THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Commodore Byron McCandless
 
 V
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 WAR IN GERMANY, 
 
 BETWEEN THE 
 
 KING OF PRUSSIA, 
 
 AND THE 
 
 EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.
 
 ill, 
 
 H I SW''? O R Y 
 
 OF THE 
 
 WAR in GERMANY. 
 
 PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE. 
 
 IN order to convey a more clear idea of the hiftory of this 
 war, and of its various operations; v/e think it may be ufeful 
 previoufly to fhew the motives which induced the feveral 
 powers of Europe to undertake it. And ahb to give an exad de- 
 fcription of the country where it was carried on ; becaufe, the 
 knowledge of thefe two points will, it is imagined, enable the 
 the reader to form a proper judgment of the generals who 
 conduced the different armies, and of the propriety of their ma- 
 noeuvres, to obtain the end each had in view. 
 
 As the reafons which determined England to declare war againft 
 France are generally known: a detail of them would be needlefs. 
 We fhall therefore relate thole of other nations only. 
 
 Of FRANCE. 
 
 TH E French convinced from experience, nothing could more 
 effedtually contribute to realize that fuperiority, which they 
 arrogated to themfelves in Europe, than the cultivation and improve- 
 
 b. ment 

 
 11 
 
 History of the War 
 
 ment of their American colonies, refolved, on concluding the peace 
 of Aix la Chapelle, to promote with care and vigilance every fchemc 
 that feemcd calculated to diftrefs our, and advance their own fettle- 
 ments. The firft ftep towards accomplilhing this end, was to find 
 a means to cut off" our communication with the Indians, on whofe 
 fricndfhip the greatnefs of our colonies much depends. This, in 
 the end, would naturally unite them to the French, who could fur- 
 nidi them with what they wanted in exchange for the different 
 commodities of that country, and by degrees be made an inftru- 
 ment to drive us out of it. They begun to execute their plan by 
 eftablifliing a chain of forts behind our fettlements, and by occupying 
 many countries, until then, thought, at leaft neutral. Though they 
 had not as yet compleated it, what was already done had fuch an 
 influence on our inland trade, as made us tremble at the fatal con- 
 fequences which would necclfarily follow, if we did not, in time, ex- 
 ert ourfelves and repel the injuries they intended us. Some meafures, 
 though ineffectual, were taken for that purpofe, and hoftilities were 
 ordered to be committed againft the French both in Europe and 
 America. As they were not prepared fufficiently to avow their pre- 
 tenfions, they only oppofed remonftrances and a feeming moderation 
 to our repeated attacks. By this means they propofed to gain time, 
 make us relax in our preparations, and render us odious to the other 
 courts of Europe. In all which they fucceeded, more or lefs, as 
 the hiftory of thofe times, fully evinces. 
 
 Finding at length that the conteft muft be decided by arms, and 
 that however formidable their land army was, the difpute in Ame- 
 rica was unequal, and would probably be determined in our favour, 
 as it depended intirely on the means of tranfporting and fuftain- 
 ing an army there, and confequently was intimately connefted 
 with a fuperiority at fea ; they wifely formed a fcheme for at- 
 tacking
 
 in G E R M A N Y. iii 
 
 tacking Hanover; the conquefl of which they fuppofed eafy, and 
 from the king's natural affection for that country, they hoped a refti- 
 tution of it would make them regain whatever they loft in Ame- 
 rica, or procure them fome other advantages. In the mean time 
 their army would be maintained from the contributions to be raifed 
 in the conquered country, and by its pofition on the Elbe, overawe 
 Germany, and effeftually give laws to the contending parties. 
 
 This plan was in the beginning attended with all the fuccefs 
 imaginable, and in the end was rendered ineffectual, only by the 
 rapacioufnefs and ignorance of the French general who then com- 
 manded. 
 
 The French fyftem was, we think, well concerted and even 
 great. They had then, including the militia, near 220,000 men, 
 maintained at a great expence; thefe would remain intirely ufelefs, 
 if the war was limited to America, or even to England, for want of 
 a marine, which could not be formed in time of war ; and the lefs 
 fo, as we had already acquired too great a fupcriority. 
 
 A German War, was for all thefe reafons both eligible and necef- 
 fary, the expence of it to them, was comparatively nothing at all, 
 being reduced to the fimple difference, between maintaining an 
 army in the field, and keeping it at home. They had troops fuffi- 
 cient to form an army in Germany, to guard their country, and to 
 conquer America -, fuppofing their marine had been capable to pro- 
 tedl their tranfports into that country. To fupply this extraordi- 
 nary expence, they propofed making every country between the 
 Rhine and the Elbe contribute. This they believed would produce 
 more than fufficient for that purpofe ; fo that they would have aa 
 immenfe army maintained and enriched at the expence of others. 
 Add to this, that being limitrophes, this alone gave them infinite 
 
 advantages over us. 
 
 b 2 Whereas
 
 iv H I s T o R Y of the War 
 
 Whereas if England propofed fending an army into Germany, flie 
 muft form it out of nothing, that is, ftie had not one man as yet 
 inhfted for that purpofe, and whatever EngHfli would be fent there 
 muft be replaced by new levies, in order to carry on the neceffary 
 ^var in America. As to the Germans, they knew we muft pay for 
 them at an extraordinary price, all which expence muft be paid by 
 England alone, as it was not poffiblc flie could make any conqueft 
 to bear any confiderable part of it. Thefe circumftances, the 
 French naturally fuppofed, would exhauft the nation's treafure, call 
 the king's attention, confequently that of his minifters to the 
 affairs of Germany, relax our preparations for America, produce 
 murmurs in the people, difunion in our counfels, and at laft reduce 
 us to the neceflity of fubmitting to whatever terms they fhould 
 think fit to impofe. To them much more juftly may be applied 
 that remarkable faying, America was conquered in Germany. The 
 only or at leaft the moft probable means they had of faving or 
 conquering America, was to carry on the war with fuccefs in. 
 Germany. 
 
 It was indifferent to the French, whether they entered Germany 
 as allies to Pruftia, or Auftria, as either would anfwer the objed 
 they had in view. It is probable, however, they would have 
 chofe the firft connexion, as they could with more eafe hurt the 
 Auftrians than the Pruffians. Being informed of our alliance with 
 Ruffia, they inftantly fent a mlnifter to Pruffia to conclude a treaty 
 on the lame footing as that in the war of 1741 ; but finding we had 
 been forced to renounce the alliance of the former, and embrace that 
 of the latter, they naturally accepted the friendftiip of the two im- 
 perial courts, and under pretence of fulfilling their engagements 
 contracted by this new alliance, they immediately prepared an army 
 of above 100,000 men, about 20,000 of which were deftined to 
 
 march
 
 in G E R M A N Y. ■vr 
 
 march to the Mayn, and from thence where the cniprcfs fliould 
 choofe ; the remainder, which was to form the main army, was or- 
 dered to the lower Rhine, and from thence proceed againfl: Han- 
 nover and its allies. The command of this army was given to 
 Marfhal D'Etries, as a recompenfe for having negotiated the 
 treaty of Verfailles; and had not the favour of an intriguing mif- 
 trefs prevailed in the choice of thofe employed afterwards to 
 execute the French plan, all "the efforts of England and its allies 
 though fupported by fome of the ableft generals, that this or 
 any age has produced, could not in all probability have pre- 
 vented its future fuccefs. 
 
 Of AUSTRIA. 
 
 TH E emprefs had ever reflefted on the lofs of Silefia with 
 infinite regret, being attended with a very great diminution 
 of her revenues and power. Thefe thoughts were aggravated by 
 obferving the afcendancy which this additional power gave the 
 kino- of Pruflia, whom it is faid (he perfonally difliked: fhe faw him 
 treated every where with refpedt, feared and courted by moft of 
 the courts in Europe. No wonder therefore, that animated with 
 thefe fentiments, fhe fliould form a plan for recovering Silefia. 
 This feems to have been the chief objedl of her counfels, ever fince 
 fhe had ceded it to PrufTia, as appears evident, from the papers 
 publifiied by the king on this fubjed. She applied to the emprefs 
 of RufTia, and irritated that princefs againfl the king of PrufTia to 
 fuch a degree, that flie was eafily prevailed upon to concur in 
 any meafurcs concerted for his ruin. The two imperial Courts 
 were therefore united, by new and flrong alliances: the ohjctt of 
 which was very extenfive, and tended not only to the recovery of 
 
 Silefia J
 
 VI 
 
 History of the War 
 
 Silefiaj but to annihilate the king of Pruffia, whofe dominions they 
 propofed dividing among them. The better to accompHlh this end, 
 they invited the king of Poland to accede to this alliance. He 
 however declined it, till he faw the two emprefTes a<fl with fuch 
 vigour, as would make it fafe for him to declare againfl: Pruflia. 
 Experience had taught him that the Pruifians could opprefs him with 
 more eafe and facility, than the Auflrians protedl him. 
 
 The Auftrian miniftcr at Peterfburg had contributed all he could 
 to the fuccefs of the treaty of fubfidy between that court and 
 England, with a view to make us, as ufual, pay the expence of thofe 
 Troops, which the two imperial courts intended to employ only for 
 their own particular fervice in attacking Pruflia, and thereby facili- 
 tate the recovery of Silefia. Probably things would have gone to 
 their willies, if the king of Pruflia had not declared he would con- 
 fider as enemies thofe who brought any foreign troops into the 
 empire; which indicated plainly he would not only hinder the 
 Ruffians from coming to the fuccour of Hannover in cafe of need, 
 but would perhaps treat that eledlorate as an enemy's country. The 
 king of England very juftly confidered, that the Ruflians would be 
 of no ufe to him, to proteft his German dominions, if they were at 
 war with Pruffia. For whatever fuccefs they might have on the 
 Baltick againft that prince, they could never hinder him, being fo 
 very near, from occupying the elcdtorate, a country without any 
 natural or artificial ftrength. 
 
 For which reafon his majefty very prudently, as we think, pre- 
 ferred the friendfliip of Prufl^ia, and renounced to that of the two 
 empreffes. That of Germany, for whofe advantage alone the alli- 
 ance with Ruflia had been made, being thus difappointed, eafily 
 perfuaded the other to break her treaty with us ; and the more 
 fo, as thefe courts never had any other objed; in forming it, than 
 
 to receive
 
 in Germany. 
 
 vu 
 
 tp receive a futfidy that would enable them to carry their fchemes 
 againft PrufTia into execution, and by no means to adt in concert 
 with us, but on condition we concurred likewife in the plan 
 they had formed for his ruin. Our connexions therefore with him, 
 brought the treaty with Ruflia to nothing, and very naturally pro- 
 duced another alliance between the two imperial courts and that of 
 France, whofe views we have already explained. 
 
 Of PRUSSIA. 
 
 TH E late king of Pruffia had cultivated the arts of peace, I 
 mean thofe which fall more particularly under the cognizance 
 of a prince, juftice and interior policy, from principle. The military 
 art rather for fhcw, than with any particular view, or love of glory. 
 He had left at his death 67,000 men well difciplined, and his maga- 
 zines abundantly furniflied with artillery, flores, &c. 
 
 The death of the then emperor Charles VI. left the affairs of the 
 houfe of Auftria, in the utmoft confufion, and diftrefs. This the 
 king of Pruflia thought a favourable opportunity to alTert the claims 
 he had to fome part of Silefia, and by fuch a bold enterprize, at the 
 beginning of his reign, fatisfy the ambition he had, to appear a for- 
 midable and enterprifmg power, capable to hold the ballance of the 
 empire, and protedt thofe princes who fhould hereafter recur to him 
 for fuccour. He was the firft who began the war againft the em- 
 prefs, which having fucceeded to his wifh, he concluded by a treaty 
 that gave him all Silefia. 
 
 The recovery of this moft fruitful province had been the principal 
 objedl of the Auftrian counfels ever fince, which finiflied, as we 
 have already related in an alliance with Ruffia calculated for that 
 end. Though they had for many years been occupied by this one 
 
 objedt
 
 Vlll 
 
 History of the War 
 
 objedt, yet in 1756, they were not prepared to put It in execution, 
 and had fixed the following year for that purpofe. 
 
 The king of Pruflia perfedlly informed of what they had projedted 
 againfl him, thought it prudent to anticipitate their operati- 
 ons, and attack the principal power of the confederacy, whom, 
 being as yet unprepared, he hoped to crulli, and thereby diflblve the 
 league before they could unite and bring their plan to bear. With 
 this view he entered Saxony: This brought on the general war in 
 Germany, of which we propofe giving an exadt account in the fol- 
 lowing Work. 
 
 Of SAXONY. 
 
 AVARICE, an impotent ambition, a fpirit of intrigue 
 combined with indolence, a total negledl of every thing 
 that tended to the welfare and intereft of the country, an immo- 
 derate love for fliews, pleafurcs, and pageantry, had been long the 
 charadleriftics of this court. No wonder ! the man who governed in 
 the name of a too indulgent mafter, had brought with him into the 
 miniftry thofe habits he had contracted while a page. Attendance 
 cofl him nothing, his life had been diflipated in the idle and trifling 
 occupations of a courtier; his great and indeed only talent was the 
 profufion of an eaftern monarch, which his vile partifans called 
 magnificence. He was afliduous only in befieging his royal mafter, 
 to prevent truth and virtue from approaching him ; fo that this 
 humane and good prince, who had the greateft defire to promote 
 the good of his people, was never permitted to know they were 
 unhappy and wanted his protection. Though this minifter knew 
 
 that
 
 in Germany. 
 
 IX 
 
 that the abjeft ftate, to which his bad condud had reduced Saxony, 
 made it impoiiible for him to undertake any thing of confequence. 
 He was, hov/even always intrigu.ng with the courts of Vienna, 
 and Peterfburg, and i^^nning projedls for aggrandifing Saxony, at 
 the expence of Prufila without having prepared any one means of 
 reahfing this vain chimera, or even provided for the common defence 
 of the country. The money raifed with difficulty on the poor fub- 
 jedl, to provide an army for his defence, was diffipated in building 
 magnificent palaces for the favourite, in expeafive journeys, &c. 
 to fatisfy his abjedt and low vanity: fo that the country, which 
 might eafily raife and maintain an army of 50,000 men, had fcarce 
 15,000 without artillery or magazines ; and therefore fell an eafy 
 prey to an ambitious and powerful invader. 
 
 Of RUSSIA. 
 
 THOUGH the plan, formed and purfued with unwearied 
 aftivity and vigilance by Peter the Great, had not fince his 
 death, been cultivated with equal care and fuccefs ; however, what 
 he had already done, made this empire powerful; and therefore 
 refpedled and carefTed. The vaft extent of this empire, the variety 
 of its produdions, and the number of its inhabitants, form fo many 
 and fuch great fources of power, that a fmall negleft, which 
 in lefler flates would be immediately and feverely felt, pafs in this 
 country unnoticed, and produce no fenfible or diredl bad effed. 
 Its refources are fo many, that in fome meafure they may be faid 
 to fupply thofe miftakes which happen in the adminiftration, and 
 
 c have
 
 X 
 
 History of the War 
 
 have kept up the luftre of the empire, though the plan of the firfl 
 Peter has not been fteadily adhered to. 
 
 While the Ottoman empire was formidable, this court and that 
 of Vienna were naturally connedled. The fear of a common, and 
 powerful enemy, united them by the ftrong tye of mutual fafety. 
 Since the decline of the Turkifli empire, (he finds it no lefs neceflary 
 to cultivate the friendfliip of other princes, particularly that of the 
 maritime powers, who take off a vaft quantity of ufelefs commo- 
 dities. This brings a proportionable fum of money into the 
 empire, which, there circulating, puts that vaft machine in motion, 
 and renders it therefore formidable. Hence the facility, or rather 
 avidity with which the northern powers in general embrace every 
 opportunity of taking fubfidies. The luxury and magnificence of 
 their courts are thereby kept up, and their princes abundantly 
 fupplied with all the fuperfluities, which vanity has made neceffary, 
 and their armies maintained at the expence of others. To thefe 
 general motives may be added others, the late emprefs of Ruffia 
 had, as we have already faid, conceived a moft violent averfion to 
 the king of Pruflia, and therefore readily concurred in any meafure 
 concerted for his humiliation, and the more fo, as they flattered her 
 with the hopes of extending her dominions on the Bakick, a thing 
 long aimed at, by the Ruffians; flie therefore with pleafure con- 
 trafted an alliance with us, which would enable her to execute the 
 defigns of her hatred and politicks at our expence. But finding 
 we would not break with Pruffia, {he inftantly renounced our friend- 
 fhip, and embraced that of France, who promifed her fuch fubfi- 
 dies, as would enable her to put her troops in motion, and adl accord- 
 ing to her own principle. 
 
 No country
 
 in Germany. xk 
 
 Of SWEDEN. 
 
 .J 
 
 NO country has in fo fhort a time changed the principles of 
 its conftitution fo much as this, except Denmark. Sweden 
 in a very few years, from a moft defpotick government, as it was 
 in Charles the Xllth's time, is now the mofl: limited monarchy in 
 Europe. Denmark, on the contrary, in near the fame period, 
 from a free government, is become intirely defpotick. Neither feems 
 to have got much by the revolution, as the power and credit of 
 either does not appear to have been thereby augmented at home or 
 abroad, particularly Sweden, whofe interefts in foreign courts is 
 much funk. The power of the crown is too limited, and that of 
 the different ftates which form the conftitution, too complicated, 
 to admit of any plan that requires wifdom in deliberation, and 
 vigour in the execution. An attempt was made fome years ago to 
 change the conftitution, by augmenting the power of the crown, 
 which could not have been executed without endangering the lives 
 and fortunes of many : it was difcovered in time, and fome of the 
 authors puniflied j as thofe who endeavour to fubvert the conftitu-' 
 tion in favour of tyranny juftly deferve. Though the plot was ren- 
 dered vain, it left, however, an univerfal fpirit of difcontent, not 
 to fay hatred and animofity againft the court, whom they naturally 
 fuppofed had favoured at leaft, if not promoted a plot, calculated 
 merely to augment the influence of the crown. They feemed 
 particularly exafperated againft the queen, a woman of fuperior 
 talents, and fifter to the king of Pruffia, to whofe inftigation they 
 attributed the attempt made againft their liberty. The French, 
 
 c 2 "wh©
 
 $;ii History of the War 
 
 who by fubfidies, and that fplrit of intrigue which diflinguifli their 
 minifters in every court, laid hold of this occafion, to make the 
 Swedes declare againfl his Pruffian majefty. The war, however, 
 being undertaken againft the will of the king, was profecuted with- 
 out vigour, and they therefore embraced the lirfl opportunity of 
 concluding a peace, which they never ought to have broke. The 
 Swedes muft keep a watchful eye on the Ruffians, who aim at 
 further conquefts on the Baltick: this cannot be executed, without 
 endangering the fafety of Sweden. Pruffia and Denmark have a 
 common intereft: in oppofing the progrefs of the Ruffians. How 
 impolitick therefore were the Swedes to have a(fted on quite con- 
 trary principles. Had the confederacy fucceeded againft Pruffia, 
 Sweden and Denmark, particularly the former, would have been 
 the vidtims of their bad policy, and fell an eafy prey to the ambi- 
 tion of Ruffia. 
 
 THESE
 
 MILITARY DESCRIPTION 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 SEAT of W A R. 
 
 Of BOHEMIA and MORAVIA. 
 
 THESE two great provinces belong to the emprefs of 
 Germany. They are feparated from Silefia, Lufatia, Saxony, 
 and part of Bavaria, and Auftria, by a continued chain of 
 very high mountains, which neceflarily renders the communication 
 between thofe countries very difficult, there being very few mili- 
 tary roads *. The firft of thefe goes from Olniutz, in Moravia, to 
 a town called Sternberg, and there divides itfelfinto two; the one 
 goes by Hoff to Troppau, and JagerndorfF, in the Auftrian Silefia -, 
 the other paffes by Friedland, Wurbenthal, and Zuckmantel, and 
 from thence goes to Neifs. Thefe two roads, particularly the laft, 
 may be confidered as one continual defile, formed by the mountains, 
 ravins, rivers, &c. and therefore may, no doubt, be defended by 
 a few troops, if properly placed, againft a numerous army. The 
 Pruffians have indeed one very great advantage : they can, by fend- 
 ing two corps, the one by Jagerndorff, and the other, out of the 
 
 » A road where infantry, cavalry, heavy artillery, and all kind of carriages can pafs. 
 
 county
 
 xiv History of the War. 
 
 county of Glatz, from Habelfchwert towards Altftat, and Schon- 
 berg, force the Auftrians to quit any pofit^on they may take, be- 
 tween Freudenthal and Neifs, by cutting off their communication 
 with Ohnutz, from whence they muft neceffarily draw their fub- 
 fiftence. Whereas thefe can take no central pofition, that will effec- 
 tually hinder the Pruffians from entering Moravia, by the way of 
 Zuckmantel, from the county of Glatz, and by Troppau, and 
 unite thefe three columns with fafety ; Olmutz being too far back, 
 can be of no ufe to guard the paffages beween Moravia and Silefia. 
 
 As the king of Pruflia cannot from any place, more conveniently, 
 carry on the war againft the emprefs's dominions, than from Neifs, 
 into Moravia, nor where his fucceffes would be attended with more 
 fatal confequences ; it is furprifing her majefliy has not thought 
 proper to oppofe, on that fide, a ftronger barrier than Olmutz, 
 which is certainly a very indifferent place. The fine defence gene- 
 ral Marflial made, during the laft war, was owing as much to the 
 weaknefs of the Pruffian army, as to his own talents and vigilance, 
 as will evidently appear by the hiftory of that famous fiege. This 
 fortrefs is fo far back, that it leaves all the avenues leading from 
 Silefia and Glatz, into Moravia, quite open, and a confiderabk 
 body of men cannot be fent far into the mountains, without evi- 
 dent rifk : nothing would be more ef&cacious to check the Pruffians, 
 than the building a fortrefs, either in the neighbourhood of Alftadt, 
 or between, Freudenthal and Zuckmantel; or laftly, between 
 Jagerndorff, and Johannifthal. The firft, would be a check on Glatz 
 and Neifs, at the fame time, and enable the Auftrians to make con- 
 tinual incurfions into thofe two provinces, without any riilc : nor 
 does it appear poffible for the Pruffians to penetrate into Moravia, 
 either from Glatz or Neifs, without previoufly taking this 
 
 fortrefs
 
 in G E R M A N Y. XV 
 
 fortrefs ; becaufe a corps of troops pofted here, and fuftained by a 
 ftrong garrifon, would cut off all communication with thofe two 
 places, and foon force an army that would advance towards Olmutz, 
 to fall back or perifli. 
 
 The lecond and third, would, indeed, effedlually hinder the Pru(- 
 fians from advancing into Moravia, 'till they had taken them : but 
 the liege of them would be more eafy, becaufe fuch a body of troops 
 might be fent from upper Silefia, and from Glatz, to feize the 
 defiles between them, and Moravia, as would make it impofllble 
 to relieve them. 
 
 Moft men think that a camp, or fortrefs, is well placed, if they 
 cannot be approached without great difficulty, which is true only, 
 in cafe they have in themfelves all the refources neceffary for their 
 defence; but as that feldom or ever happens, the perfection of 
 the one and the other would be, to find a fituation that prefents to 
 the enemy all the difficulties poffible ^ and which, at the fame time, 
 may be eafily fuccoured, if neceffary. The difficulty to find fuch a 
 fituation, or the want of that fure, coup d'oeil, has determined many 
 engineers, to choofe the plains for their fortrefl"es, which frees 
 them from the cenfure of having ill chofe their ground, and flatters 
 their vanity, by giving them an opportunity, to produce all the 
 different works they have (een in the fchools, and make fuch a fine 
 appearance on paper. 
 
 Another road goes from Olmutz, by Litau and Alfladt, into the 
 county of Glatz. The next principal road, is that, which goes from 
 the circle of Konigfgratz, by Neuflat and Nachod, into the county of 
 Glatz, and from thence into the other provinces of Silefia: it is not 
 lefs difficult than the others above-mentioned, being like them, one 
 continual defile, particularly, when it enters the Pruffian domini- 
 ons, where it is almoft impoflible for a confiderable body of troops " 
 to march, if they meet with any refiftance; efpecially, in going 
 
 from
 
 xvi History of the War 
 
 from Bohemia towards Glatz, as the mountains rife gradually; from 
 whence appears, that the PrufTians can with more eafe penetrate into 
 Bohemia, than the Auftrians can, into the county of Glatz. The firft 
 have another confiderable advantage ; they can be provided with every 
 thing from the fortrefs of Glatz, which gives them a fafe retreat, 
 when puHved back by fuperior forces : they are mafters of the ave- 
 nues which lead into Bohemia; which, being intirely open and 
 fruitful, they can enter with eafe, and fubfift for a confiderable 
 time ; whereas the Auftrians cannot enter the country of Glatz at 
 all, if the pafTes are properly guarded, and even rtiould they force 
 back the pofts placed in them, they can find no fubfiftence in the 
 country, and muft begin their operations by the fiege of Glatz, 
 which, from its very advantageous fituation, can fcarce be taken, 
 though left to the defence of its awn garrifon, and certainly not at all,. 
 if there is a confiderable body of troops in the country to fuftain it. 
 
 The hiftory of the laft and preceding wars, confirms what is here 
 advanced. In the firft, it was reduced by famine, and, in the laft, 
 chance, cowardice, and ignorance, of all which, general Laudhon^ 
 took proper advantages, were the immediate caufes of its being 
 
 taken. 
 
 The next road goes likewife from the circle of Konigfgratz, by 
 Trautenau and Landftiut, to Schweidnitz, and Jauer, in Silefia. 
 This, like the others, is a continual defile, and fo difficult, that: 
 when the paffes are properly guarded, no army can penetrate into 
 Silefia, on this fide. The Pruflians have a fine pofition near Land- 
 fhut, from whence they may, by an eafy march on the left, cover the 
 road that goes from Friedland to Schweidnitz, and fuftain effedually 
 any corps, they may fend to Schmidberg and Hirfchberg. It was 
 from this camp that Fouquet, with an inconfiderable army, fo 
 
 often
 
 in Ge RM A N Y. xvii 
 
 often baffled the attempts made by the Auftrians, though mucli 
 fuperior, to penetrate that way into Silefia, and was at laft over- 
 powered, and intirely defeated in it, by his own fault. 
 
 The Pruflians have here the fame advantages as on the fide of 
 Glatz. The fortrefs of Schweidnitz, being another place of arms, 
 fupplys them with every thing they want; and being fo near, ena- 
 bles th«m to begin their operations, much fooner than the Auftrians. 
 The mountains are filled with villages, where an army may be 
 put in cantonments with fafety, if care is taken to occupy the 
 defiles, between them and Bohemia, which they can do with eafe, 
 being within the Pruflian dominions : nothing therefore, can hinder 
 them from invading that province on this fide, even if the Aufi:rians 
 had an army there ; becaufe that army cannot take any pofition 
 nearer the avenues that lead into it 3 than behind the Elbe, fome 
 where between Konigfhoff and Kdnigfgraatz, which can, effedu- 
 ally, hinder the Pruflians from advancing any farther; but cannot 
 prevent their entring it. 
 
 When one confiders that the Pruflians mufl:, from the fituatioii 
 of their country, make their chief efforts on this fide, as well, 
 becaufe they can penetrate with fafety in various columns, can be 
 fupplied, abundantly, from Glatz and Schweidnitz, with provifi- 
 ons, fi:ores, &c. and can retire without danger in cafe of misfortune, 
 one is amazed, to fee her majefly leave this province, entirely, de- 
 fencelefs, and expofed to the continual ravages of the enemy. 
 As there k no kind of fortrefs, nothing lefs than an army, can de- 
 fend it againfl: the incurfions, that may be made from the county 
 of Glatz, and from the mountains of Landlliut. 
 
 If the enemy once paflTes the Elbe, above Konigfgratz, all the 
 provinces on the right of that river, mufl: be abandoned ; the troops 
 pofted on the frontiers of Lufatia, muft inftantly, fall hack to Prague, 
 
 d for
 
 xviii History of the War 
 
 for fear of being cut off. Even the army itfelf inuft fall back into 
 the circle of Chrudim, in order to cover Moravia, an-^ x p open 
 the communication with Auftria and the Danube. Wherea*, if a 
 fortrefs capable of containing 10,000 foot and 4000 horfe, was 
 placed behind the Elbe, between Konigflioff, an^ Kon;g<gratz, 
 with caferns and magazines vaulted, bomb-proof, the Pruflians, 
 could not take it, without infinite trouble ; and it would certai.ily 
 hold out fome months, if we judge by their fkill, on other occa- 
 fions, and give time, to come to its relief. This fituation i-s fo 
 advantageous, that it not only covers the country on that fide, but 
 likewife facilitates the means of entring Silefia. As' it may be 
 made a general place of arms, to fupply the armies deftincd on that 
 fide, nor can the enemy leave it behind him and penetrate into the 
 country, bccaufe the garrifon alone, with fome Croats and huffars^ 
 would cut oif his communication with Silefia and Glatz, in fuch 
 a manner, as would foon force him to retire, or make him, and his 
 army perifli, though he fliould leave a corps of 20,000 men, to ob-r 
 ferve the place, to fecure lais convoys. 
 
 Befides, a fortrefs of that kind, and a numerous garrifon, muft 
 force the enemy to keep a confiderable corps, both in the county 
 of Glatz, and in the mountains of Landrtiut. The advantages of 
 fuch a fortrefs, are infinite, and in my opinion, renders it abfo- 
 lutely neceflary. 
 
 The next road goes from the circle of Buntzlau, by Bakhofen, 
 Swigan, Libenau, Riechenberg, where it divides into two ; the one 
 goes to Friedland, and thence towards Grieffenberg, in Silefia, Sei- 
 denberg, in Lufatia. This road pafiies likewife through many very 
 high mountains; and therefore not eafily to be pafled, if there are 
 troops to defend the defiles. 
 
 Though the king of Prufiia, will never make his chief effort on 
 
 th 
 
 IS
 
 in G E R M A N Y. xix 
 
 this fide, having no place of arms, at a proper diftance, yet as in 
 every war with the Auftrians, he will think it neceflary to occupy 
 Saxony, fome divifion of his army will always enter Bohemia, on 
 the fide of Lufatia, while it remains quite open as at prefent : where- 
 fore it would, no doubt, be very proper, to have as near the fron- 
 tiers as pofTible, fome confiderable fortrefs, which a divifion of 
 twenty thoufand men, can neither fuddenly take, nor fafely leave 
 behind them, nor could any troops take their winter quarters, any 
 where in the mountains, from Friedland to Schandau, or even at 
 Grieffenberg, Marklififa, Lauban, and Gorlitz, if a confiderable 
 fortrefs is placed in the neighbourhood of Friedland : neither can 
 the communication be kept up between Silefia and Saxony, unlefs 
 an army bepofled to fecure it. To thefe great and obvious reafons 
 may be added, that as Silefia, is quite an open country, without 
 any fortrefs to cover it, from Markliffa to Crofi"en, near Frankfort, 
 it might be attacked, on that fide rather, than on that of Moravia, 
 and Bohemia, which now can't be done, without leaving an army 
 to cover thefe two provinces. But if they are fecured, by the 
 fortrefifes propofed to be made in Moravia, and near Konigfgratz i 
 the Auft;rians might, we think, enter Silefia, by the way of Lufa- 
 tia, provided they have a place of arms, near Friedland, which 
 would enable them, as we think, to adl with fafety and vigour on 
 that fide. The want of it, rendered ineffedtual, the victories gained 
 by the Rufiians at Zullichau, and Cunnerfdorff, and every attempt, 
 the Auftrians made, on the Queifs, and Bober. 
 
 Should thedifferent fortrefifes, above propofed, beexecuted, 30,000 
 men, befides their garrifons, will, it's thought, be more than fuffi- 
 cient to cover Bohemia, all the remainder of her majefty's forces, 
 may then, ad with fuccefs on the Queifs, and Bober, otherwife not. 
 
 The next road goes likewife from the circle of Buntzlau, by 
 
 d 2 Leypa,
 
 XX H I s T o R Y of the W 
 
 A R 
 
 Leypa, and Gabel, to Zittau, in Lufatia : this is the leaft difficult of 
 any as yet defcribed. In the mountains, however, about Gabcl, there 
 are fome defiles, which may eafily be guarded, with few troops. 
 
 The next road goes from the fame province, by Rumburg, and 
 from thence tawards Lobau, in Lufatia. This is extrecmly diffi- 
 cult, and, during the courfe of the war, I do not remember it 
 was taken by aay confiderablc corps, excepting by tjiat of the 
 prince of Pruffia, after the battle of Kollin. Little ufe can be 
 made of thefe two laft roads, by the Pruffians, being fo far from, 
 their depots, excepting for fome divfion of their army, when thcy^ 
 propofe invading Bohemia on different fides at the fame time, and 
 therefore it feem.s ufelefs, to fortify them. 
 
 The next, and one of the mod important roads, in all this- 
 country, is that which goes from Prague, by Budyn, Lowofitz,. 
 Auffig, Peterfwald, and Ghifhubel, where it enters Saxony. This 
 road is one continual defile, from Lowofitz to the laft mentioned 
 place, runs clofe to the Elbe, from Lowofitz to Auffig, where the 
 river Ella cuts it, another deep ravin beyond Peterfwald ; and a 
 third at Ghiihubel. In each of thefe three places, are fuch advan- 
 tageous pofitions, that twelve or fourteen battalions,, would be able 
 to defend them againft an army, though there be no kind of fortrefs, 
 and if there was a good one, it would be fcarce poflible to invade 
 Bohemia, on the fide of Saxony, with fuccefs. Whenever an 
 army propofes pafiing from the one country into the other, it. 
 is abfolutcly neceffiiry to be mafters of the Elbe, becaufe it is 
 by that river alone, fuch armies muft fubfill, the mountains 
 beino- fo high, and the roads fo bad, that for many months in. 
 the year, no carriage can pafs ; a fortrefs therefore here, would, 
 be an inviacible obftacle for aa army coming from either 
 country. 
 
 The next road goes likewife from the plains of Lowofitz, 
 
 over
 
 in Germany* xxi 
 
 over the mountains by Toplitz, and from thence by Zinwalde, 
 into Saxony. This road is very bad, and fo full of defiles, that 
 it is fcarce fit for any but infantry: there are many pofitions to 
 be taken on it, the principal one is near Toplitz. 
 
 The next goes out of the circle of Saatz, by Laun, and 
 Commotau, and from thence over the Bafberg into Saxony. 
 This and the next which goes likewife from the circle of Saatz, 
 by Caaden, over the Kupferberg, into Saxony, are extreamly 
 difficult, and w^hen the defiles have been properly guarded the 
 Pruffians have always been repulfed. During the war, except- 
 ing in 1757, when prince Maurice pafTed there in two columns. 
 Scarce any thing but light troops ever attempted palling thefe 
 
 defiles. 
 
 From, the circle of Ellenbogen, there go two roads, the one 
 over the mountains to Plauen, and the other through Egra. 
 Both thefe, are in fbme meafure impafifable, for an army com- 
 ing into Bohemia, becaufe it would not be fafe to pafs through 
 fuch great defiles, fo near a fortrefs. Thefe are the principal 
 roads and pafles, which occur, in the counties where the war 
 was carried on in that part of Gei"many. 
 
 Bohemia and Moravia are watered by many rivers, the principal 
 of which are the Teifs, which, rifes in the mountains of Silefia, 
 called Schneeberg, and runs by Alfladt, Muglitz, Littau, Olmutz, 
 Hradifch, &c. and falls into the Danube, at Freiburg; in the 
 latter part of its courfe, it k called the Morava: it is not navi- 
 gable, nor can any pofition be taken on its banks, to itop aa 
 enemy coming from Silefia. The beft,. however, is on the 
 heights about Littau with the right extending towards Olmutz, 
 and a corps further on towards Muglitz, otherwife a column 
 coming down the Teifs would render that pofition very hazar- 
 dous.
 
 xxii History of the War 
 
 dous. This is, no doubr, the mort: proper pofition of any to 
 cover Olmutz, which cannot be attacked while an army is here, 
 nor can it well be forced, by any indired manoeuvre to quit it, 
 being fupplied with provifions from Olmutz, nor can an enemy 
 advance towards Auftria, leaving that fortrefs, and army behind 
 him. 
 
 There are many more, fmall, rivers between Olmutz and 
 Brinn, which, pafTing through the mountains, furnifli every 
 where excellent camps. Moravia, in general, is a very ftrong 
 country, and may be defended by a fmall army againfl: a very 
 numerous one, as appeared in the war which happened after 
 the death of Charles the Vlth. For then prince Charles, aided 
 by the great KevenhuUer, at the head of a very inconfiderable 
 body of troops, compared with thofe of the enemies, drove 
 them intirely out of that country, and Bohemia, merely by the 
 fuperiority of manoeuvres, which the face of the country per- 
 mitted him to execute. 
 
 The Elbe rifes in the mountains of Silefia, called the Riefenge- 
 biirg, and runs by Arnau, KonigfliofF, Jaromitz, Konigfgratz, 
 Pardubitz, Neuhoff, Kollin, Nimburg, Brandeifs, where the Ifer 
 falls into it, Melnick, where the Moldau comes into it, Leiit- 
 meritz, above which, the Egra falls into it, Aufiig, and from 
 thence to Konigftein in Saxony, it is navigable only as far as 
 Lowofitz, where it grows confiderable. In all this extenfive 
 courfe few good pofitions can be taken on its banks. The firfl: 
 and molt important of any upon it, and indeed in the whole 
 country, is between KonigHioff, and Konigfgratz, from whence 
 an army can effedtually hinder an enemy coming from Schweid-^ 
 nitz and Glatz, from penetrating into the interior parts of 
 
 Bohemia. 
 
 There
 
 in Germany. xxiii 
 
 There are other pofitions to be taken, between Nimburg, 
 and Srp.ndeifs., which cover Prague againfl: an army coming from 
 Lulatia. , Between thefe places and Sjixony, no pofition can be 
 taken' on its banks,- becaufe it , runs paralel, to the road that 
 pafs from the one country into the other j;fo that only the right or 
 left wing of an array camped between Lowofitz and Auiig, can 
 be ported on it, according as the front is placed. 
 
 On the ZalTava, one pofttion only of confequence can be taken, 
 and that at Benefchau, froxrx whence you may cover the two 
 great roads that lead from Prague to Vienna.. 
 
 The Moldau, on which fome pofitions may be taken, which 
 cover Bohemia, Upper and Lower Auflria, in cafe any attempt 
 be made from Voigtland; iti.^axony; It was from thefe pofi- 
 .tions that the French, under marfhal Maillebois, were effeilu- 
 ally prevented from penetrating into Bohemia, and relieving 
 marfhal Belleifle, then befieged in Prague. 
 
 This is the ftrongefl: place on the river j and indeed in the 
 whole country, and is well fortified ; but being commanded by 
 the neighbouring hills, very extenfive, and divided by the Moldau, 
 it requires fuch an immenfe quantity of ftores and artillery, and 
 fuch a numerous garrifon, that it feems doubtful whether any 
 attempt fhould be made to defend it or not, excepting by a 
 couple of battalions, meerly to protect it, from plunder, by capi- 
 tulating. The fate of this city, in the war of 174T, fliews the 
 truth- of this opinion. The firft time, it was taken by aflault, 
 with a garrifon of near 4000 men in it ; the fecond time, it 
 refifl:ed a very few days only; and the third, it was aban- 
 doned precipitately by the PrulTians, on their quitting Bohemia.. 
 'In this laft war, its fate would have been decided in a few 
 days more, and it would have been taken with an army in it. 
 
 The
 
 xxiv History of the War 
 
 The Egra rifes in the circle of that name, and runs by the 
 town of Egra, thence by Ellenbogen, Saatz, Laun, and Budyn ; 
 and a little way from this laft town it falls into the Elbe. 
 The only town of ftrength on this river is Egra, which is 
 well fortified ; but being commanded by a hill, on the left of 
 the river, it cannot make any long defence ; and therefore in the 
 laft war, it was debated, whether it fhould be difmantled, or not. 
 
 It is remarkable, that, in general, the banks on the right of 
 this river are higheft; and confequently furnifli eafy means for its 
 defence. There are many good pofitions to be taken on it ; the 
 firft and principal however is, that, on the right of the river 
 behind Budyn, by which an enemy, coming from Saxony, by 
 the way of AuiTig, (which, as we have faid, is the principal 
 debouche into Bohemia) may be effecflually flopped, if another 
 ftrong corps is placed higher up, towards Laun, which at the 
 fame time ftops any column coming by the way of Commotau. 
 This body of troops muft be ftrong enough to difpute the paf- 
 fage, 'till the army pofted at Budyn has time to come up, which 
 may be done by an eafy march on the left; and if in 1756 the 
 duke of Aremberg's corps had taken this pofition, inftead of fall- 
 ing back to Mickovitz, the king of PrufTia would have found it 
 difficult to pafs the Egra, and probably would have failed in 
 the attempt, as Gen. Brown could have oppofed him with a 
 very numerous army. 
 
 This country, like moft others in Europe, was formerly go- 
 verned by the feudal fyftem; it is ftill fo, in fome meafure, and 
 notwithftanding the vaft power of the houfe of Auftria, the 
 nobility have fome privileges : for thefe reafons there is an 
 infinite number of towns fortified, or rather furrounded with 
 an old wall, after the Gothic manner, whofe ufe is very great 
 
 and
 
 in 
 
 Germany. xxv 
 
 and extenfive, as they furnifh efFedlual means to carry on 
 the petite guerre with fuccefs, and confequently harrals an 
 enemy extremely, by rendering his convoys and fubfiftence pre- 
 carious, which at lafl: muft force him to abandon the interior 
 part of the country, and approach the frontiers. They like- 
 wife enable you, with a fmall army, to difpute every inch of 
 ground with your enemy, who will not prefume to feparate his 
 troops 'till he has forced you back on the Danube. For this rea- 
 fon, the Prufllans, French, and Saxons, in the war of 1741, though 
 they were foon mafters of it, on the appearance of any fmall 
 army againft them, they were obliged to abandon it ; and indeed 
 we don't think it can be preferved, if conquered, unlefs you 
 include Moravia and Auftria, as far as the Danube; then indeed, 
 having this great river for a barrier, it may be kept, otherwife 
 not. 
 
 Though the country, from what we have faid, will appear 
 ftrong, and is really fo ; it has, however, many inconvenien- 
 cies, which make it impoffible to hinder an invafion, particu- 
 larly on the fide of Silefia. The mountains, which feparate 
 thefe two countries, make a part of Silefia, and therefore belong 
 to the king of Pruffia, who is thereby mafter of the defiles, 
 near which, he has the fortreffes of Neifs, Glatz, and Schweid- 
 nitz, where he can, with eafe and fecrefy, make the neceljary 
 preparations ; and in one march, he may enter BoheiBfe>-^n 
 three different columns, which nothing in the world can pre- 
 vent, as no pofition can be taken near enough to the Debou- 
 ches, to prevent his fubfifling, and encamping fo advantage- 
 oufly, between your army and the mountains, that you cannot 
 force him to repafs them. The nearell and bed pofitions that 
 
 e can
 
 xxvl History of the War 
 
 can be taken to cover the country from an invafion, on the 
 fiJe of SclnveiJnitz and Glatz, arc thofe already mentioned^ 
 behind the Elbe, at Konigrtiofi and Kiiiii^fgratz, which, how- 
 ever, you mart; abandon, unlefs you are ftrong enough to hinder 
 him from entering Moravia on your right, by the way of Zuck- 
 mantel, as it happened in the campaign of 1758^ and out of 
 Bohemia on your left by Friedland and Gabel. If you fail in 
 this, you muft inftantly fall back into Moravia, to cover Vi- 
 enna ; or to the Moldau, to cover Prague. In the interior part 
 of the country, the befl: pofition, without doubt, is that in the 
 neighbourhood of Collin and Czaflau, as you may from thence, 
 in a few marches, be either behind the Elbe at Konigfgratz, 
 approach the Moldau, or fall back into Moravia, as the cafe 
 may require. 
 
 The pofitions to be taken in that part of the country, are 
 thofe of Leutomifchel, Muglitz, Littau, with ftrong corps to- 
 wards Zuckmantel and Troppau, to cover the debouches on that 
 fide, where they are fecurely ported, and can be attacked only 
 in front : in which cafe they fall back on your army, or on 
 Olmutz. By taking either of thefe pofitions you cover Mora- 
 via and Auftria, and have your communication open with Bohe- 
 mia, where no enemy dare feparate, while you are in force in 
 Moravia. Another great inconveniency in the defence of this 
 country, is, that no confiderable magazines can with fafety be 
 placed, any where, but at Prague or Olmutz, which are too 
 far back from the frontiers, and your army muft be fupplied 
 from thence by land carriage,, a thing very difficult at the end 
 of a campaign, particularly if the war continues long in the 
 
 country, and makes horfes and oxen fcarce. 
 
 This
 
 . in - G B R M A N Y. xxvii 
 
 Of S I L E S I A and the County of G L A T Z. 
 
 THIS country lies from fouth to fouth-eafl: of Bohemia. It 
 extends in length from Liebenau, on the frontiers of Bran- 
 deburg, to Upper Silefia, on the frontiers of Poland and Hun- 
 gary, near 240 miles. Its breadth, including the county of 
 Glatz, to Millitfch, on the frontiers of Poland, is near 120 miles. 
 It is peopled, by near a million and a half of inhabitants, 
 and produces an yearly avenue of about four millions of dol- 
 lars, and is one of the moft fruitful and richeft provinces in 
 Europe, 
 
 It has been already faid, that it is feparated from Bohemia, 
 by a chain of mountains, running from Zuckmantel, on the 
 frontiers of Moravia, to Greiffenberg on the river Queifs. From 
 Luface, it is feparated by this river, which runs by Greiffen- 
 berg, MarkliiTa, and Lanban, and falls at Halbau into the Bober. 
 This laft river ferves as a barrier, on the fide of Upper Luface, 
 'till it falls into the Oder at Croflen. 
 
 The advantageous fituation of this country, enables the king 
 of Pruffia to invade Bohemia w^ith facility and fuccefs: whereas 
 any attempt from Bohemia againft Silefia would be attended with 
 much danger and difficulty, A fmall army pofted, any where, in the 
 neighbourhood of Glatz, with two corps; the one between Frey- 
 wald and Johanflhal, and the other about Trautenau, would, I am 
 perfuaded, render any attempts againft it, vain and fruitlefs. An 
 army fo pofted cannot be forced by any direcfl manoeuvre, be- 
 caufe the country is extremely ftrong, and it might retire under 
 the cannon of Glatz : and though either of the two corps pofted, 
 as we fuppofe, on the right and left, were puflied back; you 
 could not prefume to advance into Silefia with an army, lea- 
 
 e 2 ving
 
 XXVIU 
 
 History of the War 
 
 vine the enemy in the county of Glatz ; becaufe from thence, 
 he could cut ofF your communication both with Bohemia and 
 Moravia ; and confequently, in a few days, would force you to 
 fall back into thefe countries, or perifh in the mountains, as the 
 country between thefe mountains and the fortreffes of Neifs and 
 Schweidnitz, could not fupply an army for two days only. 
 Much Icfs could you attempt any thing againft thefe -places, if 
 there be any troops in the county of Glatz ; or any corps, how- 
 ever inconfiderable, in the neighbourhood of them, your army 
 inuft fubfill; from your magazines in Bohemia, which you can- 
 not pofiibly bring into Silefia, while the enemy is in force in 
 the county of Glatz. And though there be no enemy there, 
 your tranfports, however numerous, are foon wore out, particu- 
 larly if any rain falls, which makes the roads abfolutely impaf- 
 fable. Then you muft not think of bringing up your heavy 
 artillery, ammunitions, &c. till the place is entirely inverted, 
 and you have formed a confiderable magazine near your camp. 
 Such preparations require much more time than is neceflary, to 
 enable the king to come to its relief. Hence it appears, how dif- 
 ficult, the conquefl: of Silefia muft be, while there is any fmalt 
 army to cover it. The progrefs of the Auftrians in the cam- 
 paigns of 1757, 1760, and 1761, was, we think, intirely owing 
 to the bad condudl of the Pruffian generals; which we ihall 
 demonftrate when we give an account of thofe campaigns. 
 
 This country is watered by fmall rivers, and, like Bohemia, 
 is covered with woods, and interfered with hills and valleys : 
 and confequently furni(hes, every where, excellent camps. The 
 chief pofitions on this fide, are thofe in the neighbourhood of 
 Glatz, at Frankenftein, Wartha, 6cc. of which we have given 
 an account. On the left is one near Otmofchau, which covers 
 
 Neifs .
 
 in G E R M A N Y. xxix 
 
 Neifs : on the right is that of Landfhut, which covers Schweid- 
 nitz. There is another on the heights of Wurben, between 
 Schweidnitz and Breflau, which covers both : another, behind 
 the Reichenba.hifcli WafTer, with the right at Pultzen, and the 
 left at Faulcbrucken, which anfwers the lame purpofc : ano- 
 ther between Liebentlial and Lowenberg, which is excellent, 
 and covers the country effedually againft an army advancing by 
 the way of Gorlitz, MarklilTa, and Lauban. 
 
 Further do-vn the Queifs, is a good camp between Naum- 
 burg and Buntzlau, but it fhould not be occupied, except in 
 fome very particular cafe ; as the enemy could pafs the Queifs, 
 and enter Silcfia on your left, by Lauban; near which is a very 
 good camp for a fmall corps to ferve as a vanguard to the army 
 ported at Lowenberg. Still further down, on the Bober, is a 
 good camp at Sagan, and at Chriftianftadt, which covers that 
 
 fide effedlually. 
 
 The only navigable river in this country is the Oder, which 
 rifes in the mountains of Hungary, not far from Jablunka. It runs 
 by Rattibor, Kofel, Oppelen, Tefchen, Brieg, Breilau, Grofs Glo- 
 gau, Frankfort, Cuftrin, and Stettin, a little below which it 
 falls into the Baltic. 
 
 The firft place of any flrength you meet with, on this river, 
 is Kofel, which, though very fmall, is ftrong by its fituation,. 
 and could it contain a numerous garrifon, would be a refpedt- 
 able bulwark againft the Auftrians and Hungarians. The other 
 places we have named, as far as Breflau, are of no other ufe, 
 than to cover the country againft the incurfions of light troops, 
 and to form magazines, and fecure the fruits of the earth in 
 
 cafe of a war. 
 
 Breflau,
 
 XXX History of the War. 
 
 Breflau, the capital of Silefia, is a large atid well-peopled 
 town J but though pretty well fortified, is not capable of ma- 
 king any confiderable defence ; becaufe it is comnfianded by a 
 neio^hbouring height : it has no out-works of confequence. Be- 
 lides, great part of the town or fuburbs are without the wall ; 
 under the cover of which, you may begin your approaches very 
 near; and the ditch not being proteded by a good glacis, and 
 a well-pallifaded covered-way, you may get into the town in a 
 very fhort time. 'Tis however, in other refpedts, of great ufe; 
 as you may with fafety form there magazines of provifions and 
 {lores : and you may lodge there a good body of troops to 
 recover themfelves during the winter quarters. It may likewife 
 cover a camp, if the ground is well chofen. Its garrifon, when 
 left to itfelf, ought to be numerous, in order to proted the 
 country. From Breflau, ftill following the courfe of the river, 
 you come to Grofs Glogau, which may juflly be efteemed the 
 key and bulwark of Lower Silefia. It is a ftrong fortrefs, when 
 compared with thofe of this country, though nothing at all com- 
 pared with thofe in Flanders. 
 
 There are generally immenfe magazines, and a numerous gar- 
 rifon in this town. It covers the country fo effeiftually, that no 
 enterprife of confequence can be undertaken on that fide of 
 Silefia, until you are mafter of it. The taking of it will be no 
 eafy matter, as the king will always have an army in this neigh- 
 bourhood, to obferve an enemy coming from Poland, and if it 
 be too weak to keep the field, it will find a fecure retreat under 
 the cannon of this fortrefs, from whence it cannot be forced 
 by any diredl manoeuvre. Should the enemy attempt to leave 
 you behind, and march to Breflau, you can be there before 
 him- or by fending a body of huflars into Poland, cut 
 
 off
 
 in Germany. xxxi 
 
 off his fubfiftences (o efFcdlually, as to force him Immediately 
 to abandon his defigns and return to the frontiers of that coun- 
 try : and as the king takes cire to have all the corn ol th2 
 country depofited at Breflau and Glogau, the enemy finds no- 
 thing but the growing crop, on which no army can fubfilt a 
 day ; particularly in that part of the country bordering on the 
 Oder, which is generally fandy, and therefore by no means fruit- 
 ful. From hence it appears, that an army coming from Poland 
 cannot, however numerous, undertake any thing folid. No ma- 
 gazine can be formed nearer the frontiers of Silefia, than at 
 Pofen, fixty miles from Glogau. Such a magazine, however 
 abundant, can fcarcely fupply the daily confumption of a nume- 
 rous army, while it remains in that neighbourhood, much lels 
 can it be tranfported to Glogau, and fupply the army there for 
 at leaft two months. How can the heavy artillery, an immenfe 
 quantity offlores necefTary for fuch a fiege, be brought there? 
 How, therefore, undertake it i* even fuppofing, what probably 
 will never happen, that it be left to the defence of a com- 
 mon garrifon, and that there be no army to cover it. This- 
 fhews why the Ruffians could not, for want of a fufficient 
 magazine at Pofen, approach the frontiers of Silefia till the month 
 of July : and then their operations were chiefly regulated by 
 the neceffity of making the army fubfift, rather than with a 
 view to any military cnterprife. As they could not fubfiil in 
 any one place, long enough, to think of undertaking any thing^ 
 of confequencej they were, notwithftanding their repeated vic- 
 tories, obliged in the month of odtober, to abandon a country,, 
 which their own ravages, and the nature of the circumftances^ 
 had rendered incapable of fupporting them during the winter. 
 They mull necefl^arily fall back on the Lower Viilula, where 
 
 they
 
 XXXll 
 
 History of the War 
 
 they have their magazines. For thefe reafons, all the operations 
 of this army were reduced to marching from the Viftula into 
 Silefia, and after fighting and ravaging the country, to the return- 
 ing again on the Viftula. 
 
 We fliall conclude this defcription of Silefia with obferving, 
 that the greatelt advantage arifing from the favourable fituation, 
 and nature of this country, in our opinion, confifts in this: 
 that the king, covered with the places of Silefia, is enabled to 
 make all his motions with fafety and celerity ; that his armies 
 are abundantly fupplied, on the fpot where they encamp ; that 
 a fmall corps, prote<fled by thefe places, fupply the place of a 
 great army, and that fo effedlually, that nothing of confcquence,. 
 can be undertaken in that country while they exifl. Who- 
 ever confiders attentively what we have faid on this fubjeft, will 
 probably feel his admiration for the king of PrufTia, and his 
 contempt for the Auflrian and Ruffian generals, confiderably 
 diminifhed. 
 
 Further down the Oder, in the marquifate of Brandeburg, 
 lies the city of Francfort, a rich and populous place. It is of 
 no other ufe, however, when confidered in a military view, than 
 to cover magazines, which you muft form here, and at CrofTen, for 
 an army you may fend on the Warta towards Pofen, and thofe 
 parts of Poland. 
 
 Further down, at the confluent of the Warta into the Oder, is 
 Cuftrin. This place is fmall, and not at all ftrong, yet the Ruf- 
 fians, who attacked it in 1758, failed in their attempt. It held 
 out till the king came and relieved it, by gaining the battle of 
 Zorndorff. This confirms what we have faid of the difHculties, 
 attending fuch an enterprife, as the fiege of Glogau, or indeed 
 of any place of confiderable flrength, unlefs you can form your 
 magazines near fuch places, or that the country itfclf ihould be able 
 
 to
 
 in Germany. xxxiii 
 
 to fupply your army. But this can never happen as to ammu- 
 nitions and ftores, nor even as to fubfiftencesj if care is taken 
 to make the farmers depofit their grain in thofe places, where 
 a fiege is expedted. 
 
 The fituation of Cuftrin is very advantageous, and may be 
 confidered as one of the chief keys of Silefia and Brandeburg, 
 particularly the laft, whenever an invafion is expeded from the 
 Lower Viftula, that is, from Warfaw to Dantzig. 
 
 Some one column muft pafs here, and it would be no ways 
 fafe to penetrate into Brandeburg, without having previoufly 
 taken Cuftrin and Stettin. It were to be wiflied, that fome 
 means could be found to augment the fortifications of the for- 
 mer, fo as to make it capable of holding a numerous garrifon 
 of horfe and foot. This would add infinitely to its importance, 
 and it would then effedually cover the country on that 
 fide. Stettin, from its fituation chiefly, is capable of a long de- 
 fence, as appeared when it was taken from the Swedes, in the 
 beginning of this century. It is of infinite confequence to the 
 king of Pruffia, as it covers Brandeburg and Pomerania, in fuch 
 a manner, that though thefe provinces may be overrun and ra- 
 vaged, they can never be conquered: and we doubt whether 
 any of thofe powers, who may hereafter have views on this 
 town, will be in a condition to take it, without having made 
 a couple of fuccefsful campaigns, there being fo many things 
 to be done previous to the fiege of fuch a place. 
 
 Colberg is on the fea coaft, and though many miles diflant 
 from Stettin, it may be confidered as an outwork to that place, 
 it being the only pofl in that neighbourhood, where magazines 
 may be formed to befiege that fortrefs. No confiderable fup- 
 ply of provifions can be got, from the produces of the country: 
 
 f it muft;
 
 xxxiv History of the War 
 
 it mufl be brought from Livonia, Finland, Sweden, &c. by feav 
 So mulT: the artillery, ammunitions, and ftores, which cannot 
 be tranfported from the Viftula by land. Hence it appears of 
 what confequcnce Colberg is ; and we are therefore much fur- 
 prifed, that the king of Pruflia fhould have neglefted this place. 
 Its fortifications are fmall and inlignificant beyond conception, 
 and could not, if properly attacked, have held out two days. 
 The defence it made redounds as much to the honour of the 
 governor, as it does the imputation of ignorance on the befiegers. 
 If this place was made fit to hold a garrifon of 4000 foot, 
 and 2000 horfe, we think it would be impregnable to a Ruflian 
 army; as they could fcarce ever be provided with the neceifary 
 means to reduce it. Befides, it would efixdlually flop the 
 progrefs of an army coming that way ; efpecially if Cuftrin was 
 Kkewife put in the fituation we have mentioned. Glogau, Cuf- 
 trin, Colberg, and Stettin, may be rendered infuperable barriers, 
 on this fide the Pruflian dominions; as Neifs, Glatz, and Schweid- 
 nitz, are on the other. The putting thefe places in a refpedl- 
 able condition, is the more necefi!ary, as Pomerania and Bran- 
 deburg are open on that fide, and have abfolutely no interior 
 defence. 
 
 The frontiers of Pomerania, towards the Swedes and Meck- 
 Tenburgers, are ftrong by nature, and do not require the help 
 of art ; as the Prufiians are too powerful to fear any thing from 
 that quarter. 
 
 Of Prufiia I fliall only fay, it cannot be effedually defended 
 while it depends on the houfe of Brandeburg; becaufe thofe 
 who attack it are borderers, and have therefore at hand all the 
 means that can infure fuccefs, and all the refources necefiiary to 
 
 rcover
 
 in Germany. xxxv 
 
 recover themfelves after a defeat : whereas thofe who are to de- 
 fend it, are deprived of every advantage, and were they fubjedl 
 to no other lofs, than what naturally attends war, in one cam- 
 paign, they would be reduced to the neceflity of abandoning it, 
 as they could not poffibly be recruited in time, receive horfes 
 for remounting their cavalry, or be fupplied with ftores, 6cc. we 
 are therefore furprifed his majefty fhould attempt to defend it; 
 He, probably, held the Ruffians in fuch contempt, that he did 
 not doubt of their being eaiily beaten, and forced back into 
 their own country. But he faw his error, and therefore, after 
 his firft campaign, abandoned the country. Could his majefty 
 change this country with the Poles for that on the Lower Vif- 
 tula, it would be much for his advantage. I fliall dwell loneer 
 on the fubjedt of defending a diftant country, when I examine 
 the war in Weflphalia and Portugal, independent of politics, 
 and merely in a military view. 
 
 To the left of Pomerania, the king has the ftrong fortrefs of 
 Magdeburg on the Elbe, a place of great flrength, and of equal 
 importance; as he may form there in twenty-four hours, fuch a 
 body of troops, as will keep in awe the Saxons on the one fide, 
 and Holftein, Mecklenburg, and Hanover on the other. As to 
 the king's dominions on the Rhine, we rather think there fliould 
 be no fortrefs: becaufe it would be almoft impolTible to defend 
 them againft an enemy who is on that frontier: and it would be 
 too difficult to wreft them from him, fliould he become mafter 
 of them: whereas, if left open, he will be obliged to abandon 
 them. 
 
 The fate of Wefel in this lafl: war confirms our opinion. 
 
 f 2 In
 
 xxxvi History of the War 
 
 Of SAXONY and L U S A C E. 
 
 IN fpeakingof Bohemia and Silefia, we have already faid, that 
 the firft is feparated from Saxony by a chain of mountains 
 running from Egra to Pirna, and from Luface by the fame chain 
 of mountains running from Pirna to Friedland. From this place, 
 Luface is feparated from Silefia, by the Queifs and Bober. In 
 all this, fo extenfive, frontier, nor indeed on that towards Bran- 
 deburg and Thuringue, can any po-fition be taken, by any army 
 the cledtor of Saxony can raife, fo as to cover his country effec- 
 tually, becaufe it is not ftrong, either by art, or nature. How- 
 ever, to prcferve the capital from an enemy, coming by the way 
 of Auffig from Bohemia, a camp may be taken behind the ravin 
 of Ghifhubel, or further back at Grofs Zedlitz: this indeed is a: 
 refource for a few days only, becaufe the enemy, by marching a 
 column on the right of the Elbe by Schandau, may come and 
 encamp on the heights near the Weiflenhirfch, from whence he 
 will foon deftroy Drefden, or force you to a compofition : ftill' 
 more ufelefs would any camp in Luface be, becaufe you can 
 from no one place there, cover that country, or any part of 
 Saxony, either towards Bohemia, or on the fide of Brandeburg 
 and lower Saxony. 
 
 The fituation of the Pruflian dominions enables his majefty 
 to form different points of attack from Magdeburg, Brandeburg, 
 and Silefia, and his being fo much fuperior to the eledor of Sax- 
 ony, would render all the efforts of that prince in the defence 
 of his country vain. It is an unhappy fituation ; but fuch it is. 
 
 Saxony
 
 • in Germany* xxxvii 
 
 Saxony alone cannot withftand either Prufiia or Auftna^ and 
 therefore, by force, or perfualion, muft be made a party in every 
 war between thefe contending rivals. And as the country is 
 intirely open on the fide of Pruflia, he can over-run it and be 
 at the capital, before it is poflible for the Auftrians to bring 
 an army to cover it. We think, therefore, that Saxony fhould 
 unite herfelf to the houfe of Brandeburg. In the beginning 
 of the war, which happened at the death of Charles the fixth. 
 Saxony was connefted with Prufiia, and certainly fuffered no- 
 thing from this connexion j and had flie not altered her fyf- 
 tem, it is my opinion flie might have reaped fome advantages 
 from this union. In the lafi: part of that war, fhe was united 
 with Auftria, and was the vidlim of it. In a few days. Saxony 
 was lofl, and could not be recovered, but by the mediation of 
 England, and on fuch terms as the vidor thought proper to 
 impofe. 
 
 The tranfadtions of this laft war confirm our opinion, and 
 fhews the abfolute necefiity of changing her political fyftem. 
 She mufl forget that fhe has been equal to the houfe of Bran- 
 deburg : her jealoufy muft give way to fentiments of felf-pre- 
 fervation, which we think can be infured only by entering into 
 flrong and clofe connedions with PrufEa. 
 
 The interior of this country is interfered by many fmall 
 rivers, and by an infinite number of ravins, generally fo deep, 
 that they are almofl impaflable. Parallel to the Elbe runs the 
 Mulda J it rifes in the mountains called the Ertzgeburg, and 
 it falls into the Elbe, near DefTau. Its farthefl diflance frora 
 the Elbe, is about twelve miles : though it is no where very- 
 deep, yet as it runs through a deep ravin, whofe banks are very 
 
 higli
 
 xxxyiii History of the 'War 
 
 high and craggy, it is impoflible to pafs it, if you meet with 
 the leaft oppofition. 
 
 Between this river and the Elbe, are many good camps, but 
 no one poiition that can effectually cover the capital. 
 
 Tlie firft camp is on the right of the Weiftritz, with the 
 right wing at Plauen, and the left, on the mountain by Potch- 
 apel. To make this camp fecure, you muff have a ftrong corps 
 on the other fide of the ravin by PofendorfF, between Rabenau 
 and Dippoldifwalda, to cover your flank and watch Fribergi 
 The enemy coming up the Elbe may encamp with fafety, on 
 the heights of KelTelfdorfF. 
 
 The fecond camp is further down the Elbe, with the right at 
 Monzig, and the left at Rothfchonberg, with a deep ravin in 
 front, through which runs a marfliy rivulet. 
 
 On the other fide of this ravin, is another excellent camp, 
 called the Kattfenhaufer, which the Pruflians have often occu- 
 pied during the war. They likewife occupied one near MeifTen j 
 which was as bad as poffible, as will be evident, when we come 
 to give an account of feme adions which have paffed there, 
 during the war. 
 
 The third is at Lomatch. The fourth is at Ochatz, which 
 may be made very ftrong, by throwing up fome few redoubts 
 before the center, and beyond the right. 
 
 The fifth is at Strehlen, which is good, whichever way it is 
 taken ; but you muft have a corps at Hubertzburg. 
 
 The lafb of any confequence is at Torgau; which is a good 
 one A^'hatever way you place your front. However ftrong thefe 
 camps may be in front, no army can remain long in them, if 
 they are not fecured by ftrong corps, on the left fide of the 
 Mulda, and on the right of the Elbe; but if this precaution 
 is neglefted, an army, for example, deftined to cover Drefden 
 
 and
 
 f , 
 
 in Germany- xxxix 
 
 and Bohemia, mufl: inftantly fall back on that town, to fecure 
 its communication with Bohemia, if the enemy fends a corps, 
 beyond the Mulda or the Elbe. The fame thing will happen 
 to an army coming up that river ; a corps ported beyond thofe 
 rivers will foon force him back to fecure his communication 
 with the Lower Elbe, and with Brandeburg. This will be 
 confirmed by the operations of the war in that country. 
 
 Having explained the views of the different powers at war, 
 and given a proper defcription of the country, wherein it was 
 profecuted. We fhall now proceed to give an account of its 
 various operations, hoping to make it an ufeful, and agree- 
 able work to all military men ; for whofe ufe it was chiefly 
 undertaken. 
 
 HI STO RY
 
 HISTORY 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 WAR in GERMANY. 
 
 CAMPAIGN of 1756. 
 
 TH E king of Pruflia attempted to enter into a negotiation 
 with the court of \''ienna, and by that means gain time, 
 by which he hoped to find fome methods of dillblviiig 
 the confederacy ; or at Icalt to prevent its immediate eftedt. But, 
 finding all his propofals rejected with difdain, he refolved to anti- 
 cipate his enemy's dcfigns, and carry the war into their dominions, 
 rather than wait their attaclcing him in his own. The pofTellion 
 of Saxony is not only convenient, but almoft neceffary, in order to 
 invade Bohemia with fuccefs. His majcfly therefore determined 
 to occupy it J he was the more confirmed in this refolution, as he 
 knew the elecftor had tacitely concurred in all the fchemes concerted 
 for his ruin, and waited only for a fure opportunity to concur alfo 
 in the execution. 
 
 With this view, an army, confifting of near feventy battalions 
 and eighty fquadrons, divided into three different corps, entered the 
 eledlorate on the 29th of Auguft : the right wing compofed one, 
 and marched, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunfwic, 
 from the duchy of Magdebtirg, by Hall, Leipfig, Borna, Chem- 
 nitz, Friberg, and Dippoldifwalda, and thence towards Drefden, 
 the place dcfigned for the rendezvous of the army. The center, 
 ( B commanded
 
 2 History of the War 
 
 commanJed by the king in perfon, compofed the fecond carps, 
 and marched on the left of the Elbe, by Wittenberg, Torgau, 
 Meillcn, and thence by Keflelfdorff to Drefden. The left wing 
 formed the third corps, and was commanded by the duke of Bevern, 
 who marched from the neighbourhood of Frankfort on the Oder, 
 by Elflerwerda, Bautzen, Stolpen, and Lohmen, and there en- 
 camped on the right of the Elbe oppofite to Pirna. The whole 
 PruHian army affembled in the neighbourhood of DTcfden, on the 
 6th of September. His majefly's intention feems to have been to 
 perfuade the king of Poland to join him in attacking Bohemia, or, 
 which is more probable, in cafe of a refufal, to have a pretence for 
 fcizing Saxony, as it really happened foon after^ 
 
 The difpofition of the king's march into Saxony, we think very 
 fine, as there was not above 15,000 men in that country; which 
 v/cre not alTcmbl'ed, as yet, in a body ; and, even had they been fo, 
 they were ftill inferior to either of the king's columns, nor could 
 they advance againfl any one of them without being cut off from 
 Drefden by the other two, as appears evident from the infpedioa 
 of the map of tliat country. 
 
 The event confirmed the goodnefs of the difpofition ; tlie Saxons 
 were obliged to abandon the whole country ; and at lafl: they united, 
 to the number of about 14,000 men, in the well-known camp of 
 Pirna. His Poliih majefty had chofcn this pofition becaufe it was 
 thought impregnable ; and, as he imagined, fecurcd a communi- 
 cation with Bohemia ,- from whence only he could expedl any fuc- 
 cours, and where he could retire in cafe of necefiity. 
 
 Encouraged by thefe confiderations, he refolved to rejecft the 
 propofals made him by the king of Prufila j how honeflly we will 
 not pretend to determine, but not wifely, as will evidently appear 
 when we come to give our obfervations on this tranfaiftion.
 
 in G E R M A K Y, 1756, .3 
 
 The king of Pruflia, who propofed invading Bohemia, and re- 
 ducing it to his obedience before the emprefs could ailemble her 
 troops, or any of the other confederates be in a condition to attack 
 him, had, on his entering Saxony, ordered marflial Schwerin, at 
 the head of an army, confilling of thirty-three battahons and fifty- 
 five fquadrons, to enter that province by the v/ay cf Nachod and 
 Neuftadt. But, finding the Saxons would not come into his terms, 
 and were fo advantageoufly encamped that he could not force them, 
 he found it neceiTary to change his plan of operations. 
 
 He did not think it fafe to penetrate into Bohemia and leave the 
 Saxons mafters of the Elbe behind him, as he had no magazines 
 in that country ; nor could he convey, what little was to be found, 
 over thofe immenfe defiles into Bohemia, not having tranfports fuf- 
 ficient for that purpofe. For thefe reafons he refolved to reduce 
 the Saxons before he advanced any further ; to prevent them from 
 receiving any fuccours ; fecure u paflage for himfelf, when found 
 necellary; and obferve the motions of the Auflrians.' A confidc- 
 rable corps, firft under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunf- 
 wic, and afterv/ards under that of marfiial Keith, was fent to take 
 poft at Johnfdorff in Bohemia. Marfhal Schwerin was ordered to 
 keep his pofition at Aujeil, oppofite to Konigfgratz. This, the 
 king jufhly imagined, would oblige the Aufirians to fend an army 
 on that fide to oppofe his further progrefs ; and, if they thus 
 <iivided their forces, their efiforts to difengage the Saxons, fhould 
 they attempt it, as mofi: probably they would, mufi: be much lefs 
 formidable. 
 
 The emprefs, either with an intention to conceal her defigns 
 againfl the king of Pruffia 'till fiie and her allies were fufirciently 
 prepared to execute them, or from the uncertain, flow, and dila- 
 tory counfels of her minifiry, had not as yet aflembled any confide- 
 rable forces in Bohemia : however, on the motions of the Prufiians, 
 
 B 2 ^c
 
 4 H I s T o R V of the Wa r 
 
 file ordered all thofe that were then in the country to fjrm two 
 camps : the fmallcf^, commanded by prince Piccolomini, at Konlgf^ 
 gratz, to oppofe Schwerin : the greateft, commanded by mar/lial 
 Erown, at Kollin, which was deftined to march as foon.as poflible 
 to the relief of the Saxons. 
 
 The king encamped at Grofs Zedlitz, in the neighbourhood of 
 Pirna : his whole care was to block up the Saxons, and reduce 
 them by famine, as he could not attaek them with any probability 
 of faccefs. In this he fiicceeded to his \\ilh ; for, before the end 
 of September, they were reduced to the moil deplorable condition, 
 and in want of every thing. 
 
 The emprefs, informed of their fituation, and knowing that it 
 depended on that army, whether Bohemia or Saxony flaould be 
 made the feat of war, ordered M. Brown to march, and attempt 
 to relieve them at any rate. Upon this the marflial quitted his 
 camp at Kollin, and arHved the 23d of September at Budyn on the 
 Egra, in order to be at hand to concert meafurcs with tlie Saxons 
 for fuccouring them. Kere he was forced to remain 'till the 30t]i^ 
 to wait for the artillery and pontoons, then preparing at Vienna. 
 
 In this fituation things continued 'till the aSth, when his ma-^ 
 iefty, accompanied by fome general officers, went to marfiial Keith's 
 camp, in order to examine that pofition, and change it, if any 
 motions of the enemy fhould make it necefliiry, and then return 
 to the camp at Pirna. But, while he was here, advice was brought 
 him, that M. Brown, having at length got his artillery and pon- 
 toons, was preparing to pafs the Egra; which Ihewed plainly his 
 intention of relieving the Saxons. 
 
 The king tliought he could not fruftrate this defign mora 
 effedtually, than by advancing further into Bohemia, and force 
 M. Brown back, by a battle, if neceffary. His majefly, therefore^ 
 ordered his vanguard, confining of eleven fquadrons, 400 huffars^ 
 
 and
 
 in Germany, 1756. 5 
 
 and fix battalions, to march on the 29th of September from tlic 
 camp of JohnfdorfF, and occupy that at Tirmitz, beyond the ravin 
 and river at AufTig. Being here further informed, that the eneniy 
 was to pafs the Egra that very day, and encamp at Lovvofitz, he 
 thought it neceffary to pafs the mountains of Bafcopol and Klet- 
 chen, put the defiles behind him,, and occupy the avenues leading 
 into the plain before M. Brown's camp ; that he might, without 
 difficulty, advance and attack him, if he found it convenient ;. and 
 therefore, as foon as the head of the army, which had been ordereti 
 to follow to Tirmitz, appeared, he, on the 30th in the morninp;, 
 with the vanguard, fet out for Welmina ; where the whole army 
 arrived, without any other difficulty but tlie badnefs of the roads, 
 at eight o'clock at night-. 
 
 The king fearing the enemy would march in the night, and 
 occupy the mountains of Radoflitz and Lobofch, and, by taking 
 fuch a pofition, not only make it impoffible to attack thern^ but 
 force his majefty to fall, back to Aufiig, which could not be done 
 without the utmoft difficulty, he refumed his march, paffed the 
 ravin, and occupied the mountains on the other fide i the van- 
 guard in G. C. and the reft of the army in. G, G^ whcr^ they 
 remained the whole night, in the order they had marched ; it 
 being too late to camp, and the more fo as the ground had not 
 been fufficiently reconnoitred.. 
 
 The firft of October, in the morning, the Pruffian army, ccn- 
 fifting of fixty-five fquadrons, twenty-fix battalions, and 102 pieces 
 of cannon, was formed in I. I. the infantry in two lines, and the 
 cavalry in three, behind ; as well for want of ground, as from its. 
 nature, which rendered it improper for cavalry to aft in. 
 
 The right wing of the infantry was pofted in the village cf 
 Radoftitz, at the foot of a hill of the fame name. Before tl:iis is 
 another hill, called the Homolkaberg, which, though much lower 
 
 til an*
 
 6 History of the Wa r 
 
 than tlic former, is however Co high that it commands all the plain 
 underneath, as far as the village of Sulowitz, The king afterwards 
 advanced his right wing to this hill, and placed a battery of heavy 
 cannon upon it. 
 
 The center occupied the valley formed by that mountain and 
 the Lobofchberg, on which the left wing was ported : this laft 
 mountain is prodigioufly high and fteep, and runs into the plain, 
 almoft to Lowofitz, The fide of it is covered with vineyards, 
 which are fcparated by ftone viralls ; in thefe M. Brown had pofted 
 fome thoufand Croats, who were fuftained by feveral battalions of 
 Hungarian infantry ; K. K. parallel to thefe mountains, and at 
 fome few hundred yards diftant from the foot of them, runs a 
 niar/hy rivulet, which in many places fpreads itfelf in the plain, 
 and forms feveral large lakes j between this rivulet and the hills, 
 on which the PrufTian army was formed, runs alfo a very deep 
 ravin^ from Sulowitz to Lowofitz. The only pafTes over this rivu- 
 let and ravin are at thefe two villages, and over a narrow ftone 
 bridge between them. The ground behind this rivulet rifes a 
 little, particularly towards Sulowitz ; on this the Auftrian army 
 B. B. confjfting of feventy-two fquadrons, fifty-two battalions, and 
 ninety-eight pieces of cannon, was pofted. It was formed in two 
 lines, and a corps de referve : the infantry was in the center, and 
 the cavalry on the wings, as ufual ; that on the right, however, 
 a little before the adlion began, marched forwards, and occupied 
 the plain N. N. on the left of the village of Lowofitz, L. L. 
 M. Brown had ordered this village to be fortified, and had placed 
 fome of his beft infantry in it, with a prodigious quantity of 
 artillery. He had likewife raifed a large battery, and fome re- 
 doubts, on the plain before it. By this means he thought he 
 had rendered his right inattackable ; his center, and left, cove- 
 red by the marlhy rivulet, and the ravin above-mentioned, were 
 
 in
 
 in Germany, 1756. f 
 
 in reality fo ; and therefore he refolved to wait the event in that 
 pofition. 
 
 As to the king's difpofition we have nothing to fay ; excepting 
 that from the beginning he ought to have placed his cavalry in the 
 center, from Lobofchberg to Kinitz i this would have enabled him. 
 to leave more infantry upon the Homolka mountain, and to have 
 reinforced llill more his left, where he propofed making his chief 
 effort. From this pofition he might have fullained thofe fquadrons 
 he fent to attack the enemy's horfe, whereas they could be of no 
 ufe behind the infantry, as they could not, in that fituation, pro- 
 tecft it, in cafe they were repulfed at Lowofitz. 
 
 The king's a<5tivity in marching from Johnfdorff to Welmina 
 fliews he knew how important it was to put the defile behind 
 him ; a general maxim, when you advance towards an enemv, 
 which we prefume to recommend, for reafons too obvious, in our 
 opinion, to require an explanation » 
 
 The Auftrians fhould, we think, have fent fbme heavy artillery 
 on the right of the Elbe, and have placed a battery, as we have 
 reprefented in the plan ; this would have taken the Pruffian infan- 
 try in flank, while they advanced through the plain, from the 
 Lobofchberg, to attack Lowofitz. Why the Auftrian horfe pafled 
 the ravin to attack the Pruffians in Q^Q^we cannot conceive; as 
 it could not ferve any purpofe whatever. 
 
 The adtion begun, about feven in the morning, between the 
 Pruflian's left wing, and the troops which M. Brown had ported 
 in the Lobofchberg ; and was fuftained by an irregular lire, with- 
 out any confiderable advantage on either fide 'till near 12 o'clock: 
 then the day, which had been fo foggy that nothing could be dif- 
 tinguiflied at the diftance of a hundred yards, began to clear up. 
 A large body of Auftrian horfe N. N. was difcovered in the plain 
 by Lowofitz, as well as fome infantry in and about that village^
 
 8 History of the War 
 
 and at tlie redoubts and battery. As no regular line appeared then, 
 the king thought it was only the rear-guard ; and he was the more 
 perfuadcd of this, becaufe, from fome motions heard the night 
 before, in the enemy's camp, he imagined the army had cither 
 pafled the Elbe at Leutmeritz, or was retired back to the old 
 camp at Budyn. To be certam, however, he ordered a regiment 
 of dragoons and fome horfe O. O. to pafs through the intervals of 
 the iflfantrv and attack that cavalry. They did fo in Q^Q^and 
 drove th«m back beyond the ravin : in purfuing them, they ad- 
 vanced fo far, that they were cxpofed to a heavy cannonade from 
 Lowofitz and Sulowitz, and it was with great difiiculty and lofs 
 that they could retire under the protedion of their infantry in R. 
 from whence they were commanded to rcfume their firrt: pofition 
 behind the line. 
 
 By this time the fog was intirely dillipated, and the Auflrian 
 army appeared very clearly, in the pofition we have fliewn in the 
 
 aimexed plan. 
 
 The king, having examined it for fome time, judged the right 
 to be the weakeft for many reafons, and chiefly, by its being com- 
 manded from the Lobofchberg. He therefore ordered his fecond 
 line to enter into the firft, with the cavalry in the center, that he 
 mieht extend his front and occupy the Homolka and Lobofchberg 
 in force: this being foon executed, th-e whole army marched, in- 
 ciininy ahvays to the left; from whence he propofed making his 
 attack. This left being reinforced, and protedled by the fire of a 
 very numerous and well-ferved artillery, advanced down the Lo- 
 bofchbero- towards Lowofitz, and with great eafe drove the Croats 
 K- K. though fupported by the beft of the Auflrian infantry, out 
 of the vineyards into the plain : this will appear very natural from 
 the defcription we have given of this mountain, which overlooked 
 tlie vineyai-ds in fuch a manner, that the troops placed in them 
 
 could
 
 ill Germany, -^ZS^.t g 
 
 could not raife their heads high enough to dired their fliot at the 
 Prulfians while they came down, and confequciitly made but a 
 feeble refiftance. 
 
 M. Brown fent feveral battalions of his bed infantry from his 
 right to fuftain them in the mountains ; and general Lacy, who 
 commanded them, made feveral rigorous, but fruitlefs, attacks at 
 the foot of the mountain, in one of which he was wounded. At 
 lail he was convinced it was needlefs to renew the attempt, and 
 therefore fell back towards Lowofitz. 
 
 The Prufiians, being now quite mafcers of the Lobofchberg, 
 were ordered to halt at the foot of it, in order to reform the line, 
 which had been a little dilbrdered, as well by the adlion itfelf, as 
 by the irregularity and difficulty of the ground, and to bring up 
 the artillery : a precaution fo neceffary, that the negledl of it has 
 very often been the caufe of the lofs of many battles which might 
 hav€ been won. 
 
 As foon as they were formed, th«y advanced in feveral lines S. S. 
 towards Lowofitz, keeping their left clofe to the Elbe to avoid tiie 
 lire of the battery L. L. the right ftill continued on the Homclk-.i 
 mountain; by this dilpofition the enemy's left and center were 
 prevented from attempting any thing on that fide, and the king 
 was enabled to withdraw his left without danger, if it was repulfcd 
 at Lowofitz : which indeed was not very probable ; becaufe, from 
 the fituation of the ground, he could reinforce it with greater faci- 
 lity, and in much lefs time, than the enemy could his right : con- 
 fequently could bring a greater number of men into adlion, at the 
 fame time, which generally muft decide the fate of it. 
 
 Marshal Brown, believing that the viftory depended on his 
 being able to keep Lowofitz, threw almoft his whole right wing 
 into it, and about it ; the adlion therefore was here, long and 
 obllinate; at length however it was determined in favour of the 
 
 C Pruilians,
 
 it> History of the War 
 
 Prufi'ians, and chiefl}' by the help of their aifillery, which had fet 
 the village on fire. This circurnftance, and the want of ground 
 to form upon, put tlic Auftrians in confufion ; and, as they could' 
 not be fuftained by a proper line for want of room, the communi- 
 cations not having been made broad enough to permit three or 
 four battalions to march up in front to fupport them, they were 
 forced to abandon it, and fall back, with precipitation on their 
 cavalry.* 
 
 Marshal Brown, feeing his right wing forced, ordered his lefr 
 to advance through the village of Sulowitz W. W. and attack the- 
 cnemy's right : this they attempted to execute, but in vain ; a 
 fmall number only of the infantry could pafs the village ; and thofe 
 were unable to form on the other fide under the fire of a numerous 
 heavy artillery, which played on them from tlie battery on the 
 Homolka mountain, within a few hundred yards of the damm over 
 which they were to pafs the marfliy rivulet at Sulowitz : the few 
 who had paffed were therefore obliged to fall back inftantly into- 
 the village, which they repaffcd in confufion, as many houfes were 
 already on fire. 
 
 This attempt of the marflial's was too unreafonable to have 
 been undertaken with any other view, as we think, than merely^ 
 to draw the enemy's, attention that way, and gain time to put his 
 right in fome order, and facilitate a retreat. 
 
 This he executed in a mafterly manner, V. V. He ordered his 
 center and left to make a movement to the right, by which they. 
 occupied the ground, in the inftant the right quitted it, behind 
 
 Lowofitz. 
 
 ■* When a village is iutended to be fupf ortcd, the retrenchment mull be feparsted from 
 the houfes by an interval, fufRcient for the troops to form in, between the houfes and re- 
 trenchments ; and the village mull be cleared behind, that you may march two or more 
 battalions in front, otherwife you cannot defend it; the inftant 'tis put on fire you muH 
 abandon it in fuch confufion as femetimes comnhinicates to the whole line.
 
 in Germa^ny, 1756. j^ 
 
 Lowofiiz. This infantry, faftained by the right wing of tlie ca- 
 valry, covered the retreat fo efteclBally, that no attempt was made 
 to trouble it. 
 
 The marflial took a new pofition a little further back : the left 
 and center continued at fome diftance behind the marihy rivulets, 
 and the right formed an angle with the line, having the front to- 
 wards the plain, behind Lowofitz and the Elbe. So tliat the enemy 
 could not pafs through Lowofitz and form on the plain, with his 
 rear immediately on the Elbe, under the fire of a numerous artil- 
 lery ; and the Icfs fo, as, to form fuch a line, his battalions and 
 fquadrons muft have prefentcd their flank in marching to take up 
 their ground. 
 
 These reafons induced, or rather forced, the king to ixmain 
 fatisfied with the advantage he had gained, and keep his line 
 beloind Lowofitz, X. X. While marflial Brown continued in this 
 pofition, tlie king had by no means eiTedled his defign. The adlion 
 was not any ways decifive, and tlierefore had not made it impof- 
 iible for M. Brown to attempt the relief of the Saxons. Me was 
 now jufl as much in a condition to undertake it as before tlie 
 adlion, his lofs having been inferior to that of the Pruihans ; nei- 
 ther could the king attack him with any probability of fuccefs, as 
 he muft, in pafiing the marlliy rivulet, expofe his army to thofe 
 difilculties which M. Brown had, by experience, found unfur- 
 niountable. 
 
 From this very em.barrailing fituation his majefty's fupcrior 
 talents extricated him. He fent the duke of Bevern with a laro-e 
 
 o 
 
 body of horfe and foot to TfchilTcovitz, as if he propofed turning 
 the enemy's left flank, and hemm them in between the Elbe and 
 the Egra. This manoeuvre had its defired effedl. Marflial Brown, 
 fearing the event, haftened to repafs this.laft river, and occupy his 
 old camp at Budyn, which he did without any lofs, 
 
 C 2 Thus
 
 12 History of the Wa r 
 
 Thus ended the battle of Lowofitz, which begun at 7 o'clock, 
 and ended at three. Both parties claim the viftory. It muft liow- 
 ever be confefTed that the Pruffians have the beft right to it, if we 
 judge from the confequences of the ailtion, which is the only cer- 
 tain rule to go by in limilar cafes. 
 
 The Auftrians did certainly intend to difengage the Saxons, and 
 with that view advanced to Lowofitz. The king could have no 
 other ohjeft in view than to prevent their executing this plan. 
 This end was obtained by the battle of Lowofitz, and the fubfe- 
 quent manccuvres, which forced the Auftrians back behind the 
 Egra, and fo hindered them from undertaking any thing of confc- 
 qucnce for the relief of their friends the Saxons. Had the Pruffians 
 gained a more compleat vidtory, they would have been enabled to. 
 take their winter quarters in Bohemia. 
 
 The \ofs of the Auflrians on this occafion amounted to 19 officers^ 
 420 private men, killed: 105 officers, 1729 men, wounded: 711 
 miffing, or taken prifoners : and 475 horfes killed and wounded : 
 in all, 2984. Among the dead was count Radicati,* lieutenant 
 general of horfe, who commanded the right wing. Among the 
 wounded arui miffing was major general prince Lobowitz, and 
 many field officers. Among the many who diftinguilhed them- 
 felves, Marffial Brown, in his letter to the emprefs, takes parti- 
 cular notice of general Odonell,-]- who, after the death of Radicati, 
 commanded the right wing of the cavalry, prince Lowenfteiiii 
 Lacy, &c. &c. Th« lofs of the Pruffians, in the cavalry, amounted 
 
 to, 
 
 ♦ Count Radicati was born in Piemont. In 1739 ^-^ ^^^^ lieutenant colonel in Vernes's 
 liorfe; wounded at the battle of Grotzlca ; in 1740 was made a colonel; in 1745 a major 
 oeneial ; in 175 1 he obtained a regiment; and in 1754 a lieutenant general. He had the 
 reputation of a good officer, and particularly for his talents in exercifing the troops. 
 
 f Count Odonell is born of a vcrj good family in Ireland : he was for forae time lieu- 
 tenant colonel in Ollone's dragoons ; in 1742 a colonel of Baleyra's ; in 1746 a major genc- 
 .-a!, as a rccompcncc for his bravery and conduvl at the battle of Parma. In the expedition 
 
 againlfc
 
 in Germany, 1756. 13 
 
 to n officers, 281 private men, killed: 28 officers, 424 men, 
 wounded: 8 officers, 238 private men, prifoners. In the infantr>', 
 5 officers, 423 men, killed: 53 officers, 1374 men, wounded: 
 5 officers, 458 men, taken prifoners. In all, 3308. Among the 
 dead were major generals Oertzen,* Luderitz.f and Quadt. J And 
 among the wounded was lieutenant general Kleift, \\ who died foort 
 
 after of his wounds. 
 
 Marshal Brown, having failed in his attempt to relieve the 
 Saxons on the left of the Elbe, refolved to try his fortune on the 
 
 right". 
 
 aRalnft Provence he commanded a detached corps with repirtatJon. In this battle he com- 
 aTanded the right wing during the greatcft part of the aftion. and d.ftinguifoed himfelf 
 very much, for which he had a regiment given him. and was made a lieutenant general. 
 We fhall have occafion to mention this gentleman often, in the courfe of tins work, with 
 great applaufe. . 
 
 • This gentleman was major general of horfe. he had in hl3 youth lludied at HJle, m 
 Saxony : he was a long time a ftandard bearer and fubalter in the gens d'armes ; in 177; a 
 captain of horfe; in ,739 ^ ^^'P^ ' i" '74i ^ lieutenant colonel: and having diftingu-flici 
 himftlf at the battle of Soor he had the ordre pour le merite ; in 174; was a colonel; m 
 ,750 a major general ; in 175.2 had a regiment given him l at this battle he received three 
 wounds in the head, of which he died the next day. , 
 
 t Major general I.uderitz was born in 1699, In 171; was an under ofF.ccr in the Pctf- 
 dam guard; in 1719 a cornet; in 1725 a captain of horfe; in 17+0 a major; in 1743 a 
 lieutenant colonel, and diflinguilhed himfelf very much at the battles of Hohenfriedberg 
 and Keffelfdorff; in 1745 a colonel ; in 1752 a major general. His body was tore to pieces 
 by a cannon balL 
 
 t Baron Qaadt was in 1728 a major; in 1736 a lieutenant colonel; in 1743 a colonel; 
 in, 1747 a major general ; and then obtained a regiment. 
 
 il Lieutenant general Kleift was born in 1688. In 170Z he was a cadet ; in 1708 wounded 
 in the foot, which left the bone crooked for ever after ; foou after he went into the Talatia 
 fervice, and ferved the war in Flanders 'till the peace in 1712 ; in 1716 he returned into 
 the Pruflian fervice ; in 1724 was made a major; in 1729 he went as volunteer to Corfica ; 
 in 1738 was lieutenant colonel ; in 1742 a colonel, and was in alaioft all the aftions of thai 
 war in Silefia; in 1745 a major general; in 1747 had a regiment; in 175^5 a lieutenant 
 teneral. In the battle of Lowofitz he was wounded ; he continued however on horfcback, 
 without binding his wounds, 'till 4 o'clock. Soon after the king gave him the order of ihe 
 black eagk. He died of his wounds in Jaiy;ary follows ing at Diel'den.
 
 14 IT I s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 right. It was agreed that the Saxons (liould pafs the'Elbe, the 
 1 1 til of Oftober i'n the night, near Konigftein ; and that the mar- 
 llial fl:ioulJ attack tlie PrulTians at Ratmanrdorff and Borfdorff the 
 1 2th in the morning, while the Saxons did the fame on tlieir fide. 
 Accordingly he, at the head of about 8ooo men, palled the Elbe 
 near Raudnitz, and marclicd by Neuftadtel, Romburg, and Hanf- 
 pach, and arrived at Lichtcnhayn, where he encamped, waiting to 
 hear the PrulTians and Saxons engaged, (which he knew mufl; hap- 
 pen the iiifl.an-t thefe lail paffed the Elbe) that he might likewife 
 enter into adion, and execdte his part of the concerted plan. 
 
 The weather had been fo remarkably rainy and flormy, that the 
 Saxons could not efFecft their paflage over the Elbe 'till the 13th at 
 four o'clock in the morning, and then with much difficulty and 
 lofs of time. This gave the PruHians an opportunity of reinforcing 
 all their ports on the right of the Elbe, fo that the Saxons found 
 themfelves oppofed by for^ces much fuperior to what they expefted. 
 The ground on the right fide of the Elbe, about Pirna and Konig- 
 ftein, is interfecftcd by high mountains, covered with thick woods j 
 they are fcparatcd by deep ravins, formed by the rain in autumn, 
 and by the melting fnow in the beginning of fummer j there are 
 confequently very few pracflicablc roads. Thefe the Pruflians had 
 occupied, and fortified, with the utmoft care, by retrenchments, 
 abattis, Sec. 
 
 Among thefe great mountains is the Lilienftein, extremely high, 
 and fo near the Elbe, that there is no room to form upon between 
 the foot of it and the banks of the river ; and only one very narrow 
 road. 
 
 The Saxons paflcd the Elbe oppofite to this mountain, and en- 
 deavoured to form ; but the want of room did not permit it ; and 
 therefore they lay together in confuiion, on and about a fmall emi- 
 nence, near the village of Ebenhcit. From this fituation, fur- 
 rounded
 
 in German v, 1756. 1 5 
 
 rounded by every difficulty Avhich art and nature could oppofe, it 
 was juftly, as we think, judged impoflible for ihem to extricate 
 themfelves. 
 
 The PrufHans, in the mean time, had entered the camp of Pirna 
 early in the morning of the 13th, where they found the rear-guard 
 of the Saxons, and moft of the baggage ; both fell into their hands,, 
 the bridge having been broke before any confiderable part of them 
 could pafs : deftitute of. every refource,. extenuated with hunger 
 and cold, havip.g been under arms from the lath at night 'till the 
 14th in the morning, deprived of all hopes of being fuccoured by 
 M. Brown, who now informed them of his being only at Lichten- 
 hayn, and that he could net advance any nearer, it was refolved to 
 capitulate ; he, on his part, having waited above two days v/ithout- 
 receiving any intelligence from the Saxons, thought it neceffary to 
 provide for his own fafcty, and therefore retired. He loil no more 
 than 200 men in his retreat, which was trifling, if we coniider that 
 he might have been cut off entirely, had the Pruffians, encamped 
 at Lowofitz, been a little more vigilant ; becaufe they might have 
 pafled the Elbe, behind him, near Lowofitz, or Leutmeritz. 
 
 During this tranfadion the king arrived, the 14th in the morn- 
 ing, at his army in Saxony, and, after much negotiating, a treaty 
 was concluded with the king of Poland on the i8tli,. by which it 
 was ftipulated, that the Saxon army fhould difperfc, and enp-ao-e- 
 not to ferve againft the king of Pruflia, who was to remain mafter 
 of Saxony j and that the king of Poland fiiauld have leave to retird 
 into that kingdom. 
 
 The king of Pruffia having thus accompliihed his defigns, for 
 this campaign, ordered his armies to. quit Bohemia. This was 
 accordingly done before the end of the month. That commanded 
 by marfhal Sehwerin fell back into Silefia, and cantoned on the 
 frontiers of Bohemia from Zuckmantel to GreifFenberg. That 
 
 under
 
 i6 History of the Wa r 
 
 under the king cantoned in Saxony, and formed a chain from Egra 
 to Pirna, and from thence through Lufice, as far as the Qjjeifs. 
 
 Thus ended the campaign of 1756, which lafted only two 
 months; the tranfadions of it however juflly demand our atten- 
 tion, as well for the reputation of the generals, as for the impor- 
 tance of its event ; we ihall therefore give our obfcrvations on the 
 one, and the other. 
 
 The king of Prullia feems to have committed fome faults, both 
 as a politician, and as a general. He had known, a long time be- 
 fore he entered Saxony, that a formidable confederacy was forming 
 againfl: him ; and yet it docs not appear that he ever attempted to 
 make any alliance to countcrl)alIance it, and render its effeifb vain; 
 which, confidcring the great afcendency he had acquired in Europe, 
 he might probably have done. 
 
 He confided too much in himfelf, and had too defpicable an 
 opinion of his enemies, which might, and indeed ought, naturally 
 to liave proved fatal to him. 
 
 The next fault that occurs is, that he did not begin the war in 
 1755, or at leafl in April 1756; he was then as well prepared, as 
 in the month of Auguft, when he entered Saxony; whereas his 
 enemies were infinitely lefs Co.* 
 
 His negotiating with the king of Poland, before and after he 
 entered Saxony, we believe, was intended only to amufe that prince, 
 and prevent him from taking any meafures that might obflrudt or 
 retard his operations againfi: the Auftrians, who no doubt were the 
 
 only 
 
 • We think it a gencrnl rule that you ought to begin the campaign as foon as poflible ; 
 becaufc, if you are on the cfFenfivc, you will have time to execute whatever you have pro- 
 poled to do; if on the defenfive, 'tis no lefs neceflary to enter into the field as foon as pof- 
 fible ; bccaufc, if you arc beforehand with the enemy, you confunie the forage, and dertroy 
 the country from whence he is to live. Add, that you gain time, and rnahe him lofe the 
 campaign in driving you out of his country; and, when lie has tfTcdled it, 'tis too late to 
 undertake any thing againfl your's.
 
 in Germany, 1756. 17 
 
 only object of his projedls at this time. Our reafons for this opi- 
 nion are, that, by the tenor and manner o£ this negotiation, there 
 does not appear the leaft tendency to a compofition, but on con- 
 dition of his remaining mafler of Saxony, and of that army beinp- 
 difperfed, which no doubt he was refolved to accomplifli, that he 
 might proceed to invade Bohemia with greater hopes of fuccefs. 
 
 Whether we confider this tranfad:ion in a political, or a mili- 
 tary light, it will appear to have been a prudent and wife meafure. 
 He knew too much of the fentiments of the Saxon court, with 
 regard to himfelf, and of the part they took in the confederacy 
 formed againfb him, to confide in any offers they made him. He 
 could not prudently leave an army of 14,000 men behind him. 
 For, though the kihg of Poland promifed to difperfe them, he 
 could with eafe aflemble them, and augment them at pleafi'.re; 
 n«d foon be in a condition to Biake the Pruffian monarch repent 
 of his imprudence. 
 
 The poffeiTion of Saxony, confidered in a military light, is of 
 fo much confequence, that it is not poflible to attack the emprefs, 
 on that fide of her dominions, with the lead probability of fuccefs, 
 without it. Being extremely rich and populous, an army of 40,000 
 men can be raifed and maintained by this eledlorate. Magazines 
 may b« formed on the Elbe, from whence an army in Bohemia 
 may be abundantly fupplied ; and, by its pofition, if you are mafter 
 of Silefia, you furround Bohemia in fuch a manner, that you force 
 the emprefs to feparate her armies into fo many divifions, that Ihe 
 cannot oppofe your entering that country, any where, with fuccefs, 
 as appears from the wars carried on there at different tinaes : whereas, 
 if you are not mafler of Saxony, you can enter Bohemia on the fide 
 ef Silefia only. This enables the emprefs to unite, in fome meafure, 
 her forces, which are effecftually covered by Olmutz and Prague, 
 when foroed to fall back ; i'rom whence they cover Auftria ; and 
 
 D in
 
 i8 History of the War 
 
 in thio cafe the king of PrufTia muft always leave an army on the 
 Low£r Elbe, to cover his own dominions on that fide, left the 
 eledtor of Saxony, by force or perfuafion, fhould be induced to. 
 join the Auftrians. 
 
 For thele reafons we think the invafion of Saxony was a wife 
 meafure; how far it may be confiftent with juftice, thofe, who- 
 are better acquainted with the laws of nations tlian we are, muft 
 determine. 
 
 From what has been faid, it feems that tlie king of Pruffia 
 committed a capital fault, in not having marched into Bohemia, 
 the moment he (aw the Saxons determined to defend their camp 
 at Pirna, and reje<ft the terms which he propofed; becaufe he muft 
 certainly know that the Auftrian army was not affembled in any 
 confiderable numbers; and that it wanted artillery andftores; that 
 it was pofted at fuch a diftance as made it impoflible for M. Brown 
 to oppofe his entering into Bohemia, or ftop his progrefs when he 
 Ihould be there ; and therefore would fall back on the Danube, if 
 puftied, as well to cover the capital, as to fecure his communi- 
 cation with the troops he expeded from Flanders, Italy, anc^i 
 Iluno-ary. His majefty therefore would have found Bohemia 
 abandoned ; and, during the winter, he might with eafe have 
 reduced Prague and Oimutz j both which places being then quite 
 unprovided, and incapable of oppoftng any confiderable refiftance. 
 
 The conqueft of thefe two places would have enabled his majefty 
 to begin the next campaign in Moravia, at leaft ; and perhaps oa 
 the Danube -, with the fiege or blockade of Vienna : from whence 
 he might, without any rilk, have fent a confiderable corps on the 
 frontiers of Hungary; and the army, deftined to guard Saxony, 
 into the empire, between the fources of the Main and the Upper 
 Danube. The firft would have hindered the emprefs from receiving 
 »ny fuccours from thofe countries : and the laft would efFedtually 
 
 prevent
 
 in German- V, 1756. la. 
 
 prevent thofe princes, who were his enemies, froJ^ uniting againft 
 him ; encourage thofe who favoured him j overawe the French in 
 Alface, and on the Main ; and raife fuch contributions as would 
 have recruited and maintained his armies. Had his majefly taken 
 thefe fteps, he would have cut off all communication with 
 Flanders and Hungary ; and even with the Tyrol, if the armvj 
 which I fuppofe in the empire, fent a ftrong corps to occupy Paffau 
 and its caftle, at the confluent of the Inn and the Danube; one of 
 the mofl: important polls on that river; which cuts off all commu- 
 nication between Vienna and the empire, overawes Upper Auftria* 
 as well as the Tyrol. The few refources left her imperial majelLy 
 would have been foon exhauflcd. 
 
 Marshal Bellcifle, on the death of Charles VI. formed a plan 
 for dividing his dominions. 
 
 The French and Bavarians were to march down the Danube, 
 through Upper Auftria, to Vienna. The Prufiians and Saxons 
 were to enter Bohemia, and, having reduced it, proceed to Vienna 
 like wife. 
 
 In the firft campaign the French and Bavarians entered Upper 
 Auftria, which they laid under contribution to the gates of Vienna. 
 The Pruffians and Saxons conquered Bohemia ; and nothing could 
 have prevented the entire and compleat execution of M. Belleifle's 
 plan, but the ignorance of fome of the chiefs, the weaknefs of 
 cardinal Fleury, and the divifions among the allies. 
 
 The king of Pruilia being mafter of all the places on the Elbe, 
 by leaving a fmall corps to watch the camp of Pirna, he made it 
 impoffible for the Saxons to undertake any thing againft him. 
 Suppofing they quitted their camp, thev could not fubfifl: iu 
 Saxony, having neither places nor magazines of any kind ; being 
 at the fame time continually harraffed by the corps, which we 
 fuppofe, left there to obferve them : much lefs could they advance 
 
 D 2 into
 
 20 History of the War 
 
 into Bohemia, in order to join the Auftrians; becaufe they would 
 find themfelves inclofed between the kind's army, and the corpj 
 left in Saxony. In the end, therefore, they muft have difperfed 
 of theiiifclves. 
 
 His forces At this time were numerous, and he might with eafe 
 have brought 110,000 men into the field; 20,000 of which were 
 more than fuPncient ta block up effectually the Saxons in their 
 camp at Pirna, as appeared from the facfl itfclf ; for there was no 
 more under prince Maurice when they were forced to capitulate; 
 The remaining 90,000 were certainly more than fufficlent to drive 
 the Auftrians to the Danube. 
 
 As the army under M. Schwerin was far fuperior to that under 
 prince Piccolomini, and better provided with artillery, we think 
 he ought to have attacked him ; and, if he thought the camp of 
 Konigfgratz too ftrong, he might leave him there^ and march, on 
 the right of the Elbe, towards Brandeifs, or even approach Prague; 
 This manoeuvre would infallibly force M. Brown to quit his pofi- 
 tion on the Egra, and fall back to cover that place. M. Schwerii 
 rifk'd nothing by this motion, becaufe Piccolomini was too weak 
 to execute any folid enterprize in Silcfia : and, as to fubfiftance, 
 the marfhal could never be in want ; the country, being verj' fruit- 
 ful, would have ftirniflied him abundantly. Flad what we here 
 propofe been executed, the Auftrians muft have abandoned the 
 circles of Saatz, Leutmeritz, Buntzlau, and Konigfgratz, in order 
 to afiemble their forces about Prague, and keep open their com- 
 munication with the Danube; and, if we confider the very bad 
 ftate of that army, it is probable they would have been forced back 
 as far as Moravia i fo that the king, even without coming to an 
 adicn, would have been mafter of the greateft part of Bohemia;, 
 and have taken his winter quarters in that kingdom. Befides, the 
 
 Saxon3>
 
 in Germaiw^ '^75^' ^i 
 
 Saxons, on- feeing their friends forced back, \^ould not have pre- 
 fumed to make any ftand in the camp of Pirna. 
 
 As to the Auftrians, they feem to have committed many faults, 
 and thcfe fuch capital ones, as might have decided the fate of 
 tlieir empire, had the king of Pruflia taken, the meafures already 
 indicated. 
 
 It was well known, even in the month of June, that the king 
 intended attacking the Auftrian dominions. From the motions 
 then made in the duchy of Magdeburg and the adjoining country,. 
 it was more than probable that part of his troops would march 
 through Saxony. This fliould ha-ve determined the Aufb'ians to 
 fend ark army there, in order to fuflain the Saxons in tliat country,. 
 or at leaft facilitate their retreat into Bohemia^ This being neg- 
 lecfled, they fhould have occupied the defiles as far as the ravin of 
 Ghifhubel, and thofe by Altenberg, by which a communication 
 with the Saxons was kept open.^ Half the troops tlien in Bohemia, 
 pofted properly in thofe mountains, would have made it impoffible 
 for the Pruilians either to reduce the Saxons, or to penetrate into 
 Bohemia. 
 
 The refl of the army, deftined to a£l en this fide, fhould have 
 encamped any where between the Egra and the abovementioncd 
 defiles, and have thrown bridges over the Elbe, in order to fend 
 their light troops, on the right of that river, as far as Schandaii 
 and Hohenftein. 
 
 This would have forced the kino; to fall back, to Drefden. The 
 next campaign the fame difficulty would have occurred ; and there- 
 fore, at laft, he muft have renounced to the hopes of entering Bo- 
 hemia on that fide ; left an army to guard Saxony ; and limit his 
 operations to the fide of Silefia only. By thus fecuring the moun- 
 tains with 20,000 Auflrians, and the 14,000 Saxons, they could 
 always enter Saxony, and probably re-occupy it, confidering that 
 r the
 
 23 History of the Wa r 
 
 tlie army of the empire could afiemble on the Saala, and with eaie 
 penetrate into that country by Voightland, on the PrufTians right 
 Hank ; who, not being covered by any fortrefs on that lide, muft 
 fall back towards Wittemberg, and perhaps farther down. This 
 furnifhed an opportunity of retaking all the places on the Elbe ; 
 snd of fending a corps, through Luface, into the marquifatc of 
 JBrandeburg. The pofition of GrofTenhayn cuts off all communi- 
 cation between Silefia and Saxony, and rendered that between Silefia 
 and Brandeburg precarious; becaufe the light troops, fuftained by 
 the army at GrofTenhayn, could have made incurfions as far as the 
 Oder. Piccolomini's corps, if properly ported, was ftrong enough 
 fo oppofe Schwerin, and prevent his undertaking any thing of con- 
 fequence; which probably he had no intention to do, while the 
 king was hindered from entering Bohemia. 
 
 Having negledled to occupy the defiles leading to Pima, it 
 became impoflihle to relieve the Saxons, at Icaft on the left of the 
 Elbe ; becaufe twelve or fifteen battalions, which the king ported 
 any where between Lowofitz and Pirna, could not be forced by 
 an attack on their front; and, if you attempted to turn their right 
 v/ing, by fending a corps over the mountains at Altenberg, it is fo 
 far off that the enemy might, either from his troops in Bohemia, 
 or from thofc in Saxony, anticipate you. Wc cannot, therefore, 
 tonceive why marfhal Brown did not occupy fome of thefe defiles, 
 a?, in our opinion, the fuccefs of this campaign, and perhaps of 
 the war, depended on this rtep. 
 
 Since thefe precautions were not taken, it was certainly in vain 
 to attempt any thing on that fide of the Elbe. The only thing 
 remaining to be done, in our opinion, was to have left 20,000 
 men in the camp at Budyn ; with a corps, compofed chiefly of 
 light troops, to pufli into the mountains beyond Lowofitz, and 
 into thofe of A!ic«berg, to draw the PrufTians attention that way; 
 
 and
 
 In G 8 R M A N V, 1 7 5 6. 23 
 
 and with the remainder pafs on the right, (leaving fomcthing to 
 mafk the bridge at Leutmeritz, and obferve the enemy in tlic 
 mountains, between Lowolitz and Auflig) and march on that llde 
 to Schandan and Hohenftein, and attack the Prullians pOiT:ed at 
 Ratmanfdorff, and on the Lilienflcin. 
 
 These polls were very weak on that fide, and fortified only 
 towards the Elbe, to oppofe the Saxons, and therefore could not 
 Jiave refifted one inftant ; efpecially if, at the fame time, the Saxons 
 made any confiderable effort. By this manoeuvre the communi- 
 cation would have been eafily opened ;. and the Pruffians on that 
 fide, if purfued with vigour, could not have retired without lofs,. 
 having no more than one bridge, at Pirna, by which they could be 
 fuccoured ; on which a falfe attack might have been made tlirough 
 the foreft of Lohmen, as well to prevent fuccours, as to alarm the 
 Prufllansj this probably would have made them abandon their 
 other pofts, for fear of lofing their communication with die army 
 encamped on the other fide of the Elbe. 
 
 The jun<3:ion with the Saxons being once effefted, and all the 
 right of the Elbe, as far as Pirna, occupied by the Auftrians, his 
 majefty muft have fallen back inftantly into Saxony, or have 
 perifhed in the mountains with cold and hunger. 
 
 Marshal Brown rifqued. nothing by tliis manoeuvre, as the 
 king, with the finall army he had then in Bohemia, would not 
 have prefumed to pafs the Egra and attack the 20,000 men left 
 there ; becaufe, by fuch an attempt, he would give the Auflrian 
 general an opportunity of repaffing the Elbe, and occupy the defiles 
 behind him, relieve the Saxons, and probably reduce his majefty 
 to the melancholy necefiaty of feeing his ov/n army and tliat o€ 
 prince Maurice, thus feparated, beat in detail. 
 
 He attempted, as we have faid, to relieve the Saxons with 8000 
 men only, and could not fucceed,
 
 2^\. History of the War 
 
 Wk now come to examine the battle itfelf, wherein the condu*ft 
 of M. Brown docs not fecm, by any means, equal to the reputation 
 he had acquired. 
 
 From the dcfcription we have given of the ground, it appears 
 evident, that the marflial could not pofTibly obtain any other ad- 
 vantage, than perhaps to repulfe the enemy; which, from the bad 
 choice of his camp, was very improbable. But, even fuppofing 
 he had beat him back as far as the vineyards on the Lobofchberg, 
 -he certainly could never have forced him from thence, and from 
 the Homolka mountain ; becaufe, to form thefe two attacks, he 
 muft have filed through the villages of Lowofitz and Sulowitz, 
 and have formed between thofe villages and the mountains upon 
 which the Pruflian army, with above lOO pieces of cannon, was 
 pofled, and in many places within mufket-fhot of the ground 
 where the Auftrians muft have formed. I appeal therefore to 
 all military gentlemen, whether in thefe circumftances fuch a 
 manoeuvre was polTible. 
 
 Add to this, that the king, though repulfed, could without any 
 danger have fent a ftrong corps on M. Brown's left, which would 
 have rendered his communication with the Egra fo precarious, that 
 he muft have fallen back behind that river, as it really happened 
 the night after the adtion j for it was the fending the duke of 
 Bevern with a corps to Tfchifkovitz, rather than any advantage 
 gained in the battle, which forced M. Brown to repafs the Egra. 
 From whence it appear?, that, though the Auftrians repulfed the 
 king, it contributed nothing at all to the relief of the Saxony j 
 becaufe they could not detach, from that or any other camp be- 
 tween the mountains and the Egra, 20,000 men, and lefs would 
 IK>t do without expofmg the remainder to certain ruin. 
 
 j Havik© 
 
 5'
 
 in Germany, 1756. 25 
 
 II A VUG ncglecfted to occupy the mountains of Lobofch and 
 Homolka, which lie might have done, many hours, before tlie 
 enemy appeared, tlie only thing remaining to be done, v/as to 
 have pafTed the Elbe, the night before the battle, v\'ith the whole 
 army, leaving fome light troops to amufe the king; thefc, on 
 being puflied, retired to Biidyn. 
 
 In this cafe M. Brown might liave detached fuch a corps to 
 Schandau, as would certainly have ope-ned a communication with 
 the Saxons, and probably have deflroyed all the Pruffians on tlvat 
 fide of the Elbe : with the remainder he covered the whole country 
 efFedlually, excepting thofe few villages between the mountains 
 and the Egra, which the king would not have dared to pafs, be- 
 caufe, having no magazines in the country, and fubfifting only, at 
 leafl chiefly, from what came from Saxony, he could not advance, 
 with an army of about 25,000 men, into an enemy's countrv, 
 leaving one fuperior mafter of the defiles, between him and his 
 other army, fubfiflance, flores, &c. without expofing himfelf to 
 certain ruin. 
 
 The pofition, therefore, taken at Lowofitz, was, in our opinion, 
 as bad as poffible ; nothing could be more inconfiilent, with the 
 general theory of war, than to occupy a camp commanded by any 
 neighbouring hills, and Vv'here it was impoflible to bring as many 
 men into aftion, at the fame time, and in the fame point, as the 
 enemy ; who, on the contraiy, had ground enough to form two 
 thirds of his army to attack Lowofitz ; whereas the Auftrians could 
 bring a very few battaliMis, only, to fullain it. 
 
 The left and center were inattackable j the only point to be 
 fiiftained was Lowofitx. This the marflial faw ; but did not fee 
 that it could not be defended, becaufe it was commanded by the 
 Lobofchberg. 
 
 E U
 
 26 History of the Wa 
 
 R 
 
 If the enemy was repulfed, you could not purfue him, eltHcn- 
 with cavalry or infantry. 
 
 If we confider. this polition, relative to the relief of the Saxons,, 
 the only objet^l then in view, none could be lefs proper; becaufe,. 
 by no one manoeuvre pofliblc, could M. Brown, relieve them,. ^ 
 though he had repulfed the enemy, who might have taken fifty 
 camps between that place and the Saxons, from whence they 
 would have hindered all communication between them and the 
 Auftrians. 
 
 We fliall therefore conclude, that, in the choice of this camp,, 
 M. Brown aifted inconfiftent with the general rules of war ; and 
 with the particular ones, which the nature of the country, and the 
 objecft he had in view, prefcribcd.. 
 
 We hope our readers wiU not accufe us of prefumption, for. 
 having, thus freely, given our opinion of the adlions of thofe men^ 
 Avhofe reputation is fo well eflabliflied.. What we have faid is 
 certainly founded upon fadls, and confiftent with the nature of 
 the country; and, as we think, with the principles of war: we. 
 theyefore fubmit our reflexions to thofe who are acquainted withv 
 the one and the other. For this purpofe, we have furniflied them-; 
 with an exadl plan and defcription of the ground where the battle 
 was fought. 
 
 This, with their own knowledge of the military art, will enable^ 
 them to- decide how far our hiftory of this campaign, and our re- 
 mr.rks upon it3 various operations, are reafonable, or othcrwife. 
 
 Great preparations were, made, on both fides, for the enfuing' 
 campaign : the emprefs ordered the troops that lay in Hungary,. 
 Italy, and Flanders, to march into Bohemia : all the regiments of 
 JiufTars were augmented to 1500 men ; and thofe of the cavalry to 
 1000: tv/o of the former, and one of Hungarian infantry, were 
 nev/ raife4 :, to thefe were joined, two regiments of infantry, fent 
 
 by
 
 •ill Germany, 1756. 27 
 
 'hv the elector -of Magence and the Bifliop of Wurtzburg, feveral 
 pulks* of Uhlans, -f- and three regiments of Saxon light horfe : all 
 ■which, with what was already in Bohemia, formed an immenfe 
 army, which, according to many gazettes, am.ounted to above 
 180,000 men, and was to be commanded by prince Charles of 
 Lorrain. 
 
 The PrufTians, on their fide, were no lefs diligent and adtive. 
 The king found it abfolutely neceffary to get fome light troops, to 
 oppofe thofe of his enemies, which were extremely numerous, and 
 had given him much trouble, both in this and the preceding war 9 
 and therefore orders were given to raife four battalions of light 
 infantry, v/hich were augmented very much during the courfe of 
 the war. 
 
 There happened in the winter fome confiderable anions be- 
 tween the light troops j which, though condudled with much 
 valour and prudence on both fides, do not deferve any particular 
 detail J hecaufe, in general, they have little or no influence on the 
 fuccefs of a war, however neceflary in an army : and, though they 
 do not contribute eifentially to the good or bad ifTue of a campaign, 
 there is no doing witiiout diem. We fhaW therefore proceed to give 
 an account of the operations of the campaign of 1757- 
 
 • A pulk amounts to about 800 men. 
 
 f Uhlans are inhabitants of the Uckraine, and chiefly Mahometans. In perfon, dref?, 
 ,,-ind manner of fighting, they refemb'.e the Tartars, Calmuci^s, &c. They are armed with 
 fiilolj, fabres, a biicc 15 foot lon^, and fometimes with a bow and arrow, inllead of a 
 ■car.abiric. 
 
 E2 CAMPAIGN
 
 History of the War, 8cc^ '29 
 
 CAMPAIGN of 1757. 
 
 THE confederacy, formed againft the king of Pruilia, was noTT 
 augmented, by the acceffion of Sweden and the Germanic 
 body J whofe united forces amounted to 700,000 men ; whereas- 
 thofe of his majefty, and his allies, did not exceed 260,000. 
 
 As many of his enemies could not begin their operations until, 
 the feafon was far advanced, his majefty refolved to take the field 
 as foon as pofTible j that he might, with his united forces, attack 
 the neareft, and indeed the moft confiderable of them^ the emprefs 
 of Germany. If he had the good fortune to ftrike fome blow of 
 eonfequence in the. beginning of the campaign, it was very pro- 
 bable this would retard, at leaft, and perhaps put an intire ftop to, 
 the operations of the other confederates-. 
 
 These motives, which made it neceflary for his Pruffian majefty 
 to bring matters immediately to a conckifion, made it equally fo 
 for the emprefs to embrace a contrary fyftem.. 
 
 S«E therefore determined to remain. on the defcnfive, until her 
 allies took the field, which flie knew would oblige the kin? to 
 di'.'ide his forces into fo many parts, as vv^ould make it impolhble. 
 for him to oppofe, any where, a confiderable refiftance. This 
 favourable circumftance (he pronofcd v/aiting for, in order to bei^Jn 
 her operations-. In the mean time, nothing more was intended, 
 than to provide for the defence of her dominions.. 
 
 With this view M. Brov,^n diftributed the army, into it)ur dif- 
 ferent corps : the firft, commanded by the duke of Aremberg, w„s 
 pofted at Egra,- the fecond, under the marlhal himfelf, atBudyni, 
 the third, under count Konigfeg, at Reichenberg; and. the foiu-th, 
 undej count Serbelloni, in Moravia..
 
 30 History of , the W>^|j.x 
 
 Br tins difpofitlon the marfhal thought he could eft'ovftually cover 
 Bohemia; as each of thefe corps was very confiderable, and might 
 with cafe be aflembled infome cenj:ral\pojitio.ri, to flop the pro- 
 s;refs of the enemy, lliould he attempt to advance ; which it fecms 
 the marllial did not expedl he would or could do ; otherwife, we 
 think, he never would have permitted his magazines to be formed 
 almoft on the frontiers, againft the mofl common rules of militaiy 
 prudence. 
 
 His majefly, having refolved to penetrate into Bohemia, ordered 
 his army to allemble in four diflcrcnt corps likewifc : the one, 
 under prince Maurice, at Chemnitz ; the other, under himfelf, at 
 Lockwitz ; the third, under the prince of Bevern, at Zittau ; and 
 the fourth, under marflial Schwerin, in Silefia. 
 
 As thefe corps were very ftrong, his majefty thought he might 
 with fafety order them to enter Bohemia feparately ; but, for fear 
 of expoling them to be beat in detail, the two firft were to unite, 
 the moment they paffed the defiles, between the mountains about 
 Lowofitz and the Egra ; and the two laft were to do the fame on 
 the Ifer, about Turnau : then it was thought, that the four corps, 
 thus united into two, might proceed, without any rifk, towards 
 Prague ; where the whole was to join. 
 
 The king, fearing that the enemy fhould fend a body of infan- 
 try to occupy the defiles in the mountains, between Lockwitz and 
 Lowofitz, which might make it difficult, and perhaps impoffible, 
 for him to pafs them, ordered prince Maurice to penetrate into the 
 circle of Saatz, and inftantly occupy them on the fide of Bohemia, 
 which would necelTluily force the enemy to abandon them, for fear 
 of being hemmed in between the two corps. 
 
 Things being thus concerted, prince Maurice quitted his ftat-on 
 at Chemnitz, in the beginning of April, and marched by Zwickau 
 and Plauen towards Egraj as if he intended attacking that place, 
 
 or
 
 in Germany, 1757. 31 
 
 or at leaft penetrate that way into Bohemia, To confirm the duks 
 of Aremberg in this opinion, he ordered his light troops to engage 
 fome confiderable a£tion at Wildllein, the duke's quarters. Upon 
 which this general threw himfelf into Egra, and ordered his corps 
 to afTemble in that neighbourhood. In the mean time prince 
 Maurice returned in hafte back to Auerbach ; where, for greater 
 celerity, he divided his corps into two columns ; the one of which 
 marched by Eibenftock Schwarzenberg to Gottefgabe, and from 
 thence over the Kupferberg to Commottau ; the other went over 
 the Schneeberg Schlettau, Annaberg, and Bafberg, likewife ta 
 Commottau ; from whence he marched by Brix and Bilin to 
 Linay, where he joined the king, on the 23d of April, who had 
 likewife pafled the mountains without meeting any conliderable 
 cbftacle : the few Auftrians who v»-ere pofted at AulTig, under 
 general DraiTcovitz, having been forced to quit that place on the 
 approach of the king's army. 
 
 As the camp of Budyn is very ftrong, being covered By the 
 Egra, his majefty did not think it advifeable to attempt any thing 
 againft it in front; he therefore marched higher up the river, to- 
 wards Kofchtitz, where bridges were thrown over it,, and on the; 
 26th in the morning the whole army pafTed. 
 
 Here the light troops,, and vanguard, met thofc of the duke of 
 Aremberg, who was then coming from Egra, and propofed either 
 encamping there, or go and join M. Brown at Budyn i but, on 
 meeting the king here, he fell back towards Welwarn. 
 
 M. Brown, finding the king had pafled the Egra, and was en- 
 camped on his left tlank, thought it neceflary to quit his pofition. 
 at Budyn and. retire to Prague, which was executed without any 
 
 'Veoj
 
 -^2 H I s T o R Y of the W A R 
 
 Upon which the khig ordered the bridge at Budyn to be re- 
 paired, that he might v/ith greater eafe receive his convoys; and 
 then diredled his fteps hkewile to Prague, where he arrived the 
 2d of May, and tock his camp on the WeilTenbcrg, on the left 
 of tlie Moldau, which the Auftrians, now commanded by prince 
 Charles, had quitted, a:id pafTed on the other fide of the river. 
 
 While thefe things were pailln^r on the fide of Saxony, the 
 prince of Bevern put his corps in motion on the 20th of April, 
 and marched the fame day from Zittau to Reichcnberg, where he 
 found count Konigfeg, with a body of near 20,000 men, encamped 
 in a valley formed by two very high mountains ; the breadth ot it, 
 in this place, docs not exceed three Englidi miles; through the 
 middle of it runs the river Neifs ; into which many rivulets, or 
 rather torrents, coming from the mountains, fall. Thefe moun- 
 tains are covered with thick woods, which make it very difficult 
 for any kind of troops to pafs them ; for which reasons the Auftrian 
 general occupied the valley from one fide to the other, haj,'ing each 
 winp- extended only to the foot of the mountains : the right was on 
 a rifing ground, which was fortified with fome redoubts, and cove- 
 red by a deep ravin oji the right of the Neifs : the ceater was on 
 the left of the river, and alfo covered by a deep ravin, and fome 
 redoubts : between the left of this ravin and -the foot of the moun- 
 tain, on that fide, is a fmall plain ; here the cavalry \\'3lS ported in 
 three lines, there not being room to extend them. On the left of 
 this cavalry was a wood, in which they placed fome few battalions, 
 and .had begun to make an abattis, which was not compleated. 
 From this defcription it appears, that the right and center were 
 •very ftrong^ and fcarce to be attacked at all in front. The prince 
 of Bevern, who, by taking that route, had put himfelf under the 
 jneceffity of fighting, in order to join M. Schwerin, had now no 
 choice >ft but as to the manner of doin^ it : his corps was ported 
 
 behind
 
 in Ge rm an y, 1757- 33 
 
 behind a marfliy rivulet, which, towards his left, ran fo clofe to 
 the enemy's line, that he could not pretend to pafs it, and form 
 under their fire ; he therefore refolved to attack the enemy's left ; 
 and fent general Leilewitz over the Neifs, to attack, or rather amufe, 
 their right. Things being thus concerted, he ordered his cavalry 
 to advance and attack that of the enemy ; this was executed with 
 great bravery, but without fuccefs j they were repulfed every time ; 
 no. wonder! becaufe, in advancing towards the enemy, their left 
 flank was expofed to the fire of the artillery of the redoubts, and 
 that of the infantry behind them ; and their right to that of the 
 infantry pofled, as we have faid, in the wood, to the left of the 
 enemy's horfe. The prince, perceiving, at laft, it would be in 
 vain to renew the attack, while the enemy's horfe was thus pro- 
 tedlcd by the infantry and artillery on both flanks, ordered it back, 
 and at the fame time fent feveral battalions from his right, as high 
 as was poflible into the mountain, in order to come on the flank 
 and rear of thofe which the enemy had pofled in the wood, at the 
 foot of it : this was pund:ually executed j the enemy abandoned 
 the wood, and gave the prince's cavalry an opportunity to renew 
 their attack, which muft naturally fucceed ; that of the enemy, 
 being unable to bear its fhock, and the fire of the Pruffian infan- 
 try, which had now got pofi*eflion of the wood on their flank. 
 On the retreat of the Auftrian cavalry, tlie prince ordered his 
 whole right to advance, and occupy the ground they had quitted ; 
 fo that he was on and behind the enemy's left wing, and had, 
 befides, the advantage of the rifing ground, from whence he could 
 with cafe rake them from the left to the right. In this fituation 
 nothing remained for the Auflrians to do, but to retire as foon as 
 poflible, for fear the enemy fhould pufli on towards Liebenau, and 
 cut them offintirelyj whch he might do, as, in purfuing the left 
 wing, fome of his troops were already behind them. The retreat 
 
 F was
 
 34 H I s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 was made in good order : count Lacy, who commanded the right, 
 covered it ; at Liebenau they took a new pofition, where they were 
 reinforced by fome troops, who, on the march of prince Bevern, 
 had quitted the frontiers, and fallen back to join the main body 
 under count Konigfeg. 
 
 Thus ended the combat of Rcichenberg, in which the Auftrians 
 lofl one general, and about i ooo men killed, wounded, and taken ; 
 befides fome cannon left at Reichenberg. The lofs of the Pruflians 
 was not much inferior^ 
 
 Reflections. 
 
 As the only obje<5t the prince of Bevern could have in view,, 
 was to join M. Schwerin, we cannot conceive why he fliould 
 march by Kratzau and Reichenberg, where the road is much 
 more difficult than that by Gabel and Bohmifch Aycha,. which 
 was equally proper to effedluate his jun(5tion with Schwerin; 
 and, moreover, was guarded only by fome light troops, at Gabel, 
 which he might force, or leave behind, as he pleafed, without 
 any difficulty or rifk. In taking this lalt road, he was certainly at 
 liberty to avoid an adtion j and, if the enemy remained at Reichen- 
 berg, he might find twenty pofitions behind them, and hinder 
 them from retiring to Prague. It is always a great fault to fight, 
 when nothing can be got by it ; as in this cafe. The prince 
 wanted to join Schwerin j he might have done it without fighting, 
 and he could obtain no more by a fuccefsful adlion, as appears 
 from the fadt itfelf. He forced the enemy to quit their camp at 
 Reichenberg ; they took another at Liebenau, which he could not 
 have forced, in all probability : he muft therefore have remained 
 in the mountains, without any poffibility of joining Schwerin, if 
 tJie march of this general had not determined count Konigfeg to 
 
 quit
 
 in Germ AN Y, i757- 35 
 
 quit Liebenau and retire. AH which feems to prove, that the 
 prince engaged in an adlion without any kind of reafon, and from 
 which he could not reap any advantage, whatever was the event. 
 An immoderate defire of acquiring glory, makes men fometimes 
 undertake things without fufficiently weighing the confequences* 
 In the adlion he feems likewife to have been guihy of fome faults : 
 he formed parallel to the enemy, whofe line could not be attacked, 
 with any probability of fuccefs, excepting on the left -, which, 
 being once beat, the reft could not keep their ground; yet the 
 prince did not reinforce his right, but left his troops nearly equally 
 diftributed throughout the whole line : his left, towards the Neifs, 
 where it could be of no uk at all, was as ftrong as where he 
 formed his attack. 
 
 His attack with the cavalry was certainly ill-advifed ; for, 
 though it fucceeded, he could not profecute his advantages; for, 
 while the enemy had infantry in the wood, and their center kept 
 its pofition, his cavalry could not occupy the ground on which 
 that of the enemy flood. From the beginning he fliould have 
 formed his right as high up the mountains as polTible; brought 
 the greateft part of his infantry there ; and have done then what 
 he was forced to do at lafl. The taking fuch a pofition would 
 have forced the enemy to retire without fighting. His fendino- 
 general Leflewitz to attack the enemy's right was needlcfi. By 
 occupying the wood, and part of the hill, on his right, the adlioii 
 Wiis won ; and all the manoeuvres the enemy could make, on their 
 right and center, would have been fruitlefs. 
 
 The Auftrians camp feems, from our defcription of it, very 
 flrong; yet, on examination, it will be found otherwife ; becaufe 
 the whole was not equally fo; and therefore, properly fpcakini^', 
 no part of it. The right and center were ftrong by nature and 
 art ; being, as was faid, fortified with redoubts, &c. but, as the 
 
 F 2 left
 
 36 History of the War 
 
 left was weak, they could reap no benefit from them ; unlefs they 
 fuppofed the enemy fo ignorant as to attack them there. From 
 the general pofition of the ground, it was evident, that, if the left 
 Avas forced to retire, the enemy, by occupying it, would be in the 
 rear of the center and right, and force them to quit their advan- 
 tageous pofition, and fall back inftantly towards Johannifthiil, for 
 fear of being cut off from Liebenau : on this point, to their left, 
 depended, no doubt, the fuccefs of the adlion. They Ihould, con- 
 fequently, have fent fome of their beft infantry into the wood on 
 their left, and have placed fome heavy artillery at the fkirts of it ; 
 which, with that they had already, in the redoubts before their 
 center, would have made it impoffible for the enemv to pafs the 
 village of Bartzdorff, and the marfliy rivulet they had before their 
 front j much lefs form on this fide of the rivulet. The Auftrians 
 could bring, againft that point of attack, their artillery, their in- 
 fantry, and their cavalry, to fuflain them. In fuch circumftances 
 prince Bevcrn could not certainly have formed his attack at all. 
 
 When the Auftrians faw the enemy prepare to attack their left, 
 Why not make a general motion on that fide, and carry their line 
 up into the mountain ? This mancEuvre would have decided the 
 a<rtion in their favour; and, by negledling it, they were beat. 
 
 Their cavalry was too far advanced; which deprived them, in 
 fome meafure, of the advantage of their artillery on the right, and 
 of the infantry on the left, in the wood. 
 
 They fliould not have polled their whole army in the valley; 
 for, though the mountains which formed it, feemed impaffablc', 
 yet it happened otherwife : for the Prufiian infantry did march 
 through that on the left; gained the higher ground; and forced*, 
 confequently, the Auftrians to abandon the wood at the foot of it. ^ 
 No corps whatever muft be placed in a valley, unlefs you are 
 ^ mailers of the mountains which form it ; and, if you cann&t 
 
 occupy
 
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 37 
 
 occupy both fides, you mutt, at leaft, one : for, though at firfl 
 fight, mountains, rocks, and woods, may appear impaffable j yet, 
 upon a diligent inquiry, the contrary will be always found ; for, 
 in every country that is well peopled, there are, and mufl be, 
 communications between the villages ; at leaft, for infantry : you 
 mufl:, therefore, occupy the mountains and woods with your 
 infantry; the valley underneath with your cavalry; which will 
 hinder any enemy from pafllng through it. From all which, it 
 appears, that it was a bad camp, and a bad pofition ; becaufe, 
 having negle(fted to occupy the mountains, it could not be 
 defended ; and the troops, poflied in the valley, were not only 
 expofed to be defeated, but hkewife to be cut off from Prague, 
 and their magazine at Buntzlaw, either by the prince of Bevern's 
 corps, or by that of marfhal Schwerin. 
 
 The prince of Bevern marched, on the 23d, towards Liebenau ;. 
 where, as we have faid, he found the enemy fo advantageoufly 
 ported, that he did not think it prudent to attack them : and the 
 lefs fo, as he knew the march of Schwerin's corps would neceffarily 
 force them to retire. 
 
 This lafl general afTembled his army, on the i8th of April, at 
 Trautenau; from whence he marched, on the 19th, to Konigflioff, 
 where he pafTed the Elbe. His intentions were to proceed towards 
 Turnau and Liebenau, in order to facilitate the march of prince 
 Bevern's corps ; and, being joined with it, go to Prague. This 
 plan was founded on the fame principles as that of the king's. 
 Whatever troops tlic Aufl:rians might fend on the frontiers of 
 Luface, they could not remain there, even though they had beat 
 the duke of Bevern j becaufe the march of Schwerin, behind 
 them, muft force them to retire, for fear of being taken between 
 two fires ; as it really happened : for, on the 24th, they quitted 
 their camp at Liebenau, and marched with precipitation towards 
 
 Brandeifs;
 
 3? H I s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 Brandelfs ; and from thence to Prague, where they arrived the 3d 
 of May. M. Schwerin, in the mean time, marched from KonigfliofT 
 to Giltvhin, where he was informed of the action of Reichenberg, 
 and of the enemy's retreat. Upon which he wifely changed hin 
 route, and marched on the Ifer ; hoping fbill to cut them off from 
 Prague : and, though he did not fucceed in this, he arrived at 
 Jungbuntzlau, in time to feize an immenfe magazine which they 
 had formed there. 
 
 Having been joined by the prince of Bevern's corps, he pro- 
 ceeded to Brandeifs ; where he continued 'till the 4th of May : 
 then he paffed the Elbe, and encamped on the other fide, not 
 thinking it prudent to advance 'till he had concerted meafures 
 with the king. 
 
 His majefty, hiving thrown a bridge over the Moldan, near 
 Podbaba, paffed that river, with part of his army, on the 5th ; 
 leaving the remainder, under marfhal Keith, on the Weiffcnberg. 
 The 6th, at 5 in the morning, marflial Schwerin's army arrived j 
 and, having reconnoitred the enemy, the whole marched on the 
 left, and foon after the battle begun. We will give here the 
 different relations, that were publilhed by authority, of this 
 memorable acflion. 
 
 That publiflied at Vienna is as follows : 
 
 " His royal highnefs prince Charles of Lorrain was informed, 
 " on tnc 4tti of May, that the king of Pruffia had thrown bridges 
 " over the Moldau, near Roftock and Podbaba, in order to join 
 " M. Schwerin's army, by Winorz, and then attack our right, 
 " or cut off the communication with our magazines at Kollin and 
 " Kuttenberg. His royal highnefs changed his pofition fo, that 
 *' the left came to the town of Prague, and the right towards 
 ♦' Malefchitz and Bicchowitz. The 5th the Pruffians vanguard 
 " paffed the Moldau : we ordered feveral batteries to be raifed 
 
 " before
 
 in Germany, 1757. 39 
 
 *' before the front of our army : at 1 1 o'clock, in the night, the 
 " king ordered his whole army to pafs that river, leaving only a 
 ♦' fniall corps, and a great quantity of artillery, on the Weillenberg. 
 *' The jundlion of his, and Schwerin's army, was made on the 
 " 6th, at break of day. Immediately afterwards the whole Pruf- 
 *• lian army, amounting to above 100,000 men, advanced againft 
 "us. M. Schwerin ordered the left wing, which he commanded, 
 " to attack our right, and endeavour to break it -, while the king 
 " alarmed our left. His royal highnefs prince Charles of Lorrain, 
 " whofe army confifted of 55,000 only, faw himfelf obliged, by 
 " the motions of M. Schwerin, to order his fecond line to enter 
 " into the firft, and place it fo as to cover the right wing j the 
 •' left being already covered by the cannon of Prague. His royal 
 " highnefs left only two regiments of horfe there, and placed the 
 " other thirteen, in three lines, on our right, the better to fuflain 
 " it. All thele motions were made according as the Pruflians 
 " extended themfelves, in order to take us in flank ; which 
 " M. Schwerin had principally in view. We occupied feveral 
 " heights ; and M. Schwerin had likewife fome before him, which 
 " he mult occupy before he could approach us. Our artillery 
 " began to fire about 7 o'clock; which, as well as that of the 
 " infantry, produced fo great an citedt, that the whole line of 
 " M. Schwerin, which, according to the report of the deferters,, 
 ** had orders to attack us, with their bayonnets fixed, was totally 
 " overthrown : while our cavalry attacked Schwerin's ; beat it 
 " back three times ; and difperfed it. As the Prulfians firft line 
 " was thrown back in confufion on the fecond, this fired upon 
 *' them, and marched over their dead and wounded companions 
 " towards us. They w'ere, however, received as the firil time,, 
 ** and again beat back. Our right wing, profiting of their vidlory, 
 " followed the flying enemy, j^ good order, above 600 paces ;. 
 
 " took
 
 40 History of the War 
 
 " took feveral pair of colours; i6 pieces of cannon; and a great 
 " number of prifoners. Our right, having thus advanced, left 
 " a great opening between it and the left. The king of Pruflia 
 •' marched, in the greateft hafte, with feveral columns, and occu- 
 *' pied this vacant fpace ; and, at the fame time, ordered a freHi 
 •' body of horfe to advance, full gallop, and occupy the ground 
 " where his left had flood, and thereby come behind our right, 
 *' which was purfuing the enemy; fo that this right wing, which 
 ** had been vidlorious for three hours, was of a fudden furrounded 
 " by the enemy : and, to augment our misfortunes, there raifed 
 " fuch a cloud of dufi:, as hindered us from knowing each other; 
 •' and fuch a confufion enfued, that it was impoilible for us to 
 " alTemble the men, and put them again in order. Part of our 
 " infantry did, however, all that was pofTible to join our left 
 •' wing; in which they fucceeded ; and retired, ftep by ftep, under 
 " a continual fire, to Prague ; where they entered together. Two 
 ** thoufand of our right wing flopped near the field of battle, and 
 " thereby fuilained the refl of the troops that were in confufion. 
 *' All our artillery of referve, the heavy baggage, pontoons, mili- 
 " tary chefl, and 16000 men from our right wing, afTembled, the 
 " 8th, at Benefchau. In two days 3000 PrufTian deferters are 
 " come to the army, who all declare, that the Pruflians have lofl, 
 " killed, wounded, and mifllng, above 20,000 men. In dead, 
 " and wounded, we have lofl, at moll, 4000 men; and 2500 
 " taken prifoners ; and no more than 20 field pieces are lofl. 
 " During the battle, major general Beck, with a corps of Croats, 
 " attacked the town of Brandeifs, fword in hand; beat a Pruffian 
 " battalion, that was there in garrifon, of which he killed 100 men; 
 " and, after he had broke the bridge over the Elbe, retired with 5 
 " pair of colours, 2 cannon, 500 horfes, a rich booty, and 678 
 " prifoners, among whom was the lieutenant colonel Mardefeld, 
 
 " and
 
 in Germany, 1757. 41 
 
 '* and all the officers of the battalion who were alive ; all which 
 *' he brought to M. Daun's camp. On our fide M. Brown was 
 " wounded. On that of the Pruffians M. Schwerin, and five or 
 *' fix other generals, are killed; and general Winterfield mortally 
 " wounded." 
 
 The Prufiians account of this battle is as follows r 
 ** The king joined M. Schwerin's army the 6th of May, in 
 *' the morning; and it was refolved to attack the enemy imme- 
 " diately. The imperial army was encamped, with the left, on 
 " the Zifkaberg; and the right, on a hill, near Sterboholi. It 
 " was determined to attack the enemy's right ; the Pruflian army, 
 *• therefore, marched, on the left, through the village of Potf- 
 " chernitz. M. Brown,, having obferved this motion,, ordered 
 '* his army to march on the right, that he might not be taken 
 " in flank. The Prufiians were obliged to pafs through fome 
 " hollow ways, and over fome marfhy ground, on the other fide 
 " of the village of Bifchowitz, which threw the infantry into- 
 " fome diforder; and, the attack having been made in too mucli 
 " hafi:e, they were repulfed. Marfiial Schwerin, the greatcl't 
 '* general of his time, was killed, with the colours in his hands, 
 " at the head of his own regiment. As foon as our infantry was 
 " formed again, they renewed the attiick againll: the enemy's 
 " right wing. Prince Henry, the king's brother, alighted from 
 " his horfe, and put himfelf at the head of his brigade ; with 
 " which he mounted, or rather climbed up the mountains; and, 
 " having beat off the enemy, took feveral batteries. The cavalry 
 " of our left wing, after three attacks, forced that of the Aulirians- 
 " to retire. Our center, in the fame manner, beat the enemy's 
 " infantry, and purfued them through their camp, whidi was 
 " ftill fi:anding. Our left v/ing, to which fonic cavalry was 
 ** joined, marched to Michele ; and we feparated the Aullrian 
 •' army; the right wing of which fled to the Zallava. Uj?^!f" 
 
 G " which.
 
 43 History of the War. 
 
 " which our right attacked the enemy's left, and took fuccefl'ivelt 
 
 " three batteries, placed on the hills. Our right wing of horfe had 
 
 " no opportunity to come to adtion. Prince Ferdinand of Brunf- 
 
 " wic attacked the enemy's left in flank; and, as the king, with 
 
 *' liis left, and a body of horfe, had already reached the Moldaii, 
 
 " all the Auftrian infantry was forced to throw themfelves into 
 
 *' Prague. They attempted to march out, on the fide of Konig- 
 
 " faal, but were drove back by M. Keith's corps. We have taken 
 
 •' above 4000 prifoners ; among whom are 30 officers : befides 
 
 " 60 cannon, and 10 Aandards. On our fide we have loft, 3099 
 
 " men, 54 officers, 340 horfes, killed : 8208 men, 397 officers, 
 
 " and 246 horfes, wounded: and 1557 men, 6 officers, miffing." 
 Among the dead were M. Schwerin,* and major general Amftel. 
 
 Among 
 
 • M. Scliwerin was born tlie 26th of Oftober, 1684. He ftudied at Leiden, Roftock, 
 and Grcifswalde. In 1699 he ferved in a Dutch regiment belonging to his uncle; in 1705 
 he had a company. His uncle having quitted the Dutch fervice, he did the fame; and in 
 1706 was made a lieutenant colonel in the duke of Mecklenburg's fervice; in 1707 a colo. 
 nel. The duke Charles Leopold fent him in 17 1 2 to the king of Sweden, Charles the 1 2th, 
 at Bender; with whom he continued a year. On his return he was made a brigadier; and 
 in 1718 a major general ; in 1719 he commanded the Mecklenburg troops, at the battle of 
 Walmfmoelen, againft the Coxnmifiion's army, and beat them; and, the duke having reformed 
 ihe grcatell part of his troops, the marfhal entered into the Pruflian fervice as major general ; 
 in 1723 he had a regiment given him; in 1724. was fent as minifter to the court of Poland ; 
 in 1730 was made governor of I'eitz; in 1731 a lieutenant general ; in 1732 knight of the 
 black eagle; in 1739 general of infantry; in 1740 a field marfhal. He dillinguifhed him- 
 fclf much at the battle of Molwitz, the 16th of April, 1741 ; where he received two con- 
 fiJerable wounds : in 1744 he marched with a great army into Bohemia; where he joined 
 the kin_g, at Prague, and commanded the ficge of that place ; where he diflinguifhed hira- 
 fc!f ver^' much; in 1756 he commanded, as we have faid, the army in SileCa ; and, curing 
 that campaign, gave great proofs of his fupcrior abilities in the art of war; and was killed 
 with the colours of his regiment in his hand. He was rather a little fized man ; he had, 
 however, a martial look ; loved the foldiers ; and was very careful of them ; and was there- 
 fore much beloved bj them : and, though he on fome occafions was very hot, in all his 
 expeditions he knew how to combine the greateft bravery with the greateft prudence. After 
 liiC battle of Lowofitz the king wrote to hira to aft cautioufly (d'aller bride en main.) 
 He was twice married, and has left children of both fexes.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 43 
 
 Among the wounded were lieutenant generals Fouquet, Hantchar- 
 mois, and Winterfield J and major generals Plettenberg, Schoninrr, 
 and Blankenfee. Thefe two accounts of the battle are far from 
 being clear and explicit, and give but a very confufed idea of the 
 adion. We fhall therefore add another, wrote by count Schwerin, 
 general adjutant to the marfhal of that name, which fcems to be, 
 by far, the beft that appeared on that occalion. 
 
 " In confequence of the meafures concerted with M. Schwerin, 
 " his majefty palled the Moldau, at Seltz, the 5th of May, 1757, 
 " at 8 o'clock in the morning, with the corps he propofed joining 
 " to the marflial's army ; of which he gave us notice, as had been 
 ** agreed, by a twelve pound fliot, to which the marlhal anfwered 
 ** with the fame fignal. At 2 o'clock in the evening his majefty 
 *' fcnt Stutterheim, one of his adjutants, to the marfhal, with 
 " orders, that we, and the column commanded by general Win- 
 *' terfield, fliould break up at 1 2 o'clock that night, and compafs 
 *' our march, fo that the head of our columns fliould arrive, ex- 
 *' adlly at 4 in the morning, upon the heights of Brofiz, where 
 " his majefty promifed to be, on the right, by Tfchimniz. Thefe 
 " orders were executed with fuch precrlion, that our three columns 
 " arrived, at the place of rendezvous, at 4 o'clock ; and, at fuch 
 " a diftance from each other, as to leave only the fpace neceliary 
 " to form the line. We did not meet with any obftacle, on our 
 " march, 'till we came to the heights before Brofiz ; where Mo- 
 " dena's regiment of horfe, two of dragoons, and Feftetitz's huf- 
 " fars, were ported that night. Thefe fired upon our vanguard, 
 " and retired immediately, through Brofiz, to the left wing of 
 ** their army. 
 
 " As foon as die king had wifhed the marflial and general 
 •* Winterfield a good morning, he rode, with thefe two generals, ' 
 " without any other efcort than two of his "adjutants, captain 
 " Platen, lieutenant colonel Oelfnitz, and myfelf, to one of the 
 
 G z " higheli
 
 44 History of tlic War 
 
 highcft hills on the other fide of Brohz. From hence we could 
 difcover all the enemy's camp very plain ; the firft and fecond 
 line from one end to the other. His majelly reconnoitred it 
 with his fpying glafs. When the enemy perceived feven or 
 eight perfons on the hill, he fent us fome four pounders, but 
 without cfFedt. His majefty continued above an hour here, to 
 examine their pofition, and how they were to be attacked. 
 The enemy was ported, with the left wing towards Prague, 
 on the ZilTcaberg, behind the Invalides : the right extended 
 about 2000 paces beyond the village of Conradiz, near Ster- 
 ■boholi. Two hundred paces before their front, the mountains 
 were fo ileep and craggy, that no cavalry or artillery could pof- 
 fibly afcend them. At the foot of thefe mountains is a deep 
 valley, which was jntirely occupied by fome huflars and Hun- 
 gariaji infantry. The mountains on our fide of the valley were 
 no lefs fteep and craggy than the others : notwithftanding thefe 
 difliculties, his majefty was inclined to attack the enemy in 
 front. The marflial, on the contrary, reprefented to him the 
 difficulty of the ground ; the great march the troops had made ; 
 and the Il:rength of the enemy's pofition ; who had covered the 
 heights before their front with a prodigious quantity of heavy 
 artillery. His majefty, convinced by thefe reafons, permitted 
 the marHial to go and feek out fome more convenient place to 
 fiorm the attack. Upon which his excellency rode, full gallop, 
 before the enemy's right, where the ground on both fides falls 
 gradually, and where he perceived a plain, before the enemy's 
 right wing, near the village of Miefiz, where the infantry could 
 pafs over the meadows, and the cavalry and heavy artillery over 
 the damms. As foon as the marflial had reconnoitred the 
 ground, and given an account of it to the king, orders were 
 immediately given to the three corps to move on the left. This 
 
 " was
 
 in G E R M A N V, 1757. 45 
 
 ■*■' was executed with fiich celerity, that the arniv, Avl^iich h.id" 
 " received the orders about nine o'clock, marched above four' 
 •^ miles through very bad roads, and at half an hour pad ten was 
 " formed; and at eleven the battle begun on the left v/ing. All 
 " our cavalry was pafluig the damm, ^vhen that of the Auftrians 
 " firft turned out, and formed itfelf in order of battle, ^vithout 
 " taking down one tent. They did not probably perceive that 
 " our intention was to attack their right flank, 'till they faw two 
 " regiments of our cavalry pafs the damm, and form diredlly 
 *' on it. This man<Euvre drew their att-ention that way : they 
 ♦* then ordered all their cavalry from the left; which, with great 
 *' celerity, came and formed itfelf, on a fine plain, on the right, 
 *• in 104 fquadrons, in three lines, with intervals equal to the 
 ^' front of a fquadron. This manoeuvre was executed with fucii 
 " promptitude, that our lieutenant general, the hereditary prince 
 " of Schonaich, who had only 65 fquadrons, fearing to be out- 
 •' flanked, refolved iBftantly to. attack the enemy, without waiting 
 " for the right wing which the king had ordered to come and 
 " reinforce him. Accordingly the attack was made in the beft 
 " order. The enemy flood flill 'till we came within 50 paces of 
 ** them, then they fired their carabines; and at 30 they advanced 
 *' with a ftrong pace againfl: us. We were outwinged by 8 fqua- 
 *' drons, a-nd therefore 'tis no wonder our cavalry had fuch a hard 
 •' tafk, and was twice repulfed. In the third attack, Stechow's 
 ** regiment of dragoons, commanded by colonel Winterfield, and 
 " general Ziethen, with 20 fquadrons of Ziethen's and Putkam- 
 " mer's huffars, advanced with fo much bravery, that not only 
 " the enemy's cavalry was intirely defeated, but part of it was 
 " ^puflied on their own grenadiers, on the right wing, Mhich 
 " threw them back in the utmoft confufion. During this attack of 
 ** the cavalry, the grenadiers of our left wing, and the regiments 
 . , ^lonrn •' » of
 
 46 History of the War 
 
 of Fouquet, Kreutzen, and Schwerin's infantry, having pafled 
 over fome meadows, were forced to advance through a very 
 narrow road, in order to join the reft of the line, which was- 
 ah-eady formed. As foon as the grenadiers appeared on the- 
 other fide of the defile, they were received witJi twelve poun- 
 ders, charged with cartridges, in fuch a manner, that they 
 were inftantly forced to retire, and quit the defile in the 
 greateft confufion. In the mean time the enemy's fire grew 
 ftill more violent, and at laft obliged the grenadiers to retire 
 back over the damm. They were followed by Fouquet's and 
 Kreutzen's regiments ; and, as the fecond battalion of Schwerin's. 
 begun to do the fame, the marilial, who ha,d been continually 
 on the other lide of the defile, took, the colours out of the 
 officer's hands, and rode before the regiment ; doing all that 
 was polTible to make them advance. He drew the troops, as 
 well as he coui'd, out of the defile ; and, having put them again, 
 in order, advanced with a ftrong pace towards the enemy. 
 Scarce had he marched 12 fteps, when he received feveral 
 Ihot ; one in the ear, another in the heart, and three in the 
 body : he fell inftantly from his horfe, without the leaft figns 
 of life. General Manteufel took the colours out of his hand, 
 and gave them to tlie enfign ; who had fcarce received them,, 
 when a cannon fhot came and killed him on the fpot. Imme- 
 diately after this the whole line advanced. Our artillery did, 
 great execution. The lines were at above 60 paces diftant from.> 
 each other ; when the enemy's infantry, on the right, was ob~ 
 ferved to be in the greateft confufion. Their center kept their 
 ground much longer; being protected by a great quantity of 
 artillery. His majefty, obferving that the enemy's right wing 
 purfued our left with great vivacity, infomuch that it was fepa- 
 rated from the reft of tiie army, laid hold of this favourable- 
 
 <( 
 
 opportunity 
 
 f
 
 m Germakv, 1757. 47 
 
 " opportunity; and, with the greatefl: celerity, marched, with his 
 ** right, to occupy the fpace which the enemy, by advancing, 
 " had left open : and, by this means, feparated the two win'^-s 
 " from each other. Now the confufion was general in the ene- 
 " my's army. Our left wing, behig again formed, attacked the 
 " purfuing enemy, and drove them back : and, when they endca- 
 " voured to retire to the army, they found the ground occupied 
 " by the king. His majefty ordered an attack to be made, with 
 " fixed bayonnets, on the enemy's left wing, that was likewife 
 " flying. Here a great carnage enfued ; particularly in taking 
 " the redoubt; where the fecond battalion of prince Henry's did 
 *' wonders. The enemy's left fled into Prague; and the right, 
 *' in cenfufion, towards Malefchitz and Bifchowitz." 
 
 Before we give an account of what followed this memorable 
 battle, it is neceflary to examine the various operations which 
 preceded it, as well as the condudl of the aftion itfelf, that the 
 reader may be able to form a proper judgment of them, as they 
 are in themfelves, and independant of the events. For thefe do 
 not always proceed from fine difpofitions ; nor are prudent and 
 "wife meafures conftantly attended with happy fuccelfes. In gene- 
 ral, however, it muft be confefled, that few or no enterprizes 
 fail, but by fome error, which might have been forefeen, and 
 confequently avoided. 
 
 The plan, formed by the Auftrians, to remain on the defenfivc 
 'till their allies took the field, and thereby give them a favourable 
 opportunity to adl with vigour, was certainly wife and prudent: 
 but they feem to have failed in the execution. Two thirds of the 
 enemy's troops were cantoned in Saxony and Lufatia, and the re- 
 mainder in the neighbourhood of this laft province ; which indi- 
 cated, very plainly, that, in cafe he propofed to invade Bohemia, 
 it would be on that "fide; particularly as the king was there in 
 
 perfon.
 
 48 H I s T o R y of the Wa r 
 
 perfon. Befides, by catering Bohemia from the fide of Saxony^ 
 this lafl would be covered by that very manoeuvre : whereas, if it 
 was done from Silefia, another army muft be left to guard Saxony. 
 They ought to have known the king better, than to fuppofe he 
 would adt with part of his forces only, when he had it in his 
 power to do it with the whole. Moreover, if, contrary to all 
 appearances, as well as to the nature of things, he attempted to 
 invade Moravia, he could not, in Lefs than a month, bring his 
 armies on that fide ; and the Auftrwns did not require half that 
 time to bring all their forces there. If his majefty fent a corps- 
 there only, the garrifon of Olmutz, fuftained by fome Croats, a 
 regiment of dragoons, and anodier of huflars, would have beea> 
 fufficient to cover the country. 
 
 From all which, it appears, that the Auftrians adlcd very im- 
 prudently, in porting a corps of above 20,000 men in Moravia,, 
 where tjiey were quite ufclefs. What augments this firfl fault,, 
 WMS the leaving it there even after the Prufiiaa army was in, 
 motion, as well in Saxony and Lufatia,. as about Schweidnitz;, 
 which demonflrated their intention was to penetrate that way into. 
 Bohemia- 
 
 This corps fliould, no doubt, have been placed, during the; 
 winter, fo as to form a chain from Moravia to KonigfliofF; and,, 
 in the month of March, their quarters fliould have been drawn- 
 nearer each other ; and the center placed about Par.dubitz. This 
 would have enabled them to aflemble, on the leaft notice, either 
 on the right, towards Leutomifchel ;. or on the left^ behind tlic. 
 Elbe, about Schurtz. 
 
 When the Pruflians were in motion, this corps fhoul'd h.iv.e. 
 aflembled at Schurtz ; becaufe, from thence, it was at hand ta 
 join count Konigfeg ; and, being united, were much fuperior ta 
 the duke of Bevexn's, or marflial Schwerin's ; and therefore miglit 
 
 attack
 
 in Gerajanv, 1757. 49 
 
 attack either of thefc generals, if they prcfumed, which was not 
 probable, to penetrate into Bohemia, and hinder them from join- 
 ing their forces. But this was neglefted, and the corps in Moravia 
 quite forgot ; as one may imagine : for, thougli the enemy had 
 entered Bohemia at the other extremity, about the 20th of April, 
 yet jhis corps, on the 6th of May, was only arrived at Bohmifcxi 
 Brodt, within twenty miles of Prague. As to count Konigfeo's 
 corps, it has been already obferved, that it was pofled too far in 
 the mountains, and expofed to be taken in betv/ecn the prince of 
 Severn's corps, and that of M. Schwerin. 
 
 The Auftrians committed the fame fault exadly, in the diflri- 
 bution of their troops on the frontiers of Saxony. 
 
 It was by no means probable, tliat the king would order a 
 confiderable corps to enter Bohemia, near Egra; be:cufe, beino- 
 at fo great a dilliance from his other columns, it would be expofed 
 to be cut -off by th^ fuperior forces of the Auflrians j who mnft 
 necelTarily take a central pofition between that corps and the 
 king's, as they had the greateH part of their forces in the circles 
 .of JBaatz and Leutmeritz. 
 
 It was ftill lefs probable the enemy would undertake any thin^ 
 ragainfl Egra ; which, if provided with a common garrifon, cannot 
 be taken without a fiege ; which moft certainly he would not un- 
 dertake, as it cannot, from its fituation, facilitate the operations 
 againll: Bohemia : and, if againft all rules of war, he did lav fiege 
 to it, they might in four days have brought their army to its 
 relief. From whence it appears evident, that the placing a corps 
 in the neighbourhood of Egra was of no ufe, and fubject to be 
 cut off from the main army at Budyn, whenever the enemy en- 
 tered Bohemia by the defiles of Kupferberg and Bafbergj as it 
 really happened : becaufe M. Brown was forced to quit the po- 
 iition at Bduyn, in order to join the duke of Aremberg: whereas, 
 
 H if
 
 ^o History of the War 
 
 if this reneral had taken a pofition at Commottau, with all his. 
 light troops, fuftained by feme battalions of good infantry, in the 
 two laft mentioned defiles, it is plain prince Maurice could not 
 penetrate that way, as he did ;. and, though he had, he could not 
 join the king until he beat the duke, who might have been fuf- 
 tained by the whole army under the marflial at Budyn. This laft 
 was likewife ill poftcd, being too far back to fuftain any body of 
 troops he might fend to occupy the defiles beween Pima and Lo- 
 wofitz ; which we think is the only method that can cffedtually 
 hinder an enemy that attempts to penetrate that way into Bohemia.. 
 The marflial ought, therefore, to have affembled his quarters be- 
 yond the Egra, in fuch a manner as to be able, in one march, to. 
 be behind the Bila at Aufiig : from whence he might citJier fuf- 
 tain the light troops placed behind the ravin of Ghifhubel, or, as" 
 he thought raoft convenient, let them fall back on his army, and_ 
 defend the pofition at Aufiig, which, if occupied by an army, can-- 
 not be forced. Even, perhaps, it would have been more advan- 
 tiio-eous to advance witn the whole army, behind the ravin of. 
 Ghirtiubcl, and have fent the duke of Aremberg, with his whole: 
 corps, into tlie mountains of Bafberg ; becaufe thefe pofitions not: 
 only covered Bohemia, but alfo enabled the Aufi:rians to penetrater 
 into Saxony, if it was thought proper: whereas the different pofi- 
 tions, taken by the Auflrian army, in order to cover Bohemia, did', 
 not anfwer that end, and m-oreover expofed the different corps to- 
 be beat in detail, and hindered from joining each other; as it: 
 happened to that in Lufatia, under count Konigfeg; and that in; 
 Moravia, under marilial Daun ; the firft having been beat, and: 
 the other hindered from joining the refi: of the troops at Prague.. 
 There is fcarce any operation of war .more delicate and diflicult. 
 than the diftribution of the troops into winter quarters : it requires 
 a perfe*^: knowledge of tlie country, and muil be regulated by a, 
 
 prodigious
 
 in Germany, 1757. . 5»t 
 
 prodigious variety of circumltances : i . regard muil: be had to the 
 •enemy's difpolition ; 2. to his general plan of war, and to the 
 particular olije«ft he has in view the cnfuing campaign; 3. to t!ie 
 objed: you have yourfelf in view ibr the following campaign. 
 If you propofe to be on the defenfive, the ditlribution of the trooDs 
 niufl: be made in fuch a manner as to be able to unite in different 
 points, without leaving even a poffibility of their being intercepted 
 in their -march to the place of rendezvous : that thefe pointy be 
 -chofen as near the frontiers as pofiiblej in order to cover the coun- 
 try ; and that they be fo well chofen, that the eiiemy can neither 
 force you in them, nor leave you behind. If you propofe being 
 on the offenfive, the troops muft be fo diftributed, that, in one 
 march, or two, they form feveral great corps on the enem}''^ 
 frontiers, and pafs them fo as to feparate his quarters, and run no 
 •rifk of being intercepted before they join-, and form one body in 
 the enemy's country. Above all -things, car-e muft be taken that 
 they are not expofed to be inquieted, during the winter, which the 
 troops muft enjoy in peace and fafcty, as well to refrelh themfclves, 
 as to form the recruits, &c-. 
 
 It muft be acknowledged that the king of Prufiia excclls in 
 this, as in many other parts of war : no general has ever opened 
 the different campaigns with more greatnefs or precifion. His 
 ■quarters were fo difpofed, that it was fcarce pofFible, from thence, 
 to guefs at his intentions ; as he could, feemingly, with equal faci- 
 lity, form verydiffcrent enterprizes : from whence it always hap- 
 pened that he begun his operations with great views, celerity, and 
 cxadnefs : and, when his troops were attacked in their quarters, 
 they always affeittbled iiA the places appointed, without ever havijig 
 fuffered any confiderable lofs ; which is the more extraordinary, as 
 he had very few light troops, efpecially in the begmning. His 
 <lifciple, prince Ferdinand, has likewife (hewn himfelf infinitely 
 
 H c fuperior
 
 ^2 History of the War 
 
 fuperior to all the French generals, in this point, as appeared cvi--- 
 dently on every occafion. 
 
 The Auflrians neglcdted all the rtiles abovcmentioned, and were 
 therefore forced to abandon the country, in order to unite the 
 different corps, and moreover expofed to be beat in detail ; as wc : 
 have feen. 
 
 HAviNcatlafl affembled" their army at Prague, they were at 
 liberty to attack either the king, or marflial Schwerin, who were . 
 feparated by a great river, and a moft difficult country for military 
 operations. Th^y were much fuperior to either, and therefore 
 ought to have rifked' an adlion in tliofe circumftances ; otherwife it 
 is in vain to make war. If they thouglit themfelves unequal to the 
 king, or Schwerinj feparately, they fliould. not, certainly, have 
 fought them both when united. They fliould not have permitted- 
 the kir^g topafs fuch a- river as the Moldau, in a moft difficult 
 plaee^ and within fight-' of their camp, and remain widi a very 
 inconfiderable body of troops,- com.pared to theirs, a whole day 
 and a night on the lame fide of the river. They ought, no doubt,- , 
 to have attacked him, either before he pafi"ed, or after, before he 
 poined M. Schwerin; or, if they chofe rather to attack this laft, , 
 they fliould have left 20 battalions on the heights of Brofitz, oppo- 
 lite- Potbaba, to hinder the king from paffing, and march ta - 
 Brandeifs, againft Schwerin, without delay. 
 
 T:i.E enerny having joined all his forces the 6th' in the morning,,, 
 in. their prefence, and- his leaving M. Keith on the. other fide of-.' 
 the Moldau, in the fight of Prague, indicated very plaiiily, ha 
 propofcd bringing things to an ilfue there. The Auftrians fliould", 
 not therefore have been fo confident in their numbers, and pofition,- . 
 as to fend their cavalry to forage, while the enemy was a<5lually 
 making fome motions in their prefeuce. 
 
 When
 
 in Germany, 1757. ^^ 
 
 When they faw the enemy march on his left, they certainly 
 did right to change their pofition ; but this was only part of what 
 they fliould have done. They ought to have brought all the artil-- 
 lery poffible to bear againft the village of Podfchernitz, and have 
 attacked him as he was advancing in columns through that, village, 
 and over the meadows, without giving him time, or ground to- 
 form upon; They.fhould have put their horfe in two clofe lines, 
 which would, have enabled them to extend their right quite up to 
 tlie fifliponds, which covered their flank effedually, and deprived- 
 the enemy of the ground, on which only he could form his cavalry;, 
 and, if they kept back, their center a little, fo as to form a. curve, 
 concave towards the enemy, .which they certainly might have done,- 
 their right. being covered by the ponds, and their left by the artil-- 
 lery and infantry of the right wing, in this cafe, the enemy could . 
 not advance. at all,, without prefenting his left flank; which mufl:- 
 always be decifive in every adlion, and particularly in cavalry. . 
 But the Auftrians n-egle£ted all thefe precautions, and moreover' 
 fuffered the enemy's horfe, though lefs numerous, ta tak-cthem-. 
 in flank; and were confequently defeated. When M: Brown, 
 repulfed and purfued the enemy, he ouglit not- to have broke the • 
 line, .and ruflied forward, like a young foIdier> whofees and- 
 obferves only what pafles dire<ftly before him, without attending' 
 to the whole,' and . thereby regulate this ou that- particular 
 manoeuvre. When he. advanced, he fliould have ordered the" 
 whole- line to make the. fame motion ; and, if he di-d not chooi'e to ■ 
 quit the heights, . where his center and left flood, ha fliould have ■ 
 advanced his right, fo as to form an oblique line, with the right- 
 forwards. By tliis manoeuvre, . he.wras at liberty to bring all his ■ 
 referve, and the. right of the fecond line, to fufl^iin . the point of 
 aitack on which the vidtory depended; and, by keeping the line: 
 dofe, gave the enemy no advantage, how much foever he advanced J 
 
 widb-i
 
 ^.j. History of tlic War 
 
 \vith his right to purfue them to Podfchernitz. Evoa this oblique 
 formation neceilarily enabled him to take the enemy's whole line 
 in flank, and rake it from one end to the other. The marlhal, by 
 advancing with the right only, broke the line, and thereby left aa 
 opening, which the enem^' occupied, cut the army in two, and 
 defeated it. 
 
 There is in every camp a certain point, which may very properly 
 be called, the key of it, and on wlxich depends the fuccefs of an 
 adlion ; v/hilc you keep this, the enemy hr.s nothing ; and when 
 you lofe it, all is lolh The talent of finding out this point, is 
 perhaps the mofl fublin-ve, and the moft rare, of any in the whole 
 art.of war. On this talent depends the fcience of camps, and the 
 methods of attacking and defending them. In the prefent cafe, this 
 point was, no doubt, that fpace of ground between the point of the 
 right wing of infantry, and the pond near Sterboholi, where the 
 cavalry £hould have been polled, as it ic marked in the plan, 
 with the light troops and fome regular iiifantry in Sterbo- 
 holi, and a battery on the height, before tlie right wing of horfe. 
 While the Auflrians occupied this ground, they could not be 
 defeated i but they had fludied fo little the fcience of camps, that 
 they did not perceive this point, and formed their cavalry a great 
 way behind it^ and were beat. 
 
 From all the preceding remarks, it appears, that M. Brown 
 either did not know the country, or did not know how to occupy 
 it properly, in the diftribution of his army into winter quarters; 
 and that he committed numberlefs faults, as well before, as during 
 the adlion ; which neceflarily were followed with the lofs of it. 
 As we iinow that he was a good foldier, and by no means a con- 
 temptible general, it is far from being impoffible, that fome pri- 
 vate motives might make him lefs careful and clear-fighted than is 
 ccnliftent with a perfon of his genius. He was, no doubt, little 
 
 pleafed
 
 in Germany, 1757. ^^ 
 
 pleafed to fee prince Charles at the head of the army j and, being 
 under the command of another, was, probably, lefs anxious about 
 the event. Had he been alone, perhaps he would have acfted 
 otherwife. This fhews, how imprudent it is to employ, together, 
 men whofe private views of ambition can fcarce ever coincide.. 
 
 As to the king's difpofitions, they will, no doubt,, appear very 
 fine to thofe who are not fufficiently acquainted with the nature- 
 of military operations, or who have not attended to the defcriptiou. 
 we have given of the country wherein thefe tranfadlions happened. 
 Events, like an im.petuous torrent, hurry people away, without 
 giving them time to reflecfl on their caufes, or examine the various- 
 circumftances which contributed to produce them ; and therefore 
 their opinion of things is feldom eftablifhed on clear and exa(ft 
 ideas. 
 
 Being feparated from the enemy by a chain of mountains, and 
 moreover protedled by many ftrong places, he could diilribute his 
 troops into winter quarters as he pleafed, without any rijfk ; be- 
 caufe the nature of the country enabled him to aflemble them, be- 
 fore any confiderable body of the enemy could penetrate. The 
 difpofition of his march into Bohemia, was fubjedt to a prodigious- 
 number of obftacles y many of which were, at leafl might have- 
 been, infurm^ountable. 
 
 Prince Maurice's column -was leparated from that under the 
 king by an interval of 50 miles ; and, moreover, by a mojft dilli- 
 Gult country, full of mountains, woods, ravins, de-files, &c. The 
 enemy had, in this very fpace of ground, an army much fuperior 
 to either prince Maurice's, or the king's; they. might confcquently 
 have taken forty pofitions that would have effeftually hindered 
 their junftion ; and, if they prefumed to advance one ftep into the 
 country, attack either of them fcparaetly 3 and, being mucb 
 fuperior, probably defeat thenx, 
 
 E.VE»
 
 t; 6 li I s T o R Y of the W.\ R 
 
 EvtN after their jundllon, M. Brown, with the duke of Arem- 
 tcrg, was flill equal to them, and might have taken feveral pofitions 
 between the Epra and Prajnie, which would have hindered them 
 from approaching the Moldau, and joining Schwerin. Being at lalt 
 iiffembled at Prague, they might have attacked cither the king or 
 Schwerin, with forces much fupcrior to either. As thefe were 
 fi-'parated by the Moldau, they might have been hindered from 
 joining at all. When the king paffed that river, leaving 
 M. Keith* on the other fide, the enemy were at liberty to deftroy 
 either of them, having more time than was necclTary for that 
 purpofe. The fame reafoning holds good with regard to the 
 other two columns under prince Bevern and marflial Schwerin. 
 They were fo far IJeparated, that the enemy might have taken fuch 
 pofitions as would have hindered them from joining ; and might, 
 with fuperior forces, have attacked either. From whence it 
 cppears, that the king, by thus feparating his columns at fuch 
 .an immenfe diftance, e:xpofed them to be beat in detail, and his 
 whole army to deftruftion. His paffing fuch a rivei- as the Moldau, 
 in fight of an immenfe army, his flaying eighteen hours, at leaf!:, 
 with a handful of men, in their prefence, ought to have been 
 fatal to him 4 and, if it happened otherwife, he muft thank his 
 good fortune. 
 
 • Marfhal KejtTi, knight of the black eagle, of St. Andreas, and Alexander Newfki's 
 •orders in Ruflia, was born of the illuArious family ©f Marfliall, in Scotland. In 1730 he 
 was a mnjor general in Ruffia ; in 1734 a lieutenant general, and went with the Ruflian 
 troops inio Germany ; in 1737 he fervcd againft the Turks, and diftinguilhed himfelf grc. tly 
 at the taking of Oczakow, where he was v.ounded ; in 1741 and 1742 he commanded againft 
 the Swedes, and got the battle of Williamftrand ; in 1747 he quitted the Ruffian fcrvice, 
 and entered that of Prufiia ; in 1749 was made knight of the black eagle, and governor of 
 Berlin, with a penfion of 12,000 dollars, befides his pay. He was killed in 1758, at the 
 br.ttle of Hochkircher, at the head of the Pruflian infantry, who had repulfed the Auflrians, 
 afcd .were purfulng them. He was middle fized ; had a very martial countenance j and was 
 an humane and benevolent man. 
 
 Hl3
 
 in Germany, 1757. 57 
 
 His attacking the enemy in fuch a firong camp, and in the 
 neighbourhood of a fortrefs, was certainly very rafli, becaufe it 
 was very improbable that he beat them : and, though he did, he 
 could not reap any great advantage from it; as they could always 
 retire into Prague, and from thence march inflantly out, and 
 deftroy marflial Keith in his prefence, even after he had feparated 
 the two wings. 'Tis, in general, very imprudent to attack an 
 army near a fortrefs ; becaufe, in cafe of faccefs, 'tis impofiible to 
 proceed with cavalry, which alone can deftroy a defeated army ; 
 whatever advantages the infantry may gain, tliey cannot profccute 
 them with fuch vigour and celerity, as to hinder an enemy from 
 making a retreat, and get foon together again. Had the king got 
 fuch a battle, 20 miles from any fortrefs, the whole Auftriaa 
 army would have been, deflroyed. He was the lefs obliged to 
 attack the enemy in this pofition, as, by directing liis inarch.- 
 towards Kollin and Kuttenburg, v/here the enemy had their 
 magazines, they v/ould have followed him, and given him a more 
 favourable opportunity to attack them ; and, in all probability, 
 he would Iiave met M. Daun, then coming fronx Moravia,, 
 whom he might have crufhed. This manoeuvre would have 
 enabled him to deftroy the enemy's magazines, and foi;ce them to 
 fight on his own terms, or fubmit to be cut off from Vienna. As- 
 to the action itfelf, he had no choice in his attack,; it could ba 
 done only on the left ; but his feeing, and feizing the critical and 
 decifive moment that M. Brown gave him, by breaking his line, 
 is fuch a flroke of fuperior genius, that few, very few, are capable 
 of. His prudence, in re-eflablifiiing the line, continually, as he 
 advanced, and his whole condudl during the a(aion, moft juftly 
 deferve the greateft approbation. What appear.s rafh in the 
 manceuvres which immediately preceded it, muflr, probably, be 
 attributed to the necefhty of his atfairs, and to the knowledge he 
 
 I had:
 
 58 History of the War 
 
 had of thofe generals who oppofed him. His majtfty feems too 
 great a general to commit a common fault. 
 
 Prince Charles, with near fo,ooo men, having been forced 
 to throw himfelf into Prague, the king forrned the extraordinary 
 projedt of blockading him in that place. As it is very populous, 
 the addition of near 60,000 men, including fervants, and the fol- 
 lowers of the army, would, he hoped, fbon force them tfj fur- 
 render for want of fubfiUcnce, 
 
 During this celebrated blockade, nothing happened, but what 
 is common; and therefore, we think, a detail of the operations 
 would be no lefs infipid, than ufelefs. In fuch an operation of war, 
 nothing more is to be done, than to occupy fuch polls, in the 
 neighbourhood of the place, as mofl: efi'edlually prevent any fuc- 
 cours, provifions, or intelligence, to enter. Thofe who are fliut 
 up, on the contrary* iendeavoxir to open the chain as often as 
 polfible, that their wants may be relieved. The nature of the 
 ground, the number and fpecies of the troops on each fide, are 
 the only matters to be confulted, as to the methods to be ufud on 
 thcfe occafions : no rule can be given as to the manner of occupy- 
 in"- properly a piece of ground j genius alone can do it, and 
 precepts are vain. 
 
 It is, no doubt, a thing worthy remark, and will appear a fable 
 to pofterity, that near 50,000 men, with a train of artillery, arms, 
 See. fliould fubmit to be fhut up for fix weeks, and?, reduced to 
 extremity, by an army of equal force. That of the king did not 
 certainly, at the end of May, exceed that of the Auftrians ; which 
 Wilt upppar evident, if we conlider how many men he had lofl in 
 the battle^ by ficknefs, dcfertion, and the numberlefs detached 
 corps. TJiic ;XFmv, finall as it was, formed a chain of ports, 
 which extend-d many miles, and was moreover fcparated by the 
 Moldaujover which- tiicy communicated by two bridges onlyj 
 
 the
 
 in German r, 1757. 59 
 
 die one above, and the other below the town : fo that, in faft, 
 the Auftrians, had they chofe to march out of the place, would 
 have had no more than half the Pruffian army to contend with.i 
 why therefore they did not, no man, that has the leaft idea of 
 military affairs, can ever comprehend. A torrent carried one of 
 the bridges away; yet did they continue quiet, and. let flip this 
 favourable opportunity, without making any attempt to go out* 
 We have been very often on the ground about Prague, and muA 
 own, it is, and, will be, a matter of wonder and afloniihment, that 
 no effort was made to march out. Had they attacked the Pruflians, 
 tlius feparated by a great river,, and divided into fo many fmall de- 
 tachments, they could not. fail in theu" attempt'^ they mufl hava 
 deflroyed their army. It is no lefs furprizing, that fo great a gene- 
 ral as the king of Pruffia fhould think it pofiible to reduce an army 
 of 50,000 men, in fuch an extenfive town as Prague,, with one of. 
 equal force. The fupinenefs of the Auflrians juftified this attempt, 
 and faved his army from inevitable deftrudlion.. 
 
 When the king fammoned prince Charles to furrender, marfliali 
 Brown, then fick in bed, being confulted, anfwered, with no lefs 
 fpirit than, amazement, " Eft ce que fa majefLC croit que nous 
 " fommes. tous des C — 11 — ns. Dltes au prince que mon avis eft,, 
 " que fon altelTe aille fur le champ attaquer le M. Keith." 
 
 The celebrated marilial Belleifle, who knew Prague perfectly- 
 well, had, in the preceding war, with 15,000 men, defended it 
 for many months againft the Auftrians ; and, being at laft reduced^ 
 to the gfeateft extremity, quitted it with 12,000 meiT, and retired 
 to Egra, with fafety and glory. This general wrote a letter, while 
 the king was blockading that town; which I have feen ; wherein 
 he fays, " Je connois Prague, fi j'y etois, avec la moitie des 
 ** troupes, que le prince Charles y a adtuellement je detruirois 
 " I'armee PruiTienne." 
 
 I 2 WHILJi.
 
 6o History of the War 
 
 While the king was occupied before Prague, he fent out feve- 
 ral detachments, in order to raiic contributions, and fccure, or 
 deftroy, the magazines which the enemy had formed in different 
 parts of Bohemia. General Oldenbourg and colonel Meyer were 
 fent into the empire with the fame view, and to hinder, or at leaft 
 retard, the operations of tlie army of the empire. But all their 
 operations are of too infignificant a nature to dcferve any particular 
 detail ; none of them had, nor indeed could have, any conliderable 
 influence on the general plan of operations. We rtiall therefore 
 pafs them in filence, 
 
 Marshal Daun, who now commanded the army in Moravia, 
 which had been the preceding campaign under the orders of prince 
 Piccolomini, having received orders to join the main army at 
 Prague, quitted Moravia, and diredted his march for that purpofe. 
 However, on the 6th of May, he was only arrived at Bohmifch 
 Brodt, within 12 miles of that place, where he was informed of 
 the battle. He continued here for fome days, and then retired to 
 Kollin, as well to avoid an aftion, as to join the right wing, 
 which, as we have already faid, had retired to Benefchau. 
 
 The king, fearing that this army, which amounted to above 
 40,000 men, might not only difturb his operations before Prague, 
 but ILkewife, by fome manoeuvre or other, give prince Charles an 
 opportunity to ^et out of that place, thought it neceffary to drive 
 them further back. For which purpofe, the prince of Bevern, 
 with about 25,000 men, was ordered to execute this plan. 
 
 As this general advanced, the marflial ve-ry wifely retired, in 
 order to receive the reinforcements which were in march to join 
 liim, and fell back fuccellively tj Kollin, Kuttcnberg, Goltzjen- 
 k^u, and Haber. 
 
 Having
 
 in G E R M A N y, 1757. 61 
 
 Having at length received all the reinforcements, artillery, Sec. 
 which he expedted, he gave orders, the i ith of June in the even- 
 ing, to march next morning. Accordingly the army quitted the 
 camp of Jenikau the 12th, and marchsd the fame day to Janovitzy. 
 The next day general Nadafti was attacked at Pikan ; but, being 
 fuflained by the whole army, the PrulTians were repulfed with lofs. 
 This general, having been reinforced, was ordered to march by 
 Malefchau, and take poil at Suchdol, while general Beck, with 
 about 6000 men, was commanded to occupy Kuttenberg, which 
 the Prufiians had quitted on the 12th, and retired to Kollin. On 
 the 14th the marflial marched to Gintitz, and on the i6th to Kri- 
 dienau, v/here he encam.ped as in A. A. This whole march was 
 condudled with much prudence and vigour j infomuch that the 
 enemy was more than once on the point of being attacked, and 
 probably defeated ; being much inferior. The marflial, by the 
 ■ direftion of his march, feems to have intended to bring prince 
 Bevern to an aflion before Tie was joined by any reinforcements, 
 cfr to have cat him off from Prague j the difficulty of the roads 
 and the good conducft of the prince prevented it. 
 
 The king, being informed of tlie enemy's approach, quitted his 
 :army before Prague on the 13th, and marched towards Kollin j 
 where he propofed -uiiiting the feveral corps, he had detached, ta 
 tlie army under prince Btvern, and then attack the enemy without 
 delay. On the 14th he marched by Schwartz Kolleletz, and Zda- 
 iiitz, intending to encamp at Malotitzj but, on approaching that 
 place, a large -body of troops was difcovered marching behind Zaf- 
 muck. Being no ways prepared for an adlion, having only a few 
 battalions with him, his majefty threw them into the village of 
 Zdanitz, with the cavalry on the plain before it, and continued in 
 tliis pofition 'till he was joined by the different detachments he 
 
 cxpeded. 
 
 The
 
 62 History of the War 
 
 The camp occupied by the enemy, at Krichenau, was judged 
 too advantageous to be attacked in front, with any probability of' 
 fuccefs : nor could it be approached on the left, without marching, 
 a great way up, to the fource of the ravin which covered it. This 
 would give the marHial time to change his pofition,. as he thought 
 molT: conveniertt, and perhaps afford him an opportunity to give 
 the king the flip, and march to Prague. For which reafon hh 
 majefty refolved to occupy the hills of Chotzemitz,.. behind the 
 enemy's right. Accordingly, on the i8th in the morning, the. 
 army was ordered to march on its left, along the great road that, 
 goes from Prague towards KoUin. During the march, . advice was . 
 brou-yht that the enemy was retiring;, which was foon found to. 
 he a miftake ; for he had only changed his pofition, and was ob— 
 ferved to be putting his army ia order of battle, on the very 
 ground which tlie king propofed to occupy. 
 
 The marlhal, feeing the enemy's army move on its left, eafily 
 perceived the king's intentions were to attack him on iiis right 
 flank : to avoid which, he ordered his army to move on the right, , 
 firft to B. B. the referve in D. D. then to G. G. with the referve 
 in E. E. and general Nadafti's corps in F. F. His army, confining 
 of 60,000 men, was formed in two lines ; the infantry on the 
 wings, and the cavalry in the center.. The right of the infantry 
 was ported on a high hill, quite clofe to an open wood occupied , 
 by the light troops. At a fmall diflance before the front was the 
 village of Krzeczor, in which fome battalions were placed very 
 properly, as they could with eafe be fuftained by the line. The 
 hill, on which this village ftands, prefents, towards the right, very 
 high and deep precipices, which cannot be pafTed by any fpecies 
 of troops. At the bottom of this hill is another village, which 
 was likewife occupied by fome infantry. Out of the hill, a little 
 behind this laft village, runs a rivulet almoft perpendicular to the 
 
 enemy's.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 63 
 
 enemy's liae-;. the. banks of it are very high and craggy. Behind 
 ■this rivulet Nadafti's corps was at firll placed, and then in F. F. 
 fo that the eiiemy could not advance to attack the line, without 
 prefenting his flank to this corps. On the left of Krzeczor, on a 
 high and fteep hill, is the village of Brzi{>, a little before the line, 
 alfo occupied by feme infantry. The left was likevvife on a ver^ 
 high hill, which commands all the plain about it. Near the left 
 is the village of Podhorzj through which runs a mardiy rivulet, 
 which effectually covered that wing. All the ground before the 
 front was very unequal; this obliges a line, marching to attack it, 
 to flop often, in order to clofe and form again j which is a great 
 -difadvantage, particularly being near the enemy, whofe artillery 
 cannot fail doing great execution. 
 
 The king ordered his army to halt in the plain near Slatiflunz and 
 Novimieilo, while he reconnoitred the enemy's pofition j whom, 
 r.otwithrtanding the ftrength of it, he refolved to attack. The 
 army was again put in motion, and foon after the battle begun : 
 (;f which we Ihall give the different relations that were publiflied. 
 By which means the reader will be enabled to form a proper judg- 
 ment of this great and decifive adtion. The firft is that publiflied 
 by the court -of Vienna-; the fecond is that of the Pruflians; and 
 the lall, which is more extenfive than the others, was wrote by 
 aFrencli ofncer, v,ho was at the Auftrian army by order of his 
 •court. 
 
 " As foon as the imperial and royal army quitted the camp of 
 " Gintitz, on tlie i6th of June in the evening, in order to oc- 
 " cupy that which had been marked out at Krichcnau, his Pruf- 
 ^' lian majelly quitted likewife that of Kaurzim, and pofled his 
 army on the heights behind Planian. Upon which the Auflrian 
 army changed its pofition that fame evening, and was pofted, in 
 order cf battle, between two heights, that were to the right 
 
 " and 

 
 64- History of the War 
 
 " and left. On the iStb, in the morning, the enemy mirchecb 
 " towards Planian, and hahed between that place and the inu 
 " called Slatiflunz. At i o'clock, however, his army was put 
 " ao-ain in motion, in four columns. As foon. as- his excellency 
 ♦• marlhal Daun perceived that the enemy's intention was to come 
 •« on his right flank, he ordered the referve, and all the fecond 
 *' line, to march there, and form a flank to cover the right wing> 
 " General Nadnfti> with his hufl'ars and Groats, was likewife or- 
 " dered there for the fame purpofe. The firfl: line cohtinued in 
 *' it-s firfl: pofition 'till tlie enemy's left wing was feen to advance,, 
 *' in feveral columns,, againfl: the flank and right wing of the 
 *' Auftrian army j then it was ordered to march on its right, 
 •* quite clofe to the abovementioned flank ; a«d, at two in thj 
 " evening, it was atr length formed upon the heights. Then the 
 *' heavy artillery, on both fides, began to play. The enemy's at- 
 " tack, on our right wing was fb violent, that it threw the cavalry 
 ** into confufion : it. was, however, put again in order, by tha 
 *' bravery and good conduct of the generals Serbelloni, Daun, 
 *' Odonell, TrautmanfdorfF, and Afpremont ; and then they re- 
 " pulfed the PrufTians. Notwithflanding which, the enemy ad- 
 " vajiccd on the heights of the village of Krzeczor, Aill nearer 
 ** our flank. As foon as they reached the village, they burnt it; 
 " which was the fignal to their right wing to attack our left. At 
 *' half an hour after three they made a moft violent attack on our 
 " flank, and immediately after on our right and left wing. Some 
 *' hundred men, formed in half a fquare, penetrated through the 
 " flank ; they were, however, drove back, by our cavalry and the 
 ** Saxon carabineers. The enemy renewed his attacks feven dif- 
 •■' ferent times ; in each of which he was repulfed ; and at laft 
 " forced to abandon us a compleat vicflory. Upon which the 
 ^ Auftrian army took its third pefition on the heights, where it 
 
 *'■ remained.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 65 
 
 *' remained all night, in order of battle j and, on the 19th, retired 
 ** to the old camp of Krichenau. During the aftion, the king was 
 *' on a hill behind his left wing, from whence he gave his orders. 
 *' The enemy, in their retreat, burnt the villages of Brzafam and 
 *' Kutliers : their left wing went towards the village of Welin ; 
 *' and their right towards Nimburg. This battle, which lafted 
 " from 2 o'clock 'till nine, may be reckoned among the moft re- 
 " markable and bloody that have happened for a long time. It 
 ** was conduded, on both iides, with no Icfs valour than pru- 
 " dence ; 'till the Pruflians were, at length, thrown into tlie 
 *' greateft confufion, and forced to take a precipitate flight, by 
 *' two different ways, and in fmall divifions ; as chance brought 
 " them together. Their lofs, on this occafion, may be certainly 
 " reckoned at 20,000 men : 6500 were found dead on the field 
 " of battle ; and above 7000 prifoners : among which are lieu- 
 " tenant general Trefkow, major general Pannewitz, and 120 ftaff 
 " officers ; befides 3000 deferters. We have taken J2 pair of 
 *' colours, and 45 pieces of cannon. The lofs of the Auftrian 
 " army amounts to above 6000 men, killed, wounded, and mif- 
 *' fing. Among the firft is lieutenant general Lutzow j and among 
 *• the fecond were count Serbelloni, general of horfe, lieutenant 
 " general Wolwart, and major generals prince Lobkovitz, and 
 " Wolf. The victory, after God, mufl be afcribed to the wife 
 *' and valourous conduA of marflial Daun.* Count Stambach, ge- 
 " neral of horfe, who commanded the left wing, contributed very 
 " much to the vidory, by the vigorous attack he made on the 
 
 K- ** enemy's 
 
 " Leopold count Daun was born in 1705. He was, in tke beginning, a knight of Malta, 
 and colonel of his father's regiment: in 1736 lord of the bed-chamber; in 1737 'najor ge- 
 neral, and fervcd againft the Turks ; in 1739 a lieutenant general ; in 1740 he obtained a 
 regiment; in 1745 he was made a general of infantry; in 1748 a privy councillor; in 1751 
 commandant of Vienna; in 1753 knight of the golden fleece; and in 1754 a £eld marflial. 
 
 He
 
 66 History of the War 
 
 " enemy's right. Lieutenant generals Kolowrat, Wolwart, Wied, 
 "■* and Sincere j major generals Schallenberg, Le Fevre, and Nicks 
 " Efierhafi, diftinguiflied thcmfelves very much : as did general 
 *' Nadafti,* with the Saxon light horfe, and the other troops 
 •* under his command. The regiments that formed the referve, 
 *' and the grenadiers, fufFered very much ; having been continu- 
 *' ally in aftion. Among the infantry, the regiment of Botta, 
 ** commanded by prince KiniTcy, dillinguilhed itfelf ; having fired 
 ** all their cartridges, they however continued in the line, with 
 *' their bayonnets fixed, and repulfed the enemy. Among the 
 •* cavalry, the four regiments of Savoy, Ligne, Birkenfeld, and 
 " Wurtenberg, dillinguifhed themfelves in a particular manner. 
 " The artillery, commanded by colonel Feuerflein, was remarkably 
 *' well ferved. Amoog the volunteers, the duke of Wurtenberg^ 
 " and major general count Czernichew, -|- likewife diftinguifhed 
 " thcmfelves." 
 
 He had, in the preceding war, (hewn no lefs bravery* than prudence ; and was wounded in. 
 the battles cf Grotzka and Freidberg, in 1749. He formed the new exeicife, and com- 
 pofcJ the inftitutions for the new military academy. In 1745, having quitted the order of 
 Ivlalta, he married the countefs Euchs, (a favourite of the cmprefs) by whom he ha.-> niany 
 childrcn. He is a middle fized man, and has the moll engaging countenance that can be 
 feen : is uncommonly brave, and cool in adlion : a degree more of that vigor animi, 
 ■would make him one of the greatell men of his age. 
 
 * General Nadafti is a Hungarian born ; he ferved at firft as lieutenant colonel in Baro- 
 niat's regiment of huflari ; and in 1736 colonel ; in 1741 major general ; in 1744 lieutenant 
 general; in 1753 a privy councillor ; in 1754 commandant of Buda, and general of horfe ; 
 in 1756 bann of Croatia; and in 1758 a field marfhal. He ferved in Italy, Silefia, and 
 on the Rhine; and diftingi^ilhed himfclf greatly in the paffage of that river, in the pie- 
 ccding war; and by the taking of Schweidnitz in 1757. To recompence liis feivices, her 
 imperial majefty reftored him his grandfather's ellalcs ; and> though a Hungarian, conferred, 
 upon him the government of Buda. He was married in 1745, and. has feveral children. 
 Some drfguft h.nppened between him and the other commanders, after the battle of I.iir.i, 
 and he never appcaj-ed more in the army. 
 
 f Count Cfernichcw is a Ruffiaa born : he was fttH an enfign in the Se.-nonowflci life 
 guards ; and. ia 1756 a major generaJ. He is a man of great partSj wiiich have contribBted. 
 •tftailvarce his fortaQf. 'At ptcfcnx he is fccrctary of war.. 
 
 Tas.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 67 
 
 "TuE Pruflians account of this battle is as follows : 
 " Immediately after the battle of Prague, colonel Putkammer, 
 " with his hujITars, was fent to purfue the enemy; who was fol- 
 •' lowed,, on the 9th of May, by the the prince of Bevern and 
 *' general Zeithen, * with 20,0.00 men. The firft remarkable 
 •' fkirmifli happened at Suchdol, where the Auflrians great ma- 
 " gazine of meal was taken. Lieutenant general Ziethen, and 
 *' major generals Krochow and Manftein, with four battalions, 
 *' and 1 100 horfe, were fent from the camp at KoUin on this 
 *' expedition. They fucceeded in taking this magazine, notwith- 
 " ftanding there was a camp of huffars and Croats behind Such- 
 *' del, and the heights by St. John's chapel was occupied by the 
 *' Auftrians. General Nadafti fent lieutenant colonel Ballafti, 
 " with feme hundred huflars, to attack lieutenant' colonel Var- 
 " nery, of Putkammer's regiment, but they were repulfed with 
 ** lofs. Colonel Werner, being fent to obferve the Auftrians, was 
 " attacked, near Krattenau, by colonels Zobel and Lufmfki, with 
 "' 600 horfe, which he repulfed, and took 43 prifoners. On the 
 *' cth of June, the prince of Bevern quitted his camp at KoUin, 
 *' in order to attack general Nadafti's corps, who was encamped 
 ** on the heights near St. John's chapel ; but this general made 
 ** no ftand, either there, or on the heights by Kank; which he 
 *' quitted, as well as the town of Kuttenberg. We took y^ pri- 
 *' foners : and the enemy loft, killed and wounded, above 150 
 
 K 2 ** mtn. 
 
 * This general is greatly favoured by the king. In 174.0 he fcrved as major of hufTar?, 
 in Silefia ; in 1741 was lieutenant colonel, and decorated with the order pour Ic merite ; and 
 in the fame year a colonel, and had a regiment given him ; in 1744 a major general ; in 
 1756 a lieutenant general. After the battle of Prague, in which he diflinguifhed himfelf, 
 he was made knight of the black eagle. He has comjnonly commanded the vanguard. 
 After the battle of Breflaw, he made a fine retreat. In the battle of Torgau he gained 
 immortal glory, by occupying the heights of Suptitz, ftcr the king had been forced to 
 quit the field, which tore the vidory out of M. Daau's hands. He is won above 60 
 years old.
 
 63 History of the Wa r 
 
 men more. The prince of Bcvern, on this occailon, took two 
 magazines of forage and provifions, at Kuttenberg and Neuhoff, 
 and encamped by Nefchkarziz, a village between Neuhoff and 
 Kuttenberg. This polition forced M. Daun to quit his ftrong 
 camp at Czaflaw, and fall back firft to Goltzjenkau, and after- 
 wards to Haber. The great number of defiles hindered us 
 from attacking the enemy's rear-guard, fo that this march was 
 made without any fkirmifli, excepting that which happened on 
 the 7th of June, at the defile of Czurckwitz, which alarmed 
 general Nadafl;i, who was encamped behind Czaflaw, with his 
 corps reinforced by the four regiments of Saxon horfe. In the 
 mean while, the army under M. Daun, having been reinforced, 
 amounted to 60,000 men -, and it appeared, his intentions were 
 to march, with the greateft part of his troops, againfl that part 
 of the king's camp, before Prague, on the other fide of the 
 Moldau ; and, to cover this manoeuvre, to attack the prince of 
 Bevern with Nadafti's corps. The prince of Bevern had only 
 70 fquadrons and i8 battalions, and confequently was in need of 
 a reinforcement. The king, therefore, having drawn his ports 
 before Prague nearer together, broke up the 13th of June, and 
 marched with 10 battalions and 20 fquadrons, by Kofteletz, to- 
 wards Zafmuck. On the fame day, count Daun ordered gene- 
 ral Nadafti to attack prince Bevern's fore-pofts, and at the fame 
 time made a motion with his whole army on the Prullians flank, 
 which forced them to retire towards Kollin, and on the 14th 
 to Kaurzim, where the king's corps joined them. The 15th 
 and 1 6th were employed in reconnoitring the roads towards the 
 village of Wifocka, where the Auflrian army flood ; which was 
 not perfedly executed en account of the great number of the 
 enemy's light troops. Four thoufand pandours and huffars 
 attacked a tranfport coming from Nimburg, but the efcort, 
 
 *' coiifiiling
 
 in Germany, 1757. 69 
 
 " confifling of 200 men, under major Billerbeck, defended them- 
 '* lelves above three hours ; and, having received a reirvforcement, 
 " arrived fafe at the camp with the lofs of fcven men onlr. Oti 
 '* the 17th, as we propofed marching to Schwoylitz, wc perceived 
 '< the- enemy's army formed on the heights, in a half fquare, 
 " with the right wing extending towards Kuttenberg and Kollin, 
 " and the left towards Zafmuck ; the front was covered by a 
 " chain of fifhponds and morafles. We made a motion, fo that 
 " our right came to Kaurzim, and our left towards Nimburg 
 " and Planian, before it. On the i8th we occupied feme hills 
 " before this place. The army marched on the left, in order to 
 " attack the enemy as foon as the neceffary dil'politions could be 
 •* made; and our light troops had pofted themfelves oppofite thofe 
 " of the enemy, who endeavoured to form on our left flank ; we 
 " drove them back beyond Kollin, as far as the heights, which 
 *' we muft neceffarily occupy to be able to attack the enemy's 
 " right flank. Major general Hulfen,* with feven battalions, 
 " was ordered to render himfelf mafter of them. The infantry 
 " was to form a line to fuflain this attack, without engaging its 
 " right, which was ordered to remain fomewhat further back. 
 " Our grenadiers climbed up the heights, occupied a village the 
 •* enemy had abandoned, and took two batteries, each of 12 or 
 "13 pieces behind it ; and, of a fudden, our infantry, without 
 " giving time to ftop them, advanced and attacked all the enemy's 
 " firft line, which hindered us from fuflaining the attack of the 
 " heights : four battalions would have fufficed, and the viftory 
 •' was ours. The enemy, taking advantage of this fault, ordered 
 
 " fome 
 
 * This general was major in 1740; in 1743 lieutenant colonel; in 1745 colonel; in 
 •754 major general, and knight of the order pour le merite ; in 1756 he had a regiment; 
 .ir;d in 1758 was made a lieutenant general. He commanded a confiderable corps In 
 Saxony, againft the army of the empire, with much reputation, particalarly in the aclioa 
 by Strehlen.
 
 70 History of the War 
 
 *' ibmc infantry to file behind the line, and attack our feven 
 " battalions ; who, though they had fuffered very much in three 
 " fucceflive attacks, and from the fire of 40 pieces of cannon, 
 " repulfed them. Norman's dragoons attacked the enemy's in- 
 " fantry, difperfed feveral battalions, took 5 pair of colourr, and 
 *' then advanced againft the Saxon carabineers, whom they beat 
 *' back and purfued as far as Kollin. While our infiintry was 
 *' engaged with the enemy, it fuffered greatly from the heavy 
 " artillery : the battalions were full of large openings. The regi- 
 " ment of cavalry of the prince of Pruflia took poll oppofite the 
 *' interval between the regiments of prince Bevern and prince 
 " Henry, in order to cover the abovementioned openings, and 
 ** attacked an Auftrian regiment of foot that flood over againft 
 *' them, and no doubt had penetrated, if it had not been cxpofcd, 
 *' at the fame time, to a battery charged with cartouches, which 
 *' threw them back on Bevern's regiment. 1 he Auftrian cavalry 
 *' purfued them ; whereby prince Bevern's and prince Henry's 
 *' regiments fuffered fo much, that they were obliged to be 
 *' ordered out of the line. This produced an opening that cut 
 *' off our communication with the attack of the hcisrhts, and we 
 *' were for'ced to retire. The battalion of guards, on the right, 
 *^ repulfed four battalions, and two regiments of horfe, who at- 
 " tempted to furround them. Our left wing remained on the 
 " ground, where the enemy was ported before the aftion, 'till 
 *' about 9 o'clock, and then retired. The army marched towards 
 " Nimburg without being followed at all. Several cannon have 
 ^' been left behind, the carriages being broke, and for want of 
 *' horfes. T!ie lofs of this battle obliges us to raife the ficge of 
 " Prague. The army on the right of the Moldau marched ,to- 
 ** wards Brandeifs, and joined that which came from Kollin ; and 
 ** M. Keith, with his, marched to Budyn. 
 
 *' The
 
 in Germany, 1757. -73 
 
 " The Pruflians account of their lofs, is 1450 men, and 1667 
 " horfes, killed, in the cavalry; 8755 men, killed and mifTint^ 
 in the infantry; and 3568 wounded: in all, 13,773. T^^ ^ift> 
 publifhed at Vienna, of the lofs of the Auftrians, is 819 men 
 killed, 3616 wounded, in the infantry; 163 men, 414 horfes, 
 *' killed, 825 men, and 748 horfes, wounded, in the cavalry. 
 " Among the wounded were 23 ftaff officers, and marfhal Daun 
 " himfelf." 
 
 Though the two preceding accounts, particularly tlie laft, are 
 very clear and explicit, I will add that fent to- France, becaufe it 
 is impoflible that fo important an a(flioa fliould be too much ex- 
 plained and examined. 
 
 " Marshal Daun, having received orders, on the nth of 
 " June, to march to the relief of Prague, with full power to aft 
 " as he fhould think moft advantageous for the emprefs's fcrvice, 
 ^' quitted his camp the next morning, and, after a difficult march 
 " of fome days, arrived on the 15th at Gintitz. His excellency 
 " propofed marching, the day following, to Kaurzim, which was 
 " the moft commodious road to Prague. The king of Pruffia had 
 " joined the prince of Bevern, with a confiderable reinforcement, 
 " the preceding evening > and, as he had a perfedl knowledge 
 " of the country, he no doubt believed, that, by occupying the 
 " camp of Kaurzim, he Avould very much embarrafs marffial Dau.j 
 ** Effedlively, when the marffial was informed of it, he perceived 
 " very well the great inconveniency in which the king had put him 
 by taking this pofition, M'hile it reduced him to the neceffity c;' 
 " marching on his right, or on his left. It was extreamly dan- 
 " gerous and difficult to march on the left, on account of th- 
 " defiles, moraffes, and woods ; and, if he marched on his rigi.t. 
 " he muft neceflarily pafs near Kaurzim, and prefent his flar 
 ■■' to the enemy : and laftly, if, to avoid this, he would mar
 
 7« History of the War 
 
 *' a great way about towards the riglit, he would be the next day 
 " farther from Prague than at prefent ; and moreover would, by 
 *' that means, afford the enemy an opportunity to take twenty 
 " other pofitions, equally proper to hinder him from approaching 
 " that place ; which is very eafy in this country, where advan- 
 " tageous camps can be found on every fpot. The marflial, feeing 
 ** therefore that he muft neceffarily come to an acflion, in order 
 *' to deliver Prague, refolved to encamp the next morning in the 
 *' enemy's prefence, and reduce him to the neceflity either of 
 *' attacking, or give a proper opportunity of being attacked. 
 *' Accordingly the army marched to Krichenau. On the 17th, 
 " the marfhal, being informed that the enemy marched towards 
 ** Planian, mounted inftantly, and went to reconnoitre their mo- 
 " tions, in perfon. Perceiving that the king direded his march 
 ** towards the Auftrians right, he thought it neceflary to change 
 ** the pofition of his army. It was formed with Planian before 
 *' the front : the left wing was placed, in two lines of infantry, 
 ** with a great quantity of artillery, on a high hill, that flood 
 " quite alone, in the plain. On the right was another hill, fome- 
 " what lower than the former; on this the reft of the infantry 
 *' was ported, likewife in two lines, with two lines of cavalry 
 " on their flank. At the bottom of the hill, between thefe two 
 *' heights, is a plain of about 2500 paces long; here the marflial 
 " put two lines of horfe, and a third in refervej becaufe, as the 
 " king was equally ftrong in cavalry, it was imagined he would 
 *' make his greateft efforts againft the center, in order to cut the 
 *' army in two. His excellency ufed all the poffible precautions 
 " to elude the king's intention : artillery was placed on the flanks, 
 " and before the cavalry. Things continued in this fituation the 
 *' 17th. On the 18th the king ordered his army to march on the 
 *' left, along the great road that goes from Prague to Vienna, and 
 
 " he
 
 in Germany, 1757. 73 
 
 ** he endeavoured, continually, to come on the right flank of the 
 *' imperial army. M. Daun, perceiving the king's intention.'-, 
 ** ordered the corps de referve to march on the right wing, in 
 *' order to cover the flank. Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the 
 " morning, the head of the king's army appeared near Slatifliinz, 
 *' about a mile and a half off", where he continued 'till midday, 
 ** in order to give his columns time to alTemble : then all was put 
 *' again in motion, and always directed their march towards the 
 *' Auftrians right flank. The marflial, who expe(5led this, ordered 
 •* his fecond line to march there, and clofe up \yith the referve. 
 " At half an hour paft one, the head of the Pruflian columns, 
 ** both infantry and cavalry, appeared oppoflte the imperial army ; 
 ** which was prepared to receive them. The Pruflian infantry 
 " formed immediately, and advanced, in good order, to attack 
 " the marfl:ial ; who likewise marched to meet them. About 
 " 2 o'clock, the attack, fupported by a numerous artillery, began 
 ** with fuch incredible vivacity, that an eye witnefs only can form 
 ** a proper idea of it. The imperial army anfwered with a con- 
 " tinual fire, both of fmall arms, and heavy artillery. Tiie king 
 " of Pruflla had pofled fome heavy cannon on a hill, behind his 
 " infantry, which did the imperial army much damage. This 
 " firfl: attack lafted about an hour and a half; then the fire of the 
 ** imperial army began to be fuperior to that of the Pruflian-, 
 •*' and forced them to quit the field of battle, that they might 
 *' reft, and put thcmfelves in order to renew the aftion. This 
 ** was executed foon after; but they were repulfed, as in tJie firfl. 
 ** Seven fucceflive attacks were made from 2 o'clock 'till half an 
 *' hour paft fix, when the laft and moft violent was made. This 
 *" attack was general, and lafted 'till paft 7 o'clock, when the 
 " Pruifians were forced to give way on all fides, and retire in 
 confufion. The marflial fent fome infantry and cavalry to- 
 
 L purfue 
 
 4<
 
 74- History of the Wa r 
 
 " purfue them. The corps of light trocps, under general Nadafti^ 
 •* followed them a great way, and brought in many prifoners^ 
 •' The Saxon carabineers flood over againfl fome Pruflian infantry, 
 " from which, as well as from the artillery, they fuffered very 
 *' much : they defired leave to attack them ; which, having ob- 
 •' tained, they executed it with much bravery, cut the. enemy's 
 '* infantry to pieces,, and took feveral cannon and colours. This 
 " is what happened on the right wing, where the battle was 
 •' hottefl. About two hours after the firfl attack on our right,, 
 " that of the Pruflian army advanced againft the left of the 
 " Aullrians, in. order to attack it) which, confidering the ftrength 
 " of its pofition, ought never to have been undertaken. It ftood 
 " upon a hill which v/as ahnoft impoffihle to afcend, and which. 
 " was covered with artillery that did the Pruflians great damage. 
 *' The Pruflians right wing, being arrived at the bottom of the 
 *' hill, flopped : upon which the Auftrians left, feeing the ene- 
 ** my did not advance, being defirous to attack them, and par- 
 " take of the glory of the day with the refl of the army, quitted 
 " their pofition,. and defcended to the foot of the hill. The 
 " Auflrian infantry attacked that of the Pruflians with much 
 " bravery ;, and, after an hour's combat, obliged them to giv& 
 " way. The Auflrian cavalry advanced likewife, in order to. 
 " attack that of the enemy, but thefe immediately retired to- 
 " wards their infantry. The Auftrians were prudent enough not 
 *' to purfue their advantages on this fide, for fear of being fepa- 
 " rated from their right wing. In about an hour after, the Pruf- 
 *' fians right wing attacked the Auflrians left again -, but, in lefs 
 ** than half an hour, they were beat back in confufion. They 
 " refumed their former polition, and fired from all their artillery 
 " upon the Auflrians, during the whole aiflion. While the fecond 
 " attack was made, fix battalions, commanded by count Niclaa 
 
 Efterhafi^
 
 in Germany, • 1757. 75 
 
 *^ Efterhafi, having fliot all their cartridges, advanced againft the 
 ** enemy with fixed bayonnets, and, with great braver}% forced 
 *' them to give way. This battk was general, and all the corps 
 "' were more than once engaged, &c." 
 
 As this remarkable adlion makes a confiderable epoch in the 
 hillory of the war, being the firft the king of Pruflia ever loft, 
 we lliall here give our refledions upon it, and upon the difr-erent 
 manceuvres that preceded it. 
 
 Reflections en the battle of Koiiin. 
 
 It has been already obfefved, that the fiege of Prague, w'lik 
 about 50,000 men in it, was an imprudent and dangerous enter- 
 prize. Sieges are attended with fo great expence, and fo much 
 lofs of time, and men, that they ought never to be undertaken 
 v/ithout the utmoft neceffity. The "king of Prufiia was then in 
 circumftances that required Tome decifive ftroke; and that as foon 
 as pofTible j and therefore he fliould not, by any means, amufe 
 liimfelf with fieges, which he knew would give the Auftrians 
 -time and means to provide for their defence, whatever was the 
 <€vent of that of Prague. Sieges muft never be formed, unlefs, 
 Yi-v^hen the fortrelTes are placed on the pafles which lead into the 
 •enemy's country, and in fuch a manner that you cannot penetrate 
 ^till you are madcrs of them ; 2. when they are on your communi- 
 cations, and the country does not furhifh the neceflary fubfiftence ; 
 3. when they are necelrary, in order to cover the magazines you 
 form in the country itfelf, to facilitate your operations j 4* when 
 they contain confiderable magazines of the enemy, and fuch as are 
 'eflentially necellary to him j 5. when' the cbnqueft of them is ne- 
 ceffarily followed by that of fome confiderable diftrid;, which en- 
 ables you to f^parate your armies into winter quarters in the enemy's 
 
 L 2 country.
 
 jd H 1 s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 country. In thefe cafes, your firfl operation muft, no doubt, be 
 the fiege of fome fuch place ; which in all others muft be avoided. 
 Not one of thefe circumftances concurred with regard to Prague : 
 it covers no efl'ential pafs into the country, neither contained any 
 confiderable magazine, nor was neceffary for the king in order to 
 form one there, becaufe the country itfelf furniH^ed abundantly all 
 kind of fubj&ftence -, and, though it did not, his armies could be 
 fupplied from Sllefia, without any rifk ; for prince Charles could 
 not, if he remained at or about Prague, prevent it. If, inftead of 
 beiieging this town, his majefty had fent 20,000 men, the next 
 morning, after the enemy's right wing, which, as we have faid, 
 had fled to Benefchau, and, with the remainder, marched to Boh.- 
 mifch Brodt againft M. Daun, it is mere than probable he would 
 have deftroyed both : they certainly could not have retired without 
 lofing their artillery, baggage, &c. and muft have fell back, with 
 the utmoft expedition, on the Danube. Then the king was at 
 liberty to befiege Olmutz ; which would have given him all Bo^ 
 hernia 3 becaufe prince Charles muft likewife have marched on the 
 Danube, in order to join the remainder of the army, as he could 
 not, in the fituation in which he then was, without any magazines 
 or artillery, und-ertake any thing himfelf : he could not even apr 
 proach the king at all, without expofmg his army to deftrudion. 
 His majefty might have taken twenty pofitions that would have 
 covered the fiege of Olmutz, mafked the Danube and the capital, 
 and forced prince Charles to march up to Lintz, in order to pafs 
 it, and join the reft of the troops. This would have given him 
 all the time neccflary to reduce Olmutz, and. even Prague itfelf> 
 which would have been left to a common garrifon. His majefty> 
 allured by the uacertain and vain, but flattering, hopes of taking 
 50,000 men piifoners, loft fight of Daun and tlie right wing, and 
 with it an opportunity of giving fome decifive blow. When he 
 
 was-
 
 in Germany, 1757. 77 
 
 was informed of the enemy's approach, it was ilill time to repair 
 the fault he had committed. He might, and ought to have raifed 
 the liege of Prague, and, with his whole forces, attack M. Daun ; 
 if he fucceeded, it w»s very probable that prince Charles, in fo 
 long a march as he mufb make from Prague to the Danube, would 
 give an opportunity to attack him alfo; and he could fcarce ap- 
 proach the Danube at all, while the king was with an army near 
 Kollin, as is evident from the infpeftion of the map. 
 
 His majefty knew that prince Bevern narrowly efcaped being 
 opprefled by the fuperior forces of the enemy ; How could he 
 think that the addition of a few b:^ttalions and fquadrons would 
 infure the vidlory ? His whole army was fcarce fufficient to con- 
 tend with Daun, and yet he perfifts in his firft project of taking 
 Prague, and thereby expofed himfelf to certain deftrucflion, if the 
 enemy had done part only of what might have been eafily executed, 
 as well by the garrifoji of Prague, as by M. Daun after the battle^ 
 It is one of the moft effential qualities of a general, not to be in- 
 fatuated with a paflion for fome favourite and ftriking project, be- 
 caufe it expofes him to many, and ibmetimes fatal, confequences.. 
 It is difficult to renounce to an entcrprize once embraced, becaufe 
 it in fome meafure expofes one to tlie cenfure of want of forefi"ht, 
 or eonftancy, both very mortifying to felf-Iove. However, there 
 is more glory in mending a fault, than to perfevere in it. His 
 majefty, confiding too much in his own fuperior talents, too little 
 inthofe of his enemies, or prefled, perhaps, by the neceffity of his 
 affairs, has been obferved, very often, to undertake things much 
 above the means he had to accompliHi ljiem> and therefore no 
 wonder ihat many of his projecfVs, though in appearance plaufiblc, 
 wanted folidity, and confequently have not been always attended 
 with fuccefs. Being arrived at Kaurzim, and finding the enemy 
 too lirongly pofted to be attacked with an}- probability of fuccefs, 
 
 his
 
 yS H I S T O R, Y of tllC Wa R 
 
 his majcfly might have fell back, and taken fome other pofition, 
 which perhaps would have induced them to advance, and give him 
 an opportunity to fight upon more equal terms : if it be objefted 
 thr;t prince Charles, informed of his abfcnce, would attack the 
 army left before Prague, it only proves he was fenfible he had cx- 
 pofed that army to deftrucition, as it depended on the enemy's 
 knowing a thing, which he might have done by a thouland means. 
 When lie refolvcd to occupy the heights on the right flank of the 
 enemy, he ought not furely to have marched at broad day, becaufe 
 they muH neceflarily perceive his intention, and in time to make 
 their dlfpofitions accordingly, as it happened. Poflibly if the king 
 had fent in the evening a great corps of cavalry, which he could 
 fpare in that mountainous country, towards the enemy's left flank, 
 it v/ould have drawn their attention that way, and given him an 
 opportunity to march unobferved in the night, and occupy the 
 height of Chotzemitz : the attempting it by day made it impol- 
 fible from the firil: inllant. His majefty in marching formed a por- 
 tion of a circle j the enemy marched on the Chord, and therefore 
 could with eafe bring more men into adtion, at any one point of 
 attack, and in lefs time, than he could do, though the armies had 
 been equal, which mufl be decifive ; as his majcily was in propcr- 
 ^ori much flronger in cavalry than in infantry, he ought no doubt 
 to have chofen the mod convenient ground on the enemy's front for 
 thi\t fpecies of troops; and, as he had given them an opportunity 
 to reinforce their right, and its flank, v.'licre they had brought two 
 thirds of their army, he ought to have refufed botli his wings, and 
 make an effort with his cavalry, fullained by infantry and artillery, 
 on the center, between Chotzemitz and Brzifl:, where the enemy 
 had c>nly cavalry ; 'and therefore moft probably would have been 
 forced to give \vi\y, and their two wings, being thus fcparated, ea- 
 fily defeated i v.hcreas, by perilling to attack their right, he could 
 
 brins
 
 in Germany, 1757. 79 
 
 bring only |iis infantry to a<?ion, the ground being very improper 
 for cavalry, as well on account of the ravins and woods, as of the 
 villages before the enemy's front. Having refolved to attack this 
 wing, his majefty fliould hzve brought here all his infantry, leav- 
 ing only a line of horfe on his right, which would have been fuf- 
 ficient, as the enemy's left could never quit their advantageous po- 
 fition and defcend into the plain. This would have enabled him 
 to fuftain his vanguard properly, and at a convenient diftance ; ' 
 whereas he left it expofed, and quite in the air, his line being 
 too far back: the more fuccefsful his vanguard was, the more cer- 
 tain to be deftroyed, becaufe the more they advanced, the more 
 they expofed themfclves to be attacked on all fides, as it rerilly 
 happened : for, having pierced the firfi: line of the enemy, and at- 
 tacked the flank of the fecond, they found thcmfelves engaged 
 with the greateft part of the army in front ; and the whole reicrve,. 
 compofed of infantry and cavalry, on their flank j and at the fame 
 time expofed to the fire of a very numerous and well ferved ar- 
 tillery : and, being fo far advanced that they could not be fuflained 
 by the line, were obliged to give way. If they had been properly 
 fupported, and a body of troops fent on their flank, oppofite the 
 enemy's referve, to keep it in awe, the battle was won : the ene- 
 my's line was already broke, and had no convenient, ground behind 
 to take a new pofition upon ; fo that the whole army would have 
 been taken in flank ; nor could the referve quit its pofition ta 
 attack this vanguard in flank,, without prefcnting their own, and 
 loflng the advantage of their fituation. But, as thefe difpofitions 
 were not made, the enemy's referve, without any rifle, quitted its 
 poft, and took the king's vanguard iii flank, which, as has been 
 faid, being unfupported by any other troops, was forced to give 
 way, and the battle was lofl:. The general faults therefore of the 
 king's difpofltion, before, and during the adllon, were, i . to have 
 
 manoeuvred
 
 8o History of the War 
 
 manoeuvred by day, which gave the enemy time to change their 
 poiition, according to their circumflanccs ; 2. to have formed an 
 attack where he could not conveniently combine the different 
 ipecies of arms ; whereas the enemy had both infantry and cavalry, 
 with a great quantity of artillery, to fuflain the point attacked; 
 3. to have let general Hulfen advance fo far, that he could not be 
 fupported by the line; and, 4. to have attacked with too little 
 infantry, confidcring the nature of the ground. 
 
 As to the conduift of M. Daun, it appears uniform, and founded 
 upon reafonable principles : after the battle of Prague, it was very 
 judicious; he retired before the duke of Bevern, though ftronger 
 than him from the beginning, as well to give his men time to 
 recolleiTt themfelves, as to be able to receive the reinforcements he 
 expecfted. Thefe being arrived, his condudl changes according to 
 the circumftances ; he is now as vigorous and a<flive, as he feemed 
 before flow and dilatory. His march was calculated fo cut off the 
 prince of Bevern, before he could join the army at Prague, or be 
 reinforced by it ; and, though this projedl did not fucceed, it was 
 certainly well laid. His condu(!!l, during the adlion, appears no 
 iefs prudent. The enemy made no fault of which he did not take 
 advantage : one only he himfelf feems to have committed, which 
 was to have kept his line too far back ; tins gave Hulfen an op- 
 portunity of taking the villages, before the front, from between 
 them and the front, and then penetrate through the line, which 
 would certainly have occafioned the lofs of the battle, had he been 
 properly fupported. Whenever your line is placed behind vil- 
 lages, it mull be at a proper dirtance to fullain them, otherwife 
 they, being taken, will be of great prejudice to you, and advan- 
 tage to the enemy, whofe motions are covered and fuflained by 
 them; whereas, if you fuftain them properly, he cannot poflibly take 
 tiiem, nor advance, leaving them behind ; becaufe not only they 
 
 break
 
 ill Ge rman y, 1757. 8r 
 
 break his line and throw it into feme degree of confufion, which 
 favouraWe opportunity, if improved, will neceflarily be attended 
 with a defeat, and alfo expofe it to be taken in flank by the troops 
 pofted in them. The poflellion therefore of villages, provided 
 they are at a proper diflance to be fuftained, is one of the moft 
 advantageous circumftances that can occur in a field of battle ; but 
 all thefe advantages are loft, and turn againft you, if you do not 
 fuftain them. They are fo very advantageous that I would never 
 advife any general to attack them, if he fees they will be fuftained, 
 but rather malk them, and put them on fire witii haubitz, and 
 choofe fome other point of attack, which, though in appearance 
 lefs proper, will, generally fpeaking, fucceed better.* If the mar- 
 flial had marched the 19th with his whole army towards Prague, 
 it is probable that of the king, before that place, would have been 
 deftroyed. In war a general muft think he has done nothing, 
 while fomething remains unfinifhed; he ought to confider all his 
 fuccefles as means only that lead to greater, but never make an 
 epoch of them, or paufe to meditate, whjle in the full career of 
 vidlory and glory. 
 
 On the 19th his majefty quitted the army, which had fought 
 at Kollin, and went to Prague, in order to raife the fiege : 
 this was executed the day following without any lofs worth 
 mentioning -, that part of the army which was on the right of 
 the Moldau, marched down that fide as far as Leutmeritz, 
 
 M while 
 
 • We have a tine example of this given by the famous Marlborough, at the battle of 
 Hockftedt ; he had attacked fevcral times the village of Oberklaw, but was each time re- 
 pulfed with gre.1t lofs ; his lord(hip, very judicioufly having left a body of infantry to ma& 
 the village, advanced, and broke the enemy's line, which got the battle. The French 
 had garniflicd all the villages before their front, particularly OberkUw and Plentheim, 
 with a prodigious quantity of infantry, e.\pe£ling that the generals of the all^e^ wonld at- 
 tack them, .and by no means prcfume to advance and leave them behind ; bu: they were 
 difappointed, b?at, and loll all their infantry polled in the village;.
 
 82 History of the War 
 
 while that under M. Keith took the road of Welwarn and 
 Budyn, where he parted the Egra, and went to encamp between 
 Libofchowitz and Lowofitz, oppofite the Icing's divifion ; fo that 
 the whole formed only one army, feparated by the Elbe, over 
 which they had the necefTary communications, and could eafily be 
 on either fide, according as circumftances might require. With 
 the remainder of his forces his majefty had formed another con- 
 fidcrablc army, amounting to above 30,000 men, under the 
 command of the prince of PrulTia, who took pofl about Boh- 
 mifcli Leipa. By this means it was thought they could effeiflu- 
 ally cover Saxony and Lufatia, and keep open the communication 
 through this laft province with Silefia : for, if the enemy marched 
 down, the left of the Elbe, and attempted to penetrate into Saxony, 
 by the way of AufTig, the king could, with his army encamped about 
 Leutmeritz, pafs the river, and take fuch pofitions between Lowo- 
 fitz and AufTig, as would effeftually put a ftop to their progrefs ; 
 and, if they directed their fteps towards Lufatia, the prince's army 
 could eafily take fome advantageous camp in that mountainous 
 country, which would enable him, though inferior, to oppofe 
 them with fuccefs, at leaft till the king had time to make fome 
 manoeuvre in his favour. 
 
 While his majefty was thus occupied in making difpofitions 
 to continue in Bohemia as long as poflible, the Auftrians were no 
 kfs adtive in forming their plan to drive him out of it. This 
 could be accomplifhed in three different ways: the firfl; was to fol- 
 iovv M. Keith down the left of the Elbe, and endeavour to pene- 
 trate into Saxony, the conqueft of which would open the way to 
 carfy the war into Brandeburg, and probably furnifli fome op- 
 portunity to put a happy end to it ; and the more fo, as die Ruf- 
 lians and Swedes would be at hand to aft in concert, and confc- 
 quently v.'ith more vigour : the fecond metliod propofed, ^vas to 
 
 leave
 
 in Germany, 1757. 83 
 
 leave an army to obferve the enemy, and to fend the remainder 
 into Silefia, either to befiege Neifs or Schweidnitz, which, it was 
 imagined, would force the enemy to quit Bohemia, in order t© 
 cover thefe important places, on which the prefervation of Silefia 
 feems very much to depend : the third and lafl: method that of- 
 fered, was to keep the army together, and march towards Lufatia, 
 which would force the enemy to retire, or come to an a<ftion : and, 
 as this laft was moft probable, from the known charafter of the 
 king, it would be advifeable to have the whole army united, rather 
 than feparate it, to undertake many things at once, and fo expofc 
 it to be beat in detail. This plan was preferred to the others; 
 accordingly, the whole Auflrian army pafled the Elbe on the ill 
 of July, and encamped at Liflau, which the enemy had quitted 
 the 26th of laft month, and marched fuccefllvely to Jungbuntzlaw 
 and Tfcheditz, on tlie right of the Ifer. 
 
 Prince Charles fent general Nadafli, with a confiderable corps, 
 likewife on the right of that river, as well to obferve the enemy's 
 motions at Leutmeritz, as to cover the march of the army to- 
 wards Jungbuntzlaw. General Morocz was fent alfo, with a ftrong 
 body, on the left of the Ifer, to obferve the prince of Pruflia's 
 motions, and to prepare every thing for the march of the main 
 army. The firft of thefe corps having taJ<en poft at Mfchno, be- 
 tween the prince's army and that of the king, while the other 
 pafled the Ifer at Bakehofen, on the prince's left flank, his royal 
 highnefs thought it full time to quit Tfcheditz ; and, as thefe 
 two corps were continually on his flanks, he found it neceflary to 
 fall back fucceflively to Hirfchberg, Neufchlofs, and Leipa ; from 
 whence he fent general Putkammer, with four battalions and 500 
 huflTars, to occupy Gabel, that he might fecure that important 
 pais which leads into Lufatia. 
 
 M 2 In
 
 8^, History of the War 
 
 In the mciin time the Auftrians grand army advanced with flow, 
 i>ut cautious and fure fteps, to Munchengratz, and from thence to 
 Hunnerwafler. Tlic enemy's polition at Lcipa, covered with the 
 Poltz, was thought too ftrong to be attacked ; it was therefore re- 
 folved to turn his left flank and attack Gabel, which would nc- 
 ceflarily force him to retire, and at the fame time open a fure way 
 into Lufatia. Accordingly, general Macquire, with a confiderable 
 detachment, fuftained by the vanguard, was fent on this expedi- 
 tion. The army advanced to Nimes, in order to cover it. The 
 place was taken the 15th, after a defence of thirty-fix hours, and 
 the army immediately paifed the Poltz. All thefe manoeuvres 
 forced the prince of Pruflia to quit Leipa ; and having, with Ga- 
 bel, loft the neareft communication with Zittau, where he had a 
 ftrong garrifon, and a very confiderable magazine of every kind, 
 he was obliged to make feveral forced and difficult marches by 
 Kamentz, Georgenthal, Kreywitz, Rumburg, and Unterhennerf- 
 dorff, in order, if poflible, to anticipate the enemy ; but he was dif- 
 ?.ppointed; for, on the taking of Gabel, they had diredted their 
 march to Zittau, where they arrived the 19th, and were then 
 bombarding the town with the moft unrelenting fury. They had 
 however neglected to invert, it entirely ; the prince feized this fa- 
 vourable opportunity, approached the place with his army, and 
 havine, during the preceding night, withdrawn the greateft part 
 of the ftores, baggage, &c. on the 23d he retired, by Lobau, to- 
 wards Bautzen, without any other lofs than that of colonel Diereck, 
 and abput 200 men, who ftill endeavoured to defend themfelves in 
 that general conflagration, which confumed one of the moil po- 
 pulous and rich cities of Germany. 
 
 The Auftrians having thus drove a confiderable part of the 
 enemy's forces out of Bohemia, and fecured their communica- 
 tions with that country, by occupying Zittau and Gabel, they 
 
 refolved
 
 in Germany^ I757' 8$ 
 
 refolved to advance farther into Lufatia, and endeavour to cut off 
 the enemy intirely from Silefia. Accordingly, the grand army 
 marched the 25th from Zittau to Eckartfberg; from whence feve- 
 ral detachments were fent on the left, to obferve the motions of 
 the enemy ; and on the right, down the Neifs, in order to fecure 
 the pafies into Silefia. A fmall corps of light troops, commanded 
 by colonel Janus, had already penetrated into that country by the 
 way of Trautenau ; but it was too inconiiderable to undertake any 
 thing of confequence. 
 
 His royal highnefs prince Charles refolved to continue in the 
 neighbourhood of Zittau until the enemy quitted the frontiers and 
 fell back into Saxony; which he knew they would foon be forced to 
 do, in order to oppofe the combined army, that was then forming in 
 the empire, and preparing to march towards the Saala and Leipfig. 
 While thefe things pafled between prince Charles and the prince 
 of Prufiia, the king, with near 40,000 men, remained at Leut- 
 meritz in great tranquility, as if he had been no ways concerned 
 in the event. At length, however, the taking of Zittau roufed 
 him from his lethargy, and fliewed him the unfavourable fituation 
 of his affairs, which nothing but fuperior condudt and. adivity 
 could reinftate. On entering Bohemia, at the beginning of the 
 campaign, Silefia had been left without any troops, excepting fome 
 weak garrifons to cover It. The enemy had taken fuch a pofition 
 as made it difficult to fend any fuccours there : they could, thcre- 
 fore^ enter that country, and perhaps take fome place of confe- 
 quence before it could pofiibly b& relieved. 
 
 To remedy thefe evils, his majeffy quitted Leutmeritz the 20th, 
 and marched fucceffively to Pirna, where he paffcd the Elbe, Bif- 
 chofffwerda, and Bautzen, where he arrived the 29th, and joined 
 the army commanded by the prince of Pruffia, who retired, and 
 never appeared more in the field, and died foon after. 
 
 From
 
 86 History of the War 
 
 From hence his majefty marched to Weiftenberg, and there 
 waited 'till the arri<^al of marfhal Keith ; who, having left a fmall 
 corps to protedl §axony, followed with the remainder, and joined 
 him in the beginning of Augufl. Having thus aflcmbled a very 
 confidcrablc army, he refolved to open the communication with 
 Silefia ; and, if poilible, bring the enemy to an adlion ; which 
 migjit, if fuccefsful, retrieve his affairs. 
 
 With thefe views, his majefty quitted Weiilenberg on the 15th, 
 and marched to Oflritz. His vanguard took general Beck's bag- 
 gage at Bernftadtel ; and fome of the light troops, pufhing on to 
 Oftritz, they there furprized general Nadafti, at table; who, with 
 the utmoft difficulty, found means to efcape. All his equipage 
 was taken : lome letters were found in it that indicated a defign 
 to betray Drefdcn to the Auftrians. This ferved as a pretext to 
 treat the queen of Poland with fome hardfliip. On the i6th he 
 advanced within cannon fliot of the enemy, in order to give them 
 battle; but he found them fo advantageoufly pofted, that he did 
 not think it prudent to attack them. However, he continued here 
 'till the 20th ; and then, finding they would not quit their pofition, 
 returned to his former camp behind Oftritz. Though his majefty 
 had not been able to execute his plan intirely, he had gained an 
 important point by opening a communication with Silefia ; which 
 he refolved to keep fo, if poffible, that his forces might adl: in 
 concert, at leaft, if not united. He left, therefore, in this neigh- 
 bourhood, a confiderable part of his army, under the command 
 of the prince of Bevern ; and, 'with the remainder, returned to 
 Drefden,' in order to march againft the combined army, which 
 was advancing towards Saxony. 
 
 Before we proceed to give an account of the ulterior operations 
 of the refpedlive armies, we think it may be ufeful to examine thofe 
 which happened after the fiege of Prague. In the defcription we 
 
 have 
 
 •f 
 
 •:^ V
 
 in Grrmany, 1757. 87 
 
 have given of this country, it appear?, there are three roads that 
 go out of it into Lufatia : the firft, near the Elbe, goes by Leipa, 
 Kamentz, and Rumburg, towards Bautzen ; the fecond, along the 
 Ifer, by Munchengratz, and Gabel, tov/ards Zittau; the third, 
 by Reichenberg, and Friedland, towards Lauban : all which are 
 intercepted by many and great defiles, efpecially the firft and laft, 
 where a corps, compofed of a few battalions, would fuffice to ftop 
 an army. The plan, formed by the Auftrians, to act on the right 
 of the Elbe, preferable to the left, was certainly well advifed j 
 becaufe they could, with greater facility, drive the enemy out of 
 Bohemia, than if they attempted it on the other fide, where he 
 could take many pofitions between Lowoiitz and Pirna, from 
 whence they could not force him by any diredl motion ; and, if 
 they endeavoured to get on his flanks, it would be attended with 
 lofs of time, and perhaps would fail in the execution. This plan 
 was attended with another great advantage, that, in forcing the 
 enemy to retire out of Bohemia, by gaining his left flank, they 
 ■cut him off from Silefia, and opened a fure way into it for them- 
 felves. 
 
 As fopn as the army pafied the Elbe, a large corps, under Na- 
 dafti, was fent to obferve the king ; and another between that and 
 the prince of Pruflia's army. Thefe two corps were fo ftrong, 
 that when united they formed a fmall army, and could with fafety 
 keep clofe to the enemy, and render the communication between 
 their two armies very precarious. A third was fent on tlie prince's 
 left flank i and, within a march of theie different corps, the main 
 army advanced under prince Charles. By this admirable difpofition 
 he could fuftain them, if neceffary ; and they had a fure retreat by 
 falling back on his army : he was covered by them j and, keeping 
 on the left of the Ifer, could not be forced to light againft his will. 
 His meafures were fo well taken, and executed with fo much 
 
 vii^our
 
 8^ History of the War 
 
 vigour and prudence, that in 20 days he forced tlic enemy to 
 abandon Bohemia with great lofs, and cut off his communication 
 vith Silefia. 
 
 If, after the taking of Zittau, his royal highnefs had marched 
 to Stromberg, beyond Lobau, or to Reichenbach, or, laftly, to 
 Jauernick, with a ftrong corps on the Landfcron, and the Hght 
 troops in the woods behind Lobau, the enemy could never have 
 opened a communication with Silefia. The pofition of Kleinfchonau 
 was too far back, and left the road between Bautzen and Gorlitz 
 cpenj fo that the king could always enter Silefia without any op- 
 pofition. The method, purfued by prince Charles, of adting with 
 ftrong corps, ratlier than with the whole army, is attended with 
 infinite advantages : i. it facilitates the means of fubfifling, which, 
 in every country, is difficult, when the army is very numerous ; 
 2. it enables you to engage every day fome important combat, 
 without bringing affairs to a decifion ; 3. they revive the fpirits 
 of the foldiers, whom former misfortunes have rendered timid; 
 4. by taking pofl on the enemy's flanks you force him to quit 
 eveiy camp, however flrong, and confequently to abandon the 
 whole country. Ail which truths are deduced clearly from the 
 condudl of prince Charles on this occafion. 
 
 That of the king does not, on the whole, appear in the fame 
 favourable light. His aiftivity in raifing the fiege of Prague is 
 much to be commended ; the lealt delay would have been fatal to 
 him : his dividing the army into feveral flrong corps, after the 
 battle of Kollin, very much facilitated the retreat. Thefe pre- 
 fcnted fo many objefts to the enemy, that he could not immedi- 
 ately determine which was mod: worthy his attention; nor could 
 he undertake any thing againfl them 'till he had afcertained their 
 number, fpecies, and pofition : in the mean time they retired with 
 tranquility and fafety. From the king's condodl, on this occafion, 
 
 may
 
 in G E R M A N V, 1 7 5 7. 89 
 
 -may be deduced a general rule for retreating after an aclicn loll:. 
 That an army retreating mull: be divided into as many ftrong corps 
 as the nature of tlie country will admit of; becaufe, in this cafe, 
 the enemy can do you no very effential damage : if he feparates 
 his army likewife into many corps, neither of them wiil be ftrong 
 enough to undertake any thing of confequence j even, if they keep 
 tco clofc, they may receive fome conliderable check. Another 
 advantage, arifing from this method of retiring, is, that the ene- 
 my cannot intercept any one of your corps; becaufe he can neither 
 puOi between them, nor go fo far about as to come before them, 
 without expoling his own troops to be hemmed in between your 
 different corps. If he follows you with his whole army, one only 
 divifion can be in danger, which may be eafily avoided by forming 
 a ftrong rear-guard, who wiU get time for the remainder to march 
 off in fafety ; and the more fo, as a fmall corps marches much 
 more lightly than an army. Care muft be taken not to engage the 
 whole corps ; becaufe, if the enemy is near, and acts with vigour, 
 it will be loft intirely. 
 
 When prince Charles paffed the Elbe, it was evident he pro- 
 pofed to advance towards Lufatia, confequently the king fliould 
 have left M. Keith, w^lth a few battalions and fquadrons, in the 
 mountains between Lowofitz and Pirna, to cover Saxonv, acrain't 
 the enemy's light troops, and with the remainder have taken a 
 pofition behind the Poltz, about Leipa or Nimes, with a ftrong 
 corps on his left, towards Liebenau, and another fmaller, on his 
 right, between liim and the Elbe, on the road to Rumburg. This 
 would have made it an:ipoirible for the enemy to advance one flep 
 'till they had diflodged him ; they could not think of entering 
 thofe great defiles, through which the road leading to Rumburg 
 palTes, having a corps, as I fuppofe, in front, and the whole army 
 ijn their flank aud rear ; nor could they enter thofc of Liebenau 
 
 N and
 
 go History of the War 
 
 and Rcichenberg on his left, for the fame reafons : they mufl con- 
 fequently either force him to retire, or ftop fhort. It was ftill 
 more improbable that they would feparate their army and fend a 
 eonfiderable part of it to make an efficacious diverfion in Silefia. 
 Such is the flrength of this country, and fo many good camps to 
 be found in it, that, if the prince of Pruffia, even with his army, 
 had taken the road of Gabel and Zittau, inflead of that of Rumburg, 
 it is probable he might have flopped prince Charles, for fome time 
 at Icafl. Tlie enemy did not choofe to venture between his right 
 flank and the king's army, and they could not cafily take a pofition 
 on his left, that could force him to quit Gabel and Zittau, if he 
 had taken his camp on the mountains between thefe two places, 
 which he ought to have done, rather than take the road of Rum- 
 burg, by which he lofl them both, and his communication with 
 Silefia. When the enemy arrived at Hunnerwaffer, Why did not 
 the king march inftantly from Gaflorff, and come on their flank 
 and rear, while the prince his brother attacked them in front ? 
 Nothine in the world could hinder them from afting in concert. 
 This, however, and many other favourable opportunities, which 
 the enemy gave him, were loft. His majefty continued, as we. 
 have faid, all this while, near Leutmeritz, in perfedl tranquility. 
 
 The prince's army was, no doubt, too weak to withftand the 
 efforts of the enemy, who w^ere more than double his number; 
 yet we think he might have taken fuch camps as would have ftop- 
 ned them. When a general has the misfortune to command an 
 army that is much inferior to that of the enemy, he muft certainly 
 retire before them, if they fend very ftrong corps on his flanks, as ■ 
 well becaufe his fubfiftance becomes precarious, as becaafe they 
 may, by a judicious ufe of thefe corps, attack him with united 
 forces in front and rear, and intirely defeat him, particularly if the 
 country has many defiles. A general, in fuch circumftanccs, has 
 
 but
 
 in Germany, I7S7« gr- 
 
 but one way to extricate himfelf j which is, to attack, with his 
 whole forces, whatever corps may be fent on his flank : if he fuc- 
 ceeds, once or twice, the enemy will fcarce attempt a third time. 
 The prince, having negledled to do this, was, as we have faid, 
 forced to retire from camp to camp, and at length to abandon the 
 "whole country. 
 
 During thefe tranfaftions in Bohemia, the army of the empire, 
 confifting of 32 fq<iadrons, 32 battalions, 23 companies of grena- 
 diers, 2 regiments of hufl'ars, and 52 pieces of cannon, comm.anded 
 by the prince of Hildburgfliaufen, allembled in the circle of Fraii- 
 conia, in the month of Auguft. Thefe were to be reinforced by 
 30,000 French, under the command of prince Soubife, who had 
 been for fome time on the Main. Accordingly, they united at 
 Erfurth on the 21ft of Auguft, and afiumed the title of the com- 
 bined army; the objedl of which, was, to drive the Pruffians out 
 of Saxony. This, it was thought, could be executed without any 
 confiderable difficulty. The country was In fome meafure defence* 
 lefs, there being nothing to guard it but fome few weak garrifons, 
 which, though united, could form but an inconfiderablc corps, 
 incapable of keeping the field againft fuch fuperior forces i and, 
 being thus feparated, were flill lefs capable of making any effe<5tual 
 refiJlance. The king, being wholly taken up in obferving the 
 Auftrians, had not, as they imagined, either time or means to 
 come and oppofe their operations. 
 
 For thefe reafons, it was refolved to march down the Saala and 
 begin the campaign with the iiege of Leipfig, preferable to any 
 other enterprize, becaufe they would be at hand to receive alj kind 
 of fuccours from Richlieu's army, now intirely at liberty by the 
 convention of Clofterfeven, and moreover could, in cafe of fac- 
 ■cefs, take their winter quarters in this part of Saxon v, and the 
 .next campaign proceed to the intire conqueft of it, and of Magde- 
 burg and Brandeburg. 
 
 N 2 Thb'
 
 ^T H I S T O R Y of the Wa R 
 
 Tke king knew pcrfecftly well, that, if the progrels of the com- 
 bined army, and that of M. RichUeu, was not immediately flop- 
 ped, they would foon be on the Elbe; the confequence of which 
 inud be futal to liim. Having,, therefore, left an army, of 40 bat- 
 talions and 70 fquadrons, under the prince of Bevern, to defend 
 Silefia, he quitted Bernfladtel the 25th of Augufl-, and marched to/ 
 Drefden, where he aflemhled an army,, and proceeded without de- 
 lay to the Saala. On the 12th of September he arrived at Erfurth, 
 which the enemy abandoned on his approach, and retired to Eife- 
 nach. His majefty followed them, intending to give them battle,, 
 but he found thenrfo advantageoufly poised, fliat he did not think; 
 it advifeabk to attack them; and, feeing they declined coming to 
 a-n aftion as much as pofliblc, he refolved to fall back on the Saala,. 
 as well to make his army fubfift with more eafe,. as to be at hand:.' 
 to fuft:ain a detachment which he prcpofed fending under prince; 
 Ferdinand, to cover Halberftadt and the neighbouring country,, 
 ajjainlt the incurfions of the light troops, which infefled them- 
 daily from Richlieu's army ; and another, under prince Maurice,, 
 between the Moldau and the Elbe, to cover that part of Saxony 
 ■•Vid Bnindeburg. Accordingly, he retired firft to Buttelftadt, and: 
 fi-om thence to Naumburg, where he arrived the 13th of Oftober. 
 This retreat encouraged the combined army to advance;, they re- 
 kimed their former pofition at Erfurth, where general St. Germain. 
 \vas ported, with a confiderable detaclament, to obierve the king's, 
 motions, and cover the remainder of the army, who, not being 
 able to fupport the cold, were put into quarters of cantonment. 
 
 Prince Charles, feeing the enemy's forces thus feparated at an- 
 immenfe diftance, ajid the road into Brandeburg quite open, refol- 
 ved to {crt<i a confiderable detachment to Berlin ; and, to cover this 
 expedition, another great corps, under general Marfhal, was fenir 
 upon the Elfter. Plis royal highnefs propofgd, by this enterprize, 
 
 to
 
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 93 
 
 to raife the credit of his arms, which the taking cf the enemy's 
 capital could not fail to do ; to make a diverfion in favour of the 
 combined army, becaufe it was not doubted but the king would 
 quit Saxony for fome time, and hailen to the fuccour of his refi- 
 dence; and laftly, to oblige the prince of Bevern to make fome 
 confiderable detachment, v/hich would facilitate the means to drive 
 him out of his prefent advantageous polition. 
 
 Accordingly, general Haddick,^ with about 4000 men, was^ 
 fent to Berlin j which he took, and ranfomed, and then retired 
 behind the Spree with fafety and honour. 
 
 Prince Maurice, who, as hath been faid, had been detached 
 towards the Elbe, was on. his march there when he v/as informed 
 of the enemy's enterprize. again ft Berlin ; he immediately pafTed 
 that river, and dire(5led his march towards Berlin, in hopes f:ill to 
 anticipate the enemy, or at leaft intercept him in his retreat; but, 
 on his arrival at. Schwelinz, advice was- brought that Haddick had- 
 been at Berlin, and, having ranfomed.it, was retired intoLufatia, 
 
 The king, having been informed of this enterprize againft his 
 capital, and believing at firft that the enemy had concerted fome 
 folid plan with, the Swedes, who were likewife advancing that 
 way, thought it neceffary to go and defeat their defigns in perfon. 
 For which purpofe,. having left about 6boo or 7000 men, under 
 M. Keith, to guard the Saala, and obferve the combined army, 
 he quitted Leipfig on the i6th of O^ilober, and on the 2o.th amved 
 at Annaberg, on the right of the Elbe, wliere he was informed of 
 Haddick's retreat. Upon which he ordered prince Maurice to re- 
 fume his pofition between the Elbe and the Moldau, and with part 
 of the troops returned to Leipfig. 
 
 The generals of the combined army, now reinforced by a very 
 firong corps, commanded by the duke of Broglio, refolved to feize: 
 tliis kvourable opportunity which tlie king's abfence afforded. them,, 
 
 andi 
 
 ■ *
 
 c)A. History of the War 
 
 and once more penetrate into Saxony: accordingly, they put their 
 troops in motion, palTed the Saala on the 25th, and on the 27th 
 had their head quarters at Weiflenfels. From hence count de Mailly 
 was lent to fummon Leipfig, which M. Keith refufed to furrender. 
 Things were in this fituation, when the king arrived with about 
 10,000 men; and, being joined by the corps under M. Keith, and 
 prince Ferdinand, an army of 22,000 men was allemblcd, with 
 which he relblved to march againft the enemy. 
 
 Though the combined army was much fuperior to that of the 
 king, it was thought prudent to dcchne coming to an adion, with 
 the Saala behind them ; and probably they meant to concert fome 
 new plan with M. Richlieu, now intirely difcngaged. Accordingly, 
 the whole army repafltd that river on the 29th j 4 battalions, and 
 1 8 companies of grenadiers, were left to defejid Weillenfels ; and 
 14 battalions, with fome cavalry, under the command of the duke 
 of Broglio, were fent to occupy Merfeburg ; which fliews they 
 then propofed defending the banks of the Saala. 
 
 The king quitted Leipfig on the 30th, and arrived the day fol- 
 lowing at Weiffenfels, which he ordered to be attacked inflantly; 
 and, after fome refiltancc, took it fword in hand. The enemy, 
 having for the moft part paflcd the river, put fire to the bridge, 
 which intercepted fome of them, who were made prifoners. Their 
 army was divided into two parts : the one, commanded by the 
 prince of Hildburglhaufen, remained oppofite to Weillenfels ; and 
 the other, under prince Soubife, approached Merfeburg, to fuftain 
 M. Broglio, or cover his retreat, in cafe it ihould be thought con- 
 venient to abandon that place. 
 
 His majeliy knew, that, while the enemy had fuch confiderable 
 forces on the frontiers of Magdeburg and Saxony, he could not 
 think of fcparating his army, to put the troops in winter quarters 
 when the fcafon required it, even fuppofing he could keep* th^ 
 
 whole
 
 ill Germany, 1757. 95 
 
 whole in that countrv : it was therefore refolved to give the com- 
 bined army battle, and, if they declined it, drive them fo far back 
 that they could not refume their operations, at leali for this catr.- 
 paign. Accordingly, bridges were thrown over the SaaLi, at 
 Weillenfels, Merfcburg, and Halle, where the army paiTcd in 
 three columns, and allembled, the 2d of November, near the vil- 
 lage of Rofbach, as in A. A. The enemy, having abandoned the 
 defign of defending the banks of the Saala, quitted Merfeburg, 
 and united their whole forces in B. B. The king examined th.ir 
 portion the 3d, and refolved to attack them the next morning. 
 Accordingly, he advanced at the head of his cavalry, in order to 
 €ccupy thofe pofls which fhould be found moft proper to cover the- 
 infantry, and at the farne time form his difpofitions for the attack. 
 Being arrived in D. D. he perceived they had, in th& preceding 
 night, changed their pofition, and taken another in C. C. which 
 appeared too flrong to be attacked : upon which the army was or- 
 dered to march on the left, and encamp in E. E. with the left at. 
 Rolhach, the center at Schartau, and tlie right towards Bcdra, 
 with the cavalry in the third line. 
 
 The commanders of the combined army attributed this retro- 
 grade motion of the king to fear. This, and the great force of their 
 army, elated their courage in fuch a manner, that they refolved to 
 attack him next morning, and fo finiih the campaign ; the fatigues 
 of which their troops feemed no longer able or willing to endure. 
 The king's right and center w^ere deemed too well polled to be 
 attacked with fuccefs, confequently they propofed attacking the 
 left on the flank and rear j and at the fame time general St. Ger- 
 main was ordered to take poft, with a confiderable corps, in N. N. 
 as well to amufe the enemy, as to cover the march of tlie army : 
 at II o'clock it was put in motion, in three columns j the van- 
 guard was compofed of AuHrian and imperial cavalry, followed by 
 
 the.
 
 f)6 History of the War 
 
 -tlic French and imperial infantry; the \\holc was clofcd by the 
 French horfe. Being arrived on the hill, oppolite the enemy's 
 3t:ft flank, they halted, and ordered the French horle to advance, 
 iand join the reft of the cavalry at the head. 
 
 About i o'clock the king was informed that they were in 
 Jiiarch on his left flank; but, not being able as yet to difcover 
 their intentions, he remained quiet for the prefcnt, and obferved 
 -them. At 2 o'clock he perceived they had paffcd his flank, and 
 continued marching towards Merfeburg; upon which he ordered 
 iiis cavalry and artillery to march on the left, behind the hills, and 
 ■occupy that near Lunftadt and Reichertfwerben, while the inflxntry 
 followed in all haftc. 
 
 The generals of the combined army, feeing the enemy quit their 
 camp vi'ith an appearance of precipitation, thought they were re- 
 tiring; which fcemed the more probable, as they could not difco- 
 -ver any thing of the march, being covered by the hills. Anxious 
 ?eft the enemy efcaped, and they lofe the fruits of their fine difpo- 
 fitions, they advanced in great hafte with their cavalry, followed, 
 ft a ccnfiderable diftance, by their infantry, hoping to overtake the 
 rear-guard, and, by attacking it with vigour, either deflroy it, or 
 force th€ enemy to a general a(3:ion. Being arrived near Reichertf- 
 werben, feme of the enemy's horfe appeared on the heights behind 
 the village ; they continued, however, to advance, thinking they 
 were only pofted there to gain time, and cover the retreat. This 
 illufion foon vaniflied ; all the Pruffian horfe was then forming, 
 under the protedion of fome heavy artillery, pofted on the hill, 
 Avhich did great execution, and contributed elTentially to the fuc- 
 cefs of the battle. As foon as they were formed, his majefty or- 
 dered them to attack that of the enemy ; this they executed with 
 promptitude and vigour, broke them, and drove them back in 
 confujon to the village of Bufeiidcrit, v.here they attempted to 
 
 rally j
 
 Id. CermAny, 1757"' 97 
 
 tally; but the Pruffians renewed their attack, without giviiig them 
 time to execute it, broke them again, and fo effectually, that they 
 quitted the field. In the mean time the generals of the combined 
 army endeavoured to form their infantry j but the king, who had 
 as yet fix or eight battalions only come up, ordered them inftantly 
 to advance, and attack the enemy, while they were occupied in 
 forming the line. This was immediately executed ; and, being 
 fupported by the cavalry and artillery, they eafily broke thofe 
 few troops which had formed at the head of the columns, and 
 drove them back in confufion. 
 
 Prince Soubile, however, did not give up the affair as loff ; 
 the referve, confifling of five regiments of cavalry, was ordered 
 to advance and fuflain the infantry, in order to form the line, if 
 poffible. Thefe were inftantly attacked, broke, and drove off the 
 field ; upon which the infantry, unfupported by its own cavalry, 
 taken in flank by that of the enemy, and moreover expofed to a 
 heavy fire of the artillery and fmall arms, were unable to keep their 
 ground, much lefs form a line forwards : they attempted once more 
 to form it behind, between the village of Bufendorff and the 
 Luftfchifi", under the protcdiion of fome French cavalry j but thefc 
 being over-powered, and forced to retire, after a vigorous combat, 
 the infantry was likewife obliged to quit the field with precipi- 
 tation. Count St. Germain covered the retreat. 
 
 Thus ended the battle of Rofbachj where 22,000 men, con- 
 duced with prudence and vigour, defeated above 50,000, with the 
 inconfiderable lofs of about 300 men, killed and wounded; whereas 
 that of the combined army amounted to about 800 killed, and 
 6000 prifoners, including 1 1 generals and ^500 officers, together 
 with 72 pieces of cannon, and other military trophies. Many re- 
 lations of this battle were publiflied by authority : that of Vienna 
 is too general, and gives a very imperfecl: idea of it; we fiiall, 
 therefore, omit it, and give that of Berhn, and another wrote by an ■ 
 
 O officer
 
 99 History of the War 
 
 officer in the combined army ; which, with what we have faid oa 
 the fuhjedl, will enable the reader to form a proper judgment of 
 this extraordinary tranfadtion. 
 
 The PrufTians account of the battle is as follows : 
 
 " In the beginning of September, the army of the empire, and! 
 
 " the corps commanded by prince Soubife, aflembled at Erfurth, 
 
 " intending to penetrate into Saxony, and render themfelves mafters 
 
 " of the Elbe : upon which part of the Pruflian army marched- 
 
 " towards Naumburg. Our light troops had a fkirmifla with thofe 
 
 " of the enemy, over which they gained a confiderable advantage. 
 
 " The army pailed the Saala, and advanced as far as Buttelftedt.. 
 
 " About this time the convention of Bremerforde, between the. 
 
 " French and Hanoverians, was made, and a ftrong corps from the 
 
 ** duke of Richlieu's army entered the principality of Halbcrftadt:. 
 
 *' prince Ferdinand of Brunfwic was fent there; he foon delivered. 
 
 " the country from the French, of whom he took 20 officers and 
 
 *' 400 men j but, as the duke of Richlieu advanced with his whole 
 
 *' army, prince Ferdinand retired to Wanfleben, from whence he 
 
 •' could intercept their convoys. His majefty's army marched to 
 
 " Erfurth, which the enemy quitted and retired into the moun- 
 
 " tains behind Eifenach. We had a port at Gotha; prince Hild- 
 
 •' burghaufen attacked it, but was repulfed with lofs. Both armies 
 
 " continued in this fituation 'till the end of October, when a corps 
 
 ** of Hungarian troops marched through Lufatia into Brandeburg : 
 
 " it was thought that general Marflial's corps would follow them, 
 
 " which obliged his majefty to fend prince Maurice to oppofe 
 
 " them, and he himfelf followed, and advanced as far as Annaberg, 
 
 '* to intercept them; but the enemy's expedition had no other ob- 
 
 " jcQ. than to raife contribution, and, on the approach of prince 
 
 *' Maurice, they retired v/ithout having colledled it at all. While 
 
 " part o( our army marched to fuccour the ele(5lorate, M. Keith, 
 
 (( 
 
 wix 
 
 h
 
 in. Germany, 1757. 99 
 
 <« with the reft, retired into Leipfig. The generals of the com- 
 ** bined army bcUeved this a favourable moment to put their pro- 
 *' jedts in execution : accordingly they marched cantonwife, part 
 " by Naumburg and Zeitz, and part by Weiflenfels, in order to 
 *' take Leipfig, and our great magazine at Torgau. Our army 
 *' was ordered to affemble at Leipfig, where the different corps 
 ** arrived the 26th of Odlober. On the 31ft we marched, intend- 
 ** ing to attack the enemy's quarters ; we made fome prifoners, 
 " but went no farther than Lutzen. His majefty, being informed 
 *' that the enemy retired on all fides, marched with the vanguard 
 *' to WeilTenfels. This city was defended by fome of the Bava- 
 *' rian and Circle's troops : we attacked it, and took it, with about 
 *' 300 prifoners : the enemy burnt the bridge over the Saala to 
 ** facilitate their flight. The troops of the empire encamped on the 
 ■*' other fide of the river, over againfl Weiflenfels, pofted behind 
 *• the enclofures and the houfes, in order to hinder us from re- 
 ■** jjairing the bridge : they formed a chain on the left fide of the 
 ** river; and marflial Keith, who, with the greatefb part of the 
 " army, was marched to Merfeburg, found the bridge burnt, and 
 " the town occupied by 14 French battalions, a detachment of 
 " which broke down the bridge at Halle. The field marflial went 
 " with a detachment to this laft: place, and ordered the bridge 
 " to be repaired, which obliged the enemy to abandon their pofl:s 
 " on the Saala, and retire towards Micheln, We repaired im- 
 " mediately the other bridges, and pafl"ed the river by Merfeburg, 
 " Halle, and WeiflTenfels : the three columns alTembled on the fame 
 ♦' day near the village of Rofljach. His majefty, having recon- 
 ■" noitred the enemy, found that they could be attacked on the 
 " right flank with advantage, which was refolved to be executed 
 " the following day : accordingly we marched, the cavalry having 
 *■* the vanguard. When we arrived on the heights, from whence 
 
 O 2 " the 
 
 /
 
 loo History of the War 
 
 *' the day before we had examined the enemy*s pofitlon, we 
 " found tliey had changed it : their front was not only parallel. 
 " to ours, but was covered by a deep ravin j their right was in a 
 " wood, on a high hill, covered alfo with three redoubts and ah 
 " abbattis.* ' It was not thought prudent to attack them in thfs 
 *' advantageous pofition, and fo we returned to our old camp.. 
 ** The enemy, perceiving we did not attack them, ordered- fome 
 " detachments to follow us; they fired a few cannon fliot at our 
 " cavalry, but without effeft. The 5th, in the morning, we were- 
 " informed the enemy were in motion on their, right ; and, foon 
 *' after, that their whole army was in march : about noon we 
 " perceived the heads of their columns oppofite to the flank of 
 *• our left wing : we would take no refolution 'till we knew per- 
 *' fedlly their intentions. About 3 o'clock we perceived they 
 " had pafled our left wing, and direcfted their march towards 
 ** Merfeburg: upon which our army was formed in order of battle,, 
 '♦ and, having made a motion on the left, we coftfed ' them : we 
 *• reached the heights, which our cavalry occupied in fuch a man— 
 " ner, that they came on the flank of that of the enemy, and! 
 " after feveral attacks broke and difperfed them. Our infantry 
 " reached the village of Rcichertfwerben, where our left was 
 •♦ ported ; and, as we perceived the French infantry form in co- 
 " lumns, in order to attack us, we anticipated them. The bat- 
 " tie lafted about an hour and a half: fix battalions only of our 
 " left wing came to aflion. We followed the enemy to Burgwer- 
 " ben : the night hindered us from reaping ftill greater advantages 
 •* from our viftory. The day following our army marched to- 
 " wards Freidburg : the 7th a ftrong detachment pafl'ed the Saala, 
 " and advanced to Eckartiberg, &cc. 6cc." 
 
 • Trees cut down, and placed fo as to form a parapet ; behind which the troops, parii-, 
 cularly infantry, are plactd. 
 
 The
 
 in Germany, 1757* 101 
 
 The next was wrote by a French officer in the combined 
 army. 
 
 " It was refolved to attack the left flank of the PrufTian army : 
 ** accordingly, at nine in the morning, our's marched in two co- 
 ■ •' himns. General St. Germain was ordered to take poft before 
 -*' OUT camp, with 9 battalions and 14 or 15 fquadrons, in order 
 •* to attack the enemy in front, when he perceived that we did 
 *' the fame on his flank. The king, having been informed of 
 ** thefe motions, which he fo much defired, left his camp fland- 
 ** ing, with part of his army in it, to oppofe St. Germain, 
 " and to make us believe he was in perfedl fecurity. The left 
 **■ wing of his army was hid behind a hill> and covered by fome 
 ** marfliy ground, and a village : part of his army w^as formed be- 
 ** hind the above-mentioned hill, on which was a great quantity 
 ** of artillery. Not f&v from this hill is another, which joins it,, 
 ** and extends far into the plain. Behind this hill the enemy had 
 " his infantry in columns, a great quantity of artillery, and almofl 
 " his whole cavalry. Our army, having marched about two hours, 
 •* was now oppolite the enemy's flank ; we had a fine plain before 
 " us, and,, perceiving no enemy, we hailened our march. It 
 " looked as if we feared, the enemy fliould efcape us, and only 
 '* reconnoitred his front, without taking any notice of his left 
 " wing; fo were we heartily chaflifed for it.. About half an hour. 
 *' after three our cavalry ftruck in with that of the enemy, whick 
 ** flood at the bottom of the fecond hill, and advanced in good 
 ** order againft ours, whom they could ealily break ; becaufe the 
 " cavalry of the empire was fo clofe to them, that they could 
 " not fire freely, nor could they form in good order. When the 
 " enemy fir/t appeared^ the cavalry of the left wing, was ordered 
 •* to advance, which they executed full gallop ; but they found 
 ** that of the right wing retiring in confufion. Not withfta-n ding 
 
 thiF,. 
 
 (<
 
 I02 History of the WaII 
 
 *♦ this, tlie Auftrian cavalry, and the regiments of Bourbon, La- 
 *' meth, and Fitzjames in particular, fought with fuccefs. Scarce 
 ** was the combat between the cavalry engaged, when the enemy 
 " direded his artillery to play on the front and flank of our ca- 
 " valry and infantry. Our infantry was immediately formed, but 
 •* in fome places they were too clofe, and in others had large open- 
 *' ings ; they moved to the left, where fome brigades were foon 
 " repulfed by the fire of the Pruflians : that of Mailly followed 
 " them ; that of Wittmer, of wliich was the regiment of Dief- 
 *' bach, kept its ground the longefl ; and prince Soubife was 
 ** obliged to go himfelf and order it to retire," 
 
 All the other accounts concur in the principal circumflances, 
 and therefore it feems needlefs to add any more. 
 
 Reflections, 
 
 The generals of the combined army do not feem to have formed 
 any fixed plan of operations, as if they propofed adling according 
 to circumflances, as they occafionally arofe : at firft they feem wil- 
 ling to occupy Saxony, provided it might be done without any 
 rifk ; they avoid coming to an adtion during the whole campaign, 
 and at laft, when it was leafl; proper, they engage it. When the 
 king quitted the Saala, having there only 1 2,000 men in two dif- 
 ferent corps, then was the time to advance and attack Leipfigj 
 they might have taken many pofitions, which would have made it 
 difficult, and perhaps impofhble, for the king to relieve it ; as he 
 had no more than 10,000 men with him, and about 6000 men 
 under prince Maurice ; fo that they would have had only thefe 
 16,000 men to contend with. As to the corps under prince Fer- 
 dinand, he might eafily have been forced under the cannon of 
 Magdeburg; any fmall detachment from the right of Richlieu's 
 
 army
 
 ■ in Germany, 1757. 103 
 
 army would have been, fufficient for that purpofe. Having fuf- 
 fered the king to unite his different corps at Leipfig, it was pru- 
 dent, no doubt, to repafs the Saala, becaufe it is of too dangerous 
 a coniequence to engage an a(flion with a great river behind the 
 army ; but they fliould have defended the banks of that river. 
 As they were much ftronger than the king, he could not pafs it 
 without their knowledge : if they left a llrong detachment over 
 againfl: WeifTenfels, and another at Merfeburg, and with the army 
 had taken a central polition betweea thefe two pkces, they could, 
 by an eafy march, fuftain either of them i and therefore, in all 
 probability, have hindered the enemy from paffing at all. If they 
 propofed fighting, they could not have a better opportunity thaa 
 while the enemy was pafling the river ; and, if they did not, they 
 fhould have gone behind the Unftrut, and covered themfelves with 
 that river. It is agreed upon, by every one, that the king's army 
 paiTed the Saala in three columns ; one at Weijflenfels, another at 
 Merfeburg, and the third at Halle; by which means they were 
 feparated from each other about (even miles ; and that they united 
 at Rofbach.. We cannot conceive why the generals of the com- 
 bined army permitted the enemy to commit fo great a fault, with- 
 out punifhing him for it : they could have taken many pofitions 
 to prevent the jundtion of thefe columns; and could, widi their 
 united forces, attack either of them fcparately ; as appears evident, 
 from the infpedlion of the map. Having, during the campaio-n^ 
 declined coming to an a^ion, they fliould have perfifted in that 
 refolution a few days longer ; becaufe, from the fituation of affairs 
 in Silefia and in Weflphalia, it was probable the king would be 
 forced to go againfl the AuHrians in perfon ; and, though he did 
 not, it was impofTible for him to oppofe eifeflually the combined 
 army, and that of Pvichlieu, now difengaged, becaufe he mufl ne- 
 ceffarily have one or the other upon his flank; and, having about
 
 104 History of the Wa\i 
 
 a fifth part of their forces only, he muft have abandoned the coun- 
 try, or fell a vicflim to fiiperiority, if he perfiiled to wait for them ; 
 {o that in this very campaign he would have loft either Saxony 
 or Silefia, and perhaps both, had M. Richlieu and tlie generals of 
 the combined army acted with more judgment. 
 
 The plan they formed to attack the enemy's left flank was in 
 confiilent with all the rules of military prudence i becaufe, in caic 
 of a defeat, there was no retreat at all for them : they had a river 
 behind them, and the enemy between them and the country to 
 which they muft neceffai-ily retire. The condudl of the adtion 
 was no lefs imprudent ; they could not think the enemy would 
 permit them to invelope his left wing, and cut him off from the 
 Saala; and, as they marched at mid-day, he could not be deceived 
 as to their intentions. No general will fuffcr an enemy to attack 
 Jiim in flank and rear : How could they imagine fuch a general 
 as the king of PrufHa would commit this fault ? When they re- 
 folved to attack his left ilank, they fhould have made fome de- 
 raonftrations on his right, to draw his attention that way : and, 
 by marching in the night, approach his left flank, and attack it, 
 without giving him time to change his pofition. This was the 
 only probable means to bring their plan to bear. The method 
 they took made it impradlicable from the firft inftant they put the 
 army in motion. 
 
 When the king quitted his camp with an air of precipitation, 
 St. Germain fliould have followed him; and a ftrong detachment of 
 cavalry have been fent on the road to Merfeburg, in order to recon- 
 noitre his motions ; and, if they found he was retiring, thefe two 
 corps would have ful^ccd to beat his rear-guard; and, if it was 
 found he only changed pofition, they would have kept him at bay, 
 and give time to form the army, or retire into their old camp. Surely 
 it was unpardonable to march with the whole army without any 
 
 vanguard.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 105 
 
 vanguard, which mufl never be done, particularly if near the 
 enemy. When at length they were undeceived, and found that 
 the enemy was forming on the heights of Reichertfwerben, Why 
 perfift in advancing ? They fhould inflantly have formed their line 
 as far backwards as poflible, and by no means attempt it under 
 the enemy's fire, and fo near hinij becaufe fuch manoeuvres can 
 never fucceed, if the enemy has either conducft or vigour. 
 
 The king appears in a very different light : though he fees the 
 enemy in motion all the morning, he is eafy and quiet i no ways 
 agitated, as too often is the cafe ; waits 'till he perceives their in- 
 tentions, and then inftantly makes his difpofitions. His march- 
 ing behind the hill was attended with many great advantages : 
 that appearance of a flight elated the fpirits of the enemy fo as 
 to make them negledl the neceffary precautions ; they haftened fo 
 much that their army was thrown into fome diforder while in 
 march J and they were fo perfedlly deceived, that they, found 
 tliemfelves, all at once, with the head of their columns, under 
 the fire of the enemy's line; and fo near, that they could not form 
 their troops. The king faw this favourable moment, and ordered 
 his cavalry to attack diredtly; and, though fcarce any of the in- 
 fantry was come up, he ordered thofe few battalions to advance 
 before the enemy could make any difpofition. One inch of ground, 
 or one inilant of time loft, would have given the enemy time and 
 room to form their line ; but the king's difpofitions were fo exatt, 
 and fo well calculated, that neither happened ; and he w^as moft 
 defervedly crowned with viiflory ; which put an end to tlie cam- 
 paign in Saxony. 
 
 We have already faid, that his majcfty the king of PrufTia, 
 on leaving Lufatia, had left there the duke of Bevern,* with a 
 
 P confiderable 
 
 • Auguftus William duke of Eevern was born in 1715 : In 1733 he ferved againft the 
 French; in 1735 he entered the Pruffian fcrvice, as lieutenant colonel; in 1739 he was 
 
 made
 
 io6 H I s T o R y of the WaR; 
 
 confiderable body of troops, to obferve prince Charles ; and; ab'ove- 
 all things, hinder him from making any folid enterprize againft. 
 Silefia. Accordingly, the duke, having received a convoy from. 
 Bautzen, quitted Bernftadtel, and encamped on the mountain,, 
 called the Landfcron, near Gorlitz ; and the better to fecure the • 
 paffes of the Neifs and Queifs, that he might enter Silefia, if ne-- 
 cefTary, he fcnt general Winterfield, with a ftrong corps, between- 
 thofe two rivers, at a place called Moys, near Gorlitz. . 
 
 Prince Charles advanced with the main army as far: as -Bern- 
 ftadtel, and fent general Nadafti with a confiderable corps to Sei- 
 dcnberg, alfo between the Neifs and Queifs, as well to obferve 
 Winterfield, as to fecure a paffage over the Neifs, and be ready to 
 follow, or anticipate the duke of Bevern, whenever he went to- 
 wards Silefia. 
 
 His royal highnefs was defirous to force the enemy to quit their 
 prefent pofition, and carry the war into Silefia j becaufe not only 
 the army would be maintained at their expence, but, being much r 
 fuperior, could undertake fomething folid : whereas, if he. con- . 
 tinued there, the campaign would foon be at an end, and the fruits 
 of their preceding good manoeuvres loft. For thefe fame reafons, , 
 it was incumbent on the duke of Bevern to keep things in the 
 
 prefent : 
 
 Blade a colonel, and wounded at the battle of Molwitz; in 1741 he had a regiment given , 
 him ; in 1743 was made a major general ; in 1747 governor of Stettin ; in 1750 knight of 
 the black e.igle, and lieutenant general. He diftinguifhed himfelf in the battles of Hohen- 
 fiiedberg, Lowofitz, Prague, Chotzenaitz, and Breflaw : after which he was made a prifo- 
 ner, while he went with a fer\-ant only to reconnoitre the enemy. He was in 1758 releafed, 
 without any ranfom, for his affinity to the emprefs. The king feeming offended at his con- 
 duft, he reared to his governnaent of Stettin ; where he remained 'till 1762 ; when he was 
 called to the army in Silefia, and had a corps confided to him, while the king was befieging 
 Schweidnitz. The Auftrians, intending to relieve that place, attacked him with an army 
 under the command of gener.ih Lacy, Laudhon, and Odonell, whom he repulfed feveral 
 limes, though they were three times flronger than he was, and gave the king time to com« 
 to his aid. He may, no doubt, be numbered among the firft generals of this age.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 107 
 
 prefent fituatlon, and draw on the war, without permitting the 
 enemy to gain any confiderable advantage. His pofition feemed 
 to enable him to obtain this end. The Auftrians could not, he 
 thought, enter Silefia, and leave him behind, becaufe he could 
 return into Bohemia, and, by cutting off their fubfiftence, make 
 it impoffible for them to do any thing of confequence in Silefia ; 
 and, having a garrifon in Bautzen, he was at hand likewife to 
 favour, or be favoured, by the king's operations in Saxony ; and, 
 no doubt, could he have kept his pofition 'till the king had deli- 
 vered that country from the combined army, the enemy muft have 
 been forced back into Bohemia, without even attempting any thing 
 againft Silefia. 
 
 Prince Charles, perfeclly acquainted with all thefe reafons, 
 refolved to force the enemy to quit their pofition, and march to 
 Silefia; but, it having been judged too flrong to be attacked, it 
 was necellary to obtain by dint of proper manceuvres what could 
 not be done by force. Wherefore, he fent a corps to drive the 
 garrifon out of Bautzen, and fo cut off the enemy's communication 
 with Saxony, and determined to attack general Winterfield, which 
 would likewife cut them off from Silefia. Thefe refolutions being 
 taken, Nadafti's corps was confiderably reinforced, and on the 7th 
 of September the attack was made on that of Winterfield's. This 
 general had pofled, on a hill called Holtzberg, at a fmall diftance 
 from his camp, two battalions ^ againft which the AufVians 
 diredled their attack, and came upon them before they could 
 either be fuftained or called back. They defended themfelves 
 with uncommon bravery j infomuch that Winterfield had time to 
 H:ome with fome troops to their relief, and facilitate their retreat: 
 -upon which the combat became more violent than ever, in hopes 
 «f being able to keep their ground ; but, having lofl a^reat number 
 
 P 2 of
 
 io8 History of the War 
 
 of men, and their general mortally wounded, they were forced 
 to quit their poft, and retire to their camp. The Auftrians toot 
 poflefTion of the Holtzberg ; which, however, they abandoned 
 the next morning; having loft, in this bloody action, killed and 
 wounded, about 2000 men. 
 
 The duke of Bevern, having loft Bautzen, and with it hra 
 communication with the king in Saxony, and moreover fearing 
 the Auftrians would now, after the defeat of Winterfield> pafs the 
 Neifs with their main army, and fo hinder him from entering 
 Silefia, refolved, while it was in his power, to marcli thither; and 
 the more fo, as he could not poftibly fubfift in his prefent pofition, 
 becaufe he could draw nothing from his magazines in Saxony, and 
 what could be had from Silefia was fubjedl to be intercepted by the- 
 enemy's light troops, who were extremely numerous, and had a 
 very favourable country, full of woods, ravins, hills, 6cc. to adl in. 
 Accordingly, not daring to pafs the Neifs at Gorlitz, fo near the 
 enemy, he fell down that river to Naumburg, and there pafled it; 
 and from thence marched fucceffively, by Buntzlaw and Hainan, to 
 Lignitz, where he arrived the 19th. 
 
 Prince Charles, having received information of the enemy's 
 march, put his army inftantly in motion, and took his route by 
 Lauban, Lowenberg, Goldberg, Hundorff, Jauer, Nicolftad, 
 and Greibnig, where he arrived on the 25th. By taking this 
 pofition he had cut off the enemy from Breflaw, Schweidnitz, and 
 all Upper Silefia. On the following day, he ordered the village of 
 Barflidorff, where the enemy had pofted fome infantry, to be can- 
 nonaded; which, having put the houfes on fire, forced them to 
 retire, and take a new pofition behind it, where they could be fuf- 
 tiuned by the whole army. Prince Charles intended to attack 
 them, but the duke of Bevern, propofing, if pofilble, to regain 
 his commuaication with Breflaw and Upper Silefia, quitted his 
 
 camp
 
 Ill Germany, 1757. 109 
 
 camp in the night of the 27th, and diredled his march towards 
 Glogau, that he might pafs the Oder in fafety, if he was followed 
 by the whole Auftrian army ; but, finding that only the vanguard 
 purfued him, and that only on the right of the Katzbach, towardj 
 Parchwitz, he refolved to pafs it near Lamperfdorff"; which was 
 executed on the 29th; and, having marched up the right of the 
 Oder, he repafled it at Breilaw,. and on the ift of Oftober took 
 his camp on the banks of the Lohe, witli the city behind him. 
 By this fine march he once more opened the communication with 
 Upper Silefia, and covered the capital with his ariny, \vJaich was 
 reciprocally covered by it;. 
 
 Prince Charles found it would be ufelcfs to purfue the enemy 
 on his quitting Lignitz, becaufe he could only drive them unden 
 the cannon of Glogau,. where they could remain in fafetv, and bs 
 provided with all the neceilary ftores and fubfiftence l whereas he, 
 on the contrary, had no magazines in the country ; nor could he 
 form any, having the enemy in. front, and their ftrong places be- 
 hind him ; fo that he muft neceflarily fall back, and approach the 
 frontiers of Bohemia ; from whence only his numerous army could 
 be nouriflied. For thefe reafons,. inflead of fatiguing his troops in 
 a vain purfuit of the enemy, he diredled his march towards Breflaw> 
 hoping, no doubt,, to take that place before the enemy could come 
 near it, being in itfelf very weak, and moreover had then an inr- 
 confiderable garrifon. 
 
 Being arrived on the Schweidnitzwa/Ter, a fmall river- withia 
 three miles of Breilaw, he found the enemy had anticipated him, 
 and was encamped, about two miles oft,, between him and that 
 town. Thefe circumftances made it neceflary to concert new mea- 
 fures. His royal highnefs could not pofiibly continue long in that 
 fituation, as well for want of fubfiftence, as becaufe the v/intcr 
 was. growing Iharp, and would foon make it impoffible for liim to 
 
 keep
 
 •lit) History of the War 
 
 keep the field ; nor could he prefume to feparate his army in tht 
 middle of an enemy's country, where they had an army, and all 
 the ftrong places, in their power. It feemed likewile rather dif- 
 honourable to retire into Bohemia without having attempted any 
 thing, and Co lofe the fruits of their pafl labours j and the more fo, 
 as his army was much fuperior to that of the enemy already, and, 
 bcfides, his royal hlghnefs expedted a confiderable body of Bavarians 
 and Wurtemburger?, who were on their march, to join him. Thefe 
 motives made him determine to undertake the fiege of fome fortrefs, 
 that he might have a place of- arms in the enemy's country, and 
 put part, at leaft, of his army in it, with fafety, during the win- 
 ter, and fo be enabled to enter it the enfuing campaign without 
 difficulty ; and, having the necelTary ftores and provilions in this 
 place, profecute the war with more eafe and fafety than hitherto 
 had been done. 
 
 This refolution being taken, the next objedl was, to fix upon 
 the place that would beft anlwer the end they had in view : 
 Neifs, being near the frontiers of Moravia, could be attacked with 
 more facility than any other ; becaufe they could be fupplied with 
 every thing neceffary for fuch an undertaking from Olmutz, and 
 the taking of it would fecure a paflage into Upper Silefia; and, 
 befides,, they would, the enfuing campaign, from thence attack the 
 country of Glatz with more eafe than from any other place what- 
 ever. To this it was o'bjedled, tliat Neifs was at fuch a diltance, that 
 the army could not arrive there 'till the feafon would be too far 
 advanced to carry on the fiege without infinite pains, and probably 
 without fuccefs J and the more Co, as the duke of Bevern could be 
 there with "his army long before them, and take fuch a pofition as 
 -would effeftually cover the place; and laitly, that, though they 
 Should take it, the advantage that would accrue from it was tri- 
 fling; becaufe they would get fcarce any part of the country with 
 
 it.
 
 in Germany, 1757- in: 
 
 Hi while the enemy had Kofel, Brieg, and Glatz, all about it ; and 
 that it only covered Moravia, leaving Bohemia quite open to the. 
 enemy. . 
 
 It was next propofed to attack the enemy before Breflaw : if 
 they beat him, not only that fortrefs would fall, but they would. 
 be at liberty to attack any place in Upper Silefia;. which, being. 
 left to their own weak garrifons, would foon be reduced : by this 
 means the vrtiole Auilrian army, covered by thefe places, could, 
 with fafety be feparated, and put into winter quarters. This pro- 
 pofitioa was very plaufible, but. thought dangerous; becaufe, ia^ 
 cafe they did not fucceed in this attempt, it would be extreamly, 
 difficult to retire into Bohemia, from, whence they were feparated 
 by many high. mountains, -and had very bad roads to pafs through;, 
 and, , moreover, the town of Schweidnitz, with a ftrong garrifou- 
 in it, behind them» Thefe reafons being well-weighed, it was re-- 
 folved to attack Schweidnitz, preferable to the two others above-- 
 racntioned ; becaufe they would be mailers of the principal defiles 
 which lead to Bohemia on that fide, and of all the towns and vil- 
 lages behind Schweidnitz ; which would enable them to keep the 
 greateft part of the army in Silefia during the.winter; and, more- 
 over, if they took, it without great. lofs of time, they could then, 
 with fafety, attack the.duke of Severn, ..having a place to. retire to 
 in- cafe of misfortune, or undertake fome other enterprize, . 
 
 Accordingly, general Nadalli, with a very confiderable corps, 
 was fent to befiege, Schweidnitz,; where -he was joined by the Ba- 
 varians and Wurtemburgers. This town lies in a fine plain, about 
 three miles diflant from tlie mountains which feparate Silefia from 
 Bohemia, is rich and populous : originally, when it firft came into 
 the pov/er of the Prulhans, during the preceding war, it was fur- 
 rounded only by an eld wall, with round towers, in the Gothic 
 manner; but his majefty, confidering the advantageous fituaticn of 
 
 it,-.
 
 112 History of the War 
 
 it, as well to facilitate any projefts he might hereafter form againft 
 Bohemia, as to cover Silefia, refolved to fortify it : accordingly, 
 en the conclufion of that war, he ordered feveral redoubts, called 
 ftar redoubts, becaufe they refemblc a ftar, to be built about it : 
 thefe were joined by a curtain ; and in the intervals, between the 
 redoubts, were placed fome fmall lunettes, or half moons : tlie 
 whole covered by a ditch, with a covered way pallifaded. 
 
 Of all the fpecies of works ufed in fortification, the flarry re- 
 doubt is the worlt ; becaufe, by the nature of its conftrudlion, it 
 can have no flank ; and the re-entering angles take up fo much of 
 the ground within, that they cannot contain the number of men 
 and artillery fufficient to defend them ; and are, moreover, expofed 
 to be enfiladed from one end to the other j fo that it is impoffible 
 they fliould make any confiderable defence, when properly attacked. 
 
 General Nadaiti ordered two true attacks, and one falfe one, 
 to be made ; and the trenches were opened in the night of the aytli 
 of Odober J and, a breach having been made in three of thefe re- 
 doubts, tlie nth at night, they were carried by aflault; which 
 forced the governor to capitulate the next morning. The garrifon, 
 confifting of 4 generals, and about 6000 men, were made prifoners 
 of war : a vafl quantity of provifions, artillery, and (lores, were 
 found in the place, and 300,000 florins. 
 
 During all this time, prince Charles, and the duke of Bevern, 
 remained quiet in their camps by Breflaw -, the firfl to cover the 
 fiege of Schweidnitz, and the other to fortify his camp ; becaufe 
 he did not dare quit it, and march to relieve Schweidnitz, for fear 
 ■of lofing Breflaw, and be hemmed in between the prince's army, 
 and that before Schweidnitz. 
 
 Prince Charles, having fucceeded to his wifli, in his under- 
 taking againfl: that place, was encouraged to attack the enemy, 
 though now very flrongly fortified ; and, therefore, general Nadafl;i 
 
 was
 
 •m Germany, 1757. 113 
 
 Avas ordered to come and join the main army with that unicr his 
 ■command. Accordingly, that general arrived on the 191!), and 
 ■encamped on the right, as marked in the plan. The two following 
 days were taken up in making the necellary preparations for the 
 attack. Every thing being ready, on the 22d in the morning, the 
 battle begun -, of which we give here the different relations, as 
 publidied by authority^ which, with our refledlicns on the ground 
 and the adlion, will be fuflicient to give a clear idea of it. 
 
 That publifned at Vienna is as follows : 
 
 " The imperial and royal army was encamped, with the riglTt 
 *' at Strachwitz, and the left at GrofTmaffelwitz, in tv/o line^, 
 " and a referve. The grenadiers were ported at Groffmochber, 
 *' to cover the right wing j and fome regiments of infantry at 
 " Kleinmaffelwitz, to cover the left. The army under general 
 *' Nadafti flood on our right, beyond Operau, on the left of the 
 *' Lohe, v/ith fome light troops at IJartlieb, on the other fide of 
 *' it. The PrulTian army was likewife ported in two lines ; the 
 *' infantry in the firrt, and the cavalry in the fecond ; both ex«- 
 " tending from Cofel to Kleinmochber, and from thence, in a 
 " rtrait line, towards Breflaw j fo that it formed a half fquare, 
 ** with the angle at Kleinmochber: but, when they perceived our 
 " difpofitions, they changed their porttion, and that part of the 
 *' army which extended from Kleinmochber towards Breflaw, was 
 " ordered to advance towards the Lohe, and occupy fome hills, 
 " as well as the villages of Kleinburg and Kreitern, in order to 
 " make a front againrt general Nadarti. They were covered by 
 ** the Lohe, v.'hich is not broad, but the banks of it are very 
 " marfliy; and had thrown up a great many redoubts and re- 
 ■" trenchments. Their right wing was covered by an abatis, or 
 *■' parapet of trees cut down ; behind which they had ported their 
 
 Q^ " h nters
 
 114 HisTORVof the Wa r 
 
 " hunters or maikfmen, and fix battalions of grenadiers, to cover 
 " their right flank. The village of PilJhitz, through which the 
 " Lohe paflcs, was well fortified with redoubts, before and behind 
 " it, which prefented continually fume new defence. The famb 
 *' was done at the villages of Schmicdfeld, Hoflichen, Klein- 
 " mochber, and Grabifchcn, Avith breailworks, ditches, and three 
 *' rows of wolf-holes j* fo that it was almofl; impofiible to pafs 
 " them.- Befides thefe works, there were likewife, between and 
 *• behind the villages, other redoubts and batteries, with parapets, 
 " as far as the fuburbs of the town. On the other fide the Oder" 
 •' they had put fome infantry in the villages of Protfch, Weida, 
 " Hunnern, Simfdorff, and Rofenthal ; and fome cavalry between 
 *' the villages. Upon the left wing they had moreover two re- 
 •' giments of Hufiars. 
 
 •' Such v/as the fituation of both armies: the Auftrian amounted 
 ** to 60,000 men, and the Prullian to about 40,000. 
 
 " In confequence of the meafures concerted between his royal 
 ** highnefs and his excellency marfhal Daun, batteries were raifed. 
 *' the 2 1 ft at night, the pontoons brought near the places where 
 *' the bridges were to be laid, and all the other necefl'ary prepa- 
 " rations for pafling the river and attacking the enemy's works 
 " being compleated, the army marched the 2 2d, before day, and 
 *• was formed, in two lines, on the banks of the Lohe ; the firft 
 *• was compofed of infantry, and the other of cavalry. The bag- 
 *' gage was fent back behind the Schweidnitz, and the furgeons 
 *' ordered to follow the army, and to flay at certain places, where 
 *' the wounded were to be brought. 
 
 *' The 2 2d, the day appointed for the attack, there was a great 
 I' fog, which prevented us from feeing the enemy's difpofitions. 
 
 " At 
 
 * Rouni holes, generally about two feet in diameter at the top, one at the bottoin.i and 
 ^leor two deep.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 115 
 
 *' At nine in the morning we raifed four batteriest, In which 40 
 *' pieces of cannon were placed, which played on the villages of 
 " Pilfnitz, Schmiedfeld, Hoflichen, Kleinmochber and Grabifchcn, 
 " and the redoubts, 'till 1 2 o'clock. In the mean while, the foe 
 <' began to diifipate ; upon which we advanced to lay the bridges 
 " over the river ; and, in lefs than three quarters of an hour, feven 
 " were made in the enemy's prefence, and under their fire. 
 
 " His royal highnefs and M. Daun were at GrofTmochber, and 
 " the fignal agreed upon being given by their orders, general 
 *' Sprecher, who had under his orders mnjor general Ilichlin, 
 " advanced with 35 companies of grenadiers, fuflained by 12 com^ 
 " panics of horfe grenadiers, commanded by prince Lowenftein, 
 *' and pafled the bridge by GrolTmochber. Thefe troops were 
 " fupported by the right wing of the firft line of infantry, under 
 *' the command of lieutenant general Andlau, and major generals 
 ■*' duke of Urfel, and baron Unrhuej and, moreover, by the corps 
 " de referve, commanded by lieutenant generals count Wied, and 
 " Nicholas Elterha(i, and major generals Blonquet, Wolf, and 
 *' Otterwolf ; and, laflly, by the riglit v/ing of the fecond line, 
 " commanded by lieutenant generals Minulph, count Stahrem- 
 " berg, and major generals Wulfen, and Buttler. 
 
 " At the fame time and place, count Luchefi, general of horfe, 
 " and lieutenant generals Spada, and Wolwart, and major generals 
 " Deville, Kolbel, and Afpremont, with the right wing of the 
 *"■ firft line of horfe, likcwife pafTed. All thefe troops formed, in 
 " two lines, on the other fide the Lohc, untier the fire of the 
 *' enemy's artillery, and attacked their cavalry and infantry 
 «' that were advancing. At i o'clock the fire of the fmall arms 
 ** began, and lalk'd very hot, and in good order, about half an 
 <' liour, without being able to force either fide to cede an inch. 
 
 0^2 " At
 
 ir6 H'l STORY of the WaI 
 
 " At l.ifl, the enemy's horfe and foot were obliged to give wayvr 
 " upon which our infantry took the village of Grabikhcn, and^ 
 " the great battery behind it. Our troops advanced flill forward* 
 *' to the retrenchment by Kleinmochber j ajid, though the enemy 
 " had font there both infantry and artillery, they were, however,- 
 " drove further back. 
 
 ♦' The next attack was commanded by lieutenant general count 
 ** Arfacrg, and under him major general Lacy, and was fuftained 
 " by tlie infantiy, commanded by lieutenant general Macquire, 
 " and by the left wing of the fecond line of horfe, commanded by 
 " count Stambach, general of horfe. This column was to attack 
 *' the villages of Schmiedfeld and Hoflichen ; and, at 3 o'clock 
 " paflfcd tlte Lohe. Counts Arberg and Macquire attacked the 
 " redoubts by Schmiedfeld, and, after a moft bloody combat, drove 
 ** the enemy out of them. At the fame time, count Wied, who 
 " commanded the referve, advanced againft Hoflichen ; and, not- 
 " v/ithftanding it was covered by breaftworks, ditches, and wolf- 
 " holes, he took iti as well as the redoubt that was near it. 
 
 " The third attack againft Pilfnitz was more violent, and lafled 
 •' longer than any of the others. This village is cut in two by 
 ♦' the Lohe, whofe banks are very high here, and the ground* 
 *' all about is very clofe and difficult to be pafTed ; and, befides, . 
 ** the entry and the iflue out of it were covered by redoubts. 
 " General Keuhl, with the left wing of infantry, fuftained by the 
 " left wing of the fecond lii>e of horfe, commanded by count 
 " SerbeHoni, was ordered to attack this village, and the neigh- - 
 " bouring works ; but, by the difficulty of the ground, the 
 " ftrength of the works, and the bravery of the enemy, he was 
 *' repulfed, with great lofs, three feveral times. At laft, however, 
 " though it was now near fix o'clock, and quite dark, he re- 
 •' newed the attack with fo much courage and bravery, that the. 
 
 " enemy
 
 in Germany, 1757. 117 
 
 *• enemy was forced to give way, and abandon iucceirively the 
 ** village and the redoubts, 
 
 " We thought that, with the day, the battle was likewife at 
 •' an end. The enemy, however, appeared again, and a colanin 
 " advanced againft Kleinmochber, endeavouring to come on the 
 " flank of the archduke Jofeph's and Leopold's regiments of horfe,. 
 " Thefe being fuflained by fix. companies of grenadiers,, polled ii\ 
 " the redoubts, commanded by general Sprecher, made fuch good. 
 " manoeuvres, as kept the enemy at a diflance, till prince Charles's. 
 " regiment of foot, and Luchefi's regiment of horfe, had time to> 
 " come up,, which obliged them to retire for good, and all. 
 
 " Not far from Pilfnitz, on the right of the Lohe, the enemy, 
 " had a great abatis, which reached quite to the Oder. Colonel 
 ** Brentano, with his Croats, fuftained by 1000 men of regular. 
 " infantry, was ordered to attack it. He had the good fortune. 
 " to fucceed, and pais it ; but, as we had. not then got poiTeflion. 
 *' of Pilfnitz, he \vas forced to retire with fome lofs. Soon after,, 
 " however, he renewed the attack ; and, as our left wing was. 
 •* then advanced to Pilfmtz> he paffed the abatis, and tlirew the 
 ** enemy iBto no fmall confulion. 
 
 " Major general Beck, with a confiderable corps, was fent 
 " over the Oder;, and, having drove the enemy out of feveral vil— 
 " lages they occupied,, he cannonaded the enemy's right v/ing,. 
 " over the Oder, at Cofel, in flank and rear. 
 
 " Wh.a.t we have hitherto relatcxi was performed by the army. 
 *' v/hich had always rerrwined in this neighbourhood during the 
 " fiege of Schweidnitz. Befides thefe feveral attacks, general Na-. 
 *' dafti,, with the army he had commanded at the above fiege, 
 *' (excepting a few battalions) and reinforced by four regiments. 
 *^ of horfe, was ordered to divide his troops in three, columns,, 
 f^ at tlie head of which were the grenadiers, fuflained by battalions 
 
 " aad.
 
 ii8 History of the Wa r 
 
 " and brigades, and having paflcd the Lohc, to attack the cne- 
 ♦' ir.y's left wing, that was ported againft him. Accordingly, he 
 " occupied tlie village of Hartlicb the 21ft, which the enemy 
 *' held with infantry and cavalry; and, on the 22d, at break of 
 " day, he paffed the Lohe, and formed his army with the right 
 " at Oltafchin, and the left towards Kreitcrn, where the artillery 
 " of referve was likewife ported. The enemy, whofe cavalry ex- 
 " tended on the plains of Durjahn, endeavoured to take our corps 
 " in the flank, v/hich the good difpofitions of general Nadafti 
 " prevented. 
 
 " In the mean time, general Wolferfdorff, with 16 companies 
 " of grenadiers, attacked the village of Kleinburg, drove the ene- 
 ♦' my out of it, took one cannon, and advanced to Woifchwitz. 
 " The Saxon light horfe, who v%^ere on the right, were preparing 
 " to advance; but, the evening coming on, and the enemy's horfe 
 " being advantageoufly ported on a hill, behind fome redoubts, 
 •' o-eneral Nadafti thought it would be needlefs to attempt any 
 " thing farther. 
 
 " During this time, the enemy attacked Kleinburg with kvcn. 
 " battalions, and fome cavalry; and, having put it on fire, retired 
 " on the hills behind the redoubts; where they continued 'till 
 " they found that the rert of their army was retiring ; then they 
 " followed them, and paffed the Oder, through Breflaw. We 
 " have taken 36 pieces of cannon, and about 600 men prifoners, 
 " with above 3000 deferters." 
 
 The PrulTians account of this battle is very little exadt; parti- 
 cularly where it fays, that the Aurtrian's right wing had not only 
 been rcpulfed, but that it quitted the field, and retired to Neu- 
 mark, many miles ort"; which is both falfe and ridiculous. It is 
 ss follows : 
 
 *' When
 
 m Germany, 1757. 119 
 
 ''' When the Audriaus luiu taken Schweidnitz, and the corps 
 " employed in that fiege had joined the main army at Liffa, they 
 ** refolved to attack the prince of Bevern's corps before the king 
 " could come to fuccour him. They knew that, in fpite of 
 " Marfhall's and Haddick's corps, he had already palled through, 
 ♦* Lufatia. Accordingly, on the 2 2d of November, the attack 
 ** was made, at nine in the morning. The enemy's army was, at 
 ** leaft, three times ftronger than ours, as appears by the gazettes 
 ** they have often publifhed : and general Nadaili had a partlcu- 
 •' lar corps oppofite the flank of our left wing. The attack fuc- 
 *• ceeded fo ill to the Auftrians, that their right wing was totally 
 ** defeated, and forced to retire towards Neumark. Lieutenant 
 " general Ziethen, who commanded our left wing, likewife en- 
 *' tirely defeated Nadafti's corps, and the enemy thought the bat- 
 *' tie loft ; having been forced, in moft places, to fly ; but, as on 
 •' our right feme of our regiments had fomewhat fufFered, the 
 *' prince of Bevern thought it beft to quit the field of battle, 
 " which we had kept till 5 o'clock, and retire into our camp, 
 *• and the following night to pafs the Oder, over the bridge that 
 " is in the town of Breflaw. The Auftrians, finding that every 
 " thing was abandoned as far as Breflaw, returned, and occupied 
 ** the field of battle -, which, to their great aftonilhment, we had 
 " quitted. Our lofs is midling : that of the Auftrians, according 
 ** to accounts worthy of credit, amounts to above 20,000 men. 
 ♦* The 23d we remained behind Breflaw. The 24th, the duke 
 ** of Bevern rode out at 4 o'clock in the morning, with one fer- 
 " vant only, in order to reconnoitre the enemy, and fell in with 
 *' fome of their advanced pofts, who made him prifoner. The 
 »* fame day, having waited in vain the duke's return, lieutenant 
 •* general Kyow took upon him the command of the army. Ge- 
 *[ aeral Leftewitz, who, by the king's orders, was left commander 
 
 *« of
 
 120 History of the War 
 
 *' of Brcfliiw, could not pofTibly defend long fo extenfive a place, 
 *• and fo ill fortified, againfl fuch a confiderable army as that of 
 *' the enemy ; and fo he muil be content to have leave to re- 
 " tire, ^with his garrifon, and the fick we had left in Breflaw, to 
 " Glogau." 
 
 The Auftrians loft in this action 666, among which one gene- 
 ral, killed: 4620, of which five generals, wounded : 437mi(rmg: 
 and about 400 horfes killed, wounded, and loll:. 
 
 No account appeared of the lofs of the Prufiians. 
 
 Reflections on the battle of Breflaw, and the 
 preceding operations. 
 
 It has been already obferved, that there is, in every camp, fome 
 one eflcntial point, or hinge, which may be called the key of it, 
 and on which the flrength of it moft immediately depends : the 
 fame holds good as to pofitions. In a whole country there may 
 not, perhaps, be one found which will enable a general to obtain 
 his ends. The choice of this point, with regard to pofitions, de- 
 pends entirely on, and muft be regulated by, the cbjeft he has in 
 view; by the fituation of his magazines j and by the number and 
 ipecies of his troops ; that he may not only have a good pofition, 
 hut likewife a good field of battle, in cafe he is attacked. 
 
 The duke of Bevern had two objed:s in view : the firft and 
 principal one was to cover Silefia ; and particularly Breflaw, 
 Schweidnitz, and Neifs ; againft which alone the enemy could 
 diredl their operations : the other objedl was only fecondary, and 
 of much Icfs confequence } and was to keep open a communication 
 with the Elbe, as well to a<5t in concert with the king in Saxony, 
 as becaufe he drew his fubfifl:ence chiefly from Drefden, The • 
 camp he had taken at Bernftadtcl, though a little too far back, 
 ^nfwered, in fome meafure, thefe ends : he could be on the Elbe, 
 
 or
 
 ill Ge rm an y, 1757. 121 
 
 or in Silcfia, fooner than the enemy, by marching on his right, 
 by Lobau and Bautzen ; or on his left, by Lauban and Lowenberg, 
 and fo on to Schweidnitz or Breflaw. The only inconveniency of 
 this pofition, was, that the enemy, being m.uch fuperior, could 
 fend flrong corps towards Bautzen, and thereby render his convoys, 
 coming from the Elbe, precarious. This, hovv'ever, might have 
 been remedied by occupying Bautzen with a confiderable detach- 
 ment of cavalry, and fome light infantry, and porting another of 
 the fame fpecies about Lobau ; which would have formed a chain 
 from his right quite to the. Elbe ; fo that he might, and, as we 
 think, ought to have kept this pofition as long as pofTible i wliich 
 would have flopped the progrefs of the enemy. 
 
 Instead of which, he abandoned it, and took another, fcill 
 farther back, on the Landfcron, near Gorlitz : the confequence 
 of which was, that he inflantly loft his communication with the 
 Elbe, and rendered that with Sllefia very difficult ; nor could he 
 remain in his prefent fituation for want of fubfiflence : he might, 
 however, ftill have anticipated the enemy's march into Silefia, and 
 towards Breflaw and Schweidnitz, if, inftead of marching by 
 Langenau, Naumburg, Buntzlaw, Hainan, and Lignitz, he had 
 marched by Lauban, Lowenberg, Goldberg, and Jauer ; whicli 
 the king did, the year following, after the battle of Hochkirchen, 
 in much niore difficult circumftances : for the whole Auflrian army 
 was encamped on the Landfcron, within fight ; yet he pafl'bd the 
 ISIeifs and Queifs, and, in fpite of the enemy, went into Upper 
 Silefia, and raifed the fiege of Neifs. If, therefore, the prince of 
 Bevern had taken this route, and even gone to Liebenthal, between 
 Greiffenberg and Lowenberg, with a flrong corps on the right of 
 the Queifs, between Marklifia and Grieffenberg, it would have 
 been impofiible for the enemy to advance one ftep farther : they 
 •could not pafs between his left and tliofe immenfc mountains, 
 
 R called
 
 122 H I s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 called the Riefengeburg, - having no road ; much lels could they 
 march on his right, towards Lowcnberg and Lignitz, leaving him 
 mafter of thofe immenfe defiles and mountains which feparated 
 them from Bohemia, from whence only they could draw their fub- 
 fiftence, without expofing their army to certain deftrucftion. They 
 mufl, therefore, either flop fliort, or come to an aftion j which 
 he could accept, much to his advantage, in that ftrong camp of 
 Liebenthal, or decline it, and retire fucceflively to Lahn and Jauer, 
 and laftly to Striegau and Schweidnitz. In all which places there 
 are fuch camps to be taken, as cannot eafily be forced. The coun- 
 try is extremely clofe, and therefore numbers are of little ufe, be- 
 caufe they cannot be all brought to adlion : whereas, by taking 
 the march he did, he left that very road open which he ought to 
 have taken, and by that means gave the enemy an opportunity to 
 anticipate him ; fo that, on his arrival at Lignitz, he found they had 
 taken a pofition between that town and Jauer, and by that means 
 cut him off from Schweidnitz, Neifs, Breflaw, and all Upper Si- 
 lefia. Indeed he got afterwards to Breflaw, but this ought to be 
 attributed to his extraordinary good fortune, that the enemy com- 
 mitted a greater fault than he had done. Being arrived at Breflaw,, 
 we think he ought to have drawn the principal effedls and flores 
 out of it, and fent them to Glogau, and have gone with his army 
 to Schweidnitz, where the enemy muft have followed him ; be- 
 caufe they could not keep Breflaw, even if they had taken it while 
 he was mafl:er of Schweidnitz, and of the defiles which lead into 
 Bohemia ; nor could they force him, by any manoeuvre, to aban- 
 don that town, and the neighbourhood; nor, fuppofing they were 
 mafl:ers of Breflaw, could they put their army into winter quarters,, 
 while he was in poffefl^ion of a chain of fortreffes behind them,, 
 and had an army between them and their own country, with 
 which they could not have the leaft communication, not even v^'ith 
 
 the
 
 in German?, 1757. 123 
 
 the capital j fo that they mufl neceflarily be forced to quit Silefia, 
 and endeavour to gain Bohemia ; which was by no means an eafy 
 undertaking ; becaufe, as we have faid, they were feparated from 
 that country by an enemy's army, and three flrong fortreffes, as 
 Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neifs, on the very defiles where they 
 mufl: pafsj and, in which, in all human probability, their army, 
 in that advanced feafon, and harrafTed by the enemy, would have 
 periflied. By flaying at Breflaw, and fuffering Schweidnitz to be 
 taken, he gave prince Charles an opportunity to take firfl a poft in 
 the country, and by that means enabled him to profecute his ad- 
 vantages with fecurity; which brought on the lofs of the battle 
 of Breflaw, and with it Breflaw itfelf j and might, if thefe advan- 
 tages had been properly improved, occafioned that of all Silefia. 
 
 Whenever the Auflrians attempt any thing againfl that coun- 
 try, by the way of Lufatia, the Prufhans may, we think, by 
 taking the above pofitions, even with an inconfiderable army, 
 effedlually flop their progrefs. 
 
 As to the condudl of the adlion of Breflaw, we think that the 
 Pruflians, to the many works, which, during feven weeks, they 
 had railed, Hiould have added an Inundation, if poflible, by means 
 of the Lohe. This would have efFed;ually covered them. The 
 choice of the camp does not appear to have been well made; 
 becaufe the left wing and its flank were not fo flrong as the front j 
 fo that, if the enemy had made the principal attack where Nadafli 
 was, the FrufTians mufl have abandoned their flrong camp, and 
 lofe the fruits of their long labours, in order to make a front 
 where Ziethen flood ; and, moreover, if the enemy ever got pof- 
 feflion of the hills behind Kleinburg and Grabifchen, the whole 
 Pruflian army would have been hemmed in between the Lohe and 
 the Oder, with general Beck in their rear on the other fide, and 
 the enemy in front, without fufiicient ground to manoeuvre upon ; 
 
 R 2 and.
 
 124 History of the War 
 
 and, in fuch circumflances, it would have been difficult even to 
 get into Breflaw. It would, I think, have been better to place the 
 right on the town of Ereflaw, and occupy the villages that were 
 near and under the protedion of it. The left fliould have been 
 extended to the hills by Kleinburg and Grabifchen, which ought 
 to have been fortified with care, and redoubts raifed all along the 
 front, from right to left. The army, fo pofted, could not, we 
 think, have been forced at all ; nor could the town be attacked 
 while it was there. When the enemy palTed the Lohe at Grolf- 
 mochber, we think that general Ziethen, inftead of extending his 
 left, fhould, on the contrary, have lengthened his right as far as 
 Grabifchen; with his infantry and all the heavy artillery on the hill 
 it, and his eav-alry at the bottom of it ; and the prince of Bevern's 
 divilion fliould have clofed its left with the right of this. By which 
 Ineans, the enemy, who had palled the Lohe there, would have 
 been taken in flank, whether they attacked Grabifchen or Klein- 
 mochbcr : whereas, by the difpofitions made, there was an inter- 
 val between Ziethen's right, and the prince of Bevern's left, where 
 the enemy entered, and met with no other difficulty than that at 
 Kleinniochber. This interval was the key of the camp ; and, the 
 inilant the enemy got pofleffion of it, the prince of Bevern could 
 liot continue where he was, though he had been vi(fl:orious on 
 his right and center; becaufe, being mafters of this interval, . 
 if they reinforced that attack, which they might have done, they 
 were on his flank, and would fucceffively have puflied him into 
 the Oder : whereas, if he rcpulfed the enemy here, the battle was 
 won ; becaufe, though they fuccceded in their attacks at Pilfnitz 
 and Schmiedfeld, they could not continue in that ground between 
 the Lohe, the Oder, and his army, with Breflaw jufl: before them ; 
 and muft, therefore, have abandoned thofe villagts, and repafs the 
 Lohe, 
 
 The
 
 in Germany, 1757. 125. 
 
 The event confirms my opinion : for the enemy had got no 
 very great advantage on the right and center j yet it was necelBry 
 to retire, becaufe they had taken Grabifchen and Kleinmochber, 
 and were, confequently, on princp Severn's flank i and might, if 
 he continued in the fame pofition, cut him off from Breflaw, and 
 throw him into the Oder. 
 
 As to the condudt of prince Charles, it fcems to have been no 
 lefs, prudent than vigorous.. By fending two corps on the enemy's 
 flank, he forced them to quit their ftrong camp on the Landfcron,. 
 and go farther down, in order to pafs the Neifs and Queifs ; which 
 was an eflential advantage to him, becaufe he had, by that means, 
 a nearer road than they to Breflaw and Schweidnitz. When Iiis 
 royal highnefs came to Lignitz, we think he fliould have attacked 
 the enemy ; and, if that was thought dangerous, he fliould have 
 fent 20,000 men to befiege Breflaw, then defended by a very weak 
 garrifon ; and, with the remainder of the army, have covered the 
 fieo:e ; which he could eafily have done, being fl;ill very much fupe- 
 rior to the enemy,. who could not pofllbly approach Breflaw, v.-ith-- 
 out previoufly coming to an adlion. 
 
 When the prince of Bevern quitted Lignitz, and marched 
 towards Steinau, on the Oder, prince Charles fliould have fent 
 a.fl:rong corps after him, and with the army have gone to Dyher- 
 renfurth j and there throw as many bridges as poflible over the 
 Oder, in order to be on either fide, as circumfl:ances might require. 
 By this means he could cover the fiege of Breflaw, and efl^eftually 
 hinder the enemy from difl:urbing it. Why he pcrniitted the 
 prince of Bevern to march near twenty leagues, and pafs the Oder 
 twice, and come to Breflaw before him, while he had only ten 
 leagues to march, and no river to pafs,. is what cannot eafily be 
 conceived. As to the conduifl of the adtion itfelf, it does not feem 
 to have been intlrely prudent and blamelcfs. Tlic three attacks 
 were, made precifely againfl: the ftrongefl; part of the enemy's cam.p, 
 
 and
 
 126 History of the War 
 
 and were, moreover, expofcd to great ditHculties in pafTing the 
 Lohe under the fire of their works : whereas, if his royal highnefs 
 had only made a falfe attack on the enemy's center and right, and 
 have pofled his left by Neukirchen, with feme heavy artillery and 
 haubitz near it, and have pafled his line by Groffmochber, between 
 Operau and the Lohe, where the bridges muft have been laid, and 
 Nadafti's left quite clofe to the prince's right, fo as to form a kind 
 of curve about the enemy, as marked in the plan, he would have 
 avoided the villages and works, in which the enemy placed the 
 greateft hopes, and the difficulties that muft occur in paffing a river 
 fo near them ; and, moreover, would have forced them to abandon 
 thefe very works, in order to take a new pofition, with their right 
 on the Lohe, and their left towards the hills behind Kleinburg, 
 which would have expofed it to be enfiladed from one end to the 
 other, by the artillery placed at Neukirchen and Groffmochber. 
 When the enemy's right and center quitted their ground, as 
 they mufl: have done, nothing could hinder the light troops from 
 occupying it, and taking them in the rear. For all which rea- 
 fons, I think, the Auflrians fliould have made their attack where 
 Nadafti was, by which they would have avoided all thofe great 
 difficulties they met with. Even, if this general, inftead of ex- 
 tending his right, had ftretched his left fo as to clofe with the 
 ri""ht of the army which paffed at Groffmochber, and have adled 
 with his ufual vigour, it is probable the Pruffian army was loft, 
 and thrown into the Oder. 
 
 The immediate confequence of this battle was the taking of 
 Breflav/, with about 300,000 florins, and a prodigious quantity of 
 ftores in it. 
 
 The Auftrians, thinking the campaign finifhed, were preparing 
 to enter into winter quarters ; when news came, that the king, at 
 the head of a confiderable body of troops, was advancing towards 
 
 Silefia.
 
 in Germany, 1757. 127 
 
 Silelia. Upon which all thoughts of feparating the army were laid 
 afide, and proper meafures taken to go and oppofe the enemy. 
 With this view, colonel Bulow, with about 3000 men, was fent 
 to occupy Lignitz, in hopes, by that means, to flop the king for 
 fome time ; as it was thought he would pafs near that place. 
 Prince Charles, having refolved to go and meet the enemy, paffed 
 the Schweidnitz on the 4th of December, intending to advance 
 further on towards Glogau -, but the arrival of the enemy, the day 
 following, prevented it, and occafioned a general a<flion, near LifTa : 
 of which we fliall, as ufual, give the different accounts, as pub- 
 lidied by authority. 
 
 That of the Auflrians is as follows : 
 
 " The king of PrufTia, having quitted Saxony, and pafTed 
 ** through Lufca, he arrived, with a confiderable corps, at 
 ** Parchwitz, on the Oder, where he was joined by the army 
 ** which had been under the command of the prince of Severn ;. 
 ♦' which, with what he had conducted, amounted to 40,000 men^ 
 " provided with a fine train of artillery, fafcines, gabions, &c.. 
 " and, having pafled the Katzbach, it was eafy to forefee that his 
 " intentions were to take Neumark and Lignitz; and then, either 
 •' attack the imperial army before Breflaw, or march to Stricgau 
 *' and the frontiers of Bohemia, in order to cut off our communi- 
 " cation with that country. 
 
 " For which reafons, it was refolved by his royal highnefs 
 " prince Charles, and his excellency M.Daun, with the unanimous 
 " confent of all the generals, to advance, and pafs the Schweidnitz 
 " without delay, and fo fecure Lignitz ; and, above all things, 
 " endeavour to fruflrate the defigns of the enemy. Accordingly, 
 " the garrifon of Lignitz was reinforced, and a large corps of 
 '• Bannalifls, huffars and picquets of horfe, fuflained by the Saxoa 
 " light horfe,' were fent to Neumark. 
 
 " The:
 
 1 2 S History of tlic War 
 
 I. 
 
 " The army, having been provided on the 3d of December, 
 
 " for four days, w^ith every thing neceflary, and prepared for all 
 
 :" eyentf, broke up the 4th in the morning, and paflcd the Lohe 
 
 " and the Schweidnitz, in order to encamp there. While it was 
 
 " filing over the bridges, advice was brought, that the king of 
 
 •' PrufTia had quitted Parchwitz the 4th in the morning, and was 
 
 •' advanced to Neumark, from whence he had forced our troops 
 
 *' to retire. Upon which the baggage was fent back behind the 
 
 •" Schweidnitz, and the columns ordered to haflen their march, 
 
 " that the army might be formed ; which was accordingly done, 
 
 " in two lines. General Nadafti, with the corps under his com- 
 
 " mand, made a third, which was defigned to cover the flank of 
 
 " the left wing; and the corps de referve that of the right. The 
 
 " army was ppfted with the right at Nypern, the left at Leuthen, 
 
 *• and the center at Frobehvitz : all thefe villages were occupied 
 
 ** with infantry, and provided with artillery. In Frobehvitz wei-e 
 
 ** eight companies of granadiers, with many picquets : in Leuthen 
 
 *' feven companies of granadiers, with feveral picquets : and feve- 
 
 *' ral picquets alio in Nypern. All the companies of granadiers, 
 
 *' and the picquets of the referve, were ported on the right of the 
 
 ♦' cavalry, at the point of a wood that joined it. 
 
 *' General Lufinfki, with two regiments of huflars, and fome 
 
 ** granitzersj fuftained by tlie Saxon light horfe, commanded by 
 
 -" count Noftitz, was pofled fo as to cover the left wing ; and 
 
 *' general Morocz, with two regiments of hufl!ars, and fome gra- 
 
 " nitzers, on the right, for the fame purpofe. Whilft we were 
 
 " making thcfe difpofitions, the enemy advanced on this fide Neu- 
 
 " mark, with his right at Krintfch, and the left at Bifchdorff, 
 
 *' with his forepoiis at Borna. In this fituation both armies con- 
 
 *' tinued under arms the whole night. The 5th in the morning, 
 
 *' before day, general Nadafti, whofe corps had made a third line, 
 
 " went.
 
 in Ge R.MAN V, 1757. 129 
 
 " went, as had been concerted, and polled himfelf near the ca- 
 " valry of the left wing, and extended his troops to a hill, that 
 ** was on the fide, upon which fome artillery was placed, and an 
 ** abatis made before it. The Auflrians under his command 
 •' were next the left of the armv, and the WurtemburQ-ers and 
 *• Bavarians came to be on the flank, and behind the abatis. 
 
 " At break of day, the enemy madefeveral motions, fometimes 
 " to the right, and fometimes to the left, which lafted 'till 12 
 *' o'clock; and it appeared he intended to attack the right vving 
 " of the imperial army; infomuch that general Luchsfi, who 
 " commanded there, feht fsveral times to demand fuccours. The' 
 *' referve was defined for. that purpofej yet the fending of it 
 ** was poftponed 'till the enemy's intentions were fully known : 
 " but, as the count repeated his inftances, and the enemy's mo- 
 " tions behind the hills not being difcovered, the referve was fcnt 
 " him, and M. Daun went there himfelf, in order to be at hand 
 " in cafe of need. Scarce had the refeive marched, when tlis 
 " enemy's cavalry appeared on our left ; which fliewed they pro- 
 " pofed attacking that wing, and the flank adjoining: upon which 
 " his royal highnefs and his excellency M. Daun ordered prince 
 " Eilerhaf, general of horfe, and generals Macquire and Angern, 
 " with the cavalry and infantry under their command, and all the 
 •' fecond line, to march and fuflain that flank. About i o'clock 
 " the enemy approached it, and the fire of the fmall arms began 
 •' againft the Wurtembergers ; which being very hot, forced them 
 ** back in confufion, leaving their artillery behind them ; which 
 " brought the Bavarians, who formed the flank, likewife into 
 " confufion. Thefe auxiliary troops immediately threw the other 
 " regiments of the Imperials in diforder, and hindered thofe that 
 " were coming to fuflain them from doing any thing to the purpofe. 
 ** Every pofTible means was ufed to bring the troops into order, 
 
 S " but 
 
 V
 
 rio History of the War 
 
 " but in vain. During this time, the enemy attacked the village 
 " of Leuthen,. and the left wing of the army, and had brought 
 " tlicre the greatefl: part of his forces 3 but he was repulfed three 
 " fcveral times with great lofs ; fo that the viftory^was dubious 
 " for a long while. At length, however, the PrufTians penetrated 
 " in the opening between the left wing and the flank, and fo 
 " were in the rear of our army. We wxre forced to abandon 
 " Leutlien, and retire towards the Schweidnitz and the Lohe. 
 *' This was executed in good order, and under a continual fire^ 
 " In this manner the battle, which lafled from i o'clock 'till 
 " five, finiHied." 
 
 The Pruiiian's account is as follows : 
 
 " After the battle of Roftach, his majeily turned his thoughts- 
 " towards Silcfia, in order to oppofe vigoroufly the progrefs of 
 " the Auftrians. Accordingly, his majefly, at the head of 33 
 " fquadrons, and 19 battalions, quitted Leipfig the 12th of No- 
 " vember, and arrived the 13th at Eulenberg, the 14th at Tor- 
 " gau, the 16th at Muhlberg, the 17th paffed the Roder at 
 " GroiTcnhayn, where general Haddick had been witli 2000 men, 
 " but was retired to Konigfbruck. He had left fbme huflars be- 
 " hind the Roder to obferve us ;. but they were drove back by. 
 " ours, who took about 40 prifoners. 
 
 " The 1 8th his majefty marched by Polfnitz to Konigfbruck, 
 " where the pandours under general Haddick flopped once more ; 
 ** whom he forced to retire towards the corps under general Mar- 
 " flial, in Lufatia, who likewife retired towards Lobau, and ne- 
 *♦ ver appeared again during our whole march. The 20th his 
 *' majefty palTcd over the Black Elfter to Camenz j and the 21ft 
 " over the Spree to Bautzen ; from whence Marflial's corps had. 
 •* retired towards Bohemia : the 22d his majefty pafTed the Old 
 *' Spree^ aad went to Maltitz ; the 23d to Gorlitz j from whence 
 
 «' Haddick'3
 
 in Germany, 1757. 151 
 
 Haddlck's corps likewife retired towards Bohemia:' the 24th 
 he paffed the Qjieifs, and went to Naumburg in Silefia } the 
 26th to DeutmanfdorfFj the 27th to Lobethauj and the 2Sth 
 to ParchwitZi where we arrived at 6 o'clock in the evening, 
 and there found the Auftrian colonel GerfdoriT, who was juft 
 come with about 11 00 horfe and foot. His majefly ordered 
 him to be immediately attacked, and killed about 80 men, took 
 150 prifoners, and difperfed the reft. The armv paiTcd the 
 Katzbachj and reinained fome days at Parchwitz, to reft after 
 fuch a ftrong march. The ift of December, the hullars, be- 
 longing to the army of prince Bevern, came to us ; and the 2d 
 that whole army joined ours. On the 4th we marched to Neu- 
 mark, where we found fome thoufand Croats and huflars, who 
 kept the gate oppofite to us fluit, and endeavoured to get out 
 on the fide of Breflaw. In the mean while, fome of our dra- 
 goons and huflars went about the town, and others opened the 
 gate by force ; fo that, having drove the enemy out, they fell 
 into the hands of thofe who had gone on the other fide. We 
 killed about 300, and took 600 prifoners, with the bakery of 
 the whole army, a fmall magazine, and two cannon^ Here ad- 
 vice was brought, that prince Charles had quitted Breflaw, and 
 was advanced to LiflTa, with his right at Nypern, and his left at 
 Golau, with the Schweidnitz behind him. His majefty thought 
 proper to go and meet him; and therefore ordered the army to 
 break up on the 5th, at 5 o'clock in the morning. At break of 
 day we difcovered, on a hill behind the village of Borna, about 
 half a mile from Neumark, a ftrong corps of cavalry, which, in 
 the twilight, was thought to be the enemy's whole army. Upon 
 our approaching them, we found it was only two regiments of 
 huflars, and the Saxon light horfe, commanded by general 
 Noftitz. Our vanguard attacked them immediately; drove 
 
 S 2 " them
 
 132 History of the War 
 
 them hack into their camp ; and took 500 prifoners. We 
 continued our march, in wet and thick vveatlicr, about four 
 miles ; and, near 1 2 o'clock, we difcovered the enemy's whole 
 army, in order of battle, behind the village of Leuthen. AH 
 the hills before their front were covered with artillery ; and 
 the left wing had, befides a great hill with artillery upon if, 
 an abatis likewife. The right had alfo a great many batteries 
 before it. The king refolved to attack the enemy's left, as 
 foon as our army reached the heights before it. We marched on 
 the right ; fo that our right wing came up to the Schweidnitz 
 river. We firft attacked the wood ; and very foon drove the 
 enemy's infantry out of it. When they perceived that we out- 
 winged tliem, and took them in flank, they were forced to 
 change their pofition ; and, as we were on their flank, they had 
 nothing n>ore to do, than to take the firfl: new pofition they 
 could find, to hinder us from enfilading their army from one 
 wing to the other. They therefore fcnt fome brigades of in- 
 fantry on the heights abovementioned, behind the wood : our 
 ri<^ht wine attacked it ; and, after an obflinate combat, took 
 it. The enemy formed a new line by Leuthen, and defended 
 themfelvcs with much bravery; but, at lafl, were forced to 
 o-ive way. Here our cavalry of the right wing attacked that 
 of the enemy, and defeated it. They were, however, afterwards 
 drove back by the enemy's artillery charged with cartridges: 
 but, being again re-eftabliflied, they attacked their infantry, 
 and took many prifoners. During thele feveral attacks, the 
 enemy's right advanced. The cavalry of our left attacked that 
 of the enemy, and entirely defeated it : then our regiment of 
 dragoons Bareuth attacked a body of infantry, that was on a 
 hill, behind, while our infantry did the fame in front; which 
 foon forced them to fly. His maj^fVy purfued the enemy to 
 
 *♦ Lifla,
 
 in Germany, '^JZy- ij'' 
 
 ♦* Lifla. The battle began at i o'clock, and finidied at four. 
 " If we had had a few hours more day light, the enemy's lofs 
 " would have been ftill much greater. Prince Maurice coni- 
 " manded the right wing under the king, and major general Ret- 
 ♦♦ zow the left. Our lofs confifts in 500 men killed, and 2300 
 " wounded : among thefe is general Roehow, who was alfo taken 
 " prifoner. The enemy's army, which amounted to 80,000 men, 
 " never fought with more bravery than this time. Ours amounted 
 " to 36,000 men only. The enemy flood in a plain, with fonre 
 " fmall hills on it, which they covered with artillery. There 
 " were likewife many buihes on the plain, of which they took 
 " advantage. On their left wing was a confiderable wood, where 
 *' they made an abatis, and took all the meafures poffible to hin- 
 " der us from coming on their flank. General Nadafti, with his 
 •* corps, was likewife ported there, with intention to come on 
 " our flank. For which reafon, his majefly placed four battalions 
 " behind the cavalry of our right; which wife difpofition was 
 *' afterwards of great fervice to us : for, when. Nadafti attacked our 
 " right wing of horfe, and had thrown fome regiments in con- 
 ** fufion, the fire of thefe battalions threw the enemy back in 
 " great diforder, and by that means cleared our flank, and ena- 
 " bled our right to ad with vigour againfl: the enemy's left, which 
 *' in a fhort time was forced to retire. The right wino- of our 
 *' infantry continued to advance in the finell order, though it wu^ 
 " expofed to a prodigious cannonading, and the fire of fmall arms, 
 " Our artillery, of which we had no fmall quantit}', did great 
 " fervice, and fuftained our advancing infantry j and by der^recs 
 " filenced that of the enemy, which was at laft abandoned. 
 " Though the enemy had fought with great bravery during the 
 " whole adtion, yet they feemed to redouble their forces and 
 ** courage at Leuthen, which was fortified with redoubts and 
 
 *' retrenchments.
 
 134 II f s T o R V of the War 
 
 " retrenchments. The combat lafted here above an hour ; and 
 " our brave battahons made feveral attacks, one after another, 
 " before they got mafters of the village. This decided the battle; 
 *' for the enemy, on loiing this village, retired with great pre- 
 " cipitation, and never attempted again to make any confiderablc 
 " ftand. Our cavalry, and particularly the huffars, purfued the 
 " flying enemy; killed many; and took fome thoufands prifoners. 
 *' His inajelly purfued the enemy to Lifla, where he ordered the 
 *' army to remain that night under arms. Our infantry did won- 
 " dcrs. We thought, in the beginning, that our left would have 
 ** no opportunity to come to adlion, as our right advanced fo 
 " much before it; however, at 4 o'clock, the battle was gene- 
 *' ral : even our fmall referve was ordered to advance into the 
 ** line. Our cavalry had many difficulties, in the beginning, to 
 *' encounter, from the ditches and enclofures : at laft, how- 
 " ever, by the aftivity of our brave general Ziethen, it had alfo 
 •' an opportunity of acfting. The 6th we followed the enemy, 
 " and the 7th inverted Breflaw. General Ziethen, with a great 
 " corps of infantry and cavalry, was fent after them. He has 
 " taken feveral cannons, and above 3000 waggons. We have 
 •< taken, in and fmce the battle, to the 12th of December, 291 
 *' officers, and 2i,!;oo men, prifoners, among whom are generals 
 " Noftitz, and Odonell, 116 cannon, 51 pair of colours, and 4000 
 ** waggons." 
 
 The lofs of the Auftrians, not including the Wurtembergers 
 and Bavarians, amounted to 6574, killed and wounded. Among 
 the firft were generals Luchefi, Otterwolf, and prince Stolberg : 
 and among the wounded were generals Haller, Macquire, Lacy, 
 Lobkowitz, and Preyfac. That of the PrufTians confiftcd of about 
 5000 men, not including the cavalry. 
 
 Prince
 
 in Germany, 1757. 135 
 
 Prince Charles left a very confiderable garrifon in Breflaw,, 
 Bfider the command of general Sprecher, and retired to Schweld- 
 nitz ; and, having provided for the defence of that place, he 
 made his difpofitions to retire into Bohemia; which was accord- 
 ingly executed : and, before the end of the month, the Auftrians 
 entirely evacuated Silefia, excepting only the town of Schweidnitz. 
 
 In the mean time, the king opened the trenches before Breflaw ;. 
 and, a bomb having fallen into a powder magazine, the i6th iw 
 the evening, the attacked baftion, and near half the adjoining 
 curtain, was blown up, and above 800 men of the befieged. This 
 misfortune obliged the commandant to capitulate the 19th at night. 
 The garrifon, confifling of above 17,000 men, including 13 gene- 
 rals, and the fick and wounded at the two lafl battles, were m?Je 
 prifoners of war. 
 
 General Driefen had been fent the i6th, with a body of 
 troops, to befiege Lignitz ; and, on the 26th, took that place by 
 capitulation. Colonel Bulow, the governor, obtained leave to re- 
 tire into Bohemia, with his garrifon, confifting of near 3000 men. 
 
 Thus one vidlory, improved by a vigorous and adtive genius,, 
 enabled his majefty to recover, in one month, all, excepting, 
 Schweidnitz, that he had lort; during the whole campaign.. 
 
 It has been already obferved, that, when the king left Saxony, 
 in order to go to Silefia, M. Keith, with about 8oco men, hadi 
 been fent into Bohemia, with a view to draw general Marflial,, 
 then in Lufatia, there ; and, by that, means, facilitate the march of 
 die king. This end having been happily accomplifhed,. M. Keith,, 
 after he had burnt feveral magazines, and the bridge at Leutme- 
 ritz, returned into Saxony; where he put his troops into winter 
 quarters ^ 
 
 '.Xeflection^
 
 1^.6 History of the War 
 
 Reflections on the battle of LifTa, and the 
 preceding operations. 
 
 Prince Charles knew., even before the battle of Brellaw, that 
 the king, with about lo or 12,000 men, at moft:, was coming 
 into Silefia : the only objecft his majcfty could have in view, was 
 to join Bevern's army, without which he could attempt nothing 
 at all; nor even, with fo inconfiderahle a force as that he brought 
 with him, approach the Auftrian army, without expofing himfelf 
 to certain deftruftion. Wherefore, the only objecft prince Charles 
 Ihould have had in view, was to prevent him from efFetfluating 
 this jundlion. His royal highnefs fliould therefore have marched . 
 to Parchwitz, and take a pofition between that place and Lignitz, 
 with a ftrong corps, on the heights of Pfaffendorff, which would 
 have hindered the king from approaching the Oder; nor even could 
 he have gone to Glogau, without giving them an opportunity to 
 attack him, and confequently defeat him, coniidering the Auflrian 
 army was, perhaps, fix times flronger than he was. 
 
 The only meafure taken by the Auftrians, was to fend a gar- 
 rifon to Lignitz, which could anfwer no end whatever, and ex- 
 pofed fo many men to be loH:. It was by no means probable 
 that the king would amufe himfelf with a fiege of that miferable 
 place, when all Silefia was at Itake. 
 
 When the Auftrians had permitted the king to unite all his 
 forces, and provide them with the neceflary artillery, &;c. we can- 
 not conceive why all of a fudden they refolved to quit Brellaw, 
 and go to meet him. I know very well, that flattery, too prevalent 
 in camps, as well as courts, had raifed their fpirits and confidence 
 much above what prudence prefcribes : but they could then have 
 no motives to defire an action ; becaufe, if vidorious, they could - 
 not, in that advanced foafon, purfue the enemy further than Glo- 
 
 o:itj ; and, if vAnquirUcd, it might prove fatil to them. 
 
 Having
 
 in Germany, 1757'.^ 157 
 
 Having pafled the Schvveidnitz the 4th, they were informed 
 t4ie enemy was advancing towards them ; Why not inftantly repafs 
 that river, and put it before them, rather than behind Though 
 this river is but fmall, yet its banks, for the moft part, are very 
 marfliy; infomuch that an army cannot pafs it without the greateil 
 difficulty, and fcarce at all if they meet with any oppofition. If 
 the Auftrians had done this, and have fent a ftrong corps higher 
 up on their left flank, with their light troops on the fame fide as 
 the enemy, on the road that leads to Striegau, v.'-e do not think 
 his majefty would have attempted to pafs the river ; and, if he did, 
 ttie corps abovementloned would have been on his flank during the 
 pafl"age and the adion ; and, as they were much Wronger than he 
 was, having their army covered by the Schweidnitz, they could 
 have ported 20,000 men on their flank i which v/ould have made 
 it impofllble for the enemy to pafs the river. He would, there- 
 fore, in all probability, have marched to Striegau, in order to 
 bring the Aufl:rians from their advantageous fituation, bv endea- 
 vouring to cut off their communication with Bohemia. In this 
 cafe, the corps, polled, as we fuppofe, on their left, would have 
 been at Strie_gau before the enemy ; and the whole army mufl: have 
 marched behind Schweidnitz, with the right at Hohen GierfdorfF, 
 and the left towards Friberg j which would have fecured the road 
 by Landfliut to Bohemia, and their communication with that 
 country. This polltion is very ftrong, and we do not think they 
 could have been beat in it ; nor, in that advanced fcafon, bv anv 
 manoeuvre on their left, be forced out of it , nor could the king 
 continue in the neighbourhood of Striegau, having no magazines 
 within a hundred miles of him. He mufl:, therefore, have given 
 up the point, and retire to Glogau, in order to rcfVeih his troops^ 
 wJio v/ere much in need of refl. Thefe meafures being negle<5ted^ 
 or -never thought of, they Ihould have advanced, and occupied all 
 
 T ' the
 
 138. History of the War 
 
 the hills before them, particularly that by Lobetnhz, as well to 
 take this advantage from the enemy, as to have room enough be- 
 hind them to manceuvre upon ; but, from the moment they heard 
 of the king's approach, they feem ftupified -, they neither advance 
 nor retire. It is impofiible for a fuperior army to be outwinged, 
 but by fome fault j yet this happened. The king made great de- 
 raonftrations againft their right, by which they were deceived fo 
 long, that he, covered by the hills they had neglcdted to occupy, 
 had tijiie to bring his whole army on their left. The only remedy 
 then, was to order their right and center to march againil his left ; 
 and, as they were much fuperior, and this wing weakened, to re- 
 inforce the right. They would have invelopcd it, and in all pro- 
 bability deftroyed it ; nor could the king purfue his advantages on 
 the right, while his left was thus attacked, for fear of being in- 
 clofed between the enemy's right wing and the river, wjiere there 
 was not ground enough to adl in. They fliould, at the fame time, 
 have formed a line or two behind the flank attacked, with inter- 
 vals to let the troops repulfed pafs, and then advance againft the 
 enemy, whom they would have found broke, and in confufion, 
 and, therefore, eafily have defeated him. 
 
 Instead of which, they ordered the whole army to make a 
 motion on the left, to fuftain that wing ; fo that the columns met 
 their companions retiring, and the enemy advancing in order of 
 battle ; which hindered them from being able to form at all ; and 
 thus the whole army was defeated, one battalion after another, 
 as mufi: neceffarily happen. Troops marching in fmall and long 
 columns can never open, and form themfelves in a line, when near 
 the enemy, and under his fire ; and, therefore, fuch a manceuvre 
 muft never be attempted. They fliould have endeavoured to keep 
 the enemy back 'till they had formed a line, and then advance, 
 or wait his coming. This not being executed, the battle was loft, 
 and nothing could prevent it. 
 
 It
 
 in Germany, 1757. 139 
 
 It was likewife a capital fault to have put the auxiliary troops, 
 who had never feen an enemy, on the flank. If they had thrown 
 their light troops, and 8 or i o battalions of Auflirians", fuflained by 
 Nadafti's corps, and the whole left wing, into the wood, before 
 the village of Sagfchutz, and ordered their right and center to 
 advance, and attack the enemy's left, we think they would have 
 gained the vidlory. 
 
 The king's condudl was founded on the moft fublime principles 
 of war. Though his army was much inferior to that of the enemy, 
 3'et, by dint of fuperior manoeuvres, he broup-ht more men into 
 aftion, at the point attacked, than they -, which muft be decifive 
 when the troops are nearly equal in goodnefs. Wherefore, generals 
 muft make it their fludy, to eftablifli, in time of peace, fuch evo- 
 lutions as facilitate the manoeuvres of armies ; and, in time of war, 
 choofe fuch a field of battle, if poflible, as enables them to hide 
 part of their motions, and fo bring more men into ad:ion than the 
 enemy ; and, if the ground, either by its nature, or by the vio-i- 
 lance of the enemy, does not permit them to cover their motions, 
 then a greater facility of manoeuvring will anfwer the fame end, 
 and enable them to bring more men to the principal point attacked 
 than the enemy. The only advantage of a fuperior army, in a day 
 of a(ftion, confifts in this only, that the general can bring more 
 men into a6tion than the enemy ; but, if they do not move with 
 facility and quicknefs, and are not all brought to adtion at the fame 
 time, that fuperiority of numbers will be of no life : on the con- 
 trary, will ferve only to increafc the confufion. From whence we 
 will deduce a general rule: " That general, v.-ho, by the fliciiity 
 '• of his motions, or by artifice, can bring moft men into ad;ion, 
 " at the lame time, and at the fame point, muft, if the troops are 
 " equally good, neceffarily prevail ; and, therefore, all evolutions, 
 ■" which do not tend to this objedt, mull: be exploded." 
 
 T 2 Operations
 
 History of the War, &c. 141 
 
 OPERATIONS of the War in Pruflla, 
 between the Pruffians and Ruffians. 
 
 THE king of Pruffia, being informed of the Czarina's accef- 
 fion to the treaty of Verfailles, ordered general Lewhald, 
 with about 30,000 men, to march on the frontiers of Pruffia, 
 and oppofe the march of the enemy. Accordingly, this general, 
 having aflembled his army in the month of June, advanced to 
 Inflerburg, with a corps further on towards Memel,. to obferve 
 their motions. 
 
 In the mean time, the Ruffian army, confifting of 31 regiments 
 of foot, i4ofhorfe, 5ofhuirars, and about 16,000 Tartars, CaL- 
 mucks, and Cofacks, amounting in the whole to 62,000 foot, 
 19,000 horfe, and the abovementioned Tartars, &c. broke up in 
 May, and advanced, in four columns, towards the frontiers of 
 Pruffia. 
 
 Three of which paffied through Poland, and the fovirth through 
 Samogitia, towards Memel, This lafl was commanded by general 
 Fermor, and deftined to befiege tlaat town. To facilitate which 
 enterprize,. admiral Lewis, an Engliiliman of reputation, in ths 
 Ruffian fervice, failed with a confidcrable fleet from Revel, with 
 about 9000 men on board, in order to land, and attack Memel on 
 tlie fea fide, while general Fermor did the fame on the land fide-. 
 Accordingly, they arrived before Memel at the end of June, and^ 
 on the 5di of the following month, they took that place by 
 capitulation. 
 
 This conqueft was of infinite confequence to the Ruffians, 
 becaufe they, could make a convenient place of arms of it, andj 
 by means of their fleet, provide it with provifions and /lores fuf^ 
 ficient to fupply the whole army, (who could not poffibly be pro- 
 vided otherwife). and. confequently profecute the operations of the 
 campaign. 
 
 This.
 
 J ^2 History of the War 
 
 This expedition being happily executed, the whole army, under 
 the command of M. Apraxin, united in the month of Auguft, on 
 the river Rufs ; and from thence advanced towards the Pregel. 
 Upon which general Lewhald quitted the camp at Infterburg, and 
 retired towards Wehlau ; where he continued 'till the 30th of 
 Auguft, and then advairced to attack the Ruffians, who had 
 pafled the Pregel, and were encamped at Grofs Jagerfdorft'. This 
 occafioned a great battle : of which the Pruffians give the follow- 
 iu^ account. 
 
 *' Lieutenant general Schorlemmer having reconnoitred the ene- 
 *' my's pofition, it was refolved to attack them the 30th. We 
 " firft attacked their left wing. Prince Holftein's regiment, under 
 " his own command, Ruefch's, and the fecond battalion of Schor- 
 " lemmer, diftinguiOied themfelves very much. They took feve- 
 *' ral batteries, and totally defeated the enemy's cavalry. We 
 " advanced, over a prodigious number of dead bodies, againft the 
 *' center and right wing of the enemy's army, that was protefted 
 *' by various batteries and retrenchments. We took three of them 
 *' in the wood, each from 10 or 12 cannons : in one of which the 
 ** marflial himfelf gave quarter to a Ruffian colonel; and in ano- 
 •' ther we made general Lapuchin prifoner. We Oiould probably 
 ** have kept the field of battle, if, unfortunately, our fecond line 
 *' had not fired on our firft ; the great fmoak of the artillery, and 
 " of two villages which the enemy had put on fire, having hin- 
 •' dered our people from feeing their companions; fo that our firft 
 " line was cxpofed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, fuftained 
 " by 150 pieces of cannon, and that of our own fecond line. We 
 " therefore quitted the field of battle, and retired in good order, 
 *' without being followed. Our lofs, in all, amounts to about 
 " 2COO men. That of the enemy much above 9000. Among 
 ** whom arc generals Lievcn, and Lapuchin." This account, as 
 
 generally
 
 in Germany, 1757. 143 
 
 generally happens with the lofers, is very Httle exadt, and no ways 
 worthy to be printed, but impartiaUty required it. 
 
 That of M. Apraxin, to the Czarina, is as follows: 
 ** I Had the honour to inform your majefty, that numberlefs 
 " -and invincible obftacles hindered us from approaching the ene- 
 " my on the right of the Pregel. Wherefore, I refolved to pafs 
 *' tiiis river, and force them to come to ah aftion ; which was 
 " accordingly done on the 28th ; and, as the enemy perceived, by 
 " this manceuvre, and our ulterior march, that we could cut off 
 " their communication with the countries from whence they drew 
 " their fubfiflence, they found it neceffary to abandon their firong 
 *' camp, and likewife pafs on our fide the Pregel on the 28th, 
 " The 30th your majefty's army, in confequence of the order 
 " given the preceding night, was ready to march; and the van- 
 " guard, and part of the army, were already in motion ; when, at 
 " 4 o'clock in the morning, we perceived that the wood, before 
 *' our front, was filled with the' enemy's troops, whofe motions 
 " had been covered by it. We were not as yet formed, when 
 " the enemy came out of the wood in the fined order, and be- 
 " gan to fire upon us with their artillery, and foon after with 
 ** fihall arms ; which continued without intermiflion the whole 
 " action. They attacked our front with great fury; and it re- 
 " quired uncommon firmnefs to refift their efforts. The firft and 
 " chief attack was againff our left wing. They advanced in co- 
 " lumns, within gun fliot, and then formed the line. When both 
 " armies were formed, with the front againfl each other, the 
 " fire of artillery and fmall arms continued for three hours, and 
 " tlie viftory was all this while doubtful. The enemy made all 
 " the efforts poffible to break, our front, but were rcpulfcd in 
 " each attempt with great lofs. While thefe things paffed on our 
 " left, they attacked our right and vanguard (wiio, from tlic 
 
 nature
 
 144 History of the War 
 
 " nature of the ground, were fomewhat more advanced than ouf 
 " left) with two feparate corps of cavalry, fuftained by infan- 
 *• try; but were repulfed in both places. Our artillery, particu- 
 " larly thofe called the Schwalows, did great execution ; and 
 " contributed much to throw the enemy's cavalry in confufion. 
 " Though they met every where with the fmie bad fuccefs, they 
 " made one effort more. On our left wing feveral openings were 
 *' found in the line, becaufe the marlhy ground made it impradli- 
 ** cable to clofe it. The enemy attempted to penetrate through 
 " thefe intervals, in prdcr to cut our line in two, and fo take it 
 " in flank ; but they were miftaken : for we had ported there 
 ** fome troops out of the fecond line; fo that, fcarce had they 
 *' entered the wood, when they were received with fixed bayon- 
 " nets, and foon forced to fly with precipitation : which put an 
 '■' end to the battle, &:c." 
 
 The reft of general Apraxin's letter contains nothing more than 
 compliments, no wife ncceffary to give an idea of the action. 
 
 The Ruffians took 29 cannons, and about 600 prifoners. Tlieir 
 lofs confifted in 800 killed, among which were generals Lapuchin, 
 Sybin, and Kapnift ; and 4260 wounded, among whom were the 
 generals Lievcn, ToHloi, Boflpet, Villeboy, Manteuffel, Weimarn, 
 and Plemannikow. That of the Pruflians in about 3000 killed, 
 wounded, and milTing. 
 
 The Pruflians retired to Wchlau, and the Ruffians continued 
 in their camp, by Norkittcn, 'till the 7th of September; when 
 tliey made fbme difpofitions, as if they intended pafllng the river 
 Allcr, at Friedland, on the enemy's right flank; but it was not 
 executed. They attempted likewife to difembark fome troops in 
 the Curifh bay, but were repulfed by tlic militia. On the 17th 
 the whole Ruflian army broke up, and retired in hafle towards 
 the frontiers; io that, by the end of the month, they had entirely 
 
 abandoned
 
 in Germany, 1757. 145 
 
 abandoned the kingdom of Prullia, excepting Memel; where they 
 left lo or 1 2, GOO men. This put an end to tlie campaign in 
 Pruffia. 
 
 Reflections.. 
 
 When the Pruflians knew that the enemy was in march, they 
 fliould, one would think, advance to the frontiers, and have made 
 iricuriiuua intu Poland, lu dcrtroy the provifions, or carry it off^ 
 which would have retarded very much the progrefs of the enemy, 
 who had abfolutely no other means of fubfifling, but what they 
 found on the fpot, as they pafTed; which was rendered flill more 
 difficult, by the terror the Tartars infpired, by their uncommoa 
 ravages and cruelty. Another advantage would have accrued ; that 
 the inhabitants of Pruffia would have had time to withdraw them— 
 felves, and their cattle, and retire to Koniglberg, or fome other 
 places of furety : whereas, by flaying on the Pregel, the bcfl part 
 of the country was left at the mercy of the enemy. 
 
 As to the condufft of the action itfelf, nothing can be objedled 
 to M, Lewhald. He had, no doubt, orders to fight, though much 
 inferior. He formed his army in a line,, facing the enemy, which 
 may be confidered as a fault, being fo much weaker than they; 
 becaufe he could not make any confiderable effox"t, in any one 
 point; his troops being equally dillributed throughout the line; 
 fo that the enemy had every where a greater number of men in. 
 adlion than he could have. As the Ruffians were then little 
 known, 'tis no wonder the Pruffian general fhould think his 
 troops fuperior to theirs, and therefore did not think it neceffary 
 to oppofe any thing but infantry to infantry, and cavalry againft 
 cavalry. But experience has proved, that the Ruffian infantry is by 
 far fuperior to any in Europe; infomuch that I queflion whether- 
 
 U iit
 
 146 H I s T o R Y of the Wa r 
 
 it can be dcfcited by any other infantry whatever ; and, as their 
 cavalry is not fo good as tliat of other nations, reafon didiates, that 
 a mixed order of battle alone can conquer them. They cannot 
 be defeated ; they mufl: be killed ; and infantry, mixed with great 
 corps of cavalr}', only can do this. 
 
 If the Ruflians intended to remain in Prufiia, their firfl: care 
 ought to have been to form magazines at Memel, in order to fup- 
 ply the army; becaufe they muft: know, that it was impofTible for 
 the country, even had they obferved the moft exadl difcipline, to 
 furniHi enough for that purpofe. The want of this precaution, 
 both this and all the following campaigns, rendered their victories 
 ufelefs. They made war, and always will, in all probability, like 
 the Tartars. They will over-run a country, ravage and deilroy it, 
 and fo leave it ; becaufe they can never, according to the method 
 they now follow, make a folid and lafting conqueft. They put 
 themfelves an infurmountable barrier to it. Their own light 
 troops, and the want of a folid plan of operations, wiU one daj 
 jiiiji their ^rmj. 
 
 Operations
 
 in G ER\i AN Yy 1757. 147 
 
 OPERATIONS of the War in Pomerania, 
 between the Pruffians and Swedes. 
 
 THE Swedes, under pretence of guarrantying the treaty of 
 Weftphaha, fent an army of about 17,000 men, under the 
 command of general Ungern Stornberg, againft the Pruffians. 
 This army paiTed the Peen, and, having foon taken Demmin, 
 Anclam, and the illands of Ufedom and WolUn, they advanced 
 into the Pruffian part of Pomerania ; v.'here they raifed contri- 
 butions, witliout meeting any obftacle : for the garrifon of Stettin, 
 confining of about 10,000 men, under general Manteuffel, could 
 not quit that important place, in order to oppofe the progrefs of 
 the Swedes. At length, however, the army, which had been in 
 Pruffia, arrived under general Lcwhald ; and, before the end of 
 December, forced the Swedes to abandon all they had taken, 
 except the Penamunder and tlie Anclam.er retrenchments, and 
 retire under the cannon of Stralfund. 
 
 Thus ended the campaign of 1757, the moft important for 
 the number of great adtions, the variety of events, and the uncer- 
 tainty of its iffue, of any recorded either in antient or modern 
 hiftory. 
 
 V/£ hope our account of it, and our reflecflions on its various 
 operations, will prove no lefs agreeable than ufeful to our readers. 
 
 The End of the First Volume."
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Preface, page i, line •?, and 2\, for Didacktical, jvija" Didacticat 
 — page 6, line 8, after two, ai/^/ parts. 
 
 Page v, line 5, for Etries, reaJ Etrees. 
 Page xxxiv, line 9, far on, read in. 
 
 Page 3, line 15, for any further; to prevent, read any further: To prevent. 
 
 Page 3, line 17, /«r AuHrians. A confidcrablc, ««</ Auflrians, a cpnfidcrabis, . 
 
 Page 31, line to, after Schnceberg, add by. 
 
 Page 38, line 'i, for Giltchin, rc(7rt' Gitchin. 
 
 Page 49, laft line, for Bduyn, read Budyn. 
 
 Page 55, line ■^o, for feparaetly, jYa-i' feparately. 
 
 P.age 80, line 23, for from, read form. 
 
 Page 100, line 17, ySr coftcd, «Wcoafted. 
 
 Page 123, line 13, ybr occafioned, r^a^/ occafion. 
 
 Pagfe 127, line 14, /"or Lufca, rev!:^ Lufatia. 
 
 Page 135, line 22, dele It lias been already obferved, tli.':t« 
 
 Page 147, line 3, _/er Sternberg, ««</ Sternberg.
 
 :ussianArmy, Odtober i, 1756. 
 
 KING. 
 
 d Keith. 
 
 Prince of Pruflia. 
 
 Pr. Ferdin. of Brunfwick. 
 Quadt. Itzenplitz. 
 
 
 c 
 
 ta 
 
 ts 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 tn 
 
 
 
 Cv 
 
 
 
 ■^ 
 
 fs 
 
 c 
 
 > 
 
 
 3 
 
 5^ 
 
 a 
 
 Kyau. 
 schonaich. Pennavaire, 
 
 5» 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 en 
 O 
 
 M 
 
 cr 
 
 I I 
 
 en 
 
 ►a 
 
 ? o 
 
 rerin. 
 rtz. 
 
 s 
 
 O 
 o 
 
 Katt. 
 Truches. 
 
 en 
 
 >2 
 
 en 
 
 '^^ 
 
 e 
 
 
 I- 
 
 ^fl^ Putkammer. 
 Krumkow. 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Caval. 65. Sq. 
 
 Infant. 26. Batal. 
 
 Canons, • 
 
 102 Pieces.
 
 Order of Battle of the Prussian Army, Oftober i, 1756. 
 
 The K I N G. 
 Marfial Keith. 
 Celt, of Infant. Prince of Pruffia. 
 Ueut. Gen. Pr. of Bevern. Kleift. Pr. Ferdin. of Brunfwick. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Hulfen. Zaftrow. Quadt. Itzcnphtz. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 ba 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kleift Gren. 
 
 . Bat 
 
 to 
 
 a- 
 
 •T3 
 
 N 
 
 
 
 3- 
 
 S 
 
 P 
 
 ta 
 
 a 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 n 
 
 p;' 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 
 TT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 F. A&r. Geder. 
 Lieut. Gen. Kaetzler. Kyau. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Luderitz. Driefen. Schonaich. Pennavaire. 
 
 ^ 3 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 Gcndar 
 PriDCe 
 
 
 I 
 
 ' K. 
 
 
 « 
 
 fi- 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 p- 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 s 
 Pruffia. 
 
 9 
 
 •3 
 
 Lieut. 
 
 Gen. 
 
 Schwerin 
 
 
 Katt. 
 
 
 Gen. 
 
 Maj 
 
 Oertz. 
 
 
 Truches. 
 
 
 «^ 
 
 I. Sal. Putkammer. 
 
 r I. Bai. Putkan 
 I I. — Krumkow. 
 
 RECAPITULATION 
 
 Caval. 65. Sq. 
 
 Infant. 26. Batal. 
 
 Canons. lozPiecea.
 
 the Austrian Army, Odiober i. 1756. 
 
 Marjhal Broune. 
 :h, 
 f Lowenftein. 
 
 Stahrenberg 
 Maquire. Wiedt. 
 
 Radicati. 
 Odonel. 
 
 n 
 
 o 
 
 CO 
 
 3 
 
 olfferfdorf. 
 
 I I 
 
 
 n 
 
 o" 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 UA (.*4 (.»> (.U 
 
 UJ 1>J 04 (.(4 
 
 111^ III 
 
 =^ 3. o 
 
 
 Grotendorf. 
 
 o 
 
 C 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 ba 
 
 cr 
 o 
 
 c 
 
 3- 
 P 
 
 B 
 
 a 
 
 60 
 5-r 
 
 Lobkowitz. 
 
 en 
 
 >X9 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 O 
 
 sr 
 n -. » 
 c: f^ 2. 
 
 *« 
 
 3 
 
 CO 
 
 
 7r 
 o 
 
 I" 
 
 O 
 
 CO 
 
 W 
 
 o Ji = 
 
 3 S"
 
 X'^x 
 
 1 
 
 Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, Odtober i. 1756. 
 
 Lieut. Gen. 
 MaJ. Gen. 
 
 Marjhal Broune. 
 Collowrath, 
 
 Pr. of Lowenftein. 
 
 Stahrenberg 
 Maquire. Wiedt. 
 
 01 ^^ OJ 0> 
 
 I I 
 
 ill; 
 
 
 Radicati. 
 Odonel. 
 
 Cs Ov 0\ 
 
 I I S 
 
 s^ 5: S^ 
 
 t: i=i' 5. 
 
 o « 
 
 I 2 
 
 i ^ 
 
 Maj. Gen. Helwiger, WolfFerfdorf. Grotendorf. Lobkowitz. 
 
 I I 
 
 o q ;^ 
 
 
 I 
 
 > 
 
 On ^ ^*i 0\ 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Caval. 
 
 
 7^ 
 
 Sq. 
 
 Infant. 
 
 
 52. 
 
 Batal. 
 
 Canons. 
 
 
 98. 
 
 Pieces. 
 
 o 
 
 la 
 
 6 

 
 ^ 
 
 /lY commanded by the KING, May 4, 1757. 
 
 KING. 
 
 Id Keith. 
 
 Pruffia. Margrave Charles. 
 
 vick. Meyeringk. Pr. Maurice of Deflau. Kyau. 
 
 zow.Pannewitz. Aflebourg. HuHen. Krofik. Driefen. 
 
 « O 
 
 " s 
 
 O 
 
 6d 
 
 to 
 
 O 
 
 1^ 
 3 
 o 
 cr 
 
 ta f^ 
 
 to f^ 
 
 BO 
 
 r' 5 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
 
 ^Grumkow. i. 
 
 5'Billerbeek. i. 
 
 Rahmin. I. 
 
 Forcade. Prince of Darmftadt. 
 ■n. Pr. Ferdin. of Pruffia. Itzenplitz. Meyer. 
 1 
 
 o 
 
 O C 
 
 (^ 9- 
 
 a 3 
 
 -y>^ 
 
 ■-I 
 a. 
 
 60 
 
 > 
 <V 
 
 cr 
 o 
 
 c 
 
 I 
 
 CO 
 
 bo 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 a. 
 o 
 
 B' 
 
 n 
 
 en 
 
 c 
 
 ?//. General Ziethen. 
 
 v^ 
 
 \-n 
 
 1 
 
 C/5 
 
 1 
 
 ^ 
 
 § 
 
 n 
 
 N 
 
 P 
 
 5^ 
 
 5- 
 
 
 a 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Caval. ;8 Sq. 
 
 Infant. 5 1 Bat. 
 
 Canons 136 Pieces.
 
 "V 
 
 Order of Battle of the Prussian 
 
 Army commanded by 
 
 the 
 
 KING, 
 
 May 4, ij 
 
 S7- 
 
 
 
 
 The KIN G. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M^rflial Keith. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 General of Inf. Prince of PrufTia. 
 
 Margrave 
 
 Charles. 
 
 
 
 
 Lieut. General 
 
 
 Prince Ferdinand of Brunfwick. Meveringk. P 
 
 r. Maurice of DefTau. Kyau. 
 
 
 Majs. Gen. Schonaich, 
 
 
 Manftein. Zaftrow. 
 
 Retzow.Pannew 
 , — ' — , t ^ 
 
 tz. Aflebourg. 
 
 Hulfen. 
 
 
 Krofik. 
 
 Driefen. 
 
 «n "^ 1^ ■J^ 
 
 M « M M 
 
 N 
 
 "^ L ' 
 
 u 
 
 !' 
 
 _ _ 
 
 50 1 gicn "S 
 
 
 '^i -- w r 
 
 Cd 
 
 > CD ■ 
 
 W 1 
 
 Cd 
 
 to 
 
 t^ w 
 
 1 V 
 
 ■^ 1 1 
 
 OS ^K" a , 
 
 S g- ? 6 1 
 
 1 1 ■ N 
 
 ? ?- 1 1 
 
 I. Duringniofen."^ f 
 
 3 
 
 1 sp 1 
 
 SL too. O 
 
 u 1 
 
 s W 
 
 c 
 
 3 
 
 1^ 
 
 2". a 
 
 rumkow. 
 
 1 >ct 
 
 T 1 -f^ 
 c 
 
 n i\ 
 
 1. Wangenheim. o- 
 
 
 ' 
 
 g s- 
 
 rr 
 
 P'BUlerbeek. 
 
 "ji ? 
 
 " 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 =; 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kahmin. 
 
 I.-".- 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 I. Canitz. P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 •T3 
 
 Lieut. General 
 
 
 Prince Henry 
 
 of Pruffia. Forcade. 
 
 Prince 
 
 of Darmftadt. 
 
 
 
 Majs. Gen. Meinike. 
 
 Kannacher. Rohr. Inge 
 
 rfleben. Pr. FerL 
 
 in. of PrulBa. 
 
 Itzenplitz. 
 
 Meyer. 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 1-^ 
 
 r t* r* 
 
 h. ^ 
 
 N - N 
 
 
 -— 1 
 
 N 
 
 _ 
 
 v^ ^o 
 
 
 1 
 
 en 
 
 i ? H 
 
 ? 1 
 
 i S? 1 
 
 
 t» 
 
 O 
 
 1 ? 
 
 1 i' 
 
 
 ?r 
 *<* 
 
 CO 
 P 
 
 o " S 
 
 3 ? -■ 
 = S 
 
 ft 
 
 a. p 
 
 1 " ? 
 
 ? 2, 
 P. 
 
 
 > 
 
 r 
 
 o 
 
 3 
 
 to " 
 
 r ' 
 
 r ^ 
 §■ 
 
 3 S 
 c rr 
 
 S- E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Z;>«/. General Z\tthtn. 
 _ > . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i 1 
 
 •k 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 s S 
 
 N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s* ^" 
 
 i- 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cavil 
 
 78 Sq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 g^ 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . r> R^r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Canons 136 Pieces.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the Command of Marfhal S 
 
 CHWERIN 
 
 I, May 4, 1757. 
 
 
 H W E R 
 
 I N. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 moy. Leftewitz. Pr. of Bevern 
 
 
 Pr 
 
 . of Scho 
 
 naich 
 
 
 
 Kleift. 
 
 Schoning;. 
 
 Pr. of Wur 
 
 temberg. 
 
 Blan 
 
 kenfee. 
 
 /- — '^ 
 
 1 
 
 r- 
 
 ■ — ^ — — ^ 
 
 
 r- 
 
 
 -■^ , 
 
 
 
 -^ 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 
 1 w 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 "9 
 
 Amfle 
 Meyei 
 
 S 
 rt 
 
 1 
 
 o 
 -*1 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 2 
 
 3_ 
 
 ►t3 
 
 
 
 
 n 
 
 Zi. •"■ 
 
 P 
 
 •^ 
 
 » w 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 *i 
 
 3 
 
 
 •-t 
 
 C 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 9 
 
 en 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 jr 
 
 
 r' 
 
 I. Bat. Ingerfleben. '• 
 
 > 
 
 3 
 
 
 s" 
 
 0: 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. — Billerbeek 
 
 . s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pr. 
 
 Franc. 
 
 of Brunfvvick. 
 
 Brandies. 
 
 Norman. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 - - ^ 
 
 1 td 
 1 S 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 C: 
 
 
 
 
 pi 
 
 
 § 
 
 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^ ? 
 
 3 
 
 
 c: 
 
 S 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 CT- 
 
 
 
 2. » 
 
 rt* 
 
 
 n 
 o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 

 
 Order of Battle of the Prussian Army under the Command of Marflial Schwerin, May 4, 1757. I 
 
 Marflial Schwerin. 
 
 hieut. Gen. Bn. de Schonaich. Fouquet. Hautcharmoy. Leftewitz. Pr. of Bevern Pr. of Schonaich 
 
 Maj. Gen. Krockow. Katt. Kourfel. Trefkow. Kleift. Schoning. Pr. of Wurtemberg. Blankenfee 
 
 Maj. Gen. 
 
 1; 
 
 Plettenberg 
 
 Bat. Nimfchefiky. • 
 Manteuffel. 
 Saldern. Kalckreuter. 
 
 CO 
 CI 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 g* 1 II S" 
 
 s L £. S" K" 
 S" X s= 2, s 
 
 a s s ? 3 
 
 fo p 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 Caval. ■ ■■ ■ 40 Sq. 
 
 Infant. ■• - — 47 Bat. 
 
 Canons. — 116 Pieces. 
 
 I 
 s 
 
 a. 
 
 i ° 
 I S 
 
 1 . Bat. Ingerileben. 
 I. — Billerbeek. 
 
 11 
 
 Pr. Franc, of Brunfvvick. Brandies. Norman. 
 
 Z 
 
 o 
 3
 
 hnefs Prince Charles of Lorraine, May 6, 1757. 
 
 Lfberg. 
 
 Peroni. 
 
 Gen. of Horfe, Luchefi. 
 Dourlach. Spada. 
 
 Wolfersdorf. Urfel. Bretlach. De Ville, 
 
 M N U 
 
 TT 2 
 
 
 
 CO 
 
 a. 
 o 
 
 Crt 
 
 o 
 
 •T3 
 
 > 
 
 
 Arembers;. 
 
 T- 
 
 Otterwolf. 
 
 Gen. of Horfe, Bretlach. 
 Althan. 
 Breyfac. Modene. Lanthieri. 
 
 
 I I 
 
 o 
 
 ba 
 
 
 CO 
 
 N 
 
 
 en 
 CO 
 
 3 
 cr 
 
 CO 
 » 
 
 3 
 
 em. 
 
 CO 
 
 Referves, 
 Maquire. 
 Okelli. Argenteau. 
 
 Detached. 
 
 CO 
 
 ►a 
 
 
 CO 
 
 bd 
 
 Tj 
 
 
 O: 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 C/) 
 
 1 
 
 
 ►Q 
 
 Si 
 
 3 
 
 
 r^ 
 
 r» 
 
 § 
 
 •-► 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ex.
 
 Order of Battle of the Austrian Armv, under the Command of his Royal Highnefs Prince Charles of Lorraine, May 6, 1757. 
 
 Genls. of Horfe, Efterhazy. 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Odonel, 
 
 Maj. Gen. Lowenftein. Stampa. 
 
 Prince Charles of Lorraine. 
 Marjhal Broune. 
 Grand Majler of Arlilkry, Konigfegg. 
 Sprecher Forgatz. Arberg. 
 
 Voifin. Stolberg. Materni. Wolfen. Wurben. Peroni. 
 
 Gen. of Horfe, Luchefi. 
 Dourlach. Spada. 
 
 Wolfersdorf. Urfel. Breriach. De Ville 
 
 1 
 
 Co 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 W 
 
 g 
 
 1 
 
 
 > 
 
 > 
 p 
 
 p 
 
 3 
 
 o_ 
 
 < 
 
 
 
 
 < 
 
 •z ^ 
 
 E? ^ ^ 
 
 > 
 
 > 
 
 Gen. of Horfe. Stambach. 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Clerici. 
 
 JVJ«/. Gen. Hedwiger. Bathiani. 
 
 Wied. 
 Campitelli. Buttler. 
 
 Grand Mafter of Artillery, Keul. 
 Brgiine. Unruh. 
 
 Aremberg. 
 Lafcy. , Otterwolf. 
 
 Gen. of Horfe, Bretlach. 
 Althan. 
 Breyfac. Modene. Lanthieri. 
 
 RCAPITU- 
 
 lation. 
 
 Sq 
 
 uadrons. 
 
 CO 
 
 1 
 
 0? 
 3 3 
 3 'n 
 
 a- 3 
 
 Artillerv. 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 c 
 
 » HI 
 
 f 3' 
 at} 
 
 Firii Line. 
 
 35 
 
 •4 1 
 
 3' 
 
 32 
 
 8z 
 
 7^ 
 
 Second Line. 
 
 .- 
 
 '4 1 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 66 
 
 24 
 
 Reierves. 
 
 H 
 
 14 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 20 
 
 8 
 
 Light Troops. 
 
 1 ^^ 
 
 9 
 
 8 1 8 
 
 
 1 OTAL. 
 
 r: 
 
 4^ 
 
 35 
 
 75 
 
 7S 
 
 176 
 
 104 
 
 
 Light Troops. 
 
 /.««;. GfK. Haddick. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Babockzai. Drafchkowitz. Secfeni.. 
 
 Referves, 
 
 Maquire. 
 
 Okelli. Ar; 
 
 ■genteau. 
 
 I I 
 
 3 
 
 Detached. 
 
 I I 
 
 k- <
 
 '^ 
 
 IMY at Colin, Jane i8, 1757. 
 
 G. 
 laurice of Deflaii. 
 
 [lewitz. Manftein. 
 
 68 
 o ' 
 
 rfleben. 
 
 n 
 
 3 
 
 Gen. 
 "jen. 
 
 u 
 
 O 
 3 
 
 I. 
 
 3' 
 
 »> 
 
 ^i. Bat. Kahlden. 
 o 
 
 g> I Mollendorf. 
 
 5' 
 
 I. — Wangenheim. 
 
 Meinike, 
 
 I ^ 
 
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 De Ziethen. 
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 Order of Battle of the Prussian Army at Colin, June i8, 1757. 
 
 The K I N G. 
 General of Infantry, Prince Maurice of Deflau. 
 lim. Gen. Trelkow. Pr. of Bevern. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Krockow. Pr.Franj. ofBrunfwick. Pannewitz. Manftein 
 
 n u ~i ^< 
 
 OS • 
 
 ■ I . Bat. Nimfcheflky. <xt 
 I . — ManteufFel. § 
 
 , I. — Finck. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Krofick. 
 
 1 
 
 ff 1 
 
 1 
 
 CO 
 
 
 > 
 
 If 
 
 
 g. 
 
 Bat. Kahlden. 
 
 P- 
 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 g* 
 
 
 ?■ 
 
 . — Mdllendorf. 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 — Wangenheim. 
 
 Ingerdeben. 
 
 I I I I 
 
 3. a " 
 
 Lieut. Gen. 
 Maj. Gen. 
 
 Meinike. 
 I " 
 
 De Ziethen. 
 Hulfen. 
 
 RECAPITULATION- 
 
 Caval. 118 Sq. 
 
 Infant. 32 Bat. 
 
 Canons. 82 Pieces. 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 Pennavaire. 
 Norman. Schoenaich, 
 
 .^1 
 
 I I 
 
 o »- 2, 
 
 el 
 
 Katt. 
 
 I I I I 
 
 o 2. 
 
 5- p J»
 
 f 7
 
 /T- 
 
 _l
 
 A. J^tfsiitft Armt/ in MiuHi 
 B Jts If'/iiii/ien 
 
 r. I'.'^y/" 
 
 E. J^aiid /asfDr 
 
 F. AiisfriMu-Jf^fositwrt 
 C 2^ J)? 
 
 H J.''/>." 
 
 1. j^'mJlastDr 
 
 R. Ji^tmt OV&' t^u- St^iwe4ii/ut7. 
 
 L . jfadastu Ceips on l/ic Dm/ iifbn: th^ Action, 
 
 W . Afe' ^<frcat on dh' 7C/b-/n//s a^'wach 
 
 S . Uu-J'osi/ion at t/ieOa// a/'BcUl/f 
 
 l'ru^-ut/t£ 1^™* 
 
 AuSlTMflS ^^^"^ 
 
 •I 
 
 Lav
 
 II 
 
 ber 5, 1757. 
 Golcz. Kalckreuth. 
 
 a 
 
 a 2. 
 
 60 
 
 of Deflau. 
 
 Brunlw. 
 
 '^ f I. Ba 
 S t I — 
 
 Bat. Kleift. 
 
 Unruh. 
 
 o 
 
 
 Ziethen. 
 
 
 Schonaich. 
 
 Schmettau. 
 
 Lentulus. 
 
 oi •-'I 
 
 ^>^ 
 
 1-ri (^ 
 
 Sq. 
 
 00 
 
 1 I' 
 
 Pr. Frederic. 
 Schonaich. 
 
 n 
 
 Gardes du Co 
 Gendarmes. 
 
 Krockow. 
 
 Zetteritz. 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 f 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
 N 
 I? 
 
 CO 
 
 25 
 
 o
 
 Order of Battle of the Prussian Army, December 5, 1757. 
 
 'Miij. Gen. Wedel. Latoif. Pr.de Bevern. Goltz. Kalckreuth. 
 
 Van-Gard.-i 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Driefen. 
 
 MaJ. Gen. Meyer. Norman. Krockow. 
 
 I 
 
 Retzow. 
 
 3 
 
 The KIN G. 
 
 3. S. 
 
 Pr. Ferdin. of PrulTu. Pr. Maurice of Deflau. 
 Geift. Munchow. Kahlden. Pr. Franc, of Briinfw. 
 
 Ziethen. 
 Schonaich. Schmetcau. Lentulus. 
 
 I. Bac. Duringflioven. 
 
 I I 
 
 s 3. 
 
 S f i.Bat. Kleift. 
 
 O \ 
 
 S C '• — Unruh. 
 
 Mfj. Gen. Bredow. 
 I S 
 
 O -8 
 
 Lieutenant General Forcade. 
 Oldenbourg. Biilow. 
 
 Krockow. 
 
 I I I I u 
 
 S. *. S I £>• 
 
 Kg: P I <« 
 
 Zetteritz. 
 
 o 
 3 
 
 Lieutenant General Prince of Wurtemberg. 
 Stechow. 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Caval. 138 Sq. 
 
 In^t. - 
 Canons - 
 
 — 53 Bat. 
 • 167 Pieces. 
 
 I ^ 
 
 Q 
 
 ■Jl 
 
 „ 
 
 " J 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 .2= 
 
 
 1 
 
 N 
 
 er 
 
 s 
 
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 i
 
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