M27m A ^^s c A^ on ^^_ O = ■ "■™ —1 0^ — ID ^^^£ m 5 — ^^^ O 3 ^ ^^^s ^ 2 m _^ CD ^^^" IjD 3 — == > = 33 7 — == 3> 2=r IZES '"" ■ — t '■™ iirnr'/, . AFTAiiFnP/, § ^Ml ,«FHKlVF?r,. .n^jvrnr,. ^.ClFCAtIFO?;"^ -'1 -■■■>■ -. ^' ■ i^MH ■ J j V 1 . ' : '. : ■ d to .' ■ m^AMrr! r # . r5^ . QfCAll ;in-3Vi^ :^ l-^^^ 5? ^ .>.-!05AMr.F!,T.. ''/A.^f\i,vn-3W's^ .s" ..xTI!^^' ■.\\F-II\'IVFPr; ..tm-AV! -p o /3.JOV ^filJDNVSOl^"^ "^/^ajAlN . r <" . ; . r / «AV\EUNIVERy/A .V >- "" o ' »J Vll I J ' ~i 1 .1 ; * ' f . > . . .uiAiN IIBRARY/?^ v\T-!!- '%0JllV3JO'f^ N lE miu/rnc. If j" ^ I r r ri n <::■■ THE MONROE DOCTRINE THE VITAL NECESSITY OF ITS CONTINUED MAINTENANCE PUBLISHED BY THE . KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS HISTORICAL COMMISSION BY THOMAS H. MAHONY Assistant District Attorney Suffolk District, Commonwealth of Massachusetts WITH A FOREWORD BY REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. BENSON, U. S. N. MEMBERS OP COMMISSION Edward F. McSweeney Chairman William S. Benson Hannis Taylor Henry Jones Ford Charles H. McCarthy Maurice Francis Egan George Hermann Derry 1921 3 3} 4 • " « ■ * * • • • 7.\ PREFACE By Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson, U. S. N. An earnest consideration of the Monroe Doctrine and a sincere appreciation of what it means to the United States is more imperative now than ever before. There are at least four reasons which have prompted the Knights of Columbus Historical Commission to publish a monograph upon the "Monroe Doctrine" as its first offering to the Amercian public. First: The declaration to the world contained in the Monroe Doctrine that the United States would not permit any non- American nation to intervene in American political affairs, and Washington's policy of American non-intervention in non-American affairs have been the keystone of our foreign policy since this country has had a foreign policy. These com- plementary principles which have controlled our relations with foreign powers have made the United States the great and powerful nation which it now is. The Monroe Doctrine, at all times, merits the most important thought of this country. Second: The League of Nations Covenant, which was re- pudiated by the people of this coimtry in the national election of 1921 has been adopted by the allied and victorious powers. That covenant provides in Article XXI, that \^ "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed ti to affect the validity of international engage- ments, such as treaties of arbitration or regional J^ understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for \ securing the maintenance of peace." ^ Some of the American nations and Canada, are members *^ of the League of Nations. ^ Disputes arising between such American nations or between 5^ any of such American nations and any non- American nation, "^ under the terms of the Covenant are within the jurisdiction of ^ the League of Nations. Just how far the League of Nations might go in effectuating any League decision rendered in such ^ a dispute is a question. Recently Bolivia requested the League ~^" to consider a revision of the Bolivian-Chilean treaty of 1904 "5^ covering certain territorial boundaries of Bolivia with reference to Tacna and Arica. Chile protested that any such action by '^ the League would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The v^ League took no definite action, and after considerable objection Bolivia withdrew her request. Clearly, if the League attempted to modify the 1904 treaty and awarded to Bolivia any of the territory therein set forth as belonging to Chile, it would con- stitute a non-American intervention in American affairs to the 426270 ^ detriment politically and territorially of Chile and hence an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. Such questions are likely to arise again, and it is possible that no such appeal as Chile recently made to the Monroe Doctrine may then be made. The United States therefore is most vitally interested at the present in the assertion and maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. Third: There is now pending before the Congress of the United States a bill to exempt American coastwise shipping from the payment of tolls for passage through the Panama Canal, Considerable objection is made to any such exemption on the ground that it woidd be a violation of the Hay-Paunce- fote treaty of 1901. The question of tolls is but an incident in the operation of the Canal, but the question of an inter- oceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama and the Monroe Doctrine have been inextricably interwoven in the past and must necessarily be so interwoven in the futtire. The Monroe Doctrine was intended as a self-protective measure for the United States. The Panama Canal to a very great degree was also so intended. Any diminution of the control of the United States over the Canal not only endangers the Monroe Doctrine but also endangers the future safety, peace and prosperity of the United States. Fourth: President Harding has invited the great Powers to take part in a conference in Washington to discuss Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern Questions. The Monroe Doc- trine and the necessity for its maintenance will undoubtedly, be a controlling factor in determining the position of the United States with reference to disarmament. The Knights of Colimibus Historical Commission, there- fore, deems it most appropriate to present this discussion of the Monroe Doctrine at the present time. The author, Mr. Thomas H. Mahony, Assistant District Attorney of Boston, claims no originality in the discovery of the material used or treated. He presents an arrangement of the materials already at hand and accessible to anybody, which sets forth and empha- sizes the American aspect of the Monroe Doctrine. It is that American aspect which the Knights of Columbus Historical Commission intends to offer in all its publications dealing with American History, to stimulate a deep, sincere, and nation-wide spirit of patriotism to the end that the United States may con- tinue its mission of holding aloft the torch of freedom for all peoples. W. S. BENSON. THE MONROE DOCTRINE Summary Chapter I. — The Principle Involved. Page The United States as well as other nations possess the right of self -protection and of self-preservation 7 Chapter n. — Its Early Application. In the exercise of this right, President Washington inaugurated the policy of isolation from European political affairs 12 Chapter m.— Our Foreign Policy Prior to 1823. The complementary policy of preventing non-American inter- vention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Wash- ington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter of West Florida 17 Chapter IV. — The Holy Alliance and its Menace to the United States through the Spanish-American Colonies and the Oregon Controversy with Russia. The menace to popular government from the Holy Alliance and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 1823 which called for a definite appUcation of this second principle. 23 Chapter V. — Great Britain and Her Desire for a Joint Declaration with the United States. Great Britain's Ministry, while sympathizing with the anti- republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascend- ency in the Spanish-American colonies, and sought a joint declaration with the United States opposing intervention by France and the Holy Alliance in the affairs of the rebellious Spanish-American Colonies 33 Chapter VI.— Its Refusal. The United States Refused to Enter into any such joint Declara- tion with Great Britain 39 Chapter Vn. — The Message to Congress. The United States, through President Monroe, proclaimed to the world the determination to prevent any European nation from future colonization in, or extension of its political sys- tem to the Western Hemisphere 45 Chapter Vm.— The Doctrine Tested. The "Monroe Doctrine" has been tested at various times by France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, but the United States has resolutely maintained this poHcy to the present time 47 Summary — Continued Chapter IX. — Comments, Criticisms and Fallacies. Page Many mistakes and misinterpretations have arisen relative to the Monroe Doctrine such as the following: 67 A. That George Canning, the British statesman, was the author of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the British fleet has ever supported it. B. That the Monroe Doctrine has been changed or extended beyond its original scope. C. That the Monroe Doctrine is a guaranty given by the United States to Spanish America. D. That the Monroe Doctrine has not been consistently applied by the United States. E. That the Monroe Doctrine is a prohibition against the acquisition of new territory by the United States. Chapter X. — The Future of the Monroe Doctrine. The future of the Monroe Doctrine in effect must resolve itself into one of the following policies: 85 A. Its absolute abandonment. B. It continued assertion and maintenance by the United States acting alone. THE MONROE DOCTRINE CHAPTER I — THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED The United States as well as other nations possess the right of self-protection and of self-preservation. For the last three or four years the Monroe Doctrine has been most prominent in the discussion of world politics. The Peace Conference at Versailles, the League of Nations Covenant, and more recently the Limitation of Armaments Conference have all shared in the responsibility for directing public atten- tion to the Monroe Doctrine. What it is, how it came into existence, and what is to be its future are questions of great interest to all students of international affairs, and questions of vital importance to all Americans. The Monroe Doctrine has been defined or described in many ways, and by many people. Ex-President Taft described it in the following way: "The Monroe Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy of the United States which forbids any non-American nation, by external aggression, by pvirchase or by intrigue, to acquire the territory in whole or in part, of any country or nation in this Western Hemisphere. "^ It has also been defined or described thus: "A prohibition of the United States of European inter- ference with the political arrangements of the New World. "2 "The poHcy by which the United States opposes any acts that it considers as 'oppressing' or 'controlling the destiny of the Latin American states."* "It is a declaration of the United States that cer- tain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The declaration does not say what the course of the United States would be in case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance. . . . The doctrine rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by inter- national law. ... It does not assert or imply or involve any right on the part of the United States to impair or ^Taft Papers on League of Nations, p. 292. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 3. *R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- doned, — 10 American Journal International Law, p. 77. 7 control the independent sovereignty of any American State. . . .The scope of the doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre- existing American Government. "^ These definitions and descriptions set forth the unilateral character of the Monroe Doctrine, in its enunication and main- tenance for the security of the United States, only. On the other hand, Lord Bryce, former British Minister at Washington argues that the Monroe Doctrine, "was originally delivered as annotmcing a restriction or limitation which America proposed to place on her own action. She would not interefere in the wars and alliances of the Old World and she expected that in rettun the States of the Old World would not interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. "* As will be pointed out, there is no foundation of historical fact which justifies any such conclusion as that drawn by Lord Bryce. On the contrary, the evidence warrants but one con- clusion as to this question, viz., that the Monroe Doctrine was based upon the right of this country to self-protection, that it was intended solely for that piirpose, and that no obligations to any other power were assumed in its pronouncement. Many authors contend that the Monroe Doctrine has not attained the status of international law. Among such critics may be mentioned Ex-President Taft,^ Elihu Root,* W. F. Reddaway,^ and H. Bingham. « On the other hand President Cleveland in his special message to Congress on the Venezuela question, stated most emphatically that while "It may not have been admitted in so many words to the Code of International law, ... if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it was specifically mentioned. . . . "The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. ..."'' 'E. Root, Addresses on International Subjects, pp. 109-117. ^The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. ^Tajt Papers on League of Nations, p. 120. ■•E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 103-113. «H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1913. 'Special Message to Congress, Dec. 17, 1895— J. D.^Richardson, Mes- sages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 655. — J. B. Moore, Digest of Inter- national Law, VI, 577, 578. 8 Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, said that, "The nile thus defined has been the accepted public law of this country ever since its promulgation. "^ So far as the United States is concerned the Monroe Doctrine is, and must remain a principle of International Law, if there is any International Law, and in any event must be accepted as a principle controlling international relations. It will have the force of such a principle until such time as the United States shall be unable to supply the force necessary for its maintenance. Practically all students of the political history of the United States agree that the Monroe Doctrine is based upon the right of national self-protection, which right is recognized by international law.^ In order to secure a proper perspective for the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, a short glance at this principle of self -protection and its application will not be amiss. Every sovereign State possesses as incidental to such sovereignty the right of self-defense and of self-preservation." A sovereignty without such right is an absurdity. As deeply rooted as is the desire for self-preservation in the individual, just so deeply rooted is the same desire, but raised to a national degree, in the State. Just as the individual's right of self- preservation is recognized in national law, so is the State's right of a similar nature recognized in what we call international law. In national courts of law the right of self-defense justifies an individual in anticipating attack. "One is not obliged to wait until he is struck by an impending blow; for, if a weapon be raised in order to shoot or strike, or the danger of other personal violence be immi- nent, the party is such imminent danger may protect him- self by striking the first blow for the purpose of repelling and preventing the attempted injury."* The same right of States to anticipate injurious attack, and to go beyond their jurisdictional territory in exercising such right is recognized internationally.* Of this there are many iQlney to Bayard, July 20, 1895— Senate Ex. Documents, 31-54th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4. *E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. J. W. Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, p. 477. A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 75, 80. H. Taylor, International Public Law, p. 405. 'H. Taylor, International Public Law, p. 405, sec. 401; C. H. Stock- ton, International Law, pp. 97-109; Creasy, International Law, p. 149. *Words and Phrases Judicially Used, 2nd series, IV., 509; State v, Wilson, (Delaware), 62 Atlantic Reporter, pp. 227, 231. *Oppenheim, International Law, 3d ed. I., 214. Creasy, International Law, p. 153. Vattel, III., ch. 3, sees. 42-49. , R. Phillimore, Int. Law, I., 216. ' H. Taylor, International Public Law, pp. 422, 426. 9 illustrations. The mobilization of forces upon a State's fron- tier by a neighboring State justifies defensive mobilization and even war by the former against the latter. Again, if one nation is attempting, directly or indirectly, to seize or occupy sites of great military strategical value, and such occupation is considered by another nation as threatening the existence of the latter, it might properly object to such occupation, and go to war if necessary to prevent it.^ In the exercise of this right Great Britain in 1911 objected to Germany's occupation of a naval station on the Coast of Morocco. So, too, Great|Britain in the past objected to Russia's occupation of Constantinople. In fact, the whole theory of the Balance of Power is based upon this principle. 2 It must be noted at once, however, that in the present con- dition of international relations, International Law as enforce- able law, like national law, does not really exist. There is no underlying sanction for it,' such as there is for aU national law in the supreme authority of the State, arising directly from its people. There is no international legislature to enact international laws, no international executive to enforce them, and no international courts to administer them with power to enforce their decrees. Strictly speaking, therefore, in the absence of such sanction there is no such thing as international law at the present time, at least no international law upon which alone a state might safely rely for its protection and preservation.* The force underlying what we know as international law is merely the public opinion of the world, the comity of nations and nothing more.' Public morality, however, has never been sufficient to control the actions of the populations of States, and is not ^sufficient to^ control the actions of States. In the past the nation having power to enforce its demands has had the basis or results of such demands incorporated, to some extent, into what we call International Law.* In times of national stress, however, even the few rules or maxims, re- garded as approaching an international code, have been dis- regarded with impunity by nations which feared no disad- vantageous or disproportionate results from such disregard. For example. Great Britain entirely disregarded our rights as neutrals on the sea in the French-English wars of 1793 and ^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. ^Creasy, Int. Law, pp. 151, 279. H. Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 425, 426. 'A. J. Balfour, The British Blockade (1915), p. 10. ^Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, VI. *C. H. Stockton, Int. Law, p. 1; Pomeroy, Int. Law, p. 14; Oppen- heim, Int. Law, 3d ed., pp. 1, 14, 15; Creasy, Int. Law, p. 1. 'A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 81. 10 1803.* In the World War, Germany disregarded such rules of war as referred to blockades, to bombing of unfortified places, and to search of merchant vessels before sinking. Great Britain, to the disadvantage of the United States, and in vio- lation of the provisions of the Declaration of London (1909), by Orders in Council of August 20, 1914, October 29, 1914, March 11, 1915, and March 23, 1915, deliberately disregarded the rules of contraband, neutral trade and blockade. ^ A State, therefore to retain its economic and political inde- pendence, must be prepared to enforce its rights, for so far, International Law has not furnished sufficient guaranties. A sovereign State at all times must be the sole judge of whether its safety is or is not threatened, and of what action it will take.* To argue otherwise would be a denial of sovereignty. In the last analysis, it will always be a question of the potential energy possessed by that State which will control the necessity and the character of any action to be taken. The United States, as a sovereign State possess the sole and unqualified right to say when, where or how their safety or their existence is endangered by the action or threatened action of any other State. They possess the absolute right to take any action which they may deem proper, to prevent the aris- ing of such danger or to remove it if it has already arisen. The practical question at any given time will be whether the United States has the power to carry out their desires, and to enforce their demands, for if at any time they are in such a condi- tion that any foreign nation, with which they have as a dis- pute, beHeves itself powerful enough to disregard those desires or demands, or actually to overcome the United States by force of arms, then it is absolutely certain that no mere dec- laration of principle, or verbal objection, however strongly phrased, will be sufficient to protect the United States.* President Roosevelt pointed this out in his message of December 2, 1902 relative to the Monroe Doctrine wherein he stated that, "The Monroe Doctrine should be treated as the car- dinal feature of American foreign policy; but it would be worse than idle to assert it unless we intended to back it up. "6 i» . ■ . . m. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 171, 172. A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 6-29. *E. J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War, pp. 1-108, appendix 312-316; see also A, J. Balfour The British Blockade (1915). The Declaration of London set forth rules of naval warfare which Great Britain and the other nations there represented agreed were "actual principles of international law," C. H. Stockton, Int. Law, pp. 57-58, App. IV., 535-549. 'E. Root, Addresses on International Subjects, p. 111. *P. F. Martin, "Maximilian in Mexico," 415. *J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, p. 6762. 11 CHAPTER II— ITS EARLY APPLICATION In the exercise of this right President Washington inaugu- rated the policy of isolation from European political affairs. When the American Revolution ended, the American Colonies were recognized as constituting a new and distinct nation with all the rights of sovereignty, a republican form of government, unusual in the world of that period, was adopted by the American people. At first a loosely federated system was attempted, but later, the Constitution was adopted, creat- ing the representative democracy which we now have. At that time the European world was monarchical and auto- cratic in character. Russia, Holland, Spain, Portugal, France and Great Britain all had colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Some of these nations looked with jealous eyes at the United States, and all of them, with the possible exception of France, were opposed to republicanism. This new venture of republicanism was, therefore, con- fronted with many dangers. The success of the Revolution was not hoped by the European nations, and was not believed by England, to be permanent. ^ The same international jeal- ousies, manifested by the European Powers in Europe, were reflected in the control of their colonies. The continued existence of the Republic of the United States was at best precarious. If the experiment was to succeed, and if representative government was to survive, it was necessary to take all possible precautions to anticipate and to prevent the arising of any circimistances which might tend to destroy or endanger to it. It was apparent from the beginning that the greatest menace to the United Sta.tes lay in the colonies of the European nations upon its borders. ^^ Great Britain, in open violation of the Treaty of 1783, by retaining the fortified posts along our northern frontier, threatened trouble at any time.' Spain held the west bank of the Mississippi River and closed that river to navigation,* and also endeavored to alienate the west- ^Woodrow Wilson, George Washington, pp. 248, 249. H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 170, 175. Such opinion has been entertained more recently. See A. Carnegie, The Reunion of Britain and America — North Am. Review, June, 1893. ''H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 133. J. B. Moore, Four Phases of American Development, p. 149. 'Bancroft, History of United States, VI, 463. H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 175, 176. W. Wilson, George Washington, 302. John Marshall, George Washington, p. 255. *H. C. Lodge, Washington, II, 133; J. Marshall, George Washington, p. 269, 270. 12 em population from this nation. Neither of these nations was averse to inciting the Indian tribes along our border to serve their own ptirposes. Everything was done to render as diffi- cult as possible the progress of this country. ^ In the Caribbean Sea, Great Britain, by hampering oiu* trade and holding strate- gical places, as well as Spain and France by occupation of other similar strategical points, threatened the future safety of the United States. Even before his election to the presi- dency, Washington believed that national seciu-ity lay in isola- tion from European political affairs. ^ While the United States were developing, and while the various phases of national live were being consolidated, Wash- ington was of the opinion that they must be kept free of any disputes between the various European nations or their colonies ; moreover, he believed that all attempts of these same European nations to meddle in the affairs of the United States, or tend- ing to endanger their political or territorial integrity, must, if possible, be prevented and, in any event, most bitterly opposed. Washington on January 1 , 1788, wrote to Jefferson as follows : "Our situation is such, as makes it not only imneces- sary but extremely imprudent, for us to take part in their quarrels; and whenever a contest happens among them, if we wisely and properly improve the advantages which nature has given us, we may be benefited by their folly, provided we conduct ourselves with circumspection."' Washington in 1788 writing to Sir Edward Newenham observed : "I hope that the United States of America will be able to keep disengaged from the labyrinth of Etuopean poli- tics and wars; and that before long they will, by the adoption of a good national government, have become respectable in the eyes of the world, so that none of the maritime powers, especially none of those who hold pos- sessions in the New World or the West Indies, shall pre- sume to treat them with insult or contempt."* In these letters Washington showed clearly that this prin- ciple of national self-preservation even at that time had as- sumed in his mind a definite form, and had become the well- defined system, which, as President, he later followed. As one of his first executive acts, he careftdly examined and noted all the foreign correspondence in the Government archives. He realized the dangers to the United States from the European nations with colonies along our borders, and became convinced that the United States should not become iH. C. Lodge, Washington, II . 86, 87, 90, 133, 172, 175. m. C. Lodge Washington, II., 139, 141. »J. Sparks, Writings of George Washington, IX., 291-294. mid, IX., 398-402: 13 entangled in the affairs of the European nations and should in- sist at all times upon being accorded all the rights of a sovereign nation. 1 The foreign policy of Washington'sXadministration, based upon isolation from European entanglements, the result of sound logic and sober thinking was matured at the outset, to be applied from time to time as the occasion arose.^ Two striking instances in our early history may be cited in illustration of these points. The first, illustrative of Wash- ington's policy, involved our refusal to be drawn into the European War of 1793. In 1789 the people of France, inspired^by the success of the American Revolution, and of representative government, over- turned the monarchy and set up in its place a republic. In 1793 France and England were at war and the former sought our aid. At that time treaties were in force between France and the United States, which provided, among other things, for the payment of our Revolutionary debt to France, for the guaranty of her possessions on this continent, and for a defen- sive alliance.^ The United States was in very great danger of being drawn into the war by reason of the hostile activities of both belligerents, and at a time when every consideration for its future security demanded that it avoid participation." Washington, while gratefully remembering the French assistance during the Revolution, and mindful of the exist- ing treaties with that country, nevertheless, interested in the welfare of the United States above all else,^ pointed out that it was not a defensive war, such as was covered by the treaty, and proclaimed the neutrality of the United States on April 22, 1793. This Proclamation of Neutrality was followed in 1794 by the enactment by Congress of the Neutrality Act, the first of its kind among modem nations, which imposed upon every person m. C. Lodge, Washington II., 132, 133, 137, 143. UHd, II, 139, 141; Bancroft, Hist, of U. S., VI., 469. 3H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 166, 167. Treaties and conventions concluded between U. S. and other powers since July 4, 1776, pp. 241-254. ""The minds of the people are so much agitated, and resentments are so warm that there is reason to fear that we shall be hurried into the torrent that is ravaging Europe." Letter of March 24, 1794, J. Coit, Member of Congress, to D. L. Coit, — Oilman's, James Monroe, p. 45. '"Tis perhaps fortunate for us that we are ill-treated by both the belligerent powers; experiencing no favor from either, we shall be less an object of jealousy from either, and probably less in danger of rushing into the war than if we were ill-treated by one only. I believe we had better suffer almost anything than get into the war. ..." Letter March 25, 1794, Joshua Coit, to Daniel L. Coit — Oilman's James Monroe, p. 44. ^"All our late accounts from Europe hold up the expectation of a general war in that quarter. For the sake of humanity, I hope such an event will not take place; but, if it should, I trust that we shall have too just a sense of our own interest to originate any cause, that may involve us in it." Washington to D. Humphreys, March 23, 1793, J. Sparks, Writings 0} George Washington, X., 331: W. C. Ford, Writings of George Washington, XII., 276. U in the United States, the obligation to refrain from any act, therein set forth and defined as unneutral, against any nation with which the United States was at peace. ^ The second instance referred to, involved the War of 1812. Upon the renewal of war between France and Great Britain in 1803, the latter announced wholesale blockades of French ports, ^ and in addition, ordered the seizure of all neutral ships, wher- ever found, trading with an enemy, « denying them the right to enter any harbor on great stretches of the European oast.^ In 1807 Great Britain promulgated the "Orders in Council," intending to prohibit all neutral vessels from the use of the oceans, save such as traded directly with England or its colo- nies. ^ All this time Napoleon was replying with "orders" and "decrees" of a like nature. « Both belligerents by such acts violated the sovereignty of this country and injured it more than they injured all other neutral countries combined.'' American vessels were seized by both belligerents, but by reason of Great Britain's mastery of the seas, the United States suffered more severely by the lawless seizures of that nation.* In effect, American ports were blockaded.' Great Britain forcibly impressed at least 20,000 American seamen into her service,!" on the theory that a person, once a British subject, could not expatriate himself, and as a corol- lary, that the British Government could seize anybody, attempt- ing to do so, wherever found, and forcibly compel him to serve Great Britain in any way that nation or its agents might re- quire." The United States insisted that, as a neutral, they had the right to trade imhampered with other neutrals, and, under the proper restrictions as to contraband, had the right to trade with either belligerent; they further insisted that Great Britain had no right whatever, forcibly to impress nationals of the United States into British service. Great Britain, by her insistence upon this alleged right of "Impressment," practically proclaimed the right to British laAct of June 5, 1794—1. Stat, at Large, p. 381, ch. 50. '^Harrowby's Circular, Aug. 9, 1804; Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, III., 266. *Hawkesbury's Instructions, Aug. 17, 1805; Ibid, 266. ^Fox to Monroe, April 8, 1805, and Nov. 11, 1805; Ibid 267. 'Orders in Council, Jan. 1807, and Nov. 11, 1807, Ibid, pp. 267-273. «The Berlin Decree, Nov. 21, 1806; Ibid, pp. 290-291. The Milan Decree, Dec. 17, 1807; Ibid, p. 290. ^A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 7. 8H. Adams, Hist, of U. S., V. 31; Rept. Secy, of St., July 6, 1812, Am. St. Pap. Foreign Relations, III. 583-585. 'Channing, Jeffersonian System, pp. 184-194. See generally on War of 1812, A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, Vol. IV. I'T. Roosevelt, Naval War of 1812, p. 42; H. Adams, Hist, of U. S., III., 202. "John Lowell, Review of Treatise on Expatriation, by a "Massachusetts Lawyer." 15 control of the oceans whenever Great Britain cared to assert it, and the right to destroy American commerce without recompense. This infringed upon the sovereign right of the United States, and if allowed to go unchallenged, not only would injure their dignity, but actually endanger their very existence. While the United States had ample cause for war against France, that nation did not resort to impressment, and Great Britain's activities by reason of her control of the sea, made a more direct and harassing contact, and aroused this country, then under a Republican administration, to self-pro- tective action. Henry Clay, the great champion of Americanism stirred the patriotism of ^ this country as it had not been stirred since the Revolution. In the United States Senate on February' 22, 1810, he argued: "Have we not been for years contending against the tyranny 'of the ocean' . . . We have . . . tried peace- ful resistance . . . When this is abandoned without effect, I am for resistance by the sword. "^ Two years later while speaker of the House of Represen- tatives he said: "The real cause of British aggression was not to dis- tress an enemy, but to destroy a rival. "* The United States thus aroused to action in the defense of their rights, dignity and existence, declared war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812. In the first instance referred to, the United States mani- fested their determination to pursue as their policy with refer- ence to foreign nations the principle of absolute non-intervention in European affairs, and of complete freedom from entangling alliances, while in the second, was made clear their refusal to allow without challenge any nation directly or indirectly to attack the sovereignty or dignity of the United States. ^ ^Annals, nth Cong, jrd Session, pp. 579-582. ^Annals, I2th Cong. ist. Session, p. 601. ^See also the controversy of 1789-1790 relative to Nootka Sound; J. Marshall, George Washington, pp. 284-285; J. S. Bassett, The Federalist System, pp. 59-60; Manning, Nootka Sound Controversy, in American His- torical Association Report, 1904, pp. 279-478; Ford's Writings of Jefferson, v., 199-203, 238; C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 88-92, 100. 16 CHAPTER III— OUR FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO 1823 The complementary policy of preventing non-American inter- vention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Wash- ington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter of West Florida. The events in the early history of the United States show an appreciation of, and an earnest effort upon the part of those entrusted with government to follow the principles of foreign policy just considered as well as a ready and active response upon the part of the nation. Washington's convictions have already been referred to. These were emphasized by him in his "Farewell Address" in which he gave his parting injunction to the country in the following words: "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible . . . "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by arti- ficialties, in the ordinary vissicitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance . . . "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situa- tion? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, interest, humour, or caprice? " 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it. . . ."i According to a British writer on the Monroe Doctrine, Washington, in this message, bequeathed to his country, "a policy which above all things may be called American. "^ This iPord's Writings of Washington, XIII, 311-318. J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers oj the Presidents, I., 222, 223. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 10. 17 policy, unheard of before in international affairs, placed the country outside the toils of European greed, ambition and treachery. From this policy the Monroe Doctrine naturally developed. 1 Washington's successors also followed these principles and manifested their belief in them by many statements and actions. • John Adams in 1782, said, "It is obvious that aU the powers of Europe will be continually with us, to work us into their real or imagi- nary balances of power . . . But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle . . ,"* Adams also said that, "America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce."* In the Nootka Sound Controversy, in 1790, Adams de- clared in favor of refusing Great Britain permission to send troops through the United States to attack the Spanish colony of Louisiana.* Long afterward on September 30, 1805, in a letter to Dr. Rush, John Adams referred to his foreign policy when President, in these words: "The principle of foreign affairs, which . . . has been the invariable guide of my conduct in all situations . . . was, that we should make no treaties of alliance with any foreign power; . . . that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European politics and wars . . . "^ Jefferson, referring to the same policy, said : "I had ever dreamed it fundamental to the United States never to take an active part in the quarrels of Europe . . . "s This policy of abstention from European politics was early recognized by others as being the logical policy of the United iH. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 141, 143: Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895, Sen. Ex. Doc. jj, — S4th Cong, ist sess., p. 4. 2J. Adams, Diary, Nov. 18, 1782. »J. Adams, Works, VIII, 9, 497, 599. *C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 82-92, 100. 'John Adams, Works, I, 200. ^Letter to Monroe of June 11, 1823: Jefferson's Works, VII., 287. 18 States. Thomas Pownall, appointed Governor of Massa- chusetts Bay Colony in 1757, later Governor of New Jersey, and Governor of South Carolina, after his return to England wrote of the United States in 1781, as follows: ^ "As nature separated her from Europe, and hath established her alone on a great continent, far removed from the old world and all its embroiled interests, it is contrary to the nature of her existence, and consequently to her interest, that she should have any connections of Politics with Europe other than merely commerical . . . "^ The second phase of this foreign policy, that of refusing to allow European nations to meddle with American affairs, which was definitely proclaimed by Monroe in 1823, manifested itself very early in Washington's administration. If the policy was not definitely announced at that time, at least the germ from which the final announcement developed was present. ^ On June 21, 1792, while the United States was having diffi- culty with the Indians, who were countenanced and aided, indirectly if not directly, by Spain and Great Britain.^ Wash- ington wrote Govemeur Morris, who was then on an unofificial mission to England, as follows: "One thing, however, I must not pass over in silence, lest you should infer from it, that Mr. D. had authority for reporting, that the United States had asked the media- tion of Great Britain to bring about a peace between them and the Indians. You may be fully assured, Sir, that such mediation never was asked, that the asking of it never was in contemplation, and I think I might go further and say, that it not only never will be asked, but would be rejected if offered. The United States will never have an occasion, I hope, to ask for the interposition of that power, or any other to establish peace within their own territory."^ This phase of the foreign policy was more clearly defined, and more forcibly put forward during Madison's administration. Late in 1810 Spanish subjects seized Baton Rouge and declared it independent. The United States, against the protest of Great Britain, occupied West Florida, pending the settle- ment of the question of navigation of the Mississippi which had been closed by the Spaniards. Madison was informed and believed that Spain was about to sell West Florida. In a ^T. Pownall, A Memoiial to the Sovereigns oj Europe on the State of Affairs between the Old and the New World. ''W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 3, 11. See also on Nootka Sound Controversy as bearing on this point, C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 88-92, 100. 3H. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 86, 87, 90. *J. Sparks, Writings of George Washington, X., 239. W. C. Ford, Writings of George Washington, XII., 132-133. 19 message to Congress on January 3, 1811, he set forth most clearly this second principle, in the following words: "Taking into view the tenor of these several communi- cations, the posture of things with which they are con- nected, the intimate relations of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the Perdido River to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different respects, so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other power. "^ Acting upon this recommendation Congress passed the fol- lowing resolution: "Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces, and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity and commerce, therefore "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, "That the United States, under the peculiar circum- stances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power ; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain con- tingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said terri- tory. "^ It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1792 in Washington's administration, one of these two principles of foreign policy, based solely upon the right of national self-preservation, had become crystallized into a definite system, and the other at least suggested. 3 By 1811 both principles had become fixed and might be put into these words : A — No American intereference in European affairs; or "America, hands off Europe." B — No European interference in American affairs, or "Europe, hands off America." These two principles in no way conflict with any line of action the United States might take with reference to con- solidating its own territory, or with reference to extending its ij. D. Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 488. 2C/. 5. Stat, at Large, III., 471: Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., III., 571. 'T. B. Edington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 92. H. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 141, 143, 213-215. W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 10. 20 boundaries, by purchase, cession, annexation or othenvise. There is nothing contained in the two principles cited which would prevent the United States from annexing Texas or Hawaii upon the request of their respective peoples, or from acquiring by purchase Florida, Louisiana, Alaska, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone, or from securing by ces- sion CaHfomia, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. As Wash- ington said in 1783, "The . . . true interest of this country must be measured by a continental scale, "i Washington's efforts as President and those of his immediate successors were directed toward extending the country's boundaries west and south to the natural boundaries of the seas. The question of our territorial expansion, as will be shown later, is not involved in the Monroe Doctrine. It must be re- garded and treated as a matter entirely distinct and in no way conflicting with the Monroe Doctrine. 'Washington to Lafayette, April 7, 1783 — Sparks, Writings oj Wash- ington, VIII., 412; Bancroft, History of the U. S., VI., 83. 21 CHAPTER rV— THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND ITS MENACE TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE SPANISH-AMERICAN COLO- NIES AND THE OREGON CONTROVERSY WITH RUSSLA The menace to popular government from the Holy Alliance and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 182J which called for a definite application of this second principle. Such was the status of the foreign poHcy of the United States when two grave dangers confronted it in 1823, arising out of matters concerning foreign affairs, firstly with the Quadru- ple or Holy Alliance and secondly with Russia. When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808 and forced her King, Charles IV, as well as Prince Ferdinand forever to re- nounce the Spanish Crown, and bestowed it upon his own brother, Joseph Bonaparte, he unknowingly aroused the dormant spirit of Spanish nationalism, which manifested itself in open rebellion. 1 Provisional juntas in opposition to the new king were established in the various provinces of Spain. There- upon the Spanish colonies on the American continents which for many years had been chafing under the Spanish connec- tion, particularly by reason of Spain's oppressive measures against the native Indians, 2 and her commercial, political and economic regulations which hindered the development of those colonies, 3 began to set up provincial governments, entirely inde- dendent of either government then attempting to fimction in Spain. All the Spanish colonies of South America, with the exception of lower Peru, declared their independence about the same time. Under San Martin in Argentine, O'Higgins, Rosas, and the Carrera Brothers in Chili, Bolivar and Marino in Venezuela, the revolutions were carried on with varying success, until after the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne, it became apparent that Spain could not re- cover her former colonies.* Henry Clay, the great American champion of the South American republics, worked incessantly for their recognition by the United States. He saw as clearly, if not more clearly than did anybody else, the great effect which such a recognition would have in securing for all time the political and territorial integrity of the United States. He believed and stated as early as 1818 that there was no other question of our foreign policy in which we had so much at stake in the matter of our politics, ij. H. Latane, The United States and Latin America, p. 27. ^Ibid, pp. 5, 6. *Ibid, pp. 5-7; Hall's Journal on Chili, Peru and Mexico. (1824 — Edinburgh) I., 249, 296. *J. H. Latan6, The United States and Latin America, pp. 25-48. 23 commerce and navigation, and that South America once inde- pendent would be guided by an American pohcy.i Spurred on apparently by the untiring efforts of Clay,^ President Mon- roe, on March 8, 1822, in a special message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had arrived for such recognition and asked for an appropriation sufficient to effectuate it. An appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) was accordingly made. Such were the relations between the United States and the South American as well as the Central American nations, when the Quadruple Alliance began to cast its shadow across the Atlantic. This Alliance, popularly called the Holy Alliance developed from the Napoleonic Wars. After Napoleon was finally driven from Europe, the European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, acting under such high-sounding phrases as "Reconstruction of Social Order," and "Regulation of the Political System of Europe," parceled out to the various conquering nations what had been taken from vanquished France. ^ The dread of another return by that master soldier, who to the Allies symbolized the French Revolution, the Convention, and hence opposition to "Legiti- macy," coupled with the fear of a growing demand by people everywhere* for participation in their government, particularly felt in France,^ in England, «, in Germany,' and in Italy,* induced Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria to organize the Quadruple Alliance w^hich was probably the most powerful and efficient international combination ever created for the purpose of controlling the destinies of the world, and for main- taining as the sole basis of lawful government the principle of "Legitimacy," or the divine right of kings to rule, and to hold all the territory ruled over by them in fee simple. » Upon this principle the Treaty of Vienna was based, in entire disregard of the world-wide agitation for representative government, characterized by Mettemich in his "Confession of Faith," as "Presumption. "10 This political system generally known as the "Holy ^Benton's Abridgement, VI., 139, 142. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine. ^Memoirs oj Prince Mettemich, II., 553-586. *Ibid, III., 193, 194. Hbid, III., 460, 468. ^Ihid, III., 460, 468. 'Bancroft, History of the U. S.,YI., 54, 55, 472, 474. ^Memoirs of Prince Mettemich, II., 386. ^"The First principle to be followed by the monarchs . . . should be that of maintaining the stability of political institutions against the disorganized excitement which has taken possession of men's minds." Ibid, II., 473. ^mid, III., 458, 459, 465, 472. 24 Alliance," originated in the Treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 1814,1 and the Treaty of Vienna of March 25, 1815.= On September 26, 1815, at Paris, Francis of Austria, Fred- erick William of Prussia, and Alexander I., of Russia, executed the documents, creating the so-called Holy Alliance. ^ On October 6, 1815, the Prince Regent of Great Britain, by letter, while stating that the "forms of the British Constitution" precluded "acceding formally" to the treaty, expressed his "entire concurrence in its principles."^ The treaty was "acceded" to by France on November 11, 1815, the action however being apparently disregarded. The subscribers solemnly declared "their fixed resolution" to "take for their sole guide [in their political relations] the precepts of justice. Christian charity and peace." They agreed "on all occasions and in all places, [to] lend each other aid and assistance." They further agreed that "the sole principle . . . shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service . . . for [they] look upon themselves as merely delegated by Provi- dence to govern . . . branches of the one family. "^ On November 20, 1815, a treaty which included the real co-ordinating force of the Alliance, was signed by Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria. « This treaty, embodying the so-called Holy AlHance created the Quadruple Alliance. By the terms of this treaty the four powers agreed to combined action in the restoration of France, and in the general con- duct of European affairs. In 1818 France was taken into the combination. This treaty among other things, provided for conferences of the signatory powers at fixed periods, which in effect placed the real governing power of Europe in the five sovereigns. The first of these conferences was held at Aix-la-Chappelle in October 1818, and a declaration relative thereto was made by the Powers on November 15, 1818, which stated in part that: "This union . . . does not tend . . . to any change in the relations sanctioned by existing treaties ... it has no other object than the maintenance of peace, and the guar- anty of those transactions on which the peace was foimded and consolidated . . . Faithful to these principles [the right of nations] the Sovereigns will maintain them equally in . . . meetings; whether they be for the purpose of dis- cussing in common their own interests or whether they ^British and Foreign State Papers, I., 121, 129. Ubid, II., 443. ^British and Foreign State Papers, III., 211-212. 'Ibid, III., 213. ^British and Foreign St. Papers, III., 211-212. ^British^nd Foreign St. Papers, III., 273-280. 25 shall relate to questions in which other governments shall formally claim that interference . . . "^ It had been generally tinderstood that Spain's colonies in Spanish-America were to be at least one topic of discussion at this conference." But for some reason they were not formally taken up at that time. The revolutions in Naples, in Portugal and in Spain in 1820 resulted in another conference of the Quadruple Alliance at Troppau in November of that year, after which conference a circular relative to its results was drafted by the "Allied Courts" on December 8, 1820. This circular among other things declared that: "The. events which took place March 8, in Spain, [decree of amnesty for political prisoners] July 2 at Naples [ratification of a constitutional government] and the Portuguese castrophy [convocation of Cortes by Lisbon and Oporto juntas to revise the constitution] have neces- sarily given rise to a deep feeling of uneasiness and chagrin . . . but at the same time has made them [the Allied Monarchs] recognize the need of reuniting and deliberating in common upon the methods of preventing all the evils which menace the foundations of Europe. "It was natural that these sentiments should make an especially keen impression upon the powers that had recently put down revolution and that had seen it again raise its head. It was not less natural that these powers, to combat it for the third time, should have recourse to the same methods of which they had made use with such success in that memorable struggle which delivered Europe from a yoke it had borne for twenty years. "Everything gave ground for hoping that this alliance . , . would also be in a position to put a check on a force not less tyrannical and less detestable, that of revolt and of crime. . . . "The powers have exercised an incontestable right in commonly concerting measures of safety against the States in which an overturn of the government effected by revolt can only be considered as a dangerous example, which must have for a result an attitude hostile against all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exer- cise of this right of necessity became still more urgent when those in that situation sought to communicate to neigh- boring states the evil in which they themselves were plunged and to propagate revolt and confusion among them. . . . iParl. Pap. 1819, XVIII, 351. "^"Letters and Dispatches of Castlereagh," XII, 66, A. G. Stapleton 'Pol. Life of George Canning," II., 10. 26 "We are convinced of the necessity of proceeding against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in accordance with the principles declared above. . . . "The allied monarchs being i-esolved not to recognize a government produced by open revolt. . . "^ Though a representative of Great Britain attended this Troppau conference, he took no active part therein, and on January 21, 1819 Great Britain, in a communication to its ministers abroad, expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in such circular, and declined to become a party thereto, maintaining the Alliance, however, as to all other subjects." The Troppau Conference was adjourned to Laibach to confer with the King of the Two Sicilies, and at its conclusion another declaration was made on May 12, 1821, in which it was stated that the Alliance was "solely intended to combat and to repress rebellion," and that "The allied troops . . . [had] been stationed at suitable places [in Italy] with the sole view to protecting the free exercise of legitimate authority. . . . "In the future as in the past, they [the AlHed Monarchs] will always have the purpose of preserving the independence and the rights of each state, as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result . . . will still be . . . the consolidation of an order of things which will assure to the nations their repose and their prosperity. "Penetrated by these sentiments, the allied Sovereigns . . . announce to the world the principles which have guided them. They are determined never to recede from them, and all . . . will see and . . . find in this union an assured guaranty against the attempts of disturbers."' At the last conference of the Quadruple Alliance held at Verona in November and December, 1822, King Ferdinand VII of Spain requested the aid of the Alliance in dealing with Spain's American colonies. Spain's situation and her rela- tion to her American colonies were there discussed. A plan was made for a conference in 1823 to which the United States was to be invited. On December 14, 1822, after the Verona conference, Austria, Prussia and Russia issued a circular rela- tive thereto, in which appeared the following sentiment: ^British and Foreign St. Pap., VIII., 1149-1151, (Translation); Memoirs of Prince Metternich, III., 444-447. ^British and Foreign St. Pap., VIII, 1160. 'British and For. St. Pap., VIIL, 1201. 27 U' 'The Monarchs [are] determined on replusing the principle of revolt in whatever place or under whatever form it might show itself. . . . "i It is a generally accepted fact, though never officially acknowledged, that at this Verona conference a secret treaty was executed by Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, which, whether true or untrue, indicates the real motives and inten- tions of the Alliance. The first article of this alleged secret treaty was as follows: "Article 1. The high contracting parties being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchial principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of repre- sentative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. "^ On November 22, 1822, Great Britain following a long- established policy in dealing with a possible French and Spanish accord, declared its refusal to participate in the French invasion of Spain^ which the Quadruple Alliance authorized. In this Great Britain was undoubtedly also influenced by Russia's growing intimacy with Spain and France as well as by Russia's growing rivalry in maritime and colonial interests.^ In apparent pursuance of the plan for a conference on Spain's colonies, and proving that such intervention was in- tended, Spain's Minister of State wrote the Alliance some twenty-four days after Monroe's message to Congress of December 2, 1823, in part as foUows: "The King . . . has seriously turned His thoughts to the fate of His American dominions . . . Accordingly the King has resolved upon inviting the Cabinets of His dear and intimate Allies to establish a Conference at Paris, to the end that their Plenipotentiaries . . . may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted Countries of America. . . . His Majesty, confiding in the sentiments of His Allies hopes that they will assist Him in accomplishing the worthy object of upholding the principles of order ^Br. and For. St. Papers, X., 921-925; Memoirs of Prince Metternich, ' III., 655-662. 2Niles Register, Aug. 2, 1823, XXIV, 347; Eliot, Am. Diplomatic Code, II., 179. 3 Br. and For. St. Papers, X 4, 5, 11, 17. *C.K. Webster, Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy, Trans- actions of Royal Hist. Soc, jd Series, vol. VI. 28 and legitimacy the subversion of which, once commenced in America, would presently communicate to Europe. . . "i Invitations to attend such a conference to be held at Paris had been sent to Austria, France and Russia, a copy being handed to the British Ambassador to Spain. ^ Monroe's message reached Europe, however, before Canning made any announcement of Great Britain's position as to such a con- ference. Such were the principles and aims of the Quadruple Alliance. Mettemich, Prime Minister of Austria, whose genius was the guiding spirit of Europe at this time, believed that Europe's only salvation lay in the maintenance of the prin- ciple of "Legitimacy," the divine right of kings to rule their people, and the corresponding "divine duty" of the people to submit. In Europe the French Revolution, brought about or hastened by the American Revolution, had set up the Con- vention, the representative of the people. Mettemich, there- fore, advocated the prohibition of such popular forms of govern- ment, and, as a preventive therefor, urged the suppression of rebellions everywhere. Mettemich was ably supported in his plans by Castlereagh the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.^ In its determination to destroy popiilar government the Alliance exerted its tremendous power successfully in crushing revolutions in Piedmont and in Naples in 1821, and in Spain in 1823.* But for the objection of Great Britain, a similar revolution in Portugal, which had broken out in August 1820 wotdd also have been crushed. As indicating what the position of the Alliance would be if Spain under a "Legitimate" government, should attempt to regain her colonies, Mettemich 's letter of March 20, 1823, to Esterhazy, relative to Great Britain's suggestion of prevent- ing the war between France and Spain which France's invasion of Spain would undoubtedly bring about, is most enlightening. Mettemich said, "The idea of neutrality in this struggle is incompatible with our political system. The Emperor [of Austria] could not declare himself neutral if a principle were in question on which the existence of his Empire . . . depended, a i5r. and For. St. Papers, XI., 55-57. A. G. Stapleton, Political Lije of George Canning, II., 34. "Stapleton's Pol. Life of George Canning, II., 33, 42. ^C. K. Webster, Some Aspects of Castlereagh' s Foreign Policy — Transactions of Royal Hist. Soc. jd series, Vol. VI. "Br. and For. St. Pap., VIII., 1149, 1151, 1201. Br. and For. St. Pap. X., 921-925. See generally. Memoirs of Prince Mettemich," III., 385-651. A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of Geo. Canning, I., 133. 29 principle which we have never ceased to regard as the fundamental basis of the Alliance. "^ It was generally believed that the next movement of the Quadruple Alliance, as indicated by the Conference of Verona, would be a concerted action to suppress the revolutions in the various Spanish colonies in America. Ultimately, it was feared, definite action would be taken against the United States, " This, then, was the situation with reference to Spanish America which confronted the United States in 1823, during Monroe's administration. The second danger which confronted the United States at this time lay in Russia's attitude toward Oregon, which involved the title to a vast stretch of territory. The Russian-American Company, organized in Russia, was granted a charter by the Czar in 1799 which carried with it jurisdiction over the North Pacific Coast of North America to the 55th parallel of north latitude and also the right to found posts even farther south in territory not then occupied by other nations.' In 1792, Captain Gray, a citizen of the United States, had discovered the Colimibia River, and in 1806 the Lewis and Clark expedition, inaugurated by President Jefferson, explored the Columbia, and found no Russians, or other civilized peoples in that locality. It was not until about 1813 that Russians began to establish posts farther south than the 55th parallel. By right of discovery and exploration, there- fore, the United States acquired title to the territory, then known as Oregon, Great Britain and Spain also asserted claims to this same territory. But after the war of 1812 Great Britain and the United States entered into an agreement providing for a tem- porary joint occupation of the disputed territory. Spain by the treaty of 1819, in ceding Florida to the United States, also ceded all her rights in the Oregon territory, north of the 42nd parallel of latitude, leaving the three remaining claimants all asserting title to the Pacific Coast north of California, which included the Coltmibia River and the access it gave to the great territory it drained. On September 7, 1821, Alexander I. of Russia, issued the following ukase: "The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishering, and of all other industry, in all islands, ports, and gulfs, including the whole of the northwest coast of America, beginning from Behring's Straits, to the 51 of northern latitude . . . , is exclusively granted to Russian subjects. ^Memoirs of Prince Metternich, IV., 37. ^A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of George Canning, II., 20, 21. »J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 890. 30 It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels, not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than a hundred Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is subject to confiscation, along with the whole cargo. "^ In this ukase Russia not only extended her territorial claim four degrees farther south than she had previously claimed, and beyond the 54° 40 'parallel claimed by the United States as its proper boundary, but also asserted an exclusive right to the North Pacific Ocean and to the Behring Sea, which claims were not finally settled until 1824. 2 This naturally brought about more or less strained rela- tions between Russia and the United States, which were aggravated by reason of an announcement made on October 16, 1823, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, by Baron Von Tuyll, Russia's Minister to the United States, which inter- jected the Holy Alliance and Spanish America into the con- troversy: This announcement related to the question of Russia's recognition of the Spanish-American nations, and was to the effect that, "Faithful to the political principles which she [Russia] observed in concert with her Allies, she could in no wise receive any agent ... of the de facto governments which owe their existence to the events of which the New World has for some years been the theatre. "^ When directly pressed by Adams as to what was meant by the phrase, "political principles," Von Tuyll stated that, "He understood them as having reference to the right of supremacy of Spain over her colonies."^ This, in effect, was a declaration that Russia, already at issue with the United States upon the Oregon boundary, had definitely alligned herself with the other members of the Holy Alliance against the Spanish-American nations, whose independence had already been recognized by the United States. Russia had so little regard for this country and its power as openly to criti- cise its republican form of government, and the events which made it possible and which brought it about, because the criticism which was made of the Spanish-American nations applied equally to the United States. Mr. Adams referring to a discussion on July 17, 1823, with Von Tuyll upon the Oregon matter, said, M. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 891. ^J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 891. 3J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 180-182. ^J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 182. 31 "I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to any ' territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the prin- ciple that the American continents are no longer sub- jects for any new European colonial establishments. "^ On July 22, 1823, Adams sent a dispatch to Middleton, our Minister to Russia, in which he emphasized this same principle in the following words: "There can perhaps be no better time for saying frankly and explicitly, to the Russian Government, that the future peace of the world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American Continent. With the excep- tion of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands. "2 ij. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163. 2J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 462, 463. J. B. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I., 760. 32 CHAPTER v.— GREAT BRITAIN AND HER DESIRE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION WITH THE UNITED STATES Great Britain's ministry, while sympathizing with the anti- republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascendency in the Spanish- American Colonies, and sought a joint declara- tion with the United States opposing intervention by France and the Holy Alliance in the a fairs of the rebellious Spanish- Ameri- can Colonies. While the question of recognition of the South American republics was being strenuously advocated by Henry Clay, President Monroe, on May 13, 1818, suggested to John Quincy Adams that Great Britain be sounded upon the proposition of such recognition,! and in 1819 such a step was taken, the dip- lomatic suggestion then being made that Great Britain recog- nize Buenos Ayres, and do so simultaneously with the United States. During the month of July, 1818, Castlereagh, then the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, infonned Richard Rush, our Minister at London, that Great Britain and the other members of the Alliance had been requested by Spain to mediate between Spain and her rebellious American colonies. To this Mr. Rush replied that the United States would not in- tervene to establish any peace unless the basis thereof was to be the independence of those colonies. ^ George Canning succeeded Castlereagh, as Foreign Sec- retary, upon the death of the latter, in 1822. At that time, the British Ministry was "legitimist" in its sympathies, and at one time, constituted "the center of the opposition to revolu- tionary tendencies in Europe. "^ George Canning was also an advocate of "legitimacy"-' which inclined him to the side of the Holy AUiance, and to the side of Spain in her efforts to regain her American colonics. But British trade with these same colonies had developed greatly from the time of their breaking away from Spain. With the possible exception of the slave trade monopoly, granted to England in 1713, and a few other concessions,'^ Spain's general policy of colonial administration had been to confine ij. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 91-92. *Von Hoist's, Constitutional Hist, oj U. S., I., 419. R. Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, pp. 330, 33 1' *F. L. Paxson, Independence of So. Am. Reps. 2nd ed., p. 251. *R. Rush, The Court at London, 1819-1825, pp. 467, 468; A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and His Times, 380; J. S. Ewart, Canning Policy in Kingdom Papers, XVI., 173. ^J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 12, 13. 33 that commerce to Spain and to Spanish ships.' So burdensome were these restrictions to the colonists that a great smuggHng trade in and out of the colonies had sprung up.^ Because of these restrictions, and in an effort to open up this colonial trade to the British, there had been considerable agitation in England, as early as 1779, to bring about revolutions in these colonies, and to separate them from Spain. » The revolt, when it came "opened the door to British trade at a time when Napoleon was doing his best to close all other doors to it."* If then, Spain were to regain her colonies, her adminis- tration of them, as evidenced by her past, would greatly cur- tail British trade. Again, if, by reason of France's invasion of Spain (which was almost equivalent to a declaration of war against Great Britain), ^ and of her contemplated assistance of Spain in the latter's effort to regain her colonies, France were to secure a portion of these colonies as compensation, and she apparently desired to do so,^ the British merchants believed that Great Britain stood very little chance of holding that trade. The British "newly won commercial supremacy must be maintained and developed. Thus far public opinion was supreme."' Canning was, therefore, subjected to a tre- mendous pressure by the British merchant class* to prevent France from so intervening. In fact, as early as 1798, it had been determined that in the event of the colonies passing into the control of France, Great Britain would bring about their complete independence. » As between the principles of "legitimacy" and the interests of trade, Canning determined to 'J. H. Latane, The U. S, and Latin Am, pp. 6, 12: Hall's Journal, I., pp. 249, 296. ^Hall's Journal, I., 253, 254. ^J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 14, 15. A. Mahan, The Monroe Doctrine, National Rev. (1903), XL., 8 1. Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, VII., 266. *E. M. Lloyd, Canning and Span. Am., Trans, of Royal Hist. Soc. (N.S.), XVIII, 82: F. L. Paxson, Independence of So. Am. Reps., 2d ed., pp. 251-252. ^Annual Register (London), 1823, p. 25. ^E. Everett, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 4; A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of Canning, II, 32-33. 'W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 12, 13. «Ibid, 24. ^"But, if as appears probably, the army destined against Portu- gal, and which will march through Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France, shall overthrow the Spanish Government, and thereby place the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of France, England will immediately commence the execution of a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete independence of South America." Life and Correspondence of R. King, II., 650). "... and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that purpose." (Memo of Canning 1823 — Life of Lord Liver- pool, III, 231: Official correspondence of Canning, I, 85.) 34 pursue the latter. ^ His policy therein "was essentially British" in its character and purpose. ^ Canning accordingly directed his efforts toward prevent- ing the intervention of France, first by ^attempting to secure a joint declaration by the United States and Great Britain, opposing such intervention, which proved unsuccessful, and later by endeavoring to secure a disclaimer of such intention from France, which endeavor was successful. The effort to secure this "joint declaration," constituted one of the several circimistances leading up to A'lonroe's message of December 2, 1823. On August 16, 1823, Canning verbally discussed with Mr. Rush the question of a joint declaration by their governments, which would have the desired effect of forestalling an}^ inter- vention by France in Spanish-American affairs. To these overtures Mr. Rush replied that he would take the matter up with the United States Government countering however, by asking Canning's position upon the question of recognition, to which Canning answered that no steps toward that end had been taken. ^ On August 20, 1823, Canning wrote to Rush definitely suggesting such a joint declaration upon the part of the two governments, stating among other things, "1. We [Great Britain] conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them as Independent States, to be one of time and circimi- stances. 3. We are, however, by no means dispposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotia- tions. 4. We aim not at the possession of an}^ portion of them ourselves. 5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference."^ As a matter of fact, the substance of this note, according to a later statement of Canning himself, had been previously communicated in another note to France, and thereafter to ip. L. Paxson, Indep. of So. Am. Rep., 2 ed., pp. 251-252. T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 7. Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. Rush Corresp., etc., Mass. Hist. Soc, 2d. Series, XV., 434-436. "T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, 13. *R. Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 361-366. Rush Correspondence etc., Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd. Series, XV., 412-415. R. Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 376-378. R. Rush Correspondence ttc, Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Scries, XV., 415, 416. 35 Austria, Russia, Prussia, Portugal and the Netherlands, - Canning desiring to prevent, such intervention and taking every step which he thought might accomplish that purpose. This note to Rush, therefore, did not, as some people believe, con- stitute an exclusive invitation to the United States.^ It is to be noted that in the second clause quoted. Canning totally ignored the fact that the United States had already recognized the South American republics, and also, that in the fifth clause he apparently intended to have the United States commit themselves for all time to a non-intervention and non- annexation policy for South America and Central America. On August 23, 1823, Canning again wrote Mr. Rush, and to the effect that the Holy Alliance was soon to take up for discussion the question of Spain and her colonies, and he urged the making of a joint declaration. ^ To this Mr. Rush suggested immediate recognition by Great Britain, apparently being ready, upon that basis, to assiime responsibility for a joint declaration.* On August 31, 1823, Canning wrote Mr. Rush to the effect that Great Britain was not prepared to accord such an immediate recognition. » On September 18, and again on Sep- tember 26, 1823, Canning conferred with Rush. On the latter date he asked if Rush would not assent to a joint declaration on Great Britain's promise of future recognition, which pro- posal Rush immediately and unequivocally rejected.' The refusal of Great Britain to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies at that time created an impassse be- tween Rush and Canning. After September 26, 1823, though he saw Rush on October 8 and 9, 1823, Canning scarcely referred to Spanish- America at all, and did not again allude to the matter of a joint declaration. So striking was this abrupt and sudden cooling that Rush considered the entire discussion ended, notifying our State Department to that effect. He suspected however, that some fresh understanding between Great Britain and France might explain it.' As to this matter, Stapleton, Canning's biographer, stated that, "Mr. Canning thought that, next to the acquirement of a coadjutor so powerful as the United States, the best thing would be to acquaint the French Government, by a direct communication, that it could not prosecute its designs iJ5r. and For. St. Pap., XL, 61, 62. '^World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, June 1918, p. 285. ^Rush Correspondence etc., Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Series, XV., 416, 417: Rush, The Court of London, etc., 382. *Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 382-384. ^Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 384-388: Rush corresp. etc., Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Series, XV., 418, 419. 'Rush, The Court of London, etc., 384-406, Rush corresp. etc., Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd Series,, XV., 422, 424. Ubid, XV., 424-428, 431-433. 36 in Spanish America, except at the expense of a war with this cotintry."i As a matter of fact, after the conference of September 26, Canning, according to his own statement, sought an "explana- tion" with France. He conferred with Prince dePoHgnac, the French Ambassador at London, on October 9, 1823, and se- cured from him a statement to the eflEect that France beHeved it hopeless to reduce Spanish-America to its former state, and that France disclaimed any intention or desire to appropriate any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain any exclusive advantages therein. ^ This was not communi- cated to Rush, however, until late in November and conse- quently did not in any way affect Monroe's message. « According to Rush, "The apprehension of Britain [seemed] to be fully allayed, at least for the present ... on the score of French aggrandisement in Spanish America. "< Canning hav- ing accomplished his purpose by this "Explanation" of France, without definitely aligning herself against the Holy Alliance, and desiring not to oflfend the Holy Alliance, was apparently no longer interested in a joint declaration. * This adequately explains Canning's "cooling" process. ^\. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, II, 26. *A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Lije of George Canning, II., 26-30: Br. and For. St. Pap., XL, 49-53: Rush corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d Series, XV., 430- 436. *Rush, The Court at London, etc., pp. 409-415: W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 54. ^Rush corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc, 2d Series, XV., 430-433. *"Our intercourse in August, not having led to any practical results nor become matter of discussion between our respective governments wU be considered as having passed between two individuals relying upon each other's honour and discretion." (Canning to Rush, Dec, 13, 1823, Rush Corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d. series, XV,. 433, 434.) "All serious danger to Spanish America being now at an end, I do not at present see what there is to prevent a return to that effective amity between Great Britain and that alliance [Holy Alliance] which has heretofore existed. Events the most recent and authoritative justify us in saying, that no attempt upon the liberties of Europe, will essentially throw Britain off from the connection, or impair her co-equal allegiance to the Monarchial principle." (Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. RushCorresp. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d Series, XV., 434, 436.) 37 4262^0 CHAPTER VI— ITS REFUSAL The United States Refused to Enter into Any Such Joint Declaration with Great Britain. The situations considered in the last three chapters had been slowly but gradually developing, both before and during the Presidency of James Monroe. At the same time an intense spirit of nationalism, guided and nourished by Henr}^ Clay and to a great extent by Chief Justice John Marshall, was also developing in the United States. ^ Prior to and even during the War of 1812 a considerable part of the population, par- ticularly in New England, was opposed to any interference with Great Britain's conduct of the war against France. = They were willing to suffer quietly and submissively all the injuries inflicted upon the United States by Great Britain, ' and even considered seriously the dissolution of the Union. ■• Open rebellion was imminent.^ "Since the adoption of the Con- stitution, nearly all Americans except the younger generation, had become re-Europeanized in thought and feeling. "« Of that younger generation it was Henry Clay, from Kentucky, the great exponent of Americanism, who stirred the country to action in 1812. The War of 1812, however, "achieved an inestimable good — it de-Europeanized America. It put an end to our thinking and feeling in European terms and emotions. It developed the spirit of the new America — ^now for the first time emanci- pated from the intellectual and spiritual sovereignty of the Old World."' Monroe had been Minister to France under Washington's administration in 1794,* during the period when Washington, in his attempt to safeguard the country, was deliberately apply- ing the principle of his purely American foreigii policy of keeping out of all wars between the European nations. Mon- roe was undoubtedly familiar with this principle before he went lA. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 1-58: Scott v. Peters, 5 Cranch (U. S. Rept.), p. 135. -Morris, Diary and Letters oj Gouverneur Motris, II., 548: A. J. Bever- idge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 5. ^John Lowell, Peace with Dishonor — War without Hope (by a "Yankee Farmer"), pp. 39, 40. On September 26, 1863, Secretary Seward declared: "Their [United States] own safety and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout Wharton, Dig. of Int. Law, I, 299-338: J. H. Latene, The U. S. & Lat. Am., pp. 193-237. ^House Ex. Doc. 100-37 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 187-190: Br. & For. St. Pap., LII, 394r-397. *A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 148, 149: J. H. Latane, The U. S. &■ Latin American pp. 217, 218: Sen. Ex. Doc. ii-jSth, Cong., i Sess. p. 471. *J B. Moore, Prin. of Am. Diplom., p. 260. *J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 226. 49 America ... In no case are we likely to neglect such pro- vision for our own safety as every sovereign state must always be prepared to fall back upon."i On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives declared that, "The Congress of the United States . . . declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchial Government erected on the ruins of any republican Government in America under the auspices of any European Power. "« In 1865 about 100,000 Union troops, released from war service were sent to the Texas border, under General Sheridan, and on November 6, 1865, Mr. Seward, through John Bigelow, our Minister at Paris, notified France that "The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the United States." . . .' On February 12, 1866, with the Civil War well out of the way, Seward demanded that France state definitely when she intended to withdraw her forces from Mexico,^ and on April 6, 1866, Napoleon III., confronted with the insistence of the United States upon this principle of the doctrine, issued the necessary orders for such withdrawal.^ Maximilian's Empire collapsed in 1867 and the republic was restored. B. SPAIN As has been stated, Spain acted for a time with France and England in the matter of intervention in Mexico in 1861. One reason for her withdrawal from that expedition was a desire to concentrate her efforts in an attempt to reconquer Santo Domingo. In pursuance of this design Spain sent troops to Santo Domingo in 1861, whereupon the Dominicans appealed to the United States. Mr. Seward then notified Spain that the United States, "Would be obliged to regard them [the proceedings] as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States. "6 diplomatic Corresp. (1863), II., 709. 2J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 496. »Ms. Instr. France, XVII., 46. *House Ex. Doc, pj — jgth, Cong, i sess. ^Ibid, 42. «Seward to Tassara, Apr. 2, 1861, MS. Notes to Span. Leg., VII., 200: Moore Dig. oj Int. Law, VI. 515. Seward to Schurtz, Apr. 2, 1861, MS. Inst. Spain, XV., 263: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 515. 50 Spain, however, in spite of this protest, annexed Santo Domingo, the United States at the time being too much con- cerned with the Civil War to carry her protest to actual hos- tilities. In view of Seward's attitude toward the occupation of Santo Domingo, however, there can be no serious doubt but that the United States when free of her domestic difficulties, would have insisted upon the applicability of the Doctrine, and would have made the same demand upon Spain to evacuate Santo Domingo that she made upon France with reference to Mexico. However, before that time arrived, Spain, finding the task too great, relieved the United States of that necessity by withdrawing from the island, definitely abandoning the project on April 30, 1865. ^ C. GERMANY Shortly after the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary question between Venezuela and Great Britain, which will be referred to hereafter, Germany and Great Britain in 1902, made demands upon Venezuela arising out of alleged mistreatment of their subjects. Other claims of Germany were based on con- tracts between German subjects and the government of Ven- ezuela. ^ Both European Powers agreed to, and effected, a reprisal program, which included a blockade of Venezuelan ports, and the seizing of Venezuelan warships,^ in which procedure they were joined by Italy. Germany apparently was deter- mined to make a test of the Monroe Doctrine, at the exact time when the United States was negotiating a treaty with Colombia for the lease of a canal route across the Isthmus of Panama. •» The American minister to Venezuela, acting under in- structions of the State Department, persuaded Venezuela to agree to recognize the principle of the claims and to arbitrate the amounts of them.^ Great Britain and Italy also agreed to this proposition, but Germany declined,^ and it was only by reason of the direct pressure exerted upon Germany by President Roosevelt that Germany finally consented to arbi- trate. Mr. Roosevelt informed the German ambassador at Washington that unless Germany agreed to arbirtrate. Admiral Dewey and the American fleet, then manoeuvering around the West Indies, would be ordered to Venezuelan waters in ten days. A week later when the German ambassador declared that no word upon the matter had been received from his 'Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 517, 518.- Mw. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1901), p. 193: Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1903), pp. 427-429. *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1903) 419-454: Moore, Dig. oj Int. Law, VII., 140. ^T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 268, 269. *Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 590. «J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 252. 61 government, Roosevelt stated that Admiral Dewey's orders would be issued one day earlier, and gave Germany forty- eight hours to agree to arbitrate her claims. Within thirty- six hours Germany consented to do so.^ At the outset, Secretary of State, Hay, had notified Ger- many that President Roosevelt had stated in his message to Congress of December 3, 1901. "We do not ask under this doctrine [Monroe] for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American State. We do not guarantee any state against pim- ishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punish- ment does not take the form of the requisition of territory by any non- American power."'' When, however, Germany, with the justice of her claim, conceded, refused to arbitrate the amount, it began to look as if Germany had some ulterior motive in such refusal. Par- ticularly significant was this refusal in view of Germany's desire for colonies. Germany came into the field for colonies about 1890, after all available spots for colonization had been occupied by other nations. Her demand for colonies, therefore, meant their seizure from other powers. In this respect South America offered an attractive field, particularly in view of the number of German emigrants located there. ' When, therefore, Germany refused arbitration, President Roosevelt, without discussing in words the traditional foreign policy of the United States, and without referring to the Monroe Doctrine by name, all of which was weU known to Germany, at once brought into action the one force which has always stood behind that policy, viz., the American fleet, and indicated to the world in a most positive way that the United States in- tended to fight if necessary in support of that policy. The intimation itself, however, was sufficient. D. JAPAN In 1912 Japan was generally supposed to be engaged in an attempt to secure control of land in Magdalena Bay on the Pacific Coast of Mexico. It was reported that the purchase had been, or was to be negotiated in the name of a Japanese company.* Such an indirect method of securing a foothold in the Western hemisphere would be most ingenious, for while nominally title to such territory might be in the subjects of Japan, yet in time of the Empire's need the holdings of such »W. R. Thayer, Lije and Letters of John Hay, II., 286-288. *J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President s, pp. 6662- 6663: J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 252-255. »A. B Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 269-278. * Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 2nd Sess., XLVIII., 5661-5663. 52 subjects, to all intents and purposes would be the holdings of Japan. The situation appeared to be so threatening that Senator Lodge introduced into the United Stated Senate a resolution which was adopted in the following form: "Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor, or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for military or naval purposes. "^ Close analysis of this resolution shows the application of the same principle of our foreign policy as that upon which was based Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. Resting upon the same right of national self-preservation, and denying any foreign nation the right to interfere in purely American concerns, the Lodge resolution follows closely and logically the traditional American foreign policy. Lest, however, there be any doubt in the minds of any foreign statesmen, as to the exact extent to which such principle was applicable, this resolution proclaims definitely that the United States understands that the policy applies to all non-American Powers, Asiatic as well as European, and to all attempts, direct or indirect, to secure any foothold upon the two American con- tinents. E.— GREAT BRITAIN At the time that the Holy or Quadruple AUiance was threatening to intervene in the affairs of the Spanish-American colonies, Great Britain was interested in preventing France from extending her power to Spanish-America. As has been stated. Great Britain had secured great commercial advan- tages in the South American countries by reason of Spain's difficulties. Her desire for a joint declaration with the United States was to prevent such an intervention. Canning's suggestion was apparently designed to make it impossible for the United States to seciu-e any territory in Spanish-America, and he was greatly disappointed when the United States, refusing such a joint declaration, enunciated the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine, was aimed not only at the intervention threatened, but was also directed against any new colonization or extension of the political system of any Eiiropean power to the American Continents. This struck ^Cong. Rec. 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., XLVIII, 9923. 53 at Great Britain more than at any other nation by reason of her holdings on these continents which she could not thereafter extend save at the risk of war with the'tJmted States. Great Britain's earlier activities with reference to Cuba have already been referred to, as have also Great Britain's activities in Mexico in 1861 and in Venezuela in 1902. (a) As TO Cuba. In 1840 considerable agitation was caused by the report that Great Britain was about to annex or seize Cuba. On July 15, 1840, Secretary of State Forsyth wrote our Minister to Spain that, "the United States will prevent it [transfer of title or possession to Cuba from Spain to Great Britain] . . . at all hazards . . . and ... in case of any attempt . . . to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it."i In 1843 when British interference in Cuba was again feared, Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, wrote oiu- Consul at Havana with reference to the same subject that, "... the United States never would permit the occupation of that Island by British . . . ".^ He also renewed the "guaranty" of assistance to Spain to prevent Cuba's being wrested from her. No definite action, other than as stated in the way of interfering with Cuba was taken at this time by Great Britain. From 1849 to 1851 preparations were on foot for the in- vasion of Cuba from over seas, bv armed bodies imder the Cuban patriot, Lopez. At least three of these expeditions reached Cuba.' In 1851 British and French representatives at Wash- ington notified our government that orders had been issued to their fleets, then in Cuban waters, to repel all attempts at invasion of Cuba. To this the United States replied that such steps could "not but be regarded . . . with grave disapproval, as in- volving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectorship over American waters."* Thereafter, on April 23, 1852, Great Britain and France suggested that an abnegatory declaration as to Cuba be exe- 'Forsyth to Vail, July 15, 1840, MS. Instr. Spain, XIV., Ill: House Ex. Doc. I2i-j2nd, Cong, i Sess. ''Webster to Campbell, House Ex. Doc, I2i—j2nd, Cong., i Sess. 3J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 92-96. ^Curtis, Life oj Webster, II., 551. 54 cuted by them and by the United States, i This proposition, however, was definitely rejected by the United States and the affair ended. (b) As TO Yucatan In 1848 there was an Indian outbreak in Yucatan and the authorities of that country, apparently unable to cope with the outbreak, offered to transfer to the United States "the dominion and sovereignty' ' of that country. Similar offers were also made to Great Britain and Spain. President Polk in a special message to Congress on April 29, 1848, while disclaiming any desire for the annexation of Yucatan, referred to the Monroe Doctrine and stated that, "according to our established policy, we could not con- sent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power. "2 The trouble between the Indians and the Whites later blew over and no further action was taken by Yucatan, and there is no evidence that Great Britain ever pursued this offer of Yucatan. 3 This subject is treated here, not because it amounted to any test of the Doctrine initiated by Great Britain, for it was not. It is so treated, merely because Yucatan offered to transfer sovereign rights in American territory to Spain and Great Britain, and Great Britain was the more able and likely to accept that offer. (c) As TO Belize, the Mosquito Coast, the Bay Islands, AND TiGRE Island. The strip of territory bordering the Caribbean Sea, just south of Yucatan and known as British Honduras, or Belize, has been, and may yet be a cause of much concern between the United States and Great Britain. The territory was formerly a part of the Spanish province of Yucatan. A group of British adventurers, engaged in the business of cutting and exporting logwood, settled in this territory about 1682.^ They were limited to certain territory by a concession from Spain. The settlers, however, constantly overstepped these limits and frequent trouble between the British and Spanish resulted. In 1763 these nations sought to remedy the trouble by a treaty whereby Great Britain acknowledged Spain's sovereignty over BeHze, and agreed to demolish all fortifications con- ^Sen. Ex. Doc, 13-32nd, Cong., 2d sess. "5. Ex. Docs. 40, 45, 49,30th, Cong, i, sess; Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 423, 424. 'See generally Br. df For. St. Pap., LI., 1184, at seq. ^A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, p. 26. 55 structed therein by the British settlers.* The settlers, how- ever, still persisted in extending the sphere of their operations, and, upon war with England breaking out in 1779, the Spanish destroyed the settlement. == Great Britain thereupon protested, but took no other action against Spain. In 1783 the British again entered Belize and engaged in their log wood activities, and again trouble began. » On September 3, 1783, a new treaty was negotiated between Great Britain and Spain whereby Great Britain again recognized specifically the "rights of sovereignty of the King of Spain" over the district in question.* Friction arose, or rather contin- ued, even after this treaty.^ Another treaty was therefore executed in 1786, which con- firmed the prior treaties, and by the terms of which Spain allowed the British to extend their woodcutting, the "lands in question, however, being indisputably acknowledged to belong of right to the King of Spain. "« i Great Britain also agreed to evacuate "the country of the Mosquitoes as well as the continent in general and the islands adjacent." Trouble and warfare still persisted. A new treaty was negotiated in 1814^ which among other things provided for the ratification and confirmation of the status provided for in the treaty of 1786, which as has been said, expressly recognized the sovereignty of Spain over Belize. In 1825 Great Britain suggested that the provisions of this 1786 treaty be incorporated in a proposed treaty between Great Britain and New Granada.* In 1831 she did likewise with reference to a proposed treaty with the Republic of Central America. 9 In 1826 she actually incorporated these provisions in her treaty with Mexico. *" It is clear therefore that up to 1831 Great Britain had never acquired, or, in fact, asserted any title to this territory. The Bay Islands, a group of small islands off the coast of Belize provided with good harbors, were also Spanish territory, and no rights whatever under any of the treaties mentioned were ever accorded British subjects in these islands. On the contrary, the terms of the treaty of 1786 whereby Great Britain 'L. Hertslet, Collection oj Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers, II., 233-235. ^A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, pp. 41, 42. 'L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II, 237: A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, 44, 45. ^L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 235-241. *A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, 49-57. «L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 245, 255: A. R. Gibbs, Br. Honduras, pp. 46, 47: Correspondence Relating to Interoceanic Canal etc. (1885), pp. 171, 172. ^J. B. Henderson, Jr., American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 105, 106. L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 269-273. *T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 64. ^Ibid, p. 64. ^"Ibid, p. 64. 56 agreed to abandon the continent and adjacent islands, include It is clear, then, that Canning merely desired to prevent intervention. He never anticipated, and never accepted the other principle laid down in Monroe's mesage to the effect that the American continents were no longer subjects for future colonization. In a letter to Bagot, the British Minister at Washington, dated January 9, 1824, Canning said, "It is hardly necessary for me to add . . . that the principle . . . prohibiting colonization ... is as new to this Government as that of France. "« He wrote Granville on December 17, 1824, a year later, that "The fight has been hard, but it is won. Spanish America is free ; and if we do not mismanage our matters sadly, she is English."^ W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 18, 22, 24. T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 49. *"I am no more a lover of revolution than Prince Metternich. T have certainly passed near thirty years in fighting for old institutions." (Stapleton's George Canning and his Times, 380) : W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 24: R. Rush, The Court at London, from 1819-1825, p. 467. 'A. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, II., 26. *Ibid, II., 26, 32. ^A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, 394-396: Moore's Digest of Int. Law, VI., 410. *C. H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, p. 85. ^A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and His Times, pp. 407-411. 70 This may have referred to commercial relations and it may also have referred to something more than mere commercial relations. ^ Canning asserted further that, "Great Britain could not acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observance of it. If we [Great Britain] were to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion were effected by the Ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea, or by the new Doctrine of the President prohibiting us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either."^ He also contended that, "The principle was one which his Majesty's Ministers were prepared to combat in the most unequivocal man- ner."* This principle indeed was aimed at Great Britain as much, as it was aimed at any other nation. Considering Great Bri- tain's apparent designs in the Northwest, in the West Indies, and in Central as well as South America, that principle, if carried out by the United States, would work to Great Britain's very great disadvantage. In effect it created a deadlock with Great Britain. » Accordingly Canning challenged this prin- ciple to the very end and never accepted it,* which is rather convincing evidence that he, at least, never claimed any credit for authorship of that principle. If other proof were needed, however, it is at hand in ample quantity. Canning's first reported conversation upon this matter with Mr. Rush was on August 16, 1823, and his first letter to Mr. Rush on August 20, 1823. It was on the first of these occasions that Canning inquired as to the possibility of a joint declaration, and on the latter that he suggested his five principles already referred to. Clearly, if there was any British authorship of the Monroe Doctrine, it must be found in the transactions covered by these two occasions. But if the pri- mary principles enunciated by President Monroe had been enunciated prior to August, 1823, Canning can not, of course, be regarded as the father of them. The "Non-colonization" principle had been set forth by Adams in his conference upon the Oregon situation with Von Tuyll on July 17, 1823,^ and again in his letter of instructions to Rush of July 22, 1823, « and in a similar letter sent at the same ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine p. 97: J. B. Henderson, Jr. Am. Diplo. Questions, p. 339. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 97. >Ibid, p. 114. *W. F. Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, p. 349: R. Rush, The Court at London, from 181Q-1825, p. 419. *J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163. Mw. St. Pap. For. Rel., V., 447. 71 time to Middleton, our Minister to Russia. i The first of these events antedated by a month Canning's first talk with Mr. Rush. Canning could not possibly have been a "posthimious" father. The other principle of "non-intervention" by European nations was more or less definitely suggested by Washington in 1792, when he refused topermit any interposition or mediation by Great Britain in the struggle then going on between the United States and the Indians. It was developed by the repeated de- clarations against Spain's transfer of Cuba to any other power. It was most definitely proclaimed in 1811 by President Madison^ and approved by Congress with reference to Florida. Madison's message of 1811 and Monroe's of 1823, were both based upon the same principle viz., that the "United States had the right to limit the action of foreign powers with regard to territory within the western hemisphere but beyond their own borders, in order to prevent possible injury to their interests. "^ On May 13, 1818, more than five years before Canning's talk with Rush, Monroe proposed at a cabinet meeting the following : "Whether Ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence of those provinces."* With this principle clearly enunciated some twelve years before Monroe's message, and suggested by Monroe himself over five years before it, the claim of British authorship does not rest on very secure foundations. As a matter of fact. Canning denied any connection with the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and very carefully pointed out to France the difference between Great Britain's principles and those set forth in Monroe's message. ^ The most conclusive evidence against Canning is furnished by Canning himself. In a letter to Bagot dated January 9, 1824, recently discovered. Canning said, "The first and most essential difference is that . . . The United States have actually acknowledged the inde- pendence of the late Spanish Colonies, while His Majesty's Government continues still to withhold such recognition. . . ... If the message ... is to be considered as objecting to an attempt to recover her dominions on the part of Spain ^Ibid, 436. ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 9. ^Ibid, p. 10. *J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 91-92. *W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 95, 96, 97. 72 herself, there is again as important a difference between his [Monroe] view of the subject and ours as perhaps it is possible to conceive, "i The policy of non-intervention and neutrality established by Washington at least as early as 1793 was novel to the world. It was the logical outcome of the great struggle for liberty. The development of that principle into "America, — hands off Europe," and "Europe, — ^hands off America" was just as logical and as purely American. As Reddaway, the British author, puts it, "For forty years the United States had been hastening toward the position that they assumed in 1823. "2 _ Far from being suggested by British statesmen, it is a most distinctively American creation. Reddaway says that "the negotiations between Rush and Canning merely determined the time and manner of the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. "3 This is the most that can truthfully be said of Canning's con- ferences with Rush. The claim that the Monroe Doctrine has rested for its ^ support upon the British fleet is just as unsound as is the claim of British authorship. A review of the events in which the doctrine was tested shows that at no time was Great Britain or the British fleet supporting the position of the United States, but on the other hand was either engaged in an individual effort of Great Britain's, or was indifferently disposed, while Great Britain consented to the effort of some other nation to test the doctrine, e.g., Great Britain's attempt on Cuba in 1825, on Venezuela from 1840 to 1895, her joint attempts with Spain and France resulting in the French invasion of Mexico in 1862, and her joint effort with Italy and Germany against Venezuela in 1902. The closest approach to any basis of fact for such a state- ment is furnished by the reported action of the British fleet with respect to the German Fleet in Manila Bay in 1898, at the time when Admiral Dewey was preparing for his attack upon the Spanish forts. However, at that time Germany was just eight years advanced on her naval colonial expansion program, which ultimately brought on the World War in 1914. She was then fast becoming a great commercial and territorial rival of Great Britain. She had already acquired coaling stations and other possessions throughout the world. Great Britain, therefore, feared Germany and any effort which might have been exerted by the British Fleet at that time was a measure of self-protection for Great Britain and not of friendliness toward the United States, or in support of the Monroe Doctrine. ^Charles H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 84, 85. ''W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine p. 3. Ubid, 14. 73 The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, is a poHcy thoroughly American in its conception, development and application. It "was formulated by Americans to promote American interests. "^ For its efficacy it has rested solely upon the power of the United States and must necessarily continue so to do. B. The Monroe Doctrine and Changes, or Extensions Thereof. There are some critics of the Monroe Doctrine who, in effect, hold that the original Monroe Doctrine no longer exists,* that it has been expanded, ^ enlarged, warped or distorted so that in its present state neither President Monroe nor John Quincy Adams wotdd recognize it as their "literal teaching."* There is, of course, no question but that the particular circum- stances which obtained in 1823 have long since ceased to exist. The message of Monroe, however, was not intended to be limited to those particular circiunstances, but was intended to set forth general principles^ subject to future application as cir- cimistances might require. Its terminology, general in char- acter, the antecedent cabinet discussions, the statements and understanding of those who had to do with it, all point to the fact that it was not a mere statement of policy for that period only. Jefferson, for instance, in his letter to President Monroe of October 24, 1823, preceding the drafting of the message, and referring to the principles set forth in the message, said "This sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. . . . Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. "We will oppose with all our means, the forcible inter- position of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and more especially their transfer to any other power by conquest, cession or acqui- sition in any other way.''^ The grounds generally stated in support of the assertion of a change in, or enlargement of the Doctrine are the following: (a) Henry Clay's notification to France of October 25, 1825, that the United States ^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 28. «J. B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, pp. 293, 294, 448: W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 2, 22, 23, 29, 37, 38: H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1913. Lord Bryce, The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. »A. C. Coolidge, The U. S. as a World Power, p. 101. *A. C. Coolidge, The U. S. as a World Power, p. 107. 'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 107. «Ford's Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X., 277-278. 74 "Could not consent to the occuption of the islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European power than Spain under any circumstances whatever. "^ This is alleged to be the "first distinct officiabstatement that it is contrary to the interests of the United States and forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine for any European colony in the Americas to be transferred to another European Power. "^ (b) President Polk's message of December 2, 1845, to Congress in which he said, "It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or do- minion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent."' It is contended that the words "or dominion" constitute an extension of the Doctrine in that it prevents any European nation from securing territory by purchase or cession, in effect prohibiting any European interference on the North American continent. ■» (c) President Grant's special message of May 31, 1870, in which he said, "I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European Power."* It is alleged that this prohibition of Spanish-American States from transferring American territory to European nations is an enlargement of the Doctrine. (d) President Cleveland's special message to Congress of December 17, 1895, in which he stated that the Monroe Doctrine "has its place in the code of international law."^ It is asserted that this amounts to a claim of a status which the doctrine has never attained. (e) Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's pronouncement relative to Venezuela in 1895: "The Monroe Doctrine ... is merely the declaration that no foreign power must establish a new government, acquire new territory by purchase or force or by any method whatever, or seek to control existing Governments in the Americas."^ It is asserted that this use of the word "foreign" is an extension Mot. S . Pap. For. Rel., V., 855: Moore's, Dig. of Int. Law, VI, Ail. ^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, 5, 6: A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 90, 91: J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 323, 324. 'J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 2248- 2249: Sen. Doc. i-2g Cong, i sess., 14-15: Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 420. *W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 9: H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth. ^J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 4015. Hbid, pp. 6088-6090. ''Cong. Rec. 54th, Cong, ist Sess.; 413-420. 75 \ to all foreign powers, Asiatic as well as European; that the words "by any method whatever" is a distinct departure from the message of Monroe. (f) The Senate Resolution, offered by Senator Lodge, in 1912, relative to Magdalena Bay. "Resolved, that whenever any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupa- tion thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government, not American, as to give that Government practical power, or control for naval or military purposes, "i It is contended that this is an enlargement in that it applies not only to Asiatic powers, but also to the acquisition of territory by agencies other than national governments. ^ In spite of these contentions it is safe to say that the Monroe Doctrine has not been changed. As has been stated, the purpose of the message was to declare a general principle parallel with that of Washington's of non-intervention in Euro- pean affairs. The underlying principle was to prevent any foreign political influence of any kind from getting such a foot- hold on the American continents that it might be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. One reasonable way to determine whether the doctrine has been changed in its application to any given circumstances is to consider how Monroe and John Quincy Adams would have viewed those same circumstances. To hold that President Monroe and Secretary Adams intended to exclude future colonization by a non-American nation solely because it might endanger this country, and at the same time to assert that he did not intend to cover the purchase of territory by such a nation, or by a fictitious person created by such a nation, is to strain at the gnat and to swallow the camel. In fact John Quincy Adams, referring to Polk's message already quoted, said that he "approved entirely. "» The Statement of Jefferson quoted above shows most clearly that it was intended to apply the principle to all non-American interposition in American political affairs, direct or indirect, and under any form or pretext such interposition might take. The doctrine is strictly limited as to its scope.'* It applies ^Congressional Rec. 62d. Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 48, Pt. 10, p. 9923. See also pp. 5661-5663. '^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 10, 11. 3J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, XII., 218. ^E. Root, Addresses in Int. Subjects, p. 117. 76 to the occupation or use of territory in the Western Hemisphere to the overthrow or exclusion of an American Government, or to the danger of the United States. Hence, the principle an- nounced by Monroe as a measure of self-protection necessarily and by fair implication included within its general terms all measures looking to the prevention of all extension of the poli- tical system of any non-American nation, and of all acquisition or occupation of territory by any such nation, if it endangered the peace or safety of the United States. It, therefore, included those manifestations appearing in the later application of the doctrine referred to which are improperly called enlargements of the doctrine or extensions of its meaning. C. The Monroe Doctrine a Guaranty of Protection to Spanish America. It has been urged frequently and particularly by the repre- sentatives of Spanish-American nations that the Monroe Doc- trine extended such a guaranty of protection to those nations, that almost upon the mere request of a South American nation the United States ought to go to war if necesary to prevent any foreign nation, American as well as European, from inter- fering in any way with such Spanish- American nations. ^ At the time of the original proclamation, there was un- doubtedly a great element of sympathy for the South American nations, but it is not that sympathy which was the basis of the doctrine. It is solely the safety of the United States which constituted such basis. The doctrine offers, and was intended to offer, no such guaranty. It is an individual policy of the United States designed and intended solely for its own protec- tion. Except as stated, "It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European States. In good conduct or bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement or controversy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for interference. "2 The Panama Congress, called in 1826, undoubtedly failed because of the attitude of the United States of distinct opposi- tion to giving any such pledge to the Spanish-American nations.^ Secretary of State Hay said with reference to Venezuela, and it applies to all similar cases, that the United States, while it "regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American Countries, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered ^J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 326-327. ^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 117. Mm. St. Pap. For. Rel., V., 834-905: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 416. 77 by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated."^ President Roosevelt, speaking of this matter in his annual message of December 3, 1901, said: "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non- American power. "2 Secretary of State Olney in his dispatch of July 20, 1895, to Bayard, set forth most clearly the negative phases of the Monroe Doctrine, as follows : "It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligation or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American State or in the relations between it and other American States. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of gov- ernment of any American State or to prevent the people of such State from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. "^ Henry Clay in discussing this phase of the question said, "The declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right^to demand."^ D. The Inconsistent Application of the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with the assertion that the Monroe Doctrine has been changed, the charge is also made that the United States has not always applied or enforced the doctrine, but has on some occasions ignored circumstances of a nature appropriate forresort to it. From this it is argued that the doctrine cannot be a fixed or permanent political policy of the United States. The follow- ing examples are cited in support of such argument. ^E. Root, Addresses on Ink Sub., p. 112. *J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 6662- 6663: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 595", 596. ^Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895: Sen. Ex. Doc. 31, 54th Cong. ist. sess. 4. *Clay to Forbes, U. S. Minister to Buenos Ayres, Jan. 3, 1828, XII. MS. Inst. U.S. Min. 49. 78 (a) Great Britain and the Falkland Islands. In 1824, Buenos Ayres seized the Falkland Islands, off the coast of Patagonia, declaring them to be part of that republic. Great Britain then occupied the Islands, declaring that they had been British possessions for some sixty years. In spite of the contention of Buenos Ayres that Great Britain's act was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States recognized British sovereignty over the Islands. (b) Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Venezuela (1902). In July, 1902, Great Britain and Germany brought claims against Venezuela, and upon her refusing to recognize then, or to agree upon a common tribunal to pass on them, these European Powers proclaimed and carried out a pacific blockade "in re- prisal," seizing and sinking some Venezuelan gunboats. Ven- ezuela finally agreed to the validity of the claims and offered to arbitrate the amounts. Great Britain and Italy, who had joined in the enterprise, were satisfied and discontinued the reprisal program, Germany refusing so to do. Until President Roosevelt brought pressure to bear against Germany, as here- tofore related, the United States took no action relative to the situation so far as the Allied Powers were concerned. As has been stated, the Monroe Doctrine is in the interest of the United States and of no other nation. It is, therefore, within the discretion of the United States to say when any given situation constitutes a menace to their peace and safety. It is reasonable to assume that every instance of pressure brought to bear on a Spanish-American nation by a foreign power does not constitute such a menace. Hence the United States are not required to apply the doctrine on every occasion, but may refrain from doing so if the occasion is not considered a real menace. In the Falkland Islands episode, the United States recog- nized a title of Great Britain, acquired many years before. It was, therefore, not a question of a new venture by Great Britain, and as was said later by Secretary Bayard, "It is not seen that the Monroe Doctrine . . . has any application to the case.''^ With reference to the Venezuelan incident President Roosevelt said that the Monroe Doctrine was not intended to prevent European nations from collecting their just claims, but applied only to permanent acquisitions. Inasmuch as Germany and Great Britain denied any such intention and the latter nation's actions supported that denial, there was no need of invoking the principle. However, when Germany's attitude later showed that her intentions were in aU probability other iBayard to Quesada, March 18, 1886— lf5. Notes to Arg. Rep., VI., 256. 79 than she had stated, Roosevelt immediately brought pressure to bear on Germany and that nation discontinued its objectionable activities. Just as the Doctrine asserts no right of the United States to control the sovereignty of other American nations, so it asserts no obligation on the part of the United States to hold the South and Central American nations harmless against foreign powers, and asserts no obligation to such foreign powers to police any South American or Central American nation. ^ E. The Monroe Doctrine and the Territorial Expansion OF the United States. It is frequently stated that the Monroe Doctrine has in some way been violated or extended beyond its intent by the expansion of the territorial limits of the United States into the Caribbean Sea, into Central America and into the Pacific Ocean. It is argued that the possession of Porto Rico, of the Panama Canal Zone, of the Virgin Islands and of the Philippines controvert the Doctrine. ^ It is argued that "the principles of its [Monroe Doctrine] growth will be found to be only two . . . the integrity of national territory, and . . . the preservation of popular government;"' that while the United States has insisted many times that the Monroe Doctrine prohibited acquisition of American territory by non-American nations, it has nevertheless refused to permit the rule "to work both ways, and forbid the further acquisition of American lands by the United States. "^ It is asserted that this is a one-sided interpretation of this feature of the Monroe Doctrine,^ which "enables us to annex American lands at our pleasure, "6 and which has been "utilized not only to extend the boundary of the United States southward and eastward to include parts of Mexico and Columbia and a West India Island, but to bring some islands of the Pacific under the Stars and Stripes as well."' All this, it is said, is, in effect, a violation of territorial integrity by the United States. As a matter of fact the Monroe Doctrine has no relation whatever to any governmental action outside the Western hemisphere or to territorial expansion by the United States. The doctrine was intended solely as a defensive measure, and at the very time of its promulgation the United States was engaged in the process of consolidating its continental boundaries. Washington believed that the true mission of the United States was continental in its extent. He, therefore, worked unceas- ^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 119. '^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine; H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth. 'W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 4. *IbU, pp. 12, 13. Hbid, pp. 14, 22. Hbid, p. 40. Ubid, pp. 19, 20. 80 ingly to secure the control of the Mississippi, the cession of the western posts by Great Britain, and generally to make the United States in fact independent. ^ John Quincy Adams, some eight months before the message was announced, stated: "In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. "^ Jefferson, in his letter to. Monroe relative to the proposed message, said: "I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states."' When Mr. Monroe was sent to France as envoy in 1794, his very specific instructions contained the following: "Among the great events with which the world is now teeming, there may be an opening for France to become instrumental in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi. Spain may, perhaps, negotiate a peace, sepa- rate from Great Britain, with France. If she does, the Mississippi may be acquired through this channel, especi- ally if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner solicited."* Later, Monroe was sent to France by Jefferson to negotiate with Livingston the purchase of Louisiana, in which transac- tion, as events have proved, he was eminently successful.^ In 1804, as Envoy to Spain, Monroe endeavored to secure the cession of all Spain's possessions cast of the Mississippi, but failed. « During the administration of his predecessor. West Florida had been occupied by the United States, and in pur- suance of a Presidential message. Congress expressed its opposi- tion to any Spanish transfer of that territory to any other nation,^ and during Monroe's first administration in 1819, the cession of Florida by Spain was finally negotiated.* iH. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 133, 162-164, 21.5. 2J. Q. Adams to Nelson, April 28, 182^; House Ex, Doc, 121, 32nd Cong. I sess., 6: Br. & For. S . Papers XLIV., 138: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, I., 583. 'JefEerson to Monroe, Oct. 24, 1823, Ford's, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X., 277, 278. *D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, p. 48. ^Ibid, pp. 78-95. ^D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, pp. 98-99. ''American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 571. *D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, p. 146. 81 President Polk in his annual message of December 2, 1845, with reference to this point and the bearing of the Monroe doctrine upon it, stated that, "... We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the 'balance of power' which they may desire to maintain upon this continent. "1 In view of the statements from the persons who had so much to do with the enunciation of the Doctrine, it is absurd to say that the doctrine was bilateral; that it forbade non- American nations to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere and at the same time forbade the United States from extending their borders in any way. The Monroe Doctrine, however, does not in any way justify, nor was it intended to justify, intervention in the in- ternal affairs of any of the nations of Central or of South America. This is made very clear by the attitude of John Quincy Adams with reference to the recognition of Brazil in 1824. If the doctrine, with the formulation of which Adams had so much to do in December 1823, was intended to provide for, or to justify such interference, it is certain that in May, 1824, that same doctrine wotdd have been made use of to justify a refusal to recognize the independence of Brazil, a monarchy amid republics. Brazil through a revolution established its inde- pendence but set up a monarchy rather than a republic. Con- siderable opposition was aroused in the United States to the recognition of that form of government in America. Adams, however, argued that such interference in the internal affairs of Brazil was contrary to American policy, " and Brazil was accordingly recognized on May 26, 1824. The Monroe Doctrine claims no right upon the part of the United States in any way to control the sovereign rights of any American nation. Such incidents as are offered in proof of the allegation that our government has coerced other weaker American nations if examined show clearly that any rights asserted by the United States against such other nations were those of an equal and not of a superior. ^ In these assertions of right which exist in every sovereign state, the Monroe Doctrine was in no way concerned. ^ J. D. Richardson Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 2248- 2249. *W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 115-116. 'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 116. 82 In instances such as the Venezuelan controversy with the Allied Powers in 1902, the initial "intervention" of the United States was rather under the Hague Conventipn right or obliga- tion of "rendering the offices of good fellowship. "^ The United States under this provision has frequently offered its services in the settlement of disputes between American nations. As a residt of this, and of the misunderstanding as to its basis, it has been asserted that the United States has become the great American "schoolmaster" to all the South and Central American nations. This feeling is rather prevalent in South America where those who feel that way, either fail or refuse to distinguish between the Monroe Doctrine and the course of action by the United States of which they complain. It matters not whether the cry of "Yankee Imperialism" by South Am- ericans, is or is not justified, the Monroe Doctrine is in no way involved. This feeling of resentment is, however, directed against the Monroe Doctrine as being "patronizing" or "menacing."^ It has undoubtedly been fostered by the Canning myth,^ which has been carefidly nourished in South America to the effect that it was Canning who prevented Spain from subduing her American colonies, and hence that it was Great Britain, and not the United States, that brought about the independence of the Spanish-American nations, when, as a matter of fact, Great Britain did not recognize any of these nations until two years after the United States had done so. It is interesting to note that while this cry of "School Master" is raised, at the same time the cry is heard from non- American nations that aU the bandit chiefs of South and Central America conduct their marauding expeditions as they will, and when threatened with punishment, answer with the counter threat that the Monroe Doctrine will overwhelm such threaten- ing nation if it does not let the marauder conduct his business without interference.* In one breath it is said that the United States is too much interested to suit South America and in the next, that South America is too much interested in the protec- tion of the United States. Both claims, however, have this common basis, viz., that those who make them want to see the power of the United States to protect itself greatly diminished. President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1904, is frequently quoted as a justification for this South American fear of this country, but in that message the President merely stated that, "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 119. "George H. Blakeslee, A New Basis Needed for the Monroe Doctrine, 1913, North Am. Rev., CXCVIII., 779-789. *C. H. Sherrill, Modernizing he Monroe Doctrine, p. 87. *Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization? by "An American Business Man," 1903, North Am. Rev., CLXXVI., 525. 83 in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention, by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in fla- grant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. .- . . "We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or un- willingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign ag- gression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.! This is thoroughly sound in principle and independently of the Monroe Doctrine, as stated in the first chapter, rests upon the right of self -protection, and is, in no sense, a threat to South or Central America. President Roosevelt made this amply clear in his message of December 5, 1905, in which he said, "There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the South. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. . . ."2 !J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 7051- 7054. ^Ibid, p. 7357. 84 CHAPTER X.— TEE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE The future of the Monroe Doctrine in effect must resolve it- self into one of two following policies. A. Its absolute abandonment. B. Its continued assertion and maintenance, by the United States acting alone. The query naturally presents itself as to what is to be the future of the Monroe Doctrine. Some authors say that the doctrine which was "the sine qua non of American public policy in the nine- teenth century, is fast taking the aspect, in this twentieth century of the bete noire or the Frankenstein of the Republic which called it into existence, "i According to some writers, the future holds approximately eight possible "solutions" of the "problem" raised by the "present status" of the Monroe Doctrine.^ These solutions may be classified as follows : 1 . Reduction of its interpretation to the literal phraseology of President Monroe. 2. Its support by a concert of powers. 3. Its support by an "A. B.C." alliance. 4. Its support by the Pan-American nations. 5. Its international recognition. 6. Its submission to the "Supra National" jursidiction of (a) The Hague Court of Arbitration or of Arbitral Justice. (b) The League of Nations. 7. Its absolute relinquishment. 8. Its continued assertion and maintenance by the United States alone. The first "solution" is based on the assimiption that the doctrine has been enlarged and no longer represents the principles announced by President Monroe. It is suggested that its interpretation be restricted to the prevention, (a) of conquest or colonization by European Powers, and (b) of restoration of monarchy in Central or in South America. As has been stated, the doctrine has never been changed or expanded to include any principles other than those contained in Monroe's message. Conditions and circumstances may have changed, and the manner of applying the principles enunciated may have changed with them, but the fundamental principle of preventing foreign nations from influencing the future of the various nations of the American continents to the danger of the peace and safety of the United States has ever been the same. The very dangers which the Holy Alliance held for the United States still threaten 'W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 1. 2W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 42-124. 85 it, whatever forms they may asimie. Colonization and Absolut- ism assume very many forms. "Peaceful penetration" in all its subtle phases is more menacing than avowed colonization by reason of its very indirectness. "Claims, financial and other- wise, of European Powers against weaker nations of this hemi- sphere present a problem no less pressing and no less dangerous" than the problems of 1823. ^ Imperialism, however described, whether in the euphonious terminology of "Commonwealth" or "Empire" is just as dan- gerous to republicanism today as it was in 1823, when it was labelled "Legitimacy," and "Holy Alliance." "Eternal Vigi- lance is the price of Liberty." The advocates of "compression" base their argument upon false premises, and their conclusions are necessarily unsound. The second, third, = and fourth' "solutions" are predicated upon alliances with foreign nations, which alliances, if the doctrine is to be permanent, must necessarily be permanent also. Such alliances would be absolutely contrary to the funda- mental principle of American foreign policy armoiinced by Washington and adhered to ever since, viz., that of avoiding permanent alliances with foreign nations. This has become so firmly planted in the national character that even to suggest abandoning it is almost equivalent to suggesting national suicide.^ The results of the national election of 1920 are^a sufficient indication of the way in which the country at large regards such alliances with foreign powers, whether actual or apparent, and whether temporary or permanent. The fifth "solution" rests upon the suggestion that inas- much as certain powers are supposed to threaten the United States, a treaty should be made with them, under which, and in consideration of the United States giving ''suitable quid pro quo — such as the Philippines, or tariff concession," such powers would agree to recognize the binding force of the doctrine. ^ Nothing, however, would be gained by such a step because if at any time any of such powers beHeved it to be for its interest to avoid the doctrine, and believed itself powerful enough, no such agreement would protect the United States. On the other hand, if they were not powerfid enough to make such an at- tempt, lack of power and not the treaty would be the deterrent. The United States then, apart from the imdignified bargaining to maintain a self-protective measure, has more to gain by ^R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- doned? 10 Am. Journal of Int. Law, p. 77. *G. H. Blakeslee, A New Basis Needed for the Monroe Doctrine, 1913 No. Am. Rev., CXCVIII, 779-789. Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization? by "An American Business Man," 1903 No Am. Rev. CLXXVI. 'R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- doned? 10 ^w. Journ. Int. Law. *C H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 105, 112, 113, 121, 133. 'W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine. 86 maintaining its traditional policy of no permanent alliances, and looking to its own resources for its preservation. The sixth "solution" goes further than the others, suggest- ing in euphonious terms that the "United States take another grand and noble stride along the path of the new internation- alism, and place its Pan-American problem ... in the hands of the entire family of nations represented by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, "i or place it in the hands of the League of Nations. ^ In other words it is suggested that the United States submit to the determination of other agencies than itself the absolute control of the doctrine, and that the doctrine cease to be solely American and that it have a world basis. ^ Such a step would amount to an admission that the self- preservation and self-protection of the United States, so far as it rested upon the future affairs of the American Continents, were no longer to be a matter solely for the United States to pass upon, and so far it would be a waiver of the right of self protection. The fundamental right to national self-preserva- tion, recognized in toto as to all other nations would be denied, or at least considerably restricted as to the United States. When the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were held, and the peace conventions were under discussion, the United States specifically reserved the Monroe Doctrine from the operation of these conventions.* The question of submitting the administration of the Monroe doctrine to the Hague, therefore, has been considered already. On both occasions it was determineed that the interests of the United States pro- hibited any such submission. The reasons for such refusal are even stronger to-day than then, particularly in view of the attitude of the United States toward the League of Nations Covenant. There was room for argument that the provision of that Covenant reserved to the United States the jurisdiction over the doctrine, but the United States Senate insisted upon a more specific reserv^ation, and the people of the country, not satisfied with the Covenant even with that reservation and others, by ballot in the national election of 1920, refused to become a party to that Covenant. All suggestions of securing international support, or inter- national recognition for the doctrine are beside the point. Whatever effect such action might give has already been secured to this country. When the powers represented at the second Hague Conference recognized our reservation as to the ^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 43, 44. ^World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, I. No. 5, pp. 253-265. ^C. H. Levermore, Wot Id Court, Sept. 1917. ^Roll's, Peace Conference at The Hague, pp. 477, 531; W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc. of the U. S. 1776-190Q II. 2032: A. B. Hart ThetMonroe Doctrine, pp. 213, 214: Moore, Princ. of Am. Diplomacy P.L261. 87 Monroe Doctrine, i they in effect recognized our right to make such a reservation, and in reaHty to assert the doctrine against the world. If that Hague recognition will not control such for- eign nations, no other written memorandum will have greater weight. As the doctrine is based upon the right of self-protection, it cannot possibly be changed to a joint declaration with any other states American, European, or Asiatic. Similar declara- tions by such powers might be made, based upon a similar right of self-protection inherent in such other states. Anything other than this would necessarily be an alliance and entirely hostile to American traditions. ^ Lord Bryce argues that the Monroe Doctrine, "was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or limitation which America proposed to place on her own action. She would not interfere in the wars and alliances of the Old World and she expected that in return the states of the Old World would not interfere with the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. . . . "Monroe's policy, which was also Washington's, of holding aloof from European complications was long main- tained, and wisely maintained, by America, but the current of events has been too strong to make it possible to stand apart any longer. The whole world has now become one, and must remain one for the purposes of politics. No great nation can stand out. "Thus the Monroe Doctrine in its old form may seem to have disappeared; for the counterpart to the exclusion of the European Powers from interfering with the freedom of American states was the abstention of America from interference in European affairs. "^ Lord Bryce, in effect, contends that the United States by participating in the World War sacrificed whatever right this country may have had to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. He argues speciously that we practically agreed not to interfere in European affairs if Europe would not interfere in American affairs, and that inasmuch as we did intervene in European affairs by participation in the World War, the agreement was terminated. The premises of this argument are wholly unsoimd. There is nothing historically to justify the conclusion that President Monroe was|laying a restriction upon this country. All the facts point to the opposite conclusion, that the United States asserted the principle as a matter of self -protection and in spite ^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 109. *E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 120. ^The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. 88 of the opposition of foreign nations thereto. Lord Bryce's conclusion, therefore, is wholly unwarranted. The[seventh "solution" is more courageous than the others in that it argues that the doctrine has been outgrown, has no application whatever at the present time, is not worth while, "is an ignis fatuus,"^ devotion to which is "mere slavery to rhetoric and sentiment"-, and that it should be abandoned as an "obsolete shibboleth."* It is in reality the only alternative to the eighth "solution," that of the United States maintaining the doctrine singly. The problem of national self-protection has not materially changed from the time of Monroe's mesage to the present. To abandon the doctrine now would be to leave South and Central America open to the territorial ambitions of the European and Asiatic powers. The treaty of Versailles, following the World War, made it clear^that the great world powers are as greedy for territory now as they ever were.* "The spirit of colonial expansion still exists, "^ and the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine woiild really be an open invitation to such Powers to secure,'^ or to J increase their foothold in the Americas. The controlof the^Caribbean Sea, and of the Panama Canal would follow. %The very dangers which threatened in 1823, and which called forth the enunciation of the Doctrine would overwhelm the United States. « The people of this country, "have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our Civil War to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. . . ."' It has been well said that, "Nothing but the . . . Monroe Doctrine, has . . . pre- vented the acquisition of territory in South America and in iSydney Brooks, 76 Fortnight Rev., p., 1021. 2J. B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, p. 293. 'H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine — An Obsolete Shibboleth, Altantic Monthly. June 1913. *J. B. Angell. The Eur opea^t Concert and the Monroe Doctrine, Hamard Grad. Mag. XIV. 23. J. Bryce, The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations in The Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. ^R. D. Armstrong Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- doned? 10. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 84. ^Ibid, 77-78. ^Olney to Bayard July 20, 1895, Sen. Ex. Doc. 54th Cong., i sess. p. 4. 89 the neighborhood of the Panama Canal in recent years by certain nations of Eiirope."i The Monroe Doctrine "cannot become obsolete while our republic endures. "" It has become an unceasingly vital and compelling policy for this country.^ The Monroe Doctrine, "Like the independence of this country, it is a question of fact and not of law. The independence of this country is unquestioned, because, having declared it, we compelled the world to recognize it . In the same way we have always acted on the declaration of Mr. Monroe as the guiding prin- ciple of our foreign policy. . . . "We declare the Monroe Doctrine to be a principle which we believe essential to the honor, the safety, the interests of the United States. We declare it as a state- ment of fact, and we must have it recognized, because we sustain and support it, and we can no more permit it to be a matter of discussion with other nations than we can afford to discuss withjfthem our national welfare or our forms of government . It embodies for us the same principle as the balance of power so jealously maintained by the nations of Europe. They will not allow that to be dis- turbed, and we hold to our balance of power with equal tenacity."* From the time of President Monroe's announcement to the present time, a period of about ninety-eight years, this country has been engaged in but three foreign wars, the Mexican, the Spanish and the World War. During that same period Europe has beheld at least seventeen wars, an average of one new war for approximately every four years. The Monroe Doctrine by keeping European powers from the Western Hemi- sphere has tended toward a long continued peace. To abandon it now wotdd be to welcome Europe's almost chronic warfare. The Monroe Doctrine was intended then, as a purely defensive measure, for the sole purpose of securing the peace and safety of this coimtry. It was designed to prevent any danger from non-American nations by reason of the possession or occupation of territory thereafter, or the interference with the internal affairs of any American nation. It was based upon this country's right of self-preservation. The principle announ- ced in the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, by fair implication, if iH. Holt, Independent, LXI, 1119. F. Snow, Treaties & Topics in Am. Diplomacy, p. 423. 2Pres. Cleveland's Message of Dec. 17, 1895, J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 8088-6090. *E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 106. *H. C. Lodge, Speech in Senate, Dec. 30, 1895, Cong. Rec. 54 Cong, ist. Sess. p. 419-420. 90 not by words apply to any occupation' of American territory, temporary or permanent, direct or indirect, by any non- American power, which the United States beheves to endanger the peace or safety of this country. To permit the temporary occupation of custom houses, or of ports, by non-American powers, to en- force payment of debts, or for any other reason, as stated by President Roosevelt, is very inadvisable, for such temporary occupation might very easily turn into a permanent occupa- tion.! The Monroe Doctrine cannot, then, be abandoned, but must continue to hold its position in the foreign policy of the United States. The avoidance of permanent or entangling alliances with foreign nations and the absolute prevention of any direct or indirect interference upon the part of non-American nations in the political affairs of American nations must still be our policy. The United States must not only assert the Monroe Doctrine, but also enforce it, eliminating conditions which are provocative of aggression, as well as opposing actual aggres- sion. ^ No other policy has yet been suggested which compares in safety with that doctrine so ably worked out, and adopted by the early fathers, whose wisdom and statesmanship, viewed through the years, seem inspired. As President Roosevelt said, "Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere."' It is the one sure means for the preservation of the United States and for the preservation of liberty and republicanism, for as was so eloquently expressed by Washington in his in- augural address, "... the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered perhaps as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people."* ^Message of Feb. 15, 1905. Confidential Ex. V., 58 Cong., 3d Sess.; Moore Dig. of Int. Laiv, VI, 518-528. ^R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- doned, p. 97. 'Roosevelt's Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1901, J. D. Richardson Messages and Papers of the President, pp. 6662-6663. ^Washington's First Inaugural. J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., p. 53. 91 u J I f I C3 '<«•.> ',VHlMN'il-3W^ -^ ^OFCAjJFO/?^ ^1 c^ 4? ^OF-CAIIFO%, ^A 'jn -! V< >- \\\EUNIVERy//i 5?5. k:^ (is g ^. 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