1?V *> 
 

(Eamfmtrge historical Series 
 
 EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LlTT.D. 
 
 HONORARY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
 AND PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. 
 
 THE 
 
 UNION OF ITALY 
 
 (1815-1895) 
 
HonUon : C. J. CLAY and SONS, 
 
 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, 
 
 AVE MARIA LANE. 
 
 ffilaafloto: 263, ARGYLE STREET. 
 
 ItmiQl F. A. BROCKHAUS. 
 
 #tto gotfe: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Bombast E. SEYMOUR HALE. 
 
T 
 THE 
 
 UNION OF ITALY 
 
 1815— 1895 
 
 BY 
 
 W. J. STILLMAN 
 L.H.D. (Concordia) 
 
 LATE CORRESPONDENT TO "THE TIMES " IN ROME; 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE CRETAN INSURRECTION OF 1866, 
 
 AND OF " HERZEGOVINA AND THE LATE UPRISING." 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 1898 
 
 [All Rights reserved] 
 
UonUon : C. J. CLAY and SONS, 
 
 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, 
 
 AVE MARIA LANE. 
 
 ffilaagoto: 263, ARGYLE STREET. 
 
 iMjjjig: F. A. BROCKHAUS. 
 
 £«to ?fork: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 JSomfaag: E. SEYMOUR HALE. 
 
r 
 
 THE 
 
 UNION OF ITALY 
 
 1815— 1895 
 
 BY 
 
 W. J. STILLMAN 
 L.H.D. (Concordia) 
 
 LATE CORRESPONDENT TO "THE TIMES " IN ROME; 
 
 AUTHOR OF "THE CRETAN INSURRECTION OF l866,' 
 
 AND OF " HERZEGOVINA AND THE LATE UPRISING." 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 1898 
 
 [All Rights reserved} 
 
3> 
 
 *** 
 
 csr 
 
 GENERAL PREFACE. 
 
 The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern 
 Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about 
 the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one 
 or two cases the story will commence at an earlier date : in the 
 case of the colonies it will usually begin later. The histories 
 of the differe?it countries will be described, as a general rule, 
 separately, for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the 
 French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection of events will 
 thus be better understood and the continuity of historical develop- 
 ment more clearly displayed. 
 
 The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to 
 understand the nature of existing political conditions. " The roots 
 of the present lie deep in the past" and the real significance of 
 cojitemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes 
 which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes 
 it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in 
 cofisiderable detail, and to embody the most important results of 
 ?nodern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will 
 be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already 
 acquired some general knowledge of European History. For 
 those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography 
 appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources 
 of information and works more detailed and authoritative. 
 
 Considerable attefition will be paid to political geography, 
 and each volume will be furnished with such maps and plans 
 as may be requisite for the illustration of the text. 
 
 G. W. PROTHERO. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 IF the conclusions respecting the political position and 
 tendencies of the Kingdom of Italy, to which the author 
 of the following pages has been led, differ from those which in 
 the main are held by his English readers, he may adduce in 
 support of a somewhat pessimistic judgment, that it has not 
 been formed under the influence of any prejudice, or in 
 ignorance of any evidence that may be adduced by those who 
 hold opposite opinions. From boyhood a romantic lover of 
 Italy, he went thither in 1861, with the most exalted and 
 confident anticipations of the future of the Italian people, just 
 when unity, so long craved as a panacea for all the troubles 
 of division, was practically attained; and during subsequent 
 years there has been no long interval in which he was not 
 intimately conversant with the course of events. Nor does 
 the author's pessimism extend to the character of the people 
 of the peninsula in general, or affect his opinion of the many 
 sterling qualities of the race, in which are included all those 
 necessary for the realization of the ideals of its most sanguine 
 patriots. If, in his judgment, the present state of Italy is a 
 disappointment to hopes founded on the exalted patriotism 
 of the men who by suffering and self-immolation opened 
 the way to liberty and unity, and whose lives are unsurpassed 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 Tivaroni's book which relates to the period subsequent to 
 i860 was not published when the pages of this work which 
 bear upon it were being written: on this part of the subject 
 the author had to depend on personal knowledge of e#?nts, 
 on works such as those of Corsi and Sorin, and on public 
 documents and the files of contemporary journals. To the 
 contemporary records of Signora Jessie White Mario, Italian 
 history owes a debt not to be overestimated. Finally the 
 author has to acknowledge a great indebtedness to the Editor 
 of the series, to whom the arrangement of his subject, and 
 many emendations and additions are due. 
 
 W. J. STILLMAN. 
 Rome, May 1898. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Chap. I. Vittorio Emmanuele I 5 
 
 „ II. The Rising of 1821 16 
 
 „ III. Carlo Felice and the Repression : Suc- 
 cession of Carlo Alberto and the 
 
 Revival 41 
 
 „ IV. The Two Sicilies, 1815— 1847 ... 56 
 
 (1) Naples 57 
 
 (2) Sicily 75 
 
 ,, V. Northern and Central Italy, 1815 — 1847 86 
 
 (1) Lombardy and Venetia ... 86 
 
 (2) Parma, Modena and Tuscany . . 98 
 
 (3) The Papal States .... 108 
 ., VI. Literary Forerunners of the Italian 
 
 Revival 119 
 
 ,, VII. Northern Italy, 1847— 1848 . . .131 
 
 (1) Piedmont and Austria . . . 131 
 (a) The Five Days in Milan . . .141 
 
 (3) Venice 153 
 
 „ VIII. The War with Austria, 1848—1849 . .156 
 
 (1) Goito, Santa Lucia and Curtatone . 156 
 
 (2) Diplomacy 163 
 
 (3) Custozza 170 
 
 (4) The Armistice 175 
 
 (5) Novara 180 
 
 (6) Lombardy and Venice . . .184 
 
 „ IX. Central Italy, 1847 — 1849 I 9 I 
 
 (1) Tuscany 191 
 
 (2) Parma and Modena . . . . 195 
 
 (3) Rome 197 
 
Contents. 
 
 Chap. X. 
 
 Southern Italy, 1847— 1849 
 
 (1) Naples 
 
 (1) Sicily ...'... 
 
 PAGE 
 208 
 208 
 212 
 
 N XI. 
 
 Northern Italy, 1849—1858 
 
 (1) Vittorio Emanuele II . 
 
 (2) Cavour 
 
 (3) The Crimean War 
 
 (4) Lombardy and Venice 
 
 242 
 242 
 252 
 259 
 262 
 
 / 
 281 
 
 M XII. 
 
 The War of 1859 AND ITS Results 
 
 
 (1) Magenta and Solferino 
 
 (2) Villafranca .... 
 
 (3) Annexation of Central Italy 
 
 (4) Conquest of Sicily and Naples . 
 
 . 281 
 291 
 
 • 297 
 3<>9 
 
 „ XIII. 
 
 The Completion of Italy, 1861— 1870 
 
 326 
 
 
 (1) Aspromonte .... 
 
 (2) The War of 1866 
 
 (3) Mentana 
 
 (4) The Roman Question . 
 
 (5) The Occupation of Rome . 
 
 326 
 33i 
 340 
 344 
 349 
 
 » XIV. 
 
 Parliamentary Italy, 1871— 1886 
 
 359 
 
 
 (1) The Right in power, 187 1 — 1876 
 
 (2) The Monarchical Left, 1876— 1886 . 
 
 359 
 366 
 
 „ XV. 
 
 Disorganization 
 
 380 
 
 
 Bibliography 
 
 395 
 
 
 Index 
 
 406 
 
 
 Maps. At end. 1. (a) Italy 1815— 1859. 
 {!>) „ 1861— 1866. 
 (c) „ 1866— 1870. 
 
 
 
 2. Northern Italy. 
 
 
 CORRIGENDA. 
 
 p. 233, 1. 6 from foot, for Prince of Genoa read Duke of Genoa, 
 p. 332, 1. 4, for 1894 read 1864. 
 
V* OF THE ' r 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 ITALY. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The most important problems of European politics have 
 been largely connected with Italy, ever since the northern 
 tribes found their way across the Alps to its fertility and sun- 
 shine. The early developments of its fire-and-sword wrought 
 civilization belong to archaeology and ancient history, but 
 there is in the period of which the following pages are a 
 condensed record, one phase of the struggle for the domination 
 of Italy which has a peculiar interest for the English reader. 
 It is that in which the British power, having led the forces 
 of Europe to th e overthrow of N apoleon, began to repair the 
 ravage his conquests and invasions had wrought, by the pro- 
 motion of that constitutional liberty which the imperial ex- 
 perience of British statesmen had found to be the only barrier 
 against similar convulsions. For though Napoleon had left 
 the field of action, all the moral and material forces which 
 he had so long and successfully employed were still ready 
 to the hand of another possible master. The Revolution, 
 which had prepared them for him, had entered into the blood 
 of Europe, and especially into that of Italy, where his action 
 had been most thorough. Perhaps no task was ever under- 
 taken by any government, more difficult than that which lay 
 before the rulers of England, to check the progress of anarchy, 
 and yet foster the real interests of constitutional government, 
 s. I. i 
 
2 Italy. 
 
 The circumstances in which we live do not permit us to judge 
 fairly of the difficulties thus encountered. We are too much 
 in the habit of regarding the conservative British aristocracy — 
 at that time the most potent influence in the direction of 
 European affairs — as sympathetic with absolutism, forgetting 
 that the only example of popular liberty then known to 
 Europe had filled it with blood and ruins, and that the 
 European populations were in a state of political ignorance. 
 It was this ignorance which had made the French revolution 
 possible, and which made it necessary to guard against the 
 uncontrolled extension of political liberty in the interest of 
 liberty itself. 
 
 And England was the only power in a position to undertake 
 this work. Russia could hardly be considered an European 
 country in the sense of being interested in the task, and her 
 armies had only been the brute instruments of the conservative 
 powers in repelling an unmitigated oppression which menaced 
 every section of the existing order of things in the old world. 
 Prussia was relatively a small and weak power; conservative 
 France was paralysed for all good, and helpless ; Austria alone 
 offered valid support in carrying out any scheme of civic 
 restoration. Austria was, moreover the pjily_power -with which 
 Engla nd came into con tact in the solution of the problem of 
 what To do with Italy, the country whichTIymg betweejTFrance 
 and ^slna^^waTdestined to be the battle-field of their rivalries, 
 or the ally of one against the other. The problem was com- 
 plicated by - two consideratiojis^_yjz._that France, England's 
 hereditary enemy , had_ jfrorn^ time immemorial shown a deter- 
 mination~To absorb Italy or reduce it to the condition of a 
 vassal pro vince; aW^hat7~whfle an y addition to tiie_j)ower 
 of France was a matter of vitallmportance to England, all the 
 rulers of Francelrom Richelieu downward, had considered the 
 erection-of fteiyTnto^^trorig~alid united naUQ^asLa_jneiiace 
 to~TTe nc~h predominance ^ Unquestionably there was so much 
 oTselfinterest in The friendship which England, from the first, 
 
Introduction. 3 
 
 has shown towards the progress and prosperity of Italy. This 
 friendship has been somewhat influenced by the necessity of 
 maintaining the best relations with Austria, but national 
 politics are necessarily conducted on those lines. Sound 
 statesmanship is careful of permitting sentimental motives to 
 control international dealings, but even these were not absent 
 from the sympathy which a large majority of Englishmen, 
 official and private, have always shown for Italian emancipation. 
 
 While English sentiment and policy always favoured that 
 emancipation, those of France have as constantly operated for 
 Italian subjection. In the duel over the shaping of Italian 
 institutions which began in 181 5 and which has not yet been 
 fought out, the maintenance of good relations with Austria 
 was indispensable to the success of England. In none of the 
 difficult problems which British statecraft has had to solve has 
 greater mastery of its difficulties been needed or shown, than in 
 this, of baffling the constant efforts of France to reduce Italy 
 to subjection, diplomatic or military, and of keeping touch with 
 Austria while urging the progressive liberation and constitutional 
 evolution of Italy. If in this work the statesmen of England 
 differed, and in differing more or less, approved or opposed the 
 methods of government of Austria, there is no ground for 
 surprise. There was always before them the terrible lesson of 
 liberty carried to excess. For us, with the problem worked 
 out before our eyes, it is easy to see what might have been, 
 had statesmen possessed the gift of prescience. But the Italian 
 proverb — "Of the wisdom of yesterday, the ditches are full" — 
 can never be better applied than here. 
 
 Taking into account all the conditions of time, growth and 
 circumstance, no one has a right to say that England could 
 have done more to , show her sympathy for the healthy liberty 
 'of Italy than she did from 181 2, when she gave a constitution 
 to Sicily, to the year 1882, when she invited Italy to join her 
 in the control and civilization of Egypt. Her pressure was 
 constant on Austria in the disastrous years of 1848-9, to induce 
 
4 Italy. 
 
 the Emperors of Austria to develop gradually the free institu- 
 tions which the people could wisely use. But it is in entire 
 consonance with the conditions I have above pointed out, 
 that, while she never relaxed her urgency to that end, she as 
 invariably opposed any tendency which should render Italy 
 more subject to France. It was a sound apprehension, growing 
 out of the perception of the danger of French friendship, that 
 led her to oppose those tendencies of Cavour which ended in 
 the war of 1859 and the emancipation of Lombardy. And, 
 studying the problem as worked out, with no personal interest 
 in the question, and certainly no partiality for Austria, I am 
 profoundly convinced that most of the morbid conditions of 
 current Italian politics are due to the germs planted in the 
 national constitution by that initial mistake. On that occasion 
 Italy was betrayed, as English statesmen anticipated, by her 
 ally, as she always has been, and always will be, because the 
 real strength and independence of the Italian nation are 
 obstacles to French ambition. It might have been better for 
 Italy to wait many more generations in order to fulfil the 
 prophecy, Italia fara da se, than to be helped a step by 
 France. One of the wisest of Italian patriots once said to me, 
 " Italy was made too quickly and too easily." 
 
 If the following pages do not insist more strongly on this 
 central lesson of Italian history, it is because the continual 
 repetition of the moral of a story is wearisome, and is indeed 
 useless when one has read the story itself. The wisdom of 
 England's constant friendship for Austria is shown, it seems to 
 me, by the present position of Italy in the Triple Alliance, 
 which, if not the ideal league it was planned to be, has at least 
 displayed Austria, so long the scourge of Italy, as her constant, 
 and on the Continent her only constant, friend, and after 
 England her wisest and firmest. Studied in this light the 
 history of the Kingdom of Italy becomes one of the most 
 interesting examples of national evolution, of which political 
 philosophy can take account. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 VITTORIO EMMANUELE I. 
 
 There can be no question that at the conclusion of the 
 Napoleonic wars Italy was in fact a " diplomatic expression." 
 Any conception of the unity of Italians as a nation was only to 
 be found in rare and enlightened individuals. Napoleon had 
 left the country deprived of its youth, of its energy, but also 
 of a great many of its ancient prejudices, and had succeeded 
 in demolishing many ancient traditions without laying the 
 foundations of the new edifice. The Lombards hated the 
 Neapolitans as the Tuscans did the Piedmontese ; Sicily was 
 a nation apart by race and history, and had been given during 
 the English protectorate in 1812 a brief term of constitutional 
 government which left reminiscences rather than habits; all 
 else had been exposed to despotic government without any 
 trace of constitutionalism 1 , and Piedmont alone seemed to 
 have developed any trace of that national character which 
 was to become the basis of Italian nationality. The French 
 had made themselves detested to such an extent through the 
 barbarities and exhaustive policy of Napoleon, that even the 
 Austrians were accepted in northern Italy as saviours. But 
 
 1 The Republics of Venice and Genoa could hardly be considered 
 constitutional governments in the true sense of the word, and they were 
 to the last anti-Italian. 
 
6 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the French regime through the whole peninsula had pretty 
 thoroughly demolished the popular traditions of reverence 
 for the "legitimate" rulers. 
 
 In _E iedinont circumstances were fortunate for the be- 
 ginnings of the new nation. Conservative in character, in- 
 dependent, attached to its own institutions, Piedmont had, 
 undoubtedly, resisted better the invasion of Napoleonic 
 influences than any other part of Italy, and formed a fixed 
 point to which it was possible for the other loose elements of 
 Italian nationality sooner or later to gravitate.. King Vittorio 
 Emmanuele I, a character rather feeble than vigorous, without 
 great intelligence and disposed to despotic government, had 
 nevertheless a keen sense of the importance of his dynasty 
 and a strong repugnance to the influences which had been 
 left behind by the French. He was easily persuaded to efface 
 everything that remained of the French domination. He 
 abolished the Code Napoleon, annulled all the legislation 
 for the administration of the country, and went back to the 
 general conditions of government in 1790. He destroyed en- ^ 
 tirely the French system of administrative magistracy and of - y 
 military organization, and even went to the excess of dis- 
 missing from official employment the functionaries who had 
 been employed under the French administration. 
 
 The first step toward the union of the states of Italy 
 into one nation was the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont. 
 At the same time there were negotiations, leading rather to 
 moral than political results, for the annexation of Lombardy 
 to the new kingdom. The annexation of Genoa was how- 
 ever the only indication, at the beginning of the career of the 
 officially recognised Piedmont, of the agglomeration which 
 has since become the kingdom of Italy. The conservatives, 
 even in Piedmont, distrusted the unitarian spirit to such an 
 extent that the most conservative Piedmontese regarded it 
 as revolutionary. Bersezio says that Piedmont was so little 
 united in habits to the rest of Italy, " that by the great mass 
 
i.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. J 
 
 of people it was not even known that they were Italians." 
 One of the most intelligent and original Italians of that day, 
 Count de Maistre, had written from St Petersburg, " Cultivate 
 the Italian tendencies ; they are born of the revolution! Your 
 method of proceeding — timid, neutral, suspensive, balancing — 
 is destructive. Let the King make himself head of the Italians ; 
 let him call to all the civil and military employments, and even 
 to those in his court, people of revolutionary tendencies, 
 even those who are prejudiced. This is vital, essential ; words 
 fail me, but this is my last word, my last expression : if we 
 stand uncertain and become an obstacle, — requiem eternam." 
 But the King was not a man to listen to such bold counsel. 
 The Piedmontese Minister in London urged on Lord Castle- 
 reagh the union of Lombardy with the duchies of central Italy 
 as a step towards the formation of an Italian group separating 
 lower Italy from Austrian influence ; and the Italians residing 
 in London, forerunners of the exiles of '48, had sent agents 
 into Italy to agitate for the accession of Lombardy to Piedmont. 
 Vittorio Emmanuele would have willingly accepted the en- 
 largement of his state as far as the Mincio, sacrificing to such 
 a result even the legitimacy of the royal line, but he was 
 unwilling to give a constitution. He hated the Germans and 
 desired to remove them out of Italy, but rather because he 
 ^desired to be master in his own house than because he hated 
 despotism. The treaty of Paris of 1814 had assigned to 
 Piedmont, Sayoyy-- Genoa and Nice, which satisfied the am- 
 bitions of the King, although he had by the treaty lost 
 Annecy. 
 
 Nor was the annexation to Piedmont better received by 
 the Genoese. That ancient republic, although it suffered from 
 the French domination, reconciled itself with great diffi- 
 culty to the annexation to Piedmont, and received the new 
 administration with repugnance and even hostility. The people 
 refused to be assimilated to the Piedmontese and the most 
 conspicuous members of the aristocracy declined to recognize 
 
8 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the Piedmontese administration, retiring to their villas, and 
 withdrawing from public life until the revolutionary epoch in 
 1848. A revolutionary committee was formed in Genoa in 
 which an aspiration for Italian unity was, curiously enough, 
 coupled with revolt from Piedmont. 
 
 'I The Queen of Vittorio Emmanuele, Maria Teresa of 
 Austria, played an important part in the politics of the period. 
 Personally attractive, with great vivacity and intelligence, she 
 returned to her kingdom from the exile of Sardinia, her 
 despotic tendencies intensified, and a sentiment of royal im- 
 portance exaggerated. She re-established in greater magni- 
 ficence the forms and ceremonies of royalty — chamberlains, 
 masters of the royal house, grandees of the court — as if Pied- 
 mont were a great empire; and added her influence to the 
 series of arbitrary measures which marked the period of the 
 first years of the reign of Vittorio Emmanuele I. 
 
 The restoration of the court proved the restoration of the 
 old system of public corruption, and perversion of justice ; 
 titles, privileges, charges at court, decisions of the magistrates, 
 became the property of an aristocracy ruined by the past 
 I vicissitude s of the national life, while measures adopted for the 
 enforced liquidation of the debts of the state were turned to 
 the profit of the favoured classes. The Minister of Finance, 
 Gian Carlo Brignole of Genoa, issued a decree of liquidation 
 of the state debt, which, taken together with the general sus- 
 pension of payments and rumours of failures, produced a 
 great reduction in the value of the public funds. People in 
 the intelligence of the court were best enabled to acquire the 
 bonds at low prices, and it is even said that the Queen herself 
 shared in these speculations. The legal transactions which had 
 taken place under the French administration were declared 
 null and void. The royal authority, by annulling contracts 
 made under the French administration, and authorizing debtors 
 to refuse to pay their debts, disturbed the entire system of 
 credit. Against the remonstrances of wiser counsellors the 
 
</ 
 
 / 
 
 i.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. 9 
 
 4 
 
 King had been persuaded by his advisers that, as everything in 
 the state belonged to him in his sovereign quality, so even the 
 private affairs of his subjects were under his control. *f 
 
 Ecclesiastical relations played again an important part in 
 the state policy. The tendencies of the King had always been 
 strongly clerical, and the privileges of the Church, destroyed by 
 the revolution, were restored with usury. The clergy had always 
 been a secondary support to the throne and the King had 
 no intention of allowing the injuries inflicted by the revolution 
 to remain. All the public edifices which had been confiscated 
 by the French, with the convents, gardens and lands, were 
 restored to the Church, as well as the direction of the schools. 
 The privileges of the Jesuits were restored, and in the years 
 1816 and 1817 the Church returned substantially to its original 
 condition in Piedmont. Colleges, hospitals and other benefi- 
 cent institutions were turned into convents and monasteries; 
 and the Jesuits resumed absolute control over public instruc- 
 tion in Piedmont. The current conception of educational 
 requirements during this period is thus given by Bersezio. 
 Two years of elementary instruction in which the scholar learned 
 to read, to write and to know numbers were sufficient for the 
 people. A priest was always the schoolmaster, and in the 
 provinces the scholars left the school knowing scarcely how 
 to read print and to write badly their own names. The 
 supreme director of the schools was the parish priest. For 
 the children of the middle classes, six years in Turin, four 
 years in the provinces, of instruction in literature and rhetoric, 
 in which the Latin language, arithmetic in the first four opera- 
 tions, a little knowledge of geography, some notion of philosophy 
 and the history of the House of Savoy, were all that was im- 
 parted. Neither modern languages nor art was included. A 
 single teacher for each class, himself not very wise ; the method 
 of instruction, rod for the back and rulers for the fingers. After 
 this came two years of philosophy, logic, ethics, natural history, 
 geometry, physics, ancient history and a little Greek. Of these 
 
io Italy. [Chap. 
 
 schools, the supreme direction was in the hands of the bishops. 
 Priests and friars were everywhere in the secondary schools 
 and in the university. There was no chair of the philosophy 
 of history, of the philosophy of law, of comparative philology 
 or political economy. The lecture-rooms were miserable, 
 scarcely tolerable. Clinical instruction was considered of 
 no importance ; the sanitation was under the clergy ; great 
 favouritism in examinations was shown, so that those who 
 did not pass in the University of Turin were sure to be passed 
 at Genoa. The students were not permitted to enter a billiard- 
 room or a cafe" or to be present at any public spectacle, and 
 they were compelled to retire at nightfall. Teachers were 
 treated in the same manner ; they were even obliged to present 
 their certificates of pastoral communion, and the secondary 
 professors were obliged to wear the priestly garments and be 
 under the orders of the bishops and parish priests. 
 
 The deadening influence of absolutism, reinforced by the 
 system of education of the Jesuits, paralyzed all scientific as 
 well as literary study. The academy of sciences, reconstituted 
 under ancient regulations, excluded literature ; and the Agrarian 
 Society, as it was reconstituted, only showed the intellectual 
 misery of its surroundings. The only notable literary charac- 
 ters were Grassi and Napione ; Doctor Edoardo Calvo in the 
 popular dialect, Alberto Nota in the drama, — both mediocre — 
 and Silvio Pellico outside of Piedmont, were the only writers 
 who reflected the least honour on Italian literature. 
 
 In the war department, on the contrary, the Marquis of 
 San Marzano accomplished something. The ten million 
 francs indemnity received from France he used in recon- 
 structing the forts of Exilles and Exillon and in restoring the 
 bridge of Lesseillon destroyed during the war. San Marzano 
 instituted a military academy with aristocratic tendencies, but 
 useful, and founded the military order of Savoy. General 
 Dessaix was imprisoned for five months in pure animosity to 
 those who had served the Emperor, so great was the hatred 
 
i.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. 1 1 
 
 of everything French. San Marzano perceived that the 
 system of enlistment would not serve to form an army, and so 
 re-established in 1816 the conscription in place of voluntary 
 enlistment. Every young man from eighteen to twenty-four 
 was bound to service in the army — eight years in the cavalry 
 and twelve years in the infantry and artillery; for the light 
 infantry six years. The army of Piedmont in 18 18, consist- 
 ing of thirty thousand men on a peace-footing, might be 
 raised in time of war, through the calling in of the other con- 
 tingents, to seventy thousand. The war budget amounted to 
 twenty-two million nine hundred and forty-four thousand three 
 hundred and sixteen francs, but the minister made economies 
 when requested by the minister of finance. It is understood 
 that under the old system the nobility had preference in all 
 the superior grades of the army, and from 1816 to 1821 
 officers who had served under Napoleon could only serve in 
 the lower ranks, the loss of their former grades being imposed 
 on them, and they were forbidden to wear their decorations. 
 The higher grades belonged to the old faithful royalists, and 
 the cadres were formed of veterans. The navy was in the 
 hands of Giorgio Desgeneys, who had signalized himself in 
 Sardinia against the Algerians. He was ruled by a woman of 
 the island of Maddalena who compelled him to name her 
 husband official barber of the navy and promote all her 
 townsmen, so that none of the respectable Genoese were 
 willing to serve. 
 
 In 181 7 the Count di Vallesa, who had served with great 
 efficiency as minister of foreign affairs, resigned his office. 
 A man of no great ability, but extremely jealous of the 
 national honour, he had resisted the interferences of high 
 personages about the court in the affairs of his ministry and 
 protested against those of the queen. His resignation was 
 due to the resentment of the queen at his having declined 
 to accept her dictation. She had desired to change the 
 order of succession so as to exclude the house of Carignano, 
 
 f UNIVERSITY J 
 
 Jr 
 
12 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 a lateral branch of the royal family. On his declaring him- 
 self opposed to the change in the succession, the queen, 
 irritated, asked him if he had any other duty than to render an 
 account of his work to the King. He replied, "to my con- 
 science, to the country and to history." To which the queen 
 replied, "For me a minister is only a servant." The re- 
 signation of Vallesa, if it did not deprive the kingdom 
 of a great statesman, withdrew from the service of the state an 
 honest servant of the old Piedmontese school and one whose 
 ambition was the constant aggrandizement of the kingdom. In 
 his instructions to the Count of Brusasco, who was sent in 1817 
 to the court of St Petersburg, he said : " We can only regard as 
 a premature movement, produced by the legitimate desire of 
 national independence, the favour shown by Italians toward 
 us, which indicates that, tired of foreign domination little 
 calculated to render them happy, they are willing to pass 
 under the rule of an Italian prince who is not disposed to 
 counteract their sentiments and destroy their institutions, but 
 rather to bring them back to their national character, which 
 they were losing. All Lombardy only aspires to the fortune 
 of forming a solid nation, and its union to our state is the 
 only thing that will satisfy it." In pursuance of this policy 
 Brusasco consigned to the Czar Alexander a memorial 
 which deserves to be noticed as the earliest indication of the 
 formation of the future Italian state. It said : " The only 
 means of extinguishing the rivalry hitherto existing between 
 France and Austria is the constitution of a state in the 
 north of the Italian peninsula sufficiently strong to defend the 
 Alps and close the gates of Italy to every stranger. The 
 limits of this state are traced by nature, and are the Alps and 
 Apennines surrounding the basin of the Po, that beautiful 
 valley which begins at Mt Cenis and extends to the mountains 
 of Carniola. Language divides the Italian Tyrol from German 
 Tyrol, the Venetian states from the Illyrian states. Not only 
 the mountains and history indicate the true and natural limits 
 
i.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. 13 
 
 of such a kingdom, but the habits and customs, and the relations 
 of the inhabitants with each other. In effect, while there is 
 nothing in common between the Piedmontese and the inha- 
 bitants of Dauphine, nothing between the Austrians and the 
 Venetians, all that northern part of Italy is of the same grade 
 of civilization and so has a community of influence and interest. 
 I should say that in the highest respects the inhabitants of this 
 part of Italy have amongst themselves closer resemblances than 
 those which the Tuscans can have with the Lombards or with 
 the Neapolitans." 
 
 But the reactionary tendencies still prevailed and the 
 hostility to constitutional institutions was insuperable. The 
 old conservative party, directed by the King, the court, and 
 the high nobility, continued as in 1793, to detest revolution 
 and its cradle, France, and although they did not love, as they 
 had not in time past loved, the encroachments of Austria, — to 
 prevent which they had desired to constitute a league of lesser 
 states, — they preferred Austrian aid in every case of interest as 
 the foundation of their ideal government. This did not exclude 
 negotiations and intrigues for greater influence. The marriage 
 of Ferdinand the Seventh of Spain, that of Carlo Luigi of 
 Lucca, and that of the Prince of Carignano with the daughter 
 of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, occupied the care of the queen 
 as well as that of the court of Naples. 
 
 The appearance at this time of one of the most distin- 
 guished statesmen of Piedmont in this early period, Prospero 
 Balbo, makes a turning-point in the personal history of the 
 fime. His tendencies to reform, although not so advanced 
 as to be considered now notable, were for the time remarkable, 
 and his abilities made him one of the most influential 
 men of the epoch. From 1817 to 1820 he occupied an 
 important position in the Piedmontese administration by his 
 advocacy of constitutional reform. He instituted provincial 
 schools, in which Italian was taught, restored Giobert to 
 public instruction, urged the introduction of vaccination, 
 
14 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and by the legitimists became marked as an innovator whom 
 it was necessary to oppose. Balbo was at first disposed to 
 resign before the opposition of the legitimists, supported by 
 the court, but finally contented himself with efforts to remove 
 from the opposition the individuals who were the most 
 obstructive to his reform. Being an enlightened minister of 
 an absolute king, almost the initiator of an attempt to 
 transform an unintelligent despotism, such as existed in the 
 preceding century, into an intelligent autocracy, although 
 originally disposed to insist on his reforms and on improve- 
 ment of the administration, he shrunk from using his full power 
 to carry out his own projects. Another statesman, the minister 
 of war, Count Alessandro Saluzzo, assumed office in 1820 with 
 the same tendencies and endeavoured to bring back into the 
 ranks of the army the young men" who had fought with 
 Napoleon. 
 
 From various sources came encouragement for the intro- 
 duction of reforms. A letter to Balbo clandestinely printed 
 demanded the reasons for the delay of these reforms, and in 
 August 1820 Count Brusasco wrote from St Petersburg, "The 
 Austrian Court would have been able to draw to itself the 
 sympathies of its Italian subjects, and to found its new 
 possessions on solid bases, if immediately after the acquisition 
 of Venice it had done what the emperor Alexander had done 
 in Poland. It has committed a grave error in attempting to 
 conform them to the rest of the empire, but at present the die 
 is cast." He also advises the government of Piedmont to 
 adopt measures for the propagation of institutions calculated 
 to maintain the military spirit active in the population, to 
 inspire the sentiment of national independence, to favour the 
 sciences and the cultivation of all the arts and all the 
 industries, and to give them a completely Italian character. 
 " In this way," he says, " the strength and prosperity of 
 Piedmont will offer a marked contrast to the state of moral 
 languor which afflicts the people subject to Austria, a contrast 
 
i.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. 15 
 
 which will win over firmly to his . Majesty the hearts of all the 
 Lombards." "Austria," he adds, "will certainly hold all these 
 innovations which the King may make, as actual hostilities ; 
 but its remonstrances will be so ill-founded that it will hardly 
 dare to make them. On the other hand, the right of his 
 Majesty would be so clear and legitimate that his decisions 
 would be approved by all Europe." 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 VITTORIO EMMANUELE I. THE RISING OF 1 82 1. 
 
 In this state of things Italy approaches the critical period 
 of 1 82 1. The leading public men of Piedmont continued to 
 urge the King to introduce reasonable reforms. If the dynasty 
 of Savoy had an ideal, this was the moment to show it and to 
 prove itself worthy of its position by introducing those reforms 
 which had been already urged by the ministers of the King. 
 The revolution in Spain seemed to be established. That in 
 Naples had broken out and was in full blaze, and if the King 
 had taken up a national attitude all the Piedmontese liberals 
 would have gathered around him, while the conservatives who 
 were devoted to him personally would not have opposed his 
 will. Fortune offered to Piedmont at this moment its proper 
 position if the King had been willing, but the King was not. 
 
 The abuses in the Piedmontese state were stronger than 
 the impulse to reform, and the resistance which was offered by 
 the courtiers and the aristocracy proved an immovable barrier 
 to any change. The interest in abuses was overwhelming. Ex- 
 travagance had become inveterate, and the old privileges which 
 had been extinguished during the period of Napoleonic rule 
 were revived more keenly and with greater avidity than ever 
 before. At the same time the employes who had been dis- 
 missed, and the former officers, offended in their dignity; all 
 
Chap, il] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising of 1 82 1 . 17 
 
 that middle class which had been favoured by the conquests 
 of the revolution ; many of the clergy who had gained by the 
 reforms, all the students and many of the younger aristocracy, 
 chafed against and found unendurable the return to the middle 
 ages after the liberty of the revolution. 
 
 "Piedmont," said the constitutional committee of the 
 Canavese 1 in its revolutionary proclamation, "which, with 
 twenty-four millions of income, managed very well once, no 
 longer recognised its carelessly created debts nor made eco- 
 nomies with the more than sixty millions which it now raised 
 by the aggravation of taxation. The taxes which had been so 
 willingly suppressed by the King were revived under forms 
 still more oppressive. The postal service had degenerated 
 into a system of vexation for every class of society. The 
 privileges of the aristocracy, only changed in name from those 
 of 1797, ruined many communities and citizens by the exagge- 
 ration of local and provincial taxation to which their restora- 
 tion led. The religious houses, invited to reorganize, were 
 unable to obtain the incomes necessary, the cathedrals were 
 robbed of the revenues assured to them by the former govern- 
 ment, and the promises made them were never realized. The 
 old laws and even those which had been passed after 18 14 
 were no longer observed. The magistrates, ignorant or partisan, 
 neglected them and the new legislation which had been 
 promised never came forward. Enormous expenses hampered 
 litigation and the tribunals were corrupt. Civil and military 
 employments were accorded without any regard to merit and 
 with the greatest irregularity. Titles and decorations intended 
 to encourage virtue were prostituted like the retiring pensions, 
 and so was wasted that treasure of distinction which sustains 
 so economically the prosperity of the state. The minister of 
 police, in sheer wantonness and caprice, violated with impunity 
 the laws which guaranteed what little security, liberty, and right 
 
 1 The Canavese is the district between Turin and Alessandria. 
 S. I. 2 
 
1 8 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of property remained, not observing even those limits which 
 the decree of his appointment had established. And although 
 it was not permitted to kill unarmed and orderly people so 
 long as they were not inscribed in the catalogue of bandits, 
 it happened that by the order of certain ministers, studious 
 youths, unarmed, and protected by the constitution of the uni- 
 versity, were privately put to death. The laws were silenced, 
 justice was denied, the flower of the state assassinated. The 
 King and his word were put in contradiction, made ridiculous, 
 and the King himself made odious. Proprietors and merchants 
 were robbed, the nobility was degraded, and all was in chaos 
 and veritable confusion. Piedmont could no longer go on in 
 this state." 
 
 Open agitation for constitutional liberty was impossible. 
 Public discussion was forbidden. Professors were dismissed 
 for having advocated liberalism in the past. But the most 
 determined and the most courageous of the young men de- 
 termined not to be crushed without a movement in behalf of 
 liberty. Freemasonry and the Carbonari already existed under 
 the French Government and naturally spread. Secret societies 
 and open organizations less extreme, multiplied. Society was 
 undermined by conspiracy more or less subversive, but the 
 idea of Italian unity had not yet entered into the plans of the 
 conspirators. A call for a constitution and the expulsion of 
 the Germans, as the Austrians were called, were the limits 
 of the expression of dissatisfaction in Piedmont. Officers of 
 the army and students were drawn little by little into the 
 secret associations, and the revolution developed itself almost 
 involuntarily. The apathy of the court and the despotic 
 tendencies of the King left no other issue but popular dis- 
 content, and a violent expression of it. The most liberal of 
 the ministers did not go to the extent of advising the granting 
 of a constitution. The impatience of the younger liberals 
 took no account of the effect which was produced by the 
 advice of honest conservatives. It was under these conditions 
 
ii.] Vittorio Enimamiele L The rising of \%2\. 19 
 
 that the influence of the Spanish and Neapolitan revolutionary 
 movements finally reached Piedmont. 
 
 Four students of the University of Turin appeared on 
 the nth of January, 1821, in the theatre of Angennes, 
 wearing the red cap of the students, and were considered by 
 the government as the authors of the first revolt. Santarosa, 
 however, affirms that it was an isolated occurrence, and but the 
 outbreak of youthful indiscretion ; and more, that from January 
 to March it had no consequence and did not arouse the 
 activity of the conspirators ; but, as it occurred during the 
 revolution at Naples, it was considered a symptom of the 
 times. The government, instead of judging the students ac- 
 cording to the privileges of the university, by the magistrates 
 whose duty it was to judge university offences, arrested one 
 and confined him in the fortress. There arose, as is customary 
 in such cases, an agitation among the students, his com- 
 panions, who in great numbers paraded the streets to the 
 university, and attacked with stones the carabineers who were 
 there assembled. Thereupon the troops were called out, and 
 the students from the provincial college, going to the assistance 
 of their associates of the university, were stopped by the soldiers. 
 The ministers harangued them in vain to induce them to disperse, 
 and on the night of the 12th, the agitation still continuing, the 
 Governor of Turin came on the scene with four companies of 
 grenadiers. He was received by the students with a volley 
 of stones, upon which swords were drawn upon the unarmed 
 young men, who numbered about three hundred. The 
 body-guard and young noble officers — long afterwards ironi- 
 cally known as "the swordsmen" — attacked without reserve. 
 Colonel Ciravegna, Cesare Balbo, Collobiano and others in 
 vain attempted to arrest the fury of the soldiers. Of the 
 number of killed or wounded on the part of the students there 
 is no authentic record. The authorities declared that no one 
 was killed, but the report of the students published on the 
 19th of January, directed to the students of the universities 
 
20 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of Italy, called it a massacre. This report stated that the red 
 caps worn at Angennes were in customary use in Lombardy 
 and in the provinces of Piedmont : it maintained that the 
 arresting and imprisonment of the students violated the con- 
 stitution of the university, which attributed to a special 
 magistrate the recognition of all acts committed by the 
 students of the university; and it accused of cruelty the officers 
 of the regiment of the guards, while thanking the lower officers 
 and soldiers for their moderation. According to the report, 
 eleven of the students were killed and thirty-four wounded. The 
 officers pursued the flying students into the school sword in hand. 
 The bodies of the dead were carried by night out of the city. 
 
 The hopes of all the liberals were at this time based on the 
 Prince of Carignano, the heir to the throne and nephew of 
 the King, who had no direct heir. The Prince of Carignano 
 was twenty-three years old. He had hitherto taken no part in 
 public affairs which could have roused expectations of advanced 
 liberalism; but at eleven years of age he was an officer in 
 the Napoleonic army; he had lived in democratic surround- 
 ings, and was supposed to have more or less sympathy 
 with constitutional aspirations. Returning early to his native 
 country he associated with the young, and had been under the 
 /.influence of Count Grimaldi, who was noted for his liberal 
 // tendencies. He had taken as secretary a scholar and dramatic 
 writer, Alberto Nota. In his conversation with his friends he 
 had openly spoken in a liberal sense, and was known to 
 have expressed religious and political sentiments which for the 
 time were extremely liberal. It is said that in 1814, after 
 reading the proclamation of Schwartzenburg which announced 
 the restoration of King Vittorio Emmanuele, he exclaimed, — 
 u To wipe out this disgrace it is necessary to drive the Austrians 
 out of Italy." Numerous public men of that time have recorded 
 indications of the hopes which, in default of any more definite 
 indications in authoritative quarters, the constitutionalists 
 centred on the Prince. 
 
il] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising of 1821. 21 
 
 Martini adds that at the banquet of the officers of the 
 artillery on the 4th of December, 1820, the Prince had displayed 
 his pleasure at patriotic expressions. He wrote to Ugo Foscolo 
 a letter seen by Lord John Russell which called Foscolo to come 
 to Italy to defend the cause of liberty and independence. After 
 the revolutions of Naples and Spain he said to one of the 
 confederates, "And what are we doing?" And to Giacinto di 
 Collegno he said, " Let us do something at home." A month 
 before the outbreak of the revolutionary movement, Caraglio, 7 
 Balbo and Collegno had begun to discuss with him the consti- 
 tution. He replied to them, according to his own account, that 
 he should always conform to his duties and especially to his 
 duties towards the King, but did not exclude any line of action. 
 The young men who led the conspiracy, some of whom were 
 his intimates, looked to him as their chief, believing from his 
 conversation that he was favourable to the movement so long 
 as it was not hostile to the King. On the 6th of March 
 everything was ready for the insurrection, and it only remained 
 with the Prince to decide the manner of procedure. It is 
 apparent that at this moment, while he had not expressed any 
 opinions compromising himself or his position, he had not 
 discouraged the overtures made to him. As the principal 
 character at this stage of the liberal movement, and the man on 
 whom the greatest responsibility rested, the Prince of Carignano 
 remains the one dominant problem in the history of the time. 
 Historical estimates of his position are widely different. To 
 one writer he is the traitor of liberalism j to another the timid 
 apologist of constitutionalism. He is considered to have been 
 the Hamlet of the regeneration of Italy j one moment under the 
 influence of his duty to the King and his earliest superstitions; 
 and another under the pressure of the necessities of reform and 
 obedience to popular tendency. Yielding frankly to neither, 
 he vacillated between loyalty to the King and his desire to 
 make himself head of the patriotic movement. 
 
 When, therefore, the chiefs of the conspiracy, Carlo di 
 
22 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 San Marzano, Santarosa, Collegno, and Lisio, captain in the 
 royal cavalry, waited on him to announce their readiness for the 
 movement, they found with the Prince another person, — his 
 own personal confidant. Who this person was history does 
 not record. San Marzano opened the discussion. His lan- 
 guage was that of a man perfectly convinced and recognizing 
 no obstacles or difficulties which their plans had not foreseen 
 and would not overcome. He foresaw obstacles, but believed 
 that resolution and firmness would overcome all. He showed 
 the Prince that they had before them Italy and posterity, 
 and that the Piedmontese revolution would be the most glorious 
 epoch of the house of Savoy, adding (and the future showed 
 that his words were true), that in the movement which was 
 being prepared there was no injury to be apprehended for the 
 King or his family. Santarosa in turn exposed his views as to 
 the manner in which the revolution should secure liberty 
 within and the independence of the country. Every detail 
 was explained to the Prince and the deputation finished with 
 these words: " Prince, everything is ready; your consent alone is 
 wanting. Our friends united wait for our return to give either 
 the signal of salvation to the country, or the melancholy de- 
 claration that their hopes are vain." The consent was 
 accorded by Carlo Alberto, and Santarosa grasped his hand 
 with the freedom of a free citizen. 
 
 This is the precise, clear and particular account given by 
 the conspirators of the Prince's action and of his relations with 
 the movement at the outset. The Prince, in a document 
 directed to the Great Powers in 1822, admits this conversation 
 and recognizes the persons present. He puts the date as the 
 3rd, 4th or 6th of March and says, "They came to me to 
 demand of me secrecy as to an important confidence which 
 they were about to make to me. After having made a long 
 dissertation on liberal ideas they finished by confessing them- 
 selves members of a society which for a long time had laboured 
 for the interests of Italy ; they said that I had always shown 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising of 1821. 23 
 
 a great attachment to my country and that I should in future 
 enjoy great honour. Their conclusion was that they hoped that 
 I would put myself at the head of their movement to obtain from 
 the King slight concessions. I replied that I could not follow 
 any other method of action than that which religion and honour 
 prescribed to me, and that nothing in the world would make 
 me depart from my duties. I attempted to persuade them and 
 prove to them the folly of their enterprise, but they replied 
 that what I had said to them was useless because they were 
 bound by the strongest oaths. I then replied that I could not 
 prevent them from doing what they desired, but that I should 
 at least oppose them with my artillery. They then replied that 
 this would be useless since all the regiments of the garrison 
 were at their orders, and that I should not be able to command 
 my own troops. To prove this to me they showed me a list 
 in which I saw the names of the greater portion of the officers 
 inscribed as confederates. I then said to them that since such 
 a disgrace had befallen me I should go in person to the King. 
 They left, saying to me that they counted on the secret, that 
 they hoped that I would change my opinion, and that the 
 revolution would break out on the day on which the King 
 should come to Moncalieri." 
 
 Between these two accounts there is an open contradiction. 
 Santarosa affirms that the consent of Charles Albert was given. 
 Charles Albert says, "I said that I should oppose them with 
 my artillery." Is it possible that Santarosa should have mis- 
 understood the disposition of the Prince? No. There were 
 five people present and between the two versions the difference 
 is too great to be mistaken. Is it possible that Santarosa should 
 have invented the story ? No : not only because he was an 
 honest man and incapable of falsehood, so that nobody, not 
 even the Prince, would have dared to make such an accusation 
 against him, but because he had no need to express himself with 
 such precision if he had doubts or if he had wished to exag- 
 gerate. It was only necessary in such a case to say something 
 
24 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 general. "Did Carlo Alberto lie? Yes; he lied because it 
 was profitable for him to lie, and because his narrative not 
 being destined to publicity gave him no reason to fear detec- 
 tion." "He did not deny his relations with the men of 1821," 
 writes the minister of France at Florence, Maisonforte, after a 
 conversation with the Prince, "but he assured me that they 
 exaggerated and that the whole thing was nothing but a con- 
 versation without any conclusion." "The work of Santarosa," 
 wrote the Prince to De Sonnaz, as soon as it was published, "is 
 certainly very painful to me, but I ought to have expected it ; 
 I have not yet read it but I am sure that, in spite of his apparent 
 sincerity, Santarosa has not spoken of the word of honour which 
 he came to give me with Caraglio, that they had renounced 
 their project entirely. They have not kept their word; they 
 fled before the danger; they were hanged in effigy and in 
 consequence they cannot make valid depositions." 
 
 In 1839, Carlo Alberto, then King, wrote from Racconigi 
 another defence with the title, "Ad majorem Dei gloriam" 
 quoted by Cibrario in his recollections of his mission to Por- 
 tugal. He says, " I have been accused of Carbonarism ; I have 
 been accused of conspiracy," and then replies, " I should have 
 been led to this by a sentiment more noble, more elevating 
 than that of the Carbonari. I confess that it would have been 
 more prudent, notwithstanding my extreme youth, if I had been 
 silent when I heard their talk about war, about the desire of 
 enlarging the possessions of the King, of contributing to the 
 independence of Italy, and of obtaining at the price of our 
 blood a power and an extension of territory which might 
 increase the happiness of the country; but this patriotic 
 impulse of a young soldier need not be denied by my grey 
 hairs. Certainly at that moment I should not have been 
 capable of any act contrary to the maxims of our holy religion, 
 but I feel that to my last breath my heart will beat quickly at 
 the name of country and the hope of independence of the 
 foreigner." 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmannele I. The rising of 1821. 25 
 
 "The relation of 1822," says Enrico Poggi, "is written 
 with heat, with inexactness of dates and with many omissions ; 
 that of 1839 a f ter having lost the real memory of the facts. 
 Both, however, are interesting. On the critical points Carlo 
 Alberto is silent." Neither San Marzano, nor Collegno, nor 
 Lisio ever wrote a word, although they lived many years 
 afterwards. Collegno was Minister of the King, and Lisio was 
 deputy in 1848. Their omission to deny the important fact 
 of the assent of the Prince in the conversation of the 6th of 
 March is a crushing confirmation of the story of Santarosa, if 
 there had been any need of it. The fifth person who was 
 present at the conversation is supposed to have been Roberto 
 d'Azeglio, and he never contradicted the assertion of Santarosa. 
 But when Molinari asks, " How is it that no guarantee was 
 ever asked of the Prince?" — should we not remember that 
 the word of a Prince given to four gentlemen and Pied- 
 montese officers was sufficient, and that in an engagement of 
 this kind one does not draw up reports nor sign papers or 
 guarantees ? 
 
 Finally, as Santarosa affirms, in no document destined for 
 publication did Carlo Alberto ever deny his consent to the 
 Piedmontese revolution of 182 1, therefore we must consider 
 that consent as established. It is certain that on the night of 
 the 6th the Prince, excited by the eloquence and by the con- 
 victions of his visitors, promised formally his cooperation in 
 the revolution which was being prepared. This consent con- 
 stitutes the first and greatest error of the Prince, from which 
 follow all the others. 
 
 When Balbo in his autobiography says, " Before the outbreak 
 I believed firmly that the Prince had entirely separated himself 
 from the revolutionists and declared his resolution to them, — 
 a resolution correct, good and useful to them," this does not 
 exclude that before breaking with the conspirators he had 
 been bound to them, and that after having been bound to them 
 he denounced the conspiracy. That is to say, it does not 
 
26 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 exclude the accusation of duplicity which is the best founded 
 among all those made against Carlo Alberto regarding his 
 conduct in this difficult crisis. If he had declared to those 
 young men in the first conversation, that he desired like them 
 the independence of Italy, but did not consider that the 
 moment had come to act, and that in his position as heir 
 to the throne, while deploring the state of government in 
 Piedmont, he could not attempt to induce the King to change 
 it; had he in short refused to be that head of the conspiracy 
 which the conspirators considered necessary for the movement, 
 he would have retarded the movement and reserved the liberal 
 forces for some future time. Again, as Beauregard remarks, 
 "if the Prince, instead of accepting explicitly or explicitly 
 refusing, urged, excited and drawn on by Collegno, had sought 
 compromises and little expedients to hinder the movement — 
 such as talking with the King on the pretext that the King 
 did not clearly understand the question, — even this equivocal 
 conduct would have been an error, and a distinct refusal would 
 have been the safest way of all." But on the 6th he was not 
 uncertain ; he became so afterwards. On the 6th he was decided 
 and unequivocally accepted the revolution. 
 
 On the 7th of March the conspirators, in consequence of 
 their conversation with the Prince, set to work to prepare 
 everything. Santarosa says that the dawn of the 8th was the 
 moment appointed for the outbreak of the revolution. The 
 Prince knew it, because nothing was concealed from him. It 
 was decided that Santarosa and Collegno should pass the night 
 with the Prince in order to go with him to the arsenal at five 
 o'clock in the morning. It is affirmed by Beolchi that it was 
 arranged that at the dawn of the 8th, Collegno, with the officers 
 of artillery and the regiment of Aosta, should take possession 
 of the citadel, where the regiment was quartered, and then pass 
 the Po and take possession of the Capuchin Hill which 
 dominates the city. The King's regiment of light cavalry, 
 from Pinerolo, the Queen's dragoons from Vercelli and those 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmamtele I. The rising of 1821. 27 
 
 of Piemonte Reale from the Veneria were to have assisted ; 
 they were to arrest Thaon de Revel, General de Vanonson 
 and Majors Montezemolo, Regis and Ansaldi, and were to 
 take possession of the citadel of Alessandria. " The evening 
 of the 7th," says Santarosa, " Carlo Alberto declared to San 
 Marzano and to Collegno that he withdrew his word. There- 
 fore San Marzano and Collegno recalled the arrangements 
 made for the next day." What took place in the Prince's 
 mind between the night of the 6th and the night of the 7th? 
 The morning of the 7th the Prince had called to the palace 
 Cesare Balbo and General Gifflenga, and both had confessed 
 that nothing was ready for taking the field. The Prince 
 urged the artillery officers to withdraw from the affair and 
 then disclosed to the Minister of War that the conspiracy was 
 formed and revealed to him everything that had been done; 
 not, however, the names of the conspirators. Had he given 
 his consent to the revolution on the 6th and then betrayed 
 what he had then learned? This is one of the foundations 
 for the accusation of treachery. 
 
 The same day the King left for Moncalieri accompanied by 
 the Prince. " On the morning of the 8th," continues Santarosa, 
 " we were told that the Prince had complained of our timidity 
 and had blamed us for being too soon discouraged, and of 
 having abandoned the undertaking." Beolchi says that the 
 conspirators were joined here by Count Sanmichele, colonel 
 of the light cavalry of Piemonte, and the chiefs prepared the 
 insurrection for the 10th. The night of the 8th San Marzano 
 and Santarosa, accompanied by Sanmichele, at the same hour 
 as on the two preceding days, went again to the Prince. They 
 notified him that the revolution was to be commenced. They 
 concealed the day and omitted all details as to the measures 
 taken, fearing that the Prince in another attack of weakness 
 would again oppose all their projects. The Prince, who had 
 on the 7th taken the only correct way that remained open to 
 him, that of disengaging himself from every pledge, adopted 
 
28 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 for himself a conduct more reserved and did not give them all 
 the information that he had, but he renewed his consent to the 
 Piedmontese revolution. On the 6th the acceptation ; on the 
 7th the denial ; on the 8th a new consent. He reasoned with 
 the officers and under-officers of the artillery, while a single 
 energetic word would have been sufficient to hold them to 
 their duty. 
 
 On the evening of the 8th, a meeting of the conspirators 
 was held, in which the final measures were taken. On the 9th 
 the Prince sent for Santarosa and gave him instructions to be 
 adopted for the safety of the King. Santarosa suspected in this 
 an artifice to find out the day which had been fixed, and replied 
 that they were conspiring against Austria and her agents, but 
 that the conspirators were the best and most faithful friends of 
 the King. " What remains to be said," continues Santarosa, 
 " is what pains me most. In the moment at which Carlo 
 Alberto had seemed to promise the conspirators his adhesion, 
 he had already given the order and disposed affairs in such a 
 manner as to render impossible any movement at Turin, and 
 probably make Santarosa and Collegno the victims of the love 
 of their country." " A fatal contradiction which can only be 
 explained by accusing the Prince of treachery, and one would 
 rather say that Carlo Alberto was uncertain." Then the 
 conspirators sent orders to Alessandria, to Fossano and to 
 Vercelli to revoke the arrangements. The Minister of War, 
 warned by the Prince, had not taken energetic measures for 
 the arrest of the chiefs, which can be explained only by the 
 weakness of the Government, by the desire to take no serious 
 responsibility, and by the hope that they might still be able to 
 persuade the chiefs to desist from action. 
 
 The counter-orders did not arrive in time, or nobody 
 thought fit to obey them. On the 9th General Sanmichele 
 with the light horse of Piemonte marched from Fossano to 
 Moncalieri. The same night at a meeting of officers and 
 citizens at Alessandria, it was debated in the house of Chevalier 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising of '1821. 29 
 
 Baronis what to do, and it was decided to revolt in the name 
 of Italy and to occupy the citadel in the night. At the same 
 time a proclamation issued to the soldiers said : " Hasten to 
 surround a Prince, who, although he is heir to the throne and 
 is faithful to his King, has sworn to fall with you rather than 
 survive your and his own dishonour." 
 
 The morning of the 10th, Captain Count Palma with a 
 Genoese regiment raised in the citadel a cry for the con- 
 stitution of Spain. The Queen's dragoons with Captain 
 Baronis, Lieutenant Bianco and several citizens joined him. 
 A committee of government was formed : Colonel Ansaldi, 
 President ; members, Baronis, Bianco, Giovanni Dosena, Count 
 Palma, Urbano Rattazzi, and Luzzi, Secretary General. 
 
 The proclamations of the committee of Alessandria, which 
 derived their origin and strength from the Carbonari, are the 
 only utterances of the revolution of '20 and '21 which have a 
 decidedly unitarian character. In one of them allusion is 
 made to the King as " King of Italy " and also to the national 
 parliament. In another, "In the name of the Italian confedera- 
 tion and of Italian independence, the constitution of Spain is 
 promulgated," and " no more hereditary children of despotism 
 shall hold the dignities, but they shall be elective, and merit 
 alone shall have preeminence in them, and only in law shall be 
 found the power of the state." Another said, "The national 
 committee shall be considered legitimately formed when the 
 King shall have made his person sacred and inviolable by the 
 legitimisation of his authority as King of Italy." Another 
 concluded, "Long live the King, the constitution of Spain, 
 and Italy." 
 
 At the news of the movement in Alessandria the con- 
 spirators of Turin considered themselves in honour engaged to 
 support it, and although the head was still wanting, Dr Carta 
 went to Vercelli, Vanni to P'ossano, Beolchi to Pinerolo to 
 call the regiments to Turin. Collegno hurried to Alessandria, 
 where he arrived on the morning of the nth with Captain 
 
30 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Ravici of the artillery ; San Marzano to Vercelli, where he in 
 vain attempted to draw away from its colonel the regiment 
 of the Queen's dragoons. Lisio went to Pinerolo, where 
 he called together Ghini, Pecorara, Conti, Calosso, Bruno, 
 Capanni and others, and drew off three hundred of the King's 
 light horse. Here Santarosa raised the cry of "War to Austria," 
 and he and Lisio signed at Caragnolo, on the way to Alessan- 
 dria, the following declaration : " The Piedmontese army, in 
 the gravity of the present condition of Italy and in Piedmont, 
 cannot abandon the King to the influence of the Austrians. 
 This influence hinders the best of Princes from satisfying the 
 wishes of his people, who desire to live under the government of 
 law and to see its proper interests guaranteed by a liberal 
 constitution. This ruinous influence is the reason of Vittorio 
 Emmanuele remaining a spectator, and of his approving in a 
 certain way war made diplomatically by Austria on the sacred 
 rights of nations in order that she may govern the whole penin- 
 sula, and degrade and rob Piedmont, the object of her hatred 
 because she is not yet subject to her. We have two purposes ; 
 to put the King in a position to be able to follow the impulses 
 of his Italian heart, and to claim for the people the just and 
 honourable liberty of expressing their desires to the King as to 
 a father. If we have violated somewhat the laws of military 
 discipline, we have been drawn to it by the supreme need 
 of the country, and our guide is the example of the Prussian 
 army, which in 1813 saved Germany by the spontaneous war 
 undertaken against the oppressor ; but we swear to defend at 
 once the person of the King and the honour of his crown 
 against any enemy, — if Vittorio Emmanuele should ever have 
 any other enemies than those of Italy." 
 
 As they entered the citadel of Alessandria, the Governor 
 di Varax went with the regiments of Savoy, with the superior 
 officers of the regiment of Genoa and the Queen's dragoons, 
 direct to Susa, having decided to remain faithful. The 
 revolutionary troops occupied the city; Ansaldi took the 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmanuel* I. The rising of 1821. 31 
 
 command of the division, Santarosa that of the city and of the 
 national guard, Collegno took charge of the citadel, while 
 San Marzano, with four hundred cavalry and a strong detach- 
 ment of national guards, marched against Casale. At Turin 
 on the 9th of March the Minister of War, Saluzzo, and 
 Governor Revel announced to the Prince of Carignano the 
 movement of Fossano. The Prince accompanied the Minister 
 to the barracks, called together the officers and the troops and 
 reminded them of the fidelity they owed to the King. On the 
 10th, on the announcement of the pronunziamento of Alessan- 
 dria, Cesare Balbo went to tell him that at the royal palace 
 they counted upon his influence to obtain from the King some 
 sort of constitution. The Prince very prudently replied that 
 such a demand should be made by a minister, on account of 
 which Balbo returned with his father and Valesa. To them 
 the Prince still more prudently replied that he would make a 
 proposal to the King only in the presence of the Council and 
 if assured of their support. The Prince, accordingly, notified 
 the King that, to calm the public, it seemed to him necessary 
 to promise some concession. The ministers Balbo and Valesa 
 sustained the proposal; Count Saluzzo and Marquis Brignoli 
 were silent, the other members of the Council were opposed. 
 The King declared that he would make no concession. So 
 the Council, after having provided for the safety of the King 
 and of the throne, was able to go to sleep. 
 
 The conspirators, on the other hand, did not go to sleep. 
 On the morning of the nth eighty soldiers led by Captain 
 Ferrero, going from Carignano, called, as Beolchi says, " con- 
 spirators" by the Turinese, planted at San Salvario in front 
 of the city the flag of the Neapolitan revolution. Eighty men 
 outside proposed to fight about six thousand inside. The six 
 thousand did not move, but the eighty were joined by about 
 one hundred young men, some citizens and some students 
 from the provincial college, led by their tutors. The 
 advocate Giulio Simondi and Pollone brought sixty muskets 
 
32 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 for the citizens in a carriage from the house of Pollone. The 
 regiments of the guard and the Piemonte Reale formed in 
 front of the insurgents. 
 
 The Colonel of the light legion, Raimondi, while he was 
 attempting to induce Ferrero to withdraw, was wounded by a 
 pistol shot fired by a student named Nicolini. The Captain 
 of the Carabineers, Cravadossi, offered an amnesty to Ferrero, 
 who replied, " On this flag is written our reply. Say to his 
 Majesty that he has nothing to fear from us, but that we 
 wish the constitution of Spain and war on Austria." A 
 third messenger, Colonel Radicati, offered the constitution of 
 Bavaria. The people who had gathered together to see the 
 sight, remained seven hours curious and indifferent. The 
 legitimate monarchy did not dare to re-establish order when 
 disturbed before the capital by two hundred persons. Towards 
 nightfall the column, having waited in vain for a popular rising, 
 warned that the citadel would not aid them, quietly crossed 
 the Po at Valentino in boats and took possession of the 
 opposite hill, then went to Chieri and were received warmly 
 at Asti. But Turin did not rise and remained neutral between 
 the constitutional insurrection and the absolute monarch. 
 
 Massimo d'Azeglio in his recollections attributes to Vittorio 
 Emmanuele on the nth the intention of mounting his horse 
 and dispersing the audacious movement with a resolute attack. 
 Certainly all the old nobility and a part of the troops would 
 have followed the King, but he was kept back, it was said, by 
 those who were around him. Two reasons might have weighed 
 on his mind : either his repugnance for the shedding of blood, 
 or his doubt of the obedience of the troops. In any case the 
 inactivity of the King, indicating great weakness, destroyed all 
 his influence. On the 12th the King decided to take a more 
 vigorous attitude. He resolved to move against Alessandria 
 at the head of the troops remaining faithful, and in the mean- 
 while issued a proclamation in French to his people. " A very 
 recent, decided and unanimous meeting of the Great Powers, 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmamiele I. The rising of 1821. 33 
 
 our allies, has resolved that never, in any case, there shall be 
 approved by any of them, much less supported, any act which 
 tends to overthrow the legitimate political order existing in 
 Europe ; and even by arms Austria, Russia and Prussia will 
 make themselves judges and avengers of every attempt against 
 the preservation of the same." This proclamation was the 
 effect of the decision of the Powers at the Congress of Laibach, 
 pledging themselves to oppose any concessions to constitution- 
 alism, a decision communicated to the King at this juncture. 
 
 But the above proclamation, though printed, was not 
 published, nor would it have produced any impression on 
 the movement. While Ferrero left San Salvario unmolested 
 on the night of the nth, on the 12th at 1 p.m. the 
 citadel of Turin proclaimed the constitution of Spain and 
 raised the Carbonari. Sergeant Ritattori of the Guards ran his 
 sword through the body of a lieutenant-colonel of the artillery, 
 Desgeneys, commander of the citadel, who wished to harangue 
 the insurgents in favour of the King. This was the act which 
 decided the insurrection and placed the King in the alter- 
 native of submitting or resigning. All resistance had now 
 become impossible. The King sent the Prince of Carignano 
 to parley with the rebels, and Gambini replying from the 
 parapets that they wished war with Austria and the Spanish 
 constitution, the Prince returned to the royal palace, accom- 
 panied by many people who hurrahed for the constitution, and 
 in the midst of whom one Pietro Muschietti, formerly one of 
 the body-guard of Napoleon, carried an Italian flag. The 
 colonel of the royal regiment, believing that the people were 
 determined to enter into the palace, made a charge on them, in 
 which, however, only one woman was killed. Pinelli and 
 Martini affirmed that the Prince gave the order, "Chargez cette 
 canaille," somebody having shouted to him "Traitor," and they 
 say there were some killed and wounded, but they do not prove 
 their accusation. In the crowd there were great ladies, and 
 a certain officer asked permission from the King to charge the 
 
 s. 1. 3 
 
34 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 people, but the King refused. Under the windows of the 
 palace were four or five regiments. The Prince, according to 
 Beauregard, insisted that the King should put himself at their 
 head and declared that he would finish quickly with the in- 
 surrection. Energetic decisions seemed to be about to prevail 
 when, according to the Prince's account, Revel and Saluzzo 
 represented to his Majesty that he was exposing himself 
 uselessly. The King went to see the Queen to inform her of 
 his intention to abdicate. The Council being called together, 
 some of the military chiefs were disposed to guarantee the 
 fidelity of the troops. Colonel Ciravegna, of the regiment of 
 Aosta, said that he could only depend upon his regiment for 
 the defence of the King. Count Lodi said that thirty thousand 
 armed men were marching on the citadel. It is also said that 
 the King had on the table the constitution of Spain, and that 
 the communication from Laibach above alluded to prevented 
 him from accepting it. Having heard this discussion the King 
 decided to consult the Queen. 
 
 Of their conversation there was no witness. Balbo af- 
 firms that the Queen demanded the regency and the faculty 
 of conceding the constitution. The King returning to the 
 Council declared that he would not grant the constitution 
 of Spain, and therefore he abdicated and charged the Prince of 
 Carignano with the regency. Carlo Alberto declares that he 
 repeatedly refused the offer, but that two hours afterwards, 
 when again requested by the King, in the presence of all the 
 ministers, he said that he considered it his duty to accept it, 
 demanding nevertheless that the Queen should be present at 
 the abdication. The King confirmed his abdication, and the 
 Prince of Carignano was legally invested with the regency of 
 the kingdom on the night of the 12th of March. Vittorio Em- 
 manuele, accompanied by General Gifflenga, left the next day. 
 He was neither willing to oppose the rebellion by force, nor to 
 promise, after the manner of Ferdinand of Naples, the con- 
 stitution with the intention of withdrawing it. He behaved as 
 
ii.] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising 0/1821. 35 
 
 an honest man but his action was disastrous to the hopes 
 and interests of the country. 
 
 On the 13th Count Palma, Marquis of Prie, proclaimed at 
 Ivrea the constitution of Spain. Vercelli, Asti and Casale 
 adhered to the movement. On the same day at Turin the 
 regiment of Aosta, commanded by Colonel Ciravegna, called 
 for a constitution. The municipality went to the royal palace 
 calling for the constitution of Spain. The King had abdicated 
 the throne and given the regency to the Prince J why did the 
 Prince accept it if not to grant the constitution ? Carlo Alberto 
 relates that it was late in the evening, and the citadel threatened 
 to fire on the city. " The syndics renewed their pressure, and 
 I said to them after five hours of refusal that I could not 
 change the fundamental law of the state; that they should 
 await the orders of the new King; that all that I should do 
 would be illegal, but that to prevent a fight which would be 
 only a massacre, and to avert the disorders with which we 
 were menaced, I would permit the Spanish constitution to be 
 proclaimed pending the orders of the new King." 
 
 This declaration of Carlo Alberto is only another of the 
 evasions and equivocal declarations with which he covers the 
 whole of his conduct through this conflict. It is confirmed by 
 no other declaration made known by anybody at the time. He 
 evidently desired simply to divide with his advisers the responsi- 
 bility of an act which he throughout fully approved. He there- 
 fore demanded of the Council and the functionaries of the 
 various orders the following declaration: "We, the undersigned, 
 at the demand of his Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, 
 declare that the actual circumstances are so grave, the dangers of 
 a civil war so imminent, and the vote of the people so strongly 
 expressed, that we consider it indispensable for the public safety 
 and imposed by the situation, that the Spanish constitution 
 should be promulgated, with such modifications as His 
 Majesty, in agreement with the national representation, shall 
 consider advisable." This declaration was signed by the 
 
 3— 2 
 
$6 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Syndics, Ministers, Generals and others present at Turin, after 
 which the Spanish constitution was proclaimed. 
 
 The Spanish constitution was more democratic than the 
 English or French. It recognized the sovereignty of the nation; 
 it declared the Catholic religion the only true one, and the re- 
 ligion of the state, and forbade any other worship ; it restricted 
 the making of laws to the assembly, leaving only the faculty 
 of putting them into execution to the King ; every citizen was 
 an elector in the parish and elected secondary electors who in 
 their turn elected district electors, who again elected electors 
 of provinces on whom depended the choice of the deputies. 
 To be deputy it was necessary to have a certain income, but 
 the ministers and counsellors of the state and the employe's in 
 the King's household were ineligible as deputies. The deputies 
 were paid and elected for two years. The King might veto a 
 law twice, but on its passing a third time the consent of the 
 King was dispensed with. The King could neither dissolve 
 nor prorogue the assembly, nor could he absent himself from 
 the kingdom or marry without its consent. The details of 
 local administration were needlessly complicated. 
 
 It seems proved by various contemporary documents that 
 the Prince immediately on the proclamation of the constitution 
 set to work to deprive it of all moral authority, and himself 
 of all credit for having consented to its proclamation. He 
 himself declares that he wrote to the Governors of Genoa, 
 Novara and Savoy on the 1 7th of March that he considered 
 the proclamation of no value until it had been approved by 
 the King. This is the second confessed duplicity of the Prince 
 of Carignano, and one which complicated still more his position 
 and that of the country. Such is the opinion of the liberal writers, 
 but in view of the singular mixture of qualities in the Regent it 
 seems to me fair to admit that being only Regent he may 
 have had honest convictions that on the King alone depended 
 the final confirmation of the constitution, let the proclamation 
 be made by whom it might. He might well believe sincerely 
 
II.] Vittorio Emmanuele L The rising of 1821. 37 
 
 that his acts as Regent were capable of invalidation by the 
 King. The inborn reverence for the Crown never deserted 
 Carlo Alberto. But subsequent events showed that his political 
 conceptions had no stability. Had he been King, much of 
 this defect might have disappeared, but, as it was, his hesi- 
 tations and his alternate acceptances and refusals destroyed 
 all his moral authority and led the country into dangerous 
 complications. The subsequent details of the organization 
 of the constitutional kingdom, in view of the utter failure of 
 that organization, have no importance. On the 15th of March 
 the Prince and the government took the oath of fealty to the 
 Spanish constitution and of allegiance to the new King, without 
 any reserve as to his approbation. 
 
 The decision to declare war on Austria was an absurdity, 
 and only gave Austria the desired opportunity to intervene 
 in Piedmontese affairs. On the 15th of March the emperors 
 of Austria and Russia at Laibach had decided to increase the 
 Austrian army in Italy to sixty thousand, and to mobilize one 
 hundred thousand Russians. The discord in the councils of 
 the late insurgents continued and paralysed all preparations 
 for war abroad and all organization at home. Carlo Felice, 
 absent at Modena, repudiated the concessions made by the 
 Regent and issued the following edict: "We, Carlo Felice, 
 Duke of Genoa, declare by the present document, that in virtue 
 of the act of abdication of King Vittorio Emmanuele, our well- 
 beloved brother, which has been communicated to us, we enter 
 into possession of the fulness of royal power, postponing, 
 however, the assumption of the title until our august brother, 
 in the possession of entire freedom, shall communicate to us 
 his pleasure. We declare, moreover, that far from consenting 
 to any innovation in the form of government in force at the 
 epoch of the abdication of the King, our beloved brother, we 
 shall regard as rebels all those of the subjects of his Majesty 
 who have taken part with the insurgents, or who may here- 
 after join them, or who permit themselves either to proclaim 
 
38 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the constitution or to commit any act whatever contrary 
 to the fulness of the royal authority. We declare as null 
 all other acts of sovereign competence which may have taken 
 place since the aforesaid abdication but which have not 
 emanated from us or have not received our sanction. At 
 the same time we invite all subjects of the King who have 
 remained faithful, to persevere in their sentiments, to resist 
 with energy the few rebels, and to hold themselves ready to 
 obey our orders and reply to all appeals that we may make to 
 them for the re-establishment of legitimate order. On our part 
 we shall do everything to aid them as quickly as possible. 
 Full of confidence in the grace and assistance of God, who 
 always protects the cause of justice, and sure that our august 
 allies are disposed to come promptly to our help to re-establish 
 order and tranquillity, we promise to recompense those who 
 shall have merited to be particularly distinguished by us. 
 By the present proclamation we notify all the subjects of the 
 King our will and rule of conduct. Carlo Felice." 
 
 Accompanying this was a private letter from the King to 
 the Regent enjoining him to go to Novara, to surrender his 
 authority into the hands of General La Tour, and to await his 
 orders. The Prince paid no attention to the private letter and 
 hesitated to give full effect to the proclamation. Duplicity and 
 indecision continued, and while, on the one hand, the chiefs of 
 the insurgents continued their preparations, the Prince neither 
 took measures to resist the King nor prepared to submit to him. 
 Here appears in its full gravity the vacillating character of the 
 Regent. Had he had that reverence for the authority of the 
 King which would partially have justified his infidelity to his 
 supporters, he could not have hesitated to resign : if he had it 
 not, he must still have recognized the absolute necessity of 
 resignation, being in no position to contest the order. Had 
 he supported his followers he would probably have been de- 
 feated, but events might have justified him : as it is, he cannot 
 be justified. On the 27th of March, on receiving another letter 
 
il] Vittorio Emmanuele I. The rising of 1821. 39 
 
 from Carlo Felice, the Prince addressed himself to Vittorio 
 Emmanuele begging him to resume the crown. The Austrian 
 preparations for effective assistance to Carlo Felice continuing, 
 the Regent repaired to Milan, where he was received by the 
 Austrian authorities and whence he ultimately went into exile 
 according to the orders of the King. The revolution, thus 
 abandoned by all authority, opposed by the King and by the 
 powers of Austria and Russia, had no alternative but to 
 become an active insurrection or to submit and dissolve. 
 
 Santarosa, now the head of the insurrection and legiti- 
 mate Minister of War by appointment of the Regent, decided 
 energetically to remain in effective authority and to continue 
 the work already begun. Refusing to accept Carlo Felice's 
 repudiation of the accomplished facts, he continued the 
 military and civil organization, and prepared for war. He 
 called out the national guard, prepared for the defence of 
 Turin and summoned the country to arms. The proclama- 
 tion of the 27th of March declares: "The Prince Regent has 
 abandoned the capital on the night of the 21st to the 22nd 
 of this month without notifying the national committee or his 
 own ministers. Let no Piedmontese impeach the intentions of a 
 prince whose heart is liberal and whose zeal for the Italian 
 cause has been thus far the hope of all good men. A small 
 number of men, deserters of the country and servants of 
 Austria, have certainly deceived with detestable fabrications a 
 young prince without experience in these difficult times. A 
 declaration signed by Carlo Felice has appeared in Piedmont, 
 but a Piedmontese king in the midst of Austrians, our in- 
 evitable enemies, is a king in prison ; nothing of what he may 
 say can or ought to be accepted as coming from him. We will 
 prove to him that we are his children. Our standard is the 
 royal standard, the noble eagle of Savoy, and we are proud 
 of it. Piedmontese soldiers, national guards, do you wish 
 civil war? Do you wish the devastation of your fields, the 
 conflagration and sacking of your cities and your villages? 
 
40 Italy. [Chap. ii. 
 
 Do you wish to forfeit your glory and defile your standards? 
 Shall Piedmontese in arms rise against Piedmontese in arms ? 
 Shall brothers oppose brothers ? Corps commanders, officers, 
 under-ofhcers and soldiers, there is and can be only one way 
 of safety. Gather around our flag ; surround it ; take it and 
 hasten with it to the banks of the Ticino and the Po. The 
 Lombard land at our appearance will devour its enemies. 
 Companions in arms, this is a turning point for Europe." 
 
 The plans were in agreement with these exhortations. 
 General Bellotti was to take the place of General La Tour at 
 Novara, Ciravegna to take the field with the legions and Busso- 
 lino to unite with Ansaldi at Alexandria. But Lombardy was 
 not prepared to assist in the insurrection ; the generals dele- 
 gated to the different services were not prepared to accept 
 the alternative of active insurrection ; the army was divided, 
 one half demoralized, or faithful to the King. The troops 
 who still supported the revolution, amounting to fifteen 
 thousand, were dispersed in the cities of Genoa, Turin and 
 Alexandria. Revolutionary bands assembled here and there 
 without order or coherence. The Austrians arrived at Novara 
 early in the following month and after slight encounters in 
 various localities, the insurrection came to an end. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CARLO FELICE AND THE REPRESSION. THE SUCCES- 
 SION OF CARLO ALBERTO AND THE REVIVAL. 
 
 The insurrection having been suppressed by the Austrian 
 forces, Count La Tour entered Turin on the ioth of April, 
 182 1, and instituted tribunals for the punishment of the in- 
 surgents. A military commission judged and condemned five 
 hundred and twenty-three of the insurgents, of whom ninety- 
 one were condemned to death, fifty-three to perpetual im- 
 prisonment, while four hundred and twenty-one officers and 
 soldiers were reprimanded. The university was closed, the 
 students deprived of their privileges, and the regiments that 
 had taken part in the revolt were dissolved. On the 30th of 
 September Carlo Felice published from Modena a general 
 amnesty, from which, however, various categories of persons 
 were excepted, including the authors or promoters of the 
 conspiracies or agitations to obtain a change of government ; 
 those in whose houses meetings were held for revolutionary 
 purposes; those who had corrupted, or attempted to corrupt, 
 the fidelity of the troops ; those who, presiding over educational 
 institutions, had misled the young ; and those who in writings, 
 published or not, had advocated the institution of the new 
 form of government. The private soldiers who had taken 
 
42 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 part in the movement were pardoned ; the non-commissioned 
 officers and guards were obliged to justify their conduct; 
 the officers were all declared guilty of felony. 
 
 The . character of Carlo Felice, the new King, has been 
 variously judged according as his judges were liberal or con- 
 servative. He was simply a determined despot, kindly and 
 even generous when no question of his authority was involved, 
 inflexible when it was a question of royal authority. He de- 
 tested etiquette and ceremonial, was devoted to Austria and 
 the church, and abhorred liberalism in all shapes and forms. 
 He entered Turin on the 18th of October and was received 
 with great ceremony by the authorities but with absolute in- 
 difference by the population. He re-established in Piedmont 
 all the ancient forms of despotic personal government. 
 The universities were reorganized with the following regula- 
 tions. All the heads of the university must be ecclesiastics ; 
 the students could not leave the houses chosen for them 
 as dwellings without the permission of the prefect ; they 
 were obliged to observe the fasts under the supervision of 
 the prefect ; every student was obliged every year to give in 
 his certificate of communion ; they were forbidden to go to 
 cafes, billiard-rooms or public spectacles, and were obliged to 
 retire at certain hours. All the professors of the secondary 
 schools, even if by chance they happened to be laymen, were 
 obliged to wear the ecclesiastical dress. All the examiners of 
 the schools in the provinces were to be either parish priests or 
 bishops, and if in the departments of theology or letters, they 
 were to be Jesuits. 
 
 Carlo Felice had neither children nor direct heirs. The 
 Duke of Modena, an Austrian Archduke and husband of 
 the eldest daughter of Vittorio Emmanuele, ambitious and 
 intriguing, desired the abolition of the Salic law, which pre- 
 vented his wife from occupying the throne, in order that by 
 succeeding she might unite Modena to Piedmont. Austria, 
 on the other hand, had a distinct aspiration to extend her 
 
in.] Carlo Felice and the Repression. 43 
 
 dominion over Piedmont and had for many years nourished 
 this ambition as a measure of hostility against France. The 
 opposition of England chiefly, and secondarily of Russia, 
 prevented Austria from attaining her purpose. Piedmont 
 was preserved by European policy rather as a barrier between 
 France and Austria than from any sympathy with Italian 
 aspirations felt by the Great Powers, with the single exception 
 of England, which was however carried away by the others. 
 The principle of legitimacy made the succession of the 
 Prince of Carignano inevitable. It was said that Vittorio 
 Emmanuele proposed that, on condition of the cession of 
 Lombardy in addition to Modena to Piedmont, he would 
 consent to the abolition of the Salic law and the succession 
 of the Duke of Modena ; but the actuality of this proposition 
 is a matter as to which the leading authorities differ widely. 
 The contrary is indicated rather by the conduct of Carlo 
 Felice toward the Prince of Carignano, and the probability 
 is that accession to the throne developed in Carlo Felice 
 a spirit of individuality and nationality which he had never 
 felt in private life, and that pride of dynasty to a certain extent 
 took the place of pride of nation. 
 
 The question of succession was settled definitely in favour 
 of Prince Carlo Alberto by his accepting the obligation of 
 constituting, so soon as he should succeed to the throne, a 
 Council of State, which should include certain bishops and 
 archbishops, and all the knights of the Annunziata, in order 
 to maintain and watch over the organic constitution of the ' 
 monarchy as he found it at the death of his predecessor. 
 In 1825 Carlo Felice drew up a testament, in which he 
 recognized as true and legitimate heir of the states subject 
 to him, Prince Carlo Eduardo Alberto of Savoy, Prince of 
 Carignano, " my very dear nephew," and his descendants 
 in perpetuity. In the same year Carlo Felice received the 
 emperor Francis at Genoa. At this interview it is supposed 
 that the Italian league, under the presidency of the Emperor 
 
44 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of Austria, was urged, but Carlo Felice, in his jealousy of 
 Austria's ambitions, preferred England's protection. The 
 remainder of his reign passed in tranquillity. In 1831 he 
 died at Turin and Carlo Alberto succeeded to the throne. 
 His previous history naturally augmented the hopes of the 
 liberals, but the character of the King preserved the same 
 hesitancies, the same alternations between recognition of 
 liberal claims and assertion of royal prerogatives, which made 
 any regular liberal progress impossible for the state. 
 
 The administration of the state remained what it had been, 
 and the French revolution of 1830 did not seem to affect 
 the institutions of Piedmont. The pressure of Austria may 
 have produced its influence on the King, but the probability 
 is that the obstinacy of his character would have prevented 
 him from drawing back from his promise to preserve political 
 institutions in the condition in which he had found them. 
 ^ Meanwhile, however, the secret societies spread and the con- 
 spiracies for the realization of constitutional government under 
 Mazzini became the leading feature of the political life of 
 Piedmont The society of Young Italy organized at this 
 epoch by Mazzini became a powerful agency ; spreading from 
 Genoa it affected the entire state, and involved the army. In 
 1833 the reactionary tendency of the authorities developed 
 a rigorous course of judicial proceedings, exile and imprison- 
 ment. Many liberals were imprisoned, or went into voluntary 
 exile, and the usual course of persecution was followed by the 
 usual consequences — a more effective propaganda, j 
 
 The society of Young Italy became one of the most 
 effective institutions of progress which Italy has ever seen. 
 It was distinctly republican, and the first two articles of its 
 constitution are a formal declaration of war against all mo- 
 narchical institutions.^/ They say, " Article I. This society is 
 instituted for the destruction, now become indispensable, of 
 all the governments of the peninsula, to unite all Italy in a 
 single state under republican government." Article II says, 
 
in.] Succession of Carlo Alberto and the Revival. 45 
 
 " Having recognized that absolute government is the cause of 
 many horrible evils, and that constitutional monarchy does 
 not in any respect diminish' them, we all ought to work for 
 the foundation of the republic, one and indivisible." The 
 conspiracies of Young Italy, when discovered, led to acts of 
 suppression and vengeance on the part of the royal authorities 
 such as even the active insurrection of Alessandria had not 
 caused. A period of savage persecution and repression 
 followed, and the conduct of the King during this period, 1833 
 to 1835, repeats the worst type of the despotism of the past 
 governments of Italy : none of the aggravations of political 
 oppression — prison, torture, death — were lacking, and some 
 of the executions remain signalized in the history of Italy as 
 amongst the worst deeds of despotic government. No period 
 of the Austrian domination in Lombardy and Venice equalled 
 the brutality of the government of Carlo Alberto during this 
 period. He not only gave himself up entirely to the influence 
 of the Austrians, but seemed to invite the approbation of the 
 Austrian authorities by the excess to which he carried measures 
 of oppression. 
 
 At a meeting of the Prince with the King and Metternich 
 at Genoa in 1825, Carlo Alberto had already shown his devotion 
 to Austrian principles. Metternich writes : " Our stay at Genoa 
 will be productive of good results. The King is perfect, and 
 the Prince of Carignano, who appears to be afraid both of the 
 emperor and of myself, as everybody says, conducted himself 
 very well. He uttered frankly his pater peccavi, and seemed 
 in fact firmly resolved never more to be made an instrument. 
 If the contrary should ever happen, I do not know what evil 
 star will have brought it about, because he thoroughly knows 
 his former friends. He passed several hours with me and told 
 me all the particulars of the liberal organization as I have 
 never before heard them. Amongst other things he gave me 
 important information as to the conduct of the Duke of 
 Angouleme and his famous head-quarters. As to experience, 
 
 
46 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the time that he passed with the French army and at Paris 
 has been very useful. He speaks with all the frankness which 
 gives one the air of a convert. In the case of his conversion 
 not being genuine, he could never justify himself to the 
 emperor and much less to me. ' I was a tool,' he said, 
 taking leave of me, 'and I was so completely; to-day I do 
 not wish to be so and I will be so no more. I have learned 
 liberalism and its directors, and I am disgusted with them.' 
 His entire conduct is in fact conformed to this declaration, and 
 the Emperor thinks, as I do, that he is not likely to be re- 
 captured easily. God grant it." This attitude of the King 
 gives the key to his conduct in the treatment of Young Italy. 
 The facts of 1833 show that he thought then to make Italy 
 by ordering to the gallows and the galleys whoever dared to 
 pronounce its name. If in 1821 he had been able to excuse 
 himself by the inexperience of his youth and by the difficulties 
 of his position, his conduct in 1833, when a man grown and in 
 secure possession of the crown, and the extreme severities to 
 which he abandoned himself without any justificatio%^^)vv 
 that he had no desire to give constitutional government to 
 Italy. 
 
 But the terrible persecutions inflicted on Young Italy and 
 on all who were suspected of being affiliated to it, produced no 
 relaxation in the energy of the conspirators. Mazzini was 
 indefatigable, and during this period his influence was the 
 dominant influence in the evolution of Italy; he devised an 
 undertaking which was intended by active measures to raise the 
 spirits of the party, and organized an expedition which from 
 Switzerland and from different points should raise the standard 
 of revolution in Savoy. At the same time he proposed risings 
 in various other quarters with the expectation of diverting the 
 attention of the authorities and preventing a concentration 
 against the republican movement. Genoa, Parma, Romagna, 
 the Valtelline and Brescia were to rise, to call off the attention 
 of Austria ; and an agitation was commenced in France with 
 
in. J Succession of Carlo Alberto and the Revival. 47 
 
 the hope of obtaining French assistance. The forces to be 
 raised were put under the command of a soldier of Napoleon 
 by the name of Ramorino. 
 
 But the organization of the expedition lacked every ele- 
 ment of success, and it did not even succeed in meeting the 
 royal forces. Attacked in detail by the population, it was every- 
 where defeated and ignominiously suppressed. The chief point 
 of interest in its history is the appearance of Garibaldi, who 
 undertook to direct the movement at Genoa. The expedition, 
 like many other dreams of Mazzini, had no practical possibility. 
 The forces proposed to be raised, one thousand men, mainly 
 refugees collected here and there without congruity or organiza- 
 tion, revealed his complete incapacity to conceive the conditions 
 of success in an armed movement, and the consequences of 
 complete failure involved the suppression and exile of all the 
 principal agents. Garibaldi in after years used to refer to this 
 expedition as an indication of the incapacity of Mazzini as a 
 revolutionist. His abilities as a conspirator were unequalled. 
 
 Mj£jfji the suppression of the insurrection of Savoy ended all 
 active movements for the constitutional reform of Italy. The 
 government of Carlo Alberto, despotic, suspicious, resembled 
 in all respects that of his predecessors, and during the ten 
 years following, the state was given up to despotism in 
 civil affairs and bigotry in religion.^ The government was 
 carried on through the police and the real power was vested in 
 the church. La Farina and Brofferio say " the police and the 
 clergy became in Piedmont the curse of the state/' The police 
 were more powerful than ever. In the principal cities of the 
 provinces, the governor ; in the smaller towns, the directors of 
 the carabineers ; and in the villages, the syndic and the parish 
 priest, governed. From Genoa, the directors of the Jesuits, 
 and with them the ladies of the Sacred Heart and other religious 
 orders for various classes, guided the policy and opinions of 
 the state. The Austrian Minister, writing in 1834 to the 
 Governor of Milan, says : " If we may judge by appearances, 
 
48 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the people of Turin are the farthest from any ideas of revolu- 
 tion, and the most firmly religious ; the army is devotedly 
 faithful ; the King was received with perfect cordiality during 
 all the festivities, at which between thirty and forty thousand 
 persons were assembled." 
 
 The great outbreak of cholera in Nice, Genoa, and Pied- 
 mont depressed public feeling and public prosperity, and 
 probably hindered any revival- of patriotic sentiment. In 
 1835 a reaction against Austrian influence made a faint ap- 
 pearance, probably due to the exaggerated pressure exercised 
 by Austrian agents on the King. The more intelligent and 
 more patriotic friends of the King stimulated this reaction, and 
 while in its own affairs Piedmont scarcely realized the severity 
 of the despotism which characterized the King's early career, 
 the tendency to independence from Austria became more 
 evident. The political ideas of the King, while opposed to 
 Austria, were no more liberal than the Austrian, but the 
 spirit of the time produced certain results in the codification 
 of law. The civil code, proclaimed in 1837, gave to Pied- 
 mont for the first time a body of law, harmonious indeed 
 but adapted to the principles of the Catholic religion and 
 monarchical privilege rather than to modern purposes. In 
 1839 the penal code was published. This was a reactionary 
 code, in which heresy was punished by prison, and attempted 
 homicide, the concealment of crime, sacrilege and the theft 
 of sacred objects by death — the axe for noblemen and the 
 gallows for the common people. In 1840 the military code 
 was published, and in 1842 the commercial. The priesthood 
 was governed by special laws ; but, after all, the principle was 
 recognized of the subjection of all classes to law. On the 
 other hand local reforms progressed slowly; political, not at all. 
 
 In 1838 the King met the Emperor of Austria at Pavia, 
 and Metternich again testifies to the King's fidelity to, his 
 former professions. The King wrote: "It is, with great im- 
 patience that I have waited for the fortunate moment in 
 
in.] Succession of Carlo Alberto and the Revival. 49 
 
 which, after so many years have passed since our meeting at 
 Genoa, I permit myself to ask you, are you contented with 
 me, and do you find that I have been faithful to the en- 
 gagements I took in 1825 towards the Emperor and his 
 Ministers? At Genoa I read on the countenance of the 
 Emperor and your own that you did not put entire 
 confidence in the frankness of my explanations of the un- 
 fortunate past, nor on the value of my promises for the future. 
 I confess that I was not surprised. I should have marvelled 
 had your impressions been different." Metternich replied that 
 he had kept his word. Carlo Alberto added, " To give you a 
 proof of the faith which I repose in you alone, there is in the 
 world a great conspiracy which seems only directed against 
 the thrones, but is in fact directed against the peace of the 
 social world. I do not suppose I can teach you anything new 
 on this subject; that which I desire to prove to you is that 
 I am not the tool of a faction, like so many others. . It is 
 certain that the position of a King of Sardinia is the most 
 difficult of all positions; this difficulty depends on the 
 defects of the Piedmontese character — a character disposed, 
 to intrigue, at once bold and timid, complaining and cautious. 
 The position of the head of a country animated by such an 
 unfortunate character is by that very fact rendered extremely 
 difficult. He is never free from foreign pressure and therefore 
 must entertain suspicions against other governments. The 
 Piedmontese feeling is above all things an ti- Austrian; it is the 
 influence of France which strengthens this tendency." Then 
 he begged Metternich, in case his conduct did not seem to 
 him clear, to apply to him directly and not trust his letters to 
 the post. Metternich replied that he would rarely profit by 
 this privilege and that the only useful way of dealing with these 
 Piedmontese characters was the way of frankness, open to those 
 who have nothing to hide, either of what they. want or of the 
 direction which they follow. 
 
 These indications of the character of the King, so 
 s. t A 
 
50 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 mysterious in his general tendencies, are useful as pointing 
 out certain clues to his conduct. When he considered 
 himself in his relation to Piedmont alone, he was a despot 
 of the despots. The moment he placed himself face to face 
 with Austria he became a liberal ; not for the sake of liberalism, 
 but because Austria was despotic and because the only way of 
 combating Austria was through the liberal tendency of the time. 
 It is impossible to reconcile the conduct of Carlo Alberto 
 in 1833 and 1834 with any just conception of a liberal 
 monarchy or of constitutional rights. Clearly in his mind 
 the people had no rights; they rested with the King alone. 
 And if at any time he was disposed to make concessions in 
 the direction of constitutional liberty, it was because he found 
 every other road blocked by Austria. Most of his contem- 
 poraries were more or less infected by constitutionalism. 
 A desire for liberty for himself from the control of Austria 
 and of the Jesuits, made him seem to desire liberty for all. 
 
 I have dwelt at greater length, perhaps, than due proportion 
 in the subject justifies, on the details of the conduct of Carlo 
 Alberto, because either with or against his will and tendencies 
 he becomes a starting-point for the development of the history 
 of the kingdom of Italy. In mitigation of so severe a judgment 
 there are certain passages in his life and writings which in justice 
 should be given. We have already seen (p. 24) what he wrote 
 in 1839 in defence of his action in 1821. And in 1840 he writes 
 to Villamarina: "To gain twenty battles is well, but I would be 
 contented, for a cause which I know of, to gain ten and be 
 killed in the tenth ; then I should die happy, thanking God." 
 The inconsistencies of this character are irreconcilable. In 
 1840, when Austria proposed to occupy the line of the Po, in 
 view of the threatened war between France and Germany, the 
 King declared that he would make war on Austria or main- 
 tain an armed neutrality. At the same time, according to 
 Bianchi, it is shown by dispatches between Vienna and Turin, 
 that the Piedmontese government had already alienated France 
 
in.] Succession of Carlo Alberto a?id the Revival. 5 1 
 
 by its support of Don Carlos, and England by denying any con- 
 cession to the Waldenses, and that it finally yielded to Austria 
 without any hope of compensation. It is useless to attempt to 
 follow farther these inconsistencies in the life of a man whose 
 heart is an insoluble mystery. Tivaroni says of him, "The 
 ideal of Carlo Alberto consisted in a despotism founded on 
 Catholicism, but enlightened. All that which did not conflict 
 in his mind with religion, everything that did not lean to 
 liberalism, he promoted generously." Adding to this the 
 inextinguishable and incessant detestation of Austria, to which 
 he never dared give expression and which perhaps for that very 
 reason was more intense, we have an explanation which, if not 
 sufficient for all the sides of the problem, at least relieves him 
 from the worst imputations brought against him. In any case 
 the position of Carlo Alberto in Italian history is too im- 
 portant for light judgments. 
 
 Amongst the later studies to which it is worth our while to 
 give particular attention, is that of Baron A. Blanc {De la 
 Monarchie Representative en Italie 1 ), who is perhaps one of the 
 best fitted amongst the writers on recent Italian history to 
 throw a fair light on this period of it. Among the conclusions 
 of the work indicated occurs the following passage : " It is easy to 
 conjecture, after what has been revealed as to this strange reign, 
 what were the recommendations with which Carlo Felice had 
 accompanied the legacy of the crown. The old King must have 
 spoken to his successor pretty nearly thus: 'You are not strong 
 enough, you and your old friends, to declare war on Austria 
 and to organize a constitutional regime. Rome opposes liberty 
 as much as Austria does independence, and these two obstacles 
 being united, and a league formed between them, you cannot 
 attack one in front without attacking the other, which would 
 be senseless. Can you some day separate from this question 
 the religious element which your interests and your duties 
 forbid you to touch ? That is your affair. For the moment 
 1 Revue des Deux Mondes, 1859. 
 
 
52 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 do not depart from the policy which I have followed, and be 
 you prudent^ or you are lost.' In fact it was impossible to 
 enter into a campaign against two adversaries, of whom one, 
 long since en vedette but now suddenly intervening as the 
 chief corps d'armee, disposed of nearly the entire official 
 nation, of nearly every one of the influences of public 
 employment. The liberal party, feeble, disorganized, divided, 
 distrustful, long excluded from public duties, was not a 
 sufficient auxiliary. The King, faithful in spite of all, sought 
 help from abroad and asked of Louis Philippe if he could 
 count, in giving a constitution, on the assistance of the French 
 army in the case of aggression on the part of Austria should 
 she be discontented. The government of July, which was just 
 then preparing the expedition of Ancona, took no engagements. 
 Carlo Alberto made some efforts to reform abuses ; his orders 
 were evaded. He was overwhelmed with remonstrances from 
 all the notables of the preceding reign; he was obliged to 
 submit to these personages, not being able to make a tabula 
 rasa of all the functionaries of the kingdom. They invented an 
 incredible implement — the opposition of the bureaux. Every 
 generous idea of the King passed under the censure of the 
 ministerial departments, and came out mutilated or reduced to 
 nothing. In 1834, a minister said publicly that the King was a 
 rascal, a traitor and a brigand, but that happily Austria had no 
 confidence in him and could make Radetzky punish him. 
 M. della Margarita, minister of foreign affairs, to-day (1859) chief 
 of the Right in the Parliament, said and caused to be said, that 
 the King was a Carbonaro ; and the Count Broglia, minister 
 at Rome, said freely that between the King and M. della 
 Margarita, he would never hesitate, in case of contradiction, 
 to obey the orders of the latter. All the diplomacy of 
 Piedmont belonged to the Austro-Roman league, and the 
 King in its eyes was only a suspicious personage. 
 
 "What we have to say is so contrary to appearances that 
 we should fear to be accused of writing romance if the epoch 
 
in.] Succession of Carlo Alberto and the Revival. 53 
 
 in question was not so recent, and if the greater part of the 
 men who have groaned under the shame of these disgraces 
 were not still living and ready to give their evidence. They 
 who know how much acuteness of finesse and ability Italian 
 natures may acquire when the Jesuits take pains to make them 
 supple — those who have studied contemporary Italy, reared in 
 the school of servitude, and certain faces which could be named, 
 and which aid us to understand Machiavelli, Alberoni and 
 Mazarin — they only can. form an idea of the network which 
 was thrown over Carlo Alberto, and which he would never 
 have broken through without the generous initiative, or, as some 
 please to call it, the folly, of Pius IX. It would be a singular 
 history to write — that of this unhappy King, of whom they 
 succeeded in making a sort of Henri III, melancholy and 
 bored, or a Charles IX, anxious and savage. The commence- 
 ment of his reign was marked by the insurrections of the liberals 
 whom the defection of their former chief drove to imprecation 
 and revolt. The court of Carlo Alberto, aware that this 
 defection was only apparent, saw that it was necessary to raise 
 between him and his old friends a barrier of dead bodies, and 
 the Count di Cimie'z pronounced these memorable words : 
 'We must make him taste blood, otherwise he will escape us.' 
 The blood was shed as they desired ; thenceforward the King 
 was subject to sudden terrors and inexplicable fears. His 
 remorse, which all his contemporaries knew, threw him into a 
 sombre mysticism, into acts of expiation. He sometimes left 
 his oratory to give himself up to sensual distractions. Those 
 about him profited by this disposition of his mind to encourage 
 the superstitious tendencies of his diseased imagination. He 
 was easily impressed — they terrified him ; he raised around 
 himself an army of phantoms, and the fantastic intrigues which 
 abounded in the palace rivalled the wildest inventions of the 
 modern drama 1 . 
 
 1 Persons who lived in the court of Carlo Alberto have collected 
 some strange details of the intrigues of which he was the butt. Here, 
 
54 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 "The attitude of the enemy was caressing; he introduced 
 his war machine concealed, and when the blow was struck, it 
 seemed that it was a blow from heaven. Hunted by the 
 calculated ferocity of invisible tormentors, Carlo Alberto, be- 
 wildered, had not the energy to defy them openly, because the 
 hallucinations had a character in conformity with the religious 
 impressions which were conveyed to him by the counsels, 
 direct and argumentative, of the Pope. Carlo Alberto was one 
 of those feeble natures which rise to heroism in danger and seek 
 brilliant enterprises, but which lack what may be called 
 domestic energy. The intangible antagonist who lived beside 
 him caused him to lose his courage. Overcome by the 
 internal coalition which besieged him, he had attacks of pros- 
 tration, diz/iness, and fainting fits. Too irresolute to throw 
 off the official persecution by which he was enveloped, he 
 trusted to the hazard of the future. The coins which he then 
 struck bore the legend: 'J'attends mon astre.' Under this 
 formidable pressure Carlo Alberto remained so far faithful to 
 the principles of his youth that we must admire as well as pity 
 him, and render homage to the purity of a conscience so 
 
 amongst others, is an incident which we have from a good source. A man of 
 sense and feeling, then minister of war, was in consultation with the King, 
 when several blows were struck behind a curtain of the hall in which they 
 were. The King turned pale, "It is nothing, Sire," said M. de ***, "some- 
 body is working there doubtless." " You are not religious, you," replied 
 the King with a sombre and preoccupied air. The conversation was 
 resumed. At the end of some minutes the sound recurred. The King 
 turned pale again, began to tremble, and, quitting the astonished minister, 
 went to kneel before a crucifix in an adjoining room. People interested in 
 enfeebling his character had persuaded him that Queen Clotilde, wife of Carlo 
 Emmanuele IV, who had died at Naples in the odour of sanctity, returned 
 from time to time to the palace. Often indeed a mysterious voice, coming 
 from a comer where no one was to be seen, ordered the King what he must 
 do. The spirit scattered in his way morsels of stuffs which the King 
 carried as amulets, and ordered his attendants to carry. Finally it was 
 discovered that this miserable phantasmagory was the work of a valet, a 
 ventriloquist, in conspiracy with a bribed femme de chambre. 
 
in.] Succession of Carlo Alberto and the Revival. 55 
 
 grievously troubled. Far from accusing him of duplicity, of 
 calculating ambition, as has been done by writers who could not 
 know his interior life, we must give him credit for what he tried 
 to do, and for what he did in his rare moments of liberty. 
 Unquiet, perplexed, living, as he bitterly said to the Duke 
 d'Aumale, 'between the daggers of the Carbonari and the 
 chocolate of the Jesuits,' the unfortunate prince still worked, 
 as much as the insubordination of his functionaries permitted, 
 for the unity of his kingdom : he grouped more compactly the 
 provinces around him by simplifying their administration; he 
 separated the public treasury from his own revenues and 
 exacted a rigorous economy both in his household and in 
 the public finances." 
 
 If we are unable to accept entirely the generous defence of 
 this unfortunate prince, which this loyal critic of his life fur- 
 nishes us, remembering that not in all cases can the defence of 
 force majeure, moral or political, be adduced for the duplicities 
 of the sovereign, at least these facts, for which the name of the 
 author is sufficient guarantee, indicate a weakness of character, 
 exaggerated by a morbid religious education, which must often 
 have left him irresponsible for his conclusions. 
 
 Further, this curious and profoundly interesting study of 
 the early history of the Italian kingdom has a side-light import 
 which deserves a word of notice, as it explains a peculiarity 
 in the present condition of public affairs — the recurrence of 
 what the author calls the ' opposition of the bureaux,' displayed 
 in official conspiracies against the most solemn obligations of 
 the Sovereign's word and even the declared will of the nation. 
 It explains also the breaches of that continuity of public policy 
 which is indispensable to constitutional government, especially 
 in its foreign affairs, breaches due to the blind pursuit of 
 personal and partisan advantages — an inheritance from that 
 mediaeval statesmanship which survives through the reigns of 
 Carlo Felice and Carlo Alberto to that of Umberto I. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES, 1815-1847. 
 
 Before entering on the struggle between Piedmont and 
 Austria — the decisive feature of Italian history during the 
 years of revolution, 1848-49 — it will be necessary to relate 
 the chief events which had taken place elsewhere in Italy 
 during the previous generation. 'The movement for Italian 
 unity began in Piedmont, and it was in that little state that 
 liberal principles of government first took root and shape; but 
 the statesmen of Piedmont could never have succeeded in 
 creating the constitutional kingdom of Italy, had not the 
 ground been prepared by other agencies in other lands. 
 Throughout the peninsula, foreign pressure and domestic 
 tyranny were year by year adding to the fuel of revolution, 
 the flames of which burst forth repeatedly in one region or 
 another. The efforts of reformers and revolutionists were 
 often misled by passion, ignorance, or local prejudice; their 
 methods were crude, and their aims lacked precision; liberalism 
 and national unity sometimes found themselves in disastrous 
 opposition. But the heart of the people was gradually stirred 
 to its depths, and in the fulness of time — though not in the 
 chaotic turmoil of 1848 — the leaders appeared, who were 
 capable of uniting and guiding the popular upheaval, and 
 the blood of many martyrs bore fruit at length in a national 
 triumph. , 
 
:hap. iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 5 7 
 
 (1) Naples. 
 
 The restoration of the Neapolitan Bourbons after 1815 
 the restoration of the ancien regime. Nothing had been 
 trned, and the severity of repression extended even to the 
 circulation of books whose liberalism was of the most moderate 
 kind. In 1816 the public executioner burned in a public place 
 a great quantity of books condemned for their political views. 
 Nevertheless the condition of the "Two Sicilies" remained most 
 apathetic, and until 1820 no movement of any kind took place 
 against the oppressive tyranny which the king had brought 
 back. The Carbonari, who during the rule of Murat, had 
 been more or less encouraged by the king, from his refuge in 
 Sicily, as a means of disturbing the foreign government, now 
 became instruments in the hands of political agitators, who 
 had, however, no intention or conception of acting in favour 
 of a united Italy. It was, also, rather a tendency to rebellion 
 against any authority, and especially against foreign authority, 
 than a movement in favour of constitutional liberty. Slight 
 movements from 1818 to 1820 marked rather local discontent 
 than serious plans of action. Addresses to the King and harm- 
 less demonstrations were not wanting, but nothing serious 
 happened. 
 
 In 1820 a military movement took place, unique in this 
 respect, in the annals of Italy, but similar to the contemporary 
 movement in Spain. It was isolated, and had no previous or 
 subsequent relations with the movements in upper Italy. Started 
 by two officers in the army, with a priest, and subsequently 
 headed by General Pepe, it was joined by the Carbonari, and 
 other disorderly elements. The aims of the conspirators were 
 divergent, but there was a vague demand for a constitution. 
 The King, bound by an agreement with Austria, at first refused 
 to concede constitutional rights, but after Pepe with a brigade 
 of regular troops had joined the insurrectionary movement, he 
 yielded. 
 
 X* OF TF I 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
58 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 On the 6th of July the following edict was published: "To 
 the people of my kingdom of the two Sicilies: It being mani- 
 festly the general desire of the people of the two Sicilies to have 
 a constitutional government, of our own free will we consent, 
 and promise in eight days to publish the bases. Until the 
 proclamation of the constitution the laws now existing will be 
 enforced. Having satisfied the public desire in this way, we 
 order that the troops shall return to their divisions and every- 
 body else to his occupation." On the same day anew ministry 
 took office, composed of the Duke of Campochiaro, Count 
 Ricciardi, General Carrascosa, Marchese Amato and Ferreri, 
 all (except the last) adherents of Murat and reputed liberals. 
 A third decree, issued under the pretext of the king's health, 
 confided the active direction of affairs to his son the Duke of 
 Calabria, as Vicario, the king desiring to escape direct responsi- 
 bility for the concessions necessary and evidently not being 
 easy in his conscience about the violation of the league with 
 Austria, which bound him to give no constitutional rights 
 diverse from those of the Austrian empire. 
 
 It is probable that the king's intention always was ulti- 
 mately to withdraw concessions that had been due to fear. 
 His withdrawal from responsibility confirmed the suspicion 
 of his insincerity and therefore strengthened the movement. 
 The concession of the constitution stimulated the general 
 effervescence the more as the ignorant population, not under- 
 standing the meaning of the movement, exaggerated it in the 
 sense of personal liberty until it was joined by the whole 
 kingdom. The agitation increased, and on the night of the 
 7th of July the King constituted a council of notables and 
 signed a decree according a constitution, copied, with certain 
 modifications, from that of Spain, generally known as the 
 constitution of 181 2. The revolted army, now become the 
 main support of the constitutional movement, arrived at Naples 
 on the 9th of July, commanded by Pepe and the officers who 
 had organized the movement : the column, preceded by masses 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 59 
 
 of Neapolitan liberals and by thousands of the proprietors of 
 the adjoining provinces amounting in all to about twenty 
 thousand men, entered Naples in great triumph. Pe'pe, as 
 commander in chief, was received by the King with honour, 
 and in this manner the revolution was completed without 
 bloodshed, although those who remembered the movement 
 of 1799 predicted its failure. In fact the temperament of 
 the people was not well adapted to such a movement. The 
 Neapolitans in general had really no constitutional ideas: 
 undisciplined in politics, undermined by a system of espionage 
 and corrupt government, they displayed no unity of purpose, 
 no desire for honest government, and no perception of common 
 interest in any direction. 
 
 On July 13, the King took a formal and solemn oath, in 
 the royal chapel, to observe the constitution. Next day, the 
 new government diminished the price of salt, liberated all 
 political prisoners, and amnestied those condemned for slight 
 punishments: a little later, this clemency was extended to 
 many of those condemned for more serious crimes. The 
 government also called for volunteers to increase the army. 
 The constitution established all the privileges of the Church 
 and of the Crown, and provided for the election of a Cortes 
 similar to that of Spain, but it soon appeared that it was too 
 liberal a form of government to be practicable in Naples, where 
 the nation was unaccustomed to so much liberty. 
 
 The first consequence was the hostility of Austria, which 
 decided on measures of repression and on the enforcement of 
 the compact which the King had made with the Emperor. 
 The three allied monarchies were agreed in the attitude to 
 be taken, and Prince Metternich on the 25th of July sent 
 a circular to the German courts to notify them that Austria 
 retused to recognise the revolution in Naples, and that at need 
 she would repress it by force. He also prohibited a movement 
 planned by the Duke of Modena in anticipation of Austrian 
 interference. Austria was disposed to move immediately. 
 
60 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 England, although not favouring Austrian intervention, was 
 indisposed to oppose it actively; and France limited herself 
 to persuading the Czar Alexander, who was then under the 
 influence of the liberal minister, Capodistrias, that it would 
 have been convenient to support the constitutional movement 
 at Naples. On the initiative of France, a congress was 
 convoked at Troppau in October, 1820, with the idea of 
 arbitration at Naples to conciliate the King and the consti- 
 tutionalists. Russia, France and England would have agreed 
 on advising the concession of the constitution, but Metternich 
 applied all his energies successfully to repelling their inter- 
 vention. The want of unanimity in the views of the powers 
 at the congress paralyzed the general liberal intention of the 
 majority, and the energy of Austria triumphed over the in- 
 decision of the other powers. 
 
 It was decided finally to call a congress of the European 
 states, and since the allied sovereigns could not negotiate with 
 the revolution at Naples, to invite the King to come to Laibach 
 to confer with them. The King willingly accepted this means 
 of escaping from complicity with the revolution, and, after taking 
 a fresh oath to observe the constitution, and appointing his eldest 
 son to act as regent in his absence, he left Naples (December 
 14th, 1820). On arriving at Laibach he put himself entirely 
 in the hands of the Austrians, in consequence of which the 
 congress agreed that Austria should occupy the kingdom of 
 Naples and assist the king to recover his legitimate authority: 
 Sardinia, Tuscany, and Modena accepted the principle of 
 intervention. Only the Pope declared that he would take 
 no part in acts calculated to develope hostilities, and offered 
 his mediation for the pacific settlement of the question. On 
 the 9th of February, 182 1, the Duke of Gallo arrived at Naples 
 with a letter from the King to his son, the Regent, announcing 
 the decision which he, in agreement with the Congress, had 
 arrived at. He said: "It is beyond my power and beyond 
 all human capacity, to bring about any other result; there is 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of tJie Two Sicilies. 61 
 
 no uncertainty whatever as to the alternative in which we 
 are placed, nor of the means which alone remain to me of 
 preserving my kingdom from the plague of war." He did 
 not insist on the explicit abolition of the constitution, but 
 said: "They [the powers] consider it as an object of the 
 highest importance for the security and tranquillity of the 
 states bordering on my kingdom, and consequently all Europe, 
 that the means which I shall adopt to give my country the 
 stability of which it has need should not restrict my own liberty 
 in the choice of measures. They desire sincerely that, sur- 
 rounded by the most honest and the wisest men amongst my 
 subjects, I should consult the true and permanent interests of 
 my people without losing sight of what the maintenance of the 
 general peace demands. They desire that there should result 
 from my care and energy a system of government calculated 
 to guarantee for ever the repose and the prosperity of my 
 kingdom, and to render safe at the same time the other states 
 of Italy, removing all those motives of anxiety which the late 
 events in our country have occasioned." 
 
 The parliament in reply to these declarations decided to 
 meet the intervention of Austria with armed resistance, attri- 
 buting the decision of the King not to his own free will but 
 to the pressure from foreign power, and issued the following 
 proclamation : " The nation of the two Sicilies is the natural 
 ally of all states governed by a constitution similar to its own 
 or by any other. It renounces all right of interference in the 
 government of other nations, direct or indirect, but will never 
 consent that others should restrict its liberty of action within 
 its own limits, and it is disposed to employ every means to 
 cause its proclaimed independence to be respected. The 
 kingdom of the two Sicilies offers an asylum to all exiles 
 for liberal opinions; and finally, the nation will never con- 
 descend to make peace with an enemy as long as such shall 
 occupy its territory." 
 
 The people were in an ecstasy. The Carbonari hastened 
 
62 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 to enroll soldiers and to provide for their families./ Amongst 
 those who demanded to serve were the Prince of Salerno, son of 
 the King, the Duke of Ascoli, the Prince of Partanna, and the 
 son of the Prince of Niscemi, who was with the King at Lai bach. 
 The Austrian forces, forty-three thousand strong, now set out, 
 while the King, who had arrived at Florence, issued from thence 
 a proclamation declaring that the Austrian army should be 
 regarded as the protector of his subjects, and warning the 
 Neapolitan army and navy that they must consider it as a 
 force acting in the true interest of the kingdom ; further, that, 
 so far from having entered it for the purpose of conquest or 
 subjection, the Austrian army was authorized to unite with 
 the Neapolitan army to assure tranquillity and protect the true 
 friends of the country who were faithful subjects of their king. 
 The Austrians crossed the Po on the 4th of February, 182 1, 
 and moved slowly through the Abruzzi, directing their march 
 upon Naples. The army of Pepe, amounting to eighteen 
 thousand men with five thousand irregulars, met it at Rieti. 
 In the battle which followed, the Neapolitans, through want of 
 discipline or unity of command, were defeated after a slight 
 resistance, and fell back, intending to renew the defence on 
 the line of the Volturno ; but discontent and insubordination 
 in the army rendered the defence ineffective, and the resist- 
 ance was put down with no further serious fighting. On 
 March 23 the Austrians entered Naples. The division in the 
 ranks of the Neapolitans, strongly aided by the proclamation 
 of the King from Florence, had already undermined the 
 authority of the parliament, which was suppressed almost 
 without regret. In May, 182 1, the King returned. Naples 
 was not yet prepared to understand even what constitutional 
 government meant, and submitted again to the corrupting, 
 disorganizing regime of the Bourbons, with the discontent of 
 only a very small but influential class. 
 
 Political trials followed in great abundance; some eight 
 hundred persons (says La Farina) were sentenced to death; 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 6$ 
 
 and the prisons were filled with the condemned. Of the 
 nature of these prisons Europe was informed later by the 
 letters of Mr Gladstone, which have become classic 1 . But the 
 indignation of Europe had no other effect tjjan to destroy 
 temporarily the influence of liberal governments over that of 
 Naples. Even the Piedmontese government of 1826, by the 
 hand of Carlo Felice himself, urged the King of Naples to 
 consent to the prolongation of the Austrian occupation, in 
 order to preserve monarchical principles from destruction. 
 The King commuted most of the sentences of death into 
 various terms of imprisonment, but under the pressure of the 
 Austrian government a list of over one hundred thousand 
 suspected subjects was drawn up by the police. The Austrian 
 army was withdrawn in 1827, having cost the kingdom of 
 Naples over three hundred millions of francs. 
 
 On Jan. 4, 1825, King Ferdinando died, and was succeeded 
 by his son, Francesco I. His succession brought no change in 
 the tyranny of the government. But for some time there 
 seemed to be no vitality in the popular discontent. A slight 
 movement in 1828 indicated rather local oppression than any 
 general tendency to revolt, but it supplied the government 
 with a pretext for a number of executions, and for the entire 
 extinction of the commune of Bosco, where the rising had 
 taken place. Francesco I. died on Nov. 8, 1830, and his son 
 Ferdinando II succeeded. It was hoped that his antecedents 
 would justify themselves by an enlargement of popular liberty. 
 But accession to his father's throne produced also adhesion 
 to his father's principles. The King was changed but not 
 the system. In 1831 a slight movement, the result oi the 
 revolution of 1830 in Paris, took place, but there was no 
 serious result. In 1832 a movement, in which several priests 
 took part, was also suppressed without difficulty. In 1836, 
 on the birth of the heir to the throne, the King conceded an 
 
 1 Republished in Gleanings of Past Years, vol. I v. 
 
64 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 amnesty to numbers of political exiles, but his political attitude 
 became more decidedly despotic after the death of his first 
 wife, a princess of the House of Savoy, and his marriage in 
 the following year with an Austrian princess strengthened the 
 Austrian influence on the government. In 1837, another 
 movement, in the Abruzzi, gave occasion for more condem- 
 nations and more imprisonments, but led to no further result. 
 Another partial outbreak, which took place in 1841, was 
 followed by 133 arrests and three executions. 
 
 In 1843 the Mazzinian conspiracy began to make itself felt 
 in the Neapolitan and central Italian provinces where the 
 influence of Piedmont had not hitherto penetrated. The 
 conception of Piedmontese leadership being less prominent 
 in the plans of the central and southern liberals, Mazzini's 
 propaganda more readily took root, and under the influence 
 of his committees insurrectionary movements began. An 
 organization was established by the London committee in 
 the Romagna and in Naples, the Neapolitan committee being 
 under the direction of Carlo Poerio and Francesco Paolo 
 Bozzelli. The most celebrated of all these insurrectionary 
 movements, more from its romantic and heroic character than 
 from the importance of the movement itself or of its political 
 consequences, was that of the brothers Bandiera. This move- 
 ment, the early preparations for which had been made by the 
 Mazzinian committees, but whether under the direction of 
 Mazzini himself or not is not clearly established, was in 
 sympathy with the movement in Naples. The Neapolitan 
 branch of the insurrectionary committee was established on 
 the 15th of March, 1843, and was to embrace Sicily and 
 Calabria simultaneously. Poerio writes that great difficulty 
 was found in keeping the more active and enthusiastic of the 
 conspirators within the limits determined by the committee, 
 the more prudent desiring to retard the movement until the 
 preparations were complete; but the impatient spirits broke 
 from the control of the general committee and on the 15th of 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 65 
 
 March, 1 844, precipitated a rising at Cosenza. A brief skirmish 
 with the Neapolitan forces took place, in which a few insurgents 
 were killed and three of the gendarmes wounded, whereupon 
 the insurgents dispersed. The consequence of this failure was 
 the arrest of a number of the directors of the conspiracy at 
 Naples : Poerio, d'Ayala, Bozzelli, de Agostinis, Primicerio, 
 Cosimo and Damiano Assanti, Pierri, Graziosi and de Martini 
 were imprisoned. 
 
 Contemporaneously with this movement, the Bandieras 
 organized their expedition at Corfu. The two brothers were 
 the sons of an admiral in the Austrian navy, born in Venice, 
 and at an early period had become infected by the enthusiasm 
 and mysticism of Mazzini. In 1843, after the insurrection in 
 Bologna, Attilio, the elder brother, wrote : "The insurrectionary 
 ferment in Italy will last, if I may believe the current rumours, 
 and, thinking that it may be the dawn of our great day of 
 liberation, it appears to me that every good patriot should 
 cooperate as much as possible. I am studying a way to go to 
 the scene of action, and if I do not succeed it will certainly 
 not be my fault. It will be my preoccupation, once arrived in 
 the locality, to place myself at the head of a political band, to 
 penetrate into the mountains, and there to combat for our 
 cause to the death. The material importance will be, I 
 foresee, very slight, but the moral influence will be much 
 more important, because I shall excite apprehension in the 
 heart of our most powerful oppressor. I will give an eloquent 
 example to every other person who, like me, may be bound by 
 absurd and inadmissible oaths 1 , and I shall thus strengthen the 
 faith of our associates, weak rather from want of confidence in 
 our own means than from an exaggerated idea of the hostile 
 forces or any other reason." In his description of himself, 
 Attilio says, " I am nearly thirty-three years old ; of a rather 
 weak constitution; of an ardent heart, but often-times ap- 
 parently cold ; disposed to follow the maxims of stoicism. I 
 
 1 Allusion probably to his oath as officer in the service of Austria. 
 S. I. C 
 
66 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 believe in God and in the future life and in human progress. 
 I am accustomed in my thoughts to consider in their due 
 order, humanity, the country, the family and the individual. 
 I hold firmly that the family is the basis of all right, and 
 therefore I concluded a long time ago that the Italian cause 
 is wrapt up in that of humanity ; and rendering homage to 
 this indisputable truth, I comfort myself in the sadness and 
 difficulty of our times by the reflection that to help Italy is to 
 help all humanity. With a temperament equally ardent in 
 reflection and ready in execution, I have convinced myself of 
 the justice of the principles indicated above, and I resolve to 
 dedicate myself entirely to their practical development, which 
 is sure progress. Reflecting on the conditions of our country, 
 I have easily persuaded myself that the most probable way 
 to success in the emancipation of Italy from her present 
 opprobrious position must be that of conspiracy. By what 
 other means, in fact, than that of secrecy can the oppressed 
 prepare themselves for the struggle for liberation? Do not 
 disdain my proposals. You will find in my principles that 
 weapon which is likely to be most efficacious in the fight that 
 is being prepared by those who have the courage to raise the 
 standard of our independence and of order and regeneration." 
 Correspondence with Mazzini increased Attilio's sense of his 
 own importance and of his duty to Italy, and determined him 
 to undertake the dangerous enterprise which, though it resulted 
 in absolute defeat, still served as one of the most powerful 
 stimulants to foreign sympathy. In this sense the apparently 
 insignificant movement of the Bandiera brothers must be con- 
 sidered as one of the highest moral importance, and deserves 
 more notice than failures of far greater scope and gravity. 
 
 A letter of Emilio Bandiera to Mazzini, dated the 19th 
 of March, 1 844, says : " How will my mother and my wife, 
 delicate beings, and incapable of resistance to great griefs, 
 withstand this ruin ? To serve humanity and the fatherland 
 was, and will always be, I hope, my first desire, but I must 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 67 
 
 confess that it costs me much." On the 28th of March he 
 writes again to Mazzini: "Convinced of the duty imposed 
 upon every Italian, to give himself entirely to the improvement 
 of the destinies of our unfortunate country, we sought every 
 method to take part in that Young Italy which we knew was 
 formed to organize the patriotic insurrection. For three years 
 our efforts were useless. Your writings did not circulate any 
 longer in Italy. The governments said that you were over- 
 whelmed and discouraged by the unfortunate result of the 
 insurrection in Savoy, and, without knowing your principles, 
 we agreed with them. We wished our country united, free and 
 republican. We propose to trust only to the national means, 
 to despise any foreign aid, and to throw down the gauntlet 
 when we believe ourselves sufficiently strong, without waiting 
 for deceitful reports from Europe." 
 
 The mother of the Bandiera brothers, hearing that her sons 
 had deserted the Austrian service, followed them to Corfu and 
 piteously besought them to return to Venice and to resume 
 their positions in the Austrian navy, assuring them of pardon 
 and reinstatement. The account which Attilio gives in a letter 
 to Mazzini dated the 22nd of April, 1844, of the interview with 
 his mother, is one of the most striking and pathetic documents 
 in the story of this, the most chivalrous attempt in the annals 
 of Italian insurrection. " In vain I told her that duty com- 
 mands me to remain here ; that my native country is very dear 
 to me ; that when I return to it again, it will be not to live an 
 ignominious life, but to die a glorious death : that my safe- 
 conduct to Italy is henceforward the point of my sword : that 
 no affection can tear me from its standard, which I will em- 
 brace, and that though one may abandon the standard of a 
 king, he never may that of a country. My mother, agitated 
 and blinded by her feelings, did not hear me; called me 
 impious, unnatural, and an assassin, and her tears racked my 
 heart. Her reproofs, although not merited, pierced me like 
 the points of daggers. But suffering does not take away my 
 
 5— 2 
 
68 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 reason ; I know that these tears and this contempt are the 
 attendants on tyranny, and if at first I was only animated by 
 love of my country, I am now equally swayed by the hatred 
 which I feel for the despots and usurpers who, through their 
 infamous ambition to reign over others, condemn families to 
 such horrors. Reply to me with a word of comfort. Your 
 applause is worth a thousand insults which I receive from the 
 base, the false, the egotists and the deluded." 
 
 The Austrian government summoned the brothers to re- 
 spond for their desertion, but its summons only called forth 
 this reply from Attilio : "On the 14th of this month, we, the 
 undersigned, received the citation sent to us by order of the 
 supreme command. We boast of what the tribunal threatens 
 to consider high treason. We must either betray our country 
 and humanity, or oppose the foreigner and the oppressor. In 
 this alternative our choice is clear. The laws to which you 
 would still hold us responsible are laws of blood which we, with 
 all the just and humane, repel and abhor. The death to which 
 they would inevitably condemn us is better met by any other 
 method than under their lying and infamous direction. Force 
 is their only law, and we to a little extent at least will en- 
 deavour to put the force on our own side in order to give the 
 victory to real justice." These extracts show sufficiently the 
 utterly impracticable and romantic natures of the Bandiera 
 brothers; and the conclusion which practical men would 
 naturally draw from their declarations — that they were rather 
 of the material of the martyr than the conspirator — is confirmed 
 by the issue of the insurrection. 
 
 Ricciardi, who was one of their associates, was engaged as 
 a messenger between Paris, Marseilles, Leghorn and Corsica, 
 to arrange for the general insurrection under the direction of 
 Mazzini. It was planned that Ricciardi should land near 
 Civita Vecchia with a thousand Corsicans for an attack on 
 Rome. Nicolo Fabrizzi, starting from Malta with a band of 
 Algerians, was to raise the standard of insurrection in Sicily ; 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 69 
 
 others from Malta and from the Ionian Islands were to attempt 
 a landing on the shores of Tuscany and Naples, while ^others 
 from the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea were to invade Lombard}' 
 and Piedmont. The Committee at Paris considered the plan 
 impracticable, and it was therefore abandoned. Meanwhile 
 the Bandieras in the Ionian Islands having been joined by a 
 number of those who were waiting for the general movement, 
 were preparing for their expedition to Calabria. Fabrizzi, to 
 whom Bandiera had applied for funds, condemned the under- 
 taking as rash and destined to failure. He added, "Your 
 purpose seems to be the satisfaction of a love of excitement 
 which is entirely personal ; and you will sacrifice uselessly all 
 the men who abandon themselves to your guidance." He 
 warned the leader that in Calabria the agitation had ceased, 
 but at the same time offered to assist him in any other 
 direction. The reply of Emilio to this letter shows the nature 
 of the brothers and of their enthusiasm for Italy in a light so 
 clear that it is worth quoting, in order that one may better 
 understand the nature of the excitement developed by the 
 writings and influence of Mazzini. Emilio replied, " In Italy 
 they begin to believe that the exiles, in their impatience for 
 victory, represent everything in rosy colour, hoping that chance 
 may develope some slight incident into a general conflagration, 
 by the success of which they may profit without having made 
 the requisite preparations. We, recently proscribed, are well 
 aware how much you are calumniated — unjustly, it is true — for 
 not having allowed yourself to be killed in heading the first 
 movement and strengthening it with your presence and ex- 
 perience. And, therefore, we wish to respond once for all that 
 misfortune has assimilated our case to yours j we wish to give 
 the millions to understand that, if uncertainty still exists, yet, 
 wherever a movement takes place, the exiles will hasten to 
 participate in the glory and the danger, without waiting until 
 the success of such a movement shall have rendered their 
 assistance superfluous." 
 
70 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Even Mazzini and Ricciardi attempted to persuade the 
 Bandieras to forego this expedition, and they had already 
 turned their attention to another movement in Romagna, when 
 they were joined by Nicolo Ricciotti, another of the en- 
 thusiasts of Mazzini's school, who, weak in judgment, abounded 
 in enthusiasm and courage, and, like the Bandieras, had de- 
 cided if necessary to sacrifice himself in order to stimulate the 
 insurrection. The influence of Ricciotti decided the Bandieras 
 to resume their original plan for a descent on Calabria, and 
 Attilio wrote on the nth of June, 1844, to Mazzini as follows : 
 " Addio ! the time is short. I carry with me the principal 
 articles of a new political constitution for Italy ; that is to say 
 those concerning a communal organization, a national guard, 
 and elections.... If we succumb, say to our fellow citizens that 
 they should follow our example because life is given to us in 
 order that we may employ it nobly ; and the cause for which 
 we have fought and for which we will die is the most pure and 
 most holy that has ever warmed the breasts of men ; it is that 
 of liberty, equality, humanity, independence and Italian unity." 
 
 The expedition sailed on the 12th of June, 1844; it was 
 composed of nineteen persons, including the two Bandieras and 
 Domenico Moro, a fellow officer in the Austrian navy. The 
 question has been raised and discussed at length, whether the 
 expedition of the Bandiera brothers was betrayed by the 
 British government to that of Naples, and the charge has been 
 affirmed and denied without ever being absolutely proved or 
 disproved. The fact is indisputable that Cardinal Lambruschini, 
 Secretary of State to the Pope, informed the Cardinal Legate 
 of Bologna on the 27th of April of the expedition. It has been 
 alleged that this knowledge, said to have been communicated 
 by the English ministry of the day at a moment when the 
 movement could scarcely have been yet known in Corfu, was 
 derived from a letter of Mazzini intercepted in the English 
 post. The expedition landed on the 16th of June, 1844, at 
 Cotrone. Attilio on landing kissed the earth, exclaiming, 
 
r.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. » 71 
 
 I- 
 "Thou hast given us life and for thee we will spend it." A 
 proclamation to the Italians had been prepared : it was signed 
 by the two Bandieras and Ricciotti, and headed, "Liberty, 
 equality, independence, unity and the republic ! No more 
 kings ! Italians, God has created us all equal ; we are all 
 made in his image ; no other than He has the right to call us 
 his. What have the kings done for us ? They have proscribed 
 us and oppressed us, and have filled our country with shame and 
 insult. Let us establish a republic as did our forefathers when 
 they drove out the Tarquins. Let us proclaim ourselves free, 
 masters of ourselves, in this country in which God has placed 
 us." On the 17th the Bandieras were deserted, near San 
 Severino, by their guide, who appears to have betrayed them 
 to the Neapolitan authorities. Their childish ignorance of 
 everything that pertained to military operations and to success- 
 ful conspiracy now began to appear, in the fact that they knew 
 not where they were going or to whom to address themselves. 
 They wandered for days in a strange country, establishing no 
 communications with any friendly persons, apparently seeking 
 at hazard some chance by which they might execute their plans. 
 Under the guidance of peasants found in the locality, they 
 moved westward and near San Benedetto were attacked at 
 night by the gendarmes. After a slight conflict, in which they 
 repelled the gendarmes with little loss, they arrived at the villa 
 of the family Benincasa, eight miles from San Giovanni in 
 Fiori, where they stopped to rest. Here the people were 
 hostile and, reinforced by a battalion of cacciatori, attacked 
 them. After a short conflict with overwhelming forces, the 
 Bandieras and their principal followers were made prisoners, 
 maltreated, and carried to prison in San Giovanni in Fiori. 
 
 The trial by court martial, which followed, showed that the 
 brothers maintained their enthusiasm and courage in disaster 
 as in the attempt that led to it, and completes the picture of 
 the heroic self-sacrifice which we have seen displayed in their 
 letters to Mazzini. " During the trial the serene majesty and 
 
72 Italy. [Chai». 
 
 amiability of their looks and speech, and their grace of manner, 
 inspired reverence and pity," remarks an historian of the event. 
 On learning in prison of the execution of the prisoners taken 
 in the attempt at Cosenza a few weeks previously, Attilio wrote 
 to Signor Gioachino Gaudio as follows : " He who writes to 
 you these few words knows that he is inevitably destined to 
 speedy death. Oh ! when he burned to follow the dictates of 
 his ideals, it was not in this way that he hoped to finish his life. 
 The desire of his days, the dream of his nights, was to die on 
 the battle-field fighting against those who hinder Italy from 
 becoming like any other country and recovering its national 
 rights. Ah ! it will not be German bayonets but Italian bullets 
 which will unite us to God. What a disillusion and what a 
 mission, to be disowned and to be destroyed by those whom 
 we deemed our brothers." 
 
 But this tone of defiance was not consistently maintained. 
 While in prison, Attilio wrote a letter to the king, defending 
 his action on the ground that the movement was intended to 
 promote the cause of Italian unity, and declaring that if the 
 king of Naples was willing to become the constitutional sove- 
 reign of the peninsula he would devote his life and soul to his 
 majesty. He ended by asking for an audience. In a letter to 
 his advocate, Attilio says : " This king of Italy I cannot find 
 excepting in the king of Naples; he is an Italian, he is a 
 successor of Manfredi; against him there are no precedents such 
 as there are against the king of Savoy and the Duke of Modena; 
 he is not to blame for the deeds of 182 1-3 1 ; he is not impotent 
 like the Duke of Lucca, nor of the Austrian blood like the 
 Grand-duke of Tuscany. Persuaded that Ferdinand II, in ac- 
 cepting this policy, would become glorious, and that he would 
 have the fortitude qualifying him to regenerate our country, 
 which is also his ; knowing that to a great extent the hopes of 
 Italy converge on him, we believed that in this noble struggle 
 he would throw down the royal gauntlet, and we hastened 
 to make the appeal." Prison and the prospect of death 
 
wit-1 
 
 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 73 
 
 without the glory of battle here seem to have chilled the 
 courage and enthusiasm of the brothers, and in their defence 
 the energy and nobility of their first proposal disappear. The 
 reply to their accusers no longer rests upon the determination 
 to emancipate the country from its royal oppressors and to 
 restore the republican purity of organization, but on a com- 
 promise between the despot and personal liberty. But the 
 defence was useless, and the weakness of these last moments 
 may be forgotten in the nobility of purpose and the constancy 
 with which the Bandieras pursued their purpose to the end. 
 
 The court sentenced seventeen of the eighteen conspirators 
 to be shot, with ignominy, while the treacherous guide was 
 condemned to five years of imprisonment, probably to conceal 
 the fact of his complicity with the authorities. On the declara- 
 tion of the sentence, Emilio recovering his courage, cried, "Viva 
 la liberta, viva la patria ! " and sang the chorus, " Who for his 
 country dies has lived long enough." Five of the seventeen 
 had their sentences commuted to imprisonment, but the others- 
 were shot according to the sentence. The soldiers who executed 
 the sentence wept. The priests who visited the condemned men 
 discussed with them theological questions, and Nardi maintained 
 that he knew the gospels better than they. Ricciotti told the 
 priest Rosa that they believed that in the mountains of Calabria 
 there were multitudes of people who had attempted to revolt 
 and that their presence would have inspired movements in 
 other localities. On the 23rd of July, the day of their death, 
 the prisoners dressed themselves with the greatest elegance 
 possible in the circumstances and, refusing to be attended 
 by the priests, went to execution, attired according to the 
 sentence, in long black tunics, their heads veiled, and their feet 
 naked — the indications of ignominious punishment. Having 
 been led to the Chapel, where they were detained for some 
 time till the telegraphic confirmation of their sentence arrived, 
 they were marched to the valley of Rovito on the river Crati 
 near Cosenza, where they were shot. The fire was irregular: 
 
74 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Attilio, Lupatelli, and Venerucci survived the first discharge 
 and died with the words: "Viva l'ltalia! viva la liberta! viva 
 la patria!" 
 
 The absolute recklessness of the Bandieras, seen in the 
 light of history, affords example at once of the folly and the 
 heroism of the Italian insurrectionary movement. Judged by 
 its immediate and practical results, it was folly; judged by 
 its moral influence, none of the futile attempts was more 
 potent for Italian liberation. Mazzini has been charged with 
 responsibility for this unfortunate effort. That he did con- 
 stantly stimulate to rebellion at any cost and against any risk 
 there can be no doubt: this was a characteristic of the Mazzinian 
 agitation. The Bandiera enterprise was the legitimate fruit of 
 Mazzini's propaganda, and the fact that at the last moment he 
 condemned as rash that particular movement in which the 
 Bandieras perished does not affect the accusation that he 
 urged men recklessly and without any regard to consequences 
 to attempt insurrection, even in the most desperate circum- 
 stances. It is impossible, however, to judge or to condemn 
 the general policy except with reference to the general result, 
 and there is no question that the general result of Mazzini's 
 policy was to develop in the most direct and powerful manner 
 the insurrectionary tendency amongst all the youth of Italy. 
 The enthusiasm of men who die for an idea has the effect of 
 martyrdom, whether political or religious, and Mazzini's teach- 
 ing must be always judged as a religious propaganda and 
 not as practical politics. The names of the Bandieras un- 
 doubtedly a*cted subsequently as powerful incentives, and the 
 faith of the brothers, expressed in their own words, caused 
 " their example to be contagious to forty thousand Italians, 
 lovers of their country and bound by oath to her fortunes." 
 It is necessary that those who are born to martyrdom should 
 throw themselves absolutely into any enterprise, even though 
 it be destined to failure, hoping to induce by their example the 
 inert and the timid and those of little faith to follow them. 
 
The Kingdom of the Tzvo Sicilies. 75 
 
 (2) Sicily. 
 
 The condition of Sicily in 181 5, when the Bourbons were 
 I re-established, was in many respects different from that of the 
 other Italian states. English influence, which had been para- 
 mount in the island during the Napoleonic war, had given to 
 the Sicilians, always restless under the government of Naples, 
 a certain experience of constitutional freedom, and the return 
 of the Bourbons and the abolition of the constitution caused 
 an appeal of the warmest nature to be made to the English 
 government for the preservation of the rights which it had 
 guaranteed to them. The appeal was fruitless, for Austrian 
 influence, hostile to all constitutional concessions, soon resumed 
 its control over the royal councils. The separation of Sicily as 
 a kingdom from Naples was maintained for a while, but ceased 
 in 1 816. During the absence of the King from Sicily a prince 
 of the royal family, or a distinguished personage chosen by the 
 King, was invested with vice-regal powers. But in order to 
 pave the way for a return to the ancient despotism, a form 
 of constitution was promulgated on June 1st, 181 5, which 
 established a parliament, consisting of two chambers, peers 
 and commons; the legislative power depending upon the 
 initiative of the King, by whom all laws were to be presented 
 to the chambers. The executive power was uncontrolled and 
 solely in the hands of the King: the Roman Catholic religion 
 was alone recognised, to the exclusion of any other. Thus 
 with regard to legislation and administrative control, the rights 
 conceded to the Sicilians were purely fictitious. A dummy 
 constitution of this kind, imposed on the island, could not 
 compensate the Sicilians for the loss of independence, and 
 of the rights they had enjoyed under the constitution of 181 2. 
 The change in the seat of government from Palermo to Naples 
 left them only the shadow of autonomy, while they were 
 discontented at the loss of those resources which had been 
 
7& Italy. L Chap - 
 
 brought to Sicily by the English occupation. The inevitable 
 result was that the Sicilians became steadily and increasingly 
 hostile toward Naples, and the sentiment of distinct nationality, 
 which had been scarcely more than a question of amour propre 
 prior to English occupation, grew into strong aversion from 
 any relation with Naples. 
 
 The vice-royalty, while keeping up the pretence of auto- 
 nomy, was a mere shadow of the royal power in Naples. On 
 the 8th of December, 1816, the king published a decree stating 
 that the congress of Vienna had recognised the administrative 
 severance of Sicily from Naples, and the two kingdoms were 
 united under his crown by the name of the kingdom of the 
 Two Sicilies. The only privileges which the Sicilians retained 
 were the preservation of their separate ecclesiastical system, 
 the archbishopric of Palermo, and the right to supply one-fourth 
 of the members of the Council of State. The ministry and the 
 diplomatic service of the united kingdom resided at Naples, and 
 the direction of Sicilian administration was permanently vested 
 in the viceroy. During the four years following this settlement 
 the condition of things was unchanged, except that the dis- 
 content of the Sicilians and their antipathy to the Neapolitans 
 constantly increased. 
 
 The recall of the crown- prince from Sicily and the 
 substitution of a Sicilian general, Naselli, as vice-regent with 
 three departmental directors, produced a certain amount of 
 local discontent, and still further intensified the hostility to 
 Naples. The consequence of this want of sympathy was that 
 the movement which broke out on the mainland on the 6th of 
 June, 1820, was regarded with indifference by the Sicilian 
 residents in Naples. Naturally, however, the movement pro- 
 duced a certain reflex activity in Sicily and revived the 
 agitation for the constitution of 181 2. General Naselli, in 
 order to quiet the agitation, published a royal proclamation, 
 which, while it promised a constitution, did not definitely 
 grant what was demanded by the Sicilians ; but this promise 
 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of tJie Tivo Sicilies. 77 
 
 strengthened the agitation in Sicily for constitutional rights, 
 and led the people to hope that the constitution they were to 
 have would be the constitution of Spain. It is probable that 
 there entered very largely into the agitation the question of 
 separation of Sicily from Naples, a topic in regard to which 
 public feeling in Sicily had lately become intense. A public 
 demonstration, headed by the president of the principal 
 tribunal, demanded the constitution of Spain and indepen- 
 dence from Naples. The same night a tumult broke out at 
 Cassano between the Neapolitan troops and the people, and 
 led to serious disorders. 
 
 At Messina a demonstration took place, and on the 16th 
 of July the people of Palermo rose and took possession of 
 the fort of Castellamare, seizing fourteen thousand muskets. 
 According to Ulloa this movement was favoured by the 
 authorities in order to produce discord between the people 
 and the nobility. Owing to the confusion caused by this 
 partial connivance of the authorities, and the intrigues of the 
 leading agitators to obtain control of the movement, the 
 insurrection rapidly passed beyond the control of either party. 
 A committee was formed, headed by Ruggiero Settimo, the 
 ex-constitutional minister, Gaetani Bonanno, Father Palermo, 
 Marquis Raddusa, Colonel Requescens and Don Mercurio 
 Tortorici, Consul of the guild of fishermen. This committee 
 was charged with the maintenance of order with the aid of 
 the Guilds, and demanded from the royal government an 
 administration separate and independent from that of Naples, 
 with the Spanish constitution then conceded to the Neapolitans. 
 Naselli, being a Sicilian, may be supposed to have sympathized 
 more or less with the aspirations of the people, and for this or 
 for some other reason, to have favoured the Sicilian demands. 
 The movement therefore proceeded without hostilities, the 
 military authorities only opposing the Sicilians from national 
 jealousy. On the 17th two generals, apparently without 
 consultation with Naselli, determined to restore order and 
 
78 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 suppress the popular demonstration, and sent strong patrols 
 through the streets with this intention. The Neapolitan 
 garrison, only comprising from three to four thousand men, 
 was insufficient to control the public agitation and, as might 
 have been expected under the circumstances, conflicts broke 
 out, provoked rather by the arbitrary aggression of the troops 
 than by any act of the populace. 
 
 La Farina says that Prince Maletto and the Duke of 
 Villa Franca demanded of the governor the withdrawal of 
 the troops, and Naselli gave them a sealed letter for the 
 commandant, affirming that it contained the order for with- 
 drawal, while, on the contrary, it approved his hostility to the 
 demonstration. Maletto, insisting on what he supposed to be 
 the sense of the order, was wounded by a soldier. This was 
 the signal for the outburst. The bells of all the churches rang 
 the call to arms and the fight in the streets between the soldiers 
 and the people became desperate. The people liberated the 
 prisoners and, directed by the priests, drove the troops into the 
 royal palace and attacked the military quarter of San Giacomo 
 and the monastery of S. Elisabeta. Only one regiment of the 
 garrison opposed the troops with any firmness. The generals 
 were taken prisoners ; of the people sixty were killed ; the loss 
 of the troops was very much greater, but the feebleness of the 
 military defence was incredible. Naselli and other generals, 
 including Church, fled on board the ships, and the populace 
 sacked the town. Even many soldiers who had surrendered 
 were murdered, and the lower classes took control of the city. 
 The Prince of Aci, Colonel Lanza, Colonel Calirara and Prince 
 Cattolica were murdered, under the pretence that they were 
 traitors, having transmitted to the people the assurance of 
 Naselli that the troops would not move. The populace, 
 having become masters of the city, called together the Consuls 
 of the Guilds and the Praetor, and a provisional committee, 
 one-half of which was chosen from the nobility and the better 
 classes, the other from the lower classes, was formed under 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 79 
 
 the presidency of Cardinal Gravina. This committee, subject 
 to an agreement to accomplish nothing without the consent 
 of the Consuls of the Guilds, seventy-two in number, tem- 
 porarily directed the government. 
 
 This order of things was maintained till the 30th of July, 
 when the regent issued an edict calling on the people of 
 Palermo to lay down their arms, to which the committee 
 replied by sending a deputation to Naples demanding an 
 insular government. On the 24th of July, the Prince of Villa . 
 Franca, an ardent constitutionalist, arrived at Palermo, and, 
 being nominated president of the committee in the place of 
 Cardinal Gravina, who had become suspected by the people, 
 aided in a partial restoration of order. But the jealousy 
 between Naples and Sicily made the situation too difficult for 
 pacific arrangement. The regent nominated, as his lieutenant 
 in Sicily, Ruggiero Settimo, who refused, and then the Prince 
 of Scaletta, an appointment which only increased the agitation, 
 as the Prince was unpopular in Palermo. Meanwhile the 
 deputation which had gone to Naples to ask for independence 
 was received with marks of hostility by the populace, and 
 imprisoned by the government, while the King refused the 
 demand for separation. The reply of Palermo was naturally 
 a declaration of independence, and the duplicity of Naselli 
 and the uncertainty prevailing in the counsels at Palermo 
 produced a complication which made a peaceable issue hope- 
 less. The controversy between Naples and Palermo was 
 sustained with slight warmth by the rest of the island, but 
 disturbances naturally occurred in many places. In some, the 
 public archives and the tax offices were burned, and disorders 
 prevailed in the island to such an extent that it seemed rather 
 an outbreak of anarchy than a constitutional movement. Bands 
 were formed in different parts of the island, and a sort of 
 civil war broke out. The quarrel between Naples and Sicily 
 naturally dominated the position, and the constitutionalists of 
 Naples, equally jealous of the unity of the kingdom with the 
 
80 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 royal authorities, joined them in their anxiety for the sup- 
 pression of the insurrection in Sicily. 
 
 Toward the end of August Pe'pe landed at Milazzo with an 
 army of about seven thousand men and easily dispersed the 
 bands which alone represented the insurrectionary movement 
 there, and then, and after a sharp fight between the Sicilian 
 fleet and the Neapolitan, moved against Palermo. He issued 
 the following proclamation on behalf of the Regent : " The 
 government will make no opposition to a representation of 
 Sicily independent from that of Naples on the following 
 conditions: first, that the insurrectionary authorities at 
 Palermo shall surrender all the prisoners, and re-establish 
 order ; and, second, that the demands of Palermo shall be 
 accepted by the rest of the island in whatever manner may 
 be arranged." Pepe's orders were to use conciliatory measures 
 with Palermo on the basis indicated by the Regent and the 
 deputies of Sicily, and the presumption was that independence 
 might be agreed to at the discretion of the Regent. The 
 return of the deputation from Naples disposed the committee 
 of Palermo to accept the compromise suggested by the 
 Regent's proclamation, and a petition was signed by over a 
 million people for insular independence under the King of 
 Naples. 
 
 On the 17th of September a conference took place at 
 Cefalu between Pepe and the Prince of Villa Franca, in which 
 P£pe gave in his ultimatum — the occupation of Palermo by his 
 troops and the convocation of the Sicilian parliament. The 
 latter was to decide the question of independence, the com- 
 mittee of Palermo remaining in power until the arrival of the 
 King's representatives. Villa Franca accepted the proposition 
 and fixed the 25th for the entry of the troops. The committee, 
 as well as the consuls of the guilds, were disposed to accept the 
 conditions, and the Sicilian fleet pronounced for conciliation, but 
 the people of Palermo rejected the proposition. The troops 
 moved towards Palermo, but the people rose and again 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 81 
 
 liberating the prisoners attacked the guards in charge of the 
 city. A furious street-fight ensued, lasting two hours and 
 resulting in a victory for the populace. This was the signal 
 for the renewal of all the disorders. The city of Palermo 
 remained in the hands of the mob. No authority existed and 
 the forces there, amounting to three regiments of cavalry, one 
 of infantry and one of artillery, were dispersed. On the 26th of 
 September the Neapolitan troops coming from Milazzo, having 
 dispersed the bands in possession of the vicinity, attacked 
 Palermo : the hostilities were of the most rancorous and 
 murderous character. The Neapolitans sacked and burned 
 all the houses in the suburbs, murdering old men, women and 
 children, while the populace, opposing a vigorous resistance, 
 robbed and killed all suspected of favouring the Neapolitans. 
 The fleet and the fortresses of Castellamare and Garita opened 
 a bombardment of the city which the people sustained with 
 invincible courage. The suburbs were little by little captured 
 by the Neapolitans, who gradually penetrated into the city, 
 capturing several of the squares and driving the people back 
 into the central districts. Several popular sorties were repulsed, 
 but in spite of a continued bombardment by the fleet, the 
 people succeeded, during the night of the 26th and 27th, in 
 maintaining their ground. It is calculated that on the 26th, 
 no less than four thousand of the people were killed, and five 
 hundred of the Neapolitan troops. On the next day the attack 
 was continued and the Neapolitans penetrated as far as the 
 monastery of the Pieta. 
 
 The conflict now took a turn so unfavourable for the 
 populace that a conference between their leaders and the 
 Neapolitan commander was held, under the presidency of the 
 Prince of Paterno. After ten days of suspense and discussion 
 a convention was agreed upon, which laid down the follow- 
 ing conditions — All the forts and batteries shall be given up ; 
 the majority of the votes of the Sicilians legally convoked 
 shall decide the question between united or separate national 
 
 s. 1. 6 
 
82 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 representation in the kingdom of the two Sicilies: each commune 
 shall nominate a deputy with the one purpose and no other of 
 declaring the public vote as to the reunion or division of the 
 parliaments of the kingdom; the constitution of 1812, con- 
 firmed by His Catholic Majesty in 1820, shall be recognized 
 in Sicily, subject to such modifications as may be adopted by 
 the united parliament or by the separate parliament of Sicily ; 
 the arms and statues of the king shall be replaced ; all past 
 offences shall be forgotten. The committee presided over by 
 Paternb acted in the meanwhile as a provisional government. 
 It was composed of the military governor of Palermo, Ruggiero 
 Settimo, the Prince of Pandolfina, the Prince of Torabrina, 
 Cavaliere Emmanuele Requescens, the Duke of Cumea, 
 President Alcudi, the Consul of the Guild of Saddle-makers 
 and the advocate Ognibeni, as secretary. On the 6th of 
 October, the forts having been surrendered, the Neapolitans 
 entered into Palermo. Thus ended an outbreak which had 
 cost, according to Palmiera, five thousand lives — a number 
 which Carascosa reduces to three thousand — and which had 
 ruined villas, palaces, works of art, libraries, destroyed 
 hundreds of houses, and caused disaster and damage to the 
 amount of more than a hundred million francs, without gaining 
 anything for the people of the island. 
 
 In the compromise which was arrived at, Palermo had been 
 actuated more by its own interests than by those of the island, 
 and dissensions therefore broke out between the different cities. 
 The parliament of Naples moreover passed, on October 15, a 
 resolution in the following terms : " Having seen the reports, 
 the proposals and the documents communicated by his 
 Excellency the Minister of Home Affairs concerning the mili- 
 tary convention concluded between His Excellency, Lieutenant 
 General Floristano P£pe and the Prince of Paterno, the 
 parliament decides that this act is contrary to the principles 
 established in the constitution under Art. 172, because it tends 
 to produce division in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, and that 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 83 
 
 it is otherwise contrary to the political treaties on which that 
 unity is based; that it is equally contrary to the desire 
 manifested in a great part of Sicily by its deputations and 
 the united national parliament j that, finally, it is contrary to 
 the glory of the united kingdoms, to political conventions and 
 to the honour of the national arms. Therefore, the parliament 
 of the united kingdom of the two Sicilies declares entirely null 
 and void the military convention concluded between General 
 Pe'pe and the Prince of Paterno on the 5th of October 1820." 
 After this, the Neapolitan Government, always acting in bad 
 faith, revived its restrictions of Sicilian liberties, abolished 
 little by little those emblems of Sicilian independence to which 
 the people adhered, suppressed all the committees, and imposed 
 upon the island a war-contribution of a thousand ounces, besides 
 all the expenses of the maintenance of the army. Finally, in 
 disregard of the amnesty, the government of Naples con- 
 demned to death eleven persons at Palermo, three of whom 
 were executed. At Messina sixty people were tried, of whom 
 six were condemned and shot on the second of May, 1823. 
 
 Following on the suppression of the movement of 1820 
 there was a partial Austrian occupation, as if the savagery of 
 the Neapolitan Bourbons were not sufficient to restrain the 
 ambitions of the Sicilian people. The severities were however 
 such as to provoke the introduction of Carbonarism, hitherto 
 of little influence in the island. The first conspiracy was one 
 to poison the wine and bread administered to the Austrians, to 
 seize the authorities and the fortifications, and proclaim the 
 independence of the island — a weakly conceived project, which 
 was never attempted, but which cost the lives of nine persons 
 charged with taking the lead in it, while others were imprisoned 
 and exiled. In 1824 the concentration of all the governmental 
 functions in Naples again quickened discontent, perpetuated 
 by aggravation of the taxes and the detestable administration 
 of Delia Favare, Lieutenant of the King, a man whose morals, 
 
 I if only half as bad as painted by Sicilian historians, were 
 
84 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 enough to breed rebellion in a more patient land, and actually 
 had the worst effect on civic conditions. The Mafia 1 gained 
 greatly in strength, and many members of various societies 
 were prosecuted and condemned, especially towards 1830. 
 
 The King died in 1830, and the accession of Ferdinando II, 
 himself a native of Sicily, and disposed, in the early part of his 
 reign, to do what might be done by royal authority to mitigate 
 the miseries of the island, rekindled the loyalty of the Sicilians. 
 The new King, in the voyage through the island, which he 
 made on taking possession of the throne, was received with 
 all the delight of anticipated freedom. He sent his son, the 
 Prince of Syracuse, to administer the government, and pardoned 
 most of the political prisoners. This state of satisfaction was, 
 however, of no longer duration than the liberalism of the King, 
 who, brought up in the traditions of despotism, had other ideas 
 of the relations of King and people than those of the Sicilian 
 liberals. The despotism of a Bourbon might be benevolent 
 but it was not an advance towards constitutional government, 
 and as the illusions of the islanders faded, the insubordination 
 took the old forms. In 1831 already there were hostilities and 
 executions. The severity of the government increased, and 
 the Prince of Syracuse was recalled, as being too friendly with 
 the population. 
 
 In 1837 the Cholera visited Sicily and caused ravages which 
 can hardly be understood now. Under the influence of the 
 superstition of the day, which made the epidemic the work of 
 poisoners, the people rose and massacred the sanitary officials. 
 This revolt against the authorities, who were accused of com- 
 plicity in the poisoning, became a political movement and led 
 to one of the most ferocious repressions of the long series. 
 Imprisonments, tortures and executions surpassed all previous 
 
 1 A loosely organised association for mutual defence against the law, 
 peculiar to Sicily. All who adhered to it were bound to protect and avenge 
 any Mafiote arrested or punished for any offence against the authorities. It 
 had no constitution. 
 
iv.] The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 85 
 
 records. The liberal institutions of Sicily which still survived, 
 were mostly suppressed, and the most trivial suspicion of 
 liberalism was enough to cause imprisonment and torture by 
 flogging and privations in the prisons. " In this year," says 
 Tivaroni, "the separation of Sicily from Naples was definitively 
 decided on j after such savagery there could be no more peace 
 nor truce ; should either a constitution or liberty come from 
 Naples, it would be refused. Thus the preparation for 1848 
 was begun." In 1840, for the first time, all the chief cities of 
 Sicily were united in the conspiracy, and the old jealousies, 
 which had in former times brought Messina in arms against 
 Palermo and furnished Sicilian forces to suppress Sicilian 
 liberty, were extinguished. La Farina says that the hatred of 
 the Bourbons extinguished the animosities of hitherto rival 
 populations, which accepted the leadership of Palermo. When, 
 in 1842, the King went to Messina, he found the royal statues 
 with their ears stopped up and their faces defiled. The 
 windows where he passed were closed and the streets deserted. 
 In 1843, for the first time, the insurrectionary committees of 
 Naples and Palermo gave pledges to each other, and the 
 ground began in a certain degree to be prepared for the seed 
 of which the harvest, after many failures and disasters, was 
 gathered in i860. The Emperor and Empress of Russia, 
 visiting Palermo in 1845 were received with the enthusiasm of 
 men who considered any monarch who was not of Naples, a 
 possible friend and helper, so miserable was the condition of 
 the island. i 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 NORTHERN AND CENTRAL ITALY, 1815-1847. 
 
 (1) Lombardy and Vmetia. 
 
 At the cessation of the great struggle with the forces of 
 conquest and demolition as embodied in the Napoleonic 
 movement, the powers had only one thought, i.e. the reorgan- 
 isation of the map of Europe and the complete subjection of 
 the revolutionary spirit, which had been the fatal instrument 
 of the Despot. The civilised world was for a time imbued 
 with horror of the principles of popular self-government, and 
 a perfectly excusable dread of the resuscitation of ambitions 
 which had become identified with conquest and pillage, had 
 taken a complete mastery of all the governing classes in 
 Europe. It is necessary to hold this fact in mind, in judging 
 of the actions of the Governments which had spent years and 
 treasures in the suppression of the abuses grown out of 
 revolution, and whose dread of a renewal of them was justifiable 
 though exaggerated. 
 
 In Italy there existed no government, holding authority 
 over the whole peninsula, to direct the reorganisation of public 
 rights and conventions ; England, by her geographical position 
 as well as by her constitutional forms, was unable to assume 
 the lead ; Prussia was still in semi-chaos, and Russia was only 
 less dangerous than France. It was therefore only natural that 
 on Austria should fall the charge of supervising and carrying 
 
Chap, v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1 815-1847. 87 
 
 into effect the reorganisation of the peninsula, and though 
 England at every phase of the struggle had shown the desire 
 for a national administration, and was in many points in 
 disaccord with Austria, there was no resource but to allow 
 Austria to do in her own way what had to be done. The 
 misfortune of Europe and of Austria, but especially of the 
 Italians under Austria, was the character of Metternich. As 
 the substantial ruler of Austria, his personal importance in 
 this phase of history is only less than that of Napoleon, and 
 this in an epoch when a strong and unscrupulous personality 
 was a power above control in the most liberally constituted 
 state of the time. Absolutely without principle or scruple, 
 devoted to the idea of an unlimited and irresponsible despotism, 
 cramped by subjection to the supremacy of the Church and 
 the divine rights of dynasties, he possessed, for the realisation of 
 his views, an intellect of very limited range, scarcely more than 
 would have made a good police agent in the administration of 
 which he was the head; but this very limitation and his 
 supreme indifference to human rights and sufferings, as well as 
 to morality, made his government strong and triumphant, so 
 long as the police, and the army, which was only a branch of 
 the police in time of peace, were at his orders. 
 
 Had the Austrian government, in 181 5, known how to 
 profit by the horror excited in the minds of Italians by the past 
 French government, its conscriptions and forced contributions, 
 its merciless exhaustion of all the resources of the country; had 
 it established a government for Italy, which, while maintaining 
 the supremacy of the Emperor of Austria, should respect the 
 character of the people, it might have prolonged its hold on 
 the peninsula for many years ; but the policy of Metternich 
 was one which in time made the tyranny of the French 
 regretted. Italy was wearied of a military regime under which 
 France alone got glory, and of exhaustive taxation which 
 accomplished nothing for the country. If, in these circum- 
 stances, Austria had lightened the conscription, or flattered 
 
88 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the new self-consciousness of the Italians, she would have 
 been, for at least that generation, greeted as a benefactor. Italy 
 was prostrate and friendless ; a little good will would have 
 quieted all the agitation born of disappointed hopes, and the 
 Austrians, coming in as the enemies of the French, would have 
 seemed friends indeed. No doubt, even so, the sentiment of 
 national independence which had been aroused, and that 
 peculiar and invincible Italian dislike of the foreigner, would 
 in another generation have made the revolt certain in one 
 form or another, and in the end Austria would have been 
 obliged to abandon Italy, possibly retaining its support as a 
 friendly power. But the course followed by the Imperial 
 government was directly the opposite ; restriction and op- 
 pression in every direction ; utter disregard of all national 
 antipathies and differences of temperament, habit and tradition; 
 a determination on the part of the Aulic Council to transform 
 the Lombards and Venetians into good Austrians — this was 
 the programme. Even Metternich, whose limited intelligence 
 enabled him to see the defects of the system but not a remedy, 
 and whose policy seemed to be to suppress all indications of 
 Italian individuality while he lived, and after him to welcome 
 the deluge, wrote in 1819 to his wife, "I do not believe there 
 is anything which less resembles Germany than Italy, but our 
 wise people at Vienna wish at every cost to turn Italy into 
 Germany, — and how wonderfully well they succeed !" 
 
 The natural consequences were, of course, conspiracies. 
 Till 18 1 9 Austria, under Metternich, ruled Lombardy abso- 
 lutely and unopposed, doing its utmost to remodel the country 
 after the German ideal; and the country was slow to appre- 
 hend the drift of Austrian policy. It was the cultivated class, 
 impatient of that repression of all intellectual independence 
 which was necessary to the tranquillity of a foreign despotism, 
 that first showed signs of revolt, and the literature of the 
 day prepared the road for the political revival. In 181 9 the 
 Carbonari followed, but the first combination which displayed 
 
v.] NortJiern and Central Italy y 18 15-1847. 89 
 
 the hostility of the liberals to the system of Metternich, was 
 that headed by Count Federico Confalonieri. It came into 
 existence concurrently with the attempts in Turin (182 1) to 
 extort a constitution from the King and to drive him into a 
 war with Austria. The movement seems, however, at first to 
 have aimed rather at bringing together the sympathisers with 
 liberty than at organising active revolt. 
 
 Confalonieri, in whom intelligent Italian patriotism reached 
 its height, had been in the Austrian service and had abandoned 
 it in order to identify himself with the aspirations of Italy, 
 aiming at the union of Lombardy with Piedmont. He had 
 been a member of the deputation sent by Milan to Paris in 
 18 1 4 to urge the formation of a kingdom of Lombardy with a 
 constitution, but in his writings of that date he showed that the 
 future union of all Italy was the consequence of his policy. 
 On the 13th of May, 1814, he had written to his wife, "The 
 Italians should remain united ; should express but one desire ; 
 should forget their fatal and mistaken municipal patriotism, to 
 follow only that of the nation... Let them banish all municipal 
 ideas and prejudices ; the strongest bond in a state is to be 
 found in compactness and convenient boundaries. The city 
 can not be always a capital, and to be a great city in a great 
 state is better than to be the capital of a little state. If in the 
 process of regaining our rights, the House of Savoy, already 
 the strongest in northern Italy, is to become stronger, it is 
 better to belong to it than to increase the number of states, or 
 to form fractions of Italian duchies." During this time pre- 
 paration for conspiracy, rather than conspiracy itself, was 
 being made, but in February, 182 r, the first grave step was 
 taken in the delegation of Giuseppe Pecchio to treat for 
 common action with the conspirators in Turin. When, how- 
 ever, on the breaking out of the Piedmontese revolution, the 
 delegates Giorgio Pallavicini and Gaetano Castiglia were sent 
 to beg the Prince of Carignano to march into Lombardy, and 
 returned with a real knowledge of the state of affairs in 
 
90 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Piedmont, Confalonieri countermanded all preparations for a 
 rising, and wrote to Count San Marzano not to risk an entry ! 
 into Lombardy with a feeble force. He was then doubtless 
 more competent to judge of the chances of the movement in 
 Piedmont than those who were in the thick of it. 
 
 In 1820, though the Austrian authorities were ignorant of 
 the existence of a genuine conspiracy with a definite scope 
 such as that which Confalonieri had begun to organise, the 
 prosecution of the Carbonari began to turn the elements of 
 discontent into more definite channels, and the first eminent 
 martyrs of Italian liberty began to pay their debt to their, 
 native land. Silvio Pellico and Piero Maroncelli headed the 
 roll, and through confessions extorted by torture or by artifice 
 the arrests grew into an immense list. But the connexion of 
 the Carbonari with the Italian movement, incidental as it was, 
 was discovered by the Austrian police through an accident. 
 Gaetano Gastiglia was arrested for using a seal which bore the 
 words " Leggi e non re, Italia c'e," a roundabout way of saying 
 that with a constitution and the republic the existence of Italy 
 was established. His associate Pallavicini, who was one of the 
 delegates to Turin, supposing that the arrest was due to this 
 visit, went to the police to take the offence on his own 
 shoulders, as having led his friend into it, and so the fact of 
 the visit became known to the police. Their examination led 
 to an imprudent, if innocent, mention of the name of Con- 
 falonieri. He had anticipated arrest and had provided a 
 secure hiding-place in his palace, but when the police came it 
 had accidentally been locked and the arrest was made. The 
 carelessness of these conspirators was incredible. Confalonieri 
 had been warned by a friend in the Austrian service to leave 
 the country, but was unwilling to take his wife from her friends 
 without evident necessity, and, when arrested, sent a gendarme 
 with a note to his wife to destroy certain papers in a hiding- 
 place. The note of course led to the seizure of the papers, 
 which betrayed the names of his associates. The clue once 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1815-1847. 91 
 
 I discovered, the arrests were multiplied and the prisons of Lom- 
 jbardy and Venice were filled with victims. The trials were long 
 jand were conducted with all the cruelty and cunning of the most 
 j barbarous police of the time. Confalonieri, Andryane, Borsieri, 
 Pallavicini, Gaetano Castiglia, Tonelle and Arese were con- 
 demned to death, but their sentences were commuted to close 
 confinement in the Spielberg for terms ranging from life to 
 j three years. This commutation was obtained distinctly for 
 Confalonieri, but with great difficulty, and only after the most 
 pathetic and urgent appeals from his parents and friends 
 devoted to Austria. As he was considered the chief criminal, 
 it probably involved the same grace to the less important 
 I offenders, but even so it is said that their demands would not 
 have been listened to but for the influence of the Empress, to 
 whom were due the suspension of the execution and a new 
 inquiry at Milan. This gave the opportunity for an immense 
 demonstration on the part of the nobility and a letter from the 
 [Archbishop to obtain a pardon. Armed with these, Gabrio 
 Casati, brother of the Countess Confalonieri, obtained the 
 commutation of the sentence to one of imprisonment for life, 
 and the prisoners were sent to the Spielberg. 
 
 As the first of the great state trials consequent on the 
 condition of Lombardy under the Austrians, the trial of Con- 
 falonieri and his companions is one of the most striking 
 incidents of the struggle for Italian liberty. The prisoners 
 took their places on the scaffold, and the throng of Milanese 
 made no secret of their sympathy. "When they were on the 
 scaffold a great murmur was heard, and then silence. The 
 prisoners were then chained to rings of iron. All the windows 
 were filled with spectators; all gave unmistakeable signs of 
 compassion and interest. A prolonged murmur of satisfaction 
 greeted the announcement of mercy, another, with words of 
 comfort, the designation of the Spielberg ; and a long groan 
 followed their departure " (Tivaroni). " The palaces of nearly 
 all the nobility of Milan were closed in sign of mourning, the 
 
92 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 boxes of the Scala theatre were left empty with the curtains 
 down " (Andryane). 
 A Confalonieri, arriving ill of asthma at Vienna, became the 
 object of the most powerful temptations to betray his con- 
 federates. He was waited on by the Director General of the 
 Police, who announced the visit of a great personage. This 
 proved to be no less than Metternich himself. He explained 
 to Confalonieri the necessity of making an example of him and 
 added, " In this state of affairs, you will easily understand that 
 we attach very little importance to knowing in detail what has 
 taken place in the different states of Italy before or after the 
 revolutions of Naples and Piedmont; if then I wish to be 
 informed by you to-day, it is only from the historical point of 
 view, and in the interest of yourself and your companions. His 
 Majesty will, I doubt not, show himself grateful for any 
 confidential information which you may be disposed to give 
 him." Confalonieri replied, "Your Excellency considers me 
 of too great importance, and to satisfy His Majesty it would be 
 necessary " — " that you make a call on your memory," replied 
 the Prince ; to which the prisoner replied, "Alas! I should only 
 find there heart-pains — all the rest is obliterated," and turned 
 the conversation to another subject. The Prince then said, 
 "Perhaps on you it depends to throw off not only your own 
 chains but those of your companions in misfortune. Why keep 
 secret the names of all those who took part in your conspiracy ? 
 Perhaps you do not believe in my word — if you wish to put 
 your secrets in possession of the most august personage of the 
 empire, he will come here to find you." To this Confalonieri 
 replied that he could say no more to that august personage 
 than he had said to the Prince ; he had nothing to add, nothing 
 to conceal. 
 
 The temptation failed, and Confalonieri took his way to 
 the Spielberg, where for thirteen years he atoned for his 
 devotion to Italy, in a dungeon eight paces long and four 
 wide, a narrow barred window his only light — for candles 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 18 15-1847. 93 
 
 were not allowed — a mattress for his bed and a single blanket 
 for cover, a wooden bowl to drink from, a wooden spoon to 
 eat with, miserably fed and worse clothed, on his waist eight 
 pounds of iron and a chain from one leg to another, like a 
 galley slave. There was taken from him a leather cushion 
 which his wife had used when she came to Vienna; from his 
 fellow prisoner, Bacchiega, a sparrow he had tamed ; from 
 Silvio Pellico and Maroncelli their spectacles, afterwards 
 restored to the former but not to the latter. Thrice a day 
 their cells were searched, and every article in the cells was 
 examined lest some means of escape or relief should be 
 conveyed to them. The Emperor himself prescribed the 
 regimen: it was necessary to apply to him to increase or 
 diminish the ration of beans; for leave to amputate the leg 
 of Maroncelli; for a wig for Villa; for the sequestration of 
 Bacchiega's sparrow, and Confalonieri's cushion. This paternal 
 sovereign permitted letters from Silvio Pellico's father to reach 
 him with only the address and the signature, and only allowed 
 Andryane to inform his parents and family once in six months 
 that he was living. A man came to Brunn with a carriage and 
 passports to enable Confalonieri to escape; he refused in order 
 not to compromise his prison companion, Andryane. In 1830 
 the Countess Confalonieri died, never having been permitted to 
 see her husband, and that year Silvio Pellico was liberated; 
 Andryane in 1832; Maroncelli in 1833; Castiglia in 1835 and 
 Confalonieri in 1836, to go into exile until 1838. Their years 
 in prison did more for the freedom of Italy than their con- 
 spiracies. The indignation of the civilized world at the 
 sufferings of Silvio Pellico, Confalonieri and their companions 
 in torture did more to relax the chains that held Italy down 
 than all the risings which Austria suppressed. 
 
 From this time the patriots carried on their work openly, 
 but only by striving to form public opinion. Little by little 
 the tyranny of Austria was modified by the patient persistency 
 with which the Lombards showed their irreconcileable aversion 
 
94 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 from its rule; but the road to liberty by this direction 
 was a long one. To oppose a merely negative resistance 
 to the persecutions of the police and the provocations of 
 the Radetzky system, which repressed all manifestations of 
 Italian sentiment, was harder for the impatient and passionate 
 southern blood than the open and acute conflict of conspiracy 
 and Carbonarism. But the horrible severity of Austrian state- 
 craft, with its all-pervading espionage, its prison-tortures, its 
 artifices by which men were induced to betray each other 
 through pretended confessions craftily contrived, compelled 
 acquiescence, and after the trial of Confalonieri and his 
 associates there was a long period of relative tranquillity. 
 Opposition to the government was limited to moral resistance, 
 work in schools and hospitals, and charities — all understood 
 as protests against the Austrian domination, but not open to 
 attack as forms of resistance. Active correspondence with 
 those who, in other parts of Italy, entertained the sentiments 
 of nationality, and associations without a treasonable scope, 
 all worked together to spread the consciousness of Italian 
 citizenship long before the distinct purpose of attaining the 
 unity of Italy was the avowed motive of action. In fact it 
 is most probable that but for the savage repression of all forms 
 of political association in Lombardy, the spread of national 
 sentiment would have been slower, and Lombardy might have 
 been satisfied with something less than the union with Piedmont 
 which it obtained after so many years. The study of consti- 
 tutional systems, made practical by the movements in Spain 
 and Naples, was more seriously followed, and plans, originally 
 discordant, gradually became harmonious. The republicans of 
 Genoa found common ground with the friends of the monarchy, 
 and the universal detestation of Austria prepared the way 
 for the rule of the House of Savoy. Carbonarism could 
 not be suppressed, though punishable with death; nor could 
 Freemasonry, though the slight revival of activity which took 
 place in 1833 quickened the movements of the police, and 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 181 5-1847. 95 
 
 hardened the rigours of repression. Every form of liberalism 
 was met by prohibitive regulations of the severest kind, but no 
 severity could control the growing revolt of the popular spirit. 
 New measures forbade the young men to go abroad for educa- 
 tion, and those of the families of the upper classes who were 
 known to entertain the liberal tendencies of the day, were not 
 allowed to go abroad on any pretext; in 1832 the government 
 even declared that all who absented themselves from the 
 territory without authorization of the police were no longer 
 subjects of Austria, and were exposed to confiscation of all their 
 goods. Under these crushing restrictions nothing was possible 
 except to read and think. Reading was therefore restricted, 
 the works of Alfieri were no longer allowed to be reprinted, the 
 Bibles sent from abroad were no longer admitted, and only 
 works which offended neither Church nor state were permitted 
 to circulate. 
 
 But with the Italian temperament the forced apathy of 
 such a regime could not long be maintained, and in the place 
 of the verses of Alfieri the tracts issued by "Young Italy" and 
 the exhortations of Mazzini began to find their devious ways 
 through the ranks of the young, the students, the workmen. 
 Apprehensive of the results, the priests and the Austrian police 
 found matter here for another cast of the net, in which numbers 
 of innocent persons, and some actual conspirators, of a milder 
 type and less social importance than those involved in the 
 Confalonieri conspiracy, were caught. The trials consequent 
 on these arrests lasted two years, and on the 27th of February 
 1835 sentence of death was pronounced on Luigi Tinelli, Cesare 
 Benzoni, Pietro Strada, Giovanni Dansi, and sixteen others, 
 mostly students, with a few workmen of the higher class. Two 
 of the prisoners had gone mad in prison, one had attempted 
 to kill himself in grief at having yielded to the torture so far as 
 to allow admissions to escape him. The survivors were exposed 
 to public view on a scaffold with the sentence placarded over 
 their heads, but the sentences were commuted to imprisonment 
 
96 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 for various terms. Another great trial at Mantua in September 
 1834 ended in the condemnation of the Marquis Odoardo 
 Gonzaga Valenti to three years of prison, Arrivabene and 
 Predieri to exile, while many minor sentences were pronounced, 
 including the expulsion of the historian Cantu from the faculty 
 of instruction. Austria threatened to occupy the Swiss canton 
 of Ticino as the refuge of conspirators, but France protested 
 and Austria was obliged to content herself with a treaty of 
 extradition comprising the offences of treason and rebellion. 
 All institutions, even of charity, which had the appearance of 
 being directed by patriotic intention, or even if set afoot by 
 persons known to have liberal sympathies, were now suppressed ; 
 even the Frenchmen Lamennais and Montalembert, travelling 
 to Venice, were kept under police surveillance, with Alexandre 
 Dumas and others. 
 
 The death of the imperial jailor and inquisitor, Francis I, 
 on the 2nd of March, 1835, S ave some hope of change in the 
 horrible system of political slavery, which owed so much of its 
 rigour to his morbid passion for absolute rule. There was 
 widespread liberation of prisoners, amnesties, and pardons, 
 prisoners having the choice of expatriation or diminished 
 terms of imprisonment. The trials in progress were sus- 
 pended, and the new Emperor Ferdinand I went to Milan 
 to be crowned — for the pretence of a Lombard kingdom and 
 the fiction of autonomy were preserved. The nobility, wearied 
 of the long term of retirement and abstention from gaiety, 
 welcomed the new sovereign with acclamations and desired to 
 take it for granted that a new era had commenced. Nothing 
 was changed in the regime except that the Emperor gave 
 commissions to artists and donations to the public institutions, 
 but patriotic sentiment in the Milanese was weary, and affairs 
 went more smoothly. Luxury revived in Milan, and from 1835 
 to 1 846 pleasure and extravagance seemed to supersede political 
 activity. 
 
 The position of Venice in regard to the Italian revolution 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1 815-1847. 97 
 
 was different from that of all the other provinces. Its long 
 history, and its traditions of republican independence, had set 
 up from time immemorial a habit of considering Venice apart 
 from Italy, which was too strong for the people not to insist on 
 the maintenance of this individuality as the prime condition of 
 civic life. The betrayal of Venice by France in the treaty of 
 Campo Formio (1797) had always been resented as one of the 
 most disgraceful acts in the career of Napoleon, and when the 
 reaction came, after 181 5, the traditions of the Austrian govern- 
 ment were not old enough to have established any serious hold 
 on the people. Venice had never been part of Italy, but neither 
 was she part of Austria. Still, the repugnance to Austrian 
 government, for some time after 18 15, does not seem to have 
 been violent. 
 
 A separate government was established for Venetia, and 
 the Archduke John came to Venice to receive the oath of 
 allegiance. At the outset, from sentimental considerations 
 more than political, Austria paid a certain amount of respect 
 to the antecedents and prejudices of the people. The popu- 
 lation in general accepted with apathy, rarely interrupted by 
 any outbreak of national sentiment, the government of Austria, 
 and between the years 181 5 and 1822 there occurred no serious 
 disturbance of the public peace. The first indication of dis- 
 content came from the southern quarter, where the Venetian 
 provinces border on the Romagna, and where the Carbonari 
 had established their lodges. From 1817 to 1822 the slow 
 subterranean operations of the Carbonari were the only motive 
 power in the direction of reform, and in 1821 the trial of a 
 large number of Italians, accused of disaffection, gave evidence 
 that this work was proceeding with some success. The severity 
 of the penalties inflicted on this occasion will give us an idea 
 of the terrible rigour with which the Austrian government de- 
 fended its possessions against the aggressions of liberalism. 
 The supreme court condemned thirteen citizens to death for 
 high treason on the ground of belonging to secret societies, and 
 
 s. 1. 7 
 
98 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 about twenty more were condemned to various terms of im- 
 prisonment in the Spielberg and other prisons of the state. 
 
 This severity, prudent from the point of view of despotism, 
 had its intended effect, and until 1844 n0 political movement 
 indicated that there was any political life in Venice. Perquisi- 
 tions were made from time to time on the most trivial pretexts. 
 The possession of books inculcating liberal sentiments or even 
 of works like the Siege of Florence by Guerazzi, which was 
 simply a reminiscence of the republican period in Tuscany, 
 was condemned, while the possession of the Bible translated 
 by Deodati was sufficient to send its owner to the prisons of 
 the state. The sentences in these cases were ordered to be 
 made public without the names of the parties, and no criticism 
 on them was permitted. The concession of the railway between 
 Venice and Milan was made a political question. In 1840 it 
 was noticed that the Venetians discussed public affairs in 
 private instead of in the cafe's as hitherto ; but it was not until 
 1844 that the desertion of the brothers Bandiera, and their 
 expedition into Calabria, fell as a bomb into Venetian society. 
 The brothers Bandiera having been enrolled in Mazzini's 
 "Young Italy," this movement led to researches by the 
 authorities, which betrayed a certain amount of activity among 
 the Venetian secret societies. In 1845 Manin appeared. 
 From that time forward he was recognized as the leader of 
 liberal opinion in Venice, and when the agitation in other 
 parts of Italy, especially in Rome under Pius IX, had begun 
 to bear fruit in public action, Manin became the leader of the 
 Venetian revolt. 
 
 (2) Parma, Modena and Tuscany. 
 
 The restoration of the old order of things at Parma gave 
 the Austrian government an excellent opportunity to pay an 
 imperative obligation while restoring legitimacy its rights. 
 Marie Louise, the wife of the deposed Napoleon, had rendered 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1 815-1847. 99 
 
 services of a most important character during her brief term of 
 sovereignty, not only by her acceptance of so uneasy a throne, 
 but by systematically acting as a spy on her Imperial husband, 
 and revealing all his projects to her father at Vienna 1 . 
 Compensation for this service, and a way of escaping the 
 unpleasant descent from the condition of a Sovereign to that 
 of a subject, were found in the instalment of the Empress as 
 Duchess of Parma, the prior claims of the late Bourbon rulers 
 being compromised by an arrangement which reserved the 
 right of the Infanta Maria Luigia, of the legitimate Spanish 
 Bourbon stock, and late regent of Etruria, to succeed to the 
 duchy on the death of Marie Louise. The Infanta was made 
 pro tempore sovereign of Lucca, but, dying before Marie Louise, 
 she transmitted her rights to her son Carlo, who eventually 
 succeeded to the throne of Parma. 
 
 Of a mild, and, for one of her race, curiously liberal 
 tendency, the new Duchess of Parma, Archduchess of Austria, 
 seems to have seriously attempted to give prolonged life to the 
 system of internal administration inaugurated by Napoleon, 
 and Parma was distinguished in the general revival of the old 
 regime as the only state that largely preserved French institu- 
 tions. By a decree of November 20th, 181 7, the Duchess 
 established the equality of women in heritage, and named a 
 commission to draw up a civil code, which was sanctioned on 
 the 4th of January, 1820. In the following November a penal 
 code abolished many of the brutalities of the old system of 
 absolute government, and established the publicity of criminal 
 trials and other liberal measures borrowed from the past 
 regime. After a temporary ministerial regency under Count 
 Marescalchi, as a preparation for the assumption of her throne 
 by the Archduchess, the Count Macauly-Cerati, a native of 
 
 1 Kossuth informed me in 1852 that he, when minister of Austro- 
 Hungary, had seen in the archives of Vienna a series of letters from the 
 Empress to her father in which all the plans of Napoleon were communi- 
 cated — with what effect some future historian only can show. 
 
 7—2 
 
ioo Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Ireland but educated in Parma, was appointed sole minister 
 for another brief period, to be succeeded by Count Neipperg, 
 the latest lover of the Archduchess, and after the death of 
 Napoleon, her morganatic husband. Neipperg was an Austrian 
 marshal but a lenient governor. Dying in 1829, he was 
 succeeded by another Austrian, Baron Werklein, under whose 
 administration the burthens of the state were sensibly increased, 
 and the police and the clergy returned to something of the 
 normal Austrian condition. If universal report does her no 
 injustice, the Sovereign often forgot the duties of her position 
 in the satisfaction of her sensual pleasures, and the government 
 rapidly deteriorated, the maladministration of justice and the 
 usurpations of the clergy operating with the remembrance of the 
 earlier condition of things to produce discontent which broke 
 out into active revolt on the news of the movement in central 
 Italy in 183 1. To the demands of the people for liberal 
 concessions the Duchess replied by taking refuge at Piacenza 
 with the Austrians. Werklein resigned, and a provisional 
 government attempted to take the direction of affairs, but 
 the repression of the revolt in Modena and Bologna brought 
 back the Austrians. The treatment of the compromised was 
 lenient, and a decree of amnesty was issued on the 8th of 
 August, 1 83 1. From this time until 1847 the history of Parma 
 is one which hardly calls for notice. Marie Louise died in that 
 year, leaving the reputation of a woman whose private character 
 was not beyond reproach, but whose public conduct made her 
 notable amongst the rulers of Austrian Italy, as mild, just and 
 merciful. The influence of the liberal tendencies of Pius IX 
 had, here as elsewhere in Italy, begun to work before the 
 Duchess died, and a slight outbreak and repression had taken 
 place on the occasion of the prohibition of a banquet to the 
 Pontiff, with the cost of a few wounds to the demonstrators. 
 
 The relative good fortune in the character of its ruler, which 
 made Parma enviable amongst the Italian states under the 
 control of Austria, is sharply contrasted with the hapless fate 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 181 5-1847. 10 1 
 
 of Modena. Among the spawn of petty tyrants bred by the 
 autocracy at Vienna for the misery of the Italian people, the 
 last two Francescos of the Austro-Este house are preeminent 
 for their brutal assertion of the divine right to misgovern at 
 their pleasure the countries consigned to them. Perhaps the 
 infiltration of Italian blood in the Este family gave a more 
 intense mediaeval subtlety to their method of government, but 
 in fact they surpassed the doings of the Hapsburgs in 
 Lombardy, impossible as that might have seemed. Francesco 
 IV, son of an archduke of Austria who had been Duke of 
 Modena and Governor of Lombardy and who died in 1806, 
 and of Maria Beatrice of Este, heiress of an income of many 
 millions drawn from large estates in central Italy, as well as of 
 the Duchy of Modena, had two passions dominant over many 
 vices, hatred of France and French ideas, and love of absolute 
 government. What he did in misgovernment was not merely 
 from deference paid to orders from Vienna, as in other cases 
 amongst the petty Italian princes, but also from pure detesta- 
 tion of anything resembling popular rights and the profound 
 conviction that Providence had made the people to be governed 
 and the Princes to govern them. The Queen of Sardinia, the 
 Austrian wife of Vittorio Emmanuele I, arranged a marriage 
 between Francesco and her daughter Maria Beatrice, in the 
 hope, it is said, of inducing the House of Savoy to abolish the 
 Salic law which held there — a change which would have made 
 the wife of Francesco IV of Modena Queen of Sardinia. The 
 ambition of Francesco to become the king of an united northern 
 Italy drew him into intrigues with all classes of Italian 
 politicians ; at one time he was liberal with the constitu- 
 tionalists, at another absolute with the court of Vienna. That 
 he was a man of great ability is undeniable, and a little 
 constancy in his views, with a little political tact, would have 
 made him a dangerous candidate for the position of head of 
 an united Italy. But he was disqualified by his lack of political 
 education and his contempt for popular rights : he was crafty, 
 
102/ Italy. [Ch\i 
 
 dishonest and mendacious ; with all this he had at times the 
 courtesy of a man who considers himself master of all around 
 him, and to whom courtesy and condescension cost nothing. 
 Returning to his ancestral state on the 16th of July, 1814, he 
 abolished the laws of the defunct Kingdom of Italy and 
 the judicial system founded on French law, and soon afterwards 
 restored the codes of 1771. During the attempted invasion of 
 Murat in 18 15 he withdrew to Mantua, the favourite refuge 
 of the children of Austria when fortune seemed uncertain, 
 remaining however only a few months. The dull routine of 
 repression and irritation continued until the revolutions, which 
 broke out in Naples and Piedmont in 1820, gave rise to 
 agitation in Modena. No violence was attempted in the 
 duchy, but the popular unrest gave Francesco a pretext to put 
 his theories in operation. It was discovered that subversive 
 documents had been circulated, and many arrests were made. 
 The occasion was improved for the establishment of a true 
 inquisitorial regime, with special tribunals for conspiracy. 
 Torture was inflicted by privation of sleep and food and long 
 endurance of extreme physical discomfort : one method of 
 extorting confessions was ingenious if devilish — the adminis- 
 tration of drugs which produced delirium in the patient, whose 
 ravings were recorded as testimony against him. Amongst the 
 voluntary exiles who escaped from this tyranny was Panizzi, 
 afterwards chief librarian to the British Museum. Out of these 
 accusations grew the notorious Rubiera trials, in which the 
 Duke showed himself a worse accuser, severer judge and more 
 barbarous executioner than even his servile officials. The 
 details are not edifying, but may be found in Tivaroni, who 
 gives names and particulars of a series of iniquitous condem- 
 nations which equalled or surpassed those of the Austrians in 
 Lombardy. 
 
 The only serious and continuous effort of Francesco seems 
 to have been that to supplant the male heir of the House of 
 Savoy for the benefit of his wife the female heir of King Vittorio 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 181 5-1847. 103 
 
 Emmanuele. But even this did not prosper, and it would seem 
 that his capricious and unbalanced character led even the rulers 
 of Vienna to discourage his plans for creating a kingdom out of 
 the Principalities and part of the States of the Church. Perhaps 
 the advantage of a vigorous and unscrupulous governor in central 
 Italy did not, with the Hapsburgs, outweigh the evident disad- 
 vantage of Francesco's growing unpopularity; in any case his 
 intrigues were fruitless. Communications passed between the 
 French republicans and the Duke, and between the latter and 
 the liberals of Modena, through the medium of their well-known 
 leader Ciro Menotti. The outcome of the Revolution of July 
 destroyed any hope of aid from that quarter, and the Duke, 
 probably denounced at Vienna as compromised with the 
 liberals, went to the extreme of reaction. The result was 
 the demonstration of January, 1831, which was headed by 
 Menotti — a futile and in fact utterly inoffensive conspiracy 
 which had only succeeded in preparing a feeble protest with- 
 out overt acts. The conspirators, to the number of sixty, 
 having met in the house of Menotti, were surrounded by the 
 troops, and after a brief resistance, in which three soldiers 
 were killed, they were all captured. A rising in the capital 
 was thus prevented, and in the trials which subsequently took 
 place implacable severity fell on the prisoners. Only two, 
 however, suffered capital punishment — they were Menotti and 
 Vincenzo Borelli, the latter not one of those implicated with 
 Menotti, but vaguely accused of having participated in the 
 insurrectionary movement of 1820. There is no doubt that 
 the Duke had been deeply engaged in intrigues with the 
 liberal chiefs for the furtherance of his ambitious schemes, 
 and there is evidence enough to make it most probable that 
 the execution of Menotti was resolved on in order to silence 
 the only witness of transactions, which, if made known, would 
 have compromised the Duke with Austria without any compen- 
 sation in the direction of Savoy. It is not improbable that the 
 execution of Borelli, whose offence was not such as to distinguish 
 
104 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 him from the mass of the conspirators, was ordered simply to 
 obscure the reasons for that of Menotti. The long list of crimes 
 against justice of which the Duke is convicted by authentic 
 history proves that he was capable of such an act. On the 
 other hand, the touching letter which Menotti wrote to his 
 wife before his execution and which the government refused 
 to transmit to her, shows that he was no vulgar conspirator, 
 but a man of high principle, who had entered on the course he 
 took in full understanding with the Duke, and was abandoned 
 by him when he no longer served the ducal purposes. Menotti's 
 letter is one of the most touching documents in the history of 
 the Italian movement, and may be placed alongside that of 
 Attilio Bandiera 1 . 
 
 The movement in the city of Modena was summarily 
 checked by the capture of the conspirators, but that in the 
 provinces was more serious, and on the 5th of February, 1831, 
 the Duke considered it prudent to take refuge in Mantua and 
 leave its suppression to the Austrians. The people of Reggio 
 united with those of Modena, and a new government was 1 
 formed on the 18th of February, but the peasantry were 
 hostile and the succour hoped for from other quarters did not 
 arrive. Francesco soon returned with a strong Austrian escort, 
 and after a trivial resistance the insurgents disbanded. This 
 failure was naturally followed by new severities and a long 
 series of trials and condemnations to imprisonment or the 
 galleys. The despotic tendencies of the Duke, thus intensi- 
 fied, continued during the rest of his life without the stimulus 
 of another rebellion. He died on the 20th of February, 1846. 
 Even the liberal writers on the events of central Italy admit 
 that his private life was without grave reproach, and that he 
 was humane where no political question was involved. 
 
 The restoration of 18 14 recalled to the throne of Tuscany 
 Ferdinando III, who had been expelled by Napoleon in 1798, 
 
 1 It is to be found in Tivaroni, V Italia durante il dominio Ausiriaco, 
 I. 634. 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1815-1847. 105 
 
 and who, by the mildness of his rule, contrasting with the 
 severity of that of the French interregnum, gave his subjects 
 a degree of contentment which no other portion of the 
 peninsula under Austrian control — not excepting Parma in 
 the days of Marie Louise — enjoyed. Even the liberal his- 
 torians record that he was received with joy. The enterprise 
 of Murat in 18 15 disturbed for a moment his tranquillity, and 
 he took refuge in his Ligurian province during the short 
 campaign. While returning to the ancient system, the Grand 
 Duke preserved some of the ameliorations in the code intro- 
 duced by the French, and perhaps governed as well as could 
 have been expected of one reared in the Viennese school of 
 despotism. This led to the mitigation of all those symptoms 
 of discontent which were so intense in Modena and in the 
 provinces under direct Austrian government. The rule of 
 Ferdinando was that of a benevolent despot in a small state; 
 and such a system was better adapted to the intelligent and 
 pacific Tuscans than to any other part of Italy. The Grand 
 Duke had the means and the energy to suppress open revolt, 
 should it appear, and, feeling sure of his hold on the people, he 
 was really more tolerant than the Austrians found it safe to be. 
 Responsible ministers did not come within his limitations : he 
 had his private secretaries for foreign and domestic affairs, war 
 and finance, but he directed all. The immediate control of 
 affairs was in the hands of a Secretary of State, and to this 
 office the Grand Duke appointed Vittorio Fossombroni. His 
 functions, depending, as they did, entirely on the pleasure of 
 the sovereign, were hardly definable by statute, and practically 
 covered the entire government, so that Tivaroni says of him 
 that he was " the real master of Tuscany in this period." Born 
 in Arezzo, of a noble family, and early devoted to the study 
 of mathematics, he had given great attention to the problem, 
 so important in Italy, of the irrigation of arid lands. He had 
 accepted under the Empire the charge of supervising the drain- 
 age of the Pontine marshes, and made studies for that irrigation 
 
106 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of the Maremme which later was to become one of the chief 
 glories of the dynasty of Lorraine, serving his country tran- 
 quilly under Napoleon as he did after the restoration under 
 Ferdinando III. Gino Capponi, no poor judge of men, and 
 a liberal of the most solid type, says of him: " Fossombroni 
 had a mind of the first order in the force and range of its 
 natural qualities, but the rapidity, accuracy and admirable 
 clearness of his views were not supported by a corresponding 
 profundity of reflection or of science.... Honest in his adminis- 
 tration of public affairs, but indifferent to the peculations of 
 his subordinates, he was in personal affairs of a parsimony 
 sometimes too precise." With this character and an easy- 
 going tolerance of liberal opinions so far as the mere expression 
 of them was concerned, Fossombroni was an ideal governor for 
 an Italian population and left no good reason for measures 
 required by Austrian policy and even demanded by Vienna of 
 the Grand Duke. The Grand Duke displayed a strong amour 
 propre in the administration of his state and refused to concede 
 to Austria what it often demanded, even though in accordance 
 with his own tendencies. He was, however benevolent, still a 
 despot and a reactionary, and mingled his resistance to the 
 Roman Curia with concessions to the Church at home, re- 
 establishing ecclesiastical marriage but refusing to permit the 
 Pope to meddle in the affairs of the State. 
 
 In 182 1 the Grand Duke married, in second nuptials, Maria 
 Ferdinanda, a Bourbon princess; his son and heir, Leopold, had 
 already in 181 7 married the Princess Marianna of Saxony. The 
 stability of the dynasty of Lorraine was thus established on what 
 seemed a safe basis, and the Grand Duke clearly entertained 
 no apprehensions that liberalism might render its position 
 insecure. About the year 1820 a mild and Platonic propa- 
 ganda of progress began to make itself felt in literature, the 
 chief centre being the still well-known scientific and literary 
 reading library of Vieusseux, where advanced liberals used 
 to meet, to read and discuss the events of the day and the 
 
I v.] Northern and Central Italy, 18 15-1847. 107 
 
 [politics of Europe. Around this nucleus gathered the thinkers 
 of Tuscany, and as the genial hospitality of the Grand Duke 
 did not repel the exiles of Naples and Piedmont, the events of 
 182 1 added greatly to the strength of the movement. The 
 foundation of La Antologia, a review modelled on the Edin- 
 burgh Review, vivified the political atmosphere, and was 
 tolerated until 1833. During all these years Tuscany was 
 the Italian Arcadia, where, as nowhere else in the peninsula, 
 a certain freedom of thought and discussion existed undis- 
 turbed. The reign of Ferdinando III was one of prosperity 
 and tranquillity for his state, and to this day one may hear 
 old Tuscans repeat the traditions of a golden rule before the 
 idea of Italian unity invaded their Duchy. Tabarrini sums up 
 the condition of Tuscany as that of "a country without passions 
 or ambitions, with mild manners and an inborn sense of the 
 beautiful." 
 
 In June 1824 Ferdinando was succeeded by Leopoldo II. 
 Though less princely and more despotic than his father, he 
 was induced by the influence of Fossombroni to repel the 
 attempted intervention of Austria in Tuscan affairs, and no 
 change took place in the administration until the revolution 
 of July set the blood of the most advanced liberals in a 
 ferment. An abortive movement took place in February, 
 183 1, in consequence of which the police arrested about 
 forty of the radical and revolutionary party; but as the vast 
 majority of the Tuscans were content with the government 
 and repugnant to any change, there was no possibility of a 
 serious attempt at revolution, which for the rest the moderates 
 knew would only result in the intervention of Austria. The 
 secret society, "Iveri Italiani" and the Giovane Italia began 
 to work, but with few followers. The Grand Duke kept up 
 the improvement of the country in his mild way and the 
 masses were ready to support the government. In April, 
 1844, Fossombroni died. He was succeeded by Don Neri 
 Corsini, who soon gave place to Giuseppe Paver, under whom 
 
108 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 affairs followed their tranquil course. In 1846 some agitation 
 was caused by the extradition, at the demand of the Pope, of 
 Renzi, a political refugee — an agitation unimportant except as 
 giving the growing liberal party an opportunity for innocuous 
 manifestation. Events had to wait for the initiative of Pius IX. 
 
 (3) The Papal States. 
 
 The restoration of the Pope after 1815 was hailed with 
 great applause by the Italian population in the states through 
 which he passed on his way to Rome. Pius VII enjoyed the 
 advantage of being looked upon as a victim of the tyranny of 
 Napoleon and came back as the liberator of his people from 
 the French government and the oppressions of Murat. After 
 his return, the civil government of the Papal States was 
 practically carried on at the dictation of the Austrians. But 
 the population, weary of the oppressions and agitations of 
 the preceding years, submitted quietly, desiring only peace. 
 In these circumstances perhaps more progress was made 
 toward constitutional government than would have been 
 possible in a state of political agitation. In 181 7 the Pope 
 published a code of civil procedure, and in 1821 the com- 
 mercial code of the kingdom of Italy, as drawn up under 
 Eugene, was restored. In the penal code capital punish- 
 ment for heresy and torture were abolished. Taxation was 
 reasonable, just, and imposed according to the law, but the 
 administration was fraudulent and extremely corrupt. From 
 1 81 5 to 1830 the Pope had only two regiments of infantry 
 and a few companies of grenadiers, dragoons and artillery — 
 sufficient to maintain a tranquillity which, at least in the greater 
 part of his dominions, no political agitation disturbed. 
 
 The mountainous portions of the country, in Umbria and 
 the Marches, were, however, always more or less affected by 
 the propaganda of the Carbonari, who on the 24th of June, 
 181 7, ordered a rising. Meeting with no support from the 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 18 15-1847. 109 
 
 population, this disturbance was speedily repressed. It was 
 followed by a long list of prosecutions and condemnations to 
 death, or to lifelong slavery in the galleys, and to terms of 
 imprisonment from three to ten years. In 182 1 the activity 
 of the conspirators again provoked numerous banishments and 
 imprisonments, and in 1823 further additions were made to 
 the number of poor wretches who were wasting away in the 
 horrible prisons of the Papal States. In spite of these severi- 
 ties, the agitation continued, not extensively indeed, owing to 
 the sluggish and degraded condition of the population, but 
 always to an extent sufficient to disturb the government. The 
 Austrians remained throughout the prime counsellors of the 
 Pope, and enjoyed the advantage without incurring the re- 
 sponsibility of the cruelties to which they urged the Papal 
 government. The death of Pius VII in 1823 and the 
 accession of Leo XII, who had been known in his youth 
 to be of a frank and liberal disposition, excited hopes of 
 change in a liberal direction. But the Pope's character under- 
 went, as in so many other cases, a modification consequent on 
 the grave responsibility of his new position as head of the 
 Church : he grew timid and distrustful of all tendencies to 
 reform, and ended in becoming reactionary and hostile to all 
 liberal movement. In his policy of repression he naturally 
 relied on Austria, whose influence in Central Italy during this 
 period was constantly on the increase. 
 
 In the Romagna, where the spirit of the people has always 
 displayed a turbulence scarcely known in other parts of Italy, 
 the agitation was renewed in 1824, and was rigorously sup- 
 pressed by the papal authorities. In August, 1825, very severe 
 sentences were pronounced against the Freemasons and all 
 other secret societies. In accordance with these, more than 
 two hundred persons of all classes were arrested, and sentenced 
 to terms of punishment varying from death to ten years' im- 
 prisonment, while many others were put under police super- 
 vision. The capital punishments were commuted to the 
 
1 10 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 galleys for life. This state of things continued until 1829, 
 when Leo XII died. Pius VIII, who succeeded, modified 
 none of the measures taken by his predecessor, and his short 
 reign as pope introduced no change in political conditions. 
 He died in 1830 and was succeeded by Gregory XVI. 
 
 On the 4th of February, 1831, under the pressure of the 
 unvarying severity and brutality of the papal administration, 
 an insurrection broke out at Bologna. This insurrection had 
 no connexion with the measures of the new Pope, whose 
 election was not known when it began : it was due to other 
 causes. The discontent in the Romagna had greatly increased 
 since 1824, and the operations of the secret societies had been 
 more active and more successful there than anywhere else in 
 Italy, with the exception of Naples. Taxation was irregular and 
 accompanied by favoritism and corruption, while the measures 
 taken to suppress public opinion were arbitrary and capricious, 
 depending entirely upon the moods and humours of the local 
 administration. The influence of Mazzini began about this 
 time to be felt in Italy. He operated with great energy and 
 success in the Papal States, and was probably the main director 
 of all the liberal movements that took place, — the Freemasons 
 and Carbonari more or less following his lead. 
 
 An abortive rising had taken place in Rome on December 
 10, 1830, two days after the death of Pius VIII, but (as 
 Farini says) it had no settled plan or unity of direction. It 
 was the seizure of Menotti in Parma that gave the signal for 
 the outbreak of February in the Papal States. At Bologna the 
 existing government was at once overthrown, and from this 
 centre the movement rapidly spread throughout the Legations, 
 the Marches, and Umbria. The papal forces in Ancona were 
 overcome with little difficulty, and "within a fortnight four- 
 fifths of the Papal States had fallen away." A second attempt 
 was now made in Rome itself, but, like the first, was suppressed 
 without difficulty, the mass of the population declaring strongly 
 against the revolutionists. The Curia now tried concessions, 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 181 5-1847. 11 1 
 
 lowering the taxes on salt and meal, but at the same time it 
 gathered troops. These measures had no effect on the revolted 
 provinces, which, in a general assembly held at Bologna on 
 Feb. 25, formally abolished the temporal authority of the Pope 
 and formed themselves into a single state. A provisional con- 
 stitution was drawn up, and Count Carlo Pepoli took the lead 
 of the movement, along with other men of influence and position. 
 But the more or less conservative tendencies of these persons 
 offended the radicals and the Carbonari, and disunion began to 
 manifest itself in the ranks of the revolutionary party. At this 
 juncture the Austrian government, rightly guessing that the 
 government of Louis Philippe, however it might threaten, 
 would not proceed to active measures, resolved to obey the 
 summons of Gregory XVI and to intervene. Having restored 
 the Duke of Modena, Austrian troops entered Ferrara on 
 March 6, and a fortnight later marched on Bologna. The 
 revolution was easily put down, and the insurgent forces 
 withdrew to Ravenna and Forli, and afterwards to Ancona, 
 where they capitulated to the Austrians. The whole affair, 
 unsupported as it was elsewhere in Italy, was an ill-considered 
 and misdirected movement, which showed the strength of 
 popular discontent, but developed no distinct aims or national 
 tendencies that might entitle it to consideration as a step in 
 the national development. 
 
 These unfortunate events nearly led to international compli- 
 cations. The French government, jealous of Austrian influence, 
 protested against the continued occupation of that portion of 
 the pontifical states where the insurrection had taken place. 
 At the same time it urged the Papacy to introduce reforms, 
 with a view to satisfy public sentiment, but the despotic 
 tendencies of the papal court prevented any hearty adoption 
 of this policy. It is true that the Pope, under the pressure of 
 the liberal governments, made some show of concession. This, 
 however, had no duration, the local authorities following their 
 own pleasure in executing or neglecting their orders, and in the 
 
112 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 end things remained as they had been. In 1832 fresh dis- 
 turbances, this time mainly the work of the students, broke out 
 in the Romagna, and were suppressed by the pontifical forces 
 after somewhat severe fighting at Cesena. The suppression 
 was brutal ; at Rimini and Forli twenty-one people were killed 
 and more than a hundred wounded. 
 
 Meanwhile the Austrians had evacuated Ancona and some 
 other places, in the summer of 183 1, but they still held their 
 ground in Ferrara. In February 1832 the French, determined 
 not to leave the Papal States entirely under the influence of 
 Austria, occupied Ancona by surprise. Three men-of-war 
 arrived off the port, and landed a body of eighteen hundred 
 men, disregarding the protests of the papal government, which 
 withdrew its own troops in order not to accept any complicity 
 in the French violation of its rights. War between France and 
 Austria appeared to be imminent, but neither party was anxious 
 to fight, and Louis Philippe had no allies. The general state 
 of the pontifical territory remained unaltered, the jealousies of 
 PVance and Austria disposing the government rather to maintain 
 the status quo than to introduce any reforms. In 1837 the 
 French and Austrians simultaneously evacuated the papal 
 territories. 
 
 From 1843 to 1845 insurrection in a chronic form infested 
 the Roman states, occasionally breaking out in movements of 
 greater or less importance. The most rigorous measures against 
 the secret societies produced no effect other than that of ex- 
 tending their membership. The punishments inflicted, the 
 persecutions and imprisonments, have rarely been surpassed 
 in severity and brutality in the annals of European govern- 
 ment. The result as a whole was bitter animosity on the 
 part of the population, especially that of the more mountainous 
 provinces, toward the Pope and his government. A writer of 
 the period says: "All the population of Ravenna is intensely 
 hostile to the government ; the political registers contain only 
 about thirty people who may be said to be well disposed toward 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1 815-1847. 113 
 
 the government of the Holy See. The greater part of the 
 population is hostile to the government and might be called 
 liberal." Cardinal Massimo writes from Imola on the 22nd of 
 August, 1845: "Setting aside the old men and women, the 
 young people of the city and a very small part of the agri- 
 cultural class not entirely corrupted, the whole of the population 
 from eighteen years of age, with the exception of a few timorous 
 legitimists, is entirely and in principle hostile to the govern- 
 ment." The Judge of Ferrara at the same time writes : " The 
 friends of the government have no influence in this province 
 precisely because they are few, and the general sentiment is 
 hostile. The severity of the punishments inflicted for discontent 
 intensifies this feeling." Many liberals went into voluntary exile, 
 and from abroad became the prime movers of sedition in the 
 Papal States. 
 
 An insurrection which broke out in Rimini in 1845 still 
 further intensified the persecution, and the extraordinary 
 commissioners who were sent to Rimini and Ravenna com- 
 mitted atrocities scarcely to be described. Some of the 
 political prisoners died of starvation and of the corporal 
 punishments inflicted by the gendarmes in the prisons; and 
 Cardinal Massimo, who ruled at Ravenna, exulted publicly 
 over this severity. The reign of Gregory XVI yielded in no 
 respect to those of his predecessors in systematic and un- 
 flinching suppression of all popular rights. The corruption in 
 the papal court, the extravagance and irregularity reached their 
 maximum under Gregory XVI. The finances were in an 
 almost bankrupt condition and a loan of two million scudi 
 produced no permanent relief. In 1846 Gregory XVI died, 
 abandoned and detested. The record of his reign is summed 
 up in the following words by one of his contemporaries : " The 
 repose, the life, the reputation and the honour of families 
 disturbed, menaced, and brutally violated by spies, police- 
 men, centurions, curates, bishops, governors, vicars and 
 inquisitors ; commerce impoverished, no industries, taxation 
 
 s. 1. 8 
 
1 14 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and imposts very heavy ; the fields desolated and unhealthy ; 
 a debt of thirty-eight million scudi ; expenditure exceeding 
 income by half a million ; no control, no accounts, the admini- 
 stration badly arranged, wasteful and thievish ; five hundred 
 civil employe's with a total salary of 276,000 scudi; three 
 hundred ecclesiastics with a total salary of 1,100,000 scudi; 
 no codes of law ; constant and needless interference with 
 justice ; a detestable police ; ecclesiastical censure supported 
 by military force ; roads, asylums, associations and meetings 
 opposed; the introduction of gas prevented; criminals in 
 abundance ; forty thousand persons under police supervision ; 
 four thousand exiles. Such was the rule of Gregory XVI." 
 On the death of Gregory XVI, Rome was undisturbed. Its 
 liberal club held its usual conferences without any tendencies 
 to insurrection and the state of the city may be said to have 
 been normal. The conclave for the election of the new Pope 
 acted under the rival pressures of France and Austria, and 
 ended with the election of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, who took 
 the name of Pius IX. In his early days, when under the 
 influence of the more conservative and moderate of the Italian 
 patriots, Mastai-Ferretti was an ecclesiastic of unusually liberal 
 views. A countryman of Count Pasolini, the leading spirit 
 amongst the rational reformers in the Papal States, he had been 
 greatly influenced by that statesman, and entered upon his sacred 
 functions with a strong disposition in favour of liberal views. 
 Pius IX initiated administrative reforms, and issued an amnesty 
 for all political offences, which was signed on the 16th of July, 
 1846. This concession was made conditional on the recognition 
 of error and on signature of the following formula : " I, the 
 under-signed, recognize the reception of a singular grace in 
 the generous and spontaneous pardon conceded to me by the 
 indulgence of the most high pontiff Pius IX, my legitimate 
 sovereign, for all the part I have taken, in whatever manner, 
 in attempts which have disturbed public order and attacked 
 the legitimate authority instituted in his temporal dominions. 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy \ 18 15-1847. 115 
 
 I promise on my word of honour not to abuse in any manner 
 or at any time the sovereign clemency, and I give my pledge 
 to fulfil faithfully all the duties of a good and loyal subject." 
 The only exceptions from this amnesty were those of employes, 
 officers and ecclesiastics whose offences were complicated with 
 crime, but it comprehended all convicts, exiles and others 
 punished for political reasons by the state. 
 
 The appointment of Cardinal Gizzi as Secretary of State 
 (August, 1846) was regarded as an earnest of further liberal 
 progress. This was followed by the nomination of other 
 liberal officials to administrative posts in various parts of the 
 Papal States. Commissions were appointed for considering 
 a scheme of educational reform. Discussion of political 
 problems became active and general, and the supporters of 
 national independence began to speak freely, for instance in 
 the Scientific Congress of Italy, held at Genoa in the autumn 
 of 1846. In March of the following year, the severity of the 
 press-censorship in Rome was modified, and many journals 
 and pamphlets added a powerful stimulus to the movement in 
 favour of independence and reform. In April 1847 an edict 
 was published, instituting a Council of State, to be composed 
 of persons nominated in each province by the authorities of 
 the province, and appointed by the Pope. Laymen were not 
 excluded from this council, which, although it possessed only a 
 deliberative voice, and was entirely subject, in its composition, 
 to the ecclesiastical will, was welcomed as at least a step in 
 the direction of popular representation. The people began to 
 express their joy and their hopes in noisy demonstrations, for 
 instance on the anniversary of the Pope's accession (June, 
 1847). The government began to feel some anxiety, and 
 shortly afterwards such gatherings were forbidden. The " San- 
 fedisti " or " Gregoriani " — so-called because they supported 
 the policy of Gregory XVI, the embodiment of ecclesiastical 
 tyranny — began to recover courage, and a reaction, actively 
 supported by Austria, seemed probable. For a time, however, 
 
u6 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Pius IX adhered to his policy of reform, consented to the 
 creation of a civic guard in Rome, and substituted Cardinal 
 Ferretti — a strong reformer — for Cardinal Gizzi, as Secretary 
 of State. It appeared as if Metternich's remark, that "a 
 liberal Pope was inconceivable," was about to be falsified 
 by the career of Pio Nono. 
 
 Meanwhile, throughout the Romagna, demonstrations oc- 
 curred in increasing numbers. At Bologna the most advanced 
 Radicals organised a festa in the Borgo San Pietro in com- 
 memoration of those who had died or been imprisoned in 
 consequence of the disturbances of 1844: but the Cardinal 
 Legate prevented it. It is clear that Pius IX, on assuming 
 power, had no precise conception of his future course. Of 
 extreme benevolence of disposition, and a devout man, the 
 sufferings of the people and the severity of past governments 
 had no doubt impressed him profoundly, and believing in the 
 goodness and docility of his subjects, he was disposed to do 
 what lay in him to lessen their troubles. But, as always 
 happens in such cases, the liberal cardinal becomes an 
 absolute Pope, and grows despotic after his election. Pius IX 
 held tenaciously to the traditions of the Papal government. 
 His antipathy to constitutional control was evident from the 
 beginning. Ameliorations in the condition of his people he 
 desired, but he intended that they should be conferred as 
 those of a father to his children, and that they should be 
 recognized as free gifts and not made obligatory by any law 
 which should control or seem to control his action. It is 
 needless to describe the demonstrations of devotion and grati- 
 tude which marked the first year or two of the Pope's reign. 
 His more conservative advisers foresaw what eventually took 
 place. A people absolutely unused to liberty for centuries, 
 having the door opened which led to self-government, could 
 no more be controlled in their movements than the sea 
 tides. The demagogues and the patriots were confounded 
 together. Ciceruacchio led the one and Mazzini came in 
 
v.] Northern and Central Italy, 1 815-1847. 117 
 
 time to lead the other. The right of forming associations and 
 clubs, and all the paraphernalia of popular liberty, came 
 rapidly to the front ; the press, for which the utmost freedom 
 was claimed, at first reforming, became satirical and finally 
 subversive; and all the rest of the abuses growing out of 
 liberty presented themselves in rapid succession. Pius IX 
 desired, as a rational and healthy step, to restore the Roman 
 municipality, the recollections of which were amongst the 
 soundest traditions of the Roman state. But it should be a 
 municipality which should answer to his own will ; that it 
 should be independent of him he never dreamed. The 
 municipal council was to relieve him of care, not to assume 
 responsibility. The Pope conceded willingly all that did not 
 limit his absolute power, only to find that he had prepared the 
 approaches of attack ; and when the time came in which he 
 saw his mistake and was obliged to check the excesses of 
 popular feeling, the blame was laid not on him but on his 
 advisers, whose unpopularity increased in exact proportion 
 to the popularity of the Pope. Fraternizing banquets and 
 the organization of the civic guard went with demonstrations 
 of loyalty to the Pope and detestation of the cardinals. 
 
 This drift in affairs was toward the precipice. Austria on 
 one side, Naples on the other, and France across the sea were 
 watching with apprehension the tendency to liberal institutions 
 which might lead to the reformation and reconstitution of Italy. 
 The preparations of Austria, crafty and determined, showed 
 that Metternich at least had a distinct conception of what was 
 going on. England, as usual, with her predilection for free 
 institutions everywhere, opposed her influence, but fruitlessly, 
 to check Austrian intervention. So early as the 27 th of July, 
 1847, Austria, making a pretext of local disturbances, sent 
 troops to occupy Ferrara, pretending the precedent of the 
 disturbances of 1831. The Papal government resented this 
 aggressive action. Cardinal Ferretti protested against it, and 
 described it as a "provocation," not only to Rome, but to 
 
u8 Italy. [Chap, v.] 
 
 Italy in general. England protested, but in vain. The hold 
 of Austria on the northern border of the papal province 
 strengthened day by day. The policy of the Pope was enig- 
 matical. While diplomatically opposing the pretensions of 
 Austria, he encouraged the sentiment of the people which 
 demanded war with that empire, but at the same time refused 
 to make any preparations by which the popular will could be 
 made effective. He consented to the formation of a camp at 
 Forli where seven thousand men commanded by a Monsignore 
 was established as a protest against the Austrian invasion, 
 which, however, the Pope had no idea of repelling by force. 
 From this conflict grew the idea of a defensive league amongst 
 the Italian states — an idea which the Pope finally accepted 
 and sought to develope. The notion that a defensive league, 
 unprepared to take the offensive, was a negation of defence, 
 never occurred to the Pope, who was accustomed to deal with 
 ideas and not with facts. Meanwhile legal measures which 
 might be considered humanitarian rather than political were 
 applied in his dominions. The Jews were emancipated, and 
 the gates of the Ghetto, which had for centuries been closed at 
 night and opened in the morning, were broken down. Finally, 
 the first step toward constitutional government was actually 
 taken by the organization of the municipal council of Rome, 
 which was solemnly installed on the 24th of November, 1847. 
 The councillors received the Pope's blessing before entering on 
 their duties. On the 30th of December an edict was issued, 
 establishing a ministry, formed on western models. It was to 
 consist of nine heads of departments, but all were to be ecclesi- 
 astics. This was an unfortunate decision, which enraged the 
 radicals, while it alienated the moderates, who might other- 
 wise have aided the Papal government in stemming the 
 revolutionary tide which was soon to sweep over Rome. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE LITERARY FORERUNNERS OF THE ITALIAN RE- 
 VIVAL : GIOBERTI, CESARE BALBO AND MASSIMO 
 D'AZEGLIO. 
 
 The perusal of the literature which is now considered to 
 have stimulated the movement of 1848 almost makes one 
 question if the Italy, which we know, be the same that was 
 moved to a certain vitality by the works of Gioberti. Yet the 
 consentient opinion of Italian writers on this phase of Italian 
 history in dealing with his " Primato Morale e Civile degli 
 Italiani" is that this sober, philosophic and profoundly re- 
 ligious study, retrospective and speculative, of the conditions 
 and possibilities of Italian life was the signal of its awakening 
 from the sleep of centuries. Minghetti, who, by the part he 
 took in all the phases of the reawakening in central Italy, 
 shows himself to be a competent exponent of the views of the 
 better Italian minds of that epoch, says of it; "The book 
 seemed to some an extravagance, to others a revelation. The 
 truth is, that while many of its ideas were peculiar to the 
 author, and partook of his character, his studies and his pro 
 fession, the substance of it responded to a sentiment still 
 undefined, but which had been slowly developing in the minds 
 of Italians. The idea of nationality had, in the previous years, 
 spread far and wide through many channels, open and secret, 
 and the desire of a great and free country had taken possession 
 
120 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of the majority of the younger men ; but the methods hitherto 
 employed had proved so inefficient that weariness and disgust 
 had followed. Experience had proved that conspiracies, secret 
 societies and partial insurrections were of no utility — that they 
 made the governments more severe, retarded civil progress, 
 arrested the increase of public prosperity, plunged many families 
 into misery, and did not even win the approbation of civilized 
 nations. 
 
 " The rumours of wars and of European insurrections which 
 were circulated every spring time, the mystic declamations of 
 Mazzini in the name of God and the people, his inciting of 
 others to insurrection and murder, while he remained in security 
 in London far from danger, — all these things showed that the 
 time had come to try another method, more serious, more 
 practical and surer.... Gioberti, a Piedmontese exile for the 
 sake of liberty, had taken part in the earliest phases of the 
 Giovine Italia or had been in relation with its chiefs, but had 
 wearied of that pompous and impotent society. His intellect 
 had anticipated that change which had been imperceptibly 
 operating and now began to appear widely. ...but obscurely in 
 the consciousness of many men. This opportuneness and 
 coincidence of the ideas of the author with the spirit of the 
 day gave his book a special importance.... The purpose of the 
 book was to prove that Italy, although it had lost all political 
 value for the outside world, contained all the conditions of 
 moral and political revival, and that to effect this change there 
 was no need of revolutions, invasions or imitations of the 
 foreigner, since political revival is limited to three heads — 
 unity, independence and liberty — the first two of which might 
 be attained by a confederation of the various states under the 
 presidency of the Pope, and the last by means of internal 
 reforms in each state, effected by their respective Princes 
 without danger or diminution of their real power." 
 
 The notion that the forces which were, and long had been, 
 destroying the Italian nationality, could unite for its restoration, 
 
vi.] Gioberti, Balbo, and UAzeglio. 121 
 
 betrays the fundamental defect of Gioberti's scheme, and we 
 may well be surprised that so idyllic a vision should have been 
 accepted by thoughtful Italians as offering material for a 
 propaganda. Issued from the press of Brussels in 1842, the 
 Primato was prohibited in all the Italian states except Pied- 
 mont — an earnest of the willingness of the Princes to accept 
 the scheme it offered — and it was on that account widely 
 circulated and read. Had it been allowed by the Grand-Duke, 
 the Bourbon and the Pope, the shrewd Italians would have 
 seen in it a snare for their scanty liberties ; and it is probable 
 that, but for its proscription, it would have passed almost 
 unobserved. 
 
 Reading it now, we find it difficult to account for the 
 influence it exerted. It is not that the author was insensible 
 to the political degradation to which the masses of Italians 
 had sunk, or the political and social vices produced by the 
 system of government under which they had grown up; in 
 certain passages of his writings he had denounced, with the 
 religious zeal of a Savonarola, both vices and humiliations. 
 " If they are not abolished, even if God came on earth again 
 to give us laws, we should remain the scum and disgrace of 
 humanity." He aimed at what he believed possible — the 
 awakening of the virtues of the race by appealing to its past 
 glories and the position of supremacy which Italy had once 
 held in the civilized world. He appealed to Caesar, to ancient 
 conquest and empire, to the Papacy, to the revival of letters 
 and of art, and to the glories of the petty republics whose 
 triumphs were indeed the germs of the final division and 
 paralysis of Italy, in order to awaken the pride of Italians and 
 stimulate a new political life. He succeeded, not in renovating, 
 but in galvanising that part of the nation which was still 
 subject to literary influence and ethnological dreams ; but that 
 small portion which was gifted with political sense understood 
 that to expect from the little despots of Italy, and above all 
 from the Pope, any relaxation of their arbitrary power was 
 
122 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 absurd. Gioberti's faith in the Pontiff, evidence rather of his 
 devotion as a churchman than of his perspicacity as a states- 
 man, misled him into the belief that the head of the church, 
 who always pretended to a superhuman wisdom, could submit 
 to constitutional control. This dreamer of dreams saw the 
 Papacy, the head of Christianity, also at the head of social and 
 political reform, and of the restoration of justice and liberty — a 
 restoration which, to practical men, meant voluntary abandon- 
 ment of all restraints on heresy and apostasy, dangers in the 
 eyes of the churchman greater than any others. 
 
 But what gave Gioberti that measure of success which he 
 attained, was the singular and unique accident of the advent of 
 a Pope who had been affected by the same enthusiasms, and 
 had dreamed the same dreams — of a society reformed by the 
 Church, and restoring the government of the world to the 
 Church. The point of view of the two reformers was, no 
 doubt, widely different — the Pope seeing that the humanization 
 of ecclesiastical government would strengthen the power of the 
 Church and heighten the devotion of the nations, while Gioberti 
 hoped for reform as a concession by arbitrary power to the 
 rights of the people. Both were mistaken, as events showed, 
 but the coincidence of a reforming Pope and an eloquent 
 advocate of popular emancipation led to the delusion that they 
 were at one in their view of the science of government — a 
 delusion which no doubt helped forward the work of reform. 
 Hopes were awakened which never died out, and the reaction 
 which affected Pius IX did not carry away with it the hopes of 
 the liberals. 
 
 The central idea of Gioberti — and this was no mere 
 artificial attempt to excite the national vanity of the Italians — 
 was that history showed that by its geographical position and 
 the virtue of the antique stock, in which he made the Pelasgi 
 the ruling element, Italy had always been, and must be even in 
 modern times, the controlling member of the confraternity of 
 European nations. 
 
vi.] Gioberti, Balbo, and DAzeglio. 123 
 
 "I intend (he says) to show... that Italy alone has the 
 qualities required to become the chief of nations, and that 
 though to-day she has almost completely lost that chiefship, 
 it is in her power to recover it, and I will state the most 
 important condition of that renovation.... As infant civilization 
 was born between two rivers, so renewed and adult civilization 
 arose between two seas ; the former in fertile Mesopotamia, 
 whence it easily spread over Asia, Africa and the west; the 
 latter in Italy, which divides the Tyrrhene and Adriatic seas, 
 thus forming the central promontory of Europe and placed 
 in a position to dominate the rest of the hemisphere.... In the 
 Church there is neither Greek nor Barbarian, and all nations 
 form a cosmopolitan society, as all the tribes of Israel a single 
 nation. But as, in the Jewish nation, genealogy determined 
 the tenure of the hierarchy, and the sons of Levi received the 
 custody of the Law and the service of the Temple, so in the 
 Christian commonwealth the division of the nations is in a 
 manner involved in the order of the Catholic Church. And, 
 the Church having a supreme head, we must recognise a moral 
 pre-eminence where Heaven has established its seat, and 
 where nearer, quicker, more immediate and more uninterrupted 
 are the inbreathings of its voice. This pre-eminence certainly 
 does not transgress the natural order of divine intentions, real 
 and efficient in their working and in the obligations they impose. 
 So that the Italians, humanly speaking, are the Levites of Chris- 
 tianity, having been chosen by Providence to keep the Christian 
 Pontificate, and to protect with love, with veneration and if 
 
 necessary by arms, the ark of the new covenant Let the 
 
 nations, then, turn their eyes to Italy, their ancient and loving 
 mother, who holds the seeds of their regeneration. Italy is the 
 organ of the supreme reason and the royal and ideal Word ; 
 the fountain, rule and guardian of every other reason and 
 eloquence; for there resides the Head that rules, the Arm 
 that moves, the Tongue that commands and the Heart that 
 animates Christianity at large As Rome is the seat of 
 
1 24 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Christian wisdom, Piedmont is to-day the principal home of 
 Italian military strength. Seated on the slopes of the Alps, 
 as a wedge between Austria and France, and as a guard to 
 the peninsula, of which it is the vestibule and peristyle, it is 
 destined to watch from its mountains, and crush in its ravines, 
 every foreign aggressor, compelling its powerful neighbours to 
 respect the common independence of Italy." 
 
 Further citations are hardly necessary to show that of all 
 the idle dreams of Italian independence, those of Gioberti 
 were the most unsubstantial. That they should have so 
 deeply stirred the intellect of Italy shows that there was 
 the gravest need of an awakening. Gioberti's writings were 
 rather appeals to the mercy and benevolence of the Pope 
 and the despots, than a call to the consciences of Italian 
 aspirants after political emancipation. 
 
 Following closely on the Primato of Gioberti came the 
 " Speranze d' Italia" of Cesare Balbo, a work of a different 
 temper, and impressed with a recognition of historical pre- 
 cedent which gave it a certain practical value as a theory 
 of Italian independence. Beginning with a review of the 
 aspirations and ambitions towards a "Kingdom of Italy" 
 the author gives a lucid demonstration of the necessary 
 antagonisms in those aspirations and ambitions, according 
 to the mind which entertained them, whether that of Prince, 
 Pope or patriot. The conclusion he sums up as follows: 
 
 " That the Kingdom of Italy was a dream is proved by the 
 fact that it was never made. Let us look at the reason, clear 
 enough now. Princes, the governing classes, the people, con- 
 spirators and other classes of subjects, desired the Kingdom, 
 each after his own manner. The conspirators and the people 
 desired not so much the Kingdom as the social order dreamed 
 of in the dreamed-of Kingdom, one dream on another, liberty 
 added to independence. The Princes desired independence 
 but not liberty ; the grandees, the nobles, the rich and notables 
 of all sorts desired aristocracies; those in no way distinguished, 
 
vi.] Gioberti, Balbo, and D Azeglio. 125 
 
 democracies. And, as usual, Naples made a move and, con- 
 trary to their habits, Palermo waited and Turin moved, with 
 a want of harmony in their movements which was a prophecy 
 of discord when they should show their intentions. And 
 Austria stood behind to profit by the discord, while France 
 did nothing to prevent it, and England and the others were 
 indifferent. Sensible people had foreseen this; some generous 
 natures were sacrificed, many ambitious ones were defeated. 
 Out of it came some lessons, not new but profitably retaught — 
 that we must not confound undertakings for the sake of liberty 
 with those for independence; that the latter must have pre- 
 cedence of the former, and above all, that the Kingdom of 
 Italy is impossible with this variety of opinions, of intentions 
 and of states." 
 
 To the student of Italian history, especially to him who 
 has had the opportunity of seeing how morbid and chaotic 
 is the present condition of Italian politics, and how little 
 interest the great majority of Italians take in their own govern- 
 ment, it is surprising that Balbo, with his sober and common- 
 sense views, his clear prevision of difficulties, and his insight 
 into the defects of his countrymen, should have had serious 
 influence on the Italy of his day. This can only have been 
 due to a condition which does not now obtain — that the 
 direction of public opinion was in the hands of thoughtful 
 and prudent patriots, who kept in view the higher interests of 
 Italy. The arguments and warnings of Balbo would exercise 
 no influence on the politics of to-day, and the fact that they 
 were a powerful influence in the stirring times in which they 
 were printed shows that the men who laid the foundations of 
 the Kingdom of Italy and who produced an effect on foreign 
 opinion which still holds sway, had little in common with the 
 classes who now rule the unfortunate state. 
 
 Balbo clearly foresaw the difficulties springing from the 
 position of the Pope, the presence of Austria, the rivalries 
 of the different rulers of Italy, the party-divisions with their 
 
1 26 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 fruitless and ruinous animosities, and the weakness of the 
 democracy; he perceived the helplessness of Italy without 
 assistance from abroad, as well as the dangers and difficulties 
 of foreign support ; and he set forth these things with a logical 
 precision which is unique in the annals of Italy. " The more 
 I observe and study, the more clearly I see that there are only 
 two great and important parties in Italy (as there are only two 
 main points of view, two great interests in its politics, two 
 distinctions in its territory, i.e. dependent or independent 
 provinces), two great parties, I repeat, the foreign and the 
 national; that which despairs of independence and adapts 
 itself to dependence, and that which hopes and prepares for 
 independence. And according to their nature and to ety- 
 mology, I call all those liberal, who in any way work for 
 liberation. In the different modes of action amongst those 
 who agree on the great principle I only see family differences, 
 and my book is only the discussion of the differences so arising. 
 As to all the rest, ' Odi profanum vulgus et arceo? " 
 
 Starting from the Giobertian theory of a confederation, he 
 shows that so long as there is a foreign power embraced in it, 
 no independence is possible, and that the position of the Pope, 
 as its President, would be less rather than more independent 
 than it then was. Excluding the foreign power, there remained 
 four ways of attaining the confederation, viz. by a spontaneous 
 movement of the Italian princes ; by a spontaneous national 
 uprising; by the help of foreign powers other than Austria 
 (which power is studiously left undesignated) or, finally, by 
 taking advantage of some favourable occasion more profitably 
 employed than those of past times. In the examination of 
 these alternatives Balbo proceeds with a cold rigour of logic 
 and precedent to prophesy the discords of the Italian princes, 
 the great dangers arising from the secret societies and their 
 effects on public morality, the animosities which would result 
 from partial risings and the impossibility of an universal insur- 
 rection, and the greater danger of calling in a new foreign 
 
vi.] Gioberti, Balbo, and D'Azeglio. 127 
 
 arbiter (France) to correct the ill done by the old one (Austria). 
 IHis conclusion is that the only contingency which would justify 
 I Italians in expecting the reconstitution of Italy as a confedera- 
 jtion — for he rejects the Kingdom of Italy as impossible — is the 
 [dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which would compensate 
 I Austria in the east for what she would surrender in Italy. The 
 [analysis shows a tranquil and elevated judgment as well as a 
 j sound knowledge of his countrymen which are, for that heated 
 time, very remarkable. The most important point in Balbo's 
 conclusions, and one in which he agrees with Gioberti, is the 
 indication of a confederation of the Italian states as the only 
 1 practicable solution. And looking, with eyes freed from all 
 illusions, at the present state of the Kingdom of Italy, I am 
 compelled to say that the results justify to a certain extent the 
 I diffidence of the two Italian critics; for nothing is more evident 
 than that, while a confederation under favourable conditions 
 might have ultimately prepared Italy for a complete and satis- 
 j factory unity, the premature and forced conformity of so many 
 [and so various populations, under a system for which the larger 
 part were unfit, has introduced into the body politic diseases 
 which neither the Kingdom can now cure, nor the return to a 
 confederation remedy. 
 
 Of the work of the third person in this triumvirate of the 
 revival, Massimo d'Azeglio, Minghetti, the best qualified of all 
 our authorities, expresses the opinion that it was potent not 
 I only with the Italian public but also with the Pope. In fact, 
 one of the occasional letters of Pasolini mentions that he 
 had given the book " Cast di Romagna " to Cardinal Mastai, 
 afterward Pius IX, and Minghetti says that it had a part 
 in the formation of the liberal opinions which actuated the 
 Pontiff in the early reforms of his reign. And the exalted 
 opinion always entertained by d'Azeglio of that Pontiff may 
 well have led the latter to his first liberal step — the appoint- 
 ment of the ministry which included Pasolini and Minghetti, 
 friends of the eulogist and advocates of the same reforms. 
 
128 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 lt I cast di Romagna? says Minghetti, "was the first practical 
 exposition of the programme then first adopted — the substi- 
 tution of public, peaceful, serious and courageous discussion 
 of our affairs, for secret societies and plots. The book was 
 written with evident desire for impartiality, with a feeling 
 of just consideration for others and with frank sincerity and 
 loyalty towards friend and foe. It condemned the insurrection 
 of Rimini as imprudent, ineffective and disastrous, but at the 
 same time it showed clearly the evil character of ecclesiastical 
 
 government The effect was greater than we had anticipated ; 
 
 the book was printed in Tuscany, was everywhere circulated 
 and read, and was the general subject of conversation. This 
 was what we desired, and it showed the ground to be ready for 
 sowing the seed. All the Italian governments felt it, even the 
 Tuscan, which notwithstanding its usual liberality, resented its 
 publication and expelled d'Azeglio — by the orders of Austria, it 
 was said." 
 
 This persecution of the work of d'Azeglio was of course the 
 one thing to make his popularity complete. At this period 
 (1845), to be marked as the enemy of Austria was to become 
 the champion of all Italian pretentions. Both Gioberti and 
 d'Azeglio, devoted to the Pope, unwilling to tolerate the least 
 abatement of his dignity or sovereignty, and unable to conceive 
 the unity of Italy as possible without his cooperation and 
 leading, belong to the extreme conservative party of the later 
 period when unity began to appear a practical question. The 
 influence of the " Cast di Romagna" was greater than the 
 historian of the events discussed in it dreamed or hoped for. 
 To hate Austria, and to consider the martyrdoms of Lombardy 
 and Venice as a part of the career of an Italian liberal, belonged 
 to Italian education; but to regard the Pope as necessarily one 
 of the tyrants of Italy never occurred to the leaders of the 
 movement at this time. But this dispassionate record of the 
 misdeeds of papal agents, written with scrupulous accuracy and 
 an historical impartiality until then unknown in Italy, by a 
 
vi.] Gioberti, Balbo, and UAzeglio. 129 
 
 writer of distinction and graphic power, devoted to the Pope 
 and even tenacious of his privileges, not only must have had a 
 wide-spread influence on the general Italian question, but must 
 also have convinced many sober thinkers that the liberation of 
 Italy involved the suppression of the Papal sovereignty — a result 
 which neither of the leaders of the movement at that time 
 anticipated. And to-day, in the growing demoralization of the 
 too-hastily created kingdom, we can estimate at its true value 
 the caution and conservatism of the early Italian liberals and 
 their aversion to the system of conspiracies and insurrections. 
 The healthy progress made by Italian liberalism in spite of 
 repression in the period between 1830 and 1846, and the 
 disastrous failures of the succeeding period in which the 
 Mazzinian agitations began to dominate, justify the policy of 
 the Italian conservatives and their distrust of the republican 
 propaganda. 
 
 The literature of the subsequent years, especially the 
 proclamations of Mazzini and the incitements to violence 
 which emanated from the secret societies, not only drove 
 from the direction of the general movement the prudent and 
 responsible reformers with their moderating influence, but 
 brought to the front an element which has been ever since, 
 and is especially to-day, the most dangerous in the Italian 
 State — that form of radicalism which is inspired by intolerance 
 of the restraints of government, be it that of the oppressor 
 Austria or that of the once oppressed Italy. We have seen 
 Mazzini, its chief, embarking on a new revolution in 1870, 
 when what was most essential to Italy was to retain the 
 confidence of Europe and to prepare a place for it amongst 
 the solid states which might be counted on as an element of 
 security in international politics. This impatience of discipline 
 in the lower elements of the " party of action,' - and the efforts 
 of the higher to force reforms upon the country, in the teeth 
 of the conservative element in the state, did certainly stir the 
 blood of the nation ; but such policy led to no useful results, 
 
130 Italy. [Chap, vi.) 
 
 while it gave an undue and disastrous influence to the classes 
 whose raison d'itre is agitation for agitation's sake. When the 
 State was made, there remained for this school of professional 
 agitators only agitation for further changes, and so even Ma/.zini 
 found himself compelled, by the necessity of retaining his in- 
 fluence, to conspire against the Kingdom in favour of the 
 Republic. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 NORTHERN ITALY, 1 847- 1 848. 
 (1) Piedmont and Austria. 
 
 A great step was taken toward the re-awakening of Italy's 
 
 political life in the journey of Massimo D'Azeglio through 
 
 central Italy to study the spirit of the people. Austria was 
 
 recognized as an enemy. The great question was how to 
 
 paralyse the influence of Austria over the Pope, over the 
 
 King and over the principalities. On his return at the end 
 
 of 1845, D'Azeglio went to Turin and demanded an audience 
 
 with the King. He expressed to him the views he had 
 
 formed and the information he had gathered during this 
 
 journey, the hopes and aspirations of liberal Italy which 
 
 centred on him as the head of the coming movement ; and 
 
 the King replied, " Let these gentlemen know that they must 
 
 keep quiet at present, there is nothing to be done; but tell them 
 
 that when the time comes, my life, the life of my children, 
 
 my army, my treasury, my all, will be spent in the Italian 
 
 cause." This was the first time that the King had spoken 
 
 distinctly, without equivocation, and from this time forward he 
 
 was regarded as the leader of the great Italian movement. 
 
 It is probable that the election of Pius IX in 1846 was the 
 
 immediate cause of the King's resolutions becoming active. 
 
 That election enabled him to reconcile the two dominant 
 
 9— 2 
 
132 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 motives of his life — fidelity to his religion and hostility to 
 Austria. On the 25th of July he writes, "In spite of the little, 
 even very little (sic) Austrian party, I am firmly resolved not 
 to halt in the way of progress toward all that aims at the 
 safety of the people and the strengthening of our national 
 spirit." And again ; " For the rest, if it were desired to drive 
 out of our country everybody hostile to the Austrians, I should 
 be obliged to begin by driving out myself." 
 
 As the plans of the Pope became more clear, those 
 of Carlo Alberto defined themselves as more liberal. He 
 detested revolutionists, and it is probable that the idea of 
 parliamentary government was accepted only as an inevitable 
 means to the end of developing national character. While 
 he wrote of Italian independence and progress and rejoiced 
 over the attitude of Pius IX, for whom he entertained the 
 highest reverence and whom he was ready to defend if he 
 should be attacked — even offering to send his fleet to the 
 coast of the Romagna and to receive him in case Austria 
 should occupy his territory — he at the same time sent con- 
 tributions to the revolutionary league of the Swiss Catholic 
 cantons forming the Sonderbund, while he favoured the 
 Waldensian Catholics and sent them arms. In the midst of 
 perpetual contradictions between the old tendencies and the 
 new aspirations, face to face with the liberalizing tendencies of 
 the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King still hesi- 
 tated as to the question of the constitution. 
 
 Balbo said that Carlo Alberto did not fear liberty for its own 
 sake but regarded it as an obstacle to national independence. 
 On this point we have two letters of the King : one to Villa- 
 marina dated Aug. 28, 1847, which says : " I have just written an 
 official letter to the Holy Father to ask him to be the sponsor 
 [ot his plan of reform], and I take the opportunity to inform 
 him of all my conclusions, i.e. that to please God one must 
 profit by every step of progress and all discoveries which He 
 permits in science and art, to further the greatest good of the 
 
vii.] Northern Italy, 1 847-1 848. 133 
 
 people, and the advantage of society. I also believe that a 
 government ought to maintain a large army to be able to defend 
 its nationality, to enforce the laws, and protect the good against 
 the evil-disposed. But on the other hand it ought to give the 
 population all the advantages in its reach, and put itself at the 
 head of progress by making the proprietary class participant in 
 the administration of their provinces. To sum up, I believe 
 that a wise monarchy must be progressive in good and must 
 give the people complete liberty, except to do evil." And again, 
 "I intend to make a form of government in which my people 
 shall have all the liberty that is compatible with the preserva- 
 tion of the basis of the monarchy. I believe that in this way 
 one may establish a wise government in which liberty and 
 personal rights will be greater than those which one finds in 
 certain constitutional governments, where liberty is a fiction 
 and the administration of the state is founded on corruption. 
 To attain this end I have for many years occupied myself with 
 a series of laws to be published progressively. One of the 
 most important of these for the monarchy is the communal 
 law which is about to be published. It is founded on the 
 interests of the rural population, and in virtue of the same the 
 citizens may rise by a series of elections from the municipal 
 administration up to the Council of the state." This is pro- 
 bably the last concession in the direction of a constitution 
 which he was prepared voluntarily to accord. The constitution 
 was still in his mind distinct from reform and was probably 
 considered impracticable. 
 
 The concession of Carlo Alberto's reforms l , though they fell 
 far short of the constitution, still excited great enthusiasm in 
 Piedmont. The King, according to custom, was to visit 
 Genoa on the 5th of November, 1847, and great festivities were 
 prepared for the occasion ; triumphal processions were formed, 
 and all Turin was on the road by which the King was to leave. 
 He evidently entertained inexplicable apprehensions of evil, 
 1 Vide supra, p. 48. 
 
! 34 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and only after long hesitation decided to confront the crowd. 
 On horseback, with his children and his suite, pursued with 
 flowers and blessings, he was received by an ovation than 
 which he had never one warmer or more sincere — evidence 
 that the people had forgiven and forgotten everything. He 
 passed under a vault of two thousand flags, pale as a corpse, 
 cold, absent-minded; but when he came to his travelling 
 carriage outside the city, overcome by the unaccustomed ex- 
 perience and by the tumult of opposing emotions, he, who 
 ordinarily had seemed to despise popular demonstrations, in 
 dismounting from his horse seemed about to faint. 
 
 His reception at Genoa was equally enthusiastic. Banquets, 
 demonstrations and festivities celebrated the conversion of the 
 King to liberal sentiments. The popular demonstration against 
 the Jesuits, and the development of the constitutional tendency, 
 to the point of demanding a constitution — the first step towards 
 which was taken by Cavour, whose name is now for the first 
 time mentioned in Piedmontese history — met with no favour 
 from the King. The agitation in Lombardy which resulted 
 in the insurrection of Milan increased public excitement. 
 Demonstrations of loyalty to the King, and offers of support 
 in case of declaration of war against Austria, were multiplied. 
 The concession of the constitution in Naples added to the 
 strength of the constitutional movement, and both Turin and 
 Genoa were enthusiastic. The influence of England was at 
 this moment exerted in favour of the constitution, and on 
 the 5th of February, 1848, after the insurrection of Palermo 
 and the granting of the constitution at Naples, the King 
 appeared to have decided to grant the demands of the city of 
 Genoa. 
 
 A consultation with his ministers and principal state-officials 
 ended in their almost unanimous advice to grant the consti- 
 tution. The popular agitation was menacing, and although 
 the King appears to have entertained conscientious scruples 
 about his promise of 1824 — never to change the institutions of 
 
vii.] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 135 
 
 the state without the consent of the Knights of the Annunziata 
 and the bishops of the kingdom — he was obliged finally to 
 yield to the pressure. He had hoped that the partial reforms 
 already accorded in 1847 would have sufficed. But the 
 popular current once turned in that direction was irresistible, 
 and on the 7 th of February the King called a second council 
 of the principal men of the kingdom, presidents of the council 
 of state and ministers, and requested them to study the con- 
 cessions which could be made, insisting only on the main- 
 tenance of the Catholic religion. Poggi says that the King 
 had written on a piece of paper the first article of the con- 
 stitution : " The Catholic religion apostolic and Roman is the 
 only religion of the state; all other religions are tolerated 
 according to law." The rest of the sheet was blank, as if 
 to show that so long as the religious question was settled 
 according to his view he was indifferent to the rest. He took 
 part in the discussion on the articles, and on the afternoon 
 of the 8th of February an edict appeared with a formal promise 
 of the constitution. A petition, signed by a thousand people 
 of authority, was responded to by a proclamation admitting the 
 Waldensians to the enjoyment of civil rights. A colossal 
 testa on the 27th of February expressed the popular satisfaction, 
 and representatives of all the communes of the state were 
 invited to participate in it. Fifty thousand persons assembled. 
 A placard which bore inscribed upon it " 1821 — 1831 — 1833" 
 led the procession of the returned exiles ; a second banner in 
 mourning was followed by the Lombards j the procession was 
 three hours passing before the sovereign. 
 
 On the 28th the Jesuits were banished by popular demon- 
 stration from Genoa as well as from other places in the 
 kingdom. On the 4th of March the constitution as it is 
 now in vigour in united Italy was published. It was based 
 on the French constitution of 1830, establishing the Roman 
 Catholic religion as the religion of the state, and the King 
 as protector of the Church. It constituted two chambers, 
 
1 36 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 one of which should be nominated by the King and the 
 other by direct popular suffrage, the senate being composed 
 of the higher functionaries, bishops, the wealthy and those 
 who were recognized as having rendered eminent services to 
 the country. It appeared as if, now that the opposition to 
 a constitution in the abstract had been broken down, Carlo 
 Alberto was determined to form one that should be of 
 substantial value. But parliamentary institutions begin work 
 with difficulty. Political parties not existing, the constitution 
 of a ministry was a difficult task. The first ministry was 
 finally composed of Balbo, president of the council, without 
 portfolio ; Pareto, foreign affairs ; Ricci, home office ; Sclopis, 
 minister of justice; Franzini, war and navy; Boncompagni, 
 public instruction ; Count Desambrois, public works ; Count 
 Revel, finance — a ministry characterized by Tivaroni as 
 "without harmony, without fusion, mostly conservatives and 
 comprising only two liberals." 
 
 "So after a long and terrible evolution, terrible for him 
 and for the country, the constitutional Regent of 182 1 
 became the constitutional King of 1848. Had he a right 
 to public confidence? Could he pretend that because he 
 had been prudent in 1821 or because in 1831 he had initiated 
 some slight reforms, therefore the liberals of all parts of 
 Italy should gather round him and Piedmont, certain of having 
 found the necessary chief who should reconstruct Italy as a 
 nation? No; the events of 1821 and 1831 threw on his name 
 and his intentions, not only in the minds of the republicans 
 but in all those who were not courtiers, a doubt and a 
 distrust so intense, so legitimate, that the entire Italian 
 movement was corrupted by it. At Novara Carlo Alberto 
 atoned for his sins towards Italy, but he could not obliterate 
 the memory of them. This was enough to debar the Italian 
 movement irom obtaining that sure leadership, that crowned 
 Garibaldi who was necessary in order to unite all in one single 
 effort ; and without this union the force necessary to overcome 
 
vit.] Northern Italy, 1 847- 1848. 137 
 
 the numerous obstacles which stood in the way did not exist. 
 Failure was therefore inevitable." (Tivaroni, p. 192, v. 1.) 
 
 When in September 1847 the custom-house league between 
 Piedmont, Tuscany and the Papal States was established, the 
 moment had arrived to initiate negotiations for a political 
 league between the greater Italian states for mutual defence. 
 If Carlo Alberto desired the other states to aid him he could 
 not have been unaware that this assistance must be paid for ; 
 Tuscany, Rome and Naples would not without compensation 
 have contributed their means and their soldiers at the risk of 
 creating a powerful state in northern Italy, the existence of 
 which they did not desire. The simple aspiration to indepen- 
 dence, although this now existed in every Italian state, could 
 not induce the sovereigns, jealous of the aggrandizement of 
 Piedmont, to undergo the grave sacrifices necessary, simply to 
 substitute a Piedmontese dominion for an Austrian. A senti- 
 ment of Italian unity was not yet born, and a poor substitute 
 for it was the ambition of Carlo Alberto to create a magnified 
 Piedmont in its place. The league of the Italian states was 
 therefore partial and without sufficient motive. The Pope and 
 the King of Naples, jealous of the ambitions of Carlo Alberto, 
 lent themselves with little good will to the confederation. The 
 war on Austria which was to have been the object of the league 
 was an enterprise which demanded preparations and resources 
 far beyond those of this ill-organized alliance. It became neces- 
 sary in fact for Piedmont to accept the risks of the undertaking. 
 But in 1848 nothing was ready. The hesitations and uncertainty 
 of the King, the unintelligent enthusiasm of the people, did not 
 stimulate that forethought which should provide against the 
 contingencies of a great war. Owing to the feebleness of the 
 King neither of the liberal states was able to repose confidence 
 in him, and neither England nor France, which had now become 
 a republic, took the King seriously. Austria was supported 
 by Russia, while the preparations of the King for a war, which 
 was to expel Austria from Italy, proceeded slowly and with 
 
138 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 such vacillations that the insurrection of Milan, known as 
 the Five Days' Revolution, was necessary to move him to 
 action. 
 
 The facts regarding the final movements of Piedmont 
 indicate that the King had never seriously contemplated 
 the conditions of war. He had only dreamed about it, as he 
 had dreamed about a great many other things. Even if it was 
 true, as his advocates claim, that his apparently despotic 
 tendencies were only intended to deceive Austria, he might at 
 least have prepared for the war which he proposed to under- 
 take; but, in fact, no preparations were made. In January 
 and February 1848 the government had called under arms 
 three classes of the army, but nothing had been done to 
 make them efficient. The army was provided with nothing 
 that was necessary for immediate entry into the field, and when 
 the King crossed the Ticino on the 29th of March, 1848, it 
 was only with twenty-five thousand men. In the field of diplo- 
 macy nothing had been done to obtain the moral or military 
 support of the friendly powers. Neither France nor England 
 had been taken into the confidence of the government. 
 Even the relations with the Lombards, who were preparing 
 for insurrection, were incomplete. The proclamation of the 
 republic in France probably induced the King to refuse all 
 co-operation with that country, the dread of the republican 
 propaganda overcoming all the necessities of the situation. 
 
 It was the revolution in Vienna (March 13) and the insur- 
 rection in Milan (March 18) which put an end to the King's 
 hesitation. The Piedmontese population, especially the students 
 and the young men, could no longer be restrained, and nothing 
 but direction on the part of the King was required to develope 
 a far greater force than that with which he took the field. The 
 volunteers for Milan were not furnished with arms, and many 
 days were lost in overcoming the reluctance of the King and 
 the ministry to furnish this aid to the insurrection. Up to 
 the 22nd, assurances of neutrality and friendship were given 
 
vii.] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 139 
 
 to Austria, but on the 23rd of March an article by Cavour 
 in the Risorgimento gave the signal for a final decision. War 
 was declared on the 25 th; that is to say after the complete 
 victory of the insurrection at Milan. Had the King moved 
 earlier and had his army been able to attack the Austrians while 
 the struggle was still going on in Milan, the disaster to the 
 imperialists must have been enormous. But Radetzky was 
 allowed to retire and collect his forces anew without any 
 molestation from the Piedmontese army. It is useless to 
 discuss the pretended motives which the ministers, on behalf 
 of the King, put forward to explain a measure which had been 
 decided upon provisionally a long time before. So far as the 
 King was capable of deciding anything, he had decided to 
 declare war on Austria. The excuses put forward for the step, 
 such as the danger of the republican movement extending to 
 Piedmont if public opinion were not yielded to, the influence 
 of France and that of Switzerland, — the immediate neighbours 
 of Piedmont, — and other similar motives, were distinctly after- 
 thoughts. The King would and would not, after his usual 
 manner ; every thought had an afterthought ; he could decide 
 nothing and obeyed events without ever succeeding in con- 
 trolling them. 
 
 With the declaration of war came the necessary throwing 
 off of disguises, and a despatch of Abercrombie to Lord 
 Palmefston on the 27th of March says: "This morning the 
 Marquis Pare to, the minister of foreign affairs, affirmed that 
 the declaration against Austria had a double object : first to 
 drive the Austrians out of Italy, and second to assist the 
 provisional government of Milan." And yet on the 27th of 
 March Pareto writes to the English minister, whose govern- 
 ment had strongly advised against the declaration of war — that 
 the Sardinian navy had orders not to commit any act of 
 hostility against the Austrian navy unless provoked. The 
 proclamation issued on the 24th of March says: "People of 
 Lombardy and of Venice, the destinies of Italy are ripening ; 
 
140 Italy. [CHAP. 
 
 a happier future smiles on the intrepid defenders of in- 
 defeasible rights. Through love of race, through under- 
 standing of our times, and through unity of desire, we first 
 give expression to the unanimous admiration which Italy 
 offers you. People of Lombardy and of Venice, our army, 
 which was already concentrated upon our frontier when you 
 precipitated the liberation of glorious Milan, now comes to give 
 you that supreme proof of assistance which brother expects 
 from brother and friend from friend. We will support your 
 just ambitions, trusting in the aid of that God whose 
 marvellous help has put Italy in a condition to work out her 
 own salvation. And for the better demonstration of our 
 sentiments as to Italian unity, we will that our troops entering 
 the territory of Lombardy and Venice shall carry the shield 
 of Savoy added to the Italian tri-colour flag." On the same 
 day the King issued a decree of amnesty for all political 
 prisoners condemned before the publication of the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 The two elements which force themselves on our atten- 
 tion at the opening of this eventful war, — the condition of the 
 Piedmontese army and the enthusiasm of the population — 
 compel a comparison not at all to the credit of the King and 
 his advisers. According to contemporary evidence (BrofTerio, 
 Storia del Piemonte) in March, 1848, the Piedmontese army 
 was absolutely incompetent to take the field. Arms, ammu- 
 nition, baggage, horses, travelling- wagons, artillery-trains, camp- 
 ing-material — all were lacking. Pinelli in his Storia del Piemonte 
 says that when the preparations for war commenced, the arsenals 
 were empty, the arms insufficient in number and inferior in 
 quality, the fortresses all dismantled, horses few and poor, 
 and the cadres incomplete and uncertain. The regiments of 
 cavalry had hardly the strength of a peace establishment. 
 The change from the old flint-lock to the percussion-lock 
 musket recently made had left many of the recruits ignorant 
 of the use of the new arm, and there was no organization of 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 141 
 
 hospital service, The general staff had no strategical know- 
 ledge or education : it was ignorant of the districts in which 
 the war was to be made, and no maps were provided. Of 
 this army, thus ill-prepared, the King, even less prepared, 
 proposed to take command ; the blind leading the blind into 
 the inevitable disaster which followed 1 . 
 
 (2) The Five Days in Milan. 
 
 The war between Piedmont and Austria is so intimately 
 connected, both in its inception and its course, with the 
 insurrection of Lombardy and Venice, that before discussing 
 the events of that war we must trace the history of the 
 movements in the Austrian provinces, to which it was so 
 largely due. For a good many years, no open movement had 
 broken the apparent repose of the territories subjected to 
 Austria in northern Italy. It may be that even during the 
 long period of catalepsy, which supervened in the provinces 
 of Lombardy and Venice, conspiracies existed, though better 
 concealed than before, taught by the bitter experiences of the 
 past. But this time it was not Piedmont, nor a constitutional 
 sovereign that woke Italy from her sleep, but the Pope. 
 
 1 While these pages were being written the disaster of Adowa occurred. 
 Public criticism on that terrible waste of splendid courage and opportunity 
 has attributed it to causes very similar to those indicated in the text. 
 Nor was it otherwise at Lissa and at Custozza in 1866. It is impossible 
 not to note in crises like that of 1848 and later times, the traditional 
 tendency of the Piedmontese court to sacrifice the interests of the army 
 to the necessity of consulting the influences, either external or internal, 
 which it fears. Hence the choice of commanders notoriously incompetent, 
 a military organisation abandoned to the interests of clients of the Court 
 or, in the end, to the grouping of factions in parliament. Hence the 
 ability of enemies at home or abroad either to hinder — as in 1866 — any 
 strenuous co-operation with an ally, or — as in 1896 — to push the army 
 into a disastrous action, without the knowledge or responsibility of the 
 ministers themselves. ) 
 
142 Italy. | chap. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the signal for the liberation of 
 Italy was in effect given by Pius IX. And the slow vengeance 
 of public opinion in other lands had begun to tell on tin 
 Austrian government, which, as it had been enabled to hold 
 its possession in Italy only by the connivance of the other 
 European powers, England included, found that the growing 
 conviction of its unfitness to govern was weakening the support 
 in which its security had consisted. The initiative of the Pope 
 for the first time reconciled religious sentiment with Italian 
 aspirations after liberty. The clergy, with its immense as- 
 cendency over the rural population, always the last to be 
 brought into any political movement, in great part took the 
 path of political reform, and carried with it, not only the rural 
 classes, but that part of the nobility which still remained 
 devoted to the Church. What was of still greater importance, 
 it gave the real liberals, who only wanted an authoritative 
 name to lead them, a justification for renewing an agitation 
 which Austria, devoted to the Church, could no longer resent 
 as she had resented the initiative of her lay subjects. Pius IX 
 became the symbol of Italian liberty, and demonstrations, 
 nominally religious, became synonymous with protests against 
 the Austrian government. Busts of the Pope carried through 
 the streets of Milan excited enthusiastic demonstrations, but 
 in spite of all the vigilance of the police no open act justified 
 repressive measures. 
 
 The measure which finally provoked the outbreak was the 
 prohibition by the liberal committees of the use of tobacco, 
 the monopoly of which, held by the Austrian government, was 
 one of its principal sources of income. All the youth of the 
 liberal party bound themselves under no circumstances to 
 smoke, and to prevent, if possible, others from smoking in 
 public. On the 3rd of January, 1848, the Viceroy wrote to 
 Governor Spaur : "As to the prohibition to smoke tobacco — 
 in order to catch in the act those agitators who abuse or 
 maltreat people who smoke, the best expedient would be to 
 
vii.] Northern Italy, 1 847-1 848. 143 
 
 order some policemen in civil costume, or gendarmes, to 
 walk the streets with cigars in their mouths, and to have 
 them followed at a little distance by other guards also in 
 civil costume with orders to arrest those who disturb the 
 smokers." On the same day the people attempted to snatch 
 the cigars from the mouths of the officers, and a conflict 
 ensued in which five citizens were killed and fifty-nine 
 wounded. This was the signal for the bursting of the storm. 
 Preparations were made on both sides for the conflict, and on 
 the 1 8th, the news of the revolution at Vienna, which began 
 on March 13, quickened the ardour of the insurgents into 
 action. Slight concessions on the part of the government 
 only stimulated still more the determination to obtain reforms. 
 Proclamations were secretly posted throughout Milan de- 
 manding reforms under the menace of immediate revolt. On 
 the same day, a popular demonstration moved towards the 
 Governor's palace. The masses, scarcely knowing with what 
 purpose the demonstration had been organized, joined the 
 demonstrators, and the soldiers on guard, apprehending hostile 
 movements, fired on the people. The crowd dispersed but 
 immediately started the cry "to arms." Barricades were 
 thrown up, arms were gathered, and the conflict began, in 
 which, during five days, all classes of the inhabitants, men, 
 women and children, engaged in perhaps the most brilliant 
 feat of unorganized courage which the history of Europe can 
 record. In every quarter of the city barricades blocked the 
 movements of the troops, — by the 20th they amounted to 
 1700; cannon were made of wood with bands of iron, powder 
 was manufactured, and a long, desperate and singular struggle 
 was carried on through the streets of Milan, with horrible 
 brutality on the part of the troops and incredible audacity on 
 that of the population. 
 
 No plans had been formed which could be betrayed, but 
 the accumulated indignation of the entire people and the 
 momentary weakness of the government, unprepared for so 
 
144 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 sudden and spontaneous a movement, urged discontent to 
 action. Isolated collisions in the streets had led to an attack 
 on the Broletto, where in the head-quarters of the municipality 
 a few hundred people, of whom sixty only were armed, had 
 gathered in council. They were attacked by 2000 Croats and 
 Bohemian troops, and were dispersed after a conflict of two 
 hours partly carried on with tiles from the roofs. 
 
 adetzky supposed all to be over, and made known to the 
 municipality his determination to crush all signs of discontent, 
 even by the bombardment, if necessary, of the city. That 
 night it rained and the troops occupied themselves in 
 destroying the barricades which were springing up, but the 
 morning of the 19th was fine, and masses of the citizens 
 thronged the streets, plotting mischief, but without organi- 
 sation. It was the explosion of a long repressed fury which 
 was indifferent to all dangers. Here and there, as if by 
 inspiration, centres of organisation appeared ; churches, shops, 
 and houses were closed, the bells rang the call to arms, and 
 the barricades sprang up again everywhere ; arms were seized 
 wherever they could be found — arms of all epochs and every 
 description— the furniture of the houses was carried out to 
 form or heighten the barricades, and the energetic and long- 
 suffering population poured out of their dwellings in a state 
 of frenzy, which made no account of obstacles. Wherever 
 the troops ventured into the streets to attack the barricades, 
 tiles, furniture, stones, beams, boiling oil, were poured on 
 them; even the women took part in the fight. The chiefs, 
 Luciano Manara, Enrico Dandolo, Luigi della Porta, Augusto 
 Anfossi and others, passed from street to street, from house 
 to house, to encourage the combatants, without sleeping or 
 resting. A fever of combat spread its fiery contagion through 
 the entire population, and overpowered discipline and arma- 
 ments. 
 
 On this day, the 19th, Anfossi, at the head of a resolute 
 band, attacked and carried the Porta Nuova, a strong position 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 145 
 
 which swept two of the principal streets, and gave a solid 
 centre for concentration. The troops seemed stupefied, the 
 perpetual clamour of the bells, the ever present attacks, the 
 very ragamuffins of the streets taken with the frenzy of battle 
 and utterly indifferent to danger, mocking, jeering and deceiving 
 the troops, the rain of projectiles from the roofs, the audacity 
 of the assailants, all these things affected even the Marshal and 
 paralysed his resolution. The municipal authorities, with the 
 mayor at their head, made feeble efforts by half-hearted 
 measures to reconcile populace and government, but finally 
 yielded to the drift of insurrection and practically withdrew. 
 A council of war was formed, composed of Carlo Cattaneo, 
 the real head of the movement, Giulio Terzaghi, and Giorgio 
 Clerici, nobles, and Enrico Cernuschi, plebeian and republican. 
 This self-nominated committee of public safety was recognized 
 by the insurgents as in control of the insurrection, and unity 
 of action was thus secured. The Austrians were in possession 
 of the Cathedral — from the roof of which the Tyrolese riflemeq 
 fired on the people — the Royal palace, the Palace of Justice, 
 the head-quarters of the police, the municipal palace, the 
 barracks and the Castle. During the night of the 19th and 
 20th the Marshal had occupied the bastions at the right and 
 the left of the gates to secure the way for reinforcements from 
 the outside, and threatened the bombardment of the city. 
 
 All through the 20th it rained in torrents, but the struggle 
 continued fiercely. General Clam held his own at the Porta 
 Ticinese, but elsewhere the Austrian resistance began to give 
 way. The Tyrolese, harassed by the fire of the insurgents, 
 abandoned the pinnacles of the cathedral whence they had 
 fired on the streets below. General Rath abandoned the royal 
 palace, and the people captured the police office and the Courts, 
 where they liberated all the political prisoners, retaining in 
 prison only those accused of common crimes. The spirit of 
 the people was as humane as courageous. Bolza, one of the 
 principal persecutors, was found hidden in a hayloft and was 
 
 s. 1. 10 
 
146 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 about to be put to death by the people, when Carlo Cattaneo 
 exclaimed : M If you kill him, you do justice ; if you spare him 
 you will be acting nobly"; and he was spared. At the 
 Tribunale the people destroyed all the documents, carried away 
 all the arms, and liberated all the women, but spared all the 
 police officers who had hidden in the cellars, and carried the 
 wounded to the hospital. Count Thurn, who had ordered the 
 arrest of Bogazzi, in consequence of a quarrel in the streets, 
 was released. A proclamation put forth by the Council of 
 War, and headed by the words : " Italia libera" ran as 
 follows : " Brave citizens, let us keep our city pure ; let us 
 not condescend to revenge ourselves by the blood of these 
 miserable satellites whom the fugitive government leaves in 
 our hands. It is enough now to watch them and notify them. 
 It is true that for thirty years they have been the scourge of 
 our families and the abomination of the country, but you will 
 be generous as you have been brave. Punish them with 
 contempt and make an offer of them to Pius IX." The 
 brutality of the troops was in strong contrast with the conduct 
 of the insurgents. The soldiers broke open the doors of a 
 tavern near St Mark's and murdered the cook and three other 
 persons, after having tortured them in various ways ; they then 
 roasted alive two children and repeatedly bayonetted a preg- 
 nant woman, after which they set fire to the house and 
 withdrew 1 . 
 
 On the 20th, at midday, the commander of the Croats, 
 Baron Ettinghausen, presented himself to the Council of War, 
 saying that he came not as an envoy from the Marshal but on 
 his own account to intervene, being moved by a sentiment of 
 humanity. He proposed a truce of fifteen days. During this 
 time the Marshal should keep all the troops shut up in eight 
 different localities ; the civic guard should be regularly organised, 
 and all the positions occupied by the citizens should be put in 
 
 1 Archivio Triennale, on the authority of 250 witnesses. 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 147 
 
 a state of permanent efficiency. The municipality, which 
 deluded itself with the idea of continuing in this state of 
 semi-legality from which it had not yet emerged, entertained 
 the idea of the truce : at the worst, it would have been able 
 to maintain its communications with the surrounding country. 
 But at a joint-meeting held by the municipality and the 
 Council of War, the proposition of the truce was rejected by 
 a large majority, it being seen that in these fifteen days 
 Radetzky could collect troops from without, sufficient to crush 
 Milan. The reply to Ettinghausen was, " Say to the Marshal 
 that if he insists on continuing to fight, the nobles in Milan 
 will know how to bury themselves under the ruins of their 
 palaces." The Council of War, combative and republican, 
 was in conflict with the royalist municipality, which desired 
 to maintain a prudent attitude. The Mayor, timid and un- 
 decided, did not enjoy the confidence of the Council of War 
 and was kept under guard, but after the conference with 
 Ettinghausen the municipality issued a proclamation claiming 
 the entire direction of affairs, and formed itself into a com- 
 mittee of public security for the supervision of subsistence 
 and finance. 
 
 During the 21st, the struggle went on. A certain number 
 of combatants from outside made their way in and strengthened 
 the forces of the insurgents, and the employes of the railways 
 united in bands under their inspector Borgazzi, who was killed 
 on the fourth day of the struggle in the attack on Porta Tosa. 
 The network of barricades, held strongly by reckless masses 
 of the people, made all movements of the troops in the streets 
 impossible. Radetzky wrote to Fiquelmont : "The nature 
 of these people, it seems to me, has been transformed ; 
 fanaticism has invaded all ages, all classes and both sexes." 
 On the same day, the Council of War demanded the assistance 
 of all who had any military experience, and numbers of those 
 who had served in the army of Napoleon offered their services. 
 The centre of the city was now entirely abandoned by the 
 
148 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Austrians, and the combatants who had held the barricades 
 in that quarter, now no longer assailable, were ordered to man 
 the external barricades. During the night the people had 
 worked with feverish energy on movable breastworks which 
 they had planted under the walls. The Council of War 
 ordered an attack on the headquarters, on the barracks of 
 the engineers and the staff, and the barracks of San Francisco. 
 Pasquale Sottocomo, an old and crippled man of the people, 
 carried straw and hay, which he piled before the gate of the 
 engineers' barrack and set fire to the door. In the capture of 
 the engineers' quarters one hundred and sixty soldiers were 
 taken prisoners. 
 
 The foreign consuls having on the 20th of March protested 
 against the bombardment of the city, Radetzky replied that 
 he would postpone it for another day on condition that all 
 hostilities on the part of the Milanese should cease, and this 
 proposition was supported by the consuls at the municipality. 
 The council of war, however, refused any such concession and 
 declined the truce. The Austrian troops, as Radetzky's dis- 
 patches testify, were exhausted and had need of a rest in order 
 to enable them to continue the struggle. On the other hand, 
 it was urged that the city had only provisions enough for 
 twenty-four hours more, but Cattaneo replied, "Twenty-four 
 hours of food and twenty-four hours of fasting give us more 
 than time enough to conquer, and at the end it is better to die 
 of hunger than on the gallows." On the discussion in the 
 Municipal Council, the proposition of a three days' truce was 
 rejected by twelve votes against three, and the municipality 
 replied that the citizens who were charged with the defence 
 of the city did not accept the proposition. They added that, 
 as Field-Marshal Count Radetzky had been notified, even if 
 the truce were consented to, the ardour of the combatants 
 was such that they could not ensure its observance. 
 
 Meanwhile the question of cooperation with Piedmont had 
 arisen. A messenger had been sent to Turin on a confidential 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. J 49 
 
 mission to the King, who replied that he wished two things : 
 that a body of insurgents or deserters should draw the enemy 
 into a violation of the Sardinian territory, and that there should 
 be sent to him an address signed by the nobles. Enrico 
 Martini, who had brought this message, also proposed that 
 they should immediately constitute a provisional government 
 with authority to confer on Carlo Alberto the sovereignty of 
 Lombardy. Cattaneo, whom circumstances placed at the 
 head of the movement, advised that the decision of such 
 questions should be left to the country, and that this was not 
 the moment to consult it. "Is it then," he said, "so grievous 
 to be once in our lives our own masters ? The royal houses 
 belong to no nation : they have their own interests apart 
 from ours, and are always ready to come to an understanding 
 with the foreigner against their people. I am firmly convinced 
 that it is necessary to appeal to all Italy and to make the war 
 a national one. If Carlo Alberto is the only one who offers 
 to intervene between us and Austria, then the admiration and 
 gratitude of the people will be the prize of his generosity, 
 and no one can deny the right of the country to put itself 
 under his authority." Cattaneo remembered that it was not 
 possible to trust Carlo Alberto, who had been a traitor in 182 1, 
 and that the Lombard nobility had offered themselves to Austria 
 in 1 8 14. He declared that, on account of the weakness of 
 the means of which it disposed, he would not have favoured 
 the insurrection, but that, now that it existed, the assistance of 
 all Italy was necessary, and this would not be obtained if 
 Lombardy gave herself to Piedmont. This opposition of 
 Cattaneo to the union with Piedmont and the unquestionably 
 republican tendency of his opinions were never forgiven him 
 by the Lombard nobility. 
 
 On the 2 1 st, the Council of War invited all the communes 
 of Lombardy to constitute local councils, which should occupy 
 themselves with the question of carrying on the war. This 
 invitation said : " We ask from every city, from every section 
 
150 Italy. [Chap 
 
 of Italy, a little detachment of bayonets, which, guided by 
 some good captain, should come and hold a general assembly 
 at the foot of the Alps to arrive at a final and conclusive 
 accord against the barbarians." Late that night the munici- 
 pality, timid and vacillating, finally decided to form itself into 
 a provisional government. The formation of this government 
 encountered opposition from the Council of War and serious 
 discord was threatened, but finally, on the advice of Correnti, 
 the Council of War was fused with the Committee appointed 
 by the municipality and the two were united in a provisional 
 government. This government issued a manifesto as follows : 
 " The armistice offered by the enemy has been refused by us 
 according to the will of the people, which wishes to fight. 
 We fight then with the same courage which has made us 
 victorious in these four days and we will still conquer. Citizens, 
 we receive unflinchingly this last assault of the oppressors with 
 the confidence which is born of the certainty of victory. Let 
 the rejoicing bells respond to the sound of the cannons and 
 the bombs, and let the enemy see that we know how to fight 
 cheerfully and to die cheerfully. The country adopts as its 
 children the orphans of those who die in battle, and assures to 
 the wounded its gratitude and assistance." 
 
 Henceforward there was no way to turn back. Either 
 Milan would conquer or she would be buried in ruins. On 
 the morning of the 22nd, it being foggy and rainy, while one 
 portion of the citizens strengthened the barricades by means 
 of movable barriers consisting of masses of faggots, another 
 attacked Porta Tosa, which was defended by one thousand 
 Austrians with six pieces of artillery, and at night-fall took it 
 by assault. The city was thus opened to the outer world; 
 the people from the different sections entered freely, and the 
 communications of the Austrians from bastion to bastion were 
 broken. The Austrians abandoned several of the gates, and 
 the civic forces, reassured by the prospect of being able 
 to renew their supplies, redoubled their aggressive activity. 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 151 
 
 Alarmed by the progress which the Milanese made in every 
 direction and by the rumours that the Piedmontese army had 
 passed the frontier, thus threatening his supplies of ammunition 
 and food, the Marshal determined to evacuate Milan, preferring 
 the humiliation of retreat to the risk of exposing his troops to 
 surrender or starvation. He left behind him the treasury, with 
 two millions of florins, and on the night of the 22nd, at eleven 
 o'clock, covering his retreat with the thunder of his guns, he 
 withdrew from the line of fortifications. 
 
 His retreat being unobserved was unmolested, and following 
 the line of the Austrian fortresses in the direction of Lodi, he 
 arrived during the night at Melegnano, where a slight resistance 
 which was offered to his passage was easily overcome. He 
 rested at Lodi from the night of the 24th to the morning of 
 the 26th, whence he retired slowly through Crema to Verona, 
 where he arrived between the 5th and 6th, without having 
 been molested in any one of the many ways by which the 
 citizens might have harassed his retreat. Milan was exhausted 
 by the heroic efforts of'the five days, and the satisfaction of 
 seeing the Austrians depart was so great that no one dreamed 
 of imposing obstacles to the retreat; Milan in fact, on the 
 morning of the 23rd of March, was surprised to find itself free. 
 Cattaneo estimates the loss of the Austrians at four thousand 
 men j the Austrian account estimates it at four hundred killed 
 and wounded — a disparity which suggests exaggeration on 
 both sides ; but certainly so small a sacrifice as the Austrians 
 admit hardly justifies their evacuation of the city. The dead 
 on the Milanese side were three hundred and fifty, and there 
 were six hundred wounded. 
 
 In this conflict, which is the most memorable among all 
 the struggles for Italian liberation, all classes of society had 
 taken part ; many young men of the highest circles mingled 
 in the movement with workmen, artisans and populace, and 
 paid their portion of losses. The greater part of the clergy 
 had helped in the revolution j the Archbishop of Milan had 
 
152 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 blessed it ; the parish priests of the city and of the country 
 round about had rung their bells and spread the alarm, and 
 some had even preached in its support. The parish priest of 
 Paderno had led the people in an attack on the Austrians ; 
 a priest was wounded at Porta Tosa, and even the women, so 
 great was the excitement, took part in the combat. One 
 Louisa Battistotti, in the uniform of a fusilier, never aban- 
 doned her weapons for five days. All the contemporary 
 writers testify to the -indescribable cruelty of the Austrians. 
 Bodies of many children were found, and women and men 
 were murdered and burned. The list of their names is given 
 by Tivaroni, and in it are those of thirty women. It is greatly 
 to the credit of Milan, that the wounded and sick and the 
 families of the Austrian soldiers and functionaries remaining 
 in Milan were unmolested. The Austrians were doubtless 
 rendered less averse to the evacuation of Milan by the 
 reflection that the arrival of their reinforcements and the want 
 of military organisation among the Milanese would facilitate 
 the recapture of the city. The tenacity with which Radetzky 
 clung to his position had more of military amour propre than 
 strategical importance. If the country districts had risen, to 
 be shut up in Milan would have been destruction; if the 
 country surrendered, Milan was easy to capture; and while 
 the heroism of Milan remains undiminished in its lustre, the 
 lengthened resistance of the garrison was superfluous from 
 the military point of view. 
 
 In the country round about, the movement in sympathy 
 with the insurrection in Milan varied greatly. Some sections 
 caught the inspiration of combat, others remained absolutely 
 lethargic. Had the rising been general, the position of the 
 Austrians would have been serious, and the retreat of the 
 garrison of Milan might have been easily turned into a 
 surrender. At Mantua a movement was attempted, but 
 through want of union the Austrian garrison was able to 
 maintain its position. At Pizzighettone the little garrison 
 
vii.] Northern Italy, 1847- 1848. 153 
 
 surrendered the fortifications, but Brescia was the only im- 
 portant fortress which followed the example of Milan. 
 
 At Brescia the insurrectionary organization had always 
 been combined with the plan of cooperating with the Pied- 
 montese whenever that should be possible. On the 21st of 
 March the insurrection broke out. The city, after a short 
 struggle, fell into the hands of the people, and the defence 
 was organized by exiles who had returned from Turin. On 
 the 22nd, the soldiers of an Italian regiment in the Austrian 
 garrison of Brescia joined the people and summoned Schwart- 
 zenburg to surrender. Having captured the arsenal and two 
 barracks with a loss of ten killed and thirty-five wounded, they 
 permitted the Austrians to retire to the Oglio with four 
 thousand men, where they protected the retreat of Radetzky, 
 while another party of the insurgents captured a convoy of 
 ammunition coming from Verona. The rising of Brescia 
 was followed by similar movements in Monza, Como and 
 other Lombard cities. 
 
 (3) Venice. 
 
 Simultaneously with these movements in Lombardy, a rising 
 in Venice led to the retirement of the Austrians from that city. 
 In June 1847 a banquet had been given to Cobden at which 
 the Austrian government forbade Manin to speak. In January 
 1848 Tomasseo publicly advocated the formation of legal 
 political parties, acting openly and agitating for constitutional 
 reform. The Austrian government decided to take energetic 
 measures against this propaganda, and Manin and Tomasseo 
 were arrested and thrown into prison. Public opinion was 
 so far advanced, that this excessive severity aroused a general 
 hostility to the government, and from this time forward a 
 serious fermentation went on. On the 7th of February dis- 
 orders broke out in Padua on account of the prohibition of 
 the use of tobacco by the patriots. On the 8th, two officers 
 
 l UNIVERSITY ) 
 
154 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 having been ordered to throw away their cigars, a collision 
 took place, in which a student was killed and several students 
 and citizens wounded. One officer was killed in the dis- 
 turbance. Arrests naturally followed, and the greatest rigour 
 was employed towards all demonstrations, even the most 
 apparently innocent. The police at Venice forbade the 
 making, use, or sale of felt hats with broad brims, known as 
 " Calabrian hats," considering them as symptoms of liberalism. 
 On the ioth of February disorders broke out at Treviso in 
 consequence of a Te Deum sung by a liberal priest, and many 
 imprisonments took place. All demonstrations in the theatre 
 or in public were forbidden, wherever any possible connection 
 with politics might be suspected. 
 
 From February until the ioth of March these repressive 
 measures seemed to suffice, but the news of the revolution at 
 Vienna (March 13) produced the same effect in Venice that 
 it had produced in Milan. The people rose en masse and 
 demanded the liberation of Manin and Tomasseo. The 
 Austrian government, embarrassed by the insurrection at 
 home and the general discontent in various parts of the 
 empire, and unprovided with sufficient forces in Venice to 
 resist a general movement, should one take place, yielded and 
 liberated the prisoners. Thereupon the people demanded the 
 formation of a civic guard for the maintenance of order in 
 the city. This also was yielded, and step by step the power 
 of the people advanced. The arsenal was taken and the civic 
 guard increased from two hundred to two thousand, while the 
 forces of the Austrian army proved insufficient to hold both 
 forts and city. The Italian troops in the Austrian service 
 deserted to the insurgents. Thus the Venetian forces gradually 
 developed so strong a preponderance, that without serious 
 collision or shedding of blood the Austrian army was obliged 
 to evacuate Venice and all their possessions round about. 
 Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and other towns immediately threw 
 off the yoke. 
 
vil] Northern Italy, 1 847-1 848. 155 
 
 It was, however, a delusive victory, which, by making the 
 citizens of Venice unduly confident in their own abilities, 
 probably led ultimately to much greater difficulties than would 
 I have occurred had the Austrians been in a condition to resist 
 from the beginning. The city being free from foreign control, 
 the people determined on the restoration of the republic. On 
 March 24th the republic was proclaimed, and Manin was 
 elected president. This step called forth great enthusiasm, 
 and for a time united the population in a determined re- 
 sistance. Nevertheless in its effect upon the north-Italian 
 movement as a whole, the proclamation of the republic by 
 Manin was a grave mistake. It developed distrust between 
 Venice and Piedmont, and destroyed the cooperation which 
 might have given a different colour, at least in the diplomatic 
 world, to the entire movement. The prejudice against re- 
 publican institutions at that moment was strong in all parts 
 of Europe, excepting France, and the proclamation of the 
 republic of St Mark inclined other governments to allow 
 Austria a free hand in her action against Venice. The 
 question of fusion with the other minor states, which occupied 
 the minds of Manin and his confederates, was purely academic. 
 Such a step could not possibly exert any influence on the 
 military position, and the doubts developed by the discussion 
 destroyed any chance of harmonious action with the other 
 provinces in revolt. Hearty cooperation between Piedmont 
 and Venice became impossible, and the armistice which 
 concluded the first campaign between Piedmont and Austria 
 made no mention of Venice. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA, 1 848 — 1 849. 
 
 (1) Goito, Santa Lucia, and Curtatone. 
 
 The King of Sardinia entered upon the war with Austria 
 with the same vacillation and uncertainty with which he had 
 inaugurated the reforms; first deciding, then postponing, and 
 then coming to a new and different decision, so that a campaign, 
 begun with great chances of success, ended in a complication 
 of disasters. The army received orders to cross the frontier 
 on the 24th of March, 1848. The King left Turin on the 
 night of the 26th and entered Pavia on the 29th. Radetzky 
 had abandoned Milan six days before, had had time to re- 
 organize his army and recover from the demoralization of his 
 defeat, and was already on his way to his base of supplies. 
 But his troops were fatigued and discouraged, and if attacked 
 by a strong body of fresh men during their retreat must 
 certainly have yielded almost without resistance. The King, 
 in his M Memoirs of the War of Italian Independence," pre- 
 tended that he had delayed in order to obtain the adhesion 
 of the cabinets of London and Paris, although the opposition 
 of these cabinets had been outspoken and nothing but the 
 actual outbreak of hostilities could have induced a recon- 
 sideration. The fact is that the King, in his studies on the 
 dispositions to be made, had paid no attention to the important 
 
Chap, viii.] The War with Austria, 1 848-1 849. 157 
 
 consideration of the material for carrying on the war. Every- 
 thing was in confusion; resources which existed were not at 
 hand \ deficiencies were not supplied ; he entered the campaign 
 with a flourish of trumpets but with his army in a most in- 
 efficient condition. Instead of following Radetzky in his 
 retreat from Milan and seeking an opportunity to engage 
 him, he zigzagged across Lombardy without aim or plan of 
 campaign, and in eleven days arrived at Cremona with the 
 apparent intention of attacking the Quadrilateral. Meanwhile, 
 Radetzky had time to give his army repose, to receive reinforce- 
 ments and to put himself in the most favourable position for 
 receiving an attack. 
 
 Military critics who have written since 1848 are agreed that 
 the only feasible plan of campaign was to pass the Adige and 
 concentrate at Vicenza, thus cutting off all reinforcements 
 from the Quadrilateral. Radetzky in this way would have 
 been paralyzed ; the fortresses were not prepared for a siege, 
 and the best military opinion is that Carlo Alberto would have 
 taken them as the result of a successful campaign. Instead 
 of which, apparently unwilling to encounter the risk of any 
 decisive action, he marched and counter-marched, concentrated 
 his forces slowly on the Mincio, and remained there four months 
 in practical inactivity, more anxious apparently to oppose the 
 republicans of Milan and Venice than the Austrians under 
 Radetzky. The King finally decided to march directly on 
 Mantua, leaving a detachment on the right bank of the Po, 
 and, avoiding the plains of Montechiaro and of Ghedi, to 
 attack the enemy at Goito, at Mozambano or at Borghetto ; 
 further to send his right wing to take Mantua with the 
 assistance of the inhabitants, and then to attack Radetzky 
 before Verona. On the 7th of April, leaving a force in front 
 of Valleggio, he moved on Goito, crossing one of the three 
 bridges over the Mincio between Mantua and Peschiera. At 
 Goito a sharp engagement took place at the bridge, which was 
 defended by a small force of Austrian riflemen. After four 
 
158 Italy. [Cum. 
 
 hours' fighting the Austrians retired with a loss of three officers 
 killed, three wounded, seventeen soldiers killed and thirty-five 
 wounded ; the Piedmontese lost forty men killed and wounded, 
 but they took four guns. General Broglia, with a detachment, 
 crossed the bridge at Mozambano, skirmishing there and at 
 Borghetto. This gave the King command of both banks of 
 the Mincio. The Austrians now abandoned Valleggio, and the 
 King took up his position at Volta, where he received rein- 
 forcements. His army at this juncture numbered sixty thousand 
 men. Radetzky remained on the defensive at Verona, holding 
 the line of the Adige, and sending to Villafranca eighteen to 
 twenty thousand men, who were not disturbed. 
 
 Instead of advancing and attacking or menacing the com- 
 munications of the enemy, the King sat still to observe. Some 
 brigades were sent forward, more to occupy territory than with 
 any strategical intention. The chief critics of this period, 
 Costa de Beauregard and Willisen, consider the military plans 
 of the King to have been as uncertain as his political schemes 
 had been. "All the defects of his character, so entirely specu- 
 lative, here come out. On the slightest strategical movement 
 the King became engaged in a labyrinth of speculations as to 
 the result and arrived finally at no decision. One may say 
 in the final analysis that the real military talent of Carlo Alberto 
 consisted in seeing the defects of all combinations, even those 
 of his own. He passed his nights in prayer. His gaunt face, 
 like that of a man sick almost to death, and yet so full of fire ; 
 his sadness which seemed even to repel the resemblance of a 
 smile, had a magnetic effect on the troops." (Minghetti to 
 Pasolini.) 
 
 On the nth of April a slight skirmish took place at Castel- 
 nuovo, and three brigades under Bava made a reconnaissance 
 on Mantua, which the Austrians met by flooding the country. 
 The king then sat down to besiege Peschiera without artillery, 
 which he only received in May. On the 20th of April a 
 division of Tuscans, five thousand men with two hundred 
 
viil] The War zvith Austria, 1 848-1 849. 159 
 
 cavalry and eight guns, arrived under the command of General 
 Ferrari, an old officer of Napoleon. Amongst these were fifteen 
 hundred volunteers from Florence, Sienna and Pisa, mostly 
 students and professors, and two hundred and fifty Neapolitans 
 armed at the expense of Rafaello Scala. They were ordered 
 to concentrate at Governolo before Mantua. On the 25th Du- 
 rando with the Pontifical contingent arrived — seven thousand 
 men with twelve guns : one regiment of Swiss, one of Romans, 
 one of Grenadiers, and one of Chasseurs a. cheval. Of these 
 four thousand four hundred were excellent soldiers. 
 
 These troops, forming the extreme right of the Piedmontese 
 line, had orders to manoeuvre between the Po and the Adige, 
 supported by eleven hundred Parmesans with as many Modenese 
 and four guns. The total force amounted to sixty-six thousand 
 men with one hundred and twenty-three guns. The Venetian 
 volunteers and the Neapolitans had not yet arrived. The King 
 now decided not to oppose the march of General Nugent, who 
 was coming tranquilly from the east through the Venetian 
 provinces, but to lay regular siege to Peschiera, occupy the 
 right bank of the Adige, and drive the Austrians from the 
 passes of the Tyrol. 
 
 On the 30th of April, it was intended to attack the positions 
 of Piovezzano and Pastrengo, situated at the opening of the 
 valley, but it was Sunday, and the Piedmontese troops could 
 not move until they had been to mass, so that hours were 
 lost and the movement only began at eleven o'clock. After 
 a slight action in which greatly superior Piedmontese forces 
 occupied the hills commanding Peschiera, and in which the 
 superior quality of the Piedmontese artillery was demonstrated, 
 the right bank of the Adige was evacuated by the Austrians, 
 with a loss of eight to nine hundred, including prisoners ; 
 of the Piedmontese, fourteen were killed and seventeen 
 wounded. But the King took no advantage of these suc- 
 cesses, and remained without a conception of the consequences 
 of his victory. Desultory preparations for the siege of Verona, 
 
160 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and the continuation of the siege of Peschiera, divided the Pied- 
 montese forces, and all the operations were pursued without 
 energy and without definite plan. An attempt, on the 6th of 
 May, to occupy the heights above Verona, with over thirteen 
 thousand men and seventy pieces of artillery, resulted, through 
 the want of organization and unity of action, in a check and 
 a compulsory retreat. This affair, known as the battle of Santa 
 Lucia, was not in itself serious, but it gave fresh evidence of 
 the incapacity of the King and the lack of harmony among the 
 Italian commanders. It therefore discouraged Carlo Alberto, 
 while it emboldened the Austrians to take the offensive. In the 
 meanwhile General Nugent, slowly approaching from the east, 
 concentrated his forces at Gorizia and, traversing the Venetian 
 provinces, moved to join Radetzky. Udine attempted to 
 resist, but surrendered after a few days' bombardment. The 
 King still paid no attention to the grave danger involved in 
 the union of the two Austrian armies, and sent no forces to 
 aid the Venetians in their resistance. 
 
 Nugent, at Citadella on the Brenta, held a council on the 
 1 6th of May to decide if he should join Radetzky or first 
 subdue the insurrection in the Venetian provinces ; it was 
 decided to effect the junction. Accordingly, leaving behind 
 him sufficient forces to protect his communications, he pushed 
 forward to join Radetzky at Visnadello. Durando, who com- 
 manded the army which should have opposed Nugent, whether 
 through the want of orders from the King or afraid to offend 
 the Pope, did nothing to hinder the junction of the Austrian 
 commanders, and, remaining on the defensive, took refuge in 
 Vicenza. This place had already been attacked, in April, 
 by the Austrians under Nugent, but the assailants had been 
 forced to retreat. As it menaced the communications of 
 Radetzky with Austria, it was determined to make another 
 attempt. On the 23rd of May, General von Thurn commenced 
 an attack on the city with nineteen thousand men and forty 
 pieces of artillery : the Italians composing the garrison, numbering 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1 848-1 849. 161 
 
 about three thousand, were mostly volunteers. The attack 
 was repelled with a loss of about eight hundred killed and 
 wounded on the part of the Austrians, and thirty killed and one 
 hundred and thirty wounded of the Italians. The volunteers, 
 who in other places, for want of proper direction and organiza- 
 tion, had made a poor display, here acquitted themselves with 
 the greatest credit, and the defence of Vicenza was considered 
 one of the most brilliant feats of arms performed during the 
 war. 
 
 The junction of Nugent and Radetzky gave the latter a 
 force disposable for active operations of about fifty thousand 
 men. He now resolved to take the offensive, and, leaving 
 Verona on May 27, marched towards Mantua, which was 
 invested by the Tuscan troops. The Piedmontese, nearly 
 sixty thousand in number, were stretched along a line of 
 operations from Curtatone, on the right wing, to Peschiera. 
 The Austrian commander decided to attack Curtatone, which 
 was held mainly by a body of Tuscan students and volun- 
 teers. The King, paying no attention to Austrian manoeuvres, 
 concentrated his troops nearer to his own head-quarters, thus 
 leaving the position of Curtatone isolated. Orders were sent 
 to abandon the position, but, as they were not conveyed with 
 proper formality or through the proper officer, the commander 
 of the Tuscans declined to obey them, fearing, as he himself 
 subsequently stated, to be accused of treason. On the morning 
 of the 29th, the Austrians attacked Curtatone and Montenaro 
 with a force numbering about fifteen thousand men and twenty- 
 three pieces of artillery. The Tuscans, numbering about seven 
 thousand men, with nine guns and two mortars, made a gallant 
 resistance ; three times Curtatone was assaulted, being carried 
 on the third attempt. Montenaro was also assaulted three 
 times. The fight lasted six hours, and ended in the disastrous 
 defeat of the little Italian army, nearly all the artillery men 
 being killed at their guns, while the killed, wounded and 
 prisoners of the Tuscans amounted to nearly half their force. 
 
 s. 1. 11 
 
1 62 Italy, [Chap. 
 
 Radetzky, immediately after the victory of Curtatone, con- 
 centrated his forces for an attack on Goito. General Bava, 
 who acted as Italian commander in chief, without having the 
 control necessary for the post, profited by the delay in the 
 Austrian movements, caused by the defence of Curtatone, to 
 gather about twenty thousand men at Goito. On May 30, 
 a desultory combat ensued in which success was divided, the 
 right wing of the Piedmontese being driven back, while the 
 centre and left remained firm ; and the artillery again decided 
 the fortune of the day. The Austrians eventually retreated, 
 with a loss differently estimated at from five hundred to three 
 thousand, and fell back upon Mantua. The loss of the Italians, 
 killed and wounded, was less than three hundred. In con- 
 sequence of this victory, the important fortress of Peschiera 
 fell into the hands of the Piedmontese, but beyond this the 
 second battle of Goito had no results. The Piedmontese 
 remained inactive after the conflict, and the Austrians were 
 allowed to retire without further molestation. 
 
 Fresh risings in Vienna, and the Emperor's flight to 
 Innsbruck, occurring at this time, undoubtedly paralyzed the 
 Austrian operations to some extent, but it is worth notice that 
 Kossuth, who was at the moment of his greatest power, as 
 Austrian Minister in Hungary, refused to favour, in Italy, the 
 struggle for liberty which he himself was preparing for Hungary, 
 and decided that the forces of Radetzky should not be with- 
 drawn. The Marshal therefore renewed operations against 
 Vicenza, where Durando still commanded. Either trusting to 
 the King to follow up his success at Goito by the relief of 
 Vicenza, or incapable of any movement, he neither evacuated 
 the city nor strengthened its defences. After a vigorous attack 
 carried out by forces enormously superior to the Italian, the 
 heights were carried, and the city, assaulted on three sides, 
 capitulated on the 10th of June. Thanks to the volunteers 
 composing the greater part of the garrison, the defence had 
 been so gallant that the Austrians released the prisoners, 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 163 
 
 imposing only the condition that they should not serve against 
 their victors for three months. A rapid movement on Padua, 
 garrisoned by three thousand Roman volunteers, resulted in 
 an immediate surrender; and Treviso, with a garrison of 
 Sicilian volunteers, was given up by the orders of the 
 municipality, in opposition to La Masa, commanding the 
 Sicilians. Soon afterwards Mestre and all the minor places 
 in the direction of Venice fell into the hands of the 
 Austrians. 
 
 Thereupon, the King, feeling the danger of Radetzky's 
 increasing strength, made up his mind to act with vigour 
 against Mantua and Verona. But the same defects which had 
 made all, the other operations fruitless — the slowness of move- 
 ment and want of organization, and the ignorance of the 
 situation of the enemy — also paralyzed this. " Carlo Alberto," 
 says Lamarmora, " had not the practical common sense neces- 
 sary for the disposition of the troops, not even for understand- 
 ing the nature of the ground. He hardly knew how to keep 
 the direction of his movements and was averse to making 
 observations. So it would have been impossible for him to 
 have gained a victory, even had Radetzky followed the usual 
 dilatory methods of the warfare of that day." 
 
 (2) Diplomacy. 
 
 At this epoch the threatened intervention of France, nomi- 
 nally in favour of Piedmont, but really for her own advantage, 
 showed the difficulty which Italy had before her, in diplomacy 
 as well as on the battle-field. From time immemorial, the 
 policy of France aimed at preventing Italy from becoming 
 strong. Richelieu wrote to a French General in his time, 
 "More than anything else it is necessary for France that Italy 
 should remain divided and weak, because it is necessary for 
 us not to have at our side any strong and great nation." In 
 
164 • Italy. [Chap. 
 
 1 82 1 the French Minister at Florence wrote to the Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, " The independence of Italy (i.e. its inde- 
 pendence of Austria — real Italian independence having always 
 been opposed by France) and, above all, its subdivision into 
 little states, ought to be the desire and the aim of every French 
 agent devoted to his country." When the revolution of 1848 
 broke out in Italy, the French would have come, if called, to 
 assist in the foundation of a kingdom of Upper Italy ; but on 
 the condition that they should have Savoy and Nice, at least — 
 with the hope of substituting their own influence for that of 
 Austria over a state of secondary rank. If Carlo Alberto had 
 offered Savoy to France, the independence of Italy from Austria 
 might have been accomplished in 1848, and the kingdom of 
 Upper Italy, with the Duchies, would have constituted the basis 
 of a nation, the centre of attraction for the other provinces. 
 The internal complications would have been greater than they 
 were in 1859, for the republicans were stronger in 1848, while 
 the governments of Tuscany, Rome and Naples were more 
 popular and more difficult to deal with ; but, even so, this union 
 of the upper Italian provinces would have formed eventually 
 the basis of the Kingdom of Italy under conditions very similar 
 to those which obtained in 1859. Nevertheless it seems to 
 me that Carlo Alberto acted on a sound intuition in refusing 
 French aid at the French price, and I believe that the cause 
 ■of Italian liberty and unity, and of good government, would 
 have ultimately profited had Cavour followed the same policy. 
 The aid of France cost more than it brought in. 
 
 Carlo Alberto obstinately refused any cession of territory 
 in compensation for the assistance of France, and the succes- 
 sive French ministers who had to deal with the question 
 refused without this to assist Italy. Partly from a right instinct 
 but partly also from ignorance and vain glory, the King refused 
 all assistance, and declared that Italy was in a condition to 
 accomplish her own destiny. The dispositions of the French 
 were shown by the fact that, when Carlo Alberto entered 
 
viil] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. l &5 
 
 Lombardy, a French column 1 organized at Lyons moved on 
 Chambery. The incident had, however, no consequence except 
 to increase the distrust towards France. The Piedmontese 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to the English Ambassador, 
 "We have written to the Marquis of Brignola, Minister at Paris, 
 that he should urge the Provisional Government to keep these 
 assemblages of troops away from our frontier, in order that 
 the people may not suppose that France wishes to occupy 
 herself with us. We mean that it shall be known absolutely 
 that Italy decides to manage her own affairs." 
 
 Lamartine says frankly, in his work, "The Present, Past, and 
 Future of the Republic," "If the King of Piedmont should 
 drive Austria from Upper Italy and take possession of Milan, 
 Venice, Parma, Modena, Genoa and Tuscany, France could 
 not permit at her very doors the transformation of a secondary 
 power to one of first rank. The frontiers of this new kingdom 
 are at the gates of Lyons ; a new alliance with Austria would 
 enable this Italian kingdom to change entirely the defensive 
 position of France. The Alps would be doubly formidable. 
 France in this case must secure herself by the possession of 
 Savoy and Nice. If the King of Piedmont should be defeated, 
 France would intervene to obtain for Lombardy and Venice 
 political and constitutional, semi-national existence." These 
 
 1 An eye-witness has described to me this movement. It was organised 
 by a Lyons radical club called M Les Voraces " : it had no support from 
 the French army. A column of a thousand men, without uniforms, armed 
 with fowling-pieces, pikes, sabres, &c, marched from Lyons into lower 
 Savoy. The authorities, civil and military, withdrew. The population, 
 finding itself abandoned by the government, made no question that it was 
 given over to the French Republic ; but the next day, when the "Voraces" 
 had entered Chambery, and began to display evident anarchical tendencies, 
 the citizens of that place, aided by the peasantry of the neighbourhood 
 armed with scythes and pitch-forks, attacked them. The guard-houses and 
 the Hotel de Ville were recaptured, and the Lyonnese were made prisoners 
 and confined in the churches. There were some killed and wounded on 
 both sides. The Piedmontese authorities, who took no part in the conflict, 
 afterwards returned to Chambery. 
 
1 66 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 plans were destroyed by the insurrection of the 23rd of June 
 in Paris, but it may be said that France, whether monarchical 
 or republican, whether in the epoch of Louis XIV, or of 
 Napoleon, or of the republic of 1848, looked with unfavour- 
 able eyes on the aggrandizement of Italy. The Minister 
 Bastide, successor to Lamartine, wrote to Bois-le-Comte at 
 Turin : " We desire sincerely the liberation of Italy from the 
 foreigner, but at the same time we cannot admit that for the 
 benefit of an Italian power there should be established a 
 dominion perhaps more inconvenient to us than the Austrian. 
 In other words, we shall never remain indifferent and passive 
 spectators before the ambitious projects for the increase of 
 his dominions which the King of Sardinia seems to entertain. 
 The formation at the foot of the Alps of a monarchy of ten or 
 twelve million inhabitants, bordered by the two seas, which 
 would become in every respect a formidable power, without 
 considering the possibility of its absorbing the rest of Italy, 
 would be for France and for the peninsula a very grave fact. 
 We could admit the unity of Italy, oh the principle and under 
 the form of a federation of states — independent, sovereign and 
 counterbalancing each other as much as possible — but never 
 a unity which should put Italy under the dominion of one 
 alone of these States." 
 
 Gamier- Pages, Minister of Finance in the French Republic, 
 in his history of the Revolution of 1848, says that the sitting 
 of the Chamber on the 23rd of May, in which Lamartine made 
 his declaration concerning Italy, had been preceded by a dis- 
 cussion in the Council of Ministers on the 12th of May, in 
 which Ledru-Rollin had declared that they ought to aid Italy 
 but not the King of Piedmont. Marie Arago declared against 
 any intervention; Gamier- Page's had, on the contrary, supported 
 it, as had Lamartine. According to the analysis of that sitting, 
 communicated to Henri Martin by Page's, the Council of 
 Ministers had decided to declare to the Assembly that it was 
 the wish of the government to pass the Alps on the first appeal. 
 
vin.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 167 
 
 Lamartine considered that they might leave Venice to Austria 
 as a semi-independent state, but he would have Savoy. But 
 on the 22nd of May the Piedmontese Minister, Pareto, de- 
 clared to the Chamber of Turin that " the French army would 
 not come unless called by us, and as we shall not call it, it will 
 not come." The Lombard envoy wrote on the same day to 
 Lamartine : " I pray you to declare, what is the truth, that I, 
 as well as the representative of Venice, am opposed through 
 national sentiment to any French intervention." Giuseppe 
 Massari had written in April, " In order that Italy should exist, 
 it is indispensable that she should, in everything and for every- 
 thing, now and in future, always, always, always, act alone 
 and for herself." Gioberti had said that he feared Austrian 
 dominion less than French assistance. Poerio and Prati wrote 
 poems against that assistance. Mamiani declared it the greatest 
 misfortune for his nation, and Minghetti said, " I cannot think 
 of it without blushing and without profound indignation." In 
 Italy they still believed in May, 1848, that they could conquer 
 alone, and any cooperation which would have taken from Italy 
 the honour of victory, was repugnant even to those least confi- 
 dent in final success. 
 
 Soon after the outbreak of war, diplomacy began its attempts, 
 honest or dishonest, at conciliation. In 1848, Austria must 
 have considered French intervention in Italy as very probable 
 and certainly disadvantageous, and therefore the imperial Com- 
 missary at Gorizia had promised to the Lombards and the 
 Venetians, that if they would abandon their insurrectionary 
 policy, they should have an administration to be controlled 
 by themselves, liberty of the press, lightening of taxation for 
 the poorer classes, and all the political and national advantages 
 to which they aspired. Abercrombie, the British Minister, 
 advised the Piedmontese government to be contented with 
 the cession of Lombardy; to which the council of Ministers 
 of Piedmont replied that it was not possible to negotiate until 
 the liberation of Italy from the Austrians was complete, while 
 
1 68 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the Lombard provisional government on its side refused to 
 entertain the proposition. On the 12th of May, Viscount 
 Ponsonby, English Ambassador at Vienna, who had already 
 informed Lord Palmerston of other projects for the neutraliza- 
 tion of Italy which had been discussed and abandoned by 
 the Ministerial council at Vienna, announced the departure for 
 London of Baron Hummelauer with various proposals. Hum- 
 melauer wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 23rd of May, "If 
 to-morrow the French should pass the Alps and come into 
 Lombardy we should not go to meet them; we should take 
 position at once at Verona and on the Adige, and if the French 
 should come through and attack us, we should retreat toward 
 our Alps and the Isonzo, but we should not accept battle. 
 We should not oppose the entrance or the advance of the 
 French in Italy. Those who called them would only have to 
 experience again their domination. No one will come to find 
 us behind our Alps and we shall rest spectators of the struggles 
 of which Italy will be the theatre." 
 
 On the 24th of May, Hummelauer presented a memorandum 
 to Lord Palmerston which made the following propositions : 
 " Lombardy will be abandoned by Austria and will be free to 
 remain independent or to unite with any other Italian state 
 according to its own will. The state of Venice will remain 
 under the sovereignty of the Emperor ; it will have a separate 
 administration, completely national, formed by the represen- 
 tatives of the country without the intervention of the Imperial 
 government, and represented in the central government of the 
 monarchy by a Minister whom it will maintain there, and 
 who will direct the relations between the local administration 
 and the Imperial government. The Venetian administration 
 will be presided over by an Arch-duke as Viceroy, who will 
 reside in Venice as Lieutenant of the Emperor. 5 ' 
 
 Lamartine confirms these propositions in his History of the 
 Revolution of 1848 and declares that France would have 
 accepted them with the before-mentioned rectification of the 
 
viil] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 169 
 
 frontier in its favour. England, however, while not believing 
 that the Italian question would be so readily settled, advised 
 Austria to withdraw entirely from Italy. We need not ask 
 whether it is probable that Hummelauer's proposals would 
 have been repeated after hostilities had ceased, or that Radetzky 
 would have given his consent (which in the light of subsequent 
 events is doubtful). They were unconditionally rejected by the 
 Piedmontese Ministry, without even submitting them to the 
 approval of the King ; and in May, Pareto declared to the 
 Chamber that it had never entered into the projects of the 
 King or his Ministry to negotiate, so long as an Austrian 
 remained in Italy ; rather than condescend to this, the Ministry 
 would resign. 
 
 In May the mediation of England was offered to the King 
 on the basis of a guarantee of the integrity of his dominions 
 and the possession of the Duchies of Modena and Parma, if 
 he would make peace. The King replied that he would not 
 negotiate so long as an Austrian remained in Italy. Finally, 
 on the 17th of June, the Counsellor Schnitzer-Meerau arrived 
 at Milan to treat directly with the provisional government 
 of Lombardy; he was the bearer of a letter, dated the 13th 
 of June, from Baron Wessenburg to Count Casati, president 
 of the provisional government of Lombardy. This letter 
 declared that Wessenburg was authorized to negotiate with 
 the provisional government, on the basis of the separation and 
 independence of Lombardy, on the following conditions — the 
 assumption of a proportional part of the debt of the empire, 
 certain advantages to Austrian commerce, and compensation 
 for their losses to the members of the imperial family, and of 
 the civil and military employes. The King seems to have 
 been inclined to accept this proposal, but weakly, hesitatingly, 
 as was his custom in all matters. He replied to Abercrombie 
 on the 10th of July that he would accept a proposition to 
 make the Adige the frontier of the state, with the annexation 
 of Lombardy and the Duchies of Parma and Modena to 
 
170 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Piedmont ; and he declared that if the Austrian government 
 was disposed to make proposals of peace on the basis of such 
 modifications of the frontier, or if such proposals should be 
 made by the English Ministry in the quality of mediators, or 
 if they were made in the name of the Queen, he would not 
 hesitate to accept them. He desired this opinion, however, 
 to be considered confidential, and observed that it would be 
 easy to convince the Parliament and the nation of the wisdom 
 of these pacific measures. It is probable that on this basis, 
 in spite of the national exultation and the question of Venice, 
 matters might have been arranged pacifically, though not 
 without ulterior complications : France would probably have 
 insisted on the cession of Savoy. But all chance of a favour- 
 able result was lost through the hesitations and procrastinations 
 of the King. 
 
 (3) Custozza. 
 
 Towards the end of July, the King, having failed to make 
 any impression on Verona, concentrated his forces with the 
 object of investing the great fortress of Mantua, at the south- 
 western angle of the Quadrilateral. His culpable neglect of 
 ordinary military precautions and his frequent strategical 
 blunders had allowed the Austrians to recover from their 
 previous reverses, to receive reinforcements, and to concen- 
 trate for new operations. Meanwhile the King wasted time 
 in besieging fortresses which were impregnable to an army 
 so imperfectly supplied as his, and gave himself up to fasting 
 and prayer, until the war took a decided turn against him. 
 
 Costa de Beauregard asserts that the King was in cor- 
 respondence with a visionary nun of Savoy, called Maria 
 Teresa, in obedience to whose counsels he even changed his 
 plans and refused to follow those which had been agreed upon. 
 "The King ruled even to the last details the action of his 
 generals, and though he showed himself courageous and 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. l 7 l 
 
 indifferent to death, always the first on horseback and the 
 last in retreat, he acted with so little energy and decision, and 
 his manoeuvres were so slow and irregular, as to excite 
 despair." The reinforcements promised from Lombardy ar- 
 rived at the end of June. They consisted of twelve thousand 
 men : a promiscuous crowd, badly armed, badly clothed, and 
 without instruction. Nine battalions from Piedmont were 
 required to fill the vacancies in the ranks, making a total of 
 sixty-five thousand men (of whom sixteen thousand were 
 already ill with fevers contracted in the marshy country about 
 Mantua), with one hundred and twenty-eight pieces of 
 artillery. Against this force the Austrians mustered one 
 hundred and thirty-two thousand infantry and eight to nine 
 thousand cavalry. 
 
 It is at this point that a name destined to become one of 
 the most famous in the annals of Italy, first appears upon the 
 scene. Born at Nice in 1807, Giuseppe Garibaldi in his youth 
 took to the sea, and at the age of twenty-one undertook a 
 voyage to Constantinople and the Black Sea. At one of the 
 seaports in the East he is said to have fallen in with a follower 
 of Mazzini, who speedily enrolled him in the ranks of " Young 
 Italy." Soon after his return to Italy, he took part in a rising 
 in Genoa (1834) in connexion with Mazzini's unfortunate 
 expedition from Savoy. Proscribed by the government, he 
 made his escape to Marseilles and thence to South America, 
 where for some ten years he lived the life of a partisan, entering 
 the service of Rio Grande, then in revolt against Brazil, and 
 subsequently that of Montevideo in its war with Buenos Ayres. 
 In a series of fights, both by sea and land, he gained consider- 
 able reputation and valuable experience in guerilla warfare. 
 In Montevideo he raised a corps of 800 Italians, who followed 
 him to the death. It was the news of the war in Lombardy 
 which now brought him back to Italy. He speedily raised 
 a body of volunteers, and early in July, 1848, offered his 
 services to the King. Carlo Alberto, who had no taste for 
 
172 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 revolutionaries, gave him a cold reception, but not wishing to 
 alienate any support at such a juncture, advised him to go to 
 Venice and take part in the defence of that city. 
 
 The position of the two armies facing each other at this 
 moment was such as to leave Piedmont no hope of victory. 
 The Piedmontese forces, already less than half the strength of 
 the Austrian, extended their lines to compensate for their 
 numerical inferiority, until from the extreme right to the 
 extreme left was a distance of over eighty miles. The left 
 rested on Rivoli, thirty-four miles from Mantua, and the right 
 was at Governolo on the Mincio. This dispersion of forces 
 enabled Radetzky, marching out of Mantua with sixty thousand 
 men, to attack first the left wing, then the centre, and then 
 the right wing, crushing them one after the other. Partial 
 successes proved the military valour of the Piedmontese troops, 
 but were immediately buried in collective defeats. On the 
 23rd of July a vigorous attack on the centre drove the Italians 
 from the heights of Custozza and other positions, after which 
 Radetzky rapidly marched on the Mincio, bridged it and 
 occupied both banks of the river. In these circumstances, the 
 King, instead of concentrating all his forces, left a portion of 
 the army before Mantua and without sending advice of his 
 movements to Sonnaz, who commanded on the left, made an 
 attack on the Austrian positions. This attack, on the 24th, 
 was successful, and the Austrians were driven from Custozza. 
 But Radetzky, on the 25th, changed his front, rapidly con- 
 centrated fifty thousand men, and met the Italian advance at 
 Berettara. After a brilliant struggle, in which the division of 
 the Duke of Genoa repelled three attacks of the Austrians, 
 nightfall found the entire force engaged and no reserves 
 available. The Italians were obliged to retreat from the 
 heights of Custozza, and finally retired to Villafranca with 
 the loss of twenty-five thousand men. On the 26th they 
 evacuated Villafranca and fell back towards Piedmont. The 
 Austrians pressed on with vigour, and allowed the retreating 
 
vin.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 173 
 
 army no moment of repose. The King's sons, the Dukes of 
 Savoy and Genoa, did their best to stop the Austrian pursuit, 
 but their efforts were in vain. 
 
 It is useless to relate the details of a struggle conducted 
 without intelligence and without unity, with splendid courage 
 on the part of the troops and ignominious ignorance on the 
 part of the commanders. At Volta and Goito the brave 
 Piedmontese army showed its proverbial courage, but all the 
 advantages of offensive action and previous success were on 
 the Austrian side. On the 27 th, the King decided to demand 
 an armistice. The Austrian terms were better than the Italians 
 had a right to expect, considering the condition of the cam- 
 paign; nevertheless, the King refused Radetzky's propositions 
 and decided to retreat on Milan. The campaign was lost, and 
 nothing remained but the obligation of the King's word to 
 support the Milanese movement, which now, with the destruc- 
 tion of the Piedmontese army, was absolutely hopeless. On 
 the 3rd of August the King arrived at Milan with twenty-five 
 thousand men, followed by the Austrians forty-five thousand 
 strong. Slight skirmishes took place in which the Piedmontese 
 troops maintained their reputation, but which could not avert 
 the reconquest of the city by Radetzky, On the night of the 
 4th the King convoked a council of the generals in which the 
 Milanese had no voice, and in which it was decided to demand 
 of Radetzky an armistice with the sole condition that the city 
 should be protected. Radetzky, knowing that at that moment 
 diplomatic negotiations were going on, and that England and 
 France contemplated intervention, agreed to the King's pro- 
 posals, but stipulated for the evacuation of Lombardy, the 
 Duchies and Venetia. To this the King consented, and next 
 day (August 6) he retired to his own dominions, leaving Milan 
 to the tender mercies of the Austrian commander. 
 
 The armistice of Vigevano terminated a campaign under- 
 taken with little forethought and preparation, with incompetent 
 chiefs and inadequate forces, though with courage and resolution 
 
174 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 on the part of the people. The apprehension of foreign 
 intervention alone saved Piedmont from occupation by the 
 Austrian troops. The disaster was evidently due in the main 
 to the incompetence of the King 1 . The proch-verbal drawn 
 up by the ministry on their resignation states fairly the facts 
 of the case : " The general opinion and judgement of the 
 intelligent and experienced deplores greatly the fatality which 
 had surrounded the throne with men known to be mutually 
 antagonistic, — courtiers, not soldiers, incapable of directing 
 military affairs... As a matter of fact, the movements and the 
 condition of the enemy were always unknown, and their attacks 
 unforeseen. Our troops, even when numerically superior, were 
 always inferior at the point attacked. The storehouses were 
 full, but the distribution irregular; the soldiers were oftener 
 exhausted by privation than disabled by combat; and a 
 general confusion of ideas prevailed amongst the chiefs. We 
 will say nothing of the ineptitude of the strategical movements, 
 
 1 The Memoirs of Gen. Delia Rocca, which appeared while this work 
 was in the last stages of preparation, show very clearly where the fault lay, 
 and to whom the disasters of the Piedmontese army were due. The General 
 was chief of the staff, and as such charged with the preparations for the 
 movements of head-quarters, and the details of his diary bring to light the 
 absolute disregard which the King showed for the advice of his experienced 
 officers. In the last stage, i.e. during the retreat on the Piedmontese 
 frontier, Bava, the commander in chief, advised that the army should pass 
 the Po and take up a position menacing the flank of the Austrians in a 
 march on Milan, and at the same time defending, so far as possible, the 
 Piedmontese territory, in order to prolong the campaign with a chance of 
 retrieving the blunders made by the King during the late movements. 
 With this object the army was ordered to retreat on Borgoforte. This 
 order was countermanded by the King, who from motives of loyalty 
 towards the Milanese, as sincere as they were unintelligent, directed the 
 retreat on Milan, thus drawing the Austrians after him, and involving the 
 city in the defeat inevitable on that line of defence. The result which 
 Bava predicted followed. The city had made no preparations to receive 
 the army, or to support it, never having anticipated a defence; and the 
 ineffectual resistance under the walls led, as was foreseen by Bava, to the 
 final and complete catastrophe, both for Milan and Piedmont. 
 
viii.] TJie War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 175 
 
 but the want of foresight, and the errors which constantly 
 recurred, betray an incompetence which almost justifies the 
 want of discipline and resolution visible throughout the army. 
 We are unwilling to suppose treason, actual or intended, but 
 owing to evident indifference to the cause, declared aversion 
 from all constitutional principles, absolute ignorance of the 
 science of war, the results were very different from what the 
 valour of the soldiers had a right to expect." The one bright 
 spot in the picture is the splendid spirit with which volunteers 
 from Italy offered themselves in support of the first champion 
 of Italian emancipation. The immediate political effects of 
 this disastrous campaign were, as might have been expected, 
 reactionary, and the liberalism which had insisted on the war 
 was cowed by its failure. But the advocates of war to the 
 bitter end were not yet silenced. This was but an armistice, 
 and there was a hope that another campaign might retrieve 
 the now evident blunders of the first. In spite of the reaction 
 amongst the ruling classes, popular agitation was continued, 
 with that stubbornness which is a marked trait of the Italian 
 character, at least in the north. 
 
 (4) The armistice. 
 
 On the 4th of March, 1848, the Piedmontese constitution 
 had been proclaimed. It established two Chambers, one 
 named for life by the King, and one elective; it conferred a 
 veto on the King in all cases, without limit or conditions, as 
 well as the prerogative of making war or peace ; it gave the 
 Chambers the right to control expenditure ; it granted freedom 
 of the press with provision against abuses, freedom of meeting, 
 a national guard, the right of petition to every citizen aged 21, 
 and inviolability of domicile. It was in short a frank and full 
 surrender of all that had been so long refused. 
 
 In February, 1848, a commission, of which Cavour was a 
 member, was named for the drawing up of the electoral law. The 
 
176 Italy. Chap. 
 
 elections took place on the 27th of April, without interference 
 on the part of the government. The Chamber resulting was 
 largely liberal, but it included none of the republicans of 183 1, 
 only a few of those of later date, and no one from the aristocratic 
 class or clergy, while Cavour was only returned in the secondary 
 elections. The speech from the throne was made by the Prince 
 of Carignano, and was colourless, while the debates on the 
 reply were long and tedious, as might have been expected 
 from an assembly in which there were one hundred and forty 
 lawyers, who had never before been allowed to ventilate their 
 political hobbies without censure. 
 
 The matters to which the Parliament had first to give its 
 serious attention were the consequences of the campaign, the 
 concluding disaster of which showed that the civic discipline 
 of the little state was very incomplete. The debates proved 
 that the conceptions of the situation entertained by the repre- 
 sentatives of the people were rather those of a public meeting 
 than of a serious deliberative body. " The Piedmontese 
 deputies soon gave Charles Albert anxiety enough. Freedom 
 of speech was to them, who had lived hitherto with a gag in 
 their mouths, what his first jack-knife is to a boy; they hacked 
 and cut at everything, to assure themselves and the world that 
 they really had a weapon to use. They proposed bills to 
 abolish antiquated abuses, and to reform ancient institutions. 
 A worthy purpose no doubt, but ill-timed, when matters 
 of immediate and vital importance had to be dispatched by 
 raw legislators, and when every matter beat up opinionated 
 disputants. But the notification to the Chamber of the vote 
 of Lombardy for fusion drove these disputants to the verge of 
 civil war, and the majority of the ministers and their supporters 
 wished to have the annexation of the new provinces ratified as 
 soon as possible in order that the royal authority might be 
 substituted for their flaccid provisional administration. But 
 some of the radical deputies protested against any act of union 
 until the end of the war, and most of the Piedmontese 
 
vii i.J The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 177 
 
 members were in a frenzy lest Milan should be the capital of 
 the new kingdom." (Thayer's Dawn of Italian Independence.) 
 
 A new Ministry was formed on the 28th of July, after the 
 Chamber had passed several measures of repression against 
 the ecclesiastical orders, and of consolidation in civil affairs. 
 It was composed of Casati, a Lombard, President of the 
 Council ; Ricci, finance ; Rattazzi, agriculture ; Gioia from 
 Parma and Durini from Lombardy, without portfolios ; Plezza, 
 home office; Lisio, minister "near the King" 1 ; Collegno, 
 minister of war. These were all installed in their functions in 
 the midst of the agitations caused by the recent defeats of the 
 army. The armistice had left the people discontented and 
 impatient. Fresh outbreaks in Vienna and disorders through- 
 out the empire paralysed Austria and left a long interval of 
 comparative inactivity. This interval, which might have been 
 employed in reorganizing the Piedmontese forces, was lost 
 through dissensions between the King and the democratic 
 majority of the Chamber. Military organization did not 
 undergo the needed reforms, the depots of material were not 
 replenished, and paralysis and confusion reigned where fore- 
 thought and concentration should have been found. The 
 ministry, paralysed by dissensions, was impotent to impose 
 the reforms necessary, even had it conceived them, while the 
 failure of the Piedmontese military operations had shaken 
 the faith of the other provinces in Piedmont itself. The 
 other sections of Italy were still unprepared for union, un- 
 prepared even for separate action, while the enemy was 
 concentrated and confident, knowing that time and force were 
 with him. Wild schemes of military operations were in the 
 air, and occupied the popular mind. Garibaldi was invited 
 to join with the troops which held Rome; France prepared 
 for intervention both in Rome and in Piedmont. 
 
 When, in August 1848, the news of the defeat of Custozza 
 
 1 i.e. accompanying the king on campaign. 
 S. I. 12 
 
1 78 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 arrived in Paris, a conference was held between Cavaignac, 
 Bastide and Lord Normanby, at which France and England 
 agreed to offer their mediation to the combatants. The 
 memorandum of Hummelauer was accepted as a basis of this 
 mediation. The foundation of the agreement was the formal 
 renunciation on the part of Austria of all rights over Lombardy, 
 but the preservation of sovereignty over Venice, which was to 
 be constituted like Hungary, with a government and ad- 
 ministration of its own. If the Piedmontese had been able 
 to hold out till the end of August, something might have been 
 effected in this sense. But the proposal of mediation came 
 after the armistice and when Lombardy was already evacuated, 
 and it was too late : Austria had conquered, and believed that 
 neither England nor France would make war for the sake of 
 Italy. Still, the resources of Piedmont were not seriously 
 impaired, and had the King been willing to sacrifice Savoy and 
 Nice, France might have intervened and Austria still have had 
 to contemplate the possibility of defeat. On the 3rd of 
 September, therefore, the Emperor decided to accept mediation 
 in principle, while not binding himself to make concessions to 
 Italy, in order to avert the danger of immediate French 
 intervention. A note of the 17th of September from the 
 minister at Vienna defined the Austrian conditions : the 
 establishment of Lombardy and Venice as a kingdom under 
 Austria, with a constitutional government, including an elective 
 chamber and a national army. France suspended her military 
 preparations, but Palmerston, more sagacious than his col- 
 leagues, and foreseeing that French intervention in Italy was 
 sooner or later inevitable, advised that, in the interest of 
 Austria, and in view of possible complications, Lombardy 
 should be ceded to Piedmont. Vienna, however, hesitated 
 and Piedmont still refused to recognize the extent of its 
 helplessness. 
 
 In October the government of Carlo Alberto, taking 
 advantage of the embarrassments of Austria in connexion 
 
vin.] The War witJi Austria, 1848- 1849. 179 
 
 with Hungary, began to contemplate a renewal of the war. 
 At the end of that month the capture of Vienna and the 
 suppression of the revolution by Windischgraetz diminished 
 still further the disposition of Austria to offer concessions to 
 Piedmont, and on the 17th of January the proposal of 
 Hummelauer was withdrawn, under the pretext that it had 
 not emanated from the government of Vienna. In February, 
 1849, Swartzenburg refused to make any concessions. Louis 
 Napoleon — then President of the French Republic — had ex- 
 pressed an intention of effecting the confederation of Italy 
 under the patronage of France; to which Austria replied in 
 the same month, that she would be represented at the con- 
 ference which it was proposed to hold at Brussels, only on 
 the condition that the King of Sardinia would withdraw all 
 his pretentions and that the condition of affairs prior to 181 5 
 should be substantially maintained. The conference did not 
 meet and the government of Piedmont decided to renew the 
 war. 
 
 The organization for the new campaign was, if possible, 
 worse than that of the past. New levies of men, undisciplined 
 and reluctant, raised the army to one hundred and thirty-five 
 thousand men (including ten thousand volunteers from Lom- 
 bardy and other parts of Italy), of which the hospitals and 
 garrisons retained above thirty thousand. The army was put 
 under the command of a Polish general — Chrzanowsky. Bava, 
 the former commander-in-chief, was deposed, owing to the 
 public outcry, which made him responsible for defeats that, in 
 fact, were really due to the King. Chrzanowsky came from 
 Breslau as a simple general and was promoted first to major- 
 general and then commander-in-chief. He is described as 
 being of small stature, pale, beardless, wrinkled, with a 
 turned-up nose, projecting jaw, dull eyes, a shy and awkward 
 bearing ; he resembled a priest rather than a soldier ; he was 
 of a cold character, and he was entirely ignorant of Italian. 
 He was never seen, and in the silence of his cabinet gave 
 
180 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 himself up to details of organization which diverted him from 
 his real functions as commander-in-chief. The King regarded 
 him with reverence and wrote to Costa: "He seems to me 
 absolutely inspired ; he believes that his own operations are 
 aided by the divine will made manifest." 
 
 (5) Novara. \J 
 
 The armistice came to an end on the 12th of March, 1849, 
 and in the midst of the most unfortunate and discouraging 
 circumstances the Piedmontese army was put in motion. It 
 was divided into two corps d'arme'e; the first was in three 
 divisions, commanded by Durando, Bes, and Ramorino, the 
 leader of Mazzini's disastrous insurrection in Savoy; the 
 second corps d'armee, in two divisions, was commanded by 
 Perrone. The whole army was scattered along a line reaching 
 from Lake Maggiore by Novara and the Ticino to the Po, 
 and thence eastward to Parma. The Austrian army was divided 
 into five corps with two divisions each, the corps being 
 commanded respectively by Wratislaw, D'Aspre\ D'Appel, 
 and Count Thurn, and the reserve by Marshal De Wocher. 
 It had one hundred and eighty guns ; it was well disciplined, 
 well equipped, and was under a competent staff. The Austrians 
 concentrated at Lodi, so disposed as to induce the belief that 
 they intended to retreat on the Adda. It is useless to recount 
 the strategical and tactical blunders by which the ill-organized 
 Piedmontese army, with its incompetent commander, drew on 
 itself new disasters for Italy. The general's staff knew nothing 
 of the ground between the two armies j orders were confused 
 and slow, and the confidence of the army in Chrzanowsky was 
 at a minimum. 
 
 The commander-in-chief had to select one of three plans — 
 to throw himself on the right flank of the enemy, while the 
 two divisions at Mortara menaced him in front ; to enter 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1 848-1 849. 181 
 
 Lombardy and operate on the rear of the Austrians; or to 
 give battle on ground selected and known. He chose the 
 third and took up his position at Novara. On the 22nd of 
 March, Radetzky moved against the Piedmontese army, having 
 by his procrastination permitted it to concentrate, while if he 
 had marched rapidly on Novara he would have found it 
 unprepared and would have shortened the struggle consider- 
 ably. The strength of his six corps d'armee in the movement 
 on Novara was fifty-seven thousand men with one hundred 
 and eleven guns. Twenty thousand men with forty guns 
 remained useless beyond the Po, while unimportant combats 
 at Sforzesca and Mortara, with the marches and counter- 
 marches for three days, cost him seven or eight thousand 
 men — of whom the greater part were deserters. Since the 
 Austrians did not concentrate their forces for the attack on 
 Novara, Rattazzi could say that "at Novara fifty thousand 
 Piedmontese were beaten by less than twenty-five thousand 
 Austrians." On the 23rd of March no defensive works of any 
 importance had been undertaken by the Piedmontese, although 
 the Austrians had lost the day before in useless attempts to find 
 their enemy, who was supposed to be at Vercelli. The defeat 
 which followed is partially explained in General Chrzanowsky's 
 official bulletin. After describing the disposition of the Italian 
 troops, and the Austrian attack on the Italian left at Bicocca, 
 which was defended by the contingents from Savona and 
 Savoy, he continues, — "The Savona regiment, which was in 
 the first line, fell back, whereupon the Savoyard brigade came 
 into action. In a short time these troops retook their lost 
 positions and moved forward to the cascina Lavinchi on the left 
 of Cittadella. Meanwhile the fire of the Austrians on our left 
 slackened, and their efforts seemed now to be directed against 
 our centre at Cittadella, which was taken and retaken several 
 times. At this juncture the Austrians renewed and strengthened 
 their attack on our left. The Savoy and Savona brigades gave 
 ground and commenced to retreat toward Bicocca. In a short 
 
1 82 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 time this position was lost and the fate of the day was decided. 
 The Duke of Genoa was sent to recover the position with the 
 reserve, but after a desperate fight, in which the Duke had 
 several horses killed under him, he was obliged to retreat. 
 Then the Austrians threw their whole strength on our centre, 
 and our battalions, falling back one on the other, were obliged 
 at night-fall to retreat" 
 
 The real reason of the defeat, which the bulletin conceals, 
 is to be found in the incapacity of the Italian General. After 
 Cittadella had been taken, lost, and retaken by the twenty-third 
 regiment of the line, the Austrian attack seemed repulsed, and 
 a retreat along the whole line appeared probable. If at this 
 moment a general attack had been made by the Piedmontese, 
 the battle might have been saved ; but the commander-in-chief 
 lacked either decision or perception, and gave the order to 
 retreat. D'Aspre in his report says : " If the Piedmontese had 
 shown greater energy we should have been put, at this point, 
 in great difficulty." La Marmora, in his Episodie del Risor- 
 gimento Italiano, says, " If the repulse of D'Aspre's corps had 
 been followed up... the fortunes of the day might have changed. 
 The divisions of the reserve were then almost untouched." 
 The Austrians however returned to the attack. Late in the 
 afternoon Radetzky threw four divisions, supported by a brigade 
 of grenadiers, on Bicocca and carried the position. An 
 attempt to retake it by the Duke of Genoa with three 
 battalions, failed, and a heavy rain coming on decided the 
 day. The Piedmontese lost two thousand and eighty-three 
 dead and wounded, two thousand prisoners and twelve guns : 
 the Austrians two thousand four hundred and ninety-four 
 killed and wounded and one thousand prisoners. 
 
 The King, who had worn over his uniform a cloak trimmed 
 with black fur and silver embroidery, had continually traversed 
 the battlefield on his black horse. At night- fall he said to 
 Chrzanowsky: "All is lost; even honour"; and when Durando 
 tried to keep him out of the fire, he replied, " It is useless ; 
 
vni.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 183 
 
 let me die ; this is my last day." The Piedmontese army, 
 cut off from Turin, had no longer any basis of operations. It 
 remained forty thousand strong, but the commander had lost 
 all faith in the possibility of success. The King sent Generals 
 Cadorna and Cossato to Radetzky to demand an armistice. 
 The Marshal replied that the King must disband the Lombards ; 
 surrender to the Austrians, until the conclusion of peace, the 
 territory between the Sesia and the Ticino, and the citadel 
 of Alessandria, without waiting for the authorization of parlia- 
 ment; and give up the Duke of Savoy as hostage for the 
 observance of the stipulations. The King called together 
 the Generals and the Princes at nine o'clock and said : 
 "Gentlemen, I have sacrificed myself to the cause of Italian 
 independence ; for it I have exposed my life, that of my sons, 
 and my crown ; I cannot maintain the struggle. I understand 
 that my person may be an obstacle to the conclusion of a peace 
 now become indispensable; I cannot sign it. Since I have 
 not been able to find death on the battle-field I will make the 
 last sacrifice to my country. I lay down my crown and 
 abdicate in favour of my son." 
 
 The King immediately left Piedmont, going to Nice, 
 whence he went into exile at Oporto and there passed the 
 short remainder of his life. He died on the 28th of July, 1849. 
 On the day following the abdication a conference took place 
 between Vittorio Emmanuele and Radetzky, and an armistice 
 was concluded. The new King agreed to disband immediately 
 the Lombard, Hungarian and Polish battalions, and accepted, 
 during the armistice, the occupation by an Austrian force of 
 all the territory comprised between the Po, the Sesia and the 
 Ticino, and half of the fortress of Alessandria, at the expense 
 of the Piedmontese government. He engaged to evacuate 
 Piacenza and all the territory occupied in the principalities of 
 Modena and Tuscany; to withdraw the fleet from the Adriatic 
 within fifteen days ; and to reduce the army to a peace footing. 
 On the 26th of March he signed the treaty of peace. 
 
184 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Piedmont had in this war incurred very serious sacrifices 
 in men and money. The expense of the two campaigns was 
 145,560,000 francs, besides the war indemnity to Austria and 
 the expenses of the Austrian occupation amounting to about 
 66,000,000, a total expense of over 200,000,000 francs, which, 
 for a state whose ordinary budget did not extend beyond 
 84,000,000 was a heavy charge. Nevertheless the advocates 
 of Italian unity considered that, even disastrous as it was, the 
 war had distinctly advanced the cause of national unity and 
 independence. For the first time an Italian army had fought 
 under the Italian flag, with the distinct purpose of establishing 
 Italian unity, and, failure though it was in the military sense 
 of the word, the war produced a great moral result. Though 
 at this moment no other portion of Italy was willing to sacrifice 
 its provincial independence and its peculiar institutions, Pied- 
 mont had proved that in her, at least, Italy possessed a 
 coherent national organization, capable of effort and of sacrifice 
 for the common cause. 
 
 (6) Lombardy and Venice. 
 
 The affairs of Lombardy during the period immediately 
 following the insurrection of Milan are closely intermingled 
 with those of the war between Piedmont and Austria. It was 
 not till the 28th of July, 1848, that the Lombard provinces 
 organized their respective resources. They levied a forced 
 loan of eight millions on the capital, and six millions on the 
 various provinces, and on the 1st of August called to arms 
 the entire population from eighteen to forty years of age. The 
 disaster of Custozza left Lombardy and its insurrection to its 
 own resources, but the blunders of the Piedmontese government 
 had already made the Lombard cause hopeless. The news of 
 the capitulation of August 5 produced in Milan a painful 
 sensation, in which indignation against the King and hostility 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 185 
 
 against the Austrians struggled for supremacy. The muni- 
 cipality protested against the capitulation and the most violent 
 demonstrations were made against the King, who, being accused 
 of treason and publicly insulted, despondently offered to cancel 
 the capitulation and resume the combat. But the hopelessness 
 of any further struggle in the face of the superior forces of 
 Austria and the discouragement which supervened in the 
 liberal ranks determined the acceptance of the armistice. 
 
 An immense number of citizens abandoned the city, which 
 was reoccupied by the Austrian army on the 6th. The 
 Austrian government, desirous of conciliating the public 
 opinion of France and England, adopted a policy less rigorous 
 than that which had provoked the disturbance. The following 
 manifesto was issued in the name of the Emperor Ferdinand 
 on the 20th of September : " It is our sovereign will that the 
 inhabitants of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom should have 
 a constitution responding not less to their nationality and the 
 needs of the country than to their union with the Austrian 
 empire. With this object, as soon as its tranquillity shall have 
 been restored, we shall convoke, in a place to be agreed upon, 
 the representatives of the nation, to be elected freely by all the 
 provinces of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom." When the 
 crown was assumed by Francis Joseph (Dec. 1848) he also 
 declared that he freely recognized the high importance of liberal 
 institutions in agreement with the times, and he called Nazzari 
 to Vienna, to consult on the constitution to be granted to the 
 reoccupied provinces. Three months later the Emperor pro- 
 claimed the constitutional statute of the empire of Austria 
 one and indivisible, known as the Unitary Edict, which, in 
 article 76, promised an organic law for the Lombardo-Venetian 
 kingdom. In spite of all these provisions the state of siege 
 was maintained and the disarmament of the country proceeded 
 with unrelenting rigour. 
 
 With Milan the rest of Lombardy naturally passed again 
 into the power of Austria. But in some parts of the country 
 
1 86 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the resistance was still maintained. It was not till after the 
 battle of Novara that the Austrians recovered the town of 
 Brescia, after a memorable defence. A few days after that 
 battle, a column of twenty-two thousand men with two guns from 
 Mantua attacked San Euphemia, a suburb of Brescia, but after 
 three hours' combat they retreated. On the 27 th, the Austrian 
 forces again attacked the city and bombarded the castle. 
 Brescia resisted heroically and the inhabitants made a success- 
 ful sortie. On the 28th, another sortie was less successful, the 
 Brescians losing in killed, wounded and prisoners about one 
 hundred men. General Nugent, commanding the Austrians, 
 was mortally wounded. On the 29th, the Austrians succeeded 
 in occupying the suburbs and General Haynau, arriving from 
 Padua with reinforcements of three thousand men, laid close 
 siege, summoning the city to surrender under menace of sack 
 and destruction. The summons was disregarded and the 
 bombardment commenced. On the 1st of April the bombard- 
 ment had succeeded in crushing the general defence. The 
 combat was continued in the barricades and streets through 
 the nights of the 1st and 2nd, with the greatest obstinacy, and 
 Haynau in his report to Radetzky says, " I would not have 
 believed that so bad a cause could be defended with so much 
 perseverance," adding, "I opened immediately a terrible 
 bombardment of the city and recommenced the attack. In 
 view of the grave losses which we had already suffered, and 
 the obstinacy and fury of the enemy, we were obliged to pro- 
 ceed to the most rigorous measures. I ordered, therefore, that 
 no prisoners should be taken, that everybody found with arms 
 in his hands should be immediately killed, and that the houses 
 from which shots were fired should be set on fire. So it 
 happened that the fire, already begun partly by the troops and 
 partly by the bombardment, spread to several quarters." 
 
 A letter of G. Maifer written on the 8th of April says " that 
 the soldiers sacked the houses, set fire to them and killed 
 whomsoever they met. Men were murdered before their wives 
 
I viii.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 187 
 
 land children, and their dismembered bodies thrown out from the 
 || windows and against the barricades as one throws to the dogs 
 [the remains of a dinner." The horrors accompanying the 
 j suppression of the movement in Brescia probably surpassed 
 I all that took place during the Lombard insurrection. One 
 I would be glad to believe that the details given by the Italian 
 (authorities were exaggerated by political animosity. The 
 names, however, of the hundreds slain, with the admissions of 
 Haynau and other Austrian authorities, justify to a large extent 
 the accusations of the Italians. The brutalities of Haynau, 
 who commanded the attack, have made him notorious among 
 military monsters. Nugent, on the other hand, who was 
 mortally wounded in the assault, bequeathed all that he pos- 
 sessed to the municipality of Brescia as a testimony to the 
 heroism of the city, which won in this defence the title of 
 I The Lioness." 
 
 We must now return to Venice. The fall of Vicenza in 
 [June, 1848, followed by the recapture of other places in 
 Venetia, had practically isolated Venice and cut her off from 
 any hope of assistance from Lombardy or Piedmont. Never- 
 theless the people, inspired by Manin, determined to hold out. 
 The republican government still hoped for assistance from 
 other parts of Italy, but military conditions, added to the re- 
 actionary policy of the Pope and the King of Naples, rendered 
 this increasingly difficult. On the 3rd of July, the Venetian 
 assembly, after a hot debate, in which the influence of Manin 
 at length prevailed, resolved that, in view of the supreme ne- 
 cessities of Italy, a fusion with Piedmont was desirable. A 
 similar vote had, shortly before, been passed by the Lombard 
 assembly at Milan. But it was too late. The Piedmontese 
 army, defeated at Custozza, retired from the field, and left 
 Venice to its fate. Manin, who had temporarily withdrawn 
 from the government, now again took the helm, and the 
 Venetians resolved to continue a defence which was already 
 well-nigh desperate. They even submitted to ask aid from abroad 
 
188 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 — a step which, in the previous June, both the fusionists and 
 the republicans had condemned. On the i ith of August Manin 
 wrote to France begging the assistance of the sister republic. 
 The wisdom of this appeal is doubtful. France replied senti- 
 mentally, ordering the embarkation of three thousand soldiers 
 as a menace to compel Austria to accept her mediation, but 
 the only result of the French threat was that Austria accepted 
 the offer of mediation without suspending operations. Until 
 October nothing occurred to break the monotony of the siege, 
 which had now become close, excluding Venice from all 
 communication with the mainland. The Austrian batteries 
 were established on the borders of the lagoons, Mestre was 
 occupied, and the only possible communication from outside 
 was by sea. An intelligent examination of the political situa- 
 tion of Europe at large would have determined men, subject to 
 other influences than those of sentiment and historical associa- 
 tion, to abandon an enterprise which, humanly speaking, was 
 absolutely hopeless. But resistance at all costs was decided 
 upon by the excited patriotism of the people, and large contri- 
 butions were made by the citizens toward the cost of the war. 
 The chief difficulty of the position lay in the character of 
 Manin, who was governed more by sentiment than by sound 
 political considerations, and whose great power over the people 
 was due rather to the force of his eloquence than to the pru- 
 dence of his counsels. The Austrians actively carried on their 
 operations, and while England frankly advised the Venetian 
 government to yield, the French made some sympathetic 
 demonstrations and imposed on Austria the cessation of the 
 blockade by sea. The only reply which the Austrians made 
 to this was to press the siege by land with increased vigour. 
 The Venetian forces, such as they were, a medley of volunteers 
 from Naples, Rome and Lombardy, with the Venetian civic 
 guard and the Italian deserters from the Austrian army, 
 amounted to about eighteen thousand men ; ill-organized, 
 divided by quarrels and national jealousies, and with the 
 
viii.] The War with Austria, 1848- 1849. 
 
 exception of small bodies of enthusiastic volunteers, unfit for 
 military operations. To revive the spirit of the people, dis- 
 tressed by the long siege and the hardships naturally arising 
 from the blockade, sorties were made, and the raw Italian 
 forces distinguished themselves in two attacks on the Austrian 
 positions. In October, the town of Mestre was retaken, and 
 the Austrians lost heavily in men and guns. Meanwhile the 
 domestic difficulties in which the government of Vienna was 
 involved, through the disorders in Bohemia, Hungary, and 
 elsewhere, inspired fresh hopes in Venice. But no help came 
 from abroad, and the powers, who were conducting the nego- 
 tiations for mediation, now imposed on the Venetians the 
 cessation of offensive operations. The negotiations lasted 
 until the middle of the following March, during which time 
 no further collision took place. Meanwhile the Austrians 
 continued to strengthen their positions, though, so long as the 
 issue of the struggle with Piedmont was undecided, they could 
 not press the siege. But the battle of Novara enabled them at 
 length to throw all their strength upon the city. By the end 
 of April, 1849, they had concentrated before Venice thirty 
 thousand men, with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. 
 The siege was pushed in the most vigorous manner on the 
 side of Mestre, and the city was now blockaded by land and 
 sea. 
 
 On the 4th of May the batteries opened with forty-seven 
 guns on Marghera. The fortress was defended by two thousand 
 four hundred soldiers, more than could find shelter within its 
 walls. The bombardment on the one side and the other con- 
 tinued without intermission, but the end could not be long 
 delayed. The French and British governments, to which 
 Manin had again applied in April, declined to interfere. At 
 last the abandonment of Marghera was decided on. Ulloa, 
 the commander of the fortress, prepared for evacuation by 
 stratagem ; leaving the guns all charged with fuses of different 
 lengths, which were lighted at the moment of retirement. 
 
190 Italy, [Chap, viii.] 
 
 Thus explosions kept up the appearance of the presence of the 
 garrison until the last man had left the fortifications, and when 
 the firing ceased the Austrians assaulted an empty place. 
 The loss of Marghera brought the Austrian artillery within 
 range of the city, and the lines of the siege being drawn 
 closer, the hardships increased. Defeat was now inevitable, 
 but so long as hardships alone were to be apprehended the 
 resistance continued. The Austrian bombardment met with 
 but a feeble reply, and in July it became evident to the 
 Venetian that the issue could be but of one kind. During the 
 early days of August an agitation for surrender began, and 
 on the nth of August Manin resumed negotiations at Mestre. 
 The capitulation was signed on the 24th by Antonini, 
 Cavadallis, Calluci, Count Medin and Priuli, Manin having 
 resigned. The Austrians agreed that, beyond forty persons 
 indicated by name, nobody should be molested in consequence 
 of the insurrection. 
 
 Manin escaped, and soon afterwards retired to Paris, 
 where he lived during the rest of his life. He remained ever 
 faithful to his old principles, and a few years later, founded, 
 in conjunction with Pallavicini, the "National Society" of 
 Italy, an association which, less extreme in its views than that 
 of Mazzini, contributed largely to educate public opinion in 
 support of union and liberty. Manin himself, one of the 
 noblest names in the long list of Italian patriots, while a 
 republican on principle, was by no means a fanatic, and 
 eventually recognised the Piedmontese monarchy as the one 
 efficient means of salvation for his country. u I accept the 
 monarchy of Savoy (he said to Cavour in 1856), provided 
 that it works loyally and efficiently for the making of Italy.... 
 It should remain the centre of Italian unity." In September, 
 1857, he died. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CENTRAL ITALY, 1847-1849. 
 
 (1) Tuscany. 
 
 The condition of Tuscany, at the opening of the agitation 
 for the liberation of Italy, was much less favourable to extreme 
 measures than that of other parts of the peninsula. But here 
 too the impulse given by the reforms of Pius IX made itself 
 strongly felt, and long before the outbreak of war in northern 
 Italy, the forward party in Florence and other cities of the 
 duchy had shown signs of dangerous activity. 
 
 This liberal movement naturally excited the indignation of 
 Austria, which threatened an occupation of the Tuscan states 
 if constitutional reforms were adopted. England informed the 
 Grand-Duke that she did not recognize in Austria any right to 
 arrest or hinder any changes that took place regularly in the 
 independent states of the peninsula, and that the entry of the 
 first Austrian soldier into the Grand Duchy or the States of the 
 Church would be regarded by her as a violation of inter- 
 national rights, which would oblige her to take action by sea. 
 The attitude of France was favourable to independence within 
 constitutional limits, and, thus supported, the Grand-Duke had 
 continued to favour the movement for reform. The agitation 
 was carried on within just limits and went no further than the 
 Grand-Duke seemed willing to follow. Sympathy for the 
 
192 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 movement in Piedmont was expressed by the public and the 
 municipality of Florence. Bettino Ricasoli, gonfaloniere of 
 the city, proposed an address to Carlo Alberto and called on 
 the city to demonstrate its satisfaction at the concession of the 
 Piedmontese constitution. 
 
 On the nth of February, 1848, a great demonstration took 
 place at Pisa in favour of the constitution ; on this occasion 
 the Grand-Duke issued a proclamation, declaring that he was 
 willing to give such reforms as should be matured and which 
 the people might merit by the prudence of their conduct. 
 When it was known that the constitution was being drawn up, 
 the municipality went to the Grand-Duke to ask that it might 
 be assimilated to those of Naples and Piedmont so far as to 
 assure the formation of two legislative chambers. On the 
 17th, the constitution was published, proclaiming liberty of the 
 press, liberty of commerce and the inviolability of property, 
 with equality before the law. Advices from Rome urged the 
 disabling of non-catholics, but the constitution established the 
 legal equality of all religions. Public opinion was utterly 
 indifferent to the questions raised by the agitators, and Mazzini 
 had scarcely any followers. Tuscany, through its government 
 and through its people, followed the movement in Piedmont 
 and contributed its forces in proportional measure to the army 
 of Carlo Alberto. Early in April a Tuscan contingent set out 
 for the seat of war. The Grand-Duke presented the flags to 
 the troops and pronounced a discourse in which he spoke of 
 Italian independence and confederation. At Curtatone and 
 Montenara the Tuscan volunteers distinguished themselves, 
 and in June the minister, Ridolfi, ordered several companies 
 of regulars to be sent as an additional contingent, with six 
 hundred more volunteers and six guns. But at the same time 
 public opinion ran strongly against fusion with Piedmont. In 
 fact throughout the entire movement, until the final reforms 
 of i860, Tuscany maintained an obstinate attitude of local 
 independence. 
 
ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 193 
 
 The Tuscan parliament was inaugurated on the 26th of 
 June, 1848, and was opened by a discourse by the Grand-Duke 
 in favour of independence and Italian liberty, in which he 
 thanked God for having chosen him to give to his people a 
 liberal government. The actions of the government and the 
 deliberations of the assembly were, however, trivial and led to 
 no considerable result. Many speeches were made but few 
 decisions were taken. The antagonism between the majority 
 who were autonomists » and the minority who were fusionists 
 seemed to swamp all other questions. The ministry was 
 disposed to call in French intervention but this was negatived 
 owing to the opposition of the Grand-Duke and the autonomist 
 majority. The ministry fell in August, after two months of 
 power, and was succeeded by a moderate, or perhaps con- 
 servative, cabinet under Gino Capponi. In Leghorn the 
 people, more accessible to the agitation of the Mazzinists and 
 extremists, demanded democratic institutions and favoured the 
 republican propaganda. The ministry closed all the clubs 
 and arrested the leaders of the agitation ; but the people rose, 
 attacked the arsenals, occupied the palace of ' the governor, 
 whom they imprisoned, and took possession of the armoury. 
 From August until the middle of October anarchy reigned in 
 Leghorn and Lucca, and it was only with the greatest efforts, 
 accompanied by concessions, that the movement was prevented 
 from spreading to the rest of the principality. The conclusion 
 of the armistice between Austria and Piedmont resulted in 
 the sharpening of political antipathies, and on the 12th of 
 October, Capponi resigned. A radical ministry, under Mon- 
 tanelli — a Tuscan volunteer — and Guerrazzi, followed. Their 
 object was to bring together a national assembly, representing 
 all the states of the peninsula, to discuss Italian affairs. This 
 was naturally opposed by Austria and by the conservatives, 
 but supported by the Tuscan parliament, which met early in 
 January, 1849. Soon afterwards, the Grand-Duke, alarmed by 
 the progress of radical opinions, left Florence (on January 30, 
 
 s. 1. 13 
 
194 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 1849) for Siena, where riots had already broken out in favour of 
 restoration of the former regime. The people of Siena, driving 
 out the liberal agitators, demanded the abolition of the con- 
 stituent assembly and the return of the Grand-Duke. That 
 prince had, however, other plans in view. On the 7th of 
 February he suddenly left Siena for Orbetello, having addressed 
 the following letter to his ministers : 
 
 "Siena, 7th February, 1849. I have accepted, it is true, a 
 ministry that had already resolved on calling a constituent 
 assembly, and I made allusion to it in my discourse at the 
 opening of the legislative assembly; but now, as it becomes a 
 question of exposing me and my country to the greatest mis- 
 fortunes, that is to say of bringing on me and on so many good 
 Tuscans the thunders and the censure of the church, I must 
 refuse to adhere to the law, and I do so with all tranquillity 
 of conscience." From Orbetello he communicated with the 
 Pope, and soon afterwards joined Pius IX at Gaeta, in the 
 kingdom of Naples. 
 
 The records show that the King's action was due to the 
 pressure of Austria and the Pope. His abandonment of all 
 progressive tendencies paralyzed the moderate constitution- 
 alists, and threw power into the hands of the extremists and 
 republicans. On the 8th of February, Mazzini arrived at 
 Leghorn. The agitation passed into an extreme phase and 
 the anarchy which prevailed throughout the principality re- 
 sulted in the active intervention of Austria and the restoration 
 of the Grand-Duke. This restoration was in fact demanded 
 by all the moderates, who were alarmed by the excesses of 
 the republican element at Leghorn, and the Mazzinists and 
 fusionists became generally execrated by the population. 
 
 Here, again, the battle of Novara proved decisive of the 
 situation. The reactionary element at once assumed the 
 upper hand. On the first of May the Grand-Duke nominated 
 Serristori commissioner with full powers. He dissolved all the 
 commissions in Florence and in all the other communes of 
 
ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 195 
 
 Tuscany, and abolished every concession made previous to the 
 nth of April, 1848. On the 10th of May the Austrian forces 
 presented themselves before Leghorn. The people offered a 
 resistance which lasted until the next day, when the Austrians 
 carried the defences and took possession of the city, with the 
 usual accompaniment of executions and imprisonments. The 
 Grand- Duke re-entered his capital under the protection of 
 Austria on the 28th of July, and Tuscany, after, its saturnalia 
 of constitutional liberty and democracy, returned to a con- 
 dition infinitely worse than that whicrf preceded the agitation. 
 The Grand-Duke, ruling with Austrian support, governed on 
 Austrian principles. The constitution was overthrown, and 
 liberalism breathed no more in Tuscany, until the great 
 movement following the declaration of war between France 
 and Austria in 1859 broke the ice throughout Italy. 
 
 (2) Parma and Modena. 
 
 Marie Louise, the Austrian Duchess of Parma, was suc- 
 ceeded, on her death in 1847, by Carlo II, hitherto ruler of 
 the petty principality of Lucca, and son of that Maria Luigia, 
 the Spanish Bourbon, whose claims to the succession of Parma 
 had been recognised in 1814 (see above, p. 99). The weak 
 and hesitating character of the Duke not giving that assurance 
 of a firm policy which was required by Austria, his accession 
 was made the pretext for strengthening the Austrian garrison 
 in Parma. However, what Carlo II lacked in masterfulness 
 was supplied by his son, who was appointed to command the 
 army. Soon after his accession, Carlo II sold Guastalla to 
 the Duke of Modena, and Lucca to the Grand-Duke of 
 Tuscany; and he signed a treaty of offensive and defensive 
 alliance with Austria, recognising the right of the Austrian 
 troops to enter his states, and placing the Modenese army 
 under the orders of the Austrian general. The insurrection of 
 Milan disturbed these combinations, and in March, 1848, an 
 
 13—2 
 
196 Italy. [Chap, 
 
 insurrection broke out in Parma. The Duke drifted with the 
 Italian current into constitutional concessions, and issued a 
 manifesto in which he remitted the fortunes of his principality 
 to the arbitration of Pius IX, Carlo Alberto, and Leopoldo, 
 Grand-Duke of Tuscany, promising to grant a constitution and 
 to cooperate with the other Italian states in giving succour to 
 Lombardy. But as the Piedmontese statesmen were disposed 
 rather to annexation than confederation, his advances were 
 received with coolness, and in the confusion which followed, 
 the Duke withdrew. The fate of Parma was determined by 
 that of Piedmont, and after Novara the duchy received an 
 Austrian garrison and was placed under military government. 
 On the 20th of May, 1849, Carlo II, by a formal act, abdicated 
 in favour of his son, Carlo III, who in May, 1849, to °k 
 possession of the government, in which he renewed the 
 traditions of his House by an arbitrary and dissolute regime,, 
 comparatively free from repressive cruelty, but practically 
 under the control of Austria in all political affairs. He re- 
 newed the treaties with Austria, providing for her military 
 occupation of the principality. His prime minister was one 
 Thomas Ward, a British subject, formerly his jockey. 
 The record of his reign is one of the most degrading of all 
 those which the House of Bourbon has inscribed on the page 
 of history, but has otherwise little political value. Carlo III 
 was assassinated on the 26th of March, 1854, by a person 
 whose identity was never well established, but who was sup- 
 posed to be one of his own household, the murder being 
 attributed to a personal feud. 
 
 During the minority of the heir apparent, Marie Louise of 
 Bourbon, sister of the Count de Chambord, widow of the late 
 Duke, acted as Regent. She was a well meaning and amiable 
 princess, who began with the best intentions towards her 
 subjects, and with economy in the administration. But in 
 July, 1854, a seditious movement, ascribed by Tivaroni to 
 Mazzini, paralysed all the good intentions of the Regent and 
 
ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. l 97 
 
 brought on an Austrian intervention, followed in turn by new 
 attempts, which were severely suppressed. The period of 
 gentle reforms, carried out or intended by the Regent, gave 
 place to one of cruel repression and absolutist rigour, which 
 lasted until 1857. Perhaps the recognition of the futility of 
 those movements which it was the policy of Mazzini to 
 provoke on all occasions, even the most hopeless, weakened 
 the insurrectionary tendency ; at all events the years preceding 
 the war of 1859 were without incident in Parma. The de- 
 claration of war developed a flurry of demonstration, followed 
 by immediate repression, but a week later the Austrians, 
 retreating before the allied troops, carried with them the last 
 traces of the Bourbon government of Parma. 
 
 Francesco V, who succeeded his father as Duke of Modena 
 in 1846, possessed neither the greater nor the smaller abilities 
 •of his predecessor: he exceeded the father only in his repression 
 of liberalism, and his unmeasured severity towards disaffection. 
 The movement of 1848 drove him and his family to Mantua, 
 under the protection of Austria, and the forms of constitutional 
 government were maintained for the brief space of the war 
 between Piedmont and Austria, when Modena sent its small 
 contingent to the army of Carlo Alberto. But with the 
 blood-letting of 1848-9, the repressive measures of the govern- 
 ment, and the immense number of exiles, the liberal fervour 
 in Modena so abated, that until the dawn of the great move- 
 ment which accompanied the war of 1859, there is nothing to 
 record of Modena except a long series of political trials and 
 other tyrannical actions, in which Francesco gave play to 
 his violent and bigoted character. 
 
 (3) Rome. 
 
 The first of the liberal demands to which Pius IX found 
 it necessary to oppose an obstinate resistance, was that for the 
 expulsion of the Jesuits, in favour of which a demonstration 
 took place on the occasion of the Swiss civil war known as 
 
198 Italy. [Chap 
 
 that of the Sonderbund. The popular movement began to 
 take a turbulent complexion. The pressure of democratic 
 opinion had become too strong not to alarm the Pope, and 
 on the 1st of January, 1848, a demonstration nominally of 
 gratitude for concessions made, but probably intended to 
 extort more, found him indisposed to accept the homage. 
 The Quirinal was guarded by troops and the Pope refused to 
 show himself. The dissatisfaction manifested induced him on 
 the following day to go out, and he was received with the 
 usual demonstrations of enthusiasm but also with cries of 
 "down with the government, the police, the cardinals," and 
 " death to the Jesuits and conservatives." Ciceruacchio fol- 
 lowed the Pope's carriage in another holding up a placard on 
 which was written " Holy Father, justice ! The people are 
 with you." The emotion which this demonstration produced 
 in Pius IX is said to have caused a fainting fit, the impression 
 of which upon the masses was irritating, and the incident 
 seems to have been the turning point from which, on one side, 
 the Pope tended toward reaction and on the other the people 
 toward rebellion. Incessant demands for a constitution and 
 a responsible ministry and all the apparatus of a popular 
 government were made. 'On the 12th of January, 1848, the 
 revolution broke out at Palermo and a constitution was shortly 
 afterwards given at Naples. The liberal movement and that 
 for the unity of Italy received fresh force, and the Pope was 
 compelled to yield more or less to the pressure. He still 
 refused the constitution, but, on the nth of February, yielded 
 so far as to admit laymen to the ministry. Pasolini and 
 Sturbinetti accepted office. On the 24th of February the 
 revolution of Paris broke out, and in March the Piedmontese 
 constitution added to the strength of the liberal current. 
 There was no going back from this point after the events in 
 Naples, Paris and Turin : the Pope was forced to grant a 
 constitution or abandon the state to a revolution. Austria 
 alone presented a doubtful protection, and the Pope yielded. 
 
ix. Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 199 
 
 On the 10th of March the first ministry which preluded 
 the constitution was formed, nominally under Recchi, but 
 really under the crafty and reactionary Cardinal Antonelli, 
 Secretary of State, who assumed the presidency of the council. 
 The ministry was composed of Antonelli* Recchi, Sturbinetti,' 
 Morachini," Minghetti, ' Aldobrandini, Mezzofanti,' Pasolini; 
 Galetti,' Bedini, Cavaliere and Farini — a mixture of reactionary 
 conservatives and advanced liberals. Following the ministry 
 came the constitution (March 14) : a constitution of such 
 strong ecclesiastical colour, however, that it in reality meant 
 little more than the definition of ecclesiastical privileges and 
 the regularization of the rights of the church. The control of 
 the College of Cardinals and the veto of the Pope on all 
 legislation reduced the legislative powers of the chambers, 
 established under the constitution, to a shadow. The Pope 
 still resisted the movement for a really liberal constitution, 
 and this speedily destroyed his influence. Shortly afterwards, 
 the revolutions in Vienna and Milan annihilated the last hopes 
 which the reactionists, rather than the Pope, still entertained, 
 while the outbreak of the war between Piedmont and Austria 
 contributed to strengthen the movement in Rome. Popular 
 opinion demanded the formation of an army and active 
 measures for the assistance of Piedmont and Lombardy. A 
 force was raised, and placed under the command of General 
 Durando. Incomplete in discipline but increasing in numbers, 
 this army when once formed marched toward the Po, em- 
 ploying about a month to traverse four hundred miles. The 
 military enthusiasm of the liberals and of the emancipated 
 population carried the Pope against his will toward the final 
 catastrophe. » 
 
 On the 29th of April, Pius IX issued his allocution, or 
 encyclical, in which he declared with sufficient distinctness 
 that he did not recognize the policy of war with Austria. He 
 followed up this step by a well-meant but futile attempt to 
 mediate between the combatants. From this moment the 
 
200 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 antagonism between him and his subjects began. What the 
 ministry and the popular voice demanded, the Pope refused, 
 and the logical consequence was, in the end, the proclamation 
 of the Roman republic. The first result of the allocution was 
 the resignation of the ministry. It was followed by another, 
 almost equally incongruous, under Cardinal Soglia and Count 
 Mamiani. Mamiani accepted the office with the implied 
 understanding that the war against Austria was to be actively 
 prosecuted, but the resistance of the Pope, though passive, 
 was seconded too well by all the conservative influences to 
 permit the ministry to carry out its intentions. Weak and 
 vacillating, it yielded one day to the Pope, another day to the 
 people, and finally on the 3rd of August gave way to a 
 ministry under Fabbri, who had been pro-legate at Urbino and 
 Pesaro, and had been known as one of the moderates whose 
 ideal was a liberal government under the Pope. Mamiani 
 succeeded only in increasing the antagonism between the 
 papacy and the people. He introduced the telegraph, the 
 decimal system, books for the lower classes, and re-organized 
 on a wider basis the council of state, but he passed no 
 important measures in regard to the administration. 
 
 Meanwhile the Austrian forces, without any declaration of 
 war, attacked Bologna. The insurrection in Milan and the 
 failure of Piedmont had implicated the papal contingent, 
 which was sufficient pretext for Austria to commence hostilities 
 against the Pope, and the battle of Custozza made such a 
 measure safe. On the 8th of August the Austrian general 
 entered Bologna by treaty with the civic authorities, but a 
 popular uprising produced a conflict, the result of which was 
 the expulsion of the Austrians with a loss of five hundred men. 
 The brutalities committed by the troops in their retreat 
 exasperated popular feeling to a high degree, while the success 
 of the Bolognese encouraged the radicals in Rome. Unable to 
 cope with these difficulties and with the hesitations of the Pope, 
 the ministry of Fabbri gave way, and was succeeded by that 
 
ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 2QI 
 
 of Pellegrino Rossi. This remarkable man was a native of 
 Carrara, and had had a wide experience. He had taught the 
 science of law in Geneva, and had subsequently resided for 
 some time in France, where he had served the Guizot ministry 
 in diplomatic positions. He had imbibed Guizot's consti- 
 tutional principles, but, like him, had a strong tendency to be 
 absolutist in practice, and while personally respected, had no 
 gift for making himself popular. 
 
 The new ministry, less liberal than the people desired, 
 entered upon its difficult task in September, 1848. A number 
 of minor reforms — financial, judicial and administrative — were 
 carried out, insufficient to pacify the extremists, but sufficient 
 to cause violent antipathy among the reactionaries. Before, 
 however, anything serious could be accomplished, the ministry 
 came to an end. On the 15 th of November, Rossi was 
 assassinated as he went to the chamber to open its sittings. 
 Who assassinated him, is a political rather than a criminal 
 question. Liberals still living, w T ho were witnesses of the 
 event and participators in the active conflicts that followed, 
 declare that the assassination was dictated by the Jesuits in 
 order to confirm and strengthen the reaction. On the other 
 hand, the actual assassins are said to have been the sons of 
 Ciceruacchio. At all events, the result of the assassination 
 was to throw Pius IX entirely into the hands of the most 
 bigoted circle of his advisers. The French government on 
 one side, the Austrians and Neapolitans on the other, taking 
 the pretext of this crisis in Roman affairs as a justification for 
 their interference, invited the Pope to take refuge with them 
 respectively. He yielded to the Neapolitan invitation and 
 escaped to Gaeta (November 24). 
 
 The democratic ministry under Galletti, extorted by the 
 popular outcry from the Pope on the 16th of November, was 
 composed of people of slight influence or authority. It was 
 therefore weak, and in fact Rome may be said, after the Pope's 
 •departure, to have been governed by the mob. On the 10th 
 
202 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of December a project was presented for a constituent assembly, 
 and the rest of the year was passed in discussing plans. Hut 
 Piedmont had been defeated, and the prospects of united Italy 
 were dispersed to the winds. Schemes and counter-schemes, 
 plots and counter-plots followed on each other until, on the 
 29th of December, the council was dissolved and a decree 
 issued for the convocation of the assembly of the Roman state 
 with unlimited power. The constituent assembly met on the 
 5th of February, 1849, an d went to the Aracoeli to hear mass. 
 In the assembly Armellini, Garibaldi, Saffi, Mamiani and other 
 radicals took part, and the Pope was declared to be deposed 
 from the temporal government. The Roman republic was 
 proclaimed, but its relations with the rest of Italy were left for 
 future consideration. Envoys were sent to Paris to greet the 
 French republic and to invite the cooperation and sympathy 
 of the French government. On the 18th of February, seven 
 thousand Austrian troops re-entered Ferrara and threatened a 
 general occupation of the Roman state. Meanwhile, France 
 was also contemplating intervention. So far back as November, 
 1848, General Cavaignac had sent orders to Toulon to prepare 
 an expedition which was to be sent to Rome. On the 5th of 
 January, Lord Palmerston had protested at Paris against any 
 armed intervention at Rome, but the Pope demanded it and 
 England was indisposed to make a casus belli of the question. 
 France was determined not to permit Austria to obtain that 
 dominant position in Italy, which would have been given by 
 the occupation of Rome, and the rivalry of the two powers 
 accelerated the inevitable intervention. 
 
 The Roman assembly prepared as best it might for hos- 
 tilities, the result of which must have been foreseen by all 
 but the blindest. The news of the expiration of the armistice 
 (March 12) and the renewal of the war between Austria and 
 Piedmont excited the patriotism of the assembly to the point 
 of a declaration of war against Austria. Great enthusiasm 
 was manifested in the preparations, and great sacrifices were 
 
I ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 2 °3 
 
 [undertaken to get the army into a condition to march. But 
 while the national guard and the regular troops, amounting to 
 about ten thousand men, were marching to take part in the war, 
 the battle of Novara determined the fate of the republic. On 
 the arrival of the news of that disaster on the 29th of March, the 
 assembly thought a vigorous government necessary in view of 
 the great danger to which Rome was exposed, and therefore 
 nominated a triumvirate with unlimited powers for war or 
 peace, in order to save the republic. Mazzini, Armellini and 
 Saffi were elected on the 30th of March, and Mazzini pro- 
 nounced a discourse advocating resistance to the last and 
 the maintenance of Roman prestige for the sake of Italy. 
 Decrees and measures for the prosecution of the war followed 
 each other in rapid succession, and Rome prepared to defend 
 herself on one side against Austria, on another against Naples, 
 and on the third against France. The proposals for union 
 with the other Italian states failed, and Rome, left alone, could 
 only offer a futile resistance. 
 
 Common sense and the least practical insight would at this 
 moment have counselled surrender and have thus avoided 
 bloodshed and the destruction of many invaluable historical 
 monuments. The rivalry between France and Austria made 
 it inevitable that one or both should risk all in the determina- 
 tion to restore the Pope. No power in Europe offered more 
 than words of counsel, and in December 1848 the constituent 
 assembly in Paris had approved the sending of Cavaignac with 
 a brigade to defend the person of the Pope. France had its 
 reasons for intervention in Italy : they were the same which 
 had conduced in 1832 to the occupation of Ancona. It was 
 impossible to allow Austria to dominate the whole peninsula, 
 or northern influence to supersede that of the west, and r 
 whatever might have been the sympathy of the French 
 republic for the Roman, self-interest got the upper hand. 
 Had the Roman politicians understood this, they could have 
 made no question of the ultimate result of the struggle. It 
 
204 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 was simply a race between Austria and France as to which 
 should restore the Pope ; between the two Rome might perish 
 that was unimportant. Other reasons there were, doubtless, 
 to stimulate action on the part of the new president of the 
 French Republic, but these were enough. 
 
 In April, 1849, the French squadron left Marseilles and 
 on the 24th appeared before Civita Vecchia, carrying three 
 brigades of infantry, three battalions, and two squadrons of 
 Chasseurs : in all, according to different authorities, seven to 
 ten thousand men. The expedition landed at Civita Vecchia 
 without any resistance. The commander protested that they 
 came as friends of Rome. Besides, the Roman government 
 had prepared no means of defence and an attempt to prevent 
 disembarkation would not only have failed but would have 
 exaggerated all the difficulties of the position. The French 
 authorities published a proclamation declaring that the forces 
 of France only intervened to prevent disorder and greater 
 misfortune to the country. " France does not intend to claim 
 the right to decide as to your interests, which are those of all 
 Europe and of all the catholic world, but she feels called upon 
 to facilitate the establishment of a regime here which shall be 
 as far from the present anarchy as from the ancient abuses 
 already destroyed by the generosity of Pius IX." In vain the 
 municipality of Civita Vecchia said "Order reigns here and not 
 anarchy "; Oudinot caused the proclamation of the municipality 
 to be torn down, and in view of his assertion of friendly 
 intentions the people tranquilly accepted French occupation. 
 
 Negotiations between Mazzini and the French commandant 
 were carried on from the 24th of April until the 28th, when 
 the French troops began their march on Rome. Garibaldi 
 had entered the city, and volunteers from Genoa, Piedmont, 
 Florence and other parts of Italy, insufficiently armed but 
 resolute and ready for any emergency, gathered there to the 
 total number of about eight thousand five hundred men. The 
 attack began on the 29th. On the first day the French, deceived 
 
jix.] Central Italy, 1 847- 1849. 205 
 
 las to the quality of the resistance, came on rashly, and ap- 
 Iproaching the walls without precautions, were themselves 
 attacked and defeated, with the loss of six hundred killed and 
 wounded, and two hundred prisoners; the Italian loss amounted 
 to from three to four hundred in all. The French forces 
 withdrew, and encamping between Civita Vecchia and Rome, 
 prepared for more regular siege operations. The Roman 
 authorities, anxious to conciliate rather than exasperate, re- 
 leased all the French prisoners unconditionally. Preparations 
 were made for a vigorous defence, but without any knowledge of 
 siege operations ; otherwise the French attack might have been 
 far more disastrous to their troops. An armistice was declared, 
 of which the French took advantage to receive reinforce- 
 ments and to fortify their position, while the Romans prepared 
 to meet the Neapolitan army coming from the south. The 
 triumvirate appointed Roselli, an old soldier of the Neapolitan 
 campaigns, commander-in-chief, although the friends of Gari- 
 baldi urged very strongly his appointment to the supreme 
 command ; but local patriotism prevailed over large considera- 
 tions, and Roselli, being a Roman, was appointed. Garibaldi 
 marched at the head of a detachment of three thousand men 
 to meet the Neapolitan army of twelve thousand, which had 
 already reached Velletri and occupied that city. A difference 
 of opinion between Garibaldi and Roselli wasted time and 
 divided forces, and the result was a comparatively insignificant 
 skirmish before Velletri, in consequence of which, however, the 
 Neapolitan army retreated. Meanwhile, the Austrians, their 
 hands freed by the victory of Novara, and anxious to be 
 level with the French, again advanced into Papal territory. 
 On the 8th of May, Bologna was assaulted by the Austrian 
 army, and after suffering a bombardment of eight days 
 capitulated. 
 
 It now becoming evident that the defence of Rome was 
 impossible, the government deliberated as to which of three 
 plans to adopt; to defend the city to the last; to surrender 
 
206 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 to the French ; or to march out and fight a way through to 
 Upper Italy. The decision was in favour of the defence. 
 Garibaldi proposed following up and attacking the Neapolitans 
 and carrying the revolution into Naples, but he was overruled, 
 and it was decided to fortify and hold the city. From the 
 beginning of May until the 28th the time was passed in 
 negotiations between the triumvirate and M. de Lesseps, 
 the envoy of the French government, which resulted in an 
 agreement precluding the French from occupying the city. 
 But the reaction in France strengthened the hands of the 
 President, and Lesseps was recalled, orders being at the same 
 time sent to Oudinot to press the siege. 
 
 On the night of the 28th — 29th, in spite of the truce, the 
 French had seized by surprise Monte Mario, a dominant 
 position but too far off for effective bombardment. On the 
 1 st of June, Oudinot wrote to the triumvirs to notify them 
 that he refused to accept the result of the negotiations, and 
 demanded the surrender of the city. To prove how incapable 
 were the Roman triumvirate of conducting the defence of the 
 city, it suffices to quote the evidence of Garibaldi, who declares 
 in his memoirs, that from April to June no defensive work, 
 even temporary, had been planned or established in such im- 
 portant positions as the Villa Pamphili and the Villa Corsini, 
 from which Rome was commanded. The commissioner of war 
 had thought such preparations useless, and, while the French 
 were receiving reinforcements, so that in June they had from 
 twenty to thirty thousand men with thirty-six guns ready for 
 the attack, the Romans had received but slight reinforcements 
 of volunteers from without. Their entire force, including the 
 civic guard, amounted to a little over eighteen thousand men 
 with one hundred pieces of artillery, of which only fifty were 
 serviceable. 
 
 The French attack began on June 3rd. It was made from 
 the west side of Rome, the French troops moving from Monte 
 Mario towards the heights of the Janiculum. At the outset 
 
ix.] Central Italy, 1847- 1849. 207 
 
 Oudinot surprised in their sleep the garrison of the Villa 
 Pamphili, which was the key of the defence. When day broke, 
 Garibaldi, discovering the occupation, attacked with all his 
 force, but in a disordered and frenzied manner; he allowed 
 his troops to be defeated in detail, and at nightfall the French 
 were established in the position which they had taken. The 
 fight was distinguished rather by individual courage on the 
 part of the Italians than by any military capacity on the part 
 of the commanders. The defence of the city wall was more 
 obstinate. The Roman forces were concentrated between 
 Porta Cavallegieri and the grounds of the Villa Pamphili. 
 Trenches were opened and batteries set up by the French, 
 who, in spite of occasional bursts of patriotic valour on the part 
 of the Italians, made steady progress. The efforts of the 
 Italian troops were fruitless, in the face of the strong positions 
 held by the French and the increase in their forces, which by 
 this time amounted to from thirty to forty thousand men with 
 sixty-eight pieces of artillery. At length the resistance col- 
 lapsed, and the entry of the French took place on the 3rd of 
 July. The struggle testified to the courage of disorganized and 
 ill-armed Italians quite as much as to the organization of the 
 French. The day before, Garibaldi, gathering such forces as 
 still adhered to him, left the city and began his wonderful 
 march, memorable in the records of military operations, toward 
 Venice. He passed through the ranks of Austrians, Neapolitans 
 and French, and finally reached Venice in the middle of August. 
 Papal authority was at once restored, but it was not till April, 
 1850, that Pius IX returned to Rome, where a French 
 contingent long remained, to keep out the Austrians and to 
 signalise the orthodoxy of France. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 SOUTHERN ITALY, 1 847- 1 849. 
 
 (1) Naples. 
 
 The attempt of the Bandiera brothers was followed by two 
 years of repose, but the ferment which prevailed throughout 
 Italy in 1847 naturally caused a recrudescence of insurrection 
 in the Neapolitan states. On the night of the first of September, 
 1847, an outbreak took place in Messina and Reggio, on each 
 side of the straits. For three days the people held their own, 
 but with the aid of the fleet, and in default of any cooperation 
 on the part of the interior, the movement was suppressed. 
 Fourteen of the insurgents were condemned to death, and four 
 were executed, the sentences of the others being commuted to 
 the galleys for life. In spite however of all these reverses and 
 executions, the movement, crude and aimless as it was, per- 
 sisted, without chiefs or organisation, through the very despair 
 of individuals, thrown together by the intolerable character of, 
 the lives they led. Nothing is more powerfully demonstrative 
 of the inflexible brutality of the Bourbon rule than this 
 persistence, in face of such terrible lessons, of the pleasure- 
 loving people of the southern provinces, in their efforts to 
 escape from their chains. There was a quickening of political 
 life, and it was clear that the intelligence of liberty was 
 spreading, at least amongst the better classes — for under the 
 
Chap, x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 209 
 
 Bourbon system it was a rule to conciliate the lowest strata of 
 society by the most corrupting indulgences. The secret 
 societies made their way because people could no longer 
 live in that manner, and the risk of death was perhaps to 
 many only an excitement the more. The Bandieras had set a 
 fashion for martyrdom. 
 
 It was at this point that the reforming tendencies of 
 Pius IX began to move the waters. But the reforming Pope 
 fell under the excommunication of the despotism, and all 
 persons on whom his colours and portrait were found were 
 imprisoned ; the royal family even instituted a novena to pray 
 for light to be given to this benighted head of the Church. 
 Tumults began in Naples itself, in sympathy with the influence 
 from Rome, and these were aided by slight insurrectionary 
 movements in the interior. Though never individually im- 
 portant, their persistence compelled the King, early in 1848, 
 to make some concessions in order to keep the peace. At the 
 same time many leading men, both of Naples and of other 
 Italian provinces, brought their influence to bear on the King 
 to induce him to follow the example of Piedmont. Losing 
 constancy in the face of the contagion provoked by the Pope's 
 example, and finally of the Sicilian insurrection which began 
 at Palermo on the 12th of January, 1848, the King yielded, 
 and on the 18th of January he formed a Consulta with the 
 object of examining certain projects of constitutional reform. 
 On the 23rd of January an amnesty was granted to the 
 political convicts, with a few exceptions. A good under- 
 standing was thus temporarily restored between King and 
 people, while the insurrection in Sicily accentuated still more 
 the hostility which from time immemorial had existed in a 
 latent form between Naples and Sicily, and Naples refused to 
 the island the autonomy which it demanded. 
 
 But the King's first concessions had the effect of stimulating 
 popular demands, and on the 27th the King yielded so far 
 as to form a ministry favourable to a constitution. Bozzelli, a 
 s. 1. 14 
 
210 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 man who had suffered imprisonment for his political opinions, 
 became a member of this ministry, and was appointed to draft 
 a scheme. On the 29th, new demonstrations made the King 
 still more flexible and it was conceded that the scheme of a 
 constitution should comprise two chambers, one elective and 
 the other nominated by the crown ; freedom of the press, the 
 inviolability of the royal person, and the supremacy of the 
 Catholic religion were secured. The first responsible ministry, 
 formed on the 27 th of January, hardly afforded a guarantee 
 for workable constitutional institutions, and several changes 
 took place in the direction of more liberal government. The 
 constitution finally developed was almost an exact copy of the 
 French constitution of 1830. It established two chambers; an 
 electoral law to determine the qualities of elector and elected, 
 demanding an educational qualification in the former, with a 
 small income ; the control of the crown in religious matters, 
 and an indefinite number of peers chosen for life by the King. 
 The governments of the Holy Alliance protested against 
 these reforms, but the King excused himself on the ground 
 that the popular movement was too strong, and that he could 
 not rely on the army. On the 10th of February, the constitu- 
 tion was proclaimed, and the King, like his grandfather in 
 1820, bound himself by the most sacred oaths, to observe it 
 faithfully. The sequel was to show that Ferdinand II was as 
 false as his predecessor. In spite of these concessions, political 
 agitation, partially stimulated by the troubles in Sicily, where 
 the insurrectionary government maintained its ground, spread 
 in various quarters, and tumultuous gatherings took place 
 from time to time. Popular opinion called loudly for a war 
 with Austria in alliance with other Italian provinces ; but the 
 idea of the union of Italy was repudiated by all Neapolitans. 
 Italy they thought might come under the government of 
 Ferdinand II, but no one in Naples at that epoch accepted 
 willingly the idea of union in any other way. The King 
 resisted the tendency to war, and the ministry, unable to hold 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 2I1 
 
 its own between these opposing forces, resigned (March). The 
 new ministry, under the presidency of Carlo Troia, resolved on 
 more energetic action in the common cause. 
 
 In April, 1848, the preparations for sending an army to 
 assist the northern provinces were completed, and Guglielmo 
 Pepe, head of the insurrection in 1820, was again called to the 
 command. But the whole movement was weak and incon- 
 gruous with the circumstances, and destined to failure. The 
 King ordered the army not to cross the Po, and the fleet was 
 forbidden to give any aid to Venice. The only help which 
 came from Naples to the war of independence in the north 
 was given by Neapolitan volunteers. The army did not fight 
 and the constitution did not work. On the 15th of May — the 
 day on which the parliament met — disorders again broke out, 
 and the reactionary populace came into conflict with the adher- 
 ents of liberal government. This disturbance supplied a pretext 
 for the suppression of the chambers, which was followed by a 
 mild and inefficient protest, drawn up by Mancini, in which 
 with pompous words and magniloquent sentiment the chambers 
 protested against the arbitrary conduct of the King. The 
 ministry was dismissed, and a reactionary ministry was formed, 
 under Prince Coriati as president (May 16). Fighting in the 
 streets had gone so far as to become serious, and the losses 
 officially stated reached one hundred and thirty-two killed and 
 many wounded. But the end was what had been determined 
 on from the beginning by the King and his counsellors — the 
 complete suppression of the liberal movement. The army was 
 at once recalled from the Po, and quiet was restored in Naples. 
 The constitution was modified in a reactionary direction, and 
 a new parliament was summoned to meet in July. 
 
 Some attempts at resistance to the reaction were made in 
 the provinces. On the 13th of June a rising took place at 
 Catanzaro ; meetings were held and protests drawn up in the 
 Calabrias; and a committee of defence was formed at Cosenza. 
 But the movement evaporated in words only, although the 
 
 14—2 
 
212 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 number of insurgents, — estimated at 8000 in Calabria — was 
 sufficient to have given the government serious trouble, had 
 they been united and properly directed. Divided and uncertain 
 in their action, and unsupported by the other provinces of the 
 kingdom, these movements were finally suppressed in July, 
 those of the insurgents who could, escaping to Corfu and to 
 the Roman states. In March, 1849, it was dissolved, and the 
 Bourbon tyranny resumed its full sway. 
 
 Meanwhile the Neapolitan parliament met (July). The 
 liberal deputies, led by Carlo Poerio, vigorously attacked the 
 government, exposed its cruelties, and demanded the prosecu- 
 tion of the war with Austria. But the defeat of Piedmont at 
 Custozza made all these efforts nugatory. The reaction now 
 became supreme. The ministers paid no attention to liberal 
 speeches in parliament, which indeed no longer met with any 
 real support in the country. In September parliament was 
 prorogued. It did not meet again till the following February, 
 when the revolutionary movement throughout the kingdom 
 was practically extinct. The despotism wreaked an unbridled 
 vengeance on those who had for a time dethroned it l , and the 
 night of political lethargy shrouded southern Italy for eleven 
 years. 
 
 (2) Sicily. 
 
 During the years immediately preceding 1 848 the tyranny 
 of the Neapolitan authorities became blinder and more cruel, 
 and the hostility of the Sicilians to the Neapolitan government 
 grew more and more intense. On the night of the 26th of 
 November, 1847, some hundred workmen, assembled in the 
 Piazza del Duomo at Palermo, inaugurated a movement toward 
 that union of classes which had been recognized as indispensable 
 for the success of any liberal efforts. This movement was 
 regarded by the authorities as insurrectionary, and an attempt 
 
 1 For Carlo Poerio, in particular, see Gladstone's Letters (Gleanings, 
 vol. IV.). 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 2I 3 
 
 was made to suppress it by force, in which one of the workmen 
 was killed. On the following day a more turbulent and 
 formidable demonstration took place. Manifestations of 
 Italian sentiment for the first time appeared, along with 
 indications of a liberal propaganda. A programme was agreed 
 on by the liberal committees at Naples and Palermo, the two 
 parts of the kingdom for the first time recognizing the necessity 
 of a thorough understanding if the yoke was to be thrown off. 
 The intermediary between the two sections of the organization 
 was Francesco Crispi, then a young advocate from Palermo, 
 for several years noted as one of the foremost agitators for 
 constitutional reforms, who had recently taken up his residence 
 in Naples for the transaction of the legal affairs of his fellow 
 islanders in the Courts of Naples, to which all appeals were of 
 necessity referred. When the preparations of the joint com- 
 mittee were matured, and it was considered prudent for the 
 rising to take place in the island, the final consultation was 
 held at Naples, and Crispi sailed at the end of December 
 with the order that the rising should begin on the 12th of 
 January. 
 
 The impatience of the Sicilians, amongst whom the organi- 
 zation was not widely extended, nor the intentions of the com- 
 mittee generally known, threatened to bring on the movement 
 prematurely. On the 5th of January a violent demonstration 
 took place at Messina, the people breaking the windows of the 
 royal palace. Many arrests were made in various parts of the 
 island, but the royal functionaries seem to have acted with 
 great timidity, as if apprehending the overthrow of the existing 
 state of things, and unwilling to increase the hostility of those 
 who might become their masters at no distant day. Arrests 
 were also made of members of the committee in Naples, and 
 Crispi, who had shortly before returned to Naples, only escaped 
 through a warning given him by the printer of his legal docu- 
 ments, who had learned through the mistress of one of the 
 functionaries, that a perquisition was to be made at his lodgings. 
 
214 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 This gave Crispi the opportunity of destroying all the com- 
 promising documents and preparing for the search which 
 followed, and the result cleared him from suspicion. He 
 sailed again in the early days of January, to take his place in 
 the movement ; but the weather being unfavourable, the little 
 sailing-boat on which he had embarked was delayed, and he 
 only reached the island when the fighting had been going on 
 for two days. 
 
 One of Crispi's colleagues, La Masa, had left for Florence 
 and Rome to obtain counsel and assistance, and risings were 
 prepared in the Abruzzi under the command of Durando, a 
 Roman liberal and General. At Messina, where Gamba Costa 
 headed the movement, the arrest by General Vial of several 
 working men produced outbreaks which led to the release of 
 the prisoners. Similar disturbances took place at Catania and 
 other localities in the east of the island. On the ioth of 
 January a proclamation was secretly circulated by the committee 
 in Palermo, and pasted on the walls of various other cities, 
 calling on the Sicilians for a general rising. It ran as follows: 
 " Sicilians, the time of petition has passed ; protests, supplica- 
 tions and pacific demonstrations are useless. Ferdinand has 
 despised them all, and we, a free people, are reduced to chains 
 and to misery. Shall we defer the attempt to reconquer our 
 legitimate rights? The force of an united population is 
 irrepressible. Union of the people and downfall of the King ! 
 The 1 2th of January, 1848, will commence the glorious epoch 
 of regeneration. Palermo will receive with transport as many 
 armed Sicilians as shall present themselves for the support of 
 the common cause, to establish reforms and institutions in 
 harmony with the progress of the century and the demands of 
 Europe, Italy, and Pius IX. Union, order and obedience to 
 our chiefs, respect to property; let all theft be declared treason 
 to the country and punished as such. Whoever has no means 
 shall be provided for. Heaven will help our just enterprise. 
 Sicilians! to arms!" This open appeal to insurrection is good 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 215 
 
 evidence that no wide-spread organization existed. The know- 
 ledge of what was to be done was limited to a small and 
 well-organized committee, which trusted to the general 
 discontent to carry its decisions into immediate action. 
 
 La Farina, in his history of Sicily, goes so far as to affirm 
 that there were neither chiefs nor the means of carrying on the 
 revolution. There were indeed, four secret societies, mainly 
 directed by members of the Sicilian aristocracy, but there was 
 no general committee for the island, and it is evident that 
 there was no comprehensive plan. The insurrection sprang 
 up spontaneously, as in Milan, from a general sense of the 
 intolerable oppression which weighed on all classes alike, and 
 from a general determination to embrace the first opportunity 
 to throw it off. Any incident in such a condition of society 
 might produce the explosion. The incident in this case was 
 the arrest of eleven of the most prominent promoters of the 
 pacific demonstrations in favour of reform. Amongst these 
 were several of the leading nobility, eminent literary men, 
 ecclesiastics, and others, none of whom had ever advocated 
 extreme measures. The city of Palermo was menaced with a 
 state of siege, against which the consuls protested. The 
 younger agitators, aware of the general condition of public 
 feeling, and impatient for some action, were eager to precipi- 
 tate it, and only the influence of the elder and more sober 
 portion of the malcontents induced them to postpone the 
 movement until the appointed day. This was the 12th of 
 January, the King's birthday, a traditional occasion for de- 
 monstrations in Sicily. There were no arms, but the absolute 
 deficiency of military preparation, while it left the insurrection 
 comparatively impotent, also lulled the apprehensions of the 
 authorities, who on their part made no preparations for 
 defence. 
 
 The nth of January was quiet, but at dawn on the 12th 
 manuscript placards written by La Masa and signed "The 
 Committee," and bearing the heading "Order and Union," gave 
 
216 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 directions for the revolt. In the course of the morning of the 
 1 2th many people from the country flocked into the city. The 
 troops occupied the squares in front of the police head-quarters 
 in the royal palace, where Di Majo, the King's lieutenant, and 
 General Vial, the commander of the place, were stationed. 
 The population moved about in the streets as if in expectation 
 of some novelty, but nobody commenced an attack, and the 
 movement seemed likely to become abortive. About 8 o'clock 
 a young man named Amedeo, finding himself the only armed 
 person visible, seemed to be taken by panic and fired his gun, 
 which he had hitherto concealed, at random, shouting "To 
 arms !" At this signal one Pasquale Meloro appeared, also 
 armed, while two priests, Ragona and Luigi Venuti, entered 
 the Piazza Vigliena, with crucifixes in their hands, and exhorted 
 the people to rise. A young man, Paolo Paternostro, began a 
 speech in the old market-place, a glove maker, Santa Astorina, 
 distributed cockades, and La Masa, the recognized chief of 
 the movement, gave the signal for action with a flag made 
 of two handkerchiefs, one white and one red, tied with a 
 green ribbon to a stick. La Masa's following included Rosalino 
 Pilo, one of the future chiefs of the final struggle for Sicilian 
 liberty, that of i860. 
 
 Thereupon the crowd dispersed, the shops were closed, 
 and the bells began to ring the alarm. The principal difficulty 
 was to find arms. The troops scattered through the city were 
 attacked separately, and blood began to flow freely. Pietro 
 Amedeo, who had given the first signal, was amongst the first 
 killed. Groups of rural partisans began to come into the city. 
 The troops, disconcerted and not knowing well which way to 
 turn, attacked and dispersed the groups of youths wherever 
 they found them. About 4 o'clock the people began to throw 
 up barricades. There were at this moment only about fifty 
 armed insurgents, while the garrison, variously estimated at 
 from three or four thousand to seven thousand men, timidly 
 avoided the populous quarters. No general demonstration took 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 217 
 
 place, only the young men persisted in reuniting after being 
 dispersed, and an obstinate if desultory resistance continued 
 during the night. A more ineffective beginning of a serious 
 struggle has perhaps never been recorded in Italian annals. 
 Like that of Milan, its spontaneity was its only element of 
 success, and, unlike that of Milan, absolutely no preparations 
 had been made. 
 
 At dawn on the 13th new reinforcements came, and the 
 rendezvous in the Piazza Ferravecchia saw three hundred men 
 armed with guns and another three hundred with many sorts 
 of weapons. If the authorities had had any energy or strength 
 of purpose, the movement could have been crushed at this 
 moment without difficulty. The insurrection was limited to a 
 single quarter, which, surrounded and attacked with artillery, 
 must have immediately yielded. The movement gained no 
 strength during the 12th, and the little nucleus of resistance on 
 the 13th was hardly sufficient to create the enthusiasm necessary 
 for the successful continuance of the revolt. But the troops 
 were even more inactive than the populace. The authorities be- 
 lieved that the insurrection had been prepared by the English, 
 would be aided by them, and would probably succeed : they 
 therefore determined to await the development of the attack. 
 They concentrated their forces in the stronger buildings, the 
 royal palace, the castle, and the barracks, and abandoned the 
 rest of the city to the operations of the populace. As the 
 troops retired from the streets, they were followed by the 
 people, who began to throw up barricades, upon which the 
 cannons of the castle and the royal palace fired with grape. 
 The younger insurgents soon gathered courage from the weak- 
 ness of the military defence, and attacked the police wherever 
 they found them, while the mountaineers at the sound of the 
 firing began to flock into the city. 
 
 During these first two days, however, the want of organiza- 
 tion and concentration on the part of the insurgents would 
 have made their suppression easy, had the royal authorities 
 
218 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 properly understood it and adopted any intelligent plan. The 
 generality of the upper classes, surprised by an actual rising 
 in the initiation of which they had had no part, and which 
 seemed therefore to have been directed from abroad, at first held 
 aloof. When, however, the leading personages in the preparatory 
 conspiracy decided to assume the direction of the movement, 
 and issued from their immobility with the proclamation of a 
 constitution and Sicilian independence, the better classes 
 began to take part. The populace fell into the background, 
 and the nobles and proprietors, with the better class of 
 employe's, finding arms and means, gave the movement 
 consistency. 
 
 On the morning of the 14th, La Masa and his fellow- 
 agitators called together a committee of twenty-six citizens, 
 presided over by the Prince of Grammonte, who summoned 
 a municipal council, and it was agreed to constitute four 
 committees to direct the different phases of the movement. 
 The first committee was presided over by the Praetor of 
 Palermo, the second by the Prince of Pantelleria, a leader in 
 the movements of 181 2 and 1820, the third by the Marquis 
 di Rudini (father of the present Marquis and Prime Minister), 
 and the fourth by Ruggero Settimo. The orders issued by 
 these committees bore the signatures of all the principal 
 citizens of Palermo; at last the movement had become 
 serious. But during this day, the 14th, there were only 
 slight skirmishes in the streets, the Neapolitans awaiting 
 reinforcements from outside, while the people contented them- 
 selves with checking all movements of the military. Early 
 on the 15th combined operations began. The Palace of the 
 Finances was attacked and that of the Prefecture taken, with 
 great slaughter of the police. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th, reinforcements arrived from 
 Naples, and the immense display of force on the part of the 
 authorities began to produce discouragement amongst the 
 insurgents. Many members of the committee escaped. At 
 
3 c] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 219 
 
 8 ;he meeting which took place on the 16th, there were only 
 g line of the numerous demonstrators of the day before j these 
 li vere Ruggero Settimo, the Prince of Pantelleria, Casimiro 
 Pisani, Vincenzo Errante, Marchese Pilo-Scaletta, Francesco 
 ^rispi, Ignazio Calzone, Pasquale Calvi and Mariano Stabile ; 
 dl the rest had fled. La Masa, with an Italian flag and a 
 5rum and with the cry of "Viva la constitutione," went 
 hrough the streets to revive the agitation. He directed a new 
 ittack on the Palace of the Finances, but the garrison of the 
 Duilding had been reinforced and repelled the attack. A 
 lot engagement took place at Porta Maqueda, where the 
 Neapolitan reinforcements attempted to enter the city. Here, 
 after three hours' fighting, the insurgents were victorious, 
 apturing another gun and a number of prisoners. Stabile, a 
 member of the committee, replied to the consuls, who now 
 offered their mediation to procure peace, that Ferdinand II 
 wras the perjured and the rebel, not the people, and that 
 Sicily intended to recover her ancient liberties. 
 
 On this position the night fell. The soldiers now began to 
 exercise their usual brutalities. They captured the monastery 
 of the White Benedictines near the royal palace, murdered 
 two priests, four lay-brothers, the Baron Tortorici and ten 
 other citizens who had taken refuge in the convent, and sacked 
 both the convent and the church. These outrages produced 
 a savage excitement among the people, who in their turn 
 attacked the troops in the church and massacred all found 
 there. Encouraged by this success, they then renewed the 
 attack upon the Noviciato and the Palace of the Finances. 
 The agitation spreading, money and arms began to come in, 
 and the committee began to spread publications encouraging 
 the insurrection. The King's Lieutenant called on the Praetor 
 of Palermo to exert his influence for pacification, but the 
 Praetor refused to take any action unless the parliament of 
 Sicily were first convoked. 
 
 Longo and Orsini, who had escaped from prison, now 
 
220 Italy. [ChapI 
 
 joined the insurgents with two guns which they had obtained 
 from the English, and attacked the royal battery at Porta dl 
 Castro, cutting off the water supply from the royal palace ami 
 the quarter of the Quattro Venti, setting fire to the stores o 
 forage and straw, and preventing all passage of provisions t( 
 the troops. Desultory fighting went on until the 19th, when 
 the consuls sent in a new protest against the bombardment 
 General di Majo again invited the Praetor to the royal palace 
 in order that some means might be provided for pacification 
 The Praetor replied : " The city has been bombarded for twe 
 days, and set on fire in localities inhabited especially by the 
 poorer classes ; I myself have been fired at by the soldiers 
 while with the Austrian consul and carrying a white flag ; the 
 foreign consuls have been received with shots, when, preceded 
 by two white flags, they attempted to approach the royal 
 palace; unarmed monks have been assassinated in their 
 convents by the soldiers, while the people respect and treat 
 as brothers all the soldiers taken prisoners ; such is the actual 
 state of the city. A general committee of public defence and 
 security exists. Your Excellency, if he wishes, may direct to 
 them his propositions." 
 
 From the 19th onward the assistance received from the 
 country proved very efficient. The military organization was 
 also improved, and a committee of ladies, including the 
 Princess of Butera and Mrs Marston, the wife of the consul 
 of the United States, was organized to care for the wounded. 
 On the 2 1 st the Lieutenant sent to the Praetor of Palermo 
 a royal decree, dated the 18th of January, by which the King, 
 in spite of the anger which he had felt at the news of the 
 insurrection, conceded the reciprocal judicial independence of 
 the two parts of the kingdom, the separation of the adminis- 
 tration of Sicily from that of Naples, and the limitation of 
 administrative offices in Sicily to Sicilians. At the same time 
 he granted a general amnesty, and appointed his brother, 
 the Count of Aquila, viceroy, with instructions to nominate 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 221 
 
 (Sicilians to important positions in the administration. The 
 ifighting was now suspended for communication between the 
 itwo parties, but the royal troops having fired on the delegates 
 lof the consuls who went to negotiate, the British admiral 
 threatened to fire on the Neapolitan ships, and the Praetor 
 j declared that in order to suspend hostilities parliament must be 
 convoked under the constitution of 181 2, modified according 
 to circumstances. 
 
 The negotiations having thus failed, the fighting was 
 continued, and on the 23rd the insurgents carried several 
 positions held by the Neapolitan troops. The attack on the 
 I royal palace and the archbishopric was pressed with irresist- 
 ible vigour, and was at length successful. The royal troops, 
 running short of provisions and ammunition, evacuated the 
 city on the 25th of January, and took up a strong position on 
 Monte Pellegrino. Their retreat was harassed by the popu- 
 lace ; the royal palace was sacked ; the gendarmes massacred, 
 and grave injury done to the monuments. The forts of the 
 Molo and of Castellamare and other places outside the city 
 still held out for some days. But on the 27th the Molo was 
 evacuated, and on the 4th of February the fort of Castellamare 
 fell. The insurgents were now completely masters of the city. 
 Meanwhile the royal troops, under the command of Di Sauget, 
 fell back to Guadania, leaving on their retreat their guns and 
 many arms, their dead and wounded, but murdering and 
 ravaging as they went, violating women, murdering children 
 and burning the houses. At Guadania they embarked on the 
 ships, and on the 1st of February evacuated the island. 
 
 The Neapolitan army, with its men of war and its artillery, 
 had shown its inability to suppress in a fifteen days' fight an 
 insurrection of the people of Palermo, begun without arms, 
 without organization and without military experience, but 
 continued with a tenacity probably unequalled in Italian 
 history. The entire island rose after the example of Palermo, 
 the union being temporarily complete, and city after city 
 
222 Italy. [Chai 
 
 expelled its Neapolitan garrison. Girgenti rose on the 2 2n< 
 of January, and the garrison surrendered after nine days' fight 
 Catania rose on the 24th, and on the 27th constituted 
 general committee, which after a fight of three days expellee 
 the garrison with heavy loss. On the 29th, Caltanisetta, an< 
 on the 30th, Trapani rose, and after two days' fight the roya 
 garrison surrendered. On the 29th, Messina followed, and 01 
 the 1 st the royal troops retired to the monastery of Sante 
 Chiara, where the resistance was finally suppressed. 
 
 Lord Minto, the British envoy, had throughout these 
 transactions exercised a constant pressure toward conciliatior 
 with concessions in the sense demanded by the Sicilians 
 The Sicilians themselves had no other conception of a largei 
 scheme of revolt than that which was necessary to secure 
 insular independence. Ruggero Settimo, president of the 
 Committee, was a man of limited political conceptions, a 
 sincere Catholic, with no ideas beyond the independence of 
 the island, and out of sympathy with the conception of Italian 
 unity. The general committee created by the revolution 
 prepared the way for the convocation of a parliament, but 
 hardly anyone in Sicily perceived that the island, excluded 
 from a large national movement, would inevitably succumb to 
 the Bourbon reaction. Mazzini wrote to the Sicilians on the 
 20th of February, and besought them to think of the nation 
 and not limit themselves to their own autonomy and the old 
 constitution of 181 2, but rather to aim at the republic as a 
 means toward the attainment of national union. "Do you 
 consider yourselves (he wrote) strong enough to resume alone 
 the political life which one day will be that of Italy ? Are you 
 mature enough to reach at one leap the ideal to which you 
 aspire and to constitute at once a government better than 
 those which exist to-day, as a nucleus and living example for 
 the nation? Only in that case should I, should we, cease to 
 urge on you the union with the states of the mainland." 
 
 In the circumstances the Sicilians could not be considered 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 223 
 
 egotistic in declining to consider propositions extending beyond 
 their own security. Moreover, the tendencies of the island 
 were too autonomist for any terms of unity with Naples, and 
 without Naples no union with the upper provinces seemed 
 conceivable. When on the 3rd of February the envoy came 
 from Naples to Palermo, bringing the decree of the King 
 granting an amnesty and promising a constitution, the people 
 replied by shouts of war, and the committee refused to 
 negotiate, saying, "We can only add that it is still the 
 universal desire to effect a union with the kingdom of Naples 
 only by special ties, which the Sicilian parliament can sanction, 
 in order to form in this way two distinct members of the 
 Italian confederation." Thus far, this was the most advanced 
 position recognized by the Sicilian leaders in the direction of 
 Italian unity. The reply necessitated a struggle to the 
 death between the Bourbons and Sicily. It was not to be 
 supposed that the King would acquiesce peaceably in the loss 
 of half his dominions, and in preparing for war he appealed 
 simultaneously to England and France for their moral support. 
 The Sicilian committee, on the other hand, asked for the 
 intervention of the British representative, " in order to recover 
 the constitution [of 18 12] which by right has never ceased to 
 exist." This demand was clearly not satisfied by the constitu- 
 tion granted by Ferdinand on the 1 oth of February (see above, 
 p. 210), which provided only for a single parliament for the 
 whole kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
 
 The idea of Naples was that of a united kingdom. Sicily 
 demanded two kingdoms, two constitutions, two armies, and 
 only recognized the union in the person of the King. While 
 these negotiations were going on, the Neapolitan government 
 gave it to be understood that, if Palermo persisted in its 
 rebellion, the King would make Messina the capital of the 
 island. To this threat the people of Messina replied with 
 great enthusiasm, declaring their accord with Palermo. On 
 the 23rd of February military delegates from Palermo arrived 
 
224 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 at Messina, and under their influence the insurgents attacked 
 the fortifications still occupied by the royal troops. The 
 citadel bombarded the city 1 , causing great damage, the people 
 meanwhile fortifying the hills around with batteries mounting 
 twenty-five guns. Reinforcements arriving from Palermo, 
 Catania, Trapani and other parts of the island, the insurgent 
 forces were divided into three bodies, and on the 6th of 
 March a vigorous attack was made. The castle replied with a 
 bombardment of the city until its ammunition was exhausted, 
 after which under the influence of Lord Minto a truce was 
 agreed upon. 
 
 Meanwhile, at Palermo, the general committee formed a 
 commission for regulating the convocation of parliament, and 
 on the 24th of February issued a proclamation appointing the 
 15th of May for the elections, and the 25th for the commence- 
 ment of the session. The decree maintained the two chambers 
 of 181 2, but, as the peerages which had become extinct since 
 18 1 2 amounted to half the chamber, it was provided that they 
 should be replaced by peers proposed by the Commons, and, 
 in case of disagreement, by a joint committee of the two 
 chambers. In the negotiations with Naples, Lord Napier and 
 Lord Minto demanded for Sicily a constitution based on that 
 of 181 2, but with considerable modification, not approving 
 the new constitution which the King had conceded and the 
 Sicilians refused. The Anglo-French mediation was accepted 
 by the committee of Palermo on the basis of such a con- 
 stitution with a separate parliament. By an agreement with 
 Bozzelli, the King declared in a dispatch, communicated to 
 his own government by Lord Minto, that " we have graciously 
 decided to continue to our Sicilian subjects those parliamentary 
 institutions which the changes of time and the particular 
 conditions of our dominions beyond the Faro make desirable." 
 But this concession was subsequently withdrawn, and on the 
 
 1 From this bombardment the King received the nickname of Bomba, 
 by which he was thenceforward known. 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 225 
 
 5th of March, in a joint sitting of the council of Neapolitan 
 ministers with some Sicilians, Lord Minto proposed that the 
 King should legalize the convocation of the Sicilian parliament 
 for the 25th at Palermo, by himself convoking it for that date. 
 After a discussion which lasted from six in the evening till 
 two in the morning, Lord Minto obtained the acceptance of 
 his proposition. By a decree dated 6th of March the King 
 convoked the parliament at Palermo, authorizing it to adapt 
 the constitution of 181 2 to the exigencies of the time and 
 to provide for the needs of Sicily, though safeguarding 
 the personal union. He also nominated Ruggero Settimo 
 lieutenant-general and established under him three ministers 
 for Sicily — Pasquale Calvi, the Marquis of Torrearsa, and 
 Mariano Stabile, all of whom had been leaders in the insur- 
 rection. The decree created a minister for Sicily at Naples, 
 and provided that for all common interests the two parliaments 
 should decide by agreement. Lord Minto carried the decrees 
 to Palermo in person. 
 
 The most important difference between the King's con- 
 cessions and the demands of Palermo lay in the question of 
 the withdrawal of all Neapolitan troops from Sicily, a condition 
 which the Palermitan committee regarded as essential. If 
 in Sicily at this time the conception of Italian unity and 
 independence — against which the whole influence of Austria 
 was thrown into the scale — had had any weight, the Sicilians 
 would probably have been willing to sacrifice many of their 
 insular pretensions in order to reconcile the two kingdoms. 
 But, although English influence was exercised to the utmost 
 in the direction of conciliation and unity of action, it 
 was hardly possible for Lord Minto, even under the threat 
 of abandoning the Sicilian cause, to obtain consideration of 
 the conditions of union. The ultimatum of the committee, 
 sent on the 18th of March, was "That the King should have 
 the title of King of the Two Sicilies ; that his representative in 
 Sicily, with the title of Viceroy, should be a member of the royal 
 
 s. 1. 15 
 
226 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 family or a Sicilian, and that the office of Viceroy should be 
 supplemented by an alter ego with all the faculties and all the 
 restrictions that the constitution of 1812 gave to the executive 
 power; that all the acts or engagements made, or given, by 
 the general committee or by the local committees of the island 
 should be respected so long as their authority existed; that 
 the act of convocation of parliament published by the general 
 committee should form an integral part of the constitution ; 
 that the diplomatic, civil and military functions and the 
 ecclesiastical dignities should be conferred only upon Sicilians, 
 and by the executive power residing in the island ; that the 
 national guard should be preserved, with such reforms as the 
 parliament might see fit to make; that within eight days the 
 royal troops should evacuate the two fortresses which they 
 still held in Sicily, and that those parts of the fortresses which, 
 in the judgment of the committee or in that of the municipal 
 legislators, menaced the city, should be demolished; that 
 Sicily should coin money according to a system which the 
 parliament should determine; that the existing cockade and 
 tricoloured flag should be preserved; that Sicily should 
 receive a fourth part of the existing arms, fleet and war-material, 
 or the equivalent of the same in money; that there should 
 be no demand from one side or the other for the expenses 
 of the war, but that all damage done to the free port of 
 Messina or to the merchandise deposited in it should be 
 defrayed by the Neapolitan treasury and not that of Sicily ; 
 that the ministers of war and the navy and of foreign affairs, 
 and all those in charge of the affairs of Sicily, should remain 
 with the Viceroy, and should be responsible according to the 
 terms of the constitution ; that Sicily should not recognize any 
 minister for the island at Naples ; that the free port of Messina 
 should be restored to the state in which it was prior to the law 
 of 1826; that all affairs of common interest should be deter- 
 mined by agreement between the two parliaments ; that in the 
 case of the formation of an Italian commercial or political 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 227 
 
 league, which was desired by the Sicilians, Sicily should be 
 represented by her own delegates, equally with all other states 
 there represented; that those delegates should be nominated 
 by the Sicilian government; and that the postal and other 
 steamers, bought with the funds of Sicily and for insular uses, 
 should be sent back." 
 
 This ultimatum clearly contemplated the organization of 
 Naples and Sicily as two distinct states, with the tie only of 
 personal union through the sovereign, with local ambitions 
 and needs widely differing and leading probably to further 
 separation. These were conditions which Naples was not 
 prepared to accept, and in the rejection of which the King 
 was certain to be supported by Neapolitan public opinion, so 
 far as such could be said to exist, but at all events by the 
 chauvinism of Naples. They were such terms as a defeated 
 nation may be obliged to accept, but no other, and Bourbon 
 pride was not prepared to accept them. Lord Minto, how- 
 ever, did urge their acceptance, but the King refused. In 
 a despatch to Lord Napier he declared that he could not 
 accept the Sicilian conditions without the consent of the 
 Neapolitan parliament ; while to Palermo he replied by a 
 protest against the legality of all acts which might be done in 
 Sicily without his authority, accusing the Sicilians of opposing 
 the resurrection of Italy and the future of their common 
 country. It is possible that, as La Farina believes, the news 
 of the revolution in Vienna, received a few days later, might 
 have induced the King to yield on these points, had the 
 debate been prolonged. As it was, the unreasonable insistence 
 of the Sicilians on exaggerated conditions, only to be imposed 
 on a people recognizing itself inferior, prolonged the discord 
 and ultimately cost Sicily all her gains. The consequences on 
 the impending struggle for the independence of Italy seemed 
 grave, as withdrawing, from what should have been a national 
 effort, the entire forces of Southern Italy. But, looking over 
 the long struggle from our later point of view, we may doubt if 
 
 15—2 
 
228 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the result would in the end have been different had accord 
 been obtained. What was necessary was to eliminate Austria 
 from Italian struggles, and this neither England nor Europe 
 dared to attempt. 
 
 In spite of the resistance from Naples, the leaders of the 
 movement in Sicily proceeded with their attempt to establish 
 parliamentary government. The elections took place as ar- 
 ranged. A few candidates of the extreme republican party 
 were elected, and no partisans of the King. La Farina says 
 that, on account of the pride of the Sicilians, no one offered 
 himself as a candidate, and that there were no electoral com- 
 mittees; that out of the twenty thousand voters in Palermo 
 only three thousand cast their votes, and that the government 
 exercised no influence even for the correction and prevention 
 of abuses. The Chamber of Peers was mainly composed 
 of the old feudal nobility, and the new peers chosen by the 
 Chamber of Commons were without importance and generally 
 without social position. It is clear that Sicily was far from 
 being educated up to the compromises and concessions 
 necessary for constitutional government and an united Italy. 
 War and prolonged sacrifices were needed to complete the 
 political education of the people. 
 
 On the 25th of March, 1848, Ruggero Settimo inaugurated 
 the parliament in the church of San Domenico, concluding 
 his discourse with the following words : " The Bourbons have 
 ceased to reign in Sicily since 18 15. May God bless and 
 inspire the votes of the parliament and regard Sicily with 
 favour and permit her to unite her defences with those of the 
 great Italian nation, free, independent and united." On the 
 22nd of March, Milan and Venice had expelled the Austrians, 
 but Sicily by a more unequivocal declaration had already 
 anticipated all the other sections of Italy in the declaration of 
 her aspirations for Italian unity. Parliament decided that 
 executive power should be vested in the President of the 
 kingdom of Sicily, who should exercise it by a council of six 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 229 
 
 ministers according to the principles of the constitution of 
 181 2, preserving to him the prerogative of dissolving, adjourn- 
 ing and proroguing the chambers, the declaration of war and 
 conclusion of peace, and the right to pardon all crimes that 
 were not against the state. Ruggero Settimo was unanimously- 
 elected president of the government. He appointed as 
 ministers those who had hitherto been the presidents of the 
 various committees of the insurrection. The soul of this 
 ministry was Stabile, minister of foreign affairs. 
 
 On the first of April, parliament decided to communicate 
 to the other states of Italy the desire of Sicily, free and 
 independent, to make part of an Italian confederation. In a 
 meeting of the most prominent deputies on the morning of 
 the 8th, the minister of foreign affairs read a letter from Lord 
 Minto, dated on the 6th of April from Naples, informing him 
 that it was not probable that the King of Naples would yield 
 the crown to one of his sons, as he had proposed on the 22nd 
 of March, and that he absolutely refused to acknowledge the 
 independence of Sicily. To remain united to Naples on the 
 conditions offered by the King was impossible. Stabile 
 declared that it was better to die fighting than to submit to 
 new royal frauds. Some deputies declared themselves in 
 favour of Sicilian independence with a King of the royal 
 family, others against any Bourbon. Public opinion in general 
 was decided against any political relations with the royal 
 family, while, on the other hand, the republicans were too few 
 and the republican programme too uncertain to unite the 
 suffrages of the deputies. The formal declaration of the 
 deposition of the Bourbons was at first opposed as imprudent, 
 but after discussion was finally (April 13) voted unanimously 
 in the following words : " The throne of Sicily is vacant. 
 Ferdinando Bourbon and his dynasty are for ever deposed 
 from the throne of Sicily. Sicily will be governed as a 
 constitutional monarchy, and, so soon as it shall have reformed 
 its constitution, will call an Italian prince to the throne." 
 
230 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 This declaration was signed by all classes — archbishops, 
 princes, abbots, and deputies — and was received by Palermo 
 and by the island at large with enthusiasm. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, at this juncture, while advising the King 
 to take no part in the war which was being undertaken by the 
 northern Italian states against Austria, recommended him to 
 come to an agreement with Sicily, assuring him that neither 
 Prussia nor England would give him any countenance in 
 reconquering it. The conditions of government in Palermo 
 were, however, extremely difficult. The taste of liberty given 
 to the lower classes excited an insatiable appetite. The 
 galley-slaves who had been liberated during the insurrection 
 resumed their career of brigands ; the municipal and national 
 guard, recruited at random, were filled with characters of 
 questionable honesty; disorders occurred in many parts and 
 spread over the island, and dissensions broke out in the 
 ministry owing to personal jealousies and ignorance of the 
 art of government. The national guard assumed the position 
 of the old pretorian guard in Rome, and dominated the 
 government to such an extent that it was necessary to con- 
 ciliate it by concessions. The government decided to send 
 delegates to the other Italian states ; Father Giacinto Ventura 
 to the Pope; Carlo Gemelli to Tuscany; and Amari, Pisani 
 and La Farina to negotiate for the assistance of the Italian 
 league. La Farina and La Masa desired Sicily to take part 
 in the war in Lombardy, and proposed that she should send 
 detachments to Tuscany, to Rome, to Milan and to Turin as 
 earnest of her participation in the liberation of Italy. The 
 Marquis of Torrearsa, President of the chamber, objected that 
 this proposition was equivalent to a declaration of war against 
 Austria, while Sicily was only at war with Naples. The 
 parliament accordingly rejected the proposition of La Masa 
 and La Farina, but resolved to send a hundred men to 
 Lombardy to show her approbation of the war for the 
 liberation of Italy. But the condition of the island demanded 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 231 
 
 the entire attention of the government. The war with Naples 
 was sufficient to occupy all its energies, and the disorders 
 within the island went far to paralyze military action. 
 
 On the 8th of May parliament published a statement of 
 the charges against the Neapolitan government, including the 
 violation of the promises of 181 5 and of the constitution sworn 
 to in 181 2, the withdrawal of all the rights and franchises of 
 Sicily in 181 6, and the abolition of an independent magistracy 
 in 1837 ; and it continued : "Syracusa and Catania have been 
 saddened by the massacres committed by Caretto ; our popu- 
 lation has been exposed to confiscation, to robbery and to 
 murder, by that butcher crowned with honours and rewards ; 
 the decree of administrative uniformity has been contrived to 
 depress the spirit of the people of the two kingdoms under the 
 deceitful appearance of improvement; the most important 
 offices in Sicily are given to foreigners indisposed to recognize 
 the rights and dignity of the Sicilians." Further, it denounced 
 the vast network of police agents, as contemptuous of all laws, 
 civil and penal, violating personal security and the sanctity of 
 home; and it censured the police as at once stupid and 
 arbitrary in the suppression of all freedom of thought, in- 
 sidious in its espionage and false in its accusations, inflicting 
 imprisonment and exile without warrant or judicial proceed- 
 ings, and torture in the barracks of the gendarmes and in the 
 obscure prisons of the commissioners. The bishoprics (it 
 declared) were occupied by foreigners, and the sanctity of the 
 priesthood profaned by a system of espionage ; more than half 
 of the public revenue was diverted from the island, in great 
 part fraudulently employed to supplement the finances of 
 Naples or the privy purse of the crown; the administration 
 made a machinery of oppression and robbery; the public 
 works a pretence ; insupportable oppressions and dilapidations 
 of every kind. "In throwing off the Bourbon yoke" — so 
 this document concludes — "Sicily has fulfilled a duty, even 
 towards the foundation of Italian nationality upon the basis of 
 
232 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 a powerful coalition of states, individually autonomous but 
 federally united, and connected by their economical and 
 political relations. To this federal union, which is the supreme 
 necessity of Italy, the parliament sees no greater obstacle 
 than the usurpation of lordship over Sicily by a family which, 
 by its secular traditions, has shown itself to be the servant and 
 instrument of the foreigner, a family which has striven to 
 divide and set at enmity two nations naturally fraternal and 
 harmonious, making one only the scourge of the other." . 
 
 If at this time Sicily had been favoured by an united 
 and resolute government, the Neapolitan risings of May and 
 June would have afforded an opportunity for an effective and 
 beneficent union between the two kingdoms. The Sicilian 
 chambers did indeed decree three days of national mourning 
 for the insurgents who had perished in the risings, but more 
 practical assistance was required. An army, even a small one, 
 landed in Calabria, would have gathered together all the liberal 
 elements, and, attacking the royal forces in the rear, would 
 have speedily reduced them to impotence, strengthening the 
 position of the Neapolitan revolutionists against Austria. But 
 Sicily was still unconscious of her own requirements and of her 
 obligations toward Italy. As in 1812 and 1820, so now she 
 showed herself prepared neither for autonomy nor for parlia- 
 mentary government. The ministers could agree on no 
 measures, the chambers were in incessant dissension, and 
 ministerial propositions met with indifferent support or none at 
 all from the deputies, who were divided into groups without any 
 idea of common action. It was impossible to impagetaxes, 
 and equally impossible to organize war wkhoi^itfl^Kriic 
 conscription was intolerable, andj^jgMJ PI^Mrr^^^nly 
 rallied to the armyth^»^j| P^^^Tdisorderly elements of 
 the populatioj^Jp^^^expulsion of the Bourbon authorities, 
 the govenfl^Khad found in the treasury two millions of 
 ducats, jpHthe grist tax had been reduced to conciliate the 
 popuMT This being the only tax which could be collected 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 2 33 
 
 without the reorganization of the tax department, the govern- 
 ment was left with very insufficient means for carrying on its 
 operations. A foreign loan was out of the question. An 
 internal loan at 7 °/ was offered but failed. One million, two 
 hundred thousand ounces 1 were obtained by the sale of public 
 bonds and other resources, but this was utterly insufficient for 
 the creation of an army, and without an army independence 
 was unattainable. Arms were ordered from England but did 
 not arrive. The troops which had been organized broke out 
 into disorder and committed every kind of excess. Dissen- 
 sions of all kinds developed in the island, and republicans, 
 Bourbonists and other parties raised their heads in continuous 
 and increasing antagonism. Three months and a half passed 
 without the government having adopted a single measure for 
 the organization of an army. These defects rendered all 
 military initiative impossible, while the continued inaction 
 increased the discontent and discord. An expedition of five 
 hundred men, ill-armed and ill-provided, was ordered against 
 Naples, but its members took refuge in flight to Corfu. They 
 were stopped at sea by a royal steamer, and thrown into 
 prison. The leaders were condemned to death, but by inter- 
 vention of the British Admiral the sentences were commuted 
 to imprisonment for life. 
 
 The question of the selection of a king for Sicily now came 
 to the front. The candidates were the Archduke Charles II, 
 son of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany ; Prince Napoleon Bona- 
 parte, favoured by France ; a son of the King of Naples ; and 
 the &w«^of Genoa, second son of the King of Sardinia, who 
 '-'---MtffeTrlM^&igland. On the 10th of June, 1848, the 
 chamUJoec^P ' ■J^sa permanent body for com- 
 pleting the work of c^nsTO^ |^^^nv The national 
 sovereignty was proclaimed ; the crown^WBtajMrived of the 
 faculty of dissolving or proroguing the charrM^ and of 
 
 1 The ounce was equivalent to ioj» in English money. 
 
234 Italy, [Chap. 
 
 dismissing or suspending the national guard ; Sicily was 
 declared for ever an independent state; all citizens at the 
 age of twenty-one, knowing how to read and write, were to be 
 electors where they had resided for two years. Ministers or 
 presidents of the ministry could not be deputies or senators. 
 A deputy was to have an income of at least eighteen ounces 
 a year, and a senator one of five hundred. The communes 
 were permitted to give salaries to their representatives. The 
 parliament had the right to choose a new dynasty if the King 
 died without successors. The King was not allowed either to 
 marry or to leave Sicily without the consent of parliament on 
 pain of deposition. His title was to be " King of the Sicilians." 
 Thus the constitution of 1848 modified in a democratic direc- 
 tion that of 181 2, largely diminishing the powers of the King. 
 
 On the night of the nth of July the Duke of Genoa 
 was unanimously elected King under the name of Alberto 
 Amedeo I. The deputation charged with presenting to the 
 Duke the decree of the parliament which elected him, arrived 
 in Piedmont during the last days of the war with Austria, and 
 was obliged to await the conclusion of hostilities in order to 
 receive his reply. Carlo Alberto, desiring not to alienate the 
 King of Naples, declined the offer for his son ; England under 
 the circumstances was unwilling to persist. The Duke ac- 
 cordingly replied to the Sicilians that he preferred his sword 
 to any sceptre in the world ; that Italy had more need of 
 soldiers than of anything else, and that he was a soldier and 
 desired to fight for the cause of Italy. This refusal entailed 
 the fall of Mariano Stabile, who had held the leading influence 
 in Sicilian affairs up to this time. Having met with two 
 failures in his policy — that of the expedition to Calabria, and 
 the refusal of the crown by the Duke of Genoa — he sent in his 
 resignation, and was succeeded on the 13th of August by the 
 Marquis of Torrearsa. 
 
 The Austrians being triumphant in Lombardy and the 
 Neapolitans having withdrawn from the Po, the King of 
 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 235 
 
 Naples decided to carry on the war with Sicily. The citadel 
 of Messina still remained in the power of the royal forces, 
 although the fighting had been continuous during the months 
 of May and June, excepting the armistice. The King, there- 
 fore, at the end of August, 1848, sent a strong expedition 
 under General Filangeri, comprising about twenty thousand 
 men, who using Messina as their base, began serious operations 
 against the forces of the parliament. From Palermo rein- 
 forcements were sent to Messina, but they were ill-organized 
 and undisciplined, and badly supplied with money. On the 
 6th of September a body of royal troops, amounting (according 
 to La Farina) to twenty-four thousand men, landed and attacked 
 the city from the land side, while the citadel began a bombard- 
 ment. The Sicilian volunteers, composed in great part of men 
 released from the galleys, formed very inefficient troops, and 
 their resistance proved weak and fitful. Severe fighting 
 continued for two days, but the Neapolitan troops carried 
 the positions held by the insurgents, one by one, and gradually 
 reconquered the city. The struggle was carried on in the 
 suburbs, but all resistance being gradually overcome, the 
 population, so far as possible, fled to the mountains, many 
 who sought refuge in the churches being massacred, while 
 those who were captured in the roads and in the country 
 round about were killed where they were found. 
 
 The sack of Messina commenced on the 7th, and continued 
 until the 8th, with great cruelty, violation and murder of 
 women, and enormous destruction of property. The losses 
 on both sides had been very grave. The capture of the city 
 was followed by the proclamation of a general amnesty and 
 the establishment of a free port. La Masa, the commander 
 of the Palermitan reinforcements, fell back on Milazzo, but 
 such was the want of discipline and the insubordination of the 
 troops that he abandoned that stronghold without any re- 
 sistance, and retired on Palermo. The French and British 
 Admirals, Baudin and Parker, after the capture of Messina, 
 
236 Italy. [Chap.* 
 
 imposed on the Neapolitans, by threatening to use force, a truce 
 in order to arrange a pacification. From January to September 
 the government at Palermo had done little but debate and 
 issue proclamations. The struggles of hostile personalities, 
 the divisions and jealousies amongst the different leaders, had 
 paralyzed the government. Without the power of collecting 
 taxes, and wanting ammunition, arms and material, it was 
 impossible to carry on the war effectually, while the greed and 
 ambition of the nobles excited the most acrid contests amongst 
 the ruling classes. Neither the ministry nor the parliament 
 realized the necessity of providing for the organization of the 
 army, of supplying arms and ammunition, or of finding sure 
 means of filling the treasury. Thus the reopening of hostilities 
 at Messina found the government unprovided with any adequate 
 resources to maintain the struggle. The cities refused to pay 
 the contributions levied on them, and the rural districts had 
 nothing to give. The churches and convents were stripped 
 of their valuables for sale or pledge, and paper money was 
 issued to the amount of fifteen million francs. A loan was 
 tried at Paris, but failed, and a forced loan of twelve and one 
 half millions of francs was found impossible to collect. In 
 these circumstances it was no wonder that the insurrection 
 lost all vitality. 
 
 During the armistice imposed by the English and French 
 authorities, the King had offered the re-establishment of the 
 constitution of the 29th of January with a separate adminis- 
 tration and parliament, retaining at Naples the ministers of 
 foreign affairs and of war. But the insurrectionary government 
 refused the concession, although a portion of the clergy, the 
 aristocracy and the citizens in large part were favourable to 
 the compromise. 
 
 The fall of Messina left the Sicilian government in command 
 of less than five thousand regular forces, with disorganized 
 masses of volunteers. The chamber then voted the mobili- 
 zation of a part of the national guard, and called under arms 
 
Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 2 37 
 
 the classes of 1834 and the following years; it sanctioned the 
 employment of officers of artillery and engineers from abroad, 
 the seizure of horses and mules belonging to private individuals, 
 the formation of a battalion of the employes of the custom 
 house, and the construction of a church at Palermo to our 
 Lady of Victory ! The military disorganization went rapidly 
 from bad to worse, in spite of all the energy displayed by a 
 few members of the insurrectionary committee, of which Crispi 
 was the chief. Garibaldi was invited to undertake the com- 
 mand of the forces and accepted, but subsequently withdrew 
 his acceptance. The command of the provinces of Palermo, 
 Trapani, Girgenti, and Caltanisetta was finally given to the 
 French Traubiand, and the general direction of the war to a 
 Polish officer named Mieroslawsky. 
 
 Meanwhile the paper money which had been issued 
 depreciated rapidly in value. The divisions and jealousies 
 in the government increased, and Cordova, minister of the 
 treasury, having proposed the arrest of the chiefs of the oppo- 
 sition, violent dissensions arose, with the result that government 
 was completely paralyzed. On the 23rd of February, 1849, 
 the Tuscan envoy in Sicily wrote to his government that " all 
 aspirations after Italian unity, as well as republican doctrines, 
 though regarded by the government of Sicily, and by almost 
 all the members of parliament, as theoretically excellent and 
 perhaps capable of immediate realization in central Italy, are 
 held to be inopportune and therefore injurious here and now... 
 The masses are strong and full of generous sentiments and 
 heroic devotion to the cause of insular independence, but they 
 are so ignorant of politics and so subject to the influence 
 and the prestige of certain individuals that they are entirely 
 incapable of democratic government." On the 15 th of March 
 he writes : " In fifteen months of independence and liberty 
 and with ten millions of scudi spent, nothing serious has been 
 done to prepare the country for a strong and effective defence. 
 There are very few who understand Sicilian affairs and their 
 
238 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 relation to those of Italy or the revolution. Most of them 
 talk about Sicilian independence and Sicilian autonomy but 
 nothing more. Except a few men of the popular classes, all 
 oppose at heart the idea of democratic unity." 
 
 France and England having now exhausted their influence 
 with the King of Naples to obtain conditions acceptable to the 
 Sicilians, the moment approached for a final solution, since 
 none of the powers were disposed to take a more active part 
 in the defence of the island. The King, by a proclamation 
 issued in March through the French and British Admirals, 
 offered, as an ultimatum to Sicily, the constitution drawn up at 
 Gaeta on the 28th of February 1849 (Tivaroni), according to 
 which Sicily would return to its allegiance, and would be 
 governed by a viceroy assisted by a council of ministers and 
 a national parliament, with a national administration and a 
 revision of the constitution of 18 12 according to the needs 
 of the time ; the principal points of the island to be occupied 
 by Neapolitan troops ; the insurgents to have full amnesty, 
 subject to the temporary exile of the most prominent leaders. 
 The King refused to concede freedom of the press or a 
 national guard, but the forces by land and sea were to be 
 entirely Sicilian. The King was to be represented in Sicily 
 by a viceroy with such attributes and powers as he should 
 determine; he was to dispose of the forces by land and sea, 
 and to have the supreme direction of foreign affairs. A 
 minister for Sicily was to be always in attendance on the King. 
 The peers were to be nominated for life by the King, who 
 reserved the right to convoke and dissolve parliament at his 
 pleasure. It is clear that these proposals left hardly a shadow 
 of public liberty to Sicily. 
 
 On the 17 th of March, the Sicilian ministry having refused 
 to present the royal ultimatum to parliament, the deputy 
 Raeli presented a counter-proposal by which all Sicilians 
 between the ages of eighteen and thirty were to be included 
 in the army. With general enthusiasm the population began 
 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 239 
 
 to throw up fortifications around Palermo, and, the ministry 
 being still divided, a part resigned in order to leave the 
 government in the hands of those who were resolved to carry 
 on the war. The British and French negotiators not having 
 succeeded in obtaining any guarantees from their respective 
 governments that the King's promises should be duly carried 
 out, and the Sicilians on their side refusing to accept any 
 settlement without such guarantee, Mieroslawsky, at the head 
 of the newly reorganized army, with six guns, moved toward 
 Catania. The French Major Poulet, with a part of the 
 national guard, went to Termini, and the university legion 
 with the deputies Crispi, Papa, Natoli and Paternostro, under 
 the command of La Farina, republican ex-minister, moved 
 on to Misilmeri. Mieroslawsky disposed of seven thousand 
 seven hundred men out of the nominal forces of nineteen 
 thousand which the government had called into existence, 
 fifteen thousand being organized and the rest in bands of 
 volunteers, against sixteen thousand regular Neapolitan troops, 
 supported by six hundred and fifty-three cavalry and forty 
 guns, and aided by the ships of war along the coast. The 
 Sicilians had no ships. Their forces consisted mainly of 
 recruits unaccustomed to military discipline and badly armed 
 and equipped ; more than half the cavalry had no horses ; the 
 artillery was unhorsed ; the officers were mostly ignorant of all 
 the duties of active warfare, and two of the generals were 
 foreign ; ammunition was scarce ; there were no commissariat 
 supplies and no ambulances. The three months of armistice 
 had been utterly wasted so far as practical military preparations 
 were concerned. 
 
 Hostilities recommenced on the 30th of March, 1849, 
 and Mieroslawsky contemplated an attack on Messina, but 
 the vanguard was defeated and dispersed at Taormina and 
 Mieroslawsky was unable to rally them. On the 4th of April 
 he moved on Catania with seven thousand men, to attack the 
 garrison which consisted of twelve thousand men, holding 
 
240 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 fortified positions, with thirty-two pieces of artillery. He 
 occupied the heights of Aci which dominate the city, but 
 his vanguard was repulsed, and on the 5th the Sicilians were 
 entirely defeated and dispersed, losing three hundred and fifty 
 killed and two hundred and fifteen prisoners. Mieroslawsky 
 was wounded and his flags and guns were captured. Murder 
 and sack for five days followed this defeat. At Syracuse the 
 Sicilian forces dispersed before they were attacked ; Caltanisetta 
 received the royal troops with enthusiastic demonstrations, and 
 at Mezzagno, only twelve miles from Palermo, the last body 
 of Sicilian troops disbanded. 
 
 On the 14th of April, the chambers accepted the offer of 
 French mediation, the lower house by fifty-five votes against 
 thirty-three, the chamber of peers unanimously. The ministry, 
 again modified, opened negotiations through the British and 
 French representatives with the King, who now offered a 
 constitution, with a viceroy and a national guard for Palermo, 
 an amnesty, and recognition of the public debt. On the 1 7th 
 of April the parliament adjourned sine die. The president, 
 Ruggero Settimo, thereupon convoked a meeting of the nobles, 
 ministers, peers, and deputies, with the foreign officers, to 
 advise as to the course to be followed. Opinions were divided, 
 the principal members of the aristocracy maintaining the 
 necessity of peace, while the more radical deputies and officers 
 insisted upon resistance. The meeting broke up in tumult. 
 La Farina proposed Settimo as dictator, advocating the disso- 
 lution of the national guard and the arrest of the leading 
 advocates of peace. But resistance had evidently become 
 impossible, and Palermo, discouraged by the royalist successes, 
 felt no longer competent to carry on the struggle. Settimo 
 therefore left Palermo, surrendering his power into the hands 
 of the municipality; the other leading insurgent authorities 
 escaped abroad. On the 26th of April the Neapolitan 
 squadron appeared before Palermo and summoned it to 
 surrender. 
 
x.] Southern Italy, 1847- 1849. 241 
 
 The municipality undertook to negotiate with the royal 
 forces, but on the 29th of April, with a last volcanic eruption, 
 the people rose and expelled the municipal authorities, created 
 a new municipal council, and organized a chaotic resistance. 
 On the 3rd of May, the royal troops advanced to attack the 
 city. On the 7th they came into collision with the insurgent 
 bands, supported by the French volunteer battalion and a 
 squadron of cavalry. The combat continued during the 8th 
 and 9th in the villages round Palermo, which were carried by 
 the troops with the usual massacres of all classes and both 
 sexes. The chiefs of the squadrons and irregulars, who had 
 been bought over by the royal authorities, now imposed a 
 cessation of hostilities, and on the nth, Filangeri accepted the 
 surrender, granting an amnesty for all excepting forty-three of 
 the chiefs. On the 15th the Neapolitans occupied the outer 
 portion of the city ; the foreign legion and the Neapolitan 
 deserters marched out in silence, and a general disarmament was 
 ordered within forty-eight hours under penalty of death to all 
 found in possession of arms. It is hardly necessary to add that 
 when the victory was gained, all the King's promises were 
 forgotten. On the 20th September, 1849, the Neapolitan 
 minister replied to the British government, when they re- 
 minded him of the ancient incontestable rights of the Sicilians, 
 that " Sicily enjoys perfect tranquillity, and the inhabitants are 
 happy to have returned to the protection of their legitimate 
 sovereign." 
 
 From this date, for a period of eleven years, no further 
 movements took place in Sicily. Settimo, La Farina, Crispi 
 and all the prominent insurgents went into exile until the 
 expedition of Garibaldi to Marsala in the year i860. 
 
 s. 1. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 NORTHERN ITALY, 1 849- 1 858. 
 
 (1) Vittorio Emanuele. 
 
 Few monarchs have ever mounted the throne in the midst 
 of greater difficulties than those which encircled Piedmont on 
 the accession of Vittorio Emanuele. It was a dark day of 
 shattered hopes and national disaster. Parliamentary insti- 
 tutions were new and untried : the prestige of the monarchy 
 was shaken : the enemy was at the gates : the army was 
 demoralised, and the public funds exhausted. But the courage 
 and firmness of the young King, tried in so fiery a furnace, 
 proved themselves adequate to the task. On the 27th of 
 March, 1849, Vittorio Emanuele published his first pro- 
 clamation. It was written by himself and slightly modified 
 by Carlo Cadorna. It contained in the following words the 
 pledge to continue the work so disastrously begun by Carlo 
 Alberto. "Now our endeavour must be to maintain our 
 honour untarnished, to heal the wounds of public fortune, and 
 to consolidate our constitution. In this endeavour, I beg 
 the help of my people. I am prepared to give my solemn 
 oath, and in response I expect from the nation assistance, 
 affection and confidence." But this was not enough; the 
 public faith was too rudely shaken by the incompetence and 
 hesitations of the monarchy to be able to give ready credence 
 to the word of the King. At a review of the National Guard 
 
Chap, xi.] NortJiem Italy, 1849- 1858. 2 43 
 
 of Turin held shortly after the issuing of this proclamation, the 
 King was made to feel the distrust of the nation by the icy 
 coldness of his reception. Returning to the palace he com- 
 plained, with tears in his eyes, that he was unkindly judged. 
 The reception by the Chamber of Deputies that night was 
 still worse. When Pinelli read the conditions of the armistice, 
 amidst loud interruptions, aimed especially at the articles 
 relating to the occupation of Alessandria and the abandonment 
 of Venice, there were cries of " No, no "; " Never "; " It would 
 be vile " ; " Piedmont would be disgraced "; " Rather war to the 
 death"; and so forth. 
 
 The ministers calmly stated that they were waiting for the 
 report of Chrzanowsky on the condition of the army, and 
 ineffectually protested against the violence of the chamber. 
 On the proposal of Giovanni Lanza, the chamber voted that 
 " the armistice is unconstitutional and the ministry cannot put 
 it into execution without violating the Constitution." On the 
 proposal of Justi the assembly declared itself permanent, 
 appointed a commission to announce to the King that the 
 chamber demanded news of the progress of the war, and voted 
 as follows ; " The chamber not being able to sacrifice the 
 nation, invites the government to concentrate its forces at 
 Alessandria, and, having declared the country in danger, to 
 convoke at Genoa all the men fit to carry arms." Another 
 resolution declared that " If the ministry shall permit the entry 
 of the Austrian forces into Alessandria, or shall recall the 
 squadron from the Adriatic before the armistice is approved, 
 it shall be declared guilty of the crime of high treason." And 
 finally, in reference to the retirement of Carlo Alberto, it 
 called, on the proposal of Ceppi, for the immediate presen- 
 tation of the act of abdication. These resolutions were passed 
 with great disorder, amid expressions of contempt directed 
 against the ministry by the public present at the discussions. 
 The manner in which the reading of the armistice was received 
 by the chamber caused the King to weep bitterly. 
 
 16 — 2 
 
244 Ital y> [Chap. 
 
 In this confusion of purposes and collision of interests, the 
 King, depressed by the hostility of the radical party and the 
 lukewarmness of the Conservatives, with Genoa in insurrection 
 and the Austrians holding the keys of Piedmont, exercised 
 that resolution which was his dominant trait. Perceiving 
 that in the disposition of the Parliament nothing deliberate 
 and useful could be hoped for from it, he made up his mind 
 to dissolve the chamber, and to appeal afresh to the nation. 
 In Italy, then as now, in moments of vital decision, the 
 elective body has generally proved an embarrassment to 
 prudent government, and the perception of this fact was the 
 first proof not alone of the King's political acumen but of 
 his civic courage. On this occasion the country at large 
 recognized the wisdom and prudence of the King, and, with 
 no more excitement than was natural on the election of a new 
 chamber, accepted his decision. 
 
 Good authorities state that Radetzky offered better con- 
 ditions to the King if he would revoke the constitution. In 
 fact the government of Vienna was more anxious to check 
 the progress of liberalism than to defeat Piedmont, and the 
 importance of the crisis lay in the question whether this 
 concession to constitutional liberty should be preserved or 
 sacrificed. To support this pretension of Austria there were 
 some amongst those about Vittorio Emanuele who were 
 inclined to anticipate danger in the extension of liberty. But 
 the King, as we can see clearly by his subsequent political 
 conduct, understood the full importance of maintaining this 
 beginning of liberty, especially as justifying the claim of 
 Piedmont to the headship of a future Italy. Everywhere else 
 in the peninsula absolutism had triumphed. The Bourbon 
 restoration in Naples and Sicily; the return of the Papal 
 domination in Rome ; the principalities restored to their rulers 
 under Austrian protection ; despotic tendencies strengthened 
 even in Tuscany, the most liberal of all the Italian states ; and 
 Lombardy and Venice subjected anew to the full rigour of 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-185 8. 245 
 
 Austrian rule — all this left the future of constitutionalism in Italy 
 depending solely on its preservation in Piedmont. " Vittorio 
 Emanuele understood that his interest and honour were 
 combined in the maintenance of the constitution. Liberty 
 had disappeared from the rest of Italy, but such eclipses are 
 only temporary. Was it not evident that on the day on which 
 the peninsula should awaken from its degradation, she would 
 turn toward the only Italian people among whom was to be 
 found a liberal constitution under the tricolour of indepen- 
 dence?" (Sorin.) 
 
 On the 30th of March, 1849, the King took the oath to the 
 constitution before the parliament at Turin. The oath ran as 
 follows : " In the presence of God I swear loyally to observe 
 the constitution ; to exercise the royal authority only in virtue 
 of the law and in accordance with the law ; to render justice 
 to everyone according to his full and entire right, and to act 
 in all things on behalf of the interests, prosperity and honour 
 of the nation." To this he added the words : — " In taking the 
 reins of government in the present circumstances, of which, 
 more than anybody else, I feel the immense gravity and the 
 bitterness, I have given the nation to understand what are the 
 tendencies of my mind. The establishment of our national 
 institutions, the safety and the honour of our common country, 
 will be the continual object of my thoughts, and with the 
 constant aid of Providence and with your help I hope to be 
 able to accomplish this purpose. It is only through being 
 profoundly penetrated with the gravity of my duties that I 
 have been supported in the solemn act of taking before you 
 the oath which must guide my life." 
 
 In Genoa, on the other hand, the democracy did not limit 
 its protests to legal measures, but broke out in an armed 
 rebellion, not excited by differences as to questions of the 
 form of government but by a national amour propre, ignorant 
 and belated, if sound in its origin. Immediately after Novara, 
 Genoa had sent a deputation to Turin, offering to receive the 
 
246 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Parliament there, and urging the continuation of the war, and 
 a fresh appeal to the people. The reception of this deputation 
 by Pinelli, instead of by the King, produced a very unfavour- 
 able impression. At Genoa the clubs controlled everything. 
 On the night of the 27th of March, Genoa was excited by the 
 rumour that the Austrians were at Ponte Decimo and intended 
 to enter the city. The municipality distributed arms to the 
 people ; the clergy and the syndic invited the citizens to bury 
 themselves under the ruins of the city rather than to yield. 
 The population collected in the Piazza San Domenico, and 
 called for arms. A committee of defence was formed, together 
 with another for public security, composed of Constantino 
 Rata, David Morchio and Avezzana. 
 
 In this popular uprising the ancient character of the inde- 
 pendent people of Genoa came to the front. There was in it 
 neither republicanism — as some writers have supposed — nor 
 separatism, the ambition for the restoration of the old State 
 of Genoa. The feeling which pervaded all classes, and united 
 the Genoese republican and the Mazzinian with the partizans of 
 the Piedmontese monarchy, was common detestation of Austria 
 and common desire for independence. It was probably the 
 greater activity of the republicans, rather than their repre- 
 sentative quality, which led to their incidental prominence in 
 these disorders. Morchio and Avezzana were well-known 
 republicans. 
 
 All those who knew Morchio rendered justice to the 
 honesty of his character, and during his rule he neither 
 executed nor imprisoned anyone except the General-intendant 
 Faruto, whom he held as a hostage. Avezzana, chief of the 
 staff of the National Guard, placed himself at the head of the 
 agitation with a battalion of the artillery of the Guard, and on 
 his own responsibility, unrecognized by any authority, even 
 municipal, but aided by some of the most energetic of the 
 young Genoese, he armed six hundred porters whom they had 
 organized. On the 1st of April this force attacked the arsenal, 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1 849-1 858. 247 
 
 and, with the aid of the National Guard, captured it. In it 
 there were found fifteen to twenty thousand muskets. At the 
 same time General di Asarta, a Genoese veteran, commanding 
 the division of Genoa, gave up to the insurgents the forts 
 of Sperone and Bigatto, and on the 2nd of April consented to 
 evacuate all the fortifications held by his force of twelve 
 battalions of artillery and carabineers. The capitulation con- 
 tained this agreement : " Genoa shall rest unalterably united 
 to Piedmont." The people murdered the policeman Penco 
 and the major of the carabineers, Count Seppi di Bierolo, who 
 had gone out in civil dress, and dragged his body through the 
 streets. The agitation, arising mainly from the febrile and 
 irrational excitement which occasionally overpowers masses of 
 undisciplined men, in this case embittered by the offended 
 dignity of an ancient state and by animosity towards Austria, 
 rapidly became a sort of insanity. In order to prepare for war 
 against Austria, the insurgents demanded the expulsion of the 
 Piedmontese soldiers and the calling in of the Lombard volun- 
 teers who were quartered at Tortona, Valenza and Voghera, and 
 who showed a disposition to join the Genoese movement. 
 
 The hope of any favourable result from this campaign of 
 desperate patriotic amour propre was too slight to weigh with 
 practical minds, but the danger of a renewal of the conflict 
 with Austria was such as to make the suppression of the 
 Genoese movement, in spite of its patriotism, imperative upon 
 the Piedmontese government. The revolutionary elements 
 from other parts of Italy rallied at Genoa. Nino Bixio and 
 Mameli came from Rome, and Montanelli from Tuscany, with 
 volunteers to strengthen the movement. Under the urgent 
 pressure of this danger, General La Marmora acted energeti- 
 cally. Marching with his division rapidly on Genoa, on the 
 3rd of April he surprised the forts on the side of the Polcevera, 
 took by a coup de t?iain the redoubt of Belvedere, and with 
 little resistance occupied one section after another of the 
 fortifications. On the 5 th of April, after a short bombardment, 
 
248 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 he assaulted the city in three columns. On the 6th, an 
 armistice was signed, and Genoa submitted, with a loss on the 
 part of the Piedmontese of fifty dead and two hundred 
 wounded — a slight loss considering the magnitude of the 
 operations. A notable feature of this affair was the partici- 
 pation of a British man-of-war, which threatened to fire on 
 the Genoese batteries if the project of releasing and arming 
 the galley prisoners was carried out. Finally the crew aided 
 in the restoration of order by taking possession of the battery 
 on the Old Mole. The capture of the city was followed by 
 abuses and excesses which must have heightened the animosity 
 of the Genoese toward Piedmont j for these La Marmora must 
 be held responsible. 
 
 The trial of General Ramorino, who, at the battle of 
 Novara, had disobeyed his orders and permitted the Austrians 
 to gain an advantage which possibly decided the fate of the 
 day, supplied a vent for the national indignation, which made 
 him a scapegoat for the disastrous termination of the war. He 
 was found guilty, and on the 22nd of May was shot, not as a 
 traitor, but for having disobeyed orders. 
 
 Meanwhile the chamber had been dissolved, and a new 
 ministry formed, under Massimo d'Azeglio, whose influence 
 with the late King had been so great two years before. The 
 elections to the new chamber took place in July, in the midst 
 of general tranquillity. The chamber discussed the definite 
 treaty of peace, which had been signed on the 6th of August. 
 This treaty, after long negotiations, during which the British 
 government had applied strong moral pressure on Austria in 
 favour of Piedmont, had been concluded on terms more 
 favourable to the latter than could have been expected. A 
 considerable pecuniary indemnity was exacted from the de- 
 feated state, but Piedmont was not forced to cede any territory. 
 Adjourning until the 15th of November, the chamber then 
 resumed its sittings and discussed the report of the committee 
 on the treaty of peace. The report violently censured the 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-1858. 249 
 
 treaty. The debate was conducted with great acerbity, and an 
 order of the day, declining to discuss the treaty until provision 
 should be made for conferring on Lombard immigrants the 
 right of citizenship, was offered by Carlo Cadorna and passed 
 by a small majority. This order of the day was accepted by 
 seventy-two votes against sixty, and its adoption was sub- 
 stantially equivalent to the rejection of the treaty of peace. 
 The chamber was dissolved, and the elections to a new one 
 were appointed for the 9th of December. 
 
 In preparation for the opening of the newly- elected 
 Chamber of Deputies, the King issued a proclamation at 
 Moncalieri, which ran as follows : " I have concluded a treaty 
 with Austria, honourable and not ruinous ; the welfare of the 
 state demanded it ; the honour of the country and the obliga- 
 tion of my oath demanded that at the same time it should be 
 faithfully executed without any hypocrisy and without cavilling. 
 My ministers demanded the consent of the chamber, which in 
 reply imposed a condition that I cannot accept, because it 
 destroys the reciprocal independence of the three powers and 
 so violates the constitution. By the dissolution of the Chamber 
 of Deputies the liberties of the country encountered no risk. 
 They are safeguarded by the venerable memory of King Carlo 
 Alberto, my father; they are entrusted to the honour of the 
 House of Savoy ; they are protected by the sacredness of my 
 oath ; and who should dare to entertain a fear of their sup- 
 pression?" The proclamation concluded: "I have sworn to 
 maintain justice and liberty according to the rights of every 
 man ; I have promised to save the nation from the tyranny of 
 parties, whatever their name, their purpose, or the rank of the 
 men who compose them. In fulfilment of these promises and 
 out of respect for these oaths, I dissolved a chamber which had 
 become impracticable, and I again fulfilled them by convoking 
 another immediately ; but if the country and the electors deny 
 me their assistance, the responsibility of the future will not fall 
 upon me, and in the disorders which may arise they will not 
 
250 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 have to complain of me, but of themselves. If I believe it my 
 duty on this occasion to speak with severity, I trust that the 
 public sense of justice will recognize that I was moved by a 
 profound love for my people and for their real good, and that 
 they will see I am actuated by a firm determination to maintain 
 their liberty and to defend them from foreign as well as 
 domestic enemies. Never hitherto has the House of Savoy 
 appealed in vain to the loyalty, the good sense and the love of 
 its people ; it has, then, the right to confide in them on the 
 present occasion, and to feel assured that they will combine to 
 save the constitution and the country from the dangers which 
 menace it." 
 
 The last sentences of this proclamation seemed, in the days 
 of undefined political rights, rather a threat of absolutism than 
 a constitutional decision, and they were for a long time em- 
 ployed by the extreme Liberals as a reproach against the King, 
 and the ministry which supported him. But in later times the 
 proclamation of Moncalieri has been regarded as a proper 
 assertion of the legitimate rights of the head of the state 
 against the disorganizing and dissolving tendency of factional 
 politics. It had the eventual result of establishing the authority 
 of the King on an unexceptionable basis. This assertion of the 
 prerogative of the Crown has in some of the later crises in 
 Italy been invoked as an example to be followed by Vittorio 
 Emmanuele's successor, in whose hands the party of order 
 consider the royal authority to be dangerously weak. 
 
 The elections of December, 1849, resulted in strengthen- 
 ing the groups of the Right and the Right Centre and in the 
 reduction of the Left to about thirty votes. We may safely 
 recognize in this the effect of the Moncalieri proclamation, and 
 of the acknowledged necessity that the agitations against a 
 peaceful conclusion with Austria should be put an end to at any 
 cost. The King was received at the opening of parliament with 
 acclamation. The government candidates for offices in the 
 chambers were elected, and on the 9th of January, 1850, the 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849- 1858. 251 
 
 treaty was approved by one hundred and twelve votes against 
 seventeen. In this manner a close was put to an agitation 
 probably more dangerous to the constitution than any of those 
 which have occurred since the beginning of the movement for 
 constitutional rights. For some time afterwards ministers and 
 deputies were occupied in the discussion of measures for 
 completing the organization of the state. 
 
 One of the earliest declarations of the new government led 
 to a conflict with Rome. The Pope had returned to the 
 Vatican under the influence of the most despotic reaction, and 
 in his relations with the other Italian states he claimed to 
 retain all the mediaeval privileges to which he had ever pre- 
 tended. The " Foro Ecclesiastico," or ecclesiastical tribunal, 
 possessed sole jurisdiction over the clergy, besides extensive 
 control over laymen. The Church still maintained the right 
 of sanctuary : the Jesuits ruled education, and no house was 
 free from their inquisitional search. In February, 1850, 
 Count Siccardi, on behalf of the government, brought in a Bill 
 to put an end to these obsolete claims, and in the debates on 
 this Bill was heard, for the first time, the authoritative declara- 
 tion of the Italian policy towards the Church in Cavour's 
 famous dictum, "A free Church in a free State." The law 
 passed in spite of clerical opposition. The Archbishop of 
 Turin incited the ecclesiastical authorities to rebellion against 
 it. He was condemned by the tribunal to two months' im- 
 prisonment and escaped to France. A few days later the 
 Minister of Commerce, Santarosa, fell ill with a mortal malady, 
 and on his manifesting a desire to receive the sacrament in his 
 last moments, the clergy refused to accord the sacrament 
 unless he confessed his repentance for the part he had taken 
 in carrying the law. This Santarosa refused to do, and died 
 without absolution. The people of Turin manifested their 
 admiration for his moral and civic courage by giving him a 
 splendid funeral. 
 
252 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 (2) Cavour. 
 
 The death of Santarosa had one very important result : it 
 gave an opportunity for the admission of Camillo Cavour into 
 the ministry. Cavour, who from this time forward till his 
 death was the leading figure in Italian politics, was born in 
 1 810 at Turin. He belonged to an old and noble Piedmontese 
 family, had been educated in the military academy at Turin, 
 and served in the household of Carlo Alberto while he was 
 still Prince of Carignano. At twenty-two, being then a sub- 
 lieutenant in the Engineers, he was guilty of a manifestation of 
 liberal principles which brought him under military discipline, 
 whereupon he resigned, leaving the army and retiring to his 
 estate near Vercelli, where he devoted himself to agriculture 
 and the study of the practical and severe elements of state- 
 craft. He paid especial attention to English politics, made 
 more than one visit to England, and conceived a great ad- 
 miration for the Free-trade policy of Sir Robert Peel. Shortly 
 before the outbreak of 1848 he founded, in conjunction with 
 Balbo, D'Azeglio and other reformers, a journal named the 
 Rtsorgtmento, which had great influence on public opinion in 
 the crisis that followed. In the Parliament summoned in 
 accordance with the "statuto" or constitution (1848), he sat as 
 member for Turin, and vigorously supported the government of 
 D'Azeglic, both in its liberal measures and in its maintenance 
 of the royal authority. 
 
 He entered the Ministry with the condition that the minister 
 Cristoforo Mameli, a timid, narrow-minded man who was 
 opposed to the liberalization of the constitution, should be 
 dismissed, and in fact, a month later, Mameli gave up his post 
 to Pietro Gioia of Piacenza. The first act of Cavour, as 
 minister of agriculture, was to issue a circular to the Syndics 
 abolishing the official regulation of the price of bread in the 
 communes, — an indication of his opinions on free-trade. On 
 the 19th of April, 185 1, Cavour took the portfolio of finance. 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1 849-1 858. 253 
 
 In May 1851 he arranged the new convention with France, 
 and he concluded a new treaty of commerce in February 1852. 
 With great foresight he at the same time commenced the 
 reorganization of the State even in departments with which he 
 had directly nothing to do. Loans were negotiated, taxes 
 were increased, and railways were pushed forward in spite of 
 opposition which would have daunted a man of more timid 
 constitution. In order to strengthen the hold of Piedmont 
 on the adjoining provinces of Italy, Cavour arranged to 
 introduce into the ministry Luigi Carlo Farini, one of the 
 exiles from central Italy — a nomination of characteristic bold- 
 ness, inasmuch as Farini was not a Piedmontese even by 
 adoption, and did not possess the rights of a citizen. In 
 1852 the taxes were raised on the proposition of Cavour, the 
 increase being from four to tvvelve per cent, on the previous 
 taxes on furniture, servants and horses ; the customs duties 
 were also increased. 
 
 The reforming tendencies of the new government were not 
 favourably regarded by the reactionary party in France, and 
 were condemned in a more outspoken way by the Cabinets of 
 Berlin and Vienna. Napoleon, who by the coup d'etat of 
 December, 185 1, had made himself master of France, gave the 
 Piedmontese government to understand that he desired in his 
 neighbours a corresponding tendency. There were, among 
 the contemporaries of Cavour, some who sympathized with the 
 absolutist views of Napoleon; and even reformers like D'Azeglio, 
 Bersezio, and Menabrea responded by an attempt to carry 
 laws for the restriction of public liberty, and for regulating the 
 press and the elections in a sense according with the views of 
 Louis Napoleon. The King, on the contrary, determined to 
 be master in his own house, and in a confidential dispatch 
 to the ministers in London and Paris, dated the 10th of 
 December, 1851, declared himself resolutely opposed to the 
 suggestions from Vienna and Berlin, viz., that he should 
 modify the constitution of Piedmont so as to bring it into 
 
254 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 accordance with those of the states which adjoined him in 
 Italy. The dispatch said : " The sovereigns of Austria and 
 Prussia have indirectly, though respectfully, given the King 
 our august sovereign to understand that they advise him to 
 adopt, in the direction of his government, a tone in harmony 
 with that which is followed in the other Italian states, intimating 
 under the form of an apparent menace, that otherwise he 
 might have to repent of his persistence in following his present 
 political system." The dispatch continued : "His Majesty has 
 not been able to avoid replying with the observation that the 
 political condition of the states ruled by the two sovereigns 
 who have given him this intimation, seems to him to indicate 
 much more the need of advice, than their right to offer it to 
 others"; and it concluded that as the King did not meddle 
 with anything that other sovereigns saw fit to do, he desired 
 on his part the same freedom of action. This circular, appear- 
 ing immediately after the Napoleonic coup d'etat, displayed 
 in their best light the courage and independence of him 
 who was to become the first King of Italy. 
 
 Shortly after these incidents Cavour arranged to make an 
 open declaration in parliament of his determination to abandon 
 the old Conservative party to which he had belonged on his 
 entry into politics, for the more liberal system in which 
 the rest of his life was passed. The "Connubio," as this 
 combination between Cavour and the Liberals was called, was 
 finally and formally arranged between Cavour, Rattazzi and 
 Buffa, and their programme was formulated in the following 
 words : " Monarchy, the Constitution, independence, civil and 
 political progress." In this combination the men of the Left 
 bound themselves to abandon the extremes of their party, and 
 those who had belonged to the clerical party agreed, on their 
 part, to approach the Liberals, and by their fusion to found 
 a distinct political organization. An occasion for the declara- 
 tion of this policy in Parliament was found in the discussion 
 of the law on the press. 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849- 185 8. 2 55 
 
 The question has been raised whether Cavour, at that time 
 minister of the finances in the ministry of D'Azeglio, — in 
 some respects a Conservative,— could loyally conspire, while 
 remaining in the ministry, with men who professed opinions 
 contrary to those of his colleagues. Should he not have 
 resigned office before adopting a policy which involved their 
 fall? The question is a somewhat academical one: Cavour' s 
 action was at all events courageous, and led eventually to the 
 formation of a ministry on liberal principles. 
 
 The occasion for the rupture was not long in coming. On 
 the 15th of April, 1852, Pinelli, President of the Chamber, 
 died, and the election of the new president developed the 
 differences between D'Azeglio, President of the Council, and 
 Cavour. The latter supported Rattazzi, and the former 
 Boncompagni. Rattazzi was elected by seventy-four against 
 fifty. A rupture between D'Azeglio and Cavour speedily 
 followed. At a dinner at the house of D'Azeglio, Cavour 
 jokingly introduced the subject of the antipathy of D'Azeglio 
 for Rattazzi, on which the President of the Council exclaimed 
 with energy, " I do not want to know anything about Rattazzi." 
 Cavour made no reply but turned red with rage, sprang from 
 his seat, raised his plate and threw it down savagely on the 
 ground, breaking it into a thousand pieces; then, with his 
 hands in his hair, fled from the room shouting like a madman 
 to La Marmora, who followed without being able to overtake 
 him, "He is a beast, he is a beast!" On another occasion, 
 after the election of Rattazzi, D'Azeglio having in the council 
 of ministers requested his colleagues henceforward to behave 
 openly and loyally, Cavour replied that he would have done 
 better to moderate the anger of Galvagno towards the " Con- 
 nubio." D'Azeglio replied that he had no faith in the political 
 capacity of Rattazzi. Cavour, beside himself with indignation, 
 declared that he was tired of being suspected by his col- 
 leagues, offered his resignation and immediately quitted the 
 room without saluting any of his colleagues. Thereupon the 
 
256 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 ministry resigned, and D'Azeglio, in a letter to the King, 
 declined to form another. The King, however insisted, and 
 the ministry was formed with the exclusion of Cavour and 
 Farini. Thus began the antagonism between Cavour and 
 the Conservatives, which became the chronic condition of 
 Piedmontese politics. 
 
 Cavour for a time retired from politics and went abroad, 
 visiting France and England, as much to study foreign political 
 conditions, perhaps, as to withdraw himself from all contact 
 with the present conduct of government. The difficulties of 
 the time were too much for the timid and exhausted D'Azeglio, 
 and the King was ultimately compelled, even against his own 
 desire, to accept a new ministry. Cavour replied to the first 
 overtures by a refusal : the conduct of the government 
 toward the Pope had been too obsequious to satisfy his 
 progressive principles, and on the question of concessions to 
 the pretensions of the Vatican the discord was complete. 
 The King, with all his independence, was influenced by his 
 mother and his wife — two women who, with all their virtues, 
 were notoriously subject to clerical pressure. But in the end, 
 there being no combination to satisfy the royal tendencies, 
 Cavour was called in to form a government without the 
 stipulation of any conditions. On the 4th of November, 
 1852, this ministry, since known as the "Great Ministry," was 
 definitely formed ; Cavour being Minister of Finance and 
 President of the Council, and Rattazzi being Minister of the 
 Interior. 
 
 Cavour's leadership of the government gave a great impulse 
 to reform, especially in a financial and economical direction. 
 The finances were in disorder, the interest on the national 
 debt had increased six-fold since 1847, trade was small, and 
 communication very defective. But the country possessed 
 considerable natural resources, and Cavour set to work to 
 develope them. He concluded advantageous commercial 
 treaties with Great Britain, France and other countries : he 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-1858. 257 
 
 reformed the tariff in a free-trade direction : he promoted 
 railways, and initiated the great project of a tunnel under the 
 Mont Cenis. At the same time, the ecclesiastical legislation 
 of Siccardi was pushed further : civil marriage was legalised, 
 and the clergy were made fully amenable to the tribunals of 
 the State : the mendicant orders were suppressed, and lay 
 education encouraged. Under the guidance of La Marmora, 
 the organization of the army was reformed. Meanwhile, the 
 constitution of 1848 was strictly observed, in letter and in 
 spirit, for one of Cavour's greatest distinctions, and one in 
 which he contrasts favourably with his great contemporary, 
 Prince Bismarck, is his loyal adhesion to the best principles 
 of parliamentary government. The conviction of this loyalty 
 grew upon his countrymen, and enabled him, in the general 
 election of 1853, to carry the day against the extreme members 
 of both the reactionary and the democratic parties. With his 
 hands thus strengthened, Cavour could now proceed to claim 
 for Piedmont a place in the councils of Europe — a place which, 
 he foresaw, would furnish him with a favourable basis for 
 pushing forward the work of his heart, the reunion of Italy. 
 The year 1854 brought the opportunity of Piedmont, so 
 long desired, to assume its place as an independent member 
 of the European system. The alliance of Piedmont with 
 France and England for the Crimean War was led up to by 
 various overtures of Napoleon in different senses, especially by 
 declarations of friendly intentions with regard to the liberation 
 of Italy; but the negotiations for this Triple Alliance were 
 complicated by numerous antagonistic interests : — the conflict 
 between Piedmont and Austria was still only suspended, and 
 Cavour, apprehending that Austria, if she entered into the 
 alliance against Russia, would demand concessions which 
 might seriously compromise the interests of Piedmont, imposed 
 conditions which protected those interests. The vacillating 
 attitude of Austria increased the difficulties of the situation, 
 particularly for Piedmont. England and France, in wishing 
 
 s. 1. 17 
 
258 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 that Piedmont should enter into the alliance, were actuated by 
 entirely different motives. In the opinion of Cavour, England 
 desired simply to substitute Italian soldiers for English ; 
 France, on the other hand, desired to encourage Austria to 
 take a hand in the war against Russia by assuring her of the 
 friendly attitude of Piedmont on the frontier of Lombardy. 
 
 The Piedmontese government saw with pleasure a European 
 struggle which might permit Piedmont to take the position in 
 Europe which it desired, though at the same time it might 
 interfere with the acquisition of the Italian provinces of Austria. 
 The King and Cavour had always entertained strong views 
 in favour of participation, but the conditions proposed by 
 Cavour's colleagues hindered the King from accepting the 
 proposals of the allied Powers. The Moniteur, on the 22 nd 
 of February, 1854, published a declaration that, if and when 
 Austria should associate herself with the treaty of London 
 (November 1853) against Russia, France and England would 
 guarantee her Italian provinces and defend them against all 
 external attack. This is easy to understand. It was important 
 for France and England to have the aid of Austria, and if they 
 negotiated with Piedmont, it was not for the sake of the 
 strength to be derived from its cooperation, but only to 
 prevent Austria from declining their alliance on the pretext 
 of danger from Italy. But Austria, embarrassed, on the one 
 hand, by her connexion with Russia, which had saved her in 
 1849, and on the other, by her own interests, which led her 
 to desire the security of the Ottoman Empire, combined with 
 some territorial concessions, actually used this pretext, and, in 
 order to secure herself against Piedmont, demanded as a 
 condition the consent of France and England to the occu- 
 pation of Alessandria. The negotiations for such. concession 
 failed, owing to the definite refusal of Piedmont. It was 
 impossible that the King should make any concession allowing 
 Austria, even temporarily, to set foot upon his territory. 
 
 The negotiations accordingly dragged on, and Austria by 
 
xi.] NortJiem Italy, 1849- 185 8. 259 
 
 her indecision postponed the definite accession of Piedmont for 
 some months. Cavour, however, was keenly alive to the 
 danger that the western powers, in order to gain the assistance 
 of Austria, would give pledges of a nature prejudicial to the 
 further progress of Piedmont. The vague engagements entered 
 into by the Cabinet of Vienna in December 1854, quickened 
 his anxiety and made him resolve to anticipate Austria by 
 joining the league without any conditions at all. On the 8th 
 of January, 1855, tne King declared to Grammont his firm 
 decision to participate in the Crimean War without any con- 
 dition at all. The final decision involved a modification of 
 the ministry. On the 10th of January the minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, Dabormida, resigned, and Cavour took his place. On 
 the same day, he signed the protocol adhering to the military 
 convention, the only condition being a guarantee of the 
 integrity of the states of the kingdom of Sardinia, which 
 France and England obliged themselves to defend from all 
 attacks during the war. 
 
 (3) The Crimean War. 
 
 The conclusion of the treaty between Italy, France and 
 England, for combined action in the war against Russia, 
 strained both the popularity of Count Cavour and the au- 
 thority of the King. Combated by the Left and the revo- 
 lutionary party, still under the influence of the exiles, the war 
 was denounced as anti-liberal and opposed to Italian pre- 
 cedents, which were more in accordance with hostility against 
 Turkey, if participation there must be. The influence of the 
 great minister over the more Conservative elements, aided by 
 the sound common-sense of the King, at length prevailed, and 
 the treaty was confirmed in the Chamber of Deputies on the 
 10th of February, 1855, by a vote of one hundred and one 
 ayes to sixty noes. The majority was, however, only ninety-five 
 to sixty-four in secret ballot, a difference which indicates that 
 
 17—2 
 
260 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the opposition was stronger than it dared to show itself, and 
 that considerable pressure had been applied to the deputies 
 to induce them to follow the government. The vote in the 
 Senate was fifty-two in favour and twenty-seven against; a 
 majority rather due to respect for the King and the govern- 
 ment than to the perception of any advantage to be derived 
 by Piedmont from the alliance. It was to the wise prevision 
 of Cavour, subsequently recognised by the public, and to the 
 association of the kingdom in the action of the two leading 
 European governments that the admission of Piedmont to 
 the position of an European power was due. 
 
 In April, 1855, the Piedmontese army, 17,767 men, with 
 4,464 horses and 36 guns, sailed for the Crimea. The original 
 intention had been to place it under the command of the King's 
 brother, the Duke of Genoa, but his death having occurred 
 during the negotiations, the Minister of War, Alfonso La 
 Marmora, took the command. The experience of 1848-9 
 and the practical sense of the King and of Cavour had taught 
 the necessity of organisation; and the little army proved, by 
 its admirable discipline and by the efficient part it took in 
 several actions, especially in that of the Tchernaya, that 
 Piedmont could be counted on as a military power, thus 
 effacing the disastrous impressions of the war against Austria. 
 The sacrifices which the kingdom was called upon to make 
 were compensated by the position which Piedmont assumed 
 in Europe, while they gave it a right to a place in the councils 
 of the powers, which had long been the hope of Cavour. 
 
 Prior even to the commencement of the negotiations for 
 the treaty of peace, Cavour had arranged the programme of 
 a visit to be made by the King to the western powers. 
 Accompanied by Cavour and Massimo d'Azeglio, Vittorio 
 Emmanuele visited Paris and London in December, 1855, 
 preparing the ground for the later diplomatic action which 
 should secure the recognition of Piedmont. When, a little 
 later, the war had ended, and the Congress of Paris assembled, 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849- 185 8. 26r 
 
 early in 1856, the new power was admitted as a full member 
 of the European concert. The obstinate resistance of Austria 
 to the admission of Piedmont to a seat and a vote in the 
 Congress, on the ground that her importance did not justify 
 her presence in the councils of the great powers, was a 
 proof at once of the value of this admission and of the wisdom 
 of Cavour. The opposition was overruled, having been an- 
 ticipated and provided for in the negotiations which preceded 
 the Congress, during the visit of the King to the western 
 powers. 
 
 yln the discussions on the treaty of peace Cavour took 
 a dignified and decided part, without attempting to exert an 
 undue influence, and he succeeded in winning the esteem of 
 Russia, as well as that of the western powers. His oppor- 
 tunity came later, when the French plenipotentiary, Count 
 Walewski, acting under the directions of the Emperor, opened 
 a discussion on various subjects of general interest, among 
 which the condition of Italy was far the most important. 
 Cavour had carefully prepared the way for this discussion, by 
 establishing a good understanding on the subject with France 
 and Great Britain. He was thus enabled to call attention, in 
 the most efficient way, before the representatives of united 
 Europe, to what he justly called the utterly abnormal state 
 of Italy, to the oppression of Lombardy and Venice, to the 
 occupation by Austria of the Legations, to the horrible mis- 
 government of Naples and Sicily. Lord Clarendon, the British 
 representative, energetically supported Cavour's appeal, and 
 no single power, except Austria, ventured to defend the existing 
 state of things. No definite resolution was come to, nor is it to 
 be supposed that Cavour expected one. He had succeeded in 
 his object: he had shown Europe that there was an Italian 
 question ; he had isolated Austria in public opinion ; and he 
 had put Piedmont forward as the champion of Italian liberty 
 and Italian nationality. Nothing in the career of the states- 
 man who was to be the chief maker of Italy shows his 
 
262 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 prophetic vision more clearly than his participation — so bitterly 
 opposed by the mass of his patriotic contemporaries — in the 
 Crimean War. 
 
 (4) Lombardy and Venice. 
 
 Meanwhile, in the Austrian provinces of Northern Italy, 
 foreign tyranny was rapidly destroying, by its own excesses, 
 any support which it might have received from the public 
 opinion of Europe. In those parts of Southern and Central 
 Italy where repeated failures discouraged in a less energetic 
 population any farther hopes of progress, the re-established 
 despotism had no cause for alarm. But in Venice and in 
 Lombardy the momentary gleams of liberty, acting on a more 
 resolute nature, intensified the conflict, and consequently made 
 the Austrian rule more rigorous and uncompromising than 
 before. The government at Vienna was not accustomed to 
 be conciliatory, nor had it in its multifarious dominion ever 
 found its way to the heart of any people whom it had 
 governed. The pervading presence of the military element, 
 by which alone Austria succeeded in keeping down the 
 Italian spirit, and the constant collisions provoked by its 
 arrogance, made life unendurable. Persecutions, military 
 courts, imprisonments and executions only served to intensify 
 the brutality of the soldiers and the animosity of the Italians. 
 Piedmont was always on the border, holding the Italian flag 
 in view and always renewing the hope of union with a kindred 
 people. The Austrians understood finally that conciliation 
 was impossible, and after 1849 the record of repression was 
 something which, as a system, had never been equalled in 
 any part of Europe except in the little known and obscure 
 legends of Russian Poland. The Austrian government re- 
 mained simply an army encamped in the midst of a hostile 
 people. 
 
 Radetzky writes to his daughter on the 4th of November, 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1 849-1 858. 263 
 
 1849 : " These Italians have never loved nor will they love the 
 Germans ; but, persuaded that they cannot liberate themselves 
 by force, they have surrendered, and we are avenged; and 
 that suffices." Don Enrico Tazzili, in a memorial written in 
 prison to explain why the Italians were discontented, sums up 
 their grievances as follows : " The difficulty of communication 
 between the different provinces and the necessity of travelling 
 always with passport in hand, which obstructs commerce and 
 thus impoverishes the country ; the poverty of the journalists, 
 harassed by a prying and ignorant censorship, worse even than 
 that of Vienna ; wretched journals ; a system of universal 
 espionage; the immoral arts of the police, who condescend 
 to denounce as spies those whom they cannot purchase — as 
 was done by the director of the Lombard police with Cesare 
 Cantu; the want of information about public affairs; the 
 obstacles placed in the way of all transactions connected with 
 property in the provinces and communes ; delays in the pro- 
 ceedings for the liquidation of state debts ; bad conscription 
 laws ; monopolies in favour of a few wealthy people; the enor- 
 mous price of salt ; criminal convictions without legal defence or 
 any other guarantees; the appointment by intrigue of numerous 
 German functionaries; a pedantic system of instruction and 
 the use of foreign books; no assurance for the recovery of 
 property, and the hindrance of any petitions to the sovereign." 
 Sforza Benvenuti says in his work on Crema and its 
 territory, "The Austrians having in 1849 increased taxation, 
 especially on the wealthy, those persons who had considerable 
 incomes and even those of moderate fortunes threw off that 
 indifference with which before 1848 they quietly paid their 
 tribute to Caesar without demanding by what right and from 
 what city they were governed." On the nth of November, 
 1848, a decree dated the 3rd of October was published, in 
 which the Lombards were accused of "being indifferent to 
 the mercy of his Majesty, as proved by the never-failing 
 clemency which he condescended to show to his rebellious 
 
264 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 subjects," and therefore were subjected to extraordinary taxa- 
 tion. A special tax was laid on all the members of the past 
 provisional governments and of the committees, as well as on 
 all who had played a leading part in the revolution or had 
 given it their active or moral support. 
 
 Francis Joseph, shortly after his accession to power, issued 
 a proclamation dated the 9th of March, 1849, by which he 
 promised a constitutional regime for Austria, but he retained 
 in Lombardy and Venice only military administration. This 
 administration weighed on the people with a severity such as had 
 never before been known in Italy. On the 7th of August, 1848, 
 on his entry into Milan, Prince Schwartzenberg warned all the 
 inhabitants to surrender all their arms and ammunition under 
 penalty of death. On the 19th of August two Mantuans were 
 shot outside the gates for having been found in possession of 
 arms, and on the 1st of September another for having been 
 discovered to have kept a gun in his house. In Monza, in 
 September, 1848, the Colonel in command ordered the land 
 agent of a proprietor and his son to be shot for the possession 
 of a gun. In Milan in September a butcher was shot for the 
 possession of a knife, and a crazy man who was going through 
 the exercises of military drill with a gun in the public street 
 was also shot. In every city of Lombardy and Venetia execu- 
 tions were frequent. Whoever was accused of fomenting 
 dissatisfaction in the army, and whoever was found in 
 possession of arms or ammunition of any sort, was tried by 
 a merciless court-martial. The prince of Lichtenstein at 
 Cremona, Wohlgemuth at Como, and the local commanders 
 in various cities and provinces, condemned and executed 
 whoever was found guilty of any of these offences, and 
 although the population was terrorized into quiet, the in- 
 evitable and natural consequence was the aggravation of the 
 hostility between the civic and military elements. Of course 
 in view of the failure of previous movements and in the 
 presence of the enormous military force of Austria, all hope 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849- 185 8. 265 
 
 of liberation by armed revolt had to be given up, while, at 
 the same time, more friendly relations between conquerors 
 and conquered were rendered impossible by the memory of 
 the thousands who had perished in the struggle. Thus the 
 only possible relation between Austria and Lombardy and 
 Venetia was that of jailor and captive. The detestation of 
 Austrian rule was manifested in every direction, even to the 
 extent of recklessly provoking persecution. No demonstrations 
 of confidence or devotion to Austria were made, or, if a few of 
 the sycophants of power attempted to conciliate their masters 
 by manifesting such feelings, popular vengeance settled the 
 account. At Cremona on the 28th of April, 1852, an Austrian 
 flag having been displayed in the public place, all the windows 
 opening on the square were closed and the theatre that night 
 was empty. 
 
 Austria seemed to have abandoned all idea of pacification. 
 The most fantastic and absurd punishments were inflicted not 
 only on individuals but on provinces. The fines imposed by 
 Radetzky in Milan in November, 1848, amounted to over 
 20,000,000 francs. Mantua was obliged to pay in a few 
 days 400,000 francs. Brescia, .under the orders of Haynau, 
 paid 90,000 francs for the province, 12,600 for the expenses 
 of trials and executions and because there had been found in 
 the communal palace some old military effects left there by the 
 Piedmontese at the cessation of hostilities. In January, 1849, a 
 decree was issued that each provincial deputation should elect 
 a representative to meet at Vienna. Not an individual went. 
 At Pavia the military authorities ordered the theatre to be 
 opened, and notified the public that, "if anybody by criminal 
 political obstinacy should persist in not frequenting the theatre, 
 such conduct should be regarded as the silent demonstration 
 of a criminal disposition which merited to be sought out 
 and punished." Haynau at Brescia notified the workmen 
 that if they did not attend the theatres they would be 
 considered as taking part in revolutionary demonstrations. 
 
266 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 The list of military condemnations and executions in the 
 year 1849 is interminable. Scarcely a city of Lombardy 
 escaped. To insult the troops, or even to fail in outward 
 respect towards them, was considered a capital crime. In 
 Monza, on the 4th of April, a tavern-keeper named Angelo 
 Previtali was shot for his insulting and threatening demeanour 
 towards the royal troops during a combat; and the meanest 
 Austrian commander was justified in summarily executing 
 anyone infringing one of the military decrees. 
 
 An incident which took place at Milan on the 18th of 
 August, 1849, is worth recounting as an example of the height 
 at which this military repression had arrived. A glove-maker, 
 who had decorated her windows on the occasion of the 
 Emperor's birthday with her apron ornamented with the 
 Austrian eagle, was hissed and howled at by a crowd which 
 was dispersed by the soldiers, while the glove-maker was up- 
 roariously applauded by the officers in the cafe* opposite. On 
 the 23rd of August punishment was meted out to those who 
 had taken part in this incident. On the ground of " scandalous 
 political demonstrations, insults to the imperial flag, injury and 
 insult to the soldiery, and offences against the forces employed 
 in preserving order, and for revolutionary cries," fifteen men 
 from different provinces were punished with from thirty to fifty 
 blows on the bare back, while Ernesta Galli of Cremona, a 
 woman twenty years old, was sentenced to forty blows, and 
 Maria Conti of Florence, seventeen years old, to thirty blows 
 " for having laughed during the transaction." The expenses of 
 these punishments were charged to the commune of Milan. On 
 the 9th of September, 1849, the provincial council of Milan 
 was dissolved for having delayed in making an address of 
 submission to his Majesty the Emperor, and the imperial 
 commissioner for the direction of civil affairs in Lombardy, 
 on the 20th of September, increased the land taxes in 
 Lombardy by fifty per cent. 
 
 On the 1 6th of October, 1849, the authorities at Vienna 
 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1 849-1 858. 267 
 
 established a system of government in the Italian provinces, 
 dividing them into two distinct kingdoms, each one presided 
 over by a Lieutenant. In Lombardy this was the Prince 
 Charles Schwartzenburg, a man of liberal and humane cha- 
 racter, honest, of good intentions, " the least a soldier and the 
 most a gentleman of all the lieutenants," but ignorant of the 
 language and therefore obliged to leave the administration in 
 the hands of the corrupt and arbitrary council. In Venetia the 
 Lieutenant appointed was Anton Puchner, whose merit was 
 that he had procured the support of Russia for the Austrian 
 operations in Transylvania during the Hungarian revolution. 
 At the end of this year Marshal Radetzky fixed the term of one 
 month for the return of all exiles who had not been indicated 
 as accomplices of the revolution, they being liable (on refusal 
 to return) to confiscation of all their goods and chattels. At 
 the same time Montecuccoli, the head of the civil adminis- 
 tration, issued a decree, levying an additional tax of six millions 
 a month on the communes of Lombardy and Venetia for the 
 maintenance of the army. The contributions and requisitions 
 for the years 1848 and 1849 were later capitalized in the sum 
 of ninety-two millions, or, according to Di Castro, one hundred 
 and twenty millions, and charged to the Monti di Pieta of 
 Lombardy and Venetia. Montecuccoli also imposed a forced 
 loan of a million and a half of francs on one hundred and fifty 
 bankers, merchants, and shopmen of Milan for the last three 
 months of 1848. At Cremona, Araldi Arizzo was taxed 
 300,000 francs, Carlo Albertini 80,000; and in Mantua in 185 1 
 the lawyers Rossetti and Predevalli 14,000 francs each. The 
 income-tax, which in 18 15 was fifteen centimes on every scudo 
 of value, in 1851 had risen to twenty-four centimes. 
 
 Throughout Lombardy in 1851 the population adopted 
 the tactics of abandoning all public entertainments, theatres and 
 spectacles, and avoiding all contact with the governing classes, 
 especially with the soldiers; and this system of passive resistance, 
 which before 1848 was exceptional, now became universal. 
 
268 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Taxes of different kinds and forced loans followed, with paper 
 money of forced circulation, and the pressure in 1851 had 
 reached such a point that from all these various reasons the 
 Milanese population recommenced the agitation for revolt 
 In Venice there was less pressure and less indignation, but the 
 general result differed but little. The secret committees 
 spread, and the influence of Mazzini increased. A committee 
 was formed, with Mantua as the centre, which, under the 
 pretext of establishing a journal, founded an organization 
 whose actual object was to prepare the means for another 
 insurrection. Its programme, drawn up by Don Enrico 
 Tazzoli, was as follows : — "A monarchical constitution how- 
 ever liberal, though under a good prince it might provide for 
 the well-being of a state, does not give the requisite guarantees 
 for the future, since the executive power has the faculty of 
 dissolving the National Guard, closing the Chamber, or of 
 forgetting, after the manner of the Austrians, to reopen it, or of 
 governing by royal decrees. It is necessary, therefore, to 
 make a coup d'etat difficult. The representation of the nation 
 ought not to be interrupted, and it is necessary to have a 
 force by which any duplicity of the executive power may be 
 met, otherwise the people will always be exposed to the 
 disagreeable necessity of a revolution. The example of 
 certain countries prospering under constitutional monarchy 
 proves nothing in favour of this manner of government. It 
 would not be difficult to show in this manner that the most 
 absolute government is the best, because some wise and good 
 prince made his absolute power the means of doing good to 
 his subjects. It is not necessary here to repeat the other 
 arguments in favour of the republic as the only practical 
 means of obtaining that triple boon, Liberty, Equality and 
 Fraternity, of giving encouragement to the hopes of all, and 
 supplying the stimulus which comes from universal activity 
 and morality. The committee then is in favour of the republic, 
 but in order not to offend the feelings of many good people it 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-18 5 8. 269 
 
 feels bound to study public opinion, proposing to do whatever 
 may be practicable to spread the love of the republic, under 
 the direction of the high-priest of liberty, Giuseppe Mazzini." 
 As a practical measure they proposed to surprise the fortresses. 
 The organization of the committee was practically the same 
 as that of the Hungarian revolutionists, the central committee 
 of fifteen being divided into three sections ; only the head 
 of each section corresponded with those of the other sections, 
 and every member had in relation with him five initiated 
 members, each one of whom had five more, all being 
 known only by numbers, indicating their functions and their 
 position in the organization. In this manner an arrest could 
 only extend to the affiliated members immediately below and 
 above. This committee in Mantua proposed to set up sub- 
 committees in every district of the province of Lombardy, each 
 of which should be another centre of operations; but in most of 
 the districts this was not put into practice. Mazzini directed 
 the operations from London. But in September, 185 1, as the 
 conspiracy began to take a more definite form, many persons 
 were arrested. Amongst these was one Pizzi, of Mantua, who 
 under torture disclosed the name of the person from whom he 
 had received instructions — Professor Bozio — and he in turn 
 betrayed Tazzoli. The latter had drawn up a register of the 
 committee, written in cryptograph, the key of which was a 
 canto from Dante and certain numbers. A letter of Tazzoli 
 betrayed Teresa Marchi, who was the custodian of the register, 
 and on her arrest this was discovered. Castellazzo, one of 
 those who possessed the key of the cipher, under torture 
 gave it to the Austrian authorities, and Tazzoli, having from 
 some inconceivable motive registered all the officials of the 
 secret societies with indications of the names of many affiliated, 
 and of the principal chiefs of the committees of Lombardy 
 and Venice, with which the central committee in Mantua was 
 in relation, the entire conspiracy fell into the hands of the 
 Austrians. Arrests in great number followed, including soldiers 
 
270 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and especially Hungarians, over whom the influence of Kossuth, 
 due to their mutual relations during the unsuccessful revolution 
 in Hungary, was very great. Military trials, arrests and the 
 usual consequences of conspiracy under Austrian rule followed. 
 On the 7th of December, 1852, five of the condemned con- 
 spirators were hanged. Thus the Mantuan insurrection was 
 nipped in the bud, with no profit to the liberties of Italy but 
 an increase of hostility between the population and the Austrian 
 Government. 
 
 At Milan, however, a more ambitious conspiracy was being 
 carried on, under the direction of Mazzini, which, not being 
 discovered by the police, led to an attempt at insurrection 
 on the 6th of February, 1853. The plan, as laid down by 
 Mazzini, was comprehensive. Bands were to enter into the 
 Lombard territory at Pavia, at Poschiavo, by the Valtelline 
 and Lugano; and Mazzini was to be at Chiasso on the 5th 
 of February, awaiting the signal from Milan. It was arranged 
 that Emilia, Carrara, and Tuscany should follow. All de- 
 pended upon Milan, where Mazzini hoped for a successful 
 movement, in which case all Lombardy would have risen; 
 afterwards Sicily, and then Piedmont was expected to join. 
 It was believed that the Austrian troops would be compelled 
 to evacuate the cities of Central Italy and concentrate them- 
 selves on the Po, or by remaining divided would have been 
 easily overcome by the popular rising. 
 
 The 6th of February fell in carnival, and the movement 
 was planned with Mazzini's theoretical precision to begin at 
 five in the afternoon. The castle, with its garrison of twelve 
 thousand, was to be surprised; eighteen of the bravest men 
 commanded by the chief of the conspiracy in Milan were to 
 attack with dagger in hand the guard of eighteen men stationed 
 in the tower, after which three hundred of the people, from 
 the neighbourhood, commanded by chiefs of their own class, 
 should break in, and two hundred others in twos and threes 
 should attack by surprise the officers and soldiers in the streets. 
 
xi. Northern Italy, 1 849-1 858. 271 
 
 The head-quarters in the palace were guarded by twenty-five 
 men, and at five o'clock the generals and officers of the staff 
 were to meet at dinner with the governor. A hundred of the 
 conspirators were to attack them under the direction of one 
 Fanfulla, an officer of Garibaldi's lancers. The grand-guard 
 was in the custody of one hundred and twenty men with three 
 officers and two howitzers, and these were to be attacked 
 by the insurgents of a large section of the city. The royal 
 palace and the barracks of San Francesco were to be attacked 
 by another detachment. Eighty labourers were to be ready with 
 pickaxes and iron bars and piles to raise barricades, and the gas 
 was to be cut off to put the city in darkness. Some non- 
 commissioned officers of the Hungarian regiments had pro- 
 mised to join Klapka, one of the generals of the Hungarian 
 insurrection of 1849, who was to take part. The students of 
 Pavia were to enter Milan on receiving the signal. On the 
 night of the 5th of February a meeting of the chiefs of the 
 conspiracy decided on the rising for the next day. This 
 elaborate plan, as was the case with most of Mazzini's 
 schemes, was theoretically excellent but practically of an ex- 
 treme absurdity. To suppose that a few hundreds of the 
 populace, without organization and without weapons, could 
 surprise and overpower a garrison of twelve thousand men, 
 implied the entire efficiency and readiness of all the con- 
 spirators ; it was essential that nobody should betray to the 
 authorities any step in the movement, and that every step 
 should be successfully taken. 
 
 The proclamation which Mazzini prepared for the occasion 
 shows the character of the man and the strength of his illusions. 
 It ran thus: " The mission of the national committee is finished; 
 yours begins. The last word which to-day your brothers send 
 to you is insurrection. The moment, prepared during three 
 long years, has arrived, and it is necessary to profit by it. 
 Do not look at appearances, and do not let yourselves be 
 defeated by the cowardly sophisms of the timid. The surface 
 
272 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of Europe from Spain to Italy, from Greece to sacred Poland, 
 is a volcanic crust under which is a lava that will open its 
 way in torrents at the shock of the Italian rising. To the 
 Sicilian insurrection succeeded four revolutions ; twenty will 
 follow ours. All have bound themselves by one oath in this 
 fraternal organization. We have friends in the ranks of the 
 army which oppresses us, who will respond to our bells when 
 they ring the alarm. The national democracy forms an organ- 
 ized camp, the vanguard of the great popular army ; therefore 
 fear not isolation. The initiative of Italy is the initiative of 
 Europe. Insurrection, sacred as the fatherland which will 
 bless it, is the attainment of justice, of improvement for all ; 
 and the fraternal life of Italy which it proposes will rise in 
 its might and change martyrdom to victory. Thousands of 
 victims fallen in the holy name of Italy have deserved this 
 from you. Let the movement be as tremendous as the tem- 
 pests of our seas, and as tenacious and immovable as the 
 Alps which encircle us. Between the Alps and the Sicilian 
 seas are twenty-five millions of our countrymen and one 
 hundred thousand foreigners. The struggle is only momentary 
 if you wish it. 
 
 11 Insurrection ! From city to city, from town to town, from 
 village to village vibrates, like an electric current, the immense 
 word, arousing, raising and exciting to the fever of a crusade 
 all who have Italian hearts and Italian arms. Recall to the 
 people the unmerited massacres, the rights denied, the ancient 
 power, and the vast future of liberty, of prosperity, of edu- 
 cation which may be conquered at a blow. Recall to the 
 mothers, the sisters, the friends, plunged in inconsolable grief, 
 their dear ones exiled or in prison, or butchered because they 
 had not, and would have, a country. Recall to the intelli- 
 gence of youth the freedom of thought forbidden and sup- 
 pressed ; the great Italian tradition which they can only renew 
 by action ; the nullity in which they are, heirs of the men who 
 have twice civilized Europe. Recall to the soldiers of Italy 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-185 8. 273 
 
 the dishonour of their servile condition, despised by the 
 stranger, the bones of our fathers scattered on all the fields 
 of Europe for the honour of Italy; recall the glory which 
 crowns the soldier, the right of justice and of the nation. 
 Soldiers, women, young intellects and nations, have one heart, 
 one thought, one pulse, one prayer in the soul and one cry 
 on the lips : we wish our country, one Italy, — and the Italian 
 fatherland shall be. 
 
 " Attack ! break at all points the long and weak line of our 
 enemies! obstruct it! suppress and extinguish the soldiery! 
 ruin bridges and roads and prevent their rallying by aiming 
 at their chiefs ! Follow them, arrest the fugitives and make 
 war to the knife ! Make arms of the tiles of your roofs, and 
 the stones of your pavements, of the wood of your implements, 
 and the iron of your crosses ! Alarm them with fires lighted 
 everywhere on your hills ! From one extreme to the other of 
 Italy let the bell of the people sound the death-knell of the 
 enemy ! Conquer everywhere ! move rapidly to the aid of 
 the place nearest to you and let the insurrection become an 
 avalanche everywhere. Should fortune be against us, let us 
 hasten to the bases of operation provided by the mountains, 
 and to the fortresses which nature has given you. Wherever 
 the combat shall break out you will find brothers ; and strong 
 by the victories gained elsewhere you will return the day after. 
 Let there be but one flag — the national — write upon it the 
 pledge of fraternal union, the words ' Dio e il popolo,' alone 
 powerful in victory, the only class that does not betray. It 
 was the republican banner that saved the honour of Italy in 
 1848 and 1849, it was the banner of old Venice, the banner 
 of eternal Rome, the temple of Italy and the world. Purify 
 yourselves fighting under this flag. Let the Italian people be 
 worthy of the God who guides it. Let women be sacred, 
 sacred the old men and the children, and sacred property. 
 Punish theft as an enemy : reserve for the insurrection, the 
 arms, the ammunition and the material taken from the foreign 
 
 s. 1. 18 
 
274 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 soldier. To arms, to arms ! This, your last word, is the signal 
 of battle. The men whom you choose to guide you will be 
 to-morrow to all Europe the messengers of the first victory." 
 
 The insurrection of Milan in 1853 was the reductio ad 
 absurdum of Mazzinian notions. Eloquent proclamations, 
 passionate stimulation of patriotic sentiments, and the provo- 
 cation of youth to fruitless sacrifice and heroic failure, were 
 the chief elements of Mazzini's operations 1 . On the 6th of 
 February, instead of the expected thousands, there were only 
 one hundred and fifty people in the streets, whose operations 
 began in the murdering of any stray soldiers and officers they 
 found. Of the three hundred who ought to have attacked the 
 castle less than one hundred presented themselves. Seven or 
 eight attacked the guns in the Cathedral Square and the rest 
 dispersed. Fanfulla fled and only stopped upon reaching 
 Piedmont ; the rest of the chiefs disappeared. Of the three 
 thousand conspirators enrolled, only five hundred showed 
 themselves, of whom about one hundred took an active part 
 in the demonstration. At the royal palace, out of the hundred 
 who were to have attacked, twenty showed themselves, of 
 whom one was wounded. Barricades were erected in two 
 localities and the bells were rung to call the people to rise. 
 At Porta Tosa a more serious conflict took place. There, in 
 the narrow street, the benches of a wine shop and an omnibus 
 
 1 The following note from Mazzini to a friend and companion, 
 reads, in the light of the present state of Italy, like a bit of irony, but it 
 only expresses briefly Mazzini's delusions. 
 
 November, 1863. 
 " To N. Degola :— 
 
 Italy is a divine infant called by God to be the Moses of 
 the peoples of Europe. 
 
 " Each of us is called to be the educator, each of us may be so, 
 on condition that his soul becomes a temple of virtue, symbol of unity 
 between thought and action. 
 
 4 ' Do you too fulfil this holy mission and hold me as your brother. 
 
 "Giuseppe Mazzini." 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849- 185 8. 275 
 
 were thrown together as a barricade, and here with the guns 
 which they had been able to seize, the few assailants who had 
 been repulsed from the royal palace made a last stand. The 
 casualties, as announced by Radetzky in a proclamation of the 
 9th of February, amounted to ten Austrians killed and wounded. 
 The populace made no repTy to the calls of Mazzini. The 
 doors and windows of the houses were closed and the streets 
 were deserted. All the authorities, including the archbishop, 
 opposed the rebels. It was in fact a complete fiasco. 
 
 The chiefs of the insurrection escaped, so far as possible, 
 into Piedmont. Of the people arrested seven were hanged on 
 the 7th, nine on the 12th, and two on the 13th. For the same 
 affair, on the 18th of July, 1853, numerous citizens were con- 
 demned to punishments ranging from death to imprisonment 
 for terms of years. Tivaroni says that Kossuth disavowed a 
 proclamation to the Hungarian soldiers of the garrison, alleging 
 that it was given to Mazzini two years before for another occasion, 
 but that Mazzini had employed it for this. This is a mistake. 
 I was myself employed by Kossuth in the autumn of 1852 
 in his secret service, and he had selected me to carry his 
 proclamation to the Hungarian troops in Milan in anticipation 
 of this movement, ordering them not to fire on the populace 
 when the insurrection took place. Another contingency more 
 urgent demanded my services elsewhere and I was sent into 
 Hungary, and the service in Milan was performed by another 
 agent; but that it was actually performed according to the 
 understanding between Kossuth and Mazzini (with the result 
 that the Hungarian regiments were decimated and sent into 
 Croatia), I was subsequently assured by Kossuth himself. But 
 it is necessary to say that Kossuth, in the consultations with 
 Mazzini with reference to this rising, advised strongly against 
 it as certain to lead to no results. Hungary was not ready for 
 the movement, and Kossuth assured Mazzini that, even should 
 the insurrection in Milan be successful, he could not call on 
 the Hungarians to rise. To use his own words, " One must 
 
 18—2 
 
276 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 not play with the blood of the people." Mazzini, however, 
 persisted, alleging that even if the movement failed it was 
 necessary to do something or he would lose his control over 
 the popular feeling. It is said that Colonel Francois, Director 
 of the Police, had been warned of the insurrection and that 
 the general in command very naturally refused to believe it, 
 knowing that no serious preparations had been made for the 
 rising. 
 
 Radetzky declared the city m a state of siege pending 
 further punishments and exactions, and ordered the expulsion 
 of all suspected strangers, closing the roads from Ticino into 
 Lombardy, as the Swiss canton had given shelter to the 
 refugees. He imposed on the city of Milan the obligation 
 of supporting during the rest of their lives all the wounded 
 and the families of the killed, and an extraordinary contribution 
 for the extra pay given to the garrison on account of the insur- 
 rection. On the 13th of February, the Emperor issued a 
 proclamation confiscating all the goods and real estate of 
 all the political exiles of the Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom. 
 Twice before, the government at Vienna had vetoed this 
 measure. Now Vienna changed its system and the severities 
 of Radetzky were adopted by the Imperial government. 
 
 The failure of this movement was fatal to all liberal 
 progress in the Italian dominions of Austria, and at the same 
 time destroyed the influence and prestige of Mazzini over the 
 population. In this respect, perhaps, it was productive of 
 more good than evil, causing the Italian liberals to turn 
 from the fantasies of republicanism to the possible union 
 under the monarchy of Piedmont. At all events republicanism 
 declined in the whole of Italy. A remnant of insurrection 
 still remained in the mountains of Italian Tyrol, where the 
 local chiefs, in combination with Mazzini, had arranged to 
 rise and cut off the communication between Vienna and 
 Lombardy. Pietro Fortunato Calvi, an ex-officer of the 
 Austrian army, took up a position at the Three Bridges in 
 
xi.] Northern Italy, 1849-1858. 277 
 
 the valley of Cadore and successfully resisted for a few days 
 the march of the Austrian troops. Overpowered, arrested and 
 escorted to Innsbruck, he was thence sent to Mantua and put 
 under trial before the military tribunal. The examination 
 lasted twenty-one months. On the 10th of November Calvi 
 wrote to a friend as follows ; " There is no torture which has 
 been spared your poor Pietro; in the first months of my 
 imprisonment I was subjected to the severest trials and to 
 treatment which makes a soldier's hair rise on end when he 
 thinks of it. I was compelled to say anything that my 
 butchers desired, but you, my good friend, do not condemn 
 me too severely. I beg of you to pity your unfortunate friend 
 and have compassion on him if the treatment was too strong 
 for him. I was ready to face death without yielding, but the 
 brutal treatment which I was compelled to undergo, oh ! to 
 understand it one must have experienced it, for it was worse than 
 a hundred deaths !" Condemned to death on the ist of July, 
 1855, and asked if he wished to crave pardon, he replied that 
 he wanted nothing of the Austrians. " I hate, and will always 
 hate the Austrians until the end of my life, for all the ill they 
 have done to Italy." 
 
 He then delivered to the judges the following declaration, 
 published after his death : " I served Austria in my youth, 
 and for a long time was one of the Austrian army, acting 
 loyally for the time that I wore their uniform; when, in 1848, 
 in consequence of the bad government and the torture which 
 Austria inflicted on my poor country, the population of Italy 
 rose, I rejoiced at the event and recognised the justice of 
 their cause. Abandoning Austria and resigning all my functions, 
 I proclaimed the sacred right of Italy to be independent, and 
 loyally fought in the midst of the people to sustain her invaded 
 rights. But in my relations with others, whether while belonging 
 to the Austrian army, or when having given my resignation I 
 accompanied my brothers, I acted always with loyalty and 
 with the honesty of an honourable officer. Therefore, I protest 
 
278 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 against the illegalities employed against me by the military com- 
 mission,... the torture inflicted on my unfortunate companions, 
 the deceitful questions intended to obtain false depositions for 
 the purpose of dishonouring us, the espionage exercised by the 
 special civil court of justice, always for the same purpose ; and I 
 declare that, rather than deny the sacred principles on which the 
 cause of Italian liberty and independence repose, rather than 
 adhere to the rapacious policy of Austria, rather than sanction 
 its claims by any act which might seem to concede them, or by 
 any submission to its authority, I, Pietro Fortunato Calvi, once 
 officer of the Austrian army, and late Colonel of the Italian 
 army during the war of independence, now condemned to 
 death for the crime of high treason, go joyfully to this death, 
 declaring from the scaffold that what I have done I have done 
 knowingly and that I would be ready to do it again in order 
 to drive the Austrians out of the states which they have 
 infamously usurped. I demand that this declaration made by 
 me, with a sound mind, and written and signed with my own 
 hand, shall be, by the special court of justice, united to the 
 record of my trial, in order that everybody may know that 
 Pietro Fortunato Calvi, rather than betray his country, offered 
 it his body. Dated from the Castle of San Giorgio in Mantua, 
 ist July, 1855. 
 
 Pietro Fortunato Calvi." 
 
 To the President of the Court, to whom he offered a cigar 
 and who hesitated to accept it, he said: "Do you refuse to 
 give this pleasure to a dying man ? This offer is a proof that I 
 do not feel for you any hostility or rancour and that I desire to 
 die in peace with everybody." 
 
 This attempt of Calvi was the last menace to Austrian 
 tranquillity, for the people had finally come to understand that 
 the isolated and undisciplined acts of a populace, however 
 justly indignant, were powerless against the organization and 
 well-established forces of a despotic power. With the cessation 
 of all attempts at violent revolt the Austrian administration 
 
[.] Northern Italy, 1849- 185 8. 279 
 
 the failure of violence, attempted to win over the hearts of the 
 people by measures which were only regarded as weak, not as 
 friendly. During the visit of the imperial couple in 1858, 
 attempts were made to smooth the way for reconciliation, but 
 the people remained sullen. The Emperor drove through 
 streets where no head was uncovered, and where people cried 
 "Viva" to the syndic who followed, while they were silent 
 before the Emperor who preceded. Some few were won over 
 by the courtesies of the imperial court, but no serious breach 
 was made in the sullen resistance of the masses. The 
 Archduke Maximilian, an amiable and intelligent Prince, 
 conceived the idea of going on a conciliatory mission to the 
 Italian people. He visited Milan and Venice, and attempted 
 to win over the chiefs of the opposition, but his offers were 
 only responded to by members of the public service: the 
 people at large turned their backs on all his propositions. 
 The military authorities at the same time opposed his policy. 
 In 1858 he returned to Vienna to obtain further concessions, 
 but, in spite of all efforts and all concessions, public opinion 
 'throughout the Lombardo- Venetian dominions was resolutely 
 though silently hostile. When the students of the university 
 had a mass said in the church of San Antonio at Padua for 
 the soul of Orsini, decapitated for the attempt on the life of 
 Napoleon the Third, the whole city attended. The students 
 and the common people fraternized and the walls were 
 covered with the popular inscription " Viva Verdi," which was 
 the cipher adopted as a combination for "Viva Vittorio 
 Emanuele Re DTtalia." On every occasion which permitted 
 a manifestation of discontent against Austria, demonstrations 
 of a pacific but most enthusiastic character took place. 
 
 On the 20th of February, 1859, the death of Emilio 
 Dandolo, one of the leading combatants in the five days of 
 Milan, who had also fought at Rome under Garibaldi and in 
 1855 volunteered for the Crimean War, took place at Milan. 
 
280 Italy. [Chap. xi. 
 
 Dandolo always maintained the most resolute attitude of 
 hostility to Austria and was one of the chiefs of the Pied- 
 montese party. At his funeral fifty thousand people followed 
 the coffin and the entire city of Milan demonstrated its grief 
 and respect. The demonstrations provoked arrest and several 
 of the leading demonstrators went into exile. At the Scala 
 theatre when the chorus of Norma, " Guerra, guerra," was sung, 
 the audience applauded. At Venice in March, 1858, a great 
 crowd gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the 22nd of 
 March, 1848, and the Piazza was filled with people; ladies 
 were dressed in such a manner as to display by some com- 
 bination of stuffs the Italian tricolour. When the Archduke 
 Maximilian with the Archduchess appeared, the Piazza was 
 immediately abandoned by the entire population. Until the 
 beginning of the Franco-Austrian war, the attitude of the 
 Italian people in the cities as well as in the country remained 
 absolutely indifferent either to the menaces or to the caresses 
 of the Austrian authorities, and the war put an end to a situation 
 from which neither party reaped any profit. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE WAR OF 1 859 AND ITS RESULTS. 
 
 (1) Magenta and Solferino. 
 
 The position of Cavour after the Congress of Paris was 
 very strong, but it was that of a strictly constitutional minister. 
 It was said in Turin — "We have a ministry, a parliament, a 
 constitution : all that spells Cavour." This was perfectly true, 
 but Cavour was in no sense a dictator ; it was in and through 
 parliamentary institutions that he worked and preferred to 
 work. "Believe me (he said) : the worst of chambers is pre- 
 ferable to the most brilliant of ante-chambers." He governed 
 by persuasion, by his clear and cogent reason, by his immense 
 industry and his intimate knowledge of all departments of 
 state, by his care for every interest — political, economical, 
 educational — of his country, by the confidence he placed in 
 the parliament and by the confidence he received from its 
 members in return. Revolution and insurrection he persis- 
 tently discouraged, not only in Piedmont, but elsewhere in 
 Italy, little caring that he earned thereby the hatred of 
 Mazzini and the republicans. A futile outbreak, stirred up 
 by Mazzinians at Genoa in 1857, showed at once the embitter - 
 ment and the weakness of the party. As an antidote to this 
 revolutionary poison, Cavour pushed forward his schemes for 
 economical and financial progress. Taxation was necessarily 
 
282 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 heavy, but commercial treaties, railways and useful public 
 works gradually enriched the nation and lightened its burdens. 
 Of these works the greatest was perhaps the tunnel under the 
 Mont Cenis, begun in 1857. At the same time, the military 
 and naval defences were improved. La Marmora continued 
 to reorganise the army: a naval arsenal was created at 
 Spezzia: the fortifications of Alessandria — for which liberals 
 throughout Italy subscribed to buy one hundred cannon — 
 were strengthened. All this could not be done without cost, 
 and Cavour's popularity for a moment seemed on the wane. 
 The general election of 1857 reduced his parliamentary 
 majority in an alarming degree. Still he held on undaunted, 
 confident in the principles which he had deliberately adopted, 
 and before another election came, his policy had been re- 
 warded by its first great triumph. 
 
 In all the struggles of this new liberal government from the 
 beginning, its chief opponent and the warmest friend of Austria 
 was the Papacy, which, since the fall of the Roman Republic 
 and the return of the Pope from Gaeta, had become the 
 implacable enemy of any movement towards constitutional 
 reforms. Strong as was this alliance, Cavour was able, in spite 
 of it, to maintain successfully the cause of religious and civil 
 liberty, and it is hardly to be doubted that the adoption by 
 the Pope of the cause of Austria assisted more than it retarded 
 the emancipation of Italy. The Emperor Napoleon, animated, 
 on the one hand, by a certain natural deference for the Pope, 
 and supported by the clerical party in France, could not, on 
 the other, neglect the liberal element which, though temporarily 
 crushed, was still strong among his subjects. Thus, while 
 he was bound to maintain the position of the Pope, it was 
 impossible for him to permit papal influence to go beyond 
 its legitimate rights. But Napoleon himself adhered to the 
 hereditary policy of France, and was in heart opposed to the 
 union and complete emancipation of Italy. He could not, 
 therefore, loose his hold on an influence so likely to weigh 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 283 
 
 in the future of Italy as was the influence of the Pope ; and 
 Cavour, in struggling against these adverse tendencies, required 
 all his tact and all the moral influence of England, which at 
 that time was exercised entirely in his favour, to enable 
 him to obtain the success with which he came out of the 
 Congress of Paris. 
 
 Material advantages he did not aim at. His object was to 
 establish the prospective position of Italy, and the immediate 
 position of Piedmont in Europe as the legal and diplomatic 
 representative of the Italy to come. The great conflict which 
 lay in the future between Piedmont, on behalf of Italy, and 
 Austria, must be deferred to a more fitting occasion, when 
 Europe should have recovered from the effects of the late 
 conflict. At the dissolution of the Congress of Paris, Cavour 
 gave to the representatives of the different powers a memo- 
 randum in which he said: "Disturbed within by revolutionary 
 activity, troubled abroad by a regime of violent repressions 
 and foreign occupations, menaced by an increase of the 
 influence of Austria, Piedmont may, at a given moment, be 
 obliged to adopt extreme measures of which it is impossible to 
 foresee the consequences." This prophecy and promise of a 
 future period of activity was supported by preparations for 
 the coming struggle. But the policy of Cavour was more 
 diplomatic than military. The failure of Carlo Alberto in his 
 attempt to obtain, by the military forces of Italy alone, the 
 development of Italian liberty, persuaded him that without 
 alliances Italy could not expect to achieve what she hoped for. 
 With the recognised position which he had won for Piedmont 
 as a base, Cavour depended on the friendship of England and 
 of France, not on revolution and conspiracy, to prepare his 
 future attack on Austria. Nor did he neglect other countries : 
 he always kept an eye on the public opinion of Europe at 
 large. Both during the Congress and subsequently he sought 
 to win the good-will of Russia, and he succeeded. With 
 Prussia he was less successful, but he at least obtained 
 
284 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 neutrality from that power, whose policy at that time was 
 one of hesitation. 
 
 In depending so largely on diplomacy, Cavour was forced 
 to take steps which perhaps retarded the completion of Italy 
 more than he suspected. The alliance of France could not, 
 like the moral influence of England, be gained without com- 
 pensation, and he sacrificed so much to that alliance, that 
 his policy might seem too hasty rather than too cautious. But 
 we must remember that England, while lavish of good wishes 
 and moral support— except for a brief interval in 1857 — was 
 obstinately disinclined to translate benevolence into active 
 measures. We must remember too that Cavour had the re- 
 volutionists and republicans to think of, and he dreaded them 
 as likely rather to alienate than to conciliate the governments 
 of Europe. He was himself, in temperament and conviction, 
 averse from democratic forms of government being carried 
 beyond a certain limit; and the attempts at assassination — 
 which were the morbid outgrowth of the republican agitation — 
 gave his determination a sharper point. 
 
 The Orsini conspiracy and the attempted assassination of 
 Napoleon III (Jan. 1858), being of Italian origin, had a very 
 curious effect. At first a terrible embarrassment to the Italian 
 government, tending to alienate the sympathies of Europe, and 
 especially of France, this event led to a closer union between 
 Napoleon and Cavour. It roused bitter feeling between 
 England and France, and thus tended at first to throw 
 England into the arms of Austria. But while Italy thus 
 temporarily lost the support of England — at least the support 
 of the Tories, who now came into power for a short time — she 
 gained the more strenuous support of France. The crime 
 made Cavour and the Italian government more rigorous in 
 their action against republican combinations, but it also 
 rendered the Emperor to a certain degree apprehensive 
 of the possible consequences of persisting in a policy which 
 outraged individual Italians and degraded Italy collectively. 
 
xil] The War of 1859 and its Results. 285 
 
 The Emperor in his indignation attempted to force upon the 
 Italian authorities measures of prevention which would have 
 been oppressive to personal liberty, but Cavour and Vittorio 
 Emanuele, while passing a law to punish incentives to 
 political assassination, refused to submit to his extreme 
 demands. The probability is that this attitude of Piedmont 
 compelled the Emperor as an alternative to adopt measures to 
 conciliate the hostility of Italian revolutionary circles, which 
 had come to consider him as, equally with Austria, the jailor 
 of Italy. 
 
 However this may be, the Emperor, who had long been 
 brooding over the Italian question, and who in December, 1855, 
 had said to Cavour, "What can one do for Italy?" at length 
 made up his mind. In May, 1858, he made overtures in his 
 subtle, indirect way, for an alliance with Piedmont, overtures 
 which led to the famous meeting at Plombieres in July. At 
 this little village in the Vosges, Napoleon and Cavour met in 
 secret, and there in a two days' conversation, the league was 
 hatched which was to revolutionise Italy. No formal treaty 
 was made or signed, but a mutual understanding was entered 
 into. There was to be joint war with Austria : Italy was to be 
 free "from the Alps to the Adriatic," and, as the price of 
 French assistance, Savoy and Nice were to be "reunited" to 
 France. It was a heavy price to pay, but it bought eventually 
 much more than Napoleon ever intended to give. It bought 
 the union of Italy. 
 
 Cavour returned by way of Germany from his journey in 
 the west. From Prussia he received only vague indications 
 of hostility to his plans of opposition to Austria, and on his 
 return to Turin he devoted himself to far-seeing preparations 
 for war and for such negotiations with France as might secure 
 the active cooperation of the Emperor. The marriage of 
 Jerome Bonaparte, cousin of Napoleon the Third, with 
 Princess Clotilda, the daughter of Vittorio Emanuele, was 
 negotiated. France assumed an attitude of hostility to Austria, 
 
286 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 which was manifested at the New Year's reception at the 
 Tuileries, by the characteristic expression of the Emperor to 
 the Austrian Ambassador, ostentatiously made before the 
 representatives of Europe, — "I regret that our relations with 
 your government are not as good as they have been; I beg 
 you to say to the Emperor that my personal sentiments 
 towards him have not changed." And at the following opening 
 of the Parliament of Piedmont (Jan. 10), the King, in his 
 address from the throne, said, after announcing the marriage 
 contract : " The horizon on which the New Year opens is 
 not quite clear... Our country, small as it is, has become 
 influential in the councils of Europe, because of the greatness 
 of the ideas which she represents, and of the sympathies which 
 she inspires. The situation is not exempt from danger, for, 
 while respecting treaties, we cannot disregard the cry of grief 
 (grido di dolore) which rises to us from so many parts of Italy. 
 Strong in union, confident in our right, we await with prudence 
 and resolution the decrees of Providence." The speech was 
 enthusiastically applauded in the assembly: it echoed through- 
 out Europe. War was evidently in view. The preparations of 
 Piedmont as well as those of France were made openly, and 
 Austria responded vigorously. On the 7th of February, 1859, 
 Cavour obtained from Parliament a vote of fifty millions of 
 francs to put the kingdom in a state of defence. 
 
 Still during four anxious months the war was deferred. 
 In spite of the fact that a formal treaty was made (January 18, 
 1859), by which France bound itself to support Piedmont if 
 attacked by Austria, Napoleon's characteristic hesitation caused 
 Cavour endless perturbation. A famous pamphlet, "Napo- 
 leon III et l'ltalie," supposed to have been inspired by 
 Napoleon, appeared to commit the Emperor to a forward 
 policy : still he hesitated, anxious till the last moment to find 
 a way out of the difficulty without war. Austria appealed to 
 the German states for their support. The diplomacy of 
 Europe, disturbed by the prospect of a conflict between two 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 an d & s Results. 287 
 
 first-class powers, attempted to intervene. England offered 
 her mediation on the basis of liberal reforms in Lombardy and 
 Venice, and the renunciation of all interference in Central 
 Italy. In March, the proposition of a Congress was made by 
 Russia, and was adopted in London and in Paris. But the 
 proposal was no sooner made than endless difficulties arose. 
 Was Piedmont to be admitted to the Congress ? and if Pied- 
 mont, why not all the other Italian states? Then England 
 proposed a general disarmament, and this was strongly 
 supported by Napoleon. Cavour, in despair, assented, of 
 course on the assumption that Austria would also disarm. 
 But Austria, tired of delay, herself cut the knot. On the 
 23rd of April, the government of Vienna, having massed its 
 troops on the line of the Ticino, sent an ultimatum to the 
 Piedmontese government requiring it to disarm within three 
 days under the penalty of a declaration of war. What Cavour 
 was willing to do on the friendly advice of England, he could 
 not do under threats from Austria. He therefore rejected the 
 Austrian demand — which had put that country in the wrong — 
 and on the 27 th of April, war was declared. Vittorio 
 Emanuele issued two proclamations — one to the army and 
 one to the nation. The former announced his assumption 
 of the command of the army, and the appointment of his 
 cousin, Prince Eugenio Savoia-Carignano, to civil control 
 during the King's absence : the other accorded a complete 
 amnesty for all political offences. 
 
 The Piedmontese forces at the opening of the campaign 
 amounted to one hundred thousand men liable to military 
 service, of whom fifty thousand were then under arms. The 
 Austrian government had in the meanwhile concentrated its 
 troops in the heart of Lombardy between the Adda and the 
 Ticino, the immediate object of the campaign being the in- 
 vasion of Piedmont and the seizure of Turin. Had the 
 Austrians been energetic, they might have overpowered the 
 Piedmontese army before its allies could appear. But Radetzky 
 
288 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 was dead : his successor, Count Gyulay, was a poor substitute. 
 The Austrians were slow ; movements were of the old kind — 
 a few leagues a day, — and the delay gave the French army 
 time to arrive to the support of Piedmont. The first French 
 divisions landing at Genoa supported the Piedmontese from 
 the south, while a division under Canrobert, crossing the Alps, 
 menaced the Austrian army from the north. The Austrians, 
 renouncing at once their invasion of Piedmont, began to 
 fortify the line of the Ticino. The first conflict took place at 
 Montebello, where the French and Piedmontese troops, to the 
 number of eight thousand, found themselves in contact witli 
 the Austrian division under Field-marshal Stadion, twenty-five 
 thousand strong. The tactics of the allied army caused the 
 Austrian commander to overestimate its strength and take 
 his dispositions accordingly. Supposing the number of the 
 Franco-Piedmontese army to be very much larger than it was, 
 he remained on the defensive. The attack of the allies was 
 successful and, with the comparatively heavy loss of seven 
 hundred men, the village of Montebello was carried at the 
 point of the bayonet. 
 
 Following up the success at Montebello, the allied army 
 marched on Valenza, Casale, Vercelli and Novara, moving 
 along the right bank of the Sesia in order to turn the right 
 wing of the Austrian army, in the hope of outflanking it, 
 and crossing the Ticino before Gyulay could prepare for the 
 defence. The Sesia was crossed on the 30th of May, and the 
 army debouched on the plain of Palestro, on which the Austrian 
 brigade under the command of General Weigl was entrenched. 
 The Piedmontese army was charged with the capture of the 
 village, the King being in chief command. Cialdini with a 
 division of Bersaglieri stormed the heights, on which he placed 
 a battery of four pieces of artillery, and then carried the village 
 of Palestro at the point of the bayonet. This movement 
 disclosed the plan of the allies, and the Austrian commander 
 fell back beyond the Ticino and massed his army at Magenta 
 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 289 
 
 for the defence of Milan. On the 2nd of June the French 
 imperial guard under the orders of General Camou bridged the 
 Ticino at Porto de Turbigo near Novara. The first division of 
 the second corps d'armee, under the orders of Mac Mahon, 
 was enabled to cross on the 3rd and occupied the village of 
 Robichetto, where it received and repelled an attack of the 
 Austrian s. The Austrian general, Clam Gallas, who defended 
 another point of the Ticino — the bridge of San Martino — fell 
 back, and the two divisions of the French army which had 
 passed the river united in preparation for the battle of Ma- 
 genta. The order of battle was as follows : Napoleon III had 
 his head-quarters at San-Martino; on the right bank of the 
 Ticino the division of St Jean d'Angeli; on the left of the 
 Ticino between the bridge of Buffalora and Magenta, and 
 behind the Emperor, distributed over a space of three or four 
 leagues toward Novara, the divisions of Niel, Vinoy, Canrobert, 
 Trochu and Renault ; while finally, the corps of Mac Mahon, 
 which had passed the Ticino to the north, was approaching 
 from that direction. 
 
 The battle began between the troops of St Jean d'Angeli 
 and the advanced guard of the Austrians, but feebly on 
 account of the weakness of the French advance; and a 
 vigorous attack of the Austrians on this point would have 
 compromised the position of the French army, but Mac 
 Mahon, hearing the firing, fortunately made haste to relieve 
 the Emperor. This preliminary combat, which had for its 
 object the capture of the railway embankments and the village 
 of Buffalora, continued until four in the afternoon, at which 
 time the Austrians still held firm and the position of the French 
 had become critical. At half-past five the army of Mac Mahon 
 made its appearance, while the divisions of Espinasse, La- 
 motterouge, and Camou converged on the same point from 
 their earlier positions. The Austrians fell back on the village 
 of Magenta, which was the key of the position, and at seven 
 o'clock an attack in force established the French victory by the 
 
 s. 1. 19 
 
290 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 possession of Magenta. The Austrians evacuated Milan and 
 fell back on Melegnano, where they were followed and again 
 attacked by a French division under Baraguay d'Hilliers. 
 
 This victory, so seriously contested, barely decided in 
 favour of the Emperor by the ready comprehension of Mac 
 Mahon, seemed to have paralysed the Emperor with the 
 apprehension of his narrow escape from a great defeat, and 
 it was only on the 23rd of June, two weeks later, that the 
 French army resumed its movements. The Austrians in the 
 meantime had fallen back on the Mincio and occupied the 
 position of Solferino, where they were again attacked by the 
 allies. The Franco-Piedmontese line of battle extended from 
 Castiglione and Cavriana on the extreme right, to San-Martino, 
 near the Lake of Garda. The battle began about six in the 
 morning, Canrobert holding the right, Marshal Niel at his 
 left, then Mac Mahon, Napoleon III with the guard under 
 St Jean d'Angeli, Baraguay d'Hilliers in the centre before 
 Solferino, which was the centre of the Austrian position ; the 
 Piedmontese army with the King forming the left. A de- 
 sperate combined attack carried the heights crowned by the 
 tower known as the " Spy of Italy," from which a view of the 
 entire field could be had. This was taken by d'Hilliers at 
 one o'clock. The Austrians, massing on the heights of Cavriana 
 opposite, engaged the French in the plain beneath, while 
 Benedek on the Austrian right kept the Piedmontese in 
 check. The battle was not yet lost to the Austrians. On 
 the contrary, the new position was one the capture of which 
 would demand hard fighting and the victory seemed rather 
 inclined to the Austrians than to the French. But the for- 
 tunate foresight of Napoleon, who had then introduced into 
 military operations rifled artillery, decided the day. His 
 batteries of rifled guns established on the heights of Solferino 
 under his own eyes reached the Austrian reserves and com- 
 manded the entire field of operations. The astonishment 
 and demoralization produced by this new element, and the 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 291 
 
 necessity of finding new positions protected from this un- 
 expected fire, decided a withdrawal which became a retreat. 
 At night Napoleon III occupied the rooms which the Em- 
 peror of Austria had occupied the day before. On the left 
 the Piedmontese army attacked the position of Pozzolengo. 
 After an obstinate fight of several hours they were repulsed 
 toward the Lake of Garda ; but at 4.30 renewing the attack, 
 they carried the heights of San Martino and the Austrian 
 army fell back along the whole line. The loss of the Austrians, 
 in this obstinate battle of Solferino and San Martino combined, 
 was over twenty-two thousand men ; the French and Pied- 
 montese lost over seventeen thousand. In the night the 
 Austrians passed the Mincio and took refuge in the Quad- 
 rilateral. The French were now joined by the fifth corps 
 d'armee which had been occupied in supporting the revolt 
 of Tuscany, and at the same time the allied fleet appeared 
 before Venice. 
 
 (2) Vittafranca. 
 
 At this point diplomacy began its paralyzing operations, 
 and Napoleon III, who had by treaty engaged to deliver 
 Lombardy and Venice, or, as he had expressed it, " to liberate 
 Italy from the Alps to the sea," halted and began to temporize. 
 There is no doubt that the narrowness of the advantages he 
 had gained in the two battles just fought, and the danger of 
 defeat, which at one moment was unmistakable, had greatly 
 diminished his confidence in the events of the campaign. At 
 the same time other German powers began to threaten inter- 
 vention. The Emperor is reported to have been profoundly 
 affected by the unaccustomed spectacle of war, and to have 
 been intimidated by the menaces of Prussia, which had begun 
 to mobilize her forces. This consideration was certainly a 
 weighty one, but even had Prussia acted, he had, probably, 
 already gained advantages in his Italian campaign sufficient 
 
 19 — 2 
 
292 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 to enable him, by utilizing the forces of Central Italy and 
 extending the sphere of action, to meet the Prussian attack. 
 But the consideration which did most to bring on a pacific 
 change in the temper of the Emperor was the rapid spread of 
 the revolutionary movement in Central Italy, which threatened 
 to upset his plans for its organization, and menaced the position 
 of the Pope. The latter contingency, pressing powerfully on 
 the Catholic party in France, undermined Napoleon's power 
 just where it was strongest, and though the fabled personal 
 influence of the Empress was only a mask for the vacillations 
 of the fickle monarch, the opposition of Catholic France was 
 an element in French politics which he was not strong enough 
 to face. He might have risked the combinations from without, 
 but this menaced him from within. Moreover it must not be 
 forgotten that he was not, and could hardly be, a frank and 
 full-hearted friend of Italian emancipation. 
 
 " Napoleon III heard the menace of Germany; he was not 
 certain that he would not have in a few days a struggle on the 
 Rhine, and at the same time one in Venetia : he was besides 
 physically prostrated by the fatigue of the campaign under the 
 burning Italian sun ; the view of the battle-field covered with 
 dead and wounded had profoundly moved him; and finally 
 he felt that he might be compelled to accomplish the unity of 
 Italy and to sacrifice the temporal power of the Pope when he 
 had only intended to make a kingdom of Northern Italy. 
 Thus at the moment when France and Europe expected new 
 battles they heard that Napoleon III had had an interview 
 with the Emperor of Austria and that a peace had been 
 concluded between the two at Villafranca." (Sorin.) 
 
 The above extract from a French author, who, though not 
 entirely in sympathy with Napoleon III, has given a thoroughly 
 French colour to his history of these events, may be taken as 
 the version most favourable to French honour and consistency 
 which could be given of the conclusion of the war. It leaves 
 the Emperor convicted doubly of bad faith ; first in respect of 
 
xil] The War of 1859 and its Results. 293 
 
 his promises with reference to the conduct of the war, which 
 were unfulfilled, and secondly towards Vittorio Emanuele 
 who, as his ally, had a right to participate in any negotiations 
 for peace. The object of the war having been the emanci- 
 pation of Lombardy and Venice, at the price of the cession of 
 Savoy and Nice, he fulfilled only half of his engagement, and 
 yet, later on, insisted on Italy paying the full price, — the 
 cession of Savoy and Nice 1 . It is not possible, with all the 
 mitigations adduced, to acquit Napoleon III of bad faith ; but 
 at the same time we must admit that for a weak man who 
 never showed himself a far-sighted or bold statesman, or a 
 man of principle, he did as much as could a priori have been 
 expected of him. A bold man or a competent one would have 
 probably followed up his successes. Napoleon was neither. 
 
 The treaty of peace, signed at Villafranca on the nth of 
 July, ran as follows : " The two sovereigns will favour the 
 creation of an Italian confederation; this confederation will 
 be placed under the honorary presidency of the Pope; the 
 Emperor of Austria will cede to the Emperor of the French 
 his rights over Lombardy, except the strong places of Peschiera 
 and Mantua ; Venice will form a part of the Italian confede- 
 ration, remaining under the crown of the Emperor of Austria ; 
 the Grand-Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena will 
 return to their states, granting a general amnesty; the two 
 Emperors will demand from the Pope the introduction in his 
 states of indispensable reforms ; full and entire amnesty shall 
 be accorded to all persons compromised in the recent events 
 in the wars of the two belligerents." 
 
 "This peace, concluded on so vague a basis, satisfied 
 nobody, because, after it as before, Italy was incomplete. 
 Napoleon III had delivered Lombardy, but he had abandoned 
 that completion of Italian nationality which he had pretended 
 
 1 The demand for Savoy and Nice was dropped at Villafranca, but 
 subsequently revived. 
 
294 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 to accomplish. He had opened before him an inextricable 
 labyrinth of difficulties from which his diplomacy could not 
 extricate itself and which had a distinct influence, fatal and 
 decisive, when eleven years later he made an appeal to his 
 ancient allies." (Sorin.) 
 
 Napoleon III, for reasons based on his personal policy, 
 having signed the treaty of Villafranca, the King of Piedmont 
 was compelled to submit to the decision of his ally as to which 
 he had not been consulted. Cavour was in despair. He 
 hurried to the scene of negotiations, and in a violent outburst 
 of temper, upbraided the King for giving way. Returning 
 to Turin, he immediately resigned his office and left the 
 country. The whole of Italy rose in a tremor of indignation 
 and recalled to the Emperor in innumerable publications and 
 denunciations his famous promises : — " Italy shall be free from 
 the Alps to the Adriatic." The Peace of Villafranca was a 
 terribly painful disillusion for all the friends of Italy, and 
 a ruinous impeachment of Napoleon III, whose timid and 
 inconsistent policy showed that he was incapable of foreseeing 
 the consequences of his own acts. The French army left 
 Italy, cursed and insulted by the people who had received 
 them a few months before with such enthusiasm and friend- 
 ship. A letter of Massimo D'Azeglio quoted by Sorin draws a 
 just picture of the state of Italy at this moment : " If they had 
 proposed two months ago the following problem : to go to 
 Italy with two hundred thousand men, spend half a milliard, 
 win four battles, restore to the Italians one of their most 
 beautiful provinces, and return cursed by them, one would 
 have said the problem was insoluble. Well ! Facts have 
 proved that it was not. In Central Italy the people, excited 
 by so many promises, will not accept the Peace of Villafranca. 
 What will happen? The unknown !... Beyond that, I abstain 
 from all judgement on the conduct of the Emperor. After all 
 he has been under fire for us against the Austrians ; and as to 
 those admirable soldiers of France, I would embrace their 
 
:n.] The War <?/" 1859 and its Results. 295 
 
   
 
 ! I knees ; but all that does not prevent the situation made for our 
 I poor Italy from being terrible." 
 
 In communicating the treaty of Villafranca to Vittorio 
 Emanuele, Napoleon had said, "We shall now see what 
 the Italians can do by themselves," an enigmatical expression 
 alluding to the policy of Carlo Alberto — " Italia fara da se " — 
 which Cavour had abandoned, and hinting that the Emperor 
 would do nothing more for Italy. But the Italians had 
 determined, with the tenacity which is characteristic of their 
 race, not to let the work stand still where Napoleon had left 
 it, but to go as far as patriotism permitted against the obstacles 
 which still remained. Lombardy acted as a shield for the 
 southern provinces, behind which Italy could carry on her 
 operations, and the exhaustion of the war and the public 
 opinion of Europe prevented the Austrian Emperor from 
 interfering in what might be done beyond the sphere of 
 his legitimate possessions. 
 
 The Congress of Zurich, which met in August, 1859, had 
 invited Napoleon to answer for his work before united Europe, 
 and the programme which he proposed to this congress is 
 contained in a letter addressed on the 20th of October, 1859, 
 to Vittorio Emanuele. "It is not a question," said the 
 French Emperor, "of knowing if I have acted ill or well in 
 concluding the Peace of Villafranca; it is a question of 
 obtaining from that treaty the most favourable consequences 
 for the pacification of Italy and the repose of Europe. At 
 the moment of peace, it was necessary to make a treaty 
 which should assure so far as possible the independence of 
 Italy, which should satisfy Piedmont and the aspirations of 
 the people, but which should not wound the Catholics nor 
 the sovereigns in whom Europe interests herself. I believe, 
 then, that if the Emperor of Austria would come to a frank 
 understanding with me, in order to arrive at this important 
 result, causes of antagonism would disappear, and the regenera- 
 tion of Italy would be accomplished- by a common agreement 
 
296 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 without any more bloodshed. These are, according to my ideas, 
 the essential conditions of its regeneration. Italy should be 
 composed of several independent states united by a federal 
 organization, each of these states being free to adopt its own 
 constitution and salutary reforms; the confederation would 
 thus consecrate the principle of Italian nationality; it would 
 have only one flag, one system of custom-houses, and one 
 coinage. The central governing body should be at Rome ; it 
 should be formed of representatives appointed by the sovereign 
 of each state on the proposal of the chambers. By according the 
 Honorary Presidency to the Holy Father, we should satisfy the 
 religious sentiment of Catholic Europe ; we should augment 
 the moral power of the Pope, and we should enable him to 
 make concessions according to the legitimate desires of the 
 population." 
 
 " This plan, which I had formed at the conclusion of peace, 
 may still be realized if your Majesty will employ your influence 
 to bring it about. Great advances have already been made in 
 this direction. The cession of Lombardy with a limited debt 
 is already accomplished. Austria has renounced her right to 
 garrison the fortresses of Piacenza, Ferrara and Comacchio. 
 Finally, Venetia is about to become a purely Italian province. 
 We shall demand that Parma and Piacenza be reunited to 
 Piedmont, because this territory is strategically indispensable 
 to it. We shall demand that the Duchess of Parma be 
 appointed to rule in Modena ; that Tuscany, with the addition 
 of some territory, be restored to the Grand-Duke Ferdinand ; 
 that a system of wise liberty be adopted by all the states of 
 Italy; that Austria consent to complete the nationality of 
 Venice not only by creating a representation and an adminis- 
 trative district, but also an Italian army. We shall demand 
 that the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua be recognized as 
 federal fortresses ; and finally, that the confederation based on 
 the real necessities and the traditions of the peninsula and on 
 the exclusion of all foreign influence shall assure the work of 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 297 
 
 Italian independence. Will your Majesty be convinced of 
 this ? My sentiments do not vary as long as the interests of 
 France do not oppose ; I shall always be happy to serve the 
 cause for which we have fought together." 
 
 The conclusion was this, — Piedmont had gained one 
 province, and Italy seemed to be farther from unity than 
 before; but the fire had been kindled, and henceforward 
 there was no power which could resist the advance of Italian 
 independence. The tenacious patriotism which had survived 
 the suppressive measures of the old regime in Piedmont, and 
 the brutality and massacres of Austria in Lombardy and Venice, 
 could not be checked by the barriers of straw which the system 
 proposed by the Emperor of the French would have erected 
 around it. The fire kindled in Piedmont had already reached 
 the principalities and Tuscany : it was soon to blaze up in 
 Naples. Napoleon had left Italy to itself: it took him at 
 his word, and while the Congress at Zurich was discussing 
 the Italian question, the Italians were accomplishing facts 
 which rendered the Peace of Villafranca a dead letter and 
 the Congress an absurdity. 
 
 (3) The annexation of Central Italy. 
 
 The outbreak of war in the north naturally led to revolutions 
 in Central Italy — in Tuscany, in the duchies of Parma and 
 Modena, and in the Romagna. War was declared between 
 Austria and Piedmont on the 27th of April, and on the same 
 day the Tuscan dynasty fell. The rulers of Parma and 
 Modena fled from their capitals, and when, soon afterwards, 
 the Austrian troops were withdrawn from Bologna to aid 
 their countrymen in Lombardy, the Papal Legate retired to 
 Rome. Provisional governments were at once established in 
 these states, and envoys were sent to Vittorio Emanuele to 
 offer their allegiance to the prince who was already recognized 
 
2^8 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 as the future King of Italy. The King received these deputa- 
 tions and appointed commissioners to represent his authority and 
 interests in Florence, Modena, and Parma. As to these three 
 states there was little hesitation, but the establishment of 
 Piedmontese authority in the Romagna meant a collision 
 with the Pope, and it was not till the eve of the armistice 
 that Massimo d'Azeglio was sent to Bologna to represent 
 the King. 
 
 Meanwhile the question of the future of these provinces 
 engaged the attention of all in Central Italy. It was fortunate 
 that in Tuscany, the most important state, the supreme power 
 came into the hands of a man whose energy and courage were 
 only equalled by the statesmanlike insight with which he 
 clung to the policy of union. This man, the Baron Bettino 
 Ricasoli, was the descendant of a noble and ancient family. 
 At the moment when the revolution broke out he was on his 
 way to Turin in order to come to a complete understanding 
 with the King and Cavour. In his absence a triumvirate was 
 formed by Peruzzi, Malenchini and Dancini. Subsequently a 
 more regular government was established, in which Ricasoli 
 became minister of the interior. He soon however asserted 
 his supremacy, and became the virtual dictator of Tuscany. 
 The smaller provinces formed themselves into a new state, 
 which took the name of Emilia. Here Farini, a Romagnol 
 by origin, took the lead, and soon acquired in Emilia the 
 same authority as Ricasoli wielded in Florence. To these 
 two men it was principally due that Central Italy was guided 
 through a crisis of the greatest difficulty to a secure union with 
 Piedmont and Lombardy in the new Italian Kingdom. 
 
 In Tuscany Ricasoli had to struggle not only against the 
 partisans of the late dynasty, but against the supporters of Tuscan 
 autonomy, and against the scheme for a confederation or a king- 
 dom of Central Italy, which was put forward by Napoleon and 
 adopted in the Peace of Villafranca. This scheme was at one 
 time pressed upon Ricasoli by Farini and other representatives 
 
:il] The War of 1859 and its Results. 299 
 
 :_ _ 
 
 the outset, by Napoleon's desire that the central confederation 
 should be headed by a prince of his own family. Few Italians 
 could have wished to substitute French for Austrian domination, 
 and Farini very soon withdrew his support. More could be 
 said for Tuscan autonomy, but to this plan, as well as to the 
 other, Ricasoli opposed a strenuous resistance. At the head 
 of the unitarian party, he insisted, with a tenacity remarkable 
 amongst Italian statesmen, on the absolute and unqualified 
 unity of all the provinces under King Vittorio Emanuela> 
 But the ground was not prepared. The leading Tuscans and 
 the chiefs of Central Italy reconciled themselves with difficulty 
 to the absorption of their country in the little kingdom of 
 Sardinia. The autonomy of Tuscany seemed to them essential 
 to the preservation of the character of Tuscany and its political 
 life, and, in opposition to Mazzini, who had laboured to impress 
 the vital importance of absolute unity, men like Capponi, whose 
 patriotism was unquestioned, maintained the idea of the auto- 
 nomy of the separate portions of the peninsula. A society called 
 the National Italian Society (p. 190), organized by the exiles- 
 at Turin, had been for some years labouring for a federative 
 system, in which each province, adhering to its old limits and 
 so far as possible to its individuality, should become part of a 
 united Italian confederation. The advocates of the union of 
 Tuscany with Piedmont were few, but at their head was the 
 motive power of all— Ricasoli. France urged, and England 
 was not openly hostile to, a kingdom of Central Italy; Prussia 
 alone, with that wise foresight which characterised her states- 
 men through all the difficulties of that epoch, urged the 
 union of the principalities with Piedmont. The moment and 
 the movement were critical. The acceptance of the project 
 of a Central Italy, once effected, would have become almost 
 an insuperable obstacle to future unity, which could only have 
 been attained by a new revolutionary and probably republican 
 agitation. 
 
300 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Ricasoli threw his whole soul into this struggle, determined 
 to yield to no pressure and to admit no obstacle. He never 
 hesitated an instant in his choice of means or the object to be 
 gained. He combated the supporters of a republic with the 
 same energy as those of Napoleon or the House of Lorraine. 
 But while he refused on the one hand to concede anything to 
 the spirit of separatism he insisted on the fullest expression of 
 the popular will, resisted obstinately an enforced unification, 
 and declared that he would not accept the absorption of 
 Tuscany in Piedmont, but only in Italy under the King 
 Vittorio Emanuele. His persistency marred all the plans 
 of the French Emperor. The premature peace left Ricasoli 
 master of the situation, unless the Emperor chose to impose 
 his decisions by force ; and it cannot be doubted that to his 
 constancy and inflexibility was due in great measure the success 
 of the unitary movement, so fruitful in its ulterior consequences. 
 Ricasoli wrote to his brother after the battle of Solferino : " We 
 must no longer speak of Piedmont, nor of Florence, nor of 
 Tuscany ; we must speak neither of fusion nor annexation, but 
 of the union of the Italian people under the constitutional 
 government of Vittorio Emanuele. It is to Italian unity and 
 strength that we must aspire." 
 
 The Peace of Villafranca threw Florence into a condition 
 of intense agitation. The official bulletins posted on the walls 
 were torn down by the people. The advocates of a restora- 
 tion of the House of Lorraine excited only the most intense 
 hostility on the part of the Tuscans. The provisional govern- 
 ment in Florence prepared for hostilities. A league was formed 
 between Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Romagna, and a joint 
 army was formed, consisting of twenty-four regiments of 
 infantry, four of cavalry, twelve battalions of Bersaglieri and 
 other arms in proportion. The peace, which stipulated for 
 restoration and confederation, obliged Vittorio Emanuele to 
 recall his representatives from the revolted provinces. Early 
 in August, 1859, Boncompagni left Florence. Gierolimo Ulloa, 
 
: 
 
 ii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 301 
 
 Neapolitan general who had commanded the Tuscan army, 
 was replaced by Garibaldi. Central Italy was organizing itself 
 as a state in readiness for an active union. An assembly was 
 elected which met in the ancient hall of the Five Hundred in 
 the old town-hall in Florence. It voted the deposition of the 
 dynasty of Lorraine and annexation to the kingdom of 
 Sardinia, at the same time offering Ricasoli dictatorial powers. 
 Things were in this state when Mazzini's arrival threw a new 
 difficulty in the way of establishing a solid authority in 
 Tuscany, for his agitation for the republic exposed Italy to 
 a new danger. Ricasoli combated the projects of Mazzini on 
 the one side as he did those of the Emperor on the other, and 
 succeeded in maintaining the moral forces of Tuscany intact. 
 On the 29th of September, a council was held at Scaricalasino, 
 between Ricasoli, Farini and Cipriani, who had been appointed 
 Governor-General of the revolted provinces of Romagna, and 
 it was arranged to send Minghetti to Turin to obtain the 
 consent of the government and of the King to the election of 
 the Prince of Carignano as regent — the election to be made 
 separately by the assemblies of the four provinces. The 
 negotiations ended in a compromise : the Sardinian govern- 
 ment hesitated to take a step so compromising for the dynasty, 
 and Boncompagni was appointed Governor-General of the 
 united provinces of Central Italy. 
 
 At this juncture the Congress of Zurich, which was called 
 to ratify and give the sanction of all the powers to the Italian 
 settlement, came together. It met on the 6th of August, and 
 sat till the 10th of November, 1859. Never was a harder task 
 given to a diplomatic body to perform than that laid before 
 this assembly; it had been called to approve and countersign 
 the settlement of Villafranca, while this settlement was being 
 rendered futile by events which were its inevitable consequence, 
 and by the irrepressible action of the Italian people. At this 
 moment France had a lively apprehension of the consequences, 
 on the one hand, of renewing the war, and on the other, of 
 
302 Italy, [Chap. 
 
 putting excessive pressure on the Italians ; Prussia was ready 
 to intervene to prevent any further prostration of Austria, though 
 indisposed to support the illegitimate influence of that power 
 in Southern and Central Italy; Great Britain was well disposed 
 towards Italy, but suspicious of France. The hopes that France 
 had entertained, of being able to assume a mastery over the 
 future of Italy by keeping her divided and a field for intrigues 
 such as had been so potent in the past, were frustrated by the 
 audacity of the Italian liberals, no longer paralysed by con- 
 trariety of aims and ambitions, or by the incompetence of their 
 leaders. After long discussion, the treaty known as the Peace 
 of Zurich was finally concluded on the ioth of November, 
 1859. T ne following are the principal articles : — The prisoners 
 of war shall be surrendered on both sides ; the Austrian frontiers 
 shall be those recognized by the preliminary negotiations at 
 Villafranca ; Lombards who wish to leave the new possessions 
 of Piedmont, or to leave those of Austria to abide in those of 
 Piedmont, will be allowed one year to transport all their effects 
 without duty ; Lombards born in the territory ceded to Pied- 
 mont, and enrolled in the Austrian army shall be free. It 
 was further stipulated that the Emperor of the French and 
 the Emperor of Austria should use all their influence to 
 constitute an Italian confederation under the presidency of the 
 Pope. Venetia was to be comprised in this confederation. It 
 was agreed that the consent of the powers should be necessary 
 for any change in the frontiers of the different states of Italy. 
 The rights of the sovereigns of Tuscany, Modena and Parma 
 were formally recognized. The Emperor of the French and 
 the Emperor of Austria undertook to use their influence 
 with the sovereign Pontiff to secure reforms in his states. A 
 formal clause secured that no person compromised by the late 
 political events should be prosecuted or disturbed by either of 
 the contracting parties. 
 
 The decisions of the Congress of Zurich were as futile as 
 those of the treaty of Villafranca. The French Emperor was 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 303 
 
 obliged to accept the consequences of his previous action. 
 The presidency of the Pope, the confederation of the Italian 
 states, and all other details of the famous scheme vanished into 
 thin air. No force had been provided to compel the Italian 
 people to relinquish what they had won, and they understood 
 that the jealousies of Europe would permit none of the powers 
 to interfere. 
 
 The general assembly of the central provinces was convoked 
 for the 6th and 7th of November, 1859, and on the 7th, 
 Ricasoli proposed, and the Tuscan assembly approved, the 
 regency of Prince Eugenio of Savoy and the promulgation of 
 the constitution of Carlo Alberto. The example was followed 
 by the other assemblies in spite of French opposition, and in 
 this juncture the influence of England, now again under the 
 Whig government of Lord Palmerston, was exercised in favour 
 of the union of Italy. 
 
 The difficulties were not slight : the timidities of Turin 
 aided the promoters of division, and, but for the firmness of 
 Farini and Ricasoli, the union of Italy was in danger even 
 at this last moment. The Congress of Zurich was still sitting, 
 and Napoleon in response to the votes of the assemblies, 
 notified the King on the 9th of November that he must 
 repudiate the regency of Prince Eugenio under penalty of 
 nullification of his action by the Congress. The attitude of the 
 Emperor excited the indignation of Ricasoli, who wrote to 
 Salvagnoli : " My anger at this new expedient of the Emperor 
 has renewed my strength. I swear that I will not fail in 
 my undertaking, and I hope to accomplish it ; in any case I 
 will sooner permit myself to be crushed than yield." In face 
 of this imperial veto, the Piedmontese ministry, in council 
 with the principal political men of Piedmont, contrived the 
 expedient that Prince Eugenio should declare that, though 
 motives of public convenience compelled him to decline the 
 regency, he would, in virtue of the power given him by the vote 
 of the assembly, depute Boncompagni to exercise his authority. 
 
304 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Thereupon Castelli, one of Cavour's confidants, was sent 
 to Florence, with instructions to prevent the sending of the 
 deputation which should carry to Turin the vote in favour of 
 the regency. On the 13th Castelli telegraphed to Rattazzi 
 that he found Ricasoli obstinate, and on the same day he 
 wrote that if the King did not adopt a decided policy, he was 
 convinced that he would lose himself and Italy. " Woe to the 
 King, if he is not inspired by a real Italian will and does not 
 proclaim it loudly. His chariot is the people who elected 
 him King, and if he does not do his duty, that is, if he does 
 not maintain himself and show himself to be thoroughly 
 Italian, he will ruin himself and us. Distrust France and do 
 not trust England too implicitly. We count on the King." 
 Ricasoli resisted all compromises and the pressure of the 
 Sardinian government, and when Boncompagni notified him 
 of his immediate departure for Florence to assume the regency, 
 he openly expressed his discontent and replied that he would 
 not accept anyone as regent but the Prince, in accordance with 
 the interests of the King and of Italy, and with the vote of 
 the assembly. Peruzzi in this juncture assumed a responsibility 
 which did not belong to him, and declared his acceptance of 
 the proposition of a vice-regency, whereupon Ricasoli at last 
 yielded to the pressure of all his friends, amongst whom was 
 Cavour, and consented to accept Boncompagni, but with the 
 distinct proviso that he should be recognized as vice-regent in 
 the place of Eugenio of Carignano. 
 
 Fortunately for Italy, the French Emperor began, in the 
 winter of 1859-60, to relax his opposition. This was partly 
 due to his growing conviction that the people of Central Italy 
 desired union — and it must be remembered that he always 
 put forward the popular suffrage as the basis of his own 
 throne; partly to the fact that he could not carry out his 
 plans without force, and to apply force for such an end would 
 have been to stultify all the pretensions with which he had 
 entered Lombardy; but partly also — and this was probably 
 
xir.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 305 
 
 his most powerful motive — to his perception that the an- 
 nexation of Central Italy to Piedmont would give him a 
 pretext for reviving the claim upon Savoy and Nice, which he 
 had dropt when he failed to go to Venice. The change in his 
 policy was indicated by another pamphlet, "Le Pape et le 
 Congres," and by a change in his ministry. About the same 
 time, Cavour returned to power. The Rattazzi ministry was 
 no match for the difficult and complicated situation, and 
 Cavour became President of the Council, after six months 
 of absence from affairs, in January i860. The first thing he 
 did was to arrange with the Emperor that a popular vote 
 should be taken in the disputed provinces. 
 
 But, still true to his character, the Emperor could not 
 frankly and openly give way. He still endeavoured to impose 
 conditions on the popular vote, conditions which delayed the 
 actual union and created great embarrassment and irritation to 
 Ricasoli. The Emperor insisted on the people voting first 
 on the question whether the annexation should take place, or 
 whether the central states should be formed into a new 
 kingdom, and then as to the person who should rule this 
 new kingdom if formed. Ricasoli, irritated, writes : " Say to 
 the King, and say to Cavour, that we must have decided action 
 and firm resolutions : firmness and promptness in executing 
 them. I should like to inspire the King with my own faith ; 
 he is the providential man. But beware of uncertainty : in 
 great moments like this, prudence is that course which seems 
 most hazardous. We want no half measures. The King 
 cannot consent to name a king from his own family for Central 
 Italy : he would ruin himself." The good sense of Farini and 
 Ricasoli, ultimately supported by Cavour, at length triumphed 
 over all opposition, and on the nth of March the plebiscite 
 in the central provinces declared for union in the Italian 
 kingdom. But the representative of France at Florence still 
 protested, and demanded that a vice-regent should be ap- 
 pointed from Turin. Ricasoli replied that this was a free and 
 
306 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 spontaneous action of the people, and that he was surprised 
 that France should oppose popular government; he hoped 
 that the French cabinet would not persist in its disapproval, 
 otherwise it would only succeed in making France detested 
 instead of Austria. Montanelli wrote that the Emperor had 
 declared he would never consent to the annexation of Tuscany, 
 to which intimation the people of Florence responded with 
 enthusiastic demonstrations for Vittorio Emanuele. But this 
 was the last of the French opposition. On the 24th of 
 March Cavour signed the treaty ceding Savoy and Nice. 
 "Now," he said to the French plenipotentiary, "you are our 
 accomplices." Guizot was right when he said, " Two men are 
 now foremost in Europe, Napoleon and M. de Cavour. The 
 stakes are laid : I back M. de Cavour." 
 
 On the 20th of March, Baron Ricasoli read to the 
 Assembly, which met for the last time on that day, a message 
 in which he rendered an account of what the government had 
 done both in administration and legislation and in general 
 policy. "Our national mission," he concluded, "is finished 
 on that day in which the municipality has fused itself in the 
 nation. It only remains to us now to send to the King an 
 expression of the popular will, and on you to declare your 
 high mandate exhausted. We surrender power with the con- 
 sciousness of having exercised it for the good of the country \ 
 to the King and to Parliament belongs now the government 
 of the nation." Being charged with the duty of carrying the 
 formal result of the Tuscan vote, he was received with great 
 festivities at Genoa and at Turin, where, on the 22nd, he 
 presented the record of the vote to the King. On the same 
 day, a royal decree, which was to be sanctioned by Parliament, 
 declared that the province of Tuscany had become part of 
 Italy. A similar process took place in the Duchies and 
 Romagna, where an enormous majority voted for union in the 
 Italian kingdom. On the 12th of April the decree of annexation 
 was presented to the Parliament formed of the deputies of the 
 
xil] The War of 1859 and its Results. 307 
 
 provinces of the Sardinian kingdom and those of Lombardy, 
 Emilia and Tuscany, and by a vote almost unanimous — one 
 vote in the chamber and two in the senate being adverse — 
 the law was approved. Three days later, the decree of 
 annexation became a law of the state, and the kingdom of Italy 
 was legally and effectually constituted. 
 
 The King had submitted to the loss of Savoy and Nice 
 not merely as a set-off against the new provinces, but as an 
 earnest of further progress towards complete emancipation from 
 Austria, and Cavour undoubtedly felt that, in his future re- 
 lations with Napoleon III and in regard to the southern 
 provinces, he had secured French co-operation or at least 
 acquiescence in the steps which might be proposed. But 
 though the King and Cavour had assented, the cession 
 of the western provinces had still to be approved by Italy. 
 Cavour, on taking office in January, had stipulated for the 
 immediate summons of a Parliament, in which members from 
 Lombardy sat for the first time along with their Piedmontese 
 compatriots. This body was now to give way to a parliament 
 representative of the nation. On the 25th of March, elections 
 were held by which for the first time an Italian parliament 
 was legally constituted. 
 
 The approval of the cession of Savoy and Nice to France 
 was the great difficulty which Cavour met with in this first 
 session of the Italian parliament. The Savoyards and the 
 Piedmontese were in fact the most solid and conservative 
 peoples of the dominions of Vittorio Emanuele; those 
 upon whom political calculations might be based most firmly, 
 and whose political education had been, if not the most 
 advanced, certainly the soundest and most trustworthy. The 
 Kings of Sardinia, now to become Kings of Italy, had been 
 originally Dukes of Savoy, and to cut themselves adrift from 
 the cradle of their race added an injury of sentiment to one 
 of interest. But the arrangement having been made in the 
 treaties before the war, the payment of the price was insisted on 
 
308 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 by the brute force of the French Empire. The pretext of a 
 plebiscite, which was simply a device to cover a compulsory 
 vote, was the means by which Napoleon concealed all his 
 nefarious operations. Myself a witness of the entire trans- 
 action, a resident in Savoy during the process of transference 
 from one allegiance to another, I could see that the whole 
 process was one of coercion. On the eve of the vote I had 
 an opportunity to ascertain the opinions of those who were 
 about to participate in it as to whether the population favoured 
 the transfer, and the reply I received was this : u What can 
 you expect ? We are sold like sheep ; what have we to say 
 to the bargain?" The entire pressure of the Church and of 
 the priests was at the service of Napoleon III, who had made 
 his bargain with the clergy of France, and the officials of the 
 old kingdom destined to transference to the empire were mute 
 instruments of the combined will of France and Sardinia. 
 Thus the decisive vote was a foregone conclusion. Never- 
 theless in the new parliament there were those who did not 
 hesitate to repudiate the diplomatic agreement and refuse 
 their sanction to its legalization. A violent debate in the 
 chamber of deputies took place on the law for the cession of 
 Savoy and Nice, but after summing up gain and loss from a 
 practical point of view, parliament accepted the "fait accompli" 
 by a majority of two hundred and twenty-nine, there being 
 thirty-three negative votes and twenty-three abstentions. 
 
 But France lost more than she won. The limitations 
 which Napoleon III had sought to place on Italian liberty led 
 to a separation of interests between the two countries, while 
 the threat to the power of the Pope implied in the project of 
 a central kingdom under a Napoleon alienated the catholic 
 sentiment of Europe from the Emperor. Thus, in the end, 
 nothing resulted to him from his colossal plans, beyond the 
 acquisition of Savoy and Nice — a poor compensation for a 
 much more serious loss — the loss of the friendship of Italy. 
 The consequences were seen when, in 1870, France appealed 
 
 
[i.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 309 
 
 Italy and was refused assistance except on conditions which, 
 dng to his pledges to the Church, he could not accept, 
 [eanwhile nothing more was heard of the reforms which, 
 :ording to the agreements of Villafranca and Zurich, were 
 to be pressed upon the Pope and the King of Naples. To 
 all such proposals, Pius IX returned but one answer, "Non 
 possumus," and the new King of Naples, Francis II, followed 
 in the steps of his father. Thus they prepared the way for 
 their own destruction, and for the absorption of the fair lands, 
 which they had so long oppressed, into the new kingdom of 
 Italy. 
 
 K 
 
 (4) The Conquest of Sicily and Naples. 
 
 In the southern kingdoms of Italy, the years which inter- 
 vened between the restoration of Bourbon tyranny in 1849, and 
 the Garibaldian expedition of i860, were years of depression 
 and misery. Despotism, engaged in a struggle for existence, 
 doubled its severity, and the Neapolitan prisons were crammed 
 with suffering wretches. The governments of France and 
 England, disgusted by the inhumanities of Bomba's paternal 
 rule, protested in vain, and finally withdrew their ministers and 
 dismissed those of Naples. But nothing could teach a Bourbon. 
 Few events of any note break the terrible monotony of this 
 period. The people seemed to have lost the capacity for 
 indignation. 
 
 In these conditions, it is easy enough to understand such 
 acts as that of Agesilao Milano, who enlisted in the Neapolitan 
 army in order to get a better chance of killing the King. 
 In the attempt to accomplish this he failed, and paid the 
 anticipated penalty. Such a deed throws lurid light upon the 
 dull picture of misery and discontent stifled everywhere and 
 anyhow. In 1857 took place the expedition of Carlo Pisacane, 
 rivalling that of the Bandieras in the insufficiency of its means 
 and the ignorance of the field where it should plant its seed, 
 
310 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 and predestined like it to failure. A few confederates were 
 ready, but the people was still unprepared for a spontaneous 
 movement, and the majority of Pisacane's associates were from 
 the north of Italy. His plan was to embark with his companions 
 on a Genoese steamer which was going to Tunis, and once at 
 sea to take on board a supply of arms to be brought out by 
 Rosalino Pilo, the Sicilian patriot ; then to liberate the prisoners 
 at the island of Ponza, with whom they would disembark on the 
 Neapolitan coast and raise the Cilento. A storm, however, 
 compelled Pilo to throw overboard the cargo of his little boat, 
 and the expedition was postponed. On the 25th of June of 
 the same year they started on the ill-fated expedition of Sapri. 
 They had found and seized 150 muskets on board the steamer, 
 and, landing at Ponza as at first intended, they released the 
 galley slaves and sailed for their destination, which they reached 
 on the 28th. Like the Bandieras, they found no friends, and 
 being attacked by the peasantry as well as by the troops, they 
 were driven into the interior, pursued and finally surrounded. 
 The greater part of their number were killed in the fight, or 
 murdered by the populace, or taken prisoners, but Pisacane, 
 with Nicotera and fifty others, escaped to the mountains, where 
 they hoped to raise the population. Here they were again 
 beset by troops and attacked by masses of the people of all 
 ages and both sexes. Those who escaped the carnage were 
 taken prisoners, Pisacane being amongst the slain, and 
 Nicotera amongst the prisoners. Put on their trial, Nicotera, 
 Gagliani, Giordano, Valletta, La Sala, de Martino, and 
 San t' Andrea were condemned to death, — a penalty afterwards 
 commuted: of the rest, some 150 were sentenced to various 
 forms of imprisonment, and 56 were acquitted. The im- 
 prisoned were eventually released by the revolution of i860. 
 The movement of Pisacane was a distinctly republican rising, 
 as much in despite of the house of Savoy as of the Bourbon. 
 It was the last indication of insurrectionary activity in Naples 
 until the coming of Garibaldi. 
 
:r.] The War <?/" 1859 and its Results. 311 
 
 - 
 
 In the Principalities and in Tuscany revolutionary action had 
 been supported more or less openly by official responsibility. 
 Cavour had used means which, strictly speaking, might be 
 called illegal, to combat an external interference at once 
 unjustified and unauthorized by treaty. The provisional 
 governments under their respective dictators in Emilia and 
 Tuscany had received hearty support from the Piedmontese 
 government. Farini, and Ricasoli were in fact the lieutenants 
 of Vittorio Emanuele. It was naturally expected that a 
 movement in the south would receive the like support, and 
 Central Italy was no sooner secured than it became a basis for 
 plots and revolutionary operations against the provinces re- 
 maining under absolute governments. 
 
 The Sicilian refugees in England and in Piedmont, taking 
 up again the threads of conspiracy which had more or less 
 existed since 1848, resuscitated the organization suppressed at 
 that time. Francesco Crispi, one of the ministers of the 
 Sicilian provisional government of 1848 and long an exile in 
 England and France, and Rosalino Pilo, a Sicilian exile at 
 Genoa, were the prime movers in the revival of the struggle in 
 Sicily. In the course of two journeys through the island made 
 by Crispi as agent of the revolutionary committee, he had 
 succeeded in laying down the lines of the new movement, and 
 he then appealed to the Italian government for aid. Cavour, 
 apprehensive of all republican tendencies and recognizing in 
 Crispi a disciple of Mazzini, refused any direct co-operation. 
 Crispi, therefore, in December 1859 went to Modena to 
 arrange with Farini for the assistance necessary to arm and 
 transport the volunteers who might offer themselves for the 
 expedition. Farini accepted Crispi's explanations, and ap- 
 proved his plans. Being practically independent of the 
 government of Turin, he was able, without compromising it, 
 to offer what was necessary: he accordingly promised a 
 million francs. From Rattazzi, then Minister of the Interior 
 at Turin, Crispi received friendly assurances but without 
 
312 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 practical results. Other revolutionary chiefs, including Cairoli, 
 Fabrizi, Bertani, and Nino Bixio, exercised their influence 
 upon Garibaldi, who had lived in retirement since the Peace 
 of Villafranca, to induce him to take the lead in the projected 
 expedition. 
 
 After much debate and long hesitation, with opposition 
 from certain of the Sicilian exiles, jealous of the Mazzinians 
 and apprehensive of losing the lead in any future movements, 
 Crispi succeeded in determining Garibaldi to move. Rosalino 
 Pilo went to Palermo to prepare the movement in Sicily, in 
 anticipation of Garibaldi's arrival. Unfortunately, accidental 
 delays, added to differences of opinion between the chiefs, 
 retarded the sailing of the expedition from Genoa beyond the 
 day appointed, and the insurrection which broke out on the 
 3rd of April, i860, at Palermo was soon suppressed. The 
 insurgents however took refuge in the mountains, where they 
 maintained their organisation despite the activity of the 
 Neapolitan troops. 
 
 On the 6th of May, i860, Garibaldi, finally decided by the 
 arguments and assurances of Crispi 1 , to whom the preparation 
 of the insurrection in general, and especially in its Sicilian 
 details, was chiefly due, sailed with " The Thousand " on two 
 
 1 "Sirtori opposed the undertaking because he did not believe in its 
 success. He abused Crispi, as the principal instigator, and said to La Farina, 
 ' You will be responsible for the blood of Garibaldi ; they will say that you 
 have urged him to his ruin.' — ' On the 1st of May,' says Saffi, 'Medici also 
 dissuaded Garibaldi from the attempt.' 'On the 2nd,' says Saffi again, 
 ' Crispi and Garibaldi were alone.' ' You alone,' said the General, ' encourage 
 me to go to Sicily — all the others dissuade me.' ' I do so,' replied Crispi, 
 4 because convinced that you will do something useful to the country and 
 highly honourable to yourself. I have only one fear — the uncertainty of 
 the sea.' ' I will answer for the sea,' said Garibaldi. ' And I for the land,' 
 replied Crispi. To this surprising undertaking, three men — Crispi, Bixio 
 and Bertani — certainly contributed ; but without Garibaldi, who was not a 
 man to yield to any pressure without being convinced, nothing would have 
 been done" (Tivaroni). 
 
xii.] TJu War of 1859 and its Results. 313 
 
 old steamers, the Lombardia and the Piemonte. The arms 
 promised with the consent of Cavour were not sent, and the 
 steamers were obliged to leave with the volunteers, who before 
 departure had risen to the number of 1200. They had four 
 guns, but an insufficient supply of muskets, even for the men 
 embarked, not to speak of those which ought to have been taken 
 for the Sicilians. Undoubtedly the Piedmontese authorities 
 were more or less accomplices of the entire operation. The 
 navy had orders to close its eyes to the expedition if it went 
 to Sicily, but to arrest it if it entered a port of Sardinia. 
 After putting in at Orbetello, where Garibaldi by a ruse 
 succeeded in obtaining from the armoury the arms and 
 ammunition he required, the steamers went to Marsala, which 
 port they reached on the 13th of May. Two Neapolitan 
 men-of-war arrived in time to witness the landing, but only 
 interfered when it was nearly over, opening fire too late to do 
 any harm. There is a tradition that two British war-vessels, 
 which lay in the harbour, had been sent there with the intention 
 of protecting the landing, and that they took position in the 
 line of fire to prevent the Neapolitans from firing on the 
 Garibaldians. There does not appear to be any foundation 
 for this tradition, and it was evidently impossible for the 
 British ships, being already anchored, to put themselves in 
 the line of fire, which was at the discretion of the Neapolitan 
 commanders; but it is very probable that the notorious 
 sympathy of England for the Sicilians induced the Neapolitans 
 to believe that the ships were prepared to support the landing, 
 and temporarily paralyzed them. 
 
 Garibaldi immediately conducted his men to Salemi, a day's 
 march into the interior, where he was reinforced by constantly 
 increasing contingents of Sicilian volunteers. Here a pro- 
 visional government was organized, with Garibaldi as dictator, 
 Crispi being appointed Secretary of State. Here also the 
 programme of the expedition was announced as union with Italy 
 under Vittorio Emanuele, thus distinctly and authoritatively 
 
314 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 determining the question of a republic or an annexation 
 to Italy from the very outset. From this moment Crispi 
 practically became the political director of the insurrection. 
 His intimacy with the island and all its personalities gave him 
 a mastery which Garibaldi, knowing nothing of the island, 
 could not have acquired. From Salemi the Garibaldian forces 
 moved on Palermo. Midway, the Neapolitan army, nearly 
 double the force of Garibaldi's, with four pieces of artillery, 
 had entrenched itself at Calatafimi. A preliminary skirmish 
 in front of the main position was decided in favour of the 
 Garibaldians, and the Neapolitans retreated on their fortified 
 positions. In spite of the numerical superiority of the Nea- 
 politans, the Garibaldians, though twice repulsed, succeeded 
 finally in carrying the key of the position of Calatafimi in the 
 third charge, and the Neapolitan troops fell back on Palermo. 
 Garibaldi, following them, was joined at Monreale, five miles 
 from Palermo, by Pilo, who, with Carini, had succeeded in 
 maintaining the insurrection in the interior. Their united 
 forces made an attack on the position of the Neapolitans at 
 Monreale. But the position was too strong and the numbers 
 holding it too great. Garibaldi was therefore obliged to fall 
 back, Pilo having been killed in the fight. Here Crispi's 
 knowledge of the country came into play, and under his 
 guidance a flank march was made, leaving the communications 
 with the west and encircling Palermo through the difficult 
 mountain country south of the city. Thus, while keeping up a 
 demonstration on the side of Monreale, Garibaldi succeeded in 
 moving the main body of his forces to Misilmeri and Gibilrossa, 
 sending his artillery up by a mountain road with a small 
 detachment to mislead the pursuing Neapolitans. 
 
 At early dawn on the 27th of May, Garibaldi assaulted 
 Palermo on the east while the army of Lanza was searching 
 for him in the mountains, and with three columns, commanded 
 by Crispi, Bruzzesi and Bassini, attacked the outer lines 
 of the Neapolitans, driving them within the city walls. Here 
 
:il] The War of 1859 and its Results. 315 
 
 •ehind their defences they made a stand, but yielded to a 
 ;econd attack supported by the corps of Bixio, and the 
 aribaldians with an impetuous assault penetrated the works 
 nd reached the heart of the city. Barricading the streets and 
 onstructing hasty defences, the Garibaldians now sustained 
 n unequal combat against the garrison of the fortress and the 
 troops of Lanza returning from Monreale. The street-fight 
 ended in the garrison becoming demoralized, and taking 
 refuge in the castle, whence they bombarded the city — an 
 operation in which they were joined by the fleet. On the 
 30th of May, after a terrible but fruitless bombardment, the 
 Neapolitan commander proposed an armistice, and the British 
 Admiral Mundy, whose ship was anchored in the harbour, 
 offered it as neutral ground for negotiations. Never perhaps 
 in the daring life of Garibaldi was his splendid audacity so 
 conspicuously shown as on this occasion. His ammunition 
 was entirely exhausted ; he could not have renewed the attack 
 had the armistice been broken ; but the conditions proposed 
 by the Neapolitan authorities being unacceptable, he broke 
 off negotiations and denounced the armistice. This audacity 
 cowed the royalists, and a treaty was concluded by which the 
 Neapolitans agreed to evacuate Palermo. 
 
 The city was accordingly surrendered to Garibaldi (June 6). 
 A government was organized, and, leaving Crispi at the head 
 of affairs in Palermo, Garibaldi marched eastward on Messina. 
 The Neapolitan forces all over the island were demoralized ; the 
 minor fortresses were evacuated, and Messina, Milazzo and 
 Syracuse alone retained their garrisons. Reinforcements came 
 to Garibaldi from Italy under General Medici, while the 
 Italian government, seeing that success had crowned the 
 initiatory movements, relaxed its apparent severity and allowed 
 arms and material to be sent forward with sufficient rapidity. 
 The main body of the Garibaldians, following the northern 
 coast of Sicily, met the first decided opposition at Milazzo. 
 After a desperate fight, in which the Garibaldian losses were 
 
316 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 greater than in any other operation in the island, the 
 Neapolitans were driven into the fortress, whence ships subse- 
 quently carried them to Naples. With the garrison of Messina 
 a convention was made, allowing them to retain the citadel of 
 that city, under pledge of neutrality (July 25). Garibaldi was 
 now able to prepare for the crossing into Calabria and the 
 movement on Naples. 
 
 Meanwhile Francis II, at last fully conscious of the danger, 
 was making convulsive efforts to save his throne. He begged 
 assistance from France : Napoleon replied that it was too 
 late. He proclaimed a free constitution (June 25), but who 
 would trust the promises of a Neapolitan Bourbon ? He even 
 humiliated himself so far as to crave the help of Turin, but 
 Cavour reminded him that only a year before, on his accession 
 to the throne, he had rejected the offer of an alliance with 
 France and Piedmont against the common enemy of Italy. 
 It was hardly likely that what had been spurned then, in 
 Piedmont's hour of need, would be proffered again now. The 
 European powers protested against the action of Garibaldi, 
 but none would move. Lord John Russell, acting for Great 
 Britain, frankly approved what was going on, and in a circular 
 to the ambassadors asserted the right of the Italians to settle 
 their own affairs. Thus Garibaldi was left to pursue his course 
 of victory unchecked. 
 
 In August he crossed the straits and occupied Reggio on 
 the 2 1 st. His march on Naples was hardly contested, and, as 
 the Garibaldian forces approached, the King evacuated the 
 city (Sept. 6) and took up a position on the Volturno, 
 covering Gaeta — which fortress was made the basis of the 
 Neapolitan operations. On the 7th of September Garibaldi 
 entered Naples. He now issued a proclamation assuming the 
 dictatorship of the kingdom, and in that capacity consigned 
 the Neapolitan navy to Persano, who commanded the Pied- 
 montese fleet. During these operations, the King of Naples, 
 acting, it is said, under the advice of Napoleon III, made 
 
ML] The War of 1859 and its Results. 317 
 
 :onciliatory propositions to Garibaldi, amongst which was an 
 >ffer of fifty million francs and the Neapolitan army in aid of 
 :he expedition for the liberation of Venice. Even Vittorio 
 
 knanuele wrote to Garibaldi that in the event of the King 
 )f Naples giving up Sicily, he thought the most reasonable 
 course would be to renounce all ulterior undertakings against 
 
 le Neapolitan kingdom. The strongest pressure was applied 
 from Paris to induce Garibaldi to halt, and Cavour, with 
 his morbid apprehension of republicanism, unconvinced by 
 Garibaldi's conspicuous declaration of fidelity to the monarchy 
 at Salemi, opposed rather than favoured all his movements 
 henceforward. But the fortunate obstinacy of Garibaldi re- 
 jected all considerations of delay or compromise, and he 
 immediately followed up the occupation of Naples by a move- 
 ment against the King. The royalist army, encamped on the 
 right bank of the Volturno, under cover of the fortress of 
 Capua, had taken up a very strong position against Garibaldi, 
 whose forces were also inferior in number. During the fight, 
 or series of fights, which followed (Sept. 19 — Oct. 1), the 
 vigour and audacity of his attacks on the Neapolitan line 
 partly compensated for his disadvantages. But the Nea- 
 politans fought well, and the Garibaldians, though at first 
 successful, were forced to give up the positions which 
 they had won, and were themselves attacked in turn. They 
 repelled their antagonists, and the fighting ended for a time 
 with no decided advantage to either side. It seemed clear 
 that, without the assistance of regular troops, Garibaldi could 
 make little impression on the Neapolitan strongholds. But 
 that assistance was now approaching. The forces of Italy 
 stepped in. 
 
 After the annexation of the Romagna, the Pope, foreseeing 
 further trouble, sanctioned the formation of an army consisting 
 mostly of foreign volunteers, which was placed under the com- 
 mand of a French soldier, General Lamoriciere. Garibaldi's 
 invasion of Calabria gave the signal for disturbances in the 
 
318 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 remaining portions of the Papal territory — in Umbria and the 
 Marches. It was evident that the new Papal army would be 
 used to suppress this movement; it was highly probable that 
 it would also go to the assistance of the King of Naples. 
 Meanwhile the- condition of the Neapolitan Kingdom was 
 rapidly becoming anarchical, and serious disorders took place 
 in Sicily. Garibaldi's attitude had become somewhat sus- 
 picious: while ostentatiously declaring for "Italy and Victor 
 Emmanuel," he had omitted to take any steps for uniting 
 Sicily with the Italian kingdom. He made no secret of his 
 intention of going on to Rome, and this was certain to mean 
 a collision with France, whose troops were still guarding the 
 Pope, while he projected an immediate attack on Venice, that 
 is, another war with Austria. At the same time, feeling that 
 Cavour was the chief obstacle to this rash and headstrong 
 policy, he demanded that the King of Italy should dismiss 
 Cavour. It was evident that the whole movement was getting 
 out of hand, and Cavour resolved again to take the lead. 
 Accordingly, on the 7th of September, he requested the Pope 
 to dismiss his foreign levies, and on his refusal ordered the 
 Italian forces to invade the Papal States. One battle, at 
 Castelfidardo (Sept. 18) sufficed to scatter the Papal army. 
 Lamoriciere took refuge in Ancona, where, attacked by land 
 and sea, he was speedily forced to surrender (Sept. 29). In 
 three weeks the campaign was over, and all the Papal States, 
 except the portion immediately round Rome — the so-called 
 "Patrimony of St Peter" — were in the hands of the Italian 
 government. 
 
 This success was promptly followed by the submission of 
 the question of the Two Sicilies to the Italian parliament, 
 which, on the nth of October, voted for annexation. Ten 
 days later, a plebiscite in Naples and Sicily ratified this 
 decision. But the sovereign "by divine right" was still 
 entrenched in Gaeta and Capua, and it proved no easy matter 
 to turn him out. On the 9th of October, Vittorio Emanuele, 
 
:n.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 319 
 
 I at the head of the army which had occupied the Marches, 
 crossed the frontier of the Neapolitan Kingdom. He joined 
 Garibaldi at Teano, and the patriotic General, who, while 
 detesting Cavour, revered and loved the King, at once placed 
 himself at his sovereign's orders. Capua was taken on 
 November 2, and a week later the King and the national 
 hero entered Naples together. Shortly afterwards Garibaldi, 
 disclaiming all honours and rewards, retired to Caprera, and 
 left the completion of his work to the royal troops. The siege 
 of Gaeta was prolonged for three months, partly owing to the 
 sturdy resistance of the Neapolitan forces, partly to the doubt- 
 ful attitude of the Emperor Napoleon, who had withdrawn his 
 ambassador from Turin, and whose ships occupied the harbour 
 of Gaeta. At length, yielding to the inevitable, Napoleon 
 withdrew his fleet, and the last stronghold of the Bourbons 
 fell (Feb. 13, 1861). A few days later the first parliament 
 of united Italy met at Turin, and representatives of Naples, 
 Sicily and the Papal States voted, along with the men of 
 Northern and Central Italy, the annexation of the south to the 
 Italian crown. 
 
 It was much to be regretted that this splendid accomplish- 
 ment of a nation's hopes left a soreness behind, and alienated 
 the two great men, Cavour and Garibaldi, who had most 
 contributed thereto. The unfortunate conflict of political 
 tendencies, which had made its appearance soon after the 
 return of Cavour to public affairs, and which to a certain 
 extent justified his predisposition against volunteer as com- 
 pared to regular service, had developed in his mind a hostility 
 to the former which made it very difficult for him to utilize 
 popular efforts in the direction of freedom or constitutional 
 liberty. It was to be expected that Carlo Alberto, on the 
 appearance of Garibaldi as a volunteer during the war of 
 1848, should refuse to avail himself of the services of a 
 brilliant revolutionist; for royal prejudices are ineffaceable. 
 But Cavour had had experience of those same prejudices, 
 
320 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 sufficient, one would have supposed, to enable him to appre- 
 ciate and utilize individuality wherever it might offer itself. 
 But his reluctance to make use of any revolutionary force, or 
 of any political agency which was not strictly contained in the 
 formulae of officialism, led him to suspect not only Mazzini, 
 but also Garibaldi and other irregular agents, whether in 
 military or civil affairs, as dangerous to authority. The con- 
 sequence was that in this prejudice he no longer distinguished 
 between the men whom he might have employed and those 
 whom he could not. What had been a difficulty only on the 
 mainland, became a positive danger in Sicily, where the 
 conflict between Cavour's agents and the government of 
 Garibaldi threatened to overthrow the new order of things. 
 Garibaldi had installed Crispi as real pro-dictator, though, 
 for . the purpose of maintaining the visible connection with 
 Piedmont, he had appointed Depretis to that office, imposing 
 on him Crispi as Secretary of State. Garibaldi's policy was 
 to organize Sicily as a dictatorship under laws assimilated as 
 nearly as possible to those of Piedmont, allowance being made 
 for the difference of latitude and popular temperament. In 
 accordance with this idea, which was due to the foresight of 
 Crispi, the education of the Sicilians by gradual improvement 
 in the government and assimilation of institutions was provided 
 for. No sudden change either in moral authority or in formal 
 administration was to take place : the insular officials were to 
 remain, while the visible authority was to be vested in an 
 agent of the King. 
 
 The central idea of all Garibaldi's endeavours was that 
 Sicily should be used as the base of operations, and that when 
 the provinces of Italy still in slavery had been from this base 
 set free, a general movement for unity should take place, and 
 the kingdom of Italy should be constituted by the voluntary 
 accession of all its parts. The idea of Cavour was, on the 
 contrary, the progressive annexation of the various provinces 
 to Piedmont, so that the kingdom of Italy should be built up 
 

 xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 321 
 
 simply by an aggrandizement of the original province. That 
 this was the process by which Italy was to be made one, was 
 shown by what had happened in other parts of the peninsula. 
 But, in the south, local and provincial prejudices presented an 
 obstacle of which Cavour in his rigid theoretical conception of 
 affairs took no account. The Sicilians are a people distinct 
 and different from those of all other provinces of Italy — 
 distinct in origin, in education and tendencies — and their 
 development into constitutional life was much more easy and 
 natural than that of the inhabitants of Naples or of the States 
 of the Church. The island had frequently been the scene of 
 bloody insurrections, followed by violent repression, through 
 all of which the national feelings of the people remained 
 unsuppressed and rose spontaneously at every renewal of an op- 
 portunity for national self-assertion. The records of the island 
 are full of splendid instances of this insurrectionary activity, 
 seeking to revert to their independence to the ancient political 
 constitution of the kingdom. The attempts of the Neapolitan 
 monarchy to consolidate Sicily and Naples had met with 
 obstinate and perennial resistance on the part of Sicily. The 
 separate organization of the kingdom during the Napoleonic 
 wars by England, under whose protection the island remained 
 secure within its sea-barriers, had given the people an ex- 
 perience of constitutional government which no section of 
 Italy, not even Piedmont, had at that time received, and the 
 records of British rule have probably never been effaced in 
 the mental history of the island. The insurrection of 1848 
 had renewed these recollections. In this insurrection Crispi 
 had been one of the prime movers, and it was he who had 
 drafted the constitution under which the island was governed 
 for a year of freedom. 
 
 When therefore, in i860, the Garibaldian dictatorship 
 
 assumed the place of the Neapolitan regime the maintenance 
 
 of monarchical forms was easy, and the good faith towards 
 
 Piedmont of all engaged in the revolutionary movement was 
 
 s. 1. 21 
 
322 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 too evident even for Cavour to ignore. The proclamation at 
 Salemi of allegiance to Vittorio Emanuele had been intended 
 as a declaration of faith and a guarantee for the entire 
 obedience of Sicily to the idea of union. But Crispi, who 
 knew his compatriots, and Garibaldi, whose chief counsellor 
 and adviser Crispi was, understood that Sicily needed a political 
 education different from that which was practicable among the 
 sober and conservative populations of the north, as well as 
 from that which Naples and the States of the Church required. 
 They, therefore, had determined on the maintenance of a 
 separate dictatorship in Sicily, owing allegiance to the King, 
 but maintaining its autonomy not only in civil but in military 
 affairs. The administration of the island, retained in the 
 hands of the islanders, meant the election of administrators 
 from the people, and the growth of a practical self-government 
 which could never be attained under substantially foreign rule. 
 Further steps in the movement of emancipation were also to 
 be directed from Sicily, as an independent state — which would 
 be impossible from the moment annexation took place. The 
 autonomy of Sicily was, in the opinion of the Dictator, 
 indispensable to a plan which contemplated the extension of 
 his operations to the States of the Church and to Rome itself, 
 thence, perhaps, to Venice, and which aimed finally, when the 
 process of emancipation should be complete, at a reunion of 
 all Italy with Rome for its capital. 
 
 This extensive programme, which had to wait another ten 
 years for its fulfilment, was encompassed, as we have seen, by 
 dangers which Cavour could not ignore ; and the apprehensions 
 which Garibaldi's action aroused, added to his abhorrence of 
 Mazzinism, forced him into an attitude of antagonism. He 
 feared Garibaldi in spite of his manifest loyalty to the King, 
 and he had the gravest apprehension of Crispi, whose energy 
 and great influence over the islanders made him a formidable 
 enemy had he chosen to oppose Cavour. Crispi's early 
 political education had, it is true, been under Mazzini, but in 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 323 
 
 the preparation of the expedition of the Thousand he had 
 given sufficient proof of his fidelity to the kingdom of Italy 
 which was his hope. Had Cavour possessed a knowledge 
 of men equal to his skill in diplomacy, he would have seen 
 that no more faithful instruments for the unity of Italy than 
 Crispi or Garibaldi could have been found to his hand. 
 
 As it was, when Garibaldi, in his anxiety to maintain a 
 personal link with the kingdom of Italy, had determined to 
 leave the practical administration of the island in the hands 
 of Crispi, while appointing Depretis as nominal pro-dictator, 
 he exposed himself to the suspicions of Cavour, who discovered 
 under this apparent allegiance plots and projects for the re- 
 public, or Heaven knows what other revolutionary schemes. 
 Such were perhaps entertained by Mazzini, but they certainly 
 never existed in the minds of Garibaldi or his Sicilian 
 administrator. Cavour, easily misled as to the character of 
 the men he employed, had fixed on La Farina, one of the early 
 exiles from Sicily, as his adviser in Sicilian matters, and 
 dispatched him to Palermo as the representative of the King. 
 La Farina was a man of narrow, bigoted political ideas, 
 incompetent as an administrator, a bitter partisan, and above 
 all hostile to Crispi and to the Mazzinian sect. He made an 
 early attempt at creating dissensions in Palermo, stimulating 
 hostility to the insular administration, and carrying his intrigue 
 to the point of provoking a violent demonstration against 
 Crispi. Garibaldi therefore arrested him and sent him aboard 
 the Piedmontese man-of-war lying in the harbour. This ended 
 the direct intervention of Cavour in Sicilian matters for the 
 moment, but it increased his animosity to Crispi. Depretis, 
 crafty, treacherous and unstable, consented to promote the 
 views of Cavour while professing fidelity to the Dictator; 
 nominally conforming to the administrative ideas of Crispi, he 
 really began a network of intrigues to precipitate a move- 
 ment for the immediate annexation at which Cavour aimed. 
 Evidence of this plot coming to the hands of Crispi, he 
 
 21 — 2 
 
324 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 called Depretis to account; Depretis protested, and avowed 
 ignorance of the proceedings, until Crispi showed him his own 
 correspondence and declared his determination to lay the 
 matter before Garibaldi in person. Depretis declared his 
 intention to accompany him, and they sailed by the same 
 steamer for Naples. After looking over the evidence Garibaldi 
 dismissed Depretis, and proposed to Crispi to appoint him to 
 the vacancy. This Crispi refused, and Garibaldi appointed as 
 pro-dictator Mordini, one of the associates in the expedition 
 of the Thousand. Unfortunately Mordini, though a man of 
 sterling honesty and patriotism, was infected by the same 
 suspicion of Crispi that influenced La Farina and others, and 
 Crispi begged of Garibaldi the privilege of remaining with him 
 in the administration of Naples during the organization of the 
 Neapolitan dictatorship. As in Sicily, Garibaldi maintained 
 the connection with Piedmont by the appointment of Palla- 
 vicini as pro-dictator; but Crispi was practically the head of 
 the administration in Naples as he had been in Sicily. 
 
 The hostility which Cavour showed to all those whom he 
 considered infected with Mazzinian doctrines was implacable, 
 and the war between him and Crispi was uninterrupted while 
 Cavour lived. It is on record, that Cavour admitted in a 
 conversation with one of his colleagues that Crispi had the 
 stuff of a statesman in him; but practically the relations 
 between them were always those of political hostility. He 
 tolerated Garibaldi as an instrument, while combating all his 
 theories, but for Crispi he had no tolerance. His persistence 
 finally triumphed over Garibaldi, and the plebiscite of an- 
 nexation was proclaimed by the pro-dictatorial governments 
 both in Sicily and in Naples. When the elections for 
 the parliament of united Italy were held, official pressure was 
 everywhere applied, and, acting in harmony with the en- 
 thusiasm caused by the consciousness of becoming part of a 
 great nation, produced a result which strongly confirmed the 
 power of Cavour and the triumph of Piedmont. Crispi was 
 
xii.] The War of 1859 and its Results. 325 
 
 defeated by official pressure at Palermo, and it was only owing 
 to the forethought of a friend, who had had him nominated in 
 an electoral district under the influence of his family, that he 
 succeeded in entering the first Italian parliament, in the pre- 
 paration of which he had played so large a part. The most 
 recent history of the kingdom justifies very largely Cavour's 
 distrust of the Republican party, but, had he been a better 
 judge of men, he would have modified instead of intensifying 
 political asperities, and he would have avoided some acts that 
 gravely diminished his political influence towards the end of 
 his career. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE COMPLETION OF ITALY, l86l — 1870. 
 
 (1) Aspromonte. 
 
 The first Italian Parliament met on the 18th of February, 
 1 86 1, in Turin. Ruggero Settimo, one of the most prominent 
 figures in a generation now passing away, was appointed 
 President of the Senate — a tribute to his constancy, and to 
 that of Sicily, in the cause of constitutional reform ; while 
 Rattazzi became President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
 Outside the legal frontiers of Italy, there still remained Rome 
 and Venice ; and these omissions were enough to hinder the 
 healthy organization of the State. Conspiracies on both sides 
 of the frontier, with all their consequences, were an inevitable 
 obstacle to prosperity and peace. And to the misfortune of 
 Italy, the master mind, which in all the complications, 
 diplomatic and military, had not for a day lost sight of the 
 end, the fearless and wise pilot, Cavour, died on the 6th of 
 June, 1 86 1. His last important act was to carry through the 
 absorption of the Garibaldian volunteers into the national 
 army, an act which raised a violent storm in the chamber, and 
 bitter recriminations on the part of Garibaldi himself.   His 
 next care would have been to find some modus vivendi with 
 the Papacy. Whether he would have been successful or not, 
 it is impossible to say. At all events, before he died, he laid 
 down the lines on which the famous law of guarantees was 
 
Chap, xiii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 327 
 
 drafted ten years after his death. He died as an orthodox 
 Catholic, with the words, "libera chiesa in libero stato," on 
 his lips. 
 
 What might have been the lot of Italy had the fates called 
 him away a few months sooner, or what advantages the State 
 might have won had he been at the helm in 1866, when 
 discordant counsels and untried hands put his great gains to 
 the risk of total loss, men may, and will, conjecture. The 
 succeeding years of parliamentary education would certainly 
 have been more profitably passed with Cavour at the head of 
 the ministry, for the ablest of all his successors, Ricasoli and 
 Rattazzi, never gained the large mastery of affairs which he 
 possessed. That Cavour was widely popular while he lived can 
 hardly be said, nor were his successors, Ricasoli and Rattazzi, 
 popular men. Political life in Italy, even more than in most 
 other constitutional countries, is exposed to the excesses of hate 
 and partisanship which are the inevitable outcome of a total want 
 of party discipline, and this evil has grown with the State. No 
 one can, however, contest with Cavour the title of the greatest 
 of modern Italians, even when the claims of Garibaldi and 
 Mazzini are allowed. Full credit should be given to the 
 patriotism, courage, and high principle of Vittorio Emanuele. 
 On one occasion, at least — in July 1859 — he was wiser than 
 Cavour. But his was not the guiding, the originating mind. 
 Cavour alone had the tact and patience to turn aside the 
 malignity of the counsellors of Napoleon III, and to compel 
 from the Emperor himself the deference due to a superior 
 intellect. He held office for only ten years, but in those years 
 he made Italy. 
 
 On the death of Cavour, Ricasoli became premier, and 
 held this post till his resignation in 1862, when he was 
 succeeded by Rattazzi. The greatest difficulty of these years 
 arose from the brigandage of the Neapolitan provinces, openly 
 encouraged and organised from the territory of the Pope, and 
 subsidised by the King of Naples, who had his residence at 
 
328 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Rome. It required the severest measures of military govern- 
 ment to put an end to what was in fact a religious war, like 
 that of the Vendue. Unfortunately, while it was carrying on 
 war with the brigands, the Italian government was obliged to 
 treat with the Camorra, which was the permanent curse of the 
 Neapolitan provinces, either to bring it into opposition against 
 the brigands, or to obtain its assistance in asserting authority j 
 and this return to the ancient practices of the Bourbons, — the 
 employment of secret organizations as means of governing 
 — increased with time and became finally the plague-spot of 
 the Italian Parliament. But against brigandage at least the 
 operations were successful. Hundreds of brigands were shot, 
 and many more thrown into prison, priests and friars included, 
 and villages which were the refuge of the brigandage were 
 destroyed. I myself one day witnessed a band of about 200 
 brigands being driven across the frontier at Olevano, where 
 they were feasted and feted by the local papal authorities and, 
 dispersing, found their way back again after a few days. 
 Courts martial and oftener short shrift without trial became 
 the exclusive treatment, and even this made slow way, nor 
 was it until roads of the best construction had been driven 
 through the Abruzzi in all directions that brigandage was 
 suppressed. 
 
 In Venetia the Austrian repression, if less brutal, was still 
 completely effective. But inextinguishable revolutionary ten- 
 dencies, stimulated by the constant pressure of Garibaldi and 
 the Extreme Left, the party of action, under the lead of Crispi, 
 Bertani, Mazzini and others, kept up the agitation for the 
 recovery of Venice and Rome. The French Emperor, who 
 had withdrawn his ambassador from Turin in the autumn of 
 i860, had restored diplomatic relations and recognised the 
 kingdom of Italy after the death of Cavour. Prussia and 
 Russia followed suit. But the French garrison still remained 
 in Rome, and while preventing the government of Italy from 
 taking action, acted as a constant irritant to Italian patriots. 
 
xiil] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 329 
 
 Garibaldi was unable to acquiesce in this state of things. 
 . Returning to his old line of action, he organized the expe- 
 dition against the Papal States which ended in the disaster of 
 Aspromonte. The inner history of this expedition has probably 
 not yet been told. After an unsuccessful attempt in May, 1862, 
 to raise Tirol — an attempt known as the revolt of Sarnico — 
 there was a momentary pause in the unitarian movement. 
 Tivaroni says : " Garibaldi, having returned to Caprera after 
 the failure of Sarnico, communicated to Ripari alone his secret 
 designs. Failure had not moved him j he was impatient to 
 act, could not reconcile himself to leave Venice in the hands 
 of Austria, and Rome in those of the Pope, now that twenty-two 
 millions of Italians were ready. Suddenly, in July 1862, he 
 returned to the continent, and after a secret conversation with 
 the King and an altercation with Rattazzi, went directly to 
 Palermo, where his friend Pallavicino was prefect. The royal 
 princes happened to be there on a journey, and before leaving 
 the town they received him kindly. What is he doing at 
 Palermo? was the question of all Italy. Certainly not pre- 
 paring for an attack on Venice j but what, then ? if on Rome, 
 was it not more simple to start from Tuscany or the Romagna? 
 Garibaldi had left behind him a written declaration that he 
 went to Sicily to allay an autonomist movement which the 
 pending removal of Pallavicino threatened to develop." On 
 the 19th of July, in the cathedral of Marsala, he made the 
 people take the oath "Rome or death." "How can we see 
 Marsala," he said " without determining to complete our inter- 
 rupted journey?" At Palermo he enrolled volunteers, who 
 were sent to the forest of Ficuzza. Vecchi affirmed that the 
 State gave Garibaldi 1000 muskets, publicly landed. Certainly 
 the prefect Pallavicino, in a banquet to Garibaldi, drank to 
 " that summary of the lives of Plutarch," and proposed the 
 toast of "Venice and Rome." 
 
 Shortly afterwards Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina 
 with a body of some 4000 men, and made his way northward 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
330 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 through Calabria. At Patern6 he encountered a battalion of 
 regulars and showed the major in command a letter with a 
 large red seal, having read which, the officer bowed and retired. 
 Shortly afterwards, however, on August '29, Garibaldi came 
 into collision with the royal troops at Aspromonte, near Reggio. 
 He was ordered to withdraw, but refused. In the conflict that 
 followed he was wounded and taken prisoner. His followers 
 dispersed, and the expedition came to an end. 
 
 From these data it is not easy to draw any certain con- 
 clusion. The secret history of the affair will possibly never be 
 known. The antecedents of Garibaldi, and what we know of 
 his relations with the crown, lend the highest probability to the 
 hypothesis that Garibaldi was in secret agreement with the king, 
 if not with Rattazzi, and that the expedition had had the distinct 
 assent of the King ; but that after it was fairly embarked the 
 Emperor of the French, who, desiring to embarrass the King 
 by compromising him with the party of action, had waited for 
 this juncture to declare himself, suddenly came forward with 
 an imperious demand on the Italian government to stop 
 Garibaldi on his way. Chiala asserts that Napoleon not only 
 threatened active intervention, but actually ordered Admiral 
 Rigault de Grenouilly to land a body of troops to arrest 
 Garibaldi's movement, if the Italian forces were insufficient. 
 Troops were therefore sent, and the conflict of Aspromonte 
 ended the expedition — and the friendship of Vittorio Emanuele 
 and Garibaldi 1 . 
 
 1 I was American Consul at Rome when Garibaldi started on this 
 campaign, and one day, shortly before the collision of Aspromonte (having 
 been left by the minister in charge of the Legation), I had occasion to see 
 the Pope on some diplomatic business. I found the Pontiff in a great state 
 of prostration and anxiety. The entire city was in a fever, and it was 
 evident that no one had any other feeling than that the end of the papal 
 rule had come. The Pope said to me: "I see that the great time of 
 tribulation foretold in the Scriptures has come to pass — we shall have our 
 fifty years of affliction, but it will pass and the Church will become more 
 triumphant than ever and will have its millennium." It is impossible not to 
 
[ii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 331 
 
 (2) The War of 1866. 
 
 The affair of Aspromonte led to the fall of Rattazzi, who 
 )roke with the party of action and fell under the suspicion 
 )f yielding, not to his own convictions, but to foreign dictation. 
 [e was succeeded (November 1862) by Farini, the former 
 lictator of Emilia, but the new premier soon succumbed to 
 health, and made way for the presidency of Minghetti. 
 le new government carried on the organization of Italy with 
 energy and success, on the lines laid down by Cavour. They 
 negotiated treaties of commerce, and pushed on the con- 
 struction of railways, notably that which traverses the eastern 
 coast, and connects the north and south of Italy by way of 
 Ancona and Brindisi. But the relations between state and 
 church occupied, as they could not but occupy, the chief 
 attention of the ministry. Throughout the new dominions of 
 the King of Italy these relations were assimilated to those 
 already existing in Piedmont. A civil code was established, 
 civil marriage was universally legalized, and many religious 
 houses were suppressed. It was not likely that such measures 
 would tend to mitigate the opposition of the Papacy to the 
 new regime, but this result could not be avoided. The Papal 
 Encyclical of December, 1864, was a manifesto in which the 
 liberal ideas of the time were subjected to absolute and 
 sweeping condemnation, and in which the Holy See displaye*d 
 to the world its fixed resolve to bate no jot of its ancient 
 pretensions, to make no single change in its methods of 
 government. 
 
 This hopeless attitude was not without effect on the policy 
 of Napoleon III. Tired of his repeated failures to influence 
 
 feel that the Pope would not have been so despondent, had his information 
 given him any assurance of French intervention ; and this would justify us 
 in thinking that the Emperor had not yet disclosed his intentions, but was 
 waiting for Garibaldi's movement to make such progress as to bring 
 him into conflict with the King. 
 
332 Italy. [Chap. .1 
 
 the Pope in a liberal direction, and annoyed by the Pope's 
 rejection of advice tendered by one who was now his only 
 protector, the Emperor at length came to terms with Italy in 
 the Convention of September, 1894. The agreement arrived 
 at between the French and Italian governments was as follows: 
 Italy should protect the papal frontier from all external 
 attacks ; France should evacuate the States of the Church 
 within two years ; Italy should waive the right of protest 
 against the organization of a papal army unless it became 
 large enough to become a menace to Italy ; while the 
 Italian capital should be moved to Florence within six months 
 of the approval of the convention. The dictation by the 
 Emperor of Florence as the future capital of Italy may 
 have been intended to obviate and exclude a later removal to 
 Rome, and at the same time to reconcile the claims of north 
 and south by fixing on an intermediate locality. But it was 
 also susceptible of a different interpretation. M. Drouyn de 
 Lhuys, the French foreign secretary, remarked to the Italian 
 minister: "Of course the result of all this is that you will 
 eventually go to Rome, but a sufficient interval must elapse 
 to save us from responsibility." The move was not accom- 
 plished without disturbance. Riots took place at Turin, which 
 annoyed Vittorio Emanuele, already pained at leaving his 
 old home, but these did not alter the determination of the 
 government, which transferred its head-quarters to Florence 
 in 1865. 
 
 But the next great step in the unification of Italy was to be 
 taken with the assistance, not of France, but of Prussia. So 
 far back as the autumn of 1862 Bismarck had sounded the 
 government of Turin as to their intentions in case of war 
 between Austria and Prussia, but it was in the summer of 
 1865, when the dispute about Sleswick and Holstein began to 
 threaten trouble between the two leading German states, that 
 the first tentative advances towards an actual alliance with 
 Italy were made. The trouble blew over for the time, and 
 
it] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 333 
 
 ie Convention of Gastein seemed to render it unlikely that 
 russia would require Italy's aid. The government of La 
 [armora — who had replaced Minghetti after the riots at 
 irin — accordingly tried another tack, and offered to purchase 
 r enice of Austria for a large sum of money — an offer which 
 'rancis Joseph declined. But the occasion foreseen by 
 ivour in i860, when he told the Prussian minister that, 
 >wever Prussia might protest against the action of Piedmont 
 then, the time would come when she would follow Piedmont's 
 example — this occasion was now rapidly approaching. War 
 between Austria and Prussia became inevitable, and on the 
 9th of March, 1866, La Marmora announced to the Italian 
 minister at Berlin the arrival of a special envoy charged by the 
 Italian government with an extraordinary mission. This was 
 to arrange the treaty between Prussia and Italy, which was 
 signed on April 8. Italy in this agreement undertook to aid 
 Prussia in carrying out her projected reforms in the constitution 
 of Germany, while Prussia pledged herself to win Venetia for 
 Italy. Neither party was to make peace without the other's 
 consent. The treaty was hardly concluded when it was 
 subjected to a severe strain. Austria, anxious above all things 
 to retain her supremacy in Germany, attempted to win over 
 Italy by offering, through the agency of Napoleon, to cede 
 Venetia. The temptation was severe, but the King — the 
 Re Galantuomo — withstood it, and adhered to his engagement 
 with Prussia. 
 
 Thereupon the Emperor Napoleon, eager to prevent the 
 overthrow of that balance of power which kept Germany weak, 
 proposed a congress with a view to so arranging matters as to 
 satisfy Italy, to leave Austria and Prussia on a fairly equal 
 footing, and to revive to a certain extent his uncle's control 
 over the provinces on the Rhine. But the proposal failed 
 through the protests made by Austria against the aggrandise- 
 ment of any one power at the expense of another, and in the 
 middle of June the war began. The plan of campaign arranged 
 
334 Italy, [Chap.1I 
 
 at Berlin contemplated a joint movement on Vienna, one I 
 corps d'armee, under La Marmora, masking the Quadrilateral, I 
 while the other, under Cialdini, moving through the Venetian \ 
 provinces, was to take the road for Vienna. As the price of a ] 
 war aufond, Italy was to have secured the possession of Trent, 
 but on the condition that that province, of which Prussia j 
 could not assume the cession in anticipation — as it formed ? 
 part of the German Confederation — should have actually been 
 occupied by Italy before the conclusion of the war, and thus 1 
 by virtue of the uti possidetis would have to be ceded to her. \ 
 The French intervention, though only diplomatic, ruined this | 
 combination. It is now well known that Napoleon III, by I 
 pressure on the King, induced him to abandon the movement 
 OB Vienna and the direct cooperation with Prussia, and to ] 
 adopt instead a less energetic plan. In addition to this cause j 
 of confusion, personal and factional politics had their part in 1 
 the humiliating result of the campaign. La Marmora had no j 
 confidence in Cialdini, a general educated in the Spanish I 
 school and pledged to certain parliamentary groups, nor in   
 Persano, selected for the command of the fleet through the 
 influence of the Prince di Carignano, whose compagnon de I 
 plaisirs he was ; but, when accused of abandoning the appoint- 
 ment of his subordinates to intrigues in the Chamber of 
 Deputies and in the antechamber, he replied that the war was 
 not serious, Venetia being already ceded in principle, and the 
 Emperor of Austria being too intelligent to employ against 
 Italy forces of which he had need in his operations against 
 Prussia, and too humane to send his soldiers to be killed in 
 Italy without any necessity. 
 
 The outcome of this combination of intrigue, incompetence 
 and treachery was the half-hearted movement which resulted 
 in the battle of Custozza, in which, owing to the incompetence 
 of their chiefs, the Italians were defeated with grave loss. 
 After crossing the Mincio, the Italian army advanced upon 
 the line of hills between the Mincio and the Adige, to the 
 
[i.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 335 
 
 rest of Verona, and occupied a series of positions the centre 
 
 which was the height of Custozza, the ill-omened scene of 
 
 leir defeat eighteen years before. Here they were attacked 
 
 the 24th of June by the Archduke Albrecht, whose head- 
 
 luarters had been at Verona. The struggle was long, obstinate 
 
 id very sanguinary. At one moment the Austrians were on 
 
 le point of retiring, but, collecting all their forces for a final 
 
 ttack upon Custozza, they broke the Italian centre and 
 
 obliged the whole army to retreat. The Italians withdrew 
 
 across the Mincio, but the Austrians were too much exhausted 
 
 to follow up their victory : nor indeed had they any interest 
 
 in doing so. They had repelled the invasion of Venetia, and 
 
 the defeat of the Italian main army prevented Cialdini's 
 
 advance from Bologna and kept Garibaldi practically inactive 
 
 in the mountains to the north of Garda. This was probably 
 
 the result that Napoleon had aimed at, since, in his secret 
 
 negotiations with Austria, he had fixed this point as that at 
 
 which the negotiations for peace should commence, and at 
 
 which Italy should abandon Prussia and accept the gift of 
 
 Venetia from France. 
 
 Meanwhile the Prussians were pressing forward into 
 Bohemia, undeterred by the failure of their ally, and on the 
 4th of July the battle of Sadowa decided the fate of Germany. 
 Immediately on receiving the news of this disaster, the 
 Emperor telegraphed to Napoleon, renewing his offer to cede 
 Venetia to Italy, and requesting his intervention. This com- 
 munication was announced in the Mo?iiteur of July 5, in the 
 following terms : — " An important event has taken place. 
 After having saved the honour of his arms in Italy, the 
 Emperor of Austria, yielding to the ideas expressed by the 
 Emperor Napoleon to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, cedes 
 Venetia to the Emperor of the French, and accepts his 
 mediation to make peace between the belligerents." The 
 Emperor Napoleon hastened to yield to this appeal, and 
 immediately addressed himself to the Kings of Prussia and 
 
336 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Italy to obtain an armistice. But to this proposition neither 
 party to the alliance was inclined to consent. Whatever may 
 have been the morality of some influential Italians of the day, 
 Ricasoli, who had taken La Marmora's place as President of 
 the Council at the outset of the war, was an honest man, and 
 scorned to betray an ally. Nor was La Marmora, the com- 
 mander-in-chief, discredited as he was by the defeat of Custozza, 
 the man to add to the charge of military incapacity that of 
 moral turpitude. Other considerations, besides that of honour, 
 forbade such a step as was proposed. To acquiesce in defeat, 
 and to owe Venetia, like Lombardy, to France, would have 
 ruined the monarchy in Italy and placed the country under 
 the heel of Napoleon. The French alliance was irksome 
 enough before : it would have become infinitely more galling 
 had it now been revived in so disgraceful a fashion. Finally, 
 Napoleon wished to attach to the cession of Venetia a pledge 
 to be given by Italy regarding Rome, and such a pledge no 
 Italian government could give. The King accordingly made 
 answer to Napoleon that he could not consent to an armistice 
 without consulting his ally. At the same time the King of 
 Prussia refused to be checked in the mid-career of victory, and 
 the war was therefore continued, both in Germany and Italy. 
 The troubles between La Marmora and Cialdini were patched 
 up, and the latter took over the chief command. The Austrians 
 now retired from Venetia, and were followed by the Italians, 
 who were however prevented by disorganization, want of 
 supplies, and disunion in the supreme command, from doing 
 anything effective to attain what should have been their chief 
 object — the prevention of the Archduke's withdrawal to Austria. 
 Nevertheless they gained possession of Rovigo, Padua and 
 Vicenza, and pressed on even to Treviso. By the middle of 
 July, the whole of Venetia between Venice and the Quadri- 
 lateral — which the Austrians still held — was in Italian hands. 
 
 The Italian government — or, at all events, the Italian 
 army and people — nourished the hope that they would be able 
 
:in.] TJie Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 337 
 
 to add the Trentino and southern Tirol to Venetia, and 
 raribaldi with his volunteers made some ineffectual efforts in 
 this direction. But such hopes were doomed to disappoint- 
 ment : Italy was not yet at the end of her reverses. To help 
 in the attack on Austrian territory, and also to pacify public 
 opinion, which loudly condemned the inaction of the fleet, 
 Persano was ordered to attack Trieste. He replied that the 
 King had not authorized the demonstration against Trieste, 
 which Kossuth had begged for as the signal for a movement 
 in Hungary, and in order to avoid this movement, which had 
 probably in his prior secret instructions been countermanded, 
 turned aside and attacked Lissa, a fortress off the coast of 
 Istria. Here again bad faith met its meed of disaster. The 
 bombardment of the strong fortifications which protected the 
 island port, carried on through the day, caused serious damage 
 to the fleet, and it withdrew to the open sea to repair. In this 
 condition it was attacked, on July 20, by the Austrian fleet 
 coming out of Pola. The battle which took place was obstinately 
 contested on the part of the individual Italian commanders, 
 but without superior direction, so that the inferior forces of 
 Tegethoff, the Austrian Admiral, gained the victory by superior 
 strategy and discipline. Persano exhibited great timidity and 
 indecision throughout the fight, and at a critical moment 
 abandoned his flag-ship, the Re d'ltalia, for a smaller and 
 more secure ship, the Affondatore, an ironclad of the Monitor 
 type, giving his subordinate commanders no notice of the 
 change. Consequently, the latter, looking for the signals of 
 direction to the flag-ship and seeing none, were left to their 
 individual discretion, and acted without concert. In this 
 confusion a shot struck the rudder of the Re d'ltalia and 
 disabled her, so that she was quickly rammed and went down 
 with two-thirds of her crew 1 . 
 
 1 A curious piece of fatuity on the part of the Italian naval officials led 
 to the possibility of this accident. My eldest brother, the head of the great 
 iron-works in New York which machined and cuirassed the Re d'ltalia, 
 
 S. I. 2 2 
 
338 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 The emotion caused by this disaster and the want of orders 
 from the Admiral threw the Italian squadron into great con- 
 fusion, in the midst of which another ironclad vessel (the 
 Palestro), taking fire from a shell, was blown up. Both fleets 
 then withdrew, as if by tacit agreement, from the conflict. The 
 Austrian fleet sailed at once for Pola and the Italian for Ancona, 
 the effects of the battle having been such as to disincline them 
 both for renewal of the combat ; for, while the Italian fleet had 
 suffered the severer losses, it still retained a numerical superi- 
 ority in ships, and the injuries received by the Austrian fleet 
 were so grave, that but for the fatal personal defection of the 
 Italian Admiral and the moral effect of the sinking of the 
 Re* dTtalia, operations might have been resumed with a 
 possibility of success for the Italians. The testimony of 
 Austrian officers, taken by me immediately after the battle, 
 was in every way honourable to the tenacity and courage of 
 the Italian sailors, and the battle was, from a purely military 
 point of view, a drawn fight rather than a defeat. 
 
 Five days after the battle of Lissa — it being now clear that 
 Italy could gain no further advantage by continuing the 
 struggle, and that Prussia was in a position to dictate terms 
 to Austria — an armistice brought the war in Italy to a close. 
 On the next day (July 26) a similar truce was made in 
 Bohemia. Between Prussia and Austria the final peace — the 
 Peace of Prague — was concluded on August 23. Among other 
 stipulations, the King of Prussia undertook to persuade his 
 ally to make peace on the terms already practically agreed 
 upon, so soon as Napoleon should hand over Venetia. That 
 Italy was not included in the peace, was perhaps due to the 
 irritation of Prussia at the inefficiency of Italian assistance, but 
 that the Prussian government had no cause to complain of 
 
 and her designer Mr Brown, made every effort possible to induce the 
 officers in supervision of the construction, to allow them to carry the 
 cuirass s around the stern so as to protect the rudder. The officials, 
 ridiculing such an innovation, refused to adopt it. 
 
xin.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 339 
 
 dishonourable conduct on the part of Italy is clear from 
 Bismarck's express avowal in the Prussian Parliament a few 
 months later. "We had (he said) a powerful support in the 
 immutable loyalty of Italy — a loyalty which I cannot sufficiently 
 praise, or too highly appreciate " : and he went on to speak of 
 the severe temptation which the Italian government had under- 
 gone, and withstood. Moreover, although the Italians were 
 twice beaten, it must not be forgotten that they kept back the 
 best Austrian general and two hundred thousand men, whose 
 presence in Bohemia might easily have changed the issue of 
 the war. 
 
 Before the peace between Austria and Prussia was con- 
 cluded, Napoleon, in a letter to Vittorio Emanuele, dated 
 May 11, expressed his readiness to hand over Venetia: he had 
 only accepted it (he said) in order to save it from the miseries 
 of war. " My object was, that Italy might be free from the 
 Alps to the Adriatic." But more than one obstacle hindered 
 the conclusion of peace. The question of the amount of the 
 public debt to be taken over with Venetia gave some trouble, 
 but the pretensions raised by Italy to the Trentino and southern 
 Tirol — on the ground that these districts, or parts of them, were 
 in Italian occupation at the time of the armistice — formed a 
 more serious difficulty. It was not till Napoleon and the King 
 of Prussia had given Italy plainly to understand that their 
 pledges contemplated nothing more than Venetia, that the 
 Italian government relaxed its claim. Garibaldi and his 
 volunteers were thereupon recalled, Garibaldi obeying with 
 the greatest reluctance, and with a determination to take his 
 revenge in another direction, and on October 3 the Peace of 
 Vienna was signed. Its first article recognises the intervention 
 of France and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. "His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Austria having ceded the Lombardo- 
 Venetian kingdom to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, 
 and His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared 
 himself ready to recognise the union of the said province with 
 
 22 — 2 
 
i 
 
 340 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 the dominions of His Majesty the King of Italy, on condition 
 of the agreement of the populations concerned, &c. &c." In 
 accordance with this treaty, the usual plebiscite followed, and 
 Venetia by six hundred and forty thousand votes to sixty, 
 voted for union with Italy. 
 
 (3) Mentana. 
 
 The war over, and Venetia annexed to Italy, a new parlia- 
 ment, including the Venetian deputies, met in Florence in 
 December 1866. The French troops had, in virtue of the 
 convention of 1864, evacuated Rome a few days before, and 
 the King, in his opening speech, was able to declare, for the 
 first time, that Italy was free from the foreigner. The attention 
 of the government was immediately called to the condition of 
 confusion in the interior, and of discontent almost grown into 
 insurrection, which with another people than the Italian might 
 have been fatal to the crown. The dissatisfaction of the entire 
 party of progress with the conduct of the war, and with the 
 inaction of the government in regard to Rome, was most 
 outspoken and embarrassing for the ministry. Ricasoli, the 
 leading individuality after the death of Cavour, was one of the 
 most brilliant minds of Italy, and in other conditions, with a 
 stronger predominance of the conservative and monarchical 
 elements, would doubtless have attained a substantial success. 
 The Left had however gained greatly in the last elections, and 
 the conservative Right was not strong enough alone to control 
 the situation. A combination with the more moderate liberals 
 was necessary, and was desired by Ricasoli, and Crispi was 
 accordingly invited to join in forming a ministry. The com- 
 bination of these two, — Crispi being at that time the head of 
 the Left, and Ricasoli that of the moderate Right — would have 
 formed a government uniting all the soundest and most 
 energetic elements in the chamber. Unfortunately for the 
 nation, they differed on questions of taxation, and Ricasoli 
 
[ii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 341 
 
 fas left alone. Blamed from the outset for military failure and 
 )bsequiousness to French dictation, the ministry speedily gave 
 way. A proposal regarding ecclesiastical property being badly 
 received by the chamber, it was dissolved, but the new parlia- 
 ment proving as hostile as its predecessor, Ricasoli resigned. 
 
 Rattazzi succeeded, with a more radical policy and a pro- 
 lounced, if sometimes hesitating, assertion of the favourite 
 loctrines of the party of progress — amongst others, of the 
 tecessity of making Rome the capital of Italy. But though 
 the French had left the holy city, the Italian government was 
 bound by the Convention of September to protect the territory 
 still remaining to the Pope. It was clear that Napoleon would 
 insist on the maintenance of this pledge. Rattazzi, with all 
 his progressive tendencies, was a weak man in the presence of 
 political presssure, and dared neither to urge nor to resist the 
 movement on Rome. The radicals, including Mazzini, still in 
 exile, Garibaldi, Crispi, Bertani, and the republicans under 
 Alberto Mario, who refused election to parliament, decided to 
 keep up the agitation for the occupation of Rome, and 
 Garibaldi determined to make another attempt. Rattazzi 
 and his government hesitated and vacillated ; they neither 
 prevented nor assisted, and Garibaldi went on with his pre- 
 parations, while the Pope, on the other hand, enlisted troops 
 for his defence. 
 
 Amongst the recruits for the Pope were many soldiers 
 actually on the rolls of the French army, nominally released 
 from military service but, in reality, told off for service in 
 Rome, some of them having lately returned from the un- 
 fortunate expedition to Mexico. Of these the legion known as 
 the Antibes Legion was mainly composed. After six weeks of 
 preparation on the part of Garibaldi, Rattazzi ordered his 
 arrest at Sinalunga and he was conveyed to Caprera ; men of 
 war were sent to prevent him from making his escape. The 
 King issued a vigorous proclamation bidding all his subjects 
 refrain from acts which would damage Italy in the eyes of 
 
342 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Europe, and might lead to a "fratricidal war" with France. 
 These measures were ineffective, as was proved a few days 
 later by Garibaldi's escaping at night in a little boat and 
 reaching Florence, where he resumed his preparations. But a 
 month or more had been lost, and the papal preparations 
 meanwhile had progressed. The position was now entirely 
 different from what it might have been, had the Italian govern- 
 ment never interfered, or had it, from the outset, adopted a 
 decided policy. In vain the King wrote a personal letter to 
 Napoleon begging him not to add to the difficulties of the 
 government by a forcible intervention. Napoleon, driven on 
 by the clerical party in France, could not but adhere to his 
 decision. At this critical juncture, Rattazzi, the victim — 
 and perhaps one of the causes — of the everlasting vacillation 
 and confusion of Italian politics, suggested the desperate policy 
 of opposing by force the military intervention threatened by 
 the French in case of an insurrection. This policy, which 
 proposed to remedy, by a step of the gravest import, an evil 
 which might easily have been prevented, was rejected, and 
 Rattazzi resigned. In the excitement caused by the impending 
 movement of the Garibaldian army, no minister cared to be 
 responsible for the consequences. 
 
 On the 20th of October, 1867, Garibaldi left Florence for 
 Terni, where he openly assumed the direction of the movement. 
 At this juncture Menabrea, whose sympathies were French, 
 took the direction of the government, and issued a proclamation 
 declaring the Garibaldians to be rebels and ordering the Italian 
 troops on the frontier to attack them in any case. It is only 
 just to say here that Mazzini opposed Garibaldi's course of 
 action. Both he and Crispi strongly urged that the movement 
 should depend on a rising in Rome, and, to promote this, 
 Menotti Garibaldi and the brothers Cairoli, with a supply of 
 arms, descended the Tiber, landed at Monte Parioli, and made 
 a movement on the city. The expedition was betrayed and 
 abandoned, and the band of volunteers was cut to pieces. 
 
xiii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 343 
 
 One of the brothers Cairoli was killed and another was 
 mortally wounded. Garibaldi meanwhile crossed the frontier 
 at Passo Cortese and attacked Monte Rotondo, the garrison of 
 which, after a short resistance, surrendered. The battle of 
 Monte Rotondo took place on the 25th of October and the 
 surrender on the 26th. 
 
 On the 29th, the French expedition, which had been 
 decided on at the last moment, arrived at Civita Vecchia — a 
 fact of which Garibaldi was in entire ignorance. He, mean- 
 while, advanced to the vicinity of Rome, and waited for the 
 promised rising within the walls. His information must have 
 been very incomplete, otherwise he would have known that 
 with an army under the Pope, composed of 13,000 men, 
 without reckoning the French, an insurrection in Rome was 
 impossible. He waited until the 1st of November and then 
 retreated to Monte Rotondo, and on the 3rd, ordered an 
 advance by way of Tivoli, the papal troops, together with the 
 French, moving the same day on Monte Rotondo. They met 
 at Mentana, and in the battle which ensued, the Garibaldians, 
 after brilliantly holding their own against the Papal troops, 
 were ultimately defeated with great loss. The action was 
 decided by the French troops, coming fresh on the field with 
 their new breech-loaders, the Chassepots, and Garibaldi gave 
 the order to retreat. He was still ignorant of the actual 
 participation of the French troops in the battle. Unac- 
 customed to defeat, he determined to end the expedition by 
 utter annihilation or success, and prepared to renew the attack 
 the next morning. The revolutionary committee near the 
 frontier, watching events, had information of the actual arrival 
 and participation of the French troops, and naturally convinced 
 that, as the whole army of the French Empire lay behind the 
 detachment which had landed, success was hopeless, no matter 
 how the battle might be decided, sent Crispi to persuade 
 Garibaldi to recross the frontier. This Crispi succeeded in 
 doing, the committee having first received a promise from the 
 
344 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 ministry that Garibaldi should not be molested. In violation 
 of this promise and in spite of the protests of Crispi and his 
 associates, he was arrested at Figline and carried a prisoner to 
 Florence, whence he was sent to the fortress of Varignano. 
 The French troops, having saved the Pope, retired from Rome, 
 but occupied Civita Vecchia for the next three years. 
 
 The battle of Mentana, from the military point of view, 
 was doubtless a defeat, but it had the double effect of con- 
 centrating the attention of all Italy on the necessity of making 
 Rome the capital, and of opening the way for the co-operation 
 of the "party of action" in Italy with the Prussian government. 
 To the relations of Bismarck with the party of action, and 
 especially with Crispi, is probably to be ascribed the eventual 
 rupture of the intimate relations between that party and 
 France, as well as the animosity towards Crispi which was 
 shown by all the French governments which have since held 
 office. The possibility, that in future contingencies France 
 might find an ally in Italy, ceased on the day of Mentana. 
 Napoleon and his government had declared themselves irre- 
 vocably bound to the maintenance of the Pope and the denial 
 of her capital to Italy. 
 
 (4) The Roman question. 
 
 During the next three years, spent in struggles between 
 the growing " party of action " and the conservatives, external 
 affairs attracted little attention in Italy at large. Crispi 
 became the head of the parliamentary opposition and waged 
 a bitter, uncompromising war on the conservatives, who were at 
 once the friends of France and of compromise on the Roman 
 question. The government of General Menabrea was occupied 
 in attempting — without much success— to improve the financial 
 condition of the country ; in the difficult task of assimilating 
 the administrative system over the various provinces so hastily 
 united in one political whole ; and in encouraging education, 
 
tin.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 345 
 
 mich, especially in the south, was deplorably defective. But 
 its principal operation was that of carrying out the dissolution 
 of the monasteries, of taking over ecclesiastical property, 
 and of arranging for the payment of the clergy out of the funds 
 of the state. These radical changes in the relations of church 
 and state had been voted by parliament in June 1866 : they 
 
 let with all possible opposition from Rome. It was in vain 
 that the government bestirred itself to come to terms with the 
 
 'ope ; in vain that it tried to obtain even such concessions as 
 
 lad been granted in Austria and France and other Catholic 
 countries ; in vain that it sought to conciliate hostility by 
 pardoning and recalling the bishops who had been imprisoned 
 or sequestrated on account of their opposition to the Siccordine 
 and other ecclesiastical laws : the only answer was a stubborn 
 refusal to recognise any acts of him whom Pius IX persisted 
 in calling the King of Sardinia. 
 
 Naturally enough, the obstinacy of the Papacy increased 
 the irritation, already chronic, caused by the French occupation 
 of Civita Vecchia. The position was, in itself, humiliating to 
 national pride, and it was all the more galling because it 
 encouraged the Pope in his resistance to the national will. It 
 is not, indeed, to be supposed that the ecclesiastical policy of 
 the government was universally approved in Italy : the clerical 
 party was very influential, and the interests of the nobility, 
 especially in the Papal states and the Neapolitan kingdom, 
 were closely involved with those of the church : still the great 
 majority of the people supported the government, and was 
 therefore all the more anxious to banish the French from 
 Rome. The question became, in the complicated conditions 
 of the day, one of European importance. Prussia had no 
 objection to seeing the Italians in Rome, and was naturally 
 anxious to renew the alliance of 1866. Austria, after the 
 cession of Venetia, showed an increasing friendliness to Italy, 
 and finding the Pope quite impervious tb her influence, 
 manifestly cooled in her relations with the Vatican. The 
 
346 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 decision depended on the attitude of France. But the French 
 government was obstinate. Napoleon's minister, Rouher, when 
 approached with a view to obtaining the permission of France 
 for an occupation of Rome, replied with the famous words, 
 " Jamais ! jamais ! ", which echoed through Italy, and finally 
 ruined the Franco-Italian alliance. On the other hand, Prince 
 Jerome Napoleon, cousin of the Emperor, in a brochure 1 on 
 the subject, says : " Italy supported by Austria, has demanded 
 the revocation of the Convention, of September. Our troops 
 must be recalled. We should make an engagement never to 
 return to Rome, while allowing Italy to reserve to herself the 
 right of occupying it." It was on this last point that the 
 negotiations failed. 
 
 The Menabrea ministry, soon after coming to power, had 
 received overtures for a renewal of the alliance of 1859 
 between France and Italy, in view of the conflict which had 
 been looming up, ever since Sadowa, between France and 
 Prussia. Menabrea believed in the victory of France in this 
 contingency; he held that Prussia would be defeated and 
 obliged to pay a war indemnity to the Franco-Italian coalition, 
 which would restore the equilibrium of Italian finances and 
 strengthen the position of Italy in Europe; he hoped at 
 the 'same time to obtain the abandonment of Rome by 
 France. Austria-Hungary had, under the influence of Counts 
 Beust and Andrassy, promised adhesion to this policy in 
 principle, with the condition that the Emperor of the French 
 should concede the evacuation of Rome as an indispensable 
 preliminary step to the coalition between France, Austria- 
 Hungary and Italy. This alliance would have given the 
 cabinet of Vienna a basis of action as an armed mediator 
 between France and Italy on one side and Prussia on the 
 other. Beust held himself ready to intervene at the moment 
 of the anticipated victory of the French, a victory which would 
 
 1 Entitled "Les Alliances de l'Empire en 1869 et 1870." 
 
:m.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 347 
 
 have secured for France the boundary of the Rhine, would 
 have preserved Germany from further invasion by the French, 
 and at the same time would have checked Prussian ambitions 
 with regard to the South-German states. 
 
 A change of ministry in November, 1869, throwing out 
 Menabrea, brought in Lanza, Visconti-Venosta and Sella. In 
 this ministry Sella was friendly to Germany, while French 
 tendencies were represented by Visconti-Venosta, the personal 
 sympathies of the King leading him to co-operation with 
 France : but this policy being opposed by the general senti- 
 lent of Italy, dissensions arose in the ministry. The French 
 government, by its mistaken policy, strengthened the position 
 of Sella and enabled him to resist successfully any engagement 
 with France. The Empress Eugenie, passing through Venice 
 earlier in 1869, on her way tc the opening of the Suez Canal, 
 had had a conversation with Menabrea, in which she expressed 
 to the Italian statesman her determined opposition to any con- 
 cession on the question of Rome, repeating in substance the 
 " Jamais " of Rouher. The Duke of Grammont, when he was 
 Ambassador in Vienna, had asserted that, if France could 
 control Austria-Hungary, Southern Germany and the Catholics 
 of the Rhine, she could dispense with any cooperation on the 
 part of Italy; and on the opening of hostilities in 1870, 
 Nigra telegraphed from Paris that the Emperor had no need of 
 Italian assistance, but that if the Italians desired to see their 
 soldiers again at the side of their ancient allies, he would 
 receive an Italian corps d'armee. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, seeing France about to precipitate a 
 conflict without a sufficient understanding between Vienna 
 and Paris, and beginning, from the moment of the declaration 
 of war, to entertain doubts as to the military and political 
 readiness of Napoleon, who was attempting to drag the 
 cabinet of Vienna into an immediate participation in hostilities, 
 evaded the insistence of France by offering her good offices at 
 Florence to obtain the assistance of Italy. This was the 
 
348 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 purpose of the mission of Count Vitzthum to Florence. His 
 proposition was that Italy should take the front line as the 
 ally of France, Austria- Hungary being ready to support this 
 alliance with an army in observation on the German frontier, 
 and with operations in Bavaria if the French passed the 
 Rhine. In answer to this invitation, the cabinet of Florence 
 made the counter-proposition that Italy should take active 
 measures in support of Austria-Hungary, if the latter, in 
 consequence of its friendliness towards France, should be 
 menaced by. Russia; in which case Italy would have had a 
 sufficient motive for action in the fact that any intervention on 
 the part of Russia against Austria-Hungary might compromise 
 the results of the Crimean war and the stipulations of the 
 treaty of Paris, which Italy had signed. It was seen in the 
 sequel that this indirect connexion between the Franco-Prussian 
 war and the situation of Russia on the Black Sea was not 
 imaginary. 
 
 Meanwhile, on August 3, 1870, a direct request for an 
 alliance against Prussia was made. But the condition imposed 
 by Austria and by Italy on intervention, in any shape, was 
 the surrender of Rome to Italy. This condition Napoleon III 
 still refused, and his refusal sealed the fate of the Second 
 Empire. Prince Napoleon, whose Italian sympathies were 
 stronger than those of the Emperor, urged him very strongly 
 to give way. " Sign in any case," said he : " sign the treaty in 
 spite of the faults of orthography; advise Vienna and Florence 
 that you have signed ; engage your allies. Modifications may 
 be imposed if we are victorious ; if we are beaten, you will at 
 least have an entrenchment and a claim on the support of your 
 friends. But, in the name of God, sign before the fortune of 
 arms had been pronounced." The hesitations of the Emperor 
 were invincible. The clerical influences at home were too 
 strong for him to accept the policy of Prince Jerome. He 
 delayed until the first serious conflict — the battle of Woerth 
 (6 August, 1870) — was decided against him. He had already 
 
xiii.] The Completion of Italy \ 1 861-1870. 349 
 
 — on August 3 — recalled his troops from Civita Vecchia : he 
 now hastened to renew the negotiations, but it was too late. 
 Prince Napoleon brought to Vittorio Emanuele a sheet of 
 paper with the signature of the Emperor at the bottom, and 
 said to Lanza, the Prime Minister, " Fill in what you please." 
 Lanza took counsel with the Austrian cabinet, which replied 
 "Too late." The pressure of the Parliamentary Left in this 
 jmergency was decisive. The King desired to move, but the 
 opposition of the ministers — who assured him that sufficient 
 forces could not be mobilised in time — and of the " party of 
 action" was such that he was dissuaded 1 . Sorin says that 
 Vittorio Emanuele received in his box at the theatre on 
 the night of the 6th of August a dispatch which he read with 
 emotion. He returned to the Pitti Palace and exclaimed, 
 " The poor Emperor ! I pity him, but I have had a lucky 
 escape." This dispatch was the news of the defeat of Woerth. 
 To the succeeding appeals for succour from France, which 
 had learned too late not to despise the assistance of Italy, 
 the ministry at Florence replied by negotiating with Austria- 
 Hungary and England the well-known league of neutrals for 
 the localization of the war. 
 
 (5) The occupation of Rome. 
 
 One of the first results of the reverses which Napoleon met 
 with at the outset of the war was to bring Mazzini again upon 
 the scene, with a futile attempt to raise the flag of the 
 Republic. The facts, as recorded in the diary of Stefan o 
 Castagnola, then Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, are as 
 follows : — " The first news of the arrival of the great thinker in 
 Sicily came by telegram from General Medici, dated from 
 
 1 When Vittorio Emanuele visited the Emperor William at Berlin, in 
 1873, he frankly said to the Emperor, " But for these gentlemen (pointing 
 to his ministers, Minghetti and Visconti-Venosta), I should have made war 
 on you at that time (1870)." 
 
350 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Palermo on the 12th of August 1870, followed by another on 
 the 13th: 'As I yesterday warned you, Mazzini arrived here 
 to-day by the mail-steamer from Naples ; he was arrested and 
 sent on board the frigate Ettore Fieramosca. To avoid 
 possible excitement in the country, I send the frigate to 
 Messina, where it will await my orders according to such 
 dispositions as Your Excellency may communicate to me. 
 Perhaps the best thing to do would be to send him to 
 England.' The order of arrest had been given by the prime 
 minister, Lanza, in consequence of Medici's first telegram. 
 The council of ministers approved the arrest, and decided to 
 have it confirmed by the judicial authorities and then to 
 confine Mazzini in the fortress of Gaeta." The presence of 
 Mazzini gave rise here and there in the peninsula to local 
 republican demonstrations, e.g. on the 15th at Lecco. His 
 followers, Piccoli and Foglia, landed at Catanzaro, and in 
 the night of the i5th-i6th of August republican demon- 
 strations were made by some forty persons at Ancona. At 
 Pavia more serious incidents took place; the soldiers were 
 attacked, stones were thrown at the palace of the Prefecture, 
 and the Society of Veterans published insolent proclamations. 
 The government was, however, determined that in settling 
 with Rome it would be master of the time and the manner, 
 and that the occupation should not be the work of a con- 
 spiracy, which might in the end turn to a Republican 
 movement. That the Republicans intended to make it such, 
 was evident not only from the return of Mazzini from his 
 exile and his attempt to land in Sicily, where it is known that 
 he intended to raise the flag of the Republic, but from other 
 incidents. To the facts noted in the diary of Castagnola, it 
 may be added that Nicotera had agreed with Mazzini to form 
 a band in the mountains of Naples to act in concert with 
 Mazzini's attempt in Sicily. Mazzini was released from prison 
 at Gaeta on October 9th. In the interval, the occupation of 
 Rome had taken place. 
 
:iii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 351 
 
 The French Emperor having recalled his troops from 
 !ivita Vecchia, early in August, 1870, Italy was finally 
 ree from any foreign presence. Shortly afterwards the 
 German victories removed any fear of further French inter- 
 ference. The Italian government, driven on by the "party 
 >f action " and apprehensive of revolution and the republic if 
 le popular movement were not responded to, decided to 
 >ccupy Rome. The King made a final effort, by a personal 
 ippeal, to induce the Pope to consent to the occupation; 
 ^us IX civilly but firmly refused. By a striking coinci- 
 dence, the Ecumenical Council, which had been sitting in 
 Rome since the end of 1869, voted the infallibility of the 
 Pope on the 14th of July, 1870, on the eve of the day on which 
 France declared war on Prussia. Such a decree may well have 
 strengthened the Pope in his determination not to yield, but 
 Pope and Emperor were doomed to fall together. 
 
 Of the French element in the Papal garrison, nothing 
 remained except the few volunteers not liable to military 
 service in France j but what with the native troops, the Swiss 
 battalions, and the corps entitled Pontifical Zouaves, who 
 belonged to all nations, the forces at the command of the 
 Pope amounted to 13,700, of whom 11,000 were efficient 
 combatants. Against these the Italian government sent an 
 army of 35,000 men under the command of General Cadorna. 
 A corps under Nino Bixio moved down the Tiber, and after 
 crossing the river at Orte and Civita Castellana marched by 
 Viterbo toward Civita Vecchia. The intention of Bixio 
 appears to have been to drive Charette — the Papal com- 
 mander — into Civita Vecchia and to shut him up in the 
 fortress, but, owing to a lack of unity in the movements of 
 the Italian forces, he failed to accomplish his purpose, and 
 before he reached Civita Vecchia, Charette had escaped to 
 Rome. 
 
 Civita Vecchia, attacked from the sea by Admiral del 
 Caretto and on land by Bixio, surrendered with its garrison 
 
352 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of 1500 men, and Bixio with his forces joined the movement 
 on Rome. Cadorna, with the bulk of the troops, moved down 
 the right bank of the Tiber and occupied the country to the 
 north-east of Castel Giubileo, where he threw the main body 
 of his forces across the river and closed in on the city from the 
 north-east and south-east where the line of papal defences 
 terminated at Monte Aventino. The troops having crossed 
 the temporary bridge at Castel Giubileo on the morning of the 
 1 6th of September, Cadorna sent in the afternoon a messenger 
 with a demand for the surrender of Rome. The message was 
 couched in the most conciliatory terms, with a promise of all 
 consideration for the Pope and his interests. The papal 
 General, Kanzler, replied to the message : " General, you and 
 I are on grounds entirely different; you talk of politics and 
 interest ; the pontifical army and I only know our duty. You 
 insist on those great words 'humanity and shedding of blood.' 
 You represent to us the horrors of the siege of Strasburg and 
 the battle of Sedan. But who, then, is inhuman? General 
 Cadorna or we? Is it we who defend our Father and our 
 faith ; or is it not he who comes to attack us in a city scarcely 
 fortified, without any possible pretext, without any other right 
 than that of the strongest ? Is it not clear to every person of 
 good sense that you profit by the opportunity of the struggle 
 between France and Prussia to attack us ? You talk to me of 
 demonstrations in the provinces which you have invaded. I 
 do not know what there may be in this ; I know only that in 
 many places you have been received with the most eloquent 
 silence. As to Rome, Count San Martino will have told you 
 what he saw on Saturday last on the Piazza di Termini when 
 the Holy Father blessed the Aqua Marcia. For three days in 
 succession, from Monday the 12 th to Wednesday the 14th, the 
 people of Rome have flocked, at the invitation of the Holy 
 Father, to pray with him at the tombs of the apostles. My 
 honour and my duty command me to defend the city which 
 God has chosen as the dwelling of His vicar. The devotion 
 
1 xiil] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 353 
 
 Kthe Zouaves is not exaggeration but conviction, and from 
 general to the last soldier we will all die at our posts." 
 From the 10th to the 19th the troops were occupied in 
 ing their positions on the line indicated, a strong demon- 
 ition being made on the right bank of the river above the 
 Vatican along the Janiculum to that part of the fortifications 
 which was attacked by the French in 1849. A feigned attack 
 upon this position was intended to draw the pontifical troops 
 toward a portion of the city, — the Leonine city where the Vatican 
 and the Pope were — which had in the secret orders of the 
 general been exempted from attack. The rest of the army 
 moved by the Via Salaria and Via Nomentana on the high- 
 lands about the present railway station. The batteries were 
 placed opposite Porta Pia and near that portion of the wall 
 where the railway enters the city, temporarily fortified, and 
 fire was opened on the 20th. The attacks along the railway, 
 at Porta San Giovanni and on the Janiculum were diversions, 
 the real attack being made at Porta Pia, where a breach was 
 effected at 12 o'clock. The defence was maintained until the 
 breach was made, and it is said that the orders of the Pope 
 were simply to make a demonstration of resistance and then 
 to yield, in order to protest against compulsion by force of 
 arms. The zeal of the papal troops retarded the display of 
 the white flag until the breach was actually stormed, and in the 
 attack a number of Italians were killed and wounded. But 
 the conflict only lasted a few minutes. Before nightfall the 
 whole of Rome was occupied, excepting the Leonine city, and 
 the terms of surrender were agreed upon. 
 
 The condition of Rome at the moment of the siege 
 undoubtedly justified the statement of Kanzler, for during 
 twenty years the papal authorities had done their best to 
 stamp out liberalism in the city. Myself a resident in Rome 
 during the years preceding Mentana, I can testify that perse- 
 cution for political objects was never more unsparing nor 
 more searching than in Rome at that time. No manifestation 
 
 s. 1. 23 
 
354 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 of Italian sympathies or liberal tendencies was tolerated, and 
 the penalties for every offence against papal absolutism were 
 scarcely less severe than they were three centuries before. 
 When the old Castellani, the head of the great house which 
 restored the ancient art of gold-working in Rome, died, one of 
 the sons was in exile and the other, necessary to the pre- 
 servation of the important industry which the family had 
 inaugurated, but suspected always for his liberal tendencies, 
 was compelled to follow the corpse of his father alone. The 
 coffin and the solitary mourner were surrounded by the police 
 and not a single sympathizer was allowed to approach them. 
 Every man who had at any time manifested hostility to the 
 papal system of government was exiled or imprisoned, and the 
 better part of the people of Rome, in the political sense of the 
 term, were exiles. The populace was in a perpetual state 
 of ferment, and the news of Garibaldi's progress prior to 
 Aspromonte drove the entire floating ecclesiastical population 
 to the convents and to the mountain-villages. The walls, in 
 spite of all the precautions of the police, were placarded by 
 night with insults to the Pope and attacks on his government, 
 and the constant occupation of the police was the erasure of 
 inscriptions of insurrectionary import. One day a collision 
 accidentally took place between the police and the populace, in 
 the course of which a priest was stabbed, not fatally. The 
 police failed to discover the author of the wound, but found 
 amongst the persons arrested an exile who had secretly returned 
 to visit his friends. No proof of complicity was produced against 
 him, but being tried by the papal court he was condemned 
 to death and executed, in spite of the evidence of an alibi 
 which he brought forward. It was necessary, they said, to 
 make an example. Justice in these times was a question of 
 political influence. The courts were governed entirely by 
 ecclesiastical tendencies. The judges, setting aside all law, 
 gave sentence in accordance with their theological prejudices, 
 and every offence against common morality was ignored in 
 view of the anxiety to suppress offences against the Church. 
 
in.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 355 
 
 It was natural, in these circumstances, that the crowd of 
 dies which followed the royal troops in their entry into Rome 
 lould be enormous. Year after year their numbers had 
 cumulated ; and now men of all classes and all professions, 
 raribaldians in their red shirts, workmen, members of all the 
 >litical societies, flocked in like a crowd of camp-followers, 
 faturally the records of these days drawn up by the friends of 
 the Church contrast in the strongest colours with those of the 
 friends of Italy. The clericals regarded it as a period of 
 affliction and mourning; the liberals as a great festa of 
 liberalism. There were many who were dissatisfied ; there 
 were religious enthusiasts, timid and nervous ; there were 
 some, even, who thought that the end of the world was 
 approaching. On the other hand there were those who carried 
 jubilation to extravagance and filled the city with demon- 
 strations of joy. In all the adjoining cities, Viterbo, Civita 
 Vecchia, and the towns of the Agro Romano, the demon- 
 strations of joy which accompanied the return of their exiles 
 were even more extravagant than in Rome. 
 
 The first to enter Rome were a band of Roman exiles, 
 under the lead of Giovanni Costa, the famous Roman artist, 
 who is still living. These men following close upon the 
 troops, organized a municipal government even before the 
 royal authorities had taken formal possession of the city. 
 This vanguard of real Romans and of Garibaldians was 
 followed by a motley crowd of "patriots" from all parts of 
 Italy ; some curious, some speculators, and undoubtedly some 
 thieves. There was a competition of shopkeepers as to who 
 should first succeed in establishing his industry in the new 
 capital. Amongst them were great speculators of Lombardy 
 and Piedmont to whom, subsequently, was due the fictitious 
 growth and ultimate financial disaster of Rome. 
 
 On the entry of the troops, the government of Rome was 
 immediately organized on a military basis by the formation 
 of a commandement de place, which was confided to General 
 
 23—2 
 
356 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Masi, a Roman. General Cadorna was provisionally appointed 
 Governor. The administration drifted on as best it could. 
 The papal troops gathered after the 20th of September in the 
 Leonine city and passed the night in the great square in front 
 of St Peter's; on the next day they received the blessing of 
 the Pope and moved out of Rome with their arms and 
 baggage, drums beating and banners flying, by the Porta 
 Angelica, made a tour of the Leonine city, and at Porta San 
 Pancrazio filed before the Italian army, which saluted them 
 with military honours. They then laid down their arms in the 
 Villa Belvedere and went by rail to Civita Vecchia. The 
 prisoners taken in the various conflicts were released and sent 
 by the same road on the 23rd. In the fighting at the above 
 points the papal troops had lost sixteen killed and fifty- eight 
 wounded, and the Italians twenty-five dead and one hundred 
 and thirty wounded. The intention of the government had 
 been to leave the Leonine city under the control of the Pope, 
 hoping to reconcile the claims of Italy and of the papacy by 
 this preservation of a simulacrum of the temporal power. 
 Early indications seemed to favour the success of this com- 
 promise, but influences diplomatic or other induced the 
 Vatican to refuse the concession, while the people resident 
 in Trastevere and the Leonine city insisted on making common 
 cause with Italy. The demonstrations of Italian feeling were 
 such that, on the 22nd of September, Cardinal Antonelli, 
 Secretary of State to his Holiness, acting on the orders of 
 the Pope, demanded and obtained from General Cadorna the 
 military occupation of the entire district west of the Tiber, 
 with the exception of the Vatican. 
 
 The population of the Leonine city refusing to be separated 
 from the rest of Rome, a plebiscite was ordered on the 2nd of 
 October, and its results induced the government, though with 
 some reserves, to decide upon annexation. The difficulties 
 of the position, diplomatic and civil, were undoubtedly great. 
 The necessity of the occupation of Rome and its unification 
 
[ii.] The Completion of Italy, 1 861-1870. 357 
 
 dth Italy was imperious, but at the same time the govern- 
 lent, being subject to conservative and, to a certain extent, 
 reactionary influences, favoured a policy of extreme tenderness 
 toward the pretensions and sensibilities of the Pope. A 
 government of transition was indispensable. The clericals 
 tbout the Pope declared that he could not support the outrage 
 >f being voted out of his throne by his own subjects, the first 
 )ting box received in the plebiscite having been that of the 
 'rastevere; and the Vatican threatened that, if this measure 
 rere adopted, the Pope must abandon Rome and take refuge 
 some foreign country. In face of actual events, however, 
 le enthusiasm of the clericals cooled ; the Pope protested, 
 but remained. 
 
 The principal labour of the last session of the parliament 
 of Florence was the so-called " law of guarantees " (passed in 
 May, 187 1), which aimed at making the Papacy and the 
 Italian government mutually independent of each other. It 
 guaranteed to the Pope the diplomatic privileges of a sovereign 
 power, with its own ambassadors and its court, in the midst of 
 Rome; separate postal and telegraphic communications with 
 foreign countries; and an allowance of over 3,000,000 francs 
 a year. It allowed the Pope and his successors the use of the 
 Vatican and Lateran palaces and certain other buildings, and 
 precluded all government officials from entering any of these 
 places without leave of the Pontiff or the College. Further, 
 it relinquished the royal "exequatur" and "placet," i.e. the 
 necessity of the King's assent to the publication and execution 
 of acts of the ecclesiastical authority, including the publication 
 of bulls and the appointment of bishops 1 : it exempted the 
 bishops from any oath of allegiance to the crown : it gave the 
 clergy complete freedom of meeting. It put an end to appeals 
 to the civil courts against acts of spiritual discipline, but on 
 the other hand it denied to the church-courts the aid of the 
 temporal tribunals in enforcing their decisions. Thus Cavour's 
 1 Except Palatine bishops, who hold th^ir nomination from the Crown. 
 
358 Italy. [Chap. xiii. 
 
 principle, "libera chiesa in libero stato," was realised to a 
 degree which had hitherto been found impracticable in any 
 other European country. 
 
 This act, the main lines of which had been found amongst 
 the papers of Cavour, together with a draft of such a law but 
 with essential differences, was vehemently opposed by the 
 Left, under Crispi's leadership, on the ground that it left the 
 Pope and the Church in far too independent and powerful a 
 position. On this point they would probably have had the 
 support of Cavour 1 , but, being in a minority, they failed. 
 The extreme Right submitted the law of guarantees to the 
 approbation of the powers, desiring to give it an international 
 guarantee, and but for the refusal of England to accept the 
 charge it is probable that the law might have entered into the 
 category of treaties. At first sight the Pope seemed inclined 
 to accept the measure; but the pressure of the extreme and 
 uncompromising clericals and of France, now attempting to 
 regain by diplomatic intervention part of the political influence 
 which it had lost by war, decided him to refuse. The com- 
 promise finally arrived at by the Vatican was to remain in 
 Rome and to ignore the Italian government. In this attitude 
 it still remains. 
 
 1 The project of the law of guarantees, found among Cavour's papers 
 after his death, was a part of the general scheme which he had conceived 
 for a concordat between the Papacy and Italy, and to which, in 1861, he had 
 had reason to believe that a majority of the Sacred College was ready to 
 adhere. But according to this plan, the Papacy, limiting the formal assertion 
 of its rights over Rome to the theoretical reserves which are still made as to 
 Avignon, would have recognised the established government as the lesser 
 evil, and would have consented to the presence of the Cardinals in the 
 Italian Senate. There is nothing which would lead us to believe that 
 Cavour would have allowed the Papacy to retain the position of a hostile 
 political power residing in Rome under foreign diplomatic protection, — a 
 position which it shares with the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. 
 The failure of this attempt at conciliation between the Church and the 
 State is due to the influence of France, always quick to seize upon any 
 means of retarding the unity and independence of Italy. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY ITALY, 1871-1895. 
 
 (1) The Right in poiver, 1871-76. 
 
 In June, 187 1, the King went to Rome, and the govern- 
 ment was, transferred from Florence to the Eternal City. This 
 first visit was followed by a great flood of the Tiber, from 
 which the Vatican augured disaster, due to the occupation of 
 Rome by Italy. The greatest difficulty in the unification of 
 Italy was precisely in the absorption of the Roman State. 
 The utter want of political education from time immemorial ; 
 the absolute subjection to a politically blind and torpid 
 theocracy, ignorant of all human requirements excepting that 
 of religious sentiment ; the arbitrary imposition of bureau- 
 cratic caprice in place of legality, the natural outcome of an 
 absolutism whose head claimed to be above all law, and 
 beyond blunder or correction, and which was debarred by 
 its constitution from any sympathy with purely civil and 
 domestic humanity — all this had rendered the Roman people 
 incapable of understanding what was meant by law or consti- 
 tutional government. At the same time it was restive under 
 legal control ; it had bred brigandage, revolt, all sorts of social 
 vices, and a general insolvency of character to be found 
 nowhere else in Italy except in the City of Naples. Sexual 
 immorality was, perhaps, less flagrant than that in the southern 
 
360 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 capital, but was certainly worse than in any other Italian city. 
 In Naples the example of royalty was always a justification for 
 popular vice, but this was wanting in Rome, where the greater 
 scandals rarely occurred. But if the later Popes without 
 exception — so far as is known —maintained the moral dignity 
 of their position, this was not always the case with their 
 subordinates. Cardinal Antonelli was certainly the cause of 
 great scandal, and the lower clergy were by no means 
 immaculate. On the whole, the condition of the people at 
 large, under papal rule, was one of the most complete 
 intellectual and political lethargy I have ever known or can 
 conceive. 
 
 Into this social and political apathy came the invasion of 
 Northern Italy, — enormous numbers of speculators, adventurers, 
 contractors, demagogues and philanthropists, who, with all kinds 
 of principles and aims, individual and political, struggled for 
 influence in the new state and the new capital. The Pied- 
 montese and Lombards had pretensions to political supremacy 
 on account of their political education, while the Romans, 
 considering that Rome belonged to them before it became the 
 capital of Italy, naturally resisted all foreign pretensions j and 
 the southerners, as the Neapolitans and Sicilians were called, 
 acted as a stimulant to these antagonisms. 
 
 The day had now arrived for completing the political organi- 
 zation of Italy, made necessary by the final accomplishment 
 of Italian unity. It remained now to develop institutions 
 competent to control a nation, which was not so much a single 
 people, as an assemblage of states differing from time imme- 
 morial in education and in institutions. The great parties in 
 face of each other were the Right, or conservative party, and 
 the Left or the Party of Action, which, though hitherto in 
 opposition, had shown its strength by compelling the govern- 
 ment to make those political advances which its natural 
 conservatism and apathy had prevented it from making 
 voluntarily. The occupation of Rome would perhaps have 
 

 v.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871 -1895. 361 
 
 remained many years unaccomplished, and the opportunity of 
 1870 would have been lost, had the Right been permitted to act 
 on its own impulses ; but the opposition of the Left, an active, 
 energetic, concentrated party, always approaching the position 
 of a majority, compelled concessions on the part of the 
 conservative element which resulted in the decision to occupy 
 Rome at this favourable juncture. The Right may indeed be 
 said to have been driven into Rome by the pressure of the 
 opposition. Mazzini, it is true, had attempted to raise x the 
 standard of republican revolt in Sicily, and Nicotera, in co- 
 operation with Mazzini, had organized a band in the mountain 
 district of Naples; but the energetic action of Lanza in arresting 
 Mazzini as he landed cut short the enterprise, which had no 
 support in public opinion at large. 
 
 In this condition of antagonism between the great forces 
 of the state, the Papacy remained a spectator, taking part with 
 neither of the political parties and sharing the hopes of neither. 
 It despaired of any revulsion of feeling on the part of Italy, 
 and based its expectations entirely on the pressure of foreign 
 powers. The astonishment into which it had been thrown by 
 what it regarded as an act of aggression, an usurpation of the 
 rightful dominion of the Pope, had paralyzed it during the 
 earlier days of the occupation, but its arts and influence were 
 immediately afterwards exerted throughout Europe with the 
 hope of drawing in the catholic powers to unite in protesting 
 against the spoliation of the Holy See. But the confusion of 
 Europe at this moment, the exhaustion of France after her 
 struggle with Germany, the necessity for Austria to conciliate 
 Italy, the absolute indifference of Russia as to the claims of 
 the Roman Church, and the constant friendship of England, 
 prevented any assistance being offered to the Pope by the 
 catholic powers. The good relations between Italy and 
 Germany, the friendship with Austria, and the antagonism 
 between the interests of Italy and France, assured the firm 
 support of the German powers for all the acquisitions of Italy. 
 
362 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 This good understanding was emphasized and confirmed by 
 the visits which Vittorio Emanuele paid to Vienna and 
 Berlin in the autumn of 1873, an d by the still more striking 
 visit of Francis Joseph to Venice, followed by that of the 
 Emperor William to Milan, in 1876. The hopes of the 
 clericals therefore remained limited to the contingency that 
 the social and political crisis in France might give birth to 
 a catholic monarchy friendly to the temporal power. The 
 clericals of Paris, appealed to by their brethren in Rome, 
 gave them cautious advice : " Protest, refuse, and wait for 
 future mutations in France." France was always there, they 
 said, always catholic, and always devoted to the Pope ; some 
 chance might enable her to resume her domination of Italy. 
 And in this disposition the clericals of France and of Italy 
 still remain. 
 
 Never perhaps in the history of Europe had so many 
 political changes occurred as in those months between August 
 1870 and May 187 1. Europe was in fact shaken by a 
 tremendous political earthquake into entirely new combina- 
 tions. The old hostility between Italy and Austria had 
 given way to alliance. The intervention which Prussia had 
 threatened in 1859 in favour of Austria against Italy had 
 been changed into firm friendship for Italy. France had 
 ceased to be the dominant power in Europe ; Russia, so long 
 dormant, was now ready to recover the position which it had 
 held prior to 1854. The erection of Italy into a complete and 
 independent state had taken place ; her struggles with foreign 
 occupation were at last finished ; the great and perhaps even 
 more difficult task of domestic organization still remained. 
 This task occupied all the energies of Italian statesmen for 
 some time. The revival of the Eastern Question in 1876-78 
 did not closely concern Italy, and though she took part in 
 congresses and protocols as one of the great powers, she took 
 no distinct line, and generally followed the lead of her allies. 
 
 Three great problems lay before the government, any one 
 
xiv.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871-1895. 363 
 
 of which, so far as human wisdom and statecraft are concerned, 
 was more difficult than any mere political change. The 
 adaptation of the Church to the State presented a problem 
 which to this day is not only unsolved but does not seem to 
 have approached solution, and which still constitutes the 
 greatest difficulty of Italy. Ricasoli had the courage to 
 propose a plan which might have put an end to the divorce 
 between the Curia and the people, by giving to the latter, i.e. 
 to the assembly of the faithful, the administration of ecclesi- 
 astical estates and the election of the cures, according to a 
 primitive custom still in vigour in parts of the district of Milan. 
 To-day, however, the coalition between the republicans and the 
 clericals has rendered the return to such a policy impossible. 
 This cause of embarrassment is, however, slowly diminishing, 
 as a result of the inflexible and impracticable antagonism of 
 the Church to all reconciliation — an attitude which is producing 
 a slow but constant alienation of the Italian people from the 
 Church. The Church itself is governed far more by foreign 
 influence, its ambitions are stimulated more by foreign politics 
 than by purely ecclesiastical considerations, and it separates 
 itself more and more every day from Italy, so that the final 
 solution of the question appears likely to be found either in 
 the departure of the Pope, or in the less probable reconciliation 
 of the papacy with the state, and the normal and efficient 
 resumption of the functions of the Bishop of Rome — functions 
 entirely suspended since 1870. 
 
 The second problem was how to assimilate and combine 
 the different peoples of the peninsula, so long politically 
 separated, so unlike in temperament, pursuits and even racial 
 origin. Common desire of liberty, common hatred of the 
 foreigner, had united them for a time; but, success having 
 been obtained, the necessity of establishing a single govern- 
 ment and a general administrative system brought to light all 
 the divergencies which harmonious effort in the national cause 
 had momentarily obscured. 
 
364 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 The third problem was how to maintain independence 
 from France. From the time of Charlemagne onwards, and 
 through all the later phases of the development of Italy, the 
 intervention and pressure of France had been the chief obstacle 
 to the union of Italy, the main difficulty in the development 
 of free institutions. So long as the Pope retained his 
 position in Rome, there was always a chance for any French 
 government to recover, under certain conditions and limitations, 
 its domination over Italy. The weakness of successive Italian 
 governments and the immemorial predisposition of the Italian 
 people to regard the French as a friendly power, rendered it 
 difficult to throw off entirely this pseudo-protecting influence. 
 The division of the great political parties on the question 
 of the Church coincided with that on the subject of the 
 French alliance ; the Right clinging to the old traditions and 
 accepting the ancient dependence, while the Left rebelled 
 fitfully against the domination which the French pretended to 
 exercise. The Right still retained its numerical superiority 
 and still controlled the successive ministries. It commanded 
 an enormous pecuniary resource in the possession of the 
 property of the Church, the proceeds from which left the 
 country relatively free from taxation and enabled the govern- 
 ment to carry its measures without that severe criticism which 
 is inseparable from financial exactions. As this reserve 
 diminished and taxation became indispensable, the strength 
 of the Left increased. From 1870 to 1876 the history of 
 Italy is simply the history of a struggle for more liberal 
 measures and more democratic government against the morbid 
 conservatism and immobility of old parties, old states and old 
 tendencies. The leaders of the Left were at this time, Crispi, 
 Cairoli, Nicotera, Zardinelli, and Depretis ; of the Right, 
 Minghetti, Sella and Spaventa. The one side was tinctured 
 with every shade of agitation and revolution, the other was 
 clad in the sober tints of conservative decorum. The tact 
 of the King, perhaps more than any other influence, paved the 
 
:iv.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871- 1895. 365 
 
 way for the accession of the Left to power, which took place 
 in 1876. 
 
 The long series of governments drawn from the Right 
 came to an end on the question of the secrets of telegraphic 
 ;orrespondence — a question unimportant in itself and one in 
 aspect to which the Right was no more culpable than the 
 succeeding governments of the Left — but the simple fact was 
 that the country was ripe for political change. All the active, 
 energetic and healthy elements of political life had at that 
 moment passed into the body of the Left. It is true that it 
 contained many elements of premature corruption and political 
 decay : but for the moment the vital influences prevailed. 
 The country was tired of the immobility and apathy of the 
 old governments and said frankly, " Let us try something new." 
 The Iving, widely awake to all manifestations of passing 
 political feeling, accepted the change, which was by all his 
 ancient counsellors considered one of imminent peril, and 
 adopted frankly what to the conservatives seemed the destruc- 
 tion of all institutions — a ministry of the Left. In this ministry 
 each man had, perhaps, his own programme, but at that 
 moment the pronounced republicans — those who accepted no 
 compromise with monarchical forms — had entirely separated 
 themselves from the Left, and under Alberto Mario had 
 declared for abstention from all participation in politics. The 
 practical and efficient head of the Left, so far as intellectual 
 energy and organizing perception are concerned, was Crispi, 
 whose declaration in the moment of uncertainty as to the 
 form of public institutions, "The monarchy unites us and 
 the republic would divide us," became the key-note of the 
 democratic party. This position, assumed by Crispi, brought 
 on him the anathemas of Mazzini and the republicans, and 
 gave rise to one of the most interesting episodes in the 
 constitutional progress of Italy during this period. The Left 
 entered into power with the following programme : electoral re- 
 forms and extension of the suffrage; full liberty of conscience; 
 
366 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 freedom of speech, of the press, and of association; the 
 renunciation, in principle, of all legislation against political 
 opponents, while reserving the right to repress subversive 
 action if necessary ; in matters of finance, the abolition of the 
 grist-tax, the redemption of the forced paper-currency, and 
 the regularization of the land tax; in public works, an extensive 
 development of state railways and the concession of their 
 working to private societies. 
 
 (2) The Monarchical Left, 1 876-1 886. 
 
 It was the policy of the Right to consolidate what had 
 been gained, rather than expose it to the risks of change : 
 they avoided indicating the lines of future progress, and 
 claimed support on the ground of good government. Their 
 programme was essentially conservative. On their retirement 
 they had left the finances in good order, military affairs in 
 a fair state, the navy in process of development ; but the 
 condition of trade was unsatisfactory; the public works were 
 incompletely organized ; the taxes were very oppressive, owing 
 rather to unwise distribution tHan to their actual weight; 
 public instruction was neglected ; the administration of justice 
 was necessarily hampered by the political changes of previous 
 years; and great confusion existed in the relations between 
 the communes and the state. These elements of weakness, 
 probably unavoidable in existing conditions, owing to the 
 incongruity of the different portions of the nation, the diffi- 
 culties between Church and State, and the general want of 
 political education in the country, were common to both 
 parties and would have weighed on both alike. Thus the real 
 contest between them was rather one of future policy in 
 the department of social and economical progress than of 
 antagonism over the acts or omissions of the past. Rome 
 was won and the unity of the nation finally established : the 
 period of revolution and conflict ended with the "hie optime 
 
r.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871- 1895. 367 
 
 lanebimus" at length spoken. As the subject of dominant 
 interest in this period of Italian history is therefore rather 
 party organization and party conflict than external relations, 
 it will be necessary to give an outline of these contests between 
 the new power in politics — the Left — now organized finally as 
 the Progressive Party, and the old conservatives. 
 
 The Left, having been hitherto only a party of opposition, 
 lacked the organization, the coherence and solidity necessary 
 to resist attacks and to secure uniformity of sentiment or 
 
 )bject. It ranged in sentiment from conscientious repub- 
 licanism, only reconciled to monarchy as the safeguard of 
 Italian unity — as in Crispi, — to unquestioning devotion to the 
 monarchy, — as in Depretis j but the invariable feeling was that 
 the monarchy must develop toward democracy and must 
 reconcile itself to continual progress. But the organization of 
 the party could only be a work of time and patience. The 
 animosity of the old conservative element toward men who, 
 like Crispi, had always been in the front in every aggressive 
 democratic movement, was unappeasable, and party bitterness 
 was carried to an extreme in the conflicts between Crispi and 
 the leaders of the conservatives. The formation indeed of the 
 new ministerial party was one as much of dissolution as of 
 aggregation. Its programme as a "party" could hardly be 
 definite. It was necessary to eliminate the old irreconcilable 
 radicals little by little from those who possessed sufficient tact 
 and political discrimination to extract what was indispensable 
 to good government from the monarchical programme, and in 
 this slow and not always easy process the leaders aimed to 
 acquire by degrees the confidence of the conservative element 
 in the country. Naturally, with their accession to power, came 
 a flood of adhesions from those who only thought to succeed 
 with the successful and whose fidelity lasted as long as the 
 success. There were deserters from the Right and adventurers 
 from all sides, but the prestige of the leaders— the men of 
 action whose names had been prominent in the years during 
 
368 Italy. [Chap. I 
 
 which Italy was being made — sufficed to keep up a certain 
 kind of party fidelity. 
 
 During the early part of 1876 the government of the Left 
 enjoyed all the prestige of success and of confidence in the 
 effectual application of new principles, and the names of 
 certain men untried in administration but distinguished in 
 action, though afterwards disappointing expectation, exercised 
 at first a great fascination over the country. The elections 
 held under the first ministry of the Left, known as progressista, 
 resulted in a triumphant and extraordinary victory. Although, 
 or perhaps because, they were held on the simple programme 
 of confidence in the new government, without any definite 
 expression of principles, the results surpassed all the ex- 
 pectations of its most enthusiastic supporters. The Right 
 was reduced to a mere faction, and the new government, 
 with judgment and careful coordination, would have been in 
 possession of power and influence such as no Italian ministry 
 ever had possessed. But inexperience in political conduct, 
 and radical differences in the temperament of individuals, and 
 in provincial interests and tendencies, made a complete accord 
 in the government impossible. Certain measures of the old 
 regime were attacked with great vehemence; chief amongst 
 these was the grist-tax or impost on the grinding of grain. 
 The abolition of this tax proved ultimately one of the most 
 disastrous financial steps which the Left ever took, nor did 
 many years pass without repentance; but for the moment it 
 was a popular measure because it seemed to appeal to the 
 poorer classes. The name applied to the grist-tax, — " The 
 tax on Hunger " — sufficed to make it universally hateful. In 
 point of fact, it was so wide spread and so evenly laid that 
 perhaps no tax ever oppressed the lower classes less, and the 
 proof that its incidence was insignificant was that its abolition 
 produced not the most trifling difference in the price of bread. 
 The abolition of the tax meant simply an additional profit to 
 the bakers and the dealers in grain. 
 
xiv. J Parliamentary Italy, 1871-189$. 369 
 
 The active policy of the new ministry consisted chiefly in 
 combating clerical influence. The system of education was 
 made more laic, and little by little the authority and field of 
 operations of the church was restricted. It also paid much 
 attention to public works, in which it seemed to find a means 
 of consulting the interests of the masses. The ambitions of the 
 various chiefs of this undisciplined and energetic democracy 
 led to changes as frequent as would have resulted from the 
 antagonism of two distinct and evenly balanced parties. As 
 one or the other chief acquired predominant influence in the 
 parliament, different tendencies became supreme. Corsi divides 
 the ten years' government of the monarchical Left, as an 
 organised party, into five distinct periods. The first was from 
 March 1876 to December 1878, when it was practically con- 
 trolled by Nicotera (March 1876-December 1877) an d by 
 Crispi (December 1877-March 1878), and during this period 
 the government maintained its full authority. The second 
 period was from March to December 1878, in which a weak 
 government under the leadership of Cairoli and Zanardelli was 
 overpowered by the combined opposition of the Radicals and 
 Moderates. During the third period, which lasted until July 
 1879, the party under Depretis, with Crispi in the Home 
 Office, recovered authority to a certain extent, and the war 
 against the Radicals was energetic and effective. The fourth 
 period under Cairoli and Villa, from July to November 1879, 
 was one of weakness and vacillation. The fifth, under Depretis 
 (1879-1886), developed that fusion and confusion in Italian 
 politics, since known as "Transformism," which has been the 
 ruin of all healthy party-organisation and the corruption of 
 Italian politics. 
 
 While Crispi was for the first time minister of the interior, 
 and thus responsible for the internal government of the country 
 and the preservation of order, there occurred two events which 
 called for all possible firmness of hand in the government. 
 These were the deaths, within a short time of each other, of 
 
 s. 1. 24 
 
370 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Vittorio Kmanuele and Pope Pius IX. The presence of 
 Crispi at the Home Office at this crisis was a great good 
 fortune for Italy. The King had proved himself, during the 
 most difficult period in the formation of the kingdom, a wise 
 and determined ruler. His devotion to liberal principles no 
 one could question, while his maintenance of the dynastic 
 rights had, on the one hand, opposed an impassable barrier to 
 the schemes of Mazzini and the republicans, and on the other 
 had justified the confidence of Crispi and his followers. That 
 his successor would possess the same firmness of character no 
 one was assured, and the first days of the reign offered to 
 unquiet spirits opportunities for movements which would have 
 been recognised as folly in that of Vittorio Emanuele. If, 
 however, any subversive projects existed in the minds of the 
 inflexible and theoretical republicans who, like Mazzini, only 
 tolerated monarchy as a transition government, the measures 
 which Crispi took to meet them left no possibility of success, 
 and the crown passed without disturbance to Umberto 1 
 (January, 1878). 
 
 On the death of Pius IX, which took place in February, 
 1878, the election of his successor presented manifold and great 
 difficulties. Intrigues from without, in a question as to which 
 no one could deny the right of foreign powers to interest them- 
 selves, were set on foot, and great efforts were made to induce 
 the Conclave to remove to some other country for the election, 
 under the pretext that, in a condition of political imprisonment, 
 a free election to the Papacy was impossible. These intrigues 
 were so far successful that the College of Cardinals, by a 
 preliminary vote, actually decided to go abroad. The tact of 
 Crispi saved the situation, though, as events have turned out, it 
 is a question if the removal would not have been a real gain 
 for Italy. Crispi had at one time had intimate personal 
 relations with Cardinal San Pietro. At this juncture he sent 
 for the Cardinal and assured him that the freedom of the 
 Conclave was absolute, and that, in whichever sense they 
 
xiv.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871- 1895. 371 
 
 decided to act, they would be protected, either in their 
 deliberations in Rome or in their passage to the frontier ; but 
 that, if the Sacred College once evacuated the Vatican, it would 
 be taken possession of by the Italian government and the new 
 Pope would not be allowed to reside there. The meeting next 
 day revoked the vote of the day before and the Conclave was 
 held in Rome. The burial of Pius IX did not, however, take 
 place without much disorder, and all the efforts of the police 
 did not suffice to keep down hostile demonstrations, though it 
 is certain that the authorities did their best to maintain order. 
 Nothing serious took place, but the sentiments of devout 
 Catholics were offended by the hostile demonstrations which 
 obliged the funeral procession to take a circuitous route rather 
 than that which, perhaps with a view to a manifestation of its 
 own, it desired to take. It was disgraceful, but one who had 
 witnessed, as I had, the severities of the deceased Pope, could 
 hardly wonder that the returned victims of the former govern- 
 ment should manifest their resentment in their own way. 
 
 The connexion of Crispi with the government came to an 
 end in July 1879, through an accusation of bigamy 1 , too gladly 
 brought by his many political enemies. He resigned office, in 
 order to appear in the tribunal, and though the charge was not 
 sustained, and a verdict of not guilty was given, the hostility of 
 Court circles was so bitter that the King was unwilling or 
 unable to allow his return to office. The scandal, industriously 
 stimulated by his numerous enemies, became so vociferous 
 
 1 The facts of the case, stated with the brevity this record demands, are 
 that a washerwoman who had been Crispi's mistress in his days of exile and 
 imprisonment, and with whom he had gone through a ceremony of marriage 
 which he considered legal, became by her conduct such a disgrace to him 
 that he decided to abandon public life, when he was informed by one who 
 had been in the secret, that the marriage was not legal, and that nothing 
 prevented him from liberating himself from the connection. He left her at 
 once, having assured her a maintenance, and when, some years after, he 
 married the woman who is now his wife, the accusation of bigamy was 
 brought. 
 
 24 — 2 
 
372 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 that Crispi seemed to be definitely excluded from public life, 
 and in fact, with this period, his influence on the government 
 under the regime of his own party came to an end. 
 
 The return of Cairoli to power in July 1879 resuscitated 
 old aspirations. In the party called the " Irredentists," revo- 
 lutionary vitality awoke from its long sleep, and began to 
 demand the completion of Italy by the conquest from Austria 
 of Trent and Trieste, — the districts known as Italia Irredenta. 
 The recent acquisitions of Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia 
 excited the envy of the extreme Italian party, and a compen- 
 sation was demanded in the extension of Italy to her natural 
 limits, including the frontier of the Julian Alps. Fortunately 
 the prudence of the King, aided by the conservative elements 
 and the wisdom of General Robilant, then Italian Ambassador at 
 Vienna, averted the difficulties which threatened to grow out 
 of this ill-timed ambition. It was rather the restlessness of a 
 few adventurous spirits, surviving from the Garibaldian epoch, 
 who had not been absorbed by parliamentary activity or by the 
 antagonism of the factions, than any genuine patriotic feeling, 
 which produced this movement. Consequently the agitation 
 was momentary, and was allayed by vague assurances, rather 
 officious than official, that when the position of Austria in 
 Herzegovina and Bosnia should be secured and the next 
 readjustment of frontiers should take place, the claims of 
 Italy should find consideration. 
 
 The second government of Cairoli was terminated in 
 November, 1879, by a violent explosion of public indig- 
 nation at his apathy on the occasion of the French occupation 
 of Tunis. Cairoli was a partisan of France, and having 
 received personal assurance that no action should be taken 
 in Tunis without the consent of Italy, had allowed the 
 French preparations to go on without notice. The occu- 
 pation, in violation of this promise, put an end to the 
 entente with France and the ministry of Cairoli at the same 
 moment. 
 
xiv.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871-1895. 373 
 
 An important consequence of the Tunisian incident was 
 the entry of Italy into the Triple Alliance, which took place 
 in 1882. This step was due, however, not merely to resentment 
 at the blow which the occupation of Tunis dealt at the position 
 of Italy in the Mediterranean, but also to the growing per- 
 ception on the part of most public men in Italy that the 
 new form of government in France, which it had been hoped 
 would be more favourable to Italy than its predecessor, had 
 determined to continue the alliance with the Vatican which 
 had been the most offensive feature of Napoleon's policy, 
 and that the Republic, like the Empire before it, was aiming 
 at the subjection of the peninsula to the interests of France. 
 As the treaty of the Triple Alliance was first negotiated, it 
 assured to Germany and Austria- Hungary the defensive co- 
 operation of Italy, in the case of the peace of Europe being 
 menaced by a war for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, and 
 in compensation it secured for Italy the assistance of Germany 
 and Austria-Hungary in case England, already anxious to put 
 an end to the Dual Control with France in Egypt, should 
 substitute a condominium with Italy, and France should 
 offer armed resistance. The Italian government had proposed 
 to insert in the treaty a clause by which the " casus foederis " 
 should not be extended to hostilities with Russia, so long as 
 that power should not make common cause with the revanche 
 of France, but Austria-Hungary, on account of her eastern 
 interests, insisted on its including the case of a conflict 
 between Russia and Austria; and the cooperation of Italy 
 with England in Egypt was, at Berlin and Vienna, regarded 
 as sufficient compensation for the responsibility assumed by 
 Italy in favour of Austria-Hungary. Mancini and the Court 
 not having the courage, when the moment arrived for co- 
 operation with England, to accept her invitation, the first 
 treaty of the Triple Alliance remained advantageous only 
 to Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the renewal, five years 
 later, Robilant being minister of Foreign Affairs, the effect of 
 
374 Italy, [Chap. 
 
 the Alliance was extended to an equal participation in all 
 defensive interests of central Europe, no one of the three 
 powers being bound to take up arms in aid of any aggression 
 by either of the others; and as, under the Mancini government, 
 Massowah had been occupied by Italy, under circumstances 
 which will be explained later, while France was manifesting 
 aggressive tendencies in the direction of Tripoli and Morocco, 
 the second treaty of the Triple Alliance assured Italy of the 
 support of the central powers against any infringement, in 
 Africa, of legitimate Italian interests. 
 
 But there is no justice in the allegation that the Italian 
 authors of the Triple Alliance had incurred the obligation 
 to increase their armaments : indeed, the advice given by the 
 military experts of Germany and the general staff, was to 
 reduce the effective of the Italian army to 300,000 men, 
 while establishing thorough discipline and an organization 
 directed towards the highest mobility, so that Italy without 
 overburthening her finances might have an army ready at any 
 moment for the outbreak of war, and not leave to her allies 
 the charge of meeting alone a sudden aggression. As ordinarily 
 happens in such cases, the other powers interested in opposing 
 the Triple Alliance demanded engagements from Italy which 
 excluded any hostile intentions. In these circumstances 
 Depretis publicly declined to keep the army, during the 
 term of the Triple Alliance, in readiness for immediate 
 action, and he increased it by four divisions without in- 
 creasing the army budget. The subsequent organization of 
 the army in twelve corps d'arm^e, scant in numbers and 
 defective in equipment, intentionally sacrificed its mobility 
 and efficiency to the exigencies of the powers opposed to 
 the Triple Alliance, and to the views of the Court, always 
 disposed to inaction, and anxious to multiply the number 
 of military appointments. In acting thus, the ministry main- 
 tained that unfortunate subjection of the military interests of 
 the kingdom to politics, which had produced such disastrous 
 
xiv.] Parliamentary Italy, 1871-1895. 375 
 
 consequences in 1849 an d 1866, and was to have the same 
 result in Abyssinia in 1895. 
 
 In the negotiation of this treaty, which has been shown 
 by subsequent events to have been one of the wisest steps 
 in the history of Italian relations with other powers, and 
 one of the gravest importance to all Europe, Italian parties 
 were divided, not frankly and professedly, but largely owing 
 to secret influences, exerted, on the one side, by the Court and 
 the French government, and, on the other, by England in 
 support of Germany and Austria- Hungary, whose alliance 
 established the defence of central Europe on the East and 
 West, and who had invited Italy to join the defensive compact, 
 with the object of securing it against danger from the South. 
 Crispi, then leader of the Left, Robilant, Ambassador at 
 Vienna, and Di Launay, Ambassador at Berlin, were the 
 chief advocates of the treaty. The far-seeing Bismarck had, 
 from the date of the war of Sadowa, comprehended the help 
 which an alliance with Italy would give to the maintenance of 
 peace in Europe, and had then cultivated intimate relations 
 with the party of action through Crispi. But the earliest 
 decisive advocacy was probably that of Robilant, whose in- 
 fluence with the King was deservedly great, for few Italian 
 statesmen of his generation had his sagacity and inflexible 
 honesty. The affair of Tunis threw in the weight which turned 
 the scale and determined the entry of Italy into the Alliance, 
 in spite of Mancini, minister of Foreign Affairs, and Depretis, 
 the Premier, who remained always French in their sympathies, 
 but whose views on foreign policy were too weak to be de- 
 cisive. 
 
 It was under Depretis' long government (1879-87) that the 
 political system known as " transformism " was developed. In 
 that disastrous condition of Italian politics, all party distinc- 
 tions were finally merged in the policy of selecting the men 
 who commanded most votes from each faction in the chamber, 
 and parties disappear from the government though not from 
 
376 Italy. [ChaW 
 
 personalities. There was no longer a question of common 
 principles or even of common policy. The government was 
 conducted on purely opportunist principles, and under 1 )epretis, 
 an easy-going man, personally honest, but indifferent to the 
 means of success in politics, there gradually grew up a system 
 of purchasing support by measures involving public expendi- 
 ture, which contributed more than anything else in this phase 
 of Italian politics to bring about financial disaster. Little by 
 little all party-distinction disappeared, but the rancour and 
 malignity of old party-conflicts still embittered personal an- 
 tagonism. The ghosts of party, like the phantoms in the 
 Inferno, gnawed each others' skulls and inflicted infinite and 
 immitigable punishment for offences committed long ago. 
 Never perhaps in the history of any country, since the Italian 
 republics of the middle ages, was such venomous and unscru- 
 pulous hostility shown between public men. The policy 
 developed by Depretis, of purchasing public favour and the 
 votes of the electoral colleges by public works, led to a 
 multiplication of railways and of other public enterprises 
 far in excess of the resources of the country. Railways were 
 voted by the thousand kilometres, the pretext being that 
 the development of the country and its interests depended on 
 the increase of facilities for communication ; but these rail- 
 ways and provincial roads, being made without regard to any 
 other criterion than the insatiable demands of the electorate, 
 were rather burdens on the public purse than stimulants to 
 local prosperity. The army claimed enormous concessions, 
 and involved expenditure beyond all relation to its efficiency. 
 The traditional sympathy between England and Italy 
 brought into view at this time proofs of its persistent 
 vitality, in the proposition of the former power to Italy to 
 join her in the occupation of Egypt. In 1882, England, 
 compelled to secure the tranquillity of the Khediviate then 
 menaced by revolutionary movements, had invited France 
 as well as Italy to join her in occupation for that purpose. 
 
;iv.] Parliamentary Italy -, 187 1- 1895. 377 
 
 r rance refused, having from the beginning had her own in- 
 terests in those movements, and probably expecting that 
 England would shrink from a solitary occupation, or that 
 >he would fail in maintaining it, and would be obliged to leave 
 to France as her successor. In the long and studiously 
 prepared disorders which led to the insurrection of Arabi 
 'asha, a position had been created which (it was hoped) 
 rould subsequently enable France, by refusing cooperation, 
 to rule alone. The invitation extended to Italy by England 
 ras refused by Mancini, owing to the threat by France that 
 her participation would be regarded as a casus belli. 
 
 It was probably in large part owing to annoyance at 
 having, by this refusal, lost so brilliant an opportunity of 
 participating in the direction of European policy, that the 
 government decided later on to take part in the conquest of 
 Africa by establishing the colony of Massowah — one of the 
 most disastrous and ill-considered schemes of which Africa has 
 been the scene. This colony was initiated as a commercial 
 enterprise, with the approbation of England, but the sub- 
 sequent transformation to a military establishment was planned 
 in secret agreement with France, as a step towards the creation 
 of a condominium of three in the valley of the Nile. The 
 occupation of Suakim by England, whether due to sagacious 
 foresight or to secret knowledge of the intentions of France, 
 partially thwarted the scheme ; but that the occupation of 
 Massowah by Italy was intended as the first step in a move- 
 ment on the Nile is shown by the instructions of the minister 
 of war (Ricotti) to the commander of the expedition " to make 
 a point on Khartoum," instructions showing the most curious 
 ignorance of the geography and conditions of Abyssinia which 
 can be conceived in a government. The understanding between 
 France and Italy was completed in 1885 by a formal though 
 still secret agreement, in opposition to the interest of England. 
 Whether the British government was aware of this, or not, I 
 cannot say; but if it was cognisant of it, it must also have been 
 
378 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 conscious that the scheme would be rendered fruitless, not 
 only by its own timely occupation of Suakim, but also by the 
 difficulties in Abyssinia which lay before the combination, 
 difficulties with which the Abyssinian expedition of 1867 had 
 made England familiar. In compensation to Italy for this 
 agreement, France agreed that the status quo should be main- 
 tained in Tripoli and Morocco, while the lowering of the 
 Egyptian flag at Massowah and the substitution of the Italian 
 was agreed on as the sign of conquest, as distinguished from 
 that of occupation, as recognised by England. The subsequent 
 assent of England to this substitution (always, however, with I 
 tacit objection to the establishment of a military post on the 
 Red Sea, as was stated by Lord Hartington in the House of 
 Commons) does not invalidate the statement that the inten- 
 tions of the Italian government were directed by a secret 
 accord with France and in prejudice of British interests. The 
 published correspondence shows that, so late as March, 1885, 
 France and Italy were agreed in regarding the continued 
 occupation of Egypt by England as prejudicial to both powers, 
 and that the combination between them was due to the ap- 
 prehension that the occupation would be converted into a 
 protectorate. It was a continuation of the immemorial and 
 mediaeval policy of the Italian states, to be always prepared 
 on both sides in any European quarrel. 
 
 In 1887 the garrison of the port of Massowah, finding the 
 position constrained, attempted to establish a sanitary settle- 
 ment on the uplands of the interior. The Italian authorities 
 made propositions for an amicable settlement with Abyssinia, 
 but the Abyssinians, who had always coveted the possession of 
 Massowah, but had been unable to wrest it from the Egyptians, 
 determined to drive them out. Under Ras Alula, chief of 
 Tigre, they made a vigorous attack on the newly fortified 
 upland position, and were defeated with grave loss ; but on the 
 next day, Jan. 26, 1887, surprising a battalion on its way to the 
 fort, they annihilated it. This event, of little importance from 
 
.] Parliamentary Italy, 1 871 -1895. 379 
 
 le military point of view, produced a disastrous revulsion of 
 jeling against the ministry and led to the gradual adoption of 
 policy of conquest, which, being ill directed, ultimately 
 imed to the serious embarrassment of Italy. In a speech 
 the chamber on the first vote of credit for Massowah, Crispi 
 id expressed views not in sympathy with the establishment of 
 le colony, and, in words which now seem prophetic, had 
 irned the ministry of the dangers of the undertaking. In the 
 linisterial crisis which now took place, he was called to form 
 irt of the ministry. Popular opinion was so strongly in favour 
 of avenging the affront to the military honour of the country, 
 and so opposed to the withdrawal of the flag, that preparations 
 were made for the sending out of an expedition of 20,000 men 
 under General San Marzano. The Abyssinians now retreated, 
 and eventually the country as far as Asmara was taken posses- 
 sion of by Italy and fortified so as to be unassailable by the 
 forces of Abyssinia. 
 
 Giovanni, then Negus, being attacked in the rear by the 
 Dervishes, and harassed by rebellions at home, decided to finish 
 with the Dervishes before resuming the war against the Italians. 
 At this moment Menelik, King of Shoa, a rival pretendant 
 to the imperial crown, proposed an alliance with Italy against 
 Giovanni, and the latter being shortly afterwards killed in the 
 battle of Metemmeh by the Dervishes, Menelik succeeded 
 him, and was recognized by Italy as Negus Negesti, ruler of 
 all Abyssinia. The frontier of the colony at this juncture was 
 settled by treaty with the Negus as the line of the rivers 
 Mareb and the Balesi, at which it remained until at a later 
 period an attempt by the Abyssinians to reconquer the ceded 
 country led to a new series of hostilities. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 DISORGANIZATION. 
 
 In the recomposition of the ministry consequent on the 
 crisis of February, 1887, Depretis passed to the Foreign Office, 
 vacated by Robilant, who resented the insults of the Radicals 
 and the manner in which the disaster of Dogali had been 
 commented on by them, although he had no official responsi- 
 bility for it ; while Crispi resumed the Home Office, which he 
 held until the death of Depretis in July, 1887. In this position 
 he waged untiring war on Radicalism, and maintained public 
 order with a severity which had not lately been known. This 
 drew on him the bitter animosity of his old associates, the 
 Mazzinians, who never forgave him for his desertion of the 
 Republic. Mazzini, an idealist by nature, and clinging to the 
 Republic as the ideal form of government, was unable to 
 perceive that the population of a large part of Italy had been 
 demoralised by the years of despotism in which they had 
 learned to look at government and tyranny as synonymous. 
 He was therefore not qualified to judge of practical results, while 
 Crispi, a man of government by constitution and experience, 
 had learned that his people was not yet in the state to profit 
 by unlimited self-control, and had as the result of that 
 experience, rallied to the monarchy. Naturally the antagonism 
 between the Radicals and Crispi was bitterer than that which 
 
:hap. xv.] Disorganization. 381 
 
 they entertained for any other of his colleagues, and has in 
 effect coloured all his official career. 
 
 After the death of Depretis, Crispi assumed the Presidency 
 )f the Council, with almost unanimous public approbation, 
 fhile he retained the Home Office, and took temporary charge 
 )f the Foreign Office as well — an accumulation of duties which 
 ras in the end disastrous, subjecting him to an excessive strain 
 ,'hich proved too much for his health and his efficiency. At 
 lis moment he was in a position of authority and influence 
 mich no man since Cavour had enjoyed, and, like that 
 tatesman, he held definite ideas on public policy and the 
 >nduct of government, in which few of his colleagues were 
 ible to follow him. His insistance on their adherence to the 
 >olicy which he adopted was considered autocratic — so little 
 conception had the men in office of the conditions of minis- 
 terial responsibility in constitutional government. He was 
 accused of usurping the functions of his colleagues in the 
 ministry when he simply refused assent to measures which he 
 could not bring into accord with his own ideas of public 
 policy; he was stigmatised as dictatorial when he was simply 
 rigorous in his ideas of discipline. Sometimes, no doubt, 
 these charges appeared to have some justification: for instance, 
 when he found that the minister of war, General Bertole-Viale, 
 was determined on carrying military operations in the African 
 colony beyond the limits which he considered admissible, he 
 transferred the colony to the Foreign Office, to keep it under 
 his own control. Had he taken a similar step in financial 
 affairs, the great banking catastrophe of later years would not 
 have occurred ; but in this department he accepted, even 
 against his own judgment, the advice of the financial ministers. 
 The conditions of ministerial responsibility obtaining in Italy 
 are inconceivable in English politics. Each minister is re- 
 sponsible to Parliament for his own measures, and, the defeat 
 of one of them in no way involving his colleagues, he resigns 
 and another takes his place. This system Crispi was obliged, 
 
382 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 against his better disposition, to accept, but he did his best to 
 mend it in the execution. 
 
 The " Transform ism " of Depretis had been largely re- 
 sponsible for the chaotic condition of politics, but worse 
 consequences were to follow. Legislation no longer kept in 
 view the larger interests of the country, but, through the 
 necessity of consulting merely local and partial interests in 
 order to obtain a majority, was absorbed in petty measures, 
 adopted to conciliate constituencies, which inevitably opened 
 the way to extravagant expenditure. Sound party organi- 
 zation had utterly disappeared, and with it parliamentary 
 independence. The pressure of government on the elections 
 destroyed their liberty, and any ministry could secure a 
 majority. Sectional antipathies and jealousies were fostered 
 by the corruption in giving out public works. A hazardous 
 and finally disastrous financial system grew out of this 
 condition, and the corruption of the constituencies and the 
 Chamber of Deputies — not personally, but with the pseudo- 
 justification of the good of their constituents — brought Italy to 
 the state in which we find her a few years later, on the verge of 
 bankruptcy. Amongst the measures which contributed most 
 largely to this end were those connected with the recon- 
 struction of Rome, and the new Capital of the nation provoked 
 the most reckless expenditure. 
 
 Unfortunately the steps which the government took only 
 opened the way, first to municipal extravagance and corruption, 
 and then to private speculation, which, owing to exalted and 
 fanciful anticipations of the future of the Capital, ended 
 in disaster to individuals, the municipality and the nation. 
 Government had no means of controlling this craze, and the 
 financial resources at the ordinary command of the business 
 world were soon involved, beyond recall, in enterprises which 
 too late were seen to be unprofitable. When the excited 
 public demanded the adoption of official measures for financial 
 relief, the note circulation was extended, by tacit consent of 
 
:v.] Disorganization. 383 
 
 the ministry, beyond the resources of the banks, through loans 
 made on real estate in violation of the law concerning banks 
 of circulation. The inevitable consequence was an industrial 
 and financial crisis of the most disastrous kind. The banking 
 capital of the entire country was involved to an extent from 
 which it has not yet recovered; and as the law for the 
 resumption of specie payments had never been carried into 
 effect, the extension of the paper currency beyond its legal 
 relation to the specie reserves produced its natural effect. 
 
 The legal term of the duration of the Chamber of Deputies 
 laving still in 1890 a year to run, a dissolution was urged by a 
 lajority of the cabinet, and, though opposed to it as unprovoked 
 and unnecessary, Crispi yielded. In the elections which 
 followed he obtained, on his programme of establishing an 
 equilibrium in the budget by administrative economies, while 
 maintaining the Triple Alliance, a majority so large as to 
 become dangerous to its coherence. It comprised about 400 
 Deputies out of the 508 of which the Chamber is composed. 
 In fact so general and strong was the sentiment of public 
 confidence in Crispi, that some of his oldest and most bitter 
 opponents in the past, and as it proved, also in' the future, were 
 obliged to go to the poll under his colours. There had 
 probably never been in the history of Italian elections such 
 unanimity in the support of a ministry as in this case. Crispi's 
 tenure of office had secured the tranquillity of the country, 
 and heightened the consideration in which it was held abroad. 
 Though the opposition had assailed him bitterly on account of 
 alleged extravagance and colossal projects of expenditure, the 
 facts were that he had never imposed a new tax, but had 
 removed some which existed at his accession to power; that 
 not one of the huge public works which are to this day the 
 amazement of foreign observers, was projected or constructed 
 during his term of office ; and that even in regard to the 
 military expenditure of which he was accused of being the 
 author, he had only spent the amounts appropriated to this 
 
384 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 purpose before he took office. Quietly and without calling 
 attention to the process, he had introduced economies to the 
 amount of 140,500,000 lire (over ^£5, 000,000) a year on the 
 previous expenditure ; and he had announced his intention to 
 compel a reform of the banking system, reducing the banks of 
 circulation to one, on the models of the Banks of England and 
 France, in order to correct with greater facility the irregularities 
 of the circulation. This resolution was one of the immediate 
 causes of his overthrow. Another was the hostility of France, 
 due to his early and inveterate opposition to that control 
 which, in spite of the Triple Alliance, France had persis- 
 tently exercised over the foreign policy of Italy during the 
 governments of his predecessors. Thirdly, his determined 
 maintenance of the prerogatives of the State against the 
 pretensions of the Vatican had made the ecclesiastical 
 authorities bitterly hostile to him. All these agencies worked 
 in secret, and the tie of union between them was the small 
 section of the old Right, whose hatred of the ex-radical — due 
 to the savage and (it must be admitted) not always justifiable 
 animosity which he had shown to their party in his days 
 of combat — was, notwithstanding his efforts at conciliation, 
 implacable. Beyond these influences there was among that 
 class of politicians which composes a large part of every 
 Italian Chamber, especially since the advent of Transformism, 
 a tacit rebellion against any insistence on parliamentary 
 discipline which interfered with the personal and often 
 corrupt interests of the Deputies. The final cause of this 
 parliamentary rebellion, which so curiously contrasted with 
 Crispi's enormous popularity with the nation at large, was to 
 be found in the often injudicious and sometimes weak choice 
 of his subordinate officials. 
 
 In the month of October or early in November, 1890, 
 negotiations had been opened between the section of the 
 old Right led by Rudini, and the radical group of Nicotera, 
 for a combination against Crispi. They were suspended 
 
:v.] Disorganization. 385 
 
 luring the elections, and the actual lead in the subsequent 
 combination against him was taken by the Deputies in the 
 iterest of the Banca Romana, that one of the banks of 
 circulation which had most to fear from Crispi's scheme of 
 cform and which at the same time had the greatest control of 
 the votes of the Chamber. The section of the Right which 
 was most opposed to Crispi, and which formed the most 
 important element in the combination, was that which was 
 in favour of reconciliation with France and opposed to the 
 assumption by Italy of a part in the general politics of Europe 
 through the Triple Alliance. Added to these were various 
 Deputies of the Left, personally hostile to Crispi, and some 
 who honestly opposed him on account of his immediate 
 following, which was distrusted. The support of the Vatican 
 was assured in case of a dissolution by a promise to revoke 
 certain measures hostile to the privileges of the Church. Early 
 in the session, one of the leaders of the Right demanded of 
 Crispi that he should find places in the ministry for two of 
 that party, in default of which they intended to attack him. 
 Crispi replied that he had no power of dismissing ministers, 
 which was the prerogative of the King — in him it would be 
 unconstitutional. The combination was then definitely con- 
 cluded, and on a trivial pretext a vote was sprung on the 
 ministry, which was defeated (Feb. 1891). 
 
 The new ministry was nominally headed by Rudini, but 
 its ruling spirit was Nicotera. With this incongruity of 
 elements there was, as might have been expected, no 
 efficiency in its action, and after little more than a year of 
 troubled life, it fell before an attack similar to that which had 
 brought it into existence. 
 
 This first Rudini ministry produced little effect on the 
 home policy of the government or the condition of the 
 country, but it gravely changed the foreign situation. Rudini 
 had obtained the support of the Radicals by his promise not 
 to renew the Triple Alliance, which expired in 1891. But 
 
 s. 1. 25 
 
386 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 owing to the gravitation of Germany and Austria towards 
 Russia, which had already begun, it had become the interest 
 even of Russia that Italy should remain in the Triple Alliance, 
 instead of becoming — according to the former policy of 
 Cavour, later adopted by Mancini — a link which might serve 
 to revive the Anglo-French combination that had dominated 
 the East in 1855. The pressure of the three empires on the 
 Rudini cabinet obliged it to renew the Triple Alliance, but a 
 meeting took place at Monza in 1891, at which M. Giers was 
 present, and in which a remedy was sought for this " inevitable 
 evil," as it was called — this injury to the friendship with France, 
 which the Radicals had so much at heart. It was there agreed 
 that Russia should offer her mediation with France in any 
 difficulty, and especially in that of the casus foederis being 
 invoked by Germany on the occasion of an attack on Germany 
 by France. On this condition the Italian government pledged 
 itself to leave Abyssinia to the religious protection of Russia 
 and to embrace a favourable occasion to evacuate Erythrea, 
 only preserving Massowah as a position of international interest 
 for the control of the Red Sea. But, the military position 
 being inseparably connected with the Alliance, it was settled 
 that the army budget should not be increased, while the cadres 
 should remain as they were, although disproportionate (perhaps 
 because so), viz. for twelve corps d'arme'e, in a state which made 
 mobilization too slow to be effective. In this way Italy, though 
 a member of the Alliance, would be disabled from exercising 
 any immediate influence on the course of hostilities in case 
 of a war between France and Russia on one side and the 
 Triple Alliance on the other. 
 
 This policy, diametrically opposed to that of Crispi, was 
 that of the Court clique, always influential with the King; and 
 the ministry which, in May, 1892, succeeded that of Rudini, 
 being mainly under Radical influences, accepted the inter- 
 national position bequeathed to them. This ministry was 
 formed by Giolitti, a Piedmontese deputy, enjoying the 
 
xv.] Disorganization. 387 
 
 confidence of the Radicals and the Court. Giolitti was finance 
 minister under Crispi, and had been accused of tacit acqui- 
 escence in the irregularities of the banks. While in the Crispi 
 ministry, he had in fact been responsible for these irregularities 
 not coming earlier to light, and was subsequently inefficient 
 in finding a remedy for them or in meeting the consequent 
 financial crisis, which culminated in the failure of the Banca 
 Romana and the serious embarrassment of all the other banks 
 of circulation except those of Tuscany. These events led to 
 the appointment of a parliamentary commission to enquire into 
 the causes of the crisis. The report proved culpable laxity in 
 the government and gross corruption in some of the officials. 
 It was no sooner presented than the ministry resigned, without 
 waiting for a vote of the Chamber. 
 
 In the meanwhile, advantage had been taken of the 
 administrative weakness of the late ministries and the freedom 
 accorded to Radical and Socialist propaganda. Preparations 
 had been made for an insurrectionary movement, which broke 
 out in the latter days of the Giolitti ministry. In Sicily and 
 in the great mining district of Lunigiana in Tuscany armed 
 conflicts took place between the bands of insurgents and the 
 police and military, with bloodshed on both sides. The 
 Romagna was preparing to follow. The outgoing ministry, 
 its resignation having been already accepted, was paralyzed, 
 while the formation of a new one encountered great obstacles. 
 Public opinion called loudly for Crispi, but the hostility of the 
 Court was such that he was not sent for till December, 1893, 
 when the state of the country had become critical. Sonnino, a 
 Tuscan deputy, long recognized as the soundest financier of 
 the kingdom, and Saracco, a veteran Piedmontese deputy of 
 the highest probity and great experience in public affairs, respec- 
 tively assumed the Treasury and the Public Works, the two most 
 important portfolios in regard to their influence on the finances 
 of the country. Crispi, in the Home Office, speedily repressed 
 the insurrectionary movement, and the financial measures 
 
 25—2 
 
388 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 adopted restored public confidence. The agio on gold, 
 which, in the last days of the Giolitti regime, had risen to 
 1 6, fell rapidly to 5, and the public securities rose from 75 
 to 95. No better proof could be afforded that public security 
 and financial credit had suffered more by the gross inefficiency 
 of the late ministries than by the intrinsic weakness of the 
 country. 
 
 The Chamber, though elected under Giolitti, with unusually 
 strong official pressure, was awed by the danger of the 
 situation through which the country had passed, and for a 
 time supported Crispi in his remedial measures. But with 
 returning tranquillity the opposition resumed its tactics, and 
 a dissolution took place. The elections, probably the least 
 affected by official pressure of all that had taken place since 
 the days of the Lanza administration, returned a Chamber of 
 relatively high independence and intellectual ability, though 
 under the system obtaining in Italy neither absolute independ- 
 ence nor the best representation of the intellect of the country 
 are to be hoped for. With the support of this Chamber, 
 the ministry held office, to the profit of the country, for 
 nearly three years. The history of its fall is an epitome of 
 Italian politics, foreign and domestic. It will show, better 
 than any abstract statement, the vices inherent in the present 
 Italian government, unsupported, as it is, by an efficient 
 sentiment of national independence within, and subject to 
 continual interference from irresponsible sources without, to 
 which the Crown is unable, for various reasons, to offer any 
 effectual resistance. 
 
 When Crispi in 1893 returned to office for the second time 
 as head of the government, there seemed a great probability 
 that he would be able to maintain his position so long as his 
 age permitted. His success in mastering the difficulties of 
 the financial and political crisis, the immense popularity which 
 accrued from this success, and the general recognition of his 
 ability to meet all the exigencies of the European situation, 
 
xv.] Disorganization. 389 
 
 compelled many of his former conscientious opponents to 
 accept him as the man for the emergency. Even abroad 
 his position seemed so strong as to induce the French govern- 
 ment to make advances to him with a view of detaching him 
 from his Anglo-Italian policy. The republic offered him, in 
 exchange for the abandonment of the understanding with 
 England concerning Egypt and Morocco, a treaty of commerce 
 and such commercial facilities as would have been accorded 
 to the government of Rudini, had he abandoned the Triple 
 Alliance. These overtures Crispi repelled, and his refusal 
 determined the international position of Italy. 
 
 The foreign policy to which Crispi at all times adhered was 
 diametrically opposed to that adopted by Rudini, which was 
 supported by the Radicals and a large part of the old Right, 
 and which formed the bond between these otherwise an- 
 tagonistic elements. Ever since 1881 Crispi had maintained 
 that Italy should become the bond between England and 
 Germany; he had blamed Mancini for having refused the 
 English proposition for a joint occupation of Egypt, and he 
 valued the African colony only as a means of promoting 
 community of action between England and Italy in the 
 Mediterranean and on the upper Nile. This community of 
 action would have eventually nullified the Rudinian tendencies, 
 and would have established the Anglo-Italian concert for the 
 Mediterranean on a definite basis. With such a programme, 
 and especially with the recollection that it was a former Crispi 
 ministry which had prevented the nomination of a Russian 
 governor for Bulgaria, it was hardly to be expected that Italy 
 would escape the worst consequences of the hostility of the 
 Franco-Russian entente. This hostility was made more acute 
 by the renewal, on the return of Lord Salisbury to office in 
 1895, of an agreement between England, Austria and Italy for 
 common action in the Eastern question, originally made in 
 1887. In virtue of this agreement Italy sent her fleet to the 
 Aegean to support Great Britain at the opening of the 
 
390 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 Armenian question, and the consequence was that France 
 and Russia put pressure on Abyssinia to renew hostilities 
 against Italy. This new campaign Crispi was ill-prepared to 
 meet, as he had detailed a corps d'arm£e for an expedition to 
 Asia Minor in conjunction with the naval preparations, and 
 the strength of the forces under arms did not enable the 
 minister of war to detach another corps to Erythrea. To 
 complete the difficulties of the position, a coolness arose 
 between the Emperor of Germany and the government of 
 Crispi, the latter having notified the German government that 
 he should at the proper time denounce the Treaty of the Triple 
 Alliance with the object of providing better security for Italian 
 interests in Africa. The Emperor in reply advised the King of 
 Italy that Crispi was becoming importunate and must be got 
 rid of. This defection probably determined the fall of Crispi. 
 It gave such strength to the opposition at home, that the 
 intrigues of the Court and military circles succeeded in para- 
 lyzing all his military plans, and especially in preventing him 
 from superseding Baratieri, now recognised as incompetent for 
 the enlarged operations which were in view. The King refused 
 to consent to the supersession until it became imperative 
 through the increase of the force to a point at which a superior 
 officer was necessitated by the regulations, when Baldissera 
 was appointed to the superior command. But before Baldis- 
 sera could enter on his command, Baratieri, against the 
 distinct orders of the government, attacked with a force of 
 14,000 men the impregnable positions near Adowah which 
 Menelek held with 80,000. He was met by the most crushing 
 defeat that Italy has had to undergo in modern times. Out of 
 the total force no less than 6,000 perished. 
 
 The history of this affair still remains more or less a secret, 
 the court-martial which followed being rather calculated to 
 bury than expose the facts of the case, but the immediate 
 effect was to induce the ministry to resign without waiting for 
 the assembling of parliament. The magnitude of the disaster 
 
xv.] Disorganization. 391 
 
 made it evident that, considering the Italian temperament and 
 its tendency to panic, the responsibility for it would be visited 
 on the ministry, though it was only responsible in so far as it 
 had submitted to the Royal decision deferring the recall of 
 Baratieri. 
 
 The King, unwilling to accept the programme of Rudini, 
 gave the formation of the new ministry to General Ricotti, a 
 Senator, Rudini taking the portfolio of home affairs (March, 
 1896). By one of those revolutions which for many years past 
 have been the principal cause of Italy's weakness abroad, and 
 of that want of consideration which even her declared allies 
 have shown for her interests, the foreign policy of 1891 was at 
 once revived. One of the first steps of the new government 
 was the disgraceful publication of the confidential correspond- 
 ence with England on the African affairs, a step which met 
 with such disapprobation that it led to the resignation of the 
 Duke of Sermoneta, the minister of foreign affairs. The scheme 
 of army reorganisation proposed by Ricotti, which aimed at 
 improving the efficiency of the force by devoting money 
 rather to the instruction of the rank and file than to the 
 maintenance of superfluous officers, was opposed by the 
 supporters of the Monza understanding (p. 386) as well as 
 by the Court-party, interested more in the number of com- 
 missions to bestow than in the mobility of the force. Con- 
 sequently the law was defeated in the chamber, and Ricotti 
 gave place to Rudini as President of the Council. The 
 rejection of Ricotti's plan was a triumph for the Franco-Russian 
 party, which had re-assumed the direction of foreign affairs. 
 Africa, under this policy, being excluded from the Italian 
 sphere of action, peace was made with Menelek on terms 
 which practically implied withdrawal from Erythrea to the port 
 of Massowah. This measure satisfied the exigencies of the old 
 Right, while the Radicals were conciliated by the exclusion 
 and proscription of Crispi and by the understanding with France, 
 as well as by the reversal of the repressive policy towards the 
 
392 Italy. [Chap. 
 
 extreme members of their party. Thus the year 1897 saw 
 Italy reduced to inertia abroad and apathy within. 
 
 The animosities of the factions and the corruptness of the 
 agencies which have by this time pervaded all branches of 
 the Italian government, have developed a discontent with, 
 and even a contempt for, parliamentary institutions which is 
 at this moment the greatest danger in the condition of the 
 nation. The wisdom of Garibaldi and Crispi in insisting, 
 though fruitlessly, on the separate government of the southern 
 provinces until they should have become more fit to take part 
 in governing themselves, has now become clear. Southern 
 corruption, the Camorra, and the insubordination of the 
 Neapolitan provinces, as well as the lawlessness of the Sicilian 
 population, half controlled by the Mafia, have penetrated the 
 national government. On the one hand the northern provinces, 
 especially Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, are revolted by 
 the abuses imported from Naples and the Papal States, and 
 by the brigandage still lingering there and compromising the 
 reputation of all Italy, as well as alarmed by the perils con- 
 tained in the condition of Sicily; on the other, the southern 
 provinces, under a lax and inert government, are incapable 
 of keeping pace with Northern Italy in prosperity or order, 
 and rebel against the restraint which the northern provinces 
 would impose on them. A dispassionate observer can hardly 
 fail to see that Italy tends towards a dissolution, rather than a 
 consolidation, of her unity; but the federal system, which is 
 the aspiration of Italian Radicals, would inevitably bring about 
 the destruction at once of the monarchy and of the coherence 
 of the state. It would have been, as a preliminary condition, 
 a healthy step towards unity ; as a retrograde measure it would 
 be the prelude of disorganization and anarchy. 
 
 Such is the condition of Italy at home. Abroad, the 
 vacillations and contradictions of her foreign policy make it 
 impossible to form those stable alliances which are indis- 
 pensable to the welfare of a state conterminous with others 
 
xv.] Disorganization. 393 
 
 whose interests, often mutually antagonistic, must involve those 
 of Italy. The continuity of foreign policy is the indispensable 
 condition of consideration abroad, but the vacillation of Italy 
 between two extremes makes it impossible for any other state 
 to set much value on Italy as an ally. The healthy natural 
 tendencies of the Italian state have always been towards an 
 intimate understanding and cooperation with England, and 
 latterly with the central states of Europe, disinterested in the 
 Mediterranean question, which is to Italy a vital one. But 
 the Italian factions, while always professing a consonance 
 of views with England, have alternated between cordial 
 cooperation with her, as under Crispi, and practical deference 
 to the views of Russia and France, as under Mancini, Depretis 
 and Rudini. It may even be said that the net result of these 
 alternations is a gradual approximation towards Russia, for 
 the Anglophile sentiment of Piedmont, once dominant in the 
 government, has been steadily yielding, since the change of 
 capital, to the tendencies of Naples, always, under the Bourbons, 
 friendly to Russia. 
 
 The premature annexation of Naples, and the unfortunate 
 necessity for the transfer of the capital to Rome, have 
 introduced elements of discord into the kingdom that menace 
 gravely, if not invincibly, the existing political system. The 
 Italy to which Cavour aspired was an enlarged Piedmont, 
 and, so far as the differences of nature permitted, he 
 desired to make it a new England ; but the migrations of 
 the government and the weaknesses of its governors have 
 made it rather an enlarged Naples, without the vigorous, if 
 treacherous, internal rule, and the consistent and uniform 
 foreign policy of the Bourbons. If the virtues of the past 
 survive their former possessors, the end may yet be well; 
 but there rings in my ears the ominous judgment, pronounced 
 by more than one of those who had a part in the making of 
 Italy — "Too quickly and too easily was Italy made." 
 
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 Mariani, Carlo. L' esercito italiano. Milan, 1871. — Le guerre 
 
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 Martinengo-Cesaresco, Countess. Italian characters in the 
 
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 26—3 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abercrombie, 139, 167, 169 
 
 Abyssinia, 377 
 
 Aci, Prince of, murdered, 78 
 
 Adowah, battle of, 390 
 
 Alberto Amedeo I, 234 
 
 Albrecht, Archduke, 335 
 
 Amato, Marchese, 58 
 
 Amedeo, Pietro, 216 
 
 Ancona occupied by the French, 
 112 
 
 Anfossi, 144 
 
 Angennes, massacre of, 19 
 
 Ansaldi, Colonel, 29 
 
 Antibes, legion of, 341 
 
 Antologia, La, founded, 107 
 
 Antonelli, Cardinal, 356, 360 
 
 Aquila, Count of, Viceroy of Sicily, 
 220 
 
 Arago, 166 
 
 Armellini, 203 
 
 Aspromonte, 326, 329 
 
 Austria, hostile to reform in Pied- 
 mont, 15, 37, 40; in Naples, 59, 
 62; in papal states, in, 117; 
 troops of", enter Leghorn, 195 ; 
 enter Bologna, 200; re-enter 
 Ferrara, 202 ; Emperor of, 43 ; 
 at Pa via, 48; cedes Venetia to 
 France, 335; enters Triple Alli- 
 ance, 375, 386 
 
 Azeglio, Massimo d', 32, 127, 131, 
 298 
 
 Azeglio, Roberto d', 25 
 
 Balbo, Cesare, 19, 21, 27, 31, 
 124—7 
 
 Balbo, Prospero, 13, 25, 31 
 Baldissera, Gen., 390 
 Banca Romana, 385; failure of, 387 
 Bandiera, brothers, expedition of, 
 
 65—74, 98 
 Baratieri, Gen., 390 
 Baronis, Chevalier, 29 
 Bastide, on Italian unity, 166 
 Baudin, Admiral, 235 
 Bava, Gen., 174, 179 
 Beauregard, Costa di, 34 
 Benedek, Marshal, 290 
 Benvenuti, Sforza, 263 
 Beolchi, 31 
 Bertani, 312 
 Bes, Gen., 180 
 Beust, Count, 346 
 Bianco, Lieutenant, 29 
 Bismarck, Prince, 332, 339 
 Bixio, Nino, 312 
 Blanc, Baron, studies of, 51 
 Bologna, insurrection of (1831), no; 
 
 attacked by Austrians, 200 
 Bolza, 145 
 Bomba, King, 224 
 Bonaparte, Prince Jerome Napoleon, 
 
 233, 285, 346, 348 
 Boncompagni, 300, 304 
 Borelli, 103 
 Bozzelli, 209, 224 
 Brescia, rising of, 153; fall of, 186 
 Brignoli, Marquis, finance minister, 
 
 8, 31 
 Brusasco, Count of, 12, 14 
 Buffalora, battle at, 289 
 Butera, Princess of, 220 
 
Index. 
 
 407 
 
 Cadorna, Gen., summons Rome 
 to surrender, 352 
 
 Cairoli, 312, 342, 369, 372 
 
 Calatafimi, battle of, 314 
 
 Caltanisetta, insurrection in, 222 
 
 Calvi, Pasquale, 219 
 
 „ Pietro Fortunato, 276 
 
 Calzoni, Ignazio, 219 
 
 Camorra, 328 
 
 Camou, Gen., 289 
 
 Campochiaro, Duke of, 58 
 
 Campo Formio, treaty of, 97 
 
 Canavese, the, 17 
 
 Canrobert, Gen., 289 
 
 Capponi, Gino, 193 
 
 Capua, series of battles at, 317 — 19 
 
 Caraglio, 21 
 
 Carbonari, 18, 24, 29, 33, 52, 
 57, 61, 83, 88, 94, 97, 108, no 
 
 Carignano, Prince of, 20, 21, 31, 
 33' 36* 43? opens Piedmontese 
 parliament, 176 
 
 Carlo Alberto, 24 — 28, 35, 45 — 7, 
 succession of, 44 — 46 et seq., 132, 
 149, 156 et seq.; his reforms of 
 1837, 4^5 reception at Genoa, 
 134; crosses the Ticino, 138; 
 157 et seq. ; abdication and death 
 of, 183 
 
 Carlo Felice, edict of, 37; amnesty- 
 by, 41 ; character and death of, 
 42—44 
 
 Carlo II (of Modena) succeeds 
 Marie Louise, 195; abdicates, 196 
 
 Carlo III assassinated, 196 
 
 Carrascosa, Gen., 58 
 
 Casati, Count, 169; prime minister, 
 177 
 
 Castagnola, 349 
 
 Castelfidardo, battle of, 318 
 
 Castelli, 304 
 
 Castiglia, G., 89 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, 7 
 
 Catania, insurrection at, 222 
 
 Catanzaro, insurrection at, 211 
 
 Cattaneo, Carlo, 145 — 9 
 
 Cattolica, Prince of, assassinated, 
 
 7 8 . 
 Cavaignac, 202 
 
 Cavour, Count of, 134, 139, 164, 
 
 175, 254 — 261, 281 — 284; resigns, 
 
 294; returns to power, 305 et 
 
 seq.; animosity to Crispi, 322, 
 
 323 ; death of, 326 
 Cefalu, conference at, 80 
 Central provinces, annexation of, 
 
 297 ; commissioners appointed for 
 
 Florence, Modena and Parma, 
 
 298; general assembly of, 303 
 Cernuschi, Enrico, 145 
 Chamber of Deputies, Piedmontese, 
 
 249; confirms treaty of 1855, 259 
 Chiala, Senator, 330 
 Cholera, in Sicily in 1837, 84 
 Chrzanowski, Gen., 179 et seq. 
 Cialdini, Gen., 288, 336 
 Ciceruacchio, 201 
 Cimiez, Count of, 53 
 Cipriani, Gov. General of Romagna, 
 
 301 
 Ciravegna, 34 
 
 Cittadella, fighting at, in 1849, 181 
 Civil code of Piedmont, 48 
 Civita Vecchia, taken by the French, 
 
 204 
 Clam Gallas, 289 
 Clarendon, Lord, 261 
 Clerici, Giorgio, 145 
 Clotilda, Princess, married, 285 
 Cobden, banquet to, in Venice, 153 
 Collegno, Giacinto di, 21, 31 
 Conclave of 1878, 370 
 Confalonieri, conspiracy of, 89 — 93 
 Confederation, Italian, proposed, 
 
 296 
 Constituent assembly of Rome, 
 
 meeting of, 202 
 Constitution, Spanish, proclaimed 
 
 at Turin (182 1), 36; at Naples 
 
 (1820), 58; at Turin (1848), 135; 
 
 Naples (1848), 210 
 Convention of September, 332, 340 
 Corsini, Don Neri, 107 
 Cosenza, rising at, 65 
 Crimean war, 257 — 259 
 Crispi, Francesco, 213 — '214, 219, 
 
 •239; agent of revolutionary com- 
 mittee, i860, 311; Secretary of 
 state to Garibaldi, 314, 321 — 4, 
 minister, 340—44, 365, 367, 369; 
 
408 
 
 Index. 
 
 resigns to meet charge of bigamy, 
 371; returns to office, 380; 
 Premier, 381; falls, 385; returns 
 to power, 387; falls, 390 
 
 Curtatone, battle at, 161 
 
 Custozza, battle of, 170 — 17*; 
 second, 334 
 
 Dabormida, Gen., 259 
 Dancini, 298 
 Dandolo, Enrico, 144 
 D'Appel, Gen., 180 
 D'Aspre, Gen., 180 
 Delia Favare, 83 
 Delia Rocca, Gen., 174 
 Depretis, 320, 323, 324, 369, 375, 
 
 380 
 Desgenays, Giorgio, n, 33 
 Dessaix, Gen., 10 
 D'Hilliers, Baraguay, Gen., 290 
 Di Majo, 216 
 Dogali, battle of, 378, 380 
 Duchies and Romagna declared 
 
 part of Italian kingdom, 306 
 Durando, Gen., 160, 180, 214 
 
 Ecumenical council declares infal- 
 libility of the Pope, 351 
 
 Encyclical of 1864, 331 
 
 England, policy of, opposed to 
 France, 3, 4; to Austria, 43, 87; 
 mediation of (1848), 169, (1859), 
 287; protest against Austrian 
 occupation of Ferrara or entry in 
 Tuscany, 191 ; proposes general 
 disarmament, 287, 303, 375 — 8; 
 agreement with Austria and Italy 
 for Armenia, 389 
 
 Errante, Vicenzo, 219 
 
 Espinasse, 289 
 
 Ettinghausen, Baron, 146 
 
 Eugenie, Empress, 347 
 
 Eugenio di Savoia, Prince, 303 
 
 Fabbri, ministry of, 200 
 
 Fabrizi, 68, 312 
 
 Farini, Luigi Carlo, 298, 301, 
 
 303, 3<>5. 3ii. 331 , 
 Ferdinand I of Austria, crowned, 
 
 96 
 
 Ferdinando I of Naples, died, 63 
 Ferdinando II of Naples, accession, 
 
 63 ; visits Sicily, 85 
 Ferdinando III of Tuscany 104 — 
 
 107 
 Ferrara, occupied by Austria, 117 
 Ferreri, 58 
 
 Ferrero, Capt., 31, 33 
 Filangeri, expedition of, against 
 
 Sicily (1848), 235 
 Florence, parliament at (1848), 193 
 Fossano, movement at, 31 
 Fossombroni, 105, 107 
 France, policy of, 3, 163 — 168, 
 
 282; protests against annexation 
 
 of Tuscany, 305 
 Francesco I of Naples, accession 
 
 of, 63; death of, 63; (IV) of 
 
 Modena, 101; death of 104; 
 
 (V) 197 
 
 Francesco II of Naples begs aid 
 
 from France, 316 
 Francis I of Austria, 93; dies, 96 
 Francis Joseph, 264 ; visits Venice, 
 
 362 
 Freemasonry, 95, 109, no 
 
 Gaeta, Pope escapes to, 201 ; siege 
 
 of, 319 
 Gamba, Costa, 214 
 Garibaldi, 47, 171, 177, 204; sails 
 
 for Marsala 312, 314; enters 
 
 Naples, 316, 319; at Aspromonte, 
 
 329; arrested (1867), 341; after 
 
 Mentana, 344 
 Gamier- Pages, 166 
 Genoa, annexed to Piedmont, 6; 
 
 outbreak at (1857), 281; French 
 
 land at (1859), 288 
 Genoa, Duke of, elected King of 
 
 Sicily, 234 
 Germany, Emperor of, denounces 
 
 Crispi, 390 
 Gioberti, 13, 119 — 124, 167 
 Giolitti, ministry of, 386, 388 
 Giovanni, Negus Neghesti, 379 
 Goito, 157, 162 
 Gravina, Cardinal, 79 
 Gregory XVI, no; death of, 114 
 Grenouilly, Rigault de, 330 
 
Index. 
 
 409 
 
 Grimaldi, Count, 20 
 Grist tax, 368 
 Guizot, 306 
 Gyulay, Count, 288 
 
 Harrington, Lord, 378 
 Haynau, Gen., 186, 265 
 Hummelauer, Baron, 168, 178 
 
 Insurrection, of 182 1, suppressed 
 by Austria, 40; of Mantua, 270; 
 of Palermo (1820), 77; of Sicily 
 (1848), 216; of Milan (1853), 
 270; Sicily (i860), 312 
 
 Italian literature, ro 
 
 Italy, kingdom of, constituted legally, 
 307 ; union of central provinces 
 with, 305; intervenes at Naples, 
 318; regarded as an ally, 393; 
 fleet joins English in the Aegean, 
 389 
 
 Jesuits, restoration of, in Piedmont, 
 9, 10; again banished (1848), 135 
 
 John, Archduke, viceroy of Venice, 
 97 
 
 Klapka, Gen., 271 
 Kossuth, 99, 162, 275, 337 
 
 La Farina, 239, 241, 323 
 Laibach, Congress of, 33, 34, 37, 
 
 60 
 Lamarmora, 257, 333, 336 
 Lamartine, 165 — 1 69 
 La Masa, 214, 216, 218, 235 
 Lamoriciere, Gen., 318 
 Lamotterouge, 289 
 Lanza, 315, 347 
 La Tour, Gen., 38, 40, 41 
 Law of guarantees (papal), 357 
 Ledru Rollin, 166 
 Left, monarchical, 366 
 Leghorn, insurrection in (1848), 193 ; 
 
 entered by the Austrians, 195 
 Leo XII, 109 
 
 Leopoldo II of Tuscany, 107 
 Lesseps, 206 
 Lombardy and Venice, 86, 184, 
 
 262 
 
 London committee, 64 
 Luzzi, 29 
 
 Macauly-Cerati, Count, 99 
 
 MacMahon, Marshal, 289 
 
 Mafia, 84, 392 
 
 Magenta, battle of, 281 
 
 Maisonforte, 24 
 
 Malenchini, 298 
 
 Maletto, Prince of, 78 
 
 Mamiani, Count, 200 
 
 Manara, 144 
 
 Mancini, 373, 377 
 
 Manin, 98, 153— 155, 187 
 
 Marescalchi, Count, 99 
 
 Margarita, M. della, 52 
 
 Maria Luigia, 99, 195 
 
 Maria Teresa, 8, 34 
 
 Marie Louise 'of Austria, 195 — 6. 
 
 Marie Louise II (de Bourbon), 
 196 
 
 Mario, Alberto, 365 
 
 Maroncelli, P., 90, 93 
 
 Marriage, civil, legalised in Pied- 
 mont, 257 
 
 Massimo, Cardinal, 113 
 
 Massowah, 377 
 
 Maximilian, Archduke, 279 
 
 Mazzini, 44, 46, 47, 64, no, 129, 
 194, 203, 222, 269—274, 301, 
 341, 342 ; arrested in 1870, 350, 
 361, 370, 380 
 
 Melegnano, 290 
 
 Menabrea, assumes government, 
 342. 
 
 Mendicant orders suppressed in 
 Piedmont, 257 
 
 Menotti, Ciro, 103, no 
 
 Messina, rising at, 208, 222 ; sack 
 of, 235 
 
 Metternich, Prince, 45, 48, 49, 59; 
 character of, 87 
 
 Mierowslawski, 237 — 239 
 
 Milan, the five days, 141; incident 
 in Aug. 1849, 2 66 
 
 Milano, Agesilao, 309 
 
 Milazzo, landing at, of the Nea- 
 politan army of Florestano Pepe, 
 80 ; Garibaldi's fight at, 315 
 
 Minghetti, 331 
 
4io 
 
 Index. 
 
 Ministry, first constitutional (Pied- 
 mont), 136; first responsible 
 (Naples), Jan. 27th (1848), 210; 
 (Rome), 199; (Tuscany), 192 
 
 Minto, Lord, 222, 224, 225 
 
 Modena, 98; revolt in (1831), 
 103—4, 195 
 
 Montanelli, 306 
 
 Mont Cenis tunnel, 257, 282 
 
 Montebello, battle of, 288 
 
 Montenaro, 161 
 
 Monte Parioli, 342 
 
 Monte Rotondo, battle of, 343 
 
 Mordini, pro-dictator in Sicily, 
 
 Moro, Domenico, 70 
 Mundy, Admiral, 315 
 Murat, 57 
 Muschietti, Pietro, 33 
 
 Napier, Lord, 224 
 
 Naples, 57, 208, 309; receives 
 Vittorio Emanuele II, 319 
 
 Napoleon III, 282 et seq.; re- 
 cognises kingdom of Italy, 328; 
 letter to Vittorio Emanuele 
 after Lissa, 339 ; 342 — 8 
 
 Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 285, 
 346, 348 
 
 Naselli, Gen., 76 — 79 
 
 Natoli, 239 
 
 Neipperg, Count, 100 
 
 Nicotera, 310, 350, 369, 384 
 
 Niel, Marshal, 289 
 
 Nota, Alberto, 20 
 
 Novara, battle of, 180 
 
 Nugent, Gen., 160 — 161, 186 
 
 Orbetello, 194, 313 
 
 Orsini, conspiracy of, 279, 284 
 
 Oudinot, Marshal, 206 
 
 Padua, disorders at (1847), 153 
 Palermo, insurrection at (1820), 
 
 78—82; (1848), 217; (i860), 314 
 Palestro, battle at, 288, 338 
 Pallavicini, G., 89 
 Palma, Count, 29 
 Palmerston, Lord, 139, 168, 178, 
 
 202, 230 
 
 Panizzi, 102 
 
 Papal states, 108; revolt of (1831), 
 
 no; Republic proclaimed, 202; 
 
 occupied by Italian army, 353 ; 
 
 plebiscite, 356 
 Pareto, Marquis, 139 
 Parker, Admiral, 235 
 Parliament (Piedmontese), 175, 
 
 *43> 307; (Italian), 319, 326, 
 
 359; (Neapolitan), 61, 210; 
 
 (Sicilian), 75, 224, 228, 240; 
 
 (Tuscan), 193; (Roman), 199, 
 
 202 
 Parma, 98, 195; insurrection in, 
 
 196 
 Pasolini, 198, 199 
 Pastrengo, battle of, 159 
 Patern6, Prince of, 81 — 83 
 Paver, Giuseppe, 107 
 Peace of Prague, 338; of Vienna, 
 
 339 
 Pepe, Guglielmo, 57 — 59, 211; 
 
 Florestano, 80 — 82 
 Pepoli, Count Carlo, 1 1 1 
 Perrone, Gen., 180 
 Persano, Admiral, 337 
 Peruzzi, 298, 304 
 Peschiera, siege of, 158 
 Piedmont, 5 — 55; Piedmont and 
 
 Austria, 131 — 141; war with 
 
 Austria (1848 — 9), 156 — 184; 
 
 war of 1859, 287 — 297; alliance 
 
 with France and England for 
 
 the Crimean War, 257 
 Pilo, Rosalino, 216, 311 
 Pilo-Scaletta, Marquis, 219 
 Pinelli, 33 
 Piovezzano, 159 
 Pisacane, revolt of, 310 
 Pisani, Casimiro, 219 
 Pius (VII) 108; death of, 109; 
 
 (VIII), no; (IX), election of, 
 
 114, 142, 146; returns to Rome, 
 
 207 ; death of; 370 
 Pizzighettone, 152 
 Plebiscite, in central provinces, 
 
 305; Savoy, 308; Naples, 324; 
 
 Rome, 356; Venice, 340 
 Plombieres, meeting of Cavour and 
 
 Napoleon III at, 285 
 
Index. 
 
 411 
 
 Poerio, Carlo, 64, 212 
 Poggi, Enrico, 25 
 Pozzolengo, battle of, 291 
 Progressista, party called, 368 
 Prussia, 299, 332 
 Puchner, Anton, 267 
 
 Raddusa, Marquis, 77 
 
 Radetsky, Marshal, 139, 144, 147, 
 
 156 — 173, 181, 262, 265, 276 
 Raimondi, Col., 32 
 Ramorino, Gen., 47, 180 
 Ras Alula, 378 
 Rath, Gen., 145 
 Rattazzi, Urbano, 29, 304, 327, 
 
 33i, 34i 
 Recchi, papal ministry under, 199 
 Re d' Italia sunk at Lissa, 337 
 Reggio di Calabria, outbreak at, 208 
 Renault, Gen., 289 
 Revel, Thaon de, 27, 31, 34 
 Ricasoli, Baron, 192, 298, 301 — 
 
 306, 311, 327, 336, 340, 363 
 Ricciardi, 68; Count, 58 
 Richelieu, 163 
 
 Ridolfi, Tuscan minister, 192 
 Rieti, battle of, 62 
 Rifled artillery first used, 290 
 Rimini, insurrection at (1845), 113 
 Rittatori, Sergeant, 33 
 Robilant, Gen., 372 — 5 
 Romagna, insurrection of (1832), 
 
 112 
 Rome declared a republic, 202; 
 
 occupied by the French, 207 ; 
 
 occupied by the Italian army, 
 
 353 
 Roselli, Gen., 205 
 Rossi, Pellegrino, assassinated, 201 
 Rouher, 346 
 Rudini, Marquis of, the elder, 
 
 218; the younger, 384; fall of, 
 
 386, 389; premier again, 391 
 Ruggero, Settimo, 77 et seq., 219 — 
 
 240, 326 
 Russell, Lord John, 21, 316 
 Russia, Emperor and Empress of, 
 
 visit Sicily (1845), 85 
 
 Sadowa, 335 
 
 Saffi, Aurelio, 203 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, 389 
 
 Saluzzo, Count Alessandro, 14, 31, 
 34 
 
 San Martino, 290 — 1 
 
 San Marzano, Marquis, 10, 22, 25, 
 30; Gen., 379 
 
 Sanmichele, Count, 27 — 8 
 
 San Pietro, Cardinal, 370 
 
 Santa Lucia, battle of, 160 
 
 Santarosa, 22 — 28, 30, 31, 39 
 
 Saracco, 387 
 
 Sarnico, revolt of, 329 
 
 Schnitzer-Meerau, 169 
 
 Schwartzenberg, Prince, 264, 267 
 
 Sella, 347 
 
 Sermoneta, Duke of, 391 
 
 Serristori, Count, 194 
 
 Sicily, condition of (18 15), 75 ; 
 first constitution (by Bourbons), 
 75; separation from Naples, 76; 
 insurrection of 1848, 216; revo- 
 lution under Garibaldi, 309; 
 annexation to Italy, 324 
 
 Silvio Pellico, 90, 93 
 
 Solferino, 290 
 
 Sonnino, Baron, 387 
 
 Stabile, Mariano, 219, 225, 229, 
 
 234 
 
 Stadion, Marshal, 288 
 St Jean d'Angeli, 289 
 Sturbinetti, 198 
 
 Tazzoli, Don Enrico, 263, 268 
 Tegethoff, Admiral, 337 
 Terzaghi, Giulio, 145 
 "The Thousand" sail for Sicily, 
 
 313 
 
 Thurn, Count, 146, 160, 180 
 
 Tomasseo, 153 
 
 Torrearsa, Marquis of, 225, 234 
 
 Transformism, 369, 382, 384 
 
 Traubiand, 237 
 
 Trentino, 337, 339 
 
 Triple Alliance, 373—5, 383. 3 8 5> 
 
 39° 
 Triumvirate, Roman, 203 
 Tuileries, reception at, in 1859, 
 
 286 
 Tunis, occupation of, by France, 373 
 
412 
 
 Index. 
 
 Turin, riots at, 35a 
 
 Tuscany, 191, 193, 196, 398, 306 
 
 Udine, bombardment of, 160 
 Umberto I, accession of, 370 
 
 Valesa, Count, 11, 31 
 Vannonson, General de, 27 
 Varax, di, 30 
 Venetia, plebiscite in, 340 (see also 
 
 Lombardy) 
 Venice, insurrection in, 154; siege 
 
 of, 187; capitulation, 190 
 Veri Italiani, society, 107 
 Vicenza, defence of, 160; capture 
 
 of, 162 
 Vienna, revolt of, 154 
 Vieusseux, library of, 106 
 Vigevano, armistice of, 173 — 5 
 Villafranca, 291 ; treaty of peace 
 
 signed at, 293 — 301 
 Villa Franca, Duke of, 78—80 
 Vinoy, Gen., 289 
 
 Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, 347 
 
 Vittorio Emanuele I, King of 
 Sardinia, 30,32; abdication of, 34 
 
 Vittorio Emanuele II (of Italy), 
 183, 242, 249, 259, 260, 287, 
 307. 3' i» 317. 322, 127, 329, 
 332, 339» 349» 359. 305; death 
 of, 370 
 
 Vitzthum, Count, 348 
 
 Voraces, Les, invasion of Savoy 
 by, 165 
 
 Waldenses, emancipation of, 135 
 Walewski, 261 
 Ward, Thomas, 196 
 Weissenburg, Baron, 169 
 Woerth, battle of, 348 
 Wratislaw, 180 
 
 Young Italy, 44, 46, 95, 98, 107 
 
 Zanardelli, 369 
 
 Zurich, congress of, 295, 301 
 
 „, TBV 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
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