rAMj,,,,:;.,-.' UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA Forty Years of German- American Political Relations ^ 6}!.^^ JEANNETTE KEIM A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PHILADELPHIA PRINTED BY WILLIAM J. DORNAN 1919 COPYKIGHT iJEANNETTE KEIM 1919 EXCHANGE PREFACE The study covered by this thesis was begun in the autumn of 1916 and was undertaken for the purpose of discovering the general character of tlie relationship between the United States and Ger- many after both nations had become world powers, but before events occurred leading immediately to the great war.; Covering so long a period, I have confined my study fairly closely to the field of government publications and to autobiography. The nature of the subject, the recent character of the material and the conditions of the times have prevented access to the manuscript archives of either government. Therefore the only unpublished materials available were the very interesting Bancroft and Davis manuscripts dealing with the 1870 period. I have found, however, such an abundance of material in the published sources mentioned, that I feel justified in tracing from it the following conclusions: First : The general relationship between the two countries shows tjiree main periods of development: There was the earh' period, comprising approximately the first decade after the founding of the Empire, in which the relations were spontaneously cordial. This was followed by a period of friction developed partly by the increasing economic rivah-y of the two countries, but mostly by the development in Germany of an aggressive expansion system, and characterized by an indifi'erence on the part of the German Government toward the eft'ect of that policy upon the Unitefl States. The t hird peri od, comprising the decade following the Spanish-American war, shows a status again of generally good relations, created in part by the solution of certain outstanding controversies and in part by the deliberate policy of the German Government to cultivate in the interests of the empire the friend- ship of the United States. The ex^aiisimi— policy ])rogressed steadily, but it took into account the factor of the United States. IV PREFACE Second: The commercial controversies between the two coun- tries centered chiefly in their contrasting interpretations of the "most-favored-nation" principle as expressed in the Prussian Treaty of 1S2S. The United States correctly maintained that the treaty sti})ulated clearly for a basis of reciprocity, and the American Government acted uniformly upon this principle thi*oughout the negotiations. Germany, ignoring the equivalence clause of the treaty, incorrectly claimed unconditional " most -favored-nation " treatment and did not itself throughout this period act uniformly upon that ])rinciple. The German Government, however, ulti- mately adopted the interpretation of the United States. Third: The policies^of the two countries toward the natives of the lands of theif'commercial enterprise were in contrast. Tliis was shown in the several distant spheres in which the German and American commercial interests came in contact with each other, particularly in Samoa, in China, and in Venezuela. The German Government asserted German interests in these spheres, with some deference to the policy of other great powers, but with little or no concern for the rights or independence of the natives "oi"of tile politically weak goveriunents rightfully sovereign there. The Unijed States, on the other hand, whether working for the inde- pendence of the Samoans, for the integrity of China or for the prevention of forcible measures against Venezuela, threw its influence constantly in defense of native peoples, their rights to self-government and to undisputed possession of their territory. IMaterial for this thesis has been found in the libraries of the University of Pennsylvania, in the Public Library of Xew York City and in the Library of Congress in Washington. I am indebted to Mr. Paulsitz, of the maiuiscript division of the Xew York Library, and to the statf of the manuscript division of the Library of Congress for their interest and assistance in my work. I am especially indebted to Miss Helen S. Crowne, Miss Anna W. Hill, Miss Nellie C. Smith and others of the library staff of the Uni- versitx' of Pennsylvania for their generous help throughout my three years' work at the I'niversity. I wish, finally, to express to ^liss Julia Uussell my grateful ai)preciation of her cordial and efficient co(')])erati()n as my secretary. CONTENTS Preface iii ^ CHAPTER I \ Relations between' the United States and Germany, 1S70 . . 7 V CHAPTER II ATreatv Relationship 3G CHAPTER III -^American Citizens of German Birth— Their Rights in Germany . 51 CHAPTER IV ^COMAIERCIAL RELATIONS 64 CHAPTER V Samoa: The United States and Germany in the Pacific . . . 112 CHAPTER VI The Spanish-American War 216 CHAPTER VII Germany and the Open Door in China 244 CHAPTER VIII Germany and the Monroe Doctrine 273 Bibliography ... ;i05 Appendix . . 319 ABBREVIATIONS A. & P. Accounts and Papers (British State Papers). F. R. Foreign Relations of the United States (U. S. diplomatic correspondence with foreign countries). V. R. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. R. Gbl. Reichs-Gesetzblatt. M. INIalloy's "Treaties, Conventions, etc." Sen. Ex. Doc. Senate Executive; Documents. House Ex. Doc. House Executive Documents. Sen. Misc. Doc. Senate Miscellaneous Documents. House Misc. Doc. House Miscellaneous Documents. Sen. Rep. Senate Reports. House Rep. House Reports. R. L. S. Robert Louis Stevenson: "A footnote to history," etc. For description of the above works and other sources used see Bibliography. FORTY YEARS OF GERMAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL RELATIONS CHAPTER I RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERIMANY, 1870 The newly created German Empire received a cordial welcome from the United States. Many f actor s combined to create in the American Republic a feeling of warm sympathy for the German people (vho had just fought a successful war against a monarch imiJopular in the United States,; and who were now uniting, like tliose states, into a federal union.'^^his sympathy had a natural basis in the large and steadily increasing population of German extraction in the United States,^ and in the personal and political intercourse between the two countries which this engendered. There was also present the reminiscence of the recent American Civil War, during which Prussia, the leading state in the new German nation, had been one of the few friends of the Union cause in Europe, wdiereas the most hostile of European powers during the American crisis was in 1870 the foe of Germany. Such forces, making for friendly relationship, were increased in their effect by the pronounced sympathies of the American minister to Germany for the country of his residence and his earnest personal desire to see cultivated a close friendship between the new empire and the United States. The American friendliness for Germany was l)roug]it out during the Franco-Prussian war. In spite of the careful neutral stand taken by the go^'ernment, there was, at the i->eginning of the conflict at least, much unconcealed satisfaction over the successes of the German armies. Mr. Davis, Assistant Secretary ' Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part 2, p. 956, 41st Congress, 3cl Session. Senator Sumner reported Bismarck as declariiifi that — "Germany had in the United States her second largest state after Prussia." 8 ;!R'Ei,A,Tigtl4s^^ETVKEN' UNITED STATES AXD GERMAXY, 1870 of State records in his Journal- an incident of a meeting of the Cabinet during the early days of the war: "While we were talking, " he writes, " news was brought in from the Associated Press that Weissenbruch had been captured by the Prussians after a bloody fight. The defeat of the French did not seem to make anyone less cheerful." During the same Cabinet meeting President Grant conversed with the Assistant Secretary on the relations of the United States to the belligerents. He instructed Mr. Davis to inform IMr. Berthemy, the French ^Minister, when the opportunity offered, "That it was the intention of the United States Government to preserve a strict neutrality in the war, but that he must not be surprised if a strong feeling manifested itself among the people in favor of the Prussians; that the people had good memories, and they remembered that while the Germans sympathized with the Union and took its bonds freely during the war the French people had manifested no sympathy for the Union but had nego- tiated a loan for the Rebels, and the French Government had sent an expedition into ]\Iexico which had been construed by the people as an act hostile to this country." That the President's predictions were verified was attested by ]\Ir. John ■\I. Read, an American consular official in Paris, who wrote'' that there was a very strong prejudice in that country against Americans on account of the sympathy shown by the people of the United States for Germany. The French Minister, I\I. Berthemy, analyzed^ 2 J. C. B. Davis, Journal, 1870-71 (August 5, 1870). ' J. C. B. Davis Mss. 37 AvExuE Austin, Paris, August 16, 1870. John ^Ieredith Read to Davis: ". . . Since the war was declared I have been charged with the consular affairs of the North German Confederation throughout France and as the representative in this particular of the '"Prussians" I am not looked upon with favor by the masses of the French. There is a very strong preju- dice against all Americans on account of the sympathy shown by the people of the United States for Germany, and when one adds to this the offense of representing in any respect the ''Prussians" it does not add to one's safety." * J. C. B. Davis, Journal, September 6, 1870. Also Congressional Globe, 42d Congress, 2d Session, Part 2, 1871-72, p. 1069. X AMKHU'AX SYMPATHIES DITUINCJ FHANCO-PUUSSIAN VVAH 9 the American stMitinient as divided along party lines, the Demo- crats favoring the French and the Republicans symjiathizing witii Germany. The Assistant Secretary of State replied to him that he had not himself been aware of such a division; that it was his ])rivate opinion, however, that the American sentiment was personal to the Emperor and his dynasty and not against France or the French people. The French Minister could not wonder that there should be in the United States such a feeling against the Emperor and his government because of their policy during the recent American war, when they gave aid to the Rebels by permitting loans in Paris to the Confederacy, and in addition to this, attempted to establish a monarchy on the southern border of the United States. The political division mentioned by the French ]Minister was also voiced in Congress, Senator Morton, of Indiana, declaring it to be a notorious fact that the sympathy of the Republican party, as a general thing, was in favor of Ger- many and against France, and equally notorious that the sympathy of the Democratic party was for France and against Germany. Among the reasons for this, he stated, were the liberal sentiments of the Germans, which accorded with the principles of the Repub- lican party. There was also the feeling that Louis Napoleon, a/ usurper, had overturned a republic and had declared war against Germany without adequate and proper cause. ' Sentiments toward the two warring countries found expression in a Senate discussion^ over the sending of a relief ship to Europe. The joint resolution provided that a naval vessel be authorized to carry to Europe "such supplies as may be furnished by the people of the United States for the destitute and suffering i)eoi)le of France and Germany." This resolution being introduced in February, 1871, after the German armies had overrun France, one of the Senators, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, declared that he did not consider that the Germans were in need of any supplies from the United States, and moved to strike out the words "and 5 Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part 2, p. 954 ff, 41st Congress, 3d Session, February 4, 1871. 10 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANTT, 1870 Germany." This motion called forth prompt opposition and led to a discussion of the comparative relations of the United States to the two belligerents. Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, declared that though the French were the ancient allies of the United States, the Germans were the modern allies, had helped to recruit the northern armies with men and had saved the life of the nation. Senator Morton, of Indiana, stated that this war was inaugurated and brought on by France — that he could s\Tapathize, however, with the suffering of the French people, who were in no way responsible for it. ]\Ir. Fowler, of Tennessee, took a different stand. He said he failed to see any evidence that Germany had ever been an ally of the United States or that the country had received any particular assistance from Germany' during the late war, and that since the German Government's raid on the people of France after the battle of Sedan he had personally no sympathy with it. Senator Stewart, of Nevada, reminded him that Germany alone had taken five or six hundred million dollars of United States bonds when the country was most in need of credit and when those bonds were debarred from the exchange in London and from the Bourse in Paris. The Senator from Ten- nessee replied that that fact only showed that the Germans had made a good business investment, that, moreover, he had never seen any effort on the part of the Germans to establish free and independent governments, but that they had shown a concen- tration of despotic power, while the French people were the freest on the continent and had been constantly struggling for free institutions. At this juncture Senator Schurz, of IMissouri, rose to the defense of the land of his birth and declared that he did not think there were any governments on the face of the globe who expressed their sympathy with the cause of the I'nion as straightforwardly and emphatically as the Government of Prussia and the German governments generally, and it was the same with the German people. Moreover, in the matter of the United States bonds, these were taken by Germany when the issue of the war was by no means decided; it was a dangerous venture, but they embarked on it because they believed in the PRO-GEU.MAN SYMI'ATIIIKS OF BANCROFT 11 Rc'l)iil)lic' of the United States, had faith in the ^nvat destinies of the country, and because tlieir sympathies impelled them to risk their interests with the fortunes of the American Government. In conclusion of the discussion, Senator Sumner, of Massachusetts, acknowledged the equal debt of the United States to both nations. After re\iewino; the services of France at the time of the Revo- lution and the j^ermanent obligation arising from it, he con- tinued: "But is our obligation to Germany less? I cannot forget that this great country, fertile in men as in thought, has contributed to ours a population numerous and enlightened, by which the Republic has been strengthened and our civilization elevated. France contributed to national independence, Germany to national strength and life. How shall I undertake to determine the difference between these two obligations? We owe infinitely to France, we owe infiniteh^ to Germany." The discussion gave no evidence of a division of sentiment on / political lines, all the speakers being Republican, but was in general illustrative of the prevailing friendly feeling toward tl>e ' German nation at this time. ^ An extreme exponent of this attitude was Mr. George Bancroft, American INIinister to the North German Union and subsequently accredited to the German Empire. His dispatches to Mr. Hamil- ton Fish, Secretary of State, and to his own nephew, Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, then Assistant Secretary of State, are filled with sympathy for the German cause in the war, with admiration for German character and institutions and with unaffected effort to promote a very close political relationship between the new Empire and the United States. He consiflered the war throughout to be one of "aggression" and "without a cause"" on the part of France, and one of self-defense on the part of Germany. When, after the series of Prussian victories, which he terms "magnificent," the . 8 J. C. B. Davis Mss., Bancroft to Davis, Berlin, September 5, 1870. Also Bancroft Mss., No. 136, Berlin, Septemher 21, 1870. See also in J. C. B. Davis's Mss. a letter from Henry W. Ryder, American Consul at Chem- nitz, to Davis, August 30, 1870. 12 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GEmiANY, 1S70 demands against France were presented by Bismarck, Bancroft^ reported that these demands were considered throughout neutral 'Bancroft Mss., No. 136. American Legation, Berlin, September 21, 1870. Sir: I am able to report to you on the best authority the views which are entertained by the aUied German governments in relation to the conditions of peace to be established between themselves and France. The pledges for peace contained in the Plebiscite so lately adopted in France have not been made good. Events have shown that excitabiUty of the disposition of the French nation. The majority of the French Chamber, the Senate, and the organs of public opinion through the press have demanded a war of conquest against Germany so loudly that the isolated friends of peace lost all courage to oppose, and the Emperor may have thought himself justified in asserting that he had been forced into the war by public opinion. In view of these facts the German allied governments cannot find a guaran- tee of peace in the disposition of the French people. They must not therefore deceive themselves into the belief that there is no reason to expect after this peace a speedy renewal of attack. Whatever may be the conditions which may be demanded from France, the French nation will never forgive the series of defeats which have attended their present war of aggression. Even though the Germans were to demand no cession of territory, no indemnity, no advantage except the glory of their arms, there would remain the wounded self-love of the French people and their hereditary desire of conquests, and they would only wait for a day when they might hope to renew the war with better success. The forbearance of the German Governments in 1867 was due to their desire not to conjure up an era of bitterness and angrj^ passions, but by patience and the careful culture of friendly relations between the two nations to lay the foundations of an era of peace and reciprocal good-will. As this moderation failed of its effect, and as the Germans against all their efforts have been comjwUed to encounter a war of aggression, they regard it hence- forward as necessary to look for some securities against the next attack other than can be found in the good-will of France. The guarantees which were established in 1815 against the same ambition of the French people have lost their effect and Germany must now rely on its own strength and its own resources. The Germans ought not to be continually exposed to the necessity of again making the same exertions which they have done at this time, and material securities are therefore needed for their own protection and for the preservation of the peace of Europe. These securities are to be demanded not from any transient government of France but from the French nation, which has shown itself ready, as the history of past centuries proves, to follow any government into war and under any government to seek acquisi- tions of territory from Germany. In order therefore to establish peace, securities must be obtained against the next imminent attack from France and that can be found only in the change of the present defenseless boundary of South Germany, so that the point from which future attacks may emanate maj' be more remote and the fortresses with which France has hitherto threat- ened Ciermany may so far be brought into the power of Germany as to con- stitute hereafter defensive bulwarks against invasion. The views which I have here detailed to you I know to be those which are entertained in the cabinets of the German jirinces. They also exist in all but irresistible strength in the mind of the German people. I will add but one remark of my own: A true guarantee for Germany against future attacks from France would be the political union of Germany itself, and the most earnest negotiations are now pending between N. Ger- Bancroft's views on German terms 13 Europe to be "moderate" iiiul to be necessary securities afi;aiust the "next imminent attack from France." Should Germany retire from France, he wrote,^ leaving boundaries as they were, France would soon renew the battle for the Rhine, and as the ■ __/ man}' on the one side, and S. Germany, especially Wurteml)urg and Bavaria, on the other, for the accomplishment of that object. Germany, being united, will have nothing to fear from France on the one side, or Russia on the other. Bancroft Mss., No. 145. American Legation, Berlin, September 29, 1870. Sir: On the 24th of this month I sent j'ou the following telegram: Fish, Secretary, Washington, District Columbia, "Bismarck offered Favre truce. Conditions: Convention to he called; Germany to hold Strasburg, Verdun, Toul. Yesterday Favre rejected offer. B.ANCROFT." "The account conveyed in the telegram is authentic. In the opinion of Europe the terms offered were moderate. The statement that the Germans demanded Mount Valerien is a misrepresentation. Now, the fall of Toul has been followed by the momentous event of the surrender of Strasburg just 189 3'ears after the daj' on which it was seized by Louis XIV. Seventy thousand troops are thus set free to invade southwestern France; the left wing to touch Lyons. The effects of the surrender on the war are immense. I cannot represent to you strongly enough the fixedness of the purpose of Germany to retain Strasburg and with it Alsace as a part of Germany. All Germany demands it from a patriotic national feeling, S. Germany as a necessary defense. The acquisition of this territory proves the strongest incentive to the S. Germans to form themselves into one empire ^Aith the N. Germans, for Alsace is the bulwark of S. western Germany and the trans- rhinane possessions of Bavaria leave her no option but to overcome her jealousy of Prussia and assist in forming a united Germany. . . ." 8 J. C. B. Davis Mss., Bancroft to Davis. Berlin, October 12, 1870. ( _.) "This government disclaims utterly any desire for territory as such, and wishes for no acquisition for Prussia; the change of boundary is the demand of the military as a line of defense. Were Germany to retire from France now, leaving boundaries and fortresses as they were, France would soon renew the battle for the Rhine. The day will inevital)ly come when Belgium will be annexed to France, and then the German-Rhenish provinces would be exposed to the most imminent danger. To guard against it, CJermany demands Strasburg, a demand which is now in Europe not censured as extrava- gant; Germany demands also ]\Ietz, and on that the European mind is more divided. These demands are made primarily in the interests oi South Ger- mam% whose princes formerly constituted the Rheinlnind of Napoleon, and have held their lands on sufferance. France holding Straslnirg could at any time march to Munich. This sense of danger is contnjlling, and j'ou may set it down as fixed and resolved upon to hold at the peace both Metz and Strasburg. On the right of demand I give no opinion; h\it peace depends on its being compUed with." 14 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 day would come when Belgium would be annexed to France, the German Rhenish province would be exposed to imminent danger. To prevent this Germany was demanding Strasburg, and this demand was not censured in Europe as extravagant. ^Yith regard to the demand for ]\Ietz, opinion was divided, and while not expressing his own opinion on the right of this demand, the" minister asserted that peace depended on its being complied with. "Finally," he wrote, "I will not withhold my opinion that the German armies are now engaged in a war not only for the peace, independence and union of Germany, but also for the best inter- ests of civilization, of civil and religious liberty and of popular freedom." ^ Holding such a viewpoint toward the two belligerents, it is not surprising to find the American minister hoping for some evidence of similar feelings on the part of his home government. In Sep- tember, 1870, ]Mr. Bancroft^" wrote in confidence to his nephew, Mr. Davis, that he had been hoping to see from ]Mr. Fish "some good strong word expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so injurious to commerce and without a cause," or if this could not ^ Bancroft Mss., No. 121 (to Secretary of State Fish). '" J. C. B. Davis Mss., Geo. Bancroft to Davis. (Secret and confidential.) " Dear John: I have been hoping to see from Mr. Fish some good strong word, not violating neutrahty, but perhaps expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so injurious to commerce without a cause, and if that cannot be, then what all Europe and all neutral governments would respond to, an energetic remonstrance against the needless cruelties exercised toward the Germans domiciled in France, a most numerous, a most industrious, wealthy, orderly, peace-loving, cultivated people. A good letter expressing sympathy with the Germans would have a most important effect and perhaps in our elections carry them in November. I am certain it is best, i. e., right in itself and politic for the Government, in some way to mark strongly a sympathy with the Germans. Another consideration not so free from doubt presents itself. The neutral European powers will, when the negotiations for peace begin, attempt to exercise a prcs:^ure adverse to the Germans. The question arises whether we could, and if we can, whether we should, exercise a counter-jM'essure, so as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively by the two nationalities, German and French, without meddlesome intervention from powers that like ourselves profess neutraUty. I do not presume to offer an opinion on this subject, only to call attention to an aspect of the negotiations which is very likely to arise. I am ever affectionately yours, Geo. B.\ncroft." EKFOKTS Tt) fSEC'lKI-: ACTION' IN KAVOH OF CiEHMANY 15 be, then at least "an energetic remonstrance against the needless cruelties toward the Germans domiciled in I^'rance." Such a letter expressing sympathy with these Germans would, he declared, have an important effect and perhaps carry the home elections in November. He considered it both right in itself and politic for the United States Government " in some way to mark strongly a sym])ath\- with the Germans." IMoreover, in regard to the future, he hoi)c(l that if the neutral European powers should attempt to exercise tluring the peace negotiations " a pressure adverse to the Germans," that the United States would "exercise a counter- pressure, so as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively by the two nationalities, German and French." In reply the Assistant Secretary summed up^^ the general attitude " J. C. B. Davis INIss (to Bancroft, reply to September 5 letter from B.)- Washington, September 23, 1870. "My Dear Uncle: ( ) 1 don't see how Mr. Fish could have well done more than he did do toi manifest ovir individual symi)athy for the German cause in this war. There' was throughout the country a deep-seated feeling in their favor until it was believed they showed a determination to prolong the war for the sake of acquiring territory inhabited by a population that does not wish to come under their sway. When the public got this idea, which may or may not have been correct, they ceased to feel the intense sympathy which they had previously exhibited, and an attempt by the administration to interfere in any way in their favor, or to swerve from a rigid neutrality, would have been resented by the good sense of America. We have not received here any evidence of needless cruelties toward the Germans in the execution of the decree of expulsion. Washl)urne has made no complaint. The decree itself may have been harsh and uncalled for, but it seems to have been a military measure, entirely within the discretion of the French military authorities. Sherman did the same thing at Atlanta — so that we are the last i)eoi)le who could comi)lain of the principle. There has been a studied and persistent pressure from the German Legation since the beginning of the war to force us into an attitude toward France inconsistent with our neutrality. Baron Gerolt has spared no effort to entrap me into imi)r()]ier positions. He tried to make me protest against the expul- sion (jf the Germans. What right had we to jn-otest in an affair which did not concern us until we were asked by the North German government to be their mouthpiece — which they have never done. He grew angry when I told him of open violations of the neutrality laws by his consul in New York, and refu.sed at first to take any warning. And he had several times pressed similar questions ujjon me in a way that has ol)liged me t(} be almost harsh with the old gentleman. What he has done to Air. Fish I cannot say. In sjjite of all this, we have always construed, and without giving France cause of offense, that the symj)athies of the Administration arc with Germany. I think 1 may safely say that the whole country is satisfietl with the course Mr. Fish has pursued in this matter. As to intervention on our part, I do not think that it will take place without the previous consent of l)()th jiarties — nor will it take place then by any prospect if it is to be done jointh' with other powers." 2 16 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 of the i\merican people and the administration toward Germany. He stated that there was a deep-seated feehng throughout the country in favor of the Germans until they sought to prolong the war, in order to acquire territory inhabitated by a people who did not wish to come under their rule,^- after the American public had received the impression that this was being done, there was less sympathy for Germany, and " an attempt by the administration to interfere in any way" in favor of the Germans or "to swerve from a rigid neutrality would have been resented by the good sense of America." IVIr. Davis set forth the difficulties encountered in maintaining that rigid neutrality. Baron Gerolt, the German Minister, he wrote, spared no effort to entrap him into improper positions, seeking to have the Government protest against the expulsion of German civilians from France. While that expulsion decree may have been harsh and uncalled for, it seemed to him to be a military measure within the discretion of the French military authorities. Moreover, he had had to complain to the German minister of the open violation of the American neutrality law by the German consul in New York, who had been assisting German officers to return to the army.'"* In spite of such actions he had 12 J. C. B. Davis Journal, August 29, 1870. " Baron Gerolt said he had called in consequence of information received through the Associated Press that England, Russia and Austria intended intervening in the war to make peace, to ask what would be the public feehng in the country in regard to such an intervention — that those powers natur- ally looked with jealousy on the increase of German influence and power and would oppose an increase of territory. He added that he was induced to make the request because I had told him at my house that the people of this country would not look favorably on the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine. I replied that what I had said to him I had said privately as one gentleman to another in my own house; and that I had no objection to repeat in the same way that it was my individual opinion that the demand of territory would prolong the war and in that way would not be favorably regarded by the people of the Ihiited States — but that ofhcially 1 had only to say to him that while the United States do not permit European intervention in the affairs of their continent, they did not on the other hand intervene in European affairs." "J. C. B. Davis Mss., 1870-71. AuGXLST 1, 1870. "The Baron responded at once to my note. I told him that I had taken the liberty to ask him to call at the Department because I had seen in the newspajiers and heard otherwise that Mr. Roessing, the North German CAREFUL NEUTRALITY OK AMERICAN COVERNMENT 17 always construed, " and without giving France cause of offense, that the sympathies of the administration were with Germany." In reference to intervention, Mr. Davis asserted that such would iiardly take place without the consent of both belligerents, and not at all if it required joint action with other powers. The claims of the German ]Minister and of Bancroft that the United States should issue a protest against the expulsion of German civilians from France were based on the function, which had been assumed by the xA.merican Government, of acting as protector in France of all citizens of the North German Union. ^^ This immense work was in the hands of "Sir. E. B. Washburne, United States Ambassador to Parish In addition to other services, he distribufed among needy Germans the funds forwarded to him Consul at New York, was receiving persons at the consulate and furnishing them with the means of returning to Germany to take part in the war, and that I thought it due tn the Baron as a friendly act, to say that if that was so he had lietter he cautioned, as this Government intended to preserve and enforce its neutrality in this contest. The Baron answered quite testily, that Mr. Roessing had done nothing to violate our laws — that over 600 people had applied to him for means to go hack, but that he had refused all except persons who had left Germany under written obligations to return in case of war and serve out their term in the army — that there were a dozen or sixteen of such persons to whom he had loaned money to pay their expenses back to enable them to go into the army — that such persons were not citizens of the United States — that we had no claim upon them — that they were bound to go back — that they were now in the Prussian army — that if they did not go back they would be deserters — that Mr. Roessing in assisting them did not violate the law — that in what he had done he had acted with the sanction of the Baron — and that they would return individually and not in squads. I got the statute and pointed out to the Baron that it was an offense to assist (?) a person within the jurisdiction of the United States to go beyond their limits with intent to enter in the .service of a foreign jmnce, as a soldier, marine or seaman, and I told him that I was afraid that Mr. Roessing would be held Iw our courts to have already violated that law, and I thought it but a friendly act to caution him. The Baron replied that it could not be so. Mr. Roessing had violated no law of the United States — no court would hold so — and proceedings could be commenced against him to test it if we thought he had done wrong. Seeing the temper he was in I contented myself with saying that I had given him notice and he must exercise his own judgment as to what he would do. . . ." '■•Bancroft Mss. No. 121 (to Secretary of State Fish). Mr. Bancroft wrote that England having taken over the protection of the French in Germany would have gladly undertaken to help matters, even the protection of Germans in France. Bismarck, however, "refused to allow this and by turning over the office to our government, called the United States visibly into the circle of first class powers." 18 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANTT, 1870 by the Prussian Government. Mr. Washburne at one time wrote to Bismarck that he was giving assistance to twenty-nine hundred Germans. ^^ His efficient services in this capacity, while satisr factory to France, won the praise of Bismarck and the German Emperor^*^ and contributed effectively to the good feeling in Germany toward the United States. At the time of the French order of expulsion of the North Germans from France, Mr. Wash- burne, acting under private instructions from the State Depart- ment, presented to the Duke of Gramont an appeal,^^ " in the name ''Hepner, Adolf: "America's Aid to Germany in 1870-71," No. 123. Mr. Washburne to Count Bismarck, Paris, March 3, 1871. '^ Ibid., No. 154, Prince Bismarck to Mr. Washburne: Berlin, June 13, 1871. . . . "His Majestj' has commanded me to convey to your Excellency his grateful recognition of the zeal and kindness j'ou have devoted to the interests of the German residents under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, and with corresponding sacrifice of time and personal comfort. I beg to add the reiterated expression of the sense of obhgation I shall ever preserve for the uniform promptness and courtesy I have experienced from you in a business connection of nearly a twelvemonth's duration. With sentiments of the highest consideration, I have the honor to be Your Excellency's obedient servant Bismarck. Also Bancroft Mss. No. 126, Bancroft to Fish, Berhn, August 22, 1870. Also Congr. Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, p. 2456. Cameron (of Pennsylvania), April 16, 1872. "I ask leave to introduce a joint resolution, and in introducing it, I desire to say a single word. The Emperor of Germany, wishing to manifest his gratitude to ministers and consuls of the United States in France, is desirous of paying them some substantial compliment, but that cannot be done with- out the i^ermission of Congress. I, therefore, offer a joint resolution on the subject for the purpose of having it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. There being no objection, leave was granted to introduce a joint resolution (S. R., No. 6) permitting certain diplomatic and consular officials of the United States in France to accept testimonials from the Emperor of Germany for their friendly services to the subjects of the Emperor during the war between France and Germany; which was read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed." 1^ For Washburne's protest to Gramont against Expulsion Order of North Germans from France see Correspondence of E. B. Washburne, Franco- German War and Insurrection of the Commune. Washington Gov. Print. Office, 1878, No. 44. Washburne to Fish, August 22, 1S70, pp. 40 ff. "I said (to Gramont) further that in carrying out the wishes and instruc- tions of my Government, I wished in the name of humanity to make an REMONSTRANCE AGAINST EXITLSION (W GERMANS 19 of huinanity," to revoke the order, or if that were not possible to so modify it as to permit the larger class of Germans in Paris to remain, whose conduct could give no possible cause of complaint to the French Govcnnnent." Secretary of State Fish directed"* Assistant Secretary Davis to instruct Mr. Washburne to do what he coukl consistently with public law and with the United States' position as a neutral to mitigate the severity of the recent French order. Mr. Fisii considers that, the measure being within the recognized rights of a belligerent, the United States could not "protest" but might "remonstrate" and "use good offices." Mr. Davis informed Baron Gerolt of Mr. Washburne's remonstrance and the German Minister wished to have the action of the United States made public. This, however, the Secretary, in the interests of neutrality, refused to do.^^ earnest appeal to the French Government, through him, to revoke the order if it should be considered possilile; and if that could not be clone to so modify it as to permit the large class of Germans in Paris to remain whose conduct could give no possible cause for complaint to the French Government." Formal note August 17, 1870, Enclosure 2 m. No. 44, p. 46. . . . "Under these circumstances therefore, I feel that I should fail to discharge the full measure of the duty devolving upon me in this regard, and that I should be forgetful of the ol)ligations of humanity did I not make the strongest appeal to the government of his Majesty, through your Excel- lency, to further consider this question and to ask that if it be not possible to suspend action altogether, that there may be at least some modification of the measures already taken so as to permit such subjects of the belligerent powers as are under my protection, who are now in France, to remain in the country so long as their conduct shall give no cause of comj^laint, and further to ask for them that protection which the law of nations accords to unarmed enemies. In making this apjieal I l)ut obey the wishes of my Government, which has instructed me to do everything which is consistent with the posi- tion of my country as a neutral, and with the law of nations to alleviate the conditionof things now existing as regards these people with whose protection I have been charged." '»J. C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis, Garrisons, Tuesday morning, August 16, 1870. ^"^ Upon the Baron's insisting, Assistant Secretary Davis informed him that he could not permit any foreign minister to advise the department as to the arrangement of its affairs and that it was for the United States Govern- ment to decide whether it would or would not make public its acts. . . . J. C. B. Davis Journal, Augiist 13, 1870. "Received this morning a telegram from Washburne that Germans were ordered to (luit France — that many were poor, without means to go — that great suffering might result and tliathe wished to know if the Pru.ssian Govern- 20 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 A factor holding possibilities adverse to the friendly relationship between the United States and Germany at this time was the sale ment would place means at his control to pay for their passage. Sent at once a copy to Mr. Bancroft and to Baron Gerolt. The Baron called to know what we intended to do. I answered that we had communicated the information to Bancroft, and that it was for the Prussian Government, not for us, to now decide what should be done. He said, "Will you not instruct Mr. Washburne to protest against this? It is an act of cruelty the like of which has not been perpetrated for over three hundred years. There are over two hundred thousand Germans in Paris, most of them poor operatives, and the suffering will be incredible. This must be the act of a mob. It cannot be the act of the French Government." I answered that Mr. Wash- burne had already protested — that three weeks ago the Due de Gramont had given notice that it might become necessary to take such a step and that Air. Washburne had written a long and able paper trying to prevent it, and that his course meets with the approbation of the department. I added they have the right to do this, cruel as it maj' be, aiid having decided to do it, after full representations from this government of reasons why it should not be done, it is for Prussia to decide whether she will or will not provide the means for moving these unfortunate men. He said the thing was cruel and wrong, and that at least the department ought to make public what had been done. I answered that it was for this government to judge whether it would or would not make public its acts, that in case it seemed to me proper that we should not i^ublish what we had done — whatever were our individual sym- pathies, whether with France or Germany, we intended to maintain a strict neutrality and would do no act which could be construed by either party as done in the interest of the other. He showing a purpose to continue the discussion, I said I would not permit anj- foreign minister to advise us as to the management of the internal affairs of this department." The whole State Department seems to have had its trials with the German minister, Baron Gerolt, who apparently was retained because of having been so long in the service. Mr. Bancroft wrote that at the least suggestion from the Department the German Chancellor would recall him. See J. C. B. Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis, October 12, 1870. "As to the manner and matter of Gerolt, he would be disavowed here. I have jH-ivately requested a friend of his to give him a warning, but he is too weak and too dull to be teachable; were I to speak to the government, Bismarck, who cannot endiu'c his imbecility, would insist immediately on his recall. So a word, a half word, or a whisper, and the good old man will be left with leisure to prepare for a better world. I would get him reproved, but Bismarck would mark the sincerity of the reproof by removing him. Perhaps this had better he done. With France represented by an able man like Berthemy or Paradet, Germanj- should no longer be represented by a broken down old man who in his best years was not the wisest of mankind." J. C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis, Washington, October 13, 1870. "This is Thursday — "Dip. day." I am in momentary apprehension of the apparition of Gerolt witli his pocket full of papers covered with German text — uncertain which is the paper he wishes to let off at me, and when he has made several mistaken selections and has appealed to me to know what it was he came to say, the good little old man at last may rememlier that he has l)een instructed to l)ring to my notice the shipment in French steamers of guns packed 'in original cases' having the name of the U. S., etc., etc. In SALE OF MrNITIOXS TO FRANCE 21 of Anu'i-ican iniuiitions to Franco. It was recognized that tliis was ■ within the riiiht of private firms,-" hut the question of neutrality was raised when such arms were found to bear the mark of United States Government arsenals. The i)rotests came from the citizens and senators of German sympathies within the United States ( rather than from German official sources. Mr. Bancroft wrote \ that he had seen no evidence of dissatisfaction in German^' against the actions of the United States in this matter and that the German Government was satisfied that the President had per- fectly fulfilled his duty as a neutral.^i Since the close of the Civil War the United States Government had been selling wherever it could the oversupply of munitions left on its hands,^- and after vain will I remind him of the late proclamation for which he professed so much gratitude, in vain will 1 tell him that France thinks the Proclamation of the S' Aout unkind — that Berthemy has told me it would 'cause great regret in France' — in vain will I tell him that during our Civil War Germany sold arms to us and also to the Rebels. All in vain — the Fal)le of the Justice and the Farmer — one's bull goring the other's ox — was made to illustrate the relative position of Belligerents and Neutrals. It can't be helped. I sliall have to listen to Gerolt. 1 have alreadj^ listened to Berthemy. While writing this last sentence Gerolt is announced. I go to it, invoking all the patience of which I am capable and hoping for the particular inspiration of a little more. "Tis done — the long agony is o'er." He had nothing to say except that he "goes this afternoon to Baltimore to see his Banker" — the only significance I can see in this important communication is in connection with a cheque which Gerolt i:)assed through the Dei^irtment to the Secretary of War yester- day for one hundred and three 27 dollars [$103.27] to procure the release of a soldier. What may not France say to Germany for obtaining a soldier in the imiform of the United States 'in original cases.' By the time you return we shall have a nice batch of intricate questions — shall I keep them in 'the original cases?' " 2° J. C. B. Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis (P.S., January 23, 1871 or 2). "Our relations are too i)lain for question. Our treaties with Frederic the Great, with his successor and with tlie father of the present king all set forth in the clearest terms the right of Americans to carry contraliand of war to a power at war with Prassia — all on our side having the sanction successively of Franklin, John Adams, and Jefferson, of John Q. Adams and Henry Clay. In Statutes at Large Treaties, \'ol. Mil, page 90, Articles XII, XIII, page K)!^, Articles XII, XIII, page 3S4, Article Xll. I have, therefore, been able here to ]ireserve myself and you from the slightest charge of unfriendliness though regrets have been expressed as when at Orleans most all the guns taken were Springfield guns." Also F. R., 1871, p. 374. Bancroft to Fish, No. 160. 21 Bancroft Mss. No. 156. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, November 2, 1870. -- J. C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis. Washington, October 13, 1870. 22 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMAN^', 1870 the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war it continued to sell these government-made arms to American munitions firms within its own borders. When, however, certain of those firms were found to be acting as agents for the French Government, these sales, according to the statement of the Secretary of State, were discon- tinued. Nevertheless, he wrote to IMr. Davis, that he did not see why a "manufacturer or dealer in arms three or four thousand miles oft' should be expected to shut up shop whenever Lew Xap and Bill Hohenzollern take off their coats and go to fisticuffs to settle which is the better man or whether their boundary should be this or that side of the goose-pond." Despite the lack of formal pro- test from Germany, the subject was brought up in the Senate and, upon a resolution introduced by Senator Sumner of Masschusetts, was placed in the hands of a special committee for investigation.-^ The committee report cleared the Government-^ of any infringe- ment of the laws of neutrality, declaring that Congress having directed the Secretary of War to dispose of these stores of ammu- nition, they might have been delivered to Frederick William or Louis Napoleon in person, without violating the obligations of neutrality, and the decision not to sell arms to the firm of Reming- ton & Co., had been an unnecessary prudence. The issue of this report practically closed the controversy on the subject, though Senator Sumner registered his protest against the report on the ground that the investigating committee was composed only of 2' Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, 1871-72, pp. 953 ff. and pp. 1014 ff. "It was Sumner's allegation that at the time when arms were sold by the Government to Remington it was known that the firm was an agent of the Freneh Government. This was denied by ojiponents of the measure, who contended that Mr. Sunnier and Mr. Schurz were trying to establish a case which if estabhshed would authorize Prussia to demand an apology and indemnity for a violation concerning which it had not occurred to that country to protest." 2'' Senate Report No. 183 "Sales of Ordnance," 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. XII also pp. XVII and XVIII. Conclusion of report. "Your Committee, duly jealous of the honor of our country and the repu- tation of the officers of our Government, have great satisfaction in being able, after the most thorough and impartial investigation, to say that there is nothing in these transactions which reflects dishonor upon cither." Bismarck's oriental policy, 1S70 23 those opposed altogether to the inquiry .^^ The general subject of munitions sales had received more attention from Congress than from the diplomatic departments of the two countries involved. Among many connnon interests pointed out by ]Mr. Bancroft between Germany and the United States was an agreement expressed at this time on policy toward the Far East. The Chinese mission under Mr. Anson Burlingame-'' received a cordial welcome in Germany and the Chancellor marked throughout its stay a s\Tnpathy with the Chinese" and a desire to " do his part in saving "Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. 2, 1S71-72, p. 3325. Carl Schurz: "Speeches," etc., vol. V, p. .34 ff. , To Edward L. Pierce. New York, November 23, 1S89. "The Senate constituted the investigating committee for the evident purpose of acquitting. In defiance of well-estal)lished customs, those who moved the inquiry were rigidly excluded from membership. On the contrary they were made to appear as accused parties. I was, however, permitted to ask questions. Nevertheless, the investigation clearly established two things: I. That the rule of neutral duty as laid down Ijy the Administration itself had l)een glaringly violated, and that the defense of the War Department consist etl of the most transparent subterfuges; and II. That in making these sales the laws governing the sale of arms and anmnmition of the Government had been most unceremoniously set aside." Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner liy Edward L. Pierce, vol. IV, iip. 504 to 514. In connection with the debate in the Senate on the sul)ject of munitions sales to France, Senator Schurz answered the charge that it was "unpatriotic to expose a breach of neutrality on the part of the Administration," saying, "The Senator from Wisconsin cannot frighten me by exclaiming, ' My country, right or uTong!' In one sense I say so too. My country — and my country is the great American Republic — my country right or wrong; if right, to be kept right, and if wrong to be set right!" a retort which drew applause from the galleries." 2« Bancroft Mss. No. 65. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, January IS, 1870. " Bancroft Mss. No. 73. Bancroft to Fi.sh. Berlin, March 3, 1870. According to Mr. Bancroft, Mr. Burlingame met with a very different policy on the part of France. "P. S. Secret. In Paris Mr. Burlingame at first met with some obstructions. The French minister was slow to receive the idea that China could lay claim to equal respect. One day de Lavalette talked to him in a very high strain in the interest of the Roman Catholic Church. Claims were even put forwanl for proi)erty belonging to the Catholics centuries ago before they were driven out of the emjiire and very high words were used and even menaces of war by de Lavalette in regard to the liberty and protection that are now to be 24 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AXD GERMANY, 1870 the Chinese Empire from disintegration. " The American minister asserted, further, that he had reason to believe that Count Bis- marck was " particularly pleased to place his country side by side with the United States on a question so important not for com- merce only, but for the future history of the world. " In regard to the measures to be taken at this time by the powers for the pro- tection of native Christians in Japan,-* the German Government (then the government of the North German Union) instructed its representatives to act in harmony especially with the represen- tatives of the United States. At the request of the American Government, Count Bismarck during the Franco-Prussian war agreed to sign a truce with France in regard to the naval forces of the two countries operating in Chinese and Japanese waters.-'^ In general, Mr. Bancroft wTote to the Secretary of State''' that he was accorded to missionaries in every part of the Chinese empire. The language of the French minister became at last so unreasonable and menacing that J\lr. Burhngame interrupted him sajang, 'I see that I must write to the Chinese Government that they must prepare for war; but if France should really undertake a war against China I assure you it would not be a short or a light war but a verj^ serious one (far more serious than the affair in Mexico), one of the most difficult and serious in wliich France was ever engaged.' " 28 Bancroft AIss. No. 99. Bancroft to Fish. BerHn, June 9, 1870. (See footnote 30.) ^' Bancroft ]Mss. No. 162. Bancroft to Fish. Berlin, November 10, 1870. "Sm:^ Your communication respecting a truce respecting France and Germany in the Chinese and Japanese waters, was forwarded to Headquarters, and I have received from the foreign office the telegraphic answer of Count Bis- marck of the 14th of this month in which he declares that the minister of the marine sees no objection to the concluding of a formal convention as proposed l)y America for the Japanese and Chinese waters, and I have been requested to communicate to you the assent of this government. I annex to the Despatch a copy of the telegram. I remain, Sir, Yours sincerely, (signed) Geo. Bancroft." Telegram to Count Bismarck from Versailles to the Foreign Office, Berlin, November 14, 1877. " Marine Minister kein Bedenken gegen den von Amerika vorgeschlagenen Abschluss formhcher Convention fucr die japanesisch-chinesischen Gewacsser. Bitte Herrn Bancroft unsere Zustimmung auszusprechen." Bismarck. ^ Bancroft Mss. No. 90. Bancroft to Fish. Americ.\x Legation, Berlin, May 23, 1870. "Sir: Your instruction No. 190, was, in substance, immediately communicated by me to the North German Government. I jxarticularly explained the PKORLKM OF AMERICAN MEDIATION 25 authorized to state that tlie German Government desired "to liold the same ])()licy with the United States in its deahngs with China and Japan and would always be found ready to develop that ])olicy which the connnon interest and sense of justice of the two nations had initiated. " With the proclamation of the republic in France and its prompt iTcoynition by the I'nited States^' there was presented the problem of the United States' mediation between the two belligerents. A request that the United States join the other powers in intervention for the purpose of peace was presented l)y the French Minister of Foreign Affairs inmiediately on receiving the news of the United States' recognition of the new republic. The proposal for joint action was at once rejected''^ as being contrary to a uniform caution which you desired to exercise in the Chinese seas and the grounds of it. In reply I have received repeated heartj^ assurances of the wish of this Government to go hand in hand with the United States in its Eastern Asiatic pohcy. It accepted unconditionally every suggestion made by you. . . ." Bancroft Mss No. 99. Bancroft to Fish. American Legation, Berlin, June 9, 1870. "Sir: Today I am able to reply to your No. 192 of April 18, '70, in relation to the sj'stematic persecution of the native Christians by the authorities of Japan. The protocols of the conferences of the representatives of the treaty powers were duly communicated to the cabinet of Berlin. This Government is sincerely disposed to move in concert with the U. S. It has therefore instructed its representatives in Japan to act in harmony with his colleagues, especially with the representative of the U. S. The instructions direct him for the present at least not to employ force and not to make any menace of an intention to employ force, but if by any necessity armed force should be employed l)y the U. S. and North Germaiw for any other imperative reason, it might then become not improper to take advantage of the situation to speak with more energy for the protection of the Christians in the Japanese Empire. This Government will be willing to issue to its own representatives instructions analogous to yours. I am authorized to add as a general rule this Government desires to liold the same jiolicy with the U. S. in its dealings with China and Japan and will always be found ready to develo]! that policy which the common interest and sense of justice of the two nations have initiated. I remain. Sir, Yours sincerely, (signed) Geo. Bancroft. s'F. R., 1870, I))). HI, IK) and 117. »-' J. C. B. Davis Journal. Seftemher 8, 1870. "The President called at 11 o'clock. I told him that Washburne had recognized the new government in Paris and that Favre liad expressed pro- found emotion. I read the dispatch stating that France desired me to join the other powers in efforts for peace. He said that his impressions were against that. I said that mine were, too, and that in no event would I make a joint effort, to which he assented. . . ." 2(3 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 foreign policy of the United States, but Mr. Bancroft was in- structed^^ to ascertain whether Germany desired to have the good offices of the United States interposed. The American minister advised emphatically against intervention'^' in any form, on the ground that it would be rejectpd by Germany and therefore prove embarrassing to the Americin Government and of no benefit to any other. In fuller explanation of his cabled message, Mr. Bancroft set forth in two despatches'^ further reasons why the '' F. R., 1870, p. 193. No. 142. Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft (telegram). Department of State, September 9, 1870. "Washburne telegraphs that France requests United States to join other powers in effort for peace. Uniform policy and true interest of United States not to join European powers in interference in European questions. President strongly desires to see war arrested and blessings of peace restored. If Germany also desires to have good offices of United States interposed, President will be glad to contribute all aid in his power to secure restoration of peace between the two great powers now at war, and with whom United States has so many traditions of friendship. Ascertain if North Germany desires such offices, but without making the tender thereof unless assured they will be accepted." Fish. 3^F. R., 1870, p. 206, No. 160. Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish (cable telegram). Berlin, September 11, 1S70. (Received September 11.) "No time now for America to intervene. Germany rejects all foreign interference. Every other power holds back. America would stand alone and unable to accomplish anything. Our interest, dignity require us for the present to stand aloof." Bancroft. 35 Bancroft Mss. Nos. 132 and 133. No. 132. American Legation, Berlin, September 12, 1870. "Nothing can l)e more easy than to give an answer to your inquiries by telegram. In the first place, no jiower of Europe has as yet made any effort at mediation or intervention or interference for the restoration of {)eace lietween Germany and France; and therefore there are no jiowers which the United States could join. Secondly, at the time when France ineditatetl the unpro- voked declaration of war, neither a Eurojiean jjower nor the United States interi)()sed their influence to prevent the war of aggression and conquest. It is therefore the unanimous o]iinion of Germany, expressed in the most solenm maniu>r by addressees from its considerable cities, that Germany and France should, without foreign interposition, IV left to themselves to settle the peace. The German Gov(>rnment have not formally given their adhesion to these addresses, but I have no doubt that they sulistantially express their policy. I give it as my imdouliting o])inion, that the interposition of the BANCROFTS OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN MEDIATION St United States should undertake no action at tiiat time between the warrintr powers. When France mecHtated, said Bancroft, "the unprovoked deehiration of war, neither a European i)ower nor the United States had interposed their influence to prevent the war of aggression and conquest." It was therefore the opinion throughout Germany that the two nations should he left to them- selves to settle the peace. IMoreover, if the various European powers should "combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either United States as a mediating power would, at the present time prove embarrassing to our own Government and of no l>enefit to any other." No. 133. American Leg.\tiox, Berlix, September 12, 1870. "Sir: In further reply to your telegram received on the tenth, it may be said that mam- reasons e:?ist why the American Government should as yet adhere strictly to its traditional pohcy with regard to foreign affairs. Should the European powers combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either of the belligerents the question might arise whether the United States might not properly exercise a counter-influence on the side of right. Even in this con- tingency there would still be room for doubt. As things stand at present, I think tiie United States cannot interfere in any manner consistent with its dignity. We all as Americans are ready to welcome the restoration of the republic in France, and to desire for it a chance for free development. I certainly wish to see it established as the permanent form! The strength of our repub- lican sympathies formally expressed by our highest representative in France might in the eyes of many unfit us for the strict impartiality of a mediator. A great difficulty i)resents itself at the threshold in the want of a recog- nized government in France. We acknowledge that which has just lieen constituted at the Hotel de Ville but more than half of Europe has not done so. Germany has not done so. The United States would therefore appear in the attitude of deciding for Europe and for one of the belligerents the question as to the valid government of France. In about three weeks France has seen three ministers succeed each other. We may believe in the perma- nence of the present ministry, but a large jxart of Europe will hardly do so. It is uncertain if the people of France would consider themselves bound by a j^eace which the present government should form. There are many who insist that according to legal forms the regency has not been properly deposed and that the new ministry has not yet received the sanction of a j^opular vote or a jiohtic constituent assembly. To those who reason in that way General Trochu is the only authorized agent of the government. For he had the sanction of the two chambers of the regency and also of the gathering at the Hotel de Ville. Further the United States would be embarrassed in any attempt to suggest just and i)roper conditions of i)eace. . . . The demands of moral support on the side of France would necessarily be verj- exacting, so that the attempt to befriend might end in the deej) and permanent dissatisfaction of the party that asked to be befriended. The Germans are bent on the reannexation of Alsace and German Lorraine. This is a point on which the United States Government might prefer not to give advice." 28 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 18/ of the belligerents the question might arise whether the United States might not properly exercise a counter-influence on the side of right. "^^ There was also the difficulty of determining whether the present ministry in France, though recognized by the United States, was a permanent one. P\irthermore, "the United States would be embarrassed in any attempt to suggest just and proper conditions of peace." The Germans were bent on the "reannex- ation of Alsace and German Lorraine," and this was a question "on which the United States might prefer not to give advice." From the various reasons set forth by ]\Ir. Bancroft, it is evident that the American ^Minister did not wish the United States to be a party to any movement that would rob Germany of the fruits of victory." These reasons set forth by Mr. Bancroft were acknowl- edged shortly afterward by the Secretary of State''* to be "among 3^ J. C. B. Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis. September 5, 1870. There is little difficulty in determining the belKgerent referred to by "the side of right." (See confidential letter to Davis, quoted in footnote 10.) ^^ Carl Schurz: "Speeches," etc., vol. I, p. 519 ff. This viewpoint was also held by Senator Schurz. Letter from Carl Schurz to Hamilton Fish, Sec'y of State. St. Louis, September 10, 1870. "The telegraph informs me that the President has signified to the Prussian Government his willingness to serve as a mediator between the belligerents in Europe. Judging from the tone of the German press and all the indications which float on the surface, there seems to be but little probability that the offer will be accepted. I am glad you disclaimed at the same time any inten- tion on the part of the United States to take part in any combination of neutral Powers for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the conflict. From a purely American point of view I think it will be the best policy for us to let the denouement of that war take care of itself. As to giving an expression of our moral sympathy with the Republic as such — and in France it exists only in name — ^Ir. Washburne has devoted himself to that in his own way. I fear he has created hopes which will be doomed to disappoint- ment: the men who have undertaken to revive the traditions of 1792 — an im])ossible task under existing circumstances — will l)e apt to catch at straws and then abuse other people for leaving them in the lurch, because the straws are not timbers." 38 F. R., 1870, p. 194, Xo. 1-16. Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft. Dep.\rtment of State, Washington, September 30, 1870. No. 246. "Sir: Your dispatch No. 133, of the 12th instant, has l)een received. The reasons which you present against an American intervention between France and Germany are sul)stantially among the considerations, which S1MIL.\RITY OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN FEDERATIONS 29 the considerntions which deterniined the President" in the poHcy of "rejectini;- all idea of niextended to persons who shall be on board a free vessel although they should be enemies to the other party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy." " Malloy, Vol. II, p. 1490. 12 Malloy, Vol. II, p. 1490. ARTICLE XIII (OF TREATY OF 1799). "And in case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that PRi^VISIONS GOVERNING PRIVATE PROPERTY ON HIGH SEAS 39 which i)rovi(le' with the United States, since it included private property carried in enemy vessels. It was, however, later usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammuni- tion, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles and detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable com])ensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or anv part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascer- tained bj' the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of a contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage. All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, balls, muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartouche boxes, saddles and bridles, beyond the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that which every man serving on board the vessel, or passenger, ought to have; and in general whatever is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what descrii)tion soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband." "F. R., 1870, p. 217. Secretary Fish wrote to Baron Gerolt, the German minister to the United States in regard to the announcement of German policy: "The Government of the United States receives with great pleasure the renewed adherence of a great and enlightened German government to the principle temporarily established l)y the treaty of 1785, and since then advo- cated by this Government whenever opportunity has offered Count Bismarck's dis])atch . . . shows that North Germany is willing to recognize this princii)]e (even without reciprocity) in the war which has now imhapi)ily liroken out between that country and France. This gives reason to hope that the Ciovernment and people of the United States may soon be gratified by seeing it universally recognized as another restraining and harmonizing influence imposed by modern civilization upon the art of war." 40 TREATY RELATIONSHIP abandoned by Germany, who revoked her declaration^^ on the ground that the treatment of German merchant ships by France made it necessary to give up the position taken earHer in the war. Upon the revocation of the order, however, Bismarck assured the United States Government that all action toward American vessels would, as a matter of course, be in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of 1799/^ exempting from seizure, when carried in American vessels, all private property except contraband. The latter might be removed from the vessels and used by the bellig- erent power if compensation were later made to the owners. In taking this stand Bismarck therefore based the policy of the North German Union in this regard on the narrower principle of Article XIII, revived from the treaty of 1799, rather than on the broad principle of "free ships make free goods" embodied in Article XII revived from the treaty of 1785. "F. R., 1871, pp.403 ff. On receiving notice of the revocation of the German declaration the Ameri- can Secretaiy of State expressed to the German minister the "great regret with which the Government of the United States receives the information that circumstances have arisen which, in the opinion of the government of North Germany, justif}^ its withdrawal from a position which the Government of the United States regarded with very great satisfaction as taken in the best interests of civihzation." '5F. R., 1871, pp. 411 and 412. There was a misunderstanding at first as to the scope of the first declaration by Germany. The United States considered that since no mention had been made concerning contraband, the declaration exempted this form of "private property" also; and therefore that even though its protection when carried l)y French shi]:)s had l^een withdrawn, it would still l^e exempt from seizure when carried by American vessels. Bismarck, however, declared that men- tion of contraband had not lieen made in his first declaration, because it was assumed that "according to international usages," contraband had always been considered subject to seizure. He set forth that this principle had been endorsed by the United States itself in 1856 in regard to the declaration of Paris. Upon being asked to adhere to the four provisions of the Paris declara- tion the United States had "declared its readiness to do so only on condition that the property of subjects of a belligerent state should be exempt from capture at sea, by the war vessels of the other partly, contraband of war excepted." APPLICATION OF TREATY OF 1828 TO FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 41 Tlu' negotiations on this subject are significant aside from tlieir immetliate concern, because of the fact that the treaty of 1828 was assumed without question to be binding upon the North German I'nion, although it had been concluded only with Prussia. The United States also assumed that its obligations as a neutral under that treaty were binding uixni it in relation to the North German Union just as they would have been were Prussia alone involved in the war. This was illustrated in the neutrality i)rocla- mation issued by President Grant, in which he set forth the rights and duties of American citizens as determined by the neutrality law of the United States and by its treaty oliligations. The Presi- dent applied to the situation at that time the treaty privilege of the belligerent to carry in and out of the ports of the neutral without search or hindrance, any jDrizes captured from the enemy. This privilege he declared under the Prussian treaty of 1799, re\i\-ed by the treaty of 1828, to be still in force.^*' Later in the intercourse between the two countries doubt was expressed at various times by each of the nations as to whether the treaty of 1828 and certain other treaties formed with individual German States before the unification could be considered valid for the whole empire. i«F. R., 1871, p. 46. BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. A PROCLAMATION. (August 22, 1S70 — Enjoining neutvality in the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its aUies.) "And I do further declare and proclaim that by the nineteenth article of the treaty of amity and commerce which was concluded ):)etween his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, on the 11th day of July, A. D. 1799, which article was revived by the treaty of May 1, a. »• 1828, l)etween the same parties and is still in force, it was agreed that 'the vessels of war, public and private, of both i)arties, shall carry freely wheresoever they please, the ves.sels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such i)rizes be arrested, searched or jnit under any legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their cai>tors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obhged to show." 42 TREATY RELATIONSHIP By the treaty of 1828," Prussia and the United States had guaranteed to each other freedom of commerce and navigation. There was to be no discrimination in the form of tonnage dues or other port charges, in the ports of either nation against the vessels of the other. The vessels of each country in this respect were placed on an equal footing with its own national vessels except in the case of the ships engaged in coastwise trade. Similarly with regard to imports it was agreed that there should be no dis- crimination in the form of duties placed on the products of one I country upon their importation into the other. Though the term "most-favored-nation" was not used in the treaty the two coun- 1 tries established their relations on this basis. The idea was \ embodied in Articles V and IX of the treaty, which read as follows: Article v. " No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the produce or manufacture of Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of any article the produce or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be payable on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. Nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the importation or exportation of any article the produce or manu- facture of the United States or of Prussia, to or from the ports of the United States or to or from the ports of Prussia, which shall not equally extend to all other nations." Article ix. "If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely where it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation, when the grant is conditional." It will be seen that this latter article is in a sense contradictory to the former. Article V, if taken literally, establishes an uncon- " Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 1496 ff. MOST-FAVORED-XATION PRINCIPLE UNDER TREATY OF 1S2.S A'.] ditioiial in(>st-fav()rc'(l-iiati(Mi basis in respect to import duties. . If this article stctul alone in the treaty it would he difficult to see how either of the coutracthig parties could ' '8 For the interpretation of these articles by the two nations see Chapter III "Commercial Relations." The United States held consistently to the principle of reciprocity. Germany's policy varied. The German Govern- ment at times acted on the principle of unrestricted and at times on the principle of restricted most-favored-nation treatment in regard to the United States. See also Sen. Doc. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Session. Also article on "Most-favored-nation Relations, German-Aineriran," Ijv Dr. (1. M. Fisk in Journal of Political Fcoiiomy, March, 19().">, and the work by Richard Calwer, Berlin, 1902, entitled "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staatcn von Nordamerica." " F. R., 1871, Article 4 (pp. 384 and 385) and Article 35 (pp. 387 and 388). 44 TREATY RELATIONSHIP of 1827 with the Hanseatic RepubHcs.^" is very vague, and was seldom referred to in the practical negotiations as evidence of the vaKdity of that treaty for the whole empire. The fact that this important treaty had never by formal agree- ment been declared binding upon United Germany caused its validity to be ciuestioned at various times by each of the two countries. Officials of each nation differed from one another in their opinion on this subject. In 1897 a heated discussion"-^ took place in the Reichstag concerning the future commercial policy of Germany toward the United States as affected by the Dingley tariff. In the course of the debate the binding character of the Prussian and Hanseatic treaties was seriously questioned. Count von Kanitz-Podangen, Conservative, said that the American Union and Germany treated each other reciprocally as most favored countries, although no commercial or most-favored-natio7i treaty had ever taken place between the two states. (Staatengruppen.) He then referred to the 1827 and 1828 treaties as being — whether rightly or wrongly — (mit Recht oder Unrecht), considered the basis of the commercial relations between the two countries. Person- ally, however, he considered that to revert to these treaties was legally inadmissible (nicht statthaft). The interpellation of the Count and his colleagues w^as answered by Baron von ]\Iarschall, ]Minister of State and Secretary of the Foreign Office, who declared himself to be of quite different opinion concerning the treaty I under discussion. The question of the validity and of the limits of the region of application of these treaties, he declared, had never been specifically fliscussed-- or decided by the two countries. 20 Malloy, Vol. I, pp. 901 ff. Article IX of this treaty with the Hanseatic Repubhcs constituted a reci- procity clause almost identic in wording with Article IX of the treaty with Prussia the following year. -' V. R., lS95-lS97,Vol. VIII, pp. 5701 ff., 213 Sitz. (May 3, 1897). =2 Ibid., p. 5706. "Die Frage der Giltigkeit unci dos Geltungsbereichs dieses preussischen Vertrages ist zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland niemals prinzipiell zur Eroerterung und zur Entscheidung gelangt." It was inaccurate to state that the subject had never been discussed, but correct that it had never been formally decided. VALIDITY OF PRT'SSIAN-A]\IERICAN TREATY OF 1S2S 45 Similar treaties existed with Sweden, Norway and Denmarlc, and the iiovernnient had ahvays jjroeeeded U])()n the ])rineii)le tliat tliese liad not li^st their vahdity throuf2;h the founthnu; of the Cier- nian Empire hut liad heen transferred, together with their rights and ohhgations, to the German ?^.mpire, in appHcation of Artieles 4 and 85 of the Constitution wliieh gave over to the Empire the entire tariff and commerce legislation. Moreover, he continued, these treaties had lost their territorially restricted character before the founding of the eni})Ire, at the time of the creation of the ZoUverein. The principal proof, however, of the binding power of these treaties. Baron von IMarschall declared to be the fact that both parties had recognized their validity through conclusive acts. Rights had been claimed for and obHgations fulfilled by the whole German Empire on the basis of certain paragraphs of this treaty. In 1S85, for example, the chancellor had declared, apropos of a commercial treaty with Spain, that the United States, Sweden and Denmark could claim most-favored-nation privileges^ through their special treaties with single States, w^hich could now no longer be separated from the rest of the empire. Germany had repeatedly claimed and obtained rights from the Ignited States on the ground of the Prussian treaty, and the United States had in turn recog- nized the treaty as a basis for claims from Germany.-^ Its binding character had thus been tacitly assumed by both nations. This fact, the ^Minister of State considered, established in itself the validit^' of the treatv. -^ For accounts of negotiations involving these treaties, see Chapter IV, "Commercial Relations." See also negotiations between Bismarck and Mr. Kasson (American Minister) on German Differential Railroad Rates, 1884. (G. M. Fisk, Most-Fa vorcd-Xation Relations — German-American, in Journal of Political Economy, March, 190.3.) In 1885 Baron von Alvensleben, the German minister, wrote to .Secretary Bayard to claim for Germany, on the ground of the treaty, the reduced tonnage dues just extended by the United States to vessels from certain South Ameri- can countries. He stated that Article IX of the Prussian-American Treaty had been "in the correspondence between the cabinets of Berlin and Wash- ington concerning the petroleum railroad rates as well as ])ecause of the Spani.sh-American treaty concerning the trade of Cuba and Puerto Rico, successively asserted by both Governments to be valid for all Germany." (See F. R., 1885.) 46 TREATY RELATIONSHIP A similar debate was held in the Reichstag in 1899.-^ Again Count von Kanitz, as the representative of the German Conserva- tives, spoke against the Prussian treaty, declaring that it had been rendered null and void by the American tariff legislation. This Aiewpoint was seconded by Baron Herrnsheim, of the National Liberals, who added that it was evident that the Americans con- sidered the treaty to be no longer in force, since American Secre- taries of State Gresham and Olney had stated that there was no evidence for considering that the treaty concluded with Prussia had been extended to the German Empire. This view was at once contradicted by von Buelow, IMinister of State and Secretary of the Foreign Office, who declared explicitly that the commercial relations between Germany and the United States" rested contract- ually (vertragsrechtlich) on the treaty of 1S2S with Prussia and on the similar agreements with other German seaboard States. The differences with America on the subject, he said, were due to a different conception of the scope of the most-favored-nation clause. This declaration of the Minister of State was received with satisfaction by the more radical parties-^ and was endorsed by Count von Posadowsky-Wehner, Representative of the Chan- cellor and Secretary of the Interior. In the United States there was also uncertainty as to whether the treaty covered more than the State of Prussia, with which it had been concluded. Claims had been made to the Government of the Empire, based on the most-favored-nation status granted to the United States by the treaty,-^ which was a tacit recognition of its binding qualities upon the empire, and there seems never to have been any objection on the part of the United States to having the government of the empire base its claims against the United States on the agreement concluded by the government of one German State, Nevertheless, the view was held by at least two American Secretaries of State that the treaty could not be 2" V. R., '95 -'00, Bd. I, 30 Sitz. February 11, '99, S. 787, B. ff. See also Chapter on Commercial Relations. ^^ Ibid., S. 800. See speech of Herr Richter of the Freisinnige \'olkspartei. 26 F. R., 1885, p. 443. API'LICATIDX OF 1S2S TREATY TO THE GERMAN' EMPIRE 47 used hy Germany as a basis for claims exteiidinsjc beyond the terri- tory of Prussia. In 1894. wlien (Germany protested against the terms of the American tariff affecting the importation of German sugar,-' Secretary Gresham, though admitting the justice of the German chiim on the grounds of Articles V and TX of the LS28 treaty, declared: " The stipulations of these two articles place the commercial intercourse oj the United States and Prussia, not the fiifirc German Empire, on the most^favored-nation basis." He therefore assumed "that the German Government did not. claim that the treaty afforded any just ground for protest against the additional duty on sugars not shown to be the produce or manu- facture of Prussia^ This opinion of the Secretary of State was upheld by the United States Attorney-General. INIr. Olney was asked to render his official opinion on the claims of Germany to be exempted from the payment of duty on German salt. One of the grounds of the German claim being based on the most-favored- nation provisions of the LS2S treaty, the Attorney-General ren- dered his decision against Germany partly on the ground of the invalidity of the treaty for the whole empire. "It should be noted," he states,-* "that while this treaty is to be taken as operative as respects so much of the German Empire as constitutes the kingdom of Prussia, no facts or considerations \\\t\\ which I have been made acquainted justify the assumption that it is to be taken as effective as regards other portions of the empire. Neither am I informed whether the German salt, for which free admission into this country is demanded, is a product or manufacture of Prussia proper or of some other part or parts of the German Empire." Two years later Mr, Olney, Secretary of State, had occasion to pass upon the same question.^'-* Referring to his opinion given in 1894, he wrote to Baron von Thielmann, German minister, as follows: -^See Chapt. IV, Commercial Relations. Also F. R., 194, p. 2:^9 and Sen. Misc. Doc. Xo. 52, 53rd Cong., lird 8ess. 2* Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 52, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 5. 29 F. R., 1896, p. 209. Secretary Olney expressed hy implication a request for the Geniuin Govern- ment's view in this matter. , 4 48 TREATY RELATIONSHIP "In that opinion I discussed the several grounds upon which you had claimed by your preceding notes that German salt is entitled to come into the United States free. The first of these grounds was the applicability of the most-favored-nation clause in the treaty of May 1, 1828, between the United States and Prussia; and upon this point I remark that your note is silent, so that I am, as Secretary of State, still without the information which I lacked while Attorney-General, as to whether the treaty with Prussia is to be taken as effective as regards other portions of the Empire or whether the German salt, for which free admis- sion into this country is demanded, is a product or manufacture of Prussia proper or of some other part or parts of the German Empire." In contrast to these officials of the State Department, Congress seemed to have no doubts about the treaty but simply assumed its validity. In 1885 the Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended to the House for adoption the following resolution :^^ "Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States be requested to take imme- diate steps to secure to the United States equal benefits in the German Empire with other nations as to all articles of commerce of the United States, under the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of 1828, made with Prussia and now in force between the United States and the German Empire." In spite of this acknowledged uncertainty as to the validity of the treaty, the nations took no formal action to establish its status, but continued throughout this whole period to make practical use of it as a basis for temporary agreements to regulate their reciprocal commercial relations. ^^ "It wovild much facilitate my examination of the subject were I informed of the grounds, if any, for regarding the treaty stipulation concluded with Prussia in 1828 as now operative with respect to the whole German Empire, and if this be not the case, how and to what extent the Kingdom of Prussia may seek to adduce its treaty with the United States in support of a claim for the exemption from duty on salt produced in and exported from Prussia." The published correspondence of the two countries gi\es no evidence of a reply from Germany to this question. 3" House Report, No. 2682, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess. '1 See Chapt. IV, Commercial Relations. •See also F. R., 1883, p. 369. THE I?.\X(M?OFT TREATIES 49 Another phase of the relations between the United States and Germany, concernino; which the treaty provisions were inadequate and uncertain, was that of the status of the naturaUzed citizen and liis ritjhts and innnunities upon liis return to the land of his hirth.'-' This subject was refi;ulated by a j2:roup of treaties con- cluded before the unification of the empire with the separate states of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemburg and the North German Union. Besides differing from one another in minor respects, which caused some difficulty, these treaties left unregu- lated the status of the former citizens of Alsace-Lorraine. Just as it was never formally determined whether the 1S2S treaty with Prussia had been extended to include the whole German Empire, so it was never formally agreed upon by both countries whether or not the naturalization treaty concluded with the Xorth German Union, or any of the other treaties of the group, were valid for the whole empire and hence governed the status of American citizens born in Alsace-Lorraine. The final published correspondence up to the year 1910 showed the two governments taking opposite stands on the question — the German Government holding the ^ treaties inapplicable^^ to former citizens of the two provinces and ' the United States refusing to admit this stand.^* It is thus seen that throughout this period of forty years the intercourse between the two great nations, important as it was in , volume of trade and in social and political relations, was never at any time adequately regulated by treaty. ThjC only formal treaties covered subjects of less general importance, while the whole basis of the relationship of the two countries in their commercial inter- , course was rendered unstal)le by reason of a disagreement as to the interpretation of the oldcK treaties and by reason of an uncer- tainty as to whether they were really valid.^^ It was inevitable i '-For account of negotiations on this subject, see Chapter III "American Citizens of German Birth, their Rights in Germany." " F. R., '03, p. 443 and F. R., '00, p. 052. "F. R., '04, p. 319. '^ In 1904 a Compilation of Treaties in Force was prepared \mder a Reso- kition of the United States Senate. (Sen. Doc. No. 318, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess.) Under treaties in force with the German Empire only two were given, the 50 TREATY RELATIONSHIP that the relationship as a whole between the two nations should be adversely affected by these conditions. This was realized by the officials of both governments, but attempts to remedy the situation and conclude a comprehensive treaty were defeated by the opposing American and German economic protection policies. ^^ Consular Convention of 1876 and the Commercial Agreement of 1900. The treaties with Prussia and the several German states were listed separately under the names of Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, etc., as still in force for those states — but no statement is made as to whether or not they are in force for the Empire. '^ See Chapter IV, Commercial Relations. The conclusion of a naturahzation treaty to take the place of the "Ban- croft" Treaties of 1868 was apparently blocked by Germany. See Chapter III, "American Citizens of German Birth, their Rights in Germany." CHAPTER III a:meri(\\x citizf.xs of ger:\iax birth— their rights ix germaxy The first question of important and extended diplomatic dis- cussion to come before the two nations after the foundation of the Empire was that of the rights of American citizens of German liirtli, upon their return to Germany — particularly their rights to exemption from military service. The efforts of Bancroft in behalf of these naturalized citizens resulted in the formation of a group of naturalization treaties^ with the X'orth German Union, Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg and Hesse respectively, in the year 1868. These are known as the "Bancroft treaties," and became the basis of diplomatic correspondence, lasting throughout the whole period of forty years. Shortly after their conclusion, it was evident that the treaties were, from the American stand- point unsatisfactor\' for the chief reasons that, as pointed out by Secretary Fish:- "They are not coextensive with the limits of the Empire. The provisions of none of the existing treaties extend to Alsace and Lorraine, which form an integral part of the empire; and from which there has long been a large and valuable emigration to the I'nited States, whose status deserves recognition and protection." And secondly: "They make different, and in some respects, conflicting pro- visions respecting the naturalized citizens." In defense of the treaties, Bancroft replied'' that the German Government was not disposed to deny to the emigrants from those 'Sen. Doc. No. 318, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. XXXVII. 2 F. R., 73, p. 280. 3 F. R., 73, p. 287. 52 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH two provinces (Alsace and Lorraine) the benefits of the treaty with the North German Union and that, though there were shght differences between the treaties, they were interpreted and executed ahke. . . . He explained at the same time that it would not be ad\isable to negotiate for a single treaty with the empire, because, being directly at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, the moment was a "most inauspicious one for bringing before the German Parliament any document exempting men of German birth from obedience to German mihtary law."^ The auspicious moment apparently never came, for the Bancroft treaties with \ the five separate German States have remained in force and the long diplomatic discussions have centered in a changing inter- pretation of their clauses, and in the extent of their application. The treaty formed with the North German Union was the first to be concluded, and became the one chiefly used as the basis for discussions. The clauses most often brought to bear are the following:'^ Article I. "Citizens of the North German Confederation who become naturalized citizens of the United States of America, and shall have resided uninterruptedly within the United States five years, shall be held by the North German Confederation to be American citizens, and shall be treated as such." Article IU " A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the territory of the other party remains liable to trial and pmiishment for an action punishable by the laws of his original country and com- mitted before his emigration." Article IV. "If a German naturalized in America renews his residence in North Germanv without the intent to return to America, he shall ' be held to have renounced his natm-alization in the United States. . . . The intent not to return may be held to exist when the person naturalized in the one country resides more than two years in the other country." « F. R., 73, p. 289. ' U., Vol. II, p. 1298. THE BAXCROFT TREATIES 53 Tilt' principle through which Bancroft was able to .secure the treaties'' was that — endorsed by Bismarck himself — of the natural right of emigration and the prohibition of any punishment inflicted because of the act of emigration itself. Before this time the German kingdoms had not recognized tte right of subjects to dissolve their allegiance to their sovereign without his consent. The Bancroft treaties have therefore been considered "a great achievement of American diplomacy which has made a breach in an old feudal principle of monarchical states."^ Although the I'nited States, in the words of President Hayes,*^ admitted "no distinction whatever between the rights of a native and a naturalized citizen of the United States," the pohcy was adhered to of investigating carefully each case of molestation, and only those protests were forwarded to the German authorities which had been found In- the United States Consuls to be covered by the treaty stipulation, /. c, when the intent to return to the United States had been satisfactorily demonstrated.^ Germany, on the other hand, reserved the right to punish (by forced military sersice, imprisonment, fine or expulsion) or to release the citizen in cpiestion. As reported by the United States ]Minister at Berlin, J. C. B. Davis, ^^ "Release from fine or arrest of returned American citizens of German birth has been granted by use of the royal prerogative of pardon. It has not been regarded as a right which can be asserted and enforced under German law by the injured party." Though Germany throughout the controversies manifested a desire to adhere to the terms of the treaty, ^^ the interpretation of those tenns, and the fact of the discrepancies between the treaties signed with the separate States left room for much fluctuation of policy. As the treaty with Baden^'- contained no two-year clause, former citizens of that State on their return were apt to be molested 6 F. R., '73, p. 284. ' House Report No. 2590, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 5. 8 F. R., '79, p. xiii. ^ F. R., '84, p. 212. »" F. R., '75, p. 5G8. " F. R., '79, p. xiii. 12 M., Vol. I, p. 53. 54 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH upon their arrival, or Avithin a short time thereafter, and found difficulty in proving their intent to return. Although the United States never construed the two-year clause of the treaty to mean that the United States citizenship was lost by the two years' residence/^ nevertheless in practice it acquiesced in Germany's right by treaty to expel or to force to become naturalized any former Germaft " F. R., '85, p. 397, No. 287. Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Kasson. Department of State, Washington, January 15, 1885. "Under these treaties, a two years' residence in his native country of a citizen naturalized in the United States of America does not of itself divest him of his adopted citizenship. The treaties provide that when a citizen of either country naturalized in the other shall renew his residence in the country of his birth without the intent to return to his adopted country, he shall be held to have renounced his naturalization, and further that the intent not to return ^may be held to exist' after the residence in the native country shall exceed two years. The residence, therefore, is the only evidence open to rebuttal of lack of intention to return to the adopted country. The treaty, therefore, by itself does not work forfeiture of citizenship, and in this case some affirmative governmental act was necessary to show that the elder Klingenmeyer had through residence in Germany, without intent to return here, forfeited his naturalization. This is the construction of the fourth article of the treaty of 1868, which has been maintained by this Department and, so far as is known, admitted by the German Government." Supplement, 1913, to Senate DoC. No. 357, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess. "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc.," p. 125. Later the United States seems to have modified its views slightly concerning the principle of the two-years' residence. In 1906 a convention on the status of naturalized citizens was concluded with the South and Central American countries. This convention included the two-year residence principle of the Bancroft treaties, but it was worded so as to lay more emphasis on the two- year residence as evidence that the naturalized person residing in his native country did not intend to return to the country of his adoption. The Articles read as follows: "Art. I. If a citizen, a native of any of the countries signing the present convention and naturalized in another, shall again take up residence in his native coimtry without the intention of returning to the country in which he has been naturalized, he will be considered as having reassumed his original citizenship, and as having renounced the citizenship acquired by the said naturalization. Art. II. The intention not to return will be presumed to exist when the naturalized per?on shall have resided in his native country for more than two years. But this presumption may be destroyed by evidence to the contrary." TWO-YEA H HKSIDENCE CLAUSE ' 55 citizens after a residence of two years in Germany." It also acquiesced in the ris^ht of expulsion before the hniit of two years had expired, provided that the intention of the individual not to return could be satisfactorily demonstrated.^^ The enforcement of such right was exercised by Germany mostly in the case of men of miHtary age,^" older German-Americans being allowed to reside indefinitely in the Fatherland. ^^ ^^ " F. R., '84, p. 212, Inclosiire.2 in No. 74, Mr. Kasson to Mr. Reichard. Legation of the United States, Berlin, November 14, 1884; "In reply to your third inquiry the legation is of the opinion that recm- ring visits to Germany, not i)rolonged be^'ond two years, are permissible under the treaty, if preceded liy bona jide resumptions of residence in the United States, and that the residence of six months which preceded your recent return to Germany should ])e regarded as such a residence. In the opinion of this legation, the German Government reserved the right in ({uestion in order to act or decline to act upon each case as it should he presented at the time for action, without interference by the United States. \Ve do not therefore believe that you would now obtain from them a satis- factory rejily, and do not think it advisable to transmit your application to them, thus caUing special attention to your case and that of your children. The only effect, in our view of the case, of your overstaying two years would be to give the German authorities the right to say (without our interference) that you or your children, or l^oth, must become naturalized or leave the countrj'. As long as you hold to the bona fide intention of return to the United States to reside there as a citizen, we hold you and your minor children to be still American citizens." '5 F. R., '85, p. 401. "5 F. R., '84, p. 194. I'F. R., '83, p. 331. '^ AutoWography of A. D. White, Vol. I, p. 534 ff . "In those days an American minister at Berlin was likely to find his personal relations with the German minister of foreign affairs cordial, but his official relations continuous war. Hardly a day passed without some skirmish regarding the rights of "German-Americans" in their Fatherland. The old story constantly recurred in new forms. Generally it was sprung l)y some man who had left German}' just at the age for entering the army, had remained in America just long enough to secure naturahzation, and then, without a thought of tlischarging any of his American duties, had come back to claim exemption from his German duties, and to flaunt his American citizen i)apers in the face of the authorities of the province where he was born. This was very galling to these authorities, from the fact that such Americans were often inclined to glory over their old schoolmates and associates who had not taken this means of escajifng military duty; and it was no wonder that these brand new citizens, if their i)apers were not perfectly regular, were sometimes held for desertion imtil the American representative could intervene. Still other cases were those where fines had l)een im))osed U])()ii men of this class for non-appearance when summoned to military duty, and an American minister was expected to secure their remission. In simple justice to Germanv, it ought to lie said that there is no foreign matter of such importance so iittle understood in the United States as this. 56 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH The years 1884 and 1885 marked the beginnings of a more stringent mihtary pohcy on the part of the Germans and the tendency to extend the restrictions governing former German subjects on their return to the country.^^ It became the pre- cedent to consider that the two years' residence in Germany di^•ested automatically any former German of his acquired citizen- ship.2° It also extended its policy of the right of expulsion to the minor children of such a returning citizen. A definite ruling in regard to the fathers and sons in question was issued by the Go\'ernment.-^ 1. "Fathers naturalized in America and returning to Germany to reside, and there sojourning for more than two years, are to be regarded as having renounced their naturalization under the provisions of the treaty of 1868." 2. " But minor children of such parents born in America will be recognized as retaining their American citizenship uninfluenced by their father's renunciation of his naturalization, and they cannot be made to perform military service in Germany, but their sojourn in Germany may be refused, under the principles of international law, when the same may be required in the interest of public order." The United States refused to admit the validity of either ruling. As expressed by Secretary of State Frelinghuysen: The average American, looking on the surface of things, cannot see why the young emigrant is not allowed to go and come as he pleases. The fact is that German policy in that respect has been evolved in obedience to the instinct of national self-preservation. The German Empire, the greatest Continental home of civilization, is an open camp, perpetually l:)esieged. Speaking in a general way, it has no natural frontiers of any sort — neither mountains nor wide expanses of sea. Eastward are one hundred and thirty millions of people fanatically hostile as regards race, religion and imaginary interests; westward is another great nation of fortj' millions, wth a hatred on all these points intensified by desire for revenge; northward is a vigorous race estranged by old quarrels; and south is a power which is largely hostile on racial, religious and historic grounds, and at best a very uncertain reliance, lender such circumstances, universal military service in Germany is a condi- tion of its existence, and evasion of this is natfirally looked ui)on as a sort of treason. The real wonder is that Germany has l)een so moderate in her dealing with this question. The yearly 'budgets of military cases' in the archives of the American Emliassy bear ample testimony to her desire to be just and even lenient." " F. R., '85, p. X. 20 Y. R., '85, p. 392. 21 F. R., '85, p. 400. INCREASED RESTRICTIONS ON FORMER GERMAN SUBJECTS 01 "We think it dear that the treaty cannot of itself convert an American citizen back again to a (lernian, any more than it can make a German a citizen of tlie Inited States." "As to the sons of sucli fatliers, who, being citizens by birtli, may visit the land of their fathers' allegiance the decision of the German Government is just. They are original citizens in their .own right and the treaty does not relate to them. In all respects they stand on the same footing as native Americans of American parentage. This being so, the contention of the German Govern- ment that such sons may be expelled from Germany on abrupt notice, at the pleasure of the authorities, under the alternative of becoming German subjects is tantamount to claiming the right to expel any citizen of the United States in like manner, and with the like alternative, which of course would conflict with pro^'isions of the existing treaty." Count Hatzfeldt's reply-^ asserted that it was a view universally adhered to by nations that treaties of amity and commerce did not abolish the recognized right of each nation to expel citizens considered injurious to the welfare of the State. He pointed out further that Germany had made an important concession to the United States in recognizing the American nationality of the sons in question of the former Gennan citizens, since under the German legal \iew such sons would share the nationality of the father.^-^ He also intimated the lenient attitude of the Government, stating that: "The Government of the United States may rather rest assured that the German authorities . . . will as heretofore allow all reasonable consideration to prevail. "-■* The stricter interpretation of the treaties made their defects more e\"ident and there was some attempt in the United States to have them abrogated. During 1882 two resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives-^ providing for the termination of the Bancroft treaties. These were referred to the =- F. R., '85, p. 418. ■' V. R., '85, p. 418. 2^ F. R., '85, p. 417. 2^ Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. XIII, p. 428 (H. R. No. lOli) and 47th Cong., 2nd Se.s.s., Vol. XIV, p. 18. 58 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH Committee on Foreign Affairs, which reported-^ a substitnte resohition. This provided for the negotiation of a new naturaHz- ation treaty with the German Empire which should operate as a termination of the old treaties with the several German States without formal notice being given of the intention to abrogate them. Again, in 1885," the same resolution was recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs for adoption. In the report accom- panying the resolution the defects and virtues of the Bancroft treaties were both set forth. The committee considered the treaties to have been of great value, both in breaking down the old feudal principle of "once a subject, always a subject," and in granting substantial benefits to American citizens. ^Moreover, the committee considered that those benefits were reciprocal only in name and that they were actually useful only to the United States, because the native American naturaHzed in Germany and returning to the United States required no protection from prose- cution for unauthorized emigration or for the non-fulfilment of militars" duty. There was therefore no doubt that a simple notice to terminate the treaties would be accepted by Germany. But this would leave the citizens concerned without regulated pro- tection. Therefore the committee did not recommend that notice be given to terminate the Bancroft treaties, but it did consider that the time had come for the "conclusion of a new treaty com- prising the whole German Empire, and with such modification as might secure a more full and satisfactory protection of the rights of American citizens abroad." Apparently these movements by Congress were without results, 2« House Reports, 47th Cong, and Sess., No. 1893. (To accompany H. Res. 329.) "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, requested to take the necessary steps toward negotiating a treaty with the German Empire securing more liberal and just provisions in reference to the respective rights of citizens — native-born or naturalized — of the United States and the German Empire." " House Report No. 2590, 4Sth Cong., 2nd Sess. ATTEMPTS TO TERMINATE BANCROFT TREATIES 59 published correspondence showing no record of negotiations for a new treaty at this time. The Bancroft treaties continued to he used as governing tiie riglits of naturalized Americans on their return to Gennan\ . For several years the two governments continued to carry on a considerable dii)lomatic correspondence, reprotesting and reasserting from tlie same standpoint.-*^ President Cleveland referred to this in his message to Congress^^ but described the general relations of the two countries as having "lost none of their accustomed cordiality." The protests of the United States were changed gradually from the basis that Germany's policy of expul- sion was in violation of the Bancroft treaties to the basis that it was not friendly. As expressed by Ambassador Bayard:''" "While thus freely admitting the right of expulsion this Depart- ment holds that its arbitrary exercise cannot be regarded as con- sistent with existing relations . . . There must be declara- tions or acts (showing the intent not to return) in addition to the mere fact of return to the country of origin, in order to create or justify the conclusion that naturalization has been renounced. . . Although it is not a question arising under the treaty, it is due to comity, as well as to the existence of the treaty, that reasonable grounds for expulsion should exist and be made known." A marked decrease in the number of cases calUng for diplomatic I inter\-ention followed fluring the next few years, a situation recorded with satisfaction by the United States representatives.'*' In 1897 the reversal of the policy of the German Government in regard to the treatment of the sons of German parents became evident through the case of Alfred IMeyer.^^ fjg ^yj^g j^^j^n in the United States of Gennan parents, was brought to Germany at the age of four, and on reaching military age was impressed into the German army. In intervening in his behalf the Ignited States Ambassador brought foru'ard the ruling of the German Govern- " F. R., '87, p. 370. ^a F. R., '86, p. iv. '« F. R., '88, p. 420. " F r^ >gg^ p q^q '2 F. R., '97, p. 194. 60 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH ment in 1885, which declared that sons by reason of their American birth might not be forced to serve. The reply from the Imperial Foreign Office^'* was that ]Meyer was, under the laws of Prussia, a Prussian subject, and that if his birth on American soil made him an American citizen, then he possessed a double nationality and must fulfil his obhgations to both countries. As it turned out, IMeyer was soon dismissed from the service^^ on the ground of physical disabihty; therefore, the United States did not press its protest further and this issue remained unsettled. Cases continued to be brought to the notice of American consuls during the next few years, but formal protest was seldom made to the German Government in their behalf, as they seemed to indicate no new policy of treatment^^ and it w^as stated by the American ambassador that the number of persons molested for not having performed military service in Germany was a very small one compared to the number of naturalized Americans who each year returned to Germany. In the cases of fines imposed for such non-performance of military duty the money was nearly always refunded at the intervention of the American authorities. To decrease the number of cases of expulsion or other molestation and reduce to a minimum any resulting friction between the two countries, the United States published a notice^^ to American citizens formerly subjects of Gemiany explaining their liability under the military and expatriation laws of their native country. It was made evident also to the United States Government by its own representative in Germany that there was no intention on the part of the Prussian Government to discriminate against American citizens, and that Germans of military age returning after natural- ization in other countries received similar treatment.^" Efforts of the Prussian ^Minister of the Interior to curtail the sojourn in Prussia of former German subjects of military age caused the United States again to protest to the German Foreign Office. This protest set forth^^ that while the United States had »3 F. R., '97, p. 195. '■< F. R., '97, p. 200. 35 F. R., '01, p. 159. 36 F. R.^ '01, p. 160. " F. R., '01, p. 177. 38 F. R., '02, p. 441. Al'l'LUAniLlTY OF TREATIKS TO ALSACE-LORRAINE <)! no sympatliy with tlie evaders of military duty, and while it did not eontest the riijjht of Prussia to ex])el iindesirahles, it claimed the right to know ;<7/// any given American citizen should he so con- sidered. Otherwise, indiscriminate expulsion would "operate as a deterrent to the exercise of the rights of expatriation and the acquisition of allegiance granted under the naturalization treaties.' ' A new ])hase of the subject was introduced by cases of the former citizens of Alsace-Lorraine. By these cases it became evident that the Government of Germany was unwiUing to admit that this territory was to be included under the provisions of the Bancroft treaties,^^ which were signed before the acquisition of those provinces. The United States refused to admit this non- applicability of the naturalization treaties to the territory ot Alsace-Lorraine.^*' Germany contended that the United States had been informed of this stand definitely in ISSl and had accepted it without dispute at that time.^^ It is true that the subject was brought up in that year, but Dr. White, then American Minister, bears witness in his autobiography^- that the German contention »9 F. R., '03, p. 443. « F. R., '04, p. 319. ^1 F. R., '06, p. 652. « Autobiography of A. D. White, Vol. I, pp. 592 ff . "I immediatel}' wrote to the minister of foreign affairs, stating the man's case, and showing that it came under the Bancroft treaties, or at least under the construction of them which the German Government up to that time had freely allowed. To this I received an answer that the Bancroft treaties, having been made before Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the empire, did not apply to these new provinces, and that the youth was detained as a deserter. To this I replied that, although the minister's statement was strictly true, the point had been waived long before in our favor; that in no less than eight cases the German Government had extended the benefit of the Bancroft treaties over Alsace-Lorraine; and that in one of these cases the acting minister of foreign affairs had declared the intention of the government to make this extension permanent." The German authorities still refused to free the citizen in question, and Dr. White perceived that Bismarck himself was behind the refusal. "'The matter became more and more serious. The letter of the law was indeed on Bismarck's side; but the young man was an American citizen and the idea of an .\merican citizen being held in })rison was anything but pleasant to me, and I knew that it would be anything but j)leasant to my fellow-citizens across the water. . . . My position was especially difficult because 1 dared not communicate the case fully to the American State Department of that period. ... I therefore stopped short with my first notification to the State Department — to the effect that a naturalized American had been imprisoned for desertion in Alsace-Lorraine, and that the legation was doing 62 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH was by no means accepted without dispute by the United States. On the contrary the discussion of the case of an American citizen who was arrested by the German mihtary authorities on his return to his native province of Alsace, threatened to become a serious diplomatic incident and required skilled maneuvering on the part of the American ^Minister before the matter was adjusted. Dr. White pointed out to the minister of Foreign Affairs, that in at least eight cases the German Government had applied the Bancroft treaties to Alsace-Lorraine, and that "in one of these cases the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared the intention of the government to make this extension permanent." After much delay the German Government freed the American citizen in question. It did not \ield, however, its declaration that the Bancroft treaties did not apply to the annexed provinces. As in several other cases, the incident was therefore closed, leaving both countries holding opposite vie^^'points. Thus it became clear to both nations that the solution of the problem lay in the formation of a new treaty which should def- initely place "American citizens born in Alsace-Lorraine on the same footing as other American citizens of German origin. " There- fore, instructions were given^^ to the American Ambassador to enter into negotiations for such a treaty with the German Govern- its best to secure his release. To say more than this involved danger that the affair might fall into the hands of sensation-mongers and result in howls and threats against the German Government and Bismarck; and I knew well that, if such howls and threats were made, Bismarck would never let this young Israelite out of prison as long as he lived. It seemed hardly the proper thing, serious as the case was, to ask for mj' passports. It was certain that, if this were done, there would come a chorus of blame from both sides of the Atlantic. . . . I secured from Washington by cable a leave of absence, but, before starting, saw some of my diplomatic colleagues, who were wont to circulate freely and talk much, stated the main features of the case to them, and said that I was 'going off to enjoy myself;' that there seemed little use for an American minister in a country where precedents and agreements were so easily disregarded. Next day I started for the French Riviera. The journey was taken leisurely, with interesting halts at Cologne and Aix-la-Cliapelle; and, as I reached the hotel in Paris, a telegram was handed me — 'Your man in Alsace-Lorraine is free.' It was evident that the chancellor had felt better and had thought more leniently of the matter, and I had never another difficulty of the sort during the remainder of my stay." «F. R., '07, p. 511. ATIKMITS TO SKCUHE NEW TREATY 63 iiH'iit on the uTouiul tliat tlic Bancroft treaties had liad "the jjreatest inHuenee in (Irawin^ the people of the United States and of (lennany into friendly accord." Throngh the following year, n)l)S, no reply was received from the German Governments^ as to the negotiations suggested, although the German Secretary of Foreign AfYairs had signified the willingness of his government to conclude such a treaty. The United States Ambassador was again instructed to bring the matter before the German Government. With these instructions, given in April, 1908, the whole corre- spondence on the subject ceased to be published in the United States Government diplomatic correspondence. It is therefore difficult to ascertain what the further developments were in regard to the long-continued jiroblem of the rights of the naturalized American of German liirth to freedom of sojourn in Germany. Tracing the course of the controversy there is evident an increasing strictness in the policy of the German Government (l)articularly of the Prussian military authorities) toward the returning former Germans of military age, and the insistence of that government's right under international law to expel any citizen whom it considers to be undesirable. The United States policy became considerably modified, and in later years it admitted the rights claimed by Germany protesting only at a policy of indiscriminate expulsion. Throughout the controversy there was evident a spirit of willingness on the part of both countries, while maintaining principles, to yield in individual instances as a diplo- matic favor and in deference to the friendly relations between the two countries. " F. R., '08, p. 376. "5 F. R., '07, p. 511. CHAPTER IV CO:\BIERCIAL RELATIONS The commerce of the United States and the German Empire was never regulated by a comprehensive commercial treaty. Temporary agreements were concluded from time to time deter- mining the status of certain products of one country under the tariff provisions of the other, but the principles governing such decisions were not embodied in any formal treaty made since the unification of the empire. In the absence of such formal agree- ment the two nations used as a working basis the old treaty of 1828 between the United States and Prussia/ which placed the contracting parties on the basis of the "most-favored-nation" in all matters of commerce and naxagation. The controversies which developed from time to time over the application of this treaty to the commercial legislation of the two countries, centered in a contrasting and, in the case of Germany varying interpreta- tion of the "most-favored-nation" principle.- The question was whether that principle required the extension to all most-favored- natibns, automatically, of any privilege granted to a single country or whether it required that extension only in return for compensa- tion. The policy of Germany^ was a changing one in this respect, the Imperial Government holding at certain periods the uncon- ditional, and at others offering only the conditional concept. The United States held consistently to the narrower concept of recip- ^ For the question as to the validity of this treaty, see Chap. II, Treaty Relations. - See Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Session. Also Fisk: " j\Iost-favored-nation Relations: German- American." — Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903. Also F. R., 1911, p. 5. ' Calwer: "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 19 ff. ECONOMIC BASIS OF HELATIONS 65 rocity, /. c, no favors granted without compensating favors receised. This, as has been shown (Chapter II), was expressly provi Fisk, U. S.-Ger. Com., Polit. Rel., p. 144. RESTRICTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN PORK 67 the raw prodiu-ts reciiiirod 1)\' tliose industries. These raw products she obtained in hiri;e measure from the T'nited States. Even in the case of I'nited States' food protlucts against which she could and did enact restrictive measures, she must face the opposition of a large and growing portion of her own people, the industrials who were demanding the chea]) and abundant articles of food furnished by America. The United States on the other hand, in its strong policy of industrial protection, enacted tarifl' measures which opposed almost the complete range of German exports, since these consisted almost exclusively of manufactured goods. Such was in general the economic background for the trade relations between the two countries. Commercial conflicts brought before the diplomatic departments for solution related tJiemselves in complicated and often very indirect fashion to the changing tariff enactments. One of the earliest and most enduring subjects of controversy was that over American pork and the prohibition of its importa- tion into Germany. This commercial conflict began with the imperial decree of June 25, 1880,^ prohibiting the admission into Germany of all kinds of pork except hams and sides of bacon. The reason given for the decree was an epidemic of trichinosis due to the eating of diseased pork. The exemption was made in the case of hams and sides of bacon because, through proper inspection, the trichina? might be detected in these and the infectcfl meats condemned. In 1882^ a request on the part of the United States to have this decree modified for the benefit of certain prepared meat products of two important meat packing companies was refused. In 188.3^" a measure was brought before the Bundesrath jjrohibiting the importation of all American pork, including hams and live animals. In protesting^^ the passage of this measure the United States stated that the assumption of the diseased condition of American pork was unfounded and unjust, that German trade interests in the admission of the pork were very great, that its cheapness made it an important food product for the poorer 8 F. R., '82, p. 158. ' F. R., '82, p. 158. '» F. R., '8.3, p. 320. " F. R., '83, p. 320. 68 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS classes in Germany, and that the planned reduction of United States' import charges would so aid German manufactured goods that Germany should favor the products of the United States. That the innocuous character of American pork might be demon- strated, President Arthur invited Germany^- to "send a commission of experts to the United States to examine the raising and packing of hogs and hog products for food." This invitation was declined. The reason given was^^ that the prohibition was "a measure of internal German legislation found necessary after careful investi- gation on sanitary grounds and closely connected with the internal institutions of the country. . . . Germany by its strict and rigorously enforced legislation afforded the same protection to its people at home against all danger from German cattle and hogs, it could not therefore treat the foreign producers better than its own. An investigation of the American methods of raising hogs and preparing hog products by a commission of German experts in the United States could not effect a material change in this respect." It is difficult to follow this reasoning. An investigation by a German commission might have shown the American methods to be as careful and the meat as healthful as the German, in which case there would be no better treatment of the foreign producers. It is also difficult to see the applicability of the other argimients used, namely, that Germany made no request to England to inves- tigate German conditions when that country chose to impose restrictions on the importation of German cattle. Xor does the further argument seem conclusive that Austria-Hungary, whose cattle were also excluded from Germany, had not suggested an inquiry of German officials. The most justifiable of the reasons assigned'^ was that while a commission might find perfect order in the establishments it might visit, there was no law guaranteeing uniformity of inspection throughout the United States. ^^ 1- F. R., '83, p. 335. " Sen. Report No. 345, 4Sth Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1-44 ff. '^ Ibid., p. 153 ff. " Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 144 ff. Secretary Frelinghuysen summed up the groimd of refusal to be that "in a matter concerning domestic sanitary legislation, the German Goveni- ment could not enter into any arrangement which might imply an obligation on its i)art to accept and l)e bound by a state of facts existing outside of its jurisdiction." Ibid., page 6. GERMAN' rHOlIIIUTIOX DECREE OF 1883 09 In spite of these protests of the American minister and others from German mercliants interested in the importation of American l)ork. the decree of prohibition was passed by the Bundesrath/'"' In tr\in,u- to obtain a suspension of the prohibitory onhnance, the American ambassador expressed the warning that the United States might resort to retahatory measures against German products.^" The prohibition, however, went into effect. " F. R., '83, p. 360. '"This action on the part of Mr. Sargent was disapproved by Secretary FreHnghuysen and the minister was instructed to make ex{)lanation of this to the Gorman Government. See tlie following extracts from the correspond- ence. F. R.. 18S3, p. 342. (Inclosure in No. 111.) Mr. Sargent to Count Hatzfeldt. Legation of the United States, Berlin, February 23, 1883. Inasmuch as the United States are a large and growing consumer of German manufactures, and the food they export to Germany is a principal article of exchange, the laws of trade must dictate their obtaining the goods they import elsewhere, if the equivalent which they furnish is refused. This would prol)ably result even if the Congress did not meet the issue by legisla- tion under thebehef that another motive than the unsoundness of American pork products caused this exclusion. Such a belief, of course, could not obtain if fair investigation on the spot by German experts showed dangerous unsoundness to exist. A. A. Sargent." F. R., 1883, p. 356, No. 185. Mr. FreUnghuysen to Mr. Sargent. Department of State, Washington, March 14, 1883. So far as your intimation touches the operation of the laws of inter- national trade, it is unexceptionable. Those laws control themselves, and commerce must perforce work its own channels in the most natural oirections; l)ut when you go further and indicate the possibility that this Government may resort to retaliation if its views be not assented to by Germany, you introduce an element which it was not intended to present. The action taken by this Government was unusual, and necessarily pre- supiK)sed that the direct proposal of the President to the Imperial Govern- ment would be entertained in the same frank spirit in which it was protTered; and no doubt, it will yet receive a courteous reply, whether favorable or unfavorable. It may be that His Majesty the Emperor may decline to send hither a commission as has been proposed, through unwillingness, possibly, that the results of its labors should have a liinding ctTect upon his Government, such as might naturally be sujjposed to follow from a commission created by imjicrial order. The German Government has an undoubted right to with- hold its Cducurrence in the suggestion of the President and the exercise of the right would give no occasion for offense. It is the duty of govermnents to 70 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS The prohibition was not confined to Germany. Restrictive measures of varying degrees of severity had been enacted against American pork products since 1879 by France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Turkey and Greece and, for a short time, by England. The movement, according to the Secretary of State, Freling- huysen,^* was at first confined to hygienic considerations, but soon became subjected to the pressure of the local pork industries in the various continental countries, the general tendency of the scientists becoming opposed to the prohibitive measures as unwise and unnecessary. In the year following the German prohibition decree the whole subject of the restrictions of European countries against American be jealous of the health and careful of the interests of the citizens or subjects, and the President does not seek to support an appeal to German sense of equity by any menace. In this view of the matter, therefore, any intimation, such as is contained in your note to Count Hatzfeldt, that retaliation might ensue in the event of a refusal, was out of place." Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 154, No. 98. Mr. von Eisendecker to Mr. Frelinghuysen. Imperial German Legation, Washington, July 27, 1883. The aforesaid note of Mr. Sargent made an unpleasant impression in BerUn, both because of its interference in the domestic affairs of Germany, and of its tone, which was not in harmony with the friendly relations existing between the two governments. The German Government is consequently much gratified to find that the Government of the United States does not adopt the position taken by its representative in his aforesaid note." Mt. Sargent's severe criticism of the German Government and his impugn- ment of ^ts motives in issuing and maintaining the decree of prohibition against American pork, led finally to his recall "disguised under the name of transfer." See Moore's Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 722; Autobiography of Andrew D. White, Vol. I, p. 594; and John W. Foster's "Practice of Diplomacy," pp. 116 and 117. 18 Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. Also President Cleveland's message to Congress, December 8, 1885. (F. R., 1885, p. X.) "I regret to say that the restrictions upon the importation of our pork into France continue, notwithstanding the abundant demonstration of the absence of sanitary danger in its use; but I entertain strong hopes that, with a better understanding of the matter, this vexatious prohibition will l)e removed. It would be pleasing to be able to say as much with respect to Germany, Austria and other countries, where such food products are absolutely excluded, without present prospect of change." AMEKICAX MEAT INSPECTION LAW OF ISOO 71 products was brought before the United States Congress. The Connnittee on Foreign Rehitions, acting on a resohition of the Senate, submitted a report recommending a bill which provided for measures of reprisal.'-* The President was to be authorized "at his discretion to exclude from the United States, by procla- mation, any product of any foreign state which, by unjust discrimi- nation, prohibits the importation into such foreign state of any product of the United States." Such a provision was not passed at this time but was finally embodied in the ]\Ieat Inspection Law of August 30, 1890.'-'* In presenting its recommendation the Foreign Relations Committee had based its conclusions as to the general healthfulness of American pork products on the report of a commission which had been appointed by the President to inves- tigate the conditions of the swine industry in the United States and had testified to the generally healthful condition of the pork.-^ -- 1^ Senate Report Xo. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 2« U. S. Statutes, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., '89-'90, No. 5. 2' House Ex. Doc. Xo. 106, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 136. -- Senate Report 345, Part 2, 4Sth Cong., 1st Sess. At the time these recommendations were submitted by the Committee on Foreign Relations a minority report was filed by Senator Vance of North Carolina, Democratic member of the Committee, as follows: "The undersigned is not able to concur in the report of the committee, and is constrained by the importance of the subject to present the reasons for his non-concurrence. The matter complained of, and which the bill is designed to remedy, is the exclusion of our hog products from entering Germany for sale on the ground that they are unwholesome. In my opinion, Germany has the right to do tliis if she deems it proper, and that we are not justified in impeaching her motives in so doing. If it be true that our pork is to any extent unwholesome, we should endeavor, by a rigid system of inspection, to remove the cause of complaint. If it be that fear of trichinosis is only a pretext, and that the real reason for excluding our hog products is the desire to protect their own producers, then we are the last people on earth who ought to complain. After sur- rounding ourselves for more than twenty years with a protective tariff wall so high as to exclude virtually all the products of Germany which compete with ours, it is rather late for us to advocate retaliation against a Government which merely follows our example. In fact Germany's action is retaliation, and the cry of 'Stop thief cannot change the true condition of things. We have got to learn that we are not so great and independent as to enable us to defy the laws of political economy and the amenities of international trade with imi)unity. We have been told again and again that our true policy was to shut up 72 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AYith the continuance of the restrictions the president in a later message to Congress recommended-^ legislative measures for the prevention of the importation of swine and products of swine from France and Germany on the same ground of the unhealthful condition of the meat. Germany regarded this recom- mendation as purely retaliatory because of the measures in Ger- many against American swine products and declared that Ger- many's exportation to America consisted mainly of the fine types of sausage in the manufacture of which especial care was taken in Germany. It was also stated that if the United States wished the removal of the German prohibition, the way to secure it lay not in reprisals but in reforming her slaughter-house and packing methods. In 1891 the subject of the withdrawal of the prohibition against American pork was brought before the Reichstag.-^ Those favor- ing the withdrawal voiced their own and the United States' con- tention that the meat was healthy, that it was eaten in the United States, England and elsewhere without injury, that the German working people needed it as a cheap and nourishing food, that the United States felt keenly this discrimination against one of its staple products, that the decree when passed in 1883 was con- sidered to be merely a temporary measure, and most important of all, that the American government had just passed a law pro- viding for a very strict inspection of the hogs and hog products which should guarantee the healthy condition of the meat. The our manufactures from the competition of the world, and that all the nations thus excluded would be compelled, nevertheless, to buy our breadstuff's and provisions — that they could not do without them. We are greatly surprised and indignant when one im])ortant customer says he can get along without our hog jiroducts, and for])ids their coming in; and we propose to retaliate! For what ? For simply and frankly forbidding them to l)e imported. Suiijiose, instead of doing this, Germany had imposed a duty of 100 per cent, on them, which as effectually prohibited their importation, what then? Where would be our so-called retaliation? The undersigned can see no difference whatever in the two methods of prohiliition, so far as results are concerned, only that one is manly and direct, while the other is indirect and based on false yre- tenses." 23 F. R., '88, p. 629. 2< F. R., '91, p. 502. EFFORTS TO SEcrHF. WITHDRAW AI. OF C;ERMA\ l'R( »IIIHrnON 73 attitude of the German {rovernnuMit was throwing more lenient^'' and it implied its willingness to remove the prohibition pro\ided that fullest measures for sanitary meat could be secured. It declared, howe^•er, that it was not yet satisfied with the methods of slaughtering and preparing meat in America and that the new law adopted by Congress was inadequate, because the inspection pro\ided for was not compulsory, and was made on the meat after it had been boxed. Although the measure did not pass at this session the German minister a few months later intimated to the American Secretary of State'-*^ that his govermnent was ^^'illing to accept the inspection pro\'ided for by the new and more stringent law enacted by Con- gress on ^Nlarch third of that year. By the new act inspection was made compulsory and universal throughout the United States. The inspection was made by microscope both before and after the slaughter of the animal and the examined products were clearly labelled and identified throughout all future stages of marketing. It is important at this juncture to observe the role of the tariflf and its use by both countries to regulate reciprocal concessions. The highly protective [NIcKinley tariff of 1890 had just been enacted.-" It had removed the duty on sugar, replacing it by bounties paid to domestic sugar producers. It had, however, provided for the possibility of the renewal of the duty by a recip- rocity clause giving the president power to impose by proclama- tion certain duties on sugar, molasses, tea, coffee and hides, if he considered that any country' exporting these commodities "imposed fluties on other products of the United States which . . . he may deem to be reciprocally unjust or unreasonable." There- fore, in the same inter\'iew-^ in which the German minister inti- mated that his govennnent might be willing to accept the new meat 25 F. R., '91, p. 502. 2«F. R., '91, p. 511. " Taussig, Tariff Hi.st. of U. S., p. 276 fT. "F. R., '91, p. 511. 74 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS inspection law of the United States as satisfactory and admit pork to Germany, he also sought assurance from the Secretary of State that the United States' Government would not, through the new tariff act of October 1, 1S90, restore the duty on German sugar imported into the United States. The President justly contended, however, that since Germany excluded xlmerican pork on the ground of unhealthfulness, it should not make its repeal of the prohibition contingent on something entirely unrelated to this. Nevertheless, the President declared himself "disposed to treat with the Gennan Government respecting commercial reciprocity . . . with the greatest spirit of Uberality, and the prompt action of that government regarding the pork inspection will have its due weight in detemiining the terms of the reciprocity arrange- ment." In other words the offer to enter into a bargain was accepted. This offer resulted in the so-called Saratoga Agreement.-^ It took the form of an exchange of declarations between ]Mr. von Mimim, then Imperial Charge d'Affaires at Washington, and ]Mr. John W. Foster, and took place at Saratoga, New York, on August 22, 1891.^° The Imperial Government promised to admit to Germany American pork and pork products and to extend to the agricultural products of the United States the tariff concessions about to be granted by Germany in the treaties then in prepa- ration with several European states. The Government of the United States promised not to put into operation against Germany the provision of the- meat inspection law of August 30, 1890, which stipulatecP^ "that whenever the President shall be satisfied that unjust discriminations are made by or under the authority of any foreign state against the importation to or sale in such foreign state of any product of the United States, he may direct that such products of such foreign states so discriminating against any 23 V. R., 1891, Anlagen Xr. 571 (also V. R., 1909, vol. 2-12, Anl. p. 61). 3»Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 119, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-92, p. 110. Also Calwer, "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," pp. 21 ff. '1 U. S. Stat., 51st Cong., 1st Sess., '89-'90, p. 415, No. 5. TIIK SARATOGA AGREEMENT <0 ])ro(hict of tlie United States as lie may deem proper shall he excluded from imjxtrtatioii into the United States." The Saratoga A<>;reement was not imderstood^- to supplant in any way the old Prussian treaty, but merely to regulate the specific commercial problems of that time. The assurances on the i)art of the United States that it would not impose a tax on Genuan sugar confined themselves to the period of the duration of the INIcKinley tariff'. The German concessions^^ were also operative only for the duration of the treaties with European countries. The relation of the Saratoga Agreement^* to the principle of the '- V. R., 1909, Anl. Vol. 242, pp. Gl and 62. « V. R., '95-97, 213 Sitz. 3 Mai, '97, Vol. VIII, p. 5707. '*Sen. Ex. Doc, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-'92, Nr. 119, p. 110 (also Calwer, "Die Meistbeguenstiguno; der V. St.," p. 21 ff.). The note directed l)y the German representative von Mumm to Mr. Foster read as follows: Saratoga, August 22, 1891. "Mr. Plenipotentiary: Inasmuch as the insi)ection of meat intended for interstate commerce in North America and for exportation to foreign countries has l)een made com- pulsory l)y the act of March third, 1891, relative to the execution of that act, the Imjierial Government is happy to announce that there is no longer any cause for maintaining in force the prohiliition, promulgated on sanitary grounds in the year 1883, of the importation of hogs, pork, and sausages of American origin, provided that they are officially inspected according to the regulations of March twenty-fifth," 1891, and accompanied by the required certificate. As soon, therefore, as the Government of the United States of America is able officially to inform the Imperial Government when the act of March third, 1891, will actually take effect in the manner provided l)y the regulations of March 25, 1891, so that the guaranty which is contemplated Vn- the aforesaid act shall appear confirmed, viz., that no meat dangerous to health shall he exported, the Imperial Government will take the necessary prehminary measures to abolish the German proliibition of importation which was promulgated May sixth, 1883. The Imperial Government in making this declaration bases its action upon the supposition that, after the abolition of the aforesaid prohibition of importa- tion, the President of the United States of America will no longer have any occasion for the exercise, as regards the German Empire, of the discretion- arv powers conferred upon him bv the Fifty-first Congress. (See Section 3 of the Tariff Act of October first, 1890; also public act No. 2477.) The Imperial Government thinks that it has the greater reason for this assumption, since it is jn-epared to grant to the United States of America the same reductions in customs duties on agricultural products that have been granted by it (or still are so) to Austria-Hungary and other states during the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce that are now lacing conducted bj' Germany. Begging you to be pleased to inform me, in your reply to this note, whether the view expressed bv the Imperial Government as regards Section 3 of the tariff act of October "first, 1890, and Section 5 of the act providing for the 76 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS "most-favored-nation" has been viewed in radically opposite ways by German officials. The Imperial Chancellor, Prince von inspection of meat of August thirtieth, 1890, is correct, I await information from you as to the time when the act of March third, 1891, is to be fully enforced, in pursuance of the regulations of March twenty-fifth, 1891. I avail, etc., A. VON MUMM." The German Charge d'Affaires received on the same date the following reply from Mr. Foster: Saratoga, August 22, 1891. "Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today in which you inform me that, when the Government of the United States shall be able to announce to the German Imperial Government that the provisions of the law of March third of the present year and the regulations of the twenty- fifth of the same month, respecting the inspection of meat destined for inter- state and foreign commerce, have been practically put in operation, the Imperial Government will take the necessary steps for abolishing the order of March sixth, 1883, prohibiting the importation into Germany of hogs, pork and sausages of American origin; and you further state that, in view of this declaration and of the further fact that the Imperial Government is wiUing to grant to the United States the same tariff reductions in agricultural pro- ducts which have been granted by commercial treaty negotiations with Austria-Hungary or which may be granted to other countries, the Imperial Government entertains the expectation that no cause will thereafter exist for the President of the United States to make use, as against the German Empire of the powers conferred upon him by the Fifty-first Congress in Sec- tion 3 of the tariff law of October first and section 5 of the meat inspection law of August thirtieth, 1890. It gives pleasure to announce to you that the inspection of meat in accord- ance with the law of March third last and of the regulations of the twenty-fifth of the same month, is now and for some weeks past has been in practical operation under the direction and at the expense of the Government of the United States, and that meat so inspected will be ready for exportation to Germany on or before the first day of next month. It is also very gratifying to me to give the assurance by direction of the President, that the contem- plated action of the Imperial Government in abolishing the order of March sixth, 1883, prohibiting the im])ortation of hogs, pork and sausages of Ameri- can origin will remove the occasion for the exercise by the President, as against the German Empire of the power conferred upon him by section 5 of the meat inspection law of the Congress of the United States of August thirtieth, 1890. I am further directed by the President to state that he accepts the action of the Imperial Government in ])roposing to grant to the agricultural products of the United States the same tariff reductions, on their imi)ortation into Germany, as are granted to the similar productions of Austria-Hungary embraced in the commercial treaty recently negotiated with that government, or which may be granted by Germany to other countries, as a due reciprocity for the action of the Congress of the t^nitetl States as contained in section 3 of the taritY law of Octolier first, 1890; and that as soon as he shall be officially informed that the Imperial Government is prepared to decree the admission of the indicated products of the United States into the German Empire at the reductions of the general tariff proi)osed, the President will cause the necessary orders to be given to secure the continued free admission into the United SARATOGA AGREEMENT AND MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE 77 BiR'low, hold'"' that the sweeping achuission of all Aniorican Products to the lowest rates of duty granted by the German treaties with European countries was evidence that Germany interpreted the old 1828 treat>- clause at this time in the broadest sense; that is, that she admitted the United States to the full status of the "most-favored-nation." Richard Calwer, Social Democrat, States of the articles, the product of the German Empire enumerated in section 3 of said law of Octol)er 1, 1890. I remain, etc. John W. Foster, Special Plenipotentiary of the United States." Mr. Foster, to whom had been assigned the task of conducting all the reciprocity negotiations arising from the McKinley tariff, gives in his Memoirs (Vol. II, p. 6) an account of the negotiations with Von Mumm at Saratoga. The discussions were not to be made public until an agreement could be reached and a premature annoimcement gave President Harrison some tem- porary uneasiness. On September 10, 1891, he wrote to ]Mr. Foster (Vol. II, p. 14). "My dear General: I was extremely mystified when I found that General Rush (Sec'y of Agriculture) had talked aljout matters that I had explained to him with great care were confidential. He came here himself directly from Chicago to ask me on behalf of Swift and other packers there whether it would be safe for them to start a cargo of sugar-cured hams, etc., for German ports in view of the fact that it would take several weeks to get it there. I felt that as this matter directly touched his department, it was proper for me to tell him that the agreement had been reached, — but I told him how confidential the whole matter was; but he seems to have understood, that when the announcement of the admission of our pork came from Germany, the whole matter was open for comment. I have written to Mr. Wharton to say to Mr. Von Mumm that I was very much mortified at this mischance, and also that if he thought it desirable, a statement might go out from the State Department or from you to the effect that the reciprocity ])art of the negotiations had not been completed, and that there would be further correspondence before a general conclusion would l)e reached; but that it was hoped sonie general result would be reached in view of the friendly attitude of Germany. This would be more nearlj' true than most dii)lomatic utterances and certainly than most newspaper inter- views; indeed it would be literally true, because we do not yet know the articles that are to be included and do not know the rates, and indeed do not certainly know that the treaty of which we are to have the benefit will be completed." Xo harm befell the negotiations, however, the tarifT privileges of the German treaties with Austria-Hungary and other European countries were extended to the United States (F. R., '97, p. 176) and the agreement was hailed "as a great achievement in benefit of American commerce." (Foster, Dipl. Mem., Vol. II, p. 14.) « V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Xr. 391, p. 62. 78 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS member of the Reichstag, pointed out,^" on the other hand, that the fact that the Imperial Government used the removal of the . prohibition against American pork as a means of buying tariff concessions from the United States demonstrated a status of mere reciprocity betweeli the two nations." Certainly the bargaining character of the Saratoga Agreement was unmistakable and as such was contrary to an unrestricted most-favored-nation policy. On September 3, 1891, the decree repealing the decree excluding American pork was signed.^^ Proclamation was therefore not made imposing a tax on German sugar. / Four years later the Wilson tariff (1894) changed the basis 1 completely.^'-' The reciprocity provisions were removed.*" The new law reimposed the tax on sugar.*^ Raw sugar was placed under an ad valorem duty of 40 per cent, and refined sugar under an additional specific duty of one-eighth of a cent a pound. The '* Calwer, "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Ver. St.," p. 20. " Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. Also G. M. Fisk, "Most-favored-nation Relations — German-American," in Journal Political Economy, March, 1903. F. R., 1911, p. 5. '8F. R., '91, p. 577. "The decree respecting the prohiliition of the importation of swine, swine's . fiesh, and sausages of American origin, of March 6, 1SS3 . . . ceases to be in force for living swine as well as for such ])roducts as are provided with an official certificate stating the flesh has, in the land of origin been examined pursuant to the rules in force there, and has l^een found free from qualities , injurious to health." 39 Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 313 40 Mclvinley, The Tariff, pp. 204 and 205. In introducing his l)ill, Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, set forth the objections to these provisions of the McKinley Tariff. "This section," he said," has ])rought no appreciable advantage to American exporters; it is not in intention or effect a {:)rovision for reciprocity but for retaliation. It inflicts penalties upon the American people by making them pay higher prices for these articles if the fiscal necessities of other nations coiniiel them to levy duties upon the products of the United States which, in the opinion of the President, are reciprocally unequal and unreasonal)le. . . . Moreover, we do not believe that Congress can rightly vest in the President of the United States any authority or jiower to impose or release taxes on our people l)y proclamation or otherwise, or to suspend or disjiense with the operation of a law of Congress." « Taussig, TarilT Hist, of U. S., p. 313. SUGAR SURTAX OF WILSON TARIFF 79 bounty to domestic producers was abolished, but to offset this, an extra duty of one-tentli of a cent a pound was placed on the refined sugar from those countries which paid an export bounty to their sugar producers. This measure affected Gennany especially. She protested'*- on the ground that such a duty was in contravention of Article 5^^ of the commercial treaty of 1828 between the United States and Prussia. Within two months after the Wilson Tariff Act, Germany noti- ficd^^ the I'nited States of her intention to prohibit the importa- tion of American cattle and fresh meats owing to the discovery of Texas fever in two recent shi]3ments of cattle from the United States. The protest of the United States stated that this measure would needlessly create great injury, that the cattle affected by the Texas fever came from only a certain district of Texas, that export from this district had been prohibited and that the enforce- ment of such a measure woidd l)e considered in the United States to he imfriendly and merely retaliatory in return for the imposi- tion of the surtax on German sugar. The protest also explained that the President intended to advise Congress to repeal the sugar tax and that this action of Gennany 's in regard to American cattle would defeat his effort. President Cleveland carried out this intention and recommended to Congress,'*^ "in the interest of the commerce of both countries, and to avoid even the accusation of treaty violation," the repeal of that portion of the tariff law which laid the extra duty on sugar. The United States' Secretary- of State (Gresham) also agreed with Gennany that the duty was a discrimination against a product of Germany^*^ and was "an attempt to offset a domestic favor or « F. R., '94, p. 236. « F. R., '83, p. 369. Article V. "Nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the importation of any article the produre or iiianufacture of the United States or of I'rassia, to or from the ports of the United States, or to and from the ports of Prussia, which shall not equally extend to all other nations." " F. R., '94, p. 230. 15 McKinley, The Tariff, j). 236. « F. R., '94, p. 239. 6 80 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS encouragement of a certain industry by the very means forbidden by the treaty." Protest was also made by Germany^^ against the imposition by the new tariff act of a duty on salt imported from a country which places a duty on salt imported from the United States. This was also held to be in contravention of the "most-favored-nation" clause of the Prussian treaty, and it was further explained that the duties on imported salt in Germany were only internal state taxes, not protecting the German domestic salt industry, and hence could not be considered as a duty on American salt. Further protests were made by both countries^* and while each denied that its measures were enacted for purposes of retaliation,^* the danger of drifting into a tariff war became evident. A warning of this was expressed by the United States' ambassador to Germany who denied at the same time, however, any unfriendly attitude on the part of the German Government toward the United States. The House of Representatives, early in the year 1895,°'' passed a bill repealing the surtax on sugar. The bilP^ did not, however, pass the Senate. The tax on salt also was maintained^- as falling within the province of the tariff act. On the German side the pro- hibition of the importation of American cattle and fresh beef was maintained,^^ the German defense being that the increasing pre- cautions against it taken by other districts of the United States were proof of its diseased condition. The German Government insisted^^ that the prohibition was purely from sanitary considera- tions, was not retaliatory and had no connection with the German complaint against the sugar surtax. In 1897 the adoption of the Dinglev tariff' created a new set of I *' F. R., '94, p. 240. *« F. R., '95, p. 498. " F. R., '95, p. 570. =° F. R., '95, p. 5U. "V. R., '95-'97, 213 Sitz., 3 Mai, '97, Vol. VIII, p. 5708. B2 F. R., '96, p. 208. The United States' Secretary of State took the occasion to renew the never settled question as to whether the provisions of the old 1828 treaty with Prussia were to be considered elTective in other portions of the German Empire. (See also Chap. II, Treaty Relations.) 53 F. R., '96, p. 165 " F. R., '95, Vol. I, p. 511. TIIK DIXULKV TARIFF 81 problems for the diploniatic (lei)artments. The poHcy of recipro- city was revived." The President was empowered'''^ to negotiate with other countries for concessions in return for which the United States would reduce certain duties of the new act. The articles upon which the United States offered to reduce its tariff were argols (crude tartar), wine lees, brandies, champagne, wines, paintings and statuary — a list which Dr. Taussig declares was aimed to placate France^' since the new schedule fixed consider- ably higher duties on silk. Section 3 then stated that — ^^ "Whenever the government of any country . . . producing and exporting to the United States the above mentioned articles, or any of them, shall enter into a commercial agreement with the United States, or make concessions in favor of the products or manufactures thereof which, in the judgment of the President, shall be reciprocal and equivalent, he is hereby authorized . . . to suspend . . . by proclamation to that effect, the impo- sition and collection of the duties mentioned in this act, on such articles." after which proclamation the duties on those articles coming from the specified country might be reduced by 20 per cent. of their maximum duties for a period of five years. Any treaties arranging for such concessions must be concluded within two years after the passage of the act. The sugar tariff was also renewed^^ and given a still more retalia- tory aspect by the provision that on articles from bounty-paying countries an additional duty should be imposed "equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant" paid by the foreign country to its domestic exporting industry. The net amount of such bounties was to be ascertained by the Secretary of the Treasury who should then regulate the assessment accordingly. In Germany's case''" ^ Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. "352 56 U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., '97, p. 203, Sec. 3. " Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 353. " U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 204. " U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., '97, p. 205. 6" F. R., '97, p. 175. 82 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS this provision meant a higher sugar duty than the ^Yilson tariff surtax imposed. The Dingley tariff created considerable hostile sentiment in Germany toward the United States. By the provision that all sugar from bounty-paying countries should be subject to an extra tax equal to the net bounty paid by the exporting country, Ger- many was seriously affected and also felt it to be a discrimination against her product. In fact certain United States officials had so admitted in the case of the Wilson Tariff of 1894 which embodied the same principle. Secretary Gresham at that time stated that its effect^' "would fall on Germany and Austria-Hungary alone" and that the measure was a "discrimination against the produce or manufacture of such countries." President Cleveland in his message to Congress had emphatically recommended^'^ the repeal of the tax and the House of Representatives had voted for its repeal the folloAving year (1895). The Attorney-General, however, in the similar controversy over the tariff* on German salt, had rendered the opposite decision^^ and declared the tax on sugar to be perfectly consistent with the "most-favored-nation" clause, in the light of the longstanding American interpretation of that principle. He also pointed out that Germany had accepted such an interpretation in an international sugar conference of 1888 when the "representatives of both Great Britain and Germany expressly declared^^ . . . that the export sugar bounty of one country might be counteracted by the import sugar duty of another without causing any discrimination which could be deemed a violation of the terms of the most-fa^'ored-nation clause." The official opinions in the United States were therefore conflicting at this time^" and the policies contradictory. What one house of Congress had repealed another Congress two years later had reenacted in more severe form. Although as, ]\Ir. Olney had pointed out, Germany had agreed to such a principle in the Brussels conference of 1888, the effect was nevertheless to increase 61 F. R., '94, p. 239. «= F. R., '94, p. x. « F. R., '97, p. 178. " F. R., '97, p. 179. 65 White, Autobiography, \'ol. II, p. 134. EFFECT OF DIN(iLEY TARIFF IN GERMANY S3 resentment in Germany, especially anions those industrial classes directly att'ected by the measure. In addition to i)r()tcstins on the irround of the treaty of 1828, the German ambassador also referred to the provisions of the Saratoga Agreement of 1891,^'' stating that it was the general belief that the United States thereby guaranteed exemption to Germany from the duty on sugar. The United States, however, considered that "the. said agreement'^'' was no longer in force at the time of the passage of the act of July 24, 1897 (Dingley tariff), inasmuch as the Act of August 28, 1894 (Wilson tariff") repealed section 3 of the act of October 1, 1890 (McKinley tariff') under which the agreement was made." Strong opposition was expressed in the Reichstag'^'^ to the pro- \-isions and increased schedule of the Dingley bill and an inter- pellation was addressed to the government inquiring whether the go\"ernnient, in the face of these new American terms, would con- tinue to grant to the United States the privileges of the treaty tariff". The reply of the German government was emphatically affirmative. Baron von Marschall, ^linister of State and Secretary of the Foreign office, stated that — '^'■' "The Confederated Governments, when they concluded the commercial treaty wnth Austria-Hungary could have no doubt that they were obliged to extend without further question to the Uniterl States the tariff" reductions granted to Austria-Hungary. It would have been an off'ense against good faith if, after having repeatedly claimed from the United States rights in our favor, we had then denied our concept of those rights when our own obligations were in question." Under the German concept of the unrestricted status of the "most-favored-nation," therefore, admission to the reduced rates of the treaties was still due to the United States. In 1898 Germany issued a decree^" prohibiting the importation of American fresh fruits and later extended this to dried fruits 8« F. R., '97, p. 234. " F. R., '97, p. 179. " V. R., '95-'97i 213 Sitz., 3 Mai, '97, pp. 5701 ff. «'■' Ibid., p. 5709. " R. Gbl., '98, Nr. 3, p. 5. 84 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS also, the reason given being the danger of the dissemination of the San Jose scale, '^^ the prevalence of which in America the German Government held to be indicated by the strict measures enacted against it by several American states. '^^ Dp Andrew D. White, American Ambassador to Germany at this time, acknowledged that the publications of warning against the scale, issued by the United States Department of Agriculture at this period were sufficient excuse for alarm. '^^ He directed his efforts, however, to demonstrating to the German Governments^ that the sweeping character of the prohibition was unnecessary and unfair, that "1 F. R., '98, p. Ixxvii. "2 Sen. Doc. 131, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. The Cahfornia State Board of Horticulture, adopted Augast 15, 1894, a regulation ruling that "Fruit of any kind . . . found infected with any insect or insects, or with any fungi, blight or other disease ... is hereby prohibited from being offered for sale, gift or distribution within the State." Agricultural Bulletin No. 3, New Series, 1898, pp. 72-74. "The San Jose Scale." "We have already shown that the San Jose scale maj' be spread through the scattering of fruit parings at certain seasons of the year, and any legisla- tion which is drafted with this insect in view should contain some such rule as the one just quoted." " F. R., 1898, p. 322. "^ Dr. Andrew D. White, Autobiography , Vol. II, p. 159. Dr. White refers to the fruit situation in his autobiography: "One morning came a storm of telegrams and letters stating that cargoes of American fruits had been stopped in the German harbors under the charge that they contained injurious insects. The German authorities were, of course, honest in this procedure though they were doubtless stimulated to it by sundry representatives of the land-owning class. Our beautiful fruits, especially those of California, had come to be very extensively used through- out the Emj)ire, and the German consumers had been growing more and more happy and the German producers more and more unhappy over this fact^ when there came from the American side accounts of the scale insect dis- covered on pears in California, and of severe measures taken by sundry other states of our Union to prohibit their importation. The result was the pro- hibition of oiu- fruits in Germany, and this was carried so far that not only pears from California, l)ut all other fruits from all other parts of the country were at first i)ut under the ban, and not only fresh but dried and preserved fruits. . . . We took pains to show the facts in tlie case dealing fairly and o])enly with the German Government, allowing that the imi>ortation of scale-infected trees and shrubs might l)e dangerous, and making no objection to any fair measures regarding these. The Foreign Office was reasonable and gradually the most vexatious of these prohibitions were removed." .\i:cil)TI.\TU)XS FDLLOWINt; DINGLEY TAKll-K 85 wliile tliere inisjjht I)e (lan.u;er of infection from the importation of li\e shrnl)s and plants, this did not extend to the fresh and dried fruits. I'l^on ])resentation of the evidence, the German Foreign Office >icldc(l in certain respects^^ and removed the restrictions iii^^ainst (h-ied fruits, a^uainst fresh fruits in lots found uninfected, and removed also the reciuirement of inspection of American fruits passinii throuijh Germany in l)()nd. The prohibition was main- tained against the importation of live trees, shrubs and plants from the United States. In response to the offer of the Dingley Tariff, France, Portugal and Italy made application to the United States^" for admission to the reduced tarifli" schedule on the designated articles which formed an important part of their exports. Agreements were therefore concluded by the United States with these countries, each one granting certain reciprocal concessions" to American products. Germany then made her application for the extension of the same tariff concessions to her own exporters on the basis of the " most-favored-nation r clause of the Prussian treaty of 1828. The I'nited States replied that it could extend these reduced rates only in return for reciprocal concessions from Germany. Taking as its basis article IX of the Prussian treaty, which read:^* "If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely granted, to such other nation, or on yielding the same compen- sation, when the grant is conditional." The American Government showed that the status of the relations^^ between the United States and the German Empire was not one of the unqualified "most-favored-nation," but one of reciprocity, as was expressly provided for in the above article. « Sen. Doc. 131, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 2 ff. Also F. R., 1898, pp. 340 ff. '« V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 62. " M., Vol. I, pp. 542 and 987. M., Vol. II, p. 1463. ^8 M., Vol. II, p. 1498. " V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 62. 86 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS In asserting this interpretation the United States could demon- strate a consistent line of policy held by the Union since its begin- ning,*" and could cite numerous declarations by its leading states- men from the time of the conclusion of the Prussian treaty forward, to show that it had maintained the principle of reciprocity as the basis of and in no way inconsistent with its most-favored-nation agreements. There was one notable exception to this American policy in the treaty concluded with Switzerland in 1850.*^ Articles VIII to XII of this treaty, as well as the correspondence conducted at the time of its conclusion, placed the two nations on the broad basis of "most-favored-nation" in so unqualified a manner that the United States admitted the treaty to be an exception*- to its otherwise uniform policy. It constituted, therefore, in reality a violation of the reciprocity treaties with Germany and other countries in that it obliged the United States to extend gratui- tously to Switzerland favors in tariff and commerce which it ex- tended to other nations only in return for compensation. Realizing this fact the American Government annulled at this time the clauses concerned and renewed the Swiss treaty on the narrower basis. By so doing the United States emphasized anew its standpoint that under all such treaties it was bound to extend privileges only in return for what it agreed to consider equivalent compensation. 8" Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. Article IX is a typically worded "equivalence clause," and similar clauses modifying the basic "most-favored-nation" clauses (cf. Article V) are included in twenty-one out of twenty-eight American commercial treaties. (Ibid., page 4.) Even in the case of treaties not containing this equivalence clause the interpretation by the United States was the same as if they had con- tained the clause. (Ibid., page 13.) For a compilation of precedents of the above interpretation as rendered by the United States State Department and by the Supreme Court, see the above Senate Document. For early inter- pretations at the time of the conclusion of the Prussian treaty, see the following : American State Papers: Class I, Foreign Relations, Second Series, Vol. V, No. 423, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 641 and 669. Ibid., Vol. v., No. 404, p. 883. Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 438, p. 208. Sen. Doc, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. V, Serial No. 167, Doc. No. 196. 81 Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 1766 ff. '' F. R., 1899, pp. 746 ff. INTEHri{ETAT10N.S OF MOST-FAVOKED-NATION CLAUSE S? The Gennaii Government ajjreed to accept the I'nited States' interpretatioai of the Prussian treaty chiuse, and in a note to the American Government formally placed the commercial relations of the two countries on a reciprocity basis as follows :*^'^ " If two contractinti; i)arties are of a ditt'erent opinion concernin*^ their treaty obligations, the one interpreting the same in a narrower the other in a broader sense, then the latter must sufi'er a dis- advantage. As long as the difference of concept did not lead to an actual diti'erentiation of Germany in the United States, the Imperial Government was in the position on the basis of the broader interpretation of the treaty to grant to the Ignited States the complete rights of the "most-favored-nation." But after the Union recently had concluded with several countries special agreements which granted these tariti' favors, while the latter were withheld from Germany, then there was actually no longer allotted to Germany on the part of the United States the rights of the "most-favored-nation. " In order that the actual injury accruing to the German Empire from the treaty relationship in conse- quence of the difference of opinion over the mutual duties, may not be allowed to become a permanent one, the Imperial Government makes its own the narrower interpretation of the treaty adopted by America. Accordingly, however, just as Germany can lay claim to the favors granted by the Union to third countries, only in exchange for equivalent concessions, so the United States of America can without corresponding compensation have no title to the German treaty clauses which Germany has granted to no state without compensation but only in return for particular treaty obligations or in return for the granting of the uncon- ditional status of the "most-favored-nation." The United States agreed to the new basis'^^for the commercial relations between herself and Germany and accepted the privilege « V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. (iS (transl. by author). 8* F. R., 1878, pp. 382, 403 and 405. Though Germany presented this as a new basis, and appears to have so considered it, it was really not new but had been adopted as early as 1878 when Germany acquiesced in the special reciprocity treaty between the United States and Hawaii. The Hawaiian representative, Mr. Carter, reported June 25, 1878, following his mission to Europe, the following account of these negotiations in Berlin (j). 403). "My negotiations with that (German) government were retarded by its reluctance to make a commercial treaty without providing for the fullest 88 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS of access to the German treaty tariff as a satisfactory return measure for the concessions provided for by the Dingley tariff. In acknowledging the right of Germany to adopt the same construc- tion as the United States of its obHgations under the treaty of 1828, Secretary Hay pointed out^^ that this construction must be then appHed by Germany to all governments whose interests were protected by like treaty clauses. If Germany should apply one construction to the treaty clause when it concerned the United States and another broader construction when it concerned another country, then that fact would in itself violate the treaty as one nation would be receiving favors gratuitously and the United States only in return for compensation. In other words, it would be a similar situation to that of the United States and the Swiss treaty, a condition which had caused the United States to annul parts of that treaty. As a matter of fact the situation was such as Secretary Hay set forth. By the treaty of Frankfurt, of 1871,^'' Germany was placed on an unrestricted most-favored-nation basis with France and was obliged to extend to France gratui- tously any commercial favor granted to any other nation. This was therefore contradictory to the new construction adopted, by Germany in order to place itself on a reciprocal basis with the United States. Whether the existence and purport of the Frankfurt equality in respect to import duties. They, however, finally acknowledged that the peculiar circumstances of our position justified them in so doing, and an article was framed by which it was agreed that the special advantages granted to the Government of the United States in consideration of equivalent advantages should not in any case be invoked in favor of Germany." '^^ F. R., 1899, p. 301. ^^ Calwer, "Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," p. IS (transla- tion by author). "Now, we stand, on the other hand, with France, on an actually unrestricted most-favored-nation basis. We nuist, according to provisions of the Frank- furt peace, extend to France at once (ohne weiteres) each tariff concession granted to England, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Russia. In connection with this relationship to France, Article IX of the Prussian-American Treaty loses all meaning; from the construction of the princii)le of reciprocity there follows indirectly the just claim of the United States to the unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment. Since all favors are granted to France without any compensation, so all compensations cease to be due from the United States." ("So kommen audi fuer die Vereinigten Staaten solche Gegenleistungen ueberhaupt nicht mehr in Betracht.") CO.MMKHCIAL ACREEMENT OF 1900 89 treaty were realized by the Tnited States or not, no direct protest against it was made. The understanding as to their treaty relation by the two nations was embodied in the reciprocal commercial agreemenf^^ concluded Juh- 10. 1900. By this agreement the United States reduced the tariti' rates on the following German products: argols, crude tartar, crude wine lees, brandies, spirits, wines, vermuth, also upon oil and water-color paintings, drawings and statuary. The German Government in return reextended to the products of the United States the low rates conceded by the treaties of 1891 to 1894 to Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Russia, Switzerland and Serbia. It also removed the inspection requirements from dried and evaporated fruits imported into Germany from the United States. The United States did not gain by the agreement of 1900 any new ])rivileges in relation to the German tariff. Under the status of the "most-favored-nation" and also through the Saratoga Agreement she had had extended to her since the formation of the German commercial treaties their tariff reductions. Germany also did not gain actually any great advantage from the concessions offered by the United States since the articles enumerated consti- tuted less than 2 per cent, of her exports and were much more important to the other countries, France, Italy and Portugal, than to Germany. (I'. S. Tariff' Commission Report, "Recipro- city and Commercial Treaties," 1919, Pt 5, p. 238.) The agree- ment, however, formally assured to the I'nited States the privileges she already' enjoyed and exi:ended to Germany the most favorable terms permitted by the Dingley Tariff'. Actually she was, therefore, a "most-favored-nation" even though the United States denied that the relations were maintained on that unqualified principle, (Germany, in admitting the United States to the advantages regu- lated by the treaties then in operation with European states,** did not agree to extend to her any further advantages which might be made to the same or other nations in future treaties. On the 8' M., Vol. I, p. 558. 88 V. R., Vol. 242, p. 64. 90 _ COMMERCIAL RELATIONS whole the agreement did not cover the most important factors of commercial controversy between the two countries. It was now Germany's turn to overthrow the commercial diplo- matic proceedings with a new tariff. This did not happen suddenly, however. The proposed act was given careful and elaborate consideration*'^ for three years and was then published before being presented to either the Bundesrath or the Reichstag for discussion and enactment. The period was one of "scant harvests and extreme industrial and commercial depression." This had caused an increase in the imports of grain and foodstuffs from the United States and a corresponding increase in the hostility of the Agrarian Party toward the Union.'"' The trade balance in favor of the United States was creating anxiety throughout Germany'-'^ and in other European countries. There were academic discussions on the economic situation. Baron von Waltershausen, Professor of Political Economy at the Univeristy of Strasburg, pointed out in an elaborate essay that "the American trade balances of the three 8» U. S. Commer. Rel., 1901, p. 262. »° V. R., '98-'00, Bd. I, .30 Sitz., 11 Feb., 1899, S. 783 ff. Count von Kanitz, leader of the agrarians, voiced the attitude of the party before the Reichstag. Having set forth the important development of Ameri- can commerce and its penetration of European countries, he continued as follows (transl. by author): "Everything points to the fact that if this course of development is not interrupted the United States will gain in a short time a serious advantage (Uebergewicht) over the old culture-lands (Kultur-laender) of Europe, not only in industrial and commercial relations but also in the consideration of their status as a political power. If we seek the causes of this rapidly advanc- ing alteration, the answer is not difficult to find. It is not the greater inteUi- gence, not the better developed spirit of enterprise or industrial diligence of the American population, which creates this headstart for them, but it is a deliberate (zielbewusst), I might almost say, reckless tariff policy, which has led to these conditions. . . ." Concering the Dingley tariff in particular he continued: "That is no longer the principle of the protection of national labor for which we German protectionists strive — here (in the Dingley Tariff") it is not a question of keeping domestic production in a condition to meet the competition for foreign countries, but this policy aims at the displacement of foreign products and thereby arc necessarily created conditions which must sooner or later prove to be unbearable to the nations engaged in world com- merce." "' U. S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 261. GERMAN TAHIFF OF 1002 91 fiscal years. 1898, 1899 and 190(1 had reached the ainazinji total of Sl,6-2,()()0,0()() — almost the war indemnity paid l)y France to Germany (1870) and had reversed the position of the Union and made it the creditor instead of the debtor of Europe." Councils were held and plans formulated for defensive measures^^ in the creation of a Middle European Tariff Union. This did not mate- rialize, partly owing to the trade rivalries between the separate continental powers, but the opposition to the United States was strong.^^ The new German tariff, therefore, increased protection both to the manufacturing and agrarian classes. The American Consul-General at Berlin reported^"* that "it roughly doubles the imj)ort duties on cereals, meats and other food products, and, while generally favoring raw materials, increases the duties on practically all manufactured merchandise which is or can be pro- duced in Germany." Important to the country's foreign relations were its reciprocity provisions. In the opening article of the law^^ the reservation is expressed that the pro\'isions of the tariff shall 9- Fiske, Mid. Eur. Tar. Union, p. 595 {et al). « V. R., 1S9S-1900, Bd. V, 157 Sitz., 1 INlaerz, 1900, p. 4384. Evidence of this hostility was produced in the Reichstag In- Kunert, a Social Democrat, who in opposing the anti-American policy of the Agrarians, made public an instruction issued by a Prussian official, Baron von Rhein- baben, to the Councillors (Landraethe) and Over-mayors of Duesseldorf on July 24, 1899. It concerned the treatment of foreign consuls and gave instruc- tions that all properly delegated foreign consuls should be allowed to ask all questions within the bounds of their official duties and should receive direct repUes so long as they should not be questions of general import (allgemeiner Bedeutung). But in the case of American consuls, any information which might injure German interests was to be withheld. Under the information which was under no circumstances to "be given to American consuls were classed statistical statements concerning infringements of the food-law, espe- cialh' concerning the production and sale of unwholesome food and other products (including toys) dangerous to health, or concerning the discoveries of trichina in domestic meat, and concerning human and animal diseases. As brought out by the Reichstag member him.self, this instruction was not only unfair and hostile to the United States but was a confession f)f guilt on the part of Prussian officials. How extensive was the scope of the order was not stated, but the discussion was closed after Kunert's speech and the validity- of the instruction was left undenied. 9* U. S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 202. « R. Gbl., 1902, p. 303. 92 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS hold "in so far as the miports from particular countries are not regulated by other stipulations." Definite provision is then made for retaliatory tariff measures. Section 10 states :^^ "Dutiable products, which come from countries in which German ships or German products are treated less favorably than those of other countries, may be subjected in addition to the tariff duty, to a surtax up to double the amount of this law, or to the full value (of the products) . Duty-free products may, under the same supposition, be subjected to a duty amounting to half of their value. The measures here provided for shall be put into operation by Imperial order after securing the consent of the Bundesrath. The orders in question are to be imparted to the Reichstag at once, or, if it is not in session, at its next convening. They are to become inoperative if the Reichstag does not give its consent." The tariff' law was enacted December 25, 1902." Its general application to most nations could not be made until 190-i, because the commercial treaties concluded from 1S92 to 1S94 under the Caprivi Chancellorship did not expire until the close of 1903.^^ This left a period of two years in which other nations could nego- tiate either for separate commercial treaties, or for admission to the privileges of any treaties Germany might conclude. Germany did conclude in 1904 several important treaties of commerce^^ with continental countries, namely, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland, by means of which the products of those countries secured important tariff reductions upon importation into Germany. It then became very important to the United States to know what the effect of these treaties would be upon the standing of the United States under the Prussian treaty of 1S28. By the "most-favored-nation" , clause of this treaty ^°o American wheat, corn and other dutiable merchandise had for three-cjuarters of a century been admitted to Germany at the lowest rates of duty which had been granted to »8 R. Gbl., 1902, p. .308 (transl. by author). »■ R. Gbl., 1902, p. 303. »» U. S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 2C2. »» F. R., '05, p. 456. ")» F. R., '05, p. 457. NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING GERMAN TARIFF OF 1902 93 Russia, Austria, or any other nation. The eomniereial reciprocity arraufjement of 1900 was also involved in the concluding of these new European treaties. This latter agreement was therefore formally terminated by Germany^"! the following year (1905). The notification of its termination was accompanied, however, with the proposal that negotiations be undertaken for the con- clusion of a new treaty. In reporting to the Reichstag the course of the negotiations for the new agreement,^°2 the German Chancellor, Prince von Buelow, explained that the Imperial Government was well aware of the fact that the privileges secured from the United States by the agreement of 1900 in no way compensated Germany for the favors conceded to the United States but that it was not considered advisable at that time to demand further concessions from the United States, because of the provisory character of the agreement, as a method of tiding over the commercial relations between the two countries until the new German tariff should become operative at the close of 1903. He referred also to the new treaty between the United States and Cuba, concluded in 1902, which gave preferential treatment to Cuban sugar, and declared it incompatible with the provisions of the United States-Prussian treaty of 1828.io3 101 F. R., '06, p. 640. •o-^ V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 64. 103 M., Vol. I, p. 355. Article VIII of United States-Cuban Treaty reads : "The rates of duty herein granted by the United States to the Republic of Cuba are and shall continue during the term of this convention preferential in resjject to all like imports from other countries, and, in return for said preferential rates of duty granted to the Repubhc of Cuba by the United States, it is agreed that the concession herein granted on the part of the said Repubhc of Cuba to the products of the United States shall likewise be, and shall continue, during the term of this convention, preferential in respect to all like imports from other coimtrics. Provided, That while this convention is in force, no sugar imported from the Republic of Cuba, and being the product of the soil or industry of the Repubhc of Cuba, shall be admitted into the United States at a reduction of duty greater than twenty per centum of the rates of duty thereon as provided by the tariff act of the United States approved July 24, 1897, and no sugar, the product of any other foreign country, shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States, while this convention is in force, at a lower rate of duty than that provided by the tariff act of the United States approved July 24, 1897." 94 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS As will be seen this was merely a reassertion of the former standpoint on the part of the German Government. The American- Cuban treaty was thoroughly reciprocal in nature, the preferential treatment of Cuban sugar being granted in return for preferential treatment by Cuba of a series of products of the United States. The treaty was therefore merely another example of the oft- expressed viewpoint of the United States that reciprocity treaties were in no May conflicting with most-favored-nation clauses, and were moreover expressly p^o^'ided for in the "equivalence clauses" such as article IX of the Prussian treaty. Ha\ing definitely agreed,^°^ however, to a reciprocity basis for the commercial relations of the two countries, the German Govern- ment realized^''^ that it would be necessary to enter into new nego- tiations — and probably further bargaining — in order to secure for German sugar the favorable terms granted to the Cuban sugar- growers. This did not seem advisable at the time so the matter was left. until after the formal abrogation in 1905 of the 1900 agreement. What was urgently needed was clear to representatives of both countries, namely, a comprehensive commercial treaty. The American Consul-General at Berlin had written in 1900, at the close of his report, ^°^ "The time is ripe for a calm, deliberate, and scientific revision of the present obsolete and imperfect treaties between the Republic and the Emi)ire — a broad, intelligent adaptation of their relations in all that pertains to reciprocal trade, naturalized citizenship, and other vexed and irritating questions, to the new and vastly enlarged positions which both countries have won since the present treaties were framed." During the summer of 1905 the German Ambassador in Wash- ington took up the matter informally with President Roosevelt. According to the account given by Chancellor ^'on Buelow,^*'' the President had declared himself "in principle agreed to the iM V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 63. "^ V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 64. i»« U. S. Com. Rel., 1900, Vol. II, p. 268. 10" V. R., Vol. 242, Nr. 391, p. 65 (transl. l)y author). EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE COMMERCIAL THEATV 95 German proposition, and that ho had in mind the sending of a commission of experts to Berhn for the introduction of the nego- tiations. Later, however, the President reached the decision that the conclusion of a tariff treaty, with the sentiment then prevailing in the Senate, was not obtainable and he then gave up the dis- patching of a tariff commission." The German Government nevertheless decided to put the ques- tion formally before the American Government/^* and therefore presented in Xoveml)er of 1905 through its ambassador in Wash- ington a note containing proposals for the conclusion of a compre- hensi\'e commercial treaty. The treaty proposals sought to gain some modification of the rates of the Dingley tariff, and also altera- tions in the customs collection procedure, in return for which certain of the jirivileges provided for in the new German treaties should be extended to the United States. The American Govern- ment made no formal reply to the German note but President Roosevelt and Secretary Root stated to the German ambassador that a reduction in the tariff would not be possible at the time. They proposed, however, that Germany, in return for concessions in the matter of customs procedure, should extend to the United States in advance the new German treaty tariff, so that through such a temporary regulation of commercial relations both govern- ments would be given the opportunity for proceeding with nego- tiations for the commercial treaty. To this the German Govern- ment agreed. Accordingly, on INIarch 1, 1900, Germany independ- ently extended to the United States^"^ (until further notice, but not for longer than until the 30th of June, 1907) those tariff con- cessions embodied in the treaties of 1904 and 1905 concluded with the seven states mentioned in the 1900 agreement. The United States also independently extended to Germany once more the tariff reductions on argols, wines, brandies, art works, etc., pro- vided for in section 3 of the Dingley tariff. It also put in opera- tion certain changes in the customs procedure which tended to ^"8 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Xr. .391, p. 65 (these proposals are not jjublished in the United States Foreign Relations Series), los R. Gbl., 1906, p. 355. 7 96 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS relax the regulations objected to by Germany. More radical alterations in the customs administration requiring congressional action were recommended to Congress but did not secure enactment. Negotiations were continued and resulted in the sending of a tariff commission to Germany in November, 1906."° The Amer- ican commissioners were not given treaty-making powers by their home government; therefore the conferences which took place could be only discussions not binding to either country — of the basis and details of such a commercial treaty as might be possible for the two countries to conclude. It was found that a compre- hensive commercial treaty was not possible at that time. Only such American concessions could be obtained as could be granted by the President without action by Congress. "^ Therefore the "0 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 66. I'l House Journal, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1903-1907. An indication that certain members of Congress feared that the Executive would overstep its authority in these negotiations with Germany is contained in a resolution introduced into the House by Mr. Randall, of Texas, March 2, 1907 (H. Res. 829). "Whereas it is currently reported that negotiations have been entered into by the executive department of the United States, and under its direction, with the Government of the German Empire affecting commerce between Germany and the United States and the tariffs and regulations on and con- cerning the same, thereby changing the condition of trade between the coun- tries and affecting the revenues of this Government received from the import duties without the action of Congress: Therefore be it Resolved, That the President of the United States is hereby requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to^direct the Secretary of State to report to him for the inforn;ation of the House First: What agreement or agreements, if any, have been entered into between the authorities of the Unitecl States and the German Government, or their agents or rej:) resent a tives, affecting the tariff of the two countries in reference to imports, or the tariff on, or regulations thereof, which directly or indirectly affect the revenues or import duties of this Government. Second: What propositions, if any, have l)een made by either party or its agents looking to any change in the tariff charges or trade regulations lietween Germany and the United States affecting either directly or indirectly the revenues of this Government or its trade relations with Germany. Third: That all pai)ers and documents, correspondence, or regulations on the matter herein inquired about, in the possession of the State Dejjartmcnt be furnished for the information of the House." Mr. Watson made the point of order that the resolution was not privileged. The Speaker sustained the point of order. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, reported adversely and tabled. COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT OF 1907 97 representatives decided that an ai::reement might be formed on the basis of tlie provisional measnres enacted by both conntries in Jnne of tliat year. The conference, tlierefore, resnlted in an exten- sion of that agreement. The German decree, when finally passed h>- the Reichstag and Bundesrath/^^ admitted the United States' jjroducts to the greater part of the reduced rates granted to the continental conntries, without any statement as to date of ter- mination of this agreement, which was to be valid "until further change." The United States responded immediately by a procla- mation issued by President Roosevelt, which extended to Germany, "tluring the continuance in force of the said concessions by the (jovernment of Germany" the reduced rates on the German products, as provided by the Dingley Tariff, and also certain favorable changes in customs administration, such as could be made without action by Congress. A formal agreement, ^^'^ cover- ing these reciprocal concessions was signed at Washington, April 22, 1907,"^ and at Levico, May 2, 1907. It was expressly stated in the introduction that the agreement was a temporary one for the purpose of adjusting the commercial relations between the two countries until a comprehensive commercial treaty could be agreed upon. The agreement was accompanied by a promise on the part of the President"'^ that he would recommend to Congress the enactment of an amendment to the customs administra- tion act which should alter certain of the customs collection regulations'"^ complained of by Germany. The recommendation was made but did not secure passage. The 1907 agreement expressed the relations between the two conntries more definitely as those of pure reciprocity than any of the former agreements. The United States presented a list of articles on which it was w^illing to reduce its tariff' rate in Germany's favor — it also made less exacting certain of the regulations in the procedure of customs collection. Germany in return extended to "2 F. R., '06, p. 645 ff. "' F. R., '07, p. 477. i»M., Vol. I, p. 564. See also Sen. Doc, 1907-1908, Vol. VII, No. 185, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. "» V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 403, p. 2309. "« M., Vol. I., p. 575. 98 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS the United States most of the tariff concessions provided for in her tariff" treaties with Eiiro|>ean countries. Dr. Delbriieck. Prussian Minister of State, and Secretary of the Interior,"" stated that Germany had withheld from the United States the tariff' concessions on goods forming only 3^ per cent, of the total imports,"^ whereas the concessions made by the United States were of little value to Germany, except in the case of the modifi- cations of the customs regulation, which were not to be under- estimated. The reciprocity agreement of 1907 was not long in operation. Within two years came the enactment of the Payne tariff" (August 5, 1909), changing once more the basis of the commercial relations of the United States with other countries. The law of 1909 established a maximum and minimum tariff". The schedule as pub- lished constituted the minimum tariff — ^that same schedule plus a duty of 25 per cent, ad valorem constituted the maximum tariff. The maximum tariff was to go into effect for all countries (except Cuba) on INIarch 31, 1910, unless other countries should prove themselves entitled to the minimum rates by evidence of no dis- crimination against the products of the United States. The minimum tariff was to be granted — "^ " Whenever . . . the President shall be satisfied . . . that the government of any foreign country imposes no terms or restrictions, either in the way of tariff' rates, or provisions, trade or other regulations, charges, exactions, or in any other manner, directly or indirectly, upon the importation into or the sale in such . . . foreign country of any . . . product of the United States, which unduly discriminates against the United States or the products thereof, and that such foreign country pays no export })ounty or imposes no export duty or prohibition upon the exportation of any article to the United States which unduly discriminates against the I'nited States or the products thereof, and that such foreign country accords to the . . . products of the I'nited States treatment which is reciprocal and equivalent." 117 V. R., Vol. 259, 31 Sitz., 5. Feb., 1910, p. 1081. 118 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl., '09-' 11, Nr. 213. 113 U. S. Stat., 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, p. 82 THE PAVXE-ALDRICII TARIFF 99 111 addition to the inaxinuini tariff, especial provision was made to offset export bounties paid by producing countries, Section (i jirovides:'-'' "That whenever any country . . . shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article . . . and such article ... is dutiable under the provisions of this act, then, upon the importation of any such article . . . into the United States . . . there shall be levied and paid ... in addition to the duties other- wise imposed by this act, an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant." The reciprocity arrangements provided for in the Dingley tariff were thus repealed^-^ and the President was given authority to terminate all agreements made under them. It became the immediate duty of the foreign ambassadors in Washington to bid for the admission of their countries to the minimum tariff. During November of 1909 Ambassador von Bernstorft' conducted nego- tiations^-- with Secretary Knox concerning the new" regulation of the commercial relations between the two countries. The law left open only the one alternative; therefore Germany's objective, so far as the law itself was concerned, could be only that of the admission of German products to the rates of the minimum tariff'. Germany also sought, however, to have continued in force those alterations in the customs regulations secured by the past agree- ment, with the exception of the first of the provisions concerning the place of valuation of certain articles which was definitely established by the new law to be based on the market value in America. Germany also sought to have established separate provisions (Einzelbestimmungen) concerning the labelling of goods. ^-^ This was refused in theory though an approach to it in practice was declared probable. '20 U. S. Stat., 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, p. 82. •2> F. R., 1909, p. 270 ff. '--V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Xr. 213, p. 1557 ff. '23 V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Xr. 213, p. 6 (of Denkschrift). 100 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS The American demands as finally formulated were^^* "1. The granting of all the German treaty tariff reductions, or equivalent compensations through the granting of tariff reductions over and beyond the treaty tariff clauses up to date. 2. The admission of American pork according to the proceedings of the official trichina inspection in Germany, but without the accompaniment of the certificate (still required) demonstrating the completion of microscopic trichina inspection in the United States. 3. The admission of American cattle for immediate slaughter." Concerning the last two demands, Germany declared that they were sanitary measures determined by the health conditions in the separate countries. Similar regulations existed in all countries, not the least of these being the United States, by whose import prohibitions Germany especially was affected. Among other things the importation of live cattle from Germany was forbidden whereas that from other countries was admitted. The Imperial Government could not (therefore) treat concerning (auf — eingehen) the two above mentioned demands within the scope of tariff' nego- tiations. But in order to give proof of her friendly intentions (Gesinnungen) toward America, the Imperial Government was ready in case the Union should bring up the dispensing of the trichina test for separate discussion, to work toward the disposal of this subject according to the sense of the American wishes. ^^^ Concerning the importation of American cattle, on the other hand, the Imperial Government could neither give any prospect of con- cessions, nor enter into any negotiations. Dr. Delbrueck reported to the Reichstag the result of the negotiations, as follows i^-" "The American Government declared that in case that the German treaty tariff" should be extended unrestrictedly to the United States, that the cattle question was to be wholly eliminated from the negotiations ; that the benefits of the American minimum i2< V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 6 (of Denkschrift) transl. by author. 125 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 1557 ff. 126 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 226, p. 1560 (transl by author.). NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING TIIK PAYNE TAHIFF 101 tarirt' woiv to be extended to Germany after tlie thirty-first of March, and that tlie enstonis re,ii;uhition provisions of the 11)07 connnercial agreement (with the exception of the first, providin*^ for the valuation of goods at their export price) were to remain in force; that this extension of the minimum tariff to Germany assured the hitter the treatment accorded to the "most-favored- nation;" that the customs administration provisions of the Tnited States wouUl be appHed to German goods in a friendly and con- ciliatory spirit." In framing the Payne-Aldrich tariff on which the above agree- ment was based, the effect of the anti-trust agitation and the anti- protection movement was clearly felt.^-^ The principle by which those preparing the schedule were guided was that of adjusting the duties merely to equal the differences between the cost of production at home and abroad, and give a reasonable profit to American industries. Sincere efforts were made on the part of the Committee of Ways and IVIeans to obtain reliable information as to these productions costs. Detailed instructions were sent out^-^ to the principal American consular officers throughout the world to return full reports concerning industries, labor conditions, cost of production, prices, exports to the United States and foreign tariffs. Since the petitioners for higher duties were at this time holding up the Germans rather than the Enghsh as rivals,^-^ the reports concerning conditions in Germany became especially important. As the American Consul-General at Berlin reported that the information sought by the ^Yays and Means Committee could best be obtained through diplomatic channels, the matter was presented directly to the German Government through the American Ambassador at Berlin. The German Government responded favorably, and through the German Chambers of Com- merce it obtained voluminous information \\hich it sent to the United States^*" with the understanding that the names of the indiA-idual establishments furnishing the data, would not be dis- »" Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 370. '28 Sen. Doc. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. (German Manufactures.) »" Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 370. "0 Sen. Doc. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Scss., p. 2. 102 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS closed, and that the information would not be used for adminis- trative purposes but purely as a basis for the proposed legislation.^^^ Feehng that fresh and rehable information as to production costs in Germany would defeat the efforts of those seeking to raise the tariff schedule in America, the Geiman Government put forth special effort in the matter, furnished additional copies of the documents so that the needs of both the Committee on Ways and Means and of the Committee of Finance of the Senate were sup- plied. Due appreciation of the courtesy was expressed by the State Department but after the information was handed over to the Finance Committee of the Senate nothing further was heard of it^^- — it was neither printed nor published until August after the adjournment of Congress. The final regulating of the relations consequent to the Payne tariff was formulated in a German law as follows :^'^^ 1" Sen. Doc. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. In forwarding the information, Baron von Schoen, Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, protested against what he alleged were the mis- statements made in the hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means relative to the costs of production in Germany. He declared that "In the comparative tables on wages in the United States of America and Germany data concerning the German conditions have in many cases been utilized which cover conditions of many years ago, and no longer have any significance for the present day. In calculating American wages the highest rates have been taken as a basis while in computing German wages the lowest rates have been taken; the increase in cost of German production by social burdens has been left out of consideration; the comparison of absolute earn- ings gives an inaccurate impression, because the work accomphshed by American laborers is perceptibly greater than that of the German laborers, partly in itself and partly through the more comprehensive employment of machine work. If wages for piecework and for the manufacture of the sepa- rate articles are calculated the difference between the German and American wages is perceptibly less than would appear from the statements concerning wages on time. ... A number of firms which complained of insufficient tariff protection l)efore the Committee on Ways and Means underbid German manufacturers in the interior market of Germany, as well as in the American market. ... In many cases inaccurate statements have been made concerning the extent and duration of female and child labor, in contradiction to regulations now in force in Germany." '^- Taussig, Tariff His. of U. S., p. 371. Professor Taussig considered that the information was too damaging to the arguments of the high protection advocates for them to seek to place it at the disposal of their opponents. "'V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 1557 (3 Feb., 1910). COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT OF 1910 103 " The Biindesrath is enipcnvercd, upon the importation of prochicts of the United States of America into the (German customs territory, to grant in suitable measure, the appHcation of the tariti' pro- visions ccmceded by the commercial treaties now in force (geltend). This ])rovisi()n shall remain in force as long as the products of the (lerman Em})ire and of the countries or divisions belonging to the same customs territory shall not be subjected to higher tarifi' duties than are provided for in article 1 of the American Tariti' Law of August 5th, 1909 {i. e., the minimum tarifl"). If on the part of the I'nited States of America, the principles of the customs procedure (as provided for under B to F of the note to the Commercial Agreement of 1907) should not be main- tained, or should the United States of America through laws, treaties with third countries, or in any other way connected with the exchange of goods between the German Empire anfl the United States permit changes to aft'ect the present situation to the detriment of Germany, then the Bundesrath shall, according to its judgment, withdraw entire or in part, the privileges granted to the products of the United States." In the United States the agreement was embodied in a procla- mation'^-* declaring the rates of the minimum tariff to be in force for German products so long as the German Empire imposed no terms or restrictions which should unduly discriminate against the United States. The relations between the two countries were thus adjusted once more on a definitely provisional basis. Any alteration of policy or any concession to a third nati(m (m the part of either Germany or the I'nited States, might be construed by the other country as a discrimination, sufficient to overthrow the entire agreement. Germany carefully preserved for herself the possibility, through decision of the Bundesrath, of withdrawing her concessions should any change in the situation be made which she considered detri- mental to her interests. The United States armed itself with the wea]3on of the maximum tariff" to be used, after ninety days' notice, against any nation considered to be discriminating unduly against United States' products or industries. The power to use this weai)on was placed entirely in the hands of the President. Thus 1" Stat, of U. S., 1909-1910, Pt. II, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess.. Proclamation, p. 33. 104 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS each nation was equipped for a tariff war sliould it decide to enter upon such a contest. Neither the United States nor Germany sought such an outcome and both countries gave e^'idence of sincere desire to avoid it. President Taft emphasized his Uberal poHcy in regard to the maximum and minimum clause in the tariff act in his message to Congress (December 7, 1909).^^^ Speak- ing of the general possibilities of these provisions, he declared: "Fear has been expressed that this power conferred and duty imposed on the Executive is likely to lead to a tariff war. I beg to express the hope and belief that no such result need be antici- pated. The discretion granted to the Executive by the terms ' unduly discriminatory' is wide. In order that the maximum duty shall be charged against the imports from a country, it is necessary that he shall find on the part of that country not only discrimi- nation in its laws, or the practice under them, against the trade of the United States, but that the discriminations found shall be undue; that is, without good and fair reason. I conceive that this power was reposed in the President with the hope that the maxi- mum duties might never be applied in any case, but that the power to apply them would enable the President and the State Department through friendly negotiations to secure the elimin- ation from the laws and the practice under them of any foreign country of that which is unduly discriminatory. Xo one is seeking a tariff war or a condition in which the spirit of retaliation shall be aroused." President Taft demonstrated the sincerity of his words by issuing one hundred and thirty-four proclamations, ^^"^ extending the rates of the minimum tariff to practically the whole commercial world. Germany in turn interpreted her law in liberal fashion,'^^ and granted to the United States the benefit of her complete treaty tariff. She also, after securing the agreement to discuss the subject apart from the tariff negotiations, ^^^ acceded to the American demand in the matter of the requirements for the trichina inspec- tion of American pork. In concluding his account of the negotia- tions with the United States, Dr. Delbrueck, Prussian Minister "» F. R., 1909, p. xxvi. "« F. R., 1910, p. xvi. »" V. R., Vol. 259, 31 Sitz., 5 Feb, 1910, p. 1083. »='8 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl., 1909-1911, Nr. 213. RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MINIMUM TARIFFS 105 of State, speaking for the Imperial Chancellor, stated to the Reichstag, ^^'■' " I do not believe that we shall be obliged to make use of this jxnver {i. e. of withdrawing the treaty tarifi" privileges from the United States); for 1 am inclined to the firm hope that, since we after stubborn, lengthy, and difficult negotiations, have come to an agreement, that the United States of American will carry out in tlie s])irit of conciliation and liberal approach (Entgegenkommen) the concessions made to us, as accords with the excellent relations which obtain between the United States of America and the friendl\' related (dem diesem befreundeten) German Empire." The Payne-Aldrich Tariff' left no room for bargaining to deter- mine whether the concessions oflFered by one nation were equivalent to those oflFered by the other. The United States extended to Germany the lowest rates of duty provided for in its legislation, (lermany ex-tended to the United States the lowest rates provided for in its commercial treaties. The TariflF Act of 1909 left a'^' "high scheme of rates" and showed an "extremely intolerant attitude on foreign trade" yet as a whole, it was "less aggressively 'protectionist' than previous Republican measures," and it was executed by the administration w^th the greatest moderation ])ermitted under its provisions. The following year the United States entered upon the nego- tiations for reciprocity with Canada, looking to sweeping reduc- tions in import duties on the part of both countries to the extent, almost, of the development of a tariff' union of English-speaking North America. Germany kept close watch over the proceedings, l)reparing, should the agreement be consummated, to make a vigorous protest against these concessions to Canada''*' on the ground that they were an infringement of the principle of the "most-favored-nation" which regulated the relations between the German Empire and the United States. The comprehensive character of the reductions proposed is shown in the summary of 139 V. R., Vol. 273, AnI., 1909-1911, Nr. 213 (transl. by tiuthor). "0 Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 407. '" V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz. 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D. 106 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS the effect of the schedules as submitted to Congress. ^^■- Ninety per cent, of the total imports into the United States from Canada were to be affected by the agreement, 14 per cent, to have import duties reduced, and 76 per cent, to be admitted entirely free. On the Canadian side the proportion of reduction was not so great. Thirty-six per cent, of the total import into Canada from the United States was to be affected, 19 per cent, to have duties reduced, and 16 per cent, to be admitted free. That the terms to Canada were to be most liberal was emphasized by President Taft in his message to CongKess, January 26, 1911, recommending the ratification of the agreement.^^^ "While equivalency should be sought in an arrangement of this character," he declared, "an exact balance of financial gain is neither imperative nor attainable. No yardstick can measure the benefits to the two peoples of this freer commercial inter- course and no agreement should be judged wholly by custom house statistics." His desire to create a very special relationship with Canada is still more strongly emphasized latisr in the same speech, in which he declares,^'" "Our common boundary line of three thousand miles in itself must make a radical distinction between our commercial treat- ment of Canada and of any other country." Germany therefore considered that the agreement would con- stitute a diftlerentiation against her products, and that she would be entitled under the status of "most-favored-nation" to claim her share in the concessions. It was not considered expedient, however, to make formal protest until the agreement should have been consummated by action of Congress and the Canadian Par- liament. The Canadian reciprocity measure was again the Cuban situation reproduced on a large scale. Had it passed there would 1^5 House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, pp. 90 and 91. '« House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, p. 11. 1" House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, pp. 90 and 91. CANADIAN' RECIPROCITY MEASURE 107 have heen sweepinir concessions exchanged. Under the United States' long-practiced construction of tlie princij)le definitely asserted in the Prussian treat\- this constituted no violation of its niost-favored-nation relations with other countries. (lennany had, at the time of the agreement of 1900, definitely accepted this reciprocity basis; it was therefore a reversal of policy for her to claim a share in the privileges which the United States was prepar- ing to extend to Canada, unless she were prepared to offer to the United States some equivalence. Since the measure was finally blocked by the Canadian Parliament, no action was taken by Germany at that time. Later, however, finding that the United States had put into operation a part of the agreement relating to wood-pulp and paper,^"*^ she made protest. The negotiations did not lead to any overturning of the status quo, or to the removal of the United States from the benefit of the German treaty tariff, l)ut the result was seen in the two new commercial treaties formed liy Germany at this time with Sweden and Japan, granting to these countries special commercial concessions. The new con- cessions were not extended on the "most-favored-nation" principle to the United States. The commercial relations of the two countries at the close of 1910 were therefore admitted by both to be on the strict basis of reciprocity. In spite of tariffs the quantity of trade was enormous. Next to the United Kingdom, Germany constituted the best customer of the United States, '""^ and, next to the United Kingdom, the United States constituted the best customer of Gennany. The formal agreements were of a very temporars" character. Dr. Delbrueck, Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, summed up the relationship before the Reichstag as follows i^"*^ " I will refer here to the commercial-political relations in which we stand toward the United States of America. Between the two countries there exists no treaty. The commercial-political i« V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz., 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D. i« U. S. Com. Rel., 1909, p. 91. 1*" V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz., 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D (transl.). 108 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS relations are regulated independently (autonom) by each side on the basis of diplomatic agreements; the regulation is not for long periods, but can be altered at short notice. The United States of America have on their part given us that which they at the time {i. e., agreement of 1910) considered to be their "most- favored-nation" privilege, that is, their so-called minimum tariff; and we on our part gave to the United States our entire treaty tariff', which at that time meant our "most-favored-nation" privilege." The need for a comprehensive commercial treaty had been acknowledged by representatives of both nations,^^^ and attempts had been made to arrange such a treaty; but without success."* It seems to have been the opinion that the treaty involved tariff* reductions, and this the prevailing protection sentiment of both countries made impossible. The tendency in each case was a firm maintenance of the existing protective legislation, coupled with a willingness to make such concessions as were possible outside the boundary' of that legislation. The presidents of the United States frequently extended to Gennany concessions both in tariff duties, and in customs administration, up to the point where action by Congress was required, and there all German demands were blocked. ^50 On the other hand the United States Congress was no more determined and unyielding in its protection policy than was the "8 U. S. Com. Rel., 1900, Vol. II, p. 268. Also, Senate Journal, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1906-1907. Petitions and Memorials, December 13, 1906. "A petition of the New York Branch of the National League of Commission Merchants praying the negotiation of a treaty between Germany and the United States looking to the establishment of better trade relations, etc.; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations." 1^9 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 65 ff. i^» V. R., Vol. 260, 58 Sitz., 15 Mai., 1910 (transl. by author). Count von Kanitz (Conservative) gave before the Reichstag the situation from the viewpoint of the German Conservatives. "First," he stated, "the Americans set up a tariff with unduly high rates, sharpen up their customs administration regulations, and then say afterward, 'Now, that is our law, that we can't alter, we can't dejiart from that.' That is an extraordinarily comfortatile method of obtaining a favorable exchange of goods with other countries, antl I should think it might be recommended that we make use of this procedure ourselves." NEED OF CX-)MPREHENS1VE COMMERCIAL TREATY 101) German Govornnu'nt in its corresponding measures. The (lemane under American protection, although the treaty did not provide for such a status. The fear as to just how the Samoan enthusiasm for the United States might afi'ect commercial interests of Germany and Great Britain in the islands expressed itself in an attitude of coolness on the part of the German and British Consuls toward the American connnissioner. They absented themselves from the celebrations in honor of the treaty and the criticisms of their press were adverse. ]\Ir. Goward expressed satisfaction that he had been able to secure prompt ratification of the treaty by the Samoan Go^'ernment, thus pre^'enting active interference by other foreign] officials.''^ Urom the viewpoint of the German Consul, INIr. Gow-' ard's attitude seemed high-handed and unfriendly to German interests. In an inter^^ew'^■^ Mr. Goward had told Herr Weber that he considered the German agreement of 1877 to be terminated (erledigt); that Article IV (/. e., granting to Germany most-fa vored- " V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 88. Der Kaiserliche Konsiil an das Auswaertige Amt. "Heute kani mir seine (Mr. Maudslay, British Consular Superintendent) Korrespondenz mit Herrn Griffin zu Gesicht, woraus hervorgeht, dass die Taimua sich unter amcrikanischen Schutz stellen und anscheinend nur durch \'ermittelung des Mr. Griffin mit dem englischen Vertreter verhandeln woUten indem Herr Griffin auf Grund des abgeschlossenen Traktats das Recht der Intervention, heansprucht und den englischen Vertretern quasi das Recht abspricht, direkt mit den samoanischen Autoritaeten zu verhandeln, tjezie- hungsweise Repressalien anzuwenden. Der enghsche Vertreter wird selbst- redend heirvon keine Notiz nehmen. Es wuerde fuer alle Besitzenden auf Samoa hoechst unheilvoU sein wenn der Traktat Amerikas eine solche Interpretation zulassen und dieselbe von anderen Staaten anerkannt werden soUte. .\us den bisher bekannt gewordenen Inhalt jenes Traktats ist solches indess nicht herauszulesen, und waere ja ein solcher Anspruch auch nicht denkbar, wenn die Amerikanische Regicrung nicht ausdruecklicli eine Pro- tektorat ueber Samoa erwirbt." (gez.) Th. Weber. " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10. «5 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 2.39, p. 115. 134 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC nation privileges in Samoa) could only be considered as polite phraseology; it was not at all necessary for Samoa to conclude treaties with the other nations represented there. The German Consul replied that the German inhabitants of the island had earned for themselves the right to a voice in the affairs of the Samoan Islands and that, while they never claimed anything which could be considered to be a restriction of the treaty rights of other nations, nevertheless, equahty of treatment in Samoa had become Germany's unquestioned right. After inquiring into the conditions of the treaty which the Germans proposed to conclude with Samoa, ]Mr. Goward offered to act as intermediary. This Herr Weber promptly refused as incompatible with the dignity of the Imperial Government and of the status of German interests in the islands. ^leanwhile the German warships continued to hold possession of the harbors of Saluafata and Falealii until the German treaty could be consummated. The actions of the American Consul and of Mr. Goward were only examples of that overzealousness on the part of local officials (of each of the three nations) which became a typical cause of international troubles in Samoa.^^ The hoisting of the American flag over the Samoan flag at IMulinuu by j\Ir. Griffin was dis- avowed by the Govermnent of the United States. Mr. Griffin himself was transferred to the Fiji Islands and Secretary Seward gave the German ambassador at Washington to understand that the instructions given to the new consul, Mr. Dawson would prevent the repetition of such occurrences.^^ On his return to the United States, Mr. Goward presented a report of his mission and included in it a review of the commercial developments in Samoa and his impressions as to the value of the islands. He emphasized the importance of the harbor at Pago- Pago, which had just come into the possession of the United States. He pronounced it the most important harbor in the south seas,*** being large enough to hold the fleets of several nations, and at the 6« F. R., '94, p. 507. "V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 1-il; also p. xviii of Denkschrift. «8Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. (JOWAUl) HEl>OHT 135 same lime, so land-locked as to be secure from hurricanes and storm and easy of tlefense from land or sea attacks. As a con- clusion to the whole report of his mission to Samoa, he repeats his convictions of the importance of Pago-Pago to the United States in the following terms :'''•' "To Pago-Pago harbor in itself attention has been called^with reference to its topographical features, its capacity, its internal fitness for a naval station and its possession by the United States. Additit)nal allusion should be made to its general importance. In a naval point of view it is the key position to the Samoan Group, and likewise to Central Polynesia, admirably located for the pro- tection of American commerce, upon the increase in those waters. The Samoan Archipelago is now, by reason of its geographical position in the center of Polynesia, lying in the course of vessels from San Francisco to Auckland, from Panama to Sydney, and from ^'alparaiso to China and Japan, and from the fact of being outside the hurricane track, the most valuable group in the South Pacific. Situated half way between Honolulu and Auckland, Pago-Pago would be a most convenient stopping place or coaling station for vessels or steamers either for supplies or the exchange of commodities. Should a naval station and the adjuncts that accompany be established, and the Pacific mail steamers make it a port of call, it would necessarily become the controlling commercial point in that part of Polynesia. These are ends most worthy of accomplishment, from the results that would follow, in the civil- ization of the natives, in the starting of profitable industries, and the establishment of factories and plantations on the difterent islands. With trade connections throughout the south seas, this wealth of products would be augmented aufl naturally fall into the hands of Americans interesting themselves, who would find a market for their commodities in the nearest American port of San Francisco. This is a commercial matter of such paramount im])ortance to the merchants of the Pacific States as to call for their immediate attention and action." «» Sen. Ex. Doc. Nc. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. 136 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC Goward's testimony was endorsed shortly afterward by the German minister in Washington, who, in announcing to Seward the consummation of the German treaty, admitted that the United States had secured the best harbor in Samoa. ^^ In spite of such praise, however, the pubUc in the United States took httle interest in the new harbor, the House of Representatives refused I to vote it a coalyard and it remained deserted and undeveloped for a number of years. After considerable difficulty and delay — which were declared due to the opposition of rival influences in the islands — the German Consul and the commander of the German warship "Ariadne" succeeded in obtaining from the Samoans the long-sought treaty.'^ Immediately on its signature they raised the siege of the harbors and saluted the Samoan Government. ^ The German treaty with Samoa ^- had as its underlying motive 1' the securing for the German Empire of all the privileges of the most-favored-nation in relations with the island group. It was therefore openly admitted that it had been modelled to a consider- able extent on the recent treaty between Samoa and the United States. ^^ The latter country having been granted the harbor of Pago-Pago, the Germans chose for themselves that of Saluafata, obtaining in that harbor the exclusive right to establish a na^'al or coaling station for German ships. ''^ It was expressly stipulated. '"' F. W. Seward, "Reminiscences of a Wartime Statesman and Diplomat,'' p. 440. (See also Appendix.) " V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 179. '2 Ibid., p. 1. " Ibid., p. 1S5. '^ Ibid., p. 1. Artikel V "Es soil den deutschen Kriegschitfen freistehen, in den Hafen von Saluafata einzulaufen, dasellist zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und tiuszubessern, und der deutschen Regierung soil es ferner freistehen, in jenem Hafen nach cigenem Ermessen alle fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren Besatzungen nuetzlichen Einrichtungen und Anordnungen zu treffen. Die Samoa Regierung ist ferner damit einver.standen, class die deutsche Regierung an den l^fern jenes Hafens Gebaude Zwecks Lagerung von Kohlen und irgend anderen Bedarfsgegenstaende fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren Besatzungen errichtet. Es soil der deutschen Regierung auch freistehen, auf deni Lande wo die Stationsgehaeude errichtet werden ihre Flagge aufzu- ziehen, jedoch soil die Oherhoheit der Samoa Regierung ueher den Hafen von Saluafata dadurch in keiner Weisc geschmaelert oder beeintraechtigt werden. CiEH.MAX-y.VMOAX THKATY, 1879 137 however, tliat the sovereignty of tlie Sjuiioan Government over the harbor should be in no wise diminished or afi'ected by the con- cession.^" Sahiafata was chosen because it offered protection to ^essels througliout the whole year, whereas Apia lay open to the full force of the hurricanes during the stormy season. But, Apia being the conunercial center of the islands, it was considered necessary to guarantee that place a free and independent develop- ment, so that a special clause was inserted providing against any future curtailment of German rights in Apia harbor. Other clauses of the treaty provided for mutual freedom of intercourse, or guaranteed to Germany equal commercial treatment with all other nations in Samoa. Article VIII, '"^ however, involved a principle somewhat different from any contained in the American treaty. It provided that all laws, regulations and taxes to which Germans on the islands might be subjected were to be submitted \ andererseits aber verpflichtet diese auch nichts zu thun, wodurch die der deutschen Regierung in diesem Artikel gewaehrten Rechte irgendwie werthlos gemacht oder heeintraechtigt werden koennten. Auch soil durch die in diesem Artikel der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten Rechte der Hafen von Saluafata den Kriegs- oder HandelsschiiTen derjenigen Nationen welchen der Samoa Regierung ihre Haefen offenhaelt nicht verschlossen werden, jedoch darf die Regierung von Samoa in Bezug auf diesen Hafen und seine Ufer keiner anderen Nation gleiche Rechte, wie die der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten, bewilligen. Es soli den deutschen Kriegsschiffen ferner freistehen, auch in alle anderen Plaetze, Haefen, und Gewaesser Samoas einzulaufen daselhst zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und auszubessern, nach Massgabe etwaiger, zwischen den l)eiderseitigen Regierungen zu vereinbarenden Gesetze, und verspricht die Samoa Regierung hier ferner, dass sie keiner anderen Nation in irgend einer Weise irgendwelche Vorrechte vor der deutschen Regierung in Bezug auf den Hafen von Apia luid dessen Ufer bewilligen will, sondern dass die deutsche RegK-rung auch in dicser Bezichung mit anderen Nationen immer gleichberechtigt sein soil." ^•^ Consul Weber stated that this stipulation was inserted because of instruc- tions from his government (V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 187). There is no corresponding reservation in the article governing the transfer of Pago-Pago to the United States. (See Appendix, or U. S. Statutes at Large, 45th Congre.ss, 1877-1S79, Vol. xx, p. 704.) '« V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, .\nl. Nr. 239, p. vii. Article VIII "Alle Gesetze und N'erordnungen, welchen die in Samoa sich aufhaltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen sich zu unterwerfen, sowie alle Steuern und .\bgaben, welche dieselben demgemaess der Samoa Regierimg zu entrichten haben, sollen von dem deutschen Konsul oder anderen zu dem Zwecke von der deutschen Regierung ernannten Personen zusammen mit 138 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC to the German Consul or other German representative, who should discuss them with the Samoan official, and after this had taken place, those laws were to become valid only after they had received the sanction of the German Government. This Consul Weber considered to be a necessary measure^'' to assure to the Imperial Government the right to exert over the regulation of affairs in Samoa an influence which he held to be justified by the condition of affairs there. The Imperial Government, he considered, could not reject such a limited participation without laying the present German interests there open to foreign influence. The pre- dominance of German developments in Samoa, resulting in the great proportion of taxes being paid by German subjects, made it, he said, fitting and necessary that the Germans should have a voice in questions of taxation. The clause seems to have met with no great objection from the Samoans or from the other foreign nations interested, yet it distinctly compromises the autonomy of the Samoan Government. Another clause of the treaty (Article VI)" secured for the Germans living in Samoa definite title to all their lands purchased up to that date and stipulated against any further question as to the validity of their possession. The treaty was considered by the German Government"^ to be well suited to the protection of German interests in the immediate Samoan group, but that it would have little effect unless completed by other treaties or agreements with the other island groups, for the com- merce of which Samoa served as a point of distribution. The labor supply for the plantations on Samoa had to be secured from the other islands of Polynesia,^" consequently there was keen rivalry between the competing companies-^especially between the Ger- man and English firms — in securing and importing workers. In the case of islands which had become definitely protectorates of Beamten der Samoa-Regicning berathen werden, ebenso alle zweckdienstlichen Massregeln, um die Beobachtung solcher Gesetze und Verordnungen diirch die Deutschen in Samoa hcrbeizufuehren, jedoeh sollen alle solche gemein- schaftlich von den Beamten der beiderseitigen Regierungen berathenen und vereinbarten Gesetze und Massnahmen erst nach erlangter Bestaetigung derselben durch die deutsche Rcgierung in Kraft treten." " V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 188. '^ Ibid., p. vi. " Ibid., Denkschrift, p. xx. «» Ibid., p. 209. GERMAN TREATIES WITH POLYNESIAN CHIEFS 139 Great Britain, the inhabitants were not i)ermitted to emigrate to an>- but British possessions and Great Britain secured there})y a niono})ol\- of the hd)or supply in those regions. ^^ It was therefore held important to keep open to German firms the sources of plantation labor in the Pacific and Consul Weber was sent on a cruise throughout Pol^^lesia, forming with the chiefs treaties or agreements, the main tenor of which was to prevent any other nations from securing a monopoh' and to assure for Germany most-favored-nation treatment in all respects. Where the inhabi- tants were not sufficiently civilized to make a written agreement possible, the site for a coaling station was jmrchased. The policy, however, as expressly stipulated in the instructions of the foreign office*- was to avoid the actual purchasing of harbors and to secure merel>' the use of them for German naval vessels; to secure equal treatment of German interests, but nowhere to conclude agree- ments ^\hich should interfere with the freedom of intercourse of other nations in those islands. In summing up the German policy in the Pacific at this time, the Secretary of the Foreign Office declared*^ before the Reichstag that all the agreements concluded «' Ibid., p. 174, also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 73, par. 183. *- Ibid., Denkschrift,!?. xix. « V. R., 1879, Vol. II, 58 Sitz., 13 Juni, 1S79, p. 1602. Von Biielow (Bevollmaechtigter zum Bundesrath, Staatssekretaer des Auswaertigen Amts, Staatsminister). "Es wuerden aber diese Vertraege auf nichts anderes hinauslaufen, als auf ein gleiche.s Recht fuer alle; wir wollten kein Monopol, keine Ausschliessung anderer. 8omit naehmen wir fuer diese Niederlassungen einfach das Recht in Ansjjruch, dass dasjenige, was durch die treue deutsche Arbeit, durch den ehrenwerthen tueohtigen Unternehmungsgeist dort gegruendet und in erfreulicher Weise entwickelt sei, auch das Recht behalte, was es durch seineu I'rsprung erworljen und in der .Stille entwickelt habe, naemlich, das gleiche Recht mit Allen, 8chutz gegen unberechtigte Konkurrenten, die zum Nach- theil des deutschen Handels und der deutschen Niederlassungen gcreichten: Das ist in jedem der Schriftstuecke, die abgedruckt und beigefuegt sind, als leitender Gedanke mehr oder weniger zum Ausdruck gebracht, uns ist dies der leitende Gedanke geblieben. Ich betrachte es als ein glueckliches Anzeichen fuer das Gelingen der sich daran knuepfcnden Bestrebungen fuer die Aufrechterhaltung dieses Vertrages, . dass wir gleichzeitig mit dem Aljschluss dessell)en von Seiten der beiden grossen befreundeten Seemaechte, welche gleichfalls Interessen in Samoa haben imd vertreten, die Anerkennung und freundliche Anerkennimg l)ekonnnen haben, dass Vertraege dieser Art der rechte ^^'eg seien, um der Unsicherheit 140 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC aimed at nothing further than an equal right for all — that Germany wished to found no colonies and to establish no monopolies but only to make certain that German commerce should enjoy good and equal rights with that of any other nation. ^Moreover, he con- sidered it as a happy evidence of the success of the treaty that he had received from both of the other interested powers, friendly recognition that treaties of this sort were the right way to end uncertainties and solve the problems involved. Upon the conclusion of the German treaty with Samoa, Herr Weber, the German Consul, following his instructions, set about assisting the British Consul to obtain a treaty for Great Britain.** While the negotiations were in progress an event occurred which revealed rather clearly the contrasting attitudes of the foreign representatives toward the Government of Samoa. ^^ The Taimua and Faipule sent out an invitation to the three consuls to meet them in conference concerning the making of certain laws and especially to ask the consuls for their opinion as to the ad\isability of taking into the government as adviser a certain American gentleman then residing in Apia. Herr W^eber stated that he was opposed to the Samoans taking any foreigner into their govern- ment as adviser, believing that it would give rise to difficulties as in the time of Steinberger. ^Moreover, such an adviser should have the endorsement of the three governments, Germany, England and America, which could not well be done imtil the Samoan ein Ende zu machen. Ich bin ueberzeugt, dass gerade die freie Gleichberecht- igung, die sich nicht weiter in die inneren Verhaeltnisse einmischt als zur Aufrechterhrtltung iind Durchfuehrung des Vertrags, zur Sicherstellung der erworbenen Privatreehte, der freien Ein- und Ausfuhr noethig ist der einzige Weg ist, die grosse Konkurrenz der Nationen wie ich sohon erwaehnte, gerade an diesem Punkte der Suedsee mehr und mehr friedlich auszugleichen. So viel ueber diesen Vertrag, meine Herren. Was aber im uebrigen die weiteren Entwuerfe und Vorbereitungen zu Vcrtraegen oder wie man sie nennen will, niit den umliegenden kleinen Inseln angeht, die Sie in der sehr interessanten Kundfahrt des Herrn Ka])itaen von Werner lieschrieben finden, so glaube ieh, darauf verweisen zu duerfen dass die Sache noch nicht abge- schlossen ist, dass alier dieselben Gnnidsaetze, welche fuer diesen heutigen Vertrag leitend gewesen sind, auch da geltend bleiben: wir wollen keine Kolonien dort gruenden, wir wollen kein Monopol gegen andere haben, wir wollen nur feststellen, soweit man es feststellen kann, dass deutsche Schifffahrt und Handel dort gutes Recht und gleiches Recht haben." 84 Ibid., p. 190. «5 11,1(1^ p 191. liHlTISU-SA.MOAN TREATY, lS7i) 141 Govornniont had made some form of ajireemeiit witli E]iij;laii(l. In the meantime the eonsnls of the three powers \vonld he j;lad to lend their assistance and advice to the Samoan Government in framing new laws or regnlations for the islands. The British acting consul,**^ Mr. Swanson, expressed a similar opinion, stating that while his conntry had nt) defined relations with the Samoan Government, which hailden, die aus den I'eberschues- sigen Saeften des gesammten deutschen Koerpers naturgemaess heraus- wachsen, in fremden Laendern Pflege imd Schutz angedeihen zu lassen. Und das bejahe ich, allerdings mit weniger Sicherhcit vom Standpunkt der Zweck- maessigkeit . . . ich nicht voraussehen was daraus wird . . ., aber mit unbcdingter Sicherheit vom Standpunkte der staat lichen Pflicht. Meine von Seiner Majestaet dem Kaiser gebilligte Absicht ist, die Verant- worthchkeit fuer die materielle Entwickelung der Kolonie ebenso wae ihr Entstehen der Thaetigkeit und dem Unternehmungsgeiste unserer seefalu-en- UniSlOX OF BKITISIl-GEKMAX COLONIAL SPHERES, 18SG 153 l^he expansion projects of tlie Xew Zealanders increased the ten- sion. It Avas soon seen by l)otli governments that in order to prevent further friction it would be necessary to come to some definite agreement defining the status of each nation in certain specific groups of islands, and also to determine on some geographic cliN'ision of the South Pacific which should regulate the future developments of British and German commerce there."'- The oi)ening proposal for such an understanding was made by Germany to England and was received cordially by Lord Granville, who declared"^ emphatically that England cherished no jealousy toward German colonization enterprises and was in no way unappreciative of the important position which Germany held on some of the South Sea islands. The British Government woidd therefore be very glad to define in which parts the influence of the one country and in which parts that of the other predominated. den und handeltreibenden Mitbuerger zu ueberlassen und weniger in der Form der Annektierung von ueberseeischen Pro\'inzen an das deutsche Reich vorzugehen als in der Form von Gewaehrung von P>eibriefen nach Gestalt der englischen Royal-charters im Anschhiss an die ruhmreiche Lauf- bahn, welclie die englische Kaufmannschaft l)ei Gruendung der ostindischen Kompagnie zurueckgelegt hat, und (hoert! hoert! rechts) den Interessenten der Kolonie zugleich das Regieren dersell^en im wesentUchen zu ueberlassen und ihnen nur die Moeglichkeit europaeischer Jurisdiktion fuer Europaeer und desjenigen Schutzes zu gewaehren, den wir ohne stehende Garnison dort leisten koennen. Unsere Absicht ist nicht Pro\inzen zu gruenden, sondern kaufmaennische Unternehmungen, aber in der hoechsten Entwickelung auch solche die sich eine Souveraenitaet, eine schUesslich dem deutschen Reich lehnbar Ijleibende, unter seiner Protektion stehende kaufmaennische Souveraenitaet erwerben, zu schuetzen in ihrer freien Entwickelung, sowohl gegen die Angriffe aus der unmittelljaren Xachbarschaft als auch gegen Bedrueckung und Schaediguug von Seiten anderer europaeischen Maechte. Im uebrigen hoffen wir class der Baum durch die Thaetigkeit der Gaertner, die ihn pflanzen, auch im Ganzen gedeihen wird, und wenn er es nicht thut, so ist tlie Pflanze eine Verfehlte, und es trifft der Schade weniger das Reich denn die Kosten sind nicht bedeu- tend, die wir verlangen, sondern die Unternehmer, die sich in ihren Fnterneh- mungen vergritTen haben. Das ist der I'ntcrschied: bei dem System welches ich das Franzoesische nannte, will die Staatsregierung jedesmal bcurtheilen, ob das Unternehmen ein Richtiges ist, und ein Gedeihen in Aussicht stellt; bei diesera System ueberlassen wir dem Handel, dem Privatmann die Wahl, und wenn wir sehen, dass der Baum Wurzel schlaegt anwaechst und gedeiht, und den Schutz des Reiches anruft so stehen wir ihm bei, und ich sehe auch nicht ein, wie wir ihm das rechtmaessig versagen koennen." »2V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 711. »" Ibid., p. 712, No. 23; also House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 162. 154 saivioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific As to Samoa, the two governments exchanged assurances that each had no interest to annex this group and the activities of New- Zealand toward acquiring the islands were halted by word from the British Foreign Office stating that the German GoAernment had given and received assurance that the independence of Samoa would be maintained. Negotiations on the general subject of Pacific possessions extended throughout two years (1884-1886). During this time a series of flag-hoistings took place in the South Pacific. England, led by the demands of Australia, occupied the south coast of New Guinea and Germany immediately took possession of the north coast"^ — up to the already established Dutch possessions."^ Spain, after a controversy with Germany,"'' gained acknowledged sovereignty over the Carolines and Pelew group, France gained the New Hebrides and finally the British- German negotiations were consummated in the agreement of April G, 1886,"^ dividing between them the Western Pacific. A' line of demarcation was established, running irregularly from lo'^ north latitude to .30° south latitude. Germany agreed "not to make acquisitions of territory, accept protectorates, or interfere with the extension of British influence to the East, Southeast, or South of the said conventional line" and to give up any acquisi- tions already estabhshed there. Great Britain reciprocally made the same promises for the region West, Northwest and North of the demarcation Hne. As the part of the Pacific so partitioned included the Samoan Islands, these, together with the Tonga Islands and the Island of Nine (Savage Island), were exempted from the provisions of the treaty and were to be continued as a "4 V. R., 1885, Anal. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 718. The corres- pondence over the seizure of the New Guinea coasts shows a more aggressive colonial policy than that outlined by Bismarck to the Reichstag the preceding year. Bismarck at this time declares: "Wir beabsichtigen nunmehr, wie in Westafrika so auch in der Suedsee, diejenigen Gebiete welche durch vorherrschende Ausbreitung des deutschen Handels oder in Folge der Vorbereitungeh zu dieser als geeignet dazu erscheinen, unter den direkten Schutz des Reichs zu stellen." "5 Ibid., p. 716, No. 36. '"5 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 112. 117 V. R., 1885-'86, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 291, p. 1570. AMERICAN POLICY IN NORTH PACIFIC 155 neutral repon. Any other islands within the designated area were also exemj^ted if tliey were at this time under the protection or sovereignty of any other civilized power than Germany or Great Britain. Following the provisions of the treaty,"^ Great Britain took possession of the Kemadec Islands and Germany annexed the ^larshall, Brown and Providence groups. ^^^ While these events were taking place in the South Pacific, the United States was establishing its trade control in the North. In 18S4 it concluded with Hawaii a supplementary conventions-*^ renewing for seven years the reciprocity treaty of 1875, which had made those islands commercially a part of what might be called an American tariff union and established Hawaii as the sugar plantation of the Pacific coast. Three years previous to the treaty renewal, an attempt of Great Britain to secure with the native government of Hawaii a con\'enti()n granting to the Hindu coolie laborers the right of British consular jurisdiction in the Hawaiian Islands, met with determined opposition from the Government of the United States. In the negotiations concerning this subject the Secretarj^ of State, Blaine, stated emphatically tliat the United States considered the Hawaiian Islands as "a member of the American system of states, "^^i Having gained "8V. R., 1885-86, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 291, p. 1572. This agreement was complemented by a second providing for reciprocal freedom of trade and commerce in the German and British possessions and protector- ates in the Western Pacific. All past land claims of the sut)jects of either nation when living in a protectorate of the other nation, were to be referred to a mi.xed German-British Commission. Both governments agreed not to establish any penal settlements in or transport convicts to the Western Pacific. 1" House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 112 f. >2»F. R., 1894, p. 170. '21 F. R., 1881, p. 636 f. No. 401. Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly. Department of St.\te, Washington, December 1, 1881. "I have spoken of the Pacific Coast line given to the American Union by the cession of California in 1848, as little inferior in extent and superior in natural wealth, to the Atlantic sea-board of the original l^nion. Since that time our domain on the Pacific has been vastly increased l)y the purchase of Alaska. Taking San Francisco as the commercial center on the western slope, a line 156 sa^ioa: the united states and germ ant in the pacific a "legitimately dominant influence in the North Pacific," he declared, the United States would not allow that influence to be decreased by any hostile element. The Hawaiian Islands were so situated that they held strategic control of the North Pacific and therefore the possession of them became a question of policy strictly American. The Secretary outlined what he considered to be the commercial domain of the Western coast. It was included between a line drawn northwest from San Francisco to the Aleutian Islands and a line southwest from that city to Honolulu. The Hawaiian Islands, therefore, he considered to be the key to the maritime dominion of the Pacific states, just as Cuba was the key to the Gulf trade, and the extension of commercial empire westward from the Pacific states was as important to their development as would be their connection with the eastern seaboard by an isthmian canal. From such e\'idence of a definitely formed Pacific policy on the drawn northwestwardly to the Aleutian group, marks our Pacific border almost to the confines of Asia. A corresponding line drawn southwestwardly from San Francisco to Honolulu marks the natural hmit of the ocean belt within which our trade with the oriental countries must flow, and is, more- over, the direct line of commimication between the United States and Aus- tralasia. Within this belt hes the commercial domain of our western coast. I have had recent occasion to set forth the vitally integral importance of our Pacific possessions, in a circular letter addressed on the twenty-fourth of June last, to our representatives in Europe, touching the necessary guarantees of the proposed Panama Canal as a purely American waterway to be treated as part of our own coast fine. The extension of commercial empire westward from those states is no less vitally important to their development than is their communication with the Eastern coast by the Isthmian channel. And when we survey the stupendous progress made by the western coast during the thirty years of its national life as a part of our dominion, its enormous increase of population, its vast resources of agriculture and mines, and its boundless enterprise it is not easy to set a limit to its commercial activity or forsee a check to its maritime supremacy in the waters of the Orient, so long as those waters afford, as now, a free and neutral scope for our Pacific trade. In thirty years the United States has acquired a legitimately dominant influence in the North Pacific, which it can never consent to see decreased by the intrusion therein of any element of influence hostile to its own. The situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them the strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely American policy, as much so as that of the Isthmus itself. Hence the neces- sity as recognized in our existing treaty relations, of drawing the ties of inti- mate relationshij) between us anfl the Hawaiian Islands so as to make them practically a part of the American system without derogation of their absolute independence." J.\MES G. Blaixe. DISTURBANCES IN TIIK ISLANDS, 1886 157 part of all three govorninonts^-'- it is clear that the Samoan Islands, heiiiij ()iu> i)f the few remaining unelaimed groups of inii)ortance in the raeifie, were bound to become the object of conflicting com- mercial and ])olitical aspirations, and the subject of considerable diplomatic controversy. The events in the islands during 1885 and 188() were such as to require adjustment by the home governments. The action of the German Consul, Dr. Stuebel, in hoisting the German flag over Apia was i)romptly disavowed by Bismarck,^'-^ who declared that the German Government was wholly ignorant of the action, had no intention of violating the agreement with the United States and England nor of establishing a protectorate over the islands, but on the contrary, would maintain that agreement and adhere to the status quo. In spite of this disavowal by the home govern- ment the German corporation, dominating the trade of the islands, continued its controversy with ]Malietoa and ordered the king to remove his seat of government from ]Mulinuu point, which Mr. Weber claimed to be land belonging to the German Company. On the king's refusal the German Consul, Dr. Stuebel, with an armed force from the German naval vessel "Albatrgss," proceeded to Mulinuu and removed the Samoan flag. Protests against this act were made by the American and British consuls and it was again disavowed^--* by the German Government, which gave assurance that it was without information on the matter, but that it would "maintain all previous agreements and would adhere to the status quo/'^-'^ ^leantime the former Vice-king, Tamasese, had '22 The views of the Reichstag at this time did not keep pace with the policy of colonization as outlined by the Chancellor. In considering the Imperial Budget for the year 188o-'86, the Reichstag twice voted down measures to increase the appropriation for government officials in the South Seas — even though it was declared by supporters of the measure that such failure to support the Government policy would seriously affect the negotiations then taking place in London on the subject of German and British colonization spheres. (See Reichstag discussion, V. R., 1885, Vol. I, pp. 395-405, 16. Dezember, 1884; and Vol. Ill, pp. 1539-1587, 4. Maerz, 1885.) 1-3 House Ex. Doc. Xo. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Se.ss., p. 4. '2^ A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. II. 123 House Ex. Doc. Xo. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16. INlr. Pendleton, American Minister at Berlin, reported to Secretary Bayard an interview with 158 SA:kiOA: the united states and germant in the pacific broken away from the government and, with the assistance of the German subjects in the islands, had become again a formidable rival of ]\IaHetoa and a new war was imminent. ^Nlalietoa now appealed to the American Consul for protection, ^-^ basing his plea on Article V of the Samoan- American treaty of 1878, which promised that in case of trouble between Samoa and another power, the United States would use its good offices to obtain settlement. Mr. Greenebaume without instructions accepted INIalietoa's request and hoisted the American flag over that of Samoa at Apia. A protest was made by the German Consul and the act of its consul was in turn disavowed by the American Government.^-^ It was now reahzed that some definite plan should be agreed upon by the three governments for restoring order in the islands. Secretary Bayard suggested, therefore, that the German and British ministers at Washington be authorized to confer with him on the subject — that in the meantime three new consuls should be appointed and sent to Samoa, and a war vessel of each nation be maintained at the islands for two years. He also suggested that there should be a joint declaration made by the three Powers declaring against annexation or establishment of a protectorate by any of the three Powers. The suggestion^^s resulted in the sending of three commissioners Count Herbert Bismarck concerning occurrences in Samoa. The latter stated to Mr. Pendleton: "^^^lile, therefore, I can give you no information as to the facts, only conjectures, which may perhaps be entirely without foundation, I can say to you, as I said already a week ago to the British Ambassador, that, what- ever may have occurred, we intend to maintain the status as it has heretofore existed. We have been satisfied with that; it has been satisfactorj' to the three Governments; we have neither interest nor desire to change it; but if we had, we would take no stepj make no movement, without frankly consulting in advance the United States and Great Britain. If any wrong has been done it shall be righted, and reparation shall be made; and nothing shall be allowed to change the relative positions of these governments." '2« Ibid., pp. 25 and 26. '-' Ibid., p. 19. 1" A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 18 ff. Two months before Sec- retary Bayard made his suggestion that the three powers hold a conference on the Samoan question, Germany and Great Britain at the invitation of the Earl of Rosebery had already made arrangements for an Anglo-German COMMISSIONS TO SAMOA, 1SS6 159 to the islands to rej^ort to their home governments the actual conditions there, preparatory to a conference of the three govern- ments on plans for the administration of Samoa. The basis of this nKiuiry as set forth by Secretary Bayard^-" was to l)e "a thorough examination into the condition of the group and the (a uses of the recent disorders and discontent there, with a view to finding a permanent remedy; a report to be drawn uj) by each c(^nnnissioner for his respective government; and a status of neu- trality to be maintained by the joint counsel and influence of the three Powers, excluding annexation or predominance by any one power, and promoting the autonomy and peaceful government of the group by the native authority." The inquiry, according to Secretary Bayard's view, was to be conducted jointly. The British Government accepted this basis unquaHfiedly,^^'' the German Go^■ernment "agreed generally," but did not approve of providing the commissi(Miers with joint instructions. Also it did not contem- ])late that the three commissioners should hold joint sittings and furnish a joint report, but, on the contrary, that each should examine the situation for himself and report separately to his own government. The German commissioner was, however, instructed to communicate freely and frankly with the other commissioners. It was arranged that all three consuls should inquiry into conditions in Samoa. ( At Bismarck's suggestion the Commis- . sioners selected for the enterprise were Mr. John B. Thurston, British High Commissioner of the Western Pajcjfic, and Mr. Travers, His Imperial Majesty's Consul-General in Australia^ When the invitation came from the United States it was decided to adhere to the proposed inquiry by Commissioners already selected and to invite the American Government to send a Commis- sioner also. Count Hatzfeldt in agreeing to this suggested to the Earl of Rosebery that it would l)e "desirable that Messrs. Thurston and Travers should exchange views confidentially, with regard to their course in the matter" (Ibid., p. 27). >" Ibid., p. 35, No. 49. "" Ibid., pp. 36 and 37, also p. 39, No. 58. For instructions on this basis to the British Consul see Ibid., p. 41. The American Commissioner Mr. Bates, of Delaware, was selected by Secretary Bayard because his personal acquaintance with the man enabled the Secretary to place implicit confidence in him. Mr. Bates had never taken any public part in politics in the ITnited States nor had he held any diplomatic or consular post. 11 160 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AXD GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC leave Samoa^^^ after the arrival of the commissioners.^^- ]\Ir. Bates, the American commissioner, was authorized to disavow^^^ the action of Consul Greenebaume in assuming a protectorate over Samoa, and Secretary Bayard set forth in his instructions that the Government of the United States was unwilling to '^^ Ibid., p. 44 ff. Inclosure in No. 76. Extract from the Xew York Herald of August 20, 1886. Our Representative in Samoa. Consul Greenebaum's Explanation not satisfactory'. (From our Regular Correspondent.) Washington, August 19, 1886. "A few weeks ago ]Mr. Bates, of Wilmington, Delaware, was appointed by Secretary Bayard as a Special Agent of the State Department to proceed to the Samoan Islands and endeavor to restore the character of the Consulate to its former position of neutral relations with the Samoan Chiefs. Yesterday Mr. Greenebaum, of San Francisco, who has been the consul there for some time, arrived in Washington as it appears, under the orders of the State Department, to explain, if possible, the allegations made against him of having ignored his instructions not to take part in any local strife which was known to exist among the hostile chiefs on that island. He left today for San Francisco, and "will not, it is said, return to Samoa, his explanation not being satisfactory to the Secretary. It is alleged that, almost immechately upon arriving at Samoa, he began to take sides with one of the factions, and carried his interference so far as to provoke the opposition of the consuls of other nations. He will be permitted to resign and his resignation is expected to be forwarded on his arrival in San Francisco." Mr. Bayard later told the British Ambassador that Mr. Greenebaum had not been dismissed but that his commission had expired and the President had not seen fit to renew it (Ibid., p. 47). F. R., 1886, p. ix. President Cleveland stated in his Message to Congress, December 6, 1886: "Civil perturbations in the Samcan Islands have, during the past few years been a source of considerable embarrassment to the three governments, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, whose relations and extra- territorial rights in that important group are guaranteed by treaties. The weakness of the native administration and the conflict of opposing interests in the islands have led King INlalietoa to seek alhance or protection in some one quarter regardless of the distinct engagements whereby no one of the three treaty powers may acquire any paramount or exclusive interest. In May last Malietoa offered to place Samoa under the protection of the United States, and the late Consul without authority assumed to grant it. The proceeding was promptly disavowed and the overzealous official recalled. Special agents of the three governments have been deputed to examine the situation in the Islands. With a change in the representatives of all three powers, and a harmonious understanding between them, the peace prosperity, autonomous administration, and neutrahty of Samoa can hardly fail to be secured." "2 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 104, No. 97. The American and German Consuls left the islands before the arrival of the American and British Commissioners. The fact was deprecated by Mr. Thurston, British Com-, missioner because it gave no opportunity of acquiring direct information from Mr. Greenebaum and Dr. Stuebel whom Mr. Thurston considered to be almost entirely responsible for the recent state of affairs in Samoa. "3 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, oOth Cong., 1st Sess., p. 31. INSTHITTIONS TO AMERICAN COMMISSIONER 161 assume such a protectorate "either for itseU' alone or under any joint arrangement whereby the native authority' of Samoa would he replaced by a permanent tripartite government of the powers." He admitted that it would probably be necessary temporarily to undertake some joint arrangement to preserve order, for which the continued presence at Apia of a naval vessel of each of the powers in turn would suffice. In respect to the foreign interests throughout the whole group of islands, the secretary considered that the municipal arrangement at Apia, by which the presidency of the board was held in turn by each of the three consuls, might constitute the best solution for the administration of the islands. Beyond this no one of the powers should have "the slightest concern in the personality at the head of the Samoan native government." The three commissioners soon found imj^ortant differences in their understanding of their instructions.^^* ]\Ir. Thurston and ^Ir. 1'^ I])id., p. 139 (Appendix A). "Mr. Thurston's sta\' in Samoa was of less than two weeks' duration. As his position in Fiji is such that under the consular system of his Government the correspondence of the Apia consulate had passed under his eye, he was doubtless famihar with the general course of events in Samoa, and felt it imnccessary to spend more time there. Nevertheless I regretted very much his earl J' departure. There were some points on which further and frequent conferences between Mr. Travers and myself led often to modification and, in some instances, coincidence of views. I am convinced also that Mr. Travers' views upon which our original difference rested did undergo considerable change. Toward the end of my stay he discussed with me the possible details of a native Government to an extent necessarily involving the idea of autonomy, which at first he considered impracticable. It was, it is true, such a government as would depend for its inspiration and strength upon the {iresence in it of white men. Mr. Travers also modified his previously expressed view by assenting that our conferences and expressions of views to each other might be com- municated to our respective Governments. This permission, however, was of less value, since these conferences were under his determination, mere informal conversations; and any view which he expressed to me he did not feel bound to adhere to, but considered them liable to change on further reflection. Before leaving this subject, I desire to express the satisfaction which I derived from my intercourse with both of the commissioners. I was deei)ly impressed with the ability and fidelity with which these gentlemen api)roached the consideration of the subject referred to us. Our relations were of the most agreeable character, and resulted in sentiments of resjject and friendly regard on my part which I am glad to believe were reciprf)cated. With the exception of Mr. Thurston's brief sojourn at Apia, and the difficulty exper- ienced bj' Mr. Travers, under his instructions, of fully coinciding with our \'iews as to the investigation, I could have desired nothing more with respect to either of them." 162 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AXD GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC Bates considered that their very presence there simultaneously implied that their investigations were to be undertaken jointly even though their reports were to be separate. Mr. Travers, however, considered that their investigations also were to be entirely independent and that they had no official relations with each other. The British and American commissioners also consid- ered that they were there to plan the establishment of an auto- nomous native government to be supported by the joint influence of the three powers; the German commissioner did not state his instructions in this regard, but was emphatic in declaring his own view that "no autonomous native government was at all practicable." Mr. Bates relates, however, that during their stay on the islands and as a result of frequent conference the German commissioner considerably modified his views. Each commissioner presented to his home government a plan of his own for the administration of Samoa. The German Commis- sioner, !Mr. Travers, framed his plan^^^ on the principle that the government of the country must be "placed in the hands of but one of the treaty powers, by the consent of the others." In view of the predominance of German interests, of the service rendered by Germany in developing the islands and of the fact that German subjects paid half of the taxes in Samoa, the control of the country belonged properly to Germany. He therefore drew up a plan placing the administration of the islands in the hands of a chief officer or administrator to be appointed by the German Govern- ment. His three chief assistants, a chief justice, director of finance and a judge of first instance, were also to be appointed by the Ger- man Government. The duties of the native king were to be purely representative and the native assembly was to be permitted to meet for public discussion of matters of general interest according to old Samoan custom, but it was not to have a deciding vote, and its resolutions were to receive such consideration as might be practicable. The INIunicipal Council was to be abolished. jNIr. Travers 's plan was in brief that of placing Samoa under Germany as a mandatory, but he considered that such a plan would not I's House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2G3 ff. COM.MISSIONKHS' PLAN'S FOR SOMOAN ADMINISTRATION 163 "exclude either the Kngli li or the American Governments from active parti( ipation in tlie remix leUnii; of tlie j)oliticaI aflairs of Sam(>a or from a decisive infiuence in the subsequent control of the Government itself." y^ The British Gommissioner, ]Mr. Thurston, considered^*' that altlioui^h the interests of Europeans in Samoa could not as yet be entrusted to a native government, that "an earnest attempt to estabHsh the j)resent natixe government on an improved footing was at least worthy of trial." Such a government, however, would require the active participation of representatives of the three powers, and Mr. Thurston elaborated a plan for an administration by a council consisting of a king, a vice-king, chiefs from several districts, and three foreign officials to be appointed, respectively, by Great Britain, Germany and the United States. These officials were also to have seats in the lower house, or legislative body. The Municipal Gouncil was to be retained and to consist of nine members, of whom the consuls of the Treaty Powers were each to appoint three. In general the right of foreign subjects to juris- diction of their own consuls was to be continued. ]\Ir. Thurston's plan"^ thus maintained the idea of equality of representation of the "6 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 74, also p. 102. "'Ibid., p. 75. (Mr. Thurston's Report.) "224. In closing this Report I cannot but express regret that the recom- mendations I have the honor of submitting for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government should not have met with the concurrence of the German Commissioner. 22.5. The task of devising a scheme of government for a native community, distracted by internal jealousies, and bewildered by foreign influences ancl intervention of long duration, could not at the outset promise any higher degree of success. 226. But the difhculties inseparal)le from such a problem were not lessened when, of the three Commissioners a])pointed to visit Samoa and report to their respective Governments upon its conditions and requirements, one was indis- posed to join in a task he regarded as futile, and, moreover, not within the scope of his instructions; and another, though a])proaching the subject with a lively and earnest interest, was unable to make any substantive proposals owing to inexperience of "native character and capabilities. 227. ^^'ith the assistance of three foreign members of Government and a Magistrate, for whose services the revenue of the native Government should without difficulty be able to pay, I think it possiljle that a native Government might in time l>e established on a satisfactory footing. 228. It would, however, })e necessary for the Powers interested in Samoa to continue an executive support to the native Government through their naval authorities, for in the beginning every Chief who fancied himself slighted would proclaim that he had 'left the king' ami then proceed to hoist a flag of his own."' 164 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC powers in Samoa — it also gave more semblance of autonomy to the native government, but it was semblance merely, as the pres- ence of three foreigners with A'oting power, in the highest executive council of the countn- was hardly compatible Anth the idea of an independent government. ^Moreover, Mr. Thurston stated emphatically^^* that without assistance the natives of Polynesia were "neither capable of forming nor maintaining any form of government worthy of the name." ]Mr. Bates, the American Commissioner, feeling bound by his instructions to frame some scheme for triangular control of the native government, drew up a plan not^^^ unlike that of Mr. Thurston in that it established a nominee of each of the three powers as member of a council which was to constitute the real executive power in the islands. The foreign officers were also to have a voice in the lower legislative body. Unlike Mr. Thurston, Air. Bates considered it better to abolish the present municipal government of Apia. IMr. Bates, however, felt considerably restricted by his instructions and expressed his conviction that the extent of intervention on the part of the powders must be more systematic and comprehensive than seemed to have been contem- plated by his instructions, which looked toward the establishment of a native government of some force with oversight rather than administration by the three powers. Mr. Bates, however, realized that the real function of the powers would necessarily be that of actual administration of the government of Samoa. Moreover, Mr. Bates, having obeyed his instructions and outlined his plan for participation of the three governments, proceeded to confess his lack of faith in the plan. He stated that he shared Mr. Travers' apprehension of the dangers of tripartite control, that it would create constant international dissensions, as was evidenced by the failure of the former attempt at government by the three consuls. He therefore agreed with the German Commissioner that administration by one power would be the best plan, but disagreed with him in concluding that that power should be Ger- "8 Ibid., p. 68. "3 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 186 ff. VIEWS OF .VMEHICAN COMMISSIONER 165 many. The concentration of German interests almost entirely in one cc^mjiany made it possible for that firm to dominate German local ofHcials in Samoa and sway measures to their own interest. Then, too, the use of the German language in the Government would make it very difficult for the British and American residents who did not understand German, whereas most of the Germans understood English, which would therefore not create the same hardshij). Moreover, if it were true, as Mr. Travers emphasized and Mr. Thurston questioned, that German interests so greatly predominated in the islands, that, according to Mr. Bates, was an additional reason why Germany should not be allowed to control the government. Moreover there were also reasons in the American Commissioner's opinion why this control should not be given over to Great Britain. Chief among these was that Great Britain, like Germany, was pursuing a policy of annexation in the South Pacific; therefore, even under the most guarded treaty, the I'nited States should not allow the absolute control of the Samoan Government to pass into the hands of either of these powers. The final conclusion therefore of Mr. Bates was that the only real solution of the problem lay in assigning the administra- tion of the islands to the United States. The recognized absence of any disposition on the part of the American Government to acquire territory in that region, and its national policy of abstain- ing from intervention he considered to be reasons justifying the choice of the United States for that function, a choice which he believed would best satisfy the native population. While the three governments were thus equipping themselves with information on Samoa and otherwise preparing for the con- ference in Washington, which should solve the Samoan problem, events were taking place on the islands which were destined to affect the coming negotiations directly and indirectly. Malietoa was still the recognized native king, but the revolutionary forces under the rival chief, Tamasese, the former vice-king, were gaining in strength through the assistance, as was declared by Malietoa, of the Germans,^^'' especiall}' j\Ir. Weber, director of the great "» Ibid., p. 24. Report of Commander B. F.. Day, U.S.S. Mohican, May 28, 1886, also p. 48 and p. 229. 166 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC German company. There appeared also at this time as assistant or advisor to the rebel chief Tamasese, a certain Captain Brandeis,"' former Captain of Bavarian artillery, who was reported to be lately connected with the German consulate and to be now giving military instruction to the insurgents. To Malietoa's protest against the activities of Brandeis, the new German Consul replied that Captain Brandeis had no appointment of a military character, but was, as a private individual, peaceably assisting the govern- ment of Leulumoega {i. e., the Tamasese government), and the Consul trusted that his labors would be for the blessing of Samoa. ^*^ 1" R. L. S., p. 410. (Letters and Miscellanies of R. L. S.. Vol. XIX.) i« A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 119. M. Becker to the King of Samoa. German Consulate, Apia, February 10, 18S7. (Translation by source.) "Your Majesty: I am in receipt of the letter stamped with your Government seal, dated the 31st January, from Mr. William Coe, complaining about Brandeis, a German gentleman gone to Leulumoega in a miHtary character, now in sedi- tious relations to the Samoan Government, and attempting insurrections, requesting me to do something to Brandeis. The contents of a letter delivered to you on the 12th November, 1886, I have informed Your Majesty that my Government has instructed me that when I assumed my duties in the German Consulate to write similar letters to Tuiaana Tamasese, the same as to you. Be it well known by your Majesty in relation to the above letter, that the Government of the Emperor of Germany is in friendly relations with the Leulumoega Government as it is with your Government. The letter with the seal sent to the German Consulate greatly surprises me in calling the Government of Leulumoega 'rebels.' In the future, I therefore request your Majesty to prohibit Mr. William Coe to say no more bad words like that; for again if he says any more bad words like that in the future, it will be my duty to inform my Government, and the letters which you will receive from my Government, you will not like their contents. 1 assure you that I have nothing to do with the gentleman Brandeis, for I am not instructed by the German laws to prohibit any German gentleman coming here on his own business, and fincl an appointment among some gentlemen who are in friendly relations with the German Government. I have therefore to inform your Majesty. that I will always he ready to attend to those subjects that you may write to me upon. I shall at once dispatch the ^'ice-consul to Leulumoega to get information in relation to the doings of the gentleman Brandeis; should he find the work of the above gentleman unsatisfactory, then shall the Vice-consul speak to him. Again, be it well known that the gentleman Brandeis has no appointment in a military character, but resides peaceably assisting the Government of Leulumoega" in their work, for Brandeis is a quiet sensible gentleman, and I trust his labor at Leulumoega will do a great deal of good for the blessings of Samoa, and remain in peace May you live, I am, &c., (Signed) Becker, German Consul. ACTIVITIES OF CAPTAIN BRAXDEIS 107 In installing the new consul, the German Government gave him instructions to write similar letters to ]\ralietoa and Tamasese. To this eciual recognition of both and to the reports of the activities of Brandeis, Secretary Bayard made vigorous protest,"'' and received the reply that the German Go^•ernment was not aware of j\Ir. Brandeis's relations with the German consulate or with Tamasese and had received no information from Malietoa con- cerning his activities."^ As to the chief Tamasese, however, the '« House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 43. • No. 36. Mr. Bayard to Mr. von Alvensleben. Department of State. Washington, March 2, 1SS7. "Sir: It is proper I should acquaint you with the purport of a dispatch just received at the Deirartment and dated January 31, 1887, from the American \'ice-consul at Apia. It is stated in substance that a Mr. Brandeis, lately connected with the German consulate at Apia, has been s^ent under pay and with the title of General to give mihtary instruction to Tamasese in promo- tion of his rebellion against the Government of Malietoa. The ^'ice-consul further states that this action has Ijeen made the subject of earnest remon- strance bj' Mahetoa to the Imperial Government. I trust that the just and benevolent plan of cooperation by the three pQwers will not be allowed to be impeded by any such inconsistent and male- ficent action as has been so reported, and if any such steps have been taken that your Government will promptly check such actions by its officials, or under color of their approval. Accept Sir, &c., T. F. B.\YARD." •" Ibid., p. 50. Xo. 39. Mr. von Alvensleben to Mr. Bayard. (Translation by source.) Imperial German Leg.\tion, Washingto.n, April Uth, 1887. (Received .\pril 15.) "The undersigned Imperial German Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary has brought the polite note of the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, Secretary of State of the United States, l)earing the date of March 2, 1887, and relating to Samoa, to the notice of his high Government, and has been authorized to make the following rej)!}' thereto: The Imperial Government is not aware that a certain Mr. Brandeis at Apia sustains or has sustained relations with the German consulate at that place, or that he has become as.sociated with Ghief Tamasese. . The Imi)erial Government, moreover, has received no information concerning any rejjre- sentation made by Chief Malietoa on account of what has been tlone by Mr. Brandeis. The reference made in the note of the honorable Mr. Bayard to a rebellion of Tamasese against Malietoa's Government furnishes occasion for the remark that a formal agreement was signed at the instance and in the i)resence of the German. American and British consuls, on the 8th of June last, on board 168 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMAXY IX THE PACIFIC German Government replied that the strength of his support in Samoa warranted its recognition of his government as of equal status with that of Malietoa and that that recognition had prac- tically been accorded him by the American and British Consuls the preceding June when they had influenced Tamasese and Mal- ietoa to come on board the U. S. S. "Mohican" and sign a formal agreement of peace and friendship. Yet it agreed that the ques- tion of sovereignty in Samoa should be reserved for the coming conference to decide and that in the meantime there was no occa- sion for any one of the powers to interfere in Samoan party ques- tions.^^= It was agreed upon by all three powers that their consuls on the islands should be instructed to maintain the status quo during the sessions of the conference. A movement from another quarter at this juncture complicated the situation on the islands. King Kalakaua, of Hawaii, sponta- of the U.S.S. "Mohican," by the representatives of the opposing parties in Samoa, viz., that of MaUetoa and that of Tamasese to the effect that both parties should thenceforth hve on terms of friendship with each other. The de facto existence and the equaUty of Tamasese's party was consequently considered, both by the native and the foreign population of the Samoan Islands, as having "Haen recogniz^. so>i1Jhat tile term "rebellion" does seem approi)riate in the case to either party. It appears, however, from a tabular statement prepared by Mr. Travers, the Imperial Consul General, while he was in Samoa that Tamasese's adherents are, at the present time, nearly four times as numerous as those of Mahetoa. The Imperial Government shares the view that all propositions looking to a settlement of the question of sovereignty in Samoa should be reserved for the consideration of the conference of the three treaty powers which is to meet at Washington, and that there is no occasion for any one of the treaty powers to interfere, without the cooperation of the others, in existing party questions. The undersigned avails, etc., H. v. Alvexsleben." (See also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. X15 f.) >« A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 13-4. No. 133.1. Count Hat^feldt to the Marquis of Salisbury. (Translation by ourcer) » German Embassy, June 20, 1887. "The Imperial Government, who are equally desirous \\-ith Her Majesty's Government to preserve the status quo in Samoa, will, accordingly, again instruct their consul at Apia in the sense desired by Lord Salisbury and they hope that analogous instructions will be^sent to the British Representative." (Sec also House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 56 and 57.) HAWAIIAN EXPEDITION 169 iieoiisly outfitted and sent an expedition of his own to Samoa, '^''' seeking to form with King Malietoa an alliance which should be the starting-point of a confederation of the still inasis of their relations to Samoa. We do not, however, anticipate a favorable result from a participation of the so-called King and of one of his officials in the negotiations of the consuls, neither for the affairs themselves, nor for the agreement of the powers and their consuls between each other. The Imperial Government agrees, therefore, to the adjournment of the conference proposed liy Mr. Bayard and will, jointly with the British Govern- ment, take into closer consideration the American counter-proposition of a common control of the Samoan Government to be exercised by the three treaty powers. The Imperial Government is, however, unable to renounce an immediate reparation for the insults against His Majesty the Emperor and the national honor committed by partisans of Malietoa, on the 22nd of March last, on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday, by the ill-treatment of German citi- zens in Samoa and by violence inflicted upon thom. We also must obtain due satisfaction for the thefts and robberies committee on German plantations, which have hitherto remained vmpunished, and for the systematical refusal of legal jM'otection in cases of criminal offenses committed by Samoans against German subjects; and, furthermore, we must obtain sufficient guaranties that our treaties with Samoa be in future respected and the German interests there duly i)rotecte(l. The latter are in consequence of the uncalled-for inter- meddling of the Hawaiian Government in the political affairs of Samoa, now menaced by innninent outbreak of a civil war, endangering life and property of the Germans residing there. I'nder these circumstances and having con\anced ourselves, to our regret that our rej^resentatives in Ajiia do not enjoy the expected support of their colleagues in cases of disagreements and disputes with Mahetoa, we have to consider it our duty to independently protect our own interests and rights and to obtain the satisfaction and reparation which is due to our national honor. niSMARCK S VIEW OF AMERICAN PLAN !/!> coiintor-proposition, hut he stated plainly tliat he saw in it no solution for the existing evils. ^Yhile agreeinji; to the adjourn- ment of the conference, and acknowledging; as hitherto theetiuality of rights of the three nations in Samoa, Germany could not, he declared, "renounce an immediate reparation for the insults against His ^Majesty the Emperor and the national honor com- mitted by partisans of ]\Ialietoa." If the king were either unwilling or not powerful enough, to give Germany the necessary satisfac- tion for the past and sufficient guarantees for the future, the Imperial Government wcukl feel obliged to declare war on him personally. And if the king of Hawaii should interfere in favor of ]\Ialietoa, then the former would be entering into a state of war with Germany. We shall therefore if Malietoa is either not willing or not powerful enough to give us the necessary satisfaction for the past and sufficient guaranties for the future, feel obliged to declare war on him, and refuse to recognize his government. In case Hawaii, whose King acts according to financial princi- ples which it is not desiraV)le to extend to Samoa, should try to interfere in favor of Malietoa, the King of the Sandwich Islands would thereby enter into (a) state of war with us. The Imperial Government is, of course, far from intending to bring about any change in the i)olitical relations which the three powers represented there and connected l:)y friendship entertain to Samoa; on the contrary, we maintain unaltered the existing treaties and stijnilations between us and the Govern- ments of CJreat Britain and the I'nited States with regard to that grouj) of islands, as well as the eciuality of rights of the treaty powers. We shall also in the future continue our endeavors to arrive at an understanding about the necessary reforms in order to establish a lasting peace on the Samoan Islands, in the interest of the foreign and native population. But we are unable to allow the dignity of the German Empire and the security of the German suli- jects to l)e any longer slighted in such a manner as has been done by Malietoti. I respectfully reciuest you to bring the foregoing remarks to the notice of Mr. Bayard and, if he desires it, to leave a co]>y of them in his hands. V. Bismarck." Count Bismarck later terminated negotiations concerning Bayard's plan. (Sen. Ex. Doc. No. .31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 6 to 9.) Memorandum handed to Bayard by Baron v. Zedwitz, Xovemlwr 4th, 1SS7. "If therefore, the American Government cannot l)e convinced of the i)rac- tical advantages of the German-English ijroposition, and if it regards the carrying out of the same as dangerous to the ind(>])endence and neutrtdity of Samoa, and as a deviation from the traditional i)oiicy of the Ignited States in the Pacific Ocean, the Imperial Government has no desire to adiien^ to the plan and renew the discussion thereof. The Imi)eri;d Government, however, for the reasons stated, considers the counter-projjositions made by Mr. Bayard during the conference for an executive branch of the government composed of five members as impracticable, and is unable to regard the same as sufficient ground for further negotiations. Count Bismahck." 180 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC The especial insult referred to by Bismarck was the affair of the Emperor's birthday, when a conflict occurred between some of the followers of ]Malietoa and the German residents who were in the act of celebrating the birthday of the Emperor. The reports^'^2 as to the seriousness of the conflict vary widely according to their source, the German consul emphasizing the gravity of the event, the American and British reports minimizing the whole aft'air. Germany, however, made it the occasion for entering upon an aggressive policy against IMalietoa. A heavy fine and abject apology for this and past offenses were demanded^^^ of the king, and when these were not obtained, war was declared against him.^*^^ Great Britain offered her conciliation but this was dechned by Germany. IMalietoa fled inland. Tamasese was transported to Apia in a German man-of-war and saluted as King of Samoa. The American and British consuls immediately issued a proclama- tion^"^^ stating that they and their governments did not recognize Tamasese as King but would continue as heretofore to recognize Malietoa — they urged the Samoans, however, to submit and await the deliberations of the nations. The pursuit of jNIalietoa continued and he later surrendered and was carried into exile on 1^- For accounts of the "affair of March 22nd," the Emperor's birthday, see Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 3. (Becker to Bismarck.) R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 418 ff. A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 149. '«3 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 67 ff. '^■' That the German Government did not expect Mahetoa to comply with the demands, nor exhausted effort to have him do so, is evident from the following. (A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 138, No. 143. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet. Foreign Office, August 15th, 1887. (Extract.) "The Gorman Aml)assador called upon me today, and left with me the dispatch of which I enclose an extract, explaining the policy which the German Government projiose to adopt toward Samoa. I asked the Amt)assador whether it would not V)e possilile to give directions to the British Consul to take steps for removing the differences between King Malieta and (iermany, by including the former to meet the demands of Germany as far as they were well founded. His Excellency said that such a course might be adopted later but that it would be inconvenient for the present that any instructions should be given which might i)rematurelv announce the intentions which the Chancellor had confidentially explained.'' '^'^ Ibid., p. 147. GERMAN WAR AGAINST MALIETOA 181 board a (nTiuati war-vessel. Meantime Tamasese was being establislied in the kingsliip. The "gentleman Brandeis," who had been quietly assisting him in the organization of his forces, now became his prime ministeri^*^ and assisted him in the organization of his government. Throughout one year Samoa was under their regime. The American Consul, Mr. Sewall, offered constant and determined opposition, refusing to recognize the new ruler in any manner, and declining to serve on the Municipal Council^'^^ under the flag of Tamasese, thus eventually causing the abandonment of the miniicipal government of Apia.^''^ The British Consul, on the other hand, was instructed^^^ to recognize Tamasese as the de fdcto ruler of Samoa and to enter into such communication with him as the situation required. He was also instructed to observe strict neutrality as between the German and American authorities on the islands. In addition to this Sir Lionel West, the British Ambassador in Washington, was instructed^" to use his influence to induce the Government of the United States "to address to their Consul pacific and conciliatory instructions." The United States Consul Sewall was later instructed by Secretary Bayard to i)reserve strict " neutrality between the INIalietoa and Tamasese parties, but to uphold all rights of the United States. "^^^ The war against ^^lalietoa had involved almost no bloodshed and very slight military measures, but Bismarck reahzed that such '«« Ibid., p. 173. '«• A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 163, No. 180 and p. 170, No. 189. The American Consul Sewall protested against the assumption of rule of Tamasese over the municipality of Apia as a violation of the Municipal Convention of 1879 (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 91). The German Consul, Becker, declared it necessary to consider that convention in abeyance because the American Consul, Sewall, had refused to consent to the continuance in office of the present magistrate, and had refused to attend meetings of the Municipal Board. Mr. Becker asserted that it was not the German Commander (as alleged by Mr. Sewall) l)ut the Samoan Government that had taken over the administration of Ai)ia. Moreover, he pointed out that the Convention of 1879, on which Mr. Sewall based his protest, had not been ratified by the United States. i^sA. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 172; also Weissbuch, 1889, Vol. V, No. 7. '" Ibid., pp. 169, 172 and 173. i"" Ibid., p. 158. '"^ Weissbuch, Fuenfter Theil, No. 12. 182 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC measures as had been taken were creating a hostile opinion among the other powers. He therefore instructed the Gennan Consul,^''^ as soon as he thought it possible, to remove the German maruies from Apia. Their presence there, Bismarck wrote to INIr. Becker, was giving the American and Australian press just the excuse wanted to cast suspicion on the German policy in the Pacific, and to accuse it of aggression against the treaty rights of others in Samoa^/The Chancellor had hoped that the removal of the hostile ]\Ialietoa and the installation of Tamasese, who was friendly to Germany, would be sufficient assurance of the protection of German subjects and their interests. As long as the mihtary occupation lasted, the consul was to avoid anything which would give that occupation any other character than merely a measure of support of the newly recognized king. Any further action, moreover, was to be taken not in the name of Germany nor in reference to special German interests but in the name of the present Samoan govern- ment, the support of which the Chancellor wrote would be for the interest of all. This reveals completely the part played by the German Govern- ment to further German interests in the islands. The king hostile to Germany was removed and replaced by a chieftain friendly to German interests and well controlled by a German advisor as his prime minister. This having been accomplished, it was neces- sary to seek to overcome the hostility aroused among the other powers. The chancellor therefore ordered the immediate removal of the signs of force by which the coup had been accomplished and directed that the support of the new regime vshould be rendered as to a government thoroughly Samoan. The Tamasese-Brandeis regime lasted approximately a year and accounts are contradictory'"^ as to whether intrinsically it was 1" Weissbuch, Fuenfter Theil, No. 13. ^'^ R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 439. Mr. Stevenson refers to the severe but salutary laws enacted, the roads built, l)eacons set up, instruction given to the natives in agricultural methods, and in the raising of cacao and other products to relieve the dependence on the one product, copra. In general he writes, "The more I learn of his brief term of rule, the more I learn to admire him and to wish we had his like." In contrast see also Sen. Ex. Doc. Xo. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 159. TA.MASESE-BRANDEIS REGIME 183 mostly uood or evil. But all seem to agree that the rule was not Samoan i)ut thoroughly Germau. This fact and the strict refi;ula- tioiis enforced made his rule unpopular with native Samoans and the creation of a new opposition party was the natural result. This opposition centered in the person of Mataafa, a chief of the old Malietoa party. According to the allegations of the Germans, it was supported by the American Consul and certain British residents. ^'^ Through whatever causes, the opposition grew and the situation now became the reverse of that under ^lalietoa, the German representatives in Samoa now rallying to the support of the de facto king, the American representatives lending more or less active support to the opposition forces under IMataafa.^''^ i'-" R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 432 f. "The white enemies of the new regime were of two classes. In the first stood Moors and the employees of McArthur, the two chief rivals of the firm, who saw with jealousy a clerk (or a so-called clerk) of their competitors advanced to power. The second class, that of the officials numliered at first exactly one, Wilson, the English Acting-consul, is understood to have held strict orders to help Germany. Commander Leary of the Adams, the Ameri- can Captain, when he arrived, on the 16th October and for some time after, seertied devoted to the German interests and spent his days with the German officer, Captain von Widersheim, who was deservedly beloved liy all who knew him. There remains the American Consul-general, Harold Marsh Sewall, a young man of high spirit and a generous disposition. He had obeyed the orders of his government \vith a grudge; and looked ])ack on his past action with regret almost to be called repentance. From the moment of the declaration of war against Laupei)a, we find him standing forth in bold, consistent, and sometimes rather captious opposition, stirring up his government at home with clear and forcible dispatches and on the spot grasp- ing at every opportunity to thrust a stick into the German wheels. For some while he and Moors fought tlunr difficult battle in conjmiction; in the course of which first one and then the other, paid a visit home to reason with authorities in Washington; and during the Consul's aV).sence there was found an American clerk in Ai)ia, William Blacklock, to perform the duties of the office with remarkable ability and courage. The three names just brought together, i^ewall, Moors, and lilacklock, make the head and front of the opposition; if Tamasese fell, if Brandeis was driven forth, if the Treaty of Berlin was signed, theirs is the blame or the credit:" 1-5 R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 494; also Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 27. No. 27. Berlin, den 24. Nov., 1888. Bismarck to Konsul Knappe. "Wegen der Unterstuetzing, welche der Kommandant des amcrikanischen Kriegsschiffes und der amerikanische Konsulatsverwcser den Aufstaendischen gewaehrt haben, sind Vorstellungen in Washington erhoben worden. Die beiden amcrikanischen Beamten haben in Folge de.ssen Weisung erhalten, einc Einniischung in den Aufstand und Konflikte mit deutschen Behoerden zu 184 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC The situation was more serious this time because of the presence of the naval forces of each nation now stationed at the islands in anticipation of the threatening troubles. ^'"^ The German and American commanders took active part in the situation, backing their consuls. The period is referred to as that of the "Furor Consularis."'^^ The Tamasese forces were routed and Mataafa j)roclaimed king.^^* Finally, German marines landed for the pro- tection of the German plantations were attacked by Mataafa forces at Fangalii and lost more than fifty men, 40 per cent, of their number. Germany then prepared to take action in earnest and declared war on the Mataafa forces. In announcing the state of war, Bismarck declared^^^ that the German armed forces were vermeiden unci, falls Schwierigkeiten entstehen, neue Instruktionen abzu- warten. Was unsere eigene Haltung in Samoa betrifft, so handelt es sich in erster Linie darum, die Reichsangehoerigen und deren Interessen wirksam zu schuetzen. Es wuerden uns allerdings en\aienscht sein, Tamasese zu halten, wenn dies aber in Hinblick auf die Stimmung der einheimischen Bevoel- kerung nicht angaengig ist, erscheint es als angezeigt, wenn thunlich, einen Vergleich zwischen Tamasese und Mataafa zu Stande zu bringen. Tamasese wiierden hierl^ei moeglischst guenstige Bedingungen zu sichern sein." See also Ibid., Nos. .32, 33, 34 and 36. '"« Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 137. Rear Admiral Kimberley was instructed to keep one of his ships continuously in Samoan waters and to give her commanding officer fuU instructions "to intervene vigorously, should occasion arise, to protect the persons and property of American citizens there residing." Count Arco, German Minister, informed Secretary Bayard (Ibid., p. 161) that the German fleet was being dispatched to Samoa owing to the unsettled condition of affairs in the islands, but had no definite information as to any specific object for this. '"Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 161. Instructions were sent by l^oth the German and American Governments to their consuls to endeavor to avoid all friction or conflict of interests between the citizens of the two governments in their business operations in those islands. (See also Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 28 and No. 29. After the defeat of Tamasese by the Mataafa forces, the German Consul was instructed to con- fine his efforts to the protection of the life and property of German subjects (Ibid., p. 162). '"8 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 125. I'O House Ex. Doc. No. 118, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 15. No. 4 (e). Prince Bismarck to Count von Arco- Valley. (Translation l)y source.) MiNrsTRY OF Foreign Affairs, Berlin, January 13, 1889. "I have already notified Your Excellency that, according to telegraphic GERMAN WAH ACAIXST MATAAFA FOHCKS 185 iiistriuti'd to tnoid all iiijui'v to neutral commerce and jjroperty and that all treaty rights of Americans and British in Samoa would be preserved, and that the military measures'^" had in view only the jnmishment of the murderers of German soldiers. The German Consul, Dr. Knappe, however, being personally eager for annexa- tion, adopted measures of unauthorized vigor^*^ and placed the comimuncations from Apia on the 18th Decemtjer of last year, a detachment of German naval forces which hat! landed at the requisition of the Imperial Consul for the protection of the German settlements which were endangered by the conflicts between the native jiarties there, was attaclced by armed Samoans lielonfrinfi to the party of Chief Mataafa. This unprovoked attack is said to have taken place under the leadership of an American named Klein. On this occasion more than fifty German soldiers and officers were killed and woimdetl. In consec}uence of this we have been transjilanted from the territory of mediatorial negotiations, by which the Imperial Consul in Apia was trying to reconcile the contending parties, and for which he had sought (^ the cooperation of his English and American colleagues, into a state of war with the assailants, to our regret. We shall carry on the contest which has been forced upon us liy Mataafa and his followers, with the utmost consideration for English and American interests. Our mihtary measures have in view only the punishment of the miu-derers of German soldiers and the protection of our countrymen and their property. As they, on their part, are at war with Tamasese, our interference ^ill necessarily assume the character of assistance to Tamasese. In the endeavor for the just punishment of a murderous crime we hope for the cooperation of the treaty powers in Samoa in friendship with us, and we ask the Government of the United States to be good enough to furnish the consuls, and the commander of its ships of war in Samoa, with suitable instructions. Our armed forces there are instructed to avoid and to prevent all injury to neutral commerce and property, and to adopt measures of reprisal ancl destruction only against the followers of the party which initiated the contest against our troops by a murderous attack. ^^'e shall of course abide h\ the agreements with America and England with respect to Samoa, and pay due regard under all circumstances to the rights of those iiowers as established by treaty. I beg Your Excellency to bring this communication to Mr. Bayard's knowl- edge by reading it to him, and to leave a copy of it with him if he recjuests it. Von Bismarck." 18" Bismarck empowered the German representative to call upon German warships for aid provided the outlook for success was assured. (See Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 33.) Bismarck to Gen. Konsul, Sydney. 23. Dez., 1888. "Ich ermaechtige Sie gegen Aufstaendische, welche deutsches Eigenthum schaedigen, Huelfe unserer Kriegsschiffe nach zu suchen, falls Aussicht auf Erfolg gesichert ist." 181 Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 35. Dr. Knappe was eager for direct annexation of the islands and wrote to Bismarck that if it were possible to annex the islands the German forces present in Samoa would be suffi- cient to restore order. Bismarck replied (Ibid., No. 37) that owing to the agreement with America and England, annexation was out of the question (" Selbstverstaendlich ausgeschlossen")- 186 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GEmiANY IN THE PACIFIC whole islands under martial law. Protests were made imme- diately^*^ by the American and British Consuls and their Govern- ments, who refused to permit the jurisdiction over their respective citizens in Samoa to be transferred to that of the German represen- tatives in the islands. When news of the action of Dr. Knapps reached Germany, Bismarck immediately disavow^ed his measures, and administered a sharp rebuke to the Consul. ^^^ The Chancellor declared the protest of the other nations to be "grounded," that Dr. Knappe had overstepped his authority and that his assump- tion of control over Samoa was entirely contradictory to the policy of Germany, ^^^ and in violation of the formal treaty with England. 182 House Ex. Doc. No. 119, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3; also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 281, No. 325. 183 V. R., 1888-89, Anl. Bd. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 210, S. 1235. Telegramm. Berlin, den 31. Januar, 1889. "Folgendes an Konsul in Apia zu uebermitteln : Unter Bezugnahme auf Telegramm vom 23. Januar, bemerke ich, dass Ihnen kein Recht zusteht, Fremde der Gerichtsbarkeit ihrer Konsuln zu entziehn. Der Widerspruch Ihrer englischen Kollegen gegen die getroffenen IMassnah- men ist begruendet. Bei Konflikten welche aus dieseni Anlass entstehen, •ftiierden Sie Sich im Unrecht befinden. Die von Ihnen gestellte Forderung, betreffend Uel)ernahme der Verwaltung Hamoas durch Deutschland, liegt ausserhalb Ihrer Instruktionen und unserer Ziele. Xehmen Sie diesellien alshald zurueck. Abgesehen von Auslieferung der verbrecherischen Angreifer ist keine Forderung zu stellen, zu der Sie nicht ermaechtigt sind. Falls Ihr Telegramm hier richtig verstanden wird, kann ich Ihr Verhalten nicht gutheissen. gez. Von Bism.\rck." iM Weissbueh, 1S89, Fuenfter Theil, No. 41. Bismarck to von der Golz (K. Vizeadmiral, Kommandierenden Admiral). Berlin. 5. Felx. 1889. "Auch .\merika gegcnuebcr sind wir in Samoa, wcnn nicht vertragsmaessig gebunden, doch in amtlicher, ilurcli internationale Vcrhandlungen anerkannter Kenntnis der Vertragsrechte, welche Amerika Samoa gegenueber besitzt, und haljcn bisher keinen Anlass in diese Amerikanisch-samoanischei> Ver- traege einzugreifen. Ich glaube deshalb, dass der Protest der englischen und amerikanischen Konsidn zu Gunsten des Verbleibens ihrer Landsleute unter ihrer konsularischen Jurisdiktion ein berechtigter ist, soweit die Betheiligten nicht etwa durch Beistand, Foerderung oder Anstiftung unserer Angreifer sich der Sachc derselben aiischliessen. ^^'enn vom deutschen Konsulat das Ver- langen nach Uebertragung der \'er\valtimg in der That ausgesjirochen sein solltc, so wuerde ich das bcdau(>rn, weil es mit unscren .\bmachungen und Zusicherungen England und .\mcrika gegcnucl)er in Widersjiruch stehen wuerde und daher nicht aufrecht erhalten wcrden koennte. Je schwieriger in Samoa die in Betracht kommendcn voelkerrechtlichen Fragen liegen, urn so mehr ist fuer unser ^'erhaltcn liefreundeten Macchten gegenueber die genaue HISMAHCK's DIS.WOWAL OF KNAPPE'S MEASURES 187 INIoreover, in respect to the Tnited States, thoii(j:h not hound by any formal treaty, Germany had recognized officially the rights Inhaltung tier Greiizlinieii unserer Rcchte geboten; je fester wir innerhalb dei-sellien uiisere Rechte zu vertreten vuid durchzufuehren entschlos.scn sind, uiu so sicherer nuiss jede Ueberschreitung vermieden werden." That Bismarck's disavowal of the action of Consul Knappe relieved a tense situation and served to allaj- the indignation of the United States is shown in the following instructions from Secretary Blaine to the American delegates at the Berlin Conference. "I do not desire to embarrass your discussion of the restoration of the status quo by reference to the incidents which accompanied the declaration of martial law by the German authorities. But these incidents cannot be passed over in silence, if such silence is to lae interpreted as acquiescence either in the rightfulness or necessity of that measure. Such a declaration appears to the President to have been in direct violation of that equal and friendly cooperation which had been previously recognized as the principle of action for the treaty powers, and equally contradictory of the conditions upon which the conference was instituted. But, aside from these considera- tions, the manner and the method by which the German naval authorities proclaimed tlieir intention of carrying this declaration into effect, could only tend to evoke irritaticm and bitterness over questions which might w^ell be the subject of grave international discussion. So trenchant were the inva- sions of the rights of American citizens in Samoa, and so apparent was the purpose to disregard the dignity of the flag which protected them, that, if immechate resentment of such treatment had culminated in forcible resistance, this Government while deeply regretting so unfortunate an occurrence, w'ould have found it impossible not to have sympathized with the natural indigna- tion which prompted such a course. Had not the Government of the X'nited States believed that the objection- able proceedings were due to the hasty and too pronounced zeal of German naval officers, and not to the orders or the wishes of the authorities at Berlin, an earnest and vigorous protest would have been made against the assump- tion of such power. In this belief, the President is content to overlook the offense, and refers to it now lest silence on his part should be misconstrued by the German Government. You will therefore, be careful in any reference which you may make to the suljject, to employ a friendly tone, and to assume that the proceedings referred to were at no time authorized by the Imperial Government." In order to avoid danger of naval conflict upon the request of consuls in the future, Germany enacted by Imperial Decree, March 19, 1889, the following regulation : "The Commander of a ship of war is thereby bound in the future to test the legal and jiolitical Ixnuing of any reciuest made of him by any German Representative abroad, when the latter has no authorization or instruction from the Foreign Office to show; failing this, the Commander is to wait a _ higher decision, in case he does not share the view of the Consul as to the necessity of taking active measures of a warlike nature." Bismarck stated that this Imi)erial Decree was occasioned l)y the recent events in Samoa where an unauthorized consular request and an uiKiuestioning compliance with the same, have resulted in much loss of life, and serious injury to German interests, and have, moreover, menaced us with quarrels 188 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC of that country in Samoa as secured by its treaty of 1878. There- fore a change in the pohtical status of Samoa without the agree- ment of both these nations was not to be contemplated. ^^° During the hostihties against ]\Iataafa the American Commander at Apia called for reinforcements on the ground that American property and lives were in danger from the action of the German forces against Mataafa. The Government responded by ordering Admiral Kimberly/*^ Commander of the United States' naval with friendly Powers, without any vaUd and sufficient reasons existing for recourse to warHke proceedings. For further condemnation of Consul Knappe's actions by Bismarck see the latter's letter of March 9, 1889, to Dr. Stuebel. (V. R., 1888-89, Anl. Bd. V, Aktenstueck, Nr. 138, S. 890.) 185 Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 47. i8« Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 21 and 22, No. U. Mr. Whitney, Secretary of the Navy, to Admiral Kimberly. (Inclosure in No. 14 — telegram.) Navy Department, January 11, 1889. "Commarider MuUan of the Nipsic, telegraphs, by way of Auckland, New Zealand, that a force was landed at Samoa from the German fleet, which resulted in an engagement between the troops of Mataafa and the German forces and the defeat of the latter. He reports that the Germans in retaha- tion bombarded towns, disregarding protests and neutral rights, and that the property and lives of American citizens are in danger. He strongly urges the sending of reenforcements. The German Government claims that the German forces were first attacked, and that war now exists between Germany and that portion of the natives of Samoa, engaged in the attack upon the Germans. The German Government invites this Government in the common interest to join in establishing order in Samoa, giving assurance of careful respect for our treaty rights. The United States Government is willing to cooperate in restoring Samoan autonomy, as recognized and agreed to l^y Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, and has so informed the German Government. You will at once proceed to Samoa and extend full protection and defense to American citizens and property. You will consult with the American vice-consul, examine his archives, and otherwise inform yourself as to the situation and all recent occurrences. Protest against the subjugation and displacement of native government of Samoa by Germany as in violation of positive agreement and understanding between treaty powers, liut inform the representatives of the German and British Governments of your readiness to cooperate in causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring peace and order on the basis of a recognition of Samoan independence. Endeavor to prevent extreme measures against the Samoans and bring about a peaceful settlement. If such arrangement can be made upon that basis you will report the same for approval and you will inform this Government as soon as possible after your arrival in Samoa, of the condition of affairs and the prospect of peaceful adjustment, and whether Germany was acting impartially between the opposing native forces when the late conflict occurred. Whitney." INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIRAL KIMBERLY 189 forces in the Pacific to proceed in his flagship, the Trenton, to Apia. He was instructed "to extend full protection and defense to American citizens and property," to "protest against the sub- jugation and dis})lacenicnt of native government of Samoa by Germany," but to inform the (ierman and British re{)resentatives of his readiness to cooperate in restoring peace and order on the basis of Samoan independence. The whole correspondence on the Samoan question was communicated by President Cleveland to Congress'*^ for its consideration. The President declared that '8' Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2. Message to Congress. January 16, 1889. "On the second of April, 1888, I transmitted to the House of Representa- tives, in response to a resokition passed by that body, a report from the Secre- tary of State relating to the condition of affairs in the Samoan Islands, to- gether with numerous letters, dispatches, and the documents connected with the subject, which gave a history of all disorders in that locality up to that date. On the 21st day of December, 1888, this information was supplemented by the transmission to the Congress of such further correspondence and documents as extended this history to that time. I now submit a report from the Secretary of State, with later correspondence and dispatches exliibiting the progress of the disturbances in Samoa up to the present date. The information thus laid before the Congress is of much importance since it has relation to the preservation of American interests and the protection of American citizens and their property in a distant locality and under an unstable and imsatisfactory government. In the midst of the disturbances which have arisen at Samoa, such powers have been exercised as seemed to be within the executive control under our Constitution and laws, and which appear to accord with our national policy and traditions, to restore tranquillity and secure the safety of our citizens. Through negotiations and agreement with Great Britain and CJermany which, with our own Government, constitute the treaty powers interested in Samoan i)eace and quiet, the attempt has been made to define more clearly the part which these powers should assume in the government of that country, while at the same time its autonomy has been insisted upon. These negotiations were at one time interrupted by such action on the part of the German Government as appeared to be inconsistent with their further continuance. Germany, however, still asserts, as from the first she has done, that she has no desire "or intention to overturn the native Samoan Government or to ignore our treaty rights, and she still invites our Government to join her in restoring peace and quiet. But thus far her propositions on this subject seem to lead to such a pn^ponderance of German power in Samoa as was never contemplated by us and is inconsistent with every prior agreement or understanding, while her recent conduct as between native warring factions gives rise to the suspicion that she is not content with a neutral i)osition. Acting within the restraints which our constitution and laws have jjlaced upon the executive power, 1 have insisted that the autonomy and independ- ence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved according to the treaties made with Samoa by the powers nametl and their agreements and understand- ing with each other. I have protested against every act apparently tending 190 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMAXY IN THE PACIFIC the German proposition and actions aimed at a preponderance of German power and indicated that Germany was not content with a neutral position. Much feeUng was aroused and an appropriation of a half million dollars was voted for the protection of United States' interests in Samoa. ^^* In addition one hundred thousand was appropriated for the development of the harbor of Pago- in an opposite direction, and during the existence of internal disturbance one or more vessels of war have been kept in Samoan waters to protect American citizens and property. These things will al)undantly appear from the correspondence and papers which have been submitted to the Congress. A recent collision between the forces from a German man-of-war stationed in Samoan waters and a body of natives rendered the situation so delicate and critical that the warship Trenton, under the immediate command of Admiral Kiml)erly, was ordered to join the Xipsic, already at Samoa, for the better protection of the persons and property of our citizens, and in further- ance of efforts to restore order and safetj*. The attention of the Congress is especially called to the instructions given to Admiral Kimlierly, dated on the 11th instant, and the letter of the Secretary of State to the German Minister, dated the 12th instant, which will be founi among the papers submitted. By means of the papers and documents heretofore submitted and those which accompany this communication, the precise situation of affairs in Samoa is laid before the Congress and such executive action as has been taken is fully exhibited. The views of the Executive in respect of the just policy to be pursued with regard to this group of islands, which he in the direct higliway of a gro^\-ing and important commerce between Austraha and the United States, have found expression in the correspondence and documents which have thus been fully communicated to the Congress, and the subject in its present stage is sul)- initted to the wider discretion conferred by the Constitution upon the legis- lative branch of the Government. Grover Cleveland." Executive Mansion, January 15, 1889. 188 Congressional Record, Yol XX, Part 2, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1283. The Committee on Appropriations reported, January 29, 1889, to insert in the Diplomatic and Consular A))])roi)riation l)ill the following: "For the execution of the obligations and the protection of the interests of the United States, existing under the treaty l^etween the United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands, 8500,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to l)e expended under the direction of the President, this ai)i)roi)riation to l)e immediately availatilc. For the survey, improvement, and occupation of the bay and harbor of Pago-Pago in the Island of Tutuila, Samoa, and for the construction of the necessary wharves and l)uildings for such occupation, and for a coaling station therein, under the direction of the President, 8100,000, this appropriation to be immediately available." For Congressional discussion of the Samoan situation, see Ibid., pp. 1283 ff. (January 29, 1889) and pp. 1325 ff. (January 30, 1889). CONGRESSIONAL MEASURES 191 Pago'^-' w hii'h had remained as it was when first transferred to the United States in 1878. Realizing that affairs in the ishmds had reached a critical stage/'" Bismarck concluded that it was important for the three powers to come to an agreement concerning the future of Samoa. He there- fore proposed to Lord Salisbury^^^ that the British Government unite with him in inviting the American Government to continue in Berlin the conference begun in Washington and to renew the '89 Congressional Record, Vol. XX, Part 2, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1290, January 29, 1889. Senator Sherman, of Ohio, after the lengthy discussion on the Samoan corres])ondence and situation, set forth the following recom- mendation: "Mr. President, the conclusions to which I have come, without wearying the Senate any further, are that the first thing to ])e done is to assert our jMiwer and occupancy and possession of the Bay of Pago-Pago, and so much of the -shores of the Island of Tutuila as is necessary for a coaling station. This is a mere rocky island, com])aratively, of a few square miles, l)ut it possesses this magnificent harl)or, and one of the amendments of this bill l>roi)oses that we shall take possession of it, occupy it, erect a coaling station there and such other buildings as may be necessary. That ought to be done inunediately, because it is manifest that whatever may happen in regard to controversies in the South Sea Islands, having secured by law and l)y treaty a foothold thtre, we ought to secure that, and not treat it as we have done our ])rivileges in the Hawaiian Islands. The Government of the United States undertook, or started to do it some time ago, liut without saying anything in respect to the mode in which it was defeated it was finally dropped out of the approjiriation l)ill on the score of economy. If we had had a foot- hold in this bay as firmly and as strongly as the Germans have theirs in their bay, I believe American interests would not be so endangered as they are today. It needs no war to protect the nation's rights. The mere assertion of those rights, a due regard for them, the expenditure of money there, the storing of coal there, the landing of ves.sels there — all the.se are an assertion of power far more powerful, far more influential than protocols or diplomatic correspond- ence. That we ought to do." ''"Carl Schurz, "Speeches, etc.," Vol. V, p. 1. (Also .see Appendi.K.) Count von Arco- Valley, German Minister at Washington, consulted Senatoi Schurz on the Samoan question. The Senator, speaking as a ])rivate citizen, recommended that Count Arco advise his Government to allow the publica- tion of the jjrotocols of the conference of 1887, which it had hitherto refused to do. The Senator recommended also that the German Government acconi- I)any its invitation to the conference in Berlin with the frank statement that the basis of the negotiations would be the autonomy of Samoa and the main- tenance of all treaty rights. Count Arco informed Mr. Schurz that he would report these views to his Government. Both of these actions were taken by the German Government in arranging the Berlin Conference. '9' Weissbuch, 1889, Achtcr Thcil, No. 1; also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 270, No. 31G. 13 192 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC attempt to end the hostilities in Samoa. In making this proposi- tion the German minister was instructed to assure Lord Salisbury that Germany did not aim to gain the islands for herself, nor to put in question the equality of rights of the three powers there. On receiving the acceptance of Great Britain, Bismarck then sub- mitted to Secretary Bayard^^^ his proposal that the United States "resume with Germany and the British Government the consulta- tion regarding the Samoan question." In extending this invitation, the Chancellor declared that "any supposition that Germany would not feel satisfied with a neutral position in the Samoan Islands" was unfounded and that it was not Germa*ny's intention "to put in question the independence of the island group, nor the equal rights of the treaty powders." On this basis Secretary Bayard accepted the invitation on the part of the United States, ^^^ with the added suggestion that the three treaty powers at once instruct their officers in Samoa to suspend all belligerent action pending the decision of the conference. Unless the free election of a new king by the natives should alter them, affairs in Samoa were to remain in statu quo during the negotiations between the powers. The proposals for the conference and Germany's assur- ance that autonomy of the islands and equality of representation of the powers should be the basis of the negotiations relieved to a great degree the tension between the Governments of the United States and Germany. Possibility of hostilities between the naval forces stationed at the islands was suddenly pre^'ented by a great natural catastrophe, the famous hurricane of INIarch 16, 1889, which destroyed the entire naval forces of the United States and Germany then stationed in the harbor of Apia."^ i»2 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3, No. 3. 133 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4, No. 4. 19* R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 541 ff. The naval vessels of the three powers then anchored in Apia harbor were (American) the Trenton, Nipsic, and Vandalia; (German) the Adlcr, Ebcr, and Olga; (British) the CalHope. Of thirteen vessels assembled in the harbor the Calliope was the sole survivor. After a vivid description of the storm Mr. Stevenson concludes : "Thus in what seemed the very article of war, and within the duration of a single day, the sword arm of each of the two angry powers was broken, their formidable ships reduced to junk; their disciplined hundreds to a horde of THE CONFERENCE OK BERLIN VXi . The possible factors for danger having thus been removed, the Conference of BerHn was opened under favorable auspices which were soon realized in the success of the negotiators'^' in reaching terms of agreement. The American delegates were furnished with the following instructions :^^^ castaways, fed with difficulty, and the fear of whose misconduct marred the sleep of their commanders. Both paused aghast; both had time to recognize that not the whole Samoan Archipelago was worth the loss in men and costly ships already sutTered. The so-called hurricane of March 16th made thus a marking epoch in world history; directly and at once it brought about the congress and treaty of Berlin; indirectly and l)y a process still continuing, it founded the modern Xavy of the States. Coming years and other historians will declare the influence of that." "5 Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 181, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7. The Plenipotentiaries were as follows: The United States: Mr. John A. Kasson, of Iowa (Former Minister to Germany). Mr. William Walter Phelps, of New Jersey (Minister to Germany). Mr. George H. Bates, of Delaware (U. S. Commissioner to Samoa, 1886). Germany : Count Herbert Bismarck (Minister of State, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs). Baron von Holstein (Actual Privy Councillor of Legation). Dr. Krauel (Privy Councillor of Legation). Great Britain: Sir Edw'ard Baldwin Malet (British Ambassador to Germany). Charles Stewart Scott (British Envoy Extraordinary and Min- ister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Confederation). Joseph Archer Crowe (British Commercial Attache for Europe). 196 Pqj. instructions to the United States delegates see F. R., 1889, pp. 195 if., also resume of these instructions as presented by Secretary Blaine to Congress. (Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., Lst Sess., pp. 1 to 6.) "They were instructed to be governed in the fulfilment of their mission Ijy the most earnest assurance that the Government of the United States desired a speedy and amiable solution of all the cjuestions involved; that, while it would steadily maintain its full cciuality of right and consideration in any disposition of these questions, it was as much influenced by an anxious desire to secure to the people of Samoa the conditions of a healthy, prosperous, civihzed life as it was bound by its duty to protect the rights and interests of its own citizens wherever their spirit of lawful enterprise might carry .them; that, in the cooperation of the three governments, the President hoi)ed and lielieved that frank and friendly consultation would strengtiicn their respect for each other, and the result prove that it was not the wish of any of them to sulwrdinate the rights of the native Samoans to the exigencies of a grasping commerce, or to the political ambition of territorial extension on the part of any one of the jKiwers maintaining treaty relations with them. They were further instructed that in consenting, at the request of the Emperor of 194 SAMOA: THE united states and germ ant in the pacific 1. They were to ask for the restoration of the status qiu/^'' "in order that the disturbance of the equal rights of the powers in Samoa, which had been caused by the intervention^^* of Germany and the deportation of Malietoa Laupepa, might be removed — and their footing of equaHty restored. 2. They were to strive for "the organization of a stable govern- mental system for the islands whereby native independence and autonomy should be preserved free from the control or the pre- ponderating influence of any foreign government."^^^ Any inter- vention of the three powers should be temporary merely and "avowedly preparatory to the restoration of as complete inde- pendence and autonomy as was practicable." 3. They were to secure the settlement of the land question on some equitable and comprehensive basis which would save a reasonable proportion of the territory for the natives. 4. They were to prohibit or regulate the importation and sale of firearms and alcoholic liquors. Germany, to reopen at Berlin, the adjourned proceedings of the Conference of Washington of 1887, the President, while thus manifesting his entire con- fidence in the motives and purposes of the German Government desired it to be borne in mind that the step was the continuance merely of the efforts already made toward an adjustment of jiending questions, and not the initia- tion of a new conference on another basis, inasmuch as the Government of the I'nited States could not admit the conchtions chrectly influencing the deliberations of the conference of Washington to have been changed by any subsequent occurrences in the South Pacific " '»" Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. "The restoration of the status quo however, was not to be sulnnitted as an idtimatum which would close the conference or prevent the President from considering any plan put forward as a substitute." is's Ibid., p. 3. "While the President was imwilling to consider that action of Germany, which immediately followed the susjiension of the conferences at Washington as intentionally derogatory either to the dignity or the interests of the other treaty powers, yet he could not l)ut regard it, under all the circumstances, as an al)rupt breach of the joint relations of the three powers to each other and to the Government of Samoa, and im])()ssil)le to reconcile with the frank and friendly declaration of the German Government, ])reliminary to the meeting of the conference of 1887, that it intended to maintain the status as it had theretofore existed and had neither interest nor desire to change an arrange- ment found satisfactory to the three governments." i»»Ibid., p. 3. "Besides these evils necessarily attending the subordination of Samoan inde])endence to any one predominant alien interest, the United States could not consent to the institution of any form of government in those islands, subject, directly or indirectly, to influences which in the contingencies of the future might check or control the use or develoi)ment of the riglit acquired on the inu't of the United States by lawful treaty to establish a naval station at Pago-Pago and to control its harl;or to that end." INSTRUCTIONS TO AMERICAN DELE(J VTES 195 '). Tliey were to use tlieir own jiu lament on tlie subject of renewini; tlie muiiieipal administration of Apia. The result of the conference-'"' was in the main "entirely in accord with the instructions under which the American ])leni- potentiaries acted."-"' Provision was made first of all that the islands of Samoa should be considered a neutral territory in which the citizens and subjects of the three signatory powers were to have equal rights of residence, trade and personal protection. Neither of the powers was to exercise any separate control over the islands which were recognized as having an independent govern- ment. The natives of the islands were acknowledged to have the free right to elect a king or choose their forms of Government according to their own laws and customs. In view of the disturbed conditions in the islands, however, an immediate election was considered inadvisable, therefore it was decided to restore to Samoa as king the former monarch Malietoa Laupepa, who had been recognized by all three powers in former years. It w^as pro- vided that ]\Ialietoa's successor should be duly elected according to the laws and customs of Samoa.-°- -"" Ibid., p. 4. There were altogether nine formal conferences held in Berlin between April 29 and June 14, 1889. The results were embodied in an agreement known as the General Act of the Conference of Berlin signed at Berlin, June 14, 1889. ^oi F. R., 1889, pp. 35.3 ff., also Sen. :\Iisc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Se.ss., p. 6 ff. 2»2R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 561. "In the Berlin Act, the throe powers recognize, on the threshold, 'the independence^ of the Samoan (iovernnietit and the free right of the natives to elect their chief or king and choose their form of government.' True the text continues that, 'in view of the difficulties that would surround an election in the present disordered condition of the Cxovernment, Malietoa Laupepa shall be recognized as king unless the three powers shall by common accord otherwise declare.' But perhai)s few natives have followed it .so far, and even those who have, were possibly cast all abroad again by the next clause, 'and his successor shall be duly elected according to the laws and customs of Samoa.' The right to elect, freely given in one sentence, was suspended in the next, and a line or so further on appeared to be reconveyed by a side wind." Sen. Mi.sc. Doc, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, No. 81, p. 43. One exception was made in the event of such an election. At Count Bismarck's request it was agreed in the fifth session of the conference (and eml>odied in the protocol), that in view of the outrages committed upon German soldiers the Chief Mataafa should not be eligible to the kingship of Samoa. 196 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC The problem of foreign assistance to the native government was adjusted in the Act by the estabhshment of a Supreme Court for Samoa under the jurisdiction of a single judge termed the Chief Justice. He was to be nominated by the three treaty powers, or if they could not agree, by the King of Sweden and Norway,-"^ and his decisions were to be final. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to include all questions arising under the General Act, including questions of rightful kingship, questions of the powers claimed by any king or chief in the exercise of his office, contro- \ersies between the Samoan Government and any one of the treaty- powers, and all civil suits except those of crimes of those foreigners who were still under the jurisdiction of their own consuls. For the settlement of the land question the General Act pro- ; vided that all future alienation of Samoan lands to foreigners should, with certain exceptions,'^"^ be prohibited. To adjust all dis- putes as to land titles a land commission was to be appointed, to consist of three persons, one named by each of the treaty powers. These were to be assisted by a "natives' advocate," appointed by the ruler of Samoa with the approval of the Chief Justice. The labors of the commission were to be closed in two years or sooner if practicable. The municipality of Apia was redefined and placed under the jurisdiction of a IMunicipal Council elected by the residents of the district, and a magistrate appointed by the Council. The consuls were not to be eligible as Councillors but all regulations passed by the Coimcil were to be submitted to them for unanimous approval before becoming laws. Should agreement of the three consuls not be reached, the matter in dispute was to be referred 2"3 F. R., 1889, p. 417. It was first arranged that the Chief Justice of Samoa was to be named by the Lord Chief Justice of Enghind and to be of English professional experience, Init the United States Government objected to giving "one of the three signatory nationalities an appointment entailing so much ))olitical imjiortance," and made the suggestion finally embodied in this article of the treaty. 20^ F. R., 1889, p. 357 f. Town lots in the Municipality of Apia might still be bought by foreigners, and agricultural tracts might be leased for not over forty years, all purchases and leases to first receive the approval of the Chief Justice. GENERAL ACT OF BERLIN, 18S9 197 to the C'liief Justice for final decision. The President of the Municipal Council was to be agreed upon by all three powers, or failing this, was to be selected from the nationals of Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, ^Mexico, or Brazil, and nominated by the ruler of his own nation. Further agreements were made concerning methods of raising revenue, the regulation of the sale of firearms and alcoholic liquors, etc., and inasmuch as certain of these conflicted with the several treaties of the Powers with Samoa, it was provided that in all cases of such conflict the present act should be considered binding, after the Government of Samoa should have given its formal assent to the Act. The Conference of Berlin did much to relieve the immediate difficidties of the Samoan question. The negotiations were con- ducted in a spirit of cooperation-"^ and the basic principles being agreed upon by all three nations, there was little serious difficulty in creating a plan of government involving those principles. The 2"^ F. R., 1889, p. 419. Mr. Kasson, American representative, paid the fol- lowing tribute to Count Bisnaarck. " 'I should neglect a duty, which is both an obhgation and a pleasure, if I failed to express on the part of the American plenipotentiaries our apprecia- tion of the important service, which His Excellency, Count Bismarck has rendered by his fairness and impart ialitj' as our presiding officer. The con- ciliatory attitude which he has maintained, and the friendh' spirit in wliich he has conducted the business of the conference have exercised the most beneficial influence on the deliberations which now touch their end, and demand our frank recognition.' 'I believe that I interpret the sentiments of all the plenipotentiaries when I beg His Excellency to convey with him the assurance not only of our high appreciation of the official qualities which he has so usefully displayed through- out our proceedings, but also of the personal traits associated with them which have added a charm to official functions.' Sir E. Malet said: 'On behalf of the British plenipotentiaries I am anxious to say that we most cordially associate ourselves to the expressions which have fallen from Mr. Kasson, and that we desire that his words should be considered as coming equally from us.' Count Bismarck was anxious to express his warmest gratitude for the very flattering words addrcs.~ed to him l)y Mr. Ka.s.son and Sir E. Malet. He appre- ciated and vahied very highly the complimentary expressions uttered by them; but he considered that, if the conference had l)een able to perform work which would prove satisfactory to the governments concerned, it was mainly due to the loyal and conciliatory attitude of each and all of the plenipotentiaries and to the large amount of good work which they had done." 198 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC salient feature of the conference was the acquiescence of Germany-"" in the demands of the United States. In response to the request of Secretarv' Bayard,-"^ the warfare against the ^Nlataafa forces was stopped and the losses sustained by German forces in the islands were left unexpiated. The Tamasese government was entirely abandoned. Throughout the Conference equality of representation of the three countries was emphasized and all effort to utilize the "preponderating interests" of Germany in Samoa to obtain special treatment was abandoned. The situation on the islands was relieved by Germany's restoration of the former king Malietoa Laupepa and reestabhshment of the status quo.-'^^ 2''« R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 555. "It was agreed so far as might he to obliterate two years of blundering; and to resume in 1SS9 and at Berlin those negotiations which had been so unhappily broken off at Washington in 1887. The example thus offered by Germany is rare in history: in the career of Prince Bismarck, so far as I am instructed, it should stand unique. On a review of these two years of blundering, bulhing, and failure in a little isle in the Pacific, he seems magnanimously to have ownefl his pohcy was in the wrong. He left Fangalii unexpiated: suffered that house of cards, the Tamasese government, to fall bj' its own frailty and without remark or lamentation, left the Samoan question openly and fairly to the conference; and in the meanwhile, to allay the local heats engendered by Becker and Knappe, he sent to Apia that invaluable public servant, Dr. Stuebel. I should be a dishonest man if I did not here bear testimony to the loyalty since shown by the Germans in Samoa." Secretary Bayard himself testified to this attitude in a letter to Senator Schurz. (From "Speeches," etc., Schurz, Vol. V, p. 16.) From Thomas F. Bayard. Department of State, Washington, February 2Sth, 1889. "Now that I have succeeded in attracting Prince Bismarck's attention to the real condition of Samoa, I find his views and disposition very much as I expected them to be — moderate and conciliatory. As I wrote you, the shop- keepers at Samoa got hold of official power and abused it, and the scene is so distant that the mischief was done before the facts were known." .... 2" F. R., 1889, p. 194. 2»8 F. R., 1889, p. 198. If this had not been done, there would have been vigorous opposition on the part of the United States, as is evident from the following instructions to the American delegates. "The President hopes that these opinions will receive the consideration to which he thinks them entitled. You will submit them to the conference with temperate firmness. If it be urged, as it may be, that this forcible intervention has had consequences which practical good sense cannot dis- regard, l)ecause they can not he undone, you will say that the restoration of status quo is necessary to place the treaty powers upon their footing of equality', FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF BERLIN CONFERENCE 199 I'ho participation of tlie European nations in the administration of Samoa was fociissetl in the powers of the Chief Justice, but the disinterested character of that officer was secured by the stipula- tion that he be approved by all three powers or be appointed by a neutral nation. In transmitting the agreement to the Senate for ratification President Harrison declared, ■' I am pleased to find in this general act an honorable, just, and equal settlement of the questions which have arisen during the past few years between the three powers having treaty relations with and rights in the Samoan Islands." From other viewpoints than that of solving temporarily a diffi- cult di})lomatic situation, the Berlin agreement was not so success- ful. In the first place it was a self-contradictory instrument. Starting out with a broad declaration of the independence of the Samoan Government, it then proceeded to draw up a scheme of administration which gave merely nominal recognition to the native executive and placed all real powers in the hands of foreiga officers. For instance, the natives were declared to have the free right to elect their own king according to their own custom, but any question over the rightful election was to be decided by the Chief Justice. ^Moreover, any question as to the validity of the powers claimed by the native king was also to be decided by that foreign officer. In all civil suits between natives and foreigners the Chief Justice had the final decision and might apply the code of the United States, England or Germany as he thought most appro- priate. The municipality of Apia was recreated and placed under the control of the foreign residents there. The Act was therefore and does not prevent the treaty powers and Samoa from making any changes in the future which justice and an unselfish interest may suggest as necessary. The desire of the Government of the I'nited States to see status quo reestab- lished as the basis for future deliberation and action in no way commits it to the partisan support of any plan or person. You will not submit this proposition as an ultimatum which would close the conference or prevent the President from considering any plan which may be suggested as a substitute. But should the proposition be rejected, you will not accept such conclusion except ad referetuhun. You will com- municate such result as promptly as possible, and the President will then decide upon the course which he deems it his duty to adopt, and you will be instructed accordingly." 200 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANT IN THE PACIFIC in no sense a guarantee of the independence-^^ of the islands but rather a regulation of the foreign limitations placed upon that independence. From the viewpoint of American foreign policy, the Berlin General Act was exceptional. It committed the United States by formal agreement to active participation with European powers in the administration of a neutral territory many thousands of miles distant from its shores. Even the plan submitted by Secretary Bayard at the Washington Conference, involving, as it did, a much slighter participation of the Powers, was declared by his successor, Secretary Blaine,-^'' to go beyond the President's desires and to be out of harmony with the established policy of the United States Government. The General Act, however, was an actual tripartite government,-^^ a system which was not only contrary 205 F. R., 1894, p. 511. Secretary of State Gresham stated in 1894, in his report on "Affairs in the Samoan Islands:" "It is obvious that the machinery thus devised for the government of the islands is inaccurately styled an 'autonomous government.' It is true that in the first article of the act the contracting parties declare that they 'recog- nize the independence of the Samoan Government and the free right of the natives to elect their chief or King and choose their form of government according to their own laws and customs.' This declaration, however, only adds force to the fact that we may look in vain in all the comprehensive framework of the treaty for a single provision that secures to the nominal and vmsalaried King or to the natives either independence or any substantial part in the exercise of the Government. All these powers are in reality dis- charged by foreign officials actually chosen by the treaty powers and backed up by their force and their funds. The so-called 'autonomous government' is more than a joint protectorate. It is in substance and in form a tripartite foreign government, imposed upon the natives and sui)ported and administered jointly by the three treaty powers. Such is the arrangement to which the United States, in the pursuit of its new policy, has committed itself for the purpose of securing the so-called neutrality of these chstant islands." 21" F. R., 1889, p. 201. Referring to Bayard's plan, Blaine declared in his instructions to the delegates to the Berlin Conference: "This scheme goes beyond the principle upon which the President desires to see our relations with the Samoan Government based, and is not in har- mony with the established policy of this Government. For if it is not a joint protectorate, to which there are such grave and obvious objections, it is hardly less than that and does not in any event promise efficient action." -" Ibid., p. '202. No provision was made that this government should be temporary in character and preparatory merely to restoring complete self- government to the natives, although the .American delegates were instructed that it was the earnest desire of the President that anv intervention in Samoa RELATION OF BERLIN ACT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 201 to Amerioan foreijin policy but contrary also to the advice of all the commissioners sent to Samoa in ISSll. Each of these men had declared that a simultaneous participation of the three ])()\vers in the admhiistration of Samoa had been proved to be impractic- able and a source of international controversies. No provision was made that this government should be temporary in character, although this was the earnest desire of the American President. The conclusion of the General Act of Berlin may be considered to complete the second period of the Samoan diplomatic history. The equality of rights of the three nations in the island group had been ex])ressed ten years before in the separate treaties of each power with Samoa. That equality was now made emphatic by formal treaty between the three powers, with the acquiescence of Samoa. During the intervening decade, the commercial and political interests of the three nations in the islands had developed. German commerce there had grown and with the strengthening of German colonial policy, that commerce received increasingly the support of the Imperial Government and its military forces. The United States, through the general increase in its Pacific trade, and through the plans for an isthmian canal, had become increasingly conscious of the importance of these islands to its commercial future in the Pacific. Therefore, the State Depart- ment opposed decisively any'measures which it considered would in any way jeopardize its status of equality ih Samoa &nd especially its hold over the harbor of Pago-Pago. In instructing the Ameri- can delegates to the Conference at Berlin, Secretary Blaine had declared-'- that *'In any question involving present or future should be merely temporary. Lord Salisbury stated in his instructions to the British Plenipotentiaries: "The reports which have been sent in to their governments by the respec- tive Consuls-General, and the impressions which have been left by past experience in these islands do not leave to us much hope of the successful conduct of affairs by an at)original government acting under the simultaneous impulse of three rival but coordinate powers." (A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), No. 9, p. 6.) 2'2 Ibid., p. 201. In opposing the plan of placing the islands under any one power as mandatory, the Secretary of State had asserted the following policy: "The obligation of the Government of the United States in the South Pacific is to protect the rights and interests of our citizens who may be resi- 202 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IX THE PACIFIC relations in the Pacific, this Government cannot accept even temporary subordination and must regard it as inconsistent with that international consideration and dignity to which the United States, by continental position and expanding interests, must always be entitled." Great Britain, while maintaining all rights ~bf British subjects and their interests in Samoa, had played the role of mediator between Germany and the United States. Annexa- tion measures had been attempted by the British colonies, particu- larly New Zealand, but the home government, having come to an understanding w4th Germany on the division of spheres of interest in the South Seas, had discouraged the aspirations of the colonies and had given sanction to the German policy in Samoa.-^^ dent there and engaged in any lawful pursuit. We have no desire to dominate, and every wish to develop a stable and just government. If there have been troubles and annoj'ance, they have not proceeded from any groundless hostility of the Samoan Government or the Samoan people. They have arisen and been fostered into mischievous activity by the avarice and eagerness of com- peting merchants and land speculators, and the irregular conduct of foreign officials who are, perhaps naturally and excusably but most injudiciously, sympathetic with the prejudices and interests of their immediate constituents, the resident foreigners. To convert the assumed supremacy of any one of these contesting interests into a legalized government of these islands, does not, in the opinion of the President, promise any relief from the embarrassing dissensions which at present disturb the orderly condition of things. But there are other reasons why the Government of the United States can- not accept this scheme of subordination'. The interests of the United States require the possession of a naval station in these remote parts of the Pacific, and bj' a treaty with the lawful authorities of Samoa they have been put in control of the harbor of Pago-Pago for these purposes. We cannot consent to the institution of any form of government in Samoa subject directly or indirectly to influences which in the contingencies of the future might check or control the use or the development of this American right. Xor can the Government of the United States forget, what we are satisfied the other treaty powers will cordially recognize, that our interest in the Pacific is steadily increasing; that our commerce with the East is developing largely and rapidly; and that the certainty of an early opening of an Isthmian transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific (under American protection) must create changes in which no i)ower can Ije more directly interested than the United States. And in any question involving present or future relations in the Pacific, this govern- ment cannot accept even temporary subordination, and must regard it as inconsistent with that international consideration and dignity to which the United States by continental position and expanding interests must always be entitled." -'3 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. Gl, Xo. 56. JMr. Sewall to INIr. Porter. C0NSUL.\TE GeXER.\L OF THE UxiTED StATES, Apia, Samoa, August 15, 1S87. (Received Sept. 12.) "Sir: I have the honor to report that although, for reasons set forth elsewhere, there has been no meeting of the municipal board since my arrival here, the BRITISH-GERMAN ACCORD ON SAMOAN QUESTION 203 In reply to an inten-oiiation concrrning tlie Samoan sitnation, Sir J. Ferguson, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had dechired to the House of Commons in 1888'-'^ that he could not tell what the future of Samoa Avould he. The German peoi)le formed some of the best colonists in the British possessions. It Avas not sui)rising "that the Government of Germany, with people spread all o\er the world, should have settled to some extent in colonies of their own, rather than altogether in those of Great Britain and the United States." The British people "ought not to view with jealousy the advent of the ci^•ilized powers to colonies adjacent to their own." In instructing the British plenipoten- tiaries to the Berlin Conference, Lord Salisbury declared that the object of Her IMajesty's Government in taking part in the con- ference was merely to secure a stable government which could maintain tranquillity there and that the British interests in Samoa were "commercial and not political. "-^^ The German Chancellor openly acknowledged the British- union between the British and German consuls in support of the German cancliclate for municipal magistrate continues. The British ijro-consul acts against his personal judgment but under personal instructions to support the German candidate for six months from April last. These are not the first instructions from the British Government to its representative here that have strengthened the German hand and tended to German domination in Samoa. As early as April, 1886, Dr. Stuebel, German Consul-general informed Mr. Hugo, the associate German rejiresentative on the board, that Count Hatz- fcldt had written Berlin that the British foreign office had instructed its representative here to act with the Germans. In September, 1886, written instructions to this effect were exhibited by the British consul. These instructions went further and instructed him to request the then magistrate, a British subject, to resign. I enclose a copy of an extract from a letter called forth by this action, written by Sir Roljert Stout, Premier of New Zealand, to Sir F. D. Bell, agent general for that colony in London. There is from another source confirmation of English support of the CJermans, and indirect enc()uragem(>nt to the rebels here. In a letter referred to in my dispatch numl)ered 10, written by Meisake, interpreter and clerk at the German consulate, dated June 1, 1887, and addressed to Mataafa, Chief of Atua, it is affirmed that, 'by will of Great Britain and Germany, Germany's desires here will be approved and carried out.' I have, etc., Harold M. Sewall." ^[ (See also inclosure — account of interview between the British Minister, Sir E. Malet, and Prince Bismarck.) 2'^ F. R., 1889, pp. 184 and 185. 2'5 A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), No. 9, p. 6. 204 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC German Entente on the colonial question. In an address before the Reichstag in 1889 Bismarck announced r^^^ "In Zanzibar as in Samoa we are in absolute unity with the English Government and with it we are going hand in hand,-'^ and I am firmly resolved to hold fast to these relations." In further emphasis he continued : "This impression is, according to my political conception, the chief thing — just as in other colonies, in Samoa for example — I hold unquestionably to the accord with the English Government, and to the resolve, as soon as we are in agreement with the same, to go forward together, and as soon as we are that no longer, to refrain or to act with restraint. I consider England as the old, 2'8 V. R., 1889, Bd. Ill, 27. Sitz., 26. Januar, 1889, S. 618 (B.) and S., 619 (B). This speech was rendered during the first discussion of a bill concerning slave traffic and protection of German interests in East Africa. (Translation by author.) 2" A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-o629), p. 279, No. 322. Lord Salisbury took exception to this statement by the Chancellor as liable to misconstruction, and expressed the following modification as his view of the situation. No. 322. The Marquis of Sahsbury to Sir. E. Malet. Foreign Office, January 29, 1889. "Sir: In speaking to Count Hatzfeldt today, I referred to the speech delivered by the Chancellor in the Reichstag on Sunday last. I expressed the satisfac- tion with which I had read the language applied by the Chancellor to the value which he attached to the good understanding between the two governments. The only comment which it was at all necessary for me to make, other than that of entire sympathy and concurrence, applied to a remark of his Highness, ,as to the attitude of the two countries with respect to Samoa. His statement, that in regard to that matter the Governments of Great Britain and Germany were going hand in hand, might be open to miscon- .st ruction. It was entirely correct to say that our views were in agreement as to the arrangement to be put in force for the government of these islands in the future, but in the conflict which existed at present between the German Gdvernment and a certain portion of the inhabitants, it could not be said that we were going hand in h:ind with Germany. We were maintaining an attitude entirely neutral, and were in no degree concerned in or responsible for the action which the German Government thought it right to take. Count Hatzfeldt expressed himself entirely in accord with me as to the accuracy of the correction and said that he had no doubt that when the Chancellor used that expression, he was speaking of the more permanent arrangement with respect to which the views of the two governments were the same. I am, &c., (Signed) Salisbury." OPERATION OF THE GENERAL ACT 205 traditional ally, witlf whom we have no conflicting;' interests; when 1 say ally, that is to be taken in a diplomatic sense; we have no treaties with England; l)nt I wish to hold fast also in colonial questions to the feeling which we have had with England for at least one hmidred and fifty years. (Bravo on the left.) And if it were to be shown to me that we were losing that, then I would become cautious and seek to prevent the loss." The third period of Samoan diplomacy was characterized by the difficulties of putting into operation the stipulations of the General Act.-^^ At the base of these difficulties was the reluctance of the natives to submit to a centralized government, or to the restric- tions of any government. Being averse to taxes, coercive measures were required to collect these — the warrants of the Supreme Court went unheeded and the Treaty Powers were compelled to send men-of-war to enforce the rulings of the court. In 1893 revolu- tions broke out again requiring the armed interference of all three of the treaty powers. -^^ In order to uphold the rule of Malietoa, and the order of the islands, Mataafa and several insurgent chiefs were deported to the Marshall Islands and retained there at the expense of the three governments. Difficulties also arose concern- ing the powers of the Chief Justice-'-" as in conflict with those of the President of the IMunicipal Council, who had been given by the Treaty the power to act as adviser to the native king. The relationship of the Chief Justice to the Consuls was also a source of -'* F. R., '94, p. 511. For diplomatic cjrrespon4ence on this period, see also A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), and 1893, CIX (C-6973). 219 F. R., 1894, p. 512 and p. 594 ff. The British and German Governm(>nts agreed to disarm the natives by force, l)ut the United States objected on the ground that such measures were unnecessary and Hkely to frustrate the good effects of the Berhn Conference. (Ibid., pp. 651 and 655.) -OF. R., 1894, p. 512. The first Chief Justice, Mr. Cederkranz, was a Swede, appointed according to the terms of the treaty by the King of SwcMfcn and Norway. The President of the Municipal Council was a German subject Baron Senfft von Pilsach. Both of these became involved in difficulties con- nected with their powers, with questions of currency and the management ,of the Treasury, etc., and resigned. Mr. Henry C. Ide, an American, former member of the Land Commission, was proposed by Germany and endorsed by all three governments as Mr. Cedcrkranz' successor in the position of Chief Justice. Mr. Schmidt, former German Vice-consul at Apia })ecame President of the Municipal Council. 206 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC difficulty-'^ as was the power of the President of the Municipal Council o^'er the native treasury.-- The troubles culminated, at the death of the old king Malietoa. Great Britain suggested even before this occurred, that in view of possible troubles arising from this event, the Treaty Powers should consider arrangements for the selection of his successor.^^^ The United States maintained that the Berlin Treaty clearly stated the right of the Samoans to elect their own king according to their own custom, and that the United States would abide by this and would support the choice of the people. The British Government concurred in supporting the treaty stipulations, but suggested that the treaty powers through their consuls might arrange the manner of procedure. Germany shared this view, but the United States considered it "undue influence and violation of the treaty." Meantime as an offset to certain groups of the natives, who were assembling against the old king, the former chief Mataafa and his companions were, by agreement of the three powers, brought back to Samoa after signing a promise that they would remain loyal to Malietoa and his successors. At the death of the old king, howe^'er, this agreement was ignored and Mataafa claimed the kingship,'"^ his opponent being the king's son Malietoa Tanu. Following the provisions of the Berlin Act, the matter was placed in the hands of the Chief Justice, who rendered the decision that Mataafa had at the time of the Berlin Conference been declared to be ineligible for the kingship,--^ which should therefore fall to Malietoa Tanu. The adherents of Mataafa refused to accept the decision, declared war, defeated the Malietoa forces in conflicts involving considerable damage to the property of Europeans, and established themselves in possession of the Government. The Chief Justice and INIalietoa Tanu himself were given refuge on •"' F. R., 1894, p. 735 ff. 222 p. R., 1895, (2), pp. 1136 ff. "3 F. R., 1899, pp. 605 ff. ^24 a. & P., 1899, CX (C-9506), p. 2. 2-5 Sen. Misc. Doc, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, No. 81, p. 43. This stii)ulation was brought forward by Count Bismarck during the fifth session of the Conference; it was approved by the British representative, and no objections were raised by the American. See note 202, also A. & P., 1899, CX (C-9506), p. 3. INSURRECTION OF MATAAFA 207 board the Britisli war \essel. After several conferences })etween the foreiun consuls, the naval commanders, the Chief Justice and the l^vsident of the ]\Iunicii)al Council, it was decided to recofij- nize Mataafa and his |)arty, then in de facto possession of the g;o\ernment, to constitute the Provisional Government of Samoa, pending instructions from the three Treaty Powers.^^" Notwith- standing this decision, the American and British forces at Apia, desiring to support the decision of the Chief Justice, and thus enforce the provisions of the Berlin Act, gave active assistance to the Malietoa forces.-'-' INIalietoa adherents were brought from various parts of the island to Apia and fiu^nished w^ith arms and ammunition. For the protection of American and British citizens and property in Apia, marines and sailors patrolled the streets and the American naval vessel "Philadelphia," assisted by the British ships "Porpoise" and "Royalist," opened fire across Apia, bom- barding the ^lataafa forces behind the town. Damages caused by these activities were later made the subject of international arbi- tration.--'^ The Mataafa forces were in great strength and it was evident that the local officials were unable to control the situation, which meant that the authority of the Berlin Act was being defied. The island affairs claimed, therefore, once more the intervention of the home governments. 2^« A. & P., 1899, CX (C-9508), p. 3. 22' Sen. Doc. Xo. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9, also F. R., 1899, p. BKi. 228 F. R., 1889, p. 670 flf. By exchange of notes, August 23rd, 1899, the German and British Governments agreed to submit to arbitration the claims presented by indi\aduals or companies for damages inflicted by the military action of British or German officers at Samoa at this time. The United States accepted the invitation to cooperate in this settlement, and Ijecame signatory' to a convention for this purpose, November 7, 1899. The King of Sweden and Norway accepted the role of arl)itrator. The decision rendered by Oscar II, on October 14, 1902 (See IVI., II, p. 1595 or F. R., 1902, p. 444) was in favor of Germany. The military action of the British and .\merican forces on the islands at the time of the revolution was considered unwarranted, and the British and .■\merican Governments were, therefore held responsible for the losses incurred through these activities. The amount of claims allowed was finally placed at S40,000, of which the United States and Great Britain each paidS20.000. (See Son. Doc. No. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. III.) 208 s.uioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific By agreement of the three powers-^ a second Samoan Commis- sion was sent to the islands for the purpose of "restoring tran- quiUity and order therein." Identic instructions-^*^ were issued to the commissioners, directing them to undertake the provisional Government of the islands, for which purpose they were to exercise supreme authority in Samoa. Consular and naval officers were ordered to submit to their decisions, which were not necessarily to be governed by the Berlin Act. No act of the commissioners, however, was to be valid unless acceded to by all three.-^^ After securing temporarily a condition of peace in the islands they were to consider plans necessary for the future government of Samoa or for the modification of the Berlin Act. Though its purpose was, in the main, the same as that of the Commission sent by the three governments to the islands in 1886, the conditions of procedure were very different. The Commission of 1899 was given temporary sovereignty in Samoa, and the unity of action on the part of the three members was not only recommended but required. The work of the Commission in Samoa was efficient and success- ful.-^- The two rival native factions were induced to surrender their arms and ammunition to the Commissioners and to disband their forces. The former decision of the Chief Justice that ^Nlalietoa Tanu was the rightful king, was upheld as a matter of principle,, but to solve the immediate practical diflnculties, the office of king was abolished entirely. This met with approval from the natives, 22'J Witte, Emil, "Ten Years of German-American Diplomacy," p. 54 f. According to Mr. Witte, at this time an attache at the German Embassy, the suggestion of sending the commission was first made privately by Lord Pauncefote, the British Ambassador at Washington. Von Holleben, German Ambassador, quickly secured the consent of his Government to the plan and also the consent of Secretary Hay. According to this author. Lord Paimce- f ote wished a simple plurality vote to determine the validity of any resolutions of the Commissioners. Von Hollcl)en, however, insisted that unanimity be secured l)cfore action of any kind should be taken. 23° F. R., 1S99, p. 614 ff. 231 F. R., 1899, p. 615. The Commissioners appointed were as follows: For Great Britain: Mr. C. N. E. Eliot, C. B., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington. For Germany : Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, Counselor of Legation and First Secretary of the Embassy at Washington. For the United States: Mr. Bartlett Tripp. 232 F. R., 1899, pp. 621 ff. JOINT COMMISSION OF 1S99 209 for whom tril)al organization uikUt High Chiefs was tlio iiormal ■ form of society, the kingshij) liaving been an artificial creation produced under the influence of foreigners. The Commissioners then gave their attention to a careful study of conditions in the isianfls, the causes for the prolonged difficulties in Samoa and finally agreed upon recommendations which they considered would he "if not entirely satisfactory, at least workable." Using the General Act of Berlin as a basis, they introduced a number of modifications, the most important of which, besides the removal of the native king, were the abolishment of consular jurisdiction, and the establishment of the executive power in the hands of an administrator, to be chosen from some disinterested power and assisted by a council of delegates from the three governments. Having framed this scheme as the best one they could devise inider the tripartite principle of control, the commissioners then recorded in their joint report their opinion-^^ that " the only natural and normal form of government for these islands, and the only system which can assure permanent prosperity and tranciuillity, is a government by one power." The American Commissioner, Mr. Tripp, reemphasized this viewpoint in his private report to Secretary Hay.-^^ "I am by no means sanguine," he wrote, "that the form pro- posed will produce the eft'ect desired, for, while I have no doubt that any one of the great powers could easily govern these islands in the manner proposed, I fear their ability to do so when acting together, and I cannot forbear to impress upon my Government not only the proj^riety but the necessity of dissolving this partner- ship of nations which has no precedent for its creation nor reason for its continuance. It will produce national jealousies and endanger the friendly relations that have so long existed between the powers. Considerations of national welfare should terminate this unusual alliance at the earliest moment that it can be done with proper regard for the rights and interests of the powers concerned." A similar stand in ()p])osition to the joint control over Samoa was taken five years previous by Secretary of State, Gresham. Concludmg a report to Congress on Samoan affairs,-''^ he stated: -'' F. R., 1899,p. 638. ^^4 ihjd., p. 659. 25' F. R., 1894, p. 513. Earlier in the report (p. 509) Secretary Gresham 210 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC " Soberly surveying the history of our relations with Samoa we well may inquire what we have gained by our departure from our established policy beyond the expenses, the responsibilities, and the entanglements that have so far been its only fruits. One of the greatest difficulties in dealing with matters that lie at a distance is the fact that the imagination is no longer restrained by the con- templation of objects in their real proportions. Our experience in the case of Samoa serves to show that for our usual exemption from the consequences of this infirmity, we are indebted to the wise policy that had previously preserved us from such engage- ments as those embodied in the General Act of Berlin, which, besides involving us in an entangling alliance, has utterly failed to correct, if indeed it has not aggravated, the very evils which it was designed to prevent." The objections to tripartite control over the island group had many times found expression by British and German officials and special commissioners. Therefore, when after the report of the Commission of 1899,-^*' the move was made to dissolve the " entang- ling alliance," it found favorable sentiment in all three countries. gave further expression to his disap]iroval of the jjarticipation of the United States in the administration of Samoa. "In revieAving this chapter in the history of our relations to Samoa, fraught with so much peril to our 'safety and prosperity,' we look in vain for any compensatinjr advantage. So far as the departure from our early and con- servative ]iolicy had produced any appreciable result, it had been one of unmitigated disadvantage. It certainly cannot be maintained that the condition of the natives was improved l^y our interference. On the other hand, no interest of our own had l:)een promoted. The whole trade of the islands is of small value, and of this only an insignificant part is with the Ignited States. We have never found it necessary to interfere in the affairs of a foreign country in order to trade with it." '"" Thayer, Life of Hay, \'ol. II, p. 220. Concerning the results of the Commission, Secretary Hay, wrote to Henry White, Scpteml)er 9, 1899. "We are on the best of terms about Samoa; Sternburg backed up Tripp in everything. It was rather the English Commissioner who was offish. The Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us — on his own terms, hien entendu." The American Commissioner also wrote of von Sternburg (F. R., 1899, p. 634): "I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the German member of the Commission. With one less experienced, less honorable and conscientious, representing the great Empire of Germany, our task would not only have been difficult, but I fear a hoi)eless and unprofitable one." i PARTITION OF THE ISLANDS 211 The move was made by the German Government. It stronittert'd by the German decrees of prohibition against their product, and the American fruit-growers had a similar grievance. American life insurance companies were excluded from Prussia. American lumber and oil interests were protesting at the preferential rates granted by German government-owned railways to products from Austria and Russia.^ On the other hand German sugar-growers resented the American surtax on sugar from bounty-paying countries which they considered a discrimination. German manufacturers who had considered the ]\IcKinley tariff as ruinous to their interests were bitterly hostile over the new Dingley tariff, which went still further. At the same time they were so dependent on American raw materials that they could not retaliate effectively against the United States. The Agrarians were American rivals of long standing and the increase of American food exports increased their opposition and their demands on the government for restrictive measures. There was also a widespread fear of American commercial penetration of Germany and an anxiety over the trade balance in favor of the United States. Almost the only class as such which showed any holds against the Fatherhmd, the dechne in textile exports and the sharpened customs regulations against undervaluation, the concessions recently granted to France, and above all, the enormous growth of American manufactured exports, the aggressive comjietition of American metal and other products in South American and Eastern markets — all these weigh heavily on the hearts of the iieoi)le here, and will he heard from when the new tariff and treaties come to ojien debate in the Reichstag. What most enlightened thinkers expect, or at least hoj)e for, is that out of all these mutations will come a broad, liberal, comprehensively framed treaty, or series of treaties, between the I'nited States and (iermany, in which all the vexed and irritating questions relating to naturalized citizenship, countervailing duties, and port charges on vessels shall be regulated and liberal justice to imjiorts of food products secured by reciprocal concessions and embodied in jiermanent conventions between the two countries." 5 See F. R., 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1900 for correspondence on these subjects. Also, see Fisk, G. M., in Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903, pp. 223 ff., and White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 158 ff. 218 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR sympathy with the United States was that of the Social Democrats and other radicals.^ In the poUtical field a number of important questions were still pending. The Samoan situation had not yet received its solution through the division of the islands and was still a source of friction. In China, Germany had taken Kiao-chao and, with the subsequent seizures by the other European Powers, the dismemberment of that empire was threatened and the United States had not yet secured from any of these nations a declaration agreeing to main- tain the integrity of China and to establish the "open door" to commerce there. The most immediate and direct factor, however, in creating unfriendly relations between the United States and Germany at this time was the attitude taken by Germany during the war with Spain. From the very outbreak of the war the public sentiment in Germany was pro-Spanish and the United States was looked upon as the oppressor of a small nation in a war unjustly provoked.'^ The cause of the Cubans, so appealing to the public in the United States, seems to have been totally disregarded. This was true not only in the case of Germany but throughout the continent of Europe, and significant evidence of the general attitude was given in the joint note^ presented to President McKinley by the repre- « V. R., '98-'00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., 98 S., 27 D. Von Halle : " Deutsch- land iind die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten," Preussische Jahrbuccher, Bd. 107, 1902, p. 205. ' V. R., '9S-"00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., '98 S., 25 D. White: Autobiog- raphy, Vol. II, p. 168. Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 30 ff. »F. R., '98, pp. 740 and 741. Joint Note of the Powers Washington, April 6, 1898. "The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, acldress, in the name of their resjjective Governments, a ])ressing apjieal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further nego- tiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the reestablishment of order in Cuba. The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF SPAIN 219 'soiitatives of tlir six i)()\vers, (rreat Hritaiii, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy, ai)i)ealing to liini to maintain peace. This note was presented by the powers on the grounds of hunnmity. President INIcKinley's reply was in substance that the Tnited States shared their wish for peace, but if it should declare war, it would be on the same grounds of humanity. John Hay, then Ambassador to Great Britain, testified to the anti- American sentiment on the continent, where he declared sym- pathies were openly against the United States. This he con- trasted ^^'ith English public sentiment, which was predominantly pro- American." character of this rejiresentation will he fully recognized and appreciated by the American nation. JuLiAX Pavncefote, Holleben, P'or Great Britain. For Germany. Jules C.\mbon, von Hengelmueller, For France. For Austria-Hungary. De Wollant, G. C. Vinci, For Russia. For Italy." The President's Reply "The Government of the United States recognizes the good will which has ))roini)ted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein exjiressed that the outcome of the situation in Cul)a may l)e the maintenance of peace between the United States and Sjiain by affording the necessary guaranties for the reestablishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranciuillity of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity. The Government of the United States appreciat^^s the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the jiowers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable." That the note of the Powers was not presented in more vigorous form is said to have been due to the influence of England. A similar address was presented two days later by the same nations at Madrid, supporting the Pope's plea for an armistice. Spain yielded and ordered hostilities in Cuba suspended. (See Benton: "International Law and Dii)k)macy of the Spanish- American War," p. 89.) ^ 9 Letters and Diaries of John Hay, Vol. HI, pp. 119 ff. Hay to H. Cabot Lodge. American Embassy, London, April, 1898. "Dear Lodge: I do not know whether you especially value the friendship and sympathy of this country. I think it important and desirable in the jjrescnt state of 220 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR Germany drew upon herself in particular the resentment of the" United States because of her actions in the Far East. ]Many Americans were convinced that Germany intended to rob the United States of the fruits of victory and seize the Philippines.^" \ The immediate cause of this feeling on the part of the pubhc was the Dewey-von Diederichs episode in ]\Ianila Bay. Though extensively featured by the press and causing so much hostile feeling, especially in the United States, the story was not told by the chief actors until fifteen years afterward, when Admiral Dewey published his Autobiography and Admiral von Diederichs replied with his own account" of the controversy. Admiral * things, — as it is the only European country whose sympathies are not openly against us. We will not waste time in discussing whether the origin of this feeling is wholly selfish or not. Its existence is beyond question. I find it wherever I go — not only in the Press, but in private conversation. For the first time in my life I find the 'drawing room' sentiment altogether with us. If we wanted it, — which, of course, we do not, we could have the practical assistance of the British Navy, — on the do ut des principle naturally. I think, in the near future, this sentiment, even if it amounts to nothing more, is valuable to us. . . . You may imagine what it is to be, absolutely without Ught or instruction, compelled to act from day to day on my own judgment, and at no moment sure of the wishes of the Department. What I should have done, if the feehng here had l)een unfriendly instead of cordially sympathetic, it is hard to say. The commonest phrase is here: 'I wish you would take Cul)a at once. We wouldn't have stood it this long.' And of course no power on earth would have shown such patience, and such scrupulous regard for law." Ibid. Hay to H. Cabot Lodge. American Embassy, London, May 25, 1S9S. ".My de.\r Lodge: • The state of feeling here is the best I have ever known. From every quarter, the evidences of it come to me. The royal family, by haliit and tradition, are most careful not to break the rules of strict neutrality, but even among them I find nothing l)ut hearty kindness, and, so far as is consistent with propriety — sympathy. Among the political leaders on both sides, I find not only sympathy but a somewhat eager desire that ' the other fellows " shall not seem the more friendly. Chaml)erlain's startling speech was partly due to a conversation I had with him, in which I hoped he would not let the opposition have a monoi)oly of expression of good-will to America. He is greatly jileased with the reception his speech met with on our side, and says 'he don't care a hang that they say about it on the Continent.' " 10 V. R., '9S-'0O, 30 Sitz., 11 Feb., '99, p. 791, p. 808. " Von Diederichs: A Statement of Events in Manila Bay: Translated by permission from Marine Rundschau and published in Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. LIX, No. 4.37, August, 1914, pp. 421 to 446 inclusive. DEWEY-VON DIEDERICIIS EPISODE 221 Dewey calls his chapter "A Period of Anxiety." The Spanish fleet liad been defeated but the battle had depleted Dewey's stores of aniiiumition to such an extent that he could not have met the emergencies of another engagement, and in this situation he was confronte<^l with the knowledge that a stronger Spanish scjuadron was on its way and with the realization that another nation was assembling a powerful fleet in [Manila harbor. That nation, more- over, was showing itself determined to ignore his authority and inclined to fraternize with the Spanish officials in ^Manila. Having decided to allow visiting naval vessels every privilege admitted under international law to neutrals in a blockaded harbor, Dewey permitted all foreign ships of war to enter the harbor, insisting only on the right of boarding them to establish their identity. The British, French and Japanese vessels acquiesced, and on their first entrance to the harbor reported to Dewey and asked where they might anchor. German vessels, on the other hand, omitted this etiquette and moved about the harbor as they chose, taking soundings. On its entering the harbor at night Dewey found it necessary at times to halt a German vessel by firing a shot across its bow. The German officers frequently visited the Spanish troops and outposts, where they were paid marked attention — the talk of the town of ^Manila being that Germany would intervene in favor of Sjiain. Vice-Admiral von Diederichs himself had paid an official visit to the Spanish captain-general, who returned his call at night. According to Dewey no other senior foreign naval Admiral Dewey had not even made mention of the controversy in his reports to the Department. In his autobiography he states (Chap. XVII, p. 252): "At a dinner given me at the White House upon my return homo President McKinley mentioned the repeated statements in the press about the friction in my relations with Vice-Adrairal von Diederichs, in command of the German Asiatic squadron. 'There is no record of it at all on the files,' he said. •No, Mr. President,' I answered. 'As I was on the spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I look after it myself, at a time when you had worries enough of your own.'" Dr. White, .American Ambassador to Germany has stated that no exi)lana- tions of the episode were sought from the German Government In' the United States. (Washington Post, April 17, 1907, cited by Latane, America as World Power, p. 38.) 222 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR officer had made such an official exchange of visits with the Spanish chief of command. jNIost disturbing to the American commander, however, was the fact of the increasing number of German naval vessels which kept arriving in the harbor. Within one week there were five German men-of-war in Manila harbor, two of them haxing a heavier displacement than any of Dewey's own ships. Beside these a German transport, the "Darmstadt," had arrived bringing as relief crews for the German vessels a force of 1400 men, nearly equal to the total number of Dewey's own crews. While the "Darmstadt" received Dewey's permission for this transfer, it did not add to the American commander's peace of mind that the transport remained at anchor in the harbor for four weeks. It was in reference to Admiral Dewey's question concerning the presence of the large German force at Manila that Admiral von Diederichs was said to have replied, " I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir." The subject of actual controversy between the two commanders was the right of the blockading force to send an officer on board each neutral war vessel to establish its identity before permitting it to enter the blockaded zone. This right Admiral Dewey claimed under international law, though he disclaimed any intention of exercising the technical "droit de visite" which involved rights of search. Admiral von Diederichs denied'- this right of boarding neutral war vessels, holding that if a neutral warship was admitted within the zone, then the belligerent had no more authority over the ship than during peace; that there was no requirement to report the arrival of neutrals to the blockading party; that the only requirement was that of an official visit by the officer in command as in time of peace — a duty with which he had complied. Correspondence on the subject was exchanged, in which Dewey quoted several authorities on international law who supported his position. Admiral Dewey then relates that Admiral von Diederichs notified him that he would submit the point to a con- ference of all senior officers of men-of-war in the harbor, but that 12 Von Diederichs: "Statement of Events in Manila Bay;" in Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. LIX, No. 437, p. 430. COXTUOVKHSV ON RKillTS OF HLOCKADING SQUADRON 223 only one officer appeared, Captain Cliiehester, tlie Britisli senior officer. AcconHnu; to Dewey, Captain Cliicliester field tliat the American connnander was acting entirely within his rights and that he had received instructions from his government to comply with even more rigorous restrictions than Admiral Dewey had laid down. Atlmiral von Diederichs gave a radically different account of the proceedings, stating that he communicated individually witli the French, Austro-Hungarian and Japanese officers, that they agreed with him that the boarding of a neutral war vessel was not permissible and they gave orders to refuse visits to establish identity. In the case of Captain Chichester, the German Admiral's account states tliat though first agreeing with Dewey, lie was later convinced of the correctness of von Diederich's stand. ^^ This does not seem in keeping with the subsequent actions of the British Admiral. The controversy was finally settled by a ruling forwarded to the German commander from his home government (upon agreement witli the government of the United States) instructing that "for tlie future, and, as a rule, prior to the arrival of German ships of war before blockaded ports, the names of such ships should be communicated to the commander of the block- ading squadron, when all that will be required will be for these to exchange signals with the commander of the blockading squad- ron or his representative." This ruling thus steered a middle course between the views of the German and American com- manders. Admiral Dewey had in the meantime expressed, in an <"Ibid., p. 440. Describing the interview with Captain Chichester, Admiral von Diederichs wrote: "He brought \\'ith him a . . . work dealing with blockade, and endeav- ored to prove, by showing me several paragraphs, that Dewey's assertions were justified. In every instance I was able to prove that his book referred only to merchant ships. On being asked, he admitted the phrase 'inquiries neces- sary to establish identity' as imj)lying 'search for evidence.' I then asked him the question what he would do were an officer of another nation to endeavor thus to act against him, and received the rejjly, 'I would fire on him.' He then admitted that a search was unpermissible, that only a polite question- ing could be allowed, and that this could go no further than the officer ques- tioned ch(>s(> to allow, and he added: 'If the officer does not take my word for it the worse for him.'" 15 224 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR interview with a young German officer,^"* his rights and intentions in regard to the blockade in vigorous and unmistakable terms and instructed the officer to convey these to Admiral von Diederichs. After this incident, as Dewey himself records, "there was no further interference with the blockade nor breach of the etiquette which had been established by the common consent of the other foreign commanders." The account of Admiral von Diederichs was written as an answer^^ to that of Admiral Dewey, as a defense of the German " Ibid., p. 438. The young officer referred to was a Lieutenant Hinze. Admiral von Diederichs gives this officer's account of the interview in which, as Hinze describes it, he Kstened and Dewey talked. "Then suddenly Admiral Dewey exclaimed angrily, 'Why, I shall stop each vessel, whatever may be her colors; And if she does not stop I shall fire at her, and that means war, do you know. Sir? etc., etc' When the words 'if Germany wants war' and so on were repeated, I took my departure. I received the impression from this trivial matter that the explosion material engendered for some time past in Admiral Dewey through mistrust rumors and press reports, was on the point of going ofT!" Admiral von Diederichs then comments on this interview as follows: "Admiral Dewey knew well enough that a declaration of war could not emanate either from him or from me. I put down this behavior toward a young officer, who was interviewing him as the representative of a foreign commander, as due to the burden of his responsibility as commander of the blockading squadron and the nervous strain." This attitude of excusing Dewey's behavior on the ground of his difficult and vmenviable situation at Manila is characteristic of the general tone of the von Diederichs account. Dewey's own account of the interview reads as follows: (Autobiography, p. 267): "On the following day Vice- Admiral von Diederichs sent a capable, tactful young officer of his staff to me with a memorandum of grievances. When I had heard them through, I made the most of the occasion by using him as a third person to state candidly and firmly my attitude in a verbal message which he conveyed to his superior so successfuly that Vice-Admiral von Diederichs was able to imderstand my point of view. There was no further interference with the blockade or breach of the etiquette which had been established by the common consent of the other foreign commanders. Thus, as I explained to the President, after the war was over, a difference of opinion about international law had been adjusted amicably, without adding to the sum of his worries." 15 V. R., 1914, Bd. 293, S. 7505, 19. Februar, 1914. After the publication of Dewey's Autobiography, the sulijcct of the Manila controversy was brought by Mr. Erzberger (Center Party) before the Reichstag. In the course of a discussion of the naval budget, Mr. Erzberger spoke as follows (translation by author): "If I am rightly informed the American Commander proceeds from quite false premises. He speaks of a blockade. I know nothing of the fact that ADMIRAL VOX DIEDERICIIS' ACCOUNT 225 Adiniral's actions at Manila and as an explanation of the presence of the German forces there. Admiral von Diederichs takes up ])oint for point the incidents related by Dewey, and in some cases offers his ex])lanation and in others to the Americans. In that great region there was room for more than one people and he hoped through the new^ possessions the Germans would enter into still closer relations with their nearest neighbors there, the Americans and the Japanese. This official utterance a very frank expression of the German national expan- sion policy Ml which the recent acquisitions constituted merely milestones of progress. The secretary's speech also gives first indications of the new policy adopted, that of taking into account the factor of the United States. The relations created with the United States by these events of 1898 to 1900 were made the subject of discussion in the Reichstag.'*' " V. R., 1S9S-1900, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez, '98, S. 25 ff. Fritzen (Center Party) (translation ])y author). "In the Spanish- American war the Imperial pohcy maintained a strict • neutraUtv, and indeed in harmony with the great majority of the German s 234 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR Most of the speakers admitted the sjnipathy for Spain which had prevailed throughout Germany, but declared that the Government had observed a careful neutrality throughout the conflict. Secretary von Buelow explained that the government had had during the conflict the double duty of seeing to it that the relations of Ger- many with both Spain and the United States should remain undis- people, and even though in this war the sympathies of our nation — I say it quite openly — stood on the side of the weaker and unjustly provoked belligerent (Bravo! in the center and on the right, laughter on the left), nevertheless all the reports of the English and American papers which talk of a violation of the principle of neutrality, especially by our navy, may be rejected as evil inventions." Dr. Richter (Liberal People's Party) (Freisinnige Volkspartei), S. 27 D. "I too consider the conduct of the German Government in the Spanish- American war entirely correct, but I am not of the opinion of my colleague Mr. Fritzen that the sympathies in Germany stood everywhere predominantly on the side of Spain. (Very true! on the left)" Dr. Richter then urged a liberal commercial treaty and poHcy with the United States. Von Kardorff (Empire party) (Reichspartei), p. 70 C.: "In connection with America I should like to refer to a statement which the representative, Mr. Fritzen, made. The representative, Mr. Fritzen, said that in the Spanish-American war the sympathies of the German peojile were with Spain. To a certain extent Mr. Fritzen is right. It lies in the pecuharity of our national character that, when a weaker (nation) is attacked by a stronger, we are always inclined to take the side of the weaker and in the German nation there existed to a certain extent the feeling that the conflict of poor Spain with powerful America was an unequal conflict. Gentlemen, I admit that I, too, was not entirely free from this conception, but I must say that is a sentimental conception which politically cannot be turned to account, (nicht verwertbar) (verj' true! on the right). We must remind ovu'.selves that it is more useful to us that a great aspiring people like the Americans should win the upper hand, especially since the conditions in Spain have shown themselves to be so decadent as has come to light during this war. I hope that we preserve through the future the good relations with the United States which the Prussian government has main- tained since the time of Frederick the Great. At first it may have seemed rather startling that the Americans should all at once begin to pursue a quite different policy from that which they were formerly accustomed to pursue; an expansion policy which formerly all American statesmen had opposed. But, gentlemen, I lielieve that actually it is more to our interests here in Ger- many that a country Hke America should enter into competition with all the great powers which compete in the world, and which possess fleets and armies ready for conflict, ^^'e have no cause to regret this fact in any way, just as little (cause) as towards Japan. But in the case of America I have, besides, the feeling that it gives me a certain satisfaction to see the Anglo-Saxon, the Germanic stock — for the Americans are in great part Germanic — come for- ward so powerfully as the Americans have done 'in the last war. When I hope for a good understanding with America for the future, then I am count- ing on it that the old Bismarck principle shall be revived, namely, not to mix commercial-political questions with other political questions." ATTITUDE OF THE KAISEU 235 turl)0(l. In the iiittrest of humanity and from the standpoint of international commerce, he stated, Germany would rather have seen prevented a war which inflicted grievous wounds on hoth sides. Xevertheless. he said, after the efl'orts toward this end had proved unsuccessful, there remained nothing for Germany to do but to allow things to take their coui-se. The Cuban affair, the secretary stated, did not constitute an actual interest of Germany, nor was Germany called upon to judge who was right and who was wrong in the conflict. Germany, he said, had merely the task of observ- ing a loyal neutrality. That duty, he declared, Germany had ful- filled most conscientiously and never at any stage of the war had the German Government contemplated unauthorized interference in any form. The American ambassador, Dr. White, endorses^^ the statement that the official neutrality stand was correctly maintained by Germany and that the course, especially of the Foreign Office under Count von Buelow and Baron von Richthofen, was all that could be desired. In regard to the Kaiser himself. Dr. White states that never to his knowledge did the monarch show the slightest leaning toward the Spanish, and that, when certain publicists and statesmen suggested measures against the American Republic, the Kaiser quietly but effectively put his foot upon them. The American Ambassador relates that at the time of the visit of Prince Henry to America the Emperor said to him: 35 White: Autobiographj^ Vol. II, pp. 168 and 169. '^ Ibid., p. 204. For accounts of the British-German controversy as to the actions of both governments in 1898, see Latane "America as a World Power," pp. 63 and 64; also Review of Reviews, \^ol. XXV, pp. 267 ff.; also the Nation, 1902, Vol. LXXIV, p. 141. The following are the references made to this subject in the British Parliament: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II of Session 11 Feb., 1902, p. 992. Mr. Norman (Wolverhampton, S.). "I beg to ask the Undersecrctarj' of State for Foreign Affairs, whether Cireat Britain, throiigh her Ambassadors ever proposed a .Joint Note in which the Powers should declare that Europe did not regard the armed intervention of the United States in Cul)a as justi- fial)le, and whether in couseciucnce of the refusal of Germany this step was abandoned; and whether he can make any further statement upon the subject." The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranl)orne, Rochester). "No! Great Britain never projwsed through Her Majesty's Ambassadors or otherwise any declaration adverse to the United States in regard to their intervention in Cuba. On the contrary Her Majestj-'s Gov- ernment declined to assent to any such proposal." 236 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR "My brother's mission has no poHtical character whatever, save in one contingency. If the efforts made in certain parts of Europe to show that the German Government sought to bring about a European combination against the United States during your Spanish War are persisted in, I have authorized him to lay before the President certain papers which will put that slander to rest forever." Dr. White adds that "As it turned out there was little need of this, since the course both of the Emperor and his government was otherwise amply vindicated." The evidence" referred to by the Emperor and later published consisted of despatches from the German ambassador at W^ashing- ton transmitting the joint proposal of the diplomatic corps that a collective note be sent to the United States remonstrating against its intervention in Cuba. The Emperor had written on the margin of the despatches his express disapproval. There were, however, many contradictory statements issued by the German and British Governments and their representatives in regard to this movement at the opening of the Spanish war. The German ambassador had accused Lord Pauncefote of being the leader of the movement. Lord Cranborne, British Under- secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, denied categorically before Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Ill of Sess. 14 Feb., 1902, pp. 38 and 39. Mr. Charles Hobhouse: "On behalf of the honorable member for South Wolverhampton, I beg to ask the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he is able to recall any statement concerning a meeting of Ambassa- dors at the British Ambassy in Washington in April, 1S98." The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranborne Roches- ter). "The meeting which took place on the 14th April, 1898, was convened by Lord Pauncefote as Doyen of the Ambassadors at the verbal suggestion of some of his colleagues. Whatever opinions were expressed by Lord Paunce- fote during the discussion, which was of an informal character, were personal to himself and not in pursuance of any instructions from Her Majesty's Government. The discussion resulted in an agreement by the Ambassadors to forward an identical telegram to their respective governments suggesting a further communication to the United States. On the receipt of this message, Her Majesty's Government at once replied objecting to the terms of the proposed communication as injudicious. Two days later Lord Pauncefote was informed that Her Majesty's Government had resolved to take no action. We had at that time no information of the attitude of the German Govern- ment." Mr. Dillon. "Is the noble Lord jirepared to state whether the official German statement as to what has taken place is correct or incorrect?" Lord Cranborne. "I have nothing to add to the answer I have just given to the House." ^' Latan^: America as a World Power, pp. 63 and 64; also Review of Reviews, Vol. XXV, pp. 269 ff. INTERVENTION MOVEMENTS 237 the IIdusc of C'onimons that Great Britiiiii had ever proptjsed any (lechiration adverse to the United States in regard to their inter- \ention in Cuba, and had, on the contrary, refused to agree to such a suggestion. A few days later Lord Cranborne, on being interrogated in regard to tlie German Ambassador's accusations, repHed that the meeting of diplomats in Washington was con- vened by Lord Pauncefote at the suggestion of some of his colleagues because he was Doyen of the diplomatic corps and that any opinions that may have been expressed by the British ambassador at that time were personal ones and not based on instructions from his government. Whatever the facts at that period, it is evident that both goNernments did reject the proposal and that both were most eager at this period after the war to show that they had done so. Again, apropos of Germany's official neutrality in the war, Dr. White records^^ that on one occasion the German authorities over- hauled and searched at the mouth of the Elbe a Spanish vessel suspected to be carrying arms for use against American forces in Cuba. This action Dr. White took pains to make known in a speech at an American Fourth of July celebration in Leipsic. On the same occasion he reminded his audience, as he was in the habit of doing, that during the Civil War, when America's foreign friends were few, the German press and people had been steadily on the side of the Union. It is evident that the American ambassador and the German Secretary of the Foreign Office were both bending their efforts'''-' toward counteracting and dissipating the hostile sentiments engendered between the two countries during the war. Baron 38 White: Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 168 and 169. " White: Autobiographj-, Vol. II, p. 139. Dr. White writes of the German Secretary of the Foreign Office: "With the multitude of trying questions which pressed upon me as ambas- sador during nearly six years, it hardly seems possible that I should be still alive were it not for the genial hearty intercourse, at the Foreign Office and elsewhere, with Count von Buelow. Sunilry German papers, indeeil, attacked him as yielding too much to me, and sundry American papers attacked me for yielding too much to him; but both of us exerted ourselves to do the best possible, each for his own country, and at the same time to preserve peace and increase good feeling." 238 THE SPANISH-AMERICAX WAR von Buelow made a long speech in the Reichstag**^ on the special subject of the relations between Germany and the United States. After reiterating the strictly neutral course followed by the empire, he declared emphatically that the presence of German ships at Manila was actuated by no other motive than the obligation to protect German life and property and that of the subjects of other natibns who had been placed under German protection. The accusation of the foreign press that Germany was supporting the resistance of the Filipinos against the American occupations^ he declared to be absolutely false. The reports of tension between the German and American officers at Manila the Baron termed myths, and he asserted that their intercourse was conducted in the spirit of mutual courtesy. He pointed out that after the close of hostilities Germany had withdrawn all her ships except one cruiser from the Philippines because she was convinced that the Germans would be safe under the protection of the United States. The Secretary then declared that the relations between the German Government and the American Government were good and friendly and had never ceased to be such. The distinguished repre- sentative of the United States at Berlin, Mr. White, had testified to this in his speech on the Fourth of July. From the standpoint of rational policy the Secretary declared there was no reason why Germany and America should not stand toward each other in the pf V. R.. 1S9S-1900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 794 D ff. "^^'Schurz: Speeches, etc., Vol. VI, p. 37. New York, January 10, 1S99. To Charles Francis Adams, Jr. "As to the intention of Germany to pounce upon the PhilipiMue Islands as soon as our forces are withdrawn, nothing could he more absurd. I became firmly convinced of this by a conversation I had, immecHately after his return from Europe, with the German ambassador Mr. von Holleben. He gave me the most am]:)le proof that the German Government did not only not intend to cross our jiurjioses in any way, but that it was on the contrary bent upon doins its utmost to remain on friendly terms with the United States. It seems to me the true i>olicy is for the United States to secure an agreement of the jiowers most interested in that region to jnit the Philippine Islands under the cover of a guarantee of neutrality, as Belgimn and Switzerland are covered in Europe. The only Power that might feel inclined to frustrate such a scheme might be Great Britain who would like to force us to take the Philippines for good and thus become dependent in a sense, upon her protection." vox HUt>U)\V ox KELATIOXS WITH THE UXITED STATES 239 best relations. He saw no point at which German and American interests met in hostile manner, and also, in the future, no point M-here their lines of develoimient need cross in hostilit\'. Germany, \iv said, in no way begrudged the Americans the fruits of their \ict()ry. But (iernian public opinion, the Secretary ex])lained, had not withheld from the brave and sorely tried Si)auish i)e()i)le the expression of its sympathy, and this expression would not have loeen misconstrued in the United States if certain foreign press organs had not perfidioush' distorted it in order to create in America distrust of Gennany. The Baron then concluded with references to the volume of commercial and social intercourse between the two countries, and to their friendly political relations throughout their history. It had become evident to German leaders that the danger of a strong anti-German sentiment in the United States was a real one, and that it would be harmful to allow it to make further headway. They realized that the friendliness of the German public opinion toward the Spaniards had been a political mistake"*- and that in the meantime the great rival England, had made progress in winning American favor. The American Secretary of State John Hay was known to favor close relations with England^^ and to *- \'on Halle: " Duetschland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten," Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 205. "Like the friendly attitude towards the Transvaal in 1896, so was the unfriendly attitvide of German ])ublic opinion towards America at the outbreak of the Spanish war, undouljtedly a jiolitical mistake. The latter is the more inexplical)le since it concerned a war with Spain, that country which from the tliirty years' war on to the refusal of the German-Spanish conunercial treaty a few years ago, has mostly confronted Germany as an opponent. It stands immeasural)ly further from the German realm of cui?tom, culture and interests than does the United States, and its WTctched colonial administration gave retdly no cause for any sympathy." *^ Ibid., p. 207. Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 221. Mr. Hay wrote to Henry White September 24, 1899: ".\s long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my connction that the one indispensal)le featvuv of our foreign i)olicy should be a friendly understanding with England. But an alliance must remain, in the present state of thinii<, an unattainable dream." Ibid., p. 248. Secretary Hay wrote to Henry White, Noveml)er 21, 1900, apropos of the German-British agreement over China: 16 240 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR oppose Germany. In the most recent events in Samoa the British and American forces had combined against the Gemian.^^ The British had shown sympathy with the United States in the recent war and had encouraged the Americans to retain the Phihppines.*^ It was therefore very clear that Germany must take steps to undo as far as possible what hann had been done and to endeavor to build up in the United States a sentiment in favor of Gennany.'*^ The speeches of Baron von Buelow, referred to above, might be considered to mark the opening of this policy which was con- ducted along many lines during the next decade. One of the lines of procedure was hostility to England and the effort to make it appear that not Germany but Great Britain was the real enemy of the United States.^^ Another method was the cultivation of the ''At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser." See also von Halle: "Deutschland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten," in Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 207. Von Halle refers to Hay as an undoubted Anti-German and an Anglophile "ein zweifelloser Deutschengegner und Anglomane." ^* See Chapter V, Samoa. ^= Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. XXXII, Part I, p. 737. Senator Bacon, of Georgia, declared that the reason Great Britain was anxious to have the United States retain the Philippines was that, in case of a war of the powers over China the United States could lend her effective aid from this important base of operations. Senator Schurz held the reason to be so that the United States would become dependent on British sea-power. ^^ Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 220. Secretary Hay wrote to Henry White Sept. 9, 1899: "The Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us — on his own terms, bien entendu." Von Buelow: "Imperial Germany, p. 50. Prince von Buelow gives frank acknowledgment of this new policy adopted by Germany. "During the Spanish-American War a section of German pubhc opinion manifested strong sympathy with Spain, which was resented in the States. <( German relations with America had also been clouded by the way in which ^part of the English and American Press had interpreted certain incidents which had occurred between our squadrons and the American fleet off Manila. This tlifference reached its height in February, 1S99, so that it seemed desir- aljle strongly to advocate preparations for a better understanding between the two nations of kindred race." ^' Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 39. Mr. Wltte, appointed as Press Attache of the German Embassy in Washington, WTites: /^ EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED .STATES 241 German-American element as a nucleus for the creation of public '> sentiment favorable to the Fatherland/** Americans in Germany were gi^•en cordial reception. A direct cable to Germany was landed in the United States. A special collection of casts of medieval German architecture and sculpture was presented by the Emperor to Harvard University. The daughter of the American President was requested to christen the Kaiser's yacht. The brother of the Kaiser was sent to visit the United States."*^ The following year the American squadron was very cordially entertained at Kiel.^'^ The German Ambassador von Holleben, "In entering upon my duties I received general instructions to make every effort to make the papers keep silence, which were antagonistic to Germanv, and to perform the miracle of turning them from l^itter opponents to friends and admirers of the Emperor, as well as to make it appear that the real enemy of the United States in America was not Germany but England." « Ibid., Chap. XXII. Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 378. ^'^F. R., 1902, pp. 422 to 425. Mr. Jackson, Secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin, wrote to Secretary Hay after the visit of Prince Henry as follows: Berlin, March 19, 1902. "As already stated, in no responsible quarter is it anticipated that Prince Henry's \'isit will have any definite political or commercial result, but confi- dence is felt that 'it will bear beautiful flowers, if not fruit,' that the efforts of those opposed to our having clo.ser relations with Germany will be less liable to do harm; that the transmission of news will be more direct, and the efforts to exaggerate the importance of every irresponsible, unfriendly state- ment may be discontinued; and that the consideration of international ques- tions — ■i)olitical and economic — will be approached with mutual feelings of friendliness. Prince Henry's visit has been described as the 'rediscovery of America' and one of its results has been to open the eyes of Germany generally to the growth and imjjortance of the United States. Increased acquaintance with the United States is warmly advocated in important educational and industrial circles as being of reciprocal advantage and it is probable that in the future many more Germans of 'the better classes' will visit America as tourists than heretofore. A more intimate acquaintance with the United States and a better knowledge of our people, our institutions, and resources cannot fail to be of advantage to Germany and the rest of Europe, and it is hard to see wherein it can be otherwise than beneficial to us as well." Mr. Witte presents a different account and writes (see preface) that the visit of Prince Henry actually terminated in a diplomatic incident — by which he refers to the dismissal of Ambassador von Holleben immediately after the departure of the Prince. 5" F. R., 1903, pp. 449 and 450. On this occasion Ambassador Tower said in the course of his speech: "Mutual understanding between nations, as between inilividuals, is best attained by personal intercourse which leads to better acriuaintance; and it is the happy outcome of an occasion like this that strengthens the bond of 242 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR who had been unsuccessful in his diplomatic dealings with the Government of the United States, was recalled^^ and Baron von friendship, which, in the case of the two great powers like Germany and the United States, is a benefit to the whole ci^^Uzed world. The efforts of Ger- many and the United States are constantly tending toward the same purposes in the development of civilization, the extension of commerce, and the peace of the world. The closer our personal acquaintance becomes, the more we are sure to discover how near our paths lie to each other, how readily we may follow them together, and how much we have each to gain by the mainte- nance of harmony in the future, as in the present and the past. America wishes this, sir, vdth all sincerity. There are hundreds of thousands of people of German birth and German e.xtraction living in the United States who look back from their new home with feehngs of tender affection toward the Fatherland. They are among the Ijest of our citizens. They bring with them to us the habits of thrift and industry and the high ideals of domestic hfe which they have inherited from their ancestors, and which have contributed so much to make America what it is." The Emperor replied as follows: "In responding to your excellency's warm and sympathetic toast, I offer a cordial welcome to the American squadron, Admiral Cotton, and his officers, in the name of the German people. We look upon them as the bearers of friendly sentiments of the citizens of the United States, to which I can assure your excellency, the whole of Germany heartily responds. I am happy that mj- hopes for a better mutual understanding l:)etween our two countries, through the personal intercourse wliich my brother. Prince Henry, was able to hold with your excellency's countrymen, have been fully realized and have strengthened the bonds of friendship between Germany and America. That ni}^ gift of the casts of medieval German architecture has been received in so gracious a manner by the Harvard University gives me the greatest satisfaction. I hope that the samples relating to our old history will induce many of the young students to come over to Germany to study the originals and the people who lived around them. My sincerest wish is that our two peoples may become closer acquainted. No serious citizen in America or Germany, I trust, IjeHeves that the harmony and continuance of our mutual interest could be distur])ed by jjermanent factors in our relationship. We are knit too closely together in our material interests. Rivalries of trade and com- merce will always exist, l)ut the power which draws us together is too strong to allow the development of any antagonism. It is my firmest conviction that the fact of so many himdreds of thousands of Germans living and thriv- ing in the United States, with their hearts still warm with their love of their Fatherland, will render the task more easy for smoothing the path of undis- turbed and progressive relations which are of vital imjiortance to our countries. It is now my duty to beg your excellency to thank His Excellency the Presi- dent of the Ignited States for the joyous occasion for which we are indebted to his kindness. We all over here admire his firmness of character, his iron will, his devotion to his country, and his indomitable energy, and we readily gras]) the hand proffered to us across the sea in cordial friendship, feeling at the same time that blood is thicker than water. Gentlemen, I jjroposo the toast of His Excellency the President of the United States. God bless him and the United States. " ^' Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 293. Mr. Thayer assigns von Holleben's recall to his activities against England in the United States and his insinuations against the British Ambassador, Lord Pauncefote. According to Mr. Witte, von Holleben was dismissed because of intrigue. See Chap. XVIII. THE R()OS?:VELT ADMINISTRATION 243 Sternbiirg, wlio was personally on very friendly terms with President Roosevelt, was ai)])i)inted in his place. Coiniections with the universities were encouraued and the system of excliaiiji;e professors established. The Emperor presented to the United States a statue of the father of German-American good-relations, P>ederick the Great. In recognition of this, a few years later, Congress presented^- to the German Emperor and the German nation a statue of General von Steuben. In addition to "these forces set in motion the solution of several diplomatic controversies helped to create an era of better feeling. The Samoan situation had been terminated in a way satisfactory to both countries. Secretary Hay had secured from Germany at least a provisional acquiescence in the policy of the "open door" in China, which was followed through agreement between Germany and England by a more positive declaration of adherence to that jjrinciple. Temporarily commercial relations had been regulated by diplomatic agreements. Such efforts as these were not without results and produced, especially during the Roosevelt adminis- tration-^^ favorable sentiment toward Germany in the United States, which to a certain extent overcame the hostility aroused during the S})anish-American war. 52F. R., 1911, p. 243. ^ Von Halle : Deutschland unci tlie oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereingten Staaten, Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 210 (transl. by author) . "From this viewpoint the presidency of Roosevelt — disturbed as were the circumstances which attended his entrance into office — is to be considered in Germany as thoroughly satisfactory. For thereby there came to the head of the government a wise, farsighted man, who through his own observation and knowledge is well accjuainted with Germany, and, being a .stronger character than McKinley, will hardly offer his hand to have the American policy work for the interests of one foreign country against those of another." CHAFER VII GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA After the IVIonroe Doctrine perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the foreign pohcy of the United States is that of the principle of the "open door" to commerce in the Chinese Empire. It is important, therefore, in studying the relations between Germany and the United States to consider the policy of the German Government toward this principle so repeatedly enun- ciated and acted upon by the American Government. , Though no new idea, the principle received its first specific and expressed application as an American policy in China during the year 1899, and because of his earnest efforts in its behalf, has been associated with the name of the x\merican Secretary of State John Hay. The immediate events giving rise to Secretary Hay's first approach to the European powers on this question were the acquisition by Germany, Russia, England and France of Chinese harbors^ and the division of China by those powers into "spheres of interest" for their commercial enterprises.^ German acquisitions in China began with the seizure in 1897 of the harbor of Kiao-Chao on the ground of the murder by Chinese of two German missionaries. The diplomacy connected with the event, however, extended back to the close of the Chino-Japanese war in 1895, when Germany, France and Russia had intervened in favor of China and had forced the ^'ictorious Japanese to give 1 F. R. 1898, pp. 182 to 191. During the year 1897 to 1898, Germany acquired the harbor of Kiao-Chao, Russia acquired Port Arthur and Tahen- wan, Great Britain acquired Wei-hai-wei and extensions to her possessions in Hong-Kong, and France acquired Kwangchau Bay in the Province of Kwangtung. See also, A. & P. '98, CV (C-8814), Nos.95, 133 and 141, 144 and A. & P. '99, CIX (91317), No. 17. Japan also obtained a small con- cession at Amoy. F. R. 1899, pp. 150 to 153. 2 F. R. 1899, pp. 129 ff. SEIZURE OF KIAO-CHAO 245 up possession of the Liud-tung Peninsula. For this act it was tacitly understood by these powers — and reaUzed by China — that some tangible compensation was expected.'* The German Secretary of the Foreign Office had declared that there was no connection between the intervention in 1895 and the acquisition of Kiao- Chao.* This Mas contradicted, however, in the Reichstag by Dr. Richter (Liberal People's Party) and by Dr. Hasse (National Liberal), who, as spokesmen of their parties, declared the cession of Kiao-Chao to be a reward for the former intervention against Japan. Conclusive evidence of this is seen in the report of the Chinese officials (Tsungli Yamen) concerning their negotiations with German minister, Baron Heyking, who give as among the grounds set forth by Germany for her demands the fact of her assistance to China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-tung Peninsula by the Japanese.^ There was little attempt by the German Government to conceal the fact that the event of the murder of the two German mission- aries was merely chosen as a fitting occasion to secure that which it had become a part of deliberate German policy to secure, namely, a foothold in China, or, in the famous words of Secretary von Buelow, a "place in the sun."** The secretary declared that the •^ A. & P. '98, CV (C-8814), Xo. 114. Count IMoura\-ieff said to Sir N. O'Conor that Russia considered that China owed her the ))orts of TaHenwan and Port Arthur in return for her services to China during the war with Japan. ' V. R. 1897-1898, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, '98, S. 893, B. and S. 909, A. Dr. Hasse stated that he and his friends had been waiting for years to see in what way Germany would be recompensed for her action at that time (1895). It was therefore no longer a secret (as it had to be for years) that Germany wanted to have a reward for jilacing herself on the side of China. 5 F. R., 1898, p. 189. « V. R., 1897-98, Bd. 1, 4 Sitz., G. Dezember, 1897, S. GO (translation by author). "The time when the German left to one of his neighbors the earth and to the other the sea and reserved for himself the sky where pure theory reigns (amusement! Bravo!) — that time is past. We consider it as one of our most distinguished tasks to advance (foerdern) and to take care of (pflegen) the interest of our na\'igation, our commerce and our industry in Eastern Asia. The sending of our squadron to the bay of Kiao-Chao and the occupation of this l)ay was done partly to secure full amends for the murder of German Catholic missionaries, partly to obtain greater security than heretofore against the repetition of such events. . . We must insist that the German missionary and German enterprise, German 246 GERMANS' AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA sending of the squadron to Kiao-Chao was not an improvisation ;'' on the contrary, that it was the product of the full weighing of all contingencies and was the expression of a calm policy conscious of its goal. For the future, von Buelow declared Germany would proceed without undue haste, but also without petty narrowness, steadily, deliberately, step by step, not as conquest seekers, also not as calculators, but rather as efficient and wise merchants who, like the Maccabees of old, hold in one hand a weapon but in the other a trowel and a spade. This deliberate expansion policy of the German Government, with its complete ignoring of the rights of China in the case, did not escape unchallenged in Germany. The radical elements of the Reichstag attacked it with vigor and courage. Mr. Bebel,^ goods, the German flag and the German ship in China be respected just Hke those of other powers. (Hearty bravo!) Finally we are gladly ready to take into account the interests of other great powers in East Asia, in the seciu'e foresight that our own interests will also find their due appreciation. (Bravo!) In a word: we wish to place no one in the shade, but we too demand our place in the sun." ' V. R., 1897-'98, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, 1898, S. 895 A. Also A. & P. CV (C. 8814), No. 74. 8 V. R., 1897-'98, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, 1898, S. 899. See also vehe- ment speech against the Government expansion poUcy by Liebknecht (Social Democrat), V. R., '97-'98, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '98, S. 1981. Liebknecht — (translation by author). "I have noticed that there is no inclination to discuss in detail the supplementary budget nor to examine closely the general policy. But I cannot comply with this desire. I perceive in the part of the supple- mentary budget, so far as it pertains to Kiao-Chao, the beginning of a policy which can only become fatal to Germany. Kiao-Chiao itself is an extraordi- narily imimportant thing of little intrinsic value. By means of remarkable advertising the imagination of the German people has been kindled for this corner of the earth and there are actually many people in Germany who imagine that we have in Kiao-Chao something wonderful. . . . Let us recall how we came to Kiao-Chao at all; and here we must touch on a point which must make every German Itlush Viefore the foreign world (clen Ausland). ^^'ho had thought of Kiao-Chao a half year ago? Who, a year and a half or two years ago, had thought that Germany must have a fleet large enough to rival France, Russia, if not even England, as a sea-power? No one among the }ieople had thought of it and here in the Reichstag itself only a few had thought of it; those who timidly came forward with the thought were in a disappearing minority. Suddenly a complete reversal! Was it, as has just been stated here, a reversal within the German people? Truly not. The German people whom we know does not bother itself about Kiao-Chao and this colonial policy and fleet policy in the least. It rejects them. . . . What is to be made out of this piece- of territory? Without the hinterland it is alisolutely worthless. And what was the role which Germany played OPPOSITION OF RADICALS 247 Social Democrat, compared the descent of the German squadron on Kiao-Chao to the Jameson raid on the Transvaal which (Ger- many had so condemned and which had called forth the Kaiser's telegram of sympathy to the Boer President. He then stated that there would Iwve been nothing to be wondered at if some third nation had at this time sent a similar telegram of sympathy to the government of China. The German troops had no right on Chinese soil, and if the Chinese had forcibly ejected them they would have had good right to do so. That the murder of the mis- sionaries was only a mere excuse in order to be able to break into China, no one doubted any longer. Such protests as this, however, were confined chiefly to the radical groups, among whom opposi- tion to colonization had become practically a part of the party program and had little effect on the government policy. The treaty'-" governing the transfer of Kiao-Chao to Germany leased to that country for ninety-nine years the bay and islands of Kiao-Chao and the land projections on each side of the harbor entrance. Over all this Germany should have not only adminis- trative but also sovereign rights for the period of the lease. In addition, it was agreed that within a zone of fifty kilometers around the bay, China was to permit German troops to march through the territory at any time and was not to take any measures or issue any ordinances without the consent of the German Government. there? First it was said : it is a lease ; then it was said in all German newspapers, it is a lease only in form hut a lease in perpetuity, we will never give up the land. Therefore it was a conquest in the midst of peace. This robbery or colonial policy does not help the people in the least; on the contrary it injures them. Price Bismarck, as obedient servant of the capi- talist class, which granted him in return important and substantial rewards, tried it first with Samoa, then in Africa. And what happened then, and is still going on, does not redound to the honor of the German name and has brought only harm to the German i)eople. Now we are trjnng it with China. And here the fiasco will be still greater. In China we had the choice between the English policy, of cultivating China and furthering its develojiment by economic methods, by estal)lisliing com- mercial connections, etc., and the Russian policy which leads to the sjjlitting up of China. We have decided on the Russian jjolicy and our government has preeminently militaristic and naval purposes in view. ... Against the whole present policy, especially against the whole colonial policy, against the whole fleet craze (Plottenschwindel) — I can use no other expression — (jireat disturbance, hvely interruptions) we protest: during the election-battle and after it we will speak!" 9 V. R., 1S97-'9S, Anlagen Vol. HI, No. 262. 248 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA Nevertheless, it was stated that China retained all her sovereign rights in this zone. It is further illustrative of the aggressive character of the treaty that provision was made that in case Ger- many, before the expiration of the lease, should desire to withdraw from Kiao-Chao, China would grant her some other place better suited to her purposes and in addition would recompense Germany for the expenditures made up to that time in developing the port. Though shedding much light on the expansion system of Ger- many,^'' the treaty bears on the policy of the "open door" only in this respect — that it guarantees to China in the leased territory equal rights of commerce and navigation with the merchants and vessels of other nations. Germany retains, however, the right to decide at any time what those privileges of other nations shall be. That is, as far as the treaty stipulated, Germany was free to make Kiao-Chao an open or a closed port. She declared it a free port, aided the Chinese Government in the establislmient of a customs house there, and gave assurances to the American Ambas- 1" A. & P. '99, CIX (C-9131), No. 62 (Inclosure). Following the taking of Kiao-Chao, Germany reasserted her power and interest in the Orient by sending Prince Henry with a squadron on a tour of the Orient which should include a personal Aisit to the Enii)eror of China. The \isit was of such importance that the details of it were arranged by formal agreement. Lascelle.'^ to Salisbury, Extract from 'Reichsanzeiger' of Apr. 25, 1898 (trans- lation). Berlin-, April 27, 1898. "His Royal Highness Prince Henry will, in the course of his travels in Eastern Asia, pay a visit to His Majesty the Emperor of China at Peking. With regard to the ceremonial to he observed on this occasion, a detailed agreement has been arrived at lietwcen the Imperial German Minister at Peking and the Imperial Chinese Government ; which, according to telegraphic information, has received the assent of His lilajesty the Emperor of China. According to the terms of this agreement, His Royal Highness Prince Henry will be received on his arrival at the Peking railway station by the Tsung-li- Yamen and the Imperial Princes and will be conducted to the Imperial German Legation. On the following day His Royal Highness will pay a visit to the Emperor in His Majesty's summer residence of Wan-show-shan. His Majesty will rise to receive him, and His Royal Highness will sit down in the seat of honor by His Majesty's side. Immediately after this visit the Emperor will pay His Royal Highness his return visit, which His Royal Highness wU await in a building within the gardens of Wan-show-shan, which is to l)e placed at the Prince's disjiosal as a temporary residence. Her Imj^erial iMajesty, the ex-Regent, has also spontaneously expressed the wish to receive His Royal Highness and has conuuanded that the Prince be showni all those portions of the Palace which Europeans have hitherto been forliidden to enter." TUEATY OF KIA()-CHAt) 249 sador at Berlin'^ that the rights and privileges ensured by treaties with China to citizens of the United States would not he anywise impaired within the acquired area. This treaty, governing the transfer of Kiao-Chao, embodied by no means all of the German clahns on China at this thne. Aside from those demands^- which referred directly to the rei)aration for the murder of the missionaries/^ there was included a demand that German engineers should have preference in the building of " F. R., 1899, p. 129 f. Russia followed by declaring Dalny (Talienwan) a free and open port, but closed Port Arthur to all but Russian and Chinese vessels. (See F. R., 1898, p. 184.) >2 A. P.. '98, CV (C-8814), No. 5 and iXo. 73. Also F. R., 1898, pp. 187 ff. The demands presented by Germany to China upon the murder of the two missionaries were briefly the following : "1. The building of an Imperial tablet to the memory of the missionaries who were murdered. 2. The families of the murdered missionaries to be indemnified. o. The Governor of Shantung to be degraded permanently. ■i. The Chinese Government to defray the cost of the German occupation of Iviao-Chao. 5. German engineers to have preference in the building of any railway which China may construct in the province of Shantung, and also in the working of any mine which may exist along the track of such railway." These were the demands officially presented to the Chinese Government by German\-. It was soon discovered from the Chinese officials that there was a sixth demand, namely, for a guarantee that no murders of German subjects should ever again occur. It was this gurantee which assumed concrete form in the retention by Germany of Kiao-Chao. '3 A. & P., '98, CV (C-8814), No. 73. The attitude of the German Gov- ernment was well brought out in a speech by Secretary von Buclow before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag. After summarizing Germany's demands on China he concluded (translation by source). "The Chinese Government has thus agreed to all the demands which we have made in this respect. In accordance with my instructions, the negotia- tions htive been conducted by the German Minister at Peking in understanding with the representative of Bishoj) Auger. In the Bishop's oi)inion the grant of the three Imperial tablets — a rare distinction will greatly enhance the prestige of the missionaries in China. The Imperial Government has thus taken every step without employing un-Christian severity to secure satisfaction for the outrages perpetrated on Christian missionaries, and, as^ regards the future, to prevent the recurrence of such acts of violence. The Imperial German Representative will do all in his power to provide for the carrying out of the stijxilations made so f;ir as that had not already been done. The best security, however, is the i)ermanent iiresence of a German force at Kiao- Chao Bay, which now rests on the firm grovmd of Treaty right. By this the Chinese authorities will have continually before their eyes the evidence of German power, and will realize that wrongs committed against German nationals will not remain unavenged." 250 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA any railway which China might construct in the province of Shan- tung and also in the working of any mines along that railway. Negotiations over this demand were conducted for several months after the signing of the treaty transferring Kiao-Chao to Germany and finally resulted in further concessions more extensive and advantageous to Germany than could be inferred from the claim as first reported by Secretary von Buelow to the Budget Com- mission of the Reichstag. These new concessions^'* discriminated markedly in favor of German commerce and capital as compared with that of other nations. The Chinese Government sanctioned the construction of two lines of railway in Shantung, to carry out which a joint German and Chinese company was to be formed. The Chinese Government was to afford effectual protection to the delegates of the German company in their work. The object of the railway was declared to be merely for the de\'elopment of trade, and in demanding it, Germany testified against any aims at illegal extension of territory in the province. The Chinese Government conceded to German subjects the right of acciuiring property in mines along the whole length of the railway line and within a distance of 30 li (about 65 miles) on either side of it. Chihese capital might take part in the working of the mines. Finally there came the provision which guaranteed uneciui\'ocally the preferential treatment of Germany in the province. It was stipulated that — " If the Chinese Government or individual Chinese subjects should at any time have plans for the development of Shantung, for the execution of which foreign capital is required, they shall in the first place, apply to German capitalists for it. Similarly in the event of machines or other materials being required, German manufacturers shall in the first instance be applied to. Only when German capitalists or manufacturers have refused their assistance shall the Chinese be entitled to apply to other nations." Here was at the outset an arrangement radically contradictory to the principle of the "open door." Germany put forth in defense of the claim the fact that similar privileges had been granted to » A. & P., 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 235, Inclosure. SHANTUNG CONCESSIONS 251 France in ISO').''' Great Britain made protest to the Chinese Government stating that she had decUned in 1S95 to recognize the vaUdity of the Chinese concessions to the French, had reserved all her rights at that time, and now claimed most-favored- nation pri^•ileges on the ground of the new concessions to Germany. These she secured. ^^ Russia in turn secured concessions concern- ing railway lines near the Russian frontier^^ and trade concessions immediately north of Port Arthur, and France secured further privileges in Tonquin.^^ The situation had in short become a '5 Ibid., No. 21. Also A. & P. 1898, CV (C-8814), No. 70. The Chinese officials in an interview with the British representative declared that the German demand for railroad pri\'ileges in Shantung was similar in character to the stipulations of the French Convention of 1895. " A. & P. 1898, CV (C-8S14), No. 85. The concessions were as follows: 1. Opening of interior waterways to British and other foreign steamers. 2. Assurance that China would never alienate any territory of the pro- vinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other power. 3. The Inspector-General of Customs for the Chinese Government shall be in the future as in the past an Englishman — (for as long as the British trade with China shall continue to surpass that of any other nation.) Great Britain also secured extensions of her possessions at Hong Kong and the right to extend the Burmah Railway into Yunnan Province. (See A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 17. 1- A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9329), No. 2. A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 273 inclosure. MacDonald to Salisbury June, 24, 1898. Russian Foreign Office Special Agreement (St. Petersburg, May 7, 1898). (Supplement to Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 15, 1898, Russian calendar.) (neutral ground established north of Port Arthur). "Art. V. The Chinese Government agrees 1. That without Russia's consent no concession will be made in the neutral ground for the use of subjects of other Powers. 2. That the ports on the sea-coast east and west of the neutral ground shall not be opened to the trade of other Powers. 3. And that without Russia's consent no road and mining concessions, industrial and mercantile privileges shall be granted in the neutral territory. 18 A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 17. These concessions to France included : 1. The lease of Kwangchow Wan as a coaling station (for 99 years). 2. The right to construct a railway to Yunnan-fu from the Tonquin frontier. 3. The ])r(MTiise not tf) alienate any territory in the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan, which border on the French frontier. 4. The agreement that if the Chinese Government should ever create a Postal Department independent of the maritime customs and if a European is to be appointed Director, France will have equal right with others to appoint a candidate. 252 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA battle for concessions.^^ It was soon realized, however, by the nations themselves that they were defeating their own ends in this unrestrained competition and that it would promote the interests of all if each defined its zone of intended future activities. Accord- ingly agreements were concluded-" between Great Britain and Germany and between Great Britain and Russia-^ defining their respective spheres of interest in China. In the sphere agreed upon as belonging to one nation the other nation promised not 19 A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 245. Sir Claude MacDonald, British INIinister to China, telegraphed to Sahsbury July 23, 1898, as follows: "The battle of concessions is not in my opinion going against us, as your Lordship suggests in your telegrams of 13th July. . . . Up to the present any concessions granted to other nationahties are far outbalanced in financial value by the Shansi and Honan mining and railway concessions and by the Shanghai-Nanking Railway concession with its possible extensions." -" F. R., 1899, pp. 129 to 135. The British sphere was the valley of the Yang-tsze, the Russian sphere was all China north of the Great Wall, the German sphere was the province of Shantung and the Valley of the Hoang Ho. France, also, by treaty with China, had given notice that her sphere of interest lay in the southern provinces bordering on her possessions in Tonquin. (See footnote 17). The British and German spheres were defined by agreement between British and German banking sjiidicates in September, 1S98, and this agreement was approved by the two governments. (See A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 3121. 21 A. & P. 1899, CX (C-9241), Treaty Series No. 11. Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Russia with regard to their Respective Railway Interests in China. No. 1 Sir C. Scott to Count Mouravielf "Great Britain and Russia animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows: 1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account or on behalf of British sul)jects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directlj' or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government. 2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government. The two Contracting Parties, having nowise in ^'^ew to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or existing Treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the jiresent arrangement, which, by averting all cause of complications between them, is of a nature to consolidate peace in the Far East, and to serve primordial interests of China herself. (Signed) Chakles S. Scott. St. Petersburg, April 28, 1899." may's first notes to the powers 253 to seek for itself any railway or miiiiiifi; concessions, and not to obstruct the efforts of the first nati(>n to accjiiire from Cliina railway or mining concessions within the sti])uhite(l territory. It was these agreements acknowledging the special interests of certain European nations in certain sections of China which called forth Secretary- Hay's first notes to the powers in 1899.'- In the note to Germany the secretary wrote that although at the time of the lease of Kiao-Chao the German Government had given assurances that the rights and privileges of United States citizens would be in nowise impaired in the acquired territory, nevertheless the formal agreement since made by Germany with Great Britain, recognizing Germany's exclusive right to certain privileges in the sphere of influence contiguous to the leased area, had created a different situation. As the exact nature and extent of the rights thus recognized had not been clearly defined, conflicts might arise at any time between British and German subjects and the interests of American citizens might be jeopardized. Being anxious to remove any cause for such conflict and to ensure for the commerce of all nations equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation throughout China, the Government of the United States would be pleased to receive from the Govern- ment of Germany formal assurances that it "First, will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China. Second, that the Chinese treaty tarift" of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such i)orts as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they should be free ports), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. Third, that it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher rail- 22 F. R., 1899, pp. 128 to 143. In the note to Great Britain Secretary Hay stated that the United States would in no way commit itself to a recofjnition of the exclusive rights of any power within or control over any portion of the Chinese Empire under such agreements as had been concludetl during the past year. 254 GEKMAXY AXD THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA road charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances." In forwarding this request Secretary' Hay stated that he felt confident of the support of the German Government because of its liberal policy already shown in declaring Kiao-Chao a free port and in aiding the Chinese Government in the estabUshment of a customs house there. These two actions, he declared, were directly in line with the policy which the United States \^^shed to see estab- Ushed in China. The German Government replied first informally by interview with Mr. Jackson, American Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, declaring that the poUtics of Germany in the Far East were de facto the politics of the "open door" and that Germany proposed to main- tain this principle in the future. In regard to the United States' proposal, Secretary von Buelow ad\dsed that the other European cabinets be consulted in the matter, and if they agreed to adhere to it, Germany would raise no objection. He was also willing that the other cabinets be informed of this fact. This provisional acceptance Germany embodied later in written form, which stated that Germany had already carried out to the fullest extent equality of treatment of all nations in its Chinese possessions and that it entertained no thought of departing from this principle "so long as it Avas not forced to do so, on account of conditions of reciprocity, by a divergence from it by other governments." Similar replies-^ accepting with the same reservation the American proposal were received by the United States from Great Britain, Russia, France and Japan. Secretary Hay then issued a circular note to all the gov- ernments concerned, stating that since the condition attached to their acceptance had been complied with the UnitecTStates would, therefore, consider the assent given to it as final and definitive. '^' Ibid., p. 138. Italy having learned of the adherence of the other powers to the American proposals accepted them without reservation. THE HOXEH KEHELLION 255 Tlu' Inited States had thus mado its first i)r<)- if there is any fun going on, we want to be in.' Cassini is furious — which may be because he has not been let into the joke." 262 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA British control in China, seems to be confirmed to a degree by Secretary von Biielow in his piibhc comment" on the position of Germany in China after the acquisition of Kiao-Chao. Germany had won, he declared, in Kiao-Chao a strategic and political posi- tion which assured to it a determining influence on the future fate of Eastern Asia. From this firm position Germany could look upon the further development of affairs there with equanimity. The Germans had so great a sphere of action before them and such important tasks ahead that they had no need to be envious of the concessions made to other powers. The gist of the Secretary's words was that Germany was well satisfied with her acquisition in China and had secured enough room for future development. The conclusion seems justifiable, therefore, that the next move in her interest was not to seek further concessions for herself but to check the further acquisitions of the other powers. The par- ticular determination to prevent Great Britain from advancing her hold on the Yangtsze valley came out two years later during the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Shanghai. At that time Germany sought to obtain from China the formal pledge not to grant to any power special achan- tages of a political, military, maritime or economic nature on either the upper or lower Yangtsze.-^'^ The policy, therefore, directly suited to Germany's need was the United States policy of the "open door." This principle the new agreement with Great Britain reasserted without at the same time upsetting the status quo or in any way disturbing the advantages obtained at Kiao-Chao or throughout the province of Shantung. The replies^^ to the Anglo-German note were in principle similar to the rephes received by Secretary Hay in his first note to the powers the previous year. Russia and France each declared that the}^ had already demonstrated their intention to preserve the " V. R. '97-'98, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '98, S. 1987. 38 A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1369), No. 2. 3" For the replies of the powers see "Correspondence respecting the Anglo- German Agreement of October 16, 1900, relating to China." A. P. 1900 CV (C-365). For Hay's description of the attitude of the other powers, especially Japan, see footnote 34. JOINT NOTES OF THE POWERS, 1900 263 intesrity of Cliiiia and to maintain the "open door" to commerce in that Empire — Init tliat, in the case of the infrin, element of these j)rinciples by any jiower, they reserved the rio;ht to act according to circimistances for the guariHno; of their hiterests. Secretary Hay's reply smiimed up the previous efforts of the United States to secure recognition of the same principles set forth in the Anglo- German agreement and recorded the full sympathy of the American Go\ernment with those i)rinciples. As to the third article, however, referring to the proi)osed action of Great Britain and Germany in case of infringement of the principles by a third party, Secretary Hay deemed this to be merely an arrangement betvveen the two contracting powers and did not consider that the United States was called upon to express an opinion in regard to it. Japan took a different stand from the rest, and upon being assured that acceptance of the agreement would place it in the same position as if it had concluded with Great Britain a like agreement, it endorsed unqualifiedly the whole compact and was recognized as a signatory rather than an adhering state. Having thus definitely agreed not to use the Boxer uprising as an occasion for further territorial demands on China, the powers framed the joint note^° to the Chinese Government upon principles of the punishment of the responsible authorities of the massacres and upon equitable money indemnities to the governments and individuals injured in proportion to the losses suffered. No dis- tinction was made in the note in the treatment to be accorded to the several nations by China, except that in the case of Germany and JajDan, each of which had lost an official representative at the hands of the Boxers, China was to despatch an extraordinary mission, headed (in the case of Germany) by an Imperial Prince, to express the regrets of the Emperor of China for the murders committed. During the long negotiations of the commissioners on the subject of the amount of indemnity^' the influence of the " F. R. 1901, Appendix, p. 59. *' IV)id., pp. 141 and 142. Mr. RockhiU to Mr. Hay, Commissioner of the United States to China Peking, April 23, 1901. ... "The term.s of the .Joint Note of December 24 last stated that the indemnity should be 'equitable,' in other words just and reasonable, by which 264 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA United States was constantly on the side of moderating the demands and reducing them to amounts which China could pay "without grave financial embarrassment prejudicial to the admin- istration of the country." The influence of the German representa- tive, on the other hand, was in favor of a heavy indemnity, reim- bursing the powers for their expenses as far as the revenues of China made this possible.*^ In view of the necessity of main- taining the entente with Germany, the American Commissioner, ]\Ir. Rockhill, records^^ that Great Britain made frequent conces- we understood that it should not exceed the power of China to pay without creating for it grave financial embarrassments, prejudicial to the administra- tion of the country, administrative reform, and to all foreign interests, and which might compel it to have recourse to financial expedients, which all the powers must condemn, imperilling the independence and integrity of the Empire. Since the indemnity to be asked of China must therefore be reasonable, it mattered little to us whether its annual revenues were eighty or a hundred or more millions of taels. We were bound to only ask that which China was in a position to pay us of our losses and expenses and it was not for us to seek to ascertain what was the full extent of China's resources so as to exact the last cent of it of her." "The German minister stated that he had no instructions from his Gov- ernment on our proposition, but he thought that if the commission charged with studying the revenue ascertained that China could pay the full amount of the expenses of the powers she should be made to do so, and that he saw no reason why the latter should show excessive generositj' in the matter." Ibid., p. 171. Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay Commissioner of the United States to China, Peking, May 22, 1901. "The Austrian, German, and Russian ministers were' opposed to this proposition, the German minister expressing himself most strongly on the subject, saying that his instructions directed him to insist on the integral payment of every cent spent, or to be spent, by his Government on the expedi- tion to north China. I fancy, however, his Government has before this prac- tically accepted the British proposal." « Ibid., p. 312 ff. 450,000,000 Haekwan taels equal about $340,000,000. « Ibid., p. 175. Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay Conunissioner of the United States to China Peking, China, May 25, 1901. "The position of Germany on the question of the indemnity, has, as I have advised you repeatedly, been most uncompromising. The urgent necessity for Great Britain to maintain her entente with Germany in China is, of course, responsible for the numerous concessions she has recently made WlTllDKAW AL OF POWERS FROM SIlAXCMAl 265 sioiis to this Gerinan viewpoint. The total indeiiuuty as finally agreed upon was 45(),(K)0,()l)() Haikwan taels, an amount greater than that suggested as fitting by the United States. The next event involving the assertion of the "open door" })olicy by Germany occurred in 1902 at the occasion of the with- drawal of the foreign troops from Shanghai.''* During the dis- turbances the cit>- had been occupied by British, French, German and Japanese troops, but with the restoration of order, negotia- tions were initiated for a simultaneous withdrawal. The condi- tions'*^ laid down by Germany for the withdrawal of her troops were, first, that a previous arrangement should be made for the simultaneous and uniform evacuation; secondly, that in case any power should proceed to a fresh occupation of Shanghai, Germany should reserve the right to take similar action; and, thirdly, that the Peking Government and the Yangtsze Viceroys should engage "not to grant to any power special advantages of a political, military, maritime or economic nature, nor to allow the occupa- tion of any other points commanding the river either below or above Shanghai." The German Government explained that this did not refer to individual concessions — such as railway conces- sions, but that its purpose was merely to prevent " such grants as would entail the exclusion of free competition on the part of the other states in a manner contrary to the principle of the 'open door.' " These conditions were accepted by China. Great Britain whose sphere of interest was the Yangtsze Valley, protested at once both to Germany and to China on the ground that the "open door" principle was already sufficiently safeguarded by existing agreements; and that such an arrangement would be binding only on a limited number of powers and restricted to only a portion of to German insistence on being paid the last cent of her expenses. The most remarkable of these concessions is found, however, in the British Government's willingness to have the tariff on imports raised to an effective 5 per cent, ad valorem, without compensating commercial advantages." See also A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1005), Nos. 37, 56. 62, 65, 79, 90, 96, and 100. « A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1369). « A. & P. 1902, CXXX, No. 22 (C-1369). The first two conditions were also laid down bv France. 266 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA Chinese dominions. To the Chinese Government the IMarquess of Lansdowne sent word^*^ that the British Government would not pay any regard to any pledges given by the Chinese Govern- ment or Viceroys by which the British freedom of action in the future for the maintenance of order and the protection of British interests in the Yangtsze region would be limited. To the German Government Lord Lansdowne declared, further, that the British Government objected to the German condition, not because it had any intention of receding from the "open door" policy but because the condition seemed specially directed against Great Britain.^^ The German Government therefore modified its con- « Ibid., No. 32. The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow Foreign Office, October 16, 1902. "(Telegraphic) EVACUATION of Shanghai. Tell Prince Ching that His Majesty's Government deeply resent his treat- ment of them. Remind him that Chinese interests have constantly been upheld by them, and that the consent of Germany and France was due to our initiative. His Majesty's Government are compelled by Prince Ching's duplicity to reconsider their attitude, and he will be responsible should withdrawal of troops consequently not take place. You may communicate to him the substance of reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Government, and inform him that we shall not pay regard to any pledges given by the Chinese Govermuent or Viceroys by which their and our freedom of action in the future as regards the maintenance of order and protection of our interests in the Yang-tsze region would be limited. This telegram should be repeated to Sir C. MacDonald." ^' Ibid., No. 47. The Marquess of Lansdowne to Count Metternich Foreign Office, November 6, 1902. "To that condition His Majesty's Government took exception, not, as you are aware, because they desired to recede from their adherence to the principle of the "open door," or because thej^ are not most anxious to preserve the sovereign rights of China, but because they can see no reason why the withdrawal of their troops from Shangha* should be made the occasion for a fresh affirmation of those accepted principles, or for a renunciation which, if it had any new meaning at all, seemed specially directed against Great Britain. I understood from your Excellency that the actual terms of the General declaration which has now been made by the Chinese Government are not yet in your possession, but I gather from the description given of it in your note that it has reference not only to the Yang-tsze region, but to the whole of the Chinese Empire, with this limitation, that it would not extend to any alienation of sovereign or territorial rights by China which might already have taken place. His Majesty's Government are not a party to this arrangement, and do not therefore consider themselves affected by it, and of this they have informed the Chinese Government." GERMAN-CHINESE AGREEMENT, 1902 267 (litioii to ai)i)ly to tlir whole of the Chmese Empire aiid secured from China a formal declar/ation that the empire would not part with any of its sovereign riuhts nor would it agree to any ])referen- tial right which was opposed to the principle of the "open door."^'' The German ambassador explained^^ to the Marquess of Lansdowne that none of the powers should take offense at the agreement since they had all repeatedly declared that they would respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of the open door; that the ])resent agreement was binding on China alone, interfered with the rights of no one and aimed only at maintaining the status quo. ^Moreover, he declared, this declaration of China in no way preju- diced the Anglo-German treaty of October, 1900, nor the adher- ence of the powers to the principle of the "open door," agreed to at the suggestion of the Ignited States, but, on the contrary, completed and confirmed such declarations. The INIarquess of Lansdowne, however, reasserted that, as Her INIajesty's Govern- ment was not a party to the arrangement, it would not consider^ Great Britain to be affected by it, and he so informed the Chinese Government. « Ibid., No. 43. « Ibid., No. 48. Count Metternich to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (Received Nov. 7) (Translation) ^ly Lord, German Embassy, London, Nov. 7, 19 02. "1 had the honor to-day to receive your Excellency's note of the 6th instant, and ^hall not fail to make known its contents to my Government. I would, however, at once venture to observe that the condition which was referred to in the note from this Embassy of the 7th ultimo, and to which objection is taken by the British Government, cannot be considered as specially directed against Great Britain. By a declaration that the Chinese Govern- ment will not cede any of the rights of sovereignty of China and will not sanc- tion any monopolj' in contradiction to the i^rinciple of the open door none of the participating Powers should be offended, as the latter have re])eatedly positively declared that they would respect the sovereignty of China as well as the principle of the open door. Tliat engagements which are given to us alone by China, and which, with the exception of China, are binding on no one which interfere with the rights of no one, and only aim at maintaining the stahis quo should be taken as containing a provision directed against Great Britain must be the result of a misapjirehension. As the Imperial Government merely took jiart in the occupation of Shanghai because the serious crisis which prevailed in the interior of China two years ago might have brought about a change in the status quo in tlie Yang-tsze territor}-, it apjieared only logical to require guarantees from China as a pre- liminary to the evacuation of Shanghie, which guarantees, on the reestablish- ment of peace, would take the place of the actual guarantees given by the occupation of Shanghae. I have etc. (signed) P. Metternich. 268 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA As is evident, these negotiations represented a diplomatic game of the two powers. Germany had in the agreement of 1900 secured Great Britain's promise not to infringe upon the principle of the " open door " in her sphere of interest. The German Govern- ment now made this more secure by obtaining a proiiiise from China that no further cessions of her sovereignty would be made and no monopolies granted throughout the empire. Although it is self-evident that China had no desire to make further conces- sions and would avoid it if possible, still it was valuable to Ger- many to have this stated in formal contract, so that any breach of that contract in the future might furnish ground for corresponding new claims by Germany. In the 1900 agreement Germany had bound herself to maintain the " open door." In the 1902 agreement she had bound China as well. Two years later, during the Husso-Japanese war, Germany took the initiative still more definitely in defense of the "open door." This was done through the medium of the United States."** The German Emperor suggested that the American Government call upon the powers to use their good offices to influence Russia and Japan to respect the neutrality of China outside the sphere of mihtary operations. Secretary Hay, in agreement with President Roosevelt, acquiesced in the suggestion, modifying it by eliminat- ing the clause "outside the sphere of mihtary operations" and adding to the "neutrality" the "administrative entity" of China. The following year Germany again called upon the United States to take action in behalf of the open door.^^ The Emperor sent word to President Roosevelt that he believed the integrity of China to be gravely menaced. He was convinced that a coahtion was being formed under the leadership of France for the spoliation of China, the combination consisting of France, England and Russia. He therefore requested the United States to frustrate this coalition by asking all the powers having interests in the Far East whether they Avould pledge themselves not to claim any compensation in China or elsewhere for any services they might render to the '" Thayer: Life of Hay, p. 372. Also F. R. 1904, p. 309 ff, 327 ff. 5' Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. H, pp. 385 ff. OPEN-DOOR DIl'LOMACY DlHINCi KUSSO-JAPANESK WAR 269 lielligeroiits. This would force the powers to reveal any designs against the "open door." If the United States should accede to this request, Germany would, of course, at once declare her own policy of disinterestedness. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay agreed that it would be well to accept the Kaiser's suggestion. Accordingly the Secre- tary- framed a circular letter^- and despatched it to the American embassies throughout Europe. It stated that it had come to the knowledge of the United States that apprehension existed on the part of some of the powers lest claims be made after the close of the RusstvJapanese war for concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers. While the President was loath to share this apprehension, the United States considered it fitting to reassert the position it had maintained and which it had repeatedly made known, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of China and the open door to com- merce in the Orient. The United States, therefore, in the existing situation disclaimed any thoughTof acquiring territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire and invited the other governments =■ F. R. 190.5, p. 1. ^ ^ (Circular Telegram) "^ Department of State, Washington, Jan. 13, 1905. To the .American Ambassadors to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Portugal. "It has come to our knowledge that apprehension exists on the part of some of the powers that in the eventual negotiations for peace between Russia and Japan claim may be made for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers. The President would be loath to share this api)rehension, believing that the introduction of extraneous interests would seriously embarrass and postpone the settlement of the issues^ involved in the present contest in the Far East, thus making more remote the attainment of that peace which is so earnestly to be desired. P'or its part, the United States has repeatedly made its position well known, and has been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded to its efforts to .strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Orient, whereby equality of conmiercial opportunity and access shall be enjoyed by all nations. Holiling these views the United States disclaims any thought of reserved territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make this purpose frankly known and to remove all ai)prehonsion on this score so far as concerns the policy of this nation, which maintains so considerable a share of the Pacific commerce of China and which holds such important jrosses.sions in the western Pacific, almost at the gateway of China. You will bring this matter to the notice of the government to which you are accredited, and you will invite the expression of its views thereon. JoH.N Hay." 270 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA to express their views on the subject. The repUes from all the powers declared them to be in full accord with the principle set forth by the United States. Germany's acceptances^ of her own invitation was of course especially emphatic and gratification' was expressed that the American Government intended to continue to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the policy of the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Far East. It is thus clear that after the taking of Kiao-Chao, and beginning with the Anglo-German agreement of 1900, the United States' doctrine of the "open door" received the active support of Ger- many. The German Government claimed that it had always acted upon that doctrine and that it had demonstrated this in declaring Kiao-Chao a free port. This explanation ignored, however, the special privileges secured to Germany in the province of Shantung. These, while they left all other nations on a par with one another in relation to the trade of that province, dis- criminated in favor of German industry, products and capital in a manner directly contrary to the doctrine. The general atti- tude of the two countries toward China itself was radically different The United Sta.tes, although possessing a most-favored-nation treaty with China,^^ did not assert its rights under that treaty as ^' F. R. 1905, p. 3 (Inclosure — translation by source). The German Chancellor to Ambaesador Tower Berlin, Jan. IS, 1905. "Mr. Ambassador: I have had the honor of receiving your communication of the 14th of January-, 1905, in which you were good enough to set forth the position of your Government in regard to certain questions raised by the present war between Russia and Japan. I am extremely gratified to learn by it that the President and the Government of the United States of America intend to continue to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the {policy of the integrity of China and the ojjen door in the Far East for the benefit of the free conunercial intercourse of all nations and that they have no thought of acquiring territorial rights in the Chinese Empire. This view corresponds entirely with that of the German Government which has repeatedly declared its adherence to the principles of the integritj^ of China and the open door in the Far East. Its purpose is absolutely to stand by its former declarations. Germany's position is defined in the Anglo-German agreement of the 16th of Octol)er, 1900, which was communicated at that time to all the jiowers interested and accepted by them. In this agreement the Imix'rial Government has bound itself to support the principle of the open door in China wherever its influence may be felt. It is therefore scarcely necessary to add that the Imperial Government does not seek for itself any further acquisition of territory in China. I avail etc. BUELOW." s-iIMalloy: Vol. I, p. 221. GERMAN' AND AMERICAN' POLICIES IN CHINA 271 a basis for claim to Chinese territory, when other nations were acquiring ports and other concessions on the ground of their most- favored-nation treaties with China. The United States announced at the outset and consistently acted upon its purpose of maintain- ing the integrity of China-^^ even though it had as much basis as the others for claims to similar concessions. In the case of Germany the policy was governed by a deliberate expansion system, which ignored the rights of China and sought to justify itself by the acti(ms of the other European powers. Great Britain, France and Russia had each secured a foothold in the Empire, therefore Germany had determined to secure one also and merely waited for the suitable occasion, which came in 1897. The atti- tufle of the government was described openly by von Buelow before the Reichstag at the time of the seizure of Kiao-Chao.^*^ The Secretary stated that while the partition of China would not have been initiated by Germany, that the Government had merely seen to it that whatever happened Germany should not come out 5^ Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 234: "Peking, at U. S. Legation, October 19. — Todaj- I received an American newspaperman, and gave him a lengthy interview. I would not have talked at all with him, but for two things: his paper, which is one of great influence at Washington, has been China's advocate in all this miserable affair; and secondly, he told me that he tried to get an interview with me at the Phila- delphia junction (Germantown) but failed. So I made it up with him, and sent the thanks of China and myself to those fair-dealing people who live in the land of Lincoln and Grant and McKinley." '« V. R. '97-'98, Bd. IH, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '99, S. 1987. (transl. by author) : "Reference has been made to the partition of China. Such a partition would at any rate not have proceeded from us; we have only seen to it in season that whatever may happen, we shall not come out entirely empty handed. When a railroad train shall start does not always depend on the inclination of the traveller, but (it is his business to see) that he does not miss connections. The devil takes the hindmost! (Den Letzen beissen die Hunde) (Amusement) But we do not desire — and this I wish to mark with especial emphasis — that it should come to a partition of the Chinese Empire. And I do not believe today that such a i)artition will occur within the visible future (in absehbarer Zeit). At any rate we have won and herewith I think are best summed up the reasons, which led u.s to Kiao-Chao and al.'^o the significance of Kiao-Chao for us — in Kiao-Chao a strategic and political position, which assures us a determining influence on the future fate of East Asia. From this firm po-sition, we can await the further develoiiment of affairs with calmness and ecjuanimity. We have before us so great a sphere of action and such important tasks tliat we need not begruilge other nations the concessions granted to them. (Very good!) German foreign policy will, as everywhere, so also in East Asia, under- stand how to go its way calmly, firmly and peacefully. We will nowhere play the role of disturber of the peace, but also not that of Cinderella. (Animated bravo!)" 18 272 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA empty-handed. It was not the privilege of the traveller to deter- mine when the train should start, but it was his business to see that he did not miss it. In other words, as the secretary expressed it, it was a case of "the devil takes the hindmost" ("den Letzten beissen die Hunde"). However, having secured in China that which suited well Germany's putrposes, both from the viewpoints of strategic position and commercial opportunity, the Imperial Government considered that the interests of the empire dictated a maintenance of the status quo. For this the best instrument was kthe American doctrine of the "open door." The utterance of that doctrine, however, came Avith better grace from its first champion, the United States. For this reason" the Emperor called upon President Roosevelt for a reassertion of this doctrine at the time when the status quo in China seemed, to him again threatened. The United States was glad to take advantage of another oppor- tunity to secure from the powers reinforcement of its well-known principle. Therefore, it resulted that from the time of the Anglo- German compact to the end of the period under consideration both the United States and Germany were acting as champions of the "open door." " Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 388. Mr. Thayer holds that the Kaiser felt isolated from the other great powers at this time and feared that they aimed at the partition of China without giving Germany a share of the spoils. Mr. Thaj^er also holds that a desire to humiliate France for intrigues in Morocco was an additional reason for the Kaiser's approach to the United States on this question. Secretary Hay himself records in his diary: "What the whole performance meant to the Kaiser it is difficult to see. But there is no possible doubt that we have scored for China." Mr. Elihu Root spoke of this subject in his address as Temporarj' Chairman of the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1904. (See "The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Address and Reports," by Elihu Root, pp. 105 and 106). Mr. Root stated: "None other had won confidence in the sincerity of its purpose, and none other but America could render the service which we have rendered to humanity in China during the past four years. High evidence of that enviable position of our country is furnished by the fact that when all Europe was in apprehension lest the field of war between Russia and Japan should so spread as to involve China's ruin and a imiversal conflict, it was to the American gov- ernment that the able and far-sighted German Emperor appealed, to take the lead again in bringing about an agreement for the limitation of the field of action, and the preservation of the administrative entity of China outside of Manchuria; and that was accomplished. ... " CHAPTER VIII ger:many and the monroe doctrine F(^R a com})lete and adequate study of the German policy toward the fundamental American policy of the Monroe Doctrine, many factors besides the events leading to diplomatic negotiations should be taken into account. Such a study should give full weight to the general expansion policy of the German Govern- ment as expressed openly by its representatives and demonstrated by its colonial acquisitions. Account should be taken of the l)rograms framed and voiced by the Pan-Germanists, opposed by the Radicals and ^Moderates, but followed — at some distance — by the Imperial Government. There should also be considered the avenues through which this policy was conducted — the effective support given by the government to German enterprise in foreign countries and the efforts of the government to use the stream of German emigration to further the commerce and national prestige of the empire. It was the consciousness of these facts, rather than the factors of actual controversy between the two countries, which caused the American public to look upon Germany as the new foe of the Monroe Doctrine. In this chapter, however, the attemjjt only is made to view- the German Government's attitude from tiiose diplomatic negotiations in which the IMonroe Doctrine was the main principle involved. During the forty->ear period under consideration there were comparatively few di])lomatic controversies between Germany and the United States relating to a possible violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and with the exception of the Venezuela episode of 1902 to 1904, none which — so far as published documents reveal — threatened to become serious. The first episode occurred shortly after the unification of the empire in 1871 and related to the country so frequently the center of complications with European powers — 274 GERMANl' AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE Venezuela. Germany planned^ to present to the various powers having claims against that country the proposal that they unite to secure satisfaction of their claims. Before taking the step, however, ' Baron Gerolt, the German Minister at Washington, consulted Secretary Fish as to how the United States would receive such a proposal. He had been instructed not to make the proposal formally to the American Government unless sure that it would be favorably received. Secretary Fish informed the baron that the United States had a vivid recollection of a combined European movement against Mexico a few years previous, and would wish now to know more definitely Germany's intentions and the causes of her complaints against ^^enezuela. If the object was merely a united remonstrance against the chronic revolutionary conditions of ^ enezuela and her non-observance of obligations, the American Government would not object and would itself make a similar protest. But if, however, the purpose were the forcible coercion of ^'enezuela by a combination of European powers, then the United States would view such action with the greatest concern. Xo forcible action was taken, the countries leaving their claims to mixed commissions for settlement.' Mr. Bancroft, American INIinister to Germany, wrote to Secretary Fish^ that Germany intended nothing further than the protection of her subjects in ^'enezuela and would do nothing against the wishes of the United States. The British minister at Washington showed that the British Charge d 'Affaires at Caracas had been instructed to join 1 Moore: Vol. VI, p. 531. - House Reports No. 29, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Also A. & P., 1871. LXXll (C-30S), 571. ^ J. C. B. Davis Corresp. Fish to Davis. July 7, 1871. "Bancroft writes me that Germany means nothing in the Venezuela business, except to show a watchfulness over the rights of some of her subjects in l)usiness there, and that she will do nothing without advising us or against our wishes. He exjjresses a desire to be allowed to say that in the Joint Commission the U. S. Commissioners wished that Germany (name) one of the Arbitrators and that we i)roposed to refer the question to Germany — the latter I am not sure that we did in terms — we sounded them. I do not know that there will be any harm in letting Bancroft state the facts — not officially or by authority l)ut he may 'blal).' Do you see any objection? If not you may say so to him." PROPOSAL FOH .JOINT ACTION AC.AINST VENEZUELA, 1871 275 in a diplomatic repJresentation to Venezuela, hut to <>;() no further should the representation be unsuccessful.'* The episode did not develop into any real controversy" but served to place attain on record the opposition of the United States to combined action by European powers against an American State. In 1S74 the rumor became current that Germany was nef];otiatinjj with Denmark for the acquisition of the Danish West Indies." Mr. Bancroft was instructed to inquire discreetly into the subject and to ascertain the truth of the report, as the transfer of those islands to another European power could not be regarded with favor by the United States. Mr. Bancroft was emphatic in his denial of the report that Germany was planning to acquire the ^ J. C. B. Davis: Journal. July 6, 1871. "Ho (Sir Edward Thornton (British minister to United States)) then said that Mr. Fish had s{)oken to him about a communication from Baron Gerolt to this Government about Venezuela, proposing a joint note of the several creditor governments to be followed Ijy joint hostile action if the note should l)rove to he ineffectual, and that Mr. Fish had informed him that he had replied to the Baron that should such a note l)e followed by comliined hostile action from the European governments the United States would look with disfavor upon such a course. Sir Edward then said that he would, although not instructed to do so (show? a dispatch which he had received from his government, and proceeded to read a dispatch inclosing a copy of instructions to the British Charge d'Affaires at Caracas. It appeared from this that the Charge was instructed to advise with his colleagues and to join in a dii:)lomatic representation but to make it clear that Great Britain would not imdertako to go further should the representation be unsuccessful." ^ F. R.. LS73, p. 1171. The American representative at Caracas recorded the following year (December 10, 1S72) the visit of a fleet of five German war vessels at La Guayra, but could not rejjort as to its oV)ject. « F. R., 1874, p. 439 f., No. 253. Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish. A.MEKic.\N Legation, Berlin, January 9, 1S74. "As to Saint Thomas, Germany does not want it, would not accept it as a gift; has no hankering after that or any other West India colony; from principle avoids them; wishes at most a coaling station in Asiatic seas, and that only in case it can be enjoyed in security without being made a military I^ost. This statement I have had often from every member of the govern- ment that could by any jiossibility have charge of any negotiation made for the acfjuisition of territory. They have said it to me over and over again. This much in answer to a telegram received night before last through General Schenck. Geo. Bancroft." Mr. Bancroft was therefore instructed by Secretary Fish to be watchful should any negotiations of this character occur. 276 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE Danish islands, and a similar denial was made^ by ]\Ir. Cramer, the American representati^'e at Copenhagen.* From this date throughout the period under consideration no evidence was published connecting German diplomacy with the Danish posses- sions in the West Indies.^ For over twenty years after this report the published corre- spondence reveals no negotiations betAveen Germany and the United States involving the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1897, however, Germany made a demonstration of national power in the West Indies. A German citizen, Emil Lueders,''' living in Haiti, came into conflict with the local authorities, and on the charge of assaulting a policeman, who had entered his place of business without a warrant, was sentenced to prison for a year. The sentence was made under an act which denied the defendant the right of appeal. The personal efforts of the German representa- tive to secure his release were fruitless. Therefore the German Government took up the matter and instructed its representative to demand the release of Lueders, the punishment of the officials, an apology and indemnity. The demands were presented by the German representative to the President of Haiti in person at a public reception instead of through the Foreign Office. The Haitian President resented what he considered to be an indignity ' F. R., 1874, p. 368. * F. R., 1879, p. 208 ff. In 1879 another rumor was spread that Denmark was negotiating for the sale of the islands — to an unnamed government, pre- sumed to be that of Great Britain. On inquiries being made by Mr. Cramer, American minister at Copenhagen, the Danish minister of foreign affairs at first denied the report categorically but at a later date stated that, although he had had no information on the subject, he did not know what England might do. The Danish islands had suffered much from crop failures and riots and England would be strong enough to helj) and j^rotect them. '■'Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 294. Mr. Thayer holds that Secretary Hay suspected that the United States' treaty with Denmark for the jiurchase of the Danish West Indies was defeated in the Danish Parliament by German influence. '" Moore: Vol. VI, pp. 474 ff. Lueders had at first been sentenced for just a month, had appealed and was tried again under another act by which he was fined $500 and sentenced for a year. The indemnity demands of the German Government stipulated the payment of $1000 for each day's imprison- ment before the second judgment and .$5000 for every day thereafter. LUEDERS EPISODE IN HAITI, 1897 277 and rt't'useil to rec"ei\"e the German demands. At this juncture the American minister inter\'ened in behalf of Mr. Lueders and secured his release from prison and his safe departure from Haiti. The release was granted as an act of pardon by the president in recognition of the intercession of the American representative. The Haitian Government then suggested that the matter be referred to arbitration. Germany declined to arbitrate and insisted on an inunediate apology and the payment of an indemnity. The Government of Haiti refused both at first, though it later agreed to the indemnity. The German Government, howe^'er, despatched two naval \'essels to Port au Prince and presented its ultimatum. The Haitian Government was informed that the forts and public buildings of Port au Prince would be bombarded within eight hours unless the Haitian Go^'ernment should grant at once the following demands: (1) an indemnity of 5^30,000, (2) the return of Lueders and the responsibility for his safety, (3) an apology for the treatment of the German Emperor's representative, (4) the renewal of relations and the prompt acceptance of a German repre- sentative. With the German guns trained on the city the Haitian Government offered no further resistance and complied with all of the demands. The episode represented a demonstration of force on the part of Germany to assert its power and intention to exact severe penal- ties for injuries to its citizens in distant lands. Occurring simul- taneously with the German descent upon Kiao-Chao, it resembled that expedition in the aggressive character of the demands, the imperious methods of exaction and in the general motive of dis- play of power. The German Social Democrats ridiculed^^ the expedition as a crusade by sea, which should act as an advertise- ment of German interests overseas and help to manufacture in Germany enthusiasm for the government's fleet policy. Admiral \()n Tirpitz'- then demonstrated the correctness of their assertions by declaring that the Haitian episode, in which Germany was able at that time to despatch only two school ships, to the scene, gave » V. R., 1897-1898, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, 1898, S. 1982. 12 V. R., 1897-1898, Bd. I, 5 Sitz., 7. Dezember, 1897, S. 80. 278 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE clear evidence of the inadequacy of the German navy. The Navy bill was introduced that year^^ and the empire entered definitely upon its program for development as a naval power. The United States did not treat the German action at Haiti as having any great significance. Secretary Sherman wrote^^ to the American minister to Haiti that the INIonroe Doctrine was wholly inapplicable to the case and that the Government of the United "Von Buelow: Imperial Germany, p. 42. "Moore: Vol. VI, p. 475. Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. Powell, minister to Ha>i:i. Jantjary 11, 1898. "I have received your No. 134, of the 24th ultimo, in which you report that, in view of the 'severe lesson' of the recent German event, you have been approached by friends of the present Haytian administration 'to get the views of the Government of the United States, to arrange for a new treaty, in which they desire a closer alhance with us, virtually placing themselves under our protection.' You accorchngly ask instructions in this regard . . . It would be unfortunate if, by your reception of the overtures you now report, or in your intercourse with the Haytian administration or its friends, you have encouraged any impression that this Government entertaip a policy in this relation other than that to which it has scrupulously actWi'ed from the begiruiing of our national life. You can not be unaware that the proposal for a congress of the American States to be held at Panama in 1825-6, rested on the theory that all of them, with the United States at their head, should stand pledged to mutual pro- tection against foreign aggression looking to interference with their political organization, yet, even as to this important aspect of the question, this country held aloof, in the conviction that in any such system 'the United States would necessarily be its protector, and the party responsible to the world, while the Spanish-American States would get the benefits of a system of mutual pro- tection which the United States did not need.' (See Dana's Wheaton, page 101, footnote.) Moreover, protectorates over our neighbors have never been advocated in our foreign policy, being contrary to the principles upon which this Govern- ment is founded. A protectorate, however, qualified, assimies a greater or less degree of responsibility on the part of the protector for the acts of the protected state, without the aliility to shape or control these acts, unless the relation created be virtually that of colonial dependency, with jiaramoimt intervention of the jirotector in the domestic concerns of the protected com- munity. Any such relation is oliviously out of the question in an arrangement between sovereign states and would assuredly never be proposed bj- a state so jealous of its independence as Hayti. These observations are made for your personal guidance in dealing with the embarrassing suggestions which, it would see, are made to you by well- meaning jiersons, who have not considered the suV)ject in its true fights. They are not intended for commmiication to such ]iersons. You certainly should not proceed on the hypothesis that it is the duty of the United States to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty. It behooves me to enjoin upon you the utmost circumspection and reti- cence as to matters of this character in your intercourse with the Haytians, in order that your representative utility be not impaired, nor the true poficies of your Government be misunderstood." THE ISLAND OF MARGARITA, 1901 279 States Avas under no obligation to "become involved in the con- ' stantly recurring quarrels of the republics of this hemisphere with other states." The Government of Haiti, however, had become alarmed at the aggressive German demonstration and sought to arrange with the United States a new treaty which should virtually place the island under American protection. Secretary Sherman instructed the American minister to refuse emphatically any suggestion of a protectorate and not to proceed " on the hypothesis that it was the duty of the United States to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty." With the development of plans for the Panama Canal under American construction and ownership, increased importance was given to the region of the Caribbean and the Monroe Doctrine became more frequently involved. In 1901 Secretary Ha;^was informed that Germany was negotiating to secure the island of jMargarita off the coast of Venezuela. The details of this attempt have never been published, but that it was looked upon with concern by the United States Government is evident from the instructions sent by Secretary Hay to Mr. Jackson, ^^ Charge d'Aff aires at Berlin. Mr Hay wrote that, "Having in view the long declared and widely known policy of the United States, any attempt on the part of a European power to acquire the A>nezuelan coast-island of Margarita would be a source of concern to this Government, if not tending to the embarrassment of the cordial and frank relations between the United States and such power." It has also been stated^*' that the German Emperor was negotiating for the purchase ' for his own personal use ' of two harbors in Lower '^ Moore: Vol. VI, p. 583. Mr. Moore cites this event from State Depart- ment manuscript. "Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, Charge at Berlin, No. 1186, April 10, 1901. Ms. Inst. Germany, XXI, 283." This source is referred to liy Kraus (Die Monroedoktrin, p. 243) in his accovnit of the incident. '« Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 284. Mr. Thayer states: "In May, 1901, Hay received information that German warships had been inspeotins the Santa Margarita Islands, off the coast of Venezuela, with a view to occupying them as a naval base. Later he learned that the Kaiser was secretly negotiating for the purchase of two harbors, 'for his own personal use,' whatever that meant — on the desolate coast of Lower California." 280 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE California. Such reports, if borne out by the facts not yet made pubHc, would demonstrate the intention of the Imperial Govern- ment to ignore the well-known policy of the United States. That they did not materialize is evidence of the acquiescence of Germany though under what pressure cannot be determined. In the year 1902 several events took place involving Ger- many, the United States and the ISIonroe Doctrine. One of these concerned the foreign debt of Guatemala. Ambassador von Holleben^" left at the Department of State a " pro-memoria " stating that the council of foreign bondholders in London was seeking a new arrangement with the government of that country and desired to have that arrangement endorsed by the most interested powers, Germany, the United States and England, in order to secure from Guatemala the fulfilment of her pledges-^ The'Imperial German embassy therefore requested to be informed whether the Ignited States Government would join in such a pro- ceeding if it should be entered upon by the German and British Governments. The United States declined this proposition, stating that it was " indisposed to join in any collective act which might bear the aspect of coercive pressure upon Guatemala." The Government of the United States reserved, howe^■er, for its citizens "equal benefits with those which might be obtained for creditors of any other nationality in the adjustment of the Guate- malan foreign debt." The American jMinister to Guatemala informed Secretary Hay^^ that the Governments of Belgium, England, France, Germany and Italy had during the previous year presented to Guatemala identic notes regarding the external debt of that country. Since the reply of Guatemala had been considered unsatisfactory the powers had addressed a joint note of protest. Secretary Hay re])lied to Mr. Hunter, the American representative at Guatemala, that this joint note of the powers called for no action or comment on the part of the United States, 'inasmuch as it was within the right of the creditor nations to require pa^-ment of debts due to their nationals."' No action appears, therefore, to have been taken by the United States by way of protest to the powers, " F. R., 1902, p. 426. "* Ibid., p. 569 ff. FOREIGN DF:irr OK GUATEMALA, 1902 281 although it was later leanu'd by the American representative that they had threatened to blockade the ports of Guatemala^'-' if arrangements to satisfy their respective creditors were not made hy a specific date. The controversy represented a familiar problem to the Inited States — the demands of European powers upon a Latin-American nation for the payment of its debts — and the American Government acted consistently with its established interpretENtion of the IMonroe Doctrine. Although refusing to join in collective action of such a character, it nevertheless did not interfere with the enforcement of just claims, pro^'ided that enforce- ment did not take the form of acquisition of territory or interfer- ence with the system of go\'ernment of any American nation. During the same year a revolution in Haiti-*^ resulted in a second demonstration of German naval power at that island. Following the forced resignation of the President of the Republic by anti- government parties, a number of rival candidates entered upon campaigns for election. Of these, two were considered to have the support of foreign interests.-^ jNIr. Firmin, Haitian minister to France and former secretary of Foreign Relations in the Haitian cabinet, was said to have the favor of the French minister and the strong opposition of the German Charge d'Affaires. Another candidate, General Leconte, Secretary of Agriculture, was said to be supported by the leading German commercial and banking interests in the capital. In return for this support, Leconte, if elected, was to grant certain commercial favors. It was rumored that he was to grant to the German Government a coaling station near the ]Mole St. Nicholas. This report the American minister declared was untrue, but that it was supposed that General Leconte had made arrangements with the Hamburg-American Steamship ( "oniijany by which if elected he would favor granting the company a })lace near the mole for storing coal and also that he would grant the company concessions giving it almost exclusive control over certain mineral lands on the island. On the discovery and publica- tion of Leconte's proposed agreement by his opponents, great '<* F. R., 1902, p. 579. 2" Ibid., pp. oS7 IT. 2' Ibid., pp. 590 and 591. 282 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE opposition to him was aroused and, although both he and the German Company's agents at once pubhshed denials of the arrange- ment, the denials were not generally credited. The feelings of most Haitians had been hostile to Germany since the time of the Lueders incident, and the result was that the populace forcibly broke up the election proceedings, prevented the election of General Leconte and caused him soon aftenvard to leave the island. Meanwhile a committee of public safety had taken charge of affairs, and, although not formally recognized by the foreign diplomatic corps, was in general treated as a provisional govern- ment. The main issue of the revolution then continued to be the attempt of the former candidate Mr. Firmin, to secure the presi- dency by force. He received support by sea from the Haitian Vice-Admiral KilHck, who in his gunboat, the "Crete-a Pierrot," cruised the Haitian waters carrying ammunition to the Firminist forces and holding up Haitian merchant vessels loaded with supplies for the provisional government. The admiral had been declared an outlaw by the provisional government, which reciuested the members of the foreign diplomatic corps to consider him as such and to capture his vessel. This the foreign representatives felt that they could not do, since the admiral had committed no depredations on neutral vessels on the high seas and no other acts fulfilling the conditions of outlawry as determined by international law. Later, however, x\dmiral Killick held up a German merchant vessel, the "INIarkomannia," sent an armed crew on board and took from the vessel arms and ammunition intended for provisional government forces.-- This action met with prompt response from the German Government. It des])atched at once the corvette "Panther" in pursuit of Admiral KilHck. On finding the "Crete" anchored in the harbor of Gonaives the German commander ordered the surrender of the vessel. This was refused. Thereupon the "Panther" fired upon and sank the "Crete."-* Although the =2 F. R., 1902, p. 645. -^ Iliid., pp. 656 ff. Admiral Killick, seeing that his vessel was helpless, sent his crew ashore and then arranged powder about the Crete and blew up himself and his ship. This dramatic act won the admiration of the Haitians, strengthened the Firminist power and increased the hostility to the Germans. ACTION OV THE " PANTHER," HAITI, 1902 283 act was one of assistance to the provisional goA'ernment, whicli had aiiain called upon the powers to capture the vessel as a pirate ship, the ert'ect was ne\ertheless in general to increase the hos- tility of the Haitian people toward Germany. As was the case after the Lueders ei)is()de, reports immediately were circulated that the American Government would take over the island. The Haitian minister at ^Yashingt(m warned-^ his government that the American press was calling for intervention and annexation. This excitement aroused by the German demonstration was allayed by ]Mr. Adee's statement c(mtradicting all reports of the intention of the United States to annex Haiti. The American Government made no public protest to Germany for the action of the " Panther," and that fact was received with satisfaction by the German press, which considered it e\-idence that the " INIonroe Doctrine did not mean that the United States would object to the proper protection of its commercial interests by a European power. "-^ The controversy, however, which assumed the greatest propor- tions of those episodes invohning Germany's attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine was that of the claims against Venezuela during the years 1901 to 1904. The Gennan case as presented by the Imperial Government to the United States in December of 1901-'' ■'* F. R., 1902, p. 665 ^s ibid., p. 443. -'^ F. R., 1901, pp. 192 ff. For correspondence between Germany and N'enezuela nezuela for damages done to their lines and for the failure of the Venezuelan govern- ment to meet liabilities. These further demands we're to be enforced^'- in case the two powers upon the refusal of Venezuela to yield should have recourse to coercive measures. At the sugges- tion of the German Government^' the two countries agreed further tiiat should such coercive action be undertaken, each would support the other's demands and that (except by mutual agreement) neither would withdraw from the undertaking until the demands of both should be satisfied. There remamed, therefore, only the methods of procedure to be considered. The German ambassador suggested in general terms that the two powers concerned should take part in a joint naval demonstration.''^ The British Foreign Office thereupon consulted the admiralt\' for the ^•iews of the Lords Commissioners <•- A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 137. " A. & P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), No. 13. The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Buchanan. Foreign Office, November 11, 1902. (Extract) .... "As to the joint execution of measures of coercion, the German Govern- ment recognized that there was a sharp distinction between the character of the British and German "first-line" claims; nevertheless, the two claims ought to stand or fall together, and we ought to exclude the possilnlity of a settlement between Venezuela and one of the two powers without an equally satisfactory settlement in the case of the other. Each Government ought, therefore, to come to an understanding before it eml)arked upon a [project of coercion that neither Government should be at hl)erty to recede e.xcept by mutual agreement ; and before common action was initiated, we ought to come to a distinct agreement to this effect. I told Count Metternich that it seemed to be only reasonable that if we agreed to act together in apjilying coercion, W(> should also agree that each should support the other's demands, and should not desist from doing so except by agreement." « A. & P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), Nos. 5 and G. The Admiralty advised, however, that .such a blockade should be deferred till November when the unhealthy season would Ije over. Vice-.\dmiral Douglas (see Inclosure in No. 9) also advised waiting till November when the Newfoundland fishery season should have concluded and released the ships employed on that division. 19 288 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE as to the most effectual and convenient manner of putting pressure on the Venezuelan Government. The admiralty replied that the best method would be a blockade of Venezuelan ports — which could be effectively accomplished by the British squadron already present at the North America and West Indies station. The Vice- Admiral at Halifax, however, suggested as an alternative scheme to the blockade that all the Venezuelan gunboats should be seized until the demands should be compHed with. This suggestion was approved by the Foreign Office as preferable,^^ a blockade appearing open to some objection. Lord Lansdowne therefore informed the German Government that the first measures of coercion would be the seizure of the gunboats, and that if this should not produce the desired effect it would, of course, be neces- sary to decide w^hat should be the next step, and that this further action would be carefully considered. This plan was agreed to by Germany. Having settled upon the military measures to be taken following a refusal of Venezuela to accede to the demands the next matter to be decided was the diplomatic procedure.^*' Hereupon the Ger- man Government was seized with compunctions concerning the fact^^ that its last notes with Venezuela had been exchanged six months before and had not been "couched in a tone which would justify an immediate resort to coercion." Therefore the Imperial Government considered it necessary to give ^ enezuela one more chance and suggested that each of the two powers should simul- taneously present an ultimatum, embodying its own collective demands and referring to the demands of the other power. This '5 Ibid., Nos. 10 and 14. 36 A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Xos 134 and 138. As the German Government had done in 1901, the British Government now informed the United States of its intention of using force against Venezuela. The British Government did not, however, refer to its intentions in regard to the occupa- tion or acquisition of Venezuelan territory. Secretary Hay replied that, although "the United States Government regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American countries," it "could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated." " A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1.399), Xo. 153. ENTRANCE OF ITALY 289 Hnal etl'ort, the Ciorman ambassador explained, need not delay the aetive measures arranged, since the ultimatums miji^ht be presented at once and a jDeriod of twenty-four hours granted for compliance. The agreement finally reached*'^ was that the ultimatums should be ])resented simultaneously, though without announcing to \'enezuela the twenty-four-hour time-limit. The communications should demand that the Venezuelan Government accept in principle all the German-British claims, accept without fresh investigation the so-called first-line claims and agree to refer to a mixed com- mission the claims of the second class. At this juncture, just a few^ days before the presentation of the British-German ultimatums, Italy appeared on the scene and announced her tlesire to take part in the coercive measures. ^^ The Italian ^Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the British represen- tative at Rome that Italy also had just cause for complaint against \'enezuela, that the Italian Government had informed the United States of its intention to use coercive measures and had received a very satisfactory reply. Therefore the Italian Government, although not disposed to take the initiative in this undertaking, '''A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 153. The German Govern- ment classified its demands as follows: " (a) Payment of the German claims arising out of the civil wars of the years 1898-1900, amounting to about 1,700,000 bolivars. (b) Settlement of claims arising out of the present civil war in Venezuela. (c) Guarantee for the claims of German firms on account of the building of the slaughter-house in Caracas, amounting to a round sum of 800,000 bf)livar8. (d) Guarantee for the payment of the claims of the German Great Venezuela Railway Company for interest and sinking fund of the Venezuelan Loan of 1896." The demands under class (a) the Imperial Government stated had already been thoroughly investigated and it refused to have them suljjected to a fresh examination at the hands of the Commission. (The investigations, however, had been made by German authorities — alone — on the ground that Venezuela had refused a mixed commission.) The British claims to be "paid at once" (see Ibid., No. 161) were "the compensations in the shipping cases, and in cases where British subjects have been falsely imprisoned or maltreated," and in additif)n to these a sum sufficient to make the whole immediate pay- ment equal to that which might in the first instance be paid to the German Government. '» A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 162 and 166. 290 ger:mani- and the monroe doctrine would be glad to join in any action taken by Great Britain if this should be favorably viewed by the British Government. The reception given to this proposal was not enthusiastic. Lord Lansdowne told the Italian Ambassador that while in principle he saw no objection to Italian participation, there were many practical difficulties. The British Government had for some time past been discussing with the German Government the scope and character of the measures to be taken and these measures had required most careful consideration, "not only on account of the manner in which they affected the two European powers concerned, but on account of the international questions to which they were calculated to give rise." Having reached an agreement and pro- posing to take action at once, there was no time available for settling the conditions upon which Italy might join Great Britain and Germany, "supposing that were desired." Lord Lansdowne therefore ventured to suggest that under the circumstances the Italian Government should not press its demands at that moment. The Italian ambassador seemed in no wise disheartened by this reception. He replied that while he realized that it M'ould probably be impossible for Italy to take part in the initial action agreed upon b>- Germany and Great Britain, still he though it desirable to enter into discussion of the cooperation of Italy in the near future. In the meanwhile Italian ships might visit Venezuelan waters to show that "Italy was not indifferent to what was occurring." Lord Lansdowne promised to confer with Germany on the subject. Throughout these preparations for naval action against Venezuela the United States had made no formal protest and had informed both Great Britain and Germany that it would put fon\'ard no objections so long as there should be no attempt at the acquisition of \'enezuelan territory. ^'^ Secretary Hay made it quite clear, however, that such application of force to a South American country was regretted by the Government of the Ignited States. Evidence of his effort diplomatically to divert the two countries « F. R., 1901, p. 195, and A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Xo. 138. BRITISH-GERMAN ULTIMATUMS 291 from tlu'ir eonteniphited action is rovealod in tho official approval'^ given to the eti'orts of the l)ankin.s2; firm of SeHjiinan & Co. to effect a settlement of the \'enezuelan debt. Secretary Hay telegraphed to the American representatives at Berlin and London, informing them of the efforts of Seligman & Co., and stating that at the re(piest of that com})any it gave him pleasure to say that "the President would be glad if such an arrangement could be made as might ob^•iate the necessity of any exhibition of force on the part of Germany and Great Britain." It was to be understood, however, that the United States Government assumed "no obligation whatever in the nature either of a material or moral guarantee of any liabilities created by the transaction." This attempt to assist the banking firm to settle an international difficulty was without result. Germany and Great Britain presented their ultimatums to Venezuela on December 7, 1902."^- During the follow'ing day Presi- dent Castro published in the newspapers a statement^^ declaring that foreign creditors must await the reestablishment of peace when all promises would be fulfilletl, and that in the meantime he would not try to "placate with phrases" nor "accept humiliation." The ultimatums, therefore, were rejected,^ and on the 9th the two *^ F. R., 1903, pp. 418 ff. and p. 452. The correspondence with Great Britain shows no reply to the instructions sent to Mr. White. In the cor- respondence with Germany the American Ambassador records a declaration by Doctor von Muehlberg of the Foreign Office that aside from newspaper accounts he knew nothing of the efforts of Seligman & Company. «V. R., 1900-1903, VII, Anlageband, M. 786, S. 4957. (Contains official government account (Denkschrift) of Germany's case against Venezuela.) See also Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 272 ff. « F. R., 1903, p. 789. ** Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 279. After setting forth at length his country's side of the case, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Ivelations concluded, in reply to the German ultimatum as follows: ■'Having thus returned in an essentially conciliatory and friendly manner a reply to your note, I pass by, under special orders of the Governnu^nt, that part which relates to the joint action of the Empire and the United Kingdom; for a power like Venezuela, which need not be urged, much less constrained, to discharge as far as it is in its power, its lawful obligations, will never, in its intercourse with the other civilized nations, look for anything that will not be in accordance with the princij^les of mutual respect antl with tlie rules of reciprocal cordiality." 292 GERMANl' AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE powers entered upon their program. Both British and German interests were placed in charge of ]\Ir. Bowen, American minister at Caracas and the Venezuelan gunboats in the harbor of La Gua\ra were seized by the combined forces, no resistance being offered. ^^ The German commander sank the two vessels captured by him.^® These actions aroused great excitement in Caracas and resulted in attacks on the legations and the imprisonment of many German and British subjects. Mr. Bowen's efforts to obtain their release were not immediately successful. The counter-effect of the Venezuelan demonstrations was that the attacking powers lost no time in advancing to the second measure on their program — the blockade. Just two days after the seizure of the gunboats the decision was reached that these measures already taken would not be sufficiently effective and that the blockade should commence as soon as possible.^^ The blockade was formally announced on the 20th and included the ports of La Guayra, Caranero, Guanta, Cumana, Carupano and the mouths of the Orinoco. In the meantime the overtures of Italy had been accepted, and it was agreed that if a blockade should be resorted to Italy might take part in it. Vessels of the three nations, there- fore, held the blockaded harbors. The establishment of the blockade gave rise to a discussion with the United States as to the status and character of such a measure when not accompanied by a declaration of war. In its first note on this subject to the Ignited States in 190P* the German Government « A. P., 1903, LXXXVII (C-1399), Nos. 173 and 174. ^* F. R., 1903, p. 422. The reason given for sinking the ships was that the two vessels were not sufhcientlj- seaworthy to undertake the voyage to Trinidad under their own steam, and to have towed them there woukl have impaired the movements of the German squadron in search of the rest of the \'enezuelan fleet. 1. ^" Ibid., Nos. 182 and 183. « F. R., 1901, p. 196. Promemoria. Imperial Germ.\n Emb.\ssy, W.\sHiNGTON, December 20, 1901. "In case the German Government should be obhged to use coercion against Venezuela in connection with the pending claims, it will have to be considered what kind of measures should bo apjihed. The most important measure of coercion — that is, the blockade of Venezuelan harbors — would have to be carried through without a declaration of war preceding it. The l)lockade LEGAL ASPECTS OF BLOCKADE 293 hail (loc'lared that the measures to be taken would not be preceded 1\\ a (ieclaration of war, would constitute only a peace blockade, but would attt'ct neutral ships which would have to be turned away from the harbor.'' The United States refused to acquiesce in this extension of the doctrine of pacific blockade to include inter- ference with the commerce of neutral nations, and Secretary Hay referred to the fact that the American Government had taken this same stand in 1897 when the European powers had declared a similar })lockade of Crete.^" The German Government later informecP^ Secretary Hay that although Germany was at first inclined to a peace blockade, Great Britain had insisted on estab- lishiniT a warlike one, to which Germany had yielded.^- The stand taken by Great Britain coincided^^ with the viewpoint of the United States, which recognized no form of blockade affecting neutral commerce except the complete effective blockade of war as laid down l)y international law. Mr. Balfour, British Prime Minister, declared before the House of Commons that personally he agreed with the United States that there could be no such thing as a peace blockade and that a blockade did involve a state of war. Never- would therefore be a peace blockade. Such a blockade would touch likewise the ships of neutral powers, inasmuch as such ships, although a confiscation of tlicni would not have to be considered, would have to be turned away and l)rohibited until the blockade should be raised. In the same manner Euro- jiean states have proceeded on such occasion, especially England and France." « F. R., 1903, pp. 420 and 421. *" F. R., 1897, p. 255. In reply to the announcement by the powers of the blockade of Crete, Secretary Sherman wTote (March 26, 1897): "As the United States is not a signatory of the treaty of Berlin, nor other- wise anionalile to the engagements thereof, I confine myself to taking note of the conununication, not conceding the right to make such a blockade as that referred to in your communication, and receiving the consideration of all international rights and of any questions which may in any way affect the commerce or interests of the United States." 5' F. R., 1903, p. 421. 52 F. R., 1903, p. 454. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs explained ta Mr. White that Germany had used the word "war-like blockade" because a regular "jure gentium" lilockade required a vote of the Bundesrath. This full, recognized form was insisted on t)V Great Britain and the vote of the Bundesrath endorsed it. =' Parliamentary Debates, Session 1902, Vol. 1(3, pp. 1490 f. 294 GERMANY AND THE iMONROE DOCTRINE theless both countries avoided^'* a direct declaration of war against Venezuela. The whole controversy over the doctrines involved in the blockade has been considered^^ important as having estab- lished the American viewpoint and having definitely fixed the status of the "pacific blockade." But the theoretical aspects of the case were of less pressing significance to the United States than the facts of the situation and the immediate intentions of the blockading powers in ^'ene- zuela. The German Government had announced in 1901 that it considered under no circumstances the acquisition or permanent occupation of A'enezuelan territory, but it had suggested at that time that it might consider temporary occupation necessary. Mr. Balfour, on the other hand, declared before the House of Com- mons^*^ that the British Government had no intention of landin* troops^'' in Venezuela or even temporarily of occupying territory there. The United States Government was anxious to prevent, if possible, occupation in any form, even though declared to be temporary. As President Roosevelt stated^^ to Ambassador von =■* F. R., 1903, p. 421. The German Secretary of State for foreign affairs declared to Ambassador Tower that Germany had ("at present") no inten- tions of declaring war or of going beyond the measures of a "war-like block- ade." In the House of Commons Mr. Balfour met the question as follows: Mr. A. J. Balfour: "The question of the honorable and learned Gentleman the member for Louth, does not arise when you are in a state of war with a third party." Mr. T. M. Healy: "A state of war! Has war been declared? Mr. A. J. Balfour: "Does the honorable and learned gentleman sup])ose that without a state of war you can take the shijjs of another Power and blockade its ports?" =5 North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVII, pp. 86 ff., article entitled "The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela," by W. L. Penfield, Solicitor of the Department of State, Agent and Counsel for Venezuela and the United States at the Venezuelan Arbitration before the Hague Tribunal. *6 Parliamentary Debates, Session 1902, Vol. 16, pp. 1290 and 1490. "A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Xos. 192 and 230. After bom- barding the forts, a British force was landed at Puerto-Cabello, but withdrew after dismantling the fort guns. The German warships took part in the bomliardment (F. R., 1903, p. 796). =* Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, Appendix, p. 413. BRITISH AXD GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ARBITRATION 295 Holleben, Kiao-Chao was not a permanent possession of Germany's merely held by a ninety-nine year lease, and he did not intend to have another Kiao-(^hao on the approach to the Panama Canal. For this reason the United States Government gave support at once to the prompt proposal of \'enezuela that the differences with Great Britain and Germany be submitted to arbitration.'^^ ]\Ir. Bowen, the American minister, was permitted to accept the request of the ^'enezuelan Government that he act as arbitrator representing \'enezuela should the other powers agree to arbitrate. The crux of the whole controversy thus became the endeavor to induce Great Britain and Germany to arbitrate. Here the pub- lished correspondence reveals no hint of the decisive action taken by President Roosevelt.'''' This correspondence*^^ shows only the following facts: First, that the United States forwarded without comment to Great Britain and Germany the Venezuelan proposal to arbitrate. Secondly, that the German minister gave to Lord Lansdowne as his personal view that " there seemed to. him to be considerable objections to encouraging the idea of arbitration" and that this personal view had later been sustained by his instruc- tions from his government. Thirdly, that Great Britain also considered the Venezuelan proposal, as it stood, to be unacceptable, for the same reasons in the main as those advanced by the German Government, but that Great Britain, while refusing to arbitrate concerning cases of injury to the person and property of British subjects, suggested that the other claims be submitted to arbitra- tion and that the United States be invited to arbitrate upon them. It may be also significant of a divergence of policy between Great Britain and Germany that Lord Lansdowne told the German Ambassador that it seemed to him desirable that the countries send separate replies to the Venezuelan proposal — although he considered that in substance they should make them as similar as possible. Also the correspondence shows that the United States 59 F. R., 1903, pp. 790 ff. *" Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, ])]•>. 2S() IT. and Appendix. This action of President Roosevelt was first made public by Mr. Thayer in the above work. " A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 185, 190, 191, 193, 195, 198, 199. Also F. R., 1903, pp. 423 ff., 4.53 ff. and 790 ff. 296 GERMAXl- AND THE MOXROE DOCTRIXE repeated its inquiries concerning the intentions of the blockading powers, adding tliis time the recommendation of the American Government that the Venezuelan proposals be accepted. And, fourthly, that shortly thereafter the principle of arbitration for certain classes of claims was accepted by both the British and German Governments. There has since been revealed,*- however, the pressure exercised by President Roosevelt upon the German Government before it announced willingness to arbitrate. The President had become convinced that Germany was the leader in the transaction and intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and fortify it with a view to exercising some degree of control over the prospective Isthmian Canal. Mr. Roosevelt also became convinced that Great Britain would not back Germany in the event of hostilities with the United States over the situation. The President therefore, assembled for maneuvers in the West Indies under Admiral Dewey an American squadron superior to the German fleet assembled at ^'enezuela. Admiral Dewey was given secret instructions to have his fleet "in fighting trim" and ready to sail at an hour's notice. When, therefore, the German Ambassador von Holleben repeated that his government would not arbitrate, President Roosevelt notified him that unless within a specified number of days the German Government should signify its willingness to arbitrate, Dewey would be ordered to Venezuela to "see that the German forces did not take possession of any territory." Though the Ger- man ambassador expressed grave concern over the consequences of such an act, he seems to have concluded''^ that President Roose- velt was bluffing, for the Imperial Government furnished no reply within the time set. Thereupon President Roosevelt notified him that there was no use waiting longer and that Admiral Dewey would be ordered to sail a day earHer than the date specified. The German ambassador then awoke to the situation. He discovered that not only was the American President not bluffing, but that «^ Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II. "' Ibid., p. 416. It is asserted in an inclosure in Roosevelt's letter to Mr. Thayer that it was this misjudgment of the Venezuelan situation which caused von Holleben's recall. ACTION OF PRESIDENT KOOSEVELT 297 the Aniericaii Heet, outmatching in strenjj;th the German naval forces, was in readiness and could act to ad^'antage in the Carib- l)ean. Within twenty-four hours President Roosevelt received from the (lerman Emperor not only the consent to arbitrate but tile invitation that the President himself act as arbitrator. There- upon Mr. Roosevelt ])ublicly ex])ressed his gratification at this endorsement by Germany of the principle of arbitration. By the decisive action the President thus, without letting the public become aware of it, removed what he evidently believed to be a real threat against the ^Monroe Doctrine in the region of his pet enterprise, the Isthmian Canal. The American Ambassador to Germany, Dr. White, seems not to have shared in any degree the President's suspicions of the purposes of Germany. The action of the German naval forces at Venezuela he describes"^ as "perfectly legitimate," and states that "the Monroe Doctrine " White, Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 247 and 248. After relating the acts of the Castro Government in Venezuela, Dr. White states: "At this the German Government, as every government in similar cir- cvunstances is bound to do, demanded redress and sent ships to enforce the demand. This was perfectly legitimate; l^ut immediately there arose in the United States an outcry against a 'violation of the Monroe Doctrine.' .\s a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine was no more concerned in the matter than was the doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints; but there was enough to start an outcry against Germany, and so it began to spread. The Germans were careful to observe the best precedents in international law, yet every step they took was exhibited in sundry American papers as a menace to the United States. There was no more menace to the United States than to the l)lanet Saturn. The conduct of the German Government was in the interest of the United States as well as of every other decent government. Finally, the soldiers in a \'enezuelan fort wantonly fired upon a German war vessel — whereui)on the commander of the shij), acting entirely in accordance, not only with international la\y, but with natural right, defended himself, and knocked the f(jrt about the ears of those who occupied it, thus giving the creatures who directed them a lesson which ought to rejoice every thinking American. At this the storm on paper against Germany, both in America and Great Britain, l)roke out with renewed violence, and there was more talk about dangers to the Monroe Doctrine. As one who, at The Hague Conference, was at)le to do something for recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by European powers, and who, as a member of the \'enezuelan Commission, did what was possible to secure justice to Venezuela, I take this ()])portunity to express the opinion that the time has rome for plain speaking in this matter. Even with those f;f us who believe in the Monroe Doctrine there begins to arise a (|uestion as to which are nearest the interests and the hearts of Americans — the sort of 'duiul) driven cattle' who allow themselves to be governed by such men as now control \'enezaela, or the i)eople of Germany and other civilized parts of Europe, as well as those of the better South American repulilics, like Chile, the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and others, whose interests, aspirations, ideals, and feelings are so mucli more closely akin to our own." 298 GERMAXY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE was no more concerned in the matter than was the doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints." He also declared that " There was no more menace to the United States than to the planet Saturn" and that " the conduct of the German Government was in the interest of the United States as well as of every other decent government." Absolute proof of Germany's intention to overthrow its assurances and seek to acquire territory in Venezuela at this period has not been made public. But the reluctance to arbitrate, the increased assertion of power in regions of the Caribbean within the few years preceding the acquisition of the canal rights by the United States, the programs of the Pan-Germanists, and the general expansion policy as frequently expressed by German Government officials, combine to create foundation for the fears of the President. The subsequent negotiations related rather to the measures of securing pajnient, to the principle of equal treatment of creditor nations and to the procedure of arbitration rather than to the IMonroe Doctrine, yet they are significant of the contrasting poHcies of the United States and the blockading powers toward a debtor state. The alHed''^ powers demanded that Venezuela recognize in principle all their claims and offer provision for immediate payment of their "first-line" claims which they had declared to be not suited for settlement by arbitration .'^^ ]Mr. Bowen, duly accepted as representative of the case of Venezuela, forwarded the reply of President Castro that, bowing to superior force, he recog- nized in principle the claims of the allied powers. This was not considered satisfactory, the allied governments demanding to know the means by which Venezuela would guarantee payment of their « F. R., 1903, pp. 602 and 606. Italy declared that, while well disposed to arbitration, she would be governed in her action by the attitude of Germany and Great Britain. Italy later proposed as her conditions of arbitration: First, that the arbitration should include all her claims against Venezuela so as to leave nothing for further dispute; second, that her claims should receive precisely the same treatment and guarantees as the claims of other countries. 8«A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 199, 215, 228. See especially Lord Lansdownc's instructions to Sir M. Herljcrt, British Ambassador at Washington in No. 234. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR BLOCKADING POWERS 209 (laiiiis. This mitted to a mixed commission. Later, on May 7, 1903, fm-ther protocols were signed between Venezuela and the three blockading powers definitely referring to the Hague tribunal for arbitration the question as to whether the blockading powers should have preferential treatment. (See Ibid., pp. .31 ff.) ■1 A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399): Article V "Any question as to the distribution of the customs revenues so to be assigned, and as to the right of Cireat Britain, Germany and Italy to a separate settlement of their claims, shall be determined in default of arrangement, by the Trilnmal at the Hague, by arbitration to which any other Power interested may make itself a Party." " Ibid., No. 269. It had been agreed upon to submit to the Hague Tribunal the second class claims of the Powers, since President Roosevelt had declined their invitation to serve as arbitrator. These second-class claims were now, by the protocols, referred to mixed commissions. ■' Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 239 to 244. "^ Ibid., pp. 1325 ff. 302 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE advantages gained through activities to which they had given their tacit or expressed consent. The tribunal decided^^ in favor of the blockading powers and awarded to Great Britain, Germany and Italy preferential treatment of their claims. The presentation of the cases before the Hague Tribunal shows very clearly the opposing policies of the United States and Germany (in unison with Great Britain and Italy) in regard to the applica- tion of force against small nations for the satisfaction of financial claims. The same is true throughout the whole Venezuela episode. While the United States offered no formal protest when Gennany announced her proposal to use coercion, and stipulated only against the acquisition of territory, still it made clear its disapproval of such methods by its many attempts to bring about a settlement by arbitration, and by its own abstention from the use of similar methods for the satisfaction of its own claims. It is true that Germany, when acting alone (in 1901), had proposed'^*' to ^'enezuela the solution of their differences by arbitration and had suggested referring the claims of German subjects to the Hague Court. Fof this both the American representatives and the arbitrator gave her due credit before the tribunal. Nevertheless, after securing the support of Great Britain in the enterprise, Germany's influence had been exerted against the policy of arbitration when President Castro, under the military constraint, had offered it. Only under the effective pressure exerted by President Roosevelt did the Imperial Government yield. But that pressure was applied so quietly that it was not known to the public, and Mr. Penfield, the Solicitor of the Department of State and Counsel for Venezuela and the United States before the Hague Court, classes as one of the important features of the Anglo-German intervention in Venezuela that it constituted a "solemn recognition of the INIonroe doctrine bv non- American States."''^ i /' '6 gen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 106 ff. / '^ 8ee footnote 20 of this chapter. " North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVII, p. 86. Penfield, W: "The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela." "Measured l)y its consequences, the intervention of Germany and Great Britain in \'cnczuela in December, 1902, was a notable event in its relation INDICATIONS OF POLICY 303 Suiiiiniiiii; up the inciiients bearing on the American national j)olicy, as they appear from published diplomatic sources, it is seen that within tlie forty-year period under consideration there were comparati\ely few controversies with Germany in which that prin- ciple was involved. It is also seen that whatever the views of Pan- (rerman writers, official Germany, by its declarations of its pur-'^ poses in Venezuela, gave official outward recognition to the Monroe Doctrine."*^ On the other hand it seems significant that just about the time of the acquisition of the Panama Canal by the United States the German demonstrations of power in the region of the Caribbean became more frequent and more important. . Having secured the support of Great Britain in the Venezuelan episode, Germany had asserted her claims with more vigor and had showed less willingness to defer to the policy of the United States. More significant still was the fact that President Roosevelt, who was never considered by the Germans to hold an anti-German policy and who was on very frieiindly terms with both the Ambassador, von Sternburg, and the Emperor, should become convinced that Germany was seeking a foothold on the American Continent and should take prompt measures to prevent it. These facts are also given sui)port b>' the openly expressed expansion policy of the German Go\ernment, although that colonial sphere was never officially admitted to include the American Continent. to the law of nations. It was notable, first, as an impressive assertion of the right of intervention for the protection of subjects of intervening states; second, as definitely fixing the status of the 'Pacific blockade;' third, as a < — solemn recognition rhandlungen des Reichstags." Berlin: Xorddeutsche Buchdruckerei, 1870-1910. A stenographic record of the proceedings of the Reichstag. Well-indexed. This is a valuable source for official German Government utterances on national policy as well as for Aie views of the various parties of the Reichstag. 310 BIBLIOGRAPHY Reichs-Gesetzblatt. Berlin: Kaiserliche$ Postzeitungsamt, 1870-1910. Collection of Imperial Government statutes and proclamations. Weissbuecher. Vorgelegt dem Deutschen Reichstag. Berlin: Carl Heymann's Verlag. These contain the official correspondence of the German Government with foreign countries, instructions to German consuls, diplomatic officers etc. The "white-books" are not published continuously like the United States Foreign Relations Series, but only occasionally. There are several white books on Samoa in parts V, VI, and VIII of the white-book series. Great Britain Accounts and Papers. State Papers Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command. London: 1870-1910. Contain the Official Correspondence of the British Foreign Office. As Great Britain was involved in several of the most important issues between the United States and Germany, the correspondence between Great Britain and Germany on these subjects is particularly valuable — especially since the German Government published comparatively little of its foreign correspond- ence. '^Hertslet's Commercial Treaties. London: Harrison & Sons, 1870-1910. A collection of the treaties and conventions between Great Britain and Foreign Powers. Compiled by Richard W. Brant, Librarian of the Foreign Office and Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, Esq., clerk in the Librarian's Department. Parliamentary Debates. London: Wjman & Sons, 1870-1910. The fact that Great Britain was several times a party to the controversies between the United States and Germany causes the Parliamentary Debates to contain frequently discussions of these questions which contribute informa- tion as to the British government attitude. BIBLIOGRAPHY 311 AUTOBIOGRAPHY l^owey, Admiral George: "Autobiography of George Dewey." New York: Scribners, 1913. The firtit jniblished report by the American Admiral of his difficulties with tlu' (leniKUi Admiral after the battle of Manila. Admiral Dewey gives a clear account of the size and activities of the German forces in the harbor — both of which were in contrast to those of the other nations represented there. Foster, John W. : "Diplomatic Memoirs." ^ Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900. Contributes an account of the negotiations with Mr. von Mumm concerning the "Saratoga Agreement" with Germany. I lay, John: "Letters of John Hay and' Extracts from Diary." Washington, 1908. A collection of the Secretary's letters, printed by Mrs. Hay. Great care has been taken throughout to omit nearly all names of persons referred to in the letters, giving first initials only. The reader, therefore, while grateful to have the letters at all, feels greatly handicapped and is forced to do much guessing. Li Hung Chang: l/^reR Ff^o^EA^ ro Je ^ "Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung Ch^.g^ Z1^^;l^sfe1^J';:Z7^ London: Constable & Co., 1913. In addition to its unique qualities as an autobiography this work gives valuable insight into the viewpoint of the great Chinese statesman towards the foreign powers in general and his contrasting opinions of the different western nations. The \'iceroy's comments reflect most clearly the effects of the contrasting policies of Germany and the United States towards Cliina. 312 BIBLIOGRAPHY Schurz, Carl: "Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers," selected and edited by Frederic Bancroft. New York: Putnam, 1913. Some of the letters contained in this collection throw valuable light on the relations between Germany and the United States. Mr. Schurz as a German by birth, and a United States Senator, was unusually equipped to understand the relations between the two countries. His sympathies were thoroughly American and as a fugitive from Prussian autocracy in 1849, he became a particularly staunch champion of American democracy. The Senator sought whenever possible -to promote friendship between the United States and Ger- many. Seward, Frederick W. : "Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830- 1915." New York: Putnam, 1916. Mr. Seward was Assistant Secretary of State during the Administrations of Lincoln, Johnson and Hayes. He gives an interesting account of the nego- tions in 1877 over the first American Treaty with Samoa. Stevenson, Robert Louis : "A Footnote to History— Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa." Letters and Miscellanies of Robert Louis Stevenson, \o\. XIX New York: Scribners, 1897. Mr. Stevenson is a most valuable eye-witness of events in Samoa and of the workings of the representatives of the three nations there. Mr. Stevenson writes graphically and without national bias, taking in general the point of view of the native Samoans. Von Diederichs, Admiral: "A Statement of Events in Manila Bay." Translated from the INIarine Rundschau alid published in the Journal of the Royal United Service Listitution. Vol. LIX, No. 437, August, 1914, pp. 421 to 446 inclus. This account was WTitten by Admiral von Diederichs as a reply to Admiral Dewey's account of events at Manila which the latter published in his Auto- biography in 19i;3. Admiral von Diederichs takes up point for point the complaints made In' Dewey and either seeks to explain away their significance or contradicts the facts presented. In general the German Admiral's account seeks to smooth over the differences with Dewey at that time and to minimize the significance of German naval operations in the harbor. BIBLIOGRVrilY 313 Whito. Andrew Dickson: "Autobiography of Andrew D. "White." New York: Century Company, 1905. Dr. White's autobiography is one of the most vahiablc sources of information on the relations l)et\veen the two countries. Serving as Minister to Germany from 1S7!) to 18S1 and again, as Ambassador to that country from 1897 to 190:^ Dr. \A'hite was in close touch with the two governments in ])eriods of cordial and of strained relations. Through all conditions he served efficiently the interests of the United States, retained the respect and admiration of the German Government and was an important factor in maintaining harmony in the period of the Spanish War. Witte, Emil: "ReveLations of a German Attache." "Ten Years of German- American Diplomacy." Translated by Florence Clarkson Taylor. New York: Doran, 1916. From the German edition entitled "Aus einer Deutschen Botschaft" — "Zehn Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diplomatic." Leipzig: Zeit- bilder-Verlag : 1907. The author of this work was employed as confidential press-agent of the German Legation at Washington, and was therefore a part of the German diplomatic system in the United States at this time. It is to be regretted that he has allowed his personal grievances against the German Ambassador and other officials to distort his narrative and that he has given his book a sensa- tional and exaggerated tone which undermines the reader's impressions of its reliability. In many instances he uses insinuations instead of direct state-- ments and the particular "revelations" which he transmitted to Am(>rican Government authorities are never given at all. Nevertheless, his work sheds much light on the general methods of German diplomacy in the United St^ates, especially its activities among German-American societies. Mr. Witte's general attitude seems to be that of a genuine desire for good relations between the two countries and his book is a protest against the cUplomatists of Germany who were undermining those good relations by national propaganda in the United States. SECONDARY WORKS Benton, E. J.: "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1908. A thorough study of the diplomacy of the Spanish- American \var l)oth as a history of the negotiations preceding the conflict and an exposition of events and jiractices of the war in their relation to international law. There is ample referefitce to source materials. 314 BIBLIOGRAPHY Calwer, Richard:- "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten von Xord- america." Akademischer Verlag fuer sociale Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1902. A liberal exposition of the commercial relations between the United States and Germany, and of the poUcies of the two nations in regard to the "most- favored-nation" clause. Dr. Calwer was a member of the Reichstag, Social- democratic Party. • Fisk, Dr. George M. : " Die handelspolitischen imd sonstigen voelkerrechtlichen Bezie- hungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika." Muenchener Volswirtschaftliche Studien. Stuttgart: A'erlag der J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1897. An excellent study of the history of the political and commercial relations between the United States and Germany from colonial days, when the chief relations were wth Prussia — until 1S94. Dr. Fisk was employed as secretary to the American Embassy in BerUn and had access to the material in the Embassy Archives. Dr. White speaks -n-ith praise of Dr. Fisk's record and services at the Embassy. (See A. D. White: Autol^iographv, Vol. II pp. 131 and i;32) Fisk, Dr. George M. : "Continental Opinion Regarding a Proposed Middle European Tariff Union." Johns Hopkins University Studies, 1902. Vol. XX. Fisk, Dr. George M.: "Most-favored-nation Relations, German-American." Article in the Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903. A very good exposition based on the official correspondence pubhshed in the Foreign Relations Series and also upon certain archives of the American Lega- tion in Berlin where Dr. Fisk was employed as secretary. BIBLIOGRAPHY 315 Foster, John \V.: "The Praetice of Diplomacy." Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1900. Mr. Foster illustrates his exposition of diplomatic practice with actual incidents in the careers of American diplomatic officers — anecdotes culled from his experience as Secretary of State. A few of these relate to American representatives in Germany. Ilepner, Adolf: "America's Aid to Germany in 1870-71." St. Louis, Mo., 190.5. Ex-tracts from the official correspondence of E. B. Washburne, U. S. Ambassador to France during the Franco-Prussian war. Howe. M. A. D.: "Life and Letters of George Bancroft." New York: Scribner, 1908. Contains several letters by Mr. Bancroft on the Franco-Prussian War which are not contained in the New York Library collection nor in the pubhshed government correspondence. Tde, Henry C: "The Imbroglio in Samoa." North American Review, 1899, Vol. 108, p. G79. Mr. Ide, as former Chief Justice of Samoa, gives an authoritative resume of the Samoan question as a whole, and a first-hand account of the events immediately preceding the partition of the islands. Mr. Ide urges m()re active support on" the part of the United States (Government of the Berlin treaty provisions and of the American interests in the islands. Kraus, Dr. jur. Herbert : "Die Monroedoktrin in ihreu Beziehungen zur amerikanischen Diplomatic und zum Voelkerrecht." Berlin: Guttentag, 1913. An exhaustive ai^ scholarly' study of the American policy from a view- point non-American, but not anti-.\merican. Dr. Kraus -cites his sources throiig^mut and contributes an extensive bibhography. 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY Latane, J. H.: "America as a World Power, 1897-1907." The American Nation: A History, Edited by A. B. Hart, Vol. 25. New York: Harpers, 1907. McKinley, William : "A Review of the Tariff Legislation of the United States from 1812 to 1896." New York: Putnam, 1904. Moore, John Bassett : "A Digest of International Law." Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906. Professor Moore's epochal work reveals occasionally in its citations from State Department correspondence events and situations which are not pub- lished elsewhere. So far as I have been able to discover, Professor Moore's work is the only published source of information on the attempt of Germanj' to acquire the island of Margarita from Venezuela in 1901. Paullin, C. O.: "Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778- 1883." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1912. ' Contains extracts from Commanders' Letters and is based on research in the Navy and State Departments. Contains account of the first American agreement with Samoa made by Commander Meade in 1872. Penfield, AV. L.: "The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela." North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVII, pp. 86 ff. Mr. Penfield, Solicitor of the Department of State, was agent and counsel for Venezuela and the United States at the Venezuelan Arbitration before the Hague Triljunal. BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 Root. Elilui: "The Military and (\)lonial Policy of the riiited States. Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. A collection made and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. Most of the addresses are on military subjects, but a few deal with the foreign policies of the United States and American principles in regard to colonization. Taussig, F. W. : "A Tariff History of the United States." New York: Putnam, 1914. Thayer, William Roscoe: "The Life and Letters of John Hay." Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1915. Mr. Thayer's work is an invaluable contribution to an understanding of American foreign poHcy. By publishing directly so many of Secretary Hay's letters the work retains the character of source material, yet that material is clarified by Mr. Thayer's own able delineations of the situations and episodes treated in the letters. Secretary Hay's letters deal so frankly and tellingly with the national and international problems of his time that there is at no point any doubt of what the American policy toward foreign nations, individ- ually and collectively, was to be, so far as the Secretary of State was able to direct it. The seventeenth impression, 1916, and subsequent impressions con- tain in the appendix Ex-President Roosevelt's owm account of the episode with von Holleben by which Germany was induced to arbitrate the Venezuelan question. Thayer, W. R. : "Out of their own Mouths." Xew York: x\ppleton, 1917. A collection made for the purpose of showing German national i)olicy. Aggressive vitterances are selected from the sj)eeches and writings of Cierman .rulers, statesmen, servants, publicists, poets, business men and others — with introduction by Mr. Thayer. ^'()n Biielow, Prince Bernhard: ♦ "Imperial Germany." Translated by Marie A. Lewenz, M.A. Xew York: Dodd, Meade & Co., 1914. A clear exposition of German Imperialism. The work is a glorification by the Chancellor of the national strength achieved, of the successes of the Gov- ernment's world policy and of the consequent relations with other powers including the United States. 318 BIBLIOGRAPHY ^'on Halle, Ernst: " Deutschland iind die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten." Preussische Jahrbuecher, Band 107, 1902. An article outlining the general history of German- American relations. The author deprecates the anti-American sympathies shown in Germany during the Spanish-American war, declares as false, hostile propaganda the accusations spread in America against Germany and advocates the further- ance of good relations with the United States. The article is typical of the efforts of the German Government in the period following the Spanish-Ameri- can war to win favor in America. APPENDIX 21 APPENDIX APPENDIX I GERMAN-AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS. Treaties Concluded between the United States and Separate German States Previous to 1870. Date. German State. Subject of Treaty. 17S5 Prussia Amity and Commerce. 1799 Prussia Amity and Commerce. 1827 Hanseatic Republics Friendship, Commerce and Naviga- tion. 1828 ' Prussia Commerce and Navigation. 1828 Hanseatic Republics Additional Article to Convention of 1827. 1840 Hannover Commerce and Navigation. 1844 Hesse Abohshing "Droit D'Aubaine" and Taxes on Emigration. 1844 Wiirttemberg (Same Subject). 1845 Bavaria (Same Subject). 1845 Saxony (Same Subject). 184G Nassau (Same Subject). 1846 Hannover Commerce and Navigation. 1847 Mechlenburg-Schwerin Commerce and Navigation. 1847 Oldenburg Commerce and Navigation. 1852 Hanseatic Republics Consular Convention. 1853 Bavaria Extradition. 1853 Bremen Extradition. 1853 Mechlenburg-Schwerin Extradition. 1853 Mechlenh)urg-Strelitz Extradition. 1853 Oldenburg Extradition. 1853 Wiirttemberg Extradition. 1854 Schaumburg-Lippe Extradition. 1854 Bnmswic'k and Lucnolnirg Disposition of Property. 1855 Hannover Extradition. 1857 Baden Extradition. 1861 Hannover Abolishment of Stade dues (Naviga- tion tolls on Elbe River). 1868 Baden Naturalization. 1868 Bavaria Naturalization. 1868 Hesse Naturalization. 1868 North German Union Naturalization. 1868 Wiirttemberg Naturahzation and Extradition. Treaties Concluded and Ratified between the United States and the German Empire between 1870 and 1910. Date. Character of Treaty. 1871 Consular Convention. 1909 Patent Convention. Agreements Concluded between the United St.ates and the German Empire betm'een 1870 and 1910. Date. Subject of Agreement. 1891 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- ment. (The "Saratoga" Agreement) 1892 Copyright Agreement 1900 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- ment 1901 Agreement for Protection of Trademarks in Morocco 1905 Agreement for Protection of Trademarks in China 1906 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- ment 1907 Commercial Agreement 1910 Commercial Agreement Form. Exchange of notes. Signed but not proclaimed. Signed and proclaimed. Exchange of notes. Exchange of notes. Proclamation. by Signed and accompanied diplomatic notes. Proclamation by President of United States and in Germany by statute. Treaties and Conventions Signed Jointly by the United States, Germany and a Third Power. Date. Subject of Treaty. Third Power. 1889 General Act providing for neutralit}', etc., of Great Britain. Samoan Islands 1899 Convention Relating to Settlement of Samoan Great Britain. • Claims 1899 Convention to Adjust the Question of the Great Britain. Samoan Islands INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND ACTS :^2?. Date of Conclusion Plnoe of . Conclusion. 1875 Paris *18S3 Paris 1884 Paris 1886 Paris 1890 Brussels tl899 Brussels tl899 The Hag:iie §1900 Brussels 1901 Peking 1903 Paris 1904 Paris 1904 The Hague 1905 Peking International Conventions and Acts to which the United States and THE German Empire Were Signatories from 1870 to 1910. Subject of Convention. International Bureau of Weights and Measures. International Protection of Industrial Property. Protection of Submarine Cables. Interpretation of certain articles of Convention of 1SS4 for Protection of Submarine Cables. Repression of African Slave Trade. Regulation of Importation of Spirituous Licjuors into Certain Regions of Africa. International Peace Conference. Additional Act for Protection of Industrial Property. Conclusion of "Boxer" troubles, Provisions for Indemnities. International Sanitary Convention. Sujijiression of White Slave Traffic. Exemption of Hospital Ships in War Time from Taxation. New agreement between China and Certain Powers concerning Whang-Pu Conservancy. Creation of International Institute of Agriculture. Regulating Trade and Administration of Morocco. International Red Cross Convention. Revision of duties imposed by Brussels Convention of 1899 on Spirituous Liquors Imported into Africa. Unification of Pharmacopoeial Formulas for Potent Drugs. International Wireless Telegraph Convention. Arbitration, Rules of Warfare, etc. Repression of Obscene Publications. Regulation of Assistance and Salvage at Sea. * Xot signed at conclusion but adhered to later by United States and German Empire. t Signed by German Empire at time of conclusion, later adhered to by United States. t Includes separate articles not all of which were signed by Ijoth nations. § Signed by United States at time of conclusion, later adhered to by German Empire. II Signed by United States with reservation. Compiled from Senate Document No. 357, 61st Cong., 2nd Session. "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers," 1776-1909. Supplement to above Document, 1910 to 1913. Reichsgesetzblatt. U. S. Revised Statutes. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 119, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-'92, p. 110. (For the Saratoga Agreement of 1891 — which is omitted in the Malloy Collection, Senate Doc. No. 357, 61st Congress, 2nd Session.) 1905 Rome 1906 Algeciras 1906 Geneva 1906 Brussels 1906 Brussels 1906 Berlin tl907 The Hague 1910 Paris 1910 Brussels 324 APPENDIX APPENDIX II Prussian-American Treaty of 1828 and Articles revived FROM Former Treaties (Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Vol. II, pp. 1477 ff.) 1828 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation O Concluded May 1, 1828; ratification advised by the Senate May 14, 1828; ratification again advised and time for exchange of ratification extended by the Senate March 9, 1829.; ratifications exchanged March 14, 1829; proclaimed March 14, 1829. Articles I. Freedom of commerce and nav- VIII. No preference to importing igation. vessel. II. No discrimination of shipping IX. Most favored nation commer- charges. cial privileges. III. No discrimination in import X. Consular privileges and juris- duties on account of vessels. diction. IV. Application of two preceding XI. Deserters from ships. sections. XII. Articles of former treaties V. No discrimination of import revived, duties. XIII. Blockades. VI. No discrimination of export XIV. Estates of deceased persons, duties. XV. Duration. VII. Coastwise trade. XVI. Ratification. The United States of America and His IMajesty the King of Prussia, equally animated with the desire of maintaining the relations of good understanding which have hitherto so happily subsisted between their respective States, of extending, also, and consolidating the commercial intercourse between them, and con- vinced that this object cannot better be accomplished than by adopting the system of an entire freedom of navigation, and a perfect reciprocity, based upon principles of equity equally bene- ficial to both countries, and applicable in time of peace as well as in time of war, have, in consequence, agreed to enter into negotia- PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 325 tions for the conclusion of a treat\' of navigation and commerce; for which jHU-pose the President of the United States has con- ferred full powers on Henry Clay, their Secretary of State; and His Majesty the King of Prussia has conferred like powers on the Sieur Ludwig Xiederstetter, Charge d'Affaires of His said INIajesty, near the I'nited States; and the said Plenipotentiaries, having exchanged their said full powers, found in good and due form, have concluded and signed the following articles: Article I There shall be between the territories of the high contracting parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The inhabitants of their respective States shall mutually have liberty to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories of each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at liberty, to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their affairs ; and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the same security and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside, on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances there prevailing. Article H Prussian vessels arriving either laden or in ballast in the ports of the United States of America, and, reciprocally, vessels of the United States arriving either laden or in ballast in the ports of the Kingdom of Prussia, shall be treated, on their entrance, during their stay, and at their departure, upon the same footing as national vessels coming from the same place, with respect to the duties of tonnage, light-houses, pilotage, salvage, and port charges, as well as to the fees and perquisities of public officers, and all other duties and charges, of Avhatever kind or denomination, levied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the local authorities, or of any private establishment whatsoever. 326 APPENDIX Article III All kinds of merchandise and articles of commerce, either the produce of the soil or the industry of the United States of America, or of any other country, which may be lawfully imported into the ports of the Kingdom of Prussia, in Prussian vessels, may also be so imported in vessels of the United States of America, without paying other or higher duties or charges, of whatever kind or denomination, levied in the name or to the profit of the Govern- ment, the local authorities, or of any private establishments whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or produce had been imported in Prussian vessels. And, reciprocally, all kind of mer- chandise and articles of commerce, either the produce of the soil or of the industry of the Kingdom of Prussia, or of any other country, which may be lawfully imported into the ports of the United States in vessels of the said States, may also be so imported in Prussian vessels, without paying other or higher duties or charges of whatever kind or denomination, levied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the local authorities, or of any private establishments whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or pro- duce had been imported in vessels of the United States of America. Article IV To prevent the possibility of any misunderstanding, it is hereby declared that the stipulations contained in the two preceding articles are to their full extent applicable to Prussian vessels and their cargoes arriving in the ports of the United States of America, and, reciprocally, to vessels of the said States and their cargoes arriving in the ports of the Kingdom of Prussia, whether the said vessels clear directly from the ports of the country to which they respectively belong, or from the ports of any other foreign country. Article V No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the produce or manufacture of Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 327 importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of any article the pro- duce or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be payable on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. Xor shall any prohibition be imposed on the importation or exportation of any article the produce or manufacture of the Tnited States, or of Prussia, to or from the ports of the United States, or to or from the ports of Prussia, which shall not equally extend to all other nations. Article VI All kind of merchandise and articles of commerce, either the produce of the soil or of the industry of the United States of America, or of any other country, which may be lawfully exported from the ports of the said United States in national vessels, may also be exported therefrom in Prussian vessels without paying other or higher duties or charges, of whatever kind or denomination, le\ied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the local authorities, or of any private establishments whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or produce had been exported in vessels of the United States of America. An exact reciprocity shall be observed in the ports of the kingdom of Prussia, so that all kind of merchandise and articles of co- merce either the produce of the soil or the industry of the said Kingdom, or of any other country, which may be lawfully exported from Prussian ports in national vessels, may also be exported therefrom in vessels of the United States of America, without pay- ing other or higher duties or charges of whatever kind or denomi- nation, levied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the local authorities, or of any private estalishments whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or produce had been exported in Prussian vessels. Article VII The preceding articles are not applicable to the coastwise navigation of the two countries, which is respectively reserved by each of the high contracting parties exclusively to itself. 328 APPENDIX Article VIII No priority or preference shall be given, directly or indirectly, by either of the contracting parties, nor by any company, cor- poration, or agent, acting on their behalf or under their authority, in the purchase of any article of commerce, lawfully imported, on account of or in reference to the character of the vessel, whether it be of the one party or of the other, in which such article was imported; it being the true intent and meaning of the contracting parties that no distinction or difference whatever shall be made in this respect. Article IX If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation when the grant is conditional. Article X The two contracting parties have granted to each other the liberty of having, each in the ports of the other. Consuls, Yice- Consuls, Agents and Commissaries of their own appointment, who shall enjoy the same pri\ileges and powers as those of the most favored nations. But if any such Consul shall exercise commerce, they shall be submitted to the same laws and usages to which the private individuals of their nation are submitted, in the same place. The Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Commercial Agents shall have the right, as such, to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differ- ences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless tlie conduct of the crews or of the captain should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country, or the said Consuls, Yice-Consuls or Commercial Agents should require their assistance to cause their decisions to be carried into effect or supported. It is, however. PRUSSIAN- AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 329 understood, that this sj)ecies of judgment or arbitration shall not deprive the contending parties of the right they have to resort, on their return, to the judicial authority of their country. Article XI The said Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Commercial Agents are authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities, for the search, arrest, and imprisonment of the deserters from the ships of war and merchant vessels of their country. For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges and officers, and shall in writing demand said deserters, proving, by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls of the crews, or by other official documents, that such individuals formed part of the crews; and, on this reclamation being thus substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused. Such deserters, when arrested shall be placed at the disposal of the said Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Commercial Agents, and may be confined in the public prisons, at the request and cost of those who shall claim them, in order to be sent to the vessels to which they belonged, or to others of the same country. But if not sent back within three months from the day of their arrest, they shall be set at liberty, and shall not be again arrested for the same cause. However, if the deserter should be found to have committed any crime or offence, his surrender may be delayed until the tribinial before which his case shall be depending shall have pronounced its sentence, and such sentence shall have been carried into effect. Article XII The twelfth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, con- cluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was concluded at Berlin in 1799, with the excei)tion of the last jxira- graph in the nineteenth article, relating to treaties with Great Britain, are hereby rexdved with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the present treaty, it being, how- 330 APPENDIX ever, understood that the stipulations contained in the articles thus revived shall be always considered as in no manner affecting the treaties or conventions concluded by either party with other Powers, during the interval between the expiration of the said treaty of 1799, and the commencement of the operation of the present treaty. The parties being still desirous, in conformity with their inten- tion declared in the twelfth article of the said treaty of 1799, to establish between themselves, or in concert with other maritime Powers, further provisions to ensure just protection and freedom to neutral navigation and commerce, and which may, at the same time, advance the cause of civilization and humanity, engage again to treat on this subject at some future and convenient period. Article XIII Considering the remoteness of the respective countries of the two high contracting parties, and the uncertainty resulting there- from, with respect to the various events which may take place, it is agreed that a merchant vessel belonging to either of them, which may be bound to a port supposed at the time of its departure to be blockaded, shall not, however, be captured or condemned for having attempted a first time to enter said port, unless it can be proved that said vessel could and ought to have learnt, during its voyage, that the blockade of the place in question still continued. But all vessels which, after ha%'ing been warned off once shall, during the same voyage, attempt a second time to enter the same blockaded port, during the continuance of the said blockade, shall then subject themselves to be detained and condemned. Article XIV The citizens or subjects of each party shall have power to dis- pose of their personal goods within the jurisdiction of the other, by testament, donation, or othenvise; and their representatives, being citizens or subjects of the other party, shall succeed to their said personal goods, whether by testament or ab intestato, and PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN TREATY OK 1828 331 may take possession thereof, eitlier by themselves or by others aethig for tliem, and (Uspose of the same at their will, paying such dues only as the inhabitants of the country wherein the said goods are shall be subject to pay in like cases. And in case of the absence of the representative, such care shall be taken of the said goods as would be taken of the goods of a native, in like case, until the lawful owner may take measures for receiving them. And if question should arise among several claimants to which of them said goods belong, the same shall be decided finally by the laws and judges of the land wherein the said goods are. And where, on the death of any person hold,ing real estate within the territories of the one party, such real estate Avould, by the laws of the land, descend on a citizen or subject of the other, were he not dis- qualified by alienage, such citizens or subject shall be allowed a reasonable time to sell the same, and to withdraw the proceeds without molestation and exempt from all duties of detraction, on the part of the Government of the respective States. But this article shall not derogate in any manner from the force of the laws already published, or hereafter to be pul>lished by His IMajesty the King of Prussia, to prevent the emigration of his subjects. Article XV The present treaty shall continue in force for twelve years, counting from the day of the exchange of the ratifications; and if twelve months before the expiration of that period, neither of the high contracting parties shall have announced, by an official notification to the other, its intention to arrest the operation of said treaty, it shall remain binding for one year beyond that time, and so on until the ex{)iration of the twelve months, which will follow a similar notification, whatever the time at which it may take place. Article XVI I This treaty shall be approved and ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent by the Senate thereof, and by His Majesty the King of Prussia, 332 APPENDIX and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of Washington, within nine months from the date of the signature hereof, or sooner if possible. In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the above articles, both in the French and English languages, and they have thereto affixed their seals; declaring, nevertheless, that the signing in both languages shall not be brought into precedent, nor in any way operate to the prejudice of either party. Done in triplicate at the city of Washington on the first day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and the fifty-second of the Independence of the United States of America. (seal) H. Clay, (seal) Llt)wig Niederstetter. Articles Revived from the Treaty of 1799 between the United States and Prussia Article XIII And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in Mar with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the sub- jects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condem- nation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary' to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their pro- ceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the ARTICLES KE^•IVED FROM 1799 TREATY 333 I^laco of its destination. Bnt in tlie case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage. All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, balls, muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles and bridles beyond the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond that which e\'ery man serving on board the vessel, or passenger, ought to have; and In general whatever is comprised under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband. Article XIV To ensure to the vessels of the two contracting parties the advantage of being readily and certainly known in time of war, it is agreed that they shall be provided with the sea-letters and documents hereafter specified: 1 . A passport, expressing the name, the property, and the burthen of the vessel, as also the name and dwelling of the master, which ])assport shall be made out in good and due form, shall be renewed as oftcTi as the vessel shall return into port, and shall be exhibited whensoe\'er required, as well in the open sea as in port. But if the vessel be under convoy of one or more vessels of war, belonging to the neutral party, the simple declaration of the officer com- manding the convoy, that the said vessel belongs to the party of which he is, shall be considered as establishing the fact, and shall relieve both parties from the trouble of further examination. 2. A charter-party, that is to say, the contract passed for the freight of the whole vessel, or the bills of lading given for the cargo in detail. 3. The list of the ship's company, containing an indication by name and In detail of the persons composing the crew of the vessel. These documents shall always })e authenticated according to the 334 APPENDIX forms established at the place from which the vessel shall have sailed. As their production ought to be exacted only when one of the contracting parties shall be at war, and as their exhibition ought to have no other object than to prove the neutrality of the vessel, its cargo, and company, they shall not be deemed absolutely neces- sary on board such vessels belonging to the neutral party as shall have sailed from its ports before or withm three months after the Government shall have been informed of the state of war in which the belligerent party shall be engaged. In the interval, in default of these specific documents, the neutrality of the vessel may be established by such other evidence as the tribunals authorized to judge of the case may deem sufficient. Article X^' And to prevent entirely all disorder and violence in such cases, it is stipulated that, when the vessels of the neutral party, sailing without convoy, shall be met by any vessels of war, public or pri- vate, of the other party, such vessel of war shall not send more than two or three men in their boat on board the said neutral vessel to examine her passports and documents. And all persons belonging to any vessel of war, public or private, who shall molest or insult in any manner whatever, the people, vessels, or effects of the other party, shall be responsible in their persons and property for damages and interest, sufficient security for which shall be given by all commanders of private armed vessels before they are commissioned. Article X\l In times of war, or in cases of urgent necessity, when either of the contracting parties shall be obliged to lay a general embargo, either in all its ports, or in certain particular places, the vessels of the other party shall be subject to this measure, upon the same footing as those of the most favored nations, but without haAing the right to claim the exemi)tion in their favor stii)ulated in the sixteenth article of the former treatv of 1785. But on the other ARTICLES REVIVED FROM 1799 TREATY 335 hand, the ])r()])ri(.>t()rs of tlio vessels which shall have been detained, whetluT for some military ex])edition, or for what other use soever shall obtain from the (iovernment that shall have employed them an equitable indemnity, as well for the freii!;ht as for the loss occasioned by the delay. And furthermore, in all cases of seizure, detention, or arrest, for debts contracted or offences committed by any citizen or subject of the one party within the jurisdiction of the other, the same shall be made and prosecuted by order and authority of law only, and according to the regular course of pro- ceedings usual in such cases. Article XVII If any vessel or effects of the neutral Power be taken by an enemy of the other, or by a pirate, and retaken by the Power at Mar, they shall be restored to the first proprietor, upon the con- ditions hereafter stipulated in the twenty-first article for cases of recaj)ture. Article XVIII If the citizens or subjects of either party, in danger from tem- j)ests, i)irates, enemies, or other accidents, shall take refuge with their vessels or effects, within the harbors or jurisdiction of the (!ther, the\' shall be received, protected, and treated with humanity and kindness, and shall be permitted to furnish themselves, at reasonable prices, with all refreshments, provisions, and other things necessary for their sustenance, health, and accom(m)oda- tion, and for the re])air of their vessels. Article XIX The vessels of war, pul)lic and private, of both parties, shall carry freely, wheresoever the>' please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time b>' their 336 APPENDIX captors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show. But, conformably to the treaties existing between the United States and Great Britain, no vessel that shall have made a prize upon British subjects shall have a right to shelter in the ports of the United States, but if forced therein by tempests, or any other danger or accidents of the sea, they shall be obliged to depart as soon as possible. i^RTICLE XX No citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties shall take from any Power with which the other may be at war any commission or letter of marque, for arming any vessel to act as a privateer against the other, on pain of being punished as a pirate; nor shall either party hire, lend, or give any part of its naval or military force to the enemy of the other, to aid them offensively or defensively against the other. Article XXI If the two contracting parties should engage in a war against a common enemy, the following points shall be observed between them : 1. If a vessel of one of the parties, taken by the enemy, shall, before being carried into a neutral or enemy's port, be retaken by a ship of war or privateer of the other, it shall, with the cargo, be restored to the first owners, for a compensation of one-eighth part of the value of the said vessel and cargo, if the recapture be made by a public ship of war, and one-sixth part, if made by a privateer. . 2. The restitution in such cases shall be after due proof of property, and surety given for the part to which the recaptors are entitled. 3. The vessels of war, public and private, of the two parties, shall reciprocally be admitted with their prizes into the respective ports of each, but the said prizes shall not be discharged or sold there, until their legality shall have been decided according to the laws and regulations of the State to which the captor belongs, but ARTICLES REVIVED FROM 1799 TREATY 337 by the judicatories of tlio place into which the prize shall have been conducted. 4. It shall be free to each party to make such rejjulations as they shall judjje necessary, for the conduct of their respective vessels of war. jMiblic and private, relative to the vessels, which they shall take, and carry into the ports of the two parties. Article XXII When the contractin*; parties shall have a common enemy, or shall l)oth be neutral, the vessels of war of each shall upon all occasions take under their protection the vessels of the other going the same course, and shall defend such vessels as long as they hold the same course, against all force and violence, in the same manner as they ought to protect and defend vessels belonging to the party of which they are. Article XXIII If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance; and all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manu- facturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and in general all others whose occu- pations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy, into whose power by the events of war they may hajjpen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price. Article XXIV And to prevent the destruction of prisoners of war, by sending them into distant and inclement countries, or by crowding them 338 APPENDIX into close and noxious places, the two contracting parties solemnly pledge themselves to the world and to each other that they will not adopt any such practice; that neither will send the prisoners whom they may take from the other into the East Indies or any other part of Asia or Africa, but that they shall be placed in some parts of their dominions in Europe or America, in wholesome situations; that they shall not be confined in dungeons, prison- ships, nor prisons, nor be put into irons, nor bound, nor otherwise restrained in the use of their limbs; that the officers shall be enlarged on their paroles within convenient districts, and have comfortable quarters, and the common men be disposed in canton- ments open and extensive enough for air and exercise, and lodged in barracks as roomly and good as are provided by the party in in whose power they are for their own troops; that the officers shall also be daily furnished by the party in whose power they are with as many rations, and of the same articles and quality as are allowed by them, either in kind or by commutation, to officers of equal rank in their own army; and all others shall be daily fur- nished by them with such ration as they shall allow to a common soldier in their own service; the value whereof shall be paid by the other party on a mutual adjustment of accounts for the subsistence of prisoners at the close of the war; and the said accounts shall not be mingled with or set off against any others, for any other article or for any other cause, real or pretended, whatever. That each party shall be allowed to keep a commissary of prisoners of their own appointment, with every separate contonment of prisoners in possession of the other, which commissary shall see the prisoners as often as he pleases, shall be allowed to receive and distribute whatever comforts may be sent to them by their friends, and shall be free to make his reports in open letters to those who employ him ; but if any officer shall break his parole, or any other prisoner shall escape from the limits of his cantonment after they shall have been designated to him, such individual officer or other prisoner shall forfeit so much of the benefit of this article as provides for his enlargement on parole or cantonment. And it is declared, that neither the pretence that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this and ARTICLE REVIVED FROM 1785 TREATY 339 the next preceding article; but, on the contrary, that the state of svar is precisely that for which they are provided, and ' to the recital of these adverse conditions. Finally, he said that I might draw up the treaty in any form I thought best, and he believed his i)eople 344 APPENDIX ■would agree. They would give us their best harbor, that of Pago- Pago, which fortunately was as yet unoccupied, and in return would ask nothing, except our assuran ces of p eace and fri^ir dshTp. """l drafted^ treaty, and then another and yet another, endeavor- ing to meet the various Congressional and popular objections. It seemed as if the Senate might be induced to consent to the acceptance of a harbor, pro^'ided the country was not to pay an^iihing for it, or even to agree to protect or defend it. So, at last, the treaty was put into that form. Even the phrases tendering our good offices in case of disputes with other powers were objected to, but were finally allowed to stand. The treaty was signed and sealed by the Secretary and ^Ir. ]\Iamea, the Samoan Envoy. It was sent to the Senate and in due time was confirmed. The press and the public seemed to regard the matter with indifference, and the House refused a ny appr opriation for a coal jv'ard for Pago-Pag'Spvvliich remained deserted and unused^_^ The liiplomatic Corps, of course, iook fioEe^of fhe Samoan affair. Some of them were amused and others puzzled by it. For a nation of " landgrabbers, " as we were called in Europe, we seemed to be very slow and reluctant to take steps for our own aggrandizement. When I mentioned to the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, that the Samoans might perhaps ask Queen Victoria for a pro- tectorate in case their negotiations with us should fail, he smiled and said, "Well, I suppose we should take them, but I do not think we should care to enter into any quarrel about it." A few months later. Dr. von Schloezer, the German Minister, came into my room in very cheerful mood. "Aha!" said he. "Also we have a harbor in Samoa. Not the best — no, you have the best. You have Pago-Pago. But we have the next best." "What one have you, mein Herr?" "Apia — Apia Harbor. It is a good harbor. It is where the people are, and the trade. We shall use our harbor now. You do not use yours — no. But you will, some day. Some day, you will." And in so saying the cheery Envoy proved himself a prophet. AMKUU'AN-SAMOAN THKATY, 1.S7S 345 APPENDIX V Commercial TRf:ATY between the United States and Samoan Islands, 1878. (U. S. Statutes at Large, 45th Congress, 1877-1779, Vol. 20, p. 704) Jan. 17. 1878. Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the Samoan Islands. Friendship and Com- merce. Concluded January 17, 1878; ratification advised by Senate, with amendments, January 30, 1878; ratified by President February 8, 1878; ratified by the Samoan Envoy February 11, 1878; ratifications exchanged at Washington February 11, 1878; proclaimed P'ebruary 13, 1878. By the President of the United States of America A Proclamation preamble ^Yhe^eas a treaty of friendshij) and commerce between the United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at the city of Washington on the seventeenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight; which treaty, after having been amended and ratified by the contracting parties, is word for word as follows: contil\cting parties The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Samoan Islands, being desirous of concluding a treaty of friendship and commerce, the President of the United States has for this purpose conferred full i^owers u})on William M. Evarts, Secretary' of State; and the Government of the Samoan Islands has conferred like powers ui)on ]MK. Le Mamea, its Envoy 346 APPENDIX Extraordinary to the United States. And the said Plenipoten- tiaries having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due form, have agreed upon the following articles: Article I — Peace and Friendship There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of the United States and the Government of the 3amoan Islands. Article II — Naval Station and Freedom to Trade Xaval vessels of the United States shall have the privilege of entering and using the port of Pago-Pago, and establishing therein and on the shores thereof a station for coal and other naval supplies for their naval and commercial marine, and the Samoan Govern- ment will hereafter neither exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction within said port adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictive thereof. The same vessels shall also have the privilege of entering other ports of the Samoan Islands. The citizens of the United States shall likewise have free liberty to enter the same ports with their ships and cargoes of w^hatsoever kind, and to sell the same to any of the inhabitants of those islands, whether natives or foreigners, or to barter them for the products of the islands. All such traffic in whatever articles of trade or barter shall be free, except that the trade in fire-arms and munitions of war in the Islands shall be subject to regulations by that government. Article III^ — Duties No import or export duty shall be charged on the cargoes of the vessels of the United States entering or clearing from the ports of the Samoan Islands, and no other than a tonnage duty of one- half of one per cent, per ton actual measurement shall be charged on the. entrance of such vessels. AMKKICAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1878 347 Article IV — Consular and Mixed Court All disputes between citizens of tlio United States in the Samoan Islands, whether relating to civil matters or to offences or crimes, shall be heard and determinefl by the Consul of the United States at Apia, Samoa, under such regulations and limitations as the United States may provide; and all disputes between citizens of the United States and the people of those islands shall be heard by that Consul hi conjunction with such officer of the Samoan Govern- ment as may be designated for that purpose. Crimes and offences in cases where citizens of the United States may be convicted shall be punished according to the laws of that country. Article V — Intercession If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen, or shall here- after arise, between the Samoan Go\-ernment and any other go\'crn- ment in amity with the United States, the government of the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation. Article VI — Privileges The Government of Samoa agrees to allow to the Government and citizens of the United States free and equal participation in any pri\ilege that may have been or may hereafter be granted to the government, citizens, or subjects of any other nation. Article VII — Duration The ])rcsent treaty shall remain in force for ten years from its date. If neither party shall have given to the other six months previous notice of its intention then to terminate the same, it shall further remain in force until the end of twelve months after either l^arty shall have given notice to the other of such intention. Article VI II — lUttification and Prodantation The present treaty shall l)e ratified and the ratifications ex- changed as soon as possible. 348 APPENDIX In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this treaty at Washington, the seventeenth day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight. William Maxwell Evarts (seal) MK. Le Mamea (seal) x4nd whereas the said treaty, as amended, has been duly ratified on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same were exchanged in the city of Washington on the elcAenth day of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight: Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United States of America, have caused the said treaty to be made public, to the end that the same, and every clause and article thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington this thirteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seventy- eight, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and second. (Seal) R. B. Hayes. By the President: Wm. M. Evarts, Secretary of State. APPENDIX VI Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the German Empire and Samoa, 1879 (V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anlagen No. 239, p. 1) Freundschafts — Vertrag zwischen Seiner INIajestaet Dem Deuts- cheii Kaiser, Koenig von Preussen, etc., Im Namen Des Deutschen Reiches, und Ihren Excellenzen Den Herren Der Taimua, Im Namen der Regierung von Samoa. Seine Majestaet der Deutsche Kaiser, Koenig von Preussen, etc., im Namen des Deutschen Reiches einerseits, und Ihre GERMAN-S.VMOAN TREATY, 1S79 349 Excellenzen die Herren der Taimiia, im Xamen der Regierung von Samoa andererseits, von dem Winische geloitet, Ihro freunds- chaftlichen Bezieliungeri iind Hire Interessen gegenseitig zii foerdern and zu befestigen, haben beschlossen, einen Freund- schaftsvertrag abzuschliessen. Zu diesem Ende haben Sie zu Uiren Bevollmaechtigten ernannt, naemlich: Seine Majestaet der Deutsche Kaiser, Koenig von Preussex, etc.: Allerhoechst Ihren Korvetten-Kapitaen Carl Bartholomaeus von Werner, Kommandanten Seiner ^Nlajestaet Korvette "Ariadne, " Ritter des Koenigliehen Kronenordens dritter Klasse iind des Rothen Adlerordens vierter Klasse, und Aller- hoechst ihren Konsul fner die Samoa und Tonga Inseln, Theodor August Ludwig Weber, und Ihre Excellenzen die Herren der Taimua: das Mitglied der Taiinua, Tuia und das Mitglied der Taimua, Lemana und den I'nterstaatssekretaer ^Nleisake, welche naeh gegenseitiger jNIittheilung ihrer in guter und gehoeriger Form befundenen \'ollmachten ueber nachstehende Artikel uebereinge- kommen sind. Artikel I Es soil Friede und immerwaehrende Freundschaft sein zwischen dem Deutschen Reich einerseits und Samoa andererseits, sowie zwischen den beiderseitigen Angehoerigen ohne Unterschied der Personen und der Orte. Artikel II Den Angehoerigen ^pflicht- ungen nachkommen, sowie dieselben Steuern, Beitraege oder Auflagen entrichten wie die eigenen Landesangehoerigen. Ebenso sollen die Deutschen in Samoa sicli nach den Gesetzen und ^'e^- ordnungen richten und die Steuern und Abgaben an die Samoa- Regierung zahlen, welche spaeter zwischen den beiderseitigen Re- gierungen vereinbart werden moegen, jedoch sollen die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen darin immer dieselben Rechte und Vortheile in Samoa geniessen, wie die Samoaner oder die Angehoerigen der meistbeguenstigten Nation. Insbesondere sichert die Samoa-Regierung hierdurch den deutschen Staatsangehoerigen den friedlichen Besitz aller Laender- eien in Samoa zu, welche dieselben bisher in ordnungsmaessiger mid zu seiner Zeit gebraeuchlicher Weise von Samoanern gekauft haben, und sind durch diese Bestaetigung des Eigenthumsrechts der deutschen Staatsangehoerigen durch die Samoa-Regierung alle ferneren Anfechtungeii in Bezug auf solche Laendereien ausges- chlossen. Es soil den Deutschen daher freistehen, alle ihre Laender- eien in Samoa ungestoert zu benutzen, Pflanzungen darauf anzii- legen und die noethigeii Arbeitskraefte, sowohl zu dieseni Zwecke wie ini Allgemeinen fuer ihre Werften, Geschaeftsplaetze und Haeuser heranzuziehen und zu verwenden. CiKUMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1870 353 Artikel VII Die Bostiiniiunifi; dor (lerichtsbarkeit, welcher die in Samoa sich aiifhaltendeii deutschen Staatsangehoerigeii uiul Schutzgenossen hei Ueclitsstreitigki'iten imter sich, sowio in Bczng aiif von ihnen gegen einander begangcne ^ ergehen und \'erl)reclien untenvorfen sind, hleibt der deutschen Regierung und deren Anordnungen neberlassen, dagegen bleibt die Feststelhmg einer Gerichtsbarkeit iind des ^'e^fah^ens ui Bezug auf Rechtsstreitigkeiten zwischen den in Samoa sich aiifhaltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen einerseits und Samoanem andererseits, sowie in Bezug auf Vergehen und Verbrechen der Angehoerigen des einen vertragenden Theils gegen die des anderen, einer besonderen Vereinbarung zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen vorbe- halten, einschliesshch der noethigen Bestimmlmgen ueber die Ausfuehrung der Bestrafung der als schuldig ueberwiesenen Per- sonen, sowie ueber die Anwendung des gegenseitig zustaendigen Zeugenzwanges bei Gerichtsverfahren. Inzwischen, bis die beiderseitigen Regierungen solche Verein- barung getroffen haben, soUen alle zwischen Deutschen und Samoanern in Samoa entstehenden Streitigkeiten in bisher gebraeuchhcher Weise von dem deutschen Konsul oder dessen Stellvertreter in Gemeinschaft mit einem Beamten der Samoa- Regierung entschieden werden. Artikel VIII Alle Gesetze und Verordnungen, welche die in Samoa sich auf- haltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen sich zu unterwerfen, sowie alle Steuern und Abgaben, welche dieselben demgemaess der Samoa-Regieriuig zu entrichten habcn, soUen ^•oll dem deutschen Konsul oder anderen zu dem Zwecke von der deutschen Regierung ernanntcn IVrsonen zusammcn mit Beamten der Samoa-Regiennig berathen werden, ebenso alle zweckdienlichen ]\Iassregeln, um die Beobachtung solcher Gesetze und Verordnungen durch die Deutschen in Samoa herbeizuf uehren ; jedoch soUen alle solche gemeinschafthch von den Beamten der 354 APPENDIX beiderseitigen Regierungen berathenen und vereinbarten Gesetze mid ]Massnahmen erst nach erlaiigter Bestaetigiing derselben diirch die deutsche Regienmg in Kraft treten. Etwaige Vereinbarungen jedoch, welche Beamte der beider- seitgen Regierungen mit Beziig aiif IMunizipal-Einrichtimgen oder Polizei- Quarantaine- und Apia-Hafenverordnungen, so\ne ueber ein Verbot oder die Regelung des Verkaufs oder der Abgabe von spirituoesen und berauschehden Getraenken an Samoaner und Eingeborene von anderen Inseln des Stillen Ozeans durcli Deutsche in Samoa getroffen haben, sollen sofort von den deutschen Staats- angehoerigen beobachtet werden und zwar so lange, als die deutsche Regierung die Bestaetigung nicht versagt hat. Die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen sollen indess auch in alien diesen Faellen immer die gleichen Rechte und Vortheile wie die Samoaner oder die Angehoerigen der meistbeguenstigten Nation in Samoa geniessen und keinen Gesetzen oder IVIassnahmen unter- worfen sein, wodurch sie den Angehoerigen anderer Nationen in Samoa gegenueber zurueckgesetzt oder benachtheiligt werden. Artikel IX Ausser den in den vorstehenden Artikein gedachten verschie- denen Vereinbarungen bleibt auch die Regelung des Civilstands — inid anderer noch nicht beruehrter A'erhaeltnisse der Angehoerigen und Schutzgenossen des einen Staates waehrend des Aufenthalts in dem Gebiete des anderen Theils, wie auch die Feststellung der Rechte, Befugnisse und Verpflichtungen der gegenseitigen Kon- sularvertretung mid der in Bezug auf den Handel noch uneriedig- ten Punkte, einer ^>^einba^ung der beiderseitigen Regierungen ^'()rbehalten. Artikel X Die Regierung \'()n Samoa Aerspriclit, im eigenen Lande keine ]Mono{)()le, Entschaedigungen oder wirklichen ^'orreehte zum Nachtheile des deutschen Handels oder der Flagge und der Staatsangehoerigen des Deutschen Reichs zu bewilligen. (■ERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1S79 855 Artikel XI Die Regierunj; von Samoa verspricht, dass sie der deutschen Reiiierung sowohl in Betreff aller in den vorhertjehenden Artikeln dieses \'ertra' dispute arising as to the fact of such purchase, it shall be deter- mined by a Commission, to consist of one person nominated by the Samoan Govenmient (^Nlalo), and one nominated by her Britamiic ^Majesty's Consul; and in the event of their disagree- ment, they shall themselves select an umpire; or, if they fail to do so, such umpire shall be appointed by Her ^lajesty's Consul- General. All British subjects resident in Samoa shall be exempt from war contributions, military requisitions, and occupation of their houses and lands by war parties. l\. If any subject of Her Britannic Majesty in Samoa is charged with a crimmal offence cognizable by British law, such charge shall be tried by Her Britannic ^Majesty's High Commissioner for the Western Pacific Islands, or other British officer duly author- ized by Her Britannic Majesty in that behalf. The expression "British Law" in this Article includes any rules duly made and issued by Her Britannic ^lajesty's High Commissioner for the Western Pacific Islands, for the government of British subjects within his jurisdiction. V. Everv- civil suit which may be brought in Samoa against any subject of Her Britannic Majesty shall be brought before, and shall be tried by. Her Britannic ^Majesty's High Commissioner, or such other British officer duly authorized as aforesai- regulations to be hereafter agreed upon and published by the said board. Article III The municipal board shall have power to make and enforce regulations and by-laws with regard to police and good order, ])ublic works, sanitary regulations, the issue of licenses, the imposi- tion of harbor regulations, the p;"evention of the sale and supply of spirituous liquors to Samoans and other islanders of the Pacific Ocean, and other similar matters, within the said district, and such regulations shall be binding upon all persons within the said dis- trict, and may be enforced by penalties not exceeding S200 fine. APIA MUNICIPAL CONVENTION, 1879 361 or imprisonment witli hard labor for a period not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment not exceeding the before- mentioned penalties. Article IV The municipal board of Apia may, for the purpose of defraying expenses incurred under the above article, levy rates upon the occupiers of houses or lands within the district of Apia, not exceed- ing 5 per cent, annually on the annual assessed value of such premises, as calculated on the presumed rental valuation thereof, or 1 per cent, annually on the real value of such property. Article V All offenses against the regulations of the municipal board, by whomsoever committed, shall be tried by a magistrate to be appointed by the board. Article VI If a subject or citizen of any of the contracting parties in Apia be charged with an offense against the laws of his own country, he shall be tried according to the jurisdiction provided therefor by the legislation of the nation to which he belongs, or according to the stipulations of the treaty concluded between his nation and Samoa. Article VII Every Samoan subject charged with a criminal offense within the limits of the district of Apia, other than an ofTense against the municipal regulations, shall be liable to trial by the magistrate appointed under the provisions of Article V, in conjunction with a Samoan magistrate. Article VIII The foregoing articles shall in no way prejudice the territorial integrity of Samoa, and the Samoan flag shall be hoisted at such place of meeting of the municipal board as may be permanently adopted. 362 APPENDIX Article IX In case of civil war, the town and district of Apia, and the adjacent districts comprised between the boundaries of the town and district of Apia and Letoga, Tiapepe Point, and Siusega, shall be considered as neutral territory, and the municipal board may frame and issue such regulations as may be considered necessary for the support and maintenance of such neutrality. Article X The present convention shall be revised at the end of four years from its date, and if the internal state of Samoa at that time will happily admit thereof, without prejudice to the interests of foreign residents in Samoa, the powers conferred by the present conven- tion upon the municipal board of Apia shall cease and determine, and the district again pass under the control and authority of the Samoan Government, or such other authority as may be agreed upon between the Samoan Government and the high contracting parties. Article XI The representatives of the Imperial German Government, in virtue of the powers accorded to them by Article Xlll of the treaty concluded between His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor and the Government of Samoa on the 24th day of January last past, accede and agree to the present convention, on behalf of the Imperial German Government, subject to the conditions of the said article. Article XII The representatives of the United States Government provision- ally accede and assent to the present convention, on behalf of the Government of the United States, subject to the approval of that Government. Article XIII The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Apia within one year from the date thereof. CONSULAR S.VilOAN AGREEMENr, 1880 3C3 In witness whereof we luive signed the same and affixed thereto our seals. Done at Apia, this 2nd day of September, in the year of Our Lord 1879. (l. s.) Arthur Gordon. (l. s.) Alfred P. Maudslay. (l. s.) F. Mensing, Corvetten-Capitaen, (l. s.) T. Weber, Imperial German Consul. (l. s.) R. Chandler, Cai)tain, United States Navy, Commanding United States Ship "Lackawanna." (l. s.) Thomas M. Dawson. (l. s.) Malietoa Laupepa. (l. s.) Saga le Auauna. APPENDIX IX Agreement between Three Consuls and the King of Samoa March 24, 1880 (House Executive Documents, 50th Congress, First Session, 1877-1878, Vol. 28, No. 238, p. 207) An agreement made between the King and Government of Samoa and the foreign consuls in Samoa. Whereas the King and Government of Samoa did, on the 31st day of August, 1879, address a letter to the three Governments of the United States of America, Germany, and Great Britain, requesting them to take some concerted action for the preservation of peace and good order in Samoa, and for the protection of the King and Government thereof: and Whereas on the loth day of December, LS79, the civil war in Samoa was terminated in the treaty of peace between the repre- sentatives of the opposing forces; and 364 APPENDIX Whereas on the 23d day of December, 1879, on board H. I. G. M. ship "Bismarck," a permanent agreement was entered into by the representatives of both parties electing and recognizing Malietoa Talavou King for life; and Whereas on the 12th day of January, 1880, the Imperial German Government sent instructions tp the Imperial German Consul- general in Samoa that the Governments of England and America had accepted the proposals of the German Government, and ordering him to recognize and enter into an agreement with his colleagues for the protection of Malietoa and his government by the three powers already named in this preamble; and Whereas on the 14th day of January, 18^0, the English Govern- ment ordered H. B. M. ship "Danae" to Samoa with instructions to Captain Purvis, commanding, to recognize Malietoa and protect his government in conjunction with the naval forces of Germany and America; and Whereas the present King and Government of Samoa earnestly desire that this arrangement may be consummated as speedily as possible, for the greater security of life and property within the kingdom, and for the utmost prosperity of the Samoan Islands. Therefore the King, Malietoa Talavou, and the Government of Samoa, the Taimua and Faipule, and Captain Zembsch, Imperial German consul-general, on behalf of the German Government, and Thomas M. Dawson, United States Consul, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and J. Hicks Graves, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, etc., have agreed upon and con- cluded the following four articles, to take effect immediately, and to continue in force until ratified, modified, or rejected by the three protecting powers: Article I The present King, ]\Ialietoa Talavou, shall be supported as the head of the Samoan Government during his life-time, and his successor shall be agreed upon by the three protecting powers. GERMAN-SAMOAN COUNCIL AGREEMENT, 1884 365 Article II There shall be an executive council for the King and Govern- ment of Samoa consisting of a citizen of the United States of America, a German and a British subject, and they sliall lic^ld the offices, respectively, of minister of justice, minister of finance, and minister of public works. x\rticle III The members of the executive council shall be nominated from among the residents of Samoa by the consuls of their respective nations resident at Apia, and they shall hold office from the date of their nomination, which must subsequently be confirmed by the home Governments. Article IV The members of the executive council shall hold office until their successors are nominated by the consuls, and they shall receive such salaries as may be agreed, upon between the Govern- ment of Samoa and the consular representatives of the three pro- tecting powers. In witness whereof we have signed the same and affixed thereto our seals. Done at Apia this twenty-fourth day of March, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty. Zembsch. (l. s.) Thomas M. Dawson. . (l. s.) J. Hicks Graves. (l. s.) APPENDIX X Agreement between German Consul Stuebel and Malietoa, Nov. 10, 1884, Establishing German-Samoan Council (See V. R. 1885. Anlagen Vol. VI, Aktenstueck Xo. 167, p. 726 f.) Anlage 2 zu X'r. 47 (Uebersetzung) Um den in Samoa lebenden Deutschen die ^'ortheile einer guten Regierung zu sichern und in Ausfuehrung von Artikel MI, des 3(56 APPE^T)Ix deutschsamoanischen Freundschaftsvertrages vom 24. Januar, 1879 haben sich der "\"erw'eser des Kaiserlichen Konsulates fuer die Suedsee-Inseln und der Koenig, der Vizekoenig und die Regierung von Samoa ueber die nachstehenden Bestimmungen geeinigt: Artikel I Es wird ein deutsch-samoanischer Staatsrath gebildet. Zu demselben sollen gehoeren der deutsche Konsul oder dessen Stellvertreter, zwei Samoaner, von denen der eine von dem Koenige, der andere von dem Vizekoenig im Einvernehmen mit den Taimua und Faipiile ernannt werden, und zwei Deutsche, welche ^'on dem deutschen Konsul ernannt werden. Artikel II Der deutsch-samoanische Staatsrath soil ueber alle Gesetze und Einrichtungen berathen, und Beschluss fassen, deren Ein- fuehrung dem gemeinsamen Interesse der Samoa-Regierung und der in Samoa lebenden Deutschen entspricht. Er wird insbeson- dere gesetzliche Vorschriften aufstellen, welche auf die strafbaren Handlungen von Samoanern Anwendimg leiden, wenn damit ein Deutscher oder ein in deutschen Diensten stehender Angehoeriger eines anderen Staates oder ein in deutschen Diensten stehender farbiger Arbeiter oder das Eigenthum solcher Personen verletzt worden ist. Die gleichen Vorschriften sollen auf die strafbaren Handlungen der in deutschen Diensten stehenden farbigen Arbeiter Anwendung leiden. Artikel III Die von dem deutsch-samoanischen Staatsrath aufgestellten Vorschriften werden von dem Koenig und dem Vizekoenig unter ihrer Untcrschrift als Gesetz erlassen. In dem Eingang ist zu ervvaehnen, dass das Gesetz nach vorgaengiger Feststellung durch den deutsch-samoanischen Staatsrath erlassen wird. GERMAN-SAMOAN COUNCIL AGREEMENT, 1SS4 :^()7 Artikel IV Der Koenig \\ inl im Einvcrnehmen mit dem deutschen Konsul einen (leutsclien Beaniton dvv Sanioa-Re- with Samoa contained a standinji; otter. I added that I thoiifiht the Germans had made a great mistake in trying to impose u\Hm ttie Samoans, Ta niasese, a iding not clioseii by tTTtnTative s^ that poputaHons of that kind, if unwilling to submit to a foreigner, will be still more uinvilling to submit to a man of their own race imposed upon them by foreigners; that under such circumstances conspiracies and revolutions are inevitable; and that, in my \ opinion, the Germans as well as all others concerned would serve : their own interests much better b>' permitting the natives to choose their own king without foreign influence of any sort! roinit Arco ^yserved that this might be so, and he thought the German Government might finally accept Mataafa himself as Samoan king. The conversation turning upon what the coming conference between the treaty Powers might do, I said, in answer to a question, that as to the future government of Samoa perhaps some proi)o- sition intermediate between that advanced by Prince Bismarck and that of Mr. Bayard might be found, satisfactorily securing Samoan autonomy as well as treaty rights, and Count Arco shared that hope. He expressed regret at the fact that the Consular representatives (of the United States) in Samoa had in most instances been inferior to those of the other Powers in point of mental equipment as well as social standing, and he attributed their unsatisfactory relations in great part to that circumstance. I said that, not knowing any of the gentlemen in question, I could neither assent or dissent; but I fear the Count in making that remark was not wholly wrong. Count Arco asked me whether, notwithstanding the sul)stantial agreement of the purposes of the two Governments with regard to Samoa, I saw any point of danger. I replied that the onh- danger under such circumstances might possibly arise, as 1 thought, from the forwardness of some naval officer, or from some indiscretion in the conduct of the diplomatic correspondence, one party taking, or putting the other party into, an offensive position from which retreat with honor would be difficult. After some final exchange of sentiment as to the desirability of a prompt and complete restoration of the traditional cordiality 376 APPENDIX of feeling between the United States and Germany, the Count said that he would today send a cable message as well as a more elaborate letter to his Government, and we separated. In making this confidential communication to you I trust you will understand that I am very far from desiring to meddle with the business of the Government. But being asked for my opinion on this important affair by the German Minister in a manner manifesting a sincere desire on his part to see all differences between the two countries amicably and honorably adjusted, I thought there would not only be no harm in my giving him my indi\ddual xiews, but I might possibly aid a little in bringing about what all lovers of peace must wish to accomplish. I give you so elaborate an account of our conversation, in the hope that, if anything I said to Count. Arco was erroneous in point of fact or conclusion, you will have the goodness to set me right and enable me to correct the impressions I may have conveyed to his mind. From Thomas F. Bayard ,. • Department of State, Washington, Feb. 1, 1889. Confidential and Personal. I read with entire appreciation of its friendly motive and high intelligence your letter of the 30th, and am glad to inform you that today Count Arco came with a note-verbale from Berlin, which he read to me^ — to the effect that the extreme action of the German Consul at Samoa in declaring martial law in that region had been disapproved by his Government and that orders countermanding such steps had been sent by telegraph. This apparent return of Prince Bismarck to the line of the perfectly well understood agree- ment — that native autonomy and independence should be sus- tained by the three treaty Powers — leads me to be hopeful of a satisfactory adjustment by the conference to which I understood the German Go\ernment has decided to invite the I'nited States and Great Britain, and the terms of which may be expected to be presented here in a few days. You are perfectly correct in your diagnosis of the case — it i s a mercenary clash of riYal traders in the course of which German\- has SCIIURZ-BAYARD CORRESPONDENCE ON SAMOA 'XII allowed official action t o be too freely employed in aid of pri vate "schenfe^ Tn tlieltisciissions, which are fully re])ortcd in the proto- cols, this became ai)i)arcnt, and as I told Count Arco today, \Mr. \'on Ah-ensleben was inspired throughout by the counsel and presence here of ]Mr. Weber, formerly a Consular officer in Samoa, and now connected with the German Company there. As a result our plans for a sensible and just government in SanK)a were drifted away from the orighial basis of concurrent agreement, into a scheme which would have connected the group into a German dependency. It is, I think, unfortunate that Germany and Great Britain should decline to publish these papers, the contents of which have been discussed in the correspondence with Berlin, and which serve now only as bases for charges of "secrecy" and "suppression," creating mystery where all should be clear as day. Today Count Arco intimated that he would ask the consent of his Government for the communication of these protocols to the Senate in confidence. If that body called for them to be used in confidence, I scarcely see how the President could withhold them, although the point is delicate and I should be very sorry to have it raised. I am very sure, however, that the various plans for a native government assisted by the treaty Powers, in which no preponder- ance of control should be awarded to any one of the three, will under candid treatment yield a just and satisfactory solution of the present unhappy and distressing and dangerous condition of affairs. There can be no doubt that the wholly different ])oli(ics of the United States and Germany in respect of colonics and dependencies increase the difficulties of cooperation, but knowing the whole ground of the Samoan question, I can say to you unhesi- tatuigly it can be adjusted without difficulty if mercenary forces are not allowed to obtrude themselves into the discussions. When you come to read these protocols, which will some day be done, I have no doubt that our judgments will be at one. As soon as I received the (Jcrman note today, the President sent it in to Congress, and with an understanding that the natives are not to be crushed, and the Government with whom the treaties 37^' APPENDIX were made is to be respectfully considered, and American treaty rights guarded, I believe the mischief-makers will subside and settlement will rapidly progress. It is difficult to describe the singular bitterness of feeling which seems to control the Republican managers, and which has led to a systematic obstruction, misrepresentation and aspersion of the Administration in every Department, and towards none so fiercely as the Department of State, in which I am just closing four years of constant duty. They have sought, and only with too much success, to embarrass me in deahng with foreign Governments; and I was only too glad to see in John Sherman's speech signs of an appreciation of the responsibility which approaching power naturally brings. Your criticism on the tone and character of our Consular repre- sentative in Samoa is just. But with the pittance allowed for salary, it was difficult, indeed impossible, to obtain men of ade- quate ability, lender my urgent applications the pay was raised from $1500 to -12000, and at this session I have succeeded in getting the salary placed at $3000. The Senate Committee have been examining in secret the present Consul, to see whether some error or something of discredit to me could not be unearthed. But all I want is the whole history to be made public. Nevertheless you can appreciate such treatment of the head of a Department. I shall endeavor to get a sensible, good-tempered man as soon as I can, though the time for me is short to do so. I cannot avoid anxiety, lest the indiscretion of some naval officer, on one side or the other, may lead to a broil, which may expand itself. But I have been so single-minded in pursuing justice and friendly relations with Germany, as I belie\e my correspondence will thoroughly prove, that I believe we will find a clear channel and come to a worthy settlement. I thank you for your letter, and shall continue to believe you the friend of our country and of T. F. Bayard. I read your letter to the President. C ^v^ (' ULATlONDEgr LD21A-60fn-6,'60 ^^ (J9096sl0)476-A-.J- General Library . Uai««ityofCali£orma Berkeley, U.C BERKELEY LIBRARIES C03fltl5'm7 //