A A i CO . r 3) JD 8 O 6 J> 30 2 ro 8 3> 2 5 3 THE GIFT OF MAY TREAT MORRISON IN MEMORY OF ALEXANDER F MORRISON f THE HISTOEY OF EOME VOL. II. LONDON: PRINTED BT SPOTTISWOOlJli AND CO., NEW-STUDET SIJUAUE AND rAIU.IASIENT STREEC THE HISTOEY OF EOME. BY WILHELM IHNE. ENGLISH EDITION. VOL. II. LONDON : LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. 1871. Il DG. ABl 1571 i. CONTENTS THE SECOND VOLUME. FOURTH BOOK. STRUGGLE FOR THE ASCENDANCY IN THE WEST. CHAPTER I. CARTHAGE. Differences of soil and climate between Europe and Afi- Migrations of the Semitic and Aryan tribes . Phoenician colonisation in Africa . Points of difference between the Phoenician and 1 colonies ...... Rapid growth and power of Carthage . Nature of the Carthaginian empire Elements of weakness in the Carthaginian state Geographical dangers ..... Agriculture and trade of Carthage Dependents and tributaries of Carthage The Liby-Phcenicians ..... The Carthaginian state .... Acknowledgment of Carthaginian supremacy Phoenician cities of northern Africa The Numidians ...... Foreign possessions of Carthage . Sardinia ....... Gades and other settlements in Spain . Constitution c>f Carthage .... PAGE 3 b 5 G G 7 8 9 10 10 10 11 12 12 13 It 14 430133 VI CONTENTS OF Points of likeness between the Carthaginian and other con stitutions .... INInnicipal government of Carthage The SufFetes The command of the army . Carthaginian timocracy The Carthaginian senate The people .... Criminal jurisdiction . Carthaginian aristocracy 14 15 15 16 18 18 19 19 20 CHAPTER II. SICILY. Historical geography of Sicily Greek and Carthaginian power in Sicily Defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera Preponderance of Syracuse . Destruction of Agrigentum . Tyranny of the elder Dionysius . Victories of Dionysius . Siege of Syracuse Piratical expeditions of Dionysius The younger Dionysius and Timoleon Barren victories of Timoleon Tyranny of Agathoklcs Later expeditions of Agathokles . 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 29 30 CHAPTER III. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 264-241 B.C. Fii si Pr.ruid. To the capture of Agrigentum, 2C TortuncH of Zankh' or Messana .... (.'uptiin; of Rliegium l)y Roman mutineers . I Hero, tyrant of Syracuse ..... UolatioMH of Carthage to Rome .... JoalouHv of Rome for Carthage . . . . Rf'HoIution of the Romans to aid the Mamertines of Älci^ diaiig«! ill ihi; cliaraftcr of Koman hisLoiv Uclativc Htrciiglli y tlu! Carthaginians PAGE 73 73 75 76 76 78 78 80 80 81 82 83 83 84 85 86 86 87 88 88 89 89 89 90 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Fifth I'rriot/, 2I.S-241 B.C. Ilamilcar Barcas. Battle at the ylCyatian Islands. Peace. Ravage« of tlio ( Jarlhaginiaii fleet 97 Renewal of tlic alliaiic«' witli llicro ..... 99 THE SECOND VOLUME. IX Exchange of prisoners with Carthage . Arrival of Ilamilcar Barcas .... His treatment of tlie Gallic mercenaries Operations of Ilamilcar .... Occupation of Eryx by Hamilcar . Sufferings of the Eoman allies General impoverishment of the Roman state . Tedious prolongation of the war . Dispatch of Caius Lutatius Catulus with a fleet to Sicily Defeat of the Carthaginians at the ^gatian Islands Negotiations for peace ..... Position of the Romans at the close of the war Embassies to Rome from foreign states . Changes in the military institutions of Rome Constitution of the Roman army . Evil of annually elected generals . The Roman navy ..... Constitution of the Carthaginian armies The Carthaginian generals .... Carthaginian inieriority at sea Effect of the peace on the power of Carthage . PAGK 99 99 100 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 106 107 107 108 110 110 112 112 114 114 115 CHAPTER IV. THE WAR OP THE MEECENARIES, 241-238 B.C. Revolt of the Carthaginian allies .... Cause of the mutiny ...... Suppression of the mutiny ..... Conduct of the Romans ..... Revolt of the Carthaginian mercenaries in Sardinia Interference of the Romans in Sardinia . Surrender of Sardinia to the Romans , 116 116 118 118 120 121 121 CHAPTER V. THE WAR WITH THE GAULS, 225-222 B.C. Destruction of Falerii ..... Gallic and Illyrian wars .... Causes of the long inaction of the Gauls in Italy The position of the Gallic tribes . 123 123 123 124 CONTENTS OF Attack ou the colony of Arimiuum .... Proposed extension of the colony ..... Agrarian law of Caius Flaminius ..... Conduct of the patricians to Flaminius .... The great road of Flaminius ..... Movements among the Gallic tribes .... Fears of the Eomans ....... March of the Gauls ....... Retreat of the Gauls from Clusium and battle of Telamon Annihilation of the Gallic army ..... Devastation of the Boian territory by the consul yEmilius Eesults of the battle of Telamon ..... Subjugation of the Insubrians ..... PAGE 124 125 126 127 127 127 128 129 129 131 132 133 134 CHAPTER VI. THE FIKST ILLYKIAN WAR, 229-228 B.C. Roman colonies on the Adriatic ...... 136 The pirates of Illyricum ....... 136 Roman embassy to Illyricum . . . . . .138 Successful Roman campaigns in Illyricum .... 139 CHAPTER VII. THE SECOND ILLYRIAN AVAR, 219 B.C. Alliance of Demetrius of Pharos with Antlgonus, king of IMacedonia ......... 141 ('a]iture of Pharos by TEmilius PauUus .... 141 Position of Rome after the Gallic and Illyriau Avars . . 142 CHAPTER VIII. TIIK SKCOM) FUNIC OR HANNIBALIAN WAR, -JlS-üOl B.C. FivKt Period. From the ber/innivf/ of the icar to the Lalite of CaniKT', 218-216 b.c. RoHults of tlic first Punic war ..... Eflbcts of tlie war on tlic internal constitution of Carthage I'olicy of Ilaniilcar Barcas ...... I'h(fiiiciaii Hcttlt'iiicnts in Spain ..... IIa)ii(l [-rowlli of (Jartlia^Miiiaii ])(jwcr in Spain 143 143 145 115 116 THE SKGOND VOLUME. XI PAGE Attitude of the Iloman state ...... 14G Death of Hasdrubal 147 Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barcas ..... 147 Hatred of the Romans for Hannibal . . . . .141) Real position of Hannibal as a Carthaginian general . .150 Resources of Carthage . . . . . . .152 Policy of the Romans in delaying the renewal of the war . 153 Alliance of Saguntum with Rome . , . . .154 Preparations of Hannibal ....... 154 Importance of Saguntum . . . . . . .155 Roman embassy to Hannibal . . . . . .156 Siege of Saguntum by Hannibal . . . . . .156 Second embassy of the Romans to the Cartluiginians . . 157 Character of the second Punic war ..... 158 Growth of an Italo -Roman nation . . . . .159 Gain to the conquered tribes ...... 159 Bui'dens of the Roman allies . . . . . .160 Population of Italy 160 Naval power of the Romans and Carthaginians . . .161 Alliance of the Carthaginians with the Gauls . . .162 Expected revolt of the Italian allies , . . . .163 Attitude of the Macedonian government .... 164 Provisions of Hannibal for the defence of Spain and Africa . 1 64 March of Hannibal from New Carthage, 218 b.c. . . .165 Landing of a Roman army at Massilia . . . . .166 Inadequate preparations of the Romans . . . .166 Rising of the Boian Gaiils ....... 167 Additional Roman levies . . . . . . .167 Voyage and march of Scipio . . . . . .168 Boldness and wisdom of Hannibal's plan . . . .170 Hannibal and the AUobrogians ...... 171 Passage of the Alps .171 Geographical controversies . . . . . . .173 March to the Little St. Bernard . .... 173 Hostility of the mountaineers ...... 175 Treachery of the Gauls . . . . . . .176 Descent of the Alps . . . . . . . .176 Condition of Hannibal's army ...... 177 Hannibal and the Taurinians . . . . . .179 Alleged device of Hannibal for the encouragenicut of his soldiers ........ . 180 March and defeat of Scipio . . . . . . .180 Passage of the Trebia ........ 181 Attitude of the Gallic tribes . . . . . .182 XU CONTENTS OF Movement of the Roman army to the left bank of the Trebia Operations of Sempronius in Sicily Zeal of King Hiero ..... Junction of Sempronius with Scipio Preparations for the battle of the Trebia Tactics of Hannibal ..... Defeat of the Romans ..... Retreat of Scipio to Placentia Success and ability of Hannibal . Effects of Hannibal's victory Hannibal's treatment of his prisoners . Winter operations of Hannibal Unsuccessful attempt of Hannibal to cross the Apennines Operations in Spain ..... Defeat of Hanno by Scipio .... Alarm in the city of Rome on the tidings of Hannibal's victory at the Trebia ..... Opposition to Flaminius .... Efforts to prevent the re-election of Flaminius Flaminius elected consul .... Marches of the two consuls .... Lliscalculation of the Romans March of the Carthaginians .... Movements of Hannibal towards Rome . Movements of Flaminius .... Reasons for the censures passed upon Flaminius Charges brought against Flaminius Disposition of Hannibal's forces . 'I'he battle of the Thrasymene lake Dismay in the city of Rome on the tidings of the battle Defeat of Centenius Firnmcss of the Roman senate Prodictatorship of Q. Fabius Maximus . Military measures of Fabius Greatness of the emergency .... Plans of Haimibal ..... The Cartliaginians in Picenum Adojitif)!! of the Roman arms iv.xultation at Carthage .... The fidelity of the Roman allies . Roman firmness ...... Ii'oman Icvie« ...... Tactics of Fabius in Aj)ulia KvcIiIm ill r;ilii|(;uiia ..... PAGE 182 183 184 185 187 187 188 189 190 190 191 191 192 193 194 194 197 198 198 200 202 202 203 204 205 205 207 207 210 210 211 212 213 213 214 215 216 216 217 218 219 219 220 THE SECOND VOLUME. PAGE Dissatisfaction of the Komana with Fal)ius .... 222 The military power sliared eqriaUy between the dictator and the master of the iiorse ...... 223 Defeat of Minucius ........ 224 Effects of the policy of Fabius 224 Spirit of the Roman senate ....... 225 Operations of Cn. Scipio in Spain . . . . .226 Dispatch of reinforcements for Spain ..... 227 Civil dissensions at Rome ....... 228 Enrolment of a new Roman army ...... 229 Question of supplies ........ 230 Position of the Roman army ...... 231 Defects of Roman military usage ...... 231 Movements of the consul jEmilius ..... 232 State of feeling in Rome ....... 233 The battle-field of Cannaj 234 Disposition of the Carthaginian army ..... 235 Defeat of the Roman cavalry ...... 236 Destruction of the Roman infantry ..... 236 Capture of the Roman camps ...... 237 Effects of the battle of Canute 238 Causes assigned by popular writers for the Roman defeat . 239 The Roman allies ........ 240 Disposition of Hannibal toAvards the Romans . . .240 Danger of the Roman city . . . . . . .241 Precautions of the senate ....... 241 Military measures for carrying on the war .... 242 Second Period. From the battle of Canna.' to the Revolution in Syracuse, 216-215 b.c. Position of Hannibal in Italy ...... 244 The histories of Polybius ....... 244 Religious ceremonies at Rome ...... 246 Drain of the war on the population of Italy .... 247 New levies of the dictator M. Junius Pera .... 249 Refusal of the Romans to ransom the prisoners taken at Canna; 249 Roman slanders against Hannibal . . . . . . 251 Position of Hannibal after the battle of Cannai . . . 253 Reasons for Hannibal's hesitation to march upon Rome . . 254 Policy of Hannibal ........ 254 Overtures of Hannibal to the Roman allies .... 255 Fidelity of the allies to Rome 255 Revolts in Bruttium and Campania ..... 256 Change in the character of the war 257 XIV CONTENTS OF Eesolution of the Carthaginians to reinforce Hannibal The Avar in Spain ..... Further revolts among the Eoman allies Condition of Capua ..... Disposition of the plebeians of Capua towards Hannibal Eevolt of Capua, Atella, and Calatia The resistance of Decius Magius to Hannibal Story of Pacuvius Calavius .... Occupation of Nola by the prastor Marcellus . Occupation of Nuceria and Acerr^e by Hannibal Siege of Casilinum ..... Prospects of the war ..... Hannibal's Italian allies .... Defeat of Hasdrubal at Ibera in Spain . State of Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily Defeat of Postumius Albinus in Cisalpine Gaul Further revolts of Eoman allies in Bruttium Sojourn of Hannibal in Capua Operations in Campania, 215 b.c. Defeat of the Carthaginians at lUiturgi and Intibili in Sp? 215 B.c Success of the Eomans in Sardinia Alliance of Philip of Macedonia with Hannibal Mistaken policy of Philip .... Third Period. The War in Sicilij, 215 Death of Hiero, king of Syracuse Character of Hiero's reign .... Eelations of Hiero with Eome and Carthage . Effects of Eoman supremacy in Sicily . Ee-constitution of the Eoman senate Financial difliculties ..... Financial mea.sures ..... Commission of the year 21G b.c. . Sumptuary laws ...... Amount of the Eoman levies Eecovory of Casilinum, and repulse of Hannibal a Eevolution in Sicily ..... Negotiations b(!twfeu IIannil)al and Hieronymus Eepublican rcactir)n in Syracuse . Death of Hieronymus ..... Surrender of Ortygia by Andranodoros. Massacre of the fiimily (if II icro . 212 B.c. Nol PACE 257 258 258 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 •265 267 267 268 269 271 271 272 273 275 276 276 278 280 281 282 284 285 288 289 289 290 290 291 292 293 294 294 295 296 THE SECOND VOLUME. XV Counter revolution in Syracuse .... Triumph of the Carthaprinian party at Syracuse INIarch of Marcellus to Syx'acuse .... Military resources of Syracuse .... Failiu-e of the attempts of IMarcellus to storm Syracuse Carthaginian operations in Sicily .... Massacre of the inhabitants of Enna by L. Pinarius Eesults of the massacre ..... Siege of Syracuse by Marcellus .... Anarchy in Syracuse ...... Treachery of Mericus ...... Fall and sack of Syracuse ..... PAGE 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 309 310 310 Fourth Period. From the talcing of Syracuse to the capture of Capua ^ 212-211 b.c. Surrender of Agrigentum by Mutines, and complete sul^jugation of Sicily " . 313 Events in Spain and Africa . . . . . . .314 Employment of mercenaries in Spain ..... 316 Defeat and death of the ScijDios . . . . . .316 Operations of Hannibal in southern Italy . . . .318 Dishonesty of Roman contractors . . . . . .319 Trial of M. Posturaius Pyrgensis . . . . . .319 Condemnation of Postumius and his accomplices . . . 320 Eoman civic morality ........ 321 Growth of superstition in Rome . . . . . .321 Levying of new legions ....... 322 Surrender of Tarentum to Hannibal ..... 323 Proclamation of Hannibal to the Tarentines . . . 324 Siege of the citadel of Tarentum ...... 325 Alliance of other Greek cities Avith Hannilml . . . 326 Roman designs against Capua ...... 326 Condition of Capua . . . . . . . .327 Request of the Capuans to Hannibal for supplies . . . 328 Capture of the convoys for Capua by the Romans . , . 328 Defeat and death of Sempronius Gracchus . . . .329 Total defeat of Fulvius in Apulia ...... 330 Relative position of Hannibal and the Romans . , . 330 Resolution of the Roman people ...... 331 Siege of Capua . . . . . . . . .331 Resistance of the Capuans ....... 332 Internal condition of Capua ....... 333 Attempts of Hannibal to relieve Capua .... 333 iNIarch of Hannibal towards Rome .... - 335 XVI CONTENTS OF Dismay of the Romans Measures of the senate Eetreat of Hannibal irom Eome . Fall of Capua .... Treatment of Capua by the Romans Execution of Capuans at Rome Explanation of Roman policy Change in the character of the war Dispatch of Roman reinforcements to Spain Early life of Publius Cornelius Scipio . Family influence of the Scipios in Rome Character of Scipio .... Departure of Scipio for Spain Plans of Scipio ..... Siege and capture of New Carthage Roman regulations for the sack of towns Disposal of the booty .... Plunder of New Carthage . Personal anecdotes of Scipio Effects of the fall of New Carthage Disposition of the Italian towns . Difliculties of Hannibal's position Betrayal ol" Salapia to Marcellus . Defeat of Cn. Fulvius Centumalus at Herdonea Destruction of Herdonea by Hannibal . Operations of Marcellus Defeat of the Roman fleet by the Tarentines Pressure of the war on the Romans Refusal of twelve Latin colonies to contribute men and for the war ..... Seriousness of the crisis Fidelity of the remaining eighteen Latin colonics . Roman preparations for the re-conquest of Tarentum Of)(:rations of Fabius and Marcellus C!;iptiirn (A' the Roman army before Caulonia by Hannil lictruyul of Tarentum to tlic Romans . Position of Hannibal after tlic fall of Tarentum Fifth consulship (if Marcil his .... Death of Marcellus ...... Character and ability of Marcellus Source of tlic exaggerations in the story of Marcellus money PAOB 336 337 338 340 341 343 345 Fifth Period. From the fall of Capua to the battle on the Metaurus, 211-207 b.c. 346 346 347 348 350 351 351 352 354 354 354 356 357 358 358 358 359 360 360 361 362 363 363 364 366 367 367 368 369 370 371 371 374 THE SECOND VOLUME XVll I'AtiE lu'iising of the siege of Locri ...... 875 Prospects of the Romans 375 Discontent in Etruria 37G Events in Spain ......... 378 Battle of Ba?cula and march of Hasdrubal . . . .379 Anxiety in liome . . . . . . . . 3-'"'•■"< of Carlha- giniaii hu- prr-njacy. generosity or policy of the Cartliaginia,ns granted tlienu The amount of the services which they had to render to the state was not fixed and determined by mutual agree- ment, by stipulation or law, but depended on the neces- sities of Carthage ; and on this account they were always ready to join with foreign enemies whenever the soil of Africa became the theatre of war. During the 600 years of Carthaginian supremacy', a certain mingling of the races of the Libyans and Cartha- ginians naturally took place. A number of Carthaginians, citizens of pure Phoenician blood, settled among the Libyans, and thus arose the mixed race of the Liby- Phcenicians, who probably spread Carthaginian customs and the Phoenician language in Africa in the same way as the Latin colonies carried the Latin language and Roman customs over Italy. Prom these Liby- Phoenicians were principally taken the colonists who were sent out by Carthage to form settlements, not only in Africa, but also in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and the other islands. We have no very accurate information about the Liby-Phoenicians. Whether they were more animated by the Phoenician spirit, or whether the Libyan nationality prevailed, must remain undecided. It is, however, probable that, in course of time, they assumed more and more of the Phoenician character. The Carthaginian citizens, the native Libyans, and the mixed population of the Liby- Phoenicians constituted therefore, in strictness of speech, the republic of Carthage, in the same way as Pome, the Eoman colonies, and the subject Italian population formed the body of the Eoman state. But the wider Carthaginian empire included three other elements ; the confederate Punic cities, the depen- dent African nomadic races, and the foreign possessions. It is a sure sign of the political ability of the Cartha- ginians that, so far as we know, no wars arising from jealousy and rivalry took place between the different Phfeniciau colonies, like those which ruined the once flourishing Greek settlements in Italy and Sicily. It is CAETHAGE. H true that tlie Phoenicians were careful to exclude other chap. nations from the regions where they had founded their , ^ , trading establishments, and Carthage may also have en- deavoured to concentrate the trade of her African posses- sions in Carthage itself.' But there were no wars of extermination between different cities and the Phoenician race. All the Tyrian and Sidonian colonies in Africa, on the islands of the western Mediterranean Sea, and in Spain, which had in part been formed before Carthage, gradually joined themselves to her, and acknowledged her as the head of their nation. How this union was effected is hidden in the darkness of the early Carthaginian history. We may perhaps assume that the common national and mercantile interests prompted the isolated settlements of the far-sighted Phoenicians to a peaceful union and sub- ordination to the most powerful state.^ Thus it was possible for a handful of men of a foreign race ^ to establish in a distant part of the world an extensive dominion over scattered tracts of land and wild barbarian populations. The most important city of these Phoenician confederates Phoenician was Utica, situated at no great distance north of Carthag-e cities of northern at the mouth of the river Bagradas. In the public Africa. treaties which Carthage concluded, Utica was generally mentioned as one of the contracting parties.'* It was therefore rather an ally than a subject of Carthage, holding to her the same relationship which Prseneste and some other Italian cities bore to Rome. We have very little information about the remaining Phoenician cities on the ' Movers, I'lionizier, ii. 2, 488. Yet it is not probable tliat tho Cartlia- ginians, as Movers suspects, destroj-ed the port of Great Leptis. If they had done so, the export of goods from Great Leptis to Carthage would have been confined to the long and tedious road by land, which of course would have resulted in a loss to the Carthaginian traders. Many of the famous ports of antiquity were silted up in the course of ages, and among them, no doubt, that of Great Leptis, without the interference of man. * At least nothing is known of a forcible subjection of the smallei' Phcenician settlements to Carthage. * The English dominion in India is to some extent analogous; but the Anglo-Indians have the whole power of the mother countrj- to back them. * Polybius, iii. 24. 12 KOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. The Nu- midians. Foreign rortli coast of Africa. None of them were of such im- portance as to be placed in the same rank with Carthage and Utica. They were bound to pay a fixed tribute and to furnish contingents of troops, but they enjoyed self- government and they retained their own laws. On the south and west of the immediate territory of the Carthaginian republic lived various races of native Libyans, who are commonly known by the name of Numidians. But these were in no way, as their Greek name (' Nomads ') would seem to imply, exclusively pastoral races. Several districts in their possession, especially in the modern Algeria, were admirably suited for agriculture. Hence they had not only fixed and permanent abodes, but a number of not unimportant cities, of which Hippo and Cirta, the residences of the chief Numidian princes, were the most considerable. Their own interest, far more than the superior force of the Carthaginians, bound the chiefs of several Numidian races as allies to the rich commercial city. They assisted in great part in carrying on the com- merce of Carthage with the interior parts of Africa, and derived a profit from this forwarding trade. The military service in the Carthaginian armies had great attractions for the needy sons of the desert, who delighted above all things in robbery and plunder ; and the light cavalry of the Numidians was equalled neither by the Romans nor by the Greeks. A wise policy on the part of Carthage kept the princes of Numidia in good humour. Presents, marks of honour, and intermarriage with noble Carthaginian Indies, united them with the city, which thus disposed of tliem without their suspecting that they were in a state of dependence. That, however, such an uncertain, fluctuating alliance was not without danger for Carthage — that the excitable Numidians, caring only for their own immediate advantage, would join the enemies of Carthage without scruple in the hour of need, Carthage was doomed to experience to her sorrow in her wars with Eome. Besides her own immediate territory in Africa, the CAETHAGE. 1 3 allied Plicenician cities, and tlie Nuinidian confederates, CHAP. Carthage had also a number of foreign possessions and ]. — ' colonies, extending lier name and influence tliroughout posses- the western parts of the Mediterranean Sea. A line of q,°"1!^^ colonies had been founded on the north coast of Africa as far as the Straits of Gibraltar, and even on the -western shore of the continent, i.e. on the coasts of Numidia and Mauritania ; but these were intended to further the com- merce of Carthage, not in any way to assist her in her conquests. In like manner, the earliest settlements in Spain and the islands of the Mediterranean, in Malta, the Balearic and Lipari Isles, in Sardinia, and especially in Sicily, were originally trading factories, and not colonies in the Eoman sense. But where commerce required the protection of arms, these establishments were soon changed into military posts, like those of the English in the East Indies ; and the conquest of larger or smaller tracts of land and of entire islands was the consequence. It is evident that for several centuries the Carthaginians in Sicily were not bent on conquest. They avoided encountering the Greeks, they gave up the whole south and east coast, where at first there had been numerous Phoenician colo- nies,' and they confined themselves to a few small strong- holds in the extreme west of the island, which they required as trading and shipping stations. They appear only in the fifth century to have made an attemjjt to get military possession of the greater part of Sicily. But after the failure of this attempt by the defeat at Him era (480 B.c.) we hear of no further similar undertakings tiU the time of the Peloponnesian war. Sardinia, on the other hand, seems earl}^ to have come Sardinia, into the power of the Carthaginians, after the attempt of the Greeks of Phokaia to make a settlement there had been thwarted by the Carthaginian fleet. Sardinia was not, like Sicily, a land that attracted many strangers. It was not the eternal aj^ple of discord of contending neigli- • Movers, Tlwnizier, ii. 2, 32i fF. Thucydides, vi. 2. 14 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Gades and other settlements in Spain. Constitu- tion of Carthage. Points of likeness hotween the bonrs, like tlie richer sister island, and so it seems that, as the Carthaginians found no rival there, it was acquired without much effort on their part, Gades, the earliest Phoenician colony in Spain, and the other kindred settlements in the valley of the Bsetis, the old land of Tartessus,^ appear to have stood in friendly relations to Carthage. The African and Spanish Phoeni- cians carried on an active intercourse with each other without jealousy or mutual injury, and in war they aided each other. At a later period, when Carthage was ex- tending her conquests in Spain, Gades and the other Punic places seem to have stood to her in the same re- lationship as Utica. Thus the Carthaginian state was formed out of elements differing widely from one another in origin and geogra- phical position. The constitution and organisation of the state were admirably fitted for times of peace, and for commercial and industrial development. By the activity of the Carthaginian merchants, the varied productions of the several districts found their markets. The different peoples mutually supplied their wants, and could not fail to recognise their common interest in this intercourse with one another, and in the services rendered by Carthage. But for the strain of a great war such a state was too slightly framed. Prom the nature of things it was hardly to be expected that it could undertake any war with suc- cess, or survive a great reverse. But Carthage, notwith- standing, came out victoriously from many a struggle ; and for centuries she maintained herself as the first state in the western sea, before she sunk under the hard blows of the Roman legions. This result was brought about by a wise political organisation of the state, which bound the heterogeneous elements into one solid body. Our information about the constitution of Carthage comes to us indirectly through Greek and Roman authors, and many points with respect to it remain obscure and I\rovor8, Vhijnhur, ii. 2, 594 ff. CARTHAGE. 15 uniutelligible in consequence, more especially its origin CHAP. and progressive development ; but its general character ^ — - is tolerably clear, and we cainiot hesitate to rank it, on the Cartba^i- authority of Aristotle and Polybius, among the best of "'f" ^"'^ '' . . . . other con- ancient constitutions. A striking phenomenon may here stitutions. be noted. In spite of the radically different national charac- ter of the Semitic Carthaginians, their political institutions, far from presenting a decided contrast to the Greek and Italian forms of government, resembled them strongly, not only in general outline but even in detail. This simi- larity led Aristotle ' to compare the constitution of Car- thage with that of Sparta and Crete, while Polybius ^ thinks that it resembled the Roman. This likeness may be partly explained b}' the fact that these foreign observers were inclined to discover analogies in Carthage to their own native institutions, and that they were strengthened in this view by the employment of Greek and Roman names, just as they were constantly recognising the Hellenic deities in the gods of the barbarians. But without a correspondence of outline in the constitution of these states, such a com- parison would not have been possible, and so we are compelled to infer that in political life the Carthaginians were not Asiatics but Occidentals, or else had become so through the force of circumstances. Carthage had from the very commencement this feature Municipal in common with the Greek and Eoman republics, that the S'^^^J'^", -'• ' ment ot state had grown out of a city and preserved the municipal Carthage. form of government. In consequence a republican adminis- tration became necessary, that is to say, there took place a periodical change of elected and responsible magistrates, the people being acknowledged as the source of all political power. The first officers of state, who were called Kings or The Suf- ft Suffetes (a term identical with the Hebrew Shofetim, judges), were chosen by the people out of the most dis- tinguished families. If we had more particulars about ' Aristotle, VoUt. ii. 8, 1. * Polybius, vi. öl. 16 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. The com- maud of the army. the gradual growtli of the constitution of Carthage, we should probably find that these officers were at first invested with comprehensive powers, but that in the course of time, like the corresponding authorities in Athens, Sparta, Rome, and other places, they became more and more restricted, and had to resign to other functionaries a part of their original authority. At a later period, the suffetes appear to have discharged only religious and other honorary functions, such as the presidency in the senate ; and per- haps they also took some part in the administration of justice. It is remarkable that we cannot state with cer- tainty whether one or two sufFetes held office at the same time; but it would seem probable that there were always two, as they were compared to the Spartan kings and the Roman consuls. Still more uncertain is the duration of their term of office. It may perhaps be taken for granted that, if the dignity was originally conferred for life, it was afterwards limited to the period of a year. The most important office, though perhaps not the highest in rank, was that of the military commander. This was not limited to a fixed time, and seems generally to have been endowed with extensive, in fact almost dictatorial power, though subject to the gravest responsi- bility. In the organisation and employment of this im- portant dignity, the Carthaginians proved their political wisdom, and chiefly to this they owed their great successes and the spread of their power. While the Romans con- tinued year after year to place new consuls with divided jDOwcrs at the head of their brave legions, even when fighting against such foes as Hannibal, the Carthaginians had early arrived at the conviction that vast and distant wars could be brought to a successful issue only by men who had uncontrolled and permanent authority in their own arjuy. No petty jealousy, no republican fear of tyranny, kept them from intrusting the whole power of the state to the most approved generals, even if they belonged, as repeatedly h;ip])encd, to an eminent family, and succeeded to the command as if by hereditary right. For a whole CARTHAGE. 1 7 century members of the Mago family were at the head of chap. the Carthaginian armies, and Carthage owed to their . prudence and courage the establishment of her dominion in Sicily and Sardinia. This feature of the constitution of Carthage stands out in boldest relief in the Avar of Hanni- bal, when, according to the common view, the most flourishing age of the state was already over. Hamilcar Barcas, the heroic father, was followed by his heroic son- in-law, Hasdrubal ; and Hamilcar's fame was only sur- passed by that of his more glorious sons. None of these men ever attempted to destroy the freedom of the republic, while in Greece and Sicily republican institutions were always in danger of being overthrown by successful generals, a fate which Rome herself suffered at a later period. The Carthaginian commanders-in-chief, like the generals of modern history, were uncontrolled masters in the field, but always subject to the civil authority of the state. The statesmen of Carthage sought to obtain their end by a strict subordination of the military to the civil power, and by the severe punishment of oifenders ; not by splitting up the chief command, or limiting its duration. They instituted a civil commission, consisting of members of the select council, who accom- panied the generals to the field, and superintended any political measures, such as the conclusion of treaties.' Thus every Carthaginian army represented in a certain degree the state in miniature ; the generals were the executive, the committee of senators were the senate, and the Carthaginians serving in the army were the people. How far such a control of the generals was unwise or the punishments unjust, we have no means of deciding with our scanty means of information. But the fact that the best citizens were always ready to devote their energies and their lives to the service of their country speaks well for the wisdom of the control and the justice of the sentences. ' Polybms, vii. 9. VOL. II. C 18 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Cartha- ginian timocracy. The Car- thaginian senate. In addition to tlie suffetes and generals, other Cartha- ginian officers are occasionally mentioned, and these are designated by corresponding Latin names, such as prsetors and qusestors. In a powerful, well-ordered, and compli- cated, political organism, like the Carthaginian rej)ublic, there were of course many officials and many branches of the administration. To hold an office without salary was an honour, and consequently the administration was in the hands of families distinguished by birth and riches. These families were represented, everywhere among the ancients, in the senate, which in truth was the soul of the Carthaginian state, as it was of the Roman, and which really conducted the whole foreign and domestic policy. In spite of this conspicuous position, which must always have attracted the attention of other nations, we have no satis- factory information about the organisation of the Cartha- onnian senate. It would seem that it was numerous, containing one or two special committees, which in the course of time became established as special boards of administration and justice. The criminal and political jurisdiction was intrusted to a body of 100 or 104 members, who probably formed a special division of the senate, though we are by no means cei^tain of it. According to Aristotle,^ they were chosen from the ' Pentarchies,' by which we are perhaps to understand divisions of the senate into committees of five members each. At least it is im- possible that the Carthaginian senate could have remained at the head of the administration if the judicial office had passed into other hands. But if the Hundred (or Hundred- :ind-f<)ur) were a portion of the senate, and were periodically rciH'wcd fi'oni tinumg the greater body, they could act as tlicir coiiuuisHioiicrs. Through these the senate controlled the entire politicijl life, keeping especially the generals in dependence on the civil authority.^ The Corporation of • Aristotl.-, Po^il. ii. 8, § 4. ' TliiH roiiHtitutcs fill! Hiniilnrity of the Body of One Hundred with the Spartan Epliors, mi^ntioned by Aristotle {Füllt, ii. 8, § 2). CARTHAGE. 10 tlie Hundred, -wliicli had at first been renewed by the chap. yearly choice of new members, assumed g-radually a more - ^ . permanent character by the re-election of the same men, and this may have led to their separating themselves as a distinct branch of the government from the rest of the senate. — A second division of the great council is men- tioned, under the name of select council.' This numbered thirty members, and seems to have been a supreme board of administration. No information has come down to us with respect to the choice of members, the duration of their office, or their special functions. Oar knowledge, therefore, of the organisation of the Carthaginian senate taken altogether is very imperfect, though there can be little doubt about its general character and its power in the state. The influence of the people seems to have been of little The moment. It is reported that they had only to give their ^'^'^^ ^' votes where a difierence of opinion arose between the senate and the sufi'etes.^ The assembly of the people had the right of electing the magistrates. But that was a j)rivilege of small importance in a state where birth and wealth decided the election. The highest offices of state were, if not exactly purchasable, as Aristotle declares,^ still easily attained by the rich and influential, as in all countries where public offices conferring interest and profit are obtained by pojjular election. In the Greek republics the people exercised their sove- Criminal reignty in the jDopular tribunals still more than in the tiou"' ^^' election of magistrates. The choice of the magistrates could, in a fully developed democracy, be effected by lot, but only the well-considered verdict of the citizens could give a decision affecting the life and freedom of a fellow- citizen. These popular tribunals, which, as being guided and influenced by caprice, prejudice, and political passions, caused unspeakable mischief among the Greek states, * Sanctius concilium. — Liry, xxx. 16. The yepovcna as distinct from the (TvyKK-nros. — Polybius, x. 18, § 1. ^ Aristotle, Poli(. ii. 8, § 3. ä Folit. ii. 8, § 6. c 2 20 KOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK were unknown in Carthagre.^ The firmness and steadiness .._ , ' . of the Carthaginian constitution was no doubt in a great measure owing to the circumstance that the judicial Board of the Hundred (or Hundred-and-four) had in their own hands the administration of criminal justice. Cartha- The Carthaginian state had in truth, as Polybius states, ginianaris- . ••tit-» t ^ -i-j tocracy. a mixed constitution like Rome. In other words, it was neither a pure monarchy nor an exclusive aristocracy nor yet a perfect democracy ; but all three elements were com- bined in it. Yet it is clear that one of these elements, the aristocracy, greatly preponderated. The nobility of Carthage were not a nobility of blood, like the Roman patricians ; but this honour appears, like the later nobility in Rome, to have been open to merit and riches, as was to be expected in a commercial city. The tendency towards plutocracy draws down the greatest censure vfhich Aristotle passes upon Carthage. Some families were conspicuous by their hereditary and almost regal influence. But, in spite of this, monarchy was never established in Carthage, though the attempt is said to have been made twice. No complete revolution ever took place, and there was no breach with the past. Political life there was in all its fulness, and consequently also there were political con- flicts; but these never resulted in revolutions stained with blood and atrocities, such as took place in most of the Greek cities, and in none more often than in the unhappy city of Syracuse. In this respect, therefore, Cai'thage may be compared with Rome ; in both alike the internal development of the state advanced slowly with- out any violent reaction, and on this account Aristotle bestows on her deserved praise.^ This steadiness of her constitution, which lasted for more than 600 years, was duo, according to Aristotle,' to the extent of the Cartha- ' Aristotle, Po/il. iii. 1, § 7. * Vdlit. ii. 8, § 1 : (rrj/xflof Re TroAireias (TvvrfTa'yfXfV7}s rh rhv Simov t-^^ovaav fiifrf Tvpavvov. * I'olit. ii. 8, § 9. CARTHAGE. 21 ginian dominion over subject territories, whereby the CHAP. state was enabled to get rid of* malcontent citizens and to ^ 7 , send them as colonists elsewhere.' But it is mainlj due, after all, to the fii^m and wise government of the Cartha- ginian aristocracy. ' The same advantage is enjoyed at the present time by the United States, and the Puritan emigrations from England had the same tendency of removing the elements of discontent away from home. 22 ROMAN HISTORY. CHAPTEE II. SICILY. BOOK IV. Historical geography of Sicily. The island of Sicily seems destined by its position to form the connecting link between Europe and Africa. Whilst almost toucliing- Italy in tlie north-east, it stretches itself westwards towards the great African continent, which appears to approach it from the south with an out- stretched arm. Thus this large island divides the whole basin of the Mediterranean sea into an eastern and a western, a Greek and a barbarian half. Few Greek settlers ventured westward beyond the narrow straits between Italy and Sicily. Etruscans and Carthaginians were the exclusive masters of the western sea, and in those parts where their power was supreme they allowed no Greek settlement or Greek commerce. The triangular island had one of her sides turned towards the country of the Greeks in the east ; while the other two coasts, converging in a western direction, extended into the sea of the barbarians, and almost reached the very centre of Cartha- ginian power. Thus it hapjDened that the east coast of the island and the nearest portions of the other two coasts were filled with Greek colonies ; while the western part, with the adjacent islands, remained in possession of the Phwiiicians, who, it seems, before the time of the Greek immigriilion, had settlements all round the coast. The greater energy of the Greeks seemed destined to Hellenise the wliole islar.d. No native people could obstruct their jjrogress. The ab(n-igine3 of Sicily, the Sikeli or Sikani,' no ' Tho 8uppn.s(!y which DionysiuH had joined the island town with the main- land of Sicily had probahly destroyed the advantages of its insular position. CüHficqueutly tlic Carthaginians did not restore Motye. They made Lilybaeum SICILY. 27 a large army and fleet towards the east of the island, CHAP. where they conquered Messana, and, after drivino- Diony- ^ , sius back, besieged him in Syracuse. So changeable was the fortune of war in Sicily, and so Piratical dependent on accidental circumstances, that the question of Diünv- whether the island was to be Greek or Carthaginian was '*^^^^- almost within the space of one year decided in two opposite ways, and the hopes of each of the two rivals, after having risen to the highest point, were finally dashed to the p-round. The victorious career of Carthao-e was arrested by the walls of Syracuse, just as, twenty years before, the flower of the Athenian citizens had perished in the same spot. A malignant distemper broke out in the army of the besiegers, compelling Himilco, the Carthaginian general, to a speedy flight and to the dis- graceful sacrifice of the greater part of his army, which consisted of foreign mercenaries. Diony sius was now again, as with one blow, undisputed master of the whole of Sicily, and he had leisure to jjlan the subjection of all the Greek towns to the west of the Ionian Sea. He under- took now his piratical expeditions against Caulonia, Hip- ponium, Croton, and Rhegium, which brought unspeak- able misery on these once-flourishing cities at the very time when they were being pressed by the Italian nations, the Lucanians and the Bruttians. The bloody defeat which the Thurians suffered from the Lucanians, and the conquest of Rhegiam by Dionysius,' accompanied with the most atrocious cruelty, were the saddest events of this period, so disastrous to the Greek nation. If Dionysius had pursued a national policy, and, instead of allying him- self with the Lucanians to attack the Greek cities, had marshalled the Greeks against Carthage, he would most probably have become master of all Sicily. But the faint- hearted manner in which he carried on the war against their chief stronghold, aud changed it from an open and insignificant place into a fortress of the first magnitude. See Schubring über Motye-Lilykeum in Philologus, 18G6. ' At the time of the burning of Eome by the Gauls. . , 28 KOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. The younger Dionysius and Timo- leon. the enemies of the Greek race stood out in strong contrast with the perseverance which he exhibited in enslaving his own countrymen. After short hostilities (383 b.c.), he concluded a peace with Carthage, in which he ceded to her the western part of Sicily as far as the river Halycus. Then, after a long pause, he attempted, for the last time, an attack on the Carthaginian towns, conquering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, and laying siege to Lilybseum, which, after the destruction of Motye, had been strongly fortified by the Carthaginians and was now their principal strong- hold in Sicily. After he had been driven back from Lilybseum, the war ceased, without any treaty of peace. Dionysius died shortly afterwards. The Carthaginians took no advantage either of the in- capacity of his son, the younger Dionysius, or of the feebleness of Syracuse in the Dionian revolution, to extend their dominion further. It was only when Timoleon of Corinth ventured on the bold scheme of restoring the freedom of Syracuse that we find a Carthaginian army and fleet before the town, with the intention of anticipat- ing Timoleon and of conquering Syracuse for Carthage after the overthrow of the tyrant Dionysius. Never did they seem so near the accomplishment of their long- cherished hope. Being joined with Hiketas, the ruler of Leontini, they had already miade themselves masters of the town of Syracuse. Their ships had taken possession of the harbour. Only the small fortified island Ortygia, the key of Syracuse, was still in the hands of Dionysius, who, when he could no longer maintain his ground, had the choice to which of his enemies he would surrender, to Timoleon or to the Carthaginians and Hiketas. The good fortune ' or the wisdom of Timoleon carried the day. He obtained by agreement the possession of Ortygia and he sent Dionysius, with his treasures, as exile to Corinth. Again the Carthaginians saw the prize of all their efforts snatched (Vom Iheir hands. They feared treason on the ' The cxix'ilitioii of Tinioloon is remarkable for the unusual number of BUperuatural üvents. I'lutarcli's biography is a continuous story of miracles. SICILY. 29 part of Hiketas, their Greek ally ; and their general Mago CHAP. sailed back to Africa. There he escaped by a voluntary . ^ , death the punishment which the Carthaginian senate in- flicted only too often on unfortunate generals. His body was nailed to the cross. Timoleon crowned his glorious work of the deliverance barren of Syracuse and the expulsion of all the tyrants of Sicily Timoleon. by a brilliant victory over a superior Carthaginian army on the river Krimesus. This defeat was disastrous to Carthage because they lost in it a select body consisting of citizens from the first families. Yet the result of this much lauded victory was by no means the expulsion of the Punians from Sicily. It seems not even to have produced a change in the respective strength of the two belligerents or an alteration of boundary between the Greek and Carthaginian territory. Between the overthrow of the second Dionysius and Tyranny of the dominion of Agathokles, the most noxious and most \\^^^ hateful of her tyrants, Syracuse enjoyed, for twenty-two years, democratic government and comparative rest, as well as peaceful intercourse with the Carthaginians and with the other Sicilian Greeks. But the worthless Agathokles had hardly seized the monarchical power which seemed to have been put down for ever in Syracuse by the noble Timoleon, than the national war between Greeks and Punians again broke out, and was carried on with a violence and animosity hitherto unknown. After one de- cisive victory over Agathokles, the Carthaginians for the third time besieged Syracuse with an army and fleet, and for the third time they seemed on the point of gain- ing the last stronghold of Greek independence in Sicily. Agathokles then, with true Greek ingenuity and with the recklessness of despair, ventured upon an enterprise which thwarted all the calculations of the Carthaginians. He burst forth with his ships out of the blockaded har- bour of Syracuse, and landed an army on the coast of Africa. Attacked in their own country, the Carthaginians were compelled to relinquish all thoughts of conquering 30 EOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. Later ex- peditions of Ag,i- thokles. SjTacuse. For four years Agathokles conducted the war in Africa with extraordinary success. He not only conquered many of the country towns of the Cartliaginians, and lived in luxury from the rich spoils of that fruitful and flourish- ing land, but he took possession also of the most impor- tant Phoenician towns under the dominion of Carthage, such as Thapsus, Hadrumetum, and even TJtica and Tunis, in the immediate neighbourhood of Carthage. Internal foes joined themselves to the foreign enemy, who attacked the state in its most vulnerable part. The treachery of the general Bomilcar, and the revolt of subjects and allies, reduced the proud Punian town almost to ruin. There was now no longer any trust in the power of money or their foreign mercenaries. The citizens of the town them- selves, and the men of the noblest blood, were called out and courageously sacrificed. The perseverance of Carthage j)revailed. Agathokles escaped with difficulty to Sicily, and two of his sons, with his whole army, fell as victims to a recklessness which had not sufficient power to back it. Thus failed an undertaking on which Regulus ventured in the first Punic war with a similar result, and which succeeded only in the second war with Rome after the strength of Carthage was so completely exhausted that even a Hannibal could not restore it. The expedition of Agathokles had no influence on the relative position of the Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily. After many fruitless struggles the treaty of peace left the Carthaginians in possession of the western portion with the dominion over Selinus and Himera. Agathokles, like his predecessors Hiero and Dionysius, now formed other schemes than that of the conquest of all Sicily. He made several exptulitions into Italy and into the Adriatic Sea, conquered even the island of Corcyra, causing destruction aixl ruin wherever he appeared, without gaining a single j)ennaiient conquest. When at length, at a great age, he was murdered by his grandson, new dissensions broke out, as was usually the case after the fall of a tyrant. Sicily, now thoroughly exhausted, and retaining less and less of SICILY. 31 lier Greek nationality, soug-lit a protector from Pyrrlins, CHAP. king of the semi-barbarous Epirots. How this last -__ ^^ - attempt to unite the Sicilian Greeks and to free the island from Carthaginians failed has been already related.^ The freedom of the Greeks in the mother country had already perished. Tn Sicily, too, its days were numbered. But the prize for which the Carthaginians had contended so long was not to be gained by them. A new competitor appeared. The conquerors of Pja-rhus followed in his footsteps with more energy and success, and, after a long and changeful struggle, gave to the afflicted Sicilians peace and order, in exchang-e for their lost independence. ' See vol. i. ch. xvi. 32 ROMAN HISTORY. CHAPTER III. THE FIEST PUNIC WAE, 26i-241 B.C. First Period. — To the capture of Ägrigentum, 262 B.C. In no country inliabited by Greeks had the national 23rosperity suffered more than in Sicily by violent and de- structive revolutions, by a succession of arbitrary rulers and atrocious tyrants, by the destruction of towns, and by the transplantation or butchery of their inhabitants. Even the older and milder rulers of Syracuse, Gelon and his brother Hiero, practised, with the greatest recklessness, the Asiatic custom of transporting whole nations into new settlements, and the confiscation and new division of land. Their successors — especially the first Dionysius and the infamous Agathokles — vied with the Punic barbarians in cruelties of the most revolting kind. All towns in the island experienced, one after another, the horrors of con- quest, plunder, devastation, and the murder or slavery of their inhabitants. The noble temples and works of art of a former age sank in ruins, the walls were repeatedly pulled down and built up again, and the fruitful fields laid waste. We can scarcely imagine how it was that Greek civilisation and even a remnant of jirosperity could survive these endless calamities ; and we should welcome any evidence which might tend to prove that historians depicted in too glaring colours the troubles which were experienced in their own time. But the gradual decline of Greek power in all })arts of the island, the growth of bar- barism, and the helplessness of the people, are too clearly to be discerned to leave any doubt of the truthfulness of tlie picture as a whole. TUE FIRST rUNIC WAR. 33 There was no town in tlie island wliicli during three cen- turies had been visited by greater calamities than Messana/ Messana had been originally a Chalcidian colony, but was seized by a band of Samians and Milesians, who, being exjjelled from their homes by the Persians, went to Sicily and drove away or enslaved the old inhabitants of the town. Shortly after this the town fell into the hands of Anaxilaos, the tyrant of Rhegium, who introduced new colonists, especially exiled Messanians, and changed the original name of Zankle into Messana. In that devas- tating war which the Carthaginians carried on with the elder Dionysius, and in which Selinus,Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and Camarina were destroyed, Messana suffered the same fate, and its inhabitants were scattered in all direc- tions. Rebuilt soon after (390 b.c.), and peopled with new inhabitants by Dionysius, the town seemed in some measure to have recovered, when it fell (312 b.c.) into the power of Agatholvles. It shared with all the other towns of the island the fate which this tyrant brought on Sicily ; yet in sj^ite of the many blows it suffered, it appears to have reached a certain degree of importance and prosperity, which must be attributed in part at least to its unrivalled position in the Sicilian straits. After the fall of Agatho- kles a new misfortune befell it, and Messana ceased for ever to be a Greek colony. A band of Cam23anian mer- cenaries, who called themselves Mamertines, that is, the sons of Mars, and who had fought in the service of the Syracusan tyrants, entered the town, on their way back to Italy, and were hospitably entertained by the inhabi- tants. But, instead of crossing over to Rhegium, they fell upon and murdered the citizens, and took possession of the place. ^ Messana was now an independent barbarian town in Capture of Sicily. Shortly after, a Roman legion, consisting of ' '^^'""^ ' Hermann, Grkch. StacdsaUcrflrihrn r, § 83. - A similar act of infamous barbarity had been perpetrated before by the tyrant Dionysius the elder. Having taken Catana by treason, and having' plundered and destroyed it, he sold the inhabitants as slaves, and handed over the place to a baud of Campauian mercenaries. — Diodorus, xiv. 15. VOL. II. D 34 EOMAN HISTOEY. EOOK IV. by Roman mutine„ Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse. Campanians, fellow-countrymen of the Messanian free- booters, imitated their example, and by a similar act of atrocity took possession of Rheginm on the Italian side of the straits.' United by rela^tionship and common interests, the pirate states of Messana and Ehegium mutually defended themselves against their common enemies, and were for a time the terror of all surrounding countries, and especially of the Greek towns. After Ehegium had been conquered by the Romans,^ the day of punishment seemed to be approaching also for the Mamertines of Messana. Apart from the consideration that the possession of Messana would be a great acquisition to the state of Syracuse, that city, as the foremost Greek community in Sicily, was called upon to avenge the fate of the murdered Messanians, and to exterminate that band of robbers, which made the whole island unsafe. Hiero, the leader of the Syracusan army, was sent against them. He began by ridding himself of a number of his mer- cenaries who were troublesome or whom he suspected of treason. He placed them in a position where they were exposed to a hostile attack from the enemy, and left them without support, so that they were all cut down.^ He then enlisted new mercenaries, equipped the militia of Syracuse, and gained a decisive victory over the Mamertines in the field, after which they gave up their predatory excursions and retired within the walls of Messana, The success of Hiero made him master of Syracuse, whose citizens had no means of keeping a victorious general in subjection to the laws of the state. Fortunately, Hiero was not a tyrant like Agathokles. On the whole, he governed as a mild and sagacious politician, and succeeded, under the most difficMilt circumstances, when placed between the two great belligerent powers of Rome and Carthage, in maintaining ' Vol. i. ].. .'■jIS. 2 Vol. i. p. 540. ^ ll wii.H riol tlii'drst liiiir th;it morconary troops were exposed to such treason jit the liMiids of Syracusan generals. Durinp; the siege of Syracuse by tho Cart.liairiiiiiins, tlie first Dionysiu.s had acted in the .same manner (Diodorus, xiv. 72). AfhTwards, the farlhuginians, and even the Romans, did the same. — riutarch, Fah. Max. 22. THE FIKST PUNIC WAR. the independence of Syracuse, and in securing for his native town during his reign of fifty years a period of reviving prosjierity. First of all, he aimed at expelling the Italian barbarians from Sicily, and at establishing his power in the east of the island by the conquest of Messana. The Mamertines had taken the part of the Carthaginians during the invasion of Pyrrhus in Sicily, and with their assistance had successfully defended Messana. The attack of Hiero, who in some measure was at the head of the Greeks, as the successor of PjTrhus, forced the Mamertines to seek aid from a foreign power, after their most faithful confederates, the mutineers of Rhegium, had perished by the sword of the Romans or the axe of the executioner. They had only the choice between Carthage and Rome. Each of these states had its party in Messana. The Romans Avere further off than the Carthaginians, and j)erliaps the Mamertines were afraid to ask for protection from those who had so severely punished the Campanian freebooters of Rhegium. A troop of Carthaginians under Hanno was therefore admitted into the citadel of Messana, and thus the long-cherished wish of Carthage for the dominion over the Avhole of Sicily seemed near its fulfilment. Of the three strongest and most important places in Relations Sicily, they had now Lilybseum and Messana in their pos- tha^^to session, and thus their communication with Africa and ßo^e. Italy was secured. Syracuse, the third town of importance, was very much reduced and weakened, and seemed inca- pable of any protracted resistance. Carthage had long been in friendly relations with Rome, and these relations had during the war of Pyrrhus taken the form of a complete military alliance. Carthage and Rome had, apparently, the same interests, the same friends, and the same enemies. On the continent of Italy, Rome had subjected to herself all the Greek settlements. What could be more natural or more fair than that the fruits of the victory over Pyrrhus in Sicily should be reaped by Carthage '? The straits of Messana were the natural boundary between the commer- cial city, the mistress of the seas and islands, and the 86 ROMAN HISTOEY. EOOK IV. Jealousy of Rome for Car- thage. continental empire of tlie Eomans, whose dominion seemed to have found its legitimate termination in Tarentum and Ehegium. But the friendship between Eome and Carthage, which had arisen out of their common danger, was weakened after their common victory and was shaken after the defeat of Pjrrhus at Beneventum. It was by no means clear that Carthage was free from all desire of gaining possessions in Italy. The Homans at least were jealous of their allies, and had stipulated in the treaty with Car- thage, in the year 348 b.c.,^ that the Carthaginians should not found or hold any fortresses in Latium or indeed in any part of the Roman dominions. They showed the same jealousy when in the war with Pyrrhus a Car- thaginian fleet entered the Tiber, ostensibly for the assist- ance of Home, by declining- the proffered aid. When a Carthaginian fleet showed itself before Tarentum in 272 b.c., and seemed about to anticipate the Rom^ans in the occupa- tion of this town, they complained formally of a hostile intention on the part of the Carthaginians.^ The Cartha- ginians denied having this intention, but the Romans nevertheless had g-ood reason to be on their guard, and to entertain fear of Carthaginian interference in the affairs of Italy as well as jealousy of their powerful neighbour, who had now got a firm footing in Spain and governed all the islands of the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas.^ While this feeling was prevalent in Rome, an embassy came from the Mamertines, commissioned to deliver over to Rome Messana and the territory belonging to it,^ a present which indeed involved the necessity of first clearing the town of the ' Tili« olili'st commerciMl treaty hctwoen Rome and Carthage is erroneously placed by Polybius (iii. 22) in the year 509 n.c. See Mommsen's Chronologie, 320 f. The treaty was a kind of international navigation act, intended to keep down foreign competition. Tlie second treaty shows tliis intention still more ch'arly. '' It Hcirjis tliat thi' Homans lo(_>ked upon or ]iri'tended to look upon tliis int<-rferenco of tlie Cai'tha;j,inian fleet as a brciieli of the treaty of friendship between tho two nations, and that they made use of it to justify their war against Carthago. Livy(x,\i. 10) makes Hanno say, in (he Carthaginian senate: ' Tarf^nto, id est, Italia non abslinueramus ex faxlere.' " Tolybiua, 1. 10, § 8. " Tulybius, i. 10, § 2. TKE FIRST PUNIC WAR, 37 Carthaginians and tlien of defending- it against tliem.* ctiap. The Carthaginians, it appears, had made themselves ob- .^ . noxious since they had had possession of the citadel of ^■"^'■' Messana, and the Eoman party felt itself strong enough 264-262 to take the bold step of invoking the aid of the Romans. "'^' But for Rome the decision was a difficult one. There Rcsokition could hardly be any doubt that to grant the request of Romans to the Mamertines would be to declare war against Car- ^^^ *-'^® ^ JVlamer- thage and Syracuse, and that such a war would tax the tines of resources of the nation to the utmost. In addition to ^^®^^"** this the proposal of the Mamertines was by no means honourable to Rome. A band of robbers offered dominion over a town which they had seized by the most outrageous act of violence ; and this offer was made to the Romans, who so recently had put to death the accomplices of the Mamertines for a similar treachery towards Rhegium. Moreover, the assistance of the Romans was called in against Hiero of Syracuse, to Avliom they were indebted for aid in the siege of Rhegium, and at the same time against the Carthaginians, their allies in the scarcely ter- minated war with Pyrrhus. Long and earnest were the deliberations in the Roman senate ; and when at lenn-th the prospect of extension of power outweighed all moral considerations, the people also voted for an undertaking which seemed to promise abundant spoils and gain.^ ' According to Zonaras (viii. 9), tho Mamertines had first applied to the Eomaus for aid, and had not received the Cartliaginians into their town until they despaired of assistance being sent from Rome. There are great dis- crepancies in the accounts of Polyljiiis and Zonaras, from M-hicli it is evident that they followed different authorities. .Zonaras, or rather Dio Cassius, whoni he copied, perhaps followed Philinus, whilst Polybius made nse of this WTiter chiefly for the purpose of testing the diverging statements of Fabius Pictor. The f-wo historians, Philinus and Fabius, had written the history of the First Punic War respectively from the Carthaginian and the Roman point of view, and had thereby become one-sided and partial. Polybius was more independent in his judgment; still we may reasonably doubt that he always succeeded in dis- entangling the truth from the conflicting evidence which was accessible to him. ^ Polybius (i. 11) reports that the senate did not finallj- resolve upon war but left the decision to the people. This statement is unintelligible, for according to the constitutional law and practice the final decision always rested 430133 ^8 EOMAN HISTORY. EOOK However, if the decision was not exactly honourable, neither ^ . . ' ,.. could it, from the Roman point of view, be condemned. The surprise of Messana by the Mamertines was, as far as Rome was concerned, different from the act of the Cara- panian legion in Rhegium ; the latter, being in the service of the Romans, had broken their military oath, and had been guilty of mutiny and open rebellion. On the other hand, the Mamertines in Sicily were, as regarded the Romans, an independent foreign people. They had wronged neither Rome nor Roman allies or subjects. However atrocious their act had been, the Romans were not entitled to take them to account for it, nor called upon to forego any political advantages merely because they disap- proved of the deed. The unblushing desire for extension and conquest needed no excuse or justification in antiquity ; and Rome in particular, by reason of her former history and organisation, could not stop short in her career of conquest, and pause for moral scruples at the Sicilian straits. Change A. new era begins in the history of Rome with the first cliiiracter crossing of the legions into Sicily. The obscurity which of Roman ^gg^ed on the wars of Rome with Sabellians and Greeks history. disappears not gradually but suddenly. The Arcadian Polybius, one of the most trustworthy of ancient writers, and at the same time an experienced politician, has left us a history of the First Punic War drawn from contempo- rary sources, especially Philinus and Fabius Pictor, written with so much fulness that now, for the first time, we feel a confidence in the details of Roman history which imparts true interest to the events related and a real worth to the narrative. Rflüfivo ipjjjj fjj.y^ y^jQ^Y with Carthage lasted twenty-three years, streiiglL of ö J J > with the people. In no case could the senate resolve upon war without the consent of the peoj)lo. Polybius docs not say that the majority of the senate was «gainst tiio war. He wished only to convey the impression that the discredit, inscparaMi- (nun tlic Roman policy, was attributable not to the senate, but to the people. J I is ilic old story over again. The dirty work is to be (loiK^ by the lower class of people, not by the nobility. Compare vol. i. p. 22'J. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 39 from 264 to 241 b.c. The long duration of tlio struoo-le chap. showed that the combatants Avere not unequally matched. . ^ , The strength of Rome lay in the warlike ciualities of her ^''i'«'' citizens and subjects. Carthage was immeasurably superior '^gi-2ü2 in wealth. If money were the most important thing in war, Eome would have succumbed. But in the long war, which J^""'f '"^^^ ° Cartilage. dried up the most abundant resources, the difference be- tween rich and poor gradually disappeared, and Carthage was sooner exhausted than Rome, which had never been w^ealthy. The difference in the financial position of the two states was the more important, as the war was carried on not only by land but also by sea, and the equip- ment of fleets was more expensive than that of land armies, especially for a state like Rome, which now for the first time appeared as a maritime power. It must not, however, be forgotten that the naval and financial strength of all the Greek towns in Italy, and also of Syra- cuse, was at the disposal of the Romans. If they are less frequently mentioned in the course of the war than might be expected, it is due to the usual custom of historians, who, out of national pride, pass over in silence the assist- ance rendered by subordinate allies. The prize of the war, the beautiful island of Sicily, was gained by the vic- torious Romans. But this was not the only result. The superiority of Rome over Carthage was shown, and the war in Sicily, great and important as it was, was only the prelude to the greater and more important struggle which established the dominion of Rome on the ruins of Carthage. The carrying out of the decree to give the Mamertines Oecupa- the desired assistance was intrusted to the consul Appius tV°° ° . . . . Messa. Claudius Caudex, while the second consul was still in by the Etruria, bringing to an end the war with Volsinii.^ Romans. Appius proved himself equal to the task in the council as well as in the field. Although the war with Carthage and Syracuse was, by the decision of the Roman people, ' See vol. i. p. 479. of aua 40 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK j)ractically begun, no formal declaration was made.' Appius w ^ . dispatched to Ehegium liis legate C. Claudius, who crossed over to Messana, with the ostensible object of settling the difficulty that had arisen, and invited the commander of the Carthaginian garrison in the citadel to a conference with the assembled Mam.ertines. On this occasion, the Eoman honour did not appear in a very advantageous light by the side of the much abused Punic faithlessness. The Carthaginian general, who had come down from the citadel without a guard, was taken prisoner, and was weak enough to give orders to his men for evacuating the fortress. The Eoman party had clearly gained the upper hand in Messana, since they felt assured of the assistance of Eome. Landing of Thus Eome obtained possession of Messana, even before Romans in ^^'^'^ consul and the two legions had crossed the straits. Sicily. It ^vas now the duty of the Carthaginian admiral, who was in the neighbourhood with a fleet, to prevent their landing in Sicily. But Appius Claudius crossed during the night without loss or difficulty, and thus, at the very beginnmg of the war, the sea, on which hitherto Carthage had exercised uncontrolled dominion, favoured the Romans. The experience of the war throughout was to the same efi'ect. On the whole, Eome, though a continental power, si lowed itself equal to the maritime power of Carthage, and was in the end enabled by a great na-val victoiy to dictate peace. Ineffectual In possession of Messana, and at the head of two legions, Hiur'rwitli -A^ppius followed up his advantage with ability and bold- thft Car- ness. Hiero and the Carthaginians had been obliged, by the decisive act of the Eoman s, to make common cause together. For the first time after 200 years of hostility, Syracuse entered into a league with her lu>reditary enemies the Greeks. But the friendship was not to be of ' W'Ihm ilil.H was (Iiiiic, \vc do not know. Accoi'ding to the old sacred law and international i)raclice, it waa necessary to declare war in due form. The Kuman felialis, liowever, was not obliged to travel all the way to Carthage to do lIiJH. Jl(^ e(jnld throw hiH spear over the huslilo frontier in the immediate vieiuity of Rome. fSec vol. i. .006. B.c. TUE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 41 long duration, thanks to the rapid success of Rome. ISTo CHAP. sooner had Appius landed than he attacked Hiero, and , \.[ , so ten-ified him that he immediately^ lost courao-e, and Fikst rrn 1 Period, hurried back to Syracuse. Thus the league was practi- 204-202 callj dissolved. Appius then attacked the Carthaginians, and the result was, that they gave up the siege. After Messana was in this manner placed out of danger, Appius assumed the offensive. With one blow the whole of Sicily seemed to have fallen into his power. On the ' Polybius (i. 11, 12) minutely examines the contradictions in the reports of Fabius Pictor and Philinus. Ac ording to the latter, Appius Claudius -was worsted in his encounter with Hiero and also in that with the Carthao-inians. Polybius rejects this statement, because he cannot on this supposition under- stand the I'etreat of the allies. According to Zouaras (viii. 9), who perhaps indirectly reproduces the account of Philinus, the advantage was upon the whole on the side of the Romans, but their two victories were by no means decisive or unattended with loss, a fact which is apparent even from Polybius (i. 16, § 9). The Roman cavalry was routed by that of the Syracusans, but as their infantry was victorious, Hiero broke up and returned to Syracuse. In tlieir attack upon the Carthaginians, the Romans made an attempt to storm their camp. On their repulse, the Carthaginians made a sally, and fol- lowed up their advantage, but were driven back into their camp. Such battles, in which gain and loss are divided on both sides, are most naturally claimed as victories by both parties. The conclusion arrived at by Polybius, that the Romans must have been decidedly victorious, because both the Carthaginians and the Syracusans retreated, does not seem altogether cer- tain. We know what happens in the military operations of allies, especially when they have not full confidence in one another. The Carthaginians and tlie Greeks had always been hereditary enemies, and were now for the first time making common cause to repel a common enemy. Hiero could not per- suade himself that the Romans had crossed the straits without the connivance or assistance of the Carthaginians (Diodorus, xxiii. flF. 4) ; and when he found himself unexpectedly attacked by them on the very morning after their landino-, and left without assistance by his allies, he lost courage, though for the moment he had maintained his position. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, could see no cause for Hiero's precipitate retreat but treason or cowardice ; and they were not far wrong in such a supposition, for soon after they found Hiero clianged into an ally of the Romans. They did not therefore venture to take the offensive, but remained in their camp in the neighbourhood of Messana, without however being further molested by Claudius after his first attack had failed. If Claudius could have boasted of any decided victory during this campaign, he would no doubt have been rewarded with a triumph. But his mad advance against Syracuse ended in discomfiture and loss, and the Romans found it necessary to double the strength of their army in Sicily for the ensuing campaign. All these considerations tend to show that, though Polybius is on the whole a trustworthy and conscientious guide, we are still far removed from the historical certainty which can be obtained only from contemporary witnesses. 42 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Second campaign in Sicily, 263 B.c. Alliance of llicro witli lionio. one side lie penetrated as far as Syracuse, and on the other to the Carthaa'inian frontier. The Eoman soldiers were doubtless rewarded with rich spoils ; and this seemed to justify the decision of the people, who had consented to the war partly in the hope of such gain. But Syra- cuse, which had gloriously resisted so many Qneraies, was not to be taken at a run. AjDpius Claudius was obliged to return to Messana, after experiencing great dangers, which he could escape only by perfidy and cun- ning. The conquest of this town, therefore, was the only lasting success of the first campaign which Rome had undertaken beyond the sea. In the following year, the war in Sicily was carried on with two consular armies, that is, four legions, a force of at least 36,000 men, consisting in equal parts of Romans and allies. This army seems small when we compare the numbers which are reported to have been engaged in the former wars of Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily.' It is said that at Himera (480 b.c.) 300,000 Carthaginians were engaged ; Dionysius rej^eatedly led armies of 100,000 men into the field, and now there was a force of only four legions against the combined army of Carthaginians and Greeks. We shall do well to test the huge exaggerations of the earlier traditions by the more credible account given by Polybius of the Roman military force. The Greeks were, it is true, in the third century much reduced, and their force was probably only a shadow of their early armies ; but the Carthaginians were now at the very zenith of their power, and had certainly reason to pursue t\ui war in Sicily in good earnest. On the appearance of the Roman army, the Sicilian citii's, one after another, deserted the cause of Hiero and the Carthaginians, and joined the Romans, so that the latter, without a struggle, obtained i30Ssession of the greater part of the island,^ aiid now turned against Syra- cuse. Then Hiero saw that, in concluding an alliance with Carthage, he had made a great mistake, and that ' Sue ubovc, I). 21, note 2. - Pulybiu«, i. IG, § 3; Zonaras, viii. 9. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 43 it was high time to alter his policy. His subjects shared CHAP. his desire for peace with Rome, and therefore it could not -^^ JL . be a difficult task to arrive at an ao-reement, especially as l'"^' it was in the interest of the Romans to break up the 264 -202 alliance between Carthage and Syracuse, and, by friend- ship with Hiero, to have the chief resources of the island at their disposal. Hiero accordingly concluded a peace with Rome for fifteen years,^ engaged to deliver up the prisoners of war, to pay the sum of a hundred talents, and to place himself completely in the position of a de- pendent ally. The Romans owed a considerable part of their success to the faithful services rendered by Hiero during the whole course of the war. He was never tired of furnishing supplies of all kinds,- and thus he relieved them of part of their anxiety for the maintenance of their troops. Nor was the Roman alliance less useful to Hiero. It is true he reigned over Syracuse only by the per- mission and protection of Rome, and the city sufi^ered grievously fi'om the long continuation of the war. Never- theless, it recovered from its declining state ; and Hiero, emulating his predecessors Gelo, Hiero, and Dionysius, could display before his countrymen all the magnificence of a Greek prince, and appear as a candidate for the prizes in the Greek national games.^ The Carthaginians could not maintain their advanced Decline of position in the neio-hbourhood of Messana, in front of the !^^ 9"^.^" ■^ ° _ ^ thagmuin two Roman consular armies, although no engagement power in seems to have taken place.'* The towns also, which had "^' ^ ' ' Diodonis, xxiii. ff. 5. ^ Diodonis, xxiii. if. 9. ^ Polybius, i. 16, cpiXocrrecpat/wv koI y eis tovs "EAArjias. ■* Neither Polybius nor Zonaras mention a battle in which the Roman con- suls engaged the united forces of the Carthaginians and Syracusans. Accord- ing to the narrative of these historians, the Sicilian towns fell one after another into the hands of the Romans without a struggle. On the other hand, Pliny reports {Hist. Nat. vii. 60), that in the year 263 b.c. Marcus Valerius Messala caused a picture to be piit up in the Curia Hostilia, which represented his victory over Hiero and the Carthaginians. We have here an example of the barefaced and boundless falsification of history of which the noble families of Rome were guilty. Relying on the evidence of Polybius, we can affirm •without hesitation that the alleged victory of M. Valerius Messala is a fiction. But even the boldest family panegyrists could not venture to misrepresent events outright before contemporary witnesses. It was necessary tu wait awhile, until 44 ' EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK liitlierto been on their side, joined the Romans. Even - / Segesta, the old and faithful ally of Carthage in Sicily, made use of its alleged Trojan origin, to ask favourable conditions from Eome, and killed the Carthaginian gar- rison as a proof of its attachment to its new ally. Thus, in a short time, and without much exertion, the Romans gained a position in Sicily which the Carthaginians had for centuries aimed at in vain. Probable Compared with the rapid and successful action of the the success Romans in the beginning of the war, the movements ^the q£ ^|-^q Carthaginians appear to have been singularly slow and weak. Before the breaking out of hostilities, the advantage had been decidedly on their side. They had military possession of Messana; with their fleet they so completely commanded the straits that in the conscious pride of their superiority their admiral declared that the Romains should not without his permission even wash their hands in the sea.' The resources of almost the whole of Sicily were at their disposal, and the communication with Africa was at all times secure. Whether the important city of Messana was lost by the incapacity or timidity of Hanno, who paid with his life for his evacuation of the citadel, or through an exaggernted fear of a breach with Rome, or by confidence in Roman moderation, it is not possible to decide. Nor do we know how the Romans the memory of events had faded away, and until fiction had gradually acquired credence enough, by dint of frequent repetition in the family circle, to venture into publicity. There cannot bo any doubt, therefore, that the date given by riiny f)r the public exhibition of the picture is false. Pliny thought he could not go wrong in naming tlie year of the consulship of Valerius as that in which the picture was jtainted, and put up in the si nate-house ; and he showed here, as on many otlier occasions, his want of judgment. Ilis statement is of no value whatever for the history of art. Like the lying epitaph of Scipio Barbatus (sco vol. i. p. 4.'J9), this alleged historical painting originated many years after the death of the man whose glory it was intended to perpetiiate. It is one of tlio proofs of the worthlessness of the Capitoline fasti, that they record a triuinpli of Valerius over tiio Punians and Hiero, king of the Siculi. After this jir'iofnf iIk' uiisi'i-niiulcius vanity of the Valerii it is no matter of surprise that tliey aKiTibi^ the lii-.sf application of the name Messala to the consul of the year '2(i'.i, liiongh lie ncitJier took the place nor (iks Seneca says: Be Brcvilate Vita, I'i) liad llio imnour of (lefcndiiig it. ' Zonarus, viii. 'J. TUE FIEST PUNIC WiVR. 45 were able, in the face of a hostile fleet, to cross the straits with an army of 10,000 men, and in the year after with double that number. It seems that this could not have been easy even with the assistance of the ships of Khegium, Tarentum, ISTeapolis, Locri, and other Greek towns in Italy, for even the assembling- of these ships in the straits miglit have been prevented. The small strip of water which separates Sicily from Italy was sufficient in modern times to limit the Trench power to the continent, and, under the protection of the English fleet, to save Sicily for the Bourbons. How was it that the same straits, even at the first trial, caused the Romans no greater difficulties than an}' broad river? Was the Carthaginian fleet too small to prevent their crossing by force? Was it the result simply of negligence, or of one of the innumerable cir- cumstances which place warlike operations by sea so far beyond all calculation? Apjjarently, Carthage did not expect a war with Rome, and was wholly unprepared for it. This may be inferred with tolerable certainty, not only from the result of their first encounter with the Romans in Messana, but also from the fact that in the second year of the war they left Hiero unsupported, and thus com- pelled him to throw himself into the arms of the Romans.' The gravity of their position was now apparent, and Renewed induced them to make preparations for the third campaign ^j^g q^^. on a more extensive scale. ^ For the basis of their opera- thaginians, . 262 B.c. tions they chose Agrigentum. This town, which since its conquest and destruction by the Carthaginians in the year 405, had alternately been under Carthaginian and Syracusan dominion, had by the aid of Timoleon acquired a precarious independence, but had never recovered its ' One cause of their weakness we learn aecidentallj' from Zonaras (viii. 9). On the breaking out of hostilities, the Carthaginians ciiised the Italian merce- naries who served in their army to be massacred. We are not informed of the strength of this body of troops. If the Punic garrison of Messana consisted of such men, who, as countrymen of the Mamertines, were favourably dis- posed towards them, the loss of Messana is easily explained. At any rate, the position of the Carthaginian generals was verj' precarious if they had recourse to such a desperate measure as the massacre of their own troops. « Polybius, i. 17, § 3. 46 EOIVIAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. The Romans besiege Agrigen- tum. former splendour. Situated on a rocky plateau surrounded by steep precipices at the confluence of the brooks Hypsos and Akragas, it was naturally so strong as to appear impregnable at a time when the art of besieging cities was so little advanced ; but as it was not immediately on the coast' and had no harbour, it was impossible to supply it with provisions by sea. It is therefore strange that the Carthaginians should choose just this town for their basis, instead of their strongest fortress, Lilybeeum. Probably, the choice was determined by the closer vicinity of Syra- cuse and Messana, the conquest of which they had by no means ceased to hope for. The consuls for the year 262, L. Postumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus, marched with all their forces^ against Agrigentum, where Hannibal was stationed for the protec- tion of the magazines with an army of mercenaries so in- ferior in numbers that he could not hazard a battle. They set to work in the slow and tedious mode of attack which they had learnt in Latium and Samnium, and which, when they had superior numbers at their command, could not fail eventually to lead to success.' Outside the town they established two fortified camps in the east and the west, and united these by a double line of trenches, so that they were secured against sallies from the besieged as well as from any attacks of an army that might come to relieve the town. After they had cut off all communications, ' See Ilaltiius, Bum. Gesch. i. IGO. Siofert, AJcragas tend sein Gebiet, 1845. '^ The army must have consisted of two consular armies or four legions, althongli after the conclusion of the peace with Hiero in the preceding year the Romans had hoped that two legions would suffice for carrying on the war in Sicily (Polyhius, i. 17, § 1). Moreover, we may presmne that all their allies, especially the Syraciisans and Mamertines, sent auxiliaries. To blockade so large a town as Agi'igentum a much larger force was necessary than four legions. According to the Agrigentine historian Pliilinus (quoted by Dio- dorus, xxiii. ff. 7), tin- army of the Romans and their allies consisted of 100,000 men. * Fours years later, at the siege of Camarina, the Romans tried their own national mode of alta<'k, iind wlicn this failed, they employed Greek engines of siege, Hni>])lied by lliero, and thus succeeded in taking Camarina.— Diodorus, xxiii. if. 9. TTTE riRRT PUNIC WAR. 47 they quietly awaited the effects of hnngoi', which coukl CHAP. ITT not fail soon to show themselves. By the prompt assist- . , _ ^ "_ ance of their Sicilian allies, especially of Hiero, they were amply supplied with provisions, which were collected by them in the neighbourijig town of Erbessns. But when, after five months' siegle, a Carthaginian army Defeat of under Hanno marched from Heraclea to relieve the town, "^""°' the situation of the Eomans began to be serious, especially after Hanno had succeeded in taking the town of Erbessus with all the stores in it. The besiegers now experienced almost as much distress as the besieged. They began to suffer want and privation, although Hiero did all that was possible to send them new svipplies. An attack on the town promised as little success as one on the army of Hanno, who had taken up a strong position on a hill in the immediate neighbourhood of the Romans. The consuls already thought of raising the siege, which had lasted almost seven months, when fire signals from the town, giving notice of the increasing distress of the besieged, induced Hanno to ofi*er battle. With the courajje of despair, the Romans accepted it, and obtained a decisive and brilliant victory. The Carthaginians, it appears, now for the first time made use of elephailts, which they had learnt to apply to the purposes of war during either the invasion of Agathokles in Africa or of Pyrrhus in Sicily. But these animals seem on this occasion, as on many others, to have done more harm than good. Almost all fell into the hands of the Romans. The fragments of the Cartha- ginian army fled to Heraclea, leaving their camp, with rich spoils, to the victorious army. In the night following this victory, Hannibal took Escape of advantac^e of the exhaustion and confusion in the Roman l^^^ V'*.^' ^ _ tnaginian army secretly to leave Agrigentum and to slip away uu- garri.son noticed over the Roman lines. In this manner, he saved niumibal. at least a part of his army, after it had been materially weakened by hunger and desertion. But the miserable inhabitants of the town, who doubtless had unwillingly shared in the struggle and in the horrors of a seven 48 ■ ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Historical value of the narra- tive. montlis' siege, were doomed to pay the penalty for tlie escape of tlie Carthaginians. They were all ' sold as slaves, and so for the second time the splendid city of Akragas perished, after it had nearly recovered from the devasta- tion caused by the Carthaginians. But new settlers soon gathered again on this favoured spot. Even in the course of the same war, Agrigentum became again the theatre of some hardly-contested struggles between Carthaginians and ßomans ; and not until it had been conquered and laid waste in the wars with Hannibal for the third time did it cea.se to exist as a Greek town. With such persistent energy did the Greeks cling to the spots where they had set up their household hearths and their temples, and where they had intrusted to the mother earth the ashes of their dead. The siege of Agrigentum is the first event in the military history of Rome which is historically authenti- cated not only in its final result but to some extent also in the details of its progress,^ The earlier descriptions of ' According to Diodorus (xxiii. ff. 9), 25.000 in numljer. ' Nevertheless, much remains obscure, and the numbers especially are by no means to be trusted. That the Romans employed not one but two consular armies is certain beyond dispute, as it is admitted that both consuls took part in the siege. Yet Polybius does not distinctly state this, and even suggests the contrary by saying (i. 17) that the senate had resolved to carry on the "war in Sicily with only one consular army. He omitted to relate that this re- solution was subsequently modified. He also neglects altogether to mention the .Sicilian auxiliaries of the Romans, who, according to Diodorus (xxiii. ff. 7), swelled the whole army to 100,000 men. Moreover, we cannot ascertain the strcngtli of the Carthaginian garrison of Agrigentum under Hannibal. Poly- bius (i. 18), speaking of the sufferings caused by famine, says that not less than ;jO,0()0 men were shut up in the town. Did he include in this number the inhabitants of Agrigentum, or only the men capable of bearing arms ? or did he estimate the Carthaginian garrison alone at this figure ? The army of Hanno, which came to the relief of the town, numbered, according to Philinus (quoted by Uitjiliirus, xxiii. ff. 8), ßOjOOO foot and 6,000 horse; according to Orosius (iv. 7 ), only .'50, 000 foot and Ij^OO hor.se. Polybius says that but few escaped cÄ tills army, while according to Diodorus its lo.ss amounted only to 7,200 men. These discrepancies, which betray their origin in the writings of Pliilinus and I'abius Picfor rcs])ectivcly, cannot now be reconciled. We should like also to be authentically informed of the extent of the Roinan losses, which Diodorus (xxiii. ff. y) no doubt exaggerates by making them amount to 30,000 foot and 040 horae. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 49 battles are altogether fancy pictures. Even of the battle CHAP. of Heraelea, the first in the war with Pp-rhus which is - ,J . related intellio-ibly, we cannot tell for certain how far the J*""^ narrators made use of the notes of Pyrrhus or of other con- 264-262 temporaries and how much they actually invented. Hence we may measure the amount of benefit to be obtained from studying the details of Roman military operations in the Samnite or Volscian wars, and the innumerable descrip- tions of sieges and battles given by Livy. The Romans had sat down before Agrigentum in the Extended early part of summer. At the end of the year the consuls ^^sigas returned to Messana. Their losses in the battles, and Romans. from privations and sickness during a tedious siege, had been very great ; but a glorious success had been gained. Sicily, with the exception of only a few fortresses, was entirely subdued ; and the Romans, it would seem, now began for the first time to aim at a higher object than that which they had had in view at the beginning of the war.^ Their ambition was now no longer restrained to keeping the Carthaginians out of Messana. The prospect was opening before them of acquiring the whole of Sicily; and the prize which after centuries of bloody wars Avas not attained by their haughty rival, which the rulers of Syracuse and lastly the King of Epirus had vainly aimed at, appeared after a short conflict about to fall into the hands of the Roman legions as the reward of their courage and perseverance. Second Period, 261-255 b.c. THE FIRST EOMAN FLEET. MYL.^. ECNOMUS. REGULUS IN AFRICA. The war in Sicily was, in the following year, pursued Maritime with all possible vigour. The two consuls of 261, L. ofCu™^'^^ Valerius Flaccus and T. Otacilius Crassus (cousin and thage. brother of the consuls of 273), conquered many places in ' Polybius, i. 20, § 1. VOL. II. E ROMAN HISTORY. j>tpmiina- tion of the Romars to oope with Cartilage by sea. the island. But tlie incidents of this campaign proved more ' and more that the Romans without a large fleet could not defend such an island as Sicily, witli its vast extent of coast, against the Carthaginians who were undisputed masters of the sea. If the towns in the interior of the country were at the mercy of the Romans, those on the coasts, which were far more important, were continually exposed to the unexj)ected attacks of the Carthaginians by sea. In addition to this, the Carthaginians made use of their naval strength to send ships from Sardinia and other of their possessions, for the purpose of harass- ing the coast of Italy. It was easy for them, in this way, to keep large portions of Roman territory in continual ex«itement and serious danger. They would suddenly land on the undefended coast, plunder the open country, destroy farm-houses and plantations, carry off the in- habitants into slavery, and retire to their ships before a force could be collected to march against them.' The maritime power of the Romans and their Greek allies was not able to put an end to such proceedings. It seemed that the war so boldly undertaken, far from lead- ing to a permanent acquisition of new teiTitory, was beginning to endanger their old possessions. Under these circumstances, the Romans boldly resolved to meet the enemy on his own element ; and indeed, there was no other alternative, if they did not intend to retire from the contest with disgrace. Rome was obliged to encounter Carthage at sea, not merely if she wished to overthroAV and humiliate her rival, but if she meant to hold her own ground. The success which attended the first great naval en- giigomcnt of the Romans, and which surpassed all expec- tations, inspired them with an enthusiasm Avhich im- parted fresh strength to their national pride. New honours ' f^co vol. i. p. 'I'il. To wni'd ofTsufli altaoks upon the coast tlie Romans had fstaliÜHlicd their iiiaritinio colonics, wliich generally consisted of Roman citizens. These are the forts ((ppoi'pai), nienlioned by Zonaras (viii. 10), as lining and protecting the coasts of Italy. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 51 and a permanent monument commemorated tlie victory wliicli restored tlie waverin<>- fortunes of war even on that element on w^liicli the Eonians had never before ventured to meet their enemies nor to hope for success. For this reason the resolution of the Romans to build a large fleet, and their first naval victory, were favourite topics for the patriotic historians, and exaggerated accounts were the consequence. To make the efibrt of the nation still more conspicuous, it w^as asserted that the Romans had never ventured on the sea before,' that they had not possessed a single ship of war, and were wholly and entirely ignorant of the art of building ships, or of fitting them out and using them for military purposes. That this is a great error it is hardly necessary to say. Though Rome ori- ginally had no fleet worth mentioning, and left to the Etruscans the trade as well as the dominion at sea, still, by the conquest of Antium she acquired ships and a serviceable harbour. Since the treaty with Naples,^ in the second Samnite war, she had Greek seamen and Greek ship-builders at her disposal. At the same time she sent out ships to make hostile invasions in Campania.^ In the year 311 two Roman admirals are mentioned,'* and, as we have seen, the war with Tarentuin had been caused by the appearance of a Roman fleet before the harbour of that town. The assertion that the Romans were utterly ignorant of maritime affairs becomes thus unintelligible.^ The error is quite evident, and warns us against accepting without examination the other accounts of the buildino- and the manning of the first Roman fleet. The truth which lies at the root of the narrative is this, Late ' Polybius, i. 20, § 9 : ' Then the Romans first imdertook to build ships, . . . and, without having any appliances for ship-building or having ever thought of the sea, they conceived the plan then for the first time, and went to work with such spirit that, without a previous trial, they ventured to attack the Car- thaginians at sea, who were of old the first naval power, without a rival,' &c. - Compare Livy, xxxv. 16 : ' Neapolitan! ... a quibus (vos Romani) naves ex foedere exigitis.' Livy, xxvi. 39 : 'Postremo ipse a sociis Rheginisque et a Velia et a Psesto debitas ex foedere exigendo (sc. naves) classem viginti naviura efffcit.' ^ See vol. i. p. 421. * See vol. i. p. 412. ^ Even Polybius is here guilty of exaggeration. E 2 52 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK that the Romans in the begiiiinng of the war in Sicily .^. ,1 - had neglected their navj. They were never fond of the sea. develop- While the mariners of other nations challenged the dan- m^u-i 01 the o,gj,g Qf -j^j^g hioh seas with enthusiasm, the Eomans never iiiivy. trusted themselves without trembling to that inconstant element, on which their firm courage did not supply the want of skill and natural aptitude. They had therefore failed to take advantage of the opportunity which the possession of the harbour of Antium oflFered to them of keeping up a moderately respectable fleet. They probably laid the burden of the naval wars as much as they could on their Greek and Etruscan allies, and they may have hoped at the beginning of the Punic war that they would never need a fleet for any other object than for crossing over to Sicily. The impossibility of entertaining such an idea any longer was now proved, and they were obliged to make up their minds to meet the masters of the sea on their own element. The irailfl- The narrative of the building of the first Eoman fleet is fle^ t° ^ ^^ hardly less a story of wonder than those of the regal period ; and had the incident been recorded a few gene- rations earlier, benevolent gods would have appeared, to build ships for the Romans and to guide them on the roll- ing waves. But Polybius was a rationalist. He believed in no divine interference, and he relates the wonderful in a manner that excites astonishment, but does not con- tradict the laws of nature. The decision of the Roman senate to build a fleet was not carried out, it is said, with- out the greatest difficulty.' The Romans were utterly unacquainted with the art of building the quinqueremes — large ships of war with five benches for rowers, one above the other, which formed the strength of the Carthaginian fleets. They kncAv only triremes — smaller ships with three benches for rowers, such as formerly had been used among the Greeks. They would, therefore, have been obliged to give up the idea, of building a fleet, if a stranded Cartha- ginian quinquerenie had not fallen into their hands, which ' Polybius, i. 20, 21. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 53 they used as a model.' Tliey set to work with such zeal CHAP. Ill that, withiu two months^ after the felling of the wood, a . ^l . fleet of one hundred quinqueremes and thirty triremes was p':*"_^" ready to be launched. They were manned by Roman 201-2.3.5 citizens and Italian allies who had never before handled an ^'■^' oar, and in order to gain time these men were exercised on the land to make the movements necessary in rowing, to keep time, and to understand the word of command. After a little practice on board the ships, these crews were able to go out to sea, and to challenge the boldest, the most experienced, and most dreaded seamen of their time. We cannot help receiving this description with some Improha- hesitation and doubt. That it was utterly impossible to the"sto/-' build within the short space of sixty days a ship capable of holding three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers,^ we will not exactly maintain, as we know too little of the structui-e of those ships, and as old historians who did know it thought that the feat was wonderful, and even hardly credible,'' but not positively impossible. It is, however, surely a diflFerent thing when the story asserts that an entire fleet of one hundred and twenty ships ' Polj'bius. i. 20, § 15. The same anecdote is repeated with little variation in the narrative of the siege of Lilyb;euni in the year 249, tlie fifteenth year of tile war. Zonaras,Tiii. 16: K\avSLusTpir)petsir\r]pc!>crasavve\aße Si' avrwu''Ai'vtiipa rhf Kap)(^Ti56i/ioi> iKirKiovra Trevriipei- Kol -rrapäSeiyfxa to7s 'Vwfxalüis rfis irapaffK^vris rSiv viüu iyfveTo. Polybins, in a later passage (i. 59, § 8), tells a similar story again, referi'ing to the very last year of the war. It is difficult to see how such a fable could be invented, or find credence, for it is well known that the building of quinqueremes had been understood and practised in Syracuse for at least a century and a half (Diodorus, xiv. 41, 42). Supposing therefore, what is not at all probable, that none of the Greek towns in Ital}', not even Tarentum, had become acquainted with the build of these vessels, yet the Romans, if they wanted a model, could surely get it easily from their allies, the Syracusans, without waiting for the chance of a stranded Carthaginian vessel. ■■« Pliny, Hist. Nat. xvi. 39. Florus, ii. 5. ' This was the number on board the Roman vessels in tlio battle of Eonomus. * Polybius (i. 38, § 6), speaking of the construction of a Roman fleet in three months, in 254 b.c., says ' that it is not easy to believe it.' Yet the Romans by this time had considerable experience in shipbuilding, and the time they took was longer by one-half. We may therefore, « fortiori, apply the expres- sion of Polybius to the first feat of the Romans, and say • that it is not easy to believe it.' ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Composi- tion of the Roman navy. was built ill so sliort a time. Extensive dockyards, and the necessary number of skilled ship-carpenters, might perhaps be found in a town like Carthage, where ship- building was practised and carried on on a large scale all the year round. These conditions did not exist in Rome ; and we may therefore well ask whether it is probable that all the ships of the new fleet were now newly built and built in Rome, and, further, whether in the Etruscan towns, in Naples, Elea, Rhegiuni, Tarentum, Locri, and, above all, in Syracuse and Messana, there were no ships ready for use, or whether it was impossible to build any in these places. Surely this would be in the highest degree surprising. We know that the Romans availed themselves without scruple of the resources of their allies,' and we see no reason why they should have done so less now than at the breaking out of the war, when they made use of the Greek ships for crossing over to Sicily. We believe, therefore, in spite of the account of Poly- bius, that the greater portion of the ships of the Roman fleet came from Greek and Etruscan towns, and were manned by Greeks and Etruscans. The latter supposition is even more forced upon us than the former. A few rowers may have been drilled in the way indicated, and mixed up with old, experienced seamen ; but how anyone can possibly imagine that the ships were entirely manned by crews who had learnt rowing on land is incomprehensible. We should have to consider the art of navigation of the ancients as in the highest degree contemptible ; we should not be able to understand how the historians could speak of naval powers and of a dominion of the sea; how her ' Ni'xt to Iho navnl wcrvice, the cavalry service was least congenial to the Romans, and of this, tlierofore, tlioy threw by far the greater burden on their allies. The name for the crews was ' socii navales,' a term which shows that the allies principally had to furnish them. The Greek towns were not obliged to send contingents to the land army, but thoy had to furnish ships and sailors instead (I>ivy xxvi. .'59, xxxvi. 42). As we have previously observed (vol. i. p. '27''>), the Roman historians systematically omitted to mention the assistance of tlicir allies; yet Zonanis (viii. 14) reports that Iliero of Syracuse supplied the consul 0. Aurelius Cf)tta {2!')'2 ii.c.) wltli ships. Compare also Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9, above, p. .01, note 2. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 65 fleet could be said to constitute tlie glory, security, and greatness of Carthage, if it had been possible for a conti- nental j)Ower like E,ome, without any preparation or assist- ance, in two months to find ships, captains, and sailors who on their first encounter were more than a match for the oldest naval empire. If we bear in mind that it was a common practice among the Eoman historians to appro- priate to themselves the merits of their allies,^ we shall with the less hesitation doubt the boastful stories which tell us how the first fleet was built, and we shall in the end venture to suspect that a greater, and perhaps much the greater, part of the credit belongs to the Etruscans and to the Italian and Sicilian Greeks. The first undertaking of the Roman fleet was a failure. Capture of The consul Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a detachment On. Come- consisting of seventeen ships to Sicily, and was incautious ^^^^ Scipio. enough to enter the harbour of the small island of Lipara, which had been represented to him as ready to revolt from Carthage. But a Cartli;i ginian squadron which lay in the neighbourhood, and blocked up the harbour in the night, took the consul's ships and their crews, and, instead of the expected glory, Scipio obtained only the nickname of Asina.^ This loss was soon after repaired. The Carthaginian Battle of admiral, Hannibal, the defender of Agrigentum, enibol- ^ *' dened by this easy success, sailed with a squadron of fifty ships towards the Eoman fleet, which was advancing along the coast of Italy froui the north. But he was suddenly surprised by it, attacked, and put to flight, with the loss of > Vol. i. p. 276. ^ Polyblus, i. 21. Macrobius, Sat. i. 5. See Niebuhr, Eoin. Gcsch. iii. 677 ; English trauslation, iii. 579. Some Roman writers so represented this incident as to make the Carthaginians appear guilty of treachery and perjury (see Zonaras, viii. 10). They related that Boodes, the Carthaginian admiral, fearing to drive the Romans to despair, invited Scipio and his officers to come on board his ship for the purpose of negotiating, and then seized them all, whereupon the Roman crews lost courage and surrendered. It is needless to say that this attempt to clear Scipio of the charge of rashness and to accuse the Carthaginians of treachery is futile and childish. Polybius says nothing even of a stratagem of the Carthaginians. 56 ROMAN HISTOEY. BOOK the greater part of his ships. After this preliminary trial > ,-^ — - of strength, the Eoman fleet arrived in the harbour of Messana; and as the consul Scipio, who was to have taken the command of the fleet, was made prisoner, his colleague, Caius Duilius, gave the command of the land army to his subordinate officer, and without delay led the Roman against the Carthaofinian fleet, which was de- vastating the coast in the neighbourhood of Pelorus, the north-eastern promontory of Sicily. The enemies met off Mylce, and here was fought the first battle at sea, which was to decide whether the Roman state should be confined to Italy, or whether it should gradually extend itself to all the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean — a sea which they were now to prove themselves entitled to speak of as emphatically ' their own.' ^ It is said that the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of Hannibal, consisted of one hundred and thirty ships. It had therefore ten more ships than the Roman. Each of these was without doubt far superior to the Eoman ships in the manner of sailing, in agility and speed, but more especially in the skill of the captains and sailors, even though, as we suppose, a great number of the Roman vessels were built and manned by Greeks. The tactics of ancient naval warfare consisted chiefly in running the ships against the broadside of the hostile ships, and either sinking them by the force of the collision, or brushing away the mass of bristling oars. For this purpose the prows had under the water-line sharp iron prongs called beaks {rostra), which penetrated the timbers of the enemy's ships. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance for each captain to have his ship so completely under his control as to be able to turn about, to advance, or retreat with the greatest rapidity, and to watch and seize the favourable moment for the decisive rush. To fight from the deck with arrows and other missiles could, in this species of tactics, be only of subordinate importance, and therefore there was only a small number of soldiers on board the ships by the side of the rowers. ' ' Mare nostrum.' THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 57 The Eomans were well aware of the superiority of the CHAP. Carthaginians in maritime tactics. They could not hope - /. , to vie with them in this respect. They therefore hit upon p''^' "y a plan for supplying their want of skill at sea, by a mode of 26I-20.J fighting which should place not ship against ship, but man aa'ainst man, and which in a certain way should make the ^""^f " ' *' naval tac- sea-fight very much like a battle on land. They invented tics. the boarding-bridges.' On the fore part of the ship, against a mast twenty- four feet high, a ladder thirty-six feet long was fixed, twelve feet above the deck, in such a manner that it could be moved up and down as well as sideways. This drawing up and down was effected by means of a rope which passed from the end of the ladder through a ring at the top of the mast on to the deck. How the horizontal movements were produced does not appear from the account of Polybius, who fails also to explain how the lower end of the ladder, which was fixed to the mast twelve feet above the deck, could be reached. Perhaps there was a second part to the ladder fixed to it with hinges, leading from the deck up towards the mast, and serving at the same time to move the ladder all round the mast. The ladder was so broad that two soldiers could stand abreast on it. Railings right and left served as a protection against missiles and against the danger of falling. At the end of the ladder was a strong pointed hook bent downwards. If the enemy approached near enough, they had only to let go the rope which held the ladder upright. If it fell on the deck of the hostile ship, the hook penetrated the timbers and held the two ships together. Then the soldiers ran from the deck along the ladder to board, and the sea-fight became a hand-to-hand engagement.^ When the Carthaginians under Hannibal perceived the Defeat of ' It is not stated who was the real iiiventor. We should like to know whether it was a Koman or a Greek. - The description which Polybius (i. 22) gives of the boarding-bridges is the only one which we have, and it is not sufficiently clear and complete, so that doubts remain concerning some parts of the apparatus. See Haltaus, Gcsch. der Bömer, Beilage, pp. 607-628. 58 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. the Car- thaginians. Relief of Segesta. Roman fleet, they bore down upon it and began tbe battle, confident of an easy victory. But they were sadly dis- appointed. The boarding-bridges answered perfectly. Fifty Carthaginian vessels were taken or destroyed, and a great number of prisoners were made. Hannibal himself escaped with difficulty and had to abandon his flag-ship, a huge vessel of seven rows of oars, taken in the late war from King Pyrrhus. The remainder of the Carthaginian vessels took to flight. If the joy at this first glorious victory was great, it was fully justified. The honour of a triumph^ was awarded to Duilius ; and the story goes that he was permitted to prolong this triumph throughout his whole life by causing himself to be accompanied by a flute-player and a torch-bearer whenever he retui^ned home of an evening from a banquet.^ A column, deco- rated with the beaks of conquered ships and with an in- scription celebrating the victory,^ was erected on the Forum as a memorial of the battle. This decisive victory of the Romans happened just in time to restore the fortune of war, which had seriously gone against them in Sicily. Most of the towns on the coast and many in the interior had fallen, as we have seen, during the preceding year, into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginians were now besieging Segesta, to revenge themselves for the treachery of the Segestans, who had murdered the Carthaginian garrison and given the town over to the Romans.* During the consul's absence from the army the military tribune C. Csecilius had attempted to assist the town, but was surprised and suffered much loss.'^ The greater part of the Roman army in Sicily lay in Segesta. It was, therefore, very fortunate that Duilius was able, after his victory at Myla^, to take ' Livy, cpit. 17. This was the first trinmphus navalis. * Cicero, Dc Scncclute, 13. Valerius Maxiiiius, iii. 6, 4. ' The fraRiiiünts of tliis inscription wliicli uro still extant appear to bo parts of the column restored bj- Tiberius, and not of the original monument. See Plainer and Urlicli's Hum, p. 5^34. * See above, ]). 1 I . * Zonaras, viii. 11. Of Ihi.s drfcai no mention is made by Polybius, i. 14. THE FIEST PUNIC WAK. 69 tlie soldiers from tlie sliii)s and relieve this town. With CHAP. Ill the army thus set free, he was able to conquer some . ,J . towns, as for instance Macella, and to put other friendly ''^'•''^'"ni> cities in a state of defence. 261-205 Since the fall of AgTigentuni, the command of the Carthaginian troops in Sicily had been in the hands of Operations Hamilcar — not the celebrated Hamilcar the father of ^ar. Hannibal,' but a man not unlike his namesake in enter- prising- sj^irit and ability. It was probably owing to him that during these years the Carthaginians did not lose Sicily. He succeeded in so far counteracting- the eifect of the Roman victories at Agrig-entum and Mylsc as to make it doubtful to which side the fortune of Avar was turning. These exploits of Hamilcar cannot be given in detail, as the report of Philinus, who wrote the history of the war from the Carthaginian point of view, has been lost,^ and as the order of time in which the events succeeded each other is also doubtful,^ Still, the grand form of Hamilcar stands out in such bold relief that we recognise in him one of the greatest generals of that j)eriod. In the outset he sacrificed a part of his mutinous mercenaries after the manner which we have already seen applied by Dionysius and Hiero. He sent them to attack the town of Entella, after having first warned the Roman garrison of their approach, and thus attained a double advantage, inasmuch as he got rid of the inconvenient mercenaries, and, as despair made them fight bravely, he inflicted con- siderable injury on the Romans. This faithless proceeding-, which, as we have seen, was by no means unheard of or exceptional, shows how dangerous for both sides was the relation between m.ercenaries and their commanders. On the one side, instead of patriotism, faithfulness, and devo- tion, we find among- the soldiers a spirit of rapacity, ' Zonaras (viii. 10) erronpously supposes him to bo the father of the great Hannibal. ^ We derive our informatiou chiefly from the confused fragments of Diodorus (xxiii. fr. 9). Polybius passes over a good deal in silence, either for the sake of brevity, or from p;frtiality for tlie Romans. ^ Diodorus (he. cit.) seems to refer everything to the year after the conquest of Agrigentum, which is certainly a mistake. 60 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Destruc- tion of Eryx by Hamilcar. Victory of Hamücar at Thermae. hardly restrained by military discipline ; on the other we observe cold calculation and heartlessness, which saw in a soldier no kinsman, citizen, or brother, but an instrument of war purchasable for a certain sum, and worthy of no considerations buj those which called for the preservation of valuable property. With quite as much harshness, though with less cruelty, Hamilcar treated the inhabitants of the old town of Eryx. This town of the jd^lymi, at first friendly to the Punians and then subject to them, appears to have been exposed to the attacks of the Romans because it was not situated immediately on the coast. Hamilcar razed it to the ground, and sent the inhabitants away to the neigh- bouring promontory, Drepana, where he built a new fortified town, which, with the neighbouring town of Lilybseum, formed as it were a common system of defence, and subsequently proved its strength by a long-continued resistance to the persevering attacks of the Romans. Of the venerable town of Eryx there remained only the temple of Venus, the building of which was attributed to ^neas, the son of the goddess. After Hamilcar had thus covered his retreat, he proceeded to the attack. We have alread}^ heard of the siege of Segesta. The victory of the Romans at Mylse saved Segesta, after it had been driven to the utmost distress. But in the neighbourhood of Thermae,' Hamilcar succeeded in inflicting a great blow. He surprised a portion of the Roman army, and killed 4,000 men.- The consequences of the victory at Myla3 appear to have been confined to the raising of the siege of Segesta. The Romans did not succeed in taking the little fortress of Myttistratum (now ' Thernife was a tfwn built, by llic Carthagiuiaiis near the site of the ancient city of Himora, which they had destroyed (Diodoru.s, xiii. 59 fF. 79). "^ According to Diodorus, (xxiii. fr. 9), 6,000 men. Polybius (i. 24, §§ 3, 4) excuses and oxtenuat^es tiio defeat of the Romans. He says that the allies Hutfered the loss, not the Roman legions ; for a dispute had bi-oken out between these two classes of troops concerning the place of honour, and the allies had taken up a neparate, position, where they were surprised and cut to pieces by the Carthaginians. THE FIRST PUNIC- WAR. 61 called Mistrella) on the northern coast of Sicily. In spite CHAP. of the greatest possible exertions, they had to retreat, at ^ ,1 - the end of a seven months' siegle, with heavy losses.' ^/'^'<'>'" They lost, further, a number of Sicilian towns, the greater 261-2.JÖ part of which, it appears, went over voluntarily to the "■*^' Carthaginians. Among these is mentioned the important toAvn of Camarina in the immediate neighbourhood of Syracuse, and even Enna, in the middle of the island, the town sacred to Ceres and Proserpina (Demeter and Persephone) the protecting goddesses of Sicily. The hill Camicus, where the citadel of Agrigentum stood, fell also again into the power of the Carthaginians, who would indeed, according to the report of Zonaras, have again subdued the whole of Sicily if the consul of 259, C. Aquillius Florus, had not wintered in the island, instead of returnino- to Rome with his legions, according to the usual custom after the end of the summer campaign. In the following year fortune began once more to smile Renewed on the Romans. Both consuls, A. Atilius Calatinus and ^"'^'J^''^^'' or the C. Sulpicius Paterculus, went to Sicil}^ They succeeded Romans. in retaking the most important of the places which had revolted, especially Camarina ^ and Enna, together with Myttistratum,^ which had just been so obstinately defended. ' Polybius (i. 24, g 11) mentions only the final conquest of Myttistratum two years later, after it had, as he says, stood a protracted siege. Diodorus alone (xxiii. fr. 9) states that a previous siege ended with the retreat of the Romans from the place. Polybius betrays here as elsewhere a partiality for the Romans, which is no doubt due, at least in part, to the aiithorities whom he consulted. - At the siege of Camarina the Roman army ran great risk of being annihi- lated or captured. It was saved by th« self-devotion of a military tribune and 400 men (Livy, epit. 17 ; Zonaras, viii. 12; Gellius, iii. 7). Cato, who, in his historical work Origines, compares the exploit of this tribune to that of Leonidas at Thermopylae, laments that the Roman hero earned but scanty praise, while the deed of Leonidas was celebrated all over Greece by historians, poets, sculptors, and the whole nation. The brave tribune has indeed been hardly treated, for we do not even know his name. "Whilst Cato calls him Q. Caedicius, the annalist Claudius Quadrigarius calls him Laberius, and Livy Marcus Calpurnius. Camarina resisted all the attacks of the Romans until at length Hiero supplied his allies with engines for the siege (Diodorus, loc. cit). It is noteworthy that Polybius says nothing of all this. ^ Polybius, i. 24, §§ 9-12. Littana (Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 9.) — probably identical 62 EOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK At the conquest of this town, which had cost them so much, < ^ — the resentment among the Roman soldiers was such that, after the secret retreat of the Carthaginian garrison, they fell on the helpless inhabitants, and murdered them without mercy, until the consul put an end to their ferocity by promising them, as part of their spoil, all the men whose lives they would spare. The inhabitants of Camarina were sold as slaves. We do not read that this was the fate of Enna ; but this town could not expect an easier lot, unless it redeemed its former treason by now betraying the Carthag-inian orarrison into the hands of the Romans. From these scanty details we can form some idea of the indescribable misery which this bloody war brought upon Sicily. Expedition The successes of Hamilcar in Sicily, in the year 259, of Scipio to ^ere, it appears, to be attributed in part to the circumstance that the Romans after the battle of Mylse had sent L. Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls of the year 259, to Corsica, in the hope of driving the Carthaginians quite out of the Tyrrhenian sea. On this island the Carthaginians had, as far as we know, no settlements or possessions. Still they must have had in the town of Aleria a station for their fleet, Avhence they could constantly alarm and threaten Italy. Aleria fell into the hands of the Romans, and thus the whole island was cleared of the Carthaginians. From thence Scipio sailed to Sardinia ; but here nothing was done. Both Carthaginians and Romans avoided an en- counter, and Scipio returned home.^ This expedition to Corsica and Sardinia, which Polybius, probably on account of its insignificance and its failure, does not even mention, was for the Cornelian house a sufficient occasion to celebrate Scipio as a conqueror and hero. They were justified in villi llii>ii:in!i, iiicii1ii)iicil l).v Pdlyliiiis, (i. 21, § 10)— was likcwisp taken, as al.sü the liill Camicus neiir Af^rif^cntum, and the lown of Erbessus. An attempt of tlu! consul AtiliuH to seize the island of Lipara failed. How little the later compilers of historical compendiarics are to l)c trusted may be seen from the sutomcnts of Aurelius Victor (39) and Florus (ii. 2), that Dropana and Lilybir'um were taken by the Komana. ' ZonaruB, TÜi. 11. B.c. TUE FIRST rUNIC WAR. 63 saying that lie took Aleria ; and as the expulsion of the CHAP. Carthaginians from Corsica followed, he might be regarded ,-^ — - as the conqueror of Corsica, though in truth Corsica was jv^ioD not occupied bj the Romans till after the peace with ,:^61-'2öö Carthage. Accordingly these exploits are noticed on the second grave-stone in the series of monuments belonging to the family of the Scipios, with the first of which we have already become acquainted.^ From this modesty, which con- fined itself to the real facts, we cannot help inferring that the inscription was composed shortly after the death of Scipio, when the memory of his deeds was fresh, and a great exaggeration could hardly be ventured upon. If it had not been so, and if the inscription had had a later origin, there is nothing more certain than that in this, as in that of the father, great untruths would have been introduced. This becomes quite evident from the additions which we find in later authors, and which can have originated only in the family traditions of the Scipios. Valerius Maximus, Orosius, and Silius Italiens^ mention a second campaign of Scipio in Sardinia, in which he besieged and conquered Olbia, defeated Hanno, the Carthaginian general, and displayed his magnanimity by causing his body to be in- terred with all honours.^ He then gained possession with- out difficulty of a number of hostile towns by a peculiar stratagem, and finally, as the Capitoline fasti testify, ' See vol. i. p. 459. The following is the epitaph (Orclli, Inscript. Latin. Select, n. 552) : — Hone oino ploirume consentiont R(om;ie) Duonoro optumo fuise viro Luciom Scipione. Filios Barbati Consol censor aidilis hie fuet a(piid vos) Hec cepit Corsica Aleriamqiie urbe Dedet tempestatihiis aiele nierito. Compare Eitsehl, Bheinisches Muscuin, 1804. ' Valerius Maximiis, v. 1, 2. Orosius, iv. 7. Silius Italiens, vi. 671. " Traitsofgenerosity and a chivalrous disposition seldom met 'with among the Romans we shall frequently find in the history of the Scipios. Tliey are quite characteristic of this particular family, and their insertion into the history of Rome seems to be owing to a -n-riter of poetic imagination. Perhaps we can here trace the hand of the poet Ennius, who was a client of the Scipios. 64 ROMAN HISTORY. EOOK IV. Battle of Tyndaris. celebrated a magnificent triumplij These additions, of which neither the epitaph of Scipio, nor Zonaras, nor Poljbius know anything, are nothing more than empty inventions. Moreover, we see from Polybius and Zonaras, that, in the year before Scipio's consulate, Hannibal, not Hanno, had the command in Sardinia. When the former, in the year following (258), had been blocked up in a harbour in Sardinia by the consul Sulpicius, and, after losing many of his ships, had been murdered by his own mutinous soldiers, Hanno received the command of the Carthaginians in Sardinia, and could not therefore have been conquered, slain, and buried by Scipio the year before.^ The year 258 had restored the superiority of the Romans in Sicily. They had conquered Camarina, Enna, Myttis- tratum, and many other towns, and driven back Hamilcar to the west side of the island. The expeditions which they had undertaken against Corsica and Sardinia had also been on the whole successful. The power of Carthage in the Tyrrhenian sea was weakened, and Italy for the present secure against any hostile fleet. To these suc- cesses was added in the following year a glorious battle by sea (257 b.c.) at Tyndaris, on the northern coast of Sicily. It was no decisive victory, for both parties claimed an advantage. Still it inspired the Romans with new confidence in their navy. It induced them to enlarge their fleet, and to prosecute the naval war on a larger scale. It prompted the bold idea of removing the seat of war into the enemy's country, and of attacking Africa instead of protecting Italy against the Carthaginian invasions. Whether their hopes went further, whether they had ' Wf havo often had occasion to notice the worthlessnoss of the Capitoline fasti as historical documents. Circumstantial lies engraved on marble slabs are very imposing; nevertheless the following document must be rejected as entirely fictitious: Cornelius L. f. Cn. n. Scipio Cos. An. cdxciv. De I'oenis et Sardinia Corsica V. id. Mart. I'olybiuH, i. 24, § G. Zonaras. viii. 12. Livy, epit. 17. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 60 already conceived the scheme which Scipio succeeded in CHAP, carrying out at the end of the second war with Carthage, viz. that of aiming a deadly blow at the very centre of Carthaginian power, and so bringing the struggle to a conclusion, would be difficult to prove. In that case they would have estimated the strength of Carthage much too loAv, and their own powers too high ? Efforts were now made in Rome to fit out an armament. Movements A fleet of 330 ships of war sailed to Sicily, took on board under an army of about 40,000 men, consisting of two consular Regulus armies, and sailed along the south coast of Sicily west- Manlius wards, under the command of the two consuls, M. Atilius ^ "^'*°" Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso. Between the promontory of Ecnomus and the town of Heraclea the Romans met a Carthaginian fleet still stronger than their own, under the command of Hamilcar and Hanno, whose object was to obstruct their way to Africa. If we may rel}-- on the accounts of Polybius, there was here an army of 140,000 Romans, opposed to 150.000 Carthaginians. But it is hardly credible that the Carthaginian ships should have had an army on board equal to that of the Romans, as the latter intended a descent on Africa, and had their whole land force, i.e. four double legions, with them. The Carthaginians would have had no object in encumber- ing their ships to that extent, especially as their tactics did not consist so much in boarding as in disabling their enemies' ships, and as they endeavoured in every way to avoid the Roman boarding-ladders. We have no Carthaginian authority to test the report of Roman witnesses that the fleet of Hamilcar consisted of 350 ships. There is, then, no choice left but to follow Polybius, who has described the battle at Ecnomus with such clear- ness and accuracy of detail that nothing more can be desired.^ The Carthaginian fleet advanced from the west in a -r, , . " . nuttle of single long extended front, which stretched from the coast Ecnomus. ' Polybius, i. 2G-2S. VOL. II. F 66 ROMAN HISTORY. ROOK far out into the sea, and only on the left wing formed an ___^_„^ angle, by one detachment being placed rather in advance. The Roman fleet, consisting of four divisions, formed with three of them a hollow triangle, the point of which, headed by the consuls in person, was directed against the Carthaginian line. The quinqueremes, which formed the base of the triangle, had the ships of burden in tow, while the fourth division formed the rear in one line of war- ships, which carried the veteran troops, the triarians of the legions. If this wedge-like form of the Eoman fleet was suited to bi-eaking through the Carthaginian line, the long line of the latter was on the other hand calculated to surround the Romans. This disposition determined the issue of the battle. The consuls broke through the line of Carthaginian vessels without trouble. By their advance the two lines of Roman ships which formed the sides of the triangle were separated from the base. Against this remainder were now directed the attacks of both the Carthaginian wings. The great naval battle resolved itself into three distinct parts, each of which was sufficiently important to rank as a battle by itself. The Roman ships with the transports were hard pressed and obliged to slip their cables, to sacrifice the transports, and to retreat. The reserve, with the triarians, was in the same distress. At length, when the consuls, giving up the pursuit of the Carthaginian centre, came to the assistance of their own main body, the victory turned to the side of the Romans. The boarding-ladders seem again to have rendered important service. Thirty Carthaginian ships were destroyed, sixty-four were taken. The loss of the Romans was at the outside twenty-four ships. LandinfT of After such a decided victory the way to Carthage was |{oni!uis(in open to tlic Romaiis. But to our astonishment we read Cartliaui- j^jj.^^ t,hey returned to Messana for the purpose of taking in man turn- ■,. ■, • • n • ^ -, i , -n -, . t. ry. supplies, and repairmg their damaged vessels.^ From this ' Znnaras, viii. 12. 'I'lirrc isalso a rc^port of nocrotiations of poaco, by which Ilaiiiilcar wished to gain time. On tlii« occasion a silly story is rcLitcd, which exhibits tiic barefaced imndacity and childish vanity of the later collectors of the Roman army in THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 07 we may conclude that the losses of the Eomans were also considerable, and must have fallen heavily especially on the transport ships, which carried the provisions, a cir- cumstance of which our narrator makes no mention. After a short time the fleet again set sail, and without any opposition reached the African coast near the Hermrean promontory (Cape Bon) east of Carthag-e. The Romans then sailed eastwards along the coast as far as Clypea, which they took and fortified. From this point they made expeditions into the most Ravages of fertile part of the Carthaginian dominions, which in the fifty years since the devastating invasion of Agathokles Africa had recovered themselves, and presented to the eyes of the Italians a picture of unimagined riches and luxurious fer- tility.^ The industry and skill of the inhabitants had converted the whole of those districts into a garden. anecdotes. AVhen Hanno, vre are told, appeared as negotiator in the Roman camp, the consuls were advised to seize him, in retaliation for the treacherous imprisonment of Scipio off the island of Lipara (see above, p. 55). Hanno was in imminent danger, but saved himself by the remark that ' if the Romans acted in this manner, they would be as bad as the Cartliaginians.' The consuls thereupon felt too proud to retain as a prisoner a hostile general who had come on a message of peace, trusting to the protection of the law of nations. It seems strange that any Roman writer could (like Valerius Maximus, vi. 6, 2) find in this proceeding an occasion for glorifying Roman integrity and honour, even if it were true that Cornelius Scipio was treacherously seized by the Car- thaginians five years before. But it is too bad to make a Carthaginian general flatter the Roman people at the cost of his own and his country's abasement. Of such indirect self-laudation of the Romans we have fi-equent instances. We have noticed it on the occasion of the war with Pyrrhus (vol. i. pp. 496, 524). Polybius says nothing of the whole incident. ' This fertility indirectly contradicts the absurd story of the monstrous serpent which (as appears from Livy, epit. 18, and Valerius Maximus, i. 8, 19) occupied a prominent place in the later narratives- of the war, but which is not referred to by Polybius. Near the river Bagradas, it is said, the Roman army encoun- tered a gigantic serpent, which devoured the soldiers that approached incau- tiously and which kept the whole army at a distance from the river. No missile could pierce its skin. A detachment was sent against it, and it was at last crushed by huge stones which were discharged by ballist;e. Its putrefying body infected the air, and forced the Romans to leave the neighbourhood. We have a measure of the credulity and the credibility of Roman historians in their references to alleged evidence in the assurance that the skin of this serpent, measuring one hundred and twenty feet in length, was brought to Rome and exhibited there down to the time of the Numantine war, i.e. 133 n.c. (Pliny, Bist. ]\'at. viii. 14). F 2 68 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK Agriculture flourished among the Carthaginians in the , ' ^ highest degree ; more especially they understood how to ren- der that rich but hot and dry soil productive, by conduct- ing over it, in innumerable canals, an ample supply of water, the most needful of all requisites. The country, which still in the time of the emperors was the granaiy of the Eomans, was under the Carthaginians in the most flourishing state. It was covered with numberless villages and open towns, and with the magnificent countr}- residences of the Punic nobility. Carthage, as mistress of the sea, feared no hos- tile invasions, and most of the towns were unfortified. No chain of fortresses, like those of the Eoman colonies on the coast or in the interior of the coimtry, offered places of refuge to the distressed inhabitants, or contained a popu- lation able and ready to fight, like the Roman colonists, who could oi3pose the predatory marches of the enemy. The horror and distress therefore of the African population were great when, all of a sudden, 40,000 rapacious foes overran their country, exercising the fearful rights of war which delivered into the hands of the conquerors the life, possessions, and freedom of every inhabitant. The Cartha- ginians had in the course of the war disturbed the coast of Italy, burnt houses, destroyed harvests, cut down fruit- trees, carried away spoil and prisoners. They now suffered in Africa an ample retribution, and the Roman soldier indemnified himself thoroughly for the dangers he had undergone, and the terrors with which his imagination had filled the unknown bounds of the Africaii continent. We read of 20,000 men torn from their homes and sold as slaves. The spoils were all sent to the fortress of Clypea. Thither some time afterwards orders were sent from Rome that one of the two consuls with his a,rmj and with most of tlie ships and spoils should return to Italy, while the other consul Avith two legions and forty ships should remain in Africa to carry on the war. This resolution of the RoiiKin scnjitc; Avould be unintelligible if the expedition to Africa had been intended to answer any purpose other than that of a vigorous diversion. It could not have been sup- THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. (i(> posed in Rome that two legions, wliieli were not sufficient in Sicily to keep the Carthaginians in check, could carry on the war eifectually in Africa and overthrow the power of the Carthaginians in their own country. If Regulus had confined himself to enterprises on a small scale, the success would have been adequate to the sacrifice. But elated, it seems, by his unexpected good fortune, he raised his hopes higher and aspired to the glory of terminating the war by a signal victory.^ The battle at Ecnomus and the landing of the hostile Exorbitant army on their coast had entirely disconcerted the Cartha- Kegulus as ginians. At first they were afraid of an attack on their t'mditions .of peace. capital, and a portion of the fleet had sailed back from Sicily to protect it. There were clearly no great forces in Africa, as a hostile invasion was not apprehended. Now the Romans had efiected a landing, thanks to their victory at Ecnomus ; and the Carthaginians were not in a position to defend the open country against them. In their anxiety for the safety of the capital they at first concen- trated their troops near it ; and in this fact we find an explanation of the great successes of E-egulus. He was enabled not only to march through the length and breadth of the country without danger, but to maintain his advan- tage when the Carthaginians ventured to attack him. He is said to have won a decided victory because the Carthaginians, out of fear, would not venture on the level ground, but kept on the heights, where their elephants and horse, their most powerful arms, were almost useless. Mention is also made of a revolt of Numidian allies or subjects, which caused to the. Carthaginians a greater loss than that of signal defeat. They were therefore disposed to peace, and tried to negotiate with Regulus, who on his side wished to end the war before he was superseded in the command by a successor. But the conditions which he offered were such as could be accepted only after a complete overthrow. He insisted that they should resign ' Polybius, i. 31, § 4. 70 EOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. Defeat of EeguluS. Sicily, pay a contribution of war, restore the prisoners and deserters, deliver up tlie fleet and content themselves witli a single ship, and, finally, make their foreign policy dependent on the pleasure of Rome. The negotiations were therefore broken off, and the war was carried on with redoubled energy. In the meantime the year of the consulship of Eegulus had expired. He remained, however, as proconsul in Africa, and his army seems to have been strengthened by Numi- dians and other Africans.' The Carthaginians also increased their forces. Among the Greek mercenaries whom they now got together was a Spartan officer of the name of Xanthip- pus, of whose antecedents we know nothing, but who, if all that is related of his exploits in the African war be true, must have been a man of great military ability. It is said that he directed the attention of the Carthaginians to the fact that their generals were worsted in the war with Regulus because they did not understand how to select a proper ground for their elephants and their powerful cavalry.^ By his advice, it is said, the Carthaginians now left the hills and challenged the Romans to fight on the level ground. Regulus, with too much boldness, had ' This ib evident from the circumstance that in the next battle, so fatal to the Roman arms, Regulus had a force of 30,000 (according to Appian, viii. 3) or 32,000 men (according to Eutropius, ii. 21, and Orosius, iv. 9). * It seems very strange, as Mommsen justly remarks {Bom. Gesch. i. 529, Anm. ; Englisli translation, ii. 44), that the Carthaginian generals should have had to learn this from a stranger. Is it possible that the jealousy of the Roman liistorians grudged the Cartiiaginians the credit of having gained the victory by their own ingenuity and strength ? Perhajis the chief merit of Xanthippus consisted in the proper use of the elcpliauts. Tlie employment of these animals in war originated in Asia, and had passed into the tactics of the Greeks by the successors of Alexander the Great. From them the Carthaginians had learnt it, either in their war with Pyrrhus, or even before, from Greek mercenaries. But tlicy appear not to have been tliorough masters of tliis new engine of war. In the battle of Agrigeutum the elephants liad been of no use and bad even contributed to tiio defeat of the Carthaginians (see above, p. 47). But at Tunes, wliere Regulus was routed, tliey decided the victory. If, as is most lik(dy, Xanthippus was ;ni ofheer from the school of Alexander the Great, it was perhaps duo to liim that the elepliants were this time handled properly. This conjecture receives an indirect confirmation by the issue of the battle of I'anormuH (see bellow, p. 77), wliere tin? Carlhaginian army was defeated chiefly owing to the uuskilfuiuuss of Ilasdrubal in the use of the elephants. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 71 advanced from Clypea, the basis of his operations, and had penetrated into the neig'hbourhood of Carthage, where he had taken possession of Tunes. Here he could not pos- sibly maintain himself. He was obliged to accept a battle on the plain, and suffered a signal defeat, which, owing to the great superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry, ended in the almost complete annihilation of the Romans. Only about 2,000 escaped with difllculty to Clypea; 500 were taken prisoners, and among these Regulus himself. The Roman expedition to Africa, so boldly undertaken and at first so gloriously carried out, met with a more miserable fate than that of Agathokles, and seemed indisputably to confirm the opinion that the Carthaginians were invincible in their own country.^ It was necessary now, if possible, to save the remainder Victory of of the Roman army, and to bring them uninjured back to Romans at Italy. A still larger Roman fleet than that which had theHer- T T-i T 1 » r> • msean pro- conquered at Ecnomus Avas accordingly sent to Africa, and montury. obtained over the Carthaginians at the Hermasan promon- tory a victory which, judging by the number of Cartha- ginian vessels taken, must have been more brilliant than the last.''^ If the Romans had intended to continue the ' We cannot credit the reports according to which the Carthaginians treated Xanthippus with ingratitude and caused him to be murdered on his retxirn to his own country, in order to expunge the humiliating memory of their great ob- ligations to him (Valerius Maximus, ix. 6, 1; Zonaras, viii. 13; Appian, viii. 4). Polybius had heard of these or similar charges, but he rejected them, and reluted (i. 36, § 2) that Xanthippus left Carthage shortly after his victory, from the fear of exposing himself to jealousy and calumny. * According to Polybius (i. 36, §11) not less than 114 Carthaginian vessels were taken with their crews. But the statements concerning this victory are very eonflieting. Instead of 114 captured vessels, Diodorus (xxiii, fr. 14) mentions only 24, not to speak of the numbers given by Eutropius and Orosius. Haltaus (Gesch. der BÖ7ner, i. 308, Anm.) proposes to change the number eKarhv SfKareffcrapay of Polybius into elKuffi koI TeVcrcpa«, and thus to make the statements of Polybius and Diodorus agree with one another. This ingenious conjecture is highly commendable. If we adopt it, we shall no longer see anything strange in the narrative of Polybius, who tells us that the Romans di-ove back the Car- thaginians with ease and at the first onset (ef ecpöSov Kai paSicos rpi^panevot), an expression which woidd hardly be appropriate, if 114 vessels had been taken. Such a number of captured vessels would make the victory near tlie Hermsean promontory a mure brilliant one than that of Ecnomus ; and it would, 72 ■ ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK war in Africa till tliey had utterly overthrown Carthage, . ' ^ they would have been able now to carry their plan into execution, though not under such favourable circumstances as before the defeat of Regulus. The fact, however, that they did not do this, and that they sent no new army to Africa,^ strengthens the inference suggested by the with- drawal of half of the invading army after the landing of Regulus, viz., that the expedition to Africa was under- taken only for the sake of plundering and injuring the land, and for dividing the Carthaginian forces. The only use made of the victory at the Hermrean promontory was to take into their ships the remnant of the legions of Regulus and the spoils which had been collected in Clypea. Destnic- The Roman fleet sailed back to Sicily heavily laden. Roman But now, after so much well-merited success, a misfortune Heetoifthe overtook them on the southern coast of Sicily from which coast of Sicily. no bravery could protect them. A fearful hurricane destroyed the greater number of the ships, and strewed the entire shore, from Camarina to the promontory Pachynus, with wrecks and corpses. Only eighty vessels escaped destruction, a miserable remnant of the fleet which, after twice conquering the Carthaginians, seemed able from this time forward to exercise undisputed dominion over the sea. to pay the least, be surprising that Polybiiis should dispose of it in three lines, whilst he devotes as many chapters to the battle of Ecnomus. Zonaras (viii. 14), in his description of the battle near the Hermsean promontory, differs ■widely from Polybius. Dion Cassius, whom Zonaras abridged, had evidently drawn his information from another source, possibly from Philinus. Accord- ing to this account the battle was long doubtful, and was at last decided in favour of the Romans when those Roman vessels which had wintered in Clypea advanced and attiicked the Carthaginians in the rear. This is anotlier instance which shows that the detail of descriptions of battles deserves as yet little credit. ' Polybius says nothing of a landing of Roman troops in Clypea, and of a battle with the Cartiia^iniaiis, reported by Zonaras (viii. 14), in wiiich (accord- ing to OroHJus, iv. 9) 9,000 of thorn were killed. This alleged victory was probably gained only on paper by some patriotic Roman annalist, as a set-oflf against the defeat of Regulus. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 73 Third Period, 254-250. THE VICTORY AT PANORMUS. It was among sucli reverses as these that Eome showed CHAP, her greatness. In three months a new fleet of 220 ships , ,^ joined the remnant of the disabled fleet in Messana, and Thj^d •^ . . ' Period, sailed towards the western part of the island, to attack the 254-200 fortresses of the Carthaginians, who, little exj)ecting snch ^'^' a result, were fully enofao-ed in Africa in subduing and Capture of . . "^ ^ ^ . . . ° Panormus punishing their revolted subjects. Thus it happened that by Cn. the Romans made a signal and important conquest. Next to g ™Jq ^^^ Lilybaium and Drepana, Panormus was the most consider- able Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily. Its situation on the north coast, in connexion with the Punic stations on the Liparsean Islands, made it easy for an enemy to attack and ravage the Italian coast. The place, which, under Punic dominion, had reached a high state of prosperity, consisted in a strongly fortified old town and a suburb or new town, which had its own walls and towers. This new town was now attacked by the Romans with great force both by land and sea, and after a vigorous resistance it fell into their hands. The defenders took refuge in the old town, which was more strongly fortified ; and here, after a long blockade, they Avere forced by hunger to surrender. They were allowed to buy themselves off each for two minse. By this means 10,000 of the inhabitants obtained their freedom. The remainder, 18,000 in number, who had not the means to pay the sum required, were sold as slaves.^ This brilliant success was gained by Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who six years before had been taken prisoner in Lipara, and had since then gained his freedom either by ransom or exchange. The undisturbed blockade of the important town of Failure of Panormus, in the neighbourhood of Drepana and Lilybaeum, ^'^"^ secund ' The ransom must have been paid eitlier bj' the Carthaginian state, or by friends or relatives of the captives, not living in Panormus, for according to the laws of war all the money and valuables contained iu Panormus fell into the hands of the Romans. 74 ■ EOMAN HISTORY. EOOK shows that at that time the Carthaginians had not a suf- — / _- ficient army in Sicily, as otherwise they would certainly Eoman ex- have tried to deliver Panormus.^ They were fully engaged pedition to j^ Africa. The Romans accordingly ventured in the same Africa. ° '' year to attack Drepana, and though their enterprise failed, they attempted in the following year to take even Lilybseum, and then made a second expedition into Africa, most probably in order to take advantage of the difficulties of the Carthaginians in their own country. This under- taking, which, like the former invasion, was intended to be only a raid on a large scale, utterly failed, producing not even the glory which crowned the first acts of Regu- lus. The great Roman fleet, with two consular armies on board, sailed towards the .same coast on which Regu- lus had landed, east of the Hermsean promontoiy, where lay the most flourishing part of the Carthaginian territory. The Romans succeeded in landing in different places, and collecting spoil ; but nowhere, as formerly in Clypea, could they obtain a firm footing. At last the ships were cast on the sand banks in the shallow waters of the lesser Syrtis (Gulf of Cabes), and could only be got afloat again with the greatest trouble, on the return of the tide, and after everything had been thrown overboard that could be dispensed with. The return voyage resembled a flight, and near the Palinurian promontory on the coast of Lucania (west of Policastro) the ships were overtaken by a terrible storm, in which a hun- dred and fifty of them were lost. The repetition of such a dreadful misfortune in so short a time, the loss of two magnificent fleets within three years, quite disgusted the Romans with the sea. They resolved to relinquish for the future all naval expeditions, and, devoting all their energies to their land army, to keej) equipped only as many ships as might be needed to supply the army in Sicily with pro- ' It iH stated tliiit in this year tlio Cartliagiiiians retook Agrigentxim, jiud that they would have rocoiKjuei'od tlie whole of Sicily if thoy had not been informed of the arrival of hoth eonsids (Zonaras, viii. 14). The latter asser- tion is an unmeaning phrase, and as to Agrigentum, it is hardly probable that lifter it« repctated captiire.s that town can huvo been a place of much impor- tance or military strength. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 75 visions, and to afford all necessary protection to the coast CHAP, of Italy. We may fairly feel surprised at finding- in the Capitoline fasti the record of a victory of the consul C. Sempronius Bla?sus over the Punians.' If such a triumph really was celehrated after such an utter failure, it would follow that under certain circumstances the honour was easily obtained. The two years of the war which now followed were years Exhaus- of exhaustion and comparative rest on both sides. The ^^^^ war, which had now lasted twelve years, had caused innumerable losses, and still the end was far off. The Romans had, it is true, according- to our reports, been conquerors in almost every engagement, not only by land, but, what was prized far higher and gave them far greater satisfaction, by sea also. The defeat of Regulus was the only reverse of any importance which their army by land had experienced. In consequence of that reverse they had to leave Africa ; but in Sicil}^ they had gradually advanced further westward. The towns which at the beginning of the war had been only doubtful possessions, inclining first to one side and then to the other, were all either in the iron grij) of the Eomans, or were destroyed and had lost all imiDortance as military stations. In the west the limits of the territory where the Carthaginians were still able to offer a vigorous resistance were more and more contracted. From Agrigentum and Panormus they had fallen back ui^on Lilyboeum and Drepana, and even towards these the Eomans had already stretched ont their hands. Still more, Eome had contended for the mastery over the sea with the greatest maritiuie power in the world, and had been victorious in each of the three great naval engagements. But they Avere not at home on that element, and in the two tremendous storms of the years 255 and 233 they lost, with the fruits of their heroic ' That tlie Capitoline fasti are utterly unworthy of credit we have already seen (i. 280 ct seq. ; 528, note 2). In the present instance the alleged triumph of C Sempronius Ti. f Ti. n. Blsesus Cos de Poenis is no doubt a forger}-, imported into the public annals through the mendacity of the Scmproniau family. 76 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Capture of Li para by the Eo- Victory of the Ro- mans at Panormus. perseverance, even their confidence and their courage. The greatest burden of the war fell on the unfortunate island of Sicily, but Italy suffered also by her sacrifices of men and materials of war, by the predatory incursions of the enemy, and by the interruption of her trade. It may therefore easily be explained how both belligerents were satisfied to pause awhile from any greater enterprise, and thus gain time to recover their strength. But the war did not cease entirely. In the year 252 the Romans succeeded in taking Lipara, with the aid of a fleet which their faithful ally Hiero, of Syracuse, sent to their assistance,^ and Thermse (or Himera), the only place on the north coast of Sicily which was left to the Carthagi- nians after the loss of Panormus. That the Carthaginians should quietly allow this, without making any attempt to ward off the attack, is very surprising. In the annals which have come down to us, the history of the war is unfortu- nately written so decidedly from a Roman point of view that we know nothing at all of the internal affairs of the Car- thaginians, and of what they were doing when not engaged against the Romans. We may suppose they had still enough to do in quelling the insurrection of their subjects, and so were compelled to leave the Romans in Sicily to act unopposed. At length, in the year 251, they sent a fleet of 200 ships under Ilasdrubal, and a strong army of 30,000 men into Sicily, with a detachment of 140 elephants.^ These animals, known to the Romans since the time of Pyrrhus, had again become objects of fresh terror after the defeat of Regulus, of which they had been the principal cause, and the greatest timidity reigned in the army of the proconsul.^ Ca3ciliiis Metellus shut himself up in Panormus with only a consular army, and evaded the engagement. In the meantime Hasdrubal laid waste the open country and drew near to the town, where, between the walls and the ' Zoiiaris, viii. 11. L)iuJ(ji'iin, xxiii. fr. 14. Trontin. St.ratci). iv. 12. » OrobiuH, iv. Ü. =" Tolybius, i. 39, § 11. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 77 river Orethus,* he had no room either for drawing up his CHAP. forces — especially the elephants and the horse — or for re- . ^ . treatin«: in case of a reverse. Confident of success, and in- ^ ""'" * ^ Pkriod, tent only on drawing the enemy out of the town and getting 2.j4-2.jü them to accept a battle, he failed to take the common pre- caution of covering himself with mounds and trenches.^ On the other side, Metellus, who could at any time retreat, formed his column inside the gates, and sent a number of light-armed troops to harass the Carthaginians and draw them nearer to the town. When the elephants had driven back the Roman skirmishers as far as the town trench, and were now exposed to their missiles and unable to do any- thing further, they fell into great disorder, became un- manageable, turned round on the Carthaginian infantry, and caused the utmost confusion. Metellus availed himself of this moment to burst forth out of the town, and to attack the enemy in flank. The mercenaries, unable to keep their ground, rushed in wild flight towards the sea, where they hoped to be taken in by the Carthaginian vessels, but the gi-eater part perished miserably. Metellus gained a brilliant and decided victory. The charm was broken, the Romans were themselves again,^ Panormus was saved, and the Carthaginians were compelled henceforth to give up all thoughts of an aggressive war, and to confine them- selves to the defence of the few fortresses which they still possessed in Sicily. Having lost Therma3 in 252,'' and still earlier Solus or Soluntum, Kephalsedion and Tyndaris, they now abandoned Selinus, transplanting the inhabitants to Lilybffium. The incompetent Hasdrubal on his return paid for his defeat the penalty of crucifixion. The cap- tured elephants, the number of which, according to some writers, was about 120,'' were led in triumj)h to Rome and ' This small river flowed into the sea not far from the town on the south side. See Sohubring, Topographie vo7i Panormus. Lübeck, 1870, p. 24. '' Diodoius, xxiii. fr. 14. =• Polybius, i. 40, § 16. * Polybius, i. 39, § 13 ; Diodorus, xxiii. fr. 14 ; Zonaras, viii. 14. * Livy, epit. 19; Zonaras, viii. 14. The number varies, however, and is given by different writers as 60, 100, 104, 120, and 142. According to Polybius (i. 40, § 15), only ten were taken during the battle ; the rest fell into the hands of the Ivomans when the battle was over. Their number is not stated by Polybius. 78 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Alleged mission of Carthagi- nian envoys to Rome. The story of Regu- lus. there liuntecT to death in the circus. Never had a Roman general merited or celebrated a more splendid triumph than Metellus/ who, with two legions, had defeated and annihilated an army of double the strength of his own.^ The elephants on the coins of the Csecilian family pre- served, until late times, the memory of this glorious victory. The battle of Panormus marks the turning-point in the war, which had now lasted thirteen years. The courage of the Carthaginians seemed at length to be quite broken. They decided to enter into negotiations for peace, or to propose at least an exchange of prisoners. The embassy disj^atched to Rome for this purpose has become famous in histor}^ especially because, as it is related, the cap- tive Regulus was sent with it in order to support the proposals of the Carthaginians with his influence. The conduct of Regulus became the subject of poetical effu- sions, the echo of which we find in Horace ^ and Silius Italicus.^ Closely connected with this is the tradition of ■ the violent death of Regulus, which is so characteristic of the Roman historians that we cannot pass it over in silence. Five years had passed since the unhappy battle in the neighbourhood of Tunes, which consigned Regulus and 500 ' Polybius, i. 40, § 10. ' MeteHiis was alive many years after this victory; he was made once more consul, then master of the horse and dictator, and lastly poutifex maximus. As such he saved, from the burning temple of Vesta, the sacred Palladium, the statue of the tutelary deity of Rome, at the risk of his life, and with the loss of his eyesight, and for this exploit he obtained leave to use a chariot when he wislied to attend the meetings of the senate. Pliny {Hist. Nat. vii. 45) mentions the laudatory speech which the son of Metelhis delivered at the fun(!ral of his father and committed to writing, and in which he said 'that he had accomplislied the ten best and greatest things which wise men spend their lives to obtain : that he had wislied to be a tirst-rate warrior, a good orator, a brave general ; that he wi.shcd to conduct the highest state affairs, to enjoy the greatest honour, to possess great wisdom, to be esteemed the first among the senators, to acquire great wealth honestly, to leave behind many children, and to be the most distinguished man in the community.' From this specimen wo may form an opinion of the nature and quality of the family documents which were tlie cliief source from which the earliest Roman annalists comjiosed their so-called history of Rome. " Horace, (M., iii. 5. ■* Silius Italiens, Vunic. vi. 346-385. B.c. TUE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 79 of his fellow-soldiers to captivity. Now Avlien the Cartlia- CHAP. giiiians decided, after their defeat at Panormus, to make an . ^ . exchange of prisoners, and, if possible, to conclude peace jf,'""" with Rome, they sent Regulas with the embassy, for they 254-200 considered him a fit person to advocate their proposals. But in this expectation they were signall}^ disappointed. Regulus gave his advice not only against the peace, but also against the exchange of prisoners, because he thought it would result only in the advantage of Carthage. He resisted all the entreaties of his own family and friends, who wished him to stay in Rome ; and when they urged him, and the senate seemed disposed to make the ex- change, he declared that he could no longer be of any service to his country, and that, moreover, he was doomed to an early death, the Carthaginians having given him a slow poison. He refused even to go into the town to see his wife and children, and, true to his oath, returned to Carthage, although he knew that a cruel punishment awaited him. The Carthaginians, exasperated at this disappointment of their hopes, invented the most horrible tortures to kill him by slow degrees. They shut him up with an elephant, to keep him in constant fear ; thoy prevented his sleeping, caused him to feel the pangs of hunger, cut off his eyelids and exposed him to the burning rays of the sun, against which he was no longer able to close his eyes. At last they shut him up in a box stuck all over with nails, and thus killed him outright. When this became known in Rome, the senate delivered up two noble Carthaginian prisoners, Bostar and Hainilcar, to the widow and the sons of Regulus. These unhappy creatures were then shut up in a narrow cage which pressed their limbs together, and they were kept for many days without food. When Bostar died of hunger, the cruel Roman matron left the putrefying corpse in the narrow cage by the side of his surviving companion, whose life she prolonged by spare and meagre diet in order to lengthen out his sufferings. At last this horrible treatment became known,' and the ' This treatment was the more atrocious as the captive Ilamilear had 80 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK heartless torturers, escaping with difficulty the severest • _ / . punishment, were compelled to bury the body of Bostar, and to treat Hamilcar with humanity. The silence Tliis is the story as it is found related by a host of bis ^' Grreek and Roman authors.^ Among these, however, the most important is wanting. Polybius mentions neither the embassy of the Carthaginians, nor the tortures of Regulus, nor those of Bostar and Hamilcar ; and he observes, as we have seen, the same significant silence with regard to the alleged ingratitude and treachery of the Car- thaginians towards Xanthippus.* Moreover, Zonaras, who copied Dion Cassius, refers to the martyrdom of Eegulus as a rumour.' Besides, there are contradictions in the various reports. According to Seneca and Tlorus the unhappy Regulus was crucified ; * according to Zonaras, Eegulus only pretended he had taken poison, whilst other authorities say that the Carthaginians really gave it him. Apart from these contradictions the facts reported are in themselves suspicious. That the Romans should not have agreed willingly to an exchange of prisoners is hardly credible ; they did it two years later,'^ and it is highly probable that Cn. Scipio was thus released from his cap- tivity.'' And can we imagine that the Carthaginians tortured Regulus in so useless and foolish a manner, at the same time challenging the Romans to retaliation? Were they really such monsters as the Roman historians liked to picture them? Probable Such qucstions and considerations have for a long time thlfstory. ^Gcn Called forth by the traditional story of the Carthagi- nian embassy and the death of Regulus. The account of befrionded Refruhis in Carthage, as appears to be intimated by Diodorus (xxiv. t'r. 'JO, Taiichn.) ' Cie-eru, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Gellius, Seneca, riorus, Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, Dion Cassius, Appian, Diodonis, Zonaras. * Soo abov(s p. 71, note 1. ^ Zonaras, viii. 15. * Ilonco pfjjson, hunj^cr, deprivation of sleep, and other tortures were not sufficient to put an (^nd to tlic life of Regulus ; lie must also undergo the ignominious punishment of slaves. * Zonaras, viii. 10. ' See above, p. 73. THE FIRST rUNIC WAR. 81 the martyrdom of Rcgulus lias been almost universally regarded as a malicious invention, and the suspicion has arisen that it originated within the family of Regulus its(^lf.' This view is recommended b}" its internal credi- bility. The noble Carthaginian prisoners were given up probably to the family of the Atilii, as a security for the exchange of Regulus. But Regulus died in imprisonment before the exchange could be made. Thinking that cruel treatment had hastened his death, the widow of Regulus took her revenge in the horrible tortures of the two Car- thaginians, and, to justify this, the story of the martyrdom of Regulus was invented. But the government and the Koman people as such took no part in the tortures of innocent captives ; on the contrary they put an end to the private revenge as soon as the fact became known. The senate was not capable of defiling the Roman name by unheard-of cruelties towards prisoners, and of thus giving the Carthaginians an excuse for retaliation.^ Only to the revengeful j^assion of a woman, not to the whole Roman 2)eople, may be attributed such utter contempt of all human and divine law as is represented in the cruelties practised towards the Carthaginian prisoners. If we take this view of tlie story we shall find it improbable that Regulus took a part in the embassy of the Carthaginians,^ what- ever we may think of the authenticity of the embassy itself. CHAP. III. ' y — ■— ^ Third Pkhiod, 254-250 B.c. Foitrth Period, 250-249 b.c. LILYByEUM AND DREPANA. The brilliant victory at Panormus had inspired the Eifects of Romans with new hopes, and had perhaps raised their of plnor-"*^ demands. They determined to complete the conquest of °ius- Sicily,^ and to attack the last and greatest sti-ongholds of ' This was surmised as early as the sixteenth century by Palmer {Excrcit. in Aiictor. GrcBC. p. 151). See Niebuhr, Earn. Gesch. iii. 705 ; English translation, iii. 599. - Diodorus, xxiv. p. 91 (Tauchn.) ' Polybius' silence seems to be almost conclusive. « Polybius, i. 41, § 2. VOL. II. G 82 ROMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. Attack on Liljbaeum by the K Omans. tlie Cartliaginians in that island, namely Lilybseum and Drej)ana. Lilybaäiim (the modern Marsala), situated on a small strip of land, terminated by the promontory of the same name, was founded after the destruction of the island town of Motye, and had been since that event the chief fortress of the Carthaginians.' Besieged by Dionysius in the year 368 b.c., and by Pyrrhus in 276 b.c., it had proved its strength, and had remained unconquered. Nature and art had joined hands in making this fortress in- vincible, if defended with Punic fanaticism.^ Two sides of the town were washed by the sea, and were j^rotected, not only by strong walls, but more especially by shallows and sunken rocks, which made it impossible for any but the most skilful pilots or the most daring sailors to reach the harbour. On the land side the town was covered by strong walls and towers, and a moat one hundred and twenty feet deep and eighty feet broad. The harbour was on the north side, and was inclosed with the town in one line of fortifications.^ The garrison consisted of the citizens and 10,000 infantry, mostly mercenaries, not to be relied on, and a strong division of horse.* It was impos- sible to take such a maritime fortress without the co- operation of a fleet. The Romans were obliged to make up their minds to build a new fleet, in spite of their ' Sec above, p. 26, note 1. * See Schubring on ' Motye-Lilybsenm ' in the Philologns of 1866. The site of the ancient Lilybseum is partially covered by tlie modern Marsala. ' This port is now silted up and useless, and where the Carthaginian galleys rode there are now saltworks. But during the wliole of antiquity the port of Lilyb?eum was highly esteemed. It was here that in the first year of the IIai)nil)alian war, the consul Sempronius collected a Hect for his intended expedition to Africa; from this port Scipio sailed, and in later times it was a station for part of the Roman fleet. The Arabs called it Mars Alia, the haven of God, whenc<^ the modern name of Marsala. The total destruction of the port was probalily effected by Don Juan of Austria, who wished to make it useless for the Barbaresk pirates. The modern port of Mar-sala is on tho Bouth side of tho town, and formed by an artificial mole. * According to Diodorus (xxiv. f'r. 1) IIki cavalry amounted to 7,000, and the infantry, including the iniiabilanis capable of bearing arms, to 60,000 men. I'olh statomcuts seem vastly exaggerat 'd. THE FIRST rUNIC WAR. 83 resolution three years before.' The two consuls of the j^ear f'lr.AP. 250, C. Atilius Reg'ulus and L. Manlius Vulso, of whom . ^ , one was a kinsman, the other the colleasrue, of M. Reffulus |'o^"ktu '_ ... i KlilOD, of the year 256, sailed towards Sicily with two hundred 200-249 ships, and anchored before the harbour of Lilybseum, partly ^'^' to cut off' the town from supplies, and partly also to prevent the Carthaginian fleet from interrupting- the landing of necessaries for the large besieging army.^ The Roman land army consisted of four legions, which, Number of with the Italian allies, made together about 40,000 men. In ^^'' J '''''S- ' ° ' ing lorcc. addition to these, there were the Sicilian allies, and the crews of the fleet, so that the report of Diodorus does not seem improbable, that the besieging army amounted altogether to about 110,000 men. To supply such an immense number of men with provisions, at the furthest corner of Sicily, and to bring together all the implements and materials for the siege, was no small labour ; and as the task extended over many months, this undertaking alone was calculated to strain the resources of the republic to the very utmost. The siege of Lilyba3um lasted almost as long as the Diiration fabulous siege of Troy, and the hardly less fabulous one siege.^ of Veii, with this difference only, that Lilyba3um resisted successfully to the end of the war, and was delivered up to the Eomans only in accordance with the terms of jDeace. We have no detailed account of this protracted struggle, but it is on the whole pretty clearly narrated in the masterly sketch of Polybius, which possesses a greater interest for us than any part of the military history of ' Polybius, i. 39. ' It is not probuble, nor attested by any ancient writer, that, as Mommsen supposes {Rom. Gesch. i. 533 ; English translation, ii. 49) the Roman fleet sailed right into the harbour of Lilybaeum. On this supposition it would be unintelligible why the Romans three times endeavoured to block up the entrance to the harbour. Probably the anchoring-ground in the harbour was so near to the walls that ships stationed there were exposed to be attacked or even fired from the walls. Again in the last year of the war, when the Roman ships occupied the harbour of Drepana, they did not venture into that of Lilybfeum (Polybius, i. 59, § 9), but remained in the neighbouring bays and roadsteads. G 2 84 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Modes of siege in ancient ■warfare. Rome of tlie preceding periods. We see here exemplified not only the art of siege, in its most important features, as practised by the ancients, but we discern in it clearly the character of the two belligerent nations, the bearing of their strong and their weak points on the prosecution of the war; and we shall feel ourselves rewarded therefore by bestowing a little more attention on this memorable con- test than we have given to any previous events in the military history of Eome. In the art of besieging towns the Romans were but little advanced before their acquaintance with the Greeks, and even among the Greeks it was long before the art reached the highest point of perfection that it was caf>able of attaining in antiquity. Trenches and walls were the material difficulties with which besiegers had to contend. Before the walls could be attacked, the trenches must be filled up, and this was done with fascines and earth. As soon as the trenches were so far filled up as to allow a passage, wooden besieging towers and rams were pushed forward. These towers consisted of several stories, and were higher than the walls of the town. On the different stories soldiers were placed, armed with missiles, for the purpose of clearing the walls, or of reach- ing them by means of drawbridges. The rams were long beams, with iron heads, suspended under a covering roof, and were swung backwards and forwards by soldiers to make breaches in the walls. These two operations were the most important. They were supported by the artillery of the ancients — the large wooden catapults and ballista}, a kind of gigantic crossbows, which shot off heavy darts, balls, or stones against the besieged. Where the nature of the ground permitted, mines were dug under the enemy's fortifications, and suj^ported by beams. If these beams were burnt, the walls above immediately gave way. Against such mines the besieged dug counter- mines, partly to l-249 up part of the town trench, while by their wooden towers, battering-rams, protecting roofs, and projectiles, they ^"*=''^'- approached the wall, destroying seven towers at the point the siege where it joined the sea on the south, and thereby opening i^geu,',,"^" a wide breach. Through this breach the Romans made an attack, and penetrated into the ulterior of the place. But here thej found that the Carthaginians had built up another wall behind the one which had been destroyed. This fact, and the violent resistance opj)osed to them in the streets, compelled them to retreat. Similar attempts were often made. Day after day there were bloody combats, in which more lives were lost than in open battle.^ In one of these, it is said, the Romans lost 10,000 men.^ The losses on the Carthaginian side were probably not less. Under such circumstances, the ability of the besieged to resist had diminished considerably. En- thusiasm and patriotism alone can inspire courage in a reduced and exhausted garrison. But enthusiasm and patriotism were just the qualities least known in the Carthaginian mercenaries. Above all others the Gallic soldiers were the most vacillating and untrustworthy.* They were inclined to mutiny ; '' some of their leaders secretly went over to the Romans and promised them to induce their countrymen to revolt. All would have been lost, if Himilco had not been informed of the treachery by a faithful Greek, the Achaean Alexon. Not venturing to act with severity, he determined by entreaties, by pre- sents, and by promises to keep the mercenaries up to their duty. This scheme succeeded with the venal bar- barians. When the deserters approached the walls and • Polybius, i. 49, § 1. - Polybius, i. 42, § 13. ' Diodorus, xxiv. fr. I. This evidently exaggerated statemont seems traceable to Philiniis. * Polybius, ii. 7, § ö. ^ Polybius, i. 43. Zouaras, viii. 15. 86 EOMAN HISTOEY. Ilflief of LilybaeuDi by Uannibal. invited their former comrades to mutiny, they were driven back by stones and arrows. Many months had jjassed since the beginning of the blockade. While the Roman army had inclosed the town on the land side by a continuous circumvallation and trenches Avhich extended in a half circle from the northern to the southern shore, the fleet had blockaded the har- bour and endeavoured to obstruct all entrance b}' sinking stones.' Lilj'bffium was thus shut off from all communica- tion with Carthage, and was left to itself and the courage of its garrison. But it was neither forgotten nor neglected. It might be supposed in Carthage that a town like Lily- baiuni would be able to hold out for some mouths wdthout needing aid, and it had been well supplied with provisions before the siege began. It was well known also that if it were necessary to break through the blockade, the Roman ships would not be able to hinder it. Probably the greater part of their ships were drawn up on shore, while the rowers were employed in filling up the moat. Some few ships might be out at sea, or might be lying at anchor, ready to sail, in well-protected roadsteads ; but the violent storms, and the still more dangerous shallows of that coast, rendered it impossible for the Roman captains to make the blockade of Lilyba3um effective. The Carthaginian fleet which was stationed at Drepana, under the command of Adherbal, instead of attacking the Roman fleet before Lilybseum, made use of the time to scour the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and to hinder the conveyance of provisions for the supply of the immense besieging army. Meanwhile an expedition was fitted out in Carthage for reinforcing and victualling the garrison of Lilyba}um. An enterprising admiral called Hannibal, a man not un- worthy of this great name, sailed with fifty ships and 10,000 men from Africa'^ to the iEgatian Islands, west of Lilybffium. Here he kiy, quietly hoping for a favourable ' liiodoruH, xxiv. fr. 1. I''irii'cii .ships bulcn willi stoiioa wore sunk. '■' I'uJjbius, i. 41, § li. Atcoi'ding to Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1), thu forco THE FIRST PÜNIC WAR. 87 wind.' At last it blew strong from the west; Hannibal CHAP. now unfurled all sail, and without payin<^ attention to v ,1 . the Roman shij^s, but still fully equipped for an en- F(>uuth counter, steered through the difhcult channels between 2ü0-24ü cliffs and sandbanks towards the entrance of the harbour, where the stones which the Romans had sunk had long since been washed away by the storms. The Romans, seized with astonishment and admiration, dared not ob- struct the way of the Carthaginian vessels, which shot past them heavily laden, and with their decks crowded with soldiers, ready for battle.^ The walls and toAvers of Lilybaium were lined with its valiant defenders, who, with mingled fear and hope, looked on at the grand spec- tacle. The harbour was gained without loss. The com- plete success of this undertaking inspired the besieged with fresh hope and courage, and gave the Romans warn- ing that Lilybffium was not likely soon to be in their power. Himilco determined to avail himself of the enthusiasm Unsuccess- which Hannibal's arrival had stirred up. Sallying out on "J ^ the following morning, he made an attempt to desti'oy Himilco to the machines for the siege. But the Romans had antici- ßo^m^au pated this, and offered obstinate resistance. The battle '^vorks. was long undecided, especially near the Roman works, which the Carthaginians tried in vain to set on fire. At length Himilco saw the futility of his attempt, and com- manded a retreat. In this manner the Roman soldiers were compensated for the vexation which the superiority of their enemies at sea had caused them on the previous day. amounted to 40,000 men. He relates some interesting details, bnt on the "whole his narrative is confused and inaccurate. ' It has been asked (Haltaus, Gesch. der Bomer, i. 384) why the Romans did not attack him. The reply to this question is contained in what has been stated in the text. Most of the Roman ships were drawn ashore, the crews were employed at the siege-works, and a great number of the men had already perished. '^ According to Polybius (i. 44, § 4), the Romans feared to be drifted into the harbour. This shows clearly that the harbour was untenable for Roman ships. See above, p. 83, note 2. EOMAN HISTOEY. BOOK IV. Departure of Hanni- bal -w-itli his fleet. Capture of the Rhodian Hannibal. The niglifc following, Hannibal sailed away again witli his fleet. He went to Drepana, taking with him the horse- men, who till now had lain in Lilybseum, and were of no use there, while in the rear of the Roman army they could do excellent service, partly in harassing the enein}^ and partly in obstructing the arrival of provisions by land.' The bold exploit of Hannibal had proved that the port of Lilybseum was oj)en to a Carthaginian fleet. From this time even isolated vessels ventured in and out, and defied the slow Roman cruisers, who gave themselves useless trouble to intercept them. A Carthaginian captain, called the Ehodian Hannibal, made himself specially conspicuous by eluding the Romans in his fast-sailing trireme, slipping in between them and purposely allowing them almost to reach him, that he might make them the more keenly feel his superiority. The Romans, in their vexation, now sought again to block up the mouth of the harbour. But the storms and the floods mocked their endeavours. The stones, even in the act of sinking, Polybius says, were thrown on one side of the cuiTent ; ^ but in one place the passage was narrowed, at least for a time, and, luckily for the Romans, a quick-sailing Carthaginian galley^ ran aground there, and fell into their hands. Manning it with their best rowers, they waited for the Rhodian, who, coming out of the harbour with his usual confidence, was now overtaken. Seeing that he could not escape by dint of speed, Hannibal turned round and attacked his pur- ' Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) relates that 7,000 horse, which in the beginning of the siege formed part of the garrison, were afterwards sent to Drepana because they were of no use in LiiybiDuin. He does not state the time when this was done. Tlie inference contained in the text seems obvious. The cavalry could not leave Lilyb.-eum by land, as the Romans, in the very beginning of the siege, had drawn a ditch and mound all along the land side of Lilybaeum from sea to sea. The first opportunity for dispatching tlio cavalry by sea to Drepana presented itself when Hannibal loft the port of Lilybaoum, and could as easily take the men and horses as ballast. « Polybius, i. 47, § 4. * This fast galh'y was a Tsrpr'jpTjy ((juadrircmis), i.e. a vessel with four rows of oars. — Polybius, i. 47, § <}. TTTE FIRST TUNIC WAR. 89 sners ; but he was unequally matched in strength, and was taken prisoner with his ship. Trifling encounters like these could have but little influence on the progress of the siege. Slowly, but securely, the Roman works proceeded. The dam which levelled the filled-ui) moat became broader and broader; the artillery ^"^^r^ss of and battering-rams were directed against the towers son of which still remained standing ; mines were dug under the ' ^ J<'e"ni- second inner wall, and the besieged were too weak to keep pace with the works of the Romans by counter-mines* It appeared that the loss of Lilybseum was unavoid- able unless the besieged should receive some unlooked-for aid. In this desperate situation Himilco determined to repeat, Destmc- under inore favourable circumstances, the attempt which j^°^*^ had once so signally failed.' One night, when a gale «iege- of wind was blowing from the west, which overthrew towers and made the buildings in the town tremble and shake, he made a sally, and this time he succeeded in setting fire to the Roman siege-works. The dry wood was at once kindled, and the violent wind fanned the flame into ungovernable fury, blowing the sparks and smoke into the eyes of the Romans, who in vain called up all their courage and perseverance in the hopeless contest Avith their enemies and the elements. One wooden struc- ture after another was caught by the flames, and burnt to the ground. When the day dawned, the spot was covered with charred beams. The labour of months was destroyed in a few hours, and for the present all hope was lost of taking Lilybseum by storm. The consuls now changed the siege into a blockade, a Persever- plan which could not hold out any pros2)ect of success so ?^°''*^of the long as the port was open. But it was not in the nature of the Romans easily to give up what the}' had once undertaken. Their character in some measure resembled that of the bull-dog, which when it bites will not let ' Polybius, i. 48. 90 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Their special difficulties. The winter blockade. go. The circumvallations of the town were strengthened,' the two Roman camps on the north and south ends of this line were well fortified ; and, thus protected against all possible attacks, the besiegers looked forward to the time when they might resume more vigorous operations. For the present this was not possible. The Roman army had suffered great losses, not only in battle, but in the labours and privations of so prolonged a siege. The greatest difficulty was to provide an army of 100,000 men with all necessaries at such a distance from Rome.^ Sicily was quite drained and im])overished. Hiero of Syracuse, it is true, made every effort in his power, but his power soon reached its limit. Italy alone could supply wdiat was necessary, but even Italy sorely felt the pressure of the war. The Punic fleet of Drepana commanded the sea, and the dreaded Numidian horsemen, the ' Cossacks of antiquity,' overran Sicily, levied heavy contributions from the friends of the Romans, and seized the provisions which were sent by land to the camp of Lilybseum. The winter had come, with its heavy rains, its storms, and all its usual discomforts. One of the two consuls, with two legions, returned home ; the rest of the army remained in the fortified camp before Lilybaium. The Roman soldiers were not accustomed to pass the bad season of the year in tents, exposed to wet, cold, and all kinds of priva- tions. They were in want of indispensable necessaries. The consuls had hoped to be able in the course of the summer to take Lilyba^um by storm,^ and therefore the troops were probably not prepared for a winter campaign. Added to all this came hunger, the worst of all evils at this juncture, bearing in its train ravaging sickness. Ten thousand men succumbed to these sufierings,'' and the survivors were in such pitiable case that they were like a besiejjred tjfarrison in the last sta ^ , following year therefore (249) the consul P. Claudius J;^™™ Pulcher, the son of Appius Claudius the Blind, was sent to 200-249 Sicily with a new consular army, and a division of 10,000 recruits as rowers, to fill up the gaps which fatigue, priva- ('[j^^jj^J tions, and sickness had caused in the crews of the fleet. Puldier at The object of this reinforcement could only be that of '"'l^'^"**- attackinjx the Carthaginian fleet under Adherbal in Dre- jiana, for this fleet was the chief cause of all the misery which had befallen the besieging army. Claudius had without doubt received an express order to hazard a battle by sea. It was nothing but the ill-success of this under- taking that made him afterwards an object of the accusa- tion and reproaches which all unsuccessful generals have to expect. He began by re-establishing strict discipline in the army, and thus he made many enemies. He then vainl}' sought once more to block up the entrance to the harbour of Lilyba^um, and thus to cut off the suj)ply of provisions to the town, which during the winter had been effected without any difficulty. His next step was to equip his fleet, mixing the new rowers with those still left of the old ones, and manning the ships Avitli the picked men of the legion, especially volunteers, who expected certain victory and rich spoil ; and, after holding a council of war, in Avhich his scheme was aj)proved, he sailed away from Lilyba3um in the stillness of midnight, to surprise the Carthaginian fleet in the harbour of Drepana, which he reached the following morning. Keeping his ships on the right close to shore, lie entered the harbour, Avhich, on the south of a crescent-shaped peninsula, opens out towards the west in the form of a trumpet. Adliei'bal, though un- prepared and surprised, formed his plans without delay, and his arrangements for the battle were made as soon as the ships of the enemy came in sight. His fleet was promptly manned and ready for the engagement ; and wdiile the Romans sailed slowly in at one side of the harbour, he left it on the other and stood out to sea. Claudius, to avoid öä EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Dictator- ship of A. Atilius Ciilatinus. being sliut up in the harbour, gave the order to return. While the Roman ships were one after another obeying this order, they got entangled, broke their oars, hampered each other in their movements, and fell into helpless confusion. Adherbal seized the opjDOi-tunity for making the attack. The Eomans, close to the shore and in the greatest disorder and dismay, were unable to retreat, manoeuvre, or assist each other. Almost without resist- ance they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, or were wrecked in the shallows near the neighbouring coast. Only thirty ships out of two hundred and ten escaped. Ninety-three were taken with all their crews; the others were sunk or run ashore. Twenty thousand men,^ the flower of the Roman army, were taken prisoners. Eight thousand were killed in battle, and many of those who saved themselves from the wrecks fell into the hands of the Carthaginians when they reached the land. It was a day of terror, such as Rome had not experienced since the Allia — the first great decisive defeat by sea during the whole war, disastrous by the multiplied miseries which it occasioned, but still more disastrous as causing the pro- longation of the war for eight years more.^ The consul Claudius escaped, but an evil reception awaited him in Rome. It was not customary, it is true, for the Romans to nail their unsuccessful generals to the cross, as the Carthaginians often did ; on the contrary, like Sulpicius after the Allia, and like Yarro, at a later period, after Cann£e, they were treated mostly with ' Polybius (i. 51) does not state the total of the Eoman fleet, but mentions only the number of the sliips that escaped (30), and of those that were taken with their crews (93). This makes 123 in all. Orosius (iv. 10) gives in round numbers 120 ships as the strength of the Roman fleet, reckoning 90 as taken and 30 as saved. But Diodorus (xxir. fr. 1) states the number of Roman veHsds as 210, and Eutropius (ii. 26) even at 220. The latter writer agrees with Polybius and Orosius in giving 90 and 30 as the numbers of the captured and waved vessels respectively. The rest, he says, were sunk. According to his calculation they amounted to 100. It is strange that Polybius does not refer to tiiese, and it is not likely tliat he includes th(!ni nmong the 93 vessels taken. Ho also omits all mention of tlie number of killed and of the prisoners taki-n, whicli wo borrow from Orosius. ''■ Polybius, i. 49-Ö1. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 98 indulirence, and sometimes Avith lionour. But Claudius ;ciiap. . .Ill belonged to a house which, althou<^h one of the most dis- ^ — ^J . ting-uished among the Roman nobility, had many enemies, p°^^™ and his pride could not stoop to humility and conciliation. 200-249 With haughty mien and lofty bearing he returned to Rome; and when he was requested to nominate a dictator, as the necessities of the republic were urgent, he named, in utter contempt of the public feeling, his servant and client Glicia.' This was too much for the Roman senate. Glicia was compelled to lay down the dictatorship, and the senate, setting aside the old constitutional practice, and dispensing with the nomination by the consul, ap- pointed A. Atilius Calatinus, who made Metellus, the hero of Panormus, his master of the horse. After the ex- ph'ation of his year of office, Claudius was accused before the people on a capital charge, and only escaped con- demnation by the timely outburst of a thunderstorm, which interrupted the proceedings.^ It seems, however, that he was afterwards condemned to pay a fine.^ Hence- forth he disappears from the page of history. It is un- certain whether he went into exile, or whether he soon died. At any rate he was not alive three years later, for it is reported that at that time, his sister, a Claudian as proud as himself, said once, when annoyed by a crowd in the street, she wished her brother were alive to lose another battle, that some of the useless people might be got rid of.* The hypocritical piety of a time in which the whole of Alleged religion was nothing but an empty form, attributed the ^f° '^"' ^ defeat at Drej^ana to the godlessness of Claudius. On Claudius. the morning of the battle, when he was informed that the sacred fowls would not eat, he ordered them, it is said, to be cast into the sea, that at least they might drink. It is a pity that anecdotes such as these are so related by ' Livy, epit. 19 ; Ruptoiiins, Tih. 2. ^ Valerius Maximiis, viii. 1, 4. * Polybius, i. 52, § 3.— Scholia Bobiensia ad Cicer. De Natura Dcurum, ii. 3, 7. * Gellius, X. 6 ; Suetonius, Tib. 2. 94 ROMAN HISTORY. EOOK IV. Enpr^y of the Car- thaginians. Cicero as to leave the impression that he himself recog- nised the wi-ath of the avenf^ing^ ijods in the fate of Claudius. Perhaps the story is not true, but like so many similar tales it was inspired by pious terror^ after the day of the misfortune.^ If it could, however, be proved to be true, it would show that the national faith had dis- appeared among the higher classes of the Roman people in the first Punic war. For a single individual would never venture on such ridicule of the popular super- stitions if he were not sure of the approval of those on whose opinion he lays great weight. That the sacred fowls and the whole apparatus of auspices had not the smallest share in determining the result of the battle, the Romans knew, in the time of Claudius and of Cicero, as well as we do. The reason of the defeat lay in the superiority of the Carthaginian admiral and seamen, and the inexperience of the Roman consul and crews. The Roman nation ought to have accused itself for having placed such a man as Claudius at the head of the fleet, and for having manned the vessels with men who for the most part could work with the plough and the spade, but who knew nothing of handling an oar. The misfortune of Rome is attributable to the cumbersome Roman ships, and to the 1 0,000 newly levied rowers, who were sent by land to Rhegium, and from Messana to Lilybseum, and who probably knew nothing of the sea.^ The Carthaginians made the best use of their success. Immediately after their victory at Drepana, a division of their fleet sailed to Panormus, where Roman transport ' It was a consolation to feel, as Florus (ii. 2) says, 'that Claudius was overthrown, not by the enemy, but by the gods themselves, whose auspices he had despised.' * Tlie first who roi)orts it is Cicero, Dc Natura Beorum, ii. 3, 7. ' Tliis eoiiliniis our liypothesis that in the first Roman fleet the great majority of the crews consisted, not of hmdsmen, but of veteran seamen. Tliese iilso manned the Roman fled lli:il- wns victorious at Ecnomus. The loss of 111' so men in war and shi))\vrecks explains tiio failure of the second expedition in tlie .\frican Syrtis, and the great disasters on the coast of Sicily and Italy ('i')/) and 203 n.i;.), whilst tlio as.-iduous practice of the rowers in 2il B.C. accounts for tho victory at the iEgatian Islands. — Polybius, i. 09, § 12. THE FIRST PUNIC WAK. 9o ships lay with provisions for the army before Lilybscnm. CHAP. These now fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, and , ^'. , served to supply the garrison of Lilyba3um abundantly, p"i^f^" while the Konians before the walls were in want of the 2ö0-2i9 merest necessaries. The remainder of the Roman fleet was now attacked at Lilyba3um. Many ships were burnt, others were drawn from the shore into the sea, and carried away ; at the same time Himilco made a sally and attacked the Roman camp, but had to retreat without accomplishing- his jjurpose. The disaster of Drepana was soon after almost equalled Destmc- by another calamity. Whilst the consul P. Claudius Romal^^" attacked the Carthaginian fleet with such bad success, his fleet and colleague L. Junius Pullus, having loaded eight hundred ships transports in Italy and in Sicily with provisions for the ""'l';'^ L. army, had sailed to S}' racuse. With a fleet of a hundred and twenty ships of war, he wished to convoy this great number of vessels along the south coast of Sicily to Lily- bajum. But the provisions had not yet all arrived in. Syracuse when the necessities of the army compelled him to send off at least a part of the fleet under the protection, of a proportionate number of war ships. These now sailed round the promontory of Paehynus (Cape Passaro), and had advanced as far as the neighbourhood of Ecnomus, where the Romans seven years before had gained their most brilliant naval victory over the Punians, when they sud- denly found themselves face to face with a powerful hostile fleet consisting of a hundred and twenty ships. There was nothing left for them but to shelter their vessels as well as they could along the shore. But this could not be eifected without much loss. Seventeen of their war ships were sunk, and thirteen were rendered useless ; of their ships of burden, fifty went down. The others kept close to the shore, under the protection of the troops and of some catapults from the small neighbouring town of Phintias. After this partial success the Carthaginian admiral Carthalo waited for the arrival of the consul, hoping that he, with his ships of war, would accept battle. But when 96 KOMAN HISTOKY. BOOK IV. Seizui'e of the temple of the Eryciniau Venus by the consul Junius. Junius became aware of the state of things, he immediately turned back, to seek shelter in the harbour of Syracuse for himself and his great transport fleet. Himilco fol- lowed him and overtook him near Camarina. Just at this time signs were seen of a storm gathering from the south, which on this exposed coast involves the greatest danger. The Carthaginians, therefore, gave up the idea of attacking, and sailed in great haste in the direction of the promontory Pachynus, behind which they cast anchor in a place of safety. The Eoman fleet, on the other hand, was overtaken by the storm, and suffered so terribly that of the trans- port ships not one was saved, and of the hundred and five war shijDs, only two. Many of the crew may have saved themselves by swimming to land, but the provisions were certainly all lost.' The destruction of this fleet crowned the series of mis- fortunes which befell the Romans in the year 249 b.c., the most dismal time of the whole war. It seemed impossible to fight against such adverse fate, and voices were heard in the senate urging the termination of this ruinous war.^ But pusillanimity in trouble had no place in the Eoman character. A defeat only acted as a spur to new exertions and more determined perseverance. Immediately after the great losses at Drepana and Camarina, the consul Junius resumed the attack, as though he would not allow the Carthaginians time to be aware of having gained any advantage. A large portion of his crew had been saved. He was able therefore to bring reinforcements into ' The report of Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) is more full, and seems more accurate than that of Polyhius (i. 52-5-1), who betrays the wish to attribute the losses of the Romans more to the action of the elements than to the courage of the Carthajiinians. jVIoreover, Polybius is here guilty of an error, in calling the consul Junius the successor of Claudius, instead of his colleague, and there- fore placing the destruction of the Roman fleet at Camarina in the year 248 instead of 249. * Zonaras (viii. 1 .)) reports that a senator who spoke in favour of peace was immediately killed in tlio senate-house. It is hardly necessary to say that this is an invention. Periiaps it came from a Carthaginian source, for no one acquainti'd with the dignity and sobriety of the Roman senate could have thought such an act possible. THE FIKST PUNIC WAR. 9? tlie camp before Lilybseum, and he succeeded in establisli- ing himself at the foot of Mount Eryx, not far from Drepana, which town he partially blockaded in the hope that he might thus prevent the Carthaginians sallying thence and overrunning the country. Hamilcar had destroyed the old town of Eryx some years before,^ and had settled the inhabitants in Drepana. On the summit of the moun- tain, looking over a vast extent of sea, stood the temple of the Erycinian Venus, which, according to a Roman legend, was founded by ^neas, and was one of the richest and most celebrated of ancient temples. This was a strong position, easily defended ; and, after the destruction of the town of Eryx by the Carthaginians, it had remained in. their possession and was used as a watch tower. Junius, by a surprise, seized this temple, thus securing a point which, during the subsequent years of the war, was of great importance to the Romans, Another undertaking of Junius was less successful in its result. He endeavoured to establish himself on the coast between Drepana and Lilybgeum on a promontory stretch- ing out into the sea, called ^githallus. Here he was surrounded by the Carthaginians in the night, and taken prisoner, with part of his troops.^ cnAP. III. Fourth Period, 250-249 Capture of Juniiis by the Car- thaginians. Fifth Period, 248-241 b.c. HAMILCAR BARCAS. BATTLE AT THE ^GATIAN ISLANDS. PEACE. Erom this time the character of the war changes. The Earages of great enterprises of the previous years were succeeded by thLbTän hostilities on a small scale, which could not lead to a final fleet. decision. The Romans again gave up the naval war, and determined to confine themselves to the blockade of Lilybteum and Drepana. These were the only two places * See above, p. 60. * Zonaras, viii. 15. If it be true, as Cicero reports (Dc Bivin. ii. 33, 21), . that Junius destroyed himself, this statement ma}' still bo reconciled with that of Zonaras. VOL. II. H 98 ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK remaining in Sicily for tliem to conquer. If they could - _ / . only succeed in blocking up tlie Carthaginians in these places, Sicily might be regarded as a Roman possession, and the object of the war would be attained. This blockade demanded, it is true, continued sacrifices and exertions. But during the whole of the war the Carthaginians had hardly made any attempt to issue from their strongholds and to overrun Sicily, as in former times. A comparatively small force, therefore, was sufficient to observe and to restrain them. The Carthaginian fleet, which had had undisj)uted rule of the sea, could not be warded off in the same way. It could not be confined and watched in one place.^ The whole extent of the Italian and Sicilian coast was at all times exposed to its attacks. To meet these numerous attacks colonies of Roman citizens had been established in several sea towns. The number of these was now augmented by the colonies Alsium and FregellsB • — a sign that even the immediate neighbourhood of Rome was not safe from Carthaginian cruisers. The coast towns were, however, not entirely helpless, even without the assist- ance of Roman colonists. As the instance of the small town Phintias, on the soutli coast of Italy, shows,^ they had catapults and ballistse, which they used as strand batteries to keep off the enemy's ships. The larger, especially the Greek towns, were protected by walls, and the peasants in the open country found in them a temporary refuge, with their goods and chattels, until the enemy had retreated. In time the Romans, Greeks, and Etruscans also practised this kind of privateering, which, like the piracy of antiquity in general, and of the middle ages, occupied itself not so much with the taking of vessels on the high seas as with pillaging the coasts. War began now to be an occupation on the Roman side, which enriched a few citizens, whilst the community at large was impoverished. To what extent this privateering was gradually carried we learn ' OrosiuH, iv. 1 0. * Hero tlio Koiijiin.s drrw their ships on shore and dofeudod thorn 'veith artillery from rhintiaa. öüü abüvo, p. 'Jo. TIIK FIRST PUNIC WAR. 99 from the story of an attack on tlie African town Hippo.' The Roman adventurers sailed into the harbour, phmdered and destroyed a great part of the town, and escaped at last, thou2-li with some trouble, over the chain with which the Carthaginians had in the meantime attempted to close the harbour. Two events belonging- to the years 248 and 247 may en- Renewal of able us to form an idea of the situation of the Roman ^,'f,'\.';'i, republic at this time. These are the renewal of the alliance Hiero. with Hiero, and the exchange of Roman and Carthaginian prisoners. In the year 263, Rome had granted to Hiero only a truce and an alliance for fifteen years. During this long and trying period Hiero jproved himself a faithful and indispensable all}'. More than once circumstances had occurred in which, not merely enmity, but even neutrality on the part of Hiero would have been fatal to Rome. The Romans could not aiford to dispense with such a friend. They therefore now renewed the alliance for an indefinite period, and Hiero was released from all compulsory service for the future. The second event, the exchange of the Roman and Exchange Carthaginian prisoners.^ would not be surprising if it were ■ » ■!■ ' 1 Ö prisoners not for the tradition that such a measure had been proposed with by Carthage three years before (250 b.c.), and rejected by "^"^ ^^se- Rome on the advice of Regulus. Be this as it may, the exchange of prisoners in the year 247 cannot be denied, and it follows that the losses of the Romans, especially in the battle of Drepana, were' sensibly felt. The consul Junius was probably among the prisoners now set free.^ In Sicily the war was now locally confined to the ex- Arrival of treme west. The chief command over the Carthacrinians Hamilcar ° Barcas. was given in the year 247 to Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, that is ' Lightning,' the great father of a still greater son — ' Zonaras, viii. in. * Zonaras, riii. 16. Lirj-, epit. 19. ' It looks very much like an empty boast, if the Roman historians reported that the number of the Carthaginian prisoners was much larger than that of the Romans. It seems unlikely that the Carthaginians ever ransomed their mercouaries. It was probably easier, cheaper, and safer to engage new ones. H 2 100 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. His treat- ment of the Gallic merce- .aaries. Operations of Hamil- of Hannibal, who made this name above all others a terror to the Romans, and crowned it with glory for all time. Hamilcar, though still a young man, showed at once that he was possessed of more brilliant military talent than any officer whom Carthage had hitherto placed in com- mand of her troops. He was not only a brave soldier but an accomplished politician.' With the small means which his exhausted country placed at his disposal, he was able so to carry on the war for six years longer that when at last the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet, oc- casioned by no fault of his, compelled Carthage to make peace, this peace was made on conditions which left Carthage an independent and powerful state. When Hamilcar arrived in Sicily, he found the Gallic mercenaries in a state of mutiny. The prayers, promises, and donatives by which three years before Himilco had purchased the fidelity of his mercenaries in Lilybseum, were more likely to encourage them in their insubordina- tion than to keep them in strict discipline. Different and more efficient means were now applied to coerce them. The mutineers were punished without mercy. Some were sent to Carthage or exposed on desert islands, others thrown overboard, and the remainder surprised and mas- sacred by night. In a war carried on with such soldiers, even the best general had hardly any prospect of success against a national army like the Roman. So much the more brilliant appears the genius of; the Carthaginian leader, who made his own personal influence among the troops supply the place of patriotic enthusiasm. He could not carry on the war on a grand scale. Neither the numbers nor the fidelity and skill of his troops were such that he could venture to attack the Roman armies, which from their fortified camps were threatening Lilybaum and Drepana. Compelled to conduct the war differently, ' Diodorus (xxiv. I), following, firoluibly, I'hiliniis, applies to liim the Homeric vorso- — u/xcpoTepüf ßa(Tt\tvs t' ayaOus Kpartpus t' al^i^-l^rrjs. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. lOl he took possession of Mount Heircte (now Monte Pelle- chap. grino), near Panormus, whose precipitous sides made it . ,1 . a natural fortress, Avbile on its level summit some around J'" '" ' ^ Period, was left for cultivation, and its nearness to the sea secured 218-241 immediate communication with the fleet. Wliile, there- fore, the Eomans lay before the two Carthaginian for- tresses, Hamilcar threatened Panormus, now the most important possession of the Eomans in the whole of Sicily ; for not only had the reinforcements and supplies of their army to be forwarded from it, but it was the only place through which direct communication with Italy by sea was kept up. By the Carthaginian garrison at Heircte, not only was the importance of Panormus neutralised, but its safety was endangered, and Rome was compelled to keep a large garrison in it. For three years this state of things continued. From Occupa- his impregnable rocky citadel, Hamilcar, as irresistible Eryx^by as the lightning whose name he bore, attacked the Romans Hamilcar. whenever he chose, by sea or by land, in Italy or in Sicily. He laid waste the coasts of Bruttium and Lucania, and penetrated northwards as far as Cumse. No jDart of Sicily Avas secure from his attacks. His adventurous raids extended as far as Mount ^tna. When he returned from such expe- ditions he made the Romans feel his presence. The task of describing the almost uninterrupted fighting between the Romans and the Carthaginians before Panormus seemed to Polybius almost as impossible as to follow every blow, every parry, and every turn of two pugilists.^ The detail of such encounters escapes observation. It is only the bearing of the combatants in general and the result of which we become aware. Hamilcar, with his mercenaries, supported gloriously and successfully the unequal struggle with the Roman legions. The war thus waged by him was a prelude to the battles which his illustrious son was to fight on Italian soil. At length in the year 244 he left Hehcte unconquered, and chose a new battle-field in a ' Polybius, i. 57, § 1. XO'Z ROMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. SiifTcrings of the Roman allies. mucli more difficult situation on Mount Eryx, in tlie immediate neiglibourhood of Drepana.^ The reason for this change is not reported. Perhaps it may have been the precarious position of Drepana, which the Romans continued to besiege with increasing vigour. Close by Drepana, at the foot of the mountain, the Eomans had an intrenched camp. On the summit they held the temple of Yenus. Half way up the hill, on the slope to- wards Drepana, lay the ancient town of Eryx, demolished by the Carthaginians in the fifth year of the war,^ but now partly restored and converted into a Roman fortifica- tion. This post Hamilcar surprised and stormed in a night attack, and then took up a strong position between the Romans at the foot and those at the top of the moun- tain. He kept open his communication both with the sea and with the garrison at Drejpana, though on difficult roads. It is easy to conceive how dangerous such a position was in the midst of the enemy. Predatory excur- sions could hardly be undertaken from this point. Instead of gain and spoil the soldiers encountered dangers and privations ; the fidelity of the mercenaries again wavered, and they were on the point of betraying their position and surrendering to the Romans, when the watchfulness of Hamilcar anticipated their intentions and compelled them to fly to the Roman camp to escape his revenge. The Romans did what they had never done before. They took these Gallic troops as mercenaries into their X3ay.^ We need no other evidence to prove the extremity to which Rome was now reduced. The war now really began to undermine the Roman state. It is impossible to ascertain the weight of the burdens which fell upon the allies. Of their contri- butions and their services, their contingents for the army and the fleet, the Roma,n historians purposely tell • I'ol;yLiu.s, i. .'38, § 2. ' DiodoniB, xxiii. fr. 9. See abovo, p. GO. * After tlio war tliey got rifl of tliis liaiul. sent thorn out of Italy. — PolybiuH, ii. 7, § 10. They disarmed the men and THE FIEST rUNIC WAR. 103 US nothinof. But we know, without any such record, that CITAP, they furnished at least one-half of the land army, and . almost all the crews of the fleet. The thousands who J^^™ i^ERIOD, perished in the battles at sea and in the wrecks were, 248-241 B.c. state. for the most part, maritime allies {socii navales) who had been pressed into the Roman service. Nothing is more natural than that the extreme misery and horror of the hated and dreaded service should have excited them to resistance, which could only be quelled with great diffi- culty. What Italy suffered by the predatory incursions of the Carthaginians is beyond our calculation. But an idea of the losses which this war caused to Italy is given by the census of this time. While in the year 252 b.c. the number of Roman citizens was 297,797, it fell to 251,222 in the year 247 b.c., being reduced in five years by one-sixth. The prosperity of the people suffered in proportion. General The trade of Rome and of the maritime towns of Italy iJ/mentof was annihilated. The union of so many formerly in- the Roman dependent political communities into one large state, which, by putting down all internal wars seemed so likely to j)romote peaceful development and progress, involved them all in the long war with Carthage, and exposed them all alike to the same distress. One sign of this distress is the debasement of the coin. Before the war the old Roman As was stamped, or rather cast, full weight. Bvit by degrees it sank down to one-half, one-third, a quarter, and in the end to one-sixth of the original weight, so that a coin of two ounces in weight was sub- stituted, at least in name, for the original As of twelve ounces,' by which, of course, a proportionate reduction of ' Asses of the full -weight of twelve ounces have not been preserved. It is supposed that they were never struck of the full nominal value, to keep them from being melted down for other purposes, and to cover the cost of minting (Mommsen, Bom. Münzwesen, p. 261). It seems, however, that a very slight reduction from the full weight would have answered these purposes. If, therefore, Asses of eleven and even of nine ounces are called heavy or full Asses, the term is applicable only from the contrast of the later Asses, which ranged between five and a half and two ounces. It would seem that, in reality, 104 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. debts — in otlier words, a general bankruptcy — was caused. It was natural tliat in tbis gradually increasing poverty of tlie state, some individuals sbould become rieb. War bas always tbe effect of injuring general prosperity for tbe benefit of a few ; just as diseases, wbicb waste tbe body, often swell tbe growtb of one particular part. In war, certain brancbes of industry and trade flourisb. Ad- venturers, contractors, capitalists make tbeir most success- ful speculations. In antiquity, tbe booty of war constituted a source of great profit for a few, particularly because tbe prisoners were made slaves. Tbe armies, accordingly, were followed by a great number of traders wbo under- stood bow to turn tbe ignorance and recklessness of tbe soldiers to tbeir own advantage, in buying tbeir spoils and purcbasing slaves and articles of value at tbe auctions wbicb were beld from time to time. Anotber mode of acquiring wealtb called fortb by tbe war after tbe destruction of peaceful industry and trade was pri- vateering, a speculation involving risks, ^ like tbe slave trade and tbe blockade-running of modern times. Tbis kind of private enterprise bad tbe furtber advantage of injuring tbe enemy, and formed a naval reserve, de- stined at no distant period to be of tbe most important service. Tbe war in Sicily made no progress. Tbe siege of tionofiho Lilybseum, wbicb bad now continued for nine years, was '^''^^- car]'ied on witb considerably less energy since tbe failure of tbe first attack, and its object was plainly to keep tbe Cartbaginians in tbe town. Tbe lingering siege of Dre- pana was equally ineffectual. Tbe sea was free, and tbe garrisons of botb towns were tbus furnisbed witb all necessaries. It was not possible to dislodge Hamilcar from Mount Eryx. Tbe Roman consuls, wbo during tbe last six years of tbe war bad successively commanded in oven till) older Afisos of clcvon or nino ounces were minted in consequence of an intent i(jiial i-ediiction of tlie standard equivalent to a reduction of debts. ' Old PolypbcmuB says of pirates (Homer's Od)/ssri/, ix. 25-5) — J/UX'^' TTUfiOfyUtcut Kanuv aK\u5ano7(Ti (pfpofTis. Tedious THE FIKST PUNIC WAB. 105 Sicily, could boast of no success whicli miglit warrant them in claiming a triumph, in spite of the easy con- ditions on which this distinction might be obtained. At length the Eoman government determined to try the only means by which the war could be brought to an end, and once more to attack the Carthaginians ^!.";i^'';*'^'^ ' . ° . . of Caius by sea. The finances of the state were not in a condition Lutntius to furnish means for building and equipping a new fleet, ^-^^j^^ ^^^^ The Eomans therefore followed the example of Athens, and fleet to called up the richest citizens, in the ratio of their property, either to supply ships or to unite with others in doing so. The Roman historians were pleased to extol this manner of raising a new fleet as a sign of devotion and patriotism. It was, however, in reality only a compulsory loan, which the state imposed upon those who had sufiered least from the war, and had probably enjoyed great gains. The owners of privateers had the obligation and the means of supporting the state in the manner just described. A new fleet of two huudred ships was thus fitted out and sent to Sicily under the consul C. Lutatius Catulus in the year 242. The Carthaginians had not thought it necessary to main- tain a fleet in the Sicilian waters since the defeat of the Roman navy in the year 249. Their ships were otherwise engaged in the very lucrative piratical war on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Lutatius therefore found the harbour of Drepana unoccupied. He made some attacks on the town from the sea and the land side, but his chief energies were directed to the training and practising of his crews, thus avoiding the mistake by which the battle of Drepana was lost. He exercised his men during the whole of the summer, autumn, and winter in rowing, and took care that his pilots should be minutely acquainted with the nature of a coast singularly dangerous from its many shallows. Thus he anticipated with confidence a struggle which could no longer be delayed if Carthage did not wish to sacrifice her two fortresses on the coast. ^ ' Pulybius, i. ö9. Zonaras, viii. 17. 106 EOlVLiN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Defeat of the Car- thaginians at the ^gatian Islands. Negotia- tions for peace. The die was cast in March the following year (241). A Carthaginian fleet, heavily laden with provisions for the troops in Sicily, appeared near the ^gatian Islands. The object of the commander was to land the provisions, to take Hamilcar, with a body of soldiers, on board, and then to give battle to the Romans. This object was frustrated by the promptness of Catulus, who, although wounded, took part in the battle after having handed over the com- mand to the praetor Q. Valerius Falto. When the Cartha- ginians approached with full sail, favoured by a strong west wind, the Eoman ships advanced, and compelled them. to give battle. It was soon decided. A complete and brilliant victory crowned the last heroic exertions of the Romans. Fifty ships of the enemy were sunk, seventy were taken with their crews, amounting to 10,000 men ; the rest, favoured by a sudden change of wind, escaped to Carthage. The defeat of the Carthaginians was not so great as that of the Romans had been at Drepana. But Carthage was exhausted and discouraged. Perhaps she was alarmed by the premonitory signs of the terrible war with the mer- cenaries which soon after brought her to the very brink of ruin. Sicily had now been for several years as good as lost to the Carthaginians. The continuation of the war held out to them no prospect of winning back their former pos- sessions in that island. Carthage therefore decided on pro- posing terms of peace, and she might entertain the hope that Rome would be not less ready to bri'^g the Avar to a close. The negotiations were carried on by Hamilcar Barcas and the consul Lutatius as plenipotentiaries. At first the Romans insisted on dishonourable conditions. They demanded that the Carthaginians should \a,j down their arms, deliver up the deserters, and pass under the yoke. But Hamilcnr indignatly refused these terms, and declared he would riithcr die in battle than deliver up to the enemy the arms with which he was intrusted for the defence of his country. Lutatius therefore waived this claim, the more readily as ho wished to bring the negotiations speedily to an end, in order to secure for himself the credit THE FIEST PUNIC WAR. 107 of having brought the long war to a close. The prelimi- naries of peace were thus settled. Carthage engaged to evacuate Sicily ; not to make war upon Hiero of Syracuse ; to give up all Eoman prisoners without ransom, and to pay a sum of 2,200 talents in twenty years. On the whole the Roman senate and people approved of these terms. The formal conditions of the treaty involved the abandon- ment by Carthage of the smaller islands between Sicily and Italy (which was a matter of course), as well as the mutual obligation that each should refrain from attacking and injuring the allies of the other, or entering into an alliance with them ; but the war indemnity imposed on Carthage was raised by 1,000 talents, to be paid at once. Thus ended at length the war for the possession of Position of Sicily, which had lasted uninterruptedly for three-and- mans at twenty years, — the greatest struo^orle known to the ofenera- the close . . . . of the war. tion then living. The most beautiful island of the Mediterranean, the possession of which had been contested for centui-ies by Greeks and Punians, was wrested from them both by a people who till quite lately- had lain beyond the horizon of the civilised nations of the ancient world, which had exercised no influence on their political sj^stem and international dealings, and had never been even taken into account. Before the war with Pyrrhus, Rome was among the Mediterranean states of antiquity what Russia was in Europe before Peter the Great and the war with Charles XII. By her heroic and successful oi^position to the interference of Pyrrhus in the affairs of Italy, Rome emerged from obscurity, and made herself known to the rulers of Egypt, Macedonia, and Syria as a power with which they might soon have to deal. After the dej^arture of Pyrrhus (273 b.c.) an Egyptian Emiiassies embassy was sent to Rome, to offer, in the name of from King Ptolemy Philadelphus, a treaty of amity, which the ^»'"^'g" Roman senate willingly accepted.' About the same time ' Zonaras, viii. 6 : Kal YiroKi^alos 5e 6 4>iAd5eA(J)oj riv re Yli'p'pov kukw^ OJr;jAAo«dTa i-mOü-'V ical tous 'Pivju-aiovs av^ayojxfi/ovs Swpä t€ aiirols Tre^u-^e Kol 108 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK messengers came to Rome from Apollonia, a flourisliing v_ ^ ' Greek town on the Adriatic, perhaps for the same purpose. This was the time when the Greek world was opening- to the Uomans, when Greek art, lano-uaffe, and literature made their first entry into Italy — an event which sixteen centuries afterwards was to be followed by a second invasion of Greek learning. The Sicilian war was to a great extent a Greek war. For the first time all the western Greeks united in one great leajjue aerainst an ancient foe of the Hellenic name ; and ßome, which was at the head of this league, appeared to the Greeks in the mother countrj^, in Asia and Egypt, more and more as a new leading power whose friendship it was worth while to secure. No wonder that the history of this people began now to have the greatest possible interest for the Greeks, and that the first attempts of the Romans in writing history were made in the Greek language, and were intended for the Greek people. Changes in Vv''hile Rome, by the conquest of Sicily, gained, with tai-y iusti- regard to other powers, a position of importance and in- tutions of fluence, it became unmistakeably clear for the first time that old institutions, suited for a town community and for the simplicity of ancient life, were insufiicient for a more extended field of political and military operations. The Roman military system was organised for the defence of narrow boundaries, and not for aggressive warfare in distant parts. The universal duty of military service and the periodical formation of new armies, which was a con- sequence of it, had not appeared prejudicial in the wars with the Italian nations, who had the same institutions, and as long as the theatre of war was the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. When, however, it became no longer possible to dismiss every legion after the summer campaign, it was at once seen that a citizen army on the old plan had great military and economical disadvantages. The peasants, who were taken from their homesteads, grew 6iJ.o\oyiai> iiToi-l}(TaTo. Yuloriiis Muximus, iv. 3, 10; Livy, epit. 14; Dion Ciisaiuy, fr. 121. THE FIEST rUNIC WAR. 109 impatient of prolonged service, or if they were ordered into CHAP. B.c. distant countries like Africa.' It was necessary to steer , ,_: , a middle course, and to let at least one consular army F"th . KUIOD, return annually from Sicily to Rome.^ Only two legions 248-241 wintered regularly at the seat of war, to the great injury of military operations. Thus the time of service of the Roman soldiers was lengthened out to a year and a half. Even this for a continuance caused great difficulty. It was necessary to offer the soldiers some compensation for their long absence from home. This was effected in two ways, first by allowing them the spoils taken in war, and, secondly, by offering them a reward after the expiration of their time of service. The prospect of booty operated on them much as their pay influenced the mercenaries. It was a means for making the universal military service less onerous, for it could not fail to draw volunteers into the army.^ The granting of lands to veterans also served to render service in the legions less obnoxious. These military colonies, the traces of which are even now apparent,'' are not ' The same causes are in operation even now, and make it impossible in a country like England to introduce the conscription for military service. Englishmen will never submit to be forced into military service abroad, especially in the colonies. They acknowledge only the general obligation of defending their own country. For tlie same reason the French law of con- scription admits of substitutes. Even in France, the sons of the first families would not go to serve on compiulsion as common soldiers in Algiers or Cochin China. During the Crimean war, one-third of the men liable to be draughted paid for substitutes. In Germany, the universal obligation of serving in the army can be carried out only because Germany has no colonies and carries on no wars in distant parts. But even in Germany, the system, if tested by a long war, would probably break down ; and it is modified to a considerable extent by the law which enables young men of higher education to go through their military duties in a single year instead of tliree. * This appears to have been the rule, and it was applied even to the corps ■which was sent to Africa under Eegulus, * This had always been the practice. Eut it depended on the decision of the general whether the booty was to be given to the troops or to be reserved for the exigencies of the state. * According to Pliny {Hist. Nat. vii. 45), L. Metellus, the victor of Panormus, was once a member of a commission of fifteen men for the division of land (quindecimviri agris dandis). We do not know when this commission was appointed ; perhaps it was during the last years of the war. An extensive assignation of land to veteran soldiers took place after the end of the Hannibalian war. — Livy, xxxi. 41, 49. 110 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK IV. Constitu- tion of the Roman army. Evil of annually elected generals. therefore to be regarded as a symptom of tlie disorders of the state consequent upon the civil wars. They were a necessary result of the ßoman military system ; ^ and as long as there was unoccupied uncultivated land at the disposal of the state, such a measure, far from being hurtful, might even possess great advantages for the well- being of the state, as well as for the veterans.^ Considering the military training of the Roman soldiers, and the simplicity of the old tactics, the frequent change of the men in the legions was of less consequence than we might suppose, especially as the officers did not, as a matter of course, leave the service with the disbanded troops. When the rank and file were released from their military duty, the staff of the legion, it is true, did not remain ; but it was in the nature of things that the cen- turions and military tribunes of a disbanded legion should be for the most part chosen again to form a new one. The military service is for the common soldiers only a temporary duty, but it constitutes a j)rofession for the officers. The Roman centurion was the principal nerve of the legions, and for the most part repaired what the in- experience of the recruits and the want of skill in the commanders had spoilt. Regular promotion, according to merit, secured the continuance of the centurions in the army, and placed the most experienced of them at the head of the legion, as military tribunes. They were to the army what the paid clerks were to the civil magistrates — the embodiment of professional experience and the guardians of discipline. Such men were the more necessary as the Romans con- tinued the practice of annually changing their commanders- ' In a similar manner, in Prussia, and other countries wliere the Prussian militaiy system is adopted, the need is felt of providing civil employments for those soldiers who voluntarily serve in the army beyond the term fixed by law. These men form the staff of non-commissioned otiieors. They are eminently qualified for the lower prados of tlic; civil servic. ^ After tlie Crimean war tlic attempt was made by tlic Rritisli p;ovenimcnt to establish tlie (ierman Lci^ion as colonists in South Africa. The failure of this attempt docs not prove the system to be wrong. THE riRST PUNIC WAR. Ill in-chief. There was no greater obstacle to the military successes of the Romans than this system.^ It suited only the old time when the dimensions of the state were small. In the annual campaigns against the ^quians and the Volscians, which often lasted only a few weeks, a commander needed no especial military education. But in the Samnite wars, a perceptible lack of experieiice, and more particukirly of strategic skill, on the part of the consuls, delayed the victory for a long time. These defects were far more deeply felt in Sicily. Before a new commander had had time to become acquainted with the conditions of the task before him, even before he was on an intimate footing with his own troops, or knew what sort of enemy he had to oppose, the greatest part of his time of office had probably expired, and his successor might perhaps be on his way to relieve him. If, urged by a natural ambition, he sought to mark his consul- ship by some brilliant action, he was aj)t to plunge into de- sperate undertakings, and reaped disgrace and loss instead of the hoped-for victory. This was the inevitable result, even if the consuls elected were good generals and brave soldiers. But the issue of the elections was dependent on other conditions than the military qualities of the can- didates, and the frequent election of incapable officers was the inevitable result. Only when there was an urgent cause, the people of necessity elected experienced generals. Under ordinary circumstances, the struggle of parties, or the influence of this or that family, decided the election of consuls. The power of the nobility was fully established in the first Punic war. We find the same families re- peatedly in possession of the highest magistracies ; and the fact that military ability was not always requii"ed of a candidate is proved above all by the election of P. Claudius Pulcher, who, like most of the Claudians, seems to have been a man unworthy of high command. ' Zonaras, viii. 16 : ix^yicrrov yap ol 'Pcc/xalot (ffcpdWouTO, on Kar' iviavrhv &X\ovs eiÖ' (Tfpous apxovra? eireyUTroi', &pri 5e T^■|v (npaTr]yiav pLavQauovras TTjy o.pXf\s «TTOKOj', iiiffTTip (is a EOMAN HI8T0IIY. CHAPTEE IV. THE WAR OF THE MERCENARIES, 241-238 B.C. BOOK IV. Eerolt of the Car- thaginian iillies. Cause of As sometimes Hhe strongest men, wlien tliey liave strained every nerve and have kept up bravely in fighting against some threatening danger, succumb suddenly at last when calm and quiet are re-established, and seem doomed to perish from some internal suffering, so Carthage at the end of the long war with Eome was threatened by a much more serious evil than that which she had just gone through. The bad humours in the body of the state, no longer absorbed by exertion and activity, attacked the inner parts, and threatened sudden death. A mutiny of the mercenaries of Carthage, in connection with a revolt of all the allies and subjects, followed close on the Sicilian war. For more than three years there raged a fearful strife, accompanied by horrors which show that man can sink lower than the beasts. The cause of this war was the great weakness of the Carthaginian state, which, as we have seen, consisted in the want of a uniform popu- lation animated by the same sentiments. The mixture of races, over which Carthage ruled, felt only the increased burdens of the war with Rome, and not the patriotic en- thusiasm which lightens every sacrifice. A decisive victory on the side of Carthage might have inspired her subjects with the respect and fear which with them had to take the place of devoted attachment. But Carthage was conquered. She had, in the eyes of her subjects, lost the right to govern. It required but a slight cause to make the whole proud edifice of Carthaginian power totter to its foundation. This cause was the exhaustion of the Carthaginian m THE WAR OF THE MERCENARIES. 117 finances. When the mercenaries returned from Sicily, CHAT». and vainly looked for their overdue pay and the presents • ^ — - which had been promised to them, discontent and defiance ''^'^^--•^^ arose amono" them, and they made hig-lier and more ex- , travagant demands when they saw that Carthage was mutiny. not in a position to oppose them by force. It was now as difficult to pacify' them as to bring them back to obe- dience. Oj^en rebellion broke out, the mutineers and the allies' made common cause together, and in a short time all the towns of Libya were in revolt. Utica and Hippo Zaritas alone remained faithful. Tunes was in the hands of the mutineers, who were commanded by the Libyan Matho, by the Campanian Spendius, and by the Gaul Autaritus. The general Hanno, who as their favourite had been selected by the mercenaries as umpire to decide the quarrel, was taken prisoner and detained as hostage. Carthage was surrounded by her numerous enemies, and seemed hopelessly lost. But the spirit of the Carthagi- nian population now rose. An army was formed from the citizens and those mercenaries who had remained faithful, and Hamilcar Barcas took the command. The superiority of a true general over such chiefs as Matho and Spendius soon became apparent. The mutineers, although rein- forced, according to report, by 70,000 Libyans and Numi- dians, were surprised and defeated again and again. Hamilcar tried clemency. He only demanded a promise from the prisoners not to make war upon Carthage, and then set them free. But the leaders of the mutineers, fearing a universal rebellion among their accomplices, decided on rendering peace with Carthage impossible by ' It is not at all likely that the towns subject to Carthage were in an enviable position. It was the general practice in antiquity, and even in modern times down to a recent period, for a governing country to treat dependencies and colonies as inferiors, and to aim chiefly at deriving from them the largest possible profit. If the Carthaginians, as is reported (Appian, v. 3), caused 3,000 of their subjects, who had joined Regulus, to be crucified, it seems natural that the Libj-ans should now make common cause with the mutinous soldiers. There seems to be, however, no sufficient ground for charging the Carthaginians with unusual and exceptional cruelty (Mommsen, Höm. Gesch., i. 547). 118 EOMAN HISTORY. BOOK an act of barbarous treacbery. Tbej caused tbe im- — / _^ prisoned Hanno and seven bundred Cartbaginians to die a cruel deatb, and even refused to give up tbe bodies for buriaL Tbe war bad now assumed its real cbaracter,^ and only tbe complete overtbrow of tbe one or of tbe otber party could put an end to it. Suppres- Cartbage was indebted for its deliverance out of all mutiny. tbis trouble to Hamilcar Barcas. Inspired by bis per- sonal qualities and tbe renown of bis name, a Numidian cbief called Naravas, witli some tbousands of borse- men, went over to bis side. Tbe enemy was beaten many times, tbousands of prisoners were tbrown under tbe elepbants and trodden to deatb ; and tbeir leaders, Spendius and Autaritus, were nailed to tbe cross. Al- tbougb tbe war was not uniformly successful ; altbougb Hippo, and even Utica, tbe oldest and most faitbful ally of Cartbage, revolted ; altbougb a fleet witb pro- visions was destroyed by a storm, wbile on tbe way from tbe coast of tbe EmporiEe to Cartbage ; altbougb, in consequence of a dispute between Hamilcar and Hanno tbe second in command, tbe enemies recovered tbem- selves, and in a sally from Tunes defeated Hannibal, a lieutenant of Hamilcar, took bim prisoner, and nailed bim to tbe same cross on wbicb Spendius bad ended bis life ; yet tbe vvbole rebellion gradually collapsed, and after a reconciliation bad taken place between Hamilcar and Hanno at tbe instance of tbe senate, Cartbage soon gained tbe ascendancy, and stifled all furtber revolt in tbe blood of tbe mutineers. Tbe Libyan towns submitted again, and Cartbage was perbaps wise enougb^ not to punisb tbe misguided masses for tbe crimes of tbe ring- leaders. Even Hippo and Utica, wbicb bad marked their revolt by tbe massacre of tbe Cartbaginian garrison, seem to bavc received mild conditions. Cartbage was once again iiilcr in Africa. Conduct of TIjc coiiduct of ibo Romans in tbis war is one of tbe ' It, lioranif, in the (cniiH of Polyljiti.s (i. 6.'), § 6), a ir6\(ij.os &(nrovSos. ' rolybiua cIoch not .state how the revolted towns were treated. THE AVAE OF THE MERCEN.iEIES. 119 greatest stains on their history. The conditions of peace which had terminated the SiciHan war had not been equal to their expectations. They had tried to get more out of the Carthaginians, but were obliged to content them- selves with raising the contribution of war by 1,000 talents. There was now an opportunity of repairing their neglect, and Rome was not slow in making use of this opportunity. The Roman senate seems to have thought it unnecessary to interfere and to take part in the war of the mercenaries. It was enough to assist the rebels with the requisites of war. This was done by mercantile adventurers. Perhaps the Roman officials, even if they had wished it, would have found it difficult to prevent the sailing of ships which had provisions on board for the enemies of Carthage. But what view the senate took of such private speculations we shall soon see. A great number of blockade-runners ^ were captured by the Carthaginians. Rome had no plea or justification for intercediiig on behalf of these people. Nevertheless she did so, and there was nothing left for Carthage to do in her difficulty but to set the prisoners free. In acknowledgment of this the Roman senate gave up all the Carthaginian prisoners who were still in Italy,^ and allowed its subjects in future to send the necessaries of war only to the Carthaginians, not to their enemies — a concession which one would suppose was a matter of course. It was expected that if Carthage had opposed the de- mands of Rome for the release of the blockade-breakers, the Romans would at once have declared war. Carthage yielded, and the Romans were thus debarred from fol- lowing up their hostile policy ; they were even obliged to permit their friend and ally King Hiero of Syracuse to come forward of his own accord to the assistance of the Carthaginians. This wise statesman ^ saw plainly that the Carthaginians, after their expulsion from Sicily, were no longer his natural enemies — that they were on the contrary ' Polybius, i. 83, § 7, states that there were 500. - Polybius, i. 83, § 8. ^ Polybius, i. 83, § 3 ; vduv (ppovijxtas Ka\ vowex^^ KoyiCofiivoi. 120 ROMAN HISTORY. EOOK IV. Revolt of the Car- thaginian mercen- aries in Sardinia. able to render Lim tlie most valuable services by keeping in cbeck to some extent the excessive power of Rome. He therefore supported them with necessaries at a time when the mutineers blockaded Carthage by land and all sup- plies were cut off. Perhaps he also sent troops or allowed the Carthaginians to enlist mercenaries in his kingdom/ and his aid doubtless contributed materially to the final overthrow of the rebels. But while the insurrection was still raging in Africa, the Carthaginian mercenaries in Sardinia had imitated the example of their comrades, had murdered their officers, and had taken possession of the island. Unable to keep their position among the natives, they sought aid from Kome. At first, as it is said, the Romans resisted this temptation ; they disdained to unite themselves with the mutinous troo]3S, and to make use of the momentary dis- tress of Carthage for violating the conditions of peace which they had just sworn to observe. But when Car- thage came out victorious from the doubtful struggle, the old jealousy of the Romans revived, and they decided to take the mutinous mercenaries of Sardinia under their protection. Roman politicians justified themselves pro- bably W'ith the sophistry that Sardinia no longer belonged to Carthage, since Carthaginian authority in the island had come to an end, and there was no longer a Carthaginian garrison in it. War therefore was not carried on against Carthage, when the island was taken, but against the Sardinian natives, who were now an independent nation. But Carthage protested against this view of the case, and made preparations for the reduction of the revolted island. The Romans now openly declared their intentions. They interpreted the Carthaginian armaments as a menace of ' 'riii.s is prohably tho extent of the concession reported by Appian, v. 3 : koI ^fyo\uyiav iK t^s 'ItoA(os h fi6vov tJj/S« rhv irdKifjLOV i-airp«\iav. — Appian, viii. 5. No inor(! Iliiin lliis is implied by /onaras, viii. 17: «aJ fnffdo(p6povs 6k rrjs oiKflas av^fiaxl^o! alnols iiraya-yfcrOat 4TrfTpf\pav. Tlie Romans could never liavo allowi'd any forcipn jiower, least of all the Carthaginians, to raise troops in tiicir own inmicdialc dominions in Italy, tand this was expressly stipulated in tho treaty of peace.— I'oiybius, iii. 27, § 4 ; Appian, viii. 5. Tin-: WAE, OF THE MEECENAEIES. 121 war and complained of the interruption of Italian com- CHAP. merce by Cartliaginian cruisers. . ^ , These complaints probably show that smuggling and 211-238 B.c. the blockade-running of Italian traders had not been . Interfor- discontinued, in spite of the promise of Rome. ' For Car- ence of the tliage there was left no choice, but either to enfrafje in a ^"'":^°.^ ^'^ ° _ ' . . bardima. war with Rome, or to agree to such conditions as Rome, in contempt of all justice and relying on her superior power, thought fit to propose. Carthage was too much exhausted to take the former alternative. She vvas obliaed to purchase peace by resigning Sardinia, and by the pay- ment of twelve hundred talents. Thus did the Romans of the old time show, as Sallust remarks in tones of praise, ' that they understood how to restrain their passions, and listened to the demands of right and justice ; that especi- ally in the Punic wars, in spite of the repeated treachery of the Carthaginians, they never allowed themselves to act in a similar way, and were alone guided in their actions by a sense of what was worthy of them.' ^ The revolting treatment of her humbled rival was an Surrender evil seed destined to spring up soon in a luxuriant croj), to 'the' ""'^ and to bear as its fatal fruit the devastation of Ital}^ in the -Romans. Hannibalian war. The bitterness of soul with which the noble Hamilcar submitted indignantl}^ to unjustifiable wrong explains the inextinguishable hatred of Rome which he cherished as long as he lived, and bequeathed as a sacred trust to his great son Hannibal.^ For the present ' According to Appian (viii. 5), the Carthaginians took Eoman merchant vessels and drowned the crews to escape detection. If there is any trutli in this statement, the merchant vessels so treated must have carried supplies to the rebels or attempted to run the blockade. But in their present helpless condition, the Carthaginians, unless they were demented, could not have committed acts so foolish and so calculated to give the Eomans provocation for war. * Sallust, Catil., 51. Very different is the opinion of Polybius (iii. 28), who says that iw the proceedings of the Ilomans, ovn ir^oipaaiv ovt airiav evpot TIS tiv ivXoyov aW' bixoXoyovfiivus rovs Kapxri^oviovs rjvayKaa^ivovs wapä, Travra r a SlKaia Sia rhv Kaiphv iKXo^os ovtws Kal roiircji T^rpdircj} StecpOdpT]' iram fiev ''IraMcaTais, /xaAicrra 5e 'Pwfxalois, fxeyau Kal