UC-NRLF GIFT OF v***"*-** - A HISTORY OF ROME FOR BEGINNERS A History of Rome For Beginners From the Foundation of the City to the Death of Augustus By Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, M.A. Late Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge With Illustrations &> Maps London Macmillan and Co., Limited New York : The Macmillan Company 1897 All rights reserved GLASGOW t PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE 1 AND CO. tt HENRY JACKSON, LittD., FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, FROM HIS FRIEND AND FORMER PUPIL. PREFACE. THIS book is not a mere abbreviation of my larger his- tory. It has been written for the most part entirely afresh, and is intended to put the main events of Roman history, both in regard to political development and imperial extension, as simply and briefly as seemed possible. Military events, as such, are given with a minimum of detail, and the effects of campaigns have been dwelt upon rather than their nature and circumstances. Whether I have succeeded in hitting the mean between a Primer and an advanced History I must leave to the judgment of my readers : but that has been my aim. The book, such as it is, owes a great deal to the kind criticisms and sug- gestions of my friend and former colleague at Eton, Mr. C. H. EVERARD, formerly Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, whose patience in reading the proofs I am glad to acknowledge with gratitude. E. S. SHUCKBURGH. June, 1897. MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. GREAT DIVISIONS OF ITALY, 3 LATIUM, 6 TOGA AS WORN AT SACRIFICES, ... - 9 PLAN OF ROME, ... 14 AGGER OF SERVIUS,- ... 15 CLOACA MAXIMA, 17 TEMPLES OF VESTA AND CASTOR RESTORED, - - 24 AUGUR WITH LITUUS, .... - 27 GROTTA CAMPANA AT VEII, - 33 SHRINE OF THE PALLADIUM, - 42 SAMNITE WARRIOR, ... 48 APPIAN WAY, 51 MAP OF COLONIES IN ITALY, 56 TOMB OF SCIPIO, 58 MAGNA GRAECIA, - - - - - 62 ROMAN SOLDIERS, 69 SELLA CURULIS AND FASCES, 72 SICILY, 78 TOGA, .... 85 ROMAN COUNTRY HOUSE, ... - 91 SPAIN, ... 94 GALLIA CISALPINA, 99 ROMAN STANDARD BEARER AND SOLDIER, - - - - 103 x MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE BUST OF SCIPIO, in As WITH PROW OF SHIP, 115 ROUND DINING COUCH, 132 RUINS OF CARTHAGE, - ... . - -136 TRICLINIUM, - - - - ... - - - 140 A s WITH HEAD OF JANUS, - - - - - 154 REMAINS OF CAPITOLIUM, 173 ASIA MINOR, ---.*- 177 MlTHRIDATES EUPATOR, 178 GLADIATORS FIGHTING, - - - 199 STATUE OF POMPEY, 211 BUST OF CICERO, 229 TESTUDO, 245 BUST OF CAESAR, - - - - - - 246 CENTRAL ITALY, 256 HARBOUR OF BRUNDISIUM, .... - 258 MAP OF N. GREECE FOR CIVIL WAR, 263 NORTH AFRICA, 272 COIN OF IULIUS CAESAR AND AUGUSTUS, .... 273 COIN OF ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA, - - - - 302 ROMAN EMPIRE IN TIME OF AUGUSTUS, .... 308 M. VIPSANIUS AGRIPPA, 315 ROSTRA OF IULIUS, 326 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS. I. Regal Period, B.C. 753-509. Institutions traditionally assigned to each reign. CHAPTERS I.-II., pp. 1-27. (1) ROMULUS. Roman Senate of 200. Three Patrician Tribes Ramnes, Tities, Luceres. Thirty wards or curlae, hence Comitia Curiata. Clients. (2) NUMA POMPILIUS. Religious Institutions Pontifices, Augures, Vestal Virgins, Saiii. (3) TULLUS HOSTILIUS. Destruction of Alba Longa. Plebs. Legend of Horatii and Curiatii. (4) ANGUS MARCIUS. Pons sublicius. Conquest of Latin Towns. Mamertine Prison. Settlement of Plebs on the Aventine. (5) Lucius TARQUINIUS PRISCUS. Farther conquest of Latium. Public works ; cloacae, Circus Maximus. 100 new members of Senate ( ' patres minorum gentium j. (6) SERVIUS TULLIUS. Five classes according to census of income, subdivided into centuriae, hence Comitia Centuriata. He includes the Quirinal, Viminal, and Esquiline hills within the walls. Four city and seven- teen country tribes, whence afterwards the Comitia Tributa. (7) Lucius TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS. Conquest of Gabii. Great temple of the Capitol. Expulsion of the Tarquins. Xll CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF II. Early Republic. Struggles of Plebeians for Political and Social Equality with Patricians, B.C. 509-286. Parallel with the gradual subjugation of Italy by Rome, B.C. 509-266. CHAPTERS III.-V., pp. 28-66. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY- STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS. B.C. 509. Two consuls first appointed. Lex Valeria de provocatione. 507. 496. 495- 493- 488. First secession of the Plebs. Five Tribuni Plebis and two Aediles. 486. Agrarian law. Spurius Cas- sius put to death. 485-479. Seven consecutive consul- ships of the Fabii. 479- 472. Lex Publilia. Tribunes and Aediles to be elected by Comitia Tributa. 458. 457. Ten Tribunes instead of five. 451. First Decemvirate. Ten tables. 450. Second Decemvirate. Two new tables (Appius Clau- dius). 449. Second secession of the Plebs. Valerian and Horatian laws. Comitia Tributa of equal authority with the Comitia Centuriata ; persons of the Plebeian magistrates sacred. 445. Lex Canuleia. Conubium. ROMAN CONQUEST OF ITALY. Defection of Prisci Latini. First treaty with Carthage. Rome besieged by Etruscans (Porsena). Latin war. Battle of Lake Regillus . Wars with Volscians, Sabines, and Aurunci. League with 30 Latin towns (Spurius Cassius). War with Aequians and Volscians (Coriolanus). War with Aequians and Veientines. Legend of Fabii at the Cremera. War with Aequians and Sabines. Two battles of Mount Algidus. Cincinnatus Dictator. [Frequent border warfare Volscians and Aequians.] with PRINCIPAL EVENTS. xni CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS. B.C. 444. Tribuni militares consulari potestate, to which Plebei- ans were eligible, instead of Consuls. Censorship. 439. Spurius Maelius killed. 434. Censorship restricted to 18 months. 421. Plebeians admitted to the Quaestorship. 405-396. Pay first given to soldiers. 390. People much impoverished. 389-8. The restoration of the City carried out unskilfully. Commons much burdened with debt. 387. 384. Manlius executed for treason, owing to his support of debtors. 376. Licinian rogations proposed (i) Relief of debtors; (2) Regulation of the Ager publicus; (3) One Consul to be Plebeian. 367. Licinian rogations passed. 366. First Plebeian Consul. Praetor appointed, a patrician. 365-345. Death of Camillus. ROMAN CONQUEST OF ITALY. 358. 351. First Plebeian Censor. 343-340. 339. Leges Publiliae(T.} Plebis- cita to bind all citizens, and to be confirmed before- hand by the Senate; (2) One Censor to be Plebeian. 340-338. Siege of Veii taken by Camillus as Dictator (396). Battle of the Allia. Destruction of Rome by Gauls. Latins, Hernicans.Aequians, Etrus- cans in arms. Four new tribes (25). Gauls conquered by Camillus near Alba. 334- 332. First Plebeian Praetor. Wars with Faliscans, Tarquinii, Etruscans, Cisalpine Gauls. Stories of Curtius, T. Manlius Torquatus, M. Valerius Corvus. Treaty with Carthage. Two new tribes ( 27 ). First Samnite war : battles, Mt. Gaurus, Suessula. Latin war : battles, Veseris, Tifer- num. Latin League dissolved. Two new tribes (29). XIV CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY STRUGGLES OF THE PLEBEIANS. B.C. 327-304. 326. Abolition of nexum by Lex Poetilia. 312-308. Censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus. 302. 296. Plebeians admitted to the sacred colleges by Lex Ogulnia. 298-290. 286. Third secession of Plebs. Lex Hortensia . The auctor- itas of the Senate not re- quired for laws passed by Comitia Tributa, which thus becomes a sovereign legislature. 283. 281-275. 275-266. Plebeian Aediles and Tri- bunes obtain the entree of the Senate. [The only political distinction between the orders remaining is now in favour of the Plebeians, who alone are eligible to the Tribunate.] ROMAN CONQUEST OF ITALY. Second Samnite war : battles, Cau- dine Forks, Cinna, Bovianurn. Aequians subjected. Third Samnite war. Samnites joined by Gauls, Umbrians, and Etrus- cans : battles, Sentinum in Umbria (295), P. Decius Mus and Q. Fabius; Aquilonia (293). C. Pontius is at length defeated and captured by Q. Fabius. Quarrel with Tarentum. War with Pyrrhus : battles, Pan- dosia or Heraclea (280), Asculum (279), Beneventum (275). Capture of Rhegium and Tarentum. Gradual reduction of Samnium, Lucania, Bruttium, and their security by a system of civitates foederatae and coloniae. [All Italy south of the Rubicon subject to Rome.] III. Contest with the Gauls, Carthage, and Macedonia, of Empire beyond Italy, B.C. 264-133. CHAPTERS VI.-X., pp. 67-140. FOREIGN WARS. B.C. 269. FIRST PUNIC WAR, to help the Mamertines of Messana against Hiero and Car- t thage. Formation PRINCIPAL EVENTS. xv FOREIGN WARS. PROVINCES. B.C. 269. Victory of Claudius in Sicily. Storm of Agrigentum. Romans build a Fleet. Victory of Duilius at My- lae, B.C. 260 Of Regulus at Ecnomus, B.C. 256, who is defeated and captured in B.C. 255. Victory at Panormus over Hasdrubal. Defeat of Claudius at Dre- panum, B.C. 249. Victory of Lutatius off the Aegates insulae, B.C. 241. 241. Peace with Carthage. Car- thaginians evacuate Sicily. 238. Carthage exhausted by three years' war with her mer- cenaries. Romans demand from Car- thage the cession of Corsica and Sardinia. 235-225. Hamilcar in Spain. Han- nibal's oath. 228. War withlllyrians under Queen Teuta. 224-222. Defeat of Gauls near Telamon in Etruria, and at Clastidium (Marcellus). 221. Hannibal succeeds Hasdrubal in Spain. 219. Hannibal takes Saguntum. 218-202. SECOND PUNIC WAR. First Period. Roman Disasters. 218. Ticinus, Trebia. 217. Trasimenus Lacus (Flamin- ius). 216. Cannae (Varro). 216-212. Revolt of Capua, Lucania, Bruttium, Greek towns in Italy and Sicily (Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator). Hannibal takes Tarentum. [213-205. War with Philip of Macedon. ] Second Period. Roman Successes. 212. Marcellus takes Leontini and Syracuse. Fall of Publius and Cn. Scipio in Spain. Sicily made a Roman Province, (i) Six new tribes (35). Corsica and Sardinia made a Roman Province. (2) XVI CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF FOREIGN WARS. PROVINCES. B.C. 211. Recovery of Capua. 209. Recovery of Tarentum by Fabius. 208. Fall of Marcellus. 207. Hasdrubal defeated on the Metaurus (Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator). 210-205. In Spain Publius Cor- neliug Scipio gradually expels Carthaginians, and conquers the whole country. Laevinus reduces Sicily. Hannibal retires to Bruttium. 204. Scipio goes to Africa : block- ades Utica. 203. Hannibal recalled to Car- thage. 202. Battle of Zama. End of the war. 200-197. Second Macedonian war. Battle of Cynoscephalae (T. Quinctius Flaraininus). Proclamation of the freedom of Greek cities from Mace- donia. 200-191. War with Insubrian and Boian Gauls. 197. 190. War with Antiochus, K. of Syria. Battle of Magnesia (L. Cor- nelius Scipio Asiaticus). 183. Death of Hannibal and Scipio. 171-168. Third Macedonian war. Battle of Pydna (Aemilius Paulus). 155-150. Spanish war (Marcellus and Lucullus). 149-146. War against pseudo- Philip of Macedonia and against the Achaeans. Corinth destroyed (Mum- mius). 149-146. THIRD PUNIC WAR. Destruction of Carthage. Gallia Cisalpina a Roman Province. (3) Two Provinces in Spain. (5) Macedonia made a Roman Pro- vince. (6) Illyricum made a Roman Province. (7) Africa made a Roman Province. (8) PRINCIPAL EVENTS. xvn FOREIGN WARS. B.C. 146-140. War against Viriathus in Spain. 143-133. Numantine war (Scipio Africanus the Younger). PROVINCES. Achaia (Peloponnesus) attached for certain purposes to the province of Macedonia. IV. Period of Civil Strife in Italy, and of Foreign Wars, ending in Revolution, B.C. 134-30. CHAPTERS XI.-XX., pp. 141-302. B.C. I34I3 2 . 133. ITALY. Servile war in Sicily. 133-131. Measures of Tiberius Gracchus as to the Ager Publicus. 129. 121. Reforms of Gaius Gracchus 113-101. Cimbrian war. Aquae Sextiae, B.C. 102. Vercellae, B.C. 101. 111-106. lugurthine war (Marius). 90-88. Social war. Battle of As- culum. Admission of Italians to citizenship. 88. Flight of Marius. 87-84. First Mithridatic war (Sulla). 87. Return of Marius, and mas- sacres in Rome. 86. Death of Marius. 83-72. War with Sertorius in Spain. Sulla appointed Dictator. 82. 80. 79- 78. 74- 73-71- Sulla abdicates. Death of Sulla. Attempted re- volution of Lepidus. War with Spartacus and his gladiators (Crassus and Pompey). THE PROVINCES. The royal property and rights in Pergamus bequeathed to Rome by Attalus III. Asia made a Roman Province. (9) The Province of Transalpine Gaul first formed about this time. (10) Cilicia made a Roman Province.(n) Bithynia made a Roman Province. (12) xviii CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF ITALY. B.C. 70. Pompey and Crassus Consuls. 68-67. Pompey conquers the Pir- ates. 63. Cicero Consul. Catiline's conspiracy crushed. Birth of Augustus. 61. Caesar pro-praetor in Spain. 60. First Triumvirate, informal agreement between Gn. Pompeius, C. lulius Caesar, M. Licinius Crassus. 59. Caesar's Consulship. 58-51. Caesar's victories in Gaul. 56. Conference at Lucca. 53. Defeat and death of Crassus at Carrhae. 52. Pompey sole Consul for six months. 49. Caesar crosses the Rubicon. Civil war. Pompey crosses to Epirus. 48. Caesar defeated near Apol- lonia, Pompey at Pharsalia. Murder of Pompey in Egypt. 46. Defeat of Pompeians at Thapsus, Africa. Caesar, perpetual Dictator and Imperator, Consul for ten years. 45. Battle of Munda, Spain. De- feat of Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius. 44. Assassination of Caesar. 44-43. Octavian takes the field against Antony at Mutina. 43. Defeat of Antony at Forum Gallorum near Mutina (i3th April). Death of the Consuls C. Vibius Pansa and A. Hirtius. Formal appointment of Octavian (now called Gaius lulius Caesar Octavianus), Antony, and Lepidus as triumviri reipublicae con- stituendae. 42. Battles of Philippi. Death of C. Cassius and M. Brutus. THE PROVINCES. Syria made a Roman Province. (13) Crete and Cyrenaica made a Roman Province, though not fully organ- ized till B.C. 27. (14) The rest of Gaul added to the Province. Transalpine Gaul administered as three Provinces Narbonensis, Belgica, Celtica. (16) PRINCIPAL EVENTS. xix ITALY. B.C. 41-40. Perusian War. L. An- tonius and Fulvia against Octavian and Agrippa. 40. Peace of Brundisium between Octavian and Antony. 39. Treaty of Misenum with Sextus Pompeius. 38. Hostilities with Sext. Pom- peius recommence. Marriage of Octavian with Livia. 36. Sextus Pompeius defeated at Naulochus by Agrippa. Lepidus expelled from the Triumvirate. Antony meets with disasters in the Parthian war. 35. Sextus Pompeius killed in Asia, 33. Antony returns to Greece from unsuccessful Parthian war. 31. Battle of Actium. 30. Death of Antony and Cleo- patra. THE PROVINCES. Mauretania made vince. (17) a Roman Pro- V. Reign of Augustus. CHAPTER XXI., pp. 303-326. THE REIGN. B.C. 30. Tribunicia potestas and other honours voted to Caesar Octavianus (Augustus). 29. Three triumphs 'over Illyri- cum,' 'for the battle at Actium, ' * over Cleopatra. ' The temple of I anus closed. 27. Division of Provinces between the Imperator and the Senate. The title of AUGUSTUS be- stowed on Caesar. 26. Augustus conducts a cam- paign against the Cantabri. THE PROVINCES. Egypt made a Province with special regulations. (18) XX CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE REIGN. B.C. 25. The temple of lanus again closed. 24. Expedition of Aelius Gallus in Arabia. 23. The tribunicia potestas for life, proconsulare imperium for five years (always re- newed) secured to Augus- tus. Death of Marcellus, nephew of Augustus. 21. Agrippa marries lulia, daugh- ter of Augustus. 20. Return of the standards and prisoners from Parthia. Birth of Gaius Caesar, son of Agrippa and lulia. 19. Can tabri subdued by Agrippa. Death of Vergil. 1 8. Campaign of Drusus against the Rhaeti. 17. Birth of Lucius Caesar, son of Agrippa and lulia. 1 6. Defeat of M. Lollius by the Sicambri. 16-14. Augustus in Gaul. 13-12. German wars of Drusus, step-son of Augustus, against the Frisii and Chauci. Death of Lepidus. 12. Death of Agrippa. n-io. Campaigns of Drusus in Germany against the Cher- usci and Chatti, and of Tiberius in Dalmatia. 9. Death of Drusus. 8. Successes of Tiberius in Ger- many. Death of Maecenas and Horace. 7. Association of Tiberius in the tribunicia potestas. A.D. 2. Death of Lucius Caesar. THE PROVINCES. Galatia and Lycaonia made a Roman Province, but Mauretania restored to its king. (19) Cisalpine Gaul organized as four Provinces Narbonensis, Aqui- tania, Lugdunensis, Belgica(with Germania, Superior and Inferior) ; and later two Alpine Provinces Alpes Maritimae and Alpes Cottiae. (22) District between occupied. Rhine and Elbe Moesia made a Roman Province about this time. (23) PRINCIPAL EVENTS. xxi THE REIGN. A.D. 4. Death of Gaius Caesar. Tiberius adopted by Augustus, receives tribunicia potestas for ten years. 5-6. Campaigns of Tiberius in Germany. 7-8. Wars in Pannonia and Dal- matia. 9. Campaigns of Tiberius in Dal- matia. Defeat and death of Varus in Germany. ii. Tiberius crosses the Rhine, but fights no battle. 14. Death of Augustus August). THE PROVINCES. Roman frontier pushed back to the Rhine. FAMILY OF AUGUSTUS. SCRIBONIA=AUGUSTUS = LiviA = Tib.Claudius Nero. b. B.C. 39. Ob. A.D. 19. , = M. Agrippa, ob. u.c. 12. G. Caesar, L. Caesar, lulia, Agrippina, Agrippa ob. A.D. 4. ob. A.D. 2. 03, A.D. 28. ob. A.D. 31. Postumius, ob. A.D. 14. I TIBERIUS, adopted by Augustus. Emperor A.D. 14-37. Drusus, ob. B.C. 9. A HISTORY OF ROME FOR BEGINNERS HISTORY OF ROME FOR BEGINNERS. CHAPTER I. I. The nature and importance of Roman History ; the influence of Rome in consolidating Europe, 2. Italy at the time of the foundation of Rome; the different extensions of the name; the inhabitants of the Peninsula the Etrusci, the Umbrii ; the Sabellians, Lucani, Apuli, Bruttii, Sabines, Samnites ; the Greeks in Italy. 3. Latium ; the prisci Latini ; the surrounding tribes Aequi, Hernici, Volsci, Aurunci ; the larger Latium and its division from Campania. 4. Beginnings of Rome ; Trojan legend and Alba Longa ; the excel- lent site of Rome ; the colony from Alba on the Palatine. 5. Roma Quadrata its foundation on tJie Palatine ; meaning of the term ; other villages on neighbouring heights ; date of foundation ; the ^. Romans' view of their own origin. 6. Extension of Roma Quad- rata to Rome of the seven Mils during the reigns of the kings (i) Romulus, (2) Numa Pompilius, (3) Tulhis Uostilius, (4) Ancus Marcius, (5) Tarquinius Priscus, (6) Servius Tullius^ (7) Tarquinius Super bus ; Colonies during the Regal period. 7. Summary of the position of Rome in 509 B.C. i. What Roman History is. The history of Rome is the history of one city in a district of Italy called Latium, which, beginning as a small settlement of a pastoral folk, with a territory round it stretching scarcely five miles in any direction, gradually absorbed under its rule not only all Italy, but all Spain, Gaul, Sicily, and other islands, Illyricum and the provinces on the Danube, Greece ?? 492 Antium, ,, 467 Ardea, - ,, ,, 442 Satricum, - - - ,, . . . . }) 385 Sutrium, - - - Etrurk, - Nepete, - - . - ,, Setia, - - - Latium, - - - ,, 382 Antium (R), - - made a Roman Colony, - ,, 338 Cales, - - - Etruria, - - - - ,, 334 Anxur (R), - - Latium, - - - - ,, 329 Fregellae, ,, - - - - 328 Luceria, - - - Apulia, - - - - ,, 314 Saticula, - - - Campania, Suessa Aurunca, Latium, - - - - ]- ,, 313 Pontiae, - - - off coast of Latium, Casinum (R), - - Latium, - . . Interamna Lirinas, COLONIES IN ITALY. 7 S 10 ILIA Names underlined are those of Colonies founded before B.C. 510. Names of "Roman Colonies" are printed in capitals. Names of " Latin Colonies " are in small type. IV. COLONIES. Sora, Alba Fucentia, - - Latium, - [ B.C. 303 Narnia, - Umbria, - 11 299 Carseoli, - - Latium, - 298 Minturnae (R), - Sinuessa (R), - - Campania, [ 11 296 Venusia, - Apulia, - ,, 291 Hadria, - Picenum, - 11 289 Castrum Novum (R) Sena Gallica (R), , Picenum, - - Umbria, - I 283 (fire.) Cosa, Paestum, - - Etruria, - - Lucania, - \ >, 273 Ariminum, Beneventum, Umbria, - - Samnium, - 268 Firmum, - - Picenum, - 11 264 Aesernia, - Samnium, *i 263 Aesium (R), Alsium (R), - Umbria, - - Etruria, - - > 247 Fregenae (R), - a ,i 245 AFTER THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. Brundisium, - Calabria, - 11 244 Spoletium, Umbria, - 11 241 Cremona, - Placentia, - - Gallia Cisalpina, - -J - 218 AFTER THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. Puteoli (R), Campania, Volternum (R), - ,,---- Liternum (R), - !- Salernum (R), - Buxentum (R), - - Lucania, .... ' ,. 194 Sipontum (R), - - Apulia, . ... Tempsa (R), - Bruttium, - Croton (R), >""> Thurii (Copia), - - Apulia, .... 11 193 Valentia (Vibo), Bruttium, - >i 192 Pyrgi(R),- - Etruria, .... ,, 191 Bononia, - - Gallia Cisalpina, 11 189 Potentia (R), - - Picenum, - ,c. Pisaurum (R), - - Umbria, ---./" ^ 57 COLONIES. CH. IV. Saturnia (R), - - Etruria, - , Parma (R), - - Gallia Cisalpina, Mutina (R), - ,, B.C. 183 Graviscae (R), - - Etruria, - -^ iSi Aquileia, - - - Gallia Cisalpina, - j , , lol Luna (R), - - - Etruria, - Pisae,. - - , ,, . - ;} 180 Luca (R), ... ... , 177 Luna(R),- 177 Auximum (R), - - Picenum, - - 157 Fabrateria, - - Latium, - ,, 124 Minervia[Skylacium]( R), Bruttium, - .A Neptunia[Tarentum](R), Calabria, - .] i 22 Dertona (R), - - Liguria, - & . ? Eporedia (R), - - Gallia Cisalpina, -. ,, 100 SARCOPHAGUS OF SCIFIO EARBATUS IN THE VATICAN. CHAPTER V. THE CONQUEST OF ITALY COMPLETED. B.C. 289-271. I. Magna Graecia ; the pretensions of Tarentum, and origin of its quarrel with Rome. 2. The invasion by Pyrrhus and battles of Heraclea and Asculum. 3. Pyrrhus in Sicily. 4. Return of Pyrrhus to Italy and his defeat at Beneventum. 5. Means taken to secure Southern Italy. i. Magna Graecia. After the end of the third Sam- nite war Rome still had some troubles to contend with in Etruria, and with some of the Gallic tribes in the north, especially with the Senones, whom they eventually cut to pieces, expelling the survivors from their territories ; and with the Boii, who invaded Etruria, and with whom more than one desperate fight was fought. But it was in the south that the events occurred which had now the most important results on the extension of Roman sway. The Greek towns that fringed the southern coasts had not yet become subject to Rome, but they were so situated with regard to each other and the surrounding peoples that they were certain to become so, and already we find a party in most of them who looked for support from Rome. They were often threatened with attacks from the Lucanians and Apulians or the Samnites ; and they were so jealous of each other that they could seldom combine to resist these attacks. The Tarentines tried to establish a kind of supremacy 59 60 THE QUARREL WITH TARENTUM. CH. among them, and the policy which was favoured by Tarentum was to get help from Greece or Sicily. For this purpose Alexander, king of the Molossi in Epirus, Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, Cleonymus of Sparta, had on various occasions come to South Italy. But these princes had done little good. They had their own pur- poses to serve, and the Tarentines were soon as anxious to get rid of them as they had been to bring them in. When Rome by her wars with the Samnites began to be the most notable power in Southern, as she already was in Central Italy, many of these towns began to look to her for pro- tection. Tarentum, on the other hand, aimed at holding a kind of primacy among them, and was jealous of the interference of Rome. In the course of the second Samnite war the Romans had found it advisable to concede some- thing to this jealousy of the Tarentines. They had made a treaty with them engaging not to sail in ships of war round the Lacinian promontory into the Gulf of Tarentum. But in B.C. 282 the Romans sent help to the Greek town Thurii, which was being attacked by the Lucani, and among other things ten ships were despatched under the command of L. Valerius. These ships, in spite of the treaty, visited several Greek towns on the coast, and eventually appeared in the harbour of Tarentum itself. There was an outburst of excitement among the Tarentines; they put to sea in some of their war vessels, sunk four of the Roman ships, and killed L. Valerius. Ambassadors were sent from Rome to demand reparation, but they were insulted in the assembly, and all compensation was refused. The Romans thereupon declared war, and the anti-Roman party at Tarentum deter- mined to invite the help of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. 2. The Invasion of Pyrrhus, B.C. 280-274. Pyrrhus was king of Epirus, cousin and successor to the Alexander who had, in former days, been also invited into Italy by the Tarentines. The dynasty at first only ruled the Molossi, v. THE INVASION OF PYRRHUS. 6 1 a tribe in Epirus, but Alexander had called himself king of Epirus upon extending his dominions beyond the lands of the Molossi. Pyrrhus had at times been driven from his kingdom, and at times been king of the larger realm of Macedonia. He had led an adventurous life, fighting in all directions and most often in other people's battles. He was therefore an experienced soldier, and indeed had studied tactics carefully, and even written a book on the subject. Especially he is said to have introduced improvements in the method of laying out and fortifying camps, from which the Romans themselves took some hints. Moreover, in character he was generous and placable, and the Romans always remembered their struggle with him without rancour. They were fond of contrasting him with Hannibal, to whom they attributed every kind of treachery and cruelty. He arrived at Tarentum early in B.C. 280 with a large army and a troop of elephants, whose use he had learnt in Africa, and which the Romans had never encountered before. He endeavoured first of all to train and discipline the idle luxurious Tarentines and to collect forces from towns in Lucania, and from the Samnites. These con- tingents did not come in as quickly as he hoped ; for a Roman army under P. Valerius Laevinus, one of the consuls, was already in Lucania, wasting the country, and often preventing aid being sent to Pyrrhus. However, he did get an army together and faced the Romans near Heraclea, on the river Siris. He won the battle, though with such heavy loss that he declared that another such victory would be his ruin. The victory, however, brought him large reinforcements from Lucania and Samnium, and he determined to advance on Rome itself. But he failed to take Capua or Naples, and when he got to Praeneste, only twenty-three miles from Rome, taking Fregellae and Anagnia on his way, he found none of the towns willing to yield to him ; and, as the Roman armies were dogging his foot- MAGNA GRAECIA STADIA looc East of 14 Greenwich // 'alker & Botttall sc. CH. v. PYRRHUS IN SICILY. 63 steps wherever he went, he was in the end obliged to retire and go into winter quarters at Tarentum. Negotia- tions also were tried in vain. He sent his friend Cineas to Rome to offer the Senate peace on the condition of their leaving the Greek cities free, and restoring all they had taken from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites. But the Senate stood firm (greatly, it was said, owing to the spirited speech of the aged Appius Claudius Caecus), and would entertain no terms as long as Pyrrhus remained in Italy. Nor when Fabricius was sent in the winter to negotiate a return of Roman prisoners could the king get from him any hint of concession. The war therefore went on next year and Pyrrhus won another battle at Asculum (B.C. 279), but was himself wounded and unable to follow up his victory. He had to wait for reinforce- ments from Epirus, and in the next spring (B.C. 278) he was unable to do anything against the new consuls, C. Fabricius Luscinus, and Q. Aemilius Papus. 3. Pyrrhus goes to Sicily (B.C. 278). This inaction caused great discontent at Tarentum and defections among his Italian allies. He was glad, therefore, to accept an invitation from Syracuse and other Sicilian towns to come to Sicily to relieve them of their tyrants, and drive back the Carthaginians, who, having settlements in the west of the island, were always trying to extend their power in the east also. This was an expedi- tion something like that on which he was engaged in Italy. For Sicily, too, was fringed with Greek colonies, often at variance with each other, and all of them the object of Carthaginian attacks. There were other reasons for the Sicilian towns wanting a deliverer from outside. They had mostly, from internal dissensions, fallen into the hands of military tyrants, who were at once oppressive and incompetent ; and a few years before one of the towns (Messana) had been captured by some mercenaries from 64 PYRRHUS AGAIN IN ITALY. CH. Campania who called themselves Mamertini (sons of Mamers or Mars), and these men not only destroyed the ancient inhabitants of Messana, but made themselves a terror to the other Sicilians by raids and expeditions in search of plunder. Pyrrhus had a special tie with Syracuse, for he had married a daughter of its last great sovereign, Agath- ocles. He was to go to Sicily, therefore, to put down the tyrants, to suppress the Mamertines, and to drive back the Carthaginians. He stayed there nearly two years, and was at first very successful, and seemed likely to gratify his utmost ambition. If he were lord of Sicily, he would next pass over to Africa to subdue the Carthaginians, and then return to Italy with irresistible forces. But the same thing happened as in Italy. As soon as his tide of success turned, he found himself losing popularity : and late in B.C. 276 he resolved to return to Italy, where the Taren- tines and Samnites were once more in great alarm at the progress of the Roman arms, which were carrying all before them in the lower parts of Samnium and in Lucania. 4. Pyrrhus returns to Italy (B.C. 276). His return was not easy, for the Romans had made common cause with the Carthaginians against one who was a danger to both, and the Carthaginian fleets were on the watch for him. Still he did land with the greater part of his men, and his return checked the tide of the Roman successes. The terror of him was so great that the consuls had some difficulty in getting men to give in their names for the legions. However, the consul M'. Curius Dentatus got his legion ready in time, and intrenched himself near what was then called Maleventum, but afterwards Beneventum (B.C. 275). It commanded the road into Campania, and if Pyrrhus was to do anything of importance against Rome he must first beat Dentatus. But Pyrrhus was no longer in such good case as he had been at Heraclea. His army had now too great an admixture of Italians; his elephants V. BATTLE OF BENEVENTUM. 65 proved a weakness to him as they often did, for they fell into disorder and did him more harm than good ; he failed in an attempt to surprise Dentatus by a night attack; and he found his enemy posted on rough ground unsuitable for manoeuvring his phalanx, that is, men in long line massed many deep. At any rate he was decisively beaten ; and had to escape with a few cavalry back to Tarentum, whence he crossed again to Epirus and never returned (B.C. 274). He left a garrison in Tarentum under one of his officers, which, however, was forced to surrender little more than a year afterwards, being blockaded by the Carthaginian fleet and besieged by the Roman consul, L. Papirius Cursor (B.C. 272). 5. How the Romans secured Southern Italy, B.C. 274-267. The fruits of the defeat of Pyrrhus, and of the several campaigns carried on by the Romans during his absence in Sicily, were now to be secured. After the fall of Tarentum (B.C. 272) the Romans had first to capture Rhegium, not because Rhegium had rebelled, but because a garrison of Campanian soldiers, whom they had them- selves placed there, had mutinied, seized the town, made alliance with the Mamertines, and expelled Roman garrisons from neighbouring towns. These men resisted desperately, because they knew they had no mercy to expect. But at last they were beaten, fighting savagely to the last, and about 300 survivors were carried off to Rome and executed. There was now nobody to dispute their supremacy, and the Romans set about securing their conquest. The method pursued was this. In the first place, ' Latin ' colonies l were settled at various important places : in Samnium at Beneventum and Aesernia; in Lucania at Posidonia (Paestum); at Firmum in Picenum. The same policy was extended in the north also, Cosa being estab- lished about the same time in Etruria, and Ariminum in 1 See Appendix to Chapter iv. and Map. 66 SOUTH ITALY AND MAGNA GRAECIA SECURED. CH. v. the ager Gallicus. In the second place, a number of cities with their territory, though not burdened by colonies, were joined to Rome on special terms, which always included military or naval service in some form or other ; these were called civitates foederatae. We have already heard of Naples being thus treated in B.C. 326, and earlier still some towns in Latium had been placed in the same posi- tion. Certain cities in Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium had in the course of the last few years been added to this category, and in central Italy the entire tribes of Picentes, Marrucini, Marsi, Peligni, and Frentani were placed in the like condition. These peoples were in fact subject to Rome, but their internal government was left mostly to themselves, and their obligations to the State were regulated according to the particular foedus made in each case. In one sense a general term applied to them all municipium^ i.e. a town which had duties without full privileges. Later on we shall find them striking for ad- mission to the full citizenship, and trying in default of that to found an Italian as opposed to a Roman State. Tarentum itself was not, it seems, deprived of freedom or admitted to the Roman military league. But a legion was kept there permanently in garrison, which occupied the citadel; and its prosperity gradually dwindled away. Those of the Samnites who were not included in this arrangement were for the present cowed into acquiescence, and the general result of it all was that from that time Rome was paramount from the Rubicon to the extreme South of Italy. CHAPTER VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND FORCES OF ROME AND CARTHAGE IN THE THIRD CENTURY B.C. I. Rivalry with Carthage takes Roman arms beyond the sea. 2. Rome as a military power. 3. Rome as a naval power. 4. The nature of the Roman government. 5. The Curule Magistrates. 6. The other Magistrates. 7. The Senate. 8. Carthage: her origin and greatness. 9. The Constitution of Carthage. 10. Rome and Car- thage compared. 1. Rome extending her Power beyond Italy. We have now seen how Rome, from being a single weak city, with a small territory, rose to be mistress of Latium, and then of all Italy. The next stage in her progress will be when she begins to stretch her hands upon lands beyond the sea, and becomes the chief power in the Mediterranean. This was begun by her rivalry with the great commercial city of Carthage, which for many years had been supreme as a naval and mercantile power. Let us stop for a short time to see what the two peoples were like in resources and government when they thus began a duel for power and dominion. 2. Rome as a Military Power. We must remem- ber that the Roman government, however widely extended, was the government of a city. The magistrates and Senate must be citizens of Rome ; the legions must consist also of citizens. The number of these of military age, according 67 68 ROMAN MILITARY FORCES. CH. to the census of B.C. 265, was 292,224. In ordinary times four legions were raised each year, two for each consul, which required (infantry and cavalry together) about 22,000 men. After the conquest of Tarentum an- other legion seems yearly to have been raised to garrison it. But not only could the other citizens be called upon in an emergency, but d rectly Rome had begun the system of colonies and munieipia, she drew troops also from them, which served with the legions, though officered and drawn up separately; and when the conquest of all Italy south of the Rubicon had been accomplished, the number thus available was about 350 ooo. Each town had to make out a list of its citizens fit for military service; and in time of need conquisitores, or recruiting officers, were sent round to see that the lists were correct and the men forthcoming. When it was necessary to enrol a legion, the consul having given notice of the day, all citizens liable to serve 1 had to attend to answer to their names. First six military tribunes for each legion were appointed partly by nomin- ation of the consul, partly by election and these took turns in selecting suitable men. The recruits were then divided, according to age and wealth, into hastati^ prinripeS) triarii, and rorarii. The first three were armed with long shield, breastplate, helmet, and greaves, 2 and all had a short straight sword made for cutting or thrusting (gladius). The two first the hastatizn&principes had two pila, stout javelins with long iron head, which were thrown before charging. The third rank triarii had instead of this a pike or spear (hasfa\ though afterwards all alike had the pilum. The Rorarii were light-armed troops, who had a smaller shield (parma) and a helmet without plume, with the sword and light lance. is, men between 17 and 46 who had not already served twenty years in the infantry or ten in the cavalry. 2 Scutum, lorica, galea, ocreae. ROMAN MILITARY FORCES. 69 S < ii 7 o ROMAN SHIPS. CH. 3. Rome as a Naval Power. The discipline and organization of her army, combined with the will and faculty for governing, had made Rome the mistress of Italy, but as yet she had done little towards the possession of a navy. From very early times she seems to have used the Tiber for merchant vessels ; and the colony of Ostia, made during the period of the kings, was for the purpose of supporting the sea traffic. But it was on the capture of Antium (B c. 338) that she seems first to have possessed war vessels, when the whole fleet of Antium was removed to Ostia, though the ships seem to have been left there in neglect. But about B.C. 314, when a colony was being sent to the islands called Pontiae, it seems that the Romans first began to feel the need of having vessels, capable of de- fending themselves, for the transport of troops. In B.C. 312 duoviri navales, commissioners for superintending ships, were for the first time appointed; in B.C. 311 an officer was appointed with the title of ' praefect of the sea coast ' ; and in B.C. 282, when help was sent to Thurii, it was conveyed or accompanied by ten war-vessels (naves longae) under the command of a duovir. Still there is no idea as yet of possessing a fleet which could fight at sea. We shall learn when we come to the Punic wars how Rome partially remedied this defect. 4. The Roman Government. Rome was a republic. There was no hereditary rank, no hereditary offices. To be born in one of the Patrician gentes gave no legal privilege of importance,; and though to become a tribune a man must be a Plebeian, the tribuneship, like other offices, was elective, and no man had a claim to it. But Roman magistracies were 'honours' and carried no salary, and as most of them involved great expense, only men of wealth were as a rule candidates for them ; and there was always also a presumption in favour of the members of the same families appearing again and again in the lists of consuls. vi. ROMAN GOVERNMENT. 7 I Therefore, though the Roman constitution was democratic in the fact that its magistrates were elected by the people, and the Senate to a great extent filled by ex-magistrates who had been so elected; yet, in practice, it approached nearer to what is called an oligarchy, or the rule of a few. This was a source of strength in dealing with foreign nations, so long as these men of the governing class were, on the whole, loyal to the constitution. But corruption gradually found its way in, and led to violent partisan contests, which eventually brought revolution and a re- turn to the rule of one man, though he was never again called king. 5. The Curule Magistrates. At the head of the State were the two consuls, who originally had all the powers of the single king. They had authority over the citizens at home, commanded the armies, acted as judges, and had control of the treasury, and were preceded by twelve lictors carrying bundles of rods or fasces, with an axe, as symbols of supreme power (imperium). The checks upon their power were (i) that they were two and not one, and each acted as a restraint upon the other; (2) the Senate could control them in various ways, and even force them to name a Dictator to supersede them ; (3) the tribunes of the people could veto their actions or judicial decisions ; (4) persons sentenced by them as judges could appeal to the people. Gradually also some of their func- tions devolved on other magistrates. In B.C. 443 two new magistrates, called Censors, were appointed, who took over the duty of making up the list of the Senate and the other 'orders' in the State, performed the lustrum or official purification every fifth year, and had a general superintendence over public works, buildings, and roads. Again in B.C. 347, from which year consuls were again always elected, another curule magistrate was appointed, called Praetor, to preside in the law courts. ROMAN MAGISTRATES. CH. These five consuls, censors, and praetor now did what the two consuls used to do by themselves. They, with the curule aediles, formed something like what we call the 'government.' They became life members of the Senate, and were called Curules, from the sellae curules, ornamented chairs, set for them in the Senate house, as distinguished from the benches on which other senators sat. CIPPUS FROM AVIGNON, SHOWING SELLA CURULIS AND FASCES. 6. The other Magistrates. Besides these there were the quaestors. Their duties were mainly financial. From B.C. 421 there were four (instead of two); of whom two remained in Rome in charge of the treasury, and one accompanied each of the consuls on military service, had charge of the military chest, and generally managed the money affairs of the legions ; as new provinces were added to the Empire their numbers were .increased. When tribunes were first appointed (B.C. 494), two new officers were also annually elected from the Plebeians, called vi. THE SENATE. 73 Aediles, who acted as magistrates in petty causes, and super- intended the police of the city, the corn market, and the games. However, when the praetorship was established (B.C. 367), two new aediles were also appointed from the Patricians, called aediles Curules. They did much the same duties, and before long the curule aedileship also was thrown open to Plebeians. But being curule magistrates they obtained a life membership of the Senate, and so their office was regarded as the first step in an official career. The Dictatorship was an expedient in a time of diffi- culty, temporarily reviving the single kingship. A Dictator was supreme over all other magistrates, who continued performing their functions, but under his direction. If he was appointed for carrying on a war, he became at once commander-in-chief. Sometimes, however, he was appointed for some special purpose of a civil nature, such as holding an election. In that case he abdicated as soon as he had done what he was appointed to do. In any case he only held office for six months. He was named by one of the consuls, generally by order of the Senate, and himself nominated a second in command, called Master of the Horse. 7. The Senate. For a long time, however, the most powerful body in Rome was the Senate, the normal number of which was 300. Under the kings it seems to have been a mere council for advising the king, and he was not bound to take its advice. Under the consuls it was nominally the same, but it gradually acquired in practice a number of powers, which, though they rested on no law, and might be always overborne by a law, yet in reality were undisputed. It controlled the treasury; assigned to the magistrates their spheres of duty (though this was also done in ordinary cases by drawing lots); voted or withheld triumphs ; issued commissions to try and deter- mine cases of difficulty in subject towns, or (in later times) to arrange the constitution of new provinces ; authorized or 74 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE. CH. forbade new laws; decided, in some cases, the validity of disputed elections ; extended the command of generals in charge of armies, or superseded them by others ; received and answered foreign ambassadors, and frequently settled questions of peace or war. No law gave the Senate these powers, but it absorbed them by a kind of general assent, and for a long time no one thought of disputing them. Still it was certain that a decision of the Senate could be overridden by a vote of the people, and every now and then some magistrate did override it by this means. So that the Senate was unable to push its authority too far. 8. Carthage. The rival with which Rome was now to try her strength was Carthage. The Phoenicians, who lived in Tyre and the country round, had from very early times been great navigators and merchants. In various places on the shores of the Mediterranean they had erected factories, which had grown into towns. The most important of these was Carthage (in Greek Kapx^wv, a corrupted form of Kart-hadasat, ' New Town '), on the coast of Africa where the shore first bends to the south opposite Sicily. 1 Tradition assigned its foundation to Dido, who fled from her native Tyre after the murder of her husband, with a band of followers who established them- selves round the Byrsa, or fortress, which they purchased from the natives. As to the time at which this took place tradition varied between about the epoch of the foundation of Rome and two or three hundred years earlier. At any rate, about the time of the expulsion of the kings of Rome, we find Carthage a powerful com- mercial State, supreme over her neighbours, and in pos- session of settlements in Sicily and Spain, some of which had been founded by earlier Phoenician settlers ; and before the period of the Punic wars the city was said to 1 The Roman words Poeni and Punicus are corruptions of Phoenix *oi 'Phoenician.' Vi. ROME AND CARTHAGE. 75 contain 700,000 inhabitants. Its territory in Libya em- braced 300 cities ; it held two-thirds of Sicily, the Balearic Islands, Corsica and Sardinia, and many settlements in Spain south of a line joining the Tagus and Ebro. 9. The Constitution of Carthage. The constitution of Carthage was not unlike that of Rome in externals, there were two Suffetes or kings (Shofetim, ' judges'), a Senate, and an Assembly. But in reality the chief power had long been exercised by a small body called the ' Hundred' (actually 104). This body, originally formed by popular election, had by some means got into the hands of a few rich families and formed an oligarchy like that of Venice. But there was a democratic party also, headed by the great family of Barca, and about the time of the Punic wars this party was in the ascendant; and so the historian Polybius looked upon Carthage as an instance of mob-rule, not as a well-ordered state like that of Rome, where each rank and order served as a check upon the rest, but subject to irregular and sudden bursts of popular excitement when things were going wrong. 10. Rome and Carthage compared. As compared with Rome, Carthage was much the stronger as a naval power. She had the best vessels, and the most experienced pilots and sailors of any people ; and Rome (as we have seen) can scarcely be said to have had any navy at all as yet. Secondly, she was immensely wealthy, while Rome at this time was only beginning to use silver coins, and could have had but small store of money. But as a military power it turned out that she was inferior to Rome. To a great extent she depended on mercenary troops which her wealth enabled her to hire from different countries. These were often good troops in themselves, but they did not prove equal in the end to the citizen soldiers of Rome. CHAPTER VII. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, B.C. 264-250. I. The Carthaginians in Sicily. 2. Causes of the First Punic War. 3. The First Punic War: 1st period (B.C. 264-262) Fall of Agrigentum; alliance with Hiero. 2nd period (B.C. 262-255) The Romans build a fleet; battles of Mylae and Ecnomus; defeat and capture of Regulus. 3rd period (B.C. 254-250) Capture of Fanormus ; fruitless proposals for peace ; Carthaginians strengthen Lilybaeum. 4th. period (B.C. 249-242) Blockade and siege of Lilybaeum ; fighting at Eryx and Drepana ; Hamilcar on Mt. Hercte ; victory of Duilius at the Aegusae Islands. 4. Sicily the first Roman province. 5- The Mercenary War, and the reduction of Sardinia. i. Carthage and Sicily. The Carthaginians had long been the enemies of the Greek cities in Sicily. They had held without dispute the west of the island, as far east as the River Halycus ; but they were always trying to extend their dominions, and for this purpose had engaged in several great wars, generally with Syracuse, which, being the most powerful of the Greek cities, offered the most strenuous resistance. Thus in 480 B.C. Gelo I., tyrant of Syracuse, defeated a great Carthaginian invasion. Dionysius (tyrant from B.C. 405-367) was constantly engaged in a similar struggle. Timoleon of Corinth (being invited to aid Syracuse) conquered the Carthaginians in a great battle on the Crimisus (B.C. 340). Agathocles (tyrant B.C. 317-278) not only drove them back to the west, but 76 CH. vii. .CAUSES OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 77 even invaded their dominions in Africa. And Pyrrhus, when invited in B.C. 278-276, also forced them to keep to the west for a time, and took and besieged some of their chief possessions in Sicily. But after his retire- ment they had not only recovered their cities in western Sicily, but were again struggling to spread their power to the east. And now, as before, their chief opponent was Syracuse, at this time under the rule of an able sovereign, Hiero II. Some Sicilian states, however, were jealous of Syracuse, and were willing to welcome even Carthaginian aid against her, or to look elsewhere for support. There was always therefore an opportunity for a foreign power to interfere ; for the Greek states were often at enmity with each other, and in the several cities there were opposing parties, each ready to appeal to an outside power to crush the other. Before long a circumstance happened which brought on such an interference. 2. The Causes of the First Punic War. The Campanian mercenaries, who called themselves Mamertines, have been already mentioned (p. 63). They were in Sicily at the time of the death of Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse (B.C. 289). Left to themselves they seized on the town of Messana, expelled or killed the men, and took possession of the women, children, and property. They established themselves as a regular state, but as they were a terror to their neighbours by their constant freebooting expeditions, it became one of the chief objects of the Syracusan sovereigns to suppress them. When Hiero II. grew strong and defeated them severely at Mylae (B.C. 270), they were in great fear for their safety and looked out for help. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, whose chief towns in Sicily were Panormus (Palermo) and Agrigentum, and others sent to Rome. The Carthaginians, however, were, nearest, and while it was still uncertain what the Romans would do, a Carthaginian general named Hanno arrived HELP TO THE MAMERTINES. CH. and occupied the citadel with a garrison. The Romans had to consider what steps they should take. The cause of the Mamertines was a bad one ; but the increase of Cartha- ginian influence in Sicily they looked upon as a danger to Italy, and as a perpetuation of their own exclusion from the trade of Africa and Sardinia, from which they had been barred by a treaty made about B.C. 306. They determined therefore that they would undertake the cause 37 37 East of 14 Greenwich Walker & Boutall sc of the Mamertines, and refuse to let it be settled either by the Syracusans or Carthaginians. They hired or borrowed ships from the Greek maritime towns, Tarentum, Locri, Elea, and Naples, and sent an army by sea to Messana. Hanno by an act of imprudence allowed him- self to be ousted from the citadel, and a Roman garrison was introduced instead. And when the town thus guarded was besieged by another Carthaginian army, and by Hiero vii. FIRST PUNIC WAR BEGINS. 79 of Syracuse, the Roman commander, Gaius Claudius, sallied out and defeated both. When the consul Appius Claudius arrived he even proceeded to besiege Syracuse ; and though he did not succeed in taking it, Hiero was so much im- pressed by the superior strength of the Romans that he made a treaty with them, and remained a faithful ally to the end of his life. This was the beginning of a war which was to last nearly twenty-four years, and the object of which was to decide whether Rome or Carthage was to be paramount in Sicily. 3. The First Punic War, B.C. 264-242. First Period, B.C. 264-262. The first two years of / the war decided that Syracuse was to be the ally of _ Rome and not of Carthage; and, secondly, drove the Cartha- ginians back to the west of the Halycus by the fall of Agrigentum after a seven months' siege (B.C. 262), which was followed by the adherence of many other towns in Sicily; and this was done in spite of the fact that Carthage made great efforts to strengthen her hold, col- lecting mercenary troops from the Ligurians, Gauls, and Spain. Second Period, B.C. 262-255. From this time the Romans began to aim at more than they had first intended, namely, to expel the Carthaginians from Sicily altogether. But to do this they now learnt that they must possess a fleet. They might conquer inland towns, but they could not win those on the western and northern coasts ; for they were dominated by the Carthaginian fleets, which not only scoured the coasts of Sicily but made descents upon Italy, and held Sardinia in a firm grasp. The Romans therefore determined to build a fleet which should not merely be capable of conveying troops, but should fight the ships of Carthage at sea. It was a strangely daring thing to do, for the Carthaginians had long been masters of the sea, and their navy and crews were the best in the 8o NAVAL VICTORY OFF MYLAE, B.C. 260. CH. world; while the Romans had scarcely any ships of war, and were obliged to go to the allied cities in southern Italy for most of their crews. 1 The attempt was made however: ships were built on the model of a Punic quinquereme which had been stranded and captured, and rowers (it is said) were trained on wooden platforms. By the spring of B.C. 260 the fleet was ready and set sail for Sicily under the command of Cn. Cornelius Scipio, one of the consuls : the other consul, Gaius Duilius, going to Sicily in the ordinary way to command the army which was to relieve Segesta, then being besieged by the Carthaginians. Scipio, however, was captured while attempting to take the island Lipara. Duilius therefore took command of the fleet, and defeated the Carthaginians near Mylae. The victory was a triumph of force over skill. The Roman notion of fighting at sea was to run their ships alongside the enemy, hold them fast with a contrivance consisting of a swinging gangway and iron grapples (which they called corvi, or * crows '), and fight it out as though on land. But the victory however obtained enabled Duilius to go to the relief of Segesta, and to make descents at various places on the coast. It naturally caused great exultation at Rome, where for the first time a naval triumph was cele- brated and a column adorned with beaks of captive ships set up in the Forum (Columna rostrata). It encouraged the Romans also to take the offensive. Corsica and Sardinia were attacked in B.C. 259-8; and after an inde- cisive battle off Tyndaris in B.C. 257 they resolved to transfer the war to Africa, thus forcing Carthage to act almost wholly on the defensive. The two consuls of B.C. 256 therefore were despatched to Africa with a large fleet and army. They conquered a Carthaginian fleet which tried to intercept them off Ecnomus in southern Sicily, and 1 Hence the name of socii navales, applied to sailors in the Roman fleets. vii. DEFEAT OF REGULUS. 8 1 landed in Carthaginian territory. During the remainder of the season they harried the country and repulsed Cartha- ginian troops sent to withstand them. But in the winter one consul went home, and the other (M. Atilius Regulus) was next spring defeated and made prisoner, chiefly by the means of a certain Xanthippus of Sparta, who had taken service in the Carthaginian army (B.C. 255). The remains of the Roman army still held Clupea, a town on the coast, but were presently withdrawn and were being conveyed home by a fleet sent to fetch them, after winning another naval engagement off Hermaeum, when they were caught in a storm off the coast of Sicily, in which nearly all the ships were wrecked. Third Period (B.C. 254-250). The Romans, undis- , mayed by this double disaster, built and fitted out another fleet, and went on patiently sending armies year after year to Sicily. The fortunes of the war varied continually, and neither side gave in. At one time, by the capture of Panormus (B.C. 254), the Romans seemed to be getting the upper hand ; for Panormus had the finest harbour in Sicily, and the Carthaginians had used it as a starting- point against Italy. They adopted Lilybaeum in its place as their chief port and harbour, and this they made so strong that it was practically impregnable. Still they failed to dislodge the Romans from Panormus ; and, though in B.C. 253 the Roman fleet suffered again so disastrous a wreck that for a time Rome abandoned naval warfare, the Carthaginians got so discouraged by constant failure on shore that, in B.C. 251, they made a proposition for peace, sending the captive Regulus as envoy under oath to return if he failed to get it. Tradition said that he advised the ( Senate against granting peace, and returned to meet a cruel death at Carthage. Fourth Period, B.C. 249-242. The interest of the last eight years of the war centres round Lilybaeum, Mount F 82 THE LAST EIGHT YEARS' STRUGGLE. CH. Eryx, and Mount Hercte. During the whole time Lily- baeum held out in spite of every contrivance of blockade and siege which the Romans could bring to bear upon it. The summit of Mount Eryx and the town of Eryx, on its slope, were seized by the Romans in B.C. 249 ; but the latter was recovered the next year by the Carthaginians, who also held Drepana, on the coast immediately below. On Mount Hercte, overlooking Panormus, Hamilcar Barca (father of Hannibal) posted himself in B.C. 247, keeping up communication outside by sea from a bay and beach below, which could not be approached except over the mountain, while the Romans still held Panormus. At these three points the war went on for six weary years, which witnessed every kind of surprise, skirmish, and assault, but no decisive battle. A defeat and destruction of a Roman fleet at Drepana, under Publius Claudius, in B.C. 249, followed by the loss of a still larger fleet in a storm on the south of Sicily later in the year, had dis- couraged the Romans from continuing a naval war on which they had again ventured. Consequently they again found that their attacks on coast towns were futile, for they could be relieved and supplied by the Carthaginians at will. In the seventh year, therefore, after their last naval disaster, they again resolved to build a fleet. Early in B.C. 242* a fleet of 250 quinqueremes was ready, under the command of the consul, C. Lutatius Catulus. In March he fell in with the Carthaginian fleet, coming as usual with supplies and reinforcements for the year; and on the loth of that month decisively defeated it, off the Aegusae islands, capturing seventy and sinking fifty ships. The effect of this was that the Carthaginian garrisons at Lilybaeum and Eryx would be left without supplies, and would be obliged to surrender. It was necessary to make terms, and Hamilcar Barca, with whom the government left the arrangement, agree4 vii. SICILY THE FIRST ROMAN PROVINCE. 83 to evacuate Sicily, to pay a large war indemnity, and to promise not to attack the king of Syracuse or his allies, both sides undertaking not to molest each other or each other's allies ; to which the Senate added the evacuation of the Liparae islands (Corsica having been already .occupied), and an increased amount of war indemnity, 3000 talents (about j 20,000) in ten years, instead of 2200 in twenty years. 4. The First Roman Province. The chief fruit of the war was that all Sicily, except the kingdom of Syracuse, became the property of the Romans. It was their first possession outside Italy, and there was no precedent to go upon as to the arrangement to be made. Ten com- missioners were sent to decide what was to be done. They decided that it should be permanently a 'province' of a Roman magistrate. This word had been always em- ployed for any sphere of duty of a Roman magistrate. It was henceforth used specially (though the old use also continued) for the governorship of a country outside Italy, which had to be administered according to principles and methods laid down by a decree of the Senate. This decree was usually drawn up in accordance with the arrangements made by the commissioners sent to the spot. In the case of Sicily the plan was to take it over as nearly as possible as it was before, substituting Roman for Carthaginian supremacy. The States in it were to retain their own laws and local institutions, but were to pay a tenth of their yearly produce, and five per cent, on exports and imports to Rome, as they had paid to Carthage, or in some cases to Syracuse. Each year a praetor would be sent out from Rome to whom there would be an appeal in all cases of dispute, and a quaestor to ad- minister the finances. But certain towns which had been specially loyal to Rome were placed in a better position as tivitates foederatae, being regarded as entirely independent 84 THE PROVINCE OF SARDINIA AND CORSICA. CH. except for the one obligation of supplying sailors for the Roman navy. Rome had thus begun the system of governing countries outside Italy, which before long was to extend to a large part of the known world. 5. Sardinia taken by Rome becomes a Roman Province, B.C. 238. The reduction of Sicily to the form of a Roman province was not the end of the changes brought by the Punic war. Immediately after the peace was effected, the Carthaginians withdrew their mercenary troops from Sicily to Africa, intending to pay them, and dismiss them to their several countries. But the treasury was low, and they were tardy in producing the money. The mercenaries mutinied, and were presently joined by Libyan cities subject to Carthage. A terrible war was the result, which taxed the resources of Carthage to the utmost, and endangered her very existence; and it was not till it had been going on for nearly two years that the ringleaders, Spendius and Mathos, were killed, and the country saved (B.C. 241-239). A similar disturbance broke out in Sardinia, and the Romans, being appealed to, undertook to restore order in the island. Now Sardinia was a most cherished possession of Carthage, for, though unhealthy, it was rich in corn. The Romans, by treaty, were precluded from even trading there, much more from interfering in its government. But they caught at this opportunity, which the weakness of Carthage, after the late long war and the mutiny of her mercenaries, gave them. When the Carthaginian government therefore (having got the better of their revolted mercenaries) made prepara- tions for an expedition to Sardinia, the Romans treated it as an act of hostility to themselves, demanded the cession of the island, and an addition of 1200 talents to the war indemnity. The Carthaginians felt this bitterly as an ungenerous advantage taken of their weakness, but vii. THE PROVINCE OF SARDINIA AND CORSICA. 85 were obliged to comply. The native Sardinians, however, were rebellious, and a Roman consul with an army was sent there every year, till about B.C. 225, when, like Sicily, it was with Corsica made a province, and thenceforth two extra praetors were elected each year, one for Sicily and one for Sardinia. THE EARLIEST FORM OF THE TOGA. STATUE, DRESDEN. CHAPTER VIII. BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS B.C. 241-218. I. Roman power consolidated in North Italy. 2. War with Queen Teuta and the Illyrian Pirates. 3. Increase in the population of Rome ; the new nobility / the ager publicus ; increased number of slaves ; the spread of Greek influence. 4. Political changes ; decline of the influence of the Senate; the Comitia Tributa ; change in the character of the l^ribunate. i. Struggles with the Gauls and Ligurians in North Italy, B.C. 235-218. We have seen Rome become mistress of Italy south of the Rubicon, and of Sicily, Sar- dinia, Corsica, and other islands near the shores of Italy. For a time there was peace, and the temple of lanus was closed for only the second time in Roman history (B.C. 235). But soon her great position involved her in other struggles. The Gauls in the north and the Ligurians in the north-west were both constant dangers to her quiet possession of Etruria, and sometimes even threatened the city itself. The most rest- less and dangerous tribe was now the Boii, and either with them or the Ligurians Roman armies were engaged nearly every year. The war with the Boii and their neighbours, the Insubres, was dictated by a desire to protect the northern frontier : and towards the end of the period (about B.C. 220) it was resolved to secure this by establishing colonies at Cremona and Placentia (on the Po), and to put garrisons 86 CH. viii. QUEEN TEUTA IN ILLYRICUM. 87 in Bononia, Parma, and Mutina; while one of the great routes to the north, from Rome to Ariminum, was made fit for the passage of armies by Gaius Flaminius about the same time and called the Via Flaminia. With the Ligurians the object of the wars was primarily, no doubt, to prevent their giving assistance to the Gauls ; but soon the Romans had another object the securing of a safe and quiet route to Spain by the coast road of the Riviera, between the mari- time Alps and the sea. Neither of these objects had been fully obtained before the beginning of the Second Punic War, in spite of more than one hard-fought victory. 2. The Illyrians. At the same time the power of Rome began to be known and respected in the East. The Illyrians, living on the east coast of the Adriatic, were in a great degree a nation of pirates. They not only plundered the shores of Greece, but those of Italy too. Their long Liburnian galleys threaded the maze of islands along the Illyrian coast, and darted out to stop and plunder Italian merchants. Rome's naval superiojtityLsin.ee Jier^victories over the fleets of Carthage "caused her to be appealed to for pro- tection on many sides. Her ambassadors to the Illyrian Queen Teuta, who was engaged in blockading Issa, were answered contemptuously, and one of them even murdered on his way home by the order, it was believed, of the Queen herself. A Roman army was accordingly sent, which took possession of Corcyra (Corfu), admitted Epidamnus (Durazzo) as a 'friend and ally,' and forced Queen Teuta to submit (B.C. 229). She was allowed to retain a small part of her dominions : the rest was given to her young stepson, with a guardian named Demetrius of Pharos, who had joined the Romans against the Queen, but afterwards proved a traitor to the Romans also. The whole country, though left nominally free, had to pay a fixed tribute, and the Illyrians had to promise not to sail south of the pro- montory Lissus in a ship of war. An interesting fact in 88 FIRST DEALINGS WITH GREECE. CH. regard to this war is that it first brought Rome into direct communication with Greece. At that time the two most powerful states in Greece were the Aetolian League in the north-west, and the Achaean League in Peloponnesus. Their territories had both suffered from Illyrian piracies; and now the Roman government sent ambassadors to inform them what terms they had imposed on the Illyrians, and these ambassadors were received with great honour and respect. At Corinth, for instance, they were admitted to take part in the Isthmian games, as though of Hellenic descent; and at Athens they were admitted to citizenship and to initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries. This is to be noted, because it meant that some Greeks were already prepared to look to Rome for protection ; and all through, Roman history that was only a preliminary to the Romans exchanging such protection for absolute dominion. More- over, the Romans were beginning about this time, since their conquest of Magna Graecia, to know something more of Greek customs, thought, and literature; and when they became masters of the East, as of the West, they always treated the Greeks in a somewhat different spirit to that in which they treated the rest of the world. 3. Some Changes in Rome between the two Punic Wars, (i) The great success of the Roman arms and her increasing dominion was reflected in the city. Large numbers of people came to live there who were not citizens, but peregrini, l foreign residents.' They came for trade or pleasure, and their transactions with the citizens became so numerous that a new Praetor, called praetor peregrinus, was appointed each year to judge cases between citizens and foreigners. (2) The old quarrel between Patri- cians and Plebeians had died out because the Plebeians had got virtually everything they wanted : but a new nobility was growing up, consisting of rich men who got nearly all the offices and places of authority ; and a new viii. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS. 89 set of questions had arisen between them and the lower orders. The chief of these was the now often-recurring question as to what was to be done with lands taken from conquered peoples in Italy. The upper class wished them to remain public land, let out to capitalists, who made much by it and soon came to regard it as their own pro- perty on which there was an easy rent or tax payable to the State. The lower classes wished it to be allotted to themselves in full ownership and in fixed propor- tions. The settlement of citizens on lands at a distance from Rome had a tendency to weaken the notion of the supremacy of the city, and of the government as an urban State, and the conservatives objected to it. (3) A sign of growing wealth and success was the increased number of slaves. This was in many ways a bad thing, for it tempted people to leave the country, where farming could be carried on most cheaply by slaves who were not liable to be taken off to serve in the army, and to crowd into the city, where there was more amusement and greater chances of success in trade and commerce. It filled Rome with an idle and often turbulent populace, which afterwards caused much trouble. (4) Luxury and love of display were beginning to take the place of the old simplicity of life, and several sumptuary laws were passed to restrain it. \J^f Greek influence was beginning to be felt in some of the habits of life, but, above all, in education and literature. Greek was the c common dialect ' of a great part of the world east of Italy, and boys now began to learn it as part of an elementary education, instead of, as before, the Etruscan language. Schoolmasters and doctors were mostly Greeks ; and, as the Romans as yet had very little literature of their own, some men especially Livius Andronicus (about B.C. 240) and Cn. Naevius (about B.C. 235) began the fashion of translating Greek plays into Latin, to be acted in Rome. And when, at length, some Roman writers were 9 POLITICAL CHANGES AT ROME. CH. found to compose regular histories, instead of mere dry annals, they wrote in Greek, as though that were the only language suited to such books. The earliest to write in Latin, either poetry or speeches, of whom we know any- thing was App. Claudius Caecus (about B.C. 312), but he does not seem to have had any imitators for sixty or seventy years. 4. Senate, Comitia, and Tribunes. There had been no great constitutional change at Rome since the series of laws which gave the Plebeians full rights and admission to all the magistracies. But some of the effects of that legislation were beginning to show themselves. The in- fluence of the Senate was declining. The magistrates felt themselves strong enough, with the support of the people, to defy its orders if they seemed inconsistent with the powers which they had received from the people. They were no longer quite so much all members of a narrow clique of families, and felt less the traditional authority of the Senate ; and the old device whereby the Senate could practically supersede the consul by forcing him to name ?. Dictator fell into almost complete disuse. The dangers so near home, which arose in the Second Punic War ; the difficult questions, so often arising in its course, which the magistrates were glad to refer to the Senate ; and, above all, the government of the rapidly-increasing foreign provinces, for which there were no constitutional provisions, afterwards combined for a time to increase the Senate's power and influence once more, but for the present they were declining. Another change of importance was in regard to the comitia. The will of the people was expressed in two ways voting by centuries ,and voting by tribes. But the legislation which gave the votes of the tribes {plebiscite?) the force of law had had this result, that, while in electing magistrates the people still voted by centuries, in making laws they generally voted by tribes, that is, in the vin. THE TRIBUNES. 91 Comitia Tributa. There was no law making this distinction, but it was becoming the prevailing custom. Now the tribunes summoned and did business with the Comitia Tributa, and it was often the habit of the consuls, when proposing some law, to entrust it to a tribune to bring forward. The tribunes for this reason, and because the cases requiring their auxilium were rarer now that all citizens had equal rights, became much more engaged in politics than in their original business of protecting individuals from magisterial oppression. They had gradually got admission to the Senate, and the right of stopping business there as elsewhere, and could therefore influence acts of imperial policy. As trials ceased also to be held, except on special occasions, by the consuls, and were decided by the people themselves, they had few occasions for inter- ference in the administration of the law. Still they were regarded as the proper persons to champion popular griev- ances, or to withstand the Senate, if necessary ; and it was against the Senate, rather than against the consuls, that they now most often exercised their powers. They became, in fact, more and more political partisans. ROMAN COUNTRY HOUSE. CHAPTER IX. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR, B.C. 218-204. I. The importance of the Second Punic War. 2. Events leading to the war ; the Carthaginians in Spain; fall of Saguntum. 3. The First Period of the War in Italy (B.C. 218-216) ; Hannibal crosses the Alps ; battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia, Lake Trasimene^ Cannae. 4. The Second Period of the War in Italy (B.C. 216-207); siege and capture of Capua; loss and recovery of Tarentum ; death of Marcellus ; battle of the Metaurus. 5. The War in Sicily ; siege and capture of Syracuse by Marcellus (B.C. 214-212). 6. The War in Spain ; campaigns of Publitis and Gnaeus Scipio ; their death ; arrival of P. Cornelius Scipio Afticanus (B.C. 210); capture of New Carthage; battle of Ilipa ; Spain cleared of Carthaginian armies. 7- The last period Of the Punic War (B.C. 207-202) ; Scipio Africanus in Sicily and Africa; Hannibal recalled from Italy (B.C. 203); defeat of Hannibal at the battle of Zama (B.C. 202). 8. The first war with Philip V. of Macedonia (B.C. 214-205). i. The object and importance of the Second Punic War. The first Punic war had been fought for the possession of Sicily ; the second was for that of Spain. It did indeed leave the Romans supreme in Spain, but its accidental results were still more important. It brought Rome into collision with Macedonia, with the result that she eventually became mistress not only of that country but of Greece also. Her presence in Greece brought her into conflict with the king of Syria, and into close relations with other Asiatic princes and peoples. Lastly, the 92 CH. ix. RESULTS AND CAUSES OF SECOND PUNIC WAR. 93 possession of Spain compelled her to secure the route thither by occupying Gallia Narbonensis. That within a century from the end of the second Punic war, therefore, she became ruler of all Europe south of the Rhine and Danube, of all islands in the Mediterranean, and of a large tract of country on the coast of Africa, as well as of Asia Minor and Syria, may be traced directly to this great struggle with Carthage. Hardly any of these countries to this day are without traces of the supremacy once exercised over them by Rome. Judging by results, therefore, this is one of the most important wars ever waged. The Romans of course had no prophetic feeling of the great things it was to do for them. To them it seemed a fearful struggle for bare existence. They had expected that it would be confined to Spain and Africa ; but the most terrible and disastrous part of it was really fought in Italy. This was due to the genius of one great man, Hannibal, son of Hamilcar. 2. Immediate causes of the Second Punic War. By the loss of Sardinia and Sicily the commerce of the Carthaginians was much hampered, and their prestige lowered. They looked out, therefore, for other means of expansion. Spain was easily reached from Africa, and they already had settlements and factories there. From Spain too they were not debarred by any treaty with Rome, for the Romans as yet had nothing to do with Spain beyond having some trading connexions with Tarraco in the North East. In B.C. 238, therefore, Hamilcar Barca, who had made the great stand on Mt. Hercte in the last war, was sent with an army to secure the African coast as far as the Pillars of Hercules, and thence to cross into Spain, with general orders to promote the interests and extend the power of Carthage there. Taking his young son Hannibal with him he crossed to Spain, and there laboured patiently and successfully with this object CH. ix. CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN. 95 in view. At his death in B.C. 229, Southern Spain was mostly Carthaginian as far as the Saltus Castulonensis (Sierra Morena). He had administered the country well, had encouraged his men to settle and marry among the natives, and had done much to develop its wealth by working the mines on an improved system. His son- in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him (B.C. 229-221), and founded New Carthage to be the capital of Carthaginian Spain. At his death the army elected Hannibal (then about twenty-seven years old), who had served under his father and brother-in-law and become very popular among the soldiers, and the home government was forced to confirm the election. But the progress of the Carthaginians had already roused the jealous suspicions of the Romans, who feared that their commercial relations in the North East at Emporiae and Tarraco might soon be endangered or eclipsed by their encroaching rivals. They were, however, at the time engaged in war with the Illyrian pirates and the Boian Gauls, and therefore were content to exact a treaty from Hasdrubal, or perhaps a mere verbal declaration on his part, that the Carthaginians would not go in arms north of the Ebro. But about the same time they made terms of 'friendship and alliance' with Saguntum, which was considerably south of the Ebro, and was therefore in the ' sphere of influence ' of Carthage. Such an agreement was always held by the Romans to mean that they, might proclaim war upon any people that attacked their, ally. Now Hannibal had inherited a passion for resisting, and if possible, taking vengeance on the Romans. His father had always cherished bitter resentment for the ungenerous use they had made of the weakness of Carthage to wrest Sardinia from her ; and when starting for Spain had con- sented to take the young Hannibal (then nine years old) 96 HANNIBAL TAKES SAGUNTUM. CH. with him only after causing him to swear that he would never be friends with Rome. Hannibal now had an excellent army, devoted to him, and long trained in actual war ; and the existence of a city in alliance with Rome in a country which his arms and diplomacy were winning more and more completely, seemed to him intolerable. Circumstances gave him an excuse for interfering. There had been violent party contests in Saguntum, and one of the parties had called in the help of Rome. The Roman commission sent in answer to this request had treated the other party with great severity. Hannibal therefore determined to take Saguntum, in spite of an embassy from Rome ordering him not to attack it (B.C. 220). The command, however, was not backed up by any military aid sent to Saguntum (for the Romans were engaged again in a war in Illyria) and by the late summer of B.C. 219 after a desperate resistance and a seven months' siege Hannibal took Saguntum. The Romans at once sent an "\ embassy to Carthage demanding redress, and the surrender of Hannibal with his chief officers. The Carthaginians argued that no treaty barred them from attacking Saguntum, for though in B.C. 241 they had promised not to attack the allies of Rome, that applied only to allies existing at , the time. But the Roman ambassadors would listen to no arguments. In a dramatic scene Q. Fabius Maximus (afterwards called Cunctator) is represented as standing up in the Carthaginian Senate with his toga folded across his breast, and saying, as he pointed to the folds, that 'he carried there peace and war, which would they have?' The Senators shouted in answer that he might produce whichever he chose. 'Then I give you war,' he said, shaking out the folds of his toga. ' The majority of the Carthaginian Senate cried out that they accepted it. 3. First Period of the Second Punic War. Ticinus and Trebia, B.C. 218-216. War being now ix. HANNIBAL ON THE RHONE. 97 determined on, the Romans proceeded to make prepara- tions for waging it in Spain and Africa, using Sicily as a base of operations for the latter. But an unexpected movement of Hannibal quite disconcerted this scheme. He had during the winter of B.C. 219-218 laid his plans carefully for a march into Gaul and thence over the Alps into Italy. His object in following this route, rather than going by sea to the south, was to rally the Gauls of the Po valley to his side. He knew how hostile they were to Rome, and had interchanged messages with them and received promises of help. He felt that to attack Rome unaided was hopeless : and though he intended to work also on the hostility to Rome which he believed to exist among the Italians generally (in which he found himself to a great extent mistaken), he was not so sure of that as he was of the feelings of the Gauls. The passage of the Alps he knew to be difficult, but he knew also that many Gallic tribes had already accomplished it, and he probably underrated the real terrors of it. The Romans apparently knew of his march up to the north of Spain, but they did not fully grasp his plan and trusted to stop him on his way. Accordingly one of the consuls (P. Cornelius Scipio) was ordered to proceed to Spain, while the other went to Sicily. But a sudden movement of the Boii, who swooped down upon the new colonies of Placentia and Cremona, while it warned them that danger was to be looked for in the North, delayed the march of Scipio. To confront this immediate danger one of the praetors, Gaius Atilius, was sent with the legions enrolled by Scipio to the relief of the Roman colonists who had taken refuge at Tannetum, near Parma; and Scipio had to wait till two more legions were enrolled. Accordingly when he touched at the mouth of the Rhone on his way to Spain he was surprised to find that Hannibal had already passed the Pyrenees and 98 BATTLES OF TICINUS AND TREBIA, B.C. 218. CH. ix. had reached the Rhone higher 'up. He sent out a body of cavalry to reconnoitre, who fell in with some of Hannibal's Numidian horse sent out by him on a similar errand. After a brush with these troops the Roman cavalry got near enough to see Hannibal's camp, and hastened back with the news to Scipio. Marching hastily up the left bank of the Rhone, Scipio hoped to force Hannibal to fight him there. But when he arrived at the point at which Hannibal had crossed, he found that he was three days in advance. He hurried back to the coast ; sent his brother on to Spain with the greater part of the fleet ; and returned himself to Italy. There he took over the legions commanded by the praetor, and crossing the Po awaited Hannibal on the Ticinus. Meanwhile Han- nibal with terrible difficulties and losses had effected the passage of the Alps. By which of the passes he came is to this day uncertain : but whichever it wa, soon after reaching the plains he had to engage with the Taurini and take their chief city (Turin). He then advanced down the Po along its left bank; defeated the Roman cavalry on the Ticinus, wounding Scipio himself; and followed the retreating Roman army to the right bank of the Po till he found them entrenched on the upper Trebia, one of the southern tributaries of the Po flowing from the Apennines. Here Scipio was joined by his colleague Sempronius, who had been recalled from Sicily when Hannibal's arrival in Italy was known. Scipio wished to avoid a battle, but Sempronius was anxious to fight, and allowed himself to be tempted out by Hannibal. He crossed the Trebia on a cold rainy day and brought his men wet and hungry into collision with an enemy well fed and unwearied. He was badly beaten, but a large part of the army was got off to Placentia, and there remained safely entrenched. For the rest of the year only skirmishing went on between the two armies : and ioo ROMAN DEFEAT ON TRASIMENE LAKE. CH. Hannibal had some difficulty in retaining the fidelity of the Gauls who had joined his standard. Battle of the Trasimene Lake, B.C. 217. In the following Spring, as soon as the weather permitted, Hannibal, with a large contingent of auxiliary Gauls, started for the South, and marching past Faesulae (Florence) arrived in the neighbourhood of the Trasimene Lake. He had suffered greatly since he reached the Rhone in the previous year. Nearly half his men had been lost in the march into Italy, and now he lost a great number more in the marshes near Faesulae, which were specially dangerous from the unusually wet winter that had pre- ceded. All but one of the elephants had perished; horses and men were in a sad state of disease and emaciation ; and he himself lost the sight of one eye by ophthalmia. But the mismanagement or misfortune of the Consul opposed to him (Gaius Flaminius) gave him a victory which made up for these losses. He passed the camp of Flaminius, wasting the country far and wide as he marched. This Flaminius could not brook ; he had been sent into Etruria to stop Hannibal's march upon Rome, and he felt that he would be wanting in his duty if he allowed him to push on while he hung idly on his rear. Without waiting for his colleague who had been posted at Arimi- num to block the coast road, but who had started to join him on hearing that Hannibal was in Etruria, he broke up his camp and followed. Hannibal had turned to the left and was going along the north of the Trasimene Lake towards Perusia (Perugia\ but finding the narrow road between the lake and the mountains well fitted for an ambuscade, he concealed his men at various points commanding the road. Flaminius arrived soon afterwards, and without making proper reconnaissances, started along the narrow road. Then from every point in the surrounding mountains the enemy rushed down, and the Romans found themselves attacked ix. FABIUS 'THE DELAYER. 101 on three sides at once. They fought desperately, but were, for the most part, cut to pieces, or taken prisoners, though about 10,000 in all managed to escape in various ways, and straggling over the country found their way back to Rome. Flaminius was killed, his army annihilated, and the way to Rome lay open to Hannibal. There was no chance of the other consul, Servilius, from Ariminum catch- ing him up ; and, in fact, 4000 horsemen whom he sent in advance were intercepted by Hannibal's cavalry and killed or made prisoners. Hannibal in South Italy, B.C. 217-216. But though the Romans expected now to see Hannibal under their walls, he turned from the road leading to the capital and marched through Umbria and Picenum to Arpi on the borders of Apulia. He did not feel fit as yet to attempt the capture of a large city. His plan was to raise the Italian states against Rome, and up to this time not one had joined him. At Arpi he found himself confronted with a new army under Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been named Dictator on the news of the battle of Trasimene. Fabius adopted, and persisted in tactics which got him the name of Cunctator, 'the Delayer.' The plan was to follow Hannibal at every move- ment, cutting off stragglers and marauders, but keeping himself on high and safe ground, and avoiding a pitched battle. Hannibal tried to irritate him by marching in every direction, plundering as he went : but nothing moved Fabius from his policy of caution. He followed Hannibal through Daunia, Samnium, and into Campania. There he thought he had trapped him by blocking up the narrow gorge between Mount Tifata and the river Volturnus. But Hannibal, who had been misled by his guide, and found himself in an unfavourable position, extricated him- self by a ruse. Taking advantage of a dark night, he ordered cattle with burning torches attached to their horns 102 HANNIBAL TRICKS FABIUS. CH. ' . - : : '. : to be driven up the mountain, followed by some light- armed troops, with instructions to make their way to the ridge with all the commotion possible. This drew away the 4000 who were guarding the gorge, through which Hannibal promptly led his main army. This was distinctly a failure on the part of Fabius, and it encouraged the feeling growing against him in the army and at home. His Master of the Horse, Minucius, presently obtained some minor advantages against Hannibal in Apulia, whither they had followed him ; and this induced the people to name him also Dictator with powers equal to Fabius. His rashness, however, put him at a disadvantage when he ventured to offer Hannibal battle ; and he was only saved by the timely interposition of Fabius, to whom he there- upon surrendered his powers. The Battle of Cannae, B.C. 216. But in the following year it was determined that a great army should be collected and that battle should be given to Hannibal near his chosen quarters in Apulia. Naples and Paestum, and Hiero of Syracuse, had offered gold and other contributions ; but if Hannibal were left un- disturbed, the Romans must expect a combination of South Italian States against them, which would endanger not only their supremacy in Italy, but their very exist- ence. They had failed to effect a diversion of Hannibal's Gallic auxiliaries by sending an army to the Po. The summer was wearing away : Hannibal had captured the Roman magazines at Cannae, and as harvest time had come he was securing the corn supply of the whole district. The consuls of the year B.C. 216, C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus, were ordered to go as soon as possible to the seat of war. But they differed as to the plan to be followed : Paulus wished first to draw Hannibal to ground less favourable to cavalry, in which he was the stronger ; Varro wished to fight at once. The IX. THE BATTLE OF CANNAE. 103 latter prevailed, and the disastrous battle of Cannae (2nd August) was the result. The Roman heavy armed troops charging the centre of the Carthaginian line broke triumph- antly through it; but they pursued too far, and the two CIPPUS OF PINTANIS, A STANDARD BEARER. CIPPUS OF L. PATILIUS, A LEGIONARY SOLDIER. wings of the enemy faced to left and right and charged their flanks. They fought desperately, but the arrival of the Numidian cavalry, which had been pursuing the Roman light-armed troops routed at the beginning of the day, 104 HANNIBAL IN CAMPANIA. CH. decided the event of the battle. Of 70,000 infantry barely 10,000 escaped : about 3000 to some neighbouring towns, and the rest in scattered groups wandering through the country, till they were able to rejoin Varro who had made his way to Venusia with 70 horsemen. Aemilius himself had fallen; and though Varro was mainly responsible for the disaster, he did much to redeem his error by the vigour and spirit which he showed in collecting the scattered remains of his army : so that, when later on he returned to Rome he was met by a procession of senators and other citizens and thanked for ' not having despaired of the republic.' 4. Second Period, from Cannae to Metaurus (B.C. 216-207). Capua and Tarentum. Again the way to Rome seemed open to Hannibal, and again he declined to take it, in spite of the pressure of his officers, and especially of his Captain of the Horse, Maharbal, who promised that, if Hannibal would send him for- ward, he should 'on the fifth day feast as conqueror on the Capitol.' But Hannibal still waited for adhesions, and preferred to advance slowly into Campania, and secure possession of that district before venturing to undertake the siege of Rome. We cannot tell what would have been the result if he had taken Maharbal's advice : but we can see that he never had another real chance, although his victory at Cannae was followed, as he hoped it would be, by the adhesion of nearly all southern Italy. He entered Campania indeed, and received the submission of its chief city Capua, but he found himself in the presence of two Roman armies under M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator. He did not succeed in taking either Nola or Naples (thus failing to get what he wanted a sea-port), and such successes as he had in the capture of towns did not advance him on his way to Latium ; while his winter quarters at Capua proved so pleasant and seductive that the state of his army was ix. CAPUA BESIEGED. IO5 seriously impaired and its discipline relaxed. In the years that followed Hannibal won many battles, and probably lost none, though his generals did ; but he hardly made any progress in his chief purpose of attacking Rome or permanently alienating any great part of the country from her. His attention was distracted between the East and the West now hovering round Tarentum, now pro- mising relief to Capua, to the siege of which the Romans were directing all their energies. Tarentum fell into his hands in B.C. 212, but the Roman commander (M. Livius Macatus) maintained himself in the citadel, and thereby prevented Hannibal from using the harbour. The Roman siege of Capua went on during B.C. 212 and 211, and in the latter year Hannibal attempted a diver- sion by making a sudden and rapid march on Rome. He actually pitched a camp within three miles of the city, and rode round part of its walls. But he was closely followed or checked by two Roman armies, which he could not bring to a pitched battle ; and, finding that the city walls were impregnable with such materials as he had been able to bring with him, he as suddenly resolved to retire, and effected his retreat to the south, inflicting a severe repulse on a pursuing army as he went. He did not, how- ever, return to Capua, which, thus left to its fate, was forced to surrender to the Roman consuls (B.C. 211). A farther blow to his hopes was the recovery of Tarentum by Fabius in B.C. 209 ; and, though in the course of the years B.C. 210- 208 he held his own in the field, and in three days' fighting near Canusium (B.C. 210) reduced Marcellus to remain in- active for the rest of the season at Venusia, and in B.C. 208 surprised and killed him near Bantia, yet he was steadily losing his hold on the country and becoming more and more confined to the Lacinian promontory, where he was to stand at bay for four or five years. He had failed, above all, to obtain a good port for troops arriving from 106 BATTLE ON THE METAURUS. CH. Africa to reinforce him : and now his one hope was that supplies of men and money should be brought him from Spain by his brother Hasdrubal, who in B.C. 209 had crossed the Pyrenees with large supplies of gold, and had spent B.C. 208 in Gaul collecting allies and hiring mer- cenaries. The Battle of the Metaurus. Early in the summer of B.C. 207, Hasdrubal had crossed the Alps, and, having spent some time in an attack upon Placentia, arrived at Ariminum, intending to march down by the eastern coast road and effect a junction with Hannibal, who was near Venusia on the borders of Lucania and Apulia. Hannibal was being watched by a Roman army under one consul C. Claudius Nero, while the other, M. Livius, was encamped on the river Sena, to bar the march of Hasdrubal. But some horsemen sent by Hasdrubal to announce his arrival to Hannibal, and to request him to advance to meet him, fell into the hands of Nero, who resolved to go to the assistance of Livius without Hannibal's knowledge. Leaving enough men to defend his camp and keep up appearances, he marched away by night. On the day after his arrival the consuls determined to attack Hasdrubal, who was encamped between the rivers Metaurus and Sena. Now Hasdrubal had perceived that the one consul had been reinforced by the other ; and thinking that this must mean that Hannibal had fallen, resolved to retreat. But he lost his way and could not hit the ford of the Metaurus, and was at last forced to fight on unfavourable ground. His army behaved with great gallantry, but was out- numbered and out-manoeuvred; and seeing that all was lost, he charged a Roman cohort and died sword in hand. Nero carried his head back with ; him to Venusia, and caused it to be thrown in front of the Carthaginian lines, allowing two African prisoners at the same time to escape and carry the news to Hannibal. This really ended the ix. MARCELLUS IN SICILY. 107 Hannibalian war in Italy. The news which those Gauls and Ligurians who escaped from the Metaurus carried back to their countrymen made it certain that no more help would come to Hannibal from the North : and Hannibal himself was obliged to retreat again to his headquarters on the Lacinian promontory, from which he no more made any effectual advance ; and though he held his position there, and retained the loyalty of his army, he was isolated, and hopeless of support from home, or of any farther rising in his favour in Italy. It was natural, therefore, that the victory of the Metaurus should be hailed with transports of joy at Rome as the signal of relief from a long agony of danger and suffering. 5. The War in Sicily. One of the side issues raised by the Hannibalian invasion was fought out in Sicily, with the result of putting that island entirely in the hands of the Romans, and giving them a securer base of operations against Africa. Hiero of Syracuse died at the end of B.C. 216, and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a young man of feeble character and in the hands of advisers opposed to Rome. He was assassinated in B.C. 214, but had had time to break the Roman alliance, encouraged by the disasters sustained by the Romans in Italy. After his death two Carthaginian agents sent to Syracuse by Hannibal, Hippocrates and Epicydes, contrived to be elected generals, and to commit the republic of Syracuse to the same course of hostility to Rome. The consul Marcellus (B.C. 214), who was in Sicily, resolved to besiege that city. The siege lasted till B.C. 212, the city being defended with engines contrived by the famous mathematician Archimedes, and more than once relieved by reinforcements and supplies sent from Carthage. At length, however, it fell : the city was plundered of its wealth and works of art, and the old kingdom of Syracuse was added to the rest of the island as part of a Roman io8 THE SCIPIOS IN SPAIN. CH. province, though a few places, especially Agrigentum, held out for about two years longer. 6. The War in Spain, B.C. 218-206. While the Romans in Italy were struggling for life against Hannibal, they had been steadily keeping up another struggle in Spain, which was destined to have a still more decisive influence on the final result. The war with Hannibal is best known to us. It impressed the imaginations of the Roman writers most deeply, as no doubt it seemed to the men of the time the most pressing and important. But it was in Spain where it had been originally expected that the war would be entirely waged that the future conqueror of Hannibal gained his reputation and experience, as well as the material resources which enabled him to transfer the war to Africa. We saw that when Publius Scipio in B.C. 218 had to return from the mouth of the Rhone to Italy to meet Hannibal, he sent his brother Gnaeus on to Spain (p. 98). Gnaeus captured Hanno and much of Hannibal's heavy baggage which he had left behind in Spain ; and though Hasdrubal had done some damage to his fleet, Scipio had firmly established himself in the district north of the Ebro. In B.C. 217 he was joined by his brother Publius with fresh ships and troops ; and for four years the two brothers steadily pursued their object of pushing the Carthaginians farther and farther south. They were not invariably successful. If we divide Spain roughly into three districts, first, that part of it which is north of the Ebro ; second, the country between the Ebro and the Saltus Castulonensis (Sierra Moreno) ; and, thirdly, Baetica^ the country between these mountains and the sea, and watered by the Baetis (Guadalquiver), we may look upon the first as now almost entirely Roman, and the third as almost entirely Carthaginian ; while the tribes of the central district sometimes joined one and sometimes the other according as they alternately prevailed, or in some cases were equally hostile to both. When the Romans are most ix. P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS. 109 successful the fighting is on the Baetis, and the intervening tribes mostly favour the Roman cause ; when the Romans are unsuccessful the Punic arms compel the adhesion of these central tribes and push the war up to the Ebro. Such was the general course of events : but towards the end of B.C. 213, though the Romans had a large auxiliary army of Celtiberians, and had prevented Hasdrubal from making his way to Italy, the Carthaginians seem to have been in unusual force. Three Punic armies were threatening the line of the Ebro ; and when the Scipio brothers attempted to repel them, they perished separately within three weeks of each other. It was a great blow to the Roman cause in Spain, for the Scipios had been very influential there, and now even the position north of the Ebro was in danger. It was saved by the heroism of a young officer named L. Marcius, who secured the camp and headquarters at Tarraco until help could come from Rome. In B.C. 211 the praetor, C. Claudius Nero, arrived with an army, but did little. It was not found easy to get a successor to him, for the service was difficult and dangerous, and seemed to promise little credit. At last the son of the fallen Publius Scipio, who was to be famous as P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, volun- teered to .take the command. He was only twenty-four, much below the age to which custom (though not as yet law) limited the enjoyment of consular work or command. But he had something about him which stirred enthusiasm and won confidence, and the people elected him without hesitation. He remained in Spain from B.C. 210 to B.C. 206, and in those four years quite changed the aspect of affairs. His first move was a sudden descent upon New Carthage, the chief seat of Carthaginian power in the south. Its capture gave him not only immense supplies of money and provisions, a considerable fleet of war and merchant vessels, with the use of many skilled artizans, but above all a base of operations in the very heart of the enemy's country, their no REDUCTION OF SPAIN. CH. best port and source of supplies. Its effects were im- mediately seen in the movement of the Spanish tribes to offer their submission to Rome. From this time forward the Roman cause in Spain seems to have advanced almost without interruption. But though Scipio, when he returned in B.C. 206, could declare that, after defeating the last great Punic army raised by Mago at the battle of Ilipa, he had left no Carthaginian soldier in Spain, yet he had allowed Hasdrubal to give him the slip in B.C. 209, and was only able to warn the home government of his intended march upon Italy. Still he had done more than merely win Spain : he had secured a valuable ally in Africa, whither it was now his object to transfer the war. Syphax, king of Western Numidia, long wavered between the Carthaginian and Roman alliance. To keep him quiet, the Carthaginians stirred up Gala and his son Masannasa. This last-named prince brought a body of Numidian horse over to Spain to support the Carthaginians. Scipio's success and diplomatic skill won both of them over. He even crossed to Africa to visit Syphax, and journeyed right across Spain to have an inter- view with Masannasa. The friendship with Syphax turned out to be useless ; but Masannasa, his enemy and rival, remained devoted to the Roman side, and a few years later did valuable service. The last year of Scipio's command in Spain was marked by his own serious illness, and by a mutiny in the Roman army, leading to movements among the natives. Still when he handed over the province to his successor, the only chiefs who were formidable (Indibilis and Mandonius) had submitted, though they afterwards brought ruin upon themselves by renewing their rebellion. 7. The War finished in Africa (B.C. 207-202). When Scipio returned to Rome in B.C. 206 he had resolved to transfer the war to Africa, where he had already secured allies. In spite of the opposition of the Senate, he was elected consul for B.C. 205, and had the ' province ' of ix. SCIPIO TRANSFERS THE WAR TO AFRICA. IIT Sicily assigned to him, with leave to extend his operations to Africa. After spending a year in Sicily collecting war material and strengthening and training his army, in B.C. 204 (with imperium extended as proconsul) he started P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS. from Lilybaeum. He was at once joined by Masannasa; but Syphax had made terms with Carthage in the winter of B.C. 204-203, and was encamped with Hasdrubal near Utica, which Scipio now blockaded, after having plundered the country between it and Carthage. He deluded H2 VICTORY OF ZAMA. CH. Syphax by pretended negotiations, and then suddenly attacked and destroyed his camp and that of Hasdrubal. The Carthaginians in great alarm sent for Hannibal, who was thus reluctantly obliged to leave Italy. Before he arrived, Scipio had already defeated an army in the ' Great Plains ' ; Syphax had been captured by Laelius ; and the last Carthaginian effort in North Italy had failed by the defeat of Mago in Gallia Cisalpina ; and an embassy sent to Rome to propose peace on the basis of that made at the end of the first war had returned unsuccessful. /There had been a short truce to enable this embassy to | go to Rome and return ; but the Carthaginians violated it by seizing some ships laden with provisions from Sardinia, which had been blown into the Bay of Carthage. The war therefore recommenced, and before long (i8th October, B.C. 202) Scipio met Hannibal some days' march from Zama, and defeated him so decisively that the Cartha- ginians, having no more troops, and not enough ships to keep their harbours open in face of the Roman fleets, were obliged to submit to any terms Scipio chose to dictate. These terms were meant once for all to reduce Carthage to dependence on Rome, and to prevent her from rivalling the Romans in commerce or standing in the way of the ex- tension of their foreign dominions. They were to retain their territories in Africa, but were to give up all their elephants, and all war vessels but twenty, with which they were, if required, to assist the Roman fleet. They were to wage no war outside Africa, and none within it without the permission of Rome ; to pay 10,000 talents (about ^2,400,000) in ten years, and meanwhile to give 100 hostages. Masannasa was to have all his dominions re- stored, with a great part of those ' of Syphax. This was really the hardest condition of all; for Masannasa would be on their very frontier, and there would be constant disputes as to the limits of the two dominions, in which ix. SUPREMACY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. II3 Masannasa would always be able to reckon on the support of Rome. The surrender of the ships also must ruin their commerce and destroy their wealth. Some of the more desperate spirits in Carthage wished still to resist, but were prevented by Hannibal. From this time Carthage ceased to be important, and the Romans were masters of the Mediterranean without a rival. In the period which followed Rome extended her empire eastward without any reason to fear opposition from Carthage. It was an unreasonable jealousy which, fifty years afterwards, made the Romans determine on her utter destruction. Scipio's triumph, on his return to Rome, was the most splendid that had ever been seen in the city; and the name of Africanus, which he adopted by general consent, was transmitted to his family. The exultation of the citizens was natural. The long agony of Hannibal's invasion was at an end. He had not only been driven to leave Italy, but had been beaten in his own country. Italy was free ; Spain was open to Roman trade and Roman arms ; the islands of the Western Mediterranean were occupied by Roman fleets and soldiers; and the question had been settled for ever as to whether Western Europe was to be Latin or Semitic. 8. The War with Macedonia (B.C. 214-205). It must be remembered that, while the Romans were engaged in their mortal struggle with Hannibal, and were main- taining a difficult and expensive war in Spain, and a shorter but still severe war in Sicily, they were also engaged in a quarrel with the king of Macedonia, destined to be even more important in its after results, though desultory and unimportant in the immediate incidents accompanying it. This king was Philip V., who was constantly seeking to make himself master of Greece, and had, in fact, garrisons in several of the strong places, such as Demetrias, Chalcis, Acrocorinthus the three 'fetters of Greece.' The two II4 WAR WITH PHILIP OF MACEDONIA. CH. chief powers in Greece at this time were the Aetolian League, in the north-west, and the Achaean League in the south. In Peloponnesus, Sparta and Elis, and north of the Gulf of Corinth, Athens and Thebes maintained a nominal independence, but they had much declined from their ancient importance ; and Thessaly was almost entirely in the hands of Macedonia. King Philip was usually inclined to be on good terms with the Achaean League, and to act as its protector against the Aetolians, whose desire of extending their power in Acarnania and Epirus brought them into collision with his interests. At the time of the Hannibalian invasion Philip was in fact engaged in war with the Aetolians ; and his success was such as apparently to rouse his ambition, and make him look forward to the time when he might improve his kingdom by securing the coast line of Illyricum and the trade |Of the Adriatic, and even extend his dominion into Italy. \When therefore he heard of the battle of Trasimene, he ' determined to negotiate a treaty with Hannibal, and take the first step by seizing the ports of Illyricum and building a large fleet./ By his treaty with Hannibal, made after the battle of Cannae, he engaged to exclude the Romans from Corcyra and Illyricum. But the Romans got information about it by capturing Philip's envoys, and in spite of all which they had on their hands they proclaimed war against him also. It was not prosecuted with much vigour; but a fleet was kept permanently at Brundisium to prevent descents upon Italy, and some expeditions were made on the Illyrian coast and on the north shore of the Gulf of Corinth ; and what proved a durable friendship was made with king Attalus of Pergamus, in Asia Minor, who had his own reasons for dreading the expansion of Philip's power. Philip was also hampered by new combinations against him in Greece, and when peace was made at Phoenice (B.C. 205) the chief result was that a considerable part of ix. THE ROMANS AND GREECE. II5 Greece had come to look to Rome for protection, 1 and that she was therefore presently drawn into more decisive interference in Greece, and ultimately to supreme power there. 1 Sparta, Athens, Elis, Messene in Greece, Ilium and king Attalus of Pergamus in Asia, are in this treaty reckoned as on the Roman side. On the side of Macedonia are Achaia, Boeotia, Thessaly, Acarnania, Epirus. I'ROW OF SHIP. CHAPTER X. SETTLEMENT OF ITALY AND CONQUEST OF MACEDONIA, GREECE, ASIA, AND CARTHAGE, B.C. 202-146. I. The settlement of Italy after the Second Punic War. 2. Political changes in Rome. 3. The influence of Greece. 4. Depopulation of the country. 5. The Second Macedonian War and battle of Cynoscephalae (B.C. 200-195). 6. Greek towns declared independent. 7. War "with Antiochus III. of Syria and with the Aetolians ; battles of Thermopylae and Magnesia (B.C. 193-188). 8. Settle- ment of Asia after the war with Antiochus. 9. The destruction of Aetolia. 10. Contests ivith the Gauls and Ligurians (B.C. 200-178), II. Organization of the Spanish provinces. 12. War with Perseus and subjection of Macedonia; battle of Pydna (B.C. 175-168). 13. Effects of her conquests on Rome. 14. Macedonia made a Roman province (B.C. 147-146). 15. Destruction of Corinth and subjection of Greece. 16. Destruction of Carthage (B.C. 146). 17. Viriathus and the Numantine war in Spain (B.C. 153-133). 18. The Roman Empire at the endof'B.C. 146. i. Settlement of Italy after Second Punic War, B.C. 202-194. Rome was now again supreme in Italy, but her supremacy had to be secured and the traces of the struggle wiped out. The Italian towns generally returned to the same position which they occupied before. But to this rule there were some exceptions. The Brutii, who had set the example of revolt to Hannibal, were treated no longer as allies, but as subjects, at any rate for the present generation ; they were not enrolled in the army, 116 CH. x. RESETTLEMENT OF ITALY. H 7 and the whole country was regarded as a province ruled by one of the praetors. Campania suffered most; but the treatment of each town was carefully apportioned according to the loyalty or disloyalty it had shown during the in- vasion of Hannibal. Some were treated somewhat as Capua had been : that is to say, their inhabitants were either removed or sold into slavery, their territory was made 'public land,' in which Roman tenants, or aratores, were to be settled, paying a tithe to the Roman exchequer. They lost all independent or corporate existence, were to have no local magistrates or assembly, and were to depend for the administration of justice on a magistrate sent from Rome. But besides these penal measures others were taken more calculated to fill Italy with communities loyal to Rome. The civitates foederatae, towns connected with Rome on fixed terms, generally preserved or resumed their former rights; and the Greek towns round the coast seem to have been treated with special indulgence. In the next place, the confiscated lands in Samnium and Apulia were divided among Roman citizens, who often settled on them and spread Roman customs and ideas. And, lastly, a con- siderable batch of colonies was sent out in B.C. 194, in Apulia, Campania, and Bruttium. 1 The two Latin colonies in the north, Placentia and Cremona, which had been founded just before the war, had suffered much from the Gauls while the Romans had been engaged in the south with Hannibal. Even after the end of the war Gauls and Ligurians ventured to attack them. But in B.C. 195 they were restored and protected by the consul at the head of an army, and after a time and some more fighting the Romans obtained a firm hold of the valley of the Po. 2. Changes in Roman Politics. Two or three 1 See list of Colonies on pp. 55~57- n8 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ROME. CH. changes in the social and political state of Rome which were coming into prominence during this period may be noted here. In the first place the importance of the Senate revived. The foreign wars, and still more the foreign dominions secured by them, caused a great variety of new business : provinces had to be assigned to a larger number of magistrates ; commissioners had to be named for settling their government, and constitutions to be drawn out founded on their reports ; ambassadors had to be received and answered; trials to be held in regard to things happening in the Italian towns ; disputes to be settled arising in the provinces. Now, though no law gave the Senate the power of managing all this business, and if a magistrate chose to appeal to the people he could always override the Senate's decree, yet by general consent it was usually left in the Senate's hands. There- .x fore the Senate became the most important authority in the Empire. It was generally filled by rich men who had been magistrates and whose interests began to clash with those of the poorer citizens, and therefore we shall soon see coming into existence a party of nobles, or ^/zoftzfer, and a party of the commons, or / (3) The power of the Senate was increased also by the xiv. REFORMS OF SULLA. jgy regulation (which was generally, though not always, ob- served henceforth), whereby the consuls and praetors stayed in Rome during their year of office, and only went to provinces with imperium in the next year ; while the Senate decided which should be consular and which should be praetorian provinces, and could prolong a proconsul's or propraetor's stay in a province by withdrawing it from allotment. The governor was also forbidden to pass the boundary of his province in arms without leave of the Senate, and was to quit it within thirty days of the arrival of his successor. (4) The continuance of power, such as Marius had obtained, was to be prevented by recurring to the old rule of an interval of ten years between two consulships. And though the ten years' service in the army before holding office was to be no longer compulsory, yet the rules as to age were to be enforced, and no one was to be consul until he had been praetor, or praetor until he had been quaestor. The result of these regulations was on the whole to enhance the executive powers of the Senate and depress those of the magistrates. The censorship, for instance, was rendered almost objectless, as the list of the Senate was now made up automatically, and the affixing a nota to a man's name was no longer easy. It was one thing to omit a name from a list which the censor had to make up, especially as no one was technically a senator till the censors had so entered his name : it was another thing to strike out a name or affix a nota to one in a list for which the censor was no longer responsible. (5) Another popular institution which Sulla depressed was the Comitia Tribute. We must understand that in the Comitia Centuriata and the Comitia Tributa the same persons voted or had the right to vote. It was only a different arrangement of the voters. In the Tributa the citizens were divided by tribes in such a way that the 1 88 REFORMS OF SULLA. CH. wealthy had no preponderance ; in the Comitia Centuriata the voting was by centuries, and the centuries were so distri- buted that the few wealthy could outvote the many poor. Gradually legislation had fallen chiefly to the Tributa, though both were competent by law ; but by Sulla's arrangement nothing was left to the Tributa but the election of tribunes and the lower magistrates. Laws were to be brought before the Centuriata, while most prosecutions which used to come before the Comitia were arranged for in another way. ^ (6) The Tribunate was weakened in two ways. The tribunes were forbidden to summon and address the people, or to propose legislation without previous sanction of the Senate ; and the office was rendered unattractive to men of ability by a rule which made tribunes ineligible to other offices ; while their right of veto was restricted, though we do not know exactly how. (7) Lastly, the sacred Colleges recovered the right of cooptatio; that is, vacancies were rilled up by the existing members electing, not by the Comitia. These measures were meant to be permanent modifications of practice, mostly in the direction of a return to old customs, and all with a view to prevent excessive power of the democracy or abnormal influence of individuals. For the present the assent of the people was attempted to be secured by wide alterations among the voters themselves. The Italian towns were in many cases almost repeopled by large drafts of veterans; and the urban electorate (practically much the most important) was leavened by the addition of some 10,000 freedmen, whose masters had fallen in the civil war. They were enrolled in the urban tribes under the general name of Cornelii, following the usual practice of slaves taking the gentile name of their emancipator. 13. Sulla's Criminal Code. Sulla's constitutional arrangements, though they deeply affected subsequent xiv. SULLA'S CRIMINAL CODE !8 9 history, were not long fully maintained. But what he did as to criminal trials proved more lasting. Up to this time, if a crime had been committed, the Comitia either tried the case itself, or ordered a committee (guaestio) to try it, generally leaving the Senate to arrange the list of the jurors and other conditions of the trial. In one case, that of an accusation against a provincial governor for extortion or improperly retaining money (res repetundae], a permanent quaestio had been established by the lex Calpurnia (B.C. 149) ; that is to say, when such an accusation was brought the praetor had standing directions how to select the jury, how to conduct the case, and what sentence the court could inflict. Sulla extended this system by establishing similar standing committees to try a number of crimes of common occurrence, such as treason (maiestas\ assassination, poisoning, murder, peculation, bribery, coining, forgery, riot. One common feature in all these quaestiones was that the jurors were not to be Equites, but Senators. He no doubt held that Senators were likely to be more impartial, and this regulation, of course, was meant to enhance their im- portance, and to depress that of the Equites. It was there- fore the subject of constant struggles after his time between the two orders, which resulted in various compromises. 14. Sulla's Retirement and Death, B.C. 79-78. Sulla held his extraordinary office as Dictator only between two and three years (81-79), l n g enough to see that his new regulations were at any rate tried. Towards the end of B.C. 79 he abdicated, and retired to a villa near Cumae, where he spent the last year of his life in great luxury, in the company of men of letters, artists, musicians, and actors. He died calmly in B.C. 78, busying himself to the last with the composition of his memoirs. He is a rare instance of a man who, having obtained supreme power with great cruelty, and exercised it with severity, though also with wisdom and high policy, was able to I9 DEATH OF SULLA. CH. lay down his authority with safety. Perhaps if he had lived longer he would not have died so peacefully. It is interesting to notice that the two men destined in the next generation to be leaders in the civil war which brought the Republic to an end were both brought into contact with him and both defied him. Pompey had joined him on his landing in Italy, and had been employed after his success to secure the obedience of Africa and Sicily, and had, in spite of his opposition, celebrated a triumph for his African victories. lulius Caesar, six years Pompey's junior, had been connected with the opposite party, was a nephew of the wife of Marius, and had him- self married a daughter of Cinna, whom he refused to divorce at the Dictator's order. One of the earliest speeches of Cicero also was delivered in defence of a client accused of murder, in the course of which he ventured to speak plainly on the Sullan despotism. 1 15. The Roman Empire at the Death of Sulla, \/ B.C. 78. We shall now have to trace the course by which the constitution thus settled by Sulla broke down, and in between forty and fifty years gave place to a more complete and more lasting despotism. Before doing so it will be well to take stock of the progress made in the extension and organization of the Empire. And first let us notice that the whole of Italy from the Rubicon to the extreme south has now become an extended Rome. The various communities had long been joined to Rome in terms differing according to their origin or their separate agreement or foedus, and were called either municipia, coloniae (Roman or Latin), praefecturae, civitates foederatae, or mere fora and conciliabula (market towns). Some (as Roman colonies, and certain towns in Latium) had had the \ full franchise and a local government founded on the model of Rome ; others had had governments of their own con- 1 Pro Sexto Roscio A merino, B.C. 80. xiv. THE EXTENT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. 191 trivance, and were only bound to Rome so far as related to military service; some had had an imperfect citizenship called Latinitas; others had a constitution of their own but no jurisdiction, that is, the administration of justice was in the hands of an officer appointed by the Roman praetor. But as far as the full citizenship was concerned all these differences were done away with at the end of the Social war. All citizens in the various communities in Italy became alike citizens of Rome, though the variation in local and internal government remained as before. 1 It was now Italy (not Rome only) that was the governing body ; but it was Italy as an extended Rome, not Italy with a capital city Rome. Therefore the name and official designa- tion remained the same ; it was still Senatus Populusquc Romanus that governed ; only the Populus Romanus now included many who did not live in or near Rome. It is necessary to keep this in mind, to understand why it was in Rome alone that magistrates could be elected, the Senate sit, and orders to the provinces go forth. Rome was still mistress though she admitted Italians among her citizens. One substantial advantage of the citizen- ship was the freedom from the land tax or tributum to which all provincials were liable ; and another was the protection which it gave against arbitrary sentences of the magistrates. 1 6. Foreign Dominions. We have seen from time to time what countries external to Italy had been brought under the rule of Rome, and were now being governed by this enlarged city-state. They were called 'provinces,' that is, spheres of authority for certain magistrates. When Rome first began to have provinces (Sicily and Sardinia) additional praetors were elected to go to them, and, if they were in a disturbed state, one of the consuls often 1 Sulla disfranchised whole districts, but this disability was only temporary. 192 ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROVINCES. CH. went with an army also. But as their number increased, there were not enough praetors to govern them, and besides the increasing law-business at Rome required the presence of the praetors. Therefore it became the custom often to keep a man a second year in his province as pro praetore or pro consule, or to send him only when he had served his year of office at Rome. Sulla made this latter plan imperative, and after his time each consul and praetor drew lots during his year of office for the province which he was to govern in the next year. The Senate decided which province should have a propraetor and which a proconsul, but this was generally done according to a regular precedent ; the easier provinces being praetorian, the more difficult consular. All alike were sometimes loosely spoken of as proconsuls. In their provinces these governors were in command of the troops stationed there, or of those they brought with them ; had power of life and death over the provincials (who were not citizens) ; controlled the collection of tribute, and administered justice. The provinces consisted of certain defined terri- tory containing a number of civitates or city-states, and the terms on which they were held, taxed, and governed, differed in each according to the original formula or charta drawn up when they became provinces by commissioners sent to settle their constitution (redigere in provinciam). The Romans usually respected local customs and laws, though in certain important points the principles of Roman law were applied to all alike. Above all they lost the power of making foreign alliances or wars, and were compelled to keep peace among themselves. They all paid tribute in one form or another, and in 'return were protected from foreign invasion or damage to their commerce. 17. The Number of the Provinces. There were now ten such provinces : I. Gallia Cisalpina, i.e. North Italy from the Rubicon to the Alps, which contained xiv. PROVINCES AND DEPENDENCIES. 193 several colonies enjoying full civitas. As far as the Po, indeed, the whole country had the civitas and north of it an inferior citizenship, which was yet on a higher level than that of other provinces. II. Gallia Transalpina, sometimes called Narbonensis, from the colony Narbo which was its capital, a district on the south-east of Gaul answering roughly to the modern Provence. III. Sicily. IV. Sardinia and Corsica. V. Hispania Citerior. VI. Hispania Ulterior. VII. Macedonia, to which was joined Thessaly, parts of Epirus, and, for certain purposes, the rest of Greece. VIII. Africa, that is, the territories of Carthage in Africa. IX. Asia, the old dominions of the kings of Pergamus, Phrygia, Mysia, Caria, and Lydia. X. Cilicia. Other places were so much under the influence of Rome that they were certain to become provinces in time. Thus Illyricum or Dalmatia, the district on the east of the Adriatic, paid tribute although it was not yet thoroughly organized as a separate province, being sometimes put under the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, sometimes under the governor of Macedonia. Greece, though many States in it were nominally free, was for practical purposes under the governor of Macedonia. In Egypt the kings depended on Roman support ; and the next district in Africa to the west of Egypt called Cyrene, with Crete, had been bequeathed to Rome, though the Romans had at present refused to take it over formally. Thus the Roman Empire or protectorate already extended right across Europe and Asia Minor, and both the north and the south coasts of the Mediterranean were in her hands. CHAPTER XV. THE RISE OF POMPEY THE GREAT, B.C. 78-62. I. Signs of dissolution after the strong government of Sulla. 2. The two parties at Rome. 3. The revolt of Lepidus (B.C. 78-7). 4. Sertorius in Spain (B.C. 83-72). 5. Spartacus and the gladiators (B. C. 73-71). 6. Affairs in the East. 7. The second Mithridatic war. 8. The third Mithridatic war under Lucullus. 9. Pompey in the Mediterranean and the East. 10. War with the Cilician pirates. 1 1 . Pompey sent against Mithridates (B.C. 66). 12. Death of Mithri- dates and settlement of Asia. 13. Pompey's return to Rome. i. Signs of Dissolution. The settlement of Sulla had been brought about with so much violence that a reaction was certain to follow ; and the fierce passions roused by these scenes of blood were sure to produce others like them. We have now come therefore to a period of civil wars which, with little intermission, continued till the permanent peace secured by Augustus after the battle of Actium in B.C. 31. These wars and disturbances arose from different causes and in different places, but were all of them the result of political discon- tent or social grievances ; of overgrown wealth contrasted with ruin and poverty ; of disloyal ambition or extravagant partisanship. The legions serving at a distance from Rome began to regard allegiance to a successful com- mander as more binding than that to the State. The oppressions in the provinces inflicted by some of the 194 CH. xv. DANGEROUS DISORDERS. 195 governors and by the publicani^ or farmers of revenues, not only caused restlessness in the provinces themselves, but proved also the fruitful source of violent contests in Rome when the question of punishing powerful and guilty statesmen was mooted. The most notorious of these was Gaius Verres, who plundered Cilicia as pro-quaestor in B.C. 80-79, and was prosecuted by Cicero for extortions in Sicily, where he was pro-praetor in B.C. 73-71. Though obliged to go into exile to avoid condemnation, he was able to- take most of his ill-gotten wealth with him, and lived in luxury till B.C. 43. Other causes nearer home were of dangerous omen, such as the shock to family life caused by the growing facility of divorce, the multiplicity of slaves, the large establishments of gladiators, the increased tendency to leave the cultivation of land to slaves, and to crowd into Rome, swelling the ranks of the needy citizens who were ready to take part with ambitious or unscrupulous nobles 2. The Two Parties at Rome. But even putting aside the distinctly disloyal or ambitious, the Romans were now sharply divided into two parties, the Optimates and Populares. The Otimates, as we have already seen, wished the republican forms maintained, but the offices to be chiefly in the hands of the nobles and men of high birth, and the magistrates to be thoroughly subordinate to the Senate, which was to direct Rome's foreign policy and the government of the provinces. The Populares wanted the offices to be easily attainable by all, as by law they were open to all ; and though they did not aim at destroy- ing the Senate, they wished to restrict its functions and bring as many details of government as possible directly before Comitia. In particular they wished the juries, who tried offending governors, to be composed of Equites instead of Senators, or at least of a mixture of the two. Both had some reason on their side. But the weak 196 THE OPTIMATES AND POPULARES. CH. point in the policy of the Optimates was that, though the Senate was a better body than a popular assembly for governing a foreign empire, yet experience had shown that it was not able to control members of its own order who were determined on enriching themselves at all risks ; and that the family compacts which were made as to official promotion had often resulted in putting inefficient and corrupt men in positions of importance, and even in the command of armies. The weak point in the policy of the Populares was that not only were the Comitia unfit, as popular assemblies always are, to decide details of adminis- tration, but that the Roman Comitia were not even what they professed to be assemblies of all citizens. A large number of citizens lived at a distance from Rome, and seldom came there. The voters were mostly the city populace, among whom the ' men of the pavement,' or what may be called the city rabble, formed a powerful element. For voting at elections indeed, distant voters sometimes were induced by leading men to come to Rome, but seldom for legislation. Office was now become so valu- able from the provincial governorships to which it led, that it was fiercely contended for; and leading men on either side did not hesitate to incite their followers to riot and outrage in order to carry their election or their laws, or to interrupt assemblies at which measures they disliked were to be proposed or their political opponents to be elected. Of the two parties Pompey and Caesar came eventually to be heads respectively. Caesar had always been connected with the Populares ; but it was only in later life, and owing to a long chain of events, that Pompey came to be regarded as chief of the Optimates. We must see now how the next thirty years brought on these changes, and, with them, the practical end of the Republic. 3. The Revolt of Lepidus, B.C. 78-7 7. Sulla's death xv. LEPIDUS AND SERTORIUS. 197 was followed immediately by an attempt to upset most of his legislation. This attempt was made by one of the consuls for B.C. 78, M. Aemilius Lepidus. He passed laws for cheap distribution of corn, and for recalling those exiled by Sulla, and proposed others to undo much of his legislation-; finally, in the year after his consulship, when he was in command of troops in Etruria as proconsul (B.C. 77), he actually marched at the head of these troops to take Rome and enforce his views. He was, however, defeated by his former colleague, Catulus, at the Milvian Bridge, just outside the city, and retreated to Sardinia, where he died ; whilst one of his chief legates, M. Brutus (father of the assassin of Caesar), was captured and put to death by Pompey at Mutina. This movement was no"t of great or permanent importance, but it showed to what lengths a party leader was prepared to go. 4. Sertorius in Spain, B.C. 83-72. Another move- ment which proved more troublesome and protracted was that of Sertorius in Spain. Q. Sertorius had been in the party of Cinna, and had shared in the defeat inflicted on the consul by Sulla near Capua in B.C. 83. He had not remained in Rome to witness the triumph of Sulla. He had been already named pro-praetor of Hispania Ulterior, and went there towards the end of B.C. 83. He was much above the average of his class in energy and uprightness, but he too was prepared to resist in arms the dominant pp.rty in the government at home. Knowing that Sulla would recall him, he made arrangements to hold the passes of the Pyrenees against his legates. When they were forced, he retired gradually to Africa ; joined a fleet of Cilician pirates ; landed in Spain at Gades (Cadiz) ; crossed again to Africa ; and, finally, accepted an invitation *of the Lusitani (Portugal) to lead them against the Roman army. His character won him great influence both in Lusitania and other parts of Spain. He was joined by I9 8 FALL OF SERTORIUS. CH. other malcontents from Rome in such numbers that he pretended to have the Senate with him; and from B.C. 79 to 72 maintained his ground against many Roman com- manders and propraetors. He even negotiated with Mithridates as though head of the State, and sent a partisan to act as proconsul of Asia and assist the king. Finally his power in Spain became so formidable that, after he had defeated three Roman propraetors, Pompey was sent with a large army and the rank of proconsul to reinforce the Spanish governors (B.C. 76). But it was not for nearly four years that Pompey succeeded in putting down the insurrection, having in the course of them been driven back beyond the Ebro and suffered more than one defeat. The war dragged on, as wars in Spain always seem to have done, and became a series of assaults on isolated fortresses ; but, on the whole, in this species of warfare Pompey and Metellus made steady progress. Even in B.C. 72 however, though deserted by many of his adherents, and losing popularity as he became embittered by the wearisome struggle, Sertorius was not defeated in battle, but was murdered by the treacherous Perpenna, a legate of Lepidus, who had joined Sertorius after the death of Lepidus, but was jealous of him, and hoped to secure his own pardon by thus destroying his leader. His treason was rewarded as it deserved : for Pompey refused to see him, ordered him to be executed, and some letters involving certain men of position in Rome in the crime of treasonable corre- spondence with Sertorius to be burnt unread. Few leaders of rebellion have had a purer and nobler record than Sertorius, or have made themselves more respected and beloved by those whom they ruled. There is a certain charm in the story of his intercourse with the simple ' Lusitani and the manner in which he impressed them with confidence. He was everywhere accompanied, it is XV. SPARTACUS. 199 said, by a favourite fawn presented to him by some hunters, but which he allowed them to believe came from Diana herself, and was a pledge of her favour. In some ways the history of Sertorius's rebellion foreshadowed the civil war of Pompey and Caesar. He had so many senators with him that he could pretend to have a Senate; he was still technically endowed with Imperium and the command of a province (for he had not laid down either); he professed to be acting for the Republic against a faction ; and had the secret sympathy of many leading men at Rome. It showed the weak point in the senatorial govern- ment, and how it was possible for a provincial magistrate to defy it without being constitutionally quite in the wrong. GLADIATORS FIGHTING. 5. Spartacus and the Gladiators, B.C. 73-71. If the movement of Sertorius betrayed the weakness of the constitution, that of Spartacus pointed to a danger nearer home, and springing from the social habits of the age. 200 DEFEAT OF SPARTACUS. CH. Gladiatorial shows are first heard of in B.C. 264. Since then they had become the most popular of amusements. Wealthy men, wishing to secure public favour, vied with each other in keeping gangs or ' schools ' (ludi) of them in training. They were selected from the most powerful barbarians, and their number was now so great that they might easily become dangerous, like a caged lion, if ever the bars were broken. A large school of this kind at Capua was owned by one Lentulus, in which a number of Gauls and Thracians were being trained. Two hun- dred of them broke loose, obtained arms, and under the leadership of a Thracian named Spartacus established themselves on a spur of Mount Vesuvius (B.C. 73). They were soon joined by other escaped gladiators and slaves, and during the next three years defeated more than one consular army, and traversed Italy at their will, plundering in every direction. Spartacus does not appear to have conducted his war with special cruelty or needless outrage; the one act of severity recorded is in B.C. 72, when, having defeated two consuls in Picenum, he forced three hundred Roman prisoners to fight as gladiators. But there was necessarily nothing stable in such a raid, however long continued. Spar- tacus himself wished to cross the Alps and make his way to his native country; but his followers were divided, and most preferred the life of plunder and adventure in Italy; and in the winter of B.C. 72-71 they were concentrated for the most part round Thurii, in the south. There he was at length overcome by L. Licinius Crassus, who had volunteered to take the command, when every one else tried to avoid it. Spartacus was driven to the extreme south at Rhegium, from which he tried to bribe some Cilician pirate vessels to take him across to Sicily, where he trusted to be able to again rouse the slaves. But the Cilicians took his money and abandoned xv. SECOND MITHRIDATIC WAR. 201 him ; and he then found himself shut off to the north by a deep trench and embankment which Crassus had thrown out across the Bruttian Peninsula. He broke out indeed in spite of this ; but a great body of his adherents had been already cut to pieces by Crassus, and he himself fell after a desperate battle near Petilia (B.C. 71). The survivors of the revolted slaves, still numbering many thousands, were scattered over the mountains, where Pompey, just returned from his campaign against Sertorius in Spain, pursued and cut them off in detail, boasting that though Crassus had won battles, he had cut up the rebellion by the roots. Six thousand of the slaves who were captured were crucified along the Appian Road. Still isolated bands were in existence in the neighbourhood of Thurii as late as B.C. 60, living a life of brigandage, where they were cut to pieces by Octavius, the father of Augustus. 6. Affairs in the East. Meanwhile some attempts had been made to clear the sea of pirates, and P. Servilius Vatia earned the cognomen of Isauricus by defeating the people of Isauria beyond Mount Taurus in Asia, and added parts of Pamphylia, Pisidia, Isauria, and Cappadocia to the new province of Cilicia (B.C. 78-74). Other generals were strengthening the north frontier of Macedonia, by defeating bordering barbarians, and advancing the Roman arms for the first time to the Danube. But what proved the most important event for Rome was a renewed struggle with Mithridates. This went through two phases, some- times called the Second and Third Mithridatic wars. 7. Second Mithridatic War. When Sulla returned home in B.C. 84, he left L. Licinius Muraena as propraetor of Asia, with L. Lucullus as quaestor. Muraena was eager to distinguish himself by a victory over Mithridates. There was not yet complete peace in his province: some places, such as the island of Mitylene, still held out against the Romans, and as the settlement of Pergamus had been 202 THIRD MITHRIDATIC WAR. CH. verbal and not by a written treaty, there was sure to be points of dispute that might be made an excuse for attacking Mithridates. Muraena did in fact find such an excuse in a dispute as to the possession of parts of Cappadocia. He entered that country, pillaged villages and temples, and refused to obey an order of recall sent from the Senate. He sustained a defeat at the hands of Mithridates near Sinope (capital of the Pontic kingdom), and only desisted from the war when Sulla sent Gabinius with positive orders for his return, and with directions to make terms between the kings of Pontus and Cappadocia (B.C. 81). Mithridates had seemed glad to accept Sulla's orders and to make peace; and till B.C. 74 he lived on fairly good terms with the Roman governors of Asia, who were forbidden by Sulla's law to cross the frontier to attack him, though there was still an outstanding dispute about parts of Cappadocia, and Mithridates was doing his best to prepare for another war. 8. Third Mithridatic War under Lucullus. In B.C. 74 a question as to the succession to the throne of Bithynia brought matters to a crisis. Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, died in that year and left his dominions to the Roman people. Whether this was like the will of Attalus, which left the royal property to the Romans, hoping that they would be induced to respect the in- dependence of his people, or not, the Romans determined to treat the whole country as their own, and add it to the province of Asia till further arrangements should be made. As this gave them a district on the Pontus (Black Sea) and Propontis, and would enable them by blockading the Bos- porus and Hellespont to ruin the Pontic trade, Mithridates was expected to espouse the cause of the son of Nicomedes. His previous preparations were known at Rome, and it was determined to anticipate all danger by at once sending a xv. CAMPAIGNS OF LUCULLUS. 203 fleet and army. The army was commanded by one consul L. Licinius Lucullus, the navy by the other consul M. Aurelius Cotta (B.C. 73). Thus began a war that lasted seven years. It opened with a disaster to the Roman fleet under Cotta at Chalcedon ; and with an attempt to rouse the Greek cities in Asia to reassert their freedom from Roman imposts under the leadership of M. Marius the One-eyed, whom Sertorius had sent with the pretended authority of proconsul of Asia. But on land Lucullus was much more successful. The grand army of Mithridates, amounting to 150,000 men, was wasted in a siege of Cyzicus, and in engagements with Lucullus who came to its relief; and at the end of the year B.C. 73 the king could muster barely 20,000, while a succession of storms had much weakened and damaged his fleet. Next year (B.C. 72) M. Marius was captured ; the death of Sertorius deprived Mithridates of the hope of a diversion in his favour by occupying Roman forces in Spain ; and the king himself barely escaped from a blockade of Nicomedia. One of his lieutenants also, who had been sent to invade Roman Cilicia, had suffered similar disasters at the hands of Julius Caesar, who, while studying rhetoric at Rhodes, had raised a force of volunteers and crossed to Asia to meet him. An attempt to send money to bribe the islands of the Aegean Sea was also defeated, and the treasure captured; and the king's garrisons in Galatian towns were expelled by the tetrarch Deiotarus. Altogether, except as to the first success against Cotta, the two years (B.C. 73-72) were most disastrous to Mithridates, and destroyed all his hopes of wresting the province of Asia from the Romans. His only resource was a combination of the great kingdoms of Central Asia Armenia and Parthia against the Republic. Tigranes, king of Armenia, however, had his own battles to fight in Syria, and gave him only vain promises ; and he again sustained a great defeat at the hands of Lucullus near Cabira (B.C. 71 spring), and flying 204 DIFFICULTIES OF LUCULLUS. CH. into Armenia was kept by the king practically a prisoner till B.C. 69 ; during which time Lucullus carried all before him, as did also the Roman fleet in the Aegean and the Pontus. However, the war was not at an end. Lucullus determined to demand of Tigranes, king of Armenia, that he should hand over Mithridates; and when Tigranes, elated by his victories in Syria, refused, Lucullus, after a year's delay, in the course of which the Pontic capital Sinope was reduced to surrender, advanced upon his new-built capital (Tigranocerta), in the spring of B.C. 69. Thus the Romans were for the first time approaching the country between the Euphrates and Tigris, where they were destined to maintain for so many centuries a struggle against the Parthians. Tigranes was defeated near Tigranocerta, on the 6th of October, B.C. 69, and Lucullus not only got vast booty, but restored to the throne of Syria the expelled Antiochus Asiaticus, who, on being driven out by Tigranes, had appealed to Rome for help, and was now for a short time again allowed to call himself king of Syria. Tigranes was not yet, however, quite conquered. He summoned Mithridates from his confinement, and under his vigorous guidance again collected a large army, which, however, was again defeated by Lucullus (Sept., B.C. 68), near Mount Arsanias, in the Euphrates valley. But Lucullus was now on the high steppes of Central Asia, where the winters were most severe, and his army refused to remain there. He was obliged to come south into Mesopotamia, and, for the winter of B.C. 68-67, was reduced almost to impotence by the mutinous temper of his troops, who were instigated by his legate and brother-in-law P. Clodius to refuse to endure any farther fatigues or expeditions. The result was that Mithridates once more began a series of successful movements, and seemed likely to recover all those parts of his dominions which had been occupied by the Romans. Tigranes also recovered Armenia, on Lucullus moving westward to relieve xv. POMPEIUS MAGNUS. 205 his lieutenant Triarius, who (like his predecessor Hadrianus) had been defeated by the troops of Mithridates. Lucullus had done great things, but he was now in danger of losing all that he had gained ; and just at this juncture ten com- missioners arrived, expecting to find a new province (Bithynia and Pontus) ready to be organized, of which M'. Acilius Glabrio, who came at the same time, was to be proconsul, as well as commander against Mithridates. Lucullus there- fore felt himself superseded, and his mutinous army acted as though he were so, and for the most part left him. He still, however, remained during the winter of B.C. 67-66 in Galatia, at the head of some troops, which he did not hand over till Pompey arrived in B.C. 66 to take up the command. 9. Pompey in the Mediterranean and the East, B.C. 66-63. The rest of the war is intimately connected with the rise of Pompeius Magnus to a high position in the State. Pompey had been consul in B.C. 70 after his return from Spain, in spite of the law of Sulla, since he was neither of the consular age nor had he been quaestor or praetor. In his year of office laws were passed undoing some of Sulla's arrangements. The law preventing tribunes afterwards holding other offices was repealed, and the juries were no longer confined to Senators, but were to be one- third Senators, one-third Equites, and one-third of the order next to the Equites, called Tribuni aerarii. This made the stricter Optimates suspect him, and they eagerly opposed a bill brought forward in B.C. 67 by a tribune named A. Gabinius, because they regarded it as certainly pointing to Pompey, whose reputation had been steadily rising. 10. The Lex Gabinia, and War with Cilician Pirates. The occasion was this. The Cicilian and other pirates had become a serious danger throughout the Medi- terranean. Their numbers and boldness had risen to such a height that commerce was threatened with extinction, and the sea was almost impassable except to large vessels 206 THE PIRATIC WAR. CH. with armed men on board. They had plundered the coasts of Asia, Greece, Epirus, and Italy itself; had carried off two propraetors with their train, many ladies of high rank, and had even run into the harbours of Caieta and Ostia and set fire to the ships. Every now and then they met with retribution, as when they captured lulius Caesar on his way to Rhodes and exacted a heavy ransom, which he raised in Greek cities, and then obtained ships, pursued, captured and put them to death at Pergamus. But, as a rule, anything the Romans had done had been either unsuccessful or insufficient. The Balearic Islands (Maiorca and Minorca) had been taken over as offering them harbourage; P. Servilius Isauricus had destroyed one great nest of them, and, though C. Antonius had failed in Crete, Q. Caecilius Metellus had been more successful there (B.C. 68). Still these were only partial measures ; no general plan of repression had ever been set on foot, and the people were feeling the effects of the interrup- tion of commerce in a serious rise in the price of provisions. The law of Gabinius proposed that some one should be appointed with absolute power for three years all over the Mediterranean and fifty miles inland from all coasts, with two hundred ships and unlimited credit on the treasury, with the express purpose of clearing the sea of these pests. All eyes turned at once to Pompey, and, in spite of various methods of opposition, the bill was not only passed, but Pompey was named with an even greater equipment. He was to have twenty-four legates, 120,000 sailors and foot-soldiers, with 500 horse. Pompey justified the confidence of the people. Within a sur- prisingly small number of months he had accomplished his task ; and, during the winter of B.C. 67-66 he resided in a now pacified Cilicia, founding cities and settling the best of the pirates in districts where they could live honestly. XV. POMPEY AND MITHRIDATES. 207 n. Pompey sent against Mithridates, B.C. 66. The relief to the Romans and all Italy was great ; Pompey's reputation was at its height, and a law proposed by a tribune, C. Manilius, to confer on him the command against Mithridates was eagerly passed, in spite of the opposition of the Optimates in the Senate (B.C. 66). Pompey was again completely and rapidly successful. Mithridates, indeed, when he arrived, was at a very low ebb of his fortunes, in spite of his successes of the previous two years. The loss of the piratical fleets was a severe blow to him ; Tigranes, king of Armenia (his son-in-law), was again alienated from him ; and his attempt to gain the alliance of the Parthians was frustrated by Pompey whose forces were vastly superior to the king's, while his fleet was guarding all points on the coast from Phoenicia to the Bosporus. Still Mithridates refused submission ; and when his troops were cut to pieces in attempting a night retreat, he himself escaped to Armenia, and, finding no chance of support there, marched round the Black Sea to Colchis, intending to enter the dominions of his son, Machares, near the Crimea. Pompey followed him for some distance, wintering on the Khur, and inflicting a defeat on the Albani and Iberes, who commanded the passage over the Caucasus. In the spring (B.C. 65) he pro- ceeded as far as the Phasis ; but failing to come up with Mithridates, he left him to be dealt with by the Roman fleet, and returned southward to take over the district between the Euphrates on the east and the Mediterranean on the west, Mounts Amanus and Taurus on the north and the desert of Arabia Petraea on the south, including Pales- tine. This was now to be formed into a new province under the name of Syria ; and Antiochus, whom the Romans had restored to the territory taken from him by Tigranes of Armenia, was to be deposed. It was in the course of this business that Pompey found it necessary to 208 DEATH OF MITHRIDATES. CH. enter Palestine and capture Jerusalem, in consequence of the disturbance created by the rivalry of the two kings, Hyrcanus III. and Aristobulus, the former of whom had called in the aid of Aretas, king of the Nabataei, in Arabia. The city was delivered to Pompey without a blow ; but the temple was obstinately defended, and was only taken after more than two months' siege with much bloodshed on both sides (December B.C. 63). 12. Death of Mithridates, B.C. 63, and Settlement of Asia. While engaged in Palestine Pompey learnt that Mithridates was dead. He had reached Panticapaeum (Kertch), had forced his rebellious son Machares to commit suicide, had again collected an army, and even meditated an invasion of Italy by the valley of the Danube and the Brenner. But he was closely blockaded by the Roman fleet ; his people were suffering from their crippled trade ; and an insurrection, instigated by his one remaining son Pharnaces, compelled him to put an end to his life. After his death there was no more resistance to the Roman arms in Asia, and Pompey was able to make a settlement of Asiatic affairs as he chose. It will be well to notice what this settlement was. (i) Two new "provinces " were formed : (a) Bithynia and Pontus, sometimes spoken of by either name, including the country left by the Bithynian king Nicomedes (B.C. 74), with the addition of most of the territory lately held by Mithridates as king of Pontus. (I)) Syria, the district from the upper Euphrates and the Gulf of Issus to Egypt and the Arabian desert, was made a province, the lately restored king Antiochus Asiaticus being wholly deprived of this territory. But the country was too vast and diversified to be all under one administration, The difficulty was got over by leaving numerous. xv. SETTLEMENT OF ASIA. 209 cities and their immediate territories "free," i.e. not under a Roman magistrate, but with a local government (royal or other) of their own, though paying tribute to Rome. Thus Jerusalem and the Jews generally, thus Tyre and Sidon, remained autonomous though tributary, some of the coast towns being taken from them and added to the Province. Thus Aretas was heavily mulcted and reduced to pay tribute, but was allowed to retain his government in the same way as many other petty princes retained their government, but had to observe the Pax Romana. M. Aemilius Scaurus was appointed by Pompey as first gover- nor of this province. (2) The rest of Asia was left independent indeed, and the larger kingdoms re-established ; but their kings were set up for the first time, or restored by Pompey's authority, and really reigned by permission of Rome. These kingdoms were : (a) Tigranes was restored to Armenia. (&) Cappadocia was secured to Ariobarzanes. (c) Antiochus (not Asiaticus) was confirmed in the kingdom of Seleucia and Commagene. (rf) Attalus was made prince of the interior of Paph- lagonia. (e) Deiotarus, tetrarch of a large part of Galatia. ( /) Aristarchus, king of Colchis. (g) Archelaus, High Priest of Comana (equivalent to king). (h) Pharnaces (son of Mithridates), king of Bosporus : but certain towns were declared free ; as Phana- goria (on the Sea of Azov) and Mitylene in Lesbos, which had held out for Mithridates, and had been subdued in B.C. 81. 13. Pompey's Return to Rome, B.C. 62. These o 210 POMPEY'S RETURN. CH. xv. arrangements constituted what was called an imperator's acta. They held good as long as he had imperium, and pro- visionally at any rate afterwards ; but to be put on a clearly legal footing they had to be " confirmed " by a formal vote of the Senate: and when Pompey returned to Rome in B.C. 62, many thought that he would refuse to disband his army, or lay down his imperium until these acta were confirmed ; and there was some alarm on all sides as to what he might do. He was coming home with great glory. The sea had been cleared of pirates; two large provinces had been added to the Empire ; Asia was pacified, and nearly all the kings in it were reigning by his means or consent ; even the Par- thians, who were on the Eastern frontier and were so much dreaded, had been forced to surrender what they had taken from Armenia, and had made terms. Pompey also was bringing enormous wealth to enrich the exchequer, and a great number of noble and princely captives to adorn his triumph. With such prestige and such forces he might perhaps play the part of Sulla or Marius, and both parties were uneasy. But Pompey disappointed hopes and fears alike. He disbanded his army as soon as he landed in Italy, and came to Rome to claim his triumph. He did not lay down his imperium, for, if he had done so, he could not have had his triumph. He therefore could not actually enter the city on his arrival late in B.C. 62, but he could meet the Senate outside the Pomoerium in certain temples. He did not triumph till the 28th September, B.C. 61; and we shall find that the question of the confirmation of his acta was the cause of much political trouble. STATUE OF POMPEY. CHAPTER XVI. THE BEGINNING OF THE BREAKDOWN OF THE REPUBLIC. i. The evils requiring reform in the last period of the Republic (i) De- population of Italy and attempts to stop it ; (2) the misgovernment in the provinces ; (3) violent party contests in Rome, and the points on "which the parties ivere at variance j (4) hostility of 'the orders. 2. The leading men in the state during the revolutionary period : Of the Populares Caesar ; Pompey, Crassus. 3. Of the Optimatcs Catulus, Lucullus, Cato. 4. Cicero, Catiline. 5. The conspiracy of Catiline. 6. Consequences of the action of Cicero in putting down the Catilinarian conspiracy. i. The Evils requiring Reform in the last period of the Republic, B.C. 63-31. We have now come to a period in which events led quickly to the breakdown of the Republic, and it will be well to see whether we can point out some of the causes of it. No one cause is sufficient to account for the revolution, and no one man. There were many circumstances which combined to bring it about, and the mistakes or crimes both of those who attacked and of those who defended the constitution alike led up to the final catastrophe. Let us see what the evils in various parts of the empire were which required reform, and then we may pass to the remedies which opposing parties in Rome pro- posed for them. (i) The Depopulation of Italy. Lands were for the most part held by few men in large estates and worked by slaves. 212 CH. xvi. SEEDS OF REVOLUTION. 213 The free country people had to a great extent migrated to the towns, and especially to Rome, finding no chance of prosperity in the country. Therefore Rome was becoming crowded with a poor and discontented class. This tendency had long existed, but, partly owing to the vicious practice of distributing cheap corn, it had by this time come to a climax. Various attempts had been made to remedy it by using the ager publicus for allotments to poor citizens, and thus per- suading them to settle in the country. There was still, however, some ager publicus left, principally in Campania, once forming the territory of Capua, which was rented to farmers (aratores] ; and also considerable tracts in Etruria confiscated by Sulla, in some of which he had put posses- sores^ while in the case of others (for instance, at Volaterrae and Arretium) the law had not been carried out, and the original owners had remained in possession, always however with the terror before them lest some new proposal should be made for dividing it and displacing them. Here there was one source of political division at Rome. Various tribunes, belonging to the popular party, made pro- posals from time to time for dealing with the ager publicus in such a way as to induce farmers to settle on their properties throughout Italy. But there were too many interests in- volved. The Optimates looked upon those already in possession as their best supporters and were unwilling to do anything which might alienate them. The division of the Campanian lands also among freeholders meant the loss of the quit-rents (vectigat) to the treasury, and the more complete dependence on the tribute of the provinces over which the authority of the Senate was less secure. There was also a great deal of ager publicus in the provinces. The sale or enfranchisement of that also was proposed by Rullus in B.C. 63, but was opposed by the Optimates on similar grounds, fear for the revenue, and fear of disturbances tending to put power in the hands of military leaders and 214 DANGERS IN THE PROVINCES. CH. weaken that of the Senate. The question was more acute than usual just now, because Pompey wanted allotments for his veterans and was therefore anxious for some solution of it. We shall see presently that this helped to throw him into the arms of Caesar, who carried a law in B.C. 59 that settled the question of the greater part of the Campanian land for a time. (2) The Provinces. In the provinces there were many grievances which threatened trouble heavy taxation, mal- versation on the part of governors and publicani, and insecurity of redress before the law courts. It was commonly said that a provincial governor had to make three fortunes : one to pay the cost of games, public entertainments, and other modes of obtaining office, a second to bribe the jury when tried for malversation, and a third to live on. All these he looked to make out of his province ; so that some said that it would be better for the provincials if there was no such thing as trial for mal- versation a man would have one less fortune to make. Not only so, but either from the wording of the law or from tradition, an eques could not be tried under the lex de repetundiS) and the only persons liable were the proconsul, the quaestor, and the legati, if Senators. This monstrous privilege gave the publicani practical immunity at home. Their only restraint came from the proconsul, and him they found means to pacify or overawe. These things were surely making for the dissolution of the Empire. Some stringent reform was necessary; but the interests opposed to such reform were so great, that it would hardly be effected without a break-up of the present hold of the few upon office and power. Yet it would be wrong to think that all provincial governors were dishonest or oppressive. If it had been so, a more wide-spread disaster could hardly have been averted, such as that which overtook the Romans in Asia in B.C. 88. The provinces were, in fact, on the whole peaceful xvi. TROUBLES IN ROME. 215 and fairly prosperous. In B.C. 63 (Pompey having subdued and settled Asia) Cicero was able to say that the Empire was at peace, threatened by no rising in the provinces or acts of hostility from neighbouring princes. The evil effects of the misgovernment were to be felt first of all at Rome itself, where the eagerness for these profitable offices led to fierce party warfare. (3) Violent Party Contests at Rome. We may now turn then to Rome with clearer ideas as to the dangers brewing there. We may see that the two parties the Optimates and Populares were sharply divided on many questions : the manner of dealing with the ager publicus the reforms of the law courts, necessary for giving the provinces security for justice; the mode of dealing with the crowds of im- poverished men who, living in Rome side by side with immense wealth and luxury, were always ready to be led into disorder ; the real opening of office so that it should be within reach of all those legally entitled to it and yet not fall into unworthy hands. At present the higher offices were looked upon as all but the monopoly of a few noble families ; and the eagerness for them, combined with the difficulty of securing them, led to violence at elections, and the hiring of regular bands of roughs to break up meetings or keep other candidates and their supporters from appearing. (4) Hostility of Equites and the Senate. Besides these sources of difference there was a feud between the Senate and the Equites. The Equites were the rich middle class, not noble, as in a sense the Senators were, but always liable to become so by election to office making them life-senators. One great cause of jealousy between them was the question of juries. It had been always the custom in quaestiones or trials for the jury to consist of senators, till Gaius Gracchus transferred that function to the equites (B.C. 122). Sulla had restored the right to the senators in B.C. 81 ; but in Pompey 's consulship (B.C. 70) a new law ordained that 216 THE SENATE AND THE EQUITES. CH. one-third of the jury should be Senators, one-third Equites, and one-third tribuni aerarii men whose rateable property came next below that of the Equites. But, though a settle- ment had been thus made which roughly satisfied both parties, there were other causes of dissension. The farming of the taxes in Asia was in the hands of publicani, who were all Equites. We have seen that the taxes were paid partly in kind and partly in money, and that the companies of publicani, estimating the amount that they would yield, paid a certain sum to the exchequer and made what profit they could. A bad harvest, or an interruption of traffic, would bring them loss, and about this time they had made so bad a bargain that they were threatened with bankruptcy. The body who had the right to relieve them was the Senate ; but the Senate hesitated, and consequently there was a strained feeling between the orders. The Equites were looking to the leaders of the Populares as their natural supporters, because the policy of the Populares was to depress the Senate, to consult it as little as possible, and to pass measures through the Comitia over its head. 2. The Leaders in the State, B.C. 70-44. With these elements of revolution working, the character and loyalty of the leading men were of the first importance. Would they avail themselves of these thorny questions in order to push themselves forward and get above the law, or would they use their influence to carry or resist reforms within the lines of the constitution ? The leading men of whom we ought to have some clear idea were : (i) Gains lulius Caesar , B.C. 101-44. Caesar was born in B.C. 100 (or 101) of one of the most illustrious patrician families ; yet his aunt was wife to Marius, and from the first he had been closely connected with the popular party. He married a daughter of Cinna, and defied Sulla's order to divorce her. He served his first campaign in operations at Lesbos, which followed Sulla's return from Greece xvi. THE LEADERS. CAESAR. 217 (B.C. 8 1 -80), and after Sulla's death returned to Rome and gained reputation as an orator by prosecuting some of the opposite party for extortion (B.C. 75). This seems to have directed his attention to oratory as the road by which he was to advance in life; for he went in B.C. 75-74 to study rhetoric in the famous schools of Rhodes. But while he was there, the second Mithridatic war began with another invasion of Asia Minor, and in B.C. 74 he col- lected troops, crossed over to Asia, and defeated the king's general. He also showed his spirit in dealing with some pirates by whom he was captured on his way to Rhodes and put to ransom (p. 206). But he does not seem as yet to have discovered that his chief ability lay in the direction of military command. He returned to Rome again in B.C. 73, and, giving his support to all the measures of the popular party, began his official career by seeking the usual magistracies. Returning from his quaestorship in farther Spain in B.C. 67, he found that the burning question at Rome was the giving of extraordinary powers to Pompey, first for the piratic, and then for the Mithri- datic wars. Caesar had not yet obtained such a position as to make him a rival of Pompey, and he cordially sup- ported him, biding his time till he should have gone through the regular grades of official promotion. As commissioner of the Appian road in B.C. 67, and aedile in B.C. 65, he expended such large sums of his own that he became deeply in debt, and could only hope to stave off bankruptcy by the profits of office. After being praetor in B.C. 62, he was propraetor in farther Spain in B.C. 61-60, and there first won a name as a general, and also (by means that seem to have been oppressive) relieved himself of his load of debt. On his return he claimed a triumph, but his enemies in the Senate contrived to put off the decision as to granting it until he had to choose between entering Rome to make his profession for the consulship, and so giving up 2i8 POMPEY AND CRASSUS. en. his triumph, or waiting outside Rome and so giving up the consulship. He chose the consulship and gave up the triumph; but the Senate had made a deadly enemy of him, just at the same time as they were estranging Pompey by hesitating to confirm his acta in the East. It was a dangerous thing to do ; for by this time Caesar had shown of what metal he was made, and had by all his political actions definitely taken the lead of the Populares (2) Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, B.C. 106-48. Pompey was older than Caesar, much less enterprising, and, though per- haps as ambitious, yet much more scrupulous as to the means of gratifying his ambition. He was, in fact, a man to whom success had come so early, and remained so con- stant, that self-confidence and a high degree of self-esteem had become a second nature to him ; and he could not rightly deal with opposition in Rome, because it seemed to him unintelligible and incredible. He must have had great energy and promptitude, for everything he undertook had been done quickly and completely the crushing of the opposition to Sulla in Sicily and Africa, the sweeping away of the remnants of the gladiatorial rebellion, the clearance of the pirates, the winding up of the Mithridatic war, and the settlement of Asia and Syria. But it must be owned that in the greater part of this work he had been supremely fortunate in the time of his intervention : Crassus had broken the back of the gladiatorial war, Lucullus of the Mithridatic; and in the one instance in which he had to deal with a formidable and unconquered adversary namely, Sertorius in Spain he had met with disasters and defeats as well as successes, and owed his final triumph to the knife of the assassin. (3) M. Licinius Crassus, B.C. 115-53. The two leaders, however, strengthened their position by attaching to them- selves the richest man of the day, M. Licinius Crassus. He was about nine years older than Pompey, and, like him, had xvi. CRASSUS, POMPEY, AND CAESAR COMBINE. 219 been of the party of Sulla. He had done good service to Sulla, and was personally brave, as he showed in the war of Spartacus : but he had neither genius for war nor real interest in politics. His life-long passion had been the accumulation of an enormous fortune the foundation of which he had laid during the Sullan confiscations. He had been Pompey's colleague in his first consulship (B.C. 70), but had been on bad terms with him throughout. Most of the senators owed him money, and he expected the influence thus obtained to be as great as that of Pompey, which was gained by public services. Jealousy of Pompey made it easy perhaps for Caesar to win him over, in spite of the difference in their politics. At any rate, in B.C. 61, he enabled Caesar to go to his province by being security for his debts ; and when Caesar returned in B.C. 60 to stand for the consulship, he was induced by him to become reconciled to Pompey : and the three made a coalition, generally called the First Triumvirate, which was not a legally established com- mission, but a private understanding between the three men to support each other. We shall see presently (p. 233) what each of the three proposed to secure by this arrange- ment. It was continually in danger of breaking up owing to the mutual jealousies of Pompey and Crassus, and, after the death of Crassus, the growing antagonism of Caesar and Pompey soon brought it to an end. 3. The Leaders of the Optimates. The party of the Optimates had less need of a leader than the Populares. They were not attacking; they were simply defending privileges and old institutions. They in fact were jealous of any one who possessed superiority of character or genius; for they were a true oligarchy, and dreaded above all things the supremacy of one man who would put all citizens on an equal footing. For a long time office had been almost a matter of course for members of the great families in their turn. It was a kind of birthright which they looked for as 220 CATULUS AND LUCULLUS. cH. natural and assured. Many of them cared above all things for the ease and luxury which the great wealth thus secured brought them, and could not be induced to take any farther interest in politics, when once they had gone through the routine of the duties which their birth and position imposed on them. They did not understand the times, nor see that a new generation had grown up deter- mined to share in the spoils, or (in the case of the better of them) resolved that power should no longer be so exclusively in the hands of a class which had so often shown itself corrupt or incompetent. They of course understood that there was an opposition party ; but they either under- rated its strength, or felt too confident in their own to take active measures. The leaders therefore of the Optimates had not, like the leaders of the Populares, a crowd of eager followers at their back. The former had to rouse, the latter to restrain their partisans. These men therefore were neither so conspicuous nor so interesting as the others, (i) Q. Lutatius Catulus (about B.C. 120-60) had held the highest offices, had successfully opposed the revolutionary proceedings of Lepidus (B.C. 78-77), had denounced bribers, opposed the laws for giving Pompey extra-constitutional powers, and had for years been the head of a commission for restoring the Capitol. He enjoyed the highest character for honesty, incorruptibility, and consistency. But he was essentially a mediocre man, had no following, and evoked no enthusiasm. (2) L. Lucullus (born about B.C. 120, died B.C. 57) had made himself famous by his conduct of the Mithridatic war (B.C. 74-64), had celebrated a triumph, and possessed enormous wealth. But after his return to Rome, he took little part in politics except in an opposition to Pompey's demand for the confirmation of his acta, and the personal feeling involved in that took away much of its credit. For the last few years of his life he seems to have withdrawn from public life to enjoy his wealth, or from xvi. CATO AND CICERO. 221 ill-health. (3) M. Porcius Cato (B.C. 95-46), afterwards called Uticencis from the place of his death, was a good deal younger than these two men, but had gained consider- able influence in the Senate since his entrance into it as quaestor in B.C. 65, and was the representative of the "stern and unbending " Optimates, who opposed every demand of the popular party, were against every concession, and would listen to no compromise. He modelled himself on the character of his great-grandfather the Censor, professed the Stoic philosophy, and made his life and manners conform to that ideal. His character for inflexible integrity no doubt gave him influence in his own party, but could not atone in the eyes of the other for his obstinate opposition. There was nothing in these men to win that interest and admiration from the other classes in the State which make popular heroes. They might carry measures in the Senate, but it was Pompey and Caesar to whom the people looked as representing the governing class. Their interests, however, were usually supposed to be antagonistic. Caesar had always belonged to the popular party. Pompey had never clearly shown to which he would attach himself. What he would do when he came back with the prestige of his great successes in the Mediterranean and the East was a matter of much interest and conjecture. 4. M. Tullius Cicero, B.C. 106-43. There were two men indeed who, in the absence of both these leaders, occupied for a time an important position in Roman politics. They were the great orator, M. Tullius Cicero (B.C. 106-43) an d L. Sergius Catiline. Of the same age as Pompey, Cicero had without any military achievements risen steadily through the regular grades of office on the strength of his talents. He was a " new man," that is, no ancestor of his had held curule office; yet his influence in the law courts was so great that he had gained the usual offices without serious opposition. To the wrong-doing of the 222 L. SERGIUS CATILINA. CH. provincial governors he had shown his determination to oppose the weight of his brilliant rhetoric by his prosecution of Verres (p. 195). But the constitution of Rome seemed in his eyes sacred it was the libertas^ "the liberty," won by the heroes of the past. He would equally oppose all who put that in danger, who- ever they might be. His idea was that it might be recovered and made a reality, if strenuous efforts were made to purify the law courts, to treat the provinces with equity, and induce the best of the nobles to leave their sumptuous villas and fish-ponds and really throw them- selves into the business of government. The disunion of the orders (Senators and Equites) seemed to him to stand most in the way of forming a steady phalanx of the " best " men to oppose the forces of disorder and disruption. To secure this union every effort was to be made, every plaus- ible concession granted. But revolution must be resisted at any cost. He therefore joined the Optimates, whom he vainly hoped to rouse to the sense of their danger and the right method of meeting it. But he spoke to deaf ears ; nor was he himself sufficiently true to his principles. His voice was often raised in defence of notorious wrongdoers ; and the proud Optimates, though glad of his help, were often stung by his speeches, and never quite looked on him as one of themselves. 5. Catiline's Conspiracy, B.C. 63. The other man who now gained a temporary prominence was L. Sergius Catilina (about B.C. 108-62). Caesar in B.C. 63 had not yet won his military triumphs in Spain, and as yet had held no higher office than the quaestorship and aedileship. He was to be the leader of the Populares; but he was biding his time, and the hour was not yet come. The extreme wing of the party, however, was not content to wait, and Catiline now came forward as the leader of this section. An aristocrat by birth, though without fortune, he had joined xvi. THE CONSPIRACIES OF' CATILINE. 223 the party of Sulla, and had, according to common report, been guilty of the worst sort of excesses committed during the proscriptions. The proscription of a brother or brother- in-law, the murder of a wife and son, the corruption of a vestal virgin were all attributed to him. Yet he was praetor in B.C. 68, and propraetor in Africa in the following year, and came back in B.C. 66 to stand for the consulship. But whether it was from the scandals attaching to his name, or because of his want of wealth, he found a strenuous opposition to farther advancement. The consuls elected in B.C. 66 were disqualified for bribery, and when he tried to take their place the influence of the Senate secured the election of the previously rejected candidates ; and P. Clodius Pulcher (at that time in the party of the Optimates) was set up to accuse him of extortion in Africa, so as to prevent his being a candidate at the Comitia of B.C. 65. Some other means were found to prevent his candidature in B.C. 64 also, when Cicero and C. Antonius were elected. He was thrown into violent opposition by these measures. In B.C. 65 he was said to have conspired to kill the consuls, although this so-called "first conspiracy" was never investigated, far less proved. But in B.C. 63, Cicero affirms that he was aware from the beginning of his consulship, that a similar conspiracy was again afoot. He declares that throughout the year Catiline was gathering round him a band of desperadoes, that their plan was if possible for Catiline to be elected consul, and then to gratify his followers by offices and every kind of revolutionary legislation abolition of debts, confiscations, and plunder. The opportunity was thought to be a good one : for one of the consuls, C. Antonius, was believed to favour him; partisans of Catiline were governing Spain and Africa ; there were disturbances in Gaul; there were troubles in Etruria, because the "pos- sessors " put in by Sulla had not prospered, and the owners 224 TH E REBELLION OF C. MANLIUS. CH. whom they had displaced were eager to get back their lands. Nothing overt, however, seems to have been done until after the elections of B.C. 63. When they were over, and Catiline again defeated, he entered (it is said) on a deliberate plot. The programme was to assassinate Cicero, to fire the city in several places, assault the houses of leading senators, and cause such confusion as to give an invading army every opportunity of capturing Rome. Such an army was now known to be collecting near Faesulae in Etruria (Florence) under C. Manlius, an old officer of Sulla, who had been joined by numerous malcontents, either from the city or the ruined landowners on the Sullan allotments (2yth October). The plans of Catiline however were even yet mere matters of rumour, or had come to Cicero's ears by the doubtful channel of Fulvia, the mistress of one of the conspirators. However certain Cicero may have felt about them, he had not yet sufficient grounds to justify an arrest. At a meeting of the Senate on the 2ist September he had asked Catiline for an explanation. The latter had already been threatened with impeachment by Cato, but now deigned no answer except that he proposed to give the larger party in the State what it most wanted, a leader. Still this did not amount to guilt. Though the Senate passed the usual decree (p. 146) vesting the consul with supreme power, it was in view of the threatened movement of Manlius, against whom also extra military precautions were taken. But on the 5th November a meeting was held at the house of M. Porcius Laeca, at which (according to Cicero's informant) the worst designs had been settled upon in order to welcome and assist Manlius. Cicero secured a guard for his own house, strengthened the city watches, and on the 9th November delivered in the Senate the first speech against Catiline, in which he charged him with his designs and denounced his impudence in appear- ing in the Senate. The manifest disfavour of the senators xvi. CATILINE JOINS MANLIUS. 225 so cowed Catiline that, with a brief appeal against a hasty judgment, he quitted the house. That same night he left Rome ostensibly for Marseilles, at which town a man might escape the consequences of impeachment by living in voluntary exile. If Cicero was sure of his guilt, why did he allow him thus to escape? He felt the force of this objection, and in a public speech next morning tried to explain his motives, and promised the people protection. But though Catiline was gone, the conspiracy was still alive, as was shown by the fact (known at Rome in a few days) that Catiline had not gone to Marseilles, but to the camp of Manlius, and had taken command of it with the usual ensigns of imperium. The Senate at once declared him a public enemy (hostis) along with Manlius, ordered the consuls to levy troops, and sent a message to the camp of Manlius offering amnesty to all who should quit it within a certain time. This seems, however, to have had no effect. Adherents were flocking to Faesulae, and the alarm at Rome rose high. Cicero now struck his great blow. The duty of marching against Manlius was left to his colleague, C. Antonius. His own care was the treason within the city, which was to pre- pare the way for the invasion. He had learnt (by means of the same spy) the names of those involved, among whom were a praetor and a tribune, Lentulus and L. Bestia. The difficulty was to get proof. This was presently overcome by a rash act of the conspirators themselves. The Allobroges were the most troublesome tribe in the province of Trans- alpine Gaul, and had frequently caused alarm by revolts, or by threatening revolts. They no doubt had grievances, and at this time their envoys were in Rome to plead for the remission of a heavy money burden. The conspirators were anxious to secure support from the Province, both in the way of approval and in the more tangible shape of auxiliary cavalry ; and they offered the envoys that, if they p 22 6 THE ALLOBROGES BETRAY THE CONSPIRACY. CH. would get their tribe to furnish this support, they would undertake in return to secure the objects for which they were in Rome. The envoys (after some negotiation) con- sented; prepared to leave Rome carrying despatches to their Senate from the chief conspirators; and undertook to visit Catiline on their way home, to deliver him a letter from Lentulus, and to take his instructions. But reflection caused the cunning barbarians to resolve upon betraying the conspiracy. It was far from certain that, even if the conspirators succeeded, they would be able to do as they promised ; and their success was much less likely than their failure. It would pay the Allobroges better to secure present favour by turning informers, than to involve themselves in a movement most likely to fail. They therefore employed Fabius Sanga, their patronus, to inform Cicero of what had been going on. This was exactly what Cicero wanted to complete his case. There might be difference of feeling as between himself and Catiline ; there would be no differ- ence of feeling as to men who would use the forces of Gaul against Rome. He bade the envoys keep up the semblance of fidelity to their bargain, and prepare to leave Rome on their way home, carrying the letters with them. They accordingly started, and were promptly arrested on the Milvian Bridge. Cicero (on his authority as consul) sum- moned to his house all those who were named by the Allobroges; asked them to acknowledge their handwriting and seals ; and then handed over the letters unopened to the praetor urbanus (2nd of December). There were four men who had thus committed themselves by writing : P. Cornelius Lentulus, C. Cornelius Cethegus, Statilius, and Gabinius. They were kept under i surveillance during the night ; and next morning (3rd December), at a meeting of the Senate, the letters were opened and read by the praetor. They were vague enough, and did not bear on their face anything treasonable; that of Lentulus to Catiline being xvi. ARREST AND EXECUTION. 227 purposely obscure : " Who I am you will learn from the bearer. See that you play the man and fully realize your present position. Omit no necessary measures : avail your- self of all auxiliaries, even the most humble.' 1 '' They were, however, supplemented by the evidence of an informer (Volturcius) and of the Allobroges ; and rightly or wrongly the Senate was convinced of the guilt of the accused. They were ordered into custody in the houses of senators, and Lentulus was compelled to abdicate his praetorship. On that evening Cicero delivered his third Catilinarian speech to the people telling them of this treasonable league with the Allobroges to raise a war in Gaul, and of a store of arms found in the house of Cethegus. He found popular feeling with him, and after spending the 4th in enrolling a guard of Equites for the forum and temple of Concord, he brought the question solemnly before the Senate there on the 5th. It was not a question of guilt that the Senate was asked to decide. That had been already decided. It was asked now to advise the consul what he should do. By the decree passed some time before, he was, according to custom, invested with the power of life and death, if it seemed necessary for the safety of the State. The Senate had no right to order the execution of citizens : it was the consul, in virtue of this decree, who had the right : but he desired to be supported by a resolution of the Senate, and avowed that he was able and willing to carry out whatever it decreed. There was a division of opinion : some were for death, others for lifelong imprisonment and confiscation, others for postponing a decision till Catiline and Manlius had been put down. The second of these proposals was earnestly supported by Caesar, who almost carried the day, when the speech of Cato turned the scale in favour of death. There- upon Cicero at once had the four men strangled in the Mamertine prison. The movement at Rome, whatever it was, was crushed. 22 8 FALL OF CATILINE. CH. But the rebel camp of Manlius at Faesulae, with Catiline now in command, was still existing, though the execution of the conspirators at Rome seems to have caused large numbers to withdraw, and Catiline, indeed, had never been able to supply all with arms, There were as many as 20,000 men at one time in or near the camp; but when Catiline, recognizing the extremity of his danger, tried to make his way into Gaul, he seems to have had little more than 3000. They were, however, all desperate men, and when they found themselves debarred from the road to Gaul by the legate and army of C. Antonius, they turned to bay near Pistoria and fought fiercely till nearly all were killed. Catiline himself rushed into the middle of his enemies, and fell fighting furiously to the last. 6. Consequences of the Action of Cicero. Per- haps the conspiracy of Catiline seems more important to us than it did to contemporaries, because more than almost any other event it is continually brought before us by Cicero himself, who was extraordinarily proud of his action in thus "saving the Republic," and never ceased to refer to it. Still it was really important, as showing that there was a considerable party in the State ready to go any lengths to secure the reforms which they desired Great names were freely mentioned in connexion with it : Caesar, Crassus, and the consul C. Antonius were believed to have sympathized if they did not join ; and we must remember that one of those executed was a member of the government of the year, Lentulus the praetor. Again, the manner of its sup- pression was a dangerous precedent. The senatus consultum ultimum had been passed before in other cases, and was vaguely held to give the consuls and other magistrates the power of inflicting death if necessary (p. 146). But this was not supported by any law, and the use of it by Cicero was pushing the claim to the extreme point. It would not be forgiven, but might be imitated, by the other side; and at POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. 229 any rate it was a lesson to the Populares as to the length to which senatorial authority might be pushed. The personal results to Cicero, such as overtook him a few years later, were of little consequence except to himself. But it was distinctly a move in the direction of violence and the neglect of ordinary legal procedure, which were of evil omen for the future. BUST OF CICERO. CHAPTER XVII. THE TRIUMVIRATE. I. The political position of Caesar in B.C. 60. 2. The political position of Pompey. 3. The formation of the first so-called Triumvirate and its purpose. 4. Caesar's provinces. 5. The province in Gaul beyond the Alps. 6. Non- Roman Gaul. 7. Connexion of the Romans with the larger Gaul. 8. Caesar's measures for protecting his interests during his absence. 9. Cicero's exile and recall. P. Clodius, his tribuneship and quarrel with Pompey. 10. Cato sent to Cyprus. II. Caesars nine campaigns in Gaul y B.C. 58-50: (i) The Helvetii and Germans ; (2) the Belgae and Nervii ; (3) the Vetteti ; (4) Ger- man invaders of Gaul, first expedition to Britain ; (5) Second expedition to Britain. Fall of Sabinus and Cotta ; (6) the Nervii and Treveri. Invasion of Sicambri ; (7) Vercingetorix , chief of the Arverni. Sieges of Gergovia and Alesia ; (8) minor rebellions and measures of organization. 12. The end of Caesar 's government of Gaul. i. The Political Position of Caesar in B.C. 60. One effect of the proceedings in the matter of Catiline was to raise the position of Caesar, and cause him to be regarded more distinctly as a leader of the Populares. He was elected pontifex maximus in the March following. Being praetor in B.C. 62, he on several occasions showed his determination to resist any extension of the power of the Senate over the magistrates; and when he went in B.C. 61 as propraetor to Spain, he added to his influence by the military successes which he gained there. When he returned in the summer of B.C. 60, he found matters ripe for a new and more 230 CH. xvii. POMPEY AND THE OPTIMATES. 231 decisive movement, and he promptly took advantage of the opportunity. 2. The Political Position of Pompey. Pompey returned from the East towards the end of B.C. 62. His arrival in Italy had been looked forward to with anxiety by both parties. Both hoped for his support, for he had not shown decisively his adherence to either. He dismissed his army as soon as he landed in Italy, though with promises to the veterans that he would obtain them grants of land. He did not therefore intend to play the part of Sulla or Marius and support himself by arms. He seems indeed to have thought that his services had been so great, that he could be denied nothing. He soon found, however, that the Senate was jealous of him, and that he had to face a determined opposition. When he asked to have his acta (that is, his arrangements made during his command in the East) confirmed by one decree of the Senate, his demand was opposed by Lucullus and a large party, who claimed that each particular 'act' should be considered separately. This would take a long time, and Pompey looked upon it as a humiliation and an injury. As to grants of land for his veterans difficulties also were made which would lower his influence with the men. He was therefore on bad terms with the Optimates. But he also failed to please the Populares. There were two questions agitating the city when he returned or shortly after. One was the trial of P. Clodius for sacrilege. Clodius, a dissolute young noble (brother-in-law of Lucullus), had made his way in woman's dress into the house of Caesar (then pontifex maximus), whose wife Pompeia was entertaining ladies engaged in celebrating the mysteries of the Bona Dea, from which males were strictly excluded. His trial was made an occasion of violent party conflict. The bill for his impeachment contained a special clause as to the selection of the jury by the praetor urbanus. This was declared to be a device for tampering with the jury 232 POMPEY PLEASES NEITHER PARTY. CH. system, and was violently opposed. Clodius (raised to the position of a kind of popular hero) riotously broke up the assembly for passing the law, and eventually an amended proposal was carried, leaving him a right of challenge, whereby he obtained a jury that he was able to bribe. The other question was one between the Equites and Senate. The publicani (who were all Equites) had made a bad bargain as to the collection of the taxes in Asia. It was their own fault. The business was looked on as so profitable, that the various companies bid eagerly against each other. As it turned out, they had bidden too highly, and were threatened with bankruptcy ; for the taxes fell far short of the sum they had contracted to pay the treasury. The only authority that could relieve them of their bargain was the Senate, which, by a long established convention, had the management of the revenue. Cicero was very anxious that the concession should be made, not because he thought it equitable, but because he thought any quarrel between the orders tended to throw the rich middle class (the Equites) on the side of the enemies of the Senate and the Constitution. Now in both these cases Pompey failed to conciliate either side. In the case of Clodius he spoke so vaguely of his deference to the Senate, that he offended the Populares without pleasing the Optimates ; and in the case of the publicani he held aloof altogether, disappointing the extreme party in the Senate, headed by Cato, without winning the support of the Equites. He therefore was as far off as ever from getting the two measures which he did care for the confirmation of his acta^ and the grant of land for his veterans passed. 3. Caesar proposes to form a Triumvirate, B.C. 60. Such was the state of things when Caesar returned from Spain (B.C. 60). He too had a new grievance against the Senate. He demanded a triumph, but if he was to have xvn. THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE. 233 one, he must stay outside the walls till the Senate voted it to him ; and as he was a candidate for the consulship of B.C. 59, he was obliged to appear in Rome seventeen days before the election in order to make a declaration of his candidature, which was called a professio. His enemies in the Senate saw their way to embarrass him. They managed to put off the decision as to the triumph so long, that he was forced to give it up or give up being candidate for the consulship. He decided to give up the triumph, entered Rome, and was elected. But he was determined not to submit to farther opposition. He proposed to Pompey to join him and M. Licinius Crassus (the richest man in Rome) in a sort of committee of three, whose united influence would be sufficient to get all that they wanted from Senate and people. Pompey and Crassus had been on bad terms, and Pompey thought that to the influence of Crassus (to whom a large number of senators were deeply indebted) he owed much of the opposition which he had encountered. Caesar managed however to reconcile them, and succeeded in getting both to support him at his election. The effect was immediately evident. When Caesar became consul (ist Jan., B.C. 59), the measures which both desired were quickly passed. Pompey's acta were confirmed, an agrarian law was carried, which not only gave his veterans lands, but settled a large number of needy citizens on the ager publicus in Campania. The Equites were conciliated by the publicani being allowed an abatement of a third in their contract for the revenues of Asia, and the population of Rome by a distribution of cheap corn. As his share of the advantages, Caesar was to have a province at the end of his consulship for the unusual period of five instead of one year. This was to be given him by a law, and not (as usual) assigned him by lot under the direction of the Senate. The im- portance of this we shall see presently. It was also agreed that before long Pompey and Crassus were on their part to 234 CAESAR'S CONSULSHIP. CH. hold the consulship again, and each of them also to have a province for five years in the same way. This last was not yet made a subject of legislation; but the other measures were, and they were not passed without some show of force. Pom- pey, who now married Caesar's daughter lulia, appeared at the head of an armed force in the Campus, nominally to keep order, but really to overawe the voters ; and in the Senate, when Cato persisted in opposition, Caesar ordered his lictors to arrest him, though he presently suggested to the tribunes to release him. Moreover, the opposition of Caesar's col- league Bibulus, who was a supporter of the Optimates, and his attempt to stop Caesar's legislation by announcing bad omens, and declaring that he was ' watching the sky,' were neglected. The Senate, too, was studiously ignored, summoned as seldom as possible, and not consulted as to the laws which were to be brought before the people. This was not illegal, for the Senate had no legal claim to be consulted as to laws ; but it was a breach of immemorial custom, and was the beginning of a great change. In the reformation of crying abuses, the most notable of Caesar's laws in B.C. 59 is that which affected the provinces. The laws de repetundis had been so worded, that only the governor himself and those of his staff who were senators could be tried under it. Caesar now carried a law by which any one of the governor's staff, whether senator or eques, could be sued for restitution of money illegally received. This no doubt would be disliked by the equites, but they had to yield something in return for the relief in the matter of the Asiatic revenues. 4. Caesar's Provinces. The law for Caesar's five years' rule of a province, from B.C. 58, was proposed by a tribune, P. Vatinius. It overrode a vote of the Senate, which had assigned to the outgoing consuls for their pro- vince, Italy, that is, the care of the forests, roads, and other public works in Italy. This would have given him no xvn. CAESAR'S PROVINCES. 235 military command and no position of political importance: whereas the law of Vatinius gave him for five years the province of Gallia Cisalpina, that is, the whole of North Italy between the Rubicon and the Alps, with Illyricum annexed, and three legions. Gallia Cisalpina, a province since B.C. 181, was not, however, quite like other provinces. It was full of Roman colonies, and all cities south of the Po had the Roman franchise, while the Transpadani had the imperfect franchise called Latinitas. It was more like a part of Italy than a province, and though in the north there were occasional difficulties with Alpine tribes, it was not likely to give occasion at this time to important military operations. It was more likely that Illyricum would do so: for that district, on the east of the Adriatic, including Istria, had never been thoroughly organized. Sometimes it had been put under the governor of Macedonia, sometimes under the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, sometimes had been let alone so long as it paid its tribute. Since it had come under the dominion of Rome, however, in B.C. 228, it had often been disturbed either by internal commotions or attacks from neighbouring barbarians, and therefore Roman magistrates and armies had frequently been there. That Caesar thought it possible that he should have occasion to fight there is shown by the fact that his three legions were stationed at Aquileia, from which they might easily be transported to Illyricum. 5. The Province in Gaul beyond the Alps. What actually happened was very different. The real danger that was threatening at the time was from Gaul beyond the Alps, from which rumours of difficulties and commotions had lately been rife. Caesar therefore determined to have the province of Transalpine Gaul added to his others. This would doubtless have been secured him by a law like the others ; but the Senate, anxious that their traditional right of assigning provinces should not be wholly ignored, made 236 GALLIA TRANS ALPINA. CH. a virtue of necessity and assigned it to him, partly influenced also by the hope that he might meet with disasters there which would ruin him. At this time the Roman province across the Alps was confined to the south-eastern district of France, which has in consequence retained the name of Provence. It was bounded on the east by the Alps, on the north by the Rhone from the lake Geneva to Vienne, on the west by the Cevennes and the Upper Garonne, on the south by the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean. Formed in B.C. 1 1 8, its importance to Rome was two-fold : it secured the road to Spain, and stood in the way of northern bar- barians seeking Italy. In B.C. 105 it had been menaced and in parts occupied by the Cimbri and Teutones, and its most northern tribe, the Allobroges, had more than once given trouble and been in rebellion. 6. N on -Roman Gaul. With the rest of Gaul the Romans had dealings, but as yet had exercised no author- ity beyond the Province. Caesar speaks of it as falling into three divisions : Aquitania in the south-west, from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; Celtica, the great central block of country from the Garonne to the Seine, including western Switzerland ; and Belgica, from the Seine to the lower Rhine, thus including northern France, Belgium, and south- ern Holland. In Aquitania there was an admixture of Iberians from Spain, in the north, of Germans from beyond the Rhine. 7. Connexion of Rome with the larger Gaul. In this greater Gaul the Romans as yet had not, as I said, acted as rulers. They had from time to time been asked to interfere between contending tribes, and had adopted the Aedui (between the Loire and Saone) as "friends and allies," which implied an undertaking, more or less vague, to protect them against attack. The great enemies of the Aedui were the Sequani and Arverni, and in order to crush the Aedui these tribes had asked help from Germany. Thus xvii. CAESAR'S PREPARATION. 237 there was a prospect of a struggle between German and Roman influence in Gaul. But, since B.C. 100, the Romans had been suffering from troubles at home, and had neglected Gaul, and allowed the German king, Ariovistus, to get a footing there. He had come on the invitation of the Sequani, and as the Romans failed to help the Aedui, in answer to their request, he had forced them to give hostages to the Sequani ; but, having got into Gaul, he refused to return, and occupied part of the territory of the very people who had invited him, and was always being joined by fresh immigrations from Germany. The Roman government, far from looking on this as dangerous, had recognized the situation, and acknowledged Ariovistus as " king and ally." This was done while Caesar was consul (B.C. 59), who, there- fore, was acquainted with the state of affairs in Gaul, and had been a party to the arrangement. 8. Caesar provides for his Interests at Rome during his Absence. Such were the districts which Caesar was to govern for five years from B.C. 58. Before leaving the city, however, he made arrangements to secure himself from his enemies. Pompey and Crassus were to stay in Rome till B.C. 55 to prevent their attacks. For already there were signs of a resolute opposition : two of the prae- tors of B.C. 58 consulted the Senate as to prosecuting him for violence during his consulship, and one of the tribunes was only prevented by the veto of his colleagues from doing the same. Moreover, as he afterwards discovered, some of the Optimates sent secretly to tell Ariovistus that his opposi- tion to Caesar would be agreeable to the Senate. It was necessary, therefore, to secure that friends should, as far as possible, hold the chief offices, and declared enemies be got away for a time. It was this that led to the banishment of Cicero and the employment of Cato in Cyprus. 9. Cicero's Exile. The instrument employed for this purpose was P. Clodius Pulcher, who hated Cicero because 238 CLODIUS AND CICERO. CH. the latter had given evidence against him in the case of the violated mysteries. Clodius had been quaestor in Sicily in B.C. 60, and in B.C.* 59 intended to stand for office again. He was a patrician, and naturally his next step was the aedileship. But a much more convenient and powerful office was that of tribune, who could summon meetings of the tribes and bring in laws. But to be tribune he must be a plebeian, and the only way to become a plebeian was to get adopted into some plebeian family. If a man was still under the patria potestas he could be adopted by means of a fictitious sale on the part of his father: but if he was sui juris (i.e. free from the patria potestas)) it could only be done by a process called abro- gatio in the old Comitia Curiata, with the sanction of the pontifices, 'and with the presence of an augur. Caesar as pontifex maximus and Pompey as an augur could there- fore, if they chose, at once carry out the required formality or stop it. It was known that one of the objects of Clodius in becoming tribune was to attack Cicero. For some time Pompey and Caesar would not consent; but in the course of B.C. 59 Cicero was speaking in defence of his old colleague C. Antonius (deservedly impeached for his conduct in Macedonia), and in the course of his speech made some allusion to the politics of the day, which (he says) was reported in exaggerated terms to Pompey and Caesar. In three hours the adoption of Clodius was accomplished. Soon afterwards Clodius was elected tribune. He entered upon his office on the loth December, B.C. 59, and passed several laws aimed at the monopoly of the Optimates, one to prevent the frequent interruption of Comitia by the announcement of 'evil omens, another to prevent the summary exclusion of members of the Senate by the censors, and a third to legalize certain guilds or collegia of workmen, which had been declared illegal by a decree of the Senate, and a fourth for a dis- xvn. CICERO BANISHED. 239 tribution of cheap corn. Having secured popular favour by these laws, early in B.C. 58 he proposed another law rendering liable to banishment any magistrate who had put citizens to death without trial ; and, as soon as it was passed, gave notice of an action against Cicero. It was clear that Cicero's execution of the Catilinarian conspira- tors brought him under this law. His only resource was to avoid prosecution by going into voluntary exile. Caesar, who liked and admired him personally, had given him more than one chance of honourably leaving Rome. He offered to take him to Gaul as one of his legati, or to give him a place on the commission for assigning lands in Campania, or to grant him a libera legatio^ as it was called, that is, the privilege of travelling anywhere in the empire with the dignity and rights of an official despatched by the State, though without duties. But Cicero for a long time would not believe that Clodius meant to attack him as tribune, or that he would be allowed to suc- ceed if he did. When he saw that he really meant to do it he appealed to the triumvirs, to the consuls, to every one whom he thought could help him. But no one stirred; and he was forced to anticipate the trial by going into exile. Clodius immediately carried a bill declaring him a public enemy (hostis], confiscating his property, and for- bidding him " fire and water " (that is, making it unlawful for any one to supply him with the necessaries of life) within 400 miles of Rome. His exile only lasted about sixteen months, for Clodius, growing insolent from success, irritated and insulted Pompey, secretly supported (it was believed) by Crassus, and behaved with such violence that Pompey retired to his house, and refused to appear in the forum as long as Clodius was tribune. He also counten- anced the recall of Cicero. The riotous partisans of Clodius frequently interrupted the Comitia for passing the law; but it was at length effected in August, B.C. 57. 2 4 o CAESAR GOES TO GAUL. CH. 10. Cato sent to Cyprus. For the time, however, Cicero was removed from Rome. Cato also was got rid of, though in a different way. Clodius secured his nomination on a commission to depose Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, on the pretext that the king had abetted the pirates, and to confiscate his treasures. It was an unjust measure, likely to bring odium on whoever carried it out. But the absence of Cato was secured for some time. Nor were these the only means Caesar had of keeping up his influence at Rome. The advantage of his province was that however much he might be engaged at a distance in military operations during the summer, he could winter at some such town as Revenna or Lucca, on the southern borders of his province, where he could be visited by his friends, and be almost as if he were at home. Meanwhile he found himself engaged in a task of extraordinary diffi- culty, but one which was to place him in a position beyond his highest expectations. 11. Caesar's nine Campaigns in Gaul, (i) The Helvetii. Caesar was still outside Rome making his preparations for his province when news came that the Helvetii, that is, the Swiss living between Bale and Geneva, were migrating in a body to Western Gaul (Aquitania), and meant to pass through the Roman pro- vince. For several reasons Caesar determined to prevent this : (i) It would leave a considerable district empty which would be probably filled by Germans or other tribes, who would be troublesome neighbours to the province ; (2) it would bring the Helvetii (who had been found dangerous enemies in B.C. 103) close to the western frontier of the pro- vince, which was ill defended ; (3) the emigrating mass of 300,000 souls was not likely to find fresh settlements with- out creating some disorders; (4) in passing through the province they would come in contact with the Allobroges, who had always been a disturbing element in the province, xvii. CAESAR'S FIRST CAMPAIGN IN GAUL. 241 and had been more or less in rebellion four times since B.C. 75. His resolution was quickly taken. In a week he reached Geneva, ordered a levy of auxiliaries in the pro- vince, where there was only one legion, broke down the bridge over the Rhone at Geneva (the last town of the province), detained the Helvetii by evasive answers to their request for a passage, and meanwhile strengthened the left bank of the Rhone by an earthwork and foss wherever, for about ten miles from Geneva, it was fordable. The Hel- vetii, after vainly attempting to force a passage, turned away from the Rhone, and asked and obtained leave to pass through the territory of the Sequani. But this was a much more difficult route ; the Jura had to be crossed, and then the river Arar (Sadne). A vast host of men, women, and children, with their train of waggons, would move slowly. Caesar had time to hurry to North Italy, bring the three legions from Aquileia, raise two fresh ones in Cisalpine Gaul, and yet catch them up before they were all over the Saone. He cut to pieces one of their tribes, the Tigurini, overtook the rest near Bibracte (Autun), again defeated them with great slaughter, and forced the survivors (less than a half the original number) to return to their native land, rebuild the towns which they had burned on setting out, and settle down once more in peace. The Germans. This was the beginning of Caesar's operations in Celtic Gaul, and from it the other campaigns seemed to follow almost inevitably. In the first place, it immediately brought him face to face with Ariovistus and his Germans. The victory over the Helvetii turned the eyes of the Aedui, who had been beaten by Ariovistus, and of the Sequani, part of whose territory Ariovistus was occu- pying, upon Caesar. He readily undertook to be the champion of Gallic freedom, and immediately demanded a colloquy with Ariovistus. This being refused, he sent an ultimatum: (i) Ariovistus was to bring no more Germans Q 242 THE GERMANS DEFEATED. CH. into Gaul ; (2) was to abstain from attacking the Aedui ; (3) was to give back, and allow the Sequani to give back, Aeduan hostages. But Ariovistus would listen to nothing. He claimed the right of conquest over the Aedui, defied Caesar, and hinted that he was supported in doing so by a powerful party in Rome, which desired his defeat and fall. Caesar determined to act at once. By great exertions he outmarched Ariovistus, and seized Vesontio (Besan$ori) on the Doube ; and after some difficulties with his soldiers, who feared the unknown country and the war- like barbarians, he came up with and defeated him between Bale and Mulhausen. The slaughter was immense, and was rendered more complete by the hostile natives, who cut off stragglers of the German host as they were traversing the thirty-five miles which separated them from the Rhine. Ariovistus himself escaped across the Rhine, but by this victory north-eastern Gaul was cleared of the foreigners, and a powerful band of Suevi, who had reached the Rhine on their way into Gaul, abandoned their intention and returned home. For the first time Roman legions wintered in non- Roman Gaul. (2) Second Campaign. Gallia Belgica. The Nervii, B.C. 57. A direct consequence of this was a move- ment in Belgica. The Belgae feared an attack, and that the Roman occupation of Gaul would prevent their getting recruits. On hearing of this movement Caesar enrolled fresh legions, which he stationed at BesanQon, and after taking the chief towns across the Aisne, and receiving the submission of the Remi, he found himself in presence of the Nervii, on the left bank of the river Sambre, a tributary of the Meuse. They were a very warlike tribe, and his engagement with them was one of the most formidable in the whole war. Their defeat made Caesar master of Belgic Gaul, with the exception of one tribe on the Meuse (the Aduatuci), whose chief town he had next to take. While Caesar was thus xvii. THE NERVII AND VENETI. 243 conquering Belgium, his legate, P. Crassus, was subduing the tribes of Normandy and Brittany, and the result of the operations of B.C. 57 was to bring the whole of north-western France, with a considerable part of Belgium, under Roman sway. It was not at once organized as a province, but the tribes had submitted without any terms, and would event- ually have to accept whatever constitution Rome gave them. (3) Third Campaign, B.C. 56. The Veneti. In his third year Caesar was engaged in the same districts, not so much in making new acquisitions, as in putting down risings in those already acquired. The Veneti, in Brittany, whose country, intersected by firths, made them a seafaring folk, were destroyed by a fleet which Caesar had caused to be built in the Loire during the winter. The Aquitani were subdued by his legates, and he finished the campaign by conquering the Morini, near Boulogne. (4) Fourth Campaign, B.C. 55. The Rhine and Britain. Gaul was now conquered. But his occupation of the northern country brought him face to face with the German tribes, who were crossing the Rhine either for their own advantage or to assist the Belgae. He found a vast host of them (numbering, it is said, 430,000 souls, with women and children) in the plain between the rivers Niess and Meuse, stormed their laager of waggons, and drove them in utter rout towards the Rhine. The greater number perished by the sword or in the river. He then caused a bridge to be built across the Rhine near Bonn, and endeavoured to deter the Germans from venturing again into Gaul, by burning the houses and cutting down the corn of the Sicambri. He, however, only remained eighteen days north of the Rhine. The rest of the season was devoted to an expedition to Britain; because from this island (of which he could get little definite information) he learnt that the Gauls got supplies and other aid. His landing near Deal was stoutly resisted by the natives, and when a storm shattered his ships, they 244 SECOND INVASION OF BRITAIN. CH. again attacked his camp with great courage. Caesar was about a month in the island without being 'able to advance any distance from his place of landing, and towards the end of September returned to Gaul for the winter. (5) Fifth Campaign, B.C. 54. In his fifth year he renewed his attempt on Britain this time with greater forces, and with high expectations as to the wealth of every sort which he would find there. The civilized and wealthy appearance of Kent had much impressed him. Of the interior he knew nothing; but hoped to find it equally worth subduing. There was a good deal of interest in the expedition felt at Rome, and he was accompanied by a large fleet of trading vessels, whose owners hoped to find a new field of enterprise in the island. But this expedition was little more successful than the last. His ships again suffered from a storm and high tide, and though he advanced as far as St. Albans, crossing the Thames near Brentford, and defeated Cassivelaunus, he got no more satisfaction than a submission of several tribes, who gave hostages and promised tribute. Late in September he again crossed to Gaul, which he found in a state again bordering on insurrec- tion. In the winter of this year, in fact, he met with nearly his only disaster, two of his legates, Sabinus and Cotta, with a legion being cut to pieces on their way to join Q. Cicero, who with another legion was closely besieged in a camp near the modern Charleroi. (6) Sixth Campaign, B.C. 53. Nervii and Treveri. But though Caesar succeeded in relieving Cicero, he had to spend the whole winter and the next summer in the country, to again fight the Nervii and Treveri, and other tribes in Belgica, and once more to cross the Rhine, as well as to meet another raid of Sicambri over the Rhine. Finally, late in the year he held a meeting of Gallic tribes, at which the loyal chiefs joined in condemning the rebels, and Caesar might feel that he was again acknowledged as supreme in the north. XVII. PACIFICATION OF GAUL. 245 (7) Seventh Campaign, B.C. 52. This, however, was not quite the end of his troubles in Gaul. In B.C. 52 a rebellion broke out in the south near the province, under Vercingetorix, the chief of the Arverni. In this campaign Caesar failed to take Gergovia (almost his only failure); but after a long siege took Alesia, a fort on a hill between Tonnerre and Dijon, into which Vercingetorix had thrown himself. Vercingetorix eventually surrendered, and was taken to Rome, where he died in prison. TESTUDO(FROM TRAJAN'S COLUMN). (8) Eighth and Ninth Campaigns, B.C. 51-50. The last two years of Caesar's stay in Gaul, though not entirely free from local rebellions and some severe fighting, were mostly spent in measures meant to conciliate the newly conquered peoples; and in this he was so successful that he left Gaul on the whole content to join the Roman system. This was in truth his great glory. The conquest had cost, it has been reckoned, the lives of nearly a million human beings. It would indeed be melancholy to think that there should be no result from all that slaughter. Whether for 246 THREATENING OF CIVIL WAR. CH. xvn. good or ill, however, it had settled that Gaul was to develop as Latin and not German, and to share in the civilization and conversion of the Roman empire. 12. Caesar's position in Gaul, B.C. 50. Caesar had been now more than eight years in Gaul. He had been originally appointed for five years, but circumstances which we shall have to study immediately had caused the addition of five years more to his government, which would now end in B.C. 49. He wished to be elected consul for B.C. 48, so that he should only leave his province to take up the consulship, leaving no interval of which his enemies at Rome might take advantage to impeach him. The refusal of the Senate to allow this induced him to quit Gaul and invade Italy, and thus brought on the civil war. BUST OF I. CAESAR. CHAPTER XVIII. THE CIVIL WAR. I. Gradual estrangement of Pompey from Crassus and Caesar. 2. Pom- pey praefectus annonae ; he wishes to return to the East. 3. The conference at Lucca. 4. The breakdown of the new agreements be- tween the triumvirs. 5. Pompey sole consul. 6. Pompey's laws. 7. Pompey secures a strong position against Caesar. 8. Provocations offered to Caesar. 9. Caesar crosses the Rubicon in January, B.C. 49. IO. Pompey and his party quit Italy. II. Caesar enters Rome, March, B.C. 49, but fails to get himself 'appointed Dictator. 12. Siege of Mar- seilles by Caesar. 13. Caesar's war in Spain against Pompey's legates. 14. Caesar as Dictator holds the consitlar elections ', in which he is re- turned as consul. 15. Caesar follows Pompey into Epirus, B.C. 48 (January). 16. Battle of Pharsalia. 17. Flight oj 'Pompey. 18. Murder of Pompey in Egypt. 19. Caesar foll(nvs Pompey to Egypt. 20. The Alexandrine war. 21. Caesar dictator and consul ; troubles in Rome. 22. The war with Pharnaces in Pontus and battle of Zela (B.C. 47). 23. The battle of Thapsus (B.C. 46) and death of Cato at Utica. Caesar master of the empire. i. Gradual Estrangement of Pompey from Crassus and Caesar. We have followed Caesar's con- quest of Gaul without stopping to notice what was mean- while going on at Rome. But in fact important changes had taken place there which affected Caesar deeply, and with these he had been kept acquainted; for, as a rule, he left Transalpine Gaul in the winter and visited Cisalpine Gaul or Illyricum to hold the conventus^ or assizes, and while in the former he was easily visited by friends and supporters, 247 248 POMPEY'S EMBARRASSMENTS. CH. and thus took part in Roman politics. Now in the first years of Caesar's absence, Pompey had been gradually becoming estranged from Crassus, and in some degree from Caesar too. He thought that Clodius was secretly supported in his attacks upon himself by Crassus, who, after all, was rather Caesar's friend than his own. Finally, when Cicero returned from exile in September, B.C. 57, he came profess- ing boundless gratitude to Pompey, but hinted as openly as he dared that Caesar was his enemy, and did his best to detach Pompey from him. 2. Pompey as Praefectus Annonae. He wishes for a Command in the East. In this same year there was a great scarcity of corn at Rome : prices were very high, and a famine was feared. On the proposal of Cicero, soon after his return, Pompey was appointed praefectus annonae^ or minister for the supply of corn, throughout the empire, with ships and legates, and authority over all ports and corn markets for five years. It gave him a great posi- tion and wide authority. He at once went to Sicily, and sent his legates to other corn-growing countries, and in a few months the scarcity at Rome ceased and the price of corn went down. But when Pompey returned to Rome he found the Optimates jealous of him, and was also violently attacked by Clodius. He thought Crassus was at the bottom of this ; and, being deeply offended and alarmed, he wished to get away from Rome to the East with an army. Just then Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, was in Rome asking to be restored to his kingdom, from which his people had justly expelled him. He had aided Pompey against the Jews in B.C. 63, and Pompey therefore supported his request and wished to have the task of restoring him. But the Senate was unwilling to send him back to the East, where his name was so powerful ; and accordingly a Sibylline oracle was produced forbidding the restoration of Ptolemy by arms. The proposal to appoint Pompey, made by one of xvin. NEW ARRANGEMENTS AT LUCCA. 349 the tribunes, was abandoned, and finding himself attacked by the violence of the popular party and an object of sus- picion to the Optimates, he had no resource but to renew the understanding with Caesar and Crassus. 3. The Conference at Lucca in the Spring of B.C. 56. Caesar had his own reasons for wishing closer connexion with Pompey. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, can- didate for the consulship of B.C. 55, openly declared that he would as consul secure Caesar's recall and impeachment, and was meanwhile trying to get his laws annulled on the ground that the obnuntiatio of Bibulus made them invalid. Cicero was also opposing the execution of his agrarian law. It was time to renew the old agreement for mutual support. In the spring of B.C. 56 Caesar came to Lucca, and there Pompey and Crassus and many of their partisans held a conference with him. The result was a reconciliation of Pompey and Crassus and a new arrange- ment for the future. Caesar was to have five more years in Gaul, and the right of standing for the consulship of B.C. 48 without returning to Rome to be elected. Pompey and Crassus were to be consuls in B.C. 55, with a five years' pro- vincial government afterwards, Pompey in the two Spains, Crassus in Syria. Thus, when Caesar returned to Rome, he would come straight to the consulship without giving up his imperium for one hour, while Pompey and Crassus also would still be in possession of imperium and armies. These arrangements were immediately carried out. Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls for B.C. 55, though amidst scenes of some violence. The Senate voted not to include the provinces of Gaul and Illyricum among those to be allotted, and a law was proposed by the tribune, C. Trebonius, assigning them to Caesar, as well as the Spains to Pompey and Syria to Crassus. 4. What overset the new Agreement of the Triumvirs, B.C. 55-49. Thus the supremacy of the trium- 250 BREAKDOWN OF THE TRIUMVIRATE. CH. virs and their mutual understanding seemed restored; and Cicero, thinking that it was useless to struggle farther, and that the Optimates had basely abandoned their own cause, conformed outwardly at least to the state of things, and now thought that the best hope for public security was the main- tenance of peace between Pompey and Caesar. Events, however, before long weakened the bonds between them. In the first place, in B.C. 54, Pompey's wife lulia (Caesar's daughter) died. In the next place, Crassus, who went to Syria at the end of his consulship, fell in B.C. 53 at Carrhae, in a war with the Parthians. The triumvirate therefore was now reduced to a duumvirate. It was a question between Pompey and Caesar; and the Optimates soon came to think that their best course was to back up Pompey and belittle Caesar. Partisan conflicts were increasing in Rome. Clodius on the side of the extreme Populares, Milo in the interests of the Optimates, each with hired bands of ruffians, were continually creating disturbances and breaking up the Comitia. They prevented the election of consuls for B.C. 53 until six months of the year were passed ; and the same thing happened in the next year. In January of B.C. 52, however, Clodius was murdered in a scuffle with Milo on the Appian road near Bovillae. This gave rise to fresh riots in Rome. The body of Clodius was carried by the mob into the Curia and burnt on a pile of broken branches, in the course of which the Curia caught fire and was destroyed. At length, on the 25th of February, the Senate named an interrex, who returned Pompey as sole consul. 5. Pompey Sole Consul, B.C. 52. Pompey wished to be Dictator. But the appointment of a " dictator for sup- pressing sedition " (seditionis sedandae causa) was an anti- quated custom, which had not been heard of for many years, and the perversion of the dictatorship by Sulla had rendered the word almost as unpopular as that of king. It would also no doubt have been resented by Caesar and his party. Even xviii. POMPEY'S SUPREMACY IN ROME. 251 the sole consulship was regarded with suspicion, and the Populares wished to elect Caesar as Pompey's colleague. To avoid that, after six months he named as his colleague Metellus Scipio, whose daughter he had married. For six months, however, he occupied an almost autocratic position in Rome, and was regarded by the Optimates as the saviour of society. 6. Pompey's Laws. During these months he passed, or caused to be passed, several laws dealing with the abuses of the time : one as to the selection of jurors, under which Milo was condemned; another de iure magtstratuum, ordain- ing that in future consuls and praetors should not go to a province till five years after their consulship or praetorship. The object of this was to prevent intrigues at home for desirable provinces, and to avoid the danger from the long continuance of imperium. This law also enforced the personal appearance of a candidate for the consulship to make his professio. Finally, he passed a severe law on bribery. From the provisions of the law as to a five years' interval before taking a province, Pompey was neces- sarily exempt, for he had been holding the government of the Spains since B.C. 54, and the Senate continued it another five years. According to the agreement at Lucca, Caesar also was to be excepted from this law. There was some over- sight, however, in drawing it up, and accordingly the tribune Caelius (at Pompey's suggestion) carried a law expressly excepting Caesar. This was a concession to Caesar's claims, but he had still some reason to be anxious as to the future. 7. Pompey's strong Position. By the five additional years of Spanish government granted to Pompey, his im- perium would outlast Caesar's consulship by several years. But not only so. That might have been compensated for to Caesar by his having himself another equally important province. But Pompey's position was altogether anoma- 252 POMPEY'S ANOMALOUS POSITION. CH. lous. He was proconsul of the Spains, and yet was consul at Rome. Even at the end of his consulship he did not go to Spain, but governed it by means of three legati in command of three consular armies, he himself remaining at Rome (though unable to enter t}\e pomoerium), with imperium, and the right of raising legions. This Caesar was forced to see was a measure meant to protect the Senate from coercion on his part, and he felt it to be a menace to himself. More- over, after the fall of Crassus the Senate resolved to send additional legions with Bibulus, who was to succeed him in Syria, and voted that Caesar should supply one and Pompey the other (B.C. 51). But Pompey had, during the Gallic wars, lent Caesar two legions, and now claimed the return of one ; so that in fact Caesar's army was weakened by two legions. Caesar sent them, but by the time they arrived in Italy news came that C. Cassius (who had remained in Syria after the defeat of Crassus, as pro- quaestor) had defeated the Parthians, and repelled their invasion of Syria. The fresh legions therefore were not wanted, and were first stationed at Capua, and afterwards put into winter quarters in Apulia, where they would be ready for Pompey at any time. 8. Provocations offered to Caesar. Caesar's resentment and alarm were farther roused by frequent motions during B.C. 51 and 50 for naming his successor, and forcing him to lay down his command before being elected consul in B.C. 49. Pompey did not exactly en- courage these motions, but he temporized, all along maintaining that he believed Caesar would obey the wishes of the Senate and lay down his imperium before coming to Rome to stand for the consulship. Caesar, however, had been taking his measures with caution. He had made up for the loss of the two legions by fresh levies in Gaul, and had visited the Cisalpine towns in the spring of B.C. 50, partly to canvass them for M. Antonius, who was a candidate xvin. CAESAR'S PRECAUTIONS. 253 for the augurship, but also to ascertain how far they were ready to support himself. He also won over to his side by large bribes one of the consuls for B.C. 50, L. Aemilius Claudius, and one of the tribunes, C. Curio, a dissolute youth overwhelmed with debt. By this means every attempt in the Senate during B.C. 50 to nominate his successor was frustrated. But Pompey had grown more confident. In the early part of B.C. 50 he had had a bad illness, and his recovery seemed hopeless. This called forth an immense outburst of feeling throughout Italy. Everywhere prayers and sacrifices were offered for his recovery; and Pompey believed that Italy was altogether on his side, that he had only to stamp on the ground to raise soldiers, and that Caesar's own army was really disaffected and ready to join him. The gods had offered it was afterwards said to remove him from the evil to come, but the prayers and sacrifices of the Italians preserved him for his doom. 9. Caesar crosses the Rubicon, January, B.C. 49. The last attempt to supersede Caesar had been vetoed by Curio (about July, B.C. 50), but the consuls for B.C. 49 C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus were both hostile to Caesar, and Curio, going out of office on the loth December, B.C. 50, immediately joined Caesar at Ravenna with reports of the proceedings. He was sent back to appear in the Senate on the ist January, B.C. 49, bearing a despatch from Caesar which contained an ultimatum, his last attempt, as he puts it, to obtain a peaceful settlement, rather than (as Curio advised) to march upon Rome. Curio presented the despatch to the consuls, asking them to read it to the Senate. They at first refused, but were forced to do so by two of the tribunes friendly to Caesar M. Antonius and Q. Cassius. The offer it contained was that Caesar would lay down his imperium, giving up army and province, if Pompey would do the 254 THE FINAL RUPTURE WITH THE SENATE. CH. same. Of course it may be said that he had no right to bargain with the Senate. But it must be remembered that of the two he was in the more constitutional position. A law had given him his proconsulship till the end of B.C. 49 l } a law had exempted him from making his pro- fessio. What the Senate was trying to do was to override a law (what Caesar calls a benefidum popult] by a decree of its own ; whereas, so far from the Senate having the right to override a law, there was no certain legal basis for the authority of a decree of the Senate itself, even when it was not against a law. Caesar could stand upon his legal rights. But Pompey's position (quite unprecedented) depended upon the authority of the Senate. The Senate had extended his governorship of the Spains by its own authority. The Senate advised or authorized his remaining at Rome in spite of the universal understanding that a proconsul must go to his province and stay there. Accord- ingly when the senators, on hearing Caesar's despatch, voted with but one dissentient that Caesar should resign his province on a fixed day on pain of being held guilty of treason, and that Pompey need not do the same, the two tribunes (M. Antonius and Q. Cassius) naturally interposed their veto. The effect of this was that the measure was not a decree (senatus consultum) but a resolution (auctoritas), unless the tribunes could be induced to withdraw their veto. At four succeeding meetings of the Senate [January 2, 5, 6, 7] a violent debate was maintained as to whether the tribunes should be urged to withdraw their veto. On the evening of the yth they were forcibly expelled, and the senatus consultum ultimum passed that "the consuls, praetors, tribunes, and proconsuls (this last to include Pompey) should see that the republic took no harm." The effect of this was held to be that the magistrates named 1 Strictly till March, but custom always extended the tenure till December. xviir. CAESAR CROSSES THE RUBICON. 255 had for the time despotic power, and all personal rights were suspended (p. 146). Antonius and Cassius fled to Caesar, who was at Ravenna when he heard of what had taken place. It was exactly the pretext which he required. He had but one legion (the i3th) with him, but after haranguing the men, and finding them ready to avenge the violated tribunes, he started for Ariminum, where Antonius and Cassius had already arrived. To reach it he had to cross the Rubicon, the boundary between his province and Italy, which it was illegal for a proconsul of Gaul to pass. It was a momentous decision to make, and afterwards various stories were told of his hesitation, and of omens encouraging him to proceed. He tells us nothing of this himself. He is content with the simple fact that he went to Ariminum. By going there he was in definite hostility to the government. He was an invader, and no longer a mere proconsul. At Ariminum a certain Lucius Caesar (a distant relative), along with one of the praetors, met him with offers of mediation. But it was too late. Caesar would make no farther concession than promising to disband his legions, if Pompey would disband those in Italy also and go to Spain, thus leaving the Comitia free. Nor, though he listened and answered with courtesy, did he for a single day refrain from pushing on, and occupy- ing town after town on the way to Brundisium and on the road to Rome across the Apennines. He seized Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, and sent Antonius across the Apen- nines to secure Arretium, which would bar the advance of Pompeian troops through Etruria; and Curio to occupy Iguvium, commanding the pass over the Apennines towards Rome. He met with no resistance even at Auximum, where Attius Varus was stationed with some newly levied cohorts. The inhabitants insisted on Varus evacuating the town, and opened their gates to Caesar. All this was done before the 1 8th of January, and the news of his success caused a great, panic at Rome. CH. xvin. CAESAR'S ADVANCE. 257 10. Pompey and his Party quit Italy. The Pompeian party (as it may now be called) had understood, when they ejected the two tribunes and passed the senatus consultum ultimum, that there would be war; and they at once divided Italy and Sicily into districts for defence, and allotted the chief provinces to their supporters, as Syria to Metellus Scipio, and Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. The raising of troops was the first thing. Caesar had ventured to enter Italy with only one legion (the 1 3th), because he knew that he would be joined by others before Pompey could get an army on foot. There were only two legions ready for Pompey, those, namely, which had been sent by Caesar for the Parthian war ; but they were in winter quarters in Apulia, and would take some time to bring into action. The raising of fresh troops Pompey did not find as easy as he expected, though before he left Italy he had five legions. He seems to have quitted Rome immediately after the meeting of the yth to raise these troops, leaving the consuls at Rome to arrange for the defence of the city. But the news of Caesar's rapid advance so terrified them, that, without even staying to take the money from the treasury reserve, they hastily quitted Rome on the i8th and joined Pompey, followed by other magistrates and senators, who adhered to the same party. At Teanum Sidicinum, in Campania, Lucius Caesar brought lulius Caesar's answer ; but the consuls and Pompey would only treat on condition of Caesar's withdrawal from the towns already occupied ; and Caesar would not withdraw unless Pompey ceased levying troops in Italy, and fixed a day for going to Spain. Both therefore went on. Pompey, however, soon resolved to transfer the war to Greece, where he could be joined by auxiliaries of men and ships from the East. By the 2oth of February he was at Brundisium with his five legions. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus had raised two legions and occupied Corfinium, between Caesar and Brun- R 2 5 8 POMPEY AT BRUNDISIUM. CH. disium, but had been obliged by his own troops to surrender to Caesar, who allowed him to go free, but took over his men and arrived at Brundisium on the 8th of March with THE HARBOUR OF BRUNDISIUM. six legions and 1000 cavalry. The two consuls with the larger part of the army had already crossed to Dyrrachium, and Pompey with two legions was awaiting the return of the transports. After some fruitless negotiations and an xviii. CAESAR ENTERS ROME. 259 attempt on Caesar's part to block up the harbour, which would have forced Pompey to make terms apart from the main body of his supporters, Pompey and his two legions succeeded in crossing on the night of the i8th of March. n. Caesar at Rome, March, B.C. 49. Caesar had not sufficient ships to follow him, and was besides obliged to secure the corn-growing countries in the west, especially Sicily and Sardinia ; for as Pompey was gathering ships in the east, from Alexandria to Byzantium, he would be able to starve out Italy if the west was also in the hands of his partisans. He at once sent a legion under Q. Valerius to Sardinia, and arranged for C. Curio to go to Sicily, which was being held by Cato for the Pompeians. He himself went to Rome with six legions at the end of March. His object was to put himself in some constitutional position. The only way seemed to get himself nominated Dictator, which would give him supreme authority for the next six months, during which he could hold the elections and get returned consul for the next year. But the highest officer left at Rome was the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus, and though he adhered to Caesar, he had scruples as to the validity of any nomination of his. The old practice was for one of the consuls to name a dictator, and Cicero, whom he consulted, told him that a praetor could not name a dictator or hold consular elections. What remained of the Senate at Rome gave Caesar's legates in Sicily and Sardinia some authority, which would enable them to act with a show of legality; but the constitutional question as to his dictatorship gave rise to so much fruitless wrangling, that Caesar would not wait for a decree. 12. Caesar at Marseilles. He left Lepidus in charge of Rome, M. Antonius (tribune) in charge of Italy, and hastened to Transalpine Gaul, where Ahenobarbus (whom he had released at Corfinium), having collected a fleet at Cosa in Etruria, and manned it with his own tenants, was 260 CAESAR AT MARSEILLES AND IN SPAIN. CH. going to the province allotted him by the Senate. Arrived at Marseilles (a libera civitas in alliance with Rome), Caesar was refused admission into the town. But when Ahenobarbus sailed into the harbour, he was not only admitted, but acknowledged as commandant. The people of Marseilles thus formally adopted the Pompeian side in the quarrel. Caesar made up his mind that he must take the town, and in order to do so must have ships. In thirty days from the felling of the timber, twelve ships of war were built at Aries and put under the command of Decimus Brutus, while towers and vineae were constructed, and the siege on the land side entrusted to C. Trebonius. 13. Caesar in Spain, June- August, B.C. 49. But the main object was Spain, which he dared not leave behind him in possession of Pompeians. In Spain there were three legates of Pompey (still proconsul), L. Afranius, M. Petreius, M. Terentius Varro. The two first of these had joined forces and were stationed at Ilerda (Lerida) to resist an invasion from the north. Caesar, though delayed himself at Marseilles, had sent on C. Fabius by way of Perpignan and Barcelona, early in May; but when he himself followed in June, he found Fabius shut up in a narrow district between the rivers Sicoris and Cinca, which joins the Sicoris south of Ilerda. Both rivers were flooded, and their bridges broken down ; while the provisions of the district were exhausted. Caesar repaired the bridges and relieved Fabius, but shortly afterwards the bridges were again broken down by floods, Afranius and Petreius holding the only sound one near Ilerda. Thus Caesar was himself shut up in the same narrow fork of country, unable to obtain provisions, which his enemies could do by means of their bridge. He was in great peril, and exaggerated reports of his defeat reached Rome, where the town house of Afranius was thronged with visits of congratulation, and many who had been hesitating as to joining Pompey crossed over to Dyrrachium, xviii. SURRENDER OF POMPEY'S ARMIES IN SPAIN. 2 6l among them M. Cicero, who embarked on the nth of June. But the situation suddenly changed. A long train of provisions from Gaul had been stopped by the flooded Sicoris. Caesar managed to get a legion across in coracles constructed on the model of those he had seen in Britain ; and his men being thus on both sides of the river, the bridge was quickly repaired, and the provisions secured. Afranius and Petreius endeavoured to retire south of the Ebro, but were outmarched by Caesar, and had to choose between fighting and surrender. Their soldiers were reluctant to fight, and fraternized with Caesar's men, and after some toilsome marches, harassed by Caesar's cavalry, they sub- mitted, and were allowed to quit Spain unharmed. They both afterwards joined Pompey in Greece, and perished later on in Africa. The third of Pompey's legates, the learned M. Terentius Varro, who was governing southern Spain, called Baetica, though he loyally tried to keep faith with Pompey, found that the feeling throughout the province was so entirely for Caesar that he was obliged to submit. Caesar then returned to Marseilles, which, at the beginning of October, surrendered. Ahenobarbus escaped, but all arms, engines of war, and money were given up to Caesar. Thus in the course of the summer of B.C. 49, Caesar had secured Spain and Gaul, while his legates Valerius and Curio had occupied Sardinia and Sicily (Cato making no attempt to maintain himself in the latter). The one failure had been in Africa, whither Curio went after taking over Sicily. P. Attius Varus had taken possession of the province after leaving Auximum and, backed up by luba, king of Numidia, had defeated and killed Curio. 14. Caesar Consul. Caesar's success in Spain had smoothed the constitutional difficulty at Rome. On his way back to Marseilles he heard that a lex had enabled Lepidus to nominate him Dictator for holding the elections (comitiis habendis). This had not been done for many years, 262 CAESAR AS CONSUL FOLLOWS POMPEY. CH. xvm. because, since B.C. 212, it had been the custom of the consuls not to go out on foreign services till after the elec- tions had been held, and since the time of Sulla, the consuls, as a rule, did not quit Rome till their year of office was over. But in earlier times there were many precedents. The irregularity in this case was that he was named by a praetor; but anything was possible by a law properly passed in the Comitia. Caesar returned to Rome, held the elec- tion, and was returned as consul with P. Servilius Vatia. He stayed there only eleven days, finding time, however, to carry two laws one for the relief of debtors who, owing to the revolution, had been forced to sell property at panic prices, and another for the bestowal of the franchise on the Transpadani. Then, leaving Antony to secure the recall of exiles condemned in courts overawed, as alleged, by Pompey's troops, he hurried to Brundisium, where he had appointed his legions to muster. 15. Caesar follows Pompey into Epirus, B.C. 48. Caesar set sail on the 4th of January ; but Pompey's large fleet, drawn from various nations and under the supreme command of Bibulus, protected the coast of Epirus. Caesar was obliged to run ashore wherever he could. He eventu- ally landed somewhat south of Oricum, and was readily wel- comed there and at Apollonia, from which the Pompeian officers were forced to retire. But he failed in an attempted dash upon Dyrrachium, where Pompey had his magazines. Caesar was, in fact, in considerable danger. Though he held the coast in the district of Apollonia, Pompey's fleet swept the sea and prevented him from landing supplies or the rest of his troops from Italy. It was not till the spring that Antony arrived at Lissus (about thirty miles north of Dyrrachium) with four legions and 800 cavalry. But though Caesar, in spite of Pompey's attempt to hinder him, effected a junction with Antony, he could do little. He constructed, indeed, lines of circumvallation round those of Pompey, 264 CAESAR'S DIFFICULTIES IN EPIRUS. CH. extending to a circuit of fifteen miles ; but Pompey, having command of the sea, could get provisions for his men in abundance, though his horses suffered from want of forage, while Caesar's men were reduced to great straits. Moreover Caesar's lines were not complete ; there was a weak point at the southern extremity near the sea, of which Pompey was informed by two Gallic deserters, and towards the end of May he successfully pierced them. Caesar fortified another camp hard by : but after meeting with a fresh disaster in attacking a Pompeian legion, he resolved on retiring upon Apollonia, and thence into Thessaly. He had sent his legate, Domitius Calvinus, to intercept reinforcements which Metellus Scipio (Pompey's father-in-law) was bringing from the province of Syria along the Egnatian road : and Caesar hoped to find Calvinus and take up a better position in the interior where Pompey would be separated from his fleet. He retired by a route south of the Egnatian road, and was joined by Calvinus at Aeginium, who had made his way over the mountains from that road, where he was in danger of being caught between two armies by Metellus Scipio coming up the road from the east, and Pompey going down the road from the west. Both Caesar and Pompey were now marching in the same direction, though on parallel lines. They converged in Thessaly. For Pompey, after meeting Metellus Scipio with the reinforcements, left the Egnatian road, passed through the vale of Tempe to Larissa, and thence by Scotussa across the river Enipeus, within about four miles of Caesar in the district of Pharsalus. 1 6. Battle of Pharsalia. Pompey would still have preferred to avoid a battle. Caesar had no fleet to speak of, while Pompey's ships could sail round the coasts of Greece and bring him supplies. The decision rested with him, for Caesar would scarcely have ventured to attack with an army less than half that of his rival's. But Pompey yielded to his followers, who were elated with the retreat of Caesar and the xviii. BATTLE OF PHARSALIA. 265 reinforcements brought by Metellus Scipio. They were eager to get back to Rome and enjoy the fruits of their victory offices, confiscations, and other advantages. The battle which ensued on the 2gth of June [gth August in the unreformed calendar] was a deathblow to their hopes. It was an example of the superiority of the Roman infantry, when well trained and experienced, over an army which, though greatly superior in numbers, was composed of mixed races, and depended mainly on its cavalry. In Pompey's army there were Asiatics, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Arabians, Galatians, and Cappadocians. He had seven thousand cavalry against Caesar's one thousand. His legions, how- ever, were mostly levies of the previous year, who did not turn out to be a match for Caesar's veterans. Pompey trusted to his superiority in cavalry to outflank Caesar's line, and charge it on the rear. But though his cavalry did repulse that of Caesar, it was in turn repulsed by Caesar's reserve, or fourth line, and fled in confusion. Pompey kept his infantry on their ground to receive Caesar's charge without going to meet it, and this again proved disadvantageous. The ardour of a line in full advance overbore the dead resistance of men waiting stolidly for an attack. But Pompey had given up all hope when he saw the failure of his cavalry. He hurried back to the camp, gave some directions for its defence, and then retired to his tent. 17. Flight of Pompey. Before long Caesar was lead- ing his men to attack the camp, and Pompey was galloping out of the rear gate to Larissa. There he was joined by a few followers, and, without staying for rest, hurried on to the river, where he obtained a boat and reached the coast. Here he found a corn vessel ready to start, bound for Amphipolis. He only stayed one night there (apparently without landing), and went on to Lesbos, where his wife and younger son were with his friend Theophanes. After 266 DEATH OF POMPEY. CH. two days' stay at Lesbos, he procured a few more vessels, and proceeded on his voyage down the Asiatic coast. At Attaleia in Pamphylia he was joined by about sixty Sena- tors, and collected some ships and men. At Cyprus he found the first signs of his failing influence, for he was informed that the people of Antioch (on the opposite coast) were putting their town in a state of defence to prevent his landing. The same had happened to other fugitives of his party at Rhodes, and it became an anxious question to what country he could go with safety. He seems to have thought of Orodes, king of Parthia, to whom earlier in the year he had offered some concessions in Syria. Finally, however, he decided upon Egypt. 18. Assassination of Pompey in Egypt. The sover- eigns of Egypt were then Ptolemy XII. (a boy of thirteen) and his sister and wife Cleopatra. They were the children of Ptolemy Auletes, whose cause Pompey had supported in Rome. On the death of Auletes (B.C. 51) he had left the kingdom to these two jointly; but the ministers or guardians of Ptolemy, the eunuch Pothinus and the rhetorician Theo- dotus of Chios, had contrived to expel Cleopatra, who had fled to Syria, collected forces, and was now endeavouring to recover her share in the kingdom. To resist her Ptolemy was at Pelusium (on the eastern mouth of the Nile) with an army commanded by Achillas. There were Roman troops also at Alexandria left by Gabinius in B.C. 57-6, and some of them seem to have been with the king's army. When Pompey's messenger arrived asking shelter, the royal council was divided in opinion, but eventually decided that it would not be prudent either to receive or to let him go. To murder him would be safest "dead men do not bite." The deed was entrusted to Septimius, a military Tribune, who had once served under Pompey, and Salvius a centurion. A boat was sent out with Achillas on board, who greeted Pompey respectfully and invited him to come on shore. xvin. POMPEY'S CHARACTER. 267 Amidst the agonized anxiety of wife and friends Pompey stepped into the boat, took his place in the stern, and recognized and addressed Septimius as an old comrade. He was only answered however by a somewhat surly nod, and when, as he was stepping out of the boat, he felt the sword of Septimius at his back, he hastily drew the folds of his toga over his face and fell without a struggle. His head was cut off and his body left on the sand, until his faithful freedman Philip (who with one slave and two centurions had accompanied him) found the fragments of a stranded boat, with which he made a rude funeral pyre and burned the body. Pompey was an honest, but not a great man. He wished to be supreme at Rome, but yet to maintain the constitution two things which were incompatible. He never really liked or trusted the Optimates, yet he allowed himself to be used by them for their own purposes. He had a great military reputation, and considerable military talents, but he let the incompetent nobles in his camp overrule him. As a politician he was neither so able nor so un- scrupulous as Caesar, and had no great scheme of policy to carry out as Caesar had. As usually happens, the man that knew his own mind won in the end. 19. Caesar pursues Pompey and arrives at Alex- andria. The victory of Pharsalia was very important. Caesar had lost comparatively few men in the battle, variously stated at 200 and 1200, with about 30 centurions, whereas of Pompey's army 6000 Roman corpses were lying on the field of battle, and still more of his auxiliaries. Yet the party was not beaten. The great fleet was still in the hands of Pompeians. It was stationed at Corcyra at the time of the battle, and when the news of it arrived, Cato, who had been left in charge of the camp at Dyrrachium, joined the fleet, as did Cicero and others. Pompey's elder son Gnaeus was also on board, and, though the Egyptian contingent had deserted, there was still a powerful armament. It was at last 268 CAESAR AT ALEXANDRIA. CH. resolved (in spite of the opposition of Cicero and others) to go to the province of Africa, where they expected to be joined by Pompey and Metellus Scipio, and where the Pompeian Attius Varus was still proconsul. Meanwhile Caesar was pressing on in pursuit of Pompey with one legion and some cavalry, leaving orders for another legion to follow, which overtook him on the Hellespont. Some- where near Antioch, on his way through Asia, he was met by C. Cassius with a fleet of Cilician, Syrian, and Phoenician ships. Cassius submitted it seems without a struggle and took service under Caesar, who, guessing Pompey's destina- tion when he heard that he had been seen at Cyprus, arrived at Alexandria on the fifth of October, about ten days after Pompey's murder, of which he found men ready to assure him by presenting him with Pompey's signet ring and displaying the murdered man's head. 20. The Alexandrine War. Caesar stayed in Egypt till the spring of the following year, B.C. 47. Italy was en- trusted to Antony with the remainder of his victorious army. Caesar would no doubt have to fight the surviving Pompeians in Africa ; but for this it was necessary to strengthen his fleet and to have control of the naval powers, Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes. Finding a civil war in Egypt, between Ptolemy XII. and his sister Cleopatra, he determined to intervene. His landing with lictors and fasces was resented at Alex- andria, because it implied an assertion of Roman authority there ; and the riots were so serious, that he sent for reinforce- ments from Asia, and summoned Ptolemy and Cleopatra to Alexandria to submit their dispute to him. Cleopatra is said to have won his favour by her charms, and he decided that she was to reign jointly with her brother. But this did not suit Ptolemy's minister Pothinus. He instigated Achillas and the army at Pelusium to resist and to advance on Alex- andria. Caesar therefore was being besieged in Alexandria while ostensibly supporting the sovereigns of Egypt. He xvin. THE ALEXANDRINE WAR. 269 had not enough troops to defend the city, and he retired to Pharos, which was connected with it by a drawbridge. Here he waited for farther help coming from Asia ; but meanwhile he sent envoys in Ptolemy's name to Achillas, and when they were ill-treated by the secret instigation of Pothinus, he put Pothinus to death. Achillas being master of Alexandria set up Arsinoe, Cleopatra's sister, as queen ; who, however, soon quarrelled with him and put him to death. Towards the end of the year Ptolemy persuaded Caesar to allow him to go to Alexandria and negotiate with Arsinoe's government. Instead of doing so he joined the enemy, and sought to reduce Caesar by cutting off his convoys of provisions at sea. But in March (B.C. 47) an army arrived at Pelusium under Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Caesar had commissioned to raise forces in Syria and Phoenicia. Ptolemy marched out to meet him : but Caesar went to his support, stormed Ptolemy's camp, and drove him into flight. In his attempt to escape he was drowned, 2yth March [6th Feb.]. Shortly afterwards Alexandria surrendered, Cleopatra was made queen with a husband in the shape of another brother, a young boy, who as Ptolemy XIII. reigned with her nominally for a little more than three years, when she put him to death (B.C. 43). Egypt was thus secured. 21. Caesar Dictator and Consul. Troubles at Rome. Meanwhile at Rome Caesar had been named Dictator for a year, with the power (though not the office) of a tribune for life, and the right of being consul for five years. Nevertheless things had not gone smoothly at Rome. During the year B.C. 48 trouble had been caused by M. Caelius, a praetor, who had sought to gain favour with the mob by granting debtors better terms than Caesar's law had given them. He had been eventually driven from Rome, and had attempted to join Milo, who was in arms in South Italy to secure his recall from 270 AFFAIRS IN ASIA. CH. exile, and there both perished. Other troubles were caused by the profligate P. Cornelius Dolabella, who (like Clodius) got himself adopted into a Plebeian gens and elected tribune, that he might get more consideration for him- self; for he was overburdened with debt, and had not got what he hoped from the revolution. Antony as the Dictator's magister equitum was the highest authority in the absence of Caesar, but he seemed unable to suppress the party fights and disorders that now arose, and had himself to go to Brundisium to quell a military riot. If we may believe Cicero, he not only wasted time in coarse de- bauchery, but was enriching himself by confiscations in a way that brought Caesar's displeasure upon him. 22. The War with Pharnaces in Pontus and Battle of Zela, B.C. 47. Caesar's presence at Rome therefore was much needed. Yet he determined first to settle Asia. He travelled and did business with extra- ordinary speed. Three days at Antioch, four at Tarsus, three at Comana sufficed to settle Syria, Cilicia, and Cap- padocia. But one of the little wars in which their wide empire was always involving the Romans awaited him in Pontus. Pompey had left Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, king of Bosporus, in B.C. 63. He was now trying to recover some of his father's old dominions south of the Black Sea, which were at this time part of a Roman province, and also some territories in Armenia assigned by Pompey to Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia. Deiotarus had fought on Pompey's side at Pharsalia, and had escaped in the same ship. But he tried to make up for that by acting as an obedient vassal of Rome, and begged the help of Domitius Calvinus, Caesar's legate in Asia. Pharnaces, while pretending that he was willing to submit his cause to Caesar's arbitration, nevertheless continued his raids, and inflicted a defeat on the combined forces of Domitius and Deiotarus, and boasted of having recovered his father's kingdom. Caesar now hastened to xvni. BATTLE OF ZELA. 271 Pontus in person. On the 28th of July he met Deiotarus, whom he treated with scant favour, in spite of his humble submission and endeavours to atone for assistance given to Pompey. He deprived him of the greater part of his territories, though he allowed him to retain the title of king, and forced him to hand over some troops which he had trained in the fashion of a Roman legion. Next day he entered Pontus and answered envoys who met him from Pharnaces by ordering him to quit that country, restore certain publicani whom he had seized, and all property taken from allies of Rome. When Pharnaces, pretending obedience, yet shuffled and delayed, he advanced swiftly upon his position on a hill a few miles from Zela, defeated him, stormed his camp, and forced him to fly the country. It was this rapid and decisive victory that Caesar is said to have announced in his despatch to the Senate in three words, Veni t vidi) vici [June, B.C. 47]. 23. The Battle of Thapsus, April, B.C. 46. Caesar was back in Rome by August, B.C. 47 : but though his presence was so much needed there he only stayed about three months. By the end of October he was on his way to Africa to put down the surviving Pompeian leaders. They had had . more than a year to recover and collect their forces. There was a considerable army commanded by Pompey's father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, and supported by luba, king of Mauretania, and a strong fleet under the com- mand of Attius Varus ; while Cato was occupying Utica. Caesar was inferior in numbers, and the enemy's fleet harassed him by cutting off his transports. Still he took a number of towns and strongholds without much resistance, and having been reinforced about January, B.C. 46, was strong enough to give Scipio battle whenever he could get the chance. This chance came early in February. As he was advancing to attack Thapsus, Scipio and luba, who had been following him, got into such a position that they were forced CH. xviii. BATTLE OF THAPSUS. 273 to fight. They were beaten completely and with immense loss, and Caesar, leaving the assault on Thapsus to a legate, advanced himself to attack Cato in Utica. Cato, though a resolute, not to say obstinate, politician, seems to have been a faint-hearted soldier. Two years before he had yielded Sicily to Curio without a blow, and now on Caesar's approach he at once gave up all for lost. Yet he had the courage to die, and to die cheerfully. After conversing calmly on philosophy to a company of his friends, and com- mending his family to the care of Lucius Caesar, he retired to his bedroom and fell on his sword. The wound was not mortal, and was dressed ; but when left alone he tore off the bandages and expired. The other leaders either made their peace with Caesar or perished in various ways. luba and Petreius are said to have killed each other; Faustus Sulla and Afranius fell in a military riot. Scipio tried to join Gnaeus and Sextus Pompeius who had gone to Spain, but was overtaken by Caesar's ships and threw himself into the sea. Thus resistance in Africa was crushed, and Numidia made a Roman province. Two months after the battle Caesar embarked for Italy, and arrived in Rome towards the end of May, practically master of the Empire, although he had been nominally only consul with a colleague like any other consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus. C. lULlUb CAESAR AND OCTAVIAN (AUGUSTUS), c CHAPTER XIX. FROM THE BATTLE OF THAPSUS TO THE BATTLE OF PHILIPPI (B.C. 46-42). I. Caesar } s administration from B.C. 46. 2. The war with the sons of Pompey in Spain; battle of Mtmda, B.C. 45. 3. Consequences of the battle of Munda. 4. Caesar's reforms and projects in the last year of his life. 5. Causes of the conspiracy against Caesar. 6. The members of the conspiracy. 7. The assassination of Caesar. 8. The effects of the assassination of Caesar ; the conduct of Antony. 9. C. Octavianus comes to Rome. 10. The war of Mutina, B.C. 44-3. II. Octavianus returns to Rome and is elected consul. 12. Octavianus breaks with the Optimates ; the Triumvirate. 13. The proscriptions ; death of Cicero. 14. Defeat of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi (B.C. 42). 15. Second division of the Empire between the Triumvirs. i. Caesar's Laws and Reforms. Before Caesar's return to Rome in July, B.C. 46, he had been declared Dictator for ten years (from ist January, B.C. 45), and invested with censorial powers under the title of praefectus morum. He was in all but name an absolute king. He celebrated four triumphs, over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Numidia, thus avoiding all mention of a civil war, It was quite against precedent to celebrate a triumph over fellow citizens, and therefore these triumphs were nominally over Ptolemy in Egypt, Pharnaces in Pontus, luba in Numidia. Yet the truth could not be thus obscured, and these processions must have been bitterly offensive to many. Caesar now 274 CH. xix. THE CALENDAR RECTIFIED. 275 spent rather more than six months in Rome, and carried out a number of very useful reforms. The first was that of the calendar. The Roman year, since its settlement traditionally referred to king Numa, had consisted of 12 lunar months or 355 days (more accurately 354 days 8 hours 48 minutes 36 seconds). The solar year consists of 365 days 5 hours 48 minutes 51 J seconds. The error, there- fore, was between 10 and 1 1 days every year. The pontifices from time to time intercalated 27 days after the 23rd of February. But this was not enough, and the error had accumulated till it reached 90 days. That is to say, in a given year about this time, if there were no days intercalated, the calendar was three months in advance, and an event said to happen on 25th July would really have happened about the 25th of May. This often led to great in- conveniences. The festivals meant to be in the summer would fall in the spring, those meant to be in the spring would fall in the winter, and so on. Caesar consulted the best mathematicians; and a month of 23 days having been intercalated in February, another of 67 days was inserted between the last day of November and first of December. So that this " last year of disorder " consisted of 445 days, and the first of January, B.C. 45, was brought to its true place in the solar year. Other reforms were meant to prevent farther revolutions and restore prosperity. Mindful perhaps of what he himself had been able to do, he passed a law confining the tenure of praetorian provinces to one, and consular provinces to two years. Another law prevented Senators from residing more than three years outside Italy; and another compelled owners of sheep-runs to have at least a third of their shepherds free men. To purify the law courts he abolished the third decuria of jurors (the tribuni aerarii), so that juries should be entirely composed of Senators and Equites. The liberal arts were encouraged by giving the franchise to their professors living in Rome; 2 76 CAMPAIGN OF MUNDA. CH. and a remedy was sought for poverty and overcrowding by projects of colonization, in Carthage, Corinth, and Gaul. 2. The War against the Sons of Pompey in Spain (B.C. 45). From these peaceful employments he was forced once more to take the field. The two sons of Pompey, Gnaeus and Sextus, had taken refuge in the south of Spain. There they found the name of Caesar unpopular on account of the ill-conduct of a governor sent by him to the province. They quickly collected thirteen legions, and were joined by the leaders of the army in Africa who had escaped after Thapsus. With these troops they defeated C. Didius, whom Caesar had sent against them, and it became necessary for him to go there in person. He left Rome on the 3rd of December, B.C. 46, and was back again early in the following September. Though many Spanish tribes were in arms, taking advantage of the Roman dissensions to return to their old habits of brigandage, yet it was not a Spanish war, i.e. a war with Spaniards. The two armies were almost wholly Roman ; and the Pompeian army was filled with veterans who would fight desperately, because, having served against Caesar before, and having been granted their lives, they could have no hope of farther mercy. Caesar's troops were also veterans exasperated at having to fight again in a civil war. There was likely, therefore, to be little quarter given ; and in fact the slaughter was more ruthless than in any part of the civil war. After several minor successes Gnaeus Pompeius pitched his camp in a plain near Munda, and there Caesar forced him to give battle (iyth March). The struggle was fierce and desperate, and the loss great on both sides. Caesar, however, wa completely victorious. Gnaeus Pompeius escaped to the sea only to fall a month later when landing to take water; but his brother Sextus survived, and remained at the head of a formidable naval force for many years afterwards. xix. LAST MEASURES OF CAESAR. 277 3. Consequences of the Battle of Munda. Though Sextus Pompeius was thus still left with a large fleet, the battle of Munda secured Southern Spain for the time (the North had not been seriously disturbed), and cleared off the greater part of the Pompeian officers who had sur- vived the battles of Pharsalia and Thapsus. But its most striking effect at the moment was shown at Rome. Rumours of Caesar's defeat had at one time been rife there, and some symptoms of a rising opposition had appeared. But the news of Munda changed all that. Every kind of honour was voted to him : a supplicatio for fifty days ; the dictatorship for life ; the right of being consul for the next ten years; the entire control of the treasury; and complete military authority by the title of Imperator for himself and his children. When he returned to Rome, therefore, in September he was in fact in all but name an absolute king; and some even proposed that he should have that title, at any rate in the provinces. 4. New Reforms of Caesar, B.C. 45-44. Caesar made a good use of this position during the few months of life that remained to him, both by enforcing the laws already passed, and by passing new ones. He formed also great schemes for improving and enlarging Rome ; for drain- ing the lower parts of the town by diverting the river into a canal, and thus including part of the Vatican district within the pomoerium ; for erecting new buildings, a forum, a curia, a theatre, and several temples. A great public library was to be collected, and the best jurists were to codify the laws. Outside the city also vast works were to be set on foot ; a great canal was to drain the Pomptine Marshes ; an artificial emissary was to prevent the flooding of the lacus Fucinus ; a great harbour was to be constructed at Ostia ; a new road constructed across the Apennines to the shore of the Adriatic ; and numerous colonies to be planted, besides those actually settled at Corinth and 2 y8 THE CONSPIRACY. CH. Carthage, in various parts of the Empire, in Gaul, Illyri- cum, Egypt, Syria, and Pontus. Many of these things were actually begun, but his assassination on the i5th of March put a stop to most and delayed all. 5. The Causes of the Conspiracy against Caesar. There were many reasons which might cause a plot against Caesar's life among the nobles of Rome. However well he might conduct the government, it was the government of an absolute monarch. Offices depended no longer on popular favour or (as they had generally done before) on family arrangements. Though the form of election was still gone through, Caesar issued letters of recommenda- tion which were practically commands. His dictatorship gave him complete control over other magistrates. He filled up the Senate with friends and partisans of his own of all ranks, sometimes from the provinces, and some- times from the sons of freedmen, so that there were about nine hundred names on the roll. This was too large a body to be effective or influential ; and he himself set the example of treating it with scant respect. Then, too, the triumph after the war in Spain was plainly over fellow citi- zens, there could be no disguise as to that : and the pro- posal to give him the title of rex aroused the most deeply seated prejudices of the citizens. The story is well known how as he was watching the Lupercalia, the ancient festival celebrated on the Palatine (i5th Feb.), Antony in the semi- nude state of one of the Luperci, taking advantage of the license of the festival, attempted three times to place a gold crown on Caesar's head. Caesar indeed, observing the feelings of the people, thrice rejected it, and finally ordered it to be dedicated in the Capitol to the only king lupiter; but the incident had its effect. Again, as he was once entering the city, some officious partisans addressed him as rex, and were answered by him that they were mistaken, he was not Rex (a well-known surname of a Roman family) but xix. THE CONSPIRACY. 279 Caesar. Still he was sensitive as to opposition to this title, and when two of the tribunes pulled off some crowns with which his statues had been secretly adorned, and arrested some leaders of the mob, he showed his dis- pleasure by causing them to be suspended from their office. Moreover he seemed to be establishing a dynasty. His great-nephew, C. Octavius afterwards Augustus was now eighteen, had joined his great-uncle after the battle of Munda in Spain, and had been treated in all ways as his heir and as a prince who was to take up the position when he died. It does not seem that he actually adopted him in his lifetime (that was done by his will), but he treated him in a way that showed what he meant to do. All these things, though they perhaps did not render him unpopular with the lower orders, were deeply offensive to the nobles, who could also reckon on some points both in his policy and conduct likely to prejudice him with the people, such as his restricting the number of those entitled to cheap corn, and his habit of rather ostenta- tiously showing want of interest in the theatre and circus by reading and answering his correspondence while sitting there. Finally, like all revolutionary leaders, he was sur- rounded by many men of bad character whom he was constrained to employ. 6. The Members of the Conspiracy. However this may be, certain persons were industriously working up a plot. In our time it would perhaps have been done by securing the co-operation of the press, and paying for frequent paragraphs of detraction. In Rome it was done by scattering 'libels,' or written sentences, about the streets and Forum, and writing them on walls. They were mostly in the form of appeals to M. Brutus to justify his name and assumed descent from the Brutus who ex- pelled the kings, and from Ahala who killed a would-be tyrant. The leaders in the conspiracy were M. lunius 280 THE CONSPIRATORS. CH. Brutus, who was praetor urbanus, and C. Cassius Lon- ginus, also a praetor, and married to a half-sister of Brutus. Both had fought on Pompey's side, and had been spared by Caesar, and not only pardoned but promoted to office under his direction. To M. Brutus Caesar had been specially indulgent from affection to his mother. He had arranged that at the end of their praetorship Brutus was to govern Macedonia, Cassius Syria. It would seem that no two men could have more to lose by his death. Another was Decimus Brutus, who had served under Caesar in Gaul and in the civil war, had been since in high command in Gaul, had been specially honoured in the triumph of B.C. 45, and, as it afterwards appeared, was entered in Caesar's will as 'second heir,' i.e. to succeed in default of the heir. He, too, was a praetor in B.C. 44, had the command of troops in Cisalpine Gaul, and was nominated to the consulship of B.C. 42. We do not know, considering these facts, why he should have turned against his benefactor, except that he had married the daughter of a leading Pompeian, and may have been influenced by family connexions. C. Trebonius was another who was under similar obligations to Caesar. He had been praetor, commander in Spain, consul, and was nominated to the province of Asia for B.C. 44. And so with others, though in a less degree. There must have been something in Caesar's character that alienated friends : we must allow something also for a genuine feeling that he was an enemy to freedom and the constitution. 7. The Assassination. About seventy were privy to the plot, which, therefore, could hardly have been so well concealed had it not been carried 1 out promptly. Even as it was, it seems to have oozed out in some directions, and Caesar had several warnings. A soothsayer had bidden him beware of the Ides of March ; his wife had evil dreams ; and so many evil omens of various sorts were xix. THE ASSASSINATION. 281 reported to him, that he resolved not to go to the Senate house on the i5th. This delay alarmed the conspirators, who were afraid that they had been betrayed. Decimus Brutus undertook the treacherous task of inducing him to break his resolution. He came to his house and appealed to his pride not to let it be said that he failed to appear in the Senate from superstitious fears and fanciful causes. Caesar was convinced and rose to go about eleven in the morning. As he crossed the hall of his house his bust or statue fell and broke in pieces, perhaps thrown down by some friendly hand to warn him. As he walked along the street the crowd pressed round him with petitions, and one man with special eagerness thrust a paper in his hand, begging him to read it at once, as it concerned him deeply. But he either did not hear or did not understand, and gave it with others to his attendant. He entered the Senate, and having taken his seat, was at once surrounded by the conspirators, who pretended to be backing a petition of L. Tillius Cimber desiring his brother's recall. When he turned away, annoyed at their persistence, Cimber clutched his toga. This was the signal agreed upon. Casca struck him with his dagger, which he had concealed in the case used for carrying the writing stilus, and thereupon the others drew their daggers also and plunged them into his body. He at first tried to defend himself; but when he saw M. Brutus among his enemies, for whom he had had such great affection, he cried, " You too, my son ! " and drawing his robe over his face, fell pierced by more than twenty wounds. The conspirators had struck with such violence and haste that more than one of their own number was wounded. The other senators, after a pause of horror, rushed out of the house spreading the news far and wide through the city. 8. The Effects of the Assassination of Caesar. Whatever private motives the conspirators may have had 282 THE TYRANNY NOT KILLED. CH. for hating Caesar, there were some of them (and especially M. Brutus) who believed that they were doing a good service to the state. Caesar had made himself practically king. The old republican government and liberty would again be restored by getting rid of him. Cicero who was present, though not privy to the plot, loudly applauded the assassins, and professed to believe that a tyrant had righteously been removed and liberty recovered. Let us see why this did not turn out to be the case. Parties at Rome were too deeply divided to allow the removal of one man to make peace. The leaders in the state had all powerful followings, and were determined to secure their own interests, and not to give up any of the offices, govern- ments, or profitable employments which they had obtained from Caesar. These they were prepared to defend by arms if necessary, and their professed loyalty to the constitution, by which they justified the murder of Caesar, would not make them obedient to the Senate if it ordered any change in these things. All were in haste to take possession of what they regarded as their rights, and paid little attention to any votes of the Senate which went against their wishes. The chief magistrate after Caesar's death was Marcus Antonius, the consul, for of course the Dictatorship ended with the death of the Dictator. He was at first alarmed for his own safety, and made some terms with the assassins. But presently, when he found what a warm reception his speech (laudatio) at the public funeral of Caesar met with from the populace, he plucked up courage ; and in- ducing the Senate to confirm all the acta of Caesar, he got possession of his papers, and of a large sum of money which he had left in the treasury, and did What he chose. Some of the conspirators who had been named to provinces soon went off to them; but M. Brutus and C. Cassius, being praetors, ought not to have left Rome till the end of the year. They found, however, that the people xix. ARRIVAL OF OCT AVIAN US. 283 were so angry with them that they dared not stay, and had to retire to Antium. M. Brutus, we saw, had been named for the province of Macedonia, and Cassius for that of Syria for B.C. 43 ; but when Antony found how unpopular they were, he induced the Senate to change this, and vote Macedonia to his own brother Gaius, and Syria to Dola- bella, who had become consul since Caesar's death. 1 This they were determined to resist, and having collected troops and ships went off to take possession of their provinces. Therefore there was a certainty of civil war in the East. In the West there was also every chance of it. In Spain and Sicily Sextus Pompeius was in command of a large army and fleet, and was ready to join whichever party would grant him the best terms ; while Decimus Brutus had taken possession (in yirtue of Caesar's nomination) of Gallia Cisalpina, which Antony desired for himself. 9. Octavianus comes to Rome. Presently this state of things was further complicated by the arrival in Rome (in May) of Caesar's great-nephew and heir, the young C. Octavius, who, being adopted in Caesar's will, was now called Gaius lulius Caesar Octavianus, afterwards the Emperor Augustus. Both sides wished to get his support, and Cicero for some time thought that he had secured him on the side of the Optimates, because he quarrelled with Antony about his uncle's inheritance, and because Antony objected to his being elected Tribune. He was only eighteen years old, but had already impressed many people by his firm and cautious character. His first object, which he carefully concealed, was to avenge his great- 1 P. Cornelius Dolabella had been promised the consulship when Caesar left Rome for the Parthian war. He had actually been elected, but Antony (who objected to him) had declared the omens unfavour- able, and so it was a question whether he was legally consul. How- ever, as soon as Caesar was killed, he assumed the office, Antony not feeling strong enough to resist him. 284 THE WAR OF MtJTINA. CH. uncle by punishing his assassins; but he also was deter- mined that Antony should not have everything his own way and become alone supreme in the State. He was resolved at least to share in his power. He therefore at first seemed to take part with the Optimates, who disliked and mistrusted Antony, and was even believed to have plotted his assassination ; and when Antony towards the end of the year brought over to Italy some legions, which had been stationed in Macedonia, in order to enforce his claim on Gallia Cisalpina against Decimus Brutus, Octaviart retaliated by raising a legion among the veterans settled by his great-uncle in Campania. He was presently joined by two of the legions from Macedonia, which deserted Antony, and towards the end of B.C. 44, started for Cisalpine Gaul to prevent Antony from taking possession of that province. 10. War of Mutina, B.C. 43. This led to a war round Mutina (the modern Modena), in which Decimus Brutus was being besieged by Antony. The Senate eagerly adopted the measures of Octavian, voted him the rank of propraetor and then of proconsul, and sent the two consuls of B.C. 43, Gaius Vibius Pansa and Aulus Hirtius, to take part in opposing Antony, who, after various negotiations with the Senate, was declared a public enemy. The decisive battle in this campaign was fought at a place called Forum Gallorum (Castel Franco} on the i5th of April, followed by an attack on Antony's camp on the i6th. But in these two battles both the consuls were mortally wounded; and Antony was able to march off towards the West over a pass that brought him to the coast near Savona and thence to Gallia Transalpina. 11. Octavian returns to Rome and is elected Consul. The Optimates were greatly rejoiced at this success ; but it soon turned out that they had no cause to be glad. When Antony marched towards the Riviera, xix. OCTAVIAN CONSUL. 285 Decimus Brutus broke out from Mutina and followed him for some way, but was too late to catch him, and Antony reached the Province in safety, having been reinforced by another legion brought across the North of Italy by one of the praetors, P. Ventidius Bassus. Moreover Octavian now showed that, though he had meant to resist Antony, he would not help Decimus Brutus, one of his great-uncle's murderers. His legions supported him in this, and refused to march in pursuit of Antony. Instead of doing this, he sent to Rome demanding to be elected consul : and when difficulties were made about it, he started for Rome at the head of his army, and entered the city in August almost as a conqueror. He was immediately elected consul with his cousin Q. Pedius, whom he caused -to bring in a law for the trial of all assassins of lulius. 12. The Triumvirate: M. Lepidus, M. Antonius, C. Octavianus. But this was not all. Octavian had come to Rome resolved to break entirely with the Optimates. The Senate, in which they were the superior party, had shown that they meant to disown him. They were encouraged by the success of Cassius in Syria, who had driven Dolabella to commit suicide, and had taken possession of the province; and of M. Brutus who had taken over Macedonia and captured Gaius Antonius. Sextus Pompeius had also declared for them and had been appointed commander-in-chief of the fleet; and the governor of Africa, Cornificius, was going to send soldiers from his province to Rome. The Senate had therefore ventured to refuse Octavian's request for a triumph and the consulship. Accordingly, before setting out for Rome with his three legions, he had sent a conciliatory message to Antony, and meant, if it should seem to suit his policy, to come to terms with him. Now that he was at Rome with his army at his back, the Senate was forced to do everything he wished. The decree declaring Antony a public enemy was 286 THE TRIUMVIRATE. CH. reversed; Octavian himself was granted extraordinary powers, and was named commander, not only of his own legions, but also of those serving with Decimus Brutus. He therefore set off again in September to Cisalpine Gaul to attack Decimus, who, however, was already a fugitive without an army. He had made his way into Cisalpine Gaul, trusting to be joined by L. Munatius Plancus, the governor of Celtic Gaul. But not only had Plancus joined Antony, but so also had M. Lepidus, gover- nor of Narbonensis and Upper Spain. Being, therefore, abandoned by his army, Decimus Brutus attempted to reach Ravenna, and thence cross to M. Brutus in Macedonia. From this, however, he was cut off by Octavian's advance. Turning westward, again he tried to reach the Rhine, but was stopped in Gaul and, on Antony's orders, was put to death by a chief of the Sequani. Antony had now the support of three armies, his own and those of Lepidus and Plancus, and it remained to see whether he would come to terms with Octavian. If he did, they would be able to do as they chose at Rome, and the Senate would be quite helpless. The three commanders, Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus met on a small island in a tributary of the Po near Mutina, and made an arrangement for dividing the govern- ment of the whole Empire between them. They were themselves to be elected tresviri reipublicae constituendae for five years, that is, ' : a commission of three for settling the republic." The ordinary magistrates were to be appointed, but the triumvirs were at once to name them for the whole five years, and were to exercise absolute powers every- where over them. It was in fact to be a sort of Dictatorship in commission. Besides these general powers they were each to have superintendence of a special part of the Empire. Lepidus, with three legions, was to have Gallia Narbonensis and Spain ; Antony, all the rest of Gaul, with four legions ; Octavianus, Africa, Sardinia, Sicily, and other xix. THE PROSCRIPTIONS. 287 islands, with three legions. Antony and Octavian undertook to crush Brutus and Cassius in the East, Octavian having the additional task of contending with Sextus Pompeius, while Lepidus took temporary charge of Rome. 13. The Proscriptions. These arrangements were openly announced to the army. But there was also a secret clause inserted, whereby they agreed to put to death certain leading men in the party of the Optimates. The murderers of Caesar were of course to go; they were by this time already condemned under the law of Pedius. But there were others ; and each of the three put down names particularly odious to them. Thus Antony entered the name of Cicero and his brother and nephew. Antony allowed Lepidus to put his uncle Lucius Caesar on the list, in return for inserting the name of Lepidus's own brother. The first list thus made up consisted of seventeen names, and orders were sent at once to Rome for their execution. Thus early in December the great orator Cicero was overtaken by a detachment of soldiers near his villa at Formiae and executed, his brother and nephew having been previously put to death at Rome. When the Triumvirs returned to Rome other lists were put up in the Forum (proscripti\ so that in the end between two and three thousand persons were * proscribed.' A good many of them escaped, at any rate for the present, by joining Brutus and Cassius in the East, or Sext. Pompeius in Sicily ; and we know of several who escaped altogether. But it seems that about 150 senators and a large number of Equites (perhaps a thousand) were actually put to death. 14. Defeat of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, B.C. 42. The triumvirs entered on their office on the ist of January, B.C. 42. But they did not all three stay long at Rome. There was much to do before they were masters of the Empire. At Rome there had been a kind of com- mercial panic and other troubles. But when these matters had been to a certain extent put right, Lepidus was left in charge 288 THE BATTLES OF PHILIPPI. CH. of the city, while Antony went to get ready an army against Brutus and Cassius in the East, and Octavian to attack Sext. Pompeius in Sicily. For as long as the command of the sea was in the hands of their enemies they would have great difficulty in getting troops across, or securing supplies for their army. Besides, as Rome depended very largely on corn from Africa, Egypt, Sicily, and Sardinia, there was great danger of the city being starved out if Pompeius and other exiles had ships in various parts of the Mediterranean. Octavian did not meet with great success in his contest with Sext. Pompeius this spring, and Antony was for some time prevented crossing from Brundisium by another fleet under Cri. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had escaped from the proscription. About August, however, Octavian and Antony joining forces managed to get to Apollonia, and thence marched across Macedonia by the great road, called the via Egnatia, and found Brutus and Cassius (who had also joined forces) posted strongly at Philippi, opposite the island of Thasos. They were much better off than their opponents because they had a large fleet to bring them provisions, while the army of Antony and Octavian had to rely on the country for supplies, which were already running short. At the end of October and the beginning of November, however, two battles, at an interval of about a fortnight, settled the question. In the first Cassius was defeated by Antony, Octavian by Brutus. But Cassius, thinking that Brutus had been defeated, killed himself rather than become a prisoner. A fortnight later Brutus was defeated by Antony and Octavian together, and finding his officers unwilling to continue the struggle, put an end to his own life also. Many of the leaders were put to death after the battle, but some escaped, and some, with the majority of the legions, submitted to the triumvirs and were taken into their service. Among the survivors was the poet Horace, who had joined Brutus at Athens. In after years he made more than one half- xix. REDIVISION OF THE EMPIRE B.C. 42 289 playful, half-sad allusion in his Odes to his disaster and his escape. 15. The Empire again Divided, November, B.C. 42. The great result of this fighting was that the two most powerful men in the Empire were now Antony and Octavian (or as we will henceforth call him, Caesar). They determined, therefore, to divide the government of it between themselves once more, this time taking in the East as well as the West. Italy was to be common to both as the head of the Empire, and a common recruiting ground. Antony was to take all the Gauls and Africa, Caesar Spain and Numidia. Lepidus was suspected of having intrigued with Sextus Pompeius : if that turned out to be the case he was to have nothing, if not, Antony agreed to let him have Africa, while he him- self meanwhile went to Asia to put down opposition there and to collect money, while Caesar again undertook the war with Sext. Pompeius. They then separated; Antony went to Asia, Caesar returned to Rome. They seldom met again in friend- ship, and we shall next have to see how this arrangement soon broke down, was renewed on different terms, and ended at last in the complete supremacy of Caesar. CHAPTER XX. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND THE BEGINNING OF MONARCHY. I . The state of Italy after the battles at Philippi. 2. The quarrel between Caesar and L. Antonius. 3. The siege of Perusia and destruction of the opposition. 4. New compact between Antony and Caesar at Brundisium. 5. Peace of Misenum with Sextus Pompeius. 6. The rise of Caesar's infltience. 7. Antony in the East from B.C. 39 to B.C. 32 ; his connexion with Cleopatra. 8. The immediate causes of quarrel bet%veen Caesar and Antony. 9. Both sides prepare for war. IO. IVar proclaimed against Cleopatra. II. The battle of Actium (2nd Sept., -R.c. 31). 12. Results of the battle of A ctium. 13. Death of Antony and Cleopatra. i. State of Italy after the Battle of Philippi, B.C. 42-40. With the exception of one brief visit Antony was never in Rome again after the victories at Philippi, but was wholly engrossed in the government of the East or the pleasures of Egypt. We shall have presently to say some- thing of what he did there. Let us first follow the events which made Caesar supreme in the West, and rendered inevitable a contest between him and Antony for the rule of the whole Empire. At first, however, his authority was not undisputed even in the West. There were two survivors of the civil war strong enough to threaten the peace and prosperity of Italy : one was Gnaeus Domitius Aheno- barbus, who had commanded a fleet in the interests of Brutus and Cassius, and had defeated the triumvirs' admiral 290 CH. xx. TROUBLES AT ROME. 291 off Brundisium on the very day of the battle of Philippi. He was still in command of sixty ships, and was threaten- ing the eastern shores of Italy and the commerce with the East; while Sext Pompeius was still unsubdued on the West, and held Sicily and Sardinia, and could hamper the corn trade and threaten Rome with famine. 2. The Quarrel between Caesar and L. Antonius. Besides this Caesar found violent opposition nearer home. He returned slowly from Macedonia, being attacked by one of his many illnesses. At Rome he found Lucius Antonius (brother of Marcus) consul, having just cele- brated a triumph for some insignificant success in Gaul. Aided by his brother's wife Fulvia, a woman of masculine character, he set himself to thwart Caesar in the interests of his brother. He refused to hand over the legions which Caesar claimed in virtue of his agreement with Marcus, and promoted the discontent among the veteran soldiers to whom Caesar had to assign lands, and also among those from whom those lands were taken, pretending that he did not act fairly as between his own soldiers and those of Antony, and that he was making unnecessary confisca- tions when he had other means of satisfying the legions. It was all the easier to stir up strife because there was great financial distress at the time, owing to the heavy rise in the price of food, caused by the fleets of Ahenobarbus and Sext. Pompeius infesting the shores. After some months of bickering the breach between the two became hopeless, and Caesar repudiated the young daughter of Fulvia betrothed to him in B.C. 43. He and Lucius Antonius both collected troops. Caesar laid siege to Nursia, in the territory of the Sabines, and to Sentinum in Umbria, both of which commanded the line of the Flaminian road to the north, and recalled Salvidienus Rufus whom he had sent to Spain with troops. L. Antonius induced the Senate to appoint him Imperator for a war in which no enemy was named, 292 THE WAR OF PERUSIA. CH. and started from Rome, just before Caesar returned thither, to prevent the approach of Salvidienus. But by this time Sentinum had been taken and Nursia had surrendered, and Caesar's friend Agrippa occupied Sutrium, on the other northern road, the via Cassia. L. Antonius, finding himself cut off from any advance towards Gaul, turned aside to Perusia, which was a strongly fortified town, and there he and Fulvia entrenched themselves. 3. Siege of Perusia, B.C. 41-40. Caesar, Agrippa, and Salvidienus followed and concentrated all their forces on the siege of Perusia, which held out till March, B.C. 40, when hunger forced the garrison to surrender. Fulvia and L. Antonius were allowed to depart unharmed, but a large number of senators and Equites were put to death, and the party of the Optimates opposed to Caesar never recovered from the losses sustained. As the result of this contest Caesar was left supreme in the West ; for Lepidus, who was nominally in charge of Rome as the third Triumvir, had shown neither courage nor decision during these troubles, and never exercised any influence again. 4. New Compact between Antony and Caesar, B.C. 40. Caesar now began to be looked upon as the best guarantee for peace and plenty at Rome. For Gn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, finding that he was so successful, ceased to infest the shores of Italy with his fleet, and sailed away to join Antony. The only danger now was from Sext. Pompeius, and both Antony and Caesar wished to come to some terms with him if possible. With a view to doing so, Caesar this year (40) married Scribonia, aunt to Sextus's wife, though many years older than himself. But Antony, when he heard of what had been happening in Italy, was afraid that he would soon lose all power too. He had been living in Alexandria for the last year, fascinated by the charms of Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt, who had met him at Tarsus, and in the whirl of pleasure and dissipation had not attended much to business. xx. PEACE OF BRUNDISIUM. 2 93 The Parthians invaded Syria in April, B.C. 40, but he left the war with them to his legates, and came to Greece on pretence that his help was needed against Sext. Pompeius in Sicily. But though when his wife Fulvia came to meet him from Perusia, he repudiated her policy and treated her with great unkindness, he yet made up his mind to reduce Caesar's power. His mother lulia had taken refuge with Sextus Pompeius, and now cam 3 to visit him with a pro- posal that he should unite with Pompeius against Caesar. Antony accepted the suggestion, and, in conjunction with Ahenobarbus and Pompeius, began making descents upon the coasts of South Italy. There seemed therefore every prospect of a new and terrible civil war. This, however, was averted by the diplomacy of Caesar's minister, Maecenas, and Antony's legate, Asinius Pollio. A peace was negotiated, known as the peace of Brundisium, in the autumn of B.C. 40. By this arrangement a partition of the Roman Empire be- tween the triumvirs was made for the third time. All east of the Adriatic (except Illyricum) was to be under Antony, all west of it under Caesar. Africa (that is, the Roman province so called) was to be under Lepidus. Antony was to under- take the war with the Parthians, Caesar to deal with Sext. Pompeius. Fulvia having lately died in Greece, Antony was to confirm this pacification by marrying Octavia, Caesar's sister, who had lately been left a widow by Marcellus. The principal partisans of Antony were provided for in other ways Ahenobarbus was sent to Bithynia, Asinius Pollio to conduct a war against the Parthini in Illyricum, and Ventidius Bassus was to have the Parthian war. 5. Peace of Misenum with Sextus Pompeius. This was followed a few months later, in the early part of B.C. 39, by a treaty with Sext. Pompeius made at Misenum, where he was visited on board his vessel by Antony and Caesar. By this treaty he was to receive a com- pensation in money for his father's confiscated property, was 294 CAESAR'S INFLUENCE IN ITALY. CH. to retain a fleet, with the government of Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, and Achaia (i.e. Peloponnesus), and to be consul in B.C. 35. In return for this he was to cease all interruptions to the corn trade. Antony and his wife Octavia then de- parted to Greece, from which he was to direct the Parthian war. Caesar returned to Rome, where his daughter lulia (the only child he ever had) was born. On the very day of her birth he divorced his wife Scribonia, partly because he no longer cared to have any personal connexion with Sext. Pompeius, and partly because he was in love with Livia, whom he married early in B.C. 38. 6. The Rise of Caesar's Influence, B.C. 38 to B.C. 32. In the six years that followed these transactions, Caesar steadily grew in popularity and power at Rome, while Antony constantly lost credit there. Let us see how this came about. In the first place Caesar was in Italy and often in Rome itself, and therefore what he did was seen and known ; while Antony was far away in the East, and what he was doing was only known by report and did not gain in the reporting. In the next place the dangers Caesar had to meet were dangers which directly affected Rome, while Parthian invasions of Syria, or Roman invasions of Mesopotamia did not seem to matter nearly so much. Every one felt the rise of prices, and renewed depredations of Sext. Pompeius were sending them up again almost to the famine point. And this was partly the fault of Antony. Sextus Pompeius complained that Antony had not kept the terms of the peace of Misenum fairly, and had handed over the Peloponnese to him only after thoroughly exhausting the means of the cities in it. He therefore began again his descents upon the coasts of Italy. To ward off this danger would give a man the highest place in the affections of the citizens ; and this Caesar now set himself to do. It took nearly three years (B.C. 38-36), and he met with disasters as well as successes in doing it ; but at length in xx. PUBLIC SERVICES OF CAESAR. 295 B.C. 36 Sext. Pompeius was finally defeated, mainly by Caesar's friend Agrippa, and fled to Asia, where next year he was put to death by Antony's orders. But this was not the only service done by Caesar or his legates to the peace of the western world. Gaul was pacified by Agrippa in B.C. 38-7. Illyricum, in which Pollio, acting as Antony's legate in B.C. 39, had earned a triumph, was afterwards taken over by Caesar himself, and farther reduced under his own leadership in B.C. 35-6, and under that of Agrippa in i.e. 34. In this same year Valerius Messalla was sent by him to subdue the Salassi, who blocked the passage over the Alps by the Val d'Aosta. All these achievements were of great service to Rome; they relieved Roman commerce, and an immediate abatement of taxation took place. Moreover, after the defeat of Sext. Pompeius, Caesar established control in Sicily and in Africa by depriving Lepidus of his office of triumvir, when being summoned to Sicily to help against Sext. Pompeius he had tried to annex the government of that island. Caesar himself was rewarded by the Senate with honours which seemed to predict his future sovereignty. His person was declared sacred, he was allowed to wear always the triumphal robes, a public residence was assigned to him on the Palatine, and in the Senate he occupied the bench of the tribunes. 7. Antony in the East from B.C. 39 to B.C. 32. Meanwhile Antony, though he still had partisans in Rome, was steadily declining in influence there. After his marriage with Octavia he lived for two years in Greece, only once coming for a short time to Brundisium when asked to help against Sext. Pompeius. The Parthians were indeed re- pulsed from Syria in 39-38 by his legate Ventidius Bassus, while Cilicia and Palestine were secured by Pompaedius Silo and C. Sosius, for which Antony had the formal credit at home. But in B.C. 36 he met with disasters when invading Parthia : and in B.C. 34, though he invaded Armenia and 296 ANTONY IN THE EAST. CH. captured its king, he acted with such treachery that he was commonly considered to have disgraced the Roman name. Any advantage too which he had gained was lost in B.C. 33, when he made another fruitless expedition as far as the Araxes ; and the Parthians overran Media and Armenia. But what ruined his credit perhaps as much as anything was the fact that after two years of marriage with Octavia, who more than once had reconciled him with her brother, he sent her back to Rome on the pretence of the dangers of the Parthian war, and returned to Queen Cleopatra at Alexandria. In the intervals of his expeditions he lived with her as his wife in great splendour and luxury. Public opinion was outraged by the idea of a Roman Imperator attending upon a foreign Queen, and at Roman soldiers acting as though under her orders. Moreover, for the children born of their union various countries in the East were assigned as kingdoms, and the belief was current at Rome (promoted by Caesar's partisans) that Antony and Cleopatra meant to establish a great empire in the East independent of Rome, or one which might eventually embrace the Roman Empire itself, the centre being Alex- andria instead of Rome. 8. The Immediate Causes of Quarrel between Caesar and Antony. The triumvirate had been re- newed in B.C. 37 for a second term of five years, i.e. to 3ist December, B.C. 33. Since that time one of the three, Lepidus, had been deposed, and it remained to be seen which of the two remaining members of that commission was to become supreme. We have seen that, as far as feeling at Rome went, the tide was steadily setting in the direction of Caesar. Antony was quite aware of this, and attempted to win the support of the Senate and republican party by acting in a constitutional manner. He sent an account of his proceedings and arrangements in the East, his acta as they were called, and desired that they might be xx. MUTUAL DISSATISFACTION. 297 regularly confirmed by the Senate. He also intimated that he did not desire the renewal of the triumvirate at the end of B.C. 33. His object was to deprive Caesar of the position, while he would himself still have imperium in the East, and be so strong that the Senate would not have courage or means to deprive him of it. He hoped also thus to be able to point to his own conduct as more constitutional than that of Caesar, who he felt sure would not willingly give up his power at the same time. But all this failed in its design. His acta were of such a nature that the Senate would have probably in any case refused its approbation except under compulsion ; and with Caesar present to support the other side it was certain to do so. The causes of quarrel between the two triumvirs were always increasing. Antony complained that Caesar had exceeded his powers in deposing Lepidus, in taking over the government of the islands once controlled by Sextus Pompeius, as well as Africa, and in enlisting soldiers for himself without sending, according to their agreement, half of the levies to him. Caesar for his part complained that Antony had no right to be in Egypt, which was not a Roman province ; that his execution of Sext. Pompeius was illegal ; that his treachery to the king of Armenia was a disgrace to Rome; that his connexion with Cleopatra and his acknowledging Caesarion (a son of Cleopatra, of whom lulius Caesar was supposed to be the father) as a legitimate son of lulius was a degradation of his office and a menace to himself. 9. Both Sides prepare for War. The quarrel came to a head in B.C. 32. The consuls of that year Gnaeus Dofnitius Ahenobarbus and C. Sosius were partisans of Antony. They endeavoured to conceal the most unpopular part of his proceedings, and on the ist of January, B.C. 32, Sosius delivered a speech in his favour. But at the next meet- ing Caesar made a reply to this of such a nature that both 298 BREACH BETWEEN CAESAR AND ANTONY. CH. consuls left Rome to join Antony, who on being informed of what had occurred made up his mind that he must fight. He set about collecting troops and ships at the island of Samos, and came as far as Corcyra (Corfu} on his way to make a descent upon the coasts of Italy. But Caesar too had been active in preparations. The sea was guarded by his ships, and Antony found that he must wait for reinforcements, which he had summoned from all parts of the Empire over which his influence extended. He himself remained at Patrae, while his fleet was in the Ambracian Gulf, and his land forces encamped near the promontory of Actium. 10. War Proclaimed against Cleopatra, B.C. 32. There was now civil war ; but as usual with the Romans it was disguised. The preparations made by Antony at Samos had been regarded as a hostile demonstration of Cleopatra, and war was accordingly decreed against her. It was well understood, however, to .be against Antony. He was designated consul for B.C. 31 ; but by publishing his will, in which Caesarion was acknowledged as son of lulius, and his own children by Cleopatra were put in possession of large territories, Caesar had produced such an impression against Antony, that the Senate prevented his entering upon the office and deprived him of imperium. They did not actually proclaim him a * hostis ' ; but as in the case of other leaders of a tuinultuS) they offered indemnity to all who would quit him before a fixed day, thus treating him practically as a public enemy. n. The Battle of Actium, 2nd September, B.C. 31. In the first half of B.C. 31 both sides were engaged in mustering their forces. To the aid of Antony came many princes from Asia, and Cleopatra herself accompanied the fleet from Egypt. The collection of so large a force from so many and such distant regions occupied several months, and mean- while Antony kept himself safe in the Ambracian Gulf, and xx. THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM. 299 no operations of importance went on, except that Agrippa in Caesar's interests attacked various points on the Greek coasts, partly to prevent assistance being sent to Antony, and partly in the hope of drawing him from his safe harbourage at Ambracia. Caesar's land forces had crossed from Brundisium (probably to Apollonia), and advanced to attack Antony from the north. He fixed the head-quarters of his fleet at the Sweet Harbour (mouth of the Acheron) ; and when he found himself not attacked there, moved farther down and occupied the promontory opposite Actium, on which afterwards Nicopolis was built. Skirmishes between the cavalry of the two sides resulted generally in favour of Caesar's troops, and Antony abandoned the northern side of the Strait into the Ambracian Gulf, confining his soldiers to the southern promontory of Actium. The battle that followed was brought about by a movement made on the part of Antony in obedience to the earnest advice of Cleopatra. She was eager to go back to Alexandria, where they would be on their own ground and could, she thought, sufficiently protect themselves from attack. At Actium they were in the position of invaders, against whom the Western parts of the Empire would surely combine. After some hesitation Antony consented. Early on the 2nd of September his fleet began issuing through the straits from the Ambracian Gulf, in- tending to sail away south. But Caesar had been informed of the movement, and his ships were waiting for them outside. It was a wet day and the sea was rough. Caesar's ships were smaller than those of Antony, and, though only half as numerous (250 to 500), were more manageable in the heavy surf. They could reverse their course promptly and return to the charge, or, after pouring in a volley of darts upon some great galley, could retreat out of shot. Antony's ships were many of them of great size and were furnished with grappling irons, effective if the cast succeeded, but apt to damage the vessel or cause fatal delay if it failed. The battle raged all 300 THE TRIUMPH OF CAESAR. CH. the afternoon without decisive result. But Cleopatra, whose ship was on the southern wing of the fleet, was in a state of great excitement and terror, and, unable to bear the suspense, gave the signal for the retreat of her ships. Antony saw the movement but not the signal, and, fancying that it was the beginning of a general panic, followed the flying squadron. But though the contagion of flight spread fast among his fleet, a number of vessels still continued the fight long after nightfall, when many were blazing from the fire- brands thrown upon 'them. Caesar spent the night on board ship, and tried to save the crews of the burning vessels. His victory was complete. Next day Antony's land forces either surrendered at once, or trying to make their way home through Macedonia were followed and forced to submit. 12. Results of the Battle of Actium. The results of this battle were most important. There was little hope of Antony being able to make a stand again. His Eastern allies would not venture to send him any more help. Even Cleopatra soon showed that she was willing to betray him in hope of getting good terms for herself. The whole of the forces of the West, as well as of Greece and Macedonia, were at Caesar's disposal. He would only have to appear in Asia Minor to secure the obedience of the Asiatic pro- vinces, and the ready alliance of the princes and sovereigns reigning near the frontiers, generally by the permission or under the protection of Rome. Besides this, Caesar's position relatively to that of his rival was infinitely improved. Antony was now a fugitive and a rebel, without that shadow of a legal position which the presence of consuls and a good many Senators had given him in the previous year. Part of the victorious fleet was in pursuit of him, and it would soon appear whether or not his position in Egypt would save him. 13. Death of Antony and Cleopatra, and com- plete Supremacy of Caesar, B.C. 30. Caesar did xx. DEATH OF ANTONY. 301 not go at once to Egypt, but spent the winter in Asia and Samos, preparing to finish the war by attacking Cleopatra and Antony in Egypt. Antony had tried to get together another army. There were three legions under Q. Pinarius Scarpus in charge of Africa, which he had himself placed there. He first tried to get these : but Pinarius put his messengers to death, and declined all help. Then he tried to make preparations in case of need for a retreat to the far East, and meanwhile both he and Cleo- patra sent messages and presents to Caesar, hoping either to conciliate him or to blind him to their real plans. But they were disappointed in all their devices. The ships, which they were preparing to assist their flight in the Red Sea, were burnt by the Arabs at the instigation of the governor of Syria ; the princes and states in Asia refused all help ; while some gladiators who were in training at Cyzicus and did attempt to join him, were stopped on their march. His messages, the mission of his son Antyllus with money and presents, the surrender of one of the murderers of lulius, all failed to draw an answer from Caesar, who, however, kept up secret communications in an apparently friendly spirit with Cleopatra, whom he hoped to detach from Antony and to induce to put herself in his power. In the early part of B.C. 30 Antony found himself oh the point of being attacked on two sides; at Paraetonium by C. Cornelius Gallus, who had taken over the army of Scarpus, and at Pelusium by Caesar himself. He made an attempt to beat back Gallus, but failing in this, hastily marched back to Pelusium. A slight success over some of Caesar's men, who were wearied with their voyage and march, induced him to risk a general engagement. He was decisively beaten, and after a vain attempt to escape by sea, gave up all hope and stabbed himself with his dagger. The wound was not immediately mortal, and he caused himself to be carried to the Mausoleum, where Cleopatra 302 DEATH OF CLEOPATRA. CH. xx. had taken refuge, and there died in her arms. Caesar at once occupied Alexandria, and caused Cleopatra to be brought to the palace. She vainly tried her fascinations on him ; and when she found that she could move neither his love nor his pity, and that he intended to take her to Rome to adorn his triumph, she eluded the vigilance of her guards and put an end to her life, as it was currently reported, by the bite of an asp conveyed to her in a basket of fruit. M. ANTON1US AND CLEOPATRA. CHAPTER XXL THE PRINCIPATE OF AUGUSTUS, B.C. 30 TO A.D. 14. I. Caesar (Augustus) practically a monarch, but with republican titles. 2. The Roman Empire as it was tinder Augustus. 3. The wars of Augustus in Spain; near the Alps; on the Rhine and Danube; in Illyricum and Pannonia ; in the East. 4. Why the Empire was from time to time extended. 5. Britain not part of the Empire under Augtistus. 6. Augustus as a restorer and social reformer. 7. Augustus as a Legislator. 8. The friends and ministers of Augustus. 9. The family of Augustus and the succession. 10. The last days and death of Augustus. II. Poets and historians of the time of Aligns his. 1 2. General review of what Augustus had to do and hcnv he did it. i. Caesar practically a Monarch, but with Republican Titles. The defeat and death of Antony left Caesar virtually supreme in the Empire. There was no one now who had sufficient influence or following to withstand him. The obsequious Senate hastened to vote him all kinds of honours, and he felt so secure of his position at Rome that he stayed another year in the East to settle affairs there. The most important of the powers conferred on him was the tribunicia potestas for life. The tribunes had the right of staying all proceedings of the other magistrates by their veto, of preventing a valid decree of the Senate being passed, of summoning and consulting the Senate, of proposing laws in the Comitia, and of giving assistance to any citizen who appealed to 303 34 HONOURS AND POWERS OF AUGUSTUS. CH. them against a magistrate's sentence. Now, the old rule still held good that a patrician could not be a tribune, and Caesar both by a special act in his uncle's life-time and by his adoption into the gens Julia, was a patrician. He could not therefore be a tribune, but he was to have all the rights and powers of a tribune, and not for one year only, like the other tribunes, but for life. One of the privileges of this office, that which rendered his person sacred, had already been voted to him in B.C. 36, and was of course included in the tribunida potestas now decreed to him. He had also the right of being elected every year as one of the consuls ; he was to have a casting vote in all criminal trials, and his name was to be mentioned in all public prayers and private libations. Next year (B.C. 29) 'after celebrating three triumphs for his campaigns in Illyricum, for his victory at Actium, and for the capture of Alexandria he caused the temple of lanus to be closed as a sign of the restoration of peace, which had only been twice done before in the whole history of Rome, and set about various reforms in the Senate and State, as well as a restoration of public buildings. Next year (B.C. 28) when he and Agrippa as consuls held the census, he was entered on the roll of the Senators as Princeps Senatus, a position of great dignity though it did not add to his powers. Thus in Rome he was, under the old republican titles, absorbing the various parts of government, and taking rank as head of the State. In the next year (B.C. 27) the first great step was taken to give him formally the same authority throughout the Empire, though he represented it as in fact a "restora- tion of the republic." This was done by making a new arrangement as to the provinces. Caesar, or (as he was henceforth called) Augustus, was head of the army ; that seemed to have been all along acknowledged as the result of the imperium which he held as triumvir and had never laid down. Now in some of the provinces there were no legions, xxi. DIVISION OF PROVINCES. 305 only a small number of soldiers forming a body-guard to the governor, or performing police duties. In these provinces governors were as of old to be allotted by the Senate from ex-consuls or ex-praetors, with the general title and powers of proconsuls. In others, where a certain number of legions was always stationed, Augustus was to have supreme authority. Instead of proconsuls they were to be governed by his deputies with the rank of praetor (legati pro praetor e), who were named by him for such time as he chose, and were answerable directly to him. He had what was called proconsular authority {imperium proconsulare} in these provinces, and their governors were his deputies or legati. 1 But though his supreme authority was thus nominally confined to the imperial provinces, he in fact exercised it in the others also ; for when he chose he could control the allotment of governors by his other powers, and in all he appointed a procurator, who had charge of the collection and disposal of the tribute, and was answerable directly to him. The next step taken, in B.C. 23, recognized this by making his imperium proconsulare superior (mams) to that of the governors of all provinces alike. He was therefore now actually first in all departments of the State, and is henceforth called Princeps, or Head of the State. This particular title was not, like the others, definitely conferred on him, or at least we do not know of any law or decree of the Senate doing so; nor did it, like the old republican titles, give him definite powers. Nevertheless it was a recognized designation, meaning that in whatever functions he per- 1 The original imperial provinces were : (i) All Spain except Baetica (i.e. Tarraconensis and Lusitania). (2) All the Gauls (Narbonensis, Lugdunensis, Aquitania, Belgica with the Germanics when occupied). (3) Syria (Phoenicia and coele-Syria). (4) Cilicia. (5) Cyprus. (6) Egypt. Afterwards he gave back Narbonensis and Cyprus to the Senate, but took over Dalmatia (Pannonia and Noricum), and Sardinia for a time. All subsequently added provinces were imperial, Galatia, Moesia, Alpes Mnritimae, Alpes Cottiae, Alpes Penninae. 306 THE ROMAN EMPIRE. CH. xxi. formed he took precedence of all colleagues, and practically could perform them as he chose. The proconsular power was not, as of old, forfeited by entering the city. He could exercise it at all times and in all places. It was not therefore necessary for him to be consul, and he did not take the consulship again till B.C. 5. His most important civil power was the tribunician, and after B.C. 23 he counts the years of his reign, starting from the 25th of June in that year, and reckoning the years of his tribunida potestas. 2. The Roman Empire under Augustus. The Empire as Augustus found it in B.C. 30 did not 6/ffer much from what it had been at the death of his great- uncle in B.C. 44. Nor did he add very greatly to it in the course of his long reign. During the civil wars in fact two of the provinces, Cilicia and Syria, were at times almost separated from the Empire \ and though Mauretania was added as a province in B.C. 33 on the death of its king, it was restored in B.C. 25 to king luba. In the same year a new province of Galatia and Lycaonia was formed (B.C. 25), and some years later (the exact date is not known, but before B.C. 6) Moesia, answering to the modern Servia and Bulgaria, was also reduced to the form of a province, as a barrier of the Empire on the Danube. Moreover, when Augustus reorganized Gaul (B.C. 16-14) m f ur provinces Narbonensis, Aquitania, Lugdunensis, Belgica two districts along the Lower Rhine, called Germania Superior and Germania Inferior were also occupied and partly organized, while some minor provinces were also organized, as we shall see, in the Alpine regions. Lastly Egypt, after the death of Cleopatra (B.C. 30), was also taken over as a province. It was, however, in a special position. Partly because of its importance as a corn growing country, and partly because of the seditious character of the Alex- andrians, it was attached in a special manner to the 308 FOREIGN POLICY OF AUGUSTUS. CH. Emperor, who took both the revenues of the domain lands and the taxes into his own treasury (fiscus\ and ad- ministered it by a praefectus with three legions, an office confined to men not of Senatorial rank. In fact no Senator was allowed to go there without license from the Emperor. Augustus, then, during his reign strengthened the Empire on the Rhine and the Danube, and secured a great source of corn supply for Italy by adding the new province of Egypt, but otherwise did not extend its limits. For a time, indeed, the part of Germany which lies between the Rhine and the Elbe was in Roman hands. But an attempt to strictly enforce the tribute in it brought about the greatest disaster of the reign, and after the fall of Varus (A.D. 9), the Rhine became once more the boundary of the Empire. 3. The Wars of Augustus. But though Augustus made no great addition to the number of Roman pro- vinces, he had in his own person, or in that of his legates, to undertake many wars, either to suppress risings in the provinces themselves, or to defend their frontiers from neighbouring barbarians. The only war in which after B.C. 30 he was personally engaged was that against the Cantabri, the fierce and warlike highlanders of N.W. Spain, who were a terror to the province of Tarraconensis. He went on an expedition against them in B.C. 25, which did not prove very successful, and it was not till B.C. 19 that his great minister Agrippa finally subdued them. But the Empire was chiefly vulnerable on the north-west along the Rhine and the Danube, and in the east along the Euphrates. We have seen how much the Romans dreaded the Parthians, and their invasion of the province of Syria. Crassus had lost his army and his life in fighting them in B.C. 53, and though his quaestor C. Cassius repulsed them two years afterwards, Antony, or his lieutenants, was constantly engaged with them between B.C. 38 and his xxi. FOREIGN POLICY OF AUGUSTUS. 309 death. It was one of the triumphs of Augustus, on which the poets are most eager to dwell, that during his reign danger from the Parthians was avoided, and that they not only respected the territory of the Empire, but sought his favour by restoring the standards and trophies which they had taken from Crassus and Antony. In return Augustus gave an undertaking to abstain from entering Mesopotamia, while he retained a kind of over- lordship in Armenia. There were, however, some warlike expeditions in the east during his reign, such as the invasion of Arabia in B.C. 24, under Aelius Callus; some skirmishing with Parthian invaders of Armenia, under his grandson Gaius in A.D. 2-3 ; and a war with Queen Candace of Aethiopia in B.C. 22, under Gaius Petronius. But by far the most important military affairs were those in the north-west, both in the Alpine regions on the northern frontier of Italy, and farther north still along the Lower Rhine and Danube. The struggle with the barbarians in these districts lasted with intervals from about B.C. 17 to the end of the life of Augustus. He did not command himself in the wars needful for pro- tecting the frontiers, though for nearly three years he remained in Gaul (B.C. 16-14) or in north Italy to direct operations or to settle terms with the tribes. But he was served by a number of very able commanders, especially his two stepsons, Tiberius (afterwards Emperor) and Drusus, who in B.C. 15-14 conquered the Rhaeti (in the Eastern or Tri- dentine Alps), while in the west three new districts were organized more or less completely as provinces: (i) First, one under the name of the Maritime Alps, along the River Var, and including the modern Savoy and Nice; (2) secondly, Alpes Cottiae, in what is now north Italy, with capital Susa ; (3) and, thirdly, Alpes Penninae, the Swiss valley of the Rhone, Canton du Valois. Having thus secured north Italy, Drusus was sent to the northern part of Belgica 3io FOREIGN POLICY OF AUGUSTUS. CH. (Holland), where along the Lower Rhine, on the left bank as far up as Cologne, two districts were marked out as requiring the presence of armies, and called Germania Superior and Germania Inferior. For some purposes they belonged to the province of Belgica, but at any rate from a military point of view they were separate provinces. In B.C. 1 6 some German tribes (Sicambri, Usipetes, Tencteri) had defeated a Roman army under M. Lollius. This disaster brought Augustus into Gaul. For a time, either by show of force or by his negotiations, the German tribes on the right bank of the Rhine were kept quiet, and when Augustus returned to Rome at the beginning of B.C. 14 he is said to have pacified Spain, Gaul, and Germany. But very soon the Germans moved again, and in B.C. 13-10 Drusus fought with and defeated the Frisii, Chauci, Sicambri, Chatti, and Cherusci, while Tiberius was engaged in subduing the Dalmatians and Pannonians. Roman power was thus extended beyond the Rhine to the Elbe. Drusus died by an accident in B.C. 9 : but until the great disaster of P. Quintilius Varus, Roman Germany, in somewhat loose fashion, extended to the Elbe. Before that disaster, from about i A.D., there were frequent and dangerous movements in Germany, in which Tiberius was again engaged (A.D. 4-5) ; and after the defeat of Varus (A.D. 9) the Roman frontier was again pushed back to the Rhine. At his death, therefore, Augustus left the Empire much as he found it in regard to extent, and felt very strongly that it was as large as could be properly defended or administered. His last charge to his successors was, to be content with it as it was. 4. Why the Empire was from time to time extended. Such a policy however is not capable of being precisely carried out. Where there is a long frontier closely watched by hostile tribes, always ready to seize any opportunity of making raids across it, there will always xxi. LIMITATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 3 11 seem some necessity for occupying territory so as to push the enemy farther and farther away. Therefore we find succeeding emperors engaged both on the Rhine and Danube, as well as on the Euphrates, in military expedi- tions or in organizing new provinces. But in spite of such efforts it was after all across the Rhine and the Danube that the nations were to come who were destined to break up the Roman Empire and to renew it again in a different fashion ; and from far away in the centre of Asia came other hordes who later still were to do the same for che eastern half of the Empire. This does not come within the limits of our history ; but it is interesting to mark that Augustus had to struggle with the same dan- gers as his successors for many centuries after his death, the same dangers which eventually proved fatal. 5. Britain not taken by Augustus. Our own country cannot be reckoned as part of the Roman Empire during his life-time. lulius Caesar had imposed tribute on some British tribes in B.C. 54 ; but we never hear of it being paid, or of Roman officers going to the island. We do know, however, that certain British princes visited the court of Augustus, and we may presume that it was either in reference to this tribute, or in order to invoke his interference in local disputes. Augustus did once at least seriously intend to go to Britain, but troubles in Gaul prevented him, and the idea was never carried out. It was not till the reign of Claudius (A.D. 41-54) that there was a province of Britain. 6. Augustus as a Restorer and Social Reformer. But in spite of these wars the reign of Augustus was on the whole a peaceful one. After Actium he was, during the course of his long reign, absent from Italy at different times, about twelve years in all. The rest of the forty-five years he spent in or near Rome, and took great pains in establishing the government of the country and city, 312 REFORMS AND IMPROVEMENTS. CH. in legislation, and in reforms of all sorts. The city was divided into fourteen regions, and 265 parishes (w'ci), for various purposes of local government; a police force (cohortes urbanae) was organized to keep order ; a regular fire-brigade was established in consequence of the frequent fires which occurred ; great pains were taken to clean the bed of the Tiber and to keep up the embankment against floods, regular commissioners being appointed for the purpose. He encouraged both by his influence and example the restoration of decayed temples, and the erection of theatres and public buildings. He built a new and very splendid forum, in addition to the completion of that begun by lulius, and was able with truth to make the famous boast that he had found Rome brick and left it marble. Much also was done to make Italy safe and well ordered. He himself superintended the repair and main- tenance of the great North Road (via Flaminid] with its bridges and stations, and induced other rich men, especially those who earned triumphs, to do the same in regard to other roads as well as public buildings in the city. He divided Italy into eleven regions, apparently for police purposes, though we are not distinctly told the object or result of this division; he restored and re-peopled many of the old coloniae and munidpia which had suffered in the civil wars, and he tried to encourage the citizens to return to their farming and other country pursuits. He maintained fleets at Ravenna on the east, at Misenum on the west coast, and a third at Forum lulii (Frejus) in Gaul, to protect commerce from piracy, and to maintain the safety of the shores. He established a system of posts along the great roads in Italy and the rest of the Empire, that there might be a ready means of communication with the capital; and in many of the provinces he established towns with the rank of colonies or municipia, whose citizens had either the full Roman franchise or the partial franchises called xxi. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORMS. 313 Latinitas. He worked with the object in view of knitting this whole vast Empire as nearly as possible together as one body, while maintaining at the same time many of the privileges of Italy, and making the citizenship a reward of loyalty, and its withdrawal a punishment for violence or disloyalty. 7. Augustus as a Legislator. While thus working for the whole Empire, its safety and happiness, Augustus was not unmindful of the mischiefs which were prevalent at Rome itself, and had contributed largely to the fall of the constitution. He wished the Senate still to have high dignity and power, and he took great pains to remove from it unworthy men, and to compel suitable persons to serve in the old republican offices, which were still maintained, and which gave an entree to it. He had a great dislike to an idle aristocracy, enjoying wealth and rank, and doing nothing for the State. Many of the old families, finding that they could no longer look forward to amassing great fortunes by uncontrolled government of the provinces, tried to shirk the offices at Rome which used to lead to such appointments, as only causing useless expense. Especially a seat in the Senate, which was no longer necessary for high employment in the provinces, since the Emperor selected whom he chose, seemed less and less desirable to many. To counteract this Augustus always treated the Senate with studied respect, constantly brought matters of State before it, and gave it influence by referring to its control the trial of malversation in the provinces and cases of high treason ; while persons of a certain rank, if their means fell short, received presents from him to enable them to maintain their dignity as Senators. At the same time he took care to support the privileges and dignity of the next ordo in the State, the rich middle class, or Equestrian order, from which was drawn not only new members of the Senate but a large part of the officers 3I4 RELIGIOUS RESTORATION. CH. employed by him in the provinces. While trying thus to make the wealthier classes conscious of their duties to the State, he attempted also to raise the standard of morality and to encourage family life. Severe penalties were imposed on adultery, stricter regulations made as to divorce, and marriage was encouraged by the granting of special privileges and exemptions to married men and the fathers of children ; while those who remained unmarried beyond a certain time were not only taxed more heavily than before, but were unable to take more than half of any legacy or property left them. Augustus was also a restorer of religion. It is always difficult to say how far a man of that age believed the popular theology. Probably Augustus regarded it with a kind of indulgent scepticism, as incapable of being proved or disproved. But he believed in Divine Providence in some form, and was apparently convinced that it was for the good of the State that old rituals and observances should be maintained. He there- fore diligently restored temples, and prided himself on reviving ancient ceremonies. He was not foolish enough to regard himself as divine, yet (with some reluctance) he allowed temples in some provinces to be erected to the "genius of Rome and Caesar." The fact was that he believed in himself and his mission, and by the convenient assumption that each man had a "genius," a kind of divine presence specially attached to himself, and hardly distinguishable from himself, such worship could be paid without flagrant absurdity according to the feelings of the time. 8. The Friends and Ministers of Augustus. One of the secrets of the success of Augustus was that, unlike his great-uncle, he had the faculty of attaching friends to himself who remained faithful. His principal ministers during a large part of his reign were the men who, being about his own age, had been the friends of his boyhood. XXI. AGRIPPA. 315 The most important of these was M. Vipsanius Agrippa. He was born in the same year as Augustus ; was with him at Apollonia in B.C. 44 ; helped him in the siege of Perusia, and in his struggles with Antony ; put down risings in Gaul (B.C. 38) ; was the chief agent in the defeat of Sext. Pompeius in B.C. 35 ; commanded the army for him in Illyricum (B.C. 35), and the fleet at Actium (B.C. 32-1); crushed the Cantabrians (B.C. 25-19); and did a great deal to put down risings in the East M. VIPSANIITS AGRIPPA (B.C. 17-13). In fact, till his death in B.C. 12 he continually served the Emperor with complete fidelity and brilliant success. He was indeed marked out at one time as his successor, being married to his niece Marcella, and afterwards to his daughter lulia ; yet when Augustus designated his nephew Marcellus as his heir, Agrippa, though he was naturally disappointed, and retired for a time from Rome, yet never faltered in his loyalty. Never Emperor had a greater or more faithful servant. He was not only a successful general, but he supported his master's views in all respects, and expended immense sums (at his wish) on public buildings and improvements in Rome. Another friend, who also served Augustus faithfully to the 316 MAECENAS. CH. end, was C. Cilnius Maecenas. Unlike Agrippa he was not a military hero, rfe was a luxurious valetud- inarian, who avoided office or conspicuous positions. Nevertheless to his sagacity and fidelity Augustus owed much of his own success. He trusted him entirely in times of difficulty, even allowing him to use his signet ring at Rome when he was absent ; and though towards the end of his life (he died in B.C. 8) some coldness rose between them, Maecenas never swerved in his fidelity. Only two of Augustus' friends Salvidienus Rufus and Cornelius Gallus committed acts of disloyalty against him which entailed fatal consequences. His selection of military commanders seems (with the exception of Varus) to have been successful, and his two stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, both showed themselves men of energy and excellent soldiers. He was curiously fortunate in almost everything he undertook or had done for him. Even his survival to seventy -seven may be regarded as a stroke of good fortune, for his health had been feeble from boyhood, and he had at frequent intervals severe, and what threatened to be fatal, illnesses. His first real wife Scribonia was much older than himself, and he had married her for political reasons. Immediately after the birth of his only child lulia, he divorced her, and almost at once married Livia, whom he caused Tiberius Nero to divorce. But even this, which to our ideas seems an unpromising beginning, turned out to his happiness. Livia retained his devoted attachment and respect to the end: "Good- bye, never forget our married life" were the last words of the dying Emperor; his last conscious action was to kiss her lips. 9. The Family of Augustus and the Succession. Though Augustus was happy in his marriage, he was not fortunate in regard to the family from which his sue cessor should come. The position of the Princeps was xxi. THE FAMILY OF AUGUSTUS. 317 indeed in no sense hereditary. When Augustus died the various offices which he held, and which combined made him Princeps, would be vacant, and there was no known way of conferring them upon one man except by the ordinary forms of election, by a lex, or by votes of the Senate. Still as he went on holding these offices, and making the position of Princeps more and more a recognized and official one, it seemed to be taken for granted that one of his family would succeed him. But as one after another of these died this became impossible. As observed above, Augustus never had but one child lulia : his wife Livia brought him no children. But by Roman law adopted sons took the same rights as real sons. It was always open therefore for Caesar to put one of his relations or any one else in this position. At first, then, he looked out for a successor among the descendants of his sister Octavia, to whom he was much attached. Now Octavia was twice married. By her first husband, C. Claudius Marcellus, she had a son and two daughters. This son (the young Marcellus of Vergil) was early promoted by Augustus, with the avowed intention of making him his heir. He died, however, in B.C. 23. Octavia married a second time in B.C. 37 M. Antonius, by whom she had two daughters. For a time it was from the descendants of these that a successor was looked for, and, in point of fact, after one intervening reign, the imperial family was carried on by their descendants. But after B.C. 21 this idea was abandoned for another. In that year Agrippa, who was married to Octavia's daughter Marcella, at the wish of Augustus divorced her and married the Emperor's own daughter lulia. Within three years he had two sons born of her, Gaius in B.C. 20, Lucius in B.C. 17. In this latter year Augustus adopted both these boys, and had them educated with an avowed view to the succession. They grew up to manhood, and filled some of the magis- 318 ADOPTION OF TIBERIUS. CH. trades; and one after the other had the title of princeps iiiventutis. But in A.D. 2 Lucius Caesar died at Marseilles, and Gaius Caesar in A.D. 4 of a slight wound in Asia. Agrippa himself died in B.C. 12. After his death lulia bore a posthumous son, but he was said to be of a feeble and vicious disposition, and though Augustus adopted him in A.D. 4, on the death of Gaius, he shortly afterwards repudiated him. There were not wanting people who said that the deaths of Gaius and Lucius, and the rejec- tion of Agrippa Postumus, were the work of Livia, who wished her son Tiberius to be the successor. At any rate Augustus was now reduced to this measure. Tiberius was of an unpopular and reserved disposition, but Augustus, though he knew his faults, seems to have been attached to him. He adopted him in A.D. 4, at the same time as Agrippa Postumus, and after Agrippa's rejection Tiberius was treated as the heir and successor. He received Tribunicia potestas along with his adoptive father for ten years in A.D. 4, that he might be possessed of one of the most important functions of the Princeps in case of Augustus's death and, in order to still farther provide for the succession, Augustus required him to adopt Germanicus, son of his dead brother Drusus, though he had a son of his own. From this time Tiberius was the undisputed successor. While the Emperor's adopted sons Gaius and Lucius were alive he had retired to Rhodes and lived there in sullen retirement ; but from this time forth he takes his place, and is only absent from Italy when command- ing in Germany or Illyricum. 10. Death of Augustus. The later years of Augustus were saddened by the losses in his family, and by the military disasters across the Rhine. The destruction of Varus is said to have affected him in an extraordinary manner ; and though the exertions of Tiberius and his nephew Germanicus did something to repair the disaster, xxi. DEATH OF AUGUSTUS. 319 there was good reason for anxiety as to the safety of the Empire on the Rhine frontier. Nevertheless he retained considerable vigour and cheerfulness to the last year of his life. The end came in the course of a tour through the pleasant scenes of the Campania coast. He accompanied his adopted son and heir, Tiberius, as far as Beneventum on his way to Brundisium, from which he was going on an ex- pedition to Illyricum. Having bidden him good-bye, Augustus was going slowly back to Rome, halting at Naples, where he attended some Greek games, and joined cheerfully in a banquet that followed them. But at Astura he had caught a chill, now followed by symptoms of dysentery. Tiberius was hurriedly sent for to return, but found the Emperor dead. He had reached Nola and the house in which his father had died fifty-four years before. Finding himself dying, he admitted his friends to a las't interview, asking them with a half-sad, half-playful humour whether " he had played the farce of life well," quoting the familiar plaudite, which ended Latin plays. And when they had left the room, as he was asking for news of one of his family who had been ill, he suddenly felt that death had come, and as he tried to utter a last word of affection to Livia, and once more kiss her lips, he expired (i9th August, A.D. 14). His will had been made the year before, and deposited with the Vestal Virgins, and with it two other rolls, one containing an account of the business of the Empire, the other a statement drawn up by himself of his own achievements from the moment when the assassination of lulius called him into public life. He wished this to be inscribed on columns in Rome, and in different parts of the Empire. Fortunately one copy was written on the walls of a temple at Ancyra in Galatia, in Greek and Latin, the greater part of which is legible to this day, and tells us at any rate what Augustus believed himself to have accomplished. 3 2 LITERATURE OF THE AUGUSTINE AGE. CH. ii. Poets and Historians of the time of Augustus. It is common to speak of the age of Augustus as the golden age of Latin Literature, and indeed most of the authors whose works have survived, and are con- sidered to display the highest standard of Latin style, not only lived in his reign, but were patronized and encouraged by him, and often lived in intimacy with him. But after all those that have survived are few. The greatest of Roman writers, M. Tullius Cicero, was put to death in B.C. 43, when Augustus was only twenty years old, and can hardly be reckoned as belonging to this age, though he knew and corresponded with the young Octavian. There were histories of various kinds written during this period that have been lost, such as the History of the Civil Wars to the death of lulius, by C. Asinius Pollio, and a continuation of it by Messala. There was too a great history of Macedonia by Pompeius Trogus, of which we have an epitome or abbreviation by lustinus. A very learned man named Terentius Varro, a contemporary of Cicero, lived till B.C. 28, and one of his works on Agriculture has survived, as well as part of another on the Latin Language. But the great historian who lived at this period, and of whose work we have most, was Titus Livius. He was born in B.C. 59, about three years after Augustus, at or near Padua; he died in A.D. 17, also three years after him. He wrote a great History of Rome in 140 books from the foundation to B.C. 9, and though the earlier parts are perhaps fanciful and pretend to more certainty than was possible to obtain, the style is beautiful, and there is an evident in- tention of being honest. In the, later books (which are unfortunately lost) he told the story of his own age, and in his account of the Civil War took so much the anti- Caesarean side that Augustus used laughingly to call him the Pompeian. It is to the credit of the Emperor that he supported and patronized him in spite of this. xxi. THE POETS. 321 However, it was the poets that lived in the time of Augustus that have been the great glory of the period, and who enjoyed both the favour and munificence of Augustus. There were many poets who had a considerable reputation in their day, but those whose fame has proved lasting are Vergil, Horace, Tibullus, and Propertius. Of these the greatest name is that of P. Vergilius Maro, who was born in B.C. 70, and died in B.C. 19, being thus about seven years older than Augustus. He was born near Mantua, and suffered from the confiscations carried out in B.C. 41-40, though by the influence of Asinius Pollio he got his lands back. It was while on a visit to Rome on this business that he seems to have been introduced to Augustus, with whom he always remained in high favour, as well as with his great minister Maecenas. Vergil was not only a delightful poet who celebrated the charms of country life and the beauties of Italy, but he became a representative of his age and country. His greatest poem, the Aeneid, is a national epic meant to glorify the origin and destiny of Rome, and incidentally the descent and high mission of Augustus. It keeps permanently alive not only the spirit of the age but the highest view of Roman history. Q. Horatius Flaccus (B.C. 65-8), equally delightful as a poet, is on quite a different footing. His Odes were the first really successful attempts on a considerable scale to intro- duce lyrical poetry into Latin literature; but he too made them the means of celebrating heroic legends and great heroes of Roman history, besides preserving the feelings of ad- miration and reverence with which the Roman world of his day regarded Augustus and his family. His Satires and Epistles sometimes show us the lighter side of social life, sometimes touch rather superficially on the Greek philosophy, which served the sceptical age as a kind of religion or code of morals. Aulus Tibullus (B.C. 59-18) wrote mostly love songs or the praises of quiet life. 322 THE POETS. CH. He too had his patron among the great men of Augustus' court, M. Valerius Messalla, whom he accompanied in his expedition to Gaul. Sex. Aurelius Propertius was another of the poets patronized by Maecenas, and more or less connected with the court. He was con- siderably younger than those mentioned above (though the dates of his birth and death are uncertain), and never so popular as a poet. He, however, helped to glorify Augustus and make his reign famous. Lastly, P. Ovidius Naso, born in B.C. 43 at Sulmo, came of a well-to-do equestrian family, and was intended by his father for a political and official career. But his bent for poetry and for a life of leisure and freedom, or perhaps frivolity, was too strong, and he declined to stand for any office that would bring him into the Senate. He does not seem to have belonged to the Maecenas set, though he knew Propertius and some others who did, and had heard Horace recite his poems, which he only did in private society. He was only on the fringe of this inner circle, and probably was never admitted to close intimacy with Augustus, although his Fasti are said to have been undertaken by the Emperor's wish. Yet he lived with men of high rank, and his third wife was a daughter of Fabius Maximus and intimate with relations of Augustus and Livia. He is almost the only instance of severity on the part of Augustus to a literary man as such. In A.D. 8 he was suddenly banished, and forced to live the remainder of his days at Tomi on the Black Sea, about forty miles south of the Danube, and on the extreme verge of the Empire, where he remained till his death in A.D. 18. The cause of his banishment is not really known. It was unlike Augustus to punish a poet for his work mere personal satire he laughed at, as he could afford to do ; and though the reason given was the immorality of Ovid's verse, that would justly have applied to many other writers xxi. CHARACTER AND CAREER OF AUGUSTUS. 323 of the day. The most common theory is that he knew something as to the misconduct of the Emperor's grand- daughter lulia, who was banished in the same year. So far as Augustus employed or influenced the employment of his muse, it was again, as in the case of Vergil, employed in stirring up interest in Roman religion and the great history of Rome. The Fasti or Calendar, with its days marked by great events, gave him the opportunity of dilating on Roman heroes, as well as on the chief points in the career of Augustus himself, and thus he became a national as well as a court poet. One of the points in the character of Augustus drawn by Suetonius was his support of men of genius, and a true picture of his court cannot be conceived without taking into consideration this group of literary men which surrounded him and to whom he often gave lavishly. They repaid him by making his praises known far and wide, quite outbalancing the few who wrote against him. It is a great thing for a man's fame both in his life-time and after his death to have the good word of poets and men of letters. It was one of the misfortunes of lulius Caesar that he had most of such men against him. Augustus neglected no means of making his government liked and his person revered. 12. What Augustus had to do and how he did it. The reign of Augustus may be reckoned as extending from B.C. 30 to A.D. 14, forty-four years, during which he was ceaselessly employed in defending or ruling the Empire. The general result of his government was with- out doubt to increase the happiness of the world. We must remember what the Roman Empire was. It con- sisted of a vast number of different nations, not at one in origin, habits, or language. At the census of B.C. 28 the number of full citizens returned was little more than four millions. That must have been scarcely a tenth 324 GOVERNMENT OF AUGUSTUS. CH. of the inhabitants of the Empire. Therefore Augustus had to govern a large dominion in which only a tenth of the inhabitants had political rights, or in the political sense, freedom. He did it in a way which made men on the whole happier and more contented. How was this? Partly, no doubt, it was the effect of the previous harshness of the Republic. There had been a time when in south-eastern Europe and in Asia num- berless communities, many of them quite small, cared for nothing so much as political independence, the right of conducting their own affairs, and making wars or alliances as they chose. The severe rule of the Republic had crushed that spirit. Men were content now with being allowed to manage nothing more than municipal business, if only they had protection from violence and oppression, and could pursue their trades, cultivate their farms, and grow rich by merchandise without being ill-used by imperial magistrates or harried and robbed by barbarians or pirates. Now it was just this security which Augustus gave them. He took care that the magistrates sent out to govern did not oppress or rob the people, he kept the sea free from pirates, and defended the countries bordered by dangerous barbarians. The pax Romana was enforced everywhere ; and yet in quiet provinces there was no great army to exhaust or overawe the people. No wonder then, that after generations of oppression, or miseries from civil and border wars, these peoples were inclined to regard Augustus as a praesens Deus almost a god of peace and security. The same sentiments prevailed in Italy. " Oh, best guardian of the race of Romulus," writes Horace when Augustus had been three years absent, " return ! . . . your country calls for you with vows and prayer ... for when you are here the ox plods up and down the fields in safety ; Ceres and bounteous blessing cheer our farms ; our sailors speed o'er seas infested by no pirate ; credit XXL REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF AUGUSTUS. 325 is kept unspotted ; crime is checked ; family life purified ; none fears the invasion of Parthian or German . . . each man closes a peaceful day on his native hills, trains his vines to the widowed trees, and home returning, light of heart, quaffs his wine and blesses you as his god ! " It was this senti- ment, though not expressed always in such lyrical terms, that made the success of Augustus. He was at home and abroad the pledge of peace and security. Accordingly, though there were still many who in theory preferred the old Republican form of government (which, indeed, Augustus professed to maintain), there were never in all this long reign any plots or conspiracies of importance against his person. The few that did occur he could afford to treat with magnanimity and wise leniency. Augustus was a great statesman. Within certain limits he could endure opposition without feeling angry with opponents or treating them harshly. Yet he could be severe at times, for he loved justice and order, and thought loyalty to his government was a moral duty. His tastes and habits were simple. He disliked display and pomp, long banquets, and much wine. Perhaps he was, as some said, cold-blooded and deficient in enthusiasm. Yet his family affections were warm and constant ; he seldom lost a friend ; he liked to have children about him ; enjoyed the company of men of letters, and was courteous and gay in society. His health was always delicate, and it is not impossible that he may have been really sincere in his twice expressed wish to retire from his position and restore the republican machinery to full working order. But whether he was sincere or no, the thing was plainly impossible. Disorder and party spirit were only put to sleep, they were not dead. The restrain- ing hand once off, the eager rivalry for office and plunder was ready to begin again. The Senate could not secure the loyalty of legions and their commanders ; 326 FORCED TO CONTINUE EMPEROR. CH. xxi. nor could the rabble of Rome, idle, needy, and venal, be trusted to select magistrates who should afterwards, with- out training or high character, have a prescriptive right to govern provinces and command armies, without a supreme master to recall or punish them. Augustus was not the first or the last man who has found himself bound to a task, which he could not avoid if he would, and which has ended in becoming so much a part of himself that he would not lay it aside even if he could. REMAINS OF THE ROSTRA OF IULIUS. INDEX. Abydos, siege of, 120. Acarnania, 121. Achaean League, the, 88, 114, 121, 133. Acheron, R., 299. Achillas, 266. Acilius Glabrio, M', in Greece, 123, 124, 133. Governor of Bithynia and Pontus, 205. Acrocorinthus, 113, 121, 122. Actium, battle of, 194, 298-300, 3I5- Adherbal, 157. Aediles, 37, 38, 73. Aedui, 241, 242. Aeginium, 264. Aegusae, battle of, 82. Aemilius Claudius, L. , 50. Aemilius Lepidus, M., revolt of, 197- Aemilius Lepidus, M. (Triumvir), 259, 261, 273, 285-287, 289, 292, 293, 295. Aemilius Papus, Q. , 163. 3, L., 102. Aemilius Paulus, L., at Cannae, Aemilius Paulus, L. (in Liguria), 127. Aemilius Scaurus, M., 127. Aemilius Scaurus, M. (first Gover- nor of Syria), 209. Aenaria, 169. Aeneas of Troy, 7. Aequians, the, 5, 31, 32. Aes CorinthiacTim , 133. Aesernia, 57, 65. Aesis, R., 40. Aesium, 57. Aethiopia, 309. Aetolian League, the, 88, 114, 121 ; war with, 122-126. Afranius, L., 260, 273. Africa, province of, 193, 293, 301. Agathocles of Syracuse, 60. Ager publicus, 36, 53, 89, 144, 213. Agger Servii, 14. Agrigentum, 108. Agrippa, see Vipsanius. Agrippa Postumus, 318. Ahala, C. Servilius, 40, 279. Alba Fucentia, 57. Alba Longa, 7, 31 ; destruction of, 12 ; war with, 21. Alban Mount, the, 8. Albani (Asia), 207. Alesia, 245. Alexander, king of the Molossi, 60. Alexander, Macedonian Pretender, 132. Alexandria, 266 ; Caesar at, 267- 269, 302. Algidus, Mt, 31. Allobroges, 225, 226. Alps, the, 2, 3, 97, 98 ; Alpine provinces: Cottiae, Maritimae, Penninae, 309. Alsium, 57. Amanus, Mt., 207. Ambracia, 125, 126. 327 328 INDEX. Ambrones, 159. Amphipolis, 265. Amulius, 7. Anagnia, 61. Ancona, 255. Ancus Marcius, 12. Ancyra, inscription at, 319. Andriscus, 132. Annius Milo, P., 250, 269, 270. Antioch, 268, 270. Antiochus the Great, king of Syria, 120; war with, 122-124. Antiochus Epiphanes, 130. Antiochus Asiaticus, 204. Antiochus, king of Commagene, 209. Antium, 32, 55, 171. Antonius, C. (brother of the Triumvir), 283. Antonius, C. (Cicero's colleague), 223, 225, 238. Antonius, C. (Creticus), 206. Antonius, L. (brother of the Triumvir), 291, 292. Antonius, M. (the Orator), 171. Antonius, M. (the Triumvir), 252- 2 54> 259, 262, 270, 282, 284, 285, 292, 293, 296-302, 317. Anxur, 55. Aous, R., gorge of the, 120. Apennines, the, 2, 255, 277. Apollonia, 120, 262, 315. Appian Way, the, 50, 54, 171, 201, 217, 250. Appuleius Saturninus, L. , 163. Apuani, the, 127. Apuli, the, 4, 59. Apulia, Roman protectorate in, 50, 53- Aquae Statiellae, 127 ; Aquae Sextiae, 155, 159, 169 Aquileia, 58, 126. Aquilius, M', 143, 179. Aquitania, 236, 306. Arabia Petraea, 39, 207. Arar, R., 24. A rat ores, 213. Archelaus (officer of Mithridates), 1 80. Archelaus of Comana, 209. Archimedes, 107. Ardea, 1 6, 25, 32, 55. Argos, 122, 133. Ariminum, 57, 101, 255. Ariovistus, 237, 241, 242. Aristarchus, king of Colchis, 209. Aristobulus, 208. Aristonicus, 175. Armenia, 179, 203, 209, 295, 296, 309. Army, the Roman, at first a temporary militia, 19 ; first paid, 35 ; organization at the time of Punic wars, 68 ; changes in, made by Marius, 162. Arpi, 101. Arsanias, Mt., 204. Arsinoe, 269. Arverni, 245. Ascanius, 7- Asculum, battle of, 63 ; revolt at, 65, 66. Asia, 124, 125 ; province of, 147, 148, 154, 175, 180, 193, 300; taxes in, 216, 232. Asia (Upper), settlement of, by Pompey, 209. Asinius Pollio, C., 293, 320. Astura, 46. Athens, 88, 120, 1345 Sulla's siege of, 181. Athesis, R., 156. Atilius Regulus, M., 81. Atilius Regulus, C., 97. Attaleia, in Pamphylia, 266. Attalus I., king of Pergamus, 114, 120. Attalus III., king of Pergamus, 147, 174. Attius Varus, P., 255, 261, 268, 271. Augustus, with lulius in Spain, 279 ; ; in Rome after the assas- sination, 283 ; Consul, 284 ; joins Antony, 286, 287 ; his rising influence, 294, 295 ; his Principate, 303-326 ; his restor ations and laws, 311-314; his death, 318. Aurelius Cotta, M., 203. INDEX. 3 2 9 Aurelius Propertius, Sext,, 322. Aurunci, the, 5. Auximum, 58, 255, 261. Aventine, the, n, 153. Baetis, R., Baetica, 108, 261. Balearic Isles, 156. Belgica, 236, 242, 243, 306. Beneventum, battle of, 64 ; colony at, 57, 65. Bibulus, M., 234, 249, 252, 262. Bithynia, 174, 202, 208. Bocchus, king of Mauretania, 158. Boeotia, 123, 134, 181. Boii, the, 59, 86, 97, 126. BonaDea, 231. Bononia, 57, 126, 127. Bovianum, 166. Bovillae, 250. Bribery, laws against, 131. Britain, Caesar's first invasion of, 243, 244 ; second invasion, 244 ; intercourse with Augustus, 311. Brundisium, 57, 173, 256, 258; peace of, 293. Bruttium, 4 ; Bruttii, punishment of the, 1 1 6. Brutus, see lunius. Brutus, Decimus, 260, 280, 284, 286. Buxentum, 57. Cabira (Galatia), 203. Caecilius Metellus, Q. (Cos. B.C. 147), 133- Caecilius Metellus, Q. (in lugur- thine war), 157, 163, 170, 171. Creticus, 206. Caelius, M., 251, 269. Caenina, II. Caere, 47. Caesar, see lulius and Augustus. Caesar, Gaius, 317, 318. Caesar, Lucius, 317, 318. Caesarion, 297. Calatia, 50. Calendar, reforms in the, n, 175. Cales, 49, 55. Camillus, M. Furius, 34, 41, 42, 45- Campania, invaded by Samnites, 51 ; Hannibal in, 104; colonies in, 117; public land in, 153, 213, 233. Campus Martius, the, 13. Candace, 309. Cannae, battle of, 102-105. Cantabri, 308, 315. Canuleius, C., 39. Capite censi, 23, 162. Capitolinus, Mons, 9-11; luppiter, 1 6. Cappadocia, 174, 176, 201, 202, 209. Capua, 50 ; siege of, 104, 105 ; see also 151, 170, 200, 252. Caria, 123. Carseoli, 57. Carthage, commerce of, 2 ; early treaty with, 19; power of, in Sicily, 63, 64 ; rivalry of, with Rome, 66 ; constitution of, 74, 75 > compared with Rome, 75 > 76 ; first war with, 76, 77 ; mercenary war at, 84 ; second war with, 92-113; destruction of, 133-137 ; colony in (lunonia), 151, 152; Marius at, 189; Caesar's colony in, 278. Carthage, New (Carthagena), 95, 109, 1 10. Casinum, 55. Cassius, Longinus, C., 252, 268, 280, 283, 285, 288, 308. Cassius, Longinus, L., 156. Cassius, Q., 253, 254. Cassius, Spurius, 31, 38. Cassivelaunus, 244. Castor and Pollux, 31. Castrum Novum, 57. Catilina, see Sergius. Cato, see Porcius. Caucasus, Mt., 207. Caudine Forks, the, 49. Celtiberians, the, 137. Censorship, the, 39, 71. Centuriae, 22, 90, 91 ; Comitia Centuriata, 118, 187. Cephisus, R., 181. Cercina, 169. 330 INDEX. Ceres, 26. Chaeronea, battle of, 181. Chalcis, 113, 121-123. Chauci, 310. Chersonesus Taurica, 178; Thrac- ian, 122. Cicero, see Tullius. Cilicia, 175, 179, 193, 201, 203, 206, 295, 306. Cilnius Maecenas, C., 293, 316. Cimbri, the, 156, 159, 160. Ciminian Forest, the, 44. Cinca, R., 260. Cincinnatus, 32, 40. Cineas, 63. Cinna, see Cornelius. Circeii, 16, 32, 55, 168. Circus Maximus, 9. Cirta, 157. Civitates foederatae, 49, 66, 83, 117, 160, 191. Claudius, Appius, father-in-law of Tib. Gracchus, 147. Claudius, Appius (legate of Sulla), 170. Claudius Caecus, Appius, 54, 63, 90. Claudius Marcellus, C., 253. Claudius Marcellus, C. (husband and son of Octavia), 317. Claudius Marcellus, M., 104, 105 ; his siege of Syracuse, 107, 108 ; his death, 105. Claudius Nero, C., 106, 107. Cleopatra, 266, 268, 292, 296, 298-302, 306. Cloaca maxima, 13. Clodius Pulcher, Publ. , 204, 223 ; his sacrilege, 231 ; procures Cicero's exile, 237, 238; mur- dered by Milo, 250. Cloelia, 30. Clusium, 29, 40, 184. Coelius, Mons, 9, n, 12. Collatia, 13. Colleges, the sacred, 188. Colline gate, the battles at the, 17, 184. Colonies, 43, 55-58, 65, 117. Columna rostrata, 80, Comana, 270. Comitia Curiata> 2O, 23, 238; Comitia Tributa, 38, 54, 90, 91, 1 1 8, 187 ; see also Centuriae. Conquisitores, 68. Consuls originally called praetors, ^ 25>7I< Corcyra, 87, 114. Corfmium, 257. Corinth, burning of, 133, 134; colony at, 278. Coriolanus, 32. Corn, price of, 63 ; distributions of, 38, 151, 154, 197, 279. Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, 144.^ Cornelii, persons enfranchized by Sulla, 1 88. Cornelius Cethegus, C. , 226. Cornelius Cinna, L., 170, 181,216. Cornelius Dolabella, P., 270, 285. Cornelius Gallus, C., 301. Cornelius Lentulus, L., 253. Cornelius Lentulus, P., 226. Cornelius Scipio, P., father of Africanus, 97, 108. Cornelius Scipio, Gn., brother of preceding, 108. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P., 109-113. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L., 124. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. (Aemilianus), 137, 138, 147. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, P., 126; (his son), 147. Cornelius Sulla, L., 158, 166, 167; in Greece, 180-183; his advance upon Rome, 183 ; his dictatorship and legislation, 185- 189 ; see also 215. Cornificius, Q., 285. Corsica, 80, 83, 85, 86, 193. Cosa, 57, 65, 259. Country life, 119. Crassius, see Licinius. Cremra, R., 32. Cremona, 57, 86, 97, 117. Crete, 193. Crimea, the, 207. INDEX. 331 Critolaus, 133. Croton, 57. Cures, ii. Curiae, 20, 23 ; Curio, 27. Curiatii and Horatii, 21. Curio, C., 253, 259, 261. Curius Dentatus, 52, 64. Curules Magistrates ; 71. Cyclades, the, 120. Cynoscephalae, battle of, 121. Cyrene, 193. Cyzicus, 203, 301. Danube, R., 306, 309. Decemvirs, the, 38, 39 ; decemviri sacrorum, 54. Decius Mus, P., 47, 48. Deiotarus, 203, 270. Delium, 123. Delos, 1 80. Demetrias, 113, 121-123. Demetrius of Pharos, 87. Dertona, 58. Diaeus, 133. Diana, temple of, 16. Dictatorship, the, 25, 73; of Sulla, 185; of Caesar, 261, 274. Didius, C., 276. Domitius Ahenobarbus, L. (Prae- tor i?.C. 96), 143. Domitius Ahenobarbus, L. (Cos. B.C. 54), 257, 259, 261. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. , 288, 290, 292, 293, 297. Domitius Calvinus, 264. Drepana, 82. Drusus, step-son of Augustus, 309. Duilius, C., 80. Duoviri (of a colony), 44 ; duoviri navales, 70. Dyrrachium, 132, 260, 262. Ebro, R., 95, 108, 261. Ecnomus, battle of, So, 81. Egypt, 120, 130,266,297,301; pro- vince of, 306-308. Elateia, 181. Elea, 78. Empire, extent of in B.C. 146, 138; at the death of Sulla, 190; in time of Augustus, 306 ; partition of by Triumvirs, 286, 287, 289, 293- . Emporiae, 95* Enipeus, R., 129. Ennius, Q. , 119. Epicydes, 107. Epirus, reduced to subjection, 129. Eporedia, 58. qtiites,2T > , 148, 154; quarrel with Senate, 213, 233. Ergastulci) 142. Eryx, Mt., 82. Etruria, Sulla's colonists in, 223. Etruscans, the, 4, 8, 13, 29, 44, 52 ; religion of, 23. Euboea, 120, 134. Eumenes, king of Pergamus, 129. Eunus, 142. Euphrates, 207, 308. Evander, 7. Fabii, fall of the, 32-34. Fabius, C., 260. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Q., 96, 101, 102. Fabius Sanga, 226. Fabrateria (Fregellae), 58, 151. Fabricius Luscinus, C., 63. Faesulae, ibo, 224, 225. Fanum, 255. Feronia, fair at, 12. Fidenae, II, 34. Fimbria, C. (legate of Valerius Flac- cus), 183. Firmum, 57, 65. Flamen, 27. Flaminius, C., 87, IOO, 101. Flavius, Cn., 54, 55. Flora, 26. Forum boaritun, 19. Forum Gallorum, 284. Forum lulii, 312. Fregellae, 49, 55, 61. Fregenae, 57. Frentani, 66. Frisii, 2IO. Fucinus, lacus, 277. Fulvia betrays the Catiline con- spiracy, 224. 332 INDEX. Fulvia, wife of Antony, 291-293. Fulvius Flaecus, M., 153. Fulvius Nobilior, M., 125. Furies, grove of the, 153. Gabinius(a Catilinian conspirator), 226, Gabinius, Aulus, 202, 205, 266. Gabino cinctu, 8. Galatia, 125, 203, 205, 276, 306. Gallia Celtica, 236. Gallia Cisalpina, 55 Togata, 126, 127 ; Caesar in, 235. Gallia Transalpina, the province in, 155, 235-237 ; lands in, 163 ; Caesar in, 240-246. Gallus, Aelius, 309. Gallus, Cornelius, 316. Gaul, four provinces in, 306. Gauls burn Rome, 40, 41 ; wars with, 44, 45, 86, 87 ; join Hannibal, 98, 101 ; cease to help Hannibal, 107. Gaurus, Mt., 46. Gelo of Syracuse, 38. GenteS) 2O. Gergovia, 245. Germania, superior and inferior, 306, 310. Germanicus, 318. Germans, 237, 241-243, 310, Gladiators, 200. Gracchus, see Sempronius. Graviscae, 58. Great Plains, battle in the, 112. Greece, 2, 89 ; Macedonian su- premacy in, 114; treatment of, by Rome, 130, 134, 193; Greek towns in Italy supply ships, 78 ; Greek influence in Rome, 89, 119; Greek States in league with Rome against Macedonia, 115; Greek cities in Asia, 123. Hadria, 57. Halycus, R., 76, 79- Hamilcar Barca, 82, 93, 94. Hannibal, 93 ; elected commander in Spain, 95 ; his oath, 96 ; his march to Italy, 97, 98 ; his vic- tories in Italy, 99, 100 ; in South Italy, 101-104; in Asia, 123, 124. Hanno at Messana, 78. Hasdrubal, brother-in-law of Han- nibal, 95. Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, 106, 107, 109. Hastati^ 68. Helvetii, the, 240, 241. Heraclea, battle of, 6l. Hercte, Mt., 82. Hercules, 19. Hermaeum, 81. Hernici, the, 5, 16, 38. Hiempsal, 157, 169. Hiero of Syracuse, 78, 79, 107. Hieronymus, 107. Hills, the seven, 14. Hippocrates, 107. Hirtius, Aulus, 284. Homer, 7. Horatii, the, 21. Horatius Codes, 29. Horatius Flaecus, Q., 288, 321. Hortensius (Iegat2 of Sulla), 18. Hyrcanus, 208. Ilerda, 260. liipa in Spain, battle of, no. Illyricum, 87, 114, 129, 193, 235, 295-. Imperium, 71. Indibilis, no. Ingauni, 127. Insubres, 86, 126. Interamna Lirinas, 55. Interrex, 2O. Isaurians, the, 201. Isthmian Games, proclamation at, 121, 122. Italia, extension of name, 2-4; bad state of, in the 2nd century B.C., 143 ; amalgamated with Roman State, 191 ; depopulation of, 212, 213. Italians and the citizenship, 147, I5 2 - Italica (Corfinium), 165, 166. Italus, King, 4. INDEX. 333 laniculum, 10, 29, 153, 171. lanus, 26 ; temple of, closed, 86, 304. Jerusalem, capture of, by Pompey, 208. lews, the, 131, 209. lovis, 26. luba, 261, 271, 273. ludicta, 149, 205, 215. lugurtha, 138, 156, 157. lulia, wife of Marius, 1 38. Julia, wife of Pompey, 234, 250. lulia, mother of Antony, 293. lulia, daughter of Augustus, 294, 3 r 5> 3 l 7'> granddaughter, 323. lulius Caesar, L. (Cos. B.C. 90), 1 66. lulius Caesar, L. (his son), 255, 257, 278. lulius Caesar, C. (Dictator), 190, 203, 216, 218; advises against executing the Catiline conspira- tors, 226 ; pontifex maximus, 230 ; his provinces, 234, 235 ; his campaigns, in Gaul, 240-6 ; crosses the Rubicon, 253, 254 ; besieges Marseilles, 260; de- feats Pompey's legates in Spain, 260, 261 ; Dictator and Consul, 261,262; in Epirus, 262, 263 ; de- feats Pompey in Pharsalia, 264, 265; in Egypt, 267-270; settles Asia, 270, 271 ; Dictator, 269, 274; in Africa, 271-273; his reforms, 274-278; in Spain, 276, 277 ; death, 280, 281. lunius Brutus, M. (first consul), 30. lunius Brutus, M. (father of the assassin of Caesar), 197. lunius Brutus, M., 279, 280, 281, 283,288. lunius Norbanus, C., 183. lunius Silvanus, M. , 156. luno, temple of, 41. luppiter Capitolinus, temple of, 13, 16. lus conubii, ius honorum^ 38. lustinus, 320. Khur, R., 207. Kings, the seven, 10-16 ; expulsion of, 1 6, 23. Labicum, 32. Lacinian promontory, 60, 105,107. Lade, battle of, 120. Laelius, C. , 112. Lamia, 123. Larissa, 121, 264, 265. Latifundia, 119. Latin League, the, 5, 12, 16, 28, 29, 30, 31 ; dissolved, 46, 47. LatinitciS) 166, 235. Latinus, king, 7. Latium vetus, 5, 16. Lavinium, 7. Lesbos, 216, 265. Lex Calpurnia de repetundis, 131; Canuleia, 39; Rupilia, 143; lulia (B.C. 90), 166 ; Papiria Plautia, 1 66 ; Pompcia, 166 ; Gabinia, 205 ; Manilia, 207 ; Vatinia, 235. Liber, 26. Licinian rogations, 53. Licinius Crassus, L., 164. LiciniusCrassus, M., 200, 218, 219, 233, 248, 249, 250, 308, 309. Licinius Lucullus, L., 203, 220. Licinius Muraena, 201. Ligurians, the, 86, 107, 117, 126, 127. Lilybaeum, 81, in. Lingones, 41. Liparae Insulae, 83. Liris, R., 7. Lissus, 262. Liternum, 57. Livia, wife of Augustus, 294, 316, Livius Andronicus, 89, 119. Livius Drusus, M. (the elder), 152; (the younger), 164. Livius Macatus, M., 105. Livius, M. (Cos. B.C. 207), 106. Livius, Titus, 320. Locri Epizypherii, 78. Lollius, M., 310. Lucani, the, 4, 59, 68, 165. Lucania, protectorate in, 50. 334 INDEX. Lucca, 58, 126, 127; conference at, 2 4 9 : Lucena, 55. Lucre tia, 25. Lucullus, see Licinius. Lugdunensis, 306. Luna, 58, 126. Lupercalia, 19, 278. Lupercus, 26. Lusitani, 137, 197, 198. Lutatius Catulus, C., 82. Lutatius Catulus, Q., 159, 171. Lutatius Catulus, Q. (Cos. B.C. 78), 197, 220. Lycaonia and Galatia, province of, 306. Macedonia, first war with, 1 1 3- 1 1 5 ; second war with, 119-124; third war with, 128, 129; division of, into four districts, 120; province of, 132, 133, 193, 285. Machares, 207. Macra, R., 2. Maelius, Spurius, 40. Magna Graecia, 5, 59, 117. Magnesia ad Sipylum, battle of, 124. Mago, brother of Hannibal, no, 112, Maharbal, his advice to Hannibal, 104. Mamertine Prison, the, 158, 227. Mamertines, the, 64, 65, 77, 78. Manilius, C., 207. Manlius, C., his camp at Faesulae, 224-228. Manlius, M., defends the Capitol, 41 ; put to death, 53. Manlius, T., 47. Manlius Vulso, Cn., 125. Marcella, 315. Marcellus, see Claudius. Marius, C., 138, 157, 160-163, 167-172. Marius, C. (the younger), 184. Marius, the One-eyed, M., 203. Marrucini, 66, 165, Mars, temple of, 31. Marsi, the. o, 66. Masannasa, 110-113, 134, 135, 138, 156. Massilia, 155, 225, 259, 260, 261. Massiva, 157. Mastanabal, 156. Mathos, 84. Mauretania, 271, 306. Mausoleum at Alexandria, 301. Mavers, 26. Memmius, C., 163. Mesopotamia, 204, 309. Metapontum, 4. Metaurus, R., battle of the, 106, 107. Metellus Scipio Pius(Q. Caecilius), father-in-law of Pompey, 251, 257, 264, 271. Mevania, 50. Micipsa, 156. Milo, see Annius. Milvian Bridge, the, 197. Minerva, 26. Minervia, 58. Minturnae, 57, 168. Minucius, 102. Misenum, peace of, 293, 294; fleet at, 312. Mithridates, 167,176-182,201-205, 207 ; death of, 208. Mitylene, 201, 209. Moesia, 306. Mons sacer, 37. Morini, 243. Mucius, Caius, 30. Mucius Scaevola, Q., 164, 176. Munatius Plaucus, L., 286. Munda, battle of, 276. Mundtts, 8. Municipiiini, 66, 68, 1 66. Municius (Tr. PI.), 152. Murcia vail is, 9. Mutina, 58, 87, 126, 197, 284. Mylae, battle of, 80. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, 122. Naevius, Cn., 89. Narbo Martius, 155, 156. Narbonensis, 306. Narnia, 57. Neapolis, 49, 78, 104. Nepete, 55. INDEX. 335 Neptunia, 58, 151, 153. Nervii, 242, 244. Nexunit 36, 53. Nicomedes, 202. Nicomedia, 203. Nola, 50, 104, 166, 168-170. Women Latinum, 10. Norba, 32, 55. Noreia, 156. Numa Pompilius, II, 275. Numantia, siege of, 138, 157. Numidia, no, 156, 157, 289. Numitor, 7- Nursia, 291. Octavia, sister of Augustus, 293- 295, 317. Octavius M. (Tr. PI. B.C. 133), 145- Octavius, Cn. (Cos. B.C. 87), 170. Octavius, C., see Augustus. Opimius, L., 153. Oppius, Q., 179. Optimates, 1 1 8, 1 6 1, 167, 195, 196, 214. Orchomenus (in Arcadia), 133; (in Boeotia), 181, 182. Ordo equester^ 148, 149. Oricum, 262. Orodes, 266. Ostia, 12, 17, 55, 171, 277. Ovidius Naso, P., 322. Paestum, 4, 57, 65. Palaepolis, 49. Palatine, the, 7, 8. Palestine, 295. Palilia, 10, 19. Palladium, 27, 41. Pamphylia, 201. Panormus, 81. Paphlagonia, 179. Papirius Carbo, C. (land commis- sioner), 147. Papirius Carbo, C., 166. Papirius Carbo, Cn., 156, 170, 172, 183. Papirius Cursor, L., 50, 65. Paraetonium, 301. Parma, 58, 87. Parthians, the, 207, 250, 252, 265, 293, 295, 308. Parthini, the, 293. Patria potestas, 238. Patricians, 23, 36, 37, 53, 54, 304. Pedius, Q., 285. Pedum, 46. Peligni, 66, 165. Pelusium, 266, 268, 269, 301. PerduelliO) 21. Pergamos, 14, 148, 201. Perpenna, M., 198. Perseus, 129. Perusia, 100; siege of, 292, 315. Petilia, 201. Petreius, M., 260, 273. Petronius, 309. Phanagoria, 209. Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, 209, 270. Pharos, 269. Pharsalia, battle of, 264, 265. P basis, R., 207. Philip V., king of Macedonia, first war with, 113-115; second war with, 119-121 ; death of, 129. Philippi, battles of, 287-289. Phoenice, peace of, 114, 119. Phoenicians, 207. Picentes, 66. Pinarius S carpus, Q., 301. Pirates, 175, 183. Pisae, 58, 126, 127. Pisaurum, 57, 255. Pisidians, 125, 201. Pistoria, 228. Placentia, 57, 86, 87, 98. Plautius Silvanus, M., 166. Plautus, T. Maccius, 1 19. Plebs, 21,22; struggles for equality, 35-40, 53-55, 139 ; plebiscita, 40, 54- Po (Padanus), R., 4, 117. Pompaedius, Silo, 295. Pompeius Strabo, C., 166, 170. Pompeius Rufus, Q., 168, 170. Pompeius Magnus, Cn., 184, 190, 197, 198, 205-210, 214, 21 5; sup- ported by Caesar, 21 7; character of, 218 j his position after his 336 INDEX. return from the East, 231, 232 ; praefectus annonae^ 248 ; at Lucca, 249 ; sole consul, 250, 251 ; his provinces in Spain, 249, 250, 252; quits Italy, 257; defeats Caesar near Apollonia, 264 ; defeated at Pharsalia, 265 ; his death, 266, 267. Pompeius, Cn., at Munda, 276,277. Pompeius Sextus, 276 283, 285, 289, 293-295. Pomptine Marshes, 16, 277. Pons Sublicius, 12, 29. Pontifex maximus, 26. Pontiae, 55, 70. Pontius, Caius, 49. Pontus, kingdom of, 176, 271, 274. Pontus, the, 176, 177, 202, 208 Popilius Laenas, C., 130. Populares, 118, 161, 167, 215. Populifttndt, 1 66. Porcius Laeca, M., 224. Porcius Cato, M. (the Censor), 128, 135. Porcius Cato, M. (Uticensis), 221, 240, 259, 271-273. Porsena, 29. Postumius Albus, A., 31. Postumius, Sp., 49. Potentia, 57, 126. Pothinus, 267-269. Praeneste, 61, 184. Praetorship, the, 54, 71; praetor peregrimis, 88. Princeps, 305, 316, 317. Princeps Senatus, 304. Principes, 68. Proconsular* imperium, 305. Procurator, 305. Proscriptions, 184, 287. Province, first, 83 ; spoliation of the provinces, 131 ; numbers and government of, 191-193 ; grievances in, 214 ; division be- tween the Emperor and Senate, 304, 305- Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, 120. Ptolemy Auletes, 248. Ptolemy XII., 266, 268, 269, 274. Ptolemy XIII. , 269. Publicani, 150, 175, 232. Punic Wars, I., 76-83; II. ,92-1 15; III., 134-137. Puteoli, 57. Pydna, battle of, 129. Pygi, 57- Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, invader Italy, 60-63 ; goes to Sicily, 63, 64; defeated at Beneventum, 64, 65; his capital, 125. Qtiaestiones perpetuae, 131, 149, 189, 215. Quaestors, 72. Quintius Flamininus, T., 120-122. Quirinal, the, n. Quirites, 1 1 ; fossa Quiritiuw, 1 2. Ramnes, Titii, and Luceres, 20. Raudian plains, the, 160. Ravenna, 253, 255 ; fleet at, 312. Regillus, Lake, battle of, 31. Regulus, see Atilius. Religion of Rome, 25-27 ; affected by Greek theology, 26. Rhegium, capture of, 65. Rhine, Caesar crosses the,243; 308. Rhodes, 120, 124, 180, 203, 217, 265. Rhone, R., 97, 98, 241, 309. Robigus, 2. Roma quadrata, 8. Roman history, importance of, I, 2; government, 70, 71; magis- trates, 71-73; Senate, 73, 74; navy, 70, 79 ; growth of empire, 138, 139; supremacy in Medi- terranean, 113; ager Romanus, 10. Rome, site of, 7 ; date of founda- tion, 10; origin of name, 18; walls of, 13. Romulus, rei'gn of, 10; Romulus and Remus, legend of, 7, 20. Rorarii, 68. Rubicon, R., 2, 255. Rupilius, P., 143. Rutilius Lupus, P., 166. Rutilius Rufus, P., 176. INDEX. 337 Sabellians, the, 4. Sabine women, seizure of, n ; Sabines, 5; joint occupation of Rome, II ; wars with, 12. Saguntum, 95, 96. Salassi, 295. Salernum, 57. Saltus Castulonensis, 95, 108. Salvidienus Rufus, 291, 316. Salvius, 266. Samnites, the, 5, 13, 45; first war with, 46; second war with, 48- 50 ; third war with, 50-53 ; in the Social war, 165, 166; Sulla's severities to, 186; Samnium, 7. Samos, 298, 301. Sardinia, 79; made a Roman pro- vince, 84, 112, 193, 261, 291. Saticula, 46, 55. Satricum, 55. Saturnia, 9, (Etruria) 58. Saturninus, see Appuleius, Scipio, see Cornelius. Scotussa, 264. Scribonia, wife of Augustus, 292, 294. Secession of Plebs, 37. Sempronius Gracchus, Tib. (the elder), 128, 138. Sempronius Gracchus, Tib. (Tr. PL B.C. 133), 144-146. Sem pronius Gracchus, C., 148-152. Sempronius Longus, Tib., 98. Sena Gallica, 57. Sena, R., 106. Senate, the, 20, 73, 74, 90, 118; Sulla's reform of, 186 ; hostility of Equites to, 2 1 5 ; treatment of, by lulius Caesar, 278 ; relations with Augustus, 313. Senatus consultum ultimum, 146, 151, 224, 228, 254, 255. Senones, 40, 41, 52, 59. Sentinum, 291. Septimius, 266. Septimontium ^ IO. Sergius Catilina, L., 185, 222-228. Sertorius, Q., 170, 197-199* 203. Servilius Caepio, Q., 137. Servilius Glaucia, C, 163. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, P., 201, 206. Servius Tullius, 13, 14; his re- forms, 22, 23 ; his wall, 14. Setia, 55. Sextius Calvinus, C., 155. Sibyl, the, 27. Sicambri, 243, 310. Sicily, Pyrrhus in, 63 ; war in, 79-82, 107, 108 ; made a pro- vince, 83; Marcellusin, 107, 108; slave war in, 142, 143 ; aban- doned by Cato, 261 ; held by Sext. Pompeius, 291. Sicoris, R., 260, 261. Sicyon, 134. Sidon, 209. Signia, 16, 31, 55. Sinope, 202. Sinuessa, 57. Sipontum, 57. Slaves, 141, 142. Social war, 64-167. Socii navales, 80. Soldiers, pay of, 35. Sora, 57. Soracte, Mt., 12. Sosius, C., 295, 297. Spain, 92 ; Carthaginians in, 93- 96, 97 ; the Scipios in, 108-110, 113; organization under Cato and Gracchus, 127, 128; pro- vinces in, 193 ; Caesar in, 217, 230, 260, 276 ; Augustus in, 308. Sparta and the Achaean League, 133 j its position under Rome, 134. Spartacus, 199-201. Spendius, 84. Spoletium, 57. Spolia opima, 34. Statilius, 226. Suessa Pometia, 16, 55; Suessa Aurunca, 55. Suessula, 46. Sulla, see Cornelius. Sulla, Faustus, 273. Sulpicius, P., 167-169. Sumptuary laws, 132. Sutrium, 55. 33 8 INDEX. Sweet Harbour, the, 299. Syphax, 110-112. Syracuse, 63; siege of, by Mar- cellus, 107, 108 ; works of art from, 1 10. Syria, province of, 207, 208, 249, 252, 285, 306, 308. Tannetum, 97. Tarentum, 50-61, 65, 78, 105, 118, 151. Tarpeian Rock, 53, 168. Tarquinius Priscus, 12, 13; Super- bus, 1 6. Tarraco, 93, 95. Tarsus, 270. Taurini, the, 98. Taurus, Mt., 124, 201. Taxilus, 1 8 1. Teanum Sidicinum, 257. Tellus, 26. Tempe, 121, 264. Tempsa, 57. Tencteri, 310. Terentius Varro, C., 102-104. Terentius Varro, M., 260, 261, , 320-. Terracma, 32. Teuta, Queen, 87, 88. Teutones, 156, 159, 160. Thapsus, battle of, 271, 272 Theodotus, 266. Theophanes, 165. Thermopylae, battles near, 124, 133. 181. Thurii, 57, 60, 200. Tiber, R., 7; first bridge over, 12 ; embankment of, 312. Tiberius (Caesar), 309 ; his father, Tiberius Nero, 316. Tibullus, Aulus, 321. Ticinus, R., battle of the, 98. Tifata, Mt., 101. Tifernum, 46. Tigranes, 203, 204, 207. Tigranocerta, 204. Tigurini, 156. Tillius Cimber, L., 281. Tolumnius of Veii, 34. Tcmi, 322. Trasimene Lake, battle of, 100, 101. Trebia, R., battle on the, 98. Trebonius, C., 249, 260, 280. Treveri,* 244. Triarii, 68. Tribuni aerarii, 205, 216, 275. Tribunicia potestas, 303, 304. Tribes, 22 ; increase of, 44. Tribuni militares consulari potes- 'a*> 39, 53- Tribuni plebis, 35-37, 91 ; Sulla's measures against, 188; powers restored by Pompey, 205. Tributum, 35 ; abolished for citizens, 131. Triumph, a, 31. Triumvirate, first, 219, 232-234; the second, 285, 296. Trogus, Pompeius, 320. Tryphon, 143. Tullius Cicero, M., 190, 221, 222 ; his contests with Catiline, 223- 228 ; banished, 238, 239 ; joins Pompey in Epirus, 261 ; his death, 285 j as a writer, 320. Tullius Cicero, Q., 244. Tyre, 209. Umbrians, the, 4, 52. Usipetes, 310. Utens, R., 40. Utica, ill, 135, 271, 273. Vada Sabbata, 127. Vadimonian Lake, battle of the, 50. Valentia, 57. Valerius, I/., at Tarentum, 60. Valerius Flaccus, L., 172, 182. Valerius Laevinus, P., 61. Valerius Corvus, 45. Valerius, Quintus, 159. Valerius Messala, M., 295, 320, 322. Varius, Q., 165. Varro, see Terentius. Varus, Quintilius, 310, Vatinius, P., 234. Vectigal, 134, 213. INDEX. 339 Veil, 11,29, 32-35> 41. Velitrae, 55. Veneti of N. Italy, 41, 126; in Gaul, 243. Ventidiua Bassus, P. , 285, 293, 295. Venusia, 57, 104, 105. Vercellae, 160. Vercingetorix, 245. Vergilius Maro, P., 321. Verres, C, 195. Veseris, 46. Vesontio, 242. Vesta and Vestal Virgins, 27, 41, 31.9. Vestini, 165. Via Flaminia, 87, 312; Aemilia, 26, 126; Aemilia Scauri, 127; Aemilia Lepidi, 127 ; Egnatia, 133, 264, 288. See Appian Way. Vibius Pansa, C., 284. Vipsanius Agrippa, M., 292, 293, 308, 315. Viriathus, 137. Volscians, the, 5, 16, 31, 32, 42-44. Volternum, 57 Volturnus, R., 101. Xanthippus, 81. Zama, battle of, 112, I2O. Zela, battle of, 271. GLASGOW } I'RINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSB AND CO. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. A History of Rome to the Battle of Actium. By EVELYN SHIRLEY SHUCKBURGH, M.A., late Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge ; author of a Translation of Polybius, etc. With Maps and Plans. Crown 8vo. 8s 6d. TIMES. " We cannot doubt that so careful a volume as this is destined for a long time to come to be the accepted general history of Rome in the higher forms of schools." DAILY CHRONICLE. "Mr. Shuck burgh writes with verve and fluency, yet with steady compression of his materials." DAILY NEWS." The social progress of the Romans, their arts and letters, come in for a share of attention in the course of Mr. Shuckburgh's clear and skilfully condensed narrative." SPECTATOR." Personally speaking, we regret that there is not more of it, and hope the author will follow it up with an equally valuable volume on Imperial Rome." 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