m INTERN A 
 
 otters and Essays 
 
 
LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 /v / 
 
 c f(ecei t ved . \^J..Jt~tr*i , iSqCj 
 
 ^Accessions No.for~03o. Class No. 
 
 Main Lib. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SERIES 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Sixth Infantry U. S. Army, Instructor in Art of War at th U. S. Infa ntry 
 and Cavalry School. 
 
 MILITARY LETTERS AND ESSAYS 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN F. N. MAUDE, R.E. 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 "Letters on Tactics and Organization," etc. 
 
 No. i. 
 . 
 
 KANSAS CITY, Mo. 
 
 HUDSON-KlMBERLY PUBLISHING Co. 
 1014-1016 WYANDOTTE ST. 
 
A/f 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress in the year l,S9. r >, by 
 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO., 
 In t*he Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington, D. C. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following letters appeared (for the most part) originally in the 
 columns of the Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, and their pur- 
 pose was to keep my brother officers in Bengal informed of the direc- 
 tion current military thought was taking in the principal armies of 
 Europe, in all branches of the art of war, strategy, tactics, organization, 
 and the training of troops for war. It has always been my conviction that 
 the essential principles underlying the employment of troops in war 
 never change; invention may modify for a time the balance between 
 the three arms, and an exceptional weapon in the hands of one army 
 only may temporarily bring about a startling change' in the phenom- 
 ena of the battle-field, as in 1866 and 1870, but once the equality of con- 
 ditions is restored, matters revert to their former aspect with effective 
 ranges and distances only increased. 
 
 Thus Leuthen, Rossbach and Austerlitz remain, and will remain for 
 all time, typ'es of consummate battle-leading, and a diagram of any one 
 of these battles, with the scale omitted, will serve for any period since 
 the fire-arm supplanted the bayonet as essentially the decision-com- 
 pelling arm. 
 
 To bring this point out it was necessary to have frequent recourse 
 to forgotten histories and biographies, and thus I account for the pres- 
 ence of the several reviews embodied in this collection. 
 
 Moreover, armament and skill on the part of the leaders being 
 equal, victory, under all conditions of improvements conceivable in 
 weapons, will ultimately remain with the best disciplined troops, and 
 by "discipline" I understand that quality which is measured by the 
 endurance of loss by troops under fire, having due regard, of course, to 
 the circumstances of time, ground, and employment under which the 
 losses were inflicted. 
 
 No training in which this ultimate end of "discipline" is lost sight 
 of is worth the time wasted on it, and, reading between the lines, it will 
 be very evident that I am far from considering that all the time spent 
 in military training in England is employed to the best advantage. 
 This accounts for the descriptions of field days, etc., which may appear 
 to many to possess but ephemeral interest. 
 
 Finally, my chief object in republishing these papers has been to 
 supply a want that from my own experience I know to exist; viz., some 
 contemporary estimate made in peace-time of the spirit of different 
 armies, the method of training , n use in each, and the degree of effi- 
 ciency they may be expected to develop on active service. Anyone who 
 has attempted to unravel the causes which led to the defeat of the 
 French in 1870, or the defeat of the Prussians in 1806, will, I think, 
 readily admit of what great value half a dozen independent contempo- 
 rary works, based on the above lines and written before the event, would 
 have been to him. 
 
 In conclusion, I should like to record my special sense of gratitude 
 to Captain Arthur L. Wagner, of the United States Army, for his kindness 
 in rescuing my manuscript from the series of misfortunes which have 
 overtaken it since it left my hands for the mail steamer and which 
 have entailed a long delay in publication. 
 
 F. N. MAUDE, Captain, 
 
 Royal United Service Institution, Late R. E. 
 
 Whitehall, October 26, 1895. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 I. Statistics of the Franco-German War 5 
 
 II. Smokeless Powder 13 
 
 III. Conditions of Modern Warfare 22 
 
 IV. Cost of Modern War 28 
 
 V. German Cavalry Maneuvers :>> 
 
 VI. Independent Patrols 40 
 
 VII. A Modern Battle r>2 
 
 VIII. A Study of a Modern Battle 60 
 
 IX. Attack or Defence 68 
 
 X. The Origin of Extended-Order Fighting 7.~> 
 
 XI. The Legend of St. Privat 85 
 
 X XII. Von Wedell's Cavalry Brigade at Mars-la -Tour. .101 
 
 XIII. Present Tactical Tendencies in the German Army. 1 24 
 
 XIV. The Physique of European Armies 131 
 
 XV. The Weapon or the Man 133 
 
 XVI. The Minor Tactical Day at Aldershot 140 
 
 XVII. The Volunteer Field Day at Aldershot ir>3 
 
 XVIII. Field Day at Aldershot 102 
 
 XIX. Notes on the French Maneuvers 169 
 
 XX. The German Army 1 78 
 
 XXI. Marching through Thuringia 230 
 
 XXII. The Panics at Gravelotte 239 
 
 XXIII. Von Moltke's Work 260 
 
 XXIV. The Spirit of the New German Infantry Regula- 
 
 tions 270 
 
 XXV. Notes in Germany in 1889 291 
 
 XXVI. Blank vs. Ball Cartridge Tactfcs. . . 296 
 
THE STATISTICS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
 
 Some months ago I called attention to the publications 
 issuing from the German general staff, dealing with the ques- 
 tion of the absolute numerical strength of the troops engaged 
 on ach side during the last Franco-German War. The last 
 number completes the investigation up to the battle of Sedan, 
 beyond which, in the absence of all reliable returns, and with 
 reference to the well-known superiority of numbers on 
 the French side, it is considered not worth while to proceed. 
 The importance of these figures, for a due appreciation of sev- 
 eral great questions as to organization and tactics, is so great 
 that I propose to deal with them again at greater length than 
 before; for I confess that before they came into my hands I 
 had no adequate idea of the amount of evidence in favor of 
 the favorite German idea of the superiority of the attack to 
 the defence, or as to the full advantages of the German sys- 
 tem of territorial localization. Taking the subject by and 
 large, I had shared the opinion pretty generally held, that at 
 the commencement of the war, with the sole exception of 
 Vionville, the large numerical superiority at the command of 
 the Prussians had been reason enough to account for their 
 victories; and that therefore these victories proved nothing 
 at all in favor of the German short-service army as opposed 
 to the Imperial long-service one, or as to the individual supe- 
 riority of a French soldier to a German one. 
 
 The former point is not considered in my authority, for 
 the reason, I suppose, that the "general staff" thought that 
 matter settled beyond dispute on the field of Jena, more than 
 sixty years before; and those who are acquainted with the 
 history of Prussian army reorganization in those days will 
 understand why they should take this view, for it cannot too 
 often be repeated nowadays that during the years of the 
 Napoleonic regime in Prussia, every one of the questions with 
 regard to organization, which still trouble us, were threshed 
 
6 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 out with a thoroughness which leaves no room for doubt as to 
 the wisdom of the steps then taken, but which, unfortunately 
 for us, the peculiar conditions under which our army serves 
 prevent us from accepting. 
 
 The study of this epoch is one not usually undertaken bv 
 Englishmen, and therefore a more recent and striking proof 
 is required to show that our military system, though a neces- 
 sity of our surroundings, is, nevertheless, but a compromise 
 on which it does not do to rely too much, though I firmly 
 believe thai till existing conditions are modified, it is prob- 
 ably the best we can arrive at under the circumstances. 
 
 Putting Jena on one side, and till the issue of these sta- 
 tistics, I think it quite open to question whether anything 
 really was proved against theprinciple of long-service armies. 
 In 1866 a short-service peace-trained army defeated utterly 
 and hopelessly a long-service war-experienced one; but the 
 immense superiority of the tactical handling of the forme;-. 
 and Hie breech-loader, rendered all useful comparison of the 
 two out of the question. But in 1870 the figures I am about to 
 quote show that, even in spite of an inferior armament as 
 regards the infantry, and a tactical handling but little supe- 
 rior, the long-service army, also war-seasoned, proved unab'' 
 to hold its own against even an inferior weight of the enenn : 
 and that, too, although the latter had almost always the sup- 
 posed advantage of the ground, a defensive attitude, and field 
 fortifications in their favor. 
 
 T will now come to the figures. The affair at Weiszen- 
 berg was altogether one-sided, for is. (MM) ritles. 3.000 sabers, 
 and 144 gnns were brought up by the (Jerman stall' to crush 
 4.050 French infantry with 050 cavalry and 3 batteries. Only 
 half of the Germans were, however, engaged. The real r- i- 
 son why this steam hammer was employed to crack such a nut, 
 was that, the proper use of the cavalry division not. having as 
 yet been understood, the Germans were almost as badly in- 
 formed of the whereabouts of their enemy as the latter were 
 of theirs. It is not generally known that the formation of 
 cavalry divisions was only decreed by the King on the 29th c f 
 ' T uly, and on the ch'v of the battle, the 4th of August, the 4th 
 Tavalry Division attached to this Army (the Third) was only 
 just completed and moving up try the front a mistake which. 
 
Military Letters and Essay s. 7 
 
 however, will never.be made by the Germans again. It was a 
 consequence of this delay in forming the cavalry divisions 
 that the battle of Woerth, which took place two days after- 
 wards, was fought entirely against the wish of the army com- 
 mander; nevertheless, the latter succeeded ultimately in 
 bringing into action in round numbers 90,000 rifles, 7,750 
 sabers, and 342 guns, more than double the number that Mac- 
 Mahon could possibly bring against them. 
 
 On the part of the French this was certainly the finest 
 fight they made as regards the courage of the men and the 
 regimental handling of the troops. Possibly in this instance 
 they might have held their own against equal numerical odds, 
 for their discipline and pluck went far to atone for their want 
 of tactical instruction. The charge of Michel's brigade of 
 cuirassiers, and Septeuil's lancers only failed to be well timed 
 by a couple of minutes, and even in spite of this and the 
 absence of ground scouts, which led to terrible confusion, 
 fully obtained its primary object of gaining time, for, under 
 cover of the confusion it produced, the French irrfantry, who 
 were giving way, rallied again in a second position, and it took 
 the Prussians three hours' hard fighting to turn them out 
 of it. 
 
 These two actions were the only ones in which it was nec- 
 essary for the Germans to put in the proportion of troops that 
 is generally considered necessary in peace maneuvers to com- 
 pensate for the disadvantage of having to attack a well-pre- 
 pared and naturally strong position, as the following figures 
 will show. At Spicheren, fought the same day, 23,700 French 
 riiles, backed by 90 guns and 260 sabers holding a position of 
 unusifal natural strength which had further been strength- 
 ened artificially, were turned out of it by only 26,000 German 
 infantry with 78 guns and 840 cavalry,andthese troops attacked 
 under the most unfavorable conditions, being sent in in drib- 
 lets as they arrived on the field, with no unity of command 
 and on a front far in excess of what by all sound tactical rules 
 they should have occupied. At Fredericsburg, in the Ameri- 
 can war, the Northerners, attacking under circumstances in 
 every way more favorable, received from Lee the bloodiest- 
 repulse they ever experienced, and if in an ordinary war game 
 a similar situation arose, I fancy any umpire would unhes-ti- 
 
8 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 tatingly say that the attacking force deserved, and could ex- 
 pect, no better fate : and yet so different is the battle-field to 
 the maneuver-ground that the Germans succeeded in winning. 
 
 The battle of Colombey Nouilly or Borny on the 14th 
 August, gives a fair sample of what the Germans could do, 
 both in attack and defence Though only a portion of the 
 French troops engaged had previously been under fire, they 
 were all more or less affected by the course events had taken. 
 and can hardly be considered as unshaken. The fight was 
 brought on by the German outposts, who, seeing indications 
 of a retreat in progress, attacked at once without waiting for 
 orders, drove in the first line of the French position, and then 
 held on to them against repeated and desperate counter- 
 attacks on the part of the French. No sooner were the guns 
 heard, than every body of German troops within call heade-l 
 in for the fight, but the late hour at which it commenced, and 
 the distance, prevented any considerable number from arriv- 
 ing before dark, and ultimately the decision was given by 
 30,500 rifles with 150 guns on the German side against 50,700 
 rifies and 206 guns on the French one, the latter actually 
 bringing a five-fold superiority to bear on the point of attack, 
 which w r as easily beaten back, notwithstanding the serious 
 disadvantage the Germans labored under of having the blind- 
 ing rays of the setting sun in their eyes, which hampered the 
 practice of their artillery enormously. The French at the 
 time, and possibly even now; claim to have won this action, 
 but in presence of the fact that the Germans bivouacked on 
 the ground they had taken from the French, and were only 
 prevented from actually pursuing the latter by the fire of the 
 forts of Metz, behind which the French withdrew, this claim 
 can hardly be considered proved. 
 
 The next fight, that of Vionville Mars-la-Tour (10th 
 August, 1870) was undoubtedly the most honorable to the 
 Prussian arms. The course of this encounter is so well 
 known that it would be superfluous to dwell on it further 
 than to remind the reader that it began with a surprise very 
 indifferently executed, by the way of the French cavalry 
 camps by the 5th German Cavalry Division; and the sound 
 of the premature firing alarmed the whole of the French 
 Army lying almost close at hand, who instantly formed up 
 
Military Letters and Essays. U 
 
 and fell with, overwhelming numbers on the advance guard of 
 the 5th Division, 3d Corps, just emerging from the defiles 
 leading up from Gorze. Then began a typical encounter bat- 
 tle. Every man, horse, and gun within sound of the firing 
 marching up to assist, all superior leading was soon at an 
 end, and, tired and weary as they were with the long toil 
 under the burning sun, the troops were sent straight into the 
 fight, without any knowledge of the ground or the strength of 
 the enemy opposed to them. The fighting began at 9 a. in., 
 and up to 3 p. m. only 23,700 rifles, 8,100 sabers, and 126 guns 
 had been brought up, against which the French engaged 
 59,100 rifles, 6,700 sabers, and 300 guns, including 24 
 mitrailleurs. 
 
 After 3 :30 p. m., German reinforcements began to arrive 
 more rapidly, till at the close of the day 47,100 infantry, 8,300 
 cavalry, and 222 guns on the German side were fighting 
 against 83,600 rifles, 8,000 sabers, and 432 guns (including 18 
 mitrailleurs) on the other side. 
 
 To students of tactics, no battle in the whole war offers 
 so many points of interest, for it is the only one in which all 
 three arms bore their full share of fighting. It is not generally 
 realized how well the French fought individually. They 
 showed a steadiness under the most demoralizing circum- 
 stances that it would be utterly vain to hope for from their 
 short-service soldiers of to-day, as, for instance, the way they 
 rallied after being ridden over by Bredow's cavalry, and, 
 facing about, received his second charge, and the extreme 
 gallantry with which it is universally admitted they at- 
 tempted again and again to attack in the face of the fire of the 
 Prussian batteries. It was admitted by all that no troops 
 could have done more, but the storm of shell that met them 
 proved most conclusively the impossibility of attacking 
 directly such lines of artillery with success, where the latter 
 have a fair field of fire ; and if that was the case in 1870, when 
 common shell only had to be faced, w y hat hope have infantry 
 now, when ring shells and shrapnel have quintupled the 
 power of the guns? It should be remembered also that the 
 3d Corps were Krandenburgers i. e., true Prussians; and it 
 is just a little bit doubtful whether the other corps consisted 
 of quite the same stuff. The French claimed, and still claim. 
 
 Of 
 
 171 J 
 
10 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 to have won the victory in this day's fighting, but it is a pity 
 for them that they did not substantiate their claim by a reso- 
 lute attack next morning, for it was the very opportunity to 
 have shown the value of the long-service war-seasoned army 
 over the other system; and it is admitted now by German 
 writers, notably by Prince Hohenlohe, that such a resump- 
 tion of the offensive had a fair chance, and at any rate was 
 the last one, of success, but Bazaine, the "bon general ordi- 
 naire" showed here the want of Hint iron resolution which 
 makes the real leader, and preferred to fall back on to a 
 defensive position, from which he hoped to show what the 
 Chassepot could do under what the theorists of the practice- 
 ground had proclaimed to be the most favorable conditions 
 for it, forgetting, as they always do, in England no less than 
 in France, the truth of Suvaroff s favorite saying: "It is not 
 the gun, but the man who stands behind it, which signifies." 
 The position he took up is, by the general consent of all 
 specialists in field fortification, allowed to have been abso- 
 lutely ideal. On the left it rested on the forts of Plappoville 
 and St. Quentin, which wing was further strengthened by a 
 difficult ravine, which shattered the order of every Prussian 
 attack directed against it; and its right was approached by 
 open glacis^like slopes, not only favorable to the special 
 power of the weapon, but ideally perfect for the counter- 
 attack; and at intervals along its front lay hamlets of con 
 Fiderable extent, each of which had boon converted into a 
 small fortress. In this position, further strengthened byfield 
 entrenchments, he drew up his whole force of 100,000 infan- 
 try, 13,300 sabers, and 520 guns (including 06 mitrailleurs), 
 and against this the Germans advanced with 166,400 rifles, 
 21,200 sabers, and 732 guns. By bad leading, Bazaine actu- 
 ally only brought 83,500 titles, 550 sabers, and 398 guns (in- 
 cluding 54 mitrailleurs) into action; but, in spite of the natural 
 strength of the position above referred to, and for which am- 
 or dinary umpire would have required at least a two-fold supe- 
 riority for the attack, 109,200 rifles, no sabers, and 620 guns 
 proved sufficient to turn him out of it. There never was a 
 battle in which a better opportunity was offered of turning 
 the scale by a vigorous counter-stroke, initiated by a charge 
 of cavalry masses; but the chance was lost, and with it went 
 the last hope of the Army of the Rhine. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 11 
 
 In the subsequent battles the superiority of the German 
 morale was so marked that one is no longer surprised at any- 
 thing; still the French individually fought with the courage 
 of despair at Sedan, and the fact that they could and did 
 bring their masses to bear by the radii against the circumfer- 
 ence of the circle which the Germans had formed round them, 
 hardly prepares one for the statement that the latter only 
 found it necessary to bring 69,000 of their infantry, 800 of 
 their cavalry, and 593 guns into action in order to defeat and 
 take prisoners the 90,000 infantry and cavalry with 408 guns 
 of the French. In the face of these figures, it seems impossi- 
 ble for the latter to maintain any longer the idea that it was 
 only the numerical superiority of their opponents which 
 crushed them, or for us to doubt the possibility of turning out 
 good soldiers on the three-years-service system. The point I 
 wish to make is this, that, except in time of permanent war, 
 the long-service army inevitably eats out its own heart. The 
 constant rehearsal of the same duties develops into mere rou- 
 tine, and neither men nor officers have any stimulus to exert 
 themselves. Instruction in peace-time, to be of any use, must 
 be constantly progressive as regards the men. The moment 
 they think they have reached the end of their training, they 
 begin to look on any repetition of it as needlessly harassing, 
 and the officers soon take the same view, and cease to persist 
 in the absolute precision of execution of all drill on which 
 ultimately discipline depends. Besides, with service exceed- 
 ing six or seven years, a very large proportion of the men 
 have longer service than the subalterns and younger cap- 
 tains, on whom so much of the leading in modern fighting 
 depends. Private Mulvaney, with his twelve years' color 
 service, has his own opinion as to 2d Lieut. Smith's knowledge 
 of warfare, and though as long as all goes well he will follow 
 him with devotion for the honor of the old regiment, should 
 things go badly, he may prefer to think for himself. The 
 reserve man on rejoining has not the same self-sufficiency 
 about him, he is a bit rusty, and all the more inclined to look 
 up to his officers, for it is only a recurrence to an old habit. 
 And this has always characterized the conduct of long-ser- 
 vice troops when defeat has set in. The confidence between 
 men and their immediate superiors once shaken, and the 
 
1 2 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 whole structure of discipline lias fallen to pieces like a pack 
 of cards, especially after a comparatively long peace. For- 
 tunately, our record of European war is so good that it is not 
 easy to bring forward convincing proofs from our own his- 
 tory, but the retreat to Corunna,as described by Napier, gives 
 one an idea of what we might expect, and it must be remem- 
 bered that Moore himself was one of the best generals that we 
 ever had, and that the creation of the infantry thai afterwards 
 became so celebrated was principally the work of his hands. 
 It may be said that as yet we have not seen ihe Prussian 
 short-service army in defeat on a grand scale, but we have, 
 though it was a good many years ago; but I do not believe that 
 national courage changes rapidly; the fighting instinct is 
 almost the oldest we possess, and therefore probably the 
 slowest to change; and it is only seventy-six years, about, 
 since a short-service Prussian army showed what they could 
 do, even under defeat. At Jena and Auerstadt the old long 
 service army, after a most desperate resistance, broke to 
 pieces all of a sudden, and in forty-eight hours ceased to exist. 
 Its place was taken by a short-service one, raised under 
 every conceivable difficulty that the ingenuity of Napoleon 
 could invent, but in the very first fight in which they again 
 confronted the French at Grosz Gorchen, where the bulk of 
 their men had barely a couple of months' training, their ene- 
 mies confessed that these were no longer the same sort of ene- 
 mies they had had to deal with before, for, though again de- 
 feated, they never lost their order, and were ready to try con 
 elusions again next day. In the next year's fighting ilSl 4 
 they were beaten again and again, but still came up to time 
 again, and at Ligny, the next year, after what, by the general 
 consent of all who took part in it, was 1he bloodiest and most 
 determined struggle of the whole Napoleonic era, they were, 
 in good order again within twelve hours, and fought as well 
 as ever, shoulder to shoulder with us at \Vaterloo. The truth 
 is, that whilst lacking many of the qualities of the profes- 
 sional soldier, short-service ones have a far greater personal 
 incentive to fight, for war to them is a terrible reality, which 
 strikes right at the heart of all their dearest interests: they 
 are taken from their occupations and ties at home, and realize 
 individually the magnitude of the stakes at issue. Every- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 13 
 
 body, both English, Prussians, Austrians, and French, were 
 struck with the determination the landwehr showed in 18GG 
 and 1870, all the more so since even their own people had 
 hardly expected it. But this personal interest is lacking to 
 the purely professional soldier; between two such armies 
 war is apt to degenerate into something approximating to 
 the conventional duel, as opposed to the Calif ornian one; in 
 fact, it is not more than a century since it was considered the 
 greatest feather in a general's cap to be able to boast of a 
 successful, but bloodless, campaign. Ferdinand von Braun- 
 schweig, one of the most celebrated Prussian generals before 
 Jena, would have been as shocked at the ideas his descend- 
 ants hold about war as Gambetta's second was when Mark 
 Twain proposed "axes" as the weapons for the celebrated 
 duel, and would probably have replied to them in much the 
 same words: "But, my dear sir, have you considered what 
 the consequences of an encounter with such weapons might 
 be?" Mark confessed he had not. "Bloodshed, sir, blood- 
 shed," replied the second. "That's about the size of it." 
 again returned Mark; "and if 1 might ask, what was your 
 side proposing to shed?" I seldom listen to an umpire's 
 critique in this country without thinking of the above, for 
 undeniably we have still inherited a great many misconcep- 
 tions as to the nature of war from the old days, and the extra- 
 ordinary mania for believing in the virtues of the defensive 
 and for the necessity of avoiding losses, forgetting that vic- 
 tory is the first object, and is cheaper at any cost than defeat, 
 is distinctly traceable to the same old source. But this opens 
 another and a very wide question. 
 
 SMOKELESS POWDER. 
 
 The discussion on the relative advantages and disadvan- 
 tages of the new powders, with w r hich the military papers of 
 all countries have been filled during the past two years or so, 
 reveal in a most striking manner the spirit in which fighting 
 is viewed in the different armies concerned; this spirit being 
 the outcome of the system of tactical training in fashion in 
 each. Viewing the matter generally, it may be said that the 
 tendency in England, France, and Austria has been to con- 
 
14 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 sider the advantage derived from its introduction as princi- 
 pally on the side of the defensive, and to prophesy an alarm- 
 ing increase in the slaughter with which future battles will 
 be accompanied. In Germany alone the contrary view has 
 prevailed; there, with few exceptions, it has been pointed out 
 that inasmuch as the absence of smoke facilitates the control 
 oi the fighting line, that side which goes into action intent on 
 destroying its adversary, and not thinking how to avoid 
 destruction, is more certain than ever to ultimately effect its 
 object. 
 
 The truth is, the views put forward in the former coun- 
 tries rest on a fundamental misconception of the causes on 
 which heavy losses depend ; attributing them rather to the 
 mechanical perfection of the weapon than to the obstinacy of 
 the men who wield it; and again, by concentrating their 
 attention on the one object of avoiding losses, they lose sight 
 of the ultimate aim of all fighting viz., the defeat of the 
 enemy's army. 
 
 Actually a reference to military history will show that 
 the losses inflicted in battle have only indirectly been affected 
 by the nature of the arms in use, but have been simply con- 
 ditioned by the relative fighting excellence of the two armies 
 engaged. Where both have consisted of war-seasoned veter- 
 ans trained to the highest pitch of tactical efficiency, losses 
 of even 30 per cent have not been found sufficient to win a 
 decisive victory, for the troops have fought till sheer physical 
 exhaustion compelled them to stop killing one another, and 
 neither side has retained energy enough to attempt a pursuit. 
 Zorndorf is a case in point, and Waterloo would have been 
 but for the arrival of the Prussians. 
 
 That the question of armament has nothing to do with 
 the losses can be easily seen by noting how differently troops 
 of the same nation have borne punishment under the same 
 conditions of armament, but under different ones of training. 
 The Civil War in America is in this respect most instructive, 
 for here we have two opposing sides more similar in fighting 
 characteristics and mutual obstinacy than can well occur 
 where the contending armies belong to different nations. 
 When these two forces first met at Bull's Kun, they fought 
 till both sides were tired of it, the victors being nearly as ex- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 15 
 
 hausted as the vanquished, but this limit of exhaustion was 
 reached when a comparatively small percentage had fallen 
 on both sides. But when, in two years later, the same 
 two armies met at Gettysburg, there ensued about the bloodi- 
 est battle for both sides that is known in modern history. The 
 conditions of armament remained identical ; the only thing 
 that had changed in the interval was the "discipline," under- 
 standing the word in its widest sense, of the contending 
 armies. 
 
 Or, to take two instances in more recent history, when the 
 French and Germans met at Vionville in 1870, both being 
 armies in a relatively high state of fighting efficiency, but 
 neither being armed with weapons quite up to the latest 
 standard, they fought till night put a stop to the slaughter, 
 without decisive advantage on either side. But when, in 
 the last Servian-Bulgarian campaign, two forces in a low 
 state of tactical efficiency, but equally armed with better 
 weapons than either French or Germans possessed, encoun- 
 tered each other in a fair stand-up fight, both sides were 
 nearly equally exhausted by a perfectly trifling percentage of 
 loss. 
 
 The fact is, every body of troops possesses a certain 
 capacity for resisting loss, and this capacity varies with their 
 discipline and the fighting talent of the race. Unequal arma- 
 ment affects the worse armed side prejudicially, but with 
 equal armament troops will fight till their capacity for endur- 
 ance is exceeded, and then they will stop, and nothing more 
 is to be got out of them. The only way, therefore, in which 
 troops can be trained to the highest skill in avoiding loss is 
 by loosening all the bonds of discipline and allowing them to 
 degenerate into a mere rabble. Two armies, both trained on 
 the same system, might go on worrying each other almost 
 indefinitely with the greatest possible economy of men on the 
 battle-field, but also without any decisive result being 
 obtained, and the results would be the same whatever the 
 nature of the .arms employed. To such troops the value of 
 the smoke-screen is most obvious, for behind its veil thou- 
 sands of unwounded stragglers could withdraw themselves 
 temporarily, only to turn up safe and sound at the bivouac 
 fires in the evening; but to soldiers filled with the determi- 
 
16 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 nation to kill, and to keep on killing, the absence of the 
 smoke-cloud can only be welcome. Their own movements 
 are, no doubt, more visible to the enemy, but this is more than 
 compensated for by the clearly defined target it gives them 
 to aim at, at least within decisive fighting ranges, for the con- 
 cealment the absence of smoke affords to the defender is, to 
 my mind, in a great measure a delusion. It is Hue one no 
 longer sees the little white puffs of smoke marking the line of 
 defence to aim at, but instead the crest of the parapet is 
 defined by the bright, scintillating flashes of the rifles, which, 
 as far as my own observations go,are visible against all back- 
 grounds and catch the eye more markedly even than the drift- 
 ing clouds of smoke. With a breeze blowing obliquely 
 towards one, the puff of smoke may not become visible for 
 some yards after leaving the muzzle, and it is impossible to 
 fix the exact spot from which the shot was fired; but the 
 bright spark suddenly appearing, say under the branch of a 
 small shrub, enables you to define exactly the point to be 
 aimed at. And with artillery this is even more the case Hum 
 with small-arm fire. 
 
 But, in the nature of things, this benefits the assailant 
 more than the defender, for no one proposes or ever has pro- 
 posed to launch infantry blindly to the attack of unshaken 
 infantry, as a matter of principle. It may have to be done, 
 and it may prove successful, but it is a terrible risk, not likely 
 to be often run. But to troops once unsteadied by artillery 
 fire the definition of the target is a matter of secondary im- 
 portance, and indeed they are more likely to bag something 
 firing into the snioke than attempting to pick off an individual. 
 
 The essential fact remains, and always will remain ad 
 long as battles are fought with projectile weapons of war, 
 that ultimately the successful execution of an infantry attack 
 depends on the accuinmulation by one side, within effective 
 range of the enemy, of a sufficient number of rifles to estab- 
 lish a fire superiority over the opposing force. This supe- 
 riority once obtained, the success of the assault follows as 
 n matter of course, though not necessarily as the result of the 
 the first rush; for it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide 
 when the sufficient degree of superiority lias been attained. 
 Consequently, the characteristic of all modern great infantry 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 17 
 
 
 
 lights has been long fluctuating fire lines, alternately advanc- 
 ing and retreating; victory eventually falling to the side 
 which has the last intact reserve to throw into the combat. 
 
 This advantage will almost inevitably belong to the 
 assailant. In the Franco-German war the German infantry 
 armament w^as conspicuously inferior to that of their adver- 
 saries; the old needle-gun ranging barely 600 yards against 
 the 2,000 and more of the Chassepot, which could also be fired 
 half as fast again. Therefore, in all their battles, the Ger- 
 man troops had to advance without firing, and hence without 
 the supposed advantage of the smoke-screen, up to what is 
 now well within the effective range of modern military rifles 
 i. e., between 500 and 600 yards; and, without a single 
 exception, they succeeded in so doing, though not without 
 suffering very heavy losses; still, one line having once got 
 their footing, a second, a third, and even a fourth, could have 
 reached the same limit, each with less loss, for the fire of 
 those already in position would necessarily have interfered 
 with the enemy's power of retaliation. Hence the ultimate 
 pow r er of establishing the 1 requisite degree of superiority 
 would depend entirely on the possibility of having a suffi- 
 cient number of troops available at the right time and place. 
 The power of thus assembling a superiority of force against 
 Hie point of attack is one which in the nature of things 
 belongs by right to the assailant, who can decide when and 
 where to attack, whereas his opponent is compelled to make 
 his line equally strong along his w r hole front. Of course a 
 skillful use of ground, field fortifications, etc., may compel 
 the assailant to attack where the defender chooses; but, 
 broadly speaking, the former will always possess the advan- 
 tage above pointed out namely, that of knowing his own 
 mind. 
 
 But it may be argued that how r ever superior the Chasse- 
 pot may have been relatively to the needle-gun, it is far 
 behind the modern weapons in rapidity and accuracy, so that 
 what w T as possible in 1870 will not be possible again. With 
 all due deference to the numerous high authorities who hold 
 this view, I believe their position to be untenable, and for the 
 following reasons: In the early actions of the war it so hap- 
 pened that the Germans invariably managed to attack 
 
18 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 locally, at any rate against a very large (in some cases ar 
 enormous) numerical superiority. At Woerth four and a 
 half battalions attacked thecenter of the whole Frencharniy 
 and were ultimately beaten back, but managed to get well 
 within the (300 yards limit. At SSpicheren the numerical dis 
 proportion for the first few hours was almost as great, and al 
 Vionville every single advance was made against heavy odds 
 (in the case of the 38th Brigade, northeast of Mars-la-Tour, 
 the French being in a majority of at least four to one) ; yet 
 in every instance the Germans managed to get within what is 
 no\v very effective range. 
 
 The same line of argument applies also in a great degree 
 to the artillery; for where the weapons are the same on both 
 sides the power of accumulating a superiority of fire on anj 
 one point must always be on the side of the strategic assail 
 ant ; relatively to whom the defender must generally be at a 
 disadvantage. The only arm, therefore, which would appear 
 to be unfavorably affected by the new order of things would 
 be the cavalry, to whom the smoke-screen was undoubted!} 
 a great advantage. But even here we may doubt whether in 
 fiction the drawback will be felt as much as people imagine, 
 for when the bullets are actually flying, the minds of all 
 become so absorbed in the duty immediately before them 
 that, even though the eye may see movements taking place in 
 other parts of the field, the brain refuses to register them, 
 a close study of military history reveals scores of such 
 instances which in peace-time would be incredible, and no 
 doubt, these will recur in the future. One thing, however, 
 remains certain, that there is a limit to the endurance of 
 human nerves, and that this limit will be reached the more 
 rapidly the greater the killing power of the arms employed; 
 and then, as Hoenig says in his "Cavalry Division on the Bat- 
 tle-field," "It will come to very much the same thing, 
 whether the infantry carry pitchforks or magazine rifles/' 
 
 As regards the question of sound, we have been led to 
 suppose by the papers that the new powder gave very much 
 less sound than the old, and that ultimately a noiseless pow- 
 der altogether might be expected, and graphic pictures have 
 been given us of silent death dropping from the clouds. This 
 last prediction is a little premature; ultimately, when this 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 19 
 
 earth shall have cooled down to the point of solidification 
 of the gases of which the atmosphere consists, and it pur- 
 sues its course round the sun void of all atmosphere what- 
 ever, powders may, no doubt, explode without noise, for pow- 
 ders always do when exploded in vacuo; but then there will 
 be no men to explode them, and war will perforce have come 
 to an end. But pending that, it is the case that silent death 
 may fall on troops from the clouds, because the range of 
 small-arms is so increased that conditions may often 
 occur when a volley, fired at 2,500 yards say, will be inaudi- 
 ble, and the noise of discharge has actually been changed by 
 the adoption of a smaller bore for the rifle. 
 
 But sound has always been a very untrustworthy guide 
 to go upon. The distances to which it will travel va-ry so 
 much and so rapidly, and the principles which govern its 
 transmission are so little understood, that no experienced 
 officer would ever rely on it. Here is a case in point. At the 
 battle of Spicheren, 6th August, 1870, a Prussian division 
 (the XHIth, we believe) was on the march, directed well clear 
 of the point on which the fight took place. Suddenly heavy 
 firing was heard on the left, and the line of march was at once 
 changed, on the principle that, when in doubt, you cannot do 
 better than march towards the sound of the guns. The new 
 direction took the column through a large forest, and about 
 1 p. m., when they were half way through it, all sound of fir- 
 ing suddenly ceased. The general commanding concluded 
 that it had only been an outpost skirmish, and as his men 
 were much fatigued, he halted the column and ordered the 
 men to cook their dinners. Simultaneously on the opposite 
 side two French divisions, also hearing the firing, had got 
 under arms and were in full march to the battle-field, when 
 suddenly, and at about the same hour, the sound of the firing 
 ceased and the French generals, having marched in a hurry 
 and having left their camps standing, turned round and went 
 home to dinner. Actually the firing had not ceased for one 
 moment, but at the very time its sound ceased to travel it 
 was being largely reinforced by fresh guns on both sides and 
 continued to rage with undimmished vigor till the close of 
 the day. Meanwhile on both sides the reinforcements were 
 being anxiously looked for, and about 6 p. m. a Prussian gal- 
 
20 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 loper found his men in the middle of the forest, just standh 
 to their arms and beginning to move off, for just before h 
 arrival, as suddenly as it had ceased, the sound of the firir 
 had again become audible, and the general had already issue 
 orders to continue the advance. As a consequence, the f re* 
 troops arrived on the field just in time to take part in the tin 
 attack onForbach and the heights to the north west of ii . Tl 
 French were not so fortunate. They had hardly regaim 
 their camps, and the fires under the cooking-kettles hi 
 scarcely begun to burn, when, at the same hour as on 11 
 Prussian side, the sound of firing recommenced, and sinn: 
 taneously aides-de-camp arrived, summoning the troops 
 the battle-field. The kettles were upset, the men stood 
 their arms, and marched off again, hungry and exhausie 
 over the same road they had followed in the morning, on 
 reaching the vicinity of the battle-field in the small hours 
 the morning, and too late t o be of any service there. 
 
 A similar instance occurred in the American war \vhe 
 during Mc( 1 lellan's advance from the York Kiver on liic 
 mond, the whole of the Southern army under Longs! reel \\\ 
 Jackson fell on the right wing of the Northerners and d 
 feated it in full view of the remaining half, which looked o 
 unable to go to their comrades' assistance, owing to the ii 
 passabilityof the Chickahominy Creek and a muddy, swam] 
 valley, about a mile wide, which lay between them. Tl 
 curious part of the affair was thai, though 1hey saw evei 
 part and phase of the struggle, riot a sound of it reached thei 
 though the distance was little more than a couple of mile 
 The explanation in both cases is similar. 
 
 Professor TyndalFs experiments on fog signals off tl 
 Foreland and other parts of 1he coast showed that the chi 
 essential for sound to travel is a uniform state of the atmc 
 phere between the two communicating points. A continuoi 
 fog or a clear sky over a uniform surface of land or sea bo 
 favor the transmission of sound, but if the continuity of tl 
 medium is interrupted either by the shadow of a cloud intl 
 sky, which, by lowering the temperature underneath, dim! 
 ishes the tension of the invisible aqueous vapor in the air, ( 
 if across a dry stretch of country, a marsh, stream, or fore 
 causes the air over it to take up more moisture than it nr 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 21 
 
 mally holds on either side of it an absolute wall against 
 which the sound rebounds is formed between the two sta- 
 tions. Now in both the above instances these conditions 
 were present at Spicheren. The sky in the early morning 
 was reasonably clear and the tension in the mist of the valley 
 uniformly continuous, but as the heat of the day increased 
 the vapor rolled up into clouds, and the presence of the forest 
 caused a difference of tension to exist, and through this the 
 sound could not penetrate. As the sun lost its power, and 
 the air again became uniform in composition throughout, the 
 sound was again able to penetrate freely. In the same way, 
 at Games' Mill, the name of the American action quoted 
 above, the interposition of the marshy river again caused an 
 inequality in the atmosphere, with a similar result. So it 
 will be seen that sound is not a very certain indication on 
 which to base one's conduct, and the general who relies on it 
 to guide him through the difficulties of a modern campaign 
 would be relying on a very rotten reed. 
 
 But if, then, it follows that smokeless powder will have 
 no material effect on the losses in actual battle, and that 
 therefore no special change is called for in our formations, 
 there can be no doubt that the preliminary operations before 
 the period of decision arrives will be much more difficult than 
 formerly as much on account of the absence of smoke a.s 
 because of the increased range of the weapon and its greater 
 accuracy in the hands of cool, unshaken men. The only plan 
 hitherto proposed which seems to me to meet the require- 
 ments is that of Col. von der Goltz viz., the formation of 
 independent patrols, as described in another article and 
 to which the reader is referred. 
 
 Perhaps, in our own case, the re-creation of the light 
 companies might meet the difficulty best, for our companies 
 are almost too small for further depletion ; but in any case it 
 seems to me that, if we are to retain our position as an army 
 ready to go anywhere and do anything, w 7 e shall again have 
 to go back to specially selected and trained light troops, 
 taught toskirmish like red Indians, and to infantry of the line, 
 taught also to fight in individual order as far as their quali- 
 fications will permit, but whose chief strength should lie in 
 their absolute discipline when moving under conditions ia 
 
22 Military Letters and Essays, 
 
 which they are exposed to losses, but not able to return the 
 fire, as in the following lines of an attack. 
 
 THE CONDITIONS OF MODERN WARFARE. 
 
 In a former letter I endeavored to show how recent 
 changes in armament had rather favored the prospects of the 
 cavalry being again employed in masses, than the reverse. 
 This week I hope to* set artillery officers thinking as to 
 whether there may not also be for them a period of greater 
 tactical importance approaching. I assume in all cases, in 
 speaking of the "battle" i. e., of the decisive encounters of a 
 great war that the condition of the ground on which it wil) 
 be fought out will be favorable for maneuvers. This must nec- 
 essarily be the case where two large .armies, equally confi- 
 dent in their fighting power, are opposel to each other ; for 
 both will naturally try to obtain the conditions best suited to 
 give full play to their maneuvering capabilities, and also 
 because the large number of roads necessary for the move- 
 ments of the monster armies of the day will, as a rule, only be 
 found in comparatively easy country, clear of natural obsta- 
 cles and cover. As pointed out in another letter, every battle 
 must necessarily commence with a, great artillery duel, and 
 the issue of this duel determines for the rest of the first act 
 of the drama which side is to be considered as the attacker 
 and which as the defender. It is unnecessary to go into 
 the details of such an encounter; they belong purely to the 
 artillery; and, thanks to the efforts of our Inspector General 
 of Artillery in India, our gunners have now as reasonable a 
 chance of learning this part of their duties in the annual prac- 
 tice camps as those of any other army. It is the handling of 
 artillery relatively to the other arms that it is particularly 
 desired to bring out. The first great point to be decided is 
 whether modern artillery, with guns of approximately the 
 same power as our new 12-pounder, can be relied on to pro- 
 tect their own front. Colonel ISrackenbury, in his pamphlet 
 on the use and abuse of field artillery, reviewed in these col- 
 umns a few weeks ago, thinks it can; and as regards an 
 attack by infantry, he is certainly right; but as against the 
 charges of cavalry divisons, his conclusion is open to ques 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 23 
 
 tion. The Austrian artillery in 1806 were undeniably brave 
 and determined soldiers. It was the one arm which in that 
 disastrous campaign upheld the honor of its country; yet 
 Bredow's regiment of four squadrons rode into and captured 
 18 of their guns with a loss of only 13 horses, notwithstand- 
 ing the facts that the gunners had 1,500 yards clear range in 
 front of them, and the cavalry horses were in campaigning 
 condition (action of Tobitschau). Similarly, at Vionville his 
 brigade had to face the fire of 36 French guns at least, over 
 1,800 yards of open, yet they practically lost nothing from 
 their fire. Indeed, an officer who rode in the charge assured 
 me that in his front only one gun was fired twice, and that the 
 French officer in command of the battery told him after- 
 wards, in the hospital at Metz, that their approach had been 
 so rapid that they simply could not lower the elevation fast 
 enough to follow them. In the meanwhile, no doubt, the 
 power of the guns has increased enormously, but there is 
 room for considerable improvement before the stopping limit 
 is reached. The cavalry, too, have also made progress in the 
 speed and distance they can gallop and in the ease with 
 which they maneuver; and charges such as those delivered 
 at the cavalry maneuvers in Alsace in 1886, where two whole 
 divisions, say 6,000 sabers, were hurled at full gallop against 
 an artillery line of nearly 100 guns, will have quite a different 
 effect on the nerves of the gunners than the smaller ones had 
 An officer of the British artillery who was present on one of 
 these occasions confessed that the effect was simply over- 
 powering, and that the gunners actually had barely time to 
 fire more than five rounds or so. My conclusion is that, at any 
 rate during the earlier battles of the war, until, in fact, one 
 cavalry has established such a marked superiority over the 
 other that the latter will not dare to make the attempt in the 
 face of its watchful enemy, an artillery line cannot be held 
 as capable of protecting its own front on the field of battle 
 against cavalry; and if any artillery officers disagree with 
 this conclusion, I would ask them to go down to Muridki, if 
 the camp is not over before this letter reaches you, and ask 
 General Luck to show them what a charge of two cavalry 
 divisions means, even over an apparently open plain. 
 
 If the conclusion is granted, then it follows that both 
 
24 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 sides will be compelled to form their great lines of guns 
 under cover of strong infantry advanced guards, and these 
 guards, in order to assist in the work of their artillery, will 
 endeavor to advance near enough to be able to overwhelm 
 the enemy's gunners with their long-range fire. But a limit 
 will be placed on this advance by their own near approach 
 to each other; for if they cannot succeed in getting near 
 enough to the enemy's guns, the next best thing they can do 
 will be to prevent the enemy getting near enough to their 
 own guns, which it is their special object to protect. The 
 consequence will therefore in all probability be a stubborn 
 fire fight between the two in tan tries, and the next question 
 is. How are the supports of these two lines to be placed? Let 
 us assume the two artilleries distant 2,000 yards from each 
 other, and the two infantry guards SOO yards apart, then 
 each guard will be GOO yards in advance of its own guns. 
 Now it is evident that under normal conditions no support* 
 can be placed in front of the guns where they would be 
 exposed to all the overs nieanj I'm- the front line, the shells 
 short of the guns, and the premature bursts of their own 
 shells. Equally evident is it that it is not reasonably possi- 
 ble to place them closer in rear of the guns without exposing 
 them to tremendous loss, for the ground in rear of the artil- 
 lery will be torn up by shell splinters and shrapnel bullets for 
 a good 1,000 yards to the rear. The consequence is that at 
 this stage of the proceedings the two infantries engaged will 
 be only 800 yards apart, and neither will have any support 
 at hand within less than 1,000 yards. This does not very 
 much signify to the side which means to attack, and at this 
 period, the result of the artillery duel being still undecided, 
 neither can yet be considered as having renounced the offen- 
 sive definitely. But the time must come when one or the 
 other is distinctly getting the upper hand, and the unsuccess- 
 ful side must make up its mind what to do. It seems impos- 
 sible to expect that any leader would deliberately elect to 
 expose his artillery to piecemeal annihilation. Rather it is 
 likely that he will withdraw his guns while there is yet a 
 chance of getting them off in sufficiently good condition to 
 render it possible to employ them in a new direction at a later 
 stage of the battle. Then comes the problem, HOW T is the gap 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 25 
 
 they leave to be filled? This is a point our text-books and 
 easy guides to promotion do not tackle ; indeed, I have never 
 met a professor or instructor in the British service who had 
 ever contemplated it. Yet to my mind it is the crux of tbe 
 whole matter, and is so difficult of solution that alone it suf- 
 fices to establish the superiority of the attack over the 
 defence. 
 
 Try and picture the scene for a moment. It is a matter 
 of common knowledge that nothing works so detrimentally 
 on the morale of infantry as the withdrawal of the guns, but 
 just as this withdrawal commences, the order comes to the 
 latter to advance. The enemy's artillery has seen the prepa- 
 rations for retreat, and now intensifies its fire to the utmost, 
 at the same time giving the elevating screws a turn to 
 increase the range a little, and the whole ground for 1,000 
 yards in rear of the target is torn up into dust by the splinters 
 of shrapnel and shell, and through this dust and confusion 
 come galloping some hundred teams of almost unmanage- 
 able horses. Imagine the position of an officer in command 
 of one of the supporting battalions, who has been brought 
 up all his life to believe that only in extended order is salva- 
 tion. His common sense would tell him that in this case it 
 would mean rout entire and decisive; but it is hard to break 
 with the fixed conviction of a lifetime at such a moment, and 
 more especially to one who for perhaps some thirty years has 
 been deliberately taught to shirk responsibility. But let us 
 suppose his common sense to triumph, and that the battalion 
 or battalions reach the crest of the ridge and see the enemy 
 before them. What reasonable chance exists of covering 
 the remaining six hundred yards of open which still separate 
 them from the advance guard in full view and fire of the vic- 
 torious artillery? Prince Hohenlohe's notes on the French 
 advances at Gra velotte and the fire of the Guard artillery at 
 Sedan will supply the answer. 
 
 This, of course, is the moment to be seized by the cavalry, 
 as is pointed out in another letter, and therefore need not 
 be gone into again here. I will, however, assume that the 
 opportunity is allowed to slip, and that the defenders' infan- 
 try, thanks to steadiness and discipline, succeed in reaching 
 the line held bv their advance guard, and establishing them- 
 
26 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 selves in it. And further, that they succeed in beating off 
 the attempts of the assailants to advance further. The fight, 
 as has so often happened, comes to a deadlock, both infan- 
 tries still strong enough to defend the ground they snmd on, 
 but neither possessing "go" enough to advance. The only pos- 
 sibility now of carrying through the action lies in the ad- 
 vance of the artillery to decisive range utterly regardless 
 of loss. With each minute the infantry fight continues, the 
 accuracy of fire falls off, and probably not one man on either 
 side remains cool enough to hit a single gunner at 600 yards 
 In a recent letter on Colonel Brackenbury's paper on Field 
 Artillery, I quoted the results of the French experiments at 
 Bourges, which showed that on the peace practice-ground 
 the four batteries of a French division could at 1,200 yards 
 develop a fire effect equal to that of the whole infantry of the 
 division when drawn up in normal attack formation; and 
 further, that, from the Okehampton experiments, the powt r 
 of artillery increased enormously as the range decreased; 
 hence, since the accuracy of artillery fire does not fall off 
 under fire to anything like the extent that the accuracy of 
 infantry fire does, it is reasonable to assume that an advance 
 of the guns of the attacking division abreast of the infantry, 
 or a little in advance of it, would have an absolutely over- 
 whelming effect. If even in 1870, with guns of barely a fifth 
 of the power of those of to-day, such an advance was in all 
 cases except one (at the farm of St. Hubert, Gravelotte) 
 practically decisive, to-day there ought to be no doubt about 
 it at all. Obviously such an advance is only possible at this 
 period for the side which gained the upper hand in the pre- 
 liminary duel, and it is only after some such attempt has been 
 made and failed that the defenders' guns can come on th? 
 scene at all, but then an opportunity will be offered them, 
 which, if taken, ought to decide the action at once. But to 
 seize either this or the former one, it is essential that the 
 artillery should be able to maneuver well and rapidly; and 
 it therefore seems likely that in the future higher demands 
 than ever will be made on the skill and pluck of the drivers. 
 In spite, therefore, of Prince Hohenlohe's statement, that in 
 practice he had never seen any formations used but columns 
 of subdivisions and line, and that for all practical purposes 
 
Military Letters ana Essays. 27 
 
 all the remaining formations in the drill-book might be cut 
 out, it appears to me that, though no doubt this was the case 
 in the war to which he refers, it is assuming a great deal too 
 much to take it as proved that maneuvering will no longer be 
 required in the next. On the contrary, if we are to be pre- 
 pared for events, it would seem necessary to practice the 
 handling of these large masses of guns in peace; very much 
 on the same lines as those now followed by the cavalry divi- 
 sions, the point in both being so far the same that in each 
 case the object is to transfer a large body of mounted men 
 from a distant point and form them in a line facing the enemy 
 in the least possible time. In one respect here the Germans 
 are decidedly ahead of us. With theul the field artillery are 
 particularly trained to cover long distances at the gallop, 
 and also do a certain amount of maneuvering at that pace. 
 Of course we can gallop too on occasion, but one would like 
 to see it a little more practiced in peace. 
 
 To my mind, the more one thinks over it, the more one 
 becomes convinced that the form of the battle is tending 
 back every day towards that of the Napoleonic era. For a 
 time improvements alternately in the artillery and infantry 
 armament gave to one side or the other a preponderance of 
 strength, and this preponderating power gave its stamp to 
 the battle. But the relative powers of the two arms are now 
 again very much what they were at the commencement of 
 the century, only each arm has about tenfold the striking 
 distance it formerly possessed. The shape of the battle 
 will, therefore, be much what it was before, only with the 
 distance multiplied approximately by ten. Whether any 
 modern battle will ever be fought out w r ith the bloody deter- 
 mination of say Wagram or Friedland, it is impossible to 
 say, only with short-service armies it is at least improbable: 
 but it is because of these changes in the condition of service 
 that I am inclined to believe that the strain of the fighting 
 will again tend to settle on the shoulders of the artillery; 
 and further, that if the latter are trained sufficiently highly 
 to answer all demands on their mobility and maneuvering 
 skill, it will be practically impossible for their side to be 
 defeated. Always provided, of course, we can find a gen- 
 eral who will know how to employ them. 
 
28 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 THE COST OF MODERN WAR 
 
 It has become one of the commonplaces of contemporary 
 journalism to refer to the frightful sacrifices of human life 
 that modern war entails, and to ask what rulers would dare 
 to incur the moral responsibility which such slaughter en- 
 tails. If facts and statistics bore them out, there would be 
 nothing to quarrel with in those phrases, for undoubtedly it 
 would be a great thing to bring public opinion into harmony 
 with the opinions of the experts who virtually decide on ques- 
 tions of peace or war; but since the facts actually point the 
 other way, it is a very bad thing indeed that the public should 
 be misled into believing the responsibility which rests on 
 the rulers is so great that they would hesitate for a moment 
 to embark on a war in which their calculations show victory 
 to be almost certainly on their side. For the cost of war t> 
 the victors is .by no means so great as the public believes, 
 and it may well happen that the rulers of other countries, 
 perfectly well informed on this point and confident in the 
 fighting value of their armies, may consider the game well 
 worth the candle, and thereby seriously derange the calcula 
 tions of those whose opinions have been formed on thos> 
 supplied them by the daily journalist. 
 
 It would be a good thing if every candidate for a seal in 
 Parliament were compelled to undergo a qualifying exami- 
 nation in the principles of war as an instrument of politics, 
 and a most searching one in the statistics of recent cam 
 paigns. I fancy the study this would involve would disa- 
 greeably astonish those who believe that any considerations 
 of humanity would deter a resolute governor or group of 
 governors from engaging in military operations in cases 
 where, seen from their own point of view, victory might 
 appear sufficiently certain. 
 
 Perhaps the following figures taken from Dr. Engel's 
 statistical work on the campaign of 1870-71 may induce some 
 of my readers to consider the matter. It is generally be- 
 lieved that this campaign was one of the bloodiest on record* 
 but actually the figures worked out by this writer, and which 
 may be considered as nearly accurate as it is possible for 
 figures dealing with such questions to be. proved that ex- 
 actly the opposite was the case. Out of close on one million 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 29 
 
 combatants that Germany poured into France during the 
 seven months the war lasted, scarcely 40,000 lost their lives 
 in battle or died of their wounds or of disease i. e., barely 4 
 per cent of the total number; and of these one-quarter suc- 
 cumbed to sickness, leaving as the net loss in killed due to 
 the enemy's fire, in round numbers, 30,000 only. Of the 
 10,000 who died of disease, about 6,000, according to the 
 tables of the life assurance offices, were bound to die any- 
 how, so that the net loss due to the campaign amounts to only 
 3.4 per cent. Compare this with the losses of human life 
 that any board of railway or canal directors is prepared to 
 risk with a light heart in an undertaking promising 5 per 
 cent return on the capital entrusted to their charge, and the 
 deduction is obvious, that the statesmen who have the lives 
 and happiness, to say nothing of the financial welfare, of the 
 nation they rule to look after, are a good deal more justified 
 in incurring the risk which the care and attention they have 
 devoted to their powers of offence has reduced to a minimum. 
 The statistics of human life lost in commercial undertakings 
 are not as carefully kept as is desirable, but it is pretty cer- 
 tain that the percentage of deaths on the Hurnai line, for 
 example, pretty largely exceeded that quoted above, and 
 equally so that of the Suez and Panama canals; the Severn 
 tunnel, and balf a hundred other undertakings whose names 
 will readily occur to any engineer of experience, were also 
 not completed, if completed at all, without a far greater pro- 
 portionate sacrifice of life than it cost Germany to subdue 
 France. And in comparison with the return in both moral 
 and material welfare that this campaign brought to the 
 former, what has any commercial undertaking to show? It 
 is quite impossible to state in figures w r hat the value of the 
 new sense of power is to the Germans as a race; but no 
 nation in Europe, even including England, can show any- 
 thing like the material development that has taken place 
 along the banks of the Khine, principally since the fear of 
 French invasion was definitely removed, and that, too, in 
 spite of the losses which, bimetallisms maintain, the intro- 
 duction of the gold coinage inflicted on the nation, losses 
 which in their opinion far exceeded in amount the indemnity 
 levied upon France, which in itself barely paid the expenses 
 
30 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of the war. Now in this particular case there was no im- 
 mediate prospect of great benefit to trade, there were no col- 
 onies worth speaking of to acquire, nor was Germany in a 
 position to secure the naval supremacy necessary to com- 
 mand trade over her enemy. How different would it be in a 
 war between France and England! and it is scarcely reason- 
 able to suppose that this obvious lesson of the war has been 
 lost on our neighbors across the Channel. Would it not be 
 as well if this view of the case were brought prominently 
 before those commercial members of the House who oppose 
 every proposed addition to our armaments? They at least, 
 as directors of paying concerns, ought to know that they 
 themselves would not hesitate to recommend a proportional 
 risk of life to their shareholders for a corresponding profit. 
 Why, therefore, should the directors of a state, who only do 
 for their country on a large scale what they are paid to do for 
 their shareholders, hesitate to incur an equal risk? 
 
 But the special military interest of these statistics lie* 
 more in the tables of the wounded. Most of us can probab' v 
 face the prospect of sudden death in the performance of duly 
 that is the special prerogative of our calling, as Schiller 
 in the "Keiterlied" sings 
 
 "Wer den Todt ins Angesicht schauen kann- 
 Der Soldat allein ist der freie Mann." 
 
 "He who can look death in the face 
 The soldier alone is a free man." 
 
 But the prospect of mutilation and agonizing wounds is by 
 no means so pleasant, and it is interesting to see what our 
 chances of escape actually are against the breech-loader. 
 Possibly, too, the figures may give us some foundation to go 
 on in reasoning out our tactical formations. 
 
 The total number of men wounded were, in the Infantry, 
 103,569 (including 4,365 officers); in the Cavalry, 3,546 (in- 
 cluding 262 officers); in the Artillery, 5,869 (including 421 
 officers); and in the Engineers, 402 (including 41 officers); 
 or a grand total of 113,386 of all arms and ranks. Hence, out 
 of every 1,000 infantrymen wounded, 42.1 per mille were 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 31 
 
 officers and 957.9 men; of every 1,000 cavalry wounded, 73.9 
 per mille were officers and the rest men ; and similarly for the 
 other two arms 71.7 and 102 per mille were officers respect- 
 ively. This rather upsets one's preconceived opinions, for I 
 confess I was quite unprepared to find that even in a cam- 
 paign in which the engineers' services were so little required 
 comparatively, the sapper's chances of being hit were 2 
 times as great as that of his comrade in the line; and that a 
 cavalry officer's chance, also in a campaign in which they 
 met with no real opposition, was worth so much less purchase 
 than an infantryman's. The same fact is even more aston- 
 ishing in the case of artillery, for there seems no particular 
 reason why the artillery officer should be in nearly double the 
 danger of the -infantry officer, who is compelled to expose 
 himself for the sake of example to his men much more fre- 
 quently than the gunner officer, who walks about his battery 
 apparently in no more special danger than the men who serve 
 the guns. 
 
 Another curious fact is also brought out in a battle, 
 showing the severity of the wounds viz., that it is again the 
 engineers and cavalry who share the distinction of getting 
 the severest wounds, for 22.4 per mille of the former died cf 
 their wounds within 24 hours, and 13.3 per mille of the cavalry, 
 against only 8.5 per mille of the artillery and infantry officers; 
 and as regards men, 182.2 per ruille of the cavalry, 146.9 of 
 the infantry, and only 105 of the artillery; the figures for 
 the engineers being a fraction less than for the infantry. 
 
 This result is even more astounding than the former, for 
 one would naturally have expected the artillery to have suf- 
 fered more from shell wounds generally, far the most dread- 
 ful to look at, than the other arms; and similarly, where the 
 greater proportion of both cavalries only used blunt swords 
 in steel scabbards, and where about a fifth of both were fur- 
 ther protected by cuirasses, the natural expectation would 
 have been to find a considerable percentage of insignificant 
 bruises and few dangerous wounds. These figures, of course, 
 only show the proportions in the troops who actually came 
 under fire. Taking them over the whole army, they come out 
 very differently, for cavalry and pioneers were far less fre- 
 quently engaged than the other two arms. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 It is interesting also to note the comparative degree of 
 danger to which the different ranks are exposed. Out of every 
 1,000 of each rank, 25.64 generals were killed, 96.29 staff otti- 
 cers, 78.9 captains, 80.5 lieutenants, and 3 surgeons; and of 
 the men in the ranks only 31.17 figures which show pretty 
 conclusively that the officers did their duty, and that the posi- 
 tion of general staff officer under breech-loading fire was not 
 altogether a sinecure. Comparing the probabilities of being 
 wounded, the staff still head the list with 182.2 per mille, the 
 lieutenants coming next with 176, the captains with 151, the 
 generals with 87, and the doctors last with only 22 per miile. 
 This last figure, and the corresponding one above, ought, by 
 the way, to cause the militant officer of the medical staff to 
 draw in his horns a bit. 
 
 Unfortunately, Dr. Engel only gives the number of fatal 
 cases of sickness, not the number treated in hospital, so it is 
 difficult to compare the relative losses that we suffer in an 
 Indian campaign with those which were occasioned by the 
 conditions of a European campaign. Dysentery, diarrhea, 
 and small-pox claimed most of the victims, and principally in 
 the army of investment round Metz, who certainly were com- 
 pelled to live under exceptionally unhygienic conditions. 
 But comparing the actual losses suffered by the officers with 
 those which would have occurred under normal conditions 
 in peace-time, according to the tables of the life assurance 
 societies, it appears that a campaign in France, in spite of its 
 drawbacks of bivouacs in cold and wet, was distinctly more 
 favorable to longevity than their usual manner of life in 
 peace. But against this must be set the fact that the officers 
 as a body were picked lives, and the insurance tables only 
 deal with average lives. At any rate, it is enough to raise 
 envious feelings in the minds of those who are serving their 
 country in Ind, to find that even in peace-time they are incur- 
 ring about three times the risk that the Prussians ran in war- 
 time from natural causes. Even the rank and file, who lost 
 twice as many as the officers in proportion, were more favor- 
 ably circumstanced than we are under ordinary conditions. 
 But it is a strong point in favor of those who believe with 
 Darwin that the existence of an aristocracy justifies the 
 theorv of the survival of the fittest, to find that the officers. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 33 
 
 the pick of the aristocracy of Germany, were only half as lia- 
 ble to disease as the men, who themselves are not the scimi 
 of the nation, but to a considerable extent selected lives, and 
 no one who knows the German army would attempt to main- 
 tain that this immunity was due to the officers having taken 
 advantage of their position to secure more favorable sur- 
 roundings, for the German officer considers it as much a mat- 
 ter of honor to share the hardships of the men as we ourselves 
 do. Of course the senior officers are able to take more care 
 of themselves than the junior regimental officers, and with 
 disciplined troops this is as it should be; but the figures 
 show pretty clearly how much less elastic the older consti- 
 tutions are than the young ones, for the death-rate in the 
 ranks of the generals was 20.5 per mille as against 8.17 and 
 7.24 in those of the lieutenants and captains respectively, 
 whilst for the men it was only 13.8, or a fraction over the 
 British peace-time average, including India and the Colonies. 
 The reason for the sentimental outcry about the slaughter 
 in this war is, of course, to be found in the fact that even 3 per 
 cent on a million makes a pretty large figure, and the ordi- 
 nary human mind has a tendency to consider human suffer- 
 ing as cumulative, and not individual. But this is the one 
 mistake the soldier should guard against making, for it leads 
 to an altogether false appreciation of the facts. Unless the 
 will is steeled to resist it, the sight of a great number of 
 maimed and mutilated fellow-creatures will create an impres- 
 sion altogether overpowering. But, in reality, it is the indi 
 vidual suffering only which counts. The sufferings of a man 
 shattered beyond recognition almost by an explosion of gun- 
 powder probably the most intense form of anguish known 
 are not in the least alleviated to the man himself by the 
 knowledge that Jie is the only sufferer. Indeed, the tendency 
 of the human mind is directly the other way, and it is a satis- 
 faction even to a man with a toothache to find a fellow-suf- 
 ferer. On the other hand, it must, of course, be admitted 
 that where a large number of wounded are gathered together, 
 their individual comforts are liable to be curtailed ; but then, 
 where suffering is really great, it is astonishing how little 
 the sufferer cares about these comforts. Probably this letter 
 will seem most cold-blooded and inhuman to civilians, but it 
 
34 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 is written primarily for soldiers, and to soldiers it is, above 
 all things, necessary that no conceivable amount of human 
 suffering which, by the way, they may themselves be shar- 
 ing next moment should be able to shake their resolution. 
 There is a saying in vogue in the German cavalry which 
 might also be extended to every other arm viz., "Care for 
 your horses (resp. men) in the stable like a miser cares for 
 his gold, risk them in battle like a gambler," and, it might be 
 added, be absolutely regardless for the lives of your eneiay. 
 
 The truth is, that it is this invincible hardness of charac- 
 ter, far more than ingeniousness of brain, which really makes 
 the great commander. The mere intellectual effort of form- 
 ing a military plan to turn an enemy's flank or pierce his cen- 
 ter is so slight that the commonest schoolboy's brain would 
 suffice for it. The reason why such plans as Napoleon carried 
 out against his enemies are not more frequently met with in 
 military history is because the majority of men cannot face 
 the awful responsibility for human lives which such plans 
 entail. This is no new doctrine ; in fact, it is identical with 
 the advice Krishna gave to Arjuna in the Mahabharala, 
 which goes to prove how very similar human nature was in 
 those days to what it is now; and to all those who may be called 
 on toassumethe responsibility of leadingmen against theene- 
 my, I cannot do better than recommend the passage, which 
 they will find in Edwin Arnold's translation of the Bhagaved 
 Gita a book which contains far more valuable maxims for 
 the officer than all the text-books of tactics put together. 
 
 Tactically, the lessons to be deduced from these figures 
 are equally important. It is shown now beyond possibility 
 of question that the actual danger of material loss, even in 
 face of such a far superior weapon as that with which the 
 French were armed, is far less than what it was with the old 
 muzzle-loader a result the exact opposite of what was 
 prophesied by the gun-maker ; and hence it seems a fair de- 
 duction to make that in the next war, with equal arms on each 
 side, the losses wall be still less. For, owing to the increase*) 
 range at which these new arms are effective, there will bo 
 more time for the nervous to get frightened, and a corre- 
 sponding increase in opportunity for those whose hearts are 
 not in it, to escape from the danger; in other words, the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 35 
 
 amount of skulkers will be greater a probability for which 
 the Germans, at least, seem prepared, at any rate to a far 
 greater extent than any other power. If, for example, for 
 one man hit formerly five were frightened, next time the pro 
 portions will be as one to ten; and since frightened troops 
 are the special prey of the cavalry, the opportunities for its 
 employment will be doubly great. But if we wish to avoid 
 this danger, the path seems perfectly clear before us. We 
 must base our formations more on those which render the 
 preservation of order easier, than on those which tend to 
 reduce losses. It is better to lose a dozen men out of fifty 
 and keep the remainder in hand, than to save, say six, and 
 have the whole of the rest beyond control; and the most 
 feasible means of attaining this object will be found either 
 in Major Young's silver medal scheme, or in that of the "Mid- 
 summer-Night's Dream," which was recently reviewed in 
 your columns. The principle of both is the same, and either 
 would serve the required purpose. 
 
 GERMAN CAVALRY MANEUVERS. 
 
 I have just ridden in from the cavalry drill-ground, where 
 the general officer commanding the llth Corps has been 
 inspecting the two regiments of the Hessian Dragoon Guards 
 quartered here, and sit down at once to record my impres- 
 sions whilst they are still fresh and vivid before me. I went 
 down to the ground this morning almost prepared to scoff, 
 but I have returned decidedly inclined to pray, figuratively 
 speaking. It is intensely difficult for any Englishman, 
 proud of his race and the magnificent material for cavalry 
 soldiers it produces, to divest his mind of the patriotic bias 
 and to view things as they really are, after his ideas of mili- 
 tary smartness and etiquette have been upset by seeing the 
 individually dirty and badly turned-out types of the German 
 soldier about the street It is impossible to avoid drawing 
 unfavorable conclusions between the half -grown country 
 bumpkins in uniform one sees on sentry-go here, with the 
 smart, well-set-up hussar or lancer one is accustomed to see 
 swaggering down the Mall, say at Meerut or Lucknow; and 
 
36 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 in each case the bias leads one unconsciously to contrast the 
 extreme types of either, instead of taking a fair average of 
 both. 
 
 As I rode down towards the artillery range on which the 
 inspection was held, I reviewed in my mind all that I had pre- 
 viously written on the subject, and almost convinced myself 
 that I had really formerly sinned in the anti-patriotic line, 
 and that these troops could not be so good as they had ap- 
 peared to me to be at a distance. But almost the first ap 
 pearance of the regiment on parade Jbrought me to my senses. 
 I rode along the line two or three times to be quite certain 
 that I was not mistaken, and I saw that every horse was 
 drawn up dead square to the alignment, and every stirrup 
 practically touching i. e., the two fundamental principles 
 of accurate maneuvering strictly fulfilled. Presently the 
 general arrived and rode down the line, and then the march- 
 past began in column of divisions at a walk. About this 
 there was nothing particular to notice, except that the horses, 
 though in singularly plump condition for Germany, looked 
 terribly overweighted, and that the position of their heads 
 was uniformly good. On the other hand, their saddlery and 
 bridles left a great deal to be desired, though the men's uni- 
 forms were sufficiently well kept. There was no trot-pa,s+, 
 and immediately after the walk-past the regiment formed -up 
 in squadron columns at close interval, and the movements 
 began. They lasted nearly an hour and a half without a sin- 
 gle halt to dismount, and it is hardly possible to recall the 
 run of them, but I will attempt to do so. 
 
 First they moved off at a trot and executed a beautiful 
 wheel in this close order, then wheeled into half-column and 
 moved diagonally with perfect steadiness for about 400 
 yards; then wheeled back again into squadron columns and 
 opened to full intervals; broke again into half-column, and 
 after another quarter of a mile of this diagonal movement, 
 formed to the front on the leading division and galloped 
 some 200 yards; then broke into column left in front, and. 
 still at a gallop, moved off to the left flank. This gallop ii- 
 column of divisions was quite the thing of the day, there be- 
 ing five squadrons of 64 files each. The column was but lit- 
 tle short of a quarter of a mile long, and consisted of twenty 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 37 
 
 divisions ("zttge"), yet, in spite of its great length, the rear divi- 
 sions swung along as smoothly as the front ones, and there 
 was no perceptible opening out. After keeping this up in 
 the original direction for 1,500 yards at least, the head of 
 the column changed direction to the left, and when it had 
 gone another 600 yards, as near as I can measure it off a very 
 fair-sized map which I have every reason to believe to be ac- 
 curate the "wheel into line" was sounded, and the whole ad- 
 vanced, still at the same pace, for another 500 yards (making 
 in all close on 3,000 yards at the gallop), and then broke into 
 a trot and eventually halted for a moment's rest. The pace 
 had been so good that I had myself been left behind, and can- 
 not say how the wheel into line was actually carried out; but, 
 judging the final advance from the flank, it seemed to have 
 been carried out w 7 ith wonderful exactness. 
 
 Fresh instructions having been issued, the regiment 
 again broke into column of divisions and disappeared at a 
 trot up one of the broad roads leading through the semi-per- 
 manent camp which skirts the drill-ground. Presently we 
 heard the "halt" and the equivalent sound of "troops about*' 
 sounded, and immediately after the "gallop" again. About 
 500 yards from the mouth of the road lay a ridge of low sand- 
 hills, which was evidently supposed to be occupied by in- 
 fantry, and against these each squadron front-formed and 
 charged as they emerged from the defile. In spite of the 
 ground, which is a heavy sand, rather firmer than that about 
 Lawrencepore, the pace was tremendous, and though the 
 charges were hot delivered in quite as well closed order as 
 they might have been, yet, considering the squadrons had 
 already been galloping some distance before they front- 
 formed, the performance, on the whole, was of a very high 
 order. After the charge, the usual melee was represented, 
 and two squadrons charged again in capital order without 
 re-forming; then the assembly sounded, and the regiment 
 re-formed in rendezvous formation. They were allowed 
 only a few moments to recover themselves, and then were 
 off again working as a regiment in the front line of a brigade. 
 There were some more diagonal movements in half -column, 
 and then line formed to the front at a gallop with chargemelee 
 and pursuit fa capo about 15 minutes' more drilling with a 
 
38 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 formation to the front again from columns already gallop- 
 ing, but with no charge, and then the work was brought to a 
 close by a charge of the regiment in the conventional three 
 lines against a marked enemy led by an independent leader, 
 who very cleverly threw two of his skeleton squadrons on to 
 the melee when the whole of the other regiment was already 
 engaged. At last the regiment halted, and whilst the officers 
 rode out to the critique, the squadrons wnv once again 
 formed up for the final gallop past. This was very well car- 
 ried out. The officers having rejoined their troops, the 
 whole, headed by the band, moved off at the gallop. The lat- 
 ter, when level with the saluting point nearly, wheeled off to 
 a flank, and wheeled up again as usual, but playing their in- 
 struments and galloping at the same time, and the good old 
 kettledrum horse galloped proudly into his jplace by an in- 
 verse wheel to that of the rest of the band, and pulled up as 
 accurately in his place as any man could have done; and 
 then the squadrons swept by with an even smoothness of 
 motion that left nothing to be desired. The ground was so 
 soft that the beat of the hoofs was hardly audible, and hence 
 there was less of the "pulse of war and passion of wonder" 
 feeling about it than usually fills the hearts of those privi- 
 leged to see the gallop-past of a British regiment over the 
 hard maidan* of the East; but, on the other hand, though 
 the pace was as good as it ever ought to be, viz., 15 miles an 
 hour at least, the horses were still Hiormighly in hand 200 
 yards beyond the saluting point, and the formation in two 
 ranks distinctly preserved two points which have too often 
 in India been only conspicuous by their absence at reviews 
 w r hich could be named. This closed the proceedings for tli> 
 first regiment inspected, and the officers were again fallen 
 out to listen to what I afterwards learnt to have been the 
 most complimentary remarks of the inspecting officer. 
 
 The next regiment went through much the same move- 
 ments, so it is unnecessary to treat it in such detail How- 
 ever, it struck me as distinctly inferior to the other; and in 
 subsequent conversations with the staff officers of the bri- 
 gade, I found my idea was confirmed ; still it was very good 
 indeed, and would have compared most favorably with the 
 best performances of our own regiments. Only one point 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 39 
 
 struck me as distinctly inferior to what I have seen in India, 
 and that may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the 
 inspecting officer was an infantryman, and therefore it was 
 thought safe to go in for a bit of eyewash which could not 
 have escaped a cavalryman's keener perception. I allude to 
 the melees; they were, on the whole, only indifferently done, 
 though I have seen independent squadrons of the same regi- 
 ment execute them perfectly some few years ago. But to- 
 day the men stuck together and hardly broke up at all ; and 
 I should like to have been able to show the Germans what, 
 for instance, the llth Bengal Lancers can do in the same 
 line. 
 
 The condition of the horses w r as simply wonderful; for 
 the last three weeks they have been out five times a week at 
 regimental drills, rarely of less duration than five hours from 
 the time of leaving barracks to returning, and, working out 
 the distances with the map and my friends, I cannot put it 
 down below 30 miles a day, in field-day order certainly, but 
 still at a pace which one can only believe when one has seen 
 i t. The very day before the inspection the regiment was out r,- 
 hours; I went to stables to see the horses after they came in. 
 yet they were sleek and fat enough, and none of them showed 
 signs of fatigue. To-day, after our return, I went down 
 again; though they had not dismounted once during the 
 drill, and had been going at full regulation pace of 8 miles an 
 hour trot and 15 gallop, yet they looked as well as possible. 
 How they do it is still a mystery to me. Their allowance 
 of oats is certainly fractionally better than ours, allowing 
 for the smaller size of the horses, and their hay ration consid- 
 erably smaller how much so I cannot say off-hand, but mast 
 refer my readers to a previous letter on the subject of horses', 
 rations some three months back. I cannot see that their 
 stable management in detail is superior to ours in fact, I 
 think it is decidedly the reverse; and the only explanation 
 1 can offer for the fact is the marked advantage they have 
 over us in being able to keep their remounts till they are ris- 
 ing 7 years before putting them to hard work. 
 
 On my way back I had a long conversation apropos of 
 this subject with one of the officers who had himself been in 
 India in 1887, and had seen our cavalrv in several stations. 
 
40 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 notably in Rawalpindi; and that was the only reason he could 
 assign for what was as evident to him as to me. 
 
 A great part of the maneuvers of both regiments were 
 executed on the silent system; it was an extremely still 
 morning, with a light haze hanging, and the sound carried 
 extremely well, as long as they were working by words of 
 command. But when they dispensed with them, the effect 
 of this large mass moving silently over the soft ground, with 
 only a confused jangle of accouterments, was weird in the 
 extreme. And it was astonishing how every movement of 
 the colonel, the senior major, the adjutant, and two trump- 
 eters, riding some 150 yards in front of the line, was followed 
 and obeyed; it was a triumph for the follow-my-leader 
 school; and I for one cannot believe it possible that such 
 movements could have been performed with our "base" 
 system. 
 
 I have been told, and indeed can see for myself, that 
 immense improvements have been made in the last seven 
 years; perhaps the limit of the possible attainable with such 
 material has been attained. Recollect that the outside ser- 
 vice any man in the ranks can have is only four years, and the 
 majority have only two years and eight months at the out- 
 side; that the men are soldiers under compulsion, and not by 
 free will, and the majority are simply incapable of teaming to 
 ride really well "because they are not built that way" ; andthcu 
 think what might we not accomplish with our very decided 
 superiority in material, both of horse and man, if only we 
 would con descend to step out of our shellsof insularprejudice 
 and adopt a system which is not by any means only German, 
 but which may be said to obtain in the conduct of every civil- 
 ized business throughout the world except in our army viz., 
 the decentralization of authority, and the giving to every 
 man according to his rank full power to make the most of 
 what is in him and in the men under him. 
 
 Since my last letter T have been out to drills and inspec- 
 tions almost daily. I do not profess to attempt to describe 
 all I saw in detail, but will confine myself to those points that 
 struck me most as likely to be interesting to my readers. The 
 inspection of the cavalry brigade was a sight not easily for- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 41 
 
 gotten; the two regiments turned out five squadrons, each 
 from 60 to 64 files two pretty imposing masses to handle. 
 One of the most noticeable features about the drill was the 
 absolutely simultaneous obedience to the trumpet sounds or 
 words of command. As the last notes of the trumpets still 
 rang in the air, every horse throughout the whole mass 
 moved off at the prescribed pace. When one takes into con- 
 sideration the fact that the brigade in columns of divisions 
 was about 700 yards long, and that literally as quick as one's 
 eye could sweep from one end of the formation to another 
 the last horse of the body was moving, it will be evident to 
 what perfection they have attained. Equally striking was 
 it to see the regiments in close column of squadrons move 
 off together, and the wheeling of the brigade, in both rep- 
 ments in this formation, was simply extraordinary, each regi- 
 ment maintaining its exact shape like a small rectangular 
 block without the least appearance of straggling at the 
 edges; the best-drilled infantry wheeling in quarter-column 
 could not have excelled them. 
 
 One of the most startling things I have seen done was an 
 impromptu charge against infantry. To explain it, I must 
 say a word about the ground. It is a large irregular rectan- 
 gle, about 3,000 yards by 1,500, bounded on the south and 
 east by woods with broad roads cut through them, and on the 
 north by the line of the artillery semi-permanent encamp- 
 ment, whilst to the west it meets with cultivation which may 
 not be ridden over. The soil is a somewhat heavy sand, with 
 a little clay mixed with it, and it is broken by a few gentle 
 undulations hardly perceptible at a distance, but still deep 
 enough to hide even lancers from the eye. The brigade had 
 been trotting up the northern boundary of the camp in col- 
 umn of squadrons in a westerly direction, and had then 
 wheeled half-left into half-column. When the inspecting 
 officer, riding on the central ridge, saw a regiment of infantry 
 just beginning to issue from the skirts of the wood on the 
 south, and to his right rear, he instantly so umied "troops 
 right about," which brought them into half-column, or ob- 
 lique echelon, exactly in the opposite direction to that in 
 which they had previously been proceeding; then sounded 
 the "gallop" and "line to the front" for the right regiment, 
 
4:2 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 whilst the left one continued its movement in half-column 
 till it got in position to act as support to the first line, which 
 meanwhile swept over the ridge and came down on the in- 
 fantry so rapidly that hardly 200 men were able to get out of 
 the wood and open fire on them. Two hundred rifles, even 
 repeaters, with barely 300 yards of open to develop their tire 
 on, against 1,000 sabers advancing at full gallop, and there- 
 fore under fire for, at the outside, thirty seconds only, could 
 hardly hope for success, and it gave one an idea of how great 
 the opportunities for cavalry which may still arise are, if 
 only the latter can maneuver and their leaders know how to 
 takeadvantageof the ground properly. Altogether within the 
 week I have seen upwards of twenty charges of the whole bri- 
 gade in line,soinetimes formed from squadron columns already 
 at the gallop, and though occasionally one noticed squadrons 
 a little bit too loose at the moment (supposed) of collision, 
 yet, on the whole, I have seen nothing to alter my opinion as 
 to their immense superiority in this knee-to-knee riding over 
 the performances of our own regiments; and in conversa- 
 tion with the officers I find an absolute agreement amongst 
 them that such riding is only possible with thoroughly 
 broken horses, and where troops are maneuvered on the fol- 
 low-my-leader system i. e., where the squadron leaders fol- 
 low the regimental leaders, and the squadrons regulate their 
 pace and intervals by watching their own leaders, and not 
 by turning their heads towards a directing base. 
 
 But by this time most of my readers will have had 
 enough of cavalry for this week, so I will now turn for a short 
 space to the infantry. As I have often pointed out before, 
 the new regulations have introduced but little external 
 change in the drills, except that they no longer march-past 
 at the advance, but at the slope; and that the men have a 
 little more space in the ranks. The reviews present nothing 
 striking, and even in the maneuvers there is but little to 
 change. The new equipment has not yet been served out, 
 though it is in store for almost the whole army now, and the 
 smokeless powder has not made its way down south yet. 
 Apropos of this latter, those most likely to know are far from 
 taking the sanguine views of the popular writers about it. 
 There is still more than a question as to its stability, even 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 43 
 
 under the climatic conditions; and as to its noiselessness, 
 they say it is only less noisy because hitherto it has only been 
 experimented with out of smaller calibers than those gener- 
 ally in use, and that, in point of fact, under similar condi- 
 tions, it is rather the noisier of the two; and, indeed, since it 
 gives the highest muzzle velocities, it must necessarily Jki 
 so, for the report of a gun depends on the velocity with which 
 the bullet or other object projected and the particles created 
 by the explosion encounter the particles of air at the muzzle; 
 at least, that is the opinion of experts in sound, such as 
 Tyndall. 
 
 One change, however, has been carried out namely, in 
 the manner of carrying the old equipment which has con- 
 duced to the comfort of the man, if not to his appearance. 
 This is, that the greatcoat is no longer worn horse-collar 
 fashion over the left shoulder, but is rolled over the knap- 
 sack, thus relieving the man of a great deal of pressureacross 
 the chest, and rendering it easier for him to get under cover 
 and to shoot when lying dow r n. Formerly, too, the helmets 
 were made too straight, they tell me, for a man to shoot lying 
 down. With the coat on the knapsack, the helmet was tilted 
 down over his eyes so that he could not see, as is still the 
 case in our army; but at length a genius arose who discov- 
 ered how to avoid this by altering the pattern of the head- 
 dress, and the change which has afforded so much relief to 
 the soldier has been carried out. When will a similar far- 
 sighted being arise in our own service I wonder? But whar 
 the soldier has gained in comfort he has lost in appearance. 
 The rolled great-coat gave the man a look of immense depth 
 of chest and general sturdiness, and misled a great many 
 observers to the opinion that the men actually were thicker 
 set than our own, which statistics show to be decidedly not 
 the case, and which is now evident to everyone. 
 
 I saw several attacks delivered, and though none of them 
 were exactly identical in detail, the broad principles were in 
 all the same. As near as possible, the sequence was as fol- 
 lows: The advance guard found the enemy, always a skel- 
 eton one, and opened fire upon him, while the troops in rear 
 formed up in quarter-column under cover. The captains 
 were then sent for, and the commander gave his instructions. 
 
44 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 Let us assume the attacking force to be a regiment of three 
 battalions; it was generally drawn up with two battalions 
 in first line, and the third in second, and in rear of one of the 
 two wings. The battalion to which the advance guard be- 
 longed now received the order to engage 1 lie enemy in front, 
 while the two others prepared to attack him in flank. Th^ 
 action of the retaining battalion was very similar to our own 
 ordinary attack viz., an advance of skirmishers at about 
 four paces interval, the skirmishers advancing in groups of 
 about eight men with an N. C. O., and leaving intervals for re- 
 inforcement, not quite as great as the front of one of these sec- 
 tions; the idea being that each section should close on its cen- 
 ter as casualties occurred to make room for the reinforcement 
 to come up. Each company formed its own support, whilst a 
 complete company formed the main body or reserve. Ac 
 cording to the ground, the advance was either a purely skirm- 
 ishing one, group by group creeping upas opportunity offered, 
 or, if the terrain was suitable, the whole company front ran 
 forward together till the whole were within about 300 yards 
 of the enemy. Meanwhile the attacking wing had opened 
 out into lines of company columns, 1 wo in first, two in second, 
 two in third, and two in fourth line, generally arranged 
 chess-board fashion, or sometimes echeloned outwards, ac- 
 cording to the requirements of the case. Each company then 
 threw out a dense line of skirmishers, retaining usually one 
 "zug" i. e., one-third in support. The remaining lim's 
 followed about 400 to 500 yards in rear of each other mostly 
 in ordinary two-deep line with drums and fifes sounding 
 and the men in "parade marsch." The effect of this was in- 
 describably fine. Viewed from the enemy's side, the ad- 
 vance seemed perfectly irresistible. The fighting line 
 pressed on to within 600 to 700 yards without firing a shot, it 
 being one of the points chiefly insisted on in Germany that 
 fire should not be opened too soon. Then, however, it began 
 by spurts, as it were; three rounds independent fire; then 
 the whistle was heard, and the whole tiring ceased for a mo- 
 ment, and then, a fresh order being given, recommenced. 
 Once or twice in this stage I saw volleys fired ; but, as a gen- 
 oral rule, volleys in the attack are not believed in. As the 
 supports closed on the fighting line, the latter rose and ran 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 45 
 
 forward in two echelons only, each rush being for about 100 
 yards, so that three of them brought the line up to decisive 
 distance from the enemy's muzzles. By this time the sup- 
 ports, and sometimes the main body of the first line, had been 
 absorbed, but always the arrival of the next following line 
 was awaited, and then followed a few moments of perfectly 
 appalling magazine fire. Then the whistles sounded all 
 along the front, and the whole mass threw themselves on the 
 enemy with a cheer. The next line came up, passed through 
 or over the first, and took up the pursuit by firing volleys 
 after the enemy, whilst the remainder rallied with surpris- 
 ing rapidity; and, just as with the cavalry, a fresh operation 
 was undertaken in a new direction with the rallied forces. 
 It was this recommencement of operations at once which 
 principally struck me. With us the rush at the enemy's posi- 
 tion is too generally held to be the finale of the day's proceed- 
 ings, whereas actually it would more often be only the begin- 
 ning. But one criticism on the German practice I will per- 
 mit myself, and that is, that to follow the defeated enemy 
 again in extended order seems to me a very dangerous game 
 to play, for it is" just at this moment that offensive returns 
 by fresh bodies of troops may be expected, and these will 
 necessarily be made in close order, and through the dust, 
 smoke, and confusion will break on the pursuers with a sud- 
 denness which, backed by the magazine rifle, will be more 
 terrible than any bayonet attack of the past. There were 
 many other minor sins of omission and commission which re- 
 called the admirable criticisms of Prince Hohenlohe. Majors 
 and colonels insisted on riding in the front line, instead of. 
 commanding from their proper places in rear, and on one 
 occasion I saw two companies brought up to within twenty 
 paces of the fighting line, then within 300 yards of the <>ne- 
 my's position, in column; but, on the whole, one could not 
 help remarking the extraordinary rapidity and swing with 
 which the movements went. None of that dawdling about 
 and delay which is so common on our own drill-grounds, and 
 very far less of the direct interference of the senior officers 
 with their subordinates which tends to whiten the hair of 
 onr unfortunate captains. 
 
46 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 INDEPENDENT PATROLS. 
 
 A pamphlet has recently appeared in Berlin from the 
 pen of the well-known military writer Von der Goltz, author 
 of that excellent work the "Nation in Arms," which has been 
 translated into English more or less indifferently well, and 
 hence has become tolerably familiar in the service. 
 
 The object of his present pamphlet is to elucidate the 
 questions connected with smokeless powder and long-range 
 small-arms, and to recommend the formation and training of 
 independent patrols of men picked for their courage and 
 adroitness in true skirmishing, for the purpose of carrying 
 out a closer reconnaissance of the enemy's position than can 
 be executed, according to his views, by the cavalry alone. 
 What it comes to is briefly the formation of a new light divi- 
 sion, a special corps d? elite chosen from each company of th^ 
 army, and forming an integral part of it, but liable to be de- 
 tached and grouped together under the general direction of 
 an officer equally chosen for dash and skill in directing the 
 so-called minor operations of war. 
 
 General Von der Goltz's reputation stands so high that 
 it is impossible to suppose that he does not see the obvious 
 difficulties such an organization would entail; such, for in- 
 stance, as the apparently hopeless difficulty of securing ade- 
 quate co-operation between the different groups. There 
 must be some way out of them, and his request, not to con 
 denan his plan hastily, deserves that, as far as space permits, 
 he should be allowed to speak for himself. I will put his 
 concluding sentences first, and then follow him through the 
 course of a modern action as it presents itself to him. 
 
 "There may no doubt be many circumstances in war in 
 which these patrols could not be employed, or in which we 
 might dispense with them without inconvenience. But at 
 least it will be granted that such bodies, composed of intelli- 
 gent men, can do no harm to any one. Through them we 
 should raise a portion of the army above the level of the com- 
 mon herd, and create in our companies a kernel of soldiers, 
 reliable and ambitious, always at hand, and who would act, 
 aim, and shoot deliberately with their senses all awake, who 
 would understand patrolling in its highest sense, be able to 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 47 
 
 make reliable reports, and generally understand the phe- 
 nomena of war. From such men one could expect a higher 
 sense of duty and a fidelity on which the captains could 
 count in all circumstances. These reasons alone ought to 
 suffice to render it worth our while to select and specially 
 train those who show most aptitude for the work." 
 
 To begin now at the beginning: "Those leaders," h* 
 writes, "will have the best chance of success who can succeed 
 in bringing up their troops into the enemy's position, in com- 
 pact tactical units and without having suffered considerable 
 loss. The power of modern fire-arms, even at extreme 
 ranges, is so considerable, that even lines of skirmishers will 
 find themselves exposed to heavy loss from the moment tlie 
 ground ceases to give them any cover, and be able to inflict 
 very little indeed in return on the enemy, owing to the small - 
 ness of the target he exposes. Hence, just as at the com- 
 mencement of the century skirmishers had to precede the 
 column to draw off the enemy's attention, so is it necessary 
 to interpose a similar buffer between the dense lines of skir- 
 mishers and their foe. 
 
 "The greatest caution must be observed before commit- 
 ting these dense and not very manageable fighting lines to an 
 action ; it is absolutely essential to wait till our artillery has 
 established its superiority, and pending that, the fight must 
 be maintained by groups numerically weak, but composed 
 of picked men, whose steady aimed fire will absorb the atten- 
 tion of the adversary." 
 
 In fact, so far these independent patrols will fulfil ex- 
 actly the role of the light companies and light division of 
 the Peninsula days, the only difference being in their organi- 
 zation, which he now proceeds to explain : 
 
 "The leaders and men of these patrols must receive in 
 peace a specialized instruction. Each <zug' of a company 
 will furnish one of them, consisting of a non-commissioned 
 officer and eight men, whose packs will, wherever feasible, 
 be carried for them, they themselves carrying only their 
 ammunition and rations; the latter to enable them to get- 
 along even if separated for a couple of days from their 
 companies. 
 
48 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 "They will not be employed for the immediate protec- 
 tion of their own companies that duty will continue to 
 devolve on the ordinary patrols; but they will be used to 
 carry on special missions ordered by the officer in command 
 of the whole body of troops to which at the time they belong." 
 
 Let us follow now in detail the method of their employ- 
 ment he proposes. The cavalry division having established 
 the region in which the enemy is moving, clears the front and 
 leaves the two armies in the presence and within striking dis- 
 tance of one another; the immediate necessity is to establish 
 precisely the position to be attacked. In first line this duty 
 devolves on the divisional cavalry (which is unfortunate for 
 us,aswe have nowreduced ours to only one squadron perdivi 
 sion, altogether too small a proportion), but a man and horse 
 offerstoo gooda targetand finds too great difficulty in getting 
 cover to be counted on to get within less than 1,000 yards of 
 the enemy, if as near, and once within the zone in which with 
 the best will in the world they cannot hold out any longer, 
 they must be relieved of their duties by these independent 
 infantry patrols, who will simply "stalk" the enemy, brush 
 away any small outposts meant to keep off intruding cavalry 
 and scouts, and fix in detail the exact outline of the enemy's 
 position. On the importance of this information to the 
 leader before he determines on his line of attack it is unnec- 
 essary to dwell. Hitherto this duty has been undertaken 
 by the advance guard, and even in 1870 it was found that the 
 nature and composition of ordinary troops of the line could 
 not be trusted to carry it through. 
 
 Instead of "stalking" the enemy, they went for him 
 straight, became involved in a decisive engagement, and in- 
 stead of the following troops benefiting by the result of tho 
 intelligence secured, they had to be sacrificed to make good 
 the previous blunders. The essential point of difference, 
 therefore, lies in that the action of the patrols does not for?o 
 the hand of the commander. The risks they run are propor- 
 tionately great, and for that purpose the men must be spe- 
 cially selected for courage and skill as skirmishers in the old 
 sense of the word; and in this skill they will find the best 
 means of reducing their losses. 
 
 Mean while and under cover of these patrols the artillery 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 49 
 
 conies up into position, and as the skirmishing action in front 
 does not commit any one to decisive fighting, they can set 
 about the work of "ranging" with greater coolness and delib- 
 eration, which is all the more important because smoke-clouds 
 no longer expose the position of the enemy's guns. Even 
 the flash, which with the new powder is peculiarly vivid, no 
 longer betrays them, since the method of indirect laying has 
 reached its present perfection. 
 
 "At the present moment authorities are not agreed 
 whether artillery should be assigned to the advance guard 
 or not. For us the question is without importance as soon 
 as we have settled the question how the advance guard should 
 be employed. Its commander is authorized to seize what- 
 ever chances offer themselves by taking the initiative boldly. 
 For this purpose he requires the guns. If, for instance, it is 
 necessary to seize a village or a defile, he requires their sup- 
 port. If he meets the enemy advancing in force, he must put 
 in every gun at his disposal to check them. But if, on the 
 other hand, the enemy is found in position, it is his duty not 
 to commit his troops; otherwise he would be forcing the 
 hand of the chief commander, who would thereby lose all 
 freedom of action, and this will be the necessary consequence 
 ol engaging either guns or infantry too soon. The independ- 
 ent patrols afford him a means of avoiding both faults. 
 
 "Once the batteries have come into action, and the direc- 
 tion of the attack decided on, they must reduce the guns of 
 the adversary to silence, and then endeavor to shake his in- 
 fantry as much as possible. 
 
 "Their fire must be kept up over the heads of the ad- 
 vancing lines as long as possible, and when at last it is impos- 
 sible to distinguish friend from foe, a couple of turns of the 
 elevating screw should send the shells crashing into any 
 advancing reserves the latter may be bringing up, whether 
 visible or not. They should be there, and if they are not, it 
 is just one of the few cases where it is better to waste the 
 shells on the chance. 
 
 "The use of these independent patrols will, however, 
 immensely strengthen the hands of the side which through 
 want of numbers, or the configuration of the ground, is com- 
 pelled to adopt a defensive or offensive attitude. Behind 
 
50 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the screen formed by them, a line of guns may be drawn up. 
 whilst the bulk of the forces are held in reserve and in posi- 
 tion on another front. Look at the case from the point of 
 view of the assailant acting in the ordinary method. His 
 cavalry have received a heavy fire of infantry and artillery 
 apparently in position facing, say, northwest. The advance- 
 guard batteries come into action mid the following infantry 
 are drawn up for attack and committed to an advance. 
 Formerly it was possible to tell from the puffs of smoke ap- 
 proximately in what strength the infantry were present a 
 rapfd fire from a small number of rifles betrayed itself; now 
 one is no longer able to judge whether the rifles are few or 
 many. As the attack develops, the line falls back, and the 
 guns disappear suddenly, unmasking a fresh position facing 
 west, and the assailant finds himself compelled to change 
 front under effective fire. What that implies, those who 
 were present in 1870 can form an opinion." 
 
 It seems to me that the author is in this case and, 
 indeed, throughout making rather* too sure of the invisi- 
 bility of the new powder. This method of action was, I 
 believe, perfectly feasible even with ordinary powder; and, 
 indeed, I have often recommended it in these columns with 
 reference to the necessity of keeping up the true light in- 
 fantry principles of skirmishing in contradistinction to tin* 
 hybrid form of individual-order fighting, which is neither 
 fish, flesh, nor fowl, and which finds its expression in our 
 normal attack formations as practised on our drill-grounds. 
 The smokeless powder did not strike me last autumn in Ger- 
 many as so very invisible. True, there were no puffs of 
 smoke, but there were many conditions of background, wind, 
 and atmosphere, which, skillfully taken advantage of, as 
 they should be by good skirmishers, rendered the blank car- 
 tridges of the old powder quite as invisible as those of the 
 new. Indeed, I saw a case in point at Niederbronn this 
 year, in which, the morning haze still hanging, but very 
 lightly, myself and three other British officers watching a 
 line of skirmishers firing, decided they were using smokeless 
 powder when actually they had only the old one, and again 
 later in the day, when the mist had lifted and a fresh breeze 
 sprang up, we made the same mistake with another body of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 51 
 
 troops, and went away under the firm conviction that we ha 1 
 seen a very successful experiment with the new powder and 
 knew all about it, and were not a little sold when we learnt 
 our mistake from the German officers in the evening. It is, 
 however, only just to ourselves- to add that there had been 
 very little firing, and that, too, exclusively by the masked 
 enemy, who were very widely extended. The attacking 
 force being only exercised in preliminary movements, prac- 
 tising the battalion commanders in the use of the ground as 
 cover from sight, and in moving through some woods, the 
 "cease fire" always sounding as soon as the time for deploy- 
 ment arrived. 
 
 But subsequently, on the drill-ground at Frescate ne*ir 
 Metz, where I saw the new powder used by three different 
 brigades independently, so that there was nothing to guide 
 one's eye to the likely places from which to expect the fire, 
 an advantage one always has when working against an 
 enemy, I came to a very different conclusion to that of in/ 
 author. It seemed to me that there was no mistaking the 
 flash of discharge of the new cartridges. Poets are apt to 
 talk of the dewdrops sparkling like jewels on the sward, but 
 1hey refer to the sward immediately at one's feet, and not 
 & thousand yards away. When, however, a bright scintillac- 
 ing line of jewel-like sparkles is suddenly drawn right across 
 the mass of a brown hillside, and when, as would be the case 
 in war, the whole air is the next moment alive with a noise 
 like a myriad nightmare mosquitoes, singing past one's ears, 
 and the ground at one's feet is simultaneously torn up in lonj; 
 furrows pointing in a given direction, there can be very little 
 doubt what the scintillating line just seen really means. 
 I think that day I must have seen the new powder against 
 every conceivable kind of background, from the dark edge 
 of a wood, the border of a village, across the face of a hill, 
 and the line of a hedge, but in all cases, the bright line of 
 flashes betrayed themselves at least as well as the puffs of 
 sinoke of even full charges would have done. A properly 
 trained reconnoitering officer would have had no difficulty 
 at all in seeing through any ruse of the kind above mentioned : 
 for, even without the aid he possesses in the knowledge of 
 the direction in which to look, which would have been sup- 
 
t>2 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 plied if by chance he did not know it by the graze of the bu! 
 lets, and the possession of a map by the aid of which his sol- 
 dierly instinct should have taught him whence to expect the 
 fire, I found no difficulty in distinguishing the various fight- 
 ing lines, though three independent battles were raging 
 around me, and two of them were more than two miles dis>- 
 lart. T cannot help thinking that the case for independent 
 patrols, or, at any rate, trained light infantry, whether organ- 
 ized as light companies or as a whole division, would have 
 been rendered even stronger had their claims been put for 
 ward solely on the results of 1870, and not as a consequence 
 of the new factor. 
 
 A MODERN BATTLE. 
 
 In continuation of my remarks on Von der Goltz's "Inde- 
 pendent Patrols," I propose to give almost in full his descrip- 
 tion of a modern battle, as it. will probably shape itself with 
 the new weapons and powder now in use. 
 
 The advance patrols of cavalry having established ti:< 
 presence of the enemy on a given line and the points on which 
 his flanks rest, the general officer in command will have to 
 decide, while still at a distance of perhaps a day's march, 
 whether to attack straight to his front or to attempt to ma- 
 neuver the enemy out of his position. The length of front 
 occupied gives an approximate indication of the enemy's 
 strength, and its position on the map also reveals in part the 
 enemy's design, but for the rest the general's own knowledge 
 of the situation and of the nature of his adversary must suf- 
 fice for his first decision. Let us assume that he elects for 
 the direct attack; possibly the strategic situation leaves him 
 no choice. Before committing his troops, a detail reconnais- 
 sance is necessary. "More than ever care is required in this 
 operation, for the enemy, no longer betrayed by the tell-tale 
 puffs of smoke, will have taken advantage of every possible 
 means of cover to mislead the assailant and induce him to 
 deploy for action on a false direction." How fatal such a 
 mistake was, and how easy, even in 1870, the destruction of 
 Von WedelPs Brigade (38th) at Mars-la-Tour and the action 
 of the 9th Corps and the Guards at St. Privat amply show. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 53- 
 
 Standing on the spur of the hill running out from Aman\M- 
 lers, and on which the first batteries of the former corps un- 
 limbered to surprise the French, and were themselves sur- 
 prised by receiving fire in return from three sides one could 
 not help being struck with the value of the smokeless pow- 
 der, assuming its invisibility to be as great as it is usually 
 claimed that it is. It must have been bad enough to stand 
 there and see the smoke-puffs surrounding one round three- 
 fourths of the total horizon. What it would have been like 
 with nothing to indicate the origin of the storm which sud- 
 denly tore open the ground in apparently every direction 
 beneath one's feet one can hardly conceive. That) initial 
 blunder entailed as a consequence all subsequent ones, in- 
 cluding the premature engagement of the Guard, and 
 against a capable general should have caused the Germans 
 the loss of the day, and probably did cost them some 10,000 
 killed and wounded. What under modern conditions it 
 might imply can be better imagined than described, and no 
 precaution which could guard against it ought to be neg- 
 lected. But, as previously pointed out, the existing organi- 
 zation furnishes no satisfactory way out of the difficulty. The 
 German cavalry in 1870 was not wanting in dash and self- 
 sacrifice, yet in each of the above instances their action did 
 not suffice. The advance guards were daring enough, but it 
 was precisely that daring that did the harm. The "independ- 
 ent patrol" of picked brave men is the only way out of 1.1' e 
 difficulty. 
 
 "The current idea (in Germany) is to deploy opposite all 
 the points of the enemy's position which seem to require 
 attention a line of companies, each of which sends out a sec- 
 tion or half-section to draw the enemy's fire and then detect 
 his disposition. 
 
 "But consider the formation of these units on a war foot 
 ing: are they suited for the purpose? The whole company 
 will probably only have one officer of the age and experience 
 requisite; the reserve officers and the bulk of the men wilt 
 be entirely unsuited for it. Besides, the body itself is too 
 large a target, and will probably be shot to pieces by invisi- 
 ble foes before it gets within 1,000 yards of the position, 
 where thev will lie down, waste their ammunition, and event- 
 
54 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 ually, if not supported, bolt back, carrying demoralization 
 everywhere. 
 
 "No! This is essentially a field in which only excep- 
 tional skill and courage combined can be of any avail; and 
 the combination being but rare, those men who have it must 
 be carefully trained and set aside for this special purpose. 
 The general officer in command will personally dispose of 
 the patrols furnished by the advance guard, who will, hav- 
 ing received their instructions, advance \vith the greatest 
 caution. If the enemy opens on them with volleys at dis- 
 tances over 1,000 yards, the results are likely to be infinitesi- 
 mal, and in any case the position of these patrols cannot 
 become specially critical, as the enemy is not likely to come 
 out of his trenches for the purpose of attacking them, and 
 they will be too small a target to employ cavalry against. 
 
 "Under protection of this chain of patrols, the officers 
 of the staff and of the cavalry, provided with good field 
 glasses, execute their reconnaissance, taking advantage of. 
 every good point of observation the ground offers; whilst 
 officers' patrols from the cavalry seek to penetrate round the 
 flanks and in rear of the enemy. 
 
 "On the information thus collected, the commanding gen- 
 eral chooses the front attack. This front should fulfil the fol- 
 lowing conditions: (1) space to bring into action a larger num- 
 ber of guns than can be opposed to us by the enemy the 
 larger the better; (2) concealed lines of approach to the ene- 
 my's position; (3) and under no circumstances should werun 
 the risk of exposing our guns or infantry to concentric fire, 
 but, on the contrary, should seek always to bring conver- 
 gent fire against the enemy. 
 
 "The choice having been made, every available gun is 
 brought into action and the artillery duel commences. Too 
 much importance cannot be attached to this phase of the bat- 
 tle, for, if the assailant fails to establish his superiority, his 
 infantry has no hope of success. 
 
 "Unfortunately, owing to want of time in the maneuvers 
 and an insufficient supply of blank ammunition, it is impossi- 
 ble to give a fair representation of this part of the action ; 
 but it is most important that this abridgement of the pro- 
 ceedings does not lead to any misconception on the part of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 55 
 
 the infantry officers, who must realize, once for all, that, with 
 An approximate equality between troops, it is only the com- 
 bined action of the two arms which can ensure the result. 
 
 "The enormous increase in the power of the guns renders 
 it essential that the utmost solicitude and watchfulness 
 should be devoted to its training, for in no other arm can 
 faults or neglect in instruction entail such terrible conse- 
 quences. Not only must it be technically perfect, but it 
 must be commanded by first-class men, and on mobilization 
 undergo the least changes possible. Batteries formed only 
 on the outbreak of war are more useless than any similar 
 formations of other arms can possibly be, and their value 
 generally varies in* inverse proportion with the number of 
 strange officers, men, and untrained horses they have to ab- 
 sorb on mobilization." 
 
 The above passage, I may add in passing, is meant as a 
 particular hit at the present war administration in Germany, 
 which has allowed its artillery in these respects to fall far 
 behind the French standard in immediate readiness for the 
 field. 
 
 " While the combat of artillery is proceeding, the in- 
 fantry form up iu rendezvous formation under cover, and 
 make all disposition for the coming attack, such as getting 
 some food, issuing extra ammunition, and stacking their 
 packs, which will now generally be left behind. As each 
 fresh battalion arrives, its independent patrols fall out, and 
 are sent up to reinforce the line already engaged, and which, 
 by true skirmishing tactics, seeks to injure the enemy and 
 approach his position as closely as possible. 
 
 "At length, the enemy's artillery having been reduced 
 to silence, and the fire of our guns turned on his infantry fop 
 a sufficient time, the signal to advance to the attack is given, 
 and the first line, a dense chain of skirmishers, breaks cover, 
 and, without firing a shot in reply, seeks to press up to the 
 limit reached by the independent patrols, say 600 yards." 
 
 Against such a target the defender, firing untroubled 
 by smoke and at known distances, ought to make splendid 
 practice; in fact, it is scarcely conceivable that a sufficient 
 number of the assailants could survive the ordeal, unless the 
 nerves of the defenders have been already unsteadied by the 
 
56 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 combined action of the infantry patrols and the artillery, 
 and it is very much the custom at present in England to 
 underrate the assailant's prospects of securing this result. 
 Certainly, given our long-service soldiers and our racial char- 
 acteristics, there is every reason to believe that now, as 
 formerly, we should stand pounding longer than any other 
 nation; but again it is only a question of time, and uHi- 
 mately the defender must collapse. Let us put ourselves in 
 his place. 
 
 ''For several hours his infantry, strung up to the highest 
 pitch of expectation and anxiety as to what is coming, has 
 been lying in its trenches. Occasional weak bodies of iho. 
 enemy's cavalry have been seen, and a distant and desultory 
 fire has been carried on against hardly visible patrols, im- 
 possible to hit, but steadily creeping in closer and closer. 
 Then of a sudden, from out of the sky, so to speak, a storm 
 of bursting shells has filled the air, whose smoke conceals 
 from the eyes of the infantry the light cloud of dust, with pos- 
 sibly occasional flashes all there is to betray the position 
 of the guns from which they are fired. 
 
 "Their own artillery is bcinii sensibly overpowered, 
 and is seen to be moving to the rear. Suddenly the intensity 
 of the enemy's fire is redoubled, and the noise of the bursting 
 shells, together with their destructive effects, produces rap- 
 idly most disastrous effects on the nerves of the defenders. 
 The need of reinforcement in the fighting lino becomes 
 urgent, but the ground behind it is so swopl by the enemy's 
 fire that body after body attempting to move forward is 
 beaten back, and only the debris of a few partially successful 
 efforts ever readies the front. 
 
 "It is just at this moment that the fighting line of iln> 
 assailant makes its appearance, anywhere between 2,000 and 
 1,000 yards distant. If the officers on the defenders' side can 
 succeed in distracting the attention of their men from ihe 
 terrible spectacle of the vain efforts of their supports to suc- 
 cor them, and in concentrating it on the advancing enemy, 
 that will be about as much as can be expected, and their fire 
 will hardly be as carefully directed as the theorists of the 
 practice-ground are in the habit of assuming. But if, on the 
 contrary, our artillerv fails in its task, and the infantry ad- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 57 
 
 vances without the intermediate buffer formed by our inde- 
 pendent patrols with their carefully aimed fire, then the hope 
 of pressing in to 600 yards without firing a shot is illusory. 
 
 "Let us, however, continue the former picture. The 
 carefully aimed fire of the patrols is suddenly reinforced by 
 the rapid fire of the fighting line, and, covered by this, 
 a second line advances at somewhere about 1,000 yards' dis- 
 tance. If the first line reached its position without serious 
 loss, it is evident that the second will suffer even less, and its 
 unexpected energy will suffice to shove forward the whole 
 line another 100 yards or so. 
 
 "Then, and another 1,000 yards behind, appear the real 
 assaulting troops with fixed bayonets, meant as a visible 
 sign to the men themselves of what is now expected of them. 
 With drums beating and colors flying, the bands playing the 
 most inspiring of our national war-songs, the battalions ad- 
 vance as in review order, animated with only one sentiment, 
 to conquer or die." 
 
 The author no longer proposes to push into 200 yards 
 before commencing the "fire of decision," but hopes to be able 
 to effect all that was formerly expected at this range, thanks 
 to the flatter trajectory of the new weapons, at 400. The 
 subsequent steps call for no further remark. The storming 
 troops pursue the enemy to the further limit of the position 
 with the bayonet, and beyond by fire, and cavalry and artil- 
 lery gallop up to complete the rout. 
 
 This picture only differs from that drawn by Meckel, and 
 which was reproduced in these columns a few weeks ago, in 
 so far that the latter assumed a considerably higher degree 
 of resistance on the part of the enemy, and provided for it by 
 a larger number of successive lines. He also proposed to 
 march his actual fighting line up to the range at which fire 
 is opened i. e., 600 yards in close order, whereas Von der 
 Goltz, in spite of his independent patrols covering the ad- 
 vance, speaks of his fighting line advancing "extended." 
 
 Meckel is looked on as the extreme exponent of the close- 
 order school in Germany, and Von der Goltz belongs to the 
 moderates, but in this case it is difficult to see wherein lies 
 the advantage, if any, of the individual or extended-order 
 formation. The task set them is to cover 1,400 yards under 
 
58 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 fire without check and without replying. The chain is a 
 "dense one/' so as a target it is as vulnerable as an ordinary 
 line; but in which would the men be most amenable to disci- 
 pline and least likely to shoot their friends the independent 
 patrols, from the rear, whether the line should be in single 
 rank or double, is another question, dependent on the quality 
 of the troops, the point being that the spirit of the close-order 
 school should be observed. 
 
 Making, however, this "correction" I beg his pardon, 
 "alteration" in the above, in what single point, except dis- 
 distances, does the form above suggested differ from the old 
 Peninsula tradition, or its still earlier prototype, Frederick 
 the Great's line formations at the close of the Seven Years' 
 War? Of the two, it is really nearer the latter, for Frederick's 
 "Freischaaren" were a much closer approximati6n to the 
 "independent patrol" idea than our own Light Division; for 
 the "Freischaaren" consisted of small parties of privileged 
 blackguards, whose real object was plunder, and into whose 
 actions, provided they did the light infantry duty of the army 
 bravely, no one inquired too closely. Organized in small 
 squads under a leader of their own choice, they hung on the 
 skirts of the army, and acted as a screen against the Pan- 
 dours and Croats of the Austrian*, so that, except in so far 
 as Von der Goltz's patrols are to be animated by patriotism 
 instead of a desire for loot, the two ideas cover one another 
 pretty exactly. Whether the further step involved in group- 
 ing those patrols together to form a division is advisable, is 
 open to discussion. But the point involved for us remains 
 this: after twenty years of hot controversy, and the intro- 
 duction of a dozen new weapons of destruction, each more 
 terrible than the other, one of the leading minds in Germany, 
 with ample war experience and an enormous backing of edu- 
 cated opinion, lays down as his conception of the method in 
 which an attack can alone be carried out, to all intents and 
 purposes the exact equivalent of the way we should have 
 attacked in 1870, had we been called on to do so viz., two 
 or more successive lines covered by real skirmishers and pre- 
 ceded by a heavy artillery fire. As each successive improve- 
 ment in fire-arms was introduced, all that was necessary waa 
 to add on a hundred vards or so to the distances, and this is 
 
Military Letters anc^ Essays. 59 
 
 about what the Duke of Cambridge and the survivors of the 
 Mutiny and Sikh Wars would have done had they been 
 allowed their own way. But the young generation of the 
 time was too clever for this by half; they mistook cause for 
 eftect, and worshiped the rising sun of success. The battle- 
 fields of 1870 were principally conspicuous for clouds of skir- 
 mishers (and stragglers), the Germans won ergo, skir- 
 mishers were a good thing and must be copied at once; bat 
 it escaped these gentlemen that the French also skirmished, 
 and, on the whole, with greater adroitness, but were never- 
 theless defeated. The Germans themselves, notably the 
 highest authorities, knew all along that the presence of skir- 
 mishers in such quantities was the effect of too short a train- 
 ing and want of absolute discipline, and have sought by 
 every means in their power to obviate the latter effect. 
 
 It is inconceivable to me that H. K. H. the Duke of Cam- 
 bridge, with his constant opportunities of hearing German 
 views from the very highest sources, could have remained 
 ignorant of what was in their minds; indeed, I know, from 
 having heard many of his "critiques" at Aldershot and else- 
 where, that he was all along fully alive to them. Only his 
 words fell on deaf ears or, rather, on hearing organs too 
 dull to catch the true vibrations and he was openly abused 
 in the press by the scribblers as a fifth wheel to the coach, an 
 old drill sergeant, etc.; yet which system would have ad- 
 vanced us the furthest? The troops of twenty years ago at 
 least knew how to obey orders, and would have marched un- 
 hesitatingly to death if told to. With such men a leader 
 might have achieved anything, for it rests with the judgment 
 of the leader, and can only be estimated by him, when and 
 where to strike the necessary blow. Will the infantry of 
 to-day, taught to look on a direct advance across the open as 
 certain slaughter, prove themselves as reliable a weapon to 
 trust to? Fortunately, the drivel of the text-books has not 
 really made much impression on the rank and file, or even on 
 the subaltern officer; they are still British, and look on the 
 matter from a very common-sense side, and if only there were 
 a few more "Mulvaneys" in the ranks, w T e should not be in 
 danger of going far wrong. The danger really lies in the 
 higher ninks. who have been trained in the reformers' 
 
60 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 school; and the difficulty is that amongst these men there 
 are very many of great ability, who have devoted much time 
 and thought to the matter, and whose conclusions logically 
 follow from their premises. But the premises themselves 
 are false, and it is almost impossible to bring this home to 
 them. 
 
 Within the last few years there has sprung up in Eng- 
 land what may be called a new tactical cult, the cult of the 
 "Prussian Official," which is believed by the sect to be verbally 
 inspired, like the Bible. They search this scripture diligently 
 day by day, and deduce strictly logical conclusions from its 
 data, but all the while they are drifting further and further 
 away from real knowledge, for the assumption always under- 
 lies their work that "It was done in 1870, therefore it is 
 right," whereas in Germany they would say, "It was done in 
 1870, therefore the presumption is, it is wrong." 
 
 STUDY OF A MODERN BATTLE. 
 
 A third edition of Colonel Meckel's work on tactics an-1 
 the leading of troops in the field has recently appeared iu 
 Berlin. The author is an officer of the general staff, and is 
 well known as the supporter of the extreme conservative 
 school of tactics; indeed, he has at last admitted that he 
 wrote the celebrated "Midsummer-Night's Dream," about 
 which of late w r e have heard so much, but with the qualifica- 
 tion that he had purposely pushed his argument to its furth- 
 est length in order to attract attention and secure discussion, 
 in both of which he has been undeniably successful. But m 
 his book he takes a far less advanced position, and one which 
 I cannon help thinking will commend itself specially to the 
 regimental officers of our own service. I propose, therefore, to 
 give almost in extenso the picture he draws of the probable 
 course of a modern battle, so that each reader can form an 
 opinion for himself as to the best method of training troops 
 to undertake the greatest and most serious duty that can fall 
 to their lot viz., the frontal attack of a position over almost 
 completely open ground. 
 
 The strength of the army or, rather, of the section of 
 it which he is considering is five corps, and the field of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. (51 
 
 action the well-kiiown glacis-like slope of St. Privat le Mon- 
 tagne, which presents in its extremest form perhaps the 
 most disadvantageous conditions for the attack which can 
 reasonably be conceived. The two armies are supposed to 
 have arrived within striking distance of one another over 
 night, so that the troops maybe ranged in their proper order, 
 and the course of the whole action regulated in so far as such 
 regulation is possible. All movements take place across 
 country, and the troops are not confined to defiling along the 
 roads. The duty of determining the extension of the enemy's 
 line, and its occupation, falls, of course, primarily to the cav- 
 alry; but as the two armies approach each other, the latter 
 must clear the front and form up on the wings; at least one 
 division, however, joining the general reserve for special 
 employment by the commander-in-chief himself. 
 
 "The approach to the battle-field is carried out in rendez- 
 vous formation i. e., in the old double company column of 
 battalions; the corps in the center being formed with the 
 divisions in mass and side by side. Those on the flanks are 
 in line of battalion columns, and one division in front of the 
 other or in echelon to it to cover flanks. The advance guards 
 of the separate columns take up position outside of the effect- 
 ive artillery range of the enemy to cover the deployment of 
 the columns. And in order to determine the exact position 
 of the enemy, the batteries attached to these advanced 
 guards, reinforced if necessary by the divisional artillery, 
 open fire at long range (not less than 2,500 yards) to compel 
 his reply; but in this stage of the proceedings a reckless and 
 hasty advance to decisive range is specially to be avoided. 
 The time which will be required to get all the columns into 
 their proper place must be utilized in the reconnaissance of 
 the ground to the front, and especially of any undulations 
 which may give cover to the advance; precautions which, 
 be it noted in passing, were conspicuously neglected in the 
 last war by the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour and the 
 Guards at St. Privat. 
 
 "All being at length in readiness, and the first section of 
 the ground to be taken up to cover the position of the guns 
 for the artillery duel having been indicated, a simultaneous 
 advance on the whole front should be made, in small col- 
 
62 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 umns covered by skirmishers. This first position should be 
 outside the zone of effective infantry fire, but, where possible, 
 near enough to allow the infantry to support the artillery by 
 means of long-range fire. It must be selected with due refer- 
 ence to the cover aii'orded either by the ground or by villages, 
 copses, etc., and, as soon as reached, defensive arrangements 
 with pick and spade should be undertaken to strengthen it. 
 Where the enemy has himself occupied advanced positions 
 which nearly coincide with this line, such, for instance, as 
 St. Marie aux Chenes in front of St. Privat, the capture of 
 such places, for which special bodies of troops will be de- 
 tailed, forms part of this operation, and the whole power of 
 the available artillery should be brought to bear on them 
 from positions outside of the range of the enemy's guns \\\ 
 the main position. But the troops to which such tasks ar-> 
 assigned must be particularly cautioned not to go beyond 
 the further limit of these positions. 
 
 "Then follows the artillery duel and preparation, and 
 for this purpose every available gun for which room can be 
 found must be brought up, even from the corps and divisions 
 in reserve, and only after the fire of the enemy's guns has 
 been completely reduced, is the preparatory fire on their 
 infantry to be begun." 
 
 This is a point round which many controversies and dis- 
 putes rage in England; yet I think, if the matter is closely 
 gone into, the difficulties will- mostly be found to vanish. 
 There is no royal road to victory, and mistakes may and must 
 happen. The defender's artillery, for instance, may prove 
 the stronger of the two, and in that case the roles change 
 over the would-be assailant w^ill find himself attacked. It 
 has happened as, for instance, at Gettysburg that i.h-.> 
 defender's artillery has intentionally ceased firing to econo- 
 mize ammunition and then again come into action the mo- 
 ment the attacldnginfantry broke ground, and it is frequently 
 recommended in text-books that the defender's guns, when 
 it is found that they are being overpowered, should be with- 
 drawn under cover till the time for the assault approaches. 
 But both these courses are only possible where the assailant 
 gives himself away by overhastiness, for, when once the arli!- 
 l.-'rv fire of the defence ceases, the work of destroying the in- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 63 
 
 fan try may proceed with all necessary deliberation; and 
 then, when the latter have had their spirit completely 
 broken, the reappearance of the artillery will have little or 
 no effect on the decision, for, whatever their power may be 
 against infantry alone, against victorious infantry and guns 
 as well they can have no ultimate chance of success what- 
 ever. It therefore follows that guns once committed to a 
 decisive struggle can never be withdrawn, but must be fought 
 to the last; at any rate, their resistance gains time, and time 
 may mean the arrival of fresh reserves, or, if the day is 
 growing short, strategic reasons may compel the assailant 
 to risk an assault without waiting for the proper completion 
 of the preparation. All this, however, is a digression from 
 Meckel's text, for, as no one questions the correctness of 
 these ideas in Germany, he does not consider it necessary to 
 allude to them. 
 
 "As soon, therefore, as the artillery fire has had its effect, 
 a general move forward of all the arms takes place. The 
 advanced infantry is reinforced, the hitherto retained re- 
 serves of the leading corps advance by brigades, up to tiio 
 limitof effective infantry fire, and need not fear to cross open 
 spaces previously swept by artillery fire. Taking advantage 
 of all possible cover, they take up positions either on the 
 flanks, or not less than 500 yards in rear of the artillery lines. 
 The divisional cavalry approaches the front line of the In- 
 fantry as far as the available cover permits it to do so, and the 
 cavalry division is placed under cover, of course, in a position 
 from whence it may eventually be employed in the most ad- 
 vantageous manner and has the best field of advance. 
 
 "The batteries advance to closer ranges, and, whilst 
 firing on the infantry, remain ready to crush any fresh gnus 
 the enemy may bring into action. And now, out of the previ- 
 ously arranged line of shelter, the fighting line of the infantry 
 commences *ts advance, on a broader front and in a denser 
 line. It is not yet the assault, but an advance borne for- 
 ward, if necessary, by fresh reinforcements to the limit of 
 effective aimed fire. As the bursting shells of the artillery 
 diminish at any particular point the intensity of the enemy's 
 infantry fire, the part of the line immediately opposed to it 
 rises and presses in. As resistance increases by the addition 
 
64 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of fresh reserves to the enemy's line, it will probably fall back 
 till the balance is re-dressed by fresh supports from the rear, 
 and the result will be the long undulating lines of fire, which 
 were so characteristic of the battles of 1870. 
 
 "The impulse for the final assault may be given by a 
 counter-attack by the enemy. There are armies which can 
 not bear the punishment such a fire-fight implies, passively, 
 and these will break out to the front to get breathing-room. 
 Such a proceeding can only be welcome to the assailant. 
 Whilst the gunners and infantry overwhelm the advancing 
 line with fire, the nearest reserves are brought up wHb 
 drums beating, in close order, to give the necessary impulse 
 for a counter-assault, and the divisional cavalry follows up 
 to cut in as opportunity offers. Even a whole brigade or 
 division, handy enough to find room to get through the in- 
 fantry line, may in such cases be the first into the enemy's 
 position. 
 
 "But if the defender remains inactive, the point to be 
 assaulted is selected by the commander-in-chief, who brings 
 up a couple of divisions from the corps in reserve under cover 
 and at hand either to follow the assaulting troops in second 
 line or to take part in the attack in first line, as the conditions 
 of the moment may require. The corps on either side will 
 support the attack, but must guard against letting the whole 
 of their reserves out of hand. 
 
 "The assault is then delivered in united closed front of 
 whole brigades possibly even of divisions. The use of 
 cover has no longer any value ; to try and avail oneself of it 
 would destroy the unity of the assault. The brigades must 
 now advance straight across the open country. It is as im- 
 possible to avoid passing through artillery lines as it is fo? 
 the latter to avoid firing over the infantry; both must co- 
 operate together up to the last, and there is no room to estab- 
 lish this co-operation in any other way. The mass of the 
 artillery will maintain its position for the present, but a pro- 
 portion of batteries must limber up and accompany the 
 advance. 
 
 "In arranging the infantry for the advance, depth of 
 formation is the principal point to be borne in mind. A 
 gradual increase in the fire power and of momentum up to its 
 
Military Letters and Essays. . 65 
 
 utmost possible limit must be secured by fresh reinforce- 
 ments from the rear. With this object in view, a brigade 
 (i. e., two regiments of three battalions each) would best be 
 formed in the following manner viz., regiments side by side, 
 with one battalion each in the front line, and each of these 
 battalions will have three companies in the fighting line aa<l 
 one following some 500 yards in rear. The companies will 
 be formed with two u zugs" in front and one in immediate 
 support, and the "zugs" will be in line in single rank, with 
 the files just sufficiently lessened to allow of the use of the 
 rifle to the best effect. The battalions in second line follow 
 some 500 yards behind the supports of the first, and again 
 300 yards behind follow the brigade reserves, so that, as a 
 rule, the latter will not leave their cover till the fighting line 
 is in hottest action with the enemy. The advance takes place 
 with drums beating, and, in the case of the brigade reserves, 
 with bands playing. Without checking for a moment, the 
 lighting line moves up, if possible, to decisive range at once. 
 If, however, fresh reinforcements on the enemy's side causes 
 a halt, the company and battalion supports are at hand to 
 carry the line on, and the gunners make use of the temporary 
 check to deliver a couple of rounds of rapid fire, increasing 
 their elevation by a couple of hundred yards; if, Bowing to 
 the nature of the ground, the advancing infantry has already 
 masked their target, these shells will seriously interfere with 
 the bringing up of the enemy's reserves. 
 
 "The rearward bodies of infantry remain in uninter- 
 rupted for ward' motion, so that and the above distances are 
 based on this consideration every time after four or live 
 minutes' rapid fire, the leading line receives the impulse to 
 advance from the fresh advancing troops behind. Thus step 
 by step the wave of the attack rises, till at last, by constant 
 accession of strength from the rear, its momentum can no 
 longer be restrained, and it must break through to the front." 
 
 Here victory is achieved, not by absence of order, not 
 through the initiative of the subordinate ranks, not by skulk- 
 in g under cover, but mainly as the result of careful peace- 
 time training in absolute discipline; in fact, as Clausewitz 
 put it, by teaching the soldier "to know how to die, and not 
 how to avoid dying." It seems unnecessary to pursue the 
 
66 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 course of the battle further. It is not intended to be under- 
 stood as the only possible type of a pitched battle, but only to 
 indicate the direction in which progress is to be sought, me! 
 to warn against some modern and dangerous tendencies, to 
 point out clearly to leaders of all three arms the object they 
 must keep in mind, and to show how on their co-operation the 
 solution of the battle problem depends. 
 
 "Looking back on the past, we see quite another picture. 
 The pitiable self-destructive belief in the unavoidable dis- 
 order and the impossibility of guiding the lighting instincts 
 of the individual finds in the events of twenty years its own 
 condemnation. There, too, we heard the drums beating, and 
 saw the colors waving, and whole brigades dashing recklessly 
 across the open, only, however, to break to pieces against the 
 unshaken fire power of the adversary, and then every trace of 
 order disappeared in the confusion of the independent order 
 of fighting. Woods, villages, hollows hitherto empty were 
 suddenly crowded with stragglers, and the open fields lay 
 tenanted only by the victims of premature violence. But 
 reverse the order of the proceeding, let the thunder of the 
 guns go before the beat of the drums, the roar of musketry 
 before the bayonet, and skirmishing in its old signification 
 before the assault, and not follow after it, and the fight will 
 again assume a healthy aspect." 
 
 A few lines of explanation may perhaps make some of 
 the allusions in the latter paragraph and the general idea of 
 the. whole thing clearer. Meckel belongs essentially to the 
 school of tacticians who consider that the "Prussian Official" 
 history of the war should be studied, not in order to be copied, 
 but in order to learn what should be avoided. Unfortu- 
 nately, the modern school in England for the last twenty 
 years has adopted the former course, and, indeed, has raised 
 the book almost to the position of a divine inspiration, no 
 word of which is to be questioned. Everything that hap- 
 pened on the battle-fields is believed to have been previously 
 thought out and arranged, and not to have been, as it too 
 often happened, the result of circumstances beyond the con- 
 trol of the leaders. Skirmishers were a leading character- 
 istic of the combats, and therefore we are taught that skir- 
 mishing alone is of any avail; but, as Meckel points out. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 67 
 
 these skirmishing lines were formed as a result of bad lead- 
 ing, and not of design. The troops showed themselves 
 adepts in availing themselves of cover (10,000 men managing 
 to get out of sight and out of control in a little wood of not 
 more than 1,000 by 600 yards area; about the same number 
 are said to have taken shelter behind a wretched farm-house, 
 which would have been amply garrisoned by 200); therefore 
 we too must train our men to avoid exposure, and so on, 
 through the whole list; and the worst of it is that these 
 views have been so persistently hammered into people's 
 heads that there is now in existence an English tactical 
 school based almost entirely on hearsay, and not on experi- 
 ence, which holds in almost every respect views diametrically 
 opposed to those held by the men who actually were *ther<: 
 and know what happened; and this school will soon have 
 almost the whole training of our infantry in its hands, for it 
 originated primarily in the competitive system of study for 
 marks at the Staff College. In saying this I do not wish to 
 be understood as belonging to those who habitually sneer at 
 that institution, its products and its professors; for, though 
 a certain number of the "products" may justify the unkind 
 remarks made about them, the army itself, and the spirit 
 which tolerates the sending of men obviously unsuited for 
 staff duties from regiments to compete for admission, is 
 primarily responsible. The evil I allude to is due to quite 
 another cause, in itself highly creditable to its victims viz.* 
 the keenness of desire for personal distinction, which leads 
 to too close a study of pamphlet literature and the "Prussian 
 Official,' 'both of which are dangerous except to those who pos- 
 sess, through the men who were there, the key to a proper 
 understanding of them. 
 
 The divergence between the German school, as taught in 
 its new regulations and practiced on the drill-ground, and 
 the stereotyped way in which our own field-exercises are 
 applied at Aldershot, or any other tactical center, is simply 
 astounding, not so much as regards the form as the spirit 
 which underlies it. With us the "form" is everything; it is 
 a kind of fetish which we worship, believing it will show us 
 everywhere the road to victory with a minimum of losses; 
 or, indeed, one might drop the idea of victory altogether and 
 sn> that it will enable us to fight without getting killed; and 
 
68 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 we believe that somewhere or other there exists an ideal form 
 which will suit all cases. 
 
 The object of Meckel's writings is to prove that no such 
 form does or can exist, but that the German Regulations are 
 correct in prohibiting the employment of such stereotyped 
 forms, and fixing on each commander, according to his sta- 
 tion, the responsibility of adopting the means at his disposal 
 to the end in view r . In Germany, where the principle of the 
 delegation of responsibility has long been an accomplished 
 fact, the only difficulty to be encountered is the inertia of 
 individuals in peace-time, who naturally prefer to have their 
 thinkingdone for them. Butwith us not onlydoesthis same 
 difficulty exist, but also the far graver one which results from 
 our officers not having been trained to exercise this responsi- 
 bility in each successive rank they have held. Sooner or 
 later, if we are to continue to exist as a fighting force, this 
 difficulty will have to be faced, and now, when we have a 
 reasonable chance of a few years' peace, and our junior 
 officers in Burma have so brilliantly asserted their claims to 
 be trusted, would seem to me the best time for making the 
 experiment. 
 
 ATTACK OR DEFENCE. 
 
 A former letter was devoted to the consideration of the 
 statistics the German general staff have recently published 
 for the avowed purpose of proving that, weight for weight, 
 or numbers for numbers, their men could thrash the Freacli 
 without calling in the aid of the sin Hat all : for. as the figures 
 showed on several occasions, even when better leading had 
 placed a large numerical superiority on the ground, the ac- 
 tion was carried through and won with a force inferior in 
 numbers to that opposed to them. But, though perfectly 
 willing to agree in the main with their conclusion, it appears 
 to me that they have succeeded in proving too much, and, in 
 attributing their victories entirely to the fighting value of 
 their troops, have ignored too much the superiority they 
 acquired by their almost invariable use of the offensive, and 
 the force they derived from the better co-operation of the 
 two arms viz., the artillery and infantry. As I have stated, 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 69- 
 
 I think the evidence distinctly does prove the individual 
 superiority of the German soldier, in spite of the inferiority 
 of his infantry armament, over the French one in the yem* 
 1870. But it is impossible to ignore the facts that on many 
 an occasion in the Napoleonic era the reverse was equally 
 well established, and that fifty years before that again Fred- 
 erick the Great's Prussians were as much superior to the 
 Frenchman of that day as in 1806 they were the contrary. 
 Therefore, I take it, it follows that the raw material from 
 which the troops were created have in all three eras been 
 relatively about equal, and the reasons for their changing 
 qualities as trained soldiers must be sought for in other 
 causes, such as the difference in training of the troops, the 
 different forms of fighting, and the greater or less co-opera- 
 tion between the three arms. Thus, for instance, at Rossbach 
 5,000 Prussian cavalrj- under Seidlitz, 24 guns and 7 battal- 
 ions of infantry, two of which fired only five rounds a head, 
 and the remaining five only two, broke up and routed the 
 French army under Soubise, which numbered 64,000, and 
 took from them 72 guns. 22 stand of colors, besides killing 
 some 7,000 of them. At Jena and Auerstadt, fifty years 
 afterwards, over-centralization of command and a slavish 
 adherence to the letter and not to the spirit of Frederick'* 
 regulations led to about the most disastrous defeat in history; 
 and little more than sixty years after that again, decentrali^ 
 zation of authority and the combined action of the artillery 
 and infantry enabled 69,000 Germans* to attack, defeat, and 
 take prisoners an army of but little short of 100,000 French 
 at Sedan. 
 
 When the breech-loader was first introduced, it was 
 universally maintained by the adherents of the new arm 
 that its rapidity of fire would confer an immense superiority 
 on the defensive. Few of the principal soldiers in Germany 
 adopted the view, for they maintained that, though it might 
 and would alter the tactics of the infantry, yet that the prin 
 c!pli of the superiority of the offensive over (he defensive 
 was based on the nature of the man himself, and not on the 
 technical perfection of the weapon he carried. Tl-e French 
 took diametrically the opposite view. Their idea of (.he tacti- 
 
 *This refers, of course, to the troops actually engaged in the attack. 
 According to Borbstaedt, the German army at Sedan numbered 200,000 men,, 
 of whom 121,000 were engaged. A. L. W. 
 
70 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 cal employment of the new arm was to entrench themselves 
 up to their ears, pour in a terrible fire from their secure posi- 
 tion on the assailants, and then dash at them with the bayo- 
 net. It is a most fascinating theory on paper, and still keeps 
 a firm hold on our own tactical notions, but it is based on -t 
 misconception of human nature, and ignores also tin- fail 
 that the infantry are not the only arm to be considered on the 
 battle-field. At any rate, the two systems were practically 
 tested on the battle-fields of 1870, and with the same invaria- 
 ble results in favor of the former. 
 
 Wherever the artillery prepared the way adequately, 
 the infantry broke through without much trouble ; wherever 
 the gunners failed in their duty, the attack was beaten back; 
 the essential point being, it will be noted, the preparation by 
 the artillery. Now it is just this point that I have always 
 found it hardest to get. infantry officers to appreciate. To 
 them a battle merely implies a scrimmage between two in- 
 fantries, and if the other arms are there at all, it is either for 
 the purpose of making a noise or fighting an independent 
 duel on their own account, and this view is not only confined 
 to the junior officers at company trainings, but is equally 
 shared by the general officers and colonels who read and dis- 
 cuss United Service lectures both in India and at home. 
 Their favorite line of argument is about this : If two individ- 
 uals armed with rifles of equal power are placed, say 700 
 yards apart, and one of them is comfortably sheltered in a 
 nice little hole, w T hilst the other has to advance against him 
 right across the open, the odds are about twenty to one on 
 the man in the pit; and, therefore, if 100 or 1,000 men are 
 placed under the same relative conditions, the betting is 
 equally in favor of the ones under cover. Certainly if in 
 fantry alone made up the combined whole of a battle, this 
 reasoning would be perfectly correct; but, unfortunately for 
 them, there is another factor to be reckoned with viz., the 
 guns. These latter stand far away, back out of reach of the 
 rifle-fire of the defenders, and fill the air over their heads 
 with such a tempest of shrieking splinters and bullets that 
 by degrees the nerves of the former give way, and they can 
 no longer take accurate shots at the advancing foe. There 
 seems no limit to the degree of demoralization which may be 
 broughtabout by a sufficiently concentrated rain of shell fire, 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 71 
 
 for human nerves can only stand a certain limited number of 
 hours of intense strain, the limit depending on the men them- 
 selves and the quality of their discipline; and it is quite con- 
 ceivable, and it has indeed occurred, that the artillery prepa- 
 ration has so completely broken down the pluck of the de- 
 fenders that the attack has succeeded with hardly apprecia- 
 ble loss as, for instance, at the Bois de laGarenne at Sedan. 
 Yes, but the defenders themselves have guns, it is urged, and 
 they will not be altogether inactive spectators whilst this is 
 going on. This just misses the point of the whole thing, for 
 by the time the preparation of the attack is commenced the 
 fire of the defender's guns will have already been silenced; 
 for otherwise i. e., if they had silenced those of the assailant 
 they would themselves proceed to prepare the way for their 
 own infantry, and the roles would have changed hands; 
 otherwise the action w r oiild have come to a standstill, and 
 neither side could claim a victory. It might appear from this 
 that the form adopted by either army from the outset mat- 
 tered very little at all, and it would be so were it not for the 
 fact that the'artillery of that side which determines to attack 
 starts with an immense advantage over its adversary viz., 
 that he knows when and where he means to attack, and can 
 bring all his guns to bear on the chosen point, and thus attain 
 a preponderance from the very outset. The defender, on the 
 other hand, must either distribute his batteries in what he 
 judges to be the most favorable or most likely positions, in 
 which case he runs the risk of finding that the enemy takes 
 a different view of the matter, and he has to change position 
 under fire, or, he must keep back his batteries in reserve, and 
 bring them up when the plan of the assailant is fully devel- 
 oped; in both cases having to come into action under fire 
 an operation dangerous enough even when only percussion 
 shells were employed in 1870, and ten times more so in these 
 days of melinite bursters and shrapnell. 
 
 If the English view of the superiority of the defensive 
 form, as expressed by our Umpire Eegulations, is correct, 
 viz., that to force a position by frontal attack, and all battle- 
 field attacks are locally frontal ones, it is necessary to bring 
 a numerically superior force of from two to three fold the 
 enemy, varying with the passive strength of the position 
 
72 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 itself, it would follow that the German troops, who carried 
 such positions with only a bare superiority, were, in spite of 
 their inferior weapon, some four or five times as good, man 
 for man, as their opponents. But it is submitted that the e vi 
 dence as to their actual fighting powers hardly bears out that 
 view. Wherever French and Prussian or German infantry 
 met under conditions, which precluded the use of artillery on 
 either side, such as in wood-fighting, of which there was a 
 great deal, the equality of the two was pretty even, though 
 wood-fighting robbed the French otf the advantage their supe- 
 rior rifle gave them when they met in the open ; it required a 
 very decided numerical superiority on the German side to 
 make any head way at all, unless, as before stated, the gunners 
 had done their work first. Undoubtedly the German gun 
 was superior to the French one, both in itself and by the bet- 
 ter training of the men who worked it Still, by itself this 
 superiority was not enough to account for their invariable 
 success. The tactical handling of the artillery, as a whole, 
 has to be considered; and it appears to me, after carefully 
 going through the different battles, that if the conditions 
 had been reversed, and the Germans compelled to defend 
 whilst the French attacked, the former could have done no 
 better or different than the latter. The French artillery 
 were as fully alive to the advantage of massing their guns as 
 the Germans; and if they were less successful in the execu- 
 tion of their ideas, a little reflection will show that the uncer- 
 tainty which is the necessary consequence of the defensive 
 was the chief cause of their failure. 
 
 The successful formation of masses of guns is primarily 
 dependent on their mobility, and at the outset of the cam- 
 paign the French artillery was probably superior to the Ger- 
 man, for all their guns were horsed in time of peace, whereas 
 the latter kept up only four guns per battery, the remaining 
 two being dependent on the country horses brought up on 
 mobilization, and which were not, and could not be, in very 
 high-class condition for fast work. Certainly the French 
 commissariat arrangements were so bad that it is not likely 
 that they preserved this initial advantage for long, but we 
 have the testimony of their enemies to prove that their capac- 
 ity for maneuvering excited the warmest admiration, and in 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 73 
 
 all discussions as to the next war it is the French artillery 
 that the Germans primarily fear. The study of combined 
 tactics is so little prosecuted in our service that few officers 
 realize the position of the artilleryman on the defensive, but 
 a more complicated problem hardly exists, for at every turn 
 he is thrown in contact with the conflicting interests of the 
 other arms and the character of the ground itself. And, from 
 the nature of the case, it is impossible that it should be other- 
 wise, for though in the attack the artillery may be boldly 
 sent in advance with the Conviction that it can defend its 
 own front for a considerable time, and if forced to retire can 
 do so without ^particular risk, the defender, having to hold 
 his position against all comers, must from the first occupy 
 it in strength with infantry; otherwise the gunners, if forced 
 to retire, would leave a dangerous gap in the continuity of 
 their defences, which it might be impossible to fill up in time. 
 The advantages of the attack increase rapidly with the 
 number of men engaged on each side. Where only two divi- 
 sions fight independently, both sides have ample freedom of 
 movement; but when half a dozen corps are working to- 
 gether, they hamper each other's development very consid- 
 erably. Still, even with smaller numbers, and with refer- 
 ence only to the infantry, the attack still possesses an inher- 
 ent superiority over the defence, assuming always that the 
 former make their advance with a sufficient depth, or follow- 
 ing number of lines. This arises from a species of natural 
 selection which takes place in the advance. Of course the 
 bullets are perfectly impartial choosers of the slain, but 
 figures show that they fortunately do not select a very high 
 percentage of the men, and if reinforcements were only re- 
 quired to fill the gaps they produce, probably a strength of 
 75 per cent of the first line would be more than adequate for 
 all purposes, seeing that only once in modern history has this 
 proportion of loss been exceeded in a single battalion, and 
 that, too, in a whole day's fighting. But experience has 
 shown that at least ten men to the yard run of front are re- 
 quired to carry a position by assault, and since at the outside 
 not more than three men can conceivably use their weapons 
 with effect in this space, the balance is necessary to supply 
 the places of the "skulkers," who, as a reference to the pages 
 
74 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 oi a "Midsummer-Night's Dream" will show,avail themselves 
 of their opportunities most liberally. Hence the men who 
 actually deliver the assault are a clear case of the survival 
 of the the fittest, men who are there because they want to be 
 there, and have been brave enough to resist all temptations 
 to stay behind. But no such sorting-out process is conceivable 
 in the defence, more especially where the defenders are en- 
 trenched. There a line of troops, say at the rate of two 
 men to the yard, have been from the first, and the weaker ves- 
 sels have had no opportunity to get away. If we assume an 
 equal degree of pluck on both sides to commence with, then 
 at least an equal proportion of the men on the*defensive will 
 have been as anxious to get away as were anxious to stay be 
 hind indeed, a larger proportion ; for the advantage the lat- 
 ter possess of leaving their dead and wounded behind them 
 must not be forgotten, and therefore some four-fifths of the 
 defenders may be expected to face the advancing foe only up 
 to that point when the fear of the bayonet in front balances 
 the danger of the fire-swept ground behind. This is assura 
 ing the defender's line to be taken up some little way down 
 the slope of the position, as will generally be the case, both 
 in order to secure a better field of fire, and also to render it 
 less easy for the men to get away than it would be if they held 
 the extreme crest of a range. It seems impossible to do any- 
 thing to avoid this defect of the defence by reinforcements, 
 for these can rarely be near enough at hand, being necessarily 
 distributed equally along the whole front, whilst the assail- 
 ant has massed all his together for an effort against one 
 point, and also because too frequent reinforcements would 
 lead to hopeless overcrowding in the trenches themselves. 
 
 To my mind, these German statistics finally settle the 
 question of attack or defence in favor of the former; for it 
 must not be lost sight of that the German conduct of these 
 battles was only sound in its general principles, w r hile the de- 
 tail execution fell very much short of the ideal. Take all 
 the battles in succession, and eliminate the gross blunders 
 and losses they caused, such as the attempt to storm the 
 heights above Worth held by the French army of 42,000 odd 
 men with 4 battalions; the direct assault on the Spicheren 
 position without proper artillery preparation by some 10 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 75 
 
 battalions along a front of nearly 7,000 yards; the attack of 
 the Guards at St. Privat, all gross mistakes for which no 
 palliation can be found, and it will be seen that the Ger- 
 mans might easily have won their victories with even fewer 
 men. 
 
 This much, however, is certain viz., that the events of 
 the war fixed the idea of the offensive more firmly than ever 
 in the minds of those who took victorious part in it, and it 
 is only amongst the Austrians and French who were defeated 
 that the opposite view obtained ; and even in those armies it 
 is rapidly dying out. We only adhere to it in England be- 
 cause we still imagine that to carry out the attack neces- 
 sarily requires a numerical superiority. This is true, no 
 doubt, as regards the actual tactical execution, but it is not 
 true, even theoretically, as regards the whole army. Hither- 
 to it was only possible to advance theoretical reasons for our 
 faith, but now there are these practical examples worked out 
 on the battle-field to refer to, and no shadow of a proof can 
 be advanced in favor of the opposite view. If only this be- 
 lief in the defensive could be driven out of our tactical books 
 and schools, it would be equivalent to doubling the numerical 
 strength of the army, and it would not add twt) pence to the 
 estimates. Here is an opportunity for the reformer. 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF EXTENDED-ORDER FIGHTING. 
 
 The heading of this article is really a misnomer, for the 
 origin of extended-order fighting really is lost in the mists of 
 antiquity. It is certainly older than pre-glacial man, for the 
 baboons* who opposed a British light infantry regiment in 
 the first Bhootan expedition are said to have shown them- 
 selves .skillful individual fighters; but it is no part of my in- 
 tention to go in for antiquarian research, but only to trace the 
 development of the idea since fire-arms became sufficiently 
 perfected to render their power the decisive element on the 
 field of battle. 
 
 For all practical purposes the first Silesian War may be 
 taken as the starting-point of modern tactical evolution, and 
 
 *The incident of the combat between a British force and a tribe of apes 
 will be found, to the best of my recollection, in Darwin's "Descent of Man.' 
 
76 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the subsequent Seven Years' War is the basis of all line tac- 
 tics proper, the question of extended versus close order only 
 commencing in Europe with the French Revolution, broadly 
 speaking, in 1792. The object of this letter is to show how 
 all the questions connected with these two different ideas 
 were threshed out in the military literature of the day; and 
 how, though the advocates of individual or extended order 
 had the best of it on paper, the close-order school triumphed 
 on the battle-field; and how, seeing the line of development 
 fire-arms have taken, and the results obtained by them on 
 the battle-field, it seems probable that the latter will do so 
 again ; and further, how we as a nation have missed leading 
 the way of tactical reform, owing primarily to our want of 
 self-reliance in military matters; for it was purely our igno- 
 rance of tactical history which led to the revolution in our 
 ideas in 1871. Had we followed the course of events on both 
 sides since Waterloo, it. would have been apparent to all that 
 no nation stood further to the front and was more ready to 
 make the most of the power of the new weapons than we 
 were at the time. 
 
 I have recently come across a copy of a small work on 
 tactics written by a very remarkable man, whom the Ger- 
 mans call the father of modern tactics, in 1805. This man 
 was Heinrich Dietrich von Billow. Originally trained in 
 one of the Prussian war schools, after a few years in the 
 cavalry he left the country and visited America, England, 
 Belgium, and France, noting everywhere all that he saw of 
 tactical importance. His training in the lower ranks of tlje 
 Prussian army had made him thoroughly alive to all its de- 
 ficiencies in matters of detail, the result of pure pedantry, 
 but had failed to afford him any insight into the higher prin- 
 ciples on which the line formations actually rested; and to 
 the last he appears never to have been able to take any 
 higher view of the matter than that of a subaltern officer. 
 In America he had become acquainted with the fate that our 
 British line had too often encountered at the hands of the 
 colonists and the Ked Indians; and in France he had seen 
 all that the volunteers of the Meuse army could show in 
 the way of extended-order fighting; but of his own army ho 
 appears, as is very often the case, to have learnt only its 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 77 
 
 faults and none of its triumphs. On his return to his country 
 he wandered about to all the little German courts, trying to 
 find a position as tactical instructor, and putting in his spare 
 time by writing. But in spite of the undeniable genius and 
 brilliancy of many of his ideas, his extraordinary onesided- 
 ness and his unfortunate addiction to sarcasm stood in his 
 way. He ended by mortally offending everyone, and was at 
 last taken up on the charge of treasonable writing; and 
 though not convicted, he was considered too insane to be at 
 large and was kept in confinement at Colberg, whence how, 
 has never been cleared up he passed into the hands of the 
 Russians, and is believed to have died from the effect of the 
 cruelty and neglect of his custodians. My reason for refer- 
 ring to him is that his tactical papers contain every one of 
 the ideas to be found in the writings of the modern extended- 
 order school, such as the "Tactical Retrospect" and Bogng- 
 lawski; and so close is the resemblance that one is tempted 
 to believe that these two authors copied from him direct 
 without acknowledgment. 
 
 That pedantry had reached its extremest limits in the 
 regimental drill of the Prussian infantry there is not, and 
 never has been, any question. When we find the most re- 
 vered* writer of the drill-ground school gravely discussing 
 whether the cadence of the quick march should be 76 or 75 
 to the minute, and eventually deciding that, on the whole, 
 after ripe consideration, he gave the preference to the latter, 
 it is easy to imagine what his followers must have been like; 
 and one can easily understand that with such perverted ideas, 
 Von Billow's description of the advance of a Prussian line 
 in action may not be far off the truth. This is what he says 
 about it: 
 
 "Let us take the simplest example, the advance of a line 
 straight to its front. It is necessary, first of all, to place a lino 
 of points, and carefully dress the men on them ; all this takes 
 some time; then the word is given, and the line steps off 76 
 to the minute, rigid and silent, every man afraid of the stick, 
 and praying that they may not encounter a ploughed field, a 
 
 *I have since learned that "Saldern," the writer to whom T referred, and 
 who was the founder of our own drill-book, was, as a fact, about the best prac- 
 tical infantry leader that Frederick the Great ever possessed; having seen 
 the ground at Torgau over which he maneuvered his brigade, I feel it due to 
 apologize to his memory, though I cannot realize his mental attitude. 
 
78 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 mole-heap, or half-a-dozen heavy flintstones. These sorts of 
 things ought not to be on a battle-field; they upset the order 
 too much; nevertheless they sometimes are there, and then 
 it is very inconvenient. Suppose, for instance, a six-foot 
 ditch is met with : what is to be done ? A peasant or poacher 
 would jump across it, but with troops it is not to be thought 
 of; their trowsers are too tight, and the soldier too stiff and 
 too weary. . . .But I have said nothing of the two boys and the 
 two old men (the guides and the sergeants) who are to give 
 the time to the whole battalion, which has to look to them to 
 keep step, although every rational man prefers to look in the 
 direction in which he is going i. e., to his front. One sees 
 that such tactics are not based on anatomy, but what then ? 
 Nature must bow to art, and the man must be taught to squint. 
 Keally I find prose almost too feeble to describe what would 
 happen against my line of smart handy skirmishers, each one 
 lying flat on the ground, waiting till the enemy are within 30 
 yards before they fire; the result would be absolute 
 annihilation." 
 
 Possibly it might be; but, unfortunately for his argu- 
 ment, the line of skirmishers has never yet been found that 
 would do as he would have them. A little further on he 
 describes another method of advance as in those days a 
 favorite fad of the drill-masters viz., the oblique advance, 
 not by the diagonal march, as one would suppose, but by a 
 series of diagonal steps, the body being kept square to the 
 front. But he gives himself away rather by admitting that 
 in real work these errors correct themselves; and as, for in- 
 stonce, at Torgau, where the grape from 200 guns in line 
 proved more than flesh and blood could stand, the line broke 
 through to the front and threw themselves forward as fast 
 as they could run, throwing themselves down to get their 
 wind and going on again. His own ideal is, as he says, the 
 swarm of the Iroquois Indians, and actually what both 
 French and Germans have since practised a dense line of 
 skirmishers, one man to the yard, backed by company col- 
 umns. He would have the men trained as sportsmen rather 
 than as soldiers, each man to take individual advantage of 
 cover and to "stalk" his enemy, and never to fire till within 
 30 yards; whereas the line was supposed to open fire at 300. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 79 
 
 As regards the confusion which his style of fighting wou'cl 
 entail, he simply says, "We must learn to organize disorder," 
 "The battles of the future will be decided by skirmishing 
 fire," two sentences familiar enough to readers of modern 
 tactical literature. 
 
 Perhaps the most singular instance of his foresight was 
 his exact prophecy of what happened at Jena. There the 
 Prussians did advance in faultlessly dressed echelons, and 
 were met by the French Tirailleurs, who treated them as he 
 had foretold; but what he and his followers in modern 
 times have forgotten to notice was that, thanks to the faulty 
 leading of the superior commanders, the line was always 
 fighting against double and even fourfold odds. As is well 
 known, Jena was the death-knell of the Prussian line; the 
 reaction against the foolish pedantry which had proved its 
 ruin swept it all away its good points as well as its evil 
 ones and many would have gone the whole way advocated 
 by Von Billow. Fortunately, a few first-rate men preserved 
 their heads sufficiently to realize the weak points in Von 
 Billow's structure viz., that battles are not fought by a sin- 
 gle line alone, but by the successive employment of the re- 
 serves, and that infantry is not the only arm on the battle- 
 field. Still the principle of the small column and skir- 
 mishers asserted itself over that of the line, and has main- 
 tained itself to this day; though the long peace and the 
 almost universal neglect of military study everywhere except 
 in Berlin has caused its subsequent history to be forgotten. 
 In brief, this was as follows: When the skirmishers and 
 small columns met one another, it was speedily seen that in 
 this way no decision whatever could be arrived at, a fact of 
 which Frederick the Great and the line tacticians had been 
 perfectly well aware; the two lines of skirmishers engaged 
 along the whole front, and as the small columns were called 
 up, the fire line fluctuated backwards and forwards; it be- 
 came necessary to settle the matter one way or another, and 
 where the others tried it in a haphazard way, Napoleon sys- 
 tematized the thing. First he drove in the skirmishers, if 
 necessary, by a charge of cavalry, and established his line 
 of guns at case-shot ranges; then it was discovered pretty- 
 simultaneously everywhere that Von Billow's theory of skir- 
 
80 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 inishers versus artillery was not quite what he had expected 
 it to be. But, the old absolute discipline of the line having 
 been forgotten, there remained nothing to oppose to the guns 
 but columns, and it seems never to have occurred to Conti- 
 nental leaders to let those columns lie down, as our own Duke 
 used to make them do. A massed charge of cavalry, if not 
 interfered with by the opposing horse, then generally de- 
 cided the matter, and the conquered position was occupied 
 by columns with sloped arms. Sometimes the enemy's 
 artillery could not be so easily dealt with, and then it became 
 necessary to advance against them; and since, as recently 
 described in a letter on the Napoleonic conscription, the 
 quality of the French infantry had deteriorated so far that 
 they could no longer be induced to advance in any other way, 
 heavy columns had again to be employed a proceeding 
 which was prompty copied, like everything else the French 
 did, by the other side. Hence on the Continent, at the close 
 of the great war, both line and skirmishers were everywhere 
 somewhat discredited, and the battalion column reigned 
 supreme for battle employment. 
 
 No one thought of enquiring how the French system had 
 answered against the British line, or, as time w r ent on, how 
 our line had fared against other opponents. It was the "line" 
 borrowed from the Prussians, and therefore a relic of ihe 
 past, with which the enlightened present could have nothing 
 to do. Those, however, who did not think of it, remembering 
 the reputation the British infantry had everywhere made for 
 itself, frankly admitted that though it might suit us very 
 well, their troops had not got the stuff in them to imitate us. 
 Then came the introduction of the breech-loader simultane 
 on sly with the adoption of short service; and it seemed for 
 the moment that the supporters of Von Biilow would have it 
 all their own way-, for the power to load in any position filled 
 up what had hitherto been the weakest point of their system. 
 Instinctively, therefore, the Prussians adopted his views in 
 presence of the enemy, and against the muzzle-loader they 
 answered well enough. But when they themselves had to 
 face an enemy not only armed with as good a weapon, but 
 with a very much better one, which held them under fire for 
 a thousand yards before they could return a shot, things 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 81 
 
 changed altogether, for the troops suffered most severely, 
 and arrived at their first shooting position in such disorder 
 that to all intents and purposes they were out of hand, and 
 fought simply by individual instinct. What the resulting 
 confusion was like, the "Midsummer-Night's Dream" and 
 similar papers will give an idea; and it was universally felt 
 that somehow or other this state of things must be put a 
 stop to. 
 
 There is always a difficulty in following the course of an 
 idea at Berlin, for the highest-placed commanders, who make 
 the regulations, do not, as a rule, write pamphlets, and there 
 seems, too, both from the few that have appeared, and still 
 more from the study of their regulations, to be always some- 
 thing concealed behind what they do write, a something 
 which can only be understood by those who have been 
 through the mill, and possess the requisite key to under- 
 stand the esoteric meaning of the works. One can only 
 judge by what was done or allowed to go on, on parades and 
 inspections; but, from what I heard and saw as far back as 
 1874, the principle of the line received very much more atten 
 tion than that of the column or extended order. 
 
 Their writers had begun to turn their attention to the 
 history of their old wars, and had discovered wherein the real 
 spirit of the old line lay. This, according to Frederick him- 
 self, was not the bayonet charge in line, as so often imagined, 
 but rather the development, opposite to the point of the ene- 
 my's position selected, of an overwhelming superiority of 
 fire ; and this superiority once obtained, the further advance 
 with the bayonet was merely to clear the enemy out, and what 
 order it was made in was perfectly immaterial. Volleys 
 from a three-deep line was the best method for establishing 
 this superiority, and since, too, the only fire to be faced dur- 
 ing the advance was that of artillery, and of a few skir- 
 mishers who were easily held in check. Line was in all 
 respects the best adapted to his purpose, the attempt to 
 advance in column and then deploy into line being an 
 obvious waste of time. Now, this is exactly what we want 
 to do at the present time, only the increased range of mod- 
 ern arms compels us to move everything back a stage fur- 
 ther, and the fire of the magazine rifle at short ranges has 
 
82 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 taken .the place of the bayonet charge of former times. 
 Dealing with the purely infantry attack, a necessity 
 which may arise where the two artilleries are too well 
 matched for either to obtain a decisive superiority over the 
 other, it is obviously necessary to bring one's own infantry 
 up to effective range as rapidly and in as good order as possi- 
 ble. It will therefore be necessary to advance without halt- 
 ing to fire, in order to reduce the time of exposure; and to 
 keep the men in hand they will have to be in a close-order 
 formation of some sort, preferably in line, though by "line'* 
 we no longer mean a long unbroken line of brigade, but 
 a line of companies, separated by greater or smaller in- 
 tervals, according to circumstances, and whether in single 
 rank or double rank is a matter which will depend on the 
 quality of the men themselves. That such a line can advance 
 without firing to within effective range, say 700 yards, I be- 
 lieve to have been sufficiently proved by what happened in 
 1870, where, in spite of the absence of the covering screen of 
 smoke, and in spite, too, sometimes, of the want of artillery 
 preparation, the Germans invariably got in even closer, no 
 matter even if the numerical superiority was as high as four 
 to one; and the instances of the 38th Brigade recently quo ted 
 and of St. Privat show to my mind conclusively that they suf- 
 fered no worse w r hen in line than when in any other forma- 
 tion. The fact that these advances succeeded even against 
 great numerical superiority disposes of any objection founder! 
 on the more rapid fire of modern arms. Even admitting that 
 the present rifles fire twice as fast, and that this rate of fire 
 can be maintained, which is far in excess of the truth, we can 
 afford to divide the 20,000 French at Bruville by 2, and the 
 fact will still remain that the Prussian infantry did face on 
 that occasion a fire as heavy as 10,000 men w T ith modern rifles 
 could pour out, and reached a limit well within effective 
 range without returning a shot. But if one line could get 
 there, another could have followed it equally well, and a 
 third and fourth if necessary, always supposing that the 
 superior leading had massed the requisite number of troops 
 opposite to the point of attack, and hence the eventual accu- 
 mulation of a sufficient superiority becomes principally a 
 matter of time. That this superiority will be decisive at the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 8& 
 
 first range is unlikely, but it will be sufficient under the im- 
 pulse of fresh troops from the rear to get in a stage closer, 
 and at each stage the same result repeats itself, till within 
 400 to 300 yards the resistance of the enemy will be utterly 
 broken, and the subsequent advance will be merely to occupy 
 a position tenanted only by the dead and dying. 
 
 Of course, in proportion as the gunners have been able 
 to do their share of the work, the difficulty of the attack de- 
 creases, and it will be the business of the leader to adapt his 
 formations to the conditions of the moment; and if the ene- 
 my can be turned out by an ordinary skirmishing line, there 
 is no reason why he should not be. 
 
 Keviewing the matter in all its bearings, it appears to 
 me that the difficulties and drawbacks attending Von Billow's 
 method are even greater now than when he first started them. 
 Of course, it is as hopeless to expect in a big battle a decision 
 from a line of skirmishers now as it was then, but the main 
 difficulty now of getting them anywhere near the enemy in 
 open order is increased. Troops, unless disciplined like iron, 
 will return fire when in extended order, the moment they be- 
 gin to feel it. Formerly, when it was only a matter of fifty 
 yards one way or the other, it did not much signify if they 
 did ; now, if they began blazing at each other at 1,800 or 2,000 
 yards, the fight would be indefinitely prolonged, and the 
 losses proportionately greater. That they will do so, what 
 happened pretty generally in 1870, though I believe not in 
 the 38th Brigade, shows pretty conclusively. In spite of a 
 fairly high order of discipline, individuals began firng at 
 double the effective range of their rifles, even though they 
 knew they could not hope to hit; then how much harder will 
 it be to stop them when they know that the bullets will at 
 least go as far as those they are receiving; and to stop this, 
 nothing but effective discipline in close order under the eyr 
 of an officer has ever been known to be of any avail. 
 
 The view taken of the matter in Berlin generally tallies 
 with this, though they have adopted in their drill every one 
 almost of Von Biilow's ideas, such as developing the individ- 
 uality of the man to the utmost. Doing away with all super- 
 fluous relics of the past, they have never ceased to exact the 
 most rigid steadiness when in close order; but they assert,. 
 
84 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and I believe this to be the key to their whole system, that 
 tactics are only relatively good and bad a formation ad- 
 mirably adapted for to-day /may prove deliberate man- 
 slaughter to-morrow; and that it is not for the troops to 
 judge when, where, and in what formation to attack. For 
 instance, if the need suddenly arises for troops to move 
 against the enemy across a perfectly fire-swept space, no 
 other line being available, you don't want all the men to reel 
 that this time it is all up we are all "gone coons" for it does 
 not at all necessarily follow that they are, and the leader is 
 the best judge of that. 
 
 Now, in that way I believe we were very much better 
 off in 1870 than now ; as the army then stood, with its tradi- 
 tion of absolute unquestioning obedience, a good leader could 
 have done what he pleased with them. It is true that many of 
 the line regiments were a little awkward at outpost duty and 
 skirmishing proper, but there was no inherent reason in the 
 nature of things why they should not have been brought up 
 to the standard of our best rifle and light infantry regiments, 
 in which absolute discipline was of just as high an order. 
 The fault lay in exaggerating the dangers to be faced, and 
 teaching everybody that it was a duty he owed to the state 
 no less than to himself to avoid every possible chance of in- 
 juring his own skin. Instead of repeating like parrots the 
 terrible stories of bloodshed we learnt from our war corre- 
 spondents, who wrote primarily for the taste of the British 
 public, we might at least have pointed out that even the worst 
 of them in their exaggerated form was no worse than many 
 we had successfully faced before, and that common sense 
 showed that a bullet from a breech-loader was no more 
 deadly than from a muzzle-loader, the only question being 
 the quantity of bullets to be faced in a given time, and that 
 the duration of that time depended primarily on the use we 
 made of our own weapons. 
 
 We had, however, come to believe in the bayonet charge 
 as the essential feature of line tactics, and not in its fire 
 power, and this alone appears to me to have prevented our 
 progress. Otherwise all that would have been required 
 vould have been to move back our first fire position a little 
 further with each successive improvement in the range of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 85 
 
 our weapon. Fire superiority alone decides, has decided, 
 and more than ever will decide; and the power of accumulat- 
 ing this superiority by right belongs to the offensive, f wlio 
 brings up his masses out of sight of the enemy, and then sends 
 them in against the defender, who by the nature of things is 
 compelled to be equally strong i. e., equally weak at all 
 parts of his line, and common sense and experience alike 
 prove that the principle of close-order "line" will enable that 
 accumulation of rifles to be best carried out. 
 
 THE LEGEND OF ST. PRIVAT LE MONTAGNE. 
 
 Possibly some of my readers may be inclined to consider 
 anything relating to an event already more than twenty 
 years old as ancient history, but I can assure them that, as 
 regards the question of the evolution of contemporary Brit- 
 ish infantry tactics, the correct history of what happened on 
 the "blood-stained glacis of St. Privat on the 18th August, 
 1870," is still one of the most pressing and important ques- 
 tions of the day; for an amount of legend, rivalling in quan- 
 tity even that of the Waterloo campaign, has already ac- 
 creted round it in English tactical schools, which is likely, if 
 the tendency is not checked soon, to have the most detri- 
 mental effect possible on our fighting formations. 
 
 The conventional idea of what occurred on this occasion 
 was primarily derived from a pamphlet written shortly after 
 the war by Lieutenant Field Marshal the Duke of Wurtem- 
 berg, an Austrian officer who followed the German armies 
 in France, but who was not personally an eye-witness of this 
 particular event. His account of what took place is sub- 
 stantially as follows: 
 
 "About five o'clock in the afternoon, the commander of 
 the guard considered the enemy to be sufficiently shaken for 
 him to risk an assault across the open and gently ascending 
 ground. The 4th Brigade (Von Kessel) first moved forward 
 from Habonville in the direction of St. Privat in 'line of col- 
 umns' in two lines, with skirmishers thrown out in front; and 
 a quarter of an hour later the advance of the 1st Division (Von 
 Pape) commenced in the same formation. The front of 
 attack included little more than 2,000 paces, so that there 
 
-86 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 were about ten men to the pace. This, however, was the 
 closest formation of attack employed by the Prussians in this 
 campaign. The effect of the enemy's fire, even at a distance 
 of more than 1,500 paces, was so murderous that, according 
 to the accounts received, nearly 6,000 men fell in ten minutes, 
 .and the advance had to be immediately discontinued." 
 
 The fact that the commander of the Guard Corps was 
 himself Prince August of Wurtemberg has probably led 
 many people, who only study these things superficially, to 
 conclude that the author of the pamphlet and the commander 
 of the Guard were one and the same person, and hence to 
 attach undue weight to this pamphlet. But only the habit 
 of exaggeration which seems innate in a certain class of Eng- 
 lish military writers can account for the extraordinary way 
 in which this simple narrative, which does not vary very 
 much from the truth, except as regards losses, has been dis- 
 torted and made to serve as a basis for all sorts of ridiculous 
 schemes of attack. For the term "line of columns" "heavy" 
 or "dense" or "massive" columns have been substituted, and 
 these again have been interpreted to mean battalion, and 
 even regimental, columns. Whilst for the modest "nearly" 
 0,000 men who fell in ten minutes, 7,000, and even 8,000, have 
 been interpolated. 
 
 Let us see what actually did happen according to the regi- 
 mental histories of the troops actually engaged, and first let 
 us take the account of the part played in the battle by the 
 first "Garde Regiment zu Fusz." The original would occupy 
 several columns, so I have condensed it, even to the sacrifice 
 of style. According to this authority: 
 
 "Between 3:30 p. in. and 4 p. m. the brigade to which we 
 belonged (Von Kessel's) stood about 500 yards south of St. 
 Marie aux Chenes (a little village on the great chausee which 
 leads to St. Privat, and distant from the latter place about 
 2,000 yards in a westerly direction), fronting north, the two 
 regiments (which constituted the brigade) side by side with 
 the fusilier battalions of each as first 'treffen' (or line), their 
 flank companies in advance; the second battalions formed 
 the second 'treffen' in half -battalion columns (500 men) at 
 deploying intervals, and the remaining two battalions, the 
 first of each regiment, stood in the same formation as third 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 87 
 
 ^treffen.' For nearly two hours we lay, suffering constant 
 losses from chassepot bullets and from shrapnel fire from the 
 French batteries on our right flank about St. Privat, and the 
 incessant strain, watching for the little white clouds of 
 smoke which puffed out in the sky above us, and then the few 
 seconds of intense anxiety to know where the bullets thus 
 released would strike, did not fail to have its effect. [I may 
 mention here that the French shrapnel was of an extremely 
 inferior nature, and moreover their artillery was so thor- 
 oughly held in check by that of the Prussians that they had 
 but little attention to give the infantry, which, moreover, was 
 so far off as to be beyond the supposed limit of shrapnel lire 
 in those days.] 
 
 "At last, about 5:30, came the long-wished-for order to 
 .advance and storm the village of St. Privat. The task set us 
 was about as follows: at the foot of a long glacis-like slope, 
 which rose gently for some 3,000 paces, and without a parti- 
 cle of cover to screen our movement, to change front half- 
 right, and then move to the left across the chausee, here en- 
 closed by two deep side ditches, and then to wheel into line 
 again and advance to the assault. 
 
 "The order was executed in the following manner : The 
 two fusilier battalions, having moved northwards across the 
 chausee, wheeled to the right and advanced, that of the third 
 Garde Regiment zu Fusz' next to the road, ours next on its 
 left. The second battalions followed across the road and 
 .also wheeled to the right, joining the fighting line then on the 
 left of their respective fusilier battalions. The battalions 
 of the third 'treffen' followed in a similar manner; but as 
 soon as they crossed the road, the necessity of supporting at 
 -once the troops in the fighting line caused them to be broken 
 up by companies and sent to join the fighting line wherever 
 their aid was most required." 
 
 Von Kessel, the Brigadier, describes the movement in 
 the following manner: 
 
 "Shortly after 5:30, the divisional commander, Von 
 Pape, rode up to me and gave me the order to advance and 
 storm the village, which he pointed out to our right flank. 
 1 called up the regimental commanders and repeated it ver- 
 ~ballv as I had received it, and then added that immediately 
 
88 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 after sounding the advance, I should order a change of front, 
 quarter-right on the right battalion. On completion of this, 
 the skirmishers of the first 'treffen' were to be thrown out, 
 and then, as soon as the chause'e had been crossed, I should 
 order a second, quarter-right, change of front. 
 
 "The first wheel was executed in good order, but, imme- 
 diately after passing the chause'e, the columns came under so- 
 heavy a fire, both of artillery and chassepots, that the ad- 
 vance was seriously impeded. About 100 paces in front of 
 St. Frivat dense lines of French skirmishers lay skillfully 
 concealed, and their fire, which began by bugle sound, cost 
 us heavy losses. I saw at once that all the columns, irre- 
 spective of distances, caught it equally. The bullets, still 
 effective after several ricochets, made all calculation, based 
 on the principle of 'distances,' illusory. The French shoot 
 without aiming, and leave it to the flat trajectory of the bul- 
 let to find its own billet. The nature of the ground com- 
 pelled us to run forward by groups, and then to throw oar- 
 selves down to take breath. With severe effort, and 
 leaving men behind us at every step, we managed to reach 
 a slight undulation some 600 yards in front of the village* 
 and our resolute advance had the effect of making the French 
 skirmishers abandon their position and take shelter behind 
 the walls of the village, and their fire from this new position 
 was fortunately less effective. 
 
 "I had sent the fusilier battalions which first crossed 
 the road direct against the village, and had allowed the fol- 
 lowing ones to continue the movement to the northward (i. e., 
 left), because 1 hoped they would find better cover further on. 
 Also I knew I could rely on my regimental commanders to 
 join in as circumstances required. For myself, I remained 
 near the' chause'e, as I felt that my personal presence was 
 most required there, for the losses in officers was already 
 great. From that moment I did nothing but drive the col- 
 umns forward so as to get to closer quarters from which our 
 shorter-range weapons might be used with effect. The noise 
 of the bursting shells and the heavy infantry fire rendered 
 it almost impossible to make oneself heard; both skirmishers 
 and columns had to throw themselves down to get breath^ 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 89 
 
 I must confess that they always rose to my call and resumed 
 the advance. 
 
 "When a large body of troops advances over a plain, it 
 is particularly unfortunate that every man Can see the losses 
 that are incurred, and the sight of them increases the terror 
 enormously. Whoever denies that such scenes have an effect 
 on the young soldier, has never personally been through such 
 an ordeal. Whenever for a moment we offered a favorable 
 target, we heard a bugle-call in the French lines, and the next 
 moment came such a hail of lead that all were compelled to 
 throw themselves on their faces. The losses in the fighting 
 line caused fresh troops to be sent up, the columns rapidly 
 diminished, gaps began to appear in the front, and the loss 
 of officers became very sensible. Individuals went forward, 
 mostly stooping low, and with averted faces, with hands 
 raised in front of them, as men instinctively do in a hailstorm, 
 their features distorted by terror. The terrible moral effect 
 could not remain unrecognized. I ordered all buglers and 
 drummers to sound and beat the 'advance,' and for myself 
 kept reiterating the command, 'Forward!' 
 
 "By this time at least fifty officers in the brigade must 
 have fallen. One must have commanded in such a crisis to 
 know what it means. It struck me as I looked round ttiat 
 if things went on at this rate for long, the whole brigade 
 would be down before we reached St. Privat. 
 
 "About this time, Colonel von Roder (3d Guard Regi- 
 ment) came up to me and described the position of the left 
 wing, half a battalion of his regiment was moving on Ron- 
 court (a village about 1,000 yards north of St. Privat), and a 
 few of the skirmishers of his first battalion had also gone off 
 in the same direction. The columns of the center had di- 
 rected themselves on a small height, which broke the level 
 of the ground a little to our side of a line joining Roncourt 
 and St. Privat, and were suffering less. I fully agreed to 
 what he said, all the more as I could do nothing to alter 
 things, and gave him, as he was on foot, his horse having 
 been killed, the horse of my adjutant. Lieutenant von Kessel, 
 who had just been knocked clean out of his saddle by the 
 blow of a chassepot bullet in the right shoulder. My second 
 galloper, whom 1 had sent to ride down the front and order 
 
90 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the drums to beat the 'advance/ received a bullet through 
 his hand and did not return to me. Of my two orderlies, 
 both had lost their horses, and one was mortally wounded. 
 The bullets now came in harder and faster than ever, and my 
 horse had become through fear almost unmanageable. 
 
 "From the low meadow ground where I had spoken to 
 Colonel von Koder, I rode towards the chause'e, and found 
 everywhere the ranks much thinned. For all eventualities 
 I wished to have a formed body of men in hand, and gave the 
 necessary orders. 
 
 "So, by the alternate advance of the columns, a position 
 was at length reached from which we could reply advantage- 
 ously to the fire of the French. 
 
 "Roncourt was easily carried, and now, about 6:45, we 
 partially enclosed the village of St. Privat from the north- 
 west and west, and thus had attained a position from which 
 it was possible to advance to the storm of the place. 
 
 "I reported my position to the general officer command 
 ing, and added that, as matters stood, we were too weak to 
 advance further, but that, under cover of our fire, columns 
 might still be brought up in rear of the center. 
 
 "My idea was that I had certainly lost far the larger 1ml f 
 of niy officers, and at least half of niy men, without having as 
 yet inflicted any appreciable loss on the enemy. Still, as I 
 watched, I could plainly see that our opponent was no longer 
 unshaken; detachments began to break back and were 
 driven to the front again. 
 
 "In the village itself I saw columns advancing, but a pil- 
 lar of smoke rose up from one of the farms by the road and 
 stood out black against the sky, which was already touched 
 with the sunset colors. The fire at least was a help to us, 
 and its appearance was greeted by our men with loud cheers. 
 
 "To the northeast of the village I saw a regiment of cav- 
 alry on gray horses advancing, apparently with the intention 
 of riding down our fighting line. Infantry which on open 
 ground has already experienced considerable loss never quite 
 likes it when it sees cavalry advancing to the charge. There 
 is a considerable feeling of uncertainty as to how the matter 
 will turn out *1 nst at this moment my horse was shot under 
 me. Clearing myself from his body. I took my revolver out 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 91 
 
 of the holsters, and, walking up to the skirmishers, told them 
 what to expect, and gave the order to reserve their fire till 
 the enemy were within fifty paces, and if that did not stop 
 them, to let themselves be ridden over. 
 
 "The men of the first 'Garde Kegiment zu Fusz' were 
 noticeably cool and collected, adjusted their sights, and my 
 adjutant stayed with them to give them the word of com- 
 mand. In order to give the same orders further down the 
 line, I Doubled across a small hollow, but was so blown and 
 fatigued in my long boots, and owing to the great heat, that 
 1 was almost speechless when I reached the next body of 
 troops, and here there was no single officer erect to receive 
 my orders, and all my staff had been left behind. The ap- 
 pearance of the cavalry had its effect along the whole line. 
 Some prepared to receive them in rallying squares, others 
 in groups, and in the center the men mostly remained lying 
 down. Fortunately, nothing came of it. The cavalry evi- 
 dently had no desire to charge home, and presently vanished. 
 
 "But now the Saxons began to put in an appearance, 
 and with them the men seemed again inspired with a desire 
 to close." 
 
 So far General von Kessel; now let us turn back and 
 trace 'the fate of the individual battalions: 
 
 "The Fusiliers on the right flank of the brigade lay in the 
 line of the heaviest fire and, as already mentioned, their 
 flank companies had been sent forward as skirmishers in 
 advance. 
 
 "Already before crossing the chause'e they had come 
 under a heavy chassepot fire. They executed their change 
 of front, quarter-right, satisfactorily, in spite of a couple of 
 shells which burst amongst them, and went forward in the 
 direction of St. Privat. 
 
 "Suddenly, on the rising ground above the village, a line 
 of smoke rose clear in the air, and the next moment we were 
 overwhelmed with a storm of projectiles, and the men foil 
 in heaps. General von Kessel gave personally the order to 
 two or three section leaders to extend their men, and in a 
 few moments almost the entire flank companies were dis- 
 solved only Lieutenant von Alvensleben IT. kept his men 
 m hand about one hundred yards behind the skirmishers. 
 
92 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 Here, as everywhere, the advance was continued by alternate 
 rushes. Though the distance was still far beyond the range 
 of our weapons, the men were allowed to fire. Under the 
 appalling rain of the enemy's projectiles, one seemed so pow- 
 erless that any means of keeping up the men's spirits was 
 resorted to. 
 
 "After a few moments to get breath, a fresh rush was 
 attempted. The only drummer still remaining had both 
 arms torn off by a shell; Lieutenant von Halkewitz was hit 
 in the side, and fell; Lieutenant von Maltzahn was shot 
 through the right foot, and could not go on. The adjutant of 
 the battalion, Lieutenant von Wartensleben, had his horse 
 shot under him, but joined a company, and was himself dis- 
 abled a few moments afterwards by two bullets. The com- 
 pany again rose and raced forward some fifty paces. Cap- 
 tain Graf von Finckenstein was hit in the foot, and gave over 
 his command to his, subaltern. When we got within 600 
 paces of the village, we saw the French falling back out of 
 their advanced trenches on the village. 
 
 "The 2d Battalion came up on our left flank. The losses 
 increased from minute to minute, and the noise of the burst- 
 ing shells and of the breech-loaders was so deafening that no 
 commands could be heard, and only the whistle asserted its 
 power. The right wing division of Lieutenant von Alvens- 
 leben's 'zug' was struck by a shell, and at the same moment 
 the left wing of the same command was simply swept away 
 by a round of a mitrailleur, which struck the ground like a 
 charge of shot. But the advance continued, and after each 
 halt the men again rose up and advanced with determination. 
 About this time the 10th and llth companies (i. e., the ttvo 
 center companies, which had hitherto occupied the position 
 of our old main body in the attack) were brought up, and 
 with 'drums beating' (which means in 'parade marsch'), the 
 officers in front, the whole went forward together; but again, 
 and at about 400 paces from the village, we were compelled 
 to lie down. At this moment the cry, 'Down! the cavalry is 
 coming!' was heard, and to our left front we saw the gray 
 horses and white cloaks of the horsemen; but, fortunately, 
 the charge did not come off, for on all sides the want of am- 
 munition was beginning to be felt. Four more officers fell; 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 93 
 
 c. captain, still mounted, ordered the battalion to lie down 
 and not to advance and, greatly excited, Count Schulen- 
 berg seized Lieutenant von Boiiim by the arm and said, 'We 
 must go on, believe me. We shall lose far fewer by advanc- 
 ing than by being out here' ; and between them they got The 
 men to advance to within 200 yards of the village, where they 
 captured a shelter trench which had been deserted by the 
 French, and took cover in it. It was now r about 6 :30, and tbe 
 ammunition was about expended. With difficulty, Lieuten- 
 ant von Boniin crawled round and collected cartridges froin 
 the killed and wounded. Here for more than half an hour 
 lay the remains of the battalion waiting with longing for 
 reinforcements, but certainly not 'morally' shaken. A Saxon 
 shell burst short in amongst them and killed two men, be- 
 sides wounding several, and seven more officers fell. Out of 
 the village they could hear the French bugles sounding what 
 they took to be the 'advance' (it is the same in our own and 
 both the French and German armies), and every moment they 
 expected a counter-attack." 
 
 Here we will leave the Fusiliers, and only add that the 
 brave and fortunate young subaltern Lieutenant von Bonim 
 eventually led them through the actual assault of the village 
 and out of action. Poor Von Schulenberg, whose words 
 qiioted above show what a soldier's insight into things lie 
 possessed, was left for dead in the trench, but I believe event- 
 ually recovered, and the total losses of the battalion 
 amounted to 18 officers, 93 non-commissioned officers, and 
 372 men. 
 
 Let us take up the history of the 2d Battalion : 
 
 "After it had deployed into half-battalions and crossed 
 the chause'e, it moved further to the left, and then followed 
 as a left echelon to the Fusiliers, the idea being to get round 
 the Hank of the enemy and attack from his weakest side. 
 
 "As soon as the front had moved in to the direction of St. 
 Privat, General von Kessel ordered skirmishers to be sent 
 out, and shortly afterwards the colonel ordered the half -bat- 
 talions to separate into company columns. In this order 
 they gained ground a little way, but still fresh skirmishers 
 were called for by the general. The distance was still too 
 -reat for our weapons, and a shorter range had to be ol- 
 
94: Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 tained, and the companies advanced almost without firing a 
 shot. The attention of the men to the officers, the 'appell' 
 (untranslatable in our language, more is the pity), and the 
 lire discipline were not for a moment impaired. 
 
 "Lieutenant von Brasne'e and Lieutenant von Woyrich 
 led their 'zus' forward by alternate rushes of from 100 to 
 150 paces, and the French steadily fell back before them. 
 About 6:45 the cavalry above referred to appeared, wheeled 
 into line, and advanced at a trot direct for Lieutenant von 
 BrasneVs 'zug.' The latter ceased firing, cautioned his men 
 to shoot slow and low, and ordered them to wait for his word. 
 At about 300 yards he gave the order for independent fire, and 
 before this fire the cavalry turned tail and bolted. 
 
 "Meanwhile the 5th and Gth companies had closed in 
 again on each other and lay in line two deep." 
 
 The 7th and 8th companies had much the same experi- 
 ence as the other two; only it is worth calling attention to 
 the fact that, on the right wing, where men of two different 
 corps had become intermingled, confusion set in, and no ex- 
 ertion of the officers could prevent them bolting. Still the 
 intact portion of the companies was saved, and they eventu- 
 ally forced themselves forward and lay down in line with, 
 their comrades in the Fusiliers, waiting for the fresh impulse 
 to advance; and here we w r ill leave them till next week. 
 
 A great deal of this article has been written between in- 
 verted commas, but I should wish it to be understood that it 
 does not profess to be a literal transcript, but is only a precis 
 of some thirty pages of the original. I had hoped to quote 
 all the officers' names as they fell, so as the better to show 
 how the gradual dissolution of the force set in; but they fell 
 in such numbers that the names alone would have filled half 
 a column. Next week I hope to continue the article, though 
 not in such detail, for the experiences of all were pretty uni- 
 form, and till then I withhold any comments. Only one or 
 two points I should like to particularize here, and that is the 
 very evident difference of opinion that appears to have ex- 
 isted between the regimental officers, those in closest con- 
 tact with the men and the general officer commanding, as to 
 the use of extended order, for here we find the general calling 
 for skirmishers and the subalterns holding them back. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 95 
 
 Those of niy readers who remember the Midsummer-Night's 
 Dream," reviewed in these columns, will recall a complaint 
 on this head by the writer a point it will be useful to bear 
 in mind. 
 
 I have traced the fortunes of the Fusiliers and 2d Bat- 
 talion 1st Guard Grenadiers "zu Fusz" in the attack of St. 
 Privat in considerable detail. The experiences of the 3d 
 Battalion and, indeed, of all the other regiments were so 
 very similar that I propose only to note a few of the most 
 essential points. 
 
 The 1st Battalion of the above-mentioned regiment ad- 
 vanced at first in two half -battalion columns, which, how- 
 ever, soon lost all connection, one column being called on to 
 reinforce the extreme left of the line, the other to fill up a 
 gap in the center of the fight. Both columns appear to have 
 deployed into line from the outset; it is expressly stated to 
 have been done by the right half-battalion, and is implied 
 in the case of the other one ; and in this formation they ad- 
 vanced right into the fighting line, and only then deployed 
 their skirmishing sections. 
 
 Their arrival gave the impetus for a fresh series of 
 rushes, but their momentum was insufficient to carry the 
 troops on to the final storm, and so they, too, at length lay 
 down to wait the arrival of the Saxons, who, by the way, dis- 
 tinguished themselves by firing into the left rear of their 
 friends. Whilst lying out here in the open, it is expressly 
 stated that several of the companies previously extended 
 managed to rally their men and re-form them in "two-deep 
 line." I mention the two-deep line, because, whene/er 
 "line" without this qualification is used in German works 
 previous to 1888, thre^-deep line is understood. 
 
 As for the last rush, or, properly speaking, the actual 
 assault on the village, I will again quote the brigadier's (Von 
 Kessel's) account: 
 
 "The last position of the brigade before St. Privat 
 formed from right to left a continuous line. On the right, 
 owing to the heavy losses, there were no supports. On 
 the left there were still some closed columns behind the 
 fighting line. As soon as I had mounted a fresh horse, I 
 
Uti Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 strove hard to rally stragglers who, owing to their officers 
 having fallen, were trying to skulk off. I also endeavored 
 to drive on those who had contented themselves with lying 
 down under cover; it was a heavy task, and only partially 
 successful. 
 
 "Our line was now converging round the village, the 
 artillery were pouring shell into it, and as the losses on the 
 French side became heavier, ours diminished in proportion. 
 No order was given for the assault, every one acted spohtim-'- 
 ously a general conviction appeared to seize on all that nov 
 or never was the time. They all dashed forward together, 
 and after a sharp struggle at the walls, in which many fell, 
 the streets were filled with our men, and a succession of d<^- 
 peiate house-to-house fights ensued, in which the most indis- 
 criminate firing took place; in many places our troops firing 
 into one another, whilst during the first few moments a l'"\v 
 of our own shells added to the confusion. 
 
 "At the same time the French artillery also poured shell 
 into us; the village, too, was on fire in several places." 
 
 in the attempt to debouch out of the village, which uns 
 ultimately successful, and in the terrible artillery duel 
 which followed, when .the Guard artillery took up its final 
 position just in front of the overcrowded infantry, and which 
 lasted for possibly another hour, the losses were very heavy, 
 though of course, in the growing darkness and almost hope- 
 less confusion, they did not attract the attention the earlier 
 ones did. But, in considering the actual losses in the attack 
 with reference to the question of formations, these must not 
 bo left out of account. 
 
 I may note here in passing, as this "spontaneous" move- 
 ment of the whole is very characteristic, that the state- 
 ment quoted above is confirmed by two other witnesses w'lo 
 watched the fight from the rear viz., Prince August of Wiir- 
 temberg and Prince Hohenlohe; the latter of whom de- 
 scribes in his "Letters on Artillery" how, as he was talking 
 to the former behind the line of his guns, the corps artillery 
 of the Guard, and as they watched the gradually slackening 
 fire of the French, suddenly the thought struck them both 
 simultaneously, and turning to each other they both cried 
 out, "Now is the time!" but then in the same moment, anl 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 97 
 
 before an aid-de-camp could be sent, the whole line rose and 
 rushed for the village. 
 
 The regimental history of the 4th Guard Infantry I shall 
 treat in a much more summary manner; it is written with 
 far less ability, and the author is a little too fond of using 
 phrases such as "without firing a shot," etc., which other evi- 
 dence does not bear out to commend his accuracy of observa- 
 tion to the reader. But as it is confirmed from other sources, 
 I notice his account of the advance of the other regiment of 
 the brigade, the 2d, at the very hottest of the fight, with its 
 three battalions in line (three deep), with "drums playing 
 and with colors flying" an. expression which in Germany 
 means in the "parade marsch" as in an advance in review 
 order, and in this manner not only reached the limit attained 
 by the others already, but some further distance beyond 
 them. Their losses were actually slightly less, even though 
 they were collectively longer under fire than the other regi- 
 ments, who brought up their battalions successively, and 
 also in spite of their line of advance lying in the zone of the 
 most intense fire. 
 
 The total losses incurred by the two brigades from first 
 to last, in an action which, beginning about 4 p. m., lasted till 
 late into the night, reached the following totals: 
 
 1st Brigade, 1st Foot Guards, 36 officers, 1,072 men. 
 
 1 st Brigade, 3d Foot Guards, 36 officers, 1,067 men. 
 
 2d Brigade, 2d Grenadiers .. 30 officers, 1,034 men. 
 
 2d Brigade, 4th Grenadiers. .29 officers, 913 men. 
 
 Total 140 4,086 
 
 About their effective strength on the morning of the 
 fight I have no reliable information to my hand at this mo- 
 ment, but, exclusive of officers and train soldiers, it cannot 
 have been less than 12,000 men; so that the day's fighting 
 cost them in round figures one-third of their strength. 
 
 Now, as regards tactical formations and their influence 
 in diminishing loss, what is the outcome of the whole matter? 
 Simply this, that there appears to be nothing whatever to 
 choose between them on the battle-field, whatever the prac- 
 tice-ground experiments may teach ; in fact, as it has often 
 been put in these columns before, "The rain falls equally on 
 
98 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the just and the unjust alike, and the longer you are out in it, 
 the wetter you will get." I confess that in reading these de- 
 tailed accounts 1 was not prepared to find so much evidence 
 to prove that the fire of the French actually was under a cer- 
 tain amount of control, and was distinctly directed on cer- 
 tain marks as they offered themselves from time to time, but 
 this only makes my contention stronger, that when dealing 
 with "unaimed" fire and it is the business of the artillery 
 to see to it that the fire to be encountered in the advance is 
 u unaimed" the style of formation is, within reasonable 
 limits, practically immaterial. 
 
 The fact is, the attack, or the idea of the attack, was first 
 mooted under a wrong apprehension of the conditions to be 
 dealt w r ith viz., that 2,000 yards was well within the killing 
 range of the chassepot. For had one single responsible staff 
 officer been aware of the danger they were about to incur, 
 even though the necessity for attacking was very urgent, he 
 would either have set about it in some other way, or, as at 
 Vionville, sent in the cavalry not against the village, of 
 course, but against the left flank of the 4th (French) Corps, 
 L'Adfflirault's, which was at that moment causing or threat- 
 ening danger to the Hessians and 3d Brigade of the Guards 
 near Habonville. Possibly it would be better to say that the 
 troops would never have been placed in their initial position 
 at all, for, as pointed out above, they were actually within 
 reach of the chassepot almost from the moment they moved 
 off; but to discuss that question would take us far beyond 
 the limits of my space. 
 
 The lesson that maneuvering or attempting to maneu- 
 ver within effective range of musketry fire almost invariably 
 spells defeat, required no new illustration, for it was pre- 
 cisely a similar mistake which led to Frederick's defeat 
 at Kolin as far back as the Silesian War; and the Na- 
 poleonic campaigns are full of similar examples a fact 
 of which the Prussian general staff required no new re- 
 minder. The time may have been ill-chosen, and cavalry 
 was certainly the arm which should have been called on to 
 gain the required respite; but had it not been for the losses 
 and confusion caused by the attempt to move to a flank with- 
 in effective range of the enemy, the attack would probably 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 99 
 
 have been a brilliant success, and would have gone down to 
 history as an example of what infantry soldiers can achieve. 
 What the Germans actually did learn from this and simi- 
 lar experiences was first, the absolute importance of await- 
 ing the result oi the artillery nre; secondly, how much the 
 infantry may do for themselves by their own fire in case the 
 moment for attack has been anticipated; for it will have 
 been noticed above, that as soon as the Prussians reached 
 a position from which their own fire could be made to tell, 
 the resistance of their enemy rapidly fell off in its determina- 
 tion; thirdly, no formation is in itself a guarantee against 
 loss, but since the moral power is the decisive factor, no more* 
 troops are to be extended than can use their fire-arms with 
 full effect in the front simultaneously: all the remainder 
 should be kept in the hands of their leaders up to the last 
 moment possible. Relatively to the rest of the army, and to 
 any infantry likely to be found in the existing Continental 
 armies, the Guard fully justifies its claim of precedence; 
 for it is evident from the accounts, and also is well known 
 in the army itself, that the percentage of skulkers was re- 
 markedly small compared to what was seen on other parts 
 of the field. Possibly, if all corps had done equally well, 
 the type of attack to be seen at any maneuvers in Germany, 
 in which at last the fighting line stands from eight to ten 
 deep, would never have been involved. This overcrowding is,, 
 of course, only a peace-time result from the idea of successive 
 reinforcements from the rear to give the necessary impulse 
 for advance, and is intended principally as a school to accus- 
 tom men and officers to the noise and confusion inseparable 
 from the fighting line. But it is at once apparent how the 
 reduction of loss in any given encounter would be dependent, 
 not on formation, but on the relative superiority of the at- 
 tacking troops. A superiority which might result, either 
 from the men being from the first better disciplined and of 
 higher courage, or from want of these qualities either db 
 initioQY induced by the effect of artillery fire on the defenders. 
 This deduction is in fact the key to what may be called 
 the "esoteric" side of German tactical teaching, without 
 which the greater part of their literature, and the whole of 
 their drill book, is unintelligible. English tacticians nota- 
 
100 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 bly the Volunteer colonels, who are at present endeavoring 
 to teach the regimental officers of the army how to extract 
 nutriment from the egg of the domestic fowl always start 
 from the premise that both sides maintain throughout the 
 fight the same absolute position towards each other as re- 
 gards courage as that with which they started. If this idea 
 was correct, their deductions might commend themselves to 
 us, but it is perfectly obvious or, at any rate, a very short 
 course of study would make it so that it has absolutely no 
 foundation, either in practice or theory. Fortunately, our 
 tactical vagaries attract so little attention in Germany that 
 no one considers it worth his while to notice them seriously, 
 but if any of their own writers took to the same line, the con- 
 tempt with which he would be treated would be lofty indeed. 
 The worst of it all is that we have no one but ourselves in the 
 army to blame for this condition of affairs. Had not the 
 study of military history, particularly that portion of it re- 
 ferring to our own past, been allowed to fall to so low an ebb 
 as it did in the years preceding 1878, no surprise whatever 
 would have been felt amongst soldiers at the tales of 
 slaughter and bloodshed which reached us from France and 
 Germany, and the somewhat hysterical pamphlets which 
 reached us from the other side of the Channel would have 
 found neither translators nor readers. Amongst the edu- 
 cated portion of the German army these writers excited only 
 disdain, for between them they told us nothing essentially 
 new r ; they all, even including Von Soherff in his first work, 
 showed that either they had never studied or, at any rate, 
 had failed to understand their Clausowitz. 
 
 Many years ago, 1872, 1 was sitting in the room of a Ger- 
 man officer, many years my senior, and was occupying my 
 time, whilst awaiting his return, in reading a lot of the pam- 
 phlets of the day. When ho came in, he smiled at my zeal, 
 and going up to his bookshelf, took out a well-worn and bat- 
 tered copy of Clausewitz's "Vom Krieg" ("On War"), and 
 having opened it at the chapter on danger and the moral 
 force in battle, handed it to me saying: "There, if you want 
 to know what war is and always will be, you had better not 
 waste your time over that trash, but study this." I took it, 
 and having read it through, it was only two or three pages, 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 101 
 
 I said: "Yes, it seerns common sense, but I am afraid 1 
 should not get many marks in an examination for this." 
 "That is just where it is," he replied; "you in England study 
 to get marks, we here have to learn in order to safeguard 
 the lives and interests of the men under our command"- -a 
 remark which I neither relished nor appreciated at the time, 
 but the truth of which has daily come more and more to me 
 during the eighteen years w r hich have since elapsed. 
 
 VON WEDELL'S BRIGADE AT MARS-LA-TOUR, 
 AUGUST 1G, 1870. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington is usually credited with the 
 saying that "at the close of every great campaign, truth lies 
 at the bottom of a very deep well, and it takes twenty years 
 to get her out of it.'' Whoever said it, its correctness is be- 
 ginning to be brought home to us very forcibly with regard 
 to the history of the 1870 campaign. For a long time past, 
 English tacticians have been in the habit of relying abso- 
 lutely for their facts on the truth of the statements in the 
 Prussian official history of the war, and I confess openly 
 that I have often been in the same boat with them in this 
 respect. But during the last few years we have been con- 
 fronted with a series of other evidences, which go far to 
 undermine one's faith in our previous premises. 
 
 As an instance of the slaughter occasioned by the new 
 weapons, the case of the Guard Corps at St. Privat has been 
 cited ad nauseam; but, curiously enough, an instance of far 
 worse slaughter, more rapidly inflicted, has hitherto almost 
 escaped our notice, for in the pages of the "Prussian Official" 
 the slaughter, though admitted, has been passed over prin- 
 cipally because it was unnecessary and not crowned by suc- 
 cess in such a way as not to attract attention. But a new 
 work, entitled "Investigation into theTactics of the Future," 
 has just been published in Berlin, which throws an alto- 
 gether new light on the subject, and which proves that, accu- 
 rate as are the facts stated in the official account in the main, 
 the literary skill of the department of military history in 
 the Wilhelm-Strasse has been able to clothe them in a 
 manner which, if not altogether a direct denial of the facts?, 
 
102 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 is, nevertheless, very little short of a suggestis falsi. " We 
 owe this new light to the pen of Captain Fritz Hoenig, an 
 officer who was present with WedelFs Brigade in the action, 
 and who recounts his experiences in a very convincing man- 
 ner. His story has been before the German military world 
 since 1881, when this particular portion of it was first pub- 
 lished in a work called "The Two Brigades," and in which 
 the incidents of the fight of the 28th Brigade at Problus-Bor 
 in the battle of Koniggratz and the 38th Brigade at Mars-la- 
 Tour were made the subjects of an absolutely masterly dis- 
 section. The facts brought forward in it have never beeu 
 questioned, but, on the contrary, though the book encoun- 
 tered most severe opposition from the authorities, these 
 facts, and the method in which they were treated, have met 
 with the warmest acknowledgments of nearly all except 
 those on whom the blame was shown to lie of those v/ho 
 were present. As far as my reading extends, I believe the 
 facts, or the story, contained in this w r ork to be in every way 
 the most instructive piece of military history yet placed 
 before us, with perhaps the sole exception of the "Midsum- 
 mer-Night's Dream." As an introduction to what follows, 
 I may briefly mention that 'it was WedelPs Brigade (the 38Mi) 
 which arrived on the field of Mars-la-Tour about 4 p. m., JUST 
 after the French were recovering from the temporary paraly- 
 sis occasioned by the charge of Bredow's Cavalry Brigade. 
 It was sent in haste to check the advance of L'Admirault's 
 corps, was driven back in confusion with a loss of 53 per cent, 
 and only saved from annihilation by the dashing charge of 
 the 1st Guard Dragoons (Queen Victoria's regiment), who 
 rode down the pursuing French, and gained time for the Bri- 
 gade to re-form in something like order. With these few 
 introductory remarks, I will leave the eye-witness to speak 
 for himself; only considerations of space will compel me to 
 "precis" him very liberally. 
 
 "The 38th Brigade, consisting of the 16th and 57th Rep- 
 rnents, less one battalion of the 57th Regiment on detach- 
 ment, and with two batteries and two companies of 1hf- 
 Pioneers of the corps attached, had left Thiaucourt at 5:30 
 a. m. under command of Gener.il von Srhwarzkoppen. The 
 Brigade of Guard Dragoons with Planitz's horse artillery 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 103 
 
 battery was about one hour in advance. At 10 a. m. this lat- 
 ter detachment reached St. Hilaire, and on arrival there, 
 hearing artillery fire to the east, they pushed on in that direc- 
 tion, having previously obtained the consent of General von 
 Schwarzkoppen, who must have been perfectly well aware 
 of where the artillery fire came from. The infantry brigade 
 reached the same place at a little after 11 a. m., having 
 marched 15 miles, with only one halt of 10 minutes in 4^ 
 hours (without packs; these had been left behind at Saar- 
 brtick, and had never overtaken the troops, the men only 
 carried rolled greatcoats, cooking-pots and their ammunition 
 in 1 the haversack). It was a burning hot August day. 
 
 "The enemy was supposed to be retreating on Verdun 
 and, indeed, partly on the very road by which we were ad- 
 vancing; consequently there was a suppressed feeling of 
 excitement in the staff, and the maps had been constantly 
 studied, and we were agreeably surprised when we occupied 
 the road without any opposition on his part. The five ba t- 
 talions, the two batteries, and the two Pioneer companies 
 took up a bivouac southeast of St. Hilaire, with outposts of 
 the 2d Battalion 57th Regiment, and a squadron 2d Guard 
 Dragoons, thrown out in front; and the troops received 
 orders to cook their dinners. 
 
 "At this time I was, with several other officers and Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel von Roell, at the right flank picket, and we 
 discussed matters, which usually bear another aspect to the 
 troops to that which they have for the staff. The latter 
 know, as a rule, the why and wherefore of things, which the 
 former do not; and therefore uneasiness is apt to arie 
 amongst them. But here this was not the case, for since 
 early morning we had known the general situation with tol- 
 erable accuracy, and our objective accurately. We had 
 promised ourselves great results, and were proportionately 
 astonished when we reached our destination without opposi 
 tion, though we had heard and seen artillery fire on our right 
 for some time. 
 
 "The order to halt and cook, received under these circum- 
 stances, afforded matter for consideration, as it well might. , 
 for it showed, first, that the commander was determined to 
 remain at St. Hilaire till further orders arrived; and second, 
 
104 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 that iu spite of the growing noise of the cannonade, lie 
 counted on time enough for the troops to finish their mi -a! 
 before these orders reached him. Is'ow, it is certainly a first 
 rule for the leaders to utilize every opportunity to rest and 
 refresh their men by the way, but to halt and cook here 
 meant that the general himsejf was quite in the dark as to 
 what was happening, and was doing absolutely nothing TO 
 find out. We had not -found the enemy there whore we ex- 
 pected him, but knew from the sound of the guns that he was 
 in action not far off, and therefore his first duty should have 
 been to have strained every nerve to clear up the situation. 
 
 "Just as the fires began to burn up brightly, an officer 
 galloped in, his horse covered with sweat and pretty well 
 done up, and immediately afterwards, the 'fall in' was 
 fcov.nded, cooking-kettles upset, and the troops set themselves 
 in march. 'Chambley' was assigned us as our objective, an- 1 
 we hardly trusted our eyes when we found the place on on; 
 maps, 
 
 "At first it had been the intention of the divisional com- 
 mander to move on Ville sur Yron, almost behind the flan ; 
 of the enemy, but as we drew nearer, and from our hors-.^ 
 could see, from the long lines fringed with fire and smoke, 
 and behind them the dense rising dust-clouds, that a very 
 large force was before us, and as, further, 1 he wounded whom 
 we now began to meet gave somewhat despondent accounts 
 of what was going on, this direction appeared too risky, and 
 he bent off. half right, so as to establish connection with the 
 Hid Corps, a decision w r hich was undeniably sound. 
 
 "Amongst others wounded, I met an officer I knew rid 
 ing back with a bullet through his chest. Almost before T 
 could speak, he said with a smile: 'Well, I hope you will 
 have better luck than we had; it w y ill surprise you, this is 
 no "catshooting" like '60.' That was scarcely encouraging, 
 but there was a soldierly jocularity about his manner which 
 carried it off well. About 3 :30 p. m. w r e formed up for action 
 about 1,000 yards southwest of Mars-la -Tour. The generals, 
 Von Schwarzkoppen (division commander) and Von Wedell 
 (brigade commanding officer), had ridden on in advance to 
 reconnoiter. As they had ample time, and the Guard Dra- 
 goons had been skirmishing with the enemy for the last two 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 105 
 
 hours, there should have been no difficulty in obtaining the 
 required information more especially since the ground was 
 almost completely open. At this moment the French had it 
 ail their own way; they had occupied the high ground above 
 and north of Mars-la-Tour, and from its summit could see for 
 miles around. To turn them out of it, without great numeri- 
 cal superiority, was impossible, and further to their left, and 
 our right, our troops were being driven back out of the Tron- 
 ville copses, which they had hitherto held. Fortunately, 
 they suddenly checked in their advance, and the only expla- 
 nation we can give of this is, that the sudden appearance of 
 our solitary brigade threatening their line of retreat seemed 
 to them to indicate the advance of at least a whole corps 
 for it would have been presuming too much on the incapacity 
 of their adversary to assume that our isolated advance had 
 actually no connection whatever with any other movements. 
 Possibly, too, the capture of two or three of the Guard Dra- 
 goon scouts led to the conclusion that the Guard itself was 
 at hand. The position in which they halted was one just 
 suited to their far-ranging weapon; their front and right 
 fiank was protected by a ravine which ran along it and then 
 bent sharp to the north, from the further edge of which tho 
 ground fell away in a glacis-like slope for three or four miles, 
 broken only by the village of Mars-la-Tour about 1,000 yards 
 to the front; and our approach was rendered yet more diffi- 
 cult by w r ire fences, which seriously incommoded us, and still 
 more impeded the 1st Guard Dragoons in their subsequent 
 charge. The extent of their position was about 3,000 yards, 
 and was held by Grenier's Division in 1st line and the whole 
 of the remainder of the 4th Corps in support. The open 
 space we had to cross was about 2,000 yards. 
 
 "Whilst we were awaiting orders to advance, the Roman 
 Catholic chaplain galloped up to our colonel, and, after a 
 word or two with him, rose in his stirrups and addressed us 
 in the following words: 'Comrades, the Hid Corps is hard 
 pressed, and to you is assigned the duty of relieving them. 
 Attack, therefore, without fear of death, and then God will 
 be with yon. A men.' His manner and words acted like a 
 charm on all, and immediately afterwards the order to un- 
 cover the colors was given; the colonel added a few words 
 
106 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 in the same spirit, and the inarch began, the direction being 
 that previously assigned to us viz., northeast on the coi- 
 ner of the Tronville copses. At the time this order w<s 
 given, the French right only extended as far as these bushes, 
 and our movement was intended to form part of a combined 
 attack with ten other battalions on our right on the above- 
 mentioned copses; but long before we reached the ground, 
 the French line had been extended along the position previ- 
 ously indicated. The ten battalions, having attacked pre- 
 maturely, were at the time of our advance already falling 
 back, so what we really were trying to do was to march 
 diagonally across the front of a whole corps in position with 
 only five and a half battalions, a movement which could not 
 have the smallest prospect of success. But even after the 
 advance had commenced, we were still in complete darkness 
 as to where we were going, or what we were to do when v " 
 got there. General* von Schwar/koppen and Wedell had 
 decided between themselves, but they only gave 1 he gfin;'u! 
 direction to the regimental commanders, and certainly the 
 battalion commanders knew nothing whatever. My colonel, 
 for instance, said to me somewhat sarcastically: 'This seems 
 the chaplain's day; had it not b^en for him, we should have 
 had no idea whatever as to what was going on' and this re- 
 mark expressed about what we all felt. Hut presently the 
 enemy opened fire on us, on our left flank, and we proceeded 
 to wheel to the left to face him, all the battalions moving up 
 into one line. Of artillery preparation there was no word, 
 for our guns only came into action after we were already 
 under the effective fire of the French. This wheel, of course. 
 took time, and, indeed, was never actually completed, for the 
 pivot flank could not wait, and came in contact with the 
 enemy, and was broken and retiring before the outer flank 
 could reach them.'' 
 
 This remark is in anticipation to explain what follows, 
 for now our author comes down to the detail of the move- 
 ment of his own regiment: 
 
 "In this movement we reached the southeastern corner 
 of Mars-la-Tonr, where Von Schwarzkoppen and his staff 
 officer, Von Scherff, were sitting near us. But a little fur- 
 ther to the rear siood two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers. 
 Shells were falling amongst them, and as these became more 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 107 
 
 numerous, they wheeled about and retired a short distance; 
 in their place the 1st Guard Dragoons moved up. 
 
 "The troops were advancing briskly, and General v >n 
 Schwarzkoppen seemed to anticipate the success of the 
 movement; at any rate, as my colonel passed him, and as 
 the violence of the mitrailleur, artillery, and infantry tire 
 was fairly astonishing us, he called out to him: 'Send out 
 strong skirmishing swarms and we will soon get them,' and 
 afterwards: 'Left shoulders up a little on the copses/ 
 Mean while 1-57 had extended two'zugs'in the above direction, 
 and it seemed as if a wide gap would be formed between 
 ourselves and the 16th Kegiment. The general, who noticed 
 this, rode up and ordered a company from our battalion to 
 fill it, which was at once carried out. But the next moment 
 its captain fell, and the men bearing off to their left towards 
 a fold of the ground which seemed to offer cover, the gap was 
 again created, and was eventually filled by the fusilier bat- 
 talion of the 16th, so that from a very early moment the regi- 
 ments were intermixed. The abo ve orders were the only ones 
 we received throughout the day. 
 
 "The co-operation between the individual battalions 
 throughout the action was practically nil. I was on horse- 
 back till I fell wounded at the moment almost of our repulse, 
 exactly in the center of the whole line, and could see all round 
 me till the smoke became too thick, and the two battalions 
 on our left were hidden by it. 
 
 "The battalions pressed on independently from left to 
 right towards the north, whilst our two batteries fired over 
 our heads. As the 1-16 and 11-16 were on the shorter line, 
 they managed to penetrate the furthest, crossed the ravine 
 above mentioned, and kept their start over us to the end. 
 The right (Fusiliers, 57th Regiment, and the two companies 
 Pioneers) had the widest arc to describe, and, in spite of every 
 effort, must have reached the alignment some half -hour later. 
 When we reached the beginning of the descent towards 
 the ravine, about 600 yards from the enemy, our order from 
 right to left was as follows: In the fighting line 5-16, 7-10, 
 3-16, 2-16, 11-16, 2 zugs 2-57, 10-16, 1 zug 2-57, 1-57. In sup- 
 port, 160 yards in rear 8 and 6-16, 4 and 11-16, 12 and 9-lfi, 
 4-57, and 11-57, 12 and 10-57, and 2 companies Pioneers. 
 Bui shortly afterwards the supports, all except 4 companies, 
 
108 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 pressed forward and joined the fighting line, and the order 
 was then as follows: 5-16, 6-16, 7-16, 8-16,4-16,3-16,2-16,11-16, 
 M6, 2 zugs 2-57, 10-16, 1 zug 2-57, 12 and 9-16, 1 zug 1-57, 11 
 ind 9-57, 1 zug 1-57, 12 and 10-57, 1 zug 1-57, with the Pioneers, 
 and two other companies of the 57th Regiment as last reserve 
 200 yards to the rear. Till we reached the 600-yard limit our 
 losses had not been very heavy, but now we came under an 
 indescribably heavy cross-fire; for we, who had expected, or 
 been intended, to outflank the enemy, now found we were 
 ourselves outflanked. The enemy, who had hitherto lain flat 
 on the ground, now rose and overwhelmed us with a fire 
 which caused us to halt and attempt to return it. This 
 ruined our attack, for the men threw themselves on the 
 ground, which afforded them no cover; two-thirds of the 
 officers had fallen, and after a while the inevitable came, 
 and the line fell back. Part of our line some eight com- 
 panies on the left certainly reached the opposite side of 
 the ravine, owing to their having come on a gap in the French 
 line, but of the remainder none got nearer to the enemy than 
 at nearest 400 yards. 
 
 "The work of the general staff has described this attack 
 in a most attractive manner, possibly as a salve to the troops 
 for their tragical fate, but I can only state that its account 
 is pure fancy. I will confine myself to contradicting it iu 
 the following points: 
 
 "1. The five battalions did not, as therein described, 
 cross the ravine and appear within 80 to 100 yards of the 
 French line. Of the 20 companies, only 8 (the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 
 7th, 8th, llth of the 16th, and 2d of the 5th) got across at all ; 
 these, having the shortest way to go, and the best cover, 
 anticipated the completion of the French line, and were 
 eventually turned out by a counter-attack. The remainder 
 did not even reach the hither side of the ravine by some 100 
 yards. 
 
 "2. The needle-gun and chassepot did not act with 
 'devastating fury' against each other, for the former hardly 
 jcot within its effective range, and we suffered our losses 
 without the power of retaliation. 
 
 "3. After we had already commenced to fall back, 
 the French got within 50 to 30 yards of us, but this was due 
 to the density of the smoke of our own weapons, under cover 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 109 
 
 of which they made good their advance, and if in places it 
 came to a hand-to-hand struggle, it was because our men 
 were too exhausted to run away fast enough.* 
 
 "4. It was only in the retreat that the losses rose to the 
 point of dispersing us altogether. Fortunately for us, as 
 the enemy had passed the limit of our advance by some 150 
 j ards, the 1st Guard Dragoons attacked them, and rode them 
 down. They ran back, masking the fire of their own linea in 
 rear, shooting wildly in every direction, and throwing kits 
 tmd arms away in their panic. Then followed a general 
 pause along the whole line, even the artillery ceased firing, 
 and the battle appeared to be at an end. 
 
 "The 38th Brigade had marched 25 miles under a burn- 
 ing sun to the battle-field (without packs); between 2,500 to 
 2,000 yards from the enemy one-third of each company had 
 been extended as skirmishers, by the general's direct order, 
 who rod^ about saying, 'Only skirmishers, gentlemen, only 
 skirmishers,' to all the officers he met; and shortly after- 
 wards each company in first line reinforced its skirmishers 
 v ith a second zug, keeping only a single zug as support in 
 close order. The second line was formed of half-battalion 
 columns. Finally all were merged in one shooting line, ex- 
 cept two companies, who remained in close order, lying 
 down by direct order of my colonel, who remarked, as he 
 gave it, that he did not expect much from the style of fight- 
 ing going on. And to complete the picture of the last mo- 
 ment, companies 12 and 9 of the 16th lay in close order on 
 the ground; companies 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the 57th stood 
 upright in line (firing volleys over the heads of their skir- 
 mishers), and made one attempt to go forward again to the 
 attack. 
 
 "Every sort of formation was, therefore, tried line, col- 
 rmn, and skirmishers on a field of battle which bore onJy 
 one character. 
 
 *The picturesque, but not very candid, account of the attack in the 
 "Official History" contains the following: "With regardless energy, how- 
 ever, the Westphalian regiments press onward ; the second line moves up to 
 the skirmishing line in order to nil the vacancies in the rapidly thinned 
 ranks ; only weak detachments are left in close order behind the front. Alter- 
 nately making rushes of 100 to 150 paces, and lying down, the companies 
 hastily descend the hillside. Here comes unexpectedly to view in their front 
 a steep ravine, in places hard on 50 feet in depth, like a ditch in front of a 
 sti'ongly occupied entrenchment; but even this obstacle does not top their 
 advance. Scaling the opposite slope, all five battalions rise quickly to view 
 within 150, 100, yea, even within 30 paces of the French line." [Clark's Trana 
 lation, Part 1, Vol. I., p. 407.] A. L. W. 
 
110 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 "The regiments of the brigade stood side by side and 
 covered a mean distance of 1,500 yards under a heavy fire 
 from troops previously unshaken by artillery, and lost in do- 
 ing so 72 officers and 2,542 men, out of 95 officers and 4,54(j 
 men. They advanced steadily in quick time, and not by 
 rushes, and did not halt till compelled to do so by the enemy's 
 fire." 
 
 I propose next week to summarize the author's criti- 
 cisms, which, though somewhat long-winded, are for the 
 most part very valuable. In concluding this letter, I would 
 only again call attention to what I noticed in the case of the 
 St. Privat attack viz., that it was the general, and not the 
 regimental officers, who trusted in extended order from the 
 first. 
 
 What possible object it could serve to extend one-third 
 of the men almost 2,000 yards before they came up to the 
 limit of the effective fire of their own weapon, I leave to wiser 
 heads to discover. But, judging by his subsequent writings, 
 Von Scherff, who was present as the general's staff officer, 
 does not appear to have been favorably impressed with the 
 value of this course. 
 
 In my last week's letter I followed the brigade up to the 
 moment when the advance to the attack was begun, and 
 pointed out how over-haste and hurry on the part of the com- 
 mander led to thejir moving off even before the change of 
 front to the left was completed, so that the right wing (the 
 27th Eegiment) was racing to get round into the new align- 
 ment, which indeed they never succeeded in reaching. This 
 is how Major Hoenig describes what followed: 
 
 "Up to within some 200 yards of the dip into the ravine 
 the two half-battalions in support of the inner flanks of the 
 two regiments advanced level with one another; here the 
 half-battalion of the 57th lay down by command of Colonel 
 von Roell; the half-battalion on our left continued their 
 advance. I was about 40 paces on their right rear. At this 
 moment a color-sergeant of the 2d company 57th, which it 
 will be remembered had been thrown into and between the 
 companies of the 16th Regiment by direct order of the gen- 
 eral, came up to Colonel von Roell and reported that his 'zng' 
 would no longer follow him; he had repeatedly risen and 
 
Military Letters and Essays. Ill 
 
 gone in front of them, but they would not get up. The colo- 
 nel turned to me and said, 'Hide back with him, and see what 
 YOU can do/ I went, but most of the men lay dead or 
 wounded on the ground in the ranks just as they had stood. 
 With the aid of some few devoted men and the color-sergeant 
 a real hero in the truest sense of the word we succeeded 
 in getting some of the survivors to go on. The rest attached 
 themselves to the advancing half-battalion in support, which 
 now pushed forward and joined the shooting line. I returned 
 and found the colonel where I had left him. On our right 
 another half -battalion of our regiment has just deployed and 
 fired a couple of volleys, apparently into the backs of the 
 company in front. The colonel turned to me and said, 'We 
 must get some order into the state of things; the Fusiliers 
 (57th) are firing into my 1st company, the 16th have carried 
 away my second. If only Bernewitz (commander of the 3d 
 company) with the flag will look out/ This is simple hell.' 
 We rode forward together, and so came in rear of the fusilier 
 battalion of the 16th, which was lying behind a small hedge ; 
 and this is the picture that we saw: The colonel on foot, at 
 his side the adjutant severely wounded on the ground, both 
 their horses dead behind them. A captain, Ohly, still on 
 his horse, close to him the colors; he had a rifle in his hand, 
 and was alternately encouraging his men and shooting at 
 the enemy. Skirmishers lay on either flank and in front, bill 
 the half-battalion which this officer commanded, and which 
 has been referred to above, was still in close order. A few 
 shots only fell from our men, there was no regular fire fight. 
 The colonel of the Fusiliers (16th) begged my chief to dis- 
 mount, which he did. The next moment his horse reared up 
 and fell over dead. He knelt down by the side of the others, 
 who said, 'We have a little cover here ; as long as the fire con- 
 tinues so heavy we must stay; their ammunition cannot last 
 lor ever.' A moment or two later the regimental adjutant 
 of the 16th, Lieutenant von Wolzogen, rode up. His white 
 charger was bleeding from several wounds; but he himself 
 was unhurt, and as calm as on church parade. He reported : 
 'My chief is dead, and we have been repulsed.' Scarcely h-.id 
 he said this when out of the hollow in front, and not 100 yards 
 distant, the enemy rose up with shouts of 'En avant! en 
 
 avant! Courage! courage!' My colonel shouted one 
 
 ^pST^- 3 
 
 foJ^ OS 
 
11^ Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 last order and fell dead; then everything went back I p 
 
 to this point, though our losses had been very heavy, 
 yet they had not been sufficiently severe to rob us of all de- 
 fensive power; but the attack was too sudden; favored by 
 the ground and the dense clouds of smoke, the enemy had 
 vaanaged to bring a vast numerical superiority right up to 
 our muzzles, and the impression was too much for the nerves 
 of the men. Had the French not stopped to plunder our d^ad 
 and wounded, it would have been all over with u,s. 
 
 "About this moment I myself was wounded, but, sup- 
 ported by a couple of men, I managed to drag myself a little 
 way back;, but then both of my bearers were hit, and we ail 
 three lay together. 
 
 "The French had halted a few moments, but soon re- 
 sumed their advance and now passed over us: first a skir- 
 mishing line, then a second, also in extended order, and final- 
 ly a battalion in line; it was a moment of horrible suspense 
 lor us. The first line was firing briskly, in the second every- 
 thing was in disorder; each man seemed to be trying to keep 
 his pluck up by shouting 'Courage! En avant!' but no one 
 took any notice of his neighbor, but devoted himself to rob- 
 bing the fallen. This was the moment in which the 1st 
 Guard Dragoons attacked; the enemy's infantry was thrown 
 into complete disorder, but on the whole remained on /V.v 
 ground. Their fire ceased, how r ever, and there was an oppor 
 trinity for rallying and re-forming what remained of the bri- 
 gade. But here occurred an evil contretemps. An adjutant 
 galloped across the field from left to right, shouting with all 
 his might, 'Retreat on Thiaueourt!' I raised myself up and 
 took a last view of the scene all round me killed, wounded, 
 and a terrible w r ailing, and on the top of all, this order ; could 
 1 form any other conclusion but that all w r as lost? The regi- 
 ments had lost almost all their officers, and the men were 
 retiring in every direction; actually, the majority only ral- 
 lied to their flags about noon the next day. This is an exam- 
 ple of how not to give orders on the battle-field. The over- 
 hastiness which had ruined our advance was now equally 
 fatal in the retreat. All were, however, not so indiscreet. 
 The artillery fire had again re-commenced with great vio- 
 lence, when I saw Lieutenant Neumeister, of the staff of the 
 10th Corps, riding quietly at a walk across the field, halting 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 113 
 
 now and again to give orders. A man of really iron charac- 
 ter, he deserves the highest praise for his coolness and devo- 
 tion to duty. He it was to whom the credit of bringing order 
 out of chaos is principally due. His calm bearing revived 
 our sinking spirits; everything then was not as yet lost. 
 
 "The retreat of the 38th Brigade was the most terrible 
 drama of the whole war. It had lost 53 per cent of ics 
 strength, and the proportion of killed to wounded was as o 
 to 4. The burning heat, the preceding forced march, and the 
 racing pace at which we had attacked had done their work. 
 The soul had no longer power over the body. I saw men 
 crying like children; others fell dead from exhaustion; most 
 had only one thought viz., for water. 'Water ! water!' was 
 almost the only cry one heard from these shadow-like bodies. 
 The enemy's bullets still hummed and whistled after them, 
 but slowly, with drooping heads and distorted features, they 
 v/ound along, too dead-beat to feel their danger. A couple 
 of smart squadrons of lancers, and not a soul would have 
 escaped. Whoever has once looked on the faces of men in 
 such extreme moments can never forget the impression of 
 absolute insanity they convey insanity brought on by over- 
 exertion of the body and the horrible strain on the mind. 
 Through the broken remains of the infantry rode here and 
 there individual men of the cavalry, their swords still ex- 
 tended forward at the engage, but horse and rider perfect ly 
 mad, still under the impression that they are charging. 
 
 '* ' Where are your officers? 7 asked the men in the bat- 
 teries of the stragglers. 'We have none left/ was the an- 
 swer, and with few exceptions this was almost literal truth; 
 but these few did what men could do to rally the men, and 
 \vith partial success, for some did succeed in getting together 
 from twenty to forty men and marching them off the field in 
 order. One fact in particular deserves to be borne in mind, 
 mid that is, that in no single case did I see a man throw awav 
 Ms arms or accouterments." 
 
 It is unnecessary to follow Major Hoenig into his re- 
 searches how the brigade should have been handled, for the 
 mistakes made are too self-evident, and a positive result 
 against such enormous odds out of the question; but the fol- 
 lowing notes as to the formation actually employed, and the 
 
114 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 duration of the attack, will be useful for those who believe 
 the secret of victory to be in the use or disuse of certain 
 formations. 
 
 "At 2,500 meters from the enemy, the 2d battalion IGth 
 TV as in line of company columns, and next to it the 1st bat- 
 talion with two companies in first line, each in column, and 
 the remaining two following in half-battalion column, and 
 the fusiliers of the same regiment in similar formation. 
 
 "Then came the 1st battalion 57th, two companies wholly 
 extended almost from the first, and the other two in company 
 columns. The fusilier battalion stood originally in column 
 of double companies on the center, but broke in two half- 
 battalion columns on entering the zone of fire. The two 
 pioneer companies remained in company columns. As the 
 fight progressed, they all melted into skirmishers, except 
 one half-battalion of the 16th, two company columns of the 
 same, and the Pioneers. These closed bodies were brought 
 up with drums beating and colors flying into the fighting line, 
 and carried it forward a little, and, as far as one can make 
 out from the table of losses, suffered on the whole slightly 
 less loss than those which were extended; but the rout at 
 the end renders it useless to attach any importance to those 
 figures. 
 
 "As regards the duration of the attack, as near as can 
 be calculated, 2,000 meters was passed over in about 30 min- 
 utes; the troops held out in the position they had reached 
 about the same time, and the retreat lasted nearly as long. 
 A s to the expenditure of ammunition, it is impossible to give 
 more than a vague estimate; it was, at any rate, very slight. 
 The fusilier companies of the 57th did not, according to their 
 officers, fire more than 3 to 5 rounds per man; and the rest 
 about 10 or thereabouts; making a total of about 20,000 
 rounds. The French, on the other hand, are estimated to 
 have expended at least 1,600,000 rounds; and comparing this 
 with the number of killed and wounded, we get one Prussian 
 hors de combat for 760 rounds; and this in spite of a far- 
 ranging, flat-trajectoried weapon, and a perfectly open field 
 of fire. One cannot help wondering what the result would 
 have been had the artillery preparation been thoroughly car- 
 ried out first, and the Prussian rifle been equal in the above 
 dualities to that of their adversaries. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 115 
 
 "The French return their own losses at 200 officers and 
 2,258 men, which must all have been inflicted by the 38th 
 Brigade, its two batteries, and the 1st Guard Dragoons. But, 
 MS above pointed out, the infantry only fired 20,000 rounds, 
 and there was no particular artillery preparation. These 
 figures appear incredible, even to the Germans themselves, 
 but, though enquiries have been made in Paris, the French 
 stick to their figures. Possibly the artillery fire during and 
 after the retreat may have been more effective than supposed, 
 
 "It is a fair assumption that half the German losses were 
 inflicted on them in the retreat. The five battalions, or 4,500 
 men, lost, therefore, in advancing a mile across the open 
 under fire, 36 officers and 1,016 men, about. And this in 
 face of a fire whose quantity could not reasonably be in- 
 creased by the introduction of the magazine rifle, for the 
 numerical superiority must be taken into account. But the 
 brigade reached the effective limit of fire of their own arms, 
 still in a condition to continue the struggle. The formations 
 adopted, therefore, justified themselves, and the reason for 
 the defeat cannot fairly be attributed to them, but can only 
 be found in the w r ant of skill and unity in the command, its 
 numerical inferiority, and general ignorance of the state of 
 things on the side of the enemy." 
 
 I think the above, and the account of the attack of the 
 Guards at St. Privat recently published in these columns, 
 ought pretty well to break down the received ideas on which 
 our recent infantry tactics have been based. These ideas 
 may be reduced to the contention that, in face of the modern 
 arms of precision (? one man disabled for 760 rounds fired), 
 troops can only advance in extended order. Yet in both 
 these two examples, the bloodiest in the whole war, we not 
 only find that they did advance in close order, but that the 
 companies that did so not only did not incur heavier losses, 
 but pushed up to the front and carried the wavering line of 
 skirmishers a little bit further with them. The dispropor- 
 tion in the numbers was altogether so overwhelming in the 
 case of the 38th Brigade that more could not have been 
 expected of them than what they actually accomplished; 
 but this very disproportion settles, to my mind, conclusively 
 that, under reasonable conditions as to armament and nurn- 
 
116 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 bers, the possibility of an advance in a similar formation 
 i. e., skirmishers in front and line or small columns behind 
 is by no means precluded, and, indeed, that as regards suita- 
 bility for the end in view in a decisive attack, close order has 
 altogether the best of it For the object in such an attack 
 is to win at any cost, for the bloodiest victory is cheaper than 
 defeat, and the possibility of victory is primarily dependent 
 on the number of rifles that can ultimately be brought to 
 bear. Taking into account the tendency to "skulk" now ad- 
 mitted by the Germans themselves, and it is evident that 
 close-order formations will deliver a larger number of rilles 
 on the line of skirmishers than any other formation, and it 
 will depend entirely on the quality of the troops themselves 
 what degree of closeness is considered necessary, though 
 under ordinary circumstances the choice will be between 
 t ompany columns and line two deep. It will matter nothing, 
 if, when the lists of killed and wounded are made out the day 
 after the victory, the percentage of loss stands a little higher, 
 than may seem to the critics to have been necessary. Suc- 
 cess is the only criterion, and that success may fairly be 
 attributed to the all-compelling power of discipline and the 
 habit of close-order training, which rendered it possible to 
 deliver the right number of rifles in line at the right place. 
 All experience proves the difficulty of forcing men on in face 
 of heavy loss in individual order, and that a far higher per- 
 centage of loss can be borne by the line, though the exact 
 ratio is impossible to arrive at; but it may reasonably be 
 assumed as 1 to 2. Let us assume the fire of 2,000 rifles 
 at 400 yards as requisite to turn an enemy out of position: 
 then if 20 per cent is the highest loss troops trained princi- 
 pally to open-order fighting can be got to advance against, 
 then probably 10,000 men will have to be put in to bring the 
 fighting line up to the required strength; but if close-order 
 training forms the groundwork of their military education, 
 then probably 4,000 will be amply sufficient, for, since they 
 will continue to advance under losses which would have 
 brought the others to a standstill, fewer reinforcements will 
 be required, and the total time under fire will be correspond- 
 ingly diminished. Of course, in either case the fighting line 
 must be in extended order, because that extended order is 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 117 
 
 required to develop its fire effect to the fullest possible limit; 
 but what is meant is that the basis of all infantry training 
 should be discipline and concentration of will in the old 
 close-order school, and not the training of men to avoid 
 losses. What that means, the pages of the "Midsummer- 
 Night's Dream" show us pretty graphically. What the other 
 signifies, Albuera, and the countless other exploits of the 
 line, whose names are borne on our regimental colors and 
 those of the German army, are there to testify; and since the 
 nature of man changes but slowly, I believe that the same 
 contempt of death can be induced by training nowadays as 
 it was then; for, to my mind, death and disablement are just 
 as unpleasant to face, whether from the muzzle of the latest 
 improvement in repeating small-bore weapons or from a ten- 
 rupee jezail indeed, to the thinking mind the latter is the 
 more terrible, as it carries the larger bullet of the two. 
 
 Major Fritz Hoenig's work is not exactly conspicuous 
 for lucidity of arrangement, and he is terribly given to repe- 
 tition. His book is divided into two parts the first histor- 
 ical, and the second "psychological," as he chooses to call it; 
 and in the second he goes over much the same ground as in 
 the first, with the addition of more personal experiences and 
 observations, many of them of very great value to all English 
 soldiers who really wish to grasp the true principles of their 
 profession. For it must be understood that the current 
 notions on the nature of breech-loading fighting in Great 
 Britain at the present are almost entirely based on false 
 premises; chief amongst which are the three so often com- 
 bated in these columns viz., that the losses in battle were: 
 1st. abnormally heavy; 2d, that they were due exclusively 
 to the breech-loader; and 3d, that experience proved that 
 troops could only advance to the attack in extended order. 
 Actually every one of these premises is directly contradicted 
 by facts, and the bulk of German regimental officers who 
 were eye-witnesses of the events themselves have long been 
 aware that it was so. Only for many and obvious reasons 
 they have not chosen to publish these facts to the world. 
 Whether they will be grateful to Major Hoenig, I am doubt- 
 ful; if they are, they will give proof of great magnanimity. 
 
118 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 After reading the book most carefully, I am inclined to 
 believe that the real motive of its publication has been to 
 inform the junior officers, who have hitherto had no war ex- 
 perience, what the battle-fields of '70 were really like, and 
 thus prevent them from falling into the same errors as we 
 have done; and this I should think it was admirably calcu- 
 lated to effect, as it strips the gilt off the gingerbread in a 
 very wholesome manner. But I will let the author speak for 
 himself. The introductory portion of the second part is so 
 admirable that I give it almost in extenso. 
 
 "Frederick the Great conquered the armies of half 
 Europe, not so much because his tactics were better, as re- 
 gards form, than those of his enemies, but because they 
 were based on a more thorough appreciation and knowledge 
 of the human factor, the soldier. Where he asked too much 
 of them, as at Kolin, his grenadiers were swept away in 
 spite of their iron discipline, like the 38th Brigade at Mars- 
 la-Tour. The great king was above all things a student of 
 humanity, and used to announce his discoveries with a 
 straightforward truthfulness that no other general has ever 
 excelled. His army was in the full tide of its success when 
 he wrote to his generals in one of his tactical instructions: 
 'The Prussian soldier, taken in the mass, is naturally indo- 
 lent i. e., does little or nothing on his own initiative, but 
 requires to be driven/ That no one dies willingly, and that 
 naturally every one's chief desire is to preserve his life and 
 avoid danger, is true now as it was then. If one keeps that 
 idea before one, it is possible to approximate an idea of what 
 may reasonably be expected from the self-sacrifice of the 
 individual, and what remains to be done by discipline and 
 1he example of the officers. This nature of the man must 
 indicate the forms which are required to combat this natural 
 'indolence/ 
 
 "The great majority of our men are only impressed by 
 deeds, and therefore the king honored every bold action, in 
 order to stimulate the emulation and courage of the officers, 
 to enable them to react on the men. His successes in the 
 attack were based on a recognition of the fact that a check 
 in the forward motion is generally synonymous with failure. 
 Hence he allowed no artificial pauses for rest or to g^t 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 119 
 
 breath, but strove all he could to avoid them, and sought to 
 attain perfection, inspiring the officers with a feeling of 
 honor, and developing in them a power of will, which quailed 
 before no losses. That was their "education.' The moral 
 ellect of fire is, as a rule, much greater than the actual losses 
 it inflicts, and this is more the case now with magazine riiles 
 and high explosive shells than it was then; and that system 
 of tactics which enables the example of the leaders to do 
 most, must still be theoretically the best. His frontal 
 attacks were even more bloody than any executed against the 
 breech-loader, but the iron discipline and the example of the 
 leaders triumphed over all. In the main, his principles were 
 those of the 'Midsummer -Night's Dream' school. The sol- 
 dier iired only by word of command, and only at the short- 
 est ranges, but then with a rapidity hitherto undreamt of 
 (five volleys a minute), and every effort was made to keep the 
 racks closed. But the difference between then and now lay 
 in the fact that the prospect of heavy losses was taken into 
 account from the first, and every effort made to teach ihe 
 troops to endure them, whereas now the tendency either is 
 to consider the individual too much or too little, assuming 
 tli at even on the battle-field he will work with the precision 
 of a machine bereft of nerves and their functions. Meckel 
 is the exponent of one extreme, and Boguslawski and his 
 school of the other; the former making of the company (or 
 small unit under an officer) a shooting machine working auto- 
 matically under the officer's control; the latter making de- 
 mands on the individual heroism of the man which only an 
 army of heroes would be capable of attaining to. But of all 
 the factors which condition a man's actions, self-preserva- 
 tion lasts longest; the others melt away sooner or later in 
 presence of danger, but the latter waxes only stronger; and 
 if the system of training leads the men to suppose that the 
 care of their own life is the primary consideration, and it is 
 theirs and not their leaders' to choose when they are to give 
 it up, no prospect of success lies before them." 
 
 Then follow two or three exceedingly interesting pages, 
 but a little too tedious for ordinary readers, the gist of which 
 is that compromise is the common-sense way out of the difii- 
 cultv; utilize the heroism of the individual man as far as it 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 goes, but when whistling bullets and shrieking shell splin- 
 ters have taken off the first edge of their gallantry, be pre- 
 pared to back them up by men trained to follow their officers, 
 and train those officers as in fact only officers can be trained 
 viz., by tradition, honor, and strength of character above 
 I In: fear of death, which with short-service soldiers (i. e., 
 three-year conscripts) is an unattainable ideal. 
 
 As regards the possibility of so training them (the 
 officers), what he says is deserving of close study, particu- 
 larly by those who have not yet undergone the ordeal by tiro. 
 First the sense of "responsibility" must be brought home to 
 them. This compels a man to think and to train himself, 
 and fills those who have it in them to become leaders with a 
 feeling of duty and of confidence in themselves; weaker 
 natures are frightened at responsibility. The system of 
 1 mining, therefore, should be such as will weed them out. 
 Although exceptional strength of will is rare, still a certain 
 degree of it can be developed in all men who are not abso- 
 lutely vicious or cowardly; and by a course of moral train- 
 Ing like that which Madame Blavatsky's chelas are said to 
 undergo. 
 
 "Only under pressure of responsibility will a man put his 
 heart into his work, and responsibility teaches a man to 
 think, but close thinking is precisely the hardest exertion 
 of all, if it be continuous." Axioms, the truth of which will 
 be recognized by all who have ever been through the mill, 
 and which seem to have been written expressly for the Brit- 
 ish army, for the most striking difference one notices be- 
 tween our officers and men of the same families and educa- 
 tion, but engaged in civil life, such as barristers, engineers, 
 etc., is that the former, though frequently full of informa- 
 tion, cannot think, and seem unable to co-ordinate in their 
 minds facts in their relative order of importance. But to 
 rel urn to our author : 
 
 "Responsibility leads to the development of a proper 
 feeling of pride, with its concomitant power of feeling shame; 
 and these two together are the most important moral lever 
 for overcoming temporary weakness;" and then follow 
 passages in liis own life almost as remorselessly directed 
 as Marie Bashkirtseff in her now celebrated diary discloses 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 121 
 
 her own secrets ; and from these experiences he deduces the 
 conclusion that what, was possible for him is possible for all 
 other ordinary characters; and therefore that it is just and 
 expedient to make sharp examples of those who cannot over- 
 come their natural weaknesses. Again a lesson we would 
 do well to take to heart, for the knowledge that such punish- 
 ment was inevitable would do much to steel a weakening 
 resolution. "When an army only consists of the lowest, 
 classes of the population, then the officer is everything, and 
 his men nothing more than automatons; but when such men 
 find themselves in a really tight corner, then nothing c-iu 
 hold them. Where, on the contrary, the army embraces all 
 classes in its ranks, then the interval between officer and man 
 is correspondingly reduced, and nothing can be effected by 
 the old methods of compulsion. As false, therefore, as it is 
 to hope everything from the maintenance of the tactical 
 formations of Frederick the Great's day, just as false is it, 
 on the other hand, to wish to banish all close-order forms 
 from the battle-field ; because then all leading is at an end, 
 and the majority of the men would never be brought within 
 effective attacking range at all. Therefore the men must 
 be trained in both directions, so that the superior leading 
 may avail itself of either power according to the circum- 
 stances of the fight." 
 
 We now come to the psychological dissection of he 
 events of the 16th of August in as far as they concern the 
 38th Brigade (Von Wedell's): 
 
 ''The 38th Brigade had accomplished the distance from 
 Bingen (on the Rhine) to Pont a Mousson in 10 days, and, in 
 spite of great hardship from the heat, had borne their exer- 
 tions well. During the march news of victory had reached 
 it from all sides, so that the men looked forward, full of con- 
 fidence, to their first meeting with the enemy. I am no friend 
 of such expressions as 'burning with battle ardor,' for they 
 are only misrepresentations of human nature, which wo-ild 
 rather shun danger than encounter it. But in this case the 
 reckless declaration of war had wounded the feelings both 
 of king and nation, and as a consequence the love of country 
 of the troops was inflamed to the highest degree. The aim 
 of 1 he general had become that of (he army and of the nation, 
 
122 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and every oiie was prepared, and actually did do, all that in 
 him lay to carry it out; aiid what we did, equally with what 
 we failed to do, shows the extreme limits of what national 
 passion can achieve. For even in peace-time the march 
 would have been an exceptional one, and would not have 
 been accomplished with so small a percentage of stragglers." 
 [Unfortunately, the percentage is not given, but appears to 
 have been about 10 per cent, which, considering half the men 
 were reservists, in no training for marching, and in ii'i\v 
 boots, is certainly a very low 7 average.] 
 
 "But a battle with its thousand-fold dangers, in which 
 the life of the individual appears to be directly threatene.i. 
 and each remains constantly under the impression of .danger, 
 requires a higher grade of will-power. If on the march, the 
 quality is apparent in the determined endurance of hardship ; 
 on the battle-field a higher 'potential' is required; the man 
 who would march till he dropped cannot be induced to leu ve 
 his protecting shelter and go forward across the bullet-swept 
 ground in front of him, either by command or by the most 
 daring example; and the sergeant, who through a long ST- 
 vice of peace and war has won the reputation of being a brave 
 soldier, and who, moreover, is supposed to possess a degree 
 of moral superiority, and has been called to the honor of 
 carrying the colors of the regiment, those symbols of all mili- 
 tary virtues, throws himself flat on the ground the moment 
 the eye of his officer is no longer on him, and only for the 
 moment will the Has wave above the field when the cry of 
 'Falme hoch!' ('Raise the colors!') recalls him for a few sec- 
 onds to a sense of his duty only for a few seconds, for self- 
 preservation is the first law of nature, and only heroes can 
 break through it. 
 
 "Who would lead troops must be a judge of men, and 
 the officer must never forget that the measure he applies to 
 himself can only be applied to a few of those he leads. Will, 
 determination, devotion, and courage, even in the bravest, 
 are not always at the same tension. It is not to-day what it 
 was yesterday, and changes with a hundred conditions, such 
 as the man's health, state of hunger, etc., a fact which every 
 one can ascertain for himself; but it cannot be denied that 
 the troops of the 88th Brigade went into action under the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 123 
 
 most favorable conditions possible for the development of 
 these characteristics. But did these suffice to save them 
 from defeat and its inevitable consequences? No! They 
 fell back so completely broken that they did not even think 
 of defence. Hence it follows that there is a limit to what 
 may be accomplished, even where all these characteristics 
 are present in their highest development, and this limit must 
 be recognized by the leader, so that he learns to limit his 
 demands to the attainable, and does not live in a world of 
 illusions. 
 
 "I do not hesitate to confess that the impressions of the 
 fire we encountered at Mars-la-Tour shook my nerves for 
 months afterwards. Troops who have been through such an 
 ordeal are shaken for a long time, both the officers and men. 
 Even Skobeleff, to whom none will deny the possession of 
 the rarest qualities of personal courage and restless activity, 
 made the same admission as to his own command after the 
 three-days fighting at the Green Hills at Plevna, and yet his 
 losses in the whole three days fell far short of ours at Mars- 
 (u-Tour (42 per cent against 53 per cent) ; and sober men who 
 know what war really is will recognize the truth of my state- 
 ments. The only courage which can stay is based on self- 
 conquest, and not the mere expression of physical health and 
 strength." 
 
 Notes on the Battle-Field and the Enemy's Forces. 
 
 "Of the fighting line of the 10th and 3d Corps east of 
 Mars-la-Tour we could only see four batteries in action, but 
 already from a point a little south of the great road, Mars-la- 
 Tour, Vionville, one could take in the French position, which 
 stretched from the height (846) on the map of the Prussian 
 official account westwards up to La Grey ere Ferme (about 
 o.500 yards), and was occupied by long deployed lines of in- 
 fantry with groups of batteries in the intervals, whose sheila 
 were already falling in and beyond the village. To form an 
 accurate estimate of their total strength was impossible, but 
 ? r was certainly not less than a whole division. It was 4 
 o'clock as we moved off to the attack. 
 
 "I would here ask, first. What had been done to recon- 
 noiter the enemy's position? and, secondly, Is it possible that 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 what we all saw from the troops was not seen by the general, 
 who had occupied the very spot over which we advanced t'or 
 some time previously? and if he did see it, what steps were 
 taken to bring it to our knowledge? 
 
 "Judging by what followed, nothing whatever of what 
 should and could have been done had been attended to. A 
 general who on the maneuver-ground ventured to run his 
 head, without previous reconnaissance, against an almost 
 unassailable position, occupied by a live-fold numerical 
 superiority of men armed with a far superior weapon, would 
 at once, and very rightly, have his services dispensed wi(i. 
 The excuse that we were making a tiank is untenable, for a 
 flank attack with such a weak front as was here the case 
 would be folly; but a flank attack which, instead of being 
 directed on the enemy's flank, is really sent in diagonally 
 across his front, and so is itself taken in flank, and at the 
 same time encounters obstacles in the ground (wire fencing 
 and the ravine) which could not have been known or antici- 
 pated by the executive officers, can only end as it did in 1his 
 case. But though the whole of this ground had been in our 
 hands for the last six hours, not one word of the difficulties 
 to be encountered had been allowed to come to our knowl- 
 edge; and one is inclined to question all one hears as to the 
 way in which our cavalry fulfilled its mission as scouts. J5ut 
 failing this knowledge of the ground and the approximate 
 strength of the enemy, what premises remained on which 
 to base a properly considered tactical operation? But no, 
 every one was in too great a hurry. The brigade was sent in 
 even before it had completed its deployment; for, as already 
 related, on arrival on the ground we stood with our front 
 almost perpendicular to the enemy, and were in the act of 
 changing front to the right when the order to advance reached 
 us, and we moved off before completing it." 
 
 PRESENT TACTICAL TENDENCIES IN THE 
 GERMAN ARMY. 
 
 In recent letters I have dealt with Major Hoenig's views 
 51 s to the action of the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour, and the 
 deductions he draws therefrom, and I trust I have been able 
 to enlist the interest, if not the sympathies, of my readers 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 125 
 
 on his side which side is, indeed, merely the common-sense 
 view of the events as they actually occurred, and not the 
 theoretical aspect of them as they presented themselves to 
 interested "exploiteurs" of new fads, who wrote their his- 
 tories or chose their facts to fit in with their fads, instead of 
 adopting the reverse process. 
 
 Signs are not wanting that the common sense of the 
 army is beginning to rebel against the extremely theoretical 
 views on tactics that it has been the object of our text-books 
 and instructors to cram down our throats; but the danger 
 is that, when the inevitable reaction comes, ideas should 
 swing to the other extreme and adopt, as recklessly as the 
 other side did before, the extreme views contained in the 
 ''Midsummer-Night's Dream," the translation of which is 
 now appearing in the United Service Magazine and which, 
 to judge by what one hears around, is being only too readily 
 absorbed by those who take an interest in the question. 
 
 I think it maj^, therefore, be of interest to lay before 
 my readers the following precis of a chapter of Major Hoe- 
 nig's new book already referred to, which will give a very 
 eood idea as to how the matter at present actually stands 
 between two extreme schools in Germany i. e., how the bulk 
 of the army actually interprets their own regulations in the 
 light of the teaching of the past. 
 
 According to Major Hoenig, the primary cause of the 
 heavy losses incurred during the early battles of the war was 
 the failure of the proper responsible authorities to communi- 
 cate to the troops the result of the experiments with the 
 chassepot rifles the consequence of which was that both 
 leaders and men entered the campaign with an uncomforta- 
 ble feeling of distrust in their own arm, and, according to 
 their personal idiosyncrasy, an exaggerated dread of, or con- 
 1cmpt for, the weapon of their adversary. The result was 
 [I am not quoting his exact words, but trying to give the 
 spirit of several pages of his book in a sentence], that when 
 the bullets began to fly and men to drop at distances of 1,800 
 > ft rds and over, a feeling of uncertainty took possession of 
 all, and the troops simply ran away in the direction of the 
 enemy. The confusion resulting from this style of fighting 
 led to enormous avoidable loss, without any adequate return, 
 
126 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and this confusion, being the salient experience of all, was 
 seized on by both parties, which presently developed them- 
 selves, and which indeed were already in existence to a cer- 
 tain extent, and made the basis of two opposing schools of 
 tactics, of which the one argued that the confusion was the 
 direct consequence of the breech-loaders' fire, the other that 
 it was the outcome of insufficient steady drill. 
 
 The former school were first in the field, and it is the ir 
 writings which hitherto have had the widest circulation in 
 England due to the fact that these have been the only ones 
 translated, and not to any inherent value in the pamphlets 
 themselves. Its chiefest exponents are Boguslawski and 
 Keim, with Tallenbach and a host of other writers of lesser 
 ability. Their motto is "Organized disorder," an idea they 
 borrowed without acknowledgment from an earlier writer, 
 who, as far back as 1800, fell into the same mistake with re- 
 gard to the tactics of the French Revolution viz., that troops 
 require no compulsion to face fire, but rather enjoy it than 
 otherwise. So they may the first half-hour or so, but not at 
 the end of a long day's fighting, or after a couple of re- 
 verses. They were good enough to admit that education 
 was required to fit them to fight in this fashion; but they 
 seem to have built their structure on an ideal type of recruit, 
 which one very seldom sees in Prussia or anywhere else. 
 Their one idea of carrying through a combat is the develop- 
 ment of a superiority of rifle fire by skirmishers enveloping 
 the point of attack; and, logically speaking, they would 
 not tolerate anywhere within range of the enemy a closed 
 body in any form, but all troops behind the fighting line 
 should move in rank entire at open intervals i. e., in the 
 form of the line without its spirit. But one has only to pic- 
 ture to oneself the appearance of a battle-field with even 
 100,000 men engaged on either side to see the utter iinpracti- 
 cabilityof the idea. 
 
 The opposite school is represented by Meckel and his fol- 
 lowers, -and the "Midsummer-Night's Dream," though not 
 written by him, may be taken as fairly representative of his 
 view. And there can be no doubt of the numbers who more 
 or less follow him. In fact, he may be considered as the ex- 
 ponent of the military Tory party; of all who consider them- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 127 
 
 selves guardians of the old Prussian line traditions; and even 
 in Austria he has many supporters. I confess to being a 
 believer in him myself, and consider Hoenig hardly fair jji 
 assigning the extreme views of the "Dream" to him but it 
 is just as well to hear the worst that can be said of one's 
 party outright : 
 
 "This party strives after an ideal too fair for this work- 
 aday world, It is the exact opposite of the former, and I say 
 with absolute conviction that it is based on a similar false 
 psychological foundation. They will have nothing to say 
 to long-distance shooting, and will hear nothing of skirmish- 
 ing fire and skirmishing forms on the battle-field; their con- 
 ception of fighting is the advance of small units of automata, 
 controlled absolutely by an officer, to ranges of 200 to 300 
 yards, and then volley-firing i. e., they demand the impossi- 
 ble from their own point of view. But their demands are 
 none the less dangerous because actually impossible; for in 
 peace, when the bullets are not flying, their ideal is not only 
 possible, but very much the most convenient. The chief 
 representatives of this idea have concentrated around the 
 Berlin drill-ground, and thence their views have been spread 
 as those of men having authority ; and if before 1888 war had 
 broken upon us, against a respectable enemy, then we should 
 probably have had many bloody lessons to learn nay, possi- 
 bly the Berlin drill-ground might have proved again, as it 
 did in 1806, the point of origin of the destruction of the State. 
 Every one-sidedness in tactics leads only too surely to stere- 
 olyped attack formations, and these to defeat; but this 
 very one-sidedness has found supporters even amongst men 
 who otherwise have given proof of ability and power. Those 
 who in 1806 bore the blame for the misfortunes of the coun- 
 try were neither stupid nor ignorant; they were not even 
 <un soldierly'; it was merely their misfortune that there hap- 
 pened at the time to be no counter-current of opinion against 
 which to test the value of their ideas. 
 
 "It is particularly noticeable that it was precisely 
 amongst the very troops whose experiences at St. Privat 
 ought to have taught them better that these ideas princi- 
 pally struck root. These very experiences ought to have 
 proved to them that there was no short-cut to victory for any 
 
1~8 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 one arm alone, but that the united action of the two arms, 
 artillery and infantry, is requisite to ensure success. In- 
 stead, they tried to tind the cause of our disasters where the/ 
 were not viz., in the forms employed, and not in the place 
 where they actually originated, the faulty collective leading 
 and adaptation of means to the end in view and in so doing 
 gave themselves over into the hands of their opponents, the 
 Boguslaw T ski school. 
 
 "Between these two divergent ideas there lies, however, 
 a middle way, the principal promoters of which have b? j n 
 Von Scherff, Liebert, and Von Ariiim; these will have noth- 
 ing to do with extremes of either class, but desire individual 
 fire and individual order for the lighting line, and forms 
 ^hich are susceptible of command i. e., small columns or 
 lines for the troops in rear. They demand, further, a thor- 
 ough preliminary reconnaissance of the ground in front, so 
 that the most can be made of it for purposes of covered ap- 
 proach, and the troops be kept in hand to the last moment 
 possible. They do not relinquish in advance the possibili- 
 ties of distant fire, but still prefer to retain the fire in hand 
 as long as possible, in order then to bring its full power to 
 bear; and, on the whole, iheir ideas are covered by the new 
 regulations of 1st September, 1888. 
 
 "If anyone will take the maps of the scene of action of 
 the Guard Corps and the 38th Brigade at St. Privat and 
 Vionville respectively, and follow the course of both fights 
 carefully, he will be compelled to admit that, even under 
 present and probable future conditions of fire-arms, there is 
 no reason to suppose that it would be impossible to bring up 
 closed bodies of troops to within GOO yards of the enemy's 
 position; and more we do not, as a rule, require. Worse cir- 
 cumstances and higher requirements can hardly occur or be 
 demanded of troops. Only in the case of the 38th Brigade in 
 particular, a more reasonable balance of numbers, and a more 
 thorough preparation by artillery,wouldbe required; but these 
 two conditions fulfilled, there is no reason in the nature of 
 things why whole brigades, still under control, should not b* 
 brought up to the effective range of modern rifles (GOO yards), 
 but from that point forward all possibility of leading ceases, 
 and the result would depend on the courage and dash of the 
 individual units themselves. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 129 
 
 "With these two examples before one's eyes, it is possi- 
 ble to predict with tolerable certainty the course the struggle 
 would take if all close-order forms were abolished, and the 
 attempt made to advance 2,000 yards in successive lines of 
 skirmishers. Where the front is so limited, there is literally 
 no room for the deployment of a sufficient number of rifles 
 lor the fire fight; and to support each other at the proper 
 time, the open lines would have to follow each other so 
 closely that, with the flat trajectories of modern arms, no 
 practical diminution in the losses would be attained, and the 
 difficulty of bringing troops forward without the moral &id 
 of the shoulder-to-shoulder formation would render the whole 
 mass a rabble impossible to drive forward at all. The men 
 would throw themselves down and decline to get up again; 
 and in the end not one man in five would arrive in the shoot- 
 ing line; and this reinforcement would neither bring with it 
 the necessary impulse for a rush forward, nor even make up 
 tor the losses already incurred. 
 
 "It is not the question of 'forms' which is the burning 
 one, but rather the handling of the troops of all arms in 
 combination, and their employment with due regard to the 
 nature of the ground and the momentary condition of things.' 7 
 
 To me it seems that to a considerable extent all three 
 schools base themselves too exclusively on the purely in- 
 fantry views of a battle, and ignore the point of view of the 
 leader in supreme command. To a great extent also they 
 shut their eyes to the teachings of the past, and hastily as- 
 sume that the type of encounter that took place in 1870 is a 
 fixed form, incapable of variation. This I believe to be a 
 fundamental error; the form the battles assumed was con- 
 ditioned by the want of experience in "battle leading" on 
 both sides, which led to the employment of the troops every 
 where in driblets, and nowhere with any definite purpose, 
 and furthermore, by the fact that the French resistance was 
 generally broken in what in the Napoleonic era would have 
 been the preliminary stage of the fight only. For on neither 
 side were the battle reserves, even when there were any, put 
 into action either for counter-attack or to complete the decis- 
 ion. On both sides, but more especially by the French, 
 fresh troops were simply frittered away in driblets, causing 
 
130 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 momentary fluctuation in the fighting line, so that actually 
 the French resistance was broken down when the first line 
 of troops had carried the position before them. But such 
 haphazard leading is not likely to occur again at any rau\ 
 it would be unwise in the extreme to count on it. 
 
 The result, however, of an encounter between twa 
 armies, both of which retain large reserves, and intend to 
 employ them, will necessarily be that the decision of the- 
 fight will, as formerly, be brought about by them, and not 
 by the first fighting line, and it is quite inconceivable how 
 the infantry of these bodies can be employed in any other 
 but close-order formations. 
 
 The infantry, therefore, must be trained to meet both 
 requirements viz., to fight in individual order on one day 
 in the first line, and in close order, perhaps, the next as a 
 reserve; and the difficulty of combining the two contradic- 
 tory requirements is the present stumbling-block in all 
 armies, though not, I believe, an insuperable one. 
 
 Again, none of the writers above mentioned seem to 
 realize either the moral effect actually produced by the 
 artillery in the last war, or the enormous development of its 
 destructive power relatively to that of the infantry which 
 has since taken place. 
 
 If the leader of the three arms thoroughly understands 
 his work, the infantry will never be put in until the enemy's 
 resistance has been sufficiently broken to reduce all risk of 
 heavy loss to a minimum. If they are, it follows that the 
 leader failed in that appreciation of the circumstances which 
 is perhaps the greatest of qualities in a general, and the pos- 
 session of which in a marked degree really constitutes a man 
 a genius. 
 
 Of course, such mistakes must often occur, for the num- 
 ber of geniuses available is but small, and in peace-time they 
 have but little opportunity to come to the front; but, as a 
 general rule, it may be taken that the true index to the char- 
 acter and value of a commander is found in the proportion 
 the results obtained bear to the losses suffered in gaining 
 them, and not, as is too frequently believed, exclusively in 
 the butcher's bill of one's own side. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 131 
 
 THE PHYSIQUE OF EUROPEAN ARMIES. 
 
 A most interesting article to military men is a careful 
 comparison of the relative improvement or deterioration in 
 the physique of the European armies during the last forty 
 years, from the pen of Mr. W. M. Gattie. At first sight, see- 
 ing that in all countries recruits on joining are duly weighed 
 and measured, and the results recorded and published, it 
 does not seem difficult to settle the question of relative phys- 
 ique in a few pages; but, unfortunately, the systems by 
 which these measurements are recorded vary so much in 
 method that it is a matter of great difficulty to arrive at a 
 true conclusion, and Mr. Gattie's article runs to the imposing 
 length of twenty pages, each of which is full of interesting 
 facts and observations. Broadly speaking, he considers it 
 to be established that in those countries in which universal 
 service has lasted for a couple of generations, the figures 
 show a marked tendency in the direction of improvement, 
 and that, too, in spite of the drain of life on the battle-fields^ 
 which, however, has been very much less than he appears to 
 be aware of. In our own army, not based on universal ser- 
 vice, there has been a slight deterioration, though far less 
 than those who talk of the service going to the dogs, etc., 
 would have us believe; but it would seem that the army as. 
 a whole is a fair reflex of the classes from which it is re- 
 cruited, and that actually the stature of the lower classes has 
 been decreasing, and the cause of this decrease he assigns 
 to be the growth of the large towns and manufactures hav- 
 ing drained the agricultural communities. 
 
 From the last report of the British Army Medical De- 
 partment it appears that the average height of the recruits 
 finally approved for service is 5 feet 5.8 inches, and average 
 weight 9 stone 2 pounds. According to the French statistics, 
 the average height of the Frenchman at twenty years of age 
 is 5 feet 4 inches, the minimum height for enlistment is 5 
 feet Of inch, and the percentage of rejections for insufficient 
 stature has been gradually falling. 
 
 In Germany, where the minimum height is 5 feet 1 4-5 
 inches, the percentage of rejections under the same head has 
 also been falling steadily, and the average height of recruits.' 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 passed into the service is 5 feet 5J inches, with a weight of 9 
 stone 12 pounds, the average height of the race appearing to 
 be 5 feet 6 inches; but the measurements from which Mr. 
 Gattie derives this figure seem to us hardly sufficient to war- 
 rant this conclusion. We should be inclined to put it lower. 
 
 In Austria-Hungary the percentage of rejections is also 
 falling, and the average height of all the diverse nationali- 
 ties that go to make up the empire, between the ages of 
 twenty to twenty -two, is 5 feet 5i inches. In Italy the aver- 
 age height of the conscript is 5 feet 4J inches, and the same 
 decrease in rejections is also noticeable, and the Eussian 
 statistics, though less full and scarcely trustworthy, point to 
 similar conclusions. 
 
 "It seems then," to quote Mr. Gattie's words, "that, so 
 far as statistics are available, or may be accepted as a guide, 
 there is a general tendency on the Continent towards physical 
 improvement. At any rate, there are no such serious indica- 
 tions in the opposite direction as those which have caused 
 natural disquietude in this country. The fact has to be 
 faced, that while the physique of the English army is deteri- 
 orating under influences already considered, the material 
 from which foreign armies are drawn is on the whole better 
 and more vigorous; and this, be it remembered,has come about 
 in spite of tremendous wars in which every Continental power 
 of the first rank has sacrificed much of the flower of its youth." 
 This improvement he attributes to the healthy effects of the 
 three years' training undergone by every healthy representa- 
 tive of the nations under the colors, and urges that, since we 
 cannot have conscription, it would be as well to introduce 
 some course of physical training into the board school cur- 
 riculum which has actually to some extent been already 
 done. 
 
 It seems to us, however, that Mr. Gattie has gone rather 
 ahead of his facts. Though as regards Germany, in which 
 country the liability to service has been in force for the last 
 eighty years, it is fair to attribute the universal improve- 
 ment in physique which is, we think we may say, univer- 
 sally admitted to the action of this cause; yet in no other 
 country in Europe has universal liability to service been law 
 long enough to allow of an opinion being formed. The earli- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 133 
 
 est children of the first batch of recruits enlisted under the 
 new act can, nowhere except in Italy, have as yet reached 
 the age of twenty. Previous to 1870, conscription with sub- 
 stitutes was the order of the day, and under that system the 
 flower of the race everywhere escaped, whilst the long-ser- 
 vice men, and particularly the substitutes, had vices of their 
 own not likely to make them fathers of healthy children. As 
 to the drain of the wars above referred to, from 1815 to July, 
 1870, though exact statistics, except in the case of Prussia 
 proper, are wanting, it is not possible that the nation lost 
 more than 25,000 possible fathers; and though other coun- 
 tries suffered more severely, still in no case did the death 
 rate assume very alarming proportions. 
 
 Though universal liability to service seems to us an unat- 
 tainable ideal in our own country, still it is interesting to 
 note where we would stand in the scale if Ave had it. The 
 British Association fixes the average stature of the typical 
 Englishman at 5 feet 7-J inches, with chest girth of 36^ inches 
 and weight of 10 stone 10 pounds; and since this is the aver- 
 age of men who have never undergone any exceptional culti- 
 vation of their physique, it seems only reasonable to suppose 
 that an army recruited only from the best men, and able to 
 afford a percentage of rejections for physical unfitness higher 
 than any other country can do, would be able to improve 
 very markedly on their figures, which even by themselves 
 show us to be normally a considerably taller and broader 
 set of men than any others on the Continent. There is, 
 therefore, no real ground for the pessimism which most 
 readers of Mr. Gattie's article are likely to carry away with 
 them. 
 
 THE WEAPON OR THE MAN. 
 
 In the history of the 2d "Leib" Hussar Regiment of the 
 Prussian army in the war of 1870, 1 have come across a curi- 
 ous instance of the absurdity of basing tactics or formations 
 primarily on the nature of the weapon, and not on that of the 
 man who handles it. This regiment formed part of the 4th 
 Cavalry Division, and at the end of September formed the 
 extreme advance of the army then engaged in investing Paris. 
 Its nearest cavalry supports lay some three marches in ita 
 
134: Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 rear, the infantry still further, and in its front the first Army 
 of the Loire was gathering round and about Orleans. As the 
 ^nemy developed more and more enterprise, two battalions 
 of Bavarian infantry were detached to its support; other- 
 wise it had to rely on its own resources, and even these sup- 
 porters had to be extended over an exceedingly wide front; 
 so much so that, when on the morning of the 5th October its 
 outposts were driven in by a brisk attack of the enemy, it 
 could only muster 1 battalion of infantry, 10 horse artillery 
 guns, and 2 brigades of cavalry, but the actual fighting only 
 fell on one of these two brigades. Against a hostile force of 
 12 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 18 guns, amongst which 
 were several African battalions and some other regular 
 troops, including all the cavalry, it held its own for three 
 hours, then quietly withdrew for a couple of miles, and 
 after having been under the fire of all three batteries and of 
 dense swarms of skirmishers on a plain which afforded prac- 
 tically no cover whatever, its losses for the day amounted to 
 only 5 wounded and 19 missing, 4 horses killed and G wounded. 
 The number of missing is accounted for by the fact that 
 a Bavarian infantry picket was surprised in the night and 
 mostly captured. The method ef fighting adopted is of in- 
 terest, for it does not often happen that cavalry alone is 
 called on to face such overwhelming odds. The site of the 
 net ion was a gently sloping plain, falling towards the Prus- 
 sians. Their right rested on t^o yi'llio-o of Boissay. occu- 
 pied by a company of Bavarians, and next to it stood the 
 guns and their escort of one squadron, mostly thrown 
 out as skirmishers well to the flank. In rear of the center, 
 the village of Foury on the Orleans road was held by two 
 more companies of Bavarians, and their fourth company 
 held a small house on the railway embankment which ran 
 north and south, parallel with the road, and between which 
 and Boissav, on a front of some 2,000 yards, the line was 
 held only by cavalry skirmishers; beyond the railway the 
 line was continued by more skirmishers backed by two closed 
 squadrons. The French infantry fired away as hard as they 
 could, and made numerous forward movements, whilst the 
 guns on both sides indulged in an artillery duel, the French, 
 however, sending a few shells at the closed squadrons in rear. 
 
Military Letters ana Essays. 135 
 
 cue of which accounted for three-fifths of the total loss. The 
 method of fighting was the old-fashioned one for cavalry skir- 
 mishers viz., riding in circles, individually firing their car- 
 bines from time to time, and behind them the closed squad- 
 rons kept on the move to distract the enemy's aim. As for 
 armament, the Prussian needle-gun carbine was a perfect 
 beast of a weapon, short, clumsy, and certainly not capable 
 of accurate fire at 400 yards range. The French, both cav- 
 alry and infantry, were armed throughout with chassepots, 
 abundantly supplied with ammunition, with which they kept 
 up a fire over the whole ground in their front up to a distance 
 of over 2,000 yards. At one moment they began to come too 
 close up to the gunners, when a troop of the escort and a few 
 skirmishers charged the advancing swarm and rolled them 
 completely up, and the attempt was not renewed for about 
 an hour. On the other flank the skirmishers, finding the 
 French could not hit them, grew bolder and bolder, and gal- 
 loped close up to them, actually succeeding in forcing them 
 back for some little distance, and bagging several of them. To 
 drive them off, six squadrons of cavalry were brought up, but 
 the Hussars wanted no better chance, and with the three 
 squadrons at hand prepared to charge them ; but the French 
 halted, wheeled about, and retired, and the Prussians in turn 
 had to go back under a heavy fire, by which, however, only 
 one horse was slightly grazed just enough to draw blood. 
 
 Now these French troops were fresh, well fed and equipped, 
 and contained some excellent material and devoted officers. 
 They were certainly very far removed from the condition 
 of utter mental and bodily prostration to which in process of 
 time even the best troops may be ultimately reduced. Yet, 
 as we have seen, they could hit nothing at all, and even if we 
 assume the present repeater to be double as effective as the 
 chassepot which is hardly the case and double the losses 
 accordingly, the result is still ludicrously small. No doubt 
 against attacking infantry they would have made a better 
 show, as these present necessarily a more stationary target, 
 but even in that case it is impossible to believe that it would 
 have made much difference whether the attacking troops had 
 stood two deep or four deep, or one pace apart or three. But 
 the whole essence of leading lies in not committing either 
 
136 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 infantry or cavalry, till the artillery tire has induced an equal, 
 if not a greater, degree of prostration in the enemy. Where 
 circumstances press for a decision, and since in any case it 
 is never possible to make certain of your adversary's condi- 
 tion, then, as a principle for all decisive attacks, march to 
 meet him with your leading troops in such a formation that 
 they can at any moment develop their utmost man-killing 
 power, and those in rear in whatever sized column or line 
 best suits either the ground or their slate of discipline, but 
 never let fear of the enemy's bullets influence your choice. 
 This would give us, according to the quality of the troops, 
 either single rank with elbow-room or ordinary two-deep lim- 
 for the leading troops, and line or company column for the 
 rearward ones. 
 
 But to expose the hopelessness of the position adopted 
 by the official British school i. e., those whose duty it is to 
 train the future staft' and leaders let me here adduce in com- 
 parison the fire-power possessed by the good old Brown I Jess 
 of former days. It will be readily granted that when there 
 were no sights to be fumbled with, and firing was all done at 
 point-blank ranges, its effect was likely to be much greater 
 than nowadays, when to open at 1,000 yards and forget to put 
 down the sights as the enemy advances, destroys all hope of 
 hits on the foremost fighting line, the one on which the decis- 
 ion depends. But the actual number of bullets delivered 
 per yard run of the usual formations in those bygone days 
 was at least as great as that delivered in the same time by 
 the extended lines and weapons in use in the Franco-German 
 war. There were two forms of fire then employed. In the 
 first the troops standing four deep (this was about 1730) 
 formed eight deep as we now form fours. There was thus 
 a man's breadth between the files. The lea ding file fired and 
 countermarched through the interval; No. 2 stepped up 
 and delivered his fire, and followed Xo. 1, and so on through- 
 out the file; and in this way the rapidity of fire was brought 
 up to 12 and even 16 rounds per yard run of front. 
 
 The other method, which was principally developed by 
 Frederick, and was a consequence of the iron ramrods, was 
 half-company volleys three deep, five and even six to the 
 minute, w T hich gave something over 15 rounds per minute, 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 137 
 
 since the space allowed in the ranks was only 22 inches. It 
 is only fair to add that this lire left much to be desired on 
 the score of accuracy ; but in this respect it could never be as 
 bad as it is at present, for, after all, the bullets fell with man- 
 killing force somewhere within an area 500 yards deep at the 
 outside, instead of within one of 2,500 or more, as with the 
 chassepots. The muskets also in Prussia were purposely 
 made heavy at the muzzle to keep them down, and special 
 precautions were made to train the men mechanically to keep 
 1beu i muzzles low. 
 
 I Jut at all times since the days of Maryborough, the fire- 
 power of the line, when that line consisted of steady troops, 
 lias been sufficient to mow down their opponents with one 
 single volley. The problem has always been, on the one 
 hand, to keep the men steady; on the other, to insure that the 
 enemy was not steady at the moment of attack. This must 
 not be understood as a pleading for the old weapons back 
 again; such a thing would be ridiculous, for the first and 
 greatest object to be kept before one is, that the soldier should 
 have confidence that he is as well if not better armed than 
 his antagonist, the point again being, not the nature of the 
 weapon in itself, but its effect on the mental condition of 
 the man. 
 
 Hearing the above in mind, it is interesting to contrast 
 the conduct of the 4th Cavalry Division on this occasion with 
 that of our own 15th Hussars and other Prussian and Aus- 
 trian squadrons in 1792-93 under somewhat similar circum- 
 stances. On the 17th September, 1792, some 1,500 Prussian 
 Hussars with horse artillery guns charged and routed some 
 10,000 French troops under General Chazot, and at Villiers 
 en Couche, on 24th April of the following year, 80 Austrians 
 and 200 sabers of the British 15th Hussars, then Light Dra- 
 goons, broke 10,000 French with artillery who stood to re- 
 ceive them in an immense square. They killed 900, captured 
 400, and brought in 5 guns. At Cateau Cambresis, two days 
 subsequently, an Austrian regiment and 9 squadrons of Brit- 
 ish cavalry broke and dispersed a French corps of 27,000 in- 
 fantry, destroying some 3,000 and rapturing 22 guns, and in 
 a second charge the same day, made by four British and two 
 Austrian squadrons, another column was defeated with a 
 
 i 10 
 
138 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 loss of 1,000 men and 10 guns, the total loss for the cavalry 
 on the day being 1C officers and 380 men; and it must be 
 remembered there is strong reason for supposing that the 
 moral of these troops thus beaten was of a higher order 
 than that of the French in 1870. Many other instances 
 might be quoted, Kossbach amongst others. But I cannot 
 help believing that if in 1870 the spirit of the Prussian cav- 
 alry lias not been broken by the constant iteration of the 
 "cavalry cannot charge unshaken infantry" and the exag- 
 gerated reports as to the power of the new weapons, they 
 would have gone for the whole French division before them 
 on this day and exterminated them with a loss on their side 
 which would certainly not have exceeded that of ourselves 
 and the Austrians alluded to. Of course the duty of the 4th 
 Tavalry Division was to see, and not to light, but compare 
 Ihe moral advantages that such a success would have en 
 tailed. As it was. Hie French reported a victory, magnified 
 the weak Bavarian battalion by 10, did the same for the guns 
 and cavalry, and thus succeeded in raising the spirits of 
 their new levies behind enormously, whereas a dashing 
 charge would have served the purpose of the Intelligence 
 Staff as well, or even better, and have established such a ter- 
 ror that the French would never have ventured into the open 
 aji'ain. and all the fighting round Artenay. (Nmlmiers. I.eau 
 gency. etc., with the heavy losses it entailed, have been 
 spared on both sides. As it was, one single charge, made by 
 a troop of only say L'.~i to :>() sabers, sufficed to roll up a whole 
 line of skirmishers and keep them quiet fora couple of hours. 
 What might not have been expected from the attack of eight 
 or twelve squadrons appearing suddenly on tin- French rear? 
 And there was no reason why they should not have availed 
 themselves of their superior mobility to troll right round the 
 enemy, and thus cut him off from all support, for the ground 
 actually favored such an operation. But, with the exception 
 of the 1st (inard Dragoons, enterprise on the battle-field was 
 not a sin to be laid to the charge of the Prussian cavalry. 
 
 In the above-mentioned book an attempt has been made 
 to present in tabular form the performances, losses, and aver- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 139 
 
 age work and endurance of the horses during the campaign 
 of 1870, and in spite of the dreariness of the figures, the data 
 thus afforded should be of such value as a standard for cav- 
 alry officers and the staffs of higher commands generally that 
 I venture to submit them to my readers. 
 
 The regiment was present on the field during the follow- 
 ing general actions, some of which lasted for two days, viz., 
 Worth, Beaumont, Sedan, the two battles round Orleans, 
 and at Le Mans, and, including minor engagements, its de- 
 tachments crossed swords with the enemy on 71 days, on 12 
 of which it came under artillery fire. 
 
 Its total losses were: killed 1 officer and 19 men, 
 wounded '2 officers, and 23 men missing, captured by the-ene- 
 my 4 officers and 47 men, and died of sickness 1 officer and 29 
 men. Of horses it lost 37 killed, 38 wounded, 51 missing, and 
 138 broke down and had to be destroyed. The average 
 strength of the squadrons throughout the. campaign was 
 maintained at 96 sabers and the marching-out strength 114. 
 It raptured 1 gun, 34 ammunition and other wagons, 9,016 
 prisoners, and 111 horses. In all it marched 2,072 miles, its 
 average per marching day being 17 miles. The longest day's 
 march for the whole regiment was 41 miles, for a single squad- 
 ron 54 miles and for a patrol 104 miles. The average for the 
 regiment of hours under saddle daily was 9.5, the longest 
 time without unsaddling was 76 hours, and the total number 
 of rounds unaccounted for i. e., expended was 4,080, of 
 which only about T>3 per cent were act nally fired in action. 
 Unfortunately, there is no means of estimating the losses it 
 inflicted on the enemy during the whole campaign, but since 
 they more than once broke up bands of Franctireurs, and 
 gave no quarter, the total amount must have been consider- 
 able; and as regards their own somewhat high figure of "mis- 
 sing,'' this is accounted for by the loss of a very strong offi- 
 cer's patrol, which was left behind and forgotten by the army, 
 and being forced to take shelter in an old castle by bands of 
 armed inhabitants and National Guards, was eventually 
 for rod to surrender. 
 
 As to the endurance of the horses, the following point 
 deserves to bo noticed. After the first few weeks of the cam- 
 
140 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 paigu, thanks to the ubundaiit food and constant exercise,, 
 they actually improved in condition, and whereas at: first 
 several cases of sores on the withers occurred, indicating 
 falling off in condition, none were registered in the latter 
 months, but several were noted under the rear half of the 
 right fan of the saddle; but the curious thing is that the car- 
 bine was not carried as with us, but in the so-railed Namaqua 
 bucket in front of the right thigh, so that the usual explana- 
 tion for a sore in this position will not apply. Altogether. 
 186 cases of sore back were reported in the whole six-mom hs 
 campaign, or 33 per cent of all the horses, but only 9 per rent 
 had to be specially treated; the 01 hers \\CK- ridden through- 
 out, their cases being met by altering the folding of the 
 blanket; 50 per cent of all the horses went through the cam 
 paign without a day's sickness, and 72 per cent of tin- Ma si 
 Prussians, but the general average was brought down by 
 the horses under 7 years old, and the few horses bought or 
 captured in the country, many of whom, particularly those 
 with a Percheron strain, had to be destroyed for IVver in ih<- 
 feet. There were further, 17 cases of debility, 25 of colic, 
 and 7 horses were burnt to death by a fire breaking out in 
 their stable. 
 
 Only 25 per cent of the 5-year-olds stood the work, and 
 the best lot were those rising 11 years, of whom TO per rent 
 went through the whole six months without trouble, and even 
 the oldest horses of 18 years and upwards bore the work 
 well. There were actually two of 22 years of age, one of 
 whom was killed in action, but the other, though ridden by 
 one of the boldest scouts in the regiment, never went sick for 
 a day. 
 
 MINOR TACTICAL DAY AT ALDERSHOT. 
 
 For some years past it has been the custom to devote a 
 day each week to exercising the commanding officers and 
 senior field officers in the management of a small body of 
 their own or of all three arms according to their seniority 
 and skill. As I first remember them, there used to be a good 
 deal of farce about them, but of late, especially under Sir 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 141 
 
 Evelyn Wood, they have coine to be very searching examina- 
 tions for the officer in command, indeed affording very con- 
 siderable scope for the display of soldierly talent, and for the 
 nervous and inefficient even better opportunities for them to 
 convict themselves of worthlessness. Perhaps a detail de- 
 scription of one of these days will prove of interest to my 
 readers, seeing that one by one all officers of British regi- 
 ments may expect to come under the same harrow. 
 
 On the 2d of June a force consisting of the 19th Hussars 
 and a battery of Royal Horse Artillery was ordered to parade 
 at Government House at 8:30 a. m., under the command of 
 the senior major of the regiment. Here it was met by Sir 
 Evelyn Wood and the staff, the latter augmented for the 
 day by some 30 field officers to act as umpires, and a number 
 of orderly officers, and the whole were then taken out at a 
 trot some miles into the country, where they were halted, and 
 the scheme for the day's work first issued. The opposing 
 force had been moved off with the same ignorance of its des- 
 tination in another direction. I had attached myself to the 
 Hussars and Horse Artillery. We halted just south of the 
 village of Cove, and under cover of the embankment of the 
 main line, Southwestern Railway i. e., Basingstoke, Farn- 
 borough. Here the general and special ideas were issued, 
 and on them the officer in command of the detachmetit had to 
 issue his orders. The general idea ran as follows: "A 
 flanking column of an invading army hearing, when biv- 
 ouacked near Farnborough, that its main body has been de- 
 feated and is falling back, retires to the southward, and is 
 followed by a cavalry force moving from Reading." And the 
 special idea for the Northern or Red force ran, as near as I 
 can recall it: a The enemy is retiring, under cover of a line 
 of outposts, along the canal. A large magazine is said to 
 exist about a mile south of the Queen's Pavilion. Break 
 through, find out what is going on, and capture the maga- 
 zine." Actually the line of outposts ran from the gas works 
 bridge close to the Southwestern Aldershot Branch, to Pond- 
 tail bridge to the westward; whether this information was 
 given T forget, but, in any case, the other crossings beyond 
 the above limits were too far distant to come within the 
 
142 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 scope of the day's work. The canal throughout was consid- 
 ered as uufordable, though, as a fact, one can ride through 
 it anywhere. 
 
 The country round Aldershot is so generally known in 
 the service that much description of it is unnecessary. Tin- 
 g-round we were to operate over is traversed from north to 
 south by the Kagshot-Farnham road, and from cast to west 
 by the canal, over which there are in all six bridges viz.. 
 the gas works on the east, the iron bridge in i he south camp, 
 Aldershot wharf bridge on the main road, Kelmoor bridge a 
 mile to the westward, Xorris Hill bridge crossing I he canal. 
 which here runs in a deep cutting at a height of some I'd tn-t 
 above the water level, ami tinally I'ondtail bridge, about 
 three miles west of the main road. East of the Hagshot road 
 the conditions for the movement of mounted troops are so 
 unfavorable that practically thai side of the ground may In- 
 left out of account, and all interest centered on the wharf 
 bridge and to the westward. The wharf bridge can be ap- 
 proached under rover to within a few yards; on the other 
 hand, being on the main road, it was the most likely to be 
 best prepared for defence. Eelmoor bridge is in a re-enter 
 ing angle as regards the enemy, and its approaches ohVr very 
 little cover. Norris Hill bridge can be reached with a mini- 
 mum of exposure, for a big wood comes right down to the 
 canal, completely hiding all movements, but at the sametime 
 the length of the bridge and the depth of the cutting render 
 it very easy to defend; and last of all, Pondtail bridge is 
 about equally bad for attack or defence, and is so far on" the 
 main objective that one would only choose it as a last resort. 
 
 How the matter actually presented itself to the com 
 manding officer I have, of course, no means of knowing, but 
 to me it appeared somewhat in the following manner: The 
 enemy is beaten and in retreat. How r much beaten the indi- 
 cations along the road we are supposed to come would have 
 enabled me to judge. My best chance is to press him hard. 
 and, if possible, seize a bridge before he has thought of barri- 
 cading it. The ground east of the road is, from the map. 
 decidedly unfavorable; and would, moreover, lead to too 
 great a dispersion of my force. I will therefore send two 
 troops (we w r ere working with four per squadron) to each of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 143 
 
 the bridges westward of the main road and including the lat- 
 ter, as fast as they can travel, and with the remaining two 
 squadrons form up in readiness under cover at the north end 
 of Cove Common, that being the point from w r hich all the 
 roads radiate. As regards the artillery, two guns are 
 enough to demolish any average barricade, therefore two 
 shall go down the main road, two shall take Eelmoor bridge 
 under fire from the ridge which divides Cove Common 
 (range about 1,200 3 r ards), and two shall go with the machine- 
 gun to the high ground north of Morris bridge, from whence 
 they can either take Pondtail in reverse, or, if necessary, be 
 used at short range to blow in the barricade w r hich we may 
 expect to find at N orris bridge. With average luck, we ought 
 to rush one if not two of the four, and in any case the enemy's 
 attention will be distracted all round, and the reports^ I re- 
 reive will enable me to judge against which to mass the bulk 
 of my force. 
 
 Probably on service the officer in command would have 
 acted in this manner, but umpires are more difficult to deal 
 with than an enemy, and this scheme is a little too unortho- 
 dox to risk one's peace-time reputation on, though, as far as 
 I can judge, the chief umpire, Sir Evelyn Wood, would have 
 appreciated it. What actually happened was that small 
 officers' patrols were sent to each bridge, and Norris bridge 
 only was honored with a whole troop, the main body and 
 guns being drawn up in readiness at the north end of Cove 
 Common. I rode w r ith the scouts up to the wharf bridge, 
 and could only admire the way they worked; no reasonable 
 fault could be found with them, and they were keen and took 
 an interest in what they were doing. But some of the dis- 
 tances were considerable, and nearly an hour and a half 
 elapsed before all the reports were in, and the main body be- 
 gan to move in the direction of Norris bridge. 
 
 Personally I stuck to the umpire staff, which proceeded 
 to gallop across the plain towards Eelmoor, the general far 
 in advance and the remainder spread out any where, according 
 to the speed of their horses. We were a large body, but pre- 
 sented no conceivable resemblance to a formed body of troops. 
 Nevertheless, the enemy mistook us for cavalry, and at 
 about 000 yards opened a heavy fire on us, from which, how- 
 
144 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 ever, had we really been a squadron, we could have got 
 ample shelter behind a low undulation that ran out from the 
 canal about 250 yards in front of the bridge. Part of the 
 picket had been very well placed in a small copse which 
 gutted out of the bank on our side of the bridge, and its sup- 
 port was under cover close at hand, when- i hex were entirely 
 safe from mounted men; nevertheless they wei-e so Hurried 
 by our approach that at the critical moment, when we were 
 within 150 yards or so of them, they bolted out of the copse 
 across the bridge and left it completely open to us, running 
 away up the slope beyond in no sort of order or formation. 
 There was a very young officer in command, who nobly stuck 
 to his post, and who, on being asked lor an explanation, said 
 we had been taken for cavalry. He had orders to hold out 
 as Ipiig as his ammunition lasted; that had been expended, 
 and so he had fallen back. Pom- young chap! he was ihe 
 victim of circumstances. Yei. if Sandhurst education were 
 not a farce, he ought to have known better than this. But 
 one hardly knows what to say of the officer in command of 
 the support for not hurrying up and telling him of his mis- 
 take, for had he been alert he must have seen it, and the 
 support was not 200 yards distant. As for the men, I never 
 saw such a disorderly mob in my life; they straggled away 
 by twos and threes in no kind of order, and finally stood 
 about on the top of the hill like so many yokels at a country 
 chase. 
 
 However, having heard the explanation, we cantered on 
 to Norris bridge, and here I elected to stay, expecting always 
 the chief blow to be delivered here. When I arri \ ed the state 
 of affairs was as follows: The bridge was held by a com- 
 pany of the Scottish Rifles, who had arrived on the spot sim- 
 ultaneously with the Hussar 1 1 oops. No umpire being pres- 
 ent, the two officers had met amicably and had agreed to dif- 
 fer. The infantry man declined to give way, and under the 
 circumstances the cavalry man could not charge over his 
 body. So he dismounted a portion of his men, and the two 
 sides exchanged a lively fire. The trees here are well grown 
 and come close up to the edge of the cutting, which is lined 
 on both sides by banks, giving excellent cover. The road, 
 after crossing the bridge, runs straight for about 30 yards 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 145 
 
 on the cavalry side, and then bends sharp round to the east- 
 ward; and on it there is room to form a whole regiment un- 
 der cover. To the westward there is a clearfng up to the 
 edge of the high ground, affording ample room for a batt'ery 
 facing towards Pondtail, and the fringe of trees bordering 
 the canal is sufficiently thick to shelter any troops on the 
 clearing from tire from the south bank of the canal. A track 
 coming from the north runs into the main road across the 
 bridge just at the above-mentioned corner of the main road, 
 and affords access to the clearing. 
 
 We had hardly been at the bridge for more than a few 
 minutes when we heard a battery galloping down this track. 
 The leading gun just came in sight for a moment, and then 
 wheeled sharp to its right to come into position, against 
 Pondtail. In turning it was under fire of the infantry for per- 
 haps 10 seconds, and would probably at that, short range, 
 barely 50 yards, have lost half its team. It w r as put out of 
 action by the umpire, and I think rightly. But the remain- 
 ing five were not seen at all, and came into action taking 
 Pondtail in reverse at most effective range. This bridge, I 
 may mention, stands up well above the plain, and would not 
 have been tenable for five minutes; the line of retreat of the 
 infantry was also completely exposed. For the moment 
 the position of the artillery seemed almost ridiculous, for 
 here they were firing due west, w r hilst immediately to the 
 north and not 100 yards distant a company of infantry was 
 firing into their left rear, but on dismounting, and looking 
 along the rifle barrels, we found that the aforesaid screen of 
 trees was actually dense enough to stop all but a chance bul- 
 let, so it was decided that the guns could remain in action. 
 Meanwhile we were unaware that the officer commanding 
 the detachment had changed his plan, and was actually mov- 
 ing with the bulk of his force on Pondtail, reinforcing the 
 troop at Norris bridge only with^the remainder of its squad- 
 ron. We had seen this reinforcement come up, but in the 
 wood could not estimate its strength, and were every mo- 
 ment expecting a couple of guns to be turned on the barri- 
 cade, which was indicated by some bits of furze, and then a 
 rush to be made, either by the dismounted men, who now 
 appeared to outnumber the very weak company, or by the 
 
146 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 leading- squadron mounted, down the road, either course 
 seeming feasible. The cavalry Him sent a messenger to the 
 umpire to know whether ilie barricade the infantry claimed 
 to'have made could be considered "jumpable" or not, and 
 pointed out that both sides had arrived simultaneously, and 
 he had had the road under fire ever since. The infantry, on 
 the other hand, claimed to have cut down some fairly big 
 trees on either si-de of the road and to have m tangled them. 
 So they were asked to produce their tools, and then it turned 
 out that they had nothing but their sword bayonets, the little 
 10-inch things they now carry, and they were asked to show 
 how they could chop down the trees without exposing them- 
 selves, and it was found they could not do so, so the point 
 was given against them. We then remained momentarily 
 expecting the rush, which, however, did not come, and then, it 
 being 12 noon and the infantry having orders to retire at 
 that hour, their officer drew off his little command in the 
 neatest possible manner without showing a hand, and only 
 just in time, for meanwhile Pondtail had been forced, and the 
 cavalry patrols were already appearing on his flank. The 
 bridge now lay completely open, and still there was no move- 
 ment on the part of the cavalry. The situation was too ridic- 
 ulous, but exceedingly real. Fully ten minutes must have 
 elapsed before they began to suspect anything, and then 
 probably it was the movement of the spectators which awoke 
 suspicion. Then at last half a dozen scouts dashed over the 
 bridge, and began to examine the coverts, and their aston- 
 ished faces, when they found no enemy even within sight, 
 were a most amusing study. 
 
 Meanwhile Pondtail bridge had been carried, I learnt 
 afterwards, in good style, with little exposure and much dash, 
 and the infantry were retreating towards < 1 ocked Hat Wood, 
 over a stretch of marshy ground, dry enough for them to pass. 
 but impracticable for cavalry. Having crossed it, they 
 turned and opened fire on the leading squadron, which at- 
 tempted to follow over the same ground, but with no ground 
 scouts. They were just on the edge of the bog, and in an- 
 other moment would have been hopelessly in it, when the 
 infantry, armed with magazine rifles and all the latest im- 
 provements, turned tail suddenly and ran, and the chief urn- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 147 
 
 pire at once put them out of action. The remainder of the 
 regiment stuck to the road leading to the steeplechase course, 
 trying to get right round the infantry and cut them off. 
 
 The squadron at Norris bridge had now come across, 
 and with it the battery. The latter came into action on the 
 southern edge of the Norris Hill plateau, directing their fire 
 on the retreating infantry, who were seeking to gain the 
 cover of the copses which border the Long Valley. But the 
 enemy's gunners had also been on the lookout, and the 
 moment our battery appeared, they opened on them with 
 shrapnel from Jubilee Hill, and at a known range, and in all 
 probability would have wiped out our guns before they 
 could come into action. At this period, I regret to say, the 
 squadron immediately on the spot departed from its cavalry 
 traditions, and adopted the role of mounted infantry, pursu- 
 ing only w r ith fire; and this was all the more blameworthy, 
 for the infantry in front of them seemed completely out of 
 hand. However, they kept driving them back straight up 
 to wards Chestnut Copse and west of Long Hill. At the same 
 time the main body of the Hussars appeared on the two hills 
 in the center of the course, known respectively as Tweedledee 
 and Tweedledum, converging also on the western edge of 
 Chestnut Copse, into which a couple of companies of infantry 
 had thrown themselves. The ground in front was extremely 
 difficult for the cavalry, as a stream comes down from the 
 northwest edge of the copse and is passable only at three 
 bridges, broad enough for perhaps a front of fours. Accord- 
 ingly they dismounted, and for a few minutes a fine fight raged. 
 It seemed to me that here they lost a great opportunity. It 
 wjis impossible to charge the western edge of the copse, for, 
 apart from the difficulty of breaking into the wood itself, the 
 steeplechase course here runs in a 10-foot cutting right across 
 the front of it; it was equally impossible for the infantry to 
 break out for any offensive movement worth speaking of, 
 for they were too few in number, and the edge of the wood 
 was under the fire of the Hussars' machine-gun, which was 
 cleverly posted and not liable to distant artillery fire. Un- 
 der these circumstances, it would have been best not to dis- 
 mount at all, but to move along the reverse slope of Tweedle- 
 dee, and crossing the stream by one of the bridges, join the 
 
148 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 detached squadron, now rapidly coming up in a concentric 
 attack on the retreating right wing of the enemy, and then 
 follow on into the Long Valley, towards the supposed maga- 
 zine at the Pavilion. What did happen, however, was this : 
 After a few minutes' dismounted fire, the main body of the 
 regiment mounted, and tried to charge Chestnut Copse, but 
 only about a squadron found sufficient room, the others be- 
 ing crow T ded out towards the stream and a good deal delayed ; 
 but the one squadron which did charge forgot again to send 
 out ground scouts, and had to pull up on the edge of the 
 steeplechase cutting under a crush ing tire at 100 yards range 
 and cross it singly as best they could; they must have been 
 utterly annihilated. The detached squadron, having missed 
 halt a dozen chances of mopping up the infantry of the right 
 wing, and having allowed them to get into a reasonable posi- 
 tion, eventually decided to cluu-gr, ;md. having not more than 
 300 yards of open to cross, would probably have succeeded 
 very well, as they had only some 80 rifles to face, for* the re- 
 mainder could not be brought to bear on them, and just as 
 they had halted, the two squadrons of the center which had 
 been delayed also charged into the m&e'e. The cavalry 
 would have succeeded beyond a doubt, but at least a whole 
 squadron would have been sacrificed, and this was also the 
 chief umpire's view. However, the day was not over yet. 
 There yet remained the right wing of the infantry and the 
 battery to beat, and the officer commanding the detachment 
 received orders to go on with three squadrons and do the 
 best he could. The problem was a very difficult one, for the 
 enemy held a very strong position on Jubilee Hill, and appar- 
 ently there was not a scrap of cover for the cavalry across 
 the whole of the valley. But looking forward where they 
 were drawn up, one could see that the shoulder of the hill 
 projected beyond their alignment on their right, and if this 
 could be gained the last four hundred yards of the advance 
 would be made in a dead angle, but to gain it the whole of 
 the Long Valley had to be crossed. 
 
 The horse battery, which had meanwhile trotted up, 
 came into action on the neck of Long Hill between Chestnut 
 Copse and Cocked Hat Wood, and the regiment moved off to 
 the left under cover of the ridge. Presently they emerged 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 149 
 
 from behind the wood in column of troops, and, galloping, 
 wheeled into line and advanced a short distance, then 
 wheeled into half-column to gain the shelter of the above- 
 mentioned shoulder, then into line again and delivered their 
 charge, i rode in the rear rank for the last half-mile, and 
 uoted that the guns could not see us at all, and we could only 
 see a few of the white helmets of the infantry, till we came 
 over the brow not 150 yards away from them. It was the 
 sort of charge that cannot be decided about in peace; it might 
 or might not have succeeded. In the first place, it would be 
 exceedingly likely that, under the strain of the artillery fire 
 on their front, the appearance of the cavalry from behind 
 Cocked Hat Wood might have passed unnoticed, and, at any 
 rate, the guns could not have changed front right back with 
 sufficient rapidity, and whether the infantry saw them or not, 
 the flank movement across the valley was made at too long 
 a range and they moved too fast for fire to have had much 
 effect. Further, the infantry were by supposition part of a 
 beaten force, and had just seen half a battalion of their own 
 side wiped out, and, finally, the infantry actually were so 
 flurried that they forgot to put down their sights, all of which 
 points were brought out by the umpires in their reports to 
 Sir Evelyn. 
 
 But nothing throughout the day struck me more than 
 the improvement in the umpiring, and particularly the fair- 
 ness and thoroughness of the chief umpire (Sir Evelyn). As 
 an instance, I would quote what occurred at the charge of 
 the left squadron on the infantry outside of Chestnut Copse. 
 When Sir Evelyn arrived, two companies of infantry were on 
 the edge of the ridge, again st which the cavalry had advanced 
 one squadron only; the other two were still crossing the 
 stream in the hollow. The infantry claimed to have out- 
 numbered the cavalry, but Sir Evelyn pointed out that, in 
 the first place, one company was not facing the direction from 
 which the cavalry had come at all, and, in the second, that 
 he had himself noted the company doubling up the slope of 
 the hill at the instant the cavalry halted. Then he turned 
 to the other company, and asked how many rounds they had 
 fired, and they promptly answered "Five.'- However, he 
 proceeded to cross-examine them, and called attention to the 
 
150 M Hilary Letters and Essays. 
 
 empty cartridge rases at their feet, and brought ilie figure 
 down to two. As the company was about GO strong, this 
 gave about 120 bullets delivered, and he cannot be consid- 
 ered as over-biased in favor of the cavalry, for he assigned 
 them a loss of 20 horses, which would be remarkably good 
 shooting for broken troops on the bat t le Held. Ten years 
 ago the cavalry would have been put out of action on the spot 
 without a moment's hesitation, and they have good reason 
 to be thankful for the progress thus far made; but 1 lie harm 
 done then is still very evident, for half the officers are perma- 
 nently "funked"bythe umpires. and thus a half-hearted. daw- 
 dling style of work results, which, by leaving the troops 63 
 posed to lire ten times longer than is necessary, would lead 
 to far heavier losses in the long run. < >nly a few days before, 
 with another regiment at a similar day, we had an instance 
 of this. An outpost screen had also to be broken through, 
 and this time the line was so weak in itself, and so badly 
 taken up, that the whole regiment might have dashed through 
 some copses without incurring the lire of more than a doxen 
 rilles, and that only momentarily as they moved from cover 
 to cover. Instead of doing so. whole squadrons were dis- 
 mounted to skirmish with them, and ample time thus af- 
 forded to the enemy to bring up his supporters, which, how- 
 ever, he neglected to do. 
 
 Really to appreciate all that has been done, it is neces- 
 sary to recall the state of things that existed some seven or 
 eight years ago; and I have one recollection by me that as 
 yet I have never put on paper, h was the occasion of a 
 grand rehearsal for a prince, of a divisional day. A north- 
 ern army, represented by the whole of the division, was to 
 attack a skeleton enemy furnished by the Royal Engineers, 
 the depot battery. Royal Horse Artillery, and a squadron of 
 the 4th Dragoon Guards, who \\ere to take up a position 
 across the spurs of Tatar's Cam]) from the Pavilion to Out- 
 ridden Copse, an annex of Chestnut Copse, so often men- 
 tioned above. Things were already so far improved that the 
 exact position to be taken up was left to the enemy. 
 and had to be reconnoitered and fixed by the cavalry 
 first; and the skeletons made clever use of the slight 
 latitude allowed them, and took up their ground remarkably 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 151 
 
 skillfully, not a man being visible from the front. But even 
 before the day began, treachery of a very base description 
 was at work. A class of Army Signallers, who had nothing 
 to do with the operations, took up their stand on Hungry 
 Hill, from whence they could see into our position in reverse, 
 and began signalling all our detail arrangements over our 
 heads to confederates in the attacking force. But they had 
 reckoned without their hosts. A sergeant of the telegraph 
 troop, happening to look that way, read some of their mes- 
 Bages, and reported them to one of his officers, who, taking 
 with him some half-dozen of his mounted men, stalked the 
 party most skillfully, and made them all prisoners, and, tak- 
 ing their Hags, signalled on his own account that we had en- 
 tirely changed our front. This somewhat flabbergasted the 
 enemy, and the cavalry really had to clear up the matter 
 themselves. For this purpose the whole cavalry brigade 
 left the shelter of the copses near the club-house, and trotted 
 ii]) in line of quarter-column of squadrons at close interval, 
 with half a dozen fighting patrols out on their front and 
 flank, but not more than 100 yards distant from their main 
 body. In this order they trotted slowly towards us, and 
 halted not 500 yards from our line, of which they could see 
 nothing a1 all. Meanwhile our squadron of 4th Dragoon 
 <!uards on our left had been stalking them most skillfully 
 down a hollow, and had arrived well on their flank, and then 
 wheeling into line 1 , charged straight at them, catching them at 
 the halt. The brigadier rode up to the squadron leader per- 
 fectly furious, andasked him, so the story went, what thedevil 
 he meant by charging him at the halt. To which the officer re- 
 plied by reminding him that only a few days before the gen- 
 eral had quoted Frederick the (treat's remark that "any 
 officer who allowed himself to be attacked at the halt should 
 be immediately cashiered." This so annoyed the general 
 that he sounded "troops about," and trotted back with his 
 whole command to where he came from. A long interval 
 now ensued, during which the staff, we were afterwards told, 
 endeavored to induce him to go back and try again. At 
 length they succeeded in mollifying him, and the brigade 
 again appeared, this time with their flank a little better pro- 
 tected. P. ut again, when they reached the same spot, they 
 
152 Military Lettei s and Essays. 
 
 halted, and for some never explained reason the regiments 
 wheeled to their right, and began to proceed at a walk along 
 our front, and as they did so, we opened tire on them at bare- 
 ly 400 yards range. This was too much for them, and they 
 broke into a trpt, and then into a gallop, pursued by volley 
 after volley. As they crossed the Long Valley, a squadron 
 of mounted drivers of the Royal Engineers troops issued out 
 on their flank, and pursued them with yells of derision over 
 Long Hill and out of sight. What became of tlieiu after- 
 wards we never knew. 
 
 As for the rest of the day, there was nothing particularly 
 remarkable about it, and need not be dwelt on further, my 
 only object being to afford some standard by which to judge 
 the progress the cavalry have made. Much, very much, yet re- 
 mains to be done, but at present there is no reason to fear 
 that things can ever relapse into their former condition. < >ur 
 system is yet far from perfect, but, in spite of its faults, it is 
 working in the right direction, and if once we could get down 
 to the root of the matter, and by the adoption of the company 
 and squadron system train our young officers more as practi- 
 cal men than as mere theoreticians, our progress would be 
 ten times more rapid. Such as it is, however, we owe it to- 
 book teaching, and cannot therefore be surprised if our prog- 
 ress is slow, but once let practice and theory go hand in 
 hand, and the strides we should make would, I firmly believe, 
 render us soon a match for the best troops in the world, for, 
 I repeat it again, our raw material, whether for men or offi- 
 cers, is superior in innate quickness and intelligence for war 
 to any in Europe. 
 
 For fear, however, lest we should grow too confident 
 from the above comparison, I will add first one incident to 
 show what a Prussian crack regiment can yet do, and one, I 
 fancy, it will be hard to beat. Two French officers of cav- 
 alry went over to Germany to see how things were looking, 
 and were sent down to the 1.3th Uhlans, then commanded by 
 Von Rosenberg, the most perfect horseman and horsemaster 
 in the army, to have their eyes opened. They were taken 
 dow r n to a bridge leading over a railway which here crossed 
 the plain. To the south of them and some 000 yards distant 
 lay a dense pine wood. To the north a skeleton enemy was 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 153 
 
 seen approaching. A couple of scouts stood on or near the 
 railway, which here ran on an embankment enclosed by two 
 fair post-and-rails, the drop to the northward being much the 
 most considerable, about 30 feet. The scouts signalled the 
 approach of the enemy, and suddenly out of the wood 
 emerged Von Rosenberg with a couple of his squadrons, can- 
 tered across the intervening space, jumped the first post-and- 
 rails, clambered up on the embankment, slithered (excuse 
 the expression) down the other side and took the second 
 obstacle, and then, after a moment's check to steady his men, 
 delivered his charge within 250 yards of the last-mentioned 
 fence. And the Frenchmen rode home. sadder and wiser 
 men. I once saw the King's Dragoon Guards cross a cut- 
 ting of the Grand Trunk Road near Lawrencepore station 
 under almost equally difficult conditions, but I should like 
 to see a few more such instances before I become too cock-a- 
 hoop, and I confess the 19th Hussars have rather inclined 
 me that way. 
 
 VOLUNTEER FIELD DAY AT ALDEE8HOT. 
 
 A combined field day of Regulars and Volunteers took 
 place in the Long Valley on Wednesday last. The total 
 number of men on parade must have been nearly 12,000 rifles, 
 800 sabers, and 9 batteries, and for these the ground was all 
 too small, so that numerous apparent mistakes may be 
 written off at once, as not due to the fault of any one in par- 
 ticular. There was no particular strategic idea. The de- 
 fenders occupied the line of Long Hill, Bourley, with strong 
 advanced posts and artillery, and had prepared behind i. e., 
 to the westward a strong entrenched position on the slope 
 of Tweedledee and Tweedledum, the left flank resting on the 
 North Horns, and against them the assailants advanced con- 
 centrically, the bulk of their forces in the center and right. 
 
 When I reached the ground, I found the fight in progress. 
 On the slopes south of the Pavilion, the attacking artillery 
 was in action; and their first line of infantry had reached 
 the crest of Eolmoor plateau, overlooking the Long Valley 
 and extending in a semicircle along the edge of the broken 
 ground as far as Miles Hill. The atmospheric conditions 
 were very singular, not foggy, but a singular haze made the 
 
154 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 movement of troops, especially those in gray or red, almost 
 invisible at a distance of a few hundred yards, and hence I 
 can only speak, of what happened within a narrow limit 
 around me. As 1 rode up to the lighting line, which was 
 pretty dense, about a man to 'the pace, they were exchanging 
 volleys with the defenders in Cocked Hat Wood and on Long 
 Hill. The fire was fairly controlled, and the volleys fell 
 fairly round range. Inn not direction, being given by the 
 officers. The actual distance to ihe enemy was only 400 
 yards, but the order was, as far down the line as 1 conld hear, 
 invariably "at 800 yards." etc., but as the men did not adjust 
 their sights, probably this would not have signified; yet a 
 very simple rule exists for ascertaining the range at this dis- 
 tance approximately viz., that at 400 yards the fore sight 
 of the Martini 1 1 (Miry, when looked at from the shoulder, ex- 
 actly covers Ihe height of an average man. but no one ap- 
 peared aware of it. The supports were moving up in ex- 
 tended files, though out of sight of the enemy, and presently 
 halted and knelt down about :00 yards in rear. I may men 
 tion that the plateau falls eastward, away from the enemy, 
 just about parallel with the trajectory of the rifle at this 
 range, and consequently would have been swept by a hail of 
 shot against which nothing could live in actual practice, yet 
 there was excellent rover for all within the limit of my sight 
 not 1.50 yards further f o the rear. Further back on my way 
 ii]) T had seen the woods about the Pavilion crammed with 
 reserves, and further to the right I could see the white hel- 
 mets, but not the bodies, of a whole* regiment enfilading the 
 position of the defenders, who showed a reckless courage in 
 exposing them selves to our fire. "Presently, to save ammuni- 
 tion probably, the firing on our side ceased, while the guns 
 away on the high ground to the south continued their work 
 of preparation. The fighting line about where I stood was 
 entirely composed of Volunteers, and these lay and lolled 
 about on the ground without any semblance of discipline 
 whatever; most of them laid their rifles on the ground, and, 
 with their backs turned to the enemy, refreshed themselves, 
 mostly with unwholesome-looking apples. 
 
 At length, after a weary wait, during which I was every 
 minute getting more and more disgusted with our much- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 155 
 
 vaunted citizen soldiery, the advance was ordered, and the 
 whole line rose and moved down into the valley, followed by 
 .supports and a second line, which was also in extended order 
 of some kind. Thanks to the conformation of the ground, 
 about 200 yards further would have carried them into a dead 
 angle, in which they could have collected in numbers and 
 then rushed the opposite hill but instead, on reaching the 
 foot of the slope, they commenced an advance by rushes, fir- 
 ing again; and then ensued a scene of disorder worse than 
 anything I have ever witnessed. Notwithstanding that the 
 enemy had already given up their position, the men fired all 
 they could, 1 am bound to admit, in an approach to volleys 
 the idea was evidently there, but the execution lacked finish. 
 The small echelons rushing forward lost their direction, and 
 the rear fired into them, the machine-guns dragged by men 
 seriously hampered and delayed the movement, causing the 
 line to assume a still more irregular appearance, and the fol- 
 lowing line assumed the most extraordinary shapes, so that 
 at length the whole looked like two flattened-out W's, touch- 
 ing each other at the apices, with supports dotted in between. 
 Two companies immediately at my feet, in second line, 
 wheeled up, and threw themselves into a shallow nullah,, 
 facing so that, had they fired, they would have enfiladed both 
 first and second line for about 800 yards; fortunately, they 
 did not put in the last touch, by actually doing so. All this, 
 of course, took time perhaps ten minutes in place of two, all 
 that was necessary which, however, as no enemy w r as in 
 sight, was not of much consequence. At length they 
 reached the crest of the hill and the further edges of the ad- 
 jacent copses, and brought a heavy fire on the defenders be- 
 yond, and again an interval occurred. I then rode over to 
 the defenders, whom I found in an entrenched position, the 
 entrenchments being indicated by screens. An obstacle in 
 the shape of a stream with dense clumps of gorse on either 
 side defended the front, and this was swept by the fire of two, 
 and in some cases even three, indicated tiers of trenches, 
 which for the most part were exceedingly badly placed, so 
 that the men iu the rearmost ones must have infallibly blown 
 off the heads of the defenders of the front ones. Generally 
 speaking, the way in which troops, even Regulars, fired over 
 
l">r, Military Letters, and Essays. 
 
 each other's heads was something appalling to witness. It is 
 admittedly bad enough to have shells flying 10 feet over one, 
 though the chance of a premature burst is not 1 in 500, 
 but the thought of thousands of jumpy infantrymen pulling 
 their triggers behind one's back is one to make even the bold- 
 est tremble. It must also be pointed out that to place tiers 
 of trenches one behind the other and only a few feet verti- 
 cally above one another is to offer the opposing artillery 
 the best possible kind of target, one, in fan, that they can't 
 miss this whether ordinary or smokeless powder is used; 
 but with the latter, even if the 'trenches can be sufficiently 
 separated to prevent one acting as t lie stop-butt for the shells 
 meant for the other. The responsibility of placing troops 
 in the advanced one would be almost too great for pranical 
 men to contemplate, for with every movement behind them 
 clearly seen, it would be impossible to support or relieve 
 them, still more so to evacuate them during daylight. But 
 their employment (i. e., of their trenches) is bad in any case. 
 for there is no one denned line on which to concentrate re- 
 sistance, and when the assault comes on the men fall back 
 on the next, overrunning its defenders and masking their 
 fire and frequently carrying them all a\vay in panic confu- 
 sion. As will be seen, we had an instance of this sort of 
 thing this very day, even though no bullets were flying. 
 
 Meanwhile the second line had closed under cover of 
 Long Hill on the first, and presumably the gunners were snj> 
 posed to be at work, but I could see only one battery in action 
 on the right flank of the attacking force, from whence, too. a 
 battalion of Highlanders were advancing, taking every rea- 
 sonable advantage of cover, but they would probably have 
 been suffering unendurably from the long-range volleys; 
 their supporting line was firing over their heads. At last 
 the signal for the assault was given, and the second line came 
 over the brow of Long Hill and through the copses, leaving 
 the first, w r ho had originally captured the advance position 
 lying down, and in this there was nothing to criticise; the 
 assaulting troops have done their duty when they have 
 reached the further limit of the position they have captured, 
 and all operations beyond should be intrusted to fresh bodies. 
 The fresh line came on two deep in a tolerably dense line; 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 157 
 
 whether it was meant to be "line," or w r as merely a crowded 
 extending formation, was not quite evident. They had 
 about 450 yards to cross, and covered the first 150 at the ordi- 
 nary quick time; then they broke into a double, and then 
 rushed forward as hard as they could go, the fastest run- 
 ners coming to the front. When they reached the obstacle 
 which covered the position, portions halted and opened fire, 
 but the bulk had instinctively closed in towards the few prac- 
 ticable passages, and continued to race up hill, tailing off 
 more and more as the pace began to tell, but no following 
 line appeared to back them up, and the gunners, who ought 
 to have supported this extreme effort with every available 
 gun at case-shot range, and for whose action Long Hill of- 
 fered a splendid position, were conspicuous only by their ab- 
 sence. The Highlanders, too, dashed forw r ard on the flank, 
 and the defenders were well nigh surrounded. For a few 
 minutes a terrific fire raged all round, and the smoke out- 
 shrouded everything, and then the '"cease fire" sounded. 
 
 The assault might or might not have succeeded. All 
 depended on the extent and thoroughness of the artillery 
 preparation, but of this it was impossible to form an opinion, 
 because the insufficiency of the number of blank rounds 
 allowed them did not admit of their fire being .indicated, and 
 owing to the absence of the smoke-clouds this fire would have 
 created, and to the curious haze already mentioned, it was 
 impossible to say whether they were or were not in action 
 at the time. But if it had succeeded, it would have been in 
 spite of, and not in consequence of, the superior leading. 
 Brave men may achieve the impossible, but only at the cost 
 of heavy losses, and it is the special purpose of the mechan- 
 ism of attack, which is something totally different to any nor- 
 mal attack formation, to render success with a minimum of 
 sacrifice possible; but of a true comprehension of this mech- 
 anism there was no trace apparent 
 
 The scheme altogether appeared too ambitious and too 
 wide-reaching, the sort of thing that when you know before- 
 hand exactly what force you have opposing you, may be ven- 
 tured on, but which not even the most reckless leader would 
 dare to attempt with the class of information generally ob- 
 tainable in actual war; and seeing what sacrifices to reality 
 
158 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the limitations of time and space entailed, it seems to me 
 that the opportunity could have been utilized to more instruc- 
 tional advantage for the Volunteers than was actually the 
 case, by limiting the programme to a direct frontal attack of 
 a division acting between others in the line of battle, and 
 therefore precluded from extending its front. You do not in 
 war know beforehand deiinitely that, yon will be acting on 
 the offensive, and the enemy defending; you may both star! 
 with the same intention, and even the existence of an en- 
 trenched line, which might have been signalled from the cap- 
 tive balloon which was conspicuous above the heads of tin- 
 assailants throughout the day, would not have been quite 
 evidence enough to justify the assumpt ion t hat i he adversary 
 had definitely renounced his intention of attacking. As ii 
 was, the position when both sides faced each other across 
 the Long Valley was equally advantageous to the offensive 
 of both, and a dashing charge of cavalry, for which t here was 
 ample opportunity at the lime when, as above described, the 
 advancing force was in such confusion, would have been a 
 fitting prelude to an advance of the whole of their force, and 
 would probably have resulted in the assailants' army being 
 cut in two, for they ultimately held a line L'.oOO yards in ex- 
 tent with a force which could hardly have exceeded s.ooo 
 rifles, barely enough for a decisive assault on about half of it. 
 Not with standing the limitations of space for act ual tight- 
 ing, the ground offered almost ideal conditions for an in- 
 fantry offensive, and the numbers available being considera- 
 bly in excess of what one usually has to deal with at Alder 
 shot, was an additional reason for giving the staff an oppor- 
 tunity of handling them in what is the most dillicult manner. 
 thus teaching them how to meet these difficulties, instead of 
 setting them an easier task by allowing them to ignore 1 hem. 
 Leaving the artillery to act as best they could from the high 
 ground to southward on the spurs of Hungry Hill, the in- 
 fantry might have been formed on the parade of the South 
 Camp and its roads, two brigades side by side and the third 
 in reserve. The cavalry having established the fact that 1 1n- 
 enemy held Long Hill, the leading battalions should rapidly 
 have advanced and occupied the further edges of the copse> 
 east of Eelnioor plateau and prepared them for defence in 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 159 
 
 view of possible eventualties. Here they might have re- 
 mained for the duration of the artillery duel and preparation, 
 hidden from sight, but secure that, if the result of the artil- 
 lery duel fell out against them, no body of troops could hope 
 to face their fire down the slope of the plateau dipping 
 towards them at point-blank range, without preparation by 
 artillery, and for this the ground offered no facility. As the 
 moment for the attack- approached, picked skirmishers at 1- 
 paces interval, more in the nature of ground scouts with 
 officers from the leading companies, might have worked their 
 way up the slope to the edge of the plateau and marked the 
 best alignment. Then, when the signal to advance came, the 
 leading companies, crossing the marshy hollow at the foot of 
 the copses as best they could, should have front formed at 
 the halt and then advanced in close-order line with the utmost 
 possible discipline, only extending to open files, and dashing 
 forward with a rush to the selected position, as they came 
 in sight of the enemy. Actually even the supports moved 
 extended up this slope, though not a man of them could be 
 seen from the front, and this extended order used on such 
 an occasion only shows how utterly its true raison d'etre is 
 misunderstood. 
 
 Within 400 yards of one another no troops with modern 
 arms can exist stationary for five minutes ; therefore, as the 
 first line opened fire, a second should have been leaving the 
 copses in support, advancing likewise in close order with ex- 
 treme discipline, but not extending at all, as they would not 
 be required to fire. Their arrival within 50 yards of the 
 first line should have been the signal for the former to dash 
 forward at full speed to gain the dead angle of Long Hill, 
 and under the circumstances of the ground, the second line 
 might have followed at the double, both lines leaving their 
 machine-guns on the ridges to fire over tlreir heads, and a 
 couple of batteries should have galloped up to support them, 
 more for the moral effect than anything else, whilst the iv- 
 mainder kept up their shrapnel fire to the last moment possi- 
 ble. In the dead angle so often referred to, the assaulting 
 troops could have rested and regained their wind, whilst the 
 third followed up towards the position they evacuated, and 
 then, if the ensuing rush of the first and second failed, and. 
 
1 W Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 as in that case they should have been, they wen- charged 
 by cavalry, they would have been in a posit ion to receive both 
 them and the cavalry. It', as actually happened, the enemy 
 evacuated the position, the following lines should have 
 moved up, every available battery galloped up, and the at- 
 tack been ultimately delivered by as many successive lines 
 as there were available. Such an attack would have thor- 
 oughly met the conditions of the case, and would have given 
 every one engaged in it, from the highest to lowest, an idea of 
 what the difficulties of handling troops act ualh are.even with- 
 out the bullets flying, and no man engaged in it but would 
 have left the ground with a conviction of the absolute neces- 
 sity for the maintenance of order, and the certainty that in 
 close order only is such maintenance possible in rear of tin- 
 actual fighting line. 
 
 The march-past \\hidi followed calls for but little re- 
 mark. The cavalry and Royal Horse Artillery looked as they 
 always do on these occasions, as long as. at any rale, t In- 
 former confine their pacetoa walk. The 4th Dragoon* luanls, 
 who have only recent ly joined at t he camp. are a part icularly 
 fine-looking set of men. \ have known then now for several 
 years, but never saw them better, and, as far as can be judged, 
 when going by in squadrons the horses are excellent, only I 
 will reserve niy final opinion on this head till I have seen 
 them rank-past. In spite. of the undeniable hard work and 
 exposure entailed by last week's cavalry campaign down 
 about Woolmer, during which the weather was very unfavor- 
 able, none of the horses throughout looked any 1he worse. 
 and indeed for the most part were act ually in better fighting 
 condition than in their usual state of over-fatness. Tin- 
 mounted infantry were unfortunate enough to give their 
 opponents an occasion for laughter: the iirst two companies 
 went by very creditably, but in front of the third an officer's 
 horse turned restive, and the troop-horses immediately fol- 
 lowing him became unsteady, finally the whole of the center 
 halted, and their riders, without spurs apparently, could not 
 induce them to move forward, so that the wings swung for- 
 ward crescent-wise, and for a few moments the disorder was 
 disgraceful, and the whole column in rear threatened to be 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 161 
 
 checked. Fortunately, the animals yielded to a certain 
 amount of bad language, and resumed their progress before 
 the check had run back to the saluting base. 
 
 Of the infantry all one can say is that they were evi- 
 dently doing their best. In the old days it may have been 
 possible to drill men to go by like a wall at the shoulder, but 
 woll carried back; but the task is beyond the ptfwer of our 
 ivrruit battalions in England, and their evident straining to 
 succeed only increased the painful impression of the whole. 
 The moment, however, they came to the slope, their appear- 
 ance changed wonderfully; they recovered the normal bal- 
 ance of men in motion and swung along keeping better dress- 
 ing than they actually had done on the passing line, in spite 
 of their painstaking efforts and niggling short steps. The 
 shoulder both in the "long" and "short" manual exercise 
 should be abolished, and the men allowed to march-past at 
 the slope instead ; they would then be fit to compare with any 
 troops in Europe in this respect, which at present they cer- 
 tainly are not. 
 
 The Volunteers did not make on me such a favorable im- 
 pression as at Wimbledon; the truth is, they had been out 
 under arms a little too long, and though physically the work 
 had been light, they could no longer keep their attention 
 fixed on the matter in hand. They tried,too, one could see 
 that, but they did not all try together, and many of the 
 faces looked quite dazed, and mentally weary. In physique 
 many of the companies were tall, and one or two remarkably 
 well set up, but as a body they were conspicuously hollow- 
 chested, and, man for man, the "puny weaklings," as the 
 papers delight in calling our Regular battalions, would have 
 knocked their heads off in a service of fist encounters with 
 perf ect ease ; the Regular recruit may not be the ideal type 
 of manhood when you first get him, but a few months of phys- 
 ical drill and gymnasium do wonders for him. Whilst on 
 this topic, I may call attention to the far too exalted ideas of 
 the physical development of our race at the age at which we 
 take our recruits, that many people appear to hold. , Sand- 
 hurst cadets, chosen from the pick of the upper middle class, 
 ought to be a fair type of our best, yot, turning to the aver- 
 
162 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 age measurements of their seiiior division, given in last 
 month's number of the Royal Military College Magazine, I 
 find all they can boast of in average age 18 years 11.71 
 months; height, 5 feet 8 inches; weight, 10 stone; chest, 
 346-8 inches; forearm, 10 inches; upper arm, 11^ inches. 
 If, after several months' gymnastics and training of all kinds, 
 the pick of the country cannot do better than that, how can 
 we expect a higher average of chest measurement and 
 weight, the only two factors that really signify, from the 
 classes from which our recruits as a body are mostly taken? 
 Whilst writing the above, the August number of the 
 Journal of the United Service Institution has just corne to 
 hand, and I find in it two excellent articles: one by Capt. 
 Grierson on the German maneuvers, the other a pre'cis of the 
 last published opinions of Bronsart von Schellendorf on the 
 modern infantry combat, which latter is of altogether excep- 
 tional interest on account of the part its author has had in 
 the evolution of the new German infantry regulations, and 
 his consistent opposition to the extreme school of extended- 
 order fanatics.' Briefly, liis views may be summed up as ex- 
 tended order in the fighting line, not to reduce but to inflict 
 loss, and rigid discipline, and close order in the rear and no 
 normal attack formation at any price. A s soon as I obtain a 
 copy of the original I hope to send a more det ailed account. 
 
 FIELD DAY AT ALDERSHOT. 
 
 In order to have as fresh an impression as possible on 
 my mind of the present state of efficiency of our troops at 
 Aldershot, to guide me in making comparisons with the 
 French and German ones I am just starting to see, I attended 
 a big field day of opposing forces held last week on the ground 
 behind the Staff College between the Windsor ride on the 
 north and the Bagshot Black water road to the south. Every 
 Sandhurst cadet, still more every Staff College eleve^h&s had 
 to survey this tract of ground, so I need waste but few words 
 on description. Briefly, the plateau of the Bagshot sands 
 runs north and south from about the Jolly Farmer, and throws 
 off two broad, flat-topped spurs to the westward, between 
 which flow the two arms of the Wish, which, within the area 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 163 
 
 under consideration, are separated by a projecting tongue 
 of land, with very steep sides, known as Saddleback Ridge. 
 To the east the ground is densely wooded, and to the west 
 it is covered with heather and patches of fir scrub, whilst 
 the main arm of the Wish i. e., the most northerly is 
 fringed with birch, beech, and osiers of about ten years' 
 growth. The heather is full of holes, and the conditions 
 generally most unfavorable for mounted troops or infantry 
 in close-order formation. The attacking force, supposed to 
 have been detached from the main body of an army moving 
 on London, consisted of 2 cavalry regiments, 1 horse and 3 
 field batteries, and 2 brigades of infantry, one of 3 and the 
 other of 4 battalions. The defenders had 1 regiment of cav- 
 alry, 1 mounted infantry regiment, 1 horse and 3 field bat- 
 teries, and 44 battalions of infantry in 2 brigades. Their 
 orders were not to "precipitate an engagement, but if at- 
 tacked to fall back, as slowly as possible consistently with 
 safety, making your final stand on the danger flag-staff hill, 
 R. M. C. rifles range, where supports will reach you at 
 12:15 p.m." 
 
 The outposts were being driven in as I arrived on the 
 ground from the southward, and reaching the edge of the 
 plateau looking northward I saw the white helmets of the 
 enemy's infantry lining the edge of the slopes south of the 
 Windsor ride, with their batteries apparently dispersed 
 along the whole front, and only a few yards in rear of their 
 infantry. 
 
 Four batteries on the attacking side were already in 
 action, at 1,600 yards, and at that distance should have exter- 
 minated their dispersed opponent in half an hour. On my 
 right several battalions could be seen and heard moving down 
 Through the w r oods to the eastward ; in front of the artillery, 
 a single battalion with a small detachment, a weak company, 
 a little in advance and to the flank, perhaps 100 yards away 
 from its main body, was moving obliquely up the reverse 
 slope of Saddleback Hill, and further away to the left, the 
 Hussars of the defenders were skirmishing with our Dra- 
 goons, who showed a considerable want of enterprise and go, 
 for the Hussars were south of Saddleback Hill and could see 
 
164 military Letters and Essays. 
 
 all that was going on under its cover, and presently took a 
 sharp advantage of it, bringing a troop up, under cover, 10 
 the extreme westerly point of the ridge, and charging down 
 on the battalion and detachment already referred to. The 
 cavalry had not 100 yards to cover, and only received the 
 infantry tire in the act of pulling up. No very great result 
 could have been expected, but its effect must have seriously 
 shaken the contidence of the infantry, who, in view of the 
 proximity of their own cavalry in overwhelming force, had a 
 right almost to assume themselves secure from such annoy- 
 ance. This episode led to a short halt, whilst the umpires 
 came to a decision which was favorable to the Hussars, and 
 then the latter, free again to act. swung round the hill, and 
 charged right down upon the ilank and rear of another party 
 o.f infantry belonging to the advance guard, which had just 
 opened fire on the bulk of the Hussar regiment, who were 
 retiring across their front before t he advance of our cavalry 
 brigade, who had at last been stung into action. The 
 whole scene was for a moment very confused and hard to un- 
 ravel, but it is so instructive an instance of how luck favors 
 boldness, and want of enterprise is punished, that I cannot 
 help pursuing it further. The assailants' cavalry, being in 
 great superiority of charging force, viz., the Ith Dragoon 
 Guards, heavies, and the rUi Dragoon Guards, Lancers, 
 should have pushed boldly forward and driven the Hussars 
 in at the very first ; the latter w T ould then have had no oppor- 
 tunity of seeing behind Saddleback TTill, and under its cover 
 the whole force might then have been massed for the attack. 
 Their failure to do this gave the Hussars their chance, and 
 had it been real, after riding down and dispersing the in- 
 fantry they first came on, they would have wheeled up to 
 retire, and have fallen on the rear of the second body some 
 ten minutes sooner than they actually did, and in the confu- 
 sion they created the regiment itself might have trotted 
 across the front of the infantry unnoticed. As it was, the 
 halt for the umpires' decision made them too late, and the 
 regiment would have been half destroyed already before the 
 flank and rear attack took effect. 
 
 Meanwhile the Dragoons, who up to this time had been 
 justifying their origin by dismounted action, had been com- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 165 
 
 ing cm, and I am bound to admit that, considering the 
 infamous nature of the ground, their advance in line of squad- 
 ron columns was excellent, but, as is usually the case, one 
 mistake too often entails another, and they fell into a new 
 trap. Had they charged ten minutes sooner, they would have 
 had room to do so effectually, and if the Hussars had stood, 
 would have wiped them out by weight and numbers without 
 interference on the part of the infantry and artillery behind, 
 for the ridge would have hidden them from sight, and all 
 the defenders would have seen would have been the strag- 
 glers and riderless horses tailing over the hill ; but as it was, 
 when they reached the crest of the ridge the Hussars were 
 already safe behind the Wish, the wooded and boggy edges 
 of which they had promptly lined with dismounted men, who 
 poured a heavy fire into the would-be pursuers at about 250 
 yards range, whilst the^nfantry and artillery from the main 
 position, by their increased liveliness, appeared to be over- 
 whelming them with volleys and shrapnel at not more than 
 1,000 yards. Under these circumstances, nothing remained 
 but to halt and go back, and this was accordingly done. How 
 many in real warfare would have recrossed the hill it is hard 
 to say very few, I should imagine. The cavalry scrim- 
 mage over, there was time to turn one's attention to the 
 other arms, and this is about what I saw: The original ad- 
 vance guard had lined the wooded margin of the Wish, and 
 the first supporting lines were being brought up to strengthen 
 it. One of these, a red-coated battalion, advanced for some 
 distance in excellent order, considering the ground, in two- 
 deep line, and I was already congratulating myself on seeing 
 common sense applied at last, when at the critical moment, 
 and within 500 yards of the enemy, it suddenly went "fours 
 left" and proceeded across his front. What is to be hoped 
 for from commanding officers capable of such an action? To 
 my left rear, a strong battalion of the Cameronians were 
 coming up the reverse slope of the hill in excellent order in 
 quarter-column. As they approached the top they halted 
 by a sign from their leader, and by another deployed into 
 line without noise or confusion. They were thoroughly alert 
 and in hand; the deployment completed, they doubled over 
 the rid go and down to the cover of the copses below them. 
 
166 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 This was done in excellent style, and actually would not 
 have cost them a man, for I found out afterwards that the 
 artillery and infantry on the other side had overestimated 
 the range by 1,000 yards on a total of SOU. The same remark 
 applies to the advance of the artillery which now took place. 
 With considerable difficulty, but with undeniable skill, they 
 had been brought down the almost precipitous slopes of the 
 plateau on which they were first in action, and then, having 
 reestablished their order, had wheeled outwards in column 
 of subdivisions, and attacked Saddleback Hill by the two 
 roads leading to its two ends. This entailed their galloping 
 along the top of the ridge in full view of the enemy to get 
 room to come into action a risky proceeding, but one which, 
 as it happened, would have passed unpunished, for, as above 
 mentioned, the enemy were tiring far over their heads, and 
 by good luck they themselves opened tire with the correct 
 range to start with. I may add that my information as to 
 what went on on the other side was obtained by prearrange- 
 ment with a friend, and that we afterwards checked the dis- 
 tances by the 6-inch ordnance map. Two other points struck 
 me with regard to this artillery position; one was that the 
 ridge was so narrow in one place that one out of the three 
 batteries that came across could not have tired more than a 
 single round, as. even with the brake on. the guns would 
 have tumbled backwards down the reverse slope and hence 
 the importance of a (prick-firing non-recoil arrangement : 
 and the other, that, owing to the same steepness of the 
 ground, the service of ammunition would have been exceed- 
 ingly difficult, for the limbers had to halt at least 100 feet 
 vertically below the guns, and one can imagine the fatigue 
 it would have caused to the men to have 1 had to carry the am- 
 munition that height up a slope of about 1 in :">. The in- 
 fantry attack was now beginning in earnest, and T rode down 
 to the Wish to see beyond the screen of the trees which bor- 
 der it throughout. I found a scene of confusion exactly 
 similar to what one reads of as happening in the Franco- 
 German War. (Vrtainly our existing practice has the ad- 
 vantage of familiarizing our subalterns with bringing order 
 out of disorder, and after a year or so at Aldershot any one 
 of them will at least have had better opportunities of prac- 
 
Military Letters ana Essays. 167 
 
 tising this sort of thing than our grandfathers had after 
 going through the whole of the Peninsula. The advance 
 had already got within 150 yards of the enemy the whole 
 distance down to the Wish could not have exceeded 400, and 
 in places was less. The line had been heavily reinforced, 
 and, to avoid overcrowding, the sections that had been 
 squeezed out, or had found no room in the line, were lying 
 clown twenty to thirty yards behind it, and, I regret to say, 
 in more than one instance firing gayly into their own men 
 from behind. Presently, for some unexplained reason, pos- 
 sibly an umpire's order, the whole of the right wing turned 
 and bolted down the hill, and were received and halted by 
 the following line; and I saw an energetic brigadier and his 
 brigade major both racing about on foot, trying to re-estab- 
 lish order, and the advance was again renewed, and again 
 rame to a stand about 100 yards from the enemy. The con- 
 fusion then became so great that it is impossible to give a 
 detailed idea of what happened. In places the lines were 
 firing into one another at 30 yards range only. A horse bat- 
 tery of the defenders fought in line side by side with its 
 infantry, and, though certainly not more than 50 yards sep- 
 arated it from the assailants, it managed to limber up and 
 escape. 
 
 Still, though there was very much to criticise, on the 
 whole the men around me were better in hand than usual, 
 and certainly took an intelligent interest in the matter, judg- 
 ing by the remarks that I heard, the spirit of which only Kip- 
 ling could possibly reproduce. The ground throughout 
 was most unfavorable to the maintenance of order, but the 
 tendency seemed to be to preserve it as much as possible. 
 The main point that really struck one was that the picture 
 ultimately became far too like the 1870 style of warfare, 
 which, though no doubt unavoidable under the circum- 
 stances, viz., the short range of the German rifle as op- 
 posed to the French one, is exactly the opposite of what 
 we nowadays desire. With the present range of the weap- 
 ons in use, the ground was most favorable for the attack, 
 and all the work could have been done almost without expos- 
 ure at longer distances. 
 
168 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 A dashing cavalry would, as already pointed out, have 
 driven in the enemy's srouis and prevented his ascertaining 
 what was going on beyond the Saddleback, behind which 
 then, whilst the gunners tired away from the plateau to the 
 south, the bulk of the infantry could have been brought up. 
 The first line then being deployed under cover, and mov- 
 ing up to the crest of the ridge in perfect order, two deep. 
 there would have followed the fire preparation by both in- 
 fantry and artillery, and the latter being at 1,600, the for- 
 mer at 800 yards and at a little lower level, their fire could 
 have been safely combined on the same object. Ten minutes 
 of this would have seriously damped the accuracy of the 
 defenders' fire, and then, when the second line had been 
 brought up, similarly deployed, to within iM) or :>0 yards of 
 the crest where they would be entirely under cover, the first 
 would rise and rush down the slope to the stream. As a 
 rule, I do not believe in tiers of infantry fire, but in this in- 
 stance it might possibly be safely employed, and then the 
 certainty of such a fire superiority would be obtained that 
 the subsequent rush over the last BOO yards would occasion 
 but trifling loss. Even if the defender hung on desperately, 
 and beat off the first attempt, the second line would be close 
 at hand to move down in support, whilst the third took up 
 its place. And all attempts to assume the offensive on the 
 part of the defender could only result in failure against the 
 combined effect of the artillery fire, the second line and the 
 remnants still clinging to the edge of the stream. This plan 
 at least utilizes to the utmost the capability of the new 
 weapons, and exposes the minimum number of men requisite 
 for the acquisition of the necessary fire-power for the least 
 time. But to willfully throw away the gain in range and 
 accuracy, keeping a whole brigade in successive lines out in 
 the fire whilst advancing by little niggling rushes, promises 
 the maximum of loss for the minimum of effect, and in real 
 warfare would entail a funereal catastrophe of the first order. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 169 
 
 NOTES ON THE FRENCH MANEUVERS. 
 
 I feel too dazed by the mass of men and number of de- 
 tails that have come before me during the past week to do 
 more than note, before the mail goes out, a few of the most 
 salient tactical facts that have come before me, while they 
 are still fresh in my memory. I formed one of a party of 
 six British officers who met by chance at Bar sur Aube to fol- 
 low the maneuvers, and as we spread ourselves about on the 
 battle-fields and afterwards compared our impressions, we 
 managed to put together a good deal of information. At 
 the outset I will state that we were treated throughout witli 
 the greatest civility, being allowed to go pretty much where 
 we liked as soon as the police had satisfied themselves that 
 we were what we said we were, a very reasonable precaution 
 for them to take. For the first forty-eight hours we were, 
 in fact, pretty closely followed by "mouchards" of the tradi- 
 tional type, about as transparently disguised as an average 
 British plain-clothed detective in the regulation ammunition 
 boots, but when they saw we were all right, they ceased to 
 worry us, and, in fact, became quite friendly. We stood 
 them drinks, gave thorn lifts in our carriage, and exchanged 
 views on the English and French armies with great frank- 
 ness, parting eventually on most cordial terms. We missed 
 the operations of the first day, the 3d September, but were 
 present at the great fight of the 5th and Gth Corps at and 
 near Sesmont. The ground was of the usual chalk downs 
 type long, rolling, convex slopes, the crests some 2,000 
 yards apart. The way the two jinnies came in contact on 
 this day was extremely curious. The French have no divis- 
 ional cavalry, except a squadron for orderlies and scouting 
 purposes, the bulk of the cavalry being either formed in 
 divisions for two or more corps, or in brigades for corps act- 
 ing alone. The two brigades in this instance had an en- 
 counter in the early- morning on the Hanks, and afterwards 
 neutralized each other throughout the day. When, there- 
 fore, the two main bodies started to find one another, they 
 appear to have been pretty badly informed as to each other's 
 position. The question turned on which side could reach a 
 ridge, which dominated the plain for many miles round, first 
 
170 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and hold it. The Gth Corps advanced its infantry divisions 
 formed to tight anywhere, lines of company columns leading, 
 preceded by only a lew infantry ground scouts. The 5th 
 Corps sent on its artillery first to seize the ridge, and had 
 they been ten minutes earlier, their fire on the columns de- 
 scending the opposite slope would probably have been anni- 
 hilating, for their artillery was not in position to cover the 
 advance, but marching some distance in rear, and would 
 have had to conn- into action under the enemy's fire, hut 
 the 5th Corps missed its chance, and both sides reached Hie 
 buimmit of the hill simultaneously, and the artillery, caught 
 in the act of unlimbering by magazine tire at- 1.10 yards, for 
 a great part must have been totally crushed before firing a 
 shot. The following infantry, too, must have suffered most 
 severely, and now was the chance for a divisional cavalry 
 charge, but there was none present; only the support of a 
 few flankers, all that happened to be at hand, made a plucky 
 dash at the nearest battery, and were in it before the first 
 round was tired. 
 
 I take it, this <'ntr<'trnipx simply destroyed the day. 
 and that the subsequent maneuvers were only to prevent 
 the time being wasted, for on no other supposition ran 1 ac- 
 count for the manner in which the troops were now handled: 
 troops within 500 yards of the enemy made processional 
 flank marches to rectify their positions, and finally a whole 
 brigade was moved slowly acrossour front in a solid mass, and 
 not more than :,500 yards away from some sixteen batteries. 
 It was or would have been St. I 'rival over again, and the 
 movement can only have been undertaken as a piece of 
 brigade drill. 
 
 I noticed on my wax out some attempts at shelter 
 trenches of a very weak and insufficient profile, and exceed- 
 ingly badly placed as regards the ground. 
 
 T was most agreeably surprised by the steadiness af the 
 men under arms and the fire discipline; of actual smartness 
 such as one sees in (Jermany there was none, but the men 
 were undeniably in the hands of their leaders and did as 
 they were ordered, but without any show of keenness. On 
 the whole, T began to think T had formed too prejudiced an 
 opinion of their merits, but what I afterwards saw convinced 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 171 
 
 me that though, since I last saw them, very great progress 
 indeed had been made, still things were very far short of 
 what they should have been. 
 
 The next day was spent in changing quarters, and there 
 was little or no fighting, and Sunday following, there was 
 nothing to do but to saunter round and study the men and 
 horses. Of the latter 1 can only say that I was astounded. 
 The artillery teams, though not very uniform, were in all 
 cases good, and in some excellent, far better than any I have 
 seen during the last two years at Aldershot. The cavalry, 
 of which, however, I only saw some 500, but stripped for 
 watering, showed an immense improvement in shape and 
 quality, but all were uniformly wanting in condition and 
 muscle, and the artillery had fully half of their mounts suf- 
 fering from sore backs, girth and harness galls, all of which 
 showed that the science of keeping horses in condition is as 
 yet at a very low level in this army, as compared with their 
 rivals across the frontier. 
 
 .Monday, the 7th September, was the first day on which 
 the whole four corps were engaged viz., the 5th and 6th 
 under ( Jalliffet against the 7th and 8th under Davoust. Here 
 let me describe the appearance of the former. Though he 
 took part, in the Crimea, and cannot be under 60 years of 
 age. he looks all over a smart young cavalry subaltern, a 
 small dapper little man, about 5 feet 8 inches and 10 stone 
 in weight; with a bronzed complexion, and hardly a wrinkle 
 on his face. he looks as if he had indeed discovered the elixir 
 of eternal youth. A more striking man it would be hard to 
 find, and were he permitted to exercise his full influence on 
 the cavalry, they would be in a far different state to that in 
 which they actually are, though indeed, even in this arm, a 
 most extraordinary improvement is visible, not only in the 
 horses, which, as above stated, compare more than favora- 
 bly with our own, but particularly in the seat of the indi- 
 vidual men. .Owing, however, to the distinguished part he 
 took in the suppression of the rommune, he has been ham- 
 pered at every turn by the virulent hatred of the Socialists, 
 and has suffered many and bitter disappointments and hind- 
 rances in endeavoring to do his duty to his country, which 
 he serves wllolly and nndividedly, without reference to poli- 
 
17~ Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 tics. There is indeed a leader of men in Galliffet, if only he 
 is allowed the opportunity. But to return to the day, the 
 fight took place in a district curiously resembling South 
 Africa flat-topped "koppjes" and long, undulating ridges. 
 On one of these table-topped hills, in the center of the posi- 
 tion of the 7th and 8th Corps, I watched the proceedings, 
 and could take in pretty well all the doings on a front of bat- 
 tle of at least 8 miles. The latter two corps under Davoust 
 were taking up their positions on a long ridge running about 
 east and west, commanded near the center by another long, 
 scarped plateau, which here approached to within 1,800 
 yards, and then fell back about northeast, overlooking an 
 enormous undulating plain many miles in extent. As we 
 knew that Galliffet's army lay with its bulk on Davoust's 
 left and within 3 or 4 miles, our interest was intense when 
 we saw the latter withdrawing his troops from left to right. 
 Pretty soon the balloon, which was a feature in these opera- 
 tions, and for the day belonged to Galliffet, was seen to rise, 
 and presently a long line of guns opened from a most com- 
 manding position against Davousfs left, and shortly after- 
 wards heavy and sustained firing announced that what we 
 expected had come about viz.. an at tempt to crush and roll 
 up the exposed flank of the other army. Almost immediately 
 the stream of troops towards the right stopped, and began 
 to flow in the opposite direction. We saw the batteries of 
 the 8th Corps, which formed the left, take up a position fac- 
 ing west and north, and the reserves close up towards the 
 threatened point. The 1irst village was carried by the at- 
 tack, and Davoust's position became perilous in the < \ 
 treme, for he was in evident danger of being crushed in de- 
 tail and his batteries and reserves crowded together in a 
 pronounced salient and enveloped by a converging tire. 
 against which the ground offered only concealment from 
 sight, but no security from projectiles. It seemed to me 
 almost hopeless, and evidently the general officer command- 
 ing on the spot took the same view of it, for he brought up a 
 cavalry regiment and launched it out on a perfectly hopeless 
 attack against lines of artillery flanked by dense clouds of 
 skirmishers. Vionville must have been a joke to this. The 
 umpires also took the same view, and the cavalry were com- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 173 
 
 pelled to retire, wheeling up to the right by troops and then 
 changing direction to the rear, and as they came back they 
 presented a pretty ragged appearance. I was too far oft' to 
 judge in what order the actual charge was delivered. The 
 tiring now died away on this flank, and for a time there was 
 a lull in the action, but we now saw the 7th Corps on Da- 
 voust's right forming for an attack on the refused flank of 
 Galliffet's army, which held a position along the plateau 
 above mentioned as running about northeast. The gunners 
 now began to take up their positions, but there was much in- 
 decision in their deployment, and their ranges were exces- 
 sive, 4,000 yards and upwards, and far on the right we saw 
 a cavalry division maneuvering, with what object it was 
 difficult to perceive, but, in spite of the distance, a want of 
 precision was very apparent in their working. Then at last 
 the whole infantry advanced to the attack, the first line in 
 sections in extended order at about two men to three paces 
 in single rank, followed by succeeding lines all in file or 
 fours, heading towards the enemy. As far as the eye could 
 reach, the plain was covered with them, the lines being not 
 more than 100 yards npart, and the columns at about the 
 same interval. More guns came up, and with them 8 of the 
 new 12-centimeter howitzers intended for firing melinite 
 shells of about 60 pounds weight. The whole artillery now 
 began to advance to a second position, and the roar of their 
 fire became almost continuous; all together on this wing 
 theremust have been close on250gunsin action. The front to 
 be assaulted was even longer, steeper, and at least as open 
 as the celebrated glacis of St. Privat, and one could see with 
 glasses that the men were utterly done; the lines closed on 
 each other and presented an almost ideal target to the ene- 
 my, and now right in rear we saw first two solid battalion 
 columns, and behind them a whole regiment in one solid 
 square column, advancing to the assault with fixed bayonets 
 and a considerable a 1 tempt at close-order discipline and 
 style, whilst in the extreme right rear the cavalry division 
 was seen trotting up. What the result of the assault might 
 have been it is impossible to say, if the guns of the attack 
 had really overpowered those of the defence. After all, 
 though, the method adopted appeared the worst possible 
 
174 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 to insure success. Still such things have happened, but one 
 would like to know what the result of the defeat Davoust's 
 left had already suffered would have had on his army as a 
 whole. At any rate, the director general of the proceedings. 
 Saussier, sounded the "cease lire," and up to the present lias 
 published no decision, which looks as if he were of the same 
 opinion that we all held. 
 
 To me it seemed that Davoust was hopelessly out -gener- 
 al led, his left being exposed to attack by crushing numlx-i > 
 before the right could come up in line. His game evidently 
 was to withdraw it at once till the two were within support- 
 ing distance of one another, and this at first he appears, by 
 the movement from left to right alluded to above, to have 
 intended doing. But his decision, if made, was upset by 
 almost the first shot fired, and then his artillery nearest at 
 hand took up a line facing west against the attacking troops, 
 whilst apparently six batteries slated him from the north, 
 and the next section of his guns, which appeared to be the 
 corps artillery of the Sth Corps, came up against the latter 
 some half an hour later. Of course, things at a maneuver go 
 more rapidly than in actual war, but the point must be re- 
 membered in one's plan as part of the circumstances to In- 
 dealt with, and nothing can excuse a man for tight ing TWO 
 separate and distinct actions, divided from one another both 
 by time and space, against an enemy who opposes to him a 
 united front. 
 
 A few of the details of 1he fight deserve notice. At ih<- 
 close of the action Davoust's corps were divided by a gap of 
 at least 2,000 yards width; whilst the action on the left was 
 at its height, an infantry brigade was being moved from right 
 to left at our feet; six batteries of artillery appeared trot- 
 ting up on a road crossing the line of march of the infantry: 
 the leading battery commander signalled to the infantry to 
 let him pass, and the third battalion halted together with the 
 following three to do so, and he trotted through, the two first 
 battalions wandering off into a convenient gully, and we never 
 saw them again. Meanwhile, whilst the guns were passing. 
 the commanders of the two arms consulted and apparently 
 arrived at a new decision, for the infantry now wheeled up 
 to the front and marched off down into a hollow, where they 
 
Military Letters and Essays, 175 
 
 formed by degrees as a sort of escort or flank guard to the 
 gunners. Each battalion followed in succession, changing 
 direction at the point where the gunner sat first checked their 
 march, but though there was an excellent road leadingacross 
 the angle formed by the wheel, no one thought of saving the 
 men, who appeared very much distressed, by cutting across 
 and thus saving some :>()() yards of ploughed field. Also it 
 appeared that there was no pressing urgency for the guns 
 after all, for when the leading battery reached the spot on 
 which line was eventually formed, it halted in column of 
 route facing towards the enemy, who was enfilading it from 
 its left front at about 3,000 yards, and then, after some dis- 
 cussion, wheeled about and took up a position under cover, 
 from sight only, a little to the rear, where it was joined by 
 the remaining five batteries. Then again another battery 
 was moved to the front, again in column of route for a couple 
 of hundred yards, and again halted, and finally another bat- 
 tery was selected to advance, and after fully 25 minutes 
 delay the line was eventually formed, about half facing 
 north-northeast, the other half north-northwest. All com- 
 ment on this is unnecessary. 
 
 Many of the gun teams have white horses and proved 
 terribly conspicuous. As far as the artillery is concerned, 
 smokeless powder is no concealment; the flash is distinctly 
 apparent and enables one to define the position of the gun 
 with ease, even at extreme ranges. Kven at 0,000 yards, I 
 could locate the guns easily with field-glasses, and with 
 Scott's telescopic sights their exact position could have been 
 ma'de out. 
 
 The arrangements for the maneuvers rendered it im- 
 possible for (la 11 iff et to follow up his success: he had to be 
 at Vandoeuvre, some IS miles distant, on the Oth, and the 
 whole of the 8th was therefore spent in a retreat and pursuit 
 which called for some hard marching, and the passage of 
 the Aube was a very interesting movement to watch, the 
 chief point that attracted my observation being the absence 
 of divisional cavalry and the want of dash in the pursuing 
 artillery. The great battle at Vandoeuvre terminated the 
 second period of the maneuvers, but the nature of the ground 
 rendered it impossible to overlook the situation as on the 
 
176 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 7th, and I can therefore only describe what took place im- 
 mediately under my own eyes. 
 
 The two armies came into contact obliquely. Davoust 
 must evidently have intended to outflank Qalliffet'a Id i, but, 
 apparently not knowing where the left stood, he advanced 
 with a whole infantry division obliquely across his enemy's 
 front, and would have suffered most severely for the fault. I 
 may as well describe how it happened. Driving up from liar 
 towards Vandoeuvre. we were able to overlook the direction 
 the columns of the 7th Corps were taking. On reaching 
 the summit level from the valley of the Aube, we came on a 
 great rolling plain, stretching lor miles away before us. A 
 village lay about a mile in front of us, and we could see mm 
 at work entrenching t hem selves; otherwise not a sign of the 
 120,000 men about to engage was to be seen. Presently we 
 saw long columns of men and guns coming over the brow of 
 the plain away bark on our left rear i. e., about south. 
 About this time a few of Hie enemy's vedettes appeared, and 
 behind them we saw four batteries marching within a few 
 hundred yards of a position from whence they could have 
 taken the whole of the enemy's deployment under lire, but 
 the few vedettes never pressed far enough forward to really 
 see, and besides were opposed by scouts from the White ( 'ap 
 side. At any rate, nothing happened, and, as far as I could 
 see, the infantry of a whole division was forward for action 
 facing west in a hollow not 1,500 yards away from the ene- 
 my's position. This position was marked by 1he above-men- 
 tioned village on the main road, and a second one bearing a 
 little south of west from the first one, and about 1,200 yards 
 beyond it, called Niusement; a few entrenchments were 
 dotted about, of no great value, and it appeared to be held 
 only by an outpost line. About S a. m. a long line of guns 
 opened on Niusement, at least is batteries, and at the same 
 moment the infantry broke cover and began to advance 
 towards Nmsement, not towards the first village at all. I 
 went with the right flank, and expected the fire to break out 
 every moment, for we were passing within 400 yards of it. 
 Six batteries of the enemy now came into action on our right 
 front, and immediately after six moie wheeled up on our 
 left, and suddenly, when we were within say GOO yards of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 177 
 
 Niusement, we were being fired into in front, and both flanks 
 at once, and even from the rear; the flank section had 
 wheeled up to reply, and the extended-order brigade had be- 
 come almost a solid square. 
 
 No one seemed to mind very much, and as we were in 
 immense numerical superiority, no doubt we might have 
 extricated ourselves somehow, but a worse piece of rash 
 leading it has never been my lot to see. 
 
 During the remainder of the day the progress of the 
 troops called for no particular remark. I can only note the 
 general conduct of the men and of each arm. The infantry 
 were evidently much knocked up by the heat, which all the 
 week had been very great, and they had reached a pitch of 
 demoralization such as, with the exception of the Militia 
 Brigade at Aldershot, which broke up on one hot field day on 
 the Fox Hills and went to bathe in the canal this was in 
 1882 I have never seen or imagined. The men loafed slowly 
 forward, neither officers nor men taking the smallest interest 
 in the proceedings. Whilst a desperate action was raging in 
 front, I saw some non-commissioned officers of a company 
 lying down* in support, deliberately leave their arms on the 
 ground and slouch forward to the edge of a hollow to have 
 a general look round, nothing more. On the word "rise," 
 "advance," the men raised themselves up, using their rifles 
 as a crutch, and after settling their packs, crawled slowly for- 
 ward it sometimes took 20 seconds before the last man be- 
 gan to move, and yet, judging by their conduct afterwards, 
 they could not have been unduly fatigued. 
 
 The general direction of the movements left much to be 
 desired ; I saw again and again firing lines lying down on an 
 exposed slope at right angles to one another. The artillery, 
 of which the French are now particularly proud, engaged at 
 exceptional ranges and was always on the move never still 
 here and, there single batteries or groups of two were 
 noticeable, and even when the batteries stood together they 
 diverged their fire. In one case I saw a line of about twelve 
 batteries facing south with two wheeled back on its flank, 
 facing east a perfectly appalling situation. 
 
178 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 THE GERMAN AK.MV. 
 
 ' The maneuvers of the German Army during 1he past 
 few months deserve more than passing attention, since they 
 mark the culminating point of a cycle of military evolution. 
 which began with the French Revolution almost exactly a 
 century ago. That era introduced an entirely new factor 
 into European warfare namely, the conception of a nation 
 in arms, as opposed to a standing dynastic army; and, 
 though Napoleon the Great was quick to realize the increase 
 of fighting power which he thereby found placed at his dis- 
 posal, he had neither time mu- opportunity to develop this 
 idea to its logical conclusion. Indeed, judging by the evi- 
 dence of his own actions and writings, it is doubtful whether 
 he ever really grasped all its ultimate possibilities, for. by 
 disregarding the main principles on which its strength was 
 founded, he himself during the latter years of his reign was 
 the most efficient instrument in preparing the way for his 
 own downfall. 
 
 These main principles did not, however, escape 4 the in- 
 sight of the German leaders, trained 1 in the school of defeat; 
 and those would-be reformers who believe thai an army can 
 be created by the stroke of a pen, and are proportionately 
 discouraged when they find that this is not the case, may per- 
 haps derive encouragement from the fact that even in Ger- 
 many it has taken a whole century to develop and bring into 
 execution the full possibilities entailed by a single change 
 of principle, and that, too, notwithstanding that in that coun- 
 try able men have been working incessantly and with entire 
 self-abnegation to bring their ideas to fulfilment. 
 
 A short sketch of the successive steps which have 
 marked this evolution is all the more necessary here, since 
 without it it is wholly impossible to convey by a mere bald 
 enumeration of statements any idea of how excellent the 
 German Army really is, or the causes which have led to this 
 excellence. Fortunately, the ideas involved are simple and 
 may be rendered comprehensible in the simplest possible 
 language. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 1 79 
 
 Briefly stated, the French Revolution placed at the dis- 
 posal of Napoleon an army far exceeding in intelligence any 
 other one then in existence, the individuals of which fought 
 for personal motives primarily, and not by compulsion. This 
 state of things did not last long, it is true, but still long 
 enough to enable the new army to defeat under its new T leader 
 every dynastic army with which it came in contact, at any 
 rate until the year 1808. It was not Napoleon who defeated 
 Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the rest, but the armed 
 strength of the French nation led by Napoleon that de- 
 stroyed the dynastic forces of these countries respectively 
 a totally different conception. 
 
 Previous to this era, a king's power of offence was de- 
 termined primarily by the amount of money he could afford 
 to expend on the recruitment and maintenance of an army, 
 each man in which represented a certain sum of capital in- 
 vested and time spent in completing, his education. His 
 life, therefore, became an exceedingly valuable thing, to be 
 safeguarded accordingly, and hence the main desire of all 
 generals, except those of the highest order, such as Marl- 
 borough, Frederick, and Wellington, w r as to gain the object 
 of a campaign with as little bloodshed as possible, and hence 
 maneuvering as opposed to fighting became the ruling idea 
 of all strategists. 
 
 But the essence of the French Revolutionary Army was 
 that at first its supply of men appeared practically inex- 
 haustible, and Napoleon soon saw that what he could not 
 obtain in the recognized way he could effect by a perfectly 
 reckless expenditure of human life, not only in action, but 
 on the march. His method was really an application of the 
 survival of the fittest that is to say, if he wanted 30,000 
 men at a given point, he started 100,000, and was perfectly 
 satisfied even though the balance fell by the roadside. This 
 enabled him to inarch and strike with a rapidity beyond the 
 reach of his opponents, compelled to slow r movement to econ- 
 omize their forces. 
 
 Secondly, the individual intelligence and love of distinc- 
 tion of his men enabled him from the very first to adopt a 
 method of fighting by means of skirmishers and small col- 
 umns of greater universal adaptability than the system of 
 
180 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the line which was opposed to it. The closed line of the 
 Frederick and Wellington era was in itself the most perfect 
 and economical way of employing the fire-power of an army 
 to do a given work which could or can be devised, always 
 provided the conditions of the ground and the spirit which 
 animates it are favorable, and, given those conditions, it 
 would generally attain the desired object with least expendi- 
 ture of life the main point the opposing generals had to 
 consider; but, as pointed out above, the French could afford 
 to be independent on this head, and, further, the resolute 
 offensive of Napoleon's strategy gnu-rally gave the choice 
 of ground to him, and not to his opponents. 
 
 These conditions led every where, except in the Peninsula 
 and at Waterloo, to the triumph of the form of the skir- 
 misher and small column, but as the spirit of the men 
 changed during the course of the long wars, when France 
 again had to resort to the most siringeni measures of con- 
 scription (with substitutes allowed i. ami as at the same time 
 her enemies began to oppose her with men lighting for re- 
 venge and with personal hatred, the small column had togive 
 way, and Napoleon only retained his empire over the battle- 
 field by the masterly use of his artillery and cavalry, which 
 he was the first to perfect. During his last campaigns his 
 battles resolved themselves into three main acts fi>e T>repa- 
 ration by artillery at case-shot ranges. ihe massed charge of 
 cavalry, and the occupation of the conquered position by 
 dense infantry columns advancing with sloped arms. Vari- 
 ations, of course, occurred, but this was the general 
 mechanism. 
 
 But before 1his stage was reached the work of reforma- 
 tion in the Prussian Army had already begun under pres- 
 sure of an outbreak of prejudice and ignorance which most 
 seriously hampered the few men who really did understand 
 the points involved. The obvious issue lay for the moment 
 between the principles of the line and small columns w r ith 
 skirmishers. The two systems had met face to face on the 
 fields of Jena and Auerstadt, and the latter had ultimately 
 triumphed ; therefore, "Away with the old system and copy 
 the victors!" wasthe cry. Actually, the causes of defeat lay 
 far deeper, and were primarily traceable to the faults of the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 181 
 
 staff, which had entailed on the Prussians the necessity of 
 attacking locally under most unfavorable conditions of 
 ground and numbers, and, besides, the spirit of the line was 
 dead and only the form remained. Nevertheless, the line 
 had died gloriously; and because it was essentially a forma- 
 tion possible only to the most highly trained long-service 
 troops, its resurrection for the moment was impossible. The 
 reformers were all niad for individual-order formations, and 
 the polemical warfare which raged round Von Billow's tac- 
 tics as a central point almost equalled in volume and in- 
 tensity the similar discussion that has of late years been 
 waged over Captain May's tactical retrospect, and both dis- 
 cussions in the end have proved in Germany equally desti- 
 tute of permanent fruit. For the idea involved in this indi- 
 vidual order question is based on a misapprehension of 
 human nature. Undeniably individual order is the ideal 
 formation, but its universal application is only conceivable 
 in an army in which every individual is not only a hero for 
 the moment, but remains so throughout the whole duration 
 of a bloody action, during which his heroism is in a constant 
 state of flux and reflux, with a downward tendency. Scharn- 
 horst opposed the reformers with all the energy of his nature, 
 and a sentence he wrote as criticism on one of the numerous 
 projects submitted for his consideration "One should teach 
 the soldier to know how to die, and not how to avoid dying"- 
 contains in itself the whole secret of modern German train- 
 ing and the explanation of its excellence. 
 
 Line being for the moment impracticable, owing to the 
 impossibility of training the soldier adequately in the short 
 time then available, Scharnhorst struck for universal ser- 
 vice without substitutes, trusting to find in the individuals 
 of higher education and intelligence thus rendered available, 
 and in the feelings of personal hatred and revenge which the 
 French occupation had aroused, a set-off for the qualities 
 which in the French themselves had proved so effective in 
 the skirmishing line, and in this endeavor he was successful. 
 
 But his death and the termination of the war put a stop 
 to all further progress in this direction, and in every coun- 
 try, not excepting our own, things began to drift back into 
 the old pre-Bcvolutionary condition as regards the training 
 
182 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of in fan try for battle; indeed, they went bark ward, for Napo- 
 leon's latter battles having been won principally by the em- 
 ployment of artillery and cavalry, the tendency was rather 
 to exalt these arms, leaving to the infantry only the task of 
 the passive endurance of losses, for which they were pre- 
 pared by stern discipline, and neglecting to develop their 
 offensive lire-power, which implies more particularly "edu- 
 cation" as opposed to drill. The evolution of cavalry took, 
 as it happens, a false direction, but that at present 1 have no 
 space to pursue. 
 
 The tendency towards passive discipline only was fur- 
 ther influenced in all countries, except Prussia, by the exist- 
 ence of the system of paid substitutes, which by lowering 
 i lie moral average of the armies rendered a sterner code more 
 imperative. On the ot her hand, these countries retained the 
 advantage of a comparatively long period of service, seven 
 to twelve years on an average, against the three years in 
 Prussia proper. 
 
 It may easily be imagined, too. how strong a reaction 
 necessarily set in after the strain of years of warfare, bring- 
 ing with it a gradual relaxation of elVort in all grades. Men 
 had had enough of war on I he Continent, and the vast ma- 
 jority were only too anxious to take matters quietly for Un- 
 rest of their days, and the system in Prussia of distributing 
 the troops all over the country in small detachments made it 
 all the more easy for those disposed to indolence to follow 
 the bent of their inclinations. 
 
 But this much at least had been gained in Prussia, and 
 has formed a firm basis for further improvement namely, 
 universal service of all classes, which insured the presence 
 of educated men in all grades, and secured a far higher con- 
 ception of duty to the country, which all owed, than was pos- 
 sible where the ranks were only recruited from the lowest 
 strata of the people, and with this the possibility of a more 
 humane treatment of the soldier and the abolition of all de- 
 grading punishments. 
 
 Though all immediate interest was dead in the vast mass 
 of the nation, the war had brought to the front a number of 
 the most intellectual and able men in the country, and these, 
 with the memory of the great catastrophe and the unspeaka- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 183 
 
 ble humiliation the nation had endured vividly before them, 
 worked conscientiously and thoroughly to raise up a higher 
 order of leaders in time to come. They had seized the point 
 which Napoleon had missed viz., that an "armed nation" 
 implied armies of such numerical proportions that no one 
 man could lead them; and hence a delegation of responsi- 
 bility downwards had become absolutely essential, which 
 entailed the necessity of training a staff and generals capa- 
 ble of assuming these extended powers which were now to 
 devolve on them. How far they were successful in this 
 direction the events of 1806 and 1870 have since proved ; but 
 brilliant as these successes w r ere in the aggregate, if is evi- 
 dent from a close study of all information now available 
 that there were many, even amongst the superior leaders, 
 in those years who fell far below the requirements of the 
 circumstances, and it will be found that in the main it was 
 to the misconceptions of men of this type that the heavy 
 losses which now and again fell on isolated divisions and 
 brigades were primarily due far more so, indeed, than to 
 any new factor of warfare introduced by the breech-loader. 
 
 Thai it was so can scarcely excite surprise when the con- 
 dition under which these senior officers had spent their ear- 
 lier years is remembered. Life in those little garrisons on 
 the eastern frontiers or in the plains abutting on Holland 
 must have killed the intellect in hundreds of men who, under 
 other circumstances, might have 'excelled. And there is 
 little doubt that as a fact this did happen, and during the 
 decade between 1840 and 1850 things in Prussia had lapsed 
 into a very easy-going way indeed; but it was in these and 
 the previous years that the men who in 1870 had risen to 
 command battalions and regiments had served their noviti- 
 ate, and how great the influence of these first years is every 
 one knows from personal experience. 
 
 When i he accession of the old Emperor supplied the nec- 
 essary power to back Von Moltke in his work, the first task, 
 and one, too, which must have absorbed most of his energies, 
 was the completion and correction of the mobilization scheme 
 a scheme which was only perfected after the experience 
 of 186(5; and it is scarcely conceivable that he can have had 
 as much time to spare to devote to the training of the staff 
 
1 84 Military Lettei s and Essays. 
 
 as in subsequent years. At the same time it is certain from 
 the evidence of his own writing in 1804 that he was still un- 
 certain in his mind as to the influence the breech-loader was 
 about to exercise on tactics. 
 
 That this influence in I860 did take every one by sur- 
 prise is undeniable. The Prussian artillery and cavalry 
 neither proving equal to, nor, indeed, understanding, their 
 duties in combination with the infantry, the brunt of 1 1n- 
 fighting fell on the latter, and, thanks to the power of 1 1n- 
 new arm, they came out of it successfully. l>ui they exhib- 
 ited the characteristics that were to be expected from a 
 short-service army composed of very heterogeneous ele- 
 ments, insufficiently welded under the hammer of discipline. 
 and, just as the French Revolutionary armies before them 
 had done, they dissolved under ihe tire of the muzzle-loader 
 into lines of independent lighters, each striving to make the 
 most of the power of the new instrument. As at the com- 
 mencement of the century, a cry went up that this individual 
 order was a good thing in itself, and therefore to be univers- 
 ally cultivated, and, as before, the older men of the staff 
 met the outcry by pointing out that there was no absolute 
 good or bad in tactics, but that everything was relative, and 
 that, the conditions being abnormal, the results were also 
 abnormal and could not be accepted as a guide. This at 
 least appears to me to be the gist of Bronsart von Schellen- 
 dorfs well-known reply to Captain May; but none the less 
 every one was convinced that there was something still 
 amiss in the training of the infantry, and when, two years 
 later, France adopted a breech-loader far superior ballis- 
 tically to their old needle-gun, an uncomfortable feeling 
 spread through the whole army that a great change was in 
 progress, and the exaggerated accounts of this new rifle 
 which came over to them did not tend to make matters any 
 simpler. 
 
 The German general staff works slowly, but very surely, 
 and above all things avoids committing itself to any too 
 hasty interference with the initiative of its subordinates. 
 The regulations which were about to be issued on the eve of 
 the outbreak of the war show that their view of the matter 
 was still in accordance with the ideas of Von Schellendorf s 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 185 
 
 pamphlet above referred to namely, that the conditions of 
 the moment can alone decide the nature of the formation to 
 be employed; but of the principle of the "education of the 
 individual," the essence of the new system, I can discover no 
 trace whatever. Yet amongst the majority more particu- 
 larly of the senior officers, no longer in immediate contact 
 with the troops themselves, the idea ^correct enough in it- 
 self had the primary point on which its success depends been 
 attended to largely prevailed that the best plan to be pur- 
 sued was the extension of large bodies of skirmishers and 
 immediate advance to decisive range. It was to this ten- 
 dency, combined with consequences of the failure of artillery 
 and cavalry in the previous campaign, that the special physi- 
 ognomy of the early battles of 1870 was directly due. And 
 in this way: in 1866 the cavalry had been markedly deficient 
 in scouting duties, hence the infantry had learned to rely, 
 mainly on their own advance guards for information; and 
 this tendency was also partly inherited from tradition of 
 the time when fighting began at 300 to 400 yards, when in- 
 deed it was justifiable enough, but things were altogether 
 different when at 1,500 the infantry were already liable to 
 be overwhelmed by a storm of bullets, through which they 
 had to fight their way for a thousand yards before they 
 reached the range of effectiveness of their own weapons. 
 Further, having learned to fight for themselves without 
 reference to the artillery partly as a lesson from 1866, 
 partly as a consequence of the inevitable curtailment of the 
 artillery preparation in peace maneuvers the tendency 
 was to dash ahead at once, immediately on coming under fire. 
 This led again and again to the leading battalions of a col- 
 umn being shot to pieces before the advance-guard batteries 
 had had time to get the range, and then began a race against 
 time to fill up the casualties. Without any prearranged 
 idea of co-operation, each battalion as it reached the fight 
 formed up in company columns and moved into the fight, 
 and in a few moments a scene of confusion ensued which 
 even the official account of the general staff admits to have 
 been indescribable. 
 
 On the actors and spectators this state of affairs made 
 different impressions according to their higher or lower 
 
186 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 rank. The captain and subalterns accepted the confusion 
 as an inevitable consequence of the ne\v conditions of breech- 
 loading fire. The higher ranks saw nothing inevitable 
 about it, but only the consequences of hasty and inconsider- 
 ate assault, and practically it was the former only who pub- 
 lished their experiences, and these experiences, being eagerly 
 translated and studied in this country, have become the 
 recognized data on which our tactical systems have been 
 built up. 
 
 Another point also deserves mention. As the war went 
 on, the individual consciousness of superiority rose on the 
 Herman side in precise proportion as it fell on the other 
 one; further, in each successive action the artillery and the 
 infantry learned to co-operate more thoroughly with one 
 another, and thus not only were the losses of the lirst actions 
 not repeated, but theapparent snccessof the individual -order 
 system became more marked, and the conviction in the 
 lower ranks became strengthened that the diminution of 
 losses was the consequence of the increased employment of 
 the new order, and not, as actually was the case, to a better 
 thought-out system of co-operation. 
 
 This idea once grasped, the extreme caution which 
 marked the next steps in evolution of the German infantry 
 tactics becomes easily explicable. 
 
 These two facts alone remained certainly established 
 by experience. Isolated cases of exceedingly heavy loss, .">() 
 per cent and upwards, had indeed occurred, and on the whole 
 the discipline of the short service army had not proved equal 
 to meet the strain, a strain not more severe than had been 
 borne again and again victoriously by troops of the same 
 race and within the memory of some of their leaders, and the 
 problem was, how to decrease the strain by diminishing the 
 losses and at the same time to increase the discipline by an 
 altered system of training; and for the moment no one ap- 
 peared ready with a solution. 
 
 That the general staff was not prepared to furnish one 
 appears evident from the extraordinary latitude which dur- 
 ing the next succeeding years was allowed to all grades in 
 the interpretation of the existing regulations. As Prince 
 Hohenlohe has pointed out, every commander felt himself 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 187 
 
 bound iii honor to produce at his annual inspection some 
 original plan or other for attacking- without unnecessary 
 bloodshed, and round these so-called "Tiirken," the slang 
 name given to these eccentricities, a tremendous polemical 
 literature grew up, and for the reason above given, two fal- 
 lacies underlay the whole question first, the fire to be faced 
 was assumed always as a constant quantity; and, secondly, 
 the fire being assumed as constant and the losses having been 
 shown by statistics to have diminished as individual order 
 was more and more employed, the conclusion was jumped at 
 that in individual order alone lay a royal road to victory 
 without bloodshed. 
 
 Since both these fallacies have largely crept into our ow r n 
 literature, it seems necessary to say a word or two to expose 
 them. The fire to be faced is obviously never exactly the 
 same on any two occasions, but depends not only on the num- 
 ber of rifles employed, but on the field of fire, and more par- 
 ticularly on the state of the defenders' nerves, which neces- 
 sarily vary constantly and indefinitely in a downward direc- 
 tion under the incidence of artillery fire. 
 
 Next, as regards the losses of the attacking troops, as 
 concerning the units themselves, these only depend on the 
 qualify and discipline of these troops, and the better the 
 troops the heavier the losses they will bear without flinching. 
 If the avoidance of loss were the sole object of tactical train- 
 ing, then the way to reduce it to a minimum is obvious; do 
 away with all discipline whatever, and the troops will break 
 and run at the first shot, and, unless the pursuing cavalry 
 manage to cut in on them, their losses will be infinitesimal 
 indeed. 
 
 The great bulk of the infantry officers in Germany took 
 very little interest in these discussions, for the system on 
 which they had been trained made them too practical in 
 their aims and allowed 1hem time for thinking; and since 
 the whole possibility of the great evolution which has taken 
 place in Germany depended on the fact that such officers did 
 exist in sufficient number, it is worth while inquiring why 
 it was that in Germany only such men were found. Short 
 service was here the determining condition. In the old pre- 
 Jena days, the captains of companies or squadrons were ex- 
 
188 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 actly what in the majority of British regiments they still are, 
 and for precisely the same reasons. Still further back in 
 the history of the German Army, the same system as that to 
 which we owed our purchase system was still in vogue. The 
 captain either recruited and brought his company complete 
 in men, receiving the patent of rank in exchange, or else, be- 
 ing selected by the "iuhaber" that is, proprietor of the 
 regiment for the purpose, he was given a sum of money with 
 which to raise and equip a certain number of men. This 
 done, he became the "company father," responsible for every- 
 thing relating to his command. But as the evolution of fire- 
 power led, under the old Dessauer and Saldern. to the sub 
 stitution of line formations and the battalion as unit, instead 
 of the deep formation, the company commander lost his tac- 
 tical importance and became only an administrative official. 
 To render the new movements in battalion possible, the com- 
 panies had to be equalized on parade, and lost their inde- 
 pendence completely; indeed, they even lost their names, the 
 battalions being divided into eight divisions only, irrespect- 
 ive of the number of companies, and the captain's sole duty 
 was limited to the giving of words of nmmiand. all responsi- 
 bilities remaining in the hands of the battalion commanders. 
 At the same time, once regiments were raised, they wen- 
 recruited by regiments and not by companies, and the re- 
 cruits, few in number under the Ion ^service system, were 
 trained by specialists that is, by the adjutant and sergeant- 
 major and, in consequence, the captains, being no longer 
 responsible for the fighting training of their men, soon lost 
 the knowledge necessary for imparting it. 
 
 But with the introduction of short service the number 
 of recruits which had annually to be drilled vastly exceeded, 
 the power of the existing staff, and partly also as a conse- 
 quence of the number of small detachments and garrisons 
 they had to be handed over to the captains to drill and train. 
 This compelled the captains to learn thoroughly, for you can- 
 not teach what you do not know, and under these conditions 
 the Prussian junior officers had been at work when the first 
 war broke out for sixty years, though, it is true, actual high- 
 pressure competition had only set in in the last six. on the 
 accession of the late Emperor William. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 189 
 
 Hence, though in the main the system of training in the 
 Prussian Army was drilling in the mass and not training by 
 individuals, when on the battle-field all higher organizations 
 were disintegrated by fire, the great majority of the captains, 
 trained for years to assume responsibility, did so at once 
 without any great friction, and when the two campaigns 
 were at an end there were hundreds who had studied the sub- 
 ject of military training practically and knew exactly where 
 the difficulties lay, and being given, as above pointed out, a 
 comparatively free hand, at once supplied the solution to the 
 problem how to combine the discijiline of closed bodies with 
 the necessities of individual fighting by introducing into 
 their companies the system of individual education of the 
 soldiers. 
 
 Their reasoning was this: Discipline is the product of 
 a number of factors obedience under penalty of punish- 
 ment, emulation, patriotism, honor, and so forth. Obedience 
 under fear of the stick utterly failed in 1806, but the other 
 factors can only be felt by cultivated minds; therefore, we 
 must cultivate the individual mind. This was the rough 
 conception, and soon it graduated down into a conviction 
 that each one felt, even if he could not express it in words 
 but he learnt it as a practical fact in front of his troops dis- 
 cipline is the resultant will-power of many minds acting in 
 the same direction; the more united the thought and the 
 greater the concentration of will in the individual, the more 
 complete is its power. Therefore, again we must educate 
 the minds of the indivduals to appreciate facts alike, and at 
 the same time train the power of concentration by exacting 
 the performance* of every order "with the complete exertion 
 of mind and body/' It is not enough that an order should 
 be obeyed; how it is obeyed is the real consideration.. 
 
 As a fact, every good drill in every army has known 
 and realized the necessity for instantaneous obedience for 
 centuries; it is the justification of "smartness." No practi- 
 cal soldier ever thought for a moment that the wall-like pre- 
 cision of a march-past, or the lightning-like rapidity with 
 which arms were shouldered, had much to do with the science 
 of theoretical tactics; but he did know that these were out- 
 ward visible signs of the knowledge and spirit which alone 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 rendered the execution of practical tactics on the battle-field 
 possible. What he did not know, and what to this day no 
 nation but the Germans have thoroughly realized, was, lhat. 
 mechanical obedience alone would not suffice, but that it 
 must be combined with the higher education of the man him- 
 self. Volumes have been written in support of either view, 
 and both sides have been free with ridicule, but, as usual. 
 truth lies between the extremes, and true fighting efficient -y 
 can only be obtained by a combination of both. 
 
 Some years ago a hot discussion on this subject wa> 
 raised in Austria, and the Archduke Johann published a 
 pamphlet entitled "Drill or Education/' a copy of which was 
 sent to the old German Emperor, who read it and passed it 
 on to Bronsart von Schellendorf, with the remark, "Head 
 this, it is excellent; and you will see I have already made 
 my comment on it on the title-page;" and, looking at the 
 place indicated, Von fechellendorf saw that the Emperor 
 had merely passed his pencil through the word "or" and sub- 
 stituted for it "and," making it read "Drill and Education." 
 
 II. 
 
 In niy previous letter I endeavored to trace out ih- 
 causes which have led to the present excellence of the Ger- 
 man Army. Summed up briefly, these are as follows: 
 
 First, the great attention paid to the training of general 
 officers and their staff. This has been the special work <>t 
 Von Moltke and the "Krie^s Akademie" or Staff Colleg-. 
 but was only partly completed when the wars of 1866 and 
 1870 broke out. 
 
 Secondly, the practical knowledge possessed by the 
 company officers of the detail work of preparing troops for 
 war this being a direct consequence of the obligation short 
 service imposed on them, of being personally responsible for 
 the training of their men. 
 
 And, thirdly, the possibility, due only to the existence of 
 this practical knowledge, of substituting the system of "indi- 
 vidual" for the "mass" training of former days. 
 
 Each step in their progress has thus grown out of ground 
 previously made good by experience, and in no case is there 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 191 
 
 any indication of the reform bj r "ukase" which character- 
 izes the military evolution of other nations. 
 
 Another great advantage of the German system of de- 
 centralization is the possibility of selecting the best men 
 for staff duties and commands, an advantage which no other 
 system can supply. This, however, had not come fully into 
 force at the time of the 1870 campaign. 
 
 Further, in estimating the efficiency of the army that 
 crossed the French frontier in the summer of that year, it 
 must not be forgotten that the advantages above mentioned 
 existed in Prussia only, for in Bavaria, Wtirtemberg, and 
 other states, not only was there no Von Moltke, but universal 
 liability to service had only come into force during 1867, the 
 system of paid substitutes having hitherto very generally 
 prevailed; arid, in addition, the troops of the old German 
 Confederation having only faced the breech-loader, not used 
 it, even more exaggerated opinions as to its power prevailed 
 than in Prussia. 
 
 Having now cleared the ground sufficiently to proceed 
 with the further evolution of the army since 1870, with spe- 
 cial reference to the incidents observed at the recent ma- 
 neuvers, I proceed to take the three arms in succession, com- 
 mencing with the infantry. 
 
 In addition to the point relating to the individual train- 
 ing of the recruit already referred to in my first letter, and to 
 which I sftall have to recur later on, the next most important 
 provision of the new regulations is the absolute prohibition 
 they contain of any attempt to systematize or formulate a 
 normal scheme of attack. The idea involved is that the co/i- 
 ditions under which collisions of armed forces occur are so 
 uncertain varying from a skirmish of outposts on all sorts 
 of ground, and passing through all stages down to a final effort 
 at the end of a long day, when the physical and mental con- 
 dition of both sides has sunk to such a level that it is no longer 
 a question of making them advance in the best theoretical 
 order, but the one thing is to get them to fi^ht at all that no 
 one normal system is conceivable equally adapted to all; 
 and further, that, by sanctioning any such system or systems, 
 the leaders of all grades, by bein relieved of direct responsi- 
 bility and being able to shelter themselves against all possi- 
 
19^ Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 ble ill success under the wording of the regulations, are de- 
 prived of all incentive to learn how to employ the means at 
 their disposal to the best advantage under all circumstances 
 as they arise. An army really efficient for w r ar requires no 
 such cut-and-dried aids, but finds, in the individual training 
 of each grade to exercise each his own judgment by constant 
 practice in front of the troops, supervised and corrected in 
 peace-time by trained umpires and superior officers, its surest 
 guarantee of success. 
 
 What I am now about to describe, therefore, can only 
 be taken as a special instance of the employment, of troops 
 in a particular case, but I think it will be of use as an illus- 
 tration of the results of the above mentioned principles. It 
 was an engagement at Schlottheim. in which one division of 
 the llth Corps struck lair on the Hank of the 4th Corps and 
 was adjudged to have rolled the latter up. I followed the 
 inarch of the outer brigade of thisdivision,six battalionsand 
 three batteries, the latter belli nd the leading regimenl : on two 
 other parallel roads, distant respect i\Hy some 2,000 or 4,000 
 yards, similar columns could also be observed, all moving 
 eastward and slightly converging on Schlottheim. We w r ere 
 still out of sight of the enemy's position when the boom of 
 guns became audible, and almost immediately afterwards 
 a few shots fell from the advanced scouts in the direction of 
 a mass of woods, which, in two patches, with a gap between, 
 crowned the crest of a ridge, which fur the moment hid 1he 
 enemy from sight. The firing ceased almost at once, the 
 head of the column bent oft' from the roadway and began to 
 form up, sending a hat talion into each of Ihe 1 wo woods, and 
 further to the rear the column loosened and the batteries 
 disengaged themselves and trotted up to the front, unlimber- 
 ing under cover and running the guns up by hand into the 
 position indicated by the aforesaid gap. I hurried forward 
 and, reaching the crest of the hill, saw before me a deep val- 
 ley, which here bent off almost at right angles, a towering 
 hill some 1,200 feet high forming the apex of the angle, dis- 
 tant from our guns some 1,500 yards. Between us the slopes 
 were very steep, but away to the westward, whore the valley 
 bent back, the ground fell from the position of the enemy, 
 indicated by the flashes of his guns, with a uniform dip for 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 193 
 
 some 800 yards, arid then the slopes became gently convex, 
 thus hiding the movements of troops in the hollow. On the 
 prolongation of the salient of the angle, and deep in the hol- 
 low, lay the village of iSchlottheiin, into which the head of 
 the left column of the division was just entering, whilst its 
 guns were trotting up the slope covered by a few Uhlan 
 vedettes, and, further to the left, the fight appeared to have 
 been in progress for some time, for infantry, as yet unseen 
 from the enemy's position, were moving up the slope in lines 
 of coinapny columns, and a few minutes after I arrived I saw 
 the batteries already in action limber up and advance to the 
 front. I now crossed the hollow, and in so doing lost sight 
 for the moment of the progress of the fight, but when I ar- 
 rived at the edge of the uniform slope above mentioned, I 
 found that the infantry, coming through Bchlottheim, had 
 preceded me, and were lining a hollow road which here ran 
 across the enemy's front, and the guns above mentioned were 
 just coming into action upon a little roll of the convex slope, 
 which enabled them to fire over the heads of the infantry, 
 though they were scarcely three hundred yards in rear. Six 
 batteries were here unlimbered, and, as the lateral space was 
 limited, they were crowded together at half interval; and 
 three more batteries in a group further to the rear, finding, I 
 suppose, no room in front, were firing over the heads of 
 everybody. 
 
 \\ r hat had been going on in the rear of the enemy's guns 
 I have no means of knowing, but at this moment his infantry 
 was attacking down-hill in a dense line of skirmishers, 
 backed by an almost continuous line of supports. His posi- 
 tion appeared about desperate, for this movement must have 
 been visible, in part at least, to the guns on our right, and 
 his flank batteries had been compelled to wheel up against 
 them almost at right angles. The remainder of his guns 
 must, therefore, have been enfiladed; and, deprived of their 
 support, his infantry had to advance down-hill under both 
 artillery and infantry fire, whilst our following masses 
 could move up in company column imperceived. Neverthe- 
 less, our infantry line was itself outflanked on its left, and 
 it became a race which side could reach this flank the soon- 
 er. Our company columns were rapidly coming up, when 
 
194 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 I caught the sound of drums beating and saw the enemy's 
 supporting line moving up in close order with sloped arm*, 
 and by the swing of the right arm I could tell it w r as a case 
 of "parade mar sch" only resorted to under fire in moments 
 when everything depends on the maintenance of the utmost 
 force of will-concentration. They reached the front, and the 
 fire now blazed out with a scarcely conceivable intensity. I 
 looked round and saw 7 four company columns just closing up 
 to extend our left, when with a real cheer the whole of the 
 enemy's line dashed forward, enveloping our left. One of 
 our company columns deployed instantaneously, but the 
 others, still hidden from sight of the coming danger by 1 1n- 
 rolling ground, halted, ordered arms together as on an in- 
 spection parade, and stood until the enemy's heads showed 
 above the rise at not more than 100 paces, when ihey re- 
 ceived them with rapid independent fire from the leading 
 ranks only. 
 
 The attack w r as adjudged to have been repulsed, the fir- 
 ing which had raged between the lines at the unpleasantly 
 close distance, for the new cartridges, of barely ten paces. 
 was stopped by whistle and command, and the enemy wen- 
 ordered to retire. In practice, of course, tin* victors would 
 have pursued at once and driven the debris back right on to 
 their remaining guns in rear; but as this was impossible in 
 peace, the Emperor, who had that moment arrived on the 
 spot, sounded the "cease fire," and the whole battle came to 
 an end. My attention had been, so completely engrossed 
 with the matter immediately under my eyes that I have little 
 idea of what occurred further to the left, only catching a 
 momentary glimpse of a groat cavalry charge far away in 
 the distance and retaining a confused idea of long and end- 
 less lines of infantry backed by masses of closed battalions, 
 presumably under cover, and further to the rear on either 
 side long lines of artillery. 
 
 The fight being over, whilst the mounted officers were 
 gathering for the critique, I walked on to find out why the 
 companies on our left had received an infantry attack in 
 column, and luckily found an acquaintance in one of them, 
 who told me that the thing had been so sudden that they 
 thought they had to deal with cavalry, and therefore stood 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 195 
 
 ready to form company squares. I was very much struck by 
 one thing : A moment before the men had been moving with 
 an order and precision beyond praise; every order was 
 obeyed instantaneously, and one would have thought they 
 liad come fresh on parade, but actually these men were weary 
 with four previous days' successive marching, on which they, 
 had never been under arms less than nine hours, and once 
 over twelve, and how weary they w r ere may be judged by 
 the fact that within five minutes of the "cease fire" I counted 
 in one company of 120 men 70 fast asleep on their knapsacks, 
 lying with their faces to the sky. A better example of what 
 a complete conquest the will can achieve over the body, when 
 trained on the Prussian method, I could hardly have wished 
 to see. 
 
 In the main, the other engagements followed the same 
 course, and became monotonous from their very excellence. 
 The whole thing worked automatically. The long columns 
 evolved themselves into fighting order more like some living 
 organism, always exactly adapting themselves to the con- 
 ditions of the moment ; nowhere a rigid adherence to forms, 
 causing an excess of strength at one part, a deficiency at 
 another, but everywhere, as one looked round, one felt the 
 exact adaptation of means to an end. 
 
 It must not be supposed that this state of affairs has 
 been reached without much trouble and difficulty; on the 
 contrary, the full consequences involved in the fundamental 
 conceptions of the new regulations namely, individual 
 training, delegation of responsibility, and the prohibition 
 of the "normal attack formation" have only been evolved 
 by incessant friction. 
 
 The chief difficulties to be overcome were first, the de- 
 sire to monopolize power, common to all grades of ambitious 
 and energetic men ; and secondly, the general conviction that 
 the scenes witnessed on the battle-fields of France (where* 
 as admitted b} r the official historians of the war themselves, 
 wild confusion in the fighting line was the chief character- 
 istic), were the inevitable outcome of fighting under breech- 
 loading fire, and not, as actually was the case, the direct 
 
196 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 consequence of an equality of armament such as had never 
 before existed in any campaign. 
 
 The former difficulty led a number of the captains, on 
 whom increased power had now devolved both by custom 
 and regulation, to hamper the initiative of their subordi- 
 nates by endeavoring to keep the conduct of the fight too 
 exclusively in their own hands, and was only conquered by 
 the common sense of t heniajorityafter many yea rs of experi- 
 ence. The latter difficulty led directly to the idea that the 
 primary object of lariiral formations was to lessen the 
 chance of avoiding losses, and not, as it actually is, to insure 
 the most rapid and complete extermination of the enemy. 
 
 This misconception did not long survive. Common 
 sense again, derived from practical knowledge, soon killed 
 it, and only a few cases occur now and again sporadically; 
 but the "epidemic," .as a German writer christened it, has 
 long since passed away. Nevertheless, it led during the 
 period of its prevalence to every conceivable system even 
 such absurdities as ad van ring on the enemy in file, or fours, 
 and dotting the men about all over the ground at equal in- 
 tervals all round being duly tried and condemned; and 
 would-be inventors of Iliese and like tactical nostrums in 
 this country would save themselves and the army much time 
 and trouble if, before suggesting fresh fads, they would 
 study the history of similar experiments in Germany. 
 
 But much friction yet remained to be overcome in com- 
 bining the absolute obedience, the old conception of disci- 
 pline, with the freedom it was held necessary to accord to 
 the individual in the fighting line; while further confusion 
 was caused by the use of the term "schiitze" i. e., skirmisher 
 to designate the units of which the fighting line consists. 
 
 Originally the "skirmisher" fought by his own individ- 
 ual judgment, stalking the enemy and utilizing every ad- 
 vantage of cover the ground afforded him. In the prelimi- 
 nary phases of an engagement such latitude of choice may 
 freely be conceded to a few brave and specially selected men ; 
 but when once the attack has to be pushed home such delib- 
 erate action ceases to be possible, and the safety of the in- 
 dividual derived from skill in the choice of ground as cover 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 197 
 
 has to be sacrificed in the interests of the whole. The rapid 
 infliction of overwhelming loss on the enemy then becomes 
 the main point to be kept in view, and to this end it becomes 
 necessary to place as many men in the front line as can use 
 their rifles with effect viz., about one man to the yard ; and 
 with such a dense line the choice of cover by the individual 
 is necessarily an extremely limited one. Furthermore, 
 since concentration of fire promises the most rapid and 
 speedy results, a limit had to be placed on the skirmishers' 
 right to choose when and at what to fire, and this last limita- 
 tion destroyed the last vestige of skirmishing in its original 
 acceptation. 
 
 A line of men, however, of the above density viz., one 
 man to the yard cannot, in face of the enemy's fire, retain 
 for long a sufficient power of offence. As the men fall it 
 becomes weaker and weaker, and has to be supported by 
 fresh troops from the rear. These, being sent in in similar 
 order, have to find room by the side of those already in posi- 
 tion or in the gaps made by the enemy's fire, and hence each 
 successive reinforcement, however welcome, brings with it 
 increased confusion in the fighting line. The question then 
 arose, Is such confusion unavoidable? A very powerful 
 party maintained that it was not, and that the way out of the 
 difficulty lay in reverting to the traditions of the past and 
 drilling the soldiers again to mechanical obedience and close 
 order. Their views found their extreme expression in the 
 w T ell-known pamphlet entitled "The Midsummer-Night's 
 Dream," which advocated most powerfully the adoption of 
 a system of attack in lines of sections, each section about 
 70 strong, in single rank, shoulder to shoulder, close order, 
 under the command of a commissioned officer. Their fire 
 was to be as that of a machine, entirely under the control of 
 one man, and as the inevitable casualties ensued in the fight, 
 the section closed on its center, and made room for following 
 sections to reinforce. 
 
 It is a point worthy of most careful attention on our 
 part that these views found their warmest supporters pre- 
 cisely amongst those men who had survived the bloodiest 
 slaughter of the whole war, and about the year 1882-83 
 
198 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 'found their fullest expression on the Tempelhof drill-ground 
 at Berlin. 
 
 Theavoidance of loss being the one horn of thedilemma, 
 the reintroduction of mechanical discipline the "massen- 
 dressur" of the old days was the order; and, at the risk of 
 appearing tedious to those \vlio have not followed the suc- 
 cessive steps of the modern military e\ olution, I must dwell 
 on it a little longer. 
 
 The old system of "mass" training implied the menial 
 "degradation of every man who passed through the ranks, 
 and involved the impossibility of recruiting the cadres of the 
 non-commissioned officers, for the selection of the right man 
 for the right place became impracticable. ' .Mass training 
 i. e., mechanical obedience had proved itself, even when ii 
 reached its utmost development, as before the Jena catas- 
 trophe, and again in 1870, when it was less pronounced tluin 
 in the previous period, a rotten reed to trust to. Individual 
 training has its dangers, but it insures that every man who 
 serves with the colors is improved as a cili/en by the process, 
 in so far as he is taught to act on his own responsibility, 
 and guarantees to a certain extent that the non-commis 
 sioned officers are recruited from the best available men, by 
 securing for each individual the opportunity of showing 
 what is really in him, and not merely testing his ability to 
 pass examinations on paper. As an extreme instance, I 
 would adduce the well-known faculty of the Bengali Baboo 
 to pass any paper test, and his absolute incapacity to bear 
 actual personal responsibility where that 'responsibility 
 entails the handling of men directly, even where the risk to 
 life and limb involved is infinitesimal. 
 
 The framers of the new (Jerman regulation have man- 
 aged to avoid both horns of the dilemma by combining t In- 
 strong points of both extremes, and through it the army lias 
 been made what Scharnhorst wished it to be a national 
 university for the training of character and a means of pre- 
 venting the evolution of a "literary proletariat" to use 
 Prince Bismarck's words which is the special danger to 
 which all systems of free education are exposed. 
 
 The object of "free education" in Prussia has been 
 overlooked in England. It was simply a bargain between 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 199 
 
 king and people, originated and practically carried through 
 by Scharnhorst, the terms of which briefly were as follows : 
 The king i. e.,the country requires intelligent, educated 
 soldiers as a means to preserve the nation. The king i. e., 
 the country will educate every one practically free of 
 charge if, in return, the boys so educated, or their represent- 
 atives, agree to serv.e as soldiers for a space of three years. 
 The system of blind mechanical obedience, which drilled, or 
 attempted to drill, the soul but of man, and which Scharn- 
 horst did not live long enough to prevent, made the army, if 
 not a burden to the country, at any rate a hindrance to its 
 development, but was a fair set-oft' for the advantages con- 
 ferred. The system the new regulation has initiated, far 
 from acting as a hindrance to its commercial prosperity, 
 gives to every man who undergoes it not only the trained 
 habit of self-reliance, the basis of all business success, but 
 eliminates one-half of that "literary proletariat" which, in 
 Prince Bismarck's view, constituted so great a danger to 
 the country; and if it withdraws from reproductive employ- 
 ment an average of 450,000 men per annum, it gives back 
 not only more vigorous men, but, through the sanitary 
 method of life, the hard outdoor exercise and fresh air, the 
 bettor food and more healthy lodgings which the majority 
 find in barracks, to say nothing of the moral habits of re- 
 si raint a sensible discipline enforces, it extends each man's 
 usefulness by five years at least, for each year they spend 
 with the colors. Whether this deduction is or is not correct, 
 let those who are feeling the pinch of German competition 
 in trade answer. They felt it some years ago, when corre- 
 spondence in these columns showed that want of power to act 
 on 1heir own responsibility was the one thing wanting to 
 prevent their swamping. the market for British clerks or 
 managers. How much more will they feel it ten years 
 hence, when the new regulation has been in foree long 
 enough to bring the men trained on the new principles into 
 the labor market! Would it not be well for us now, w T hilst. 
 we still have time, to alter our system of military education, 
 so that our discharged reserve men may be able to compete 
 on equal terms with the horde threatening to overwhelm us? 
 
200 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 III. 
 
 In my previous let UTS I have referred to the two main 
 points in the Genium Kegulations for Infantry viz., Hie 
 individual training- of the soldier and the delegation of re- 
 sponsibility and it will be at once apparent that sum" 
 counter-check to the extreme consequences of either is 
 necessary if the infantry fight of the future is not to degener- 
 ate into a scene of the wildest confusion, culminating in, as 
 the Germans lugubriously term it, "Kin ISegralmiss ersier 
 elasse" i. e., a funeral of the largest dimensions. This 
 check is found in Section B, 88, which practirally applies 
 to all grades in the hierarchy namely, that the conclu- 
 sion of the fight must find the command (in this case 1he 
 section) in the right place with reference to the other units 
 round it. Where this place is or will be cannot be laid down 
 by regulations, but depends on circumstances; and. further, 
 to prevent any possibility of a man or a leader trying to es- 
 cape the consequences of action by inaction, he is reminded 
 in Section C, 121, that delay or failure to act will always be 
 judged as a worse error than a mistake in 1he method of 
 action chosen. 
 
 In fact, what the new regulation does is, instead of de- 
 grading the soldier to the level of an unthinking machine, 
 to place him, on Hie battle-Held, on the level of general intel- 
 ligence which the British law has long since accorded to the 
 average civilian in case of a street row or riot namely, to 
 enforce on him the obligation to make up his own mind, and 
 to act in what appears to him to be the best manner for pre- 
 serving the public peace, and not merely to stand as a looker- 
 on and send for the police. In dealing with civil riot, an 
 officer and every man under him is placed in the same p >si 
 tion viz., he must use his own judgment in the choice of 
 means, but cannot shelter himself behind a superior or the 
 plea of obedience to or absence of orders. 
 
 With regard to the delegation of responsibility, it is to 
 be noticed that, though the principle is asserted throughout, 
 the amount to be accorded below the rank of the company 
 commander varies with the circumstances. The captain's 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 'JO I 
 
 full independence is decreed by regulation, and cannot be 
 interfered with; but the captain must exercise his own judg- 
 ment as to how much freedom he delegates to his subaltern, 
 and the latter again does not let his group leaders out of 
 hand if he can avoid it. This a moment's reflection will 
 show to be a very necessary arrangement, for it is obvious 
 it would not be advisable to allow a last-joined subaltern 
 the same latitude of action that can be safely conceded to a 
 senior lieutenant with eighteen years' service. Nor will the 
 (iermans at any price have the total splitting up and slow- 
 ness of action entailed by the system of considering the 
 "group" as the ultimate unit of tactics a system which finds 
 many advocates in our own and other services. When all 
 his officers have fallen, a group leader must assert his direct 
 authority, just as, when the group leaders are down, the sol- 
 dier himself must use his ow r n judgment, for which contin- 
 gency he is carefully trained; but as long as his subaltern 
 remains on his legs, the group leader only acts as his sub- 
 ordinate assistant, seeing that the orders given are obeyed, 
 but not personally communicating them. Reflection will 
 show this to be a very sound and common-sense arrange- 
 ment, for, as long as a command can be heard, time is only 
 lost by its repetition through intermediate links. It is no 
 longer possible to handle a battalion by direct word of com- 
 mand under fire; instructions or orders must therefore be 
 issued, but the section (i. e., subaltern's command) and the 
 company must be kept in hand till the last moment possible. 
 
 This marks well (he distinction between the German 
 and the extreme open-order school. The latter say, "Confu- 
 sion in the fighting line is ultimately inevitable, therefore 
 let us go to meet it and start with confusion." Their oppo- 
 nents point out that, though ultimately inevitable, it is the 
 work the enemy's bullets have to accomplish, and, therefore, 
 to adopt it from the first is simply to save the enemy the 
 needful expenditure of ammunition requisite to bring it 
 about. 
 
 The concentrated will-power alone possible in close 
 order in its highest form is to the attack what velocity is to 
 the projectile. A projectile penetrates as far into an iron 
 
202 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 plate or other obstacle as its //* viva 1 1 he product of its mass 
 by the square of its velocity; will carry it. \Ve might say 
 that an attack penetrates just as far into and through that 
 lire-swept zone which forms an advanced shield or protec- 
 tion for the defender as its mass multiplied by the square of 
 its discipline w r ill carry it. Voluntarily to give away the 
 cohesion secured by discipline is about as sensible as trying 
 to pierce an armor-plate with a charge of case or small shot. 
 
 The expression the "square of discipline" may appear 
 fanciful, but a little consideration will show it is far nearer 
 the truth than the use of the word "discipline" alone would 
 be, for every increment in discipline tells in two ways it 
 enables you to bring a larger number of men up into the fight- 
 ing line at closer range, and under better control, and their 
 fire will, therefore, be all the more effective; but because 
 their fire is mo re etl'ectivethe enemy's power of inflicting loss 
 on the firing and following lines is further diminished; the 
 firing line can be trusted to hold out longer, and. therefore. 
 the following lines may be held back at such a distance that 
 they do not, at first, incur loss from 1lie bullets exclusively 
 meant for the lines in front of them. 
 
 In my first letter I said that this year's maneuvers 
 marked the culmination of a cycle of a century's evolution, 
 and I have step by step endeavored to explain my meaning. 
 Actually, the line of demarcation is not so easy to define ex- 
 actly. It is true that these are t he tirst maneuvers in which 
 all three-years contingents of the peace effective have under- 
 gone the same uniform training; but this does not apply to 
 the reservists and landwehr. who, in lime of war, will In- 
 cabled to the colors, nor, on the other hand, have the non- 
 commissioned officers, still less 1he officers, had the advan- 
 tage of working steadily on the same lines. Still further 
 improvement, therefore, may be looked for in the future, 
 for the old saying, "It is hard to leach an old dog new 
 tricks,'' has much truth in it, and each successive step above 
 indicated has met with opposition in each rank successively. 
 But the evil is not so great as might be imagined, for, though 
 the new system has only been, officially. Hiree years in exist- 
 ence, practically it does but formulate in precise terms the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 203 
 
 methods which have been more or less in fashion for the last 
 ten; and the difference is mainly this, that, whereas for- 
 merly each company commander was working in fear and 
 trembling of what new fad a superior might spring on him, 
 now he can give his undivided attention to the work before 
 him. Possibly this may be not so great an advantage in 
 practice as it appears in theory, for, under the old condi- 
 tions, a man learnt independence of judgment and was 
 obliged to have confidence in his own opinion, and the fads 
 of superiors preserved him from getting too much in a 
 groove. In a certain German garrison T knew well, each 
 battalion had to practice three separate and distinct forma- 
 tions for attack, one for the regimental inspection, one for 
 the brigadier, and a third for thedivisional commander, and 
 T remember asking an old friend whether this state of affairs 
 was not very injurious. He only laughed and said, "Well, 
 in action no two cases are exactly similar, so, if we are suffi- 
 ciently w r ell trained to satisfy the requirements of the in- 
 specting generals, we shall be all the more likely to adapt 
 ourselves to the varying conditions of reality" an optim- 
 istic way of looking at things, to be commended to our own 
 officers suffering under similar adversities. 
 
 To come now to questions of equipment and their influ- 
 ence: The new German rifle, as everybody knows, is not 
 correctly described as a "magazine'' weapon, but rather as 
 a "multiple" loader, and is to rny mind the simplest and 
 most practical military weapon yet put into the hands of any 
 soldier. There is no "cut-off" to convert the magazine rifle 
 to a single-loader, liable to jam from various causes, no 
 necessity of recharging the magazine, and no possibility of 
 finding it empty at a critical moment. The soldier simply 
 opons the brooch, thrusts in a little metal case containing 
 five cartridges, and fires them in succession, having to work 
 tho brooch-block to bring each cartridge into position in suc- 
 cession. Tho fifth time he draws back tho block, the empty 
 r-aso is ojoctod, and another put in, so that no time is wastod 
 in fumbling for single cartridges. Further, the arrange- 
 ment of tho expense-pouch w T hich, however, has been in 
 use si n co 1872 offers practically the advantage of a maga- 
 
204 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 zine. The pouch on the right-hand side is kept constantly 
 full from the others, and its lid when open falls outwards, 
 possessing herein a greal advantage over all others that I 
 know of. in fact, and as a practical arrangement, this gav 
 to the old Mauser single-loader all the advantages of a mag 
 azine rifle, and enabled it to fire within 1he minute a greater 
 number of rounds without the many disadvantages of tin- 
 latter sucli as empty ma/agine at the critical moment, etc. 
 Indeed, I have often marvelled that, whilst we were willing 
 to copy "pickelkaubes." badges of rank, etc., such a simple 
 and practical point should have escaped our attention; still 
 more, that with such a. practical expedient ready to our 
 hands, we should have wildly launched out into the expendi- 
 ture of millions on a magazine ritle, which, as far as concerns 
 the magazine, and with the existing pouch, is no better than 
 the old rifle would have been with the Prussian pouch. An- 
 other practical point I noticed is the parking of these cart 
 ridges. Each little case of five cartridges is parked with 
 two others in a cardboard packet closed by a strip of tape. 
 which is pulled off by a jerk, and uncovers not only the cases. 
 but holes cut out for the finger and thumb to grasp them by. 
 The! advantages of this simple arrangement are obvious. 
 no time is lost in stowing away the separate cartridges, 1 hex- 
 can be thrown down in the shooting line without dust and 
 grit sticking to the lubricant, the distribution of ammuni- 
 tion is rendered more easy, and also its collection from the 
 wounded. 
 
 Fifteen of these packets go into a larger and stronger 
 millboard box, which is closed in the same manner, and to 
 which is further attached a piece of strong webbing, by 
 which it can be readily lifted out of the ammunition-wagons. 
 and two of them knotted together can be conveniently car- 
 ried over the shoulders or by any sort of a stick, their joint 
 weight being about 32 pounds and their contents .V.O rounds, 
 or 225 each. Five more of those boxes go into a regular 
 ammunition-box, which can be readily opened and the con- 
 tents tumbled out. The weight of the new cartridges is 
 about three to two of the old ones, hence for the 100 rounds 
 formerly carried the man now carries 150. which are distrib- 
 

 ., -?.*- -rtv 
 
 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 uted in the following manner: 30 rounds in each of the 
 front pouches and 90 rounds in a separate pouch behind. 
 
 As regards the supply of ammunition in action, the 
 fundamental idea is that you can never have too much of it, 
 and therefore every opportunity must be utilized, before go- 
 ing into a fight, to serve out as much as the men can carry in 
 their haversacks, pockets, etc. 
 
 On the defensive, of course, any amount of cartridges 
 can be laid out in niches cut in the parapets or other protec- 
 tion, and whenever the offensive passes over into a passive 
 condition, ammunition can be brought up from the wagons 
 which follow the battalions into action as closely as possi- 
 ble, with greater or less trouble according as the way to 
 them is more or less under cover. But when troops are 
 once definitely committed to a decisive advance, I find that 
 very little faith is put in any system of supply from the rear. 
 It is all very simple in peace-time and on paper to send un- 
 armed men backwards and forwards to the wagons, but it 
 is quite another thing to expect men to do the work when 
 the bullets are flying, and those w r ho are brave enough to 
 attempt it would be of more use in the fighting line. Again, 
 the mere physical difficulty for a heavily laden man to over- 
 take an advancing fighting line when the latter has perhaps 
 800 yards start out of a total distance to be traversed of 1,600 
 is in itself insuperable. 
 
 Most men with whom I talked over the question ex- 
 pressed a common-sense opinion that 150 rounds per man 
 was enough for any one attack, and if this number is fired 
 away without result, then what is w r anted is fresh nerves 
 for the firors. and those can only be supplied by fresh rein- 
 forcements. The long and the short of it is that practical 
 men take every opportunity they can of completing this 
 ammunition from the handiest source, and do not rely on any 
 cut-and-dried regulations. 
 
 The greatest possible stress is laid on the maintenance 
 of fire-discipline, but this is not well seen in the maneuvers, 
 and can only really be judged on the shooting-ground, where 
 the Germans now enjoy a great deal of practice. Still, even 
 what I did see in the maneuvers left a very favorable impres- 
 
^06 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 sion as regards the complete control the officers exercised. 
 The value of such discipline is based on the assumption that 
 superiority of fire has always been the condition on which 
 the successful advance with the bayonet ultimately turned. 
 In the old days on equal fronts they (the Germans) sought to 
 obtain this by exceptional rapidity of fire, due to better me- 
 chanical drilling. The French met this in 1806 with envel- 
 oping tactics and better marksmanship. In 1866 the Ger- 
 mans again obtained the desired result by mechanical im- 
 provement in the weapon, and in 1870 by using against the 
 French the same tactics the latter had formerly so success- 
 fully used against them. But now all weapons are mechan- 
 ically on an equality; both sides are equally alive to the 
 advantage, where possible, of out-flanking tactics, and, on 
 paper at least, equally skilled in marksmanship. The supe- 
 riority will again have to be fought out on equal and par- 
 allel fronts. What further step forward can be made? The 
 answer they have found is based on the idea of handling the 
 fire of the sections as units, like the fire of a battery acting 
 with others in brigade. The captain controls the fire of his 
 three sections, as the officer commanding a brigade division 
 of artillery controls the fire of his three batteries, lie <-;m 
 order one section to hold the enemy in check along the wiiole 
 of his front and with his other two converge a crushing su- 
 periority on any selected point of his enemy's line; but they 
 do not allow this idea to descend lower in the scale, to the 
 groups, as they consider the fire of ten or a dozen rifles 
 too insignificant to exercise a decisive effect. 
 
 This may seem a counsel of perfection, an ideal to be 
 striven for, indeed, but not to be attained on this side of the 
 grave; but it must be admitted that the idea is sound, and. 
 since it involves the co-operation of only three trained offi- 
 cers, more likely to succeed than the rival schemes in other 
 countries, which hope to achieve a similar result through 
 the co-operation of some twenty to thirty less responsible and 
 less trained group leaders. 
 
 The introduction of smokeless powder has, however, 
 rendered this ideal far more attainable than when it was first 
 proposed, now some years ago. In the absence of the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. ~07 
 
 smoke-screen on both sides, the company officers not only 
 find it easier to work together, but can control their men and 
 judge the effect of their lire on the enemy to a far greater 
 degree than was formerly possible. From their point of 
 view this increased power of control more than compensates 
 the attack for the increased facility of concealment smoke- 
 less powder confers on the defence. It is true that the lat- 
 ter also profits by the same increased power of control, but 
 they argue that, from the nature of things, the defence striv- 
 ing only to avoid being beaten, whereas the attack fights 
 with the determination to win, the latter is in a position to 
 make far better use of this new powder than the former. Put 
 in another form, it comes to this the heavier and more 
 accurate the fire whistling over a trench, the harder it is to 
 make men raise their heads over it, to take steady aim. 
 Smokeless pow r der makes it easier for the attack to deliver 
 such a fire; hence the difficulties of the defence will be in- 
 creased. Further, in the absence of smoke, men stationary 
 on the defence cannot escape the depressing influence of the 
 dead and wounded lying round them, but the attack leaves 
 all these evidences of the fight behind it. So again the ad- 
 vantage is on its side. 
 
 Generally, it is held that the possibilities of conceal- 
 ment the new powder affords have been immensely over- 
 rated, and what I have personally seen during the past two 
 years leads me to the same conclusion. If ordinary Euro- 
 pean short-service soldiers possessed the skill of the Red 
 Indians as skirmishers, no doubt the advantage would be 
 immense; but, as a fact, they do not, and neither in Ger- 
 many nor in any other country have I ever experienced any 
 difficulty in making out the enemy from the infantry fighting 
 line. The ordinary spectator, looking at the progress of 
 the battle generally, may often be in doubt as to where the 
 enemy actually is, but the company officer in the front, with 
 his attention fixed on the one hedgerow, edge of the wood, 
 or whatever the point he is ordered to carry may be, will 
 always find indications enough to guide his aim. Just as 
 in stalking game it is chiefly a question of knowing where 
 to look, and not the power of eyesight^ that makes the differ- 
 
208 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 ence between the experienced hand and I he beginner, and, 
 as in game-shooting, too, it is the movement of I lie animal 
 that usually betrays its position, so also in the case of troops 
 engaged it is the movement inseparable from the conduct of 
 the fight that renders their concealment impossible. 
 
 One other point in connection with 1he new riile remains 
 to be noticed, and that is its extraordinary power of pene- 
 tration. Stockades of 12-inch baulks are perforated with 
 ease, even at extreme ranges, and even :>0 inches of oak will 
 be penetrated at 200 yards. Hanks of earth '2 feet thick 
 are no longer proof, and 18-inch brick walls are pierced 
 through and through. Its power against this last descrip- 
 tion of cover will entirely revolutionize the tactics of the 
 defence of villages and their influence as points of support 
 on the battle-field : for the aid of artillery is no longer indis- 
 pensable to breach any ordinary walls. At 4(H) yards a 
 company of infantry firing volleys will cut down the wall of 
 a house in a few rounds, and at 200 even a section of TO men 
 will do the same. This power will render the interior de- 
 fence of all ordinary villages impracticable, for ihe attack- 
 ing party can cut its way through partition walls without 
 the necessity of having recourse to any of the old-fashioned 
 methods, such as the explosion of dynamite or gun-cotton 
 slabs against the walls a service often of very great 
 danger. 
 
 The reputation of the (lei-mans for marching has stood 
 high ever since the last war. In 18S: I was with a brigade 
 which averaged .",2 miles a day for three consecutive days; 
 but though I cannot this time reduce the- work done to pre- 
 cise figures of distance for the mountainous nature of the 
 ground and the greater distances traversed in fighting order 
 across country would render such figures valueless I can 
 assert that, from my ow r n observation and from what I learnt 
 from the same officers who had been present: on the occasion 
 above alluded to, the work done was as hard again, for dur- 
 ing the last week it was incessant and exactly as it would be 
 in war. Taking the record of a single battalion, and one 
 that got off rather cheaply, 1 find that on ^Monday, Tuesday, 
 and Wednesday it was under arms on the inarch for eight 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and a half hours exactly, and, further, had to supply the out- 
 posts on Wednesday. On x the Thursday, Friday, and Satur- 
 day it bivouacked twice, fought in three long actions over 
 difficult ground, and was under arms on each day for over 
 twelve hours. Yet it marched back without one single case 
 of sickness after five weeks' absence, and the company to 
 which my informant belonged had not one single foot-sore 
 man. On the Thursday night a whole division was biv- 
 ouacked round and about Miihlhausen, and I went all round 
 the camps with friends who could tell and show me every- 
 thing, and I could not help being struck by the improve- 
 ment in physique since the last time, eight years ago, that I 
 had bivouacked with the same regiments. Of course, in 
 point of measurements one can say nothing; figures show 
 that an annual improvement is perceptible, but it is far too 
 small to be visible to the naked eye. I could only judge by 
 the cheeriness and capacity for bearing exertion. The work 
 this year, as above stated, had been distinctly harder, but 
 there were no signs of distress. On the former occasion the 
 men in bivouac were very silent, no animal spirits about 
 them, and later in the night, when it came on to rain, they 
 crouched round the fires and sang bits of the "volkslieder" 
 in a very subdued and melanchoty fashion they were thor- 
 oughly stale. And next day in marching one saw signs of 
 great weariness and exhaustion in many faces. This time 
 I did not see anything of the kind, either on the night in 
 question, which happened to be fine, or on succeeding days 
 after wet and cold nights had set in. The men sang round 
 their fires, the bands played, and everything was as animated 
 as a country fair. And though, as I stated in my last letter, 
 when they got a rest next day, they lay down and slept right 
 away, I saw nowhere that drawn, pinched look of extreme 
 weariness that makes one's heart sorry for the poor 
 sufferers. 
 
 Is this increased endurance a consequence of the new 
 regulations or not? I think so, for endurance is far more a 
 matter of mind than people think, and it seems to me that 
 this cultivation of the individual will is already bearing 
 fruit in a greater cheeriness and sense of manliness than 
 was possible under the old regime. 
 
210 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 The causes already referred to in my first letter viz., 
 dispersal of troops iii small garrisons, want of interest in 
 tactical matters, the consequence of the reaction after the 
 prolonged strain of the great wars w r ith Napoleon, and the 
 extreme financial exhaustion of the country which resulted 
 therefrom reacted even more prejudicially on the mounted 
 arms of the service than on the infantry. In addition, these 
 had special difficulties of their own to contend with, of which 
 the most injurious were the want of an inspector-general 
 of cavalry, and the false tactical traditions they inherited 
 from the campaigns of the War of Liberation. Of course, 
 there were not wanting many men who worked heart and 
 soul for the good of this arm as for the others, and the system 
 of short service, entailing on the squadron officers, as it nec- 
 essarily did, the duty of mastering the practical part of their 
 profession i. e., the training of remounts, education of ili< 
 recruit both as a soldier and as a horseman, and, above all 
 things, the care of the horses and fitting of saddlery guar- 
 anteed the country the possession of a thoroughly reliable 
 body of junior leaders. But as long as the ultimate respon- 
 sibility for the efficiency of the whole arm w r as dispersed on 
 the shoulders of the corps and division commanders most 
 of whom were necessarily infantry officers uniformity of 
 training, the most essential condition of good maneuvering 
 with cavalry, was unattainable. 
 
 It is not much to be wondered at, therefore, if the results 
 obtained by the cavalry in 1866 left very much indeed to be 
 desired ; but the cause and its remedy were correctly appre- 
 ciated, and the appointment of Prince Frederick Charles as 
 inspector-general of cavalry in the autumn of that year 
 marked the commencement of a new era. 
 
 The accumulated errors of sixty years of misdirected 
 training cannot, however, be eliminated in one-twentieth of 
 that time, and, great as was the progress effected under the 
 Prince's guidance between 1866 and 1870, the cavalry were, 
 as a body, far behind the level of efficiency demanded by the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 211 
 
 altered conditions, both strategic and tactical, under which 
 they were about to be employed. 
 
 The cavalry experts, as a body, were seriously disap- 
 pointed by the small results obtained by the 70,000 and more 
 horsemen that invaded France in 1870. But they were in no 
 way disheartened, for the material, both men and horses, 
 w r as proved to be excellent, and it was seen that all that was 
 wanted was a sensible system to develop the best, qualities 
 of both, and at the same time to train the superior officers in 
 the art of handling the higher units namely, the brigades 
 and divisions. 
 
 The defects of the old system were thus summed up by 
 one of their first authorities on this subject: 
 
 "Our riding education keeps our horses during the whole 
 of the winter, from October to April, in the man ege or riding- 
 school. Then follow the squadron training and regimental 
 drills, also on level parade-grounds. Only during the short 
 period of the detachment exercises and maneuvers, which 
 last only four weeks, is it necessary for cavalry to ride 
 straight across whatever comes first. Is it possible that the 
 soldier can feel full confidence that his horse will carry him 
 as long as he sits still and does not worry his mouth? Is it 
 to be expected that he can keep his eyes on the enemy and 
 his squadron leader? Is it not much more likely that he 
 will be anxiously looking down at every stone and cart-rut 
 on the ground, pulling at his horse's head, and thereby 
 destroying the order of the formation? But how can a 
 leader who has grown up in this groove feel confidence in 
 the ability of the men following him to reach the enemy knee 
 to knee, when he knows that every potato-field, every ridge 
 and furrow loosens their order?" 
 
 To eliminate the defects indicated in the above passage 
 has been the chief object kept in view by the cavalry 
 reformers during the last twenty years, and the steps they 
 have taken have been, briefly, as follows : 
 
 As far as possible, the time spent in the eovered-m 
 schools has been curtailed, and more importance has been 
 attached to an outdoor training of the men to control their 
 horses on all sorts of ground likely to be met with, while at 
 
212 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the same time largely increased drum mis have boon made 
 on the staying power of the horses, and a proper conception 
 of what "condition" really implies has been arrived at. 
 
 This last is the essential point on which everything 
 turns. As long as squadron commanders were judged by 
 the fatness of their horses, as under the old regime, the 
 keener and more ambitions they were, the more certain was 
 the ultimate ruin of the whole arm, for it did not pay 1o show 
 horses in fighting condition, and hence no man who wished 
 to get on in his profession dare train his horses in the long 
 gallops and fast work required by the altered conditions of 
 warfare. 
 
 As soon, however, as this misconception had been 
 removed, the practical knowledge acquired as a consequence 
 of short service had full scope to assert itself, and the squad- 
 ron commanders, being untrammelled in the exercise of their 
 responsibility, soon evolved by competition a system of train 
 ing which utilized every grain of corn and every hour of the 
 day to the fullest extent possible. 
 
 ly pract ical experience i hey found how to apportion the 
 food of the horses to the work 1<> be done, diminishing ihe 
 ration in the winter and increasing it in the summer, when 
 the exertion demanded was greater. And, further, each 
 officer had to learn, on pain of rejection if he failed, how 1o 
 exercise his pow r er of demanding work and inflicting punish- 
 ment in the best possible way. For,if lie asked too much, both 
 men and horses became stale, and if he failed to secure the 
 willing obedience of his subordinates through the abuse of 
 his power, the failure was made manifest by 1he absence of 
 that cheerful alertness in the men that shows the squadron 
 to be really in the hands of the commander, and without 
 which maneuvering of the standard I have seen in Germany 
 is impossible. 
 
 I consider this alertness "appel" the (lei-mans call it 
 the salient characteristic of their whole army, but more 
 especially of their cavalry. Other cavalries may and do 
 show bolder riders, firmer in the saddle, but in none that I 
 have ever seen is there any approach to this extraordinary 
 sympathy between the men and their leader. The squadron 
 
Military Letters and Essays. '^1B 
 
 moves literally as one man, obeying the slightest indication 
 of its leader, and seemingly instinctively adapting itself to 
 <'\ cry variation of pace and direction, exactly as a first-rate 
 orchestra obeys the baton of its conductor. Only those who 
 know by practical experience the difficulties usually insepa- 
 rable from any attempt to maneuver ten or twenty squadrons 
 in which this union between leader and squadron has not 
 been attained will appreciate fully all I mean to convey, but 
 Ihoy. I think, will fully agree with me that without it such 
 performances as I am about to describe would be practically 
 unattainable. 
 
 The first encounter took place between the cavalries of 
 I lie two armies in the vicinity of Miihlhausen, on the 17th of 
 Sept ember. On this day the cavalry division of the Xlth 
 Corps issued from the mountainous district they had been 
 marching through from Tassel and came in contact with the 
 cava.lry covering the IVth Corps advancing from Erfurt. 
 Close to the village of Seebach I came upon a brigade of 
 three regiments belonging to the latter force. Just as I 
 reached them news of the enemy's approach came in, and the 
 brigade moved off westward in rendezvous formation that 
 is. with the three regiments abreast, in line of squadron col- 
 ums at close intervals. From where I stood the ground fell 
 u way to the north and west in gentle undulations; there were 
 no fences or hedges, but in the trough of each undulation 
 lay generally a running stream a couple of feet wide, flow- 
 ing between boggy banks, a few pollard willows indicat- 
 ing its course. Here and there slight outcrops of rock and 
 some patches of low scrub offered further impediments to 
 progress. 
 
 Northward lay the town of Miihlhausen, out of which a 
 chausse'e, bordered with the usual avenue of poplars, ran al- 
 most due west along the crest of a long gentle spur that came 
 down from the distant mountains, and amongst the trees on 
 t he cbausse*e I could detect, by their white cap covers, the en- 
 i niy's patrols. 
 
 The brigade 1 moved off down the slope and across the 
 first of the hollows at a steady uniform trot, crossing the 
 stream in the bottom without losing for a second its sharply 
 
214 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 defined rectangular outline, every horse quiet and steady in 
 its place, uot a sign of that useless expenditure of force in- 
 dicated by plunging, restive horses, which the passage of 
 even the smallest obstacle usually entails. Then tln-y 
 brought up their left shoulders, and in the distance I saw a 
 second brigade belonging to the same division converging on 
 them. Presently they came within supporting distance of 
 one another, and both wheeled up until they fronted north- 
 wards, their horse battery galloped out to the inner flank 
 and unlimbered, and its first round was answered by the 
 enemy's battery in position along the chausse'e. 
 
 The two brigades had meanwhile continued their ad- 
 vance towards the enemy at the same uniform steady pace, 
 their outline as sharply defined as the edges of the squares 
 on a chess-board. But, on hearing the first shot, they 
 opened out into line of squadron column at full interval, at 
 the same time forming two lines in echelon, two-thirds of the 
 whole strength being in the leading echelon. 
 
 Descending into another hollow, they were for a mo- 
 ment hidden from the defender's artillery, but beyond that 
 their further advance would be in the full sweep of his shrap- 
 nel fire. They crossed the brook in the bottom with perfect 
 steadiness, and then, taking advantage of the shelter the 
 rise afforded them, they sounded "line to the front," and the 
 moment this was completed. the"ga11op,"and swept over the 
 brow of the hill in a well-closed-up line and in a long, stretch- 
 ing gallop. For the moment, as they descended into the 
 last hollow between them and the enemy, I lost sight of them ; 
 but presently they reappeared dashing up the further slope 
 at the fullest speed of their horses,but I noticed that the rear 
 rank was no longer quite as well closed up as usual. The 
 inner flank was almost on the road, it seemed to me, when 
 suddenly the two outer squadrons went "troops left wheel," 
 and the head of the column thus formed changed direction to 
 the right. The rest of the first line, followed at a couple of 
 hundred yards by the second ono, dashed over the road 
 ditches, and the whole disappeared behind the screen formed 
 by the trees and into the valley bevond. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 215 
 
 The last round of the guns had been delivered at 200 
 yards range, but the counter-charge, which was actually at- 
 tempted, was masked from my view by the advancing lines. 
 But less than a minute after the troops crossed the road I 
 saw two regiments of white caps and their battery tearing 
 up the slope of the hill beyond, above the line of the trees, 
 and closely followed by three regiments of our own side. 
 Then the "halt" suddenly sounded, the Emperor and staff 
 appeared on the scene, and from all quarters the officers gal- 
 loped up for the critique. I followed over the ground the 
 charge had traversed, and in the hollow in front of the road 
 came upon the cause of the unsteadiness in the rear rank 
 noticed above. This was a broad drainage channel, about 12 
 feet wide and 5 feet deep, cut along the bottom, with slopes of 
 1 by 1 a sufficiently serious obstacle. The horses, by the 
 marks of their feet, had mostly skated down the first 3 feet 
 and then, jumped the remainder clear. Further on I came 
 to the reason for the break into column above alluded to. 
 The road was here scarped out of the side of the hill, and 
 there was a drop of about 13 feet into it. They had seen it 
 only just in time, but, being perfectly in hand, had wheeled 
 off sharp, and the tracks of the outermost horses were not 
 10 feet from the edge. 
 
 But down in the hollow beyond a still greater surprise 
 awaited me, for here ran a stream of water some 6 feet broad, 
 in a trench 40 feet wide from cutting line to cutting line, and 
 at least 12 feet deep, a big "in and out," with running water 
 where one would have wanted to take off. It would have 
 scattered any ordinary hunting-field, but a battery and five 
 regiments of cavalry in all had swept over it, without a sin- 
 gle man down, at the fullest extended speed of their horses. 
 
 I was, unfortunately, unable to see any other of the 
 charges equally closely, but on the following day I saw in the 
 distance a charge by the whole cavalry division of the llth 
 Corps, which caught twelve batteries and a brigade of infant- 
 ry of the 4th Corps in flank and rear, and, in the opinion of 
 the umpires, exterminated both. On the third day, in the 
 fight near Schlottheim, a similar charge was also made, 
 though with less favorable results; and in the final battle of 
 
216 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the whole campaign, when the t\v<> corps united, under the 
 command of the Kmperor, attacked a marked enemy in the 
 country north of Langensal/a, Yon der IManit/, witli sixty 
 squadrons, liurled himself on the right Hank of the enemy, 
 with results which secured the warmest approval of the 
 Emperor. 
 
 I was a little nearer to this last charge, and the sight was 
 one not readily to be forgotten a long black wall, a mile or 
 more in length, moving diagonally across the plain, eating 
 up the ground like the swiftly advancing shadow of an 
 eclipse. Presently, as it struck the enemy, it broke forward. 
 like the surf of a breaker foaming over mcks, and then the 
 dust rose and hid all subsequent movements from sight. 
 
 I afterwards learnt that this attack was meant, in the 
 Napoleonic style, as an attempt to decide the action at any 
 cost, and with this purpose the divisions were formed in four 
 successive lines, and about r>00 yards apart, so that the troops 
 assailed had no time to recover from the confusion created 
 by the first charge before another and another were upon 
 them. 
 
 I was unable to ascertain exactly the distance covered 
 in the three latter charges at full speed, but in the last case it 
 was very considerable, at least 1,500 yards. In the first 
 charge, cavalry /v rx^.v cavalry, I was, however, able to plot 
 the course almost exactly, and I found out that from where 
 the brigade started a t the trot to where the "gallop" sounded 
 was 8,000 yards, and thence to the point the pursuing regi- 
 ments had reached when the halt brought them to a stand 
 was another 1,000 yards: and it is worth while noting that 
 thirty years ago, in the days when fatness, not "condition," 
 was the criterion of efficiency, 1,500 yards at the trot and 800 
 at the gallop was thought to be too much to ask of the horses 
 an ideal to be striven after, but hardly to be attained. 
 
 And these distances wen 1 covered, not by troops fresh 
 out of barracks, but by horses which had already under-gone 
 five weeks of great exertion, which in the last week had ex- 
 ceeded anything asked of them during the 1870 war. A 
 friend of mine who had been through the whole campaign 
 
 that hitherto lie had always considered the davs which 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 2.1 1 
 
 included the battles round Metz the hardest week's work of 
 his life, but that the last six days of this autumn had made 
 greater demands on both men and officers, and they had, of 
 course, none of the excitement of actual war to keep them up. 
 The patrols had been out and away at 2 a. m., riding often 
 seventy miles at a stretch, and the regiments themselves 
 were under arms for .twelve to fourteen hours, and then 
 had to take their turn of outpost duty, while they rarely 
 found shelter at night for more than half the squadrons. 
 
 During the days immediately succeeding the maneu- 
 vers I had ample opportunity of studying the effects of this 
 long-continued hard work on the horses, and was astounded 
 to see how well they had stood it. They were looking thin 
 certainly, and perhaps 5 per cent really required a few days' 
 rest ; but, as a body, they were perfectly fit to have continued 
 at w r ork. In some half-dozen squadrons that I was able to 
 inspect more closely, and the horses of which I saw stripped, 
 I found perhaps 2 per cent of slight sore-back cases, and 
 about the same number of cases of debility; but I neither 
 saw nor heard of a single horse suffering from the former 
 that could not have been treated on the line of march, and 
 ridden further. 
 
 Compared with what I remember to have seen after the 
 maneuvers of 1874 and 1875, when the work done had not 
 been nearly so hard, the contrast was most remarkable. Then 
 I had seen squadrons come back into garrison almost as 
 emaciated and weak as our own came back to Aldershot and 
 Brighton after Egypt, and the general opinion of the officers 
 I met agreed with mine. 
 
 The causes to which this improvement is to be traced 
 are two first, the increased knowledge of the care of horses, 
 which, as above pointed out, has resulted from the substitu- 
 tion of a true standard of "condition" for the old fancy one, 
 and the emulation due to the independence of the squadron 
 leader; and, secondly, the immense improvement in the qual- 
 ity of the remounts supplied from the Government studs. 
 Whether this is due to better management of these establish- 
 ments or to changes in the stamp of sire supplied I am not 
 prepared to say. Formerly Arab sires were almost exclu- 
 sively em ployed, and the progeny of these with the East Frus- 
 
218 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 sian marcs gave a small but exceedingly enduring stamp of 
 horse, which proved its value in the campaign of ISTd. lint 
 of late. I am informed, English thoroughbred stallions have 
 been very largely subst il uled. and the general ojtinion is 
 strongly in their favor; and 1 also learnt that Ihe Knglish 
 thoroughbred stock, bred and reared for a couple of genera- 
 tions in France, is considered 1o be superior for breeding 
 purposes to sires directly imporhMl from Kngland. 
 
 Me this as it may. there can be no doubt that the modern 
 Prussian stud-bred horse is a better type for cavalry pur- 
 poses than any 1 have elsewhere seen. He has all the breed- 
 ing of a good Australian, is better coupled and more compact, 
 and is infinitely more hardy than tin- Walers we see in India. 
 The absence of sore backs cannot. I lake it. be attributed 
 either to belter rilling or better saddles. On 1 he former 
 point little need be said. The (lermans cannot afford to pick 
 their men. and t lie men do not lake as naturally to the saddle 
 as ours. lint the mailer of the saddles deserves at lent ion. 
 for it is the only one in which the (lermans seem 1o be going 
 backward. For years the Cuirassiers and Lancers rode in 
 Ihe Danish saddle, the Hussars and Dragoons in the Hunga- 
 rian. Of the former I have no practical experience; it was 
 quite as heavy and generally objectionable as our own. But 
 the Hungarian saddle, reduced to its simplest form, is the 
 best and simplest type that hitherto has been, or can be. de- 
 vised. It consisted only of two wooden side-bars, united 
 near the extremities by strong front and back arches, con- 
 nected by a 'stout piece of webbing laced down to Ihe side- 
 bars. The horse's blanket, folded in more or less folds, 
 according to the animal's condition, was tirsl placed on the 
 back, {he saddle girthed on, and the man's blanket or 
 sheepskin thrown over the whole and secured by a surcingle. 
 Ordinary wallets in front and a rolled coat behind completed 
 the equipment, and the absolute dead weight carried was re- 
 duced to a minimum. Year by year, however, the original 
 idea of the saddle was lost sight of, and it came to be re- 
 garded merely as a convenient peg on which to hang kit, 
 which would have been better left in the squadron wagons. 
 The wallets became larger, and two large leathern pockets. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 219 
 
 in which a whole change of clothing is stowed, and on w r hich 
 the rider actually sits, were placed over the tree, till at length 
 the weight carried has come to exceed even our own march- 
 ing-order limit; and now, instead of going back to the origi- 
 nal idea, a new saddle very similar to ours, with stuft'ed pan- 
 *els,has been issued for trial, which is, without kit, as heavy as 
 the one w r e are trying to do away with, and seems to me to 
 possess all the disadvantages with which w r e are so well 
 acquainted. 
 
 The saddle did not appear popular with the men, but I 
 rould trace no sore backs to it. Therefore it appears clear to 
 me that, since all three saddles are in their present state de- 
 fective, and yet the proportion of sore backs is almost infin- 
 itesimal, the prevalence of this infirmity in other services 
 is far more due to want of condition than to the saddle itself. 
 
 The Artillery. 
 
 The war of 1870-71 overtook the Prussian artillery at 
 the commencement of its reformation. Its leaders were 
 united as to the employment of great masses of guns and 
 the concentration of their fire against individual objects. 
 But the time at their disposal had been altogether too short 
 to admit of the practical detail on which such combined 
 action depends being adequately worked out. Hence, 
 though the form was frequently attained, the spirit was 
 often missing, and in those instances in which the fire of 
 many batteries was combined on one objective it was as 
 often as not due to the trained tactical common-sense of the 
 battery commanders leading them to select the same tar- 
 gets, and not to any pro-arranged system of co-operation 
 originated by the superior authorities. "Fire discipline" 
 and "ranging" wore then, too, in their infancy. .V school 
 of gunnery on the lines of our Okehampton establishment 
 had been founded about three years before, the expenses of 
 which. Prince Hohenlohe tells us, had been met by private 
 subscription amongst the artillery officers, but it had not 
 been in operation long enough to supply even one trained 
 
-220 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 officer per three batteries, and exclusively affected the Prus- 
 sian batteries, those of the other States being still in an ex- 
 ceedingly backward condition. 
 
 It is not much to be wondered at, therefore, if on many 
 occasions the effect of the German artillery fire appeared to 
 such capable judges as the late General Sheridan, U. S. A., 
 exceedingly email in proportion to the number of batter i<-s 
 engaged. To imagine, however, that these results can be 
 taken as a guide for the effect of artillery fire in tin- m-xi 
 campaign would be a terrible mistake to make. For. apari 
 from the technical improvements in the arm, which alone 
 render it, at a low estimate, five times more effective in man 
 killing power than it was then, we now have to count on bat- 
 teries every one of which has received a uniform training 
 many times superior to \\\\\\\ was Him possible, and all these 
 batteries have been trained to work together by practice on 
 the ranges and in the maneuvers. 
 
 I regret that I am unable to stateat first hand the results 
 of the range practices. The Germans lay great importance 
 on preserving' absolute secrecy about them, and I have al- 
 ways been asked to withdraw before practice commenced, 
 as my presence w r ould compromise my hosts. As rough 
 guides to forming an opinion as to the progress made, it 
 may be useful to note that four minutes is considered ample 
 for ranging with the double-wall percussion shell, a vei \ 
 effective man-killing projectile, and it is said that two min- 
 utes more is always sufficient to change to shrapnel and 
 time-fuse. On the subject of the high-explosive shells 1! 
 strictest reticence is observed; all I know is that they have 
 been in regular use for some years, and have stood satisfac- 
 torily all tests as to durability in store, safety in the limbers, 
 etc. As regards the accuracy of the practice, certain ru- 
 mors were current in England last summer thtit in this 
 respect much was still desirable. I endeavored to ascer- 
 tain the truth of these rumors, and came to the conclusion 
 that they were without foundation; that, on the contrary. 
 the men were taught a uniform system of laying, and that 
 with every year the results were improving. What probably 
 gave rise to the idea was I hat the targets and conditions of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 221 
 
 practice were being made more and more difficult and more 
 in accordance with the necessities of war service. 
 
 Great as is the importance German gunners attach to 
 accurate shooting, they are fully aware that the best shoot- 
 ing in the world is of little avail unless the batteries possess 
 sufficient mobility to insure their coming into action at the 
 right time in the right place; and the progress made in this 
 direction since 1870 is very great indeed. On this point 
 what I saw at the maneuvers enables me to speak at first 
 hand. 
 
 In my previous letter, describing the cavalry encounter 
 at Miihlhausen, I called attention to a horse battery clearing 
 a running stream some 6 feet wide, at the bottom of a cut- 
 ting some 13 feet deep, and, though no other instance of 
 quite so startling a nature came under my eyes, yet I saw 
 enough to convince me that this particular battery was in 
 no way more efficient than the remainder of the horse artil- 
 lery, and that the field batteries ran them very close as re- 
 gards mobility. These latter make far more use of the gal- 
 lop than is the custom in other services, and simply excel in 
 long advances in line at full speed. The same "thrusting" 
 idea is as much a characteristic of this arm as it is of the 
 other two. The lasting impression the maneuvers left on 
 my mind in this respect was that, though the batteries never 
 disdained cover where cover was compatible with good fire- 
 effect, they never hugged it, but always sought to unlimber 
 within the limit of rapidly effective range, like the infantry, 
 on the ground that the surest way to diminish one's ow r n loss 
 is to inflict heavier and more rapid injury on the enemy. 
 
 On one occasion I was fortunate enough to see at close 
 quarters an excellent example of these long advances. Some 
 six batteries, as nearly as I could count them, had formed 
 line under cover, at the edge of a plateau swept by the ene- 
 my's fire. Whilst they were forming, a very small party of 
 staff officers selected their alignment some 1,200 yards to 
 the front, and sent word back to the batteries to advance. 
 This they did, at the fullest extended speed of their horses, 
 in line, their dressing nearly perfect. A small hollow road 
 lay across thoir path, and one or two awkward drainage 
 
222 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 channels, but these were crossed without disorder, and tin* 
 guns reached their allotted position without overcrowding 
 appreciably, halted, unlimbered, and opened lire simultane- 
 ously. This was the only instance in which 1 was snlti 
 ciently close at hand to judge the driving and drill, both of 
 which were excellent, but on two other occasions L saw in 
 the distance similar long advances at speed made 1 by several 
 batteries united. There was no rigid adherence to rule in 
 this maneuvering in the larger units, and wherever the 
 ground permitted the batteries found their way into their 
 positions individually by the shortest line and the best way 
 they could. 
 
 In action no special rule seemed to govern the position 
 of the wagons; sometimes 1 saw them formed in column 
 immediately behind the outer Hanks of the battery, but 
 more generally those of the first line were brought up, one 
 in rear of the interval between each pair of guns, and at 
 some 60 to 80 yards distance, and the ammunition served 
 out direct from them, and not from the limbers, winch WT<- 
 always, when possible, withdrawn under cover. 
 
 The fire-discipline in moments of tactical important- 
 when rapid tire was called for was excellent, and the guns 
 were served with a smartness almost equal to what I have 
 seen on the gun-deck of the Excellent , and nowhere else. 
 During the long periods of preparation and of the artillery 
 duel, when shortness of ammunition supply compels the tire 
 to be merely indicated by an occasional round, it is almost 
 needless to say. this high tension was relaxed, but even then 
 each gun was properly laid before being tired, and never 
 once did I see any of the fictitious smartness so dear to the 
 old school of general officers, which consisted in galloping 
 up with loaded guns and firing the first round almost before 
 the trail touched the ground. 
 
 The number of roads generally available and the com- 
 paratively small number of troops engaged rendered it un- 
 necessary to call on the artillery for any long movements in 
 columns of route at the trot. At any rate, there were no 
 cases of ten and fifteen miles being covered on end at that 
 speed. The preparation of the horses far such distance-. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 22 3 
 
 and even longer ones, lias, however, been by no means neg- 
 lected, and the arm is in a position to satisfy even greater 
 demands than were made on it in this respect in 1870. 
 
 In those days the idea that such long marches at a high 
 iate of speed were absolutely necessary to insure the timely 
 formation of the great artillery lines was still ne>v, even in 
 Prussia, and unknown in the smaller States. Further, the 
 small number of guns horsed in peace, only four per battery, 
 necessarily prevented a uniform condition of training in 
 the horses, the time between the declaration of the w r ar and 
 the first engagements being altogether too short to admit 
 of its attainment. The "cult of the fat horse," too, was as 
 rife and as prejudicial here as it was in the cavalry, and the 
 horses themselves were of an inferior stamp to those which, 
 thanks to the money sunk years ago in the Government 
 studs, are now available. 
 
 All these drawbacks have since been minimized, if not 
 altogether swept away. The horses, though still looking 
 very light for draught purposes, are well bred and possess 
 great endurance. Six guns and a variable number of wag- 
 ons being fully horsed, fewer augmentation horses are re- 
 quired on mobilization than formerly, and a battery com- 
 mander who dared to show his horses in the old-fashioned 
 condition of sleekness would certainly be relieved of his 
 responsibilities next morning. 
 
 It is important, too, to note that the system of pole 
 draught is still adhered to. It is admitted that, theoret- 
 ically, where sufficiently powerful wheelers are available, 
 shaft draught may be preferable, but, practically, it is held 
 that in action the advantage of being able to interchange 
 the horses from the wheel to lead or center rapidly is of far- 
 greater importance, whilst, as a fact, pole draught gives as 
 high a degree of mobility as is required. I wish to draw no 
 comparison between our own and the German artillery in 
 this respect; but it is worth while remembering that our old 
 Indian artillery also adhered to the pole draught, which 
 had been tested in action times innumerable, and were fully 
 equal in rapidity of movement over difficult ground to their 
 comrades of the Royal Horse Artillery, and, further, that 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the shaft draught lias never been tested under conditions at 
 all approaching those of a modern engagement since its 
 introduction. 
 
 With reference to I he question of the use of smokeless 
 powder by the artillery, J found the general idea to be that it 
 was all a gain to the side which thought more of killing its 
 enemy than of avoiding being killed itself. It enormously 
 facilitates the maintenance of tire-discipline within the bat- 
 tery, permits of continuous lire even at the most rapid rate, 
 for no smoke interferes with the laying, and above all things 
 cheers the hearts of the men by enabling them to see the re- 
 sults of their lire. As a means of concealment it is of n<> 
 value at all, for, even at extreme ranges tit 5,000 yards and 
 upwards, the llash of discharge is always distinctly visible, 
 and at fighting ranges the llash enables one to note exactly 
 the position of th<' enemy's gun, which was not always possi- 
 ble with the old powder, for the smoke obscured the object, 
 'and prevented one's picking up an exact point to aim at. 
 Indirect laying may, indeed, be resorted to, and then the con- 
 cealment would be perfect, but 1 found it little in favor, and 
 the new howitzers are expected to deal with it when it oc- 
 curs. As regards the cooperation of the artillery with the 
 infantry, nothing was left to be desired. One common in- 
 stinct seemed to guide the two. In the earlier stages of an 
 action the infantry always waited for the guns to do their 
 work, and during this period the infantry were almost in- 
 visible on either side nothing but long lines of batteries 
 w;ere to be seen by the spectator trying to take in the gen 
 eral situation. Once, however, the infantry commenced 
 their attack and it was the guns that waited on them. 
 Never once did I see an occasion on which the support of 
 artillery was called for, without it being already at hand, 
 either in action or moving up. If their lire was called for, 
 the artillery shirked no losses to render it effective, and 
 crowded the guns together at even less than half interval, 
 to bring the maximum possible number to bear; and with 
 the same object in view they fired over each other, and over 
 the infantry, up to the last moment possible. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 The General Staff. 
 
 The General Staff of the German Army is too wide a 
 theme to discuss here. All that space permits me to do is to 
 point out the principal causes which have led to its efficiency. 
 It is a point of honor in the regiments concerned only to 
 submit the names of such officers for examination to the 
 corps commanders as are likely to make thoroughly sound 
 staff officers, and be a credit to the regiments themselves. 
 The officers thus selected undergo an examination carefully 
 framed to elicit what the candidate does know, and whether 
 he can really think, or is merely gifted with a retentive mem- 
 ory. The best men are then selected by the chief of the gen- 
 eral staff himself. The principle, therefore, is selective, not 
 competitive. The fortunate candidates then attend the 
 *'Kriegs Akademie," or Staff College, for three years, during 
 which they pass through a course of practical training which 
 differs from that in vogue in other countries much as the 
 education of a man who wishes to become a senior wrangler 
 differs from that of an engineer the former devoting him- 
 self specially to pure mathematics, ignoring friction and the 
 strength of materials in his calculations; the latter know- 
 ing that to him these are the very essence of his practical 
 success. What friction and strength of materials are to the 
 engineer, knowledge of men and all that relates to their 
 fare, movement, and supply is to the staff officer; and to 
 prevent his losing touch with the men and degenerating 
 into an office man or pedant, each officer who eventually 
 secures appointment has to return to the troops for two or 
 more years after each tour of staff duty. 
 
 Office work throughout the whole army being decen- 
 tralized to the utmost extent possible, a staff officer has time 
 to devote himself to the practical side of his business, and 
 as a consequence a very high degree of excellence has been 
 attained in all that relates to the combatant duties of the 
 staff, and of these the writing of orders for tactical pur- 
 poses stands first. I have had many opportunities of exam- 
 ining these, both on this and on previous occasions, and what 
 cannot fail to strike one about them is their businesslike 
 precision. Never a word +o much, and rarely one that 
 
226 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 could be altered with advantage, and never is the sphere of 
 command of the next grade of the order interfered with. 
 The quickness and rapidity with which they arc given is 
 equally noteworthy. Where the ordinary start' officer, ac- 
 customed only to the formulas of "The troops will parade 
 for divine service as follows," or "A district court-martial 
 will assemble," etc., would require to return to his quarters 
 and refer to the text-books, laid aside since he passed his 
 last examination, the German start officer will receive his 
 outpost reports, and on the strength of them dictate his 
 orders for his chief's signature from the saddle. 
 
 The test put on them this year is admitted to have been 
 the most severe ever yet exacted of them in peace-time, for 
 in no previous maneuvers have the conditions approached 
 those of active service more closely. Beyond fixing the dis- 
 trict in which the operations were to take place, there was 
 no prearrangement whatever, but every night the orders 
 were issued on the basis of the outpost reports received, the 
 umpire staff only introducing reports of imaginary events 
 necessary to keep them within the limits of the ground. 
 The reports were rarely all in before midnight, and hence 
 the divisions only received their orders bet ween 1 and li a.m., 
 the brigades perhaps an hour later. Obviously complaints 
 would have been numerous had not each start' been thor- 
 oughly tip to its work. Such complaints, however, did not 
 occur, and since the divisions worked like clockwork to- 
 gether, it is pretty evident that there was no cause for 
 them. 
 
 No maneuvers, however great the latitude allowed to 
 commanders, or however extended the area of ground avail- 
 able, are of any real value unless the duties of the umpire 
 staff are thoroughly well performed; hence the greatest 
 care is exercised in the selection of officers for this purpose, 
 and the Kmperor himself officiated as chief umpire. Of the 
 less exalted members of this branch T can only say that they 
 were always on the spot when required, and their decisions 
 were clear and at once 'obeyed. Of the chief umpire's crit- 
 iques, of course, I can only speak from hearsay, but I had 
 many opportunities of hearing them discussed by competent 
 
Military Letters and Essays. JCT 
 
 nieii of considerable rank, and they were universally consid- 
 ered to have been admirable even the beaten side 
 admitted it. 
 
 In no instance was there any possibility for suspecting 
 prearrangements. The Emperor dealt with the things as 
 they happened from the saddle, and so immediately after 
 the event itself that there could be no question as to the 
 originality of the opinions he expressed. The impression 
 produced on the two corps which maneuvered before him 
 W 7 as excellent for these had not previously been inspected 
 by him and, needless to say, there had been many an 
 anxious doubt expressed, even by men in high position, in 
 strictest confidence of course, as to whether this exceedingly 
 young leader, who had never seen a shot fired in anger, \vas 
 really a serious and capable judge of tactics or not; but 
 that he is both, his conduct of the recent maneuvers has 
 settled beyond dispute. 
 
 In the foregoing columns 1 have endeavored to present 
 as clear a picture as possible of the progress made by the 
 three arms since 1870. Limits of space alone have com- 
 pelled me to pass over the equal advance made in the sub- 
 sidiary services, the engineers, the railway battalions and 
 fortress troops, telegraphs, supply, and sanitary services; 
 and in making the comparison it must be remembered that 
 the efficiency of an army as a whole is the product of the 
 efficiency of all the above factors, and not merely their sum, 
 for all are so closely interwoven, and touch each other at 
 so many different points, that failure in one may entail the 
 collapse of the whole. 
 
 In 1870 the German Army was still a very heterogene- 
 ous assemblage of units; now it is a homogeneous one. 
 Then not one single arm was really on a. level with the re- 
 quirements of the arms then in use: the infantry were mark- 
 edly inferior to their enemy in armament, and had not dis- 
 covered the true secret of discipline viz., the individual 
 education of the soldier: the cavalry was still in a back- 
 ward condition they neither knew the limits of the endur- 
 ance of their horses, nor were they trained to move in the 
 larger bodies, such as brigades and divisions, and, worst of 
 
228 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 all, they were still under the influence of the old Napoleonic 
 dogma that "cavalry cannot charge unshaken infantry"; 
 the artillery, though they were better armed than their ad- 
 versary, had only grasped the idea which was to guide their 
 employment, arid had not mastered the details; and, finally, 
 the staff as a body was only really efficient in its highest 
 ranks. Now all this is changed: the infantry are equally 
 well armed, and have tapped a new source of strength no 
 other nation has yet discovered; the cavalry know what 
 they can do as regards endurance, and have learnt by experi- 
 ence that the question whether infantry arc unshaken or 
 not can only be decided by the event, not judged by appear- 
 ances, and they know now how to report and whom to report 
 to; the artillery can now rely on executing what was for- 
 merly only a pious wish on the pan of i lu-ir leaders; and the 
 excellence of the staff has had time to pem-irair rvm into 
 the lowest grades of the institution. 
 
 As the German Army now stands, I believe it to be the 
 most perfect engine of war ever yet put together. The parts 
 are better balanced; the material in its ultimate molecules, 
 the men, is better; each man is thoroughly forged, and the 
 friction in the moving parts, thanks to the staff, is reduced 
 to as low a limit as is possible as long as human nature re- 
 mains what it is. 
 
 The question only rejuains, Why has it been possible 
 to produce these results in Germany alone? For, with a 
 considerable knowledge of the other armies of Europe, I 
 assert that it nowhere else exists. And the only answer I 
 can find is this: The German Army is exactly suitable to 
 the conditions of its environment. No copy of it can ever 
 be the same, for the same conditions nowhere else exist. 
 These conditions are first, an extraordinary sense of duty 
 to the country in all ranks, the lesson taught them by the 
 events of 1806, and exceedingly well learnt; secondly, an 
 aristocracy sufficient in number to supply a nearly homo- 
 geneous class of junior officers from men born to command; 
 thirdly, the possibility, due to tho existence of this aristoc- 
 racy, of delegating responsibility to all ranks, which insures 
 the existence of practical soldiers, thoroughly acquainted 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 229 
 
 with every detail of their service the first guarantee for 
 excellence in the staff, and the most thorough check conceiv- 
 able on the propagation of faddists; fourthly and last, the 
 entire absence of cliques amongst the officers, and their thor- 
 ough loyalty and confidence in the fairness and military 
 judgment of the ''War Lord." 
 
 The last is the most important of all, and it must be ad- 
 mitted that the danger three years ago was very imminent, 
 for, if confidence in the capacity and justice of the Emperor 
 were once shaken, the keystone on which the whole struct- 
 ure depends would be withdrawn. Favoritism and self- 
 interest would then have crept in, and with them would 
 have vanished the very conception of duty for duty's sake. 
 This point can never be too frequently reiterated. Within 
 the limits prescribed by the material of which the Army is 
 built up, efficiency depends absolutely on the strength of 
 the sentiment of loyalty amongst the officers to the Crown; 
 for the work demanded of them can never be obtained for 
 money, even if nations were prepared to pay the market 
 value of the officers' services. 
 
 Civilians may demur to this reasoning, but let them try 
 the work and see. They may argue that our great railways 
 obtain the best that men can give them for their services, 
 and at the market rate; but they forget. that the railway is 
 always, so to speak, on active service, and men are dealing 
 with conditions as they actually are, and not training to 
 meet emergencies which may never arise within their own 
 lifetime. Imagine the Northwestern Kailway running only 
 three trains a day out of Euston, but maintaining half its 
 present staff and passing them on to a reserve, on the chance 
 that some day they* would suddenly be called on to deal with 
 a traffic equal to that of August. Would they be able to get 
 the same work out of their men that they now do? I fancy 
 not ; for practical men paid at a practical rate would take a 
 common-sense view of the matter, and decline to overwork 
 themselves accordingly. What cannot be effected bypracti- 
 cal common-sense can be carried through by sentiment, and 
 in peace-time the only sentiment which can be relied on to 
 unite men in one aim is lovaltv to the Crown. 
 
*J30 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 MARrillXG THROUGH TIU'RIMMA. 
 
 Perhaps the pleasantest part of the whole period of the 
 maneuvers was the march home through the Thuringian 
 Forest. I was offered, and accepted, a horse and quart ITS 
 if I would join a squadron and accompany them on their 
 homeward march, of course I was warned that my quarters 
 were not likely to be equal to those in Ilie best hotels, and 
 that I must expect 1o rough it, but I thought I had had as 
 much experience under that head as most men, and was not 
 at all appalled at the prospect, and willingly agreed to come 
 with them. We marched on the morning of the Monday fol- 
 lowing the close of tin- active operations from Sonneborn, a 
 little place near Gotha, where the squadron had lain over 
 Sunday. I had gone out to join them over night, and came 
 in for a village ball given to the men by the inhabitants, 
 and in its way it was about the most amusing thing T ever 
 saw. T may mention that nearly every village in these parts 
 has a large public hall for dancing or music, and in propor- 
 tion to the size of the villages and apparent well-to-dom-ss 
 of the inhabitants, these rooms are really excellent, many 
 of them with first-rate boarded floors, good enough for any 
 dancers, and the one in which was the dance I am about to 
 describe was very spacious, capable of holding 200 couples 
 with ease. \Ve ourselves had tumbled on excellent quar- 
 ters with an old Hanoverian baron, who. when he heard that 
 nn Englishman who spoke (ierman was going to march with 
 the party next day. had at once sent in a carriage and a 
 pressing invitation tn come out and .join them at once, and 
 he received me with the kindest and most courteous hospi- 
 tality, and after supper we all went down to see the ball- 
 room. It was pretty well crammed, every peasant within 
 reach, and of course all the women, having come in for the 
 fun. The latter all wore their costumes, and as the stamp of 
 features which characterizes the district, though not ex- 
 actly pretty, is good, honest, and above all things healthy, 
 the effect of the whole was most excellent. The squadron 
 commander said he really must present his squadron prop- 
 erly to his host and me, and so called his sergeant-major. 
 
Military Letters ana Essays, 231 
 
 who, of course, was master of the ceremonies, and ordered 
 a "kaiser parade," an order which was received with much 
 cheering and applause. The squadron took their partners 
 and formed up for marching past, two couples abreast, the 
 band played their "walk-past," and the whole then ranked 
 past in "parade marsch," the men saluting and the girls 
 kissing their hands; this last -.was de rigueur, and was the 
 greatest fun imaginable, the girls giggling and blushing, 
 and some hiding their faces with confusion when the critical 
 moment approached, but it all went off in the best manner, 
 and I did not see a single bold or vulgar-looking girl in the 
 room. Then they trotted and cantered past, the last being 
 done by a "chassee" step, and when they reached the further 
 wheeling-point, they walked off down the room, forming a 
 "melee"; then the "rally" was sounded, they re-formed in 
 line across the room, and then, the captain taking the stout 
 young landlady as his partner, the whole advanced in re- 
 view order, halted, saluted or kissed hands according to sex, 
 and the whole broke up into a waltzing mass amidst roars 
 of applause. Nothing could have gone off with more spirit 
 or laughter, and nowhere could one see officers, non-com- 
 missioned officers, and men on better terms with one another. 
 To say the German discipline is soul-killing, degrading, etc., 
 is a uiosi ridiculous libel. I can speak with some experi- 
 ence now, and can only reiterate that nowhere have I seen 
 in >i-e universal mutual kindliness between the ranks than 
 everywhere in Germany where I have been. After this we 
 withdrew for a bit, and nearly came in for witnessing about 
 the only sort of misconduct that ever upsets the German 
 soldier not drunkenness, T am happy to say, but the in- 
 evitable consequence of the female preference for uniform 
 to plain clothes. A number of the young village dogs felt 
 aggrieved at the undisguised admiration their young women 
 bestowed on the dragoons, and the consequence was very 
 near being a genuine street row. However, the non-com- 
 missioned officers and village police stepped in, the latter 
 running the plain-clothes contingent in very promptly, re- 
 minding them that their conduct was most impolite to the 
 soldiers, who were the guests of the village, and the crowd 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 was brokeu. up without serious consequences. No notice 
 was afterwards taken of the affair by either police or the 
 soldiers, and the matter quietly dropped. Human nature is 
 much the same even \\ here, and the cause is as old as the 
 hills. 
 
 Next morning we marched to a little village at the foot 
 of the mountains, the men so overladen with good things 
 given them by their hosts of the night before that they were 
 eating all the way, and probably they had a good deal of 
 lost time to make up, as the work had been so hard the pre vi- 
 ous week, fourteen to sixteen hours under arms, if not all 
 the time in the saddle, and the country so overcrowded 
 with men that they must have got considerably in urn-Mrs 
 with their food supply. [ know I had myself done so. Our 
 new quarters were in a large, straggling, and very primi- 
 tive village, and there w r as abundance of room for the men 
 so much so that many houses got off with no soldiers at all, 
 whilst the others only received two or three apiece, and the 
 people (not all of them, but still some who had no soldiers 
 to entertain) came and complained that they had been ex- 
 empted. "Last time," they said, ''that troops came through, 
 we had some to look after, and we treated them well : what 
 have we done that we should be forgotten this time? \Ve 
 have boys in the army too, and would like to return the kind- 
 ness they say they have elsewhere received. It is our duty 
 and we like it." And looking at their faces, there could be 
 no doubt as to the genuineness of their wish, for these vil- 
 lagers are as straight as they make them, and speak the 
 truth without any circumlocution. My friend and I found 
 quarters-at the village schoolmaster's, an old soldier of 1870, 
 wounded twice at Worth and once on the Loire; he was an 
 exceedingly interesting, well-informed man, and the books 
 in his room showed a very high standard of culture, political 
 and literary. His hospitality was boundless, and he hon- 
 estly gave the best the place afforded, and it was very good 
 indeed; and next morning he refused to accept a brass far- 
 thing, even the Government allowance to which he was en- 
 titled, for one of us. Next day's march was a glorious one, 
 over a mountain ridge rising 3,500 feet above our starling- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 233 
 
 point. First we passed through magnificent beech forests, 
 the trees growing straight up some 80 feet without a branch, 
 and running some 2 feet 6 inches in diameter. Then we got 
 among tlie pines, and into an atmosphere like an October 
 morning at Simla; indeed, the big pines reminded one so of 
 the deodars that I almost fancied myself back there again, 
 and found myself wondering what I should do when I ar- 
 rived. We were marching by the road which Luther took 
 when he returned from Warms, and half way we passed 
 near a stone set up to mark the spot where he was waylaid 
 and carried a prisoner to the Wajrtburg near Eisenach, a few 
 miles north of our path. We halted here for breakfast, and 
 as we had part of the band with us, it played to us for a bit, 
 and then those who wished w r ere allowed to go and look at 
 the monument, about which all seemed interested. Again 
 the men were so overladen with good things that the -halt 
 had to be prolonged to give them a chance of getting through 
 them all, and when at length we moved on, I never saw men 
 look more thoroughly happy and contented. 
 
 We passed by some lovely old castles, and at Altenstein 
 one of the subalterns took me to see a hunting-lodge of the 
 Duke of Weimar, and a lovelier spot I have seldom seen, 
 not the least attractive point about it being the ^exquisite 
 turf and lawns by which it was surrounded, a thing the 
 absence of which spoils, as a rule, the best of German coun- 
 try houses; but the secret of this was, I learnt, a Scotch 
 gardener. From here we descended an almost precipitous 
 slope, with gray rock cropping out through breaks in the 
 forest, by a most perfectly graded and maintained road; 
 indeed, throughout the march I was struck by the excellence 
 and ingenuity of their road engineers, and I wished the idiot 
 who laid out the Murree-Pindi cart road had previously 
 studied under one of their number; much needless suffering 
 to "tonga <M ponies and the poor old "byles" might thereby have 
 been spared, and the sum of animal misery largely dimin- 
 ished. Our next quarters looked at first forbidding, but 
 again we fell on our feet, for we found on our arrival an 
 invitation to lunch and dinner at the house of a gentleman 
 in the neighborhood, and on my friend riding on to explain 
 
284 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 
 
 my presence, lie found his host's wife was an Irish lady, 
 who sent me the warmest welcome. Our host, though a 
 native of the district, had been in the Austrian service for 
 some years, and remembered an old friend of mine, Colonel 
 Xeville, of Hyderabad, very well. The former had left the 
 Austrian service in 1860, and afterwards held a high position 
 at the court at Meiningen. In 1870 he had gone to the war as 
 a "Johanniter" to look after the wounded and had then been 
 appointed as preset to one of the occupied districts of France, 
 and as an instance of the mildness and tact with which in 
 some places the conquerors ruled, I may mention that during 
 the year or more he held office, not one single Frenchman 
 was arrested by the police or otherwise harassed for political 
 reasons; of course, the average number of criminals had to 
 be dealt with, but the French looked after them by their own 
 tribunals. But his .reminiscences of tin* Austrian cavalry 
 were to me the most interesting, and he told mi* that, excel- 
 lent as the old Austrian cavalry were in all drills and move- 
 ments, the improvement in the Prussian ami Herman caval- 
 ries has put the latter far ahead of the former in all-round 
 efficiency. The old Austrian cavalry, it will be remembered, 
 maneuvered without squadron intervals, with all officers in 
 the ranks, had no "base" in our sense of the word, and it an- 
 swered admirably; yet he considered the Herman system of 
 dressing from the troop leaders (equally without a "base") to 
 be far better adapted to present requirements. 
 
 Next day I left the squadron to pay a visit by rail to 
 Eisenach, intending to rejoin it the following day by the 
 same means of communication. I found an excellent hotel, 
 and being favored by weather, enjoyed my trip amazingly. 
 To people who want to find a pleasant and economical 
 summer retreat whilst home on furlough in England, I can- 
 not do better than recommend either Eisenach itself or some 
 of the numerous mineral w r atering-places in its vicinity. Of 
 these I visited Fredericksroda and Liebenstein, two beauti- 
 fully situated places with springs warranted to cure any- 
 thing; the accommodation is equal to the best in Homburg 
 or Wiesbaden, the sanitary arrangements thoroughly sound, 
 and the prices just about half what one has to pay in these 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 235 
 
 more fashionable places. At Eisenach itself I found a real- 
 ly excellent "kuranstatt," newly built, large and roomy, fur- 
 nished as civilized places should be, which is by no means al- 
 ways the case even in such well-known places as those above 
 mentioned, and situated in such exquisite scenery, moun- 
 tains, castles, rocks, forests, etc,, that one could hardly de- 
 sire more. As for the historic and legendary interest of 
 the country, it is wide enough to meet all tastes, from those 
 who wish to see the room where Luther translated the Bible 
 to those who prefer expeditions to the Venusberg in search 
 of the enchanted cave that Tannhauser wearied of. The 
 mention of the last-named place need cause mothers no anx- 
 iety, for if the goddess ever did live there, she has left little 
 trace of her loveliness on the inhabitants. 
 
 When I rejoined the squadron next day, w T hich for them 
 had been a day of rest, I found my quarters fixed at a neigh- 
 boring chateau which belonged to a "graf," a soldier of 
 course. The house was full for a shooting-party, but they 
 would not hear of my going to the village inn, but took me 
 in with almost Arab hospitality. At dinner I met an old gen- 
 eral, who for many years had been in the historic section of 
 the general staff, and who is at present engaged in further 
 researches into the Waterloo campaign. From him I learnt 
 a great deal in confirmation of the views as to the evolution 
 of the German Army that I have endeavored to bring out in 
 those columns, more particularly with regard to the gradual, 
 growth of the independence of the company leader. A s with 
 us, in the days when the purchase system originated, the cap- 
 tains had been fully responsible for the administration 
 and fighting training of their companies, but the introduc- 
 tion of battalion line tactics had disestablished them. The 
 battalion was told off on parade into eight or more divisions, 
 irrespective of the strength or number of the companies, and 
 the captains no longer necessarily commanded the same men 
 as they did when in quarters. The consequence was that all 
 responsibility for the fighting efficiency passed into the 
 hands of the colonel and sergeant-major. What broke this 
 system, which still partially obtains with us,was the introduc- 
 tion of short sevice, which, by inundating the battalion with 
 
236 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 recruits, rendered the old plan of training them by specialist > 
 i. e., adjutants, riding-masters for the cavalry, etc. abso- 
 lutely unworkable,and the captains had again to be called on 
 to do their share of the work. This entailed on them the obli- 
 gation of learning themselves in order to teach others, and it 
 was this system which gave to Germany the number of 
 sound common-sense, practical regimental officers who form 
 the strength of her army, and whose absence in our own 
 army Lord Wolseley is so constantly deploring. Why not. 
 therefore, extend the same system in our own service? Tin- 
 example of the 19th Hussars proves its adaptability to our 
 conditions. 
 
 Our party comprised several ladies, ami when, after din- 
 ner,!! turned out that the stranger within their gates was not 
 unsympathetic to German music, we had a very good time in- 
 deed, and eventually fell back on the old collection of Ger- 
 man "volkslieder," and sang it through from cover to cover. 
 Next morning the inmates of the chateau and of the village. 
 the female sex predominating, turned out to see us off, and 
 we marched away, our band playing the German equivalent 
 of "The Girl I Left Behind Me," which, on the whole, if less 
 rollicking in tone, is more sentimental and better adapted to 
 the circumstances. 
 
 I may here mention a custom of the German service 
 that struck me as peculiarly pleasant and soldierly. Every 
 morning when the captain rode down to take over the squad 
 ron, he greeted them with "Good morning, Dragoons," to 
 which they all replied with a shout, "Good morning, Herr 
 Rittineister." The same custom applies in all superior 
 grades, and in addition to the kindness of sentiment it ex- 
 presses, it has a distinct practical value in enabling one to 
 gauge the men's feelings. There is all the difference in 1 lie- 
 world between the response evoked by a good man whose 
 men are cheery and contented, and the perfunctory, by-order 
 sort of answer an unpopular man receives. 
 
 This was my last day's march with the squadron, for it 
 was to bring us to Fulda, on the main line back to England, 
 and it was a day I shall not readily forget. The weather was 
 glorious and the country enchanting, and the men in even 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 237 
 
 better spirits than before, and they sang their good old sol- 
 dierly songs with a will that went to one's heart. I had got 
 quite attached to them, and felt quite sorry to leave them. 
 Their straightforward independence of character, and the 
 way they looked you straight in the face, answering any 
 question with perfect self-assurance and not a trace of servil- 
 ity, went straight to my heart. To say they are crushed 
 under the iron rod of discipline is the greatest lie ever pub- 
 lished; the exact opposite is the case. They are good sol- 
 diers because they are treated and trusted like men, and 
 have become self-reliant, independent agents disciplined, 
 because common sense and education teaches them that 
 combined action is a necessity in all conditions of life, and 
 only a fool kicks against necessary restraint. 
 
 It is equally wide from the truth to assert that the iron 
 hrel of a military despotism is turning them into socialists. 
 Socialists many old soldiers, in Germany may be, in the 
 sense that they will support the party with their votes that 
 promises them the same freedom that British labor has long 
 enjoyed, and which, provided the law is strong enough to en- 
 force fair play between both parties, is in itself an excellent 
 thing. In that sense the Emperor himself is a socialist, but 
 both Emperor and soldiers know the value of a strong 
 Government and disciplined obedience too well to listen for 
 a moment to the rabid howl of the proletariat press, princi- 
 pally recruited from the ranks of those whose defective phys- 
 ique and superabundant imbecility have prevented their pas- 
 sage through the great national university; and, if the occa- 
 sion should arise, I have not the least doubt in my mind that 
 every one of those amongst the soldiers who for their imme- 
 diate interest may now be voting for socialist candidates 
 would fall in with their old steadiness and shoot the anarch- 
 ists and their followers down without the slightest moment- 
 ary hesitation. But Fulda was reached in due course, 
 and I said good-bye to my friends and took my seat in the 
 train to Mainz, and on the way made the acquaintance of an 
 old German gentleman, who confirmed in conversation the 
 views I have expressed above. 
 
 I staid a night in Mainz to meet an old friend, an infant- 
 ry officer and an Englishman, from whom I received many 
 
238 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 useful facts as to the performances during- the five-weeks 
 campaign. They were indeed extraordinary. Day after day 
 the men had been under arms for nine hours at a stretch, 
 and on the last three, which wound up the business, had 
 every morning paraded at 5:30 a. in., and not got back to 
 quarters till G p. in. The heat had IMMMI very great and i he 
 mountainous country most trying. One action in pursuit 
 was exceptionally trying, and the conduct of the oppos 
 ing rear guard most excellent, and again and again they 
 came up with him; the lotteries on both sides came into ac- 
 tion, the heads of the columns closed up, but each time as t he 
 advance was about to commence the ninny slipped away 
 and the weary pursuit began again. Measured as nearly as 
 w r e could by the map, the distance traversed in full marching 
 order, on a hot day, up and down steep hills and through for- 
 ests, was fully twenty-five miles, and to this six more should 
 be added for the mere distance involved in the tactical ma- 
 neuvers which could not be measured exactly. 
 
 Of the changes due to the new powder, or which were 
 prophesied as its consequence, I saw little, both in France 
 and Germany. Batteries in action were clearly discernible 
 by the flash up to ten thousand yards, and as regards 1 he in- 
 fantry, though only on one occasion did I notice the scin- 
 tillating sparkle of the flashes which had struck me so much 
 last year at Metz, still, as long as European troops remain 
 what they are, and fail to come up to the ideal of the Red In 
 dian skirmisher, they will practically always be sufficient 1\ 
 visible to men with decent eyesight. Your tactical training 
 and common sense tell you where to look, and the thin blue 
 haze or occasional flash then soon clears up the mystery. A s 
 to the advantage it confers on the side which means 1<> kill. 
 and not merely to avoid killing, the gain is incalculable, for 
 you see your target before you and your men around you. 
 and the maintenance of fire-discipline is many times more 
 easy than formerly. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 239 
 
 THE PANICS AT GRAVELOTTE. 
 I. 
 
 Those who remember the original correspondent's re- 
 ports of the war of 1870 will recall numerous references to 
 a condition of panic prevailing in the German Army during 
 the battle of Gravelotte (18th August), which it is exceed- 
 ingly difficult to reconcile with the official history subse- 
 quently published by the stall' a work which, to our mis- 
 fortune, it has been somewhat the custom of our tactical 
 teachers to accept as a species of revelation, no word of which 
 is to be questioned. A new work by Captain Hoenig, one 
 of the ablest military writers of his country, entitled "Twenty- 
 four Hours Of Moltke's Strategy," has recently been brought 
 out, which sheds considerable light not only on the question 
 of the panics, but also on the whole subject of the method of 
 fighting or tactics of the Germans during this war. It has 
 been a great hindrance to our tactical evolution that we have 
 always assumed that the Germans fought in a certain man- 
 ner becauseduereflectiou had convinced their ablest thinkers 
 that this manner was the right one, whereas the truth really 
 was they assumed this form because want of tactical train- 
 ing (particularly in their leaders) and a markedly inferior 
 armament compelled them to fight the best way they could, 
 and not as they would have wished to; and since the war, 
 whilst we have been endeavoring to copy their system or, 
 rather, want of system on the grounds of practical experi- 
 ence on the Franco-German battle-fields, ever since the first 
 flush of enthusiasm spent itself, their leading thinkers, 
 Meckel, Von Scherff, etc., as publicists, and their generals as . 
 practical instructors on the parade-grounds, have been going 
 on the opposite tack. "We won in 1870," they say, "in spite 
 of our want of skill in handling troops, not by reason of it; 
 let us make clear to ourselves the causes which led to our 
 severe losses, and work to eradicate them." 
 
 As long as the senior officers who conducted that cam- 
 paign were 1 alive, the criticism needed to bring out these 
 causes was very difficult to exercise; it is still difficult to 
 state in plain language what actually happened on many 
 
240 Military Letters and Essays 
 
 battle-fields witness the storm raised by Meckel's now well- 
 known "Midsummer-Night's Dream." Hoenig, however, 
 who is a reserve officer, and has already done good service 
 in this cause by his study, "The Two Brigades/' is absolutely 
 fearless, and speaks his view of the truth in the most vigor- 
 ous manner, tearing and rending the unfortunate official 
 history till it has hardly a rag left to cover its nakedness, at 
 least with regard to this particular battle. 
 
 He was not a spectator of the fight, it is true (he was 
 badly wounded at Vionville two days previously), but he has 
 studied the ground with the utmost care, and has collected 
 avast mass of information from eye-witnesses and regimental 
 histories, and uses this evidence with, to my mind, great care 
 and judgment. It is frequently objected to his work that it 
 is very easy to be wise after the event, and Hoenig would ha \ < 
 done no better himself under the circumstances, but this 
 objection is entirely beside the point in this class of military 
 work, the purpose of which is simply to find out the truth, 
 state the causes of the incidents, and by study learn to avoid 
 them in future. And this he has done in a masterly manner. 
 The title of the work seems to me misleading, it is in a far 
 greater degree a tactjcal rather than a strategic study, but 
 some of the lights he gives us are invaluable for understand- 
 ing the strategical movements of the 17th and 18th of 
 August. Chief amongst these I should place the influence 
 the great age of the King had in the choice of headquarters, 
 and how this choice reacted on the conduct of operations. It 
 must have struck many readers of the official account as 
 curious that the preliminary orders for the 18th were issued 
 at 2 p. m. on the 17th from Flavigny, at an hour when little 
 was known of the French position, and the outpost reports 
 could not possibly be in. This Hoenig shows was entirely 
 due to the anxiety of headquarters to get the King back 
 under cover in Pont a Mousson for the night, and generally 
 to prevent his over-fatiguing himself, and under the circum- 
 stances one can only wonder at the skill with which Von 
 Moltke framed the order, leaving it open to alteration for all 
 contingencies. He, however, does not clear up the extraor- 
 dinary apathy of the German cavalry throughout the whole 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 241 
 
 day. It is true the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were so ex- 
 hausted by their previous day's work that nothing could in 
 reason have been expected of them further; but other squad- 
 rons were coming up, and a five-mile ride to the front would 
 have cleared up all difficulties. Hoenig suggests that a 
 younger man, say Napoleon, under the circumstances would 
 have ridden f.orward, seen with his own eyes and slept on the 
 field, not a severe trial on a warm, fine night in August; but 
 even this would not have relieved the cavalry of their respon- 
 sibility, and, as far as I can see, nothing ever will do so. 
 
 Space prevents me following him throughout the whole 
 of his book ; it numbers some 240 pages, and every one con- 
 tains many facts of exceptional interest. I can only pick 
 out here and there points of particular moment. 
 
 One of the first of these is the small headway that had 
 then been made amongst the senior officers in grasping the 
 full scope of what is implied by decentralization of responsi- 
 bility. The 7th Corps, Von Zastrow, lay to the south and 
 west of the plateau held by the French, and separated from 
 them by a deep rocky ravine, the bottom and sides of which 
 were for the most part clad with thicket and forest. 
 
 From actual observation I can agree with Hoenig. ' All 
 this ground is by no means impassable for infantry, and it 
 would have been an easy task to reconnoiter and make good 
 tracks practicable for guns in the time at their disposal. 
 Napoleon executed a much more difficult task when he 
 brought guns on the Langrafenberg at Jena. But to do this 
 the staff of the corps should at once have reconnoitered the 
 ground thoroughly, or caused.it to be done. They, however, 
 did nothing of the kind; and since, further, none of them, 
 more particularly Steinmetz, commanding the 1st Army, 
 seem to have been accustomed to operating in difficult 
 ground, they were frightened at the sight of the mountains, 
 and jumped to the conclusion that the heights could only 
 be approached by the great chausse'e from Metz to Verdun, 
 which crosses the ravine on an embankment 40 feet in height 
 at least, approached on either hand by deep rock cutting, 
 forming, therefore, a defile of the worst character, and per- 
 haps 1,200 yards long. 
 
24"2 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 Now this road ran along the line separating the 8th and 
 7th Corps, the whole of the latter lying well to the south. 
 The 8th Corps, which belonged to the 1st Army, Steinmetz, 
 had been withdrawn from his command by Von Moltke's 
 order that morning, and though the 2d Corps following in 
 rear had been assigned him instead, Steinmetz was hurt and 
 annoyed, and his loss of mental balance had a most sinister 
 influence on the course of the day's fighting. 
 
 His orders received from Von Moltke about 10 :30 a. in. 
 indicated his course for the day viz., an attack against the 
 enemy's left flank from the direction of the Bois de Vaux (i. e., 
 from the southward), and cautioned him meanwhile only to 
 use his artillery. At the time the infantry of the 7th Corps 
 was scattered about without any cohesion at all over a larjje 
 space of ground, and the first duty of the corps commander 
 should have been to get them in hand a duty which Hoenig 
 shows was perfectly practical. Within two hours nineteen 
 battalions might easily have been concentrated along the 
 rear edge of the above-mentioned wood, but nothing of the 
 kind was attempted. When about noon the firing began, 
 the whole artillery available unlimbered south of Gravelotte, 
 and a number of isolated battalions were launched straight 
 at the French position, and there was no unity in their efforts 
 whatever. Nevertheless, by degrees they conquered some 
 very important quarries by the edge of the plat ran, and fur- 
 ther north, in conjunction with Goeben's corps (the 8th), car- 
 ried St. Hubert, a farm to the east of the defile, the enemy 
 having been driven out of the buildings by artillery fire. 
 Goeben's handling Hoenig praises throughout, and St. Hu- 
 bert having been won, and tfie edge of 1be plateau also 
 reached, Steimnetz came to the conclusion that the eneiny 
 was beaten, and nothing remained but to pursue. Now, 
 exactly at the same time, Goeben, and the artillery officers 
 of the 7th Corps, who had a good view of the enemy's position, 
 and could see that only the outposts had been carried, the 
 main line being still untouched, noticed movements on the 
 other side which led them to believe that a storm was brew- 
 ing, and Goeben ordered a brigade across the ravine to sup- 
 port the troops at St. Hubert. 
 
V^ o* ^ 
 
 Military Letters and Essays. 243 
 
 At this moment Steinnietz had just issued his orders for 
 the "pursuit." "The 1st Cavalry Division crosses the defile 
 of Gravelotte; the advance guard, supported by the fire of 
 the batteries of the 7th Corps, will attack, leaving St. Hubert 
 on its left, in the direction of the Moscow farm, and will not 
 draw rein till it reaches the glacis of Metz; all other regi- 
 ments to follow it." Metz, 1 would here point out, is at 
 least seven miles from St. Hubert, and the ground between 
 perfectly impracticable for cavalry; further, as the direction 
 indicated points to Thionville, not Metz, it is very evident the 
 old general had not consulted his map. Again, if the enemy 
 was retiring, the cavalry must trot to overtake them, and 
 this would bring them in six minutes or so alongside of 
 Goeben's infantry already occupying the defile, at a spot 
 where the embankment is twenty feet high or more, in full 
 fire of the enemy. But this was only the beginning. Von 
 Zastrow at the same moment ordered the whole artillery of 
 his corps at hand to cross the defile and come into action 
 beyond it. The commander of the artillery could hardly 
 believe his ears as he received this order. Seeing clearly 
 what was coming, but compelled to obey, he sent his gal- 
 lopers down the line to transmit it, with the caution not to 
 go too fast, and to tell the battery commanders to be as slow 
 about limbering up as they reasonably could be. 
 
 Unfortunately, three batteries, not having found room to 
 come into action, were standing ready at the western exit of 
 Gravelotte, and nothing could save these, even though the 
 staff officer did his best not to find them; they trotted off, 
 and being nearer to the road than the cavalry, took the lead 
 of them. 
 
 "Now," to quote Hoenig, "let us use our imagination : 
 
 "1. The eastern exit of Gravelotte had been obstructed 
 by wires only partially removed by infantry. 
 
 "2. St. Hubert had just been carried, and hundreds 
 of wounded stragglers, etc., were dragging themselves back 
 along the road. 
 
 "3. To meet them comes first an infantry regiment 
 (tfce 29th) ; one squeezes by as best one can. 
 
244 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 "4. But this infantry did not know cavalry and artillery 
 were following. 
 
 "5. The latter also were ignorant that they would find 
 infantry in front of them. 
 
 "6. None of the three expected the crowds of stragglers. 
 
 "7. All three were full of zeal for action. 
 
 "Presently all of them were chock-a-blork. 
 
 "What a picture, and what leading J There was only 
 one road, and into it one threw troops from five different 
 commands, without any mutual understanding, any order of 
 march : left to themselves to get through as best they could, 
 then some to pursue, some to reinforce, etc. Now, add to 
 this a wall of smoke in front out of which the flames of burn- 
 ing St. Hubert shot up, the shells from 144 guns in action 
 screaming overhead, men crowding together crushing the 
 wounded, the cries of the latter, the shouting, the echoes of 
 bursting shells in the wood, and lowering dense over all a 
 dust-cloud that made dark the burning sun above. Imagine 
 all this, and try to realize the mental condition of the men 
 struggling to fulfill their orders." 
 
 Needless to say that this mighty pillar of dust was not 
 long in attracting the enemy's attention; what it was caused 
 by they could not tell, but it was evidently something very 
 unusual, and they prepared to meet it. The dust on the road 
 grew denser, men fairly groped in it, and they began to re- 
 member that, as they descended, the enemy's fire, both of 
 artillery and foot, had almost ceased. Each felt something 
 was brewing, and a queer feeling of anxiety as to what it 
 might be arose. 
 
 In front were the 4th and 3d Light, then the 3d Horse 
 and the 4th Heavy Battery, who crushed past the 29th Foot 
 as best they might. Seizing the opportunity, the 1st Cavalry 
 Division pressed in close behind in the following order : 4th 
 Uhlans, 2d Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans, another horse battery, 
 and then the 2d Brigade (viz., 8th Uhlans, 3d Cuirassiers, 
 12th Uhlans), and to these attached themselves the two 
 divisional regiments, the 9th and 13th Hussars, who, not 
 belonging to the cavalry division^ tried to push past the 
 former. They had originally all moved off in column of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 245 
 
 troops, but had been compelled to diminish the front to 
 "threes," and this not being carried out quite as on parade, 
 had brought the following regiments to a dead halt. Thirty- 
 two squadrons were thus jammed up on this narrow dyke or 
 between walls of rock, fortunately for themselves, the 
 batteries of the 14th Division had been cut off by the stream, 
 and remained limbered up awaiting their turn, but this was, 
 nevertheless, prejudicial to the whole, in so far that they 
 were deprived of their fire just at the moment it was most 
 wanted (from the Gravel otte side) to cover their debouch 
 from the further end of the gully. The leading batteries 
 got through and unlimbered, the 4th Uhlans also. Both 
 were received with a storm of shot and shell; two limber 
 trains, maddened by the noise and pain of wounds, bolted 
 back into the mass, crushing many; the situation was in- 
 tolerable; then suddenly from over the valley they caught 
 the notes of the "retire," and, except the first four batteries 
 and the 4th Uhlans, they did; how, Hoenig does not say, but 
 I doubt if they did it at a walk. 
 
 Hoenig does not excuse Hartmann, the commanding 
 officer of the cavalry division, from blame. His orders were 
 precise, but he should have satisfied himself that they were 
 possible of execution, and that seems a fair comment. The 
 batteries of the 14th Division also returned to their old place, 
 and had again to "range" them selves. Had they remained in 
 action, their covering fire might have done much to reduce the 
 losses of their comrades on the other side. The fate of these 
 merits a few lines of description. The artillery commander had 
 ridden on in front to reconnoiter a position, but, in their 
 eagerness, the batteries had crowded on him too rapidly, 
 and had given him no time to look round. Actually the 
 position is so bad for artillery that, going over the ground 
 two years ago with several decidedly capable British gun- 
 ners, we simply could not believe that four batteries had ever 
 unlimbered there. With the books and maps in our hands, 
 we tried to identify the spot, and came to the conclusion that 
 either they never got there at all, or the distribution of the 
 troops as shown on the map was utterly incorrect. The 
 books (Hofbauer and the official history) state that only the 
 
246 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 knee-high wall extending along the road from St. Hubert 
 offered any cover. Gniigge's battery, the 3d, took advantage 
 of it ; the others extended the line to the east, front to the 
 north (i. e., Moscow farm), and this brought their flank 
 within 300 yards of French infantry in numbers in Point 
 du Jour. We felt certain there must be some mistake, and 
 at this hour Point du Jour must have been in German hands, 
 but it was not; and with the fire from this point on their 
 flank, and an overpowering enemy in front, these batteries 
 held their ground and served their guns. The 1st, which 
 was the first on the right (i. e., exposed) flank, was soon shot 
 to pieces, but as long as a gun could be manned its captain, 
 Trautmann, lying mortally wounded on the ground, having 
 dragged himself in torture till he could prop himself up 
 against a shattered carriage, directed its fire till his life 
 ebbed out, and he sank a hero if ever there was one. The 
 same fate overtook the 2d Battery, Oapfain ITnssc. Orders 
 were sent to him to retire, but seeing 1h< importance of 
 standing by his comrade on the left, lie sent back word he 
 would rather die than give way. He actually maintained 
 his position for two hours. Then fresh teams were brought 
 up, and as he had fired his last round and those of Traut- 
 mann's guns also (it appears they had only their limbers with 
 them), he at length gave the orders to limber up, but all the 
 fresh horses were killed except two, and these eventually 
 brought off a single gun heavily laden with wounded. 
 
 Gntigge held out all day, and he, too, lost very hoavily : it 
 was some minutes before his first round was delivered, but 
 then his guns shot so straight that with his comrade Hasso 
 they beat down the enemy's fire, range about 700 yards. A 
 more extraordinary instance of the power of guns, as guns 
 were then, it would be hard to discover: it more than equals 
 the case of the 8 guns on the Spicherenberg, which in a half- 
 hour's duel beat off and compelled a whole French battalion 
 to retreat from their trenches at GOO yards distance only. 
 
 The 4th Heavy Battery never unlimbered at all. Had 
 its commander got to the south of the road, its fire against 
 Point du Jour would have been invaluable in relieving the 
 pressure on the flank of the others, but he lost his head and 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 247 
 
 retired his guns. The experience of the 4th Uhlans is per- 
 haps the most remarkable of all. They had to halt, as the 
 4th Heavy Battery prevented their deployment, but they 
 moved olf the road to the southward to clear the way for the 
 following regiment, and whilst there the colonel heard the 
 "retire'' from over the valley, an order he felt it impractica- 
 ble, under the circumstances, to carry out ; so, the regiment 
 being then in column of troops, he sounded the "gallop," and 
 led straight for the quarries to the southward, where he 
 halted and wheeled up in line, facing the enemy about Point 
 du Jour at 400 yards only. A small wave of the ground 
 partially covered the cavalry, and here for a whole hour this 
 regiment held out whilst the rapid-fire, flat-trajectoried 
 weapon of the French poured out bullets towards them; 
 then he retired, having reconnoitered practicable paths and 
 taking his wounded with him. In the whole day, this regi- 
 ment lost 3 officers, 49 men, and 101 horses. 
 
 Those who still doubt the possibility of well-led cavalry 
 breaking infantry had better work out the following rule-of- 
 three sum: assuming two-thirds of the loss to have been 
 suffered in position, the remainder going and coming, then if 
 a line of infantry firing for an hour against a stationary tar- 
 get and at point-blank range can kill 66 horses, how many 
 would the same line kill in four minutes against a rapidly 
 moving one? Double the rapidity of fire .of the rifle, and the 
 prospect is even then not so very terrible, even if accuracy 
 remained constant, and did not, as we know it does, vary 
 inversely w r ith the square of the rapidity. Such things hap- 
 pened in 1870, and will happen again. It is not improved 
 weapons that the infantry require, but a new kind of men, 
 and it is easier to get a patent for the former than for the 
 latter. 1 would also call particular attention to the fact that 
 tlio Fivneh about Point du Jour were by no means beaten, 
 but, on the contrary, it took the Prussians a couple of hours 
 iri ore of hard fighting to turn them out. 
 
248 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 IL 
 
 In the last article on Hoenig's new work I brought the 
 relation of events down to the moment when Steinmei/.'.s 
 attempt at pursuit had utterly collapsed. The 4th Uhlans 
 were retiring into the ravine, Trautmann's battery had cc ased 
 to exist, Hasse had succeeded in withdrawing his last re- 
 maining gun, and Gniigge alone, sheltered by a knee-high 
 wall, remained in action. Some 15,000 infantry, densely 
 crowded together, still lay to the south of the road and St. 
 Hubert in such appalling confusion that all efforts to rally 
 them proved hopeless, and as the bullets and an occasional 
 shell plunged into them, their pluck died out, and they began 
 to dribble away into the woods in the ravine by hundreds. 
 All this took some time, about two hours, and mean while 
 other events were taking place in rear, to whirh we- must 
 return. 
 
 The 2d Corps, Von Fransecky, was forming up near 
 Kezonville, the 3d Division already on the ground, the 4th 
 in the act of arrival. This corps was now assigned to the 
 1st Army by Headquarters. The latter had ridden forward 
 to the right rear of the 7th Corps close to Gravelotte, and 
 here the meeting between the Kingand Steinmetz took place. 
 What words passed between them will never be known, 1he 
 two staffs remaining a couple of hundred yards away; but, 
 to judge by the king's gestures, Steinmetz had rather an 
 unpleasant five minutes. If he had been difficult to get on 
 with before, he became ten times worse afterwards, and 
 refused to do more than merely transmit 1 he orders received, 
 without adding the details of execution which it was his 
 province to supply. 
 
 The 3d Division was now rapidly approaching, brigades 
 in rendezvous formation, bands playing, colors flying. As 
 they descended the gentle slope towards the enemy's position 
 just above the cleft of the ravine, the sinking sun (it was 
 about 6 p. m.) caught their burnished helmet spikes till the 
 masses glowed like a sea of fire, an apparition not lost on 
 the French. Le Boeuf and Frossard met at this moment; 
 they were entirely unable to guess at the number approach- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 249 
 
 ing, and Frossard considered these newcomers must be the 
 "Reserve Army under the King of Prussia," really meaning 
 the ;M Army under the Crown Prince. Both agreed that 
 something must be done, and that to break and defeat the 
 troops immediately before them, if only to save the honor 
 of their arms and gain time for retreat. Both had caused 
 the time which had elapsed since the "pursuit" fiasco to be 
 utilized to good purpose; new reserves had been organized, 
 cartridges served out, etc., and guns, which had been driven 
 off the field by the Prussian artillery, were waiting under 
 cover, loaded and limbered up, ready to gallop forward into 
 their old position, from whence they knew the ranges. Fros- 
 sard's corps was the first ready, and, unfortunately for the 
 French, he moved off independently. Suddenly the front 
 of his line was wrapped in a smoke-cloud, a storm of bullets 
 swept through the air, and the French dashed forward with 
 all their old gallantry and elan from Point du Jour. The 
 exhausted fighting line immediately to their front gave 
 way; the French followed, skirting Gniigge's battery , at 
 about 100 yards; the latter threw 7 round the trails of his 
 three flank guns and poured case into them as they passed. 
 The Prussian artillery on the ridge south of Gravelotte woke 
 up, and their shells visibly shook the order of the* charge, 
 but still to the spectators at Gravelotte it seemed that they 
 reached and entered the eastern boundary of the wood in 
 the ravine. Then suddenly out of the western edge of the 
 same wood there burst forth a perfect torrent of stragglers, 
 the thousands literally who for hours had been collecting in 
 it. In a wild nccess of panic they dashed up the steep slope, 
 and on to the front of their batteries; in vain the jrunners 
 yelled at them and threatened to fire on them (but did not), 
 in vain mounted officers threw 7 themselves upon them sword 
 in hand ; the mob was mad with terror, not to be denied, and 
 swept through the batteries, demoralizing all they came in 
 contact with. But here one of the strong points of the 
 artillery came out: the guns could not move without horses, 
 and their detachments stuck to them, and in a few moments 
 resumed their fire, and as at this moment some fresh troops 
 from Goeben's corps (the 8th) cut in on the French flank from 
 
 17 
 
250 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 St. Hubert, the latter were compelled to retreat. As a fact, 
 they hud not really ever readied the wood; the artillery tire, 
 supplemented by that of the really brave men who had ral- 
 lied at the edge of it, had stopped the rush, and a very slight 
 pressure on the flank had induced their rearward movement. 
 
 This was the second panic of the day, but a third one 
 was at this very moment brewing, and, curiously, as a result 
 of Goeben's order which had brought this above-mentioned 
 and sorely needed support to the* flank, (loeben, seeing the 
 2d Corps approach, knew that he had no further need for a 
 reserve, and had sent in his lust-Hosed troops towards St. 
 Hubert some minutes before the French counter-stroke. 
 The direction in which they were sent is open to question on 
 tactical grounds; there were far too many troops at St. 
 Hubert as it was, and with the I'd Corps on the ridge at 
 Gravelotte. a limit was actually placed to the French attack 
 in any case; his reserve was more required on his outer Hank, 
 where for hours a most extraordinary gap existed, offering 
 a chance to Le ISoeuf such as in the hands of a Napoleon must 
 have given the victory to the French arms, but of which, un- 
 fortunately for them. Le Uoeuf did not avail himself. 
 
 ]>ut, right or wrong, Goeben could not conceivably have 
 anticipated what actually did occur, for it simply passes the 
 mind of man to conceive such a concatenation of blunders. 
 The Dili Hussars, the divisional regiment, had remained 
 with tin 1 reserve i. e.. the last -mentioned brigade ('the :>lMi 
 and when this moved off. either with or without orders, it 
 followed in its track, along the great road, of course. The 
 deployment and action of the leading troops of the brigade 
 against the flank of the French counter-stroke checked the 
 movement of the following infantry, and the cavalry regi- 
 ment, as usual, tried to force its way past. They were in 
 column of threes; soon the block became absolute, and to 
 reduce the height of the target, the officer commanding the 
 Oth Hussars ordered the men 1o dismount, which they did. 
 As if tilings were not already bad enough for the Germans, 
 fortune ordained yet another cause of perplexity. At this 
 very moment, the reserve men and horses of the regiment, 
 coming straight from Germany, arrived on the scene. They 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 251 
 
 had found the halting-place of their command, had there been 
 rapidly told oft' into a fifth squadron, and immediately moved 
 off iii its wake. Their horses were half-broken to fire, the 
 men even less trained, and in a few minutes they became ex- 
 ceedingly unsteady in the roar of the tire re-echoing from the 
 woods and the crash of the bursting shells. The colonel in 
 front knew nothing of this reinforcement, and presently, 
 finding all possibility of advance at an end, he decided to 
 gel out of it far enough to give the infantry room. Having 
 mounted the men, he sounded "threes about," that fatal sig- 
 nal, and then "walk, march." "Threes about" was obeyed 
 with unanimity, but the untrained horses, being now at the 
 head of the column, quickened the pace. The colonel, having 
 retired as far as lie wanted to, then sounded "front," and was 
 obeyed by the first three and part of the fourth squadron; 
 but the fifth never heard the "front" at all, or, if they did, 
 mistook it for the "gallop," for at that moment they broke 
 dean away and dashed back in wildest confusion up the road. 
 The led horses and teams in the street of Gravelotte took 
 fright. Panic seized on most of the men, and the next mo- 
 ment a horde of men, horses, teams, etc., dashed out of the 
 west ward end of the village and made off for the setting sun. 
 Officers of every rank rode at them with their swords and 
 used them, but were swept away too, and, not two hundred 
 yards away, the King and staff were spectators of the 
 disaster. 
 
 Fortunately for the < lermans, the French were in no con- 
 dition to take advantage of this disorder, even if they saw it. 
 The Prussian gunners were still in action, and fairly swept 
 everything away before them, even with their old-fashioned 
 common shell, and what chance would any existing troops* 
 have against modern shrapnel under similar circumstance's? 
 A lull now took place for a while, but the King's blood was 
 up. as was every one's else except Von Moltke's. The King 
 now ordered Steinmet/. to attack with everything he could 
 lay hands on; Von Moltke endeavored to dissuade him, but 
 in vain. Having said all he could, Von Moltke fell away 
 a couple of hundred yards or so and found some other busi- 
 ness to attend to. This is historical, and deserves to be re- 
 
252 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 membered, for You Moltke iu his recent work has deliber- 
 ately taken the blame .on his own shoulders to save the King's 
 prestige, but there were many witnesses to the scene, and 
 Hoenig vows they can corroborate his statement. Stein- 
 metz, as we have seen, had lost both his head and his tem- 
 per; he passed on the order as he n -reived it to Von Zastrow 
 (8th Corps) and Von Fransecky iiM Corps). The former had 
 never for a moment had his command in hand during the 
 whole day, and now all he could do was to send gallopers tu 
 order anyone they could find to advance, simply, no direction 
 or method being assigned them. Von Fransecky, who was 
 a first-class man, but perfectly strange to the ground, dared 
 not risk a movement through the woods direct against the 
 enemy in the fast-growing darkness (it was now past seven 
 and in the ravine the light was rapidly failing), lie accord- 
 ingly chose the good old road, the defile so often fatal on 
 this unlucky day, though doing so meant, with regard to the 
 position of his corps at the moment, moving round the an- 
 of a circle instead of by its chord. The order was given, the 
 troops took ground to their left, wheeled into column of sec 
 tions down the road, and with bands playing. King and stall' 
 waiting to receive the officers' salutes as they passed, the 
 unfortunate corps moved forward to what should have been. 
 and narrowly escaped being, its doom. 
 
 St. Hubert had remained in the Prussians' hands all 
 this time, and the ground immediately on either side of it, 
 but Von Fransecky and the officers with the leading regi- 
 ments, new to the ground, appear to have been unaware of 
 this. As the leading regiment approached I he unlucky gar- 
 rison of this their bridge head, unable to distinguish tin- 
 uniforms in the twilight, but receiving the bullets meant for 
 their comrades, they "front formed" as best they c!>nld, and 
 opened a violent fire into the backs of their own men, many 
 of whom broke back, overran the head of the column, and 
 confusion worse confounded ensued. The bravest men held 
 on to the post, which was never relinquished, and under 1 heir 
 protection order was ultimately re-established, but not till 
 after a long delay. 
 
 We must return for a moment to the events which had 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 253 
 
 been taking place south of the road about the great quarries 
 just before the 2d Corps began its advance. These quarries, 
 properly utilized, were the key to the French position, lying 
 as they did, but some 400 yards in front of Point du Jour, 
 and affording ready-made cover for a whole division to form 
 under. They had been captured once by the Germans some 
 hours before, but the French counter-stroke had forced them 
 out again, and the latter had held on to them with grim de- 
 termination. Shortly before the 2d Corps moved off, the 
 isolated companies, on the initiative of the leaders on the 
 spot, had again succeeded in rushing them, and again ;the 
 French from Point du Jour made desperate and repeated 
 efforts to reconquer them, with all the better chance of suc- 
 cess, for the darkness had now deprived the Germans of the 
 support of their artillery. Von Zastrow meanwhile, as 
 already stated, had been sending officers to order whatever 
 they could find to advance, and, fortunately, they only found 
 four out of ten battalions. These were just now emerging 
 from the wood in rear of the defenders of the quarries, when 
 the French made an unusually vigorous rush for their front. 
 The supporting battalions, receiving a heavy fire and know- 
 ing nothing of the presence of their own men in front of 
 them, rushed forward and poured a heavy fire into the backs 
 of the latter, and one must do honor to the courage these 
 displayed. They were the survivors of the fittest, weeded 
 out by a process of selection that had endured for hours, and 
 no man left his post, but hung on and mowed down the 
 French at their very muzzles. Then, as the fire from the 
 rear still continued, officers and volunteers walked bravely 
 back in the teeth of their own men's fire, and' at length suc- 
 ceeded in stopping it. It was now pitch dark, the "cease 
 fire" had been sounded all along the Prussian line, and 
 accepted, curiously and very fortunately for the Germans, 
 by the French (it is the same in both armies and our own), 
 for the former were now about to put the finishing stroke to 
 their day's work of blunders, and expose themselves to what 
 should have been absolute destruction. It is difficult to dis- 
 entangle what actually took place within my space. Hoenig 
 takes pages to narrate it, and I have but sentences to dispose 
 
254 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of it in. Briefly, when the troops coming up the road tired 
 into the bucks of their comrades, and a part of the latter 
 broke back, hopeless confusion ensued at the head of the 
 column. The troops in rear, mad to get forward, pressed 
 hard oil those in front, and actually, thanks to their Hosi- 
 er der and excellent discipline, managed to force their way 
 through as formed bodies, and then attacked "outwards in 
 all directions, only to be beaten back again." 
 
 Again there was a lull in the tight, and it seems to have 
 been about this time that the "cease tire" was sounded. Von 
 Fransecky, his two divisional commanders, and their stall's 
 were at St. Hubert. They derided that something more was 
 to be done 1 , and ordered the 4th Division forward. At the 
 time it was so dark that the troops had literally to grope 
 their way across. The leading battalions, in fact, were 
 Brought to a stand by the darkness, and formed in Hose col- 
 umn, and by decrees the others formed on them, so that by 
 about 10::>0 p. m. :M fresh battalions were massed beyond 
 St. Hubert on a space of 1,:',00 yards front, !M!0 yards depth. 
 "How, nobody can now say, "and about t liese had aggregated 
 thede'bris of ."V.lcompaniesof the Sth rorpsandL'l'of thelth.so 
 that towards 11 p. m. 4S battalions stood like sheep in a pen 
 on a space of about l.UoO yards front by 1,100 deep, and not 
 300 yards from the enemy's mux/les. "Surely," as ILoenig 
 says, "military history contains no parallel case. Why had 
 one brought these masses together? To attack; but ihen. 
 in the name of all things reasonable, why did they not attack? 
 The answer may perhaps be given by those who understand 
 the 'moral ' of Iroops. Why did not at least these 
 
 twenty-four fresh Pomeranian battalions go straight for ihe 
 enemy without a shot? One hears so much of 'dash' and 
 'resolution,' of 'an advance with 1he bayonet.' of 'the ad van- 
 tages of a night attack.' Here lay all the conditions for suc- 
 cess in such adventures ready to hand, the enemy not :00 
 yards away. The troops were 'massed' and the dreaded tire 
 /one lay behind. Tf. as the troops actually did, it was possi- 
 ble to remain in Ihis dense mass from 11 p. in. to K next 
 morning, and always under a certain amount of fire, for from 
 time to time the musketry blazed up anew, ihen why could 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 255 
 
 not we go forward with drums beating, aiid overrun the 
 enemy with cold steel? Three minutes were all that were 
 required, and we should have lost fewer in those three min- 
 utes than we actually did in the seven hours. Why? The 
 answer is plain, and I will give it: Simply because we did 
 not understand what fighting means; the whole course of 
 the day shows it. \Ye did not understand either skirmish- 
 ing tactics or the employment of lines and columns, and the 
 climax of the day was the bankruptcy declaration of our 
 tactical experts. The spirit was there, that is proved by 
 our seven hours' endurance in this position, but it is not 
 enough merely that the spirit should be there; one must 
 also know how to use it." 
 
 Mind, these are the words of a (Herman critic, not mine, 
 and, as far as can be judged by comparison with official re- 
 ports, regimental histories, and the stories which from time 
 to time have reached my ears in messes and elsewhere, they 
 are by no means exaggerated. Indeed, Hoenig is not at all. 
 the man to do so willfully, for it was Hoenig who stood up 
 for the infantry, and proved that this picture was at any rate 
 not of universal application throughout the war, when, some 
 three 1 summers ago, Meckel showed up in very unfavorable 
 colors what happened in the (ierman ranks on the battle- 
 fields of 1S70 in his "Midsummer-Night's Dream," a work 
 that may be summarized in a few words from his classic 
 work on tactics: "The beat of the drum went before the 
 thunder of artillery, and our power shattered to pieces be- 
 fore 1 the fire of his unshaken infantry. Woods, hollows, and 
 villages were filled with stragglers, and the open field lay 
 tenanted only by the dead and dying victims of our prema- 
 ture violence." Yet these are the tactics which our modern 
 wiseacres would have us copy, and now at a time when 
 ample evidence of their futility lies to our hand for those, 
 at least, who will take the trouble to use it. 
 
 To return to our "muttons," whilst tin 1 lM Corps occu- 
 pied this unheard-of position, the debris of the 7th and 8th 
 were withdrawn as best they could be, and the massed bands, 
 many of which had been left behind on the other side of the 
 ravine, struck up "ITeil dir im Siegers Kran/" and u Xun 
 
256 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 danket alle Gott." Surely "All we like sheep have gone 
 astray" would have suited the circumstances better. 
 
 It is only fair to give Hoenig's opinion as to how the 
 whole fight of Gravelotte should have been conducted. Von 
 Moltke's first order indicated distinctly an attack against 
 the enemy's extreme left from the Bois <ie Vaux as t he main 
 point to be kept in view, and while that was preparing, the 
 deployment of artillery only. This order was received about 
 eleven, and Von Zastrow, warned in this sense by Steinmetz, 
 should at once have proceeded to get his corps in hand, a 
 proceeding he omitted, and, as a consequence, from first to 
 last he never had a really formed reserve in his hands from 
 beginning to end of the battle. His stall' should have 
 already reconnoitered all available approaches, and made 
 arrangements for improving them for the passage of guns, 
 and cutting paths through the forest and undergrowth. 
 Markers should have been placed from point \to point as re- 
 . quired. -Now w r ould have come in the action of real light 
 infantry troops as I would see them. Hoenig has not caught 
 on to this idea yet, but Yon der Goltz is its originator. 
 Picked and highly trained men i seven about) from every 
 company, under a non-commissioned officer, should have 
 skirmished towards the heights, gradually reconnoitered, 
 and formed a first fire position at the break of the slope. 
 Then, whilst the guns poured in a hail of shell upon St. 
 Hubert and Point du Jour, the infantry formed in com- 
 pany columns in the ravine should have worked up by the 
 reconnoitered paths, and suddenly occupied in a dense fight- 
 ing line the whole of the front indicated by the true skir- 
 mishers all along, from north of the main road to the eastern 
 edge of the Bois de Vaux. Behind these the second and 
 third lines form for attack; then, when this is completed, say 
 in perhaps half an hour or a little more, from all points of 
 the arc surrounding them the troops break forward for the 
 assault of St. Hubert and Point du Jour. Judging by what 
 actually happened, by the fact that throughout the day only 
 once did even two battalions, as such, attack together, can 
 any doubt exist that the result of this combined onset, pre- 
 pared by both artillery and infantry, would have been the 
 
Military Letters and Essays. '^57 
 
 capture of this wing of the position at the first rush? Even 
 allowing for the inferiority of the Prussian infantry weapon, 
 I think not, and assuming equal armament, I feel no doubt 
 whatever. 
 
 To a lesser extent the same criticism applies, according 
 to Hoenig, to the action of the 8th Corps, of which, on the 
 whole, and under the circumstances as they occurred, he 
 liiids little fault. The want of a fire-position for infantry 
 preparation was the chief deficiency, but, looking at the 
 ground and the nature of the Prussian armament, I can 
 hardly see how this could be avoided, though it might well 
 be in the future. 
 
 Now turn to the losses, remembering it is "the terrible 
 losses due to the new arms which caused the Prussian col- 
 umns to melt away, etc.," and that it is on the assumed 
 reality of these losses that our modern school of attack form- 
 ations depends. We find the 2d French Corps, Frossard, 
 the beaten debris of Spicheren and Vionville, and the 3d, Le 
 Boeuf, opposed to, in all, three full German corps in round 
 numbers, 40,000 against 90,000 the latter with an enor- 
 mously superior artillery armament, though with an inferior 
 infantry one. The French lost in both corps 2,034 men, and 
 the Germans, as nearly as possible, 267 officers and 5,128 
 men, or about 5.5 per cent. Of course these losses were very 
 unequally divided. I have not the official lists by me for com- 
 parison, but I take the figures as Hoenig gives them. The 
 four battalions of the 32d Brigade, the only ones who carried 
 out a united attack together, lost in the whole fight 7 officers 
 and 104 men, say 2^ per cent. In the 7th Corps only two 
 regiments, the 39th and 73d, had losses worth speaking of 
 viz., the former 4 officers and 124 men, the latter 3 officers 
 and 164 men, out of 3,000 each; but, to the best of my recol- 
 lection, some companies, particularly in the 7th Corps, suf- 
 fered out of all proportion to these figures. Still, follow the 
 course of the action as above depicted, make all due allow- 
 ance for panics, for men not a few shot by their own side, 
 etc., and where are the terrific losses before which the old- 
 fashioned "line" is to melt away. It took more than this 
 to make it melt in the old days any way. If it is urged that 
 
258 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 modern weapons are more perfect than those of twenty years 
 ago, here and throughout the war I should be content to 
 halve the iiumber of rifles and double the rale of tire, or 
 double the rate of tire throughout. Still I see nothing half 
 as terrible as the storm of tire that destroyed ihe Imperial 
 Guard in a few moments at Waterloo, or the tire that again 
 and again failed to slop the rush of our troops in the Penin- 
 sula. What comparison can there be between this lire and 
 1he case that greeted our troops in the Crimea, or from the 
 fourteen guns that swept the breach at Padajos? yet neither 
 sufficed to stop us, though subsequent events, and passive 
 obstacles, forced us to retire. 
 
 It is that blessed word breech-loader which has wrought 
 the evil, and, curiously enough, it has been amongst I lie men 
 who are personally notorious for exceptional personal cour- 
 age under fire that it has worked the greatest havoc. They 
 have gone on the WMM '><jn<>t ti i, j>r<> nuujnijiw theory, and 
 fallen down and worshiped it; it has become iheir fetish, 
 and they have immolated in their lectures thousands of un- 
 fortunate Prussians (notably of the (luardi before it. Yet. 
 had they been actually on the spot, they would personally 
 hardly have noticed it. but have said pretty hard tilings of 
 the troops who failed to stand up to it. 
 
 The more one studies this war. the more one becomes 
 convinced of these truths. The (lermans were tactically 
 disgracefully handled; want of artillery preparation, the 
 fatal system of attacking with a line of skirmishers only a 
 couple of hundred yards in front of their company columns. 
 and a marked inferiority in their weapons, in themselves 
 were the causes of their disasters. As a consequence, wild 
 confusion resulted; individual training of the soldiers was 
 yet in its infancy, and the short service it wo and a half years 
 at the outside) was not enough to render them proof against 
 the trouble around them. Out of 10,000 put in on a given 
 front, frequently not more than I'. 000 actually fought in 1 1n- 
 fighting line, but these were the survivors of the til lest, and 
 their conduct deserves all the praise lavished on the avmy as 
 a whole. 
 
 The German officers as a body are perfectly aware of 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 259 
 
 these facts, though, for obvious reasons, they rarely speak 
 of them, and for the past twenty years have been endeavoring 
 to correct them. Their progress has been slow, because they 
 had a world of preconceived ideas to conquer, but it has been 
 sure and on lines almost exactly the opposite to those indi- 
 cated in our new drill-book, as an hour's visit to the Tempel- 
 liof tields here would demonstrate to anyone who knows 
 what to look for. The French in their drill tactics were 
 ahead of the Germans in 1870, but since then have gone 
 backwards, and are now years behind them. We alone were 
 then in a position to make a jump forward, basing 
 our ideas on the old Peninsula traditions and the ex- 
 periences of the American war, imparting only the princi- 
 ple of individual instruction and the same decentralization 
 of command which obtains in a polo team viz., every man 
 (i. e., captain or other commander) to be held responsible 
 that at every moment of the game he occupies the correct 
 position relatively to the other members of the team, and 
 that, too, without being shouted at. 
 
 This may appear an extreme assumption, but let us 
 apply it to the celebrated glacis of St. Privat. The gunners 
 already in line, at say 12,000 yards, have prepared the way. 
 The Light Division as real skirmishers have crept up to and 
 marked the first fire position. Our first line follows. De- 
 ployed two deep, say <> paces between companies, they would 
 have presented a target of far less depth than the skirmish- 
 ers' supports and reserves constituting the first line of the 
 Prussians, and suffered correspondingly less loss. As a fact. 
 Von Kessel, commanding the 1st Brigade of the Guards. 
 says in his report that from the moment they broke cover it 
 was evident that all ideas of avoiding losses based on dis- 
 tances between supports and skirmishers, etc., was entirely 
 illusory, and other eye-witnesses confirm his statement; and 
 that our single line presents a less favorable target than 
 three following ones in the conventional formation any one 
 can convince himself by looking at troops thus formed on a 
 parade-ground. Tf more practical proof is wanted, place 
 dummies in the corresponding orders, and fire at them at the 
 next field-firing experiments. The first rush of the Prussians 
 
260 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 took them in to 600 yards; three battalions that actually 
 did go in line, three deep, got even further, but then they had 
 to stop, because the elan of the others on either flank, in ex- 
 tended order, had given out sooner, and then came the mis- 
 fortune for the Prussians that they had halted practically 
 beyond the effective range of their weapons. With equal 
 arms this would not have occurred, but the moment the line 
 opened effective fire, and the bullets sang about the heads 
 of the enemy, their aim would have been deranged, and a fol- 
 lowing line would have reinforced the first with far more in 
 hand than the former: athirdand fourthmight follow, at time 
 intervals of perhaps ten minutes. Ultimately the whole must 
 have broke through to the front, just as the Prussians 
 actually did,but the whole affair would not have lasted fifty 
 minutes, and the losses would have boon correspondingly 
 reduced. The Prussians advanced, offering a most favora- 
 ble target they were for two hours under a heavy fire to 
 which they could make no effective reply. Ultimately they 
 stormed the posit ion, got into the wildest confusion, and con- 
 tinued to fight till long into the night, losing men every min- 
 ute. With the old drill-book, distance only being altered, 
 our skirmishers would have effectually prepared the way, 
 we should have exposed a far less favorable taruH . and -een 
 under fire say one hour against six. The Prussians lost 30 
 per cent in the whole day; would we, in the assault carried 
 out as indicated, have lost 10 per cent, and, with the old dis- 
 cipline, would that have sufficed to stop us? I think not; 
 but my readers can afford to draw their own conclusions. 
 
 VON MOLTKE'S WORK. 
 
 We shall probably never know the precise extent to 
 which the credit for the resurrection of the (jorman nation 
 is to be divided amongst the three great men to whom it is 
 due. Probably the old Emperor has never b< en and never 
 will be sufficiently recognized as the ultimately responsible 
 individual, but, nevertheless, it is certain that on Von Moltke 
 rested by far the larger share of the load. He was so abso- 
 lutely trusted by his chief that, though the responsibility 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 261 
 
 of actually signing the orders as drafted by the chief of the 
 staff finally rested on the King, the mere fact of their being- 
 put in writing by his staff officer decided the signature, and 
 the latter was perfectly aware that this was so. 
 
 The difficulty is to find some v kind of a standard by which 
 to judge him. The greatest characteristic of a successful 
 leader is primarily and undeniably the power of coming to a 
 definite decision in face of the most contradictory evidence, 
 and staking the lives of thousands on its correctness, but the 
 greatness of character evinced in so doing depends primarily 
 on the nature of the man himself and the absolute purity of 
 his motives. In the case of a man entirely egotistical, care- 
 less of human suffering, and playing only for his own hand, 
 the decision of character which sends thousands to; their 
 death and for itself remains absolutely unmoved in the pres- 
 ence of the most appalling aggregation of human suffering 
 the mind of man can conceive Napoleon at Aspern the 
 night before Wagram, for instance excites horror only, 
 and where the man arrives at his decision, not in presence 
 of the suffering, but comfortably at his ease in Downing 
 Street, for instance, as our great and good Mr. G - has 
 done several times in the course of his career, the horror is 
 changed only to disgust and revulsion. Even with the latter 
 the feeling of disgust may be modified, for, after all, the man 
 may have convinced himself that his decision was for the 
 good of his country, and was arrived at as a matter of duty 
 only. 
 
 The Chicago merchant w T ho simply and solely for his own 
 personal profit attempts to corner the grain market, and 
 thereby put up the price of bread 50 per cent in England, 
 probably would create, if successful, a greater aggregate of 
 suffering than Napoleon or Gladstone at their worst have 
 ever done, but for him no excuse is possible and no respect 
 can be felt. We cannot respect the latter ; it is possible still 
 to respect Napoleon, but w r e absolutely must respect and 
 admire men like our own Iron Duke and Von Moltke, who, 
 in spite of their extreme gentleness and humaneness in ordi- 
 nary life, could resolve and execute for duty only, even 
 
262 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 Avhen tare to face with the siilVering their resolutions 
 entailed. 
 
 All this the critics of Von Myltke and his life have 
 hitherto missed. To them he was more the chess-phi yer, 
 moving his pieces about on the ground, hardly indeed intel- 
 lectually as great, for the ultimate combinations in war are 
 far more simple and resolve themselves into three at most 
 to turn the right, the left, or pierce the center no more 
 difficult to choose the right one than to play the three little 
 thimbles and one small pea of the race-course, and indeed, if 
 t he fate of an empire, one's own life, and the lives and happi- 
 ness of thousands depended on the decision, the resolution 
 required to play the latter would be almost as great. 
 
 To my mind, the attitude of a mind like Von Molt ke's in 
 presence of an impending battle has been best described by 
 the Sanskrit author of the Khagaved (Jita, and is contained 
 in the tirst and second chapters of that book, to which I 
 would refer my readers, not in the original, but in Kdwin 
 Arnold's translation. For those who have it not at hand. 
 I add the following: 
 
 When the two armies viz., that of the Pandaos and 
 Rajah Duryodhana stood face io face with each other. 
 Arjnna, who appears to have been commanding the forces of 
 the latter in chief, directed his charioteer, \vh:> happened 
 to be Krishna in disguise, to drive him out into the open 
 space between them for a last reconnaissance, and 
 
 "Seeinir those opposed. 
 
 Such kith .urown enemies Arjimjfs heart 
 Melted with pity, while he uttered this." 
 
 I need not quote his utterance. Briefly, such thoughts must 
 necessarily arise in the mind of any thinking man. called on 
 to kill or superintend and direct the killing of beings with 
 whom he has no personal quarrel. Finally he decided that 
 killing is murder, quite in the style of our peace-at-any-price 
 humanitarians, and then Krishna turns on him with these 
 words, which embody the whole conception of a soldier's 
 dutv: 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 263 
 
 'Thou grieves! where no grief should be! thou speakest 
 Words lacking- wisdom! for the wise in heart 
 Mourn not for those that live, nor those that die: 
 Nor I, nor thou, nor any one of these, 
 Ever was not, nor ever will not be, 
 For ever and for ever afterwards 
 All that doth live, lives always! To man's frame, 
 As there come infancy and youth and age 
 So come there raisings up and layings down 
 Of other and of other life abodes. 
 Which the wise know and fear not. This that irks 
 Thy sense life, thrilling to the element, 
 Bringing the heat and cold. sorroAvs and joys, 
 'T is brief and mutable! Bear with it, Prince, 
 As the wise bear. The soul that is not moved, 
 The soul that with a strong and constant calm 
 Takes sorrow and takes joy indifferently, 
 Lives in the undying! That which is 
 Can never cease to be. That which is not 
 Will not exist. To sec This truth of both 
 Is theirs who part essence from accident, 
 'Substance from shadow. Indestructible. 
 Learn thou! The life is. spreading life through all. 
 It cannot anywhere, by any means. 
 Be any wise diminished, stayed, or changed. 
 But for these fleeting frames which it informs. 
 With spirit deathless, endless, infinite. 
 They perish. Let them perish. Prince, and fight. 
 Tie who shall say. 'Lo! I have killed a man!' 
 He who shall think. 'Lo! I am slain!' those both 
 Know naught! Life cannot slay Life is not slain. 
 
 * * * * 
 1 say to thee. weapons reach not the Life. 
 Flame burns it not. waters cannot o'er whelm, 
 Or dry winds wither it. 
 
 * * * ' * 
 This Life within all living things, my Prince. 
 Hides beyond harm: scorn thou to suffer then 
 For that, which cannot suffer. Do thy part. 
 Be mindful of thy name, and tremble not: 
 Nought better can befall a martial soul 
 Than lawful war: happy the warrior 
 
 To whom comes joy of battle. 
 
 /<*>r o* TOT 
 
 prr^^iruifi.STTT 1 
 
 i V A *V x-j> , ( i Jr J 
 
264 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 But if thou shimn'st 
 This honorable field a Kshattriya. 
 If, knowing aiy duty and thy task, thou bidd'st 
 Duty and task go by that shall bo sin! 
 And those to conie shall speak thee infamy. 
 From age to age; but infamy is worse 
 For men of noble birth to bear than death: 
 
 So minded, gird thee to the fight, for so 
 
 Thou shalt not sin!" 
 
 / 
 
 And, as far as it is possible to reconstruct his personal 
 faith from his action, the following words seem to cover his. 
 case exactly: 
 
 "No man shall scape from act 
 By shunning action; nay, and none shall eome 
 By mere renouncements unto perfectness: 
 Nay, and no jot of time, at any time 
 Rests any actionless; his nature's law 
 Compels him, even unwilling, into act; 
 (For Thought is act in fancy.) He who sits 
 Suppressing all the instruments of flesh, 
 Yet in his idle heart thinking on them, 
 Plays the inept and guilty hypocrite; 
 But he who, with si rnng body serving mind. 
 Gives up his mortal powers to worthy work 
 Not seeking gain, Brjima! Such an one 
 Is honorable. Do thine allotted task 1 
 Work is more excellent than idleness. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 Finally, this is better, that one do 
 
 His own task as lie may. even though he fail. 
 
 Than take tasks not his own, though they seem good. 
 
 To die performing duty is no ill: 
 
 But who seeks other roads shall wander still." 
 
 To seek, as otir newspaper writers have done, to estab- 
 lish Von Moltke's claim to greatness on the ingenuity he 
 showed in his strategical acts or in his astounding knowl- 
 edge of the elementary arithmetic he required in order to 
 solve the questions of time and space with which he had to 
 deal, is merely to confess one's own ignorance of the nature 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of war, which would not signify, and to belittle the hero one 
 would praise, which does matter very much indeed. 
 
 The truth is, in England the art of war is very dimly 
 grasped as yet. It is an art, not a profession or a trade, and 
 the men who have excelled in it have, as a rule, been "artists" 
 in the highest sense. They have brought something higher 
 than talent and industry to bear on it, and have succeeded 
 because they possessed "genius." But who can understand 
 or explain in set rules what genius accomplishes? You may 
 found schools of art criticism, and lay down hard-and-fast 
 conventional rules, but the true artist, whether painter, 
 musician, or soldier, will walk through them. 
 
 Up to the era of Napoleon, war as a science had been 
 in the hands of a limited clique in all countries. From time 
 to time a "genius" arose amongst them, but, as a rule, the 
 genius himself had neither time nor sometimes education to 
 explain his methods, nor would his followers have under- 
 stood what he meant had he been able to do so. His fol- 
 lowers and disciples attempted to do so for him, and as their 
 limited faculties were not able to follow the constant varia- 
 tions in the many factors of the complex problem with which 
 he dealt, they fixed their attention on one of them only and 
 eliminated all the rest. In this way arose what one may 
 call the chess-board school of strategists, in whose miscon- 
 ceptions we in England are still deeply involved. But, 
 under the terrible pressure which Napoleon's occupation 
 brought to bear on Germany, the highest intellects were 
 forced to bring their minds to bear on the problem. Philos- 
 ophy in Germany was just then at its zenith, and Kant,Fichte, 
 and Hegel were founding what, I think I am correct in stat- 
 ing, has since been the most prolific and important school of 
 modern thought. This philosophy was taught in the origi- 
 nal (i. e., pre-Jena) Kriegs-Akademie (or Staff College) at 
 Berlin, and Clausewitz was one of Kant's best pupils. 
 Whether Scharnhorst ever gave much time to the subject I 
 have been unable to discover, but he supplied Clausewitz 
 with an immense amount of practical data in addition to 
 what the latter could himself contribute, and, after the con- 
 clusion of the war for freedom' in 1815, Clausewitz sat him- 
 
 18 
 
266 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 self down to study and elaborate a system of war ethics, if 
 such a term be permissible, in which was invest igated for 1 he 
 first time the action and reaction of the many constantly 
 varying factors on which success in war ultimately depends, 
 and in so doing first made clear wherein the great talent of 
 a leader actually lay. The old-fashioned school of writers, 
 by eliminating all factors but one, brought down the concep- 
 tion of a commander's intellectual achievements to the low- 
 est possible level. Clausewitz raised it to its highest, and 
 the w r hole result of his system is finally concentrated in his 
 well-known phrase, "In war everything is simple, but to 
 secure this simplicity is difficult." Speaking generally, and 
 apart from the education of his own will-power on the lines 
 already indicated in the extracts from the Hhagaved (lit a 
 quoted above. Von Moltke's great work in the Prussian 
 Army was the reduction of everything connected with war 
 to the condition of simplicity 1o which Clausewit/'s saying 
 referred. Instead of eliminating the factors of danger, pri- 
 vation, fatigue, etc.. in which warlike action has its being, 
 from his mental field of vision, by simply ignoring them, as 
 Hamley does, he accepted them as concrete facts to be dealt 
 with, and devoted his whole energy to reducing them to the 
 lowest possible level by careful organization. Like a care- 
 ful mechanical engineer, he reduced the friction in the mov- 
 ing parts of the great machine to its lowest possible limit, 
 and then went a step beyond what the engineer can do. and 
 by the creation of a specially trained stall' made the machine 
 into a sentient organism which under normal conditions 
 could work itself. The present German Army mobilized 
 for war, and in presence of the enemy, can best be compared 
 to a gigantic octopus. Let the prey once come within reach 
 of its feelers, and the whole organism settles to work, and, 
 unless choked off by superior orders, does not desist till its 
 utmost fighting power has been brought to bear. The life 
 blood, which animates the whole, which causes it tr> perform 
 this purely animal function, is the system of delegated re- 
 sponsibility which entails on each link in its constitution the 
 obligation of acting on its own judgment. When the com- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 267 
 
 mander-in-chief , through the medium of his staff, interposes, 
 its action ceases to be automatic and becomes intelligent. 
 
 In this respect, thanks to Von Moltke, the German Army 
 is far ahead of any other in the world. Probably we come 
 next, but if we do, it is in spite of, and not by means of, our 
 traditional system. France and Eussia are still far behind 
 in the race. But if under this head less than justice has 
 been done to him by our English critics, this is even more 
 the case with regard to his actual achievements in the field, 
 for they have overlooked the fact that neither in 1866 nor 
 1870 was his work completed, but really only just begun. It 
 takes time to carry through such a vast plan of reorgani- 
 zation, and in 1866 it was only just beginning. The higher 
 commands up to and including the divisions were filled by 
 selected men, but below these grades it had not been possi- 
 ble to find a sufficient number of really trained men for the 
 posts ; for those who had entered the army during and about 
 the thirties had grown up in the old school, and were too old 
 to be taught new lessons. Military service was a very differ- 
 ent thing then to what it has since become, and the slowness 
 of promotion and want of all interest in life, particularly in 
 the smaller garrisons, could not have been without their 
 effect. The cavalry was at a very low ebb; by the confes- 
 sion of its own men, it could not even ride, and as for scout- 
 ing duties, of them it knew little, if anything; in fact, as a 
 general rule, it moved behind, and not in front of, its army. 
 The artillery was only partially armed with rifled guns, and 
 did not know how to use these, and the infantry had only the 
 breech-loader, as then untried, to rely on ; and were almost 
 entirely without war experience; and this army was to be 
 pitted against a thoroughly war-seasoned one w r ith an ad- 
 mirable artillery, and a caA r alry in many respects superior to 
 anything in Europe to-day numerically, too, almost equal 
 to its opponent. But its organization was that of a machine, 
 and its principles of strategy those of the old school; and 
 Von Moltke staked everything on his estimate of the hopeless 
 slowness which must result, and the want of co-operation 
 certain to exist between the officers in high command, from 
 the attempt to lead a force of its numerical magnitude on 
 
268 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 the old lines of over-centralization. How far he counted 
 on the breech-loader it is impossible to say; no doubt it went 
 for vefy much, but the essence of his strategy was based 
 without question on the superior mobility Which his higher 
 organization promised him. He won, and ever since critics 
 of the old school have been endeavoring to prove that, ac- 
 cording to all rules of the game, he ought to have failed, not 
 recognizing that he had changed these rules. 
 
 Even in 1870 his work was still far short of completion. 
 The staff was nearly perfect ; the leaders of the higher grades 
 in the infantry much improved, both by experience and selec- 
 tion; the cavalry understood its role as a covering force, 
 though it had forgotten its duty on the battle-field; the artil- 
 lery had improved enormously, but the infantry were at an 
 enormous disadvantage as regards their armament, and 
 were deficient in length of service and war experience to 
 those they w^ere about to meet. Besides, a point generally 
 overlooked, the new armament and the extended-order 
 method of employing it suited the French nature far more 
 than that of the German, for it was they who first brought 
 it into vogue in Europe, and for three-quarters of a century 
 it had been traditional with them. 
 
 To the ordinary student of the war, who goes only by 
 the printed official accounts, and is unable to read between 
 the lines for want of the key, which can only be obtained 
 from the actors and eye-witnesses of the scenes described, 
 everything appears to have gone like clockwork; and to a 
 certain extent it did, but at a cost of enormous friction, due 
 to inexperience of what was before them. The outposts en- 
 countered the enemy, and automatically every unit within 
 reach closed in and surrounded him; the organization was 
 so simple that even the grossest blunders could not cause it 
 to fail ultimately, however bloody local repulses may have 
 been. What really strained the mental endurance of Von 
 Moltke was not the intellectual effort needed to decide which 
 flank of the enemy to turn, but the knowledge of the weak- 
 ness of many of the links to w T hich he was compelled to trust, 
 and what we should admire in him was the strength of char- 
 acter which assumed the responsibility with full knowledge 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 of the risks he ran. His conduct of the campaign would 
 have been impossible to a leader, directing similar numbers, 
 but who had not previously by organization and training 
 eliminated the chief causes of friction in the execution of 
 his orders. Even Napoleon could not have handled such an 
 army, for the reason that he had neither staff nor corps com- 
 manders to do it with, and it is in this point that the true 
 bearing of Von Moltke's life on the conduct of war is most 
 conspicuous, for he has made of it an art impossible for any 
 hastily organized forces to undertake with success, even if 
 commanded by men of undoubted courage and personal ex- 
 perience, but not trained to act together in the same school 
 on sound principles. But as yet this lesson has not even 
 been perceived out of his own country, and nations are still 
 preparing to go to war with one another under conditions 
 which render the very vastness of their numbers an addi- 
 tional drawback to them. 
 
 How the German armies would have worked in the next 
 campaign had it been possible for them to be commanded by 
 Von Moltke himself, in the full vigor of his intellect, can be 
 only matter of conjecture; but, from the war till his retire- 
 ment, it had made enormous strides, and he would have had 
 a very different weapon to handle from what he ever had 
 before. But, even as it is, the main portion of his work re- 
 mains, and the leading of large bodies is now so simplified in 
 that country that no leader of moderate ability and resolu- 
 tion can well go wrong with it. The attention of the world 
 has been so exclusively directed to the more visible changes 
 which have taken place in the armament and the training of 
 the troops themselves that the silent and secret labors of the 
 general staff have passed unnoticed, and it is quite clear 
 from the recent writings and utterances of some of the lead- 
 ing French and Russian generals that the very outline of 
 the idea has barely dawned on them; and, unfortunately, 
 things are not much better in our own case. 
 
270 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW GERMAN INFANTRY 
 REGULATIONS. 
 
 I have received from Berlin, accompanied by the wann- 
 est recommendations, a copy of a short pamphlet by a 
 Captain Moller, of the German Infantry, containing an ad- 
 mirable study of their new regulations for the training of 
 infantry and the spirit in which these regulations are to be 
 interpreted. To those in our own service w r ho w T ish to under- 
 stand the method pursued in the making of their soldiers 
 in Germany such a study is peculiarly valuable, because the 
 regulations are so short, and so very general in the terms 
 and expressions used, that it would be possible to put any 
 construction one liked on them to suit one's particular fads. 
 and hence one is liable to think one has found something 
 entirely in harmony with one's own idea, when it is really 
 diametrically opposed to the spirit in which the phrase or 
 paragraph is actually interpreted in the German Army. 
 This sort of misfortune has overtaken a great many of 
 our Volunteer colonels and tactical nostrum-mongers in 
 England. 
 
 The three booklets which contain all that is necessary 
 for the instruction of the complete German soldier of what- 
 ever rank within the battalion are the "Exercir Reglement," 
 the "Schiesz Vorschrift," and the "Feld Dienst Ordnung," 
 the first and last corresponding to our "Field Exercises," and 
 the second to our "Musketry Regulation" ; and to get a com- 
 plete grasp of the subject it is necessary to study the three 
 together and discover how each fits into and supplements 
 the other, which is difficult enough for even a German officer 
 and almost impossible without guidance for a foreigner. 
 It is this task which the writer has undertaken to execute ; 
 and, in the opinion of German officers likely to know T , he has 
 made a brilliant success of it. 
 
 His first task is to define distinctly the sphere of action 
 of the company commander : 
 
 "The company is now for all tactical purposes what the 
 battalion formerly was (and still is in England): a body of 
 men drilled under fire by the verbal command of its com- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 maiiding officer. Nowadays the latter only^ssu^^&tHfc 
 company leader the duty to be caiejiedlp^l^akd leaves k)LhimQ^$l] 
 the choice of the words of commami and tJ^driJ^na)S:mranoy 
 which this duty is to be performed ;\JjlV4tnen the company 
 is acting as part of the battalion, the company com- 
 mander is responsible that its action is subordinated to 
 that of the remaining companies. He has therefore not only 
 to keep his attention on his own command, but to see what 
 other companies are doing on either side of him, and to 
 bring his own movements into harmony with theirs ; and he 
 must always remember that neglect or delay to act on his 
 own responsibility will be a heavier aspersion upon hi& 
 character as a soldier than a mistake in the choice of the 
 method in which to act; and the conclusion of a fight or 
 exercise must always find him and his company in the right 
 place, even when no further orders have reached him during' 
 its course." 
 
 "The independence accorded him within these limits 
 may under no circumstances be taken from him, for 'the 
 independence of all subordinate leaders (in the choice of 
 means implied) is the foundation of all great results in war.-' 
 (Exercir Eeglement 54, Sec. 3.) The obvious danger to be 
 guarded against here is lest the company leader, in conse- 
 quence of a want of tactical intelligence, fails to grasp the 
 scope of the movement as a whole, and so passes out of 'the 
 hand of the battalion commander." 
 
 "On the other hand, just as it is his own duty to avoid 
 this pitfall, the company commander must check any tendency 
 on the part of his subordinates to get out of hand. It is his 
 duty to keep his command firm within his own grasp." 
 
 "In order to carr} r out this part of his duty, he must 
 choose his position with judgment. If the company is fight- 
 ing alone, he will generally be able to direct its action best 
 from the supports; where, however, he is acting as part of 
 the battalion or larger command, he will, as a rule, be better 
 in the fighting line." 
 
 "His instructions to his subordinates will be given in 
 the form of orders, short and clear, and he must specially 
 guard against ordering more than he must or than he can." 
 
212 Military Letters and Essays 
 
 "Above all things, he must strive to keep the flre-eft'ect 
 of his three <zugs' in his own hands. Just as the commander 
 of an artillery 'abtheilung' (brigade division) disposes of the 
 fire of his batteries, just so must the company commander 
 be able to control the fire-action of his three 'zugs/ either 
 concentrating their whole power on one point of the enemy's 
 line, or occupying the enemy along the whole of his front 
 with the fire of one 'zug' while the other two concentrate 
 the whole of their power on some other target which may for 
 the moment appear to be tactically more important." 
 
 "Of course, this fire-control is only possible in the intro- 
 ductory stages of an action, but the better the captain under- 
 stands his work, the longer will he be able to maintain his 
 control. But even when the course of the fight has deprived 
 him of this power, his influence on the course of the action is 
 far from exhausted. It is his duty to arrange with all avail- 
 able means at his disposal for the supply of ammunition to 
 the fighting line; he must act as a directing link in the chain 
 of command between the superior leaders in rear and ihe 
 fighting line, whose attention is necessarily exclusively di- 
 rected towards the front only,' and see that the' three 'zugs' 
 act in harmony with the troops on either flank; and, MS far 
 as lies in his power, mu^t make his greater experience and 
 better-trained tactical knowledge tell in the conduct of the 
 fight, particularly when, as must often happen, his subordi- 
 nates are reserve officers or even only non-commissioned 
 officers*" 
 
 "Finally, he must ever remember that it is both his duty, 
 and especially lies in his power, to impress on the whole of 
 his command the stamp of his own individuality; and that 
 his personal bearing and example has more influence in 
 determining the result of a. fight than that of any other officer 
 in the whole militarv hierarch v." 
 
 The "Zug" Leader /. r., the tivlxiUcrn 
 
 The "zug," which corresponds most nearly with our 
 half-company, is the smallest body commanded by a commis- 
 sioned officer, and it is his duty to keep his "zug" thoroughly 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 273 
 
 in hand, even in the most difficult conditions of ground, and 
 under the disintegrating influences of the combat. His 
 example, therefore, is of the utmost importance. 
 
 His most difficult duty is the maintenance of fire-disci- 
 pline. The "zug" is the ultimate fire-unit, Hot the group or 
 half -section, for it alone possesses the requisite fire-power 
 to obtain a perceptible effect against all the ordinary targets 
 likely to present themselves in war. Every man in it is 
 directly under the hand of the leader, for the group leaders 
 are only his assistants, and he should be allowed as much 
 independence in the exercise of his power as the captain can 
 grant him, taking into account his length of service and 
 personal qualifications. 
 
 He must thoroughly understand the amount of fire-power 
 at his disposal and its suitable application. The control 
 of this power is not a science, to be learnt from the regula- 
 tions, but rather an art, which by practice can be developed 
 in an extraordinary degree. There is all the difference in 
 this respect between a good and a bad "zug" leader, as be- 
 tween an average band sergeant and the leader of a crack 
 orchestra; and a good leader will have his fire so completely 
 in hand that he can regulate it from the slowest and most 
 deliberate dropping fire to the full crash of rapid independ- 
 ent fire; and at the same time be able to change it from one 
 objective to another, as may become necessary. 
 
 But even apart from this fire-control, his responsibility 
 is still a very great one. When the first extension takes 
 place, he receives his orders from the captain, but as the 
 fight progresses, both time and means often fail the latter 
 to communicate his further intentions, and then he must act 
 on his own initiative in choosing the proper forms to suit 
 the momentary circumstances; remembering always that 
 "any delay or failure to act will reflect on his character more 
 than a mistake in the choice of the method employed." 
 
 He is responsible also that in each rush his men are 
 halted in the most suitable position within the limits as- 
 signed him, first, so as to make the fullest use of his fire ; and 
 secondly, to be as little exposed as possible. If he finds him- 
 self on ground on which he can no longer act, he closes his 
 
274 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 command himself and joins the rest of the company ; and in 
 any case, the close of the movement must find his "zug" in 
 ^he right place and front, whether in close or in open order. 
 
 The "group leaders" are not link's in the chain between 
 the "zug" leader and his men, but only assistants to help 
 him to control them; orders only pass through them when 
 the sound of the firing overpowers the leader's voice. He 
 (the group leader) controls the position of every man under 
 him, and sees that all orders with regard to sights, object to 
 be fired at, etc., are carried out, and if the fire becomes too 
 hasty, he takes steps to put a stop to it. He regulates the 
 distribution of ammunition brought up from the rear, coin^ 
 municates the range to any other group arriving on his flank, 
 and if another becomes doubled up, on reinforceing, with his 
 own, he redivides the two into fresh con imands, with the 
 leader of the reinforcement, without waiting for orders from 
 his superior. 
 
 Just as the "zug'' leader is bound not to let any oppor- 
 tunity pass of taking advantage of any mistake on the part 
 of the enemy, and yet is held responsible that he does not 
 pass out of the hands of the captain, so also is the group 
 leader responsible in both! directions to his "zug" leader, 
 and the close of any maneuver or fight must find him in his 
 right place, with reference to the rest of the "zug." 
 
 It will be noticed that the position of the group leader 
 is very different from that held by him in most armies, our 
 own included, in which he is supposed to command the 
 men of his section or squad, and not merely to act as an 
 assistant to the lieutenant in command, and the reason above 
 given will, on examination, I think, commend itself as a 
 sound one. 
 
 Besides the group leaders, each section is supplied with 
 two or three picked judges of distance, who are specially 
 selected and trained, and has also from four to six men 
 specially selected to act as scouts on the battle-field; and 
 further, a special non-commissioned officer to act as serrefile, 
 to follow the line in action and see that no straggling takes 
 place. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 275 
 
 Extended Order. 
 
 "Troops principally fight in this order; the action is. 
 commenced in this form, and in most cases carried through 
 to the decision in it." (Exercir Regleinent II., Sec. 19.) The 
 difficulty of leading troops when extended varies with the 
 nature of the ground, the cover it does or does not afford, 
 the noise, and other demoralizing influences of the fight. 
 The actual value of a body of troops i. e., the degree of edu- 
 cation the soldiers have received and their discipline can 
 therefore be best judged by seeing them in extended order; 
 for since they are then withdrawn from the immediate super- 
 vision of their leaders, greater demands are made on their 
 own individual judgment and intelligence. But though con- 
 siderable freedom and independence must thus be left to the 
 individual, still he must be distinctly given to understand 
 that, as long as his leaders can make their influence felt, he 
 is bound to the strictest obedience, and may only take the 
 law into his own hands when the leaders are no longer there 
 to give him orders. "The strictest discipline is even more 
 essential in extended order than in close" ; and it is no longer 
 the dashing enterprise of the individual, which was formerly 
 the special mark of good skirmishing, but the resolute stead- 
 fastness of all resting on a strong sense of duty as a founda- 
 tion, which is decisive. This sense of duty is stronger than 
 fear of punishment, and lasts longer in presence of danger. 
 It can principally be developed in the men by the thorough 
 education of the individual, and by the maintenance of ex- 
 treme smartness in the execution of all commands, not only 
 on the drill-ground, but in field maneuvers also. This does 
 not, of course, mean that these maneuvers are always to be 
 carried out at attention ; on the contrary, the Germans are 
 very particular to spare their men all unnecessary exertion, 
 only calling them to "attention" for movements which have 
 to be made under the enemy's fire ; but they demand, never- 
 theless, that, when a word of command is given, it shall be 
 obeyed with the utmost rapidity and precision. For in- 
 stance, one may meet a company shuffling along the road, 
 smoking, laughing, and joking, as it executes some portion 
 of a large change of front, but when it reaches its ground. 
 
276 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 and receives the commands to halt, order arms, lie or kneel 
 down, each one is obeyed with the same instantaneous pre- 
 cision with which it would be done on an inspection parade. 
 At least as much attention should be given to securing 
 the exact and punctual obedience of all movements and 
 orders required for the maintenance of fire-discipline and 
 the advance under fire as is devoted to the smart execution 
 of the manual. Such movements are rapid loading, fixing 
 the sights at the correct elevation, fixing side-arms, particu- 
 larly when lying down. The instantaneous obedience to the 
 command "Rise!" previous to an advance should be partic- 
 ularly insisted on, so that even under fire it may be obeyed 
 mechanically; similarly also the greatest care should be 
 devoted to seeing that the individual men learn how to direct 
 their fire to both right and left, so that it may be concen- 
 trated on any particular point as desired, and finally the im- 
 mediate cessation of all fire on the sound of the whistle. 
 Smart execution of these things can only be obtained by 
 officers who know 7 how to command smartly, and sleepy or 
 drawly words of command will only be obeyed in a sleepy 
 and slovenly fashion. 
 
 Movements of the Fighting JAnc. 
 
 The great difficulties connected with the movement of 
 long lines of men in extended order demand that this subject 
 should! be particularly practised in peace-time, under all 
 sorts of varying conditions. The greater the extent of the 
 line, the less attention can be paid to the cover of the individ- 
 uals, as soon as this consideration clashes with the unity and 
 maintenance of direction by the whole. On the other hand, 
 in large bodies it becomes the duty of the superior leading 
 to choose a line of advance which will afford as much COV<T 
 as possible for its troops. 
 
 In the advance the "zug" and group leaders march in 
 front, the center group leader being responsible for the direc- 
 tion, unless otherwise ordered, and the remainder judging 
 their intervals froni him. When the line halts to open fire, 
 each section and group is not bound to halt on the spot it 
 occupies at the moment, but may run forward a few yards 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 277 
 
 if by so doing it obtains a better field of fire than it other- 
 wise would, without, however, interfering with its neighbors 
 alongside. (It is obvious that to conform to both these con- 
 ditions a very high degree of training, and even of talent, 
 is necessary on the part of the group leaders.) The position 
 of the following support depends primarily on its being able 
 always to reinforce at the right time. As the fighting line 
 closes on the enmy, the necessity for prompt reinforcement 
 becomes greater, and hence the support must be nearer. 
 Similarly the more obstinate the fight, the greater becomes 
 the urgency for backing up the fighting line. But in both 
 cases proximity to the fighting line entails heavier loss, and 
 the problem is to balance the two, bearing in mind that the 
 infliction of injury on the enemy, and not the avoidance of 
 loss, is the primary consideration. 
 
 The support may join the fighting line either on the 
 flanks or directly from the rear, by doubling up with the men 
 already there. The former has the advantage of keeping 
 the sections distinct, but is rarely possible where the com- 
 pany is acting with others, and the latter has distinctly the 
 advantage of acting as a stimulus and encouragement to the 
 men already in the front line. In this case the group leaders 
 must re-divide the line between them, without waiting for 
 any commands. 
 
 As regards formation : any formation may be employed 
 w 7 hich tends to diminish loss without, however, detracting 
 from its unity and handiness in open ground line will be 
 the most suitable; in undulating or intersected ground some 
 form of column and it will move so as to occupy always 
 a relatively correct position with reference to the fighting 
 line i. e., it is not bound to conform strictly to the move- 
 ments of the latter, but may, within the limits fixed for it 
 by neighboring troops and the necessity of conforming to 
 the above-mentioned conditions with regard to distance, 
 choose its own time and way of carrying out its duties. As 
 a general rule, it will move in quick time and strictly at 
 "attention"; it may, however, be compelled to move at the 
 "double." 
 
278 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 The Control of the Fire of the Fighting Line. 
 
 The order to open fire, by the "zug" leader, must convey 
 the following information viz., the direction of the object 
 to be fired at, the particular portion of the object to be la km 
 under tire, the elevation, and finally, the nature of the fire 
 *X) be employed thus: 
 
 Half left on the low hill artillery two right-hand guns 
 -at 1,000 yards, ready, etc. 
 
 The choice of the object is a very important point, which 
 usually has to be decided by the section leader on his own 
 responsibility. A company in fire will usually be a more 
 important body for the time than a distant battery, and an 
 advancing line of skirmishers better deserving of attention 
 than the support following them. Where several targets 
 are all equally important, the best plan is to choose the deep 
 <est and densest; and against skirmishers, to direct the fire 
 at that portion of the line behind which advancing supports 
 are observed; and when lire has been opened against any par- 
 ticular object, it should be continued till that object has been 
 destroyed. 
 
 Volli'i/N nr f ii<lrjH')i</<'iit Fire. 
 
 The nature of the fire employed will vary with the tar- 
 gets and the conditions under which these expose themselves. 
 The volley is, of course, excluded as soon as the noise of the 
 firing on either flank, or the heaviness of the enemy's lire. 
 renders it doubtful whether the executive word can be either 
 heard or obeyed, and this will generally be the case. C'mi- 
 sequently it can only be used in the introductory phases of 
 an action, to obtain the correct range, or against cavalry, or 
 in ambuscades. Otherwise independent fire is to be pre- 
 ferred, as it allow r s of better aiming and consequently more 
 hits. Independent fire may be either slow, brisk, or rapid; 
 brisk and, still more, rapid firing leads only too often to badly 
 aimed fire. This want of fire-discipline 1 can only be kept 
 in check by continual practice and the greatest strictness of 
 officers and non-commissioned officers. It is not the number 
 of shots fired, but the number of hits, which decides. But 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 279 
 
 though a steady, well-aimed fire generally obtains a better 
 percentage of hits, it does not follow that a slow fire is 
 always to be preferred to a rapid one; that would be to mis- 
 take altogether the nature of the advantage conferred on us 
 by the new rapid-firing arm. Except when the necessity 
 exists of saving ammunition, or where one is particularly 
 well covered from the enemy's fire, a slow rate of fire can 
 only be blamed, for though a higher percentage of hits may 
 be obtained by this means, it takes very much longer to do 
 so, and consequently entails heavier losses on one's own 
 side; for instance, if a line of skirmishers advancing across 
 the open against a line of well-covered defenders went in 
 for slow fire only, it would suffer a double drawback viz., 
 heavier losses and develop less fire-power than its adver- 
 sary, who would, therefore, soon obtain the fire-superiority; 
 and that, too, even if the assailant was originally numer- 
 ically stronger, for in that case, his men being more closely 
 packed in the fighting line, they would be easier to hit. 
 Hence it follows that, as a principle, in action, one should 
 shoot as rapidly as possible consistently with careful aiming, 
 and if an access of fire-power is suddenly required at any por- 
 tion of the line, it should be developed by bringing fresh 
 rifles into the fighting line, and not by increasing the rate 
 of fire. It is very difficult to hit the right mean between an 
 overcareful husbanding of ammunition and its reckless ex- 
 penditure niggardliness at the wrong time may entail de- 
 feat, whereas the opposite course may of itself suffice to 
 bring about a fortunate decision ; the best practical rule to 
 follow is to reserve one's fire as long as possible, and then 
 to confine its greatest rapidity to those moments in which 
 the targets exposed offer the most favorable chances of ob- 
 taining a high percentage of hits. 
 
 Th( OlwrrutJoii of the Fire-Effect. 
 
 The chief advantage derived from the introduction of 
 the smokeless powder has been to facilitate the observation 
 of the fire-effect. Before, this was generally impossible; 
 now, however, with good field-glasses, the effect of the bul- 
 
280 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 lets striking either on the ground in front or amongst the 
 enemy can be seen at great distances, and the lire of a sec- 
 tion "ranged," except under very unfavorable conditions^ 
 almost as well as a battery. (This is the author's view, not 
 mine; but it must be remembered that even w r ith the old 
 black powder, it very often was possible to find the range 
 from trial volleys; and without the smoke to interfere with 
 the operation, it must obviously be far more easy now 7 than 
 it was then, and particularly so at short ranges, where the 
 enemy's smoke hid the effect of one's shot, w r hich will have 
 a decidedly exhilarating effect on the shooter.) 
 
 "Though the fire should, as a matter of principle, re- 
 main as long as possible in the hands of the 'zug' leader, it is 
 obvious that in the latter stages of the fight his presence 
 cannot be counted on or his voice heard, even if he is still 
 there to command, and similarly, too, with the group leaders ; 
 the men will then be left to their own resources, and it is 
 therefore imperative that their training should have fitted 
 them to face such exigencies, and if necessary? once set in 
 the right direction, to fight the battle out automatically. It 
 is for this reason that so much stress is laid on the musketry 
 instruction of the individual man, who must know not only 
 the best targets to fire at, but the importance of reserving 
 his fire, and the difficulties of replenishing his ammunition 
 when once it is expended." 
 
 The Supply of Ammunition. 
 
 une of the chief advantages of the new magazine rifle 
 consists in the reduction of the weight of the cartridges, 
 which is, relatively to that of the old Mauser pattern, in tin- 
 proportion of 27 to 43, and hence the 150 rounds now carried 
 weigh actually 1 pound less than the 100 rounds the man 
 used to be loaded with; the method of packing them is also 
 a very practical one, favoring particularly their rapid dis- 
 tribution in action. Five cartridges are made up in a small 
 metal frame, and are placed in the magazine simultaneously. 
 Every three of these frames are made up into a small paste- 
 board packet, in the sides of which holes are made to enable 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 281 
 
 the forefinger and thumb to catch hold of the frames readily. 
 The packet is opened by tearing off the pasteboard lid. The 
 advantages of this method of packing are that all fumbling 
 for cartridges is done away with and the actual time of load- 
 ing is reduced by four-fifths. The packets can be laid down 
 on the ground alongside of the firer without risk of the bul- 
 lets becoming covered with sand or grit, their distribution 
 is easier, and their collection from the dead and w r ounded 
 much simplified. 
 
 Fifteen of these packets, in three layers of five each, are 
 made up in a larger pasteboard case, weighing when full 15 
 pounds, and furnished with straps, which enable two such 
 cases to be slung on a yoke or a simple stick, and brought up 
 over the shoulders. Five of the cases go into one cartridge^ 
 box, which is of the same cubic contents as the old one, but 
 which holds 1,125 rounds as against 900, and weighs 12 
 pounds less. 
 
 The 150 rounds carried by the man are thus distributed: 
 the two front pouches on the belt contain 2 packets or 30 
 rounds each; a larger pouch, also on the belt, but carried 
 behind, carries 90 rounds; and all the pouches are fitted with 
 strips of leather or webbing by putting on which the packets 
 are raised so that they may be readily grasped and pulled 
 out. The pouch ammunition is to be considered more as a 
 reserve stock for sudden emergencies; otherwise, whenever 
 a fight is in prospect, additional rounds are to be issued and 
 carried in the pockets, haversacks, or between the buttons 
 of the coat, and these are to be used up first. The man must 
 further be taught always to keep the right-hand pouch full 
 for occasions when rapid firing is required, and if it has been 
 drawn on, then to complete it again as soon as possible. 
 When fighting on the defensive, packets of cartridges are to 
 be laid alongside of each individual soldier. 
 
 During the progress of the fight, the cartridges are to be 
 replaced from the small-arm ammunition-wagons, each com- 
 pany commander detailing a sufficient number of ammuni- 
 tion-carriers. The small-arm ammunition-wagons will be 
 drawn up as close to the fighting line as conditions of cover, 
 etc., permit, and will supply ammunition to any body of troops 
 
 19 
 
282 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 * 
 
 who may require it, without reference to the regiment to 
 which they belong. In critical moments, they must not 
 shirk driving right up into the lighting line. All supports 
 advancing into the front line will bring up with them as 
 many rounds as possible. 
 
 Infantry rrrxH* /nfantr//. 
 
 In a contest of infantry versus infantry, lire -eiVect de- 
 cides, and this condition can be satisfied either by engaging 
 a larger number of rifles, by concentrating the fire against 
 a decisive point, by better shooting and fire-discipline, or, 
 lastly, by utilizing cover more skillfully. Each or all may 
 be employed, according to circumstance*. 
 
 Fire-effect is best developed in extended order, and 
 therefore have as many skirmishers as possible every body 
 of troops kept back is in itself an evil. But the difficulties 
 of recognizing from the first the proper point against which 
 to put them in, together with the necessity of protecting the 
 flanks and generally for providing for eventualities, render 
 it impossible to extend the whole fire-power of the company 
 from the first, and hence a formation in depth is a necessity 
 (and, it is implied, an evil). 
 
 \Vliere the company is fighting alone, in broken ground, 
 and the situation not yet clear, caution must prevail, and 
 but few men be extended; but where the conditions are 
 reversed, and where prompt support may be counted on, 
 the whole company may be broken up. There is, therefore, 
 no absolute best or worst. Each case must be decided on 
 its merits only. 
 
 Too weak a support implies over-daring; too strong an 
 one, a dispersal of force. The evil of retaining too great a 
 reserve of power in hand reaches its culminating point when 
 soldiers are thus saved up only to be used in case of a repulse. 
 On the other hand, a support well placed under cover pre- 
 serves its full power, and can thus be employed with all thf 
 greater vigor at the decisive time. 
 
 Bearing these principles in mind, the company coin- 
 man^er will in most cases do well to keep, during the intro- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 283 
 
 ductory phase of a combat, the fighting line as, weak as possi- 
 ble consistent with the development of the absolutely essen- 
 tial minimum of fire, in order to be able to employ the un- 
 shaken remainder of his command to the best possible ad- 
 vantage in the later stages of the combat. Though, as a 
 general rule, it is customary to extend a whole "ug" at once, 
 yet in the earlier stages the object of the extension is only 
 to gain touch with the enemy and to guard against surprises, 
 and to retain full freedom of action with the bulk of one's 
 striking-power, and for these purposes even a group may 
 suffice. On the other hand, the simultaneous extension of 
 several "zugs" is by no means excluded; at times, in fact, 
 it is absolutely necessary. In order to attain the Requisite 
 degree of fire-superiority, it is, as a rule, necessary to bring 
 into action a greater number of rifles than the enemy, and all 
 at one moment of time, and not by driblets, because a grad- 
 ual reinforcement of the fighting line often dges not lead to 
 the attainment of a superiority, but barely suffices to fill up 
 the gaps caused by the enemy's fire. Therefore, if possible, 
 double the number of men should be extended from the first 
 as the enemy shows against one ; and this particularly in the 
 rase of a company forming part of a battalion, as the re- 
 maining companies can be trusted to act in its support. Still, 
 as a rule, even when in battalion, the companies should each 
 keep their own cl'osed support in hand. 
 
 The company fighting alone should only in the very 
 rarest cases be entirely extended. From the first it should 
 strive to maintain at least one closed support, and even a 
 second one further to the rear or behind an unsupported 
 wing is not excluded, but in the actual execution of an 
 attack the leader must not hesitate to employ, if necessary, 
 every available rifle in the front line; it may be just the last 
 half-dozen extra ones that turn the scale. 
 
 Concentration of Fire <m the Dccisire Point. 
 
 Fire-superiority does not altogether depend on the rela- 
 tive proportion of rifles engaged, but better control of the 
 fire may give the superiority to the side which is actually 
 
284 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 numerically inferior. But tlie first condition necessary to 
 fulfill in the latter case is to be able to concentrate the whole 
 fire-power under one's command on the decisive point of the 
 enemy's position, and there, on that point, obtain the de- 
 sired result; in most cases the rest of the line will fall back 
 without waiting for more. The advantages of a convergent 
 fire are obvious, but, from the nature of things, the possi- 
 bility of developing this convergency belongs specially to 
 the assailant, who possesses the power of freedom of motion 
 by which he can envelop the point of attack; and in propor- 
 tion as he exerts this power, the effect of his own fm is in- 
 creased and that of his adversary lessened. 
 
 .]/ nxketry Tniiiiiiit/ nn<l 
 
 To utilize the full power of the weapon, coolness, indi- 
 vidual skill, and fire-discipline are the chief requisites. The 
 introduction of the small-bore rifle with its flat trajectory 
 has reduced the value of individual marksmanship, as the 
 flat trajectory has lessened the importance of correct dis- 
 tance-judging. Consequently, we must rely more on the 
 superior coolness of our men, and use our utmost endeavors 
 to develop their fire-discipline to the highest possible pitch, 
 for without such discipline the control of the fire and its con- 
 centration on the decisive points would be an impossibility. 
 Fire-discipline comprises the conscientious execution of all 
 orders received during the fight, and the most minute atten- 
 tion to the rules laid down in the musketry instruction. 
 Further, it demands steadiness under fire; even when the 
 latter may not be returned, care in the delivery of every shot, 
 constant watchfulness by the leader of the enemy, and the 
 immediate cessation of fire the moment the target disappears 
 or the sound of th^ whistle is heard. 
 
 Cover. 
 
 Good cover helps much to the attainment of the desired 
 fire-superiority, because it lessens losses, and hence gives, 
 even to a numerically weaker detachment, the power of in- 
 flicting a proportionately higher degree of loss; and the in- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 285- 
 
 troduction of smokeless powder lias added to its importance, 
 for formerly the puff of smoke betrayed the position of the 
 enemy, and hence only cover thick enough to stop the bullets 
 was of any avail, whereas now any bush or tuft of grass 
 which conceals the individual renders it impossible to aim 
 directly at him. Invisibility is therefore of the first impor- 
 tance; a sharply defined trench of freshly turned earth, by 
 attracting attention and drawing a convergent fire, may 
 nowadays prove worse than useless. But, owing to the 
 increased penetration of the new bullets, earth parapets, 
 when intended as actual cover and not merely as a screen 
 against sight, will require a thickness at the crest of at least 
 4 feet 6 inches, and against long-range fire shallow trenches 
 are of little value. 
 
 Masonry screens, such as houses, walls, etc., give danger- 
 ous splinters when struck by the new bullets, and the thin 
 walls of modern "jerry" built structures are no longer secure 
 against penetration; under artillery fire they should be 
 avoided, as they not only afford conspicuous marks for the 
 gunners to lay on, but they are no longer shell-proof, and 
 further, the poisonous gases evolved by the high explosives 
 now in use for bursters will render any closed rooms untena- 
 ble. (In 1870 a 2-feet-6-irich brick or stone wall proved gen- 
 erally sufficient to stop either French or German shells, the 
 velocities being low, and the shells, bursting instantaneously 
 on impact, only scarred them slightly. Going over the battle- 
 fields last summer, I saw many instances notably at the 
 Geisberg at Weissenburg in which buildings, though bear- 
 ing numerous marks of direct hits, had, nevertheless, 
 scarcely suffered at all.) 
 
 Wooden shelters require to be at least 2 feet 6 inches 
 thick to stop a bullet, and hence the cover formerly afforded 
 by trees in wood fighting will now generally prove illusory. 
 Fn occupying a wood, therefore, trenches should be made 
 some little distance to the frojit, as the crashing of the bul- 
 lets through the brandies above tends to unsteady the 
 troops by giving them an exaggerated idea of the enemy's 
 fire. 
 
286 Military Letters and Essay 6. 
 
 J tifantry versus Cacalry. 
 
 Smokeless powder will have a most detrimental eflect 
 on the cavalry. Formerly the infantry only saw the ap- 
 proaching horsemen up to the moment they themselves 
 opened fire, for the smoke, as a rule, at once hid them from 
 sight, and it happened occasionally that excited infantry 
 blazed away into their own smoke long after the squadrons 
 they had opened on had ridden away. This can never hap- 
 pen again. But, in spite of the immense increase of fire- 
 power, cavalry will still attack infantry that it has reason to 
 believe to be shaken, and infantry should stand to receive 
 such attacks in the formation they happen to be in at the 
 moment, never running into groups. Squares arc only justi- 
 fiable when, owing to want of ammunition, the infantry are 
 defenceless. 
 
 The writer makes a calculation of the number of rounds 
 that can be delivered by a company of 200 men in the time 
 the cavalry would take to close from 440 yards, viz., half 
 a minute and gives it at 10 rounds per man, or 2,000 in all ; 
 but a battery in line would deliver a larger number of bullets 
 on the same front and in the same time and yet batteries 
 have been ridden down before now, even with a couple of 
 thousand vards of clear field of fire before them. 
 
 J-nfautry versus Art-iHrry. 
 
 The author considers the relative power of the two arms 
 much the same as formerly, but the smokeless powder will 
 prove much more advantageous to the infantry. Up to 1,500 
 yards th artillery can still hold their own against infant ry, 
 but within 1,000 yards, since they require three to four min- 
 utes to find the range, it ought, generally speaking, to be im- 
 possible for them to come into action at all with any pros- 
 pect of success. If the infantry can get within 800 yards, 
 they should establish their fire-superiority very rapidly, and 
 within 400 yards it ought to be altogether impossible for the 
 gunners to limber up. But these deductions only apply as 
 long as the fire-discipline of the company remains intact. 
 
oar 
 
 Military Letters and Essays. 287 
 
 I think it will be useful to give the statement of the num- 
 ber of rounds at different ranges which the writer considers 
 necessary to put a battery out of action, as it affords a basis 
 to guide an umpire in his decisions, and at any rate marks 
 the limit beyond which even an extreme partisan of the foot 
 soldier can hardly go. 
 
 At 060 yards 1,600 rounds should silence a battery of 
 U pieces. 
 
 At 880 yards 5,000 rounds should silence a battery of 
 pieces. 
 
 At 1,100 yards 8,000 rounds should silence a battery of 
 6 pieces. 
 
 At 1,320 yards 19,000 rounds should silence a battery of 
 pieces. 
 
 At 1,050 yards 30,000 rounds should silence a battery of 
 6 pieces. 
 
 But this number of rounds must be fired within a cer- 
 tain time, otherwise the artillery fire will seriously diminish 
 the number of rifles available. If, for instance, a group of 
 10 men, with 1,000 cartridges available, were to tackle a 
 battery at 1,100 yards, then each man would have to fire 800 
 rounds; and at even 25 rounds a minute the operation would 
 take :>2 minutes an obvious impossibility, yet it is the sort 
 of decision that umpires sometimes give. The best chance 
 infantry have is that afforded them when the guns are 
 caught in the act of unlimbering, for during the three to four 
 minutes available, during which the gunners are ranging, 
 no return fire is to be feared. If, therefore, during those 
 minutes a sufficient number of rifles is at hand to deliver the 
 requisite number of rounds steadily and without hurry, the 
 battery may be safely tackled; if not, it should be let alone. 
 Hence at 1,100 yards not less than a company should be 
 available against each battery, and at 1,050 a whole bat- 
 talion at least would be required, and the expenditure of 
 ammunition out of all proportion to the possible results. 
 Of course, if the battery is under cover, the number of rounds 
 required may be indefinitely increased. 
 
 Movements under artillery fire should be carried out 
 in line, and no closed bodies of infantry can remain halted 
 
288 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 within 2,000 yards of artillery, if the latter are actually tir- 
 ing at them; within 1,500 yards no lateral movements in 
 close order of any kind can be carried out. 
 
 The more all the guns of a battery are annoyed by fire 
 at the same time, the less accurately will they shoot; on llu 
 other hand, such dispersion of fire does not promise the best 
 Results except at short ranges; hence at long distances UK* 
 fire of a whole company should be directed on one gun at a 
 time, for choice the windward one, and at ordinary ranges 
 i. e., within 1,000 yards each "zug" can devote itself to a 
 single gun, either the odd or even ones. 
 
 Attack or J)<-frn<v. 
 
 Then follows a very thorough examination of the old 
 question of anvil or hammer iiinln- the new conditions of 
 smokeless powder and small-bore, flat-trajectory weapons, 
 in which the author, whilst admitting the many points in 
 which the defence gains, such as concealment and increased 
 depth of fire-zone to be passed over, nevertheless conies to 
 the conclusion that, on the whole, the balance of advantages 
 remains with the assailant, and principally because the de- 
 fender is bound to hold a line and be equally strong at all 
 points, whereas his opponent requires only to make his 
 superiority felt at a particular point, the .choice of which 
 must always remain in his hands; and further, the power of 
 concentrating the fire of a superior number of rifles against 
 this point is immensely increased by th<- range of the n<-\\ 
 weapons. It is, however, obvious that the application of 
 this principle of concentration makes far higher demands 
 on the excellence of the troops and their fire-discipline than 
 the "straight to the front" method of fighting formerly. 
 Still it is the object of the new regulations to ensure this 
 higher discipline, and practical men in Germany do not con- 
 sider the standard, to be unattainable, but say the smoke- 
 less powder will distinctly aid the maintenance of this fire- 
 discipline, and that, by enabling not only the leaders but the 
 individual men to see their objective before them, the whole 
 act will be carried out with a greater degree of harmony and 
 a higher energy. 
 
Military Letters and Essays. ^89 
 
 As a general rule, the defender has the advantage due 
 to his knowledge of the distances at the longer ranges; 
 hence it is not to the interest of the assailant to attempt 
 to tackle him on this, his strongest ground. He must strive 
 at once to get in to closer ranges at which the tlat trajec- 
 tory of his weapon puts him on equal terms with his enemy. 
 In doing so heavy losses are to be expected, but the only 
 way to reduce them is to shorten the time of exposure, and 
 every man must in peace be convinced of this truth. It will 
 rarely, if ever, be possible to advance uninterruptedly to 
 decisive ranges with the dense line of skirmishers on which 
 the execution of the attack actually devolves. But this line, 
 whatever its formation may be at the moment, must be 
 covered by a light line of true skirmishers to annoy the ene- 
 my and generally to act like the ground scouts of the cav- 
 alry. Eight to twelve paces between the files is recom- 
 mended, and then he proceeds to describe in considerable 
 detail what is nothing more or less than an attack conducted 
 in the true spirit of the British line, the point of which, it 
 must be remembered, did not lie originally in the bayonet 
 attack, but in the bringing up of the maximum possible num- 
 ber of muskets to decisive range. It was the fire which was 
 meant to do the work, and not the cold steel, and it was pre- 
 cisely because the point came to be overlooked that it be- 
 came possible for our would-be reformers to bring about 
 the state of confusion and muddle in which our present ideas 
 on infantry fighting are involved. It is really immaterial 
 whether the line is formed two deep or in single rank, the 
 object to be borne in mind being only the maximum possible 
 development of fire. But what differentiates the line from 
 skirmishing or independent-order fighting is, whether the 
 choice of where to die is left in the hands of the individual 
 or of his leader. And from the above it will be very evident 
 that, in Germany at any rate, the man has very little say in 
 the matter. His military qualifications, his character, etc., 
 are all developed up to the highest possible degree to enable 
 him to act in case his leader should fall, but till that event 
 happens, the discipline is as rigid as ever it was in the days 
 of Frederick the Great. The whole end and aim of the 
 
290 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 modern German training, as it appears to ine, not only after 
 reading the above pamphlet, but after watching the practice 
 of the new regulations on the parade- and maneuver-grounds 
 last autumn, is to introduce into the fighting line the same 
 absolute concentration of the will on the instantaneous exe- 
 cution of the word of command as was formerly considered 
 only necessary in the close-order school. 
 
 Certainly this idea has not yet stood the test of experi- 
 ence, and there are in Germany many who hold that the two 
 opposite qualities viz., individuality and absolute obedi- 
 ence are absolutely irreconcilable. The ''Midsummer- 
 Night's Dream" was an effort in this direction. But there 
 seems no real reason in the nature of things why this irrecon- 
 cilability should exist, and in fact, as has been frequent ly 
 urged in these columns, the example of the navy actually 
 proves that it does not do so, for the smartest drill to be seen 
 in the German Army is a joke by the side of gun drill on 1 he 
 Excellent. The main point in which the execution of the 
 modern attack differs from the old one of a century ago is 
 that, as the limit of effective range has been extended up 1o 
 between 600 to 800 yards from the enemy's muzzle, the oper- 
 ation of obtaining the fire-superiority has nowadays to be 
 repeated perhaps three or four times in succession before 
 the position can be actually entered. The immediate effect 
 of a heavy fire is only momentm-y; and troops recover their 
 power of resistance very rapidly if the fire directed against 
 them ceases, as it must necessarily do when the assailant 
 begins to advance, and fresh supports may reach them and 
 thus reestablish the balance. When this lakes place, the 
 assailant will be compelled to halt and to repeat the process, 
 and for this purpose a second, third, and even a fourth line 
 must follow behind the fighting line. The provision of these 
 following lines in sufficient number being the duty of the 
 superior commander, and since he has all along known 
 where he means to put in the bulk of his force, whereas his 
 adversary has had to keep his reserves distributed to meet 
 all possible eventualities, it is evident that in this game 
 of successive reinforcements the ultimate advantage must 
 always be on the side of the assailant. Smokeless powder 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 291 
 
 and flat-trajectoried rifles make no difference here; but, 
 since it is admitted that the sight of the killed and wounded 
 lying around has always affected the defender more than 
 the assailant, for the latter in his forward movement leaves 
 the victims of the fight behind him, it is evident that in this 
 respect the absence of the smoke-veil will have a very detri- 
 mental effect on the former. Now the backward and for- 
 ward movement of lines of troops, when once hotly engaged, 
 appears to obey an instinctive impulse in the air, so to speak. 
 Every body of troops possesses a certain power of resist- 
 ance, depending on its discipline and its nationality. On 
 the troops of one nation the loss of 10 per cent will create 
 such an impression of terror that it will bolt at once; those 
 of another may fight on with 50 per cent down. Certainly 
 the rapidity with which such loss is inflicted counts for very 
 much, and the youth and inexperience of the troops for yet 
 more. The losses troops suffer in the attack depends pri- 
 marily on the length of time they are out in ttie rain, but 
 since the new rifle and the absence of the smoke-screen en- 
 able them to inflict not only a greater but a more demoraliz- 
 ing loss on their adversary in the same time, it is obvious 
 that they themselves need not be so long exposed to fire as 
 formerly. The decision will, therefore, be brought on more 
 rapidity, and the difficulty of guarding against it by timely 
 reinforcement on the part of the defender will be even more 
 insuperable than it used to be. At any rate, this is the line 
 of thought pursued in the German Army, and it appears to 
 me to be in consonance with the traditions of our army and 
 the nation at large; and I can only trust that this article 
 may be of use in removing some of the terrors with which, 
 to judge from contemporary military literature in England, 
 the introduction of the new arms has invaded us. 
 
 NOTES IN GERMANY IN 1889. 
 
 Contrary to all one heard last year relative to the new 
 German Infantry Drill Regulations, the old Prussian "pa- 
 rade marsch" still lives, and long may it continue to do so, 
 for I am confident that it actually has counted for more 
 
292 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 in the victories of the German Army than our apostles of 
 the new school of tactics appear to realize. 
 
 Ultimately I believe it will be found, by those who pur- 
 sue the subject far enough, that the disciples of passive en- 
 durance, which is still the essential point to some four-fifths 
 of the troops engaged, at any rate during its introductory 
 phases, is the outcome of continuous exercises of the sim 
 plest description; but which, being carried out, in the words 
 of the German drill-book, "with the utmost concentrated 
 effort of mind and body/' by degrees enable the will to en- 
 tirely master the natural weakness of the man himself, and 
 thus to render him capable of facing death itself unmoved. 
 
 It is in the "parade marsch" that this "concentrated 
 effort" finds its highest expression. No soldier can look 
 on entirely unmoved at a German battalion marching past. 
 In spite of the unfavorable impression their somewhat 
 clumsy acoouterments, the average youthfulness and boy 
 ish appearance of the men themselves, and their habit of 
 marching out of step when at ease is calculated to create, 
 no sooner does the band strike up, and they are called to 
 attention, than they become transformed, and sweep by with 
 a proud, confident bearing that makes one feel one might do 
 anything with such men. Now it cannot be honestly main- 
 tained that the march-past of the average British or native 
 battalion inspires one with any similar feeling. Now and 
 again an exception occurs, but they are few and far between. 
 More generally the effect on the spectator is one of pure 
 boredom, mitigated only by the amusement one derives from 
 the mounted officers' attempts to salute. Why is it that on 
 these occasions both men and officers give one the impres- 
 sion of being overcome with bashfulness? Off parade, as a 
 rule, no one can accuse them of it; but just in that one act 
 of military pomp, in which every man should feel as if his 
 regiment first and himself next were the only things in the 
 world worth thinking about, they are all seized with a ten- 
 dency to hang their heads like modest maidens, and to look 
 at the toes of their boots. Of course there are battalions 
 and battalions. The Guards, Sikhs, Ghoorkhas, all still 
 fill one with the thrill of soldierly pride; but, as regards^ 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 293 
 
 the vast majority, the impression the ordinary march-past 
 conveys to the observer is that both men and officers are 
 bored, and that neither care a straw for themselves, the 
 regiment, or each other. Our forefathers were perfectly 
 right when they settled on the march-past as the test by 
 which a commander can best judge of the spirit of a regi- 
 ment in a short space of time, for in no other way is it prac- 
 ticable to concentrate the whole of the wills of the men on 
 one effort to excel, and the more every man looks on himself 
 as the best in the best regiment in the world, the more over- 
 powering will be the impression conveyed to the reviewing 
 officers' mind. Cleanliness and smart turn-out, due to pun- 
 ishments and harassing, are absolutely useless to blind the 
 eyes of the true soldier, and one can never help smiling at 
 the way some commanding officers seek to impose this trans- 
 parent eye-wash on generals and inspecting officers who 
 have all been through the same mill before them, and know 
 every dodge in the game; but when cleanliness and smart- 
 ness are there as the result of the pride of the men in them- 
 selves and in the regiment, their influence again reacts on 
 the feeling of the men in the march-past, and contributes to 
 the force of the impression made upon the reviewing officer. 
 It is necessary to insist on this view of the matter, for 
 there is an increased tendency in the Infantry to believe 
 that, because the fighting line no longer maneuvers in close 
 order under fire a change, by the way, which really was 
 made by the French in the Revolution, and not by the Ger- 
 mans in I860 therefore marching past, smartness under 
 arms, etc., are all a useless waste of time, ,and to point to the 
 new German drill-book in confirmation of this. In reality 
 no greater mistake could be made. It is granted that to the 
 casual reader the book in question may seem to sanction a 
 departure from the former standard of smartness, but those 
 who are bound to read it the most carefully viz., the officers 
 themselves don't interpret it in that spirit at all. The 
 fact is, that practically the new book is merely the final 
 sanctioning by regulation of the then existing interpreta- 
 tion of the old one, which had established itself on a sort 
 of "survival of the fittest" principle by a system of trial and 
 
294 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 error experiments since the last war. For years past the 
 greater part of the old book had been as extinct as the dodo, 
 and all drills and tactical exercises and maneuvers had been 
 conducted in very close accordance with the new prescription, 
 though no official sanction for the custom existed, and there- 
 fore a man was always liable to be pulled up by some be- 
 fogged old pedant who might not have assimilated the 
 theory of modern fighting a condition whirh, though it 
 rarely occurred, still rendered the subordinates a little ner- 
 vous, and led to a certain amount of time being wasted on 
 non-essentials. Otherwise nothing has been changed in 
 the spirit of the training at all. 
 
 One point which strikes one very forcibly indeed after 
 watching our own Infantry drill is the excellence with whirh 
 the words of command are given, and the general attention 
 paid to the bearing of the officer who gives it. The new 
 regulation lays particular stress on this point, and insists 
 that, except in cases where a loud command might betray 
 the presence of an ambuscade or generally defeat the idea 
 of a surprise, the word of command is to be given with the 
 utmost precision and distinctness, and the intention of 1h- 
 regulation is consistently and 'thoroughly carried out. Of 
 course, the same idea exists in our own service, on paper 
 but on paper only; too often one can see an officer who con- 
 siders he has done all that is necessary in raising his voice 
 sufficiently to be heard by the men under his immediate com- 
 mand, and if they happen to be only a single man detach- 
 ment or an officer's guard, he speaks to them only in his 
 ordinary voice, and at the same time does not trouble to 
 come to "attention" himself. The result necessarily is, that 
 as he himself does not take the trouble to put himself out, 
 the men don't see the necessity of exerting themselves 
 either, and the order is obeyed in a casual sort of manner, 
 most subversive of the idea of discipline. One can see this 
 on any guard-mounting or church parade, where the num- 
 bers to be controlled are insignificant. As I write, I can 
 recall five instances in point, all of them guards of honor for 
 the commander-in-chief or a lieutenant-governor, and the 
 officers in command of which were all rather above than 
 
Military Letters ana Essays. 295 
 
 below the average of smartness; yet, with the cominander- 
 in-chief, all his staff, and a host of spectators looking on, 
 not one thought it worth his while to make his men jump to 
 his word. Just across the road here lives the officer command- 
 ing the battalion quartered in this place, and twice a day 
 under my windows the ceremony of fetching the colors and 
 bringing them back is gone through, of course by a different 
 officer and guard on each occasion. Yet every time the 
 officer halts his command, steps out in front of it, standing 
 strictly at "attention," and gives the necessary words with 
 the same energy and life as if he were drilling a battalion. 
 I can only say that even the Guards in London, who are un- 
 questionably far smarter in these and similar duties in 
 fact, in all drills than anything else in the army, can show 
 us nothing like it. 
 
 Now let any one who cares about these things go down 
 to a company instruction parade or any similar duty and see 
 whether officers, even the smartest, give their commands 
 with this concentrated vim, or as if they really meant to be 
 obeyed. In fact, if, as I believe, obeying does not merely 
 imply a leisurely doing of a thing, but rather a sort of jump- 
 ing into the collar, an instantaneous simultaneous move- 
 ment of all, as if an electric shock had struck them, no real 
 obedience is ever seen with us except on a battalion parade; 
 and I fear that, till the idea of company officers commanding 
 their own men is fairly adopted in our service, it never will 
 be, for neither men nor officers feel that they belong to one 
 another. The company officers do not really command their 
 men, but, through the courtesy of the colonel and adjutant, 
 the men are lent to the officers to play with. But it is quite 
 different in the Artillery and Engineers; there both men 
 and officers belong to each other, and they know it; and 
 though in neither service is it possible, as a rule, to insist 
 on the simultaneous execution of a command for, gener- 
 ally speaking, each number has a different duty to perform 
 yet one can see in a moment the immense difference of the 
 influence the officers of the scientific branches (so called) 
 exercise over the men under them. Possibly this statement 
 will be objected to by many who have not thought about the 
 
296 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 matter much; if so, I can only ask them if they have ever 
 galloped for a general, or if not, the first time they do, to 
 notice the difference between the way an order is received 
 and obeyed by a Gunner subaltern and an Infantry one. I, 
 for one, do not believe, or, at any rate, believe only to a very 
 limited degree, in the system of selection for commissions 
 by examination, and can myself find but very little to choose 
 between the raw material at Woolwich and at Sandhurst; 
 but compare the finished product after about five or seven 
 years' service, and there can be little doubt as to the superi- 
 ority of the system of delegated responsibility by which the 
 Artillery man is trained, and that in vogue in the rest of the 
 army. 
 
 To those who are too proud to learn from either the 
 Germans or another arm of our own service, let me recom- 
 mend the study of our own navy, in which again Hie 
 system of delegated responsibility is the motive at work. 
 No man's pride can be hurt by being compared with \\ 
 national service which is excellence itself, and no one who 
 objects to the German system of command as inapplicable 
 to English conditions can maintain his objection when he 
 sees the results which the very same system worked by 
 Englishmen afloat is capable of turning out. 
 
 BLANK VERSUS BALL CARTRIDGE TACTICS. 
 
 A tactical work of more than usual importance has 
 just appeared in Berlin. It is from the pen of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Malachowski, a well-known authority of the 
 general staff. As far as I have had time to read it, it seems 
 to be the very thing tacticians have been searching after 
 for the last twenty to thirty years. The title I have freely 
 rendered above, and in the main the book may be described 
 as an historical unraveling of the alternate influence peace 
 and war, together with improvement in armaments, have 
 had on the evolution of tactics since 1742, the era of the 
 first Silesian war. It is specially devoted, of course, to the 
 German armies, but the French also come in for their share 
 of criticism, and the chief point to notice is, how time and 
 again an admirable system evolved on war service has been 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 ruined by the pedantry of the parade-ground and the zeal 
 of tactical "drill-book mongers." It is a sizable work (some 
 400 pages) and would have been more valuable, if less reada- 
 ble, with a larger allowance of references. What the ulti- 
 mate conclusions will be I do not yet know, but it is a book 
 which can be studied with profit by all, and to avoid waste 
 of time in ordering it, I take a special chapter out of the 
 middle, partly as illustrating the tendency of the work, 
 partly as giving us the opinion of a well-known Russian tac- 
 tical authority, Dragomirow,on the Prussian Army as it was 
 in 1860, a point of departure very essential for all who would 
 study the development of modern breech-loading tactics. 
 Malachowski says, speaking of the moral of the troops at 
 the outbreak of the war: 
 
 "Of special enthusiasm in the men there was no ques- 
 tion; the object of the war was not understood by the lower 
 classes, and the loAver middle ones did not sympathize with 
 it. But the want of this enthusiasm was replaced by loy- 
 alty to king and country and the feeling of duty and honor 
 inherent in the nation. It was better with the officers; they 
 were animated with a degree of personal incentive to dis- 
 tinction and intelligence hitherto unknown amongst them. 
 As regards the drill-book, all that was of value was to be 
 found on the four pages devoted to the company column; 
 excluding these, probably no infantry ever took the field with 
 a less practical regulation. As the event proved, \t was for- 
 tunate that it was so, for with the then prevailing pedantic 
 tendency on the drill-ground a revision could hardly have 
 failed to bring in much that was evil." 
 
 In explanation I may add that in the main the drill- 
 book was Scharnhorst, original 1809-12, one with concre- 
 tions more or less detrimental appended. 
 
 "From Kessel's work we may learn that we had about 
 grasped the idea of small in preference to battalion columns, 
 but these were still in the bonds of hard-and-fast adherence 
 to prescribed distances and intervals within the limits of 
 the battalion and brigade drill. It was this very tendency 
 which proved so disastrous to the Austrians. The infantry 
 was thus practically thrown on its own resources; thanks 
 
 20 
 
298 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 to its officers, this was about the best thing that could have 
 happened to it. 
 
 "On mobilization, at latest on the passage of the fron- 
 tier, we stripped off our figurative regulation clothing and 
 the most diverse forms came to light. In one corps the two- 
 deep formation was accepted as fundamental; in another 
 one would not hear of company columns, and formed half- 
 battalions and half -companies; in a third the two flank com- 
 panies were sent forward, the two center ones following 
 as a half-battalion in rear; in a fourth companies always 
 formed in column right in front. It is a pity no one lias 
 ever collected all the variations indulged in both in 1866 and 
 1870." * * "And the King looked on with a laugh at all, 
 wusely leaving every man to win in his own way; only being 
 strict against neglect of duty and want of zeal. It is won- 
 derful the effect this steady confidence of his in the troops* 
 exercised on our officers in both wars." 
 
 The picture the new national army presented applies 
 well also to the conditions of 1870. To get an impart ial idea 
 of it, let us see what an able Russian general, Dragomirow, 
 who followed the war on Steinuietz's staff, has to say of it. 
 His book appeared in 1868, when the impression of his ex- 
 perience must still have been fresh in his mind. He first 
 treats of the "spirit of the army and character of its 
 training" : 
 
 "Duty for duty's sake in all, even the smallest details, 
 is the most characteristic trait in the Prussian Army. At 
 first it might seem this devotion to minor details of duty 
 would result in pedantry, yet the facts show this is not the 
 case. The Prussian soldier is not of an excitable tempera- 
 ment; his love of order, obstinacy, and steadiness, however, 
 deserve high praise. What is very remarkable is the extra- 
 ordinary unity of opinion and similarity in the way of grasp- 
 ing a question of military importance in the officers, and 
 their inexhaustible zeal. The essential points are not lost 
 sight of in this care for the small formalities; the letter 
 does not kill the spirit, for this letter is a characteristic of 
 the race. Every Prussian is in a sense a pedant, but a 
 pedant who acts; consequentially pedantic not only in his 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 299 
 
 relation to others, but equally to himself, even against his 
 own interests. No one seeks his own ends at the expense 
 of others, or allows either himself or others license." 
 
 As an example of this strictness, he quotes General 
 Steinmetz daily letting the corps defile before him, passing 
 over little irregularities which pleased or cheered the men, 
 a rose in their coats or leaves in their helmets, but re- 
 morselessly down on anything betokening real slackness, 
 an unbuttoned shoulder-strap, for instance. Malachowski 
 agrees to all this, only he points out that if pedantry had not 
 in I860 killed the spirit, it was due to deeper causes since 
 1806, and not to anything essential in the character of Prus- 
 sian pedantry, for Prussian pedantry had brought about 
 the disasters of that fatal year. Those causes were the in- 
 troduction of short service, the education of the nation (?), 
 and what he, as far as I have read, has not alluded to the 
 growing tendency to decentralization, the necessary conse- 
 quence in Prussia of the short service. Dragomirow then 
 goes on to the training of the troops for war, first amongst 
 the officers. With them the "similarity of appreciation of 
 military problems" is a chief factor, and the "nature of his 
 surroundings, which compel every officer to improve his 
 knowledge." Theoretical and historical knowledge of war 
 he finds in all, and therein he sees "the chief counterpoise 
 against the soul-destroying influence of the cult of the drill- 
 book." The officers of the general staff he finds completely 
 free from the tendency to systematize, so common amongst 
 civilian Germans. They recognize that practical ability is 
 not so much a matter of deep or extensive knowledge as of 
 the capacity to adapt this knowledge to the object in view. 
 The efficiency of the general staff is the special work of Yon 
 Moltke. He then proceeds to analyze Prince Frederick 
 Charles's "instructions (literally hints) for the troops taking 
 the field under my command in 1866." To the best of my 
 belief, it is unknown in England. After pointing out that 
 though in its broad features the campaign is intended to be 
 conducted in an offensive form, yet it may happen that 
 locally troops may be thrown on the defensive when their 
 fire-power as against the Austrians should decide every- 
 
300 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 thing. He then recommends precisely the same style of 
 fighting- which won for us our fume in the Peninsula a few 
 skirmishers to hang on the Hanks of the approaching col- 
 umns and then at point-blank range half a dozen volleys and 
 the bayonet. One point he insists on: "The first line is 
 never to be relieved by the second; troops once sent in to 
 the fight must stay there to the last. The relief of the 1 wo 
 lines as practised on the parade-ground docs not and never 
 has taken place, as it was intended to in war, and it is not 
 to be attempted." As to formation, Dragomirow says: 
 "The Prince seems to be in contradiction: first, with the 
 regulation, by proposing his own forms; and secondly, with 
 himself, in allowing the troops to choose whatever forms 
 they are best accustomed to. But behind t his apparent con- 
 tradiction lies sound principle viz., to allow the greatest 
 possible moral and intellectual freedom to the individual; 
 for only under these conditions can the individual develop 
 his full powers and knowledge to the greatest good of ihe 
 whole." . 
 
 Here the author (Malachowski) digresses and asks the 
 parade-ground tacticians, who also cite the Prince as on 
 their side, "Do they really believe we owe our victories in 
 1866 to the fact that the regulations contained prescribed 
 forms for the attack of a battalion or brigade? Is it not 
 rather the case that we won because our officers were suffi- 
 ciently well trained and intelligent to modify the regula- 
 tions to fit the circumstances, and to the developed charac- 
 ter which enabled them to act on their own responsibility?" 
 Of General Steinmetz, Dragomirow relates that he saw him 
 daily, on marches which did not lead to an encounter, in- 
 spect the baggage-wagons, and ask every man with them 
 why he w 7 as there, sending him back to the front if he was 
 not duly authorized. In other corps men often crawled like 
 bees over the wagons. Such thoroughness on his part had 
 a great effect on the discipline of his command. With re- 
 gard to the attack on Skalitz, Dragomirow asked Steinmetz 
 for details of his dispositions. Steinmetz replied: "OhT* 
 the thing is very simple. One simply attacks, and if beaten 
 off, attacks again, and so on till one succeeds." "But,"^ 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 301 
 
 said his interlocutor, "do you uot relieve the troops?" "Re- 
 lieve them?" replied the general in a puzzled sort of tone. 
 "Yes; with fresh ones when the leading companies have 
 become dispersed?" "Oh no," returned the general. 
 "Troops once under fire must stay there till the end." The 
 idea of reliev ing troops has at last died out pretty generally, 
 but at that time in most other armies it was almost a matter 
 of faith, and one must appreciate it to understand the pecul- 
 iar form the battles on the Continent during the previous 
 twenty years had assumed. It is a point that at the time 
 was much overlooked by our own authors, particularly in 
 criticisms on the Solferino campaign. The position of the 
 Prussians at Nachod Dragomirow considers to have been 
 very precarious, and in discussing it comes to the common- 
 sense conclusion, but one which differs entirely from that 
 usually assumed by battle critics, that "The theoretically 
 deduced demonstrations of the better plan, however, usually 
 fail to grasp all the factors actually in play at the moment. 
 This is what students of war usually overlook in practice 
 the immediate point is not what is best, but what is possi- 
 ble." On the evening of the 28th June, when Benedek learnt 
 of the combat of Soor and its prejudicial result for the 
 Austrians, he turned on Henikstein and Krismanic with the 
 words : "I told you they would beat us if we employed our 
 forces in detail," and from this remark and the history of the 
 day he deduces that a commander-in-chief can never learn 
 the art of war by practice alone. If he has not prepared 
 his mind by careful and thorough study of military history, 
 he falls helplessly into the hands of any a Weyrother." 
 Weyrother, it will be remembered, was the unfortunate 
 chief of the staff who devised the beautiful parade maneuver 
 which was to have destroyed Napoleon at Austerlitz, but 
 which the latter tore asunder. The name has since become 
 a generic term to describe the product of the parade-ground, 
 a closet student who without personal responsibility pre- 
 pares plans for soldiers to execute. Dragomirow does not 
 make his meaning quite clear here, for Von Moltke too was 
 but a closet student, and the fact that he had never even com- 
 manded a battalion was hardly an advantage to him. What 
 
302 Military Letters and Essays. 
 
 it all conies to is the guidance under which a iium studies 
 war, or, in the absence of guidance, the genius he brings to 
 bear on it. One or the other he must have; without either, 
 neither practice nor study, nor both together, will avail. 
 With reference to Koniggratz, he (Dragomirow) admires the 
 conception of the battle as a whole, still more the initiative 
 of the commanders who dared to assume the responsibility 
 of modifying their orders to suit the changed circumstances. 
 This was specially noticeable in the case of the advance of 
 the 1st Guard Division on Chlum, for the orders could not 
 have been based on an accurate knowledge of the circum- 
 stances, no such knowledge being conceivably possible at 
 the time they were issued. Finally he says: 
 
 "All the world wonders at the emYieiu-y of the new 
 Prussian weapon, but it occurs to but few to notice the cool- 
 ness, intelligence, self-denial, and sense of duty of the men 
 who held these weapons. Are these factors really only 
 secondary? Are they not, perhaps, the decisive ones? In 
 war that side will be defeated that was already beaten in 
 peace. In war mutual self confidence, the root of discipline, 
 cannot exist when in the individual the feeling of duty lias 
 not been developed, or perhaps the soil from which it springs 
 does not exist. Each man must at least be sufficiently car- 
 ried away by the cause for which he is fighting, which may, 
 for the moment, be only the credit of the body of troops, ihe 
 company or regiment to which he belongs, to die for it cheer- 
 fully. In a way, the truth of this is universally admitted; 
 we are never tired of repeating, 'In war moral counts for 
 three-quarters,' etc., but when we come to investigate a par- 
 ticular point, this is forgotten, and one endeavors to deduce 
 the result from the weapons, the hair-powder, or the length 
 of the pigtails. The effect of the Prussian fire was not in 
 itself particularly remarkable, and if as a fact it did spread 
 universal consternation, the reason is only because people 
 forget too easily former experiences. To whom is the terri- 
 ble effect of British volleys in Spain unknown (remember it 
 is a Russian who speaks)? In those days the armament on 
 either side was equal, but there were other points of differ- 
 
Military Letters and Essays. 303 
 
 ence viz., national skill in the use of arms, coolness, and 
 steadiness. 
 
 "With weak or insufficient development of the moral 
 quality of the troops, no improvement either in weapons or 
 in drill will avail anything. Both no doubt help to over- 
 come the obstacles between us and the attainment of our 
 ends, but do not teach how to pursue these ends with deter- 
 mination and energy. This cannot be taught, it can only be 
 evolved from the personal energy of the men and their 
 leaders; without this energy, indeed, better weapons only 
 do harm, for they lead to waste of ammunition. An improve- 
 ment in the method of employing troops will then also be of 
 evil, for though it teaches the way to overcome obstacles, at 
 the same time it reveals their full strength, and thereby 
 affords undecided characters excuses and justification for 
 their want of determination. The Prussians now and again 
 formed unskillful plans, but they formed them with resolu- 
 tion, and, thanks to this quality of resolution, in the end 
 they remained victors." 
 
 I have reproduced Dragomirow's ideas at length, partly 
 for their intrinsic interest, and partly because these extracts 
 show Malachowski's fairness of mind in accepting a foreign- 
 er's judgment of his own army, and still more his confidence 
 in the fairness of his brother officers who will read the book. 
 
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