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 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 &sw\ft\\\v i\\\v \\\\\\H>\\\\v 
 
 
 vWXWV^ViW 
 
 
THE SPIRIT 
 
 MILITARY INSTITUTIONS; 
 
 OR, 
 
 ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 THE ART OF WAR. 
 
 BY 
 
 MARSHAL MARMONT, 
 
 DUKE OF RAGU8A. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE LATEST EDITION, REVISED AND CORRECTED 
 BY THE AUTHOR; 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES, 
 
 BY HENRY COPPEE, 
 
 PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 LATE AN OFFICER OF ARTILLERY IN THE SERVICE OF THE U. 8. 
 
 n A ft ^ 
 OF THE 
 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 J. 13. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
 1862. 
 
Entered, according to Art of Conine, in tln> yt-ar 180:2, \>y 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CD- 
 ID the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the i:;i-t.-ui 
 District of Pcnn.sylvania. 
 
MARSHAL MARMONT'S DEDICATION. 
 
 TO THE ARMY. 
 
 I DEDICATE my book to the army. 
 
 The army was my cradle ; I have passed my life in its ranks. I have 
 constantly shared in its labors, and more than once I have shed my 
 blood, in those heroic times the memory of which shall never be lost. 
 
 Arrived at that age when all the interest and the consolations of life 
 are found in meditating upon the past, I address to the army a last 
 token of remembrance. 
 
 The soldiers, my companions in arms, united in themselves all the 
 military virtues. To valor and to the love of glory, natural to French- 
 men, they joined a great respect for discipline and an unlimited confi- 
 dence in their commander, the first elements of success. 
 
 And thus, under my command, never, with equal forces, have they 
 been beaten. Often conquerors, in spite of inferiority of numbers, they 
 but very seldom yielded even to an immense superiority of force, or to 
 the fatality of circumstances, and even then they always remained 
 formidable enough, in the midst of reverses, to cause the enemy almost 
 to regret his victory. 
 
 The soldiers of the present day march worthily in the footsteps of 
 their predecessors; and the courage, patience and energy which they 
 have unceasingly displayed in the long and painful war in Africa, 
 demonstrate that always and everywhere they will respond to the needs 
 and the exigencies of the country. 
 
 The former were the object of my most assiduous cares and of my 
 liveliest solicitude. 
 
 The latter, as long as I live, shall have my warmest sympathies. 
 
 THE MARSHAL DUKE OF RAG US A. 
 
 (iii) 
 
 30006 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 THE work now presented to the public has remarkable claims to 
 the respectful attention of military men. 
 
 The French title, "De V Esprit des Institutions Militaires," is per- 
 haps most exactly translated, "Essential Principles of the Art of 
 War." Here then will be found a condensation of these principles, 
 not gathered from books, but presented from the author's experi- 
 ence of campaigns in which he played important parts, and on 
 battle-fields of which he was an eye-witness, and, in many cases, a 
 commander of the highest grade. 
 
 A brief enumeration of the principal events in his career will 
 prove that he was essentially a fighting man and a skilful general, 
 who has won the right to lay down the principles and make the 
 criticisms contained in this work. 
 
 AUGUSTUS FREDERICK Louis VIESSE DE MARMONT was born at Cha- 
 tillon, on the Seine, July 20, 1774. He was a sub-lieutenant before 
 he was sixteen ; and was with General Bonaparte at Toulon, and 
 during the campaign of 1796 in Italy. He was the first man to dis- 
 embark of the expedition to Egypt. Having returned with Bonaparte 
 to France, he was with him on the 18th Brumaire ; and in the cam- 
 paign of 1800 he was director of the artillery, in its difficult pas- 
 sage over the St. Bernard and under the guns of the Fort of Bard, 
 as well as on the victorious field of Marengo. At the end of the 
 campaign he was general of division. He rendered excellent ser- 
 vice at Wagram in 1809 ; and at Znaim was made Marshal of the 
 Empire and Duke of Ragusa. Transferred to the command of the 
 army of Portugal in place of Massena, in 1811, he displayed great 
 skill ; but lost the battle of Salamanca, being wounded early in the 
 action. His arm was amputated a few days afterwards, and he 
 was incapacitated from taking the field until 1813. In that year 
 his genius and valor were splendidly conspicuous at Lutzen, Baut- 
 zen, Dresden and Leipsic. In the terrible battle around Leipsic, 
 
 1* (v) 
 
vi TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 of which he gives us such graphic glimpses, he was badly wounded 
 in several fingers of the remaining hand; but, guiding his horse 
 with one sound finger, he charged the enemy at the head of his 
 reserves. 
 
 Too much praise cannot be accorded him for his untiring energy 
 and cheerful valor in the movements upon French soil in 1814. 
 The fields of Brienne, Champ-Aubert, Vauchamps, Montmirail and 
 others bear witness to his worth. His dispositions for the defence 
 of Paris, and the battle which he fought there against overwhelm- 
 ing numbers on the 30th of March, 1814, were a fitting close of his 
 military life; they were splendid efforts. 
 
 I need not enter upon the question of his evacuation of the city, 
 and his submission to the Bourbons, further than to say that he 
 was empowered by Joseph Bonaparte to open a conference with 
 the allies, and that he stipulated for a guarantee of life and liberty 
 to the Emperor Napoleon. 
 
 My task does not require me to speak of his career under the 
 Restoration : he remained true to the Bourbons. 
 
 Those who desire fuller information may find it in his Memoires, 
 9 vols. 8vo., in which he vindicates his political and military con- 
 duct. 
 
 I have kept as close to the original as the idiom would permit, so 
 as to present the author's very words: the few notes, generally of 
 a popular character, are designed for elucidation to the general 
 reader: the military man will find the original clear enough with- 
 out notes. The author's notes are marked with the initial of his 
 name, M . 
 
 My object in translating the work is to offer to the patriotic sol- 
 diers now in the field, in defence of the government, constitution 
 nii'l laws, a summary of the great practical principles of the art 
 of war, which they may daily apply. Indeed, I have been struck 
 by finding on almost every page some exact elucidation of military 
 us now arising, explanations of our military successes, and 
 reasons for the reverses we have sustained. This is not a proper 
 time to draw the parallels; they must be left to the intelligence 
 !' i In- r.-.i'l.T and the labors of the future historian. 
 
 H. C. 
 
 I'll 1 1.'.: 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 DEDICATION TO THE ARMY p. iii 
 
 PREFACE v 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Scarcity of good military books. Special treatises do not contain 
 the principles of the art. Character of the writers of antiquity 
 Polybius and Vegetius, more curious than useful, (note.) 
 Character of modern war. Difficulty of command in the modern 
 art. In what, it consists. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar. Rev- 
 eries of Chevalier Folard. Camp of Bayeux, and experiments 
 of Dumesnil-Durand. General Rogniat. Particular object of 
 the present work. Richness of our military literature. Works 
 of the first order. Writings of Napoleon. "Principles of strat- 
 egy" of the Archduke Charles. Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr. 
 Twenty campaigns and fifty years of experience 25 
 
 PART I. 
 
 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Definitions. 
 
 The art of war. Genius for war. Necessity of a knowledge of 
 human nature. Why one man may be worth ten, and how ten 
 men are not worth one. Mind and character. Military arts. 
 
 vii 
 
Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 Strategy, tactics, artillery, fortifications. Organization, manoeu- 
 vres, administration. Dangers. Physiognomy of battles. Power 
 to make a good use of the sacrifice of life. The profession of 
 arms.... 33 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 General Principles. 
 
 Very few. Infinite variety of conditions in an army. Combina- 
 tions resulting from them. Chance should be taken into account. 
 The disproportion between the genius of Napoleon and that of 
 his adversaries. With equal chances, victory always belongs to 
 him who has been able to present a superior force at a given 
 moment. Inferiority in numbers compensated by the quality of 
 troops. Barbarous troops always weak against less numerous 
 disciplined troops. After the first victory opinion takes the 
 place of arms. The Greeks and the Persians. Marathon and 
 Plataea. Conquests of Alexander. The Romans against the 
 Germans and the Gauls The French against the Turks. Ad- 
 vantages of assuming the initiative. Campaign of Italy in 
 1796-97. Axiom... . 36 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Bases and Lines of Operation, and Strategy. 
 
 Base of operation. Line of operation. Strategic points. Strategic 
 lines. Napoleon's chess-board. Consequences of the violation 
 of principles at Marengo. Moreau's strategy. His tactics 
 llohcnlimlcn. Character of that battle. What gained the vic- 
 tory. General Richepanse. Importance of mobility in an army. 
 Russian usage. Independence of reserves. Necessities relative 
 t<> the line of operation. Liberty of communications. Base of 
 operations. Its extent relative to the line of operation. Funda- 
 mental axiom of Napoleon. Grand successes due to his observ- 
 ance of it in 1805, 1806, 1809. Parallelism of the bases of 
 operation of the opposed armies. March in 1812. Disappear 
 I the ba< of operation*. Admiral Trhits.-liukntf mid 
 
CONTENTS. ix 
 
 General Kaptzievitsch. Examples relating to useful changes of 
 the line and base of operations. 1797, the Austrian army after 
 the surrender of Mantua. 1814, Marshal Duke of Dalmatia 
 (Soult) at Toulouse. Two principles 40 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Tactics. 
 
 In what it consists. Easy theory. Difficulties in practice. Con- 
 dition of a general at the head of a large army. Living provi- 
 dence. Necessity of tactics for subordinate generals. The author 
 at the Camp of Zeist. Comparison of strategy and tactics. War- 
 like genius as it concerns both. Skill of Napoleon. Liitzen an 
 unexpected battle. A historic detail. The battle was not at 
 Starsiedel. Battle of the Moskwa. The withholding of the re- 
 serve. Napoleon unfaithful to his principles of war. Useless- 
 ness of fresh troops the morning after a battle. Why. Waterloo. 
 The guard advanced too late 49 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 \ 
 
 Manoeuvres. 
 
 Means of tactics. Order of march and order of battle. Forma- 
 tions for both. Intermingled deployment of columns. Exam- 
 ple. March in the plains of the Tagliamento in 1797. Attack 
 of a position. Skirmishers in front of the columns. They cover 
 the deployment. Formation in square. Its specialty. Its diffi- 
 culties. Squares formed for marching. Example in Egypt. 
 Two special causes suggested this formation. Formation in six 
 ranks become superfluous and abandoned. Difficulties of forma- 
 tion in square for marching 55 
 
X i -i INTENTS. 
 
 < 
 
 PART II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION, FORMATION AND SUBSISTENCE OF ARMIES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Organization and Formation of Troops. 
 
 Both are accomplished by the powers of the general and the nature 
 of the arm. Order and obedience o'J 
 
 FIRST SECTION. Infantry. In the squad the unit is the man. In 
 the company, the squad forms the unit. In the battalion it is 
 the company. In the army, the battalion. The company is for 
 organization and administration. The battalion is for manoeuvre 
 and battle. Real limits of the battalion. Conditions of the 
 battalion. Necessity of considering it as it regards the distance 
 at which the voice may be heard. One officer to forty soldiers. 
 Strength of battalions in the Austrian and English armies. Dis- 
 advantages and advantages in the number of troops in battalions. 
 French battalions. Limit indicated by the author. Forced 
 diminutions of the great'whole. Its greatest reduction upon its 
 arrival before the enemy. Strength of the battalion relative to 
 the adopted formation. Three ranks. Two ranks. Fire by 
 three ranks. Purely theoretic. Inevitable fusion of the third 
 rank with the two first. Cause of disorganization. Design of 
 the formation in three ranks. Modifications to be made in the 
 formation in two ranks. How this formation becomes the best. 
 Formation of the regiment. It is arbitrary. Question of ailmin- 
 igtration and economy. Regiments with numerous battalions. 
 Their great advantages. Economy. Esprit de corps. Facility 
 of echelons. Qualities of the colonel. Ovlcr, justice, firmness. 
 Special corps. Principles applicable to them. Regiments of 
 li_ r lit infantry in France and Russia. They are only so in name. 
 Chatteurr i \ u-i rian chasseurs. English cha---m-. 
 
 \ olii^i-ui s. Their application to strong, a.i\ am -c.l ^nanl- ami 
 mountain warfare. Necessity of strong companies. > 
 
 .cti.m. sin-n^ili Hiil yonlh. (Jarrison battalions good as 
 |'.,|-iifi. .| | IMC- h ,!,,> ,.f tm^liiiir their ^ilVfy lo 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 poor troops. The point of support of the army disappears at 
 the moment of need. Examples ; garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
 Major Aubert 60 
 
 SECOND SECTION. Cavalry. Fire-arms only accessory. Its spe- 
 cialty is fighting hand to hand. Impetuosity of its movements. 
 Superiority of French cavalry. Its exploits in Italy. Scarcity 
 of good commanders. We can only count three in twenty years 
 of war. Their names. Qualities indispensable in a cavalry 
 general. Promptness of coup d'ceil. Rapidity in making deci- 
 sions. Prodigality and recklessness in attack. Preservation 
 and minute care of his command before battle. Using them un- 
 reservedly and unsparingly at the given moment. Special char- 
 acteristic of Murat. Marching in column without object before 
 the enemy. Why. Necessity of the formation in two ranks. 
 The squadron the unit for battle. Mobility combined with order; 
 basis of its strength. Formation considered the best. The unit 
 for battle the same as that for administration. Vicious organi- 
 zation under the Empire reformed at the peace. Line of cavalry 
 in battle ; different formations of the French, Germans, and Rus- 
 sians The part played by cavalry. It sees and hears for the 
 army. It completes victory. Liitzen and Bautzen Incomplete 
 victories. Cavalry in battle. It has two objects to accomplish. 
 Heavy cavalry. Lances and sabres. Light cavalry. Fire-arms; 
 musketoons and pistols. Dragoons. Mounted infantry. Spe- 
 cialty of this arm. Creeds and convictions. Necessity of em- 
 ploying small horses. Boots and clothing. Arms of cavalry in 
 general. Lances, sabres, pistols, carbines. Of the lance in 
 particular. Little suited to light cavalry. Its origin. It is 
 the true arm of cavalry of the line. Sabre and lance compared. 
 The lance at Dresden. Curassiers repulsed, and a breach made 
 by fifty lances. Prejudices from habit. The Cossacks. Their 
 skill. Formed by nature Cossacks of the Don frontier. Have 
 degenerated. Why. Asiatic Cossacks of Kouban. Russian 
 hussars and chasseurs, cavalry of the line. How Austria might 
 have Cossacks. France will also have her own. How. Defen- 
 sive arms in their relation to cavalry. Which is the best. It 
 might also be applied to infantry. Instruction of cavalry. Its true 
 purpose. Horse and horseman. Equitation. Habit of thorough 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 charges. Promptness in rallying. Disadvantages of moderate 
 charges in instruction. Fatal education of the horse at drill. 
 New suggestions proposed by the author 69 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Artillery. 
 
 Its importance. The simplest is the best. In what perfection con- 
 sists. Necessity of reducing the number of calibres. Carriage 
 of siege and sea-coast artillery. Uselessness of the 16-pdr. 
 Field artillery. Its conditions. 6-pdrs. Used in the wars of 
 the Empire. 8-pdrs. Their chief disadvantage. 12-pdrs; their 
 object. Batteries of 24-pdrs Their services on the day of bat- 
 tle. Hollow projectiles. Large mortars. The Marmont and 
 Villantroy mortars. Mountain artillery. Congreve rockets. 
 Rampart guns. Dimensions of the pieces. Their weight. By 
 what both weight and dimensions are determined. Theory of 
 explosion. With what the diminution of range is connected. 
 The friction of the expansion. Long pieces and strong charges. 
 Experiments with the length of 35 calibres. Maximum of range. 
 With what length. Disadvantages of the length which gives the 
 greatest range. Length of 22, 18, and 24 calibres. Instantane- 
 ous combustion of powder; its disadvantages. Special phe- 
 nomenon. Powder of General Rutty. Its extraordinary strength. 
 In two schools it destroys all the pieces. Causes of this fact. 
 Better the enemy of well. The weight of pieces. Force of re- 
 coil. Analogy. Experiments of 1802 and 1808. They founded 
 the system. Artillery of the Empire. Comparative weight of 
 the cannon and the ball. Lightness of English pieces. Uni- 
 formity of construction in the materiel. Its importance. De 
 Gribauval. His principles misunderstood. The twenty-two 
 kinds of wheels reduced to five. Unit for battle. Composition 
 of the battery. Its three elements. Importance of mobility. 
 It- present perfection. Work of M. Valtee. Artillery drivers. 
 They were used in all the campaigns of the Republic. The artil- 
 lery train the creation of the author. System perfected under 
 th<- Restoration. Artillery of new invention. General consider- 
 ations Congreve rockets. The author's views upon their use. 
 A new combination of arms for battle. Two infantries. Pro- 
 
CONTENTS. Xiil 
 
 portion of arms. Infantry. Artillery. Its importance when 
 'there is no place for the use of cannon. Mountain warfare. 
 Warfare in plains. Effects of rockets in the next war. Experi- 
 ments to be made. Necessity of preparing for their use. Rev- 
 olutions in the art of war. Paixhans' artillery. Resistance of 
 air. Quantity of motion. Destructive action. Paixhans' gun 
 in the defence of places. It will change the naval system. Ship- 
 of-the-line compared with a frigate. History of the Paixhans' 
 gun. The author's influence upon its adoption 86 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Fortifications. 
 
 How the idea of fortifications originated. Their importance and 
 their development proportional to the means of attack. What 
 they are for towns ; or countries. Principles. Special charac- 
 teristics of Vauban. His system on the frontier of Flanders. 
 Good for Holland. Why. Two kinds of fortified places. Depot 
 fortresses. Their first condition. Their situation. Strasburg, 
 Metz and Lille. Alexandria, Mantua, Venice. Protecting forts. 
 Forts of manoeuvres. Where should they be established? Mount- 
 ain gorges. River frontiers. Importance of secure places for 
 provisions. Detached works. Fine application. Entrenched 
 camps. They are of two kinds. Continuous line. It produces 
 evil results. Why. Opinion of an entrenched army. Its falsity 
 and its consequences. Three examples. Lines of Turin; 80,000 
 men against 40,000. Lines of Denain; Eugene and Villars. 
 Lines of Mayence. Affair of October 8, 1795. The lines are 
 good. Against what armies. Eugene of Savoy at Belgrade. 
 The true pledge of victory is in courage, and contempt for the 
 enemy. Permanent entrenched camps. Their real value. Towers 
 of Lintz. The model was not completely followed. Their true 
 utility. Fundamental principle. Strategic point well chosen. 
 Importance of their construction. Attack upon Vienna in that 
 direction impossible. Entrenched camp of Verona. Fortifica- 
 tions of Paris. Importance of that capital. Its fall drags down 
 the kingdom. The part played by detached forts. Paris should 
 not sustain a siege. Real superfluity of a continuous fortifica- 
 tion . 107 
 
XIV "VI I.N l> 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Administration. 
 
 Its true basis is in the legality of consumption. Confusion under 
 i he Directory. One hundred and fifty thousand men who did not 
 exist. Corps should have their own administration. Responsi- 
 bility of commanders. Economical clubs. Their import- 
 ance 122 
 
 SECTION FIRST. ProvisioVis. Bread. Tne greatest emoarrassment 
 in war. Problem solved by the Romans. An easy thing in 
 their time. Why it is more difficult at the present day. Effica- 
 cious nfeans. The soldier should have the means of providing 
 for himself. Satisfactory experiments of this method. In what 
 consists the great difficulty. Men could live upon flour, but 
 not upon grain. Division of labor. The soldier knows how to 
 make soup if he has the materials. He should make his own 
 bread. How. The army of Portugal. Napoleon employs the 
 same means. Portable mills. The conditions of their use. 
 Objection. Not valid. Bran in bread. Facilities of this mode 
 to the administration. Question of subsistence solved. Im- 
 promptu ovens. Magazines of grain in time of peace 124 
 
 SECTION SECOND. Hospitals. Spirit inherent in the soldier. Duty 
 of conscience and humanity. Duty of interest. Pecuniary in- 
 terest is not sufficient recompense. Morality. Reward of public 
 opinion. Brothers-hospitallers. Individuals at wages. The 
 spirit of charity. A hierarchy to be founded. Hospital service 
 distributed to three corps. The medical art. Materiel of hospi- 
 tals. Service of the Brothers. Knights of Malta. Causes of 
 their transformation. Strong prejudice. The idea impracticable 
 under the Restoration. Why. Its utility in the army of Africa. 
 Importance of objections. Vanity of ridicule. Ameliorations 
 attempted. Hospital reports. Hospitals should be within reach 
 of the troops. Disadvantages of long transportation. Aggrava- 
 tion of diseases. Encumbrances. Trials made I-' 1 
 
CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Military Justice and the Composition of Courts-martial. 
 
 The army a special society. Character of military justice. Com- 
 plement of discipline. To whom it should be confided. Mil- 
 itary judges during the Revolution. Error recognized. Cre- 
 ation of councils of war. Military justice not absolute. Not 
 founded upon the same principles as civil justice. Here the regi- 
 ment is the unit. The colonel. Regimental courts-martial. 
 Motives of the legislator relative to the courts. By division. 
 Composition of the council of war. All grades there represented. 
 Why. Indulgence principally in the higher grades. The par- 
 doning power. Should be reserved to the colonel. Usage in 
 Austria.., .136 
 
 PART III. 
 
 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Employment of the Different Arms. (NOTE.) 
 
 Their organization should be separate. Their instruction uniform. 
 Combination of arms relative to their employment. Results of a 
 proper mingling. Creation of esprit de corps. Importance of 
 homogeneousness. The Roman legion. An expression of Vege- 
 tius. The middle ages. Frederick. First trial. Marshal Brog- 
 lio. The Republic. Formation into brigades. Their constitu- 
 tion. Vices of this method. It ie abandoned. The division the 
 constant unit. Army on a peace footing. Napoleon separates 
 the cavalry from the divisions. Disadvantages. Accessory arm 
 and principal arm. When and how. Limits of numbers for 
 cavalry reserves. Excess in numbers more embarrassing than 
 useful. Armies of moderate strength. In large armies an addi- 
 tional echelon Why. Conditions of facility in the exercise of 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 command. Organization of an army corps, (corps d'armee.) Its 
 composition. Movable reserves. The general of 80,000 men and 
 the general of 10,000. Their particular parts. Napoleon at 
 Lutzen. Creation of grades in relation to command. Necessity 
 of an intermediate grade between the lieutenant-general and the 
 marshal. Self-love 141 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Offensive and Defensive "Wars. 
 
 The application of the simplest principle in both. Particular char- 
 acteristics of each. The necessity to study contemporary wars. 
 Why. They instruct best. The wars of Frederick. Resources 
 of his genius. Campaigns of the Revolution. Memoirs of Gou- 
 vion Saint-Cyr. Operations of the Archduke Charles in 1796. 
 Campaigns of Italy in 1796 and 1797. First example of strate- 
 gic operations on a great scale. The profession. Immense re- 
 sults with moderate means. In a single year, a bold offensive, and 
 a skilful model defensive. Unexampled victories. Immortal 
 epoch. Summary of military facts. It should be written with 
 commentaries. Campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809. Wars in 
 Spain. Forgetfulness of principles. Awakening of 1814. One 
 against eight. Thirty -five thousand men fragments of the army. 
 Cbamp-Aubert, Vauchamps, Gue*-a-Treme. Paris. Song of the 
 swan 152 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Marches and Encampments. 
 
 Marches within reach of the enemy. Precautions. Compn-iii..n 
 of advanced guards. Out of sight of the enemy. Utility of 
 light troops. Intersected and wooded countries. Fl.mkris. 
 Fan-shaped reconnoissances. Encampments. Well-selected ppots. 
 Natural obstacles. Encamp on this side. Why. Surprises. 
 Two modes of encamping. Troops deployed and troops in mass. 
 Which is preferable. Mode of execution. Consequences of the 
 nipt of rules. 1813, Hanau. Division Maison 
 
CONTENTS. XV11 
 
 Fine revenge upon the Prussians at Vauchamps, Hohenlinden, 
 Falkenheim. Marches in presence of the enemy. This is tac- 
 tics. Vigilance and foresight in the commanders. Discipline 
 and skill of manoeuvre in an army. Parallel march of the Eng- 
 lish and French armies in 1812. Historic details. Flank ma- 
 noeuvres. The French army marches like a regiment. The two 
 generals hesitate to give battle. They watch each other for five 
 leagues. Only example of a march of this kind 159 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Reconnoissances in Force, and the Precautions they Require. 
 
 Great difficulty in the conduct of an army. Search for the enemy. 
 Necessity of constant contact The part played by cavalry. The 
 curtain must be torn away. Precept. Consequence of forgetting 
 it. The army of Portugal in the valley of the Tagus. Double 
 reconnoissance on Almeida and Elbodon. The English cavalry 
 put to flight. Brigade of infantry isolated. Fuente-Guinaldo. 
 The reconnoissance not sustained. The English army escapes. 
 Smiles of fortune 168 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Detachments in Presence of the Enemy. 
 
 Their object is to profit by a victory which we anticipate. Exam- 
 ple of the results of unexpected defeat. Wurmser in 1796, on 
 the Lago di Guarda. Alvinzi at Monte Baldo and at La Corona. 
 Detachment on the Adige. Napoleon in 1800. Detachments on 
 the Po, the Ticino and the Adda. Hypothesis of a retreat upon 
 Genoa. Forty-five thousand men against twenty-two thousand. 
 The Austrian army attacks. Battle of Marengo lost up to five 
 o'clock in the afternoon. Return of Desaix's division, which had 
 been detached on the road to Genoa. Splendid victory. A dan- 
 gerous example to follow. 1813, the overthrow at the Katzbach. 
 Conclusions and precepts 172 
 
 2* 
 
xviii CONTENTS. 
 
 C HAPTER VI- 
 
 Battles. 
 
 Rules and principles. Varieties. Nature of the ground. Strength 
 of position makes up for the number of troops. Denies in front. 
 Formation on two lines. It is not absolute. The commands 
 should embrace the two lines. Why. The reserve. General dis- 
 positions. Defensive battles. Choice of position. Rear free 
 and protected. Offensive battles. Strategy and tactics. Skill 
 in manoeuvre, intelligence and dash. Genius of the French suited 
 to offensive battles. Immense difficulties in the offensive for the 
 administration and maintenance of troops. The defensive suited 
 to the genius of the English. The Duke of Wellington in Spain. 
 Massena threatens Portugal. The Duke places himself under 
 shelter of two strongholds and behind the Coa. He retires upon 
 Lisbon, waiting the results of famine and suffering upon the 
 French army. System decided and followed with perseverance. 
 Renewed at Waterloo. On the side of the English the battle is 
 defensive. Precepts. Transformation of the offensive movement 
 into a defensive one. Example. Offensive war was specially suit- 
 ed to Napoleon's genius. His debut in Italy offensive, afterwards 
 defensive; then again offensive. 1805, Austerlitz. Jena. 1809. 
 Ratisbon. Wagram; attack in front. 1812, battle of the Mosk- 
 wa. Importance of a flank movement. Direct attacks. Pleas- 
 ure of employing force. 1813, Liitzen; defensive battle. Bautzen. 
 U-ij^ic. A bad battle-field. The 18th of October, defensive 
 battle. Battle of Brienne, Craon, Laon, Arcis, Champ-Aubert, 
 Montmirail, Vauchamps, Montereau. What he had to do at 
 Paris. Fourteen thousand men against fifty-four thousand. Thir- 
 teen thousand of the enemy hors de combat. The hour for battle. 
 Regulated by circumstances. With superior forces the attack 
 should be made early in the morning. Why. Napoleon at Water- 
 loo. With equal forces we should attack in the middle of the 
 day. Why. 1796, reverse of Cerea and Alle Due Castelli. 
 \\iirraser outside of Mantua. Victory of San Giorgio. Defen- 
 sive battles belong to the trade of war. Offensive, the resource 
 of genius. Frederick II. in the Seven Years' war. His cam- 
 paigns resemble those of Napoleon. Each general has his own 
 
CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 way of conducting war. Turenne and Conde. Alexander an>l 
 Caesar. Fabius, Hannibal and Scipio 177 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Conduct of a General on the Morning after a Victory. 
 
 Many know how to win battles, few know how to profit by victory. 
 The losses experienced appal indicision and timidity. Scherer 
 at Loano. Clairfait at Mayence. Moreau in 1800. Brune on 
 the Mincio. Conduct of Napoleon. He never had need of a 
 second battle. Great temporary fatigues. Abundance and rest 
 insured for a long time. Limit passed. Campaign of Russia. 
 Offensive movement for three months. Conditions of a serious 
 pursuit. Necessity of proportioning the means to the end. 
 After Wagram. March on Znaim. Passage of the Taya. Never 
 refuse succors when offered 192 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Retreats. 
 
 In presence of a superior enemy. Delicate and hazardous opera- 
 tion. The difficulty resides in the morale of the troops. Effects 
 of imagination on the soldier who turns his back to the enemy. 
 Contempt of the enemy excites his respect. Necessity of retard- 
 ing the march of the enemy. Formation by echelons. Partial 
 combats. Rear guard. Importance of artillery. The enemy 
 kept at a distance. 1814, Bliicher before Vinde. Six thousand 
 men withdraw peaceably before forty-five thousand. Retreat 
 upon the Voire after the battle of Brienne. The enemy attracted 
 to Perthe. Defile of Rosnai passed without disorder, and as if 
 on drill. Retreats with troops equal in force to those of the 
 enemy. Position chosen in advance. Calculation of time, dis- 
 tance and quickness. Retreat on the Duero. Moreau's retreat 
 on the Rhine. Massena in Portugal 197 
 
XX NTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Night Attacks and Surprises. 
 
 A surprise is a piece of good fortune. Good troops improve it, and 
 they ftlone should attempt it. Night attacks. Their opportune- 
 ness. Only a few troops should be thus employed. Disorder in 
 the enemy's ranks. Success certain against tolerable and badly- 
 disciplined troops. Necessity of very precise instructions. Ex- 
 amples; the Austrian army at Hochkircb. Affair of Etoges in 
 1814, surprise of Urusoff's corps. Chevert at Prague. Prince 
 Eugene of Savoy at Cremona; details. Presence of mind of the 
 French soldier. Attempt of the English upon Bergen-op-Zoom; 
 splendid defence of General Bizanet General Laudon at Glatz. 
 Enterprise upon the T work at Mantua. Colonel Dufour at the 
 Fort of Bard. M. de Se"narmont... .. 204 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 The Defence of Fortified Places. 
 
 Essential conditions. Importance of the commander. Compari- 
 son of the glory. True courage and truly brave men. Defence 
 of Grave by Chamilly. Of Lille by Boufflers. Of St. Sebastian 
 by Rey. Of Burgos by Du Breton. Of Wittenberg by La- 
 poype. Necessity of a legal examination of all surrenders. 
 Sorties. Their timeliness and aim. Easy surprises ; how they 
 occur. Prague in 1741. Rodrigo in 1812. Badajos. Sara- 
 gossa, Genoa -~1 
 
CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 PART IT. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Morals of the Soldiers ; Armies in Former Times and at the 
 Present Day. 
 
 Elements of value. Means of developing them. Discipline. Cor- 
 poral punishments. Inadmissible, in what armies. Power of 
 opinion in the French army. Praise and blarne, emulation. 
 Dignity respected in the soldier punished. Contempt reserved 
 for the base alone. In what consists the worth of the man. In- 
 finite shades. Severity in its details. Confidence. Power is 
 easy during peace. Difficulties of its exercise in danger. Energy 
 imparted by confidence. Duty of the chief relative to the sol- 
 dier. Sublime emotions of his heart. Two facts. Activity. 
 Conditions of health. Military exercises. Instruction; utility of 
 grand manoeuvres. Emulation. New interests created in relation 
 with circumstances. Association of the soldier with the common 
 glory. Egypt. Holland. Dalmatia. The names of the regi- 
 ments and of their colonels inscribed on the rocks which they 
 cleft, in building splendid roads. Great camps of instruction. 
 Their importance. Their effect on the army of 1805. They 
 should be made permanent. Uncultivated country. Three 
 months' residence Algeria, a vast place of exercise. Concern- 
 ing the formation of regular armies in Europe. Feudal condi- 
 tions. The sovereigns dependent on their vassals. Finances. 
 Independent companies. Necessity of regular revenues. Order 
 and economy. The creation of armies in relation to civili- 
 zation. Obstacles placed by the lords. Voluntary enrolment. 
 The disorder of the times favors it. The trade of the soldier 
 becomes a resource. Often the basis of a great fortune. The 
 Visconti, Sforzas, Scaligeri. Norman adventurers. Warriors 
 of reputation. They become intermediaries. Regiments by 
 contract. Ferdinand II. demands an army of Wallenstein. 
 The manner of executing the contract. The regiment a piece 
 
XXII CONTENTS. 
 
 of property. Origin of their names. Kecruiting. Volun- 
 tary enrolment become insufficient. Why. Great influence of 
 civilization and order upon the epoch. Tax of blood. Public 
 charge. Its influence upon the spirit of armies salutary. Com- 
 parative morality. Guarantees for public interest. Of the con- 
 script fits de famille. Two systems of distributing men in an 
 army. Prussian, Austrian, and German usage. The men of the 
 same country are in the same regiments. Usage in France and 
 Russia. Which is preferable. Provincial spirit. Its disad- 
 vantages in the days of the Revolution. Means of avoiding 
 them. Its advantages to valor and emulation. Council of war 
 of 1828. Solution of the question proposed by General d'Am- 
 brugeac 229 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Military Spirit and the Difficulties of Command. 
 
 A mystery of the human heart. Love of danger. The instinct of 
 self-preservation yields to the ardor of courage. Sphere of activ- 
 ity relative. The same sentiment animates the soldier and the 
 general. Nobleness of the profession in all its grades. Friend- 
 ship. Its causes and their energy. Mobility of the human 
 heart. Sentiment of fear. More common than might be sup- 
 posed. Discipline its remedy. Effects of imitation. The brave 
 engender the brave. Necessity of rewarding and exalting true 
 courage. Bravery. Its three degrees. Which the rarest. He- 
 wards which it deserves are never burdensome to a sovereign. 
 Reciprocal confidence. Upon what it is based in different de- 
 grees. Inexperienced armies cannot have it. National guards. 
 Can do nothing at the start. Why. The misfortune of first 
 efforts with their aid. Appreciation of the enemy's character 
 True genius of Napoleon. Three operations necessary to con- 
 stitute a mass of men an army. Confidence the complement <>f 
 organization, discipline and instruction. The soldier without 
 intelligence and the soldier who reasons. Their faculties forwnr 
 n do not go to war to be killed. Command. 
 Tin- profession and genius. What gives authority. Kasy 
 
CONTENTS. XX111 
 
 ence. The man who obeyed yesterday commands to-day. Priv- 
 ilege of certain minds. Predestination. Napoleon. Powers 
 requisite for command. Will. Intelligence and firmness. Which 
 element should sway. ^Equation. Nevertheless a great deal of 
 mind necessary to accomplish great deeds. Historic names ; they 
 all possessed great minds joined to great strength of character. 
 Decision. Office councillors. Painful part of command. Re- 
 sponsibility. How the burden is borne. Necessity of repose of 
 conscience after a resolution has been made. Element of force 
 and security during the roar of battle. Summary of qualities 
 required for command. Subordinate command. The responsi- 
 bility of the commander is infinitely less. Intelligent obedience 
 and absolute rest after the execution of an order 243 
 
 NOTE. The general who is also a sovereign. Facility of his pro- 
 jects. No responsibility. Certainty of obedience after as well 
 as before the event. General Bonaparte had more merit in com- 
 mand than the Emperor Napoleon. Parallel. Which then is 
 preferable in command of an army, a general or a sovereign? 
 Reparable misfortunes. Catastrophes without remedy 251 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Portrait of a General who fulfils all the Conditions of Command. 
 
 Bravery. Calmness, coolness, dash. Necessity of an acknowl- 
 edged reputation. When it does not exist, the opportunities of 
 making it should be eagerly seized. This reputation established, 
 he should be reserved in danger. Physical qualities. He must 
 see for himself. Privileges of youth when it attains to command. 
 The habit of obedience sometimes diminishes the powers. The 
 value of time. Unbounded activity. Ubiquity. Severity. Sen- 
 timent of order. Goodness joined to force. Merited punish- 
 ments. Consideration due to the soldier's uniform. Gravity in 
 a general. It does not exclude familiarity. Upon what the lat- 
 ter is founded. Facility of access. Importance ol knowing 
 everything. Magnificence. In what it should consist. Numer- 
 ous horses. Why. Very hospitable house. Advantages to the 
 service. Luxury in maps. The campaign of Marengo. Fort of 
 
XX17 CONTENTS. 
 
 Bard. The Little St. Bernard. Secrecy. The true means of 
 deceiving the enemy. How to discover his intentions. Simpli- 
 city of prisoners. Necessary independence. Freedom in com- 
 binations. The government should not trammel them. Unre- 
 served confidence. Necessary consequence of investing with 
 command 257 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 The Reputation of Generals. 
 
 Marshal Brune. Three great epochs of his life. In Switzerland, 
 in Holland, in Italy. In spite of exceptions, merit must be 
 judged by success. Classes of generals. To whom the first 
 place is due. In antiquity; in modern times. The second class. 
 It is more numerous. Third class. Generals who compose it 
 not rare. Fourth and last class 266 
 
 CONCLUSION... .. 270 
 
1NTKODUCTORY. 
 
 No modern work upon the art or the institutions of 
 war, contains a complete body of doctrine.* Some special 
 treatises have been published, upon the different arms ; 
 but, in general, the principles of the matter have not been 
 laid down. In them we obtain superficial glimpses of the 
 technical and minute details, without a sufficient indica- 
 tion of the great aim and the means by which it is 
 attained. 
 
 Ancient writers have investigated military questions 
 more profoundly ; but how can their theories be appro- 
 priate, since the discovery of gunpowder has modified 
 so completely the science of war ? 
 
 Polybius and Vegetiusf may still satisfy our curiosity ; 
 
 * This seems to be wilful injustice to General Jomini, against 
 whom the author was prejudiced; his Precis de V Art de la Guerre; 
 Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon ; Traite dcs grandes Operations 
 Militaires; Traite de arande Tac^te, etc., are the most valuable 
 treatises on this general subject. 
 
 f Besides his histories, Polybius was the author of a work on 
 tactics. 
 
 Vegetius, (de re militari.) 
 
 3 (25) 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 but let us look no longer in their writings for useful and 
 applicable instruction.* 
 
 Ancient and modern wars have no point of resemblance, f 
 except a moral relation, or that sublime part of the art 
 which consists in a knowledge of the human heart, 
 knowledge, at all times, so important for the government 
 of men, and which, in war, exerts an influence still more 
 prompt and decisive. 
 
 All is changed in the form and the proportion of arms ; 
 their greater range keeps the combatants at greater dis- 
 tances; they impress greater terror, and produce also 
 more prodigious results. 
 
 Add to this that formerly the combatants were in fewer 
 numbers. 
 
 The command of troops offers at the present day far 
 greater difficulties. Among the ancients, who fought 
 always hand to hand, the army was compactly formed. 
 The small number of soldiers occupied but a very limited 
 space ; its front was scarcely equivalent to that of one of 
 
 * The author appears to confound the ancient works on tactics 
 with the ancient military histories. Xenophon, Polybius, and Arrian 
 have all written works, or sections of works, on the tactical sys- 
 tems of their day. These, indeed, may have no other interest for 
 the modern military student, than to satisfy an antiquarian curi- 
 osity. But the same writers and to them may be added a greater, 
 Julius Ceesar have likewise left behind them military histories 
 histories of ancient campaigns recorded by ancient soldiers. 
 
 f So far as the tactics of the ancient wars are concerned, yes. 
 But not so for their strategy. .Jumini, in his 7Wn.< <le V Art de la 
 Guerre, (t. i. p. 12,) declares that "strategy was the same in the 
 days of Caesar, as in those of Napoleon." 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 27 
 
 our brigades. If a general could not exactly see each 
 one of his soldiers, he could, at least, be seen by every 
 one. Operating upon so small a scale, the supreme chief 
 was able to betake himself everywhere ; and this chief 
 was himself a combatant, setting the example, sword in 
 hand. In our days, the general fights by will and by 
 thought ; his skill in the management of the sword is of 
 small importance; his mind embraces a very different 
 space from that spread before his sight : a general, in one 
 word, is very much less of a soldier although he should 
 strive to become a good one than a moral being who, by 
 his influence over other intelligences, seems to govern 
 events, like the mysterious powers of nature. 
 
 Thus modern war constitutes an entirely new art, which 
 would find neither model nor elucidation in the wars of 
 the Greeks and the Romans.* 
 
 * Contra, Napoleon. Dr. Arnold remarks: "Now it so happens, 
 that one who well knew what military lessons were instructive, the 
 Emperor Napoleon, has selected out of the whole range of history 
 the campaigns of seven generals only, as important to be studied 
 by an officer professionally, in all their details ; and of these seven, 
 three belong to the times of Greece and Rome, namely, Alexander, 
 Hannibal, and Caasar." (The campaigns of the first two, it may 
 be added, are best read in the works of Arrian and of Polybius.) It 
 may be concluded, then, that Marshal Marmont is right in pro- 
 nouncing the ancient works on tactics to be of no use to the modern 
 student, but that he should not have said the same of their works 
 on strategy that is, their histories of such campaigns as Napoleon 
 recommended for careful study. But even if we admit, that the 
 ancient writers furnish nothing in strategy any more than in 
 tactics to copy, they may yet be useful by what they do to inspire. 
 When such a mind as Julius Caesar's not only records his move- 
 ments before Pharsalia, but also explains the ratio of them, it is 
 
% _' s INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Jf the greatest captains of antiquity, if Alexander, 
 Hannibal, Caesar, could return to earth, and chance to 
 come upon a field of battle, their military genius would 
 understand nothing there ; and they would need more than 
 one campaign before they could completely embrace the 
 mechanism of the profession, the consequences of our 
 institutions, and of the new arms. 
 
 These truths are so evident to all who have made war, 
 that it is asked how, even in the time of Louis XIV., the 
 reveries of the Chevalier Folard were seriously enter- 
 tained, and still later, the more foolish reveries of Menil- 
 Durand, to such a degree as to establish a camp expressly 
 (at Bayeux) to make comparative experiments of forma- 
 tion and manoeuvre. It is more astonishing still that a 
 general of our own epoch (Rogniat, general of engineers)* 
 
 impossible that the genius of the modern military student shall 
 not be stirred and inspired, not only to copy but to emulate. Nay, 
 it may well happen, that some original minds would derive less 
 real inspiration from the reading of modern campaigns, wherein all 
 the appliances and accompaniments nre familiar and stale, thau 
 from that of ancient wars, in which, while the strategical genius 
 was the same, it had to deal with means so widely different. It is 
 in i his way, perhaps, that we account for a portion of the :it trac- 
 tion which the study of the Greek and Roman art of war has had 
 for some of the most powerful military minds of modern times. 
 The last work of Napoleon was a volume of memoranda on the 
 campaigns of Caesar. 
 
 * If General Kogniat's work (Considerations sur VArt de la Ouerrt, 
 ^",) were really such visionary trash as our author would 
 have us believe, it f time in Napoleon to devote to 
 
 it a Tolume of criticism. The book (with its Mxporue avx Note* 
 CntKjuts de Napoleon, Paris, 1823,) is, at least, a remarkably intr- 
 esting one. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 29 
 
 should have written a large book to resuscitate and am- 
 plify these delirious fancies ; for if he did not figure among 
 combatants, he had at least the opportunity and the neces- 
 sity to witness battles. 
 
 I have proposed to myself, to sum up, in a brief sketch, 
 the essential principles of military operations, organiza- 
 tion and institutions. I have sought to demonstrate that 
 nothing should be left to chance in this matter; that 
 everything in it should depend upon a generating princi- 
 ple, from which necessary consequences flow. 
 
 A principle is discovered by a careful consideration of 
 the end to be attained, and by then seeking the best 
 means of attaining it. 
 
 Principles being established and recognized, genius 
 properly applies them ; and it is in this that the whole art 
 of war consists. 
 
 It seemed to me useful to set them forth in the sim- 
 plest manner; and to compose a kind of rudimentary 
 system of the military art, which shall embrace at once 
 all the branches of this art and the different services of 
 armies; by stripping it of the technical charlatanism 
 which too often accompanies it. 
 
 Nevertheless, the study of military men is not limited 
 to a knowledge of these principles: they ought, besides, 
 to read attentively the history of the campaigns of great 
 generals; for the entire genius of these superior men is 
 displayed in the application of these principles. 
 
 In this direction the military literature of France is 
 3* 
 
30 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 particularly rich ; but even here a choice may be made. 
 We prefer to go back to the source ; we limit ourselves to 
 the works of those who have themselves commanded ; for 
 little fruit may be expected from those campaigns related 
 by subaltern officers, who, strangers to all the difficulties 
 of command, and often to the first ideas of the profes- 
 sion, set themselves up as masters, as censors ; new Ther- 
 sites, they are sarcastic in their language, but feeble in 
 heart and arms; better constituted for talking than for 
 fighting. Their works are a tissue of errors and false- 
 hoods. 
 
 Above all the documents which ought to be carefully 
 studied, may be recommended the dictations of Napoleon, 
 published under the title of Memoirs of Montholon. In 
 every line we recognize the superior genius, the powerful 
 logic, the authority of the great captain. His opinions 
 or his explanations, although sometimes susceptible of 
 controversy, offer immense instruction; he who can medi- 
 tate upon and understand them, will have the very instinct 
 of war. 
 
 An older work, which cannot be too much studied, is 
 the book published by the Archduke Charles of Austria,* 
 under the title of Principles of Strategy. There may be 
 seen the application of his principles to the movements 
 which he made in 1796 against the armies of the Rhine 
 
 * Son of the Emperor Leopold II., born 1771, distinguished as a 
 general in the wars of the French revolution. His great work is 
 
 Grundxiitze der Strateyie erlaittrrt (lurch <fir I><irxlrllun<j <lrs I 
 
 von 179B, in Deut*chl<iml. Tr;m-l:u.-il iniu Kronen /or Jomini, and 
 
 annotated //// him. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 31 
 
 and of the Sambre-et-Meuse. It is a picture of all the 
 rules of great campaigns. 
 
 The Memoirs of Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr,* and the 
 History of the Campaign in Russia, by M. de Segur,f 
 may be read with advantage. It is from such sources 
 that wholesome instruction and the surest ideas must be 
 drawn. 
 
 I have long studied the constitution of the different 
 arms, and their most proper employment; and I believe 
 the principles true, which I am about to expound. I rec- 
 ommend them to those ardent, intelligent and valorous 
 young men, who are taking our places. It is for them 
 that I have written. 
 
 The work now presented to the public is the last con- 
 tingent of service which I can offer, at the close of my 
 life, to the profit of a science which I have always culti- 
 vated with ardor, and of a profession which I have pur- 
 sued with enthusiasm. 
 
 * Louis GOUVION ST. CYR, born 1764. In 1795 a general of 
 division; in 1798, in command at Rome; in 1799, with Moreau on 
 the Danube and at Hohenlinden; in 1812 with Napoleon in Russia; 
 wounded at the retreat from Moscow. He served under the resto- 
 ration; but, opposing the change in the law of elections, he re- 
 signed, went into retirement, and died in 1830. 
 
 f I visited in 1826, and spent a whole clay upon, the battle-field of 
 La Moskwa, [the last battle, near the city of Moscow, before the 
 entrance,] with many French and Russian officers who had taken 
 part in the action; I read, on the spot, the three well-known narra- 
 tions of De Segur, De Chambray, De Boutourlin; in my opinion, 
 the first mentioned alone gives an exact account of the manner in 
 which the events must have transpired there. M. 
 
32 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 My leisure has found a charm in this summary of my 
 studies and my remembrances. It is, moreover, the fruit 
 of meditations, developed in my mind by my long and fre- 
 quent conversations with Napoleon, by twenty campaigns 
 of actual war, and by more than half a century of mili- 
 tary experience. 
 
GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DEFINITIONS. 
 
 BEFORE entering upon the subject, I will begin with a 
 few definitions. 
 
 The art of war is the aggregation of the various kinds 
 of knowledge necessary for the control of a mass of armed 
 men, to organize it, to move it, to cause it to fight, and 
 to give to its component elements their greatest value, 
 compatible with their preservation. 
 
 A genius for war consists in the talent for applying 
 these elements appropriately, and for proposing the best 
 combinations, with exactness and promptitude, in the 
 midst of dangers and crises. 
 
 Military genius is incomplete, if, to the faculty of mak- 
 ing these combinations, which I will call technical, a gen- 
 eral does not unite a knowledge of human nature ; if he 
 has not the instinct to divine what is passing in the souls 
 of his soldiers, and of the enemy. These inspirations, 
 
 (33) 
 
;J4 UENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 variable as they are, form the moral* of war ; a mysterious 
 action which gives instantaneous power to an army, and 
 causes one man to be worth ten, and ten not to be equal 
 in value to one. 
 
 There are two other faculties equally necessary, author- 
 ity and decision, which are natural gifts. 
 
 Moreover, if to constitute a great general, great intel- 
 ligence is needed, still more is character requisite. It 
 is character which presides at the execution of plans. 
 It is character which, in both ancient and modern times, 
 has caused generals of the first class to shine. 
 
 The military arts consist in the knowledge of the sci- 
 entific or mechanical processes which regulate the details 
 of action, and the employment of the proper means. 
 
 Thus, strategy, tactics, artillery, fortifications, organi- 
 zation, the administration of armies, are military arts 
 which should be familiar to a general. Each art has its 
 theory ; but the talent to make use of it with advantage, 
 demands frequent applications and an observant mind. 
 
 Of all human events, those connected with war demand 
 more, doubtless, of the concurrence of that aid which 
 is called experience. The soldier must become accus- 
 tomed to danger, to that physiognomy of battles which 
 presents so many different phenomena. The man born 
 brave, will be able at the outset to expose himself to dan- 
 ger without fear and suffering, sometimes even with pleas- 
 
 * This use of moral, although recognized, is classed by Bescher- 
 elle (Dictionnaire National) among the Neologitme*. 
 
DEFINITIONS. 35 
 
 lire; but it is only by the lapse of time that he will 
 acquire the faculty of discriminating how he will be able 
 to make, by offering his life as a sacrifice, the best pos- 
 sible use of it. 
 
 Finally, the profession of arms is a life consecrated 
 to military labors ; and this expression is most properly 
 applied to those who execute rather than theorize. 
 
36 GENERAL TUKORY OP THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 General principles for the conduct of armies are not 
 very numerous, but their application gives rise to a great 
 variety of combinations, which it is impossible to foresee 
 and to lay down as rules. 
 
 The conditions in which an army finds itself vary almost 
 infinitely; the principal points of view are the combi- 
 nationr-in one, of the elements which compose it; the 
 relative condition of the two armies; the nature of the 
 theatre of war, and of the neighboring territories ; the 
 part to be played, whether offensive or defensive ; the 
 reputation and character of the general against whom we 
 act, etc. etc. 
 
 Various circumstances open an immense field to com- 
 binations ; the greatest mind is incapable of embracing 
 them all. Thus it happens that the greatest generals 
 commit blunders ; the best are those who commit the fewest. 
 The more, however, we admit new elements into our cal- 
 culations, the more we control events. A prudent fore- 
 sight must embrace in its plans not only the probable, but 
 tin- possible; and thus we have a proper guarantee against 
 fortuitous risks. Thus it is that, in the day of reverses, we 
 re and guard against great catastrophes. 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 3t 
 
 This foresight was one of the highest faculties of Napo- 
 leon in his prime. His adversaries being almost always 
 without it, the results which he thereby obtained aston- 
 ished the world. 
 
 I will lay down, as principles, certain rules of which a 
 general should never lose sight. I shall only indicate the 
 aim and design ; the means must always be subordinate to 
 circumstances. 
 
 Two armies being of nearly the same force, and of 
 about the same morale, the chances are equal. To render 
 these chances more favorable, our movements should be 
 combined in such a manner as to deceive the enemy, 
 inspiring him with such fears as will lead him to divide 
 his forces. Then the more skilful general, gathering his 
 own suddenly together, overwhelms his divided adversary ; 
 and the momentary superiority which he has been able 
 to acquire, makes the final victory comparatively easy. 
 
 Numerical superiority, at the very instant of the com- 
 bat, is of extreme importance. Doubtless the quality of 
 troops is more to be considered than their numbers ; but, 
 in the present excellent condition of the armies of Europe, 
 the number and the combination of means concur power- 
 fully to produce success. It is otherwise when civilized 
 troops fight against barbarians, who, deprived of instruc- 
 tion and without discipline, do not form a compact aggre- 
 gation. Operating without union and without harmony, 
 they are always inferior, at a given time, to the weaker 
 but more united mass by which they are opposed. Two 
 
 4 
 
38 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 attacks repeated without success often one, indeed 
 will decide the less brave to retire: the others are af- 
 fected by the contagion of example, and soon all have 
 disappeared. Conflicting opinions then take the place of 
 arms. Thus are explained the wars of the Greeks against 
 the Persians, the battles of Marathon and Plataea, the 
 conquests of Alexander, the triumphs of the small Roman 
 armies over the Germans and the Gauls, and, in our own 
 time, the success of European armies against the Turks, 
 notwithstanding the disproportion of numbers. 
 
 With the purpose of dispersing the forces of the enemy, 
 we must harass him particularly upon those points essen- 
 tial to his safety, and promptly seize the moment in which 
 he has yielded to our feints, to attack him upon a weak 
 point with superior numbers. This is just what is called 
 a feint in fencing phrase, with the sword in hand, in single 
 combat. Two or three slight partial advantages open 
 the way for the more considerable ones which decide the 
 fate of the campaign. 
 
 It is thus seen how important it is for a general to 
 assume the initiative in movements : thus he overrules the 
 design of his enemy, and a first success frequently gives 
 an ascendency which is never lost. But the favorable 
 moment must be clearly discerned. Too great a dispro- 
 portion in force and in the various means, would be an 
 insurmountable obstacle. We should wait until the con- 
 fidence of the enemy leads him into error. Profiting 
 diligently by the occasion when offered, the skilful general 
 may thus obtain an advantage which will permit him to 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 39 
 
 turn the tables on his adversary, and to pass from defen- 
 sive to offensive. 
 
 This is what happened, remarkably, in 1796, in the 
 immortal campaign of Italy. The French army, having 
 arrived at the frontiers of the Tyrol, and in a defensive 
 position, found itself much inferior to the Austrian army, 
 augmented as it was by the reinforcements led by Wurm- 
 ser* in person. The enemy's general, in attacking, had 
 divided his forces; the French general reunited his own, 
 and soon a first success enabled him to assume the offen- 
 sive in turn. Afterwards a series of victories succeeded, 
 in combats where the French army was almost always 
 superior in numbers, on the field of battle. 
 
 To sum up, in one word, this division of the art of war, 
 which applies to the general movements of armies, it 
 should be observed that it is always founded upon a cal- 
 culation of time, distance, and celerity of movement. 
 
 * Dagobert Sigismond, Graf von Wurmser, born in 1724, was a 
 septuagenarian when in command of the Austrian army in Italy. 
 After a siege of nine months he surrendered to Napoleon at Man- 
 tua in 1797. 
 
40 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 BASES AND LINES OF OPERATION AND STRATEGY. 
 
 The base of operations of an army is composed of the 
 country which it covers, which famishes its wants, which 
 sends to it every day the supplies of every kind which it 
 consumes, of men, horses, provisions and munitions, 
 and which receives its sick and wounded, etc. etc. 
 
 The line of operation is determined by the general 
 direction of the march, which is indicated by the object 
 of operation, or the point which it is desired to attain. 
 
 The general movements which are executed out of sight 
 of the enemy, and before an action, are called strategy. 
 
 Strategic points are those which it is important to 
 occupy, whether to threaten the enemy's communications, 
 or to cover our own. They should be chosen in such a 
 manner as to facilitate the combinations of the movements 
 of the different columns of an army. In general, the place 
 where many roads meet is a strategic point; in a mount- 
 ainous country, the place where many valleys come to- 
 gether is a strategic point. 
 
 Strategic lines are those which join strategic points, 
 which ure useful in the movements to be made between 
 tin-in; they should be the shortest lines possible. 
 
 In the judicious choice of strategic points and lines 
 
LINES OF OPERATION AND STRATEGY. 41 
 
 consist the safety of armies in case of reverse, and the 
 cause of the greatest results in case of success. 
 
 Napoleon possessed in an eminent degree a genius for 
 strategy; no general has ever surpassed him in this re- 
 spect ; no one has been able better to discern, in advance, 
 the point where he ought to strike. 
 
 A great army is composed of many columns ; they are 
 necessarily separated, that they may be subsisted and 
 moved with facility. Their arrangement should be such 
 that the most distant parts will be able to arrive on the 
 field in time for battle, either to take part in the combat, 
 or simply to act as a reserve. The aim of strategy is 
 to combine the march for the promptest union of troops 
 upon the same point ; sometimes on the centre ; sometimes 
 on one of the wings. A march thus regulated is what 
 Napoleon called his chess-board.* 
 
 His first campaigns were all of this character, except 
 
 * What Napoleon used to call his chess-board, was the field (zone) 
 within which the movements which he was meditating, must take 
 place. Thus, in 1813, with the complicated positions of his vari- 
 ous corps d'armees, and those of his adversaries, before his mind's 
 eye, he exclaimed to Marmont himself, (Memoires, t. v. p. 256,) 
 ' L'e"chiquier est bien embroiiiHe" ; il n'y a que moi, qui puisse s'y 
 reconnaitre!" an exclamation from which Thiers felt bound, as 
 usual, to take all its homeliness and strength. (Le Consulat el 
 r Empire, t. xvi. p. 511.) 
 
 It may be well enough to add, that the figure, which Napoleon's 
 chess-playing propensities led him thus habitually to employ, has 
 been adopted by Riistow, in his Allgemeine Taklik, (Zurich, 1858,) 
 and has been carried out by him with true German compldj^ness: 
 "From this," (he says, p. 27,) "it follows, that the number of the 
 divisions of an army cannot be a matter of indifference. While the 
 commander-in-chief is assigning them their respective places upon 
 
 4* 
 
42 (JENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 Marengo, where, deviating from this principle, he was on 
 the brink of defeat.* Everywhere else he is seen upou the 
 day of action, assembling upon the field of battle all the 
 forces of which he could reasonably dispose. 
 
 Moreau, on the contrary, whose talents have been so 
 much praised, understood nothing of strategy, -f His skill 
 was shown in tactics. Personally very brave, he handled 
 well, in the presence of the enemy, the troops occupying 
 the space which his eye took in ; but he fought his prin- 
 cipal battles with only a part of his disposable strength. 
 
 At Hohenlinden,J where his success was so brilliant, 
 
 the given chets-board, he is really making a kind of composite 
 problem. The divisions are the pieces, which he makes use of for 
 this purpose. The distribution of these pieces corresponds to the 
 subordinate problems, the successive solution of which effects the 
 solution of the problem as a whole. The number of these sub- 
 ordinate problems, into which the main problem is subdivided, 
 is repeated much in the same way upon any chess board, every 
 theatre of military operations," etc. etc. 
 
 * The principal detachment was that of Desaix, which was too 
 far off on the morning of the battle. Its forced march, and parti- 
 cipation in the renewed battle of the afternoon, were due to Desaix, 
 and not to the prevision of Napoleon. 
 
 f Napoleon himself expressed at that time his conviction and 
 disappointment that Moreau could not command one hundred thou- 
 sand men; and that there were not two men in France who could. 
 His generals, however, soon developed their powers under his 
 iii-n uctions. 
 
 I The battle was fought on the 3d of December, 1800, between 
 the French under General Moreau, and the Austrians under the 
 Arrhduki- .Inlm. in tin; forest of Hnhciilindrii. between ihe rfori 
 IHT :ui<i IIHI. The success of die Krenc-h was in u great measure 
 due to die intelligence and courage of Gem-nil Ku-hepanse, who 
 
 l.-d in jruininjr the Austrian rear, and throwing the 
 column into t'litiil 
 
LINES OF OPERATION AND STRATEGY. 43 
 
 Moreau ought to have been defeated, and would probably 
 have been, if the Austrians had not manoeuvred with un- 
 exampled carelessness. The French army was composed 
 of twelve divisions; the three on the right, commanded 
 by General Lecourbe, and the three on the left, conducted 
 by General Sainte-Susanne, took no part in the battle. 
 The Austrian army was united, but desultory in its march ; 
 the centre column, which encountered no obstacle, and 
 followed the high road, with almost all the artillery, pre- 
 sented itself unsupported, and without being formed in bat- 
 tle array ; it could thus be attacked in flank. Such good 
 fortune was not due to the dispositions of General Moreau. 
 General Richepanse, a man of talent and courage, finding 
 his division surrounded by Austrian troops, which were 
 beginning to organize, faced them in every direction, and 
 possessed himself of a hundred pieces of cannon which 
 were marching in column over the causeway. 
 
 The reunion of an army at the moment of battle being 
 the aim, and rapidity of marches the means, the divisions, 
 which are the unite, should be combined, and to that end 
 should be easy to move. An entire army will always 
 have (although it may arrive in time) a slow movement ; 
 but rapidity may be given to the elements which compose 
 it. To this end divisions should not be overburdened 
 with artillery and subsistence stores. I do not approve 
 the Russian usage of encumbering them with cannon. 
 The great reserves of material and provisions of every 
 kind should have an independent march ; should be suffi- 
 cient for themselves, and, in case of need, should be 
 
44 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 escorted by special troops. It is the province of the 
 general-in-chief to hold them always within reach of the 
 place where they will be most useful, according to their 
 destination. 
 
 There is another object which should call forth all the 
 solicitude of a general, viz., to cover perfectly his line of 
 operation, while at the same time he threatens that of the 
 enemy. Open communications are necessary to the main- 
 tenance of an army; once lost, the moral condition is 
 compromised. Confidence, that power of opinion the 
 place of which nothing in the world can supply among 
 troops, does not always resist such a trial. 
 
 Hence the necessity of an extended base of opera- 
 tions. If one stronghold and many fortified points are 
 situated upon this base, or a great river form a part of it, 
 great advantages result. The more extended the base, 
 the better is the line of operations covered. It was a 
 fundamental axiom of Napoleon. It is never departed 
 from with impunity. In his splendid campaigns of 1805,* 
 1806,f and 1809,| he has presented great examples, and 
 profited skilfully by the favorable circumstances which the 
 direction of our frontier gave him. 
 
 * 1805. The coalition of Russia, Austria, Sweden and England; 
 the naval defeat of the French at Trafalgar, was more than com- 
 pensated by the capitulation of Ulna, and the splendid victory 
 
 crlit/. which produced the peace of Presburg. 
 f IKOfi. The 1'russian campaign, containing the victory ot'.lm.i. 
 fuul the entry into Iterlin. 
 
 * 1809. The campaign of Aspern, Essling, and Wagram, term 
 
 in the trure of /IIMVTII 
 
LINES OP OPERATION AND STRATEGY. 45 
 
 Two armies which have bases of operation parallel, and 
 of the same extent, are in similar conditions ; and either 
 one, in turning the other, is also forcibly turned. But it 
 is not the same, if the two bases of operation are of dif- 
 ferent lengths and inclined towards each other. 
 
 In 1805, the French army, after the fine march from 
 the coasts of the English Channel into Germany, directed 
 itself upon the flank and rear of the Austrian army, which 
 had invaded Bavaria. A battle lost upon the Danube 
 would have thrown it back upon the Rhine; a battle 
 gained caused the conquered army to lay down its arms. 
 
 In 1806, the French army, at the opening of the cam- 
 paign, found itself upon the flank of the Prussian army ; 
 it was not the less careful to preserve its communications 
 open with France from Mayence to Basle; and these 
 communications were so well assured, that a reverse could 
 have no great consequences, while a single victory pro- 
 duced the results so well known. 
 
 In 1812,* when Napoleon strayed to an unmeasured dis- 
 tance from his point of departure, (for, let it be observed 
 that the dimensions of a base of operation to satisfy existing 
 conditions are not absolute, but relative to the length of the 
 line of operation,) his base was lost. Established at first 
 upon the position of the different corps of his army, it 
 would have sufficed if the army had remained nearer the 
 frontier. But these bodies being abandoned to themselves, 
 fluctuating, subjected to the chances of war, and encoun- 
 
 * The campaign in Russia. 
 
46 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 tering hostile bodies of at least equal forces, the army in 
 the end lost all its communications. When they reached 
 the banks of the Beresina, Napoleon was about to suc- 
 cumb ; and the army would have been shattered to frag- 
 ments, without a kind of miracle, the merit of which 
 Admiral Tchitschakoff and General Kaptzievitsch may 
 appropriate to themselves.* 
 
 But there are circumstances in which it is useful and 
 salutary to change, in the midst of a campaign, the direc- 
 tion of the line of operation, and to choose another base ; 
 and although the most natural idea and the most habitual 
 usage may be to place ourselves in front of the country 
 which we wish to defend, it sometimes happens, neverthe- 
 less, that it is placed more efficaciously in a safe condi- 
 tion, by assuming a line of operation which seems to 
 abandon it and deliver it up to the enemy. 
 
 When in 1797,f after the surrender of Mantua, the 
 French army marched upon Vienna, the Austrian army, 
 which found itself too inferior to offer battle, retired in 
 the direction of the capital. If, instead of operating 
 thus, it had taken post in the Tyrol, the natural obstacles 
 which the country presents would have established a sort 
 of equilibrium between the respective forces; the uewly- 
 
 * Tchitschakoff with the bulk of his forces was before Borisoy, 
 fully deceived by the pretended intent inn* >f the French below 
 AH. and he had only a detachment of light troops at Studi- 
 anka." THIEBS, Contulal el i Kinjiire. 
 
 + The close of the first campaign in Italy. 
 
LINES OF OPERATION AND STRATEGY. 4T 
 
 raised troops of Hungary and Croatia, who could not be 
 of good service on a day of battle, would have sufficed to 
 cover the frontier of Friuli,* hold in check a French 
 corps, and paralyse its action, notwithstanding the excel- 
 lence of its troops, (for the French army had none but 
 good troops.) Besides, the Austrian army, by taking this 
 line of operation, would have gone to meet strong rein- 
 forcements, which could only come to it from the banks of 
 the Rhine. In fine, if the war had carried the belligerent 
 armies into Suabia and Bavaria, all the Austrian forces, 
 reunited at the centre of operations, would have had the 
 power to manoeuvre under the most advantageous condi- 
 tions. The Austrian army was then very wrong in taking 
 the line of operation which it adopted. 
 
 Here is another example : In 1814, the Marshal Duke of 
 Dalmatia, (Soult,) after having operated upon the Adour, 
 was obliged to quit the basin of that river, and he directed 
 his line of operation upon Toulouse. In this he acted 
 wisely, for he thus kept off the English army from the centre 
 of France, more certainly than in retiring upon Bordeaux, 
 where they would have followed him : a small body of 
 troops, supported by the national guards, placed in rear 
 of the waste lands, and covering Bordeaux, would have 
 guaranteed the safety of that town, if the spirit of the 
 times and the political complications of the interior had 
 not rendered these wise dispositions useless. 
 
 * An old province of Northern Italy, now forming the circle of 
 Goritz, part of Triest, and the delegation of Friuli. 
 
48 OENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 To sum up Strategy has a double aim : 
 
 1. To unite all the troops, or the greatest number pos- 
 sible, on the field of action, when the enemy has only a 
 part of his own there ; in other words, to cherish a numer- 
 ical superiority for the day of battle. 
 
 2. To cover and insure our own communications, while 
 threatening those of the enemy. 
 
TACTICS. 49 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 TACTICS. 
 
 Tactics is the art of handling troops upon the field of 
 battle, and of manoeuvring them without confusion. The 
 end to be attained is to preserve order, in the midst of the 
 apparent disorder produced by such a multitude of men, 
 horses and machines, the combination of which forms 
 an army, and to obtain from them the greatest advant- 
 age. 
 
 Tactics is the science of the application of manoeuvres. 
 One may be a great tactician without any genius ; but 
 one does not become so without great practice : nothing 
 is more simple to conceive than the theory ; but the prac- 
 tice is not without difficulties. The general must be famil- 
 iar with the means foreseen and calculated by the regula- 
 tions ; he must at one glance know how to judge of a field, 
 estimate distances, determine clearly the direction, appre- 
 ciate the details, combine the links in the chain of cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 This kind of merit was incomplete in Napoleon ; a fact 
 explained by the first part of his career. 
 
 Simply an officer of artillery, up to the moment when 
 5 
 
50 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 he was placed at the head of armies, he had never com- 
 manded either a regiment, a brigade, a division, or an 
 army corps.* He had not been able to acquire that 
 power of moving troops upon a given space whicli is 
 developed by daily habit, ceaselessly varying the combina- 
 tions. The wars in Italy offered him scarcely any appli- 
 cation of this nature, the habitual actions being reduced 
 in general to combats of posts, to the attack or to the 
 defence of defiles, and to operations in the mountains. 
 
 Later, when he had attained to the supreme power, the 
 strength of the armies which he led, requiring their organ- 
 ization into army corps, rendered the application of tac- 
 tics less necessary to him. A general, at the head of 
 eighty, one hundred, or one hundred and fifty thousand 
 men, only gives the impulsion; he fixes the principal 
 points of the movements; he establishes the general con- 
 ditions of the battle; he provides, in fine, for the great 
 accidents which may occur; he is the living providence of 
 the army. The generals who manoeuvre and fight are 
 those who command thirty thousand men, and the gen- 
 erals under their orders ; these latter should be familiar 
 with tactics. If I have acquired some reputation in this 
 respect, I owe it to ray long sojourn in the camp of Xri>t, 
 where, for more than a year, I was constantly occupied in 
 instructing excellent troops, and in instructing myself, 
 
 * Brigadier-General Chanez, former sergeant of iln> G 
 Frar^aises, commanding officer <>!' I'mi- .luring tin- winter ( 
 "., taught tin- iimiuMtvreB to General Bonapurir, who was 
 then general-in chief of (be army of the interior. M. 
 
f yNIVERSiTY J 
 
 ' - TACTICS. 
 
 51 
 
 with that emulation and fervor which a first separate com- 
 mand in the palmy days of youth, affords. 
 
 Tactics has the same aim as strategy, but upon a 
 smaller scale and a different theatre. Instead of operat- 
 ing over a vast country, and for whole days, the action is 
 upon a battle-field the extent of which is embraced by the 
 eye, and the movements upon which are accomplished in 
 a few hours. The basis of the combinations, the proposed 
 aim, is, always to be stronger than the enemy at an indi- 
 cated point of the battle. Tactical talent consists in caus- 
 ing the unexpected arrival, upon the most accessible and 
 the most important positions, of means which destroy the 
 equilibrium, and give the victory; to execute, in a word, 
 with promptness, movements which disconcert the enemy, 
 and for which he is entirely unprepared. 
 
 To this effect it is essential to employ reserves appro- 
 priately and with judgment : this displays the true genius 
 for war. We should carefully avoid using them too 
 soon or too late; if too soon, we employ our means 
 uselessly, and deprive ourselves of them at the moment 
 when they will be most necessary ; if too late, we either 
 allow the victory to be incomplete, or the reverse to in- 
 crease and become irreparable. 
 
 Every soldier should be compelled to expend his entire 
 energies ; but exhaustion comes, and it is at that moment, 
 so important to recognize, that the use of succors is 
 urgent. One thing is certain, they will not fail to be 
 asked for a long time before the urgency is real. 
 
 Napoleon was very skilful in this respect; he saw 
 
02 GENERAL THEORY <>F THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 clearly the knot of the battle. At Liitzen,* he furnished me 
 with a splendid proof. The engagement was unexpected. 
 Believing the enemy to be in retreat, the emperor had set 
 out for Leipsic with two army corps, and had directed me 
 to make a strong reconnoissance upon Pegau. Starting 
 from Rippach,f where I had passed the night, I deemed it 
 prudent to make my movement by the right bank of the 
 ravine, although this was the longer road. I did not wish 
 to endanger my communications with the main body of 
 the army, which owed its safety to this circumstance. I 
 reached Starsiedel, in battle order, precisely at the mo- 
 ment when the enemy, having surprised the third corps, 
 was about to surround and destroy it. I had the time to 
 cover it partially, and to protect its right, while it flew 
 to arms. The battle was fought immediately: immense 
 masses of troops, an enormous cavalry and a considerable 
 artillery attacked me. While the third corps was sus- 
 taining at Kaya a very obstinate infantry engagement, 
 Napoleon flew to that point. The forces which I had in 
 my front, constantly increasing in numbers, I sent to ask 
 him for reinforcements ; he sent word back that the battle 
 was at Kaya, and not at Starsiedel ; and he was right. I 
 had indeed hindered the loss of a battle at its beginning, 
 but it was in the centre that it was won. 
 
 In other circumstances Napoleon judged less justly. 
 
 At the Moskwa, he displayed a fatal circumspection 
 
 * Campaign of 1813. 
 
 f Where Marshal BenBiere8 was killed. 
 
TACTICS. 53 
 
 in refusing to allow his guard to march, when at two 
 o'clock General Belliard came to ask it of him. The 
 Russian army was then in the greatest confusion; im- 
 mense results would have been obtained with fresh troops ; 
 one hour of respite saved the enemy.* 
 
 Napoleon was thus unfaithful to one of his favorite 
 principles, which I have heard him repeat: "That those 
 who preserve their fresh troops for the morning after a 
 battle are almost always beaten." He added: "If it be 
 necessary, the very last man should be given up; because 
 on the morning after a complete success there are no more 
 obstacles before us. Opinion alone insures new triumphs 
 to the conqueror." 
 
 In the same manner, at Waterloo, Napoleon caused his 
 guard to charge too late. If it had marched whilst the 
 cavalry was performing prodigies, the English infantry 
 would probably have been overthrown, and the French 
 army, disembarrassed of the English, would have been 
 able to receive, fight and conquer the Prussians.! 
 
 * This is echoed by Thiers, (Consulat el V Empire:} "At the great 
 battle of Moskwa his hesitation to send his guard into action was 
 probably the cause which prevented the complete destruction of the 
 Russian army." But he afterwards extenuates the fault: "If at 
 the Moskwa he did not make use of his guard, it was because he 
 found it necessary to act cautiously in an enterprise of which he 
 began to see the folly." 
 
 f He contemplated a last charge just before the forward movement 
 of the allies. "Napole"on, ayant runi dans ces entrefaites les six 
 autres bataillons de la vieille garde de"tache"s sur divers points, se 
 dispose a seconder les efforts sur Mont-Saint-Jean, lorsque le 
 
 5* 
 
>4 GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. 
 
 To sum up Tactics may be defined : the art of move- 
 ments executed in presence of the enemy, using the forma- 
 tion which offers most advantages, and which is most in 
 harmony with circumstances. 
 
 dt-sordre qui commence a se manifester dans la droite du corps 
 d'Erlon, le contraint a faire former ces bataillons en Carre's." 
 JOMINI, Camp, de 1815, p. 216. 
 
MANOEUVRES. 55 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 MANOEUVRES. 
 
 Manoeuvres are the means by which the principles of 
 tactics are applied. They consist in the art of moving- 
 masses, and of causing them to pass, without confusion 
 and with rapidity, from the order of march to the order 
 of battle, even in the midst of the fire, and the converse. 
 
 Troops may fight and march in all the formations; 
 but there are some preferable to others ; certain of them 
 for fighting, others for marching; and formations for bat- 
 tle vary also according to circumstances. 
 
 Thus troops are deployed when they are to receive the 
 enemy, and he is marching upon their position to subject 
 him to an extended fire; otherwise he would approach 
 almost without danger. If we are marching upon him, 
 we may also deploy ; but that is not without great dan- 
 ger, on account of the fluctuating character of a march 
 in line of battle, and the disorder which may result from 
 it. It is preferable, therefore, to have only a part of the 
 troops deployed, and to alternate these with columns, 
 which are so many compact points where the authority of 
 officers will have less difficulty in maintaining order. It 
 was with this formation that the right and. centre of the 
 French army in Italy traversed in If 9t the vast plains of 
 the Tagliamento, in presence of the Austrian army. 
 
56 UKNERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART 
 
 The attack of a position requires the most rapid 
 march, and, the space to be passed over being often brist- 
 ling with obstacles, the troops should always be formed 
 in column by battalions. These little masses are easy to 
 move; they cross, without difficulty, all the defiles; the 
 rear, less exposed to the fire of the enemy than the front, 
 pushes the front forward, and thus they arrive at the point 
 to be attacked the more quickly. 
 
 As a complement to this disposition of troops, a great 
 number of skirmishers should precede the columns, and 
 march in a direction corresponding to the intervals of the 
 battalions, in such a manner as to divide the fire of the 
 enemy, and to cover the deployment if it becomes neces- 
 sary, without masking the heads of columns, which may 
 immediately commence firing. The skirmishers thus 
 placed will find themselves supported ; they have rallying 
 points, designated and within reach, and they can never 
 be compromised. 
 
 The formation in square can be only accidentally made, 
 and for the purpose of resisting, in an open country, the 
 attack of a numerous cavalry. As this formation does 
 not easily agree with the ordinary movements and with 
 a combat against infantry, troops should be accustomed 
 to pass as rapidly as possible from the deployed order 
 to the deep order, and vice versa. 
 
 We have seen nevertheless, in Egypt,* troops formed in 
 scjimres for the march, and for whole days at a time. 
 
 * MONTHOLON, (Dictations of Napoleon at St Helena,) Campaign in 
 Egypt, where the necessity of tin- f'orm:ition is t'ullv ^ei forth. 
 
MANOEUVRES. 57 
 
 But that happened from two causes : it was desired to 
 assure and inspirit the soldiers against the impetuous at- 
 tacks of a new enemy, and to cover and secure the sick, 
 the wounded, and the artillery.* A superfluous and almost 
 ridiculous depth was given to the squares, by placing the 
 men in six ranks. It is true that this was changed as 
 soon as it was found that the precautions were exagger- 
 ated, and they were satisfied with a square of three ranks, 
 and even of two ; nor did they recur even to this forma- 
 tion except at the moment when they foresaw an immedi- 
 ate charge of the enemy. 
 
 In general, the march in square is detestable ; however 
 little it is prolonged, it leads to disorder ; for the condi- 
 tions of the march are not the same upon the different 
 sides of the square, two sides marching in line of battle 
 and the other two by the flank. 
 
 * Add to these the savans whom Napoleon had taken with him 
 into Egypt: "They had been supplied with asses, the beasts of 
 burden easiest attained in Egypt, to transport their persons and 
 philosophical apparatus ; and loud shouts of laughter used to 
 burst from the ranks while forming to receive the Mamelukes, 
 when the general of division called out with military precision, 
 <Let the asses and the savans enter within the square.' The sol- 
 diers also amused themselves by calling the asses demi-savans."- 
 Scott's Life of Napoleon. 
 
THE ORGANIZATION, FORMATION AND 
 MAINTENANCE OF ARMIES. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 THE ORGANIZATION AND FORMATION OF TROOPS. 
 
 The organization and formation of troops are by no 
 means arbitrary undertakings ; they have for their aim, to 
 render compact a combination of men, and with them to 
 form a whole, a movable unit: the rules to be established 
 rest upon conditions determined by the faculties of the 
 individual commander, and by the nature of the arms 
 which he employs. 
 
 To form troops, the first thing to be done is to estab- 
 lish order and secure obedience. It is with this aim that 
 a classification and successive ties have been conceived, 
 which, combined with skill, oblige a great mass of indi- 
 viduals to submit to the action of authority. 
 
 (59) 
 
60 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 FIRST SECTION. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 We commence by forming a small mass, easy to govern ; 
 we then unite many of these masses, subordinating their 
 commanders to a superior commander: in this case, the 
 unit is no longer a man, but a number of men united. 
 
 Thus a squad, composed of eighteen or twenty men, 
 obeys a sergeant, aided by corporals ; the union of squads 
 forms a company, which is commanded by a captain, aided 
 by subordinate officers ; and many companies form a larger 
 mass, called a battalion, The commander of a battalion, 
 in contact only with four, six, or eight men, commands 
 through them as a medium, and thus acts upon the 
 whole. 
 
 The company is the element of the organization, dis- 
 cipline and administration: the battalion is the true mili- 
 tary element in the infantry ; the unit for battle. It is 
 by battalion that movements and manoeuvres are made ; it 
 is by battalion that the fighting is done. 
 
 As to the numerical strength of a battalion, it may 
 vary, but only within certain limits, which are prescribed 
 by the very nature of things. We should not adhere to 
 the letter of the proverb " The God of hosts is on the 
 aide of the heavy battalions" a proverb, moreover, which 
 is doubtless understood to apply to large armies, thus 
 l -iirnating the whole by a part. Two conditions are 
 observed in the numerical composition of a battalion. It 
 be cany to move, and, when deployed, the voice of 
 
INFANTRY. 61 
 
 the commander should be readily heard at both extrem- 
 ities of the line. Observing these limits, the number of 
 companies, and the personnel of each company may be 
 increased more or less, at will. 
 
 There is a proper proportion to be established in the 
 number of officers and soldiers. That suggested by expe- 
 rience, as best uniting economy with good service, is 
 one officer to forty soldiers; or twenty-five officers to a 
 battalion of one thousand men. It will be easily seen, 
 that a great number of supernumerary officers has only the 
 disadvantage of greater expense to the government; in 
 every other respect they are useful, whether by multiply- 
 ing the means of action, and of superintendence, and as 
 models of courage, or by making an easy system of re- 
 wards, by more rapid promotion. 
 
 The effective force of organization differs also among 
 nations. The strongest battalions are the Austrian, the 
 weakest the English. The full number, in Austria, is over 
 twelve hundred men; these are too many for good ser- 
 vice. It is hardly possible, with such a number, to move 
 with order and facility. 
 
 I see, however, an advantage in this arrangement : as 
 losses in war are constantly occurring, and as recruits are 
 often kept back, so large a battalion resists for a longer 
 time; even a great diminution in its force does not render 
 it unserviceable. 
 
 In France, we have habitually had weak battalions, and 
 their effective force, even when entering upon a cam- 
 
 6 
 
82 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 paign, is almost always below the prescribed number of 
 the organization. 
 
 I will place, as the limit, one thousand men to a bat- 
 talion ; and that, because the number cannot be preserved 
 entire, when it passes from a state of peace to that of 
 war, when it leaves the garrison to enter on a cam- 
 paign. 
 
 As the result of constant observation, it may be said, 
 that the corps best governed and in finest condition, under- 
 goes at that period a diminution of one-fifth, i.e. of the 
 men in the hospitals, the workmen who remain at the 
 depot, the men belonging to the train, etc. etc. A bat- 
 talion of one thousand men, has then no more than eight 
 hundred men under arms ; after a few months of the cam- 
 paign it is reduced to five hundred, an effective force still 
 sufficient in presence of the enemy. 
 
 The formation which is adopted for the battalion will 
 also influence its numerical strength. 
 
 In all the continental armies the infantry is formed in 
 three ranks; in England it is formed in two.* This latter 
 formation seems to me far preferable. Nothing justifies 
 the third rank. 
 
 Without entering into details concerning the firings, 
 we may appeal to experience. On drill the firing may 
 be by three ranks, but not in war. The French tactics 
 prescribe that the musket shall be passed to the third 
 rank, designing that rank only to load, not to fire. It is a 
 
 * The Unit. ! Sen,- infantry arc formed habitually in two, and 
 !'! the reasons 1> nted. 
 
INFANTRY. 3 
 
 theory not applicable when before the enemy, and a prac- 
 tical experience has condemned it to disuse. Fighting is 
 done with musket firing when troops are in position. 
 The best formation then is that which renders the fire 
 most effective; which gives it the best direction, and 
 greatest development. Indeed the third rank soon min- 
 gles itself with the two first: it takes instinctively the 
 most advantageous formation; but the change being 
 made contrary to order, brings with it a kind of disor- 
 ganization. It would be better, for these reasons, to 
 settle upon the formation in two ranks, and to render it 
 permanent. 
 
 In placing the troops in three ranks, the design was to 
 give them more consistence when inarching in line of battle. 
 But the means does not attain the end. Even in three 
 ranks a line in movement is far from solid ; and for a 
 march in line of battle I would prefer a still deeper for- 
 mation. 
 
 At all events, with a slight modification the forma- 
 tion in two ranks will fulfil all the required conditions. 
 Thus : 
 
 When in position, the troops have, by that very fact, a 
 front half as large again. In marching in line, ploy the 
 first and fourth divisions in rear of the second and third, 
 and you will have four ranks, and at the moment of halt- 
 ing, you will present a front, less by a fifth, it is true, than 
 that of the existing formation; but in two minutes it may 
 be doubled. Here then, for the march, is a solid and 
 compact formation, which will permit a battalion to fire 
 
64 FORMATION', KT\ OF ARMIES. 
 
 in every direction, in case of an unexpected charge of 
 cavalry, which may have surrounded it, simply by an 
 about face, executed by the first and fourth divisions, 
 which have doubled on the second and third. 
 
 The formation in two ranks, with this disposition car- 
 ried out when marching in line of battle, seems to me 
 incontestably the best. 
 
 After the formation of the battalion comes that of the 
 regiment. Here all is arbitrary, and depends upon the 
 caprices of the organizing power. The regiment may 
 be of two or three, or of four, five and six battalions ; it 
 is only a question of administration and economy. 
 
 The regiments composed of many battalions are less 
 expensive, with the same number of men. There is econ- 
 omy in the organization of the staff, and in the advant- 
 ages of a community of subsistence applied to the greater 
 number. Such regiments have in general a better spirit, 
 a regimental tone (esprit de corps) the more energetic, 
 because there is a greater number of individuals honor- 
 ably vieiug for reputation and glory. They have more 
 brilliancy (eclat) too in the public eye, their force putting 
 them in condition to execute, without aid, the greatest 
 plans. 
 
 In wars of invasion, in occupying extended countries, 
 regiments thus constituted may form echelons in order to 
 gather together as they march the men who have lingered 
 in the rear. These intermediate bodies receive the re- 
 rmits, s.-t tin-in up, and thus act as feeders to the battal- 
 ion < which an- in front of the enemy. In this manner a 
 
INFANTRY. 65 
 
 great economy of men is attained, an economy not less 
 important than that of money. 
 
 In general, the regiment is an essentially administrative 
 formation. It is of the character of a kind of social con- 
 stitution, animated by a patriotic and domestic spirit. 
 
 The colonel is the chief of this form of municipality, 
 the father, and the magistrate ; and without any desire to 
 depreciate courage, the first of military virtues, the essen- 
 tial qualities of a colonel, those which most influence the 
 excellence of a regiment, are less an extraordinary intre- 
 pidity, than a spirit of order and justice, and great firm- 
 ness. The best corps are those which are thus com- 
 manded. 
 
 On principle, a regiment of infantry should be instructed 
 for every kind of service ; and the conditions and necessi- 
 ties of war require that it should have a light infantry 
 which should belong to, and be part of it. Neverthe- 
 less special light infantry corps have been deemed useful, 
 and I share this opinion. For vanguards, for detachments, 
 in intersected and mountainous countries, there are wanted 
 men endowed with special instruction, who know, by a 
 peculiar instinct, how best to surmount obstacles, and 
 who, drilled to the greatest precision and address, know 
 how to deliver the deadliest fire. 
 
 But, according to my judgment, in no army have the 
 true principles been followed. 
 
 In France and in Russia, there are regiments of light 
 infantry ; these bodies scarcely differ, either in name or in 
 dress, from ordinary regiments of the line. 
 
Ofi FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 Recently, in France, the Chasseurs de Vincennes have 
 been established. This is a good institution, but incom- 
 plete in so far as that the battalions which compose this 
 corps are not divided into campaign battalions, and gar- 
 rison battalions, according to the principles which I shall 
 enunciate hereafter. 
 
 In Austria, there are battalions of chasseurs; in Eng- 
 land, there are light infantry companies belonging to a 
 regiment which never leaves its depot. These two organ- 
 izations are worth more than our own; but even they 
 have need of modifications. 
 
 The regiments of infantry have their voltigeurs. In 
 this respect, one immediate want is already satisfied. By 
 recruiting the voltigeurs from the centre companies, men 
 may be chosen who are most in condition to render good 
 service. 
 
 The special corps of light infantry should have numer- 
 ical strength proportional to the needs of heavy van- 
 guards, and mountain warfare. Regiments of many 
 battalions are too strong for this service; and as it 
 necessitates an extreme division of soldiers, one chief 
 cannot command a great number. Such an organization 
 should be adopted, therefore, as would present to the 
 enemy only a strong battalion. 
 
 This would be done by having three strong companies. 
 I would propose that a battalion of light infantry should 
 consist of twelve hundred men, formed into six companies 
 of two hundred men each, each company commanded by 
 li\e (.Hirers. lint it i- not -ulVieient that these troops 
 
INFANTRY. 67 
 
 should have special instruction; they should have more 
 vigor and youth than the others; the choice of men is of 
 the greatest importance. 
 
 If a new corps is formed it may be constituted in the 
 most satisfactory manner ; and yet, at the end of a few 
 years, there will be, to govern young soldiers, a heavy 
 official organization, (cadre,) and the corps will have 
 lost all its agility. 
 
 Light infantry corps should be composed of two bat- 
 talions, the one of twelve hundred men, designed to be 
 always maintained complete in numbers, and on a war 
 footing; the other, of four companies, composed of from 
 six to eight hundred men, which I will call the garrison 
 battalion, designed to instruct recruits, to receive all the 
 men yet in a condition for service, but who are no longer 
 fit for the war of outposts, which requires so much vigor 
 and youth. 
 
 I see another advantage in this disposition. There are 
 thus placed in the hands of a general, very fine corps, 
 which he may employ to garrison places or fortified posts, 
 threatened by the enemy. 
 
 I know that it is always a painful resolution to station 
 in garrison, a good regiment or a part of a good regiment, 
 which is in a condition to take the field ; but on the other 
 hand it is both absurd and fatal to confide the protection 
 and defence of such a place to poor troops. They sur- 
 render the place, at the first attacks of the enemy, and the 
 general sees the prop (point d'appui) upon which he 
 
tJS FORMATION, ETC. or AH MIES. 
 
 depended disappear, at the very moment when most 
 necessary to him. 
 
 In Spain, I twice suffered this painful experience Gen- 
 eral Dorsenue had formed the garrison at Ciudad Rod- 
 rigo* negligently, and that place, which had resisted for 
 twenty-five days, of regular approaches, the siege of the 
 French army, and the most powerful means, was taken in 
 four days by the English, even while the army of Portu- 
 gal was flying to its succor. 
 
 A little later, I had caused to be fortified, with the 
 greatest care, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, in 
 order to secure the communication of the army of Portu- 
 gal with that of Southern Spain. Works reveted with 
 masonry, joined with a redoubt, covered the left bank ; 
 advanced forts defended the only passage by which the 
 enemy's artillery could debouche. This post of Almaraz 
 was of the greatest importance ; I had there placed gar- 
 risons of sufficient strength. But the troops were of a 
 mixed character, and the poor troops were in the major- 
 ity, particularly a German battalion called Prussian. The 
 good troops occupied the advanced posts which defended 
 the hill of Miravete. The enemy presented themselves 
 unexpectedly; the English column which conducted the 
 artillery was arrested, and could not pass. But another 
 column, having passed by footpaths over the girdle of 
 rocks which borders the elevated plain, arrived with 
 scaling ladders, and attempted the assault. The l.-a>t 
 
 * Vide Thiers, (Cotuulat et V Empire,} January. 181ii, wh-r, thi 
 hcr<- n-t'rrrftd to ar ^'IVD 
 
CAVALRY. 69 
 
 resistance would have been sufficient to repel such an 
 audacious attack, executed in open daylight. The com- 
 mander of the fort, Major Aubert, a very brave soldier, 
 sprung upon the parapet to encourage his intimidated 
 troops ; he was killed ; his death spread terror among his 
 men, and the garrison fled to the other side of the Tagus, 
 abandoning the fort to the enemy, who retired after hav- 
 ing destroyed its means of defence. 
 
 SECOND SECTION. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 In cavalry, as in infantry, the end to be attained com- 
 prises, order, obedience, facility of movement; but the 
 manner of fighting and the nature of the weapons not 
 being the same, everything differs in the application. 
 
 The fire-arms used by cavalry are a superfluous acces- 
 sory ; their most common use is as means of signals. 
 
 Cavalry is instituted for hand to hand fighting ; it is to 
 cross swords with the enemy, to shock, to overthrow, to 
 pursue. To pursue an enemy is its habitual office ; for it 
 is rare that the two parties come into collision. Almost at 
 the moment of contact, the less confident of the two halts, 
 and then turns to flight. 
 
 The movements of this arm should always be rapid and 
 impetuous ; sometimes even but only with small bodies 
 there may be a headlong movement which resembles im- 
 prudence. 
 
70 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIKS. 
 
 The French cavalry is the finest in the world for fight- 
 ing; its charges are fearless and thorough, (au fond.) 
 It is sometimes indeed the victim of rashness; but in gen- 
 eral, and upon occasion, what favorable results does such 
 temerity produce ! 
 
 In our first and immortal campaigns in Italy, how many 
 thousands of prisoners were due to a mere handful of 
 horse ! 
 
 To command cavalry, where large masses are concerned, 
 superior qualities and special merits are necessary. There 
 is nothing so rare as a man who knows how to wield, con- 
 duct and use them appropriately. In the French armies, 
 we can count but three in twenty years of war ; Keller- 
 mann,* Montbrun, and La Salle. 
 
 The qualities necessary for a general of cavalry are of 
 so varied a nature, and are so rarely combined in the 
 same person, that they seem almost to exclude each 
 other. 
 
 The first thing to be mentioned is a sure and prompt 
 coup d'oeil, a rapid and energetic decision, which does 
 not, however, exclude prudence; for an error made and a 
 blunder committed, in the beginning of a movement, are 
 irreparable in consequence of the small amount of tiim 1 
 required to execute it. It is otherwise with infantry, 
 whose march is always slow, compared with the move- 
 ments of a general and his aides-de-camp. 
 
 * The younger KrlU-rmuim, whose famous cavalry charge, when 
 Desaix waft leading his division against the advancing Ansirinns, 
 won the day. 
 
CAVALRY. 
 
 The cavalry general should study to place his troops 
 under shelter from the fire of the enemy, and at the same 
 time to keep them in position ; but to lavish them when 
 the moment of attack has arrived. The evening before a 
 battle, and indeed until they are called out to fight, he 
 will watch over the comfort, both of men and horses, 
 with minute care ; he will foster these forces in all their 
 valor, but when the moment has arrived, he must know 
 how to launch forth that cavalry without regard to the 
 chances of loss, with the sole purpose of making the 
 most of them. 
 
 A general scarcely ever fulfils in the same degree these 
 two conditions. One, of excellent administrative powers, 
 takes good care of his cavalry; but, too much occupied 
 with this thought, he does not dare to launch them upon 
 the enemy, and they become useless on the day of battle. 
 Another, always ready to lead them into action, takes so 
 little care of them during the campaign, that they perish 
 of want before they see the enemy. To cite two exam- 
 ples : We might reproach Murat with that want of care ; 
 and the contrary excess may be charged to the general 
 who commanded the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, after 
 Bessieres* was wounded, at Wagram. If the charge had 
 been made at the time when the offensive movement of 
 
 * Jean Baptiste Bessieres, (Marshal of France and Duke of 
 Istria;) born in 1768; entered as a private in Louis XVI. Consti- 
 tutional Guard in 1791. Captain of Chasseurs in 179G, at the 
 beginning of the first campaign in Italy ; rose rapidly ; was Mar- 
 shal of the Empire in 1804; Duke of Istria in 1808: gained the 
 famous battle of Medina del Rio Seco in Spain : wounded at Wag- 
 
72 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 Macdonald, sustained by the artillery of the Imperial 
 Guard, had overthrown the Austrian right, twenty thou- 
 sand prisoners would have fallen into our hands. 
 
 Cavalry, when about to attack the enemy, and the men 
 to fight hand to hand, should never fight in column. This 
 formation will serve to facilitate its march ; but at the mo- 
 ment of its approach to the enemy, it must be deployed. 
 A column of cavalry surrounded, is soon destroyed; for 
 there are very few of the soldiers who are within reach 
 to use their arms. Cavalry when deployed should be 
 formed into two ranks, so as to check the disorder which 
 might occur in the first rank : it was formerly in three ; 
 but it did not require much time to manifest the vice of 
 that formation. 
 
 The fighting unit is called a squadron: the rule, for 
 determining its strength, is to unite the greatest mobility 
 with the maintenance of order. 
 
 A squadron having too great a front would be easily 
 thrown into disorder by the slightest obstacle, and every 
 troop in disorder is half conquered. Experience proves 
 thai the host formation, that which most completely unites 
 strength and consistence with great facility of movement, 
 is a squadron of forty-eight files, divided into four sub- 
 divisions of twelve each. Subdivisions of from sixteen to 
 
 ram, 1809; killed at Kippach. the evening before the battle of I.iii- 
 teu, 1813 
 
 'I IK- oflircr IIITI- rcfVrifl to was General Walther, who, wlu-n -n- 
 iiulil to charge with the cavalry of the (iu:ml, 
 vii'l ln> miiM only receive .P|,T- from Bessieres. As Bessicrcs 
 had bui-u WMUii'lfl jusl lu-fui-f, no orlci> were pvcii. 
 
CAVALRY. 73 
 
 eighteen files would also be proper at the beginning of a 
 campaign, especially with light troops, where more active 
 service and numerous detachments weaken the corps. 
 
 The inconsiderable number of men and horses permits 
 that arrangement in the cavalry, which would be impos- 
 sible in infantry: i.e. the fighting unit is the same as the 
 unit of administration. 
 
 In general, perfection in the service would demand in 
 every arm an organization which may be at once applied 
 to the combat and to daily existence, that is, to the arrange- 
 ment of barracks, to administration and manoeuvres ; an 
 organization which should constantly keep the troop in 
 the hands of the same commanders, and would thus give 
 'it more fixedness and power. 
 
 Formerly the squadrons were composed of two com- 
 panies. One of the two captains thus found himself sub- 
 ordinate to the other; this was a vicious combination. 
 He who commands should have a social superiority, con- 
 stant and determined, over those who obey him. Such is 
 the fundamental principle of a hierarchy. Nevertheless, 
 we did carry on war with squadrons thus formed; but 
 after the peace a serious discussion engaged all the best 
 minds ; the squadron company was adopted, and the sol- 
 diers, whatever their position and circumstances, always 
 remain under the orders of one chief.* 
 
 * Lieutenant-General Pr<>val, who, under the restoration, was a 
 member of the council of war, and one of its luminaries, is the 
 author of the principal ameliorations which were then adopted at 
 the organization of the cavalry. M. 
 
 7 
 
7t FORMATION, KTC. OF ARM IKS. 
 
 There is, in the formation of cavalry in line of battle, 
 a difference between the usages of the French army and 
 those of the German and Russian. With us, the squad- 
 rons are at equal distances from each other; with the 
 others, they are placed together two and two ; and form 
 a division without interval. This formation, preserving 
 the same mobility to the squadrons, gives more consistence 
 to each point of the line ; and, in that respect, there is an 
 advantage; but, on the other hand, in the French forma- 
 tion, the front of the line is greater with an equal number 
 of combatants, which causes an extension of the wings. 
 I will not decide between these two formations, the ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages of which seem nearly bal- 
 anced. 
 
 Cavalry is a necessary arm in war, to reconnoitre and 
 to give news of the enemy's movements. Such is the 
 duty of the cavalry called light ; it is the sight and hear- 
 ing of the army : without it a general is at every moment 
 environed with dangers. 
 
 Cavalry is also useful in fighting, and especially to turn 
 a victory to profit. Without cavalry, a battle gained 
 gives no decisive result. 
 
 We put that to the proof in 1813, after having con- 
 quered, at Liitzen and at Bautzen, the Russians and Prus- 
 sians, with our infantry alone :* it is a general opinion that 
 these victories were of great importance; but no real 
 
 * After the almost annihilation of the Grande armte in 1812, the 
 
 lifncult task for Napoleon was to create a proper cavalry 
 
 force. This accounts fur their inefficiency at Liitzen and Bautzen. 
 
CAVALRY. 75 
 
 advantage resulted from them. A flying enemy can 
 always be rallied, when we do not reach him rapidly, at 
 the moment of his disorder. 
 
 Cavalry in battle have a double object: 1st, to fight the 
 enemy's cavalry, and to pursue the conquered army ; 2d, 
 to fight against infantry drawn up to resist it. 
 
 To fight against infantry, there is needed a heavy cav- 
 alry, barbed with steel, and sufficiently covered or shel- 
 tered from the fire, to attack it without fear. They should 
 be armed with lances and sabres; each man should have 
 simply a pistol ; there is no need of other fire-arms, ex- 
 cept a prescribed number of carbines to each squadron, 
 so that every regiment shall have the means of informing 
 itself when it is isolated. 
 
 There is a fourth kind of mounted troops, of very 
 ancient institution,* and whose nature has been altered, it 
 is difficult to say for what reason ; I speak of dragoons. 
 
 In the beginning, they were only mounted infantry; 
 they should always have preserved that character. With 
 this condition dragoons may, in a thousand circumstances, 
 render immense service : in detachments, for surprises, in 
 retrograde movements, and principally in pursuits. But 
 it is necessary that, in conformity with their establishment, 
 they should be mounted upon horses too small to be put 
 into line ; otherwise, the aspirations and ambition of the 
 
 * It was Marshal de Brissac, who in the sixteenth century, dur- 
 ing the wars in Piedmont, established the first corps of dragoons, 
 and found great advantage in their use. M. 
 
76 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 colonels would soon change them into cavalry, and they 
 would become at once bad infantry and bad cavalry. 
 
 A troop should have its creeds, its convictions, its faith, 
 the resultant of sacred principles and even of prejudices, 
 which are inculcated in their minds. But the intelligence 
 of the soldiers must not be confused, by professing in 
 their hearing opposite opinions, by saying in a solemn 
 manner when they are exercised as cavalry that cavalry 
 must always triumph over infantry ; and, when the moment 
 for exercises on foot arrives, to teach them by counter- 
 comment that a good infantry is invincible by cavalry. 
 When applied, the axioms recur to the mind of the sol- 
 dier almost always in an inverse application. As a foot- 
 soldier he remembers to what extent the cavalry is the 
 formidable arm; as horseman, he does not forget how 
 much infantry is to be feared by cavalry. 
 
 I repeat, nothing is more useful than the establish- 
 ment of dragoons ; but they must not be perverted. 
 
 The horses should be small, as has been said; their 
 equipments, as well of men as of horses, should be solely 
 calculated for the commodious and rapid service of a real 
 infantry, armed with irood muskets having bayonets, and 
 \\rll provided with ammunition. The dragoons should 
 also be elothed and shod for ease in marching. 
 
 As to the cavalry, properly so called, cavalry of the 
 line and cuirassiers, I would arm them with lances, and 
 half-curved sabres, fit for the double purpose of pointing 
 ami rutting, and with a pistol: in each squadron, there 
 should be twenty breech-loading carbines. 
 
CAVALRY. 77 
 
 I have elsewhere considered the subject of the lance; 
 and that I may not impair the unity of the matter, I will 
 bring together the arguments which recommend that arm, 
 "the queen of arms," according to the expression of Mar- 
 shal Saxe. 
 
 I shall begin, however, with the remark, that it is in 
 nowise a fit weapon for light cavalry, who having to 
 defend themselves against numerous enemies at the same 
 time, should be provided with fire-arms and with sabres. 
 Notwithstanding, it is light cavalry which has been armed 
 with the lance, in those countries into which it has been 
 imported. 
 
 But we know with what facility new usages are adopted ; 
 in the most civilized countries the authority of example 
 induces a blind confidence. We do not go back to the 
 origin, nor to the circumstances which elucidate it ; we do 
 not consider essential differences ; and hence we have faulty 
 and undigested applications. Thus, whence comes the 
 improper employment of the lance in the arming of 
 mounted troops ? From the examples set to us by war- 
 like hordes, such as the Cossacks and Arabs. These 
 tribes inhabit plains where horses are abundant; they 
 fight without instruction and without rule, and throw the 
 lance with wonderful effect. It has therefore been said 
 considering them as light troops the lance is the weapon 
 for light cavalry. 
 
 The origin of this weapon has not been sought for, nor 
 the reason why these tribes make so skilful a use of it. 
 
 In a barbarous country, where industry has not yet 
 7* 
 
78 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 penetrated, where there exist neither manufactures of 
 arms nor armories, nor the money to buy them abroad, a 
 man mounts his horse, and wants a weapon ; he cuts a 
 long branch from a tree of light wood, sharpens the 
 point, hardens it in the fire, and that is the lance. A 
 little later, he procures a large nail, and puts it at the 
 end ; his weapon becomes a more dangerous one. Finally, 
 this rod is furnished with an iron tip, regularly fashioned, 
 and behold the lance which our troops have adopted. 
 
 It is not of their own choice that the Cossacks and the 
 Arabs arm themselves thus, but from necessity. And if 
 they have become formidable by their skill in handling the 
 lance, it is because they have used it from their infancy. 
 
 Nothing, with regard to light troops, specially organ- 
 ized in a civilized country, should be concluded from such 
 examples. 
 
 The lance is the weapon for cavalry of the line, and 
 principally for those destined to fight against infantry. 
 The sabre cannot supply its place: armed with sabres, 
 what use could cavalry make of them, if the infantry re- 
 main firm, and are not struck with fright ? The horseman 
 cannot sabre the foot-soldier; the bayonets keep the horse 
 at too great a distance. On the other hand, let the 
 horse which remains tin- only offensive arm of the cav- 
 alry soldier be killed ; he falls and opens a breach, and 
 that breach gives to those nearest to him the mean- of 
 jifiiclratiiiLr tin- ranks. The Mrife is then entirely to the 
 advantage of the infantry. On the contrary, suppose the 
 -MUM- line of rivalry. fiiniMinl with a row of pikes which 
 
CAVALRY. 7i> 
 
 stand out four feet in front of the horses ; and the chances 
 of success are very different. 
 
 But the sabre is more befitting than the lance for light 
 troops. In hand to hand conflicts, a short weapon is 
 handled more easily, and is more advantageous than a 
 long one. All other things being equal, it is certain that 
 a huzzar or a chasseur* will beat a lancer ; they have time 
 to parry, and return the blow, (riposter,) before the lan- 
 cer, who has thrown himself upon them, can recover him- 
 self for defence. 
 
 The sabre designed for light troops should be slightly 
 curved ; that which is perfectly straight is of less value 
 for single combat. 
 
 The same troops should also be provided with fire- 
 arms, whether as additional means of resistance, or to 
 make themselves heard by the main bodies, for whose 
 behoof they are sent to scout and reconnoitre. 
 
 With regard to cuirassiers, and all cavalry of the line, 
 it would be proper to arm them both with the lance and 
 the straight sabre. The first rank would then charge with 
 the lance in rest; the second with the sabre in hand. 
 Once the shock is made and the ranks mixed, the sabres 
 of the second rank would do their office. 
 
 * Lord Ellesmere, in the Quarterly Review for June, 1845, ques- 
 tions this assertion. He says: "If by 'tomes choses e gales' be 
 meant that the parties opposed shall have had nothing but the usual 
 regimental instruction in the use of their respective weapons, we 
 have no doubt that the Marshal is right; but we also believe that 
 the lance is by far the superior weapon in the hands of a horseman 
 bred and trained to its use." The reviewer is borne out by facts. 
 
80 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 In the days of chivalry, battle was given directly in 
 front ; the charge was a direct one : the long weapon was 
 of course preferable then ; which explains to us the use 
 made by knights of their lances. 
 
 I will cite a fact, in support of my opinion, concerning 
 the manner of employing the lance, and obtaining the 
 greatest effects from its use. 
 
 In 1813, at the battle of Dresden, our cuirassiers had 
 made many charges on the left of the Austrian army, 
 upon their infantry, which had been abandoned by the 
 cavalry. The infantry steadily resisted ; they repulsed 
 our attacks, although the rain had put all their guns in 
 such a condition that they could not fire. We could only 
 overcome that resistance, by causing fifty lancers, who 
 formed the escort of General Latour-Maubourg, to pre- 
 cede the cuirassiers ; the lancers made a breach ; the cui- 
 rassiers were able to penetrate and to make general havoc. 
 It is true that the fire of the infantry was very feeble ; 
 but, under any other circumstances, the question would 
 not have been uncertain, if the cuirassiers had been armed 
 with the formidable lance. 
 
 The lance is equally successful in combats with cavalry, 
 line against line, when the enemy has only sabres. It is 
 admirable at the moment of attack. It is useful also in 
 pursuit. 
 
 Ill a word, I fed authori/ed to say that, for cavalry of 
 the line, the lance should In- the principal weapon, ami the 
 -alnv an auxiliary arm: that, for light troops, the 
 Should Consist of sahn-s and firr-ai-niv 
 
CAVALRY. 81 
 
 custom and prejudice will long contend against these 
 principles, the truth of which I think nevertheless has 
 been fairly demonstrated. 
 
 The Russian army possesses an immense advantage 
 over all the other armies of Europe. The Cossacks, 
 belonging to it, form a light cavalry, excellent, indefati- 
 gable and intelligent; they know how to find their way 
 in trackless places, (s'orienter,) with precision, thoroughly 
 to reconnoitre a country, to observe everything, and to 
 take independent care of themselves. 
 
 They cannot be compared to any light troops, system- 
 atically instructed for that service: they are formed by 
 nature ; their intelligence is developed by the daily wants 
 to which they are subjected. I speak of the Cossacks of 
 the frontier, who, constantly at war with their neighbors, 
 always in presence of a skilful and enterprising enemy, 
 are obliged to be, at every moment, on the alert for their 
 own safety. 
 
 The Cossacks of the Don, formerly admirable, have 
 become less excellent, less intelligent, since their country 
 has been covered by conquered provinces. But there are 
 still large numbers of Cossacks guarding the frontiers of 
 Asia; on the Kouban, upon the line, on the Therec, and 
 east of the Caspian. Russia can prepare, and lead into 
 Germany, more than fifty thousand of this cavalry, which 
 will leave all the regular cavalry to be carefully cherished 
 and strengthened, against the day of battle. This cir- 
 cumstance warrants us in considering the Russian hussars 
 and chasseurs as cavalry of the line, and forbids their 
 
82 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES 
 
 being used as light troops ; for from want of habit and 
 exercise, it is certain that they know nothing of those 
 exercises which the Cossacks execute so well. 
 
 Austria ought to have something analogous to the Cos- 
 sacks, not however on a great scale. She should be able 
 to procure easily ten thousand troops of this kind, by 
 forming a corps of five hundred horse in each frontier 
 regiment. I do not understand why, in that country, 
 where everything is arranged with so much care, where 
 the organizations are so judiciously made, (raisonnees,) 
 they have not yet attempted anything like this. 
 
 France, when she shall have subdued Algeria, will be 
 able, without difficulty, to raise Arab troops, who, in time 
 of war, will render incalculable service. To attain this 
 end demands a constant solicitude on the part of the gov- 
 ernment; and it would be well, at the present time, to 
 increase, as much as possible, the number of indigenous 
 troops, so as to have a mass of men attached to the glory 
 of our arms; habituated to mingle their interests with 
 ours, to rejoice in our success, and fit to furnish good non- 
 commissioned officers, the need of whom would be more 
 ami more felt in proportion as their organization should 
 be extended. 
 
 Cavalry being designed for hand to hand fighting, it is 
 a-k< -<1 why more care is not taken to cover the men from 
 the enemy's fire. A very little would suffice to protect 
 them from a sabre stroke, or from a lance, or even to 
 deaden tin- force of a musket-ball, fired from a distance, 
 
CAVALRY. 83 
 
 or a pistol shot.* The Orientals, whose combats are 
 always of the nature of melees, have at all times taken this 
 precaution ; they are often clothed in coats of mail. The 
 breast might be protected by a buff coat, of such stuff as 
 the Castilian peasants wear ; for the head, the shako should 
 be reinforced on the inside by two cross pieces of wood, as 
 is commonly practiced ; the limbs should be protected by 
 one or two light iron-chain works, placed outside upon 
 the sleeves and the pantaloons. This double cuirass of 
 buff, festooned and adorned, would form an elegant dress, 
 which would bring to mind that of the Roman soldiers. 
 This light and warm dress, which favors health, by 
 shielding the soldiers from the disagreeable effects of sud- 
 den changes of temperature, might be equally appropri- 
 ate for the infantry of the line. Were this adopted, the 
 ordinary dress would be a short-skirted loose coat, like 
 that of the cuirassiers ; and the buff coat, worn only when 
 under arms, would be the signal for service. 
 
 I will add a word, concerning the instruction of cav- 
 alry, which has always seemed to me incomplete. Too 
 much importance cannot be attached to skill in horseman- 
 ship, (equitation,) nor can there be too much care taken, 
 to render the men perfect masters of their horses. The 
 man and his horse must form but a single individual, 
 which shall realize the fabulous Centaurs. 
 
 * The author wrote from the experience of a long period, now 
 suddenly passing away under the influence of improvements in 
 fire-arms. Rifled muskets and rifled cannon make all attempts to 
 cover the person of the soldier fruitless. War is proportionally 
 more destructive. 
 
84 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 Equitation is everything. It is what subdues the horse 
 and tames him. The manoeuvres will always be suffi- 
 ciently correct, if the soldiers are good horsemen. En- 
 couragements of every kind should be held out to further 
 this object. The troops should be accustomed to charg- 
 ing to the enemy's centre, without being particularly 
 careful to preserve a certain order, incompatible with this 
 impetuosity, which is the best means of beating the ene- 
 my ; but, at the same time, they should be habituated to 
 rally, at the first signal, with promptness and dexterity. 
 They should be constantly placed in these circumstances, 
 that they may be prepared for them by all necessary 
 means. Thus the apparent disorder of the charge will 
 have no influence upon their morale. 
 
 On the other hand, if the charges, while under instruc- 
 tion, be feeble and moderate, they will be less powerful 
 still, when before the enemy, and will never overthrow 
 him; and, at the first disorder, the soldiers will think 
 themselves lost. 
 
 There is a usage often practiced at drills, great evolu- 
 tions, and sham-fights: the cavalry is made to charge 
 upon the infantry; and in consideration of its being only 
 a -iiiiulated combat, the cavalry is halted before having 
 reached the infantry, or it escapes through the intervals. 
 Nothing can be worse than this kind of education for the 
 horses; being thus accustomed to avoid the point of 
 attack as an obstacle, they can never be made to come to 
 close quarters, for their habits accord with their instinct, 
 and perhaps with that of their riders. This praei 
 
CAVALRY 85 
 
 pernicious ; it should be banished from the drill, and re- 
 placed by an entirely different lesson. The war results 
 would be immense. I understand it thus : 
 
 Place a line of infantry opposite a line of cavalry; 
 give such distance between the files in the two lines, that 
 a horse and a man may easily pass between them. The 
 cavalry waver at first, even at a walk, but they pass 
 through the infantry ; they try it again and again, many 
 times at a trot and at a gallop, until the horses execute 
 the movement, so to speak, of themselves. The move- 
 ment is then accompanied with a few musket shots, along 
 the whole line, increased in number as the instruction 
 proceeds; and if it be desired to increase the noise, the 
 infantry files may be formed in six ranks, and the noise of 
 the firing is then equal to that of a whole battalion. 
 
 After many days of similar exercise, a cavalry corps' 
 will be better fitted than others, not thus instructed, to 
 attack infantry, and the horses, well set up and accustomed 
 to precipitate themselves upon a fire which they have 
 learned to face, will of their own accord carry their riders 
 along, if the latter should be tempted to moderate their 
 ardor. 
 
 8 
 
FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 THE third arm, now become indispensable in war, is 
 artillery. It is of capital importance. But its use de- 
 pends particularly upon its organization and the principles 
 upon which it is constituted. 
 
 I shall try to lay down those principles, and develop 
 their consequences. I will commence with the materiel; 
 I will afterwards pass to the means of making the best 
 use of it. 
 
 The simplest artillery is the best. If the same calibre 
 could satisfy all wants, and the same carriage serve for 
 all transportation, that would be the perfection of the 
 service. 
 
 But this cannot be : artillery is to produce very various 
 effects; these effects being given, the problem is to de- 
 termine the corresponding calibres, limiting their number 
 to the absolute necessity of the case; for whenever two 
 calibres serve the same purpose, there is one too many, 
 and it is moreover injurious on account of the compli- 
 cation which it produces, in munitions, stores, and sub- 
 Mitutions. 
 
 . \rtillcry >lnmlil l><- divided into three kinds ; 1st. 
 ami >ea-coast artillery; 2d, field artillery; 3d, mountain 
 
ARTILLERY. 87 
 
 artillery. In each of these divisions, and, in spite of the 
 difference which necessarily exists in the weight and 
 dimensions of cannon, the same calibres should be adopt- 
 ed, as far as possible, so that the same munitions may 
 be used. 
 
 In sieges and in the defence of fortified places, such 
 pieces are needed as will destroy men, dismount the ene- 
 my's guns, and carry to a great distance. Experience 
 has demonstrated that the 12-pdr. gun perfectly accom- 
 plishes these objects. 
 
 In this kind of war, ramparts are also to be destroyed, 
 crumbled away, to open a practicable path by which to 
 penetrate into the place. In this view it is no longer a 
 murderous weapon ; it is a utensil, a machine, the batter- 
 ing-ram of the ancients, rendered still more powerful and 
 more expeditious. To produce this effect, the 24-pdr. 
 is absolutely indispensable. The 16-pdr., formerly in use, 
 was superfluous ; in the one case insufficient, in the other 
 excessive. 
 
 Field artillery is intended to follow the troops in all 
 their movements, and to arrive promptly at a prescribed 
 point, to crush the enemy. To this end we need a light 
 material, of easy transport, and very easy of movement, 
 so that no obstacle of ground can arrest its progress. I 
 should consider a sufficient calibre that of the 6-pdr., in 
 use throughout Europe, and which I caused to be adopted 
 when I was at the head of the French artillery. With 
 this calibre all the wars of the Empire were carried on. 
 We have returned to the 8-pdr. ; no doubt its superiority 
 
88 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 gives some advantages; but it has the great disadvantage 
 of increasing the munitions one-third in weight, and of 
 thus rendering necessary more considerable means of 
 transportation, means always lacking in war. 
 
 A second object to be accomplished in field wars, is to 
 produce great effects by the aid of powerful reserves; 
 to silence the fire of the works in temporary fortifications, 
 upon which the enemy is resting; to arm such works 
 when constructed by ourselves ; to breach walls not prop- 
 erly embanked; to protect the passage of rivers. For 
 these purposes 12-pdrs. are certainly necessary ; but not 
 so heavy as those employed in sieges or in the defence 
 of places. In fine, there may properly be in the train of 
 armies one or two batteries of 24-pdrs. short, designed to 
 be fired with charges weaker than a third of the weight 
 of the ball, and which, in a thousand circumstances, will 
 render splendid service on the day of battle. 
 
 The calibres, as we have just seen, should then be pro- 
 portioned to the effects to be produced; and notwith- 
 standing the great number of these, they may be reduced 
 to three, by varying the dimension and weight of the 
 pieces. But this is not all; we also employ hollow pro- 
 jectiles, shells and howitzes; their calibre, as far as pos- 
 sible, should be the same as that of cannon; and this 
 offers no practical difficulty. 
 
 Howitzes of 5 inches diameter, having the same 
 
 diameter as 24-pdr. balls, are everywhere adopted, with 
 
 I vantage of serving indifferently in howitzers or 
 
 juris A larpor calibre has appeared useful for siege 
 
ARTILLERY. 89 
 
 howitzers; and the proper system has been observed, in 
 giving them a diameter of 8 inches, allowing the use 
 of these howitzes in 8-inch moHars, of which great use 
 is made in the attack and defence of fortified places. 
 
 Afterwards come the other mortars of greater calibre. 
 Here the larger the calibre, the greater the effect. The 
 expense and the difficulty of transporting munitions are 
 the only arguments against their employment. The mor- 
 tars, designed to receive a very heavy charge, cast upon a 
 broad plate which supports them, and to which my name 
 was formerly given, as well as those named d la Villantroy, 
 are only applicable to the defence of coasts, because of 
 their immense weight, and because they are especially 
 designed to carry to a very great distance, which is use- 
 less in sieges and the defence of places. 
 
 Further on I will speak of a newly-invented artillery, 
 and it will be seen that the principle of uniformity of 
 calibre has been retained in arms employed for different 
 purposes. 
 
 The calibres of which I have just spoken are then the 
 only ones which are necessary for use in sieges and for 
 field service. 
 
 There now remains the artillery useful in mountainous 
 warfare. Without entering into details, I will say that it 
 should be composed of pieces sufficiently light to be car- 
 ried on the backs of mules : larger pieces, such as are 
 transported on sledge-carriages, are more, embarrassing 
 than useful. Congreve rockets are also eminently fitted 
 
 8* 
 
90 FORMATION, ETC OF ARMIKS. 
 
 to be employed in the mountains. I will speak pres- 
 ently of this invention. 
 
 There is still to be mentioned an arm from which may 
 be obtained great results; these are wall or rampart 
 guns, only lately invented, which load at the breech, and 
 throw a ball weighing several ounces, with very great 
 precision of aim, and with a range similar to that of 
 pieces of small calibre. These guns, distributed to the 
 number of ten or twelve to a regiment, and carried habit- 
 ually with their ammunition, upon a single carriage, would 
 be, on occasion, of extreme utility. 
 
 After having spoken of the calibre of cannon, and the 
 motives which induce a choice, it will be proper to say 
 one word of the other dimensions and the weight of 
 pieces. The determination of these is not arbitrary ; it 
 springs from positive circumstances, which have a direct 
 influence upon their utility. 
 
 The length of a cannon is relative to the charge to 
 be used. We do not confine ourselves to the precise 
 limit which experiments have demonstrated as that which 
 will give the greatest range. To avoid other disadvant- 
 ages, this limit has not been regarded as absolute; but 
 we approach it as nearly as possible. The gas formed by 
 tin- combustion of th<> powder, and the explosion of which 
 produces the force which impels the ball, acts as a resid- 
 ing force. 
 
 Now to the extent to which it acts upon the ball wlu-n 
 in mot ion, it jiujrim-nts the force which follows it, and, 
 consequently, the range: this action is the result of tin- 
 
ARTILLERY. 91 
 
 combustion. If the combustion be not finished when the 
 ball has left the piece, there is a diminution of the range ; 
 if it be prematurely finished, and the ball receives the 
 entire impulsion from it before having passed through the 
 length of the piece, there is also a diminution of range ; 
 but in the latter case it is the friction which occasions it. 
 The quantity of powder should be such that the expan- 
 sion of the gas which it produces in burning, shall accom- 
 pany the ball, from the bottom of the piece to the muzzle 
 of the piece, no more nor less ; and so, with long pieces, 
 there must be stronger charges, and, with short pieces, 
 weaker charges. 
 
 In France there has been adopted, for cannon, a uni- 
 form charge, represented by the third of the weight of 
 the ball. With this condition a series of experiments has 
 been made, to determine the length which will give the 
 greatest ranges ; and pieces, thirty-five calibres in length, 
 have been cast. 
 
 After having verified the range thus obtained, the piece 
 has been sawed off at the chase, so as to diminish its 
 length one calibre ; the range is then greater. The oper- 
 ation is renewed, and the result has always been the same, 
 until a length of twenty-seven calibres is reached; pass- 
 ing this limit, to twenty-six calibres, the range has been 
 found to be in a diminishing scale. It is then properly 
 concluded that with a cannon of twenty-seven calibres in 
 length, and a charge of one-third the weight of the ball, 
 the maximum of range is obtained. 
 
 But it is difficult to manoeuvre pieces of this length ; 
 
^2 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 and, to remain within medium limits, there has been 
 adopted for siege and place guns, a length of twenty-two 
 calibres. For field-pieces, which require a still easier 
 and prompter manoeuvre, this length has been reduced to 
 eighteen calibres, and some foreign nations have fixed it 
 at fourteen. 
 
 I do not speak of howitzers: this is a particular arm 
 designed for firing in ricochet, established upon other 
 principles, and must satisfy other conditions. 
 
 I will now make a remark, founded upon a well-authen- 
 ticated fact, the application of which is important, and 
 which seems astonishing. The powder should burn rap- 
 idly, but not instantaneously; otherwise the force of 
 inertia would cause a violent shock, which would destroy 
 the arm itself. Its action should be successive ; a special 
 fact has given me the means of acquainting myself with 
 this phenomenon. 
 
 General Rutti, an officer of great merit, placed at the 
 head of the government works of powder and saltpetre, had 
 succeeded in making powders of extraordinary strength ; 
 and he thought he had obtained a most important result. 
 Five hundred thousand pounds of this kind of powder 
 had already been made, and it was thought desirable to 
 reserve it as a precious thing for the uses of war. An 
 official circumstance happily changed this design. The 
 new powder was issued to be used at the drills of the 
 puird, in 1828. In two schools of practice, all the 
 cannon were burst and rendered unserviceable. These 
 t;iri- being established, I sought for their cause: there 
 
ARTILLERY. 93 
 
 was no other explanation than that which I have given. 
 It is a verification of the adage : "Better is the enemy 
 of well"* 
 
 As to the weight of pieces, it may be diminished in a 
 very considerable manner, and without disadvantage as 
 respects the resistance ; but the carriages suffer greatly, 
 and are easily broken. The force of the recoil, spending 
 itself upon too light a mass, produces a sudden and de- 
 structive shock. After a certain limit, a pound of metal 
 taken away from the weight of the piece should be added 
 to the carriage which supports it. 
 
 That fact will be made clear by the following example, 
 which every one may have daily before his eyes. A jug- 
 gler will place upon his chest a stone of great weight, 
 and he will brave the effect of a blow from a war-club, 
 whilst, with a stone of less weight, he would be injured 
 by it. 
 
 In 1802 and in 1803, when I was working to establish 
 the new system of artillery, which was afterwards used 
 during the entire period of the Empire, the experiments 
 which I directed, upon the weight of metal, demonstrated 
 that the proportion which equally satisfies the conditions 
 of mobility and preservation, is one hundred and twenty 
 pounds for every pound in the weight of the ball, pro- 
 vided the charge be one-third the weight of the ball. 
 
 The English attach great importance to the lightness 
 of guns for horse artillery. They do not give, or, at least 
 
 * "Le mieux est 1'ennemi du bien'" or, in our own homely 
 adage, "Let well enough alone." 
 
94 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 they did not give, thirty years since, more than ninety 
 pounds for every pound in the weight of the ball ; but it 
 must also be observed that they reduced the charge to a 
 quarter, instead of a third. 
 
 One word more concerning the materiel. Carriages of 
 various kinds are necessary elements of the artillery serv- 
 ice : use injures them, destroys them, and new ones are 
 constantly necessary to replace them. Hence the great 
 advantage of a perfectly uniform construction. De Gri- 
 bauval, first inspector general of artillery, author of the 
 first regular system, claims the glory of having estab- 
 lished this uniformity. Thus, the fragments of a carriage, 
 constructed at Auxonne or at Toulouse, could be used 
 to repair a similar carriage made at Strasbourg. But 
 subjected to the influence of officers of artificers,* their 
 pedantry has led them to adopt, in construction, fruitless 
 divisions and subdivisions, and thus in a systematic man- 
 ner great embarrassments have resulted, almost equiva- 
 lent indeed to the confusion from which we had just 
 emerged. 
 
 To give an idea of this, I will o l y cite one single fact 
 which has remained in my memory. There were, as well 
 as I now remember, twenty-two kinds of wheels in his 
 system of artillery. I reduced them, in the system of 
 1803, to ten. At the present time we have come down to 
 four or five ; and I believe that this kind of materiel has 
 
 * Officiert tTouvrieri (d'artiUeric.) There are in the Kn-m-Ii Mn 
 
 military artificers ouvriert whose duty it is to conMruci nil 
 l.i mis of military carriages, implement* ami machines. 
 
ARTILLERY. 95 
 
 never reached the same perfection. In the next war 
 fifty cannon well commanded will produce more effect than 
 one hundred, such as they formerly were.* 
 
 In my encomiums upon the new artillery, I only except 
 the 8-pdrs., which has been resumed, and the exagger- 
 ated weight of field-pieces, recently fixed at one hundred 
 and fifty pounds for every pound in the weight of the 
 ball. 
 
 But the best materiel in the world will be of only mod- 
 erate effect, if it is not in the hands of men capable of 
 producing, with it, its greatest results ; and as remarkable 
 as had always been, in France, the instruction of the corps 
 of artillery, there were many things wanting : its organi- 
 zation was very imperfect. 
 
 The signal disadvantages have been successively reme- 
 died, and now all the conditions for producing the best 
 service seem to have been satisfied. 
 
 The unit for battle, in the artillery, is the battery. It 
 is composed of six or eight pieces, always marching 
 together, with their munitions, and placed under the same 
 command. It is to th. artillery what the battalion is to 
 the infantry, and the squadron to the cavalry. This corps 
 should then be homogeneous and compact ; the elements 
 which compose it should have the same spirit, and the 
 habit of being together. 
 
 Now, there are three distinct elements : the materiel or 
 
 * Marshal Val6e, formerly central inspector of artillery under 
 the restoration, is the author of that splendid system of artillery 
 in personnel and materiel now adopted in France. M. 
 
'I*. FOK.MATHiN. KTC. OF AKM1 K.s. 
 
 arm properly so called, those who use it, and those who 
 transport it. If these elements do not agree, the artillery 
 is imperfect. 
 
 The first merit of artillery after the courage of the 
 gunners and the exactness of their aim is its mobility. 
 It is thus seen how important is the management of the 
 horses provided to draw the cannon. 
 
 In earlier times everything was divided ; the guns re- 
 mained at the arsenal or in the park, until the moment of 
 fighting; the horses belonged to a contractor, and the 
 drivers were his servants, treated without consideration, 
 having no prospect of promotion, and called by the name 
 of artillery drivers. We made all the campaigns of the 
 Republic with this monstrous organization. 
 
 Under the Consulate and during the Empire, this serv- 
 ice was ennobled, and the corps of artillery drivers (corps 
 du train) was formed with its non-commissioned officers 
 and officers. There was thus a prospect of promotion, 
 and the name of driver was replaced by that of soldier 
 of the train. My influence was direct upon this organi- 
 zation, which was indeed, in great part, my own work; 
 and to the end that the rights of different grades should 
 not clash as to command, I was careful to give to officers 
 of the train only grades inferior to the corresponding 
 grades in the artillery corps. 
 
 In this manner was prevented which is indispensa- 
 ble all embarrassment and conflict in the relations be- 
 tween the commanders of batteries and those who conduct 
 thriii. As to the latter, for lack of sufficient in>t ruction, 
 
ARTILLERY. 9t 
 
 never being designed to exercise higher authority, this 
 difference in the grades will always keep them, naturally 
 situated, acccording to the order of military rank, in a 
 station of obedience. This organization lasted during 
 the entire time of the Empire. At the end of the res- 
 toration, the council of war of which I was one of the 
 vice-presidents under M. le Dauphin, changed the organ- 
 ization of the corps of artillery. They divided it into 
 batteries, having their materiel, their cannon and horses, 
 conducted by cannoneers of the second class, who are 
 at the same time instructed in manoauvring and serving 
 the cannon, and who are called cannoneer-drivers. This 
 organization has certainly attained to perfection. 
 
 There have been created, within a few years, two kinds 
 of artillery, the effects of which, in my judgment, are 
 wonderful, if their use can be fully developed in the next 
 war : Congreve rockets for field service, and cannon called 
 Paixhan, for the defence of coasts and cities. I firmly 
 believe that the power of resistance of fortified places 
 will be increased by their use. The mode of warfare and 
 the organization of armies will experience also a great 
 modification. But these two objects deserve a more 
 particular development. 
 
 The part played by artillery in war, has daily acquired 
 more importance by reason not only of its increase, but 
 also of its great mobility, which permits an almost infinite 
 combination of movements. Nevertheless, there are limits 
 to this mobility, which gives us the means of assembling 
 
 9 
 
98 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 upon a given point a great mass of artillery. The num- 
 ber of guns proper for a given war is equally limited, by 
 reason of the expense and the embarrassment of trans- 
 porting a surplus of materiel, such an embarrassment 
 indeed as might, in marches, more than counterbalance, 
 in disadvantages, the advantages which might be expected 
 of them at the moment of action. 
 
 Experience has demonstrated that the maximum should 
 be four pieces for a thousand men, a proportion moreover 
 which will be soon found to have been exceeded, after a 
 few months of campaign; for the materiel is not sub- 
 jected to the same causes of diminution as the infantry 
 and cavalry, and the personnel of the artillery, so small 
 in numbers, is always easily maintained complete. 
 
 But the Congreve rockets, which have progressively 
 been brought to great perfection, and are now dischai ir <i 
 with sufficient precision of aim, form a kind of artillery, 
 which may become a principal arm, by the development 
 of which it is susceptible in its application. 
 
 Indeed, when the arm is composed solely of the projec- 
 tiles which are employed ; when no machine is necessary 
 to discharge them, and when they do not present to the 
 enemy's fire any surface upon which to draw his dis- 
 charges; when finally, by very simple dispositions, there 
 may be given to this fire a development so great that the 
 IV" lit of a single regiment may be subjected to n rain- 
 >tonn of balls, representing the fire of a battery of one 
 hundred cannon; then the means of destruction are such 
 that there is uo struggle possible, in following the rules 
 
ARTILLEEY. M 
 
 and the principles which the present art of war has esta- 
 blished. 
 
 The following is my conception of the employment of 
 Congreve rockets : I would cause, in each regiment, five 
 or six hundred men to be instructed for the service of this 
 new arm. Two wagons would suffice to carry one hun- 
 dred frames, (chevalets,) such as the Austrians have 
 adopted ; and at a given order, these hundred frames, 
 each served by three or four men, would deploy a fire of 
 which we can scarcely form an idea. 
 
 To such a fire as this, could masses be opposed, even 
 of troops in battle array, upon many parallel lines ? As- 
 suredly not. Now, the advantage in battle consists in 
 making the enemy fall back ; we must then march upon 
 him, cross the space which separates us; and to do it 
 with the least danger possible, we should employ the arm 
 which may be carried most rapidly over this space. 
 On this account cavalry is the best; and this cavalry 
 itself will be subjected to a new kind of manoeuvre, 
 so that it may present itself to the fire of the enemy with 
 the fewest chances of destruction. Thus it should be dis- 
 persed as skirmishers, ready however to reunite at a 
 given signal, to prepare itself for the shock which 
 must follow the completed charge. Then the infantry 
 changes its function : it becomes the auxiliary of the Con- 
 greve rockets, or rather of the rockets now become its 
 own weapon, the muskets being for the time only acces- 
 sories. 
 
 In this new system, infantry has need of an entirely dif- 
 
KM) FORMATION, ETC. <>F ARMIES. 
 
 ferent instruction. It should be divided into two parts : 
 the first armed with the rockets ; the second designed to 
 place them upon the frames, to serve them at the rallying 
 point, at the moment when they shall come in immediate 
 contact with the enemy. Then the proportion of the 
 arms (infantry and cavalry) must be changed. There 
 should be more cavalry and less infantry ; a cavalry drilled 
 in an entirely peculiar manner, and an infantry-artillery, 
 if I may thus express myself, the functions of which should 
 be limited to serving the rockets, to carrying them and 
 aiming them, to the occupation of entrenched posts, to 
 the defences of fortified places, and to mountainous war- 
 fare. 
 
 But this new artillery acquires great importance in a 
 thousand circumstances where cannon can play no part 
 whatever. In the mountains, we transport, at the present 
 time, with great difficulty, a small number of pieces which 
 can there be of little effect. With rockets, we have an 
 arm of long range, which may be established everywhere 
 in profusion, upon rocky -summits, as well as upon lower 
 plateaux. On level plains every building is transformed 
 into a fortress, and the roof of a village chun-h Ix-comes, 
 at will, the platform of a formidable battery. In a word, 
 this invention, such as it is, and with the perfection to 
 which it may yet be carried, is applicable to all conditions, 
 bends to all circumstances, to all combinations, and must 
 si.- HUM' an immense ascendency over the destiny of the 
 world. 
 
 by a special corps, roiisiilnvil pun-ly as artil- 
 
ARTILLERY. 101 
 
 lery, the rockets would be necessarily rare, and could pro- 
 duce but little effect. But an immense development is 
 the only useful manner of employing them, the only means 
 of astounding, of overpowering, of overthrowing as with 
 a thunderbolt: they must therefore become the weapon 
 of the army, properly so called. 
 
 We reflect only little by little upon the nature of things. 
 We act for a long time by routine, without concerning 
 ourselves with possible modifications and ameliorations; 
 thus it will only be with time that we shall be able to 
 appreciate the power of Congreve rockets. But if, in 
 the next war, a skilful and calculating general should 
 have a glimpse of the question in all its developments, 
 in all its consequences; if he should prepare his means 
 in silence, to display them upon the field of battle, he 
 would obtain a success which would defy resistance, until 
 the enemy should avail himself of the same means. At 
 the moment of this grand experiment, the personal genius 
 of the commander would attain a great ascendency over 
 the fortune of the war. 
 
 Nevertheless, as rational and plausible as the result 
 which I predict may be, experiment alone will establish, 
 in an incontestible manner, the merit of this new inven- 
 tion.* The wise man can only have absolute conviction, 
 after facts have realized his hopes, as there are so many 
 
 * The Congreve (war) rocket was only invented in 1804, when 
 Sir William Congreve changed the paper case for one of iron, and 
 armed its head with a shot or shell, thus making what before was 
 a pyrotechnic toy, or, at best, a signal light, a destructive weapon 
 of war. 
 
 9* 
 
109 FORMATION, F.T<\ OF ARM IKS. 
 
 unforeseen circumstances which modify the best founded 
 calculations, the most seducing probabilities. 
 
 However, such are the appearances, that a skilful and 
 enlightened general ought in the very next war to pre- 
 pare for using this new arm, and for astounding the 
 enemy by its effects. If he alone uses it, he will probably 
 be master of the campaign ; and, if his adversary has 
 been as vigilant as he, he will at least secure himself 
 against a defeat. But his foresight must embrace all the 
 consequences of this new means, relatively to the other 
 arms, to their proper proportions, to their mano3uvres, 
 and to the manner of using them. 
 
 After the successful employment of Congreve rockets 
 in a campaign, it is evident that they would be adopted 
 in all armies; then the equilibrium would be re-estab- 
 lished, and there would no longer be an exclusive advant- 
 age for either side. But the art of war would, by their use, 
 be powerfully modified. The most vigorous combats, and 
 those producing the greatest moral results, would render 
 battles shorter, would diminish the effusion of blood : for 
 that which gives victory is not the number of men killed, 
 hut tin- number frightened.* 
 
 I repeat it, ('on-jn \c n.rkrt> must produce a revolu- 
 tion in the art of \\ar: and they will assure success and 
 glory to the genius who shall have been the first to com- 
 prehend their importance, and to develop all the advant- 
 age which may spring from their use. 
 
 ir, nous n'avons toua qu'une certaine dose de courage, 
 qui s'^ranouit a 1 Rogniat* }< -'"' 
 
ARTILLERY. 103 
 
 I come now to the consideration of Paixhan artillery.* 
 The heavy artillery, to serve its purpose, should have a 
 great range, and the projectiles which it throws a great 
 momentum. Now to obtain this momentum, one of two 
 things is necessary; either the velocity must be very 
 great with a moderate mass, or the mass must be great 
 with a less velocity; for the momentum of a body is 
 equal to the mass multiplied into the velocity. 
 
 Up to the present time, the smaller mass, with consid- 
 erable velocity, has been preferred, on account of the 
 difficulty of transporting heavy projectiles; but if this 
 has been right with respect to sieges, where the transpor- 
 tation is to be made in short and definite times, it has 
 been wrong under other circumstances which allow an un- 
 limited time, or which permit easy transportation, whatever 
 be the weight. In a word, for the defence of fortified 
 places, for the armament of sea-coasts, and for the naval 
 service, this artillery possesses immense advantages, which 
 I proceed succinctly to analyze. 
 
 1. The resistance of the air to the motion of the body 
 being proportional to the square of the velocity, it is less 
 with these heavy projectiles; and, therefore, the range 
 and the accuracy of aim are greater. Supposing a velo- 
 city of twelve hundred feet in a second, with the ordinary 
 ball, and of four hundred with the Paixhan ball, the 
 resistance of the air would be : : 9 : 1. 
 
 2. The momentum of a twenty-four pound ball, with a 
 
 * The Paixhan gun, named after the inventor, is a large howitzer 
 throwing very large balls and shells. 
 
104 FORMATION, ETC. OF AMMIh> 
 
 velocity of twelve hundred feet, will be represented by the 
 number 28.808, while that of a Paixhan ball, of twelve- 
 inch calibre, or weighing one hundred and forty pounds, 
 with a velocity of four hundred feet, would be expressed 
 by 56.000; that is, it would be nearly double. That of 
 a thirty-six pounder, with the same velocity of twelve 
 hundred feet, would be 43.000, and thus in proportion 
 more and more feeble. 
 
 3. The destructive force being in the ratio of the sur- 
 faces, i.e. to the squares of the diameters, the proportion 
 here will be as 1 to 4. 
 
 4. Finally, the thirty-six pound ball will pass through 
 the epaulment* of a land battery, or the sides of a ves- 
 sel, or it will bury itself in their thickness. It matters 
 not where it lodges, it will produce no damage : and if it 
 passes through the planking, the hole which it makes is 
 easily stopped up; but a Paixhan ball produces far 
 greater ravages. First of all by its great diameter and 
 the slowness of its motion, with equal momentum, the 
 effect being in the inverse ratio of the velocity, it demol- 
 ishes a greater surface; then in striking it makes an im- 
 mense breach : if it is a battery which it has struck, it 
 must be reconstructed; if a vessel. >he goes to the bottom, 
 without a chance of saving her. 
 
 To defend a fortified place by such means, elevates 
 the defence almost to the character of an attack; and 
 the employment of this arm again>t ships at sea, 
 
 * Any elevation of earth, thrown up to cover troops, in BO 
 
 Inn iii i hi- cminiTtii.il :m f/niuln^nt i tin- parapet of a battery. 
 
ARTILLERY. 105 
 
 make squadrons disappear, and great vessels especially. 
 Indeed, the superiority of a ship-of-the-line over a ves- 
 sel of inferior size has two causes: the former carries 
 a battery which the armament of the frigate cannot 
 resist, and the frigate has a battery the calibre of which 
 is insufficient to injure the ship-of-the-line. Therefore 
 a frigate is not in condition to sustain the slightest strug- 
 gle with a ship-of-the-line, because the fire of the frigate 
 is only dangerous to the crew and the rigging, while the 
 fire of the ship-of-the-line is destructive besides to the 
 vessel itself, and may in a moment engulf it in the bot- 
 tom of the sea. 
 
 But when the day shall come in which a small vessel, 
 either with steam or sails, and with a small force, shall be 
 provided with one or two guns, a single ball of which 
 would suffice to destroy the largest vessels, then ten 
 small craft, each armed with two heavy guns, must quickly 
 put an end to any ship which they surround. Ships which 
 cost more than fifteen hundred thousand francs ($300,000) 
 offer, in such a case, no guarantee of permanence and 
 good effects. The Paixhan artillery is then the destruc- 
 tion of the navy as at present constituted.* 
 
 During the period of the restoration, Lieutenant-Colo- 
 nel Paixhans, an officer of great distinction, conceived the 
 idea of proposing this artillery. Louis XVIII. appointed, 
 to examine it, a commission of generals and naval officers 
 of the highest rank, of which he made me the president. 
 
 * These principles are recognized and carried out in our gun- 
 boat flotilla. 
 
KM, FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES 
 
 Experiments were, however, necessary to determine the 
 range, the greatest accuracy of aim, and the means of 
 easily manoeuvring this piece. The experiments made at 
 Brest succeeded perfectly, and surpassed the expectations 
 of the author. Hence we should adopt, in artillery, the 
 changes which produce immense modifications in naval war- 
 fare by rendering large ships unnecessary ; in the defence 
 of coasts, thus rendered easier and surer ; in the defence 
 of fortified places, which may thus be, it seems, much 
 prolonged. But the adoption of this new arm should 
 not cause us to dispense with the use of hollow shot, fired 
 from thirty-six and twenty-four pounder guns ; since the 
 effects of these, although less powerful, are always formi- 
 dable to the enemy, and favorable to defence. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 107 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FORTIFICATIONS. 
 
 IT would not comport with the spirit of the present 
 work to treat in detail of fortifications, and it would 
 probably be beyond my powers. I shall consider then 
 simply the needs of war, and the aim which is proposed 
 in erecting fortifications, leaving aside all that concerns 
 the engineer's art. 
 
 In earlier times, strongholds formed themselves, so to 
 speak. In periods of anarchy, of disorder and internal 
 wars, a picture of which is offered by the middle ages, 
 numerous populations, condensed and rich, desired to 
 place themselves in a condition of safety. They were 
 fortified by surrounding them with a rampart. They 
 were armed. Means of attack being yet in their infancy, 
 they were thus sheltered from all offensive attempts. 
 
 But the invention of artillery, and the perfection which 
 that art has attained, soon changed such a condition of 
 things. For the old strongholds, valueless against regu- 
 lar means of attack, it has been necessary to substitute 
 fortified places, constructed carefully and at the expense 
 of the state. And as they could not all be fortified, gov- 
 ernments have interposed to make choice of the towns 
 which, by their importance, and particularly by their posi- 
 
108 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 tion, demanded most care and protection. The question 
 has then been considered no longer in respect to the 
 special interest of towns, but particularly to the defence of 
 the country against a foreign enemy. Often, however, 
 the choice seems to have been made at random, and with- 
 out sufficient motives for the preference. 
 
 All great questions ought to be resolved upon princi-. 
 pie. The first thing is to recognize the aim and to 
 point it out. Then the means of attaining it will pre- 
 sent themselves to the mind : otherwise we are moving 
 blindly. 
 
 Here, the resolutions arrived at have been modified by 
 private interests and personal influence ; and, it may be 
 added, by the system of war established in the epoch of 
 Louis XIV., which rested upon many errors. 
 
 Certainly no one has a greater respect for Vauban* 
 than myself; but he was more of an engineer than a gen- 
 eral ; and, constructing many fortifications, he gave him- 
 self up complaisantly to works in accordance with his own 
 taste. 
 
 He must therefore be lavish of fortified towns. One 
 tiling, however, astonishes me in a genius of this nature: 
 it is that, on an open frontier like that of Flanders, he 
 
 * Sebastian le Prestre. Seigneur de Vauban, Marshal of France, 
 born 1633; the greatest military engineer of his age and country. 
 He was the |crfecter <>t the bastioned front; and is said to have 
 f'oi -titled three hundred old cit:ulel-. erected thirty-three new ones, 
 to have had the management of fifty-three sieges, and been pres- 
 ent &t one hundred and forty-three engagements. He left various 
 important works on Fortifications. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 109 
 
 had conceived the idea of creating a material barrier of 
 great value, by means of a system of fortified places 
 arranged like the squares of a chess-board, (en echiquier.) 
 
 Nothing could be better than such a system for a 
 small country like Holland, the defence of which is in 
 great measure based upon natural circumstances, turned 
 to profit by art; short distances, and fortresses which 
 control vast inundations, forming great obstacles, add to 
 the means of an army, and facilitate its manoeuvres. 
 
 But to imitate this system upon an open frontier was 
 an error which a genius of the order of Vauban's should 
 not commit. If he was not forced to bend to the exi- 
 gencies of a superior command, he yielded in his charac- 
 ter as engineer, to the attraction and the mania of con- 
 structions. 
 
 The changes which have taken place in the manner of 
 making war, and especially in the strength of armies 
 placed in the field, have demonstrated the vice of such a 
 system of defence ; and the idea of reproducing such 
 works would not enter now into any military head. 
 
 The received principles establish two kinds of fortified 
 places ; depot fortresses and forts of manoeuvre. 
 
 The first are large, very strong, and few. One on a 
 frontier is sufficient. 
 
 They should contain materiel sufficient for the needs of 
 a large army which assembles there, in artillery equipage, 
 in spare fire-arms, and in munitions of every kind. They 
 should have numerous work-shops, an arsenal of construc- 
 tion, and, at all times, the materiel of a great hospital. 
 
 10 
 
110 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 and >uhsistence stores. In a word, the regiments sent to 
 this place must be enabled to leave it organized and 
 armed, and ready at once to take the field and fight. 
 
 Later, the reinforcements, and recruits to fill vacancies, 
 of which the army is in need, are organized in such places ; 
 and if the commencement of the war have been unfortu- 
 nate, or if the army, inferior to that of the enemy, should 
 be reduced from the first to the defensive, its strength 
 would be doubled by falling back upon such a place, sit- 
 uated, by preference, upon a navigable river, to facilitate 
 the arrival of stores of every kind. A depot fortress 
 also favors the mano3uvres of an army which is operating 
 in its vicinity, and gives, at the same time, great strength 
 to its base of operations. 
 
 We have in France three places of this kind, wonder- 
 fully situated, Strasburg, Metz, and Lille ; for the fron- 
 tiers of Germany, Ardennes and Flanders. 
 
 In the days of our grandeuj, we had in Italy, according 
 to the space, three places in echelons which assured us 
 the possession of that country, Alexandria, Mantua, and 
 Venice. Had our prosperity lasted, it is probable that 
 another stronghold of great importance would have been 
 constructed on the Save. In newly-conquered countries, 
 such places are not only depots for the defence of the 
 frontier, they are also places of sway over the surround- 
 ing territory. 
 
 After the depot fortresses, come the forts of manoeuvre. 
 in ii-i tul in facilitating the movements of armir.v 
 and in thwarting or hindering those of the enemy. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. Ill 
 
 They should be exclusively situated, either on rivers, 
 of which they occupy both banks, or upon mountains the 
 valleys of which they enclose. 
 
 A chain of mountains presents great obstacles to the 
 movements of an army. The roads which cross it can 
 alone give passage to a considerable materiel. It is 
 therefore useful to close the points of issue by a fortress, 
 in such a manner as to hinder an attacking enemy from 
 profiting by them, and reserving to ourselves the power 
 to use them. 
 
 A river forms the line of defence for an army; the 
 enemy makes his arrangements to cross it ; he must create 
 the means of passage, for he does not possess permanent 
 bridges. The army placed upon the defensive can, on 
 the contrary, manoeuvre with security upon both banks, 
 and bring all its forces against one part of those of the 
 enemy, when they are divided. If it succeeds in beating 
 the troops which have remained in rear, and which have 
 not yet crossed the river, it delivers those who have 
 crossed to the fatal chances which are presented by an 
 isolated situation and broken communications. In gen- 
 eral, the most efficacious method, for an energetic defence, 
 consists in offensive movements restrained, well calculated, 
 executed rapidly and fitly. 
 
 I will make this the limit of the general ideas which 
 should preside in the defence of a frontier. As to the 
 details of construction, I will only say that, considering 
 the movements of artillery, and the facilities of transpor- 
 tation, there is an object which cannot be too strongly 
 
112 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARM IK- 
 
 recommended to the consideration of engineers, viz., 
 to prepare shelters sufficient and perfectly secure for 
 stores of every kind, and for a considerable part of the 
 personnel of the garrison ; otherwise the defence is not 
 possible. 
 
 Strongholds should, besides, occupy great spaces, by 
 means of detached works systematically placed, and so 
 strong that each one will be able to defend itself. The 
 general defence will thus be rendered easier, the attack 
 will be more embarrassed, and the resistance much longer. 
 This kind of fortification had received a fine application 
 at Alessandria in Piedmont ; and, if political events had 
 permitted it to be used, that place would have rendered 
 great service. But afterwards, its considerable extent 
 requiring a large garrison, and the Piedmontese army 
 being of moderate numerical strength, the King of Sar- 
 dinia could not, with propriety, preserve it. It has there- 
 fore been destroyed, and is reduced, at the present time, 
 to the citadel alone. 
 
 I have explained, in another place, the design of strong- 
 holds and the conditions which should determine their 
 construction, and the choice of their location. I will 
 now speak of those fortifications the object of which is $o 
 cover an inferior army against a superior one, and to give 
 to it powei* to resist, in spite of the disproportion of 
 force : in a word, entrenched camps, designed to establish 
 .1 kind of equilibrium between unequal forces. 
 
 Entrenched camps are of two kinds. The first are 
 composed of a continuous line, whirl) creates material 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 113 
 
 obstacles along the entire development of the position 
 occupied by an army ; the others consist of a determ- 
 ined number of points fortified with care, rendered, if 
 possible, strong enough to be under no apprehension 
 from a sudden attack, (coup-de-main.) Being able to 
 resist a powerful attack, they serve also as supports for 
 troops, protect their flanks, cover a part of their front, 
 render them impregnable, without in any way restricting 
 the liberty of their movements. 
 
 The first kind have scarcely ever accomplished good 
 results. Attacked seriously, they have almost always 
 been forced. This result may be attributed to two causes. 
 
 First, the troops, obliged to guard the entire develop- 
 ment, are too much divided; a single point gained by the 
 enemy often suffices to cause the evacuation of all the 
 others. Second, the entrenched army always regards 
 itself as inferior, and this opinion robs it of one-half its 
 strength. If a point is forced, it gives up the thought of 
 resistance, although this is the very moment when it is 
 most sure of conquering; for it has necessarily superior 
 forces to the enemy, who has as yet been only able to pen- 
 etrate with the head of a column, and whose troops, fol- 
 lowing the first, can only arrive slowly, and by passing 
 through defiles. And so it is, that while cheap and easy 
 success belongs to the entrenched force, it thinks only of 
 retreat. 
 
 The examples in illustration of this are numerous. It 
 would be easy for me to cite many, but I will content my- 
 
 10* 
 
114 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 self with mentioning three celebrated ones, the last of 
 which took place under my own eyes. 
 
 The first is the storming of the lines of Turin, defended 
 by an army of 80,000 men, attacked by Prince Eugene of 
 Savoy* with 40,000 Austrians. 
 
 The second was offered at Denain, where Marshal Vil- 
 lars,f with a disheartened and inferior army, beat Prince 
 Eugene. 
 
 The third is the taking of the lines of Mayence, de- 
 fended by a French army of 30,000 men, and composed 
 of works of rare perfection, the most considerable of their 
 kind which have been built in modern times. Con- 
 structed under the direction of General Chasseloup-Lau- 
 bat, one of the best engineers France has ever had, these 
 works seemed impregnable. Nevertheless, on the 8th of 
 October, 1795, two detachments were sufficient to give 
 rise to a disorder which nothing could repair; the one of 
 four hundred men, crossing the Rhine in rear and above, 
 the other which coming up through a narrow space, left 
 between the river and the lines, at the moment when 
 numerous troops were arranged for an attack in front. 
 
 * The fifth son of Eugene Maurice, Duke of Savoy -Carignan, 
 born at Pari^. ! <1 the Austrian service, 1688. Served 
 
 as a volunteer against the Turks; created Lieutenant Field Marshal, 
 L687, Defeated the Turks at Zenta, September 11, 1G97. Sur- 
 prised and defeated Villeroi near Cremona. Aided Marlborough in 
 the victory of Hochstadt, (Blenheim,) August 13, 1704. Took Bel- 
 grade, 1717. 
 
 f Louis Hector de Villars, born at Lyons, 1658. Served in the 
 army of Louis XI V On itod Mm, . hal dc Camp, 1690. Defeated 
 the AuHtrians at Denain, 1712, and forced I' ^-ne to raise 
 
 the siege of Landrlcy. 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 115 
 
 The only reasonable use which can be made of parallel 
 lines, is to employ them against very large but poor 
 armies, against Eastern troops. Their utility in such 
 cases has always been demonstrated and acknowledged; 
 the success obtained by Prince Eugene of Savoy before 
 Belgrade, is an additional proof of it. Placed between 
 the lines of circumvallation erected against the garrison 
 of the fortress and the lines of countervallation facing the 
 army of the Grand Yizier, he was able to continue the 
 siege, hold the army in check, capture the place, and come 
 out of the struggle victorious; but, against European 
 armies, other principles must be followed. 
 
 When a soldier is authorized to place his entire safety 
 in a material obstacle which is before him, that obstacle 
 being overcome, he thinks no longer of defence, and this 
 fatal impression is often communicated to persons of 
 high grade. A soldier should, on the contrary, be con- 
 vinced and he cannot too often be reminded of it 
 that the guarantee of victory lies chiefly in his courage, 
 and that he ought to scorn the enemy. But if, instead 
 of obstacles which paralyze his movements, he has only 
 supports which cover and protect his flanks, he will con- 
 sider himself invincible, and this opinion will soon be 
 shared by his enemy ; then if he resists an attack, free to 
 move in any direction, he will have the power to profit 
 by a victory, and to develop its consequences. 
 
 An army in presence of another army stronger than 
 itself, and in definitive circumstances, will do well to 
 entrench itself. Resting upon a fort, a river, or mount- 
 
lli FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 ain>. and environed by a greater or less number of defen- 
 sive points rendered as strong as possible, it will succeed 
 in supplying the want of numbers, and in establishing a 
 sort of equilibrium. 
 
 The subject leads me naturally to the question of pe.r- 
 manent entrenched camps ; newly established, composed of 
 revetted works, embracing a large space, situated on 
 strategic points, and traversed by a great river. Nothing, 
 in my judgment, is of more value, or can be of greater 
 service. Many establishments of this kind, although con- 
 structed upon very different scales, and on conditions by 
 no means the same, are now in process of erection or have 
 been erected within a recent period. I will mention two 
 principal ones which have attracted the most attention 
 that of Liritz, in Upper Austria, and the fortifications of 
 Paris. 
 
 The entrenched camp of Lintz is composed of forty- 
 two towers, carefully constructed; they occupy a circular 
 space of more than six leagues ; each one of these towers 
 is casemated,* covered, on the side toward the open coun- 
 try, by the relief of a glacis,^ and it has an entirely 
 sweeping fire. The model tower had a deep ditch, with 
 a revetted counter-scarp, and a counter-scarp gallery fr 
 reverse fire; and it was very wrong, I think, thnt these 
 means of security were suppressed in the system. The 
 
 * A casemate is a bomb-proof chamber r vault in a fort, through 
 
 an (. riling in which usually in tin- si-arp wall cannon art- tir.d. 
 
 t Tin- 'iii.-r >ln|e of the ground, beyond the ditch, towards tin- 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 117 
 
 armament of each tower is composed of a dozen pieces of 
 large calibre. The towers are placed in sight of each 
 other, and near enough to support each other. They 
 occupy, in a portion of their development, a succession 
 of heights, connected at some distance with rugged and 
 difficult mountains, and they abut and support themselves 
 upon the right bank of the Danube, some distance above 
 the town. On the left bank, a greater height, but- 
 tressed upon the upper Danube, (Posilingberg,) is occu- 
 pied by a proper and sufficiently strong work; from 
 which extends another line of .towers, embracing a large 
 space, and coming in the same manner to rest upon the 
 Danube, below the town. 
 
 I will not here discuss the strength of isolated towers ; 
 I think them but little capable of resistance, when aban- 
 doned to themselves. But, covering an army, which 
 is enclosed in the space embraced by them, they seem 
 to me to be impregnable. Never could the enemy 
 undertake to besiege them, sustained as they are by the 
 army, and never would an army placed under their pro- 
 tection, have anything to fear. 
 
 The fundamental principle of entrenched camps of this 
 kind is, that they cannot be blockaded, and that they are 
 placed at the meeting point of numerous communications. 
 With this in view the camp of Lintz is in proper position, 
 its strategic position is well chosen. Two roads, one on 
 each bank of the Danube, go down the river at greater or 
 less distance from its borders Many roads lead into 
 Bohemia ; others are directed toward Salzburg, the Tyrol, 
 
118 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 Styria and Carinthia. A camp as large as that of Lintz, 
 with the obstacles which the country presents, cannot be 
 surrounded by the enemy ; and the army which is there 
 enclosed can never lose all its communications, unless we 
 suppose that the forces in its front are at least triple its 
 own. It will then be always able to receive reinforce- 
 ments, and be reorganized, until the moment when it may 
 think proper to assume the offensive : the enemy will thus 
 be forced to remain in observation; for never would he 
 dare to risk himself in the narrow valley of the Danube, 
 and to march upon Vienna, leaving the Austrian army in 
 that offensive and menacing position. 
 
 Indeed such a resolution would be foolish in the ex- 
 treme; and if, in 1809, the camp of Lintz had existed, 
 Napoleon would not have gone to Vienna, or would have 
 entered it much later than he did. In war, and espe- 
 cially for great monarchies, time is everything, since it is 
 only necessary to give the natural resources of a country 
 the means of developing. The entrenched camp of Lintz 
 was then a good and great military conception. 
 
 There are in every country localities which would aid 
 analogous establishments, and which would, upon occa- 
 sion, be of great utility. 
 
 Tin- entrenched camp of Verona was constructed in the 
 same spirit; and, although then- may be very dinVmit 
 conditions, it can and must play an important part, 
 in tin- li;iinl> of a general who will be able to make n-r 
 of it in his inaiHi'iivres. 
 
 I (OHM now to the defensive works erected at Paris, 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 119 
 
 which have been, and still are, objects of such great and 
 solemn debates. The construction of the forts, the sys- 
 tem of which seems to me perfectly conceived, is a greater 
 assurance of the independence of France against the 
 attacks of entire Europe, than the acquisition of many 
 provinces, which would have in that proportion removed 
 the frontier to a greater distance. 
 
 No one will deny the immense influence exerted by 
 Paris upon the destinies of the kingdom. A head out 
 of proportion to the body, but a living centre, where 
 are assembled faculties and intelligence, where an irresist- 
 ible moral power is developed, where immense treasures 
 are accumulated, and where is found in reunion all that 
 the country has most distinguished, Paris has accomplished 
 wonders for the power, the glory and the brilliancy of 
 France. But that city caused it to purchase this advant- 
 age at a dear rate, by the weight with which it crushed 
 the country when it fell. Interests which touch the 
 whole kingdom, and compromise its very existence, can- 
 not be abandoned to the hazard of two or three battles : 
 either the frontiers must be removed, or the dangers which 
 the enemy's approach causes it to risk should be dimin- 
 ished ; and there was no other means but to prepare an 
 impregnable refuge for the French armies, unfortunate and 
 beaten, by reuniting them under her walls. 
 
 Whatever might be the consequences of the most dis- 
 astrous campaign, 80,000 or 100,000 men of the fragments 
 will always constitute the remains of an army ; and rest- 
 ing against forts regularly constructed, these 80,000 men 
 
120 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 will be unconquerable. Now, with the resources which 
 Paris contains in personnel of every kind, in materiel of 
 every sort, and with the aids of the neighboring depart- 
 ments, the skeletons would soon be filled up, the losses 
 repaired; and in less than one month an army of 300,000 
 men, well provided, and renewed as to its morale, would 
 be ready to march against the enemy. What force then 
 would not the enemy require to resist? If he divides his 
 forces he will be feeble in all parts and easily destroyed ; 
 if he holds together to resist and to fight, how can he 
 support himself? And what would be his fate after the 
 smallest check ? 
 
 If then the enemy should advance upon Paris, there 
 would be nothing better for him to do than to leave it 
 again, before the French army, reorganized, should be 
 able to go and find him there ; he would be obliged to 
 hasten to establish the war in the provinces, and within 
 reach of his resources. In that case the war is carried 
 back to the frontiers, and everything returning into 
 its natural condition, a catastrophe is no longer to be 
 feared. 
 
 I regard, then, as a most useful event to the safety and 
 to the defence of France, the construction of detached 
 forts, the development of which is such that the enemy 
 cannot present himself in force upon many points at once. 
 But it was not necessary to fortify Paris by a continuous 
 fortification; for in my judgment and in that of men of 
 (Incut ion and experience, this city is not in condition to 
 a siege; it was sufficient to adopt such a sv-t -m 
 
FORTIFICATIONS. 121 
 
 of defence that it can never be besieged; and, to this 
 end, the only end which should have been considered, the 
 forts were sufficient; the continuous line is superfluous; 
 and whatever may happen it can never have a useful 
 application. 
 
 11 
 
FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 MEN brought together in large numbers have wants ; 
 the talent to satisfy these with order, economy, and intel- 
 ligence, forms the science of administration. 
 
 The basis of a good administration is in the care taken 
 to acknowledge the reality of consumption, (legitimite des 
 consommations.) Where the reviews are exact, where the 
 effective force and those present under arms are determ- 
 ined in a precise manner and frequently, there are elements 
 of order: for great abuses are found less in the prices 
 of things consumed, than in the consumptions which have 
 never taken place, but are only conjectured. 
 
 In the time of the Directory, the French military ad- 
 ministration was in great confusion ; and the First Consul, 
 upon his accession to power, made haste to create a new 
 corps, charged with revisions, for the establishment of 
 order. 
 
 II. determined to give it great consideration, which 
 was justified by great zeal. At the end of six months, 
 more than 150,000 men, who were not in existence, but 
 for the greater number of whom rations, pay and cloth- 
 ing were drawn, were stricken from the rolls. 
 
 The systems of administration are different according 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 123 
 
 to countries: all are susceptible of good results, when- 
 ever the effective force, and those present under arms are 
 exactly determined. I will only observe that there are, 
 in my opinion at least, great advantages in giving to vari- 
 ous corps the faculty of administering for themselves as 
 far as possible ; for as the excellence of troops is always 
 connected with good administration, a great responsibility 
 should be imposed on the commanders of bodies of troops, 
 and they should also be invested with great powers ; their 
 operations should be scrutinized, but the direction of them 
 should be left to their discretion. The sole responsibility 
 of judgment concerning the soldiers is itself a great 
 guarantee that they will be zealous. The colonels who 
 are found to prevaricate should be punished in an exem- 
 plary manner; but, on the other hand, the glory of the 
 successes they obtain should be conceded to them. 
 
 It has been forbidden in France to form, in the various 
 corps, economical clubs, (masses d'economie,) and a great 
 error has thus been committed. A community of living 
 is always of advantage, and a skilful and intelligent com- 
 mander, without depriving the soldiers of the enjoyment 
 of any of their rights, can and ought to make them thus 
 economize. If forbidden, they are none the less formed, 
 and not being avowed, they are often put to a mysterious 
 and culpable use. When, on the contrary, they are not 
 only authorized, but also directed, and left to the dispo- 
 sition of the commander, to be used for the benefit of 
 the regiment, in accidental cases and those beyond the 
 prevision of the regulations, there will be 'great encour- 
 
124 FORMATION, ETC. OT ARMIES. 
 
 agemeut, and the colonels will be honored by the success 
 of an industry, the honorable fruits of which they will 
 reap. 
 
 Two very important branches of administration are 
 defective in almost all the armies of Europe: these are 
 hospitals and provisions.* An enlightened government 
 ought to seek to establish both upon a new basis; im- 
 portant and direct benefits to the art of war, and for the 
 welfare and preservation of the soldiers, would result from 
 it. I will begin with provisions. 
 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 In treating of the victualling of troops, I shall only 
 speak of the furnishing of bread; it, alone, presents diffi- 
 culties, the provision of cattle being always within reach 
 of the consumers. 
 
 The difficulty of distributing bread regularly to the 
 troops, is one of the most embarrassing things in war. It 
 is inexplicable that so many distinguished generals, who, 
 from this cause, have been thwarted and fettered in the exe- 
 cution of their projects, should not have arrived at the 
 solution of so important a problem. 
 
 The Romans had solved it; but, in general, their wars 
 
 * Calif. 1 in our service subsistence ttoret : the officers charged with 
 providing them arc called commissaries of aubtietcncc. 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 125 
 
 did not require as rapid movements as those of modern 
 wars. 
 
 There is, I believe, a perfectly satisfactory manner of 
 conquering this difficulty, and the change which I pro- 
 pose would have a powerful influence upon the art of 
 war. 
 
 Regularly to receive distributions of bread through 
 the labors of the administration, the army should be either 
 stationary or in retreat, always remaining at the same 
 distance from its magazines, or approaching them. 
 
 If in marching forward, it departs from them in a con- 
 stantly increasing manner, the operation would be impos- 
 sible for any commissary, however skilful he might be; 
 for convoys could not move more rapidly than the army, 
 and they would follow it always at the same distance as 
 at the moment of departure ; at each new expedition of a 
 convoy, the distance increasing, the difficulty becomes 
 greater. 
 
 In a war of invasion, the troops can only live upon the 
 resources of the country through which they range. But 
 the time necessary to make bread in inhabited places, the 
 ordinary insufficiency of mills and ovens, and their dis- 
 tance, render local resources very incomplete, and the 
 penury which results from these things leads to great suf- 
 ferings and great disorder. Now, the maintenance of 
 order, of every kind, and in every manner, is the safety of 
 armies. 
 
 The only efficacious means of insuring the regular sub- 
 sistence of the soldier, is to put upon himself the duty of 
 
 11* 
 
126 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 providing, according to a designated mode. I have made 
 the experiment, and the result was entirely favorable. 
 
 Men do not make war in a desert, or if such an excep- 
 tional circumstance should happen, they make their dispo- 
 sitions accordingly. War is ordinarily made in inhabited 
 countries ; and where there are people, there is grain to 
 feed them. It is then in the means of using the grain, 
 with which the barns are filled, that the solution of the 
 question is found. 
 
 The great difficulty is to reduce the grain to flour, as I 
 will explain further on. There must be mills to grind 
 the corn ; men could live, at need, on flour alone, without 
 turning it into bread ; but they would die of hunger on 
 heaps of corn. 
 
 When manual labor is scarce and dear, there is advant- 
 age in using powerful machines in manufactures, and 
 in centralizing the labor; but when manual labor is 
 abundant and costs nothing, it would be better to follow 
 an entirely opposite system. By thrusting the labor from 
 the centre to the circumference, it is rendered easier; and 
 by putting it into the hands of those who will profit by it, 
 their zeal and punctuality are assured. That being set- 
 tled, it is evident that the labor of soldiers can be arranged, 
 without. disadvantage, and it is to their benefit to receive, 
 as an indemnity, the current market price of the labor 
 with which they are tasked. 
 
 Why is it that, in the field, soldiers never lack soup, when 
 they have meat, bread mid ramp-krttlos ? It is because 
 they make it themselves. If a onuni-sury had conceived 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 127 
 
 the idea of undertaking it for a whole division, on any 
 pretext whatever, or even a colonel for his regiment, never, 
 while marching, would soldiers have it to eat. 
 
 Let us apply this example of soup to bread making, 
 and the soldier would never want for it. I propose to 
 give the army portable mills : I tried this measure in 
 one campaign in Spain, and it succeeded completely. 
 The army of Portugal, in 1812, subsisted thus, during 
 six months; the only disadvantage encountered was that 
 the grinding stones were rapidly worn out ; that was rem- 
 edied by means of a better hardening process, and very 
 durable ones were made. 
 
 Napoleon, informed of these results, was struck, in the 
 midst of the miseries of the Russian campaign, with the 
 advantages which might be derived from their use ; and 
 he ordered a great number of these mills to be made for 
 the grand army. Five hundred were sent to him; they 
 arrived at Smolensk, at the time the army was returning 
 from Moscow. But then there was no longer manual 
 labor to work them, nor were there soldiers to use them. 
 
 I will state what were and what ought to be the condi- 
 tion of these mills : 
 
 1. Light enough to be carried by one soldier, who 
 leaves his ranks for that purpose, on account of its 
 importance, if the regular means of transportation chance 
 to be wanting. 
 
 2. Capable of being used by a single man. 
 
 3. Producing fine flour, and sufficient, with four hours' 
 labor, for the wants of a company. 
 
128 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 The mills of the army of Portugal produced thirty 
 pounds of fine flour in an hour. It has been objected to 
 this system, that the regulations having prescribed the 
 extraction of the bran, this operation complicates the 
 process. I answer that carefully-made experiments have 
 proved the uselessness of extracting the bran, with grain 
 of a good quality. 
 
 With even tolerable grain, if it be pure and unmixed, 
 the bread is always good. When the commissariat pro- 
 vides bad bread, the soldier must necessarily receive it 
 and eat it, under pain of dying of hunger, because the 
 time of consumption is immediate; but when the grain 
 which is issued to him is full of dust, or of any other 
 mixture, it may be cleaned before using it, and thus the 
 soldier will always eat good bread. In this respect, 
 his condition will be ameliorated ; it would be still more 
 so by the extra pay for his labor, which he would receive 
 either in money or in an increase of ration. 
 
 But this is what I judge to be the aim of the adminis- 
 tration ; habitual simplification, in time of war, facil- 
 ity of service. A general-in-chief makes more mental 
 effort, in the present day, to assure the subsistence of 
 his troops than for all other things, and his combina- 
 tions are constantly thwarted and destroyed, for want of 
 issues of bread, made in time. 
 
 Thus has been resolved, not only the question of indis- 
 pensable food given to the troops, but also that relative 
 to bread, properly so called. Means have been found to 
 make, by a simple excavation, in all kinds of soil, and in 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 129 
 
 four hours, ovens which two hours afterwards are ready 
 to bake bread. In every bivouac, flour is made in suffi- 
 cient quantity for daily consumption; and at every rest 
 or stop in the movement, furnaces are made in the soil 
 of a peasant's homestead, and bread baked in advance. 
 From that moment the supply of an army takes place of 
 itself; the administration is not more occupied with these 
 details, than each man is with the assurance of the circu- 
 lation of his blood : it is the consequence of a principle 
 which is constantly in action. 
 
 In time of peace, the government should have maga- 
 zines of grain to issue to the troops. In a defensive 
 war, it should be the same. In a war of invasion 
 each regiment would receive daily from the adminis- 
 tration of the country through which it was passing, or 
 would take from the barns of the inhabitants, the neces- 
 sary quantity of grain. But the habit must be followed 
 and contracted during peace ; for, on principle, the usages 
 of peace ought to assimilate as far as possible to those 
 of war; and this truth is particularly incontestible when 
 it concerns the introduction of a great change. 
 
 SECTION SECOND. 
 
 HOSPITALS. 
 
 There is nothing sadder than the spectacle often pre- 
 sented in an army by military hospitals. Attentions, 
 
130 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 almost always incomplete, are given to a class of men, 
 who nevertheless, by many titles, have the right to univer- 
 sal solicitude. A life of devotion composes their exist- 
 ence; sufferings, fatigues, dangers, are their only prospect. 
 The noblest sentiments animate their hearts, and these 
 generous men only ask of their commanders, that, in order 
 to secure their love, they should be just in the exercise 
 of their authority. Such is the inherent spirit of a sol- 
 dier ; and it especially belongs to the French soldier, who 
 is no stranger to any of the sentiments which honor 
 humanity. Doubtless there are vices and evil passions in 
 armies, as in all associations of men ; but we there find 
 also the model of the highest virtues. The preservation 
 of sick and wounded soldiers is then a duty of conscience 
 and of humanity. It is also of great importance for the 
 government as well as for the general; for the greatest 
 number of soldiers is an element of success, and their re- 
 placement by recruits, costly as it is, is far from supplying 
 the place of those which are lost. Moreover, what confi- 
 dence, what .energy is inspired, on the battle-field, in a 
 good soldier, by the certainty that in case of wounds, 
 the most efficient succors will be lavished upon him ! 
 
 Perhaps, to this end, it would be necessary to change 
 the character of the administration of hospitals; to seek 
 a mode of recompense more noble than that of pecuniary 
 interest, to develop worthier and more elevated consider- 
 ations, the better to sustain courage and devotion. 
 
 It tin- functions of those who administer to the care of 
 M-k and wounded were elevated, ennobled and re- 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 131 
 
 warded by public opinion, and by the pleasures which the 
 exercise of charity, and the sentiment of piety afford, 
 there would most certainly result from this a great benefit 
 to the suffering. 
 
 The means of achieving this result would be to leave to 
 a religious body, who were not strangers to the subordin- 
 ate functions of surgery and medicine, the care of military 
 hospitals ; not the administration properly so called, and 
 the handling of the funds, but the monopoly of cares and 
 of direction. 
 
 A body of brothers-hospitallers, engaged for life, or for 
 a determined time, having honored commanders, might 
 be charged with the care of the wards, and with service 
 at the bedsides of the sick. Paid assistants would be 
 placed under their orders for the more menial and disa- 
 greeable duties; but without any kind of care, in an 
 urgent case being thought beneath the commanders them- 
 selves. The spirit of charity would support them in 
 their labors. A detachment of these respectable brothers, 
 after having received their destination, would never quit 
 the individuals confided to their care. Their presence 
 would be hope and consolation to the sick; and their 
 holy ministry, exercised to the profit of all, friends and 
 enemies, would become their safeguard among all the 
 armies of Europe, when the fortune of arms should cause 
 them to fall into their hands. 
 
 Public consideration and the joys of conscience would 
 be their special reward. A hierarchy wisely constructed 
 would establish a blind obedience in a corps devoted 
 
132 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 to the practice of the most touching virtues. The gen- 
 eral of an army should receive at times, and give the 
 place of honor to, the superior of these brothers-hospital- 
 lers; he would honor thus all the subalterns, and would 
 pay them with that precious coin, the value of which 
 is increased tenfold by the measure with which it is em- 
 ployed. 
 
 Thus the service of hospitals would be performed by 
 three bodies: 
 
 1. The doctors of the medical art, physicians and 
 surgeons ; 
 
 2. The administration which creates the materiel, dis- 
 poses of the funds, and provides the commissariat; 
 
 3. The hospital-brothers, charged with administering 
 the cares, and with directing their entire application to 
 the welfare of the sick. 
 
 This latter corps, constituting in some sort the board 
 of living and energetic control of everything ill-judged 
 which the administration properly so called might do, 
 would offer a guarantee, at all times, for regular system. 
 
 The Knights of Malta* had their origin in the atten- 
 tions given to pilgrims who were going to Jerusalem, and 
 charity was their first law. Anarchy and disorder in the 
 places where they were established, forced them to arm 
 for their own defence ; and, while remaining hospitallers, 
 tin v became soldiers. 
 
 * The Knights Hospitallers of St. John: after the em- . l< 
 
 I. -lit :il I'.lin '!<. uii'l whi'li lrivrn tlicnrr by t hr < )t tomans, Slut ium-l 
 
 :it Miilui. which WH* |in -nt-| to them hy Charles V. 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 133 
 
 Courage and the profession of arms have always had, 
 and will never cease to have, an eclat which naturally 
 pleases the multitude ; and the character of soldiers having 
 inspired them with a love of war, the hospitallers changed 
 their nature. Their creation had been the expression of 
 the wants of a certain society ; and what I would restore 
 would greatly ameliorate the condition of that mass of 
 men, worthy of so great interest, which forms, in Europe, 
 an energetic and truly patriotic part of every nation. 
 
 It would not be difficult to draw up the conditions for 
 the administration and service of hospitals; but these 
 naturally spring from the general plan which I have 
 adopted. 
 
 For a long time past, and under the Empire, in view of 
 the disorders of which I have sometimes been a witness, 
 this idea has constantly occupied my mind. Under the 
 Restoration, it was not practicable, because of the suppo- 
 sitions to which it gave birth ; but the moment has perhaps 
 arrived for its execution with profit and success. How 
 great would be the relief experienced thereby, by the 
 army of Africa, (Algerie.) 
 
 I do not disguise to myself the objections which may 
 be urged to this establishment, nor the difficulties of 
 maintaining harmony between rival corps, working to the 
 same end ; but there are already two, which are often far 
 from being understood, and a third, without complicating 
 the matter much more, would bring useful information for 
 the enlightenment of authority. 
 
 I know besides that a kind of ridicule may be thrown 
 12 
 
134 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 upon this institution ; but I willingly brave it, giving 
 myself up to the thought that it would contribute to the 
 amelioration of the lot of soldiers ; a powerful interest in 
 my judgment, both for the service and for humanity. 
 
 In later years, the service of hospitals has, however, 
 been ameliorated, by a military organization of the attend- 
 ants. A system of grades, established as among troops, 
 gives a prospect to those who serve well, and creates a 
 means of order, of oversight and of discipline; a kind 
 of point of honor springs up, and authority is more 
 easily exercised. Good results should ensue. 
 
 In general, military organization insures at all times 
 the regular action of power; it thus constitutes essen- 
 tially a great means of order; it would be successfully 
 employed whenever it was desirable to act upon associa- 
 tions of men destined to work together for the same end ; 
 and the more the first elements are impressed with it, the 
 more it will tend to profit and advantage. 
 
 One word more about hospitals. 
 
 The wretched and false calculations of economy upon 
 what we have agreed to call, in the language of accounts, 
 the hospital daily report, have been the cause of diminish- 
 ing too much the number of these establishments; and the 
 desire of putting upon other persons duties which concern 
 ourselves, has too frequently multiplied their abandon- 
 ment Nothing is more fatal than these two systems, when 
 they are not prompted by imperious circumstances, such 
 a the vicinity of the enemy, the absolute want of means, 
 etc. In ordinary cases, hospitals cannot be placed too 
 
ADMINISTRATION. 135 
 
 closely within reach of the troops, nor can the sick be too 
 much divided as to place. Generally, diseases of a sim- 
 ple nature are cured in a few days, when they are treated 
 at once. They are aggravated by long transportation ; 
 and long return journeys, after the disease is over, exhaust 
 men still feeble, and produce relapses which another journey 
 renders fatal. Thus, by multiplying hospitals, and placing 
 them within reach of the troops, their cure is rendered 
 easier, the diseases are hindered from becoming aggra- 
 vated, and the sick from being weakened ; and we prevent 
 the obstacles which bring in their train those contagious 
 diseases, such fatal sources of the greatest ravages. 
 
 By this system, more money would seem to be expended, 
 but the result would be a much greater economy. 
 
 This is the system which I have constantly followed, 
 and by it the troops under my orders have found them- 
 selves well cared for. 
 
136 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 MILITARY JUSTICE, AND THE COMPOSITION OF COURTS- 
 MARTIAL. 
 
 THE social state cannot subsist, if the conditions of its 
 existence are not fulfilled. It is the same with an army, 
 which presents the example of a particular society, sub- 
 jected to special rules and a special code of morals. To 
 discover the principle which may solve our question, I look 
 first at the characteristics of military justice, and I find it 
 to be the complement of the means of discipline. To 
 whose hands should its execution be confided? To the 
 hands of those who are charged with the maintenance of 
 discipline, who feel every day its necessity, who perform its 
 duties, and are the most interested in it. It is then to 
 the officers in active service that this care should be exclu- 
 sively committed. 
 
 Nevertheless, it has not always been so. During the 
 
 Revolution, military judges were appointed, who were civic 
 
 officers accompanying the army. The error which had 
 
 thus been made was soon recognized : the consequences 
 
 fatal; and councils of war were created, such as 
 
 .it- at pre.-ent . 
 
 In ls-j f an Hl'ort was made to improve the matter, 
 
MILITARY JUSTICE, ETC. 137 
 
 and a new law for military justice was presented to the 
 chamber of peers. 
 
 A commission composed of men of eminent merit, but 
 unacquainted with troops, proposed to substitute for the 
 temporary councils of war, permanent war-tribunals, pre- 
 sided over by general officers. This new method, by 
 establishing a military magistracy distinct from the army 
 proper, would have had all the disadvantages of the 
 system adopted temporarily under the Republic, and 
 would besides have altered, in the eyes of the troops, the 
 character of generals, essentially fighting men, who should, 
 by their presence, keep alive the ideas of glory and 
 reward, and not thoughts of crime and punishment. 
 
 Military justice is not established, in an absolute man- 
 ner, upon moral principles : its foundation is necessity. 
 
 Doubtless, in the judgment of all sensible men as far 
 as morality and the interest which belongs to personal 
 right are concerned there is a great difference between 
 the thief, and the soldier who disobeys his commander 
 and insults him in a moment of passion. Nevertheless, 
 the punishment of the soldier will be the graver. To 
 avenge society, it will be sufficient that the one should go 
 to the galleys, while the army would be lost if the other 
 were not punished with death : for, from that moment, all 
 bonds are broken, and the military edifice, which is only 
 based on respect and submission, would crumble without 
 this support. 
 
 There is then an immense difference between civil jus- 
 tice and military justice. The latter seems barbarous, 
 
 12* 
 
1 I s FORMATION, ETC OP ARMIES. 
 
 but it is indispensable; and its execution can only be 
 insured by the very persons who, by the conditions of 
 their existence, are interested in it. 
 
 If the battalion forms the unit for battle, the regiment 
 forms the social military unit, the family and the tribe. 
 The colonel, the chief of this society, is invested with a 
 kind of magistracy which must carefully guard its preser- 
 vation. 
 
 It is for him to punish ; it is for him to assure to each 
 one impartial and speedy justice, to maintain daily order, 
 and the execution of the laws, upon which that order 
 rests. Thus when regular armies have been formed, each 
 regiment has had its tribunal under the high oversight of 
 its colonel; and even at that epoch it was not only a 
 necessity, but a right; for each colonel being the adminis- 
 trator of his regiment, should have legal and extended 
 powers as the guarantee of the obedience of his subor- 
 dinates. 
 
 Regimental tribunals still exist in many of the great 
 armies of Europe. Placed within reach of the persons 
 to be tried, their action can always make itself felt with- 
 out delay. This consideration is of such capital import- 
 ance, that perhaps there is ivam to pn -It T Hint system to 
 .mother adopted in l-'nuiee and Russia, that of division 
 tribunals only. 
 
 We understand the motive \\liich has influenced the 
 a tor; he wished to shelter the accused from the per- 
 sonal passions of the commanders, by causing tlieiu to be 
 4 ried before a tribunal eompo>ed in great part of ollicers 
 
MILITARY JUSTICE, ETC. 139 
 
 not belonging to their corps. On the other hand, these 
 officers being in active service and employed with troops, 
 it seems certain that their judgment, delivered without 
 prejudice, will have that severe character which the good 
 of the service demands; for the colonel who presides 
 would do for the interest of any other regiment just what 
 will be done at some later time for his own regiment by 
 another colonel. The interest of the army will always be 
 considered. 
 
 There has been established, in each council of war, an 
 organization of officers of every grade. It is a recogni- 
 tion of the sentiment of duty which is remarked equally 
 in all the parts of a hierarchy, and a guarantee for the 
 accused, who thus have one or many of their peers in 
 rank among their judges. Such an arrangement is with- 
 out danger; for indulgence, if that be feared, is more 
 probable in elevated than in inferior grades. 
 
 I conclude then that, on all grounds, military tribunals 
 ought to be exclusively composed of individuals in active 
 service, and belonging ta the very corps placed under 
 their jurisdiction. 
 
 A final arrangement would perhaps be desirable in 
 military justice. It exists in Austria, and the effects seem 
 to me salutary. The right of pardon and the commuta- 
 tion of punishment are not reserved to the sovereign; 
 they belong to the colonel proprietary of the regiment;* 
 
 * The "proprietor" of a regiment confers his name upon it, and 
 nominates the officers up to the grade of captain, inclusive. 
 McClelland "Armies of Europe." Topic, "The Austrian Infantry." 
 
140 FORMATION, ETC. OF ARMIES. 
 
 who, in practice, delegates their exercise to the field offi- 
 cer commanding. There are so many circumstances which 
 may operate in favor of a soldier guilty of breach of dis- 
 cipline, (it is almost always for such acts that pardon is 
 granted,) the commanders who are upon the spot are so 
 fully able to appreciate the opportuneness of an act of 
 clemency, that it would be, in my judgment, very useful to 
 confer this prerogative, not to the commander of the 
 corps, but to the commanding general of the division, or 
 of the corps d'armee. 
 
 In the present condition of things, a brave soldier, 
 whom every one would willingly save, perishes, a victim to 
 the rigor of the law ; or, in the desire for his preserva- 
 tion, justice is violated, an equally painful alternative. 
 
111. 
 
 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE USE OP THE DIFFERENT ARMS.* 
 
 THE troops of the different arms should be separately 
 organized, that they may receive the uniform instruction 
 which is appropriate, and acquire a suitable spirit. 
 
 This principle has sometimes been deviated from, by 
 forming legions, but they have not worked well. The 
 officers who command these corps, being best acquainted 
 with the arm in which they originally served, always give 
 it the preference, and treat it according to their predilec- 
 tion. In the artillery, it is absolutely impossible to 
 provide for the needs of instruction; for it would re- 
 
 * The use of the word arms is twofold; it refers to weapons, 
 the musket, cannon, sabre, lance, etc.; and also, as in this con- 
 nection, to the great essential division of troops into infantry, cav- 
 alry and artillery. These are called the three arms. 
 
 (141) 
 
142 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 quire us to multiply infinitely the necessary establishments, 
 such as the polygon,* schools, and batteries of differ- 
 ent kinds. The artillery ought therefore to be collected 
 together in a single garrison, if possible, that they may 
 all receive the same instruction. The government might 
 then devote more money to this object, since a greater 
 number of individuals would participate in it. I proposed 
 this when I was commander of the French artillery ; but 
 considerations of administration and economy, based upon 
 local interests, prevented the adoption of the change. 
 
 But if the arms should be separated in time of peace, 
 the better to develop their special instruction, they must 
 be combined in time of war. 
 
 It is by mingling them intelligently and skilfully, that 
 the best results are obtained; they sustain each other 
 reciprocally, and concert their efforts appropriately. By 
 leaving together the same corps, associated during many 
 campaigns under the same general, an esprit de corps is 
 created, and, in consequence, a useful homogeneousness. 
 The troops have thus all the value of which they are 
 susceptible. The leg-ion, among the Romans, is the first 
 pxiimple of this combination, which certainly contributed 
 powerfully to their triumphs. "A divinity," says Vege- 
 tiu^. "inspired them with the conception." 
 
 * The "polygont" is a place enclosed by works resembling those 
 of a fortification, net apart for the instruction of the artillery, in 
 their various exi-n-i-.-- : --Lt petit polygon*" is the place for carry- 
 ing on gun-drill in winter, generally in the bastion nearest to tlie 
 n n ill cry barracks. Burnt' Naval and Military Dictionary, voee 
 
 H I',. 
 
THE USE OP DIFFERENT ARMS. 143 
 
 In the middle ages, in the period which followed them, 
 and even down to our time, the greatest generals had 
 no idea of imitating them; even Frederick did not 
 think of doing so. The essay was made in the French 
 army, at the end of the seven years' war, under Marshal 
 Broglio,* and to this belongs the glory of putting that 
 profound conception into practical shape. But the usage 
 was not established until the commencement of the wars 
 of the Republic, and then it was that the art of war 
 underwent one of the greatest revolutions of our day. 
 
 The infantry, organized formerly in brigades, was under 
 the orders, when it was formed, of two or three generals, 
 who commanded the centre and the wings respectively. 
 The cavalry was in the same manner divided and placed 
 upon the wings, and the appointments to subordinate 
 commands were given only upon the day of battle. All 
 the generals resided ordinarily at the general headquar- 
 ters, and they were charged, in routine, with the duty of 
 leading detachments. The general of an army, wishing 
 to confide an instant command and the charge of an 
 expedition to a very capable general, or one who inspired 
 him with more confidence than the rest, was thus forced 
 to wait until the order of the roster brought the turn of 
 that individual to march, and he must adjourn the opera- 
 
 * There were several of this name. The one here referred to is 
 Victor Francis, born, 1718, who was not only distinguished in the 
 seven years' war, in which he fought under D'Estre*es at Hasten- 
 back, and under Soubise at Rosbach, but he was Minister of War 
 to Louis XVI. in 1789, and commanded a division of Emigres in 
 1792. He died in 1804. 
 
144 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 tiou, or make fictitious detachments, to employ those who 
 preceded him. The detachments having returned, the 
 troops were separated, and the brigades received their 
 destination by the directions of the general staff. It is 
 asked how, with such a system, an army of any size could 
 be moved, could form and fight ? 
 
 They employed whole days at a time, simply to put the 
 army in line of battle. The least movement often pro- 
 duced confusion, and the heavy artillery, leaving the park 
 for the battle-field, and put in battery sometimes the 
 evening before, went into park again immediately after 
 the action. 
 
 This barbarous and absurd system has been changed 
 since our earlier wars; and all the armies of Europe soon 
 adopted, from our example, the new organization, which 
 gives mobility to the troops and renders them always 
 iv:nly to fight. A general has thus the means of making 
 with facility such combinations as circumstances and his 
 genius may inspire in him. 
 
 In an army, the constant unit, which should never vary, 
 I ut the numerical strength of which may be greater or 
 less, is the division. It is ordinarily composed of two 
 brigades, each of two regiments, and sometimes of three; 
 and it has, besides, two batteries of artillery and a corps 
 of seven or oiirht hundred horse. It has a complete 
 administration; it is an army on a small scale: it can 
 act M-pai-alrly. march. MltMM and liirht ; or it can mint 1 
 with ease to take the part assigned to it in line of battle. 
 
 It was thus that the French army was organized in our 
 
THE USE OF DIFFERENT ARMS. 145 
 
 first and immortal campaigns in Italy, and also some 
 years afterwards. At a later period, Napoleon having 
 formed corps d'armee, he withdrew the cavalry from the 
 divisions, and contented himself with applying to the 
 corps tfarmee the principles of the legion. But in the 
 corps d'armee the cavalry is too far from the divisions ; 
 it is not under the control of the infantry generals who 
 conduct the battle ; it is unable, in many circumstances, 
 to take timely advantage of the disorders which arise in 
 the enemy's ranks. I shall hereafter speak of corps 
 d'armee, and the circumstances which have authorized 
 and even necessitated their formation. 
 
 The division is then the army unit, the first element by 
 which the three arms are bound together in an intimate 
 manner ; but the wants of an army are not limited thus. 
 
 Each arm, after having been accessory, must in its turn 
 become a principal element, because there are circum- 
 stances in which a particular effect is to be produced. 
 Thus cavalry reserves are indispensable, whether for en- 
 gaging masses of cavalry, or to precipitate themselves 
 upon ill- supported infantry corps, or to cover infantry 
 when in disorder, or to carry batteries, etc. 
 
 This cavalry should be supported and sustained by an 
 artillery force belonging to and associated with it, accord- 
 ing to circumstances, in order to obtain the desired result. 
 The cavalry is here the principal arm, and the artillery 
 accessory. But the turn of the latter also comes during 
 the battle ; the artillery reserve, employed to produce a 
 s;reat effect, at a given moment and upon a designated 
 
 13 
 
146 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 point, becomes suddenly the principal arm ; it crushes the 
 enemy with its fire. Then the infantry advance, which 
 completes the disorder, and finally the cavalry, charging 
 upon them, finish their destruction and assures the vic- 
 tory. 
 
 I shall not enter into those details which would estab- 
 lish the character of the circumstances in which the artil- 
 lery is charged with the exclusive part; but I have 
 already said enough to conclude that each arm must be, 
 in turn, accessory and principal ; and if the artillery is to 
 act upon an isolated point, the infantry and cavalry 
 troops, designed to protect it and assure its safety, must 
 be subordinate to it in all their movements. 
 
 But cavalry reserves, important as they are, should 
 not exceed a designated force upon a given point : beyond 
 certain limits, the most skilful general cannot handle 
 them ; and, besides, it is difficult to subsist a great number 
 of horses together. 
 
 I would limit the force to six thousand horse, the man- 
 agement of which is practicable ; with this number success 
 ought to attend any reasonable undertaking with cavalry 
 upon the field of battle. 
 
 Napoleon, in his last campaigns, organized bodies of 
 cavalry composed of three divisions numbering at least 
 twelve thousand horse. This idea was monstrous, and 
 without useful application on a battle-field; it was the 
 cause of immense losses without fighting, these great 
 iirpx having served no other purpose thim t<> present an 
 i ordinary spectacle, designed to astonish the eye. 
 
THE USE OP DIFFERENT ARMS. 147 
 
 The organization of armies should then establish divi- 
 sions, and reserves of each arm. I refer to armies of 
 moderate strength; for in great armies, there must be 
 besides an additional echelon, as an element of order and 
 of action. This is brought about by constituting the 
 troops into corps d'armee: that is, there should be estab- 
 lished fixed commands, intermediate between the com- 
 mander-in-chief and the generals commanding divisions. 
 
 An army of 100,000 men, arranged in ten or twelve 
 divisions, would be difficult to manage, if it were not 
 organized in corps d'armee; for confusion would soon 
 arise on account of the too great number of independent 
 units, allowed to manoeuvre freely according to the gen- 
 eral direction given by a single commander-in-chief. The 
 need has therefore been early felt to form new aggrega- 
 tions of these divisions, to simplify the arrangements of 
 the general-in-chief ; and two, three, or four divisions 
 have, to this end, been united together. 
 
 Thus an army, composed as I have just indicated, is 
 divided into four fractions ; the general-in-chief can move 
 these with facility ; he has in hand four corps, of which 
 three form his line of battle, and the fourth his reserve. 
 
 In all grades of the military hierarchy, it is by placing 
 a commander in communication with a small number of 
 immediate subordinates that the exercise of authority is 
 facilitated. 
 
 The corps d'armee, being small armies, should have an 
 organization analogous to the principles which I have 
 established, and should be thus composed : 
 
14K DIFFERENT OPERATIONS tF WAR. 
 
 1. Of three divisions, in which the three arras are com- 
 bined ; 
 
 2. Of a reserve of cavalry, supported by horse artillery ; 
 
 3. Of a reserve of artillery. 
 
 The reserves, designed to move in any direction, at 
 need, should be very easy of movement, (mobiles,) and 
 for the artillery, which must often take post at great dis- 
 tances, light artillery should be employed. 
 
 Thus ordinary artillery, which by its new organization 
 is very moveable, would answer for service with the divi- 
 sions of infantry ; and light artillery would be exclusively 
 employed, in serving with cavalry and for reserves. 
 
 The organization, a sketch of which has been now pre- 
 sented, is in accordance with the formation we use at the 
 present day ; it results from the nature of the arms and the 
 manner in which war is now carried on, and the fractions of 
 the army are designed to render the exercise of command 
 easy. The commands are of different kinds, and- their 
 character is changed according to the number of troops. 
 
 A general fights with 10,000 men; he must be in the 
 midst of his troops, and often exposed to musket shot. 
 
 A general commands 30,000 men; he puts his troops 
 and reserves in motion ; and if he is habitually, except in 
 extraordinary cases, out of the range of musketry, he 
 must be constantly within that of cannon, and must 
 remain in the limit of space where balls are falling, 
 
 A general directs 80,000 or 100,000 men ; he arranges 
 i In plan, gives the orders before battle, gives impulsion 
 i. the movement, and awaits the events in a central posi- 
 
THE USE OF DIFFERENT ARMS. ^149 
 
 tion. During the action he becomes a sort of provi- 
 dence ; he confronts unforeseen circumstances, and reme- 
 dies great accidents. He must expose himself before the 
 battle, in order to see for himself and to judge with pre- 
 cision the condition of things; these duties being fulfilled, 
 he gives his orders, and leaves each one to play the part 
 assigned him. 
 
 If things go well, he has nothing more to do ; if acci- 
 dents happen, he must parry them by the combinations 
 which are in his power ; if the action is progressing very 
 badly, and a catastrophe is to be feared, he must put him- 
 self at the head of his last troops which he launches upon 
 the enemy, and his presence, in this extreme moment, 
 gives them an impulsion and a moral effect which doubles 
 their value. 
 
 It was thus that Napoleon exercised command. His 
 operations having been almost always crowned with suc- 
 cess, and the armies he commanded being of very great 
 numerical strength, he was rarely exposed to imminent 
 danger. But at Liitzen a great crisis occurred, and the 
 nature of the army, composed of young soldiers, increas- 
 ing its importance, he rallied the troops himself before 
 Kaya, and led them to the charge under a deadly fire.* 
 
 * According to Thiers, something like this occurred more than 
 once: "Kaya was forced. * * * Napoleon, in the heat of the 
 fire, rallied the conscripts. ' Young men,' said he, 'I had counted 
 on you to save the Empire ; and you fly.' " And again : "In the 
 midst of our conscripts, some of whom fled, even in his presence, 
 in the midst of balls and bullets falling all around him, he advanced 
 the Young Guard." Le Consulat et V Empire, lib. 48. 
 
 13* 
 
150 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 
 
 It must be evident, from what I have already said, 
 what principles have served as a basis for the creation of 
 grades. It has been desired to assimilate them to natural 
 commands, so that the chief may have a social position 
 entrenched from the observation of his subordinates, and 
 always above them, even out of service. 
 
 France is the only country where they have omitted, to 
 the great prejudice of the service, to create an interme- 
 diate grade between that of general and marshal, for the 
 command of a corps d'armee. The dignity of marshal 
 only comports with a command in chief, and the sad 
 experience has been attained that many marshals brought 
 together in the same army, and under the command of 
 one of their own number, almost always lead to great 
 misfortunes, by the want of agreement and of subordina- 
 tion which reign among them. There was necessary 
 an emperor, a great captain, to command an army, the 
 yeat corps of which are under the orders of marshals. 
 Corps, it is true, were often under the orders of lieu- 
 tenant-generals, to whom was given the temporary title 
 of general-in-chief, and who received a commission to 
 command. I should add that a commander who had 
 received such power once, was never afterwards called to 
 the command of a single division. But the grade being 
 always the same, it is annoying to establish voluntarily 
 and freely such relations. 
 
 As authority, everywhere necessary, is nowhere more so 
 than among troops, and since from the command of au 
 array to that of a r<>m|>:inv. it j< essential that the chief 
 
( UNIVERSITY ) 
 
 Of 
 THE USE OF DIFFERENT ARMS. 151 
 
 who disappears should be immediately replaced, it has 
 been necessary to establish, as a fundamental principle, 
 the seniority of command. But it is otherwise with the 
 accidental exercise of this right by the fortuitous result 
 of events in war, (each one feels the necessity of this 
 arrangement;) it is otherwise with the delegation of 
 authority with the same rank, by the will of the sover- 
 eign, and when he is master, to choose. 
 
 Self-love (amour propre) suffers in obeying an equal, 
 especially if he is a junior; and self-love, the cause of so 
 much good and so much evil, exercises, in the profession 
 of arms, an immense power, for it is its very life. 
 
 An army composed of men without self-love would be 
 worthless ; it is because they are filled with it, that the 
 French are such good soldiers; it is thus also that sol- 
 diers furnished by large cities, where self-love is most 
 active, but who are less strong and less robust, often 
 greatly surpass in worth those who come from the 
 country. 
 
152 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARS. 
 
 I HAVE already said, and I repeat it, that movements 
 in war, whether offensive or defensive, must always be 
 based upon a calculation of time and distance. But the 
 applications of this principle are easier in defensive than 
 in offensive war. 
 
 In the latter the operations are vaster, the conditions 
 more variable, the elements of the calculation more uncer- 
 tain. At any moment one may be forced to change his 
 part, to abandon an attack in order to defend himself and 
 to escape great perils. There is needed, therefore, a 
 greater genius, to be always ready to vary his projects, to 
 execute new combinations. 
 
 In a defensive war, the theatre is more contracted ; the 
 operations are upon familiar ground, the nature of which 
 may be exactly appreciated. The combinations being 
 less in number, it is easier to arrange for them and to con- 
 front them. In offensive war, genius must supply the 
 want of experience, and guess at the character of the 
 country in which the operations are made: the points of 
 support upon which we count, vary and sometimes disap- 
 In defensive war we act upon a field prepared and 
 Minlied; we have fixed pivots of operation; everything 
 may be ailmlutcil with precision. A superior genius is 
 
OFFENSIVE ANT) DEFENSIVE WARS. 153 
 
 then more necessary for offensive war, while a great knowl- 
 edge of the profession, the talent to choose judiciously 
 the points of support, an extreme foresight, with indefati- 
 gable activity, may suffice for the needs of defensive 
 war. 
 
 Nevertheless this kind of war is far from being easy, 
 because, properly speaking, a general is only reduced 
 to act on the defensive when the means at his disposal are 
 inferior to those of the enemy. Now, in modern wars, 
 with equality of arms, instruction and experience, numbers 
 are of chief avail. The difference which exists between 
 such and such an army, in such and such a campaign, 
 depends particularly on the moral; and appreciation here 
 does not belong to the rules of the profession, but to that 
 sublime part of the art which supposes an acquaintance 
 with the human heart, the movements of which are so 
 rapid and so mysterious. 
 
 After having settled the principle of the movements of 
 armies, we can only develop it by examples. 
 
 The instruction is to be found in the study of the most 
 memorable campaigns. Doctrinal teaching must rest upon 
 facts. These may be chosen both in successes and in 
 reverses, by showing in the narration of each event what 
 part was due to combinations and what to chance. 
 
 We should study in preference the events of our own 
 epoch : the examples will be better understood, the cir- 
 cumstances being better known. Besides, with the prog- 
 ress which the art of war has made, with the present 
 and always increasing mobility of armies, we have con- 
 
154 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAK. 
 
 trived to render easy what would formerly have been im- 
 practicable. Among former wars, which may still be 
 useful for our instruction, are those of Frederick II. (the 
 (ire at.) It is true that the examples of that time are 
 scarcely applicable to our days, things have changed so 
 much ; but it is in relation to the moral of war that we 
 should consider this great captain 
 
 When we see Frederick, beaten at Hochkirch, and after 
 having lost two hundred cannon, retire only two leagues 
 upon the Spree, take position there, and brave the men- 
 aces of his victorious enemy, we ask in vain for the 
 explanation of a mystery which no one at this day under- 
 stands. 
 
 When we reflect upon the weakness of Frederick's re- 
 sources, we ask again, how, in the presence of so many 
 enemies, and for so many years, he could maintain and 
 recruit his armies ? In truth, we do not know which to 
 admire most, his victories or his power of resources and 
 preservation. 
 
 The long wars of our epoch, the great events which 
 they offer to our meditations, all the circumstances of 
 which must be weighed, are equally to be considered, in 
 our armies and in those of the enemy. 
 
 The first campaigns of the revolution present nothing 
 in our armies or those of our adversaries, which is not 
 susceptible of a bitter criticism: of this we may easily 
 convince ourselves by reading the first volume of the 
 Memoirs of Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which in this con- 
 ii. i ti..n have a very lively interest. 
 
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARS. 155 
 
 The operations of the Archduke Charles, in 1796, 
 opposing the French armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse, and 
 of the Rhine, are the first example of operations com- 
 bined systematically on a vast scale ; we cannot meditate 
 too carefully upon the work of this prince, in which his 
 principles are established, with the demonstration of his 
 operations and the motives which directed them. All the 
 great principles of war are there deduced, at the same 
 time that they find their application in the facts which are 
 there set forth. 
 
 But the campaigns which most demand reflection are 
 those of the French army in Italy, in 1796 and 1797. 
 They all combine exactness in calculation, correctness in 
 movement, a profound knowledge of men and of things. 
 
 Never was war so admirable, so perfect. It was the 
 art put in action in its sublimest elements. With moder- 
 ate means, immense results were obtained. 
 
 That one year's war hardly presents models of every 
 kind. But we find an offensive, skilfully and audaciously 
 conducted ; a defensive, in which smaller forces constantly 
 repulsed superior forces, by contriving to present often 
 upon the battle-field a superiority in numbers; a war 
 which, by skilfulness of direction and vigor of execution, 
 led to an unexampled series of victories. Immortal epoch, 
 the prodigies of which surpassed all that has been done 
 before or since ; for in a series of combats so long, in the 
 midst of so many diverse movements, it is impossible to 
 discover a single error, a single forgetfulness of the true 
 principles of the art. 
 
156 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 At the moment of the opening of the campaign, the 
 French army, scarcely thirty thousand strong, lacking 
 everything, has not yet finished its preparations, when it 
 is forced to enter upon its operations, the enemy approach- 
 ing Genoa to cover that place. The hostile army is 
 attacked, more than fifty thousand strong, but composed 
 it is true of troops of two different nations. The Aus- 
 trians are beaten, pursued, and soon held in check by a 
 single division. The French army throws itself upon the 
 army of Piedmont; complete and rapid successes spread 
 confusion and discouragement among the allies, and the 
 King of Sardinia makes peace. 
 
 A precipitate march surprises the passage of the Po, 
 which the French army, for want of means, could not 
 have been able to force in presence of the enemy. An 
 energetic action gives them the passage of the Adda. 
 Milan opens its gates. A little after this, an insurrection 
 bursts out in an entire province ; the insurrection is sup- 
 pressed. The army, which has hardly slackened its march 
 for a moment, forces the passage of the Mincio, arrives 
 upon the Adige, and takes a defensive position which 
 covers the conquests it has made in less than fifty days. 
 Hostile armies are successively formed, and come to try 
 upon us unavailing efforts. Mantua falls; we march upon 
 Vienna, and peace is concluded. 
 
 Nothing could be more useful for the instruction of 
 officers who give themselves up to the study of great 
 campaigns, and to military conceptions of a high order, 
 than to write this memorable campaign, with the 
 
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARS. 157 
 
 and the documents belonging to it. Commentaries would 
 be thus united which would explain the philosophy of the 
 movements, and would display their spirit and results. 
 The campaign of 1805, so splendid, so well conducted, 
 and so remarkable in its denoument, favored, it is true, by 
 the immense and almost incredible mistakes of our adver- 
 saries; that of 1806, which completes it; and finally, 
 that of 1809, might be the objects of a special study and 
 of instructive commentaries ; for we cannot too much 
 admire this grand epoch of Napoleon's life. 
 
 But we must pass over in silence the war in Spain, and 
 the period which follows, or at least only speak of them 
 to discover the errors, and to demonstrate that fortune 
 was right to abandon Napoleon, at the time when he was 
 unfaithful in his conduct to the true principles of war, 
 which up to that time he had always respected. The accu- 
 mulation of men and means was useless ; to date from those 
 epochs of sad memory, if we except Liitzen and Bautzen, 
 we do not recognize Napoleon in any of his campaigns. 
 
 A sort of awakening came, however, a little later. The 
 great captain discovers himself in 1814; but opinion 
 alone was then fighting for him: he had no longer an 
 army ; scarcely were we one against ten. Never did the 
 forces of which Napoleon could dispose in his movements 
 between the Seine and the Marne, exceed thirty-five thou- 
 sand men, fragments of his former army. My corps,* 
 
 * In this campaign of rapid and successful movements, (1814,) 
 the talent of Marmont was especially conspicuous, and nowhere 
 more so than in the movements in and about Paris. 
 
 14 
 
15S DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 which alone claims the glory of the combats of Champ- 
 Aubert, Vauchamps, Montmirail, the second affair at 
 Gue-a-Treme, never had four thousand men, the relics 
 of fifty-two different battalions. At Paris, supported by 
 the Duke of Trevisa, (Marshal Mortier,) our united forces 
 were fourteen thousand men, and the enemy had fifty-three 
 thousand engaged, and thirteen thousand hors de combat. 
 It was the song of the swan. 
 
MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 159 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 
 
 Marches within reach of the enemy cannot be made 
 with too great precaution, nor can encampments be 
 selected with too much prudence. Every one knows how 
 the former are executed ; but the composition of advanced 
 guards, and the respective position of the arms which 
 form them, must be modified by the nature of the country. 
 
 The aim being to gain intelligence of the enemy, and 
 to be informed of his arrival as soon as he approaches, it 
 is most useful to reconnoitre at the greatest possible dis- 
 tance, without, however, compromising the detachments. 
 The advanced guard of an army which is not in presence 
 of the enemy, ought at least to be a day's march from the 
 main body; and that of a division several hours in 
 advance. 
 
 Light troops should be intelligently employed, and they 
 should not be spared ; for it is chiefly in this kind of ser- 
 vice that they are useful: if they allow an army to be 
 surprised, their commander has failed in his duties ; he 
 cannot allege a good excuse. It is especially in inter- 
 sected and wooded countries that precautions must be 
 redoubled. Skirmishers, thrown out on both flanks, should 
 be supported by detachments appointed for them to rally 
 upon, and should be, moreover strong enough to defend, 
 
160 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 at need, for some time, defiles which might afford to the 
 enemy the means of turning the flank of the army. 
 
 In marches, encampments are made to rest the troops 
 and to satisfy their wants, not at all to fight. An 
 encampment is made, by preference, on the banks of a 
 streamlet, near a village, because the soldiers have the 
 advantage of the water, and the resources which a col- 
 lected population presents. But however important these 
 considerations may be, safety also must be considered, 
 and the means of resisting an unforeseen attack and a 
 surprise must not be neglected. I am not speaking of 
 guards, who always must cover and surround the camp ; 
 they are of prime necessity, were it only in the relation 
 of a police force. 
 
 When there is an obstacle, the establishment of camps 
 should be chosen within, and never beyond, at least for 
 the greatest part of the troops. Without doubt it would 
 be advantageous, when the day's march begins, to have 
 passed a defile and to debouche more easily; but this 
 advantage is more than compensated by the security of 
 the repose. If there is no obstacle, or if this obstacle 
 may be easily turned, a surprise is to be feared; a large 
 body of cavalry may suddenly appear, as if it had sprung 
 out of the earth ; safety then is to be found in the arrange- 
 ment of the encampment itself. 
 
 There are two modes of encamping: the troops de- 
 ployed in front of the color-line, and the troops formed 
 in mass by battalion. This last arrangement is far pref- 
 erable, and offers all kinds of advantages. 
 
MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 161 
 
 It is executed thus : 
 
 A division* is placed in two lines, and each battalion is 
 formed in mass by division; they are separated by two 
 half battalions formed in mass by company. The interval 
 which separates the two fractions is the extent of a divi- 
 sion front, and forms a street perpendicular to the front 
 of the encampment. 
 
 The tents or barracks are established on the right and 
 left, and the spaces between them are placed so as to 
 open into the street, either directly or by a little cross 
 street. At the moment when the battalion takes its arms, 
 each soldier goes to his own company, which is formed in 
 the street of the camp, and the battalion is formed at the 
 very instant, and ready to march. If the impetuosity of 
 a mass of cavalry is such that it precipitates itself upon 
 the camp, it will find all the troops in mass, and, so to 
 speak, entrenched in the midst of their tents and bar- 
 racks. 
 
 Contempt of the foregoing rules led, on the 29th of 
 May, 1813, near Haynau, in Silesia, to a fatal event. 
 
 The division Maison,^ which had marched the whole 
 day, and taken position without proper reconnoissance, 
 was surprised : twenty-two Prussian squadrons, in ambus- 
 cade in a neighboring forest, suddenly debouched, at the 
 
 * The division here referred to is a mass of troops comprising 
 two or more brigades ; the word as used immediately afterwards 
 means the union of two companies. The double use of the word 
 has often led to confusion. 
 
 | The divisions of the French army receive the names of the 
 generals commanding them. 
 
162 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS UF WAR. 
 
 moment they were establishing the camp; the division 
 was in great part destroyed without having been able to 
 fight. 
 
 In another circumstance, the same negligence on the 
 part of the Prussians gave us a splendid revenge, and 
 caused us to obtain an easy victory. 
 
 After the combat of Champ-Aubert, (February 10, 
 1814,) in which my corps d'armee had, unaided, destroyed 
 or taken almost entire the Russian corps of Olsufieff, the 
 Emperor ordered me to proceed to Etoges, to cover the 
 army on that side, while he should march upon Montmi- 
 rail, which was occupied by the corps of Sacken. Sacken, 
 beaten, retired upon Chateau-Thierry, where he crossed 
 the Marne to stay the pursuit of Napoleon, who had fol- 
 lowed him. During this time Bliicher, in person, had 
 advanced with the corps of Kleist, and had marched upon 
 Etoges: on the 13th he undertook to force me to evacu- 
 ate this advantageous post. After having made a feint 
 of desiring to defend it, I retreated. The enemy followed 
 me closely, but with great circumspection, and there 
 were until evening only weak engagements with light 
 troops. I took position on the skirt of the forest of 
 Fromentiere, and the enemy encamped at about twice 
 cannon range from me. I had announced to Napoleon 
 the arrival of Bliicher, and had advised him of the 
 movements I was going to execute : I was assured of his 
 prompt return. On the 14th, at four o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, I set my force in motion to approach Mont mi rail, 
 and I sent an officer to obtain intelligence of the 
 
MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 163 
 
 ror. He had just arrived, and sent me word that I might 
 attack the enemy whenever I thought proper; that he 
 was in condition to support me. 
 
 There is in front of the village of Yauchamps, on the 
 side towards Paris, a position advantageous and easily 
 defensible; it is the slope of the plateau which borders 
 the small valley on which Yauchamps is built; to the 
 right and front, a wood presents the means of taking in 
 reverse all bodies which should advance inconsiderately 
 without having occupied it. I caused this wood to be 
 occupied as quietly as possible; I deployed my troops 
 on the hill, I put my cannon in battery, and we awaited 
 the enemy. 
 
 The corps of Kleist, the strength of which was four 
 times that of mine, thought it had nothing to fear, and 
 marched with extreme confidence, the troops being in 
 column, and touching, without any interval between them, 
 and even without scouting : finding the village unoccupied 
 Kleist passes through it, but, assailed by a murderous fire of 
 artillery and musketry, attacked at the same time in front 
 and flank, thrown into confusion, he flies from the village 
 in 'great disorder, and, our cavalry pouncing upon him, four 
 thousand prisoners fall into our hands. From that mo- 
 ment the enemy, who had no regular formation, withdrew 
 in mass until evening; while that day, so splendid for us, 
 terminated for him in a new catastrophe. 
 
 The victory of Hohenlinden, the brilliancy and the 
 results of which were so great, is an event of the same 
 nature. The centre column of the Austrian army, which 
 
K>4 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 followed the high road, and to which had been united a 
 great part of the artillery of the flanking columns, to 
 facilitate their transportation, outstripped the other col- 
 umns, and was marching without proper scouting parties, 
 by reason of the confidence imparted by the combat of 
 the evening before, and the belief entertained by them 
 that the French army had beaten a retreat. 
 
 They encountered the French unexpectedly in the very 
 middle of the forest. Attacked vigorously before they 
 were able to take the necessary dispositions to resist, and 
 soon taken in flank, this immense column of materiel was 
 captured, and the battle won. 
 
 There is nothing more delicate or more worthy of atten- 
 tion than how to conduct a numerous artillery through a 
 very wooded country, in presence of the enemy. What- 
 ever may be the desire for keeping it together, too much 
 precaution under such circumstances cannot be taken to 
 guard against surprise, for the consequences of the slight- 
 est negligence are almost always fatal. 
 
 On the 29th of August, 1813, after the battle of Dres- 
 den, I was charged with pursuing the enemy's army, the 
 main body of which was retiring by the Altenberg road. 
 After having beaten, at Possendorf and Dippoldiswalde, 
 the corps which covered the movement of concentration, 
 I was to continue, the next morning, my march upon Fal- 
 kenheira. Arrived at the village of Frauendorf, I learned 
 that the enemy occupied, with a strong advanced guard, a 
 good position at Falkenheim. Before entering the forest 
 whirli must be crossed, and which some light troops occu- 
 
MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 165 
 
 pied, I had it searched and cleared by three or four thou- 
 sand infantry, extended upon a very long front. Having 
 cleared the forest, I took a position upon the skirt of it 
 with my advanced guard, and I waited until my whole 
 corps had joined me. I debouched then with all my 
 force : in a moment the enemy was overthrown and driven 
 from his position, abandoning almost all his artillery. 
 
 There are also marches executed in presence of the 
 enemy, with your army entirely united, formed and ready to 
 fight, having the design of causing the enemy to leave a 
 position which he is occupying. These marches belong to 
 tactical movements; nothing demands greater attention 
 or exacts greater precautions. 
 
 To execute a movement of this kind, the troops must 
 be well disciplined and thoroughly drilled, the generals 
 vigilant and active, and the commander possessed of ex- 
 treme foresight. 
 
 The army of Portugal, in 1812, under my command, 
 made such a march successfully. 
 
 The French and English armies were encamped on the 
 two banks of the Duero ; the former was inferior to the 
 latter by about 6000 foot and 4000 horse.* In spite of 
 the disproportion of force, I was obliged to assume the 
 offensive. I was informed, by official correspondence, that 
 no important succor could be afforded me; and, on the 
 
 * Earl Ellesmere, in the article before alluded to, (Foreign Quar- 
 terly,) disputes this assertion: proving from the morning reports 
 of the French and Anglo-Portuguese armies, for that day, that the 
 disparity was only 2500 men. 
 
166 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 other hand, the English army, already so superior, might 
 in a few days receive powerful reinforcements from Estre- 
 madura by the bridge of Alcantara, while the army of 
 Galicia, which was blockading Astorga, was going to be 
 disposable, and to operate in my rear, in consequence of 
 the surrender of that town, which, for want of supplies, 
 was on the point of opening its gates. I concluded that 
 to change the condition of things, I must assume the 
 offensive, prudently indeed, to manoeuvre so as to force 
 the enemy to retreat, and not to fight unless it should be 
 necessary. The passage of the Duero was then resolved 
 upon and executed. 
 
 The French army, united, encountered the next morn- 
 ing two English divisions at Tordesillas de la Orden, 
 which hastily retired; they were closely pursued, (Vepee 
 dans les reins,) and would probably have been destroyed, 
 isolated as they were, if the French cavalry had not been 
 inferior to those of the enemy. 
 
 The two armies were posted on the evening of that pur- 
 suit, facing each other, and separated by the Guareua, a 
 marshy brook. 
 
 On the 20th of July, the French army, formed in order 
 of battle, broken by company, made a flank manomvre 
 by the left to ascend the stream; having arrived at a 
 crossing known beforehand and promptly improved, its 
 head crossed to the left bank, laid hold at the outset of a 
 plateau which extends indefinitely in a direction threaten- 
 ing the enemy's retreat, and debouched there under the 
 
MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS. 167 
 
 protection of a very large battery which covered its 
 movements. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington thought at first that he would 
 be able to oppose the offensive march; but it was so 
 rapidly and unitedly executed, that he soon renounced 
 the idea of attacking.* 
 
 He then get the English army in motion, following a 
 plateau parallel to that which we occupied. 
 
 The two armies continued their march, separated by a 
 narrow valley, always ready to accept battle ; some hun- 
 dreds of cannon shot were exchanged, according to the 
 more or less favorable circumstances to which the sinuos- 
 ities of the ridge gave rise; for each of the generals 
 wished to accept battle, and not to attack. They arrived 
 thus, after a march of five leagues, in the respective posi- 
 tions which they desired to occupy, the French arrny 
 upon the heights of Aldea-Rubia, the English army on 
 those of San Cristoval. 
 
 This remarkable march is, moreover, the only fact of 
 that nature which, to my knowledge, has occurred in our 
 days. But it may be renewed, in a war in which the 
 forces are about even, and when the generals do not 
 desire to fight except with assured advantages, or in 
 determined and very favorable circumstances. 
 
 * The Duke of Wellington told me afterwards that the French 
 army marched, on that occasion, like a single regiment. That was 
 his expression. M. 
 
168 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF RECONNOISSANCES IN FORCE, AND THE PRECAUTIONS 
 THEY REQUIRE. 
 
 To know the position of the enemy, to have timely 
 information of the movements he is making, to collect suf- 
 ficient intelligence to guess his plans, these constitute 
 one of the greatest difficulties which the command of an 
 army habitually presents. Nothing should be neglected 
 by which we may obtain exact information, and the surest 
 method is always to be in contact with the enemy by 
 means of light troops, frequently to have small engage- 
 ments, and to make prisoners, whose answers are almost 
 always simple and sincere. More is learned through 
 them than by means of the most faithful spies. The 
 latter often confound the names of corps and of gen- 
 f-rals, and form very inexact estimates of the strength 
 of the troops concerning whom they report. When two 
 armies, by the combinations of war, find themselves sud- 
 denly in presence of each other, or have remained a long 
 time at a certain distance from each other, it is important 
 to be most positively assured of the situation of things : 
 t<> this end, there are made what are called reconnois- 
 sances in force, (grandex reconnaissances.) 
 
 These operations demand much prudence, and even an 
 -|) rial foresight, particularly if we have not decided to 
 
BECONNOISSANCES IN FORCE, ETC. 169 
 
 fight, except under extraordinary and very advantageous 
 circumstances. 
 
 Cavalry should be principally employed ; and, if possi- 
 ble, only cavalry and light artillery should be engaged, so 
 that we may remain master of our movements. What is 
 to be done is to tear away the curtain which conceals 
 an army ; and when a general has been able to penetrate 
 sufficiently to see with his own eyes the situation of the 
 enemy, he has accomplished his purpose. 
 
 But he must make such dispositions as to sustain the 
 troops engaged, and to receive them if they are hurried 
 backwards. He should have quite within reach a respect- 
 able body of infantry; and in rear of that corps, the 
 whole army should be drawn up for an immediate march, 
 if circumstances require it, to take part in the action. 
 A moment of delay might cause the loss of sudden oppor- 
 tunities, which, properly seized, give unexpected advant- 
 ages. 
 
 I will cite an example in which the non-observance of 
 this precept prevented me from gaining an easy victory 
 over the English army in Spain. Instruction is perhaps 
 better conveyed by recalling mistakes, than by relating 
 successes. 
 
 In 1811, I was occupying the valley of the Tagus, with 
 the army of Portugal. My mission was to guard the 
 safety of two strongholds which covered the north and 
 south, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, which belonged to 
 the armies of the south and north, and formed part of 
 their field of action. Ciudad Rodrigo, being in want of 
 
 15 
 
170 WFFEKKXT OPERATIONS OK WAR. 
 
 provisions, General Dorsenne, commanding the northern 
 army, organized a great convoy, and made his dispo- 
 sitions to conduct it thither. He furnished 10,000 infan- 
 try and 2000 horse for its escort. But the concurrence 
 of the army of Portugal was necessary to render its 
 march safe, the English army being in cantonments very 
 near. I took the greater part of the army beyond the 
 hill of Banos, and placed it in echelon from Tamames 
 to the river of Agueda. I repaired to Rodrigo with 1500 
 horse ; General Dorsenne went there also, and introduced 
 into the city, with great supplies, a small division of 3000 
 infantry, commanded by General Thiebault. The rumor 
 was rife that the English were making arrangements to 
 besiege Rodrigo, and that provisions within reach had 
 been collected there. To gain correct information was 
 opportune, and it was agreed that a strong double recon- 
 noissance should be directed upon the Almeida road, and 
 on the heights of Elbodon, where the English army had 
 its advanced posts. This reconnoissance was to be made 
 by the cavalry of the army of Portugal, commanded by 
 General Montbrun. 
 
 General Thiebault received orders to be ready to sus- 
 tain him if necessary. The position of Elbodon being 
 captured in a moment, the cavalry of the English army 
 was put to flight, and a brigade of English infantry found 
 itself isolated. After having bravely received several 
 charges, it retreated upon Fuente Guinaldo. Favored by 
 liillicult ground, and thanks to the rapidity of its insin-h 
 :IIHI its vsilor it could not Itc destroyed. Fiit-nti- (iuinaldo, 
 
KECONN01SSANCES IN FORCE, ETC. 171 
 
 the knot of the roads, and the strategic point for the as- 
 sembling of an army, must then be occupied without delay. 
 The division Thiebault was called upon; but placed at 
 too great a distance, because it had only come out with 
 the design of defence and security : the field of battle 
 being singularly distant on account of the retreat of the 
 enemy, it arrived too late, and its extreme weakness did 
 not permit, at the very verge of nightfall, that it should 
 be launched upon the entrenchments of Fuente Guinaldo, 
 upon which columns coming from different sides were 
 directed. If 8000 men had been in my hands, I could have 
 acted confidently. Fuente Guinaldo would have fallen into 
 my power. The light division posted at Martiago, upon 
 the right bank of the Ague'da, would probably have been 
 taken or destroyed, the English army dispersed, and its 
 corps, without union, would have been in the most criti- 
 cal position. Having had the time to reassemble, tC 
 hastened to make good its retreat, and the opportunity of 
 an easy and complete success was thus lost. 
 
 I repeat it, when a strong reconnoissance is made, 
 troops should always be arranged in such manner as not 
 to be forced to accept a serious battle ; but, at the same 
 time they should be in relative position, either to reassem- 
 ble the troops engaged, if they are beaten, or to profit by 
 a fortuitous and favorable circumstance. Whatever con- 
 sideration is entertained for an adversary, he should never 
 be thought infallible ; fortune often smiles at the moment 
 when we least expect it ; and we should always be pre- 
 pared to prove to her that we are worthy of her favors. 
 
172 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 DETACHMENTS IN PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY; THE PROPER 
 TIMES FOR MAKING THEM, AND THE DANGERS WHICH 
 ACCOMPANY THEM. 
 
 SOMETIMES a general, too much preoccupied with the 
 idea of a success for which he hopes, makes in advance, 
 without having beaten the enemy, arrangements for giving 
 a grand result to victory. To this end, he divides his 
 forces and launches them in different directions. Instead 
 of conquering, he is beaten. The detachments he has 
 sent out are captured or destroyed, and a campaign opened 
 under favorable auspices, is now but a succession of re- 
 verses. 
 
 I will cite several examples in support of my assertion. 
 
 In 1796, in Italy, Wurmser enters upon the campaign 
 with an army superior to that of the French ; a column 
 turns the French flank, and marches by Brescia, upon 
 their communications. This column, too weak to resist 
 the united French force, retires upon its approach. Sep- 
 arated from the greater part of the array, by the mount- 
 ains and the Lago di Quarda, it is ignorant of the events 
 whieh are transpiring; and the French tinny, placed in 
 the centre, beats, one after the other, all the corps which 
 snccessively present themselves. 
 
 In the same year 1796, General Alvinzi debouches from 
 
DETACHMENTS IN PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY. 173 
 
 the Tyrol, and attacks the French army, occupying the 
 chain of Monte Baldo and the Corona. Believing a vic- 
 tory certain, he detaches a body of 5000 men, commanded 
 by Colonel Lusignan, who, after4iaving followed the border 
 of the Lago di Guarda, changes direction, approaches the 
 Adige, and takes position in rear of the French army, and 
 on its direct line of communication. This corps is held in 
 check by the weak division of Rey, who, having rejoined 
 the army, established himself in front of it. The battle 
 was gained by the French army; and the corps of Lusig- 
 nan attacked, routed, and almost entirely captured. 
 
 In 1800, Napoleon debouched into Italy with an army 
 of 60,000 men. Having crossed the Po, and completely 
 turned the Austrian army, he found himself upon their 
 lines of communication, with the design to take posses- 
 sion of all the roads by which they might attempt to 
 retire.* 
 
 To achieve that, he placed on the Tessino a part of 
 his force on the right bank of the Po, while, of necessity, 
 he sent upon the Adda and Oglio one division to cover 
 himself in that direction. Then, supposing that the Aus- 
 trian army, united, would desire to make its retreat upon 
 Genoa, he detached a division in the direction of Novi, to 
 shut that route against him. There only remained to 
 him 22,000 men, and the enemy had 45,000 united on the 
 
 * There remained to the army which fought at Marengo, only 
 the corps of Victor, formed of the two small divisions Garclanne 
 and Chamberlac ; the corps of Lannes, composed of the divisions 
 Watrin and Monier ; the division Boudet, 5000 strong; a very weak 
 cavalry, and thirty-two pieces of artillery. M. 
 
 15* 
 
174 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Bormida. The enemy attacked him ; the battle of Ma- 
 rengo was fought; obstinately disputed, it seemed lost at 
 five o'clock in the afternoon, when the division detached 
 toward Novi arrived. General Desaix,* who was at its 
 head, had wisely halted it, on hearing the cannon of the 
 battle, to await orders. He retraced his steps, and arrived 
 in time to act as a reserve, and the battle was gained, 
 although only 27,000 men had been at one time in action, 
 and 22,000 had been forced to bear the entire weight of 
 the battle. Thus our forces engaged were, on this occa- 
 sion, only two-thirds of the enemy's force ; and it was a 
 bare chance that made them more than one-half. A splen- 
 did victory doubtless, the results of which were immense ; 
 but it would be dangerous to take as a model the strategic 
 combinations which led to it ; for it ought to have been 
 lost, on account of the superiority of force and the means 
 which opposed us. 
 
 If victories are possible under such conditions, we 
 should not too much count upon them. We should doubt- 
 less display all the more energy in proportion as the cir- 
 cumstances are less favorable ; but unwonted sanguineness 
 must not give birth to them. 
 
 * Dcsaix an<l Keller maim retrieved the fortunes of the day. 
 "Simple, timid, even awkward, his face always hidden junior 
 his long and flowing hair, Dcsaix had not a military appearance; 
 
 lint heroic under fire, kind to his troops, niode-t among his COm- 
 radcs, gencrou* to tin- vanquished, he wa< :i<l<>r.'d \>\ the army. * 
 * * His mind solid and profoundly cultivated, his kno\v! 
 war. lii attention to his duties, and hi* disiiiteiv-tedne--. mado 
 him an accomplished model of all the Warlike virtues." TIIIKHS, 
 / ' 'ontulat et I I 
 
DETACHMENTS IN PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY. 175 
 
 In 1813, the French army of Silesia, more than 80,000 
 strong, united at 'Goldsberg, commanded by the Marshal 
 Duke of Tarentum,(Macdonald,) was opposed by an army 
 nearly equal, commanded by Blucher. The Duke of Ta- 
 rentum advanced upon the enemy, whom he supposed to 
 be in force at Jauer ; at the moment of moving he detached 
 the division Puthod, to march through Sehonau upon 
 Jauer, to find the enemy and to take him in flank. 
 
 But Bliicher at the same moment assumed the offensive 
 on his side ; the French army, badly informed, met the 
 enemy unexpectedly near the Katzbach, and was obliged 
 to accept battle without having united its forces. Bad 
 combinations and a series of misfortunes led to confusion. 
 The French army was beaten, and forced to fall back, the 
 division Puthod lost its communications ; cornered at 
 Bober, outflanked, overpowered by numbers, after having 
 fought valiantly, it was taken almost entire. 
 
 There result from the foregoing examples, and from 
 many others which I might add, the following conclu- 
 sions : 
 
 1. Nothing is more dangerous than to make an import- 
 ant detachment, before having given battle, gained a vic- 
 tory and acquired a decided ascendency over the enemy. 
 
 2. The execution of such a hazardous combination 
 requires that an army should have a sufficient superiority 
 to give great probability of victory : and its strength 
 should never be so weakened as to be less than that of 
 the enemy in front. 
 
 3. When we are at a distance from an enemy, who is 
 
176 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS oF WAR. 
 
 strong enough to oft'er us battle, and are marching towards 
 him, we should occupy, by advanced guards and light 
 troops, at least the space of a day's march distance around 
 us, so as to be informed of his movements and modify 
 our own in consequence. 
 
 4. Finally, when we think proper to make a single 
 detachment, its direction must be determined, and succor- 
 ing troops placed in such a manner that it will always 
 have an assured retreat upon the main body, and can in 
 no case lose its communication. 
 
BATTLES. 177 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 BATTLES. 
 
 To treat in detail of the dispositions which the conduct 
 of a battle requires is impossible : a thousand unforeseen 
 circumstances force us to modify them ; fortuitous acci- 
 dents occur to change our whole economy. I will limit 
 myself then to recalling and stating the rules to be fol- 
 lowed, and the principles to be respected, to prepare a 
 battle and to distinguish its proper character. As to the 
 manner of giving" battle, nothing can be more variable. 
 It differs according to the nature of the operations to be 
 executed, and the kind of mission which the army has 
 received. It varies with the composition of armies, and 
 the special character of the troops; it varies also by 
 reason of the talent and the kind of faculties possessed 
 by the generals who command. 
 
 I shall enter into very few technical details as to the 
 formation of troops, and the preliminary plans ; for these 
 dispositions depend particularly upon the nature of the 
 ground on which the battle is to be fought. Thus, for 
 example, it is evident that a position near a field of battle 
 which may serve for a base and support, should be occu- 
 pied in force, and in such a manner as to exercise a salu- 
 tary influence, whether we attack or defend. The strength 
 
17 V WFFKKKXT OPERATIONS OF WAK. 
 
 of a position supplies what is wanting in the number of 
 troops : defiles placed in front render a part of the means 
 of defence superfluous, and the means of attack more 
 difficult. As to the rest, the simplest reasoning often 
 instinct alone suffices to make us feel the modifications 
 necessary in those formations established by usage. I 
 will state, in few words, that, all local influences apart, 
 there has been adopted, as a fundamental principle, the 
 formation of troops on many lines. The first line de- 
 ployed, the second in column by battalion, at deployment 
 distance, ready, if there is need, to march or to form into 
 line; and a third line, composing the reserve, in column 
 by brigades, ready to march wherever it can become 
 useful 
 
 I will, however, make one observation upon general 
 dispositions ; it is that the command of troops should be 
 devised so as to embrace the two lines at once ; that is, 
 that these corresponding parts be under the direction of 
 the same commander. The reason of this is easily con- 
 ceived. As the second line is destined to sustain the first, 
 it is necessary that the movements of the corresponding 
 fractions in the two lines agree perfectly. It is not the same 
 with the reserve; it forms a complete and independent 
 corps, which should have all its means united to act accord- 
 ing to the circumstances; thus, a corps d'arm&e of four 
 division-:, in disposition to offer battle, should have, in my 
 opinion, the following formation: 
 
 In the first line, three brigades of three diHVmit divi- 
 sions, and in the second, the three other brigades of the 
 
BATTLES. 179 
 
 same divisions; and the fourth division in rear, entire, 
 and formed in two masses, each of a brigade. 
 
 The cavalry should be thus placed : that of the divi- 
 sions, on the flank or in rear of their respective divisions, 
 and the masses of cavalry formed in several lines, and on 
 the flanks of the army, abreast of the second line; and, 
 in preference, on the side where the country is- most open 
 and most favorable to its movements and its action. 
 
 As to the artillery, that constituting the reserve should 
 hold itself in rear of the infantry reserve, ready to move 
 wherever it should be needed. 
 
 Finally, I will add that the art of directing a battle 
 well consists particularly in the judicious and timely em- 
 ployment of the reserves; and the general who, in a 
 hotly-contested battle, has fresh and disposable troops at 
 the end of the day, when his adversary has used all his, 
 is almost certain of the victory. 
 
 I will now establish the character of battles, by divid- 
 ing them into two classes : defensive and offensive. 
 
 For the first, the conditions of success are : the choice 
 of a good position, the flanks of which are well posted, 
 and the rear free and protected ; obstacles, which render 
 the enemy's approach more difficult, in front; finally, 
 brave, disciplined troops, commanded by an energetic and 
 determined man. 
 
 Offensive battles require, more than all else, good strate- 
 gic combinations and skilful tactics : troops easily handled, 
 good marchers, nimble, and intelligent, with a decided 
 dash about them. The soldier must be ambitious of sue- 
 
180 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 cess, as though it belonged to him personally, and he 
 must associate himself with the idea of it in advance. 
 
 In applying these observations, which I regard as of 
 rigorous importance, to the character of different armies, 
 and in taking as examples troops which have the least 
 resemblance, we observe that the genius of troops in these 
 two conditions belongs eminently to the French, for offen- 
 sive battles, and to the English, for defensive. If we observe, 
 besides, that, in offensive war, the difficulties of adminis- 
 tration and of the subsistence of troops are immense, 
 while, in defence, only money and will are necessary; if 
 we reflect, finally, that the English army, by its composi- 
 tion, its customs, its needs, requires, more than others, 
 abundance, we shall be more and more forced to the 
 conclusion that defensive war, with all its consequences, 
 is more in keeping with the faculties of the English array, 
 and that it would be less easily waged by a French army. 
 
 The events of the war in the Peninsula, still present to 
 our remembrance, demonstrate this truth. The English 
 general, whether by his nature and his own character, or 
 by his skill in seizing the conditions in which he was 
 placed, comprehended, from the beginning, the system he 
 ought to follow, and never departed from it. 
 
 For a long time he perseveringly made use of a pow- 
 erful auxiliary which the force of circumstances offered 
 him, our misfortunes; he did not cease to make the m-t 
 of them. His army, abundantly provided with everything, 
 all to unite every day, had constantly the powerof motion, 
 was always threatening: military and political calcula- 
 
BATTLES. 181 
 
 tions alone gave motive to its operations; while the 
 French army, abandoned to want of every description, and 
 to labors of all kinds, was daily losing its means and its 
 strength. If a position was impregnable, the English 
 general occupied it, and waited until it was in danger of 
 being turned, or until the French army should come to 
 dash itself against insurmountable natural obstacles, con- 
 suming its valor in pure loss. 
 
 Thus, when Marshal Massena,* at the head of a supe- 
 rior army, threatened to invade Portugal, Wellington 
 placed himself behind two strongholds, and, covered be- 
 sides by the Coa, he waited until the French army had 
 exhausted a part of its means in two sieges; abandoning 
 to the fate of war the garrisons of these two places, which 
 did not belong to his army, he retired, when they capitu- 
 lated, and when he might fear being attacked himself, to 
 go and take position at Busaco. After having repulsed 
 the French army which attacked him inconsiderately, he 
 withdrew and disappeared, when it was manoeuvring to 
 turn him, and the English army retired into the lines of 
 Lisbon, f where art had aided nature with powerful means 
 of resistance. (1810-11.) 
 
 * Andrea Massena, born at Nice, 1758; at the age of 17, a pri- 
 vate in the Royal Italian regiment ; passed through the grades of 
 corporal, sergeant, lieutenant; retired from the army in 1789. 
 General of division in 1793, and renowned for skill and bravery 
 throughout the wars of the Empire. Such was his good fortune 
 that Napoleon called him the "favored child of victory" His 
 great fondness for money has been much censured. He died in 1817. 
 
 f These are commonly called the lines of Torres Vedras, fifty 
 miles of fortifications enclosing Lisbon. Nothing else could have 
 
 16 
 
182 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 The English general waits patiently for famine and 
 misery to disorganize and destroy the French array ; he 
 follows his system in a manner so rigorous, that he allows 
 them to remain unattacked, although they are in sight 
 and within range of his guns, and not in condition either 
 to offer battle or oppose a serious resistance, weakened as 
 they are by the absence of fifteen or twenty thousand 
 men, who, leaving their arms stacked, range fifteen or 
 twenty leagues, seeking provisions in the interior of Por- 
 tugal. Reduced to nearly one-half, the French army 
 returns into Spain, after having abandoned all its guns, 
 all its materiel, for want of horses to take them away ; 
 and three-quarters of its cavalry are on foot. It has 
 experienced immense losses, although it has not fought, 
 except at Busaco, and has only had during the retreat 
 two combats of small importance. 
 
 Wellington always followed an analogous system ; and 
 when later, at Waterloo, he found himself confronted by 
 Napoleon, it was again a defensive battle which he 
 fought. 
 
 We see then that, in a defensive war, which is always a 
 question of time, battles must be rendered as rare as pos- 
 sible, because marches and various circumstances injure 
 and sometimes destroy the means of an adversary, more 
 certainly than the most signal victory could do. 
 
 Wellington's army from (he most disastrous defeat. Once 
 within th-*<- lines, the Kn^lish were plentifully supplied by the 
 TaguH and the sea, while Massena, without supplies, was obliged 
 to retire, after ineffectual attacks. 
 
BATTLES. 183 
 
 As to the particular circumstances of defensive battles, 
 they should always be delivered in front ; and the talent 
 consists in forcing the enemy, by dispositions wisely con- 
 ceived, to attack where we have been able to prepare the 
 easiest resistance. But there are also battles which, be- 
 ginning with an offensive movement, are reduced, in the 
 action, to a defensive combat ; this is what happens when 
 prudent and circumspect generals, placed at the head of 
 forces nearly equal, wish to bring on a battle. 
 
 In 1812, an example of this kind was offered: the 
 English army was superior to the French army by 8000 
 infantry and 4000 horse. The French general, after hav- 
 ing been a long time upon the defensive, in expectation 
 of promised succors, having been informed officially that 
 they would not be sent him, was obliged to assume the 
 offensive, in order not to see, day by day, his situation 
 growing worse. 
 
 But on taking the offensive, and, by strategic move- 
 ments forcing the enemy to fall back, he did not wish, 
 resolved as he was to fight, to renew by a rash attack the 
 events which had taken place before. He desired, if there 
 were a battle, that it should be delivered upon a ground 
 of his own choice; that it should be received and not 
 given. On the other hand, the English general, faithful 
 to his system, equally proposed to himself to reduce the 
 action to the defence of a position. Hence the remark- 
 able movements which took place from the Duero to 
 Tormes towards the middle of July, 1812. 
 
 This system being followed, on either side, the English 
 
184 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 army was obliged to make a retrograde march. Its return 
 upon the Agueda, and its re-entrance into Portugal, would 
 incontestibly have been the immediate result of that part 
 of the campaign, if a movement had not been executed 
 without orders in the French army, and if the marshal 
 who commanded it had not received a severe wound three- 
 quarters of an hour before the battle ; from this, want of 
 certainty occurred in the command which hindered the 
 timely repairing of mistakes, and brought on an action 
 which should not have been risked until later, and under 
 better auspices. In spite of these drawbacks, the loss 
 was equal in the two armies. 
 
 Although I firmly believe that French troops, well 
 commanded and properly provided, are fit for all kinds of 
 war, I think nevertheless that offensive war is more in 
 keeping with the spirit, the nature and the character of 
 our soldiers: it was especially the distinguishing charac- 
 teristic of Napoleon's genius. 
 
 I have already said that no one ever possessed in a 
 higher degree than himself strategic talent; and his offen- 
 sive marches, until the Russian war, were skilfully con- 
 ceived. The power of the means of which he made use, 
 their energy, the moral force which animated them, his 
 activity, the absolute freedom in his projects and his cora- 
 binations, precipitated events, and in exalting the spirit 
 I his soldiers, overwhelmed the enemy with discourage- 
 in. nt in advance; and there is not much space between 
 the fear of being beaten and a defeat. What u series 
 of splendid operations, executed in a magical manner I 
 
BATTLES. 185 
 
 At his debut in Italy, he turns all the positions and 
 beats the enemy in detail, before they are able to collect 
 their forces. He passes the Po without having the enemy 
 before him, because he has prevented that by his move- 
 ments. The war becomes defensive ; but soon he changes 
 its character, and, by attacking, he rediscovers the appli- 
 cation of his own special genius. 
 
 In 1800, he enters Italy, and forces the Austrian army 
 to receive battle in the most fatal position, with the most 
 annoying conditions, after having }ost its communications 
 and its points of retreat. 
 
 In 1805, the direction of his armies alone, which he 
 leads in mass upon the Danube, after having displayed 
 heads of columns in the Black Forest, to fix the attention 
 of the enemy, decides the question of the campaign ; for 
 if Mack,* instead of having brought upon himself, by a 
 foolish confidence, the catastrophe of the Austrian army, 
 had withdrawn, this simple movement would have placed 
 us in possession of the whole of Bavaria. 
 
 At Austerlitz, it was a tactical movement which, in a 
 few hours, settled the fate of the battle. At Jena, the 
 same prodigies were effected by the same means. As 
 long as this system was followed, similar successes crowned 
 all the enterprises of Napoleon. 
 
 In 1809, at the opening of the campaign, before Ratis- 
 
 * Charles, Baron von Mack, an Austrian general, incompetent 
 and unfortunate. His capitulation of Ulna, here referred to, was 
 foolish and cowardly. He was tried, and sentenced to death for it, 
 but the sentence was commuted, and afterwards remitted. 
 
 16* 
 
186 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 bon, the same spirit directed his operations. But soon 
 his system changed: the passage of the Danube, after 
 having failed the first time, was executed with sur-r>s, 
 and followed by a battle gained on the plains of Wa^nmi. 
 Here it was a direct attack in front which constituted the 
 battle. Moreover, circumstances did not allow him to 
 choose. The passage of a river like the Danube is not 
 an easy thing, and cannot be made secretly; and when an 
 army, posted upon the opposite bank, wishes to contest it, 
 we must resolve to fight at the moment of landing the 
 first troops ; then the accumulation of means and energy 
 alone give the pledge of victory. 
 
 In 1812, it depended upon his own will to give to the 
 great battle, which he fought upon the Moskwa, the char- 
 acter of his preceding victories. A simple flank move- 
 ment would have permitted him to fight the Russian 
 army with much greater advantages, by cherishing the 
 chance of far greater results. But a decided taste for 
 direct attacks already begun to manifest itself in him, a 
 taste for the pleasure of employing force, and a kind of 
 disdain for the concurrence of art and skilful combina- 
 tions. He conquered, but with immense losses and unim- 
 portant advantages. 
 
 In 1813, his applications were varied. 
 
 At Liitzen, being surprised, the battle commenced by 
 being defensive, but it soon became offensive. 
 
 At Bautzen, the strategic movements were skilful and 
 
 well ronrrivrti. 
 
 Hut, at I,ri|.-ic, we are fain to a-k IH.W .\apulr. m, who 
 
BATTLES. 187 
 
 had choice of the theatre of operations, could, of his own 
 accord, have chosen a theatre so little advantageous, and 
 which, according to the simplest calculations, must prove 
 fatal to him? The battle of the 18th of October was 
 defensive, and offered no chance of success, because the 
 battle of the 16th had not been gained, and the enemy on 
 the 17th had been reinforced by 150,000 men. He should 
 by all means have avoided it, and withdrawn without 
 delay. 
 
 In France, the battles of Brienne and Craon, that of 
 Laoii, that of Arcis, could not produce any advantage, 
 whether in the concentration of force, or in the direction 
 of the attacks; all the operations of this period were of 
 necessity limited to partial movements, directed against 
 separate corps. In these, all that could be done was to 
 exercise the remaining energy of the French army ; these 
 combinations, moreover, belonged to the genius of Napo- 
 leon, who then made many happy applications of them, 
 as at Champ-Aubert, at Montmirail, at Yauchamps, at 
 Montreau, by giving to an obstinate defensive, an offen- 
 sive character, which was the fundamental basis of his 
 talents. 
 
 But, finally reduced to the necessity of a battle, by the 
 reunion of all the enemy's forces, and compelled to fight, 
 he was obliged to resume the defensive, to choose a posi- 
 tion at Paris, to fortify it, to collect all his means and 
 those of the capital, which alone could support him, and 
 to make a last trial of fortune. 
 
 If 14,000 men, fragments of his army, abandoned to 
 
188 1HFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 themselves, were able in an open country, without a 
 single artificial work to support them, deprived of the 
 succors which the city ought to have been able to furnish 
 them, by the disappearance and flight of the higher 
 authorities to resist for ten hours the colossal forces 
 assembled before them, of whom 54,000 were engaged 
 and 13,000 put hors de combat, we may judge what might 
 and ought to have happened, had the combatants num- 
 bered 30,000, under the protection of good works, which 
 would have tripled their force, and aided by the means 
 of Paris, the action and concurrence of which would have 
 resulted from the presence and authority of Napoleon.* 
 
 But this kind of resolution did not belong to his genius; 
 he did not wish to foresee it, nor to prepare for its execu- 
 tion ; he had placed, in last resort, the lever of his power 
 solely in opinion. But if this power of opinion is im- 
 mense, its only durable effect rests upon the condition of 
 being based upon something positive and real. 
 
 One word more upon offensive battles. At what hour 
 should they be fought? This is a question worthy of 
 examination, as it is of great importance. 
 
 When we have the choice, the hours should be varied 
 according to circumstances. Have we a decided superi- 
 ority, which authorizes a firm confidence in victory? The 
 attack should be made early in the morning, that we may 
 
 * The reader is again r>min<l<-<l that \1 nmont was a participator 
 in these m<> "-d by Napoleon in France in such a 
 
 masterly manner in 1814. He was in command at Paris, iiml to 
 him is due the gallant defence, against ; i.. which tic refers 
 
 without a mention of himself. 
 
BATTLES. 189 
 
 profit by the successes obtained. Every true soldier will 
 recall the chagrin he has felt in the midst of success, on 
 seeing the arrival of night ; and the impatience with which 
 it is expected in case of reverse.* 
 
 Again, the attack should be made as soon as possible, 
 when we have all our troops in hand, while the enemy 
 has not yet assembled his own. We ask in vain, why 
 Napoleon at Waterloo, in the longest days of the year, 
 only attacked the English at eleven o'clock in the morning, 
 although he knew, by an intercepted letter from Bliicher 
 to Wellington, that the first Prussian columns could not join 
 the allied forces until four in the afternoon ; for, if Napoleon 
 should be victorious, he would present himself to the Prus- 
 sian army, after having beaten the English ; and if his arms 
 should be unsuccessful, he would at least avoid having 
 upon his hands a second army in the midst of the combat, f 
 
 Great military questions may almost always be reduced 
 to simple ideas, and the axiom here stated is that we have 
 more chances of success in fighting one to one, than one 
 against two. 
 
 * The reputed exclamation of Wellington at Waterloo is a case in 
 point; "Night or Bliicher!" 
 
 f Marmont had at this time accepted a position under the Bour- 
 bons, and his criticism is considered prejudiced. But Napoleon's 
 friends have tried in vain to answer the question proposed. The 
 muddy condition of the roads, which rendered the movements of 
 cavalry and artillery difficult, has been alleged in defence. They 
 could not have dried much by eleven o'clock, and the splendid 
 charges of Milhaud's cavalry disprove this excuse. The truth is, 
 his conduct here is in keeping with the singular irresolution mani- 
 fested on the few previous days. 
 
190 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAH 
 
 But when forces nearly eqnal render victory uncertain, 
 it is better to attack towards the middle of the day; the 
 consequences of a reverse are less formidable, and a gen- 
 eral must above all think of the preservation of his army. 
 The destruction of the enemy holds only a secondary 
 place in the order of duties and interests. Moreover, if 
 the question remain undecided, we have the whole night 
 to prepare a new attack and other combinations. Be- 
 sides, the troops are well rested, they have been able to 
 breakfast before the combat; they are in conditions of 
 force and energy. On the contrary, the defensive army, 
 preoccupied and agitated, cannot. give itself up to such 
 complete repose, and often sees its morale injured in pro- 
 portion as the moment of action approaches. 
 
 In the midst of our triumphs in Italy, two slight re- 
 verses had occurred on two succeeding days, at Cerea and 
 Alle Due Castelli, in consequence of the extreme fatigue 
 and a little disorder which existed in Massena's division. 
 As it was important not to let Wurmser come out of 
 Mantua, and to guard against a new check, the troops 
 were rested until noon ; they only took arms after their 
 dinner, and the victory of San Giorgio was not for a mo- 
 iiinil doubtful. 
 
 To sum up: defensive battles belong more to war 
 as a profession ; offensive battles, well planned and well 
 conducted, arc the appanage of genius. Such was the 
 inn- characi.T of tin- wars of Frederick II. (the (Jivat.) 
 for tin; preat defensive war of seven years almost always 
 had an offensive character; and, in this respect, his cam- 
 
BATTLES. 191 
 
 paigns strongly resemble many campaigns of Napoleon, 
 with the simple differences of the period and the state of 
 military science. 
 
 In attentively reading the narrative of the action of 
 great generals, we may recognize the kind of troops 
 which they have commanded, by the manner in which they 
 have employed them. We may even recognize their own 
 character; for it must be admitted that those who have 
 excelled in a particular kind of war had a special genius 
 for it. Natural instinct, if not our best guide, at least 
 powerfully contributes to develop our faculties. 
 
 In all ages, great generals have impressed upon their 
 operations an individuality; the same operations, con- 
 ducted by men whom we most frequently compare, present, 
 upon reflection, essential differences. The campaigns of 
 Turenne and the great Conde are not at all similar; 
 and it is the same, in antiquity, with Alexander, Caesar 
 and Fabius, Hannibal and Scipio. 
 
 A skilful general must, then, on entering upon a cam- 
 paign, possess himself thoroughly with the conditions in 
 which he is placed, by the nature of his troops, their 
 number, the object assigned to him, and the means at his 
 control ; and he must provide, even though contrary to 
 his own taste, the best modes of employment which it is 
 proper to give them. 
 
I -'2 DlFFERFuNT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE CONDUCT OF A GENERAL THE MORNING AFTER A 
 VICTORY. 
 
 GENERALS who gain battles are less rare than those 
 who know how to profit by victory. It is sometimes said 
 that the battle is the aim, while in reality it is only a 
 means. This is to be remarked particularly in the wars 
 of former times, but in our own times even examples 
 have not been wanting. 
 
 An ordinary general is only struck by the losses he has 
 experienced, and hardly has a suspicion of those of the 
 enemy ; hence arise fatal indecision and timidity, instead 
 of confidence which everything would authorize. 
 
 In 1795, Schoerer, after the battle of Loano, could, 
 without a serious engagement, have invaded Italy. In 
 the same year, Clairfait, after his signal victory before 
 Mayence, could have arrived under the walls of Stras- 
 burg, if he had marched without delay. In 1800. Moreau, 
 by rapid movements, could have completed his successes 
 at the opening of the campaign. The same year, in Italy, 
 Brune, after crossing the Mincio and the Adige, could 
 have destroyed entirely the Austrian army, which was 
 rrtiring before him; so favorable were the circumstances, 
 that the least energy would have sufficed. 
 
 Napoleon is the first, in our epoch, who has drawn from 
 victory all the consequences of which it is susceptible. 
 
CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AFTER A VICTORY. 193 
 
 After gaining a battle, he marched with rapidity in pur- 
 suit of the enemy, in order to obtain easy successes, and 
 to rob him of the little confidence which remained. With 
 such a system, a new battle was rarely necessary in order 
 to attain an important end. 
 
 Doubtless in such marches a general is not much occu- 
 pied with providing for the wants of his army. Disad- 
 vantages result from this, but much less than the advant- 
 ages which are assured. As, moreover, the march is 
 generally through a fertile country, amidst a compact 
 population, the sufferings of the soldiers are thus moder- 
 ated ; that rapid march is soon ended, and an important 
 pledge, with immense resources, falls into the hands of 
 the conqueror. Then abundance and rest give power to 
 repair losses, and, besides, to augment the means of prog- 
 ress. Whenever Napoleon made war in Germany, he 
 acted thus and was successful. Vienna, twice occupied, 
 furnished him incalculable resources, and gave a pledge 
 which was of great value in the subsequent negotiations. 
 
 But there is a limit which cannot be passed with impu- 
 nity. When this system of war was applied to Russia, it 
 was no longer a question of ten or twelve rapid marches, 
 in a country filled with resources, and in the midst of a 
 gentle population, accustomed to respect rules and to 
 obedience ; it was an offensive movement of nearly three 
 months,* almost without halting, in a poor country, offer- 
 
 * Passage of the Niemen, the 23d of June; entry into Moscow, 
 the 14th of September. The movement consumed eighty -three 
 days. M. 
 
 IT 
 
194 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 ing the weakest resources, and a population often hostile ; 
 and the object of this movement was not to pursue a con- 
 quered army, but to reach an army which was falling back 
 upon its own means, while we were using ours in march- 
 ing only, by sufferings of every kind to the soldiers;* 
 sufferings which soon engendered a sort of disorganiza- 
 tion. Napoleon was thus running upon certain loss. 
 
 If then it may be laid down as a great principle in war, 
 that a general should endeavor to profit by his successes, 
 and neglect nothing to complete them, by the rapidity of 
 his movements in pursuit of a vanquished enemy, it may 
 also be seen that there are limits to this rule, and that its 
 application should be subordinated to special circum- 
 stances. 
 
 But if a serious pursuit is to be undertaken, compact 
 and powerful means should be devoted to it, means capa- 
 ble of surmounting all obstacles. Otherwise, by being 
 forced to halt in the midst of the undertaking, we allow 
 the enemy to recover his morale, and permit those advant- 
 ages upon which we had a right to count to escape us. 
 
 After the battle of Wagram, Napoleon gave me, on the 
 8th of July, (1809,) the command of one of the advanced 
 guards of the great army. Massena was following the 
 main body of the enemy's army, which was retreating by 
 the Hollabrun road. I was thrown forward upon the 
 
 * The first corps, at the beginning of the campaign, was 80,000 
 
 : at the review in Moscow, it numbered 16,000. 
 Tin- French cavalry of the line had, on entering upon flu- ( ..in 
 paign, 50,000; at the review in Moscow, it had 6000. M. 
 
CONDUCT OP A GENERAL AFTER A VICTORY. 195 
 
 Nicolsburg road, in pursuit of Prince Rosenberg, who 
 was marching in that direction ; and Marshal Davoust 
 received an order to support me with his corps. I over- 
 threw the troops in my front ; and as they changed direc- 
 tion, abandoning the road into Moravia, by marching 
 upon the Laa, to cross the Taya there, and to join the 
 main body at Znaim, I did so likewise. 
 
 On the evening of the 9th, when I reached that river, 
 I received a message from Marshal Davoust, who wrote 
 to me from Wilfersdorf, that if I needed assistance, he 
 was ready to join me. I had encountered but little 
 resistance from the enemy, and nothing authorized me to 
 think that succors were necessary; I therefore gave no 
 invitation to Marshal Davoust. 
 
 Moreover, I thought that as no force had marched upon 
 Nicolsbarg, Davoust would abandon the design of direct- 
 ing himself upon that town. Everything happened differ- 
 ently from what I had been led to believe. Davoust 
 marched to Nicolsburg, to supply his troops more easily ; 
 and I marched to Znaim, where I expected to encounter 
 only a rear guard, and to be able to unite with Massena. 
 But the enemy's retreat had been slower than I thought; 
 two-thirds of his army were still on this side the river, 
 with almost all their materiel, and one-third was immedi- 
 ately in my front. I took a defensive position to resist 
 their efforts, and this position sufficiently near to Znaim 
 acted also upon the retreat of the enemy's army, at the 
 crossing of the bridge over the Taya. In spite of his 
 repeated efforts, he could not dislodge me. I did not, 
 
196 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 however, the less perceive the mistake I had made in not 
 calling upon Davoust, and that which he had made in not 
 coming spontaneously to my support. The retreat of the 
 enemy would have been cut off; and the mass of his 
 troops, obliged to retire by difficult cross roads, and to 
 ascend the Taya, would probably have incurred the loss 
 of a great portion of their materiel, and thus his disorgan- 
 ization would have been brought about. Such a success 
 might have had incalculable consequences. 
 
 Succors deemed superfluous should not be summoned, 
 but those which are offered should never be refused ; for 
 often a chance occasion gives them an unforeseen value. 
 
OF RETREATS. 197 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OF RETREATS. 
 
 IT is not without justice that great praise has always 
 been accorded to retreats made in presence of a supe- 
 rior enemy ; this is one of the most delicate and hazardous 
 operations of war. 
 
 The principal difficulty lies in the morale of the troops, 
 which becomes much impaired in these circumstances ; it 
 is a singular thing, the different impression produced 
 upon the soldier, when he looks the enemy in the face, and 
 when he turns his back upon him. 
 
 In the first case, he only sees what really exists ; in the 
 second, his imagination increases the danger. A general 
 must then inspire his troops with pride and a just confi- 
 dence, and present these sentiments to them as a powerful 
 means of safety. 
 
 The soldier should be made to comprehend, that if he 
 scorns the enemy, the enemy will respect him. In ordinary 
 circumstances, when a general finds it necessary to retire 
 at the approach of the hostile army, and nothing requires 
 him to prolong his stay in the place he is going to leave, 
 reason and prudence demand that he commence his move- 
 ments before the enemy is in sight. By allowing an 
 interval of two leagues at least, he gives to his march 
 more comfort and facility. But there are circumstances 
 
 17* 
 
198 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 in which it is specially important to retard the enemy's 
 march, to cause him to lose time by forcing him to make 
 dispositions for attack, which suddenly become superflu- 
 ous, because we withdraw at the moment when the battle 
 seems ready to begin. Then are needed, at the same time, 
 excellent troops, and great precautions on the part of the 
 commander. It is in an arrangement by echelons, and 
 great precision in the movements, that security is to be 
 found. 
 
 If the retiring corps be so disproportioned to that 
 which follows it, that it cannot hazard a battle, it may 
 still, with prudence, sustain partial combats without dan- 
 ger. To this end it should prepare its movements before- 
 hand, in such manner that there shall be no embarrassment 
 among the troops, and that their march may always be 
 light and easy. The general will place with his rear 
 guard sufficient artillery, but not too much; it should 
 be well served, well manojuvred, and some of the pieces 
 should be of large calibre. This artillery, divided into 
 two or three parts, placed in echelons, will march with 
 facility, and will prepare successive and instantaneous 
 points of resistance. The enemy is thus forced to 
 halt in order to make his dispositions before attacking, 
 and at the moment these dispositions are completed, the 
 movement is resumed and the rear guard disappears. 
 Then tin- enemy advances again; but he is kept at a dis- 
 tance by the fire of the artillery, which he soon discovers 
 t<. In- snprriur to his own ; for the pursuing force length- 
 en- "lit its columns, while the other, by retiring, constantly 
 
OF RETREATS. 199 
 
 carrries away the field of battle, and draws nearer to its 
 reserves. 
 
 Hence there is a continual alternation in the respective 
 strength of the troops in contact. 
 
 On the 25th of February, 1814, I executed a move- 
 ment of this kind successfully. I was operating upon the 
 left bank of the Aube, and my corps was composed of 
 about 6000 men of all arms. The Prussian army, com- 
 manded by Marshal Bliicher,* and 45,000 strong, crossed 
 the river at Plancy, and marched against me. I took 
 position on the heights of Vinde, in rear of Sezanne. 
 Appearances were such as to cause the enemy's general 
 to believe that I had resolved to fight. He made com- 
 plete dispositions to carry the position, and placed about 
 thirty cannon in battery. That moment having come, all 
 my forces broke up in good order, well together, and with 
 celerity, and the enemy started in pursuit; but in the 
 march, which lasted the whole day, things worked in such 
 manner that he was always kept at a distance, and forced 
 frequently to halt to reunite his forces when he had been 
 
 * Lebrecht von Bliicher, Prince of Wahlstadt, Field Marshal 
 of the King of Prussia, born 1742; major in 1793, and fought 
 with distinction in numerous battles on the Rhine ; major-general 
 1794; fought at Auerstadt, 1806; defeated the French marshal, 
 Macdonald, at the Katzbach, 1813. In the same year repulsed 
 Marmont at Mockern; was highly distinguished for his movements 
 in France in 1814, here referred to; repulsed and beaten by Napo- 
 leon at Ligny in 1815, and arriving at a decisive moment at Water- 
 loo, to the assistance of Wellington, insured the victory. His great 
 energy and promptitude gained him the name of Marshal Forwards. 
 Died 1819. 
 
200 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 too rapid. I arrived at Ferte'-Gaucher, all the time ex- 
 changing cannon shots, and took position behind Morin ; 
 I had lost no men, except those struck by the enemy's 
 balls, and I had not left behind a single living man, nor 
 a piece of artillery. 
 
 The morning after the 'battle of Brienne, I was charged 
 by Napoleon to withdraw upon the Yoire, to take position 
 at first at Perthe, in order to attract the attention of the 
 enemy as long as possible, and thus to make a diversion 
 in favor of the mass of troops who were retiring upon 
 the Aube, by the bridge of Lesmont. After having 
 paraded my forces at daybreak, and prepared my retreat 
 in such a manner as to secure it, I executed it with- 
 out loss, under the guns of the enemy; I passed the 
 defile of Rosnai, without disorder and as if on drill, 
 before the army of the enemy, almost the whole of which 
 was directed upon me ; it was unable afterwards to cross 
 the Voire, which it tried many times to do in vain. 
 
 If the retiring army is of sufficient strength to measure 
 itself with the enemy, analogous dispositions are made. 
 Its safety lies still in the manner in which the echelons 
 are placed, and the aim is always the application of the 
 fundamental principle established above to be imnv 
 numerous than the enemy, at the moment of combat, on 
 the field of battle. 
 
 The best disposition in such a conjuncture is this : to 
 retreat with the army very early, leaving a strong rear 
 guard, which should retreat as late as possible without 
 iNrlf; to take position in a defensive plnrr. 
 
OP RETREATS. 201 
 
 at such a distance that the enemy can only arrive three 
 hours before sunset. However anxious to fight, he has 
 not time to make his preparatory dispositions, and if he 
 attempts the attack before completing them, he ought to 
 be crushed, for the encamped army has all its forces 
 united, while he necessarily has only a portion of his 
 own. 
 
 It was thus that in 1812 the army of Portugal, very 
 inferior to the English army, withdrew while in its sight, 
 from the banks of the Tormes, to go and take position on 
 the Duero, from which the enemy made no attempt to 
 drive it. 
 
 In 1796, when General Moreau* evacuated Bavaria, to 
 retreat upon the Rhine, followed by the Austrian army, he 
 put this theory in practice ; pressed too closely, and 
 inarching with his forces united, he halted, gave battle, 
 and gained a victory. 
 
 But if an army in retreat, or even a single rear guard, 
 finds upon its route an impregnable position, which the 
 enemy cannot carry except by turning it at a distance, 
 
 * Jean Victor Moreau, born 1763; at first a lawyer; became a 
 soldier at the outbreak of the Revolution, 1789 ; brigadier-general 
 in 1793; general of division, 1794. His revolutionary sympathies 
 received a severe shock by the execution of his father at Brest, by 
 the Jacobins. Commander-in-chief of the army of the Rhine and 
 Moselle in 1796, and defeats Wurmser ; distinguished in Italy, 
 1799; commanded the northern army against Kray and the Arch- 
 duke John in 1800, and won the battle of Hohenlinden. Opposed 
 Napoleon and conspired against him in 1804; was exiled, and lived 
 some time in New York ; in 1812, accepted a position on the Empe- 
 ror Alexander's staff, and was killed at Dresden in 1813. 
 
202 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 they should always occupy it during the entire time they 
 can remain without danger; if the enemy manoeuvres 
 to cause them to evacuate it, his operations are delayed, 
 and time is everything for the defensive. If the enemy, 
 in his impatience and ardor, attacking suddenly, rushes 
 upon material obstacles, an easy victory will be gained, 
 and one sometimes very destructive to the enemy, and 
 susceptible of considerably changing the relations of the 
 morale of the two armies. 
 
 This is what happened in Portugal, on the 27th of Sep- 
 tember, 1810. The English army, inferior to the French, 
 took post on the 26th, upon the mountain of Busaco, 
 counterfort of the Sierra of Accoba. The right of the 
 position, which was impregnable, barred the road, while 
 the left, connected with higher mountains, was of easy 
 access. Massena, whom the Emperor had recommended 
 to profit by his superiority to force the enemy to accept 
 battle, resolved upon an immediate attack, and, unfortu- 
 nately, without having sufficiently reconnoitred the posi- 
 tion occupied by the enemy along his entire front. After 
 unheard-of efforts, the corps of General Reignier suc- 
 ceeded in scaling the mountain under the enemy's fire, 
 but, coming upon the plateau, and finding the whole 
 English army drawn up, it was easily overthrown ; it lost 
 in a few minutes the ground it had painfully and coura- 
 geously gained during an hour. Six thousand men were 
 put hors de combat. The next morning, seeing a move- 
 in, nt of the French army by its right, the English ann\ 
 iliji|iparcMl. Tin- n-ull <if this niif'orlimai.- combat 
 
OF RETREATS. 203 
 
 changed the morale of the two armies, and diminished 
 on our side that blind confidence so necessary to success, 
 while it reinspired that of the enemy. Had this event 
 not happened, an attack upon the lines of Lisbon would 
 probably have been attempted, and had that succeeded, 
 the success would have terminated the war in the Pen- 
 insula. 
 
204 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 
 
 No theory can be made concerning surprises. Sur- 
 prises ought to be impossible of execution in the day- 
 time, and would always be so if every commander and 
 every soldier did their duty with exactness and intelli- 
 gence ; but sometimes things happen otherwise. When 
 the enemy is surprised, it is a good fortune by which we 
 should know how to profit ; for nothing promises a prompt 
 and easy success more fully than this. 
 
 Troops which are in the order of formation exacted by 
 circumstances, troops which know that they are about to 
 fight, which are animated by the sentiment of their 
 strength, by confidence, troops of this nature attacking 
 a surprised enemy, in no way prepared to resist them, 
 have such advantages over him that they have the right 
 to count upon victory. 
 
 Very good troops, animated by an excellent spirit, 
 commanded by a general skilful and prompt in his re- 
 solves, may sometimes escape a catastrophe under simi- 
 lar circumstances ; but it is equally true that such troops 
 and a general possessing these qualities will never so con- 
 duct themselves as to be placed in such a condition. 
 
 entirely otherwise with night attack* ; there can- 
 not be surprises, in the proper acceptation of the word ; 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 205 
 
 but there are sudden attacks which nothing could have 
 foreseen, and there may be ignorance of the true disposi- 
 tions of the enemy, because one cannot be aware of his 
 presence during the night, except at a very short distance, 
 when armies are near each other. 
 
 It is only in the case of extreme proximity that I be- 
 lieve such an enterprise to be possible ; for if it were 
 necessary, before attacking, to pass over a great space, 
 there would be many chances that the different columns, 
 at the moment of action, would not be in harmony with 
 each other. 
 
 It is then, I repeat, when two armies are very near to 
 each other that such an action can be performed ; but in 
 this only a moderate force should be employed ; the attack 
 should be made upon many points at the same time ; above 
 all, the attempt should be made to throw the enemy into 
 disorder; if we can do that, we obtain the results of a 
 victory, without having purchased it by great sacrifices, 
 and we are ready to profit by it, if, later, the condition of 
 things offers us the opportunity. 
 
 It is principally against tolerable troops and weak 
 discipline that we ought thus to act. If in the midst of 
 the uncertainty of a true attack, such troops are put 
 in motion, confusion soon springs up among them ; some- 
 times it even happens that the different columns mistake 
 and fire into each other, to the entire profit of the 
 assailant, who is only a spectator; he who attacks, only 
 employing a part of his troops, after having fortified 
 them with precise instructions which determine the sphere 
 
 18 
 
I'IFFKKKNT oI'KUATlONS OF WAR. 
 
 in which they are to operate, and having made them 
 understand the ground and the direction of the other 
 columns, runs a much less risk of falling into errors. We 
 have more than once seen columns of the same army, 
 operating at night, mistake each other respectively for the 
 enemy, and do each other much injury.* If simple chance 
 may produce such accidents, we may conceive it possible 
 to contribute to their production, and then the accidents 
 will be still graver, because the presence of the enemy is 
 real, and his action may be joined to that of chance in a 
 direct manner; it is therefore well, when circumstances 
 are very favorable, sometimes to attempt night attacks ; 
 to employ in them at first a limited number of troops, who 
 will seek to render themselves masters of certain import- 
 ant points, and to be in readiness to overwhelm the enemy 
 with all available means, as soon as day shall have dawned, 
 if we may thereby promise ourselves great advantage. 
 
 The finest example of an attack of this kind is the 
 enterprise executed by the Austrian array against the 
 Prussian army at Hochkirch, on the night of the 13th and 
 14th of October, 1758. The two armies were very near. 
 Marshal Daun skilfully planned the attack, which Gen- 
 eral Laudon executed with great vigor. This enterprise 
 was favored by the blind confidence of the great Freder- 
 ick, who did not perceive the dangers by which he was 
 
 * Witness the affray in which the Austrian army was engaged at 
 Karausebcs in 1789, under Joseph II. The different columns, 
 mistaking each other for the enemy, during (he night, iin-1 im<> 
 Other, 'ni'l put f.i "M i men knra de combat. 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 207 
 
 threatened. A sudden attack, in several columns, 
 made the Austrians masters of the great battery of 
 the Prussian camp. They fought with energy until ten 
 o'clock in the morning, and then the Prussian army was 
 forced to retreat; this it accomplished in good order, 
 and without being pursued, after having lost almost all its 
 artillery. To effect even this required just such good 
 troops and the prestige of the name of the great captain 
 who had thus been beaten. 
 
 But if the circumstances which permit an enterprise of 
 this nature are rare and delicate, if they should be care- 
 fully meditated upon, there are others in which there 
 should be no hesitation, and which, without disadvant- 
 age, even in case of failure of success, give, in the event 
 of success, very important results. 
 
 If beaten troops, in retreat, inconsiderately take a posi- 
 tion too near the pursuing enemy, in the evening, and 
 without being protected by material obstacles, these nat- 
 urally constitute very favorable circumstances; then a 
 night attack, made with a few troops, and conducted with 
 vigor and intelligence, would be very proper. 
 
 The evening of the battle of Yauchamps, I had the 
 good fortune to apply this principle with great success. 
 
 On the 14th of February, 1814, after the bloody affray 
 of the morning at Yauchamps, which cost the Prussian 
 army 4000 prisoners, the enemy began to retreat; my 
 corps pursued him with ardor, and I succeeded in sur- 
 rounding his rear guard, composed of a Russian divi- 
 sion, with my cavalry, increased by a reserve of that arm 
 
20S 1HFFERKXT >1'ER ATloXS OF WAR. 
 
 which Napoleon had placed at my disposal. This Rus- 
 sian infantry bravely resisted the charges directed against 
 it, and continued its march. 
 
 Arrived at Etoges, and night having come on, covered 
 by the forest through which they had passed, they halted, 
 and made arrangements for establishing themselves there. 
 I had received orders from Napoleon to halt at Champ- 
 Aubert, and take position ; but I knew the ground well, 
 having only left it the evening before ; and knowing that 
 the position of Etoges was as bad for the enemy as 
 it was favorable for us, foreseeing, too, that as soon as 
 the morning came I should be charged with covering the 
 movement which the Emperor was going to make to bring 
 together the corps which were mano3uvring in the basin of 
 the Seine, I thought it necessary to hasten and try a sudden 
 attack upon this force, and not to wait until he should 
 evacuate Etoges before replacing him there. I brought 
 together eight hundred infantry ; I formed them in columns 
 upon the high road, placing only fifty men on the right 
 and left in the woods, at a hundred paces distant, to flank 
 them ; and, marching with them, I put this troop in motion 
 in the most perfect silence, forbidding them to fire a sin- 
 gle musket shot, but gave them orders to precipitate 
 themselves upon the enemy as soon as they should reach 
 him. It is tlm-r-quarters of a league from Champ-Au- 
 bert to Etoges; in half an hour we had reached the 
 enemy's advanced posts. The Russian troops, occupied 
 with pp |>aratinn> fur the night, had dispersed, and only 
 had uiidrr arm< tin- main guards and the posts of obser- 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 209 
 
 vation. One charge with the bayonet put these to flight; 
 we precipitated ourselves upon the village; and, in one 
 moment, after having received hardly five hundred mus- 
 ket shots, the entire infantry and artillery, comprising 
 nearly four thousand men, were in our power, as well as 
 Prince Urusoff, who commanded them. 
 
 After a decided reverse, and a precipitate retreat, even 
 if executed in good order, we should separate ourselves 
 so far from the enemy on the evening of the battle as to 
 be secured against his attempts of this nature ; and, after 
 a decided success, we should not hesitate to undertake a 
 night enterprise against a beaten enemy who places him- 
 self imprudently within reach of the blows of his con- 
 queror. 
 
 I now come to consider those surprises the aim of 
 which is to seize a fortified place: enterprises of this 
 nature have been often repeated ; some have succeeded, 
 others have failed, and although it is difficult to recog- 
 nize precisely the circumstances which have produced 
 these various results, we may nevertheless indicate them, 
 at least in part, by seeking for the conditions which should 
 have caused their success. 
 
 When such operations can be executed, we should not 
 hesitate to attempt them ; their success sometimes sud- 
 denly changes the system and the character of the war, 
 and procures advantages much greater than a battle won. 
 
 It is ordinarily by means of sources of information es- 
 tablished with inhabitants of the place, that the opera- 
 tions are mn.de. Sometimes the influence of money is 
 
 18* 
 
210 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 sufficient to seduce them; but when religious or political 
 passions hold sway, there is often a chance of finding 
 individuals with characters which pass for honorable, who 
 are disposed to serve you. There are also enterprises 
 executed by the sole concurrence of stratagem, boldness, 
 and courage, which succeed, the plan of which has been 
 based upon a knowledge of the weakness and negli- 
 gence of a garrison. In the number of the latter, I will 
 place the surprise of Prague by the French army in 1741, 
 which has made the name of Chevert celebrated; and the 
 taking of Fort Mahon in 1756. 
 
 The fundamental principle of success in a surprise, 
 whether it be favored from within or not, is promptly to 
 make ourselves masters of an entrance which opens upon 
 the country. The number of troops introduced furtively 
 or by escalade will always be small; it can never in- 
 crease as rapidly as the troops who are collected for the 
 defence, nor promptly enough to be formidable to a garri- 
 son arrayed in the defence: the principal aim, therefore, 
 should be to cause powerful succors to arrive as quickly as 
 possible. When this condition is not fulfilled, if the heads 
 of both garrison and commander are not turned, such bold 
 enterprises must always fail. 
 
 But we should be well persuaded that even with the 
 most favorable elements it is still possible to fail, if the 
 garrison, thus Mirpri-ed. i- animated by an excellent 
 spirit, and if the soldiers are endowed with great energy, 
 which keeps them from calculating, at the very first mo- 
 ment, hoili the disparity .f fmvc :ind the present danger, 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 211 
 
 while they only think of the defence, and not of saving 
 themselves. Then every soldier fights just where he 
 happens to be ; the smallest gatherings are effectual 
 everywhere, at the door of a house, the corner of a 
 street, behind a wagon ; they thus unexpectedly derange 
 the enemy's combinations, by arresting the march of his 
 first troops ; and this is the beginning of safety for the 
 place. Its chances increase every minute : other troops 
 form in the same manner as the first, and soon the garri- 
 son is set up again, relieved from that powerful moral 
 effect which the unforeseen always causes ; it reunites, acts 
 in combination, and comes victorious out of the struggle 
 in which it seemed at first bound to succumb. 
 
 In such circumstances, the first soldiers placed by chance 
 in the presence of the enemy should have only one thought, 
 the safety of the whole, and the glory which always 
 accompanies a great act of self-devotion. 
 
 Never was a sentiment of this nature more energetically 
 expressed or more brilliantly displayed than at the sur- 
 prise of Cremona, on the 1st of February, 17 02. Never 
 did a more glorious event give lustre to the character of 
 the French soldier. 
 
 Cremona was occupied as the headquarters of the 
 army, and had a garrison of 8000 men. The great extent 
 of the works, the negligent manner in which they were 
 guarded, the security which reigned there, and a habitual 
 forgetfulness of military duties, all of which were observed, 
 gave to Prince Eugene of Savoy the idea of gaming pos- 
 session of it, by surprise, and of making the garrison 
 
2\'l DimfelNT OPERATIONS OF WAK 
 
 prisoners. The discovery of an abandoned old aqueduct, 
 favored the enterprise ; a priest who was won over. 
 ciatcd with some of the inhabitants, prepared the scheme: 
 four hundred disguised grenadiers are introduced, and kept' 
 concealed in a church; other troops penetrate through th< 
 aqueduct. A postern, which had been walled up, is demol- 
 ished during the night; six thousand picked men, at whose 
 head Prince Eugene marched the first general of his age 
 seem to take possession of the town ; at length the enemy 
 reaches the great square, (place d'armes,) and occupies 
 the principal communications before the garrison is even 
 alarmed. At the cry, " the enemy is in the town I" every 
 man awakes and flies to arms; the fight is waged at every 
 point. Marshal Villeroi is taken, all the generals except 
 two are killed, wounded or taken prisoners, and the direc- 
 tion of the defence is entirely abandoned to the instinct 
 of the soldier ; voices which seem providential resound in 
 every direction ; they indicate movements and combina- 
 tions which must result in safety ; and those troops, sur- 
 prised in their beds, naked, and deprived of their officers, 
 seeking vainly to join them, fight furiously in the midst 
 of tliis chaos for twelve hours, without eating, without 
 drinking. :md without clothing and that in the depth of 
 winter. At length they drive out the enemy who had 
 assailed them, after having caused him to run the immi- 
 nent risk of being taken prisoner himself. And neverthe- 
 his enemy, commanded by an illustrious captain, 
 nly thi- slitrht mistake in his calculations : meeting 
 a battalion which was iibmit t< t;ikc arm* in ._.-,. to drill, 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 213 
 
 and the delay in the arrival of succors, four thousand 
 strong, upon which he counted, and the special object of 
 which was to cut off the escape of the garrison. 
 
 We can conceive nothing more sublime. If in a condi- 
 tion so extraordinary and so unfortunate, a garrison could 
 find its safety in its energy, we may judge what ought to 
 happen, when a garrison does not abandon itself at the 
 first sight of danger, and attempts to resist a feeble 
 detachment which has penetrated into the work by sur- 
 prise, and when the disproportion of numbers is so great 
 between those who attack and those who defend : the 
 resistance of one hour decides the issue ; it sweeps away 
 the effects of surprise, in themselves so powerful. We 
 then come into the domain of the real, a thousand times 
 more formidable than that of the imagination. 
 
 In our own time an analogous event to that of which I 
 have just spoken happened, to shed lustre upon our arms. 
 It is less known, but it is well to recall it to memory, and 
 to transmit the circumstances to posterity. 
 
 When, in 1814, the events of that war had moved us 
 away from the banks of the Rhine, Holland was evacu- 
 ated, and immediately became hostile to France. English 
 troops, under the orders of General Graham, were soon 
 debarked to support the public spirit, and to give strength 
 to the revolution thus begun. 
 
 General Molitor, on leaving Holland, placed garrisons in 
 the most important fortified towns ; but the condition of 
 our armies at that time did not allow the detachment of 
 many troops, and they could probably only be composed 
 
1.M 4 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 of depot battalions.* The garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom, 
 on account of the importance and extent of the works, 
 was put at 4000 men. Those of the conscripts who did 
 not belong to the old limits of France having deserted, it 
 was reduced to less than 3000, and it was with this weak 
 body that the brilliant feat of arms now to be related was 
 executed ; a feat as glorious for this handful of brave men 
 as for General Bizanet, who commanded them, because on 
 the part of the commander, the wisest and most far-seeing 
 measures had been taken in advance, and more energetic 
 ones still succeeded these, when the moment of action 
 arrived. Here it was different from Cremona, where sal- 
 vation was due solely to the obstinate courage of the sol- 
 diers. At Bergen-op-Zoom, the soldiers were eminently 
 brave also, resolute, energetic, but it was especially by 
 their subordination to the laws of discipline, and by their 
 exact fulfilment of the orders of their chief, that they tri- 
 umphed over the enemy. 
 
 The insufficiency of the garrison had determined Gen- 
 eral Bizanet to concentrate all the troops in the town, and 
 to evacuate the exterior works, in the midst of which his 
 small command would have seemed lost. He counteracted 
 the disadvantages arising from this measure, as it con- 
 cerned observation of the enemy's movements, by numer- 
 ous patrols; he doubled the interior posts, and established 
 numerous night piekets, always ready to seize their arms. 
 nil Craham, who COmin;iii<le<l the Knrli>h in IIol 
 
 * Less fit than others to take the field, and left in garrison on 
 that account. 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 215 
 
 land, and who was at a short distance from Bergen-op- 
 Zoom, being informed of the small number of defenders, 
 thought he could carry it by a sudden attack, (coup de 
 main.) He relied also upon the aid of the inhabitants, 
 and had secret communications with the interior. He 
 detailed for this enterprise 4800 men, and he chose for the 
 attempt the night of the 8th and 9th of March, the anni- 
 versary of the birth of the Prince of Orange. 
 
 The assailant divided his party into four columns, 
 designed to make four simultaneous attacks : the first two 
 were to scale the ramparts one between the Antwerp 
 gate and the harbor, the other between the Antwerp gate 
 and the Breda gate ; a third was to present itself at the 
 Strenburg gate, to make a false attack ; and the fourth 
 was to enter the town by the harbor, taking advantage of 
 the low tide. 
 
 At ten o'clock at night, the third column surprised the 
 advanced post at the Strenburg gate, but its progress 
 was entirely arrested by the fire of the troops placed in a 
 stockade to defend the stationary bridge. 
 
 The garrison flew to arms. 
 
 At the same time, the fourth column entered by the 
 harbor without having been perceived by the guard-boat, 
 and penetrated into the city. But troops sent against it 
 having succeeded in dividing it, one part was halted, 
 while the other part reached the rampart, where it was 
 followed. 
 
 The second column had succeeded in its escalade, and 
 was marching upon the Antwerp gate, to throw it open 
 
216 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 to General Graham, who was waiting on the glacis with 
 the rest of his troops and his cavalry. But a strong, 
 reinforcing picket, sent in hot haste by General Bizanet 
 to the Antwerp gate, prevented the English from seizing 
 it, and the first column, failing in its escalade, was re- 
 pulsed with great loss. 
 
 There were in like manner engagements in different 
 directions during the whole night. 
 
 At the break of day, General Bizanet attacking with 
 the remainder of his force, threw the enemy back upon 
 the water-gate, and brought him to a stand: not being 
 able to retreat, crushed by the grape of the exterior 
 works, the English columns were thus obliged to lay 
 down their arms, with a loss of 1200 killed, 600 wounded, 
 (of whom two were general officers,) 2177 prisoners, 
 (among whom were one general and four colonels,) 4000 
 muskets, four flags, a quantity of munitions, etc. 
 
 General Graham begged a suspension of arms for three 
 days, to bury the dead, take away the wounded, and receive 
 prisoners returned on parole. 
 
 All eulogium is superfluous after the narrative of such 
 an action. 
 
 < h blood has been famous in every epoch; our 
 morals give extraordinary tclat to military glory, and 
 this appreciation of the value of the sacrifice of life, 
 sacrifice which public opinion alone can worthily recom- 
 pense, has contributed much to develop in France tin- 
 virtues of devotion, safeguard of the power of nations. 
 Tin- army will not change so lonir as our morals remain 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 217 
 
 the same. Heaven grant, for the destinies of the conn- 
 try, that it may always be so, and that those dry and 
 calculating minds who see the guarantee of social hap- 
 piness only in material interests, and whose fatal aberra- 
 tions prove a complete ignorance of the human heart, 
 shall never exercise in the councils of the country a 
 power and a credit which would tend to its destruction. 
 
 I search my memory in vain for examples of surprises 
 of fortresses executed successfully against French troops. 
 I have, on the contrary, met those which have transpired 
 among foreign troops, and I will cite two which happened 
 to the Prussians in the seven years' war : that of Glatz in 
 1760, and that of Schweidnitz in 1761. 
 
 General Laudon had, before his approach, established a 
 system for obtaining information with several officers of the 
 garrison of the fortress of Glatz, by means of the monks 
 who lived there. Scarcely had the Austrians arrived be- 
 fore the place, when they opened their trenches, and being 
 informed at what time the officers who were devoted to 
 them would be on guard in the advanced fort of the 
 Grue, a fort cut out of the rock, and deemed impregna- 
 ble, they directed a strong attack upon this point; the 
 besieged fled, and the Austrians, who followed them with 
 ardor, entered pell-mell with them into the fortress. 
 Ready reserves followed the first troops, and the Aus- 
 trians were in possession of the place without having 
 encountered the least resistance. 
 
 As for Schweidnitz, it happened thus: Five hundred 
 prisoners of war were there, and among them an Italian 
 
 19 
 
218 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 major named de Roca, a partisan officer; this officer 
 knew how to get into the good graces of the commander, 
 and was permitted to walk freely about the fortress. He 
 soon knew the position of the posts and the details of the 
 service. He intrigued in the town, and set to work to 
 corrupt those who might serve him. Upon his represent- 
 ations, General Laudon conceived the project of surpris- 
 ing the place, which he executed on the night of Septem- 
 ber 30 and October 1. He distributed twenty battalions 
 in four attacks. The commander of Schweidnitz was at 
 a ball; but upon certain alarming indications he had 
 made the garrison take arms, without, however, sending 
 any one outside to learn whether the enemy was near ; so 
 that the Austrians even reached the palisades without 
 being discovered. They surprised the Stricgauet gate ; 
 in the confusion the prisoners of war, having torn away 
 the mask, took possession of the interior gate, and in less 
 than one hour the town was taken, and the garrison were 
 prisoners of war. 
 
 I will add two words concerning two surprises which 
 were essayed in our days, but which did not succeed, 
 solely because of the manner in which they were tried. 
 
 In 179G, when the French army was making ready to 
 besiege Mantua, it was considered possible and very ad- 
 vantageous to carry, on the first night, the T work, by a 
 surpriM'. This work, without revetment, covers a long 
 rtirtain of the principal, which is only flunked by two 
 towers; it then constituted, and has still formed 
 since the construction of the fort of Pictoli, which we built, 
 
NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. 219 
 
 the best defence of Mantua on that side. The garrison 
 was considered weak and exhausted by sickness; three 
 hundred soldiers were dressed in the uniform of the garri- 
 son, and placed under the orders of an Italian officer, a 
 deserter from the Austrian service, who was serving in 
 our ranks ; he was to feign a defence of the island in 
 which the fort was situated, and to seem to be closely 
 pressed by French troops, to throw himself upon the bar- 
 rier of the covered way to seek protection there, to cause 
 them to open to him, to seize that opening, and thus 
 secure an entrance into the fort ; but the officer of whom 
 I have just spoken, who did not care to fall into the 
 hands of the Austrians and be hung, was too gentle in 
 the execution of his part, while Murat, who commanded 
 the troops designed to aid him, acted slowly and with 
 circumspection. The garrison, enlightened by this tardi- 
 ness, were not duped by the comedy, which could only 
 have succeeded through extraordinary activity and quick- 
 ness. 
 
 The second was the enterprise made in 1800, on the 
 Fort of Bard. Scarcely one hundred and fifty men com- 
 posed the garrison. The assault which was made would 
 infallibly have succeeded if it had been discreetly con- 
 ducted. Colonel Dufour a brave soldier, but entirely 
 destitute of intelligence and incapable of reflection, charged 
 with the command of the column which was to seize the 
 gate instead of approaching in silence, and noiselessly 
 placing his ladders against the wall, which he should have 
 scaled in a moment, bethought himself, like a fool, to have 
 
--' DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the charge beaten before leaving the village. The garri- 
 son, warned, placed itself in defence ; Dufour received a 
 ball in the breast, and the attack was repulsed with con- 
 siderable loss. It was this check which necessitated the 
 bold enterprise of taking the artillery, by hand, under the 
 same fort, during the night, in spite of the enemy's fire, 
 and thus to pass the defile.* 
 
 * I have the right to claim for myself the merit of the concep- 
 tion and execution of that audacious enterprise, all the details of 
 which I directed in person. 
 
 The First Consul only concurred in it, by authorizing me to try 
 it; but justice imposes upon me the duty of associating with it the 
 name of my chief of staff, then Lieutenant-Colonel de Se"narmont, 
 an officer of great merit and valor, afterwards lieutenant-general, 
 and killed before Cadiz. He contributed powerfully to success by 
 the assistance he rendered me. This officer bore one of the finest 
 artillery names, which his father had already rendered illustri- 
 ous. M. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES. 221 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES. 
 
 THE first element of resistance in a fortress, is to have 
 a good commander ; add to this first indispensable condi- 
 tion, a garrison of sufficient strength and full supplies of 
 every kind provisions, munitions, etc. and you will be 
 able to obtain the most extraordinary results. The forti- 
 fications may be more or less perfect ; but this perfection, 
 always desirable, is a small matter, if its effects be com- 
 pared with those produced by the courage and resolution 
 of the chief who presides over the defence. 
 
 The commanding officer of a fortress is its soul; it 
 lives in him and through him. If at the commencement 
 of a siege a garrison is poor, it will soon become good 
 under a good commander; he will be able to awaken in 
 it sentiments of honor, of patriotism and of glory, which 
 sometimes slumber in the hearts of soldiers. 
 
 It is very fine to win battles ; the eclat which redounds 
 to the commander dazzles ; success brings enthusiasm and 
 admiration; but it is finer still more meritorious, at 
 least to defend a place during a period which passes the 
 recognized limits of defence. 
 
 The glory of a battle won, however brilliant it may be 
 for the ^general, is always shared ; that of a commander 
 of a fortress is almost entirely his own. This glory is his 
 
 19* 
 
222 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 work ; it is the fruit, not of a unique action accom- 
 plished under determinate circumstances, but of a long 
 and uninterrupted series of persevering efforts, ceaselessly 
 renewed, with the same certainty of their inutility, if 
 timely succors do not arrive ; the efforts of each day 
 are not rewarded by the prospect of the delights of vic- 
 tory; they are always, on the contrary, connected with 
 a painful sense of relative weakness, and they have not, 
 for aim, to triumph over the enemy, but only to delay his 
 successes, without changing the results. 
 
 Every man of sentiment always has courage and energy 
 for twenty -four hours; in success, every man seems a 
 hero. But how rare it is to find the same courage, the 
 same tenacity, the same ardor, in reverses I It is only the 
 truly brave who then display these qualities, and it is easy 
 to count them. 
 
 But the commander of a besieged fortress is surrounded 
 by conditions much more difficult still. It is necessary 
 not only that he should possess and preserve a moral 
 courage such as Providence has rarely granted to man, 
 but even that this courage should increase in proportion 
 as circumstances, becoming more difficult, would natu- 
 rally lessen it; for he must counterbalance in the garrison 
 the effect of sufferings and want which fall to their lot 
 The commander alone seems interested in the defence, 
 because he almost alone receives the glory of it, while 
 those who are under his orders only have its hardships. 
 Thus, moreover, when a commander is disposed % to sur- 
 , h- alwayR finds himself surrounded by approvers 
 
f VNi\ 
 
 THE DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES. 223 
 
 of this policy, and by officers disposed to raise scruples 
 and doubts which have also occurred to his own mind; 
 and when he calls the votes of a council assembled to 
 decide whether the time to capitulate has arrived, the 
 affirmative is always proclaimed, and it sometimes hap- 
 pens that those who protest against the surrender, would 
 not utter this advice if their votes could change the 
 majority. 
 
 Nothing is worthier of admiration than the defence of 
 a place carried to extreme limits ; but nothing is rarer. 
 
 Justice then requires that the names of those who 
 have acquired such glory should be rendered immortal. 
 
 The most splendid defence known in the history of 
 modern wars is that of Grave, on the Meuse, by de Cha- 
 milly, in 1675; nothing can be compared with it. That 
 town had received the depots of the army, at the time of 
 the invasion of Louis XIY. in Holland, and contained 
 great supplies. Its extent is of moderate size ; it had a 
 garrison of 5000 men ; it was defended for five months of 
 regular siege; it resisted all the efforts of the Prince 
 of Orange, who lost 30,000 men there, and Chamilly only 
 surrendered upon an order signed by the king, carrying 
 away with him all his artillery to the arms of France.* 
 
 * I was always ambitious to be placed in charge of the defence 
 of a great fortress, having an internal sentiment that this task 
 would not be above my powers. If I had been, I should have 
 caused the journal of the siege of Grave to be reprinted, that every 
 officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier might have had a 
 model in his hands. If regiments are some day provided with 
 libraries, it would be useful to place this work in them, worthy as 
 it is of a soldier's greatest interest. M. 
 
*2'2 I DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 After this admirable defence, we should place in the 
 first rank that of Lille, and its citadel, in 1708. Marshal 
 Boufflers, who commanded there, won immortal glory. 
 
 In our days sieges have been rare; we cannot, how- 
 ever, pass in silence the defence of the works of San 
 Sebastian, commanded by General Rey, a long and obsti- 
 nate defence which cansed great losses to the English 
 army. 
 
 The defence of the Fort of Burgos, under the orders 
 of General Dubreton, which, attacked less powerfully, 
 was still not without glory ; and that of Wittemberg on 
 the Elbe, by General La Poype. 
 
 But to set against a few extraordinary resistances which 
 we most admire, how many moderate defences are there, 
 judged with unmerited indulgence ; how many culpable 
 surrenders which remained unpunished I 
 
 The preservation of a fortress is so important and 
 essential ; it influences sometimes so powerfully the safety 
 of an army and a country, that its surrender should 
 always be an object of a legal investigation, which would 
 force a clear statement of the circumstances accompany- 
 ing the defence and leading to the capitulation. Then, 
 the commander should be punished, or else rewarded and 
 covered with unstinted praise. 
 
 The regulations for the navy prescribe the trial of 
 every captain who has lost his vessel, in whatever manner 
 the event may have happened. If he has done his duty, 
 he is acquitted and honorably restored to service. 
 
 We understand this indulgence and this reservation in 
 
THE DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES. 225 
 
 the legislation, because circumstances of superior force 
 may occur upon so movable an element as the sea, and be 
 powerful enough to rule and master science, vigilance and 
 courage. But on land nothing is variable ; when surren- 
 der is not caused by the failure of supplies, there can be 
 no legitimate excuse ; we can only choose between praise 
 and blame. Military regulations should be rigorously 
 executed, and when a commander surrenders before there 
 is a practical breach in the body of the place, and before 
 having sustained at least one assault, there is crime on his 
 part, and consequently there should be punishment. 
 
 I shall not enter into the technical details of the attack 
 and defence of fortresses. Special works have treated of 
 these matters in a complete manner. I shall content 
 myself with a few reflections on the general direction to 
 be followed in a defence. 
 
 In great fortresses it is too much the habit to make 
 sorties at a distance before the beginning of the siege, and 
 to exhaust a part of the means, forces and confidence, 
 which are so useful and which it is so important to pre- 
 serve until the moment when courage and valor shall be 
 still more necessary. By going out to a distance from the 
 fortification we lose our point of support ; we are deprived 
 of those succors which establish a sort of equilibrium 
 between the garrison and the attacking army. I should 
 advise, then, that in every case, unless there be a hope of 
 thereby raising the siege, a sortie made with a large por- 
 tion of the garrison should never go to such a distance 
 
226 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 from the works as to be deprived of the efficient aid of 
 the cannons of the fortress. 
 
 But if sorties of this kind should be prohibited, those 
 having for their object the destruction of the enemy's 
 works, as soon as commenced, cannot be too frequent, 
 their chief aim being to arrest the enemy's movements 
 and to gain time; this will be best achieved by giving 
 him frequent alarms, and by often forcing sharp but short 
 combats upon him, which require him to recommence the 
 same works many times. In proportion as the enemy 
 approaches the place, and the siege progresses, sorties 
 made with smaller numbers the field of battle becoming 
 more and more restricted should be still more frequent. 
 In fine, it is at the moment when the close proximity of 
 the enemy so often presents to commanders the idea of 
 surrender, that the real defence should begin ; and it even 
 seems that it should never end, if every day new obstacles 
 are prepared, if interior entrenchments are opportunely 
 constructed; such dispositions should be made that the 
 besieged should never be completely deprived of the fire 
 of artillery, but should always preserve a few guns, well 
 covered, for defending the breach. This precaution alone, 
 which should be a matter of special concern, may control 
 the destiny of the place for many days, and add very 
 much to the glory of its defence. 
 
 I will close this chapter with an observation by which 
 the commandants of besieged fortresses should pmlit. It 
 is always against surprises that they should gunnl tln-m- 
 Belves; for the more improbable a thing, the greater the 
 
THE DEFENCE OF FORTIFIED PLACES. 227 
 
 effect it produces when it does occur. A brave garrison 
 defends a breach, and the enemy cannot for a long time 
 overcome its resistance ; but if, at a moment when the 
 attention of all is directed upon the defence of an open 
 and assailed point, it is discovered that the enemy has 
 entered the place at another point by escalade, then the 
 mind becomes confused, the defence of the breach is aban- 
 doned, and the place taken. 
 
 Never, then, should the most exact watchfulness upon 
 every point be relaxed; particularly should the eye be 
 kept upon those points which seem the least easy to be 
 attacked ; for the enemy will choose them in preference, 
 because seemingly able to defend themselves they will not 
 be placed in charge of any force. 
 
 In 1741, the fortifications of Prague were the object of 
 tumultuous night demonstrations, on the part of the 
 French army, upon two points, and these demonstrations 
 attracted the whole garrison ; but other troops directed 
 their march in silence upon a point in the body of the 
 works enclosing the new town, which was at some dis- 
 tance; they carried with them a single ladder, crossed 
 over the rampart, finding no one, opened the nearest gate, 
 and the town was taken almost without a struggle with 
 the garrison. 
 
 In our own days, in 1812, at Rodrigo, the garrison 
 bravely defends a practicable breach made in the body of 
 the place, and repulses the enemy ; but fifty English sol- 
 diers escalade with ladders the castle, a dominant point, 
 the scarp of which is revetted, and of great height ; they 
 
228 DIFFERENT OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 spread the alarm, give rise to disorder, and are masters 
 of the town. 
 
 So likewise at Badajos. That city, besieged in the same 
 year, is provided with a good garrison, commanded by a 
 distinguished general, General Philippon, who had already 
 sustained a glorious siege the year before. Entrenched 
 against the breach, he there repels the assaults of the 
 enemy; but the castle, the walls of which are eighty 
 feet high, is escaladed by fifty men ; alarm and disorder 
 are spread around, and the city is taken. 
 
 Never under any pretext should this general oversight 
 be relaxed ; but there should be disposed, even in the 
 places which seem most guarded against attack, some 
 means of resistance, especially when a siege is begun, and 
 when the enemy may and must suppose that all the means 
 of defence have been concentrated upon the point to which 
 he is directing his attacks.* 
 
 * I have not indicated in the number of remarkable defences 
 that of Saragossa, by the Spaniards, because it is connected with 
 a different order of events. An immense population, refugees of 
 the province, with vast supplies, a population rendered fanatical by 
 religion and patriotism, constantly more than double the number 
 of the besieging force, and whose daily losses were almost imper- 
 ceptible, by occupying those immense and indestructible convents, 
 which are real fortresses, could and did arrest for a long time our 
 efforts. But similar circumstances can hardly be renewed; that 
 defence cannot furnish instruction which can be useful in regular 
 warfare. As to the siege of Genoa, it was a splendid and grand 
 operation of war, but the defence of an entrenched camp, not of a 
 fortress properly so called. M. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MORALS OF SOLDIERS AND THE MANNER OF FORMING 
 THEM; ARMIES IN FORMER TIMES AND ARMIES AT THE 
 PRESENT DAY. 
 
 THREE things are necessary to give value to troops: 
 the love of order, the habit of obedience, and confidence 
 in themselves and in others. Such are, in their moral 
 relations, the fundamental basis of an army. Without 
 this basis, an assemblage of men has no consistence, jus- 
 tifies no hope, satisfies no want. 
 
 We should then in no degree neglect to develop these 
 three elements in the minds and hearts of soldiers, to 
 introduce into the morals of men of war those habitudes 
 which I will call military virtues. 
 
 Discipline that is, submission to rules and to the will 
 of the lawful commander must be unrelaxingly observed ; 
 
 20 (229) 
 
230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 and each one, in whatever grade he may be placed, should 
 always remember that he commands his subordinates only 
 by the title of the obedience which he renders to his 
 superiors. 
 
 Discipline, always severe for a grave dereliction, should, 
 however, be measured in its applications. 
 
 In countries where elevation of sentiment, delicacy of 
 manners, and dignity of character have banished corporal 
 punishments, it is necessary, as far as possible, to intro- 
 duce opinion into the punishments. 
 
 The French army particularly has always offered to an 
 intelligent commander frequent occasions of utilizing this 
 resource. Praise and blame, properly applied, the talent 
 to excite a useful and noble emulation, have often been 
 sufficient for all needs. Punishments and rewards, based 
 upon opinion, have this marvellous characteristic, that 
 they are susceptible of infinite shades, and act powerfully 
 upon generous hearts. Never should a punishment, what- 
 ever it may be except for an act of flagrant baseness 
 be inflicted with an expression of contempt. Everything 
 that degrades the soldier and brands him, diminishes his 
 value, as everything which exalts him in his own eyes 
 adds to his powers. There are a thousand means of vary- 
 ing the expression of these sentiments; a skilful chief 
 chooses with discernment the means which best suit tin- 
 kind of men he has in hand, and the circumstances in 
 which they are placed. 
 
 In some armies severity is carried to excess in treating 
 those faults which, to the eye of reason, seem trifling. 
 
THE MORALS OF SOLDIERS. 231 
 
 Without venturing to blame, I cannot approve the import- 
 ance thus attached to them. Relating to certain details 
 of dress, or to a momentary lack of steadiness under 
 arms, too grave a punishment is unreasonable ; but mod- 
 erately inflicted, and looked upon in their relation to 
 morals, the punishment has a good effect. The spirit of 
 order, respect for regulations, are everywhere displayed ; 
 and it is as education, as a habit of life, that they should 
 be regarded. A soldier in a soiled coat will doubtless 
 fight as well as another whose uniform is perfectly correct ; 
 but, less exact in fulfilling his daily duties, he will proba- 
 bly be less obedient to the voice of his commander. 
 
 The life of an army is so astonishing, so artificial, that 
 we cannot neglect, without danger, anything which con- 
 'tributes to give to its morals habits of order and of sub- 
 mission. But the commander must see the true aim, 
 without exaggerating the importance of the means. 
 
 It is necessary that officers and commanders concern 
 themselves, with particular care, to inspire confidence in 
 their soldiers. Without this close bond, they can count 
 upon nothing. In rest, in a state of peace, regulated 
 power is easily respected and obeyed ; but in the pertur- 
 bations which dangers cause, everything becomes compli- 
 cated, and the least natural obstacle may become insur- 
 mountable. It is then that self-confidence, and trust in 
 others, those powerful internal voices, bestow an extraor- 
 dinary energy which insures success. 
 
 The commander must then provide for the welfare of the 
 soldier, must be willing, on important occasions, to share his 
 
-'I- THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 sufferings and privations; watch over the maintenance of 
 order and discipline; punish when necessary, and eagerly 
 seize opportunities of bestowing rewards just rewards ; 
 for confidence in the justice of the commander is the basis 
 of his credit and of the sentiments with which he is re- 
 garded. The instinct of the man is skilful to discover when 
 a commander is worthy. Severity, then, has nothing which 
 frightens or wounds, for it supposes force ; and force, 
 when it is the sincere interpreter of the laws, insures an 
 efficient protection of rights. Even those who are the 
 subjects of its action feel, at the bottom of their hearts, 
 its utility and respectability. 
 
 As much .as the maintenance of order should be, to 
 commanders of every grade, a constant and ever-present 
 thought, in just the same proportion should love for the 
 soldiers be profoundly graven upon their hearts. I have 
 already said this : how can they do otherwise than love 
 that class of men, so deserving, so hardly treated in 
 their entire condition, so habituated to privations, whose 
 life is composed of so many sacrifices, who pass the 
 best years of it in the midst of painful labors, dangers 
 unceasingly renewed, and who so sincerely attach them- 
 selves to their commander, when they are loved by him I 
 The soldier is good, by his very nature. If his education 
 does not give him the right to be placed in the first rank 
 of society, he would merit it by the sentiments which ani- 
 mate him. Habitual submission to regulations render 
 him more moral still. A life of danger develops the 
 noble instincts of his heart, and induces a constant devo- 
 
THE MORALS OF SOLDIERS. 23ii 
 
 tion, a sentiment inspired by Heaven itself. On' his 
 return to his fireside, the soldier is almost always a model 
 to that portion of society in which he is called to live. 
 I have seen him, in the midst of disorders and atrocities 
 which war sometimes engenders, distinguish himself by 
 acts of holy piety, of evangelical charity.* Shame and 
 confusion to all who do not honor him, or who do 
 not concur in every effort to ameliorate and soften his 
 existence. 
 
 Another duty, which should never be neglected, is that 
 of keeping soldiers in constant activity. Activity should 
 be a second nature to them. Like almost all men, they 
 are disposed to be lazy; it renders them the greatest 
 service to change this disposition. Rest and idleness 
 diminish their strength and lessen their courage. Health, 
 energy and moral valor spring generally from a life har- 
 dened by fatigue and spent in movement. 
 
 Military drills are the first elements of that activity 
 which I would enjoin ; but they are not the only elements. 
 In the first place, a soldier should acquire the most com- 
 plete instruction ; when he has that, to occupy him with 
 
 * I could cite many of these traits ; I will only mention one. 
 During the campaign in Egypt, a village revolted ; a military 
 execution was necessary as an example. The village was burned, 
 and nearly all the inhabitants put to the sword. 
 
 A soldier, who doubtless had done his part, in this cruel work, 
 was struck with the sight of an infant who was stretching out its 
 arms to him. He put it on his knapsack, took a goat to nourish 
 it, carried the child for eight days, dragging the goat along, until 
 he could find an Arab woman, who adopted the infant M. 
 
 20* 
 
234 THE PHILOSOPHY OP WAR. 
 
 the details of what he already knows, is an infallible means 
 of producing in him an antipathy to his profession. 
 
 Great manoeuvres, presenting a splendid spectacle, are 
 the only things constantly to his taste ; but new interests 
 may be created for him, by exciting emulation in sports of 
 different kinds. He may also be employed in important 
 public works ; and as a reward, the history of the regiments 
 thus employed may be associated with the works they 
 have executed by giving to these works their name. It is 
 thus that splendid and great things might be accomplished 
 economically, at the same time that there would be devel- 
 oped among the soldiers ideas of immortal glory and 
 greatness, which cannot be too much fostered among men 
 of war. 
 
 In the course of my military life, I have never permit- 
 ted an opportunity to escape of applying this principle ; 
 and I have had cause of self-gratulation, not only as it 
 concerned the immediate effect, but also in its influence 
 upon the health and spirit of the troops. But I was 
 careful not to pass certain limits, and in nowise to com- 
 promise a military spirit, the preservation and devel- 
 opment of which should never cease to be the aim of 
 every effort of a commander. Egypt, Holland, Dalmatia 
 still present to our view those monuments of our past 
 greatness, and of the then existing morals. In the latter 
 country, eighty leagues of splendid roads, constructed in 
 the wildest localities, in the midst of the greatest natural 
 difficulties, have left to the inhabitants honorable remem- 
 
THE MORALS OF SOLDIERS. 235 
 
 brances which will be imperishable. Inscriptions cut 
 upon the rocks yet announce to travellers that these works 
 were executed by certain regiments and certain colonels. 
 And when these brave soldiers, whose memory is so dear 
 to me, laid down their picks and shovels to resume their 
 arms, with what brilliancy did they display themselves on 
 the battle-field ! What strength, what energy did they 
 not bring to bear upon the longest marches and the great- 
 est fatigues ! 
 
 Among the complementary means for the formation of 
 troops, I will place in the first rank the establishment of 
 great camps of instruction. These alone, during peace, 
 can give to troops the habits and instruction which they 
 need. Military spirit is only developed in the midst of 
 the dangers of war, and such union of troops as present 
 its image. Life in camp, the movements incident to it, 
 the mingling of arms, that peculiar life from which civil 
 society is so far removed, and which is the prime element 
 of success and of glory, can only be created by assem- 
 blages of troops of some permanence and surrounded by 
 comforts. I am not speaking of those temporary assem- 
 blages which are sometimes seen in different countries, 
 the object of which is rather to present a spectacle than to 
 give instruction and to develop the faculties; but of those 
 camps of my youth, out of which sprang the finest and 
 best army which has existed in modern times, and which, 
 if it be equalled, certainly can never be surpassed : I 
 speak of the army which encamped for two years on the 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 shores of the English Channel and the North Sea, and 
 which fought at Ulm and Austerlitz.* 
 
 Supported by this example, and convinced by my own 
 reflections, I would suggest that permanent establishments 
 be formed in provinces which have but poor agricultural 
 resources, like Champagne ; and that durable barracks be 
 arranged to receive 30,000 men.f The same troops 
 should occupy them for three months at least. Three 
 such establishments would suffice to give and preserve 
 to the French army a military spirit and an instruction 
 which would keep it constantly ready for war. But there 
 is just now a vaster field for such exercises, Algeria, 
 which, if it makes us pay dear for its benefits, endows the 
 army most richly in the matter of which I have spoken. 
 
 I cannot close this chapter without entering into some 
 details as to the manner in which regular armies are 
 formed in Europe ; it is curious to see in what respects 
 the armies of former times differ in their composition 
 from those of the present day : the consequences drawn 
 from this comparison will themselves offer food for reflec- 
 tion. 
 
 After the invasion of the barbarians, and the destruc- 
 tion of the Roman power, all special military organ i/.u- 
 tions had disappeared in Europe. For many centuries, 
 
 * This was the camp of Zeist, alreal i to by the author 
 
 with great affection and culogium. 
 
 t These ideas seem to be carrinl out in the entrcm-hed camp nt 
 Chalons, prepared by Louis Napoleon; and in tho Kn^lish camp at 
 AM.-rshott. 
 
ARMIES OF FORMER AND PRESENT TIMES. 287 
 
 armies had no other basis than that of the feudal consti- 
 tution. When experience had demonstrated the weakness 
 of these temporary reunions of men, assembled in haste 
 and without rule, which were suddenly dissolved, whether 
 by the caprice of the great lords or by the exigence of 
 their wants, and which thus rendered impossible every 
 operation based upon calculation, the problem undertaken 
 was to create regular and permanent means of power. 
 
 The sovereigns, however invested with the right, were 
 without effective power over their vassals. To free them- 
 selves from this dependence, as soon as their finances per- 
 mitted, they wished to have their own troops ; and such 
 was the origin of independent companies, (compagnies 
 d'ordonnance.) 
 
 But regular revenues were necessary constantly to main- 
 tain troops under arms ; and, on the other hand, regular 
 revenues are not obtained without order and a certain 
 administrative organization; the creation of armies was 
 then at once the cause and the means of a commencement 
 of civilization. 
 
 Nevertheless, the feudal system, placing the people in 
 the hands of the lords, the latter were far from favoring 
 the establishment of troops destined to overthrow their 
 power ; the sovereigns, being only able to dispose of their 
 private domains, very limited, were reduced to regular 
 enlistments, made for stated sums of money. 
 
 The disorders which existed throughout Europe, the 
 constant wars which were waged, the multitude of petty 
 sovereigns, rendered the people miserably poor, and pre- 
 
238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 sented to them the trade of the soldier as a resource. 
 The morals of the age moreover allowed each one unlim- 
 ited hopes of ambition. 
 
 A soldier might aspire to everything ; and his combina- 
 tions had no other element than his personal interests. 
 The motive was not then as now the single thought to 
 perform his duty towards his sovereign, to defend his 
 country and to win glory, that reward of public estima- 
 tion so precious in our day. Soldier or captain, each one 
 craved riches, and often raised his aspirations as high as 
 a sovereignty. The Visconti, the Sforzas, the Scaligeri, 
 the Ezzelini, and many others, had no other origin, and, 
 before them, kingdoms had been the prey of certain Nor- 
 man adventurers. Sovereigns, to facilitate the execution 
 of their plans, were all obliged to employ, as intermedi- 
 aries, warriors of reputation and credit, who, devoted to 
 that profession from boyhood, were acquainted with many 
 men capable of seconding them, and ready to share their 
 fortunes. 
 
 Each one of these, in his sphere, had his roll of clients, 
 and they united in furnishing regiments for any given 
 eoterprisfc 
 
 Ferdinand II. (of Germany) sent for Wallenstein, and 
 asked him for an array.* Conditions were discussed, and 
 
 * This was in 1624-6, just after the opening of the "thirty years" 
 war. WallenHtcin'w terms, which were accepted, were that he would 
 raise and support an army of 50,000 men at his own expense, it In- 
 hh'juld have unlimited command of them, and be allowed t> in-lrni- 
 nilv himself from the conquered lands. Nothing could inon 
 lily illuxtniK' th- barbarities of war in that epoch. 
 
ARMIES OF FORMER AND PRESENT TIMES. 239 
 
 the treaty concluded. Wallenstein sent for officers in 
 whom he had confidence, and negotiated with them for 
 regiments, associating them in his benefices. These latter 
 enlisted captains, who took upon themselves the charge of 
 forming companies and of finding soldiers ; and the army 
 was created. It is just as in our day a monarch negoti- 
 ates a loan with a rich banker, who distributes the greater 
 part of it among his correspondents, associating them in 
 the profits which he counts upon making; and these, in 
 turn, seek for the money they need in the purses of private 
 individuals. 
 
 It is understood that such an organization made the 
 regiment the property of the colonel who had formed it. 
 
 Hence the names which they have received and have 
 preserved in Austria, where, although they have become 
 the regiments of the monarch, as in all other countries, 
 they have nevertheless maintained, in some sort, their 
 primitive physiognomy, and preserved their own consti- 
 tutions and privileges. Moreover, the system followed 
 there, which has put the institutions in harmony with 
 state interests and present customs, offers, at the same 
 time, a noble and splendid reward to generals whose lives 
 have been rendered honorable by glorious services, and 
 guarantees to the sovereign the proper choice of officers 
 and the good spirit in the corps. 
 
 This is a fitting place to remark the immense difference 
 presented in the composition of armies at the present day 
 and in the preceding centuries. Our armies are formed by 
 conscription ; it is so in all the continental states, but not 
 
240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 in England, where special circumstances explain the main- 
 tenance of a system existing nowhere else. Armies in our 
 day are of too great numerical strength for voluntary en- 
 listments to supply their needs ; moreover, there are not 
 enough men to whom military service is a resource neces- 
 sary to their livelihood ; public order, which everywhere 
 reigns for the good of humanity, greatly diminishes this 
 number. Finally, the chances of good fortune in this 
 career are too limited to lead men of some station to 
 choose it. Other openings are provided, by the develop- 
 ment of industry, to ardor and intelligence, and fortune 
 presents herself in these without danger. Forced enlist- 
 ments are then the only means of providing for the 
 defence of the state; and "a tax of blood has become 
 everywhere one of the public claims. 
 
 The spirit of armies has been greatly modified by 
 this; but it is by no means lost, notwithstanding appear- 
 ances. Voluntary enlistment, with a terribly rigorous 
 discipline, has sometimes made, as in England, good 
 troops ; but can we compare, for intelligence and moral- 
 ity, an army composed of young men of family, brought 
 up in a spirit of order and obedience to laws, to one 
 which, containing perhaps a few individuals animated by 
 the love of war and of glory, is composed, in great propor- 
 tion, of vagabonds, who are driven, by their bad morals, 
 from a quiet and industrious life ? 
 
 How much better are the public interests secured, when 
 they are confided to those who look upon the military 
 service as a noble and important duty ! The young man 
 
ARMIES OF FORMER AND PRESENT TIMES. 241 
 
 upon whom the lot falls, pacific in his manners, may leave 
 his family with regret, even with grief; but the warlike 
 spirit so natural to man, and particularly to the French, 
 soon inspires him; then he cherishes noble thoughts; he 
 becomes greater in his own eyes; he is faithful, he is 
 devoted, and he finds in the good opinion, of his com- 
 mander and of his companions the reward of his sacri- 
 fices, his labors and his dangers. Such, at the present 
 day, is the European soldier; for the system is every- 
 where uniform. 
 
 It may still be necessary to determine which is to be 
 preferred of the two following systems : whether to place 
 recruits from the same locality in the same regiments, or 
 to distribute them into different corps. The first plan is 
 adopted in Austria, Prussia and Germany; the second in 
 France and Russia. Each has its advantages and disad- 
 vantages ; but my judgment is in favor of the first system. 
 
 To begin with the disadvantages, this system gives to 
 the soldiers a local and provincial spirit which, after the 
 numerous revolutions we have experienced, would not be 
 without danger, if such circumstances could be foreseen. 
 Perhaps also it lessens, in time of peace, the military 
 spirit, and tends to form an assemblage of peasants rather 
 than of soldiers; but these disadvantages are easily reme- 
 died, if the reunions are multiplied, and the duration of 
 camps of instruction prolonged. 
 
 As to the advantages, they are great and incontestible. 
 As regards the administration, the enlistment is easier; 
 the officers of the corps have the means of keeping au 
 
 21 
 
242 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 eye on the men who are on leave ; the transition from a 
 peace footing to a war footing is marvellously simplified. 
 As it concerns the morale, there is an increase and the 
 effect is important of those sentiments of honor which 
 render all the soldiers pensionaries of the glory of their 
 regiments, bj| giving them in addition the task of defend- 
 ing the reputation of the province in which they were 
 born. It is an additional motive, a new encouragement. 
 
 Besides, a distinguished soldier is rewarded for his good 
 conduct, by the consideration he enjoys in his corps ; now 
 the system followed in France deprives him of this ad- 
 vantage, when he retires from service. Returned home, 
 he is no longer known ; he loses the greatest reward of 
 his life, the good renown which he has acquired. It 
 would follow him to his fireside, if he found there the 
 companions of his youth; he would remain surrounded, 
 until his death, by the glory (aureole) which he might 
 have deserved and obtained.* 
 
 * The council of war, in 1828, considered this question. Gen- 
 eral d'Ambrugeac, one of the most distinguished officers of the 
 army, reporter of the infantry committee, had presented a mixed 
 system, which, by creating an excellent reserve, solved the ques- 
 tion in a perfectly satisfactory manner. By a strange fatality, 
 few of the works of this council, in which military questions 
 were <M:iM-d ami deliberated upon with care, received a practical 
 solution. M. 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 243 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MILITARY SPIRIT, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMMAND. 
 
 
 
 THE assemblage of 100,000 men, in the same place, 
 far from their families, from their property, from their 
 interests; their docility, their obedience, their ease of 
 combined movement, (mobilite,) and their preservation; 
 in short, the spirit which animates them, and at a signal 
 given by one man only impels them to precipitate them- 
 selves with pleasure into imminent danger, where many 
 of them will find death ; all these surely constitute one 
 of the most extraordinary spectacles which can be pre- 
 sented by men in society ; a phenomenon the cause and 
 principle of which are to be found in the mysteries of the 
 human heart. 
 
 It belongs to our nature to seek for and to love the 
 emotional ; the idea of danger is pleasing, although at 
 the most threatening moment, there are few men not dis- 
 concerted by it. But we need to compare ourselves with 
 others; emulation is natural to us; every one aims to 
 think himself, and to see himself, superior to his fellows. 
 Such is the motive by virtue of which the instinct of self- 
 preservation gives place to noble bursts of courage. 
 
 The sphere of activity in which self-love acts depends 
 upon the situation of the individual. Every one wishes 
 to be seen and admired. The man placed in a crowd 
 
244 THE PHI1.0SUIMIY F \\.\li. 
 
 sees his horizon in what immediately surrounds him ; in a 
 more elevated situation, this horizon widens; when we have 
 reached the summit, the world opens to our contemplation. 
 
 This sentiment, so honorable to man, inspires the most 
 generous actions. It is the motive alike of the private 
 soldier and o.f the general. Thus, in all its grades, the 
 profession of arms is noble, because, for all alike, it is 
 composed of sacrifices, and is rewarded, before all, by 
 public estimation and by glory. To speak disdainfully of 
 those who compose the rank and file of armies, is a kind 
 of blasphemy ; even to speak of them with indifference is 
 to misconceive the very conditions of our nature. 
 
 The elevated sentiment which I have just described is 
 compatible with another very noble sentiment that of 
 friendship. 
 
 Community of danger, of glory, of interest, establishes 
 the closest and sincerest ties ; and as everything has its 
 points of contact and its connections in the great mystery 
 of society, it is precisely in a state of war, and in the midst 
 of dangers where society has most need of them that 
 we find most habitually displayed friendship, or the habit 
 of companionship, (camaraderie,) and that esprit de 
 to which opinion has imparted so much strength. 
 
 The exchange of services rendered, reciprocal assist- 
 ance received and given, doubles indeed increases ten- 
 fold the strength and security of each individual. Thus 
 opinion produces, develops and exalts the virtues among 
 mm in proportion as cirrum-tunces render their practice 
 nn re necessary to secure their preservation. 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 245 
 
 But the heart of man is easily swayed, and the best 
 sentiments are combated by others, which spring from 
 the same principle considered in a different light. 1 brave 
 a danger to save a comrade, because I count upon him in 
 a similar emergency ; but let the immediate danger seem 
 to me too pressing: let fear rise superior to the interest 
 which draws me to the succor of the individual menaced, 
 and the instinct of self-preservation presents itself to my 
 eyes when viewed in the light of present peril ; I hurry 
 away from the danger, forgetting all the motives which 
 should have impelled me to brave it. The sentiment 
 which has then overpowered me, which is called fear, is 
 not uncommon m the presence of real danger; it is even 
 much more common, and exercises a greater influence 
 than is supposed, upon a great number of persons.* It 
 is exactly to combat this and to nourish the opposite sen- 
 timents, that the power of discipline has been called to 
 the aid of authority; and as example greatly influences 
 the conduct of men ; as the pre-eminently brave often 
 carry others along with them, we cannot too richly reward, 
 in every way, those who rise superior to common rules, in 
 
 * From no one could such an acknowledgment of human frailty 
 come, with greater warrant of truth, than from the valiant and 
 sometimes rash marshal. 
 
 Not to speak of numerous striking instances of Marmont's valor, 
 the defence of Schcenfeld, in the great battle of Leipsic, may be 
 cited as a particular example; that suburb was carried by the Rus- 
 sians five times, and as often retaken by Marmont; his aide was 
 killed at his side, and when, with overwhelming numbers, the Rus- 
 sians finally occupied it, they left 4000 men upon the field, as 
 proof of the tenacity of the defence. 
 
 21* 
 
24i THE I'HlLoSnl'HY (>F \VAK. 
 
 order to increase their generous dispositions; for upon 
 such the fate of battles often depends. 
 
 Bravery, in the armies of Europe at the present day, 
 and particularly among officers, may be thus classified: 
 
 The courage which keeps one from dishonoring him- 
 self, which causes him to perform his duties rigorously ; 
 this is not rare. 
 
 That which impels a man to exceed his duty ; this is 
 much less common. 
 
 That, finally, which decides a man unhesitatingly to 
 make his life subordinate to the success to which he is to 
 contribute ; this is the rarest possible. Therefore, when 
 such valor is displayed, honors, wealth and consideration 
 should be its reward ; and the opportunity for conferring 
 these rewards, thus limited, is so infrequent, that the 
 expense would never be burdensome to any state. 
 
 The sentiments of which I have just spoken are not the 
 only ones which ought to find place in the hearts of sol- 
 diers. It is necessary, in order to give to troops their 
 entire value, that confidence should exist among all those 
 who compose an army. The soldier must believe in the 
 valor of his comrade. He will be convinced that his 
 officer, equally brave, is his superior in experience and 
 knowledge; he will take for granted in his general the 
 same valor, and still more science and talent: thus the 
 army forms a bundle of rods which nothing can break. 
 Tiii> is the first condition of the strength of armies, the 
 first element of success. 
 
 But tit is fundamental base which we call confidence is 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 247 
 
 only possible among tried and veteran troops, and not 
 among new troops who do not know each other. Hence 
 the absurdity of the system of a national guard, designed 
 to take the place of regular troops. The national guards, 
 supposing them to be composed of everything that there 
 is bravest on earth, will never be worth anything at the 
 beginning; for, as the valor and capacity of each cannot 
 be appreciated by the others until they have experience 
 of each other, the first attempts will be made without the 
 aid of mutual confidence, and will probably lead to great 
 and irreparable misfortunes. 
 
 The entire morale of war, for the general, consists in 
 knowing the motions of the spirit which animates sol- 
 diers; in the rectitude of the judgments he forms, and of 
 the application he makes of them, in the varied chances 
 of war, as well of his own troops as of those which he 
 has fought and is going to fight. These constitute an in- 
 dependent faculty in the profession of arms ; nothing less 
 than an appanage of genius. All great generals have 
 possessed it, and never did any man in the world have it 
 in a higher degree than Napoleon. 
 
 Discipline, the auxiliary of courage, is necessary also 
 as a means of order. We may perceive its entire im- 
 portance by reflecting upon the mechanism of an army, 
 and by asking ourselves how such a multitude can subsist 
 in motion as at rest. 
 
 It is not sufficient to assemble men in greater or less 
 numbers to constitute an army. They must then be organ- 
 ized. I have elsewhere explained by what mechanism 
 
248 THE I'HILnxU'HY OF WAR 
 
 obedience is assured, by placing the commander, in the 
 different military grades, in concert with a limited number 
 of men, upon whom he can easily exercise his powers. 
 
 This division once made, and this organization estab- 
 lished, discipline must be arranged ; that is, the subordin- 
 ates must be habituated to a passive deference towards 
 their superiors. 
 
 Then we arrive at instruction. 
 
 Thus three operations are necessary to convert a mass 
 of men assembled together into an army : 
 
 1. To organize ; 2. To discipline ; 3. To instruct. 
 And the complement of the organization, discipline and 
 instruction, is confidence an essential element the 
 absence of which deprives an army of a great part of its 
 value. This confidence should extend to all and each : 
 confidence of soldiers. among themselves, in their recipro- 
 cal relations; confidence of each officer and soldier in 
 their higher commanders; and especially in the command- 
 er-in-ehief. 
 
 This important element, which acts so powerfully upon 
 n- 11 Its, produces the greater effect in proportion as the 
 soldiers are more intelligent ; for confidence founded upon 
 a knowledge of men and things is not an unreflecting 
 sentiment, u blind faith. 
 
 Soldiers without intelligence have little mobility, and 
 vary less than others who are livelier and more able to 
 reason. The former are more easily commanded, ai.d 
 there is less disadvantage in Diving them generals of lim- 
 enpaeitv. Tin- otheix, on the eontmry. will h;ive 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 249 
 
 more or less value according as the general is more or 
 less worthy to command them. 
 
 In speaking of these two kinds of soldiers, I have 
 especially in view the Germans and the French. The 
 Germans have often achieved successes with leaders of 
 very moderate ability ; the French are worth ten times as 
 much with a commander whom they esteem and love. 
 
 They sink beneath all comparison when commanded by 
 a general who inspires neither their esteem nor confidence. 
 They proved this at Hochstadt, (Blenheim,) in 1704; 
 before Turin, in 1706; and in 1813, at Vittoria. The 
 reason is simple. Men do not go to war to be killed ! 
 They always go to conquer the enemy ; and if they run 
 the chance of dying, it is on the condition that the sup- 
 posed sacrifice of life to which they submit will be useful. 
 Let the moment come when an intelligent mass has before 
 it no probability of victory, no chance of a glorious com- 
 bat ; from that moment they hesitate to compromise their 
 lives, and seek to preserve them for an occasion when 
 they shall be able to accomplish the sacrifice more use- 
 fully. 
 
 I have sought to explain the different emotions which 
 succeed each other in the hearts of soldiers ; movements 
 whence result phenomena apparently contradictory to the 
 eyes of the ignorant, who, looking upon men as passive 
 machines, do not comprehend the variations of which they 
 are susceptible. I shall now touch upon the question of 
 command, and shall endeavor to establish the qualities 
 which it renders necessary. 
 
2f)ll THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 The art of war is composed of two distinct parts : the 
 profession properly so called, and the moral part, the 
 appanage of genius. I have already expressed my opin- 
 ions concerning the moral of war; I shall only add one 
 word as to the qualities which confer upon a commander 
 authority over those who surround him. 
 
 There is, in the first place, in certain individuals the 
 faculty of acting upon the minds of others, a natural 
 authority which demands an easy obedience. This author- 
 ity is a special gift, and springs from causes hidden and 
 above our comprehension. One, who was a subordinate 
 yesterday and is to-day a commander, handles his power, 
 at the moment he is invested with it, with as much facil- 
 ity as if he had always been clothed with it. Another 
 and the example is not uncommon exercises an author- 
 ity over his equals which they do not contest, although it 
 rests upon no right, and although he is not gifted with a 
 superior mind; this is a faculty belonging to his individ- 
 ual organization. The lawfully-appointed chief who pos- 
 sesses this power, inspires a salutary fear. He is consid- 
 ered severe, and the severity which he is supposed to feel 
 really dispenses with its exercise. A look, a word, acts 
 upon minds with irresistible ascendency. Such men are 
 designed by Providence to command others. 
 
 But as this powerful and natural action over one's fel- 
 
 toWl i- ratvlv met with, obi-dinm- has IMMMI insured by 
 
 Mining subordinates to respect and reverence their 
 
 commanders. Grades have been established to < let ermine 
 
 tin- rights of command, and to place in proper social rela- 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 251 
 
 tions, distinct and constant, those who are invested with 
 them. To the higher grades public honors have been de- 
 creed, in order to strike the minds of others, and speak to 
 their imaginations. In a word, nothing has been neglected 
 to increase, in public opinion, the greatness of the depos- 
 itaries of power, to the end that obedience may be better 
 assured ; an easy task in ordinary times, and when nothing 
 opposes the preservation of good order, but difficult in 
 moments of danger, suffering and passion. When the 
 general has a reputation for courage and capacity, which 
 calls for esteem and gives birth to confidence, his power is 
 augmented ; when to this he unites a great and noble 
 family name, and his social position is very elevated, he 
 is still greater in the eyes of the multitude. The more 
 the depositary of authority possesses power and credit, the 
 more we recognize in him the ability to distribute rewards, 
 and the more easily is he obeyed. 
 
 All these means, united in the person of Napoleon, 
 greatly favored his successes. They compose, if I may so 
 express myself, the necessary conditions of command. 
 But what are the personal faculties which command re- 
 quires ?* 
 
 * I have here established the conditions which are most favor- 
 able to command ; and it results from them that when the general 
 is at the same time the sovereign, everything conspires to aid him. 
 Absolute freedom in his projects, in his movements and in his 
 operations; the accumulation of means and of resources; the ab- 
 sence of responsibility; the power to experiment with hazardous 
 combinations, which, with great chances against them, promise also 
 great advantages; the certainty of being always obeyed wlintevcr 
 may happen, and zealously served, etc. etc. Differing from a situ- 
 
252 THK PHILOSOPHY OF WAR 
 
 The art of war, considered as to what constitutes the 
 profession, is entirely combination and calculation. In 
 this view of the subject, I entered into circumstantial 
 details when treating of strategy and tactics. But in 
 
 ation so advantageous, a simple general has never at his control 
 more than limited means. Whatever be his powers, he can only 
 exercise them within certain limits. It is not sufficient that he 
 should do well, but he must hold himself in readiness beforehand 
 to justify his enterprises. In a word, the obedience due him may 
 be rendered doubtful ; and rivalries, hatred, intrigues, may become 
 powerful auxiliaries to the enemy against whom he is fighting. 
 
 These two situations are not to be compared ; and the merit of 
 the general who is successful far surpasses that of the sovereign. 
 Thus the glory of Napoleon in Germany does not nearly equal that 
 of General Bonaparte in Italy. In the first campaign, without 
 name, without experience in command, with feeble and incomplete 
 means, an army inferior in numbers, and ill-provided, he obtains 
 brilliant successes, conquers Italy, and secures it. In the other 
 campaigns leaving out of the account the splendid combinations 
 developed by them, the greatness of means, their accumulation, 
 the abundance of resources of every kind, seem to conspire to take 
 away from genius the trouble of assuring the victory. 
 
 The chances of success being more numerous for the military 
 sovereign than for the general, the desire would be natural that the 
 former should command; nevertheless it should be otherwise. 
 
 In the first place, who is a competent judge of a sovereign's 
 t-ilent? And who will insure that these illusions will not be the 
 cause of inspiring in him a fatal confidence? Supposing even that 
 he does not take upon him supreme command, until he lias made 
 numerous essays, there will always be great 'lander to the state. 
 For reverses, should they occur, will attack in popular estimation 
 the consiilTati'.n 'Itie to the principle upon which tin- power is 
 immense social mi-foriune ! Add to which tin- command 
 of armies should, for the pnMic interest, he submitted to control. 
 \Vhntever be tin; latitude given to a general, there are limits which 
 he must not pass; and if he he freed from those, who will in-im- 
 moderation in the ch u ' 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 253 
 
 order that combinations should give favorable results, a 
 strong will must preside; for changes in fixed ideas, with- 
 out sufficient motive, have many disadvantages, and often 
 produce great disasters. 
 
 Two things then are requisite in a general: intelli- 
 gence and firmness. The former, because without that 
 there are no combinations; at the outset the army is 
 defenceless. The latter, because without a strong and 
 tenacious will, the execution of the plans conceived can- 
 not be assured. But here relative qualities govern abso- 
 lute qualities; firmness must rule intelligence. In this 
 relation is found the element of success. If we desired 
 to estimate by figures each of these faculties, I should 
 much prefer a general possessing intelligence as 5 and 
 firmness as 10, to one having intelligence as 15 and firm- 
 ness as 8. When firmness governs intelligence, and mind 
 has a certain range, we move along towards a defined 
 aim, a'hd have chances of attaining it. When the reverse 
 is the case, opinions, plans and direction are changed 
 unceasingly, because a vast intelligence at every instant 
 considers the questions under a new aspect. If force 
 
 catastrophes is always in proportion to the accumulation of means, 
 and the extent of enterprises; and then they shake society to its 
 lowest foundations. The errors or misfortunes of a general are 
 always reparable in a great country; those of a sovereign, whose 
 imagination is excited, lead to complete ruin. Therefore a sover- 
 eign should limit himself to governing, administration, the crea- 
 tion of means, and rendering them abundant; he ought especially 
 to bestow a large confidence upon the general who is worthy of it, 
 and reward magnificently and without jealousy; but never assume 
 the responsibility and charge of command. M. 
 
 22 
 
254 TI1K PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 of will does not secure us from these changes, we float 
 among the different schemes, adopting none definitely, (the 
 worst feature of all,) and, instead of approaching the goal, 
 a shuffling march often leads us away from it, and we are 
 lost in wanderings. 
 
 And yet the conclusion would be wrong that there is 
 no need of much mind to accomplish great ends. A 
 mediocre mind is not to be found in any of the great gen- 
 erals of antiquity or of modern times, in any of the great 
 historic names which march through the centuries above 
 their fellows. Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar, pos- 
 sessed the highest faculties of intellect. It was the same 
 with the great Conde, Luxembourg, the great Eugene, 
 Frederick and Napoleon. But all these great men, to a 
 superior mind added still more strength of character. 
 
 This necessity that the will should govern the intelli- 
 gence, is felt at every moment by the commander; for in 
 this position it is frequently necessary to take a certain 
 course, and to decide upon it. What men without char- 
 acter most dread is, to fix a determination; a fatal in- 
 stinct leads them to postpone a resolution often urgent, 
 and which, when it is formed, is no longer useful as a 
 reason for delay, and even sometimes becomes fatal. 
 
 This remark authorizes me to proclaim the following 
 principle: a general may indeed take counsel when he 
 feels the need of it ; but the habitual part of office coun- 
 r, unless at the special request of the Commander-in- 
 chief, cimnot be successful. 
 
 The necessity of adopting hi- .wn resolutions is then the 
 
MILITARY SPIRIT, ETC. 255 
 
 painful part of a commander's duty. At that moment re- 
 sponsibility appears, with its imposing train, with all the 
 interests resting upon it, and which, above all, one defends 
 in the bottom of his heart ; responsibility towards those 
 on whom he depends ; responsibility as it concerns public 
 opinion ; responsibility to himself, to his own conscience ; 
 immense responsibility, more terrible in proportion as one 
 is more penetrated with the sentiment of its duties. There 
 is but one way of supporting this burden : he must have 
 force and resolution enough to place himself above all 
 consequences, sure of finding in his conscience and in his 
 intentions a generous approbation of what he has done, 
 after having made the best use of all his faculties and of 
 all his intelligence. But there are very few men capable 
 of placing themselves upon such an eminence as this. 
 The necessity for prompt decision is at once so important 
 and so difficult in command, that when the course adopted 
 is of such a nature as not to receive any modification, 
 when the cannon is roaring, and the battle is going on, 
 when each one has had indicated to him the part he is to 
 play, the commander-in-chief is tranquil; he has recov- 
 ered the security and repose of mind which he could not 
 have the evening before. 
 
 Thus, then, when a general possesses the mind to see, 
 judge and combine, and the will to execute ; when to these 
 qualities he unites a knowledge of men, of the passions 
 which sway them, of the secret emotions of their hearts, 
 developed in war by so many causes; when, moreover, 
 danger, far from paralyzing his faculties, only increases 
 
356 THE PH1L00OPHT OF WAR. 
 
 their power and gives them new energy ; when, finally, he 
 loves his soldiers, is loved by them, and carefully guards 
 their preservation, their interests, their welfare, like the 
 father of a family ; then he unites all the qualities which 
 promise success. I say promise not assure ; for war has 
 such varied chances, it is subjected to so many hazards, 
 that there can never be certainty before the event is 
 accomplished. 
 
 In treating of the qualities necessary to the exercise of 
 command, I have meant to speak of the command in 
 chief. A command, however extensive, cannot, when 
 made subordinate, be at all compared with the chief 
 command, however the latter may be restrained by the 
 number of troops ; for there is no longer the necessity of 
 overcoming that great difficulty which I have endeavored 
 to make manifest, which consists in resolution. I com- 
 manded, under Napoleon, armies of different strength, and 
 corps d'armee. Ten thousand men only, given up to the 
 combinations of a single chief, present incomparably more 
 embarrassment, and give rise to more solicitude, than the 
 command of fifty thousand, forming a subordinate part 
 of an army of t\v< hundred thousand. In the latter case, 
 to move, march and fight, according to given orders and 
 with a specified design, are easy things; and when the fight 
 or the marches are terminated, when the camp is estab- 
 lished, the general rests himself, like the lowest soldier, 
 waiting for orders: at this very moment, on the contrary, 
 the commander-in-chief is most a prey to disquietude, and 
 nm<t BXmiM v.-ry kind of foresight. 
 
QUALITIES OF GENERALS CALLED TU COMMAND. 257 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PORTRAIT OF A GENERAL WHO FULFILS ALL THE 
 CONDITIONS OF COMMAND. 
 
 I WILL here give a summary, in few words, of the 
 qualities and the manner of life which should be possessed 
 by a general called to command. 
 
 He is brave, and known to be so by the whole army ; 
 his courage cannot for a moment be questioned or become 
 a matter of doubt. His valor is characterized by calmness 
 and coolness, (sang froid,) without, however, excluding, 
 in certain circumstances, that dash and activity which 
 are contagious and attractive. If his reputation, in 
 this respect, is not sufficiently established, he should 
 seek and seize an opportunity for fixing it upon an im- 
 movable foundation; otherwise he cannot exercise over 
 generals, officers and soldiers, that power of respect and 
 esteem indispensable to his success. 
 
 Once his reputation is established, he should avoid, 
 without betraying too much concern, being prodigal of 
 his life. 
 
 His mind must, as I have already said, be kept in sub- 
 ordination to his will. 
 
 His physical strength should resist the greatest fatigue, 
 and considerations of health should never keep him from 
 seeing, for himself, into important matters ; for the most 
 
 22* 
 
BOQ THE PHILOSOPHY OK WAR. 
 
 carefully-prepared reports, the recital of the most skilful 
 persons, can never supply, to the same degree of preci- 
 sion, the knowledge which one obtains with his own 
 eyes. 
 
 If nature has endowed him with high faculties, it is 
 desirable that he should attain early to command; his 
 successes will in that way be rendered more certain. He 
 will have that marvellous energy and that self-confidence 
 which double his strength. An object of sympathy to all 
 who are young in the army, he will display at the same 
 time a great deference for age, and must be gifted person- 
 ally with sufficient experience. There are things which 
 only time and experience teach, and which are never 
 guessed at. But too long a habitude of obedience dimin- 
 ishes rather than develops the faculties of command. 
 
 It is especially necessary that he should have had prac- 
 tical knowledge of war when very young, and but a little 
 after his entrance upon the career of arms; otherwise he 
 will acquire with difficulty that tact and instinct which 
 such early training creates, and which wonderfully simplify 
 the difficulties of the art. 
 
 He will ceaselessly bear in mind that a surprise never 
 happens except as a consequence of culpable neglect, and 
 that a general surprised is dishonored. 
 
 It is not only himself but his subordinates also, whom 
 he must shelter from reproach, by preventing their mis- 
 takes. 
 
 Knotting the value of time, the only treasure which 
 cannot >< supplied, he will di>|M HM with writing much 
 
QUALITIES OF GENARALS CALLED TO COMMAND. 259 
 
 himself, leaving this labor to those who, by explicit func- 
 tion, are charged with transmitting his orders. He will 
 reserve to himself only the approval of their work. 
 Never has a good general written much in war move- 
 ments. It is the head which must then work, and not the 
 
 * 
 
 hand. He employs his time more usefully in giving ver- 
 bal instructions, in preserving freedom of mind to judge 
 whether his intentions have been faithfully rendered, and 
 in meditating upon new combinations. 
 
 His activity should be unbounded ; his presence, often 
 unexpected, will render every one fearful of being caught 
 in fault ; he will thus nourish the zeal of all. 
 
 All his decisions will be ruled by an impartial justice and 
 severity in maintaining order and discipline, thus secur- 
 ing to soldiers the enjoyment of their rights, the greatest 
 welfare compatible with their situation. 
 
 If severity is one of his duties, there is another more 
 agreeable to perform, which is not of less importance : I 
 mean rewards due to meritorious actions and to good 
 conduct. He should be neither prodigal of them nor 
 parsimonious; he should consider it his own business to 
 procure them, by making them of more value even than 
 if they were personal benefits. He should especially con- 
 sider the claims of merit; for if a just reward acts as 
 an encouragement to generous hearts, a reward not de- 
 served destroys all emulation, and gives rise to intrigue. 
 The instinct of man, and his innate love of justice, should 
 always inform the mind which presides at the distribution 
 of rewards. 
 
J'.0 TI1K PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 If the general is faithful to his principles, if he fulfils 
 the conditions which I have enumerated, he will be an 
 object of respect, esteem and affection to the troops. 
 The need of order is so energetically felt by soldiers, that 
 they always love, in a commander, the severity which 
 guarantees it; and they rest with confidence upon him 
 whose decisions are accompanied with known firmness and 
 equity. 
 
 Goodness without force is nothing; it confuses itself in 
 opinion, and in reality, with the weakness which abandons 
 a commander to the influence of his surroundings. But 
 goodness, united to a rational seyerity, makes a general 
 the idol of his soldiers. Rigor, however great it may be, 
 demands certain forms, and should never become insult- 
 ing : a man is resigned to merited punishment, but abuse 
 irritates him. A just punishment produces the more 
 effect in proportion as it is inflicted with great calmness ; 
 violence in a commander authorizes the murmurs of the 
 jruilty subordinate. A general, besides, should always 
 treat with consideration every one wearing a soldier's 
 coat. There is in the profession something so noble, the 
 sacrifice of life is so sublime, that those who, by their 
 condition, are always ready to offer it, have a right to 
 our regards, even when they deserve an act of severity. 
 
 A general should be habitually grave in his manners, 
 as far as concerns his subordinates; and yet this authority 
 even does not exclude a kind of familiarity, of dignified 
 gaiety, which inspires affection and esteem. There is a 
 M-ritimrnt of fraternity, very naturally springing from a 
 
QUALITIES OF GENERALS CALLED TO COMMAND. 261 
 
 community of dangers, privations and fatigues, and which 
 has nothing incompatible with the rules guarding rank, 
 and the maintenance of discipline. The more then a gen- 
 eral forgets his superiority, the less does a soldier lose 
 sight of it. A general should be accessible to every- 
 body. 
 
 He should receive and open all despatches at the very 
 moment of their arrival, without letting any consideration 
 of his own comfort cause him to defer it. In the midst 
 of the fatigues of a campaign, although he may have been 
 awakened twenty times in one night, to receive unimport- 
 ant news, he must not prohibit his people from rousing 
 him again. War news may be of such importance, and 
 the delay of two hours may become so fatal, that the 
 fate of an army sometimes depends upon his immediate 
 knowledge. 
 
 A general should be as magnificent as his fortune will 
 allow. His greatest luxury should consist in a large num- 
 ber of horses ; he must have enough not to be hindered in 
 any plans he may deem useful. He should have, as the 
 next object of his magnificence, a mansion in which he 
 can constantly dispense hospitality. Never should an 
 officer come to his headquarters, on service, without re- 
 ceiving testimonials of it. It is, in the first place, a 
 praiseworthy act in itself: for the staff officers, or officers 
 separated from their corps, are in such unfortunate condi- 
 tions as to living, that they would be reduced, if the gen- 
 eral did not have a care of them, to a state of real want. 
 To this humane consideration is joined another interest, 
 
262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 which regards the good of the service itself. An officer, 
 charged with despatches, hastens his arrival when he 
 knows beforehand the reception which awaits him. He 
 quickens his march from affection for his commander and 
 for himself. Time, always elsewhere useful, plays so im- 
 portant a part in war, that it must by every means be 
 economized. 
 
 A general should neglect no means of knowing in ad- 
 vance and in its details, the country in which he is going 
 to make war. He should procure its most accurate statis- 
 tics ; he should know in what its resources of every kind 
 consist, by carefully studying its topography. The least 
 negligence in this study may have the gravest conse- 
 quences. He cannot too carefully reflect upon all the 
 circumstances which characterize a country, and on the 
 means of rendering them useful. By procuring, at any 
 price, the best maps, by ceaselessly examining them, even 
 in a general manner, he may be sure of acquiring ideas 
 sometimes felicitous, and of immense value in their appli- 
 cation. 
 
 The insufficiency of information almost caused the fail- 
 ure, in its beginning, of the immortal campaign of Ma- 
 rengo, in 1800, and produced many difficulties. The 
 First Consul was not aware of the existence of the Fort 
 of Bard, and its means of resistance. We could easily 
 have taken it, by carrying with the advanced troops pieces 
 of sufficient calibre. It was not known that tin- Little 
 i Hani, which debouches, like the Great St. Bernard, 
 in the valley of Aosta, was practicable for artillery ; the 
 
QUALITIES OF GENERALS CALLED TO COMMAND. 263 
 
 passage of the mountains would have been more prompt, 
 without presenting all the obstacles which have constituted 
 it one of the most remarkable operations of our epoch. 
 All projects demand the profoundest secrecy ; a general 
 should never communicate them except to those charged 
 with their execution, and at the very moment when their 
 knowledge of them becomes necessary. How many enter- 
 prises, well conceived, have failed by reason of having 
 been known to the enemy ! Nothing, on the contrary, is 
 more favorable to success than to allow an opposite opin- 
 ion to the true one to be formed ; it is by deceiving those 
 who surround him that a general will make the change 
 more effective upon the enemy. 
 
 But in proportion to the importance of concealing his 
 plans, he should inquire into those of the enemy ; in this 
 respect he should neglect nothing. Without having a 
 blind faith in spies, he should keep them and pay them 
 well. It is especially useful to procure intelligence by 
 means of employes attached to the staff-corps. 
 
 If he succeeds, his first care should be to learn, in 
 detail, the organization of the different corps which com- 
 pose the enemy's army, and the names of the generals 
 commanding them. With this aid, and light troops well 
 commanded, who, constantly harassing the enemy, make 
 prisoners, sure documents are obtained of the movements 
 he is making. The capture of a single soldier of a 
 certain regiment, announces the presence of a certain 
 division, belonging to a certain corps, and from these 
 facts a general sees the spirit and aim with which his 
 
264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 adversary operates and manoeuvres. It is difficult to form 
 an idea of the candor, simplicity, and truth with which 
 a prisoner answers, without suspecting the bearing of the 
 questions put to him, and without thinking that he is 
 recreant to the cause he has zealously served, and which 
 he is very far from wishing to betray. 
 
 In fine, the general who values his own glory, should 
 free himself in his operations from absolute dependence ; 
 it is always fatal. An enlightened government has not 
 the desire to direct everything; it limits its part to an 
 indication of the aim, after having determined the nature 
 of the means and their quota. It is for the general alone, 
 placed in the presence and in the midst of difficulties, to 
 decide upon the system to be followed and the combina- 
 tions to be executed. Rather than submit to too direct 
 an action on the part of the government, the general 
 should abandon a command which he cannot exercise in 
 its fulness. Either it should cease to oppose him, if 
 he preserve its confidence, or it should retire him from 
 the command if it think he is proceeding in an im- 
 proper manner. Government should only act upon the 
 general who has its confidence, through the influence of 
 counsels which do not bear the character of imperative 
 orders; it should especially avoid placing near him an 
 office-councillor; for nothing is more absurd than such a 
 system, and as I have already said, its results have always 
 fatal. A general may indeed excite discu> 
 
 mm nf rxpcri"iice, even receive advice when ho 
 think.- it MX f'ul to him; but he mu-i nrvrr ! rri|uin-d t< 
 
QUALITIES OF GENERALS CALLED TO COMMAND. 265 
 
 ask it and to defer to it. In general, in an army, there 
 are only two parts to play : to obey and to command. 
 Let the government give the command of its armies to 
 those whom it thinks the worthiest, and at the same time 
 let it concede to them an unreserved confidence : other- 
 wise it should replace them. 
 
 23 
 
THK PlIIL<>sol'HY OF WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE REPUTATION OF GENERALS. 
 
 I WILL close this work with a few reflections upon the 
 reputation of generals, and the reasons upon which it is 
 established. 
 
 Generals sometimes attach their names to successes 
 with which they have little or nothing to do ; successes 
 obtained in spite of their ill-conceived dispositions, or in 
 consequence of advice received, and appropriately fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 I have known many of this kind : among others, and 
 the most notable, Marshal Brune,* who, in every respect, 
 was extremely mediocre. His name nevertheless is asso- 
 ciated with three glorious souvenirs : with the successes 
 of the French army against the Swiss, in 1798; against 
 the English and the Russians, in 1799; against the Aus- 
 irians in Italy, in 1800. 
 
 In Switzerland, the superiority of our forces, and the 
 divisions existing in that country, necessarily decided the 
 question in his favor. In Holland, he was not at the 
 combat of Bergen; the battle of Bewervich was fought 
 
 * In spite of his private qualities and the deplorable death of 
 which he was the victim, we cannot help remembering that Mar- 
 une was one of the most singular and striking examples of 
 i in caprices of fortune. M. 
 
THE REPUTATION OP GENERALS. 267 
 
 by chance, unexpectedly delivered, without prearranged 
 plan, without any direction : the follies and the stupidity 
 of the Duke of York produced definite results. In 1 800, 
 in Italy, after brilliant successes, with which the general- 
 in-chief had comparatively little to do, we were in posi- 
 tion, had another man been at our head, entirely to destroy 
 the enemy's army. 
 
 Contrary examples may be cited, i.e. of men of great 
 talent whose efforts have been betrayed by fortune. 
 
 But these different examples should not hinder us from 
 judging by results: such indeed is the proper manner of 
 appreciating the value and merit of generals. To assume 
 a different basis, to rest our judgment upon the idea we 
 may have formed of the mind and talents of a general, is 
 to enter an inextricable labyrinth, and often to expose 
 ourselves to error; for each one will only see through the 
 prismatic medium of prejudice, friendship and passion. 
 If we sometimes deceive ourselves in judging by facts, we 
 should deceive ourselves much more in directing ourselves 
 solely by personal knowledge of individuals. Fortune 
 may indeed once or twice overwhelm with her favors a 
 man who is not worthy of them ; she may betray the finest 
 combinations of genius, and humiliate a noble bearing; 
 but when the struggle is prolonged, when events are multi- 
 plied, the man of true talents infallibly conquers her favors ; 
 and if continual reverses occur, we may boldly conclude 
 that in spite of a superior mind and qualities which have 
 dazzled us, a lack of harmony in those faculties destroys 
 their power. 
 
268 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 I classify generals in four categories. 
 
 I place in the first the generals who have won all the 
 battles they have fought. The first place in public esti- 
 mation is incontestibly theirs. But their number is so 
 small that we can with difficulty find their names. In 
 ancient times, I can only find Alexander and Cassar. The 
 Grecian generals of illustrious name, such as Miltiades 
 and Epaminondas, have owed all their celebrity to one or 
 two actions. 
 
 In modern times, I find scarcely more than Gustavus 
 Adolphus, Turenne, Conde, Luxembourg, and Napoleon 
 until 1812 ; for I am correct in placing in the number of 
 reverses for which a general is responsible, the destruction 
 of armies through want of proper care and extreme lack 
 of foresight. 
 
 In the second category I will place the generals who, 
 if they have often gained victories, have sometimes lost 
 them, after having desperately contested them. These 
 are the great majority of those whose names are inscribed 
 in the temple of memory. Perhaps among them may be 
 found some who are worthy to figure in the preceding class. 
 For between two generals who contend with equal merit, 
 victory must indeed decide for one or the other, but it will 
 have been dearly bought, and its results will be limited. 
 
 In tin- third category will be ranged the generals who, 
 hal>ituallyunfortiiiiate in war, and having experienced many 
 reverses, have never been destroyed, nor discouraged, but 
 have always been able to oppose a menacing front, and to 
 impress the enemy witli fear. 
 
THE REPUTATION OF GENERALS. 269 
 
 These generals are rare, and they must have great 
 ascendency over those by whom they are surrounded. 
 Such in ancient times were Sertorius and Mithridates, and 
 in modern times the celebrated Wallenstein and William 
 III. King of England. 
 
 Finally, in the fourth category, there will naturally be 
 found those who lose their armies without fighting, or 
 without making the enemy pay dearly for his victory by a 
 vigorous resistance. As to such, it is easy to mention 
 their names; every country, every epoch, has furnished 
 examples. 
 
 23* 
 
270 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAK. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 FROM all that has been now said, I think I have a right 
 to draw the following conclusions : 
 
 1. The fundamental principle of the organization of an 
 army is found in the fact, and the spirit of aggregation, of 
 an assemblage of men, which becomes a compact mass, a 
 unit; and which, by a skilful and ingenious mechanism, 
 gives great mobility to the different parts of which it is 
 composed. 
 
 2. The parts which constitute the elements of this 
 whole must have dimensions, form and limits, which are 
 the necessary consequences of the faculties of the man and 
 of the arms he uses. 
 
 3. Nothing is arbitrary in the organization of troops 
 and in the movement of armies. On the contrary, every- 
 thing must depend upon regulations derived from certain 
 laws. To apply them properly forms the whole of the 
 science of war. 
 
 4. An army is composed of materiel and personnel.* 
 There are natural and determined relations between these 
 two elements, which, however, vary, according to the cir- 
 cumstances and the aim which is proposed. Their pro- 
 
 * Although these words have been used throughout the work, it 
 may be well to state, in this summary, that mufcrn-l im-lu-le* stores, 
 mimit: .ij.nietii. nl' every kind: and />/- 
 
 and contingent >(' m<-ti : tin- former, the things used in war, and 
 the latter, those who n-e them 
 
CONCLUSION. 271 
 
 portions do not depend upon caprice, but only upon the 
 nature of things. 
 
 5. The greater or less amount of excellence in these 
 elements exert a powerful influence upon the results ; and 
 here the quantity yields in importance to the quality. 
 
 6. A third element enters into the value of an army : 
 that is, the moral element. It alone often surpasses in 
 importance all the others, while these, however, have an 
 effective power of the first value ; for the corps must exist 
 in order that spirit may animate it. Thus, beyond a cer- 
 tain limit, the real strength of an army is not increased in 
 proportion to the number of troops and of material 
 means; but much more in proportion to the animating 
 spirit. 
 
 t- To develop the spirit of an army, to increase its 
 confidence, to speak to its imagination, to elevate the soul 
 of the soldier, such should be the constant object of the 
 cares and efforts of the general. 
 
 8. The chief element of military spirit is esprit de corps; 
 it is a powerful resource, which cannot be too much main- 
 tained. In the opinion of each soldier, the army to which 
 he belongs, and his general, should be invincible; his 
 division the best in the army, and his regiment the bravest 
 and most renowned. With these convictions his strength 
 and courage are increased tenfold. 
 
 9. In a word, every soldier should be profoundly pene- 
 trated with the idea of his country's glory, and devotion to 
 his prince, who is its representative and exponent: the 
 love of country, that divine sentiment engraved by Provi- 
 
272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. 
 
 dence upon the hearts of all men, should constantly sus- 
 tain him, exalt him, and make him equal to existing cir- 
 cumstances. But this sentiment should not be an idle 
 word; it must be sincere, serious, energetic; its reality 
 must be proved, at need, by great sacrifices. The his- 
 tory of all times has preserved examples of this, rare, it 
 is true, but sublime, the results of which have astonished 
 the world. 
 
 10. The best army, then, is that which completely ful- 
 fils the foregoing conditions; their union and concord 
 constitute its true value. As these conditions are almost 
 all variable and of difficult appreciation; as the mind 
 cannot embrace all possible combinations, no one can 
 determine in advance, in a rigorous manner, the effective 
 power of an army; he can only judge by a sort of in- 
 stinct, which is not far from the truth. But later it is by 
 the character of its actions and their results that its value 
 may be correctly determined. 
 
 I stop here : this sketch is sufficient to effect the object 
 which I have had in view. To give to each part of which 
 it H composed the development of which it is susceptible, 
 would require continued labors which I have neither the 
 strength nor the will to undertake. I have said enough 
 to lead the mind to reflection, and to make it manifest 
 that our sublime profession is based upon principles from 
 which we should never wander: by respecting them, we 
 give to the means of action at our disposal their entire 
 possible value ; the constant aim proposed to all who 
 arc placed in command. 
 

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