m DS r-t UC-NRLF A6&7> GIFT OF HORACE W. CARPENTER. TURKEY, No. 1 (1922). CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESPECTING THE ANGORA AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 20, 1921. Presented to Parliam*nt by Command of Hu Majesty. LONDON : PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY '8 STATIONERY OFFICE. To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from IJ..M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses: Imperial House, Kinqsway, London, W.C. 2, and 28, Abingdon Street, London, S.W.I; 37, Peter Street, .Manchester; 1, St. Andrew's Crk scent, Cardiff; Porte Street, Edinburgh; OU F1!0M >\", Ltd.. 40 k 41, Lower Sackvii.le Street, Dublin. 1921. [Cmd. 1570.] J'rice 9d. Net. 4* TABLE OF CONTEXTS. No. and Name. Date. Subject. Page- 1921. 1 To Count de Saint- Nov. 5 Anlaire 2 M. de Montille 3 To M. de Montille . . 4 M. de Montille 5 ,, i) 6 To M. de Montille . . Calls attention to difficulties raised by con- clusion of Angora Agreement and asks for explanations on a number of points . . 3; 17 French Government declare that the agree- ment is strictly limited in scope and does not prejudice the general question of final peace with Turkey. Eeasons which have induced France to conclude agreement . , T 25 His Majesty's Government take note of the assurances contained in No. 2, but find it difficult to reconcile the assurances with the actual text of the agreement . . . . 24 Dec. 6 | French Government confirm assurances and reply to the additional criticisms in No. 3 10 16 Acknowledges receipt of No. 5 2& Encloses copies of letters and notes exchanged at time of signature of agreement . . . . 34 43 (Vf^. Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government respecting the Angora Agreement of October 20, 1921. No. 1. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Count de Saint- Aulaire. Your Excellency, Foreign Office, November 5, 1921. On the occasion of our interview on the 3rd November, I undertook to send you a memorandum containing the principal points arising out of the draft agreement concluded between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government, and also the accompanying letter to M. Franklin-Bouillon bom Fuftsoul Kernel Bey to some of which I had called your attention, although it was not possible in the course of a single conversation to refer to all. I commenced by reminding you that in the earlier part of the present year I had asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin- Bouillon had any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private person who was going to Angora in connection with the press or for purposes of his own. Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government. M. Briand had in an official note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally, when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had again enquired as. to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Govern- ment the larger questions of peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Government, with regard to French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops. Belying upon these categorical assurances, I had taken no further steps in the matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only during the last week I had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and in spite of their pressure, I had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful effort in the interests of the alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that I had read the provisions of M. Franklin-Bouillon's agreement, as to which I could not avoid asking a number of serious questions, and which I could hardly believe that the French Government would be prepared to accept in its present form. 030 *JO0 1 22 F.O.P. f7417] B 2 Wt MM] 92 12."> 2/22 [7879] 403722 The points of the agreement as communicated to His Majesty's Government which seemed to me to call for special explanation were the following : Article 1 provides that with the signature of the agreement " the state of war will cease beween the high contracting parties." Clearly, this phrase implies something more than a local armistice, because a state of armistice is still technically a state of war. Nothing is said as to whether the agreement is provisional pending a general peace between the Allies and Turkey or whether it is intended to have purely local scope. The latter could hardly be the case, as some of the articles appear to be of general application to Turkey. It is presumed, therefore, that the agreement establishes a state of peace between France and the Grand National Assembly. It would also appear that the agreement involves formal recog- nition by France of the Grand National Assembly of Angora as the sovereign authority in Turkey, in which case a peace concluded with Angora would be contrary to the Franco-British Treaty of the 4th September, 1914, and to the London Pact of November 1915. Article 3. This provision for the withdrawal of French troops from the territory handed over to Turkey ignores French obligations under article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, to maintain troops in the zone of special French interests until the French, British and Italian Governments are agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey is being executed, and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities have been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed. While the evacuation of Cilicia, which, as M. Briand stated, was the object of the negotiations, necessarily involved the withdrawal of French troops, it was clearly incumbent on the French Government to take all possible guarantees for the protection of minorities in accordance with their obligations. But while the full amnesty provided in article 5 may offer some protection for the minorities in Cilicia, the agreement appears to contain no safeguards for its effective operation by the Kemalists. Further, while article 6 provides that " the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declares that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established by the conversations concluded on this subject between the Powers of the Entente, their enemies and certain of their Allies," it is noted that the clause is not drafted to apply to Cilicia and is therefore presumably of general application to Turkey. It is thus open to the objection that it runs counter to the pro- visions of the Treaty of Sevres for the protection of minorities, and ignores the responsibilities assumed by the French Government for the protection of minorities in the zone of their special interests under the Tripartite Agreement. Article 1 of that agreement states that the " assistance " to be afforded to the Turkish Government by France " shall be specially directed towards enhancing the pro- tection afforded to racial, religious or linguistic minorities." It appears, therefore, that by this article France has not only renounced her responsbilities with regard to the protection of minorities, under the Tripartite Agreement, but has pledged herself to substitute for the minority provisions in the Treaty of Sevres other provisions on the lines of the treaties made between the [7447] principal Allies and such European countries as Poland. It need hardly be pointed out that these treaties are inadequate and their provisions generally quite inapplicable to Turkey. In fact, the contention of the Angora Government on one important point of general application to Turkey has been accepted by one Ally in advance of general negotiations for a treaty of peace between all the Allies and Turkey. Article 7. It is assumed that this article, which provides for special rights of Turks in the Alexandretta area and for the use of Turkish as the official language, will necessitate some modification of, or addition to, the draft mandate for Syria now before the League of Nations. Article 8. The revision, provided for in this article, of the northern frontier of Syria as laid down in the Treaty of Sevres cannot be regarded as the concern of France alone. It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted a common gage of Allied victory, although by an arrangement between the Allies the mandate had been awarded to Fiance. The mandate is now under consideration by the League of Nations and this important and far-reaching modification of the territory to which it applies altogether ignores me League of Nations, while the return to Turkey <>f territory handed over to the Allies in common without previous notification to Great Britain and Italy is inconsistent with loth the spirit and the letter of the treatj which all three have signed. Further, the revision provides for handing hack to Turkey the localities of Nisibin and deziret -ibn-< hoar, both of which are of great Strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the tame consideration applies to the handing hack to Turkey of the track of the Bagdad Railway between Choban-Be} and Nisibin. In neither case have Hi*- Majesty's Government been consulted Jt is noted that the frontier is to he " fixed " by the two parties within one month of the signature <>f the agreement in advance of all the other frontiers of Turkej under the Treat\ of Sevres. Article '.. Inasmuch as this concession may he followed by demands from Turkes for similar privileges in regard to other sites, the Allies vers entitled to expect that they should have been con- sulted before an\ such arrangement was made. Article 1". The transfer of the Bozanti Nisibin section of the dad line to a French group seems to be tantamount to the tution 1>\ France of paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement of the loth August. 1920, in advance of, and independently of the duties and responsibilities undertaken by France towards her Allies under the Tripartite Agreement and under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey ( which are interdependent. It is presumed that the transfer of this part of the Bagdad line by Turkey to the French group is not intended to override article 2'Ji of the Treaty of Sevres, whereby Turkey was herself to liquidate the whole Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal Allies. Nor is it supposed that the article can be intended to give France a large portion of the railway without regard to the claims of her other Allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sevres is the Allies common asset, and in respect of which special arrangements :re contemplated under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. Paragraph 3 of article 10 provides that each party shall have the right to use for military transport that part of the Bagdad line which lies in the other's territory. This in effect appears to mean that France must permit Turkish troops to be carried from Konia to Nisibin and possibly thus threaten the Mesopotamian frontier. Great Britain ai>i. avec satisfaction, cette occasion de se seigner but les tendances du Gouvernement d'Angora et les !- nifttre fin aux hostility dont la France supportait, en Cilicif. tout le poids, alors que la nation et le Parlement avaient exprime, avec force leur volonte" de faire cesser de cruelles effusions ie gang t des depenses particulierement one>euses. Le President du Conseil a estime que M. Franklin-Bouillon etait pleinement qualifie" pour entreprendre une telle enquete par son ^ d'ancien membre du Gouvernement, sa connaissance 8 approfondie des affaires d 'Orient et les garanties qu'offraient son experience et son activity. Votre Seigneurie constatera que rien, dans le programme d 'information indiquS ci-dessus, n'allait a l'encontre des assurances donnees par M. Briand, aux termes de quoi la France n'avait con- tracts et ne contracterait aucun engagement touchant aux questions generales de la paix entre les Allies et la Turquie, sans etre en accord etroit avec eux, et particulierement avec le Gouvernement britannique. Quant a la seconde mission de M. Franklin-Bouillon, mission dont votre Seigneurie a connu le caractere officiel, elle n'est pas davantage sortie du cadre trace par M. Briand; laissant entierement de cote les problemes de la paix generale, elle s'est limitee strictement a la negociation des affaires memes enumerees par votre Seigneurie dans sa lettre du 5 novembre : liberation des prisonniers francais, protection des minority en Cilicie, et questions qui se posaient n^cessairement comme corollaires de 1'eVacuation de la Cilicie par nos troupes. Le Gouvernement francais m'a prescrit de renouveler 1 'assurance qu'il a toujours reserve la question de la paix avec la Turquie et n'a jamais envisage qu'un engagement puisse etre pris a cet egard en dehors d'un accord etroit avec ses Allies et, notamment, avec le Gouvernement britannique. Des assurances catogoriques a cet Sgard ont deja Ste donnees au Gouvernement britannique le 14 juillet 1921 ,. et je suis charge" de les reit^rer expressement. Le Gouvernement francais les repete d'autant plus volontiers qu'il a trouve chez le Gouvernement anglais le meme esprit de complete collaboration lors des conversations qui ont eu lieu r^cem- ment, a Londres, entre votre Seigneurie et les Ministres grecs, pour la recherche d'une paix satisfaisante en Orient. Le Gouvernement de la ESpublique ne peut que se rejouir de constater la parfaite identite de principes qui existe ainsi entre les deux Gouvernements. Ce plein accord, sur les maximes qui reglent la conduite des deux Gouvernements, met le Gouvernement francais d'autant plus a l'aise pour dissiper tout malentendu, tant sur la portee de 1' Arrange- ment d' Angora, que sur les motifs qui ont amene" la France k l'ap])rouver. Sans doute, le Gouvernement anglais a attire l'attention du Gouvernement francais sur les inconvenients d'un accord direct entre la France et le Gouvernement d 'Angora. Le 4 avril, au cours d'une visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre au Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, il fut rappele a Lord Hardinge qu'en mars 1921,. M. Briand avait declare, a plusieurs reprises, a Mr. Lloyd George, sans que le Premier Ministre britannique elevat la moindre observa- tion, qu'il ne quitterait pas l'Angleterre sans avoir conclu un accord avec la delegation d 'Angora. M. Briand avait fait ressortir que nf le Parlement ni l'opinion francaise n'accepteraient la prolongation d'hostilites entrainant des pertes cruelles et inutiles, puisque le Traite de Sevres consacre l'evacuation de la Cilicie et que les legeres concessions faites, a la frontiere septentrionale du mandat syrien, conform^ment au principe des nationality qui a domine toute l'ceuvre de la paix, ne sont au detriment d 'aucun Allie, tout en etant propres a faciliter l'entente generale. II fut, en meme temps, precis^ a Lord Hardinge que M. Briand avait alors marque a. Mr. Lloyd George qu'il ne signerait cet accord qu'a la derniere heure et apre^ avoir constate l'impossibilite d'aboutir a Londres a un arrangement. general but 1 Orient, ("est au cours de cette conversation que, des 1. \ avril, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre recut le texte de 1 'arrangement dont il s'agit. Ces declarations out ete* renouvelees a votre Seigneurie par M. de Saint-Aulaiiv le H avril dernier, quand elle a bien voulu entretenir Le representant de la Kepublique de cette affaire. Le Gouvernement iraia.ais a etc fonde a eroire que les explications fournies par l'Ambassadeur de France avaieiit donne au Gouvernement britanni- que se> apaisementa, puisque votre Seigneurie n'a pas donne suite au projet de note dont elle avait annonce* L'envoi a M. de Saint- Aulaire. Depuia bra, le Gouvernement brancaia n'a cease* d'ailleurs, et notaumient dans sa lettre du 14 juillet dernier, adivssee a rAmbaaaadeur d'Angleterre, d'affirmer sa volonte de mettre fin aux hoatilitee qui ae pourauivaient sur les contins du mandat Byrien, des qu'il pourrait obtenir I'acoeptation de clauaea preoisea assurant la protection des minoritea et ootammenl dea Armenieua. -t. dana cea conditions, et alora que depuia longtempa deja |( - Mlit'-s avaient retire* leura troupes dea divera points de 1 'Empire ottoman occupea au moment de ['armistice, que le Gouvernement lis a estime. aprea avoir informs* sea Allies de sos intentions, at en reservant aoigneusemenl la solution de toutes les questions generales a regler an commun par les Allies, qu'il avait le droit de a 'engager dans la voie ou ses partenairea I 'avaient precede*, en usant dea moyena que les evenementa imposaient. Le (louvernement de Sa Majeste* reoonnsjtra, en effst, que ai le retrait des troupes royalee dea rrontierea de la Mesopotamia et la auppression du controle militaire allie* sur lea voles Eerreea d'Anatolie ont pu a'accomplir aana accord avec Le Gouvernement d'Angora, de*pourvu a cette epoque de toute puissance offensive, il ae pouvait en etre de meme but les rrontierea de Byrie, car. d'un odte, lea forces nationalistes lit depuis lora coiisiderableiiieiit developpeefl ei, |ar ailleiirs, la trouve pas, oomme la "Vfeaopotamie, protegee par la ace. Nul ne pent contester que Is France u avait de ohoiz qu'entre les deui alternatives suivantes : ou bieii maiuteiiir sea effectlfa -t continuer la guerre en Cilicie, on bien negooier avec le pouvoir de fait < | n i oommandaii aux troupes turques de cette region. La volonte de la nation rranoaise s'et.-mt dairement, fortement el oonstam- nieiit manifested en Eaveur de ['evacuation, le Gouvernement francais star] dans 1'obligatiorj de poursuivre la conclusion d'un arrangement local, qui est. au nste, conforms, dans sea disposit ions fonda- mentalea, a celui dont le teste avait ete* communique au Gouverne- meni angJaia le 1 avril 1921 . I. - tendancea generates qui ont inspire la conduite du Gouverne- mettl francais t'-tant ain>i precisees, J ai riioiineur de donner. ci-apres. a votre Seigneurie quelquea eclaircissementa touchant des points particuliers viaea dana sa lettre du 5 novembre. Lea mota "cessation de I'etal de guerre," qui figurent a L 'article l pr . ont paru au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste* etre des termes unpropres pour definir mi armistice local. Votre Seigneurie estime. en outre, que mention aurait du etre bute du caractere provisoire de l' arrangement intervenu. I>a redaction adoptee donnerait, au con- traire, a I'accord I'apparence d'un veritable Traite* de Paix. Ainu que la deja marque* verbalement a Lord Hardinge le Directeur dee Affaires politiques, I'Accord d'Angora oe eonatitue i>as 10 un Traite de Paix. Ce n'est qu'un arrangement de portee locale conclu avec un pouvoir qui n'est reconnu ni de jure ni de facto, mais qui a manifesto une autorite, un patriotisme et une loyaute, propres a le faire considerer comme capable de tenir et de faire executer les engagements qu'il a contractus. D'une maniere generale, si 1 'Arrangement d 'Angora eut constitue un Traite de Paix, il aurait du, suivant la constitution, etre soumis a la ratification du Parlement. Or, il a ete simplement approuve par le Gouvernenu nt francais et aucune ratification parlementaire n'a 6te sollicitee. Le Gouvernement francais considere, d 'autre part, que 1 'usage des expressions " d 'armistice " et " d 'arrangement provisoire " eut risque d'inquieter les populations en leur faisant craindre une reprise des hostilites. Quant au terme " hautes parties contractantes," il n'a qu'une valeur d'usage et de courtoisie traditionnelle ; il figure d'ailleurs deja dans l'Accord de Londres, et le Gouvernement britannique n'avait, jusqu'ici, formule aucune objection contre son emploi. II est a peine besoin d'ajouter que l'emploi de ces expressions n'implique nullement, en droit international, la reconnaissance de jure d'un Etat ou d'un Gouvernement nouveau. Le Gouvernement britannique estime que l'article 3 de l'Arrange- ment d 'Angora ne tient pas compte des obligations contractees par la France, en vertu de l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite. Selon 1 "interpretation donnee par votre Seigneurie audit article 8, la France aurait pris 1 'engagement de ne retirer ses troupes de la zone d'interets speciaux, qu'apres s'etre assured de 1 'execution des garan- ties pour les minorites. Le Gouvernement francais considere que l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite du 18 aout 1920 a ete redige non pas dans le but de nous obliger a rester en Cilicie, mais bien au contraire dans 1 'intention de limiter notre occupation. II tombe sous le sens que le Gouverne- ment francais n 'aurait jamais consenti a prendre 1 'engagement et a supporter les charges d'une occupation indefinie. Le Gouvernement francais a d'ailleurs, a plusieurs reprises, comme je l'ai marque plus haut, indique au Gouvernement asglais la necessite ou il se trouvait de mettre fin a la situation anormale qui prolongeait les hostilites sur la frontiere syrienne, tandis qu'elles avaient cesse entre les autres Allies et la Turquie, sans qua pour cela i'etat de paix put etre considere comme juridiquement retabli. En outre, le Gouvernement francais tient a faire une remarque generale quant a la validite de l'Accord tripartite sur quoi est fondee principalement 1 'argumentation juridique de la lettre du 5 novembre. En aucun cas, le Gouvernement francais ne se reconnaitrait autoris^ a transiger sur les droits reconnus par cet accord au profit de ses Allies, soit d'Angleterre, soit d'ltalie. Mais il estime d'autant plus avoir le droit de renoncer aux avantages stipules en sa faveur que cet accord n'a pas ete ratifie et, comme le Traite de Sevres, doit, aux termes mernes des declarations faites par Lord Curzon, tout recem- ment, a Londres, aux Ministres grecs, subir certaines modifications; il ne saurait done avoir la valeur d'un traite en vigueur. Enfin, dans les parties du territoire ottoman comprises ou non comprises dans les zones d'ou les troupes alliees se sont retirees, aucune garantie n'avait pu jusqu'a ce jour etre obtenue en faveur des minorites. La France, au contraire, a expressement subordonne tout retrait eventuel de ses troupes de Cilicie a 1 'engagement pris par le Gouvernement d 'Angora qu'il assurerait la protection des minorites et la prise effective de dispositions dans ce sens. 11 Le Gouvernement de sa Majeste regrette que, par 1 'article 6, la France ait admis, pour la protection des minorites, des garanties differentes de celles que le Traite de Sevres avait prevues et qu'en ne limitant pas express^ment k la Cilicie lesdites dispositions le Gouvernement francais ait paru donner satisfaction a une des pre- tentions du Gouvernement d 'Angora en une matiere de grunde importance et de portee generale, alors qu'un tel sujet devait essen- tiellement faire l'objet d'un accord entre les Allies et etre reserve pour les negociations de la paix generale. II ne saurait, sans injustice, etre fait reproche a la France de t 'avoir pu faire accepter, pour la protection des minorites en Cilicie, des garanties que la pression de la force totale des Allies n'a pu o')tenir de la Turquie. Le retrait des troupes francaises etant une necessite, le Gouvernement de la Republique a esthxte* que sa volont6 de ne point s'ecartcr des dispositions signaei, mats non ratifiees du Traite de Sevres, ne pourrait aller jusqu'a laisser les minorites sans protection auoune, el qu'un devoir d'humanite l'obligeait a leur assur r, tout an moins, les garanties inscrites dans les trait^s imposes par 1 'Entente a la Hongrie et a la Bulgarie. Quant mi regret exprune par votre Seigneurie que ces dernieres garanties puiaaent etre considerees eomme s'appliquant non seule- rnent a la Cilicie, mail aux autres parties de la Turquie, le Gouverne- ment francais considere que tout l'Accord d Angora est doming par t qu'il sa^'it d'un arrangement d'une portee locale. D'ailleurs, il ne s.mrait etre fait j^iict au Gouvernement francais <} 'avoir etendu aes obligations non point dan- son propre nteret, mais dans eelui - populations de I'Anatolie, qui se fcrouvent encore actuellement privees de toute protection. [ndependamment des garanties Gormellement anoncees dans ord, je puis ajouter que M. Franklin-Bouillon est tombs' d accord l touvernement d' Angora pour controler lui-meme les conditions dans lesquelles i 'effect ueron 1 1 evacuation et 1 'installation des nouvelles autontea; il sera aide dans cette tache par trots den- gues speciaux du (iouvernemenl francais, qui resideronf b Adana, a Mersina et a Aintab. Le regime adminiafaratif, vise a l'article 7, pour la region d'Alexandrette, n'est pas en opposition avec le regime prevu pour le mandat qui doit tenir compte de l'extreme diversity des races en il est ooniorme a l'organisation generale des pays de mandat francais, organisation qui accorde deja une lame autonomic admini- strative aux different! troupes ethniques. L'article 7 de l'Accord d 'Angora n'attribue, d'ailleurs, aucun droit politique ou ^conomique 2i la Turquie et ne prevoit l'usagi de la langue turque, concurrem- ment avee l'arabe et le francais, qu'en raison de l'emploi de cette langue par la grande majority de la population. La rectification de frontiere prevue par l'article 8 apparait a votre Seigneurie comme interessant non Beulement 1- Gouvernement francai> soul, mail les Gouvernements allies, les territoires pris a la Turquie oonstituant le gage de la victoire commune. Votre Seigneurie estime qu'une modification tnritoriale du mind it BVfiet) ompte des obligations de la France vis-a-vis de la Ligue des Nations, tandie que la retrocession arait fonde sur une interpretation que le Gouvernement francais tient a rectifier. 11 ne s'agit point d'une question de souverainete, mais d'un droit de propriete, reconnu pour des raisons de sentiment. L 'article 10 se borne a constater que le Gouvernement d 'Angora accepte le transfert a un groupe francais de la concession de la section lio/anti-Xisibin du Chemin de fer de Bagdad it nc precise pas, comme le fait 1 'article 201 de l'Accord d 'Angora, loin d'etre une violation des stipulations de l'Ariangement tripartite, n'en oonatitue, en r. alite, qu'une application anticipee. Quant a l'utilisation militaire de la ligne, elle a principalement pour but le maintien de l'ordre dans les parties eloignees de toute communication, mais il serait inconcevable que la voie ferree puisse etre utilisee contre l'Angleterre. En effet, le chemin de fer passe pd mandat svri.-n depuis Maidam-Ekbes juaqu'a Chobanbeg et le Gouvernement francais s. rait par consequent en mesure d .ureter les transput: araissaisnt impliquer la possibility d'un.- menace militaire contre la frontiere de Mesopotamia Sur ce point, le Gouvernement francais tient a donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesty 1 'assurance la plus formelle qu'en in cas il ne pourrait enviaager l'hvpothese d'une facility quel- que donnee par lui a des desseins hostiles dirig^s contre un ltoire de mandat britannique. Les liens etroits qui unissent I'Empire britannique et l'idee que le Gouvernement 14 francais se fait de ses devoirs, en tant que membre de la Society de Nations et Puissance mandataire, suffisent a faire ^carter semblable preoccupation. En cas de conflit arme, les lois de la neutrality feraient meme- au Gouvernement francais 1 'obligation d'interdire aux transports- turcs l'utilisation du territoire syrien et la voie ferree au dela de Chobanbeg, coupee du reste de la Turquie, perdrait toute valeur pratique. La lettre adressee par Youssouf Kemal et qui accompagne lu texte de l'accord a egalement fait l'objet d'observations du Gouvernement britannique. Votre Seigneurie a marque le regret que ladite lettre paraisse e^ablir un rapport entre des promesses de concessions et le voeu exprime, dans ce document, qu'en raison des relations anciennes des deux " nations," les questions ayant trait a l'independance et a la souverainete de la Turquie seraient examinees par la France dans un esprit de cordialite. Le Gouvernement de la Kepublique tient a donner 1 'assurance qu'il ne recherche en Turquie aucun avantage exclusif, ni dans l'ordre politique, ni dans l'ordre economique. II ne s'est en rien departi des principes g^neraux du Traite de Sevres et de 1 'Accord tripartite. II a reserve avec le plus grand soin toutes les questions ayant trait a la paix avec la Turquie, qui est et doit rester une oeuvre interalliee. Les promesses de concessions visees dans la lettre de Youssouf Kemal ne sont la contrepartie d'aucun engagement secret, ecrit ou verbal, que M. Franklin-Bouillon aurait pris touchant les questions- qui doivent etre r^glees d'accord entre les Allies et notamment les revendications turques sur Smyrne et la Thrace. M. Franklin - Bouillon n'a eu et n 'aurait d'ailleurs accepte aucune conversation sur des questions territoriales autres que celles impliquees par l'evacua- tion de la Cilicie. Le negociateur turc d 'Angora a si bien lui-meme compris cette situation qu'un proces-verbal special mentionne que les question* d'ordre general sont reservees pour etre traitees lors de la paix. Amsi il a reserve expressement pour la conclusion du Traite de Paix le reglement des questions relatives a la participation de la Syrie a la dette ottomane, a la liquidation des biens de l'Etat, de la Couronne et de l'Eukap, au regime des Capitulations et a toutes autre* consequences du changement de souverainete sur les pays a mandat. S'il exprime quelque desir au negociateur francais, il a bien soin de ne s'adresser qu'a lui en le priant de recommander sa demande au Gouvernement francais pour le moment ou sera n^gocie le Traite de Paix. Votre Seigneurie a exprime le desir de savoir si le Gouvernement- francais avait repondu ou se proposait de r^pondre a Youssouf Kemal. M. Franklin-Bouillon s'est borne a adresser a Youssouf Kemal un. accuse de reception de sa communication dans les termes du para- graphe premier en ajoutant ses remerciements des sentiments et des. voeux exprimes par le Ministre d 'Angora. Quant aux rumeurs relatives soit a la promesse faite a la France- d un monopole pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie, soit a l'eventualite d'un emprunt, soit encore a la fourniture de materiel de guerre, elles sont denudes de tout fondement. Les ^changes de vues, or aux ou ecrits, qui ont pu avoir lieu entre des personnalite* po.litiques et M. Franklin-Bouillon, n'ajoutent rien a la substance de l'accord, qui ne comporte aucun arrangement secret. Ce n'est point 15 suns une douloureuse surprise que le Gouvernement francais a vu mentionner dans un document officiel, meme en ajoutant qu'il n'y e^ait accorde aucune creauce, les bruits dun encouragement donne par la France a une agitation antibritannique en Mesopotamie. Les u lations eutre la France et la Grande-Bretagne sont hop intimes et amieales pour qu'il soit necessaire de dementir de semblables imputations. Si, abandonnant la discussion proprement juriuique. les deux Gouvernements elevent le debat, votre Seigneurie reconnaitra, d'une part, que le Gouvernement irancais ne pouvait prolonger ind^fini- ment les sacrifices de tout ordre qu'impliquait l'occupation de la Cilicie, alors que les forces alliees s'etaient retirees de nombre da regions saisies comme gages lors de l'armistice, et que, d 'autre part, eette intention avait et^ clairement et constamnieut manifested par la France, tant par l'organe de son Premier Ministre que par celui de ses repr^sentants diplomatiques. Bani pr&endre aueunement s'etre assure l'assentiment de l'Angleterre a ses desseins, la France pout legitimeinent soutenir qu'elle a averti son Allie dee necessity* dont elle devait tenir compte. Dans ces conditions, je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne maintienne pas les objections qu'il a elevees a premiere vue centre I 'Accord d 'Angora et veuille bien reconnaitre que la France a tout fait pour concilier le maintien de ses obligations itractuellea et le souci des interets de >e> Allies et de ses devoirs -ihumanite avec la necessite ou s'est trouve le Gouvernement de la I'liblique de se liberer d'une charge que l'opinion publique considerait comme intolerable. Le Gouverneiutiit francaii ue fuse, d'ailleurs, pu- admettre que, lors de la conclusion de la paix. lea different* accords _ cies jusqu'a ce jour, Traits de Sevres, Accord tripartite, Arrangements pour la Liberation des Prisouniers, Accord d'Angora) soient ajust^s pour prendre place dans le reglement general. Veuillez agr^er, &c. L. de MONTILLE. (Translation.) Lord, November 17, 1921. FOLLOWING on the conversation which your Lordship held with M. de Saint-Aulaire in regard to the agreement reached between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government, your Lordship was good enough to address, on the 5th instant, to the Ambassador of the Republic, a letter drawing attention to the various points on which the agreement in question seems to the British Government to go beyond an arrangement of a purely local character (" tractation locale ") as defined by M. Briand, and to reserve special and particular advantages for France. I hastened to bring this letter to the notice of my Government, which, having examined it with the greatest care and in the most friendly spirit, has requested me to communicate to your Lordship the observations which its consideration has suggested. The French Government has no doubt but that the clear and precise character of this explanation will remove the impression which would appear, from your Lordship's letter, to have been formed, and which can only be due to a misunderstanding. In the first place, the French Government is glad to see that His Majesty's Government have clearly understood the nature of the- 16 two missions with which M. Franklin-Bouillon was entrusted, missions of which your Lordship was informed from the moment when they were first decided on. M, Franklin-Bouillon "s first journey was undertaken on his own suggestion and in an entirely private and personal capacity; the French Government gladly availed itself of this opportunity to obtain information in regard to the policy of the Angora Government and the possibilities of putting an end to the hostilities, of which France was bearing the whole brunt in Cilicia, at a moment when the nation and the Chamber had vigorously expressed, their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed and to expenditure which it was particularly difficult to bear. The President of the Council considered that M. Franklin- Bouillon was fully qualified to undertake such an enquiry, in view of the fact that he was a former member of the Government, in view of his deep knowledge of Eastern affairs, and of the guarantees offered by his experience and activity. Your Lordship will recognise that there was nothing in this programme of enquiry, to which I have just referred, which was contrary to the assurances given by M. Briand, to the effect that France neither had contracted nor would contract any engagement in regard to the general questions of peace between the Allies and Turkey without being in close agreement with the former, and particularly with the British Government. As regards M. Franklin-Bouillon's second mission, of the official character of which your Lordship was informed, that mission fell no less within the scope indicated by M. Briand than the first. Leaving wholly on one side the problems of a general peace, it was strictly limited to the negotiation of those questions referred to by your Lordship yourself in 3-our letter of the 5th November, that is, the liberation of French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and questions which arose as necessary corollaries of the evacuation of Cilicia by our troops. The French Government has instructed me to renew the assurance that it has always reserved the question of peace with Turkey, and that it has never contemplated that any engagement could be entered into on this subject excepting in close agreement with its Allies and particularly with the British Government. Explicit assurances on this point have already been given to the British Government on the 14th July, 1921, and I have been directed categorically to repeat them. The French Government repeats these assurances all the more willingly since it has found in the British Government the same spirit of complete collaboration during the conversations which have recently taken place in London between your Lordship and the Greek Ministers with a view to reach a satisfactory settlement in the Near East. The Government of the Republic cannot but express its satisfaction in recognising the absolute identity of principles which is thus shown to exist between the two Governments. Tli is full agreement on the principles which govern the conduct of the two Governments renders it all the easier for the French Govern- ment to dissipate all misunderstanding, both in regard to the scope of the Angora Agreement and in regard to the motives which have led France to approve it. Tt is true that the British Government have drawn the attention of the French Government to the disadvantages oi a direct agreement 17 between France and the Government of Angora. On the 4th April, in the course of a visit of the British Ambassador to uie Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Lord Hardinge was reminded that in March 1921 M. Briand had declared on several occasions to Mr. Lloyd George, without the British Prime Minister making the slightest observation, that he would not leave England without having concluded an agree- ment with the Angora delegation. M. Briand had pointed out that neither the Chamber nor French public opinion would agree to the prolongation of hostilities, involving as they did losses which were both heavy and useless, since the Treaty of Sevres sanctions the evacuation of Cilicia, and since the slight concessions made in regard to the northern frontier of the Syrian mandate, in accordance with that principle of nationality which has dominated the whole peace settlement, are not to the disadvantage of any ol the Allies, while, at tlie same time, being of a nature calculated to facilitate a general settlement. It was at the same time clearly explained to Lord Hardinge that M. Briand had also stated to Mr. Lloyd George that he would only sign such an agreement at the last moment, and after it had been proved impossible to reach a general settlement of the Eastern question in London. It was in the course of this interview- that, as early as the 4th April last, the British Ambassador received the text ot the agreement in question. These declarations were renewed to your Lordship by M. de Saint-Aulaire on the I9fch April last, when you were so good as to discuss this question with the representative of the Republic. The French Government was justified in believing that the explanation given by the French Ambassador had reassured the British Govern- ment, since your Lordship went no further with the despatch of the note which you had informed M. de Saint-Aulaire you would send him on this subject. Since that date, indeed, the French Government has continually announced, particularly in its letter of the 14th July last to the British Ambassador in Paii^. it- desire to put an end to the hostilities which were being carried on on the borders of the Syrian mandate, as soon as it could obtain the acceptance of definite provisions assuring the protection of the minorities and especially of tlie Armenians. It was in these oircumsi and at a time when the Allies- had long withdrawn their troops from the various points of the Ottoman Empire, the military occupation of which had taken place I consequence of the armistice, that the French Government. considered, after having informed its Allies of its intentions, and while carefully reserving the solution of all the general questions which must be decided jointly by the Allies, that it had the right to embark on a course which its partners had already followed, and in making use of such means as events forced upon it. His Majesty's ernment will in fact recognise that, if the withdrawal of His M.i]. -t \ - forces from the frontiers of Mesopotamia and the removal of Allied military control over the Anatolian railways was able to be cairied nut without any agreement with the Angora Government, which at that time had no power of attack, a similar course could not be pursued on the frontiers of Syria, for, on the one hand, the innalist forces have since then considerably developed, and on the other. Syria is not, like Mesopotamia, protected by distance. No one can doubt that France only had a choice between the two* following alternatives: [7447] C 18 Either to maintain her effectives and to continue the war in Cilicia, or To negotiate with the de facto authority which was in command of the Turkish troops in this region. The will of the French nation manifesting itself clearly, strongly and constantly in favour of evacuation, the French Government was obliged to attempt the conclusion of a local arrangement which, more- over, conforms in its fundamental provisions, with the arrangement of which the text was communicated to the British Government on the 4th April, 1921. Having thus described in detail the general tendencies which prompted the action taken by the French Government, I have the honour to give your Lordship the following explanations regarding particular points mentioned in your Lordship's letter of the 5th November. The words " cessation of the state of war," which appear in article 1, seem to His Majesty's Government to be unsuitable terms in which to define a local armistice. Your Lordship considers, further- more, that the provisional character of the arrangement arrived at should have been mentioned, whereas the terms actually used, on the contrary, give the agreement the appearance of a regular treaty of peace. As the Director of Political Affairs has already pointed out verbally to Lord Hardinge, the Angora Agreement does not constitute a treaty of peace. It is only an arrangement of local significance concluded with a Power which is neither recognised de jure nor de facto, but which has manifested a degree of authority, patriotism and loyalty, such as to warrant the opinion that it is capable of keeping and executing the obligations which it has assumed. Generally speaking, if the Angora Agreement had constituted a treaty of peace, it should, according to the Constitution, have been submitted to Parliament for ratification. As it is, it has simply been approved by the French Government and no parliamentary ratification has been asked for. The French Government, on the other hand, considers that the use of the expressions " armistice " and " provisional arrangement " would have involved the risk of alarming the populations by making them fear a resumption of hostilities. As regards the term " high contracting parties," its value is only one of usage and traditional courtesy. Moreover, it already figures in the London Agreement, and the British Government have hitherto raised no objection to it. It is scarcely necessary to add that the use of these expressions by no means implies, in international law, the de jure recognition of a new State or Government. The British Government consider that article 3 of the Angora arrangement does not take into account the obligations assumed by France under article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement. According to the interpretation which your Lordship puts upon article 8, France has undertaken not to withdraw her troops from her zone of special interests until after she is assured of the execution of the guarantees for the safety of the minorities. The French Government considers that article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 18th August, 1920, was drawn up, not with the object of obliging us to remain in Cilicia, but, on the contrary, with the intention of limiting our occupation. It stands to reason that the 10 French Government would never have consented to undertake an indefinite occupation and to bear its cost. The French Government has. moreover, on various occasions, as T have pointed out above, drawn the attention of the British Govern- ment to the fact that it was obliged to put an end to the abnormal situation which was being prolonged by the hostilities on the Syrian frontier, at a time when hostilities had ceased between the other Allies and Turkey without rendering it possible to consider that a state of peace had thereby been established. Furthermore, the Trench Government desires to make a general observation as to the validity of the Tripartite Agreement upon which the juridical arguments m your Lordship's letter of the 5th November arc principally founded. The French Government would in no case consider itself authorised to enter into any compromise regarding the rights accorded by this agreement to either of her Allies, Great Britain or Italy, but it considers that it has all the more reason to renounce the advantages accorded to it, because this agreement has not been ratified, and because the Treaty of Sevres must, as has been stated quite recently by Lord Curzon to the Greek Ministers in London, undergo certain modifications. It cannot, then, be con- sidered as having the force of an operative treaty. in. in the Turkish territory, both within and outside the zones from which Allied troops have been withdrawn, it had not been possible hitherto to obtain an\ guarantees in favour of minorities. France, on the contrary, has exprcssk made any eventual withdrawal of her troops from Cilicia subject to the engagement entered into by the Angora Government that it will assure the protection of minorities, and to the effective adoption of the necessary measures. His Majesty's Government regret that by article 6 France should have admitted, for the protection of the minorities, guarantees which differ from those which the Treaty of Sevres provided, and that by failing to limit these provisions specially to Cilicia, the French Government should have appeared to meet one of the claims of the Angora Government in a matter <<\ great importance and of general bearing, whereas a matter of this kind should, by its nature, form the subject of an Inter-Allied agreement and be reserved for negotiations > a general p- Prance cannot, without injustice, be reproached with having failed to secure the acceptance of the guarantees for the protection of the Cflfoian minorities, which the pressure of the aggregate strength of the Allies has been unable to exact from Turkey. The withdraw,* of French troops being a necessity, the Government of the Republr: considered that its desire not to depart from the terms of the signed, but unratified, Treaty of Sevres, could not be pushed to the point of leaving the minorities without any protection, and that an obligation of humanity obliged it to secure for the minorities at least the guarantees contained in the treaties which have been imposed by the Entente upon Hungary and Bulgaria. As regards your Lordship's regret that these latter guarantees might be considered as applying not only to Cilicia but to other parts of Turkey also, the French Government considers that the entire A: j reement is dominated by the idea that it is only a question of an arrangement of local importan Furthermore, no reproach should be made to the French Govern- ment on the ground that it has extended its obligations, not in its [7447] C 2 20 own interests, but in the interests of the Anatolian populations, who at the moment are still deprived of every kind of protection. Over and above the guarantees formally specified in the agreement, I may add that M. Franklin-Bouillon agreed with the Angora Govern- ment that he should himself supervise the conditions of the evacua- tion of the territory and of the establishment of the new authorities. In this duty he will be assisted by three special delegates of the French Government, who will reside at Adana, Mersina and Aintab. The administrative system for the district of Alexandretta contemplated in article 7 does not conflict with the system contem- plated for the mandate, which is to take into account the extreme diversity of races in Syria. It harmonises with the general organisa- tion of countries under French mandate, and this organisation already allows a large measure of administrative autonomy to the different racial elements. Article 7 of the Angora Agreement, more- over, does not confer on Turkey any political or economic right, and only contemplates the use of Turkish concurrently with Arabic and French because the great majority of the population speak Turkish. The frontier rectification contemplated in article 8 appears to- your Lordship to affect not only the French Government, but also- the Allied Governments, since the territories taken from Turkey constitute the gage of the common victory. Your Lordship considers that the territorial modification of the Syrian mandate does not take into account the obligations of France towards the League of Nations, while the retrocession, without previous notice being given to Great Britain and Italy, of the territories which Turkey had aban- doned to the Allies, is incompatible with both the spirit and the letter of the treaty which bears the signature of the three Powers. This situation appears to your Lordship to be all the more regrettable because, as the frontier is to he fixed within a month of the signa- ture of the agreement, the Turco-Syrian frontier will be decided before all the other Turkish frontiers, which are to be delimited by the Treaty of Sevres. The French Government must first point out that upon the morrow of the armistice the Allies effected other occupations and took measures of military control in Turkey, which equally consti- tuted gages of importance, and yet it has been impossible to main- tain in their integrity either these occupations or these measures of control. The districts under the Syrian mandate dealt with in article 8 are, moreover, not properly Arab territory, but rather a country of migrations without precise limits, without sedentary population, and where not Arabs but Kurds predominate. Finally, there would appear to be some exaggeration in reproaching France with giving up a relatively insignificant fraction of the occupied Turkish territory at a time when, more than three years after the armistice, she is still bearing the losses and the cost of maintenance of an army of nearly 100,000 men on the frontiers of Syria, while in the other parts of Turkey where iUlied troops were stationed effectives have been progressively reduced to a few battalions. The maintenance of such numerous contingents has been the result hitherto, not of the difficulties of keeping order in Syria, but rather of the necessity of being in a position to face an eventual Turkish threat against Cilicia. The end of this danger will enable the French Government no doubt, in a very short time, to make a considerable reduction ir ' t> " French forces in the East. 21 It is well to add that our Allies have for a long time been aware of the obligation under which we were to abandon certain portions of the Syrian mandated territory in order to secure the evacuation of Oilieia. As regards the territories lying between the Euphrates and the Tigris which, for thai matter, have never been occupied by the Allied forces, the communication made to Lord Hardinge on the 4th April of the agreement concluded at London between M. Briand and Bekir Samj at any rate amounted to a precise indication of the intention of the French Government to give up the occupation of these territories. With regard to the reproach that we have given up this territory as the result oi an agre ment, it is right to repeat that the present situation ig wry different from that of which the Powers might have previously profited. The Turkish forces have developed consider- ably. The Angora Government now possesses armies of an offensive value which it had not previously. As -non as the evacuation of Cilicia was decided upon, it became impossible to avoid the necessity for making an agreement, and it would have been inconceivable that such an agreement Bhould I d at without certain concessions on both sides. The French Government is convince. I that in this respect it has _ , i\en the Leagu of Nations no ground for complaint. Moreover, the argument about mandates can for many reasons not be maintained. The mandates have not yet been ratified by the League of Nations, and their terms are still under discussion. The Treaty ol Sevres has not come into force. The British Government even admit that it must be modified. The frontiers which it has fixed are therefore not unalterable. France, the mandatory for' Syria, is alone entitled to deal with the interests ot the Syrian population in their unavoidable relations with the Turkish popula- tion beyond the frontier. Tb i by your Lordship regarding article '. which deals with tbe tomb of Sultan Suleiman, appears to be based upon an interpretation which the Freneh Government desires to correct. Tbe matter at issue is not a question of sovereignty, but rather a right oi property which has been recognised for sentimental reasons. Article 10 merelv establishes the fact that the Angora Govern- ment accept- tb transfer oi the concession of the Bosanti Nisibin lion of the Bagdad Railway to a French -roup, and does imi -tate, as does article '2 ( M of the Treaty of Sevres, that the Government " will transfer " tbe said concession. Thus the procedure contem- plated by article 2*M of the Treaty of Bevi served, and the ingora Agreement constjjtutes no obstacle to its application. As regards th basis of the arrangement made between the Allies arding railways under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, and particularly paragraph 2 of that article, the British Government will be so good as to note that the French Government desires to confirm the fact that this arrangement is in no Bense modified, nor is the distribution between France, Great Britain and Italy of the whole Bagdad Railway. Tbe Treaty of Sevres provided for the disposal of the Bagdad Railway up to the River Jeihun only. If this treaty bad come into fore.-, the railwav east of tbe Jeihun would have been in the heart of Syria, and, in view of this, it would have had to be liquidated, in accordance with the Treaty of Sevres, by the mandatory Power acting alone. Tbe transfer of this -ection to a French company, in 22 accordance with the Angora Agreement, leaves our position unaltered, while leaving the railway in Turkish territory. It is true that this argument cannot be applied to the section of the line which runs between the Cilician Gates and the Jeihun. There would therefore appear to be a certain justification for the protest against an immediate transfer to a French company of this section which, according to the terms of the Tripartite Agreement, was to be exploited jointly as an Anglo-Franco-Italian undertaking. But in reality paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement expressly contemplates the transfer to us of this section as representing the French interests which existed in the Bagdad Railway before 1914. Thus article 10 of the Angora Agreement, far from being a violation of the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement, does not in reality amount to more than application of them in advance. As regards the use of the line for military purposes, its principal object is the maintenance of order in the districts far removed from ail means of communication ; but it would be inconceivable that the railway could be used against Great Britain. The railway, in fact, passes over Syrian mandated territory from Maidan Ekbez as far as. Choban Bey, and the French Government would therefore be in a position to put a stop to any transport which might seem to imply the possibility of a military threat against the frontier of Mesopotamia. On this point, the French Government is anxious to give to His Majesty's Government the most formal assurance that it could in no case contemplate the possibility of any sort of facilities being given by it to hostile designs directed against any territory under a British mandate. The close ties which unite France and the British Empire, and the French Government's conception of its duties, both as a member of the League of Nations and as a mandatory Power, are sufficient to dispel any such fears. In the event of an armed conflict, the laws of neutrality would. ki fact, impose on the French Government the obligation to prohibit the use of Syrian territory by Turkish transport, and the railway beyond Choban Bey, cut off from the rest of Turkey, woidd lose all practical value. The letter from Youssouf Kemal, which accompanied the text of the agreement, has also formed the subject of comment on the part of the British Government. Your Lordship has expressed regret that, this letter would appear to establish a connection between promises- of concessions and the wish, expressed in the same letter, that in view of the ancient relations existing between the two "nations," questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey should be examined by France in a friendly spirit. The Government of the Republic desires to give the assurance that it seeks in Turkey no exclusive advantages, either political or economic. It has not departed in this matter in the slightest degree from the general principles of the Treaty of Sevres and of the Tripartite Agreement. It has taken the greatest care to reserve all' questions relating to peace with Turkey, which is and must remain an inter-Allied matter. The promises of concessions indicated in Youssouf Kemal 's letter are not connected with any secret engage- ment, either written or verbal, entered into b\^ M. Franklin-Bouillon , in regard to questions which must be decided by agreement between the Allies, and particularly in regard to the Turkish claims to Smyrna 23 and Thrace. M. Franklin-Bouillon, indeed, has neither discussed nor would have agreed to discuss, any territorial questions other than those involved in the evacuation of Cilicia. The Turkish negotiator at Angora has himself so clearly under- stood this situation that it is stated in a special minute that question*! of a general nature are reserved to be discussed when peace is made. Thus he specifically reserved, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, any settlement of the questions connected with the partieipa- tion of Syria in the Ottoman debt, with the liquidation of property of tie State, of the ( town and of the Wakf, with the ( 'apitulatory regime, or with any other matters following on the change ol sove reign ty in the mandated territories. If he expressed a desire to the French negotiator, lie was careful to limit himself to begging him to arcomroend his request to the consideration of the French Govern- ment at such time as the Treaty of Peace may be negotiated. Your Lordship has expressed the desire to know whether the 1 nch Government had replied or proposed to reply to Youssouf Kemal. M. Franklin-Bouillon confined himself to addressing to Youssouf Kemal an acknowledgment of the receipt of his communi- cation in the terms of the first paragraph, adding his thanks for the* sentiments and wishes expressed !>\ the togora Minister. As to the reports regarding on the one hand a promise made to France of a monopoly over the organisation of the gendarmerie, and on the other the possibility of a loan, or again, the supply of war material, they are devoid of all foundation. The exchanges of views, whether verbal or written, which may have taken place between certain political personages and M. Franklin-Bouillon, add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which carries with it no secret arrangement. It is, in fact, not without painful surprise that the nch Government has serin mention in an official document, even though it was added that no credence was attached to them, of rumours of encouragement alleged to have been given by France to anti-British agitation in Mesopotamia. The relations between France and Great Britain are too close and too friendly for it to be necessary my such imputations. If, putting aside the purely legal aspect of this question, the two Governments look at the matter from a higher point of view, your Lordship will recognise on the one hand that the French Govern- ment could not prolong indefinite ly the sacrifices of every kind which the occupation of Cilicia involved, at a time when the Allied forces , withdrawn from numerous districts seized as guarantees at the time of the Armistice, and, on the other hand, that the intentions nch Government in this matter had been clearly and fiequently declared by France, both through her Prime Minister and through her diplomatic representatives. Without claiming in any sense to have assured herself of England's agreement to her plans, France can legitimately maintain that she warned her Ally of the it is which she had to take into account. In these circumstances, I have no doubt that His Majesty'; Government will not adhere to the objections which they raised at first sight to the Angora Agreement, but will recognise that France hafl done everything in her power to reconcile the maintenance of her legal obligations, the care of the interests of her Allies, and her duties from the humanitarian point of view, with the necessity with which the Government of the Republic was faced of freeing itself from a burden which public opinion regarded as insupportable. 24 The French Government, however, is not unwilling to admit that when peace is concluded, the different agreements which have been negotiated hitherto (Treaty of Sevres, Tripartite Agreement, arrange- ments for the liberation of prisoners, and the Angora Agreement), shall be adjusted in such a way as to take their place in the general settlement. I avail, &c. L. de MONTILLE. No. 3. The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. de Montille. Sir, Foreign Office, November 25, 1921. His Majesty's Government have considered with the utmost care and attention the note which you addressed to me on tLt 17th November regarding the agreement negotiated by M. Franklin Bouillon at Angora. They have observed with satisfaction the detailed character of the reply which the French Government has returned to my note of the 5th November, and they desire to reciprocate the conciliatory tone in which that reply has been couched. If further observations are required it can only be with the object of removing still outstanding misconceptions, and of passing, if it may be, from the sphere of a common understanding to that of common action. 2. It gives pleasure to His Majesty's Government to take note of the emphatic assurances contained in the reply of the French Government with regard to the scope and consequences of the Angora Agreement as understood by its signatories. These assurances are so important, and it is so essential that no doubts as to their nature should exist between our two Governments, that it appears desirable to summarise them as they are deduced from your note as follows: (1.) The agreement is not a treaty of peace, and implies no recognition de jure or de facto of the Government of Angora. (2.) The agreement is of purely local scope, and is " dominated " by that idea. The French Government, as hitherto, reserves the question of peace with Turkey and has never contemplated any engagement in that direction without a close agreement with the Allies and especially with Great Britain. In particular, the rights of Italy and Great Britain recognised in the Tripartite Agreement are not in any way touched by the Angora Agreement. (3.) No facilities will be given by France for hostile designs against a territory under the British mandate ; and in particular, in the case of armed conflict, France, as a neutral, would not permit the transfer of Turkish troops across Syrian territory under article 10 of the agreement. (4.) No reply beyond a formal acknowledgment was returned by M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal's letter of the 10th October, and that letter the official publication of which in these circumstances it seems somewhat difficult to understand was not the counterpart of any secret understanding written or oral with M. Franklin-Bouillon >Z5 on matters which must be settled in agreement between the Allies, and especially the question of Thrace and Smyrna. M. Franklin-Bouillon held and would have consented to hold no conversation on territorial questions other than those implied in the evacuation of Cilicia. As proof of this, mention is made of a proces-verbal of questions reserved by the Kemalist negotiator at Angora. (;").) Tin- rumours as to the French monopoly for gendarmerie organisation, a French loan, the supply of French war material to the Kemalists, and in particular as to the encouragement of an anti-British agitation in Mesopotamia are baseless, and the views exchanged orally and in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangement. (6.) The French Government admits the principle of adjusting in the final treaty of peace the different agreements negotiated: Treaty of Sevres, Tripartite Agreement, ements for the liberation of prisoners, and the Angora Agreement. " .".. Confidently believing that this summary accurately represents the views and intention- ot the French Government, His Majesty's Government express their sincere gratification at the full and frank nature of tb.se assurances, and thej cordially recognise the spirit of amity and goodwill in which they have been offered. If I now draw attention to certain points on which His Majesty's Government have found and still find some difficulty in reconciling these assurances, and the detailed arguments DJ which they are supported, with the actual text of the agreement of the 20th October, this is due to a de-ire. not to prolong controversy, but to remove any misgivings thai may still survive, and which might become a source of con- ceivable misunderstanding in the future. I. I will deal first with a question with which British public opinion, and, indeed, the sentiment of the civilised world, is profoundly concerned namely, the protection of the non-Turkish minorities in Cilicia. Whatever \ ie\v max be taken of the precise validity of the Tripartite Agreement and the underlying intention of article 6, the French Government will hardly dispute that that incut represented not only a definite pledge on the part of France towards her other Allies to undertake in Cilicia the common Allied task of protecting the minorities of Turkey, but also the immediate assumption of a definite responsibility towards those minorities themselves, who bad been admittedly encouraged by the continued Allied occupation of Cilicia and by the published terms of the Tripartite Agreement to return there. 5. The French Government will readily understand, therefore, the apprehensions felt by His Majesty's Covernment at finding in the agreement no guarantees for the safety of these people beyond the amnesty of article 5 and the general declaration of the Kemalist Government, as to the minority rights in article 6. 1 need hardly remind you that while Part IV of the Treaty of Sevres provides a ire of restitution for the serious injuries inflicted upon the minorities since the 1st August, HU4, and for the renewal of those necessary privileges accorded to them by the Turkish Government throughout Turkey before the war, no counterpart to these provisions in the minority treaties concluded with the European 26 countries. Yet it is only the guarantees afforded by the latter treaties which the Kemalist Government in article 6 of the present agreement have declared themselves ready to offer. In fact, the value of this article and of article 5 depends exclusively on that loyalty of the Kemalist Government " to keep and execute engage- ments " as to which sanguine views are expressed by the French Government in your note. His Majesty's Government in the light both of past history and of recent events find it difficult at present to share those views, and the}' would fain hope that in any final treaty of peace the Allies may insist upon obtaining Turkish assent to the fuller safeguards of the Treaty of Sevres. In tlie meantime, however, the grave responsibility of withdrawing the protection of her troops has been taken by France, and the presence of a limited number of special French representatives in Cilicia during and after the evacuation is the sole additional guarantee that has been provided for the security of the jeopardised sections of the population. His Majesty's Government, while convinced that the French Govern- ment will lend its utmost efforts to the safeguarding of their interests, cannot conceal the fact that they regard the situation with no small anxiety. 6. There is another feature of the agreement, namely, the format revision of the northern frontier of Syria, provided for by article 8 of the Angora Agreement, as to which it is necessary to say some- thing. I do not wish to dwell here upon the extent of the surrendered territory, although this is far from inconsiderable, nor upon the danger that the normal number of its. inhabitants may have been swollen since the armistice by an influx of Christian refugees; but His Majesty's Government cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad railway to Turkey, or of the transfer to that Power of the " localities of Jeziret-ibn-Omar and Nisibin. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, the latter transfer has never been contemplated up to this date, and no attempt has been made to ascertain their views upon it. For the rest, while they readily accept the French Government's assurance of their determination that no movement of Turkish troops over the Syrian portion of the Bagdad line with hostile intention against Irak shall be permitted. the\ apprehend, nevertheless, that article 10 of the agreement as it now stands may be found to preclude the French Government from arresting such movements in time of peace, whatever their ultimate object might prove to be. 7. Thirdly, the misgivings expressed by His Majesty's Govern- ment at certain features of article 10 have not been altogether dispelled by your explanations. Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French company in advance and therefore possibly to the prejudice of the reciprocal Allied arrange-, ments contemplated by article 294 of the Treaty of Sevres and article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, it is necessary to point out that these stretches of the railway which were previously in Syria but are now surrendered to Turkey, although placed in the French zone of economic interest, ought naturally to fall to be divided among the Allies in accordance with the above-mentioned articles of the Tripartite Agreement and the Treaty of Sevres, and accordingly it is not relevant to claim that, had they remained in Syria, they could, by article 293 of the treaty, have been liquidated by the French Government as- 27 mandatory for Syria. Nor does the transfer to a French company of that part of the railway which still remains in Syria in itself fulfil the provisions of article 29.'5 of the Treaty of Sevres, which stipulates for liquidation by the mandatory and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial Commission as an Allied asset. 8. There remain a number of subsidiary q ues ti o ns concerning which I am most reluctant to pursue a controversy that can only div.it our two Governments from larger and more important issues, and which are mentioned here solely with the object of correcting certain errors of fact. These questions relate, firstly, to the two missions of M. Franklin-Bouillon, concerning which the French niiifiit is mistaken in thinking that H i-> Majesty's Government fully informed either by the French Government or by M. Franklin-Bouillon himself, and secondly, to the explanations alleged to have been given to the British Government concerning the abortive agreement concluded by M. Briand with Bekir Sami Bey. ili- Majesty's Government had no certain knowledge of the terms or even the general character of this agreement until they were pre- 1 with the text. A> soon as this had been received I stated very fully and explicitly the objections entertained by His Majesty's Government in a conversation with the Count de Saint-Aulaire on the 10th April last; and these objections (which I gave no undertakings to record or repeat in a note) were only not pursued because it was a ri atter of public knowledge that the Angora Government had already declined to accept the agreement. 9. In the concluding paragraph of the note under replj the French Government admits that when peace is finally concluded the different tnente which have been negotiated up to date, including the i Agreement, will require to be adjusted with a view to taking their place in a general settlement. On this understanding it appears to be no longer necessary for me explicitly t<> reserve the attitude of H ~ Majesty's Government with regard to the Angora Agreement in il. These subjects will come up again for discussion later on, and more especially will this he the case with regard to those articles of the agreement, such as articles <>. ,s and 1<>. which appear to irfringe the provisions of the Treat \ of Sevres and the Tripartite ement. 10. Of greater importance is it to turn to the question of that larger settlement which both Governments must continually hold in Slew and the prolonged postponement of which is a source of ever- pr wing injury to all the parties concerned. 11. I have already acquainted the French Government with the i -toi\ results of the conversations which I have held with the Greek Ministers in London. The acceptance by the Greek Govern- ment without reservations of Allied mediation of which the French oment has already been informed, is the first and necessary towards some general Allied intervention. The French Govern- will readily appreciate, however, that if Stieh intervention is to be made at an early date with reasonable hopes of success, both com- batantfl in the present struggle must be made clearly to understand ; the three Allies are loyally united and firmly agreed upon the - of their mediation and the manner in which it is to he put for- It is this paramount consideration which renders particularly gratifying to me those passages in your note which indicate the tance which the French Government attaches to Franco-British 28 co-operation in the Near East, and in which, acknowledging the spirrt of " complete collaboration " which characterised my conversations with the Greek Ministers, it expresses its satisfaction at " the perfect identity of principles " existing between the two Governments. His Majesty's Government, for their part, are convinced that it is only on the basis of such a collaboration, bearing fruit in acts rather than in words, that a speedy, just and general settlement in Turkey essential alike for the prosperity of Europe and Asia can be secured. 12. In the firm hope that the identity of principles, which His Majesty's Government have always felt to underlie the Eastern policy of the Great Allied Powers, may at no distant date be trans- lated into identic action, I reserve for another communication the proposals which, on behalf of the British Government, I am prepared to make I have, &c. QUEZON OF KEDLESTON. No. 4. M. de Montille to the Marquess Cuizou of Kedleston. [Received December 7.) Ambassade de France, M. le Marquis, Londres. \e 6 decembrc 1921. J'.-u transmis a moil Gouvernement la lettre que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'adresser, le 25 novembre dernier, au sujet de l'accord negocie par M. Franklin-Bouillon a Angora. Je suis charge de marquer a votre Seigneurie combien le Gou- vernement de la Republique a ete heureux de eonstater que le Gou- vernement de Sa Majeste britannique appreciait le sentiment dans lequel il suivait cette affaire et etait resolu a la traiter dans le meme esprit. Comme votre Seigneurie, M. le President du Conseil est convaincu que la continuation d'echanges de vues entre les deux Cabinets sur ce sujet ne peut avoir d 'autre fin que de prevenir la possibility de tout malentendu et de rendre plus facile, par une -entente commune, une action commune que le Gouvernement francais souhaiterait voir e^endre au reglement de tous les problemes qui interessent les deux pays allies. J'ai pour instructions de faire savoir a votre Seigneurie que le resume, fait dans sa lettre, des assurances que j'avais ete invite a formuler est l'exacte expression des vues et des intentions de la France. II me sera seukanent permis, a propos du paragraphe 1 de ce resume, de remarquer que si l'Accord d'Angora n'implique aucune reconnaissance de jure ou de facto du Gouvernement d'Angora, ce Gouvernement avait e^e traite comme un Gouvernement de fait par les Allies, a cote du Gouvernement de droit de Constantinople, lorsqu'ils admirent aux Conferences de Londres ses representants sur un pied d'egalite avec ceux du Gouvernement de Constantinople, qui d'ailleurs laisserent constamment la parole aux representants du Gouvernement d 'Angora . Apres avoir bien voulu marquer sa sincere reconnaissance pour le caractere des assurances donnees et cordialement reconnu 1 'esprit d'amitie et de bonne volonte dont s'est inspire nion Gouvernement ^n les exprimant, votre Seigneurie attire mon attention sur certains 29 points qui lui paraissent comporter encore quelques edaircissements 'tiennes, par l'article 6 de ('Accord d 'Angora, dont I'applicatloo ne peut qu'etre strictement limitee a la Cilicie eVacuee, 'les garanties qui m- sunt pas sans valeur, surtout si Ton songs a la situation dans laquelle se trouvent actuelle- ln.tit les minorites chre'tiennes dans le reste >i the Treatj oi Sevres and article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. J beg to remind your Lordship that the Angora Agreement only admits of the preliminary " acceptance " of a transfer and reserves the application of the provisions <>f the Treaty of Peace and oi luiri-AUied arrangementa as to the authority which will make this transit r. ot the procedure to be followed, and of the agreements as to the division of the entire Bagdad Railway between France, England and Italy. As regards the Bozanti-Jeihun section, it is the intention of the French Government to urge no right other than that contained in article \ of the Tripartite Agreement; it considers, moreover, that article 10 ol the Angora Agreement does not deprive France, in so tar as the -ledum ESkbes and Choban Bej -Nisihin sections are con- cerned, "f an \ of the rights granted to it by the said article 4 and articles 293 to 296 of the Treaty ol Sevres. It also considers that the last paragraph <>f article 203, dealing with the payment to the Financial Commission oi the proceeds of the liquidation of railways, should be applied in its entirety. As regards the various " subsidiary questions " which did not, in your Lordship's opinion, appear to have sufficient importance to justify a continuation of the discussion. I shall confine myself, in accordance with your Lordship's suggestion, to observing that the objections which your Lordship made verbally to the Count de Saint- Aulaire and considered unnecessary to confirm by a note, appear to me to have been entirely removed by the assurances which I had the honour of giving to your Lordship, on the instructions of my Govern- ment, in m\ note oi the 17th November last. I trust that, alter the explanations which this Embassy has been instructed to furnish quite frankly in regard to the Angora Agree- ment, the Government oi His Britannic Majesty will be convinced that the Government oi the French Republic, in effecting an agree- ment which French public opinion was entitled to ask for, never lost sight oi the necessity far concluding as soon as possible and jointly with its Allies, a treaty re-establishing peace throughout the East. In consideration of the harm which would bo caused to all parties b\ any fresh delay in the conclusion of this urgently desired peace, m\ Government will make all possible efforts to collaborate in the suggested work ol mediation, a task which will be rendered all the lier by the agreement ol France, Great Britain and Italy, in regard both to the extent of this mediation and the methods by which it is to be brought about. Consequently the Government oi the Republic awaits with confidence the proposals alluded to at the end of your Excellency's note, deeming it. however, essential that Allied Intervention should be resorted to in circumstances which would admit of a tangible result being attained. I avail, &c. L. de MONTILLE. [7447] J) 34 No. 5. St. de Montille to the Marquess Gurzon of Kedleston. [Received December 14.) Ambassade de France, Londres, M. le Marquis, le 10 deccmbre 1921. 1'rknant acte des assurances donnees par mon Gouvernemriit , votre Seigneurie voulait bien noter au "paragraphs 5 de sa lettre du 25 novembre que " the views exchanged orally or in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrange- ment." Le Gouvernement francais, tenant a ce que le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste" recoive tout apaisement a cet egard, me charge de communiquer a votre Seigneurie les lettres et notes annexes echangees entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et les representants kema- listes, lettres et notes dont M. Brian d a, d'ailleurs, d6ja donne lecture h Lord Hardinge. Ces documents, qui se trouvent ci-joints, sont au nombre de onze. Comme votre Seigneurie pourra s'en assurer, ils n'ont pas le earactere d'avantages secrets modifiant 1 'Accord d'Angora. Le Gouvernement francais serait oblige au Gouvernement britan- nique de ne pas rendre ces textes publics sans s'etre au prealable mis d 'accord avec lui. Veuillez, &c. L. de MONTILLE. Enclosure 1 in No. 5. Note. Il a ete convenu entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Youssouf Kemal Bey que l'accord signe aujourd'hui n'entrera en vigueur qu'apres 1' approbation des deux Gouvernements, approbation qui devra etre donnee dans un d^lai de quinze jours au plus. Youssouf Kemal Bey declare en sa qualite de Ministre des Affaires etrangeres que l'appro- bation du Gouvernement francais entraine de piano celle de son Gouvernement. Fait a Angora, le 20 octobre 1921. FKANKLIN-BOUILLON. YOUSSOUF KEMAL. Enclosure 2 in No. 5. FoussO'u/ Kemal Bey to M. Franklin- Bouillon. Excellence, Angora, le 20 octobre 1921. Commk complement a l'accord signe ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, je suis heureux de declarer a votre Excellence que les oeuvres scolaires et hospitalieres francaises et les institutions d'assistance continueront a exister en Turquie, tant bien entendu que ces oeuvres et institutions ne pourront sous aucun pretexte ou dans aucun cas se livrer a une propagande ou une action quelconque contraires aux interests de la Turquie et aux lois turques. Veuillez, &c. YOUSSOUF KEMAL. 96 Enclosure .* in N*o. R, A o It' . Au moment de proeeder a la signature dfi 1' accord intervenu uujourd'hui entre le Gouvernement de la Grande Assembled nationale de Turquie et le Gouvernement de la liepublique francaise, l'0U88Oui Kemal Bey, le plenipotentiaire turc. a emis les considera- tions Buivantes, dont M. Franklin-Bouillon, plenipotentiaire francais, ;i bien voulu prendre note: Le plenipotentiaire turc tient a faire des reserves expresses en ce qui ooncerne le reglemenl des questions relatives a la participation M. Franklin- Bouillon. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1U21. As a corollary to the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, I am happy to inform you that the French educational and charitable institutions and relief organisations will continue to exist in Turkey, it heiug clearly understood that such institutions and organisations shall not under any pretext or in any circumstance lend themselves to propaganda or to any action whatsoever contrary to the interests of Turkey Of to Ottoman law. I have, Ac. YUSSOUF KEMAL. Enclosure 3 in No. 5. Note. 1\ signing the agreement arrived at to-day between the Govern- ment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Gov in ment of the French Republic. Yussouf Kemal Bey, the Turkish plenipotentiary, has advanced the following considerations, of which M Franklin-Bouillon, the French plenipotentiary, has taken note. The Turkish plenipotentiary wishes to make express reservations concerning the settlement of questions relating to the participation of Syria in the Ottoman Debt, in State, Crown and Wakf property, 40 and in all other matters arising out of the change in the legal status of that country, which settlement shall take place at the time of the conclusion of the general Treaty of Peace. As regards the districts of Alexandretta and Antioch, Yussouf Kcmal Bey declares that it is necessary that the inhabitants should be granted the right to adopt a special flag containing the Turkish flag as a part of its design. The French plenipotentiary, acknow- ledging the desirability of according such a privilege to the inhabi- tants of these districts, has promised to take the necessary steps to this end with his Government. As regards article 5, concerning the complete amnesty to he granted by the two contracting parties, the French plenipotentiary declares that he will recommend his Government to take the neces- sary measures in order that the inhabitants of the districts of Alexandretta and Antioch may benefit by this amnesty. With regard to article 10, the Turkish plenipotentiary declares as follows : i. The kilometric guarantee has hitherto, by virtue of the acts of concession of the Bagdad railway, been established on the basis of the gross receipts of the whole line ; it is essential to fix the kilo- metric guarantee pertaining to the Turkish Bozanti-Nisibin section, as in the past, on the basis of the gross receipts of the whole of the Bagdad line. The French plenipotentiary undertakes to call the attention of his Government. to the equity of this claim. 2. The plenipotentiaries of the two parties agree that the fixing of the tariff for Turkish military transport by railway in Syrian territory and the fixing of the tariff for Syrian transport by railway in Turkish territory will be reserved for subsequent examination. They have likewise recognised the necessity on both sides of giving adequate notice every time that either of the two countries desires to avail itself of the right specified in article 10, paragraph 2, of the Franco-Turkish Agreement. The Turkish plenipotentiary makes the following request, which the French plenipotentiary agrees to support with his Govern- ment : In the port of Alexandretta, Turkish nationals, Turkish goods and vessels under the Turkish flag should enjoy entire freedom of use of the port. They should, in this and in all respects, be treated on a footing of absolute equality with the inhabitants, the goods and the vessels of the country. In that port, there should be teased to Turkey a piece of land which should be set apart for the direct transit of merchandise coming from or going to Turkey. All facilities should be granted to Turkey for linking up this piece of land with the railway connecting Alexandretta with Turkish territory, and for its administration, leasing and method of exploitation. No dues or taxes other than tonnage, wharfage, pilotage, light- house and quarantine dues, levied equally on the inhabitants, goods and vessels of the country, should be imposed on Turkish nationals, goods and vessels engaged in the transit of merchandise coming from or going to Turkey. Done at Angora in duplicate, the 20th October, 1921 (1337). FRANKLIN-BOUILLON . YUSSOUF KEMAL BEY. 41 Euclosure 1 in No. ">. Yu880uf Kemal to M. Franklin- Bouillon. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. I have the honour to inform you that my Government desires to avail itself of the collaboration of French specialist instructors in the Turkieh gendarmerie schools. I trust that the Government of the French Republic will be good enough to give this request their consideration. I should be happy to inform your Excellency later of the number of French instructors we shall require. I have, &c. YUSSOIT KEMAL. Enclosure 5 in No. 5. touj Kemal /< M Franklin-Bouillon. Your Excellency, Angora, October 90, L921. With reference to article 12 of the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, 1 have the honour to inform yon that i he method of apportioning the waters of the Kuweik can be settled by the representatives of the population of the Turkish districts situated to the north of the lint- Bpecifieo 1 in article 8, and those of the population of the city of Aleppo. I have, &c. YUSSOUF KEMAL. Enclosure <*> in No. 5. touj Kemal l<> M. Franklin-Bouillon. Your Excellency, Angdra, October 20, 1021. In reply to the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 20th October, 1921, respecting the request of a French group regarding the Arghana mine and an agricultural concession which is stated to have been granted before the war in the vilayet of Adana, 1 am happy to inform your Excellency that I shall cause the examination of these two questions to be proceeded with without delay. 1 have, Ac. YUSSOUF KEMAL BEY. Enclosure 7 in -No. 5. M . Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouj Kemal. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. I hasten to acknowledge t li . receipt of your note accompanying the agreement, the terms of which we have drawn up together. I fully share your hope that the agreement concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with a view to effect a definite 42 and durable- peace, will result in the re-establishment and con- solidation of the close relations which have existed in the past between the two nations, the Government of the French Republic making every effort to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey. I have, &c. HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON. Enclosure 8 in No. 5. M. Franklin- Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. I have much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the 20th October, 1921 (of which I attach copies), respecting: 1. The maintenance of French schools and institutions in Turkey. 2. The selection of French officers as gendarmerie instructors. 3. The apportioning of the waters of the Kuweik. 4. The concession for the Arghana mine and for cotton-fields in Cilicia. I have, &c. HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON. . Enclosure 9 in No. 5. M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. As a corollary to article 7 of the agreement signed to-day between our two Governments, I think it desirable to explain that as regards the special administrative regime for the district of Alexandretta, the districts with Turkish majorities will in general be administered by officials of Turkish race. Schools will be established which will enjoy all facilities for Turkish cultural development. This regime will apply equally to the district of Antioch and to the parts of the old vilayet of Adana to the south of the line specified in article 8. I avail, &c. HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON. Enclosure 10 in No. 5. M. Franklin- Bouillon to Yussouf Kemal. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. As a corollary to the agreement signed this day between our two Governments, I have the honour to confirm the fact that the recognition of the transfer prescribed by article 10 of that agreement is subject to the two following conditions: 1. That the rights of the Turkish Government shall be maintained. 2. That the Government shall be guaranteed against any claims by the old company resulting from the transfer. I have, &c. HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON. 48 Enclosure 11 in No. 5. Af. Franklin-Bouillon to Yussouj Kemal. Your Excellency, Angora, October 20, 1921. I had occasion to draw your attention to the fact that in the course <>i the negotiations which took place in London in March 1921, your plenipotentiaries promised to the representatives of the Government of tin- French Republic the concession of the Arghana mines, of which a French group had made a "very complete preliminary examination. Your Excellency informed me that this concession had already been granted to a Turkish group. I then requested you to make every endeavour to arrange with this group that the French group should participate to a fair extent in this undertaking. I pointed out t assure me that you would do everything possible to expedite the examination of these two questions. 1 have pleasure in taking note of your declaration. 'HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON. No. 6. The Milium. n , M. de Montittc. Sir, Foreign Office, December 15, 1921. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the hith December, communicating, for the information of His Majesty's Government, copies of certain annexes to the agreement of the 20th October, signed by M. Frankb'n-Bouillon and Yussouf Kemal and also ot certain letters exchanged between these gentlemen on the same subject. I have, 4c. CURZON OF KEDLESTON. oO 4# ^* ***> 5^ s e >** - ^ 25 493722 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Ill