Colonel Monson set out from Deosar on the 
 1 8th April and reached the vicinity of Jaipur on the 21st 
 Lord Lake had not dispatched him a day too soon, for he 
 found Holkar's army occupying a position which threatened 
 the city on its southern side. Whether it was that Jeswant 
 Rao was unwilling to strike the first blow at the British, or 
 whether he had already conceived the design of enticing 
 Colonel Monson into a position from which he would find it 
 difficult to withdraw, ma}' not be exactly known. It is 
 certain, however, that when on the morning of the 23rd, Mon- 
 son reconnoitred his position, Jeswant Rao had disappeared ! 
 
B karat-pur. 299 
 
 Holkar had marched in a southerly direction, apparently 
 without purpose. Meanwhile, however, Lord Lake had dis- 
 patched Colonel Don with seven companies of native bat- 
 talions, a native cavalry regiment, and a native battery, to 
 gain possession of Tonk Rampura, a strong fort in the district 
 of Tonk. Don had duly stormed Tonk Rampiira. The news 
 of this had a marked influence on the proceedings of Jeswant 
 Rao. Before the fall of Tonk Rampura he had carefully kept 
 on the right bank of the Chambal,but,on hearing of Don's suc- 
 cess, he crossed that river and marched hastily southwards. 
 
 Relieved by this retreat Lord Lake resolved to rest his 
 troops and to postpone serious operations until after the rainy 
 season. Lie directed Don, then, to join Monson with two 
 native regiments; ordered that officer, whose force was thus 
 strengthened to 4,000 men, to march on Kota and cover the 
 Jaipur territory, whilst he himself should move on Agra and 
 Kanhpur. Similarly, General Wellesley directed Colonel 
 Murray to march with a small force from Gujrat upon Indiir, 
 with a view to prevent Jeswant Rao from attempting to recover 
 ground in the north. 
 
 Monson had, we have seen, been ordered to defend, from 
 Kota, the territory of Jaipur. Scarcely, however, had Lord 
 Lake moved towards Agra than it occurred to Monson that by 
 making a movement from Kota southwards he would be able 
 to open communications with Murray. In spite of the fact 
 that such a move was opposed to the general instructions he 
 had received from his Commander-in-Chief, he made it; 
 marched through the Mokandara pass twenty miles to Sonara, 
 detached thence one native regiment, six 6-pounders, and some 
 irregular horse, under Major Sinclair, to seize the small but 
 strong fort of Hinglajgarh; whilst he pushed on himself, not- 
 withstanding very rainy weather and bad roads, to the village 
 of Piplah. Here he received information that Holkar had 
 suddenly retraced his steps and was then encamped with a 
 strong force on the Chambal, some twenty-five miles distant, 
 
300 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 covering the town of Rampiira, within the Indiir territory — 
 not to be confounded with the Tonk Rampiira — and guarding 
 the only ford across the river by which it could be approached. 
 
 Monson had with him but three days' supplies, and he had 
 experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining any mere from 
 the country through which he had marched. Piplah was only 
 a village, quite unable to furnish him, and he had counted on 
 re- victual ling at Rampiira. To reach Rampiira was now 
 impossible, if Holkar should bar the way. Equally so to 
 remain, with only three days' supplies, at the village of 
 Piplah. He could not make up his mind to retreat. But 
 Monson was a very sanguine man. He had absolute faith in 
 the moral efficacy of a forward movement. He could not 
 divest himself of the belief that if Holkar, who had shrunk 
 from attacking him at Jaipur, were to learn that he was march- 
 ing on Rampura he would retreat before him. He resolved 
 then, in spite of the still continuing rain, to march on that 
 place. Setting out on the morning of the 7th July, he halted 
 for the night at Guri, seven miles from Rampura. There, con- 
 flicting information of the movements of Holkar at first 
 reached him. Finally, however, at nine o'clock at night he 
 received certain intelligence that Jeswant Rao had crossed the 
 river and was distributing largesses to his troops. This was 
 regarded as the certain prelude to action, and Monson accord- 
 ingly ordered his troops to remain under arms all night. 
 
 During that night he consulted with the commanding officers 
 under him, and especially with the leader of the native con- 
 tingent, Bapiiji Sindia. Unfortunately, this man, who was in 
 secret correspondence with Holkar, prevailed upon Monson 
 to give the order to retreat. In a word, the resolution which 
 had prompted Monson to advance from Piplah vanished when 
 he was persuaded that his progress so far had not induced 
 Holkar to evacuate Rampiira. In vain did the commandants 
 of the native regiments urge him to advance. In vain did 
 Lieutenant Lucan, who commanded the native cavalry levies, 
 
B karat pur. 301 
 
 beg him, on his knees, to attack Holkar, offering to encounter 
 that chief with his own men. Colonel Monson had made up 
 his mind. Telling Lucan that he might, if he chose, stay to 
 encounter the whole Maratha army, he gave immediate orders 
 for a retrograde movement. During the night, indeed, he held 
 his ground, but at four o'clock the following morning he 
 despatched his baggage and camp equipage towards Sonara, 
 and followed at nine A.M. with his infantry and guns, directing 
 Lucan to cover the retreat with his cavalry. His hope was to 
 reach the Mokandara pass before the enemy could overtake 
 him. Once there, he calculated on being able to obtain sup- 
 plies from the country beyond it, whilst his troops would 
 defend the pass against Holkar's entire army. 
 
 But Monson had not left his ground at Gun three hours 
 before he found he had reckoned too much on the inactivity 
 of Jeswant Rao. Scarcely had that time expired when 20,000 
 Maratha horsemen, flushed with the conviction of their own 
 superiority, dashed upon Lucan's scanty horsemen and speedily 
 overpowered them. Lucan and his comrade, the Baraitch 
 Nuwab, after doing wonders, were wounded and taken 
 prisoners, whilst Bapiiji Sindia, throwing off the mask, boldly 
 went over to the enemy. Monson, meanwhile, pushed on with 
 his infantry, reached Sonara, a march of twenty miles, the 
 same evening, and the Mokandara pass, nearly twenty miles 
 further, early the next morning. There Jeswant Rao sum- 
 moned him to surrender. On his refusal, Jeswant Rao at- 
 tacked him ; but Monson's troops responded nobly to the 
 appeal which he made them, and, after a contest which lasted 
 from eleven o'clock in the morning till six o'clock in the 
 evening, drove back the Maratha troops in confusion. 
 
 It had been, we have seen, Monson's intention to hold the 
 Mokandara pass, the entrance to which was strongly fortified, 
 and to await there provisions and supplies. But fearing on 
 the evening of the ninth that the Marathas might be induced 
 in consequence of their repulse, to endeavour to cut him off 
 
3<D2 The Decisive Battles of India, 
 
 from Kota, he resolved to leave Colonel Don, with one bat- 
 talion, to defend the pass till the morning, and to retreat 
 himself to that place. 
 
 Don successfully performed his part of the programme, 
 then, pushing on, rejoined Monson. Three days of hard 
 marching brought the force to Kota, but the Rajah of that 
 place declined to admit it, and even refused it provisions. At 
 nine P.M. of the 12th it started, then, for Ganias on the Cham- 
 bal. It reached that place, after a harassing march, on the 
 13th, crossed the river, not without great difficulty, the 14th; 
 and pushed on, the 16th, without order, through a heavy 
 country, the black soil of which had been reduced by the rain 
 almost to the condition of a bog. On the 16th, it was found 
 impossible to drag the guns through the sticky black soil, made 
 more sticky by the heavy rain. They were, therefore, spiked 
 and abandoned. The force pushed on, but in eight hours it 
 was able to accomplish only as many miles. On the 17th the 
 Chambali Nala, close to the entrance of the Lakri pass, was 
 reached; and here the force halted till the 26th, in great dis- 
 tress from want of food, and constantly harassed by the enemy. 
 On the evening of the 26th the worn-out soldiers attempted 
 the passage of the Nala, threatened all the time by the enemy's 
 cavalry, who cut off numbers of their baggage cattle. On the 
 27th, however, the passage was completed, owing very much 
 to the exertions of Colonel Don, who commanded the rear- 
 guard, and who had to beat off the attacks of the population, 
 eager for plunder, as well as of the enemy's cavalry. All the 
 baggage, however, had to be sacrificed. On joining the main 
 body that same evening Don received a letter from Monson 
 announcing that he had preceded the force to Tonk Ram- 
 pura. The command then devolved upon Don, who, in two 
 marches, characterised by great suffering, led the starving force 
 to Rampiira, where Monson re-assumed command, and after 
 many hesitations, resolved to remain until the reinforcements 
 for which he had applied should reach him. 
 
Bharatpiir, 303 
 
 The reinforcements, consisting of two native battalions, one 
 regiment of irregular cavalry, and six guns, reached Tonk 
 Rampiira on the 14th August. They brought with them, how- 
 ever, no supplies. For a week Monson remained at that place, 
 threatened on the one side by Ilolkar, on the other by Bapiiji 
 Sindia. He might have remained there longer until the further 
 reinforcements promised by Lord Lake should have reached 
 him. But — to use his own expression — "his mind was so dis- 
 tracted" that he could think coolly upon no point. In a 
 moment of utter discouragement he gave orders to retreat on 
 Kushalgarh,. telling his officers at the same time that it would 
 be for them to make their way to Agra, some ninety -eight miles 
 further, as best they could ! 
 
 In the march to Kushalgarh Monson was attacked when 
 crossing the Banas, on the 24th August, by Jeswant Rao 
 Holkar, and was very severely handled. Monson himself 
 behaved with conspicuous gallantry; but the 2nd Battalion 
 2nd N.I. was almost annihilated; several of his best officers 
 were killed or wounded; one howitzer was lost, and the spirits 
 of both officers and men were greatly affected. He succeeded, 
 however, in reaching Kushalgarh on the night of the 25th, 
 having marched that day thirty-six miles, exposed all the 
 time to constant attacks. At Kushalgarh he obtained sup- 
 plies; but a detachment of Sindia's troops stationed there, 
 which he had expected to support him, displayed a decidedly 
 hostile disposition. 
 
 Great as had been Monson's difficulties up to the time of 
 his arrival at Kushalgarh, they now became infinitely greater. 
 The town was ill-fitted for defence; the enemy were swarming 
 around its walls; his troops were dispirited; he himself had 
 no plan. After considering the whole day of the 26th, Mon- 
 son at last resolved to evacuate the place, though he scarcely 
 knew in what direction to retire. At eight o'clock that evening, 
 then, he formed the troops that remained to him in an oblong 
 square and moved off in that formation. The enemy, however, 
 
304 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 soon discovered his retreat, and 20,000 cavalry started on his 
 track, and soon came up with and attacked the rear face of 
 the square. The steadiness of the men forming that face, the 
 remnant of the 2nd Battalion 21st X.I., however, kept the 
 enemy at bay, though the attacks were repeated until noon of 
 the day following. But their last remaining gun, a howitzer, 
 was spiked and abandoned. 
 
 The retreating force took advantage of the cessation of the 
 enemy's attacks at noon to hurry on to Hindaon, a large city 
 with extensive fortifications. They came within sight of it — 
 having marched twenty-seven miles without a halt — at sunset, 
 only to find, to their intense disappointment, that it was partly 
 occupied by the enemy. Unwilling, with a tired and partly 
 demoralized force, and with an enemy still following in its 
 rear, to risk a fight for its possession, Monson moved to an 
 old fort in its neighbourhood, and there gave his troops a few 
 hours' repose. At one o'clock the following morning, how- 
 ever, he was again on his way, still marching in the same form- 
 ation. As long as the darkness continued there were no signs 
 of an enemy; but at daylight the Maratha horse came swarm- 
 ing on his track, accompanied by camels carrying rockets and 
 swivel-guns, which were occasionally discharged. The situa- 
 tion was soon to become even more perilous. For, at seven 
 o'clock, as he and his troops emerged in very straggling order 
 from some intricate ravines, they perceived the enemy formed 
 up in front and on both sides of them, whilst just as the 
 moment the Maratha horse came thundering on their rear. In 
 this terrible extremity the sipahis proved themselves worthy 
 alike of their officers and of their training. Forgetting the 
 long marches, the harassing disquietudes, of the previous two 
 months, of the fact that the men who attacked them were men 
 of their own faith and country, they formed up steadily, re- 
 served their fire till the enemy were within fifty yards, and 
 then began a continuous file-firing which emptied many a 
 saddle. On the rear, on the front, on both flanks did the 
 
lUiaratpur. 305 
 
 horsemen of Jeswant Rao make charge after charge. All in 
 vain, however. They made no more impression upon those 
 brave sipahis than did the French cavalry of Napoleon upon 
 the solid squares of the British at Waterloo ! 
 
 Finding all their efforts to break the square with their horse- 
 men ineffectual, the Marathas then attempted the surer method 
 of pouring in a steady fixe from their matchlockmen and the 
 camel-swivels. From this the sipahis suffered terribly. Mon- 
 son, therefore, gave orders to move on, still in square. But 
 the enemy continued their attacks, and took advantage of the 
 inequalities of the ground, caused by the many ravines and 
 nalas in the way, to inflict very severe loss upon the retreating 
 force. Nor with the waning day did they lemit their attacks. 
 Sunset came and there was no respite. Darkness followed 
 almost immediately ; still the matchlock fire continued. Under 
 such circumstances halting was not to be thought of. The 
 sipahis pushed on, then, till they reached the entrance of the 
 Biana pass, one of the most difficult, from its narrowness and 
 steep ravines, in the country. Here the semblance of order 
 almost entirely disappeared. To get through the pass was the 
 object of every individual. Officers, sipahis, camp-followers 
 rushed through it in wild disorder. One battalion alone, form- 
 ing the rear face, the 1st Battalion 14th N.I., kept some kind 
 of formation, and, by preventing the rush of the enemy's 
 horsemen, enabled their comrades to escape. 
 
 After they had emerged from the Biana pass, the force made 
 no further attempt to rally. The next day some stragglers 
 reached Fathpiir Sikri. But even here there was no rest for 
 them, for the very townspeople treated them as fugitive out- 
 casts and fired upon them. With the poor remnant of strength 
 remaining, they pushed on then to Agra, still twenty-three 
 miles distant, and that day and the following, the 30th and 
 3 1st August, the arrival of wretched, footsore, half-starved, 
 and dispirited fugitives conveyed to the garrison of Agra 
 
 x 
 
o 
 
 06 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 some idea of the humiliation ever in store for the general who 
 retreats before a barbarian enemy ! 
 
 Such was Monson's retreat. What it cost in men was never 
 ascertained. Of the officers, fourteen were killed, one was 
 drowned; three were taken prisoners, one of whom was mur- 
 dered and one died ; nine were wounded. The misfortune was 
 due entirely to the want of steadfastness of Monson. Unduly 
 bold, he had advanced, in opposition to the general directions 
 of Lord Lake, from Kota. When he heard that Jeswant Rao 
 was at Rampiira on the Chambal, he had still time to fall back. 
 His resolution to advance and attack was an heroic resolution. 
 Had he carried it out he would probably have succeeded. 
 Even if he had failed, had he been destroyed, the effect would 
 not have been nearly so bad as that which actually followed. 
 But, having only three days' supplies, to advance, over a 
 barren country, to within seven miles of an enemy, and then, 
 morally frightened, to retreat, was of all courses the most in- 
 sane. The retribution which followed was a righteous retribu- 
 tion. It served, for a long series of years, as an example and 
 as a warning, never requiring, until 1841, when its teaching had 
 been forgotten, a painful and humiliating renewal ! 
 
 During this retreat the conduct of Jeswant Rao had not been 
 marked by the energy and decision for which the Maratha 
 world had given him credit. With 60,000 horse and 15,000 
 footmen under him he had failed to destroy a demoraHsed 
 enemy retreating under circumstances of great disadvantage. 
 He himself had sent on, he had not led on, his troops. Though 
 he had forced back, then, the British sipahis, he had failed to 
 destroy them. With the natives, indeed, who contrasted his 
 comparative success with the constant defeats of Sindia and 
 the Bhonsle, the fact that he had driven before him the uncon- 
 quered British greatly augmented his credit. But his own 
 estimate of his prowess was not apparently very high. Not- 
 withstanding his success against Monson he would not even 
 attack the city of Mathura, rich as it was, until after the Eng- 
 
Bharatpur. 307 
 
 lish had evacuated it. When on the 15th September they fell 
 back to concentrate at Agra, he then, the day following, 
 entered Mathura, but he showed no disposition to move nearer 
 to his enemy. 
 
 The news of Monson's disaster inspired every Englishman 
 in India, from the Governor-General downwards, to exert him- 
 self to the very utmost to avenge it. Fortunately that 
 Governor-General was Marquess Wellesley — a real king of 
 men — who shrank neither from responsibility nor from danger. 
 Orders were instantly issued to concentrate a force under Lord 
 Lake's orders for offensive operations. 
 
 Lord Lake, who was at Khanpur when the disaster occurred, 
 marched from that place, with the troops stationed there, the 
 3rd September, and reached Sikandrah — the portion of Agra 
 where stands the mausoleum of the illustrious Akbar — the 
 22nd of the same month. There, another portion of the aveng- 
 ing army had been collected. It consisted, when united, of 
 three regiments of dragoons— the 8th, 27th and 29th— five 
 regiments of native cavalry, the 76th Regiment of Foot, and 
 the flank companies of the 22nd Regiment, ten battalions of 
 native infantry and the usual proportion of artillery. 
 
 On the 1st October Lord Lake marched towards Mathura. 
 Holkar, however, had no wish to fight a general action. His 
 plans were conceived in a far abler spirit. He wished to delay 
 the advance of his enemy, to harass him by flying parties, 
 whilst, with his main body, he should make a dash at Dihli 
 and gain possession of the person of the ruling Mughul, the 
 blind Shah A'lam. He had already dispatched his infantry in 
 the direction of the capital, whilst, with his cavalry, he took a 
 position at Aurang, a village nine miles to the west of Mathura. 
 Unsuspicious of Holkar's device, Lord Lake, who had 
 caused Mathura to be re-occupied, moved against that chief 
 early on the morning of the 7th. But, as soon as the vanguard 
 of the British army appeared, Holkar evacuated his position 
 and retreated more quickly than he could be pursued. On 
 
308 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the ioth a similar attempt was attended with the same result. 
 The next day Lord Lake received a dispatch from Colonel 
 Ochterlony from Dihli, informing him that Holkar's infantry 
 had appeared before that city on the /th and were about to 
 attempt its capture. 
 
 The defences of Dihli were in a very dilapidated condition. 
 The walls had not been repaired since the city was taken by 
 Ahmad Shah Durani; the ramparts had mostly fallen, and 
 the bastions were in a state of decay. The garrison consisted 
 of two and a half native battalions, and some — as the event 
 proved, untrustworthy — matchlockmen. But as a set-off to 
 the disrepair of the defences and the paucity of the troops was 
 the fact that the men who wielded the chief authority within 
 its walls were men of the stamp of those who have made Eng- 
 land. They were Colonel David Ochterlony and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel William Burn. 
 
 It is not necessary to describe here the details of the story of 
 the defence inaugurated by these gallant officers. It must 
 suffice to state that for seven days the troops of Holkar, 19,000 
 strong, with 160 guns, commanded by Bapuji Sindia — the 
 man who had proved a traitor to Monson — used all the means 
 in their power to master the place. But all the assaults which 
 they made were repulsed. On the 14th, learning that Lord 
 Lake was marching to relieve the city, they made a grand 
 attempt to escalade the walls simultaneously at several points. 
 In not one did they succeed. Then, completely baffled, they 
 retreated the same night, leaving the scaling ladders standing ! 
 On receiving Ochterlony's dispatch Lord Lake had started at 
 once for Dihli, leaving on the road, with a noble disregard of 
 rule, unattached and unmasked, three or four strong places 
 which had declared for Holkar. He reached Dihli the 18th. 
 The necessity of providing supplies for his troops forced him 
 to halt there for some days. He dispatched, however, on the 
 25th a small force under Colonel Burn to relieve Saharanpur. 
 Learning on the 29th that Holkar had crossed the Jamna at 
 
Bharatptir. 309 
 
 Panipat and had poured into the Duab, he started, the next 
 day, in pursuit cf him, at the head of three regiments of 
 dragoons, three of native cavalry, and Colonel Don's reserve 
 brigade of infantry. Holkar, meanwhile, had attempted to 
 destroy Burn's party, and, coming upon him with his whole 
 force, had forced him to take refuge on the 30th, with but a 
 small stock' of provisions, in a mud fort near Shamli. Here 
 Burn resisted for three days the repeated attacks of Holkar's 
 army. On the fourth day the news of the approach of Lord 
 Lake induced that wily chief to raise the siege. 
 
 Lord Lake, indeed, arrived the day following, the 3rd 
 November, having marched eleven and a half hours the previ- 
 ous day. He halted, then, on the 4th, but resumed the pursuit 
 by forced marches on the 5th. When, on the 15th, he reached 
 A'liganj and found the village, which had been set lire to by 
 the enemy, still burning, he resolved to push on the same night, 
 with the cavalry and galloper guns in pursuit. Just as he was 
 starting, however, a courier reached him with the information 
 that General Fraser, whom he had left in command of the 
 army during his absence, had achieved, en the 12th, a victory 
 over the main body of the enemy at Dig. To that event I 
 must recur for a moment. 
 
 Fraser had been left at Dihli with a force consisting of the 
 76th Regiment, the Company's European Regiment* and six 
 native battalions. Having ascertained that Holkar had left 
 his infantry and artillery behind him when he made his raid 
 into the Duab, Fraser, acting on instructions from Lcrd Lake, 
 went in search of them on the 6th November. He found them 
 on the 1 2th occupying a very strong position close to the 
 fortress of Dig. Their left rested on that fortress, which was 
 very strongly armed, and was covered by a morass which ex- 
 tended likewise in front of the centre; their right was protected 
 by a village en a height, bristling with guns. Fraser carefully 
 
 * New the Rcval Minister Fusiliers. 
 
310 The Decisive I tallies of India. 
 
 reconnoitred the position and then formed his plan. He 
 resolved to make a flank attack on the village, and when he 
 had carried it, to roll up the enemy from the right, and either 
 to destroy them or force them within the fort. To do this he 
 made a flank movement to his left beyond the morass and the 
 village; then, having well cleared the latter, took ground to 
 his right at a right angle to his first movement, then formed 
 up on the right flank of the village, facing it, and dashed the 
 76th against it. That gallant regiment drove the enemy from 
 the village, and then rushed down the declivity, supported by 
 the European and four native regiments, to attack the first 
 line of guns, which, in the meanwhile, the enemy had formed 
 to protect their centre and left. 
 
 This line they carried; but they had no sooner done so than 
 the\ r found themselves exposed to a heavier fire from a second 
 line. Under this fire they fell rapidly. One shot carried off 
 their General's leg, as he was forming up his men to charge. 
 The command then devolved upon Colonel Monson. Monson 
 at once carried out Fraser's plan, charged, drove the enemy 
 from the second line, and forced them to take refuge within 
 the fortress. Whilst he had been thus engaged, the enemy's 
 horse — who, on the first sign of Fraser's flank movement had 
 been dispatched from the left to make, by a wider circuit, a 
 movement conforming to his — came up on the rear of the 
 British force, and, galloping forward, retook the first line of 
 guns it had captured, and turned them upon the still advanc- 
 ing Europeans. They were thus occupied when Captain 
 Norford of the 76th, who had noticed their action, charged 
 them with twenty-eight men of his regiment and compelled 
 them to relinquish their hold. It was a very gallant action 
 and it cost Captain Norford his life. There still remained a 
 body of the enemy who had moved beyond the morass in the 
 direction of the British baggage, which had been left there 
 under the guard of two native ^giments. Against that body 
 
Bkaratptir. 3 1 1 
 
 Monson now turned, opened fire upon their flank and forced 
 them back through the morass. 
 
 The victory was in many respects important. It was the 
 first decisive reply to the disaster of Monson's retreat. It 
 proved that on the field of battle Holkar's infantry and 
 artillery, even when resting on a fortress, were no match for 
 the British. The circumstances connected with it made one 
 thing clear. The fortress of Dig belonged to Ranjit Singh, 
 Rajah of Eharatpiir; that Rajah was nominally the ally of 
 the British; yet he had allowed Holkar, who was at war with 
 the British, free use of his fortress : it was evident, then, that 
 Ranjit Singh was prepared to cast in his lot with Holkar. 
 
 The battle of Dig cost the British 643 men killed and 
 wounded. General Fraser died a few days after the action. 
 The victors captured eighty-seven pieces of cannon, of which 
 fourteen were pieces which had been lost by Monson in his 
 retreat. The loss of the enemy was computed, probably with 
 truth, at something under 2,oco. 
 
 Lord Lake, I have said, received information of this victory 
 just as he was setting out from A'liganj at the head of his 
 cavalry in pursuit of Holkar. Its communication to the men 
 he was leading encouraged them greatly. They set off at once, 
 marched all night by the light of the moon, and at daybreak 
 came in sight of Holkar's encampment at Farakhabad. Lake 
 at once ordered the galloper guns to open fire. 
 
 Holkar was entirely unsuspicious of his vicinity. In the 
 early part of the night which had just then terminated he had 
 been enjoying a nautch, when, in the midst of it, a messenger 
 communicated to him the information of the defeat which his 
 troops had sustained at Dig. Troubled more than he cared to 
 avow, he quitted the entertainment without communicating the 
 news to his chiefs. He was still sleeping heavily when the fire 
 of the galloper guns convinced him that the enemy he most 
 dreaded was upon him. He was thoroughly panic-stricken. 
 Forgetting the fame he had acquired, the boasts he had in- 
 
312 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 dulged in, his visions of empire and dominion, he hurriedly 
 mounted his horse, and, followed only by those who had been 
 as expeditious as himself, galloped at full speed to Mainpuri, 
 not even drawing rein till he had placed eighteen miles of 
 road and a river between himself and his encampment. It was 
 well for him that he had made the haste he did make. For 
 Lord Lake, after the first discharge of the galloper guns, had 
 dashed with his cavalry into the encampment, and his men had 
 had little to do but to sabre the beings who rose in hurry and 
 confusion from their slumber. In the attack and the pursuit 
 which followed, the enemy lost about 3,000 men, whilst the 
 desertions were even more numerous. The English lost but 
 two men killed and twenty wounded. 
 
 It is as well, in the present day, to note and remember the 
 particulars which made this surprise very remarkable. Lord 
 Lake had quitted Dihli the 31st October. Between that date 
 and the date on which he surprised Holkar at Farakhabad — 
 the 17th November — he had marched 350 miles, rescuing in his 
 way a beleaguered garrison. In the twenty- four hours immedi 
 ately preceding the surprise he had marched seventv miles 
 Xor did this long march prevent him from attacking the 
 enemy at once, and pursuing him for ten miles further ! 
 
 Nor even then did he relax ! Finding that the remnant of 
 Holkar's army was making for Dig, he followed it, and, on the 
 28th, joined the force commanded by Monson between Mathura 
 and that fortress. He had to wait there a few days until the 
 siege-train should join him from Agra, but on the arrival of 
 that he took up, the 13th December, a position before Dig. He 
 opened fire the following morning, effected a practicable 
 breach in an outwork at an angle of the city on the 22nd ; 
 stormed and occupied that outwork the same night. This 
 gallant deed so intimidated the garrison that they evacuated 
 the fortress and retired to Bharatpiir. The British troops 
 entered the citadel of Dig on Christmas Day. 
 
 There still remained Bharatpiir, the Rajah of which had 
 
Bharat pur. 3 1 3 
 
 openly declared for Holkar. It was necessary that he should 
 be made to submit, or should receive a lesson. As soon, then, 
 as he had repaired the fortifications of Dig, and had met the 
 stores for the army which he was expecting, Lord Lake 
 marched for that place. He took up his ground in front of it 
 on the 2nd January. 
 
 The fcrtress of Eharatpiir was founded in the early part of 
 the eighteenth century by the Jats — a people recognised by 
 Colonel Tod as the Getae and Massagetse of the ancient 
 writers, belonging to the same family as the Jutes of Jutland 
 — who emigrated from Miiltan in the century immediately pre- 
 ceding, and settled in the Duab. 
 
 The fortress took its name from " Bharat," the younger 
 brother of the Hindu divinity, Rama, and "pur," the Hindu 
 word for "city." It lies thirty-four miles to the west of Agra, 
 m the midst cf an almost level plain covered with jungle, and 
 abounding in several pieces of water or ponds. The town, 
 eight miles in circumference, is bounded on the western side by 
 a ridge of low, bare, flat rocks; whilst on the three other sides 
 its limits are dotted by a few isolated eminences of no great 
 height or size. . The fortifications at the time of which I am 
 writing consisted of a citadel and a continuous enceinte of 
 thirty-four lofty mud bastions, connected by curtains, and in 
 shape generally either semi-circular or like the frustra of cones. 
 On some of these bastions there were cavaliers, and most of 
 them were joined to the curtain by long, narrow necks. In 
 many cases the ramparts were strengthened by several rows of 
 trunks of trees, which were buried upright in the mass of earth, 
 and all of them were constructed of clay mixed with straw and 
 cow-dung — a composition which, put on in layers, each 
 hardened by the sun before another is applied, was, of all 
 others, the best adapted to baffle the artillery fire of that daw 
 The enceinte was surrounded by a nala or dry watercourse, 
 with steep, almost perpendicular, banks. One source of weak- 
 ness in it, however, arose from the fact that numerous small 
 
3 H The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 watercourses led into it from the ponds in the plain, thus 
 affording- in many places an easy descent. It possessed nine 
 gates, and outside of each an equal number of semicircular 
 earthworks. The citadel, which completely commanded the 
 body of the place, rose to a height of 1 14 feet above the level 
 of the ground, and was very strong. The ditch, 150 feet broad 
 and fifty-nine deep, had its counterscarp faced by a perpen- 
 dicular revetment of stone. From the bottom of the escarp 
 rose a perpendicular stone wall of eighty feet, forming a 
 fausse-braye, well flanked by forty semi-circular towers. 
 Above this arose another stone wall, seventy-four feet in 
 height, and flanked by eleven conical bastions, whose total 
 relief reached 173 feet. The strength of the fortress was 
 further increased by the vicinity to it, on a higher level, of a 
 lake called the Moti Jhil. This lake was bounded on the side 
 cf the town by a bund or embankment, by the cutting of which 
 not only could the ditch be filled, but a great portion of the 
 surrounding country could likewise be laid under water. It 
 was garrisoned by 8,000 men, composed partly of the hitherto 
 unconquered Jats, and partly, though to a lesser extent, of the 
 refugees from Farakhabad. But, outside the walls had col- 
 lected the still numerous cavalry of Jeswant Rao Holkar and 
 the considerable following of Amir Khan, a partisan leader, 
 who had recognised the supremacy of Jeswant Rao, and who 
 became subsequently famous as the founder of the still exist- 
 ing principality of Tonk. It may be added that the confid- 
 ence of the defenders was further increased by a prophetic 
 legend to the effect that Bharatpiir would only be taken when 
 a long-nosed alligator — a kumbhir — should drink up the 
 water of the ditch surrounding the fortress. 
 
 Lord Lake, on the other hand, though at the head of a force 
 flushed with recent victory, was ill-supplied with the guns 
 necessary for the attack of a place so strong as Bharatpur. 
 When he came before it, on the 2nd January, he had but six 
 18-pounder battering guns, four 8-inch and four 5),-inch 
 
lUiaral pur. 
 
 j l ? 
 
 mortars. When these became inefficient from excessive firing, 
 as proved the case with some of them, he had to use guns 
 captured from Holkar, hurriedly furnished with touches from 
 Mathura. Knowing his weakness in this respect, Lord Lake 
 had been strongly in favour of attempting the place by a coup 
 de main, but had been dissuaded. On the 7th January the 
 18-pounder batteries opened fire on the south-west front of the 
 fortress, whilst the two mortar batteries shelled the town. On 
 the gth, a breach was reported practicable. That same night, 
 three columns — one, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mait- 
 land, and composed of the flank companies of the 22nd, 75th 
 and 76th, and the Company's European regiment and a bat- 
 talion of sipahis; the second, commanded by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Ryan, and consisting of 150 men of the European 
 regiment, and a battalion of sipahis; the third, led by Colonel 
 Hawkes, and comprising two companies of the 75th and 
 a third battalion of sipahis — were told off for the 
 assault. Ryan was to attempt the Nimdah gateway ; Hawkes 
 to storm the position to its right ; Maitland to penetrate by a 
 breach between the two. At eight o'clock the three columns 
 started. Maitland, however, lost his way amid the swamps 
 and pools which intervened between his point of departure 
 and the point of attack, encroached upon Ryan's line of 
 advance, and missed the breach altogether. A scene of in- 
 credible confusion followed. The enemy, reused by the 
 clumsy advance of the assailants, received them with a con- 
 tinuous fire of musketry and grape, as well frcm the front as 
 from the circular bastion nearest to the breach. This com- 
 pleted their disorder. Twenty-three men of the 22nd did 
 indeed wade through the ditch, breast-high, and even ascended 
 the breach, but their number was too small to admit of their 
 storming the enemy's batteries, and, unsupported, they fell 
 back before reaching the crest. When, after a long interval, 
 Maitland had concentrated his force in front of the breach, 
 the enemy had brought to bear upon the approaches a fire 
 
3ib The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 which it was impossible to face. Hawkes, meanwhile, had 
 driven the enemy from their advanced guns; and Ryan, after 
 shaking off Maitland, had compelled the enemy to fall back, 
 though he was prevented by a deep drain from following 
 them. Everything depended upon Maitland's success. Feel- 
 ing this very keenly, that officer advanced and gallantly led 
 his men up the breach. He had approached the crest when he 
 was shot dead. Other officers took his place, but to no pur- 
 pose. The slaughter amongst them was terrible. At length, 
 baffled but not humiliated, the survivors fell back to the 
 trenches, exposed, in their retreat, to a galling fire from the 
 enemy. They had lost five officers and eighty-five men killed, 
 twenty-four officers and three hundred and seventy-one men 
 wcunded : about one seventh of the total number of the three 
 columns; more than a third of the number of the column, 
 Maitland's, which was chiefly engaged ! 
 
 Undaunted by this failure, which he rightly attributed to 
 the fact that the centre column had lost its way, Lord Lake 
 recommenced on the 16th the fire from his batteries, and on the 
 2 ist succeeded in effecting another breach a little to the right 
 of the first one. This time he determined to attempt the 
 assault in the daytime. He believed himself to be in every 
 respect better prepared for success than on the first occasion, 
 for, on the 18th, he had been reinforced by three sipahf batta- 
 lions, some convalescent Europeans, and a few field-pieces, 
 and he had obtained, he imagined, correct measurements of 
 the ditch at the point where he intended to cress it. In this 
 latter matter he was deceived. The officer to whom he had 
 entrusted the duty of ascertaining the measurements had con- 
 fided its execution to a Havildar and two privates of native 
 cavalry, and, on their vague assurance that the ditch at the 
 point indicated was neither broad nor very deep, and that the 
 breach was easy of ascent, had made a report which his 
 superiors had accepted as correct. 
 
 At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 2 1st the storming 
 
Bharalpur. 3 1 7 
 
 party, composed of 150 men of the 76th, 120 of the 75th, 50 of 
 the 22nd, supplied with three portable bridges, in the form of 
 broad ladders covered with laths; and supported by the re- 
 maining portions of those regiments, and by three battalions 
 of native infantry, the whole commanded by Colonel Macrae, 
 advanced to the assault. On reaching the ditch, they found 
 that not only was it much broader than had been represented, 
 but that the enemy, by improvising dams across it above and 
 below the selected point, had enormously increased the volume 
 of water there. The portable bridges were thus useless, and an 
 attempt made to lengthen one of them by fastening to it a 
 scaling-ladder completely failed. At this conjuncture, and 
 when the men stood powerless, exposed to a heavy fire from 
 the defences, Lieutenant Morris of the Company's European 
 Regiment jumped into the water, swam across the ditch, and 
 began to clamber up the breach followed by several men who 
 had been inspired by his example. But the enemy had taken 
 the precaution to range a battery behind, so as to command the 
 breach, and the guns from these opened a fire, in addition to 
 the musketry fire which had already begun to play, upon the 
 comparatively few men who had passed the obstacle of the 
 ditch. Seeing these exposed to certain death, and unable to 
 send to them any assistance, Colonel Macrae sounded the 
 recall. The survivors only came back, however, when their 
 leader, Morris, had been severely wounded and many of their 
 comrades killed. When these were once again safe on the 
 British side the stormers retired in great confusion, leaving a 
 large number of wounded, and the scaling-ladders and bridges, 
 in the hands of the enemy. The abortive and ill-arranged 
 attempt had cost them, in killed and wounded, eighteen officers 
 and five hundred and seventy-three men. It deserves to be 
 added that whilst the storming party w r as thus fruitlessly 
 employed, Holkar and Amir Khan had made a vigorous 
 attempt upon the British camp, which was repelled only by 
 the skilful use of the galloper guns. 
 
318 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 The failure cf this attack only rendered Lcrd Lake more 
 determined to persevere. In a "general order" which he 
 issued at this time to his troops he acknowledged the gallantry 
 and steadiness they had displayed, and expressed a confident 
 hope that in a very few days the obstacles which had baffled 
 them would be overcome. This order produced the very best 
 effect ; and this effect was heightened by the defeat, a few days 
 later, of Amir Khan, by Colonel Need and the 27th Dragoons, 
 in an attempt made by that chieftain to intercept a convoy of 
 provisions escorted by Captain Welsh from Mathura. 
 On this occasion Amir Khan only saved his life by 
 stripping himself of the gaudy apparel which he habitually 
 wore, and by mixing then, half naked, with his fleeing troopers. 
 An attempt made by Holkar upon a second and larger convoy 
 escorted by Colonel Don from Agra was equally defeated by 
 Lord Lake in person. These two repulses so discouraged 
 Amir Khan that he renounced his alliance with Holkar, and 
 made for Rohilkhand, followed in that direction, and until he 
 had crossed the Ganges, by a British force under General 
 Smith. 
 
 Meanwhile there had been a lull in the siege operations, 
 during which the position of the besiegers' camp was shifted 
 to the south, and considerable industry was employed in the 
 preparation of fascines, pontoons and rafts. On the 10th 
 February the force was augmented by the arrival from Bom- 
 bay of a division under General Jones, consisting of the 86th 
 Regiment, eight companies 65th Regiment, four battalions of 
 native infantry, and five hundred irregular horse. Measures 
 were at once taken more in unison with the scientific character 
 of siege operations; regular approaches were made; and the 
 batteries were brought much closer to the defences. On the 
 19th February the breach effected by these means was reported 
 practicable, and it having been ascertained, likewise, that .1 
 mine, which had been laid for the purpose of blowing up the 
 counterscarp, was ready for explosion, Lord Lake ordered the 
 
B karat fur. 319 
 
 third assault. To command it he had selected Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Don, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself 
 during Monson's retreat, as well as before and after it. The 
 storming part)' was composed of three columns; one, of _ ; oo 
 men of the 86ih Regiment, and a sipahi battalion; the second, 
 of 300 men cf the 65th Regiment, and two sipahi battalions; 
 the third and central, of detail from the 75th, the 76th, and 
 the Company's Europeans, and three battalions of sipahis. 
 
 The arrangements for the storming party had been com- 
 pleted, and the orders that the storm should take effect at 
 three o'clock the following afternoon issued, when, on the 
 night of the 19th, the enemy made a sally, which was repulsed 
 only with considerable loss and after very severe fighting. At 
 daybreak they returned to the assault, and for some time 
 gained a decided advantage; but after a conflict which lasted 
 several hours and ccst the besiegers several lives, they were 
 iigain forced back. 
 
 These two sorties had not contributed to encourage the men 
 of the storming party. Still no change was made in the dis- 
 position or in the hour of attack. It was arranged that Cap- 
 tain Grant, with the first column I have named, should attack 
 the enemy's intrenchments outside the town ; that Colonel Tay- 
 lor, with the second, should carry the Birnarain gate, reported 
 to be easily accessible ; whilst the centra 1 column, led by Don 
 in person, should simultaneously advance and enter by the 
 breach. 
 
 The unhappy result is soon told. Grant, indeed, not only 
 drove the enemy from their intrenchments, but nearly suc- 
 ceeded in entering the place upon their heels. He captured 
 eleven guns, al! of which he brought into camp. But Taylor 
 was repulsed at the Birnarain gate. The task of Don, and its 
 result, were still more disheartening. He gallantly led his 
 men to the breach, but, in spite of all his entreaties, they re- 
 fused to follow him into it. The head of the column halted 
 under an enfilading fire, every shot of which told, and, dis- 
 
320 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 couraged either by the sight of the dead bodies of their com- 
 rades, killed in the sally of the morning, or apprehending that 
 the approaches had been mined, the men composing it remained 
 deaf alike to entreaty and exhortation. Don turned from 
 them to the men behind them, those of the remnant of the 22nd 
 Foot and 12th N.I. These responded to his call, and dashed 
 gallantly to the front. Finding the ditch full of water and 
 unfordable, they rushed to the right, to a point above the dam 
 which had been made, crossed the ditch, and began the ascent 
 of a rugged bastion which seemed to command an entrance 
 into the place. Many men, amongst them the colour-bearers 
 of the 12th N.I., reached the summit; but they remained there 
 unsupported, and though just at the moment the enemy's mine 
 exploded to the disadvantage of the enemy and threw them 
 into considerable confusion, the head of the column still re- 
 fused to budge. No exertions of their officers could rouse 
 them; and when even fourteen of the former rushed to the 
 front, not a man followed them ! It was a day rare in the 
 annals of the British army, a day of panic ! Colonel Don, 
 then, was forced to relinquish the attack. He had lost 3 
 officers and 162 men killed; 25 officers and 732 men wounded ! 
 
 Attributing the conduct of the men to exceptional causes, 
 Lord Lake resolved to renew the attack the next day. He 
 continued, therefore, all that night and the next day on the 
 defences. Then, parading the troops who had displayed so 
 much unwillingness to advance the previous afternoon, he 
 addressed them in terms which went to their very hearts. For, 
 when he concluded by offering them, then, an opportunity of 
 retrieving their conduct, they came forward to a man. 
 Lieutenant Templeton of the 76th offered to lead the forlorn 
 hope. 
 
 This time Colonel Monson was selected to lead the storming 
 party. It consisted of the Company's Europeans, the greater 
 part of the 65th and 86th regiments, three sipahf battalions, 
 and the flank companies of a fourth. The attack was to be 
 
Bharalpur. 321 
 
 directed on the rugged bastion on the summit of which the 
 1 2th N.I. had succeeded in planting their colours the previous 
 day. So steep, however, was the ascent, and so continuous and 
 well-directed the fire upon it by the enemy from the bastion 
 nearest to it, that but few men succeeded in reaching the sum- 
 mit. The first of these was young Templeton, the leader of 
 the forlorn hope, but he was at once shot dead. His place 
 was soon taken by Major Menzies, Aide-de-camp to Lord 
 Lake, who gave an example never to be surpassed, of cool and 
 inspiring courage; but he, too, shared the fate of Templeton. 
 After making many efforts to surmount the difficulties before 
 him, Monson gave orders to retreat, not, however, till his losses 
 m killed had amounted to 6 officers and 125 men, and in 
 wounded to 28 officers and 862 men ! 
 
 The four assaults had cost the besiegers a loss, in killed 
 and wounded, of 3,100 men, and had left Lord Lake in a posi- 
 tion far worse than that he occupied when he commenced the 
 siege. His battering train had become unfit for service : not 
 one 18-pounder shot remained for use; the supply of gun- 
 powder was almost exhausted ; provisions were scarce : and 
 there were but few stores of any kind. Whilst, too, the con- 
 fidence of the enemy had increased, that of the besiegers had 
 greatly diminished. On the 23rd February, the* enemy suc- 
 ceeded in burning the British batteries. The following day, 
 Lord Lake formally raised the siege, and took up a position, 
 greatly harassed in his movement by Holkar's cavalry, six 
 miles to the north-east of Bharatpiir, covering the road leading 
 to the depots at Agra, Mathura, and Dig. Very soon after 
 he went in pursuit of Holkar, followed him across the Satlaj, 
 and, in December of the same year, forced him to implore his 
 mercy. The Government of India reinstated the fugitive 
 prince in his dominions. 
 
 T have now related the first siege of Bharatpiir. It failed 
 for two reasons : the first, that it was begun and conducted 
 throughout with inadequate artillery means; the second, that 
 
 Y 
 
322 The Decisive Bat lies of India. 
 
 there was not an engineer in the force who was acquainted 
 with the defences of Bharatpiir, or with the peculiarities of the 
 ground immediately under its walls. The failure, however, 
 was unfortunate; and though the Maharajah Ranjit Singh, 
 shortly afterwards sued for peace, and made his submission, 
 he had gained with his countrymen as much in prestige and 
 credit as the English had lost. His capital was the only 
 fortress in India from which British troops had fallen back 
 repulsed. During the twenty years that followed, " Bharat- 
 piir " was a word to conjure with in the habitations of dis- 
 affected princes and nobles throughout the country ; and it 
 required the reversal of the result of the first siege to deprive 
 that word of its efficacy and its sting. 
 
 The opportunity came in the year 1825. Ranjit Singh died 
 at the close of 1805. His eldest son, Randbir Singh, was 
 loyal to the British during his reign of eighteen years. His 
 brother, who succeeded him in 1823, died on the 26th Febru- 
 ary, 1825. He left a son, six years old, named Balwant 
 Singh, whose succession was recognised by the British 
 Government. But his cousin, Durjan Sal, supported by the 
 Rajah of Karauli and others, attacked, dethroned and 
 imprisoned him. Upon this the British Resident at Dihli, Sir 
 David Ochterlony, who was also the Governor-General's Agent 
 for Bharatpiir, assembled a force to reinstate the rightful heir ; 
 and there can be little doubt but that, had he been allowed to 
 proceed, no serious hostilities would have followed. But the 
 Governor-General, Lord Amherst, trusting to a peaceful 
 adjustment of the family differences, and not considering that 
 the recognition by the Government of India of an heir- 
 apparent during the lifetime of the father imposed upon it 
 the obligation to maintain him in his position under the cir- 
 cumstances which had occurred, disapproved of Ochterlony's 
 policy, and summarily removed him from his post. Ulti- 
 mately, however, the Government was forced to take up and 
 carry out the policy it had thus rejected, and under circum- 
 
Bharatfur. 323 
 
 stances far less favourable. For Durjan Sal, in the interval, 
 whilst negotiating with, and professing to leave the decision 
 on his claims to, the British Government, had been engaged in 
 preparing to assert them, by strengthening the fortifications 
 of Bharatpur, by levying troops, and by soliciting aid— which 
 had been secretly promised — from the Rajput and Maratha 
 princes. The attitude of Durjan Sal, combined with the 
 prestige attaching to his capital, produced at last so great an 
 excitement and commotion throughout the country, that, to 
 prevent a general conflagration, Lord Amherst was forced to 
 adopt the policy of Sir David Ochterlony and to expel the 
 usurper. The carrying out of this resolve was at once 
 entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 The army which assembled at Agra in November to under- 
 take the second siege of Bharatpur numbered 27,000 men. It 
 had a battering train of 102 guns and 52 pieces of artillery. 
 The English regiments employed were the nth Dragoons, the 
 1 6th Lancers, the 14th and 59th regiments, and — a short time 
 after the siege had commenced — the Company's European 
 regiment. Lord Combermere, a friend and comrade in arms 
 of the Duke of Wellington, had that year arrived in India as 
 Commander-in-Chief. He assumed command of the force on 
 the 1st December; moved with the right wing on the 5th to 
 Mathura, and marched thence, at its head, on the 9th, to 
 Bharatpur. General Nicholls, commanding the left wing, 
 similarly received orders to quit Agra on the 8th and to take 
 a position to the west of the place on the 10th. These 
 arrangements were carried out with but slight deviations, and 
 Bharatpur was invested on the 11th December. 
 
 Since the abortive siege of Lord Lake in 1805 the fortifica- 
 tions had been somewhat strengthened. Additions had been 
 made to the enceinte, and one bastion, called Fath Burj, or 
 Bastion of Victory — so named because the natives declared it 
 had been built with the bones and cemented with the blood of 
 those who had fallen in the last siege — had been added to 
 
324 The Decisive Battles of India, 
 
 the thirty-four previously existing. The garrison had been 
 considerably augmented. The fortress was defended now by 
 25,000 men, mostly Jats and Patans, the two most warlike races 
 in India. It was well stored with supplies, and the ramparts 
 were plentifully furnished with guns. 
 
 Recognising the mistakes which originated in the first siege 
 from want of accurate knowledge of the ground, Lord 
 Combermere and his engineers spent the nine days after his 
 investment of the place on the nth in reconnoitring every 
 part of the fortress. On the 20th he and they had arrived at 
 definite conclusions. These Lord Combermere at once 
 endeavoured to carry out. 
 
 Lord Lake had made his approaches to the south-west face 
 of the town. Lord Combermere decided to attack the fronts 
 about the north-east angle, which the defenders considered 
 their strongest point. The reasons which led him to this con- 
 clusion were clear and simple. The north-east angle was, 
 with the exception of one short face in another direction, the 
 only part of the place totally unflanked ; the ditch there was 
 comparatively shallow and almost dry : a ravine which fell 
 into the ditch gave great facility and cover to those desirous 
 of descending into it. Moreover, whereas from that angle 
 the heaviest artillery fire could be concentrated on the assail- 
 ants at a distance, it could not touch those who should 
 approach close to the ditch. 
 
 On the 23rd the investment was drawn closer, and Lord 
 Combermere sent two columns to seize the village of Kadam 
 Kandi on the right front, and Baldeo Singh's garden on the 
 left front, of the attack, situated about 750 yards from the 
 place, and about 800 yards from each other. Their possession 
 was important, for they afforded good cover to the men sup- 
 porting the parties about to work in the construction of the 
 first parallel. The defenders made some attempts to disturb 
 the operation, but without any practical result. That same 
 night the first parallel was commenced, and so well did the 
 
Bharatpur. 325 
 
 men, Europeans and natives, work at it, that before daybreak 
 a gun battery of eight 18-pounders and a mortar battery for 
 six 8-inch mortars were finished and armed. As soon as it 
 was light a fire from these batteries opened on the place. The 
 enemy attempted to reply, but, finding they could not suffi- 
 ciently depress their guns, they ceased firing and withdrew 
 them. 
 
 Before these approaches had- been made, the fire from the 
 mortars had caused great damage to life and property within 
 the city. Lord Combermere, as a chivalrous soldier, was very 
 unwilling that the injury intended for armed enemies should 
 be inflicted upon women and children. He accordingly had 
 written, on the 21st, to Durjan Sal, offering safe conduct and 
 escort to any women and children who might wish to leave the 
 fortress. After some correspondence, Durjan Sal agreed to 
 avail himself of the permission, and, on the 24th, all the 
 women not belonging to the royal family emerged from the 
 city and passed through the besiegers' lines, unmolested and 
 unsearched. It transpired a little later that these fugitives 
 had carried off precious stones to an enormous value secreted 
 about their persons ! 
 
 On the 24th the besiegers widened the parallel to a breadth 
 of ten feet, and the same night carried out an approach in 
 advance of it by means of the flying sap. They commenced, 
 likewise, a breaching battery for ten — -eventually for eleven — 
 24-pounders and a small barbette battery. The party engaged 
 in this work was, however, attacked, and, after a heavy loss, 
 was forced to discontinue its labour. But, the enemy's fire 
 slackening, it resumed it and had made considerable progress 
 before daybreak. That day and the following the 18- and 
 24-pounders kept up a heavy fire on the place and silenced 
 the enemy's guns. In the course of the second day, the 26th, 
 the approaches had advanced to within 250 yards of the place. 
 It was evident that the feeling of the defenders was far less 
 confident than had been that of their forerunners in 180s, for 
 
326 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 that same afternoon a body of their cavalry, laden, it is 
 believed, with treasure, dashed out and succeeded in escaping. 
 
 On the 27th, the second parallel was completed at a dis- 
 tance of 250 yards from the ditch. It was armed with two 
 batteries, one for two 12-pounders, the other for twelve 24- 
 pounders. The following day the approaches were brought 
 to within forty yards of the ditch. On the 29th, the second 
 parallel was extended ; and a new battery for four guns was 
 added to the left of the northern breaching battery, with a 
 view to destroy the defences which were reported to exist in 
 rear of the bastion intended to be assailed. Another battery 
 for two guns was also thrown up in advance of the second 
 parallel to enfilade the ditch of the north front. The fire 
 now brought to bear on the fortress had a very discouraging 
 effect on the garrison, and 600 of them sent an envoy to the 
 Commander-in-Chief to treat for terms. The negotiation 
 came to nothing, because the 600 declined the only terms that 
 would be accepted — surrender at discretion. 
 
 On the 30th and 31st, and on the 1st January, the newly 
 erected batteries were armed, the approaches were extended, 
 and the trenches were improved ; one mine, which had been 
 begun before, was pushed on, and a second was commenced. 
 Two more were begun on the 2nd. On the 3rd, the third 
 parallel was extended, and on the 4th a fifth mine was begun. 
 The work in these mines was continued night and day till the 
 7th, when one was exploded, without, however, producing 
 much effect. But, on the following day, the explosion of four 
 mines blew in the counterscarp and procured for the assailants 
 an excellent descent into the ditch. It was generally thought 
 in the army that Lord Combermere would order the assault 
 for that day. But he rightly considered that the defences had 
 not yet been sufficiently broken down, and resolved to develop 
 still further the system of mining and countermining. 
 
 In this work the engineers displayed great skill and daring. 
 On the 9th, they exploded a scarp-gallery occupied in some 
 
Bharatpur. 327 
 
 force by the enemy. On the 12th, however, Captain Taylor 
 and Captain Irvine of the Engineers, with a small following 
 of Europeans and Gurkhas, and a few sappers, failed in a 
 very daring attempt to destroy a gallery which allowed the 
 enemy to communicate, through the ramparts, with a new- 
 erected parapet of cotton bags. But, on the 14th, Irvine 
 rendered signal service by destroying the same gallery and 
 effecting a small but very practicable breach. On the 16th, 
 the last supply of shot, shell and gunpowder remaining in 
 the Agra arsenal reached the besiegers. The same day Cap- 
 tain Carmichael, of the 59th regiment, responding to the 
 express desire of his general, General Nicholls, to ascertain 
 the nature of the obstacles which would have to be encoun- 
 tered behind the defences, performed an act of very great 
 daring. Taking with him five or six Gurkhas, who volun- 
 teered for the service, and accompanied by Captain Davidson 
 of the Engineers, Carmichael walked at midday, from the 
 advanced trench to the foot of the breach — a distance of fifty 
 yards. Although the space traversed was enfiladed by a well- 
 manned bastion on its left and the top of the breach was 
 strongly occupied, the volunteers reached the point I have 
 indicated, and even mace half the ascent of the breach, before 
 the enemy perceived them. A few seconds later brought the 
 whole party to the summit. The startled defenders, believing 
 at first that they were the head of a storming party, seized 
 their muskets and hurriedly delivered their fire. Fortunately 
 it took no effect; and when the smoke had cleared away, the 
 visitors, cool and collected, took a deliberate survey of the 
 interior of the fort, storing every position in their minds. 
 They continued the survey till the defenders, recovering from 
 their astonishment, rushed forward to seize and punish them. 
 But these, not awaiting the assault, turned, dashed down the 
 breach, and, in spite of a fire from behind them and on their 
 flank, which literally swept the earth, reached the trenches with 
 
328 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the loss of but one man. Even he was hit so close to the goal 
 that he actually dropped into the trench ! 
 
 This gallant deed was productive of most important results. 
 Captain Carmichael and his comrades imparted to the General 
 information which determined him to risk an assault without 
 further delay. For Lord Combermere had now certain evi- 
 dence that the defences, though formidable, were by no means 
 impregnable. 
 
 On the 17th, then, the Commander-in-Chief directed that 
 the three principal mines to be exploded at the moment of 
 attack should be charged with powder. One of these mines 
 was under the angle of the north-east bastion or cavalier; the 
 second was destined to widen the right gun breach ; the third, 
 about midway between the two, was to blow 111 the counter- 
 scarp. The explosion was to be the signal for the assaulting 
 columns to advance. 
 
 These columns were composed and formed as follows: — 
 The right column, commanded by Major-General Reynell, 
 was subdivided in the manner now to be described : (1) 
 Colonel Delamain, commanding a party composed of two 
 companies of the Company's European regiment, a regiment of 
 sipahis, and 100 Gurkhas, was, on the extreme right, to storm 
 the breach to the right of the Jangmah gate; Colonel Reynell, 
 leading two brigades in person — Brigadier McCombe's, con- 
 sisting of a company of the 14th Foot, leading and followed 
 by a spiking party of gunners, supported by four more com- 
 panies of the 14th, a regiment of sipahis, and 100 Gurkhas; 
 and Brigadier Patton's, ranged behind McCombe's, and con- 
 sisting of four companies of the 14th, five of one sipahi bat- 
 talion and another entire battalion; was to attack the centre 
 or main breach — that at the north-east angle of the fortress. 
 
 To act in conjunction with the right was the left attack, 
 subdivided into four columns, the whole directed by General 
 Nicholls. Of these columns, that on the right, composed of 
 two companies of the Company's Europeans, two of native 
 
Bharatpur. 329 
 
 infantry, and 100 Gurkhas, led by Colonel Wilson, and pre- 
 ceded by pioneers carrying six ladders, was to escalade the 
 place at a re-entering angle to the left of the main breach. 
 Immediately on its left, the second column, commanded by 
 Brigadier Edwards, and composed of seven companies of the 
 59th Foot, one sipahi battalion, and 100 Gurkhas, was to make 
 what was termed the main attack. The order of this attack 
 was to be as follows : Two companies of the 59th were to lead 
 it, followed closely by pioneers carrying six short ladders; 
 then the Brigadier and five more companies of the 59th; then 
 the native battalion. On reaching the summit the seven com- 
 panies of the 59th were to turn to the left; the sipahis were to 
 advance into the town, and then, moving in a parallel line, 
 were to cover their right flank. The Gurkhas, meanwhile, 
 were to enter along the counterscarp and keep down the 
 enemy's fire. 
 
 The third column of General Nicholls' attack was com- 
 posed of the three remaining companies of the 59th Foot, 
 accompanied by pioneers bearing ladders, followed by 100 
 Gurkhas, and having attached to it a body of sappers and 
 twelve men carrying nooses to slip over the upright beams in 
 the parapet, so that they might act as hand ropes. This 
 column was to assail the gun breach in the curtain immedi- 
 ately on the left of the attack of the second column. 
 
 The fourth column, commanded by Brigadier Fagan, and 
 composed of three sipahi battalions, was held in reserve. 
 
 During the siege Lord Combermere had trained his men in 
 the use of ladders and of hand-grenades.* He had been very 
 careful in seeing that the ladders were made of the material 
 which, after trial, proved most suitable, viz., of bamboo; and 
 to enable the attacking columns to advance promptly, he had 
 caused steps to be cut in the parapet of the trenches. No pre- 
 caution to ensure success had been omitted. 
 
 * This was the last occasion on which Grenadiers carried the missile 
 which gave them originally their distinctive appellation. 
 
330 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 At half past four o'clock on the morning of the 1 8th the 
 columns told off for the assault quietly entered the trenches. 
 A very brisk fire was kept thence on the defences. It was 
 replied to rather fitfully, the enemy appearing every now and 
 again to be apprehensive that mischief was brewing. A little 
 after 8 o'clock the two smaller mines, that under the right 
 breach, and that under the counterscarp, exploded. Startled 
 at the sudden shock, the defenders crowded into the angle of 
 the north-east bastion, some waving their swords in defiance, 
 others beckoning eagerly for support. A few minutes later 
 the ground she ok beneath them; a violent concussion seemed 
 to split the firmament ; a dense cloud of dust and smoke arose, 
 and their disjointed limbs were hurled, with stones, timber 
 and masses of earth, into the air. Some of the debris felJ 
 even into the British trenches, killed two sipahis standing- 
 close behind Lord Combermere, struck down Brigadier 
 McCombe at his side, and killed or wounded Brigadier Patton, 
 Captain Irvine, Lieutenant Daly, and some twenty men of the 
 14th Foot. As soon as the eye could penetrate through the 
 clouds of dust and smoke the grenadiers of the 14th and '59th 
 were seen rushing impetuously up the steep faces of their 
 respective breaches. A moment later, as it seemed, and a loud 
 cheer from the men in the trenches below announced that they 
 had gained the summit. Lord Combermere had with diffi- 
 culty been restrained from accompanying General Nicholls' 
 mam attack. Now he could hold back no longer. He 
 ascended the breach, and hoisted the British flag on the 
 summit. 
 
 Nor had the main attack of General Reynell's two brigades 
 been less successful. The cheers from the trenches below had 
 announced, simultaneously with the success of the 59th, the 
 success of the 14th, gallantly led by Major Everard. Arrived 
 on the summit, Everard had at once given the colours to the 
 wind. But there the defenders were congregated in the 
 greatest force, and for a few minutes a hand-to-hand 
 
B liar at pur. 331 
 
 encounter took place, not exceeded in fierceness by any 
 encounter in our Indian wars. For there, the unconquered Jat 
 and the death-scorning Patan, armed with tulwar and shield, 
 met the British soldier, provided only with his bayonet. It 
 was soon seen that the islanders had prevailed, for their main 
 column was noticed to turn to the right and drive the enemy 
 with fierce energy along the ramparts. Every now and again 
 as some vantage point was approached the defenders were 
 seen to rally and stand — then to give way and flee, only to 
 rally and stand again. The sipabis, meanwhile, were showing 
 themselves worthy of this glorious comradeship; and though, 
 in one or two instances, their firing was somewhat wild, they 
 displayed a fearlessness deserving of all praise. 
 
 At length Everard reached the Janginah gate. A moment 
 later and he sighted Delamain's column, which, after storming 
 the breach to the right of it, had turned to the left. The situ- 
 ation was peculiar. Between the two British columns was a 
 steep and very narrow gorge, fully sixty feet deep, the only 
 descent to which was by narrow flights of steps. To the 
 right edge — from the town — of this gorge, Everard was driv- 
 ing the enemy he had beaten; whilst, to its left edge, Dela- 
 main was pursuing the enemy who had tried to bar the way to 
 him. The fury cf the battle here, then, exceeded anything 
 that had gene before. A certain death stared the defenders 
 in the face. The consciousness of this inflamed their resolu- 
 tion to sell their lives as dearly as possible. But the British 
 were not to be withstood. Those that escaped the bayonet 
 were pushed into the gorge below; and there, their cotton 
 dresses igniting from the musketry fire at close quarters, they 
 suffered a death compared to which death from the bayonet is 
 merciful ! 
 
 The two columns then united and pushed their way along 
 the right to the Kumbhir bastion. Here Major Everard 
 hoisted a red coat to signify his success to those below. 
 
 I have recorded already the first success cf General Nicholls' 
 
332 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 main attack. The bastion they had gained was connected 
 with the other part of the fortifications by a long neck. Along 
 this the stormers had rushed without a check. At its mouth, 
 however, the enemy made a stand, but were soon forced back. 
 Exposed all this time to a severe fire from an outwork near 
 the left main breach, they were not insensibly relieved when 
 Brigadier Patton's brigade attacked that outwork and diverted 
 the lire. They then proceeded to follow the enemy along the 
 ramparts to the left, in face of a heavy fire, which killed the 
 brigadier, Edwards. Nicholls, however, who had been only 
 wounded by the consequence of the explosion to which I have 
 referred, persevered, and, in spite of every obstacle, succeeded 
 in gaining touch with Reynell and Delamam. 
 
 The right column of Nicholls' attack, commanded by 
 Colonel Wilson, had meanwhile attempted to escalade the 
 gun-breach. Wilson succeeded, though he was followed by 
 only twenty or thirty men. The remainder went up by the 
 left mine-breach and joined him on the summit. Thence he 
 fought his way through the town, and, driving all opponents 
 before him, finally remounted the ramparts. 
 
 Bharatpur was now virtually gained. The citadel alone 
 held out. In front of this a fight had already somewhat 
 accidentally taken place. For an officer of the 41st N.I., 
 Major Hunter, just after Everard's column had joined Dela- 
 main's, had. by mistake, entered the city and reached a bridge 
 leading to the citadel. His presence had caused so much 
 alarm to the enemy that, in their haste to shut the gates, they 
 had excluded about 100 of their own men, amongst whom was 
 the brother-in-law of Durjan Sal, Khiishial Singh. Major 
 Hunter had advanced to offer quarter to this nobleman, when 
 the latter, with a terrific sword-blow, nearly severed his left 
 arm from his body. A conflict had then ensued which had 
 resulted in the extermination of the excluded warriors. Major- 
 Hunter and his men had then quietly made their way back to- 
 the ramparts. 
 
I III aral pur 
 
 303 
 
 This citadel was now summoned by order of Lord Comber- 
 mere. As no answer was returned, guns were brought up 
 against it. But after a short cannonade the garrison surren- 
 dered unconditionally. The prophecy had been fulfilled. 
 The " Ktunbhir " — f or so they called " Combcrmere ' -had, in 
 very deed, drank up the waters of their ditch. 
 
 But there was one man all this time who, in spite of the 
 storming of the town and the fall of the citadel, had nut 
 despaired of escape. This was Durjan Sal, the pretender, 
 whose conduct had caused all the bloodshed I have recorded. 
 As soon as this prince had realised that the fortunes of the 
 day were going against him he hastened to the citadel. 
 Collecting there a vast amount of jewels, he secured them on 
 the persons of his wife, his two sons, himself and forty chosen 
 followers, and then started to cut his way out. Dashing upon 
 a small party of the 14th at the Kumbhir gate, he cut his way 
 through and entered a small jungle, where he was joined by 
 some mere horsemen. Thence he tried to find an outlet to 
 emerge into the open. Long was it in vain, for every outlet 
 was guarded by the British cavalry. At length a chance 
 offered. At half -past two the Brigadier commanding the 
 cavalry, believing that he had captured every fugitive, dis- 
 missed his brigade. Then Durjan Sal and his followers 
 emerged. Llad he waited a quarter of an hour longer he 
 might have got off. But he was noticed by the riding-master 
 of the 8th Light Cavalry at the moment when the men of that 
 regiment had but just dismounted. Instantly pursuit was in- 
 augurated. The fugitives were caught, and Durjan Sal 
 surrendered ! 
 
 Such was the second siege of Bharatpur. The cost to the 
 besiegers of its capture was 1,050 in killed, wounded and miss- 
 ing, including 7 officers killed and 41 wounded — a small pro- 
 portion in comparison with the losses sustained by Lord Lake 
 when commanding a force less than one-half as strong. The 
 treasure captured realised nearly half a million. 
 
334 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 But it was neither the treasure nor the comparative small- 
 ness of the casualties that invested the capture of Bharatpur 
 with immense significance. It completely restored the prestige 
 of the British. It dissolved the formidable confederacy 
 which had been secretly arranged. It proved to the discon- 
 tented that not a fortress in India was impregnable; that the 
 British were able to overcome all opposition within the empire 
 of Hindustan. One more war, indeed, the Maratha war of 
 1 8 17- 19, rendered necessary by the reversal by the immediate 
 successors of the great Marquess Wellesley of the policy of 
 that illustrious statesman, was required to enforce the absolute 
 supremacy of Great Britain. But, thenceforth, that supremacy 
 was universally recognised. It must, nevertheless, ever be 
 remembered, never more vividly than at the present moment, 
 that there is one condition which the princes of India demand 
 as the price of their subordination to British authority. They 
 are content to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Empress of 
 India on condition that the servants of the Empress will pro- 
 tect them against every enemy from outside. The chapter 
 which immediately follows shows how well those servants 
 understood and performed that obligation, when the necessity 
 arose in 1845-6. Let us hope that they will understand and 
 perforin it now (1888) when the horizon might at any moment 
 become clouded, and a contest precipitated between the gar- 
 rison of the fortress of Hindustan and the European foe which 
 has subdued the sandy deserts beyond its glacis. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 FIRUZSHAHAR AND SOBRAON. 
 
 THE founder of the Sikh religion was Nanak, son of a petty 
 Hindu trader named Kalii. Nanak was born in the vicinity 
 of Lahor in the year 1469. A youth much given to reflection, 
 he devoted himself at an early period of his life to a study 
 of the rival creeds then prevailing in India, the Hindu and 
 the Muhammadan. Neither satisfied him. Though his first 
 teacher had been a learned professor of the latter faith, the 
 simple mind of Nanak could find no resting-place in a religion 
 in which the worldly element so largely predominated; nor 
 was he more content with the specious abstractions of 
 Hinduism. 
 
 After wandering through many lands in search of a satis- 
 fying truth, Nanak returned to his native country with the 
 conviction that he had failed. He had found, he said, many 
 scriptures and many creeds; but he had not found God. 
 Casting off his habit of an ascetic, he resumed his father's 
 trade, married, became the father of a family, and passed the 
 remainder of his life in preaching the doctrine of the unity 
 of one invisible God, of the necessity of living virtuously, and 
 of practising toleration towards others. He died in 1539, 
 leaving behind him a reputation without spot, and many 
 zealous and admiring disciples eager to perpetuate his creed. 
 
 The founder of a new religion, Nanak, before his death, 
 
336 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 had nominated his successor — a man of his own tribe named 
 Angad. Angad held the supremacy for twelve years, years 
 which he employed mainly in committing to writing the doc- 
 trines of his great master and in enforcing them upon his 
 disciples. 
 
 Angad was succeeded by Uiranar Das, a great preacher. 
 He, and his son-in-law and successor, Ram Das, were held in 
 high esteem by the Emperor Akbar. 
 
 But it was the son of Ram Das, Arjiin, who established on 
 a permanent basis the new religion. Comprehending the ap- 
 plicability of the teaching of Nanak and his successors to 
 every state of life and to every condition of society, Arjiin 
 arranged their several writings, added to them the most suit- 
 able compositions of preceding religious reformers, and, com- 
 pleting the whole with a prayer and some pious exhortations 
 of his own, he produced the sacred book, the Grunth, of the 
 new faith, and imposed it upon his followers as containing the 
 guide to their religious and moral conduct. Simultaneously 
 he fixed the seat of the chief Guru, or high priest of the reli- 
 gion, and of his principal followers, at Amritsar, then an 
 •obscure hamlet, but which, in consequence of the selection, 
 speedily rose into importance. Arjiin then regulated and 
 reduced to a systematic tax the offerings of his adherents, to 
 be found even then in every city and village in the Panjab 
 and the cis-Satlaj territories. Nor did he disdain to increase 
 the wealth of the holy city he had founded by traffic of a very 
 •extensive character. Meddling, however, in the political con- 
 tests which almost invariably supervened on the death of a 
 Mughul sovereign, Arjiin unfortunately espoused the losing 
 side, was imprisoned, and died. 
 
 The real successor of Arjiin was his son, Hur Govind. Hur 
 Govind founded the Sikh nation. Before his time the fol- 
 lowers of the Giirii had been united by no tie but that of obedi- 
 ence to the book. Govind formed them into a community of 
 warriors. He did away with many of the restrictions regard- 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. $$ 
 
 3/ 
 
 ing food, authorised his followers to cat flesh, summoned them 
 to his standard, and marched with them to consolidate his 
 power. 
 
 A military organisation based upon a religious principle, 
 and directed by a strong central authority, will always become 
 powerful in a country the government of which is tainted with 
 decay. The ties which bound the Mughul empire together were 
 already loosening under the paralysing influence of the bigotry 
 of Aurangzib, when, in 1675, Govind, fourth in succession to 
 the Hur Govind to whom I have adverted, assumed the mantle 
 of Guru of the Sikhs. Intolerance reigned supreme through- 
 out India. Tegh Buhadur, the father and immediate prede- 
 cessor of Govind, had been put to death by Aurangzib, a 
 martyr to his faith, and his body had been exposed with 
 ignominy in the streets of Dihli. This murder made of 
 Govind, then only fifteen years old, the irreconciliable enemy 
 of the Muhammadan name. x*\cting under the advice, almost 
 under the authority, of his father's friends, he for the time 
 concealed alike his enmity and his ambition, spent twenty 
 years in comparative obscurity, hunting the tiger and the wild 
 boar, learning the Persian language, studying the best means 
 of swaying the races whom he would have to influence, and 
 perfecting in his own mind the means of shaking the empire 
 held together by the iron hand of the man who had slain his 
 father. 
 
 The better to work out his end Govind still further simpli- 
 fied the dogmas of the faith. Assembling his followers, he 
 announced to them that thenceforward the doctrines of the 
 *' Khalsa," the saved or liberated, alone should prevail. There 
 must be no human image or resemblance of the One Almighty 
 Father; caste must cease to exist; before Him all men were 
 equal ; Muhammadanism was to be rooted out ; social distinc- 
 tions, all the solaces of superstition, were to exist no more ; 
 they should call themselves "Singh" and become a nation of 
 soldiers. 
 
338 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 The multitude received Govind's propositions with rapture. 
 By a wave of the wand he found himself the trusted leader 
 of a confederacy of warriors in a nation whose institutions 
 were decaying. 
 
 About 1695, twelve years before the death of Aurangzib, 
 Govind put his schemes into practice. He secured many forts 
 in the hill-country of the Panjab, defeated the Mughul troops 
 in several encounters, and established himself as a thorn in the 
 side of the empire. At last Aurangzib took the alarm. He 
 directed the governors of Lahor and Sirhind to move against 
 the Guru, and even threatened to send his son, Buhadur Shah, 
 to command the army against him. Against such forces 
 Govind could do but little. After a series of manoeuvres he 
 found himself surrounded at Anandpur. His adherents, who 
 had till then followed him with implicit trust, murmured in 
 this hour of his supreme necessity ; many of them even deserted 
 him; but Govind himself never quailed. Sending his mother, 
 his wives, and his children* to Sirhind he threw himself into 
 the fort of Chamkaur. Besieged there, he still bade a haughty 
 defiance to the enemy, and, after a desperate defence, in which 
 he saw his two remaining sons and nearly the whole of his 
 band perish, he escaped by night to Behlolpiir, and thence to 
 Damdamma, midway between Firuzpiir and Hansi. There he 
 remained, unmolested, for several years, engaged in adding 
 another book to the Grunth, and in devising measures for 
 rousing the energies of his followers. 
 
 Aurangzib died in 1707. Buhadur Shah, who succeeded 
 him, summoned the Guru to his camp in the valley of the Goda- 
 vari. Govind complied, was received with respect, and even 
 trusted with a military command. But in the midst of his 
 new prosperity he was assassinated by the sons of an Afghan 
 whom in a sudden fit of anger he had killed. 
 
 * The boys were, on their arrival there, betrayed to the Muhammadans 
 and put to death. 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 339 
 
 Before leaving the cis-Satlaj territory Govind had be- 
 queathed his temporal power to Banda, a native of southern 
 India. Banda justified the selection. Recognising the fact 
 that the death of Aurangzib had dissolved the bond which 
 kept the Mughul empire together, Banda raised an army of 
 devoted followers, defeated the Mughul governor of Sirhind, 
 avenged the death of Govind's children, and occupied the 
 country between the Satlaj and the Jamna. This success 
 brought upon him the army of Buhadur Shah, and, surrounded, 
 as his predecessor had been, by the emperor's army, Banda 
 owed his escape only to a stratagem. Escape he did, however, 
 with all his followers; and, making his way to Jamna, laid 
 the fairest part of the Panjab under contribution. 
 
 Every day, however, loosened the bonds of union throughout 
 the Mughul empire. The death of Buhadur Shah, in 17 12, 
 and the contests amongst the rival candidates for the succes- 
 sion, gave strength to the nobles and the confederacies who 
 were playing for their own hands. Banda took advantage of 
 the surrounding turmoil to build a strong fort, Giirdaspur, 
 between the Bias and the Ravi, and, when the turmoil had 
 subsided, he issued from the vicinity of that fort, defeated the 
 army of the Viceroy of Lahor, and once more occupied Sir- 
 hind. Again were the chosen troops of the Mughul empire, 
 led by their best general, Abdul Samad Khan, despatched 
 against him. Again were the Sikhs, beaten in the open, com- 
 pelled to flee before the foe. At last they took refuge in the 
 new fort of Giirdaspur. Besieged here, they defended them- 
 selves to the last extremity. It was only when every means 
 of defence was exhausted that they submitted. They had 
 better have died of starvation; for the tortures inflicted by 
 the victors on Banda and on many of his followers were so 
 cruel that the pen refuses to record them. The blow was a 
 serious one, and it was followed up by a rigid persecution. 
 Recantation or death was the Muhammadan cry. Carried out 
 unsparingly, it almost seemed as though it had produced the 
 
340 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 desired effect, for, for the period of a generation, the Sikhs 
 were hardly heard of again in history. 
 
 But the principle which bound them together was a pure 
 and a strong principle. Decay, too, was doing her work on all 
 the surrounding institutions. Gradually, one after another, 
 whole provinces became dissevered from the Mughul empire. 
 Bengal, Awadh, Haidarabad, disclaimed dependence on Dihli. 
 The Marathas ruled in western and central, and were steadily 
 pressing up towards north-western, India. The invasion of 
 Nadir Shah came to deal a fatal blow to an empire already 
 a shadow of its former self. In the turmoil which followed 
 the Sikh confederacy gradually reconstituted itself. Then 
 followed the several invasions of Ahmad Shah Durani. The 
 Panjab fell for a time under the sway of the Afghan. The 
 Sikhs, often rising in arms, and as often dispersed, succeeded 
 at length, under the leadership of Jassa Singh, a carpenter by 
 trade (1758), m temporarily occupying Lahor. Three years 
 later was fought the decisive battle of Panipat. But though, 
 the year following, the victor of Panipat inflicted a crushing 
 defeat upon the Sikhs near Lodiana, destroyed their temples, 
 and slew his prisoners by hundreds, the time had gone by when 
 such a community could be rooted out. The Durani had to 
 leave India — an India about to be re-parcelled. Amongst the 
 new claimants for dominion were the English, the Niiwab 
 Vazir of Awadh, the Marathas, and last, but not least, the 
 Sikhs. 
 
 Of these several claimants the last-named were not the least 
 resolute. The year following their defeat by Ahmad Shah 
 they avenged that misfortune by inflicting upon the Afghans 
 an overthrow even more decisive in the plains of Sirhind. 
 Uniting then with the Jats, and in alliance with Holkar, they 
 laid siege to Dihli, and though forced by another interrup- 
 tion — speedily abandoned — of Ahmad Shah, and by the defec- 
 tion of Holkar, to raise that siege, they hurried back across the 
 Satlaj, attacked and seriously maltreated the great Durani, 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 341 
 
 near Amritsar, took possession of Lahor, and parcelled out 
 amongst themselves the whole country between the Satlaj and 
 the Jhelam. The chiefs then convened a solemn assembly at 
 Amritsar, at which they formally proclaimed the sway of the 
 Sikh nation and the prevalence of their faith. To commem- 
 orate this event, to bind it on the tablets of the hearts of their 
 followers, they struck from their mint a coin bearing an in- 
 scription to the effect that Guru Govind had received from 
 Nanak the three virtues — grace, power, and rapid victory. 
 
 For two years the Sikhs remained unmolested in their new 
 dominions. In 1767, however, Ahmad Shah, bent on recover- 
 ing the Panjab, made his last attempt to enslave India. The 
 attempt failed, mainly in consequence of the defection of his 
 own troops. Left, then, to themselves, the Sikhs, divided into 
 twelve confederacies or misls, each of which had its chief, equal 
 in authority to his brother chiefs, felt the want of the organiza- 
 tion which a central authority alone could bestow. Each misl 
 or confederacy fought for itself, and it was not until 1784 
 that a young chieftain, named Maha Singh, gained, mainly by 
 force of arms, a position which placed him above his fellows. 
 The only other chief who could at all pretend to rivalry with 
 Maha Singh was the leader whom he had defeated, Jai Singh 
 Kunaia. But Maha Singh, as great in diplomacy as in war, 
 found means to conciliate even him. A marriage between his 
 son and the grand-daughter of Jai Singh cemented a union 
 which was never afterwards broken. The name of the son of 
 Maha Singh was Ranjit Singh. 
 
 Ranjit Singh was born in 1780. At the early age of eleven 
 he lost his father. Before he had attained maturity evil day^ 
 befell the territories of which he was the nominal chieftain. 
 In 1797, six years after his father's death, the Panjab suffered 
 again from the horrors of an Afghan invasion, conducted by 
 Shah Zaman. Lahor was taken by the invader, only, how- 
 ever, to be almost immediately evacuated. The invasion was 
 renewed the following year, and Lahor was again occupied. 
 
342 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 But eighteen summers had formed the character of Ranjit 
 Singh. A true follower of Guru Govind, he hated the Afghan 
 invaders with an intensity inspired by the conviction that they 
 were the determined enemies of the freedom and the toleration 
 which were the watchword of his tribe. For the time, however, 
 his weakness forced him to dissemble. By a show of service 
 well appreciated he obtained from the Afghan ruler the inves- 
 titure of the capital of the Panjab (1799). Immediately after- 
 wards serious occurrences in his own country forced Zaman 
 Shah to return to Kabul. 
 
 Ranjit Singh became then the recognised ruler cf the Sikhs, 
 just after the English had destroyed the power of Tipu Sahib, 
 and just before the contest for supremacy with the Marathas, 
 which was really decided at Assaye and Laswari. The defeat 
 of Holkar, which followed the crushing overthrow of Sindia, 
 confirmed a supremacy which had been already assured. 
 Holkar, after a show of success, crcssed the Satlaj in the 
 autumn of 1805, a fugitive, with, as he said himself, "his king- 
 dom on his saddle's bow," and implored the assistance of 
 Ranjit Singh. But "the Lion of the Panjab," as he was called 
 about this time, had no wish to embroil his young nation with 
 the veterans who had destroyed the powerful hosts of the 
 Marathas. Lake, with his victorious army, was on the track of 
 Holkar, and Lake was not the man to fail to push his advan- 
 tage to the utmost. Ranjit Singh, then, received Jeswant Rao 
 Holkar at Amritsar, and made it clear to him that the aid he 
 wished for would not be given. By this time Lake was on the 
 Bias, and Holkar, after hesitating for a moment whether he 
 should not traverse the Panjab and invoke the aid of the 
 Afghans, finally accepted (24th December, 1805) the terms 
 offered by the English general. 
 
 - Ranjit Singh himself exchanged at this time friendly com- 
 munications with General Lake. It is even said that he 
 entered in disguise the English camp in order to inspect the 
 troops who had overthrown such famed warriors as Sindia, the 
 
Firiizshahar and Sobrdon 343 
 
 Bhonsle and Holkar. The communications led, however, to 
 no practical result. 
 
 But the visit made by the English commander to the coun- 
 try of the Sikhs was not altogether void of consequences. In 
 the cis-Satlaj territory Lake had been joined by two Sikh 
 chieftains of repute, Lai Singh of Khaital, and Ehag Singh of 
 [hind, mule to Ranjit Singh. These chieftains had already 
 rendered good service to a British detachment at Shamli when 
 it had been hard pressed by the enemy. On his passage 
 through Patiala, too, Lake had received promises of devotion 
 frcm its ruler, Sahib Singh. Before the war had terminated 
 the two first of these chieftains received handsome acknow- 
 ledgments from the Indian Government, and there can be no 
 doubt but that, had the policy of Marquess Wellesley not been 
 suspended, the cis-Satlaj chieftains as a body would have 
 acknowledged the over-lordship of the British. The tempor- 
 ary reversal of Marquess Wellesley's system delayed this 
 acknowledgment; but the kindly memory of the British 
 remained, and in due season bore abundant fruit. 
 
 Meanwhile Ranjit Singh had applied himself zealously to 
 the task of consolidating his dominions, of giving unity to 
 diverse and scattered elements, of welding the increasing Sikh 
 nation into a well-ordered commonwealth. Beyond the Satiaj 
 he succeeded almost to his fondest hopes. But in the cis- 
 Satlaj territories a spirit of independence had been awakened 
 strong enough to dispose the chiefs to resist the claim made 
 by the Panjab ruler even to nominal cverlordship. In 1808 
 these chieftains combined to resist the aggressive system which 
 Ranjit Singh threatened to introduce amongst them — a system 
 which would bring them into direct subordination to Lahor. 
 Recollecting their friendly intercourse with General Lake, they 
 dispatched messengers to the British Resident at Dihli, pray- 
 ing for support in case of need. But the Cornwallis policy — 
 the policy of under no pretence interfering in the affairs of 
 
344 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 native states — was in the ascendant, and from Dihli no assur- 
 ing replies reached them. 
 
 But the dread of the ambition of Napoleon changed the 
 course of events. That dread inspired the British Govern- 
 ment with the idea of seeking alliances for British India not 
 only beyond the Jamna but beyond the Indus. To secure 
 these alliances Mr. Elphinstone was dispatched to the court of 
 Shah Shiija, then ruler of Kabul, and Mr. Metcalfe to that of 
 Ran jit Singh. In view, too, of an impending crisis, the Corn- 
 wallis policy was still further suspended; and the chiefs of 
 Patiala, of Jhind, and of Khaital were verbally assured that 
 they had been brought under the protection of the British 
 Government. 
 
 Ranjit Singh heard of this act while Mr. Metcalfe was still 
 with him. He resented it so much that but for the earnest 
 entreaties of two of his most trusted counsellors he would have 
 declared war against the English. As it was he broke off the 
 negotiations, crossed the Satlaj at the head of his army, seized 
 Faridkot and Ambala, levied exactions in Malarkota and 
 Thanesar, and entered into an agreement or alliance with the 
 ruler of Patiala. 
 
 The proceedings of Ranjit Singh seemed to the Governor- 
 General, Lord Minto, to be of a character to demand a vigor- 
 ous counter-demonstration. He accordingly ordered Sir 
 David Ochterlony to march northwards with a force to sup- 
 port Mr. Metcalfe, and to confine Ranjit Singh to the north 
 bank of the Satlaj. Ochterlony on entering Sirhind was 
 received with open arms by all the chiefs, one only excepted, 
 and then halted at Lodiana, near his supplies, to wait for the 
 next move of Ranjit Singh. 
 
 Ranjit Singh was in this position. His hold on the Panjab 
 was not absolutely secure. Multan, Peshawar, and many other 
 strong places were held by the Afghans. He could not, until 
 he had secured his kingdom beyond the Satlaj, engage in a 
 war with the English. Reluctantly, then, he gave way, and 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 345. 
 
 recognised the protectorate of the British Government over the 
 cis-Satlaj states, those only excepted which he had originally 
 acquired south of that river. 
 
 During the five years which followed Ran jit Singh was 
 occupied in carrying out, not always successfully, his ambiti- 
 ous schemes beyond the Satlaj. Some acquisitions he did 
 make, but he failed, for the second time, before Multan in 
 1810; and he was foiled in an attempt upon Kashmir in 1 8 14. 
 But he never lost heart. He had placed one aim before him, 
 the unification of the Panjab under his sceptre, and he kept 
 that ever in view. In 1818 he captured Multan, and gained a 
 post on the north bank of the Indus which secured to him the 
 passage of that river. In 1819-20 he conquered Kashmir and 
 annexed Derajat. Four years later, 14th March, 1823, he 
 defeated the Afghans at Naoshera, and sacked Peshawar, 
 which, from this time forward, may be regarded as an integral 
 portion of his dominions. From this year, indeed, his aim 
 may be said to have been attained, his dominions to have been 
 welded into one whole. He had become the feudal chief of a 
 large population, devoted to war and to the preparation of 
 military means and equipment. To this end were directed 
 the wealth, the energies, the longings of the people. 
 
 A circumstance had occurred, the year previous to the con- 
 solidation of his dominions, which had greatly stimulated the 
 ambition of Ranjit Singh to possess an army equal to any 
 emergency. This was the arrival at Lahor of two officers who 
 had made their proofs under Napoleon, Generals Allard and 
 Ventura. Ranjit Singh persuaded these officers to accept posi- 
 tions in his army not dissimilar to those which de Boigne and 
 his coadjutors had held in the armies of Sindia. At a later 
 period two other officers, who had undergone the same train- 
 ing, Generals Court and Avitabile, were added to the list. 
 Possessing great capacity and experience, these officers suc- 
 ceeded very speedily m engrafting on the most promising raw 
 material in Asia the discipline and the dexterity of the Euro- 
 
346 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 /~~pean soldier. Strong of body, active, intelligent, unfettered 
 by the bonds of caste prejudice, full of courage and gifted 
 with a wonderful stamina, accustomed to live on flesh or dis- 
 pense with it, the Sikh has the making of the finest soldier in 
 
 — 4:he world. And it is not too much to affirm that the rank and 
 
 file of the Sikh army became, under the training of the skilled 
 officers I have named, the finest rank and file of the world. 
 They wanted but officers, from general to subaltern, to be in- 
 vincible. These, happily for England, they had not. 
 
 An interview between Ran jit Singh and the Governor-General 
 of India, Lord William Bentinck, at Rupar, on the Satlaj, in 
 October, 1 831, seemed only to confirm the conditions of friend- 
 ship between the two nations. There can be no doubt, how- 
 ever, but that Ranjit always regarded the advances of the 
 aggressive foreigners with suspicion. Already had they 
 thwarted his projects on Sirhind and Malwa, and he feared 
 lest, fixed now on the banks of the Satlaj, at Firiizpur and 
 Lodiana, they might interfere with the designs which he had 
 already nurtured regarding Sindh. To bring his suspicions 
 to a test he laid a claim, the year following the interview, to a 
 paramount right over Shikarpur. But eventually he had to 
 yield — and not only to yield, but to grant, unwillingly, the 
 opening of the Satlaj to British traders. It was about this 
 period that, glancing at a new English map of India with the 
 political agent, Captain Wade, and noticing how many por- 
 tions of it were encircled by the red line betokening the 
 supremacy of England, lie exclaimed with a sigh: "All will 
 become red." 
 
 It would be interesting to study the history of Ranjit Singh's 
 dealing with his powerful neighbours from this period to the 
 hour of his death. He never trusted them. He saw the 
 beginning of those trading aspirations which, by bestowing a 
 power to interfere, had led to the absorption of Bengal and of 
 the North-west Provinces. Had he been younger, or had he 
 felt within him the power to command, he would have resisted 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 347 
 
 and fought. But at his age — and he was old for his age — he 
 feared to risk the empire he had made on a single battle. He 
 preferred the impossible task of conciliating an aggressive 
 race. He had not sufficiently realised the fact that a race 
 which, from small beginnings, had succeeded in appropriating 
 one-third of the globe, can never be diverted by conciliation 
 from its natural bent. He tried it, however, first when Sir 
 Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief of the army in India, 
 visited Lahor in 1837; and, again, when the Governor-General 
 of India, Lord Auckland, demanded, in 1838, permission to 
 allow the English troops to traverse the Pan jab in order to 
 seat Shah Shuja on the throne of Afghanistan. Unwillingly, 
 most unwillingly, did Ranjit Singh yield to this demand. The 
 idea that he was to be girt about by the armies of England 
 chafed him. He entertained no doubt that the men who had 
 overcome the Marathas in all their glory could easily conquer 
 and retain the northern province, which had always been the 
 outer rampart of the Mughul empire. And then where would 
 he be? With the English south of the Satlaj, the English 
 north of the Indus, the English protecting Sindh, what chance 
 of independence would remain for the Panjab? Still — he 
 yielded. Again he tried conciliation : he became a party to 
 the alliance against Dost Muhammad. 
 
 What he hoped cannot be doubted. He hoped, though he 
 believed it not, that the resistance of the mountaineers might 
 so weaken his aggressive allies that he would be left master 
 of the situation — master to conquer Sindh, master to recover 
 the cis-Satlaj districts — possibly to acquire more. Nor can it 
 be questioned that had a few years of vigorous life yet been 
 spared to him he would have used to the advantage of the 
 Sikh nation the mishaps which overwhelmed the English army 
 a little later. 
 
 It was not to be. Ranjit Singh lived only long enough to 
 hear that the English had taken Kandahar. He died on the 
 
V 
 
 348 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 27th June, 1839, aged in years only fifty-nine, but older in 
 physique by at least twelve or fifteen years.* 
 
 His eldest son, Kharak Singh, succeeded him. He was 
 almost an imbecile. But his son, Nao Nihal Singh, had in- 
 herited much of the ability of his grandfather. He was a 
 man who could rule as well as govern; who distrusted the 
 rajahs of Jamu, and who was resolved to be master. Every- 
 thing seemed to favour him. Kharak Singh, always ailing, 
 showed every disposition still further to abridge his life by his 
 excesses.! In October, 1840, it was clear that his days were 
 numbered. On the 5th of the following month he died. 
 
 Nao Nihal Singh became ruler of the Panjab. But the acces- 
 sion of a prince so able, so resolute, so self-reliant, did not suit 
 the views of the ambitious rajahs of Jamu. Returning from 
 performing the last rites at the funeral pyre of his father, Nao 
 Nihal was passing under a covered archway with the eldest 
 son of Gulab Singh by his side, when a portion of the structure 
 fell, killed the son of Gulab Singh, and so severely injured 
 the Rajah that he died that night. The day of his accession 
 was the day of his death.J 
 
 Sher Singh, a reputed son of Ranjit, succeeded to the 
 thus vacated throne. A voluptuary without talents, Sher 
 Singh conciliated neither respect nor affection. Suddenly an 
 unexpected rival appeared in the person of Chand Kaur, 
 
 * When Lord Auckland paid his return visit to Ranjit Singh in 1839, 
 the Sikh ruler, says Sir Henry Lawrence, had completely lost the power 
 of speech. Before he died, the same year, the faculties of his mind gave 
 way, and the powers of the State had been usurped by the rajahs of 
 Jamii. 
 
 t Sir Henry Lawrence says he was the victim of a slow and subtle 
 poison. 
 
 J Captain Cunningham states : "It is not positively known that the 
 rajahs of Jamu thus designed to remove Nao Nihal Singh: but it is 
 difficult to acquit them of the crime, and it is certain they were capable 
 of committing it." Sir Henry Lawrence would appear to have been of 
 the same opinion (vide " Calcutta* Review," vol. i. p. 479). Captain 
 Gardner, who witnessed the accident, recorded his belief that it was 
 premeditated. 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 349 
 
 widow of Kharak Singh, and mother of the deceased Nao 
 Nihal. Matters were further complicated by the opportune 
 recollection that Rani Janda Kaur, a favourite wife of Ranjit 
 Singh, had borne to him a son, named Dhulip, a few months 
 before the conferences regarding the re-seating of Shah Shuja 
 on the throne of Kabul had taken place ! 
 
 For the moment the sword decided the question. Sher Singh, 
 having gained over the Jamil rajahs, marched on Lahor, cap- 
 tured it, and caused himself to be proclaimed Maharajah. Mai 
 Chand Kaur was treated at first with outward respect ; but, 
 after a time, she was placed under surveillance, then in con- 
 finement. In the course of time, her paramour, who had been 
 allowed to share her fate, was seized, tortured, and put to 
 death; and a little later, about a year after her overthrow, Mai 
 Chand Kaur herself was, at the instigation of higher authority, 
 beaten to death with slippers by her own slave girls ! 
 
 Sher Singh had gained his throne by the army, and the army 1 
 had become his master. From that moment, until it invaded 
 British territory, the Sikh army never ceased to be master in 
 the Panjab. Xo longer was it the willing instrument of a 
 despotic but genial government. It had come to look upon 
 itself as the representative body of the people, as the Khalsa 
 itself, commissioned by the various tribes to take a leading 
 part in public affairs. Distrustful of the English, the Sikh 
 chiefs and soldiers yet behaved with singular loyalty to that 
 people in the hour of their calamity in Afghanistan, and even » 
 aided them to force their way through the Khaibar. After 
 the disaster had been retrieved, and the English army had re- 
 turned to the south of the Satlaj, Lord Ellenborough, then 
 Governor-General, expressed a desire that Sher Singh should 
 visit the British camp at Firiizpiir. But neither Sher Singh 
 nor his Jamii advisers desired an interview which, they im-, 
 agined, would be used to force from them new concessions. 
 Advantage, then, was taken of a misunderstanding to postpone 
 it indefinitely. 
 
350 The Decisive Baffles of India. 
 
 But events were marching too fast for the repose of the 
 voluptuary who ruled the Panjab. The year following the 
 return of the English from Kabul he was deliberately mur- 
 dered by his boon companion, Ajit Singh Smdhawala, a man 
 whom he had recalled from exile. The assassin then murdered 
 the son, Partab Singh; then the minister, chief of the Jamu 
 rajahs, Dhian Singh; and then proceeded to the citadel to 
 proclaim a new king. But, meanwhile, Hira Singh, son of the 
 murdered Dhian Singh, had thrown himself on the army, and 
 promised them rewards if they would avenge the death of 
 their friend and his father. The issue was doubtful, because 
 the Jamu rajahs were hated by the troops, and it is probable 
 that if Ajit Singh and his confederates had been able to main- 
 tain their position in the citadel for three days the army would 
 have come round to them, and the days of the Jamu rajahs 
 would have been numbered. But, on the spur of the moment, 
 the army responded to the call of Hira Singh; the citadel 
 made a poor defence; Ajit Singh and his brother were killed; 
 and the next day Dhulip Singh, the only surviving son of the 
 great Ranjit, was proclaimed Maharajah. Hira Singh was 
 nominated his Vazir ! 
 
 Be it remembered that the new rajah was then in his fifth 
 year, an irresponsible minor. His mother, Rani Janda Kaur, 
 became, in virtue of his age and of her relationship to him, 
 regent of the kingdom. Of this lady it is not necessary to 
 say more than that, gifted with considerable talents, she had 
 not been endowed with the faculty of rightly directing those 
 talents. Nor had education supplied that which nature had 
 denied. With all her abilities, she was, and remained to the 
 end, a spirited, hot-tempered, intriguing woman, swayed always 
 by her passions, and possessing a large capacity alike for love 
 and for hate ! 
 
 The Rani had, on her accession, an intuitive conviction of 
 the necessity of crushing the ambition of the Jamu rajahs. 
 But she chose her instrument badly. Perhaps because there 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobtdon. 351 
 
 was no one else upon whom she could thoroughly depend, she 
 selected her brother, Jowahir Singh. Jowahir Singh was a 
 
 weak debauchee, without character and without influence. He 
 made the attempt, and failed. Scarcely had the failure been 
 recognised than a new peril arose. Kashmira Singh and 
 Peshora Singh, two princes who claimed relationship to Ranjit 
 Singh by adoption, if not by blood, rose in revolt. Though 
 the revolt collapsed, mainly through the imbecility of its two 
 leaders, it proved the beginning of many others. Noble after 
 noble rose in rebellion, nor was the spirit of sedition satisfied 
 until the rule of the Jama rajahs had been overthrown, and 
 their leader, Hira Singh, been slain (21st December, 1844). 
 
 To the Government of Jamii rajahs succeeded an adminis- 
 tration — if, by courtesy, it can be called such — of which Jowa- 
 hir Singh, the brother, and Lai Singh, the lover, of the Rani, 
 were the responsible heads. Of the first I have already spoken. 
 Lai Singh was a man of greater ability and cunning. Of the 
 Sikh nobles, he and another, Tej Singh, had been foremost in 
 recognising the necessity of curbing the insolence of the army. 
 There is reason to believe, indeed, that at this early period 
 they had begun to nurture the idea that if they should fail to 
 master those all-powerful soldiers it would be wise policy to 
 throw them on the bayonets of the British. 
 
 The first measure of the new confederates was to humble 
 Gulab Singh, now become chief of the Jamii family. The 
 army, which Hira Singh had attempted to conciliate by a 
 monthly increase of two and a half rupees to the pay of each 
 common soldier, was further propitiated by a new increase of 
 one-fifth of that sum. It was then ordered to march against 
 Gulab Singh. The rajah, one of the most astute men of his 
 day, submitted without a struggle, scattered his rupees broad- 
 cast among the soldiers, and returned with them to Lahor, 
 where, to save his life, he surrendered without a murmur a 
 considerable portion of his ancestral domains. He was then 
 permitted to return to Jamii. 
 
7,-^2 The Decisive halites of India. 
 
 Meanwhile Jowahir Singh had been appointed to the fatal 
 post of Vazir (14th May, 1845). Shortly there followed a 
 second rebellion of Peshora Singh, terminated very quickly by 
 the surrender of that insignificant political personage. His 
 very insignificance should have saved him. But Jowahir Singh 
 no sooner had him in his power than he caused him to be put 
 to death. The news of this outrage roused into action feelings 
 which had for some time been fomenting in the army. Long 
 had the soldiers despised Jowahir Singh ; the crime perpetrated 
 on Peshora changed that feeling to hatred. At a solemn meet- 
 ing of the Panchayats, or regimental councils of the army, 
 Jowahir Singh was sentenced to death. He was required, in 
 consequence, to appear before the assembled Khalsa to answer 
 for his misdeeds. Tremblingly he obeyed; but to insure, if 
 possible, his safety, he placed beside him, in the howdah of 
 his elephant, the boy Maharajah, Dhulip Singh. The troops, 
 however, thoroughly in earnest, were not thus to be baulked of 
 their prey. The Maharajah was made to descend and enter 
 a tent. A party of soldiers then disposed of Jowahir Singh 
 by a volley of musketry ! 
 
 The army, thus become the arbiter of the fate of the rulers 
 •of the country, was now more than ever master. To men like 
 Lai Singh, Tej Singh, and others who had a stake in the 
 country, the situation had become intolerable. Earnest secret 
 efforts were then made by these men to arouse in the ranks of 
 the army a spirit of hostility to the English. They bore no 
 grudge against that people; they wished them no ill-will; they 
 rather hoped that the power which ruled India south of the 
 Satlaj would rid them of those all-powerful janissaries who, 
 at a word, might sentence them and their families to death. 
 Y By degrees they succeeded. The soldiers, roused to a deter- 
 mination to conquer India, selected as prime minister and as 
 commander-in-chief Lai Singh and Tej Singh, the two nobles 
 who had most openly declared in favour of the new aggres- 
 
Firiizshahar and Sobrddn. 353 
 
 sion; and, on the 11th December, 184$, tumultuously crossed 
 the Satlaj some twelve miles below Firuzpur. 
 
 What sort of reception were the English prepared to give 
 them? The Government of India had been neither blind nor 
 indifferent to the anarchy which had prevailed in the Panjab 
 -nice the day when Sher Singh refused the invitation of Lord 
 Ellenborough. That nobleman, strong in his conviction that 
 ;i crisis was imminent, and might occur at any moment, had 
 made every preparation in his power to meet it. He had estab- 
 lished a new cantonment, the head-quarters of a division, at 
 Ambala, in Sirhind, and had located there the troops who 
 had previously occupied the far less commodious station of 
 Karnal. He had directed the throwing up of an intrepchment 
 round the magazines and stores of Firuzpur. He had even 
 contemplated more. It had been his intention to establish a 
 fortified camp between Miidki and Jagraon, and he was only 
 prevented from carrying out this project by his untimely , 
 recall.* He did not the less commend the plan to his successor, 
 Sir Henry Hardinge. But like every Governor-General who 
 has landed in India, from the time of Clive downwards, Sir 
 Henry Hardinge had quitted England with the most sincere 
 and loudly-proclaimed resolution to maintain a policy of 
 peace. It can easily be understood, then, that he was un- 
 Avilling to inaugurate his assumption of power by sanctioning 
 a line of policy which would most certainly have been de- 
 nounced as menacing the independence of a free people. Rut 
 Sir Henry had not been long in India before he recognised, as 
 clearly as had Lord Ellenborough, the danger of the situation. 
 Quietly and unostentatiously, then, he strengthened the force 
 in the north-west; increased the number of native regiments 
 at Firuzpur to seven; placed at the head of the brigade there 
 the best officer in the Bengal army, General Littler; and 
 brought up to support the frontier force every man who could 
 
 * I received this information from the late Karl of Ellenborough 
 
 himself. 
 
 A A 
 
354 The Decisive Dailies of India. 
 
 be spared from the eastern, and even from the southern, por- 
 tions of the empire. He did not mass the troops in the north- 
 west on any particular spot, for such action on his part would 
 have been liable to afford to the Sikhs the excuse they wanted ; 
 but he kept them handy, in readiness to move at the first signal. 
 
 On the nth December, we have seen, the Sikhs gave that 
 signal. They crossed the Satlaj twelve miles from Firuzpur, 
 and at once intrenched themselves on the south bank of the 
 river. Their counsels were divided. Whilst many amongst 
 the rank and file were eager to push on at once, and overwhelm 
 the weak British force at Firuzpur, others, stimulated by Lai 
 Singh and Tej Singh, who dreaded a victory of the Khalsa 
 over the British, and whose main object was the destruction 
 of the army which threatened them, were eager to push on, 
 and have the glory of capturing or slaying a British Governor- 
 General. Still, Firuzpur was so temptingly near, and was so 
 weakly defended, its arsenal being three miles from the station, 
 that it is probable the advocates for an attack on that place 
 would have carried the day, but for the conduct of the British 
 general commanding there, General Littler. 
 
 Littler was a very capable soldier, daring, resolute, and self- 
 reliant. He had 7,000 men under his command; but of these 
 rather less than 1,000 were Europeans. As soon as he heard 
 that the Sikhs, in large force, were attempting the passage of 
 the Satlaj, Littler at once summoned the commanding officers 
 of regiments to his quarters, and asked their advice. Without 
 one exception they recommended throwing up intrenchments 
 to fortify the station. Littler listened to them all, dismissed 
 them without a word from himself, and learning the next 
 morning that the Sikhs had crossed the river, and were in- 
 trenching themselves on its south bank, marched out and 
 offered them battle ! 
 
 This bold and judicious action had an excellent effect. If 
 the Sikhs ever had any intention of attacking Firuzpur, the 
 movement of Littler effectually dissipated it. They left, then, 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdohi. 355 
 
 uninjured a position they might easily have carried, and the 
 occupation of which by them would have effected incalculable , 
 damage to the British army, and prepared to carry cut the 
 design craftily instilled into them by their leaders. 
 
 Meanwhile the news of the passage of the Satlaj had reached \| ^1 
 the Governor-General, and the Commander-in-Chief in India, 
 Sir Hugh Gough. Instantly, from every station in the North- 
 West, horse, foot, artillery were in motion. From the hill J 
 
 stations of the Himalayas there hurried down two European 
 regiments. The divisions stationed at Ambala and at Mirath 
 marched on one common point. The Lodiana force was con- 
 centrated at Bassian. On the 13th, Sir Hugh Gough, who 
 had started from Simlah, was with the Ambala troops at the 
 town of Sirhind; on the same day he opened communications 
 with Sir Henry Hardinge. On the 14th the army was formed 
 into brigades and divisions. On the 15th Gough' s division 
 marched twenty-six miles to Lattala, and the day following 
 thirty miles to Wadni, effecting, on the way, at Bassian, a 
 junction with the Governor-General and the Lodiana force. 
 
 Wadni belonged to the Sikhs, and the officer who held the 
 place refused the British army supplies. He yielded, however, 
 to force. The next day the army marched ten miles to Charak ; 
 and the following day, the 1 8th, twenty-one miles further, to 
 Miidki. They had scarcely taken up their ground here, how- 
 ever, when they found themselves threatened by a detachment 
 of the Sikh army. 
 
 It happened in this wise. The Sikh army, having crossed ' 
 the Satlaj on the nth, had remained for some days motion- 
 less. The influence of its leaders, Lai Singh and Tej Singh, 
 caused them to waste those precious days. Intimidated by 
 Littler's bold challenge, they had spared Firiizpur. Their in- 
 telligence department being extremely defective, they had but 
 imperfect news of the movements of the British army. A bold 
 and sagacious enemy would have found it comparatively easy 
 to destroy that army in detail. But boldness and sagacity 
 
356 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 were alike wanting in the councils of the Sikh leaders. At 
 last, after they had rested six days idle on the south bank of 
 the Satlaj, information upon which they could rely reached 
 their camp (i/th December) that the British army would cer- 
 tainly arrive at Mudki the following day. Here was an oppor- 
 tunity. The Sikhs had 30,000 men on the south bank : the 
 English, of all arms — not including Littler's force, which had 
 not yet effected a junction with Gough — numbered 11,000: 
 they would reach Miidki tired and unprepared : how easy then 
 to surprise and overwhelm them ! Such were the counsels of 
 common sense. But the Sikh army, under the baneful in- 
 fluence of the leaders who were bent on its destruction, had 
 no regard for such counsels. Instead of marching en masse 
 to overwhelm the enemy, they were persuaded to detach only 
 a brigade consisting of less than 2,000 infantry, supported by 
 twenty-two guns and 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry.* 
 
 The British force had, I have said, just arrived at Miidki 
 when the proximity of the enemy was reported to Sir Hugh 
 Gough. Few men braver than the soldier who commanded 
 the British army have ever lived; not one who was less of a 
 strategist or a tactician. Of Clive, of John Adams, and of 
 Wellesley it has been recorded that under the roar of cannon 
 their mental energies redoubled, and that never was their vision 
 so clear or their action so cool as when the battle raged furi- 
 ously and doubtfully around them. Sir Hugh Gough pos- 
 sessed the opposite characteristic. Under the excitement of 
 battle he forgot all his plans; he could only push forward. 
 He chafed under the delay caused by the preliminary fire of 
 his artillery; he burned with impatience to let his infantry get 
 at the enemy. Such a disposition, less harmful against an 
 
 :: Vide Cunningham, p. 30(5. Captain Nicholson, who was at that 
 lime British Agent at Finizpur, estimated the detached force as con- 
 siderably smaller. The numbers given in the official dispatches (14,000 
 to 20,000 infantry and the same number of cavalry) are absurdly unreli- 
 able. Personal inquiries on the spot enable me to state that the numbers 
 given in the text are correct. 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon 
 
 j?/ 
 
 Asiatic foe than any other, was dangerous when allowed to 
 have its way against an enemy so formidable as the Sikhs. It 
 would have been fatal had the opposing army been European. 
 Such was the leader to whom it was reported, about 3 o'clock 
 in the afternoon (18th December), that the Sikhs were ad- 
 vancing. The men, tired after their march of twenty-one miles, 
 were cooking their dinners. Instantly the bugle sounded; the 
 half-cooked dinners were abandoned, the men turned out, the 
 line of battle was formed, and the order to advance was given. 
 The front line was formed of the three arms, the artillery 
 being in the centre, flanked on both sides by infantry, and 
 the infantry again by cavalry. Behind this line came the main 
 body of the infantry in contiguous columns; and in rear of 
 all a small reserve. After marching a mile and a half the 
 advance came under the fire of Sikh guns in position. Still 
 the British troops pressed on. A few minutes later and the 
 enemy's cavalry threaten both flanks of the British. To repel 
 these Gough launches his own cavalry against them, and, under 
 cover of their brilliant charge, deploys into line his infantry 
 columns and sends them against the enemy. The enemy's 
 hope, at this crisis of the battle, was in their guns. What could 
 their handful of infantry effect against the superior numbers 
 of the British? Still they remained firm, opposing, with 
 steady discipline, a continuous musketry fire to that of the 
 enemy. All at once, however, their flanks were uncovered ; 
 their cavalry gave way ! Even in that hour the troops of the 
 Khalsa were true to their renown. They retired, steadily, their 
 faces to the foe, disputing every inch of ground. For five 
 miles they fell back, still doggedly resisting, seizing every 
 opportunity, every vantage ground* to turn upon their pursuers. 
 
 * In his article on this campaign in the Calcutta Review, vol. vi. pp. 
 263, 264, Sir Herbert Edwardes involuntarily lenders justice to the Sikh 
 army at Miidki. Sir Herbert was then under the impression (1846) that 
 the number of the Sikhs greatly exceeded the actual amount. He cal- 
 culated the infantry at about 4.r,()(). and the cavalry from 20,000 to 
 
358 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 With nightfall only did the contest cease. Of their twenty- 
 two guns the Sikhs had lost seventeen; they had lost also the 
 field of battle; but they at least had not lost their honour ! 
 
 In this combat the English lost 872 men killed and wounded, 
 amongst the former the famous Sir Robert Sale, and General 
 M'Caskill. How many of the Sikhs were slain can never be 
 known. In all probability their casualties did not exceed 
 those of their enemy. 
 
 That the victory of Mudki was not considered in the British 
 camp to be very decisive was shown by the determination ar- 
 rived at that evening to effect a junction with Littler before 
 attempting anything further. Orders to that effect were ac- 
 cordingly transmitted to that officer. It was ascertained the 
 next day that the main body of the Sikhs, consisting of twelve 
 battalions of infantry, eighty guns, many of large calibre, and 
 from 10,000 to 12,000 horsemen, or in all under 30,000 men,* 
 were encamped in a deep horse-shoe form round the village of 
 Firuzshahar. Before venturing to attack such a position it 
 was necessary that the army should be reinforced. 
 
 That same day some reinforcements, the 29th Foot and the 
 1st Europeans, the nth and 41st Native Infantry, and a small 
 detachment of heavy guns, arrived in camp. The day fol 
 lowing, the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, notified 
 to the Commander-in-Chief his willingness to serve under his 
 orders as second in command. The offer was accepted. Sir 
 Henry brought to the army a great accession of strength; for, 
 in calm, cool, clear judgment on the field of battle he was 
 surpassed by no one then in India. 
 
 The village of Firuzshahar is ten miles from Mudki, nearly 
 midway between that place and Firuzpiir. Early on the 
 morning of the 21st December the army, led by Sir Hugh 
 
 30,000. Whilst, then, exalting the prowess of the British soldier, lie 
 renders perfect justice to the gallant stand made by less than 2,000 men 
 against four times as many. 
 
 * Edwardes estimates them at 35,000 with between eighty and ninety 
 guns.— Calcutta Review, vol. vi. p. 271. 
 
Firitzshahar ami Sobrdon, 359 
 
 Gough, left its encamping-ground to effect 11 junction with 
 Littler, who, on his part, quitted Firuzpur to march across 
 country to meet it. The junction was effected four miles from 
 the Sikh position, about half -past one o'clock in the day. The 
 skilful manner in which this manoeuvre was effected by Littler 
 completely deceived the Sikh reserve which, under Tej Singh, 
 had been set to watch Firuzpur, and severed it from the main 
 army. 
 
 The junction having been effected, Gough marched on the 
 enemy's position. He found it, to use his own language, "a 
 parallelogram of about a mile in length and half a mile in 
 breadth, including within its area the strong village of Firiiz- 
 shahar; the shorter sides looking towards the Satlaj and 
 Miidki, and the longer towards Firuzpur and the open 
 country." 
 
 The dispositions for the attack were not completed till an 
 hour before sunset. The left division was Littler's, next to 
 him was Wallace, then the whole force of artillery, with the 
 exception of three troops of horse artillery, one on each flank 
 and one in support, to be used as it might be wanted; on the 
 right was Gilbert's division. The division of Sir Harry Smith 
 and the cavalry formed the reserve, a brigade of the cavalry 
 being thrown forward in support of each wing. Sir H. 
 Hardinge commanded the left wing, Sir H. Gough the right. 
 
 The order of the battle was as follows : Littler was to attack 
 nearly the whole of the west face, that looking towards 
 Firuzpur and the open country, Wallace the corner of the west 
 and south face; Gilbert the rest of the south and as much of 
 the east as he could manage. Littler came first under fire, 
 just about, as I have said, an hour before sunset. To him the 
 hardest work had been allotted, for on the west face the Sikhs 
 had massed their best troops and their heaviest artillery. 
 Boldly, however, did he advance, his troops in the highest 
 spirits : so boldly, indeed, that the issue appeared certain to 
 Littler. When he was within 1 ^o yards of the intrenchment 
 
360 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 he gave the order to charge. Gallantly did the troops respond 
 to this call, until, within a few yards of the enemy, the Euro- 
 pean regiment on the right of the line, crushed, apparently, by 
 the overwhelming lire from the intrenchment, halted, turned 
 about, and fell back, accompanied by the native soldiers, who 
 took their cue from them." Then, amongst many, undoubted 
 panic set in. The cry of "India's lest" was heard from one 
 commanding officer as he tried in vain to rally his men. The 
 left attack on the Khalsa had failed so signally that it could 
 not be renewed. 
 
 It was not until Littler had been beaten back that General 
 Wallace was able to bring the next division into fire. Suffi- 
 cient time elapsed between the two attacks to allow a part of 
 one of the native regiments belonging to Littler's division, 
 the 14th, to rally and join in the new attempt. Wallace was 
 more successful than Littler. The European regiment in his 
 division, the 9th, and one of the native regiments, the 26th 
 Native Light Infantry, had been comrades in the Afghan cam- 
 paign, and they now vied with each other in generous rivalry 
 in the field. The two sides of the angle on which they directed 
 their efforts were well manned and well defended. But 
 nothing could withstand their ardour. They carried the posi- 
 tion at the point of the bayonet, in the face of a fire which 
 cost the 9th Regiment alone 273 men in killed and wounded. 
 
 To Gilbert had been assigned the storming of the south and 
 south-east faces of the intrenchment. lie had two splendid 
 European regiments, the 29th and the 1st Europeans — now the 
 Royal Munster Fusiliers — under his command, and native regi- 
 ments worthy of being their comrades. With great gallantry 
 and suffering much loss, the division carried the two faces. 
 They carried them, however, only to find that their work was 
 but just beginning. Behind the guns they had captured were 
 
 * Sir John Littler's dispatch : Sir Herbert Edwardes in the Calcutta 
 Review, vol. vi. p. 273-."). It was well known that the commanding 
 officer of the regiment in question had given the order to retire. 
 
Firitzshahar and Sobrdon. 361 
 
 posted the unsubdued infantry of the enemy, and these poured 
 forth a continuous galling lire of musketry upon the English, 
 now face to face with them. To add to the horrors of the 
 situation, one of the enemy's magazines exploded under the 
 feet of the 1st Europeans, blowing up many men and officers 
 and rending the regiment in two. Undismayed, however, the 
 gallant division pressed on, and drove back the foe. It was 
 only on the approach of darkness that they retired, and took 
 up a position about 300 yards from the intrenchment, ready 
 to advance again with the morning's light. 
 
 The battle, then, was not yet won. On the right the Sikhs 
 held their own, and the fire from their guns continued to pour 
 death and havoc into the British ranks. To deal finally with 
 them the reserve under Sir Harry Smith was ordered up; the 
 3rd Dragoons were at the same time launched upon a batter}* 
 which kept up its deadly shower. The manner in which they 
 carried out this order is thus described by an eye-witness:* — - 
 " The) r charged, and carried the battery they were opposed 
 to, — -the leaders filling up the yawning trench with their own 
 numbers, and those who followed crossing on a living bridge 
 
 of their comrades But this was not all. Having put 
 
 the artillerymen to death and silenced the battery, this gallant 
 band faced the whole Khalsa army within the intrenchment, 
 swept through their camp with loud huzzas over tents, ropes, 
 pegs, guns, fires, and magazines, cutting down all who opposed 
 their passage; and having traversed the enemy's position from 
 side to side, emerged among their friends with numbers 
 thinned, indeed, but covered with imperishable glory." 
 
 But the effect of this brilliant feat of arms was but tem- 
 porary. Night fell before victory had been achieved. The 
 Sikh infantry still offered a stead)', and so far a successful, 
 resistance to the British army. The position when darkness 
 covered the field may thus be briefly summarized. On the 
 
 * Sir Herbert Edwardes, Calcutta Ucvieio, vol. vi. pp. 27(i-7. 
 
362 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 extreme left Littler, repulsed, had fallen back on a small 
 village directly west of the Sikh intrenchments. Two regi- 
 ments of Wallace's division, the 9th Foot and 26th Light 
 Infantry, had, in the confusion of the battle, taken ground to 
 the right, and were intermingled with those led by General 
 Gilbert. Sir Harry Smith, whom we have seen brought up to 
 finish the action, had penetrated to the very heart of the great 
 parallelogram, and had halted there ready to resist any attack. 
 Gilbert's division on the right, reinforced, as just stated, by 
 the 9th Foot and 26th Light Infantry, and increased by strag- 
 glers from broken regiments, and Smith's, were the only two 
 left on the field of battle. But Gilbert was soon to find him- 
 self alone. Between two and three in the morning the enemy 
 forced Smith to fall back, to evacuate the intrenchment, and 
 to retreat on a village two miles to the south-east of Firuz- 
 shahar. Gilbert was thus left alone to face the enemy. But 
 with Gilbert were Hardinge and Gough, and these three gal- 
 lant soldiers had laboured indefatigably since nightfall to 
 restore order among the stragglers and to encourage the troops. 
 This at last accomplished, the men lay down to take some 
 fitful repose. 
 
 Soon they were roused again to action. As the night was 
 wearing away the Sikhs brought up their heavy guns, and 
 played them with deadly effect upon the British troops, only 
 300 yards distant. Sir Henry Hardinge, cool and ready, at 
 once called upon the two regiments nearest him, the 80th and 
 the 1st Europeans, to "sec if they could not stop that gun." 
 The two regiments appealed to sprang at once with alacrity 
 from the ground, dashed forward into the intrenchment, 
 spiked the gun, and "returned again to their cold bivouac on 
 the frosty ground."* They were not again disturbed. 
 
 Let us take a glance now at the Sikh camp. The brave, un- 
 tutored warriors who defended it, led by generals who were 
 
 * Edwardes. 
 
Firiizshahar and Sobrdon. $b$ 
 
 betraying them, had, if they had only known it, won a victor}-. 
 They had repulsed the British attack. They had driven back 
 Littler, f creed Smith to retire, compelled even Gilbert to 
 evacuate the position he had gained, and thrown the whole 
 British army into disorder. What was mere, they had still 
 10,000 men under Tej Singh, watching Firuzpur, who had not 
 been engaged, and these could not fail to join them with the 
 morning's light. Had a guiding mind directed the movements 
 of the Sikh army nothing could have saved the exhausted 
 British. But the Sikhs, as we know, possessed no guiding 
 mind. The honest men amongst them either did not recognise 
 the advantage they had gained, or were powerless in the 
 presence of those who saw, in the attitude of Gilbert's division, 
 the certainty of a renewal of the attack on the morrow. To 
 these divided counsels were added the fatal suggestions of the 
 traitors who desired nothing less than the victory of the 
 Khalsa. The result was stormy counsels, bitter words, plunder, 
 desertion. All cohesion vanished; the morale, which alone 
 could have insured victory, disappeared. 
 
 When the day broke, then, and the English line again 
 advanced, it encountered no opposition. The Sikhs were 
 driven out of the village of Firuzshahar." :;: The British line, 
 then changing front to its left on its centre, swept the camp, 
 marched round two sides of the parallelogram, and emerged 
 on the north-east of the plain. 
 
 The line then halted, and its two leaders, riding along its 
 front, were received with cheers. Every man thought that the 
 work was done, that the victory had been gained. But, 
 suddenly, the scene changed. A dense cloud of dust appeared 
 on the horizon. It approached nearer and nearer. From it 
 there emerged the advance guard of a fresh army of Sikhs. 
 It was the army of Tej Singh, marching from the leaguer of 
 
 * There was no real opposition. It was "little more than the passive 
 resistance of tin- wreck of a great army."— Sir Herbert Ed w a ides, 
 Calcutta 'Review, vol. vi. p. 279. 
 
364 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Firuzpur to recover the advantage which Lai Singh had 
 
 thrown away. 
 
 Tej Singh had it in his power to recover that advantage. 
 The true and loyal men who had served under him had urged 
 him to fall upon the English army at daybreak, when they 
 were entangled in the intrenchments He might have done 
 this. He would have done it had he been as loyal as the least 
 of his followers. But Tej Singh had but one object — to see 
 the Khalsa troops overcome and dispersed. He waited, then, 
 till the army of Lai Singh had been put to flight, till the 
 British had had time to reform. He then skirmished with 
 their line, and opened an artillery fire upon the British lett. 
 Tli is lire evoked no response. The English had exhausted 
 their ammunition; they "were unable to answer him with a 
 single shot."* This fact, which would have inspired a true 
 man with a determination to continue the contest, produced an 
 opposite effect upon the traitor who commanded the Sikh 
 forces. He suddenly ordered the firing to cease, and, turning 
 his horse's head, galloped as fast as he could towards the 
 Satlaj. He did this at the moment when victor)- was in his 
 grasp, for a portion of the British army was, at the moment, 
 retiring from Firuzpur ! f 
 
 * Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch. 
 
 f Cunningham's '"History of the Sikhs," pp. 308, 309, and notes. 
 Sir Herbert Edwardes' narrative bears out the view taken in the text 
 so far as relates to the practical result of Tej Singh's conduct. He 
 say-, after recording the facts: '"To what the army of the Satlaj are 
 indebted for this deliverance ; whether to cowardice or treachery, or 
 ignorance on the enemy's part of the British numbers, or whether, 
 after all, Tej Singh's whole object was a chivalrous wish to cover his 
 friend's retreat — remains to be guessed and wondered at, but we fear 
 not to be satisfactorily decided." We may dismiss at once the last 
 supposition, that regarding the "chivalrous wish," for the British were 
 not pursuing. Cowardice can scarcely have been seriously suggested : 
 nor can ignorance cf the British numbers be pleaded with better grace. 
 There is only one possible solution, and that is the solution adopted in 
 the text. The object of Tej Singh was to destroy the Khalsa army, and 
 then to claim credit with the British for having destroyed it. He suc- 
 ceeded in both objects. 
 
F iriizshakar and Sobrdon. 365 
 
 Such was the battle of Firuzshahar -a battle gained after it 
 had been lost, and then regained after its success had once 
 more been imperil led a battle which shook the edifice of 
 British dominion in India to its very basis, which impressed our 
 native soldiers with the conviction that the English were not 
 invincible. More, far more, than the Kabul disaster of 1S41 
 did the battle of Firuzshahar give birth in the minds of the 
 sipahis to the conviction that great numbers might prevail even 
 over their foreign masters. 
 
 For, be it remembered, the numbers on both sides were not 
 Very disproportionate. The English army mustered over 
 16,000; the Sikhs, excluding Tej Singh, who was not near the 
 battle-field, did not certainly exceed 30,000; and if the latter 
 possessed a slight superiority in artillery and a strong posi- 
 tion, these advantages were mere than counterbalanced by the 
 treason of their leaders, the want of unity in their counsels. It 
 was these two circumstances alone that lost them the clay. 
 
 The results of the battle have been so well described by the 
 faithful and accurate author to whom I am so largely in- 
 debted* that I cannot do better than record them in his own 
 impressive language : " A battle had thus been won, and more 
 than seventy pieces of artillery, and some conquered or confis- 
 cated territories, graced the success; but the victors had lost a 
 seventh of their numbers,f they were paralysed after their 
 prodigious exertions and intense excitement, and the Sikhs 
 were allowed to cross the Satlaj to prepare for fresh contests. 
 The Sipahi mercenaries had for the first time met an equal 
 antagonist with their own weapons — even ranks and the fire of 
 artillery. They loudly complained of the inferiority of their 
 cannon; they magnified banks two or three feet high into 
 formidable ramparts, and exploding tumbrils and stores of 
 powder became, in their imagination, designed and deadly 
 mines. Nor was this feeling of respect and admiration con- 
 
 * Cunningham's "History of the Sikhs." 
 
 t They lost 694 killed, 1,721 wounded, or a total of 2,415. 
 
6 
 
 66 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 fined to the Indians alone; the European soldiers partook 
 of it." 
 
 The moral effect of this hard-gained victory was seen in the 
 demeanour of the cis-Satlaj feudatories. Whilst the beaten 
 army was allowed to cross the Satlaj leisurely, and then to 
 recross again and construct a bridge-head to ensure freedom 
 of passage, the cis-Satlaj feudatories kept as much as possible 
 aloof from their new masters. The Rajah of Ladwa even 
 joined the enemy, and subsequently burned a portion of the 
 cantonment of Lodiana; and, generally, the demeanour of the 
 petty princes was such as to indicate their conviction that the 
 hour of independence was approaching. 
 
 The English army, meanwhile, gradually reinforced, had 
 advanced to the Satlaj, and taken up a strong position on the 
 left bank, stretching from Firiizpur towards Hariki. Thence, 
 whilst waiting for his heavy guns, Gough, on the i/th Janu- 
 ary, 1846, dispatched Sir H. Smith to capture Dharmkot, and 
 to cover the march of the expected convoy of guns, ammunition 
 and treasure. Dharmkot having surrendered without blood- 
 shed, and the progress of the convoy having been thus made 
 more secure, Smith was ordered to proceed to the relief of 
 Lodiana, threatened by a Sikh army under Ranjur Singh. On 
 his march thither Smith received information (21st January) 
 that Ranjur Singh, with an army estimated at 8,000 irregular 
 cavalry and nearly seventy guns,* had the previous day occu- 
 pied Badiwal, eight miles distant. Smith then concluded that 
 by making a detour to the right, so as to leave his left flank 
 three miles distant from the Sikh position, he would be able 
 to effect a junction with the Lodiana brigade without molesta- 
 tion, and he attempted to give effect to this idea. x-\s he 
 approached Badiwal, however, it became clear to him that he 
 would not be allowed to carry it out with impunity. Ranjur 
 Singh moved from that place with the apparent intention of 
 heading the English force. But as Smith, who wished to 
 
 * Sir Herbert Edvrardes. 
 
Fiftizshahar and Sobrdon. 367 
 
 avoid a combat, inclined more and more to the right, die Sikhs 
 pounced upon the English rear-guard, and captured nearly 
 the whole of their baggage ! 
 
 This misfortune, which gave heart to the malcontents all 
 over India, which made Tej Singh and Lai Singh tremble with 
 fear, and which drew the head of the Jamii family, Gulab Singh, 
 to Lahor, to gain supremacy should the Sikhs be victorious, or 
 to share in the spoil should they be beaten, was very soon 
 avenged. On the 28th January, Smith — his army reinforced 
 to a strength of 1 1,000 men — marched to give the enemy battle. 
 He found them strengthened by the addition of 4,000 infan- 
 try, their left resting on the little hamlet of Aliwal, their right 
 on the village of Biindri. So little did they expect the Eng- 
 lish, that they had but just time to throw up banks of earth to 
 protect their guns when the battle commenced. Smith, seeing 
 that Aliwal was the key of the position, sent his infantry 
 against that hamlet. The Sikhs who defended it were hill- 
 men, with no heart in the cause of the Khalsa. After firing a 
 straggling volley they gave way, and fled from the field, 
 headed by the commander of the army, Ranjiir Singh. Whilst 
 this was going on on the left, the English cavalry, led by the 
 1 6th Lancers, made a magnificent charge on the Sikh right. 
 There the Khalsa regiments behaved in a manner worthy of 
 their renown. They knelt to receive the dashing charge of the 
 Lancers and their Indian comrades; but, as these approached, 
 they instinctively rose and delivered their fire. Beneath the 
 charge that followed they did not yield, nor was it till they 
 had been three times ridden over that they gave way. After 
 the battle it was found that the ground was more thickly 
 strewn with the bodies of the victorious horsemen than of the 
 beaten infantry. An attempt made to rally behind Biindri was 
 ineffective. The English pushed their advantage to the utmost, 
 nor did they cease till they had forced the Sikhs to recross the 
 Satlaj, and had captured more than fifty of their guns. 
 
 This victory changed the aspect of affairs. Whilst it raised 
 
^) 
 
 68 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 the hopes of Lai Singh and Tej Singh, it encouraged the astute 
 rajah of Jamu to open negotiations with the British. Gulab 
 Singh possessed at this time the reputation of being the most 
 able and the most formidable of the Sikh aristocracy, and it 
 was by no means displeasing to Sir Henry Hardinge to receive 
 proposals of accommodation from one in so high a position. 
 In reply, then, to Gulab Singh's overtures, the Governor- 
 General intimated that he would be prepared to acknowledge 
 a Sikh sovereign in Lahor after the Sikh army should be 
 .disbanded. 
 
 Neither, however, had the Sikh army any intention of dis- 
 banding itself, nor did Gulab Singh, Lai Singh, or Tej Singh 
 possess the power to force it to such a step. Its destruction 
 then became a necessary preliminary to the carrying out of the 
 plans of the Sikh rulers. 
 
 By degrees, by means of the bridge-head they had con- 
 structed, the Sikhs crossed over into the intrenchment they had 
 formed on the left bank of the Satlaj. But alike in the con- 
 struction of the intrenchment and in the means taken to fortify 
 it there was evidence of the want of a guiding mind. Each 
 regiment seemed to work for its own hand, and for that alone. 
 Instead of being a position possessing defensive works regular 
 in design, the intrenchment at Sobraon presented the most 
 glaring anomalies. Whilst on the left and centre, where the 
 regular battalions were mainly posted, batteries and salient 
 points had been constructed as high as the stature of a man, 
 defended by ditches which an armed soldier could not leap 
 without exertion; on the right flank the parapets were thrown 
 up at intervals, and constructed in a very slipshod fashion. As 
 some compensation, however, this flank derived support from 
 a salient battery, and from heavy guns on the right bank of 
 the river. Whilst the left and centre faces had 57 pieces 
 in battery, the right was protected only by 200 zimi- 
 baraks (falconets). A bridge of boats connected the intrench- 
 ment with a smaller camp on the right bank. It shculd lie 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon. 369 
 
 added that, owing to the carelessness of the English, the Sikhs 
 had captured, and continued to hold, a post of observation 
 almost within hail of the British pickets. The strength of the 
 Sikh armv within the intrenchment on the left bank did not 
 exceed 20,000 men.* They were commanded by Tej Singh. 
 But, outside, higher up the river, Lai Singh disposed of a body 
 of 10,000 horsemen. 
 
 The English had been forced to watch the gradual growth 
 of these works, pending the arrival of the siege tram and 
 reserve ammunition for 100 field guns. The first instalment 
 of these reached the British head-quarters on the /th and 8th 
 of February. On the latter day joined also the brigades 
 which had been detached for operations in the neighbourhood 
 of Lodiana. On the 9th the plan of operations was decided 
 upon, and it was determined to attack the enemy's position the 
 following morning. 
 
 The general plan of attack adopted by the British general 
 
 r 
 
 was to force the right or weaker end of the intrenchment close 
 
 to the point where it rested on the river, and thus take the guns 
 
 on the outer face in reverse. To carry out this plan he had 
 
 resolved to prelude the attack by a fire from his heavy guns, 
 
 then to launch his left, commanded by Sir Robert Dick, against 
 
 the right; whilst his centre, Gilbert, and his right, Smith, 
 
 should divert the attention of the enemy by a false attack; 
 
 and his cavalry, Cureton, should occupy the attention cf Lai 
 
 ^Singh. 
 
 Before dawn the British columns were in motion. The 
 
 morning was dark and foggy, favourable to a surprise. The 
 
 advance guard, composed of the 62nd Fcot, dashed upon the 
 
 post near the British camp, and another in the village of Little 
 
 Sobraon, only to find it unoccupied. t Thus, favoured alike 
 
 by the fog and the carelessness of the enemy, the British 
 
 * Cunningham, p. 321. My own investigations confirm this in 
 calculation. 
 
 + It was the bad practice of the Sikhs to occupy the place strongly 
 during the day, and to abandon it at night. 
 
 B B 
 
3JO The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 pushed forward until, at a little before seven o'clock, they had 
 been able unobserved to place their heavy guns in position. 
 Exactly at seven o'clock these opened their fire, and, by a 
 curious coincidence, precisely at the same moment the fog 
 lifted, and "the surprised Khalsa at once heard and saw that 
 the avenger had come upon them."* 
 
 Clamorously did the Sikh drums beat to arms; eagerly did 
 the gallant defenders rush to their posts. Not for long had 
 the British guns opened before an answering fire from the in- 
 trenchment proved to their army that they had all their work 
 before them. 
 
 The cannonade had lasted two hours, and but little impres- 
 sion had been made on the intrenchment, when it was reported 
 to Sir Hugh Gough that the ammunition of the heavy guns 
 was "wellnigh expended." The gallant soldier, who had been 
 fretting for the time to arrive when he could launch his in- 
 fantry at the enemy, felt his heart bound with a secret joy as 
 he gave the order to his left to advance and carry out the pre- 
 concerted programme. 
 
 Under a slackening fire from their own guns, formed in 
 line, the first brigade of the British left, "in even order and 
 with a light step," advanced to the attack. It was composed 
 of the ioth and 53rd Foot, the 43rd and 59th Native Infantry, 
 was led by Brigadier Stacey, and was supported on the flanks 
 by Horsford's and Fordyce's batteries and Lane's troop of 
 Horse Artillery. No mean authority, the late Sir Herbert 
 Edwardes, himself an eye-witness, has pronounced this to have 
 been "beyond all comparison the finest attack of the cam- 
 paign." I cannot do better, then, than describe it in his own 
 words. "The artillery," he writes,! "galloped up and 
 delivered their fire within 300 yards of the enemy's batteries, 
 and the infantry charged home with the bayonet, and carried 
 
 * Edwardes, (jhdeutta Review, vol. vi. p. *_M»4. Vidt also Chmningham, 
 1>. 32.5. 
 
 t Calcutta Review, vol. vi. p. 294. 
 
Fitusshahar and Sobrdon. 371 
 
 the outworks without firing a single shot. As it was the finest 
 attack, so also did it meet with the most determined hand-to- 
 hand resistance which the Khalsa soldiers had yet opposed to 
 the British. Like lightning the real plan of the attack seemed 
 to Bash on the minds of all the desperate men in that intrench- 
 ment ; and, disregarding the distant feints of Gilbert's and 
 Smith's divisions on their left and centre, they rushed to the 
 right to repel the real danger that was upon them. In vain 
 Stacey's brigade tries to withstand the mass which every 
 moment is growing denser; in vain Wilkinson's brigade" - 
 second brigade, left division "comes up to the support; in vain 
 Ashburnham's reserve swells the furious tide of the assault." 
 
 In one word, the attack so gallantly made was, for the 
 moment, repulsed. The Sikhs, righting with the same steadi- 
 ness and resolution which they have since invariably displayed 
 when fighting for the British, had, in an incredibly short space 
 of time, turned their guns on the advancing enemy. When 
 the combatants paused for breath the British found that the 
 line of trench alone was all that they had gained. 
 
 Sir Hugh Gough -had observed, with passionate excitement, 
 the splendid advance of his left, then their sudden check. 
 Divining that to, gain such a result the enemy had concen- 
 trated all their efforts on their right, he dispatched orders to 
 his right and centre to make of their feigned a real attack. 
 Smith and Gilbert responded to the call, and at once pushed 
 forward. But before them were the strongest parts of the 
 intrenchment, high and continuous ramparts, guarded by deep 
 and broad ditches. The Sikhs, too, noticing their movement, 
 rushed back tumultuously to the defence. Grape, round shot 
 and musketry, poured forth at a distance at which almost every 
 shot was bound to tell, forced the assailants for a moment to 
 recoil ; only, however, for a moment. In spite of their enor- 
 mous losses* they reformed and returned to the charge—this 
 
 * Gilbert's division lost H.^.j men. ;ui<l Smith's 189, in about half-an- 
 hour. 
 
372 The Decisive bailies of India. 
 
 time under happier auspices; for the British left, taking advan- 
 tage of the slackening of opposition to them, caused by the 
 rush of the defenders to oppose the centre and right divisions, 
 had again pushed forward, and had penetrated within the 
 intrenchment sufficiently far to give a hand to the extreme left 
 of the British centre. The tide of the fight was now turning 
 against the defenders, and to make its turn irrevocable the 
 traitor commander-in-chief, Tej Singh, instead of leading 
 fresh men to sustain the failing strength of his right, fled 
 across the bridge, and, either by accident or design, sank its 
 centre boat.* Thenceforward, steadily advancing, the assail- 
 ants, though still gallantly opposed, carried one position after 
 another, and, pushing on, pressed the defenders towards the 
 banks of the, now to them, formidable river. But, fiercely 
 assailed, the Khalsa warriors viewed with calmness the in- 
 evitable fate before them. " No Sikh offered to submit, no 
 disciple of Govind asked for quarter. They everywhere 
 showed a front to the victors, and stalked slowly and sullenly 
 away, whilst many rushed singly forth to meet assured death 
 by contending with a multitude. The victors looked with 
 stolid wonderment upon the indomitable courage of the van- 
 quished, and forbore to strike when the helpless and dying 
 frowned unavailing hatred. But the warlike rage or the cal- 
 culating policy of the leaders had yet to be satisfied, and,. 
 standing with the slain heaped all around them, they urged 
 troops of artillery almost in the waters of the Satlaj, to more 
 thoroughly destroy the army which had so long scorned their 
 power." t At half-past ten o'clock not a single Sikh soldier 
 remained on the left bank of the Satlaj ! 
 
 r~ Such was the battle of the Sobraon. Though in point of 
 actual fact it terminated the Sikh invasion, and threw the 
 
 * Cunningham, p. 327. 
 
 + Cunningham, p. 328. This is confirmed by Edwardes, Calcutta 
 Review, vol. vi. pp. 295, 296. Gough writes in his dispatch: "In their 
 efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they 
 suffered from our horse artillery a terrible carnage." 
 
Firiisshahar and Sobrdon. 3J3 
 
 fate of the Sikh nation into the hands of the British. Sobraon, 
 as a decisive battle, must be considered not by itself, but as 
 the complement to, and natural consequence of, Firuzshahar. 
 Of the two, the latter was really the decisive battle. There, 
 victory long hovered in the balance. There, victory for the 
 Sikhs — -a victory twice within their grasp — would have meant 
 to the English the loss of India. When the Sikhs were beaten 
 at Firuzshahar they had really lost the game. Thenceforth 
 they had to get out of the difficulty the best way they could. 
 They were persuaded by their treacherous leaders to make 
 one more attempt at Sobraon. But there they never had a 
 chance of victory. The overthrow at Firuzshahar still ham- 
 pered them. Nor, even if the English had been repulsed, 
 would the consequences have been so tremendous as would 
 have been entailed by a defeat at Firuzshahar. That would 
 have meant the destruction of the British army. A repulse 
 from Sobraon, had it been possible, would still have left the 
 British army in a position to renew the attack. 
 
 Rightly, then, must we regard Sobraon as the complement 
 to Firuzshahar. The result of the latter really decided the 
 question of empire ! 
 
 There was no great disproportion between the numbers en- \ 
 gaged at Sobraon. The fighting strength of the English 
 engaged was about 15,000; that of the Sikhs fell somewhat 
 short of 20,000. But, whilst the English were led by a gallant 
 soldier, with his whole heart in the cause, the worst enemy of 
 the Sikh soldiers was their general. It is beyond a doubt 
 that he betrayed them. The English lost 320 killed and 
 2,083 wounded. The casualties of their beaten foe have been 
 calculated from 5,000 to 8,000; most of these happened after, 
 they had lost the battle. -* 
 
 The battle gained, the English army crossed the Satlaj, 
 and on the 12th occupied the fort of Kasur, within thirty 
 miles of Lahor. The Sikh army had meanwhile retired, its 
 spirit broken, to Amritsar. From this place they gave their 
 
374 
 
 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 assent, on a requisition made by the Court, to the proposition 
 that Gulab Singh, the Jamu chief, whose treachery had not 
 been apparent to them, should have full powers to treat with 
 the English on the admitted basis of recognizing a Sikh 
 Government in Labor. Finally, after some negotiation, a 
 treaty was concluded at Kasur on the following conditions : 
 (i) That the country between the Bias and the Satlaj, known 
 as the Jalandhar Doab, comprising the districts Jalandhar, 
 Hoshiapiir, and Kangrah, with an area of 11,408 square miles. 
 and a population of 2,470,000 souls,* should be transferred to 
 the conquerors; (2) that the Sikh treasury should pay a million 
 and a half sterling for the expenses of the war. It was soon 
 found, however, that it would be impossible for the Sikh 
 treasury to find two-thirds of the sum agreed upon. A way, 
 creditable to none of the parties concerned, was then found 
 to meet the difficulty. In lieu of one million of the sum they 
 had agreed to pay the Sikh Darbar yielded the magnificent 
 province of Kashmir — a country famed for the beauty of its 
 scenery, the mildness of its climate, the industry of its in- 
 habitants — to the British. The British, retaining only the 
 suzerainty, sold the province to the chief of Jamil, Rajah 
 Gulab Singh, for a million sterling. 
 
 The reasons for this transaction have never been sufficiently 
 explained. Sir Henry Hardinge declared that he required the 
 money, and that he had not sufficient troops to occupy Kash- 
 mir. But a mountainous country, like Kashmir, possessing a 
 few strong passes, would have been easily garrisoned by a 
 brigade. The fallacy of the reasoning is further proved by 
 th'j fact that very shortly afterwards Sir H. Hardinge effected 
 a considerable reduction in the native arm}*, thus giving evi- 
 dence that he had actually more troops than he required. To 
 a rich country like England the million of money was but a 
 small compensation for the possession of the finest mountain- 
 ous tract in the whole world. Subsequent events have proved 
 
 * Bloohmann . 
 
Firuzshahar and Sobrdon, 375 
 
 that the transaction was a blunder, politically and morally. 
 Politically, because England thus gave away the opportunity 
 of strengthening her frontier, and of gaining a position which, 
 in the event of an invasion, would be of incalculable value; 
 morally, because the Governor-General had no right to sell a 
 hard-working and industrious people to a chief alien in race 
 and religion, and harsh and oppressive in nature."* 
 
 The treaty concluded, Lai Singh was rewarded for his 
 treachery by being made Vazir, and a high position as the 
 nominal head of the army was secured to Tej Singh. But 
 these chiefs and those associated with them were still afraid 
 of their broken and diminished army. Thinking only of 
 themselves, not at all of their country or of the child Maha- 
 rajah, in whose name they exercised authority, they pressed 
 upon the British Government a policy of the kind which has 
 ever proved, sooner or later, fatal to the native Government 
 which has adopted it. They requested, and the request was 
 granted, that a British force should remain at Lahor till the 
 last day of December, 1846. Before that day had arrived 
 they had again requested, and the request was agreed to, that 
 the British force should remain at Lahor till the Maharajah 
 should attain the age of sixteen. 
 
 Further, and what was of far greater importance still, it 
 was, on the motion of the Lahor Darbar, agreed at this period 
 (16th December, 1846) between the two Governments, that "a 
 British Officer, with an efficient establishment, shall be ap- 
 pointed by the Governor-General to remain at Lahor, which 
 Officer shall have full authority to direct and control all 
 matters in every department of the State." t 2nd. That a Re- 
 gency should be appointed of eight selected Sikh nobles, 
 chiefest of whom was Tej Singh, and that "no change shall 
 
 * "The transaction," writes the fearless and conscientious Cunning- 
 ham (p. 332), "scarcely seems worthy of the British name and great- 
 ness." His remarks in continuation are well worthy of perusal. 
 
 + Agreement between the British Government and the Labor Darbar, 
 16th December, 184G, Art. II. 
 
376 The Decisive Baltics 0/ India. 
 
 be made in the persons thus nominated, without the consent 
 of the British Resident, acting under orders of the Governor- 
 General."* 
 
 This, then, was the result of Firuzshahar and Sobraon ! The 
 English Government assumed virtually the protectcrate of the 
 Panjab during the minority of the Maharajah Dhulip Singh, 
 constituted that sovereign prince its ward, and, the better to 
 ensure the proper government of his country, and the due 
 transmission to him of his power intact at the proper time, 
 nominated as Controller of the native regency, "with full 
 authority to direct and control all matters in every depart- 
 ment of the State," a British officer, having under him British 
 assistants. In a word, by the agreement of the 16th Decem- 
 ber, 1846, the English assumed the responsibility of the 
 Government of the Panjab. 
 
 In the light of the events which followed this is a very 
 important consideration. It is necessary that the reader should 
 bear it in mind when he comes to consider the causes and con- 
 sequences of the second Sikh war. 
 
 It remains only to add, that the officer to whom the 
 Governor-General delegated the important trust set forth in 
 the last paragraph but one was Colonel, afterwards Sir Henry, 
 Lawrence. 
 
 * Agreement between the British Government and the Labor Darbar 
 ICth December, 184(5, Art. V. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 CHILIAN WALA AND GUJRAT. 
 
 FOR fifteen months after the agreement made, the 16th 
 December, 1846, between the British Government and the 
 La.hor Darbar, _the Panjab remained apparently quiescent, 
 under the control and guidance of a British officer. That 
 officer was not always Sir Henry Lawrence. After administer- 
 ing the affairs of the Sikh State for less than a year, that 
 upright and distinguished man had, to recover his shattered 
 health, accompanied the retiring Governor-General, Lord 
 Hardinge, to England. 
 
 But during the few months of his tenure of office Sir Henry 
 Lawrence had laid down the principles upon which he pro- 
 posed to guide and reform the administration of the Panjab. 
 The chief of these was English supervision. With this object 
 he had deputed two of the ablest of the officers placed at his 
 disposal — men already famous, and both of whom have an 
 imperishable record in the Temple of Fame, Herbert Edwardes 
 and John Nicholson--to Bannii, a district in the Derajat, north 
 of Dera Ismail Khan, a portion of the Panjab territory, which, 
 though nominally ceded to it by the Afghans, had neither 
 been completely conquered nor thoroughly occupied. Ulti- 
 mately it was arranged, Nicholson's services being at the time 
 required elsewhere, that Edwardes should proceed to Bannii 
 
 alone, and this arrangement was carried out. It was a bold 
 
 377 
 
378 The Decisive Battles of India, 
 
 step indeed to send to a countr y which had never been properly 
 subdued, one month's inarch from Labor, to control its inhabi- 
 tants, a solitary Englishman. But the result proved the cor- 
 rectness of the view taken by Sir Henry Lawrence, alike of 
 the selected Englishman and of the feasibility of the task to 
 him entrusted. 
 
 To other parts of the Pan jab, likewise, Sir Henry deputed 
 officers of his selection. His brother, George Lawrence,* not 
 the least able and the least distinguished of a very remarkable 
 family, was sent to the still more distant pest of Peshawar. 
 Accompanying him was a promising young officer, Lieutenant 
 Bowie, already noted for the accuracy of his judgment. To 
 Atak had been sent Herbert; to Hazarah, Abbot of the Artil- 
 lery, the noblest and gentlest of men, endowed with a heart 
 which comprehended all mankind, and who had previously, 
 alone and unattended, made a romantic and dangerous; 
 journey from Herat to Khiva and Bokhara, and thence to the 
 frontier of Russia, fcr the purpose of negotiating the freedom 
 from slavery of Russian subjects detained in those countries; 
 to other difficult districts, John Nicholson, already referred 
 to; Lake, an officer of the Engineers, of cool and calm judg- 
 ment; Reynell Taylor; Lewin Bowring, afterwards Chief 
 Commissioner of Maisiir; Cocks; and some others. The main 
 instructions given to these officers were to report freely to Sir 
 Henry regarding the state of the several districts, to resettle 
 the country, to make recommendations as to reforms, and to 
 do their best to maintain peace and order, and to instil con- 
 fidence as to the intentions of the British into the people. t 
 
 * The late Sir George Lawrence, K.C.B. 
 
 1 "I offer you liberty," said Edwardes to the people of Bannii, "and 
 not only offer it, but guarantee it so long as the Sikh treaty with the- 
 English lasts. Only pay of your own free will, into any treasury you 
 like, an annual tribute of forty thousand rupees, and no army shall 
 again enter your valley, no Sikh show his face within your boundaries, 
 you shall be left in the undisputed enjoyment of your own country and 
 your own laws." — Edwardes's "A Year on the Panjab Frontier." p. 
 23. This offer supplies the keynote to the British policy of 1847. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gttjrat. 379 
 
 It may well be doubted, judging from the knowledge we 
 
 now possess, whether, even if Sir Henry Lawrence had re- 
 mained at his post, the system of controlling the Sikh Darbar 
 
 bv means of reports received from British officers at the ex- 
 tremities of the Pan jab could have long resisted the strong 
 national feeling which was silently growing up throughout 
 the country. The fact is that neither Lord Hardinge, Sir 
 Henry Lawrence, nor any of the able coadjutors of the latter, 
 recognised the fact that though the Sikh arm}' had been 
 decisively beaten at Sobraon, the Sikh people had never felt 
 themselves subdued. On the very morrow of their great 
 defeat, the soldiers, and the classes from whom the soldiers 
 were enlisted, had recognised that they had been betrayed ; 
 that they and their country had been sacrificed to the chiefs 
 who were now reaping the reward — thanks to the protection 
 afforded them by the foreigner — of their combined cowardice 
 and treason. At the very time, then, when the English officers 
 I have enumerated were performing the dangerous duties 
 allotted to them with marked success among the rude tribes on 
 the extremities of the kingdom, within the Khalsa itself there 
 was being nurtured a feeling which tended to render certain, 
 at no distant day, a national rising. 
 
 It was not to be expected that the English officers deputed 
 to outlying districts on the frontier, inhabited, be it remem- 
 bered, not by Sikhs, but by tribes who had been subdued by 
 the Sikhs, should realise the thoughts which coursed through 
 the heart of the Sikh nation. They were, after time had 
 allowed their true position to become understood, regarded 
 for the most part as the friends of the tribes, as their protec- 
 tors against the oppression of the nearest Sikh authorities. 
 The officers in question, recognising this feeling on the part of 
 the populations amongst whom their lot was cast, reported, 
 with just pride, to Sir Henry the success of their mission. Not 
 is it to be wondered at that Sir Henry, coming in contact at 
 Lahor with the chiefs who had betrayed their own people in 
 
380 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 the late campaign, should consider that the reports of his 
 officers justified him in looking forward to a long period of 
 tranquility in the province of which he had the control. 
 
 It is certain that unless Sir Henry Lawrence had been satis- 
 fied that affairs in the Panjab were progressing in a satisf ac- 
 tor)' manner, he would not have yielded to the wish expressed 
 by Lord Hardingc that he should accompany him to England 
 at the end of 1847; nor, unless Lord Hardinge had been 
 impressed by the same view, would he have signalised the last 
 few months of his administration by a reduction of the army ; 
 nor would his friends have declared, as they loudly declared 
 on his departure, that there would not be another shot fired in 
 India for another ten years.* 
 
 The successor of Sir Henry Lawrence was the Foreign 
 Secretary of the Indian Government, Sir F. Currie. An able 
 Foreign Secretary, Sir F. Currie had had little experience of 
 administration, still less of the administration of a country 
 peopled by a race of warriors only half subdued, and chafing 
 every day under the recollection of the means by which they had 
 been subdued; warriors, whose chiefs, the men whom he had 
 to control, were as smooth-tongued, as slippery, and as oily 
 as the subordinates with whom he had had to deal in the early 
 days of his official life. Moreover, it must be recollected that, 
 as Foreign Secretary, Currie had been the recipient of the 
 secret reports of Lawrence, and that when he relieved him of 
 his office he was prepared thoroughly to endorse the opinions 
 regarding the tranquillity of the country to which Sir Henry 
 had given utterance. 
 
 And yet the period in question was really most critical. 
 Smooth as was the outer surface, the currents below were in 
 violent commotion. The true Sikh leaders, the leaders who 
 preferred independence to servitude, however gilded, had 
 taken their measures with the Sikh soldiery, and were waiting 
 only for their opportunity. 
 
 * Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 2o7. Personal observation. 
 
Ckilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 381 
 
 It is just possible, seeing what sort of a man Sir Henry 
 Lawrence was, that, had lie remained at Lahor, the oppor- 
 tunity would not have been given, and that, under any cir- 
 cumstances, he would have dominated the situation. His 
 noble bearing, his gentle manner, his lofty character, had 
 already gained for him sincere respect, and, it is not too much 
 to say, in some cases, affection, even from those who were 
 plotting against the English. It is certain, moreover, that 
 Sir Henry Lawrence would not have given to the confederates 
 the opportunity of which they took advantage; as certain, 
 that, had an outbreak occurred in his time, he would have met 
 it in a different manner. 
 
 The crisis which occurred soon after Sir F. Currie had 
 assumed the control at Lahor occurred in this wise : 
 
 Mulraj, eldest son of Sawan Mall, had succeeded his father 
 in 1844 as Diwan, or Governor, of Multan. The conditions 
 of the succession were, that while the Diwan should transmit a 
 certain fixed amount yearly to the Lahor Darbar he might 
 keep for himself the remainder. These terms had been 
 enjoyed by his father with so much advantage, that, on his 
 death, after an administration of twenty-three years, he had 
 left £900,000 to be divided amongst his sons ! 
 
 On his accession Mulraj was expected to pay to the Lahor 
 Darbar a fee of thirty lakhs of rupees. Lie was quite pre- 
 pared to pay that amount, but the Government at Lahor was 
 in a state of revolution, and the matter stood over, therefore, 
 until after the abortive invasion of India. 
 
 In 1846, after the close of the war, the Lahor Government, 
 during the premiership of Lai Singh, demanded payment, and 
 sent a detachment of troops to enforce it. Either confident 
 in his strength, or imbued with contempt for the Darbar, 
 Mulraj refused compliance, and, meeting force by force, 
 defeated the Darbar troops near Jhang. 'The British then 
 intervened, and it was finally settled that Mulraj should give 
 up the district of Jhang, north of Multan, and comprising 
 
382 The Decisive Bullies of India. 
 
 nearly one-third of the province theretofore held by him; that 
 he should pay twenty lakhs as the succession-fee; and that 
 the revenues of the districts still left in his charge should be 
 raised in amount by rather more than a third. Mulraj ex- 
 pressed himself well pleased with this arrangement. 
 
 Faithfully did Mulraj fulfil the engagements he then made. 
 But lie did not satisfy the Lahor Regency. Complaints 
 reached that body and its controller, Sir Henry Lawrence, to 
 the effect that the weight of Mulraj's little finger was heavier 
 than his father's loins. Called upon to remedy the evils com- 
 plained of, Mulraj fired up. The summons was, he contended, 
 outside the agreement he had made with the Darbar, and 
 which he had faithfully kept. He might have added that the 
 revenue demanded from two-thirds of his father's territory, 
 exceeding by one-third the amount which his father had paid 
 from the whole, rendered necessary an increase of taxation. 
 After some fruitless interchange of communications, Mulraj, 
 on learning that Sir Henry Lawrence was about to leave for 
 England, came to Lahor, and tendered resignation of his office 
 (November, 1847).* 
 
 Sir Henry Law r rence had left Lahor for England when 
 Mulraj arrived. Mr. John Lawrence, therefore, received him. 
 With him, after much, but fruitless, persuasion not to persist 
 in his idea, Mulraj came to the following agreement: — First: 
 That his resignation should be accepted, but should be kept 
 a profound secret from the Lahor Darbar. Secondly : That 
 it should take effect from the end of the following April, up 
 
 * Evidence of Mr. John Lawrence at Mulraj's trial, vide Echvardes's 
 "A Year in the Panjab," pp. 36, 37. Mulraj gave as his reason for 
 resolving to resign. Firstly : That the new Custom arrangements in the 
 Panjab had an injurious effect upon his revenues, for, though they had 
 not been introduced into Multan, his people did not like to pay any 
 longer those dues which had been abolished every where else. Secondly : 
 Because an order had been passed by the Regency, giving his people a 
 right of appeal against his judicial decisions. It was this last griev- 
 ance, so completely outside the convention he had made, under the 
 .auspices of the Resident, which specially weighed upon him. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 38 
 
 3 
 
 to which time Mulraj was tq account fur the revenue. Thirdly : 
 That two or three months before his actual resignation two 
 British officers should proceed to Multan, to be initiated by 
 Mulraj into the state of the country, and ultimately to be 
 installed by him to take charge of it* This agreement settled, 
 Mulraj returned to his government. 
 
 Sir F. Currie was unable to assume charge of the office held 
 l>v Sir Henry Lawrence till the 6th March. Meanwhile, not- 
 withstanding the engagement to secrecy, the story of Mulraj's 
 intended resignation had been noised abroad. The conse- 
 quence was that when Sir Frederick arrived, considering the 
 pledge to secrecy to be at an end, he insisted, against Mr. 
 Lawrence's remonstrance,! on consulting the Lahor Darbar. 
 Pefore doing so, however, lie wrote to Mulraj to request him 
 to withdraw his resignation. Mulraj refused. Sir F. Currie 
 then, in consultation with the Darbar, resolved to carry out 
 the third clause of the agreement made between Mr. John 
 Lawrence and Mulraj, and to send to Multan two English 
 officers to be initiated into the affairs of the province. He 
 selected for this purpose, Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew, of the Civil 
 Service, and Lieutenant \Y. A. Anderson, of the Bombay 
 Fusiliers. 
 
 I must ask the reader always to bear in mind that Multan 
 was considered the strongest fortress in the Panjab; that Sher 
 Singh, who subsequently led the popular movement, was a 
 prominent member of the Regency, and believed to be ex- 
 tremely well affected to British interests; and that the word 
 had been passed to all the able-bodied men in purely Sikh 
 villages that the time was approaching when their services 
 would be urgently required. $ With the knowledge of these 
 
 * Edwardes's • A Year in the Panjab," pp. 40, 41. 
 t Ibid. 
 
 I Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 257, Art. "The Second Sikh War." 
 Tins article has since been republished with the name of the author 
 
 attached the late Sir Henry Durand. ■'Towards the close of 1848," 
 wrote Sir Henry. " many a village seemed to possess no other inhabi- 
 
384 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 incontestable facts, it is difficult, looking back, to resist the 
 conclusion that the resignation of Mulraj, proposed the 
 moment Sir Henry Lawrence had quitted Lahor, was part of 
 a deep scheme to inveigle the English into hostilities, at the 
 hottest season of the year, against the strongest fortress in 
 the Pan jab, to be detained there until the general rising, 
 already determined upon, should be accomplished. The 
 father of Mulraj, though of low origin, had been emphatically 
 one of Ranjit Singh's men. Mulraj had been brought up in 
 the same school. In common with the Sikh nation, its mem- 
 bers loathed the idea of being dragged at the chariot wheels 
 of the conqueror, who, they one and ail believed, had not 
 vanquished them in fair fight. 
 
 Still, however clear this may appear to us, who, with the 
 knowledge of subsequent events, can trace their cause, it can 
 easily be understood how it was a sealed letter to every Eng- 
 lishman at that time in authority. The arrangements made 
 with respect to the Pan jab were so perfect, the contentment of 
 the people was so assured, the reforms- introduced by the 
 English were so popular, that it was heresy to dream of Sikh 
 disaffection. And, in point of fact, no one on the spot did 
 dream of it* 
 
 With a light heart, then, Currie despatched Agnew and 
 Anderson to Multan, there to be tutored by, and ultimately 
 to relieve, Mulraj. To escort them there was detailed a body 
 of about 1,400 soldiers of the Sikh army. Of these, the in- 
 
 tants than old decrepit men, women and young children. Our two 
 years' sway had not proved popular ; and the able-bodied flocked to the 
 rebel standard of the chiefs, even from districts under our immediate 
 supervision and control, without the slightest check or hindrance." 
 
 I have used deliberately the words "on the spot," because a soldier 
 not on the spot, the greatest man I ever met in India, the late Sir 
 Henry Durand, did see it. I have often heard him relate how, being in 
 England at the time, he had endeavoured vainly to impress his fore- 
 bodings alike on the India Office and the Board of Control. He has 
 himself told how his warnings, after Multan had defied our troops, were 
 received at both those high places. Vide Calcutta Review vol. xv. p. 
 258. 
 
C hill dnw did and Gujrdt. 385 
 
 fantry, upwards of 600 in number, were hill-men, the troops 
 least affected to the Khalsa, and therefore likely to be in- 
 fluenced by a display of manly qualities on the part of their 
 officers; the cavalry, regular and irregular, Patans and Sikhs, 
 numbered about 700, and there was an excellent troop of horse 
 artillery. The whole were commanded by a Sikh officer, 
 Sirdar Khan Singh, who was to succeed Mulraj as Nazim, or 
 Governor, of the Multan districts. 
 
 Regard being had to the fact that the infantry of the escort 
 were hill-men, very lukewarm in their devotion to the Khalsa, 
 wisdom would have dictated to the two British officers the 
 advisability of accompanying them in the march to Multan. 
 But the hot season had set in, and it was pleasanter to travel 
 by water. By water, then, the two English officers and the 
 new Xazim, Sirdar Khan Singh, proceeded, whilst the troops, 
 left to themselves, marched by land. The result was, that, on 
 the 1 8th April, the two parties, the troops and their com- 
 manders, met each other fcr the first time in front of Multan. 
 They encamped then at 1'dgah, a spacious Muhammadan 
 building, within cannon-shot of the north face of the fort, 
 and about a mile from Mulraj's own residence, a garden house- 
 outside the fort, called Am Khas. 
 
 Into the events which immediately followed it is not neces- 
 sary to enter into great detail. They are very simple. Mulraj 
 and the British officers exchanged visits on the 18th, and it 
 was arranged that on the following morning Mulraj should 
 make over the fort to Sirdar Khan Sineh. 
 
 Earl)- on the morning of that day that official and the two 
 British officers, accompanied by Mulraj, entered the fortress; 
 were shown all over it, received the keys, planted sentries 
 from the men of their own escort, mustered Mulraj's garrison, 
 endeavoured to allay the sullen feeling of which the latter 
 gave evidence at being thrown out of employment, and set 
 out to return to their camp. 
 
 On their way, crossing the bridge over the ditch, one of the 
 
 cc 
 
386 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 late garrison, standing upon it, struck Agnew from his horse 
 with his spear. Agnew jumped up to return the blow with 
 his riding-stick, when the man rushed in with his sword and 
 inflicted two severe wounds on the Englishman. A crowd 
 collected : soon the news was noised in the fort ; the late gar- 
 rison came pouring forth, set upon Anderson and cut him 
 down, leaving him for dead. Mulraj, at the first signs of 
 tumult, put spurs to his horse, and forced his way to his private 
 house. Anderson was carried, seemingly dead, by the men 
 of his escort, to the Fdgah ; Agnew was, about the same time, 
 extricated from the mob by Sirdar Khan Singh, lifted on to 
 his elephant, and conveyed to the same building. 
 
 Of the two Englishmen Agnew was the less injured. In 
 the trying situation in which he was placed he displayed the 
 calmness, the courage, I might even add the generosity, of his 
 race. Unwilling to condemn Mulraj for an outbreak which 
 might well have been caused by the fanaticism of a solitary 
 soldier, he wrote to him (11 A.M.) to express his utter disbelief 
 in his culpability, and to beg him to prove his good opinion 
 by seizing the guilty parties and coming himself to the I'dgah. 
 Three hours later, as Mulraj gave no sign, Agnew despatched 
 letters to Herbert Edwardes at Banmi, and to General van 
 Cortlandt, Governor for the Sikhs of the province of Dera 
 Ismail Khan, to ask for assistance. At four o'clock a message 
 came from Mulraj, to the effect that he could neither give up 
 the guilty nor come himself, as he, after some efforts, had been 
 forced to desist from attempting to control the storm ; " that 
 all the garrison, Hindu and Muhammadan, were in rebellion, 
 and the British officers had better see to their own safety." 
 
 The die, in fact, had been cast. Whether Mulraj designed 
 that the outbreak should occur at that particular time, or in 
 that particular manner, may be doubted; but, the outbreak 
 having occurred, he had but one thought — to place himself at 
 the head of the movement. The messenger who had conveyed 
 to Agnew the reply of Mulraj returned to find his master pre- 
 
Chilidnwdid and Gujrdi, 387 
 
 siding at a council of his chiefs ! That same night, Mulraj, 
 to prevent their flight, carried off the whole of the carriage 
 cattle of the English officers and of their escort ! 
 
 Agnew, undismayed, showed a bold front to the foe. He 
 had still the escort and their six guns. If he and his comrade 
 had only but marched with that escort and won their esteem ! 
 It was too late to think of that now ! Still, he placed his 
 guns and posted his troops in the manner best calculated to 
 offer successful resistance. He made, too, one effort, unhappily 
 fruitless, to induce the chiefs round Mulraj to obey the orders 
 of the Lahor Regency. Presently guns opened upon his posi- 
 tion, alike from the fort and the private house of Mulraj. 
 Then emissaries came to tempt the escort. Despite of all the 
 efforts of Agnew, they succeeded. Before the sun set, all the 
 troops — horse, foot, and artillery- — had gone over, "except 
 Sirdar Khan Singh, some eight or ten faithful horsemen, the 
 domestic servants of the British officers, and the munshis of 
 their office."* 
 
 "Beneath the lofty centre dome of that empty hall (so strong 
 and formidable that a very few stout hearts could have de- 
 fended it)," continues the author from whom I have just 
 quoted, "stood this miserable group around the beds of the 
 two wounded Englishmen. All hope of resistance being at 
 an end, Mr. Agnew had sent a party to Mulraj to sue for peace. 
 A conference ensued, and, 'in the end,' say the Diwan's judges, 
 ' it was agreed that the officers were to quit the country, and 
 that the attack upon them was to cease.' Too late ! The sun 
 had gone down; twilight was closing in, and the rebel army 
 had not tasted blood. An indistinct and distant murmur 
 reached the ears of the few remaining inmates of the I'dgah, 
 who were listening for their fate. Louder and louder it grew, 
 until it became a cry — the cry of a multitude for blood ! On 
 they came, from city, suburbs, fort ; soldiers with their arms, 
 
 * Edwardes. 
 

 
 88 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 citizens, young and old, and of all trades and railings, with 
 any weapons they could snatch." 
 
 Then was consummated the murder of the two gallant Eng- 
 lishmen. The head of Agnew was severed from his body, 
 whilst Anderson, who, since he had been brought in grievously 
 wounded from the fort, had been incapable of stirring from 
 his bed, was hacked to pieces with swords. Sirdar Khan 
 Singh, faithful to the last, was conveyed a prisoner into the 
 presence of Mulraj, and laden with taunts and insults ! 
 
 I have said that at two o'clock on the day on which he was 
 assaulted Van Agnew had despatched a letter, asking for aid, 
 to Edwardes. The letter reached Edwardes at Dera Fath 
 Khan, ninety miles from Multan, on the afternoon of the 22nd 
 of April. With the prompt resolution which ever charac- 
 terised him, Edwardes at once transmitted a dispatch to the 
 British Resident at Lahor, informing him of the attack made 
 upon the two Englishmen, and announcing his own intention 
 of marching upon Multan with the raw native levies* of which 
 he could dispose. Leaving Edwardes, for the present, I must 
 precede his letter to Lahor. 
 
 Sir Frederick Currie received the first news of the outbreak 
 at Multan on the 21st of April. He rather made light of it, 
 considered the affair unpremeditated, and that though Mulraj 's 
 conduct was very suspicious, yet that his share in the outrage 
 was doubtful. Impressed with the idea that Mulraj was very 
 unpopular both with the army and the people, and that it was 
 quite possible that he might have been urged to extreme 
 measures by " unfriends "t desirous of effecting his ruin, he 
 deemed, at the moment, that the crisis would be adequately 
 met by the despatch against Multan of a force composed of 
 
 There were twelve infantry companies, three hundred and fifty 
 mounted men, two guns, and twenty zumbaraks (falconets). 
 
 1 Sir F. Currie's own word : vide extract from Blue Book, Edwardes's 
 ■• A Year in the Panjab," vol. ii. pp. 122-23. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 389 
 
 seven battalions of infantry, two of regular cavalry, 1,200 
 irregular horsemen, and three troops or batteries of artillery 
 
 all belonging to the Khalsa army to proceed or be stopped 
 according to the accounts he might receive in the next twenty- 
 four hours. Such a force he despatched accordingly. 
 
 When, two days later, Currie received an account of the 
 attack upon, but not of the massacre at, the I'dgah, he was as 
 far off as ever from arriving at a just conclusion. Still im- 
 plicitly trusting the Sikh sirdars, and wrongly attributing the 
 movement to " Patan counsel and machination,"* he directed 
 the Sikh sirdars, "all the chiefs of the greatest note," with 
 the few Sikh troops at Labor, to take part in the operations 
 already ordered, intending to support them with the British 
 movable column, stationed at Lahcr. The idea of a general 
 conspiracy on the part of the Sikh chiefs and population never 
 having entered his head, Currie was sanguine enough to believe 
 thai a demonstration on!y would be sufficient! 
 
 The receipt, the next day of a more complete account of the 
 events at the I'dgah, comprising the murder of the two British 
 officers, caused another modification in the views of the Resi- 
 dent. The facility with which the Sikh escort had gone over 
 to Mulraj for the first time aroused within his mind that, 
 possibly, the entire Sikh army might follow its example. He 
 abandoned, then, at once, as impracticable, his dream of a 
 demonstration, recalled the order given to the officer com- 
 manding the Eritish movable column, and informed the Sikh 
 sirdars that they must put down the rebellion themselves ! 
 
 The Sikh sirdars, all men, in the view of the British Resi- 
 dent, "implicitly to be relied upon," did not view matters quite 
 in the light in which they presented themselves to the mind 
 of that high Official. They declared themselves unable to 
 coerce Mulraj without the aid of British troops; and, admit- 
 
 * This wa3 absolutely the reverse of true. If we had any friends in 
 the Panjab they were the Patans : our enemies were the pure Sikhs. 
 + Blue Book. Sir F. Cuirie to the Governor-General, 24th April. 
 
390 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 ting that their own men could not be depended upon, urged 
 that they should not be employed at all in the operations 
 against Multan. Sir F. Currie then recommended that the 
 British army should itself undertake the operation, not in the 
 interests of the Sikh Government, but — his mind curiously 
 running on the Patan scare— to prevent the Afghans estab- 
 lishing themselves on the Indus !* On the same day he wrote 
 to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, recommending that 
 a British force should at once move upon Multan, capable of 
 reducing the fort and occupying the city, independent of any 
 assistance, or in spite of any opposition, from the Sikh troops. 
 
 Lord Gough, however, who was at Simla, conceived that at 
 the advanced season of the year operations against Multan 
 would be uncertain in their results, if not altogether imprac- 
 ticable. He therefore not only declined to commit himself 
 to the plan urged by Currie, but even deprecated the weaken- 
 ing of Lahor in view to the very uncertain disposition of the 
 Sikh army. In this view the Governor-General concurred.! 
 
 The siege, then, having been postponed till the autumn, it 
 is time we should return to Edwardes. 
 
 We left that officer at Dera Fath Khan, preparing to march 
 with his raw levies, numbering only about 1,600 men, against 
 Multan. Between him and that fortress flowed two broad and 
 rapid rivers. Writing to his friend Reynell Taylor at Bannu 
 to send him a regiment of infantry and four guns "sharp," 
 he crossed the Indus, reached Leia on the 25th April, and was 
 joined there by many of the Patan gentry of the neighbouring 
 districts. Mulraj, hearing of this movement, sent a force 
 against him. On its approach Edwardes evacuated Leia, re- 
 crossed the Indus, and effected a junction on the night of the 
 
 * Blue Book. Sir F. Currie to Governor-General, April 27, 1848. 
 
 + Edwardes is of opinion that the delay, thus sanctioned, precipitated 
 the war (vol. ii. pp. 144-7). I ani inclined to believe that the war had 
 already been pro-determined upon by the Sikh nation, and that the 
 hostile action of Mulraj was prompted by a desire to drag the English 
 into it at an unfavourable season. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 391 
 
 3rd of May, with a Patan force, under Genera] Van Cortlandt. 
 Four days later Mulraj recalled his army from Leia, and 
 Edwardes at once occupied that place **>ith a picket. Whilst 
 Van Cortlandt, then under orders from Lahor, proceeded to 
 enter the trans-Indus territories of Mulraj, Edwardes waited 
 at Dera Fath Khan till the situation between Leia and Multan 
 should develop itself. Learning on the 15th May, from his 
 picket, that a Sikh force had arrived within striking distance 
 of Leia, he crossed the Indus during the night with 200 men, 
 and, joining his picket, repulsed the enemy with the loss of 
 all their zumbaraks (falconets) and twelve men killed. Four 
 days later the loyal Biluchis and Patans defeated the Sikh 
 party near Deru Ghazi Khan, and took possession of that 
 place for the English. This victory deprived Mulraj of all 
 his trans-Indus dependencies. Edwardes then occupied Dera 
 Ghazi Khan, and watched thence the movements of the enemy. 
 Learning at length that Mul raj's best army had taken the 
 held to secure the country between the Indus and the Chinab, 
 Edwardes, now joined by the loyal Nuwab of Bahawalpur, 
 marched against it,, met it at the village of Kinairi on the 
 Chinab, and, after a contest which lasted nine hours, com- 
 pletely defeated it. The effect of this victory was to deprive 
 Mulraj of the country between the Indus and the Chinab, and 
 of nearly all between the Chinab and the Satlaj. Following 
 it up, Edwardes, reinforced by Van Cortlandt, and joined by 
 Lake, pushed on towards Multan, met the last army of Mulraj, 
 commanded by that chief in person, at Sadusam, close to the 
 walls of the fortress, completely defeated it, and confined the 
 enemy thenceforth to the city and its defences. They never 
 again emerged from it until the British army approached to 
 besiege the place. This is not the place to do justice to the 
 energy, the daring initiative, the greatness of character dis- 
 played by Herbert Edwardes. Alcne, unsupported, he achieved 
 a result of which a British army might have been proud. And 
 it is not too much to affirm that had he been then and there 
 
392 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 supported by a few British troops and guns, placed under his 
 own orders, he might have taken the fortress, and possibly 
 have nipped the rising in the bud!* 
 
 Meanwhile, whilst Edwardes and his gallant comrades were 
 thus combating, with means of their own manufacture, against 
 the chief who had revolted against the Lahor Darbar, Sir F. 
 Currie was preparing, in concert with that Darbar, and in cor- 
 respondence with the -Governor-General and the Commander- 
 in-Chief, for the autumn siege of Multan. Rut before the 
 autumn arrived the horizon had become more clouded still. 
 In the month of July a plot was discovered, in which the Rani 
 Janda, "who had mere wit and daring than any of her 
 nation, "t was seriously implicated. The chief conspirators 
 were brought to trial, and were hanged, and the Rani was 
 exiled to the fort of Chunar, there to be kept as a state pris- 
 oner. Information reached Lahor about the same time that 
 the Hazarah was shaky, and that a suspicious movement had 
 been observed in that province. Notwithstanding the con- 
 fidence justly felt by Currie in Abbot, the English representa- 
 tive in the Hazarah, and the assurances of Chattar Singh, 
 father of Slier Singh, a prominent member of the Lahor Coun- 
 cil of Regency, that there was nothing really to be appre- 
 hended, there was sufficient disturbance in the air to cause 
 great anxiety to a man m the position of the British Resident. 
 Just at this crisis Currie was cheered by the news of the battle 
 of Sadusam, and incited to action by the recommendations 
 from Edwardes which accompanied that news. At once, then, 
 on his own responsibility, he directed the British brigade at 
 Lahor to march upon Multan. Currie's conduct in this respect 
 was confirmed very grudgingly by the Governor-General. As 
 for the Commander-in-Chief, in the promise of facility and 
 aid he despatched to the Resident, he took care to remind 
 
 Kdwardes, vol. ii. chap. viii. Since the first and second editions of 
 this work appeared Lady Edwardes lias published a detailed life of her 
 lamented husband. 
 t Edwardes. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 393 
 
 him that the troops had been ordered to move upon his 
 responsibility. Upon Lord Gough, however, it devolved to 
 arrange for the strength and composition of the British force 
 to be employed. 
 
 It was speedily decided that the Lahor brigade should be 
 reinforced by that at Firuzpiir. The force would then consist 
 of about seven thousand five hundred men, including two 
 European regiments, the IOth and the 32nd, with a proportion 
 of artillery, including a siege tram, and cavalry, and would 
 be commanded by General Whish, the commander of the 
 brigade at Labor. Currie, meanwhile, in concert with the 
 Regency, had decided to despatch a purely Sikh force to 
 Tolomba, under the command of the ablest of its members, 
 Sher Singh Atariwala. This force, consisting of about five 
 thousand men, was not, however, content with marching to 
 Tolomba, but pushed on, on the 6th July, to Multan. 
 
 Whish left Lahor with his brigade on 24th July, and en- 
 camped at Sital-ki-mari, before Multan, on the 18th August. 
 The following day he was joined by the Firiizpur brigade, 
 commanded by Brigadier Salter. Whish found Edwardes's 
 arm)', now compesed of fourteen thousand infantry and over 
 eight thousand irregular cavalry, encamped at Surajkiind, 
 about six miles distant. His first care was to lessen that dis- 
 tance by bringing Edwardes two miles nearer to the fortress, 
 a movement which was not accomplished without some hard 
 lighting, in which Lake and Pollock —now Sir Frederic Pol- 
 lock — -distinguished themselves. 
 
 Pending the arrival of the siege train, Whish and his chief 
 engineer, Major Napier — now Lord Napier of Magdala — - 
 closely reconnoitred the fort. The two officers named, with 
 a small party of the staff, crept forward into the Fdgah, and 
 thence made a leisurely observation. They emerged with the 
 conviction that " it was no contemptible piace of arms." They 
 could do nothing, however, till the arrival of the siege guns, 
 and those guns reached the camp only on the 4th September. 
 
394 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 But before their arrival an event occurred which greatly 
 affected the course of action. The threatened outbreak in the 
 Hazarah had taken place, and Chattar Singh, father of Sher 
 Singh, who commanded the Darbar troops before Multan, had 
 placed himself at the head of it. It is true that Sher Singh 
 cleared himself, in the opinion of Herbert Edwardes, from 
 any complicity in his father's conduct; but the fact that that 
 father was at the moment at the head of a great national move- 
 ment was not encouraging. Under these somewhat unfavour- 
 able auspices the siege of Multan began (7th September, 1848;. 
 I do not propose to do more than give a summary of it. On 
 the 9th, a night attack made upon some gardens in front of 
 the trenches, though conducted with great gallantry, and illus- 
 trated by the splendid valour of Lieutenant Richardson, of 
 the Indian Army, and of Captain Christopher, of the Indian 
 Navy, both of whom showed the way to their followers, was 
 repulsed.* On the 12th, Whish, after a very hot encounter, 
 productive of loss on both sides, especially on that of the 
 Sikhs, cleared his front, gaining a distance in that direction 
 of eight or nine hundred yards, and driving the enemy into 
 the suburbs. The place seemed now at the mercy of the 
 British general. He was within easy battering distance of the 
 city walls. A few days more and Multan would have been 
 his. But, just at this critical moment, he was baffled by an 
 action which, though foreseen by some acute minds, f had not 
 been provided against. On the morning of the 14th Septem- 
 ber Sher Singh and his whole force gave their adhesion to the 
 national movement, and entered Multan. 
 
 In consequence of this defection General Whish at once 
 raised the siege, but remained encamped before the place, at 
 first on the field at Sadusam, later on a more convenient spot 
 
 Richardson was brought from the combat covered with wounds; lie 
 still, I believe, lives. Christopher was mortally wounded. 
 
 The mind of Edwardes, for instance. See his letters of the 4th and 
 loth September, vol. ii. pp. -187-498. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 395 
 
 close to the suburbs of the town, waiting for reinforcements 
 or orders. He remained there inactive, but still m a way 
 blockading the town, till the 27th December, when, reinforce- 
 ments having arrived, he resumed the siege. Long before that 
 period the decisive action of the national movement had 
 passed to another part of the country. To that part 1 propose 
 now to transport the reader. 
 
 The rising of Chattar Singh, the defection of Sher Singh, 
 the consequent raising of the siege of Multan, brought matters 
 in the Pan jab to a crisis. There could no longer be any doubt. 
 The Khalsa had resolved to strike a great blow for inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 The Government c f India was neither blind nor deaf to the 
 signs of the time. The Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, in 
 a famous speech delivered at Barrackpur, which resounded all 
 over India, declared that as the Sikh people wished war "they 
 should have it with a vengeance." The Commander-in-Chief, 
 Lord Gough, issued, early in October, a general order an- 
 nouncing the formaticn, at Firiizpur, of an army, to be styled 
 "the army of the Panjab," under his own personal command. 
 
 Whilst this army was assembling, Cureton, with a brigade 
 of cavalry, and Colin Campbell,* with a brigade of infantry, 
 were directed to march from opposite directions on Giijran- 
 wala, a small fort about three days' march from Lahor, which 
 it was expected the Sikhs would occupy. Cureton, who arrived 
 there first, found the place unoccupied. So much, at this time, 
 did the British undervalue their enemy, that a very general 
 impression prevailed that if Cureton and Campbell had pushed 
 on from Gujranwala they would have finished the war. 
 
 Similarly Brigadier Wheeler's brigade, which, since the 
 month of August, had been engaged, under the direction 0/ 
 Mr. Jchn Lawrence, in putting down the national movement in 
 the Jalandhar Doab, and Brigadier Gcdby's brigade, were 
 pushed on, about the 3rd November, towards the Ravi. 
 
 * Afterwards Lord Olvrie. 
 
396 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 The entire army formed by Lord Gough, including the 
 three brigades already mentioned, and the division under 
 General Whish still before Multan, was composed of seven 
 brigades of infantry, four of cavalry,, and a numerous artil- 
 lery. It numbered about 17,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. 
 Of the former arm, however, between 4,000 and 5,000 were 
 with General Whish. The army, then, which Lord Gough 
 found under his own immediate direction, when, after crossing, 
 the Satlaj and Ravi, he arrived at the small village of Nciwala, 
 thirteen miles from the Chinab, on the 20th of November, con- 
 sisted of about 12,500 infantry, of whom one-fourth were 
 Europeans, and 3,500 cavalry, comprising three British 
 regiments.* 
 
 Ten miles from the British camp, and three only from the 
 banks of the Chinab, near the walled town of Ramnagar, lay 
 detachments of the Sikh army. They were encamped in an 
 open plain, covered with a low scrub jungle extending to the 
 river. Midway between their position and the river was a 
 small grove. 
 
 The position was admirably chosen. From it the Sikh com- 
 mander, who was no other than Sher Singh Atauwala, whose 
 desertion to Mulraj had caused the raising of the siege of 
 Multan, could intercept the movements of the ruler of Kash- 
 mir, Giilab Singh; could cover his communications with his 
 father in the Derajat; and could draw his supplies from the 
 productive districts in the upper part of the Chinab. Such a 
 position was worth fighting for. Indeed, Sher Singh would 
 have been justified in seeking an opportunity to bring the 
 British to action to maintain it. 
 
 Apparently, however, Sher Singh regarded the ground about 
 Ramnagar as not worth fighting for. For, when, on the morn- 
 
 These were the 3rd Dragoons, the 9th Lancers and the 14th Light 
 Dragoons (now 14th Hussars). The European infantry regiments were 
 the 24th, the 29th, the 61st and the 2nd Europeans (now the 2nd Bat- 
 talion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers). 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 397 
 
 ing of the 2 2nd of November, Lord Gough moved with a force 
 composed of cavalry and artillery, supported by an infantry 
 brigade* and two batteries of artillery to reconnoitre the posi- 
 tion of the enemy, Sher Singh directed the detachment on the 
 left bank to recross the river by the ford, and to rejoin him on 
 the right bank. 
 
 Lord Gough belonged essentially to a " fighting caste." In 
 the presence of an enemy he could think only of how to get 
 at him. At that time of supreme excitement all ideas of 
 strategy, of tactics, of the plan of the campaign, vanished 
 from his mind. How a momentary triumph might be gained 
 became his dominant and fixed thought. On the occasion of 
 which I am writing a calm and cool leader would have re- 
 joiced to see an enemy voluntarily abandoning, in the face of 
 a military demonstration, a splendid military position, and 
 retreating to a country where supplies were difficult, and 
 whence he could not control the ruler of Kashmir. He would 
 even have aided him by making the demonstration more pro- 
 nounced. But no thought of that kind ever entered the brain 
 of Lord Gough. He had joined and placed himself at the 
 head of the advanced party of cavalry that morning " un- 
 known to the majority of his staff," t and he now saw the enemy 
 retiring without striking a blow ! Little recked he of the fact 
 that his own advanced party was small in numbers, that he 
 had left the main body of his troops behind him without 
 orders and without a head ; it never occurred to him to reflect 
 that in all probability the Sikhs were but retiring to a selected 
 position, covered with heavy guns, on the right bank of the 
 
 1 The advanced force was composed of the 3rd and 14th Light 
 Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Native Light Cavalry, the 12th Irregulars 
 and the Horse Artillery of Lane and Warner, all led by General Cureton. 
 The supporting infantry brigade Mas commanded by Brigadier Godby, 
 and consisted of the 2nd Europeans and the 31st and 70th Native In- 
 fantry. The two batteries of artillery were Dawes's and Austen's. 
 
 t "Commentaries on the Pan jab Campaign," 1848-9, by Captain J. 
 H. Lawrence- Archer, p. 9. 
 
398 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 river. He thought of nothing but that the enemy were es- 
 caping him when they were within measurable distance of his 
 small force. Rendered wild at this thought he dashed his 
 cavalry and horse artillery at the Sikhs as they were crossing 
 the ford. 
 
 The horse-artillery guns of Lane and Warner, opening upon 
 the enemy engaged in a movement of retreat, caused them at 
 first some slight loss. But as the British guns pressed on, 
 they came, as might have been expected, under the fire of the 
 enemy's guns on the right bank, a fire so superior to their own 
 that their position became untenable. The English then en- 
 deavoured to retire. But this had become a matter of great 
 difficulty. Their guns, one of them especially, had become 
 deeply embedded in the heavy road of the river bank. It was 
 difficult to extricate them, and, after superhuman efforts, the 
 English, to save the remainder, were forced to abandon that 
 one. 
 
 To cover the retreat of the British artillery, Captain Ouvry, 
 with a squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons, made a gallant 
 charge on a body of the enemy who had taken up a position 
 on an islet surrounded by stagnant pools. This charge was 
 followed by others; but the Sikh infantry, cool and reso- 
 lute, maintained on the cavalry a galling fire, and then, 
 as the charges ceased, advanced to capture the abandoned 
 gun. 
 
 Burning with indignation at the very idea of the enemy 
 carrying off a trophy in the very first action of the campaign, 
 Colonel Havelock, commanding the 14th Light Dragoons, de- 
 manded and obtained permission to drive the enemy back. 
 The 14th, accompanied by the 5th Native Light Cavalry, 
 charged, then, upon the advancing Sikhs with so much fury 
 that they rolled them back in disorder. Hoping then to re- 
 cover the gun, the 14th pursued their advantage, and dashed 
 forward to the- ground on which it lay. But here not only did 
 the heavy sand tell on the horses, but they came within range 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdi. 399 
 
 of the batteries on the right bank. Under cover of this fire, 
 too, the Sikh infantry rallied and returned to the charge. In 
 the fight that followed Havelock was slain. Cureton, who had 
 witnessed the charge, galloping down to withdraw the 14th 
 from the unequal contest, was shot through the heart. The 
 cavalry then fell back, leaving the gun still in the sand. During 
 the day the enemy succeeded in carrying it off. 
 
 Such was the combat of Ramnagar, an affair entailing con- 
 siderable — the more to be regretted because useless — loss on 
 the British army. The object aimed at — -the retirement of the 
 Sikhs to the right bank — had been gained by the mere display 
 of the British troops. The subsequent fighting was unneces- 
 sary butchery, which caused the loss to the British army of 
 two splendid officers, Cureton and Havelock, and eighty-four 
 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Besides this, it gave great 
 encouragement to the Sikhs who could boast that in their first 
 encounter they had met the British not unequally. 
 
 The Sikhs, having crossed to the right bank of the Chinab, 
 were now in the strong but inhospitable territory between that 
 river and the Jhelam. A really great commander would have 
 been content that they should remain there, eating up their 
 scanty supplies, until Multan should have fallen, when, with 
 a largely increased army and greatly enhanced prestige, he 
 could assail them with effect. The true course and position of 
 the English commander was, in fact, to use the language of 
 the most competent critic of the time, "marked out by the mani- 
 fest objects of the enemy. To remain in observation on the 
 left bank of the Chinab; to regard himself as covering the siege 
 of Multan and holding Sher Singh in check till that place fell ; 
 to cover Lahor and cut off all supplies from the districts on the 
 left bank of the Chinab reaching the enemy; jealously to 
 watch the movements of the latter, whether to the northward 
 or southward: these should have been Lord Gough's objects. 
 So long as Sher Singh was disposed to have remained 
 on the right bank of the Chinab, Gough should have left 
 
4<30 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 him undisturbed, and patiently have awaited the fall of 
 Multan."* 
 
 But Gough cared for none of these things. He saw only 
 tne enemy. The enemy being on the right bank, he must cross 
 to that bank and get at him. His mission, as he read it, was 
 to seek the enemy wherever he could be found, attack him and 
 beat him. Larger aims than this lay outside the range of his 
 mental vision. 
 
 The English general prepared, then, to dislodge the enemy 
 from the right bank, and to cross the Chinab. To make a 
 direct attack on his position would have been dangerous ; for 
 the right bank was considerably higher than the left, and the 
 ford across it was covered by a very powerful artillery. Rut 
 rivers rarely present a serious obstacle to a resolute com- 
 mander. This was especially the case with the Chinab in the 
 cold months of the year, for at that season the stream con- 
 tracts itself to a comparatively narrow channel, fcrdable in 
 many places. It was not difficult, therefore, for Lord Gough 
 to turn the position of the army which faced him on the right 
 bank. 
 
 Between Ramnagar, which had now become the head- 
 quarters of the British army, and the town of Yazirabad, some 
 twenty-five miles to the east of it, on the same side of the 
 river, were three fords across the Chinab — -the fords of Ghari, 
 of Ranikan, and of Ali Sher; the first-named being eight, the 
 others about thirteen, miles distant from the British camp. 
 There was also a ford opposite Vazirabad itself. Lord Gough 
 had before him, then, a choice of passages across the river. 
 
 But, extraordinary fact ! although, as I have shown, time 
 
 * Sir H. Durand's article in the Calcutta Berime, vol. xv. p. 261. 
 The justice of this criticism is proved by the fact that, before he could 
 strike an effective blow, Gough was compelled to wait for the fall of 
 Multan, and for the reinforcements which that fall secured to him. The 
 crossing of the Chinab would serve no good purpose, unless it Mould 
 tnable him to strike at once a decisive blow at the enemy. This Gough 
 tailed to do. 
 
Ckilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 401 
 
 did not press him, although sound policy would have induced 
 him to remain altogether where he was, yet so eager was Gough 
 to "get at" the enemy, that he would not spare a single day 
 to have the fords I have named properly examined.* He 
 would appear to have been satisfied with the report of his staff 
 that the fords were practicable, but that they were strictly 
 watched by a numerous and vigilant enemy. Such "strict 
 watching" has not, under other leaders, prevented British 
 officers from making the strictest examinations. There was 
 plenty of time for such ; for, anxious as was Gough to look the 
 enemy in the face, he could not put in action the turning move- 
 ment till the heavy guns should have arrived, and those reached 
 him only on the 30th November. 
 
 The very next day Lord Gough directed his divisional 
 general of cavalry, Sir Joseph Thackwell, to march, at one 
 o'clock in the morning, with the force destined for the turning 
 movement, upon the ford Ranikan. His force consisted of 
 three troops of horse artillery, two light field batteries, two 18- 
 pounders; of the 3rd Light Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Native 
 Light Cavalry, the 3rd and 12th Irregulars; of the 24th and 
 61st Regiments of the Line, and of the 25th, 31st, 36th, 46th, 
 56th, and four companies of the 22nd, Native Infantry — in all 
 about 8,coo men. It was accompanied by a pontoon train. The 
 infantry was commanded by Brigadier-General Sir Colin 
 Campbell. 
 
 Thackwell had resolved to cross by the ford of Ranikan, on 
 the ground that, being further from the position of the enemy 
 than that of Ghari, it would not be so fiercely disputed ; but, to 
 make assurance double sure, he detailed a small force to secure, 
 if possible, the ford in front of Vazirabad. 
 
 To assure the success of the movement Thackwell was under- 
 
 "That these fords were not subjected to a minute scrutiny, in which 
 the highest authorities should have actively participated, was after- 
 wards deeply lamented." — " Narrative of the Second Sikh War in 
 1848-9," by Edward Thackwell. late A.D.C. to General Thackwell. 1851. 
 
 DD 
 
402 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 taking, silence, secrecy and dispatch were absolutely requisite. 
 All three, on this occasion, were conspicuous by their absence.* 
 Not only did the camp-followers raise an astounding din, but 
 the infantry, unprovided with a guide, became entangled in 
 the intricacies of the vast camp, and finding it impossible, 
 owing to the intensity of the darkness, to see, and difficult to 
 feel, their way, did not reach the rendezvous till two hours 
 after the appointed time. As a natural consequence, the turn- 
 ing force, instead of reaching Ranikan at eight o'clock as had 
 been laid down in the programme, arrived there at eleven 
 o'clock. 
 
 Thackwell rode to the front to reconnoitre. The view that 
 met his gaze w r as not encouraging. He saw before him a broad 
 river-bed — -far broader here than in front of Ramnagar — the 
 water flowing swiftly over which was divided into four 
 separate channels, with sandbanks, and, as the natives reported, 
 with dangerous quicksands. The opposite bank was out of 
 range, and was guarded by the enemy. t 
 
 Thackwell, Colin Campbell, and other high officers, spent 
 three hours in debating the course to be pursued. Evidently 
 the ford of Ranikan presented great, and previously un- 
 thought-of difficulties. By degrees one and all recognised the 
 impossibility of attempting it. Campbell then counselled a 
 return to camp, but Thackwell, wishing to prove the matter to 
 the utmost, resolved to attempt the ford at Vazirabad. He 
 accordingly resumed the march, and reached his destination at 
 six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 Here, too, but for the fortunate unforeseen and unexpected, 
 he might have been again disappointed. But this time a good 
 genius, in the shape of a man who, already great, afterwards 
 
 Lawrence-Archer's "Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign," p. 1(5. 
 + The surprise of Thackwell is a sufficient proof that any previous 
 examination of the ford must have been of a most cursory character. 
 Neither he nor his staff had any idea of its actual features before he saw 
 it. Yet, compare these facts with Lord Gough's bulletin of the 5th 
 December ! 
 
Chilidwwdld and Gnjrdt. 403 
 
 astonished the world by his brilliant feats of war -the illus- 
 trious John Nicholson — had made his task easy. John Nichol- 
 son was at this time a political officer attached to the head- 
 quarters of the army, for the purpose of facilitating the com- 
 munications of its chief with, and of bringing his own influence 
 to bear upon, the nobles and people of the country. On this 
 occasion foreseeing the difficulties which might possibly baffle 
 Thackwell at the fords, Nicholson had ridden forward with a 
 few of the Patan horsemen whom he had raised and trained, 
 and secured at Vazirabad seventeen large boats. These con- 
 stituted the acceptable present which gladdened the heart of 
 Thackwell as he rode into Vazirabad. 
 
 Darkness had already set in. It was one great fault of the 
 Sikh army, as apparent in this campaign as in that which was 
 concluded at Sobraon, that they trusted too much to the dark- 
 ness of the night. Not accustomed to attempt night-surprises 
 themselves, they posted no guards. But for this, under the cir- 
 cumstances, Thackwell might have been again baffled. The 
 darkness of the night and the neglect of the Sikhs, however,/ 
 greatly befriended him. 
 
 Thackwell wisely resolved to take advantage of these two 
 < ircumstances to cross at once, and gain a footing on the right 
 bank. 
 
 The result showed how fatal would have been the attempt 
 had the enemy been on the alert. On the assurance of Nichol- 
 son's Patans that the enemy were not watching on the othcr 
 side the guns were first crossed over. Of the two brigades of 
 infantry, one, Pennycuick's, then passed over in the boats. The 
 other, Eckford's, attempted wading; but, after mastering the 
 first and second branches of the stream, they were brought to a 
 dead stop by the third, and were forced to bivouac for the 
 night on a sandbank. Of the cavalry, Tait's Irregulars crossed 
 the ford as indicated by stakes : not, however, without the loss 
 of some men from drowning. 
 
 The troops who had crossed, as well, it can easily be 
 
4C4 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 imagined, as those who had stuck half-way, passed a miserable 
 night. They were all more or less wet ; the cold was the in- 
 tense, cutting cold of a Panjab December night; they had eaten 
 nothing, or but little, all day; they had no food with them, 
 and they were unable to light fires, lest they should attract the 
 enemy. The agony of such a situation is simply indescribable. 
 But the darkest hour comes to an end. With daylight, and 
 the glorious sun which soon followed daylight, the men re- 
 vived. They had at least an undisturbed footing on the right 
 bank, and their comrades were crossing. Food would soon 
 give them back their strength, and a brisk march restore their 
 circulation. At length, by about noon, all the force had passed 
 over except the 12th Irregulars and two companies of the 22nd 
 Native Infantry. These were detailed to escort the useless 
 pontoon train back to Ramnagar. 
 
 It was two o'clock before the men had finished their meal 
 and were ready to march. Meanwhile Thackwell and Colin 
 Campbell were discussing the line of advance to be adopted. 
 They knew nothing of the country in which they were. They 
 had only, then, to push on by the compass in the direction of 
 the enemy. They marched that afternoon about twelve miles, 
 to Duriwal, without encountering the Sikhs. There Thackwell 
 received a message from Gough, congratulating him on 
 his successful passage, and urging him to attack the enemy 
 in flank the following day, whilst he should assail him in 
 front. 
 
 The next day this order was countermanded. After march- 
 ing six miles Thackwell received a dispatch from the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief forbidding him to attack till he should be 
 joined by Godby's brigade, which was to cross at the ford of 
 Ghari. To facilitate this junction Thackwell then directed his 
 march towards the three villages of Tarwalur, Rattai and 
 Ramiikhail; but, too intent on the idea of holding his hand to 
 Godby, he made the mistake of not occupying the line of those 
 villages, and of not throwing out his advanced guards and 
 
Chilianwala and Gujrdt. 405 
 
 pickets well in front of them. Instead of so doing, he en- 
 camped on the grassy plain in front of the larger village of 
 Sadiilapur, having the three villages 1 have named in front of 
 him. 
 
 Whilst they are breakfasting let us cross the river and see 
 what Lord Gpugh was doing at Ramnagar. 
 
 Lord Gough, we have seen, had dispatched Thackwell to 
 effect the turning movement early on the morning of the 1st of 
 December. It was not till midday of the 2nd that he learned 
 the complete success of the operation. To distract the enemy's 
 attention from Thackwell, then, he immediately opened a heavy 
 fire upon the enemy's position on the opposite bank. The 
 Sikhs replied by directing a return fire from the few guns 
 which effectually guarded the ford, and which were so placed, 
 that, though the fire of the British artillery was admirable, it 
 could not, from the width of the river, silence them.t 
 
 Whilst the artillery fight was thus raging, Sher Singh was 
 made aware of Thackwell's successful passage and his subse- 
 quent movement. The idea which flashed across his mind was 
 an idea worthy of a great commander. He resolved to march 
 at once to crush Thackwell before Gough could possibly come 
 to his support. He would then deal with Gcugh. 
 
 He broke up his camp, then, without delay, and drew back 
 his whole force about two miles, preparatory to the contemplated 
 movement. Meanwhile he gradually slackened his artillery 
 fire against the British, until at length it ceased altogether. 
 
 But the movement to the rear was scarcely effected when 
 other thoughts came over the mind of the Sikh leader. What 
 if Lord Gough, encouraged by the cessation of fire, should 
 cross at once ? He would be between two fires. He some- 
 what modified his plan, then, and, leaving the larger moiety of 
 his forces to amuse Gcugh, marched with 10,000 men against 
 Thackwell. This change in resolution was a half measure, and 
 
 * Vide Calcutta Review, vol. \v. pp. 264, 265. 
 t Lawrence-Archer, p. 29. 
 
406 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 in war half measures rarely succeed. The action of Lord 
 Gough proved that audacity on this occasion would have been 
 justifiable. For that General, completely deceived, renounced 
 the idea he had communicated to Thackwell, of an immediate 
 crossing. He spent the night of the 2nd in pushing forward 
 breastworks and batteries, just as if a formidable enemy had 
 been in front of him. It was not till the night of the day fol- 
 lowing that he discovered the abandonment by the enemy of 
 his position, nor was he able to bring his army to the opposite 
 bank till after Sher Singh had met Thackwell and was taking 
 up a new position on the left bank of the Jhetam. Audacity 
 was, therefore, not wanting on one side only. 
 
 Whilst Gough was thus throwing up his earthworks and his 
 batteries, Sher Singh was marching against Thackwell. He 
 caught him about eleven o'clock on the 3rd, just as the English 
 leader had taken up the position I have already described, in 
 front of Sadiilapiir and behind the three villages. Thack- 
 well's men had but just piled arms and fallen out, when, sud- 
 denly, a peculiar sound was heard overhead, and, on looking 
 up, a shell was discovered bursting in mid-air, between the 
 British line and the villages in front — a distance of about half 
 a mile of level turf. After this came round shot.t It was 
 Sher Singh who had thus surprised the British, badly posted 
 facing three villages which he now held. In that supreme 
 hour he must have deeply regretted that he had not brought 
 with him his whole army. The English troops at once fell in. 
 The infantry deployed, and the advanced guard, which by this 
 time was about equi-distant between the enemy and the British 
 
 * Lawrence-Archer, p. 29 note; Calcutta Review, vol. x\\, p. 266. 
 
 Lawrence-Archer, p. 23. The extraordinarily careless manner in 
 which the British generals conducted their operations in this campaign 
 is proved by the admission of Captain Thackwell, who acted as A.D.C. 
 to the General of that name throughout the campaign. :< It was diffi- 
 cult to believe,'' he wrote, ''that this shot was fired by the enemy, for 
 the scouts and patrols had raised no alarm of their approach." The 
 question naturally arises, had any scouts been sent out, or had any 
 patrols been posted!' 
 
Chilidnwdiu and Gujrdt. 407 
 
 main body, was ordered to fall back. When this had been 
 accomplished, Thackwell, in order to have a clear space in 
 front of him, retired about 200 yards further. 
 
 Meanwhile, Sher Singh, still wanting in audacity, had con- 
 tented himself with holding the three villages, and with pour- 
 ing in a continuous fire from his guns. This fire could not 
 have failed, under ordinary eircumstances, to produce a mur- 
 derous effect; but on this occasion its result was minimised in 
 consequence of the precaution taken, on the advice of Colin 
 Campbell, by the British general, to make his infantry throw 
 themselves on the ground. 
 
 For nearly five hours the British force sustained this fire 
 without replying. At last, at nearly four P.M., Thackwell's 
 patience was exhausted, and he ordered his guns to reply. The 
 artillery duel then continued till sunset, varied only by two 
 feeble attempts made by the Sikhs to turn both flanks of the 
 British force. That on the left was baffled by Biddulph's 
 Irregular Cavalry and Warner's troop of Horse Artillery, sup- 
 ported by the 5th Light Cavalry ; that on the right by Christie's 
 Horse Artillery, the 3rd Light Dragoons and the 8th Light 
 Cavalry. 
 
 By sunset the firing on both sides ceased, and Sher Singh, 
 still haunted by the fear lest Gough should take advantage of 
 the night to cross, fell back on his position without loss and 
 without pursuit. The loss of the British was only seventy- 
 three. 
 
 Such was the artillery combat of Sadulapiir, dignified, in 
 the inflated language of the British commanders of the day, 
 with the name of a battle. It must be a strange kind of battle 
 in which, by the admission of the general, "the infantry had 
 no chance of firing a shot, except a few companies on the left 
 of the line," to repulse a turning movement, and the cavalry 
 never charged. No, Sadulapiir was nothing more than an 
 artillery combat. The armies never came to close quarters ; the 
 English, because Sher Singh held a very strong position in the 
 
408 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 three villages, and the ground between them and their posi- 
 tion was unfavourable to an advance; the Sikhs, because their 
 leader feared to commit himself to a battle when he might, at 
 any moment, hear the guns of Lord Gough thundering on his 
 rear. There can be no doubt but that his want of audacity in 
 not bringing up his whole army lost him a great opportunity ; 
 for no position could have been weaker than that of the Eng- 
 lish — and in war opportunities do not return.* 
 
 Meanwhile, Lord Gough, still encamped at Ramnagar, pend- 
 ing the construction of a bridge of boats across the Chinab, 
 had, on the fourth, dispatched Sir Walter Gilbert with the 9th 
 Lancers and the 14th Light Dragoons to the right bank of that 
 river. Gilbert returned to report that the enemy had disap- 
 peared. Sher Singh had, in point of fact, fallen back during 
 the night of the 3rd on his main body, and, in view of taking 
 up a new position on the Jhelam, had marched a few miles in 
 that direction. 
 
 "The ill-advised passage of the Chinab," writes the most 
 competent critic of this campaign,! "the failure to strike a 
 blow, and the withdrawal of the enemy intact to positions of 
 
 * Tt is ludicrous to read Lord Gough's despatch on this battle. Alike 
 in the statement of facts (?) and in the inferences drawn from those — 
 facts, it is throughout a supreme effort of the imagination. Beginning 
 by the statement : "It has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe to the 
 British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations 
 rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Chinab, 
 the defeat and dispersion of the Sikh force under the insurgent rajah 
 Sher Singh," it proceeds to give a description of the battle of Sadiilapiir 
 — a battle not brought to a decisive issue solely in consequence "of the 
 exhausted state of man and horse" on the British side. (The men had 
 marched six miles and had lain down for five hours !) After stating, 
 then, the fact of his own passage of the Chinab, and the retreat, in 
 disorder (?), of the Sikhs, he draws the inference — soon, to his dismay, 
 to be proved utterly baseless — that the movement to the Jhelam of the 
 Sikhs has "become more a flight than a retreat," and that "a great 
 portion of those not belonging to the Khalsa army have dispersed and 
 returned to their homes." It may be said of all Lord Gough's despatches 
 that they should be left unread by those who wish to possess a true 
 knowledge of the actions which they profess to describe. 
 
 t Sir Henry Durand, vide Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 200. 
 
CkiHdnvdld and Gujrat. 4° c ) 
 
 their own choosing, were doubtless sufficiently irritating" to 
 the British commander-in-chief. If the passage of the China!) 
 was to be justified at all, it could only be justified by follow- 
 ing it up by a rapid advance on the enemy. Under the circum- 
 stances it was simply a useless piece of bravado. In spite of 
 it, Gough, with his mam army, was still chained to the left 
 bank ; he had no reserves ; the commissariat arrangements were 
 still incomplete; a feeling of insecurity was beginning to arise 
 in Labor; Multan was still unsubdued; Wheeler's brigade was 
 still bus)- in the Jalandhar Doab. In spite of Lord Cough's 
 bulletins, which imposed upon nobody, it was universally felt 
 that up to that point the campaign had been a failure.* The 
 public, in fact, had lost all the confidence they ever possessed, 
 never very much, in the miliary capacity of Lord Gough. 
 
 Nor with time did matters improve. After his affair at 
 Sachilapiir Thackwell had pushed on, in a blind sort of manner, 
 after the enemy. He had been joined by Godby's brigade at 
 nine A.M. of the 4th, and by the 9th Lancers and 14th Light 
 Dragoons on the evening of the same day. On the 5th he 
 moved to Helah, a mud village which had arisen on the accu- 
 mulated debris of other villages. From this place, if he had 
 only known it, Sher Singh and his army were distant only ten 
 miles. But, so vicious was the system of reconnoitring, and so 
 hostile to the English was the feeling of the people, that 
 although Thackwell sent out two large observation parties of 
 cavalry and artillery, these returned to camp only to report 
 that they had seen, indeed, small bodies of the Sikhs, but that 
 the villagers persistently asserted that Sher Singh had already 
 crossed the Jhelam. 
 
 On the 1 8th December, the bridge of boats being ready, 
 Gough crossed to the right bank, and marched forthwith to 
 within three miles of the position which Thackwell still held 
 at Helah. Sher Singh, well informed of the British move- 
 ments, thought the moment opportune to march on Dinghi, a 
 
 * Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 207. 
 
410 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 post from which he threatened the ford at Vazirabad and 
 Vazirabad itself. He so imposed upon the English general 
 that the latter resolved on the moment to fall back on Gujrat, 
 and actually sent orders to Thackwell to support him in that 
 movement. Under inspiration happier than his own, however, 
 he cancelled the order, and dispatched instead a brigade of 
 cavalry and three guns to guard the ford. The army remained 
 ir Helah and its immediate vicinity. 
 
 The Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, had been very un- 
 willing to give his sanction to a general attack upon the main 
 Sikh army until Multan should have fallen. His position in 
 this respect was not very logical. Holding the views he did, 
 he should have kept the British army on the left bank of the 
 Chinab. Once having allowed Gough to cross, he should have 
 urged him to immediate action. By his steering a middle 
 course, by his allowing Gough to move to the right bank and 
 then holding his hand, there came about a state of affairs which 
 might be regarded almost as alarming. 
 
 Gough was still halted at Helah, when, in the beginning of 
 January, the important fortress of Atak, on the Indus, held till 
 then by Lieutenant Herbert, surrendered to the Sikhs. The 
 fall of Atak effected an immediate change in the views of Lord 
 Dalhousie. Regarding it as an event which let loose the 
 besieging army led by Chattar Singh, father of the Sikh com- 
 mander-in-chief, and which opened the war for the advance of 
 an Afghan contingent, for which it was known that chief had 
 been negotiating, he at once, ioth January, sent pressing orders 
 to Gough to strike, if he should deem himself strong enough, 
 an effectual blow at the enemy in his front, and to strike it 
 'with the least possible delay." 
 
 In consequence of these instructions Gough broke up his 
 camp near Helah, and advanced, at daylight on the 12th, to 
 Dinghi, some twelve miles distant. Here he received informa- 
 tion, subsequently proved to be true, that the Sikh army was in 
 position some fourteen miles distant, that its left rested on the 
 
Chiltdnwdld and Gufrdt. 41 1 
 
 low hills of Rasiil, its centre on the village of Fathshah-ki- 
 Chak, its right on Mung. 
 
 That afternoon Gough summoned some of the officers whom 
 he most trusted to confer with him on the best mode of carry- 
 ing out the Governor-General's instructions. Amongst the 
 officers so summoned was Major, afterwards Sir Henry, Durand, 
 who had but recently joined the camp. The high character 
 borne by this officer more than warranted the extension to him 
 of the summons to attend the meeting, and it was upon the 
 advice he gave that the commander-in-chief decided to act. 
 
 Major Durand — after alluding to the fact, a report of which 
 had been made to head-quarters, that though the front of the 
 enemy's position was covered by a thick belt of jungle, yet 
 along the frequented road which led from Dinghi straight upon 
 Rasiil the country was more open —pointed out that a line 
 which extended from Rasiil to Miing must be thin and weak, 
 and recommended, therefore, that the British army should 
 march on Rasiil, and, taking the enemy in flank, should double 
 up his line, thrust it back upon Fathshah-ki-Chak and Mung, 
 into a country void of supplies, where he would be hemmed in 
 between rivers he could not cross, and thus cut him off from 
 the fords of the Jhelam, sever his communication with Chattar 
 Singh and with Atak, and render it impossible for him to 
 receive further aid in men and provisions. This plan, consti- 
 tuting an echelon attack quite in the style of the Great 
 Frederic," was, I have said, accepted by Lord Gough. 
 
 In the chapter immediately preceding, when I introduced 
 Lord Gough to the reader, I described him as a general the 
 reverse in one respect of Clive, of Adams, of Wellesley, of 
 Massena, and of other great captains who were remarkable for 
 their clearness of vision and coolness under the roar of cannon, 
 inasmuch as he, under the same circumstances, forgot all his 
 previous plans and sought only to get at the enemy. The 
 
 * Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. l>(>8. 
 
412 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 events which followed the deliberations of the I2th January 
 illustrate this remarkable feature of his character. 
 
 Gough had resolved, I have said, on an echelon attack on the 
 enemy. It was intended that Gilbert's division, forming the 
 extreme right, should force the left of the enemy, whilst "the 
 heavy and field artillery, massed together, should sweep in 
 enfilade the curvilinear position of their centre and right"; 
 that then, as soon as Gilbert had shaken and broken up the 
 left, Campbell, till then kept in reserve with the massed artil- 
 lery, should, with Gilbert and the cavalry, "throw himself 
 fairly perpendicularly across the left centre of the opposing 
 force, and hurl it to the southward."* 
 
 Full of carrying out this plan, Gough marched from his 
 ground early on the morning of the 13th January. "It was 
 one of those pleasant mornings," writes Captain Lawrence- 
 Archer, himself a combatant, "peculiar to the cold season of 
 upper India. The air was still and bracing, and the increasing 
 warmth of sunshine, in an almost unclouded atmosphere, pro- 
 duced the glow so welcome after the cold of the early dawn." 
 After proceeding five or six miles, Gough halted and sent on 
 the Engineers to reconnoitre. They returned about ten o'clock 
 to report the road clear and practicable for guns, and that the 
 enemy were marching down from Rasiil, apparently to take up 
 a position in the plain. The view which had been urged upon 
 him being thus confirmed, Gough pushed on along the road to 
 Rasiil. He had not, however, progressed very far when 
 deserters informed him, through the political agent, Major 
 Mackcson, that the enemy were in some strength on the left of 
 the British advancing column in the neighbourhood of the 
 villages Mujianwala and Chilianwala. On receiving this in- 
 formation, Gough, renouncing the plan of the previous evening, 
 quitted the Rasiil road and inclined to the left. Further in- 
 formation having made known to him that small detachments 
 of the enemy's horse had been visible on the plain in advance 
 
 * Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 268. 
 
Chilidnwdld and (iujruL 413 
 
 of the mound and village of Chilianwala, and their infantry 
 on the mound itself, he turned directly to the left, and marched 
 straight on that point, leaving the Rasul road in the rear of, 
 and parallel to, his line when it was deployed." 
 
 The Sikh detachment at the mound of Chilianwala, for it 
 was no more, did not await the threatened attack, but fell back 
 precipitately upon its main line by the Mung road. Gough 
 speedily gained the vacated mound, and from its summit 
 obtained a good view of the country occupied by the enemy. 
 To bring his army in front of, and parallel to, their line he had 
 to bring his left forward. Whilst this movement was being 
 effected he had time to examine in detail the enemy's position. 
 He saw them— to the number of about 23,000! — their right 
 facing Chilianwala, about two miles from that village, but less 
 from the British line, which was deploying about 500 yards in 
 front of it, their left resting on the high ground of Rasul. 
 There was a great interval between the left of their right wing 
 and the right of the centre. "It was evident," writes Durand, 
 "that the enemy occupied a position too extended for his 
 numbers." His extreme right was refused, and inclined 
 back towards Miing. 
 
 When the British army had deployed it was noticed that its 
 line of infantry, solid and compact, did little more than oppose 
 a front to Sher Singh's centre. It is true it somewhat over- 
 lapped it, with the result, however, that its left brigade (of 
 Campbell's division) faced the gap of which I have spoken as 
 existing between the Sikh right wing and centre. 
 
 *. "It would have been a very hazardous movement," writes Durand, 
 whose account of this movement I have followed almost verbally, "in 
 front of an intelligent general, with troops quick and ready at man- 
 oeuvre ; for Gough offered his right to an enemy in position within 4,000 
 yards of him, with a thickish belt of jungle, which would have covered 
 their approach until they debouched and formed across his exposed 
 flank." — Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 269. 
 
 t The official report, as usual, greatly exaggerates the enemy's num- 
 bers. It says from thirty to forty thousand. It should rather have 
 been from twentv to twentv-five thousand. 
 
4*4 
 
 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 Gough had no intention of engaging. It was two o'clock in 
 the afternoon, and his troops had been under arms since day- 
 break. He gave orders, therefore, to his Quartermaster-General 
 to take up ground for encampment. Meanwhile, pending the 
 completion of that officer's labours, the troops piled arms. 
 
 But Sher Singh was determined to force on a battle that 
 afternoon. Knowing the temperament of the British com- 
 mander, that the fire of artillery was the music which would 
 make him dance, he dispatched to the front a few light guns, 
 and opened fire on the British position. 
 
 The fire was distant, and the effect innocuous, but the insult 
 roused the hot Irish blood of the leader of the English army. 
 It "drew" him, in fact, precisely in the manner designed by 
 Sher Singh. He at once directed his heavy guns to respond, 
 from their position in front of Chilianwala, to the fire of the 
 enemy. The distance from the enemy's advanced guns was 
 from fifteen to seventeen hundred yards. Yet the density of 
 the jungle prevented the English gunners from getting any 
 sight of the Sikhs, and they had to judge their distance by 
 timing the seconds between the report and the flash of the 
 hostile guns. Their fire failed to silence that of the enemy, 
 for Sher Singh, determined to complete the drawing operation 
 he had so well begun, sent the whole of his field artillery to 
 the front, and the Sikhs, excellent gunners, maintained an equal 
 ■contest with their foe. 
 
 This was more than Gough could stand. A thorough 
 believer in the bayonet, and looking upon guns as instruments 
 which it was perhaps necessary to use, but which interfered 
 with real fighting, he, wild with excitement, ordered his infan- 
 try to advance and charge the enemy's batteries. 
 
 The order of the English line was as follows : Of the infan- 
 try, Sir Walter Gilbert's division occupied the right, but he was 
 flanked by Pope's brigade of cavalry, strengthened by the 14th 
 Light Dragoons, and three troops of artillery under Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Grant. Tn the centre were the heavy guns under 
 
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Chilidnwdld and Giijrat. 415 
 
 Major Horsford. The left was formed of General Colin 
 Campbell's infantry division, flanked by White's brigade of 
 cavalry and three troops of horse artillery under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Brind. The field batteries were with the infantry 
 divisions, between the intervals of brigades. The reserve was 
 commanded by brigadier Penny, and Brigadier Hearsey pro- 
 tected the baggage." 
 
 The reckless nature of the order given by the Commander- 
 in-Chief — viz., to carry the guns in front at the point of the 
 bayonet — may be judged from the fact that between those guns 
 and the troops on the British left who were to carry them was 
 very nearly a mile of dense and unknown jungle. However, 
 British soldiers, well led, shrink from no impossibility ; and on 
 this occasion the divisional commanders, at all events, were 
 men of tried experience and ability. Cough's orders, then, 
 were obeyed. The British line pressed on. I propose first to 
 accompany the left, led by Colin Campbell. 
 
 I have stated that Campbell's left brigade (Hoggan's) over- 
 lapped the right of Slier Singh's centre, and faced, therefore, 
 in the original formation, a blank space. Pushing on towards 
 the enemy, the right brigade then naturally came full in front 
 of Slier Singh's right centre, which had been strengthened by 
 many guns. Though the fire of these guns had been rapid, t 
 the brigade had suffered comparatively little, until, breaking 
 out of the jungle, it came to a more open space in front of the 
 
 * Lawrence-Archer, pp. 14, 45. Gilbert's division was composed of 
 Mountain's brigade (29th Foot, 30th and 56th X.T.), and Godby's 
 brigade (2nd Europeans, 31st, 45th, and 70th N.I.). Campbell's divi- 
 sion consisted of Pennycuick's brigade (24th Foot and 25th X.I.). and 
 Hoggan's brigade (01st Foot, 30th and 40th N.I.). Penny's reserve 
 was composed of the 15th, 20th, and 09th N.I. Hearsey had some 
 irregular cavalry to guard the baggage. The total number of the 
 British combatants was between fifteen and sixteen thousand. 
 
 1 Vide Sir Henry Durand's article, Calcutta "Review, vol. xv. pp. 270. 
 271. Compare it also with the equally graphic account, confirming it 
 in all main essentials, of another eye-witness, Captain Lawrence-Archer, 
 in his excellent work. '" Commentaries on the Panjab Campaign," 
 18^8-9." 
 
416 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 guns. Now the storm of shot and grape thickened, and the 
 gallant brigade charged; but the jungle had necessarily dis- 
 ordered the formations, and having to charge over about three 
 hundred yards, the men were winded before reaching the guns, 
 and broke from the charging pace at the moment that it was 
 most important to have continued it. The brigade fell, then, 
 unavoidably into some confusion; more especially as the pools 
 of water in front of the enemy's battery obliged some of the 
 men to make a detour. In doing this many of them began to 
 load and fire. The result was that in a very brief space all 
 order had disappeared. After a short interval of time, how- 
 ever, the scattered groups, finding themselves within reach of 
 the guns, charged home as if with one mind, bayoneted the 
 gunners, and for a moment held them ! 
 
 But only for a moment. As the smoke cleared away, the 
 Sikhs, noticing the small number of the men who had made 
 that desperate rush, rallied; and, reinforced by infantry from 
 the rear, recovered the battery; then, aided by their cavalry, 
 drove back the brigade almost to the point which it occupied 
 at the beginning of the action. 
 
 Colin Campbell all this time was with the left (Hoggan's 
 brigade). That brigade, facing, as I have said, the long gap 
 between the left of the right division of the Sikh army, com- 
 manded by Atar Singh, and the right of the centre division, 
 with which was Sher Singh, had, pushing on without meeting 
 with any opposition, penetrated the gap, and, wheeling to the 
 right, had placed itself on the flank of the Sikh centre. This 
 position, however, was not so advantageous as it would at a 
 first glance seem to be; for, whilst the right of the Sikh centre, 
 wheeling in an incredibly short space of time, showed a firm 
 front to the British brigade, the entire right division, breaking 
 from the opposition offered to their advance by the cavalry of 
 Thackwell and the guns of Brind, wheeled to their left and fell 
 on the rear and the left flank of Campbell. The latter, then, 
 soon found himself engaged in front, flank and rear— his sole 
 
Chilian 1 ® did and Gu/rdi. 417 
 
 chance of success resting 1 n the courage and discipline of his 
 men. The faith which Colin Campbell ever possessed in the 
 British soldier was proved on this occasion to be well founded, 
 for never did men deserve better of their country than, " during 
 that mortal struggle, and on that strange day of stern vicissi- 
 tudes," did the gallant 61st* 
 
 Leaving Campbell thus making head against considerable 
 odds, I must proceed with the reader to the British right. 
 There Gilbert had to encounter difficulties not less great than 
 those which the other divisional leader had encountered. He, 
 too, had to storm batteries, supported by infantry, and covered 
 by jungle, in his front; and, what was worse, when he was 
 deeply engaged with the enemy, he had to see his flanks un- 
 covered — the left by the defeat of Pennycuick's brigade, the 
 right by the repulse of the cavalry, presently to be related. 
 Xor had his own front attack been entirely successful. The 
 left regiment of his right brigade, the 56th Native Infantry, 
 after making head with great gallantry against superior 
 numbers, and losing eight officers and 322 men killed and 
 wounded, had been forced back. The Sikhs, availing them- 
 selves of the gap thus produced, had separated the two 
 brigades the one from the other, and these found themselves 
 now, like Hoggan's brigade on the left, assailed, each on its 
 own account, on front, rear and flanks. In this crisis, when 
 everything seemed to frown on the British army, the behaviour 
 of the Bengal Horse Artillery was superb. Splendid as is the 
 record of that noble regiment, it may be confidently asserted 
 that never did it render more valuable, more efficacious service 
 to its country, never did it tend more to save a rash and head- 
 strong general from the defeat he deserved, than on that 
 memorable 13th January. The battery of Dawes attached to 
 
 * Calcutta "Review, vol. xv. p. 271. Lawrence- Archer, pp. 61, G2. It 
 
 deserves, in justice to the old native army, to be recorded that the 
 30th and 46th N.I. "supported the 61st Foot with steadiness and 
 ■courage." 
 
 EE 
 
41 8 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 Gilbert's division was, at the crisis I have described, of special 
 service. "In spite of jungle and every difficulty," records 
 Durand, "whenever, in a moment of peril, he was most needed, 
 Dawes was sure to be at hand ; his fire boxed the compass 
 before evening, and Gilbert felt and handsomely acknow- 
 ledged the merit and the valour of Dawes and his gunners."* 
 
 I have stated that whilst Gilbert's left had been uncovered 
 by the defeat of Pennycuick's brigade, and his centre broken 
 by the crushing in of the 56th Native Infantry, his right had 
 been exposed by the repulse of the British Cavalry. It 
 happened in this wise : 
 
 The cavalry on the right was commanded by Brigadier Pope, 
 an officer in infirm health. It included a portion of the 9th 
 Lancers, the 14th Light Dragoons, the 1st and 6th Light 
 Cavalry. "Either by some order or misapprehension of an 
 order,"* this brigade was brought into a position in front of 
 Christie's horse artillery — on the right of Gilbert's division — ■ 
 thus interfering with the fire of his guns and otherwise hamper- 
 ing it. Before Pope could rectify his mistake a body of the 
 enemy's horsemen, suddenly emerging from the jungle, charged 
 his brigade, and one of them singling out Pope, cut him across 
 the head with a tulwar. The brigade, taken by surprise, had 
 halted, waiting for orders. In consequence of the severe 
 wound of the commander no orders came, and the brigade. left 
 to itself, and threatened by another body of horsemen, dashed, 
 panic-stricken, to the rear, rushing over and upsetting guns, 
 gunners and gun-waggons in their headlong rout. The 
 Giirchuras, whose inferior numbers did not justify this scare, 
 pursued their flying enemy closely, dashed amongst the guns, 
 cut down Major Christie, completely taken by surprise, and 
 many gunners with him, captured all the guns of Christie's 
 troop and two of Huish's, and would have penetrated to the 
 
 * "Dawes's battery Avas the saving of us." — "Journal of a 
 Subaltern" (written by an officer of the 2nd Europeans). 
 
 * Lord Gough's despatch. 
 
Chilidnwdid and Chi /nil. 419 
 
 general staff but for the gallantry of the 9th Lancers. These 
 rallied behind the guns *and checked the body of Giircharas. 
 A few cf the latter, however, did advance to within a short 
 distance from the Commander-in-Chief — so near, indeed, that 
 his escort of cavalry prepared to charge. They were, however, 
 dispersed by a few rounds of grape. 
 
 L'p to this point the battle had gone badly for the British. 
 We have seen the left brigade of the left division fighting for 
 dear life, surrounded on three sides; the right brigade of the 
 same division driven back almost to its starting point; the two 
 brigades of the right division separated from each other, and 
 each surrounded; the cavalry and horse artillery, which should 
 have covered the extreme right, defeated, and six guns cap- 
 tured. Lord Gough must have been very sensible of the 
 critical state of affairs when he ordered up Penny's reserve to 
 replace Pennycuick's brigade. But all order has disappeared ; 
 the several regiments, it might in seme cases be said the several 
 groups cf each regiment, were fighting for themselves, and 
 Penny's brigade, sent to reinforce Campbell, somehow found 
 itself attached to Gilbert's division. 
 
 Gough had now to depend mainly upon his infantry ; and 
 the stout men who composed that infantry did not fail him. 
 On the right, the pertinacity and the high courage of the 29th 
 Foot and the 2nd Europeans (now Royal Dublin Fusiliers) 
 gradually wore down the enemy; on the left, Campbell, 
 repulsing every attack, succeeded at last in forcing the Sikhs 
 to give ground. On both flanks these successes were followed 
 by a final charge, and the British cheer, sounding exultingly 
 even over the roar of artillery and the rattle of musketry, 
 borne by the breeze to the ears of the Commander-in-Chief, 
 was the first announcement to that gallant soldier that he might 
 cease his anxiety, for that the day, if not won, was saved. 
 
 There was time yet even to win the day. The cavalry on the 
 left, led by Thackwell, and the horse artillery on that flank 
 were still intact. They had performed the great service of 
 
z|20 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 keeping in check the entire right division of the enemy. Unett, 
 with a squadron of the 3rd Dragoons, and three squadrons of 
 the 3rd Light Cavalry, has made a most brilliant and success- 
 ful charge, piercing the compact masses of the enemy ; and the 
 danger in that quarter being far less pressing than on the 
 uncovered right, Brind had been dispatched with his guns, and 
 White with his brigade of cavalry, to the right flank. Thus 
 strengthened, the cavalry there had reformed. This took place 
 just before the British cheer 1 have referred to announced the 
 final repulse of the enemy's infantry. 
 
 "We feel convinced," writes Durand, in the article from 
 which I have so largely quoted,* "that, had Lord Gough 
 ridden up at that moment to H.M.'s 14th Dragoons, spoken a 
 few words to the corps, and bid them retrieve the lost guns 
 and strike for the bright fame of their Peninsular honour, 
 they would have swept on like a whirlwind, and dashed upon 
 the retiring confused masses of the enemy, as heedless of 
 numbers as Unett's squadron of the 3rd had done on Atar 
 Singh's compact, unshaken troops. It would have saved many 
 a bitter pang, many a reproach, and silenced for ever the men- 
 tion of the unhappy and unaccountable retreat which gave our 
 guns and gunners to the enemy. It would, too, have prevented 
 the withdrawal of the infantry from the ground so hardlv 
 won; and all the guns taken from the Sikhs, and 
 all the wounded, of whom we had many, would have been 
 saved." 
 
 But it was not to be. The words were not spoken. The 
 thought to speak them never probably entered the head of the 
 infantry commander, who believed he had been saved by his 
 infantry. Heedless of the other branches which, well managed, 
 might have more than retrieved all the faults cf the day, he 
 rode forward to his exhausted, but victorious, infantry, who 
 were close in front of him. The guns and reformed cavalry 
 
 * Calcutta 'Review, vol. xv. pp. 272, 273. More than one officer Avho 
 fought in that battle has pronounced a similar opinion. 
 
Chdidnzcdld aiui Gujrdt. 421 
 
 were left in the position in which they had reformed, as though 
 they had been useless ! 
 
 The mistake in this respect was the more glaring and the 
 more disastrous in its consequences, as Gough was brought to 
 the conclusion, after he had reached his infantry, that it was 
 inadvisable for them to try to hold the ground they had won. 
 It was five o'clock, and darkness was approaching. Campbell 
 and other influential commanders then urged him to fall back, 
 pointing out to him that the enemy, though repulsed, had not 
 been broken, and that it was absolutely necessary to retire on 
 a position where water could be procured, and where the bag- 
 gage would be ensured protection. The nearest approach to 
 such a position was Chilianwala, where, too, the ammunition 
 was stored, and food would be obtainable. Gough yielded to 
 these reasons, and gave the necessary orders.* 
 
 The British army then retired from the well-fought field, to 
 win which had cost them, in killed and wounded, 89 officers 
 and 2,357 fighting men, leaving on the field many standards- 
 lost, not captured — six guns, and all their dead.t It cannot 
 be said of this battle that "it was a famous victory." Indeed, 
 it can only technically be called a victory, and most certainly 
 if was of a Pyrrhcean character. 
 
 The judgment formed after a lapse of more than thirty 
 years, when time and death have assuaged all the passions of 
 the period, is that no British general ever fought a battle sc 
 badly as Lord Gough fought Chilianwala. It was, throughout. 
 a day of blunders. 
 
 The original conception, inspired by another, was masterly 
 Carried out exactly as it had been planned, it would have 
 
 * Sir Henry Durand contends, and in my opinion with justice, that 
 this giving up the field of battle was a mistake. He would have had 
 the infantry bivouac where they had fought, supported by guns. By 
 daylight the wounded and captured guns would have been secured. He 
 even ventures to think that the resumption of hostilities in the early 
 morn would have been attended with success. Calcutta Review, vol. xv. 
 pp. 274, 275. 
 
 f Lawrence-Archer, pp. 78, 79. 
 
422 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 taken the long line of the enemy in flank and have rolled it up. 
 There would have been no heavy jungle, nothing in the shape 
 of natural obstacles to impede him.* But it was in the nature 
 of Gough that the news of the vicinity of a body of the enemy, 
 however small, should make him cast to the winds all his pro- 
 jects, however well conceived. It was something of this sort 
 which caused him to make his first mistake, and leave the road 
 to Rasu!. 
 
 When, however, he had quitted that road, and, marching to 
 the left, had taken up a position in front of Chilianwala, 
 Gough, instead of hurling his infantry blindly against the 
 enemy's line, should have attempted to take advantage of the 
 faults of their formation. The long gap between the Sikh 
 right and the Sikh centre was the most conspicuous of those. 
 faults. A real general might have so thrust his army into that 
 gap as to sever the two wings of the enemy and roll them up 
 m oppcsite directions. It must be admitted that this would 
 have been a very delicate operation, requiring very skilful 
 handling, and quite beyond the powers of the actual British 
 commander. But this is only to admit that Lord Gough was 
 not a skilful general. 
 
 The attack, in the manner in which it was made, was one 
 which required neither military knowledge nor military ex- 
 perience to order. One can understand how a general, in the 
 crisis of a great battle, when the supreme moment for a decisive 
 advance of his infantry had arrived, should launch forward his 
 reserves with the command, "Up, Guards, and at them !" But 
 what is not comprehensible is that a general, leading an army 
 composed of the three arms, facing an enemy about a mile 
 distant from him, whose long line overlapped his own, and 
 between whose position and his was a belt of dense jungle, 
 should, before he had exhausted, or even seriously used, the 
 fire of his artillery, turn to his infantry and exclaim, "Up, 
 men, and at them !" And yet this is positively the gist of the 
 
 * Calcutta lie new, vol. xv. p. 275. 
 
( hilidnwdld and Gujrat. 4 2 3 
 
 directions which Lord Gough gave at Chilianwala. To give 
 such an order, what experience, what knowledge, what educa- 
 tion were required ? A competitor for the army course could 
 have said as much : probably, having the benefit of the long 
 examination of the enemy's position from the mound of 
 Chilianwala, he would have done far better !* 
 
 Whilst, after the battle, the English retired to the village of 
 Chilianwala, the Sikhs on the other side, after gathering up the 
 trophies won, alas ! from their enemy, fell back three miles, 
 and recccupied their position at Rasul. It was the policy of 
 the Sikh commander to await in his position the arrival of the 
 trocps led by his father and cf the cavalry contingent expected 
 from Afghanistan. The junction with these ence effected, he 
 had two courses before him ; the first, by a rapid movement 
 across the Chinab, to turn Lord Gcugh's position and fall upon 
 Lahcr; the second, to strengthen his position at Rasul, and to 
 tempt the English leader to attack him. His knowledge of 
 Lord Gough's character, and the ease with which that general 
 had always succumbed to similar temptations, misled Sher 
 Singh on this occasion. It will be seen by the narrative that 
 Gcugh, implored not to attack till he should be reinforced by 
 
 * On this point I cannot forbear to quote the .striking criticism of 
 Durand. " Our attack," he writes, " fair upon the centre of the enemy, 
 gave the latter the full advantage of his very extended position; and 
 as his centre was covered by thickish, bushy jungle, which dislocated all 
 formations in line, and inevitably produced confusion in the brigades, 
 besides offering difficulties to the movements of the guns and to bringing 
 them into action, the troops were sure to come in contact with the Sikh 
 infantry and guns in the most unfavourable position, their organization 
 disturbed, and nothing but their own courage and the example of their 
 officers to compensate for every conceivable disadvantage. Verily, 
 British infantry, British officers, and British bayonets are of such a 
 character, so entirely to be relied upon, that it is no wonder that British 
 generals will dare and risk much. The dauntless valour of the infantry 
 rectifies the errors of its commanders, and carries them through what 
 would otherwise be inevitable defeat and disgrace. But it redeems their 
 errors with its blood ; and seldom has there been more devotion, but, 
 alas ! more carnage, than on the hard-fought field of Chilianwala, a field 
 fairly won, though bravely contested by the Sikhs of all arms." — Cal- 
 cutta Review, vol. xv. p. 270. 
 
424 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 the troops set free by the fall of Multan, was not to be drawn 
 a second time. Sher Singh would still willingly have awaited 
 him in the position he had greatly strengthened, but, forced, by 
 the impossibility of obtaining supplies for his increased army 
 to quit it, he put into operation the second alternative, just one 
 week, fortunately for the English, too late. 
 
 Meanwhile, Gough, on the morrow of Chilianwala, had taken 
 up for his arm\' a position between the village of that name 
 and Mujianwala — a position far too cramped and confined, 
 for it left all the roads open to the Sikh army, and the country 
 free to their foraging parties. When Gough recognised this 
 error it was too late to repair it, for the Sikhs, intellectually 
 quicker than he, had occupied the points which dominated the 
 plain.* 
 
 In this position Gough awaited the fall of Multan. That 
 event occurred on the 21st January, eight days after Chilian- 
 wala. The troops engaged in the operation, consisting of 
 three brigades, and numbering about 9,000 men, of whom one 
 third were British, led by General Whish, set out at once for 
 Ramnagar, but before that general could join the Commander- 
 in-Chief circumstances had forced Lord Gough to break up 
 his camp at Chilianwala. 
 
 I have stated that Sher Singh, after his well-contested battle, 
 had retired on Rasul, there to await the arrival of reinforce- 
 ments, led respectively by his father and by one of the sons 
 of the Amir of Kabul. Chattar Singh reached him on the 
 
 * "Much," says Durand, "was thrown away of the fruits of the 
 victory by withdrawing from the ground which the infantry had so 
 nobly won at Chilianwala ; but when this had been done much more was 
 lost and thrown away, in our opinion, by failing to perceive the strate- 
 gical importance of the position, which, for several days after the battle, 
 the enemy left optional to Lord Gough to take up or not, as he pleased. 
 Afterwards, when our own timidity had restored their confidence, the 
 Sikhs saw the momentous importance of what we had neglected. They 
 became exceedingly jealous of the hill-top looking down on Kotri, and 
 any demonstration on the part of Gough to seize it would have been 
 stoutly contested." — Calcutta Review, vol. xv. p. 285. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 425 
 
 1 6th, and assumed the nominal command in chief. The 
 Afghans arrived two days later. 
 
 The arrival of Chattar Singh had increased the Sikh army 
 by a third, and, when joined by 1,500 Afghans, it numbered 
 about 34,000 fighting men.* The temptation to march upon 
 Lahor was great ; but, in the first place, the army had not yet 
 recovered from the shaking at Chilianwala, and, in the next, it 
 was still hoped that Lord Gough might be tempted. 
 
 The increased number of mouths in the Sikh position began, 
 about this period, to cause them great inconvenience. Provisions 
 had for some time been scarce, even for the Sikhs, and it was 
 now found impossible to provide for many days longer for 
 the greatly augmented army. On the 3rd February, then, in 
 pusuance of a resolution arrived at the previous day, the Sikh 
 leader, without quitting his position, thrust, as a tentative 
 measure, his cavalry through the Khuri pass, thus threatening 
 the road to Dinghi, a place in rear of the British army, and 
 commanding a passage across the Chinab. 
 
 Gough was informed of this change, but, clinging to his 
 good advisers, and brought to feel that in his actual position — 
 the centre of the circle of which the enemy would have to 
 traverse the arc — he could fall upon the Sikhs at a disadvan- 
 tage should they attempt to cross the river, he kept a vigilant 
 look-out and remained motionless. This was the more credible 
 to him, as he had to resist not only his own longings but the 
 suggestions of influential men about him. 
 
 The thrusting of the Sikh cavalry through the Khuri pass 
 was, in fact, one of the temptations of Sher Singh. This 
 having failed, he pushed the horse (6th February) to Dinghi, 
 at the same time holding Rasul. Again, however, did Gough 
 stand firm, and refused to be drawn. 
 
 On the nth the Sikh leaders tempted him once again, and, 
 
 * The number given by some writers 00,000, and even more— is ridi- 
 culous. The trained army of the Sikhs never, in their best day, reached 
 60,000.— Vide Cunningham's " History of the Sikhs." 
 
426 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 this time, in a manner which, they hoped, he could not resist. 
 Advancing their cavalry in some force to Barra Amra, they 
 formed line of battle in front of Khiiri, their right resting on 
 the strcng hill ground, a prolongation of their position of 
 Rasiil — their left refused, and the Khiiri pass and road in 
 their rear. It was a magnificent position, for if Gough had 
 attacked them, as they hoped he would, he must have exposed 
 his flank and rear. But again was Gough a very St. Anthony, 
 and refused to move. 
 
 But even a St. Anthony must sometimes sleep. That after- 
 noon, Sher Singh, baffled in his intentions, led back his army 
 to its original position. But during the night he withdrew his 
 left wing from Rasiil to Piiran, thus bringing it in close com- 
 munication with the right, which already occupied that line. 
 The following day he completed all his preparations for a 
 decisive move, and that night, whilst Gough was sleeping, suc- 
 ceeded in turning the English position, and in gaining a march 
 towards the Chinab. 
 
 When this movement was reported the next morning to the 
 veteran leader it did not reuse him to action. Notwithstand- 
 ing the march gained by the Sikhs, it was in the power of the 
 English general greatly to harass them, had that general only 
 so chosen. But the morning of the 14th February found 
 Gough undecided how to act. Councils were held and dis- 
 missed. Orders were first given to the army to march at 
 eleven o'clock, and then those orders were recalled. Finally 
 Gough contented himself with sending orders to Whish, who 
 had reached Ramanagar, to pushup a detachment to Vazfrabad 
 along the left bank of the Chinab, so as to prevent the crossing 
 of that river. Whish had anticipated these orders, and it was 
 the knowledge that such a detachment guarded the fords 
 which brought conviction to the minds of the Sikh leaders that 
 their turning movement was stamped by the motto ruinous in 
 war — -by the fatal " Too late." They marched, then, on the 
 town of Gujrat, and there took up a position. They did not 
 
 
( hilianwala and Gujrdt. 427 
 
 despair. Their great object, still, was to bring Gough to action 
 before he could be reinforced. They used every means to 
 accomplish this result, except the one which could not have 
 failed. With a faint-heartedness which, to us looking back, 
 seems unaccountable, they did not dare to attack him. They 
 had many opportunities. They knew, as soldiers, that, with 
 Whish marching to join him, Gough would not be mad enough 
 to remain in his position — that he would stretch cut a hand to 
 the friendly supports. To strike him before that hand had 
 been grasped was, then, their true policy, their only chance of 
 success. They had the opportunity, because now the positions 
 were reversed, and they occupied the point in the centre of the 
 circle. But they could not nerve themselves -to the enterprise. 
 It may well be conceived that the splendid valcur of the 
 British infantry at Chilianwala had at least produced that 
 result. 
 
 On the 15th Gough broke up from his position, and, without 
 hindrance from the enemy, marched to Lasiiri, a position which 
 secured, though it did not effect, a junction with Whish, and 
 was yet near enough (the distance was twenty miles) to the 
 Sikhs to prevent any attempt on their part to cross the Chinab. 
 On the 1 6th indecisive councils again prevailed, seme urging 
 upon Gough to march to Kiingah, within five miles of the Sikh 
 pesitien, ethers, more wise 1 }', to push on to Sadulapiir. The 
 advantages of the latter course were too obvious to be resisted, 
 for whilst the march to Kiingah would most certainly have 
 brought on a battle before Gough could be reinforced, that to 
 Sadulapiir was free from the risk of collision with the enemy, 
 and gave time for the reinforcements to come up. Gough 
 decided, then, upon the march to Sadulapiir. 
 
 The day of the 16th had been spent in council. On the 17th, 
 making a short march towards the enemy — his right en Goli, 
 and his left behind Isharah — Gough was joined by one brigade 
 of Whish's force. On the 1 8th he made another short march- 
 halting wth its left on Kiingah — five miles from the enemy. 
 
s 
 
 428 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Here, on the iQth, he halted, to be joined by the second brigade 
 of Whish's force, under Markham. On the 20th, joined by 
 the third, or Bombay brigade, under Dundas, he marched in 
 battle array to Shadiwala. This march brought him face to 
 face with the enemy. 
 
 The Sikh leaders had expected to receive the attack that 
 very day. To meet it they had posted their army in the 
 following manner : Their centre was formed behind the village 
 of Kalra; their left rested on the Katelah, a rivulet which flows 
 into the Chinab at a point above Vazirabad ; their right, 
 refused, was covered by the Dwarah, a dry, sandy-bedded 
 rivulet of some breadth, which, after passing to the west of 
 Gujrat, takes a bend eastward, before striking south to Haria- 
 wala and Shadiwala. In rear of the position was the town of 
 Gujrat. They maintained this order on the 21st. 
 
 Gough and his most trusted officers examined the position 
 thoroughly on the 20th. It was not a strong one. The 
 Dwarah, on which the Sikhs relied to protect their right, pre- 
 sented nowhere any real obstacle to men or guns. The Katelah, 
 a small stream easily crossed, was even less formidable. In 
 resting upon that it might be said with truth that the Sikh left 
 rested on the air, for it afforded no protection against attack. 
 Gcugh, then, decided to attack the Sikh left and centre and 
 drive them back on their right. To carry out this plan he 
 directed an advance of the heavy artillery, placed in his centre, 
 and of the right wing, composed of the divisions of Whish and 
 Gilbert, and supported by the greater part of the field artillery 
 When these should have doubled on the Sikh right, its left and 
 centre, the British left wing, composed of Campbell's and 
 Dundas's divisions, was to complete the work of destruction. 
 The cavalry would then render the defeat one from which 
 there should be no rallying. The Dwarah, up to the enemy's 
 position, was to be the regulator of the advance of the British 
 line. 
 
 Such was the general programme. It deserves, however, to 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 429 
 
 be added that the British being very superior to the enemy, 
 alike in the weight of metal and in the number of their guns, 
 ijt was decided that the infantry should not advance to close 
 quarters until the artillery had made itself felt. A strong 
 feeling prevailed that the British could not afford another 
 ("hilianwala.* 
 
 "The morning of the 21st February," writes Durand, in the 
 article so often quoted from, "was clear and bright; and, as the 
 enemy's masses had very early taken up their position, there 
 was no dust of moving columns to cloud the purity of the air 
 and sky. The snowy ranges of the Himalaya, forming a truly 
 magnificent background to Gujratand the village-dotted plain, 
 seemed on that beautiful morning to have drawn nearer to gaze 
 on the military spectacle. A looker-on might have thought the 
 army drawn out on some gala occasion ; for, the baggage being 
 packed in safety at Shadiwala, the force moved free of in- 
 cumbrance, and the whole had the appearance of a grand 
 review." 
 
 Exactly at half-past seven o'clock the British army, formed 
 up in the order I have mentioned,t marched to the pre-arranged 
 positions. When the centre had reached Hariwala, on the 
 Dwarah, the distance from the Sikh centre and left, and from 
 
 * A story was current immediately after the campaign, which, though 
 resting on no foundation, yet, from the conviction that it ought to be 
 true, found general acceptance. It was to the effect that Lord Gough's 
 staff, knowing his excitability under fire, and his passion for employing 
 infantry before the guns had done their work, induced the gallant 
 veteran to mount, by means of a ladder the only mode of access-j-to 
 the top story of an isolated building which commanded a complete view 
 of the battle-field. They then quietly removed the ladder, and only 
 replaced it when the artillery had done its work. Sc non e vero, e ben 
 trovato. 
 
 t To enter more into detail, i may state that the exact order was as 
 follows : — On the extreme left was Dundas's Bombay Column, covered 
 by Blood's troop of Horse Artillery, and supported by Thackwell, with 
 White's cavalry brigade, the Sindh Horse, and Duncan's and Huish's 
 troops of Horse Artillery. On its right was Campbell's division, covered 
 by Ludlow's and Robertson's light field batteries: in reserve, Hoggaifs 
 infantry brigade. 
 
 In the centre were the heavj- guns, eighteen in number, drawn by 
 
430 The Decisive Baltics of India. 
 
 the village of Kalra, which they held m force, was about two 
 thousand yards. Upon the British line halting in line with 
 this village the Sikh guns opened fire. The distance, however, 
 was too great to allow it to have effect, and, when the heavy 
 artillery of the British replied, it was found absolutely neces- 
 sary to move forward to closer quarters. The British advanced, 
 then, to a nearer but still too distant position. Just at that 
 moment the horse artillery of both wings, displaying that 
 splendid daring which gave the regiment of which it formed a 
 part the title to the proud motto of V biquc, galloped to the 
 front, and, careless of the prompt return fire from the enemy's 
 guns, made their presence felt on the enem)''s infantry. The 
 heavy guns meanwhile steadily advanced, supported by the 
 right, and, unlimbering within telling range, poured forth shot 
 and shell with rapidity and precision upon the Sikh batteries 
 and masses. So great was the effect, that the enemy, unable to 
 stand before it, yielded ground, and retired behind the line of 
 Kalra villages, which they still, however, held in force, and 
 which served as a protection to them. Gcugh, all this time, 
 had been anxiously waiting for the moment when he could use 
 his infantry. That moment seemed to him now to have 
 arrived, and, though it would have been far wiser, and, as it 
 turned out, would have saved much expenditure of blood,* 
 had he held them back for another quarter of an hour, he could 
 restrain himself no longer, but ordered Gilbert and Whish to 
 storm the villages in front of them. 
 
 elephants. Next to the heavy guns, on their immediate right, was 
 Gilbert's division; and on his right Whish's division, covered by For- 
 dyce's, Mackenzie's, and Anderson's troops of Horse Artillery, with 
 Dawes's- Dawes of Chilianwala renown — light field battery : Lane's and 
 Kinleside's troops of Horse Artillery being in a second line in reserve, 
 under Brind. The right flank was protected by Hearsey's and Lock- 
 wood's cavalry, and by Warner's troop of Horse Artillery. — Vide 
 Lawrence-Archer, p. 94. 
 
 * "Had Shakspear been permitted to expend a few minutes' atten- 
 tion and a few rounds upon Burra Kalra and its supporting batteries 
 the loss would have been less, or altogether avoided." — Calcut ta Review, 
 vol. xv, pp. 289, 290. Shakspear commanded the heavy guns. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 431 
 
 Gallant!} - did the two British divisions advance to carry out 
 their orders; but the resistance was determined, the bearing of 
 the Sikhs heroic. They met the advancing foe face to face, 
 and strove with undaunted courage to drive him back. Vain, 
 however, were their efforts. Step by step did the British 
 troops make good their footing, until at last they forced the 
 enemy, still fronting them, to fall back on his second line. 
 The gallant nature of the defence may be gathered from the 
 loss inflicted by the Sikhs on their assailants. In carrying the 
 village of Burra Kalra the 3rd Brigade 2nd Europeans, 31st 
 and 70th Native Infantry) lost upwards of 300 killed and 
 wounded; whilst in storming Chota Kalra, the 1st Brigade 
 (10th Foot, 8th and 52nd Native Infantry) lost in a few 
 minutes more than half that number. But in addition to the 
 loss of the infantry, that of the Horse Artillery, who supported 
 them, was extremely heavy. Anderson's troop suffered severely, 
 their leader himself falling, whilst Fordyce's troop was nearly 
 annihilated ! 
 
 Whilst affairs were thus progressing on the right Colin 
 Campbell and Dundas on the left were not the less rendering 
 splendid service. True to the programme they advanced very 
 gradually in alignment with the right wing, in columns at 
 deploying distance, taking no heed of the ineffective fire of 
 the Sikh artillery in their front. It happened that two villages 
 in their front, the villages of Lunpur and Jamna, which, if 
 defended, might have given them some trouble, had not been 
 occupied by the Sikhs. On passing these, Colin Campbell, 
 finding his men well within range, deployed, and, moving up 
 to within about 1,000 yards of the Sikh batteries, made his men 
 lie down, and pushed forward Ludlow's and Robertson's light 
 field batteries. These, commanded and worked by Majoj 
 Mowatt, trotted rapidly forward before the Sikh gunners could 
 get the range, unlimbered, and, at a distance of about 800 
 yards, opened a crushing fire on the battery opposed to them 
 and on the infantry supporting it. 
 
432 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 Under the fire of these guns, which steadily advanced, 
 Campbell gradually pushed forward his infantry, making the 
 men lie down whenever they halted. At last, the enemy's 
 artillery fire gradually slackening, two of the British guns 
 succeeded in taking up a position whence they could sweep the 
 head of the Dwarah. This position was fatal to the enemy. 
 In a few minutes the Dwarah was cleared of living Sikh in- 
 fantry, "and Campbell, with very trifling loss, by good man- 
 agement of the guns under his command, occupied the position, 
 from which he had forced his opponents to retire, without 
 firing a musket-shot."* 
 
 So concluded the first phase of the fight. The Britis)" 1 
 advance had been successful along the whole line. On tne 
 right two important positions had been gained; on the left, the 
 enemy had been forced back from the nala (rivulet) on which 
 they rested. It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that 
 the Khalsa troops, though maltreated and forced back, were 
 beaten. Driven though they had been from their first line, 
 their hearts were still strong, their courage still resolute, their 
 heads still clear; and, just at the moment when Gough was 
 congratulating himself that the difficulties of the day had 
 been overcome, the gallant Sikh infantry was preparing to 
 make another bid for victory. 
 
 In taking up the line of the Dwarah, the English left — the 
 divisions of Campbell and Dundas — had thrown itself on the 
 right of the Sikhs. This manoeuvre, extremely efficacious in 
 forcing the Sikh line to quit its first position, had yet been 
 attended by this inconvenience, that it had produced a large- 
 gap between the English left and its centre. The Sikh leaders, 
 unwillingly forced back, were not slow in detecting from their 
 new alignment this defect in the English formation, and they 
 prepared, with skill and courage, to take advantage of it. 
 They recognised it was their last chance, for already their line 
 
 * Durand, Calcutta Beview, vol. xv. p. 289. 
 
Ckilidntvdld and Gujrdt. 433 
 
 of retreat was menaced. Not only had the Afghan cavalry 
 succumbed to a gallant charge of the Sindh horse, but Thack- 
 wellwas pushing forward White's brigade in a manner danger- 
 ously threatening to their right and rear. If, however, at this 
 terrible crisis they could pierce the British centre, laid so in- 
 vitingly open, all might yet be well. Full of these desperate 
 hopes, the Sikh leaders, reforming their right division, sent 
 their men on this forlorn enterprise. It was indeed a bold 
 push for victory. For a moment it seemed as though it might 
 succeed; for when the English general, perceiving the danger, 
 dispatched in haste two troops of Horse Artillery to fill up 
 the gap, he discovered that their shot and shell had been ex- 
 pended, and that they must await a fresh supply from the rear. 
 The silence of these guns encouraged the Sikhs, and their 
 advance assumed for a moment quite a dangerous character. 
 That it would have proved so had the commander of the 
 British division nearest the gap been other than a man of great 
 readiness, of watchful coolness and of capacity, is quite certain. 
 But, from his post on the Dwarah, Colin Campbell suddenly 
 became aware of the danger. With a true military instinct, he 
 at once turned the fire of a portion of his artillery upon the 
 advancing mass. The Sikhs, realising on the instant that they 
 could not proceed without exposing their flank to an artillery 
 fire, and that Campbell would be able to throw himself upon 
 them as they pushed forward, unwillingly renounced the move- 
 ment, and, covered by their cavalry, fell back in good order. 
 It was time, indeed, that they should; for the English right 
 was rapidly advancing, and the Sikh left and centre were 
 retiring fast, in heavy columns, covered by cavalry, over the 
 open country, passing to the east of Gujrat. Their right — ■ 
 completely turned by Dundas and Campbell, cut off from their 
 natural line of retreat on the Jhelam by Thackwell, and driven 
 upon the centre — was forced then to retire by the line taken by 
 the other masses. "By one o'clock in the afternoon" — to use 
 the exact words of the warrior-statesman whose criticism on the 
 
 FF 
 
434 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 campaign is a masterpiece of fair and sound argument* — 
 11 Gough had overthrown the Sikh army, and had crowded it in 
 heavy masses upon a line of retreat which offered no hope of 
 support, provision, or escape for the disheartened soldier)-, if 
 properly followed up." 
 
 Followed up it was. Cavalry and Horse Artillery were 
 launched in pursuit of the enemy. During the remaining hours 
 of the day the beaten army was subjected to all the horrors 
 and all the inconveniences of constant and repeated assaults 
 It gave way under the pressure. Many Sikhs quitted the ranks 
 and rid themselves of their uniform. For miles the country 
 was strewed with guns, bullocks, waggons, tents and standards, 
 abandoned in hot haste. Darkness at length put a stop to the 
 pursuit. At a distance of some fourteen miles from the battle 
 field, Thackwell, who conducted it, halted his men, intending 
 to bivouac for the night and renew the pursuit in the morning 
 But Gough, unwilling, apparently, to commit so important a 
 business to his cavalry unsupported by infantry, recalled him 
 to camp. 
 
 The next morning two British columns were launched in 
 pursuit of the enemy. One, the smaller, under Colin Camp- 
 bell, proceeded to the Bimbir Pass to secure any guns which 
 might have taken that route ; t the other, the more import- 
 ant, led by Gilbert, proceeded by Dinghi to the Jhelam, and, 
 crossing that river, followed up the enemy with so much 
 vigour, that on the 14th March the entire Sikh army uncondi- 
 tionally surrendered. J 
 
 Thus ended the second Sikh war. The army, which had 
 
 * Sir H. Durand, Calcutta Review, vol. xv. pp. 290, 291. The readei 
 who may refer to this article will see the large extent to which 1 have 
 been indebted to its author. 
 
 + It returned a few days later, with no results. 
 
 J The English prisoners with the Sikh army. George St. Patrick Law 
 rence, Howie, and Herbert, were released by Chattar Singh on the 6th 
 March. Two days later, Slier Singh, at an interview with Gilbert, was 
 informed of the only terms which could be accorded to him, viz., uncon- 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrat. 435 
 
 considered itself betrayed at Firuzshahar and at Sobraon, had 
 never thoroughly submitted to the conqueror. In 1848-9 it 
 selected its own time of outbreak, it chose its own field, and 
 again it was beaten. This time, certainly, there was no sus- 
 picion of treachery. 
 
 And yet it is beyond question that the main cause of the 
 failure of the national rising was the inefficiency of the 
 national leaders. No troops could have fought better than the 
 Sikhs fought, no army could have been worse led than the 
 Sikh army was led. Sher Singh's leadership was a leadership 
 of lost opportunities. A great general— a general even of the 
 average run of intellectual men — -would have massed his whole 
 army against Thackwell at Sadiilapur and have crushed him. 
 Such a general would have attacked the British army in its 
 position on the morrow of Chilianwala : such a general would 
 not have waited at Rasiil till the British reinforcements from 
 Multan were within easy hail, but, turning Gough's position, 
 or fighting him if he had placed himself in his path, would 
 have re-crossed the Satlaj and fallen upon Whish's army 
 wherever he could have found it. All these things having 
 been neglected, such a general, emerging at the eleventh hour, 
 as Sher Singh emerged, from Rasiil, would have forced the 
 English general to fight, even at the risk of attacking him. 
 Gough had not been reinforced, and to fight him then would 
 have been better policy than to wait for him at Gujrat. 
 
 Turn we now to the English general. Gough, at the outset 
 of the campaign, committed as many faults as his opponent ; 
 but he redeemed them towards its close. Never was a cam- 
 paign ushered in by so much vacillation. "At the very out- 
 set," to use the language of an officer who served throughout 
 
 •ditional surrender. On the 14th Chattar Singh, Slier Singh, and the 
 principal Sikh leaders delivered their swords into the hands of the 
 British general. At the same time forty-one pieces of artillery were 
 surrendered, and the remnant of the Sikh army, reduced to a moiety 
 of that which had fought at Gujrat, laid down their arms in the presence 
 iof British troops. Vide also Lawrence-Archer, pp. 107, 108. 
 
436 The Decisive Battles of India. 
 
 it,* "orders and counter-orders succeeded each other so rapidly, 
 that a state of feverish excitement, prejudicial to the public 
 interests, was unnecessarily kept up ; and regiments showed 
 the effects of varying and harassing rumours in their hospital 
 returns." 
 
 It was, perhaps, in consequence of the vacillating air he 
 breathed that Gough, when he sent Thackwell across the 
 Chinab, committed the grave strategical fault of dividing his 
 army in the presence of an enemy superior to it when united. 
 li does not exculpate him that Sher Singh missed the offered 
 opportunity. Again, I have pointed out the serious tactical 
 error he committed on the 13th January, in abandoning, on 
 the spur of the moment, the matured plan to march on Rasiil. 
 Chilianwala was a severe lesson to him. It taught him caution 
 — for the moment, too great caution. On the morrow of the 
 battle he contracted his army within a position, m which, had 
 he been attacked, he would have fought at great disadvantage. 
 He gave up his touch on the surrounding country, thus yield- 
 ing to the enemy an advantage which, fortunately for Gough, 
 he did not adequately appreciate. But from this time his 
 errors ceased. His conduct in refusing the temptations laid 
 in his way by Sher Singh cannot be too much appreciated, for, 
 to his nature, such temptations must have been almost irresis- 
 tible. Not only did he resist them, but he resisted likewise 
 the pernicious advice of men of high position to manoeuvre 
 in a manner which must have precipitated a combat before 
 his army had been reinforced. At Gujrat, too, he adhered 
 steadily and wisely to a well-considered programme. In fact,. 
 Chilianwala had been a lesson from which he had known how 
 to profit. 
 
 Chilianwala was, indeed, a lesson to both armies, and on 
 both it produced different effects. Paradoxical as it may ap- 
 pear to pronounce in a manner so categorical regarding a battle,, 
 of which it may be said that, if the English won the field- 
 
 * Lawrence-Archer, p. 111. 
 
Chilidnwdld and Gujrdt. 437 
 
 the Sikhs carried off all the trophies of the fight, it is yet true 
 that, morally, Chilianwala decided the issue of the campaign 
 Whilst, as we have seen, it produced an excellent effect on the 
 English Commander-in-Chief, the Sikh leaders never recovered 
 from the impression produced upon them by the splendid 
 daring of the British infantry. It was that impression which 
 induced vacillation in the Sikh camp at Rasiil, which prevented 
 Sher Singh from attacking Gough before he had been rein- 
 forced, which hindered a bold strategic movement across tne 
 Chinab. Whatever, then, the faults of the English general, 
 Chilianwala was not fought in vain. Gujrat was to it what 
 Sobraon had been to Fi'ruzshahar. 
 
 One word as to the consequences of the national uprising. 
 The reader who has accompanied me so far will recollect that 
 by the agreement made with the Lahor Darbar, on the 16th 
 December, 1846, the British Government assumed, and dele- 
 gated to a special officer, " full authority to direct and control 
 all matters in every department" of the Sikh state, until such 
 time as the Maharajah Dhulip Singh should attain the age 
 of sixteen. This contract, whilst it made the British Govern- 
 ment responsible for order in the Pan jab, constituted it also 
 the guardian and protector of the young Maharajah. Against 
 the British protectorate, so constituted, the Sikh army rose, 
 the interpreters of the national feeling against foreign over- 
 lordship. The British army subdued that rising, and con- 
 quered the Panjab. The question then arose, For whom ^ The 
 answer of Sir Henry Lawrence was clear and precise. "We 
 have conquered the Panjab," he said, in so many words, " for 
 the young chief of whom we are the guardian." But other 
 answers were given, displaying the aggressive nature of the 
 Anglo-Saxon. These had the most weight with Lord Dal- 
 housie, and he decided that the Panjab had been conquered 
 for England. 
 
 The Panjab, consequently, was annexed. Against the an- 
 nexation I do not venture a single word. It must have come 
 
438 The Decisive Bailies of India. 
 
 sooner or later, and it was better to take it after a fair fight 
 than to steal it in the manner we adopted towards Awadh 
 (Oudh) some five years later. But for the guiltless boy, for 
 the young Maharajah, of whose interests we were the guardian, 
 for Dhulip Singh, surely some fitting provision should have 
 been made. Granted that we did well to take his kingdom, 
 by what right did we annex his private estates ? This is a 
 question in which the honour of the country is concerned. It 
 behoves it also to demand whether a pension for one uncertain 
 life is sufficient compensation for the loss of a great position 
 and 'the forfeiture of inalienable private property ! 
 
INDEX. 
 
 — +- 
 
 and 
 
 th 
 
 Abdji, commanding the last trained army of 
 Sindia. retreats towards the hilly coun- 
 try of the Mewat, 286; is attacked and de- 
 feated at Laswari, 28G-8. 
 
 Abbot, Captain, is sent by Sir H. Lawrence 
 to Hazurah. 378; confidence of, 392. 
 
 Adams, Major John, character of, 147; dis- 
 position of forces made by, for the war 
 against Mir Kasim, 147; reaches Katwa. 
 1 \7 ; defeats the enemy, after a hard- 
 fottght battle, near Katwa, 149; drives 
 the enemy from Motighil, and occu- 
 pies .Murshidabad, 150; beats the enemy 
 after a desperate battle at Gheriah, 
 151-4; marches towards U'ndwah Nada and 
 halts at Palkipiir', 150; makes no impres- 
 sion on the strong- position of the enemy. 
 156 ; receives information from a repen- 
 tant deserter, which decides him to at- 
 tack. 157: after a desperate contest, 
 storms the position and destroys Mfr 
 Kasim's army, 158-60; captures Munger, 
 Ragmahal and Patna, 161 ; great merits 
 of. 161-2; untimely death of, 162. 
 
 Afghan cavalry, a contingent of. joins the 
 Sikh army at Basul, 423; are overthrown 
 by the Si'ndh horse, 433. 
 
 Agnew, il. I'. A. Vans, is despatched by 
 Sir F. C'urrie to Multan to receive the 
 resignation of Mulraj, 384; proceed by 
 water and reach Multan. 385; receives 
 from Mulraj the keys of the place, when 
 he is assaulted by a Sikh soldier. 385; 
 calls upon .Mulraj to clear himself of com- 
 plicity in the assault, 386; despatches 
 message to Edwardes and Van Cortlandt, 
 386; is abandoned by his escort, 387; is 
 murdered by the Militants, 388. 
 
 Agra, Lake defeats the Marathas at, 
 captures the fortress, 284-5. 
 
 Ah mail Shah, Durani, battles of, witl 
 Sikhs. 341. 
 
 Aji. combat on the, 148. 
 
 .[lam. Shah, invades Bengal, 12G : takes re- 
 fuge with the ^Niiwab-Yazir of Awadh, 
 167 ; is virtually a state prisoner in his 
 camp, 196; is released from captivity in 
 Dihfi by General Lake, 284. 
 
 439 
 
 Alt Vardi Khan usurps the Government of 
 Bengal, 4] ; continued struggle of, with 
 the .Marathas ends in the yielding of 
 Katak, 41-2 ; is succeeded by Siraju'd 
 daulah. 42. 
 
 Ahgarh, combat before, and capture of, by 
 General Lake. 281-2. 
 
 Ait tea I. battle of, 367. 
 
 Allard, (lateral, enters the service of Ran- 
 jit Singh, 345. 
 
 Atyd, desperate, fight near, 224. 
 
 Amherst, Lttril , disgraces Ochterlony for 
 his action regarding Bharatpiir, 322 ; is 
 forced, in consequence, to order the siege 
 of that fortress, 323. 
 
 Amir Khdit, allies himself with Jeswant Rao 
 Holkar to harass the English before 
 Bharatpiir, 313; is defeated by Colonel 
 Need, and renounces Holkar' a alliance, 
 318. 
 
 Amyatt, Mr., one of the violent members of 
 Council opposed to .Mir Kasim, is detained 
 by the latter at .M linger, 14l»: 
 
 Anandrdz Gajapati, Rajah of Viziyanagaram, 
 disaffection of. towards the French, 76;' 
 rises in revolt and sends a messenger to 
 Calcutta for aid, 77; receives Forde, and 
 accompanies him on his march against 
 the French. 80; terror of, during the pro- 
 gress of the battle, 86; again accompanies 
 the English in their march against the 
 French. 92; pusillanimous conduct of, 97; 
 takes part in the attack on Machhli- 
 patanani, 99. 
 
 Avderton, Lieutenant IT. .4., accompanies 
 Mr. Vans Agnew to Multan, 384; reaches 
 that place, 885 ; is set upon, after receiv- 
 ing the keys of the fortress, cut down, 
 left for dead, and then carried into the 
 l'dgah. 386; is murdered, 388. 
 
 AiK/atl succeeds Nanak. as chief of the Sikh 
 sect, 336. 
 
 Argaum, battle of. 276-7. 
 
 Argtin, fixes the Sikh religion on a secure 
 
 foundation,' 336. 
 Armies, location of the several British, at 
 the time of the outbreak of the first 
 Ma nit ha war. 2<>3-4. 
 Artillery, splendid service of the, at Gujrat, 
 43(1. 
 
440 
 
 index. 
 
 Assad' ullah Klidn, Mir, quasi commander of 
 Mir Kasim's army at Siiti, moves into the 
 plains at Gheriah. and gives battle to the 
 English, 151 ; gallantrv and early success 
 of, 152-3. 
 
 Assay e, battle of. 270-4; comments npon, 
 274-5 : casualties at, 275. 
 
 Atah, fort of. is surrendered to the Sikhs, 
 410. 
 
 Aurangzih, persecutes the Sikhs, 337-9. 
 
 Avatabile, General, enters the service of 
 Banjit Sineh, 345. 
 
 Awadh (Oudh), early came under Muham- 
 madan influence, 163; at length falls under 
 the independent rule of Shuja'u'd daulah, 
 164 ; vide Shuja'u'd daulah. 
 
 P.. 
 
 Badiwdl, combat of, 366-7. 
 
 Badrn'din Khan, one of Mir Kasim's gen- 
 erals, gallantry of. at Gheriah, 152. 
 
 Baglur, important military events at, and 
 near. 223-5. 
 
 Baillic. Colonel, is stationed at Guntur. on 
 the outbreak of the last war with Haidar 
 Ali, 233 ; is ordered by Sir H. Munro to 
 effect a junction with him at Kanchi- 
 pnram, 234 ; the careless dispositions of, 
 detain him for ten days on the Gumadi- 
 pundi. 239 ; is attacked by Tipu at Parm- 
 bakam, and repulses him, 240 ; applies to 
 Munro for reinforcements, 241 ; is com- 
 pletely beaten and forced to surrender by 
 Haidar and Tipu, 242-5. 
 
 Bdji Rao Pe*hwd, character of. 259; hood- 
 winks Daolat Rac Sindia, 261 ; is forced 
 by "Holkar to flee from his capital, 260; 
 implores, in vain, the aid of Sindia, 260 ; 
 throws himself into the arms of the Eng- 
 lish, and si^ns the treaty of Bassein, 260. 
 
 Balcsar, battle of, 198-205; consequences of, 
 205-7. 
 
 Banda. succeeds Govind as chief Guru of 
 the Sikhs. 339 ; is crushed by the Mughuls, 
 340. 
 
 Bangalor, military occurrences on the 
 plateau of. 218-24. 
 
 Bdpuji Sindia, accompanies Monson's force, 
 298 ; advises him to retreat from Holkar. 
 301 ; deserts to Holkar, 301-2 ; acts against 
 Monson. 302 ; commands the force which 
 makes the raid on Dihli, 3C8. 
 
 Bassein, treaty of, cause and enormous con- 
 sequences of the, 260-1. 
 
 Bengal. Rise of the English in, 35-40 ; pros- 
 perity of, affected by the invasion of 
 Nadir Shah. 41 ; falls under the rule of 
 Ali Vardi Khan, 41 ; then of Siraju'd 
 daulah, 42: settlements of the English in. 
 uprooted bv Siraju'd daulah, 43-4. 
 
 Bharatpiir. Ranjit Singh, Rajah of, Holkar 
 boasts that he has obtained the alliance 
 of. 297 ; allows Holkar free use of his 
 fortress of Dig, 311 ; repulses the British 
 from Bharatpiir, 315-22: submits to the 
 British, H22 ; Ditrjdn Sal, usurper of, 322 ; 
 makes alliances against the British. 322 ; 
 is besietred by Lord Combermere. 323; 
 sends out the women laden with jewels. 
 325: endeavours to escape, 333; but is cap- 
 tured. 333. 
 
 Bharatpiir, fortress of. description of the, 
 313-4: legend of. 314; first siege of, 315-21; 
 losses sustained at the first siege of, 321 : 
 loss of prestige caused by the failure of 
 
 Bharatpur - cont. 
 the siege of, to the British. 322; second 
 Biege of, 323-33: storming and capture of, 
 327-33 ; moral effect of the capture of, 324. 
 
 Bidna, struggle of Monson through the pass 
 of. 305. 
 
 Biderra, battle of, 121-2. 
 
 Boughton, Mr. Gabriel, cures the daughter 
 of Shah Jahiin. and obtains, as a reward, 
 a firman establishing the British in Ben- 
 gal, 36. 
 
 Bourquin, Louis, commanding one of Sin- 
 din 's armies, is defeated bv General Lake, 
 near Dihli, 283-4. 
 
 Bowie, Lieutenant, is sent with George Law- 
 rence to Peshawar, 378 ; prisoner to Chat- 
 tar Singh is released, 434-5. note. 
 
 Bowring, Lenin, is selected by Sir H. Law- 
 rence as an assistant, 378. 
 
 Braithuaite, Colonel, is ordered, on the out- 
 break of the last war with Haidar Ali, to 
 move by Chengalpatt on Madras, 234 ; de- 
 taches Lieutenant Flint to defend Wandi- 
 wash, 235 ; surrenders to Tipu, 254. 
 
 British Government, the, assumes a protec- 
 torate over the Panjab, and makes the 
 Maharajah Dhulip Singh, its ward. 375-6. 
 
 British power in India, causes tending to 
 the rise of the, 1-7 ; in Bengal, 35-41. 
 
 Brooke, Captain, saves the English army 
 from destruction at Malwagal, 221 ; is sent 
 to negotiate with Haidar Ali, but fails, 
 227-8. 
 
 Bundelkhand, Rajah of, strikes for inde- 
 pendence, 166-7 ; invades the territories of 
 the Emperor and the Niiwab-Vazir, 167 ; is 
 defeated by Mir Kasim, 168-9. 
 
 Burn, Colonel William, commands at Dihli 
 during its siege by Holkar's troops, 308 ; 
 is sent to the Duab, and pursued and be- 
 sieged bv Holkar till relieved by Lord 
 Lake, 308-9. 
 
 Bus*!/. Marquis de, influence exercised by, 
 at the court of the Siibahdar, 72 ; policy 
 of. in the Northern Sirkars, 74 ; is re- 
 called by Lally to Arkat, 75 : leaves with 
 pain and grief, making over the Sirkars 
 to the Marquis de Conflans, 75-6. 
 
 C. 
 
 Ca'dlaud, Major, repulses the invasion of the 
 Shahzadah, 126 ; is summoned to Calcutta 
 to consider the policy to be adopted in 
 the crisis caused by the death of Miran. 
 127 ; votes against the treaty with Mir 
 Kasim. but a bribe from the latter is, 
 nevertheless, placed to his credit. 130. note. 
 
 Calcutta, becomes the head settlement of 
 the English in Bengal, 40 ; which effects 
 a fusion with the settlement at Huglf, 42; 
 great prosperity of, under the privileges 
 granted by the Emperor Farrakhsivar. 
 42; Siriju'd daulah expels the English 
 from, 43; retaken bv Clive. 46; messenger 
 from the Northern Sirkars reaches. 77. 
 
 Cullender, Captain, unexplained absence of, 
 in the assault on Machhlipatanam, 99; is 
 killed, 102. 
 
 Calvert, Contain, baffles Haidar Ali before 
 Ambiir. 216. 
 
 Campbell, Brigadier Colin, is despatched 
 with a brigade of infantry to Gujran- 
 wala, 395; commands the infantry of the 
 force sent under Thackwell to effect the 
 passage of the Chinab, 401 ; advice of, to 
 
Index. 
 
 44 
 
 Camphtll, Brigadier Colin— cont. 
 
 Thaokwell, 4(;2 ; saves the combat of 
 Sadulapur by making the infantry lie 
 down, 4<t7 . crnllanl oonduot of, and of his 
 division, hi Chilianwala. 416-20 J manoeuvres 
 verj skilfully at Gnjrat and rolls up the 
 right of the Sikhs. 431-2; foils n dangerous 
 attempt made by the Sikhs to pierce tin- 
 British centre, 432-3. 
 
 Carmichael, Captain, splendid daring- of, at 
 the second Biege of Bharatpur, 327. 
 
 Carnae, Major, engaged at the battle of 
 
 Gheriah. 152; at C'ndwah Nala. 158; as- 
 sumes command of the army, 180; charac- 
 ter of, 180; "ant of enterprise of, 180; 
 marches to Baksar, i v 2; Fabian policy of. 
 
 distasteful to the Calcutta Council. 182-3; 
 falls back on Danapiir. 1*4 ; is marly taken 
 prisoner. 184; leaves Hay unsupported, 
 1*4-5; falls lack on Patini. 185; repulses 
 the army of the Niiwdb-Vazfr, 186-90; 
 fails to follow up the victory. 1!»1 ; is re- 
 moved from the Company's service. 191. 
 
 Carstairs, Colonel, is driven from Patna. 
 and from Bankiptir. and defeated and 
 slain, by Mir Kasim's army. 141-2. 
 
 Champion, Major, efficient conduct of. at 
 Kalvarghat 105: is led into an ambus- 
 cade near A'rah and suffers loss, 195; 
 rights at Raksar. 199-205. 
 
 Chanda Eaur, Row*, widow of Kharak Singh 
 intrigues for supreme power in the Pan- 
 jab. 340 : is imprisoned and beaten to 
 death with slippers by her own slave-girls, 
 34!). 
 
 Chandranagar, captured by the English. 37. 
 
 Chang&mah, the English defeat Haidar Ali 
 at, 215. 
 
 Chamock, Mr. Job. abandons Bengal, re- 
 turns, and fixes the English colony at 
 Chatanati. 37. 
 
 Chatanati, English settlement at. founded, 
 37 ; is fortified and repulses an attack, 
 37-8 : is joined to Calcutta, 38. 
 
 Chattar Singh, assures Sir P. Currie that 
 nothing is to be apprehended in the Haza- 
 rah. 302 : places himself at the head of the 
 national party, 394: takes Atak, and pro- 
 ceeds to join his son Sher Singh, 410; 
 joins him at Pastil, 424-5. 
 
 Chelambram, English forces repulsed at, 240; 
 
 battle of. 250-3 (vide also Porto Novo). 
 Chicdcole, vide Shirikdkolam,. 
 
 Chilianwala, Battle of, begins, 414; the 
 right brigade, Campbell's division at. 
 415-6': the left brigade. Campbell's divi- 
 sion at. 415-7; Gilbert's division at. 417-8; 
 Dawes's battery at. 418 and note; the 
 cavalry on the right at. 418; state of the 
 battle" of. after the charge of the Giir- 
 ehuras. 419; cavalrv on the left at, 
 Unett's charge, 410-20: the battle of, is 
 gained, 420 : but its material results arc 
 lost by the prompt retirement of the 
 British force, 421 and note, 424: is a les- 
 son alike to the Sikh and to the British 
 commanders. 430-7; moral effect of. 430. 
 Christopher, Captain. Indian Xavv. distin- 
 guished gallantry of. 304. 
 Cine. Robert, disturbs by his action at 
 Arkat the anticipated triumph of the 
 French. 22-3: is forced by the sudden ris- 
 ing of Piz.-i Sahib and the French in north 
 Arl<at. to renounce his plans on Triehina- 
 palli, and proceed against the above-men- 
 tioned enemies. 23; after various forced 
 marches discovers that the enemy are 
 
 CUte, Ixnliert—uont. 
 
 marching- on Arkat, 24; follows them and 
 is led into a trap at Knveripak, 25-7: 
 Banger of the position of, 26-7; is so hard 
 
 pressed that he is counselled to retreat. 
 
 27 S . ti-ies one available alternative, 29-30; 
 which Buoceeds, and the battle is won, 
 30-1 ; conduct of, before and daring the 
 battle, vindicated. 32-3; is dispatched 
 
 from Madras to recover Bengal. 45-6; re- 
 takes Calcutta and captures Eugli, 46 ; 
 terrifies the Niiwiib before Calcutta, and 
 forces him to retire, 47-9; meditates an at- 
 tack on Chandranagar, and captures it. 
 17; attitude of, vis-a-vis to SiraVjud'd dau- 
 lah, 511; crisis between, and the Niiwab 
 precipitated, 50; gains over Mir J'afar 
 and other generals, 511-1 ; marches against 
 the Niiwab, 52; reaches Patti and sends 
 Eyre Coote to capture K at w a, 52; receives 
 from Mir J'afar most uncertain sounds, 
 52; holds a council of war, which decides 
 by a majority, of which he was the leader. 
 not to fight, r,l-:>; left alone, resolves to 
 fight, 55-6; crosses the Bhagirathi and 
 marches to Plassey. 57; bivouaeks in a 
 mango move beyond that place. 57 ; dis- 
 poses his army for battle, 60; is forced to 
 withdraw his army within the grove, 61; 
 resolves to hold on till nightfall and then 
 try a surprise, 61; is roused from a sleep 
 by a retreating movement on the part of 
 the enemy, 64; takes the initiative, 64; 
 and defeats the disorganised masses of 
 tin- enemy. 66; and gains the battle, 66-7; 
 the manner in which the surroundings of 
 the battle have detracted from the fame 
 of. 68-9 ; resolves, against the advice of 
 his council, to aidthe native revolt against 
 the French in the Northern Sirkars, 77-8 : 
 dispatches Forde thither with an armed 
 force. 78 ; forces a Dutch vessel to leave 
 the Hugh', 110; sees through Mir J'afar. 
 110: resolves to thwart the Dutch projects 
 at all hazards, 111; takes every precau- 
 tion against their invasion, 114 ; commits 
 The command of the land forces to Forde 
 and Knox, 114-5: refuses the demands of 
 the Dutch. 116; directs Forde and Knox to 
 march against the Dutch, 117; authorizes 
 Commodore Wilson to attack the Dutch 
 ships. 117-8; laconic reply of. to Forde's 
 application for orders, 120; is succeeded 
 in Bengal by Vansittart. 127 : warning- 
 given by, to Vansittart, 133; profits by 
 the victorious campaign against the Nti- 
 wab-Yazir of Awadh. 206-7. 
 Clone, Sir Barn/, neg-otiates and sig-ns the 
 
 Treaty of Bassein. 260-1. 
 Cocks, Mr., is selected by Sir H. Lawrence 
 
 as an assistant. 378. 
 Combermere, Lord, assumes command of 
 the army for the second sieg-e of Bharat- 
 piir. 323': strength of the force of. 325-6: 
 invests the place, 324; allows the women 
 To be senT out thence. 325; advances his 
 parallels, 326-8; and storms it, 330-3; ful- 
 fils the native prophecy. 333. 
 Confians, Marquis <le, assumes charge of the 
 Northern Sirkars, 76; incapacity dis- 
 plaved by, in the presence of the rising 
 at Vishakpatanam, 70 ; marches slowly to 
 Pajahmahendri, and thence to a position 
 within sight of IVddapiir, 80: manoeuvres 
 To attack Forde. 81 ; achieves a partial 
 success, which is fatal to him. 82: attacks 
 Forde at Kondiir, 83; when enjoying the 
 
442 
 
 Index. 
 
 Covjltinn, Marqvia <le — cont. 
 
 conviction of the success, is suddenly as- 
 sailed in fin nk and routed. N4-5 , flees from 
 the field to .Maehhlijmtanairi. 9(1 : resources 
 at the disposal of, 1)1 ; sends :.n army of 
 observation under du Etooher into * the 
 field. 1)1 ; retires within the defences of 
 IfachhUpatanam, 93 ; attacked by Forde, 
 loses his head, 103; and surrenders. 1114. 
 
 Coote, Eyre, captures Katwa, 53 ; arguments 
 of, in favour of fighting, at the council of 
 war before Plassey, 54-5: is dispatched. 
 after Baillie's defeat, to astume chief 
 oommand in .Madras, 247: marches to- 
 wards I'ondicherry, 248; is drawn by 
 Eaidar into a trap. 248; from which he is 
 extricated solely by the stupidity, or 
 worse, of the Chevalier d'Orvcs. 24!t ; at- 
 tempts the pagoda of Chelambram, but is 
 repulsed with loss, 249 ; calls a council of 
 war. and resolves to attack Haidar, 2.50; 
 reconnoitres his position and plans the at- 
 tack. 231; gains the battle. 262-8: takes 
 some places in the face of Haidar. and 
 beats him at Parmbakam, 254. 
 
 Cosby, Colonel, is ordered, on the outbreak 
 of the last war with Haidar Ali, to act on 
 The enemy's communications, 235 ; joins 
 the retreating armv of Munro at Chengal- 
 patt. 246. 
 
 Council, The Calcutta, mean and disreputa- 
 ble conduct of, towards Mir Kanim, 128-3!) ; 
 endanger the safety of the British posses- 
 sions by deliberately breaking a promise 
 made to the troops in the hour of their 
 need. 172; disapprove of the Fabian 
 policy of Carnac, 182. 
 
 Court, General, enters the service of Ranjit 
 Singh. 345. 
 
 Cure-ton, General, occupies Gujranwala. and 
 joins Colin Campbell there, 3!J5 : gallant 
 death of. 399. 
 
 Currie, Sir Frederic, is appointed to succeed 
 Sir H. Lawrence in the control of the 
 Lahor Regency, 380; character of, 380; 
 tries in vain to persuade Mulnij to with- 
 draw his resignation, 383; dispatches 
 Messrs. Agnew and Anderson to Multan. 
 384 ; accompanied by a new Governor and 
 some Sikh troops, 38.5 ; receives news of 
 the murder of Agnew and Anderson, 389; 
 vacillation of, and strange infatuation of, 
 with respect to the Patans, 'AM ; recom- 
 mends the undertaking of immediate 
 operations, but is vetoed by the comman- 
 der-in-chief, 390 ; Edwarde's's victory at 
 Sadasam. decides to order a 'brigade to 
 -Multan. 392: dispatches a Sikh force to 
 Tolomba, 393. 
 
 Dullionsie. the Marquis of, Governor- 
 General of India, concurs with Lord 
 Gough that it would be impolitic to march 
 against Multan during the hut season. 
 390; declares that if the Sikhs want war 
 they shall have it with a vengeance, 395 ; 
 authorises Lord Gough to attack the 
 Sikhs. 410: after the war, has two courses 
 open to him, 440 ; annexes the Pan jab, 
 44(1. 
 
 Daolat Rao Sindia, succeeds Madhaji. char- 
 acter of. 258; is manipulated by Baji Rao 
 Peshwa, 259; defeats Holkar at Indiir, but 
 
 Daolat Rdo Sindia cont. 
 
 • lues not follow up his victory. 259; re- 
 fuses, a iter the defeat of his army near 
 Puna, in march to the aid of the Peshwa, 
 260; by his shortsightedness drives the 
 Peshwa into the hands of the English, 
 and causes the dissolution of the Maratha 
 confederacy, 260 ; awakes to a sense of his 
 folly, 262 : refuses to be a party to the 
 treaty of Bassein, and tries to form a con- 
 federacy against the English, 2(il ; obtains 
 only the support of Raghuji BhonshS, but 
 nevertheless prepares for the struggle, 
 262 ; strength of the army of. 264 ; waver- 
 ing nature of. 264: begins the war and. 
 stealing a march on the English, makes 
 for Haidarabad, 268 ; baffled in this, con- 
 centrates his forces, and takes up a posi- 
 tion between Bokardan and Assaye, 269; 
 prepares to give battle at Assaye, 271 ; 
 position of the army of, 271 ; is attacked, 
 272 ; observing a hesitation in the Eng- 
 lish advance, orders a charge of cavalrv, 
 272; is anticipated by Wellesley. 272; 
 quits the field as soon as his cavalry is 
 defeated. 274 ; is attacked by Wellesley at 
 Argaum. 277; is completely defeated. 278: 
 confides Ah'garh to the charge of Monsieur 
 Perron. 281 ; the trained armies of, are de- 
 feated at Aligarh. 282: before Dihli. which 
 falls in consequence. 284 ; at Laswari, 
 285-7; agrees to the treaty of Sarji Arjen- 
 gaon. 291. 
 
 Delamain. Colonel, distinguishes himself at 
 the final assault on Bharatpiir, 331. 
 
 Delamarr, Sergeant, driven by neglect into 
 rebellion. 176-7. 
 
 Deo Raj, Datuai, usurps the regal power in 
 Maisiir. 210: transfers it to his brother 
 Nanjiraj. 211. 
 
 D'Espremenil, /Jural, is governor of Madras 
 for the French, 9 : some account of, 9 and 
 note; repulses the Mughuls from before 
 Madras. 10; and forces them to raise the 
 siege, 10-1. 
 
 Dhulip Singh, Maharajah, son of Mahara- 
 jah Uanjit Singh, birth of, 349; becomes 
 ruler of the Pan jab at the age of five 
 years. 350 ; accompanies his uncle, Jowahir 
 Singh, on the summons given to the latter 
 by the Sikh army. 352 ; is made to dis- 
 mount from the elephant whilst the 
 soldiers si.oot his uncle, 352; is taken 
 under the protection, and made the ward 
 of the British Government, 376 ; which be- 
 trays its trust in 1849. 439-40. 
 
 Dick, General, commands the left attack of 
 the British at Sobraon, 369-70; the attack 
 of, "the finest of the campaign." at first 
 repulsed. 370-1 : but, thanks to the success 
 of the attacks on the right and centre, 
 ultimately succeeds. 371-2. 
 
 /J/7/, Battle of. 309-11 : fortress of. is captured 
 by Lord Lake. 312-3. 
 
 Dihli, battle gained near, by General Lake. 
 gains for the English entrance into. 283-4: 
 state of the fortifications of, when threat- 
 ened by Holkar, 308: seven days' abortive 
 siege of. 308; Lord Lake arrives at, 3C9. 
 
 Disraeli, Mr., successful application of one 
 of the aphorisms of, 157. 
 
 Don. Colonel, is detached to storm Tonk 
 Itampiira. 299; storms it and joins Mon- 
 son. 299; conduct during the retreat. 301-6; 
 commands the third assault at the siege of 
 Bharatpiir. 317-8. 
 
Index. 
 
 44;> 
 
 Duff, Major (iriinf. praise acooided by, to 
 the French administration of the Northern 
 Birkars, 74. 
 
 ])iiin/(is. General, joins Lord Sough's army 
 after the capture of Multrin. 428; com- 
 mands the extreme left division &1 Qujrat, 
 429 and note; combines with Colin Camp- 
 bell to turn the Sikh right, 432-5. 
 
 Dupleix, resolves to expel the English from 
 
 .Madras. 6-7 ; captures .Madras and orders 
 his lieutenant to retain it at all hazards. 
 8; sends Paradis with a force to Madras. 
 
 II; splendid prospects opened to. by vic- 
 tory of Paradis. 15-6; splendid results 
 achieved by. 18-9 ; disturbed by (live's 
 action at Arkat, organises a scheme to re- 
 cover the lost prestige, 20; is foiled by 
 The result of Kaveripak. 31-3. 
 
 Dupre", Mr., negotiates with Haidar Ali. 
 389-30. 
 
 Da Rocker, is sent at the head of an armv 
 into the field. 91-3. 
 
 Durand, Sir Henry, article of. in Calcutta 
 Review, page 383, note and man)/ subse- 
 quent notes; opinion of, regarding- the 
 state of affairs in the Punjab in the early 
 part of 1848, 384, note: advice given bv. to 
 Lord Gough, -411: of the battle of Chilian- 
 wala, £22-3 and note: of Gujrat, 433. 
 
 Dutch, The. establish their Indian head- 
 quarters at Chinsurah, 108; jealous of the 
 English progress under Olive, intrigue 
 with Mir J' afar, 109-10 ; bring a ship into 
 the Hugh, but are forced to send it away. 
 112 ; bring seven ships, full of troops, into 
 the same river, 112-3 : demand reparation 
 of the English, 115 ; capture English 
 ships and push up towards Calcutta, 116: 
 their ships are attacked and destroyed by 
 an inferior force of English ships, 116-7 ; 
 the land forces of. are completely de- 
 feated by Forde at Chandranagar, 119-21 : 
 and at Bidcrra. 123; waive all their claims 
 and admit the predominance of the Eng- 
 lish. 123; adventurers with the British 
 armv. 171. 
 
 E. 
 
 Edwardes, Herbert, is dispatched by Sir H. 
 Lawrence to Ban mi. 377 ; his policy there. 
 378 and note; action of, on receiving the 
 news of the murder of Tans Agnew and 
 Anderson. 388; prepares to march against 
 Mulraj, 390; totally defeats his armv at 
 Kinairi, 391 ; and at Sadusam. 391 ; block- 
 ades Multan. 392; might have finished the 
 war had he been then and there sup- 
 ported, 391-2. 
 
 Ellenborough, Earl of. expresses a desire 
 for a friendly interview with Ilajah Slier 
 Singh, 349; prescient policy of. with re- 
 spect to protection against a Sikh inva- 
 sion, 353-4. 
 
 EUis, Mr., agent to Patna and member of 
 Council, character of. 139; makes prepar- 
 ation to seize the Niiwnb's city of Patna. 
 139; surprises that city. 140; is driven 
 from it by Mir Kasim's troops and forced 
 to retreat towards Awadh, 141 ; is taken 
 prisoner to Patna. 142. 
 
 Ellor. vide E'hir. 
 
 E'hir, early description of. 73; captured by 
 the English. 92. 
 
 English, The. first settlement of, in Bengal. 
 35-40 ; prosperity of. 40 ; prosperity of, not 
 
 English, The eont. 
 affected by tfaratha* invasions, 12; settle- 
 ments of, uprooted by Siraju'd daulah, 14; 
 conquer the Northern Birkars, 7.~>-lu3: lo68 
 of, at the storming of Machhlfpatanam, 
 105; ships attack and destroy a superior 
 force ,,t Dutch ships in the Hugli, 117-9; 
 base, mean and disreputable policy pur- 
 sued l».\. in Bengal, 133; system of tyranny 
 carried on by, against Mir Kasiin and his 
 subjects, 136-7; drive Mir Kasim to war. 
 137; declare the deposition of Mir Kasim 
 and the restoration of Mir J 'afar, 144; 
 chances of. and of Mir Kasim. 145-6; 
 causes which seem to militate against the 
 success of. against the N li wah-Vazir of 
 Awadh, 17(1-2; mixed composition of the 
 army. 171-2; value of the stakes played 
 for. and won by. at Baksar. 205-6; policj 
 of, in southern India, differs from that 
 adopted in Bengal. 214-5; arc duped into a 
 war against Haidar Ali, 215; virtually re- 
 fuse Haidar Ali's peace proposals, 220; 
 are harassed by their engagements with 
 Muhammad Ah, 222; again reject the 
 offers of Haidar Ali, 228; who, at length, 
 forces his own terms upon them, 229-30 ; 
 fail to keep their engagements with Hai- 
 dar Ali. 230; capture Pondieherry and 
 
 threaten Mahe. 230-1 ; provoke a war with 
 Haidar, 231-2; are ill-prepared for the con- 
 flict, 233. 
 
 Erode, vide Yirod. 
 
 Everard, Major, splendid conduct of. at the 
 storming of Bharatpiir. 330-1. 
 
 Farakhdbdd, Holkar is surprised bv Lord 
 bake at. 311-2. 
 
 Fazal Ullah Khan, one of Haidar Ali's 
 generals, debouches into the plains by 
 Koimbatiir. and clears the country as far 
 as Trichinapalli, 225-6. 
 
 Firuzshahar, position taken by the Sikhs at. 
 359: battle of, 359-65; comments on. 365 
 and note; impression made by the battle 
 of. on the sipahis, 365 ; on the cis-Satlaj 
 feudatories. 366. 
 
 Fischer, Captain, gains the trench in the 
 storming of Machhlfpatanam, 99; pushes 
 along- flic rampart to the right. 102. 
 
 Fitzgerald, Major, saves Colonel Wood's 
 armv when the latter is on the point of 
 succumbing to Haidar Ali. 225; is baffled 
 by Haidar. 22(1. 
 
 Fletcher, Colonel, is detached to reinforce 
 Baillie, 211 ; baffles Haidar by his intelli- 
 gence. 241-2. 
 
 Flint, Lieutenant, is dispatched to assume 
 command at Wandiwash, 235; daring con- 
 duct of. 236 ; splendid defence and its 
 striking consequences, 237; reward meted 
 out to. 237. note. 
 
 Futile. Lieut .-Colonel. is dispatched by 
 ('live with an armed force to the Northern 
 Birkars, antecedents of. 78; arrives at 
 Yishakpatanam. and arranges with the re- 
 volted Rajah, 80: marches towards Kajah- 
 mahendri and occupies a position four 
 miles from that of the enemy. 81: man- 
 oeuvres to attack him. 82; occupies the 
 village of Kondiir. 82; is attacked by Con- 
 flans. 83; the cool and brilliant conduct of, 
 gains one victory. 83-6 : and then another. 
 84; great credit due to, 85; dispatches 
 
444 
 
 Index. 
 
 Ford*, Lieut. -Colonel -oont. 
 
 Knox To pursue the enemy. 87; resolves to 
 push his victory to the utmost, 88; crosses 
 the Godavari and captures E'liir, 90; 
 marches against Konkal, "2: storms it and 
 pushes on to Macbhlipatanam, U2-3 ; which 
 he invests, 93 ; enormous difficulties of the 
 position of, 93-5; aggravated by the con- 
 duct of his native ally, 95; is apparently 
 lost, 96; noble character of, 97-8: resolves 
 to storm the place, 98; dispatches Knox 
 to make a demonstration, 98; and orders 
 Anandraz to do the same. 98; whilst he 
 luirls Fork, Maclean and Fischer against 
 the one assailable point, 100; forces the 
 enemy to surrender at discretion, 104; 
 great merits of, 104-5 : important results 
 of the action of. 105; treatment meted out 
 by the Court of Directors to. 106-7; takes 
 part in the operations in Bengal against 
 the Dutch, 115; marches on Chandranagar, 
 and defeats the Dutch there. 120; applies 
 to ('live for orders and receives a laconic 
 reply. 120; marches on Biderra, encoun- 
 ters and completely defeats the Dutch 
 there, 120-2; tribute to, 124. 
 
 Fraser, General, is left at Dihli when Lord 
 Lake starts for the Dual), 309; attacks the 
 enemy before Dig, 310; is mortally 
 wounded. 310. 
 
 French, The. break the understanding ex- 
 isting on the Koromandal coast by avail- 
 ing themselves of their superiority to at- 
 tack the English. 0-7 ; refuse to restore 
 Madras either to the English or to the 
 native ruler of the Karnatak, 8 ; prepare 
 to resist the latter by force of arms, 9 : 
 defeat the cavalry of Maphuz Khan, and 
 force the Mughuls to raise the siege, 
 10-11: defeat the Mughuls at St. Thome. 
 13-4: magnificent prospects opened out to, 
 by the victory. 15; brilliant actual re- 
 sults of. for. 1(3-7; misfortune of, in not 
 possessing a commander. 19 ; are disturbed 
 by dive's action at Arkat. 20: attempt a 
 counter scheme, 20-1 ; plunder the environs 
 of Madras. 21 ; disturbed by the arrival 
 of ('live, manoeuvre skilfully to -deceive 
 him. 23; lead Clive into a trap at Kaveri- 
 pak, 24: almost win the battle, hut, for 
 want of ordinary care, lose it, 26-31: posi- 
 tion of. in the Northern Sirkars, 72-8; are 
 beaten at Komliir and forced to evacuate 
 Rajahmahendri, 82-8; lose the Northern 
 Sirkars. 89-106; adventurers with the 
 British army. 171 ; a portion of the adven- 
 turers join the Nuwab-Yazir, 170-7. 
 
 Ganida, difficulties of Monson's force at. 302. 
 
 Ganjum, description of. 73-4. 
 
 German, adventurers with the British army, 
 171: cautious nature of. 177. 
 
 Gilbert. General f afterwards Sir AValter), 
 commands the right division of the army 
 at Finizshahar. 359; is successful, but 
 withdraws for the night. 360-1 : conducts 
 a reconnaissance across the Chinab, 108; 
 gallant conduct of. and of his division, at 
 Chilianwala, 417-9; force? the centre of 
 the Sikh position at Gujrat, 431 ; follows 
 up tlie v'ctory*, 433 1: a.^l compels the 
 surrender ol the whole Sikh army. 435 and 
 if.'te, 
 
 Glenn, Lieutenant, encounters and defeats 
 an enemy vastly superior in numbers on 
 the Aji river. 148; captures Katwa and 
 rejoins the main army, 149. 
 
 Gottdvari, The, waters the Northern Sir- 
 kars. 73. 
 
 Godby, Brir/adier, is sent with his brigade 
 to reinforce Thackwell, 404-9; gallant 
 fight of. and liis brigade at Chilianwala, 
 415-8. 
 
 Gough, Sir Hugh (afterwards Lord), Com- 
 mander-in-chief in India, collects his 
 forces to meet the sudden irruption of the 
 Sikhs. 355; character of. 356; beats the 
 Sikh detachment at Miidkf, 357-8; orders 
 Littler to join, and marches on Firiizsha- 
 har, 358; order of battle of. before Firuz- 
 shahar. 359 ; gallantry of, 362 ; gains the 
 battle after he had lost it, 363; whilst re- 
 ceiving congratulations on his victory is 
 again threatened, 363; is saved by the 
 treachery of Tej Singh, 364 ; dispatches 
 Smith to Dharmkot and Lodiana, 366 ; at- 
 tacks the Sikhs in their position at Sob- 
 r.ion, 369; orders a timely advance of his 
 centre and right, 371 ; gains the battle, 
 372 : marches on Lahor, 373 ; vetoes Sir F. 
 Currie's proposal to undertake operations 
 against Multan during the hot season, 390; 
 forms the Army of the Panjab. 395: 
 masses his army at Noiwala, 396; defects 
 in the character of. as a general, 397: un- 
 necessarily forces on the combat of Ram- 
 nagar, 398-9 ; true course to befollowed by. 
 399; rejects it, 400; carelessness of. with 
 respect to the proper examination of the 
 fords across the Chinab. 400-1 ; dispatches 
 Thackwell to turn the Sikh position, 401 ; 
 dispatches an order to Thackwell to fight, 
 and then countermands it, 404; pounds 
 Sher Singh's position across the Chinab, 
 405 : continues to pound it after it had 
 been evacuated by Sher Singh. 406 ; con- 
 structs a bridge across the Chinab, and 
 sends cavalry reinforcements to Thack- 
 well. 408: dispatch of, on the artillery 
 combat of Sadulapiir, 408, note; crosses 
 the Chinab and touches Thackwell's force, 
 409-10 ; receives instructions to engage the 
 enemy. 410 ; adopts the advice tendered to 
 him to turn the Sikh position at Easiil. 
 411 : whilst marching to execute this idea, 
 is suddenly diverted from it by the appear- 
 ance of Sikh parties on his left, 412 ; 
 marches on Chilianwala. and resolves to 
 encamp when he is " drawn " by Sher 
 Singh. 413-4 ; attacks the Sikhs. 414 : looks 
 only to his infantry, 415-9; misses a great 
 opportunity to make the victory decisive, 
 420-1 and note ; withdraws from the field, 
 leaving standards and guns as a trophy to 
 the enemy. 421. notes to 423 and 425 : com- 
 ments on the manner in which, fought the 
 battle. 421-3. and note tn 4?3 ; concentrates 
 his army within too small a place, and 
 allows the Sikhs to dominate the plain. 
 424 and note ; is tempted again and again 
 by Sher Singh to action, butwiselyrcfrains. 
 425-6 : perplexity of, when Sher Singh 
 threatened his communications, 426 ; after 
 some indecision, holds his hand to. and 
 effects a junction with Whish, 426-7; de- 
 termines to attack the Sikhs at Gujrat. 
 428 : arranges plan of battle. 428-9 and 
 note: fights and gains it. 429-35: sends 
 Gilbert in pursuit, and finishes the war. 
 435 ; vindication of the conduct of, after 
 
Index 
 
 445 
 
 Gough, Sir Hugh -rout. 
 Chilianwala, 4S6-6; lhac battle aleBBon to, 
 488. 
 
 dm Hid, further supplies the dootrinea of the 
 Sikh faith, and establishes the " Khalsa," 
 337 ; is perseouted by A.urangsfb, but non- 
 oared by his saooessor, and ultimately as- 
 sassinated, 338. 
 
 Gray, Mr., is sent as envoy to Eaidar Ali 
 
 with very paltry presents, 231 ; failure of 
 the mission of. 232 
 
 Cnjrdt, position of the Sikh and the British 
 armies before. 428; battle of. 429-35. 
 
 Gul&b Singh, Eta jab of Jamti, succeeds to 
 the headship of the Jamti family on the 
 death of Hira Singh, 351 ; pacifies the 
 army sent to destroy him. 351 ; makes 
 overtures to the British after Aiiwal, and 
 receives a reply satisfactory to the chiefs, 
 who wished, first of all. the destruction of 
 the Sikh army. 368; buys Kashmir from 
 the Government of India, 374. 
 
 Gundlakamma, The, one of the boundaries 
 of the Northern Sirkars, 73. 
 
 H. 
 
 Haidar Alt, parentage of, 211 ; early train- 
 ing of, 212; joins the Dfaistir army under 
 Nanjiraj, and adopts a military career, 
 212 ; gradually builds up a position for 
 himself, 213; turns against his benefactor 
 and assumes the virtual sovereignty of 
 Maisur, 214 ; makes head against a quad- 
 ruple alliance, detaches two of its mem- 
 bers, and enters the field against the Eng- 
 lish and Muhammad All, 215; is defeated 
 in two engagements, 215 ; recovers himself, 
 captures some places, and lays siege to 
 Ambiir, 216 ; is baffled by Captain Calvert, 
 and falls back on Kaveripatam. 217; re- 
 treats to the Bangalor plateau, 217 ; gains 
 the whole of the western coast and re- 
 turns, inspirited, to the Maisur plateau, 
 218; attacks Murari Rao unsuccessfully, 
 219 ; marches to overwhelm Colonel Wood, 
 219 ; is baffled by Smith, and saved from 
 destruction by Wood's folly, 21!) and note ; 
 proposes to the English to make peace, 
 but considers their conditions too exor- 
 bitant, 220 ; entices Colonel Wood into a 
 snare, and all but destroys his force, 221 ; 
 out-manoeuvres Wood, 223 ; despatches 
 Fazal Cllah Khan to clear the plains be- 
 low Koimbatur, 225 ; debouches into the 
 plains, deceives Fitzgerald, takes Kanir, 
 and presses on to Yirod (Erode), 226; 
 forces, in a peculiar manner, the surren- 
 der of that place. 226-7 ; marches eastward 
 and proposes terms of accommodation to 
 the English, 227 ; on the terms being 
 rejected, out-manoeuvres the English, 
 threatens Madras, and forces his own 
 terms on the English, 228-9 ; summary of 
 the following cloven years of the life of, 
 230; protests vehemently against the Eng- 
 lish attack on Mane, 231 ; receives the 
 English envoy and resolves on war with 
 the English, 232 ; dashes into North Arkat, 
 and penetrates as far as Kanchipuram, 
 233 ; invests Wandiwash with the flower of 
 his army, 235 ; is baffled there by the dar- 
 ing of one Englishman, 235-7 ; feels that he 
 has the English in his grasp, 238 ; receives 
 information from Tfpti that he was about 
 
 Haidar Alt -oont. 
 to attack Baillie, 238; interposes between 
 Monro and Baillie, 230; tries to entice 
 Colonel Fletcher into a trap, but fails, 
 2*1-2; sends the' bulk of his army to rein- 
 force Tfpti, 212; and, having lulled Mum.. 
 into security, follows himself, 2*2; joins 
 Tfpti in time to compass the destruction 
 of Baillie's fore, 243-5; misses a great op- 
 portunity of finishing the war, 240 ; takes 
 Arkat and Ambiir, 247; OUt-manOBU vres Sir 
 Eyre Coote, and has him in his power, 24S ; 
 loses the opportunity through the imbecil- 
 ity of his French naval colleague, 240; is 
 so elated by the repulse of Ghelambram, 
 that he resolves to force on a battle, 250 ; 
 position chosen by, 251; loses the battle, 
 252-3; renounces the contest for empire, 
 and fights to save what he had, 254; dies, 
 255. 
 
 Hamilton, Mr. William, cures the Emperor 
 Farrakhsiyar. and obtains important con- 
 cessions for the English in Bengal, 39-40. 
 
 Harding e, Sir Henry, succeeds Lord Ellen- 
 borough as Governor-General, and gradu- 
 ally adopts the views of the former, with 
 respect to a Sikh invasion, 353; prepares 
 for the coming storm. 353-4; offers himself 
 as second in command to Sir Hugh Gough, 
 358; calm, clear judgment of, 358; gallan- 
 try of. 302; gives guarantees to Ghilab 
 Singh. 368; annexes the Jalandhar Doab 
 and Kashmir, and sells the latter to Giila!> 
 Singh, 374; establishes a Government at 
 Lahore under British control, 375-6; fails 
 to recognize the fact that the Sikh ariny 
 had never considered itself fairly beaten, 
 379; reduces the armv, and resigns his 
 office, 380. 
 
 Hastings, Warren, was an exception to the 
 general corruption in Bengal, 133; the soli- 
 tary supporter of Mr. Vansittart in Coun- 
 cil, 134; endeavours to check the violence 
 of his colleagues, 136 ; appealed to by 
 Madras for aid, raises money, and rii.s- 
 patches Sir Eyre Coote with reinforce- 
 ments for that Presidency, 247. 
 
 Havelock, Colonel, gallant charge and death 
 of, 398-9. 
 
 Hay, Mr., one of the members of Council op- 
 posed to Mir Kasim, is detained by the 
 latter at Monger. 1-10. 
 
 Herbert, Lieutenant, evacuates Atak. wine'. 
 thus falls into the hands of Chattar Singh, 
 410 : is released. 435-0. note. 
 
 Hessing, George, commanding at Agra for 
 Sindia, is placed under restraint by his 
 own men, 284-5. 
 
 Hinddon, horrors of Monson's position at 
 and near, 304. 
 
 Hoggan, Brigadier, gallant fight of the bri- 
 gade of, at Chilianwala, 415-6. 
 
 Holkar, vide Jeswant Rao Holkar. 
 
 II olio ml. relative position of. to Kne/bun!. 
 with respect to conquests in the East. 
 108-9; establishment at Chinsurah. H>!» 
 (vide The Dutch). 
 
 Holwell, Mr., and the catastrophe of the 
 Black Hole, 43 and note; acts for Vansit- 
 tart after the departure of Olive, 125 ; 
 policy recommended by, not adopted. 127. 
 
 Hossllr, important military events in the 
 vicinity of, 223-4. 
 
 llurjli, settlement of the English at the town 
 of, is merged into the settlement at Cal- 
 cutta, 38-9 ; is stormed by the English. 46. 
 
 Hunter, Major, has his arm nearly severed 
 
446 
 
 Index. 
 
 from his body as he is offering forms fo 
 the enemy. 332. 
 Hi a- Govind, simplifies the Sikh doctrines, 
 336. 
 
 I. 
 
 Irvine, Captain, gallant conduct and skill of, 
 at the second siege of Bharatpiir, 327. 
 
 Irving, Captain, gallant conduct of, fit 
 C'ndwah Xala, 158-9. 
 
 J. 
 
 J'a far. Mir. is gained over by Clive. 51; 
 uncertain nature of the communications 
 of, with ('live on the eve of Plassey., 53; 
 baseness of the treason of, towards Siniju'd 
 daulali. 62-3: essentia] viciousness of the 
 j ml icy of, 70 : responds to the advances 
 made' by the Dutch to upset the English, 
 110-1: 'double-dealing policy of, 111-2; 
 abandons his Dutch allies on their defeat, 
 121 ; shows a marked disinclination to make 
 way for .Mir Kasim. 130; forced by the 
 English to yield, he retires to Calcutta, 
 131-2 and note ; is restored to his office by 
 the English, 144; conditions of the restora- 
 tion of, 144 anil note; joins Major Adams 
 in the field. 148; enters Murshidabad in 
 triumph. 1.1(1: endeavours to dissuade the 
 Xiiwab-Yazir of Awadh from espousing 
 the cause of .Mir Kasim, 167-8; in vain, 
 169; advances money to suppress mutiny 
 of European troops, 177-8 : takes up a posi- 
 tion with Carnac for the defence of Patna. 
 is.! : is engaged in battle before Patna, 
 187-90. 
 
 Jdlandhar Dodb, The, is annexed by Sir 
 Henry Hardinge, 374. 
 
 Jamii, the Rajah* of, obtain a preponder- 
 ating influence in the Government of the 
 Panjab. 34K ; the chief of the, Dhian Sing-h. 
 is murdered, 350 ; the next in succession, 
 Hira Singh, obtains the support of the 
 army, and becomes Vazir. 350: is slain, 
 351 :' the next chief of. Gulab Singh. 351. 
 vide Gulab Singh. 
 
 Janda Kaur Rani, wife of Ranjft Singh. 
 34!): becomes regent of the Panjab. 350; 
 character of, 350; is deported, for plotting. 
 to Chunar. 392. 
 
 Jennings, Captain, votes in the majority of 
 the council of war before Plassey against 
 fighting, 54; succeeds to the temporary 
 command of the Bengal army, 170-1 ; is in- 
 disposed to pursue Mir Kasim, 171; re- 
 presses mutiny of the European troops 
 under his orders. 173-0; represses mutiny 
 of the sipahis. 178-;); makes over the com- 
 mand to Major Carnac, 180. 
 
 Jeswant Ran llnlkar. defeats 8 India's army 
 in two successive battles, 25!) ; is himself 
 beaten by Sindia at Indiir. 259; not being 
 followed up. recruits another army and 
 defeats Sindia' a army near Puna, 260; this 
 decisive battle the proximate cause of the 
 break-up of the Maratha confederacy, and 
 brings about the treaty of Bassein, 260; 
 refuses to join Sindia in the war against 
 the English. 262; submits to the English 
 with " his kingdom on his saddle's bow," 
 291 : reason why. held aloof, when Sindia 
 and the Bhonsle warred with the British, 
 294 : character of. 294 ; escapes from con- 
 finement, wars with Sindia and occupies 
 Puna. 294-5 : watches the defeat of Sindia 
 by the British with complacency, 295; the 
 
 Jeswant Rao Eolkar oont. 
 haughty letters of. breathe war, 296 ; mur-' 
 
 ders the Englishmen in his employ, 290-7 ; 
 provokes the English Government beyond 
 endurance, 297-8; invades Jaipur terri- 
 tory, 298; threatens Jaipur, 298: after 
 some manoeuvring, marches south and 
 crosses the Chambal, 299; entices Monson 
 to march against him, 299; then turns 
 round and drives Monson before him to 
 Agra. 301-5 ; criticism on the conduct of, 
 during the pursuit, 300 ; occupies Mathura, 
 307; amuses Lord Lake, whilst he sends a 
 force to make a dash at Dihli. 307-8; be- 
 sieges Colonel Burn in the Dual), 309; 
 rushes off on the approach of Lord Lake, 
 309 ; is surprised by Lord Lake at Farak- 
 habad. 311-2: hovers about Bharatpiir 
 during the siege, 314-8; final defeat of. 
 291, 321. 
 
 Johnson, Captain, is forced by Haidar's gen- 
 eral to fall back on Trichinapalli, 226. 
 
 Jowdhir Singh, brother of the Rani, Janda 
 Kaur. becomes the nominal head of the 
 Sikh Government. 351 ; becomes Vazir, and 
 rouses the indignation of the army by 
 putting- to death Peshora Singh. 352; is 
 murdered by the Sikh soldiers. 352. 
 
 K. 
 
 Karnatak, Nuwabs of the, process whereby 
 the position of the, towards the European 
 settlers on the Koromandal coast became 
 invested, 1-17. 
 
 Kashmir, is accepted from the Sikh Govern- 
 ment by Sir Henry Hardinge in lieu of an 
 indemnity imposed by him upon that 
 Government. 374; sells Kashmir to Gulab 
 Singh for the same amount. 374: ])olicy 
 and morality of the transaction. 374-5, and 
 note to 375. 
 
 Kasim, Mir (Mir Muhammad Kasim Khan), 
 deputed by Mir J'afar, envoy to Calcutta 
 on the death of Mfri.n. 127 ; character and 
 instinctive policy of, 12S ; cajoles the Cal- 
 cutta Council into substituting himself for 
 Mir J'afar as ruler of Bengal, 129; condi- 
 tions of, and price paid for, the alliance. 
 129-30; takes up the office of Subahdar of 
 the three provinces, 132 ; reforms instituted 
 by, and just aims of. 132-3: causes which 
 led. to hate the English with a bitter and 
 brooding hatred, 133: removes his capital 
 to Munger, and prepares for the coming- 
 storm, 134-5 : receives a visit from Mr. Van- 
 sittart. makes great concessions, and con- 
 cludes a treaty with him. 137 ; acts on the 
 treaty, but, when the Calcutta Council dis- 
 avow it, establishes free trade throughout 
 his dominions, 138; in spite of enormous 
 provocation, endeavours to maintain peace 
 with the English, 139; despatches troops 
 to pursue the English who had treacher- 
 ously seized his city of Patna, 141 ; issues 
 a manifesto justifying- his conduct, and 
 appealing to the English for redress. 142 : 
 the English answer by deposing-. 145 ; 
 chances of success of. 145-6; one fatal flaw 
 in the natu r «5 of. 146 anil note ; army of. 
 after three defeats, retires on Siiti. 150 ; 
 fatal want caused by the absence of, 151 ; 
 orders his last and best army to a very 
 strong position behind U'ndwah Nala, 155: 
 stakes his whole fortune on the issue of 
 the battle to be foug-ht there. 156; irri- 
 tated at his defeat there and the loss of 
 
hide. 
 
 44/ 
 
 Kdsim, Mir cont. 
 Hunger, orders the murder of bis Euro- 
 pean prisoners, 161; quits Bihar and im- 
 plores the protection of the Ndwab-Yaafr 
 oi A.wadh, 101 3 takes refuge in the terri- 
 tories <>f that prince, 186; makes an im- 
 pression upon the Niiwab-Ya/.ir at Alla- 
 habad, 168; proceeds against and defeats 
 the Rajah of Bundelkhand, 169-70; marches 
 with the Niiwal«-\ azir to invade Bihar. 170; 
 tin- agents of. attempt to undermine the 
 
 BngliBD army. 172: is with the Niiwab- 
 
 \ 'azir before Patna, 186; misbehaves in 
 the battle fought before that place, 189-90; 
 is dismissed from the oamp of the Nuwab- 
 Yazir with contumely, 107 and note. 
 
 Katicd, battle of, 148. ' 
 
 Kand >l . Btorming of, 02. 
 
 Kdv/ripdk, description of the battle of, 
 
 24-31 : the victory of, transfers the moral 
 supremacy in Southern India from the 
 French to the English, 31 ; is the second 
 act in the drama of which St. Thome" was 
 the first. 32. 
 
 Kiriic. Lieut, uuitf , commands the party 
 which decides the battle of K;iv<rip:ik. 29. 
 
 Khal*d, doctrines of the. established bv 
 Oovind, 337. 
 
 Khan Singh, Sirdar, is appointed to succeed 
 Mulraj at Mult an, and accompanies Messrs. 
 Agnew and Anderson. 385; loyalty of, at 
 the Multan orisis, 386. 
 
 Kharak Singh, succeeds Jlanjit Singh as 
 ruler of the Punjab. 348 ■ death of, 348 
 and note. 
 
 Kilpatriek, Major, is despatched from 
 Madras to aid the refugees from Calcutta. 
 reaches Falt.a, 44. 
 
 Knox, Captain, is despatched by Forde to 
 follow up the victory of Kondur. *7 ; cap- 
 tures Rajahmahendri, 88; and Narsipur, 
 '.12: makes a demonstration against Mach- 
 hlipatanam, 98; takes part in the opera- 
 tions in Bengal against the Dutch. 115-9; 
 and against the Shahzadah, 126; and under 
 Adams. 16S : succeeds to the command of 
 the army and resigns it to Jennings. 170. 
 
 Kolar, important military events near, 
 217-22. 
 
 Konda villi . description of, 73 and note. 
 
 Kondur, battle of, 82-7. 
 
 Koringa, description of, 73. 
 
 Kotdh, Rajah of, refuses to admit Monson's 
 force in its retreat. 302. 
 
 Krishna, the. one of the great rivers of 
 Southern India, 73. 
 
 Kumbhir (the Hindi for a Long-nosed alli- 
 gator), prophecy current among the In- 
 dians regarding, in connection with Bhar- 
 atpiir. 314: how the prophecy regarding, 
 was fulfilled. 333. 
 
 Kmhalaarh, difficulties of Monson's retreat 
 to and from. 303. 
 
 "Lake, General, marches from Kanhpiir to 
 attack Sindia's trained army at Aligarh, 
 281: defeats the enemy under Perron be- 
 fore that place. 281-2: and storms Aligarh, 
 282; comes upon their army under Louis 
 Bourquin. near Dihli. 283: attacks and de- 
 feats it. 2S3-4 ; enters Dihli and releases 
 and restores the blind Kimr. Shah A'lam. 
 284: sets out for Agra. 284; attacks and 
 defeats the remnants of Perron's and 
 Bourquin'B armies, and captures the for- 
 
 Lake, General cont. 
 tress. 885; follows the last trained army 
 of Sindia, 286; in consequence of the heavy 
 state ..f the ground, and to prevent the 
 
 enemy's escape into the hill country, fol- 
 lows it up with his cavalry alone, and 
 catches them at Laswari, 286; attacks the 
 enemy, but is forced to hold off. pending 
 the arrival of his infantry, 2S7 : on the 
 
 arrival of the infantry, attacks again, and. 
 after a very hardly contested battle, gains 
 a decisive victory. 287-9; summary of the 
 campaign of. 291; character of*. 291-2; 
 warns Holkar of the consequences of his 
 proceedings, 296; marches to Bindaon to 
 lie ready for action. 207; again warns Hol- 
 kar. 297 ; resolves to protect the Rajah of 
 
 Jaipur, 298; despatches Colonel Monson to 
 Jaipur, and Colonel Don first to Tonk Ram- 
 piira. and then to join Monson. 208-0; re- 
 solves to keep Monson at Kota whilst he 
 rests his troops till after the rainy Si ftSOE 
 200; marches to. and occupies. Mathura, 
 307; fails to bring Holkar to action. 307-8; 
 learns that Holkar's infantry was men- 
 acing Dihli and sets out for' that place, 
 308; finding Dihli safe, follows Holkar to 
 the Duab. 308-0; hears of the victory of 
 Dig, 309; surprises Holkar at Farakha'bad, 
 311-2: captures the fortress of Dig, 312: 
 marches against Bharatpiir, 313: is ill- 
 supplied with materiel for the siege, 314-5; 
 orders a first assault. 315; a second. 315-6; 
 encourages the men, 318; receives rein- 
 forcements. 318; orders a third assault. 
 318-9; a fourth. 320-1; raises the siege, 
 321: forces Holkar to surrender. 321. 
 
 Lake, Lieutenant, an assistant under Sir 
 Henry Lawrence. 378. 
 
 Lai Singh, a prominent Sikh nobleman, is 
 anxious to crush the insolence of the Sikh 
 army. 351 ; to save himself and to ensure 
 its destruction, urges the Sikh army to 
 attack the British, 3.54; baneful influence 
 of. on the Sikh movements. 350. 303 ; is still 
 bent on the destruction of the Sikh army. 
 307-S : rewards accorded to, for his 
 treachery, 375. 
 
 Lally, Count, arrives in Southern India to 
 expel the English therefrom. 74: success 
 of. greatly impeded by his rashness. 71-5: 
 recalls Bussy from Arkat, and leaves the 
 defence of the Northern Sirkars to the 
 Marquis de Conflans, 75. 
 
 Laswdri, battle of, 287-0: remarks upon the. 
 289-91 : decisive as to the war. 201. 
 
 Lawrence, Colone] (afterwards Sir Henry), 
 is appointed first Resident at Labor to 
 control the Sikh regency, 377 ; mode 
 adopted by. to carry out the general con- 
 trol of the Pan jab administration, 377-0: 
 accompanies Lord Hardinge. on leave, to 
 England, and is succeeded by Sir F. 
 Currie, 380; could lie have prevented the 
 outbreak?. 381 ; is unfavourable to the an- 
 nexation of the Paniab, 437. 
 
 Lawrence, George St. Patrick, is deputed by 
 his brother Henry to Peshawar. 37s : is 
 released from imprisonment with the Sikh 
 army. 435-0 note. 
 
 Lawrence, -loin, receives Mulraj at Labor, 
 and arranges regarding his resignation. 
 3S2-3 : evidence of. at the trial of Mulraj. 
 382, note. 
 
 Littler. General . commands at Firuzpiir. 
 when the Sikhs cross the Satlaj. 353: 
 taking counsel only from his own true 
 heart, marches out and offers them battle. 
 
448 
 
 Index. 
 
 Littler (ient>ral— cent. 
 
 which they refuse, 3.54; commands tlio left 
 of the English force at Firusshahar, 3/)!) : 
 ionics first of all into action, and. after 
 sustaining heavy losses, is repulsed, 359-60. 
 
 Luean, Lieutenant, and other officers im- 
 plore .Monson not to retreat, 300-1; gal- 
 lantry of, 301. 
 
 MacGuire, Mr., accepts a bribe from Mir 
 Kasim, 130. 
 
 Machhlipatanam, early acquisition of. by 
 the French, 72; description of, 73: head- 
 quarters of the French in the Northern 
 Sirkars, 74 ; defences of, 93-4 ; is invested 
 by Forde, 94; storming of. 97-104: impor- 
 tant results of the conquest of. 106. 
 
 Maclean, Captain, gains the breach at the 
 storm of Machhlipatanam, 100; further 
 progress of, 104 ; joins the English army 
 on the Diirgawati, 172. 
 
 Macrae, Colonel, commands the second as- 
 sault at the siege of Bharatpiir, 317. 
 
 Mddhaji Sindia, character and grand con- 
 ceptions of, 257-8; dies just as he was 
 mounting the last step of the ladder, 2.5S. 
 
 Madras Government , The, on learning 
 Baillie's defeat, apply to Bengal for aid, 
 247. 
 
 Madras, terms of the treatv dictated at, by 
 Haidar AH to the English, 229-30. 
 
 Malta/leu Rao Ndrdyan, last but one of the 
 Peshwas of the Marathas, 258 ; commits 
 suicide, 258-9. 
 
 Make", threatened by the English, who take 
 it despite of the protestations of Haidar 
 Ali, 231. 
 
 Maisur, ancient dimensions of, 208: gradual 
 formation of the kingdom of, 209-10 ; regal 
 power in, usurped by the Dalwais. 210-1 ; 
 falls under the virtual sovereignty of 
 Haidar All, 213-4 ; important military 
 events on the plateau of, 218-25 ; summary 
 of events in. during the eleven years fol- 
 lowing the dictation of terms by Haidar to 
 the English, 23(J ; restored to' the Hindu 
 dynasty, 256. 
 
 Maitland, Lieutenant Colonel, commands the 
 first assault at the siege of Bharatpiir, 
 315-6. 
 
 Malwdgal, combat of, 221-2. 
 
 Mdphuz Khan, eldest son of the Niiwab- 
 of the Karnatak, is sent to recover Madras 
 from the French, 8: besieges that place, 
 9 ; cavalry of, are completely beaten by 
 the besieged in a sally, 11 ; raises the siege, 
 12; resolves to intercept the relieving 
 French force under Paradis, 12 ; lines the 
 Advar near St. Thome with his troops. 
 12-3: is attacked and completely defeated 
 by Paradis. 13-5. 
 
 Mardthd Confederacy, the first fatal blow 
 dealt to. by the treaty of Bassein, 2G0-1 ; 
 the second and decisive blow dealt to. 291. 
 
 Mardthd War, the results of the first, with 
 respect to the actual present, 289-90 ; and 
 to the future, 291. 
 
 Marhar, is appointed to discipline and com- 
 mand one of Mir Kasim's brigades. 135: 
 recaptures Patna treacherously seized by 
 the English. 141 ; ensag-ed at the battle of 
 Gheriah. 151-4; at U'ndwah Nala, 160. 
 
 Martine, Lieutenant Claude, commands a 
 French company in the British army under 
 
 Martive, Lieutenant Claude— cont. 
 Jennings, 172; loyal and effective action 
 of, during the mutiny, 175: is despatched 
 to Calcutta. 1S2. 
 
 Mehdl, Mir. Khan, a commander under Mir 
 Kasim. gallantly aids in the recovery of 
 Patna, 111. 
 
 Menzies, Major, gallantry of. at the siege of 
 Bharatpiir. 321. 
 
 Metcalfe, Mr., is despatched as envoy to 
 Ran j ft Singh, and wisely influences him. 
 344. 
 
 Minto, Lord, takes up the dropped thread of 
 Marquess Wellesley's policy. 344. 
 
 Miran. son of Mir J'afar. perfidious nature 
 of. 122-3; is struck dead by Lightning, 126. 
 
 Mokandara pass, retreat of Monson's force 
 through, 3(H. 
 
 Monson, Colonel, is despatched to protect 
 Jaipur. 298; character and antecedents of, 
 298; finds Holkar threatening Jaipur. 298; 
 finds, when reconnoitring, that Holkar 
 had disappeared, 298 ; marches, under or- 
 ders from Lord Lake, to Kota. 299; re- 
 solves, against the spirit of Lake's order, 
 to move southward. 299 ; learns that Hol- 
 kar is on the Chambal near him, 299; re- 
 solves to march towards him in the hope 
 that he will retire. 300; finding Holkar does 
 not retire, retreats. 300-1 ; falls l«ack. pur- 
 sued, to the .Mokandara pass, 301 ; thence 
 to Ganhis and Tonk Bampiira. 302-3: 
 thence to Kiishalgarh. still pursued. 303; 
 thence to Hindaon, 304; thence, terribly 
 harassed, through the Biana pass, 305 ; 
 and finally to Agra. 305: judgment on. 
 306 ; assumes command before Dig on the 
 death of General Fraser. 310 ; and wins 
 the battle, 310-1 ; commands the fourth as- 
 sault at the siege of Bharatpiir, 320. 
 
 Moracin. Monsieur, appointed French resi- 
 dent at Machhlipatanam, 74: arrives too 
 late to prevent the catastrophe at that 
 place, 106. 
 
 Moran, Captain. <rallant conduct of, at 
 U'ndwah Nala. 159. 
 
 Mud'n. Mir, gallantry of. at Plassey, 62: 
 death of, fatal to Siraju'd daulah. 62. 
 
 Mudki, combat of. 356-8: numbers of the 
 Sikhs at, 358 and n<dc. 
 
 Muhammad Tali Khtin. one of Mir Kasim's 
 generals, sends a detachment to attack 
 Glenn on the Aji. 148 : fights a battle with 
 Major Adams near Katwa. 149 ; gallant 
 death of, 149. 
 
 Mulrdj, succeeds his father as Diwan of 
 Multan, 381 ; at first resists, but finally 
 agrees to. the conditions of the Labor Dar- 
 bar, 381-2: the complaints against the ad- 
 ministration of. are backed up by the 
 Lahor Darbar. 382-3: proceeds to Labor to 
 see Sir H. Lawrence and to fender his 
 resignation. 382 anil note; is received by 
 Mr. John Lawrence, and persists in his 
 resignation. 382-3: pressed by Sir F. 
 Currie, still refuses to withdraw his resig- 
 nation. 38:5; receives Messrs. Agnew and 
 Anderson and transfers to them the keys 
 of the fortress. 385; behaviour of. when 
 the British officers are cut down. 386; re- 
 ply of. to Vans Aimicw's summons. 386: 
 casts in his lot with the national party. 
 387 ; troops of. are defeated by the Biliichis 
 near Dera Ghazi Khan, and by Edwardes 
 at Kinairi and Sadusam. 391 ; is blockaded 
 in Multan. 391. 
 
hid 
 
 iiarx 
 
 449 
 
 Multan, o, mcs into the possessi I Ranjii 
 
 Singh, :t4."> ; the Diwani of, devolves upon 
 .Mulraj. :tsi ; the strongest fortress in the 
 Paniab, 383 ; murderous events and rising 
 in. :is4 : blockaded by EdwardeB, :«»l ; siege 
 of, begins, 393; is raised and recommenced, 
 394-5; in taken. 124. 
 
 .1/ iniiji'-r. is made his capital by Mir Kasim, 
 and is greatly strengthened, 134 and note. 
 
 Munro, Major (afterwards Sir Elector), suc- 
 ceeds Carnac in command of the army, 
 191-9 : charaoter of, 193; suppresses a 
 mutiny of the sipalus. 193; advances and 
 crosses the Son at Kalvarghat, 1 ! >."> : reaches 
 Bakaar, 196; resolves to attack the enemy 
 on the 34th, but is himself attacked on 
 the 33rd, L98; fights and wins the battle 
 of Baksar, 199-304; is commander-in-chief 
 at Madras when Haidar Alt dashes into 
 north Arkat, 2114; unsound military views 
 of, 2:11: to carry out those views, stretclies 
 the law and assumes command of the army 
 in the field, 2:14: directs Baillie, from pure 
 self-will, to make a circuitous march to 
 KAnchipuram, 2:is ; allows Haidar Ah to 
 interpose between him and Baillie, 239 ; 
 sends reinforcements to Baillie. 241 ; loses 
 his head and retreats to Chengalpatt, 
 24.">-<i : thence to the vicinity of Madras. 
 247. 
 
 Murdri lido, joins the English army on the 
 Maisiir plateau. 218; repulses an attack 
 made by Haidar All, 210. 
 
 Murray, Colonel, is ordered by Wellcsley to 
 march on Indiir. 299. 
 
 Murxhid Ktili Khan, firm and just rule of, in 
 Bengal, 40. 
 
 Murtazanagar, description of, 7:1 and note. 
 
 Mussalipatam, vide Machhhpatanam , vide 
 also note* to 72-3. 
 
 Mutiny of the English troops under Knox. 
 172: under Jennings, 17:i-(i: of the Bipahis, 
 under the same officer, 17(!-s ; of the 
 Bipahis under Munro. l*)2-4. 
 
 Myxore, vide Maittiir. 
 
 N&nak, founder of the Sikh religion, :i:i."> ; is 
 succeeded by Allgad, 3:iG. 
 
 Nanjirdj, Dalwai, inherits the usurped 
 power of his brother Deo Kaj. 211; takes 
 Haidar All under his patronage, 212: is 
 deposed and pensioned by Haidar All. 214. 
 
 Nao Nihal Singh, grandson of Ranjii Singh, 
 succeeds Kharak Singh as ruler of the 
 Panjab, : J .4s : is killed the very day of his 
 accession. :14N (lull note. 
 
 Napier, Major Robert, is appointed chief en- 
 gineer of the Multan besieging force, 393; 
 opinion of, of Multan. :i!):t. 
 
 NaHr Khan, Mir. one of Mir Kasim's gen- 
 erals, gallantry of, at Gheriah. 153. 
 
 Nicholh, General, is second to Lord Comber- 
 mere in the second siege of Bharatpur, 
 :i2:-f : commands the left attack at the final 
 storm. 328-32. 
 
 Nicholson, John, an assistant under Sir 
 Henry Lawrence. .'{77 : by his activity and 
 forethought secures a safe passage of the 
 China), to Genera) Thackwell. 403. 
 
 Nizam AH, Nizam of Haidarabad, joins 
 Haidar Ali against the English 215; is 
 frightened by the bad result of the cam- 
 paign to renounce the alliance. 217. 
 
 Ntzdmpatanam, description of, 7:4. 
 
 o. 
 
 0%terlony, Colonel David .afterwards Gen- 
 eral Sir David), is Governor-General's 
 ag' nt at Dilhi when that place is besieged 
 bj llolkar's troops, 308; takes wise action 
 regarding Bharatpur, for which he is re- 
 buked by Lord Amherst. 333; who. how- 
 ever, is forced to carry out the policy of, 
 M2:i ; is despatched by Lord Minto to coerce 
 Kaujit Singh, 344. 
 
 Orme, Mr., testimony of, to the effect of the 
 battle of St. Thome, 1"> ; regarding the 
 Btorming of tfachhlipatanam, 104. 
 
 Orion. Captain, disgracefully surrenders 
 Virod i Erode) to Haidar AH, 227. 
 
 Orveo, The Chevalier d', commands the 
 French fleet on the Madras coast. 248; de- 
 liberately throws away the chance of com- 
 pelling the surrender of a British army. 
 24!». 
 
 Oftxoor, vide Ho**ur. 
 
 Ondh, vide .1 uadh. 
 
 P. 
 
 Punjab, The, rule of the Sikhs declared in. 
 341 : annexed by the British. 4:57 H. 
 
 Panneau, a Lad type of French officer. 92. 
 
 Parodist, proceeds from Pondicherry to rein- 
 force the garrison of Madras. 12; reaches 
 the Adyar to find its banks lined by the 
 Mnghul army, resting on St. Thome. Li: 
 unhesitatingly fords the river, attacks, 
 and gains a victory which revolutionizes 
 the condition of Southern India, 13-5. 
 
 Parmbakam, battle at. and near, ending in 
 the destruction of Baillie's force. 239-45. 
 
 Patnd, battle of. 188-91. 
 
 Pennycuich, Brigadier, gallant conduct of. 
 and of the brigade of. at Chilianwala. 
 415-9. 
 
 Perron, Monsieur, commands for Sindia at 
 Aligarh, 281 ; half-heartedness of, and its 
 
 cause. 281. 
 
 l'l«*s>-!i, battle of. <i<l-7: effects of. in tin- 
 present, and in the future. 67-8; a decisive 
 though not a great battle, 68. 
 
 Pollock, Lieutenant, distinguishes himself 
 before Multan. 393. 
 
 Pondicherry, captured by the English, 230; 
 re-occupied by the French, -'8 
 
 Porto Novo, 1. attic of,250-3; decisive of the 
 pretensions of Haidar. 253-4. 
 
 Prudence, definition of. 27. .v.. 
 
 i:. 
 
 Righuji Bhonxle, Rajah of Barar, allies him- 
 self with Sindia against the English. 262; 
 strength of the army of, at the outbreak 
 of the war. 264; military capacity of. 2n'4 ; 
 prepares to give battleto the English at 
 Assay e, 27it ; gives an example to his men 
 of unsurpassed cowardice. 27."> : is attacked 
 by Wellcsley at A rg a u m . 277 ; is completely 
 defeated and Bigns a very disadvantageous 
 treaty with the conqueror, 27s. 
 
 /,'';/// Ddft, fourth teacher of the Sikhs. 336. 
 
 Rdjahmahendri, description of. 7:5, note; 
 Conrinns arrives at, and moves To a posi- 
 tion fortv miles from. 7!) -. is captured bj 
 the English, 87-8. 
 
 Rimnagar, combat of, 397-9; military posi- 
 tion of, for an army wishing to cross the 
 Chinab, W0. 
 
 GG 
 
45° 
 
 Index. 
 
 Rdmnarain, is removed from the governor- 
 ship (it Patna by .Mir Kasim. 134. 
 
 Han jit Singh, birth of, 341 ; has transactions 
 with the Afghans, and becomes recognised 
 
 ruler of the Sikhs. 342; exchanges friendly 
 communications with General Lake, 342 ; 
 tries to consolidate his dominions, but 
 fails with the cis-Satlajj nobles. 343; who 
 invite, and ultimately obtain, the support 
 of the English, 343-4; resents the conduct 
 of the English, but, on the approach of 
 Ocliterlony, and having in view the cir- 
 cumstances of his own dominions, com- 
 plies. 344-5: consolidates his trans-Satlaj 
 dominions. 3-45: acquires Multan, Kashmir, 
 the Derajat and Peshawar. 34.5: takes into 
 his services four French generals to dis- 
 cipline his armv. 345; has an interview 
 with Lord \V. Bentinck, 346: tries the 
 temper of the British, and eventually with- 
 draws his pretensions, 346; feelings of, 
 towards the British. 34G-7 : unwillingly en- 
 ters into the alliance pressed on him by 
 Lord Auckland to aid in the restoration of 
 Shah Shuja. 347; his convictions— and his 
 hopes, 347 ; dies. 347-8 and note. 
 
 Ranjur Singh, commanding a Sikh force, 
 maltreats Sir Henrv Smith at Badiwal, 
 366-7: but is beaten at Aliwal, 367. 
 
 Ratal, Sikh position at, 410-1. 424-5. and note 
 to 425. 
 
 Reinhard, vide Samru. 
 
 Reynell, Major General, commands the right 
 attack at the second sieg-e of Bharatpur, 
 328-30. 
 
 Richardson. Lieutenant, distinguished gal- 
 lantrv of. before Multan. 394. 
 
 Riz'i Sdhib, inspired by Dupleix. rouses 
 north Arkat against the English, 21: 
 carries the war up to the vicinity of 
 Madras, and procures a respite for Trichin- 
 apalli. 21-2: is beaten at Kaveripak, 26-30. 
 
 Robinson, Captain, consequences of the for- 
 feiture of his parole by. 227. 
 
 Sail itla ii'ir. combat of. between Sher Singh 
 and Thackwell, 405-7. 
 
 Saldbat Jang, Bubahdar of the Dakhan, 
 marches to threaten Forde. 06. 
 
 Samru. appointed to discipline and com- 
 mand one of Mir Kasim's brigades. 135: 
 is despatched to cut off the retreat of the 
 English from Patna. which he effectually 
 does, destroying or taking prisoners their 
 whole force. 141-2 and note; engaged at 
 the battle of Gheriah. 150-4 : at U'ndwah 
 Xal-i. 160; in the battle before Patna, 
 L88-90; at Baksar. 197-203. 
 
 Sher Singh, Atdriwdld, member of the Labor 
 Regency, is despatched with a Sikh force 
 to Multan, 31)2-3; joins the national party. 
 304: takes up a strong- position d eheral 
 the Chinab, 306; retires to the north bank 
 on the approach of Lord Gough, 397: and 
 maltreats him. 398; on learning Thack- 
 well' a passage of the Chinab. is animated 
 by a brilliant idea. 405: which he Foolishly 
 onlv carries out in part. 4G6 ; and executes 
 feebly. 407 : engages Thackwell in an ar- 
 tillery combat at Sadiilapur, and thou 
 falls back on the line of the Jhelam. 407-8; 
 makes a feint, which almost succeeds in 
 forcing Gough to retire. 410; takes ur> a 
 position at Rasul, then, extending his line. 
 tempts Gondii to diverge from his course 
 and attack him at Chilianwahi. 412-3; is 
 
 Shir Singh, Atdriwdld — cont. 
 
 beaten, but reaps the fruits of victory, 
 423-4 ; the chances open to, after the battle, 
 are not taken. 424; he holds, however, the 
 country between his position and that of 
 the British, 424 and note; the junction of 
 Chattar Singh increases his army by one- 
 third. 425 ; vainly tempts Lord Gough to 
 tight. 425-6; threatens his line of com- 
 munication, and finally takes post at 
 Gujrat, 426; where he resolves to accept 
 battle. 428; fights and loses the battle of 
 Gujrat, 429-35 : surrenders with his whole 
 army, 435 and note; unpardonable faults 
 committed by, during the campaign, 436; 
 was daunted by Chilianwala. 437. 
 
 Sher Sinr/h, reputed son of Ranjit Singh, 
 succeeds Nao Nihal Singh, 348; allows the 
 Sikh army to master him, 349 ; shirks an 
 interview with Lord Ellenborough. 349; 
 is murdered. 350. 
 
 Shrikdkolam, description of, 73; Shir A'li 
 Khan, one of Mir Kasim's g-enerals, fatal 
 feebleness of. at Gheriah, 153. 
 
 Shuja'u'd daulah, becomes Nuwab-Vazi'r of 
 Awadh (Oudh). 164: promises protection 
 to Mir Kasim. 166; the action of the Bun- 
 delkhand rajah changes the views of. 167-8 ; 
 but the sight of Mir Kasim's trained in- 
 fantry almost brings back, to his old idea, 
 168; agrees to espouse Mir Kasim's cause 
 provided the latter disposes of the invader 
 from Bundelkhand, 169 ; marches to invade 
 Bihar, and reaches Banaras, 169-70 ; mis- 
 hap of. in crossing the bridg-e of boats, 
 185-6 : reaches Baksar, and follows Carnac 
 towards Patna. 185 ; is foiled in an at- 
 tempt to cut him off. 186 ; takes up a posi- 
 tion opposite the English before Patna, 
 187 ; attacks the English army and is re- 
 pulsed, 188-90; retires on Baksar, 191: dis- 
 misses Mir Kasim, 197 : on the approach 
 of the English armv, resolves to sacrifice 
 the advantage of his position, and attack 
 them, 198; is defeated by Munro, 198-204; 
 stake played for. and lost by. at Baksar, 
 205-6 : comes under British influence. 206. 
 
 Sikh<. The. founder of the religion of. 335; 
 are formed into a nation. 336-7: are per- 
 secuted by Auranezib, 337 : rallving- under 
 Banda, again crushed, apparently for ever, 
 339 : rallying once again, they assert them- 
 selves, are beaten by. and beat. Ahmad 
 Shah, and finally proclaim the sway of 
 their nation in the Panjab. 340-1 : they 
 separate into twelve misls or confeder- 
 acies, but finally combine under Ban jit 
 Singh, 341-2; except those of the eis- 
 Satlaj territories, who evoke, and eventu- 
 allv obtain. British protection. 343-4: 
 those of the trans-Satlaj arc consolidated 
 under Ranjit Sing-h, 345: qualities of the. 
 as soldiers, 345-6 : the army of the. be- 
 comes paramount in the state. 349-52 : and. 
 urged treachcrouslv by its chiefs, crosses 
 the Satlaj. 353; decline battle with Littler 
 and lose six most precious days. 354-5 : send 
 a small detachment to attack the British 
 at Miidki. 356; are repelled, after a severe 
 combat. 357-8: are attacked by the Eng- 
 lish at Firuzshahar. 358-9; repulse Littler, 
 and at nightfall still occupy the assailed 
 positions. 360-1 ; during the night drive 
 out Sir Harrv Smith and maltreat Gilbert. 
 362; have victory in their grasp if their 
 leaders are only true. 363 ; evacuate their 
 position in the early morn. 363 and note ; 
 have another chance of regaining the 
 
hid 
 
 ex. 
 
 45i 
 
 Sikh*, The -cont. 
 battle, but are betfftyed by Tej Singh, 364 : 
 maltreat Smith at Badiwal, but are beaten 
 at Aliwal, 300-7 ; intrenoh themselves at 
 Sobraon, 368 ; are attacked by the British. 
 369; make a splendid defence, but are 
 beaten, 370-2; the losses of, enormouslj 
 aggravated by the treaohery of Tej Singh, 
 373; are forced to yield the Jalandhar 
 Doab and Kashmir. .(74; are again be- 
 trayed by their ohiefs, 375 ; smouldering 
 feeling of anger amongst, in consequence 
 of these events, 379 ; gradual fermentation 
 among the, 379-80 and note; move of, in the 
 Easarah, 392; outbreak of, in the Hazarah 
 and before Multan, 393-4; crude English 
 opinion regarding the resources of the, at 
 this time, 395; retreat across the Chinab 
 before the British. 397-9; carelessness of, 
 at night, very favourable to the British, 
 403; fight an indecisive artillery combat 
 with Thackwell at Sadulapttr, and fall 
 Lack on the Jhelam, 406-8; fight at Chilian- 
 wala, are beaten, but, notwithstanding, 
 enjoy all the fruits of victory. 415-23; re- 
 take their position at llasul. and dominate 
 the ground between them and the British 
 camp, 424 and imtc; the army of, at Rasul, 
 i6 increased by the junction of Chattar 
 Singh and the Afghans, 424-."); range them- 
 selves in order of battle before Ghijrat, 
 428: their centre and left are forced back, 
 430-1 : also their right. 431-2 ; make a des- 
 perate effort to recover the day. 432-3; are 
 baffled by Campbell, cut off from their true 
 line of retreat by Thackwell. and driven 
 from the field in disorder. 433-4 : renounce 
 the struggle, 4.35; main cause of their de- 
 feat 435, consequences of the war to, 
 437. 
 
 Sirdju'd daulah, succeeds Ali Tardi Khan 
 as ruler of Bengal, Bihar and Orisa. 42; 
 wages war against the English — the Black 
 Hole tragedy, 43-4: raises an army to meet 
 Clive, but is intimidated and retires. 407 ; 
 attitude of, face to face with Clive. 4S ; 
 crisis between, and ('live precipitated. 4!i ; 
 attempt to crush Mir J'afar, 50: scales 
 fall from the eves of. and he orders his 
 army to Pal^si. 51 ; joins his army, and 
 takes up a strong position near that vil- 
 lage, 57-8 ; composition of the army of. 
 58: formation of the army of. 5!): at the 
 crisis of the battle is persuaded by his 
 traitor generals to quit the field — affecting 
 incident preceding his departure. 62-3; 
 partial vindication of. 70; murder of, 71. 
 
 Sirkdrx. Th-e Northern, early cession of. to 
 the French. 73: description of. 73: con- 
 quered by the English. 74-100. 
 
 Smith, Contain, efficient conduct of. before 
 Pat mi . 186. 
 
 Smith. Colonel Joxeph, repulses Haidar Ali 
 at Changamah and at Trinomalli, 215-6; 
 the presence of, determines Haidar to as- 
 cend the ghats, 217 ; ascends the Maisilr 
 plateau, and takes Baglnr and Hnssur, 2is ; 
 saves Wood from destruction, 221 ; is sum- 
 moned to Madras. 222. 
 
 Smith, Mr. Culling, accepts a bribe from 
 Mir Kasim. 130; opposes him. 130. 
 
 Smith. Sir Harry, commands the reserve of 
 the British army at Firuzshahar. 350: is 
 ordered up to deal finally with the enemy. 
 36T : advances to the centre of their posi- 
 tion, but is driven back and retreats two 
 miies from it. 362 ; is despatched with n 
 force to Dbarmkot and Lodiana, 366; is 
 
 Smith, Sir Harry — cont. 
 
 maltreated by the Sikhs at, Badiwal, 366-7; 
 Init heats them at Aliwal, 367; commands 
 the right division at Sobraon, 360; makes 
 
 a BUOCeSSful attack, though attended with 
 great loss. 371-2, urn/ note to 371. 
 
 Sobrdon, battle of. 300-72 ; the complement 
 to Firuzshahar, 373; strength of the com- 
 batants at. 373. 
 
 Soldier, the iinreformed British, at Chilian- 
 wala, 417-23. and note to 423. 
 
 Sombre', vide Samru. 
 
 St. Fraia, commands the European contin- 
 gent for the N'liuab at Plassey, 00; splen- 
 did behaviour of, 63-4; is forced by Clive 
 to retreat, 65-6. 
 
 St. Thome", battle of, 12-4; effect of, is to 
 revolutionize the existing condition of 
 affairs in Southern India. 15-7. 
 
 Stevenson, Colonel, strength and location of 
 the force of. at the outbreak of the first 
 Maratha war. 203; secures Jalnah, and ar- 
 ranges attack on the enemy with Welles- 
 ley, 268-9; joins Wcllesley the day after 
 Assaye, which had been precipitated in 
 his absence, 275 ; captures Burhanpfir and 
 Asergarh. 275: and marches to besiese 
 Qiialgarh, 270; joins Wcllesley, and takes 
 part in the battle of Argaum, 276-7; stormB 
 Ghialgarh, 27s. 
 
 Straw, made leader of the mutineers, 174; 
 returns to reason, 176. 
 
 Stuart, (lateral, commands with effect 
 under Sir Eyre f'oote at Porto Novo, 251-2. 
 
 Sumner, Mr., accepts a bribe from Mir 
 Kasim, 130. 
 
 Surji Arjengdon, Treaty of, and its condi- 
 tions, 291. 
 
 Si'iti, position of Mir Kasim's army at, 150. 
 
 Symmonds, Ensign, cool and intrepid con- 
 duct of. at Kaveripak. 20-30. 
 
 T. 
 
 Taylor. Captain, skill and daring of, at the 
 second siege of Bharatpiir, 327. 
 
 Taylor, Lieutenant Reytiell, is selected by 
 Sir H. Lawrence as an assistant, 378. 
 
 Tej Singh, a prominent Sikh noble, sees the 
 necessity of crushing the insolence of the 
 Sikh army, 351 ; to save himself, and to 
 ensure its destruction, urges the Sikh 
 army to attack the British, 352; baneful 
 influence of. on the Sikh movements, 355; 
 when he has a chance of fighting the Eng- 
 lish at great advantage, betrays his trust, 
 303; is still bent on the destruction of the 
 Sikh army. 305 ; consummates the destruc- 
 tion of that army at Sobraon by breaking 
 their line of retreat. 372: rewards accorded 
 to, for his treachery, 375; makes an ar- 
 rangement with the British, by which 
 the latter shall garrison Labor till the 
 Maharajah attain the age of sixteen. 375. 
 
 Tem/ilefou, Lieutenant, gallantry and death 
 of. 321. 
 
 Thackwell, Sir Joxe ph, is dispatched by 
 Gough to cross the Chinab and turn the 
 Sikh position, 4<il ; finds the fords impass- 
 able, and presses on to Vazirabad, 402; is 
 able, owing to the prescience of Nicholson, 
 to attempt a passage there, 403 ; great diffi- 
 culties and privations of the troops com- 
 manded by, 4U3-4; marches in a haphazard 
 manner in search of the enemy. 404 ; is sur- 
 prised by Sher Singh in a bad position, 
 from which he extricates himself, 406-7; 
 
452 
 
 Index. 
 
 Thaekwell, Sir Joseph — tout. 
 marches after the Sikhs and halts at 
 Helah. 40!> ; perfunctory nature of the re- 
 connaissances carried on by, 409 ; cuts off 
 the line of retreat of the Sikhs at (iiijr.it, 
 433-4: pursues them till recalled by Lord 
 Gough. 435. 
 
 Tippoo, vide Tipu. 
 
 Tipu, undergoes the baptism of fire, 216; in- 
 timates to his father that he was about to 
 attack Baillie. 239 ; character of. 210; 
 feebly attacks Baillie and is repulsed. 240; 
 reinforced, prepares to renew the attack. 
 242: attacks, and (under Haidar) destroys 
 Baillie's army. 243-5 : forces Colonel Braith- 
 waite to surrender, 254. 
 
 Ton I- Rdmpura, is stormed by Col. Don. 299; 
 is reached by Monson in his retreat. 302. 
 
 Trichindpalli, the fall of. alone wanting to 
 give the French supremacy in Southern 
 India, 18; Clive's conduct at Arkat not in 
 itself decisive of the fate of, 20. 
 
 Trinomalli, Haidar Ali repulsed bv the Eng- 
 lish at. 215-6. 
 
 U. 
 
 Ummar has, is the third high priest of the 
 
 Sikh sect. 336. 
 U'nduah Ndld, description of the position 
 
 at, 154-5 : Mir Kasim's troops congregate 
 
 at. 155; battle of. 156-60; consequences of 
 
 the victory of. 150-61. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vansittart, Mr., succeeds Clive in Bengal. 
 125 ; falls in with the plan of substituting 
 .Mir Kasim for Mir J "afar, and accepts a 
 bribe from the former. 129-30 ; warning re- 
 ceived by. from Clive, 133-4; has but one 
 supporter in Council. Warren Hastings. 
 134; is powerless against his corrupt Coun- 
 cil. 136; proceeds armed, as he believed, 
 with full powers to Hunger, to negotiate 
 with Mir Kasim. 137: concludes a treaty, 
 which his Council disavow. 137-8 ; endeav- 
 ours to assuage the rashness of his Coun- 
 cil, 130. 
 
 Ventura. General, enters the service of Ban- 
 jit Singh. 345. 
 
 Yerelst, Mr., belongs to the party in the 
 Calcutta Council opposed to .Alii- Kasim. 
 139. 
 
 PijiyArdm, Riiji. Bajah of Vijiyanagaram, 
 is devoted to French interests. 74 : is suc- 
 ceeded by his son, whose tendencies are 
 averse, 76. 
 
 Yishdkpatanam, description of. 73; is seized 
 by Anandraz Gajapati, 77. 
 
 Vizagapatam, vide Yiskdkpatanam. 
 
 W. 
 
 Wallace, General, commands the centre divi- 
 sion of the British force at Firiizshahar, 
 350; desperate fiyht of, with the enemy. 
 360. 
 
 Wandiwdsh, invested by Haidar Ali. 235; 
 splendid defence of, by Lieut. Flint. 237: 
 effect of that defence on the war. 237. 246-7. 
 
 Watts. Mr.. English Agent at Murshidabad, 
 leaves that place by stealth, 51. 
 
 Wellesley, Colonel Arthur, commands the 
 advance British force in South-western 
 India, 262; proposes test terms to the 
 
 Wellesley, Colonel Art Inn- cont. 
 
 Maratha allies, which are refused. 262-3; 
 strength and location of the force com- 
 manded by, 263; character and previous 
 career of. 265-7; begins the campaign by 
 the capture of Ahmadnagar and A'lranea- 
 bad. 268; arranges a plan of campaign 
 with Stevenson, 260; suddenly beholds the 
 enemy in front of him in position at A.8- 
 save. 27ii; resolves to attack without wait- 
 ing for Stevenson, 270-1 ; attacks. 271 ; 
 calmness and coolness of. when the ad- 
 vance of his guns is checked. 272: antici- 
 pates the charge of the enemy's horsemen, 
 and gains the village of Assa'ye. 272-3: fol- 
 lows up the enemy across the Jewah, and 
 stains a complete victory, 273-4: credit due 
 to, 274-5 ; led two charges and had two 
 horses shot under him. 275. marches to 
 cover Stevenson whilst the latter besieges 
 Gualgarh, 275; comes upon the combined 
 Maratha force drawn up on Argaum, 277; 
 reconnoitres and attacks, 277; rallies the 
 native infantry who had fallen back, 277; 
 personally leads a charge of the Madras 
 cavalry against the enemy's cavalry and 
 rolls them up, 278 ; gains a complete vic- 
 tory. 278 ; can claim the credit of subduing 
 the Marathas in Western and South-wes- 
 tern India, 278-9. 
 
 Wellesley, Marque-*, policy of. towards Tipu 
 Sultan, and Maisiir. 256; makes prepara- 
 tions for the impending war with the 
 Marathas, 263; objects of. and dangers to 
 be mr-t t»y, k80 ; system of, iHO-i ; de- 
 termination of, on learning of Mon son's 
 retreat. 307. 
 
 Whish, General, is dispatched with a British 
 force to Multan, 393; besieges Multan. 303; 
 raises the siege and recommences it, 304-5 ; 
 captures Multan and marches to join Lord 
 Gough, 424: baffles Slier Singh. 426; and 
 joins Lord Gough, 427; forces the left of 
 the Sikh position at Gujrat. 430-1. 
 
 Wilson, Colonel, gallant conduct of. at the 
 storming of Bharatpiir, 332. 
 
 Wilson, Commodore, attacks and destroys a 
 superior force of Dutch ships in the Hugli. 
 117-0. 
 
 Wood, Colonel, is surprised bv Haidar Ali at 
 Budikota. but is saved by Smith. 219 ; 
 folly of. 210. note; is drawn into a snare 
 by Haidar Ali at Malwagal. and is only 
 saved from destruction by a ruse of Cap- 
 tain Brooke. 221 : is regarded by the Mad- 
 ias Council as their "only general." 222; 
 is out-manoeuvred by Haidar, 223: when on 
 the point of being destroyed is saved by 
 Fitzgerald, 224-5 : rs removed, from his 
 command, 225. 
 
 Yanun, description of. 73. 
 
 Yirod, strange storv of the capture of. by 
 Haidar Ali. 226-7.* 
 
 Yorl-e. Captain, mounts the breach and 
 dashes along the southe'rn face of the ram- 
 part of Machhlipatanam, 100; after a 
 brilliant success his men are seized by a 
 panic and fall back. 101: Yorke rallies 
 them, and leads them on, when he is met 
 by the enemy, shot through the body, and 
 driven back." 101-2; accepts a present from 
 Mir Kasim. 130. 
 
 Prixtfd Br The New Temple Piirss. 17 Grant Boad, Cboydon. 
 

 
 8 9.820.800. 155 Englisi 
 
 Scale of English l\ 
 
 o 10 o 
 
 oiftvay.? shewn. thi*Ls 
 
 tbmorine Tciegniph Cables 
 
 Heights in Feet above 
 Native States are colour e 
 
CATALOGUE A. 
 
 WILLIAM REEVES 
 
 AND 
 
 BEEVES & TURNER'S 
 
 PUBLICATIONS 
 
 WORKS IN GENERAL LITERATURE 
 AND ECONOMICS 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 WORKS ON FREEMASONRY 
 
 Y 
 
 IS 31 Kindly Note the various Catalogues issued. 
 
 A General Literature, Art, Economics and Freemasonry. 
 
 B Musical Literature (Biography, History, Criticism Esthetics, Essays 
 
 Organ, Orchestra, Piano, VioIin ; etc.) 
 C Music (Songs, Music for the Piano, Organ, Violin, Mandoline, etc.,) 
 
 in sheet form and in hound volumes. 
 D Social and Political Books and Pamphlets. 
 E Masonic Text Books Rituals, etc. 
 
 LONDON: 
 WILLIAM REEVES, 8? Charing Cross Road. W.C. 
 
CATALOGUE A 
 
 WILLIAM REEVES 
 
 AND 
 
 REEVES & TURNERS 
 
 PUBLICATIONS 
 
 WO B KS IN GENERAL LETT HAT I ^E E 
 AND ECONOMICS 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 WORKS ON FREEMASONRY 
 
 1 
 
 t^^T Kindly Note the various Catalogues issued. 
 
 A General Literature, Art, Economics and Freemasonry. 
 
 IS Musical Literature (Biography, History, Criticism /Esthetics, Essays 
 
 Organ, Orchestra, Piano, Violin ; etc.) 
 C Music (Songs, Music for the Piano, Organ, Violin, Mandoline, etc.,) 
 
 in sheet form and in hound volumes. 
 D Social and Political Books and Pamphlets. 
 E Masonic Text Books Rituals, etc. 
 
 LONDON: 
 WILLIAM REEVES, 83 Charing Cross Road. W.C. 
 
GENERAL L1TERA TURE, 
 
 THE BEST TERRIBLE TALES from the German, French, 
 Italian and Spanish. By Authors of Repute, many 
 being especially Translated for this Collection and 
 appearing here for the First Time in English. Over 
 170 pages in each volume, the set of 4 vols., tastefully 
 bound in cloth, gilt top, rough edges, 8s. 6d. net. 
 Preface reads: Id this collection of Terrible Talcs I have gathered 
 together the best with which I am acquainted in The various languages. 
 Very many of them, so far as I know, have never before appeared in Eng- 
 lish. The Tales are told by masters of the craft of story-telling, and are 
 such as, it seems to me, must prove interesting to all. For ordinary 
 humanity the terrible will always possess a fascination, and we find tin- 
 best literary men of all countries and all times availing themselves of it 
 in order to amuse their readers. French, German. Italian and Spanish 
 authors have exerted themselves in the composition of such pieces, with 
 what success I leave the reader of Terrible Tales to judge. 
 
 [William Shakespeare] THE YOUNG MAN FROM 
 STRATFORD. A Juryman's View of the Bacon- 
 Shakespeare Controversy. By Henry Saint-George. 
 
 Portrait. Crown 8vo, cloth, 2s. net. 
 
 " This is an attempt to view the controversy from the point of view of the 
 juryman who, having heard the advocates of both sides has to deliver his 
 verdict for or against Bacon or Shakespeare as the case may be. It is a 
 fresh method of treatment and well handled too; indeed it is one of the 
 sanest books we have met with on the subject."- Freeman's Journal. 
 
 Over 1,300 Pages. 
 THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF PERCY BYSSHE 
 SHELLEY. The Text Carefully Revised, with Notes 
 and a Memoir by William Michael Rossetti. 
 Together with occasional Notes or Textual Revisions by 
 Dr. R. Garnett, R. Browning, W. Bell Scott, A. C. 
 Swinburne, W. Allingham, James i'B. V.") Thomson, 
 E. Z. Trelawny, H. Buxton Forman and others. 3 
 thick volumes. With Portrait, Illustrations and Fac- 
 simile. Crown 8vo, designed cloth, gilt tops, 12s. 6d. net. 
 (Published at 22s. 6d.) 
 
 Kossetti's edition of Shelley's poems containing' as it does occasional notes 
 or variant textual rendering's of so many authorities is an indispensable 
 work for all lovers of the poet. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE VIOLIN AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
 PLAYED ON WITH A BOW, from the Remotest Times 
 to the Present; also an Account of the Principal 
 Makers, English and Foreign. By W. Sandys and S. 
 A. Forster. With numerous Illustrations. Thick 8vo, 
 cloth, offered at 7s. 6d. net (pub. 14s.). 
 
GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 LETTERS WRITTEN BY LORD CHESTERFIELD TO HIS 
 
 SON. Edited, with occasional Elucidatory Notts, 
 Translations oi all the Latin, French and Italian Quota- 
 tions mid ;i Biographical Notice of the Author. By 
 Charles Stokes Carey. With Portrait. Over 800 
 pages. Two thick volumes. Crown 8vo, cloth. 10s. (id. 
 
 The literary reputation of Chesterfield rests on the letterB. Their shrewd- 
 is, "it and purity of style are universally admitted; their moral tone is 
 re disputable, but modern criticism has tended to modify Johnson's 
 
 • i 88. w it a 
 
 mo 
 
 - vere strictures. 
 
 •• The Keystone op all the Occult Sciences." 
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM OR MESMERISM AND ITS PHENO- 
 MENA. By the late William Gregory, M.D., F.R.S.E. 
 Fifth Edition. With Introduction by " M.A. Oxon." 
 
 Over 250 pages, 8vo, cloth. Published at 6s. net. 
 Professor Gregory's work has well been described as " the keystone of 
 all the occult sciences " and as a standard work on mesmerism has always 
 held its place. Many chapters full of interest bear on some of the 
 familiar phenomena of spiritualism — Clairvoyance. Lucid Prevision, Mes- 
 meric Trance, etc. — as well as others dealing with the more obscure phe- 
 nomena under such headings as Premonitions, Preditions, Mesmeric Sensi- 
 tives, Self-Induced Trance, Od Force, Phreno-Mesmerism, The Mesmer- 
 ising of Animals, The Healing Power of Mesmerism, Odyle, Visions in 
 Crystals, Medical Clairvoyance, Extasis. In fact, the work is a store- 
 mine of information for the student of the occult. 
 
 Folk-lore of the Basutos. 
 BASUTOLAND: ITS LEGENDS AND CUSTOMS. By M. 
 
 Martin. Crown 8vo, cloth, 3s. 6d. net. 1903 
 
 The author as the wife of a Basutoland Government official, spent many 
 years in the large tract in South Africa reserved for this remarkable 
 race. Both her husband and herself moving continually amongst the 
 natives and living in no less than ten different homes during the period 
 of their official duties, had peculiar opportunities for studying the cus- 
 toms and folk-lore of the natives. 
 
 ESOTERIC ANTHROPOLOGY (The Mysteries of Man). A 
 Comprehensive and Confidential Treatise on the Struc- 
 ture, Functions, Passional Attractions and Perversions, 
 True and False Physical and Social Conditions, and the 
 Most Intimate Relations of Men and Women. By T. L. 
 Nichols, M.D., F.A.S. With numerous Illustrations, 
 thick post 8vo, cloth, 5s. net. 
 
 250,000 copies of this work having now been issued to the general public 
 is, we consider, the best testimony of its value as a hygienic guide. It 
 consists of twenty-four chapters of 347 compactly-printed pages together 
 with many illustrations. 
 
GENERA L LITERATI' RE. 
 
 PRACTICAL ASTROLOCiY. By Alan Leo. Being a 
 Simple Method of Instruction in the Science of Astro- 
 logy. New and Revised Edition, with Numerous Dia- 
 grams and Tables. Thick crown 8vo, cloth. Published 
 at 5s. net. 1910 
 
 Contents.— Introduction.— Chapter I, The Signs of the Zodiac— II, The 
 flanets and their Symbols. — III, The Aspects. — IY, The Value of the 
 A-spects. — V, The Exaltations of the Planets. — VI, The Planets and Signs. 
 —VII, The Nature of the Signs of the Zodiac. — VIII, The Groupings of 
 the Signs. — IX, The Twelve Houses of the Heavens. — X, How to Cast the 
 Horoscope.— XI, How to Place the Planets in the Map.— XII, The Various 
 Branches of Astrology.— XIII, The True Nature of the Various Planets.— 
 XIV, The Decanates and Faces of the Signs of the Zodiac— XV, The 
 Twelve Houses of the Horoscope. — XVI, Character and Disposition.— XVII. 
 The Mental Qualities. —XVIII, Mind and Character Contrasted.— XIX, De- 
 lineation of Two Horoscopes. — XX, Delineation of Map No. 7.— XXI, How 
 to Improve the Life, Mind atid Character.— XXII, Final Considerations. 
 
 {Uniform with Chaffers' Hall Marks.) Fully Illustrated. 
 Handsome Large Royal 8vo Volume. 
 
 PEWTER MARKS AND OLD PEWTER WARE (Domestic 
 and Ecclesiastical). By Christopher A. Markham, 
 F.S.A. With about 100 Illustrations, 200 Facsimile 
 Marks and nearly 1,000 Full Descriptions of Touches 
 from the Touch Plate at Pewterers' Hall, as well as other 
 Marks obtained from Various Sources. List of Members 
 of the Pewterers' Company from 1450 to the Present 
 Time. Information on the Manufacture, Composition 
 and Cleaning of Pewter, etc. Thick royal 8vo, cloth, 
 gilt top, 21s. 1909 
 
 J. H. Yoxall, M.P., the well-known writer on Collector's Hobbies, says : 
 " In my opinion ' Pewter Marks and Old Pewter Ware ' does for col- 
 lecting old pewter what ' Chaffers ' did for collectors of plate and pottery 
 and porcelain— it authentically and comprehensively gives the maker's 
 marks and names and dates, and it enables verification. I consider it 
 is necessary in the pewter line as ' Chaffers ' is in the lines of old 
 ceramics and old gold and silver plate." 
 
 " There are 1,168 of these touches. All are clearly printed and dis- 
 tinguished, so that anyone possessing old pewter bearing one of these 
 marks can readily ascertain its date and origin. The chapters whieh 
 deal with the history of the manufacture are well illustrated by a series 
 of domestic and ecclesiastical subjects .... while the collector continues 
 to collect, this book will be invaluable to him." — The Antiquary. 
 
 " It is just the kind of book a collector likes, full of the ' marks ' and 
 touches that help him to select and arrange his treasures. Already it 
 has achieved the dignity of a large edition." — Glasgow Evening News. 
 
 " Mr. Markham's book is the first really exhaustive work on the subject. 
 Its importance, therefore, to the collector is obvious. It is a sumptuous 
 volume." — Northampton Herald 
 
GKN h'HA L LITER A TU HM. 
 
 ENGLISH PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL PHRASES. By 
 
 W. Cauew Hazutt. Collected from the most Authentic 
 Sources, Alphabetically Arranged with Extensive and 
 Valuable Explanatory Notes, together with many Refer- 
 ences to their Earliest Occurrence. New Edition, re- 
 vised throughout. Nearly 600 pages. Thick crown 
 8vo, cloth, gilt top, 7s. 6d. 1907 
 
 It is believed that no work quite so comprehensive as this is to be found 
 in any of the European languages. This volume and subject have now 
 occupied the Editor during more than forty years, and no pains have been 
 spared to make it satisfactory and complete. 
 
 The Editor begs to signalise the valuable co-operation of Mr. F. J. 
 Furnivall, Rev. \V. YV. Skeat, the late Archbishop Trench, Mr. A. T. Q.- 
 Couch, Mr. \V. Aldis Wright, Mr. C. W. Keynell, Mr. A. G. Greenhill, 
 of Emmanuel, Cambridge, Mr. J. Higson, Lees, Manchester (for many 
 proverbial sayings of Lancashire and Cheshire), Mr. Raymond Vose, filr. 
 John Shelley (of Plymouth), and other gentlemen who have obligingly 
 assisted him in various ways. 
 
 " Very neatly bound and well printed. The wonderful completeness of 
 the volume will be apparent on any casual reference to the text ; the com 
 parative study of national proverbs and phrases being facilitated by 
 allusions to allied sayings in foreign tongues. The literary value of the 
 book is evidenced by constant reference to authorities, and by instances of 
 phrase employment by famous English writers." — The Globe. 
 
 " The most fascinating dictionaries are those of phrase and fable and 
 the best phrase-book is ' Hazlitt.' "— Westminster Gazette. 
 
 Second Edition, 1908. With Nearly 200 Illustrations. 
 
 A HISTORY OF FURNITURE, together with Chapters on 
 Tapestry, Oriental Embroidery and Leather Work, 
 Bronzes, Ivories and other Figures, Clocks and Time 
 Pieces, Wrought Iron, Brass and other Metal Work, 
 Jewellery, Gems and Enamels, Glass and Ceramics, 
 Oriental Lacquer, Varnish, etc. By Albert Jacque- 
 mart. Edited and Translated by Mrs. Bury Palliser. 
 Second Edition. With nearly 200 Illustrations, 500 
 pages. Thick royal octavo, ornamental cloth. Pub- 
 lished at 31s. 6d. 
 
 Albert Jacquemart was a most accomplished and scientific writer, and 
 this history is the matured fruits of a life of study and continuous obser 
 vation. He was favoured by witnessing the reward and development of 
 the taste for Art, which has become the feature of the present generation. 
 
 For the last few years the " History of Furniture " has been out of 
 print, scarce and at a premium, so no apology is needed for reprinting a 
 work so necessary to all Collectors, Dealers and Lovers of the Antique. 
 
 The whole of the original illustrations, which lend such value to the 
 text, have been reproduced and we venture to believe in a much superior 
 style than in the first issue. The drawings are the work of Jacquemart'e 
 eon and are models of brilliancy and finish. 
 
GESEHAL IAL ERA TV HE. 
 
 Popular Antiquities or Great Britain. 
 FAITHS AM) FOLKLORE. A Dictionary of National Beliefs. 
 Superstitions, and Popular Customs, Past and Current, 
 with their Classical and Foreign Analogues, Described 
 and Illustrated. Forming a New Edition of " The Popu- 
 lar Antiquities of Great Britain," by Brand and Ellis. 
 largely Extended, Corrected and brought down to the 
 Present Time, and now First Alphabetically Arranged. 
 By W. C'Kew Hazlitt. Specimens of Reference Head- 
 ings: Abbot of Bon Accord, Abbot of Unreason, Abing- 
 don, Berks, Abraham-Men, Admiral of the Blue, Adop- 
 tion, Adventurer, Advertisements and Bills, JEpiornis 
 or Epiornis, Aerolites, iEtites, Afternoon Music. 
 St. Agatha's Letters, St. Agnes Day or Eve, Agues, St. 
 Aldgate, Ale. Ale-house, Ale-Stake or Bush, All Fours, 
 Allhallow Even, All-Hallows, All-Hid, All in the Well, 
 All Saints, Alsatia, Altar, Ambassador, St. Ampoule, 
 Amulets, Anagram, Ancients, St. Andrew's Day, 
 St. Andrew's Well, Aneling, Angelica, Angels or Genii, 
 St. Anne's Well, near Nottingham, St. Anthony of 
 Egypt or Thebes, St. Anthony of Padua, Apostle Spoons, 
 Apparitions, Apple-Howling, Appleton-Thorn, St. Ap- 
 pollonia's Day, etc., etc. 2 vols, 8vo, bevelled cloth, 
 gilt tops, 21s. 
 " Students are greatly indebted to the industry which has given us these 
 volumes .... they will especially appreciate the alphabetical form which 
 has for the first time been adopted." — The Spectator. 
 
 " Wherever you open it, you may dip with the certainty of bringing up 
 something suggestive or entertaining or informing .... It is hardly too 
 much to say that they contain something about almost everything con- 
 nected with popular lore and custom." — The Antiquary. 
 
 " All lovers of folklore and they grow more numerous every year are 
 under an obligation to Mr. Hazlitt for these most serviceable volumes." — 
 The Graphic. 
 
 " The two volumes form a handsome dictionary of national beliefs, 
 superstitions and popular customs, both past and present, and, as a gift- 
 book to those interested in these matters, would doubtless be regarded with 
 much favour." — The World. 
 
 THE NATURALIST IN BERMUDA. A Sketch of the 
 Geology, Zoology and Botany of that remarkable Group 
 of Islands, together with Meteorological Observations 
 by J. M. Jones, assisted by Major J. W. Wedderburn 
 and J. L Hurder. with a Map and Illustrations. Cr. 
 8vo, cloth. 7s. fid. 1859 
 
GUN URAL LITERATURE. 
 
 The Best Librae? Edition. 
 ESSAYS AND LETTERS OF MONTAIGNE. Edited by Wm. 
 Carew Hazlitt. An Entirely New Edition formed 
 from a Collation of the Foreign Quotations; a fresh 
 English rendering and a Careful Revision of the Text 
 throughout, some Account of the Life of Montaigne, 
 Notes to which are Added, a Translation of all the 
 Letters known to be Extant. With Index, Portraits, 
 Facsimile Letter and other Illustrations. Handsome 
 Library Edition, 4 Volumes, 8vo, in designed buckram 
 cloth, 42s. 1902 
 
 " A sumptuous edition and will form a worthy addition to any library. 
 It contains man; letters of the illimitable essayist never before published, 
 and the translation is undoubtedly tlie best that has yet appeared in 
 ting-laud." — Daily Telegraph. 
 
 " The book has now at length been adapted to the last French Variorum 
 so far as possible, and innumerable errors of the former English versions 
 have been rectified. The Biographical account of the essayist has been 
 considerably amplified, and instead of the sixteen Letters given in 1877 
 there are thirty-five." — The Athenaeum. 
 
 Russell Lowell says of Montaigne : — " He helped himself to ideas in every 
 direction, but they turn to blood and colouring in his style and give a 
 freshness of complexion that is for ever charming." 
 
 " Cotton's text is revised from comparison with the original and with 
 Florio, his liberties corrected and his interpolations transferred to foot 
 notes. The work on the whole has been well done and the text much cleared 
 and improved, so that it comes closer to Montaigne than any now in tbe 
 market. . . . We could cite passages where Mr. Hazlitt's Cotton clears 
 what in Florio is nonsense." — The Academy. 
 
 " The results of Mr. Hazlitt's labours are before us in these four well 
 printed (on specially made paper), handsomely bound volumes — an ideal 
 library edition of the prince of essayists — Mr. Hazlitt has carefully revised 
 the English translations of the many Greek and Latin Quotations and 
 supplied and verified the references — a laborious piece of work .... has 
 given us in these beautifully produced volumes, decidedly the best and 
 fullest presentment of Montaigne yet available in English." -The 
 Antiquary. 
 
 THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA. From 1746 to 1849 
 inclusive. By Colonel G. B. Malleson, C.S.I. Por- 
 trait, Map and Four Plans. Fourth Edition. Thick 
 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d. 
 
 This volume contains the story of the conquest of the several races of 
 India by our countrymen, and in no other history is the story of how we 
 won India told with more attention to the real causes of our action, and 
 with greater resolve to tell the whole truth without respect of persons. On 
 the appearance of the work it was seen to be of such interest and import- 
 ance that the Times devoted to it a leading article. Since then three large 
 editions have been sold and the work is now available in a fourth edition. 
 
GENERAL LIT ERA TU RE. 
 
 Chaffers' Works on Pottery and Porcelain, and Gold and Silver Plate, 
 are the recognised authoritative works amongst all Dealers, Collectors, 
 Librarians, Auctioneers, Estate Agents and Valuers for Probate and in the 
 Law Courts. They are continually being brought up-to-date by their 
 respective editors. 
 
 THE KERAMIC GALLERY. Containing several Hundred 
 Illustrations of Rare, Curious and Choice Examples of 
 Pottery and Porcelain from the Earliest 'limes to the 
 Beginning of the Nineteenth Century. With Historical 
 Notices and Descriptions. By William Chaffers. 
 Second Edition. Revised and Edited by H. M, CVn- 
 dall, I.S.O., F.S.A. Nearly 500 pages, roy. 8vo, cloth 
 extra, gilt top, 35s. net. 
 
 This new edition, which has been thoroughly revised and provided with 
 an index, contains over one hundred more examples than the first edition, 
 besides five in colour, is in one volume instead of two and is issued at half 
 the price. 
 
 "The New Chaffers," Reset, Enlarged and Revised 
 Throughout, 1912. 
 
 MARKS AND MONOGRAMS ON EUROPEAN AND ORI- 
 ENTAL POTTERY AND PORCELAIN. With over 
 5,000 Potters' Marks and Illustrations. By William 
 Chaffers. Thirteenth Edition, with an Increased 
 Number of some 2,000 Potters' Marks and a List of 
 Sale Prices. Edited by F. Litchfield, assisted by R. L. 
 Hobson, of the British Museum (Majolica and Ori- 
 ental Sections), and Dr. Justus Brinckmann, Curator 
 of the Hamburg Museum. Over 1,100 pages, thick 
 imperial 8vo, ornamental cloth, gilt top, 42s. net. 1912 
 
 Ninth Edition, Considerably Augmented and Carefully 
 Revised by C. A. Markham. 
 
 HALL MARKS ON GOLD AND SILVER PLATE. By \Ym. 
 
 Chaffers. Illustrated with Revised Tables of Annual 
 Date Letters Employed in the Assay Offices of the United 
 Kingdom. Together with A History of L'Orfevrerie 
 Francaise, with Extracts of Statutes and Ordinances 
 and 12 Plates of French Hall Marks. Ninth Edition, 
 Extended and Enlarged, with Frontispiece and the 
 Addition of 260 New Date Letters and Marks, and a Bib- 
 liography. About 400 pp., royal 8vo, cloth, gilt top, 21s. 
 
 1905 
 
I ■ EN E HAL LIT ERA TURE. 
 
 The Companion to "Hall Marks on Gold and Silver 
 Plate." 
 
 HISTORY OF ENGLISH GOLDSMITHS AND PLATE- 
 WORKERS (GILDA AURIFABRORUM), and their 
 Marks stamped on Plate, copied in Facsimile from 
 Celebrated Examples and the Earliest Records Pre- 
 served at Goldsmiths' Hall, London, with their Names, 
 Addresses and Dates of Entry. By Wm. Chaffers. 
 2,500 Illustrations ; also Historical Account of the Gold- 
 smiths' Company and their Hall Marks and Regalia ; 
 the Mint; Closing of the Exchequer; Goldsmith 
 Hankers ; Shop Signs, a Copious Index, etc. 267 
 pages, royal 8vo, cloth, 12s. 1899 
 
 The price of old plate steadily increases and naturally Collectors, 
 Dealers and others desire every proof in fixing dates. The above work 
 will be of great value in ascertaining the fourth stamp on plate, viz., the 
 Makers' Mark. No less than 2,500 marks being tabulated with their Names, 
 Addresses and Dates of Entry, together with much other information. 
 
 COLLECTOR'S HANDBOOK OF MARKS AND MONO- 
 GRAMS ON POTTERY AND PORCELAIN OF THE 
 RENAISSANCE AND MODERN PERIOD. By Wm. 
 
 Chaffers. New and Enlarged Edition. With some 
 5,000 Marks selected from his Larger Work Edited by 
 F. Litchfield, assisted by R. L. Hobson, B.A., of the 
 British Museum, and Dr. J. Brinckmann, Curator of 
 the Hamburg Museum. Crown 8vo, cloth, gilt, 6s. net . 
 
 This Handbook will be of great service to Collectors while travelling, 
 being a compact and liandy volume for easy and quick reference. 
 
 COLLECTOR'S HANDBOOK TO KERAMICS OF THE RE- 
 NAISSANCE AND MODERN PERIODS. Selected from 
 the Larger Work entitled the Keramic Gallery. By 
 William Chaffers. With 350 Illustrations. Crown 
 8vo, cloth, Gs. 
 
 This handbook is full of illustrations of the rare and valuable specimens 
 of pottery and porcelain so eagerly sought after by collectors. A careful 
 study of the pieces depicted and their accompanying descriptions should 
 greatly assist beginners in recognising good specimens and add to their 
 powers of discernment and critical judgment, particularly with respect to 
 the many pieces bearing no marks. Brief accounts of the principal manu- 
 factories are iriven. 
 
GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 The Three following form a Complete Set of Handbooks 
 on Gold and Silver Plate. English, French and Foreign. 
 HANDBOOK TO HALL MARKS ON GOLD AND SILVER 
 PLATE. By Wm. Chaeeers. With Revised Tables of 
 Annual Dale Letters Employed in the Assay Offices of 
 England, Scotland and Ireland. Fourth Edition, Edited 
 and Extended with over 220 Additional New Marks by 
 C. A. Markham, F.S.A. Crown 8vo, cloth, 6s. net. 1913 
 This fourth edition has ben extended and completely revised. Some 220 
 new marks have been added by the editor, forty of which have been drawn 
 by Mr. T. Shepard, of the Heralds' Office. Dublin Castle. The whole of 
 the additional marks have been taken from various pieces of silver, with 
 the exception of the present date letters, which have been furnished by the 
 Assay Masters, and the foreign marks which have been taken, by permis- 
 sion from official sources. This work is intended for all those who require 
 in a convenient form information respecting the marks on gold and silver, 
 for the purpose of readily fixing the date and office of assay of any piece 
 of plate. 
 
 HANDBOOK TO FOREIGN HALL MARKS ON GOLD AND 
 SILVER PLATE (except those on French Plate). By 
 C. A. Markham, F.S.A. , containing 163 Stamps. 
 With Notes on the Various Makers. Crown 8vo, cloth, 
 5s. 
 
 hANDBOOK TO FRENCH HALL MARKS ON GOLD AND 
 SILVER PLATE. By C. A. Markham. Notes on the 
 Various Makers with Illustrations of their Ma rks. Crown 
 8vo, cloth, 5s. 
 
 SHELLEY'S PRINCIPLES. Has Time Refuted or Con- 
 firmed Them? A Retrospect and Forecast. By 
 Henry S. Salt. Post 8vo, sewed, 6d. net. 
 
 HAUNTED HOMES AND FAMILY TRADITIONS OF 
 GREAT BRITAIN. By J. H. Ingram. With Illustra- 
 tions. The two Series in one thick volume. Crown 
 8vo, cloth. Published at 7s. (id. 
 
 The collection of strange stories and weird traditions has not been corn 
 piled with a view of creating tut frisson noueeau, but to serve as a guide 
 to the geography of Ghostlaud— a Handbook to the Haunted Homes of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 "It is a book that will be welcomed, not only by the general reader, 
 but the literary student and lover of antiquities will uo doubt be glad 
 to add it to Ins reference library, for it is the means of preserving curi 
 ous traditions associated with souie one hundred and fifty of the most 
 interesting spots in the country. The mystery of ' Epworth Parsonage ' 
 it is really an unaccountable thing. We cannot doubt the relation, for it 
 is from the words of John Wesley himself, and the victims were the 
 members of his own family." — The Schoolmaster. 
 
GENERAL LITERATI l:i 
 
 ARMS AND ARMOUR IN ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE 
 
 AGES; also a Descriptive Notice of Modern Weapons. 
 By Charles Boutell. Translated from the French of 
 M. P. Lacombe*. With a Preface, Notes, and an Addi- 
 tional Chapter on Arms and Armour in England. A 
 
 New Edition. With numerous added Illustrations of 
 tine Specimens from the Collections of Sir Noel Paton, 
 Lord Zouche, Windsor Castle, etc., etc. Crown 8vo, 
 cloth. Published at 7s. (id. 
 
 CONTENTS. — Weapons of the Stone Aye — Arms and Armour of the Bronte 
 Age — Of the Greeks and Persians — Of the Romans — Decoration of Ancient 
 Arms and Armour — Weapons of Savage Races— Of the Middle Ages — Of the 
 Transition Era — Arms and Armour in England — Modern Arms, etc., etc. 
 
 ENGLISH HERALDRY. Specially Prepared for the Use of 
 
 Students. By Charles Boutell. Eleventh Edition, Ed- 
 ited and Revised with Additions (including the New 
 Orders recently created) by A. C. Fox-Davies. Nearly 
 500 Illustrations, 367 pages. Crown 8vo, cloth. Pub- 
 lished at 7s. 6d. 
 
 Contents. — Introduction — Early Heraldic Authorities — English Heraldry 
 as now Existing— Grammar of Heraldry— Marshalling— Cadency— Differ 
 encing— Crests— Badges— Supporters— Flags— Royal Heraldry— Orders of 
 Knighthood— Precedence— Genealogies— The College of Arms— Coins— Seals, 
 etc. etc. 
 
 This volume, eminently suitable for the use of students at an early 
 period of their study of English Heraldry, commends itself also to those 
 inquirers who may desire some general information on the same subject, 
 without having any intention to devote to Heraldry too much of their 
 rime or serious regard. 
 
 Inseparably associated with the History of our Country, English 
 Heraldry has the strongest claims upon the attention not only of all 
 Historians, but also of all who desire to become familiar with their 
 writings. In like manner, Heraldry may be studied with no less of ad 
 vantage than of satisfaction by all Artists, whether Architects, Sculptors. 
 Painters or Engravers, nor is it too much to assert that a knowledge of 
 Heraldry, in consequence of its singular and comprehensive utility, ought 
 to be estimated as a necessary element of a liberal education. 
 
 FLAGELLATION AND THE FLAGELLANTS. A History of 
 the Rod in all Countries, from the Earliest Period. By 
 the Rev. W. M. Cooper. With numerous curious Illus- 
 trations, Full-page and otherwise. 540 pages, thick 
 crown 8vo, cloth, 7s. 6d. (issued at 12s. 6d.) 
 A True History of the Rod as an instrument for correctional purpose! 
 
 in the Church, the State, and the Familv 
 
 LIFE OF DAVID GARRICK. By J. Smyth. Post 8vo, 
 boards, Is. 
 
12 GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 RURAL RIDES in the Counties of Surrey, Kent, Sussex, 
 Hants, Wilts, Gloucester, Berks, Oxford, Bucks, Somer- 
 set, Hereford, Salop, Worcester, Stafford, Leicester, 
 Hertford, Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge, Hunting- 
 don, Nottingham, Lincoln, York, Lancaster, Durham 
 and Northumberland, During the Years 1821 to 1832. 
 By W. Cobuett. With Economical and Political Obser- 
 vations. Edited with Life, New Notes, and the Addi- 
 tion of a Copious Index, New Edition by Pitt Cobbett. 
 Map and Portrait, xlviii and 806 pages, 2 vols., crown 
 8vo, cloth, gilt, 12s. 6d. 1908 
 
 If we regard these rural rides as a whole, we shall find in them an 
 accurate picture of social and domestic life in England, which it would 
 be difficult to find elsewhere. Although a keen politician, every- 
 one at all acquainted with Cobbett's writings must have observed his 
 passionate sympathy with all rural occupations. He wrote on such sub- 
 jects with ail the yearnings of first love ; the reader feels the breeze fan- 
 ning his cheek, he smells the heather and the young hawthorn, and he 
 hears the song of birds on every side, and there is a homely vigour in his 
 style whicn is perfectly delightful in this age of artificial refinement. Our 
 companion throughout the book is a man who thoroughly understand.- 
 what he is describing with all the experience of a farmer, and with all the 
 keen observation oi a naturalist. For this reason no lover of country 
 pursuits can take up " Rural Rides " without a new interest and delight. 
 
 " Cobbett's ' Rural Rides ' is to us a delightful book, but it is one which 
 few people know. We are not sure that up to the present time it was im- 
 possible to get a nice edition of it. We are therefore glad to see that 
 Messrs. Reeves and Turner's recently published edition is a very creditable 
 production, two handy well tilled volumes." — Gardening. 
 
 ANCIENT MYSTERIES DESCRIBED: Especially the Eng- 
 lish Miracle Plays founded on the Apocryphal New 
 Testament Story, Extant among the Unpublished MSS. 
 in the British Museum, including Notices of Ecclesias- 
 tical Shows and Festivals of Fools and Asses, the Eng- 
 lish Boy Bishop, Descent into Hell, the Lord Mayor's 
 Show, the Guildhall Giants, Christmas Carols, etc. 
 With Engravings and Index. By William Hone. 300 
 pages, 8vo, cloth. Published at 5s. 
 
 Contents. — Mysteries. 1. The Birth of Mary. 2. Mary's Education in the 
 Temple, and being served by Angels. 3. The Miraculous Espousal of 
 Joseph and Mary. 4. A Council of the Trinity and the Incarnation. 5 
 Joseph's Jealousy. <j. Visit of Mary to Elizabeth. 7. The Trial of Mary 
 and Joseph. 8. The Marvellous Birth and the Midwives; the above occupy 
 ing 72 pages. Pages 73 to 300 consist of interesting chapters as follows: — 
 1. Council of the Trinity. 2. The Brethren of the Holy Trinity of St. 
 Botolph without Aldersgate. 3. Christmas Carols. 4. Engravings of 
 Apocryphal New Testament Subjects. 5. The Descent into Hell. 6. 
 Heme's Print of the Descent into Hell. 7. Origin of Mysteries. 8. The Boy 
 Bishop— English Mysteries. !). Pageants. 10, Lord Mayor's Show. 11. The 
 Giants in Guildhall. Addenda- Glossary — Index. 
 
GENERAL LITER I'll RE 
 
 THE APOCRYPHAL NEW TESTAMENT: Being all the 
 Gospels. Epistles, and other Pieces now Extant attri- 
 buted in the first Four Centuries to Jesus Christ, His 
 Apostles and their Companions, and not included in the 
 New Testament by its Compilers. By William Hone. 
 8vo, cloth. Published at 5s. 
 After the writings contained in the New Testament were selected from tht 
 numerous Gospels and Epistles then in existence, what became of the 
 books that were rejected by the compilers? This question naturally 
 (.ccurs on every investigation as to the period when and the persons by 
 whom, the New Testament was founded. The books that exist are carefully 
 brought together in the present volume. They naturally assume the title 
 of the Apocryphal New Testament, and he who possesses this and the New 
 Testament has in two volumes practically all the historical records relative 
 to Christ and his Apostles now in existence. 
 
 POETICAL WORKS (Complete) OF JAMES THOMSON 
 ("B. V."). The City of Dreadful Night, Vane's Story, 
 Weddah and Om-el-Bonain, Voice from the Hell, and 
 Poetical Remains. Edited by B. Dobell, with Memoir 
 and Portrait. 2 vols., thick crown 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d. 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES. By James 
 Thomson (*'B. V."). 483 pages, crown 8vo, cloth, 6s. 
 
 A SHELLEY PRIMER. By H. S. Salt. Cr. 8vo, bds., 2s. 6d. 
 
 THE MUSIC OF THE MOST ANCIENT NATIONS, Par- 
 ticularly of the Assyrians, Egyptians and Hebrews ; 
 with special reference to recent discoveries in Western 
 Asia and in Egypt. By Carl Engel. With numerous 
 illustrations. Thick demy 8vo, cloth, 8s. 6d. net (pub- 
 lished at 18s.-). 
 
 Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians says of Carl Engel : 
 " His attainments as a musician, his clear insight into books in many 
 languages, his indefatigable perseverance in research and the exercise of 
 a rare power of judicious discrimination, made him one of the first author- 
 ities on his subject in Europe, and he became a collector when opportuni- 
 ties were more frequent than they are now for acquiring rare instruments 
 and books. He thus formed a private museum and library that could 
 hardly be rivalled except by a few public institutions." 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF NATIONAL 
 MUSIC. Comprising Researches into Popular Songs, 
 Traditions and Customs. By Carl Engel. With 
 numerous Musical Examples throughout. Thick 8vo, 
 cloth. 
 
14 GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 SONGS FROM THE RAVEL. Song-Poems for Setting to 
 Music. By Ernest Austin. Crown 8vo, sewed, 2s. 6d. 
 
 MODEST IDYLLS FOR MUSICAL SETTING. By Ernest 
 Alfieri. Crown 8vo, sewed. Is. net. 
 
 RUSKIN'S NOTES ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL 
 PICTURES OF SIR JOHN EVERETT MILLAIS. Ex- 
 hibited at the Grosvenor Gallery, 1886. With a Preface 
 and Original and Selected Criticisms by John Ruskin 
 and other Comments. 8vo, sewed, Is. 
 
 RUSKIN'S NOTES OF THE PICTURES OF MR. HOLMAN 
 HUNT. Exhibited at the Rooms of the Eine Ait 
 Society, 1886. With Criticisms by John Ruskin and 
 other Comments. 8vo, sewed, Is. 
 
 THE NATURALIST SCHOOL OF PAINTING. By E. Bate. 
 
 Is. (large paper, 2s. 6d.) 
 
 THE NATIONAL MUSIC OF THE WORLD. By H. F. 
 
 Chorley. Edited by H. G. Hewlitt. Contains many 
 Musical Illustrations. With Frontispiece. New Im- 
 pression with Index added. Crown 8vo, cloth, gilt top, 
 6s. 1911 
 
 Mr. Chorley was for many years the musical critic of The Atheineum, and 
 this volume is marked in the highest degree by the critic's acumen and 
 learning. The research and speculation for which the theme affords such 
 ample scope is supported by a profusion of illustration attesting the wide 
 range of the author's experience as a student of the art. 
 
 BABES AND INFANTS: Their Foods, and Notes on Manage- 
 ment. A Book for Mothers, Nurses, and Those having 
 the Care of Children. By Frederic Mercer, Physician. 
 Post 8vo, sewed, 9d. 1907 
 
 Preface says : — My life as a medical practitioner of nearly twenty years' 
 standing and experience, has taught me that there is a great deficiency of 
 knowledge as to the correct method of rearing infants. It is sad to think 
 that half the children who die under one year of age, do so from improper 
 feeding ; and still more melancholy is the knowledge that this mortality is, 
 if not entirely preventable, capable of diminution. With the latter object 
 in view I have written this small book, etc. 
 
FREEMASONRY. 
 
 BOOKS OIM FREEMASONRY. 
 
 TEXT-ROOK OF FREEMASONRY. A Complete Handbook 
 of Instruction to all the "Workings in the Various 
 Mysteries and Ceremonies of Craft Masonry. Contain- 
 ing tli*> Entered Apprentice, Fellow-Craft, and Master 
 Mason's degrees. Ceremony of Installation of the 
 \V. Master and Officers of the Lodge, together with the 
 whole of the Three Lectures. Also the Ceremony of Ex- 
 altation in the Supreme Order of the Holy Royal Arch. 
 Illustrated with four engravings of the TRACING 
 BOARDS. By "A Member of the Craft." New and 
 Revised Edition. 270 pages, post 8vo, blue cloth, red 
 edges. 5s. (or blue calf limp, gilt edges, 10s. net). 
 
 Ditto, on thin paper, bound in leather pocket-book style, 5s. 
 
 The Waistcoat Pocket Edition. 
 THE HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTION IN CRAM 
 
 MASONRY. Containing the Full Workings of the En- 
 tered Apprentice, Fellow-Craft and Master Mason's 
 Degrees. Printed in red and black. With Folding 
 Plates of the Three Tracing Boards. 148 pages. 12mo, 
 leather, 4s. net. Size 3^ inches by 2\ inches. 
 Tliis small but clear type edition is eminently suitable for carrying on 
 the person for study and reference at odd moments. The size and compact- 
 ness allow of its comfortable insertion in the waistcoat pocket. 
 
 THE THREE TRACING BOARDS. In post 8vo, cloth line, 
 Is. 6d. net. 
 
 TEXT-BOOK OF ADVANCED FREEMASONRY, containing, 
 for the self-Instruction of Candidates, the Complete 
 Rituals of the Higher Degrees, viz., Royal Ark 
 Mariners, Mark Master, Royal Arch, Red Cross of 
 Rome and Constantinople, Knights Templar and Rose 
 Croix de Heredom ; also Monitorial Instructions on the 
 30th to the 33rd and last degree of Freemasonry. With 
 Historical Introductions and Explanatory remarks. 278 
 pages, ciown 8vo, cloth, 10s. net (or crimson calf Limp, 
 gilt edges. 15s. net). 
 
 This volume, presented to the Masonic Brethren by the compiler, is in- 
 tended to supply a want hitherto entirely unsupplied of a complete hand- 
 book for the self-instruction of those Brethren desirous of entering' the 
 Higher Degrees of Freemasonry. In performing this self-imposed task it 
 behoves the compiler to acknowledge the aid he has received in the His- 
 torical and Explanatory Remarks appended to the various Rituals, from 
 the works of such distinguished and erudite Brethren as Brothers Dr. 
 Oliver, Findel, C. T. McClenachan, VS., Jeremiah Howe and others. 
 
FREEMASONRY 
 
 THE SCOTTISH FREEMASON'S COMPREHENSIVE MONI- 
 TOR. Containing the Working of the E.A., F.C. and 
 M.M. Degrees, with the Three Lectures and the Cere- 
 monials of the Mark Degree and Installation of the 
 R.W.M. and Office Bearers of a Lodge. Illustrated by 
 the Three Tracing Boards. Post 8vo, cloth, 5s. 
 
 J)itt<>, on thin paper, bound in leather pocket-book style, 5s. 
 
 The above is the only authentic Scottish Ritual containing- the complete 
 workings of the three Degrees in Craft Masonry, together with the Mark 
 and Installation of the R.W.M. as universally worked under the Grand 
 Lodge of Scotland at home and abroad. 
 
 SCOTTISH FREEMASON'S COMPANION (Scottish Work- 
 ing). Containing the Complete Workings of the E.A., 
 F.C. and M.M.'s Degrees, together with the Ritual of 
 the Mark. With Charges, Test Questions, a Selection 
 of Masonic Songs, Explanations and Folding Plates of 
 the Three Tracing Boards. 12mo, limp leather, gilt 
 edges, printed in red and black, 4s. n.et. Size 31 
 inches by 2| inches. 
 This small but clear type edition is eminently suitable for carrying on 
 the person for study and reference at odd moments. The size and compact- 
 ness allow of its comfortable insertion in the waistcoat pocket. It is the 
 standard working uniform with the " Scottish Monitor " advertised on 
 this page. This edition contains the Lectures. 
 
 SCOTTISH FREEMASON'S TWENTIETH CENTURY BOOK 
 OF INSTRUCTION. Containing the Working of the 
 E.A., F.C. and M.M. Degrees, with the Ceremonies of 
 the Mark Degree. "Vest Pocket Edition" in four 
 separate parts. Size 3i inches by 2\ inches, in case, 
 2s. 6d. net. {Ditto, Four Parts, in cloth, 3s. 6d. net.) 
 
 Indispensable to young Masons. Each Degree printed and bound separ- 
 ately, the four clearly printed books being enclosed in a case. On 
 entering the E.A. Degree the first booklet can be studied, for the F.C. the 
 second booklet can be given and so on. The working is uniform with the 
 " Scottish Monitor." See above. 
 
 PERFECT CEREMONIALS OF THE SCOTTISH MARK 
 DEGREE (Standard Working). Post 8vo, cloth, 2s. net. 
 
 Contents : Introductory and Historical Notes — The Officers of a Lodge — 
 Opening a Lodge in the Mark Degree — Ceremony of Advancement. First 
 Part— Ceremony of Advancement, Second Part— Closing a Lodge in the 
 Mark Degree— Charge which may be given to the Candidate— Songs and 
 Odes. 
 
 This working is uniform with that contained in the " Scottish Monitor." 
 
FREEMASONRY 
 
 CEREMONY OF INSTALLATION 01 THE RIGHT WOR- 
 SHIPFUL MASTER (SCOTTISH WOBKING) AND 
 OFFICE BEARERS OF A LODGE. Complete Edition, 
 
 with ;i Selection of Prayers, Charges, over LOO .Masonic 
 
 Toasts and other Useful Matter. Standard Working. 
 Post 8vo, cloth, 2s. net. 
 
 Contents: The Ceremony of the Installation of the Office-Bearers — In- 
 stalled Wasters' Degree- Ceremony of Opening an Installed blaster's Degree 
 Ceremony at a Board of Installed Masters— Charges and Prayers— The 
 
 Masonic Calendar— On the Examination of a Candidate- The Jewi 
 Masonic Toasts. 
 Uniform working with the " Scottish Monitor." 
 
 MYSTERIES OF FREEMASONRY; or, An Exposition of the 
 Religious Dogmas and Customs of the Ancient Egyp- 
 tians: showing, from the origin, nature and objects of 
 the rites and ceremonies of remote antiquity, their 
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