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 The Art of Transition in Plato 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF 
 AKD LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF GREEK 
 
 GRACE HADLEY BILLINGS 
 
 A x-iivate Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1920 
 
(Ulfp IttloprBttg nf CUtjirago 
 
 The Art of Transition in Plato 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS 
 
 AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE 
 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF GREEK 
 
 BY. 
 
 GRACE HADLEY BILLINGS 
 
 A Private Edition, Distributed By 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1920 
 
ult{r (SoU?giatr Prpaa 
 GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 Menasha, Wisconsin 
 
 i^CH,? ?ir, 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 Introduction 1 
 
 Chapter 
 
 I. Main Transitions 4 
 
 The dramatic introduction — Transition from the in- 
 troduction to the main body of the dialogue — The dra- 
 matic conclusion — Transition from the main body of the 
 dialogue to the conclusion — Transitions between larger 
 subdivisions in the main body of the dialogue; brief analy- 
 sis in case of the Laches, Gorgias, Phaedrus, Meno; de- 
 tailed analysis of Phaedo, Theaetetus, Philebus, Republic, 
 Laws. 
 
 II. Minor Conventional Forms of Transition 53 
 
 Transition by explicit reference to the plan and 
 course of the argument — Cross reference — Dismissive in- 
 troductive forms — Formulas of omission or postponement 
 — Dismissive and summarizing transitions — Transition 
 by assumption — Dichotomy in transition — Transition 
 by new suggestion — Introduction of new terms — 
 Transition by definition — Transition by criticism or 
 correction — The shift from general to particular and vice 
 versa — Applied analogous illustrations — Enumerations — 
 Inferential particles — Interrogative formulas — Transi- 
 tional adverb and prepositional phrases — Connective 
 particles — Narrative formulas. 
 
 III. The Literary Art of Transition 71 
 
 Introductory — Examples of artistic transitions — 
 Plato's transitional usage of proverbs, quotations, images, 
 continued metaphor, leit motif — Word transitions — 
 Various literary methods of advancing the argument — 
 Playing with the order of the subject — Blending of 
 literary devices with real argument — Digressions — Paro- 
 dies. 
 
 Appendix 102 
 
 433078 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The following study of Plato's methods of transition was under- 
 taken at the suggestion of Professor Paul Shorey of the University of 
 Chicago. My warm thanks are due to him for his invaluable help and 
 criticism during the progress of the work. Former members of his 
 seminar on Plato will find my indebtedness to Professor Shorey espe- 
 cially evident in the section on the Republic. I am sorry that his long- 
 promised edition of the Republic is not yet in print so that my 
 acknowledgment might be more definite. I wish also to express here 
 my thanks to Dr. Thomas H. Billings of Carleton College and 
 Miss Frances W. Hadley who have generously borne the entire 
 burden of the proof-reading. 
 
 Grace Hadley Billings. 
 
 Northfield, Minnesota, 
 August, 1920. 
 
THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Introduction 
 
 The subject of the methods of transition used by Greek and Latin 
 writers has by no means received the attention it deserves.^ The 
 value of such a study for the understanding and appreciation of an 
 author's style is readily apparent. Nor is the investigation so simple 
 as it might at first sight appear. The elusiveness of the subject and 
 its difficulties will be illustrated in the following paper. The inquiry 
 has been confined to the Platonic dialogues.^ Our first problem is 
 one of method. Platonic thought seems to follow whither the wind 
 blows;3 in reality it is guided by a subtle art. A study of the process 
 might develop into a treatise on Platonic dialectic, on the logic of 
 Plato's style. This would necessitate a complete analysis of the 
 argument of every dialogue, showing Plato's logical methods of 
 thought-transition. Moreover, in the dialogues, while the stream 
 of thought is continuous, yet it runs from point to point. Every 
 sentence is connected, explicitly or impHcitly, with what precedes 
 and follows. A study of transitions might become an attempt to 
 classify all the forms of sentence connection.^ This latter interpreta- 
 tion of the subject involves another. Its constant use of particles is 
 a prominent idiomatic characteristic of the Greek language. Many 
 particles are distinctly particles of connection, and most of them have 
 
 1 Two recent Yale dissertations— A. R. Brubacher, Sentence Connection in 
 Herodotus, New Haven, 1902, and C. W. Mendell, Sentence Connection in Tacitus, 
 New Haven, 1901, approach the subject from the standpoint of historical syntax. 
 Dr. Mendell has since published Latin Sentence Connection, New Haven, 1917, 
 in which he continues his investigations in a wider field. There are also several 
 German dissertations dealing with the mechanical formulas and phrases of 
 transition used by the Greek orators. (Cf. p. 53, n. 1.) 
 
 - For a detailed survey of transitional usage in another special field, see R. D. 
 Elliott, Transition in the Attic Orators, Menasha, Wis., 1919. 
 
 3 Rep. 394d; Theaet. 172d; Laws 667a. Jowett and Campbell, Republic of 
 Plato, Oxford, 1894, Vol. II, p. 10; Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought, Chicago, 
 1903, p. 5. 
 
 * Dr. Mendell finds three fundamental principles underlying all sentence 
 connection: — repetition, change and incompleteness. 
 
 1 
 
2 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 some transitional usages. Thus it becomes possible to regard an 
 account of Plato's methods of transition as practically equivalent to 
 a treatise on Platonic particles. 
 
 The versatility of Plato's genius is responsible for a further com- 
 plication of the subject. Plato's style has been aptly called pan- 
 harmonic. He passes at will from simplicity to complexity, from the 
 commonplace to impassioned eloquence without disturbing the har- 
 mony of the whole. CampbelP has distinguished five varieties of 
 Platonic manner — simple statement or narration, ornate narration, 
 passages of moral elevation, question and answer, continuous 
 dialectic. Such a stylistic classification might be adopted as the frame- 
 work for a discussion of transitions, for different methods are neces- 
 sarily characteristic of each style. 
 
 The method followed in the present paper is one of compromise. 
 Without attempting an exhaustive study of the process of Platonic 
 dialectic, of Plato's methods of sentence connection, or his use of 
 particles, it is the purpose of this discussion to present from the 
 Platonic dialogues adequate material for the illustration of all these 
 methods of approach to the study of transitions. The stylistic basis 
 of arrangement has not been adopted, but changes in transitional 
 method due to differences in style have been noted. The first chapter 
 contains analyses of a number of representative dialogues. In these 
 analyses only so much of the philosophic content of the argument is 
 given as is necessary to make intelHgible the outline of the logical 
 and artistic framework of the dialogue. The chief emphasis is placed 
 on the indication and description of the main points of transition in 
 the argument. The two succeeding chapters are devoted to a more 
 minute study of Plato's methods of transition. The second chapter 
 deals with his usage of conventional transitional formulas and 
 includes a brief, incomplete account of Platonic transitional particles. 
 Under the heading 'Plato's literary art of transition' more unusual 
 and artistic means of connection have been discussed. Little or no 
 attempt at formal classification has been made. Similar transitional 
 devices are grouped together for purposes of description. The fre- 
 quent union of several transitional elements in one passage and the 
 difficulty of fixing hard and fast boundaries between different types 
 of transition make any rigid classification impossible as well as useless. 
 
 6 Jowett and Campbell, Republic of Plato, Oxford, 1894, Vol. II, p. 166 ff. 
 
INTRODUCTION 6 
 
 The present paper, therefore, disregards most of the commonly sug- 
 gested lines of division, such as the separation of transitions into 
 personal and impersonal, explicit and disguised, natural and manu- 
 factured. Even the important distinction between an external form 
 of connection by formula, phrase, particle, or repeated word and an 
 inner thought-transition by means of summary, generalization, dis- 
 missal, criticism, or description of plan, has been rejected as a basis 
 of classification. Most transitions indeed contain both an external 
 and internal element. This discussion is occupied with the recogni- 
 tion and description of these as they appear in different combinations, 
 rather than with any attempt to decide in individual passages upon 
 which transitional element the balance of emphasis rests. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 Main Transitions 
 
 Plato has no special methods which he reserves for main transi- 
 tions. The device which opens a whole discussion may appear later 
 on in a very minor subdivision. Generalizations as to the intrinsic 
 importance of this or that transitional device are practically worth- 
 less. But a careful analysis of the main transitions in individual 
 dialogues is by no means barren of result. It is possible to penetrate, 
 if ever so little, the secret of that wonderful smooth style^ where 
 thought follows thought in a sequence so genuine that it is often hard 
 to put one's finger on any line of division; — so completely is the 
 whole discourse a unit. 
 
 To connect the main body of thought successfully with the intro- 
 duction, so as not to leave the transition abrupt or arbitrary, is 
 recognized by rhetoricians^ as one of the hardest of the writer's tasks. 
 In dealing with this difficult transitional problem Plato is pre- 
 eminently successful. His introductions are varied and interesting. 
 We miss the stereotyped personal proemium common in the orators.^ 
 An approach to the formal prothetic introduction is found in some 
 of the later dialogues, but even there the semblance of a dramatic 
 setting is often preserved. The Cratylus affords a good example of 
 this type. It opens with the invitation to Socrates to join in the 
 discussion whose theme Hermogenes briefly explains. With the 
 usuaH protest of ignorance from Socrates and of his willingness to 
 investigate the subject in company with the others (384c), the argu- 
 ment begins. The Sophist is nearly as abrupt. After the bare men- 
 
 ^ Olympiodorus in his scholia to Plato's Phaedo has noted this smoothness 
 of transition. Finckh, Olympiodorus, Scholia in Platonis Phaedonem, Heilbronn, 
 1847, p. 13 — a\l/o<pr)Tl TTJs ixtTa^aaews yevon'tv-qs blKT)v kXalov pkovTos' oh yap 
 \oyoypa(piK6p to diaipeLv els irpCiTov koI devrepov Ke<pa\aLOP. The figure of the stream 
 of oil is Platonic. Cp. Theaet. 144 B. 
 
 2 Genung, Practical Rhetoric, p. 283. 
 
 3Isoc. XII, VI; Lysias III, XII, XVI et al.; Andocides I; Aeschines II; 
 Ant. V. 
 
 ^Laches 186 c, Theaet. 145 e, 157 cd, Meno 71b, 80 d, Rep. 331 e, 354 
 c, 450 e-451 ab, Lysis 212 a, Gorg. 506 a. 
 
 4 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 5 
 
 tion of the appointed meeting and a half-playful reference to the 
 god-like character of the philosopher stranger, Socrates propounds the 
 question for investigation. A few details of procedure are arranged 
 and the discussion begins with the application of the chosen method to 
 a simple subject. In several other dialogues, notably the Philebus, 
 Parmenides, Politicus and Meno'^ the discussion begins abruptly with 
 no dramatic preface. 
 
 Abruptness of beginning is characteristic also of the spurious 
 dialogues.^ The subject of discussion may be introduced entirely 
 without prelude as in the De Justo which begins, "Can you tell us 
 what justice is?" (372a) Where there is any attempt at a dramatic 
 introduction it is purely conventional. The Theages will serve as a 
 good example of this type.^ After a few stereotyped details of place 
 and occasion Demodocus reveals his reason for consulting Socrates; — 
 he is worried about the education of his son. The transition to the 
 following discourse is brought about through the common^ Socratic 
 principle of the need of agreement as to the meaning of the subject 
 under discussion. (122b-e) 
 
 In the majority of the genuine dialogues a dramatic introduction, 
 often lengthy and elaborate, prepares the way for the discussion. 
 The predominant feature may be a vivid description of the setting, 
 as in the Lysis,^ or a piece of character delineation, as in the 
 
 5 This lack of dramatic introduction natural enough in the metaphysical 
 dialogues is noteworthy in the Meno, which is a minor dialogue of search other- 
 wise rich in dramatic interest and clever character portrayal. 
 
 6 Compare the De Virtute (376a) the Demodocus (380a) and the Hipparchus 
 (225a). 
 
 ' The Sisyphus, Eryxias and Axiochus are similarly abrupt and conventional 
 in their introductions. Grote, Plato, Vol. II, p. 94, has noted that some of the 
 genuine dialogues begin abruptly and bases upon this argument his acceptance 
 also of some usually regarded as spurious. But among the genuine dialogues, if 
 we except the Meno, it is the abstruse metaphysical type which is lacking in 
 dramatic introduction. The spurious dialogues are more akin in subject matter 
 to the minor dialogues. 
 
 8 See Theaet. 154de; Meno 75d. 
 
 9 In the introduction to the Lysis Socrates describes how, while walking 
 from the Academy to the Lyceum, he met and joined a group of his young friends 
 who were on their way to a neighboring palaestra. In their conversation on the 
 road the subject of friendship, the dominant idea of the dialogue, is readily intro- 
 duced through the criticism of Hippothales for the fooHsh and extravagant manner 
 in which he addresses his friend Lysis. Socrates convinces Hippothales that he 
 
6 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Euthyphro;^" or both elements may be equally important, as in the 
 artistically perfect Protagoras. In any case these opening scenes 
 strike the key-note of the dialogue. They forewarn us of the tone 
 and character of the discussion which they introduce. 
 
 The dramatic introduction in the Laches is particularly appro- 
 priate, for an inquiry into the nature of courage is easily developed 
 from a discussion of the advisability of learning the art of fighting 
 in heavy armor.^^ The series of transitions, leading up to the main 
 inquiry is a good illustration of Socrates' skill in guiding a conversa- 
 tion. ^^ In the first half of the introduction Socrates has little active 
 
 ought to change and offers to advise him if he can have an opportunity to talk 
 with Lysis. Thus transition is made to the idea of a discussion (206 c). There 
 follows a charming description of the scene in the palaestra. Lysis and his 
 friend Menexenus come over and sit down by Socrates and he begins to talk 
 with them (207b). 
 
 The introduction to the Charmides is equally rich in descriptive detail. 
 
 1° There is very little description of the setting in the Euthyphro. Socrates 
 and Euthyphro meet in the porch of the King Archon. Both are involved in 
 law-suits. Socrates has been charged with impiety. Euthyphro is engaged in 
 the prosecution of his own father for the murder of a hired laborer. In the course 
 of their conversation the question of the piety of Euthyphro's act naturally 
 arises (4e). Socrates is eager to learn from Euthyphro what piety is in order that 
 he may defend himself against Meletus. Thus the idea of a discussion is intro- 
 duced (5c). The formal request for a definition of piety (5d) serves as the final 
 transition to the main discourse. It is in keeping with the ironical tone which 
 pervades the whole dialogue that the great moral teacher Socrates should be 
 represented as anxious to become the pupil of the wrong-headed bigot Euthyphro. 
 
 " Equally appropriate is the choice of the two brave generals as Socrates' 
 respondents in this discussion. Artistic selection of the characters to fit the dis- 
 course is typical of the minor dialogues. Lysis and Menexenus are an example 
 of friendship. The youth Charmides is an embodiment of the virtue temperance. 
 So too in the Theaet. which in many details resembles the minor dialogues the 
 characters are adapted to their theme. 
 
 1^ The subject of the discussion is frequently introduced through Socrates' 
 clever manipulation of the conversation. So in the Phaedo, where the final 
 transition to the theme of the discourse, the true philosopher's willingness to die, 
 is made through explanation of Socrates' intentionally paradoxical reply to a 
 question of Cebes, 61 B, "Tell this, then, to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him if he 
 be wise to follow me as quickly as possible." In the Symposium, although the 
 narrative introduction is occupied mainly with the personality of Socrates, his 
 lively conversation with Aristodemus on the road, his characteristic lapse into a 
 brown study, his rall>'ing reply to the playful admiration of Agathon's welcome, 
 it is through the proposal of Eryximachus, 176 e f., that the subject of discourse 
 is introduced. Socrates, however, sanctions the plan. 177 de. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 7 
 
 part. He excuses himself modestly on the ground that he is younger 
 and less experienced than the two generals. The long set speeches 
 of Nicias and Laches for and against the practice under discussion 
 form an interesting contrast to the Socratic dialogue which follows, 
 to which transition is made by the call upon Socrates to cast the 
 deciding vote (184d). The familiar^^ Socratic doctrine of the neces- 
 sity of dependence not upon the opinion of the majority, but of the 
 'one wise man' forms the next onward step in transition (184e). 
 The attempt to answer the question 'wise in what?' — to define the 
 main point at issue — leads to the generalized distinction between 
 means and end (185d), and by application of this distinction Socrates 
 makes the important transition from body to souP* (185e). There 
 now follows a discussion of the two tests of the claim to knowledge, 
 ability to name one's teachers or to show some practical results of 
 one's teaching of others. Socrates as often^^ professes ignorance 
 (186c) in order to bring on a discussion. Lysimachus asks Nicias 
 and Laches whether they are willing to submit to examination. The 
 following passage, 187c-189b, with its comment upon the character 
 of Socrates may seem like a digression, but it is important for the 
 appreciation of the dialogue that Socrates be recognized as a moral 
 teacher with more than a mere intellectual interest in the discussion.^® 
 Furthermore, the figure of the Doric harmony here introduced appears 
 later on (193e), with unifying effect. ^^ The excuse of forgetfulness 
 by Lysimachus (189c) makes Socrates the leader of the discussion. 
 But Socrates, when thus in control of the situation, makes a sudden 
 
 " Theaet. 144e; Crito 44cd. 
 
 1^ Compare Protag. 352ab; Theaet. 145ab. In Char. 154de the transition 
 from body to soul is very cleverly managed. Socrates picks up the word &-!ro5vvai 
 which liad been used in comment on the physical beauty of Charmides and applies 
 it to the investigation of his soul, thus giving a moral turn to the discourse. 
 
 " See above, p. 4, note 4. 
 
 '« Similar in purpose is the passage in Char. 156a-157a, where the pretext of 
 giving Charmides a remedy for the headache is used by Socrates as the occasion 
 for a short discourse on the art of medicine and the relation between soul and 
 body. The ethical application of these remarks leads to the question whether 
 Charmides possesses the virtue of temperance and the lad's modesty necessitates 
 the usual Socratic conclusion — we must investigate together. 
 
 " Similarly in the Euthyphro the impending trial of Socrates, which is 
 brought into prominence in the introduction, appears as a leit-motif throughout 
 the dialogue. See below pp. 80 and 85. 
 
8 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 shift of the plan of inquiry to one based rather on first principles 
 and introduces the doctrine of Tapovaia^^ (189e) which he explains by 
 a concrete illustration. This is a question of the Tapovaia of virtue. 
 Transition to discussion is made through the assumption that what 
 we know, we must be able to express.^^ Inquiry into the nature of 
 virtue is evaded here by the assumption that virtue is a whole with 
 parts and the final narrowing of the question to the investigation 
 'what is courage?' is made by reference back to the art of fighting 
 in heavy armor, the practice of which is supposed to produce 
 courage.^" 
 
 There may be debate about the extent of the dramatic introduc- 
 tion in the Crito. If it is regarded as including only the brief pre- 
 liminary conversation, Socrates' vision with its beautiful and pathetic 
 adaptation of the Homeric quotation, "On the third day thou shalt 
 go to fertile Phthia" (44b), supplies the link of transition to Crito's 
 plea that Socrates will allow his friends to plan his escape. If on 
 the other hand, the main theme of the dialogue is not the plea for 
 escape, but the consideration of the question whether escape is right, 
 then Crito's arguments for the escape and the preliminary discussion 
 of the value of the opinion of the many are to be included in the 
 introduction, from which transition is made through the application 
 of general principles to the particular question, and the common^^ 
 Socratic formula, 'We must consider together.' 
 
 i« napovtria, presence, is one of the terms used by Plato to express the relation 
 of the idea to the particular object. Socrates' use of the term in this passage is 
 rather logical than metaphysical. Compare also Char. 158e-159a. 
 
 >' A similar combination of ideas is used in Char. 158e-159a. Here it is a 
 question of the irapovcria of temperance. The assumption that if Charmides 
 possesses the virtue he can give an account of it introduces the demand for a 
 definition of temperance and the beginning of the discussion. 
 
 2" The introduction of the Laches has been criticized as disproportionate in 
 length to the main discussion. Bonitz (Platonische Studien, Berlin, 1886, p. 226), 
 defends Plato by the argument that it is no longer in our power to discover what 
 special purpose he may have had in any chosen mode of expression. This seems 
 an adequate defense. Why should not the raising of the question of the profit of 
 professional training and the resulting typical speeches of Nicias and Laches be 
 accepted as important to Plato's design in the Laches as well as the lessons in 
 logic and ethics which are dramatically taught in the later discussion? 
 
 " Meno 80d, 81e, 86c; Theaet. 145d, 151e; Char. 158d; Crat. 384c; Laches 
 201a. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS V 
 
 The introduction to the Phaedrus is rich both in descriptive detail 
 and character delineation. Socrates meets the young Phaedrus, an 
 enthusiastic lover of discourse, on his way for a walk outside the walls. 
 He has just come from a visit with Lysias where he has heard a 
 discourse on love which urged favoring the non-lover rather than the 
 lover. Socrates begs him to repeat it. After considerable protest 
 and feigned reluctance on the part of Phaedrus, Socrates' playful 
 insistence is rewarded. Phaedrus admits the possession of the 
 manuscript and suggests (228de) that they sit down and read it. 
 The following account of their walk along the Ilissus, the interesting 
 mythological digression suggested by the place, and the description 
 of the fair retreat beneath the lofty plane tree are deservedly famous. 
 Finally with some jesting by-play on Socrates' fondness for the city 
 and the manner of his allurement to this unaccustomed distance from 
 it, return is made to the manuscript. A resumptive 5' ovu dismisses 
 the by-play and with a simple aKove 5?) the speech of Lysias is intro- 
 duced. 
 
 The dialogues just discussed are of the direct dramatic type.^^ 
 Their introductions are generally short,^^ noteworthy for character 
 portrayal rather than scenic elaboration.-^ In the narrated dia- 
 logues^^ the introduction may include in dramatic form the request 
 for the narrative and some preliminary conversation as well as the 
 
 '^ So also the Gorgias, Euthyphro, Laws, Ion, Menexenus, Hippias II and 
 the doubtful Hippias I and Ale. I and II. 
 
 ^' The Laches is a notable exception. 
 
 "* In the Gorgias the setting is not even mentioned, merely implied. The 
 rhetorician Gorgias has just been giving an exhibition, apparently in a pubHc hall, 
 for which Socrates and his pupil Chaerophon have arrived too late. But what 
 Socrates really wants is a chance to talk with Gorgias and at his request Chaere- 
 phon is on the point of asking the rhetorician to define his profession (447b) when 
 Polus, Gorgias' pupil, interrupts and offers himself as respondent with the excuse 
 that his master is tired. In the following conversation Chaerephon and Polus 
 illustrate very amusingly the characteristic and contrasting styles of their respec- 
 tive masters. Socrates interrupts to correct Polus and draw the distinction 
 between praise and definition. Through this lesson in elementary logic transition 
 is made (448e) to the discussion with Gorgias, from whom Socrates now demands 
 (449a), "But rather, Gorgias, do you tell us yourself what we ought to call you, 
 and what is the art in which you are skilled. " 
 
 '^ These include the Lysis, Charm., Protag., Phaedo, Symp., Theaet., 
 Enthydemus, Republic. 
 
10 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 narrative introduction to the discussion, or, as in the Lysis and 
 Charmides, the request may be presupposed^^ and the narrative 
 introduction begin at once. 
 
 The brilliant and complicated Protagoras is a narrated dialogue 
 within a dialogue and has therefore a double introduction. In the 
 brief preliminary conversation between Socrates and an unnamed 
 friend, the character of Alcibiades serves as the connecting link which 
 binds this introduction to the main dialogue. Socrates turns the 
 reference to his favorite to introduce the name of the stranger from 
 Abdera by whose wonderful wisdom he has been so charmed that he 
 even forgot the presence of Alcibiades the Fair. Thence the request 
 for an account of his conversation with Protagoras follows as a matter 
 of course (310a). 
 
 In the narrative itself our decision as to the limit of the dramatic 
 introduction depends upon our decision as to the main purpose of 
 the dialogue. If that is the discussion of the question whether virtue 
 is one or many then the dramatic introduction extends through the 
 myth of Protagoras. The method of transition at this point is a 
 familiar one.'^ Socrates expresses great admiration for the words of 
 the Sophist. He will feel quite satisfied if only Protagoras can clear 
 up one little difficulty. Is virtue one and are justice, temperance 
 and piety parts of it, or are these all names of the same thing which 
 is one? (328e-329c) 
 
 Since however this discussion really occupies a comparatively 
 small part of the dialogue it seems more reasonable to adopt the view 
 that the main aim of the Protagoras is more general, the dramatic 
 illustration of the contrast between Socratic and Sophistic methods 
 and the superiority of dialectic. It is easy to see how the myth of 
 
 2« In the Lysis, Charmides and Republic, Socrates is the narrator; his auditor 
 is not even mentioned. In the Symposium, the request of the auditor, an 
 unnamed friend, for an account of the discourse on Love at Agathon's banquet is 
 presupposed. But since the narrative is preceded by a brief conversation between 
 the auditor and narrator this dialogue should be classed with the Protagoras, 
 rather than with the Lysis. 
 
 "Theaet. 145d, 161c, 202d; Laches 180b; Euthyph. 12e-13a, 7a; Protag. 
 319a, b. Cp. also below pp. 89 ft. In Char. 154de this common transitional device— 
 the expression of satisfaction with his own or another's conclusions or ideas if only 
 one slight addition or correction be made — is used, together with the transition from 
 body to soul, to introduce the idea of conversation with Charmides. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 11 
 
 Protagoras, Socrates' clever ironical parody of current methods of 
 literary interpretation, the long dramatic interlude in which Prodicus, 
 Hippias and the other personages of the dialogue play characteristic 
 parts, and the several passages of actual dialectic all contribute to 
 this general aim and unite into a complete artistic whole. Upon 
 this view, the dramatic introduction extends to the myth of Pro- 
 tagoras which is then the first main division^* of the dialogue to which 
 transition is made through Socrates' request for clearer proof of the 
 possibility of virtue being taught. ^^ 
 
 The Euthydemus, like the Protagoras, is a narrated dialogue, 
 but the enclosing frame is, in this case, a much more integral part 
 of the structure, for Crito, who appears in the introduction begging 
 Socrates for a description of his encounter with the two strangers 
 (271a), enters also into the discussion in the midst of the narrative 
 (290e-293a), and the dialogue closes with the consideration of the 
 criticism of the Sophists and of Socrates which Crito has heard from 
 a bystander, a clever writer of speeches for the courts (304c, d). His 
 character then is a much more important unifying element than that 
 of Alcibiades in the Protagoras.^° In the preliminary conversation 
 with Crito and in the narrative introduction the keynote of the whole 
 dialogue is struck in the extravagant ironical praise which Socrates 
 showers upon the two Sophists. The main purpose of the dialogue — 
 the caricature and exposure of eristic methods — is clearly indicated. 
 As in the Protagoras the question of the education and improvement 
 of an intelligent youth furnishes the excuse for the ensuing discussion. 
 Socrates urges the Sophists (275a) to postpone until another time 
 their display of other matters, but for the present to persuade Cleinias 
 that he ought to study philosophy and practise virtue. This they 
 
 2* For description of the transitions between the other four important sub- 
 divisions of the dialogue see below p. 17, notes 50 and 51 and p. 58, n. 33. 
 
 2' Or the introduction may be considered as extending only to 318a where, 
 after the decision for a public discussion and the description of the grouping of 
 the audience, Socrates puts for a second time the question, ' What will happen to 
 the youth Hippocrates if he associates with Protagoras?' 
 
 '" Similarly in the Phaedo Echecrates is more than a mere deus ex machina 
 whose formal request is the occasion of the narrative. Twice during the dialogue 
 (88c and 102a) some comment of his to Phaedo upon the narrative marks a crisis 
 in the argument and his name appears also at the very end. He is a real, sympa- 
 thetic auditor of whose presence we are kept conscious throughout. 
 
12 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 agree to do if the youth will only answer. He is used to that, says 
 Socrates; and so the fun begins. 
 
 Although the Theaetetus is a dialogue within a dialogue it differs 
 from the others of that class. TLj discussion is not narrated, but 
 is presented as a written manuscript giving in true dialogue form the 
 exact words of each speaker,^^ and thus avoiding the constant repeti- 
 tion of "said he" and "said I." The recollection and mention of the 
 discussion is occasioned very naturally by the fact that Euclides has 
 just been escorting the sick and wounded Theaetetus on his way from 
 Corinth to Athens. The usuaP- request to hear the tale follows. 
 The reading of the manuscript is prefaced by explanation of its 
 form (143c). The dramatic introduction to the dialogue proper is 
 developed quite in the style of the minor dialogues. ^^ Socrates uses 
 the remark of Theodorus as to the personal resemblance between 
 Theaetetus and himself (144e) to introduce the idea of the authority 
 of the specialist. But while Theodorus is not to be trusted as to 
 physical resemblance his praise of Theaetetus for virtue of Soul 
 constrains the lad to submit to examination. Having thus, by means 
 of the familiar transition from body to souP^ (145b), introduced 
 the idea of a discussion, Socrates begins to question Theaetetus 
 about his studies. The transitioa thence to the main topic of the 
 dialogue is easy. Socrates is himself a learner, but he has "one little 
 difficulty'"'^ (145de), which he hopes Theaetetus and the rest will help 
 him to solve — "what is knowledge?" Theodorus excuses himself on 
 the ground that he is inexperienced in dialectic and Theaetetus 
 becomes the respondent (146b). 
 
 There is less variety in Plato's conclusions than in his introduc- 
 tions. Some endings hke that of the Repubhc are carefully planned 
 
 31 This plan may have been adopted for the sake of greater verisimilitude 
 since the accurate repetition of such a long and complicated argument would be 
 an improbable feat. So in the Symposium (178a) Plato represents Apollodorus 
 as warning his friend just before he proceeds to recount the speech of Phaedrus 
 that he does not himself remember exactly everything that Aristodemus told 
 him, nor did Aristodemus remember exactly all that each one said. That in 
 reality Plato cared little for verisimilitude in such details is evident from his dis- 
 regard of time probabihties in the Repubhc. See p. 40, n. 132. 
 
 32Protag. 310a; Phaedo 57a; Euthyd. 27la. 
 
 33 See above p. 5 f. and also p. 7, n. 16. 
 
 3< See above p. 7 and n. 14. 
 
 ^ See above p. 10 and note 27. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 13 
 
 for artistic climactic effect. But in general they are not so well 
 managed as the introductions; they are more stereotyped, less 
 effective. The Sophist has no dramatic conclusion; it ends abruptly 
 with a summary^^ of the final definition of the sophist (268c-d) and 
 its acceptance by Theaetetus. In the Cratylus the polemic against 
 the flowing philosophers closes, in the style of the minor dialogues," 
 with a Socratic profession of ignorance and recommendation to 
 further inquiry.^^ The transition to the conclusion is made by the 
 sudden and perfunctory introduction (440e) of the common^^ formula 
 of postponement, ets au^ts toIuvp. The Meno ends almost as abruptly 
 as it began. After the statement of the final conclusion of the dis- 
 cussion (100b) Socrates makes a last protest against their order of 
 investigation. The question what is virtue should be settled first. 
 The formula of withdrawal vvv 8' e/jLol nlv cbpa ttoi ievai follows abruptly 
 and the dialogue closes with a significant reference to the angry 
 Anytus. 
 
 - The dialogues just considered illustrate abrupt and rather mechan- 
 ical methods of conclusion. In several of the dialogues the closing 
 scene, though brief, is developed in a style which recalls the dramatic 
 introduction. In the Charmides Socrates' summary^" of the results 
 of the inquiry (175a), which follows the rejection of the sixth defini- 
 
 '' The Parmenides and Politicus also end with summaries. 
 
 " The conclusion to the Theaetetus shows a similar resemblance in manner 
 to the early dialogues. After an enumeration of the refuted definitions of knowl- 
 edge (210a) Socrates returns to the figure of the midwife. But his half-humorous 
 moralizings upon his art and its effect upon Theaetetus are cut short by the 
 recollection of an engagement at the porch of the King Archon. The last word 
 is the promise of a meeting on the morrow (210d). 
 
 '* See above p. 4, n. 4 for the use of the Socratic profession of ignorance to pro- 
 voke a discussion. In the minor dialogues of search a repetition of this protest, 
 and exhortation to continue the inquiry usually appear in the conclusion. Cp. Laches 
 200e-201a, Lysis 222e-223b, Char. 175b-176a, Rep. 354b. 
 
 3« Cp. p. 58, n. 32. This same formula in Euthyph. 15e checks Socrates 
 who is launched enthusiastically upon a fresh start in the argument (15cd) and 
 closes the discussion. Socrates' reproachful reference to his purpose in beginning 
 the inquiry is of no avail. 
 
 " Similarly in the Lysis at the close of the discussion a brief transitional 
 paragraph (222e) summarizes their futile attempts to discover the friend. There 
 follows a short dramatic scene (223ab), the humorous description of the noisy 
 invasion of the half-drunken attendants, which puts a stop to Socrates' intended 
 further investigations. 
 
14 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 tion of temperance is full of characteristic humor and ironical self- 
 depreciation. A playful reference ( 1 75e) to the charm of the Thracian 
 physician recalls the beginning of the discussion. Socrates' exhorta- 
 tions to Charmides to persist in his self-examination and discover 
 whether he has need of the charm are cleverly turned by the youth 
 (176b), "And I think, Socrates, that I have great need of the charm, 
 and for my part there is no reason why I shouldn't be charmed by 
 you every day." The dialogue ends with Critias and Charmides 
 vigorously protesting their unshaken confidence in Socrates. 
 
 The dramatic elements in the conclusion of the Laches are even 
 more prominent. The decision in 199e that they have failed to 
 discover what courage is leads naturally to a bit of amusing by-play 
 between the two generals. Laches cannot resist gloating over 
 Nicias' failure. Nicias retorts with a sharp rebuke and affirms his 
 intention to continue the inquiry. Laches is still sceptical and 
 advises Lysimachus and Melesias to consult Socrates rather than 
 Nicias or himself with regard to the education of the boys. In this 
 way a return is m.ade (200c) to the topic with which the dialogue 
 began. Lysimachus urges Socrates to consent to advise them, but 
 Socrates makes use of his accustomed-^^ profession of ignorance (200e- 
 201a) to enforce the characteristic moral: — since they are all equally 
 at a loss they must all seek out a teacher and learn. A m,eeting is 
 appointed for the next morning. 
 
 From the final reluctant admission that completes the refutation 
 of Protagoras (360e) the transition to the concluding summary is 
 made easily and naturally by Socrates' earnest protest against the 
 charge of contentiousness. He follows this up by a statement of their 
 original positions with regard to the issue debated, and the strange 
 reversal brought about by the argument. Finally by a literary 
 reference to Prometheus and Epimetheus (36 Id), picking up the 
 language of the myth told by Protagoras early in the dialogue, he 
 leads up to the suggestion that they continue their investigations. 
 But Protagoras, after a courteous expression of praise for Socrates' 
 zeal and conduct of the argument, postpones further discussion 
 els aWis (361e) and both withdraw. 
 
 The Symposium is largely narrative and descriptive; its transitions 
 are therefore of the type natural to such discourse. The closing 
 
 *' See above p, 4, n. 4. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 15 
 
 scene is introduced by one of the common'*^ devices of narrative 
 transition — reference to the speaker who has just finished (222c). 
 The scene throughout is pure narrative flowing smoothly. Transi- 
 tional particles**^ such as ovv, jiev ovv, drj, jxtv-b'e, 'yap and /cat link sen- 
 tence to sentence in a natural sequence. 
 
 In the Phaedrus 278b a perfect imperative of completion and 
 dismissal*^ ireiraiado) is used in the transition from the discussion to the 
 closing scene. The summary of the results of the inquiry is intro- 
 duced under the guise of a message to Lysias. Socrates' rather 
 patronizing encomium on Isocrates the Fair is called forth by the 
 question of Phaedrus, who is perhaps loath to have his friend Lysias 
 the only one criticized: — "What message will you send to him, 
 Socrates, and how shall we describe him?" (278e) Unsatisfied in his 
 desire Phaedrus then m_akes the suggestion, "Let us depart." The 
 famous prayer of Socrates to Pan and the other gods of the place 
 closes the dialogue (279b). 
 
 The closing scenes of the Gorgias and Republic^^ are structurally 
 ahke in this respect: in both Plato supplements the conclusions of 
 dialectic by the religious confirmation of a myth of the underworld. 
 In the Gorgias, the myth introduced by aKove dri (522e) follows 
 naturally upon Socrates' eloquent protest that "death no man fears, 
 who is not altogether senseless and cowardly, but he does fear wrong- 
 doing." At the end of the myth, 527a, a resumptive d'ovu introduces 
 the final summary by Socrates of the important ethical conclusions 
 of the dialogue and an exhortation to his companions to trust his 
 argument rather than the thesis of CalHcles. 
 
 The myth in the Phaedo is not, strictly speaking, a part of the 
 conclusion, but immediately precedes the dramatic concluding scene 
 of the dialogue. In purpose and relation to the argument, however, 
 it corresponds exactly to the myths in the Gorgias and Republic. 
 In its beginning (107c) the Phaedo myth is so much a continuation 
 of the argument that it is not formally distinguished as a myth. But 
 in 110b, the major portion of it is so introduced. In the transitional 
 paragraph that hnks the myth to the dramatic conclusion of the 
 dialogue Socrates carefully distinguishes myth from dogma and then, 
 
 « See p. 69. 
 « See p. 70. 
 . ^ See p. 57. 
 ^ For the discussion of the conclusion of the Republic see pp. 44 ff. 
 
16 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 in language that recalls the original theme of their discourse, explains 
 the purpose of the myth: it is a charm to induce the conviction that 
 death has no terrors for the philosopher, "And words Hke these he 
 ought to croon over to himself as a charm, and that is why I lengthen 
 out the tale." (114d). The exhortations to Simmias and Cebes and 
 reference to his own approaching death-hour form a natural final 
 step in the transition to the wonderful closing scene of the dialogue. 
 Strictly speaking the main divisions of a dialogue are the three 
 fundamental elements, the dramatic introduction, the body of the 
 discourse and the conclusion. However, the main discussion usually 
 falls naturally into a number of important and well-defined parts. 
 The transitions between these larger sub-divisions of the subject 
 may very properly be considered as main transitions. In the minor 
 dialogues of search important divisions in the argument are frequently 
 marked by a change in the respondent.''*' The two parts in the m.ain 
 discussion in the Laches are so indicated. Laches' attempts at defini- 
 tion are confined to bringing out the temperamental aspect of cour- 
 age (190e-193e). With the change to Nicias as respondent the 
 intellectual aspect is introduced^^ and the argument becomes more 
 subtle. In the paragraph of transition between the two parts of the 
 
 *^ See above p. 6, n. 11. The care with which Plato suits the character of the 
 respondent to the tone of the discourse makes the change in respondents a very 
 natural and effective means of transition. 
 
 ^' Similar advance from a simple to a more complex treatment is found in the 
 Lysis and Charmides. In the latter Socrates' conversation with the youth 
 Charmides (159a-162a) deals with the comparatively simple external aspects of 
 temperance, while in the extremely subtle following discussion (162e-175a) 
 Socrates interrogates the older, more experienced Critias. The transition scene 
 (162a-e) is very amusing. By slily humorous disparaging comments Socrates 
 cleverly goads Critias into taking up the defence of the definition of temperance 
 as "doing one's own work," a definition for which he is evidently responsible in 
 spite of his denial (161c). 
 
 The first part of the Lysis (207c-210d) is occupied with an edifying protrep- 
 tic discourse in which Socrates and Lysis are the interlocutors. At its close (2 lOe) 
 Socrates recalls his purpose — to give the foolish Hippothales a lesson in addressing 
 his friend. This first conversation is thus closely bound to the dramatic intro- 
 duction. At the suggestion of Lysis Menexenus now becomes the respondent 
 (211a). Socrates' playful protest and comment on the eristic disposition of 
 Menexenus (211bc) account for the subtlety of the following discussion. In 
 213d Lysis again enters the argument, but the shift in respondents is only one 
 element in this complicated transition. See below p. 72. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 17 
 
 discussion the literary conceit of the personified argumenf^ which 
 bids them endure in the inquiry is followed by Laches' description 
 of the effect of the elenchus upon himself. Then with the figures*^ 
 of the huntsmen and the storm Socrates introduces the suggestion of 
 summoning Nicias to their assistance. Socrates' harping upon dxopta 
 and its derivatives adds a slight unifying touch. 
 
 The main discussion in the Gorgias falls naturally into three parts, 
 conversations of Socrates with Gorgias, Polus and Callicles res- 
 pectively. The transitions are simple and natural, the influence of 
 the shift of respondents upon the character of the discussion unusually 
 plain. Through Gorgias' unwillingness to deny that the rhetorician 
 would teach justice to a pupil who needed that instruction he is finally 
 involved in a contradiction and refuted by Socrates (461a). Polus 
 intervenes and defends his master. After ironical commendation of 
 Polus and injunctions to him to give up lengthy harangues-^'' Socrates 
 offers him his choice of questioning or answering. The discussion 
 continues in 462b with Socrates as respondent, though he still guides 
 the course of the argument.^^ The transition in 481b is similar. In 
 spite of his scorn at Gorgias' scruples Polus himself is not entirely 
 devoid of moral sense. He admits that to do wrong is more disgrace- 
 ful than to suffer wrong, and this admission leads to his refutation. 
 
 *^ See below, p. 79. 
 
 43 See below, p. 78. 
 
 «» A further example of Socratic hostility to lengthy speaking is seen in Prot. 
 335. In the preceding debate whether the virtues are one or many Protagoras 
 seeing himself refuted delivers a long speech (334a-c) on the relativity of the 
 notion of good. With an ironical plea of forgetfulness Socrates protests his 
 inability to continue the discussion unless Protagoras will cut his answers short, 
 which the sophist refuses to do. This disagreement between the disputants, 
 which results in a deadlock in the argument, serves as the transition to a dramatic 
 interlude in which the other personages of the dialogue, anxious for the continua- 
 tion of the discussion, urge various schemes of compromise and reconciliation. 
 
 " Compare Prot. 338de where for the sake of enabling the argument to 
 proceed Socrates suggests that Protagoras assume the role of questioner for a 
 time and later submit again to interrogation. Through this suggestion and its 
 reluctant acceptance by Protagoras transition is made to one of the main divisions 
 of the dialogue (339a-347a)— Socrates' interpretation of a poem of Simonides in 
 which he cleverly parodies current methods of literary criticism. Again in 347b 
 Alcibiades checks Hippias who is eager to make a display speech, with a reminder 
 of the agreement (338d) that Protagoras should in turn submit again to the 
 elenchus. This reference is an important link in the series of transitions which 
 leads to the final discussion. 
 
18 IRE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Callicles now interrupts with the amazed query whether Socrates is 
 really in earnest or joking. Chaerephon replies, "He seems to me, 
 Callicles, to be terribly in earnest, but there's nothing like asking him." 
 With the utterly unscrupulous and cynical CalHcles as respondent 
 the character of the discussion changes. Socrates redoubles his irony 
 and becomes uncompromising in his severity. 
 
 The analysis just given follows the external artistic frame-work 
 of the dialogue. In the consideration of the main transitions of the 
 Gorgias another important question arises, how is the connection 
 made between the two parts of its double theme? Rhetoric is the 
 ostensible topic of discussion; in reahty ethics occupies as prominent 
 a place. The transition from rhetoric to ethics is managed very 
 skilfully. In 455d Socrates leads Gorgias on to make immoral claims 
 for rhetoric. Under the influence of ironical praise from him the 
 unsuspecting sophist displays an immoral complacency at the idea 
 of the rhetorician's power over the expert craftsman (456a, b). After 
 these admissions Socrates is able by the introduction of the famihar^^ 
 analogy of the arts and virtue to pass easily to the question of the 
 attitude of rhetoric toward justice and injustice (459d), thus giving an 
 ethical turn to the subject. 
 
 The Phaedrus is another dialogue with a double theme, in this 
 case rhetoric and love. The first part of the dialogue, including the 
 speech of Lysias,^' 230e-234d, in praise of the non-lover, the rivaling 
 speech of Socrates, 237b-241d, and the myth, 243e-257b, which is 
 Socrates' palinode or recantation,^* is occupied with love. By the 
 literary criticism of the speech of Lysias, already suggested (234e, 
 235a, 236a) in the dramatic interlude connecting his speech with that 
 of Socrates and taken up again in 258d, transition is made to the topic 
 of rhetoric and the two parts of the dialogue are connected. 
 
 Like the Gorgias, the Meno is divisible into three parts and 
 contains conversations of Socrates with three different persons. The 
 main transitions, however, are not marked by the change in 
 respondents. The first part of the dialogue (70a-80b), the attempt 
 to define virtue, ends with Meno's complete puzzlement. He vividly 
 describes the effect of the Socratic elenchus upon himself by the image 
 
 «2 Meno 90b; Laches 194e; 195b, 198d,e; Rep. 332c et al. 
 S3 See below, pp. 99 and 101. 
 s" See below pp. 70 f . 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 19 
 
 of the torpedo-fish. After some bantering comment, the usual protest 
 of ignorance from Socrates and the consequent suggestion that they 
 conduct the inquiry together,*^ Meno introduces the sophistic quibble 
 (80d) of the impossibility of inquiring into what one does not know. 
 This passage serves as the transition to the second division of the 
 dialogue. Instead of answering Meno's query directly Socrates has 
 recourse to a myth*^ (81a) setting forth the doctrine that all learning 
 is recollection. The myth answers Meno's objection. and Socrates 
 accordingly returns (81e) to his previous offer of joining Meno in an 
 investigation of the nature of virtue. But Meno dem_ands proof of 
 the theory of recollection and this demand forms the transition to the 
 dialogue with Meno's slave by which Socrates establishes the doctrine 
 (82b-85b). These two subjects, the theory of recollection and its 
 proof, occupy the second main division of the dialogue. Socrates 
 follows up the conversation with the slave boy by some remarks on 
 its significance, closing with an emphatic reaffirmation of his belief 
 in the value of inquiry (86b). This rejection of the sophistic dictum 
 that all investigation is fruitless serves as a natural transition to 
 further discussion, and Socrates again (86c) suggests their joint inquiry 
 into the nature of virtue. But Meno prefers to return to the original 
 question of debate, whether virtue can be taught. The discussion 
 with Anytus as to the existence of teachers of virtue occupies the cen- 
 tral part of this third division of the dialogue. 
 
 In the following pages a more detailed outline of three of the longer 
 and more complex dialogues is presented. An analysis of the Phaedo 
 supports the comment of Archer-Hind that "every important issue 
 turns upon some pertinent remark of Cebes. "^^ The discussion 
 begins (61c) with Socrates' qualification of his thesis that any philoso- 
 pher worthy the name will be willing to die by the statement that he 
 will not perhaps effect his own death, "for men say that is not lawful." 
 At the end of Socrates' explanation of the theory that suicide is wrong 
 Cebes raises the question (62c-e) how then the philosopher can desire 
 to die and leave such good masters as the gods. The transition to the 
 first general exposition of the reasons why the philosopher will wel- 
 come death is made by the figure of the defence (63b). Simmias 
 suggests that Cebes meant to make his objection personal. How can 
 
 "^^ See above, p. 8, and note 21. 
 
 '« See p. 93. 
 
 " Archer-Hind, Phaedo, London (MacMillan), 1883, p. 41. 
 
20 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Socrates bear so easily to leave his friends and those good rulers,the 
 gods? Socrates feels bound to explain his attitude toward death. 
 He must make his defence as in a court-room. He will try to speak 
 more convincingly to them than he did to the dicasts. 
 
 This figure of the defence recurs again.^^ It is picked up by 
 Simmias after Socrates' first earnest statement of his faith that in the 
 other world he will find gods wise and good. Again after the brief 
 dramatic interlude of 63d-e it introduces renewed discussion. So- 
 crates now states his thesis in even more vivid paradoxical form 
 (64a) , the true philosopher spends all his life practising death. Having 
 defined death as the separation of the soul from the body, he brings 
 forward several points''^ in support of his thesis. After considerable 
 elaboration and expansion of these arguments, Socrates concludes 
 in 69d-e with a recurrence to the figure of the defence. 
 
 At this juncture Cebes brings forward the objection that Socrates 
 is assuming the immortality of the soul, a point that needs proof. 
 The transition (69e-70a) is of the dismissive-introductive type,^^ com- 
 bining a simple narrative formula^^ for marking a change in speakers 
 with the common dismissive-introductive form with /xiv and 5^, which 
 marks a change in subject. Cebes desires proof (1) that the soul 
 exists when the man dies, and (2) that it has power and intelligence. 
 With the suggestion ' ' Let us consider the question somewhat in this 
 way" (70c), Socrates introduces an argument based on the old 
 tradition that the souls of the dead exist in Hades and are born again 
 on earth in new forms. Following the development and confirmation 
 of this theory Cebes again (72e) interrupts to suggest^^ ^h^t the 
 doctrine of recollection also implies the previous existence of the soul. 
 In 77b Simmias calls attention to the fact that while the theory of 
 recollection seems to establish the certainty of the preexistence of the 
 soul and its intelligence in that former state, this proof fails to settle 
 the question raised by Cebes (70a) whether the soul exists after 
 death. As Cebes remarks (77c) the soul's immortality has only been 
 
 68 Cf. p. 81, n. 37. 
 
 *^ These points are introduced by regular minor conventional phrases of 
 transition, — CKt^paL Sij . . . iav apa /cat aol crwSoK^ direp knol. (64c) tL bk Sr) (65a) 
 tL di Srj t6. TOLaSe 65d. See below pp. 53 ff., 68. 
 
 *° See below pp. 56 ff. 
 
 " P. 69 below. 
 
 82 Kal UTiv marks this suggestion as a transition to a new point. See below, p. 69. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 21 
 
 half proved. Even after the assurance of Socrates that the combina- 
 tion of the two arguments given establishes also the soul's existence 
 after death, Simmias and Cebes still hesitate (77e). Their dissatis- 
 faction, vividly described by Cebes' picture of the child within us 
 that fears death as some goblin, serves as the transition''^ to the 
 discussion of indissolubihty in general and the conclusions to be drawn 
 from the soul's evident affinity to the indissoluble. With this argu- 
 ment from probablity the first main division of the Phaedo ends (84b). 
 The second section of the dialogue contains the objections of 
 Simmias and Cebes to the preceding conclusions. Transition is 
 made through a brief dramatic interlude (84c-85d) describing the 
 effect of the previous discourse on the company. Simmias and Cebes 
 are not satisfied, but hesitate to disturb Socrates with further ques- 
 tions. But Socrates by a pathetic comparison of himself to the swan 
 who sings before his death persuades them that they ought to talk 
 and ask him whatever they wish as long as the 'Eleven' allow. The 
 objection of Simmias (85e-86d) is based on the Pythagorean theory 
 that the soul may be a harmony dependent for its existence upon the 
 framework of the body. The objection of Cebes continues his former 
 protest (77c) that the existence of the soul after death has not yet 
 been fully proved. The previous arguments have established the 
 superior strength of the soul. It may probably exist after the body 
 and may survive many bodies, but that it is altogether immortal and 
 indestructible has not yet been proved. Cebes illustrates his position 
 by the figure of the weaver who wears out many cloaks, but is out- 
 lived by the last which he weaves. Here another dramatic scene is 
 interposed (88c-91c). By the vivid description of the despair of the 
 company and the courageous protest of Socrates against misology 
 Plato marks the importance of this crisis in the discussion. The 
 Phaedo is a good illustration of one of Plato's favorite®^ methods of 
 developing a theme. A partial or superficial view of the subject is 
 first presented, only to be superseded or supplemented by further 
 discussion.*'^ His methods of transition to the more complete presen- 
 
 " The final step in the transition is found in the dismissive formula 78a b 
 in which Socrates returns to the argument oOev 8k airtKlTroyitv. 
 
 " The Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium and Theaetetus are other notable 
 examples of this method. See Jowett-Campbell, Republic, Vol. II, p. 10. 
 
 ^^ Hirzel, Der Dialog, Vol. I, p. 230 — commenting on the development of the 
 argument in the Phaedo^compares it to " a row of circles which touch one another, 
 but yet each of them is complete in itself." 
 
22 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 tation are varied. Sometimes, as at the end of Bk. I of the RepubHc, 
 it is Socrates who is dissatisfied with his own conclusions. Here the 
 suggestion of difficulties by the disciples provokes further discussion. 
 In 91c-d Socrates continues the argument with a resumptive summary 
 of the objections of Simmias and Cebes, which he proceeds to ansv/er 
 in turn. That of Simmias is less important and easily disposed of 
 (91e-94e). The transition to the objection of Cebes is affected by 
 the jesting personification of the argument (95a), incorporated in a 
 dismissive-introductive formula. Theban Harmonia has been pro- 
 pitiated. We must now deal with Cadmus. In 95b-e Socrates again 
 recapitulates the objection of Cebes which is fundamental and in- 
 volves no slight matter (95e), the complete investigation of the cause 
 of generation and destruction. There follows what may be an account 
 of Plato's own philosophical experienced^® in the search for a final 
 cause; at any rate it culminates in an exposition of the theory of Ideas 
 as a working hypothesis. The im^portance of this conclusion for the 
 argument is m^arked by a very brief dramatic interlude (102a) in 
 which Echecrates expresses his approval of the acceptance of the 
 theory. Resuming his narrative of the discussion Phaedo dismisses 
 the question of the acceptance of the Ideas and proceeds (102b) with 
 a continuative formula to drj /jLera ravra to discuss their bearing upon 
 the problem of change. The following final proof of the immortality 
 of the soul depends upon a subtly fallacious application of the princi- 
 ple that opposite ideas are mutually exclusive. 
 
 In the Theaetetus "much of the argument is purely dramatic, 
 directed only against the cruder forms of the theory com.bated.'"" 
 A study of the main transitions in the dialogue is of value in the 
 distinction between serious argument and mere eristic and persiflage. 
 In his first attempt at defining knowledge, 146c, Theaetetus falls into 
 the error of confusing definition with enumeration. As in the Meno 
 (72a-c) Socrates corrects him, illustrating his meaning by a sample 
 definition (147a). Theaetetus shows his comprehension of the 
 method indicated by volunteering a definition of some mathematical 
 terms. But he m.odestly protests his inability to define knowledge. 
 His description of his previous efi"orts and failure leads Socrates to 
 introduce the figure of the mid- wife (148e). This metaphor, which 
 
 "= Burnet {Phaedo, Oxford, 1911, Introd. p. 38 S. and note on p. 95) believes 
 this to be a description of Socrates' intellectual experience. 
 " Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 67. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 23 
 
 plays an important part in the structure of the dialogue/^ is developed 
 through several pages. The return (151d) from this digression is 
 made by a resumptive phrase^^ and reiteration of the demand for a 
 definition of knowledge. The transition to discussion of Theaetetus' 
 second definition, that knowledge is perception, is made by the 
 common exhortation to joint investigation, ^"^ coupled with a reference 
 to the metaphor of the midwife (151e). With this definition of 
 knowledge as perception Socrates identifies the Protagorean dictum 
 that man is the measure of all things. The result seems so paradoxi- 
 cal that he hazards the statement (152c) that Protagoras spoke in a 
 riddle to the mob, while to his disciples in secret he told the truth. 
 This playful remark, with its punning reference to the 'AXrideia of 
 Protagoras, draws from Theaetetus the request for an explanation 
 (152d) which serves as the transition to an interpretation of Prota- 
 goras with whose doctrine of relativity Socrates connects also the 
 flowing philosophy of Heraclitus.'^ In 160d he reaches the conclusion 
 that Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception is a very fine 
 one, inasmuch as it agrees with these important teachings of Prota- 
 goras and Heraclitus. The image of the midwife now appears (160e) 
 in combination with the further image of the dyu(^t5p6/iia in transition 
 to the criticism of Protagoras. A variation of the familiar^^ tran- 
 sitional formula of 'one little difficulty' forms the final step in the 
 transition (161c). Socrates first overwhelms the doctrine with ridi- 
 cule. In 162d Protagoras or some one of his defenders is represented 
 as objecting to the methods used against him. The formula" aXXrj 
 5i7 (TKeTVTeov (163a) marks a fresh start in the argument. In the 
 following pages 163-165 Socrates employs arguments which he him- 
 self admits to be eristic (164c-165a, b), justifiable in that they are 
 directed against a crude, literal indentification of knowledge and 
 perception. In 164e the literary conceit^"* of the personified argument 
 is developed quite at length to introduce the defence of Protagoras. 
 Socrates' promise to come to the aid of the orphaned argument (165a) 
 
 ^^ See below, pp. 82 f. 
 
 ^^ See below, p. 54, pp. 97-99; TrdXt;' 617 olv «$ apx'js- 
 
 ■"•See above, p. 8, n. 21. 
 
 " The half serious tone of 156-157 is s'gnificant.. 
 
 " See p. 10, n. 27. 
 
 ^^ See below, p. 54. 
 
 ^^ See below, p. 79. 
 
24 THE -ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 is picked up, after intervening persiflage, in 165e as the final step in 
 transition to the defence. An interlude of by-play (168c-169c) 
 results in establishing Theodorus as the respondent. In 169d the 
 argument is resumed with a brief summary of the present position. 
 It concludes in 171c with a TcepLTpoTrrf''" — the "truth" of Protagoras 
 does not seem true to most people and must therefore be admitted by 
 him to be false oftener than true. But here Socrates silences the pro- 
 test of Theodorus by the assurance that he does not intend to rely 
 upon this argument. The transition is made by a play on words. ^^ 
 By the distinction between sense impressions and the knowledge of 
 what is healthful or advantageous Socrates passes to a more serious 
 line of attack. At this point, however, the argument is interrupted 
 (172b) by an eloquent digression, which Socrates himself recognizes 
 as such (177b), in which he contrasts the life of the philosopher with 
 that of the clever unscrupulous lawyer. The transition to this 
 digression is very skilfully managed. By the mention of persons 
 who are unwilHng to accept the doctrine of extreme relativity when 
 there is a question of the recognition of the advantageous in conduct, 
 Socrates is led to speak of what such people consider wisdom. Here 
 he pauses (172b), struck by the length of the digression into which 
 he is being led. The protest of Theodorus that they have plenty of 
 leisure picked up by Socrates (172d) makes a very clever and artistic 
 transition" to the description of the life of philosophic leisure con- 
 trasted with the illiberal limited existence of the lawyer. In 177c 
 Socrates dismisses the digression and returns to the previous argu- 
 ment. He now proceeds to serious criticism^* of the doctrine of 
 relativity and in 183b, c, the definition of knowledge as perception is 
 defeated in so far as it "depends upon extreme Protagorean relativity 
 or Heracliteanism, which makes all thought and speech impossible."'* 
 Theaetetus suggests (183d) that the definition should now be con- 
 sidered in relation to the theory of Parmenides and the philosophy 
 of rest. Socrates, however, rightly rejects this suggestion, on the 
 
 " Note the invidious harping on a.\i)deLa. 
 
 ■6 See p. 79, n. 32. 
 
 " See p. 97 f . 
 
 " See above p. 21. In the Theaetetus it is the protests of the defenders of 
 Protagoras, cleverly introduced in various ways by Plato in 162d, 164e and 171c, 
 that bring about the advance to really serious argument superseding the captious 
 and eristic treatment of the earlier pages. 
 
 " Shorey, Unity, n. 523. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 25 
 
 ground that it will involve them in too great difficulties. Through 
 the figure of the midwife (184ab) he returns to Theaetetus as respon- 
 dent and advances to a renewed discussion of his definition of know- 
 ledge from the point of view of physiological psychology. This 
 interlude in which he plays with the order of the subject forms a 
 very interesting variation in transition.^" In 186d the conclusion is 
 reached that truth is not in our sensations, but in the generalizations 
 about them, so that knowledge is obviously something different 
 from perception (186e). In 187a, b, as in 151d a resumptive formula 
 and the demand for a new definition of knowledge mark a fresh start 
 in the argument. Theaetetus suggests that knowledge may be true 
 opinion. The question at once arises (188a), 'How can false opinion 
 be explained?' Plato is careful to warn us by his leaving out of 
 consideration learning and forgetting, that he is not serious in his 
 apparent acceptance of the ixi] 6v fallacy (189b). The following 
 attempts to explain false opinion as "heterodoxy" (189bc) or to 
 account for its existence by reference to the material images of the 
 wax tablet (191c) and the aviary (197c) all prove futile. In 200 c,d, 
 after a last reductio ad absurdum Socrates concludes that the attempt 
 to discover the nature of false opinion is doomed to failure until they 
 shall have determined the nature of knowledge. The transition here 
 is enlivened by the conceit of the personified argument^^ which re- 
 bukes them for their desertion of her. A resumptive formula (200d) 
 introduces the re-statement and further examination of the definition 
 of knowledge as true opinion. It is easy to find a practical instance 
 drawn from the experience of the law courts in which true opinion 
 imparted by persuasion is not knowledge. The definition accordingly 
 does not hold. In 201c, d, Theaetetus makes a third and final attempt 
 and, recalling words that he has heard but forgetten till now, 
 defines knowledge as right opinion with 'Koyos.^^ It is interesting to 
 note the parallelism between Socrates' treatment of this and the ear- 
 lier definition of knowledge as perception. In 152a-e he preceded to 
 explanation and testing of the definition by connecting it with the 
 doctrines of Protagoras and Heraclitus. So here (201d) in the inter- 
 pretation of this definition he introduces a theory of elements and 
 compounds for which he himself disclaims responsibility. As in the 
 
 80 Cf. p. 94, n. 76. 
 
 81 Cf. p. 79. 
 
 82 See p. 92 for this literary device of the 'unexpected recollection.' 
 
26 THE AKT OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 case of the earlier definition (cf 160d), the interpretation in terms of 
 the theory seems at first entirely satisfactory (202cd). But as in 161c 
 Socrates makes the transition to the criticism of Protagoras by ex- 
 pressing his wonder at one point, so now (202d) one of the state- 
 ments they have just made fails to suit him. He beheves that letters 
 and syllables must be equally known. But perhaps the syllable is a 
 whole different from the elements which compose it. The trans- 
 itional phrase crKeirTeov Kal oh TcpoboTtov, which introduces the discussion 
 whether "whole" and "all" are the same, should be compared with 
 the formula aXXrj 5?) aKewreov in 163a which introduces a fresh start 
 in the argument. "Whole" and "all" are proved to be the same 
 (205a). The general conclusion follows (205b), that whether the 
 syllable is made up of elements or is indivisible, syllable and elements 
 are equally inteUigible. This theory then like that of Protagorean 
 relativity has proved an unstable basis for a definition of knowledge. 
 In 206c he dismisses further consideration of the theory and turns to 
 the discussion of three definitions of \6yos. None of these prove 
 satisfactory; the definition of knowledge as right opinion with \6yos 
 is therefore rejected (210a). An enumeration of the refuted defini- 
 tions of knowledge introduces the brief dramatic conclusion. 
 
 That ancient scholars appreciated the structural difficulties of 
 the Philebus is shown by the title of Galen's lost treatise, "Concerning 
 the Transitions in the Philebus. "^^ The following analysis of the 
 logical framework of the dialogue does not claim to compensate for 
 the loss of Galen's work; much less does it make any pretence to be an 
 exhaustive outline of the philosophic content of the Philebus.^* 
 
 The main divisions in the Philebus are not so clearly marked as in 
 dialogues of less complexity. Frequent resumes of the argument^^ 
 and restatements of the issue^'' attest Plato's realization of the diffi- 
 culty of following the intricacies of the reasoning. Many slight 
 passages of by-play^' relieve the strain of argument and preserve 
 
 *' Poste, Philebus, Oxford, 1860, p. 105, n. 4, for no apparent reason translates 
 this 'On the abrupt transitions of the Philebus.' 
 
 ^* The unity of the Philebus has been questioned by Poste and others. Bury, 
 in his edition (Cambridge University Press, 1897), maintains the logical coherence 
 of the dialogue. In this he follows Trendelenburg, De Platonis Philebi Consilio, 
 Beriin, 1837. 
 
 ^ 19c, d, 22b, c, 26b, 27b, 31a, 41b, 50b, c, 60a, b. 
 
 «« 14b, 19c, d, 22c, d, 27c, 50e, 55c, 60a, 61a. 
 
 8' 12b, 15c, 15e, 22c, 23b, 27e, 34d. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 27 
 
 through the rather artificial framework the semblance of natural 
 dialogue form. The dialogue begins abruptly without dramatic intro- 
 duction. It is apparently the continuation by Socrates and Protarchus 
 of a previous conversation of Socrates and Philebus. With the ques- 
 tion (lib), "Shall we sum up the two views?" Socrates introduces 
 an explicit statement of the question at issue, What is the good? 
 Philebus contends that it is pleasure and enjoyment, Socrates that 
 it is thought, memory, right opinion. In lid Socrates makes the 
 transition, by a similar formula of exhortation,^^ to a more precise 
 re-statement of the problem, Which state or disposition of the soul 
 is able to make hfe happy for all men? The phrase rt 8' (lie) intro- 
 duces the possibility of a third claimant for first place. After this 
 preliminary agreement as to the issue and the withdrawal of Philebus 
 from the argument, the discussion is introduced (12b) by a transi- 
 tional formula of exhortation.^^ Socrates begins with a playful adap- 
 tation of a familiar religious formula and reference to Philebus' 
 identification of pleasure with Aphrodite. But in 12c he dismisses 
 this Httle by-play and advances (with 8e) to the important point that 
 pleasure is an equivocal term. He enumerates four unhke kinds of 
 pleasure. Protarchus meets this point by the distinction that al- 
 though these arise out of opposites they are not therefore themselves 
 opposite. But Socrates rejects this distinction and demands a defini- 
 tion of pleasure as necessary for the argument (13b). Here Pro- 
 tarchus protests that pleasure qua pleasure is never bad. Socrates' 
 criticism of Protarchus (13c-d) for thus blocking the argument and 
 exposing them to ridicule as inexperienced in dialectic opens the way 
 for the discussion of method which occupies the second sub-division 
 of the dialogue. Before this is taken up, however, Socrates estab- 
 lishes the fact that knowledge also has many species and must be 
 defined (13e-14b). This brief prehminary section of the dialogue 
 closes with a re-statement of the issue (146). 
 
 A transitional formula of exhortation (14c) introduces the general 
 question of proper dialectic method. This is really, Socrates claims, 
 only the old and troublesome problem of the one and many. Protar- 
 chus' failure to understand this statement^^ leads to explanation and 
 illustration from Socrates. Finally in 16c he sets forth the method of 
 
 ** See p. 54. 
 83 See p. 88. 
 
28 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 synthesis and diaeresis as the practical solution of their difficulties, 
 whose use makes the difference between true dialectic and mere eris- 
 tic. Demand for further explanation (17a) is followed as usual by- 
 elaboration and illustration. In 18d Socrates takes up the question, 
 raised by Philebus (18a), of the bearing of this method upon the 
 present discussion: it must be used in the enumeration and definition 
 of the many species of pleasure and knowledge (19a). Protarchus 
 delegates the task^° to Socrates (19c), adjuring him to choose what 
 method he will, so long as he solves their problem. With this re- 
 currence to the issue and a warning that this is to be no mere result- 
 less dialogue of search the section on method concludes (20a). 
 
 Before attempting the investigation of the species of pleasure and 
 knowledge, Socrates returns (20b), by the literary device of the "un- 
 expected recollection,"^^ to the suggestion already glanced at in 
 lid: — the good may be neither pleasure nor knowledge, but some 
 third thing. He proposes, and Protarchus accepts, three criteria 
 by which to test the good: it will be perfect, sufficient and desired 
 above all things. An ordinary formula of exhortation (20e) intro- 
 duces the application of these tests to pleasure and knowledge. Both 
 fail and the true answer that the life to be preferred is a mixture of 
 pleasure and wisdom is introduced (22a) as a suggestion by Socrates. ^^ 
 The question, "Do we understand?" prefaces a concluding sum- 
 mary (22b-c) which reverts in playful manner to the terms of 12b-c. 
 
 Transition to the modified form of the problem which now con- 
 fronts them is made through the image of the second prize, introduced 
 in a dismissive-introductive formula with /xh ovv and bk hi] (22c). ^' 
 Is pleasure or knowledge rather the cause of the excellence of the 
 mixed life? Here the direct division of pleasure and knowledge into 
 species is again postponed, by their inclusion in a larger classification 
 of ovra. The first two classes, the aireipov and the wepas, are reached 
 by a reference (23c) back to the discussion on method (16c). The 
 third class is a mixture of these. Socrates introduces the fourth class, 
 the cause of the union, by a playful jibe at his own stupidity (23d). 
 The next step is the application of the method of synthesis and diaere- 
 
 »" See below, p. 76, for description of the literary elements in the transition to this 
 demand. 
 
 " See p. 92. 
 
 92 See pp. 61 f. 
 
 93 See pp. 56 f. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 29 
 
 sis to these classes. The aTreipov is treated first (23e-24e). By an- 
 tithesis transition is made (25a) to the wepas, consideration of which 
 had been postponed in 24a. The discussion of this class is brief, a 
 mere enumeration of its main characteristics. A transitional eUv 
 introduces the third class^^ (25b), in the treatment of which both 
 aTreipov and irepas are further discussed. A reference back to 23d 
 introduces the fourth class (26e). The argument is led on by a series 
 of suggestions from Socrates and ends with a brief recapitulation of 
 the four classes (27b). A restatement of the question at issue (27c) 
 serves as the transition to the next point for discussion: — the assign- 
 ment to its proper class of each of the three lives under consideration. 
 To facilitate discussion the mixed life of pleasure and knowledge is 
 identified, without dispute, with the third class, the ixlktov. The satis- 
 factory dismissal of this subject and advance to the consideration of 
 pleasure is marked by a transitional eUv (27e). A change of interlo- 
 cutors adds further emphasis. Pleasure, and pain too, since they 
 admit of degree are easily assigned to the aweLpov. The question as 
 to knowledge is now (28a) introduced with playful solemnity by 
 Socrates. Philebus here gives way again to Protarchus, but he too 
 declares himself at a loss. Socrates accordingly takes up the ques- 
 tion himself (28c) and, with a glance at Philebus' charge that he is 
 unduly exalting his god, knowledge, launches into an eloquent digres- 
 sion on the theme that mind is the king of heaven and earth. At its 
 close (30e) Protarchus, though slightly bewildered, is content to 
 admit that mind belongs to the fourth or causal class. Socrates 
 frankly confesses his remarks to have been intended as a respite from 
 their serious argument. 
 
 Transition to the next section of the dialogue is made through a 
 formal resume of the conclusions just reached about pleasure and 
 knowledge (31a) and a statement by Socrates of the next point for 
 investigation — the origin of pleasures and pains. A series of sug- 
 gestions from Socrates leads to the conclusion that they arise in the 
 mixed class^^ through dissolution and restoration of the harmony be- 
 
 ^* The following invocation to God is intended, Bury thinks (p. 42), to draw 
 attention to the "combined difficulty and importance of what is to follow." 
 Perhaps rather it is a fanciful way of leading up to the criticism (25d) that the 
 -TTtpas has not yet been adequately treated — a somewhat captious criticism, for 
 the enumeration of 25ab, though brief, is practically sufficient. 
 
 *^ The class in which they arise must not be confused with the class to which 
 they belong. 
 
30 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 tween the aireipov and thcTrepas. With the discussion of examples of 
 this process the analysis of the species of pleasure has at last begun, 
 as is recognized in 32b, In 32d the discussion is advanced by an 
 announcement of plan; in the investigation of the second species of 
 pleasure, the pure pleasures of the mind, it maybe possible to discover 
 whether the whole class of pleasure is always desirable. But before 
 proceeding with this analysis, Socrates calls attention, with a formula 
 of exhortation, to the neutral state which may, after all, be the most 
 god-like. This subject, however, is postponed (33c) ets ovBls, and by 
 a recurrence to the image of the second prize, return is made to the 
 discussion of the purely mental pleasures. This is found to involve 
 some preliminary investigations, 1) of sensation and memory (33c- 
 34c) and 2) of the nature and origin of desire (34d-35c). The 
 renewed discussion of the states of pleasure and pain brings Socrates 
 to a new question, (36c), should the terms true and false be used of 
 pleasure? A warning of the importance of the subject and the 
 necessity of being assured of its relevancy, ending with the famihar 
 conclusion, "we must consider, "^^ forms the transition to actual dis- 
 cussion (36e). Considerable space is given to this problem for ethical 
 reasons, Plato realizes the moral effect of the estabhshment of the 
 appHcability of the epithets true and false to pleasures. Socrates 
 begins the argum.ent with a more precise definition of the point at 
 issue (37a) and a strong statement^^ of the view which he intends to 
 oppose (37b). It soon appears that a discussion of true and false 
 opinion is involved (37e). The ordinary transition-formulas of ar- 
 gument are varied here by the introduction of a reported imaginary 
 conversation of a man with himself (38c, d), and the development of 
 the comparison of the soul to a book (38e-39b). The existence of 
 false opinion, and consequently of false pleasures and pains, and the 
 similar illusory character of both are finally established (39c-40e). 
 Socrates now proceeds, with tI be; to a further analogy between false 
 opinions and false pleasures; in both falsity is synonymious with bad- 
 ness (40e). But Protarchus objects and Socrates accordingly post- 
 pones dealing with this point, until he has brought forward further 
 proofs of the existence of false pleasures. The image of the wrestlers 
 (41b) introduces the new attempt. A recapitulation of former ad- 
 
 9« Cf. p. 54. 
 
 " Cf. Rep. 357-367 and Theaet. 166-168. 
 
MATN TRANSITIONS 31 
 
 missions regarding the nature of desire (34b) and of pleasure (27e) 
 leads to the conclusion that pleasures in themselves may be false and 
 illusory, without reference to false opinion (42b). A transitional 
 t^rjs byphixeQa (42c) introduces yet another proof which Socrates seeks 
 in a further consideration of the fact that pleasures and pains arise 
 out of changes in the bodily state. In 42d he makes an abrupt and 
 seemingly irrelevant reference to the interval when the body exper- 
 iences no change, or rather when its motions are too slight to rise 
 above the threshold of consciousness and produce either pleasure or 
 pain. Through this renewed discussion''^ of the neutral life the doc- 
 trine that pleasure is mere freedom from pain is disproved (43c). 
 Protarchus is convinced (43e) by the argument and illustrations of 
 Socrates. The latter, however, seizes the opportunity to discuss 
 the theory as upheld by certain philosophers. The transition is 
 made (44a, b) by the common device of the interlocutor's failure to 
 understand and the consequent need of explanation.^^ A statement 
 of plan follows (44d-e). By this introduction of ''the enemies of 
 Philebus" the analysis of the nature and kinds of pleasure is con- 
 tinued with fresh interest. As the nature of anything is best seen 
 from extreme cases, they now proceed (45e-46a) at the suggestion of 
 Socrates to examine typical examples of the in tensest pleasures which 
 are really mixtures of pleasure and pain. This analysis of mixed 
 pleasures ends (50b) with a general conclusion and summary. A 
 paragraph of transition follows (50c-e) in which discussion of further 
 instances of mixed pleasures is postponed. For the sake of the origi- 
 nal question at issue the unmixed pleasures must next be analyzed. 
 Socrates begins (51a) with a reference to the aforementioned (44b) 
 physicists who deny the existence of true pleasures. His assertion 
 of disagreement with them serves to introduce the following enumera- 
 tion; while Protarchus' failure to understand leads at once to a fuller 
 description of these pleasures (51b-52b). Now that the distinction 
 between pure and impure pleasures has been adequately estabhshed 
 (52c), Socrates proceeds to some further comparison of the two spe- 
 cies; the pure pleasures belong to the class of measure, the ir'tpas, the 
 impure or mixed pleasures to the aireLpov; the pure pleasures are true, 
 the impure are false (52d-53b). Some further considerations as to 
 
 *' Postponed in 33bc. 
 59 Sec below, p. 88. 
 
32 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 the nature of pleasure are now introduced to lead up to the formal 
 rejection of the view that pleasure is the good. The transition is 
 very abrupt. The conventional phrase tL de to ToiovSe; (53c) forms 
 the only preface to Socrates' question whether pleasure is not akin 
 to generation rather than to essence. But as if to compensate for 
 this lack of emphasis, in the immediately following discussion of the 
 terms relative and absolute, the idea of the final cause is introduced 
 (53e) in a playful over-elaborate style which draws instant attention 
 to its im.portance in the argument. The conclusion (54c-d) is stated 
 in the form of a syllogism: (1) pleasure is a generation coming into 
 being for the sake of some essence and therefore not a final cause; 
 (2) the final cause must be a good; (3) pleasure must belong to some 
 category other than the good. This section of the dialogue closes 
 with a further confirmation, a somewhat rhetorical argument, the 
 absurdity of measuring moral qualities by the standard of pleasure 
 (55a-b).ioo 
 
 The examination of the species of pleasure is now finished and by a 
 sort of argument um e contrario and figurative reminder of the issue 
 Socrates passes to the examination of the species of knowledge. The 
 analysis follows the method of dichotomy outhned in 16c, and is far 
 less intricate than the discussion of pleasure. In 58a, in answer to 
 Socrates' question whether dialectic is not the truest of the sciences, 
 Protarchus introduces a slightly irrelevant point, the claims of Gor- 
 gias for rhetoric as the greatest of the arts. Socrates points out the 
 irrelevancy (58bc) and proves the superior clearness and exactness 
 of dialectic. In 59b he dismisses (with /xev drj) all such personal dis- 
 putes and returns (with 5e) to the point in question before the digres- 
 sion. The object of this highest science, dialectic, is true being. 
 But the fairest things should have the fairest names. This contem- 
 plation of true being must therefore be called mind and wisdom, the 
 very terms which Socrates has defended as rivals of pleasure (59d). 
 With the completion of this analysis the m^ain point at issue, the com- 
 
 1°° Poste, E. {Philehus, Oxford, 1860, p. 105, n. 4) argues that the Philcbus 
 is "a composition of two distinct fragments forming a well-proportioned whole, 
 but rather carelessly soldered together in respect of some of the minuter touches. " 
 He considers the words ■koKKt] . . . aXoychrara an interpolation added to effect 
 this joining. But there seems to be nothing in this particular passage to support 
 such a view; and the logical connection of the analysis of the species of knowledge 
 with the theme of the dialogue is unmistakably clear. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 33 
 
 parative claims of pleasure and knowledge, is really settled. Socrates' 
 conclusion, triumphantly stated in 65a, is here implicitly estab- 
 lished. The last pages^"^ of the dialogue are a subtle blending of real 
 argument with figurative and rhetorical elaboration. 
 
 The philosophic and structural unity of the Republic, attacked 
 by Hermann, Krohn, Pfleiderer, Rohde, and other German scholars 
 has been established beyond a doubt by the arguments of Hirmer, 
 Zeller, and Campbell. ^"^ A detailed study of the main transitions of 
 the dialogue only adds a further confirmation of their results. Ac- 
 cording to Hirmer's and Campbell's analyses the Republic readily 
 falls into five main divisions, marked with careful transitions. The 
 controversy begins over Book I, the introduction. Regarded by it- 
 self it seems a complete well rounded whole.^"^ Hermann declares 
 it to be an independent minor dialogue.^"-* But though Book I may 
 conceivably have been published earher than the rest of the Republic^'^^ 
 
 i"! For a detailed analysis of these pages see below pp. 95 f. 
 
 "= Hirmer, J., Entslehung u. Komposilion d. plat. Pol., Leipzig, 1897, J. P, 
 Vol. 23. Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. 2, 1, 558 ff. Campbell, Republic, Vol. II, pp. 
 1-66; see also Shorey, Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 78-82. 
 
 '"^ Pohlenz, Aus Platos Werdezeit, Berlin, 1913, p. 209, n. 1, accepts the 
 verdict of Sprachstatistik for the earlier composition of Book I, but argues that 
 it could never have been independent. He bases his conclusion on the extent 
 and tone of the introduction scene and on "die ganze Richtung nach der die 
 Gerechtigkeit erortert wird. " Von Arnim, Platos Jugenddialogc u. d. Ent- 
 stehitngzeii des Phaidros, Leipzig, Teubner, 1914, p. 71 f., contests this view. 
 
 1" See Hermann, Gcschichte u. System d. plat. Phil., Heidelberg, 1839, p. 537. 
 Nusser, Phil., vol. 53, 1894, p. 27, regards Book I as inorganically joined to the rest 
 and is inclined to doubt its authenticity. Cp. Hirmer, p. 606 f., for a detailed 
 refutation of these views. He enumerates the passages in Book I which contain 
 anticipatory hints of the later discussion. See also Campbell, op. cil., pp. 2-5. 
 
 i°* Von Arnim, op. cit., pp. 71-109, bases his conviction of the earlier and 
 independent publication of Book I in part on the result of his statistical stylistic 
 investigations which establish its affinity with the Laches and Lysis. But 
 granted that the method of Sprachstatistik does prove earlier composition we may 
 still adhere to the view that even at that date Plato had in mind the plan of the 
 whole Republic. Von Arnim finds further confirmation of his opinion in the 
 fact that the development of ideas in Book I seems to place it earlier than the 
 Gorgias and Lysis and later than the Laches and Protagoras. But as he seems 
 fully aware (Vorwort, pp. III-VII) of the difficulties that beset such a line of 
 reasoning and of the fallacies to be avoided (See Shorey, Unity, pp. 4, 19, and 
 note 109) he would no doubt himself admit that at most it could establish only a 
 strong probability. See Shorey's review of Von Arnim's book. Class. Phil., 
 Vol. 10, p. 334 f. 
 
34 " THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 its complete suitability as an introduction to the whole work makes 
 such a presumption unnecessary.^"^ The chief feature of the brief 
 descriptive narrative of the setting is the charming portrait of the 
 aged Cephalus, artistically significant in that he is himself the perfect 
 embodiment of that justice which is to be the theme of discourse. 
 In the prehminary conversation of Socrates and Cephalus (328c- 
 331b) the external connection between points seems slight; but 
 throughout the passage one feels below the surface an inner connect- 
 ing link, a unifying force, the aim of Socrates and Plato to guide the 
 discussion into an edifying channel.^"^ This determination finally 
 culminates in 331c where Socrates abruptly generalizes the words of 
 Cephalus into a definition of justice, which he proceeds to test by 
 negative instances. In this way the subject of justice is introduced 
 for consideration. In the course of the following discussion^"^ the 
 ethical problem as to the nature of justice and its rewards which is 
 the real theme of the Republic is clearly indicated. ^°^ The most 
 important subdivisions in Book I are marked by a change of interlo- 
 cutors. In his conversation with Cephalus and Polemarchus Socrates 
 is opposing popular opinions. After the interruption of the bully- 
 ing Thrasymachus (336b) he turns to an attack on sophistic views of 
 justice. The purely dialectical treatment of Bk. I sets the subject 
 forth dramatically. But although by a train of subtle, sophistical 
 reasoning Socrates succeeds in establishing against the sophist 
 Thrasymachus his thesis that the just life is the happiest and that 
 the Hfe of injustice is altogether wretched, he concludes (354b, c) as in 
 the minor dialogues with an avowal of "Socratic ignorance." The 
 figure of the "feast of reason" used sarcastically by Thrasymachus 
 
 i"" In the beginning of Book II (357a) Plato refers to Book I as a proemium. 
 Pohlenz, op. cit., p. 209, note 1, thinks that while Plato designed Book I as an 
 introduction he naust himself have felt the lack of harmony between it and the 
 following books. He regards it as possible that the Clitophon is an unfinished 
 attempt to replace Book I with a more satisfactory introduction. 
 
 ^" Note the characteristic moral turn in 330d. 
 
 "8 See especially 344a, c, e; 347d, e; 352d. 
 
 ""' Hirmero/>. cit. (p. 602) says that justice is only the nominal theme of the 
 dialogue, that the state is the actual theme. Rather is it true that to the Greek 
 mind the ethical ideal of justice is ine\dtably connected \\'ith political theory. Or 
 one may say that the RepubHc like the Phaedrus and Gorgias has a double theme. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 35 
 
 earlier in the discourse (352b) is introduced again in a dismissive 
 forniula^i" at the close of his refutation by Socrates (354a) and is 
 picked up by the latter (354b) in transition to a concluding expression 
 of dissatisfaction with the result of the argument. By this dissatis- 
 faction of Socrates and his criticism of his own method of procedure 
 in passing on to questions about justice before defining its nature, 
 transition is made to the second main division of the Republic which 
 comprises Books II, III and IV. The first few sentences in Bk. II 
 continue the transition with Glaucon's protest against the inade- 
 quacy of the previous discussion and his appeal to Socrates to attempt 
 a more scientific investigation (358b). The question is now resumed 
 with the strongest possible statement of the case for injustice, put 
 in the mouth not of Thrasymachus,^^^ but of Glaucon and Adeiman- 
 tus, who do not themselves beheve it (358b-367e).^^^ The brothers 
 demand of Socrates (367e) proof of the value of justice per se. Thus 
 the discussion is lifted to a much higher plane than that of Bk. I, and 
 the fuller investigation that follows is amply justified. By the found- 
 ing of the ideal state and the elaboration of the analogy between the 
 state and the individual"^ the insufficient dialectical treatment of 
 Bk. I is supplemented"^ by sociological and psychological arguments. 
 
 '""Let this then ... be your entertainment at the feast of Bendis." 
 k(TTiacr9o: the perfect imperative of completion and dismissal is used. The phrase 
 h Tols ^evdi5ioLs recalls the dramatic setting, and thus has a unifying effect. 
 
 "1 The change of interlocutors at the beginning of Bk. II cannot fairly be 
 used as an argument for its independence of Bk. I. The logical and artistic 
 reasons for the change are sufiScient to explain it. Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
 who are in sympathy with Socrates, are the natural and fitting respondents in 
 the serious exposition that follows. There is similar artistic motivation in the 
 change of interlocutors within Bk. I and in the minor dialogues of search. See 
 above p. 6, n. 11. 
 
 "= Windelband {Gesch. d. ant. Pliilos. p. 225) maintains that Bk. I and Bk. II 
 to 367e form an independent whole. He cuts off Socrates' answer in 368b making 
 it thus a resultless dialogue on justice. Afterwards he revised his position, 
 regarding 357-367 as a later inserted appendix to Bk. I. Cf. Hirmer, op. cit. pp. 
 595-6, 609-10 for discussion and refutation of Windelband's views. The higher 
 tone of 357-367 separates it naturally fromBk. I; nor does its character seem that 
 of an appendix, but rather transitional and introductory. Dreinhofer {Plaios 
 Schrijt liber d. Staat, p. 1-5) also groups the first ten pages of Bk. II with Bk. I. 
 
 "3 See below p. 82, n. 39. 
 
 ^" See above p. 21. 
 
36 THE ART OF TRANSITIONS IN PLATO 
 
 The transition to the founding of the state, the first important 
 subdivision of this section of the Republic, is made by an image, the 
 analogy of the large and small letters. The state is larger than the 
 individual: therefore the nature of justice may be more easily dis- 
 covered in the state (368e). The first sketch (369b-372a) describes 
 the simple nature-state, whose growth is controlled by the principles of 
 specialization and the division of labor. In such a city justice would 
 appear, so Adeimantus suggests (372a), in the dealings of the citizens 
 with one another. But Plato is aware that this simplest type of 
 city-state affords no scope for the development of his poHtical and 
 ethical theories; accordingly he passes on (372e) to the description 
 of a more luxurious city. The transition is made by a half-serious, 
 half-comic interlude (372a-d), in which Glaucon protests against the 
 swinish character of the life of the simple city. The problems of life 
 in the more comphcated city demand the addition of a new class 
 of citizens, the warriors or guardians (373e). Discussion of the na- 
 ture, education and method of selection of these guardians occupies 
 the remainder of Bk. II and the greater part of Bk. III. The transi- 
 tion to the first of these topics is very skilful. In the longe contrario 
 sentence (374c-d) which establishes the necessity of a warrior class, 
 the development and illustration of the argument based on the divi- 
 sion of labor introduces the ideas of /jLeXerTj and eTrto-rij/zTj ; (pvais, the 
 third member of the triad is at once suggested to the mind.^i^ A 
 dismissive-introductive formula, with ixeu 8r] balanced by Be 8r],^^'^ 
 marks the advance from the subject of the guardians' natural 
 endowment to that of their education^^^ (376c). Socrates describes 
 the kind of Hterature to be avoided (376d-378e) and lays down the 
 principles which are to guide writers of tales in their city (378e-383c). 
 The attack on Homer and the poets here begun is further developed 
 in Bk. Ill which continues the description of the purified education. 
 The transition is made by a sentence summarizing and dismissing, 
 with nev 8r], the closing subject of Bk. II and introducing, with the 
 phrase H be hi] ; the next topic. 
 
 After discussing in detail both subject-matter and style of the 
 Hterature and music suitable for the training of the guardians, Soc- 
 rates passes to the subject of gymnastic. Again the transition is of 
 
 "^ These are the three necessary prerequisites for a perfect ayuivKJTfis. 
 
 'i^Cf. pp. 56 f. 
 
 "^ Notice also that the emphatic position of dp't^povron aids in the transition. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 37 
 
 the dismissive-introductive type (403c). In 412b, waiving further 
 •discussion of details, he dismisses, with jdep 8ri, this exposition of the 
 main outHnes of the education of the guardians, ^^^ and advances, with 
 the transitional phrase to Si] fxera tovto, to the question which of these 
 warriors or guardians shall be our rulers. The following description 
 (412c-414b) of the principles and tests which shall govern their selec- 
 tion is very brief.^^^ The subject of the estabUshment of these regu- 
 lations is now introduced (414b-c) rather abruptly by reference 
 back to a previous (389b-c) discussion of the necessary lie. The 
 allegory of the earth-born children, whose substance God mingled 
 with different metals, gives a fanciful, semi-religious guarantee for 
 the permanence of the ideal city (414c-415d). The book closes with 
 a description of the manner of life which is to be required of the 
 rulers to secure their disinterested patriotism (416d-4l7b). 
 
 The opening pages of Bk. IV (419a-427c) are occupied with a 
 semi-digression or interlude in which various objections are answered. 
 The connection with Bk. Ill is made through the first objection, that 
 the guardians (or rulers) will not be happy. The points brought for- 
 ward by Adeimantus and Socrates in support of this accusation 
 repeat, with derogatory tone, the details of the eloquent summary at 
 the end of Bk. III. With 427ci2o begins the transition to the second 
 important sub-division of the argument in Bks. I-IV, the establish- 
 ment of justice in the state and, by analogy, in the soul of the indivi- 
 dual. Here also as in 368e, figurative language^^^ inaugurates the 
 transition, which is further marked by the summoning of Polemar- 
 chus and the others to a share in the conversation and by a re- 
 statement of the main points at issue. The ideal state has now been 
 
 11* The passing reference in 412a to the need of an everabiding tTnariiT-qs or 
 presiding genius, if the state is to be preserved, should be noted as an important 
 anticipatory hint of Bks. V-VII, the higher education and the rule of the 
 philosopher-king. (Cf. 497c.) 
 
 "' Hirmer (pp. 610-11) notes that this chapter on the rulers is strikingly 
 short and superficial, merely an appendix to the fuller treatment of the nature 
 and education of the guardians. This incompleteness he considers a conclusive 
 disproof of the independent existence of Bks. I-IV. 
 
 120 Schleiermacher {Platans Werke III Th., I Bd., Berlin, 1828, p. 20) makes 
 this the end of the second main division of the Republic. This seems wholly 
 illogical. The program outlined in 369a has not yet been completed, as Glaucon 
 reminds Socrates in 427d. Compare also Hirmer's statements, p. 587, note 1. 
 
 1=1 See p. 79. 
 
38 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 founded. By the assumptions-^ j-jjat^ rightly organized means ethical- 
 ly good, Socrates introduces the subject of the four cardinal virtues 
 (427e). Instead, however, of proceeding at once to the discussion 
 of justice,^-^ he first defines the other three virtues, wisdom, courage 
 and temperance and determines in what part of the state each v.dll be 
 found. Finally in 434c he comes to the definition of justice in the 
 state as the performance by each class of its own work. The next 
 task is the discovery of justice in the individual, and to this Socrates 
 makes transition (434d) by reference back to the analogy of the large 
 and small letters (368d), recalling their object in founding the state. 
 Developing the analogy between state and individual he assumes the 
 existence of three principles in the soul (435e), appetite, spirit and 
 reason, which correspond to the three classes in the state, the traders, 
 auxiharies or warrior class and the guardians or rulers. By a regular 
 dismissive-introductive transition (tovto nev 8ri . . . rode 8e i]8r]) Soc- 
 rates now (436a) passes from the recognition of these three types in 
 the soul to the difficult question whether they are really three or 
 rather one principle acting in three ways. By applying the law of 
 contradiction, he proves the soul to be tripartite and estabhshes the 
 opposition of appetite and reason (439e) and the relation of spirit as 
 an ally of reason (440b). The virtues in the individual are now 
 defined, and the definition of justice in the state is found verified in 
 the individual (442d). As a further confirmation this conception of 
 justice stands the test when judged by the criteria of popular ideas^^^ 
 of justice (442e-443c). 
 
 At the end of Bk. IV a provisionals^^ conclusion is reached. Our 
 dream is realized (443b). We have discovered justice (444a). After 
 
 ^" While this assumption in a sense begs the qviestion, it does not interfere 
 at all with the validity of the following arguments. 
 
 123 See p. 94. 
 
 •2'' See p. 84. This recurrence to the popular notions of justice, the subject of 
 Socrates' conversation with Cephalus and Polemarchus in the early part of Bk. I, is 
 not only an illustration of a common Platonic trait of style, but a confirmation of the 
 unity of the Republic as well. 
 
 125 Hirmer (p. 618) points out that the words dXX' ofxcos (445b) continuing the 
 discussion show that the conclusion reached in 444a-445b is regarded only as 
 provisional. Compare also tv-kov tlvo. in 443b. Similarly ws kv rvircc 414a, and 
 OL niv dr) Tviroi 412b imply the incompleteness of the treatment of education. 
 However, disregarding these plain hints does not affect the certainty that this 
 conclusion is not final. The seeming completeness and independence of single 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 39 
 
 the acceptance of the analogy of health and disease (445a), the ques- 
 tion of the comparative advantage of the just and the unjust life be- 
 comes foolish. Socrates now suggests that they complete the picture 
 by an investigation of the forms of degeneracy in state and individual. 
 The familiar^^^ exhortation not to grow weary in the argument en- 
 livened by the figurative expressions, "since we have reached this 
 height" and "as from a watch-tower" marks the transition (445b, c). 
 The opening hnes of Book V are also transitional — a brief summary of 
 the final conclusions of Bk. IV and Socrates' reiteration of his inten- 
 tion to discuss the types of degeneracy. At this point, however, the 
 argument is interrupted by a long digression, Bks. V, VI and VII, in 
 which the brief and inadequate treatment of the rulers^" [-^ ^y^ jj^ 
 412b-414b, and the sketch^-^ of their education given in 376c-412b are 
 supplemented by the complete picture of the philospher-king and the 
 detailed account of the higher-education and the Idea of Good. 
 Very properly too is the paradoxical theory of the "community of 
 wives," which needs careful explanation, postponed to this section 
 of the dialogue. ^2^ These books, then, are the logically necessary 
 complement of Bks. I-IV.^^° Transition to this third main division 
 of the Repubhc is made very naturally and effectively by a dramatic 
 interlude (449b-451b) in the style of Phaedo 84c. Polemarchus and 
 Adeimantus, after whispered consultation, demand an explanation 
 of the proverbial phrase kolvo. to. ip'ikuv as applied by Socrates in 
 
 sections of an argument has been already noted (see above, p. 21) as a common 
 peculiarity of Platonic composition. Many times the discussion will seem at an 
 end only to be renewed again. In Bk. I, for example, the argument might have 
 concluded at 336a, 343a or 347e. 
 
 i"-« Compare also Theaet. 151d, 157d; Protag. 333b; Crat. 411a, 428a; Soph. 
 261b, 264b; Rep. 435d. 
 
 '-" See above p. 37, n. 119. 
 
 '^^ Plato indicates clearly that this is only a general outline. Cf. 412b and 
 414a as well as the reference to "the longer way," that is the higher education, 
 in 435d which is picked up in 503a, 504b. 
 
 For a general discussion of this subject see Jowett-Campbell, Plato's Republic, 
 Vol. II, pp. 8-12. 
 
 '=» Compare 502d, where Socrates refers to his earlier omission of these topics 
 as "a piece of cleverness which was not of much service." 
 
 "" For a full discussion of the technical and artistic reasons which determined 
 the contents of Bks. V-VII and a convincing refutation of the theories of Krohn, 
 Christ, Pfleiderer and Rohde that they are superfluous or a later addition to 
 Bks. I-IV, see Hirmer, pp. 612-620. 
 
40 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 423e-424a to women and children. The scene is enlivened by figura- 
 tive and proverbial expressions and by a playful use of legal terminol- 
 ogy. Socrates prefaces his explanation by characteristic^^^ protests of 
 ignorance and unwillingness. ^^^ The unforced naturalness of this 
 transition scene is a strong argument against the "separatists. "^^^ 
 Throughout this section of the dialogue the transitions are managed 
 with great skill. Especially noteworthy are the recurrent comparison 
 of the wave and the chimerical wish (evxv), external means by which 
 Plato secures a unity of tone for the whole. ^^^ 
 
 The first part of Bk. V (451c-471c) is occupied with the discussion 
 of the two paradoxes concerning women, Socrates' explanation of 
 his application of the phrase kolvo. to. <p'i\wv. The first paradox, the 
 community in education between the male and female guardians 
 is shown to be both possible (451c-456c) and desirable (456c-457b). 
 By the figure of the waves of ridicule transition is made to the con- 
 sideration of the second paradox, the community in wives and chil- 
 dren for the guardians. The question of its possibility is postponed 
 by Socrates'^^^ (458ab), until he shall have established its desirability. 
 But when this has been accomplished, 466c, a digression on war 
 affords a further excuse for postponement. The transition to this 
 digression is entirely natural, and the German critics^^^ who find here 
 an awkward juncture of two independent sections seem quite un- 
 justified. Socrates has mentioned in a casual way in his concluding 
 summary (466c) that the women also will go to war. It is quite in 
 accord with Plato's manner that such a point should be singled out 
 for further development.^" Glaucon's recall of Socrates from the 
 digression is equally natural. He reminds him that meanwhile the 
 possibility of the second paradox still remains unproved. His 
 
 ■^' See p. 4, n. 4. 
 
 >5- Plato seems to have forgotten the original scene (328a). 
 
 "' Notice too that the interlocutors do not make their request immediately 
 after the provisional conclusion of 445b. Socrates first sets forth his program 
 for the discussion of injustice. Bks. I-IV are thus also closely bound to Bks. 
 VIII and IX. 
 
 1** For a full treatment of these, see pp. 72 and 84. 
 
 135 See p. 84. 
 
 "* For a discussion of the question see Hirmer, p. 619. As to the subject- 
 matter of this digression, Hirmer shows that no more suitable place in the Repub- 
 lic could be found for this section. 
 
 1" Compare Laws 692d-693c, 655a, b; Phaed. 258e-259e; Phil. 28c-30e. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 41 
 
 brief reference to the results of the previous discussion includes men- 
 tion of the content of the digression, which is thus adequately con- 
 nected with the rest of the argument. 
 
 This conversation between Glaucon and Socrates (471c-473c) 
 forms the introduction to the second main division of this section of 
 the Republic (471c-502c). The possibility of the community of wives 
 appears (471e) dependent on the possibility of the existence of a state 
 such as they have been describing. To the latter question Socrates 
 accordingly turns his attention. A brief discussion of the relation 
 between the ideal and actual prefaces the statement in 473d of the 
 third and greatest paradox, the government of the state by philosopher- 
 kings.^^^ The explanation and establishment of this paradox 
 involves thorough investigation of the nature of the true philosopher 
 and proof of his fitness for rule.^^^ Finally in 501e Socrates and Adei- 
 mantus agree that enough has been said to satisfy their opponents 
 and in 502c Socrates declares that the possibility of the existence of 
 their state has been proved. 
 
 With a dismissive-introductive transition Socrates now passes to 
 the question of the education by which these philosophic guardians 
 will be produced — a subject which occupies the remainder of this 
 section of the dialogue. Plato's symbolical expression for the com- 
 plete education of the guardians is the knowledge of the Idea of Good 
 (505a). He leads up to the discussion of this by a brief but adequate 
 resume (502e-503e) of the main points in his earlier insufficient treat- 
 ment of the rulers in Bk. II, 412b-414b, and by reference (504a) to 
 the tripartite division of the soul and the definitions of the four vir- 
 tues established in Bk. IV. The discussion of the Idea of Good is con- 
 cluded by the development and interpretation of the image of the 
 divided line (509d-511e) and the following allegory of the cave 
 (514a-519c), an allegory of " the ascent of the soul into the intellectual 
 world" (517b). The application (519c-521c) of this allegory of 
 education to the guardians of the ideal state introduces in a natural 
 way the discussion of the details of their higher education, the means 
 
 '^* For description of the further development here in transition of the 
 figure of the wave, see p. 72. 
 
 139 Windelband (Gesch. d. ant. Philos., p. 225) concludes his second main 
 division of the dialogue with 486. This view seems unjustified by anything in 
 the subject-matter or its arrangement. Hirmer (p. 620) believes his error due 
 to a misconception of the allegory of the ship of state (488 f). 
 
42 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 by which they shall attain to that necessary knowledge of the Idea 
 of Good. Of the two criteria (52 Id) by which Socrates proposes to 
 test his scheme of education the first is the only one of real importance, 
 viz. that the subject studied should train the mind to think in abstract 
 terms. The second test, that it should be useful for a soldier is only 
 a detail in the literary frame- work of the dialogue: it is inserted merely 
 because the guardians are drawn from the warrior class. Applying 
 these two criteria, gymnastic, music and the arts are rejected (521e- 
 522b) and mathematics, applied mathematics and dialectic are 
 selected as materials for the higher training of the guardians (522c- 
 540c). 
 
 At the close of Bk. VII the discussion of the ideal state and its 
 philosophic rulers is declared complete (540d-541b). The fourth 
 main division of the dialogue comprises Bks. VIII and IX. Bk. VIII 
 opens with a transitional elev expressing satisfaction with the preced- 
 ing and introducing a brief summary (543a) of the contents of Books 
 V, VI and VII. Following, in 543b nal iiriv introduces a reference 
 to still earher conclusions— the provisions of the last pages of Bk. III. 
 These summarizing statements lead naturally to the return from the 
 digression which is effected (543c-544b) by a recapitulation of the 
 program outHned by Socrates at the end of Bk. IV and by reference 
 back to the scene at the beginning of Bk. V. The image of the 
 wrestler (544b) serves as the immediate transition to the resumption 
 of the argument from the conclusion of Bk. IV."" Socrates now 
 enumerates (544c) the four degenerate types of state and individual 
 which are to be the subject of their discussion, viz. the timocratic, 
 oligarchical, democratic and tyrannical. He reminds his hearers 
 that this investigation is necessary to complete their inquiry as to the 
 comparative happiness of the life of justice and injustice (544d-545a). 
 By a reference back to the analogy of the large and small letters 
 (368d) he introduces a brief outhne of the method of procedure which 
 he proposes to adopt (545b). Finally, in 545c, with a transitional 
 phrase of exhortation,^^^ he turns to the first topic of discussion, the 
 development of timocracy from the ideal state. But here the general 
 problem arises, why should there be any degeneracy? Plato recog- 
 nizes that dogmatism is out of place here. Accordingly he dismisses 
 
 »" See above p. 39, n. 126. 
 1" See p. 54. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 43 
 
 the subject with the myth of the so-called Platonic number (546a- 
 547a). Transition to the myth is made by the playful adaptation of 
 a Homeric quotation^'- (545d, e) and in 547a the incorporation in a 
 similar manner of a few words from Homer^'*^ into the final summariz- 
 ing sentence of the myth and the playful reference to the language of 
 545d, e mark the return to the discussion of the rise of timocracy. 
 The sketch of the origin and character of the timocratic state now 
 follows (547b-548c). With a dismissive transition waiving further 
 details Socrates next passes to the description of the character and 
 origin of the timocratic soul. In 550c this is declared complete and 
 he turns to the consideration of the rise of oligarchy. The formula of 
 transition here is varied by an adapted quotation from Aeschylus. ^^'^ 
 After the description of the oligarchical state he takes up the nature 
 and origin of the corresponding individual (553a-555b). Democracy 
 is next to be considered (555b), and the democratic nature (558c- 
 562a). Lastly, there are left for discussion tyranny (562a-569c) 
 and the tyrannical soul (571a-576b). Throughout this description 
 of the four degenerate types of state and individual the transitions 
 are simple and unelaborate, mostly of the ordinary dismissive- 
 introductive type which is especially suitable for the connection of 
 sub-divisions in the argument, where any decided break in the 
 continuity is undesirable. ^^^ 
 
 Transition to the next main division of this section of the dialogue 
 is marked by a change of interlocutors and by Socrates' recurrence 
 (576b) to the ethical problem, which is the main issue of the Republic, 
 and of which he reminded his hearers in 571a, before beginning the 
 description of the tyrannical man. With the completed picture be- 
 fore us of the worst and wickedest type of soul, the tyrannical, we are 
 ready for the comparison with the best and m.ost just and the judg- 
 ment as to their happiness. The provisional conclusion of Bk. IV 
 is here substantiated by three formal arguments. The first proof 
 (576c-580c) for the superior happiness of the just man is based on 
 the parallelism between state and individual and is, in a way, a sum- 
 mary of the whole social and political thought of the Republic. The 
 
 >«I1. XVI 112. 
 i«Il. VI 221; XX 241. 
 '" Aeschylus, Septem 451 and 570. 
 
 "^ For an account of the recurrent metaphor of the drones as a unifying ele- 
 ment in Bks. VIII and IX, see pp. 81 f. 
 
44 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 formal proclamation of the five types of state in order of their happi- 
 ness and the other references to the methods of theatrical contests 
 merely serve to emphasize the importance of the conclusion. With a 
 transitional eUv Sij and a regularly balanced^^^ dismissive-introductive 
 formula advance is now (580c-d) made to the second proof.^^^ This 
 argument is psychological, based on the tripartite division of the 
 soul: — the man who seeks ideal pleasures will have experienced also, 
 in a fair degree, the lower pleasures, while the man devoted to honor 
 or gain has no knowledge of the higher pleasures. The third and 
 crowning"^ argument, the metaphysical, rests on the proof of the 
 unreaHty and impurity of all pleasures except those of the wise man 
 (583b-588a). In 588b Socrates dismisses (with eUv 5?)) as satisfactory 
 the conclusions of the discussion up to this point. By again recur- 
 ring to the main theme of the dialogue he now introduces, as 
 supplemental confirmation of the three formal arguments, two figures, 
 the image of the beast in man (588b-591c) and the analogy of health 
 and disease in the soul (591c-592). 
 
 With the end of Bk. IX the ethical demonstration of the superior 
 happiness of the just hfe is complete, Bk. X is an appendix in which 
 Plato adds to his elaborate sociological and psychological arguments 
 the religious confimation of a myth describing the rewards of the just 
 man in the other world. The eloquent moral climax of Bk. IX is 
 thus superseded by a higher spiritual climax. 
 
 The transition to this concluding book is especially interesting. 
 The myth does not follow immediately upon the conclusion of Bk. 
 IX. Plato was aware that sustained grandeur becomes wearisome. 
 Accordingly ^k. X opens with an abrupt return (introduced by 
 Kai ixrjv) to the question of the banishment of poetry from the ideal 
 state. This interpolated^*^ discussion closes with a summary (607b- 
 
 i« See pp. 56 f. 
 
 1" Pfleiderer {Platonische Frage, p. 74) and Rohde (Psyche, p. 558) maintain 
 that 580c-588a is a later insertion. This arbitrary act is due solely, as Hirmer 
 believes (p. 622), to their desire to exclude all mention of the Ideas from Bks. 
 VIII-IX and so in their opinion establish their priority to Bks. V-VII. No 
 illogicality of thought or awkwardness in connection at this point, which might 
 support their position, can be pointed out. 
 
 "* The literary features of the transition to this argument are described in 
 Chap. Ill, p. 75. 
 
 '" Aside from the artistic reasons for the introduction of this discussion at 
 this point, we should also note that its position is logically appropriate. Plato 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 45 
 
 608b) emphasizing the importance of the question for the moral wel- 
 fare of the State and leading naturally to Socrates' suggestion (608c)i5'' 
 that the greatest rewards of virtue have as yet been undescribed. 
 The following proof of the immortahty of the soul, which is introduced 
 by Socrates' picking up of the word 'great,' is needed here to pave 
 the way for the myth. In 612a Socrates dismisses further discussion 
 of the soul and returns to the question of the rewards of justice. The 
 speech of the two brothers at the beginning of Bk. II is taken up and 
 the prizes received by the just man at the hands of gods and men 
 briefly enumerated. Finally, in 613e-614a Socrates passes by a dis- 
 missive-introductive transition to the myth which details the rewards 
 of justice in the hfe to come. In Bk. I we have the picture of the aged 
 Cephalus, the just man, whose eyes are already turned in hope to the 
 other world (330d-331b); now at the close of our long investigation 
 the tale of the experience of Er the son of Armenius strikes the same 
 key-note and rounds the dialogue into one harmonious whole. The 
 single impressive summarizing sentence which follows the myth and 
 concludes the dialogue sustains the note of eloquence. In its chmac- 
 tic conclusion the Republic is unique among the dialogues, most of 
 which end on a quiet commonplace note with their highest point of 
 feeling before the conclusion. ^^^ 
 
 There is one important transitional problem in connection with 
 the Republic which has been only partially disposed of by the above 
 analysis of the main transitions of the dialogue, and that is the divi- 
 sion into books. Are the transitions from book to book real and do 
 the divisions so made mark important logical divisions in the argu- 
 ment? The transitions between Books I and II, IV and V, VII and 
 VIII and IX and X coincide with the main transitions of the dia- 
 logue.^^2 The separation of the three larger portions of the dialogue 
 into parts corresponding in length as nearly as possible with the 
 
 is here supplementing his earlier polemic of Bk. Ill by psychological and phil- 
 osophic arguments based on the intervening sections of the dialogue. For a full 
 justification of this \dew see Hirmer, pp. 624-625 and Shorey, Unity of Plato's 
 Thought, p. 81. 
 
 150 Hirmer (p. 588) calls attention to the fact that this second sub-division 
 of Bk. X, like the first, begins with Kal nrjv. 
 
 1" Compare the Gorgias, Philebus, Cratylus. 
 
 '" Hirmer (p. 589) thinks the division into books originated in the recogni- 
 tion of these main divisions. 
 
46 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 introduction and conclusion is both natural and artistically desirable, 
 provided always that it does not violate the logical structure by em- 
 phasizing minor sections at the expense of the more important. In 
 the Repubhc there is no suggestion of any attempt at a slavish 
 equahzation of the number of pages in the several books, though they 
 are fairly uniform in length. ^^^ The transitions from book to book 
 are sometimes shght, but they always mark definite and logical sub- 
 divisions of the subject. The transitions between Bks, II and III 
 and III and IV have been described already.^^* Books V and VI are 
 very closely connected. In the last part of Bk. V Socrates distin- 
 guishes the nature of the true philosopher from that of the "lover of 
 opinion." Bk. VI 484a dismisses with /jLev 8ri further consideration 
 of this question and passes on to discuss the comparative qualifica- 
 tions of the two types for leadership (484b). Bk. VI ends (Slid, e) 
 with a brief dismissive summary of the interpretation of the im.age of 
 the divided line. Bk. VII begins rather abruptly, with a mere 
 phrase of transition /jLera ravra drj introducing the allegory of the cave. 
 The slight transition is perfectly adequate because of the general 
 parallelism between the two images, a parallehsm pointed out by 
 Socrates himself (517b). 
 
 The description of the tyrant state and its rise out of a degenerate 
 democracy is declared complete at the end of Bk. VIII (569c). Bk. 
 IX begins (571a) with the simple statement of the tyrannical type of 
 individual as the next topic for discussion. Objection may be made 
 that the book-division here is arbitrary, that the description of the 
 tyrannical soul should logically be included in Bk. VIII. On the 
 contrary there is both logical and artistic justification for its position 
 at the beginning of Bk. IX. The first formal argument for the su- 
 perior happiness of the just man hinges on the contrast which his life 
 presents with that of the tyrant. The description of the tyrant then, 
 stands in a closer logical and artistic relation to the content of Bk. IX 
 than to that of Bk. VIII, and is rightly included in Bk. IX. The fact 
 that Socrates refers to the ethical problem in 571 before he begins the 
 account of the tyrannical soul is a clear hint of this relation. 
 
 1" Birt {Das antike Buchwesen, Berlin, 1882, p. 442) gives the following 
 statistics as to the distribution of lines:— Bks. I 1279, II 1147, III 1393, IV 1147. 
 V 1371, VI 1165, VII 1128, VIII 1128, IX 941, X 1147. 
 
 15" See pp. 36 f . 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 47 
 
 From the above analysis it is evident that the division of the 
 dialogue into books is neither arbitrary nor inartistic. It does not 
 fall within the scope of the present paper to attempt to settle the 
 much disputed question^^^ whether Plato himself is responsible for this 
 division or whether it is the work of a later hand. In so far as the 
 decision depends on evidence from the study of the transitions there 
 seems to be nothing to prevent the acceptance of the division as 
 Platonic. However, there are other considerations which give us 
 pause. In order to reach a final conclusion it would be necessary to 
 examine the evidence for an earher and less satisfactory division^^" 
 into six books, as well as to investigate fully the claims based on the 
 analogy of proved instances in the case of Homer, Hesiod, Thucy- 
 dides, Xenophon and Aristotle.^^^ 
 
 Turning directly from the structurally perfect Republic one is 
 impressed by the comparative irregularity of the Laws. But if this 
 "masterpiece of Plato's old age" falls short of perfect symmetry in 
 outline, it is at least logically coherent. Plato was perhaps himself 
 aware that the discourse is a little rambling. At any rate, throughout 
 the Laws, there is a very evident effort to guard against logical confu- 
 sion by frequent cross-references,^^^ repetitions,^^^ resumes and antici- 
 pations^^" of the main plan. Several quasi-apologies^" for the numerous 
 delays and false starts and for the "many apparently trifling cus- 
 toms or usages" that "come pouring in and lengthening out our 
 
 ^^* The division into books is regarded as unplatonic by Schleiermacher, 
 p. 4ff.; Hermann, PL Ph., pp. 537, 693; Steinhart, EM., p. 66 ff.; Christ, PL 
 Stud., p. 22; Birt, Das ant. Buchw., p. 447; Nusser, Plalons Poliicia, p. 95 ff.; 
 Dreinhofer, PI. Schr.uber d. St., 24 anm.; Hirmer, p. 589-91. 
 
 The following attempt to prove the division Platonic. Schneider, Ajisg. 
 I, p. xiif.; Rettig, Prolegomena ad Platonis Rempiiblicam, Bernae, 1845. 
 
 i5« Pohlenz {Aus Platos Werdezeit, Berlin, 1913, pp. 207-237) deals at length 
 with the tradition of an earlier edition of the Republic, but does not touch the 
 question of Bk. division. 
 
 167 For a thorough discussion of these arguments see the literature of the 
 subject noted above. 
 
 158 649b, 652b, 672c, 682e, 685b, 688a, 696c, 701d, 705b, d, 707d, 773e, 781e, 
 796e, 793b, e, 794b, 798d, et al. 
 
 i59 659d, 688b, 699c, 733, 662-63, 740e, 743e, 754c, 770c, 774c, 812a, 822e, 
 876d, 887b. 
 
 '«» 682e-683a, 699e, 701cd, 702a, 722c-723e, 768c, d, 864c. 
 
 1" 768c, d; 642a, 682e, 701cd, 723d, 799d, 780d. 
 
48 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 laws,"^®^ show that Plato fully recognized the possibility of criticism 
 of the structure of the dialogue. 
 
 In brief the plot of the Laws is as follows. There is practically no 
 dramatic introduction. The subject of discussion is introduced al- 
 most in the form of a title irepi re TroXiretas to. vvv Kai vo/jlwv (625a). A 
 very sHght description of the setting and personages of the dialogue 
 accompanies the announcement of the subject. But although with- 
 out dramatic introduction, the Laws is by no means lacking in pre- 
 fatory matter. The first four books and nearly half of the fifth (to 
 734d, e) comprise a lengthy prelude or preamble, sociological, histori- 
 cal, and ethico-religious, which seems many times on the point of 
 coming to an end, but is repeatedly continued to include further intro- 
 ductory material. In 734e general preliminary considerations are at 
 last dismissed. The transition is made through a formal dismissive- 
 introductive statement of plan. "Let the preamble to the laws 
 which has been here given suflSce; after the preamble the law must 
 needs follow; or rather, to speak more accurately, a sketch of the 
 laws of the state." The laws of the constitution of the state are 
 considered first; provisions for the distribution of land, the appoint- 
 ment of officials and the establishment of courts of appeal. These 
 enactments are each in turn prefaced by appropriate explanatory and 
 hortatory preambles. In 768c-e further discussion of the courts of 
 law, the election of magistrates and other details of political ad- 
 ministration is dismissed for the present. The Athenian declares that 
 they are now ready to proceed to the actual laws of the state. After 
 a rather lengthy proem, he at length begins with the enactments regu- 
 lating marriage and the birth of children which occupy the remainder 
 of Bk. VI. Bk. VII treats of education, Bk. VIII of festivals, games, 
 mihtary exercises and other institutions of civil life. Bk. IX is con- 
 cerned with criminal offences. Bk. X is an eloquent ethico-religious 
 preamble to all the laws of sacrilege. The transition to this from Bk. 
 IX is made by the introduction at the beginning of Bk. X of a general 
 law summing up all acts of violence. The recognition of the impor- 
 tance of offences against the Gods leads naturally to the following 
 protest against atheism. Books XI and XII are occupied with a great 
 variety of miscellaneous laws relating to dealings between man and 
 man. With the discussion of the regulations regarding burial the 
 
 "^ 793d. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 
 
 49 
 
 laws strictly speaking are completed— 960b. It remains to make pro- 
 vision for the permanence of these institutions. The impressive 
 description of the nocturnal council of guardians which shall be the 
 eyes and mind of the state, acquainted with the final aim of the law- 
 givgj.163 « a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state, "^^^ 
 forms the final main division of the dialogue. In the transition to 
 this conclusion a familiarises literary transitional device, the respon- 
 dent's failure to understand, is followed up by an analogy. We need 
 some preserving power in our state which shall be Hke the third of the 
 Fates, Atropos, the unchanging one. In this way the full explanation 
 is naturally introduced. 
 
 That the Laws, while loose in structure is by no means devoid of 
 plan the above brief analysis will show. The long rambling proemium 
 presents the greatest structural difficulties; and it is this section of the 
 dialogue that contains the largest number of those transitional sum- 
 maries, reminders of the plot and similar devices by which Plato strives 
 to correct the impression of disorder.i^^ xhe discussion in Bk. I begins 
 very abruptly with the Athenian's question^^^ as to the aim of certain 
 Cretan institutions, the common tables and the gymnastic drill. 
 Cleinias replies that their purpose is to inspire courage in war. In 
 the course of the following criticism, which is based on the fundamen- 
 tal principle that laws should be framed with a view to all the virtues 
 rather than one alone, the Athenian describes at length the purpose 
 and procedure of an ideal lawgiver. This description, 631b-632d, is 
 an excellent summary of the entire plot of the dialogue and an argu- 
 ment for the belief that from the start Plato held the plan of the whole 
 firmly in his mind. The discussion of courage, resumed after this 
 summary, is followed (635e) by an investigation of institutions 
 relating to temperance. In this way the subject of the disciplinary 
 value of pleasure is introduced. The discussion of this sociological 
 problem continues through Book II and is worked out with consider- 
 able detail:— the use of wine, the song and dance and festive inter- 
 course in general are considered. The transition from Book I to II 
 
 163 964e-965a. 
 
 1" 968a. 
 
 If" See p. 88. 
 
 "56 See above pp. 47 f. notes 158-162. 
 
 "7 625c. 
 
50 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 is made by a simple progressive formula to. 8ri /xera tovto us eoiKe aKeirrkov 
 and the dismissal of the point last established. 
 
 Book II closes with a summary of the discourse on wine and music. 
 The sociological part of the proemium is now complete. At the 
 beginning of Bk. Ill instead of taking up gymnastic^^^ Plato turns 
 to the question of the origin of society. He attempts to disguise the 
 lack of real connection between Books II and III by the use of the 
 transitional formula ravra jxh ovu 8r] ravrrj. Book III contains several 
 important recapitulations and reminders of the plot. When in the 
 course of the historical survey of the development of civilization the 
 settlement of Lacedaemon is reached, it is made the excuse for a 
 reference back to the beginning of the dialogue, and the recognition 
 of the prefatory and preliminary character of all the preceding dis- 
 cussion of wine and music. ^^^ In 683e there is a further reminder of 
 the same conclusion, that in pursuing the discussion of the settlement 
 of Lacedaemon they are really resuming the original inquiry after a 
 digression. 688b again strikes the keynote of Bk. I that the lawgiver 
 should regard all virtue not merely a part. In the latter pages of Bk. 
 Ill the balance of powers in the Spartan consitution is contrasted 
 favorably with the extreme tyranny of Persia and the equally extreme 
 democracy of Athens. Here the Athenian pauses to consider the best 
 method of procedure and call attention to the importance of the pre- 
 vious arguments.^^" Megillus calls for a fuller explanation and thus 
 transition is made to an emphatic statement of the characteristic 
 Platonic doctrine that degeneracy in morals follows degeneracy in 
 music. In 701c there is an important reminder of the plot and 
 plain hint of Plato's purpose in inserting frequent summaries — 
 "Now why have I said all this? Because it seems to me that the 
 argument, like a horse, ought to be pulled up from time to time, not 
 let to go with mouth unbridled as it were. " The following resume in 
 702a leads to the discovery that their conclusions may be put to prac- 
 tical proof in the new Cretan colony which is about to be sent out. 
 This foundation of the Cretan state forms the external basis of the 
 whole plot of the Laws. Its introduction here serves as the transi- 
 tion to Book IV which continues with further particulars as to site 
 and the character of the colonists. 705de reiterates, in the tone 
 
 "' The discussion of gymnastic is postponed until 813, 814. 
 1" 682e-683a. 
 "° 699e. 
 
MAIN TRANSITIONS 51 
 
 of Bk. I, the warning as to the final aim of the lawgiver. 715e marks 
 the completion of the historical and political section of the proemium 
 and the beginning of a general ethico-religious preamble which is 
 introduced under the guise of an address to the new colonists (716-7 18) . 
 In 718b-d an idea is introduced which is of the utmost importance in 
 the literary frame-work of the dialogue/^^ that of the need of a special 
 preamble prefixed to each law, whose purpose shall be the pre- 
 disposition of the citizens to obedience. This idea is developed with 
 considerable repetition by the use of image and quotation and by the 
 example of a specimen law of marriage with appropriate preamble. ^^^ 
 Finally, in 722c d, the entire discussion up to this point is formally 
 recognized as the general prelude or preamble to the laws which are 
 to follow. After a little further explanation and generalization of 
 the idea, the transition to Bk. V is made (723e-724a) by dismissive 
 introductive formulas marking out the order of discussion. A part of 
 the ethical principles necessary to their preamble have already been 
 sufficiently developed in the hortatory address to the new citizens 
 on the honors due to the gods and their parents. ^^^ It remains to 
 complete this unconscious^^'' proemium by a further prefatory ethical 
 discourse dealing with all that relates to the souls and bodies and 
 possessions of the citizens. The completion of this ethico-religious 
 preamble occupies the first half of Bk. V. In 734e the general pre- 
 amble comes to a sudden end. Its dismissal is marked by the use of 
 the imperative of completion. ^''^ The next topic for consideration is 
 the laws of the constitution. Further preliminary material, a special 
 proemium to these laws, is here introduced, 734e, by the figure of 
 weaving, which suggests the idea of purification. In 737c the laws 
 are at last begun. 
 
 Throughout the main body of the dialogue the plan is fairly regu- 
 lar; laws with their preambles prefixed follow one another in the 
 order given in the general outline above. '^^ The literary significance of 
 the idea of the proemium to the plot of the laws is here apparent. 
 Most of the numerous passages of eloquent moral reflection, the philo- 
 
 "1 See below. 
 
 172 721. 
 
 1" 716-718. 
 
 "<723d. 
 
 1'° Kal TO n'ev Trpoolfxiov rihv vojj.o.^v kvTavOoi XexOev rdv Xoyo^v riXos ex^TO}. 
 
 i"« See pp. 48 f. 
 
52 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 sophical and political disquisitions, by which the dry detail of legisla- 
 tion is constantly varied, are introduced, either explicitly or implicitly 
 as preambles to the following laws, not as irrelevant digressions dis- 
 turbing the unity of the whole. It is interesting to note^^^ that the 
 formula of transition from preamble to law always suggests the hope 
 that the persuasive power of the former will render the threats and 
 penalties of the law unnecessary. 
 
 The transitions from book to book in the Laws are simple and 
 abrupt. That from Bk. Ill to IV is the only one that shows any 
 attempt at artistic elaboration. Bks. XI and XII are absolutely 
 unconnected; a mere formula forms the only transition between 
 Books II and III. In the case of the other books a single transitional 
 sentence of the dismissive-introductive type at the beginning of the 
 book, connects it with the preceding But it is not only the book to 
 book transitions in the Laws that are abrupt and stereotyped; the 
 transitions throughout the dialogue are more artificial, less natural 
 and artistic than in the Republic. Increased formality and precision 
 are indeed characteristics of the style of all the "later" dialogues. ^^* 
 The abruptness and conventionality of the book to book transitions 
 in the Laws is therefore no convincing argument that the division 
 into books is unplatonic. As in the case of the Republic, however, 
 the question is far too complicated to be decided by a mere considera- 
 tion of the transitions.^^' 
 
 1" See Shorey, "Plato's Laws and the Unity of Plato's Thought," Class. 
 Phil. IX, p. 369. 
 
 1"* See Appendix, pp. 102 f. 
 '"^ See above, p. 47. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Minor Conventional Forms of Transition 
 
 An exhaustive account of the transitional phrases, formulas and 
 particles, of the more stereotyped methods of transition used by 
 Plato would require a sentence to sentence analysis of the dialogues. 
 No one has as yet attempted such a comprehensive summary,^ 
 though various statistical studies of particles^ supply some material. 
 The present paper aims merely to collect and illustrate some of the 
 commonest of the conventional forms of transition which appear in 
 the dialogues. 
 
 Most numerous of all is that type in which the transition is made 
 by some explicit reference to the discussion. This may take the 
 form of a command to investigate, an exhortation to joint activity, 
 a statement of the need of inquiry, a brief prothetic declaration of 
 intention, or a detailed description of the method and purpose of the 
 subsequent discussion. Forms of aKeirrco, eTrto-KeTrrco, (TKoreu, opaco, 
 X47W, hpoko^ and similar verbs, deictic pronouns and adverbs^ such as 
 TovTo, T68e, TOLovTov, ovTus, w5e and a5, combined with inferential particles 
 like olv or 8i] constitute the usual vocabulary of this variety of 
 transition. Its simplest type is a brief form.ula of command,^ intro- 
 
 1 Hans V. Arnim's Sprachliche Forschungen zur Chronologie der Platonischen 
 Dialogen (Wien, 1912) p. 9, contains a very slight attempt at classification of 
 formal transitions. There are also several treatises on methods of transition used 
 b>- the Greek orators. These have been listed by R. D. Elliott, TransUion in the Attic 
 Orators, Menasha, Wis., 1919, pp. 1-9. 
 
 " See Appendix, p. 102, n. 1. 
 
 3 Deictic pronouns and adverbs are always transitional because they contain 
 in themselves elements of repetition and incompleteness. See Mendell, Latin 
 Sentence Connection, pp. 19, 33, 91-93, 142 f. 
 
 * Cf. Protag. 316c, 323a, 355a, 356c; Euthyph. 9d, 10a, 12d; Crat. 389a, 
 392c- Rep. 477c, 485b, 524d; Gorg. 476b, 495c; Theaet. 147a, 153d, 158e, 182a, 
 166d, e; Meno 71c, d, 73d, 82b, e, 90b, 93b; Phil. 49b, 29b, d, 31d, 32e, 39e, 
 45d- Phaedo 67e, 70d, 73b, 74a, 80a, 92c, 96d, 104b; Char. 161b; Phaedr. 243e, 
 263d, 264c, 268a; Laches 189c, d; Lysis 206b, 217c; Crito 51c, 50a; Symp. 199cd, 
 
 53 
 
54 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 ducing a new subject for investigation. Thus in Gorg. 510b the words 
 (TKoireL di] Kal rode mark the advance to the next point in the argument. 
 The resumptive formula of command which introduces a fresh start 
 in the discussion^ should be included here. aWts and TraXtj' e^ apxrjs 
 are its common catch-words. So Euthyphro lib, dXXa ttoKlv eiire e^ 
 apxv^- For the formula of exhortation to joint inquiry® compare 
 Protag. 330b — tpepe drj . . . . KOLvfj ciKep(!ojj.eda toIgv tl avToJv kcTTiv 
 eKa<xTov. In Char. 167ab the formula which marks a fresh start in 
 the argum_ent takes the form of an exhortation.^ TrdXti^ roivw .... 
 ucrirep e^ apxrjs eTrL(jKep(!cjj.tda. The transitional statement of the need 
 of investigation as an obligation is also very common. The verbal in 
 -reos may be used^ as in Theaet. 203e, aKeirrkov Kal oh irpoboTeov ovrcos 
 avav8pcos /xeyap . . . \6yop ; xpv or i5eT may take the place. of the 
 verbal.^ Thus Laches ISle, gvkovv /cat vvp xPV t^'Pootov avro tovto 
 (jKepaadai and Rep. 46 le bet or] to fxerd. tqvto jSejSaLcoaaadaL -wapa tov 
 Xoyov. The simple formula, whether of command, exhortation or 
 obligation, may be slightly elaborated by the injunction not to be 
 discouraged;^" so in Protag. 333b, Wl 617 .... /117 aTOKafjLccfxev dXXd /cat 
 TO. Xotrd 8LacrKe\pa)p.e9a. Compare also Crat. 411a, ovk a-KobeCKLaTeov dXX' 
 eTTKr/ceTrreoi/. 
 
 The transition may be made by a prothetic statement of intention 
 or purpose. ^^ The myth in Protag. 320c is introduced by a clear 
 indication of the speaker's feeling with regard to it, 5o/cet roivvv (xol, eipt], 
 
 210e, 217b, 214b, 215b, 207c, 200a, d, 176a. For a further discussion of these 
 formulas, see infra, p. 62. 
 
 <* Cf. Theaet. 151d, 184b, 187a; Protag. 333d; Phaedo 105b; Meno 79e, 90c; 
 Char. 160d; Laches 198a, 191e. 
 
 « Cf. Theaet. 151e, 157e, 203a; Laches 192e, 198c; Euthyph. 7a, 9e; Lysis 
 216c, 218d; Laws 649b; Soph. 261d, 267e; Gorg. 476a; Protag. 343c; Meno 78c, 
 86c, 87e, 88a; Phil. Ud, 12b, 14c, 34d, 35d, 37a, 39c, 51e, 54a; Rep. 372a, e, 
 334e, 436b, c, 473b, 489e, 576b. For the interrogative form with PovXei ovv see 
 infra, p. 60. 
 
 ' Cf. pp. 74 f. and Laws 626e. 
 
 8 Cf. Theaet. 164c, 179d, 181b, 204b; Euthyph. 15c; Phaedr. 244a, 246b; 
 Meno 96d; Char. 158d; Phil. 26e, 28a, 34d, e, 36e, 46b, 49a. 
 ~~ — » Cf. Laches 179b; Theaet. 192a; Meno 79c, 87c; Symp. 189d; Crat. 384c. 
 
 " Cf. Theaet. 151d, 157d; Rep. 445b; Soph. 261b, 264b; Phil. 21d; Crat. 428a. 
 
 " Cf. Protag. 324d, 338c, d, 353c; Phil. 18a, 26b; Symp. 177c, 186b, 189d, 
 194e, 204d; Gorg. 473a, 464b; Rep. 491a; Phaedo 96a; Crat. 404e; Pol. 267d. 
 
MINOR FORMS OP TRANSITION 55 
 
 Xo-pikaTepov tlvai. ixvBov v/juu XeyeLv. Again in Protag. 342a Socrates pre- 
 faces his interpretation of the poem of Sinionicles with an announce- 
 ment of his own intention, eyed to'luvv, riv b' €700, a yk iiol boKet wepl tov 
 acrfiaTos tovtov TecpaaofxaL vjjuv SeL^eXdeiv. 
 
 Transitions in which the reference to the discussion is confined to 
 a stereotyped formula illustrate the external method of connection, 
 which may or may not be strengthened by further transitional ele- 
 ments. In many cases the idea of the formula is reinforced by or 
 developed into a more definite description of the plan and method 
 of the discussion. 1^ These detailed outlines of method are charac- 
 teristic of the later and more difficult dialogues. They are especially 
 frequent in the Laws. So in Laws 632d-e the common transitional 
 resumptive formula, k^ a.pxvs ■koXlv e/xoL ye boKel xPW<^i- bie^eXdelv 
 KaOairep y)p^afj.eda is elaborated by a description of the proposed order 
 of topics in the discussion. 
 
 A transitional discussion of method may include protest against 
 or rejection of some unsatisfactory course of procedure. ^^ So in 
 Theaet. 191 a-c in a lengthy outline of his plan for further investiga- 
 tion Socrates condemns a previous decision. ^^ The sum.marizing 
 formula /jltj yap ovru Tidc^fxeu, dXX' w5e serves as the final explicit link 
 in transition to the reconsideration of the question, "what is false 
 opinion." A criticism of former methods may be combined, in a 
 transitional passage, with a resumptive recurrence to the main ques- 
 tion at issue. The Meno affords several examples of this type of 
 transition ;^-^ for instance in 77a, after Socrates has finished his series 
 of sample definitions, he urges Meno to redeem his promise to define 
 virtue Kara oXov and stop "making many out of one." 
 
 The transitional resumptive statement, summary, or reminder of 
 the issue is not always associated with criticism. It is constantly 
 used to mark the return from a digression;^" it provides a method for 
 
 '2 Cf. Crito 48b-e; Gorg. 505e, 506a; Laches 189e, 197e; Meno 86d, e; Symp. 
 201d, e; Protag. 333c; Phil. 20c-e, 23b-e, 28c, d, 31b, 32c, d, 34c, d, 44c, d; Phaedr. 
 237c, d; Laws 626d, 638b, 643a, 799d et al.; Rep. 368e, 369a, 545b. 
 
 '^ The introduction of the idea of criticism or correction is a common transi- 
 tional device. Cf. ittfra p. 63, also p. 93. 
 
 " Cf. Theaet. 162e-163e, 166d, e, 187d, e, 188c, d; Rep. 354; Symp. 180c, d; 
 Laches 190c, 185b-c. 
 
 16 Cf. Meno 74a, 93a-b. 
 
 « Cf . pp. 98 f. 
 
56 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 advancing the argument common in all the dialogues,^' especially 
 suited to the more complicated and difficult. ^^ A brief resumptive 
 summarizing phrase often serves to introduce the conclusion of a 
 passage of reasoning. '^^ The phrase oOrco dij tovtuv viroKeLfxevo^v is so 
 used in Protag. 359a. 
 
 Cross reference to a previous point is a usage closely allied to the 
 resumptive transition, though far broader in its scope. Its effect is 
 always unifying and in many cases it is also transitional. Advance 
 to a new step in the argument is frequently made through the appeal 
 to a previously established point. So in Laches 198a the reference 
 back to a former fundamental assumption (190d) is an important 
 element in the transition to renewed discussion. This use of cross 
 references in the progress of the argument, in binding one division 
 to another and making the whole logically coherent, is distinctly 
 transitional. In many instances, however, their purpose is much 
 more general; they contribute to the unity of tone, the artistic unity 
 of the dialogue.^" Of such a character is the reference to Thrasy- 
 machus and his views in Rep. 367a-c, and the recurrence to the style 
 and philosophy of Thrasymachus in Adeimantus' objections in 419. 
 Cross references naturally occur more frequently in the longer, more 
 complex dialogues, but they are used in all the dialogues.-^ 
 
 A prothetic statement of the point next to be considered is often 
 combined with the formal dismissal of a preceding discussion. This 
 dismissive-introductive form of transition is very common." It may 
 be used to mark either a minor advance or an important division of 
 the argument. The type admits of numerous variations, but the 
 principle underlying them all is the characteristic Greek fondness 
 for balance. The expression of dismissal is usually marked by the 
 
 '" Cf. supra, p. 54, n. 5; also Euthyph. 9a; Protag. 349a-c. 
 
 18 Cf. p. 26, notes 85 and 86; p. 47, notes 158, 159, 160; also Theaet. 169d; Phaedo 
 91c-d; Protag. 359ab; Gorg. 506c; Rep. 543ab. 
 
 19 Cf. Meno 76d, 98a; Phil. 48c; Symp. 178c, 180b; Phaedo 66b, 80ab, 11 la. 
 
 20 Scholars have made extensive use of cross references in proving the struc- 
 tural unity of the Republic. Cf. pp. 33-45. 
 
 21 The following list of cross references in the Laches and Phaedrus will 
 illustrate the usage. Laches 186e ref. to 184d; 187c to 179b; 191c to 190e; 193d 
 to 188d; 198a to 190d. Phaedrus 243e ref. to 237b; 249d to 245b; 249e to 249b; 
 250c to 250b; 253cd to 246a; 257a to 243b; 262d to 259b; 265a to 245bc; 265b 
 to 244. 
 
 22 For a literary variant of this t>'pe cf. pp. 89 f. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 57 
 
 particle fih alone or strengthened by ovu, 8r] or roivvv, while the new 
 topic of discussion is introduced by a balancing 5e, 677 or 5e by]P Both 
 parts of the transition admit of all the variety of expression noted 
 in the consideration of introductive formulas (pp. 53-55), i.e., 
 command, exhortation, statement. In the dismissal the perfect 
 imperative, which implies completion, is more frequently used than 
 the present. Deictic pronouns and adverbs form an important 
 transitional element in both dismissive and introductory statements. 
 Protag. 332a illustrates the simplest method of balance, with ixh and 
 5e, the formula of exhortation, and the deictic pronouns, tovto point- 
 ing backward and robe forward, tovto /xeu eaaw/jLeu, Tode de dXXo JJv 
 €X67€s k-KiaKepuiixtda}^ For the use of the imperative in the dismissaP^ 
 compare Laws 734e — koL to ixh -kpooIijilov tccv v6/xccp kvTavddl \exdev tccv 
 'Koycov reXos exeroj, yuerd 6e to irpoolixLov avayKOLov tov vofxov eireaOai. 
 In Rep. 456c both the balancing particles are strengthened by an 
 inferential 617. Kai 6tl jxiv 8rj SvpaTo., 5Lcc/xo\6yrjTaL ; Nai. 6tl 8e St) 
 ^eKTiaTa, to fxtTa tovto SeT bioixoXoy-qd-qvat}^ In Theaet. 182c one point 
 is selected to continue the discussion; the others are dismissed with 
 ^t^^ Tolvvv. TO. /xev Toivvv aXXa xaipetv edaco/jLev . . . . ov 8' evtKa Xeyo- 
 fjL€v, TOVTO fjLovov ipvXaTTWjitv, kpoiTOiVTes.^"^ Similarly, fxtv toivvv and the 
 perfect imperative upladui are used in Rep. 439e to dismiss the dis- 
 cussion of the two elements in the soul, desire and reason, while 
 8e8ri introduces the investigation of the third element, "spirit." 
 Dismissals with pev ovv are especially common, not only in Plato,^^ 
 
 2^ In a few cases the balance is differently marked. So in Rep. 444a an 
 inferential 617 is followed by yap. ecn-co 6^ . . . . /ierd yap tovto aKeivTtov ol/xai 
 &8iKiav. Again in Rep. 607b ravra 8ri . . . . a.ivo\t\oyi}a9o} in the dismissal is 
 balanced by an introductory Trpoe'L-irufj.ev dk. Compare Rep. 553a, 562a; Laws 
 820e. 
 
 ^ For other cases of the pev-Se balance, cf. Protag. 347b, 358a; Phaedr. 246a, 
 248a, 265c; Symp.isOc, 186a, 201d, 207b; Pol. 287a; Rep. 432b, 580c; Laws 745e; 
 EuthjT)h. 3c; Phil. 12c, 15a, 28e; Meno 86b, 89d; Phaedo 69e, 95a. 
 
 25 Cf. Laws 698a; Rep. 392c, 503b; Meno 92d; Phil. 28a; Phaedr. 246d. 
 
 2« For other examples of pev 8r) in the dismissal, cf. Theaet. 173b, 187a; 
 Gorg. 470b; Laws 672e, 698a, 832ab; Symp. 196a, 216c, 220c; Meno 93e; Phil. 
 59b; Phaedo 78ac; Phaedr. 238d, 246d; Rep. 392c, 376c, 386a, 415d, 436a. 
 
 ^^ For other examples of ptv toIwv in dismissal cf. Theaet. 150a; Rep. 427c, 
 502a; Symp. 200a; Phil. 32b; Rep. 611a, 613e; Phaedr. 264e; Soph. 245e; Laws 
 779d. 
 
 28 For other examples cf. Protag. 321d, 319c, 323c, 324c, d, 355e; Theaet. 
 180c; Laws 816d, e; Symp. 178a, 183c, 195c, 196b, d, 204b, 221c; Phil. 13ab 
 
58 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 but in other Greek writers as well.^^ In Laches 183d in transition 
 to the dimax of the amusing anecdote of the scythe-spearman 
 nev ovv is used to dismiss uninteresting details, to. iih oivv aXka ovk 
 a^ia \kytiv irepi r' avSpos' to 8e cxotpKJixa to tov 8peiravov tov Tpos rfj \6yxv 
 olov inrk^T]. A formula of dismissal may be reinforced by a detailed 
 dismissive summary.^" So in Rep. 350d the formula tovto ixh runv 
 ovTo: KelaOw is preceded by a resumptive summary of conclusions, 
 introduced by 8e ovv. Compare also Laws 689c-e where the dismissive 
 formula tovto fiep toIvw ovTi^i Kdadoo is followed by a long explanatory 
 summary. At the close of the paragraph the dismissal is repeated 
 with another formula, TavTa fxev ovv, KaQinrep tlivoiiev apTi, ^ekeyneva 
 TedrjTo: TavT-g and the next topic is introduced by 5€ bi]. 
 
 The Platonic dialogues contain also another type of dismissive 
 transition, that in which discussion of a subject is either passed over 
 altogether, or dismissed by a formula of indefinite postponement.^^ 
 The subject so postponed is not usually treated again.^^ avdis or 
 CIS avdi^ is a common catch- word of the dismissal; the new topic for 
 discussion is usually introduced immediately with 5e.^^ So in Pro tag. 
 347b Alcibiades checks Hippias from making a display speech and 
 recalls the agreement between Socrates and Protagoras as to further 
 
 16e, 22c; Phaedr. 238d, 239b, c, d, 246a, 250c; Rep. 357a, 347de. The combina- 
 tion M^" olv may be further strengthened by an intensifying 617. So in Rep. 
 359b, 360d; Phaedo 112e. 
 
 29 Cf. Isoc. IV 43d, 47c, 61d; Thuc. I 123, 15, 40; III 64; Isaeus VII 11; 
 Isoc. II 17d; V 93d, 98d, 100a, 101b; VII 151b; VIII 164b, 171c, e; Lysias X 31; 
 XII 47; XIII 51; XIV 3; XXIII 13; XXIX 8. 
 
 s" Cf. Rep. 398bc; 461d-462a; Phaedr. 245b; Laws 674a-676a; 697c-698a; 
 822cd; 832ab. 
 
 31 Cf. p. 78 for a literary elaboration of this method of transition. 
 
 3= This is the view defended by Adam {Republic of Plato, Vol. I, pp. 46-7, Cam- 
 bridge, 1905) in a note to Rep. 347e. He cites Siebeck's unsuccessful attempt to prove 
 that "phrases of this sort always refer either to some future dialogue contemplated by 
 Plato, or to a later part of the same dialogue." (Siebeck, Zur Chron. d. PI. Didoge, 
 pp. 121 ff.) 
 
 An occasional instance occurs in which a subject postponed receives further 
 attention. Rep. 466a takes up the question of the happiness of the guardians 
 dismissed in 420d. The phrase els avdis is not used in 420d, but appears in 466a 
 where Socrates recalls the previous dismissal. Compare Phil. 42c-43e, where the 
 discussion of the neutral life dismissed with els avdis in 33b is again renewed. 
 
 33 Cf. Protag. 357b; Rep. 347e, 430c; Euthyph. 6c; Meno 99e; Tim. 50c; 
 Symp. 194e; Euthyd. 275a. In Symp. 175e oKlyof vanpov is used instead of 
 avdis. Cf. Kal T-dxa in Soph. 254b. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 59 
 
 debate, els avQls ye' vvu de bUaLov ecfTiv a (h/jLoXoyrjaarrju. This formula 
 of postponement may be used to bring a dialogue to an end;^^ thus 
 Euthyph. 15e, els aii^ts tolvvu, . . . vvv yap (Tirevbo) ttol, Kal jjlol cbpa 
 awLevai. 
 
 In Laches 181c a /uep ovv of dismissal is combined with a postponing 
 aS^ts ; 8e returns to the point at issue, ravra ixev ovv Kal av iroLrjaecs Kal 
 rineTs ere Kal avdts viroiJLvrjao/jLeV irepl de <j)v rjp^aiJLeda tL ipare.^^ Another 
 paraleiptic formula^^ is used in Rep. 412b, in passing over minor 
 details^^ of legislation, xop^tas yap tI au tls Ste^tot tup tolovtoov; elev and 
 the phrase to 8ri ixeTo. tovto introduce the next point. Phil. 50c-e fur- 
 nishes an example of a more elaborate paraleiptic transition. In dismis- 
 sing further discussion of the class of mixed pleasures Socrates acknow- 
 ledges that much remains to be said. He has purposely treated the 
 difficult case of comedy in order that Protarchus might excuse him from 
 the rest. " I fancy, " he continues, " that I may obtain my release with- 
 out many words, if I promise that tomorrow I will give you an account 
 of all these cases. At present I want to sail in another direction. " 
 Protarchus agrees to the postponement. Socrates then states as the 
 next topic of discussion the unmixed pleasures. The particle toIvvv 
 and a dismissive prepositional phrase //era tcls fjieLxBelaas rjdoi'as connect 
 this statement with the preceding. 
 
 In the case of a subject to be treated again the postponement is 
 usually to a time more definite than the vague els aWts.^^ So in Phil. 
 18a Socrates postpones his answer to Philebus' question as to the 
 relevancy of his discourse on method until he shall have given some 
 further illustrations. He recurs to the question in 18d, dismissing 
 his explanations as adequate. 
 
 34 Cf. Protag. 361e; Crat. 440e. 
 
 '^ Cf. Phil. 41a. In Phaedr. 268a a regular dismissive formula of exhortation 
 is used in a paraleiptic transition; in Rep. 400c a dismissive perfect imperative is 
 similarly used. 
 
 36 Cf. Phaedr. 241e; Euthyd. 291 b. 
 
 3' The omission of detail may be implicit rather than explicit, as in Theaet. 
 179c. Compare the explicit paraleiptic statements in Phil. 26b; Gorg. 465b; 
 Rep. 47le, 484a, 548d; Laws 772a. The use of dXXd, alone or in combination 
 with yap, ovv or 8ri, in waiving further discussion should be noted here. Cf. Meno 
 92c; Phaedr. 261c; Rep. 530c; Theaet. 177e; Phaedo 100a. 
 
 38 Compare Phil. 24a with 25 b, d; Laws 768c, d with 853 f, 956 f. 
 
60 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Transition to further discussion may be made by an assumption 
 evading proof or dismissing difficulties.^^ So in Euthyphro 9c-d, 
 Socrates dismisses by an assumption the consideration of Euthyphro's 
 treatment of his father and is thus enabled to resume the quest for 
 the definition of piety. In Theaet. 185e, Socrates avoids by an 
 assumption the necessity of proof. He declares that Theaetetus has 
 done him a kindness in releasing him from a very long discussion, 
 "if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and 
 others through the bodily organs. " The division of things into two 
 classes is a further transitional elem.ent in this passage. 
 
 Gorg. 454e illustrates the introduction of a dichotomy'*'' as a 
 method of advancing the argument. Transition to the amended 
 definition of rhetoric is made by the division of persuasion into 
 8vo etdr]. Note the introductory interrogative formula iSouXet ovu 
 . . . duiixev. 
 
 Akin to this method of formal dichotomy is the transition made 
 by formulating a distinction and offering a choice.^^ Of this nature 
 is the transition in Laws 654c to the discussion of what is the standard 
 of the beautiful. So in Meno 73e Socrates' question whether justice 
 is virtue or a virtue serves as a transition to the effort to show Meno 
 the distinction between genus and species. The piece of inductive 
 reasoning in Meno 77b-78b by which Socrates proves that all men 
 desire the good furnishes a more extended illustration of this method 
 of advancing the argument by formulating distinctions. Meno has 
 just given his definition of virtue as kividvixovvTa rcbv koKwv dwarov dvai 
 TTopi^eadai. With a view to using the most sharply contrasted terms 
 Socrates asks permission to substitute the word ayadwv for KoKibv. 
 Meno consents and Socrates states the question he wishes to discuss — 
 Do some men desire evil and others good? Do not all desire the good? 
 Meno will not agree to the latter, but declares expHcitly that some 
 men desire evil. Socrates then formulates a distinction and offers 
 Meno his choice; do those who desire evils do so in ignorance, think- 
 ing them goods or are they aware that they are evils? Meno thinks 
 that there are instances of both. Once again Socrates makes Meno 
 
 " Compare the adoption of a method of hypothesis in Phaedo 100a and Meno 
 86e. 
 
 " Cf. Theaet. 198d; Laws 629c; 646e; Crat. 424c; Phil. 18b c; Phaedr. 277b; 
 Rep. 397b. 
 
 « Cf. Theaet. 196c, 203c; Meno 73d, 78d. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 61 
 
 agree to the explicit statement; some men desire evil, knowing that 
 it is evil. He now makes this question still more definite, do they 
 desire that this evil should become their possession? Meno believes 
 that desiring a thing can have no other meaning. Socrates proceeds 
 with another dichotomy; do they desire this ignorantly, thinking 
 that evil is a benefit, or do they know it to be an iajury? Again Meno 
 boldly asserts that there are instances of both. " Do you really think 
 that they recognize evil as evil, when they think it is a benefit?" 
 continues Socrates, and by this question forces from Meno the reluc- 
 tant admission (with -ye) that he does not think they do. With an 
 inferential ovkovv Socrates states his conclusion; these men do not 
 really desire evil, but good, in their ignorance mistaking the one for the 
 other. Meno grudgingly assents. 
 
 Socrates now returns, with tI be ; to the other group, those who 
 desire evil, knowing that it is injurious. Meno agrees that they must 
 be aware that they will be injured by it. With an introductory 
 dXXa, pointing the contrast of the new thought, Socrates asks whether 
 these men do not think that those who are injured are wretched, in so 
 far as they are injured. Meno agrees that this too must be so. With 
 a view to strengthening the statement, Socrates picks up the word 
 ad\lovs with be and asks whether they do not consider the wretched as 
 KaKobaifxovas , unfortunate. Meno assents, and, with an ovv marking 
 the inference, Socrates asks whether anyone wishes to be wretched 
 and unfortunate. This seems to Meno impossible. Socrates now 
 states his conclusion with apa ; no one chooses evil unless he wishes to 
 be wretched and unfortunate, for wretchedness is just desiring evil 
 and getting it. Meno's assent is an expHcit statement of the con- 
 clusion toward which Socrates has been working, "You seem to me, 
 Socrates, to speak the truth; and I think that no one chooses evil. "^^ 
 
 The introduction of new suggestions, usually by Socrates, is an 
 extremely common form of transition to further discussion.^^ Some- 
 times the argument is led on by a series of such suggestions.''* Various 
 transitional phrases, formulas and particles are used to preface them. 
 
 ^2 The above analysis will illustrate not only the use of dichotomy, but also 
 Plato's method of advancing from point to point in an induction. 
 
 "•^ Cf . pp. 92 f . for a literary elaboration of this method of transition. 
 *' Cf. Phil. 26e seq., 31b seq. 
 
62 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 The formulas of command and exhortation noted above/^ and similar 
 phrases bespeaking the attention^^ are regularly used to introduce 
 new suggestions. So in Protag. 324a the phrase ei yap WeXets hvorjaai,, 
 introduces Protagoras' views on punishment. Similarly the com- 
 mand Tu 8e oij evTevdev rjbrj wpoaaxes tov vovv introduces the discussion 
 of the arithmetician in Theaet. 198b. 
 
 The introductory formula often takes the form of a question as to 
 the agreement of the respondent.'*^ So in Theaet. 189e, the definition 
 of thought as conversation of the soul with herself is introduced by the 
 query to 8e dtavoetadaL ap' oirep eyCs KoXets. A new term or idea is 
 sometimes introduced by the abrupt question whether it is included 
 in the respondent's vocabulary, whether he recognizes its existence.^^ 
 The subject thus introduced often seems entirely irrelevant. So in 
 Rep. 349d, the subject of music introduced in this way, fiovaiKov 
 5e TLva \eyeLs, eTepov de ixfjLovcrou, seems at first sight to have nothing to do 
 with the argument. However, it serves as the starting-point for a 
 refutation of Thrasymachus drawn from the analogy of the arts. 
 
 One of the commonest methods of opening a discussion or making 
 a fresh start in an argument is by demand for a definition.^^ The 
 demand may be introduced in various ways. In Euthyphro the dra- 
 matic explanation of the benefit to Socrates from becoming a pupil 
 of the pious Euthyphro (5a-c) and the generalization of the idea of 
 piety (5d) lead up to the request for a definition which starts the dis- 
 cussion. (5d). In Euthyphro lib the formula dXXd TrdXti' elire e^ dpx^s 
 introduces the reiteration of the request and consequent fresh start in 
 the argument. Again in 15c a similar transition appears, reinforced 
 
 *5 Cf. supra, pp. 53 f. Akin to the formula of exhortation is the inter- 
 rogative formula with /SouXet and the subjunctive. Cf. Phil, lib where Socrates 
 introduces an explicit statement of the question at issue with the words /SoOXet 
 (TvyKfipaXaLwauneda eKarepov. Also Protag. 317d; Laches 193e, 194b; Meno 76c, 
 86c; Phil. 28e; Rep. 521c, 577b; Theaet. 199a; Crat. 383a; Phaedo 70b, 79a, 104c. 
 
 «Cf. Phil. 24e, 29a; Symp. 177b; Theaet. 201d; Meno 82b; Euthyph. lie. 
 See also pp. 67 f. 
 
 " Cf. Theaet. 189b-c; Phil. 31b, 38e;Phaedr. 268a; Phaedo 64c, 103c; similarly 
 Rep. 456d; 434a. 
 
 <8 Cf. Gorg. 454c, 464a; Theaet. 163e, 198a; Protag. 332a; Phaedo, 103c, d; 
 Crat. 385b; I Ale. 128 b; Soph. 226b; Meno 75e, 76a, c, d, 88a; Rep. 352d; 348c. 
 These same formulas are also used to introduce a definition of terms; so in Protag. 
 358c d; Theaet. 145d; Phil. 34e, 37a; Phaedo 64c. 
 
 « Cf. Phil. 13b; Theaet. 146c, 148d, I51d, 187b, 200d; Char. 159a, 160d; 
 Laches 190d, 191e, 194c; Lysis 212a; Gorg. 449d; Meno 71d, 72c, 86c. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 63 
 
 by the appropriate image of Proteus. As Euthyphro refuses to exert 
 himself further the dialogue comes to a conclusion. 
 
 There are several types of transition in which the idea of criticism 
 or correction is the prominent element. One such has already been 
 noted.^" The criticism may take the form of a demand for greater 
 clearness which serves to introduce discussion or explanation."^ So 
 in Rep. 332c the request for a more specific definition, developed and 
 illustrated through the analogy of the arts, leads to an explanation of 
 terms which provokes discussion. Similarly, in Protag. 318b-c, Soc- 
 rates' criticism of the vague reply of Protagoras, supported by ana- 
 logous examples, leads to a more adequate response which is capable 
 of being discussed. The demand for clearness may come from Socra- 
 tes, as in the examples noted above, or it may be consequent upon the 
 respondent's failure to understand some statement. His request for 
 more exact explanation of a point not sufl&ciently clear is a frequent 
 method of introducing concrete illustration or detailed exposition. 
 The uses and varieties of this type of transition will be discussed fur- 
 ther^2 in connection with its Hterary value. Its characteristic vocabu- 
 lary includes imperative formulas such as X€7e ij.6mu, (ppa^t aa<peaTepov, 
 and interrogative formulas such as ttoIop drj Xeyets ; ttcoj Xeyetj.^^ The 
 criticism may take the form of a question as to the adequacy of some 
 statement or its relevance to the present discussion.^"* So in Phil. 
 17e-18a Philebus praises Socrates' discourse on method, but demands 
 what its application is to the problem in hand.^^ In Meno 75c Meno's 
 objecton to Socrates' definition of figure serves as the transition to 
 a short digression on the difference between dialectic and eristic. 
 
 Another common method of advancing the argument is through 
 generahzation. In the search for definition it often serves as the 
 transition from a failure to further attempts on the respondent's part. 
 The generalization is frequently introduced by some words of praise 
 or excuse to soften the following criticism. So in Rep. 331c Socrates 
 
 "0 Cf. supra, p. 55. 
 
 " Cf. Protag. 312d, 320b-c; Phil. 37a; Euthyph. 6c d. 
 « Pp. 87 lif. 
 
 "Laws 691b, 700a; Phaedr. 257e, 261e, 263a; Phil. 14c, 17a, 23e, 25d, 31e, 
 51b,d, 53d, e;Theaet. 155d. 
 
 " Cf. Meno 73d, 78d, 79c, 97d; Theaet. 169de. 
 
 " Cf. pp. 89 ff. for a different combination of praise and criticism in transition. 
 
64 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 compliments the aged Cephalus on his excellent words before he 
 generalizes them into a definition of justice and proceeds to test their 
 adequacy. The generalization in this case forms a transition to the 
 testing by negative instances, and to consequent further discussion. 
 
 In Laches 191e, the generalization follows the testing and rejection 
 of Laches' first definition of courage, and serves as the transition to 
 his second attempt. Here, however, owing to Laches' inability to 
 grasp the meaning of a general concept, Socrates is obliged to give 
 him the further assistance of a sample definition (192a b); thus an 
 additional element enters into the transition. Socrates prefaces the 
 generalization with a word of apology for his own unskilful question- 
 ing to which he attributes Laches' failure. With this passage in the 
 Laches, it is interesting to compare Laws 633c, where a similar gen- 
 eralization of courage is used as a transition.^" 
 
 A generahzation m.ay be developed as a conclusion from several 
 particular instances or it may serve as the basis for a conclusion 
 through appHcation to a particular instance. It is interesting to 
 note how such shifts from particular to general and from general to 
 particular" are effected. In Protag. 327c the transition from general 
 to particular is made by the appHcation to the inquiry about virtue 
 of a general analogy drawn from the arts. The phrase ovtcos g'lov Kal 
 vvv marks the application. Various combinations of deictic adverbs 
 and inferential phrases and particles are similarly used; e.g., ha tI ovv ; 
 /cat vvv 8ri, tovto av jjLade, ovkovv and the elliptical eirei.^^ Laches 185d 
 illustrates the establishment of a general conclusion from several 
 particular instances, ovkovv ivl \6yco introduces the generalization. 
 A slighter instance of this shift appears in Theaet. 175c where the 
 generalizing phrase irepl tovtcov airavTcov gathers up a long list of de- 
 tails. The adverb avWrjlSSriv is another word characteristic of this 
 form of transition.'^^ 
 
 58 Cf. Euthyph. 5d; Theaet. 178a. Theaet. 147d-148b is interesting as an 
 exercise in generalization. 
 
 *^ In Theaet. 190b, particular, general and particular follow one another in the 
 aba order. 
 
 "Cf. Laches 183c, 185e, 189e; Protag. 326e; Symp. 205d; Phaedr. 238b; 
 Meno 71b, 87e; Euthyph. 12a; Rep. 346a, 353d. 
 
 55 Cf. Theaet. 155c, 193b, 175b, 196b; Meno 73bc, 85c, 88c; Phaedr. 238b, 
 247e, 249e; Phil. 29d, 32a, 50b; Protag. 325c; Rep. 335d, 342e, 350a, 353d; Laches 
 192b; Lysis 215d; Char. 167d; Gorg. 476d; Phaedo 66b; Euthyph. 13c. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 65 
 
 The constant appeal to analogous illustrations is a common 
 characteristic of the Socratic method of reasoning. Their employ- 
 ment in making the shift from general to particular^" is only one 
 instance of their appearance in the dialogues. They occur so often 
 that it seems worth while to make a further study of the transitional 
 phrases used in their introduction and application. The introductory 
 transitional reference to the illustration may be very explicit, as in the 
 phrase (t/jllkpov Xa/Se ■Kapabei'ytJ.a and similar phrases;" more often a 
 phrase with coo-Trep or olov is used,®- or an introductory avTUa, ovkovv, 
 ovv or elliptical kivd.^^ In introducing further illustrations®'* or ex- 
 amples, when one has been already given, the adverbs /cat, en, om and 
 the prepositional phrases irpbs and eirl tcvtols appear in various com- 
 binations.®^ The mechanical phrase ei 8e (3ov\eL is similarly used.®^ 
 In marking the transition to the apphcation of an illustration or 
 example the deictic adverb oCrco is frequently used combined with 
 some connective or inferential particle, e.g., ovtco 8r], ourco Kal vvv, ovtco 
 de Kal, ovTO) to'ivvv f less Stereotyped phrases are also common, so 
 6is Tama aivoP\kiro:v in Protag. 320b; irpos t'l ovv hi] Xeyco ravra, Meno 
 97e.®8 
 
 To keep the machinery of the dialogues in motion a multitude of 
 minor conventional phrases and particles of transition is necessary, 
 
 «o Cf. supra, p. 64. 
 
 " Cf. Theaet. 154c, 176e; Soph. 218d. 
 
 ^^ oxnrep, Phil. 18a; Phaedr. 265e; oxxTrep rode, Symp. 205b; ibawep ovv el, Pro- 
 tag. 334d; olov, Theaet. 147c, I75e, 207a, 208d; Phaedr. 240b; Euthyph. 13ab; 
 Symp. 181a; Meno 73e, 86e; Phil. 29b; Crat. 387a; Phaedo 81e; Gorg. 495e. 
 
 ^^ avTiKa, Protag. 359e; Theaet. 166b; Phaedr. 235e; Gorg. 483a. ovv, ovkovv, 
 Phil. 31e; Crat. 388a, c, 390b; kwet, Protag. 319e; Symp. 208c, d; Euthyph. 4c, 
 5e; Euthyd 307a; Laches 183c; eTrel avrUa, Laches 195b. 
 
 ** For further discussion of transitions in a series cf. infra, p. 66. 
 
 ^^ovKodvKal, Symp. 199d; Meno 90d, 94a; Gorg. 477b; Theaet. 172a, 158d; 
 Euthyph. 10a, c; Crat. 387b. eTrei Kal, Phaedr. 344c; Theaet. 153a, 157a; Symp. 
 188a; Phil. 14d, 55a. en rolvw; "en oiv; Symp. 188b, 199e, 216a, 220e; Meno 88a; 
 Phil. 47d, 51e; Phaedr. 240a; Protag. 326b; Theaet. 153c. Phrases with irpos and 
 iirl; Phil. 20b, 37c, 23d, 55b; Theaet. 153c; Symp. 184e; Rep. 363e; Protag. 326b. 
 
 «6 Cf. Protag. 320a; Symp. 177b, 209d, 220d; Meno 94b. 
 
 " Cf. Protag. 334d, 347e; Theaet. 153d, 207b; Symp. 181a, 184c, 186c, 202b; 
 Meno 72c, 87b; Phaedr. 245d; Phil. 18b. 
 
 Cf. also vvv Tolvvv Meno 90e; tolvtov de tovto Kal; Symp. 178e, Pol. 287c. 
 
 «8 Cf. Phil. 34c, Char. 154b, Euthyph. 12c. 
 
 In Crat. 388d a transitional elev introduces the application of a series of in- 
 ductive examples to the case in hand. 
 
66 THE ART OF TRANSTTION IN PLATO 
 
 Some of these are purely mechanical, with no inherent transitional 
 meaning, such as the phrase el 5e /SouXei noted above ;^^ others are by 
 nature connective, e.g., the numerous inferential phrases and par- 
 ticles. An adequate treatment of transitional particles would involve 
 a careful analysis of many minor distinctions in usage and shades of 
 meaning^'' which is far beyond the scope of the present paper. The 
 following very incomplete collection of examples of some of the more 
 obvious and general types of transitional phrases and particles will 
 illustrate the possibilities for investigation along this line. In this 
 discussion the material considered has been grouped under these 
 headings: 1) transitional phrases and particles used in enumeration; 
 2) inferential phrases and particles used to mark somiC slight advance 
 in the argument; 3) interrogative transitional phrases; 4) miscel- 
 laneous adverbial and prepositional phrases and particles of connec- 
 tion; 5) narrative phrases and formulas of transition. 
 
 In marking the transitions from point to point in an enumeration 
 Plato uses not only the regular phrases irpwrov, hevrepov, Tpirov,''^ etc., 
 but various other expressions as well. Often the first step is intro- 
 duced by Tcpwrov and further steps by simple variants such as dra, 
 eireLTa, avdts or avf^ or the introductory phraseology of the whole 
 series may be varied from the conventional numerical expressions. 
 avTiKa, e^rjs, ert, fxevSe, forms of aXXos, prepositional phrases such as 
 juerct TovTo and eTrt tovtols, the phrase el 8e /SouXet^^ and other similar 
 expressions may be used.^-* The long speech of Nicias in Laches 
 181e-182e affords a good example of the skilful management of 
 transitions in enumeration. The following is the series: ToXkaxv, 
 fxri aXKodi . . , dXX' h tovtco, Kal a/jLa, eireLTa, n'eyicnov fievTOL, en 8e 
 Kai, wpoadrjao/jLev 8' avT^ ov afxiKpav TpoaOrjKrjv, jxi] aTL/jLaaco/jLev 8e elTrelv. 
 Word, phrase and sentence transitions are included. Finally a sum- 
 marizing and dismissive fxev ovv brings the speech to a conclusion and 
 a following 8e introduces the speech of Laches. 
 
 " Cf. supra, p. 65. 
 
 " This has been done for the particle yap by Geneva Misener, (University 
 of Chicago Press, 1904) 
 
 " Cf. Phaedr. 266de, 271ab; Phil. 27b; Theaet. 193ab; 155ab; Rep. 358c. 
 
 " Cf. Phil. 15b, 21bc; Meno 90a, 95a; Symp. 181b, c, 184a, 189de, 207b, 
 210a, 211a, 219e-220a, 221ab, 222a; Theaet. 194d, 199d; Laches 186a. 
 
 " Cf. supra, p. 65 for discussion of transitions in a series of illustrations. 
 
 '^Phil. 12cd, 18bc; Meno 71e, 92a, 93b-94b; Symp. 207de; Theaet. 166b; 
 Laches 182e-183c, 191d-e; Gorg. 491b-c. 
 
MINOR FORMS OF TRANSITION 67 
 
 The inferential particles 6/7, ovv, ovkovv, apa, and toIvvv are con- 
 stantly^^ used in transition, either alone or in combination with other 
 particles and phrases. The use of ij.ev ovv, fxtv 8r] and /xev toIvvv in 
 dismissals has been noted. '^^ ovv, iiev ovv and bi] are also frequently- 
 used with resumptive force. '^^ The common idiomatic iiiv ovv which 
 marks a correction'^ is of course transitional; so is the ovv or §' ovv 
 which waives further consideration of some point. ''^ An inferential 
 8r] or ovv combined with the adverb outcos may introduce a summary.*" 
 Inferential particles are often attached to an imperative. The intro- 
 ductory formulas of command with verbs of investigation discussed 
 above*^ usually contain an inferential 8rj or ovv. This construction is 
 widely extended. Forms from dfiL, exw or any verb which may serve 
 to attract the attention are used.^- These brief quasi-exclamatory 
 
 '6 Their use with simple inferential force to mark some slight advance in the 
 argument is so common as scarcely to need illustration. Cf. Symp. 178e, 180a, e, 
 181b, c, 183e, 201b, 207a, 208b; Meno 79ab, 87d, 90b; Phil. 21d, 26b, e, 40c, 49d; 
 Protag. 330d; Euthyph. 7e, 13b, 14c; Phaedo 109a; Theaet. 170a, 185b; Phaedr. 
 244d, 261c, 262b et passim. apa is constantly used to mark a conclusion; cf. 
 Crat. 388b, e; Lysis 212d, 214d; Laches 186a; Protag. 332b, e, 340d; Theaet. 
 160cd; Rep. 350b; et passim. 
 
 ^^ Cf. supra, pp. 56 ff. 
 
 " Char. 157b; Phil. 20a, 24d, 28a; Symp. 177c, 181a, e, 186e, 201d, 207a; 
 Phaedr. 243b, 230e, 259d; Protag. 359b, 329b; Rep. 350d; Soph. 249b. 
 
 ^8 Protag. 309d, 349e; Theaet. 165a, 181d; Symp. 201c, 202b; Phil. 25b, 
 39c; Phaedr. 234d; Laches 192c; Crat. 405a; Euthyd. 284b; Crito 44b; Rep. 
 341a, 392b, 444b. 
 
 " Phaedr. 230e, 253e, 260d; Laws 739e; Rep. 337c, 620d. 
 
 80 Cf. Symp. 180b, 181a, 184a; Phaedr. 245d, 241e; Meno 88e; Pol. 301c; 
 Rep. 556c. 
 
 For another transitional use of the same expression cf. supra, p. 65. 
 
 81 Cf. stipra, pp. 53 f. 
 
 82gx€697 Theaet. 186b; Laches 198b; Protag. 349e; Rep. 353b; Gorg. 460a, 
 490b. <ptpt Sf, Crito 47a; Soph. 229b, 261d; Pol. 267a; Rep. 453e; Gorg. 493d; 
 Protag. 330b, 332c, 349e; Meno 75b, 82d; Euthyd. 293b; Theaet. 203c, 206c, 
 209b; Phaedo 79b; Crat. 385 b; Phil. 27c. W^ di,, Theaet. 148d, 178b, 203b; 
 Laches 194c, e; Gorg. 495c; Phaedr. 262d; Meno 77a; Phil, lid, 27d; Protag. 
 332d, 333b, 352e, 359c; Crat. 389a; Hipp. II 368a; Pol. 305b; Rep. 399e, 455b. 
 Wi ovf, Rep. 376d; Symp. 199c; le^ ovv Sv, Theaet. 195e; Wl vvv, Euthyph. 9a. 
 6pa 8ri, Phaedo 79e; Euthyph. 12d; Theaet. 197c, 203c; Protag. 339b; Rep. 416d. 
 aye br), Phil. 39e; Soph. 235a. Compare also the more explicit phrase irpocxexi 817 t6v 
 vovv and its variants, Meno 82b; Char. 160d; Phil. 31d, 32e, 45d; Symp. 210e, 
 217b; Theaet. 198b; Soph. 262e; Pol. 259d, 306c; Lysis 219b; Laws 667a. 
 
68 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 phrases may be used alone to introduce a point or they may simply 
 precede and reinforce a regular formula of command or exhortation. 
 
 Interrogative transitional formulas with H are very common. 
 t'l 8e ; tL 8r]; TL ovv ; H 8e 8r] ; TL 8ri ovv ; and other combinations occur.^^ 
 They are used to mark any slight advance in the argument; to intro- 
 duce an objection, a new suggestion, an illustration, or the appKcation 
 of some point. Formulas with ttws and forms of ttoTos are also used.^^ 
 
 The importance of adverbs as an element in various forms of 
 transition has already been sufficiently illustrated.^^ The adverbs 
 ourcos, Si8e, av, aWts, ttciXlv, e^rjs, Itl, i]8r] all have transitional force. 
 The exclamatory eUv, which is also transitional may for convenience 
 be included here.^® Here too should be noted the resumptive 
 elra, exetra or ovtus which picks up and summarizes a list of par- 
 ticiples.^^ Demonstratives always have transitional value. Transi- 
 tions are often made by means of demonstratives alone or by phrases 
 with the demonstrative pronouns, fxera tovto and /jLera ravra are 
 especially common, ^^ either appearing alone or in some transitional 
 formula. Similar phrases with k, Sta, irpos, Kara, and Trept are also 
 used.^^ The transitional vrpos or ext tovtols has already been noted. ^^ 
 
 «^Ti5e, Laches 185e, 192d, 195e, 199a; Meno 7lc, 73a, 76a, 77e, 92e, 93e, 
 98b; Symp. 201b, 206a; Euthyph. 4a, 8b; Rep. 332e, 515b, 517d; Theaet. 148c, 
 153b, 154a, 205b; Protag. 332c, 351b, 353a, 356e; Phaedr. 234e, 258b; Phil, lid, 
 22a, 29c, 40e; Phaedo 59c, 64d; Gorg. 478d, 495c. t'l Si); Protag. 351c, 360d; 
 Theaet. 204a; Gorg. 486e; ri oiv; Char. 154e; Protag. 317d, 331a, 360c; Rep. 
 437b, 516c; Laches 193e; Meno 95b; Phil. 38e, 41e, 53b; Phaedr. 242d; 263c; 
 Theaet. 154c, 158d, 164c, 168d, 200d; Gorg. 498a. W Se di,; Protag. 358b,c; Theaet. 
 204b; Meno 87d, 95b; Euthyph. 14a; Phaedo 58c, 65a; Rep. 468a, 523e; Gorg. 
 502b. tI 5' av; Theaet. 206a; Gorg. 504c. ri 617 av; Euthyph. 14c. tI drj ovv; Rep. 
 369e; Gorg. 515e; Symp. 205a, 206e; Meno 89d; Euthyph. lOd. 
 
 "Cf. Phaedo 73d, 89c, 104d; Euthyd. 284c, 293e; Meno 91c, 96e; Laches 
 193e; Gorg. 491d; Phil. Ud, 13b, d, e, 14c, 21d, 29a, 24e, 31c, 35c, 36c, 39e and see 
 Appendi.x-, p. 103. 
 
 85Cf. ^(^/'ra, pp. 53, 57, 58f.,63. 
 
 8« Cf. Chap. I, pp. 29, 42, 44; also Crat. 388d; Laws 690, 691b; Gorg. 472d, 480a; 
 Apol. 18e, 19b; Symp. 176a; Crito 47c; Meno 75c, 78d, 83c; Char. 156a; Phaedo 95a; 
 Phil. 15d, 25b, 27e; Rep. 332d, e, 350d, 353b, 412b; et al. 
 
 87 Cf. Theaet. 193c; Protag. 319d, 358c; Rep. 331b, 336e, 443e, 591e. 
 
 88 Cf. Protag. 311a, 313a, 325d, 330d, e, 344b, 355a; Theaet. 148a; Rep. 456c; 
 Meno 72c, 87c; Euthyph. 12d; Phaedo 102b; Phil. 29d, 38c, 52d; Symp. 175c, 
 176a, e, 197c, 199c, 204d, 210b, 215b, 219e d passim. 
 
 83 Cf. Protag. 326a; Lysis 218a; Gorg. 454b; Phaedo 58c, 59a, 66b, d, 67e, 
 74a; Rep. 408c; Symp. 180b, 184a, 198e; Phil. 29e, 57c, et al. 
 "0 Cf. supra, p. 65. 
 
MINOR FORMS OP TRANSITION 69 
 
 The phrases e^ apxfjs and et<> avOts have also been discussed. ^^ Phil. 
 52d is interesting as an illustration of the frequent piling up of 
 transitional phrases and adverbs in one minor transition, ert toLvvv 
 ■jrpos TOVTOLS, /uLera ravra, Tohe avTOiv oiadereop. to ttolov; 
 
 The ordinary connective usages of /cai, ixkv-bk and dXXd do not need 
 illustration, but there are several idiomatic transitional uses of these 
 particles, alone and in combination Vvith others, which may be noted. 
 E.g., Kal 8ri KaL is used to apply a general statement to a particular 
 case or introduce emphatically an important point ;^^ ye alone or with 
 ^17 or Kai may indicate the transition to a new class ;^' 8e ye is regularly 
 used to mark a minor premise ;^^ 8k is used to pick up and define a 
 term already introduced ;^^ dXXd fiiiv, r) Kai, rj Kai and Kal fxriv may mark 
 the advance to a new point, or a sHght step forward in the argument.^^ 
 dXXd yap and dXXd 8r] are used to introduce an objection or its 
 answer." 
 
 The narrated dialogues furnish countless exam.ples of the various 
 common transitional formulas with e^??, elirop, aKovo) and similar verbs, 
 which are essential to that type of writing.^^ In a v/ell-known pas- 
 sage in the Theaetetus^^ Plato himself lists some of these phrases. 
 
 " Cf. supra, pp. 54, 58. 
 
 82 Cf. Meno 70b, 88d, 89e; Phil. 12e; Laches 182d; Euthyph. 2d; Theaet. 
 171d, 187c; Symp. 182a; Protag. 339a, 343b, 345e; Rep. 328e, 343b, 373a, 420d 
 et al.; Phaedo 59d, 85d. 
 
 93 Cf. Rep. 425b; Theaet. 156b; Gorg. 450d. 
 
 9" Cf. Rep. 335d, 349c, 412d; Theaet. 204e; Meno 84e; Gorg. 498e. 
 
 95 Cf. Symp. 186d, 207d; Phil, lie; Phaedr. 246d, 247c; Meno 86e; Theaet. 
 176b; Laches 198b; Euthyph. 10c; Phaedo 68a; Rep. 444d. Cf. also 5e 8r) in 
 Phaedr. 238a; and yap in Euthyph. 2d; Laches 198b. 
 
 ^^Kalti7,v Phaedo 71a, 72e; Gorg. 471d; Laws 629b, 640a; Rep. 370e, 424a, 
 431d; Laches 181a, 193c, 199e; Euthyph. 12a; Theaet. 143e, 148b, 149c, 153b, 
 159a, 170d, 182e, 188a, 204d; Meno 87d, 98c; Symp. I79b, 196c, 202b, 199c; 
 Phil. 17b, 18e, 21c, 26a, d, 27a, 31a, 33c, 48a, et passim. Kal ixrjv is sometimes 
 slightly adversative in tone hke Kal toi. dXXd ixiiv Rep. 370b, 468c, 502b, 
 525a; Phil. 35b; Phaedr. 240a, 244d; Symp. 176d; Protag. 332a, 359d, 360c; 
 Theaet. lS8e, 189a, 190d; Crat. 386d; Phaedo 74c, 75a. f, Kal Protag. 330a; 
 Euthyph. 8c; Theaet. 149a, 178b, 184e, 186a, 188e; Phaedo 76b; Rep. 348d. 
 
 " Cf. Protag. 338c; Theaet. 176b; Euthyph. 6d; Meno. 94d, e; Rep. 365cd, 
 487b; Symp. 199a; Laws 805b; Rep. 366a; Phil. 43a, 49c. Cf. also dXXci in Meno 
 75c; aWa fxrjp Symp. 202d. 
 
 98 Cf. Symp. 174c, 175b, 176e, 185c, 198a, 208b, 212c, 218d, 219a, 222c; 
 Char. 156d; Protag. 318b, 330b, 339b, d, 337a, c, 340e, 347b; Phaedo 69e, 73a; 
 Rep. 336b, d, 337a et passim. 
 
 »» Theaet. 143c. 
 
70 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 Besides these formulas with verbs of saying, the common continua- 
 tive particles, ovv, fxev ovv, b-q, yap, /cat, /xev, 8e, dXXd and the conjunc- 
 tions and adverbs which indicate time sequence, such as kirei, eTrei.8rj, 
 drJTa, ii8r], are naturally used with special frequency to mark transitions 
 in narrative.^"*' 
 
 looCf. Char. 153a-d, 155b; Symp. 174a, 175b, 176ab, 177a-e, 180d, 189c; 
 Protag. 318a, 320c seq., 342a, 310a; Phaedo 59d-e; Rep. 614b-621b, et passim. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 The Literary Art of Transition 
 
 Plato is the first great artist of prose style. He resembles the 
 cleverest modern writers in his complete mastery over his material 
 and his ready commiand of every device for securing unity and variety. 
 This skill is nowhere more apparent than in his management of 
 transitions. In Plato's hands transition becomes a literary art. 
 Not only does he understand how to use to the best advantage the 
 ordinary conventional means of connection, the formulas of summary 
 and dismissal, the explicit statement of purpose, the multitude of 
 transitional plirases and particles which are the natural resource and 
 the common property of other ancient writers; but he is master also 
 of the use in transition of image, proverb, quotation, continued meta- 
 phor; he is aware of the artistic value for purposes of transition of 
 literary devices such as the ironic self-check, the paradox, dramatic 
 personification of the argument, and he is not afraid to play with 
 the order of the subject for the sake of gaining variety and heighten- 
 ing interest. 
 
 The use of literary allusion or adapted quotation in transition 
 seems preeminently modern. But in Symp. 220c through an adapted 
 Homeric quotation^ Plato secures real literary value for an otherwise 
 ordinary dismissive-introductive transition. "I have told you one 
 tale, but another instance is worth hearing of the deeds and endurance 
 of that mighty man, while he was on the expedition. " Different 
 but equally modern is the passage in the Phaedrus (243a) where the 
 reference to Stesichorus and quotation from his palinode form the 
 chief step in transition to the idea of a second speech from Socrates 
 in recantation of his first. What seems like a playful whim or 
 capricious impulse is really studied art, a clever literary method of 
 securing an effective transition from a superficial and inadequate 
 treatment of love to one that is deeper and more complete. ^ Another 
 
 1 Od IV 242. 
 - See p. 21. 
 
 71 
 
 (^ 
 
72 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 interesting element in this paragraph of transition is Socrates' use of 
 proverbial language in the explicit statement of purpose which closes 
 his brief summary of his reasons for recantation. "I desire as it 
 were to wash the brine from my ears with water from the spring."* 
 
 In Lysis 213e-214b an appeal to the authority of the poets is 
 combined with metaphor in advancing to a new point in the dis- 
 cussion. The transitional formula of exhortation, " But let us proceed 
 no further in this direction, " suggests the noun-metaphor of the hard 
 road of investigation. The language of this metaphor continues, 
 leading up to the reference to the poets. And here another metaphor, 
 the description of the poets as "fathers and leaders in wisdom," adds 
 further variety before the actual quotation'* which starts the new 
 discussion. This transition then includes formula, image and literary 
 reference. 
 
 A recurrent metaphor used in transition may be an important 
 element in the literary frame work of a dialogue. So in the Republic 
 the figure of the "sea of difficulty," first casually introduced in a dis- 
 missive transitional formula in 441c,5 appears again with greater 
 elaboration in 453d in transition to a refutation of the charge of incon- 
 sistency. It is further developed into the figure of the three waves of 
 ridicule in 457bc where it serves as the transition from the first 
 paradox, the community of education between male and female 
 guardians to the second, the community of wives and children for the 
 guardians. After much postponement and digression, it is used again 
 in 472a to introduce the discussion of the possibiHty of the third 
 paradox, the rule of philosopher-kings. Finally in 473c the metaphor 
 of the "laughing wave" prefaces the actual statement of the third 
 paradox which in 472 was postponed by a brief digression on the 
 relation of the ideal to the actual. This image then not only helps to 
 give artistic unity to Book V but, if we accept 441c as a preparatory 
 hint, Hnks this book to the preceding. 
 
 'The probable literary source of this expression is Od. 6:224, as has been 
 pointed out by Shorey in The English Classical Review, 1904, p. 302 f. 
 
 *0d. XVII 218. 
 
 ' Campbell {Republic, Vol. II, p. 12) finds the first hint even earlier, in 
 iyLTre-KTiiKaixiv, 435c. Shorey, (.1. J. P., XVI 225) rejects as fanciful any dis- 
 covery of the image of the wave in these passages (435c and 441c). At the best, 
 in his opinion, they are "unconscious anticipations." 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 73 
 
 The above description of instances of artist'c transition is suf- 
 ficient to show how any attempt at classification is beset with diffi- 
 culties. In the majority of cases where the transition has any literary 
 value it is not simple but complex, a skilful combination of a number 
 of transitional elements. It may be that one element is so evidently 
 predominant that the transition easily falls under one category. On 
 the other hand, several elements may seem equally important. The 
 classification followed in this chapter, is purely tentative, adopted 
 for convenience of discussion, not intended to be either definitive 
 or exhaustive. 
 
 Other Greek writers quote proverbs; Plato is the first to incor- 
 porate a proverb in his argument so that it becomes the link of transi- 
 tion from one point to the next. In Rep. 423c-e where Socrates and 
 Adeimantus are discussing the injunctions to be laid upon the guard- 
 ians, transition is made by means of a proverb^ to the idea that, if 
 only the guardians receive the proper education and nurture, "the 
 one great thing," then the "many" minor details of legislation may 
 safely be left to them. Similarly in Laches 196d by means of the 
 proverb, "not every pig would know," to which he adds the words, 
 "nor be courageous," Socrates passes to the point that, according 
 to the definition of Nicias, courage must be denied to animals.^ 
 Euthydemus 297c presents an entertaining variation of this method. 
 The sophist accuses Socrates of running away and refusing to answer. 
 He retorts with the proverb that "not even Hercules could fight 
 agains two," whih he proceeds to explain and adapt playfully to 
 the present case. But the sophist, in no wise abashed, picks up the 
 reference to the proverb and uses it to continue the game of eristic 
 quibbles.^ 
 
 In Phaedo 99c a proverb is used in combination with a transition 
 of the ordinary dismissive-introductive type. The failure of Socrates 
 to find the final cause is dismissed with ^h ovv; the narrative then 
 advances with a continuative bk; but it is the following proverbial 
 
 * The proverb is ttoXX' oI5' dXwTnj^ dXX' extws tu ixkya. Adam's edition of the 
 Republic notes the reference to proverbial language, but does not cite the proverb. 
 Other editors seem to have missed the meaning of to \ey6ixtvov here. The same 
 proverb is similarly used in Pol. 297a. 
 
 ' See also Phaedr. 257d; Phaedo 108d; Pol. 264b; Lysis 207c; Phil. 48c. 
 
 * See also Phaedo 89c and Laws 919b for use of this proverb. 
 
74 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 expression "rw behrepov ttXow"^ that really supplies the main element 
 of transition to the theory of ideas and method of hypotheses. In 
 many similar cases of transition by other methods a proverb appearing 
 at the point of transition attracts the attention and adds emphasis. 
 So in Phaedrus 260c, the transition is very effectively reinforced by a 
 proverb. The amusing illustration of the man who, deceived by an 
 ignorant but eloquent friend, purchases an ass in the belief that it is 
 a horse, is appHed to the case of an orator who, himself ignorant of 
 good and evil, deceives an equally ignorant city. The transition to 
 the application is really made by the words "not about an ass. " But 
 these words at once suggest the proverb "The shadow of an ass." 
 The adoption of the proverbial expression here adds to the eiTective- 
 ness of the transition.^'' 
 
 A proverb brought in at the point where a change in speakers is 
 made may add greatly to the smoothness and naturalness of the 
 transition. Note for example the use of the proverb, "Let brother 
 help brother," in Rep. 362d, and the expression "Your will is my 
 will" in Theaet. 162b where Socrates returns to Theaetetus as 
 respondent. Again in Crat. 411a in the transition to the explanation 
 of the derivation of the names of the four virtues, the famihar^^ 
 exhortation not to be discouraged gains a new emphasis from the 
 addition of the proverbial phrase "put on the lion's skin."^^ Simi- 
 larly, in Phil. 60a, the proverb "twice and thrice what is fair, "^^ in 
 modified form reinforces the statement of the need of recapitulation 
 which, set in a framework of minor transitional formulas, introduces 
 another resume and reminder of the issue. 
 
 The familiar proverb, " the third to the Savior, " is frequently used 
 by Plato in the introduction of the final" stage in an argument or 
 discussion. So in Char. 167ab where the regular formula, "Then let 
 us investigate again as if from the beginning, " serves as the transition 
 
 ^Compare our expression, "the second best." This proverb is used also 
 in Phil. 19c, Pol. 300c. 
 
 " Cf. also Laws 753e; Phil. 29a; Rep. 435c, 563d, 497d, 521c; Theaet 208b; 
 Pol. 300c; Laws 723d, 701d, 968e; Lysis 218c; Phaedr. 272c; Theaet. 201d. 
 
 » Cf. p. 54. 
 
 '- See also Soph. 261b where the proverb "such a faint heart will never take 
 a city" is similarly used. 
 
 " This proverb is similarly used in Gorg. 498e in Socrates' appeal to Callicles 
 for his help in drawing out the conclusions from their argument. See also Laws 
 754c, 956e. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 75 
 
 to examination of the sixth definition of temperance, the proverb 
 "the third to the Savior" inserted in the formula emphasizes the 
 finality of the attempt and gives a literary value to the transition. 
 Again, in Rep. 583b, this proverbial expression appears in combina- 
 tion with the figure of the Olympic contest to introduce the third 
 and last argument for the superiority of the just over the unjust life. 
 The use of the figure enhances the idea of finality suggested by the 
 proverb. In this greatest of moral contests, as in the physical, it is 
 the third throw that wins.^^ 
 
 Plato uses quotations in transition in several ways.^'' The quota- 
 tion may serve to introduce a new character either in narrative or 
 argument. The case in Protag. 315bc is especially apt. The lines 
 which introduce the heroes Heracles and Tantalus in the eleventh 
 book of the Odyssey (Od. XI, 601 and 582) are here adapted to preface 
 the half-humorous descriptions of the famous sophists Hippias and 
 Prodicus. Again in Protag. 340a it is by means of a Homeric quota- 
 tion (II. XXI, 308) that Prodicus is brought into the argument to 
 assist Socrates. There is a somewhat similar use in Gorg. 505e, 
 where a quotation from Epicharmus, "Two men spoke before, but 
 now one shall be enough, " introduces Socrates' consent to serve in the 
 double capacity of questioner and respondent. 
 
 More frequent and important is the use of quotations in the pro- 
 gress of the argument to effect the transition from point to point in 
 the discussion.^^ So in Charmides 173a an allusion to the passage in 
 the Odyssey^^ describing the two gates of dreams forms the transition 
 to the investigation whether tem.perance as a "science of sciences" 
 would have any practical value. Two such cases of transitional use 
 
 " For further examples of the use of this proverb in transition see Phil. 66d, 
 where it introduces the third recapitulation, and Laws 692a. 
 
 1^ The use of a proverb or a quotation to formulate a definition or a new 
 point for debate can hardly be called transitional. Although the quotation or 
 proverb in such cases does serve to indicate a new phase of discussion, the actual 
 transition is usually found in some prefatory phrase or formula. See Meno 77b; 
 Gorgias 510b; Char. 164d; Rep. 407ab; Euthyphro 12b; Laws 629, 630a-c, 731e. 
 The common use of quotations in illustration or proof is also non-transitional. 
 See Char. 163b; Gorgias 484b, 526d; Symp. 195d; Laches 201b; Lysis 215c; 
 Laws 680b, 68 le, 690e. 
 
 '* Instances of this use of quotation in Rep. 545d, e, 547a, 550c; Crito 44b, 
 have been described already in Chap. I, pp. 8, 43. See also Crat. 428a. 
 
 i^Od. XIX 562. 
 
76 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 of quotation occur in the Gorgias. The reference to the well-known 
 drinking song in 45 Id introduces the idea that Gorgias' definition of 
 rhetoric is inadequate, being praise not definition. Again, in 492e, 
 a saying of Euripides^^ prefaces Socrates' explanation of the Pytha- 
 gorean view that our body is our tomb. 
 
 A familiar quotation may be adapted as a transitional formula, ^^ 
 a minor connecting link in the train of thought. So in Meno 76d 
 Socrates introduces his Gorgian definition of color with the words, 
 "And now, as Pindar says,-" read my meaning." The quotation 
 here is combined with the inferential phrase k tovtuv b-q. Similarly 
 in Rep. 563c a quotation from Aeschylus,^! "Why not . . . utter the 
 word which rises to our lips," is combined with ovkovv to form a 
 transition. Another possible instance is Crat. 428d. Here a Homeric 
 quotation^^ is cleverly introduced into a transitional self-check. 
 
 Proverb and quotation occasionally appear together in a transi- 
 tion. So in Symp. 174b Socrates' punning adaptation of the proverb, 
 "To the feasts of inferior men the good go unbidden," combined with 
 playful criticism of II. II 408 and another Homeric reference (II. 
 X 224)=^^ are important transitional elements in the passage of by- 
 play which serves as the introductory explanation of Aristodemus' 
 presence at Agathon's banquet. Similarly the "subtly moralized" 
 paraphrase of Hesiod (0. D. 293) which appears in Phil. IQc^^ involved 
 with the proverbial expression, "tw devrepov ttXovv" serves as the 
 transition to the demand that Socrates shall undertake the enumera- 
 tion and definition of the species of pleasure and wisdom, which Pro- 
 tarchus feels unable to attempt. 
 
 Plato's use of images in transition is even more varied than his 
 use of proverb and quotation. In some cases the language of the 
 transition is only slightly figurative or fanciful, suggesting metaphor, 
 in others the figure is clearly developed and applied. Sometimes such 
 a metaphor is extended over several pages; it may even appear as a 
 
 i« Frag. 7 of the Polycides. 
 
 " For additional examples see Phaedr. 260a; Symp. 220c. 
 ^^Frag. 82. 
 " Frag. 351 Nauck. 
 «I1. Ill 109. 
 
 =" The same quotation is used transitionally in II Alcib, 140a. Compare 
 Protag. 348c where it is used by Socrates to support his claim of disinterestedness. 
 s^Shorey, A. J. P. XIII, p. 372. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 77 
 
 unifying element throughout the dialogue. In Rep. 427d the regular 
 dismissive-introductive transition by which Socrates introduces 
 the search for justice in the now completed ideal city, is varied by the 
 addition of the words, "bringing a torch from somewhere," which 
 give a figurative touch to the whole. So in Theaetetus 187b in a 
 transition to a fresh start in the argument the ordinary transitional 
 formula, "and now consider again from the beginning," is enlivened 
 by the added figure, "having wiped out all that went before. "^^ 
 In Theaetetus 164c as in 187b the image appears in conjunction with 
 a conventional formula of transition to a fresh start in the argument. 
 But the more fully developed metaphor of 164c, "Like a cock of 
 mongrel breed we seem to have leaped away from the argument and 
 begun to crow before we have won the victory," does more than add 
 vigor and individuality to the transition. This striking figurative 
 expression of the idea of mistaken confidence forms a natural and 
 effective introduction to the criticism of the previous method of 
 conducting the argument. 
 
 A figure may be used for climactic effect in a transitional series. 
 So in Symp. 217e-218b, where Alcibiades prefaces an anecdote of 
 Socrates by an enumeration of his reasons for relating it, the regular 
 phraseology of the series^'' is employed, but it is the vigor and vivid- 
 ness of its imagery — detailed comparison of the effect of philosophy 
 on the soul to the bite of a serpent, followed by the lesser figures of 
 the philosophic madness and Bacchanalian frenzy — which makes the 
 third reason an effective climax and the most important step in the 
 transition. 
 
 In Rep. 403e, the comparison of the guardians to athletes of war 
 is used in working out the conclusion that their gymnastic training 
 must be "simple" and "not over-precise." The more specific transi- 
 tion to this subject is in the phrase tI 8e 617; but the following words, 
 "for are the men not in training for the greatest contest?" add a more 
 important element, for the application of this figure colors the whole 
 discussion. 
 
 An image may be used in the introduction of another personage 
 into the dialogue or in making a shift of interlocutors. So in Theaet. 
 162b the implicit application to the present case of the Spartan 
 
 ^ Similarly the figure of "retracing our steps" gives artistic value to the 
 transition in Theaet. 187e. See also Theaet. 200e; Laws 892d, 893b. 
 »• See Chap. II, p. 66. 
 
78 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 custom of compelling every one who enters the gymnasium to strip 
 and display his skill in contest is pressed by Socrates and evaded by 
 Theodorus with the result that Theaetetus again becomes the respon- 
 dent. Again in 169a-b the shift to Theodorus is finally effected by a 
 reference to this same simile of 162b and a further comparison of 
 Socrates to Skiron and Antaeus. So also in Laches 194bc, when the 
 elenchus has reduced Laches to perplexity, it is by means of the figures 
 of the huntsmen and the storm that Nicias is introduced into the 
 discussion.-^ 
 
 A figure may be em.ployed as a formula,^^ as an external means of 
 transition to a new line of investigation. An instance of this is the 
 figure of the wrestler in Rep. 544b which introduces the return to the 
 discussion of the types of degenerate states. "Then, like a wrestler 
 .... you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me 
 ask you the same questions, and do you give me the same ansv/er 
 which you w^ere about to give me then." An even clearer case is the 
 metaphor of the game of draughts used in transition in Laws 739a, 
 "The next move in our pastime of legislation." 
 
 The transitions from point to point in the progress of an argument 
 afford great opportunity for a varied use of metaphor. Transition 
 to an objection or correction may be made through an image. ^^ So in 
 Theaet. 203d-e the comparison of the argument to a runaway slave 
 introduces the correction, "Perhaps v/e ought to have maintained 
 that a syllable is not the letters, but one single idea formed out of 
 them." Rep. 458 a-b illustrates the literary elaboration of a post- 
 ponement^o by means of a figure. The discussion of the possibility 
 of the second paradox involves the discussion of the possibility of the 
 entire state. Socrates introduces the idea of postponement by the 
 metaphor of the day-dreams of an indolent man, in the application of 
 which he outlines the order he wishes to adopt. " So now I too shrink 
 from the harder task, and I want to postpone those matters and con- 
 sider later how they are possible," etc. 
 
 " Also Theaet, 184b. 
 
 28 Compare also Phaedr. 236b; Pol. 287c; Phil. 13d, 41b, 44d. 
 '9 See also Theaet. 164c, 208e. 
 
 30 111 Symp. 209e-210a a dismissive-introductive transition is similarly 
 embellished by a figure. Compare also Rep. 432b-d; Phil. 55c. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 79 
 
 Personification of the argument is a type of metaphor rather fre- 
 quently used in transition.^^ So in Phaedr. 260e Socrates employs 
 the personified \6yot. to bear witness to the theory that rhetoric may 
 be a mere unscientific knack, rather than an art. The figure is more 
 elaborately developed in Theaet. 164e, where complaint against the 
 maltreatment of the orphaned discourse of Protagoras and the failure 
 of its natural protectors, such as Theodorus, to come to its assistance 
 serves as a clever transition to the so-called "defence of Protagoras" 
 by Socrates. The personification of the argument in Laches 194a 
 involves a literary conceit.^^ After the failure of the definition of 
 courage as endurance, Socrates, picking up and playing on the 
 phraseology of the subject under consideration, makes abrupt transi- 
 tion to further discussion by the literary conceit of enduring at the 
 bidding of the argument that courage may not laugh at their lack of 
 courage in investigating her nature. 
 
 Although the figure in transition often seems a mere artistic sub- 
 stitute for or reinforcement of a conventional formula, it sometimes 
 stands in a much more intimate relation to the argument. The new 
 idea introduced may be implicitly suggested by the figure or developed 
 by its direct application.^^ Thus in Rep. 343b it is through the figure 
 of the shepherd and its application that transition is made from the 
 ideal to practical experience in the consideration of justice and 
 injustice. The paragraph of transition in Theaet. 179d illustrates 
 both uses of metaphor. The first figure is incorporated in a transitional 
 formula. "And therefore let us draw nearer . . . and give the 
 truth of the universal flux a ring; is the theory sound or rotten?" 
 The second figure, that of the war which is raging about the theory, 
 contributes both language and ideas to the following discussion. In 
 181a it is used in transition again, combined with further figurative 
 language, Socrates' comparison of their position to that of "players 
 in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged dif- 
 ferent ways by the two parties." 
 
 3> Compare Theaet. 200c; Rep. 503a, 538d; Laws 699e, 701c, 892d; Phaedo 
 95a. 
 
 '^ Another example of a Hterary conceit used in transition occurs in Symp. 
 185c, where the usual transitional reference to the previous speaker takes the 
 form of a Gorgian paronomasia. 
 
 '3 Compare Rep. 368d, 484c; Theaet. 155e, 167b; Gorg. 4S6d; Phil. 38e-39b; 
 Laws 803ab; Phil. 59de; Laws 960cd. 
 
80 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 There is a very clever instance of the use of an applied figure in 
 transition in Meno 72a. After the enumeration of virtues which 
 Meno offers as a definition, Socrates comments, "I certainly seem to 
 have met with great good fortune, Meno, if, when seeking for one 
 virtue, I have discovered a whole swarm of them which are in your 
 keeping. " Then picking up this image of the swarm he uses it in an 
 illustration, introduced by arap, put in the form of an imagined 
 question whether bees differ "as bees." In this way he reaches the 
 idea that a definition must give the essence or "common notion" of 
 the thing defined. Again in Laws 734e-735a, the image of weaving 
 the web, introduced by Kadairep ovv 8r], suggests the idea of cleansing 
 from which is developed the need of tests and purification in the state. 
 
 A case like that of the applied metaphor of the dog in Rep. 375 
 is sometimes criticized as fallacious. But the Republic is not a 
 debate with an adversary nor is any argument in this instance based 
 upon the metaphor. The image here is merely a literary device for 
 illustrating the exposition of the temperament of the guardians. This 
 is shown by 375d where a departure from the image is playfully alleged 
 as the cause of their temporary bewilderment. "And I was at a loss, 
 and when I had considered our previous words, I said, 'My friend 
 it is with good right that we are in difficulty, for we have left the 
 metaphor which we set before ourselves.' " Socrates then proceeds to 
 further illustration through a return to the metaphor.^^ 
 
 The use of recurrent metaphor^^ is a feature of Platonic style which 
 is often utilized in transition. Even when not strictly transitional 
 its effect is always unifying; so in the Laches where the figure of the 
 Doric harmony between a man's words and deeds introduced by Laches 
 
 34 In some cases where transition is made by an image and its application, it 
 is a subtlety of Platonic style to blend the image with the thing to which the 
 image refers. This blending often results in a repetition of the phraeseology of 
 the image in the application, or a slightly strained adaptation to the image of the 
 characteristics of the thing compared. The echoing of words and phrases recalls 
 in outward semblance the Homeric simile. So in Rep. 402a-c where the figure of 
 the letters and their images in water or in mirrors is applied to the forms of the 
 virtues and their appearance in concrete shapes, the term el/cij/as is used in both 
 sides of the comparison, while the phrase ovr' kv ffixupQ ovt' iv M«Ta>>^w riTLna^ofiev 
 aira, used of the letters, seems framed especially to correspond to nvTe kv aixiKpols 
 fiiire iv fjityaXois aTijjLa^wii^v of the application. 
 
 ^ See George B. Hussey, The More Complicated Figures of Comparison in 
 Plato, A. J. P., Vol. XVII, pp. 329-346. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 81 
 
 in 188d is picked up by Socrates in 193d-e. The image of the (papnaKov 
 by which Socrates characterizes the useful lie in Rep. 382c appears 
 again in 389b, where its use is restricted to physicians and to the 
 rulers. Later still, 459c, with a reference back to the earlier passage, 
 it introduces the idea that the rulers must enforce proper regulations 
 of marriage. Thus a new and important point is emphasized.^^ 
 
 In these simple cases the figure recurs but once or twice. In the 
 longer dialogues one may find also more elaborate examples of this 
 use of metaphor." Bks. VIII and IX of the Republic contain a 
 striking instance. The growing image of the drones in the hive plays 
 an important part in binding together the descriptions of the degen- 
 erate states and the corresponding individuals. It is first^* introduced 
 in 552c in the description of the evils of oligarchy, where the idle 
 spendthrift is compared to a drone. Socrates pauses here to elaborate 
 the image by the distinction between the flying drones which are 
 stingless and the walking drones which are both stinging and stingless. 
 Through the further application of the developed figure he passes to 
 the conclusion (552de) that paupers and criminals will be found 
 together in the state. In 554bc drone-like desires, as ofa pauper or 
 rogue, are declared to exist in the oligarchical man. The figure 
 reappears again in 555de in the description of the rise of democracy 
 out of oligarchy. Ruined men of rank, ripe for conspiracy, and 
 unscrupulous business men who reduce men to pauperdom by exor- 
 bitant rates of interest are both compared to stinging drones. The 
 figure is used in 559c in pointing the difference between the democratic 
 man and the oligarchical. Again, 559d, it is from the tasting of 
 drone's honey that the change of the oligarchical principle into the 
 democratic begins. In the account of the rise of tyranny out of 
 democracy all the classes of the democratic state are described in 
 terms of this figure; the idle spendthrifts who form the ruling power 
 are drones (564b-d), the wealthy tradesmen are food for the drones 
 564e), and the people get their share of drone's honey (565a). Finally 
 (565c), it is the drones' sting that drives men deprived of wealth to 
 
 '" Similarly the figure of the "feast of reason" introduced in Rep. 352b is 
 picked up in transition in 354a. Cf. pp. 34 f. 
 
 '' The recurrent figure of the 'wave' in Rep. V has been described above, 
 p. 72. See also Chap. I, p. 20 for reference to the recurrent metaphor of the 
 defence in Phaedo 63b, d, e; 69d, e. 
 
 " The comparison of the state to a hive appears earlier (520b). 
 
82 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 revolt and leads to the subsequent establishment of a tyranny. In 
 567d the tyrant's body-guard are described as drones. The figure 
 recurs for the last time in the account of the nature and origin of the 
 tyrannical man; in 573a, where the master-passion in his soul is 
 described as a "monstrous winged drone"; in 574d, which describes 
 the rise of this passion when pleasures begin to swarm in the hive of 
 his soul; and in 577e, where the conclusion is reached that the tyranni- 
 cal soul will be least of all able to do as it likes, being continually 
 goaded by the sting of passion.^^ 
 
 The figure of the midwife in the Theaetetus is one of the most 
 important examples of the recurrent transitional image. It appears 
 frequently throughout the dialogue, sometimes alone, sometimes in 
 combination with other methods of transition. The image is intro- 
 duced first in 148e-149a, after Theaetetus' confession of his inability 
 to define knowledge and his dissatisfaction at this failure. Through 
 a long digression of dramatic dialogue and description, the figure is 
 fully developed and in its entirety serves as the transition to renewed 
 attempt at definition. In a narrower sense the resumptive form.ula 
 and the familiar exhortation not to grow weary^'' with which the 
 description closes (151d), mark the return from the digression to the 
 argument. In 15 le after the statement of the definition the formula, 
 " But, come now, let us examine it together, " reinforced by a reference 
 to the metaphor, introduces the testing of the definition. In 15 7c-d 
 the transition from puzzlement to continued effort on the part of 
 Theaetetus is made by another recurrence to the metaphor and the 
 ideas involved in its interpretation, the principle of Socratic ignorance 
 and the method and purpose of the elenchus. In 160e, 161b, the 
 figure of the midwife is combined with a new figure, that of the 
 
 ^^ The figure of the drones in the hive is a subordinate comparison in the 
 larger analogy of the state and the individual which extends as a framework 
 throughout the Republic. See especially 368d, 434d-435e, 440b, 442de, 444a-e, 
 449a, 545b, 552c, 564b, 567c, 576a, 580c. Hussey, pp. 339 f. has worked out this 
 analogy by diagrams. In its development a group of minor images, some of 
 them recurrent, are used: the comparison of state and individual with the 
 human body (401c, 409a, 591cd), especially in regard to health and disease 
 (444d, 490c, 495d), with a harmony (401d, 430e, 432a, 591d), a ship (488, 573d), 
 a beast (440b, 493ab, 572b, 588b, 591c), a bird's nest (543a, 573e), a many-colored 
 cloak (557c, 558c, 561e). The references given above are not complete. See 
 also Hussey, loc. clt. 
 
 ■-*See p. 54. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 83 
 
 ainpibpbixLa to introduce the testing of the definition that knowledge 
 is perception, as interpreted and supported by the doctrines of Pro- 
 tagoras and the "flowing" philosophers. Again, in 184b, transition 
 is made by means of reference to the image, to a fresh start in the 
 argument and to the return to Theaetetus as respondent. Finally, 
 in 210b, the image is employed to bring the dialogue to a conclusion.^^ 
 
 Hardly less im.portant, though far less complicated, is the recur- 
 rent figure of the second prize in the Philebus. It appears first in 22c. 
 Dismissing (with fxlv ovv) the attempt to establish niind alone as the 
 highest good, Socrates restates (with be drj) in the form of this image 
 of the second prize the modified view of the issue. Thus the transition 
 is miade to further investigation. In 23a the image is picked up, with 
 8e 8rj, by Protarchus v/ho agrees with Socrates as to the value of the 
 discussion. In 33c the question v/hether the gods are or are not 
 indifferent to pleasure is postponed by a reference to the image in a 
 dismissive formula. Again in 61a, Socrates recurs to the main issue 
 by means of this same image ; "Then now we must ascertain the nature 
 of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that 
 we may assign the second prize. " And in 66e the image prefaces the 
 final resume and conclusion of the discussion.^- 
 
 A trait that is sometimes missed by literary critics and translators 
 of Plato is his use of recurrent figurative language or continued meta- 
 phor to lead up to and emphasize some moral idea. So in the Laws 
 a figurative expression from the language of the Ideas, ttoT ^Xtiroiv, 
 repeated with minor variations of phraseology and grammar, con- 
 stantly appears in connection with and leading up to the idea of the 
 ethical aim of the law giver, which is itself one of the recurrent themxCS 
 of the Laws.^^ A similar transitional use of musical terms occurs 
 
 ■•1 The Theaetetus contains an unusual number of recurrent metaphors; the 
 image of the chorus, used in transition in 173bc; the wax tablet, 191cd, 194c, 
 200c; and the aviary 197c, 198d, 199a-e and 200c. 
 
 ^^ Other cases of extended recurrent metaphor in the Laws, Timaeus and 
 Politicus are treated by Hussey, pp. 343 ff. For another example of recurrent 
 metaphor in the Philebus cf. Phil. 12bc, 22c, 26b, 28a. 
 
 *' Laws 625e, irpos tovto 0\kTvuiv; 626a, a-Ko^Xkivuv els; 630c, irpos ttju neyiaTTjf 
 aptrifv . . . 0\kiruv; 688a, irpos tovto pXkwovTa; 688b, irpos wa^rav piv (SXeireLv; 687a, 
 xoT pXewoiv; 687b, irpos tovto ^Xeiruv; 693b, Trpos raDra ^XkirovTa; 707d, airo^XkirovTes 
 vvv irpos . . . apeTTiv; 714b, Trpos aptTXfv . . . ^Xeireiv; 743c, euTavQa effXeirev; 
 757c, iiropXeiroPTas; 770c, Trpos raDra ^XtwovTas; 962a, ol 0,XkwtLV 5eT; 962d, vrpis 
 aXXo . . . /3Xe7r«. See also 962e; 705d; 784a; 965b; 922e, et al. 
 
84 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 in Laws 689 seq.;^'* the musical figure is kept up throughout the 
 discussion of ignorance. 
 
 In this guidance of the thought by the choice of words the language 
 is not necessarily figurative, nor is it always a moral tone that is 
 thus secured.'*^ Irony and a slightly hostile intention are shown by 
 the persistent harping on 7roptfo/xat and its derivatives in Meno 78c-e. 
 In Rep. 332 the constant repetition of 6ipeLX6fj,evov , the word of the 
 definition, emphasizes its inadequacy. A more important instance 
 is the repetition of evxv in the third main division of the Republic 
 (Bks. V-VII), by which Plato subtly hints his own recognition of the 
 ideal and slightly chimerical character of his suggestions. The word 
 occurs first in 450d in the introductory transition scene, where 
 Socrates protests his "reluctance to approach the subject, lest our 
 aspiration . . . should turn out to be a dream only. " It is repeated 
 in 456b, when the possibility of the community in education between 
 the male and female guardians has been established. Again in 499c 
 it recurs in a strong affirmation of the possibiUty and necessity of the 
 rule of the philosopher-king. Finally in 540d, at the end of Bk.VII, 
 it appears in a summarizing statement, "that what has been said 
 about the state and the government is not a mere dream, and although 
 difiicult, not impossible." 
 
 Akin to the usage treated above is the frequent repetition, in 
 widely separated parts of a dialogue, of some single word or phrase, 
 which thus serves as a link of connection, subtle but psychologically 
 strong.^ So irapaKaTadrjK-q which is prominent in Bk. I of the Repub- 
 lic (331 seq.) recurs after a long interval in Bk. IV 442e in the applica- 
 tion of the common tests of justice to the city and individual just 
 described. 
 
 When a recurrent phrase has emotional connotations it may be 
 styled a leit-mitif. Such an artistic device seems at first sight purely 
 ornamental, but is really unifying and transitional as well. The hint 
 of the coming trial of Socrates appears as a leit-mitif in the Gorgias 
 (511c, 521e and 522b) in the conversation of Socrates and Callicles 
 
 ^* 689a biaifioplav ; 689b TrXrjfxneXeffTaTas; 6S9d dceu (Tu/X(^aj;'ias; 691a 6ta ttXtj/u- 
 fieXeiav Kal knovalav. 
 
 *^ In Rep. 342 the importance of the idea of the ruler is emphasized by 
 repetition. 
 
 " yr)p6Tpo<pov, Rep. 331a, is picked up in 569b. Compare also the repetition 
 of {nrepairoev^ffKeiv in Symp. 179b, 180a, 207b, 208d. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 85 
 
 and yet more clearly in Meno 94e, 99e and 100c in the thinly veiled 
 threats of Anytus and Socrates' references to his hostility. In the 
 Euthyphro the trial is imminent and what was before a leit-motif is 
 utilized in the development of the dramatic setting (Euthy. 2, 3, 15). 
 A very impressive instance of the use of leit-motif occurs in the 
 Phaedo. The words of Socrates in 61e referring to the impending 
 discussion "For what else should one do in the time before sunset," 
 repeated in substance if not in exact phraseology at the crisis of the 
 argument in 89c, "Well, he said, summon me as your lolaus, as long 
 as it is still light," are echoed by Crito with almost intolerable pathos 
 in the closing scene of the dialogue, (116e)— "But I think, said he, 
 Socrates, that the sun is still shining upon the mountains, and that it 
 has not yet set. "'*^ 
 
 The variety of ways in which Plato effects a transition by a single 
 word is noteworthy. The use of a recurrent word in the guidance of 
 the thought or as a unifying element has already been discussed. A 
 figurative or poetic word is often used to arrest the attention and 
 force the request for further explanation. Rep. 412e-413c illustrates 
 this device. In making the statement that the guardians must be 
 watched to see whether they constantly hold to their belief that they 
 must act always to the best advantage of the city Socrates uses the 
 poetic and figurative expressions yorjTevofjLevot and eK^aWovat. Glaucon 
 at once requests an explanation, picking up k|3dXXou(n in €k^oKt]v 
 (412a). After satisfying him on this point Socrates repeats 
 'YorjTevofj.evoL with yorjTevdevTes and introduces besides the metaphori- 
 cal KkaweuTes. Glaucon is again completely mystified. Explanation 
 follows. By this literary device Plato is enabled to elaborate an 
 important idea and to impress it on the mind of the reader more 
 surely than he could have done by pages of dogmatic exposition.^^ 
 
 A term which is to figure more or less prominently in later discus- 
 sion may be introduced elaborately or casually into an earlier part of 
 the discourse. So the term (xeXKov which is introduced and defined in 
 Theaet. 178a appears (in the form tccp fxeWoPTUp) in the latter part 
 of b in an important new step in the argument. Similarly, in Theaet. 
 173e the verb aarpovonovaa which appears merely as one of many 
 details in the description of the philosopher paves the way for the 
 
 " Compare also Phaedo 85b where the same idea occurs, though the phrase- 
 ology is different. 
 
 " Compare twas in Rep. 415e. 
 
86 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 typical illustrative anecdote of Thales the astronomer which follows in 
 174a. There is an important instance of this method of transition 
 in Euthyphro 4e — where daiov used by Euthyphro in the climax of 
 his narrative is picked up by Socrates in tuv daio^v and becomes the 
 theme of inquiry for the remainder of the dialogue.^^ 
 
 A transition may be made by a play on words.^'* In Theaet. 171c, 
 Theodorus protests against the rather invidious harping on "truth" 
 with which Socrates concludes his half-serious refutation of Protago- 
 ras; — "We are running my friend too hard, Socrates." Socrates 
 picks up the figurative Karadeonev with another compound of 6ecc; — 
 "But it isn't evident, my friend v/hether we are running beyond the 
 truth," in transition to the assurance that he will not rely seriously 
 upon the foregoing argument. 
 
 A word used literally may be picked up and applied in a figurative 
 sense as in Char. 154e. Socrates has just given a moral turn to the 
 conversation by the transition from body to soul. He now makes 
 the transition to the idea of discussion by the suggestion, (introduced 
 by tI ovv) that they lay bare the soul of Charmides. The verb used is 
 aTre5v(TaiJ.ev which repeats metaphorically the aToddvai of 154d. Simi- 
 lar in many respects, though set in a more complicated frame work, 
 is the transition in Protag. 352ab. In an imaginary illustrative 
 conversation dealing with the condition of the body, Socrates uses the 
 word airoKa\v\l/as . Then by a shift from body to soul, he m.akes the 
 application of the illustration to the mental attitude of Protagoras by 
 repeating the verb in a figurative sense. 
 
 In most cases the repetition of the word involves no shift in mean- 
 ing. So in Laches 181ab a short digression on the character of Soc- 
 rates is introduced by Kal iir}v and a repeated word. With opdovvra. 
 Laches picks up the bpQoLs in the speech of Lysimachus. There is a 
 further echo in bpQi). The device may be repeated through several 
 consecutive sentences forming a kind of "chain figure. "^^ So in 
 
 ^* Compare Rep. 374d where <f>v\a.Kuiv first appears in the technical sense in 
 which it is used throughout the Republic. 
 
 '"In Laches 194d; Theaet. 180b; Rep. 330b, transition is made by a play 
 on the double meaning of ttoTos. Compare Laws 655a where a play on the double 
 meaning of xp^l^-o. serves as the transition to a slight digression. See also Phil. 
 14b; Rep 5n4bc. 
 
 ^' See Theaet. 176b. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 87 
 
 Char. 157a where the sequence runs depaireveti', depareveadai. eirccSoLS, 
 eTcodas — X670US, Xd'YiiiP—'eyyiypeadat, kyyevoijLeprjs. 
 
 It would be easy to multiply examples of transition by repeti- 
 tion.^2 Those described will perhaps suffice to illustrate the possibili- 
 ties of a simple mechanical device in the hands of a master. 
 
 In a form of literary expression like the philosophical dialogue 
 special problems of transition confront the writer. The stream of 
 question and answer must flow naturally and smoothly without 
 becoming monotonous. Important points must be duly emphasized, 
 minor details subordinated, necessary explanations introduced in 
 such a way that they will not seem forced. In a general way all the 
 methods of transition described above, the use of image, proverb, 
 quotation and repeated word, contribute to the solution of these 
 problems, for they add variety and interest. But these devices are 
 not peculiar to the dialogue; they are equally suited to other forms of 
 discourse. To meet more directly the special difficulties of the dialogue 
 form, Plato employs transitions of another type which may be des- 
 cribed as rhetorical methods for varying the conventional conduct of 
 an argument. These more unusual forms of transition, however 
 apparent their purpose may be to the student of literary style, seldom 
 seem forced or artificial, but fit naturally into the logical framework of 
 the dialogue. One such device has already been mentioned, the use 
 of unusual or poetic words to surprise the attention and provoke 
 inquiry for explanation. Plato makes use of paradox for a similar 
 purpose.^^ The case may be very slight as in Rep. 377a where the 
 paradoxical suggestion of the use of \pevbets \6yoL in education requires 
 explanation. Compare also Rep. 376ab where Socrates confirms the 
 principle that the guardians must be lovers of wisdom by developing 
 the analogy of the well-bred dog with the humorously paradoxical 
 claim that the dog is fond of learning. 
 
 Without having recourse to actual paradox, Plato may state his 
 idea in a figurative or elHptical way which is at first blush quite unin- 
 telligible; or he may use expressions intentionally difficult, obscure or 
 
 '" See Theaet. 155cd, 156a, 158b-d, 172cd, 195bc; Protag. 361d; Symp. 178c; 
 Euthyph. 3e; Laws 692d; Phaedr. 258de; Phaedo 72a, 92d, 109a; Phil. 19a, 28c, 
 29ab; Rep. 440cd, 504d, 548c, 607c, 608c. See Mendell, C. W., Latin Sentence 
 Connection, pp. 21-85 for a complete treatment of the element of repetition in 
 transition. 
 
 " See Phaedo 64; Rep. 422a. Also Phaedo 61bc and p. 6, n. 12. 
 
88 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 technical. In all these cases it is the interlocutor's failure to under- 
 stand which supphes the final step in transition to further explanation. 
 So in Gorg. 463d Socrates' definition of rhetoric as a "shadow of a 
 part of the poHtical art" is purposely enigmatical and naturally 
 provokes the demand for the long explanation which follows.^^ In 
 Euthyphro 10a, the intellectually sluggish Euthyphro fails to grasp 
 the significance of the distinction between essence and attribute 
 implied in Socrates' question, whether the "holy is loved by the gods 
 because it is holy, or holy because it is loved by the gods. " His 
 admission of his inabiHty leads at once to more simple and detailed 
 explanation. If the case of the slow-witted Euthyphro were the 
 only one to be considered we might conclude that this "failure to 
 understand" was introduced for the characterization of the re- 
 spondent. But the fact that it is just as liable to be used of those who 
 are quick in comprehension, like Theaetetus or Glaucon and Adeiman- 
 tus, excludes such a theory; and the frequency of its occurrences^ 
 supports the view that it is purely transitional. 
 
 A variant on this method of transition is the respondent's ignor- 
 ance of some point or his inability to grapple with some question.^^ 
 This always shifts the burden of responsibility to Socrates. Thus in 
 Phil. 48d Protarchus' inability to apply the method of diaeresis to 
 the idea of ignorance of self, forces Socrates to undertake the task. 
 So also in Theaet. 201 d, Theaetetus' unwillingness to undertake to 
 recall all the account which he has heard of "things knowable" paves 
 the way for Socrates' long exposition. The respondent's misunder- 
 standing" of some statement may serve as the excuse for further 
 explanation. In Rep. 475d Glaucon's misinterpretation of Socrates' 
 definition of the philosopher and his continued failure to understand 
 the explanation by which Socrates narrows that definition lead to an 
 interesting statement of the theory of ideas. 
 
 Similarly the respondent may himself advance a wrong but plaus- 
 ible view which comes under discussion thereby.^^ So in Rep. 439e 
 
 s-* See also Rep. 449c and pp. 39 f. 
 
 « Rep. 352e, 398c, 429c, 438b, 504d; Theaet. 152d, 155d, 164cd; Symp. 206b; 
 Meno Sle; Phil. 26c, 44b, 51b; Phaedo 93a; Laws 700a, 960c. This method of 
 transition may be repeated several times in the course of an exposition. See 
 Theaet. 192c; Rep. 392c. 
 
 65 See Theaet. 197a; Phil. 54b, 57a, 28b. 
 
 " See Phil. 14d; Rep. 523b. 
 
 '8 Phil. 21a; Rep. 578b. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 89 
 
 Glaucon advances the opinion that the 9vn6s, instead of being a third 
 element in the soul, may be akin to desire. This theory is thus in a 
 natural manner brought up for consideration and refutation. The 
 mistake of Cleinias in Laws 792b serves as the transition to an ethical 
 discourse on pleasure and pain in the vein of the Philebus. In Laws 
 857bc, the dialogue is diversified by the error of the legislator in pro- 
 posing an unreasonable law. He is recalled by Cleinias and the 
 correction leads to a further discussion of the subject of proemia. 
 
 Self-correction is a similar device introduced into the argument 
 for transitional purposes.^^ In Laws 894d the legislator corrects his 
 own error in assigning the tenth place instead of the first to that 
 motion which changes both itself and other things. He thereby 
 emphasizes the importance of spontaneous motion. Similarly in 
 Theaet. 195b-c Socrates' ironicaF" self-criticism introduces his dis- 
 covery of an objection to his previous conclusion; the image of the 
 wax-tablet does not explain all cases of false opinion. 
 
 The self-check^^ is a transitional device familiar to writers from 
 Homer down.^^ In Plato it is sometimes playful or ironical in tone. 
 So in Phaedrus 238c-d where Socrates pauses in the midst of his 
 discourse on love to comment on his own inspired, dithyrambic style. 
 Crat. 428d is very similar in tone. Socrates replies to the playfully 
 extravagant praise of Cratylus, "I have long been wondering at my 
 own wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to 
 stop and ask myself, what am I saying?" The self-check in this 
 case forms the transition to a careful examination of the previous 
 argument. In Phaedrus 260d Socrates checks himself in his criticism 
 of rhetoric, "But perhaps, my friend, we have been abusing rhetoric 
 more roughly than we ought." Thus the defence of rhetoric is 
 introduced. 
 
 The type of transition in which a general expression of praise, 
 satisfaction or assent is followed by the statement of "one little 
 
 6« See Lysis 214e; Phil. 43b-c; Theaet. 169e. 
 
 *" Note the repetition of the significant dSoXeo-xr??. 
 
 «' See Rep. 536b; Laws 701c, 722d, 803bc. 
 
 ^- dXXa riri fjioi ravra (piKos SieXe^aro Oviios; is a Homeric tag used in transition 
 in soliloquy. Cf. II. 22 :121 and 385. Pindar, P. 4, 247 affords a striking e.xample 
 of the self-check in transition. See also P. 11, 38. For a less happy use of this 
 transitional device see Apol. Rhod. I, 648 and 919. 
 
90 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 difficulty" may be styled a literary variant of the dismissive- 
 introductive transition. Protag. 328e-329b is a good example of this 
 form of transition. Socrates dismisses with extravagant praise the 
 myth of Protagoras just completed. "Yet," he concludes, "I have 
 still one little difficulty." In this way the discussion of the unity 
 of virtue is introduced.^^ Similarly, in Euthyphro 12e-13a these 
 words of Socrates, "That is fine, Euthyphro, but there is still a little 
 point on which I need further information," serve as the transition 
 to investigation of the meaning of the term attention. 
 
 The dismissive expression of praise may be followed by an abrupt 
 turn to a new point. This is the form which the transition takes v/hen 
 Socrates is baffied in the fine of argument he has been pursuing.^* 
 So in Theaet. 163c "Splendid, Theaetetus, and it isn't worth while 
 disputing with you about these matters, . . . but consider now this 
 other difiSculty which is coming up, and see how we shall get rid of it. " 
 
 One of the most characteristic devices for introducing a discussion 
 is the Socratic profession of ignorance.^^ "You perhaps understand, 
 Polemarchus, but I do not." These half ironical words of Socrates 
 preface the testing of the definition of justice supported by the author- 
 ity of Simonides, Rep. 331e. *So in the beginning of the Meno (71b), 
 Meno asks Socrates whether virtue can be taught. After a compli- 
 mentary contrast between the flourishing condition of wisdom in 
 Thessaly and the drought in Athens, Socrates introduces the dis- 
 cussion by a very emphatic avowal of his own ignorance: "Now I 
 myself, Meno, am in like case; I share my fellow citizens' poverty in 
 this respect; and I blame myself for knowing nothing at all about 
 virtue; and when I do not know what a thing is, how could I know 
 anything about its characteristics?" By the cleverly inserted dis- 
 tinction between essence and attribute the subject of discussion is 
 shifted to 'what is virtue.' 
 
 The imaginary or supposed question in its different forms affords 
 an easy method of varying the transitions from point to point in a 
 
 "For further examples see Theaet. 145d, 161c, 202d; Cbar. 154e; Symp. 
 201c; Laches 180b. Less clearly marked cases occur in Protag. 319ab; Euthyph. 
 7a; Phaedo 69e. 
 
 "In Protag. 351b the new point is introduced abruptly without connection 
 with the preceding through any expression of satisfaction. 
 
 ^ For other examples see Meno 80cd; Laches 186c; Theaet. 145e, 157cd; 
 Rep. 354c, 450e-451ab; Gorg. 506a; Lysis 212a; Crat. 384c. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 91 
 
 discussion. It may be little more than a softened form of inquiry used 
 for politeness' sake. Compare Meno 72b where the question really 
 adds nothing to the transition except the artistic effect of a varied 
 phraseology.*^® An imagined request for explanation on the part of 
 the respondent may introduce the concrete illustration of some point, 
 or the description of an analogous case. So in Rep. 337a and 341e. 
 Or the questioner and respondent may be represented as being inter- 
 rogated by an imaginary third party." This is the form most fre- 
 quently used by Plato. So in Protag. 353a seq. Socrates sets forth 
 the meaning of the phrase, "being overcome by pleasure," and the 
 theory of the balancing of pains and pleasures, by means of a long 
 imaginary dialogue with ol toXXoI twv avOpcarcov. Various formulas 
 introduce these questions and serve as the explicit verbal transition 
 in each case. 
 
 While the invented interlocutor is usually the versatile and ever- 
 present Tis he sometimes assumes a more definite character as in 
 Theaet. 200ab; "For that hero of dialectic will say with a laugh." 
 Here an objection is dramatically put in the mouth of an imaginary 
 eristic opponent who is mentioned also in 197a and 165d. In 165d 
 the description of the experience of Theaetetus at the hands of this 
 imaginary eristic questioner leads to a return to the subject of the 
 defence of Protagoras, mentioned already in 164e. In this defence, 
 Socrates imagines Protagoras himself addressing them. This is the 
 final stage in the development of the device of an imaginary inter- 
 locutor.®^ 
 
 The reported imaginary conversation of a man with himself is 
 another transitional device employed for the sake of variety. So in 
 Phil. 38c-d Socrates introduces and develops a psychological analysis 
 of perception and recognition by describing the imaginary discourse 
 of the mind with itself, rts merely takes the place of rifxas in this 
 passage. Again, in Euthyphro 9c, Socrates sets forth in dramatic 
 form as an imaginary discourse with himself his doubts whether he 
 has yet learned from Euthyphro the nature of piety. This leads to 
 an assumption for the sake of argument that Euthyphro may be 
 
 "« See also Symp. 199e. 
 
 " See Symp. 204d; Gorg. 451ab; Protag. 311b, c, de, 312d, 330c, d, e, 331a; 
 Rep. 332c; Theaet. 147a, 163d, 184b, 188d, 195c, 203a, et al. 
 «8 See also Theaet. 154c, 178b; Phaedr. 268a-e, 269a-c. 
 
92 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 right in his claims in regard to the impiety of his father's act, and so 
 to a further demand for the definition of piety. 
 
 Transition may be made by the interlocutor's answering his own 
 question or anticipating and forestalling an objection.*^ In Protag. 
 325c, Protagoras' answer to liis own rhetorical question introduces his 
 account of Greek education. In Laws 893a, the legislator's stated 
 intention to answer his own questions and avoid bewildering his 
 companions, forms one element in the highly figurative transition to 
 the proof that soul is prior to body. Throughout the enumeration of 
 the ten kinds of motion the legislator follows this method. In Gorg. 
 505cd this method is employed under shghtly different circumstances. 
 Callicles refuses to continue the discussion with Socrates and remains 
 firm in his decision in spite of Socrates' plea that the argument shall 
 not be left without a head. When Socrates asks for a volunteer to 
 help him finish the debate, Callicles suggests the possibility that he 
 himself assume the role of respondent to his own questions. With 
 the approval of the others Socrates adopts this plan and for some time 
 continues the discussion alone except for an occasional appeal to 
 Callicles for his approval. By 510a, however, Callicles has been insen- 
 sibly won over to good nature and is again drawn into the argument.^" 
 
 When discussion is blocked, the sudden recollection of some for- 
 gotten words of another may eft"ect the transition to a new definition 
 or further argument." In Theaet. 201c, the conclusion has been 
 reached that knowledge and true opinion are not identical. Transi- 
 tion is made to the new definition of knowledge as true opinion 
 yuerd X6701; by the words of Theaetetus, "I had forgotten, Socrates; 
 that is just what I have heard from some one else; and now I recall 
 it. "^2 And Socrates, in introducing his discussion of this definition, 
 picks up the words of Theaetetus with the colloquial phrase, "Hear 
 
 *^ Compare Symp. 208d; Euthyph. 7cd. 
 
 ^o There is a similar situation in the Protagoras. In 360d, Protagoras sees 
 his refutation inevitable and refuses to answer. When pressed by Socrates, he 
 retorts "Finish it yourself." Here, however, there is no transition to further 
 discussion. Socrates extorts one last admission from the reluctant sophist and 
 then passes to defence of his own purpose and general remarks on the outcome of 
 the discussion. 
 
 " Cf. Phil. 20b; Phaedr. 259e; Char. 161b; Lysis 215c. 
 
 " Note that yk meaning "to-wit" picks up aXXo of the previous conclusion, 
 thus aiding in the transition. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 93 
 
 then a dream in return for a dream," and declares that he too is not 
 speaking upon his own authority. 
 
 In the Meno (80e-81a), when further discussion seems blocked 
 by Meno's introduction of the sophistic argument about the impos- 
 sibiHty of inquiry, Socrates introduces his eloquent, poetical exposi- 
 tion of the theory of recollection with the statement that he has heard 
 it "from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine." 
 But the reference to other authority is unconnected here with any 
 hint of forgetfulaess or sudden remembrance. Again in the Phaedrus 
 (235b) this same idea, the recollection of some words of the wise, is 
 an important element in the transition to Socrates' extravagant speech 
 in favor of the non-lover. Phaedrus has finished reading aloud the 
 speech of Lysias and demands Socrates' opinion of it. When Socrates 
 ventures upon some criticism, Phaedrus protests. But Socrates per- 
 sists in his opinion. He recalls that he has heard "ancient sages, 
 men and women, who have spoken and written of these things." 
 And he is sure that, repeating what he has heard, he can make "a 
 speech as good as that of Lysias and different." With characteristic 
 Socratic irony he protests that the speech is no invention of his own, 
 though he cannot remember at the moment from whom he heard it.^^ 
 
 The transition by a protest or apology, common in the orators^^ 
 is found also in Plato. "Then I must speak," says Glaucon in Rep. 
 361e, "andnow if my language is rather coarse, Socrates, please to 
 suppose that it is not I who speak, but those who praise injustice 
 instead of justice." With this disclaimer of responsibility, Glaucon 
 prefaces the second part of his defence of the unjust life. So in Gorg. 
 494e, Socrates prefaces his demand whether Callicles still maintains 
 that pleasure and good are identical by a protest that Callicles is 
 to blame for the coarse tone of the preceding argument. ^^ 
 
 '^ In the two passages last described this transition also marks the change 
 to a more elevated style. It is interesting to compare the transitions in Rep. 
 614b; Gorg. 522e-523a; Phaedo 110b. 
 
 ''' Orators often introduce a statement oralineof argument with the apologetic 
 protest that their opponents force them to take this position— e.g., Dem. XVIII, 
 228, 269, 312; Isoc. XV, 310; Lysias III, 3; XII, 3; Isaeus II, 1. 
 
 '^ See also Thaedr. 237a. Socrates' protest in Rep. 509c that Glaucon is to 
 blame for any exaggeration, "for you made me utter my fancies, "is not strictly 
 speaking transitional, though it is picked up by Glaucon in his demand that the 
 discussion be continued. Rather it is a bit of by-play introduced to relieve the 
 strain caused by the long, difficult argument. 
 
94 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 For the sake of variety Plato sometimes plays with the order and 
 plan of the subject. '^^ Such a structural device is necessarily transi- 
 tional, since it offers a means of introducing topics effectively and of 
 regulating discussion. The frequent comparison of the argument to 
 a wind which must be followed whithersoever it blows, is not of 
 course to be taken seriously." "Such words," says Campbell,^^ 
 "express the spirit of the catechetical mode of expression, but only a 
 bhnd simplicity can believe the master serious when he professes not 
 to know the way. " Whenever Plato plays with the order of his sub- 
 ject, it is for artistic reasons and not because the plan was not firmly 
 fixed in his own mind. In Rep. 430d, after the discussion of courage, 
 Socrates pretends to want to pass on to justice at once "without any 
 longer troubling ourselves about temperance." Adeimantus pro- 
 tests. By this dramatic by-play, the transition to the definition of 
 temperance is varied. Similarly, in Rep. 457e, instead of turning 
 directly to the discussion of the desirability of the second paradox, the 
 community of wives, Socrates attempts to escape by the assumption 
 that its advantages are self-evident if only it is possible. Glaucon, 
 however, will not permit this evasion, and the discussion thus intro- 
 duced proceeds. 
 
 Frequently, the leader of the discussion pretends to have stumbled 
 on a point, when in reality he has led up to it througlT a carefully 
 prepared image or argument. So, in Laws 722cd, the analogy of the 
 slave physician and the true has prepared the way for the principle 
 that all laws need a preamble. This idea of the necessity of a preamble 
 and the conclusion that all their previous words have been in reality 
 naught but prelude are nevertheless introduced as unforeseen and due 
 to lucky chance. 
 
 Again in Laws 888, the long discussion of the difficulties of meeting 
 the problem of religious scepticism really forms a very fitting intro- 
 duction to the following generalization of the pre-Socratic nature 
 philosophy; the Athenian stranger, however, exclaims at the remark- 
 able discussion into which they have unwittingly fallen (Laws 
 888d).79 
 
 '« Although this method of variation is especially characteristic of the 
 Republic and Laws, it is not confined to these dialogues. Compare Theaet. 
 183b-184b; Symp. 185c-e. 
 
 " See Introduction, p. 1. 
 
 '« Essays in Edition of Rep., Vol. II, p. 10. 
 
 " Cf. also Rep. 399e; Laws 681c, 686c. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 95 
 
 In the Republic and Laws, it is usually comparatively easy to 
 distinguish the literary machinery from the real argument. This is 
 not always the case. One of the most important features of Platonic 
 style and one that has often misled critics, is his playful blending of 
 real arguments with mere literary devices for carrying out an illustra- 
 tive imagery.^" The concluding pages of the Philebus perhaps afford 
 the most considerable example of this puzzling confusion. In 59c-d 
 Socrates has really established his thesis, the superiority of knowledge 
 over pleasure. ^^ Further confirmation is not needed except for 
 rhetorical effect. In 59d-e a dismissive eUv and an image derived 
 from the idea of the /xlktov introduce a summary of previous argu- 
 ments. A proverb*^ serves as the final step in transition to this 
 resume. A challenge to other investigators (60d) prefaces the re- 
 statement (61ab) of their earlier^^ conclusion that neither knowledge 
 nor pleasure unmixed is the good; the good is in the mixed life where 
 it dwells as a man in his home. Various images and literary conceits 
 follow, carrying out the figure of the mixture and serving as a transi- 
 tion to the piece of serious reasoning that follows. "In the life that 
 is well mixed" the good will appear more clearly. Let us pray to the 
 gods and make the mixture. We are like wine mixers; pleasure is 
 like honey; knowledge like water. Finally, with (pepe d-q and the 
 picking up of koKus, Socrates turns (61d) to the serious question 
 whether every form of pleasure and knowledge should be admitted to 
 the mixture. Knowledge is considered first and in 62bc the con- 
 clusion is established that all forms of knowledge, even the imper- 
 fect, will be necessary. The following images of the porter opening 
 wide the door, and of the receiving basin of streams emphasize and 
 develop this conclusion in figurative language. In the second image, 
 Plato finds a suggestion for his transition to the consideration of 
 pleasure; "And now we must go back to the fountain of pleasures" 
 (62d). "It is time now for us to consider about the pleasures too, 
 whether we must let in all these together also" (62e). True and 
 necessary pleasures will of course be admitted. With regard to the 
 other pleasures the previous course of the dialogue has shown Plato's 
 opinion clearly enough. Accordingly, instead of repeating the argu- 
 
 80 As in Rep. 375-6. S:;e p. 80. 
 8> See pp. 32 f. 
 8= See p. 74. 
 « 22bc. 
 
96 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 ment, he adopts the literary device of an imaginary dialogue with the 
 pleasures and sciences themselves (63a-64a), asking their opinion on 
 the subject of admitting all forms of pleasure. This gives him an 
 opportunity to review the previous conclusions in a striking, dramatic 
 way. 
 
 With an abrupt formula of transition, dXXa fxr]p kuI robe ye avayKotov 
 (64a), Plato now turns to the somewhat arbitrary selection of truth, 
 symmetry and beauty as the three chief elements of good. The figure 
 of the dwelling place of the good recurs (64c) and a figure from the 
 chase emphasizes his conclusion (65a), "Then if we cannot hunt 
 the good with one idea only, with three we m.ay capture it. " We are 
 ready now for the triumphant final decision, "And now, Protarchus, 
 any man could be an adequate judge for us concerning pleasure and 
 wisdom, as to which of them is more akin to the highest good and more 
 to be honored among men and gods." In the rem.ainder of the dia- 
 logue, Plato is merely adding further reasons in a somewhat rhetorical 
 style, in order to make his conclusion more effective. The words of 
 Protarchus (65b) show this, "That is plain, nevertheless at any rate 
 it is better to go through with the argument." The distinctions and 
 terms of these last pages should not, therefore, be too closely pressed. 
 Bury^' and Poste make this mistake when they criticize the argu- 
 ment which identifies truth with mind rather than with pleasure, 
 because Plato refers to pleasures of love instead of pure pleasures. 
 This is all mere rhetorical reinforcement of the argument; his con- 
 clusion has already been established. 
 
 Through a similar error, too much is often made of the six grades 
 enumerated in 66. They are not to be taken seriously. They are 
 aptly introduced by a playfully exaggerated command to Protarchus 
 to proclaim their decision far and wide,^ and end in a quotation which 
 is also a figure, "And now, with the sixth generation, as Orpheus says, 
 cease the glory of my song" (66c). In transition KaTaTravaare is 
 picked up hy KaTaTreiravixevos. The following figure of putting a head 
 on the argument and the proverbial "third to the savior" introduce 
 a third and finaP® restatement both of the original thesis and the ques- 
 tion of the second prize and a third and final resume of their conclu- 
 sions. Socrates closes with the triumphant boast that we shall not 
 
 *^ Bury, Philebus, Appendix B, p. 169 ff. 
 
 ^ The transition in Rep. 580b is similar in tone. Cf . p. 44. 
 
 «• Cf. 19c, 60a. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 97 
 
 believe pleasure to be first in importance even if all men and beasts so 
 affirm. Although the exposition is complete, the dialogue ends with 
 Protarchus still unwilling to let Socrates go, a touch probably added 
 by Plato to heighten the resemblance of the Philebus in outward form 
 to the minor dialogues of search. 
 
 In the passage just analyzed it is significant to note that it is only 
 after his thesis is established that Plato gives his fancy free rein. The 
 resultant bafiling mixture of rhetoric and serious thought does not 
 effect his conclusions; there is no sacrifice of logical clearness for the 
 sake of ornament. Another evidence of Plato's care in guarding 
 against confusion in the argument is found in his treatment of digres- 
 sions. An explicit warning does not usually precede the digression, 
 but the resumption of the argument at its close is always clearly 
 marked. The method of approach to a digression is naturally deter- 
 mined in great measure by its content and purpose. The digression 
 may be a passage of by-play or of eloquent moral reflection which 
 serves to vary the monotony and reHeve the strain of a difficult 
 argument; or it may be a discussion of some subject supplemental to, 
 or illustrative of the main argument. Euthyphro llb-e furnishes an 
 example of the first type of digression. Euthyphro is completely at 
 a loss and complains that their arguments ''seem to turn around and 
 walk away." The suggestion of motion leads Socrates into a com- 
 parison of their words to the handiwork of Daedalus. The playful 
 discussion of the application of this metaphor affords a pleasant relief 
 from the preceding subtle dialectic. The transition here is cleverly 
 made through the development of a chance expression. ^^ It is only 
 at its close (lie) that the passage is marked as a digression by the 
 explicit dismissal, "Enough of this," and the restatement of the 
 question at issue, the nature of piety.^^ 
 
 It is entirely natural that the idea of leisure should frequently 
 appear in transition to a digression. In the case of the charming 
 poetical digression in Phaedrus 258e-259e it is introduced merely to 
 justify the digression. But in Theaet. 172b it not only serves this 
 purpose; it is also the chief element in the transitions^ to Socrates' long 
 
 *' For digressions similarly introduced see Rep. 466d; Phil. 12bc, 28ab; 
 Phaedr. 258e; Laws 692d. 
 
 ** Compare Laws 655b where a slight digression on color is dismissed with 
 the phrase "not to be tedious." Also Phil. 59b-c. 
 
 89 See p. 24. 
 
98 THE ART OF TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 eloquent description of the life of the philosopher as contrasted with 
 that of the clever, unscrupulous lawyer.^*' The return from this 
 lengthy digression is marked by a dismissive apology (with ixeu ovv). 
 " These however, " says Socrates, "are digressions from which we must 
 now desist, or they will overflow and drown the original argument; 
 to which, if you please, we will now return" (Theaet. 177bc). A care- 
 ful resumptive summary of the argument follows (177c). Another 
 sHghter instance in which the dismissal takes the form of an explicit 
 apologetic recognition that what precedes is a digressions^ is found 
 in Rep. 571a-572b. This is a digression of the supplemental type.^^ 
 The transition to it is rather abrupt. Before proceeding with the 
 description of the tyrannical soul, Socrates brings up "a previous 
 question which remains unanswered, . . . the nature and number 
 of the appetites." He himself declares that until this subject is 
 adequately treated, "the inquiry will always be confused." The 
 supplemental character of the digression is thus explicitly recognized. 
 At the close of this discussion Socrates remarks, "In saying this I 
 have been running into a digression; but," he continues, resuming the 
 argument, "the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even 
 in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature, which peers out in 
 sleep." 
 
 More often the dismissal of the digression is not explicit, merely 
 implied by a resumptive statement, or the repetition, with some 
 resumptive particle, of the point under consideration before the 
 digression. s^ So in Laws 693c the Athenian returns from an illustra- 
 tive^^ digression (692d-693c) on the Persian Wars with the remark, 
 "Let us resume the argument in that spirit," picking up the idea of 
 the legislator's need of an ideal aim, a point which the digression has 
 emphasized. Again in Protag. 328a-329b, Socrates' remark that he 
 has "one little difficulty" is repeated, with i^Dv 8r}, at the end of the 
 
 ^o For further examples of edifying moral or religious digressions cf. Phil. 
 28c-30e; Laws 803a seq.; Phaedo 89c-91c. 
 
 '^ For further examples of apologetic dismissal cf. Phil. 30e and Rep. 543c. 
 For a full description of the latter passage see p. 42. 
 
 '- Bks. V-VII of the Republic form a lengthy digression which supplements 
 the argument. See discussion in Chap. I, pp. 39 f. 
 
 S3 Cf. Theaet. 151d, 165e. 
 
 '^ Further examples of this type of digression: Theaet. 165a-e; Laws 655ab; 
 Rep. 466d-471a. 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 99 
 
 ironical digression in which he explains his confidence in Protagoras, 
 and serves as the transition to renewed discussion. 
 
 Another interesting topic which should be at least touched upon 
 in any study of Plato's literary methods of transition is his treatment 
 of transition in parodies. The myth in the Protagoras, the speech of 
 Lysias in the Phaedriis, the speech of Aspasia in the Menexenus and 
 the speeches of Aristophanes, Agathon and the rest in the Symposium 
 are the most considerable examples of parody in the dialogues. So 
 cleverly has Plato imitated the manner of these other writers that 
 there have not been lacking critics in modern times as well as in antiq- 
 uity to maintain that the passages in question are not parody at all, 
 but the authentic work of the authors to whom they are ascribed by 
 Plato. ^^ But the fact that, aside from these passages, Plato has 
 shown himself able completely to vary his style at will establishes his 
 ability to write parody; and it certainly seems far more probable that 
 such an artist would exercise his own creative power rather than be 
 limited by dependence on other writers. However, setting aside the 
 question of Platonic authorship, it is interesiing to note the methods 
 of transition used in some of these passages, as they illustrate types 
 of style quite different from the dramatic description, the continuous 
 dialectic or the stichomythia of question and answer which make up a 
 large part of the dialogues. 
 
 The myth in the Protagoras (320c seq.) is an example of simple 
 narrative style. It opens with a narrative 7dp. The sentences are 
 short. The methods of connection are uniformly simple; narrative 
 conjunctions, such as eweLSr], 6tl, otclv; transitional particles 
 
 ^^ This view finds most general credence in the case of the speech of Lysias. 
 Blass [Attischc Bercdsamkeit, Leipzig, 1887, Vol. I, pp. 423-430), while accepting 
 the Platonic authorship of the speeches in the Symposium, maintains that the 
 resemblance to the style of Lysias in the speech in the Phaedrus is too perfect 
 to admit of its being parody. He lists the authorities ancient and modern on 
 both sides of the question. 
 
 Adam in his edition of the Protagoras (pp. xxi-xxii, Cambridge, 1893) 
 argues against the Platonic authorship of the myth. But his reasoning is defec- 
 tive. Intent to caricature is not the only adequate motive for parody; and it is 
 unfair to base any arguments upon the disputed speech in Phaedrus 233 ff. 
 Adam cites Zeller {Archiv. fiir Geschichle der Philosophic, V 2, p. 175 £f.) and 
 Chiapelli {ibid. Ill, p. 15 and 256 f.) who support the same view. The ancient 
 authorities are listed by Stallbaum (Ed. of Protagoras, Leipzig, 1882, p. 77). 
 For the other view see Stewart {Myihs of Plato, London, 1905, pp. 220-222), and 
 Grote, (Plato, Vol. II, London, 1888, pp. 274-275). 
 
100 THE ART or TRANSITION IN PLATO 
 
 ixh-bk, Kai, yap, ovv, drj, /xeu ovv ; deictic pronouns and adverbs, repeated 
 words. The time sequence forms the chief bond of connection 
 throughout. 
 
 The speech of Agathon (Symp. 194e-197e) is a brilHant rhetorical 
 display in the sophistic style. The transitions are explicit. Each 
 subject is formally announced and as formally dismissed. The speech 
 opens with a prothetic statement of plan. irpojTov fxev and tTeLra 
 introduce the two topics of the discourse; first, the method to be 
 adopted in the praise of Eros; second, the actual encomium. The 
 rhetorical balance is further continued through the contrast of the 
 wrong methods of previous speakers with that to be used by Agathon. 
 The summarizing application concluding this brief discussion of 
 method is introduced by ourco 677 (195a). Trpwrov and eTreira again 
 appear in enumeration. A transitional ovv introduces the first point 
 in the encomium; Eros is the most blessed of the gods because he is 
 the fairest and best. The proofs of his preeminent beauty are dis- 
 cussed first. irpoJTov p.tv introduces the first point, his youth. When 
 this is established, advance to the next is made through the common 
 dismissive-introductive form of transition with ij.ev ovv and be (195c). 
 A dismissal of these two points (with p.tv drj) combined with the 
 introductory phrase irpos 8e tovtols (196a) marks the transition to the 
 third. Another explicit transition of the formal dismissive-introductive 
 type effects the advance from the subject of the beauty of 
 Eros to that of his virtue. This theme likewise is treated with 
 rhetorical formahty. The four virtures are considered in turn. The 
 following phrases mark the transitions; to nev ixkyicTov (196b) intro- 
 duces the claim that Eros is just; irpbs bk rfj buaioavvQ (xouppoavvqs 
 7r\elaTT]s jxerexeL (196c) marks the advance to temperance; with /cat iirjv 
 the encomiast proceeds to the subject of courage. These three are 
 now formally dismissed with fxev ovv and the remaining virtue, wis- 
 dom, is presented for consideration by a common introductive formu- 
 la (196d). Throughout the speech the more minute transitions in 
 the discussion of the various points are also explicit. Proofs are 
 carefully labelled as such (195b, d; 196a). A summarizing ovtojs 
 and the common adverbial phrase pLera tovto mark the transition 
 (197c) to the final topic, Eros' benefits to men. The eloquent Gor- 
 gian conclusion is the most notable parody of the flamboyant style 
 and displays to perfection its chief features, antithesis, balance, 
 alliteration, assonance, homoeoteleuton, jingling word-play, exag- 
 
LITERARY ART OF TRANSITION 101 
 
 geration, asyndeton. For its unity this passage depends upon 
 word-order and rhythm. 
 
 The much debated Menexenus^*^ is another and even more striking 
 instance of Plato's parody^^ of the epideictic style, in this case the 
 k-Kirijufios. Its subject matter deals with the regular tottol of this 
 class of literature. ^^ The style is balanced and rhetorical and employs 
 transitional methods similar to those just described. For example in 
 236d note the transitional use of the favorite rhetorical antithesis 
 between word and deed and the studied balance of phrases. There 
 is the same formal statement of theme and summarizing dismissal 
 of conclusions, the same constant use of rhetorical figures that were 
 noted in Symp. 194e-197e. 
 
 The much-disputed speech of Lysias in the Phaedrus illustrates 
 the plain rhetorical manner. Aside from the continual use of balance 
 few figures of style appear. The methods of connection are simple, 
 even monotonous ;^^ a few particles, used over and over, form prac- 
 tically the entire machinery of transition. The balance with nkv 
 and bk occurs repeatedly, the balance dXXd — oh eight times in 233 and 
 234. en be is used four times (231a, b, 232a, 233d), koI jxkv b-q five 
 times (231d, 232b, e, 233a, d). The frequent use of the conjunction 
 coo-re should also be noted. 
 
 '^ Burgess, Epideictic Literature, University of Chicago Press, 1902, p. 148, 
 note 1, cites the literature on the genuineness of the dialogue. 
 
 " That the Menexenus is avowedly a parody seems clear from the con- 
 clusion (249de) where Menexenus plainly hints at his disbelief in Aspasia's author- 
 ship. 
 
 '^ Burgess, op. cit., pp. 146-157, analyzes the content of the Menexenus and 
 compares it with the other extant examples of kTrLTa.<fWL. 
 
 55 Blass has noted this (p. 430 note). 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 Although this study of Plato's methods of transition is by no 
 means statistically complete, yet the amount of material collected 
 will justify a few general conclusions as to variations in usage in 
 earlier and later dialogues. Chronologically the Platonic dialogues 
 may be divided into three main groups. The minor Socratic dia- 
 logues are generally regarded as early; the Theaetetus and Republic 
 are typical of the middle period ; while the Laws, Timaeus and difi&cult 
 metaphysical and dialectical dialogues are undoubtedly late.^ 
 
 In the later dialogues the frame-work is obvious. The transitions 
 are usually explicit. Formal detailed statements of method, pre- 
 scribing the course to be followed or the principles which are to 
 govern the discussion, and summarizing resumes are naturally char- 
 acteristic of these difficult dialogues. The frequent occurrence of 
 these types of transition in the Laws and Philebus has been noted. ^ 
 
 In the dialogues of the middle period the bald outhnes of the plot 
 are disguised under a wealth of imagery and dramatic detail. Transi- 
 tional summaries and statements of plan occur, but they are less 
 prominent and are often combined with other elements.^ The more 
 artistic and unusual forms of transition discussed in chapter three 
 occur with greatest frequency in the dialogues of the middle period. 
 
 The minor dialogues of search illustrate most clearly the pretence 
 at lack of plan which is a chracteristic feature of Platonic method. 
 Transitional references to the course of the argument are generally 
 brief and simple; if at all lengthy they are embelhshed by dramatic 
 
 1 Minute statistical investigation of Plato's style, diction and use of particles 
 have contributed materially to the solution of the problem of dating the dialogues. 
 But such evidence, however valuable for confirming the general classification of a 
 dialogue as early, middle or late, must not be regarded as alone sufficient to date a 
 dialogue. Cf. Shorey, Unity, pp. 49 ff. The most important of these statistical 
 studies are — C. Ritter, Unlersuchungen, Stuttgartt, 1888; Campbell, Introduction 
 to Edition of Sophist and PoHticus, Oxford Press, 1867; Campbell, Essays I and 
 III in Vol. II of Jowett and Campbell's Republic, Oxford Press, 1894; W. Ditten- 
 berger — ri ixrjv; {Hermes, Vol. XVI, 1881, pp. 321-345); Schanz — tQ 6vtl and ojtws 
 (Hermes, Vol. XXI, 1886). 
 
 2 Cf. Chap. II, p. 56, also Chap. I, pp. 26, 47. 
 
 3 Cf. Theaet. 191a-c, 187d-e. 
 
 102 
 
APPENDIX 103 
 
 and artistic details.* Conventional transitional formulas and phrases 
 occur in great numbers in all the dialogues. They are indeed essen- 
 tial to the catechetical form. Statistical study, however, reveals the 
 tendency to a decided increase in their use in the dialogues of the 
 middle period, while their excessive occurrence in the later dialogues 
 contributes largely to bring about that greater formality and arti- 
 ficiality of style which has been noted by scholars.^ The transitional 
 usage, in typical dialogues, of forms of toIos will illustrate this point. 
 In the Laches, Lysis and Charmides, which are presumably early, 
 there are only three instances of forms of ttoTos in transition, once in 
 the common formula to irolov 61) tovto and twice in oblique cases, 
 TTotoj and Toiav. In the Theaetetus the number of cases is increased 
 to thirteen, all stereotyped phrases with tolov or Tota. But in the 
 Philebus, which is late, ttoIov and xoTa occur in transition forty-three 
 times. Similar statistics might be gathered on the transitional usage 
 of TTcos, Xeye iJiovov, and other stereotyped transitional phrases. 
 
 * Cf. Laches 190c-d, 197e; Lysis 213e. 
 » Campbell, Republic, Vol. II, pp. 60-6L 
 
INDEX OF REFERENCES TO THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES 
 
 (Numbers refer to pages of the dissertation. Mere lists of passages in 
 foot-notes are not included.) 
 
 Charmldes, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 54, 74, 75, 86, 103. 
 
 Cratylus, 4, 13, 54, 74, 76, 89. 
 
 Crito, 8. 
 
 Euthydemus, 11, 73. 
 
 Euthj'phro, 6, 7, 13, 54, 59, 62, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 97. 
 
 Gorgias, 9, 15, 17, 18, 54, 60, 74, 75, 76, 84, 88, 92, 93. 
 
 Laches, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, 17, 54, 56, 58, 59, 64, 66, 73, 78, 79, 80, 86, 103. 
 
 Laws, 47-52, 55, 58, 60, 64, 75, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 94, 98, 102. 
 
 Lysis, 5, 13, 16, 72, 103. 
 
 Menexenus, 101. 
 
 Meno, 5, 13, 18, 19, 55, 60, 61, 63, 76, 80, 84, 85, 90, 91, 93. 
 
 Parmenides, 5, 13. 
 
 Phaedo, 6, 11, 15, 16, 19-22, 73, 81, 85, 98. 
 
 Phaedrus, 9, 15, 18, 21, 56, 71, 74, 79, 89, 93, 97, 101. 
 
 Philebus, 5, 26-33, 58, 59, 63, 69, 74, 75, 76, 83, 88, 91, 95-97, 102, 103. 
 
 PoHticus, 5, 13, 74, 83. 
 
 Protagoras, 6, 10, 11, 14, 17, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 75, 86, 90, 91, 92, 98, 99. 
 
 Republic, 12, 15, 21, 33-47, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 
 
 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 98, 102. 
 Sophist, 4, 13, 74. 
 Spurious Dialogues, 5. 
 
 Symposium, 10, 12, 14, 21, 71, 76, 77, 78, 79, 84, 100. 
 Theaetetus, 12, 13, 21, 22-26, 54, 55, 57, 60, 62, 64, 69, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 
 
 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 102, 103. 
 Timaeus, 102. 
 
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