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REESE LIBRARY 
 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
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 A c cess ions No.<3# b /V Shelf No. 
 
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INQUISmO PHILOSOPHICA, 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 BY 
 
 M. P. W. BOLTON, 
 
 AUTHOR OF AN 
 " EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SCOTO-OXONIAN PHILOSOPHY." 
 
 LOKDOuST : 
 CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193 PICCADILLY. 
 
 MDCCCLXVI. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 ROBSON AND SON, GREAT NORTHERN" PRINTING WORKS, 
 PANCRAS ROAD, N.W. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Remarks concerning the criticism of Metaphysical Writers . 1 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 On the general nature and purport of Metaphysics, and on 
 various objections urged against them .... 9 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Statement of the doctrine of the Relativity of Truth. Its 
 application to Theology. Examination of Butler's attitude 
 in reference to it . . . . . . .48 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Examination of the attitude of Socrates in reference to the 
 doctrine of Relativity. Statement of the doctrine of Rela- 
 tivity as expounded by Kant. Kant's teaching concerning 
 the Unconditioned . . . . . .84 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Further examination of Kant's doctrine concerning the In- 
 tellect and Reason. Misrepresentations of his teaching 
 pointed out. His doctrine concerning Morality and Theo- 
 logy. Objections to his system 103 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Examination of the doctrine of Relativity as taught by 
 Hamilton. His teaching concerning the incognisability of 
 the Unconditioned . . . . . . .142 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Examination of the opinions of Mr. Mill, and of a writer in 
 the Contemporary Review, concerning the meaning of 
 Hamilton's doctrine 180 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Further examination of Hamilton's doctrine concerning Know- 
 ledge. Appearance of discrepancy between two main 
 portions of his teaching. Examination of attempts made 
 to reconcile them. The insufficiency of these attempts 
 pointed out 198 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 On Kant's Idealism 232 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 On the teaching of Butler . . . . , .263 
 
AN EXAMINATION 
 
 OP THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 INTEODUCTIOK 
 
 IF the writings of an eminent metaphysician are 
 criticised, and alleged inconsistencies pointed out 
 in them, the criticism is sometimes met by urging 
 that the metaphysician in question was a very able 
 and learned man, and consequently could not have 
 committed the mistakes ascribed to him. And the 
 criticism may be further complained of as an at- 
 tempt to pick to pieces the work of an author of 
 high reputation, and to injure his fair fame. 
 
 Thus Mr. Mill having carefully examined the 
 philosophical works of Sir "W. Hamilton, and 
 pointed out, as he conceives, a great number of 
 discrepancies in them, a writer in the Contem- 
 porary Review blames him, as having " tasked 
 all the resources of minute criticism to destroy 
 
 B 
 
2 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 piecemeal the reputation of one who has hitherto 
 borne an honoured name in philosophy." And 
 further he says : u Mr. Mill's method of criticism 
 has reduced the question to a very narrow com- 
 pass. Either Sir W. Hamilton, instead of being 
 a great philosopher, is the veriest blunderer that 
 ever put pen to paper, or the blunders are Mr. 
 Mill's own." But, it is urged, we cannot adopt 
 the first alternative, since Hamilton's metaphysical 
 abilities have been generally recognised ; conse- 
 quently, we must adopt the second, and regard 
 the blunders as Mr. Mill's. Accordingly, the 
 Eeviewer censures Mr. Mill's statements as "a 
 mass of misconceptions," displaying " an unusual 
 deficiency of philosophical knowledge." 
 
 Here, however, we might urge against the 
 Reviewer a similar alternative: "Either Mr. Mill 
 is the veriest blunderer that ever put pen to paper, 
 or the blunders imputed to him are the Reviewer's 
 own. But Mr. Mill is not the greatest of blun- 
 derers since it is generally recognised that his 
 abilities are of a high order therefore, &c." 
 
 If this style of reasoning were correct, it would 
 apply to no one more strongly than to Sir W. 
 Hamilton. Schelling and Hegel were philosophers 
 who enjoyed great reputation; whose names have 
 made much more noise in the world than Hamil- 
 ton's. Yet Hamilton imputes to them blunders of 
 the grossest description, deriding their fundamental 
 doctrines as outrageously absurd as fit for La- 
 puta, not for reasonable beings. And he ridicules 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 3 
 
 these philosophers, and all who admire or re- 
 semble them, as 
 
 " Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimseris." 
 
 These criticisms would be disposed of in a very 
 summary manner if it were lawful to argue as fol- 
 lows : " Schelling and Hegel were philosophers of 
 high repute, exercising a powerful influence in 
 Germany, and admired by many persons of great 
 ability. Sir W. Hamilton by his method of cri- 
 ticism brings us to this pass : that we must either 
 regard these philosophers as gross blunderers, or 
 consider that the blunders are his own. The latter 
 alternative is much the easier of the two." 
 
 And Hamilton's criticisms of Brown, Kant, and 
 Cousin might be disposed of in like manner. 
 
 But those who have studied metaphysics know 
 well that it is possible to attribute great discre- 
 pancy and error to the works of a metaphysician, 
 whilst feeling great respect for his intellect. Kant 
 labours to prove that the metaphysical systems of 
 Des Cartes, Leibnitz, and his predecessors were 
 entirely null, while yet he greatly admired their 
 abilities. Hamilton criticises very unfavourably 
 the doctrine, of Kant, declaring that it leads to 
 the most melancholy consequences, to the worst 
 and most pervading scepticism; and yet on many 
 occasions he expresses high esteem of Kant's in- 
 tellectual power. Schopenhauer professes with 
 evident sincerity the highest admiration for Kant; 
 yet he cross-examines him as rigorously as he can, 
 
4 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 and accuses him in a great number of cases of in- 
 consistency. 
 
 Indeed, the dynamic merit of a metaphysician 
 cannot be estimated by the correctness of the re- 
 sults which he obtains. A powerful system of 
 reasoning proceeding on wrong principles may 
 trouble the waters of thought and excite mental 
 activity far more than a correcter doctrine set 
 forth by an inferior intellect. 
 
 But are we, because we highly esteem the in- 
 tellectual power of a philosopher, to abstain from 
 pointing out errors or discrepancies in his writings ? 
 Are we to say, " I content myself with calling atten- 
 tion to his merits; I leave to others the invidious 
 task of picking holes in his reputation, and detract- 
 ing from his fair fame"? Shall we blame Hamilton 
 because, while expressing high admiration of Kant's 
 powers, he nevertheless severely condemned some 
 of his most important principles? Or shall we 
 blame Schopenhauer for having pointed out nu- 
 merous alleged errors and discrepancies in the 
 doctrine of Kant, for whom he expresses the pro- 
 foundest admiration? 
 
 To do this would be to ignore altogether the 
 meaning and object of Metaphysics, the purpose 
 of which is to present to us a connected har- 
 monious body of doctrine. It is quite alien to 
 the spirit of philosophy to accept doctrines which 
 appear to us inconsistent, and to get over the dif- 
 ficulty by means of Faith, saying, I cannot con- 
 ceive how the doctrines can be reconciled; but I 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 5 
 
 believe that they can be, since they are taught by a 
 philosopher whom I admire and revere. However 
 greatly we may admire a philosopher, it behoves 
 us diligently to scrutinise his doctrines. And where 
 these are inconsistent, we must consider that he 
 has so far failed to accomplish the special task of 
 Metaphysics; though, notwithstanding this failure, 
 his attempt may in other respects possess high 
 value. 
 
 Seeing the great freedom with which distin- 
 guished metaphysicians assail one another as guilty 
 of inconsistency, it is natural to inquire what may 
 be the cause of such discrepancies. On this point 
 we may listen to Mr. Mill, who, speaking of Ha- 
 milton, says : " It is strange, but characteristic, 
 that Sir W. Hamilton cannot be depended on for 
 remembering, in one part of his speculations, the 
 best things which he has said in another; not even 
 the truths into which he has thrown so much of 
 the powers of his mind, as to have made them, in 
 an especial manner, his own."* " It would hardly 
 be believed, prior to a minute examination of his 
 writings, how much vagueness of thought, leading 
 to the unsuspecting admission of opposite doctrines 
 in the same breath, lurks under the specious ap- 
 pearance of philosophical precision which distin- 
 guishes him."f 
 
 Here the inconsistencies of teaching are as- 
 cribed to forgetfulness and vagueness of thought. 
 
 Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 284. 
 f Ibid. p. 357. 
 
b AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 We can hardly, however, suppose that able meta- 
 physicians are naturally more afflicted with obli- 
 viousness or vagueness of thought than ordinary 
 persons; we might rather suppose that Hamilton, 
 Kant, Leibnitz, and Des Cartes were more than 
 usually clear-headed, and capable of treating a 
 subject consistently. We are therefore led to 
 suppose that if philosophers frequently fall into 
 inconsistency, this indicates some more than ordi- 
 nary obscurity in the topics and questions about 
 which they concern themselves. And if we study 
 more closely their doctrines and controversies, we 
 shall probably see much to confirm this opinion. 
 We may find ourselves tempted to conclude that 
 a great deal of metaphysical controversy is thrown 
 away, owing to the circumstance that the dis- 
 putants do not distinctly understand the ques- 
 tions at issue ; so that philosophers who differ ex- 
 tremely in words may not differ much in ideas; 
 while, vice versa, some may appear to agree who 
 do not do so really. 
 
 Discrepancy, therefore, in the writings of a 
 metaphysician may be held to indicate that he is 
 treating of a question which he has not placed 
 before his own mind in a perfectly distinct man- 
 ner, so as thoroughly to apprehend its meaning 
 and perceive its bearings. And if a philosopher 
 of eminent ability is in such a case, we may be 
 pretty sure that many previous metaphysicians 
 have been so likewise ; that the question is one 
 concerning which further elucidation is needed. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 7 
 
 Nothing tends so much to remedy this state 
 of things as an examination which brings the dis- 
 crepancy in question clearly to light ; for when 
 this is once done, it is not likely to be repeated 
 in the same manner. Such an examination helps 
 to clear away the obscurity which previously at- 
 tached to the question, and which rendered pos- 
 sible the vagueness of thought and discrepancy 
 of utterance. It thus conduces to a very salutary 
 result; for a distinct understanding of the mean- 
 ing of metaphysical questions, and a perception of 
 their bearings, is perhaps more needed in the pre- 
 sent state of Metaphysics than any thing else. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 IT is sometimes asserted by writers of ability that 
 the study of Metaphysics is profitless ; that meta- 
 physical speculation results from the action of the 
 human mind in an imperfect stage of development, 
 and is laid aside when this stage is passed through, 
 and a higher state of culture attained. Neverthe- 
 less, we find that works professedly metaphysical 
 continue to be produced by writers of high ability ; 
 the recent work of Mr. Mill, carefully discussing 
 a number of metaphysical questions, being a con- 
 spicuous example of this. 
 
 We are sometimes told that physics are pro- 
 fitable, because they concern themselves with real 
 things; while metaphysics are vain, because they 
 concern themselves merely with abstractions. If 
 this account were correct, it would be matter for 
 wonder that so many minds of high ability should 
 have occupied themselves with metaphysics, and 
 that so much interest should still be taken in them. 
 But if we examine the works of the great meta- 
 physicians, we shall see that their character is not 
 conformable to the above account. We shall see 
 
10 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 that the so-called metaphysicians seek to obtain 
 knowledge of that which is invisible, and is not 
 shown to us by experience ; but that not the less 
 they seek for a knowledge of that which is actual 
 and real. We shall find them busying themselves 
 very much with two topics God and the future 
 state. Plato, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Kant, 
 all inquire concerning God ; and this part of their 
 inquiries is regarded as of main importance. Now 
 God is not a phenomenon : we cannot see him, nor 
 apprehend him by the senses ; nor is he ever ex- 
 hibited to us in physical experience. Nevertheless 
 we must not on that account jump to the conclu- 
 sion that he is a mere metaphysical abstraction. 
 
 Again, many metaphysical writings, such as the 
 Phcedo of Plato, and the opening of Butler's Ana- 
 logy, contain reasonings intended to make it ap- 
 pear that man does not perish when he dies; that 
 after his death he enters on a new stage of exist- 
 ence, where his happiness is influenced by his pre- 
 vious conduct on earth. These writings are pro- 
 perly called metaphysical. They deal with mat- 
 ters beyond the range of physics, and arrive at 
 conclusions which it is impossible to verify by ex- 
 perience ; yet the knowledge sought for in them is 
 a knowledge of reality, not a knowledge of mere 
 abstractions. 
 
 We may see the source of metaphysics when 
 we consider the question put by Epicurus to his 
 tutor : u And Chaos whence?' 7 An inquisitive mind 
 naturally feels a lively desire to know the original 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 1 I 
 
 cause of the phenomena which he sees about him; 
 and though the phenomena which excite this in- 
 quiry are physical, the inquiry itself is metaphy- 
 sical. 
 
 The different answers obtained by those who 
 have engaged in this inquiry constitute the prin- 
 cipal differences between the. various metaphysical 
 schools. Some thinkers, considering the order and 
 harmony displayed in the world (called on this 
 account the Kocpog), conclude that the universe 
 was produced by the design of an intelligent being 
 a bqpiovg'yos. Some thinkers, on the other hand, 
 are unwilling to ascribe design or forethought to 
 the Supreme Being, . regarding it as an imper- 
 fection; and prefer to suppose that the Divine 
 Intelligence acts spontaneously, in a manner some- 
 what resembling the unconscious inspiration of 
 artists and poets. The instinct of animals is also 
 thought to bear some analogy to it. 
 
 The reasonings which from the appearances of 
 order and adjustment in the universe infer that it 
 was produced by intelligence or by design, are 
 treated of by Kant as the cosmological and teleo- 
 logical arguments; and one of the principal pur- 
 poses of his great work is to examine the validity 
 of these reasonings. 
 
 But because these arguments are spoken of 
 under these scholastic names, we must not suppose 
 that they are the peculiar property of professional 
 metaphysicians. They have passed through the 
 minds of a vast number of persons of very different 
 
12 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 periods, countries, and classes. We find them in 
 the Psalms : " He that planted the ear, shall he 
 not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not 
 see ? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not 
 he know?" We find the same reasoning repeat- 
 edly in the Koran: " The succession of night and 
 day; . . . the rain which descends from the clouds 
 and restores life to the parched earth ; the animals 
 which cover its surface ; the changes of the winds 
 and of the clouds, are, in the eyes of those who 
 have knowledge, marks of the power of the Most 
 High." When Napoleon, after hearing the anti- 
 theistic arguments of his savans, replied, point- 
 ing to the starry heavens, " Vous avez beau rai- 
 sonner, Messieurs; mais qui done a fait tout cela?" 
 he appealed to the same reasoning. And the same 
 reasoning is frequently employed by persons of 
 humble rank, and of little education; totally un- 
 acquainted with the works of metaphysicians, not 
 even knowing the names of Plato, Leibnitz, or 
 Kant. Yet, employed by them, simple as they 
 are, it is still a metaphysical argument. 
 
 Metaphysicians are by no means agreed as to 
 the validity of these reasonings. They were ac- 
 cepted very cordially by Voltaire, who seems quite 
 convinced of their validity; but they are scru- 
 tinised very diligently by Hume and by Kant, 
 who both come to the conclusion that they are 
 defective. And since that scrutiny they have en- 
 joyed amongst metaphysicians much less credit 
 than they formerly did. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 13 
 
 The great diversity of opinions which have 
 been entertained concerning the nature of the 
 cause of the universe is principally referable to 
 one source viz. the existence of evil. While 
 Nature exhibits to us much that is beautiful and 
 admirable, she also exhibits to us much of a dif- 
 ferent character, such as the long catalogue of 
 human crimes and diseases, pestilence, war, and 
 death. The Theist calls attention to various com- 
 binations which, he declares, tend evidently to the 
 promotion of enjoyment or well-being, to the con- 
 servation of life, or the good of society ; and which, 
 as he thence infers, manifest the designing intel- 
 ligence of a benevolent . Being. The Antitheist 
 replies by calling attention to the tiger, the shark, 
 the vulture, the torpedo, the boa-constrictor, the 
 cobra-capella. If the eye and the ear give evi- 
 dence of design, the electrical organ of the tor- 
 pedo, the sting of the scorpion, the apparatus for 
 secreting venom in the serpent must, he argues, 
 be held to do so equally. And the design thus 
 evinced is, he contends, not that of a benevolent 
 being. Was it, he asks, a benevolent being who 
 put into the cat the instinct to amuse itself with 
 the agonies of the mouse, and who endowed the 
 predatory animals with the structure and instincts 
 in virtue of which they live in perpetual war with 
 other races? Nor will he allow that the theistic 
 argument is any better, if we consider man. The 
 Theist may call attention to the wonderful pro- 
 ducts of human intelligence, to the mechanical 
 
14 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 triumphs by which man extends his dominion over 
 Nature, to the works of Phidias, Michael Angelo, 
 Raphael, to the writings of Homer, Dante, Shake- 
 speare; and may ask, Could such faculties have 
 been implanted in man except by a Divine In- 
 telligence? Or again, he may point to the re- 
 ligious nature of man, to the faith and fervent 
 prayers of saints, to the self-abnegation which 
 the nobler class of men have displayed in their 
 endeavours to benefit their fellows; and may ask, 
 By whom could such a nature have been implanted 
 or communicated, if not by a good and holy Being? 
 But his opponent points to the long history of 
 human crimes and strife, to religious rancour and 
 persecution, to the Inquisition and the Auto da 
 Fe; and contends that if the Author of the uni- 
 verse were both benevolent and powerful, he could 
 not have peopled the earth with such a race as 
 that of man. 
 
 From the consideration of such circumstances 
 different thinkers have come to very different con- 
 clusions concerning the nature of the cause of the 
 Universe. Some regard the world as produced by 
 the design of one Person, in the highest degree 
 powerful and good; some as produced by several 
 Persons, powerful and good, and perfectly agree- 
 ing amongst themselves. Others have come to 
 
 o o 
 
 the conclusion that the phenomena of the world 
 are caused by the conflicting action of two beings, 
 one of whom is good, according to our idea of 
 goodness, and endeavours to produce order, har- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 15 
 
 mony, and happiness; while the other is bad, ac- 
 cording to our idea of badness, seeking to mar the 
 works of the benevolent Being, and to produce dis- 
 order, strife, and misery. Others have supposed 
 the world to be ruled by a number of different 
 beings, of different qualities and purposes. Others, 
 again, regard it as produced and governed by the 
 action of one Person, or the consentaneous action 
 of many Persons, whom it is proper to call good 
 and beneficent, but whose so-called goodness and 
 beneficence must be of a kind of which we can 
 form no conception, differing from the goodness 
 and beneficence of the best men not merely in 
 degree, but in essence or principle. 
 
 There are, however, some thinkers who regard 
 all the above hypotheses as equally erroneous ; 
 holding that the world was not caused by intelli- 
 gence or design at all : that it has resulted from 
 the unconscious changes of an unintelligent prin- 
 ciple, acting by blind physical necessity. The 
 difference between this view and that which 
 ascribes Mind to the cause of the Universe is 
 succinctly intimated in the lines of Euripides : 
 
 TTOr' 1 (TU, SuOTOTTCKTTOC aSll/CU, 
 
 i/c, eiV avajKri 0*'croe art VOVQ |3/oorwv. 
 
 The various phenomena which to the one class of 
 thinkers appear to indicate the contrivance of an 
 intelligent Maker are viewed by the others in a 
 totally different light. Lucretius strongly exhorts 
 his disciple : 
 
16 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 " Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata 
 Prospicere ut possemus ;" 
 
 denouncing the contrary opinion as an error which 
 should be sedulously avoided. And in present times 
 thinkers of this class consider that since the labours 
 of Hume and Kant, the teleological argument may 
 be disregarded as obsolete. 
 
 Nor is more impression made upon them when 
 their opponents appeal to the religious or spiritual 
 consciousness ; to the sentiments, emotions, or af- 
 fections of Man. It is urged that these affections 
 find no adequate object for their exercise among 
 transitory secular phenomena ; that man's long- 
 ings cannot be satisfied except by belief in a 
 Personal Being, who is imperishable and perfect. 
 To this the advocates of the contrary doctrine re- 
 ply, that that which seems desirable to us, that 
 which would gratify our sentiments and cravings, 
 is not on this account to be regarded as true or 
 existent. Experience, say they, does not confirm 
 such a notion. We see men entering the arena of 
 life full of aspirations and desires, and full of con- 
 fidence that those aspirations will be gratified ; 
 but the realities of life do not answer to their 
 ideas, and they are disenchanted in a very rough 
 manner. In order to ascertain truth of fact, we 
 must not look within us, to our own cravings and 
 emotions, but must look out of ourselves to ex- 
 perience ; and must refuse to believe doctrines, 
 however agreeable, which experience does not 
 verify. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 1 7 
 
 Now experience, say they, does not verify the 
 doctrine of the Theist. It does not show to us 
 any immortal intelligent being or person, nor any 
 person possessed of great power in controlling the 
 phenomena of the Universe. Nor does it show to 
 us any man who exists after his death. Its teach- 
 ing is, that when a bird dies, or a dog dies, or a 
 man dies, the result is in all cases the same ; the 
 bodily organism is destroyed, and with it the life 
 and intelligence of the animal or individual finally 
 cease. 
 
 Moreover, say they, experience shows that the 
 sentiment or craving talked of by the Theist the 
 strong desire to believe in the existence of an in- 
 visible Perfect Person may be accounted for much 
 more easily than by supposing that such a Person 
 really exists. Experience shows that when men 
 or women cannot find in real life objects which 
 satisfy their natural affections and desires, they 
 invent ideal or imaginary objects, and turn their 
 affections upon these. The social state being now 
 very imperfect, this process takes place to a large 
 extent, and hence Theism is common ; but if the 
 social state were properly reformed, so that persons 
 generally could fully occupy their sentiments and 
 emotions in loving and benefiting their fellows, 
 they would no longer invent ideal objects of their 
 affections ; and Theism would be found to wane 
 and disappear. 
 
 They do not, however, admit that in this case 
 Religion would cease ; but maintain that Religion 
 
18 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 might exist without belief in a God. Indeed, 
 Buddhism is declared to be a standing example 
 in proof of this. It is properly called a religion ; 
 since it exercises a powerful influence over its 
 votaries, exciting their devotion and reverence, 
 and inducing them to undergo austerities of a 
 severe kind. It has copious records of mission- 
 aries and martyrs, who exhibited a highly heroic 
 and self-denying spirit. Yet, it is asserted, it is 
 without a God ; it strongly denies the existence 
 of an intelligent First Cause, or of an imperishable 
 Person. 
 
 In proof of the same view, the example of 
 Schopenhauer is adduced. He greatly admired 
 the ascetic mediaeval monks, and greatly admired 
 the Buddhist religion, while yet he was a decided 
 Antitheist. 
 
 Again, Comte is represented by some persons 
 as eminently devout and religious, and yet not a 
 Theist. 
 
 Thus it is considered that the extinction of 
 Theism, so far from causing the ruin of religion, 
 might tend on the contrary to strengthen, purify, 
 and exalt it. 
 
 The perplexities attending the existence of 
 evil, the principal source of these persistent de- 
 bates, are strikingly set forth by Schopenhauer, 
 who vividly depicts the imperfection of man and 
 the ills of life, and quotes an abundance of authors 
 (among whom Pascal is conspicuous) dwelling 
 on the same gloomy theme. Schopenhauer seems 
 
PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 19 
 
 to have been principally determined to his Anti- 
 theism by his consideration of this subject. It is 
 also strongly insisted on by Mr. Mansel, who re- 
 marks : " The real riddle of existence, the pro- 
 blem which confounds all philosophy, ay, and all 
 religion too, so far as religion is a thing of man's 
 
 reason, is the fact that evil exists at all 
 
 Against this immovable barrier of the existence of 
 evil the waves of philosophy have dashed them- 
 selves unceasingly since the birthday of human 
 thought, and have retired broken and powerless/' 
 
 He himself is led by his reflections on this 
 subject to his theory concerning the Divine Mo- 
 rality. 
 
 A writer warmed with polemic against philoso- 
 phers may regard with something like complacency 
 even the existence of evil, when he contemplates 
 this as an insoluble difficulty, securely baffling all 
 their speculative efforts. But other writers, re- 
 garding the struggles of the human mind from a 
 different point of view, display a more sympa- 
 thising spirit, and use language in which no trace 
 of jubilation can be detected. Tennyson speaks of 
 " the painful riddle of the earth ;" and Heine de- 
 scribes this riddle as 
 
 " Das qualvoll uralte Biithsel, 
 Woriiber schon manclie Haupter gegriibelt, 
 Haupter in Hieroglyphenmiitzen, 
 Haupter in Turban und schwarzem Barett, 
 Perriickenliiiupter und tausend andre 
 Arme, schwitzende Menschenhaupter 
 
20 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Sagt mir, was becleutet der Mensch ? 
 Woher 1st er kommen ? Wo gelit er hin ? 
 Wer wolmt dort oben auf goldenen Sternen ?" 
 
 Having for their object to solve this "riddle of ex- 
 istence," this " uralte Rathsel," or to obtain, if 
 possible, some light concerning it, Metaphysics 
 cannot be denounced as dealing with topics of no 
 interest. But it is quite possible that whilst in- 
 viting us to deal with very interesting matters, 
 and alluring us to their study by the hope of at- 
 taining valuable information, they may not be able 
 to gratify our wishes and expectations. 
 
 When a person first endeavours to grapple with 
 problems of the nature above described, he is apt 
 to do so without any misgiving as to the powers 
 of the human intellect, and he expects to attain 
 before long a result in which he can acquiesce 
 with confidence. But after a fuller study of the 
 matter, when he finds . the great discrepancy of 
 opinion amongst philosophers, and examines the 
 various arguments which have been urged by 
 them against each other, this confidence is apt to 
 be shaken ; and he begins to entertain a suspicion 
 that possibly the human intellect may not be so 
 adequate to the task as he had at first supposed. 
 Hence there arises the further question, "Is the 
 human intellect competent to obtain light on these 
 points, or are they beyond its reach ?" 
 
 Concerning this question very various opinions 
 have been held. Many philosophers have treated 
 confidently of the subjects in question, not doubt- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 21 
 
 ing that by the exercise of our natural faculties 
 we can obtain valuable light concerning them. 
 But others deny this, maintaining that our na- 
 tural faculties can give us no light concerning 
 such questions. All that we can do, say they, is 
 to observe the succession of phenomena, offered 
 to us by physical experience, and generalise our 
 observations into laws. The nature of the unseen 
 cause of the Universe, supposing such a cause 
 to exist, is, say they, wholly beyond our reach. 
 Whether the Universe be produced by design 
 or intelligence, or by blind physical necessity ; 
 whether there be a Ruler of the Universe, who is 
 wise and benevolent, or whether there be no Being 
 of the kind ; whether man exists after death, or 
 whether when he dies he perishes, are questions 
 wholly beyond the reach of our faculties. If we 
 could obtain answers to them, the knowledge 
 would be interesting ; but as we can obtain no 
 answer on which we can depend, the proper course 
 is not to waste our time in fruitless efforts, but to 
 devote ourselves to those matters which we are 
 competent to know, viz. phenomena, and the laws 
 regulating their succession. 
 
 This view of the matter is frequently spoken of 
 as Positivism, and is attributed to Comte and his 
 followers. But some persons assert that this is a 
 complete mistake ; that the real doctrine of Comte 
 is quite different from that usually assigned to him.* 
 
 The question concerning the power and scope 
 See Note A. 
 
22 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 of our faculties, whether they can give us in- 
 formation concerning causes and things, or merely 
 about phenomena ; whether the results obtained 
 by them are true relatively to other beings, or 
 whether they are true only in relation to man, 
 is generally considered a metaphysical question. 
 Kant's great work, the Critigue of the Reason, has 
 for its object to investigate these points; and this 
 work by common consent is called metaphysical. 
 
 Such being the topics of metaphysical inquiry, 
 it is likely that Metaphysics will exist for a long 
 time to come. And it is likely that hostility to 
 Metaphysics will also long continue. A large por- 
 tion of mankind are engaged in practical pursuits, 
 and regard with aversion speculations which seem 
 to them subtle and useless. There is always too 
 a considerable body of mankind who think that 
 physical experience is the only source of certainty ; 
 that whatever cannot be verified by this is so un- 
 certain as to be of no value. Even in Asia, ac- 
 cording to M. Gobineau, an empirical sect holding 
 these views exists in considerable numbers. 
 
 Again, there is always a large class who, re- 
 ceiving doctrines implicitly on authority, refuse to 
 engage in any metaphysical inquiry, saying : 
 
 S"', OV^ZIQ aura KarajSaXtt Aoyoc, 
 
 ro 
 
 These of course cannot approve the attitude of 
 the metaphysician, described by Des Cartes, who 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANI AND HAMILTON. 23 
 
 engages resolutely in inquiry, determined to scru- 
 tinise all his previous beliefs, and to reject those 
 which he had most cherished, if he finds them 
 unable to stand the scrutiny. Thus it happens 
 that Metaphysics find themselves beset with ene- 
 mies on all sides. 
 
 It would be useless to quote opinions adverse 
 to Metaphysics, as these abound and have long 
 abounded. But it is worth while to adduce the 
 opinions of some writers who do not join in the 
 outcry against them. I will quote that of Scho- 
 penhauer, a writer not prejudiced in their favour 
 by any penchant for metaphysical theology, since 
 he opposed Theism in a most resolute manner. In- 
 stead of regarding Metaphysics as a product of the 
 human mind in an immature state, he considers 
 them to arise when man passes from the child-like 
 stage to that of mature intelligence ; in which con- 
 dition his need for metaphysics is as urgent as any 
 of his physical needs. 
 
 He says : " Mit der Unfahigkeit zum Glauben 
 wiichst das Bediirfm'ss der Erkenntniss. Es giebt 
 einen Siedepunkt auf der Skala der Kultur wo 
 aller Glaube, alle Oifenbarung, alle Auktoritaten 
 sich verfliichtigen, der Mensch nach eigener Ein- 
 sicht verlangt, belehrt, aber auch iiberzeugt seyn 
 will. Das Ga'ngelband der Kindheit ist von ihm 
 gefallen ; er will auf eigenen Beinen stehn. Dabei 
 aber ist sein metaphysisches Bediirfniss so unver- 
 tilgbar wie irgend ein physisches."* 
 
 Ueber die vierfache Wurzel, &c. p. 116. 
 
24 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Entertaining these views, Schopenhauer does 
 not look down with contempt on the great meta- 
 physical writers ; but speaks with genuine and 
 heartfelt reverence of " Plato der gottliche und 
 der erstaunliche Kant." 
 
 Mr. Mill also opposes the opinion which re- 
 gards Metaphysics as obsolete or as useless; and 
 he has given practical proof of his earnestness, by 
 devoting his great intellectual powers to the dis- 
 cussion of metaphysical questions. Speaking of 
 his recent work, examining the doctrines of Ha- 
 milton, he says : " The justification of the work 
 itself lies in the importance of the questions, to 
 the discussion of which it is a contribution. Eng- 
 land is often reproached by Continental thinkers 
 with indifference to the higher philosophy. But 
 England did not always deserve this reproach, and 
 is already showing, by no doubtful symptoms, that 
 she will not deserve it much longer. Her thinkers 
 are again beginning to see, what they had only 
 temporarily forgotten, that a true Psychology is 
 the indispensable scientific basis of Morals, of Po- 
 litics, of the science and art of Education; that 
 the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of 
 all science ; that those difficulties can only be 
 quieted by being resolved; and that until they 
 are resolved, positively if possible, but at any 
 rate negatively, we are never assured that any 
 human knowledge, even physical, stands on solid 
 foundation."* 
 
 Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 2. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 25 
 
 In addition to the opinions of Schopenhauer 
 and Mill may be quoted that of Waterland, which 
 will seem obsolete to some, but of high authority 
 to others. Having been accused by his opponents 
 of mixing metaphysics with his theology, he replies : 
 "Let those who object to us the use of Meta- 
 physicks, try if they can come at the proof of the 
 Father's being self-existent, underived, one, simple, 
 uncompounded, undivided, intelligent, Agent, &c. 
 without entering into Me taphy sicks."* 
 
 Where such a large number of persons enter- 
 tain a rooted dislike to Metaphysics, topics of com- 
 plaint against metaphysicians may be expected to 
 abound. One complaint frequently urged against 
 them is that they are dialectical and controversial. 
 Nor indeed can the fact thus complained of be 
 denied, the history of Metaphysics being a tissue 
 of controversy. Plato and Socrates controvert the 
 Sophists; Aristotle controverts Plato; Des Cartes 
 controverts Hobbes and Gassendi; Locke contro- 
 verts Des Cartes; Leibnitz controverts Locke and 
 Bayle ; Hume controverts the world at large ; Kant 
 controverts Leibnitz and the mass of dogmatical 
 philosophers; Hamilton controverts Brown, Kant, 
 Cousin; Mill controverts Hamilton. Now this 
 characteristic of metaphysical inquiry is, say its 
 opponents, exceedingly distasteful to us; for how- 
 ever we may differ among ourselves on other points, 
 we all agree on this that we cannot bear contro- 
 versial people, that we cordially detest dialectic. 
 
 Waterland on Christ's Divinity, Sermon vi. 
 
26 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 This dislike to dialectic is however by no means 
 immutable. If persons listen to arguments to which 
 they find it difficult to reply, directed against some 
 belief or opinion which they cherish, they cannot 
 bear dialectic; but if the arguments are directed 
 in favour of their own views, and their opponents 
 experience difficulty in grappling with them, then 
 they highly admire the dialectical power of their 
 champion, declaring that his logic is irrefragable, 
 that he crushes his opponents with an iron mace, 
 &c. 
 
 Few writers have been more controversial or 
 dialectical than St. Augustine; and his opponents 
 used to make this a topic of complaint against him ; 
 the Donatist bishops declining to confer with him, 
 and warning their flocks to avoid him, on the 
 ground that he was " dialecticus." St. Augustine 
 defends himself from these attacks, not by disown- 
 ing, but by justifying dialectic. He urges that 
 u dialectic" in the proper sense signifies " dispute;" 
 that dispute or $iate%t$ in behalf of truth is per- 
 fectly legitimate, and was practised by St. Paul 
 and Christ. He says to Cresconius : " Si et Paulus 
 dialecticus erat, et ideo conferre cum Stoicis non 
 timebat; .... jam cave cuiquam dialecticam pro 
 crimine objeceris, qua usos Apostolos confiteris." 
 Again : " Si et disputatorem Apostolum negas, qui 
 tarn assidue, tarn egregie disputabat; nee grasce 
 nosti, nee latine." Again : "Si autem Christum 
 dixeris dialecticum, laudabis dialecticam, quam 
 mini pro crimine objeceras." 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 And he explains his views more fully in the 
 following passage : 
 
 " Hanc enim artem quam dialecticam vocant, 
 quae nihil aliud docet quam consequentia demon- 
 strare, seu vera veris, seu falsa falsis, nunquam 
 doctrina Christiana formidat . . . . Et ipsa enim 
 fatetur, et verum est, neminem disputando ad con- 
 clusionem falsam consequenter impelli, nisi prius 
 consenserit falsis, quibus eadem conclusio velit 
 nollit efficitur. Ac per hoc qui cavet ne se lo- 
 quente consequantur falsa quae non vult, volens 
 falsa caveat quo3 praacedunt. Si autem prase e- 
 dentibus veris inhaeserit, quaecumque consequentia 
 perspexerit quaa falsa existimabat, vel de quibus 
 dubitabat, admonitus amplectatur, si veritati est 
 pacatissimaa amicior, quam contentiosissimae vani- 
 tatL"* 
 
 Here St. Augustine declares that false conclu- 
 sions cannot follow from true premises ; that 
 nobody can consistently be brought to a false 
 conclusion, unless he has given his consent to false 
 premises ; that a doctrine which is found to lead 
 to false conclusions should be abandoned, though 
 previously it had been believed ; arid that conclu- 
 sions which are found to follow from true pre- 
 mises should be embraced, though previously they 
 were disbelieved. And this tracing out of conse- 
 quences is asserted by him to be the main office 
 of " dialectic," esteemed by him as of great value. 
 
 A view similiar to the above is expressed by 
 
 S. Augustinus contra Cresconium, lib. i. cap. 20. 
 
28 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Mr. Mansel. Speaking of doctrinal developments 
 he says : " By intellectual developments I under- 
 stand logical inferences from doctrines, or from 
 the comparison of doctrines ; which, in virtue of 
 the great dialectical maxim, must be true, if legiti- 
 mately deduced from what is true."* This per- 
 fectly agrees with St. Augustine's view concerning 
 the connection of conclusions with premises. 
 
 Such being the nature of dialectic, metaphy- 
 sicians cannot be otherwise than dialectical. For 
 the great object of metaphysical study is to obtain 
 a coherent body of doctrine. An ill-digested con- 
 geries, where one assertion conflicts with another 
 and conclusions do not follow from premises, can 
 be obtained at once without labour ; and if we are 
 satisfied with such a medley, we need not vex our- 
 selves with studying Metaphysics. Those who 
 devote time and labour to philosophy do so with 
 the hope of removing the discrepancies which 
 embarrass immature thought. And the bringing 
 to light such discrepancies, either in our own 
 doctrines or in those of others, is the office of 
 dialectic. 
 
 But just as dialectic is valuable to the meta- 
 physician, it is odious to the non - philosophical 
 person, who dislikes inquiry. He holds probably 
 an immature collection 'of doctrines, full of contra- 
 diction, in which he feels perfect complacency, so 
 long as the contradictions are not made obvious 
 to him ; and nothing so greatly excites his ire as 
 
 Bampton Lectures, Lecture viii. note 18. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 29 
 
 to find the latent contradiction brought to light. 
 The magnitude of the displeasure thus occasioned 
 is shown fey the fate of Socrates, who, making it 
 his business to cross-examine his hearers, and to 
 render clear to them the contradictions into which 
 they fell, became intolerable to them, and was 
 silenced by a dose of hemlock. And seeing the 
 great zeal with which he exercised his dialectical 
 vocation, we may rather wonder that it was not 
 cut short at an earlier period of his life. 
 
 Nor can we wonder that troublesome dialec- 
 ticians were silenced in a very summary manner 
 whilst ecclesiastical authority reigned paramount. 
 They were treated indeed with great leniency, 
 being punished "citra sanguinis effusionem," and 
 accordingly burnt alive ; and in order to give 
 them more time for repentance, they were gene- 
 rally burnt by a slow fire. But they did not 
 appreciate the benignity of this treatment ; and 
 probably Giordano Bruno would rather have been 
 dealt with by Athenian Dicasts than by Christian 
 Inquisitors. 
 
 But however odious dialectic may be to those 
 who dislike philosophy, metaphysicians must esteem 
 it very differently. In examining a metaphysical 
 system, they must carefully trace the conclusions 
 which legitimately follow from the premises ; and 
 if these are untenable, or if they conflict with other 
 portions of the doctrine, they should regard this 
 as indicating a flaw in the system. And it does 
 not avail to plead that the philosopher whose work 
 
30 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 is examined did not himself draw the consequences 
 in question, and would not have approved them. 
 The purport of the objection is not to- make out 
 that the philosopher himself holds the consequences ; 
 but to show that premises laid down by him lead 
 to these consequences ; that if he maintains the 
 premises, he should accept the consequences ; if 
 he will not consent to accept the consequences, he 
 should abandon the premises. 
 
 When Hamilton criticises Kant's doctrine, he 
 attacks it on the ground that it leads, by logical 
 sequence, to pernicious consequences, to "the 
 worst and most pervading scepticism." Hamilton 
 does not suppose that Kant himself drew these 
 consequences, and advocated this pernicious scep- 
 ticism ; but if it had been urged that Kant per- 
 sonally was no sceptic, and that therefore the 
 objection was null, Hamilton would have laughed 
 at such a style of defence. 
 
 We have previously noticed that one of the 
 objections made against Metaphysics is, that they 
 deal not with realities, but with void abstractions. 
 In support of this objection, it is pointed out that 
 some of the principal metaphysical disputes are 
 about the Finite, the Infinite, the Absolute, the 
 Conditioned, the Unconditioned, the Divine, the 
 Perfect, &c. Here, it is said, we have nothing 
 but bare adjectives, not united with any noun; and 
 investigations about such void abstractions cannot 
 be interesting or profitable. , 
 
 In order to examine this objection, it is proper 
 
PKJNCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 31 
 
 to consider awhile the nature of abstract and 
 general notions. 
 
 A very strange account is sometimes given of 
 these. It is said that the abstract notion of hu- 
 manity is a notion, in which we conceive all the 
 various qualities which different men are capable 
 of possessing, existing in a purely abstract state. 
 That to conceive the general notion of " Man" or 
 "the Human," we must conceive a man who is 
 neither young nor old, short nor tall, clever nor 
 stupid, black nor white, &c. Sometimes, again, 
 it is said that "the Human" denotes a man or 
 object possessing at the same time all the attri- 
 butes which can possibly be predicated of any 
 man ; being at the same time young and old, 
 black, white, red, olive, clever and stupid, good 
 and bad, &c. 
 
 Were this the true account of the nature of 
 abstract and general notions, the only wise course 
 would be to dismiss them at once to limbo. We 
 may, however, denote by the title "abstract and 
 general notions" the mental functions in virtue 
 of which we make an intelligent use of abstract 
 and general terms. And when thus explained, 
 abstract and general notions, so far from being 
 chimerical or useless, are exceedingly valuable, 
 indeed indispensable to the use of language. 
 Language, as Leibnitz and Locke remark, would 
 / be impossible if it were necessary to denote every 
 individual object by a separate word ; it is only 
 classification which makes it possible ; and classifi- 
 
32 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 cation is performed by means of abstraction and 
 generalisation. Abstract notions or conceptions 
 when thus explained are not the exclusive pro- 
 perty of metaphysicians or philosophers, but are 
 constantly used, even by the simplest persons. 
 When a peasant looking at a number of objects on 
 a hill-side calls them all by the name of sheep, or 
 when a cook putting a number of globular objects 
 into a saucepan calls them all peas, these persons 
 perform the functions of generalisation and ab- 
 straction as easily and as unknowingly as Monsieur 
 Jourdain talked prose. If propositions concerning 
 "love" or "beauty" or "marriage" are addressed 
 to a very unlettered maiden, she will not be pre- 
 cluded from understanding them because the words 
 "love," "beauty," &c. are abstract terms, and her 
 intellect is not adequate to the task of framing 
 abstract notions. 
 
 Accordingly we find that abstract and general 
 terms are freely used in works intended for the 
 instruction of simple and uneducated persons. They 
 are abundantly used in the Bible. The proposition, 
 " Godliness with contentment is great gain," is one 
 couched in as abstract terms as any proposition 
 can be ; yet very simple persons are capable of 
 understanding it. They gather from it without 
 difficulty that it is advantageous to a real living 
 person to be godly and contented. Thus the ab- 
 stract expressions convey information concerning 
 that which is concrete and actual. 
 
 And such must always be the case, in order 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 33 
 
 that abstract terms may be profitable. Abstract 
 language is legitimate if it can be interpreted into 
 intelligible statements concerning the concrete, but 
 otherwise it is illegitimate, not fulfilling the true 
 function of language. Schopenhauer with much 
 justice likens abstractions to paper money, which 
 is valuable if convertible, but otherwise valueless. 
 The writer who uses abstract terms may be likened 
 to a banker : if he can convert his abstract lan- 
 guage into intelligible statements concerning the 
 concrete, he may be regarded as solvent ; but 
 if he cannot do this, he mast be pronounced 
 insolvent. 
 
 When metaphysicians discourse about " the 
 Finite," "the Infinite," a the Divine," "the Hu- 
 man," and the like, this test must be applied. If 
 they can convert their language into profitable 
 statements concerning that which exists, or is pos- 
 sible, they are not to be blamed ; but if they can- 
 not give an intelligible interpretation to their 
 language, if their abstractions have no application 
 to the concrete, they must be adjudged guilty of 
 metaphysical insolvency. 
 
 Expressions of the form above noticed are fre- 
 quently used by various writers : for the purpose 
 of illustration I give a few examples. 
 
 Mr. Mill says : " Between the true and the false 
 there is a third possibility, the Unmeaning."* It 
 is not difficult to interpret this. We can under- 
 stand from it that there are three kinds of verbal 
 
 System of Logic, vol. i. p. 305. 
 
 D 
 
34 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 statements : those that are true, those that are 
 false, and those that have no meaning at all. 
 
 In another passage Mr. Mill says : " The paviour 
 who cannot use his rammer without the accus- 
 tomed cry, the orator who had so often while 
 speaking twirled a string in his hand that he be- 
 came unable to speak when he accidentally dropped' 
 it,, are, it seems to me, examples of a customary 
 which did approach to and even reach the neces- 
 sary."* 
 
 Here the adjectival forms of expression, ;i a 
 customary" and " the necessary," are, as in the 
 preceding case, capable of being easily inter- 
 preted. 
 
 In another passage Mr. Mill says : " This, how- 
 ever, is true of the finite as well as of the infinite, 
 of the imperfect as well as of the completed or 
 absolute."')* 
 
 Malebranche says : " Rieii de fini ne peut avoir 
 assez de realite pour representer I'mfini. Or je 
 suis certain que je vois I'infini. Done Tinfini 
 existe."J 
 
 Des Cartes, in the French version, says : " Ceci 
 ne laisse pas d'etre vrai, encore que je ne com- 
 prenne pas 1'infini ; .... car il est de la nature 
 de I'infini que moi qui suis fini et borne ne le 
 puisse comprendre." And again : " Nous ne nous- 
 
 Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 2G3. 
 
 f Ibid. p. 56. 
 
 J Entretiens sur la Metaphysique. 
 
 Meditation troisieme. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 35 
 
 embarrasserons jamais dans les disputes de 1'infini ; 
 d'autant qu'il seroit ridicule que nous, qui sommes 
 finis, entreprissions d'en determiner quelque chose, 
 et par ce moyen le supposer fini en tachant de le 
 comprendre."* 
 
 Again, he speaks of Reason as "la puissance de 
 bien juger, et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux," 
 frequently repeating this mode of expression. 
 
 In Greek we may take as instances : 
 
 TO tlOV TTUV 
 
 ovo ft ot' a/cQ<i>v ro 
 
 yap ro 
 
 Aristotle, speaking of the \oyoi of Socrates, 
 says that they all have ro Kzgirroy, zai TO zop-^ov, 
 xui ro %,uivoro[jjov. 
 
 But indeed in Greek the mode of expression is 
 so familiar that examples might be readily quoted 
 to any extent. 
 
 The following are some further illustrations of 
 the usage. 
 
 Mr. Mansel says, " that life in which the mar- 
 vellous and the familiar are so strangely yet so 
 perfectly united. "f 
 
 Just as Mr. Mansel here uses the adjectival 
 form u the marvellous," so Voltaire uses that of 
 " le merveilleux." He says : " Une grande preuve 
 que les capitaines de Charles VII employaient le 
 merveilleux pour encourager les soldats." 
 
 Mr. Farrar, in his Bampton Lectures, speaks of 
 
 Les Principes de la Philosophie, lore partie, 26. 
 -j- Bampton Lectures, lect. v. p. 163. 
 
36 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Paulus as " attributing the supernatural to ignor- 
 ance," and says that " the appeal to the super- 
 natural" "had never quite died out in the church." 
 Again he says, " the ethical superseded the his- 
 toric." 
 
 Mr. Lecky, in his History of Rationalism, says : 
 "If we pass from the Fathers into the middle 
 ages, we find ourselves in an atmosphere that was 
 dense, and charged with the supernatural." And 
 again: "Generation after generation the province 
 of the miraculous has contracted." 
 
 Dr. Newman says : " Nor does it avail to object 
 that, in this contrast of devotional exercises, the 
 human is sure to supplant the divine, from the 
 infirmity of our nature." 
 
 Mathematicians use the same mode of expres- 
 sion. Professor Sylvester, in his Astronomical 
 Prolusions, speaking of geometry and analysis, 
 says : " The interval between the two is as wide as 
 between empiricism and science, as between the 
 understanding and the reason, or as between the 
 finite and the infinite."* And again, in another 
 mathematical paper, he says : "It often happens 
 that the pursuit of the beautiful and appropriate, 
 or as it may be otherwise expressed, the endeavour 
 after the perfect, is rewarded with a new insight 
 into the true."f 
 
 As examples of a similar usage among poets 
 we may take the following. 
 
 * Philosophical Magazine, January 1866. 
 t Ibid. March 1866. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 37 
 
 Milton says : 
 
 " Discord first, 
 
 Daughter of Sin, among the irrational 
 Death introduce d. " * 
 
 Again : 
 
 a Will he draw out, 
 For anger's sake, finite to infinite?"! 
 
 And again : 
 
 " Prevenient grace descending had removed 
 The stony from their hearts. "{ 
 
 Shelley says : 
 
 " Th' inheritors of unfulfilled renown 
 Rose from their thrones, built above mortal thought, 
 Far in the unapparent." 
 
 Goethe says : 
 
 " Das Unzulangliche 
 Hier wird's Ereigniss ; 
 Das Unbeschreibliche 
 Hier ist es getlian ; 
 Das Ewig-Weibliche 
 Zieht uns hinan." 
 
 The above examples suffice to show that though 
 the mode of expression in question is not usual in 
 colloquial English, yet it is freely employed by 
 writers of very different kinds, and sanctioned by 
 such high authority, that it were vain to denounce 
 it as illegitimate or unmeaning. Metaphysicians 
 therefore cannot be blamed because they talk about 
 "the Finite, "the Infinite," "the True," " the 
 
 c Paradise Lost, book x. f Ibid. J Ibid., book xi. 
 
38 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Divine," &c. ; and it is quite unwarrantable to 
 infer from their use of such expressions that Me- 
 taphysics are about void abstractions. 
 
 It is quite possible that some metaphysicians 
 may have lost their way, and propounded doctrines 
 concerning abstractions which they were incapable 
 of interpreting into truth concerning any thing 
 existent or conceivable. According to the simile 
 above noticed, such writers are unable to cash 
 their notes ; and have fallen into a state of meta- 
 physical insolvency. Schopenhauer particularly 
 accuses Schelling and Hegel of having gone astray 
 in this manner ; and censures them in consequence 
 with great asperity. 
 
 Again, the Platonic theory of Ideas is some- 
 times censured as a vain reverie about mere ab- 
 stractions. But many able philosophers wholly 
 dissent from this view. Kant regards the theory 
 in question as in the main profound and valuable. 
 Schopenhauer, who detests speculations about ab- 
 stractions, and who pursues Schelling and Hegel 
 with biting invective because he thinks they have 
 indulged in it, highly admires Plato's theory of 
 Ideas, regarding it as essentially agreeing with the 
 Kantian doctrine. And Schopenhauer can hardly 
 have been prejudiced in favour of Plato, since he 
 vehemently dislikes and condemns his Theism.* 
 
 It is quite likely that in many cases philoso- 
 phers have gone astray, and lost themselves in a 
 maze of abstractions, admitting of no profitable 
 
 * See Note B. 
 
ITvINCirLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 39 
 
 interpretation. Just in the same way mathema- 
 ticians sometimes lose themselves in a maze of 
 symbols, and produce results which they cannot 
 profitably interpret. But the errors of metaphy- 
 sicians and mathematicians who have gone astray 
 must not be confounded with the nature of meta- 
 physics and mathematics. Both these make use 
 of abstractions : but the purpose of both is to ob- 
 tain a knowledge about really existing things. 
 
 When, therefore, philosophers dispute concern- 
 ing the Finite, the Infinite, the Eelative, the Ab- 
 solute, &c., the profitableness of the dispute will 
 depend upon the mode in which the expressions 
 are interpreted. We shall find different expositors 
 proposing a great variety of interpretations. 
 
 Sometimes it is said that "the Infinite" and 
 "the Absolute" mean infinite and absolute being; 
 and that this signifies abstract being apart from 
 .any attribute unpropertied, unconditioned, unde- 
 termined. Thus the Infinite so explained is held 
 to be neither real nor unreal, neither active nor 
 inactive, neither conscious nor unconscious, &c. 
 Sometimes, again, the Infinite is explained as sig- 
 /nifying a being or object of which every possible 
 attribute is predicated in an infinite degree; which 
 is infinitely real and infinitely unreal; infinitely 
 active and infinitely inactive ; infinitely good and 
 infinitely bad; infinitely powerful and infinitely 
 weak, &c. 
 
 Now when the Infinite and the Absolute are 
 thus explained, it is quite useless to make them 
 
40 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 subjects of discussion; and the so-called Meta- 
 physic, which busies itself about them, should be 
 dismissed, as dealing with void abstractions. 
 
 But it would be perfectly wrong to conclude 
 that statements about " the Finite," "the Infinite," 
 &c. are necessarily illegitimate; that all writers 
 who discourse about them deal with meaningless 
 abstractions. If a writer wishes to say that every 
 thing which we can imagine is Finite; that we 
 cannot imagine any thing that is Infinite, any In- 
 finite thing, or quality, or object,- he may with 
 perfect correctness express this by the compen- 
 dious statement, " The Finite alone is imaginable; 
 the Infinite is unimaginable." In like manner he 
 may correctly say, " The Finite only is conceiv- 
 able ; the Infinite is inconceivable ;" meaning 
 thereby to express that we can conceive only 
 finite objects, and cannot conceive any infinite 
 thing or object. 
 
 We must not suppose that because the expres- 
 sions "the Finite," "the Infinite," "the Pheno- 
 menal," "the Human," have a singular form, and 
 are made to agree with verbs in the singular num- 
 ber, that therefore what is said about them is 
 said only about a single thing or object. In saying 
 that "the Finite is not able to comprehend the 
 Infinite," we assert that no finite mind can com- 
 prehend any infinite object: but the number of 
 Finite minds or intelligent beings concerning whom 
 this incapacity is asserted may be exceedingly 
 great. So we may say in the singular " the Fi- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 41 
 
 nite exists/' though admitting the existence of 
 many finite objects; or again, we may say "the 
 Infinite exists," while we may recognise the exist- 
 ence of many infinite things, or of many infinite 
 persons. In a similar manner, we say in the 
 singular "the nation rejoices," or "the nation 
 mourns;" meaning thereby that a great number 
 of persons rejoice or mourn. 
 
 The perplexities which have been caused in 
 recent debates by the use of expressions of the 
 form above considered show that explanation con- 
 cerning them is not uncalled for; and this must 
 be my excuse for having dwelt on the subject 
 somewhat at length. 
 
 What has been said above concerning the attacks 
 on Metaphysics is in a great measure applicable to 
 similar attacks made against u Ontology." Onto- 
 logy, it is said, is void and vain; since it is dis- 
 course about ro ov, about naked being devoid of 
 attributes, unpropertied and unconditioned ; and 
 discourse about such an empty abstraction must 
 be nugatory. 
 
 To oi>, however, need not be interpreted as sig- 
 nifying naked being without attribute. It may 
 be used to signify that which is, as opposed to ro 
 (paivopzvov or ro ^OKOVV, that which merely seems to 
 be. If a philosopher wishes to express that we 
 cannot know any thing as it really is, that we can 
 know only seeming or appearance, he may express 
 this by saying that we can know only phenomena, 
 and cannot know TO oi> or TO ovrug ov. In this state- 
 
42 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ment ro cv does not signify a nonentity or void 
 abstraction ; but, on the contrary, it signifies some- 
 thing believed to be much more real than pheno- 
 mena. Though here the expression ro w is sin- 
 gular, yet it need not signify only one thing. As 
 ro $aiv6(Mi>ov may be a class including a great number 
 of <paiv6[Mva, so ro v Svrug w may be a class comprising 
 a great number of Svrug ovru. When the expression 
 ro v Sv is used in this latter sense, Ontology will 
 " mean discourse about reality or real things, not 
 .about a nonentity or meaningless abstraction. 
 
 Sometimes the sense of the word " Ontology' 7 
 is shifted in the course of a piece of reasoning; 
 and because Ontology considered as the science 
 of a naked abstraction is nugatory, it is inferred 
 that Ontology in the second sense is nugatory: 
 and thus it is concluded that we can know only 
 illusory appearances, and cannot know real fact or 
 truth. But such a mode of procedure is evidently 
 illegitimate. It may be that we can know only 
 seeming or appearance, not actual fact or truth: 
 but this position cannot be proved by merely shift- 
 ing the sense of " Ontology" or of any other word. 
 Persons who have little taste for Metaphysics 
 sometimes represent them as un-English. Let 
 them, say they, be studied by Germans and other 
 foreigners ; but the British mind is fitted to occupy 
 itself with matters of a more practical and useful 
 description. And indeed, if the object of Meta- 
 physics were to discuss void abstractions, the Bri- 
 tish mind would show its good sense in refusing to 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 43 
 
 meddle with them. We have seen, however, that 
 such is not the object of philosophy; and conse- 
 quently we cannot infer, on such a ground, that 
 the British mind is unphilosophical or non-meta- 
 physical. 
 
 And indeed the truth is, that our island has 
 given birth to numerous thinkers who have shown 
 conspicuous ability in metaphysics. The nation 
 which has produced Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, 
 Hume, Reid, Hamilton, and Mill, besides many 
 other metaphysicians of considerable note, cannot 
 with any justice be deemed to have evinced inca- 
 pacity for metaphysical pursuits.* 
 
 All the above-named philosophers have acted 
 effectively upon European thought; but two of 
 them, viz. Locke and Hume, have done so in a 
 most especial manner. The powerful effect pro- 
 duced by Locke's teaching in France, annulling for 
 a long time that of the native Cartesian school, is 
 sufficiently known. But the philosophical thought 
 of the present day owes more to the influence of 
 Hume. No metaphysical writer in any age or 
 country has exercised a greater influence than 
 
 Schopenhauer frequently praises the English or British meta- 
 physicians, expressing an opinion that their works are not sufficiently 
 studied and valued. He repeatedly testifies the highest admiration 
 of Hume. He also greatly admires Locke, preferring him to Leib- 
 nitz, and to all German metaphysicians with the exception of Kant. 
 In one passage he speaks of him as really a summus pliilosophus, to 
 whose honour it redounds that he was called by Fichte the worst of 
 all philosophers : " em wirklicher summus pliilosophus, Locke, dem 
 es zur Ehre gereicht, von Fichten der schlechteste aller Philosopher! 
 genannt zu seyn." 
 
44 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Hume, the Corypha3us of philosophical sceptics. 
 " In his investigations," says Tennemann, " philo- 
 sophical scepticism appeared with a terrific force, 
 profundity, and logical consequence, such as had 
 never previously been witnessed."* He broke the 
 dogmatic slumber of metaphysicians, among others 
 of Kant and Reid, put the questions of metaphy- 
 sics in a new light, and paved the way directly 
 for the production of the Kritik der Eeinen Vernunft. 
 From his powerful influence springs the modern 
 form of philosophical scepticism which now pre- 
 vails so widely, and which, denounced at first by 
 theologians as pregnant with impiety, has suc- 
 ceeded in rallying a large number of them to its 
 standards, and found in them its warmest ad- 
 herents. 
 
 Hume's scepticism called in question the va- 
 lidity of the human intellect itself. Before him, 
 says Schopenhauer, nobody had doubted that the 
 principle of causality, the principle of sufficient 
 reason, was an eternal and absolute truth, valid 
 for all classes of beings, for men, for angels, and 
 for God. Hume was the first to whom it occurred 
 to question the authority of this principle, and call 
 upon it to show its title-deeds. Schopenhauer does 
 not approve of the answer which Hume gave to the 
 question which he thus put, which he pronounces 
 to be false and easily refutable. (Other philo- 
 sophers, however, such as Mr. Mill, have adopted 
 Hume's solution.) But Hume's merit, says Scho- 
 
 Quoted in Hamilton's Discussions, p. 116. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 45 
 
 penhauer, lay not in the answer, but in the ques- 
 tion itself; which stimulated Kant to still pro- 
 founder researches, and led to a far deeper idealism 
 than that of Berkeley, viz. transcendental idealism 
 a revival of the ancient Yed antic doctrine, by 
 means of which Kant swept away the old dogmatic 
 systems, and changed the face of European phi- 
 losophy. 
 
46 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 NOTE A. 
 
 The different statements made concerning Comte are 
 curious. Mr. Farrar represents him as teaching that 
 science passes through three stages the theistic, the pan- 
 theistic, and the atheistic ; and that its perfection consists 
 in reaching the third stage. He also speaks of his system 
 as silent about God, spirit, and immortality. Dr. Mac Cosh 
 speaks of him as a rabid atheist. Mr. Mill, who evidently 
 wishes to treat him with perfect fairness, asserts that his 
 religion is without a God; that he neither affirmed nor 
 denied the existence of God or Providence. On the other 
 hand, some persons assert that he fervently embraced 
 Theism, regarding atheists with the greatest contempt. 
 So far from being silent about God, it is asserted that 
 he wrote on this theme so copiously as to be even weari- 
 some ; so that less devout persons were tempted to exclaim, 
 66 Avec ton Etre Supreme tu commences a m'embeter." 
 
 These differences of view remind us of the similar ones- 
 concerning Spinosa, who is spoken of by many writers a& 
 a rank atheist, blasphemous and irreligious ; by others as- 
 eminently pure, holy, and inspired by God. 
 
 When we become acquainted with the peculiarities of 
 Comte' s system, when we learn from Mr. Mill and others 
 that he in a manner deified a large portion of the human 
 race and some brute animals, and that he taught a " Posi- 
 tive Fetishism," ascribing some kind of divinity to the 
 . Earth and to pure Space, we can better understand the 
 singular diversities of judgment concerning his doctrine. 
 
 Not unfrequently Comte is looked on as a Secularist, 
 who would divert men from thinking about the invisible, 
 about God, or things remote from earth, and would bid 
 them occupy their thoughts only with the phenomena of 
 this life. But we are assured that his favourite work was 
 
PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 47 
 
 the Imitation of Christy which particularly bids us to think 
 little of this transitory life, and to meditate continually 
 about God, the future state, and the unseen world. 
 
 So too it is often thought that Comte had a great dis- 
 like to Metaphysics. But we are assured that he was 
 particularly fond of Dante, whose great work is full of 
 the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas and the schoolmen. 
 And Mr. Mill tells us that he particularly admired Des 
 Cartes and Leibnitz, ontologians par excellence, regarding 
 them as the greatest philosophers of modern times, and 
 considering their minds to bear the nearest resemblance to 
 his own. Apparently, therefore, he esteemed them much 
 more than he did Locke and the empirical or sensational 
 schools. 
 
 B. 
 
 In one passage Schopenhauer says: "Hatte manjemals 
 Kants Lehre, hatte man seit Kant den Platon eigentlich 
 verstanden mid gefasst, hatte man treu uncl ernst dem 
 innern Sinn mid Gehalt der Lehren beider grosser Meister 
 nachgedacht, statt mit den Kunstausdriicken des eineii um 
 sich zu werfen und den Stil des aiidern zu parodiren ; es 
 hatte nicht fehleii konnen, dass man langst gefuiiden hatte, 
 wie sehr die beideii grossen Weisen ubereinstimmen und 
 die reine Bedeutung, der Zielpunkt beider Lehren, durch- 
 aus derselbe ist." See Welt als Wille, &c. Buch iii., the 
 \ whole of which book is devoted to an exposition of the 
 ' Platonic doctrine of ideas. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE doctrine which lies at the root of philosophical 
 scepticism is that which affirms the relativity of 
 human knowledge and truth. According to this 
 doctrine there is no absolute standard of truth, no 
 standard valid in relation to all judging persons. 
 A statement which is true in relation to A may be 
 false in relation to B, and vice versd ; and neither 
 party is entitled to hold that his opinion is true to 
 the exclusion of the other. Both opinions or judg- 
 ments have a relative truth ; i. e. each is true in 
 relation to the person affirming it ; and we are not 
 warranted in ascribing to either of the judgments 
 any truth other than truth of this description. 
 
 For instance, let us consider judgments ob- 
 tained by the senses. One person, A, tasting 
 chocolate, pronounces it to be pleasant ; another, 
 B, tasting it, pronounces it to be unpleasant. 
 Neither party has a right to say that he cognises 
 the nature of the chocolate more accurately than 
 the other. The one statement is true in relation 
 to A, the other in relation to B, and neither of 
 
tJKj 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 49 
 
 them has a truth higher than this merely relative 
 truth. 
 
 When, therefore, in common parlance we are 
 said to taste the chocolate, we acquire no know- 
 ledge of the chocolate as it really is further than 
 this that, acting in conjunction with "the nerves 
 of our palate, it produces a certain taste or flavour. 
 This flavour is perceived or cognised by us ; but 
 we are not entitled to affirm that it in the least 
 resembles the chocolate itself, i.e. the agent or 
 thing which, acting in conjunction with our nerves, 
 produced the flavour. 
 
 Nor are we entitled to affirm that the flavour 
 experienced or cognised by us, and called by us 
 the taste of chocolate, resembles the flavour ex- 
 perienced by other persons, and called by them 
 the taste of chocolate. A hundred or a thousand 
 persons may taste chocolate, and the flavour expe- 
 rienced by each of them may be entirely different. 
 And no one of them will have a right to say : My 
 constitution is right, and I cognise the true taste 
 of the chocolate ; whilst you, who experience a 
 different taste, err, and do not cognise the choco- 
 late correctly. 
 
 In the case described, the chocolate, considered 
 as an unknown external agent, is called in Kantian 
 language the Noumenon, while the flavour per- 
 ceived when it acts on the nerves of our palate is 
 called the Phenomenon. Thus there are two co- 
 efficients, the external noumenon and the subject 
 (the sentient person) ; and the phenomenon results 
 
 E 
 
50 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 from the joint action of this pair of agents, vary- 
 ing according to the varying constitution of the 
 subject. 
 
 The same applies if we consider the perception 
 of colour. In common parlance we are said to 
 see the colour of an orange, and we pronounce this 
 colour to be yellow. And a child or an unreflect- 
 ing person is apt to believe that in doing this he 
 sees a real quality of the orange ; that the yellow 
 tint perceived by him actually exists on the surface 
 of the orange ; and that all persons who see the 
 orange rightly see the same yellow tint. But a 
 slight acquaintance with physics dispels this view 
 of the matter, and shows that the tint perceived 
 varies, according to the light falling on the orange, 
 and according to the nerves of the person who 
 looks at it. A hundred persons may look at the 
 same orange, and all may see a different tint, 
 though they may all call this tint by the same 
 name of yellow. 
 
 The judgments, therefore, concerning the taste 
 of the chocolate and colour of the orange are said 
 to be knowledge of a merely relative kind. In 
 terming this knowledge " relative," it is not meant 
 merely that it implies relation, the relation of 
 subject and object ; for absolute knowledge, i. e. 
 knowledge valid in relation to all knowers, would 
 equally do this. But it is meant that the relation 
 between subject and object is of such a kind that 
 truth varies according to the varying constitution 
 of the subject, so that what is true in relation to 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 51 
 
 one subject, or one mental constitution, is not true 
 in relation to another. 
 
 Let us now consider the perception of form or 
 extension. Looking at an orange and taking it in 
 our hands, we pronounce that it is round of a 
 nearly spherical form. Ordinary persons believe 
 that the orange really has this form ; that all per- 
 sons who perceive or judge rightly must ascribe 
 to it this form, and no other. And many philoso- 
 phers, who readily admit that our knowledge of 
 flavours and colours is merely relative, agree with 
 the vulgar in reference to our knowledge of ex- 
 tension, holding that our knowledge in this case 
 is absolutely true ; knowledge of real external 
 fact. 
 
 But the doctrine of Relativity, which asserts 
 that all human knowledge is merely relative, does 
 not tolerate such a view. According to it, our 
 knowledge of the form of the orange is just as 
 relative as our knowledge of its colour and taste. 
 Like them, it is produced by the joint action of 
 the noumenon and the subject. The noumenon, 
 which is unseen and unknown, acting in conjunc- 
 tion with our perceptive or mental faculty, pro- 
 duces a phenomenon which we cognise as spherical. 
 But the spherical phenomenon thus produced may 
 be no more like the noumenon than the colour or 
 flavour produced by its action on our nerves. The 
 noumenon may not be spherical ; it may not be 
 extended or exist in space at all. Moreover this 
 noumenon, acting on the faculties of other beings, 
 
52 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 may produce a phenomenon of a form quite unlike 
 that which we perceive and cognise. 
 
 According to these two opinions, a totally dif- 
 ferent view is taken of the truth of geometrical 
 science. The one set of philosophers consider that 
 the propositions demonstrated by Euclid are uni- 
 versal truths ; that they are true in relation to all 
 intelligent beings ; and they express this by say- 
 ing that their truth is absolute. According to the 
 other philosophers, the truth of these propositions 
 is merely relative: they are true in relation to 
 beings whose minds are constituted in a particular 
 way; while they may be totally false in relation 
 to beings whose minds are differently constituted. 
 
 It is to be observed that when the Absolutist 
 philosophers declare these propositions to be uni- 
 versal truths, valid in relation to all intelligences, 
 they do not mean to assert that they are univer- 
 sally recognised as true, or assented to. The con- 
 trary is notorious. It is well known that men are 
 capable of disbelieving the propositions of Euclid ; 
 and that they may act on a belief concerning geo- 
 metrical figures quite opposed to his demonstra- 
 tions.* But the Absolutists assert that this in no 
 way affects the truth of the propositions, which 
 do not become false because they are disbelieved. 
 
 As an instance of this, it is on record that a water- company, 
 who had supplied water to some works through a pipe of a certain 
 diameter, agreed to supply them through a pipe of twice the 
 diameter for twice the former price ; believing that the volumes 
 of the water discharged would vary as the diameters of the pipes, 
 i. e. that the areas of the pipes varied as the diameters. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 53 
 
 When, therefore, they affirm these propositions to 
 be universal truths, they do not mean that they are 
 universally assented to ; but that they are assented 
 to by all persons who judge rightly, and that they 
 cannot be denied by any person without error. 
 
 A precisely similar difference of opinion exists 
 in reference to Time, and our judgments concerning 
 time, and objects enduring or changing in time. 
 
 The same dispute exists concerning the prin- 
 ciple of Causality or of sufficient Reason. Some 
 philosophers ascribe to this an absolute or univer- 
 sal truth ; while others think that it is true only in 
 relation to intellects of a particular type; or again, 
 \that it may be true on earth, but false in Sirius or 
 in distant stars. And there is a similar dispute 
 concerning our other intellectual conceptions, such 
 as those of Existence, Substance, Reality, Relation, 
 Unity, Plurality, &c. 
 
 But the most important application of the 
 doctrine of relativity is that which concerns our 
 moral principles and judgments. Concerning these 
 there is a similar difference of opinion. Some 
 philosophers, who willingly ascribe a merely re- 
 lative character to our physical and geometrical 
 knowledge, refuse to ascribe a similar character 
 to our moral judgments. They grant that in 
 cognising the taste of chocolate we cognise a phe- 
 nomenon which may be quite different from the 
 iioumenon, and quite different from that cognised 
 by other persons, and thus obtain no knowledge 
 of the chocolate, except that it produces a certain 
 
54 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 affection in us. But the case, say they, is other- 
 wise when we cognise the will, character, or moral 
 disposition of a man. In this case, say they, we 
 do not cognise merely a sentiment produced by 
 the noumenon in us, but we cognise the character 
 or disposition which really belongs to the real 
 man. If one person assert this to be morally 
 good, and another to be morally bad, we must not 
 say that both these judgments are relatively true ;. 
 but we must hold that one of them is true con- 
 formable to fact, and the other false not con- 
 formable to fact. Herein, as they contend, these 
 judgments differ from those of two persons, one 
 of whom asserts that chocolate is pleasant, and 
 the other that it is unpleasant; these latter judg- 
 ments having a merely relative truth, and neither 
 being superior to the other. 
 
 In like manner these philosophers hold that 
 there is an absolute standard of moral good and 
 moral evil; so that certain moral principles have 
 a universal validity, and are binding on all moral 
 beings, at all, times and in all parts of the Uni- 
 verse. They refuse to allow that the fundamental 
 principles of Morals, held to be true in relation 
 to man, may be false in relation to angels or to 
 God ; or, again, that they may be true on earth, 
 but false in distant parts of the stellar universe. 
 
 The doctrine of relativity, which declares all. 
 human truth to be merely relative, condemns this 
 view of the subject. According to it, our moral 
 judgments are no less relative than our judgments 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 55 
 
 about form, taste, colour, &c. Like them they 
 are produced by the joint action of the noumenon 
 and the subject, and give us a knowledge only of 
 phenomena. A certain noumenon, acting in con- 
 junction with the mind or nature of A, produces a 
 certain phenomenon, exciting in A the sentiment 
 of moral approbation. But the phenomenon thus 
 produced may be wholly unlike the noumenon, 
 just as the taste or colour produced by a nou- 
 menon may be wholly unlike it. Again, the phe- 
 nomenon produced may be wholly unlike that 
 which the same noumenon produces in the mind 
 or faculties of another subject differently consti- 
 tuted. The noumenon which, acting in conjunc- 
 tion with A's faculties, excites in him a sentiment 
 of moral approbation, acting in conjunction with B 
 may produce a sentiment of moral disapprobation. 
 A and B each cognise the sentiment experienced 
 by each respectively; just as in tasting chocolate 
 each cognises the flavour which he himself experi- 
 ences ; but in neither case does the sentiment or 
 phenomenon experienced afford any knowledge of 
 the properties or nature of the noumenon. 
 
 As to the absolute standard of good and evil 
 affirmed by the Absolutist philosophers, the doc- 
 trine of relativity denies its existence. It de- 
 clares that moral good and evil are merely rela- 
 tive, varying with the peculiar structure and con- 
 stitution of the judging subject, so that what is 
 good in relation to one man may be bad in rela- 
 tion to another ; and moral principles which are 
 

 56 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 true in relation to man may be false in relation to 
 angels or to God. 
 
 This relativist doctrine is expounded on some 
 occasions by Hume, who writes concerning it as 
 follows : 
 
 " If we can depend upon any principle which 
 we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be 
 considered as certain and undoubted that there 
 is nothing in itself valuable or despicable, desir- 
 able or hateful, beautiful or deformed ; but that 
 these attributes arise from the particular constitu- 
 tion and fabric of human sentiment and affection. 
 What seems the most delicious food to one animal 
 appears loathsome to another. What affects the 
 feeling of one with delight produces uneasiness in 
 another. This is confessedly the case with regard 
 to all the bodily senses. But if we examine the 
 matter more accurately, we shall find that the 
 same observation holds even where the mind con- 
 curs with the body."* 
 
 " We may push the same observation further, 
 and may conclude, that even when the mind ope- 
 rates alone, and, feeling the sentiment of blame 
 or approbation, pronounces one object deformed 
 and odious, another beautiful and amiable, I say 
 that even in this case those qualities are not really 
 in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment 
 of that mind which blames or praises. You will 
 never convince a man who is not accustomed to 
 Italian music, and has not an ear to follow its 
 
 Hume's Essays, Essay xviii. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 57 
 
 intricacies, that a Scotch tune is not preferable. 
 You have not even a single argument beyond 
 your own taste which you can employ in your 
 behalf. And to your own antagonist his parti- 
 cular taste will always appear a more convincing 
 argument to the contrary. If you be wise, each 
 of you will allow that the other may be in the 
 right ; and having many other instances of this 
 diversity of taste, you will both confess that beauty 
 and worth are merely of a relative nature, and 
 consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an 
 object in a particular mind, according to the pecu- 
 liar structure and constitution of that mind."* 
 
 Again he says : 
 
 "We have already observed that no objects 
 are in themselves desirable or odious, valuable or 
 despicable ; but that objects acquire those qualities 
 from the particular character and constitution of 
 the mind which surveys them. To diminish, there- 
 fore, or augment any person's value for an object, 
 to excite or moderate his passions, there are no 
 direct arguments or reasons which can be employed 
 with any force or influence. The catching of flies, 
 like Domitian, if it give more pleasure, is preferable 
 to the hunting of wild beasts, like William Rufus, 
 or conquering of kingdoms, like Alexander."! 
 
 The diversity of human tastes and sentiments, 
 and the discrepancy of moral judgments, is a topic 
 copiously insisted on by the advocates of the doc- 
 trine of relativity. They point out that practices 
 
 Hume's Essays, Essay xviii. f Ibid. 
 
58 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 which are admired in one country are censured in 
 another ; that one religion enjoins as holy what 
 another condemns as detestable. Some persons 
 especially admire hermits, monks, and saints, St. 
 Jerome, St. Dominic, St. Francis, St. Thomas 
 Aquinas ; others regard such a type of character 
 as very defective, while greatly admiring that of 
 Alexander, of Ccesar, of Cromwell, of Napoleon. 
 Some persons greatly admire Danton, Fouquier 
 Tinville, Marat, Eobespierre ; while others detest 
 them. The Orientals are prone to reverence as 
 divine conquerors like Timour, who devastate 
 wide regions and erect pyramids of human skulls.* 
 Victor Hugo remarks on the profound admiration 
 expressed by Cantemir for the Turkish Sultans, 
 their most cruel acts appearing perfectly right in 
 his eyes. Ivan the Terrible is regarded by some 
 as a monster of cruelty ; but we are told that the 
 Russians reverenced him as almost partaking of a 
 divine character. And throughout the world gene- 
 rally, it will be found that some persons ascribe to 
 God and adore as divine a type of character which 
 others regard as cruel and odious. 
 
 Then, again, we are told to look at the great 
 diversity of human tastes ; that which causes pain 
 to one person causing delight to another. One 
 person delights in tranquil meditation, another in 
 litigation, another in war and bloodshed. One 
 person sympathises with his fellows, so that he 
 
 M. Hue gives as the refrain of a popular Mongolian song, 
 " ame divine de Timour, quand renaitras tu ?'' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 59 
 
 cannot bear to see them in pain ; but others derive 
 pleasure from witnessing pain and torment. This 
 taste was very strong in some of the Eoman 
 Emperors and Italian tyrants, affording to them a 
 principal source of gratification. Gilles de Laval, 
 a French nobleman of high position and reputation, 
 found such pleasure in witnessing torments, that 
 he systematically kidnapped children, whom he 
 tortured and put to death. He confessed to have 
 thus murdered more than 600 children, describing 
 the pleasure which he derived from this procedure 
 as exquisite, and the impulse to indulge in it as 
 irresistible. Whilst acting in this way he was 
 particularly assiduous in his attendance at Mass 
 and the ceremonies of the Church.* Ivan the 
 Terrible had, it is stated, a similar taste, torturing 
 victims with his own hands, and inflicting torture 
 on women previous to subjecting them to his 
 embraces. 
 
 Under such circumstances, it is asked, how can 
 it be supposed that man has any absolute standard 
 of right and wrong, of good and evil ? Evidently 
 that which is good in relation to one man is evil 
 in relation to another ; that which excites in one 
 man the sentiment of pleasure and approbation 
 excites in another the sentiment of uneasiness and 
 blame. It is therefore impossible that our moral 
 judgments can be absolute, or can give us any 
 cognition of the properties of noumena. They 
 
 An account of Gilles de Laval, and of other persons of similar 
 constitution, is given in a work by Mr. Baring Gould. 
 
60 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 give us cognition only of a sentiment produced 
 partly by the noumenon and partly by the sub- 
 ject, and varying according to the constitution of 
 the subject. One person says that Christ is good 
 and Ivan bad ; but another may hold that Ivan is 
 good and Christ bad. Each has an accurate cog- 
 v nition of his own sentiment ; but neither has any 
 knowledge of the noumena. The truth of the 
 judgments is in both cases merely relative. Rela- 
 tively to one sort of subject Christ is good and 
 Ivan bad ; relatively to another sort Ivan is good 
 and Christ bad ; and neither class of subjects is 
 entitled to say : My constitution is right, and yours 
 is wrong. And even if all mankind agreed in re- 
 garding as true certain moral judgments or prin- 
 ciples, we should be no nearer the attainment of 
 absolute truth ; since judgments which are true 
 in relation to man may be false in relation to angels 
 or to God, or to beings inhabiting distant portions 
 of the stellar Universe. 
 
 Some philosophers admit that there is de facto 
 a certain moral standard binding at present on all 
 men living on the earth ; but they do not hold 
 that this standard is permanent, universal, absolute. 
 Ten thousand years hence men may be regulated 
 by a very different standard. At the present time 
 the inhabitants of Jupiter, or of distant parts of 
 the stellar regions, or angels, may be regulated by 
 moral standards inconceivably different from the 
 one now valid on earth. Thus according to this 
 view our moral ideas and reason are merely regu- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 61 
 
 lative ; they are fit to guide us practically during 
 our present life, but they cannot afford to us any 
 knowledge or conception of the absolute morality 
 of God. 
 
 A doctrine of this kind has been thought by 
 some theologians to offer great advantages for the 
 defence of orthodox dogma and the refutation of 
 Eationalists. A staple objection urged by these 
 against several theological doctrines is, that they 
 are repugnant to our moral sense, since they as- 
 cribe to God a character not conformable to our 
 idea of goodness. Such objections, it is thought, 
 can be summarily disposed of, if it can be shown 
 that the truth of our moral judgments is relative, 
 not absolute ; that they merely tell us what is right 
 or wrong according to a human standard, not what 
 is right or wrong according to the principles of 
 the divine morality. 
 
 Doctrines of this nature have, as Mr. Mill ob- 
 serves, been frequently advocated by theologians ;* 
 but lately they have attracted especial attention on 
 account of the vigour and ability with which they 
 have been urged by Mr. Mansel in his celebrated 
 Bampton Lectures. 
 
 One ecclesiastical dogma which is often objected 
 
 e " That we cannot understand God ; that his ways are not our 
 ways ; that we cannot scrutinise or judge his counsels, propositions 
 which, in a reasonable sense of the terms, could not be denied by 
 any Theist, have often before been tendered as reasons why we 
 may assert any absurdities and any moral monstrosities concerning 
 God, and miscall them Goodness and Wisdom." Mill's Examination 
 of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 90. 
 
62 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 to on the grounds above mentioned is the doctrine 
 of Vicarious Punishment. This represents that 
 men being sinful and guilty, and deserving eternal 
 punishment, God, desiring to relieve them from 
 this, inflicts punishment on an innocent substitute, 
 and accepts this punishment in lieu of that merited 
 by the guilty persons.* The claims of justice be- 
 ing thus satisfied, the guilt of the sinners is ex- 
 piated ; God is reconciled to them, treats them 
 with favour, and, provided they believe that their 
 guilt has thus been expiated, confers upon them 
 everlasting bliss. 
 
 A great number of writers have at various times 
 objected strongly to this doctrine. Some of the 
 principal objections which have been urged against 
 it are quoted by Mr. Mansel in his Bampton 
 Lectures. 
 
 Socinus, quoted by him, says : " Quid enim 
 iniquius quam insontem pro sontibus puniri, prce- 
 sertim cum ipsi sontes adsunt, qui ipsi puniri 
 possunt?" Froude, also quoted by Mr. Mansel, 
 objects on very similar grounds : " That each 
 should have his exact due is just is the best for 
 himself. That the consequence of his guilt should 
 be transferred from him to one who is innocent 
 (although that innocent one be himself willing to 
 accept it), whatever else it be, is not justice." 
 
 Coleridge also objects to the doctrine in ques- 
 tion. " Is it possible," he asks, " to assent to the 
 
 * What is here said of men generally is by some theologians 
 said only of the Elect. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 63 
 
 doctrine of redemption as at present promulgated, 
 that the moral death of an unoffending being 
 should be a consequence of the transgression of 
 humanity and its atonement?" 
 
 Some theologians combat these objections by 
 urging that the principle of Vicarious Punishment 
 does not shock the human sense of justice; but on 
 the contrary recommends itself to it. It is asserted 
 that this principle was employed in the education 
 of James I. ; that when this prince committed a 
 misdemeanour, he was punished not in proprid 
 persona, but by proxy a flogging being inflicted 
 on a boy who was kept for the purpose.* 
 
 Further, it is pointed out that this principle is 
 extensively used in China. In a recent article in 
 the Fortnightly Review Sir J. Bowring gives some 
 interesting particulars concerning this. He says : 
 
 " As was said of old time, 4 An eye for an eye, 
 and a tooth for a tooth/ so the Chinese still recog- 
 nise the principle that the penalty to be paid for a 
 crime need not be visited on the criminal himself; 
 but that the substitution of an innocent for a guilty 
 person to bear the award of the law may satisfy all 
 the demands of justice. In the embarrassments of 
 the imperial treasury during the last war, procla- 
 mations of the emperor frequently appeared in the 
 Peldn Gazette, authorising the commutation of the 
 judicial sentences which inflicted personal punish- 
 ment by the payment of sums of money, to be 
 
 I. think I have seen a similar statement concerning the edu- 
 cation of Charles I. 
 
64 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 estimated according to the gravity of the offence 
 and the rank or opulence of the offender. Men 
 are to be found as candidates for the scaffold when 
 a large remuneration is offered for the sacrifice of 
 life. To such a sacrifice posthumous honour is 
 frequently attached ; a family is rescued from po- 
 verty, and enters on the possession of comparative 
 wealth." 
 
 " In the history of the intercourse of the East 
 India Company with the Chinese, it will be found 
 that the authorities were never satisfied with the 
 averment that the individual charged with offences 
 could not be found ; they always insisted that some 
 English subject could be found, and delivered over 
 to the penalties of the law. They invariably took 
 high ground, asserted that the laws of China must 
 be respected in China, and that those laws provided 
 a certain and always applicable punishment, by 
 which the demands of justice might and ought to 
 be satisfied. They turned a deaf ear to the repre- 
 sentation that, according to European law, the in- 
 dividual who had committed a crime was the only 
 proper person to be punished for that crime; and 
 considered it a sort of c barbarian 7 notion that any 
 crime should be passed over without being followed 
 by the appropriate penalty visiting somebody or 
 other." 
 
 These examples, however, by no means satisfy 
 the Rationalist objectors, who contend that though 
 the principle in question may be recognised by the 
 Chinese and by other nations, it is still essentially 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 65 
 
 unjust. Suppose, in England, a Greenacre, or 
 Palmer, or Pritchard, having been convicted of 
 a murder, were allowed to purchase a substitute 
 who should be hung in his stead, would such a 
 proceeding, they ask, be tolerated? would it be 
 held that the majesty of law was vindicated, and 
 the claims of justice satisfied? or would it not be 
 felt that one grievous wrong was added to another ? 
 This sentiment of reasonable Englishmen is, they 
 contend, correct ; and that of the Chinese mistaken 
 and barbarous. 
 
 Some theologians feel that the mode of defence 
 above considered is very precarious, and accord- 
 ingly think it better to adopt a different one, 
 founded on the doctrine of relativity. They 
 admit that, according to the standard of human 
 reason, the English principle is correct, and the 
 Chinese wrong ; that, in the human administration 
 of justice, the person who has committed a crime 
 is the only person on whom the punishment of the 
 crime ought to be inflicted. But this, they urge, 
 is no objection to the theological dogma, since hu- 
 man morality is merely relative ; and consequently 
 the principles of human and divine justice may be 
 essentially different. Vicarious punishment may 
 be unjust according to the standard of human rea- 
 son ; but we cannot hence infer that it is incom- 
 patible with the principles of divine justice. 
 
 Again, Rationalists object to the doctrine which 
 asserts that true believers a small portion of 
 mankind are saved, while the rest of the human 
 
 F 
 
66 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 race is consigned to everlasting torment. This 
 doctrine has been taught with great zeal by many 
 theologians. Tertullian, in a well-known passage 
 quoted by Mr. Lecky, represents the spectacle of 
 the sufferings of the damned as one of the chief 
 delights enjoyed by the elect in heaven. " How 
 shall I wonder ! how shall I laugh ! how shall I 
 rejoice! how shall I triumph, when I behold so 
 many and such illustrious kings, who were said to 
 have mounted into heaven, groaning with Jupiter 
 their god in the lowest darkness of hell ! Then 
 shall the tragedians exert their vocal powers more 
 loudly, under the stimulus of their own calamity. 
 Then will the actors be seen to advantage, ren- 
 dered nimbler and more supple by the heat 
 
 Compared with such spectacles, with su.ch subjects 
 of triumph as these, what can praetor or consul, 
 quasstor or priest, afford? and even now faith can 
 bring them near, imagination can depict them as 
 present."* 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas, a very placid saint, quite 
 free from the impetuosity of the fervid African, 
 teaches a similar doctrine concerning the enjoy- 
 ment which the elect will derive from witnessing 
 
 r") 
 
 the torments of the damned. He pronounces 
 "Beati in regno coelesti videbunt poenas damna- 
 
 torum, UT BEATITUDO ILLIS MAGIS COMrLACEAT."f 
 
 And this doctrine was considered perfectly ortho- 
 
 See Lecky's History of Rationalism, vol. i. p. 356. 
 f Quoted by Mr. Lecky, History of nationalism, vol. i. p. 
 350. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 67 
 
 dox, and held by many eminent theologians and 
 saints. 
 
 Now, say Rationalists, we refuse to believe that 
 God and saints in heaven can derive pleasure from 
 such a source. We cannot think that they have 
 tastes analogous to those of Gilles de Laval and 
 Ivan ; so that a relish is added to their delights by 
 the contemplation of agony in others. We cannot 
 believe that, under the governance of an omnipo- 
 tent and beneficent Being, a large portion of the 
 Universe should be peopled by wretched beings 
 who live in everlasting sin and torment, and that 
 this should contribute to the glory of God and the 
 enjoyment of his saints. 
 
 But all these difficulties are summarily silenced, 
 if it can be shown that the human standard of 
 morality is not absolute; that the finite mercy 
 and goodness of man may be very different from 
 the infinite mercy and goodness of God ; and that 
 the mercy and goodness of the beatified elect may 
 resemble the divine, not the human type. 
 
 Another doctrine, which has been taught by 
 theologians, and censured by Rationalists, is that 
 which declares that Baptism is necessary to sal- 
 vation, and that infants who die unbaptised are 
 damned. This doctrine has been zealously taught 
 by theologians of the highest repute. St. Augus- 
 tine's labours in enforcing it are well known. He 
 refused to listen to the speculation that the infants 
 went to a separate region, less terrible than the 
 abode of Satan and his company ; maintaining that 
 
68 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 they went to hell in the strictest sense, and de- 
 scended into everlasting fire. Mr. Lecky gives 
 references to St. Augustine's teaching on this sub- 
 ject, and he also quotes the following statement of 
 the doctrine from St. Fulgentius : 
 
 " Be assured, and doubt not, that not only men 
 who have obtained .the use of their reason, but also 
 little children who have begun to live in their mo- 
 ther's womb and have there died, or who, having 
 been just born, have passed away from the world 
 without the sacrament of holy baptism, adminis- 
 tered in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy 
 Ghost, must be punished by the eternal torture of 
 undying fire: for although they have committed 
 no sin by their own will, they have nevertheless 
 drawn with them the condemnation of original sin 
 by their carnal conception and nativity."* 
 
 It has been ruled by some divines that the in- 
 fants sentenced to this doom retain in the infernal 
 regions their tiny dimensions and feeble locomotive 
 powers; so that, as they insist, there are u infants 
 not a span long crawling on the floor of hell." 
 
 Some theologians do not consider it perfectly 
 certain that infants who die unbaptised are dam- 
 ned; but they regard it as very probable, and 
 censure those who refuse to admit this, as rash and 
 dogmatising. Others do not hold that all infants 
 who die unbaptised are damned, since they think it 
 possible that some of them may be elect. Accord- 
 ing to their doctrine, a portion of the infants in 
 
 tt Lecky's History of Rationalism, vol. i. p. 397. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 69 
 
 question are saved and a portion damned. Ration- 
 alists object to these doctrines as to the preceding 
 one, on the ground that they ascribe to God con- 
 duct which shocks our ideas of mercy, justice, and 
 goodness. Nor do the advocates of the doctrines 
 in question seek to deny this; on the contrary, 
 they sometimes dwell on the point with triumph. 
 Pascal says : " Qu'y a-t-il de plus contraire aux 
 regies de notre miserable justice que de damner 
 eternellement un enfant incapable de volonte' pour 
 un peche ou il paroit avoir eu si peu de part, qu'il 
 est commis six mille ans avant qu'il fut en etre? 
 Certainement rien ne nous heurte plus rudement 
 que cette doctrine, et cependant sans ce mystere, 
 le plus incomprehensible de tous, nous sommes 
 incomprehensibles a nous-memes."* 
 
 We are thus, it is thought, reduced to the fol- 
 lowing pass: either we must deny the doctrine 
 concerning baptism and original sin, so generally 
 taught by the Church and divines, or we must 
 assent to the doctrine of the Relativists; viz. that 
 the mercy and goodness of man may be very differ- 
 ent from the infinite goodness and mercy of God. 
 
 Another doctrine taught by many theologians 
 is that concerning Predestination and Election. 
 This affirms that whereas all mankind are in their 
 own nature totally devoid of goodness, God, by an 
 act of undeserved favour, elects a portion of them 
 to be partakers of everlasting bliss, while he does 
 not so elect the others; it seeming to him right 
 
 Quoted by Mr. Lecky from the Pensees, chap. iii. 8. 
 
70 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 and fit that these latter should not be saved, and 
 should pass to everlasting torment. He is supposed 
 to actuate the elect by his grace, so that they be- 
 lieve aright, and are thus justified; but, as it is 
 not designed that the non-elect shall be saved, he 
 does not influence them in like manner ; he either 
 does not act on them at all, or he acts upon them 
 in such a manner that the grace is not operative ; 
 so that right belief is not produced, and their hearts 
 remain hardened. 
 
 These doctrines have been taught by very emi- 
 nent theologians by St. Augustine, Luther, Cal- 
 vin, and a great many others. Hamilton quotes 
 the Confession of Faith of the Church of Scotland, 
 which declares that " God from all eternity did, by 
 the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, 
 freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes 
 to pass."* 
 
 Thus, according to this doctrine, the salvation 
 of the elect and the damnation of the reprobate 
 have been ordained unchangeably from all eter- 
 nity, and when a man is born into the world 
 his fate is irrevocably determined. And it is 
 further taught, by a general consensus, that the 
 number of the reprobate predestined to damnation 
 greatly exceeds that of the elect predestined to 
 salvation. 
 
 Hamilton remarks that the Westminster Con- 
 fession of Faith agrees in teaching the same doc- 
 
 Hamilton's Dissertations, appended to his edition of Reid, 
 p. 977. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 71 
 
 trine. And Mr. Young quotes from this Confes- 
 sion the following declaration : 
 
 " By the decree of God, for the manifestation 
 of his glory, some men and angels are predestined 
 unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to 
 everlasting death." 
 
 And again : 
 
 " The rest of mankind" (i. e. all the human 
 race except the elect) " God was pleased, according 
 to the unsearchable counsel of his own will .... 
 to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and 
 wrath for their sins, to the praise of his glorious 
 justice."* 
 
 Luther says: "Hie est fidei summus gradus, 
 credere ilium esse .... justum, qui sua voluntate 
 nos necessario damnabiles facit."f 
 
 The theologians who hold that the damnation 
 of the reprobate is unchangeably ordained from all 
 eternity by the wise and holy counsel of God, 
 plead in its support the authority of Scripture, 
 especially statements of St. Paul such as the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 " For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on 
 whom I will have mercy, and I will have compas- 
 sion on whom I will have compassion. 
 
 " So then it is not of him that willeth, nor 
 of him that runneth, but of God that showeth 
 mercy. . . . 
 
 * The Life and Light of Men, p. 492. 
 
 f Concerning Luther's statements on the subject, see Hamilton's 
 Discussions, pp. 505-510. 
 
72 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 " Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will 
 have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. . . . 
 
 u Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he 
 yet find fault? . . . Nay but, man, who art thou 
 that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed 
 say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made 
 me thus? 
 
 " Hath not the potter power over the clay, of 
 the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and 
 another unto dishonour? 
 
 " What if God, willing to show his wrath, and 
 to make his power known, endured with much 
 longsuifering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruc- 
 tion; and that he might make known the riches 
 of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had 
 before prepared unto glory?"* 
 
 It is particularly urged that the elect are not 
 chosen on account of any merit or good quality in 
 themselves, but entirely by the undeserved favour 
 of God. As the potter, taking clay of the same 
 lump^ converts a portion of it into honourable 
 vessels, and a portion of it into mean vessels, so, it 
 is contended, God, taking human beings of the same 
 quality, equally destitute of merit, converts some 
 of them, by his grace, into vessels of glory, while 
 he does not treat the others in the same Vay. 
 
 Here again Eationalists raise objections. Let 
 it be, say they, that the potter treats the clay with 
 which he works entirely according to his own good 
 will and pleasure; fashioning some portions of it 
 
 St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, chap. ix. verses 15-23. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 73 
 
 into pots or pipkins, and some portions, of no better 
 quality, into beautiful vases. We do not blame his 
 procedure. But the circumstance which, in our 
 eyes, justifies this arbitrary handling on the part of 
 the potter is, that the material fashioned by him is 
 unconscious, not capable of happiness and misery. 
 Suppose that the clay manipulated by him were 
 conscious, and that he formed some of it into happy 
 and some into miserable vessels. A difficulty would 
 then be imported into the matter which did not 
 previously exist. And if the happiness and misery 
 of the vessels resulting from the different modes of 
 treatment were everlasting, the difficulty would be 
 increased. Under such circumstances, a vessel of 
 wrath, doomed to everlasting misery, could hardly 
 feel that it had been justly treated. It would natu- 
 rally ask, " Why was I made a vessel of wrath, 
 eternally wicked and wretched, when other pieces 
 of clay, of exactly the same quality, have been 
 made vessels of glory, and enjoy everlasting happi- 
 ness?" And if it was told, u You have no right to 
 complain, for you have been entirely made by the 
 potter, and the thing formed has no right to com- 
 plain of the person who formed it," it could hardly 
 be satisfied by such an answer; it could hardly be 
 convinced thereby that its complaints were unrea- 
 sonable, or that the procedure of the potter dis- 
 played benevolence and justice. 
 
 The doctrine which asserts that God has a per- 
 fect right to deal as he pleases with his own, and 
 that the thing formed has no right to complain of 
 
74 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 him that formed it, is strongly held by some Ma- 
 hometan theologians. Mr. Palgrave mentions a 
 tradition current in the East, and much admired 
 by the Wahabees, which says that " when God 
 resolved to create the human race, he took into 
 his hands a mass of earth, the same whence all 
 mankind were to be formed, and in which they, 
 after a manner, preexisted; and having then di- 
 vided the clod into two equal portions, he threw 
 the one half into hell, saying, i These to eternal 
 fire, and I care not;' and projected the other half 
 into heaven, adding, ' And these to Paradise, and I 
 care not.' "* 
 
 In this statement God is represented as or- 
 daining the damnation of men with insouciance; 
 whereas in the Scotch Confession he is repre- 
 sented as doing so by a most wise and holy counsel. 
 But the Mahometan asserts quite as strongly as 
 the Calvinist that God's procedure in the matter 
 is perfectly wise and holy. And if the goodness 
 of God is essentially different from that of wise and 
 holy men, carelessness about the fate of his crea- 
 tures may be perfectly compatible with his wis- 
 dom and holiness. His wisest and holiest course 
 may be to refrain from electing vast multitudes of 
 his creatures, and to ordain unchangeably their 
 everlasting wickedness and torment, without for 
 one moment disturbing on such an account his 
 own blissful serenity. 
 
 Another difference between the two doctrines 
 
 * Palgrave's Travels in Arabia, vol. i. p. 3G7. 
 
, 
 
 1 1 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 75 
 
 may be noted in this, that according to the Maho- 
 metans, half the lump of clay is sent to heaven and 
 half to hell; whereas, according to the Christian 
 predestinarians, the number of persons sent to hell 
 greatly exceeds that of the saved, who are but 
 a select few, a very small portion of the human 
 race. 
 
 The objections urged by Rationalists against 
 the dogmas of Predestination and Election present 
 grave difficulties so long as it is assumed that 
 divine goodness and human goodness are iden- 
 tical, or closely alike. But the Relativist Theolo- 
 gians, who regard the divine morality as very 
 different from the human, make light of them. 
 They even welcome the difficulties set forth, and 
 press them into the service of their theory. How, 
 they ask, could a Being, animated with goodness 
 and mercy, according to the human notion of those 
 qualities, unchangeably ordain the everlasting 
 wickedness and torment of unnumbered millions 
 of his creatures ? How could a Being, animated 
 with human benevolence and compassion, " harden 
 whom he will" ? for how could he will or desire 
 to harden any human heart ? How could he make, 
 or suffer to be made, vessels of wrath, fitted for 
 destruction ; i. e. fitted for the companionship of 
 devils and everlasting wickedness ? By the mere 
 movement of his will he could with the greatest 
 ease make this same material a vessel of mercy ; for 
 the elect, whom he prepares for everlasting glory, 
 are not in their own nature a whit better than the 
 
76 AN EXAMINATION OE THE 
 
 reprobate. If he conferred on both an equal 
 measure of his grace, acting in an equally efficient 
 manner, both would believe and be converted with 
 equal facility. Of course, if his goodness and com- 
 passion were identical with the human qualities 
 styled by those names, he would act on all effi- 
 ciently, so that all would believe and be saved. As 
 he does not act in this way, it is sufficiently evident 
 that his benevolence cannot be the same as the 
 human. Thus, they contend, it is conclusively 
 shown that St. Paul and Mr. Mansel perfectly 
 agree ; and that we cannot controvert the latter 
 without impugning the authority of the former. 
 
 We thus see the important bearing of the doc- 
 trine of relativity on theology. The Rationalist 
 objects to certain doctrines, taught as revealed 
 truths of great importance, relying on the author- 
 ity of his moral sense or reason. The Relativist 
 rebuts these objections, by challenging the autho- 
 rity of the tribunal ; alleging that the moral 
 reason, like the senses and intellect, affords 
 merely relative truth; that though valid in rela- 
 tion to man, it is not necessarily valid in relation 
 to all persons. It is not, therefore, he contends, 
 competent to sit in judgment on statements of a 
 professed revelation concerning the moral nature 
 and conduct of God. The right course, he con- 
 tends, is not to consider whether the doctrines in 
 question approve themselves to our moral reason, 
 but to examine whether they rest on the authority 
 of teachers whose mission is duly accredited by 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 77 
 
 miracles. If there is historical evidence to show 
 that such is the case, the doctrines ought to be 
 submissively accepted, and the cavils urged on the 
 pretended authority of the moral reason ought to 
 be overruled. 
 
 This mode of proceeding is likened to the in- 
 ductive or Baconian method, as distinguished from 
 the a priori or ontological method. 
 
 The examination of the issue thus raised be- 
 tween the Eationalist and the Relativist Theolo- 
 gian pertains to Metaphysics ; and such being the 
 case, it cannot rightly be deemed that Metaphysics 
 are uninteresting or frivolous. 
 
 In support of the relativist doctrine, Mr. 
 Mansel particularly claims the authority of Bishop 
 Butler ; and if he could make good this claim, he 
 would do much to fortify the influence of his own 
 teaching at Oxford. Let us then examine for 
 a while whether Butler does really affirm the mere 
 relativity of moral truth and knowledge. 
 
 Butler advocates in a most unflinching manner 
 the doctrine of vicarious punishment, contending 
 that God may transfer the penalty of guilt from 
 the offender to an innocent person ; and that he 
 makes large use of this principle in his government 
 of the Universe. At the same time Butler does 
 not appear to suppose that vicarious punishment 
 is conformable to the principle of human justice. 
 He does not appear to think, like the Chinese, that 
 if a person has committed a murder, it would be 
 proper in a human magistrate to hang or decapitate 
 
78 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 a substitute in his stead. Had he been tutor to 
 James the First, he would not. we may be almost 
 certain, have inflicted the floggings which his pupil 
 might have merited on the back of any other 
 boy. 
 
 Every where he seems to recognise as the prin- 
 ciple of human equity, that set forth by Ezekiel 
 that one person shall not bear the iniquity of an- 
 other ; that the righteousness of the righteous shall 
 be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked 
 shall be upon him. 
 
 Accordingly he treats the dogma of vicarious 
 punishment as one not to be received on the evi- 
 dence of reason, but solely on the authority of 
 external testimony. We cannot conceive or un- 
 derstand how it can satisfy justice to punish the 
 innocent instead of the guilty ; but if there is ex- 
 ternal evidence showing that God actually is pro- 
 pitiated by vicarious punishment, it is our duty 
 to believe that such is the case, however impro- 
 bable the fact might previously have appeared to 
 us. And to support this view Butler endeavours 
 to show that we are constantly compelled to be- 
 lieve, by external evidence, what a priori, to the 
 eye of reason, appears grossly improbable. He con- 
 siders himself to have proved " that real internal 
 improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, 
 are overcome by the most ordinary testimony;"* 
 and further, " that we scarce know what are im- 
 probabilities," when we come to consider the divine 
 
 Analogy, part ii. chap. 3. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 79 
 
 government and administration of justice; subjects 
 so vastly above our reach. 
 
 Mr. Mansel is well entitled to contend that 
 Butler in this reasoning (which constitutes the 
 critical part of the Analogy) proceeds on the 
 principles which he has himself advocated in his 
 Bampton Lectures. Since Butler holds that the 
 divine wrath can be appeased by vicarious punish- 
 ment, and that sin can thus be atoned for, while 
 he holds that such a principle is not fit to regu- 
 late the human administration of justice, and is 
 not sanctioned by human reason, he cannot (Mr. 
 Mansel may fairly say) deny the doctrine taught 
 in the Bampton Lectures ; that the human idea of 
 justice is relative, not absolute; that though fitted 
 to regulate our conduct while on earth, it is by 
 no means identical with the justice of God; not 
 competent to measure it, or to give us know- 
 ledge concerning it. And as the idea of jus- 
 tice is a fundamental idea of morality, if hu- 
 man justice is merely relative, human morality 
 cannot be absolute. And thus if Butler recog- 
 nises the relativity of the former, he may fairly 
 be held to teach implicitly the relativity of moral 
 truth. 
 
 On other occasions, however, Butler proceeds 
 on the supposition that certain moral principles 
 cognisable by us are absolute, universal. Thus he 
 pronounces that as the world is under the govern- 
 ment of a righteous Being, we are justified in hold- 
 ing that finally and upon the whole every one shall 
 
80 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 receive according to his personal deserts.* Here 
 he quite abandons the doctrine of relativity, since 
 he assigns to the principle that every body ought 
 on the whole to be treated according to his per- 
 sonal deserts, an absolute or universal character; 
 and considers that it is binding on God, as well as 
 on man. 
 
 This is quite contrary to Mr. Hansel's doctrine. 
 According to it the principle in question is merely 
 relative and regulative, and cannot be considered 
 binding on God. He might treat some men ac- 
 cording to their personal deserts according to the 
 Law; while he might treat others much better 
 than they deserve, under a dispensation of grace, 
 superseding the action of the Law. He might 
 confer on this favoured class bliss of an exalted 
 kind, not at all due to their merits. Though they 
 might have little or no merit, and a great deal of 
 demerit, yet he might impute their sins to Christ, 
 and impute the merits of Christ to them; and 
 might treat them as if they merited heavenly bliss, 
 though really they did not do so. And he might 
 treat them in this manner not merely for a short 
 time, but through all eternity. And if it were 
 objected that the procedure thus attributed to God 
 were unjust, as not treating people on the whole 
 according to their personal deserts, this objection, 
 
 * " The world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply that finally and upon the whole every one shall 
 receive according to his personal deserts." Butler's Analogy, Part 
 ii. chap. v. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 81 
 
 conformably to Mr. Mansel's teaching, would be 
 summarily overruled, as founded on the erroneous 
 supposition that the human notion of justice is fit 
 to measure the absolute justice of God. 
 
 But, according to Butler, if such doctrines are 
 taught as articles of a professed revelation, we are 
 entitled to reject them on the ground that divine 
 justice is like the human in this important respect; 
 that, on the whole, it treats every one according to 
 his personal deserts.* 
 
 Similarly, if we were taught, that two men 
 being equally devoid of merit, God elects one to 
 glory, and actuates him efficiently by his grace, 
 while he never so treats the other, according to Mr. 
 Mansel's principle we should not be authorised to 
 criticise or reject this doctrine, while according 
 
 * Mr. Mansel specially examines the supposition that God can- 
 not forgive sins freely and fully, finally exempting the sinner from 
 their deserved penalties ; that he is bound to treat every one, on 
 the whole, according to strict justice, without grace or favour, so 
 that ultimately every person shall receive the recompense exactly 
 appropriate to his personal deserts. He condemns this view of 
 the case as open to a great number of objections, and considers it 
 to be based on the same erroneous principle which vitiates gene- 
 rally the procedure of the vulgar Rationalists : viz. the assump- 
 tion that the human idea of justice is adequate to measure the 
 morality and justice of God. He adduces many examples of 
 assertions of like character, blaming them as specimens of the 
 hardihood of human ignorance. (See Bampton Lectures, Lect. vii. 
 pp. 212-217.) Thus it would appear that if Mr. Mansel's prin- 
 ciples are correct, the great Butler, generally considered so cau- 
 tious, has made a serious faux pas; has fallen into the errors of 
 the vulgar Rationalism, and afforded a notable example of the 
 hardihood of human ignorance. 
 
 G 
 
82 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 to Butler's principle we should be authorised to 
 do so. 
 
 Again, if we are taught, that the personal de- 
 serts of two infants being equally null, one of them 
 is taken to heaven, because it has been baptised, 
 while the other, being unbaptised, passes to hell, 
 according to Mr. Hansel's principle we could not 
 condemn such teaching, while according to But- 
 ler's we could. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that Hr. Hansel is justi- 
 fied to some extent in claiming the support of 
 Butler's authority, but not entirely so. It appears 
 that on some occasions, and at very critical por- 
 tions of his argument, Butler adopts Hr. Hansel's 
 principles, holding that the reason of man is not 
 competent to sit in judgment on statements con- 
 cerning the moral nature and conduct of God ; and 
 that the principles of human and divine morality 
 may be exceedingly different. But it also appears 
 that on some occasions he assumes with great con- 
 fidence that certain moral principles cognised by 
 us are absolute: binding not merely on man as 
 man, but on all beings capable of morality, and 
 particularly on God. He thus, without any appa- 
 rent scruple, adopts the very principle which Hr. 
 Hansel condemns as the fundamental error of Ea- 
 tionalism, to prove the illegitimacy of which is the 
 main object of his celebrated Lectures. 
 
 Under such circumstances, Butler's authority 
 cannot be claimed effectively either by the Rela- 
 tivist or the Absolutist. We may infer that the 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 83 
 
 question of relativity had not been brought to a 
 distinct issue in his mind. Had it been so, we 
 can scarcely doubt that he would have treated 
 the subject in a more efficacious and instructive 
 manner. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE doctrine of Relativity was no stranger to the 
 subtle Greek mind. According to Plato, it was 
 held by Protagoras in a very thorough-going man- 
 ner, being expressed by him in the compendious 
 formula, nuvruv {jj'trgov avfyuKog. And Protagoras 
 and his followers appear to have taught it with 
 great emphasis in its application to moral judg- 
 ments, asserting that there was no absolute crite- 
 rion of right and wrong ; that what was right in 
 relation to A might be wrong in relation to B. 
 Similarly, according to Plato, it was frequently 
 taught that right and wrong were constituted by 
 the law of the state, and thus varied in different 
 countries, or in the same country when the legis- 
 lative public opinion changed. 
 
 The doctrine of Relativity adapted itself well 
 to the requirements of the popular Hellenic ortho- 
 doxy. For the actions ascribed by this to the 
 various deities Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, Venus, 
 &c. could not be defended, if judged by the hu- 
 man standard of morality ; and it was thus almost 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON, 85 
 
 incumbent on the orthodox believer to hold that 
 the human standard of morals was different from 
 the divine. 
 
 Among the various opinions which have been 
 pronounced concerning the philosophy of Socrates, 
 it has been held that its object was to inculcate 
 the doctrine of Relativity. But we cannot adopt 
 this view unless we believe that Plato has entirely 
 misrepresented his master's teaching. It is clear 
 that Plato decidedly opposed the doctrine in ques- 
 tion : and if Socrates taught it, why was Plato his 
 admirer and disciple? 
 
 In the Tliecetetus Socrates is represented by 
 Plato as strenuously combating the doctrine of 
 Relativity in its application to morals; contend- 
 ing that right and wrong are not mere matters of 
 opinion, but founded in the very nature of things. 
 The gods, he declares, are just and holy : in pro- 
 portion as man resembles them, he is good; in 
 proportion as he is unlike them, he is bad. 
 
 Let us consider the following passage : " It is 
 not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be de- 
 stroyed; since it is a necessity that there should 
 always exist something contrary to good : nor can 
 it have its abode among the gods; consequently it 
 must circulate about our mortal nature and this 
 earthly region. On this account we ought to strive 
 to escape as quickly as possible from this world to 
 that. Now this escape consists in resembling God 
 so far as lies in our power; and this resemblance 
 takes place by becoming just and holy with intel- 
 
86 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ligence God is never unjust in any way : 
 
 on the contrary, he is consummately just; and 
 nothing resembles him more than the man who 
 becomes most eminently just. Upon this hangs 
 the true ability of a man, or his worthlessness and 
 unmanliness : for the knowledge of this is genuine 
 wisdom and virtue ; while the want of such know- 
 ledge is manifest ignorance and baseness." 
 
 " There are in the nature of things two exem- 
 plars, one divine and blessed, the other without 
 
 God and miserable The excess of their 
 
 folly hinders them from perceiving that by their 
 unjust mode of acting they are rendered like the 
 latter, and unlike the former ; of which accordingly 
 they bear the penalty, by leading a life suitable to 
 the type to which they are assimilated.' 7 
 
 Again, let us consider the following passages in 
 the Apology : " If on arriving at Hades, delivered 
 from the so-called judges of earth, we find there 
 real judges those who are said to administer jus- 
 tice there, Minos, Ehadamanthus, ^Eacus, Tripto- 
 lemus, and the other demigods who were just 
 during their life, would the journey thither be an 
 evil?" 
 
 " And you too, my judges, should be of good 
 hope as regards death, and should think over tho- 
 roughly this capital truth, that there is no evil for 
 the good man, neither during his life, nor after 
 his death; and that his welfare is never disre- 
 garded by the gods." 
 
 Again, in the Pliwdo Socrates is represented as 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 87 
 
 saying : " Certainly, if I did not expect to find 
 gods wise and good, and men who have died better 
 than those who dwell here, I should be wrong in 
 not grieving to die. But you should know that I 
 hope to pass into the company of good men 
 though I cannot affirm this with full certainty; 
 but that I shall arrive among gods, righteous 
 rulers, of consummate goodness this, if one can 
 be certain of any thing of the kind, I undertake 
 to affirm with the fullest confidence." In another 
 passage he treats as ridiculous the supposition that 
 a true philosopher, a man who really loves wisdom, 
 and who firmly hopes to find wisdom in Hades, 
 should be grieved to die. 
 
 Again, in another passage, he says that "the 
 soul, the invisible principle, passes into another 
 region, excellent, pure, invisible rightly there- 
 fore called Hades into the presence of the good 
 and wise God ; whither, if it please God, my soul 
 will very soon journey." 
 
 It can hardly be supposed that the sentiments 
 thus ascribed to Socrates were never really ex- 
 pressed by him, but were invented and put into 
 his mouth by Plato. And if we assume that they 
 really were expressed by Socrates, we cannot re- 
 gard him as holding the doctrine of Kelativity. 
 Clearly he considers that there is a standard of 
 right and wrong, of good and evil, which is con- 
 stituted by the very nature of things, which can- 
 not be altered by the opinions of men, nor even by 
 the will of the gods. He does not hold that the 
 
88 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 gods can make different standards for different 
 places, regulating one class of beings by one stan- 
 dard, and another by another; but he holds that 
 there is an eternal and absolute standard, valid 
 throughout the whole universe; that in every 
 place, and at every time, those who conform to a 
 certain type resemble the gods, and partake of 
 their nature, being thus wise and good; while 
 those who depart from it become unlike the gods, 
 and are so far unwise and bad. And conformably 
 to this view he holds that if two persons judge 
 differently concerning moral principles, concerning 
 the nature of right and wrong, the case is not as 
 when they judge differently concerning chocolate, 
 one affirming that it is pleasant, and the other that 
 it is unpleasant ; but that on the contrary one of 
 the persons judges truly, in conformity with fact 
 and with the divine mind ; while the other person 
 judges falsely, in opposition to these. 
 
 Again, supposing the sentiments in question to 
 have been rightly ascribed to Socrates, it is clear 
 that he was what is often called an a priori spe- 
 culator and transcendentalist ; not restricting his 
 thoughts to the field of phenomena, but exer- 
 cising them about matters quite beyond that field, 
 and making with great confidence assertions which 
 cannot be verified by physical experience. He did 
 not regard reason as impotent in reference to such 
 matters, nor did he look upon those who refuse to 
 despair of philosophy as evincing error or infirmity. 
 On the contrary, he regards despair of philosophy 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 89 
 
 as evincing these defects. He says, relatively to 
 this point : " Let us above all things take heed 
 that one misfortune does not befall us." " What 
 misfortune ?" asks Phaedo. " Let us not," replies 
 Socrates, " become misologues, as some persons be- 
 come misanthropes ; for no greater evil can befall 
 a man than that of hating reason. Now misology 
 and misanthropy arise from similar causes." He 
 proceeds to explain that a person who has placed 
 great confidence in those who did not deserve it, is 
 led to believe that there is no honesty or goodness 
 in men : whence arises misanthropy. Similarly a 
 man who has placed confidence in reasonings which 
 afterwards turn out to be unsound, is apt to con- 
 clude that reason is untrustworthy, and after much 
 disputation may arrive at the conclusion, " that he 
 has become very wise ; that he has discovered, by 
 peculiar lights, that neither in things nor in reason- 
 ings is there any thing true or stable." Would it 
 not, he asks, be a deplorable thing that when reason 
 is really trustworthy, we, having fallen into per- 
 plexity, should not attribute this to our own in- 
 capacity, but should shift the blame upon reason, 
 and pass the rest of our lives in hating and ca- 
 lumniating it ? u Let us then take care above all 
 things that this evil does not befall us ; and let us 
 not allow ourselves to harbour the thought that 
 perhaps there is nothing holy in reasoning." 
 
 Again, supposing the sentiments in question to 
 have been really expressed by Socrates, it can 
 hardly be doubted that he adopted the view some- 
 
90 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 times spoken of as vulgar Rationalism, according 
 to which reason is competent to sit in judgment 
 on statements of a professed revelation concerning 
 the moral nature and actions of God. For it is 
 sufficiently clear that the wise and holy gods in 
 whom he believed were very different from the 
 gods of the popular mythology from Jupiter, 
 Bacchus, Venus, &c. and that he must have dis- 
 sented very largely from the popular orthodoxy of 
 his day. No doubt his sentiments on this point 
 transpired in various ways. He would thus incur 
 blame from two different classes, and run counter 
 to two different feelings. He would shock the 
 conservative sentiment which reverenced ancient 
 dogma and established religion ; while he would 
 also wound popular susceptibilities, as not treating 
 with due respect the opinions of an enlightened 
 Demos. It is probable that even at the present 
 day prejudices arising from these sources continue 
 to be entertained against him. 
 
 It does not seem, therefore, that the doctrine 
 of Relativity can claim the authority of Socrates as 
 on its side. However, the doctrine in question, 
 and the philosophical scepticism founded on it, 
 played no inconsiderable part in the schools of 
 ancient philosophy, and numbered among their 
 advocates speculators of distinguished talent. 
 
 The middle ages were not on the whole con- 
 genial to philosophical scepticism ; but the theo- 
 logical disputes accompanying the Reformation 
 were fitted to revive it, and it appears with con- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 91 
 
 siderable force in Montaigne, Pascal, and Bayle. 
 The inquiries of Locke naturally led to a closer 
 study of the questions concerning knowledge ; and 
 the doctrine of Relativity, with its sceptical answers 
 to these questions, reappeared with vivacity in 
 Hume. Nevertheless it came on the philosophical 
 world with something of the eclat of novelty as set 
 forth by Kant, being expounded by him, in his 
 critique of the speculative faculties, in a more 
 rigorous and methodical manner than had previ- 
 ously been done. 
 
 Kant teaches in a very emphatic manner that 
 we can know only phenomena, which according to 
 him are produced by the joint agency of two co- 
 efficients, the external thing or noumenon, and the 
 mind or subject. The phenomenon thus produced 
 may be altogether unlike the noumenon. Phe- 
 nomena are cognised by us as in space and time ; 
 but we must not conclude that the real things or 
 noumena exist in space and time. 
 
 For instance, in common parlance, we have a 
 knowledge of the moon : by the joint use of our 
 senses and our reason, we know that it has an 
 approximately spherical form. Kant does not deny 
 v that there is a real thing, external to our mind, 
 which is concerned in producing this knowledge. 
 This may be called the real or noumenal moon, 
 the moon as it really is. This noumenon, acting 
 in conjunction with our faculties, produces a phe- 
 nomenon, which we cognise as spherical, or ap- 
 proximately so; but we are not entitled to affirm 
 
92 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 that the real moon, the noumenon, is spherical, 
 nor even that it is extended at all. 
 
 Similarly, phenomena cognised by us suffer 
 change in time : a tree which was small grows to 
 be large ; a horse which was sound and swift be- 
 comes lame and slow : but we are not entitled to 
 affirm that the things as they really are (the nou- 
 mena) suffer any change in time, nor even that 
 they exist in time at all. 
 
 Nor again are we entitled to affirm that the 
 same noumena will produce the same phenomena 
 in all minds or subjects. Let the constitution of 
 the subject be altered, while the non ego or nou- 
 menon remains the same, and the phenomenon 
 produced and cognised may be entirely different. 
 The noumenal sun and moon, acting on the fa- 
 culties of other beings, may produce phenomena 
 wholly unlike the sun and moon as cognised 
 by us. 
 
 Again, Kant examines the conceptions of the 
 understanding, such as those of unity, plurality, 
 reality, causality, &c. and comes to the conclusion 
 that they are valid only for the cognition of phe- 
 nomena; that if we apply them to noumena, our 
 procedure is illegitimate. 
 
 Having, as he conceives, established these re- 
 sults, Kant sweeps away in the most summary 
 manner the dogmatic philosophies of Leibnitz, 
 Wolf, Des Cartes, &c. earning thereby the title of 
 Alleszermalmer. He condemns these systems as 
 invalid, on the ground that they applied the con- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 93 
 
 ceptions of the understanding to noumena, instead 
 of restricting their application to phenomena. 
 Dogmatic theology is struck down at once; for 
 God is a noumenon, not a phenomenon, and can- 
 not be legitimately clothed with the conceptions of 
 the understanding, nor reasoned about by their 
 aid. 
 
 The most important features in Kant's philo- 
 sophy are well set forth by Schopenhauer, who 
 greatly admired Kant, and studied his system 
 much more fully than is usually done.* I give 
 some extracts from his account of it. 
 
 " Kant's grosstes Yerdienst ist die Unterschei- 
 dung der Erscheinung vom Dinge an sich, auf 
 Grund der Nachweisung dass zwischen den Dingen 
 und uns immer noch der Intellekt steht, weshalb 
 sie nicht nach dem, was sie an sich selbst seyn 
 mogen, erkannt werden konnen."f 
 
 " Wie nun also Kant's, auf die oben dargelegte 
 Weise gefasste Sonderung der Erscheinung vom 
 Dinge an sich in ihrer Eegriindung an Tiefsinn 
 und Besonnenheit Alles was je dagewesen, weit 
 ubertraf; so war sie auch in ihren Ergebnissen 
 unendlich folgenreich. Den ganz aus sich selbst, 
 auf eine vollig neue Weise, von einer neuen Seite, 
 und auf einem neuen Wege gefunden stellte er 
 hierin dieselbe Wahrheit dar, die schon Platon 
 
 At the same time many of his criticisms of Kant may be 
 regarded as very questionable. 
 
 f Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille, &c. (Kritik der Kantischen 
 Philosophic), vol. i. p. 494. 
 
94 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 unermiidlich wiederholt, und in seiner Sprache 
 meistens so ausdriickt : diese, den Sinnen erschein- 
 ende Welt habe kein wahres Seyn, sondern nur 
 ein unaufhorliches Werden; sie sei, und sei auch 
 nicht. und ihre AuiFassung sei nicht sowohl eine 
 Erkenntniss, als ein Wahn. 
 
 " Die selbe Wahrheit, wieder ganz anders dar- 
 gestellt, ist auch eine Hauptlehre der Veden und 
 Puranas, die Lehre von der Maja .... Kant 
 nun aber drlickte nicht allein die selbe Lehre auf 
 eine vollig neue und originelle Weise aus, sondern 
 machte sie, mittelst der ruhigsten und nlichtern- 
 sten Darstellung, zur erweisenen und unstreitigen 
 Wahrheit; wahrend sowohl Platon, als die Inder, 
 ihre Behauptungen bios auf eine allgemeine An- 
 schauung der Welt gegriindet hatten, . . und sie 
 mehr mythisch und poetisch, als philosophisch und 
 
 tleutlich darstellten Solche deutliche 
 
 Erkenntniss und ruhige, besonnene Darstellung 
 dieser traumartigen Beschaffenheit der ganzen Welt 
 ist eigentlich die Basis der ganzen Kantischen 
 Philosophic, ist ihre Seele, und ihr allergrosstes 
 
 Verdienst Alle vorhergehende occiden- 
 
 talische Philosophic, gegen die Kantische als un- 
 saglich plump erscheinend, hatte jene Wahrheit 
 verkannt, und eben daher eigentlich immer wie im 
 Traume geredet. Erst Kant weckte sie plotzlich 
 aus diesem ; daher auch nannten die letzten Schliifer 
 (Mendelssohn) ihn den Alleszermalmer."* 
 
 Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille, &c. (Kritik der Kantischen 
 Philosophic), vol. i. p. 496. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 95 
 
 The above account well sets forth the distinc- 
 tive features of Kant's idealism. According to 
 this doctrine, the intellect stands between us and 
 the real object, preventing us from attaining a 
 knowledge of the thing which actually exists. The 
 objects in space and time, which ordinary persons 
 regard as real, and speak of as stones, houses, 
 trees, sun, moon, &c. are according to this view 
 phenomena which we ourselves in a great measure 
 produce, conformably to the laws of our peculiar 
 structure. If this structure were different, the 
 phenomena produced and cognised would be dif- 
 ferent. Thus the world, commonly regarded as 
 real, is according to this view " traumartig," 
 dream-like, produced to a great extent by our- 
 selves. As Schopenhauer remarks, this doctrine 
 has much resemblance to that of the Yedantists, 
 which represents the phenomenal world as Maya, 
 illusion. 
 
 Idealists sometimes strive to explain away their 
 idealism, as agreeing with the belief of ordinary 
 persons. Thus Berkeley, having advanced positions 
 apparently similar to those of the Yedantists, la- 
 bours afterwards to prove that he quite agrees 
 with ordinary people, and that he denies only an 
 unintelligible doctrine of certain philosophers. But 
 it would be vain to attempt such a course with the 
 idealism of Kant. There can be no question that 
 it differs from the ordinary belief, that it is not 
 merely a novel mode of stating a commonplace 
 opinion. Ordinary persons certainly believe that 
 
96 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 the real sun and moon exist in space, and have a 
 certain figure ; and when they are told that this 
 figure belongs merely to a phenomenon created by 
 their minds ; that the real sun and moon may have 
 no figure, and may not exist in space, they regard 
 such a view as extraordinary, as scarcely conceiv- 
 able or intelligible. 
 
 Similarly, when, according to common parlance, 
 a certain event happens in time, when a man, for 
 instance, grows from childhood to old age, or loses 
 an arm or loses his reason, ordinary persons sup- 
 pose that the real man suffers a change in time; 
 and if they are told that what has undergone 
 change is only a phenomenon which they them- 
 selves have created; that the man or thing as it 
 really is may not have changed in time, and may 
 not exist in time at all, they are puzzled, and 
 regard such a doctrine as contrary to common 
 sense. 
 
 Another important part of Kant's system is his 
 doctrine concerning Keason. He distinguishes 
 
 Vernunft (usually translated Reason) from Ver- 
 stand (usually translated Understanding). Accord- 
 ing to him the peculiar characteristic of Yernunft, 
 or Reason, is, that it seeks u das Unbedingte" 
 
 ^ and u das Absolut" the Unconditioned and the 
 Absolute. 
 
 By this he does not mean that Reason seeks a 
 void abstraction, an empty adjective, but that she 
 seeks something which is unconditioned, something 
 which is absolute. As we have seen, this mode of 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 97 
 
 using such expressions is sanctioned by the au- 
 thority of the best philosophers,, and is perfectly 
 legitimate. 
 
 With respect to "das Absolut," Kant notices 
 that the word "Absolut" has become ambiguous by 
 unsettled use ; and he specifies the sense in which 
 he himself designs to employ it, viz. to denote that 
 which is valid in all relations, as opposed to that 
 which is valid only in some particular respect, or 
 under certain restrictions. 
 
 In order to understand his statement, that Rea- 
 son seeks " das Unbedingte," it is essential that we 
 should understand what he means by the word 
 "Bedingung." According to his use of language, 
 whatever is indispensable to the existence of an 
 object is a "bedingung" of that object. The "bedin- 
 gungen" of a man's existence are all those things 
 or circumstances which are indispensable in order 
 that the man may exist; in the absence of any 
 one of which the man will not exist. In the case 
 of a man, the number of such " bedingungen" is 
 manifestly very great. The "bedingungen" con- 
 nected with a promise are all those circumstances 
 or events in the absence of any one of which the 
 promise will not be binding. The " bedingungen" 
 of a proposition are those propositions on the truth 
 of which its truth depends; so that if they are 
 true, it is true ; if otherwise, it is not true. 
 
 In considering a physical event, the aggregate 
 of Bedingungen constitutes the Ursache or cause ; 
 which taking place, the effect necessarily takes 
 
 H 
 
98 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 place. Schopenhauer points out this distinction 
 between " Bedingung," condition, and " Ursache" 
 or cause. He says : " Die verschiedenen einzelnen 
 Bestimmungen, welche erst zusammengenommen 
 die Ursache kompletiren und ausmachen, kann man 
 die ursachlichen Momente, oder auch die Beding- 
 ung en nennen, und demnach die Ursache in solche 
 zerlegen."* He points out that in ordinary par- 
 lance we frequently call one of the Bedingungen 
 or conditions the cause. Thus if all the conditions 
 necessary to the production of a phenomenon exist, 
 with the exception of one, when this last condition 
 comes into play, and the phenomenon accordingly 
 is produced, we are apt to call this one condition 
 the cause of the phenomenon. But such a mode 
 of expression is not accurate : strictly speaking, the 
 aggregate of Bedingungen or conditions is the 
 true cause. f 
 
 Ueber die vierfache Wurzel, &c. 20. 
 
 f Mr. Mill, explaining the word " condition," says : " According 
 to the best notion I can form of the meaning of ' condition,' either 
 as a term of philosophy or of common life, it means that on which 
 something else is contingent, or (more definitely) which being given, 
 something else exists or takes place." {Examination of Hamilton's 
 Philosophy, p. 51.) The more definite explanation here given is 
 open to some objection, as defining Cause (Ursache) rather than 
 Condition (Bedingung). The total aggregate of conditions being 
 given, the contingent event will exist or take place ; but one condi- 
 tion or bedingung being given, this need not be so. What follows, 
 however, shows that Mr. Mill takes precisely the same view of the 
 meaning of " condition" as Schopenhauer, regarding the aggregate 
 of the conditions as the cause. And in his work on Logic the same 
 view is explained very fully. See System of Logic, vol. i. chap, v., 
 On the Law of Causation, particularly p. 365. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 99 
 
 Such being the meaning of the word "Be- 
 dingung" as used by Kant, there is no difficulty 
 in understanding what he means by the words 
 " bedingt" and " unbedingt." An event, A, is 
 " bedingt," if its occurrence is contingent or de- 
 pendent on something else, B ; so that if B take 
 place, A will take place ; if otherwise, A will not 
 take place. A proposition is "bedingt" if its 
 truth depends on that of some other proposition ; 
 so that if proposition A is true, proposition B is 
 true ; if A is not true, B is not true. A promise 
 is "bedingt" when the obligation to perform it is 
 contingent or dependent on certain circumstances; 
 so that if these events occur, the promise is bind- 
 ing ; if otherwise, it is not. 
 
 From such a meaning of the word " bedingt" 
 that of "unbedingt" necessarily follows. If an 
 event is not contingent or dependent on any other 
 event, it is " unbedingt." If the truth of a propo- 
 sition does not depend on that of any other pro- 
 position, such a proposition is " unbedingt." If a 
 Being is self-existent, avrugxqg, if his existence is 
 not contingent or dependent on the existence of 
 any thing else, such a Being is u unbedingt." 
 
 The word " unbedingt" or unconditional is fre- 
 quently used not in a perfectly strict sense. Thus, 
 in common parlance, a promise is said to be " un- 
 conditional," though the existence of many condi- 
 tions is tacitly understood. But when theologians 
 speak of the Divine Being as " unbedingt" or non- 
 contingent in a strict sense, they consider that such 
 
100 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 a Being does not exist in one place to the exclu- 
 sion of another, or at one time to the exclusion of 
 another, nor under certain circumstances to the 
 exclusion of others. They hold that "das Un- 
 bedingte" exists under all change of circumstances ; 
 that no possible change of these can bring about 
 its non-existence. 
 
 It is the more important to understand rightly 
 the meaning attached by Kant to the word " be- 
 dingung," because the English word " condition," 
 employed to translate it, is capable of expressing a 
 different meaning. Sometimes the English word 
 " condition" corresponds accurately to the German 
 word "bedingung." Thus when we speak of the 
 " conditions" of a promise, of a treaty, of a sur- 
 render, what we here call "conditions" are what 
 a German would call " bedingungen." If we say 
 that a promise is "conditional," the word "con- 
 ditional" here is equivalent to the German word 
 "bedingt." If we say that the surrender of a 
 garrison was " unconditional," the word " uncon- 
 ditional" here is equivalent to the German word 
 "unbedingt." But we very frequently use the 
 word " condition" to signify not the conditio sine 
 qua non, but the internal state or mode of being of 
 a thing : as when we talk of the condition of Eng- 
 land, of the condition of a horse, of a prize-fighter, 
 of a boating crew, of a picture, &c. The word 
 " condition" thus used would not be translated in 
 German by the word " bedingung." To say that 
 the "bedingung" of wine or of a picture was good; 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 101 
 
 that a horse was in good " bedingung ;" that the 
 " bedingung" of a country was good or bad, with 
 the view of expressing what is meant by the 
 English word " condition" when used in cases of 
 this kind, would not be German. In such cases a 
 German would use the word " Zustand," " Lage," 
 or some similar word. 
 
 The words "conditioned" and "unconditioned" 
 are by no means usual; but the word "ill-condi- 
 tioned" is familiar, and in this adjective condition 
 bears the second of the senses above explained, 
 viz. that of mode of being. An " ill-conditioned 
 fellow" means a person whose internal state or dis- 
 position is bad. Accordingly when we hear of the 
 " unconditioned" our thoughts are naturally direc- 
 ted to this meaning of the word " condition," and 
 we are prone to interpret the expression as signify- 
 ing that which has no mode of being at all that of 
 which no attribute or property can be predicated. 
 It is obvious that this meaning is very different 
 from the other, and that the statement, " God is 
 unconditioned," will have a widely different pur- 
 port according as one or the other sense of the 
 term is used. In the former sense it will signify 
 that there is nothing external to God which is a 
 sine qua non of his existence; that no change of 
 circumstances can cause his non-existence. In the 
 latter sense it will signify that God has no distinc- 
 tive mode of Being, that he has no attributes, 
 faculties, or properties. Both these propositions 
 have been asserted by theologians ; but they are 
 
102 AN EXAMINATION, ETC. 
 
 by no means identical ; and a theologian may hold 
 the former as true, while rejecting the latter as a 
 pernicious error. 
 
 The above remarks concerning the meaning of 
 words may perhaps seem censurable to some per- 
 sons. " Why," they may exclaim, " grovel in the 
 region of logic, and busy ourselves about terms, 
 notions, conceptions, and ideas, when the main 
 thing needed is to emancipate ourselves entirely 
 from these, and to put ourselves in immediate and 
 vital contact with that which is?" So long, how- 
 ever, as we are dealing with language, we cannot 
 get out of the region of logic Xoy;;^ nor dis- 
 embarrass ourselves of notions, conceptions, intel- 
 lections, ideas functions indispensable to the use 
 
 v of language. Kant has endeavoured to communi- 
 cate truth to our minds by means of language by 
 characters written in a book; and if we are to 
 profit by his instructions, it is indispensable that 
 
 \ we should understand the meaning which he has 
 attached to his terms. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 WHEN we understand the meaning of the word 
 " bedingung" as used by Kant, we shall not have 
 difficulty in understanding his doctrine concerning 
 Reason, asserting that it endeavours to find or 
 attain "das Unbedingte." 
 
 When a person endowed with Reason looks at 
 the various phenomena of Nature, he is not satis- 
 fied with simply observing them as isolated data, 
 but he desires to grasp the data together in a 
 system to ascertain the laws of their connection. 
 Accordingly when he perceives a phenomenon, he 
 desires to know its u bedingungen" or conditions. 
 And supposing him to have discovered these, by 
 the same impulse of curiosity he desires to learn 
 the conditions of these phenomena, the conditions 
 of the conditions. Now it is supposable that in 
 thus ascending from conditioned to condition we 
 may ultimately reach a condition that is uncon- 
 ditioned, something of which nothing else is a 
 sine qua non, which does not stand to any thing in 
 
104 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 the relation of u bedingtes" to " bedingung." Or 
 it may be that the regressus from conditioned to 
 condition admits of no termination ; in which case, 
 Kant tells us, though each member of the series is 
 conditioned, the totality of the series is uncon- 
 N ditioned, since there exist no conditions beyond it 
 on which it can depend. Thus, then, according 
 to Kant, that insatiable curiosity of Reason which 
 prompts it always to inquire for the cause of 
 phenomena, which led Epicurus to ask, "And 
 Chaos whence?" is a nisus to reach "das Un- 
 bedingte." 
 
 Evidently this is very different from a search 
 after a meaningless abstraction. 
 
 As we have seen, according to Kant, an infinite 
 series of conditioned events, and an uncaused first 
 term, are both u unbedingt" unconditioned. If 
 we call an uncaused first term absolute, then, ac- 
 cording to this doctrine, an infinite causal series, 
 and an absolute commencement of such a series, 
 are both " unbedingt" unconditioned. 
 
 In a chain of demonstration, where one propo- 
 sition is said to follow from another, Kant considers 
 a like connection (viz. that of " bedingtes" to " be- 
 dingung") as existing between the propositions; 
 and the search for the unconditioned is here the 
 search for a first principle, for a proposition whose 
 truth does not depend on the truth of some anterior 
 proposition. 
 
 Time is considered by Kant as a series, in which 
 all past time is the u bedingung" (condition) of the 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 105 
 
 present moment. He says: "I can consider the 
 present moment in relation to past time only as 
 'bedingt' (conditioned) .... since this moment 
 comes into existence only through the past time, 
 or rather through the passing of the past time." 
 According to this view a totality of time, whether 
 infinite or finite, would be "unbedingt" uncon- 
 ditioned, since there would be no preceding time 
 by which it would be " bedingt" or conditioned. 
 So that in considering time, there is again, accord- 
 ing to Kant, a series of conditions, and a search for 
 the unconditioned " das Unbedingte." 
 
 With respect to space, Kant points out that in 
 apprehending it we measure it, and that this pro- 
 cess is successive, takes place in time, and contains 
 a series. In this series each portion of space suc- 
 cessively added in thought is the " bedingung" of 
 the limits of those previously thought ; and thus 
 the measurement of a space is to be viewed as a 
 synthesis of a series of " bedingungen" or condi- 
 tions. Accordingly a totality of space, whether 
 infinite or finite, would be "unbedingt" uncon- 
 ditioned, as in the case of time. And thus here 
 again we find a series of conditions, and a search 
 for the unconditioned. 
 
 A terminated space, beyond which there is no 
 space, may be called an absolute space ; and in like 
 manner a terminated time, beyond which there is 
 no time, may be called an absolute time.* If 
 we adopt this phraseology, then, conformably with 
 
 This phraseology is employed by Hamilton. 
 
106 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Kant's view, we may say that infinite space and 
 absolute space, infinite time and absolute time, are 
 both " unbedingt" unconditioned. 
 
 When we consider the acts or volitions of a 
 person, here again the relation of "bedingtes" to 
 "bedingung" comes under discussion. On the 
 one side it is held that the acts and volitions of a 
 person called free are in reality " bedingt" condi- 
 tioned; that they depend on antecedents in such 
 a way that, given the antecedents, the act or voli- 
 tion cannot but follow. On the other side it is 
 held that a free act or volition does not stand to 
 antecedents in the relation of " bedingtes" to " be- 
 dingung;" that the antecedents in two cases being 
 precisely the same, the act or volition may be 
 different. According to this latter view of the 
 subject, the free acts or volitions of a person are 
 " unbedingt" unconditioned. 
 
 We have thus four principal topics in reference 
 to which the relation of "bedingtes" to "bedin- 
 gung" may be. considered. It may be considered in 
 reference to physical phenomena, to propositions to 
 space and time, and to volitions or voluntary acts. 
 These four cases are discussed at length by Scho- 
 penhauer in his treatise Ueber die vierfache Wurzel 
 des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde. He points 
 out that to these four different cases there corre- 
 spond four different kinds of necessity, viz. 
 
 1. Physical necessity. 
 
 2. Logical necessity. 
 
 3. Mathematical necessity. 
 
^Uttj. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 4. Moral necessity. 
 
 The existence of this latter kind of necessity is 
 affirmed by Schopenhauer, who strongly maintains 
 that acts and volitions commonly called free are 
 conditioned, i.e. that given the antecedents, the 
 act or volition cannot but ensue. But it is not 
 recognised by many philosophers, who maintain 
 that free acts or volitions are unconditioned. 
 
 From the above we see the very important part 
 which the words " bedingt" and " unbedingt" play 
 in the philosophy of Kant, and also the very im- 
 portant part which the notions, corresponding to 
 the words as used by him, play in philosophy. Mr. 
 Mill, after criticising Hamilton's usage of the word 
 " unconditioned," pronounces that the word is an 
 interloper in philosophy, and that it ought to be 
 discarded. And indeed the word has been so used 
 by many English writers as to produce a great 
 amount of confusion. They have not distinguished 
 the sense of the German word " Bedingung" from 
 the more ordinary sense of the word " Condition," 
 in which it corresponds to " Zustand" or " Lage :" 
 the latter sense has been uppermost in their minds, 
 and yet they have imagined the words " conditioned" 
 and "unconditioned" thus used to be proper equi- 
 valents for the Kantian words " bedingt" and " un- 
 bedingt." They have thus produced results of a 
 very chaotic kind, not calculated to add lustre to 
 British metaphysics. But if we give up the words 
 " conditioned" and " unconditioned," we ought to 
 have some others capable of expressing the sense 
 
108 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 which Kant and Schopenhauer attached to the 
 words " bedingt" and u unbedingt." 
 
 Examining the procedure of Reason, in its 
 endeavours to penetrate to the unconditioned, 
 Kant finds that it becomes involved in a conflict 
 of opposing theses ; one asserting that the world 
 has commenced in time, the other denying this; 
 or, again, one asserting that the spacial extension 
 of the world is infinite, the other denying this ; 
 and others of a like nature ; each of these opposite 
 theses being, as he asserts, maintainable with an 
 equal show of reason, so that neither can definitely 
 prevail. He calls this conflict " the Antinomy of 
 Eeason." He teaches that it arises from an ille- 
 gitimate use of Reason, viz. when, instead of 
 applying the principles of the understanding to 
 objects of possible experience, we try to extend 
 their use beyond those boundaries. He says: 
 "Wenn wir unsere Vernunft nicht bios zum Ge- 
 brauch der Verstandesgrundsatze auf Gegenstande 
 der Erfahrung verwenden, sondern jene liber die 
 Grenze der letztern hinaus auszudehnen wagen, so 
 entspringen verniinftelnde Lehrsatze, die in der 
 Erfahrung weder Bestatigung hoffen, noch Wider- 
 legung fiirchten diirfen, und deren jeder nicht al- 
 lein an sich selbst ohne Widerspruch ist, sondern so- 
 gar in der Natur der Vernunft Bedingungen seiner 
 Nothwendigkeit antrifft, nur das unglticklicher 
 Weise der Gegensatz eben so giiltige und nothwen- 
 dige Griinde der Behauptung auf seiner Seite hat." 53 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Yermmft. Die Antinomie der Reinen 
 Vernunft, 2 Abschnitt. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 109 
 
 Censuring thus as illegitimate the "trans- 
 cendent" use of Reason, Kant recognises as valid 
 and fruitful its " immanent" use, when it is em- 
 ployed to order and systematise the cognitions 
 obtained by experience. Used in this way, it 
 constructs the various sciences, Astronomy, Zoo- 
 logy, Botany, &c. The possession of Reason, 
 therefore, in a great measure distinguishes man 
 from beasts, who, though endowed with Verstand 
 (Understanding), cannot systematise the data af- 
 forded to them, as man does in elaborating sciences. 
 Kant teaches that there is a natural temptation 
 to employ the ideas of Reason illegitimately, owing 
 to a certain natural illusion, termed by him trans- 
 cendental illusion, which disposes us to believe that 
 these ideas, whose right use is purely immanent, 
 can enable us to extend our cognitions beyond the 
 limits of experience. Critical examination shows 
 us that this appearance is illusory, and prevents us 
 from being deceived by it; yet though delusion is 
 thus prevented, illusion still remains. As examples 
 of illusion thus existing without delusion, Kant 
 instances the appearance of the sea, which seems 
 
 1 to be higher at the horizon than near the shore, 
 though we know that this is not the case; and 
 
 ^ again the appearance of the moon, which seems 
 larger near the horizon than near the zenith, 
 though we know both by measurement and by 
 calculation that the appearance in question is 
 illusory. 
 
 These views are expressed by Kant in a great 
 
110 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 number of passages, of which the following may be 
 quoted : 
 
 " The result of all the dialectical attempts of 
 pure Reason not only confirms the truth of what we 
 have already proved in our transcendental analytic, 
 namely, that all inferences which would lead us 
 beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and 
 groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this 
 important lesson, that human reason has a natural 
 inclination to overstep these limits. .... 
 
 "Whatever is grounded in the nature of our 
 powers will be found to be in harmony with the 
 final purpose and proper employment of those 
 powers, when once we have discovered their true 
 direction and aim. We are entitled, therefore, to 
 suppose that there exists a mode of employing 
 transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent ; 
 although, when we mistake their meaning, and 
 regard them as conceptions of actual things, their 
 mode of application is transcendent and delusive. 
 .... Thus all errors of misapplication are to be 
 ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to under- 
 standing or Reason"* 
 
 "I accordingly maintain that transcendental 
 ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, 
 that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and 
 that, when thus considered, they assume a falla- 
 cious and dialectical character. But, on the other 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason. On the Regulative Employment of 
 the Ideas of Pure Reason. Conf. Meiklejohn's Translation. See 
 Note A. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. Ill 
 
 hand, they are capable of an admirable and indis- 
 pensably necessary application to objects as regu- 
 lative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain 
 aim, the guiding lines towards which all its lines 
 follow, and in which they all meet in one point. 
 This point, though a mere idea (focus imaginarius) 
 .... serves notwithstanding to give to these con- 
 ceptions the greatest possible unity combined with 
 the greatest possible extension. Hence arises the 
 natural illusion which induces us to believe that 
 these lines proceed from an object which lies out 
 of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects 
 reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But 
 this illusion, ivhich we m.ay hinder from imposing 
 upon us, is necessary and unavoidable if we desire 
 to see, not only those objects which lie before us, 
 but those which are at a great distance behind 
 us. ... If we review our cognitions in their entire 
 extent, we shall find that the peculiar business of 
 reason is to arrange them into a system, that is to 
 say, to give them connection according to a prin- 
 ciple."* 
 
 In the rest of the section Kant proceeds to 
 explain the principles on which reason proceeds, 
 when legitimately, i. e. regulatively, employed, in 
 thus arranging our cognitions into a system, and 
 elaborating the sciences. 
 
 In the next section Kant repeats the same teach- 
 ing. He opens it with the following declaration : 
 
 " It is quite impossible that the ideas of the pure 
 
 * Critique of Pure Reason. Ibid. See Note B. 
 
112 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 reason can be dialectical* in their own nature ; it 
 must be the mere abuse of them which causes them 
 to generate in our minds a deceptive appearance. 
 
 "For," he proceeds to say, "they are consti- 
 tuted by the nature of our reason ; and it is impos- 
 sible that this supreme tribunal of all the lights 
 and claims of speculation should itself be an ori- 
 ginal source of fallacies and deceptions. It is to 
 be expected, therefore, that these ideas should have 
 a genuine and legitimate aim. Nevertheless, the 
 mob of Sophists raise against reason the cry of in- 
 consistency and contradiction, and pour abuse on 
 the government of that faculty whose constitution 
 they cannot understand, while it is entirely to its 
 beneficial influences that they owe the position and 
 the intellectual culture which enable them to cri- 
 ticise and blame it."f 
 
 Afterwards again he says : " And now we can 
 see clearly the result of all transcendental dialectic, 
 and can accurately determine the real purpose of 
 the ideas of the pure reason, which become dialec- 
 tical solely from misunderstanding and want of 
 due circumspection. "J 
 
 It may be observed that Kant uses the word " dialectical" in a 
 peculiar sense, connected with his doctrine of the Antinomies. He 
 % means by it not simply disputative or argumentative, but disputing 
 about matters beyond the legitimate scope of reason (i. e. about 
 things not in the field of experience), so that the disputation or 
 reasoning is void and vain. 
 
 f Critique of Pure Reason. On the Ultimate End of the Natural 
 Dialectic of Human Reason. See Note C. 
 Ibid. Ibid. See Note D. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 113 
 
 Again : 
 
 " Thus pure Reason, which at first seemed to 
 promise us nothing less than the extension of our 
 cognition beyond the limits of experience, is found, 
 when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but 
 regulative principles, the function of which is to 
 introduce into our cognition a higher degree of 
 unity than the empirical use of the understanding 
 can compass. These principles, by placing the 
 goal to which we approximate at so great a dis- 
 tance, enable us to elaborate to the highest degree 
 the coordination of our cognitions into a systematic 
 whole. But, on the other hand, if misunderstood, 
 and employed as constitutive principles of trans- 
 cendent cognition, they, by a brilliant but mis- 
 leading illusion, produce an appearance of know- 
 ledge, accompanied by endless controversies and 
 contradictions."* 
 
 Having thus shown the difference between the 
 illegitimate and the legitimate use of Reason the 
 former "transcendent," seeking to transcend the 
 limits of experience; the latter " regulative," or 
 " immanent," not overstepping those limits, but 
 seeking to systematise our empirical cognitions 
 Kant devotes the concluding portion of his work, 
 the Methodenlehre, or doctrine of Method, to an 
 examination of the principles which guide Reason 
 in its legitimate use. 
 
 Such is the real nature of Kant's doctrine ; and 
 it is important to set it clearly forth, inasmuch as 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason. Ibid. See Note E. 
 
 I 
 
114 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton has wholly misrepresented it. 
 He represents Kant as teaching that Reason, when 
 legitimately exercised, is essentially delusive; whence, 
 as he observes, the most pervading scepticism in- 
 evitably results ; and he represents himself as cor- 
 recting this erroneous doctrine, by discovering and 
 showing that the antinomies expounded by Kant 
 result only from an illegitimate use of Reason. 
 
 The following are passages from Hamilton's 
 writings setting forth this view. 
 
 Speaking of Kant, Hamilton says : 
 
 " He endeavoured to evince that pure Reason, 
 that Intelligence, is naturally, is necessarily repug- 
 nant with itself, and that speculation ends in a 
 series of insoluble antilogies. In its highest po- 
 tence, in its very essence, thought is thus infected 
 with contradiction, and the worst and most per- 
 vading scepticism is the melancholy result. If I 
 have done any thing meritorious in philosophy, it 
 is in the attempt to explain the phenomena of 
 these contradictions; in showing that they arise 
 only when intelligence transcends the limits to 
 which its legitimate exercise is restricted; and 
 that within those bounds (the conditioned) natural 
 thought is neither fallible nor mendacious 
 
 'Neque decipitur, nee decipit umquam.' 
 If this view be correct, Kant's antinomies, with 
 their consequent scepticism, are solved; and the 
 human mind, however weak, is shown not to be the 
 work of a treacherous Creator."* 
 
 * Lectures, vol. i. p. 402. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 115 
 
 In another passage concerning Kant, after 
 stating his doctrine relative to Phenomena and 
 Noumena, Hamilton says : 
 
 " In accordance with this doctrine, he explicitly 
 declares Reason (or Intelligence) to be essentially 
 and of its own nature delusive; and thus more 
 overtly than the others he supersedes (what con- 
 stitutes the fundamental principle and affords the 
 differential peculiarity of the doctrine of the con- 
 ditioned) the distinction between Intelligence within 
 its legitimate sphere of operation, impeccable, and 
 Intelligence beyond that sphere, affording (by abuse) 
 the occasions of error."* 
 
 In another passage, after describing the idea of 
 the unconditioned as " self-contradictory," "a mere 
 fasciculus of negations," he declares that Kant " ap- 
 propriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cog- 
 nisance of these negations, hypostatised as negative, 
 under the Platonic name of Ideas. "f 
 
 He further adds : " His doctrine leads to abso- 
 lute scepticism. Speculative Reason, on Kant's own 
 admission, is an organ of mere delusion. The idea 
 of the unconditioned, about which it is conversant, 
 is shown to involve insoluble contradictions, and 
 yet to be the legitimate product of intelligence. 
 Hume has well observed that 'it matters not whe- 
 ther we possess a false reason, or no reason at all.' 
 If ' the light that leads astray be light from hea- 
 ven,' what are we to believe? If our intellectual 
 
 Discussions, p. G33. f Ibid. p. 17. 
 
116 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 nature be perfidious in one revelation, it cannot be 
 presumed truthful in any."* 
 
 The passages previously quoted from Kant show 
 how entirely different his real doctrine is from that 
 thus ascribed to him by Hamilton. As we have 
 seen, instead of teaching that Keason is delusive 
 and perfidious in its very nature, he strongly blames 
 such a view, ascribing it to the " mob of Sophists," 
 who vilify a faculty the nature of which they can- 
 not understand. Instead of appropriating Reason 
 as a specific faculty to take cognisance of the un- 
 conditioned, he expressly declares that Reason 
 cannot give us any cognition of an unconditioned 
 object : that its true office is to systematise data 
 furnished by experience, and thus to construct 
 science. As to hypostatising negations under the 
 name of Ideas, Kant does nothing of the sort ; the 
 ideas of which he treats are not regarded by him 
 as hypostases, but as conceptions or ideasf mental 
 functions which guide and regulate the mind in 
 systematising data gathered from experience. 
 
 Instead of teaching, as Hamilton represents, 
 that contradiction and antinomy spring from the 
 legitimate use of Reason, Kant declares such a view 
 to be wholly untenable, asserting that antinomy 
 and perplexity cannot possibly spring from Reason 
 rightly used ; that it must be the abuse of Reason 
 which gives rise to such results. He expressly 
 
 Discussions, p. 18. 
 
 t The words " Begriff" and " Idee" are both applied by Kant to 
 these Ideas ; the " Idee" being a " Begriff" of a peculiar kind. 
 
PEINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 117 
 
 warns us that they are to be ascribed to defects 
 of our own judgment, to errors of misapplication, 
 not to Understanding or Eeason.* 
 
 Thus the explanation of the antinomies put for- 
 ward by Hamilton as a discovery of his own, his 
 most meritorious philosophical achievement, is no 
 other than the explanation which Kant himself 
 gives, not once merely, but in a great number of 
 passages. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that Hamilton first imputes 
 to Kant a doctrine which Kant strongly condemns ; 
 next puts forward the doctrine which Kant clearly 
 and repeatedly asserts, and represents this as a 
 discovery of his own, a valuable improvement on 
 Kant's teaching. And he tells us that if he has 
 done any thing meritorious in philosophy, it is in 
 making this discovery ! 
 
 We are forced to conclude that Hamilton had a 
 very imperfect knowledge of Kant ; that he under- 
 took to criticise and correct him, while leaving a 
 great portion of his work unread. 
 
 It is possible that Hamilton's error arose in 
 some degree from a cursory reading of the pass- 
 ages in which Kant says that the transcendental 
 illusion, which tempts us to regard the ideas of 
 reason as valid beyond the limits of experience, 
 
 It deserves to be noticed that, according to Kant, even the 
 illegitimate use of Reason (i.e. the transcendent use) does not in all 
 cases produce Antinomy. It does so, according to him, only in Cos- 
 mology. In Psychology and Theology it leads, as he teaches, to 
 void results, which do not extend our knowledge ; but it does not 
 in these cases produce Antinomy. 
 
118 AN EXAMINATION OE THE 
 
 can never be thoroughly removed. Hamilton has 
 not distinguished between illusion and delusion* 
 But the fault here is not at all irnputable to Kant, 
 who has signalised the distinction with perfect 
 clearness by the illustration which he gives, viz. 
 the appearance of the moon near the horizon ; and 
 also by distinctly telling us that though the illusion 
 is unavoidable, we can hinder it from imposing 
 on us. 
 
 If we wanted other illustrations of illusory ap- 
 pearance besides those mentioned by Kant, there 
 are plenty of them. A very good example is 
 afforded by the stereoscope. We know that the 
 objects placed in this are two in number and flat; 
 yet we never get rid of the illusion, according to 
 which these appear to be one object in relief. Here 
 % there is inevitable illusion, yet without delusion. 
 Though this illusion springs from the nature of 
 our perceptive faculties, and cannot be got rid of, 
 yet we do not on that account regard our senses as 
 perfidious and delusive in their very nature. Kant, 
 therefore, may believe a similar illusion to be gene- 
 rated in the exercise of Reason, without regarding 
 that organ as mendacious, as a faculty of lies, as 
 " the work of a treacherous Creator. "f 
 
 * Kant uses for the former of these the two terms " Illusion "" 
 and " Schein." See Note F. 
 
 f As another instance of a natural illusion, we may notice that 
 which occurs when a marble or ball is touched by two fingers 
 crossed ; the result being that we seem to feel two marbles or balls. 
 Here the illusion is natural; yet we do not on this account conclude 
 that the sense of touch is essentially perfidious and untrustworthy. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 119 
 
 Hamilton attacks Brown (his favourite aversion) 
 with much asperity as having misunderstood and 
 misrepresented Eeid:* but it may be questioned 
 whether any philosopher ever misrepresented ano- 
 ther more completely than Hamilton has Kant, in 
 reference to the points above noticed points of 
 primary importance. 
 
 Holding, as we have seen, that the functions of 
 intellect are valid only with reference to objects 
 of experience, Kant takes a different view of the 
 nature of necessary truths from that which most 
 preceding philosophers had done. It had been 
 held by Des Cartes and many others that such 
 truths were absolute and eternal ; valid not merely 
 in relation to man, but also in relation to angels, 
 to God, and to all intelligent beings. Kant, in 
 treating of the Intellect, regards their necessity 
 as merely subjective, depending on the peculiar 
 constitution of our faculties. Schopenhauer sets 
 forth the difference between Kant and his prede- 
 cessors in reference to this point. Both, he says, 
 agree in asserting that axioms or principles im- 
 pressed with the character of necessity, and not 
 taught by mere experience, exist. But Kant's 
 predecessors said, " c Diese Grundsatze, oder Er- 
 kenntnisse aus reiner Vernunft sind Ausdriicke 
 der absoluten Moglichkeit der Dinge, ceternce veri- 
 tates, Quellen der Ontologie : sie stehen iiber der 
 
 Mr. Mill considers that here again Hamilton has gone astray ; 
 that Brown correctly understood and represented Reid's doctrine ; 
 and that the person who misunderstood it was Hamilton himself. 
 
120 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Weltordnung, wie das Fatum liber der Gottern der 
 Alten stand.' .Kant sagt: es sind blosse Eornien 
 unsers Intellekts, Gesetze, nicht des Daseyns der 
 Dinge, sondern unserer Yorstellungen von ihnen, 
 gelten daher bloss fur unsere Auffassung der Dinge, 
 und konnen demnach nicht iiber die Moglichkeit 
 der Erfahrung hinausreichen."* 
 
 And again : 
 
 " Ich habe es oben als das Hauptverdienst Kants 
 aufgestellt dass er die Erscheinung vom. Dinge an 
 sich unterschied, diese ganze sichtbare Welt fur 
 Erscheinung erklarte, und daher den Gesetzen 
 derselben alle Giiltigkeit liber die Erscheinung 
 hinaus absprach."f 
 
 Now here again it is important to pay atten- 
 tion to Kant's doctrine, because it is not always 
 correctly seized and represented. Let us, for in- 
 stance, consider the account of it given in Mr. 
 Lewes's History of Philosophy ; a work displaying 
 careful research, and a desire to state correctly the 
 various opinions criticised. 
 
 It is said in this, with reference to Kant : 
 
 " The vital point in his system is, we repeat, 
 the question as to whether we have ideas inde- 
 ^ pendent of experience. This is all- important. And 
 what gives it this importance? The conviction 
 that if we are sent into the world with certain 
 connate principles of truth, those principles cannot 
 be false ; that if, for example, the principle of 
 
 Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic, p. 505. 
 f Ibid. p. 514. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 121 
 
 causality is one which is antecedent to all expe- 
 rience, and is inseparable from the mind, we are 
 forced to pronounce it an ultimate truth."* 
 
 And again, it is said of Kant's doctrine : "It 
 proclaims that knowledge has another origin be- 
 sides experience ; and that the ideas thus acquired 
 are necessarily true. In this the veracity of con- 
 sciousness is established, and scepticism is de- 
 feated." 
 
 This account fails to put before us the distinc- 
 tive feature of Kant's .doctrine on the subject of 
 a priori truths ; such, for instance, as the principle 
 of Causality. We might infer from it that Kant 
 regarded the principle of Causality as an ceterna 
 vcritas, and that he ascribed to it this character on 
 the ground that it is a priori, not derived from 
 experience : whereas in truth Kant especially com- 
 bats this view, maintaining that though the prin- 
 ciple of Causality is a priori, it is not therefore to 
 be regarded as absolutely or universally true. He 
 even considers that it may not be true in reference 
 to the origin of the voluntary actions of men. 
 
 Kant considers that in cognition the mind is not 
 passive a mere recipient of data brought into it 
 ab extra. He holds that knowledge results from the 
 joint action of the Mind and the external Reality, 
 called by him the Noumenon. Those who deny 
 this can scarcely hold the doctrine of Relativity. 
 Attributing activity to the mind, and considering it 
 
 History of Philosophy, p. 550. 
 
122 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 as one of the co-efficients by means of which em- 
 pirical phenomena are produced, he ascribes to it 
 a constitution, in virtue of which it acts, according 
 to law. As he considers experience to be produced 
 and determined by the native constitution of the 
 Mind, acting in conjunction with the Nounienon, 
 he cannot regard the constitution of the Mind as 
 a posteriori, as posterior to experience. To do this 
 would, according to his view, be to put the cart 
 before the horse. On the contrary, he regards the 
 native structure of the Mind as a condition (bedin- 
 gung) of experience, not experience as the bedin- 
 gung of the mental structure ; and he expresses 
 this by calling the elements native to the Mind a 
 priori. But while thus affirming the existence of 
 a priori energies or functions, he refuses, so far as 
 the Intellect is concerned, to regard these as a 
 source of universal or absolute truth, holding that 
 the constitution of our intelligence may be very 
 unlike that of other beings, and that the cognisable 
 objects produced by us may be very different from 
 those produced and cognised by them. This is, in 
 fact, the doctrine of Relativity. 
 
 Such a doctrine does not defeat philosophical 
 scepticism, but rather is the main pillar on which 
 it rests. 
 
 Some persons might perhaps be disposed to 
 question Schopenhauer's statement that Kant denies 
 to our intellectual conceptions all validity (alle Giil- 
 tigkeit) beyond the domain of phenomena and ex- 
 perience. They might point out that Kant in some 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 123 
 
 passages appears to recognise a certain "proble- 
 matical" application of categories and conceptions 
 to noumena. We find, however, that according to 
 Kant no knowledge or profitable result can come 
 from this " problematical" application, whatever its 
 nature may be ; since in a great number of passages 
 he declares with the greatest explicitness that all 
 judgments in which we apply conceptions or cate- 
 gories to noumena are illegitimate ; that the only 
 function for which the categories were intended, 
 and for which they can be legitimately used, is for 
 conceiving and cognising phenomena; that they 
 are valid only within the field of possible ex- 
 perience. 
 
 He sums up his investigation of the Principles 
 of the Understanding in the following way : 
 
 " The final result of the whole of this section is, 
 then, as follows : All principles of the pure under- 
 standing are nothing more than a priori principles 
 of the possibility of experience ; and to this latter 
 alone do all synthetical a priori propositions relate ; 
 nay, their very possibility rests entirely on this 
 relation."* 
 
 In his exposition of the Categories he heads a 
 section as follows : 
 
 u Die Kategorie hat keinen andern Gebrauch 
 zum Erkenntnisse der Dinge, als ihre Anwendung 
 auf Gegenstande der Erfahrung" i. e. 
 
 " The Category has no use or function in cog- 
 
 Critique of Pure Keason. On the System of Principles. 
 See Note G. 
 
1 24 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 nition, except its application to objects of ex- 
 perience." 
 
 Again, he says of the Categories : " Sie dieneii 
 nur zur Moglichkeit empirischer Erkenntniss"- 
 i. e. " they serve only to render possible empirical 
 cognition." " But this," he proceeds to say, " is 
 called experience (Erfahrung). Consequently the 
 categories have no other use or function (Ge- 
 brauch) in cognition, except in so far as they are 
 applied to objects of possible experience." 
 
 Again, he says: "It is absolutely impossible 
 for the categories to possess any application be- 
 yond the limits of experience." " If we abandon 
 the senses, how can it be made conceivable that 
 the categories . . . have any sense or meaning at 
 all?"* 
 
 Again, criticising rational theology, he repre- 
 sents its procedure as vain, because it tries to 
 think or cogitate (denken) the Supreme Being 
 " by conceptions which have properly no applica- 
 bility except in the world of sense. "f And he 
 declares that "the very conceptions of reality, 
 substance, causality, nay even of necessary exist- 
 ence, lose all significance, and become mere empty 
 titles, devoid of all content, when I venture with 
 them beyond the domain of the senses. "J 
 
 Again : " All the categories by which I attempt 
 to form a conception of such an object (viz. a 
 
 Critique of Pure Eeason. On Phenomena and Noumena. 
 See Note H. 
 
 f Ibid. On the Natural Dialectic of the Human Reason. 
 J Ibid. Ibid. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 125 
 
 cause of cosmical order) have exclusively an em- 
 pirical application, and are utterly devoid of mean- 
 ing, except when applied to objects of possible 
 experience, or, in other words, to the world of 
 sense."* 
 
 And as we have above seen, in the passages 
 previously quoted concerning the true function of 
 Reason, Kant again and again inculcates the same 
 view, declaring that Reason is employed legiti- 
 mately and fruitfully when it regulates the em- 
 ployment of the categories in the field of possible 
 experience; but that if it ventures to use them 
 otherwise, it acts illegitimately, and generates as a 
 consequence worthless results. 
 
 Now this doctrine of Kant concerning the use 
 and function of categories, conceptions, and forms 
 of the intellect, serves his purpose admirably so 
 long as it is his business to crush (zermalrnen) the 
 metaphysical systems of his predecessors; but if we 
 apply it to test Kant's own doctrine, it no longer 
 does him equal service. For Kant has himself 
 a certain portion of positive or affirmative doc- 
 trine. He does not come before us a thorough- 
 going sceptic, who doubts the existence of every 
 thing except himself or his own sensations. He 
 has even been understood as undertaking in the 
 second edition of his work to refute by rigorous 
 demonstration the egoistic idealism which denies or 
 doubts the existence of real things, differing from 
 the Ego and its modes or affections. 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason. Ibid. See Note I. 
 
126 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Thus then Kant, in his anti-sceptic character, 
 affirms that Noumena exist. In doing this he ap- 
 plies to Noumena the category or conception of 
 existence. He affirms that they really exist ; thus 
 applying to them the category of reality. He 
 affirms that they are Noumena, i.e. objects of our 
 vovg^ thus applying to them the conception of re- 
 lation, and specially of the relation of voovptvov to 
 vovg. He affirms that they are to be believed by us, 
 that they are objects of our belief; thus apply- 
 ing to them the conception of credibility, and again 
 that of relation. He supposes that there are Nou- 
 inena existing besides himself, indeed he gene- 
 rally speaks of Noumena in the plural number, 
 thus applying to Noumena the category of plurality. 
 He declares Noumena to be different from Phe- 
 nomena ; the peculiar merit of his doctrine is held 
 to be that he distinguishes Phenomena from things 
 in themselves, or Noumena; thus he applies to 
 Noumena the category or conception of difference. 
 
 Again, he teaches that Noumena are active or 
 operative; that by the joint action of the external 
 Noumenon and of our faculties the Phenomenon 
 is produced. And this is evidently an important 
 part of his doctrine. For if we considered that 
 Phenomena might take place and be cognised 
 without any operation or agency of Noumena, 
 we should have no ground to affirm the existence 
 of Noumena at all. Here, then, he applies to Nou- 
 mena the category of activity, of causality. 
 
 Thus then Kant, in his - own teaching, does 
 
TRINCirLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 127 
 
 apply to Noumena the conceptions or categories of 
 existence, reality, activity, relation, difference, &c., 
 and propounds to us the judgments formed in 
 virtue of such an application as valid and legiti- 
 mate, as important truths; while on the other 
 hand he forbids Leibnitz and other philosophers 
 to apply categories or conceptions to Noumena, and 
 proclaims it as the main purpose of his labours 
 to establish that such a procedure is wholly ille- 
 gitimate. 
 
 As to any attempt to demonstrate the existence 
 of Noumena, clearly, if the negative part of Kant's 
 doctrine is right, the attempt must be hopeless. 
 For the demonstration must be conducted by 
 thought, which cannot be done without employing 
 the categories ; and the conclusion must apply some 
 of the categories to Noumena, and that not pro- 
 blematically but assertorically. If such a pro- 
 cedure be altogether illegitimate, as Kant so re- 
 peatedly asserts, the pretended demonstration must 
 be illegitimate. 
 
 Thus then it appears that the negative prin- 
 ciple enunciated by Kant, and established, as he 
 asserts, by his critical labours, is too negative for 
 his purposes; that it is in truth Alleszermal- 
 niend ; crushing the doctrines of his predecessors, 
 Des Cartes, Leibnitz, &c., but crushing with equal 
 completeness his own teaching, so far as this is 
 positive. 
 
 Again, after having shown, as he conceives, 
 the vanity of all theology based on the intellect 
 
128 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 and speculative Reason, Kant professes to restore 
 what he had apparently destroyed, by means of the 
 moral or practical Reason. Relying upon this, he 
 re-introduces to us the theological doctrine, that the 
 world is governed by a Personal God, a righteous 
 Judge, who awards to men after death the lot which 
 they deserve : appropriate misery to the bad, and 
 appropriate bliss to the good. 
 
 But if the principles employed in the Critique 
 of the speculative Reason are correct, how can 
 judgments obtained by means of the practical Rea- 
 son possess any absolute truth? Is it urged that 
 they have a character of necessity or universality, 
 and that judgments having this character should 
 be regarded as absolutely true? If the Critique 
 was correct, it has been shown that the character 
 in question may arise simply from the fact that our 
 minds are constituted in a particular way ; and that 
 it does not authorise us to believe that other beings 
 think or judge in like manner. If this be the case, 
 the judgments in question, however useful they 
 may be for the regulation of our conduct, cannot 
 authorise us to affirm the existence of an unseen 
 Noumenon wholly beyond the field of experience, 
 and to affirm that this Noumenon governs the 
 Universe according to our idea of justice. 
 
 Further, according to the principles of the 
 Critique, we cannot know the character or moral 
 disposition of persons as they really are of Nou- 
 mena. Our moral judgments or cognitions must 
 be produced partly by the action of the Noumenon, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 129 
 
 and partly by that of the Subject or Ego. And we 
 have no right to affirm that the constitution of one 
 subject resembles that of all other subjects, nor 
 consequently that they all produce like Phenomena 
 when acted on by the same Noumenon. Socrates 
 or Washington, or Moses or Christ, as they really 
 are, may produce one sort of phenomenon when 
 acting in conjunction with our faculties, and a 
 totally different phenomenon when acting upon 
 beings gifted with a different constitution ; so that 
 A may cognise Socrates as good and Heliogabalus 
 as bad ; while B may cognise Heliogabalus as good 
 and Socrates as bad. The truth of the cognitions 
 being of this kind, the theological edifice raised 
 upon them cannot possess truth of a higher cha- 
 racter, in which case it would be quite profitless. 
 
 Further it is evident that when Kant, in his 
 moral theology, affirms God to exist, to be a 
 righteous governor of the Universe, rewarding the 
 good and punishing the bad, he quite sets at 
 nought the principle laid down in his Critique, that 
 categories and conceptions have no valid appli- 
 cation except to phenomena and to objects of ex- 
 perience. For it is uniformly assumed by Kant 
 that God is a noumenon, not a 'phenomenon, and 
 that he does not lie within the field of possible ex- 
 perience. Were this otherwise, all Kant's critique 
 of rational theology would fall to the ground. If, 
 then, we can legitimately predicate of God exist- 
 ence, goodness, righteousness, power, and the attri- 
 butes of a moral governor, we can legitimately 
 
 K 
 
130 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 make application of categories and conceptions to 
 a Noumenon, and that too not merely problema- 
 tically, but assertorically. 
 
 The discrepancy between the principles adopted 
 by Kant in the two portions of his teaching has 
 been pointed out and blamed by many writers, and 
 is censured with muxh severity by Mr. Mansel. 
 Mr. Mansel especially desires to lower the authority 
 of the Moral Reason, this being the organ princi- 
 pally employed by Rationalists in their criticism of 
 theological dogmas. When therefore Kant, hav- 
 ing refused all absolute validity to the Speculative 
 Reason, and pronounced it incompetent to occupy 
 itself concerning God, proceeds to ascribe an abso- 
 lute character to judgments of the Practical Reason, 
 and by means of these to set forth doctrines con- 
 cerning God, Mr. Mansel regards him as undoing 
 all that was most valuable in his labours. " If," 
 says he, "I build again the things which I de- 
 stroyed, I make myself a transgressor. " He points 
 out that Kant, when considering the necessity of 
 moral judgments, wholly abandons the doctrine 
 which he held in reference to the necessity of geo- 
 metrical and other a priori judgments. In treating 
 of the latter he regarded necessity as arising from 
 the peculiar structure of our faculties, as no indi- 
 cation that the so-called necessary truth was true to 
 other beings; while in treating of moral judgments 
 he falls into the old view, as if in their case neces- 
 sity was indicative of absolute or universal truth. 
 This, says Mr. Mansel, is indeed a marvellous at- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 131 
 
 tempt to send forth from the same fountain sweet 
 waters and bitter.* 
 
 The remarks made by Mr. Mansel concerning 
 the discrepancy of the two views taken by Kant 
 seem to me well founded; and indeed even Kant's 
 admirers generally admit that he has not conciliated 
 these two portions of his doctrine. 
 
 In explaining the distinction between the spe- 
 culative and the practical Reason, Kant tells us that 
 the former seeks cognisance of " that which is," 
 while the latter concerns itself with " that which 
 ought to be." Clearly if this be the case, it is im- 
 possible to establish the existence of God by means 
 of the practical Reason alone. The practical Reason 
 may affirm that there ought to be a God or Moral 
 Governor of the world, but not that there is such 
 a being. To enable us to do this, it is necessary 
 that the speculative Reason should step in, and as- 
 sure us that what according to the practical Reason 
 ought to be, may reasonably be affirmed to exist. 
 But according to Kant the speculative Reason can- 
 not take this step, since it is not authorised to pass 
 beyond the domain of Phenomena and Experience. 
 All its efforts to help the practical Reason at this, 
 critical conjuncture are thus paralysed. 
 
 Under such circumstances it cannot be won- 
 dered at that Kant's moral theology, viewed in 
 
 * The waters called sweet by Mr. Mansel seem to be the nega- 
 tive portions of Kant's doctrine, wherein he impugns the authority 
 of the Intellect ; while the waters which he esteems bitter are ap- 
 parently those in which Kant exalts the authority of the Moral 
 Keason. 
 
132 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 connection with his previous doctrine, has generally 
 failed to give satisfaction. Indeed Schopenhauer 
 considers that Kant himself perfectly knew its 
 weakness, and did not propound it seriously; that 
 his real object was to uproot Theism; and that his 
 pretended moral proof of the existence of God was 
 merely a weak pillar with which he propped up the 
 theistic edifice, so that he might have time to get 
 out of it before it fell to the ground. " Kant," he 
 says, "als er alte, ehrwiirdige Irrthlimer einriss 
 und die Gefahrlichkeit der Sache kannte, nur hatte, 
 durch die Moral - theologie einstweilen *ein Paar 
 schwache Stiitzen unterschieben wollen, damit der 
 Einsturz nicht ihn trafe, sondern er Zeit gewonne, 
 sich wegzubegeben."* 
 
 Holding, however, that Kant has attacked and 
 subverted Theism, Schopenhauer will not allow 
 that he has attacked or injured religion, since 
 ^ he maintains that true religion is not theistic, 
 Buddhism being an example of this. He considers 
 that if Kant's Critique had appeared in a Buddhist 
 country, it would have been regarded as a highly 
 religious work, defending orthodox idealism, and 
 thoroughly refuting the theistic heresy. 
 
 It is difficult to accept this view of Kant's pur- 
 pose, since there are many passages in which he 
 uses theistic language in an apparently natural and 
 spontaneous manner; at the same time it must be 
 admitted that it is difficult to make out with cer- 
 tainty his precise view ; for, after apparently affirai- 
 
 Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic, p, GCKy 
 
PEINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 133 
 
 ing the existence of a God, a Moral Governor of 
 the world, he throws every thing back again by 
 explaining that such affirmations have only a prac- 
 tical or regulative, not a speculative validity. Thus 
 the doctrine seems to come to this : not that God 
 does really exist, but that it is very useful to act 
 as if a God did exist ; that such a supposition regu- 
 lates our moral conduct in a salutary manner ; that 
 " si Dieu n' exist ait pas, il faudrait 1'inventer." Un- 
 doubtedly this kind of teaching affords fair ground 
 for Schopenhauer's assertion that Kant was not in 
 earnest with his Moral- Theologie : " da ein theo- 
 retisches Dogma von ausschliesslich praktischer 
 Geltung der holzernen Flinte gleicht, die man ohne 
 Gefahr den Kindern geben kann; auch ganz eigent- 
 lich zum ' wasch mir den Pelz, aber mach' ihn mir 
 nicht nass' gehort."* 
 
 Thus then we are justified in concluding that 
 Kant has not successfully solved the problems 
 with which he has grappled. In his negative 
 teaching he displays great profundity and intel- 
 lectual power; and in his moral philosophy he 
 displays a moral elevation recalling that of So- 
 crates ; but he has not fulfilled the requirements 
 of Metaphysics ; he has not successfully expounded 
 to us a coherent body of doctrine. 
 
 Ueber die vierfache "Wurzel, &c. p. 114. 
 
134 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 NOTE A, p. 110. 
 
 " Der Ausgang aller dialektischen Yersuche der reinen 
 Yernmift bestiitigt nicht allein, was wir schon in der trans- 
 scendentalen Aiialytik bewiesen, iiamlich dass alle misere 
 Schliisse, die mis iiber das Feld mogliclier Erfalirung 
 hinausfiihren wollen, triiglich imd grundlos sind ; sondern 
 er lehrt uns zugleich dieses Besondere, dass die nienscliliclie 
 Yernuiift dabei einen natiirlichen Hang habe, diese Grenze 
 zu iiberschreiten, dass transscendentale Ideen ilir eben so 
 natiirlich seien, als dem Yerstande die Kategorien, obgleicli 
 mitdemUnterschiede, dass, so wie die letzteren zur Wahr- 
 lieitj d. i. der Uebereinstimmung unserer BegriiFe mit dem 
 Objecte fiiliren, die erstereii einen blosen, aber unwider- 
 steliliclien Sclieiii bewirken, dessen Tiiuscliung man kaum 
 durch die scharfste Kjritik ablialten kann. 
 
 "Alles, was in der Natur unserer Kriifte gegriindet 
 1st, muss zweckmassig und mit dem riclitigen Gebrauclie 
 derselben einstimmig sein, wenn wir irar einen gewissen 
 Missverstand verliiiten und die eigentliclie- Kichtung der- 
 selben ausfindig machen konnen. Also werden die trans- 
 scendentalen Ideen allem Yermuthen nacli ihren guten und 
 folglicli im mane 11 ten Gebraucli haben, obgleicli, wenn 
 ihre Bedeutung verkannt und sie fiir Begriffe von wirk- 
 liclien Dingen genommen werden, sie transscendent in der 
 Aiiwendung und eben darum triiglicli seiii komien. Demi 
 iiiclit die Idee an sich selbst, sondern bios ilir Gebraucli 
 kann entweder in Anseliung der gesammten moglichen 
 Erfalirung iiberfliegend (transscendent), oder eiiiheim- 
 iscli (immanent) sein, nachdem man sie entweder gera- 
 dezu auf einen ihr vermeintlicli entspreclienden Gegen- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 135 
 
 stand, odor nur auf den Yerstandesgebraucli iiberhaupt, in 
 Anselmng der Gegenstande, mit welchen er zu tlmn hat, 
 richtet, und alle Fehler der Subreption sind jederzeit einem 
 Mangel der Urtheilskraft, niemals aber dem Yerstande oder 
 der Vernunft zuzuschreiben." Kanfs Kritik der reinen 
 Vernunft, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leips. 1853, pp. 466, 7. 
 
 NOTE B, p. 111. 
 
 " Ich behaupte demnacli : die transscendentalen Ideen 
 sind niemals von constitutivem Gebrauche, so dass dadurch 
 Begriffe gewisser Gegenstande gegeben wiirden, und in 
 dem Falle, dass man sie so verstelit, sind es bios ver- 
 iiiinftelnde (dialektisclie) Begriffe. Dagegen aber liaben 
 sie emeu vortreffliclien und unentbehrlich nothwendigen 
 regulativen Gebrauch, namlich den Yerstand zu einem 
 gewissen Ziele zu ricliten, in Aussiclit auf welche die 
 Richtungslinien aller seiner Regeln in einem Pimkt zusam- 
 menlaufen, der, ob er zwar nur eine Idee (focus imagi- 
 narius), d. i. ein Punkt ist, aus welchem die Yerstandes- 
 begriffe wirklich nicbt ausgehen, indem er ganz ausserlialb 
 den Grenzen moglicher Erfahrung liegt, dennocli dazu 
 dient, ilinen die grosste Einheit neben der grossten Aus- 
 breitung zu verschaffen. Nun entspringt uns zwar hieraus 
 die Tauscliung, als wenn diese Richtungslinien von einem 
 Gegenstande selbst, der ausser dem Felde empirisch- 
 moglicher Erkenntniss liige, ausgesclilossen waren, (so wie 
 die Objecte hinter der Spiegelflache gesehen werden,) 
 allein diese Illusion, (welclie man docli hindern kann, dass 
 sie nicht betriigt,) ist gleicliwolil unentbehrlicli nothweiidig, 
 wenn wir ausser den Gegenstanden, die uns vor Augen 
 sind, aucli diejenigen zugleich sehen wollen, die weit davon 
 uns im Riicken liegen, d. i. wenn wir, in unserem Falle, den 
 Yerstand iiber jede gegebene Erfahrung, (den Theil der 
 gesammten moglichen Erfahrung) hinaus, mithin auch zur 
 
136 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 grosstmoglichen und aussersten Erweiterung abricliten 
 wollen. 
 
 " Uebersehen wir unsere Verstandeserkenntnisse in 
 ihrem ganzen Umfange, so finden wir, dass dasjenige, was 
 Yernunft ganz eigentliiimlicli dariiber verfugt und zu 
 Stande zu bringen sucht, das Systematise lie der Er- 
 kenntniss sei, d. i. der Zusammenhang derselben aus einem 
 Princip." Ibid. p. 468. 
 
 NOTE 0, p. 112. 
 
 " Die Ideen der reinen Yernunft konneii nimmermehr 
 an sich selbst dialektiscli sein, sondern ihr bloser Miss- 
 braucli muss es alleiii maclien, dass uns von ilmeii eiii 
 triigliclier Sclieiii entspringt ; denn sie sind uns durch die 
 JSTatur unserer Yernunft aufgegeben, und dieser oberste 
 Gerichtshof aller Rechte und Anspriiche unserer Specu- 
 lation kann uiimoglich selbst urspriingliclie Tiiuscliungen 
 und Blendwerke enthalten. Vermutlilicli werden sie also 
 ihre gute und zweckmassige Bestimmung in der Natur- 
 anlage unserer Yernunft haben. Der Pobel der Yer- 
 niinftler schreit aber, Avie gewonnlich, iiber Ungereimtlieit 
 und Widerspriiche, schmabt auf die Eegierung, in deren 
 innerste Plane er nicht zu dringen vermag, deren wohl- 
 tliiitigen Einfliissen er aucli selbst seine Erhaltung und 
 sogar die Cultur verdankeii sollte, die ihn in den Stand 
 setzt, sie zu tadeln und_zu verurtheilen." Ibid. pp. 483, 
 484. 
 
 NOTE D, p. 112. 
 
 " Nunmehr konnen wir das Resultat der ganzen trans- 
 scendentalen Dialektik deutlich vor Augen stellen und die 
 Endabsicht der Ideen der reinen Yernunft, die nur durch 
 Missv erstand der Unbehutsamkeit dialektiscli werden, genau 
 bestimmen." Ibid. p. 490, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 137 
 
 NOTE E, p. 113. 
 
 " So enthalt die reine Vernunft, die uns Aiifangs 
 nichts Geringeres, als Erweiteruiig der Kenntnisse liber 
 alle Grenzen der Erfahrang zu versprechen schien, wemi 
 wir sie reclit verstehen, Nichts, als regulative Principien, 
 die zwar grossere Einheit gebieten, als der empirische 
 Verstandesgebrauch erreicheii kann, aber eben dadurch, 
 dass sie das Ziel der Annaherung desselben so weit hinaus 
 riicken, die Zusammenstimmuiig desselben mit sich selbst 
 durch systematische Einheit zum hochsten Grade bringen, 
 wenn man sie aber missversteht und sie fur constitutive 
 Principien transscendenter Erkenntnisse halt, durch einen 
 zwar glanzenden, aber triiglichen Schein Ueberredung und 
 eingebildetes "Wissen, hiemit aber ewige Widerspriiche 
 und Streitigkeiten hervorbringen." Ibid. pp. 503, 504. 
 
 NOTE F, p. 118. 
 
 " Der logische Schein, der in der blosen Nachahmung 
 der Yernunftform besteht, (der Schein der Trugschliisse,) 
 entspringt lediglich aus einem Mangel der Achtsamkeit 
 auf die logische Eegel. Sobald daher diese auf den vorlie- 
 genden Fall gescharft wird, so verschwindet er ganzlich. 
 Der transscendentale Schein dagegen hort gleichwohl nicht 
 auf, ob man ilm schon aufgedeckt und seine Nichtigkeit 
 durch die transscendentale Kritik deutlich eingesehen 
 hat, (z. B. der Schein in dem Satze : die Welt muss der 
 Zeit nach einen Anfang haben.) Die Ursache hievon ist 
 diese, dass in unserer Vernunft, (subjectiv als ein mensch- 
 liches Erkenntnissvermogen betrachtet,) Grundregeln und 
 Maximen ihres Gebrauchs liegen, welche ganzlich das 
 Ansehen objectiver Grundsatze haben und wodurch es 
 geschieht, dass die subjective Nothwendigkeit einer ge- 
 
138 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 wissen Verkniipfung unserer Begriffe, zu Gunsten des Ver- 
 standes, fur eine objective Notlrvvendigkeit der Bestimmung 
 der Dinge an sicli selbst gehalteii wird. Eine Illusion, 
 die gar niclit zu vermeiden ist, so wenig, als wir es ver- 
 meiden komien, dass uns das Meer in der Mitte nicht lioher 
 scheme wie an dem Ufer, weil wir jene durch hohere 
 Liclitstralilen als diese sehen, oder nocli mehr, so wenig 
 selbst der Astronom verliindern kann, dass ihm der Mond 
 im Aufgange niclit grosser scheme, ob er gleich durch 
 diesen Schein niclit betrogeii wird. 
 
 " Die transscendentale Dialektik wird also sich damit 
 begniigen, den Schein transscendeiitaler Urtheile aufzu- 
 decken, und zugleich zu verhiiten, dass er niclit betriige ; 
 dass er aber auch (wie der logische Schein) sogar ver- 
 schwinde und ein Schein zu sein aufhore, dass kann sie 
 niemals bewerkstelligen. Demi wir habeii es mit einerna- 
 turlicheii und uiivermeidlicheii Illusion zuthun, die 
 selbst auf subjectiven Gruiidsiltzen beruht und sie als ob- 
 jective uiiterschiebt, aiistatt dass die logische Dialektik in 
 Auflosung der Trugschliisse es nur mit einem Fehler in 
 Befolgung der Grundsiitze, oder mit einem gekiinstelten 
 Scheine in Nachahmtmg derselben zu thun hat. Es gibt 
 also eine natiiiiiche und uiivermeidliche Dialektik der reinen 
 Vermmft, niclit eine, in die sich etwa ein Stumper, durch 
 Mangel an Kenntnissen, selbst vervvickelt, oder die irgend 
 ein Sophist, um verniinftige Leute zu verwirren, kiiiitslich 
 ersoniien hat, sondern die der menschlicheii Yernunft 
 uiihintertreiblich anhangt, und selbst, iiachdem wir ihr 
 Blendwerk aufgedeckt haben, demioch niclit auf horen wird, 
 ihr vorzugaukeln und sie unabliissig in augenblickliche 
 Yerirrungen zu stossen, die jederzeit gehoben zu werden 
 bedurfen." Ibid. pp. 264, 265. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 139 
 
 NOTE G, p. 123. 
 
 " Die letzte Folgerung aus diesem ganzen Absclmitte 
 ist also : alle Grundsatze des reinen Verstandes sind Nichts 
 welter als Principien a priori der Mogliclikeit der Erfahrung, 
 und auf die letztere alleiii bezielien sich auch alle synthe- 
 tische Siitze a priori, ja ilire Mogliclikeit beruht selbst 
 ganzlich auf dieser Bezielmng." Ibid. p. 223. 
 
 NOTE H, p. 124. 
 
 " Dass also der Verstand von alien seinen Grundsatzen 
 a priori , ja von alien seinen Begriffen keinen andern als 
 empirischen, niemals aber einen transscendentalen Gebrauch 
 maclien konne, ist ein Satz, der, wenn er mit Ueberzeugung 
 erkannt werdeii kann, in wichtige Folgen hinaussieht. 
 Der transscendentale Gebrauch eines BegrifFs in irgend 
 einem Grundsatze ist dieser: dasser auf Dinge iiberhaupt 
 und an sich selbst, der empirische aber, wenn er bios auf 
 Er sch einun gen, d. i. Gegenstande einer moglichen 
 Erfahrung, bezogen wird. Dass aber uberall nur der 
 letztere stattfinden konne, ersieht man daraus. Zu jedem 
 BegrifF wird erstlich die logisclie Form eines BegrifFs (des 
 Denkens) iiberhaupt, und dann zweitens auch die Mog- 
 liclikeit, ihm einen Gegenstand zu geben, darauf er sich 
 beziehe, erfordert. Ohne diesen letzteren hat er keinen 
 Sinn und ist vollig leer an Inhalt, ob er gleich noch immer 
 die logische Function enthalten mag, aus etwanigen datis 
 einen BegriiF zu machen. Nun kann der Gegenstand 
 einem BegrifFe nicht anders gegeben werden, als in der 
 Anschauung, und wenn eine reine Anschauung noch vor 
 dem Gegenstande a priori moglich ist, so kann doch auch 
 diese selbst ihren Gegenstand, mithin die objective Giiltig- 
 
140 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 keit nur durch die empirische Anschauung bekommen, 
 wovon sie die blose Form 1st. Also bezieheii sich alle 
 BegrifFe und mit ihiien alle Grundsatze, so sehr sie auch 
 a priori moglich sein mogen, dennoch auf empirische 
 Anschauungen, d. i. auf data zur moglichen Erfalirung. 
 Ohne dieses haben sie gar keine objective Giiltigkeit, 
 BOndern sind ein bloses Spiel, es sei der Einbildungskraft 
 oder des Yerstandes, respective mit ihren Yorstellungen. . . . 
 Dalier erfordert man auch, eineii abgesonderten BegrifF 
 sinnlich zu mac lien, d. i. das ilim correspondirende 
 Object in der Anscliauung darzulegen, weil ohne dieses 
 der BegrifF, (wie man sagt,) ohne Sinn, d. i. ohne Bedeu- 
 
 tung bleiben wtirde Hieraus fliesst nun unwider- 
 
 sprechlich, dass die reinen Verstandesbegriffe niemals von 
 transscendentalem, sender n jederzeit nur von empi- 
 rischem Gebrauche sein konnen." Ibid. pp. 226, 227, 
 230. 
 
 "Wenn man von den Sinnen abgeht, wie will man 
 begreiflich maclien, dass unsre Kategorien (welclie die ein- 
 zigen iibrig bleibenden BegriiFe fiir Noumena sein wiirden) 
 nocli iiberall Etwas bedeuten ?" Ibid. p. 237. 
 
 NOTE I, p. 125. 
 
 " Ich denke mir alsdenn dieses hochste "VYesen durch 
 lauter BegrifFe, die eigentlich nur in der Sinnenwelt ihre 
 
 Anwendung haben ; und selbst die BegrifFe von 
 
 Eealitiit, Substanz, Causalitat, ja sogar der Nothwendigkeit 
 im Dasein verliereii alle Bedeutung und sind leere Titel zu 
 BegrifFen, ohne alien Inhalt, wenn ich mich ausser dem 
 Felde der Sinne damit hinauswage." Ibid. pp. 489, 490. 
 
 " Fragt man denn also (in Absicht auFeine transscen- 
 den tale Theologie) erstlich: ob es etwas von der Welt 
 Unterschiedenes gebe, was den Grand der Weltordnung 
 und ihres Zusammenhanges nach allgemeinen Gesetzen 
 

 PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 
 
 enthalte, so ist die Antwort: ohne Zweifel. Denn die 
 "Welt ist eine Summe von Erscheimmgen ; es muss also 
 irgend ein transscendentaler, d. i. bios dem reinen Yer- 
 stande denkbarer Grund derselben sein. Ist zweitens 
 die Frage: ob dieses Wesen Substanz, von der grossten 
 Realitat, nothwendig u. s. w. sei, so antworte ich: dass 
 diese Frage gar keine Bedeutung liabe. Denn alle 
 Kategorien, durch welche ich mir einen Begriff von einen 
 solclien Gegenstande zu machen. versuche, sind von keinem 
 anderen, als empirischeii Gebrauclie und liaben gar keinen 
 Sinn, wenn sie niclit auf Objecte moglicher Erfahrung, d. i. 
 auf die Sinnenwelt angewandt werden. Ausser diesem Felde 
 sind sie bios Titel zu Begriffen, die man einraumen, dadurch 
 man aber auch Niclits verstelicn kann." Ibid, p. 500. 
 
 The passage last quoted illustrates very well, in a short 
 compass, the apparently contradictory nature of Kant's 
 teaching about the use of the categories. In the first part 
 of the passage an assertorical application of various cate- 
 gories is made to a transcendental thing or object wholly 
 beyond experience, called " der Grund der Weltordnung," 
 an expression in itself involving the employment of various 
 categories ; and the proposition resulting from this employ- 
 ment of the categories is declared to be unquestionably 
 legitimate and true. But immediately after this has been 
 done, the passage goes on to say that no category has any 
 signification or sense (" Bedeutung" or " Sinn") when 
 applied to such an object ; that all application of the cate- 
 gories to an object out of the field of possible experience is 
 illegitimate and completely void ; being a procedure by 
 means of which the human mind can understand nothing 
 " Nichts verstehen kann." 
 
CHAPTER Y. 
 
 THE doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge holds 
 a very prominent place in the philosophy of Sir 
 W. Hamilton, whose treatment of this subject is 
 regarded by his admirers as especially valuable. 
 On the other hand, his teaching concerning it has 
 been sharply assailed by Mr. Mill and Mr. Stirling, 
 who condemn it as full of inconsistency. They 
 have set forth copious extracts of passages from 
 his works, which they declare to be irreconcilable. 
 Mr. Mill comes to the conclusion, that though 
 Hamilton in many places asserts with such em- 
 phasis the doctrine of Relativity, he did not under- 
 stand the real meaning of that doctrine, and that 
 he repudiated it in every sense which renders it 
 other than a barren truism. 
 
 Hamilton's doctrine of Relativity is especially 
 taught and enforced in his celebrated article on 
 the Philosophy of the Unconditioned. It is impos- 
 sible to understand his doctrine about knowledge 
 (or Gnosiology) unless we understand his views 
 concerning the Conditioned and the Unconditioned. 
 These have been very differently expounded by 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 1 43 
 
 different interpreters, and disputes concerning their 
 real meaning will probably continue for some time 
 to come. 
 
 The immediate object of Hamilton's article is 
 to review the philosophy of Cousin. After giving 
 a summary of Cousin's principal positions, he says : 
 " Now it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. 
 Cousin is involved in the proposition, that the Un- 
 conditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately 
 known in consciousness, and this by difference, plura- 
 lity, and relation.'" * Proposing to examine this 
 position, he thinks it well to premise a statement 
 of the opinions which it is possible to entertain in 
 reference to the Unconditioned (Absolute and In- 
 finite). 
 
 These opinions, he says, may be reduced to 
 four, which he describes as follows : 
 
 " 1. The Unconditioned is incognisable and 
 inconceivable, its notion being only negative of 
 the Conditioned, which last alone can be posi- 
 tively known or conceived. 
 
 U 2. It is not an object of knowledge; but its 
 notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, 
 is more than a mere negation of the Conditioned. 
 
 U 3. It is cognisable, but not conceivable: it 
 can be known by a sinking back into identity with 
 the Infinite- Absolute, but it is incomprehensible 
 by consciousness and reflection, under relation, dif- 
 ference, and plurality. 
 
 " 4. It is cognisable and conceivable by consci- 
 
 Discussions, p. 12. 
 
144 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ousness and reflection, under relation, difference, 
 and plurality."* 
 
 Hamilton states that the first of these opinions 
 is the one which he maintains as true; the second 
 being that of Kant, the third that of Schelling, and 
 the fourth that of Cousin. 
 
 He undertakes to refute the three last, and to 
 establish the first, this being the task to which he 
 devotes his article. 
 
 Thus, then, Hamilton undertakes to prove that 
 we cannot conceive or know the Unconditioned, 
 either by consciousness and reflection, under rela- 
 tion, difference, and plurality, or by any faculty 
 of a peculiar kind, in the exercise of which con- 
 sciousness and reflection, with their accompanying 
 conditions, are dispensed with. 
 
 Now there is one opinion which it is possible 
 to entertain concerning the Unconditioned, which 
 is not mentioned in Hamilton's enumeration : viz. 
 the opinion that the Unconditioned is not merely 
 incogitable and incognisable, but that it is also in- 
 credible ; that it is nothing at all a mere zero. 
 
 If Hamilton entertained this opinion, it would 
 be his duty to state it. As he does not do so, we 
 may presume that he did not regard it as one of 
 the opinions which could possibly be entertained 
 by a philosopher. It would seem, therefore, that, 
 whilst rejecting the doctrines of Schelling and 
 Cousin, so far as they affirm the cognisability of the 
 Unconditioned, he agreed with them in believing 
 
 Discussions, p. 12. 
 
PPtlXCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 145 
 
 that the Unconditioned exists, and that knowledge 
 of it, if it could be obtained, would be important 
 and valuable. 
 
 Before proceeding to combat the three doctrines 
 which he disapproves, Hamilton sets forth more 
 fully his own. " The Reviewer's doctrine of the 
 Unconditioned " is explained by him as follows : 
 
 "In OUR opinion, the mind can conceive, and 
 consequently can know, only the limited, and the 
 conditionally limited. The unconditionally unlimited 
 or the Infinite, the unconditionally limited or the 
 Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the 
 mind; they can be conceived, only by a thinking 
 away from, or abstraction of, those very conditions 
 under which thought itself is realised ; conse- 
 quently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only 
 negative, negative of the conceivable itself. For 
 example : On the one hand we can positively con- 
 ceive, neither an absolute whole, that is a whole 
 so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a rela- 
 tive part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute 
 part, that is, a part so small that we cannot also 
 conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller 
 parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively 
 represent, or realise, or construe to the mind (as 
 here Understanding and Imagination coincide), an 
 infinite whole, for this could only be done by the 
 infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which 
 would itself require an infinite time for its accom- 
 plishment; nor, for the same reason, can we fol- 
 low out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. 
 
 L 
 
146 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 The result is the same, whether we apply the pro- 
 cess to limitation in space, in time, or in degree. 
 The unconditional negation, and the unconditional 
 affirmation of limitation ; in other words, the Infi- 
 nite and the Absolute, properly so called, are thus 
 equally inconceivable to us. 
 
 " As the conditionally limited (which we may 
 briefly call the Conditioned) is thus the only pos- 
 sible object of knowledge and of positive thought, 
 thought necessarily supposes condition. To 
 think is to condition; and conditional limitation is 
 the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. 
 For, as the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, 
 nor (by a more appropriate simile) the eagle out- 
 soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by 
 which alone he is supported; so the mind cannot 
 transcend that sphere of limitation, within and 
 through which exclusively the possibility of thought 
 is realised. Thought is only of the conditioned; 
 because, as we have said, to think is simply to con- 
 dition. The Absolute is conceived merely by a 
 negation of conceivability ; and all that we know, 
 is only known as 
 
 ' won from the void and formless Infinite? 
 
 How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought 
 is only of the Conditioned, may well be deemed a 
 matter, of the profoundest admiration. Thought 
 cannot transcend consciousness ; consciousness is 
 only possible under the antithesis of a subject and 
 object of thought, known only in correlation, and 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 147 
 
 mutually limiting each other ; while, independently 
 of this, all that we know either of subject or object, 
 either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in 
 each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, 
 of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit 
 that the consequence of this doctrine is, that phi- 
 losophy, if viewed as more than a science of the 
 Conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the 
 particular, we admit, that we can never, in our 
 highest generalisations, rise above the Finite ; that 
 our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be 
 nothing more than a knowledge of the relative 
 manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is 
 our highest wisdom to recognise as beyond the 
 reach of philosophy. This is what in the language 
 of St. Austin, ( Cognoscendo ignoratur, et ignorando 
 cognoscitur. 1 
 
 " The Conditioned is the mean between two 
 extremes, two inconditionates, exclusive of each 
 other, neither of which can be conceived as possible, 
 but of which, on the principles of contradiction and 
 excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary. 
 On this opinion, therefore, our faculties are shown 
 to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not 
 represented as conceiving two propositions subver- 
 sive of each other, as equally possible ; but only, as 
 unable to understand as possible, either of two ex- 
 tremes ; one of which, however, on the ground of 
 their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recog- 
 nise as true. We are thus taught the salutary 
 lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be 
 
148 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 constituted into the measure of existence ; and are 
 warned from recognising the domain of our know- 
 ledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon 
 of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we 
 are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability 
 to conceive aught above the relative and finite, in- 
 spired with a belief in the existence of something 
 unconditioned beyond the sphere of all reprehen- 
 sible reality."* 
 
 Having thus stated his own doctrine, Hamilton 
 proceeds to examine the second of the opinions 
 mentioned by him, viz. that of Kant. He considers 
 this doctrine to be in the main the same as his own ; 
 but to stand in need of some important corrections. 
 It pronounces the Unconditioned to be incognisable, 
 and so far is right ; but it regards the notion of the 
 Unconditioned as having a certain regulative effi- 
 cacy, instead of treating it as purely negative : and 
 herein, says Hamilton, it is wrong. 
 
 The following passages set forth Hamilton's 
 view of Kant's teaching on the subject. 
 
 " The second opinion, that of KANT, is funda- 
 
 " True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy : 
 ' A God understood would be no God at all ;' ' To think that 
 God is, as we can think him to be, is blasphemy.' The Divinity, in 
 a certain sense, is revealed ; in a certain sense is concealed ; He is 
 at once known and unknown. But the last and highest consecra- 
 tion of all true religion must be an altar 'Ayi^o-r^ 0e ' To the 
 unknown and unknowable God." 1 In this consummation, nature and 
 revelation, paganism and Christianity, are at one : and from either 
 source the testimonies are so numerous that I must refrain from 
 quoting any. Am I wrong in thinking, that M. Cousin would not 
 repudiate this doctrine ?" Discussions, pp. 14, 15. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 149 
 
 mentally the same as the preceding. Metaphysic, 
 strictly so denominated, the philosophy of Exist- 
 ence, is virtually the doctrine of the Unconditioned. 
 From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the Infinite, the 
 Absolute, the Unconditioned, formed the highest 
 principle of speculation ; but from the dawn of 
 philosophy in the school of Elea until the rise of 
 the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was 
 made to investigate the nature and origin of this 
 notion (or notions) as a psychological phenomenon. 
 Before Kant, philosophy was rather a deduction 
 from principles, than an inquiry concerning princi- 
 ples themselves. At the head of every system a 
 cognition figured, which the philosopher assumed in 
 conformity to his views ; but it was rarely consi- 
 dered necessary, and more rarely attempted, to as- 
 certain the genesis, and determine the domain, of 
 this notion or judgment, previous to application. In 
 his first Critique Kant undertakes a regular survey 
 of consciousness. He professes to analyse the con- 
 ditions of human knowledge, to mete out its 
 limits, to indicate its point of departure, and 
 .to determine its possibility. That Kant accom- 
 plished much, it would be prejudice to deny ; nor 
 is his service to philosophy the less, that his success 
 has been more decided in the subversion of error 
 than in the establishment of truth. The result of 
 his examination was the abolition of the metaphy- 
 sical sciences, of Eational Psychology, Ontology, 
 Speculative Theology, &c., as founded on mere 
 petitiones principiorum. Existence is revealed to 
 
150 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 us only under specific modifications ; and these 
 are known only under the conditions of our fa- 
 culties of knowledge. 4 Things in themselves/ 
 Matter, Mind, God, all, in short, that is not 
 finite, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no 
 analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of 
 our knowledge. Philosophy was thus restricted 
 to the observation and analysis of the phenomena 
 of consciousness ; and what is not explicitly or 
 implicitly given in a fact of consciousness, is con- 
 demned, as transcending the sphere of a legitimate 
 speculation. A knowledge of the Unconditioned 
 is declared impossible ; either immediately, as an 
 intuition, or mediately, as an inference. A demon- 
 stration of the Absolute from the Relative is logi- 
 cally absurd ; as in such a syllogism we must 
 collect in the conclusion what is not distributed 
 in the premises : And an immediate knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned is equally impossible. But 
 here we think Kant's reasoning complicated, and 
 his reduction incomplete. We must explain our- 
 selves. 
 
 "While we regard as conclusive, Kant's ana- 
 lysis of Time and Space into formal necessities of 
 thought, (without however admitting, that they 
 have no external or objective reality ;) we cannot 
 help viewing his deduction of the c Categories of 
 Understanding/ and of the ' Ideas of Speculative 
 Season/ as the work of a great but perverse in- 
 genuity. The Categories of Understanding are 
 merely subordinate forms of the Conditioned. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 151 
 
 Why not, therefore, generalise the Conditioned 
 Existence conditioned, as the supreme category, or 
 categories, of thought ? and if it were necessary 
 to analyse this form into its subaltern applications, 
 why not develope these immediately out of the 
 generic principle, instead of preposterously, and 
 by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the 
 laws of the understanding from a questionable 
 division of logical propositions ? Why distinguish 
 Reason ( Vernunff) from Understanding ( Verstand), 
 simply on the ground that the former is conversant 
 about, or rather tends towards, the Unconditioned ; 
 when it is sufficiently apparent, that the Uncon- 
 ditioned is conceived only as the negation of the 
 Conditioned, and also that the conception of con- 
 tradictories is one ? In the Kantian philosophy 
 both faculties perform the same function, both seek 
 the one in the many; the Idea (Idee) is only the 
 Concept (Begriff} sublimated into the inconceiv- 
 able; Reason only the Understanding which has 
 4 overleaped itself.' Kant has clearly shown, that 
 the Idea of the Unconditioned can have no objective 
 reality, that it conveys no knowledge, and that 
 it involves the most insoluble contradictions. But 
 he ought to have shown, that the Unconditioned 
 had no objective application, because it had, in 
 fact, no subjective affirmation; that it afforded no 
 real knowledge, because it contained nothing even 
 conceivable; and that it is self-contradictory, be- 
 cause it is not a notion, either simple or positive, 
 but only a fasciculus of negations negations of 
 
152 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 the Conditioned in its opposite extremes, and 
 bound together merely by the aid of language and 
 their common character of incomprehensibility. 
 (The Unconditioned is merely a common name 
 for what transcends the laws of thought for the 
 formally illegitimate.} And while he appropriated 
 Reason as a specific faculty to take cognisance of 
 these negations, hypostatised as positive, under the 
 Platonic name of Ideas ; so also, as a pendant to. 
 his deduction of the Categories of Understanding 
 from a logical division of propositions, he deduced 
 the classification and number of these Ideas of 
 Reason from a logical division of syllogisms. Kant 
 thus stands intermediate between those who view 
 the notion of the Absolute as the instinctive affirma- 
 tion of an encentric intuition, and those who regard 
 it as the factitious negative of an eccentric gene- 
 ralisation 
 
 " The imperfection and partiality of Kant's 
 analysis are betrayed in its consequences. His 
 doctrine leads to absolute scepticism. Speculative 
 reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of 
 mere delusion. The Idea of the Unconditioned, 
 about which it is conversant, is shown to involve 
 insoluble contradictions, and yet to be the legiti- 
 mate product of intelligence. Hume has well 
 observed, ' that it matters not whether we possess 
 a false reason, or no reason at all.' If 'the light 
 that leads astray, be light from heaven,' what are 
 we to believe ? If our intellectual nature be per- 
 fidious in one revelation, it cannot be presumed 
 
PEINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 153 
 
 truthful in any ; nor is it possible for Kant to 
 establish the existence of God, Free-will, and Im- 
 mortality, on the supposed veracity of reason, in 
 a practical relation, after having himself demon- 
 strated its mendacity in a speculative. 
 
 " Kant had annihilated the older metaphysic, 
 but the germ of a more visionary doctrine of the 
 Absolute (Infinito-absolute) than any of those re- 
 futed, was contained in the bosom of his own philo- 
 sophy. He had slain the body, but had not exor- 
 cised the spectre, of the Absolute ; and this spectre 
 has continued to haunt the schools of Germany 
 even to the present day. The philosophers were 
 not content to abandon their metaphysic ; to limit 
 philosophy to an observation of phenomena, and to 
 the generalisation of these phenomena into laws. 
 The theories of Bouterweck, (in his earlier works,) 
 of Bardili, of Eeinhold, of Fichte, of Schelling, of 
 Hegel, and of sundry others, are just so many 
 endeavours, of greater or of less ability, to fix the 
 Absolute as a positive in knowledge ; but the Abso- 
 lute, like the water in the sieves of the Danaides, 
 has always hitherto run through as a negative into 
 the abyss of nothing/'* 
 
 Having criticised Kant's doctrine, and pointed 
 out, as he conceives, its imperfections, Hamilton 
 proceeds to examine the third doctrine mentioned 
 by him, viz. that of Schelling. Concerning this 
 he says : 
 
 " His opinion constitutes the third of those 
 
 Discussions, pp. 15-19. 
 
154 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 enumerated ; and the following is a brief statement 
 of its principal positions : 
 
 "While the lower sciences are of the relative 
 and conditioned, Philosophy, as the science of sci- 
 ences, must be of the Absolute the Unconditioned. 
 Is the Absolute then beyond our knowledge ? 
 philosophy is itself impossible. 
 
 " But how, it is objected, can the Absolute be 
 known? As unconditioned, identical, and one, it 
 cannot be cognised under conditions, by difference 
 and plurality ; not therefore, if the subject of 
 knowledge be distinguished from the object of 
 knowledge. In a knowledge of the Absolute, 
 existence and knowledge must be identical : the 
 Absolute can only be known, if adequately known; 
 and it can only be adequately known, by the 
 Absolute itself. But is this possible ? We are 
 wholly ignorant of existence in itself: the rnind 
 knows nothing, except in parts, by quality, and 
 difference, and relation ; consciousness supposes 
 the subject contradistinguished from the object 
 of thought; the abstraction of this contrast is a 
 negation of consciousness ; and the negation of 
 consciousness is the annihilation of thought itself. 
 The alternative is therefore unavoidable : either 
 finding the Absolute, we lose ourselves; or retain- 
 ing self, and individual consciousness, we do not 
 reach the Absolute. 
 
 " All this Schelling frankly admits. He (and 
 Fichte also) explicitly admits that a knowledge of 
 the Absolute is impossible, in personality and con- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 155 
 
 sciousness : he admits that, as the understanding 
 knows, and can know, only by consciousness, and 
 consciousness only by difference, we, as conscious 
 and understanding, can apprehend, can conceive 
 only the Conditioned ; and he admits that, only if 
 man be himself the Infinite, can the Infinite be 
 known by him. 
 
 6 Nee sentire Deum, nisi qui pars ipse Deorum est ;' 
 (* None can feel God, who shares not in the Godhead.') 
 
 " But Schelling contends that there is a capa- 
 city of knowledge above consciousness, and higher 
 than the understanding, and that this knowledge 
 is competent to human reason, as identical with the 
 Absolute itself. In this act of knowledge (which, 
 after Fichte, he calls the Intellectual Intuition), 
 there exists no distinction of subject and object, 
 no contrast of knowledge and existence ; all differ- 
 ence is lost in mere indifference, all plurality in 
 simple unity. The Intuition itself, Reason, and 
 the Absolute are identified. The Absolute exists 
 only as known by Reason ; and Reason knows only 
 as being itself the Absolute. 
 
 " This act (act!) is necessarily ineffable : 
 
 * The vision and the faculty divine/ 
 
 to be known must be experienced. It cannot be 
 conceived by the understanding, because beyond 
 its sphere ; it cannot be described, because its 
 essence is identity, and all description supposes 
 discrimination. To those who are unable to rise 
 
156 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 beyond a philosophy of reflection, Schelling can- 
 didly allows that the doctrine of the Absolute can 
 appear only a series of contradictions ; and he has 
 at least the negative merit of having clearly ex- 
 posed the impossibility of a philosophy of the 
 Unconditioned, as founded on a knowledge by 
 difference, if he utterly fails in positively proving 
 the possibility of such a philosophy, as founded on 
 a knowledge in identity, through an absorption 
 into, and vision of, the Absolute. 
 
 "Out 'of Laputa or the Empire it would be 
 idle to enter into an articulate refutation of a 
 theory, which founds philosophy on the annihilation 
 of consciousness, and on the identification of the un- 
 conscious philosopher with God. The Intuition of 
 the Absolute is manifestly the work of an arbitrary 
 abstraction, and of a self- delusive imagination. To 
 reach the point of indifference, by abstraction we 
 annihilate the object, and by abstraction we anni- 
 hilate the subject, of consciousness. But what 
 remains ? Nothing. ' Nil conscimus nobis.' We 
 then hypostatise the zero ; we baptize it with the 
 name of Absolute ; and conceit ourselves that we 
 contemplate absolute existence, when we only 
 speculate absolute privation. This truth has been 
 indeed virtually confessed by the two most dis- 
 tinguished followers of Schelling. Hegel at last 
 abandons the Intuition, and regards ' pure or un- 
 determined existence' as convertible with 'pure 
 nothing ; ' whilst Oken, if he adhere to the In- 
 tuition, intrepidly identifies the Deity or Absolute 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 157 
 
 with zero. God, he makes the Nothing, the No- 
 thing he makes God ; 
 
 6 And Naught is ev'rything, and ev'ry thing is Naught.' 
 
 Nor does the negative chimera prove less fruitful 
 than the positive ; for Schelling has found it as 
 difficult to evolve the one into the many, as his 
 disciples to deduce the universe and its contents 
 from the first self-affirmation of the 'primordial 
 Nothing/ 
 
 ' Miri homines ! Nihil esse aliquid statuantve negentve ; 
 Quodque negant statuunt, quod statuuntque negant.' 
 
 " To Schelling, indeed, it has been impossible, 
 without gratuitous and even contradictory assump- 
 tions, to explain the deduction of the finite from 
 the infinite. By no salto mortale has he been able 
 to clear the magic circle in which he had enclosed 
 himself. Unable to connect the unconditioned 
 and the conditioned by any natural correlation, he 
 has variously attempted to account for the phe- 
 nomenon of the universe, either by imposing a 
 necessity of self-manifestation on the absolute, i.e. 
 by conditioning the unconditioned ; or by postu- 
 lating a fall of the finite from the infinite, i. e. by 
 begging the very fact which his hypothesis pro- 
 fessed its exclusive ability to explain. The veil of 
 Isis is thus still un withdrawn; and the question 
 proposed by Orpheus at the dawn of speculation 
 will probably remain unanswered at its setting, 
 
 fJ-OL cv TL ra TTUVT' IcTTOI, KOL xwpic fWtrrov ; 
 How shall I think each, separate and all, one ?') 
 
158 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 " In like manner, annihilating consciousness in 
 order to reconstruct it, Schelling has never yet 
 been able to connect the faculties conversant about 
 the conditioned, with the faculty of absolute know- 
 ledge. One simple objection strikes us as decisive, 
 although we do not remember to have seen it 
 alleged. ' We awaken,' says Schelling, ' from the 
 Intellectual Intuition as from a state of death ; we 
 awaken by Reflection, that is, through a compul- 
 sory return to ourselves.' We cannot, at the same 
 moment, be in the intellectual intuition and in 
 common consciousness; we must therefore be able 
 to connect them by an act of memory of recollec- 
 tion. But how can there be a remembrance of the 
 Absolute and its Intuition? As out of time, and 
 space, and relation, and difference, it is admitted 
 that the Absolute cannot be construed to the un- 
 derstanding ? But as remembrance is only pos- 
 sible under the conditions of the understanding, it 
 is consequently impossible to remember anything 
 anterior to the moment when we awaken into con- 
 sciousness ; and the clairvoyance of the Absolute, 
 even granting its reality, is thus, after the crisis, 
 as if it had never been. We defy all solution of 
 this objection. But it may be put in another form : 
 To know the Absolute and to be the Absolute are, 
 ex hypothesi, one and the same. Therefore, in the 
 Intellectual Intuition, the individual speculator, the 
 conscious Schelling, Steffens, Oken is annihilated; 
 and, e contra, the Intellectual Intuition is impossible 
 for the philosopher in a state of personal individual- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANI AND HAMILTON. 159 
 
 ity and consciousness. But it is in this state of per- 
 sonality, and non-intuition of the Absolute, that 
 the philosopher writes ; in writing therefore -about 
 the Absolute, he writes of what is to him as zero. 
 His system is thus a mere scheme of words."* 
 
 In the above description and criticism of Schel- 
 ling's doctrine, the word "consciousness" plays a 
 conspicuous part. We are told that the Absolutef 
 cannot be known by consciousness, in or under con- 
 sciousness, in personality and consciousness, &c. We 
 are told that Schelling postulates the existence of 
 some faculty above consciousness, by means of which 
 the philosopher can attain knowledge of the Uncon- 
 ditioned of the Absolute. And this pretension is 
 condemned as flagrantly absurd; as not needing 
 serious discussion. 
 
 Now the question arises, what is the sense which 
 Hamilton here attaches to the word Consciousness ? 
 
 Hamilton, in his Lectures, defines Consciousness 
 as " the recognition by the mind or ego of its acts 
 and affections ; in other words, the self-affirma- 
 tion, that certain modifications are known by me, 
 and that these modifications are mine."J At the 
 same time he explains that we must not regard 
 Consciousness as different from the modes or affec- 
 tions of which we are conscious. And in the same 
 
 Discussions, pp. 19-23. 
 
 t It is to be observed that in discussing the doctrines of Schel- 
 ling and Cousin, Hamilton uses the word " Absolute " in conformity 
 with their usage, according to which the Infinite and the Absolute 
 are not opposed, or contraries, as in Hamilton's own terminology. 
 
 f Lectures, vol. i. p. 193. 
 
160 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 chapter he says: "Whatever division of the men- 
 tal phenomena may be adopted, all its members 
 must be within consciousness. Let consciousness, 
 therefore, remain one and indivisible, comprehend- 
 ing all the modifications all the phenomena, of 
 the thinking subject."* 
 
 If such be the meaning of the word Conscious- 
 ness, then a state above consciousness, or out of 
 consciousness, would signify a state in which we 
 do not recognise our own existence in which we 
 cannot affirm " I exist," " this affection or modifi- 
 cation is mine." 
 
 Some persons, however, think that Hamilton 
 occasionally uses the word Consciousness in a much 
 more restricted sense, viz. to signify immediate as 
 opposed to mediate knowledge ; and that when he 
 denies the possibility of knowing the Absolute in 
 or under consciousness, he uses the word in this 
 restricted sense. 
 
 A little attention will suffice to show, that in 
 the above criticism of Schelling the word Consci- 
 ousness is used in the larger, not in the more re- 
 stricted sense. For we are told that u the annihi- 
 lation of consciousness is the annihilation of thought 
 itself" And after it has been urged that the mind 
 knows nothing except in parts, that consciousness 
 supposes the distinction of subject and object, we 
 are told that the following alternative is unavoid- 
 able. "Either, finding the Absolute, we lose our- 
 selves ; or retaining self and individual conscious- 
 Lectures, vol. i. p. 183. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 161 
 
 ness, we do not reach the Absolute." Here the 
 alternative presented to us is sufficiently clear ; if 
 we find the Absolute, we cease to be conscious 
 we lose the knowledge of our own existence ; if 
 we continue conscious cognisant of our own ex- 
 istence we cannot know the Absolute. 
 
 Again : we are told that Schelling and Fichte 
 frankly admit that " as the understanding knows, 
 and can know, only by consciousness, and con- 
 sciousness only by difference, we, as conscious and 
 understanding, can apprehend, can conceive, only 
 the Conditioned." It is scarcely possible to mis- 
 take the doctrine here stated, viz. that while we 
 are conscious, we cannot apprehend or conceive the 
 Unconditioned. 
 
 Again : Hamilton objects to Schelling's theory, 
 because it founds philosophy on the annihilation of 
 consciousness, and on the identification of the un- 
 conscious philosopher with God. He describes the 
 pretended mode of knowledge, absurdly, as he 
 thinks, laid claim to by Schelling, as one in which 
 a Nil conscimus nobis," and speaks of the pre- 
 tended mystical state as one in which " the con- 
 scious Schelling, Steffens, Oken is annihilated." 
 
 It appears, therefore, sufficiently clear that 
 Hamilton ascribes to Schelling the following doc- 
 trine. "It is impossible for man to cognise the 
 Absolute so long as he is conscious (so long as 
 he is cognisant of his own existence) because con- 
 sciousness implies relation and difference the an- 
 tithesis of subject and object. But the philosopher 
 
 M 
 
162 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 can rise into an ecstatic state, beyond the reach of 
 the vulgar, in which he loses consciousness and 
 individuality, ceases to be Schelling or Steffens or 
 Oken, becomes identified with the Absolute, and 
 in this state enjoys knowledge of the Absolute, of 
 the Unconditioned." 
 
 Hamilton signifies his approval of one portion 
 of this teaching, while he condemns the remainder. 
 His view may be stated as follows. 
 
 Fichte and Schelling are quite right in main- 
 taining that man, so long as he is conscious, cannot 
 enjoy knowledge of the Absolute. The reason- 
 ings by which they demonstrate this point, on the 
 ground that consciousness implies relation and dif- 
 ference, the antithesis of subject and object, are 
 perfectly correct and convincing. But when Schel- 
 ling proceeds to assert that the philosopher can 
 obtain cognition of the Absolute in a state of un- 
 consciousness, he commits absurdity. It is only 
 while we are conscious i. e. while we are cogni- 
 sant of our own existence and affections that we 
 can know any thing ; if we cease to be conscious, 
 we can neither know the Absolute nor any thing 
 else. Schelling ought to have perceived that if 
 we cannot cognise the Absolute while we are con- 
 scious, we cannot cognise it at all. He ought to 
 have taught the first part of his doctrine, and 
 given up the latter part. He would thus have 
 come to the sound and correct conclusion, that 
 the Absolute, the Unconditioned, cannot be known 
 at all by the human mind. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 163 
 
 Having examined, and severely condemned the 
 doctrine of Schelling, Hamilton proceeds to ex- 
 amine the fourth of the opinions set forth by him, 
 viz. that of Cousin, according to which the Uncon- 
 ditioned is cognisable in the ordinary state of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 To refute this doctrine Hamilton employs the 
 reasonings previously urged by Fichte and Schel- 
 ling, viz. that consciousness implies the antithesis 
 of subject and object, and thus involves difference, 
 relation, and plurality. He deduces from these 
 considerations the following alternative. " Either 
 the Absolute cannot be known or conceived at 
 all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought 
 to the conditions of plurality and difference. It 
 was the iron necessity of the alternative that* con- 
 strained Schelling to resort to the hypothesis of 
 a knowledge in identity through the Intellectual 
 Intuition; and it could only be from an oversight 
 of the main difficulties of the problem, that M 
 Cousin, in abandoning the Intellectual Intuition, 
 did not abandon the Absolute itself."* 
 
 Again, he says : u If a knowledge of the Ab- 
 solute were possible under these conditions) i. e. 
 those of relation, plurality, and difference, ) it may 
 excite our wonder that other philosophers should 
 have viewed the supposition as utterly impossible ; 
 and that Schelling, whose acuteness was never 
 questioned, should have exposed himself gratuit- 
 ously to the reproach of mysticism, by his pos- 
 
 Discussions, p. 33. 
 
164 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 tulating for a few, and through a faculty above 
 the reach of consciousness, a knowledge already 
 given to all in the fact of consciousness itself. 
 Monstrous as is the postulate of the Intellectual 
 Intuition, we freely confess that it is only through 
 such a faculty that we can imagine the possibility 
 of a science of the Absolute ; and have no hesita- 
 tion in acknowledging, that if Schelling's hypo- 
 thesis appear to us incogitable, that of Cousin is 
 seen to be self-contradictory." * 
 
 As we have seen, the postulate of the Intellec- 
 tual Intuition, as described by Hamilton, was the 
 postulate that the philosopher could cognise the 
 Absolute whilst himself unconscious. Hamilton 
 condemned this hypothesis as ridiculous, because 
 we cannot know any thing except when we are 
 conscious. And now he declares that if we could 
 cognise the Absolute at all, we could only do so 
 in the mystical state described by Schelling, i.e. 
 in a state of unconsciousness. Monstrous as such 
 a supposition is, he deems it. better than the doc- 
 trine of those who think that we can cognise the 
 Absolute in the normal conscious state. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that Hamilton conceives 
 himself to have brought the matter to the follow- 
 ing pass. 
 
 It is impossible for man to obtain knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned (Absolute and Infinite) either 
 in the ordinary state, in which he is conscious of 
 his own existence, or in an ecstatic state, in which 
 
 Discussions, p. 32. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 165 
 
 he loses consciousness, and becomes identified with 
 the Absolute or the Infinite. The first supposition 
 is refuted by the consideration that all modes or 
 faculties of which we are conscious imply plural- 
 ity, relation, and difference ; consequently no such 
 faculty can enable us to conceive or know the 
 Unconditioned the Absolute. The second suppo- 
 sition is refuted by the simple consideration, that 
 when a man is unconscious, he cannot know any 
 thing at all. 
 
 Consequently we are brought to the conclu- 
 sion, that knowledge of the Unconditioned (Infinite 
 and Absolute) is entirely beyond the reach of man 
 in his present state : and thus Hamilton conceives 
 that he has established his thesis. 
 
 It would be very strange that Hamilton should 
 take all this trouble to demonstrate the incognisa- 
 bility of a zero ; and very strange, if the theme of 
 these laborious demonstrations were regarded by 
 him as a zero, that he should nowhere express 
 such an opinion. Some expositors, however, who 
 believe themselves to be advocates of Hamilton's 
 doctrine, have endeavoured to explain it in con- 
 formity with such an hypothesis. According to 
 them, Hamilton's object is to prove that every 
 thing which exists, divine or human, is condi- 
 v/ tioned; i.e. exists in a specific state, which ren- 
 ders it different from other things. He wishes, 
 say they, to show that God is not unconditioned, 
 as philosophers have foolishly supposed : that the 
 Unconditioned is a nonentity, a meaningless ab- 
 
166 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 straction, and that all discourse about it is vain 
 mere babble about nothing. 
 
 If, however, we examine with attention Hamil- 
 ton's language and mode of procedure, we shall see 
 that such an interpretation of his doctrine is quite 
 untenable. 
 
 In the first place it may be observed that 
 the exposition in question would entirely vitiate 
 Hamilton's criticism of Kant. For "das unbe- 
 dingte," about whose cognisability Kant inquires, 
 is not a mere zero a meaningless abstraction. 
 The question examined by Kant is this " Can 
 we obtain any knowledge of a thing or Being, 
 which stands to other things in the relation of 
 bedingung to bedingtes (conditio to conditiona- 
 tuni), but does not stand to any thing in the rela- 
 tion of bedingtes to bedingung (conditionatum to 
 conditio). In order that Hamilton's criticism of 
 Kant may be valid and pertinent, it behoves him 
 to show that such a thing or Being is entirely 
 inconceivable ; that our notion of it is purely nega- 
 tive, i.e. no notion at all. If, instead of doing 
 this, he proves the incognisability of a nugatory 
 Unconditioned, of a meaningless abstraction, his 
 criticism of Kant is based on a misunderstanding, 
 and is a complete fiasco. 
 
 But further, when we examine Hamilton's lan- 
 guage, we find it repeatedly indicating in an un- 
 mistakable manner, that the Unconditioned, whose 
 inconceivability and incognisability he is engaged 
 in demonstrating, is not regarded by him as a non- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 167 
 
 entity or zero. He constantly intimates his belief 
 that the knowledge of the Unconditioned, which he 
 declares to be wholly beyond the reach of man, 
 is knowledge of a most important kind, much 
 superior in dignity and value to knowledge of the 
 Conditioned. 
 
 For instance, he tells us that "the mind can 
 conceive only the limited and the conditionally 
 limited ;" that " thought is only of the Conditioned ;" 
 that " philosophy, if viewed as more than a science 
 of the Conditioned, is impossible;" that knowledge 
 is " only of the modified and phenomenal." Ex- 
 pressions of this sort would be quite absurd if 
 he believed that every thing which exists is condi- 
 tioned, and that the Unconditioned, whose incog- 
 nisability he proclaims, were alike incognisable and 
 incredible. 
 
 Further he declares that the Conditioned is a 
 mean between two extremes, both wholly incogit- 
 able, but of which one must be regarded as neces- 
 sary. In conformity with this doctrine, he teaches 
 that infinite space, infinite time, infinite attributes, 
 and the infinite Divine Being (God) are uncon- 
 ditioned. This is quite opposed to the view as- 
 cribed to him by some expositors, that every thing 
 which really exists is conditioned, and that the 
 Unconditioned is nothing at all. 
 
 Again, after urging that thought is only of the 
 Conditioned, and that the Unconditioned is wholly 
 incogitable, he deduces from this, by way of in- 
 ference : " True, therefore, are the declarations of 
 
168 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 a pious philosophy, c A God understood would be 
 no God at all;' 'To think that God is as we can 
 think him to be is blasphemy. 7 ' This indicates the 
 view that God, as he really exists, is unconditioned, 
 and very different from God as we think him to be, 
 viz. as finite and conditioned. 
 
 If we examine Hamilton's criticism of Kant, we 
 find it to express the following view. 
 
 Kant did great service by abolishing Rational 
 Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology, and by 
 proving that Things in themselves Matter, Mind, 
 God all that is not finite, relative, and phenome- 
 nal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond 
 the verge of our knowledge. But he marred his 
 work by one error, viz. by teaching that our Idea 
 of the Unconditioned has some regulative validity ; 
 instead of recognising that it is purely negative, 
 properly no notion or idea at all. By this part of 
 his doctrine he afforded a loop-hole to the Abso- 
 lutists, who are not content to restrict themselves 
 to the mere observation of phenomena, and the 
 generalisation of phenomena into laws, but aspire 
 to treat about that which is not phenomenal and 
 not finite, more particularly about God. Availing 
 themselves of the loop-hole thus afforded them 
 by Kant's doctrine, they again began to speculate 
 about that which is not phenomenal and not finite, 
 again busied themselves with theology; and thus 
 Kant's teaching failed of its promised effect. 
 
 Hamilton undertakes to set this right by show- 
 ing that our Idea of the Unconditioned is purely 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 169 
 
 negative; that it has no regulative efficacy or 
 validity, as Kant asserts; that the Unconditioned 
 has no affirmation at all, subjective or objective. 
 This being proved, the loop-hole which Kant's 
 doctrine afforded to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, &c. 
 will be closed; philosophers will be compelled to 
 recognise that that which is not phenomenal and 
 finite (consequently that God) bears no analogy 
 to our faculties, and is beyond the verge of our 
 knowledge. They will therefore be compelled 
 to restrict themselves to that humble office which 
 they so much dislike, viz. the observation of 
 phenomena, and the generalisation of those pheno- 
 mena into laws; and accordingly must cease to 
 busy themselves with theological speculation. All 
 this is to be effected by proving that our Idea of 
 the Unconditioned is purely negative; that it has 
 no regulative value, as Kant maintained; that the 
 Unconditioned has no subjective affirmation, as 
 Kant supposed. Clearly, in order that such rea- 
 soning may be valid, we cannot regard the Uncon- 
 ditioned, whose notion is here in question, as incre- 
 dible, as a mere piece of nonsense. Were we to do 
 so, we must look on Hamilton's reasonings as fit 
 only for Laputa ; for no rational person could hold 
 that in proving the incogitability of a mere zero, 
 he was restricting us to the observation of pheno- 
 mena, and preventing us from speculating about 
 God. In order that we may regard Hamilton's 
 procedure as rational, we must suppose him to 
 believe that the Unconditioned, though its Idea is 
 
170 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 purely null and negative, is not itself unreal and 
 incredible ; that though wholly beyond Intellect and 
 Reason, it lies within the sphere of Faith ; and 
 that its existence cannot be denied by those who 
 recognise the existence of God. 
 
 The Unconditioned reasoned about by Hamilton 
 in his criticisms of Schelling and Cousin is mani- 
 festly supposed by him to be the same as that 
 previously treated of in the criticism of Kant. The 
 reasonings are clearly designed to establish the doc- 
 trine maintained by him against Kant, by which the 
 imperfection of Kant's doctrine is to be remedied, 
 and the loop-hole which it afforded to Absolutists 
 effectually closed. For this purpose it is sought to 
 demonstrate, by an examination of the conditions 
 of consciousness, that we cannot obtain knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned while we are conscious ; and 
 the supposition that we can obtain such a know- 
 ledge in a state of unconscious ecstasy is dismissed 
 as absurd. In this way it is supposed to be proved 
 that the limits of speculation laid down by Kant 
 cannot be overpassed ; and that however distaste- 
 ful these restrictions may be to philosophers, they 
 must consent to submit to them, if they would not 
 perpetrate sheer absurdity. 
 
 After Hamilton has finished his discussion, and 
 demolished, as he conceives, the doctrines of Schel- 
 ling and Cousin, he states that, though so widely 
 dissenting from Cousin, he yet "owns a strong 
 feeling of interest and admiration for those qua- 
 lities, even in their excess, which have betrayed 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 171 
 
 him, with so many other aspiring philosophers, 
 into a pursuit which could only end in disap- 
 pointment we mean his love of truth, and his 
 reliance on the powers of man. Not to despair of 
 philosophy is ' a last infirmity of noble minds.' 
 * The wish is parent to the thought.' Loath to 
 admit that our science is at best the reflection of a 
 reality we cannot know, we strive to penetrate to 
 existence in itself; and what we have laboured 
 intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we 
 have accomplished, but, like Ixion, we embrace a 
 cloud for a divinity."* 
 
 In these desponding utterances Hamilton ap- 
 pears to proceed as before on the view, that if we 
 cannot conceive or know the Unconditioned, then 
 we -must despair of philosophy, recognise that we 
 cannot penetrate to u existence in itself," and that 
 our science is at best the reflection of a reality we 
 cannot know. And in the appendices to his Article 
 this view of the great imperfection of human know- 
 ledge (caused by the circumstance that man can 
 only know the conditioned, the phenomenal, the 
 finite) is expressed in still more forcible and still 
 more desponding accents. Thus he says : 
 
 " Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter 
 is relative conditioned relatively conditioned. 
 Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they 
 external, be they internal, we know nothing, or 
 know them only as incognisable ; and become aware 
 of their incomprehensible existence only as this is 
 
 Discussions, p. 37. 
 
172 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 indirectly and accidentally revealed to us through 
 certain qualities related to our faculties of know- 
 ledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think 
 as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of 
 themselves. All that we know is therefore pheno- 
 menal phenomenal of the unknown. The philo- 
 sopher speculating the worlds of matter and of 
 mind is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant 
 admirer. In his contemplation of the universe, the 
 philosopher indeed resembles JEneas contemplating 
 the adumbrations on his shield ; as it may equally 
 be said of the sage as of the hero : 
 
 f Miratur : Rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet.' 
 Nor is this denied ; for it has been commonly con- 
 fessed, that as substances, we know not what is 
 Matter, and are ignorant of what is Mind."* 
 
 In another passage he says : 
 
 " We philosophise to escape ignorance, and the 
 consummation of our philosophy is ignorance ; we 
 start from the one, we repose in the other; they 
 are the goals from which and to which we tend; 
 and the pursuit of knowledge is but a course be- 
 tween two ignorances. . . . We never can emerge 
 from ignorance ; our dream of knowledge is a little 
 
 light rounded with a darkness Science is a 
 
 drop ; Nescience is the ocean in which that drop is 
 whelmed."f 
 
 Again he declares that " the doctrine of the 
 Conditioned" (the doctrine which he professes, and 
 has laboured to establish in his Article) is " a phi- 
 
 Discussions, p. 643. f Ibid. p. 634. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 173 
 
 losophic nescience;" that the "relative knowledge" 
 furnished by it is confessed to be " absolute ignor- 
 ance;" that "the knowledge of Nothing is the 
 principle and consummation of all true philo- 
 sophy." " Scire Nihil stadium quo nos ketamur 
 utrique."* 
 
 Such language indicates a profound conviction 
 on Hamilton's part that the knowledge attainable 
 by man in his present state (knowledge of the Con- 
 ditioned) cannot for a moment be compared with 
 the knowledge enjoyed by those superior beings 
 whose mental constitution enables them to conceive 
 and to know the Unconditioned. 
 
 In his Lectures, recurring to "his doctrine con- 
 cerning human knowledge, he states it thus in a 
 summary form : " Whatever we know is not known 
 as it is, but only as it seems to be."f And he 
 quotes a copious array of authorities in support of 
 this view. Among these may be noticed that of 
 Bacon, who says : " est intellectus humanus instar 
 speculi inaequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam natu- 
 ram naturae rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et 
 inficit."J Also that of Seneca, who says: "Tota 
 rerum natura umbra est aut inanis aut faHax."- 
 This assertion reminds us of the Hindoo doctrine 
 of Maya, and of Schopenhauer's statement that, 
 according to the true, the Kantian doctrine, the 
 external nature which we perceive and cognise is 
 " traumartig." 
 
 Discussions, p. G09. f Lectures, p. 146. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 147. Discussions, p. 636. 
 
174 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 As might be expected under such circum- 
 stances, Kant figures as a prominent authority 
 in favour of Hamilton's Phenomenalist doctrine. 
 A number of Philosophers are quoted as " Testi- 
 monies to the fact that all our knowledge, whether 
 of Mind or Matter, is only phenomenal ;" and the 
 list is closed by Kant, a passage being quoted from 
 his Critique, with the remark, that " a hundred 
 testimonies to the same truth might be adduced 
 from the philosopher of Koenigsberg, of whose 
 doctrine it is, in fact, the foundation."* 
 
 In these parts of his teaching Hamilton appears 
 fully to espouse Kant's doctrine, viz. that Pheno- 
 mena are produced partly by real external things 
 (Noumena), and partly by our Minds, and that 
 owing to the action of our minds, they differ to 
 an unknown extent from the external co- efficient 
 which co-operated in producing them. And he 
 appears to declare, with great emphasis, that these 
 Phenomena conditioned modified by our minds, 
 are the sole objects of our knowledge, so that we 
 know things only as they seem to us, distorted by 
 our faculties not as they really are. 
 
 From the above examination, it seems pretty 
 clear that knowledge of the Unconditioned was 
 regarded by Hamilton as knowledge of real fact, 
 of things as they really are: while knowledge of 
 the Conditioned was regarded by him as know- 
 ledge of distorted appearance the reflection of a 
 reality we cannot know a nescience rather than a 
 
 Discussions, p. 636. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 175 
 
 knowledge. In proving, therefore, that the con- 
 ditions of consciousness preclude us from attaining 
 knowledge of the Unconditioned (the supposition of 
 a knowledge out of consciousness being rejected by 
 him as ridiculous) he imagined himself to be prov- 
 ing that the constitution of our consciousness, the 
 fact that it implies subject and object, relation and 
 difference, precludes us from attaining knowledge 
 of things as they really are ; and particularly of God 
 as he really is. 
 
 Some expositors, believing themselves to be 
 advocates of Hamilton's doctrine, have asserted 
 that he uses the phrase "the Unconditioned" in 
 two very different senses; so that sometimes it 
 stands for God, and sometimes for a zero, for a 
 ridiculous figment. It is manifest that this hypo- 
 thesis is very awkward. In reference to it, let 
 us hear what Locke says concerning the practice 
 of shifting the meaning of words and phrases. 
 
 " Another great abuse of words is inconstancy 
 in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse 
 written of any subject, especially of controversy, 
 wherein one shall not observe, if he read with 
 attention, the same words (and those commonly 
 the most material in the discourse, and upon which 
 the argument turns) used sometimes for one col- 
 lection of simple ideas, and sometimes for another, 
 which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being 
 intended for signs of my ideas, to make them 
 known to others, not by any natural signification, 
 but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat 
 
176 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 and abuse when I make them stand sometimes for 
 one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful 
 doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but 
 
 great folly, or greater dishonesty One 
 
 who would speak thus in the affairs and business 
 of the world, and call eight sometimes seven, and 
 sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, 
 would presently have clapped upon him one of 
 the two names men are commonly disgusted with. 
 And yet, in arguings and learned contests, the 
 same sort of proceeding passes commonly for wit 
 and learning ; but to me it appears a greater dis- 
 honesty than the misplacing of counters in the 
 casting up of a debt, and the cheat the greater, 
 by how much truth is of greater concernment and 
 value than money." 
 
 Hamilton has nowhere notified to us that he 
 shifts the sense of his terms so that "the Uncon- 
 ditioned" sometimes signifies God, and sometimes 
 nothing. To suppose that he uses such a license 
 without saying any thing about it, would not be 
 to defend him. For if it be improper to mak 
 the same sign stand sometimes for seven and some- 
 times for eight, it would be much worse to make 
 it stand sometimes for nothing, and sometimes for 
 God. 
 
 At the same time, it is not difficult to under- 
 stand the reasons which have led some expositors 
 to adopt the hypothesis in question. Hamilton, 
 on various occasions, declares in the strongest 
 manner the total inconceivability or incogit ability 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 177 
 
 of the Unconditioned. Now a large number of 
 persons regard total inconceivability as involving 
 incredibility. Hence, when Hamilton declares that 
 the Unconditioned is totally inconceivable, that it 
 cannot be affirmed at all in conformity with the 
 conditions of our intellect, &c., they naturally 
 suppose that the Unconditioned of which he thus 
 speaks is both incogitable and incredible a mere 
 nonentity or zero. And if other expositors ascribe 
 to him the opinion that the Unconditioned of which 
 he thus speaks is not unreal or incredible, they are 
 apt to resent this as grossly unjust, as imputing to 
 him a flagrant absurdity. 
 
 That partial inconceivability does not involve 
 incredibility is generally admitted : it is probable, 
 indeed, that nothing is conceived fully or ade- 
 quately by the human mind. If Hamilton merely 
 said that the Unconditioned, though partially in- 
 conceivable, nevertheless could be a legitimate 
 object of belief, his statement would occasion no 
 difficulty. But if it is said that the Unconditioned 
 is wholly inconceivable, as inconceivable as a cir- 
 cular square, or a virtuous logarithm, and yet that 
 its existence ought to be believed, then a great 
 number of persons feel themselves staggered ; and 
 they think that Hamilton cannot have taught such 
 a doctrine. 
 
 It is urged, indeed, that conception is of the 
 how, and belief of the that ; that because we cannot 
 conceive how A is possible, we are not thereby 
 incapacitated from believing that A exists. A cir- 
 
 N 
 
178 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 cular square and a virtuous logarithm are incon- 
 ceivable, i.e. we cannot conceive how a square can 
 be circular, or how a logarithm can be virtuous; 
 but this, it is urged, does not render us incapable 
 of believing that a square is circular, or that a loga- 
 rithm is virtuous. But these representations do 
 not satisfy the expositors in question, who declare 
 that when they find themselves unable to under- 
 stand how a circle can be square, or how a loga- 
 rithm can be virtuous, when they find themselves 
 unable to conceive, or mentally take together the 
 attributes verbally united in the written symbols, 
 they do find themselves greatly impeded in believ- 
 ing that circular squares or virtuous logarithms 
 exist. Accordingly, this class of interpreters do 
 not like to attribute to Hamilton the doctrine that 
 the Unconditioned is totally inconceivable and in- 
 cogitable, and yet credible, real, existent. And 
 they try to .relieve him from the difficulty attend- 
 ing such a doctrine, by supposing that there are 
 two different Unconditioneds, one nugatory, the 
 other divine ; that some of his language has refer- 
 ence to one of these, and some of it to the other. 
 
 Another class of expositors regard such a view 
 as feeble and erroneous, calculated to damage 
 Hamilton, and to mar his doctrine. According to 
 them, the principal merit of Hamilton's labours 
 consists in this, that he effects the complete dis- 
 junction of cogitability from credibility. In sup- 
 port of this view they appeal to the language of 
 Hamilton himself as for instance, when he says : 
 
j 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 179 
 
 u What I have said as to the infinite being (sub- 
 jectively) inconceivable, does not at .all derogate 
 from our belief of its (objective) reality. In fact, 
 the main ' scope of my speculation is to show arti- 
 culately, that we must believe, as actual, much 
 that we are unable (positively) to conceive, as 
 even possible."* When once, say they, we frankly 
 recognise that inconceivability even of the most 
 extreme kind is no proof of incredibility, then we 
 shall be able to understand that the Unconditioned 
 may be as inconceivable as a circular square, or a 
 virtuous logarithm, or coloured time, and yet that 
 it may not be incredible, or a zero. We shall un- 
 derstand that Hamilton may regard its notion as 
 purely negative, and may pronounce it to have no 
 affirmation, either subjective or objective, under 
 the conditions of our intellect, and yet may believe 
 it to exist. An Unconditioned thing or Being may 
 be wholly incogitable, all our attempts to think 
 about such an object or about affirmations con- 
 cerning it may be frustrated by contradiction ; and 
 yet belief that an Unconditioned Being exists may 
 be perfectly legitimate, and even necessary. This r 
 say they, is the grand truth, which Hamilton has 
 demonstrated by strict logical reasoning in the 
 most irrefragable manner. 
 
 Letter to Mr. Calderwood. Lectures, vol. ii. p. 535. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 To illustrate the differences of opinion which have 
 arisen concerning the true meaning of Hamilton's 
 doctrine of the Unconditioned, I propose here 
 to examine the accounts given of it by Mr. Mill, 
 who opposes Hamilton, and by a recent writer in 
 the Contemporary Review, who defends Hamilton, 
 and complains that Mr. Mill has wholly misun- 
 derstood him. In paying attention to this latter 
 work I shall perhaps be blamed by some critics, 
 who think that an author loses dignity in noticing 
 " ephemeral literature." But I do not myself share 
 this view. Writers of great ability, amongst others 
 Dr. Dorner and Mr. Mansel, have contributed to 
 the journal in question ; and a writing of ability 
 does not lose in importance because it appears in 
 the pages of a Review. It may be remembered 
 that Hamilton's article on the Unconditioned made 
 its appearance in this very manner. 
 
 Mr. Mill says: "The question really at issue in 
 Sir W. Hamilton's celebrated and striking review 
 of Cousin's Philosophy is this : Have we or have 
 
PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 181 
 
 we not an immediate intuition of God ? The 
 name of God is veiled under two extremely ab- 
 stract phrases, 'the Infinite' and 'the Absolute.'" 
 Mr. Mill proceeds to say : "In this contest it is 
 almost superfluous for me to say that I am entirely 
 with Sir W. Hamilton. The doctrine that we have 
 an immediate or intuitive knowledge of God, I 
 consider to be bad metaphysics, involving a false 
 conception of the nature and limits of the human 
 faculties, and grounded on a superficial and erro- 
 neous psychology. Whatever relates to God I 
 hold with Sir W. Hamilton to be matter of infer- 
 ence ; I would add, of inference a posteriori. "f 
 
 The writer in the Contemporary Review asserts 
 that Mr. Mill has wholly missed the meaning of 
 Hamilton's doctrine concerning the incognisability 
 of the Absolute and the Infinite, and says that he 
 will make this clear. He takes objection at once 
 to Mr. Mill's statement that "'the name of God is 
 veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, ' the 
 Infinite and the Absolute,'" and complains that by 
 substituting the word God in place of the Infinite, 
 Mr. Mill wholly perverts Hamilton's argument. 
 He has failed, we are told, to see that the Infinite 
 treated of by Hamilton is " the pseudo- Infinite," 
 which is wholly different from " the true Infinite," 
 and so far from being identical with God, or like 
 God, is the name of nothing at all. 
 
 We have, however, seen, from the previous 
 
 Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 32. 
 f Ibid. p. 33. 
 
182 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 examination of Hamilton's language, that he cannot 
 have designed to prove the incognisability of a 
 mere zero ; that he evidently supposes himself to 
 have proved that the true Infinite is inconceivable 
 and incognisable. And the reviewer himself would 
 scarcely deny that what is said concerning the true 
 Infinite has its application to God. Mr. Mill 
 therefore, as it seems to me, is perfectly right in 
 supposing that the debate between Hamilton and 
 Cousin has reference to the knowledge of God, and 
 was understood by both parties to derive its prin- 
 cipal importance from this circumstance.* 
 
 But is Mr. Mill right in representing Hamilton 
 as denying only an intuitive or immediate know- 
 ledge of the Unconditioned, of the Infinite ? Does 
 Hamilton admit that we can obtain a knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned by means of reasoning by 
 demonstration or inference ? 
 
 We have seen that, according to Hamilton, 
 consciousness includes all phenomena of the con- 
 scious subject ; all modes concerning which we 
 can say, " this mode or operation is mine." And 
 we have seen that according to him no faculty of 
 
 It need not, however, be supposed to concern exclusively the 
 knowledge of Grod. As has been previously pointed out, the asser- 
 tion that " the Unconditioned is incognisable," may be employed as 
 a compendious mode of stating that every thing which is uncondi- 
 tioned is incognisable. Now Hamilton, there is reason to believe, 
 considers that every thing as it really exists, not altered by subjec- 
 tive forms, conceptions, predications, is unconditioned. If this be 
 so, then in maintaining the incognisability of the Unconditioned, he 
 would signify that we cannot know any thing as it is, unaltered by 
 the medium through which we perceive or cognise it. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 183 
 
 this description is fitted to afford us knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned, because all such faculties 
 imply subject and object, relation and difference. 
 It is evident that if this reasoning is correct, no 
 ratiocination of which we are conscious can afford 
 us knowledge of the Unconditioned ; that while 
 we are conscious we cannot obtain the knowledge 
 in question, either by immediate knowledge or by 
 a train of reasoning. And it is further evident 
 that ratiocination in a state of ecstasy, or uncon- 
 sciousness, would not be considered by Hamilton 
 as more efficacious for the purpose in question, 
 since he considers that out of consciousness we can 
 neither know nor reason. 
 
 Further, the following point is to be noticed : 
 Hamilton particularly contends that thought is 
 valid only when exercised about the Conditioned ; 
 that if we exercise it about the Unconditioned, we 
 use it illegitimately, and produce antinomy. Now 
 if first principles are valid only for the Conditioned 
 (as, according to Mr. Mill, is decidedly proclaimed 
 by Hamilton), and if thought, the indispensable 
 instrument of reasoning, is valid only within the 
 same sphere how can we, by means of ratiocina- 
 tion, obtain conclusions which are valid for the 
 Unconditioned, and give us information concerning 
 it ? How can our conclusions have a validity or a 
 scope which is denied to our premises, and to the 
 organ by means of which our reasonings are con- 
 ducted ? 
 
 Indeed, Hamilton tells us that if we could 
 
184 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 obtain knowledge of the Unconditioned at all, it 
 would be by a faculty like that asserted by Schel- 
 ling, which is one of intuition. So that apparently 
 he regards knowledge of the Unconditioned by 
 inference, as more hopelessly beyond our reach 
 than knowledge of it bv intuition. 
 
 o ./ 
 
 If Hamilton thought that we can attain a 
 knowledge of God by means of ratiocination, he 
 could not approve Kant's assault on Rational 
 Theology. Kant examines the reasonings by 
 which it is attempted to prove that God exists, 
 that he made the world by design, &c. He pro- 
 nounces them all defective, and asserts that this 
 deficiency is due to the nature of our thought and 
 reason, which are not fit to be exercised about 
 such matters, transcending, as they do, the field of 
 experience. Now Hamilton declares his opinion 
 that Kant has established his case, and has effectu- 
 ally demolished Rational Theology. He could not 
 reasonably do this if he thought that we can obtain 
 a knowledge of God by means of ratiocination or 
 inference. 
 
 It seems to me, therefore, that Hamilton would 
 utterly repudiate the doctrine, that we can obtain a 
 knowledge of an infinite or an unconditioned object 
 by deduction or inference. And if Mr. Mill were 
 to set forth those propositions relating to God, to 
 a Supreme Being, Infinite or Absolute, which he 
 regards as "matter of inference"- if he were to 
 attempt to establish by inference even the existence 
 of such a Being, he would be liable to the cen- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 185 
 
 sure of Hamilton's negative teaching. He would 
 be exposed to its censure, as not contenting himself 
 with the observation of Phenomena, and the gene- 
 ralisation of Phenomena into laws; as vainly en- 
 deavouring to restore that Rational Theology which 
 Kant had thoroughly destroyed ; as making a tran- 
 scendental illegitimate use of his thought and 
 reasoning faculty.* 
 
 The writer in the Contemporary Review having 
 accused Mr. Mill of entirely misunderstanding 
 Hamilton's doctrine about the Unconditioned, un- 
 dertakes to expound it properly himself. 
 
 He tells us that "'the unconditioned' is a term 
 which, while retaining the same general meaning, 
 admits of many applications, particular or universal. 
 It may be the unconditioned as regards some spe- 
 cial relation, or the unconditioned as regards all 
 relations whatever. Thus there may be the un- 
 conditioned in Psychology the human soul con- 
 sidered as a substance ; the unconditioned in Cos- 
 mology the world considered as a single whole ; 
 
 It is curious to notice the result obtained by combining the 
 expositions of Mr. Mill and his Reviewer. Hamilton contends that 
 we cannot conceive or know the Unconditioned by consciousness. 
 This, says Mr. Mill, means that we cannot know God by immediate 
 knowledge or intuition. No, says the Reviewer, the question is not 
 about the knowledge of God ; the Unconditioned whose knowledge 
 is thus denied by Hamilton is not God, but an empty figment, a 
 zero. If Mr. Mill's interpretation of the word Consciousness and 
 the Reviewer's of the phrase " the Unconditioned " were correct, we 
 should thus obtain for Hamilton the singular thesis that we cannot 
 conceive or know a void figment by immediate knowledge, but only 
 mediately, by means of ratiocination or inference. 
 
186 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 the unconditioned in Theology God in his own 
 nature, as distinguished from his . manifestations to 
 us ; or, finally, the unconditioned in Ontology the 
 being on which all other being depends 
 
 " The general notion of the unconditioned is 
 the same in all these cases, and all must finally 
 culminate in the last, the unconditioned par excel- 
 lence. The general notion is that of the One as 
 distinguished from the Many, the substance from 
 its accidents, the permanent reality from its vari- 
 able modifications. Thought, will, sensation, are 
 modes of my existence. What is the / that is one 
 and the same in all ? Extension, figure, resistance, 
 are attributes of matter. What is the one substance 
 to which these attributes belong ? But the gene- 
 ralisation cannot stop here. If matter differs from 
 mind, the non-ego from the ego, as one thing from 
 another, there must be some special point of differ- 
 ence which is the condition of the existence of each 
 in this or that particular manner. Unconditioned 
 existence, therefore, in the highest sense of the 
 term, cannot be the existence of this as distin- 
 guished from that ; it must be existence per se, the 
 ground and principle of all conditioned or special 
 existence. This is the unconditioned, properly so 
 called ; the unconditioned in Schelling's sense, 
 as the indifference of subject and object ; and it 
 is against this that Hamilton's arguments are 
 directed. 
 
 " The question is this : ' Is this Unconditioned 
 a mere abstraction, the product of our own minds ; 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 187 
 
 or can it be conceived as having a real existence 
 per se, and, as such, can it be identified with God 
 as the source of all existence ? Hamilton maintains 
 that it is a mere abstraction, and cannot be so iden- 
 tified; that far from being a name of God, it is a 
 name of nothing at all. c By abstraction/ he says, 
 4 we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we 
 annihilate the subject of consciousness. But what 
 remains? Nothing.' When we attempt to con- 
 ceive it as a reality, we ' hypostatise the zero.' " 
 
 Had the above exposition been propounded by 
 a French or German philosopher, by a partisan of 
 Brown, or by any writer whom Hamilton desired 
 to combat, what abundant matter for censure would 
 he have found in it ! He would have pointed out, 
 in the first place, that there is a radical error in 
 talking about four different kinds or sorts of Un- 
 conditioned ; since each of these sorts, being differ- 
 ent from the other, must be conditioned in a spe- 
 cial way; so that the four different sorts of (so- 
 called) Unconditioned are in reality four Condi- 
 tioneds. He would have pronounced it equally 
 erroneous to define " the general notion of the 
 Unconditioned" as that of u the one as distin- 
 guished from the many." He would have sum- 
 marily condemned such a definition as suicidal, on 
 the ground that it defines by distinction and differ- 
 ence what is conceived only as exclusive of both. . 
 
 He would have made a similar objection on 
 being told that the notion of the Unconditioned is 
 that of the substance as distinguished from its acci- 
 
188 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 dent. Substance implies relation; that which siib- 
 stat must be related to something under which it 
 stands. So that here again the definition would be 
 censurable, as defining by relation and distinction 
 what is conceived only as exclusive of both. 
 
 Similarly, when the notion in question is fur- 
 ther explained as that of "permanent reality," he 
 would have raised the same objection. Permanence 
 implies relation \ per (through) is a particle which 
 implies relation. Moreover, permanence implies 
 duration. To say that A is permanent, is to say 
 that A endures through a portion of time. So 
 
 that the notion of the Unconditioned, as thus ex- 
 / 
 
 pounded, involves the idea of time ; and the so-called 
 Unconditioned is conditioned in time. 
 
 Again, when we are taught that "the Uncon- 
 ditioned par excellence" u the Unconditioned pro- 
 perly so called," is " the ground and principle of 
 all conditioned existence" " the being on which all 
 other being depends" there is here again the same 
 objection: relation and distinction are introduced 
 into the very definition of the Unconditioned. 
 
 It is manifest that if the Eeviewer's account 
 of the matter had fallen under the adverse criticism 
 of Hamilton, it would have experienced little mercy 
 at his hands. He would have declared that the 
 pretended Unconditioned defined in it was. in every 
 case, nothing but a conditioned and a relative ; and 
 tha,t the attempted exposition betrayed complete 
 ignorance of the very elements of the subject. 
 
 Further we are told by the Reviewer, respecting 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 189 
 
 the four different Unconditioneds, that the three 
 first are to be distinguished from the last, called the 
 Unconditioned in Ontology. The Unconditioned 
 in Theology is awful and divine : the Unconditioned 
 in Ontology is nothing at all -nugatory and ridi- 
 culous. 
 
 Now, according to the Reviewer's own account, 
 the Unconditioned in Theology is not a Phenomenon, 
 not God as he merely seems, but God as he actually 
 and verily is. But discourse about this pertains to 
 Ontology, not to Phenomenology. Thus the Un- 
 conditioned in Theology and the Unconditioned in 
 Ontology are bound together; if the latter is to be 
 ridiculed as a chimera, the former must share the 
 same fate. Or again, suppose we define the Un- 
 conditioned in Theology as the primal being, the 
 first cause, on which all conditioned or contingent 
 being depends, this Unconditioned also pertains to 
 Ontology, and discourse about it is ontological, 
 not phenomenological. Thus we cannot separate 
 the Unconditioned in Theology from the Uncondi- 
 tioned in Ontology, treating one as real and divine, 
 the other as nugatory and ridiculous. Discourse 
 about an unconditioned divine Being is at one and 
 the same time Theology and Ontology. It is on- 
 tological Theology ; i. e. it is discourse about God, 
 not merely as he seems, but as he actually and 
 verily is. If Ontology is chimerical, such Theo- 
 logy is chimerical likewise. 
 
 Similarly, the Unconditioned in Psychology and 
 Cosmology are not Phenomena, not the soul and 
 
190 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 world as they merely seem to us, but the soul and 
 world as they really and actually are, as ovrag ovrcc. 
 And discourse about these pertains not to Pheno- 
 menology, but to Ontology; so that if the Uncon- 
 ditioned in Ontology is nonsensical, the Uncondi- 
 tioned in Psychology and Cosmology are so too. 
 In other words, if Ontology is chimerical, ontolo- 
 gical Psychology and ontological Cosmology have 
 the same character. 
 
 If Hamilton had held that the Unconditioned in 
 Theology is God, and the Unconditioned in Onto- 
 logy nothing at all, it was his duty to inform us 
 of this important distinction ; and it behoved him 
 to let us know whether the Unconditioned, whose 
 incognisability he undertakes to demonstrate in his 
 celebrated article, were the former or the latter- 
 God as he is, or Nothing. But he has nowhere 
 notified to us the distinction in question. He seems 
 fully persuaded that if he can prove the Uncondi- 
 tioned to be incognisable, he thereby destroys 
 Ontology ; and that if he destroys Ontology, he 
 thereby prevents philosophers from speculating 
 about any thing as it actually is; about the soul 
 as it is, about the world as it is, or about God 
 as he is. The supposition that there are three 
 Unconditioneds (in Psychology, Cosmology, and 
 Theology) whose incognisability is not proved by 
 his reasonings, would not have been endured by 
 him. Such a supposition would render his attack 
 on Rational Theology a complete failure ; for, 
 manifestly in such a case he would not have closed 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 191 
 
 the door which Kant, as he complains, left open 
 to the Absolutists ; on the contrary, he would 
 himself have left it wide open. Philosophers, in 
 the case supposed, might laugh at his labours. 
 They might say, " You have with great labour 
 demonstrated the incognisability of the Uncondi- 
 tioned in Ontology; but this does not affect us, 
 for this Unconditioned is nothing at all, and we do 
 not seek to obtain knowledge about it, since the 
 knowledge of Nothing is not the aim or consumma- 
 tion of our philosophy. We desire to obtain know- 
 ledge about the Unconditioned in Psychology, in 
 Cosmology, and in Theology; and you have not 
 proved these to be inconceivable or incognisable. 
 We can speculate about the soul as it is, the world 
 as it is, and God as he is, just as freely as if you 
 had never written. Your examination of the laws 
 and conditions of consciousness has not the slightest 
 efficacy in restricting us to the observation of phe- 
 nomena, and the generalisation of those phenomena 
 into laws the domain within which you pretend 
 to confine us." 
 
 From our previous examination of Hamilton's 
 language, we have seen that he could not have 
 believed himself to be proving the incognisability 
 of a zero ; that he evidently imagined himself to 
 be engaged in a far more important task, viz. in 
 proving that knowledge of a most exalted and 
 valuable kind is beyond the reach of man in his 
 present state. And it is to be observed that the 
 Reviewer himself, though laying down that the 
 
192 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Unconditioned in Ontology is a mere zero, never- 
 theless proceeds to connect it with God, and to 
 treat it as something awful and mysterious. Thus, 
 while telling us that the Unconditioned par excel- 
 lence is the name of nothing at all, he nevertheless 
 assures us that the notion of the Unconditioned, in 
 all cases, is that of permanent reality. Here the 
 notions of blank vacuity and permanent reality are 
 treated as interchangeable, and the mere zero 
 figures as the permanently real. Already it claims 
 some connection with the Eternal and Divine. 
 
 Again, we are told that the Unconditioned in 
 Ontology, the Unconditioned par excellence, is " the 
 being on which all other being depends," "the 
 ground and principle of all conditioned existence ;" 
 while a few lines further on we are told that it is a 
 mere zero, the name of nothing at all. Thus we 
 find ourselves introduced to the esoteric doctrine 
 that the Unconditioned in Ontology, though a mere 
 zero, is the being on which all other being depends, 
 the ground and principle of the universe. 
 
 Again, the Reviewer asserts that the various 
 different Unconditioneds, that in Psychology, in 
 Theology, &c., all finally culminate in the last the 
 Unconditioned in Ontology, or the Unconditioned 
 par excellence, which, as we have learnt, is a mere 
 zero. Thus there comes to light the further eso- 
 teric doctrine, that the Divine Unconditioned. God 
 as he really is, culminates in the nugatory Uncon- 
 ditioned, the ridiculous zero. 
 
 In another passage the Reviewer tells us : " By 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 193 
 
 our immediate consciousness of a moral and per- 
 sonal nature, we are led to the belief in a moral 
 and personal God ; by our ignorance of the Uncon- 
 ditioned, we are led to the further belief that 
 behind that moral and personal manifestation of 
 God there lies concealed a mystery the mystery 
 of the Absolute and the Infinite." So that, behind 
 the moral and personal God (a mere conditioned 
 and relative) there lies concealed the mystery of the 
 Unconditioned par excellence, the Absolute Uncon- 
 ditioned, the ground and principle of the Universe, 
 in which (though it is a mere zero, the name of 
 nothing at all) Nature and God finally culminate. 
 
 Again, the Reviewer, after quoting extracts from 
 the leading authorities among the fathers and the 
 schoolmen, expounds them as teaching the follow- 
 ing doctrine : " We believe that God in his own 
 nature is absolute and unconditioned; but we can 
 only positively conceive him by means of relations 
 and conditions suggested by created things. We 
 believe that His own nature is simple and uniform, 
 admitting of no distinction between various attri- 
 butes, nor between any attribute and its subject; 
 but we can conceive Him only by means of various 
 attributes, distinct from the subject and from each 
 other. We believe that in His own nature He is 
 exempt from all relations of time ; but we can con- 
 ceive Him only by means of ideas and terms which 
 imply temporal relations . . . Our thought, 
 then, must not be taken as the measure and limit 
 of our belief ; we think by means of relations and 
 
 o 
 
194 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 conditions derived from created things ; we believe 
 in an Absolute Being, in whose nature these condi- 
 tions and relations, in some manner unknown to 
 us, disappear in a simple and indivisible unity." 
 
 Thus, then, though we may talk of God as 
 many different Persons, we ought to believe that 
 his real nature is purely simple and uniform, not 
 admitting of distinction of Persons ; that in his real 
 Absolute Being the three different Persons about 
 whom theologians talk vanish in some manner un- 
 known to us are sublated, and disappear. We 
 ought to believe that the real nature of God is 
 unconditioned, unpropertied, free from plurality, 
 relation, and difference ; imperfections which are 
 unavoidably attached to it when distorted by the 
 action of our predicating faculty, but which Faith 
 assures us not to sully the nature of God as he 
 really is, as Svrug &v, unaltered by our conceptions 
 and categories. If this be the case, when Hamilton 
 proves that we cannot conceive any thing uncon- 
 ditioned, because thought implies plurality, rela- 
 tion, and difference, while the nature of the Un- 
 conditioned excludes these, his argument does 
 apply to the conception of God. If the real nature 
 of God is purely unconditioned, in the sense of 
 unpropertied; if in it there is no distinction of 
 persons, attributes, or faculties no plurality, re- 
 lation, or difference then, manifestly, the argu- 
 ments urged by Hamilton against Cousin and 
 Schelling prove with perfect cogency that we 
 cannot conceive or cognise God as he really is. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 195 
 
 Under such circumstances it is perfectly correct 
 to contend that God as he is cannot be known by 
 us while conscious, since consciousness implies 
 plurality, relation, and difference ; and that he 
 cannot be known by us in an ecstatic unconscious 
 state, since in such a state conception and know- 
 ledge cease. 
 
 Doctrines which interchange God and Nothing, 
 representing the Unconditioned now as Divine, the 
 ground and principle of the Universe, and now as 
 nugatory, devoid of attributes, the name of no- 
 thing at all, may seem strange and almost blasphem- 
 ous to some persons ; but they are by no means 
 novel, being abundantly found in the teaching of 
 Buddhists, Neo-Platonists, Gnostics, and others. 
 The Yalentinians taught that the Divine ground or 
 principle was fivQog, an abyss, unpropertied uncon- 
 ditioned. Plotinus, with his school, taught that the 
 Divine ground or principle was ro sv awhovv, de- 
 void of consciousness, of thought, of faculties. The 
 Kabbalah teaches that " God is boundless in his na- 
 ture. He has neither will, intention, desire, thought, 
 language, or action. He cannot be grasped or 
 depicted, and for this reason is called En Soph, 
 and as such he is in a certain sense not existent." * 
 
 Many Christian theologians have taught doc- 
 trines of a similar kind. Cardinal de Cusa quotes 
 with approval the statement of "magnus Diony- 
 sius," who asserts " intellectum Dei magis accedere 
 ad niliil quam ad aliquid." And Hamilton quotes 
 
 * See the Kabbalah, by Dr. Ginsburg, p. G3. 
 
196 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 with approval the statements of Cusa, declaring that 
 his doctrine, so far as it is negative, coincides with 
 the principles of his own philosophy. And a great 
 number of other Christian theologians are quoted 
 by Mr. Mansel, and writers on his side, setting 
 forth that though we speak of God as many dif- 
 ferent Persons, and as endowed with many different 
 attributes, such as power, wisdom, goodness, jus- 
 tice, &c., yet all .this is spoken merely anthropo- 
 pathetically, and that in the real Divine Nature 
 as it verily is, undistorted by the predicating forms 
 of our intellect, there is no distinction of one 
 Person from another, nor of one attribute from 
 another, nor even of substance from attribute- 
 nothing but a perfectly pure unity, totally devoid 
 of relations, diversity, attributes, faculties. 
 
 A doctrine of this nature affords a good deal 
 of opportunity for Protean tactics ; and Hamilton's 
 disciples seem disposed to avail themselves of these, 
 so that whatever account be given of Hamilton's 
 doctrine, they may denounce it as grossly errone- 
 ous. Is it represented that Hamilton, in reason- 
 ing about the knowledge of the Unconditioned, 
 intends to reason about the knowledge of God? 
 ! they exclaim, this is a gross error. The Un- 
 conditioned has no attributes or properties; it is 
 the barest of abstractions, a foolish figment, a 
 mere zero. Hamilton wishes to prove this, and 
 to show that God and every thing real must be 
 conditioned. 
 
 On the other hand, is it urged that the Uncon- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 197 
 
 ditioned about which Hamilton reasons is nothing 
 at all, and that in proving its incognisability, 
 Hamilton proves merely the incognisability of a 
 zero ? ! it is exclaimed, this is a gross error. 
 Though the notion of the Unconditioned is a mere 
 zero, the Unconditioned itself is not a zero : its 
 existence cannot be denied without Atheism. All 
 the best divines teach that though we speak of 
 God as conditioned, yet in reality God is uncon- 
 ditioned, unpropertied, devoid of faculties. In. 
 proving that we cannot know the Unconditioned, 
 Hamilton proves that we cannot know God as he 
 really is, and thus effectually annihilates Meta- 
 physical Theology ; a result of immense value. 
 
 By shifting backwards and forwards from one 
 of these views to the other, and by occasionally 
 mixing them both together, it may be hoped to 
 obtain for Hamilton's doctrine the protection of 
 obscurity. But such a method of procedure is 
 not calculated, on the whole, to be more successful 
 than that of the ostrich, when, burying its head in 
 the sand, it imagines itself to be invisible, and safe 
 from its pursuers. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 WE have already seen from our examination of 
 Hamilton's statements, that he evidently regards- 
 knowledge of the Unconditioned as greatly supe- 
 rior to knowledge of the Conditioned. The former 
 is knowledge of actual fact, of that which really is ; 
 while the latter is knowledge only of that which 
 seems, the reflection of a reality we cannot know, 
 an ignorance or nescience rather than a know- 
 ledge. 
 
 But why, it may naturally be asked, does 
 Hamilton regard that which is conditioned as 
 shadowy and comparatively unreal, and that which 
 is unconditioned as so much more real and im- 
 portant? AYhat is the meaning which, in taking 
 such a view, he attaches to the words Conditioned 
 and Unconditioned? 
 
 He can hardly be using the word u condition" 
 in the sense which properly belongs to the German 
 word "bedingung," according to which the aggre- 
 gate of conditions, " bedingungen," constitute the 
 cause. For in this sense of the word, the condi- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 199 
 
 tioned (das Bedingte) is not shadowy or unreal. 
 That which is contingent, that which stands to 
 something else in the relation of conditionatum 
 to conditio (or of bedingtes to bedingung), may 
 nevertheless be perfectly real. For instance, ac- 
 cording to many theologians, the Second and Third 
 Persons of the Trinity are not self-existent, but 
 stand to the First Person in the relation of beding- 
 tes to bedingung, and yet the Second and Third 
 Persons are considered by these Theologians to 
 be perfectly real. Again : the great body of Theo- 
 logians regard the world sun, stars, earth, ani- 
 mals, men, angels, devils, as contingent, as stand- 
 ing to God in the relation of conditionatum to 
 conditio, and yet as real. And Hamilton probably 
 would concur in this view. To regard the self- 
 existent or non- contingent Being as alone real, 
 and every thing else as unreal, would probably be 
 denounced by him as Pantheism. 
 
 Mr. Mill considers this meaning of the word 
 Condition (i.e. that in which it corresponds with 
 the German word Bedingung), and shows that it 
 does not suit Hamilton's doctrine.* After trying 
 some other senses, which he does not find satis- 
 factory, Mr. Mill suggests the following. " He 
 means by Conditions something similar to Kant's 
 Forms of Sense, and Categories of Understand- 
 ing He is applying to the mind the 
 
 scholastic maxim ' Quicquid recipitur, recipitur 
 ad modum recipientis.' He means that our per- 
 
 See Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 51 and 52. 
 
200 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ceptive and conceptive faculties have their own 
 laws, which not only determine what we are capa- 
 ble of perceiving and conceiving, but put into our 
 perceptions and conceptions elements not derived 
 from the thing perceived or conceived, but from 
 the mind itself."* 
 
 Thus the doctrine, "to think is to condition," 
 would mean, that in thinking we put into the 
 object of thought elements derived from the mind 
 itself, so that the Phenomenon cognised by us 
 differs from the Koumenon, the external co-effi- 
 cient which co-operates with our faculties in pro- 
 ducing the Phenomenon. The " conditioning " 
 action of the intellect thus understood is that 
 described by Bacon, when he says that "intel- 
 lectus humanus suam naturam naturae rerum im- 
 miscet, eamque distorquet et infieit." The Noume- 
 non, the real external agent, or thing as it is, is 
 unconditioned, because not altered or distorted by 
 the action of the intellect. 
 
 When this is the sense attached to the words 
 "conditioned" and "unconditioned," we readily 
 understand why Hamilton considers the Uncon- 
 ditioned as real, and the Conditioned as only the 
 distorted reflection of a reality as that which 
 seems to us, not that which actually is. 
 
 The writer in the Contemporary Review, pre- 
 viously noticed, gives an explanation of the matter 
 much agreeing with that of Mr. Mill. He says: 
 " The assertion that all our knowledge is relative, 
 
 * Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 54. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 201 
 
 in other words, that we know things only under 
 such conditions as the laws of our cognitive facul- 
 ties impose upon us, is a statement which looks at 
 first sight like a truism, but which really contains 
 an answer to a very important question 4 Have 
 we reason to believe that the laws of our cognitive 
 faculties impose any conditions at all? that the 
 mind in any way reacts on the objects affecting- 
 it, so as to produce a result different from that 
 which would be produced were it merely a pas- 
 sive recipient?' ' The mind of man,' says Bacon, 
 4 is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, 
 wherein the beams of things shall reflect according 
 to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an 
 enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, 
 if it be not delivered and reduced.' Can what 
 Bacon says of the fallacies of the mind be also said 
 of its proper cognitions? Does the mind, by its 
 own action, in any way distort the appearance of 
 the things presented to it ; and if so, how far does 
 the distortion extend, and in what manner is it to 
 be rectified? To trace the course of this inquny 
 from the day when Plato compared the objects 
 perceived by the senses to the shadows thrown by 
 the fire on the wall of a cave, to the day when 
 Kant declared that we know only phenomena, 
 not things in themselves, would be to write the 
 history of philosophy. We can only at present 
 call attention to one movement in that history, 
 which was, in effect, a revolution in philosophy. 
 The older philosophers in general distinguished 
 
202 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 between the senses and the intellect, regarding the 
 former as deceptive, and concerned with pheno- 
 mena alone; the latter as trustworthy, and con- 
 versant with the realities of things. Hence arose 
 the distinction between the sensible and the in- 
 telligible world, between things as perceived by 
 sense and things as apprehended by intellect, be- 
 tween Phenomenology and Ontology. Kant re. 
 jected this distinction, holding that the intellect 
 as well as the sense imposes its own forms on the 
 things presented to it, and is therefore cognisant 
 only of phenomena, not of things in themselves. 
 The logical result of this position would be the 
 abolition of ontology as a science of things in 
 themselves, and a fortiori, of that highest branch 
 of ontology which aims at a knowledge of the 
 Absolute #r' l^oyyv, of the unconditioned first 
 principle of all things. If the mind in every act 
 of thought imposes its own forms on its objects, 
 to think is to condition, and the unconditioned is 
 the unthinkable."* 
 
 In this exposition the Reviewer seems to 
 attach to the word "condition" the sense pre- 
 viously suggested by Mr. Mill. Our thought is 
 held to " condition" objects, because it puts into 
 them elements which do not exist in the external 
 thing as it actually is, undistorted by our minds. 
 And this real thing is said to be " unconditioned," 
 because it is not altered, modified, distorted, by 
 the action of our Senses or Intellect. 
 
 Contemporary Review, No. II. p. 185. 
 
PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 203 
 
 In one of Hamilton's statements of the doctrine 
 of Kelativity, he explains it thus : u Our know- 
 ledge is relative; 1, because existence is not 
 cognisable absolutely and in itself, but only in 
 special modes; 2, because these modes can be 
 known only if they stand in a certain relation to 
 our faculties ; and, 3, because the modes, thus re- 
 lative to our faculties, are presented to and known 
 by the mind only under modifications determined 
 by these faculties themselves"* This last paragraph 
 expresses the doctrine ascribed to Hamilton by 
 Mr. Mill and the Keviewer, as above quoted, Adz. 
 that the objects of our cognition are made to a 
 considerable extent by our own faculties, and that 
 in consequence of this they differ from the ex- 
 ternal agent which co-operated with our faculties 
 in producing them. 
 
 In illustration of his view, Hamilton says: 
 " Suppose that the total object of consciousness 
 in perception is = 12; and suppose that the ex- 
 ternal reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, 
 and the mind 3, this may enable you to form 
 some rude conjecture of the nature of the object 
 of perception." f 
 
 In this example the Phenomenon, the object 
 of cognition, is supposed to contain 12 elements, 
 of which 6 are furnished by the external agent (the 
 Noumenon), while 6 are furnished by our Senses 
 and Intellect. This action of our faculties (Sense 
 and Intellect) is what Hamilton calls the " condi- 
 
 Lectures, vol. i. p. 148. f Ibid. vol. ii. p. 129. 
 
204 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 tioning" action of our faculties, in virtue of which 
 to perceive, or to think, or to know, is to " condi- 
 tion," and all the objects of our thought and know- 
 ledge are u conditioned." The external agent 
 (Noumenon) which co-operated with our facul- 
 ties in producing the Phenomenon, putting it into 
 6 elements, while they on their side put into it an 
 equal number, is regarded by Hamilton as "un- 
 conditioned," because it has not been thus altered 
 or distorted by our faculties, i. e. it contains no 
 elements which have been put into it by our 
 Senses or by our Intellect. In this state, accord- 
 ing to Hamilton, it is not capable of being cog- 
 nised by us, our knowledge of the qualities of the 
 Phenomenon giving us no knowledge of the quali- 
 ties or nature of this Unconditioned Agent. 
 
 Thus, then, the doctrine which asserts that we 
 perceive and know only the Conditioned, that to 
 think is to condition, that the Unconditioned is 
 totally inconceivable and incognisable, will signify 
 that every act of perception arid of intellectual 
 predication is a modifying and distorting act, put- 
 ting into the perceptible or cogitable Phenomenon 
 elements which do not exist in the Noumenon ; and 
 that we cannot perceive, conceive, or know any 
 thing which is not modified and distorted by this 
 conditioning action of our Senses and Intellect. 
 
 This doctrine coincides with that expressed 
 by Schopenhauer, " dass zwischen den Dingeii 
 und uns immer noch der Intellekt steht, weshalb 
 sie nicht nach dem, was sie an sich selbst seyn 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 205 
 
 mogen, erkannt werclen konnen." The intellect 
 is considered to be a distorting medium, standing 
 between us and the real thing, and preventing 
 us from conceiving or cognising it as it really 
 is. And it is not admitted that there is any me- 
 dium other than the Senses and Intellect, which 
 is free from this defect, and which enables us 
 to view or cognise the real thing without dis- 
 tortion. Evidently, this Gnosiological doctrine is 
 one of great importance. 
 
 This doctrine of Hamilton is frequently com- 
 mented on by Dr. MacCosh, who does not approve 
 of it. He speaks of Hamilton as expounding a 
 doctrine " which makes us perceive objects under 
 forms, and with additions imposed by the per- 
 ceiving mind, which landed him avowedly in a 
 system of nescience."* Again, he describes his 
 doctrine as "thoroughly Kantian." "It makes 
 the mind look at things, but through a glass so 
 cut and coloured that it gives a special shape and 
 hue to every object." " To suppose that in per- 
 ception or cognition proper we mix elements de- 
 rived from our subjective stores, is to unsettle 
 our whole convictions as to the reality of things; 
 for if the mind adds three things, why not thirty 
 things why not three hundred? till we are landed 
 in absolute idealism."! 
 
 We see from the above extracts that Hamilton 
 does not profess to decide how far the mind " con- 
 ditions" its object, i. e. puts into it elements of its 
 
 Defence of Fundamental Truth, p. 12. f Ibi<i - P- 219 - 
 
206 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 own, and thus makes it different from the Noume- 
 non; yet he 'clearly asserts that it does exercise 
 this action. He does not say we cannot tell whether 
 the objects which we cognise are conditioned by 
 the mind, and rendered different from the Nou- 
 menon, or whether they are unconditioned, iden- 
 tical with the Noumenon ; but he asserts that they 
 certainly are conditioned, and that in cognising 
 them we do not cognise the Noumenon. And fur- 
 ther, he asserts that the " conditioning " action of 
 the Mind takes place in all cases, so that in no 
 single case do we know the Unconditioned, i. e. 
 the genuine external Reality unaltered or undis- 
 torted by our minds. 
 
 Since, according to the doctrine above ex- 
 plained, every act of predication is a " condition- 
 ing" act, putting into the object of thought some 
 element which does not exist in the Noumenon, or 
 external co- efficient, the unconditioned reality can 
 have no predicate at all predicable by our minds. 
 Thus it comes to pass that the unconditioned, the 
 real par excellence (that which is undistorted by our 
 minds), is regarded as totally devoid of predicable 
 attributes, as having no affirmation, subjective or 
 objective, under the conditions of our intellect. 
 
 Together with his doctrine of Relativity Ha- 
 milton conjoins that which he calls Natural Real- 
 ism; and in the latter he appears to maintain what 
 in the former he denies. Whereas in the former 
 he asserts that we know only that which seems, 
 not that which is, in the latter he declares that 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 207 
 
 we know real external things, and qualities or 
 properties as they exist in real external things. 
 Passages setting forth this doctrine have been so 
 copiously quoted by Mr. Mill and Mr. Stirling, 
 that it is not needful for me to cite many of them. 
 It is sufficient to notice the following. 
 
 Hamilton declares that the true belief, the 
 belief given by consciousness, and entertained by 
 all who accept its authority, is this : " / believe 
 that I immediately know a material world existing ; 
 in other words, / believe that the external reality itself 
 is the object of which 1 am conscious in perception"* 
 He represents the " Hypothetical Realist " as re- 
 fusing to accept this deliverance of Consciousness, 
 and as propounding a false doctrine, which he 
 describes as follows : " The Hypothetical Realist 
 contends that he is wholly ignorant of things in 
 themselves, and that these are known to him only 
 through a vicarious phenomenon, of which he is 
 conscious in perception : 
 
 ' JRerumquQ ignams imagine gaudet.' "f 
 
 Here the Hypothetical Realist is blamed as 
 making two erroneous statements: that we are 
 wholly ignorant of things in themselves, and that 
 man "reruin ignarus imagine gaudet." Yet both 
 these statements have been made by Hamilton 
 himself, who, in his doctrine of Relativity, main- 
 tains totidem verbis that we cannot know things in 
 themselves, and that man " Rerum ignarus imagine 
 gaudet."J 
 
 Discussions, p. 89. f Ib id. P- ^- J See above, p. 172. 
 
208 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Again : in his Dissertations Hamilton contends 
 that we have an immediate knowledge of external 
 objects, and he explains immediate knowledge as 
 follows : 
 
 " A thing is known immediately or proximately^ 
 when we cognise it in itself ; mediately or remotely, 
 when we cognise it in or through something nume- 
 rically different from itself"* "In a presentative 
 or immediate cognition there is one sole object; the 
 thing (immediately) known and the thing existing 
 being one and the same."f 
 
 And he follows up this doctrine at length in 
 his dissertation on the Primary and Secondary 
 Qualities of Body ; from which Mr. Mill has given 
 copious extracts. He here divides the qualities of 
 body into three classes, called by him primary, 
 secondary, and secundo-primary ; and he maintains 
 that qualities of the first and third kind are appre- 
 hended by us, as they actually exist in external 
 bodies. J He considers that Extension, Divisibility, 
 Size, Density, Figure, Incompressibility, and seve- 
 ral other qualities, are all perceived by us in this 
 way ; i. e. as they really exist in external bodies. 
 
 Concerning Extension, he states that "we have 
 not merely a notion, a conception, an imagination, 
 a subjective representation of Extension, called up 
 or suggested in some incomprehensible manner to 
 the mind, on occasion of an extended object being 
 
 * Dissertations, p. 805. f Ibid. 
 
 I See Hamilton's Dissertations, Note D. Mill's Examination 
 of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 19. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 209 
 
 presented to the sense ; but that in the perception 
 of such an object we really have, as by nature we 
 believe we have, an immediate knowledge of that 
 external object as extended."* 
 
 Mr. Mill, in commenting on this teaching, ob- 
 serves : " There is nothing wonderful in Sir W. 
 Hamilton's entertaining these opinions ; they are 
 held by perhaps a majority of metaphysicians. But 
 it is surprising that, entertaining them, he should 
 have believed himself, and been believed by others, 
 to maintain the Relativity of all our knowledge. 
 What he deems to be relative, in any sense of the 
 term that is not insignificant, is only our know- 
 ledge of the Secondary Qualities of objects; Exten- 
 sion, and the other Primary Qualities, he positively 
 asserts that we have an immediate intuition of, 
 c as they are in bodies,' c as modes of a not-self;' 
 in express contradistinction to being known merely 
 as causes of certain impressions on our senses, or 
 on our minds, "f And Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 
 which of the two doctrines, that of Relativity or of 
 Natural Realism, was really held by Hamilton. 
 
 A writer in the Westminster Review thinks that 
 Hamilton may have really held both doctrines at 
 different times. " Mr. Mill," he remarks, "is of 
 opinion that one of the two must be taken 4 in a 
 non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either 
 did not hold, or had ceased to hold, the doctrine 
 
 Dissertations, p. 842. Quoted by Mr. Mill in his Examination 
 of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 18. 
 
 j- Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 20. 
 
 P 
 
210 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 of the full relativity of knowledge, the hypothesis 
 of a flat contradiction being in his view inadmis- 
 sible. But we think it at least equally possible 
 that Sir W. Hamilton held both the two opinions 
 in their natural sense, and enforced both of them 
 at different times by argument, his attention never 
 having been called to the contradiction between 
 them. That such forgetfulness was quite possible, 
 will appear clearly in many parts of the present 
 article."* 
 
 Afterwards the Reviewer again observes : 
 "What surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's 
 inconsistencies is the amount of self-forgetfulness 
 which they imply."f And he gives the following 
 explanation of this forgetfulness : "It would ap- 
 pear that the controversial disposition was power- 
 ful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present im- 
 pulse of that sort (as has been said respecting 
 Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served to 
 provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, 
 but also exercised a Lethsean influence in causing 
 obliviscence of the old."J 
 
 Mr. Stirling concurs with Mr. Mill in regarding 
 the two doctrines in question as irreconcilable, 
 and censures Hamilton as sometimes a Phenome- 
 nalist and sometimes a Presentationist. 
 
 Hamilton was aware that there is an appear- 
 ance of discrepancy between his various statements, 
 and he makes the following remarks for the pur- 
 pose of explanation : 
 
 Westminster Review, January 1866. t Ibid - + Ibid. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 211 
 
 " I have frequently asserted that in perception 
 we are conscious of the external object immediately 
 and in itself. This is the doctrine of Natural 
 Realism. But in saying that a thing is known in 
 itself, I do not mean that this object is known in 
 its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us. 
 This is impossible, for our knowledge is only of 
 the relative."* 
 
 Here the doctrine that our knowledge is only 
 relative is explained as signifying that we do not 
 know that which is out of relation to us. u Abso- 
 lute existence " is treated as equivalent to u exist- 
 ence out of relation to us." But that which is out 
 of relation to us is not an object of our belief, since 
 whatever is an object to us is related to us. That 
 which is out of relation to us is not a Noumenon, 
 since a Noumenon, ex hypothesi, is an object of our 
 vovg^ and acts upon us, producing in conjunction 
 with our faculties the Phenomenon. So that the 
 doctrine of Relativity, thus explained, comes to 
 nothing at all. It does not proclaim the incog- 
 nisability of Noumena, of the real external co- 
 efficients which, in conjunction with our faculties, 
 produce Phenomena ; it does not proclaim the in- 
 cognisability of things as they really exist, undis- 
 torted by sense or intellect; it merely proclaims 
 the incognisability of a nonentity or zero, alike 
 incogitable and incredible, and is thus quite insig- 
 nificant, enouncing no limitation or imperfection 
 of our faculties. 
 
 Dissertations, p. 866, foot-note. 
 
212 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Such an explanation is entirely null, and in- 
 stead of elucidating Hamilton's position, tends only 
 to induce a belief that Hamilton did not clearly 
 apprehend the meaning of his own statements ; for 
 it is quite evident that he propounds his doctrine 
 of Relativity as one which enounces a serious limi- 
 tation of our faculties, not as one which proclaims 
 the incognisability of a zero. 
 
 The writer in the Contemporary Review, pre- 
 viously mentioned, who is a warm advocate of 
 Hamilton, undertakes to explain clearly his doc- 
 trine, and to show that Mr. Mill and Mr. Stirling 
 have wholly misunderstood it. He declares that 
 Hamilton's doctrine, when properly interpreted, is 
 throughout perfectly consistent. "In answer to 
 Mr. Mill's question, which of Hamilton's two 'car- 
 dinal doctrines,' Relativity or Natural Realism, c is 
 to be taken in a non-natural sense ? ' we must say 
 neither. The two doctrines are quite compatible 
 with each other, and neither requires a non-natural 
 interpretation to reconcile it to its companion."* 
 
 The source of Mr. Mill's error, according to 
 the Reviewer, is this, that he has regarded "phe- 
 nomena " as mere modes of mind, whereas u a 
 phenomenon may be material as well as mental." 
 44 The thing per se may be only the unknown 
 cause of what we directly know, but what we 
 directly know is something more than our own 
 sensations. In other words, the phenomenal effect 
 is material as well as the cause. "f 
 
 Contemporary Keview, February 1866. j- Ibid. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 213 
 
 Unquestionably, if we would try to reconcile 
 Hamilton's statements, we must ascribe to him the 
 view that Phenomena may be material as well as 
 mental. Since, on the one hand, he repeatedly 
 declares that we can know only Phenomena, and 
 on the other, that we can know material objects 
 external to the mind, we must ascribe to him the 
 opinion that the external material objects which 
 we cognise are Phenomena, unless we at once give 
 up all hope of harmonising his statements. 
 
 It may be observed that there is nothing un- 
 usual in calling external material objects Pheno- 
 mena. Sun, moon, trees, and the various physical 
 objects and events are ordinarily called Phenomena. 
 But it must further be observed, that if Hamilton 
 regards material external bodies as Phenomena, 
 while other philosophers mean by Phenomena 
 modes of the mind or Ego, he has no right to 
 quote those philosophers as supporting his doc- 
 trine, merely because they say with him that we 
 can know only Phenomena. Kant may agree with 
 him verbally in saying that we know only Pheno- 
 mena; but if in Kant's language Phenomena are 
 modes of the Ego, while in Hamilton's language 
 this is not the case, then Hamilton's doctrine must 
 not claim (as it sometimes does) the support of 
 Kant's authority.* 
 
 It is, however, quite possible that some expositors might 
 attribute to Kant the view that extended phenomena are external 
 and material. Others, however, might insist that this externality 
 and materiality must be purely ideal ; that otherwise we must 
 
214 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Let us suppose, then, that according to Hamil- 
 ton material extended bodies cognised by us are Phe- 
 nomena, and that we know extension and other qua- 
 lities as they exist in these external bodies. So far 
 his doctrine would present no peculiar difficulty; 
 or rather so far it would be quite commonplace. 
 
 But difficulty arises when we have to take this 
 doctrine in company with the doctrine of Rela- 
 tivity, taught by Hamilton with equal earnestness, 
 which declares that every act of predication is an 
 act of distortion, so that no quality is conceived or 
 known by us as it exists "unconditioned," unmo- 
 dified, or undistorted by the mind. And in con- 
 sequence of this it is proclaimed that our science 
 is but the reflection of a reality we cannot know; 
 that man " Reruin ignarus imagine gaudet." 
 
 For clearly if we conceive extension and nu- 
 merous other qualities as they exist in real ex- 
 ternal Nature, not altered or distorted by our 
 minds, it is wholly incorrect to maintain that 
 every act of thought is an altering or distorting 
 act; and that in consequence of this we can have 
 no knowledge of any quality as it exists " uncon- 
 ditioned," unchanged by our minds. Again: if 
 the Extension conceived and known by us is Ex- 
 tension as it actually exists in undistorted Nature, 
 
 abandon most important parts of Kant's doctrine. Warm admirers 
 of Kant have complained that his teaching in reference to this 
 point is not uniform ; that the matter inserted in the Second Edi- 
 tion of his Critique greatly marred the integrity of the Idealism 
 propounded in the First. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 215 
 
 then it is the very Extension known by God ; and 
 our knowledge of Extension, so far as it goes, 
 must be correct and conformable with the divine 
 knowledge. For it cannot be supposed that there 
 are truths of real Nature of which we are cogni- 
 sant and God is ignorant; if, therefore, there is 
 any fact in real Nature (undistorted by our minds) 
 which we know, that same fact must be known by 
 God. Suppose, for instance, the sun, as it really 
 exists, not changed or distorted by any action of 
 our minds, really has that figure which Astrono- 
 mers ascribe to it, then that truth must be known 
 not only by Astronomers, but by God ; and so far 
 human knowledge will be a knowledge of real fact, 
 and will be conformable with divine knowledge. 
 Again: if the extension of natural things, not 
 changed by our minds, is the same as the extension 
 of which Euclid treats, then the truths demon- 
 strated by Euclid will be truths common to the 
 human and to the Divine Intelligence ; common to 
 all minds which know Extension as it is. 
 
 But if such were the state of the case, what 
 could Hamilton mean by proclaiming that our 
 knowledge is merely relative; and how could all 
 his complaints and desponding utterances be jus- 
 tified ? If he is not satisfied with knowing the 
 truths which God knows, what can his exigencies 
 be ? If our knowledge is knowledge of real fact, 
 and our truths the same as those known by God, 
 with what grace or propriety could he disparage 
 such knowledge as merely relative, as a very poor 
 
216 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 and meagre affair, the reflection of a reality we 
 cannot know, a nescience or ignorance, &c. &c. ? 
 
 There seems to be only one way of proceeding 
 if we would not, at this point, abandon the attempt 
 to reconcile Hamilton's statements. We must ap- 
 parently hold that all qualities conceived by us, 
 whether primary or secondary or any other, are con- 
 ditioned, i. e. changed or distorted by our minds, 
 and are not identical with qualities as they exist in 
 external Nature, unchanged by our minds, and as 
 they are known by God. Extension as conceived by 
 us must be Extension formed or changed by our 
 minds ; not Extension as it exists in Nature, uii- 
 distorted by our minds, and as it is known by God. 
 The geometrical truths demonstrated by Euclid 
 must not be regarded as true to the Divine Mind ; 
 in which case their truth may rightly be termed 
 merely relative, and Hamilton's disparaging utter- 
 ances may plead justification. The like must hold 
 good of Duration, Mobility, Incompressibility, and 
 generally of all qualities: none of these can be 
 known by us as they exist unchanged by our minds, 
 undistorted or unconditioned. And what has been 
 said of mathematical science must be true of all 
 other human sciences ; none of these must be re- 
 garded as furnishing to us truths which are true 
 in relation to God. And when Hamilton asserts 
 that external material bodies are known by us as 
 they are, or that certain qualities of these bodies 
 are known by us as they are, we must for like 
 reasons hold that these material bodies are merely 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 217 
 
 Phenomena, changed or distorted by our minds 
 (conditioned), and that in cognising them we do 
 not cognise real Nature, as it exists unchanged 
 by our conceptions and categories (i. e. uncon- 
 ditioned). We must recognise that these mate- 
 rial Phenomena may differ to an unknown extent 
 from the Noumena or real things which concurred 
 with our minds in producing them. 
 
 According to this view of the matter we should 
 know primary and secondo-primary qualities as 
 they exist in conditioned material bodies : but this 
 knowledge would still be merely knowledge of the 
 Conditioned, and would give us no knowledge of 
 things as they really exist undistorted by our 
 senses and predicating faculty, by our categories 
 and conceptions, and as known by God.* 
 
 We have seen that Hamilton makes very different statements 
 concerning the knowledge of " things in themselves," declaring 
 sometimes that we do know the " thing in itself," at other times 
 that such knowledge is wholly beyond our reach. We may suppose 
 that by the expression "thing in itself" he sometimes means the 
 external bodily Phenomenon, as distinguished from our own mental 
 modes ; while sometimes he means by it the unconditioned reality, 
 the Noumenon or unknown cause, which in conjunction with our 
 faculties produces the conditioned cognisable Phenomenon. 
 
 Some writers have thought to explain the matter by saying 
 that when Hamilton affirms the cognisability of " things in them- 
 selves," he is talking " cosmologically ;" when he denies it, he is 
 talking " ontologically." But this explanation would not avail us, 
 unless we clearly understood the difference between talking cos- 
 mologically and talking ontologically. And this difference might 
 be explained very variously, according to the philosophical doc- 
 trine of the expositor. Some people might think that to talk onto- 
 logically is to talk in conformity with real fact, while others might 
 
218 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 We thus come to the following doctrine con- 
 cerning the Perception and Cognition of material 
 objects. 
 
 The Noumenon (the Unconditioned Reality) 
 and our minds act conjointly. This joint action 
 produces a Phenomenon, an object of thought and 
 knowledge, which is material and extended. We 
 cognise extension and various other qualities as 
 they exist in this material Phenomenon; but this 
 cognition of the qualities of the Phenomenon gives 
 us no knowledge of the qualities of the Noumenon 
 of the Unconditioned Reality. The Phenomenon 
 is extended, hard, of a certain figure, &c. ; but the 
 external agent or cause which, acting in conjunc- 
 tion with our minds, produced the Phenomenon, 
 may not be hard or extended; may not be in 
 Space or Time at all. 
 
 Similarly, because the Phenomenon is condi- 
 tioned and cognised as material, we are not 
 authorised to affirm that the Noumenon which co- 
 operated in producing it is material. If we call 
 this Noumenon material, we must understand 
 thereby merely that it is of such a nature that, 
 acting in conjunction with our faculties, it pro- 
 think that it is to talk nonsensically or chimerically, about 
 nothing at all. 
 
 If Hamilton sometimes talked cosmologically, and sometimes 
 ontologically, he ought to have notified and explained the circum- 
 stance. To use two different modes of talking, neither of them 
 explained, and to propound in these two modes statements which, 
 so far as words go, are flatly contradictory, is not a procedure cal- 
 culated to illuminate the dark places of philosophy. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 219 
 
 duces a material Phenomenon. We must take 
 care not to regard it as material in the same sense 
 as the Phenomenon ; i. e. we must take care not to 
 ascribe to it extension, hardness, figure, mobility, 
 existence in Time, &c. For if we do so, we throw 
 over the doctrine of Relativity, claiming to con- 
 ceive and cognise that which is unconditioned, 
 undistorted by our Sense and Intellect. 
 
 In this way we obtain a doctrine which com- 
 bines the two positions taught by Hamilton with 
 equal emphasis, viz. 1. that we do know extension 
 and other qualities as they exist in external bodies ; 
 and 2. that we can know only the Conditioned, only 
 the Phenomenal ; that we can know nothing of the 
 actual reality, undistorted by the conditioning ac- 
 tion of the Mind. 
 
 In examining more closely the doctrine to 
 which we have been thus conducted, the following 
 point is to be noticed, viz. that Hamilton distin- 
 guishes two objects in perception or cognition, one 
 immediately cognised, present in our sensitive 
 organism, and one external to our organism. 
 Thus, when, in common parlance, we are said to 
 see the sun, according to Hamilton the object im- 
 mediately perceived is an affection of our retina, 
 or rays of light in contact with our organism; 
 while the sun at a distance of many millions of 
 miles is perceived or cognised mediately, by means 
 of the phenomenon in the retina or sensorium. 
 Similarly, when, according to common parlance, 
 we see a horse at a distance of 20 yards, here, 
 
220 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 according to Hamilton, there are two objects of 
 perception or cognition; one the object present in 
 the sensorium, the other a horse at a distance of 
 20 yards. 
 
 Here, then, we have to ask, Does Hamilton 
 regard the objects out of our organism, e. g. the 
 sun in the heavens, or the horse at a distance of 
 20 yards, as Phenomena or as Noumena? as ob- 
 jects conditioned by our Minds, or as uncondi- 
 tioned things into which our Minds have put no 
 elements ? 
 
 If he regards them as Noumena, not distorted 
 by our minds, then, according to his doctrine that 
 we know only Phenomena, they cannot be objects 
 of our thought or knowledge. We are not at 
 liberty to affirm that they are extended, or that 
 they have any cognisable property further than 
 this, that they co-operate with our minds in pro- 
 ducing the phenomena cognised by us. It would 
 not even be legitimate to affirm that they are at 
 a distance from us, and to affirm what that dis- 
 tance is would be altogether wrong. But such a 
 position would manifestly be opposed to Common 
 Sense. Mankind in general firmly believe that 
 objects out of their organism horses, trees, stones, 
 &c., are objects of thought and knowledge, are 
 extended, and have other known properties. As- 
 tronomers believe that the sun at a distance of 
 more than 90 millions of miles from the earth, is 
 an object of knowledge, and can legitimately be 
 treated of by Keason and Science. They believe 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 221 
 
 that it is extended, that it has a certain figure, 
 known by them, that it exists in Time, moves in 
 a certain way, &c. We cannot, therefore, ascribe 
 to Hamilton the opinion that the objects in ques- 
 tion, external to our organism, are Noumena, not 
 Phenomena, without bringing ~ his doctrine into 
 conflict with that Common Sense, to whose autho- 
 rity he professes implicit deference. 
 
 Being thus compelled to ascribe to him the 
 opinion that material bodies external to our organ- 
 ism are cognised by us, and that the bodies so 
 cognised by us are Phenomena, let us consider his 
 doctrine according to that hypothesis. 
 
 As we have seen, he teaches that all Phenomena, 
 all objects of our thought and knowledge, are Con- 
 ditioned, i. e. altered by the distorting action of 
 our Sense and Intellect, and consequently differing 
 from the undistorted reality to an unknown ex- 
 tent. Thus, then, external objects bricks, stones, 
 &c., a horse at a distance of 20 yards, the sun at 
 a distance of more than 90,000,000 of miles 
 being Phenomena cognised by us, are conditioned 
 by our minds. And it is impossible for us to know 
 \ how much of these Phenomena is produced by the 
 unknown external cause, and how much by our 
 senses and intellects. Six parts of the sun may be 
 v produced by the Noumenon, three parts by our 
 Senses, and three parts by our Intellects ; or the 
 proportions may be very different. 
 
 Our perception or cognition of the sun takes 
 place as follows : a Noumenon, whose nature is 
 
222 AN EXAMINATION OP THE 
 
 wholly unknown to us (for we have no knowledge 
 of the Unconditioned), acts in conjunction with 
 our minds or faculties. The result is that a mate- 
 rial Phenomenon is produced, of a spheroidal form, 
 more than 800,000 miles in diameter, and more 
 than 90,000,000 miles distant from us ; but we 
 cannot say how far this Phenomenon resembles the 
 unknown Noumenon which concurred with our 
 Sense and Intellect in producing it. This Nou- 
 menon may not be spheroidal, may not be extended 
 at all. 
 
 Here, however, we obtain a result by no means 
 conformable with Common Sense. Ordinary peo- 
 ple do not object to call the sun in the heavens, 
 or a horse at 20 yards distance, a Phenomenon; 
 \ meaning that it is an object which appears to them. 
 But when they are told that these objects, being 
 Phenomena, are conditioned by our minds, and 
 that in consequence of this they differ to an un- 
 known extent from the actual Reality, undistorted 
 by our Sense and Intellect, they are not prepared 
 to concur with this doctrine. The notion that our 
 mind co-operates in making a horse at a distance 
 of 20 yards, or a mountain at a distance of a 
 mile, or the sun at a distance of more than 
 90,000,000 of miles, is one that never passed 
 through their thoughts, and when propounded 
 to them seems so strange as to be absurd. And 
 when they are told that, owing to this condition- 
 ing action of our mind, the Phenomenon may 
 be quite different from the Noumenon, or undis- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 223 
 
 torted Eeality ; when they are told that the phe- 
 nomenal sun cognised by us as a round body of 
 more than 800,000 miles diameter, is produced 
 partly by our minds and partly by an unknown 
 thing, which may not be in Space, or extended at 
 all, they will not assent to this view of the matter. 
 Or, again, if they are told that a horse cognised 
 by them as running about in a field, is a Pheno- 
 menon, formed partly by their minds, and partly 
 by a horse as it really is, an unknown Noumenon, 
 which may have no head, body, or legs, and may 
 not be in Space or Time at all, they will not re- 
 cognise this as Common Sense. 
 
 We see, therefore, that Hamilton's doctrine is 
 not ultimately benefited by supposing that the 
 Phenomena to the cognition of which he re- 
 stricts us are in some cases external and material. 
 Whether we regard Phenomena as modes of mind, 
 or as material, the difficulties attending his teach- 
 ing are in either case equally great. It appears 
 that we cannot consistently hold the two main 
 doctrines taught by him. We must either give 
 up the Reidian doctrine of Common Sense, or we 
 must abandon the doctrine of the Conditioned, 
 which regards thought as a distorting medium, 
 and proclaims that on this account we can know 
 nothing as it really exists, unaltered by our no- 
 tions, categories, and conceptions, i. e. Uncondi- 
 tioned. It would seem that Dr. MacCosh is per- 
 fectly right in an opinion which he expresses on 
 some occasions, that Hamilton took portions of 
 
224 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 doctrine from Eeid and from Kant, which cannot 
 be amalgamated. 
 
 In further examining Hamilton's doctrine, it 
 would be proper to ask the following question : Is 
 the material Phenomenon produced by the joint ac- 
 tion of the Mind and the Noumenon permanent or 
 transitory? Does it continue to exist after the joint 
 action of the Mind and the Noumenon has ceased ? 
 or, does it cease to exist as soon as the Mind be- 
 gins to cognise other objects and produce other 
 Phenomena ? Whatever answer be given to this 
 question, great difficulties would be incurred un- 
 less the authority of Common Sense were summa- 
 rily overruled. 
 
 Let us consider the doctrine in question, in 
 reference to the cognition of minds and persons. 
 According to common parlance, we know other 
 persons and know their characters ; but according 
 to the doctrine under consideration, what we really 
 know is a Phenomenon, created partly by the ex- 
 ternal thing and partly by our minds, and which, 
 owing to the conditioning action of our minds, 
 may differ from the external co-efficient, or cause, 
 to an unknown extent. We cannot, therefore, 
 know how far the nature or character of the 
 real person, as he actually exists, resembles the 
 \ nature of the phenomenal effect cognised by our 
 minds. 
 
 This doctrine would have an important bearing 
 on Theology. It is said in Theology that we can 
 think of Christ in his human nature, and can have 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 225 
 
 a knowledge of him. But according to the doc- 
 trine in question, what we think of and know in 
 this case is a Phenomenon created in a great mea- 
 sure by our own minds, and which, owing to their 
 conditioning action, may differ to an unknown 
 extent from the Noumenon Christ ; from Christ 
 as he actually is, undistorted by our Sense and 
 Intellect. 
 
 Again ; in Theology it is said that we can 
 think of God and know him : the Psalms and the 
 writings of Divines are full of statements to this 
 effect. But according to the doctrine in ques- 
 tion, what we think of and know in this case is a 
 Phenomenon, created in a great measure by our 
 minds, and conditioned by them. This Pheno- 
 menon differs greatly from the Divine Noumenon, 
 from God as he actually is. God as he really is 
 is Infinite, Non- Phenomenal, Unconditioned ; while 
 the Phenomenon cognised by us is Finite, Phe- 
 nomenal, Conditioned ; and it is impossible for us 
 to know how far the Noumenon may be unlike the 
 Phenomenon. Thus, though we are said to think 
 of God and to know God, what we really think of 
 and know is not God, but a finite Phenomenon, 
 exceedingly different from him. Indeed, we are 
 assured that this difference is so great, that it 
 would be blasphemy to suppose that God as he 
 really is is of the same nature as the Phenomenon 
 conceived and cognised by us. 
 
 It is further to be observed that since accord- 
 ing to the doctrine in question we know nothing 
 
 Q 
 
226 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 of Noumena, we are not authorised to affirm that 
 all minds condition phenomena in the same man- 
 ner; that the same Noumenon X, acting conjointly 
 with A and acting conjointly with B, will produce 
 in both cases the same phenomenal result. The 
 Noumenon Christ acting on beings of a certain 
 constitution may produce a Phenomenon, not 
 only entirely unlike his own real nature, but also 
 entirely unlike the Phenomena which he may 
 produce when acting on beings constituted in a 
 different way. And similarly, in the so-called 
 cognition of God, the finite Phenomena cognised 
 by different beings may not only be very unlike 
 God, but may be very unlike one another. This 
 being so, the Noumenon which acting on our 
 minds produces a Phenomenon which excites in 
 us a sentiment of moral approbation, acting on 
 the minds of angels or of inhabitants of distant 
 stars may produce a Phenomenon which excites 
 in them a sentiment of moral disapprobation. The 
 case will resemble that which occurs when different 
 persons cognise the taste of chocolate, where the 
 same Noumenon acting on subjects differently con- 
 stituted, produces Phenomena pleasant to some and 
 unpleasant to others. Each person will cognise 
 accurately the Phenomenon conditioned and con- 
 ceived by him : but all will be equally unable to 
 derive from this cognition any knowledge of the 
 nature of the Noumenon. 
 
 And as our so-called cognition of God is only 
 the cognition of a finite Phenomenon, which may 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 2$/ 
 
 be exceedingly different from God, we cannot 
 know what the real moral nature of God is. The 
 finite Phenomenon cognised by us may be condi- 
 tioned as wise, good, just, &c., and may be cog- 
 nised by us as having those qualities, but we cannot 
 tell how far the Noumenon may have qualities 
 resembling those which we thus conceive in the 
 Phenomenon. Consequently, we cannot know the 
 nature of the Divine Morality, and must recognise 
 that its standard may be very different from that 
 which regulates our human notions. And this 
 being the case, we ought to recognise that different 
 classes of beings may be regulated by very dif- 
 ferent moral standards, and that our standard 
 cannot legitimately claim any absolute or universal 
 validity. When, therefore, different beings, acted 
 on by the same Noumenon, produce different Phe- 
 nomena, some conditioning the phenomenon as 
 morally good and others as morally bad, none of 
 them will be entitled to say, my constitution or 
 conditioning faculty is right, and that of the other 
 subjects wrong. 
 
 If such be the real nature of the doctrine of 
 the Conditioned, and such the results involved in it, 
 then it would be quite natural that all who embrace 
 that doctrine should pour forth their lamentations 
 in unison with Hamilton, proclaiming that we must 
 despair of philosophy, that our so-called science is 
 very poor and worthless, that all our efforts to 
 know end in doubt and failure, and have for their 
 consummation the Knowledge of Nothing. 
 
228 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 The question arises, Did Hamilton really hold 
 the doctrine which thus asserts the Eelativity of 
 Moral Truth ? If it had been pointed out to him 
 that it follows as a consequence from the principles 
 which he has laid down, would he have accepted 
 and approved it? From some of his statements 
 we might infer that he would have disapproved 
 and rejected the doctrine in question. For in- 
 stance, he tells us that " intelligence reveals pre- 
 scriptive principles of action, absolute and universal, 
 in the Law of Duty;"* and again, that "intelli- 
 gence recognises " " the unconditional law of duty, 
 and an absolute obligation to fulfil it." Here he 
 appears to embrace the doctrine of Kant, so strongly 
 blamed by Mr. Mansel as a fount of bitter waters : 
 he appears to assign to the principles of Morality 
 an absolute and universal, not a merely relative 
 character. 
 
 As, however, these utterances are incidental, 
 and are nowhere amplified or systematised, it 
 might be held by some interpreters that they are 
 not to be construed strictly : that Hamilton merely 
 means by them to affirm the existence of a moral 
 standard valid in relation to men living on earth 
 at the present time, and does not intend to assert 
 the validity of this standard in relation to all moral 
 beings, to possible inhabitants of remote stars, to 
 angels, or to God. The expositors who take such 
 a view might plead in support of it, that Hamilton 
 has so repeatedly and so explicitly affirmed the 
 Lectures, vol. i. p. 29. 
 
PKINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 229 
 
 mere relativity of all our knowledge, that we can- 
 not suppose him to have attributed to truths of 
 the moral Reason an absolute universal validity. 
 Again, they might point out that one great article 
 of his Philosophy is that we know nothing free 
 from distortion : in which case Moral Truths and 
 Principles cognised by us must be altered and 
 distorted by our minds, and cannot be identical 
 with Truths as they are known pure and undis- 
 torted by God. And they might urge that if 
 Hamilton, after teaching such doctrines, proceeds 
 to affirm that we can know Moral Principles of an 
 eternal and immutable character, valid in relation 
 to all spiritual Beings, and conformable with the 
 real principles of Divine Goodness, he would be 
 quite as obnoxious as Kant to the strictures of 
 Mr. Mansel, as trying to send forth from the same 
 fountain sweet and bitter waters, and as building 
 again the things which he had destroyed, thereby 
 making himself a transgressor. Further, they 
 might point out that if Hamilton does ascribe to 
 Moral Principles, cognised by our Reason, an abso- 
 lute or universal validity, his doctrine would not 
 take away from philosophers the right to criticise 
 statements of professed revelations concerning the 
 moral attributes and conduct of God : in which case 
 it would be no obstacle to the Vulgar Rationalism. 
 Under such circumstances the authority of 
 Hamilton, like that of Butler, cannot be invoked 
 with much effect, either by the Kantian, who 
 maintains the absolute validity of moral principles, 
 
230 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 or by the Protagorean, who denies this. It is 
 possible that in reference to this question Hamil- 
 ton's combative disposition might have induced 
 him to defend two different theses, according to 
 the manner in which the subject might have come 
 before him. Suppose that Brown, or some French 
 philosopher, had taught that our moral principles 
 are merely relative; that principles concerning 
 right and wrong which are true on earth might 
 be false in Orion; that the conduct and character 
 which excite the sentiment of approbation in a 
 rational man might excite disapprobation in angels 
 and in God; or vice versa. Not improbably, Ha- 
 milton would have violently denounced such a 
 doctrine as pernicious and detestable, as obliging 
 us to regard our nature as a lie, and our Creator 
 as perfidious. 
 
 But suppose again, that a rationalist or philo- 
 sopher had assailed some of the Calvinistic dogmas, 
 of which Hamilton is asserted to have been a 
 staunch adherent : suppose, for instance, a philo- 
 sopher had impugned the teaching of Calvin con- 
 cerning Predestination or Vicarious Punishment, 
 objecting that these doctrines ascribed to God a 
 moral character inconsistent with the rational idea 
 of Goodness ; and suppose that a champion of the 
 Calvinistic doctrine had endeavoured to rebut 
 these objections, by urging that moral truths and 
 principles are relative, not absolute ; that the 
 Divine standard of Morality may be very different 
 from the human ; that thought is only of the con- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 231 
 
 ditioned and finite, and cannot profitably be exer- 
 cised about God, who is unconditioned and infinite ; 
 that its true business is to generalise phenomena 
 into laws, and not to busy itself with theological 
 speculations; it is by no means impossible that 
 Hamilton would have approved this reasoning, and 
 praised it as a sound and valuable application of 
 the grand doctrine of Relativity. And it is possi- 
 ble that his polemical disposition might have led 
 him to adopt both these different views at different 
 times, causing him to forget during his advocacy 
 of the one what he had urged as champion of the 
 other. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 ON KANT'S IDEALISM. 
 
 IN the foregoing chapters concerning the teaching 
 of Kant I have made no reference to the Commen- 
 tary on his Critique by Dr. Kuno Fischer, which 
 has recently been translated, with additional dis- 
 quisitions, by Mr. Mahaffy. I was not aware of 
 the existence of this work till after the preceding 
 chapters were sent to the press. Since that was 
 done I have seen the work in question, and finding 
 in it interesting matter relating to subjects which I 
 had previously noticed, I add here remarks having 
 reference to some points of importance. 
 
 I notice that Mr. Mahaffy signalises very clearly 
 the difference between Kant's doctrine concern- 
 ing transcendental illusion and that ascribed to 
 him by Sir W. Hamilton ; and after having ex- 
 plained this, he asks, not unnaturally, " Was there 
 ever a more flagrant falsification of a philosopher's 
 opinions ?"* 
 
 Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary, Introduc- 
 tion, p. Ixiv. 
 
S 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 233 
 
 Both Dr. Fischer and Mr. Mahaify express 
 opinions of much interest concerning Kant's Ideal- 
 ism ; and the question whether he taught a uni- 
 form doctrine on this subject. Dr. Fischer agrees 
 with Schopenhauer in thinking that he did not do 
 so ; that in the First Edition of the Critique he 
 taught a pure Idealism, in a clear and unambiguous 
 manner, while in his Second Edition he marred 
 and contradicted this. Mr. Mahaffy disputes this 
 view of the case, holding that there was no such 
 change ; that both editions teach consistently the 
 same doctrine. 
 
 In examining Hamilton's teaching we saw that 
 very different opinions may be entertained con- 
 cerning the nature of Phenomena. Thus it may be 
 held that all Phenomena are modes of the Ego ; or 
 it may be held that some Phenomena are external 
 material things, not modes of the Ego. In order 
 to understand the real meaning of Kant's doctrine, 
 it is essential that we should know what view he 
 holds concerning the nature of Phenomena. Unless 
 we know this, we cannot understand the nature of 
 Nournena (Dinge an sich selbst). And as the 
 distinction between Phenomena and Noumena lies 
 at the very root of Kant's philosophy, uncertainty 
 on the above points casts doubt and obscurity over 
 the whole of his doctrine. 
 
 One of the portions of matter introduced into 
 Kant's Second Edition, which is regarded by 
 Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer as incompatible 
 with the decided Idealism of the First, is the so- 
 
234 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 called Refutation of Idealism. In this Kant under- 
 takes to prove " the existence of external objects 
 in space" " das Daseyn der Gegenstande im 
 Raum ausser mir." And he calls these objects 
 in Space " Dinge" and " wirkliche Dinge."* So 
 that, having previously contended that objects in 
 Space are merely Phenomena, not things in them- 
 selves (Dinge an sich selbst), he now contends 
 that these objects are Things, real things, and 
 really external. Here, therefore, his doctrine 
 seems to assume a Realistic form, similar to the 
 Realism of Hamilton ; which combines the two 
 positions : 1. that we can know only Phenomena; 
 and 2. that some Phenomena are real external 
 things, differing from the Ego and its modes. 
 
 Dr. Fischer wholly refuses to regard Pheno- 
 mena in this realistic light ; maintaining that Phe- 
 nomena in all cases are nothing but modes of the 
 Ego, representations within us; and that if we 
 deny this, and regard them as real external things, 
 not modes of the Ego, we spoil the whole of Kant's 
 doctrine. 
 
 Dr. Fischer's opinions being of much interest, 
 I quote some of his statements. He says : 
 
 "The objects of knowledge are: either things 
 without us, real things (res), or merely represen- 
 tations within us (idece). Let us call the first 
 view Realism, the second Idealism; and let us put 
 to Kant the question : What objects, according to 
 his system, are cognoscible? Which are the only 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ed. Hartenstein, p. 211 et seq. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 235 
 
 possible objects of our cognition, res or idece ? He 
 has already determined all knowledge to be ex- 
 perience, because its only objects are phenomena. 
 But the phenomena are felt by our perception, 
 represented by our intuition, connected by our 
 imagination, made objective by our understanding 
 and its concepts. There is in phenomena nothing 
 which is not subjective. They are nothing but 
 our representations , and can be nothing else. It 
 is perfectly inconceivable how a thing existing 
 apart from our power of representation a thing 
 per se could come with all its properties into our 
 faculty of representation, and ever become a re- 
 presentation. But, if there be no representation 
 of a thing, how can there be a knowledge of it ? 
 It follows from this, that the only possible objects 
 of knowledge can never be anything but our re- 
 presentations. This is the very basis of the Critick 
 of the Pure Reason, and its original form is per- 
 fectly in accordance with this spirit. In this 
 sense, it is thoroughly idealistic. The whole pro- 
 blem of cognition lies on this safe basis. If the 
 objects of all possible cognition are merely phe- 
 nomena that is, representations in us and alto- 
 gether subjective, how is a cognition of them pos- 
 sible, which must yet be universal and necessary ? 
 How is an objective experience of them possible ? 
 This is the question of the Critick. This question 
 makes the investigation both novel and difficult. 
 Berkeley knew that all our objects were only re- 
 presentations ; but had no suspicion how from 
 
236 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 such objects any cognition should ever come ; so 
 his doctrine lapsed into the scepticism of Hume. 
 We must not, then, identify Kant with Berkeley, 
 as Garven did, in his well-known criticism. Kant, 
 indeed, agreed with Berkeley in this, that he too 
 allowed no objects of knowledge but representa- 
 tions ; but he differed from Berkeley in this, that 
 he discovered the universal and necessary repre- 
 sentations, which are not themselves objects, but 
 produce objects the necessary forms of representa- 
 tion both of the understanding and the sensibility ; 
 and in this very discovery consists the Critick of 
 the Pure Eeason. 
 
 " To make the distinction between himself and 
 Berkeley plain, Kant might have laid much more 
 stress on the critical character of his investigations, 
 but should never have weakened their idealism. 
 This was the mistaken line which he took in his 
 Second Edition. Here he wrote, as an appendix 
 to the 'Postulates of Empirical Thinking,' that 
 4 Refutation of Idealism ' which was directed im- 
 mediately against Berkeley. And his whole de- 
 monstration comes to this, that it is only the exist- 
 ence of things without us which first renders pos- 
 sible the perception of ourselves. As if, in the 
 true spirit of the Critick, things without us could 
 \ be anything else than things in space as if space 
 could be anything else than our representation 
 as if things without us could be anything but our 
 spatial representations! This is no refutation of 
 Berkeley, but merely a flat denial of Idealism, by 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 237 
 
 which Kant abandoned his own teaching in the 
 most inconceivable manner."* 
 
 Again : 
 
 "All objects of possible experience are pheno- 
 mena. All phenomena are nothing but represen- 
 tations (vorstellungen) within us. . . ." . This is 
 the strictly idealistic teaching of the critical philo- 
 sophy, which does not admit of the smallest modi- 
 fication without shaking to its foundation and de- 
 stroying the very same critical philosophy."! 
 
 "We have repeatedly pointed out the fact that 
 the Critick of the Pure Reason, in its original form, 
 carries out that doctrine accurately and consist- 
 ently, but in its succeeding editions weakens this 
 idealistic doctrine, blunts (as it were) its edge, 
 gets rid of its unambiguous and positive expres- 
 sion, which removes any possible doubt. Nay, 
 further, in certain passages it favours remarkably 
 the opposite view, which it introduces in certain 
 places, like a spurious interpolation. The succeed- 
 ing Edition of the Critick, as compared with the 
 first, differs from it partly in omissions, partly in 
 additions, both referring to the idealistic doctrine 
 the former to conceal it, the latter to let its con- 
 tradictory have its say. Such an addition was the 
 ' Refutation of Idealism^ which Kant in the Second 
 Edition of the Critick adds to the postulates of em- 
 pirical thinking. Such omissions are to be found 
 in the deduction of the Categories, and in the doc- 
 
 Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary, p. 131. 
 t Ibid. p. 172. 
 
238 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 trine of the distinction between phenomena and 
 noumena. But in no part of the First Edition was 
 the language of idealism so plain, unambiguous, 
 and palpable, as it was here in the refutation of 
 rational psychology. These decisive passages were 
 suppressed in the following Editions, and only 
 lately brought to light again by Schopenhauer's 
 ' Critick of the Kantian Philosophy.' There can be 
 no doubt that Kant weakened the strict idealism 
 of his doctrine, not because he doubted it, nor 
 because he wanted courage to maintain so daring 
 a theory, but merely because he wished to make 
 his teaching, to a certain extent, popular and 
 exoteric. Common (or exoteric, or dogmatical) 
 sense was satisfied to accept the Kantian philo- 
 sophy with this little admission, that phenomena 
 were also something beyond our mere faculty of 
 representation not much, but just something to 
 be set down for our satisfaction as a mere un- 
 known X."* 
 
 In numerous passages of the First Edition 
 Kant expresses a view concerning the nature of 
 Phenomena precisely agreeing with that expressed 
 in the above passages by Dr. Fischer. He declares 
 himself to embrace the doctrine of transcendental 
 Idealism, according to which Matter is nothing 
 but " Erscheinung, die von unserer Sinnlichkeit 
 abgetrennt nichts ist:" u a Phenomenon, which 
 apart from our sensibility is nothing." He pro- 
 ceeds to say that, according to this doctrine, Matter 
 
 Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary, p. 173. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 239 
 
 is a kind of Vorstellungen, representations, which 
 are called external, not as referring to real non- 
 Egos, but merely because they refer perceptions to 
 Space, which Space, however, really " is in us"* 
 And again he says : " Nun sind aber aussere 
 Gegenstande (die Korper) bios Erscheinungen, 
 mithin auch nichts anderes, als eine Art meiner 
 Vorstellungen," i. e. "external objects (bodies) are 
 merely Phenomena, consequently only a sort of 
 my representations." And yet again he says, in a 
 passage which seems to be perfectly explicit : "in 
 unserm System diese ausseren Dinge, die Materie 
 namlich, in alien ihren Gestalten und Verander- 
 ungen, nichts als blosse Erscheinungen, d. i. Vor- 
 stellungen in uns sind;" i. e. "in our system these 
 external things, that is to say, Matter in all its 
 forms and changes, are nothing but mere pheno- 
 mena, i. e. representations within us." And there 
 are many other passages of a similar kind. 
 
 The passages above quoted occur in the cri- 
 tique of the fourth paralogism of Transcendental 
 Psychology, which appeared in the First Edition 
 of the Kritik, but was suppressed in the Second. f 
 
 " So 1st sie bei ihm nur eine Art Vorstellungen (Anschauung), 
 welche ausserlich heissen, mentals ob sie auf an sich selbst aussere 
 Gegenstande bezogen, sondern weil sie Wahrnehmungen auf den 
 Baum beziehen, in welchem Alles ausser einander, er selbst der 
 Raum aber in uns 1st." KritiTe der Reinen Vernunft, ibid. p. 646. 
 
 f Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, ibid. pp. 644-652. A trans- 
 lation of this critique is given by Mr. Mahaffy, along with trans- 
 lations of other passages similarly suppressed in the Second Edi- 
 tion. 
 
240 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 They show that Kant's language, in his First 
 Edition, concerning the nature of Phenomena, 
 fully agreed with that employed by Dr. Kuno 
 Fischer ; asserting that Phenomena are not real 
 things external to me (ausser mir), but that they 
 are representations (vorstellungen) within me (in 
 mir). But Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer com- 
 plain that in the Second Edition the language is 
 changed ; that passages such as those previously 
 quoted, declaring that Phenomena are Vorstel- 
 lungen in mir, are suppressed, while Kant actually 
 undertakes to demonstrate that objects in Space, 
 Phenomena, are wirkliche Dinge ausser mir. 
 
 It is, however, important to observe that while 
 Kant asserts extended Phenomena to be real ex- 
 ternal Things, and undertakes, in his Kefutation 
 of Idealism, to prove this point, he nevertheless 
 intimates to us that this reality and externality 
 are empirical. -He tells us that the Phenomena 
 are empirically real, and transcendentally ideal. This 
 distinction is hinted in the Refutation of Idealism, 
 though it is kept there somewhat in the back- 
 ground ; but it is very clearly stated in the critique 
 of the fourth paralogism previously mentioned ; as 
 in the following passages : " Der transcendentale 
 Idealist kann hingegen ein empirischer Realist, 
 mithin, wie man ihn nennt, ein Dualist seyn."" 
 And again: "Also ist der transcendentale Idealist 
 ein empirischer Realist, und gesteht der Materie, 
 als Erscheinung, eine Wirklichkeit zu, die nicht 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Yernunft, ibid. p. 646. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 241 
 
 gcschlossen werden darf, sondern unmittelbar 
 wahrgenommen wird."* And at the same time 
 we are told : " Wir konnen mit Recht behaupten, 
 dass nur dasjenige was in uns selbst ist, unmit- 
 telbar wahrgenommen werden konne, und dass 
 meinc eigene Existenz allein der Gegenstand einer 
 blossen Wahrnehmung seyn konne."f 
 
 Thus these passages declare that the transcen- 
 dental Idealist regards Matter as a Phenomenon 
 witldn us: since it is a Phenomenon immediately 
 perceived (unmittelbar wahrgenommen), and since 
 only that which is within us can be perceived im- 
 mediately. And we are told very unmistakably 
 that transcendental Idealism is considered by Kant 
 to be the correct doctrine; as for instance in the 
 following statement : " Fur diesen transcenden- 
 talen Idealism haben wir uns nun schon im An- 
 fange erkliirt."J 
 
 The distinction thus made is, I believe, never 
 retracted in the Second Edition: but in various 
 parts of that edition the reality and externality of 
 matter (or of extended phenomena) are insisted 
 upon, without its being distinctly pointed out that 
 this reality and externality are merely empirical, 
 not transcendental. Thus, as it seems to me, it 
 may fairly be maintained that both Editions teach 
 the same doctrine, viz. that extended phenomena 
 are empirically external, while transcendentally they 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Vernunf t. Ibid. p. 647. 
 f Ibid. Ibid. p. G44. 
 | Ibid. Ibid. p. 64G. 
 
 R 
 
242 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 are internal, blosse Vorstellungen in mir. But, as 
 it seems to me, it may with reason be asserted, 
 that this doctrine is more clearly taught in the 
 First Edition: that in the Second Edition, the 
 reality and externality of extended phenomena 
 are insisted on, without attention being called to 
 the circumstance, that all the while they are trans- 
 cendentally blosse Vorstellungen in mir. 
 
 Thus, then, it appears that we cannot under- 
 stand the very foundation of Kant's doctrine, un- 
 less we understand what, according to his view, 
 is the true nature of Experience ; and what is the 
 difference between empirical and transcendental. 
 This question is connected with the previous one 
 concerning the nature of Phenomena, as unless 
 we understand the difference between Phenomena 
 and Noumena, we cannot rightly understand that 
 between empirical and transcendental.* It would 
 be necessary to know whether according to Kant's 
 view we have any experience of real external 
 things, or whether all objects of experience, even 
 those which seem to us most completely different 
 from ourselves, are really and truly modes of our- 
 selves Vorstellungen in mir. Again, it would be 
 necessary to know whether experience is created 
 by two factors, an Ego, and an external Noume- 
 
 For Kant explains the words " transcendental " and " empi- 
 rical" by means of the words " Ding ansichselbst " and " Erschein- 
 ung" (Phenomenon). A conception, he tells us, is used transcen- 
 dentally, when it is applied to " Dinge an sich selbst ;" empirically, 
 when it is applied to Erscheinungen, i. e. to Phenomena. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 243 
 
 non, or whether it is produced by the Ego alone. 
 Until these points were settled, we could not un- 
 derstand the difference between the empirical and 
 the transcendental. 
 
 Again: it is to be noticed, that though Kant 
 ascribes Keality to extended Phenomena, and un- 
 dertakes to prove that they are real, he does not 
 appear to think that they have the same sort of 
 Reality as Noumena, or Things per se. As we have 
 seen, in the passages previously quoted, he speaks 
 of bodies as blosse Erscheinungen, mere Phenomena. 
 And in explaining the "transcendental" and ''em- 
 pirical" use of conceptions, he tells us : u der trans- 
 cendentale Gebrauch eines Begriifs ist dieser : dass 
 er auf Dinge iiberhaupt und an sich selbst, 
 der empirische aber, wenn er bios auf Erschein- 
 ungen, d. i. Gegenstande einer moglichen Erfah- 
 rung, bezogen wird."* And he goes on to say 
 that " nur der letztere," i. e. only the empirical use 
 of the conception is possible. And language of 
 this kind is repeatedly used by him, indicating that 
 according to his view it is a limitation and imper- 
 fection of our faculties that we can know only 
 Phenomena, and cannot know Noumena, or Dinge 
 an sich selbst. 
 
 Thus, then, it appears that according to his 
 doctrine Phenomena and Noumena (Dinge an sich 
 selbst) may both in a certain sense be spoken of 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Vernunf t. Von dem Grunde der Unter- 
 scheidung aller Gegenstande iiberhaupt in Phaenomena und Nou- 
 mena. Ibid. p. 226. 
 
244 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 as Eeal : but that Noumena are real in a higher 
 and more eminent sense than- Phenomena. In 
 order, therefore, that we may properly understand 
 his philosophy, it is necessary that we should un- 
 derstand his view concerning the nature of Reality, 
 and the two different sorts of Reality: what is 
 that sort of Reality which he predicates of Pheno- 
 mena, and what is that higher and more eminent 
 sort of Reality w r hich belongs to Xoumena, or 
 Dinge an sich selbst. And further, it behoves us 
 to understand what is the true nature of Ideality 
 from a transcendental point of view, so that we 
 may not misapprehend him when he tells us that 
 extended Phenomena, though empirically real, are 
 transcendentally ideal. We can at once see that 
 an examination of these points would be attended 
 with a good deal of difficulty. But when further 
 we remember that, according to a main article of 
 Kant's doctrine, neither the category of Reality 
 nor that of Ideality can be legitimately applied to 
 Noumena, so that whether we assert them to be 
 real or ideal, we in either case speak improperly, 
 our sense of the difficulties of the task before us 
 becomes intensified. 
 
 In like manner, and for like reason, we could 
 not apply assertorically to Koumena the categories 
 of externality or of non-Egoity. Whether we 
 might assert them to be external or internal, to 
 be modes of myself, or different from myself, in 
 all these cases the assertions would be illegiti- 
 mate ; indeed, as we are frequently told by Kant, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 245 
 
 would be wholly unmeaning, devoid of all Be- 
 dcutung or Sinn. 
 
 The differences of opinion above pointed out 
 among Kant's commentators, and the difficulties 
 attending their discussion, of which we have had a 
 glimpse, illustrate in a striking manner the diffi- 
 culty and obscurity which attach to the funda- 
 mental questions of Metaphysics. Kant was a 
 thinker of extraordinary power and profundity; 
 he occupied many years in thinking out his doc- 
 trine concerning knowledge ; and he has evidently 
 endeavoured to explain it to the best of his power.* 
 The whole of his doctrine is based on the distinc- 
 tion between Phenomena and Things per se or 
 Noumena: this distinction, as Schopenhauer tells 
 us, is the vital point of his philosophy : if we do 
 not clearly understand this, we cannot clearly 
 understand any part of his system. And yet we 
 find that his most conscientious students and 
 admirers, after devoting great time and labour to 
 the study of his works, cannot agree among them- 
 
 It has been thought indeed, as we have seen, by some of his 
 warmest admirers, that this was not the case as regards his Kefu- 
 tation of Idealism, and the other qualifications of his Idealistic 
 doctrine made in his Second Edition ; that in this part of his 
 teaching he sought to win adherents and smooth over opposition, 
 by concealing the real nature of his principles. But this view of 
 the matter is very questionable : the apparent vacillation and in- 
 consistency of his language may be easily accounted for by the 
 difficulties attending a really earnest attempt on his part tho- 
 roughly to understand and elucidate his doctrine concerning know- 
 ledge ; difficulties which, as we have sufficiently seen, might be 
 found by him very great. 
 
246 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 selves as to the real nature of Phenomena; nor 
 consequently as to the real nature of Things per se, 
 and the distinction between the two. And further, 
 we have seen that the difficulties attending this 
 question are so great, that possibly there never 
 will be a full agreement among his commentators 
 upon this point ; one so fundamental, that until it 
 is clearly understood, obscurity attaches to the 
 whole of his doctrine. 
 
 Mr. Mahaffy observes that some persons have 
 strangely misunderstood the purport of Kant's 
 " Refutation of Idealism," regarding it as an at- 
 tempt to demonstrate the existence of Noumena ; 
 a view which he thinks can only have arisen from 
 want of attention. Evidently this interpretation 
 is connected with the source of difficulty previ- 
 ously mentioned, viz. that Kant's ablest expositors 
 have not satisfactorily ascertained what he under- 
 stands by a Thing in itself (Ding an sich selbst) 
 or Noumenon ; and in what he considers it to 
 differ from a Phenomenon. As we have seen, 
 some of his expositors think that a real external 
 thing, really different from modes of the Ego, is 
 a Noumenon ; so that when Kant undertakes to 
 demonstrate that objects in Space are really ex- 
 ternal, and are not modes of the Ego, he appears 
 to them to be demonstrating that objects in Space 
 are Noumena, and thus to be spoiling and upset- 
 ting his own doctrine. And, indeed, they may 
 point out that Kant's language countenances such 
 a view ; for he blames the Idealism of Berkeley, 
 
I7KJ 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 247 
 
 as regarding " den Raum, mit alien den Dingen, 
 welchen er als unabtrennliche Bedingung anhangt, 
 fur Etwas, das an sich selbst unmoglich sey."* 
 Here, therefore, he appears to intimate that Space 
 may have an existence " an sich selbst," and that 
 extended things may be " Dinge an sich selbst :" 
 and that if we deny this, we fall into the Idealism 
 of Berkeley, and commit error. When he uses 
 such language, it cannot surprise us that he should 
 have been regarded as impugning his own previous 
 doctrine, and teaching that extended objects may 
 be " Dinge an sich selbst," or Noumena. 
 
 In addition to these considerations, there was 
 probably another tending to produce the view in 
 question, viz. the consideration of the task which 
 it was incumbent on Kant to perform, if he was 
 really to refute the scepticism dreaded as a natural 
 consequence of his doctrine. Let us awhile exa- 
 mine this point. 
 
 The real objection entertained by many per- 
 sons to Kant's doctrine is, that it paves the way to 
 Egoism ; i. e. to the hypothesis that I myself, by 
 my own solitary action, have created the whole 
 universe, sun, moon, earth, stars, and all the per- 
 sonages who, as I conceive, people life and history : 
 my father and mother, my friends and contem- 
 poraries, French and English, Greeks and Persians, 
 Jews and Romans, Cesar, Alexander, Cromwell, 
 Moses, Christ. According to this view, Life might 
 
 Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Widerlegung des Idealismus. 
 Ibid. pp. 211-214. 
 
248 AX EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 be regarded as a consistent dream, entirely the 
 product of my own mind or faculties. By some 
 action of these, of which I am not conscious, I 
 produce objects, which I project, objectify, con- 
 stitute into a non-Ego, and thus people the uni- 
 verse with objects, and make my own drama of 
 Life, as I do in a dream. Such is the view asserted 
 with enthusiasm by the Baccalaureus in Faust, 
 supposed to be heated with the fumes of Fichtean 
 philosophy. 
 
 66 Die Welt sie war niclit eh' icli sie erschuf ; 
 Die Sonne f iilirt' ich aus dem Meer herauf ; 
 Mit mir begann der Mond des Wechsels Lauf ; 
 Auf ineineii Wink, in jener ersten Nacht, 
 Entfaltete sicli aller Sterne Praclit." 
 
 It is easy to see how Kant's doctrine is supposed 
 to conduct to this view. For Kant is understood to 
 teach that Space and Time are nothing but forms 
 or subjective conditions of sensibility ; that by the 
 employment of its forms and categories the mind 
 creates objects quite different from the Noumenon, 
 or "Ding an sich selbst;" so that Phenomena have 
 extension, duration, unity, plurality, activity, and 
 a great number of qualities which do not exist in 
 the Noumenon. This being so, it is natural to ask, 
 why may not we consider the Phenomenon, the 
 object of thought and knowledge, to be entirely 
 produced by the mind or Ego? why should we 
 bring in an unknown X a Noumenon, a non- 
 EX), as a co-efficient helping to produce the Phe- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 249 
 
 nomenon ? If the Mind can do so much, why may 
 it not do all ? If it can create Space and Time, and 
 clothe the phenomenon with Extension, Duration, 
 Unity, Plurality, E elation, &c., why may it not 
 clothe it with the categories of Existence, non- 
 Egoity, and Reality? In this case objects pro- 
 duced entirely by the Mind would be cognised by 
 us as really existent things different from ourselves. 
 Though purely our own creations, they would by 
 a differentiating action of the Mind be projected, 
 objectified, and made into real non-Egos. Then 
 might we glorify ourselves with the Baccalaureus 
 as having brought into being Sun, Moon, Earth, 
 Stars, Cesar, Alexander, Hannibal, Christ, and gene- 
 rally the whole world and all its contents. This, 
 in fact, was the consummation at which Fichte 
 arrived, in developing Kant's principles, as under- 
 stood by him ; and he thought it impossible to 
 extricate himself from it, except by calling to his 
 aid Faith, as a Deus ex machina. 
 
 Indeed, the language employed by Kant in his 
 First Edition might be thought in many places to 
 teach the doctrine of Egoism not merely by impli- 
 cation, but directly and explicitly. Let us listen to 
 Mr. Mahaffy's statements on this point. He says : 
 "It is the mind, then, and the mind only, which 
 makes objects ; for the objects mean not only mere 
 representations, but an order and unity among 
 them, and the unity necessary. Now, nature in 
 Kant's book means this regular order in phenomena 
 this classifying of all our sensations under cer- 
 
250 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 tain heads, and bringing them together under 
 various unities. Hence the pure Understanding 
 makes objects, and so makes nature. This is the 
 language of the First Edition."* 
 
 And Dr. Kuno Fischer says : 
 
 " The first edition of the Critick proceeds in a 
 thoroughly critical spirit, resolving the object alto- 
 gether into our phenomenon or representation, and 
 showing the faculties which form it. For even the 
 raw material of which the object consists, the sen- 
 suous data of sensation, being mere modifications 
 of our sensibility, are nothing without us, or inde- 
 pendent of our perceiving consciousness. The 
 form as well of intuition as of experience is alto- 
 gether our product. Kant here expresses it most 
 explicitly, that phenomena or sensuous representa- 
 tions are not objects beyond our power of repre- 
 sentation ; that the object of cognition does not 
 exist out of cognition ; that all phenomena are 
 objects within us, and as such determinations of 
 ourselves, "f 
 
 We can readily understand that a philosophy 
 using language of this kind would seem to many 
 persons to be either actual Egoism, or something 
 so near it, that it could hardly fail to lead to it by 
 the natural course of development. 
 
 Now when Des Cartes is giving free play to his 
 doubting faculty, with the view of ultimately com- 
 
 Mahaffy's Translation of Fischer's Commentary. Introduc- 
 tion, p. xliv. 
 f Ibid. p. 78. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 251 
 
 bating the doubts raised, he considers as possible 
 a sceptical Egoism of the kind above described. 
 The doubter, in entertaining this scepticism, or 
 in putting it before his mind, reasons as follows : 
 I have observed that in dreams I regard as real, 
 and as different from myself, objects which in the 
 waking state I believe to have been created by my 
 own mind. May it not then be, that the objects 
 which in the waking state I regard as real things, 
 different from myself, are really, in like manner, 
 creations of my own mind ? May not the different 
 personages who give an interest to my waking life 
 be of the same nature as those who give an interest 
 to my dreams ; whom, though created by my own 
 faculties, I project and objectify, conversing with 
 them as if they were different from myself, regard- 
 ing some of them as friends, and some as enemies ; 
 fearing or disliking some, and loving others ? This 
 is the scepticism propounded as possible by Des 
 Cartes, which it behoves Kant, if he is to meet the 
 difficulties of objectors, to combat and refute. Let 
 us examine whether he has really done this. 
 
 It may be observed in the first place that 
 Scepticism of the kind above explained is not 
 refuted by alleging that Life in the waking state 
 is much more consistent than the life or drama of 
 dreams; for dreams vary greatly in this respect, 
 some of them being free from extravagance, and 
 quite simulating the consistency of real life. Nor 
 can it be refuted by alleging that the impressions 
 or phenomena which we experience in the waking 
 
252 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 state are much more vivid than those which we ex- 
 perience in dreams, since the phenomena in dreams 
 and the emotions occasioned by them are fre- 
 quently very vivid and intense. It is well known 
 that persons frequently suffer greatly from the 
 terror caused by frightful dreams. Abercrombie 
 mentions the case of a man who carried on a con- 
 sistent dream from night to night, and was much 
 more interested in this dream than in the events 
 of his waking state ; so that when one of the per- 
 sonages of his dream died, he died of grief. Here 
 there was 110 lack either of consistency or of viva- 
 city in the impressions; yet, nevertheless, these 
 are regarded as the phenomena of a mere dream. 
 Whatever may be the truth of this and similar 
 accounts, it is clear that their truth is quite 
 conceivable ; and this suffices to show that the 
 reality which we ascribe to the events of our 
 waking state, while we refuse to ascribe it to those 
 of our dreams, does not consist in regularity of 
 order, nor in vivacity of impression. Nor again, 
 can this reality be accounted for by pointing out 
 that the phenomena do not appear to depend upon 
 our will ; for the phenomena or events of a dream 
 do not appear to the dreamer to depend upon his 
 will. Indeed, the events of the dream frequently 
 take a course exceedingly unpleasant to the 
 dreamer, which, if they lay under the control of 
 his will, could hardly be the case. 
 
 Further, it is to be observed that an Egoistic 
 doctrine of the kind proclaimed by the Baccalau- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 253 
 
 re us, is not controverted by asserting that the 
 Phenomena produced and cognised are real, arid 
 different from the Ego which produces them. 
 The Baccalaureus would probably have entered 
 with alacrity into this view of the case ; the notion 
 that he created a real Sun, a real Moon, real 
 Stars, &c., would have seemed to him to enhance 
 the dignity of his creative powers, and to aiford 
 to him food for self-glorification. It is, indeed, 
 pretty evident that when in his conversation with 
 Mephistopheles he imagines himself to be con- 
 versing with Faust, an aged bookworm, dried up 
 by laborious study, he regards his interlocutor as 
 a non-Ego ; since he ridicules him as stupid and 
 worthless, and uses language, as Mephistopheles 
 observes, of a very rude kind, such as he certainly 
 would not have applied to himself. And in like 
 manner he derides the whole tribe of Philistines, 
 whose bonds he has burst asunder. Though, 
 therefore, he regards these as creations of his 
 own, he nevertheless looks upon them as non- 
 Egos. Apparently he considers himself to have 
 a power of projecting out of himself, and making 
 into non-Egos, Sun and Moon, Germans and 
 French, Illuminati and Philistines, &c. The 
 point, therefore, of his doctrine does not lie in 
 denying the existence of external objects, or of a 
 non-Ego, but in maintaining that the non-Ego is 
 entirely his own creation ; that he himself, without 
 any co-operation of external things, has made Sun, 
 Moon, animals, men, and the whole world. 
 
254 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 Again : it is to be observed that the Scepticism 
 in question is not refuted, nor even touched, by 
 proving that our perception or cognition of phe- 
 nomena or of events is experience (erfahrung) 
 not imagination or phantasy. For the question 
 immediately recurs, What is the nature of Ex- 
 perience ? By what is it caused or produced ? Is 
 it produced by two factors or co-efficients, an Ego 
 and a non-Ego, or is it produced by the Mind or 
 Ego alone ? The Egoist asserts that it is produced 
 solely by the Ego ; that there is no external X or 
 Noumenon which concurs with the Ego in pro- 
 ducing it. Manifestly, if this view is taken, we do 
 not in the least touch Egoism by asserting that 
 our cognition of Phenomena or of events is Ex- 
 perience. 
 
 When, like Des Cartes, we give the rein to our 
 doubting faculty, the form of Scepticism above 
 explained suggests itself to the mind ; and if Kant 
 is to clear away the difficulties propounded by Des 
 Cartes, and to do battle by argument on behalf 
 of Common Sense, this is the form of doubt with 
 which it behoves him to grapple. But if we exa- 
 mine his reasonings, we shall find that he does not 
 do so. Exception may be taken at the outset to 
 the mode in which he states the "problematical 
 idealism " of Des Cartes ; i. e. the scepticism which 
 Des Cartes suggests as possible, and wishes to 
 overthrow. According to him, this admits as un- 
 questionable only one empirical assertion, viz. the 
 assertion " I am." This is by no means the case. 
 
PllINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 255 
 
 The scepticism in question recognises as certain 
 such statements as the following : "I doubt," " I 
 fear," " I hope," " I grieve," " I rejoice," &c. It 
 also admits as certain such statements as these : 
 u I think of something which I call the sun, or 
 which I call the inoon;" " I think of objects which 
 I regard as persons different from myself, loving 
 some and disliking others." But admitting all 
 this, it says, perhaps all the phenomena which I 
 perceive and think about are produced entirely by 
 myself are as much my own creations as the 
 dramatis persona? of my dreams. 
 
 Having stated the Cartesian scepticism in the 
 above manner, Kant endeavours to refute it by 
 reasoning. For this purpose he endeavours to 
 prove that objects in Space are real (wirklich) and 
 external (ausser mir). But, as we have seen, this 
 does not touch the real knot. The Baccalaureus 
 would willingly assert that Sun, Moon, Stars, 
 Faust, Mephistopheles, Philistines, &c., were real 
 external non-Egos ; but, nevertheless, he would 
 contend that these real external objects were cre- 
 ated entirely* by himself, without the co-operation 
 of any external cause, or co-efficient. 
 
 Further, it is to be observed, that though Kant 
 professedly demonstrates the extended phenomena 
 to be real and external, it is admitted by him that 
 this reality and externality are merely empirical 
 This being the case, he does not hurt the Egoist, 
 for the most thorough-going Egoist would be quite 
 willing to grant that the phenomena of the uni- 
 
256 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 verse were empirically real and external, if he 
 might nevertheless assert that in a higher trans- 
 cendental sense they were ideal and internal. 
 
 Indeed, if we examine Kant's reasonings, we 
 shall find that they do not oblige the sceptic to 
 ascribe to extended phenomena any externality 
 other than that which he might ascribe to the 
 extended phenomena of a consistent dream. 
 
 Again, Kant labours to prove that our cogni- 
 tion of extended phenomena is " Erfahrung," Ex- 
 perience, not " Einbildung," Imagination; direct- 
 ing his reasoning principally to the demonstration 
 of this point. But, as we have seen, the establish- 
 ment of this point would not affect the Egoist, 
 who is perfectly ready to assert that his cognition 
 of extended phenomena is experience, but maintains 
 that experience is created solely by himself by 
 an occult action of his Ego so that the objects 
 which empirically are non-Egos, transcendentally 
 are his own creations objectified. 
 
 What is really needed for the refutation of the 
 Egoist is to show that phenomena and experience 
 are not produced solely by the Ego, whether act- 
 ing consciously or unconsciously; that a 11011- Ego 
 has some share in their production. And Kant 
 does not make the slightest attempt to prove this 
 point. To do it, would be in fact to prove the 
 existence of Noumena : for a non-Ego, which 
 concurs with the subject or Ego in producing 
 Phenomena, is a Noumenon, if there is any 
 such thing as a Noumenon at all. Evidently 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 257 
 
 therefore, if Kant is to confute Egoism, and to 
 silence, without the aid of Faith, the scepticism 
 which assails the mind in the state of Cartesian 
 doubt, it behoves him to demonstrate the ex- 
 istence of Noumena. But manifestly he cannot 
 do this, unless he makes some assertorical appli- 
 cation of categories to Noumena: the very pro- 
 cedure which over and over again he condemns as 
 illegitimate. 
 
 Mr. Mahaffy appears to think that Kant did 
 not intend to dispute the position of the Egoist, 
 who asserts that phenomena and experience are 
 produced solely by the Ego. According to his 
 view, if I rightly understand it, Kant neither 
 affirmed nor denied the Egoistic doctrine: con- 
 sidering that there was no evidence either for or 
 against it, he refused to dogmatise, like other 
 philosophers, but left the question open.* Agree- 
 
 I gather this as Mr. Mahaffy's view from passages such as the 
 following. "Most philosophers dogmatize and assert a non-Ego 
 as the cause of such sensations. Kant, seeing that there was no 
 evidence whatsoever on either side, quietly says that the question 
 remains here undetermined. His solution of the problem of the 
 Ego and non-Ego is a problematical pluralism, which may not 
 impossibly be a real monism, but upon which we can never hope 
 
 for the smallest additional evidence Thus Kant was neither 
 
 an absolute idealist, nor a realist ; he was a critic. His system 
 
 being empirical, he never meant absolutely to deny any 
 
 world beyond the subject, but only to determine what belonged to 
 the subject and what to the object. Nor did he deny that the sub- 
 ject, by some occult and to us inconceivable action, might produce 
 what is called the object ; but this question he leaves undetermined." 
 Mahaffijs Translation of Fischer's Commentary. Introduction, 
 pp. xliv. xlv. 
 
 S 
 
258 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ably to this view of the matter, Kant's principles 
 would point to the following Egoistic doctrine, 
 which they would allow us to entertain. I (qua 
 Noumenon) am the whole Universe, ro sv xcci ^rav, 
 the Absolute. In virtue of a certain mysterious 
 property, I differentiate myself, I fall asunder 
 into Subject and Object : thus producing the phe- 
 nomenal Ego and the phenomenal non-Ego. In 
 this way I make into empirical non-Egos, en- 
 dowed with empirical reality the various physical 
 objects sun, moon, stars, mountains, &c. and 
 also the various personages who empirically people 
 the stage of my life, my opponents as well as 
 my friends. In the same manner I endow with 
 empirical reality the personages of past history 
 Cesar, Alexander, Hannibal, Moses, David. In 
 the same way I make Christ, and endow him 
 with empirical externality and reality. In like 
 manner I make the devil, whom many of the per- 
 sonages created by me believe to exist, and fear. 
 When I act as a Philistine, I make him ; when 
 I act as an Illuminato, I, if I choose, destroy 
 him. 
 
 " Wenn ich nicht will, so darf kein Tenfel seyn." 
 
 In a similar manner I make God, whom many of 
 the personages created by me believe to exist, 
 and worship ; and if I find it useful to regulate 
 myself according to a Moral- Theologie, I may do 
 the same: regarding him as a governor of the 
 Universe, superior to myself, and giving to this 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 259 
 
 non-Ego a regulative reality. But though em- 
 pirically these various objects are real external 
 things, transcendentally they are objects made by 
 my own treatment of my own vorstellungen, and 
 are internal, in mir ; transcendentally I am that 
 I am, ro sv zat KM, the Absolute.* 
 
 It may well be doubted whether Kant really 
 regarded an Egoistic doctrine of this sort as per- 
 missible : for on many occasions he represents him- 
 self as Endeavouring to combat scepticism ; such, 
 for instance, as the scepticism of Hume ; and he 
 gives us to understand that the doctrine of know- 
 ledge expounded in his work accomplishes this end 
 in a satisfactory manner. He tells us that only by 
 the principles of his Critique " can we cut away 
 the roots of Materialism, Fatalism, Atheism, of 
 freethinking Unbelief, of Fanaticism, and Super- 
 stition causes of mischief to the general public : 
 moreover also those of Idealism and Scepticism, 
 which are more dangerous to the schools, and 
 cannot easily find access to the public." And he 
 declares that, considering these beneficial conse- 
 quences, governments ought to befriend the criti- 
 cal doctrine which he has expounded, rather than 
 that of the schools, f Looking at such state- 
 
 Such a view resembles that expressed in the Oupnek'hat, 
 quoted by Schopenhauer. " Hae omnes creaturse in totum ego sum, 
 et prseter me aliud ens non est." 
 
 f "Er bleibt immer ausschliesslich Depositor einer dem Publi- 
 cum, ohne dessen Wissen, niitzlichen Wissenschaft, namlich der 
 
 Kritik der Vernunft Durch diese kann allein dem Materi- 
 
 alismus, Fatalismus, Atheismus, dem freigeisterischen 
 
260 AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
 
 ments, we may naturally suppose that Kant would 
 not have approved Egoistic monism ; and from 
 other statements we might infer that he did 
 not feel satisfied with the method which Fichte 
 adopted in order to get rid of it ; viz. that of 
 calling in brusquely the aid of Faith. In refer- 
 ence to such a method of proceeding he says : 
 " Even if we looked on Idealism as practically 
 harmless (whereas, in truth, it is far from being 
 so), still it would be a disgrace to philosophy and 
 to human Reason that we should be obliged to 
 
 assume the existence of external things 
 
 solely on the authority of belief : and when any 
 body might choose to call it in question, should 
 not be able to oppose to him a satisfactory demon- 
 stration."* From such language we might natu- 
 
 Unglauben, der Schwarmerei und Aberglauben, die all- 
 gemein schadlich werden konnen, zuletzt auch dem Idealismus 
 und Skepticismus, die mehr den Schulen gefahrlich sind und 
 schwerlich ins Publicum iibergehen konnen, selbst die Wurzel ab- 
 geschnitten werden. Wenn Regierungen sich ja mit Angelegen- 
 heiten der Gelehrten zu befassen gut finden, so wiirde es ihrer 
 weisen Yorsorge fur Wissenschaften sowohl als Menschen weit 
 gemasser sein, die Freiheit einer solchen Kritik zu begiinstigen, 
 wodurch die Vernunftbearbeitungen allein auf einen festen Fuss 
 gebracht werden konnen, als den lacherlichen Despotismus der 
 Schulen zu unterstiitzen, welche liber offentliche Gefalir ein lautes 
 Geschrei erheben, wenn man ihre Spinneweben zerreisst, von 
 denen doch das Publicum niemals Notiz genommen hat und deren 
 Verlust es also auch nie fuhlen kann." Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. 
 Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe, ibid. p. 29. 
 
 " Der Idealismus mag in Ansehung der wesentlichen Zwecke 
 der Metaphysik fiir noch so unschuldig gehalten werden, (das er in 
 der That nicht ist,) so bleibt es immer ein Skandal der Philosophic 
 und allgemeinen Menschenvernunft, das Dasein der Dinge ausser 
 
PRINCIPLES OF KANT AND HAMILTON. 261 
 
 rally infer that he would have considered it a 
 reproach to his system, if it could not get rid 
 of the Egoistic doctrine without calling in the 
 aid of Faith ; and that he wished his refutation 
 of Idealism to be regarded as a discharge of the 
 task which it thus behoved reason and philosophy 
 to perform. 
 
 Certainly, whatever doubt may exist as to 
 Kant's view, there can be none as to that of the 
 ordinary public, for the tranquillising of whose 
 scruples the " Eefutation of Idealism " is generally 
 supposed to have been written. Unquestionably, 
 they would not regard the Egoistic doctrine as 
 permissible ; and if Kant had explained to them 
 that he did so regard it, instead of conceding to 
 him that he had vanquished scepticism, as he 
 claims to have done, they would think that he had 
 capped previous forms of scepticism by one of a 
 peculiarly portentous kind. They would not at 
 all esteem the Moral- Theologie, if once it were ex- 
 plained that the God discoursed of in this might 
 be a mere creation of Kant's faculties. Nor, 
 under the circumstances supposed, would they in 
 the slightest degree value the so-called " Refuta- 
 tion of Idealism." If Kant had explained to them 
 that the reality and externality spoken of in this 
 were merely phenomenal, and that it was not in- 
 
 uns, (von denen wir dock den ganzen Stoff zu Erkenntnissen selbst 
 f iir unseren inneren Sinn her haben,) bios auf Glauben anneh- 
 men zu miissen, und, wenn es Jemand einf allt es zu bezweifeln, ihm 
 keinen genugthuenden Beweis entgegen stellen zu konnen." Ibid. 
 Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe, ibid. p. 32. 
 
262 AN EXAMINATION, ETC. 
 
 , tended to refute transcendental Idealism, or trans- 
 cendental Egoism, such as above explained, they 
 would unanimously say : " In that case your Refu- 
 tation is quite useless, so far as we are concerned, 
 and does not remove in the slightest degree the 
 objections which we entertain against your doc- 
 trine." 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 
 
 BUTLER'S doctrine has been a subject of comment 
 in a recent article in the Saturday Review, in 
 which the writer expresses a good deal of dis- 
 satisfaction with it. And this sentiment appears 
 to be shared by a numerous party connected with 
 Oxford, who no longer regard Butler's reasonings 
 as conclusive or triumphant. This feeling has found 
 utterance in many ways. Thus Mr. Goldwin Smith 
 speaks of the Analogy as a greatly overrated work ; 
 while Mr. Maurice expresses an opinion that " the 
 religion of hoops and ruffles" exercised a depress- 
 ing influence on Butler's powers, and marred the 
 value of his labours. 
 
 The writer of the article in the Saturday Review 
 complains that Butler, instead of defending the doc- 
 trine of Vicarious Punishment as usually taught, 
 has substituted another doctrine in its place. Ac- 
 cording to the doctrine usually taught, there is a 
 real transfer of penalty from one person A, to 
 another person B. An offence having been com- 
 mitted by A, the penalty due to that offence is 
 
264 ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 
 
 inflicted on B, A being thereby relieved from the 
 penalty; and it is declared that this transfer of 
 penalty satisfies the claims of Law or Justice, 
 which requires that guilty acts should be punished, 
 but does not require that the punishment should 
 be inflicted on the guilty agent in propria persona. 
 This is the principle of vicarious punishment pro- 
 perly so called; that which, as we are assured, is 
 recognised by the Chinese, and extensively used 
 in their administration of justice. 
 
 Butler undertakes to show that Vicarious 
 Punishment, though objected to by philosophers 
 as irrational and unjust, is actually found to be 
 largely employed in the observed course of Nature. 
 To make out this, he shows (as it is exceedingly 
 easy to do) that in the observed course of Nature, 
 the wrong- doing of one man frequently entails evil 
 consequences to other persons; but he does not in 
 the slightest degree make out. that the sufferings 
 endured by these persons are a substitute for the 
 penalty due to the wrong-doer that they relieve 
 him from any part of the punishment which his 
 offences deserve. 
 
 Again, Butler devotes a good deal of labour 
 to show that in the ordinary course of Nature the 
 , sufferings of one person may produce consequences 
 very beneficial to other persons. Eationalists do 
 not in the least deny this. They fully admit that 
 in the ordinary course of Nature the sufferings of 
 self-sacrificing persons produce beneficial results 
 to other persons: that the sufferings of heroes, 
 
ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 265 
 
 saints, and martyrs, frequently produce results 
 which benefit a large portion of mankind ; and 
 that the death and sufferings of Christ did this in 
 an eminent degree. But while freely admitting 
 this, they do not admit that in such cases there is 
 a transfer of penalty from the guilty to the inno- 
 cent, whereby the requirements of justice, human 
 or divine, are satisfied, and the guilty relieved 
 from the penalties which their conduct deserves. 
 
 In order to show that the cases insisted on by 
 Butler are not really cases of vicarious punishment, 
 the Reviewer instances the example of the drunk- 
 ard, observing : " The debauched father transmits 
 a scrofulous constitution to his innocent son ; but 
 he pays the penalties of his own debauchery in 
 his own person equally whether he has a son or 
 not. His son's sufferings put him in no better 
 position than he would be in if his son did not 
 suffer : they usually put him in a worse position." 
 
 Indeed it is evident that if there are two 
 drunkards, one of whom, having no family, dam- 
 ages only himself, while the other causes ruin 
 to a large family of children, the reproaches of 
 conscience and the blame of mankind would, 
 ca?teris paribus, fall more severely on the latter 
 than on the former. Whereas if the case were 
 one of vicarious punishment, properly so called, 
 provided the latter drunkard caused an amount 
 of suffering to his children, equal to that which 
 the former one caused to himself, the claims of 
 justice would be discharged, and the drunkard 
 
266 ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 
 
 might equitably be relieved from all personal suf- 
 fering. Advocates of the doctrine of Vicarious 
 Punishment, such as the Chinese, might perhaps 
 be willing to entertain this view of the case, but 
 unquestionably Rationalists would not do so. 
 
 Among the most obvious cases in which the 
 evil qualities of one man produce suffering to 
 others, is that of bad governors, compendiously 
 described in the proverb, "Delirant reges, plec- 
 tuntur Achivi." At first sight this looks like an 
 enunciation of the principle of Vicarious Punish- 
 ment. But Rationalists do not believe that the 
 sufferings of the "Achivi" have for their effect to 
 relieve the "reges" from the penalties which they 
 deserve. Suppose there are two Caligulas or 
 Neros, equally evil in their intrinsic nature, one 
 of whom is placed in a position where he can do 
 little harm to his fellows, while the other ascends 
 a throne, and causes a great amount of suffering. 
 Rationalists do not believe that the latter will be 
 punished by the Divine Justice less than the for- 
 mer. And holding such a view, they do not re- 
 gard the suffering caused by the despot as a case 
 of vicarious punishment, i. e. as a punishment which 
 is endured by some person vice the person by 
 whom it was merited. 
 
 Nor, again, do Rationalists believe that in such 
 cases the innocence of the sufferers would avail to 
 produce the effect in question, viz. that of reliev- 
 ing the guilty person who caused the suffering 
 from the penalty deserved by him. For instance, 
 
ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 267 
 
 they do not think that the comparative innocence 
 of the children tortured and put to death by Gilles 
 de Laval, the Marechal de Retz, was a circum- 
 stance tending to lessen the penalties allotted to 
 him by the Divine Justice. Even if the children 
 murdered by him had been recently baptised, and 
 had committed no post-baptismal sin, they do not 
 think that this circumstance would have operated 
 in his favour, as causing transfer of penalty from 
 him to his victims, and removing or mitigating the 
 punishment which he himself would receive. 
 
 Let us take another instance. Two murders 
 are committed : in the one case no person is con- 
 victed and no punishment inflicted ; in the other, 
 an innocent person is erroneously believed to have 
 committed the murder, is sentenced as guilty, and 
 hung. Rationalists do not believe that the perpe- 
 trator of the first murder will be punished in the 
 next world more severely than that of the second, 
 because nobody has been hung on account of his 
 deed. Consequently, the suffering inflicted on the 
 innocent person who is hung is not regarded by 
 them as a vicarious or substitutive punishment, i. e. 
 as taking effect in lieu of that deserved by the 
 murderer as satisfying the claims of justice, or 
 the majesty of law as relieving the murderer 
 from any of the penalty due to his crime. 
 
 Entertaining such views, Rationalists do not 
 regard Butler as making out any case from obser- 
 vation or experience in favour of the doctrine which 
 they condemn. He shows that in the observed 
 
268 ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 
 
 course of nature, the acts of men produce far- 
 reaching consequences, affecting many persons, 
 whether for good or evil a fact which they do 
 not dream of denying ; but he does not hereby 
 succeed in establishing the doctrine of Vicarious 
 Punishment, which affirms that the penalty of guilt 
 is transferable, that the demands of Justice may 
 be satisfied by inflicting it on an innocent sub- 
 stitute, and not inflicting it on the guilty person. 
 
 Indeed, instead of attempting to make out this 
 point, Butler, as we have previously seen, advances 
 a principle which utterly forbids us to entertain 
 the doctrine in question : asserting that God is 
 bound to treat every one on the whole according 
 to his personal deserts. If we admit this principle, 
 we cannot accept the doctrine of Vicarious or Sub- 
 stitutive Punishment, so generally taught as ortho- 
 dox, the gist of which lies in denying the principle 
 thus asserted by Butler : in maintaining that God 
 treats a certain favoured class, viz. orthodox be- 
 lievers, vastly better than they deserve, inflicting 
 the penalties of their guilt on Christ, and thus 
 satisfying the demands of the Law. Moreover, if 
 we accept the principle enounced by Butler, we 
 must regard the everlasting bliss enjoyed by that 
 portion of mankind who are saved, not as a free 
 gift wholly undeserved by them, but as a just 
 reward, appropriate to their personal goodness and 
 merits. Thus Butler's principles strike at the very 
 root of the whole doctrine concerning the Scheme 
 of Redemption and Salvation so largely taught as 
 
ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLEK. 
 
 orthodox, with all its accompanying doctrines con- 
 cerning Expiation, Substitutive Punishment, Free 
 Grace, Predestination, and Election. Under such 
 circumstances, it is scarcely possible to deny the 
 opinion of those who allege that whatever may be 
 the intrinsic or philosophical merits of the scheme 
 contemplated by Butler, it has not that of being 
 in conformity with the old doctrine that com- 
 monly called orthodox. 
 
 Had Butler clearly explained his own peculiar 
 view, and brought into prominent notice the im- 
 portant principles in which he concurs with the 
 Eationalists, it is probable that, instead of being 
 generally regarded as a pillar of orthodoxy, he 
 would have been very generally censured, as Ea- 
 tionalising, Pelagianising, unsound. But his most 
 important principles are enounced quite cursorily, 
 their necessary consequences are not pointed out, 
 and the outlines of the general scheme suggested 
 are not filled up. In a large portion of his work 
 he has the air of reasoning in favour of the ordi- 
 nary orthodox theology, and as there is a good 
 deal of obscurity in his style, most readers fail to 
 perceive that all the while the principles stated by 
 him are quite in opposition to this. In much of 
 his reasoning he appears to proceed on the princi- 
 ples advocated by Mr. Mansel, according to which 
 Moral Truth is merely relative, and Reason is riot 
 competent to sit in judgment on statements con- 
 cerning the moral nature and attributes of God. 
 So strong is this appearance, that Mr. Mansel, 
 
270 ON THE TEACHING OF BUTLER. 
 
 without any hesitation or misgiving, claims him 
 as advocating the Theory taught in his B amp ton 
 Lectures, concerning the Divine Morality ; under- 
 standing him as seeking to establish this by an 
 appeal to the observed course of Nature. 
 
 Under such circumstances it is not surprising 
 that Butler's work, which long enjoyed such high 
 authority, should fail to satisfy inquiring minds 
 of the present day, when philosophical specula- 
 tion is more active. Nor can we wonder that 
 persons who greatly admire his moral and intellec- 
 tual qualities should regard his achievement with 
 disappointment, and should deem that but for the 
 fetters of some unfavourable influences he would 
 have produced a far more homogeneous and power- 
 ful result. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 EOBSON AND SON, GKEAT NGRTHEEN FEINTING WOEKS, 
 PANCRAS ROAD, N.W. 
 
NOTE, p. 70. 
 
 I find that the reference to the Scotch Confession, which I 
 had attributed to Hamilton, is not apparently made by Hamil- 
 ton, but by his Editor, who is quoting Dugald Stewart. It 
 appears also that the Confession quoted is not the Confession 
 more properly called Scotch, but the Westminster Confession. 
 The remarks made by Hamilton in the text concerning the 
 Calvinistic teaching seem to show that Hamilton concurred 
 with Dugald Stewart and the Scotch Church in approving the 
 doctrine set forth in the Westminster Confession. 
 
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