545 UC-NRLF B M D7T Tfit, 1010 ;£P ..-J ^;^? 1010 BLANC MONT (MEUSE-ARGONNE-CHAMPAGNE) Monograph No. 9 .^?^^^ \r ^' Prepared in the Historiczi! Branch, War Plans Division , General Staif June, 1921 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1922 Wat? DEPARTifENT \ ' i)0c:ulri&]utNo.*1010 : Omcc of The Adjuiaiii Generai & WAK DEPAETMENT, Washington, April 12^ 1920. The following monograph, entitled " Blanc Mont (Meuse-Argonne- Champagne) ," prepared in the Historical Branch, War Plans Divi- sion, General Staff, is approved and published for the information of all concerned. [062.1, A. G. O.] By order of the Secretary of War : PEYTON C. MARCH, General^ Chief of Staff. Official : P. C. HAEUIS, The Adjutant General. '■-3172 GENERAL SCHEME OF MONOGRAPHS, HISTORICAL BRANCH. (Where a title is given without special mark, the monograph is contemplated or in preparation; a title with a single * indicates a monograph completed and awaiting publication; a title with two ** indicates a published monograph.) I. Narrative History of Military Operations. TheMajorOperationsof the A. E.F. (G. O. 83, W. D., 1919.) H. B. Mono- graph No. 17. *"Cambrai." H. B. Monograph No. 5, W. D. Doc. 1017, 1920. "Somme Defensive and Lys." *" Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon." H. B. Monograph No. 13. "Champagne-Marne and Aisne-Marne." H. B. Monograph No. 14. (a) "The 3d Division on the Marne." H. B. Monograph No. 15. "Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys." **(a) "Operations 2d Corps in Somme Offensive." 11. B. Mono- graph No. 10, W. D. Doc. 1016, 1920. " St. Mihiel." H. B. Monograph No. 12. ' ' Meuse- Argonne . ' ' **" Blanc Mont (Meuse- Argonne-Champagne)." H. B. Monograph No. 9, W. D. Doc. 1010, 1920. "Vittorio-Veneto." * ' ' Operations in North Eussia, 1918- 1919." II. B. Monograph No. 11. " Operations in Siberia, 1917-1920." " Operations in Italy, 1917-1918." II. Studies of Services of Supply. ** ' ' Organization of Services of Supply, A. E. F." H. B. Monograph No. 7, W. D. Doc. 1009, 1920. "Replacement of Personnel, A. E. F." II. B. Monograph No. 8. " Procurement of Supplies, A. E. F." " Initial Equipment and Supply, A. E. F." III. Special Tactical Studies. *-■• "A Survey of German Tactics, 1918." II. B. Moncgi-aph No. 1, W. D. Doc. No. 883, 1918. ** "A Study in Troop Frontage." H. B. Monograph No. 4, W. D. Doc. No. 992, 1919. **"A Study in Battle Formation." H. B. Monograph No. 6, W. D. Doc. No. 1012, 1920. IV. Military Activities in ths United States. **" Economic Mobilization in the United States for the War of 1917." H. B. Monograph No. 2, W. D. Doc. No. 885, 1918. ** "A Handbook of Economic Agencies of the War of 1917." H. B. Mono- graph No. 3, W. D. Doc. No. 908, 1919. * " The Signal Corps and Air Ser\dce: A Study of their Expansion in the United States, 1917-1918." H. B. Monograph No. 16. V. Histories of Troop Units. * "Outlines of Histories of Divisions." ** ' ' Outline History of Regiments." 4 BLANC MONT. OPERATIONS OF THE 2D AND 36TH DIVISIONS WITH THE FOURTH FRENCH ARMY IN CHAMPAGNE IN OCTOBER, 1918. [Map iot'osif herewith; for greater detail see Tahure, Attigny and Ste. Mane sheets, ■rrrlsTsis-l -The Blanc Mont operation is classed by the Americans as a part of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, but in a broader sense it was a part of the general offensive that extended along the entire front of the Allied Armies be- tween Switzerland and the English Channel. All of the armies were engaged in a converging attack— the British toward Cambrai, the French east and west of Eeims to- ward the Aisne, and the Americans toward Sedan and Mczieres. The result of these operations, if successful, would be to clear the Germans from France and Bel- gium, prevent the withdrawal of a large part of them into Germany, and also prevent the removal of the sup- plies accumulated in Belgium. This would be effected by the cutting of the Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres railway sys- tem, and the cutting or threatening of the northern sys- tem through Liege. Ihe reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was prelimi- nary to the main operation, which commenced on Sep- tember 26. In the main operation the First American Army advanced in and east of the Argonne forest. The Fourth French Army, in whose sector the Blanc Mont operation occurred, advanced west of the forest. Thus a successful advance by both armies would lessen German resistance in the difficult country covered b}'' the woods. When the Germans were thrown back in the first battlo of the Marne in 1914, the line stabilized in Champagne about halfway between Souain (5 kilometers north of Suippes) and Somme-Py. It passed through Navarin Farm and it was in this vicinity that the 21st Corps of the Fourth French Army attacked when the Meuse-Ar- gonne operation started on September 26. The French, prior to their attack in this quarter, had called upon Gen. Pershing for assistance, and the orders transferring the two divisions that later on participated in it were issued by general headquarters on Septem- ber 23. O ' BLANC MONT. Atfacking September 26 on the Navarin Farm line, the 21st French Corps had succeeded in advancing about 5 kilometers, forcing the Germans to abandon their succes- sive lines until, on September 30, the latter were holding the rearmost line of the main position. North of Somme- ■■i. Py this line consisted of the Prussian, Elbe, and Essen trenches, and it was the resistance offered by these trenches that had stopped the French advance when the 2d American Division relieved them here on the night of October 1-2. ^_0p. Rpt., 2a The 2d Division had participated in the St. Mihiel of- fensive, September 12-15, 1918. On the night of Septem- F. o. 30, 2d ber 15-16 the division marched from its position in the front line of the Thiaucourt sector to the Ansauville- Royaumeix area, 12 kilometers north of Toul. Op. Rpt., 2d Qn September 20 and 21 the division marched to the F. o. 31, 2d vicinity of Toul, where it reorganized and received new clothing and equipment. ,„Fye ,,^°- On September 23 the chief of staff, First Army, sent a telegram to the 2d Division informing it that it would loe'cV ^G H^Q proceed to a new area, and on the same date issued Special Order 285, which prescribed the details of the move. The p. o. 32, 2d movement was made by rail (except motor transport by marching) starting on September 25 and terminating on File No 102 September 28. A special order. Fourth French Army, o. H. Q. directed detrainment near Chalons, where the division passed into the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center (G. A. C.) iAo^noj_-r-'' 1 • • -I of^der of the 3d the high ground 01 Ibt. Ji,tienne, where it occupied Brigade com- _, • 1 1 1 n 1 1 mi • • • mandintc officer as a salient with both lianks exposed, ihis position was Marine Brigade , .,-p,. , , ,..,. ,. , was held up and m the 4th Brigade sector, as the dividing line between the position dom- !• 1 • ji i'TT'ii../->/i^ inated the Suippe brigades ran just to the east oi Hill 159(160 on 2 o ^o o o rnap), vaiiey." state- ,., ,ri-i 1 •] ' ment of Brig'w which was the high ground occupied. Oen. Hanson E. In the 4th Brigade the advance prescribed by Field Fii4. Order 36 was made by the 5th Marines, which passed Brig.' through the 6th, and was able to advance only about Ih kilometers, where it hung on under fire. Two companies of the 6th Marines were ordered up to protect the left flank. At midnight the line of the 2d Division was approxi- mately as follows: The 9th Infantry on the road from Medeah Farm to the crossroads 2 kilometers to the southwest. The 23d Infantry between this road and the hill 1 kilometer southeast of St. Etienne. The leading battalion on this hill was over 2 kilometers in advance of the 9th Infantry and not in communication with either the French 67th Division on the right or the 4th Brigade on the left. The 5th Marines a little north of the Blanc Mont ridge road northeast of Blanc Mont, The 6th Marines south of the Blanc Mont ridge road. The left of the 4th Brigade line was refused because of the Germans still on the western slopes of Blanc Mont, The area occupied by the Infantry was a triangle, its of "Brigade com! base a line from Medeah Farm to the southeastern slope ^^'^"e'^"; mak^'a of Blanc Mont, and its apex the hill 1 kilometer south- br°oiden*"*^ stat^ east of St. Etienne. The difficulty of this position is cen." Ha°4on "I: evident, as on the right the French had not advanced as p|[^_ ^^^^ ^'' far as Medeah Farm and on the left they were still south of Blanc Mont, On October 3 the 36th Division was transferred from t e 1 e g r » m , ,. , /^ ^ A • ,. , .-, , 7364-B, G. A. C. the reserve 01 the (jrroup of Armies of the Center to the reserve of the Fourth French Army effective on Octo- ber 4. 14 BLANC MONT. ^F. o. 2, ««th Qyi the night October 4-5 the 7lst Infantry Brigade and the 111th Field Signal Battalion were transferred by truck from the region Tours-sur-Marne to the Suippes- Somme-Suippe area. F. 0. 37, 2d Field Order 37, 2d Division, issued at 6 a. m. October Div. . . 4, directed a resumption of the advance to the north. Memo., Rhea The designation of H hour was postponed until aero- ^ m,^'^' ^^'^^ planes should report as to the position of the divisions on the flanks — whether or not these divisions were abreast of the 2d Division. in?^^*°'^' ^^^ ^^ daybreak October 4, the Germans counterattacked the 23d Infantry in its advanced position and were re- pulsed. This regiment also suffered considerably from fire in the rear, from machine guns that had been passed by during its advance of the previous evening or that had slipped through the line. At 2 p. m. the 1st Bat- talion was holding the front in some old German trenches southeast of St. Etienne while the 3d Battalion and a j)art of the 2d were protecting the flanks. Con- nection with the 67th French Division on the right had Message. 4th j^ot been established, but the 5th Marines advancing Brig, to G— 3. ' ^ along the Somme-Py-St. Etienne road north of Blanc Mont during the morning had relieved the situation on that flank. During the night October 3-4 the 22d French Division relieved the 21st French Division south of Blanc Mont. The 22d Division advanced the morning of October 4 Message, Aero, along the Bovaux Bevreutli and Nuremberg: it did not Squad. 27 to C. ° • i c V, i n r G., 2d Div. take as its objective the western slopes oi Blanc Mont, which were still occupied by the Germans, but bore away toward the northwest. At about 10 a. m. a bat- Message, 22d taliou of the 22d Division was arriving at the St. Pierre- Div. to G-3. ^ St. Etienne road, and other French troops were ap- proaching the Arnes River to the northwest of St. Pierre. Thus the advance of this division did not immediately relieve the situation on the left flank of the 4th Brigade, although it undoubtedly made the Germans on Blanc Mont apprehensive, as they were now occupying a salient position, and this made the final operations against the hill much easier for the 4th Brigade. Mwsage, Aero, rjpj gj^j^ French Division on the right of the 3d Bri- Bquad. 27, to ^ /-^ i i °-3- gade also advanced the morning of Octooer 4, but to ^(^3^=^' ^^^ was stopped before noon on the line Orf euil-Bemont Chateau. This division seems to have been in communi- BLANC MONT. 15 cation with the 9th Infantry, near Medeah Farm, but not tion' SthTh 'iS- Avith the 23cl Infantry in itfi advanced position. E^' Taced* "Te^ At about 12.30 p. m. the division commander, 2d Divi- pj*^"^',*, ^"gtate- sion, designated H hour as 2.30 p. m. The 1st Battalion, ??«"* °' ^"f- ■ t5 1 7 Gen. Hanson E. 23d Infantry, which was occupying a salient position j}y^^ Hist. Br. southeast of St. Etienne, advanced toward the ridge Message, g-s northeast of the village. This attack was not supported op. Rpt., sd on either flank, as the 4th Brigade did not advance at History, 23d all, and the French 67th Division, fighting south of Bemont Chateau, was too far away to render assistance. g^J!' ^p*" **^ The attacking waves came immediately under heavy ma- History, 23d chine-gun fire as well as a counter barrage. Casualties ^^ were numerous, the battalion commander was killed, and after an advance of only 300 yards, the battalion with- drew to its former position in the German trenches southeast of St. Etienne. The attack ordered by Field Order 37, 2d Division, for October 4 was not carried out by the 4th Brigade ^^- ^pt., 4th because " it was considered inadvisable to advance leav- ing the machine-gun nests on the western slopes of Blanc Mont intact." Some operations were undertaken against these nests without much success. The 4th Brigade com- g^g- «?*•• <*•> mander reports that they were reconnoitered the after- noon of October 4 and unsuccessfully attacked during the evening. The reconnaissance evidently involved some hard fighting. At 2.20 p. m. the regimental com- , Message, Fe- -XT • 1 11 1 It ^^^^ **' Lejeune. mander, 5th Marines, reports "Marines badly shot up and requests artillery fire north of Blanc Mont. At 2.40 Message, Adjt. . 1 T-. • 1 T% r • 1 1 1 ^^''^ ^■'»S- to G-3. p. m. the adjutant, 4th Brigade, reports Marines held up by fire from east end of Blanc Mont, and at 3.05 p. m. the division information officer with the 4th Brigade re- Message, Maj. a Til HIT J. I^oberts to G-3. ports that machine-gun nests on west end ox Blanc Mont are causing heavy casualties in 4th Brigade. At 3 p. m. the chief of staff, 2d Division, informed Message, Myers G-3, 21st French Corps, that the 2d Division was unable corps. to advance because the divisions on its flanks had failed to keep abreast, and that the 22d French Division on the left had advanced west instead of north. He also told him that the 2d Division could not maintain its position north of Blanc -Mont and Medeah Farm, unless its flanks were covered. Late in the afternoon, hoy\'ever, the situation on the 3rig!^to^fr 4th G-3. 'western slopes of Blanc Mont eased up somewhat. At 4 p. m. the resistance there had ceased and the 6th Marines Brig??! a-3. 16 BLANC MONT. "u-ere advancing, having cleaned up the machine guns. In this the 17th French Infantry assisted. Eihg^\^^a-3.^^' At 9.05 p. m. the regimental commander, 6th Marines, reports a gap of 400 to 500 yards between his regiment sw^trro^G-3."' and the 22d French Division, and the information officer with the 22d Division reports that at 5.40 p. m. the di- vision is in communication with the Marines at a point 400 meters north of Blanc Mont. At midnight October 4, the situation in the 3d Bri- gade was practically the same as on October 3. In the 4th Brigade, the 5th Marines were still on the Blanc Mont-Medeah Farm ridge, their right near the cross roads on the Somme-Py-St. Etienne road and their left refused so as to face the eastern slopes of Blanc Mont. The 6th Marines had passed Blanc Mont and were in communication with the 22d French Division, which was near St. Pierre. The Germans still held the crest and eastern slopes of Blanc Mont, but they were practically 23d"S.^^to*G-3'. surrounded there. They held St. Etienne, whence they had driven back patrols of the 23d Infantry. In the front of the 2d Division the Germans were holding a line from St. Etienne through the cemetery to the east. Message, 21st At 11 p. m. the 3d Battalion, 341st French Field Artil- lery, was placed at the disposal of the 2d Division. F. o. 38. 2d Field Order No. 38, 2d Division, issued at 4 a. m. Octo- Div. . ... . . ber 5, directed the division to continue its advance toward Telephone mes- tlic samc objcctive giveu in Field Order No. 37 — Ma- Eiy.' chault-Cauroy. H hour was not given, and at 9.05 a. m. the division commander, in a telephone conver- sation with the commander of the 3d Brigade, said " H hour will not be given." In the same conversation he describes the cleaning up of Blanc Mont, and says that all the 2d Division will do on October 5 will be to keep abreast of the French divisions on the flanks — that no formal attacks will take place. Thus, Field Order History, 23d j^q. 38 was practically revoked as far as the 3d Brigade Message, Ely ^^g concemed. The 23d Infantry made no attempt to to 2d F. A. Brig. *' t t-» • i Telephone mes- advaucc. At 3.40 p. m. the line of the 3d Brigade ex- sage, C. of S. to -^ P o T-i • c. 0. 6th Ma- tended from 1 kilometer southeast of St. Etienne to nnes. southeast of Medeah Farm, practically the same as on October 4. The 23d Infantry was still occupying the right of the 4th Brigade's sector at 4.05 p. m. Message, 0. 0. At 6.15 a. m. October 5 the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 0-8. *""^* ° attacked the German machine guns on Blanc Mont and. BLANC MONT. 17 with no casualties, carried the hill and captured 209 BrtJ't^^o^s/"' prisoners, besides much materiel, 'including 75 machine guns and trench mortars. The bloodless character of this Brigfto^fr-3, * enterprise was due to the efficient artillery preparation bv the 2d Field Artillery Brigade. This operation was Memo., 2d f. *^ . ■ /^ 1 ^' ^rig. to O. preliminary to the advance prescribed by Field Order of s. No. 38, the provisions of which could not have been car- ried out as long as the Germans occupied Blanc Mont. The operation report of the 4th Brigade states that 3^.°|- ^p'- ^^^ pursuant to Field Order No. 38 the 4th Brigade attacked in the direction Machault-Cauroy on the afternoon of October 5. The 6th Marines passed through the 5th Marines, the 2d Battalion leading, and the attack was stopped by machine-gun fire 2 kilometers southeast of St. Etienne, where the troops dug in. The records do not show that H hour was designated to the 4th Brigade, and it is probable that this movement was in line with Gen. Lejeune's intention not to make any formal attacks on October 5, but merely to keep his line abreast of the French divisions on the flanks. This advance relieved the situation on the left of the 23d Infantry, which had been occupying an advanced position, partly in the 4th Brigade's sector, since October 3. On the right of the 2d Division the French 73d Di- on^^^'l^h ^"rsd vision attacked at 5.15 a. m. October 5, and at 6.10 a. m. ^'^- *° ^^^ had reached Wallmiiller Lager, about 1 kilometer north- east of Medeah Farm. Here it was stopped, and then , Jei. message, '■ '- ' Infor. Off. to fell back to its line of departure. The 170th French Di- g-3. vision was then put in at 11 a. m., evidently without , ™- "Jissage. ^ . ^, . Infor. Off. to success, as at 8.25 p. m. the information officer with the g-s. French reports to G-3 that the French hope for success „"«fsage, infer. '- '■ , Off. to G-3. and will do their best. Gen. Naulm, commanding the 21st Corps, was evidently apprehensive about the situation on the right of the 2d Division. In a message to Gen. Lejeune at 12.40 p. m. he tells him that a French division had been ordered to send assistance to the 73d Di^dsion and he requests the 2d Division not to hesitate to engage its reserves on that flank. The right flank of the 3d Bri- to*info?.^off.?3d gade was still resting on Medeah Farm the evening of ^- ''*^- October 5. On the left of the 2d Division the French situation was os*^"' wuh ^"wd more favorable. The 22d Division advanced with little ^^^- *° ^^• opposition at 6 a. m., and at 10.55 a. m. had reached St. Pierre-a-Arnes, its right extending about 1 kilometer 85777°— 22 3 1 O BLANC MONT. i3frto^(>-3 ^^' t^"^^rd St. Etienne. This it was able to do because Blanc 'Mont had been cleared of the German machine Lay^o*fr^3. ' guns. At 3.-10 p. m. St. Etienne was eri\ neously re- ported captured. While patrols ma}' have entered the western part of the village on October 5, there was Message, G-3 fig-hting back and forth in the town and cemetery on October 5, 6, and 7, and the place was not definitely Message, Infor. . Off. with 22d taken until October 8. However, the advance of the 22d Division brought the French line abreast of the 2d Division so that at 1.45 p. m. the two divisions were in communication about one-half kilometer south of St. Etienne. s.^o'Tfh'iE' G. ^t 3 P- ^- tbe 4th Machine Gun Battalion, until then ^"op. Rpt, 4th i^ reserve, received orders to report to the 3d Brigade. M. G. Bn. Company B was sent to the 23d Infantry and Company A was held at brigade headquarters. The line of the 3d Brigade was unchanged the night of October 5-6. The 4th Brigade had advanced its line so that it connected with the 23d Infantry on the ridge southeast of St. Etienne, whence it extended west and connected with the French about one-half kilometer south of that village. The French 22d Division had experienced so little opj)osition in its advance that it believed the same condi- tions existed on the 2d Division's front. The 118th t)if.*V3^G-z.^"'^ French Infantry, finding nothing in front of it to the west of St. Etienne, sent a message at 4.55 p. m. to the 2d Di^dsion, recommending that the latter advance also, as probably little resistance would be met. The events of October 6 and 7 were to prove that the German main effort was directed against the 2d Division front, as this division was the most dangerous to the German plan of withdrawal. French ^Ar my"! The 7lst Infantry Brigade and the 111th Field Signal ®'^** ^' Battalion, of the 36th American Division, were placed at co^s,°oct! 5.^^ *h® disposal of the 21st French Corps at 8 a. m. October 5. On October 6, they were placed at the disposal of sefh Div^ '"*' *' the 2d Division. The remainder of the 36th Division (less artillery) was on October 6 and 7 moved by march- ing to the Suippes area. Div.!'ppf'87-co! The 36th Division during its operations in Cham- pagne was short a large amount of transportation. This shortage was supplied in part by the French and in part by the 2d Division, but at all times its movements were hampered. BLANC MONT. 19 On October 6 the only fighting consisted of small local ^Pp- ^p*- ^^ actions in which the line was slightly advanced. These local actions included an attack at 6.30 a. m. by the 3d g^g;- ^p*- "'^ Battalion, Gth Marines, on machine-gun nests southeast of St. Etienne, which were captured at 9.30 a. m., thus cleaning up the country south of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil BrS?1o^G-3.**'' road. The 23d Infantrj'^ also participated in this attack, which the 3d Brigade commander states was necessary uri^?* ^^■' '"^ because during the attacks on October 3-5 a part of the 23d Infantry had gotten into the Marine sector, and when moved out of it the night of October 5-6 in com- pliance with division orders, the vacated space was not occupied promptly by the Marines; the Germans there- fore came back and delivered flanking fire from the west on the 3d Brigade. The result of this attack was to bring the front of the 2d Division up to the general line of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, which is where the 71st Brigade relieved it the night of October 6-7. The line was not continuous, nor were the troops sheltered, except in shell holes or fox holes made by the men themselves. Neither did it follow the road exactly, but departed from it at places by several hundred meters. On the right the Elv to C O line connected with the 73d French Division northwest of 23d inf. Medeah Farm, and on the left with the 7th French Di- oiv. ' vision about one-half kilometer south of St. Etienne. The Germans still occupied the cemetery and the eastern part of St. Etienne, and the French line was bent around jjg't'fnes^to g^s! it to the west and north. The relief of the front line of the 2d Division by the 71st Brigade was effected the night of October 6-7, pur- suant to Field Order No. 39, 2d Division, which directed ^f- o. 39, 2d the 3d and 4th Brigades to leave one battalion in each brigade sector until further orders. The brigade ma- chine-gun battalions, the Stokes mortar, and the 37-milli- meter detachments were to remain for 24 hours with the incoming brigade. Mortars and 37-millimeter guns were to be turned over to the 71st Brigade when the 2d Divi- sion personnel withdrew. The 71st Brigade, which had had a difficult march on History, seth October 6 from Somme-S'uijDpcs to south of Somme-Py, started for the front line at 5.30 p. m. Guides from the 2d Division were to have met it in Somme-Py, but some did not appear and those that did were not well ac- quainted with the country. The result W'as that the Div. Uiv. 20 BLAKG MONT. ^_op. Rpt, S6th entire ni<2:ht was spent by the troops in marching and countermarching through the rough country between Somme-Py and the front line. By daylight, however, all troops were in position except the Headquarters Com- pany of the 142d Infantry, which wandered around until afternoon, ^^op. Rpt., 3d xhe 141st Infantry relieved the 23d Infantry, which withdrew to the Pylone Hill. The 9th Infantry was left in line, each of its battalions being put alongside a corre- sponding battalion of the 141st Infantry, which had its History, 36th 1st Battalion in front, 2d Battalion in support, and 3d in reserve. The 142d Infantry relieved the 6th Marines, putting its 2d Battalion in front, its 1st in support, and its 3d in reserve. The 6th Marines withdrew to Blanc Mont ridge and the 5th Marines remained in support. History, 36th Companies B and C, 132d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 141st Infantry, and Companies A and D to the 142d Infantry. The commanding general, 3d Brigade, retained com- to ™worth.^^^ mand of his brigade sector. At 12.10 p. m. October T he informed the commanding general, 71st Brigade, of that fact and directed that the sector, which included the 141st Infantry, be extended 500 yards to the right so ' as to take over ground held by the French. This anoma- lous state of affairs might have had serious consequences, but it does not seem to have done so. No fighting occurred in the American front on Oc- tober 7. The time was utilized in reorganizing the line with the 71st Brigade in the front line, and making ar- rangements for the next attack, which all knew to be impending. Message, Lt. During the day conflicting reports were received as to the possession of St. Etienne by the French. The in- Message, Infer, formation officer with the 22d French Division reports Brig, to G-3. that the Germans took the town in a fog at 6.20 a. m., but that the French recaptured it at 8.30. The town is re- ported to be occupied hj Germans before 8.40 a. m. Message, 4th Thcsc two TBDorts agree, but at 11.50 a. m. a patrol of the Brig, to G-3. , , r • n -, o ^ ^ 6th Marines was fired on trom cemetery and western Message, 6th [eastcm?] edge of the town, and at 1.15 p. m. the 6th Marines to G-3. ]yjj^j.- j^gg reported that they estimated 200 Germans in St. Etienne and more coming over the hill. They believed that thg Germans were trying to filter into the town and ^ Message, in^for. ^^^-^^^ ^j^^ remaining French out. The 21st Corps believed wTiv." ^' "^ ^' that the French held the town, as it sent two messages BLANC MONT. 21 to the 2d Division requesting the bitter to take it over. The facts are that the Germans held tlie cemetery and tlie greater part of St. Etienne, while the French had a precarious footing in the western part of it. During the afternoon reports were received that the G^2"to*G-3^^*" Germans were digging in 1| kilometers northeast of St. infor. ofr. with Etienne, and that they were massing in the woods north- ^^^ ^^^' *° ^'' east of the town. Also that their heavy artiller}'^ had been ordered back and that the infantry was to make a Qia'tVa-s.^'^**' two days' stand. There was every indication that the Germans intended to hold on a line running from St. Etienne through the cemetery and thence to the northeast along the ridge toward Semide. The 7th French Division relieved the 22d on the left of the 2d Division the night of October 7-8. The attack of October 8 was made pursuant to Field „/• ^- *^' *^ Order No. 40, 2d Division,^ which prescribed an advance in the direction Machault-Cauroy. The infantry attack was to be made by the 71st Brigade on the front it was occupying. The 2d Division was to constitute the reserve and furnish the troops for flank protection and connec- tion with the adjacent divisions. Two battalions of I'rench tanlvs were assigned to the 71st Brigade. The 36th Division had no artillery, and the 2d Field Artiller}- History, stth Brigade with attached French artillery (29tli, 341st, 452d F. A.) was to support the attack. The written order was issued at 11 p. m. October 7, but on the after- noon of the 7th the commanding general of the 71st Bri- gade was summoned to the 2d Division headquarters, where he received verbal orders for the attack. The field order issued by the 71st Brigade for the at- f- o. i, 7i»t tack on October 8 was practically a copy of Field Order No. 40, 2d Division,^ except that the tasks of the two infantry regiments were prescribed. These were to at- tack in column of battalions, which were to " leapfrog " as each successive objective was gained, the leading bat- talion becoming the rear battalion after the first objec- tive was gained, the second battalion becoming the lead- ing one, and the rear one becoming the second, etc. ' In the records of the 36th Division this order appears as F. O. ZO. The 2d Division issued two field orders numbered 39, and subsequently renurnhcred the second one " 40," but this change was not made in the copies sent to the oGth Division. ' F. O. 40, 2d Division, is made a part of F. O. 1, 71st Brigade, by notations such as the following ; "As per F. O. 40, Ileadciuarters 2d Division attached." This necessitated distributing the divisional field order to all who received the brigade order, which is not only likely to be confusing but dangerous if the former should be lost or not received. 85777°— 22 4 22 BLANC MONT. to^i^mpauy'r! ^ Hour Tvas designated as 5.15 a. m. *^* History 86th "^^^^ Commanding general, 71st Brigade, assembled his ^i'* regimental commanders during the evening of October 7, discussed the plans for the attack, and issued a warn- ing order. He dismissed them about 9 p. m. and they re- turned to their headquarters and assembled the battalion commanders, who after receiving their orders returned to battalion headquarters and assembled the company commanders. All orders were based upon the verbal in- structions given to Gen. ^Vliitworth at 2d Division head- quarters, as Field Order No. 40 (with a memorandum giving H hour attached) did not reach the 71st Brigade until after midnight and Field Order No. 1, 71st Brigade (with Field Order No. 40 attached), was not sent out until 3 a. m. and apparently got no farther than regi- mental headquarters. The result of all this was that the company commanders received verbal orders that had been four times verbally transmitted, those of the 141st Infantry (except Company A) receiving them between 1 and 3 a. m., while the 142d Infantry did not receive theirs until about 5 a. m. H hour seems to have reached the troops just before the attack was to start. The leading battalion of the 141st Infantry received it at about 5.11 a. m. The battalion commander of the leading battalion of the 142d Infantry was still giving his instruction to his company commanders when the barrage started. History, 86th The 141st Infantry attacked in the sector formerly oc- ^^' cupied by the 3d Brigade (right of the division sector). The leading battalion (1st) started on time, and imme- diately encountered heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. The battalion commander was killed. However, the troops advanced a short distance north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, where they were definitely stopped. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 141st Infantry, followed the 1st in the order named. Neither was ready to move at H hour — the 2d because the battalion commander decided to shift his companies in line at the last moment, and the 3d because of the failure of the companies to receive notifi- cation of H hour. Both battalions soon became disor- ganized. However, groups of them kept on and joined the 1st Battalion, north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. Here the regiment hung on the rest of the day. Company A, 141st Infantry, had been on the extreme right of the battalion sector prior to the attack and runners with BLAIJ^C MONT. 23 I orders had failed to reach it. Nevertheless, it advanced shortly after H hour also to a position north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, where it seems to have formed some kind of (lank protection for the advanced elements of the regiment The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, which had been desig- nated to connect the 71st Brigade and the 73d French Division, had become considerably involved. At 8.40 ^dnT^^oih^in?:. a. m. its commanding officer reported that the l-ilst In- to c. o. 9th inK fantry had been stopped, that his losses were heavy, and that he must have assistance, and at 9 a. m. he asked for relief. The French 73d Division is reported to have R.-Jf ^'^^3 '^'* advanced and then retired through the line of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry. This report is not substanti- ^ MesMge, Ely "^ . , /Y> • 1 *" Lejeune. ated, but it is true that they did not advance suthciently to better conditions on the right of the 71st Brigade. At 11.14 a. m. the information officer with the 73d Divi- y^Y^li^^^l' ^f^ sion reported tliat the French line extended west from Bois du Coq, which would be a prolongation of the line to which the fragments of the 141st Infantry were clinging. At 2.40 p. m. the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 2d Rn'^lngs^^to a Engineers, reported to his regimental comm.ander that *^- ^d Engrs. the battalion had relieved a battalion of the 9th Infantry and stated that the American line was ahead of the French line. A company of the 4th Machine Gun Bat- talion was also placed at the disposal of the Engineer Battalion, which took over the duties of flank protec- tion and connection between the 71st Brigade and 73d French Division. A battalion of French tanks was assigned to the 141st ^y^^'^^°^' *""> Infantry. The following report as to their operations is an extract from the History of the 36th Division : It was about this time (6.30 a. m.) that the tanks attached to the regiment came into action. * * * Their commanding; offi- cer, however, had not learned the time of H hour, as the runner who was sent to him with the information did not reach his post of command. In consequence the tanl^s did not begin their advance on time and first made their appearance on the left flank of the 141st Infantry some 15 minutes after the 2d Battalion had started the assault. They seem to have given some little assist- ance to various detachments of the 2d Battalion as it came for- ward, but as there was no liai.son between the infantry and the tanks, and as the latter seemed to have no concerted plan of action, their assistance was negligible. * * « Worst of all, * * * they tsvice fired into that detachment (3d Battalion Headquarters and group of B Company), killing and wounding quite a number of men. • * ♦ All the tanks shortly there- 24 BLANC MOKT. after left the field. * * * During the course of the foUo'n'ing afternoon (October S), with the consent of the commanding officer, 141st Infantry, the tanks were withdrawn entirely from action. The 141st Infantry had a hard time on October 8, but ^_History, 36th ^j^g I42d had a harder. To begin with, the company com- manders did not receive their orders until about 5 a. m. — too late to allow them to digest the orders properly and transmit them to their companies. Consequently the advance was from 5 to 15 minutes late in starting, which largely nullified the effects of the artillery barrage. History, 3cth The 2d Battalion advancing northwest fought its way past Hill 160. After it had overcome the German resist- ance on the Hill 160 ridge, the principal obstacle to the battalion's advance was the cemetery at the northeastern corner of St. Etienne, which was a mass of machine-gun nests dug among and through the graves, and which had a field of fire of from 500 to 1,000 meters through an arc of 180 degrees from southwest to northeast. Parts of the battalion finally arrived on the St. Etienne-Semide road about 1 kilometer northeast of St. Etienne. Here it was joined by portions of the other battalions and a line was established which seems to have extended from the north- eastern corner of St. Etienne, through the cemetery to- ward Semide. Here the troops dug in. The left of the line was secured at first by the French 7th Division, infor. Off. 7th whose line at 10.20 a. m. was northwest of St. Etienne, and later on by the occupation of the town by American troops. But the right was absolutely uncovered, as a gap of more than 2 kilometers existed between the 142d and 141st Infantry Eegiments, and, moreover, the latter's most advanced elements were more than a kilometer in Op. Rpt., 4th I'ear. This fact, and the disorganization of the troops, ^^' caused the Avithdrawal of the 142d Infantry during the late afternoon to the ridge through Hill 160. Commu- nication with the French 7th Division was established through the American troops in and north of St. Etienne, • but connection with the 141st Infantry was not obtained until the next day. HiBtoiy, 36th The tanks attached to the 142d Infantry rendered no ^^' more service than those with the 141st Infantry. The tank commander was killed early in the morning while the infantry was attacking Hill 160, and one tank dis- abled. The others then withdrew. BLANC MONT. 25 St. Etiennc itself does not seem to have caused much difficulty during the fighting on October 8. A platoon piJ^'^^^'y- ^^^^ of Company I, 142d Infantry, is reported to have entered the town during the morning, established connection with the French, " who were found there in light force," and to have remained there the remainder of the day. ^^Pp- ^p*- ^"^^ A patrol of the 142d Infantry probably entered St. Etienne, but the town can not be said to have been in j^^fj^- "p*- *^^ American possession until about 11 a. m., when the 1st Battalion, Otli Alarines, which was designated for liaison Brig!^to^&-3. duty on the left of the 71st Brigade, entered the town Avithout difficulty. Two of the companies of this bat- talion attempted to occupy trenches to the north of the town, but were unable to do so, whereupon they fell back on the other two companies and occupied trenches to the south, connecting with the 7th French Division. At piJ,"^°^- q^s/*^ 4.40 p. m. the American line included St. Etienne. The ^.^p- ^pt.. 36th evening of October 8, a battalion of the 2d Engineers ^.^p- i^p'- 2d reinforced the Marine battalion. The 71st Brigade had been roughly handled in its first „4PP,^"'^3'6t*h active service. Its losses from all causes — killed, i^'v. wounded, missing, and gassed — amounted to 75 officers and 1,314 enlisted men, a percentage of 33 for officers and 23 for enlisted. These losses were high, and ap- peared higher. Exaggeration of losses always occurs especially in new troops, and this action was no excep- tion. At 8.45 a. m. a message from the 71st Brigade to „¥^fs?i "|* ° -^ . Bng. to O. of S. G-3 states that the losses had been 50 per cent. This and other discouraging reports caused considerable ap- prehension as to the safety of the right flank of the 71st Message, g-3 to Brigade, and the brigade commander requested that the 2ist corps. 72d Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion be ordered to reinforce him. Gen. Lejeune repeated this request to the 21st Corps, at the same time telling Gen. Whit- ^vwu^rth."* *" worth that he had ordered Gen. Ely to put in everything he had. In the meantime the 71st Brigade had stopped advancing, and as the Germans did not counter attack, reinforcements were unnecessary. The failure of the 71st Brigade is not fully explained by its heavy losses. The chief of staff of the 3Gth Divi- statement of sion states that the failure of the attack was largely due 1620°. * ^ " to the fact that the line of departure was given as. the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road, whereas the true line was gen- erally some distance in rear of that road; the artillery 26 BLANC MONT. barrage thus left untouched the advanced German ma- chine-gun groups, which were able to oppose and dis- organize the advance of the Tlst Brigade from the very beginning of the attack. The sketch referred to in the Artillery Annex to Field Order No. 40, 2d Division, shows that the barrage came down on a line between 300 and 400 meters north of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road. The irregular front line of the Tlst Brigade, while it followed the general line of this road, departed from it in places by several hundred meters, and was in advance of it only in the left of the sector. It is therefore certain that a strip several hun- dred meters wide in front of the Tlst Brigade was un- touched by the barrage and the events of the battle indi- cate that the Germans had machine guns in this area. Such a situation was not uncommon during the war, and was usually met by withdrawing the troops from the front line before an attack in order to allow the barrage to cover doubtful territory. Had this been done, the bar^ rage could have been placed as far south of where it actually fell as desired. Why this was not done it is impossible to say, except that haste seems to have char- acterized this whole attack. The front line of the Tlst Brigade on the night of October 8-9 ran generally east and west from a point about 2 kilometers northwest of Medeah Farm to the western slope of Hill 160. In the sector of the 141st Infantry it was parallel to the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road and about 400 meters north of it. In that of the 142d Infantry it was bent to the north around Hill 160. The line was held by provisional organizations composed of such men as could be assembled. It was not continuous and the two infantry regiments were not in communica- tion. The battalion of the 2d Engineers maintained communication with the T3d French Division on the right, and a battalion of the 6th Marines, reinforced by a battalion of the 2d Engineers, held St. Etienne and the cemetery and were in communication with the French Tth Division. The line was supported by the infantry of the 2d Division on Blanc Mont-Medeah Farm ridge. Instructions, Instructions received by the commander of the Tlst 2d Div. to Tlst ^ , ■ ■ • i> i • Brig., Oct. 9. Brigade early on October 9 directed him to rectify his line and organize it in depth; to maintain contact with the enemy and adjacent divisions; to reconnoiter tlie trench system 800 meters north of St. Etienne and to BLANC MONT. 27 take it over if unoccupied and to prepare to attack it at 10 a. m. if occupied; to prepare to take over entire sector of 2d Division, which was to be withdrawn on the night of October 9-10. The 71st Brigade, however, was in no condition to dj"'"'"''^' ^°''' attack. It devoted the day to the reorganization of its ^.^p- ^p*- ^eth troops, who were stretched across the divisional sector ^^^p- ^p'- ^d in a single line without either supports or reserves ex- cept those furnished by the 2d Division. There was no mixing of regiments, but within each regimental sector battalions, companies, and platoons had lost all signs of organization. Provisional units were formed, and were placed so as to fill up gaps in the line, rectify it, and secure communication with adjacent units. The line of the 142d Infantry had been erroneously ^.^p- ^vt, 36th reported as in rear of that of the 141st Infantry, In order to correct this a provisional battalion of the 142d pi"/''''''*' ^^^^ Infantry, accompanied by a platoon of Stokes mortars and one of machine guns, attempted to advance toward St. Etienne about 11.30 a. m., but did not get far beyond the crest of the Hill 160 ridge. Here it took shelter and waited until night, when it returned to Hill 160. This was the only offensive operation during the day. There was no change in the position of the 71st Bri- gade's line on October 9. A battalion of the 2d Engi- neers still was connecting the 141st Infantry with the g^^Mes^^^^g^_ coi. French 73d Division on the right. On the left, however, the battalion of the 6th Marines had occupied the div/*^*"^^' trenches 700 meters north of St. Etienne. This left flank information group, composed of Marines and Engi- neers, was relieved the night of October 9-10 and on October 10 by detachments of the 142d Infantry taken from Hill 160. The front line of the 36th Division then included St. Etienne and the cemetery, two points that had given so much trouble to both French and Americans. The Fourth French Army " Order of the day," for 4th Army staff, October 9, stated that the fraction of the 36th Division north of Suippes (the part not already engaged) was placed at the disposal of the 21st Corps, and that it would relieve the 2d Division except artillery. On Octo- ber 8 the commanding general, 21st Corps, directed the s. o. s.rsi/s. 36th Division to relieve the 2d Division the evening of ^ °'^'' October 9, 28 BLANC MONT. F. 0. 41. 2d The relief was effected bv Field Order No. 41, 2d Division, which prescribed that it should be completed before 5 a. m. October 10. The 2d Field Artillery Bri- gade, the 2d Engineers, and certain supply and sanitary units and materiel, were to remain with the 36th Divi- sion, and the machine guns in the front line and support positions were to remain for 24 hours. Command was to pass to the 36th Division at 10 a. m. October 10. F. 0. 5, 36th The 36th Division (less artillery, field signal battalion, and 71st Brigade) at the time of receipt of Greneral Order No. 41, 2d Division, was in the area Suippes- Souain. The 72d Brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion were ordered to concentrate during the day of October 9 in the vicinity of Navarin Farm preparatory to effecting the relief. The signal battalion was already in this vicinity. Thence conducted by guides from the troops to be relieved, they proceeded at 9 p. m. to their respective areas. F. 0. 6. sGth The 143d Infantry relieved the 3d Brigade in its sup- port and reserve positions. The 2d and 3d Battalions ^^History, 85th ^.^j-g^g^j ^1^^ 23d Infantry about 2 kilometers southeast Op. Rpt., 3d of St. Etienne, south of the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road and east of the St. Etienne-Sonmie-Py road. The 1st Battalion took position near the road crossing. The 144th Infantry relieved the 4th Brigade. Its 1st Battalion relieved the 6th Mariftes southeast of St. Etienne and west of the St. Etienne-Somme-Py road. The 2d and 3d Battalions relieved the 5th Marines just north of Blanc Mont. History, 86th Both Fcgiments stated that they were able to obtain *''■ but little information from the troops relieved. History, 86th Companies C and D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, were attached to the 143d Infantry, and Companies A and B to the 144th Infantry. The 72d Brigade headquarters were established about Op. Rpt., 2d li kilometers southwest of Somme-Py, at the former ''''■• headquarters of the 4th Brigade. History, 36th The relief was completed by 2.30 a. m. October 10, except that the 131st Machine Gun Battalion did not get into position until late the same morning. Company B seems to have been held near headquarters of the 71st Brigade, while Company A was sent north of Medeah Farm as an information group on the right of the 141st Infantry, BLANC MONT. 29 Orders issued by the 21st French Corps for October g^^^/g Zr^lt. 10 contemphited the cleaning up by the aoth Division of ^^' -^'^ ^''"^''■ certain trenches 1,200 meters north of St. Etienne. This operation was to commence at 9.30 a. m. October 10, and di'v'."""^^' '°"* when the orders for it were received at headquarters of the 71st Brigade the relief of the 2d Division had not been completed. Thus the order, if obeyed, would havo necessitated an advance and probably an attack by the 71st Brigade, and its commanding general, believing his brigade not sufficiently recovered from its efforts of November 8, went to headquarters of the 2d Division and had the contemplated attack abandoned. The command of the sector passed from the 2d to the ^j^p- ^p'-- ^d 3Gth Division at 10 a. m. October 10, and the 36th Divi- sion headquarters was established at the former head- quarters of the 2d Division at Somme-Py. The com- manding general, 2d Division, and his assistant chief of staff, G-3, remained with the commanding general, 3Gth Division, for 24 hours longer. The 2d Division (less the units to remain with the 3Gth oi^'*' ^^^" Division)* was assembled near Navarin Farm, whence it marched to the Suippes-Somme-Suippes area. The 3d and uh^Brigs. *** Brigade marched to billets 4 kilometers northeast of Suippes and the 4th Brigade to the Suippes-Nantivet- Somme-Suippes area, where it passed to the reserve of the Fourth Army. The 2d Division machine-gun units were relieved from duty with the 36th Division on Octo- ber 10 and rejoined their division. The opinion held by the French on the operations of si" i°e'un"4'th the 2d Division in Champagne is shown by the following ^''"'^' ^'^*- '^' extracts : Up to October 4, at which date the present bulletin is written, the Fourth Army has pushed its advance up to the objectives of the very highest importance. A splendid American division, full of dash and ardor, the 2d Division, U. S., placed at the dispo- sition of the 21st Corps on October 3, made itself master of Massif du Blanc Mont, which dominates the valley of the Suippes in rear of the region of Monts ; this conquest rapidly brought about the downfall of Notre Dame des Champs and the Grand Bois de St. Souplet. *The units of the 2d Division which remained with the 36th Division History, SCth were the 2d F. A. Brigade, part of the 2d Ammunition Train, 2d Eni,'!- '*'• neers, SO trucks of 2d Supply Train, 19 water carts, and certain ordnance mati'rlel. I 30 BLANC MONT. „, l"..* * '• rJ^F^i' The Intelligence Report of the 21st Corps for October 21st Corps, Oct. 6. ^ ••■ ■•• 6 states: Despite the flank fire of extremely numerous machine guns, artillery, and even mineuwerfers, both on its right and left flanks, the 2d Division, U. S., was able to maintain in toto its advance, and thus made possible the advance of the 11th Corps on the morning of the 5th to the River Arnes. Casualty list, The Severity of the fighting of the 2d Division is evi- au to' Op. Rpt. denced by the following casualty list, which includes the losses October 2-10, inclusive : Officers. Enlisted. Killed 41 6 48 102 12 685 579 926 Slightly wounded 2,367 207 Gassed Total 209 4,771 Appendix to The cHvision captured 1,963 prisoners, including 48 Div. " officers. It reports the capture of 25 guns, 332 machine guns, 20 trench mortars, 6 antitank guns, besides great quantities of ammunition, tools, lumber, signal property, railroad equipment, etc. American During its operations near Blanc Mont the 2d Division wc6lflv bittl© or* der map ; French was opposcd bv the 200th and 213th German Divisions, daily battle or- ^ 5 , . , , i ,. i t i t • der map. botli of which wcre reported to be iresh. In addition prisoners were reported to have been captured from six Intel. Rpts., other divisions, but it is impossible to ascertain what por- °^^' tions of these divisions were put into the line. About this time the Germans commenced to reinforce weak places by bringing up whatever troops they could lay hands on, which evidently accounts for the large number of divisions seemingly opposed to the 2d Division from October 2 to 10. Early in the morning of October 10, unmistakable signs pointed to a withdrawal of the enemy along the Message, s. R. entire front of the Fourth Army. In front of the 21st F. A.' Brig. " Corps enemy batteries were firing at long range, and batteries previously reported in the immediate vicinity Message, c. o. i^cid not fired for 12 hours. French patrols sent out 121st Art. to ^ G-3- from the 73d Division had lost touch with the enemy north of Medeah Farm. Later these patrols reported that they had gone 500 meters north of Bemont Chateau History, 36th witliout eainino; contact. The 7th French Division was Dlv. reported to have advanced 3 kilometers north of St. Etienne, where it encountered fire from its right flank. BLAITC MON^T. 31 The assistant chief of staff, 2d Division, informed the e,imy'Tn*°His! 71st Brigade that the enemy was evidently retreating and p°p7'iw-i92?'''' ordered energetic patrolling to verify this. During the afternoon indications of the enemy's retreat multiplied. The French divisions on the flanks of the 3Gth Division had passed the front of the 71st Brigade during the morning, but no general attack was ordered by that brigade, which merely maintained contact. In doing pj^^*^*°'"5'' ^^^^ this the provisional units of the 141st Infantry made a slight advance of about 300 meters, which brought ite front line to the unimproved road leading due east from St. Etienne, where they " dug in." This operation was in the nature of a reconnaissance in force. The 142d History, seth Div, Inf antrj'^ is reported to have sent out patrols which " met with such heavy enemy fire from the trenches north of St. Etienne * * * that no further advance was at- tempted, and throughout the remainder of the day the regiment remained in its position." On October 10, the 141st Infantry reported casualties DiJ!f p.'^2i7f^*'' of 6 killed and 12 wounded, and the 142d Infantry, 2 killed and 58 wounded. Orders from the 21st Corps, received by the 36th Di- vision shortly before noon on October 10, gave informa- tion of the enemy's withdrawal and of the advance of the 73d and 124th French Divisions (the center and right divisions of the 21st Corps), and directed the 36th Division to advance its lines and keep abreast of the 11th Corps. In compliance with the corps order, the 36th Division ^^^- o. 6, scth issued Field Order No. 6, which directed the advance of the 36th Division to a line even with the French divisions -on its flanks. The attack was to be made at 5 p. m. October 10 by the 72d Brigade, regiments abreast, which was to pass through the 71st Brigade, 143d Infantry on tlie right and 144th Infantry on the left, each regiment in column of battalions. After the passage of the lines the 71st Brigade and the 2d Engineers were to consti- tute the reserve. Arrangements for artillery support were made ver- History, seth bally with the commanding officer, 2d Field Artillery Brigade, whose regiments, in view of uncertainty as to the location of both the French and the 71st Brigade, were ordered to communicate directly with the infantry and to give them the necessary support. Dif. 32 BIANC MONT. The above order (Field Order No. 6) was distributed and discussed at division headquarters at about 2 p. m. October 10, the commanding general, 72d Brigade, and his regimental and machine gun battalion commanders being present. The orders of the commanding general, 72d Brigade, are probably embodied in Field Order No. 1, 72d Bri- gade, no copy of which can be located. History. 86th fhe attack order of the commanding officer, 143d In- fantry, assigned the 2d Battalion as the assaulting bat- talion, Companies L and M to the support and the 1st Battalion to the reserve. Companies I and K, and Com- pany D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, formed the right information group and a platoon of Company G plus two machine guns the left detachment. The 144th In- fantry was expected to furnish like troops to the inter- regimental information group. History, »oth "Yhe advancc started about 6 p. m., delayed, it appears, by artillery fire during the preparatory arrangements and by the distances separating the troops. But little progress was made. The 2d and 3d Battalions soon be- came intermingled with the 141st Infantry and their most advanced elements got only as far as the St. Eti- enne-Scay Farm road, where they dug in, thus prolong- ing to the west the front line of the 141st Infantry, which had reached that road during its reconnaissance in force. The 1st Battalion, in reserve, did not move. Neither the liegimental Machine Gun Company nor Company D, 133d Machine Gun Battalion, participated in the attack. Casualties in the 143d Infantry consisted of 8 killed and 83 wounded. The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, which was on the southwest slope of Hill 160, had during the afternoon of October 10, been ordered to relieve the troops of the 142d Infantry in St. Etienne, and Company B was en- gaged in this operation when the battalion commander received an order placing his battalion in reserve for an attack, to be delivered at 5 p. m. Company B was with- drawn and the battalion resumed its original position. The attack order of the commanding officer, 144th In- fantry, designated the 2d Battalion plus the Regimental Machine Gun Company, the 37 millimeter guns and Stokes mortars as the assaulting battalion, the 3d as the support and the 1st as reserve. No instructions for BLANC MONT. 33 connection with adjacent troops or for flank protection were given. The 144th Infantry also advanced at about 6 p. m. It made no better progress than the 143d Infantry. Tlie leading battalion seems to have reached a system of old German trenches southeast of St. Etienne from which position it was moved to the right in rear (south) of Hill 160. The support battalion (3d) conformed to the move- ments of the 2d, and morning found both battalions well within the lines of the 142d Infantry. The reserve bat- talion (1st) did not move from its position on Blanc Mont. Casualties in the 144th Infantry were 31 wounded. Field Order No. 6, 36th Division, directed the 72d Brigade to pass through the lines of the 71st Brigade. There was no passage of lines, and on the morning of October 11 the 71st Brigade was still holding the front line of the division sector, and the 72d Brigade was in its rear, except for detachments of the 143d Infantry, who were along the Scay Farm-St. Etienne road between the 141st and 142d regiments. At 5 p. m. October 10 the 21st Corps issued Operation 3g^8P;3 ^2itt Order No. 3.806/3, which gave the information that the ^«^p^ enemy was withdrawing along the entire corps front and directed an energetic pursuit toward Attigny. The . 36th Division was directed to conform to the movements of the 73d Di%dsion, which was reported to have advanced to the north edge of the woods north of Bemont Chateau. The above order was received at division headquarters some time during the evening of October 10, and upon it was based Field Order No. 7, which was issued at 11.30 .,,^- o. 7, seth Div. p. m., and was almost identical with Field Order No. 6, except that it assigned objectives. H hour was 9.30 a. m., October 11. In compliance with Field Order No. 7, the 72d Brigade di""*°'^' ^"^'^ advanced the morning of October 11 from its position of the night before. The 144th Infantry (whose 1st Bat- talion had relieved the mixed troops of the 142d Infantry in St. Etienne early on October 11) seems to have started on time, but the 143d Infantry did not start until some time after H hour, thus leaving uncovered the left flank of the 73d French Division and the right flank of the 144th Infantry. However, there was practically no op- 34 BLANC MONT. position on either the French or American front and the attack ordered by Field Order No. 7 became an easy but very slow pursuit. Upon arriving at the second objective named in Field Order No. 7, line Machault-Semide, the troops halted and bivouacked for the night. The 144th Infantry had lost 3 killed and 26 wounded during the day and the 143d Infantry 1 killed and 70 " wounded or gassed." The front line of the 36th Division had been advanced 4 kilometers. Why the 72d Brigade halted on the second objective does not appear, but it may be because the French divisions on its flanks halted also, although some- what in advance of the 36th Division. The 71st Brigade did not move on October 11, but devoted the day to reorganizing and supplying its still intermingled troops. Op. Order, 21st Corps ordcrs for October 12 directed the resumption of the pursuit, the day's objective being the heights Chardeny-Vaux. The 36th Division objective included Yaux and Hill 167 to the northwest thereof. F. 0. 8, 36th The 36th Division orders directed the 72d Brigade to DlV. . >T -n • continue the pursuit, with the 71st Brigade and 131st Machine Gun Battalion following in reserve at 4 kilo- meters. H hour was 6 a. m. ^ R o. 2, 72d Field Order No. 2, 72d Brigade, directed the brigade to advance with its units in the same relative position in which they had halted for the night, and emphasized connection with the adjoining French divisions which were in advance of the 72d Brigade. Pursuant to the above orders, the advance was re- sumed at 6 a. m. October 12 by the 144th Infantrj'-. The 143d Infantry, not having received its orders, was slow in starting, but took up the march, as the commanding officer of the leading battalion understood that he was to advance the morning of the 12th, in connection with adjacent troops. Little opposition was encountered, the casualties for the day in the brigade being 9 killed and 58 wounded. The brigade halted late in the afternoon and established outposts just north of Hill 167. Com- munication with the adjacent French divisions, the 73d Order, 21st and 7th, was maintained during the advance. Both of orps, . r/ . ^j^ggg (divisions, in compliance with a corps order issued at 1.30 a. m. October 12, passed beyond the day's objec- tive and reached the canal which parallels the Aisne River on its south bank. BLANC MONT. 35 The 71st Brigade bivouacked the night of October 11- ^^^p- ^p*- ^^^^ 12 1^ kilometers southeast of Dricourt. The corps operation order for October 13 directed that the south bank of the Aisne be cleared of the enemy and that arrangements be made to cross the river. Dur- ^ ^p- ^o^^^'l^^^ ^ Corps, 3831/3. ing the night October 13-14 the 124th French Division was to be relieved, the 73d Division was to talte over its front, and the 36th Division was to extend its line to the right to take over the sector of the 73d Division to in- clude the Briqueterie, 1,000 meters east of Attigny. The 72d Brigade was given the task of reconnoitering |,iv; ^' '' ^^^^ to the river, clearing the south shore, and in case the north bank was not strongly held, of establishing bridge- heads. The 71st Brigade was to make arrangements to take over the left of the 73d Division's sector. Complying with Field Order 9, the 1st Battalion, niv/**""^^' 143d Infantry, advanced to the canal during the late morning of October 13, its right resting on Attigny. The 1st Battalion, 144th Infantry, also advanced to the canal and dug in, its left resting on Givry. The 3d Battalion followed the 1st and was also near Givry.-"' ^^.^p- Rpt-. seth The remainder of the brigade was distributed in depth between the canal and the line of resistance, which was on the heights south of Attigny. The above- described movements drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne and the brigade's casualties for the day were 29 killed and 207 wounded, most of them being in the 144th Infantry. This and other signs indi- cated that the Germans intended to make a stand on the Aisne. During the night of October 13-14 the 71st Brigade f. o. lo, seth took over the front of the 124th French Division to include iiistory, seth . . Div« the Briqueterie, and the troops in the divisional sector were rearranged so that tlie infantry brigades were side by side, 71st on the right and the 72d on the left. From right to left the regiments held the line as follows : 141st, 142d, 143d, 144th. The sector from front to rear was divided into three zones — outpost, support, and reserve zones. Each regiment had a battalion in the outpost zone (which extended from the river to the line of resist- ance on Hill 167), and a battalion and a machine-gun company in regimental reserve. Each brigade had a •The History of the 36th Division states that the advance of the 144th Infantry to the caual was without authority from cither brigade or division coinmander. 36 BLANC MONT. battalion and a machine-gun company in brigade reserve and the division reserve consisted of a battalion and a machine-gun company from each brigade and the 131st Machine Gun Battalion. The ground between the river and the heights was held lightly, the bulk of the troops being held in rear of the line of resistance. The division reserve was located near Dricourt. A light regiment of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade supported each brigade and the heavy regiment the entire divisional sector. The divisional front line after the above dispositions were completed extended from the Briqueterie, inclusive (1 kilometer east of Attigny), to Givry, inclusive. The rearrangement of the troops of the 36th Division was completed by daylight October 14, except that con- siderable confusion existed in the 144th Infantry, whose 1st and 3d Battalions were near Givry, and this regiment was not in its proper position until the night of October 15-16. The period from October 14 to October 26 was one of comparative inactivity in the sector of the 36th Division and resembled the former trench warfare. The division took advantage of the suspension of operations to re- equip its troops, police the battle fields near St. Etienne, and bury its dead. Patrolling went on constantly and exposure always drew fire from the north bank of the Aisne. Possible crossing places were reconnoitered and preparations were made to cross the river when the ad- vance should be resumed. History. 36th Effective noon October 18, the headquarters and corps F. o. 11, 36th troops of the 21st Corps were withdrawn from the Fourth Army for operations elsewhere. The 36th Divi- sion became the right division of the 11th Corps, and the 73d French Division became the left division of the 9th Corps. These reassignraents made no change in the front occupied by the 36th Division except to shift the eastern boundary slightly to the east. Messages, 8 On the night October 20-21 the 7th French Division and 9, G-3, SGlh • , i <• it i • i Div., Oct. 18. was Withdrawn from the line and its sector was taken History, 36th , i ,,^ t-. i i ^/, i a • t^- • • Div. over by the 61st l* rench and 36th American Divisions. Div. " To accomplish this both of the brigades of the 36th Division extended their areas to the west, the 71st Bri- gade taking over a portion of the area of the 72d Brigade and the latter taking over a portion of the area of the 7th French Division. After the change was made, the west- BLANC MONT. 37 ern boundary of the 3Gtli Division ran approximately north and south just east of the villages of Ambly-Haut and Floury. The 36th Division was again shifted the night of Diy.' ^' ^"' '"^^ October 22-23. The 73d French Division was with- drawn from the line, the 36th Division took over its area, oi"''**"^' ^^^ and the 61st French Division took over the front of the dit.^" ^^*'' ^^^ 36th Division to Givry, exclusive. This change practi- cally reestablished the former western boundary of the 36th Division. The eastern boundary, after the shift, was Voncq ( exclusive) -Coegny-Chardeny-Quilly (all inclusive). In making the change the regiments were also shifted in line and occupied the sector in the follow- ing order from right to left: 142d, 141st, 144th, 143d. The 53d French Division was on the right of the 36th. This last shift to the east brought the 7lst Brigade opposite a horseshoe bend in the Aisne, 3 kilometers east of Attigny. This bend was formed by a swing of the river to the north and was 3 kilometers broad at the base and about the same distance in depth. The ground within the loop was higher than the country to the south, and itself was dominated by the hills to the north and east of the river. The Germans, in their withdrawal across the river, had not relinquished the ground within this loop, but had constructed a trench across its base which was protected by several belts of wire and by ^ ^ ^ ^^^^ strong points. The French 73d Division attacked this ^iv- P ^ Op. Order 50, position unsuccessfully on October 16 and 17; it was ii^^ co'^p^- known as the Forest Farm position by reason of a farm situated near the base of the loop. On October 23 the 36th Division was directed to prepare a plan for tlie reduction of this position, and on October 24 orders from the 11th Corps directed the division to take the position before February 27, and assigned additional artillery for that purpose. On the same day, October 24, a corps order directed u^'t^rp^ °°" the relief of the 36th Division bj^ the 61st and 22d French Divisions the nights of October 26-27 and 27-28. When it was decided to attack the Forest Farm position on op. order «i. ^ 11th Corps. October 27, the relief of the attacking units, two battal- ions, was postponed until the night October 28-29, while the 2d Field Artillery Brigade's relief was postponed until the night October 27-28. 38 BIANC MONT. p.F- 0. 13, 36th T]^e actual relief was accomplished as follows : mstory. 36th "^^^^ ^^g^^* ^^ Octobcr 26-27 the 143d Infantry was re- Div. lieved by the 61st French Division and marched to the vicinity of St. Marie-a-Py. The same division relieved the 144th Infantry the night of October 27-28, and the regiment marched to Machault. The reserve battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 142d Infantry and the 3d of the 141st, were relieved by the 22d French Division the same night and marched to Somme-Py. The support battalions of the 71st Brigade, the 1st of the 141st Infantry and the 2d of the 142d Infantry, each having two platoons of the 132d Machine Gun Battalion, were relieved the night of October 28-29 by the 22d French Division and marched to the S'omme-Py area. The relief of the reserve and support battalions of the 7lst Brigade was not effected until after the success of the attack upon Forest Farm had been assured. F. 0. 14, 86th Xhe capture of the Forest Farm position was assigned to the 71st Brigade, supported by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the artillery of the 9th and 11th Corps and the 61st and 53d Divisions. Hd"^ Art Ko' ^^ ^^ ^^^ clear just what French artillery actually par- 2026.' ticipated in this operation. The orders drawn up by the commander of the artillery of the 11th Corps, who had been loaned to the 36th Division to coordinate the action of the French artillery, specify the duties to be performed by the artillery of the 9th Corps, the heavy artillery of "the Army Corps" (the 11th) and by the artillery of the 61st Division. H hour was at 4.30 p. m. October 27. The artillery preparation commenced 20 minutes earlier and was directed on the German posi- tions within the bend in the river, and upon the batteries located north of the river within the sector Semuy- Givry. Its effectiveness was such that the infantry ad- vanced to the objective with almost no casualties. F. 0. 6, 71st The infantry attack was made by the two regiments of ^"^.' the 71st Brigade abreast, the 142d on the right and the ^^History, t ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ j^^^ Each regiment had a company of the 132d Machine Gun Battalion attached, and was formed in three lines with a battalion as attacking unit, one in support, and one in reserve. The attacking battalions, 3d of the 142d Infantry and 2d of the 141st Infantry, each had attached a platoon of machine guns and in addition Company D, 141st Infantry, was attached to the assault- ing battalion of its regiment. BLANC MONT. 39 The parallel of departure followed the road from the Briqueterie to lloche. The line held by the 71st Brigade was generally in advance of this road, and was with- drawn thereto the night of October 2G-27. Promptly at H hour on October 27, the infantry advanced, following ^.op. Rpt., seth the barrage which drove the Germans to their dugouts and kept them there until they surrendered. Within an hour the troops Avere on the objective, a line running southeast through Forest Farm, with a loss of but 11 killed and 36 wounded. One hundred and ninety-four prisoners were captured. The support battalions, 1st of the lllst Infantry and 2d of the 142d, were used as information groups and to clean up in rear of the attacking battalions. The reserve battalions did not participate in the fight at all. The command of the 36th Division sector passed to .,I^\^^q^^ '*• the 22d French Division at 8 a. m. October 28. At this time all of the organizations of the 36th Division had been relieved except the troops occupying the captured Forest Farm position and the two battalions supporting them. The latter were relieved the night of October 28- 29. The former remained in position until between 3 and 5 a. m. October 29, when they were relieved by the 22d French Division and proceeded, some by truck and some by marching, to the camps near Somme-Suippes, where the remainder of the division had preceded them. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade and the 2d Engineers re- joined their division in the Argonne. The contrast between the first and last operations of the 36th Division is great. The former were character- ized by orders hastily given and transmitted, imperfectly understood, and consequently poorly executed. The lat- ter operation was carefully planned and the orders were so given as to allow them to reach and be understood by the troops who were to execute them. The result was almost a bloodless victory. To be sure the troops had been seasoned by over two weeks' experience in what approximated to sector warfare, but that alone would not account for the difference. Had the attack of October 8 been as thoroughly planned and prepared as that of October 27 it would have stood a chance of success even with inexperienced troops, remembering that the Ger- mans were in retreat when the 36th Division entered the line. 40 BLANC MONT. American •weekly battle or- d er maps; French daily battle order maps. History, Div. Durinc^ its operations, October 6-28, the 36tli Division ■was opposed by the 17th and 213th German Divisions, the former reported as " tired " and the latter as " fresh." Besides the above, reports indicate that parts, at least, of the 195th, 242d, and 239th Divisions were in line, but it is impossible to verify this. They were probably there, as the Germans were then throwing into line whatever troops they could lay their hands on. scth ^i-^Q casualties of the 36th Division while in line Octo- ber 6-28 were as follows : Killo'l .... Wovmdcd. Missing... Gassed Total. Officers. 35 122 Enlisted. 486 1,450 427 2,443 s. o. 458/3. Qn October 28 the 36th Division was transferred to Army. ' the First American Army and ordered to proceed to the Dampierre-le-Chateau area, there to await orders. The movement was made by marching on October 30 and 31. F. 0. 95, 1st There the division passed into the reserve of the First Army and was attached to the 1st Corps. ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS (OCTOBER. 1918). 2D DIVISION. Commanding general: Maj. Gen. J. A. Lej^une, U. S. M. G. Chief of staff : Col J. C. Rhea, G. S. G-1: Lieut. CoJ. Hugh IMatthews. G-2: Maj. R. S. Keyser. C-3: C(A. H. B. Myers. 3d Infantry Brigade : Brig. Geu. H. E. Ely. 9th Infantry: Col. G. W. Stuart 23d Infantry : Col. E. R. Stone. 5th Machine Gun Battalion : Maj. H. T. Lewis. 4th Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. W. C. Neville. 5th Marines : Col. Logan Feland. 6th Marines: Col. Harry Lee. 6th Machine Gun Battalion: Maj. L. W. T. Waller, jr. 2d Field Artillery Brigade : Brig. Gen. A. J. Bowley. 12th Field Artillery: Lieut. Col. J. A. Holabird. 15th Field Artillery: Col. J. R. Davis. 17th Field Artillery: Lieut. Col. L. C. Sparks. 4th (Divisional) Machine Gun Bat- talion : Maj. A. D. Bruce. 1st Field Signal Battalion: Maj. Charles Murphy. 2d Engineers : Col. W. A. MitchelL 36TH DIVISION. Commanding general : Maj. Gen. W. R. Smith. Chief of staff: Col. E. J. Williams, G. S. G-1: Col. W. G. Sills (Oct. 12-25). Lieut. Col. C. W. Neal, F. A. G-2: Lieut. Col. C. H. Mason, G. S. G-3: Lieut. Col. J. A. Atkins, G. S. 71st Infantry Brigade: Brig. Gen. Pegram Whitworth. 141st Infantry : Col. W. E. Jaclfson. Lieut. Col. L. R. James (com- manding after Oct. 19). 142d Infantry: Col. A. W. Bloor. 132d Machine Gun Battalion: Maj. P. A. Weatherred (com- manding until Oct. 21). Capt. S. D, Redings (com- manding after Oct. 21). 72d Infantry Brigade : Brig. Gen. J. A. Hulen. 143d Infantry: Col. J. S. Hoover (command- ing until Oct. 18). Lieut. Col. I, J. Phillipson (commanding after Oct. 18). 144th Infantry: Col. J. S. Parker (command- ing until Oct. 14). Lieut. Col. O. E. Roberta (commanding after Oct. 14). 133d Machine Gun Battalion : Maj. L. S. Davidson. 13lRt (Divisional) Machine Gun Bat- talion : Maj. Ellis Stephenson. lUth Field Signal Battalion: Maj. G. A. Robinson. 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1. Correspondence, G. H. Q. of the A. J5. F. Field Orders, 1st Army, 1918. (Filed in G-3 records, A. B. F., Washington.) 2. Operation Report, 2d Division, period Sept. 15 to Oct. 9, 1918, Field Orders, 2d Division, 1918. Operation Report, 3d Infantry Brigade. Operation Report, 4th Infantry Brigade. File of messages, Headquarters 2d Division, Oct. 2 to Oct. 9, 1918i» History of 23d Infantry. Field Orders, Sd Infantry Brigade, 1918. (Filed in Historical Branch, W. V. D., G. S.) 3. Field Orders, 33th Division. History of the 36th Division and Appendices. Operation Report, 36th Division. Field Orders, 71st Infantry Brigade. Field Orders, 72d Infantry Brigade. (Filed in Historical Branch, W. P. D., G. S.) 4. French Documents : Group of Armies of the Center. Fourth Army. Twenty-first Corps. Eleventh Corps. (Filed in Historical Branch, W. P. D., G. S.) 5. American and French Battle Order Maps. (Filed in G-2 records, A. E. F., Washington.) 42 o