vJtUA 5", X
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
>^<2-
INDIAN MUTINY
OF
1857-8
KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY
INDIAN MUTINY
OF
<$f NATIONAL
185748
Edited by COLONEL MALLESON, O.S.L
Vol. II.
By Sir JOHN KAYE, K.C.S.I., F.R.S.
CABINET EDITION.
SECOND EDITION.
LONDON :
W. H. ALLEN k Co., Ltd., 13, WATERLOO PLACE.
1892.
[Al I Rights Reserved.']
I SHOULD HAVE DEDICATED
THESE VOLUMES
TO
LORD CANNING,
HAD HE LIVED;
I NOW INSCRIBE THEM REVERENTIALLY
TO HIS MEMORY.
411850
. . . For to think that an handful of people can, with the
greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent
of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. —
Bacon.
... AS FOR MERCENARY FORCES ( WHICH IS THE HELP IN THIS CASE),
ALL EXAMPLES SHOW THAT, WHATSOEVER ESTATE, OR PRINCE, DOTH REST
UPON THEM, HE BIAY SPREAD HIS FEATHERS FOR A TIME, BUT HE WILL MEW
THEM SOON AFTER. — BaCOU.
If there be fuel prepared, it is hard to TELL whence the spark
SHALL COME THAT SHALL SET IT ON FIRE. THE MATTER OF SEDITIONS IS OF
TWO KINDS, MUCH POVERTY AND MUCH DISCONTENTMENT. It IS CERTAIN, SO
MANY OVERTHROWN ESTATES, SO MANY VOTES FOR TROUBLES. . . . THE
CAUSES AND MOTIVES FOR SEDITION ARE, INNOVATIONS IN RELIGION, TAXES,
ALTERATION OP LAWS AND CUSTOMS, BREAKING OF PRIVILEGES, GENERAL
OPPRESSION, ADVANCEMENT OF UNWORTHY PERSONS, STRANGERS, DEATHS,
DISBANDED SOLDIERS, FACTIONS GROWN DESPERATE; AND WHATSOEVER IN
OFFENDING PEOPLE JOINETH AND KNITTETH THEM IN A COMMON CAUSE. —
Bacon.
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
The editing of the second volume of Sir John Kaye's History-
has "been regulated on the same principle as was the first. The
text has been left intact. In the few instances in which the
Editor has believed that the conclusions arrived at by the dis-
tinguished author were not warranted by facts, he has intimated
his dissent, and his reasons for that dissent, in notes bearing his
initials. The Appendix has been somewhat reduced, either by
the omission or the abbreviation of matter which seemed super-
fluous, or by the transfer as notes to the pages indicated of
corrections made by the author in editions subsequent to the first.
The spelling of proper names has, moreover, been made to con-
form to the more correct system now happily coming into
general use.
Under ordinary circumstances the Editor would have re-
frained from adding to the above short explanation. It has
been represented to him, however, that as the present Cabinet
Edition will appeal to a large class who may not have the
opportunity of referring to a Gazetteer, it would add con-
siderably to the value of the work if he were to add a short
description of the geographical position of the principal places
mentioned in each volume. To comply with this suggestion
the Editor has compiled, partly from an excellent little work —
the very best of its kind — entitled " School Geography of India
V iii EDITOR'S PEEFACE.
and British Burniah," by the late Professor Blochmann ; * and
partly from the new edition of " Thornton's Gazetteer ;" a list of
forty-six places mentioned in this volume. He has also ap-
pended, to the chapter to which it refers, an excellent sketch
of the Imperial City of Dehli, the original of which was
kindly given to him some time since by Mr. Atkinson of the
Becord Office.
G. B. M.
1 November, 1888.
* Published at Calcutta by tbe Calcutta Schoolbook Society.
PREFACE
By Sir JOHN KAYE.
When the first volume of this book was published, I had little
expectation that the second would be so long in course of com-
pletion, as the result has shown it to have been. In truth, I
had not measured aright the extent of the work before me.
But when I came to take account of the wealth of my materials,
and to reflect upon the means of converting them into history,
I saw clearly that the task I had undertaken was a more
arduous and perplexing one than I had originally supposed.
It is not difficult to make the reader understand my per-
plexities ; and I hope that, understanding, he will sympathise
with them. The events to be narrated covered a large area of
space, but were compressed within a small period of time.
Chronologically they moved along parallel lines, but locally
they were divergent and distracting. The question was how
it was best to deal historically with all these synchronous
incidents. To have written according to date, with some
approach to fidelity of detail, a number of separate narratives,
each illustrative of a particular day, or of a particular week,
would have been easy to the writer, and would in some sort
have represented the character of the crisis, one of the most
distinguishing features of which was derived from the con-
fusion and distraction engendered by the multiplicity of sim-
ultaneous outbursts in different parts of the country. This
mode of treatment, however, though it might accurately reflect
the situation, was not likely to gratify the reader. The multi-
plicity of personal and local names rapidly succeeding each
other would have bewildered him, and no distinct impression
would have been left upon his mind. But though the nature of
the subject utterly forbade all thought of unity of place and
unity of action, with reference to the scope of the entire work,
x AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
there was a certain unification of the several parts which was
practicable, and which suggested what might be called an
episodical treatment of the subject, with such connecting links,
or such a general framework or setting, as historical truth
might permit. And, in fact, different parts of the country
were so cut off from each other when mutiny and rebellion
were at their height, that each series of operations for the
suppression of local revolt had a separate and a distinct char-
acter. Certainly, in the earlier stages of the War, there was
no general design — little co-operation or cohesion. Every man
did what was best in his eyes to meet with vigour and sagacity
an unexpected crisis. The cutting of our telegraph-wires and
the interruption of our posts were among the first hostile efforts
of the insurgents in all parts of the country. Joint action
on a large scale was thus rendered impossible, and at the
commencement of the War it would scarcely have been desir-
able. For our people had to deal promptly with urgent
symptoms, and references and consultations would have been
fatal to success.
Thus circumstanced with respect to the component parts of
this History, I could not easily determine to what particular
events it would be best to give priority of narration. One
thing soon became unpleasantly apparent to me. I had made a
mistake in forecasting the plan of the entire work, in an
" Advertisment " prefixed to the First Volume. It was im-
possible to write adequately, in this instalment of my book, of
all the operations which I had originally intended to record.
With materials of such great interest before me, it would have
been unwise to starve the narrative ; so I thought it best to
make confession of error, and expunge my too-hasty promises
from subsequent editions of the work. In pursuance of this
revised scheme, I was compelled to put aside much that I had
written for this Second Volume, and though this has ne-
cessarily retarded its publication, it has placed me so much in
advance with the work to be accomplished, that I hope to be
able to produce the next volume after a much shorter interval
of time.
The selection made for this volume from the chapters which
I had written may not perhaps be the best, but it is at least
sufficiently intelligible. After describing the earlier incidents
of the mutiny, as at Mirath and Dehli, at Banaras and Allahabad,
and at different stations in the Fan jab, I have narrated, up to a
AUTHOR'S PREFACE. xi
certain point, those two great series of operations— the one
expedition starting from Bengal with troops drawn from the
Littoral, the other from the North- Western Frontier, with
forces derived from the Hill Stations and the Panjab — which
were consummated in the capture of Dehli and the first relief
of Lakhnao. In the one I have traced the movements of Neill
and Havelock, under the direction of Lord CanniDg, and in the
other of Anson, Barnard, Wilson, and Nicholson, with the aid
and inspiration of Sir John Lawrence. It is by thus following
the fortunes of individuals that we may best arrive at a just
conception of the general action of the whole. For it was by
the energies of individual men, acting mostly on their own re-
sponsibility, that little by little rebellion was trodden down,
and the supremacy of the English firmly re-established. It
will be seen that I have adhered very closely to pure narrative.
The volume, indeed, is a volume of fact, not of controversy and
speculation ; and as it relates to the earlier scenes of the great
struggle for the Empire, it is mostly an account of military
revolt and its suppression.
Dealing with the large mass of facts, which are reproduced
in the chapters now published, and in those which, though
written, I have been compelled to reserve for future publica-
tion, I have consulted and collated vast piles of contemporarv
correspondence, and entered largely into communication, by
personal intercourse or by letter, with men who have been
individually connected with the events described. For every
page published in this volume some ten pages have been
written and compiled in aid of the narrative ; and if I have
failed in the one great object of my ambition, to tell the truth,
without exaggeration on the one hand or reservation on the
other, it has not been for want of earnest and laborious inquiry
or of conscientious endeavour to turn my opportunities to the
best account, and to lay before the public an honest exposition
of the historical facts as they have been unfolded before me.
Still it is probable that the accuracy of some of the details
in this volume, especially those of personal incident, may be
questioned, perhaps contradicted, notwithstanding, I was about
to say, all the care that I have taken to investigate them, but I
believe that I should rather say " by reason of that very care."
Such questionings or contradictions should not be too readily
accepted ; for, although the authority of the questioner may be
good, there may be still better authority on the other side. I
ril AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
have often had to choose between very conflicting statements ;
and I have sometimes found my informants to be wrong, though
apparently with the best opportunities of being right, and
have been compelled to reject, as convincing proof, even the
overwhelming assertion, "But, I was there." Men who are
personally engaged in stirring events are often too much oc-
cupied to know what is going on beyond the little spot of
ground which holds them at the time, and often from this
restricted stand-point they see through a glass darkly. It is
hard to disbelieve a man of honour when he tells you what he
himself did; but every writer, long engaged in historical
inquiry, has had before him instances in which men, after even
a brief lapse of time, have confounded in their minds the
thought of doing, or the intent to do, a certain thing, with the
fact of having actually done it. Indeed, in the commonest
affairs of daily life, we often find the intent mistaken for the
act, in the retrospect.
The case of Captain Kosser's alleged offer to take a Squadron
of Dragoons and a troop of Horse Artillery to Dehli on the
night of the 10th of May (illustrated in the Appendix) * may
be regarded as an instance of this confusion. I could cite other
instances. One will suffice :— A military officer of high rank, of
stainless honour, with a great historical reputation, invited me
some years ago to meet him, for the express purpose of making
to me a most important statement, with reference to one of the
most interesting episodes of the Sipahi War. The statement
was a very striking one; and I was referred, in confirmation of
it, to another officer, who has since become illustrious in our
national history. Immediately on leaving my informant, I
wrote down as nearly as possible his very words. It was not
until after his death that I was able orally to consult the friend
to whom he had referred me, as being personally cognisant of
the alleged fact — the only witness, indeed, of the scene de-
scribed. The answer was that he had heard the story before,
but that nothing of the kind had ever happened. The asserted
incident was one, as I ventured to tell the man who had
described it to me at the time, that did not cast additional
lustre on his reputation ; and it would have been obvious,
even if he had rejoiced in a less unblemished reputation, that
* [Transferred ia sufficient detail as a footnote to the page in which the
transaction is recorded.— G. 15. M.]
AUTHOR'S PREFACE. xiii
it was not for self-glorification, but in obedience to an irre-
pressible desire to declare the truth, that he told me what
afterwards appeared to be not an accomplished fact, but an
intention unfulfilled. Experiences of this kind render the his-
torical inquirer very sceptical even of information supposed
to be on " the best possible authority." Truly, it is very
disheartening to find that the nearer one approaches the
fountain-head of truth, the further off we may find ourselves
from it.*
But, notwithstanding such discouraging instances of the
difficulty of extracting the truth, even from the testimony of
truthful men, who have been actors in the scenes to be de-
scribed, I cannot but admit the general value of such testimony
to the writer of contemporary history. And, indeed, there
need be some advantages in writing of events still fresh in the
memory of men to compensate for its manifest disadvantages.
These disadvantages, however, ought always to be felt by the
writer rather than by the reader. It has been often said to
me, in reply to my inquiries, " Yes, it is perfectly true. But
these men are still living, and the truth cannot be told." To
this my answer has been : " To the historian all men are dead."
If a writer of contemporary history is not prepared to treat
the living and the dead alike — to speak as freely and as truth-
fully of the former as of the latter, with no more reservation
in the one case than in the other — he has altogether mistaken
his vocation, and should look for a subject in prehistoric times.
There are some actors in the scenes here described of whom I do
not know whether they be living or whether they be dead. Some
have passed away from the sphere of worldly exploits whilst
this volume has been slowly taking shape beneath my pen.
But if this has in any way influenced the character of my
writing, it has only been by imparting increased tenderness to
my judgment of men who can no longer defend themselves or
explain their conduct to the world. Even this offence, if it be
one against historical truth, I am not conscious of having
actually committed.
* It may be mentioned here (though not directly in confirmation of the
above) as a curious illustration of the difficulty of discerning between truth
and error, that the only statement seriously impugned in a former work of
history by the author of this book, was the only one which he had made as
the result of his own personal knowledge — the only fact which he had
witnessed with his own eyes.
xiv AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
I have but a few more words to say, but because I say them
last it must not be thought that I feel them least. I am pain-
fully sensible that in this narrative I have failed to do justice
to the courage and constancy of many brave men, whose good
deeds deserved special illustration in this narrative, and would
have received it, but for the exigencies of time and space,
which have forbidden an ampler record. This, perhaps, may
be more apparent in other volumes than in this. But, what-
ever may be the omissions in this respect, I do not think that
they will be attributed to any want of appreciation of the
gallantry and fortitude of my countrymen in doing and in
suffering. No one could rejoice more in the privilege of il-
lustrating their heroic deeds than the author of these volumes.
It is one of the best compensations of historical labour to be
suffered to write of exploits reflecting so much honour upon tho
character of the nation.
J. W. K.
Pexge— Midsummer, 1870.
LIST AND SHOET DESCRIPTION OF PLACES
MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.
Agra or Agrah, on the river Jamnah, formerly a village, made by Sikandar
Lodi the Capital of India. It continued as such till the reign of Shah
Jahan. The fort, built during the reign of Akbar, contains a palace and
several beautiful buildings. It is now the head-quarters of the civil
division of the same name. In 1857 the population of the city was
about 140,000.
Allahabad, formerly called Prayaga, situated at the confluence of the Jamnah
and the Ganges. The fort, resting on the Jamnah, was built by Akbar.
Allahabad is now the seat of the Government of the North- West Pro-
vinces, and is the centre of the railway system of Northern India.
Ambalah, capital of Sirhind, situated on an open plain, three miles east of
the river Chaghar, fifty-five miles north of Karnal, sixty-nine miles south-
east of Lodiana.
Amritsar, chief town of the division of the same name, is the sacred capital
of the Sikhs. The district is bounded on the north-west by the river
Kavi, on the north-east by the district of Gurdaspur, and on the south-
west by the district of Lahor.
Xzamgarh, chief town of the district of the same name, in the Banaras
division. It was founded by Azam Khan, an officer of Shah Jahan.
Balandshahr (from the Persian baland, high, and shahr, town), chief town
of the district of the same name in the Mfrath division.
Banaras, also called Kashi, on the Ganges, a holy city of the Hindus,
famous for its ghauts, its temples, its minarets, and the observatory of
Kajah Jai Singh of Jaipur. It is the head-quarters of the division of
the same name.
Barrackpur, or the city of barracks, fifteen miles from Ca-jutta, on the left
bank of the Hugli : selected more than a hundred years ago as the site
for the troops to protect the capital.
Barhampur, a station in the Murshidabad district, south of the city of
that name, formerly the capital of Bengal. Barh&mpur is a civil
station.
Ghanar, an ancient fortress in the Mirzapur district of the Banaras division ;
twenty-six miles from Banaras, and twenty from Mirzapur.
Damdamah, incorrectly written Dumdum, formerly the head-quarters of
Artillery, now a suburb of Calcutta, from which it is distant four and
a-half miles.
xvi SHOET DESCRIPTION OF PLACES.
Dehli, written also Dihli" and Dilli, a city on a branch of the Jamnah. The
present city was built by Shah Jahan, and was called by the Mughul
Court, in consequence, Shahjahanabad. The neighbourhood abounds
in historical recollections. In 1857, it had a population of about 150,000.
Dehra Dux, a district in the Mirath division, at the foot of the Himalayas,
of which Dehra, the head-quarters of the 2nd Gurkha Regiment, is the
capital.
Derajat, a division in the Panjab, comprising the Trans-Indus territory,
and the Sindh Sagar Duab, north of MuzarTargarh district.
Faizabad, in Oudb, chief town of the district and division of the same name,
on the Ghaghra : famous as the birthplace of Ram.
Farrukhabad, on the Ganges, chief town of a district in the Agra division.
The English civil station is called Fathgarh.
Fathgarh, incorrectly spelt Futtehgurh, three miles from Farrukhabad
(q. v.).
Fathpur, sometimes but incorrectly spelt Futtehpore, chief town of the
district of the same name in the Allahabad division: seventeen miles
north-west of Allahabad, and fifty south-east of Kanhpiir.
Firuzpur, south of the river Satlaj, a military and civil station in the Lahor
division of the Panjab.
Govindgarh, a fort built at Amritsar (q. v.) by Ranjit Singh to overawe the
Sikh pilgrims.
Gurdaspur, the capital of a district in the Amritsar division of the Panjab,
bounded on the north by Kashmir, on the east by Kangrah, on the south
by the Amritsar, and on the west by the Sialkot, district.
Hazarah, on the left side of the Indus, north of Rawalpindi. This district
forms the northernmost part of British India, running between the Indus
and the Jhelam, and then passing in long but narrow strips, called
Kaghan, along the north-western frontier of Kashmir. It is watered by
the Nainsukh river, a tributary of the Jhelam.
HlSAR, a division, now forming part of the Panjab, west of Dehli. In this
division is the town of Hansi, famous in the history of the decline of the
Mughuls.
Hoti Mardax, a cantonment in the Peshawar division, the head-quarters of
the famous Corps of Guides. It lies on the right bank of the Chalpani
river, and is thirty-three miles north-east of Peshawar.
Hugli (name derived from liogla, marsh reeds), is a town in the district of
the same name, in the division B.irdwan, in Western Bengal. It was
one of the earliest English settlements. Hugli is also the name of the
branch of the Ganges on which Calcutta is built.
Jalandhar, a division of the Panjab comprising the districts of Jalandhar,
Hoshiarpiir, and Kangrah.
JaunpuR, a town on the Gumti, formerly capital of the ancient kingdom of
Jaunpur, and now chief town of the district of the same name in the
Banaras division. It is famous for a bridge over the Gumti, built by
a general of the famous Akbar, in 1573.
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PLACES. xvii
Jhelam, a district of the Rawalpindi division. Its chief town, a military
station in 1857, bears the same name. Jhelam is also the name of one
of the five great rivers of the Panjab. It has a length of about 450
miles.
Kanhptjr (sometimes illogically written Cawnpore), is derived from two words :
" Kanh," a name of Krishna, and lt Pur," a city. It lies on the right
bank of the Ganges, 628 miles from Calcutta, and 130 from Allahabad.
Karnal, the chief town of a district in the Dehli division, formerly a
military station. It is on the high road between Dehli and Ambalah.
Kashmir, as now constituted, is bounded on the north-west by the district of
Hazarah; on the west by the districts of Hazarah, Rawalpindi, and
Jhelam, the river Jhelam forming the boundary ; to the south by the
districts of Gujrat, Sialkot, Gurdaspur, and Kangrah ; by the States of
Chamba, Lahui, and Spiti ; to the east by the Chinese empire ; and to
the north by the Karakoram range.
Kohat, capital of district of same name, lies on the road from Peshawar to
Kalabagh. It is thirty-seven miles south of Peshawar.
Lahor, on the Ravi, is chief town of the division of the same name, and
capital of the Panjab.
Lakhnao : vide Oudh.
Lodiana, chief town of the district of the same name in the Ambalah
division. Lodiana was built by some generals of Sikandar Lodi, and
was named after that prince. The town is eight miles south of the
Satlaj.
Mian-Mir, the cantonment of Lahor, three miles distant from the civil
station. It derives its name from a famous saint.
MiRATii, the chief town of a district and division of the same name, some-
times incorrectly spelt Meerut, is on the river Kalinadi ; it is twenty-
live miles from the Jamnah, and twenty-nine from the Ganges.
Naoshahra, a village and cantonment in the Peshawar district, twenty-six
miles east of Peshawar, on the Kabul river.
Oudh, a province bounded on the north by Nipal, and on the three other
sides by the north-western provinces of India. The principal stations
in Oudh are Lakhnao, the capital ; Barahbanki, Unao. Rai-Bareli, Sul-
tanpiir, Partabgarh, Faizabad, Gondah, Bahraich, Sitapur, Hardui, and
Kheri. The total area is 23,992 square miles, and the population, in
1857, amounted to nearly eleven millions.
PANfpAT, a town in the Karnal district of the Dehli division, famous for the
decisive battles fought there, and for the turbulent character of its
people.
Panjab, the — the land, as its name signifies, of five rivers — is bounded in
the north by Kabul and Sawad (commonly Swat), Kashmir, Thibet; to
the east by Thibet, the Jamnah, and the North-West Provinces; to the
south by the same Provinces, by Bikanir and Jaisalmir in Eajputana,
and by Sindh ; to the west, by the Sulaimani range and Afghanistan.
In 1S57, the Dehli division was not included in the Panjab territory.
VOL. II. b
xviii SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PLACES.
PE3HAWAB, more correctly Pasha war, (it was formerly spelt Parshawar),is the
chief town of the division of the .same name. It lies near the left bank
of the Btira stream, thirteen and a half miles south-east of the junction
of the Sawad and Kabul rivers, and ten and a half from the fort of
Jamru 1 at the entrance of the Khaibar Pass. It is 276 miles from Lahor
and 100 from Kabul.
THiLrn, a town in the Jalandhar division, on the right bank of the Satlaj,
eight miles north-north-west of Lodiana.
Rawalpindi, the chief station of the division of the same name in the
Panjab. The division comprises the district also called Rawalpindi,
tlie fort of Atalc, on the Indus, built by Akbar in 1583, and the districts
Jhelam, Gujrat, and Shahpur.
RThki, a cantonment for sappers and British troops in the Mirath division.
The Thomason Engineering College is here. Riirki is twenty-two miles
east of Suharanpur.
S'.alkot, chief town of a district in the Amritsar division of the Panjab. It
is seventy-two miles north-east of Lahor.
SBIRAMFtJB, on the Hiigli, opposite Barrackpiir. Noted for the labours of
Carey, Marsbman, and Ward, in missionary enterprise. Was former' y
incorrectly called Serampore.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
Editor's Preface , ■■ m
Author's Preface
List aiid Short Description of Places mentioned in this Volume .
PAGE
vii
IX
XV
BOOK IV.— THE RISING IN THE NORTH-WEST
CHAPTER I.
The Dehli History.
Importance of the Seizure of Dehli
Moral Influences .
Position of the Dehli Family-
Early History
Successive Degradations
Intrigues of Ziuat-Mahal
Death of Prince Fakiruddin
l.'ene wed Intrigues
Views of Lord Canning .
Stale of Muhammadan Feeling at Dehli
The Native Press .
Intrigues with Persia
The Proclamation .
Temper of the Soldiery .
1
1
1
2
4
10
20
21
22
26
27
29
SO
31
CHAPTER II.
The Outbreak at Mirath
State of the 3rd Cavalry
The Court of Inquiry
The Court Martial
Imprisonment of the Eighty-five
The 10th May at Mirath
Release of the Prisoners
General Revolt of the Sipahis
Inactivity of the European Troops .
Question of Responsibility considered
Horrors of the Night
Escape of the Mutineers
32
33
35
38
40
43
44
46
49
51
54
CONTENTS OF VOL. IL
CHAPTER III.
THE SEIZURE OF DEIILI.
PARE
The Mirath Mutineers at Dehli 57
Progress of Insurrection 58
Events at the Dehli Palace 59
State of the British Cantonment 63
Mutiny of the Native Regiments at Dehli 64
The Explosion of the Magazine ....... 66
Escape of the British Officers ........ 69
Massacre of the Prisoners ........ 74
CHAPTER IV.
CALCUTTA IX MAY.
Efforts of Lord Canning 83
State of Public Feeling in Calcutta 84
Apprehensions and Alarms ........ 85
Bearing of the Governor-General ....... 86
The Queen's Birthday ......... 87
The First Movement towards Dehli 89
The Volunteer Question ........ 92
First Arrival of Succours .95
Appearance of Colonel Neill . 96
CHAPTER V.
LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON".
General Anson at Ambalah .103
First Movement of Troops 105
The Panic on the Hills 108
The Siege Train 109
The Military Departments 110
Difficulty of Movement 112
Remonstrances against Delay ....... 113
Views of Lord Canning and Sir John Lawrence . . . .113
Good Work of the Civilians 121
Conduct of the Sikh Chiefs 121
The March to Karnal 122
Death of General Anson . . . . . . . .123
Succession of Sir Henry Barnard 126
CHAPTER VI.
THE MARCH UPON DEHLT.
State of Mirath 129
The Sappers and Miners 130
Defence of Riirki 131
CONTENTS OF VOL. II. xxi
PAGE
Colonel Baird Smith 132
Mutiny of the Sappers 133
Inactivity at Mirath ......... 134
March of Wilson's Brigade 137
Battle of the Hindan 137
Junction with Barnard 142
Battle of Badli-ki-Sarai 143
Position hefore Dehli ......... 145
BOOK V.— PROGRESS OF REBELLION IN UPPER INDIA.
CHAPTER I.
BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD.
The North-West Provinces
State of Affairs at Banaras
State of the City .
The Outbreak at Azamgarh
Arrival of General Neill
Disarming of the 37th N. I.
The Mutiny at Jaunpiir
Affairs at Allahabad
Mutiny of the 6th N. I. .
Appearance of General Neill
The Fort Secured .
Retributory Measures .
148
149
150
160
162
165
178
180
187
197
199
201
CHAPTER H.
KANHPUK.
Arrival of Havelock at Allahabad ....... 209
Meeting with Neill 214
Advance of Renaud 214
Havelock's Brigade 215
Kanhpur 216
The City 217
The Cantonment 217
Sir Hugh Wheeler 219
Dangers of his Position 221
The Intrenchments ......... 221
Dundu Pant, Nana Sahib 225
Revolt of the Native Regiments 232
The Siege 236
Gallantry of Individual Officers 240
Womanly Endurance 243
The Capitulation 251
Massacre at the Ghaut ......... 253
Escape of a Solitary Boat 259
Its Adventures on the River 260
Mowbray Thomson and Delafosse 261
CONTENTS OF VOL. IL
CHAPTEK III.
THE MARCH TO EANHPUB.
PAGE
Havelock at Allahabad 269
Equipment of the Brigade 269
Advance towards Kanhpur ........ 270
Junction with Renard ......... 271
The Battles of Fathpur and Aong 271-278
The Massacre of the Women and Children 279
Battle of Kanhpur 2S2
CHAPTER IV.
EE-OCCTPATION OF EANHPU]
Havelock at Kanhpur .
State of the Soldiery
Discouraging Circumstances .
Flight of the Nana
Destruction of the Bithur Palace
Arrival of Neill
His Punishment of Criminals .
General Aspects of the Rebellion
First Movement towards Lakhnao
290
290
291
292
291
298
300
309
311
BOOK VI.— THE PANJAB AND DEHLI.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB.
General Condition of the Panjab
Honrces of Danger
British Relations with Afghanistan
Causes of Confidence . . ;
Lawrence at Rawalpindi
Montgomery at Lahor .
Events at Mian-Mir
Services of Brigadier Corbett .
Disarming of the Native Regiments
Seizure of the Fort of Lahor .
Events at Amritsnr and Guvindgarh
The Mutinies at Firuzpur and Philur
311
315
315
316
318
319
320
322
321
32G
326
328
CHAPTER II.
PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI.
Peshawar
Internal and External Dangers
The Civil and Military Authorities
336
337
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
Herbert E<lwaides
John Nicholson ....
Sydney Cotton and Neville Chamberlain
Council at Peshawar
Arrangements for a Movable Column
John Lawrence at Rawalpindi
Despatch of Troops to Dehli .
The March of the Guide Corps .
Quintin Battye ....
CHAPTER III.
PROGRESS OP EVENTS IN THE PAN JAB.
General Policy of Sir John Lawrence
The Raising of Local Levies .
Events at Peshawar
Disarming of Native Regiments
Punishment of Deserters
Punishment of the 55th.
Expedition to Hoti-Mardiin .
Alarms on the Frontier
The Outbreak at Ja'.andhar .
Rising at Lodiana.
The Importance of the Panjab
CHAPTER IV.
DEHLI — FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE.
General Barnard's Position .
Dehli and its Environs .
Question of an Immediate Assault
Councils of War .
Abandonment of the Night Attack
Waiting for Reinforcements .
Engagements with the Enemy
Battle of the 18th June .
The Centenary of Plasst y
Arrival of Reinforcements
Arrival of Chamberlain and Band Smith
Death of General Barnard
CHAPTER V.
PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE.
General Reed in Command
Exeitions of Baird Smith
Inadequacy of Resources
Action of July 9 .
Action of July 14 .
xxiv CONTENTS OF VOL. H.
PAGE
Departure of General Reed 441
Brigadier-General Wilson in Command 442
Question of Raising the Siege 443
Protests of Baird Smith 444
Social Aspects of the Camp 449
State of the Dehli Garrison 456
CHAPTER VI.
THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB.
Question of the Abandonment of Peshawar ..... 457
Views of Sir John Lawrence, of Edwardes, and of Nicholson . . 458
Decision of Lord Canning ........ 465
Mutiny at Jhelam 469
Mutiny at Sialkot. ......... 471
The Movable Column 475
Affairs of Trimu Ghat ......... 481
Nicholson ordered to Dehli ........ 485
The Battle of Najafgarh . 491
Appendix . 496
LIST OF MAPS.
The Punjab, North -West Provinces, &c. . . . To face page 1
City of Kanhpur 217
City of Dehli 384
' "W..M-1..M ri ,..
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.
BOOK IV.— THE EISING IN THE NORTH-WEST.
[May, 1857.]
CHAPTER L
THE DEHLI HISTORY.
It was a work of time at Calcutta to elicit all the details of
the sad story briefly outlined in the preceding
chapter. But the great fact was patent to Lord Lord Canning
Canning that the English had been driven out of quesaon? ehh
Dehli, and that, for a time, in that great centre of
Muhammadanism, the dynasty of the Mughul Family was
restored. The tremendous political significance of this revolu-
tion could not be misunderstood by the most obtuse, or glossed
over by the most sanguine. The Emperors of Dehli had long
ceased to exercise any substantial authority over the people
whom they had once governed. For fifty years the Master
of the Dehli Palace had been, in the estimation of the English,
merely a pageant and a show. But the pageantry, the show,
the name, had never ceased to be living influences in the minds
of the princes and people of India. Up to a comparatively
recent period all the coin of India had borne the superscription
of the Mughul ; and the chiefs of India, whether Muhammadan
or Hindu had still continued to regard the sanction given
to their successions by that shadow of royalty, as something
more assuring than any recognition which could come from the
substance of the British Government. If the Empire of Dehli
had passed into a tradition, the tradition was still an honoured
one. It had sunk deeply into the memories of the people.
VOL. II. B
2 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1804-57.
Doubtful, before, of the strength of these influences, Lord
Canning now began to suspect that he had been misinformed.
In the preceding year, he had mastered the whole Dehli
history, and he knew full well the peculiar circumstances which
at that period made it so perilous that the Imperial Family
should be appealed to in aid of the national cause. He saw
before hiin, in all their length and breadth, the incidents of
family intrigue, which imparted a vigorous individuality to the
hostility of the Mughul. He knew that the chief inmates of
the palace had never been in a mood of mind so little likely to
resist the temptations now offered to them. He knew that the
old King himself, and his favourite wife who ruled him, had
been for some time cherishing animosities and resentments
which rendered it but too likely that on the first encouraging
occasion they would break into open hostility against the
usurping Englishman, who had vaulted into the seat of the
Mughul, reduced him to a suppliant, and thwarted him in all
the most cherished wishes of his heart.
With as much brevity as may suffice to make the position
The Dehii c ^ ear » t ne Dehli story must be told. The old
Ftory-sbah King, Bahadur Shah, whose sovereignty had been
Aiam. proclaimed, was the second in descent from the
Emperor Shcih Alam, whom, blind, helpless, and miserable, the
English had rescued from the gripe of the Marathas,* when at
the dawn of the nineteenth century the armies of Lake
and "Wellesley broke up their powerful confederacy, and
scattered the last hopes of the French. Shah Alam was the
great-grandson of Aurungzib, the tenth successor in a direct line
from Taimur, the great founder of the dynasty of the Mughuls.
Even in the depths of his misery and humiliation, he was
regarded by the most magnificent of English viceroys as a
mighty potentate, whom it was a privilege to protect, and
sacrilege to think of supplanting. The " great game " of Lord
Wellesley embraced nothing so stupendous as the usurpation of
the Imperial throne. Perhaps it was, as his brother Arthur
* Lord Lake's first interview with him is thus officially described in the
records of the day: "In the magnificent palace built by Shah Jahan the
Commander-in-Chief was ushered into the royal presence and found the
unfortunate and venerable Emperor, oppressed by the accumulated calamities
of old age and degraded authority, extreme poverty and loss of sight, seated
under a small tattered canopy, the remnant of his royal state, with every
external appearance of the misery of his condition."
1804-5'.] LORD WELLESLEY AND SHAH ALAM. 3
and John Malcolm declared, and as younger men suspected and
hinted, that the Governor-General, worn out by the oppositions
and restrictions of the Leadenhall-street Government, and
broken in health by the climate of Calcutta, had lost his old
daring and cast aside his pristine ambition. Perhaps it was
believed by him and by his associates in the Council Chamber that
it would be sounder policy, tending more to our own grandeur
in the end, to gather gradual strength from this protective con-
nexion with the Emperor, before endeavouring to walk in the
pleasant paths of imperialism. But, in either case, he recoiled
from the thought of its being suspected in England, that
he wished to place the East India Company, substantively or
vicariously, on the throne of the Mughuls. " It has never," he
wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
June 2, 1805, "been in the contemplation of this Government
to derive from the charge of protecting and supporting his
Majesty the privilege of employing the Eoyal Prerogative as an
instrument of establishing any control or ascendancy over the
States and Chieftains of India, or of asserting on the part of his
Majesty any of the claims which, in his capacity of Emperor of
Hindustan, his Majesty may be considered to possess upon the
provinces originally composing the Mughul Empire. The
benefits which the Governor-General in Council expected to
derive from placing the King of Dehli and the Royal Family
under the protection of the British Government, are to be
traced in the statement contained in our despatch to your
Honourable Committee of the 13th of July, 1804,* relative
to the evils and embarrassments to which the British power
might have been exposed by the prosecution of claims and pre-
tensions on the part of the Marathas, or of the French, in the
name and under the authority of his Majesty, Shah Alam, if the
person and family of that unhappy monarch had continued
* The objeeta are thus enumerated in the despatch to which reference
is made : " The deliverance of the Emperor Shah Alam from the control of
the French power estahlished in the North-West quarter of Hindustan, hy
which the Government of France has been deprived of a powerful instru-
ment in the eventual prosecution of its hostile designs against the British
Government in India, and the British Government has obtained a favourable
opportunity of conciliating the confidence and securing the applause of sur-
rounding states by providing a safe.and tranquil asylum for the declining age
of that venerable and unfortunate monarch, and a suitable maintenance
for his numerous and distressed family." — July ]3, 1804.
4 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1804-5.
under the custody and control of those powers, and especially of
the French.
It must have taxed the ingenuity of Lord AVellesley, even
with the experienced guidance and assistance of Sir George
Barlow and Mr. Edmonstone, to design a scheme for the con-
tinuance or restoration of the Empire on a small scale — a
scheme whereby Shah Alani might become more than a
pensioner, a pageant, and a puppet, and yet less than the
substance of a sovereign. He was to be a King and yet no
King — a something and yet nothing — a reality and a sham at
the same time. It was a solace to us, in the " great game," to
know that we " held the King ; " but it was a puzzle to us how
to play the card. It was, indeed, a great political paradox,
which Lord "Wellesley's Government was called upon to
institute ; and he did the best that could be done, in the
circumstances in which he was placed, to reconcile not only the
House of Taimur, but the people who still clung reverentially
to the great Muhammadan dynasty, to the state of things which
had arisen out of those circumstances. It was determined that
a certain amount of that dignity, which is derived from
territorial dominion, should still be attached to the person of the
Emperor; that within certain limits he should still be the
fountain of justice ; and that (negatively) within those limits
the power of life or death should be in his hands. And, in
addition to the revenues of the districts thus reserved as an
appanage of the Throne, he and his family were to receive
stipendiary allowances amounting to more than a hundred
thousand pounds a year.
Thus the Emperor of all the Indies — the Great Mughul,
traditionally the grandest sovereign in the Universe — became,
whilst still indued with the purple and the gold of imperial state,
and rejoicing in the appearance of territorial dominion, virtually
a pensioner of a Company of Merchants. The situation was one
which conferred many advantages on the British Government
in India, but it was not without its dangers. Even in the
depths of his misery and degradation, the King's name was a
pillar of strength ; the rags of royalty were reverenced by the
people. And Lord Wellesley saw clearly that if the ancestral
State of the Mughul were perpetuated — if he were left to reside
in the Palace of Shah Jahan, with all the accompaniments of his
former grandeur around him, in the midst of a Muhammadan
population still loyal to the House of Taimur — there might
1806.] AKBAK SHAH AND ME. SETON. 5
some day be an attempt to^ reconstruct the ruined monarchy in
the person of one of Shah Alani's successors, which might cause
us grievous annoyance. So it was proposed that Hunger
should become the residence of the Imperial Family. But the
old King shuddered at the thought of removal, and the shudder
ran through his family, from the oldest to the youngest, male
and female, relatives and dependants. Not, therefore, to inflict
any further pain or humiliation upon them, Lord Wellesley
consented that they should abide in the Dehli Palace. At some
future time their removal might be effected without any cruel
divulsions, any of those strainings and crackings of the heart-
strings, which must attend the exodus of Princes born in the
purple, with the memory of actual sovereignty still fresh
within them.
In December, 1806, Shah Alam died, and was succeeded by his
son, Akbar Shah. It happened that the English
officer, who at that time represented the British Akbars'hfih
Government at Dehli, was a courtier of the old
school, whose inveterate politeness of speech and manner had
ample scope for exercise at the ex-imperial Court. Mr. Seton
would have died rather than hurt the feelings of the humblest
denizen of the Palace. In the caricatures of the period he was
represented saluting Satan with a low bow, and hoping that his
Majesty was well and prosperous. Associated at this time, in a
subordinate capacity with Mr. Seton, but much trusted, and
consulted by him with the deference shown to an equal in age
and position, was young Charles Metcalfe, who, although little
more than a boy, saw clearly the store of future trouble which
the British Government was laying up for itself by not curbing
the pretensions of the now effete Mughul. " I do not conform,"
he wrote, " to the policy of Seton's mode of managing the Royal
Family. It is by a submission of manner and conduct, carried
on, in my opinion, far beyond the respect and attention which
can be either prescribed by forms or dictated by a humane con-
sideration for the fallen fortunes of a once illustrious family.
It destroys entirely the dignity which ought to be attached to
him who represents the British Government, and who in reality
is to govern at Dehli ; and it raises (I have perceived the effect
disclosing itself with rapidity) ideas of imperial power and sway
which ought to be put to sleep for ever. As it is evident that
we do not mean to restore imperial power to the King, we ought
not to pursue a conduct calculated to make him aspire to it.
6 THE DEIILI HISTORY. [180G-37.
Let us treat him with the respect due to his situation ; let
us make him comfortable in respect to circumstances, and give
him all the means, as far as possible, of being happy : but,
unless we mean to re-establish his power, let us not encourage
him to dream of it." No grey-haired politician could have
written anything wiser than this ; and when, after the lapse of
a few years, the writer himself became " Eesident " at l)ehli,
and had the supreme direction of affairs, all his boyish impres-
sions were confirmed. He was brought face to face with a state
of things offensive alike to reason and to humanity; but neither
he nor his successors in the Eesidency could do more than
recommend one measure after another which might gradually
mitigate the evils which stood out so obtrusively before
them.
Time passed ; and the English in India, secure in their great
possessions, dreading no external enemy, and feeling strong
within them the power to tread down any danger which might
arise on Indian soil, advanced with a firmer step and a bolder
presence. They no longer recoiled from the thought of Empire.
What had appeared at the commencement of the century to be
perilous presumption, now seemed to be merely the inevitable
accident of our position. The " great game " had been imper-
fectly played out in Lord Wellesley's time ; and ten years
afterwards Lord Hastings saw before him the results of that
settlement where nothing was settled, and resolved to assert
the supremacy of the British Government over all the potentates
of India. Times were changed both at home and abroad, and
our feelings had changed with them. The Company had not
quite forgotten that it had been established on a " pure mercantile
bottom." But the successes of our arms in Europe had given
us confidence in ourselves as a great military nation ; and,
though the Directors in Leadenhall-street, true to their old
traditions, might still array themselves against all projects for
the extension of our military and political power in the East,
it was felt that the people of England would applaud the bolder
policy, if it were only successful. From that time England
became arbiter of the fate of all the Princes of India. There
was no longer any reluctance to assert our position as the para-
mount power. It was a necessary part of the scheme then to
put down the fiction of the Dehli Empire. The word Empire
was, thenceforth, to be associated only with the British power
in the east ; and tie mock-majesty, which we had once thought
1800-37.] DIMINUTION OF IMPERIAL PRIVILEGES. 7
it serviceable to us to maintain, was now, as soon as possible, to
be dismissed as inconvenient lumber.
It might be narrated how, during a period of thirty years,
the sun of royalty, little by little, was shorn of its beams —
how first one Governor-General and then another resisted the
proud pretensions of the Mughul, and lopped off some of the
ceremonial obeisances which, had so long maintained the inflated
dignity of the House of Taimur.* All these humiliations
rankled in the minds of the inmates of the Palace ; but they
were among the necessities of the continually advancing supre-
macy of the English. It may be questioned whether a single
man, to whose opinion any weight of authority can fairly be
attached, has ever doubted the wisdom of these excisions. And
humanity might well pause to consider whether more might not
yet be done to mitigate that great evil of rotting royalty which
had so long polluted the atmosphere of Dehli. That gigantic
Palace, almost a city in itself, had long been the home of mani-
fold abominations; and a Christian Government had suffered,
and was still suffering, generation after generation of abandoned
men and degraded women, born in that vast sty of refuge, to
be a curse to others and to themselves. In subdued official
language, it was said of these wretched members of a Royal
House, that they were " independent of all law, immersed in
idleness and profligacy, and indifferent to public opinion."! It
might have been said, without a transgression of the truth, that
the recesses of the Palace were familiar with the commission of
every crime known in the East, and that Heaven alone could
take account of that tremendous catalogue of iniquities.
On the evening of the 28th of September, 1837, Akbar Shah
died, at the age of eighty-two. He had intrigued
some years before to set aside the succession of ^i^ 837 '^ ^ b
the Heir-Apparent in behalf of a favourite son ;
but he had failed. :J And now Prince Abu Zaffar, in the official
language of the day, " ascended the throne, assuming the title
* It was not until 1835 that the current coin of India ceased to bear the
superscription of the Mughul emperors, and the " Company's rupee " was
substituted for it.
f Sometimes, however, great crimes were punished. Prince Haidar Sheko,
for example, was executed for the murder of his wife.
% Indeed, he had made two separate efforts, in favour first of one son, then
of another. The first endeavour was attended with some eventful circum-
stances which might have led to violence and bloodshed.
8 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1837.
of Abul Muzaffar Siraju' din Muhammad Bahadur Shah Padshah-
i-Ghazi." It is sufficient that he should be known here by the
name of Bahadur Shah. He was then far advanced in age ; but
he was of a long-lived family, and his three-score years had not
pressed heavily upon him. He was supposed to be a quiet, inert
man, fond of poetry, a poetaster himself; and not at all addicted,
by nature, to political intrigue. If he had any prominent
characteristic it was avarice. He had not long succeeded to the
title before he began to press for an addition to the royal
stipend, which had in some sort been promised to Akbar Shah.
The Lieutenant-Governor was unwilling to recom-
jietSffe. 68 mend such a waste of the public money ; but the
Governor-General, equally believing it to be
hmd Auck " wasteful, said that, although as a new question he
would have negatived it, the promise having
been given, it ought to be fulfilled — but upon the original con-
ditions. These conditions were, that the King should execute
a formal renunciation of all further claims upon the British
Government ; but Bahadur Shah did as his father had done
before him. He refused to subscribe to the proposed conditions,
and continued to cherish a belief that, by sending an agent to
England, he might obtain what he sought without any embar-
rassing restrictions.
Akbar Shah had employed as his representative the celebrated
_ # Brahman, Eammohan Eai, and ever still regard-
Kammohan Eai. . n . lc . , , P .. ~ ^ ,,°
ing liimselt as the fountain of honour, had con-
ferred on his envoy the title of Eajah. English society recog-
nised it, as it would have recognised a still higher title,
assumed by a Khidmatgar ;* but the authorities refused their
official recognition to the Eajahship, though they paid becoming
respect to the character of the man, who was striving to en-
lighten the Gentiles, as a social and religious reformer. As the
envoy of the Mughul he accomplished nothing ; and Bahadur
Shah found that the " case " was much in the same state as it
had been when Eammohan Eai left India on the business of
the late King. But he had still faith in the efficacy of a mission
to England, especially if conducted by an English-
ompson. man> g Q w j ien kg heard that an eloquent lecturer,
who had gained a great reputation in the Western world by his
earnest advocacy of the rights of the coloured races, had come
* A table-attendant ; a waiter. — G. B. M.
1843-9.] ZENANA INTRIGUES. 9
to India, Bahadur Shah invited him to Dehli, and was eager
to enlist his services. He had many supposed wrongs to be
redressed. Lord Ellenborough had given the finishing stroke
to the system of nazar-giving, or tributary present-making, to
the King, by prohibiting even such offerings by the Resident.*
Thus had passed away almost the last vestige of that recog-
nition, by the British Government, of the imperial dignity of
the House of Taimur ; and although money-compensation had
been freely given for the loss, the change rankled in the mind
of the King. But the Company had already refused to grant
any increase of stipend to the Royal Family until the prescribed
conditions had been accepted;! and Mr. George Thompson had
no more power than Rammohan Rai to cause a relaxation of the
decision. And in truth, there was no sufficient reason why the
stipend should be increased. A lakh of rupees a month was
sufficient, on a broad basis of generosity, even for that multi-
tudinous family ; and it would have been profligate to throw
away more money on the mock-royalty of Dehli, when it might
be so much better bestowed. J
There was, indeed, no ground of complaint against the British
Government ; and, perhaps, the King would have
subsided into a state, if not of absolute content, enana intngue -
of submissive quietude, if it had not been for that activity
of Zenana intrigue, which no Oriental sovereign, with nothing
to do but to live, can ever hope to resist. He had married
a young wife, who had borne him a son, and who had become a
favourite, potential for good or evil. As often it has happened,
* Nazars had formerly been presented by the Governor-General and the
Commander-in-Chief— by the latter, it would seem, as recently as 1837, on
the accession of Shah Bahadur. — See Edwards's " Keminiscences of a Bengal
Civilian."
f Letter of the Court of Directors, Feb. 11, 1846 : " It being impossible
for us to waive this condition (of executing a formal renunciation of all
further claims), the King must be considered as having declined the offered
benefit."
% In addition to this monthly lakh of rupees, paid in money, Bahadur
Shah continued to enjoy the proceeds of some crown lands, and also of some
ground-rents in the city. — See evidence of Mr. Sanders at the King's trial :
" He was in receipt of a stipend of one lakh of rupees per mensem, of which
ninety-nine thousand were paid at Dehli, and one thousand at Lakhnao, to
the members of the family there. He was also in receipt of revenue to the
amount of a lakh and a half from the crown lands in the neighbourhood
of Dehli. He also received a considerable sum from the ground-rents of
houses and tenants in the city of Dehli."
10 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1849.
from the time of the patriarchs downwards, this son of his old
age also became a favourite ; and the King was easily wrought
upon by Queen Zinat-Mahal to endeavour to set aside the
succession of the Heir-Apparent in favour of the boy-prince. The
unjust supersession, which his father had endeavoured to per-
petrate against him, might now some day be put in force by
himself, for the gratification of his favourite. But it was neces-
sary in such a case to walk warily. Any rash, hasty action
might be followed by a failure which could never be repaired.
In any case, it would be better to wait until the child, Jawan
Bakht, were a few years older, and he could be extolled as a
youth of promise. Meanwhile the great Chapter of Accidents
might contain something in their favour. So hanging on to the
skirts of Circumstance, he watched for the coming of an oppor-
tunity. And ere long the opportunity came — bringing with it
more than had been looked for, and not all to the satisfaction of
the royal expectants.
The story may be briefly told. In 1849, Prince Dara Bakht,
the Heir-Apparent, died. At this time the King,
1849. Bahadur Shah, had numbered more than seventy
succession? * e years. In natural course his death could be no
very remote contingency. The question of succes-
sion, therefore, pressed heavily on the mind of the Governor-
General. Lord Dalhousie was not a man to regard with much
favour the mock sovereignty of the Mughul. Others before
him, with greater tenderness for ancient dynastic traditions,
had groaned over the long continuance of a state of things at
which reason and truth revolted ; and the extinction of the
titular dignity of the Kings of Dehli, after the death of Baha-
dur Shah, had been urged upon the Government of the East
India Company.* But the proposal stirred up divisions in the
Council Chamber of Leadenhall, which resulted in delayed
* Writing on the 1st of August, 1844, the Court of Directors observed :
" The Governor-General has given directions to the Agent that, in the event
of the demise of the King of Dehli, no step whatever bhall be taken which
can be construed into a recognition of the descent of that title to a successor
without specific authority from the Governor-General. If in these instruc-
tions the abolition of the title is contemplated, we cannot give it our sanction
until we have heard further from you on the subject, and have had time to
consider the purport and the grounds of the recommendation which may be
offered."
Dalhousie's
measures.
1849.] POLICY OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 11
action. The usual expedient of waiting for further advices
from India was resorted to, and so Lord Dalhousie found the
question unsettled. The death of Prince Dara Bakht afforded
an opportunity for its settlement, which a Governor-General of
Dalhousie's temperament was not likely to neglect. The next
in succession, according to Muhammadan law, was Prince Fakir-
ud-din, a man of thirty years of age, reputed to be of quick
parts, fond of European society, and tolerant of the British
Government. And the Governor-General saw, both in the cha-
racter of the man and the circumstances of his position, that
which might favour and facilitate the changes which he wisely
desired to introduce.
It was manifestly the duty of the British Government not to
perpetuate a state of things which had nothing
but tradition to gloss over its offensive deformity. Lord
But the operation that had become necessary was
not one to be performed violently and abruptly,
without regard to times and seasons. Feeling sure that the
opportunity could not be far distant, Lord Dalhousie had been
contented to wait. It had now come. Prince Dara Bakht was
the last of the Dehli Princes who had been " born in the
purple." He had been reared and he had ripened in the expec-
tation of succeeding to the Kingship of Dehli ; and there might
have been some hardship, if not a constructive breach of faith,
in destroying the hopes of a lifetime at the very point of
fruition. But Prince Fakir-ud-din had been born a pensioner.
He had no recollection of " the time when the King of Dehli
still sat on the throne and was recognised as the paramount
potentate in India." It could, therefore, be no injustice to him
to admit his accession to the chiefship of the family upon other
conditions than those which had been recognised in the case of
his father; whilst it was, in the opinion of the Governor-
General, sound policy, on the other hand, to sweep away all the
privileges and prerogatives which had kept alive this great
pretentious mock royalty in the heart of our Empire.
The evils to be removed were many ; but two among them
were more glaring than the rest. The perpetuation of the
kingly title was a great sore. Lord Dalhousie did not overrate
its magnitude. Perhaps, indeed, he scarcely took in its true
proportions. For he wrote that the Princes of India and its
people, whatever they might once have been, had become
"entirely indifferent to the condition of the King or his
12 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1849.
position." * And he added : " The British Government has
become indeed and in truth the paramount Sovereign in India.
It is not expedient that there should be, even in name, a
rival in the person of a sovereign whose ancestors once held the
paramountcy we now possess. His existence could never really
endanger us, I admit; although the intrigues of which he
might, and not unfrequently has been made the nucleus, might
incommode and vex us." I have said before that Lord
Dalhousie " could not understand the tenacity with which the
natives of India cling to their old traditions — could not
sympathise with the veneration which they felt for their
ancient dynasties." "f Time might have weakened the venera-
tion felt for the House of Dehli, but had not, assuredly, effaced
it. There was still sufficient vitality in it to engender, under
favouring circumstances, something more than discomfort and
vexation. Bui, Lord Dalhousie erred only in thus under-
estimating the proportions of the evil which he now desired to
remove. He was not on that account less impressed with the
fact that it would be grievous impolicy on the part of the
British Government to suffer the kingly title, on the death of
Bahadur Shah, to pass to another generation.
The other evil thing of whiph. I have spoken was the main-
tenance of the Palace as a royal residence. Eegarded in the
aspect of morality and humanity, as already observed, it was
an abomination of the worst kind. But, more clearly even
than this, Lord Dalhousie discerned the political and military
disadvantages of the existing state of things, by which, what
was in reality a great fortress in the hands of a possible enemy,
was suffered to command the chief arsenal of Upper India.
" Here," wrote the Governor-General, " we have a strong
fortress in the heart of one of the principal cities of our Empire,
and in entire command of the chief magazine of the Upper
Provinces — which lies so exposed, both to assault and to the
dangers arising from the carelessness of the people dwelling
around it — that it is a matter of surprise that no accident has
yet occurred to it. Its dangerous position has been frequently
remarked upon, and many schemes have been prepared for its
improvement and defence ; but the only eligible one is the
transfer of the stores into the Palace, which would then be kept
by us as a British post, capable of maintaining itself against
* Minute, February 10, 1849. t Ante, vol. i.
1849.] DANGER OF THE MAGAZINE. 13
any hostile manoeuvre, instead of being, as it now is, the
source of positive danger, and perhaps not unfrequently the
focus of intrigues against our power." *
There was undoubted wisdom in this. To remove the Dehli
Family from the Palace, and to abolish all their Alsatian
privileges, upon the death of Bahadur Shah, could have been
no very difficult work. But to Lord Dalhousie it appeared
that this part of the duty which lay before him should be
accomplished with the least possible delay. He conceived that
there would be no necessity to wait for the demise of the
titular sovereign, as in all probability the King might be per-
suaded to vacate the Palace, if sufficient inducement were held
out to him. He argued that, as the Kings of Dehli had
possessed a convenient and favourite country residence at the
Kutb, some twelve miles to the south of Dehli, and that as the
place was held in great veneration, generally and particularly,
as the burial-place of a noted Muhammadan saint and of some
of the ancestors of Bahadur Shah, his Majesty and the Boyal
Family were not likely to object to their removal, and, if they
did object, it was to be considered whether pressure might not
be put upon them, and their consent obtained by the extreme
measure of withholding the royal stipend. But the represen-
tative of a long line of Kings might not unreasonably have
* It does not appear, however, that Lord Dalhousie laid any stress upon
the fact that no European troops were posted in Dehli. Nor, indeed, did
Sir Charles Napier, who at this time was Commander-in-Chief of the British
army in India. He saw clearly that the military situation was a false one,
and he wrote much about the defence of the city, but without drawing any
distinction between European and Native troops. In both cases the antici-
pated danger was from a rising of the people, not of the soldiery. With
respect to the situation of the magazine, Sir Charles Napier wrote to the
Governor-General (Labor, Dec. 15, 1849), saying : "As regards the magazine,
the objections to it are as follows : 1st. It is placed in a very populous part
of the city, and its explosion would be very horrible in its effects as regards
the destruction of life. 2nd. It would destroy the magnificent Palace of
Dehli. 3rd. The loss of Government property would also be very great,
especially if my views of the importance of Dehli, given in my report, be
acted upon ; namely, that it and Danapur should be two great magazines
for the Bengal Presidency. 4th. It is without defence beyond what the
guard of fifty men offer, and its gates are so weak that a mob could push
them in. I therefore think a powder magazine should be built in a safe
place. There is a strong castle three or four miles from the town which
would answer well, but I fear the repairs would be too expensive; more so,
perhaps, than what would be more efficacious, viz., to build a magazine in
a suitable position near the city."
14 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1849.
demurred to the expulsion of his Family from the old home of
his fathers, and it demanded no great exercise of imagination to
comprehend the position.
When this exposition of Lord Dalhousie's views was laid
before the Court of Directors of the East India
Views of the Company, the subject was debated with much
Government, interest in Leadenhall-street.* Already had the
strong mind of the Governor-General begun to
influence the councils of the Home Government of India.
There were one or two able and active members of the Court
who believed implicitly in him, and were resolute to support
everything that he did. There was another section of the
Court, which had no special faith in Lord Dalhousie, but which,
upon system, supported the action of the local Governments, as
the least troublesome means of disposing of difficult questions.
But there was a third and powerful party — powerful in
intellect, more powerful still in its unflinching honesty and
candour, and its inalienable sense of justice — and this party
prevailed. The result was that the majority agreed to despatch
instructions to India, negativing the proposals of the Governor-
General. But when the draft went from Leaden-
Conflkt between hall-street to Cannon- row, it met with determined
the Board. an opposition from the Board of Control, over which
at that time Sir John Hobhouse presided. f It
was contended that the British Government were not pledged
to continue to Shah Alain's successors the privileges accorded
to him, and that the Court had not proved that the proposals of
the Governor-General were either unjust or impolitic. Then
arose one of those sharp conflicts between the Court and the
Board which in the old days of the Double Government some-
times broke in upon the monotony of their councils. The
Court rejoined that the proposals were those of the Governor-
General alone, that the concurrence of his Council had not been
obtained, that the contemplated measures were ungenerous and
unwise,} and that it would give grievous oifence to the
* Sir Archibald Galloway, who had taken part in the defence of Deldi
at the commencement of the century, was Chairman of the East India
Company.
t Mr. James Wilson and the Hon. John Eliot were then Secretaries to the
Board.
+ h The question," they said, " is not one of supremacy. The supremacy
of the British power is beyond dispute. The sovereignty of Dehli is a title
1849.] CONFLICTS IN THE HOME GOVERNMENT. 15
Muhammadan population of the country. They were prepared
to sanction persuasive means to obtain the evacuation of the
Palace, but they most strongly objected to compulsion. The
Board then replied that it was not necessary in such a case to
obtain the consent of the Members of Council, and that, if they
had felt any alarm as to the results of the proposed measure,
they would have communicated their apprehensions to the
Court (which, however, w r as a mistaken impression) — that
there was no sort of obligation to continue to the successors of
Shah Alam what Lord Wellesley had granted to him — tha fc it
was a question only of policy, and that as to the effect of the
proposed measure on the minds of the Muhammadans, the local
ruler was a better judge than the Directors at home (and this,
perhaps, w r as another mistake) ; but when the Indian minister
added : " The chance of danger to the British Empire from the
head of the House of Taimur may be infinitely small ; but if a
Muhammadan should ever think that he required such a
rally in g-point for the purpose of infusing into those of his own
faith spirit and bitterness in an attack on Christian supremacy,
he would surely find that a Prince already endowed with the
regal title, and possessed of a royal residence, was a more
efficient instrument in his hands than one placed in the less
conspicuous position contemplated by Lord Dalhousie and his
advisers," he spoke wisely and presciently. On the receipt of
this letter, the Court again returned to the conflict, urging that
they felt so deeply the importance of the subject that they
could not refrain from making a further appeal to the Board.
They combated what had been said about the implied con-
currence of the Council, and the argument against the claims of
the Dehli Family based upon the action of Lord Wellesley, and
then they proceeded to speak again of the feelings of the
Muhammadan population. " The amount of disaffection," they
utterly powerless for injury, but respected by Muhammadans as an ancient
honour of their name, and their good feelings are conciliated to the British
Government by the respect it shows for that ancient honour. The entire
indifference of the Princes and the people of India to the condition or position
of the King is alleged ; but the Court cannot think it possible that any
people can ever become indifferent to the memory of its former greatness.
The traditional deference with which that memory is regarded is altogether
distinct from any hopes of its renewal. But it is a feeling which it is impolitic
to wound. From mere hopelessness of resistance it may not immediately
show itself, but may remain latent till other causes of public danger may
brin°r it into action."
16 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1849.
said, " in the Muhammadan population, which the particular
measure, if carried into effect, may produce, is a matter of
opinion on which the means do not exist of pronouncing con-
fidently. The evil may prove less than the Court apprehend,
or it may be far greater than they would venture to predict.
But of this they are convinced, that even on the most favour-
able supposition the measure would be considered throughout
India as evidence of the commencement of a great change in
our policy." " The Court," it was added, " cannot contemplate
without serious uneasiness the consequences which may arise
from such an impression, should it go forth generally through-
out India — firmly believing that such an act would produce a
distrust which many years of an opposite policy would be
insufficient to remove." Then, having again entreated most
earnestly the Board's reconsideration of their decision, they
concluded by saying that, if they failed, they would "still have
discharged their duty to themselves, by disclaiming all
responsibility for a measure which they regarded as unjust
towards the individual family, gratuitously offensive to an
important portion of our Indian subjects, and calculated to
produce an effect on the reputation and influence of the British
Government both in India and elsewhere, such as they would
deeply deplore." But the last appeal fell on stony ground.
The Board were obdurate. They deplored the difference of
opinion, accepted the disclaimer, and, on the last
Dece i849 r 31, ^ a y °f tne y ear > directed, " according to the powers
vested in them by the law," a despatch to be
sent to India in the form settled by the Board. So instructions
were sent out to India, signed ministerially by certain members
of the Court, totally opposed to what, as a body, they believed
to be consistent with policy and justice.
On full consideration of this correspondence, conducted as it
was, on both sides, with no common ability, it is
Summary difficult to resist the conviction that both were
argument. right and both were wrong — right in what they
asserted, wrong in what they denied. It was, in
truth, but a choice of evils that lay before the Double Govern-
ment ; but each half of it erred in denying the existence of the
dangers asserted by the other. Much, of course, on both sides
was conjecture or speculation, to be tested by the great touch-
stone of the Future ; and it depended on the more rapid or the
more tardy ripening of events on the one side or the other to
1849.] DOUBTS OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 17
demonstrate the greater sagacity of the Court or the Board.
If there should be no popular excitement before the death of
Bahadur Shah, to make the King of Dehli, in his great palatial
stronghold, a rally in g-point for a disaffected people, that event,
followed b}'" the abolition of the title and the removal of the
Family from the Palace, might prove the soundness of the
Court's arguments, by evoking a Muhammadan outbreak ; but,
if there should be a Muhammadan, or any other popular out-
break, during the lifetime of Bahadur Shah, it might be shown,
by the alacrity of the people to rally round the old imperial
throne, and to proclaim again the sovereignty of the House of
Taimur, that the apprehensions of the Board had not been
misplaced, and that the danger on which they had enlarged
was a real one. There was equal force at the time in the
arguments of both, but there was that in the womb of the
Future which was destined to give the victory to the Board.
Lord Dalhousie received the instructions bearing the official
signatures of the Court in the early spring of
1850 ; * but he had before learnt in what a hotbed isso.
of contention the despatch was being reared, and defied. 8
when it came he wisely hesitated to act upon its
contents. It is to his honour that, on full consideration, he
* Some powerful protests were recorded by members of the Court — among
others by Mr. Tucker, then nearly eighty years of age. In this paper lie
said : " That they (the Dehli family) can be induced voluntarily to abandon
their palace, I cannot, for one moment, believe. The attachment of the
natives generally to the seats of their ancestors, however humble, is well
known to all those who know anything of the people of India; but in this
case there are peculiar circumstances, the cherished associations of glory, the
memory of past grandeur, which must render the Palace of Dehli the object
of attachment and veneration to the fallen family If the object is to
be accomplished, it must be by the exertion of military force, or intimidation
disgraceful to any Government, and calculated to bring odium on the British
name." "I have the highest respect," he said, "for the talents, the great
acquirements, and the public spirit of Lord Dalhousie ; but I must think
that an individual, who has only communicated witli the people of India
through an interpreter, cannot have acquired a very intimate knowledge of
the character, habits, feelings, and prejudices of the people." The veteran
director erred, however, in making light of the strength of Dehli as a fortified
city. " It is not," he said, " a fortress of any strength It has been
repeatedly entered and sacked by undisciplined hordes." "There is, in
fact," he continued, " no ground for assuming that Dehli can become a mili-
tary post of importance, especially now that we have advanced our frontier
to the banks of the Indus."
VOL. II. o A
18 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1850.
deferred to the opinions expressed by the majority of the Court,
and by others not in the Court, whose opinions were entitled to
equal respect. " The Honourable Court," he said, " have con-
veyed to the Governor-General in Council full authority to
carry these measures into effect. But I have, for some time
past, been made aware through different channels, that the
measures I have thus proposed regarding the throne of Dehli,
have not met with the concurrence of authorities in England
whose long experience and knowledge of Indian affairs entitle
their opinions to great weight, and that many there regard the
tendency of these proposed measures with anxiety, if not with
alarm." He added that, with unfeigned deference to the
opinions thus expressed, he still held the same views as before ;
but that, although his convictions remained as strong as ever,
he did not consider the measures themselves to be of such
immediate urgency as to justify his carrying them into effect,
" contrary to declared opinions of undoubted weight and autho-
rity, or in a manner calculated to create uneasiness and doubt."
He was willing, therefore, to suspend action, and, in the mean
while, to invite the opinions of his Council, which had not been
before recorded.
"Whilst the main questions thus indicated were under con-
sideration, another difficulty of a personal charac-
Palace ^ er arose . The King protested against the sue-
intrigues. * ^
cession of Fakir-ud-din. Stimulated by his
favourite wife, Ziuat-Mahal, he pleaded earnestly for her son,
then a boy of eleven. One objection which he raised to the
succession of his eldest surviving son was a curious one. He
said that it was a tradition of his House, since the time of
Taimur, that no one was to sit on the throne who had been in
any way mutilated ; Fakir-ud-din had been circumcised, and,
therefore, he was disqualified.* The objection was urged with
much vehemence, and it was added that Fakir-ud-din was a
man of bad character. The immediate effect of these repre-
* The statement was an exaggerated one — as all the Mughul Emperors,
up to the time of Humayun, were circumcised. After the accession of this
prince, for reasons given in a very interesting note, at the end of the volume,
furnished by my learned friend, Maulavi Saiad Ahmad, C.S.I., the rite was
discontinued, generally, in the family. But, for certain physical reasons, an
exception was made, with respect to Fakir-ud-din, and Zmat-Mahal seized
upon the pretext.
1850.] VIEWS OF THE SUPKEME COUNCIL. 19
sentations was that Lord Dalliousie determined for a while
to suspend official action with respect to the question of suc-
cession, and to see what circumstances might develop in his
favour.
In the meantime he invited the opinions of his colleagues in
the Supreme Council. It consisted, at that time,
of Sir Frederick Currie, Sir John Littler, an old ggJSKdil
Company's officer of good repute, and Mr. John
Lowis, a Bengal civilian, blameless in all official and personal
relations, one of the lights of the Service, steady but not
brilliant. The first shrewdly observed that we might leave
the choice of a successor until the King's death, which could
not be very remote, and that we might then easily make terms
with, or impose conditions upon, the accepted candidate, for the
evacuation of the Palace. The General looked doubtfully at
the whole proposal. He believed that the Muhammadan popu-
lation of India still regarded with reverence the old Mughul
Family, and would be incensed by its humiliation. He coun-
selled, therefore, caution and delay, and in the end persuasion,
not compulsion. But John Lowis laughed all this to scorn.
He did not believe that the Muhammadans of India cared
anything about Dehli, or anything about the King; and if
they did care, that, he said, was an additional reason why the
title should be abolished, and the Palace vacated, with the least
possible delay.*
The result of these deliberations was that a despatch was
sent to England, recommending that affairs should remain
unchanged during the lifetime of the present King — that the
Prince Fakir-ud-din should be acknowledged as successor to the
royal title, but that advantage should be taken of the preten-
sions of a rival claimant to the titular dignity to obtain the
desired concessions from the acknowledged Head of the Family
* " But, if these fears are not groundless, surely they afford a positive
reason for taking the proposed step, because the result anticipated, as it
appears to me, can arise unly if the Mnhammadans (no doubt the most restless
and discontented of our subjects) have continued to look upon the repre-
sentatives of the House of Taimur as their natural head, and to count upon
the Palace of Dehli as a rallying-point in the event of any outbreak amongst
them. If it be so, it is surely sound policy, on the first favourable oppor-
tunity, to remove the head, and to put the projected rallyinrr-point into safe
hands."
C 2
20 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1850-
— -that inducements should be held out to him to leave the
Palace and to reside in the Kutb, and that, if necessary, this
advantage should be purchased by the grant of an additional
stipend.
To all the recommendations of the Governor-General — so far
as they concern this history — the Home Govern-
£S55n?e nt ment yielded their consent. Permission was then
Heir- granted to the Dehli Agent to make known to
Apparent. p r i nce Fakir-ud-din, at a confidential interview,
what were the intentions and wishes of the British Govern-
ment. A meeting, therefore, took place between the Prince
and Sir Thomas Metcalfe ; and the former expressed himself,
according to official reports, prepared to accede to the wishes of
the Government, " if invested with the title of King, and per-
mitted to assume the externals of royalty." An agreement was
then drawn up, signed, sealed, and witnessed, and the work
was done. It was, doubtless, pleasant to the authorities to
think that the heir had acceded willingly to all the demands
made upon him. But the fact is that he consented to them
with intense disgust, and that throughout the Palace there
were great consternation and excitement, and that no one was
more vexed than the mother of the rival claimant, Queen
Zinat-Mahal.
I must pass hastily over the next two or three years, during
which the animosities of the Queen Zinat-Mahal,
1856. and of her son, Jawan Bakht, continued to fester
Fakk-ud-din. under the irritations of a great disappointment.
And ere long they were aggravated by the
thought of a new grievance ; for the King had endeavoured in
vain to induce the British Government to pledge itself to make
to his favourites, after his death, the same payments as he had
settled upon them during his life. The intrigues which, if
successful, would have secured to them so much at the expense
of others, altogether failed. But the King lived on — lived to
survive the heir whose succession was so distasteful to him.
On the 10th of July, 1856, Prince Fakir-ud-din suddenly died.
It was more than suspected that he had been poisoned. He
was seized with deadly sickness and vomiting, after partaking
of a dish of curry. Extreme prostration and debility ensued,
and although the King's physician, Assan-ullah, was called in,
he could or would do nothing to restore the dying Prince; and
in a little time there were lamentations in the Heir- Apparent 's
1856.] DEATH OF THE HEIR. 21
house, and tidings were conveyed to the Palace that Fakir-ud-
dfn was dead.*
How that night was spent in the apartments of Queen Zinat-
Mahal can only be conjectured. Judged by its results, it must
have been a night of stirring intrigue and excited activity.
For when, on the following day, Sir Thomas Metcalfe waited
on the King, his Majesty put into the hands of the Agent a
paper containing a renewed expression of his desire to see the
succession of Jawan Bakht recognised by the British Govern-
ment. Enclosed was a document purporting to convey a
request from others of the King's sons, that the offspring of
Zinat-Mahal, being endowed with "wisdom, merit, learning,
and good manners," should take the place of the Heir- Apparent.
Eight of the royal princes attached their seals to this address.
But the eldest of the survivors — Mirza Korash by name — next
day presented a memorial of his own, in which he set forth
that his brethren had been induced to sign the paper by
promises of increased money-allowances from the King, if they
consented, and deprivation of income if they refused. An effort
also was made to bribe Mirza Korash into acquiescence. He
professed all filial loyalty to the King ; declared his willingness
to accede, as Heir- Apparent, to such terms as the King might
suggest; but when he found that his father, instigated by the
Queen Zinat-Mahal, was bent on setting him aside altogether,
he felt that there was nothing left for him but an appeal to the
British Government. "As in this view," he wrote to the
British Agent, " my ruin and birthright are involved, I deem
it proper to represent my case, hoping that in your report due
regard will be had to all the above circumstances. Besides
being senior, I have accomplished a pilgrimage to Mekka, and
have learned by heart the Koran ; and my further attainments
can be tested in an interview.'
* The Palace Diary of the day says : " Having felt hungry, the Prince
imagined that an empty stomach promoted bile, and partook of some bread
with curry gravy, when immediately the vomitings increased, which produced
great debility. Every remedy to afford relief proved ineffectual, and H.R.H.
rapidly sunk. Mirza llahi Baksh sent for Hakim Assan-ullah to prescribe.
The Hakfm administered a clyster, which, however, did no good. At six
oclock, the Heir- Apparent was in a moribund state, and immediately after
the noise of lamentation was heard in the direction of the Heir-Apparent's
residence, and news was brought to the Palace of H.R.H.'s demise. Hi3
Majesty expressed his sorrow. The Nawab Zinat-Mahal Be'gam condoled
with his Majesty."
22 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1856.
By this time Lord Canning had succeeded to the Governor-
Generalship, and a new Council sate beside him.
LoMaumfn" ^e whole question of the Dehli succession, there-
fore, was considered and debated by men unin-
fluenced by any foregone expressions of opinion. In truth, the
question was not a difficult one. The course which Lord Dal-
housie meant to pursue was apparently the wisest course ;
although he had erred in believing that the Muhammadans of
Upper India had no lingering affection for the sovereignty of
the House of Dehli ; and not less in supposing that the removal
of the King and the Eoyal Family from the Palace in the city
would not be painful and humiliating to them. But, with
laudable forbearance, he had yielded to the opinions of others,
even with the commission in his hands to execute his original
designs. Lord Canning, therefore, found the Dehli question
unsettled and undetermined in many of the most essential
points. Bringing a new eye to the contemplation of the great
danger and the great abomination of the Dehli Palace, he saw
both, perhaps, even in larger dimensions than they had presented
to the eye of his predecessor. He did not, therefore, hesitate to
adopt as his own the views which Lord Dalhousie had recorded
with respect to the removal of the Family on the death of
Bahadur Shah. " It is as desirable as ever," he wrote, " that
the Palace of Dehli — which is, in fact, the citadel of a large
fortified town, and urgently required for military purposes —
should be in the hands of the Government of the country, and
that the pernicious privilege of exemption from the law, which
is conceded to the Crown connexions and dependants of the
King now congregated there, should, in the interests of morality
and good government, cease." It was scarcely possible, indeed,
that much difference of opinion could obtain among statesmen
with respect to the political and military expediency of placing
this great fortified building, which dominated the city of Dehli,
in the secure possession of British troops ; nor could there be
any doubt in the mind of a Christian man that, in the interests
of humanity, we were bound to pull down all those screens and
fences which had so long shut out the abominations of the Palace
from the light of day, and excluded from its murky recesses the
saving processes of the law.
But the extinction of the titular sovereignty was still an open
question. Lord Canning had spent only a few months in India,
and those few months had been passed in Calcutta. He had no
1856.] LOED CANNING ON THE DEHLI SUCCESSION. 23
personal knowledge of the feelings of the princes or people of
Upper India ; but he read in the minutes of preceding members
of the Government that the traditions of the House of Taimur
had become faint in men's minds, if they had not been wholly
effaced; and he argued that if there was force in this when
written, there must be greater force after a lapse of years, as
there was an inevitable tendency in time to obliterate such
memories. " The reasons, 1 he said, " which induced a change
of purpose in 1850 are not fully on record;* but whatever they
may have been, the course of time has assuredly strengthened
the arguments by which the first intentions were supported,
and possibly has removed the objection to it." He further
argued, that as much had already been done to strip the mock
majesty of Dehli of the purple and gold with which it had once
been bedizened — that as first one privilege and then another,
which had pampered the pride of the descendants of Taimur,
had been torn from them, there could be little difficulty in
putting the finishing stroke to the work by abolishing the
kingly title on the death of Bahadur Shah. " The presents,"
he said, " which were at one time offered to the King by the
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief have been discon-
tinued. The privilege of a coinage carrying his mark is now
denied to him. The Governor-General's seal no longer bears
a device of vassalage ; and even the Native chiefs have been
prohibited from using one. It has been determined that these
appearances of subordination and dependence could not be kept
up consistently with a due respect for the real and solid power
of the British Government, and the same may be said of the
title of King of Dehli, with the fiction of paramount sovereignty
which attaches to it. . . . To recognise the title of King, and
a claim to the external marks of royalty in a new person, would
be an act purely voluntary on the part of the Government of
India, and quite uncalled for. Moreover, it would not be
accepted as a grace or favour by any but the individual him-
self. But," added the Governor-General, "whatever be the
degree of rank inherited, the heir whom in right and con-
sistency the Government must recognise is the eldest surviving
son of the King, Prince Mirza Muhammad Korash, who has no
* That is, not on record in India. The reasons are fully stated above ;
but Lord Canning apparently did not know that the " Court's despatch " was
i really not their despatch at all.
24 THE DEHLI HISTOKY. [1856.
claims from early reminiscences to see the unreal dignity of his
House sustained for another generation in his own person."
The policy to be observed having thus been determined, the
Governor-General, with the full concurrence of his Council,
proceeded to issue definite instructions for the guidance of his
Agent. The substance of them is thus stated :
" 1. Should it be necessary to send a reply to the King's
letter, the Agent must inform his Majesty that the Governor-
General cannot sanction the recognition of Mirza Jawan Bakht
as successor.
" 2. Mirza Muhammad Korash must not be led to expect that
his recognition will take place on the same terms as Fakir-ud-
din's, and that during the King's lifetime no communication is
to be made, either to his Majesty, or to any other member of
the family, touching the succession.
" 3. On the King's demise, Prince Mirza Muhammad Korash
should be informed that Government recognise him as the head
of the family upon the same conditions as those accorded to
Prince Mirza Fakir-ud-din, excepting that, instead of the title
of King, he should be designated and have the title of Shah-
zadah, and that this communication should be made to him not
in the way of writing, negotiation, or bargaining, which it is
not the intention of the Governor-General in Council to admit,
but as the declaration of the mature and fixed determination of
the Government of India.
" 4. A report to be made of the number of the privileged
residents in the Palace ; to how many the privilege would
extend, if the sons and grandsons, but no more distant relatives
of any former King were admitted to it.
"5. The sum of fifteen thousand rupees per mensem from
the family stipend to be fixed as the future assignment of the
heir of the family."
Intrigues of
Zinat-Mahal.
Such, as represented by official documents — such as they
were then known to Lord Canning — were the
state and prospects of the Dehli Family at the
close of the year 1856. But there was something
besides reserved for later revelation to the English ruler, which
may be recorded in this place. The King, stricken in years,
would have been well content to end his days in quietude and
peace. But the restless intriguing spirit of the Queen Zinat-
Mahal would not suiter the aged monarch to drowse out the
1856.] PALACE INTKIGUES. 25
remainder of his days. She never ceased to cling to the hope
that she might still live to see the recognition of her son as
King of Dehli, and she never ceased to intrigue, at home and
abroad, by the light of that pole-star of her ambition. One
impediment had been removed by death. Another might be
removed in the same way. And if the British Government
would not favour the claims of Jawan Bakht, other powerful
Governments might be induced to hold out to him a helping
hand. It was stated afterwards that the King had never
resented the determination to exclude the Dehli Family from
the Palace, as the exclusion would not affect himself, and he
had no care for the interests of his successor.* But it has been
shown that Queen Zinat-Mahal was loud in her lamentations
when it was known that Fakir-ud-din had surrendered this
ancient privilege ; for although she hated the recognised heir,
she knew that he was not immortal ; and changes of Govern-
ment, moreover, might beget changes of opinion. There was
still hope of the succession of Jawan Bakht so long as the old
King lived ; and therefore she desired to maintain all the
privileges of the Kingship unimpaired to the last possible
moment of doubt and expectancy.
Meanwhile, the youth in whom all these hopes centred, was
growing up with a bitter hatred of the English in
his heart. The wisdom, the learning, the good
manners of the Heir-expectant were evinced by the pertinacity
with which he was continually spitting his venom at the English.
He did not hesitate to say, even in the presence of British sub-
jects, that " in a short time he would have all the English under
his feet."f But his courage was not equal to his bitterness ; for
* Evidence of Assau-ullah, on the trial of the King of Dehli.
f See the evidence of Mrs. Fleming, an English sergeant's wife, who thus
recites an incident which occurred on the occasion of a visit paid by her
to the Queen Zinat-Mahal : " I was sitting down with his sister-in-law, and
Jawan Bakht was standing by with his wife. My own daughter, Mrs. Scully,
was also present. I was talking with Jawan Bakht's sister-in-law, when
Mrs. Scully said to me, ' Mother, do you hear what this young rascal is
saying ? He is telling me that in a short time he will have all the infidel
English under his feet, and after that he will kill the Hindus.' Hearino-
this, I turned round to Jawan Bakht, and asked him, ' What is that you are
saying ? ' He replied that he was only joking. I said « If what you threaten
were to be the case, your head would be taken off first.' He told me that
the Persians were coming to Dehli, and that when they did so we, that is,
myself and daughter, should go to him, and he would save us. After this he
left us. I think this must have occurred about the middle of April, 1857."
26 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1857.
if he were asked what he meant "by such language, he would
answer that he meant nothing. He was " only in sport." He
had been for years past imbibing the venom in the Zenana,
under the traitorous tuition of his mother, and he was ever
anxious to spit it out, especially in the presence of women.
To what extent the intrigues thus matured in the Queen's
apartments may, by the help of her agents, have been made to
ramify beyond the Palace walls, it is not easy to conjecture.
There is no proof that in or about Dehli the question of succes-
sion was regarded with any interest by the people. It little
mattered to them whether one Prince or another were recognised
as the head of the Family and the recipient of the lion's share
of the pension. If attempts were made to excite the popular
feeling to manifest itself on the side of Jawan Bakht, they were
clearly a failure. But there is at least some reason to think
that the emissaries of the Palace had been assiduous in their
efforts to stir into a blaze the smouldering fires of Muhammaclan
zeal, and to excite vague hopes of some great Avatar from the
North -West, which would restore the fallen fortunes of the
House of Dehli, and give again to the Muhammadans of India
the wealth and honour of which they had been deprived by the
usurpation of the English.
So it happened that as the new year advanced there was
unwonted excitement among the Muhammadans
state of feeling f Tjeh]^ The Native newspapers teemed with
vague hints of a something coming that was to
produce great changes, resulting in the subversion of the power
of the English. Exaggerated stories of the Persian war, and
most mendacious statements of reverses sustained by the
English, were freely circulated and volubly discussed. At one
time it was said that the Persians had come down to Atak, and
at another that they were in full march through the Bolan Pass.
Then it was alleged that the real history of the war was,
that the Shah of Persia had for five generations been accumu-
lating munitions of war anc 1 neaping up treasure for the purpose
of conquering India, and that the time had now come for action.
Eussia, it was said, had placed its immense resources freely
at the disposal of the Shah. A thoroughly appointed army of
nearly half a million of men, with immense supplies of military
stores, had been sent to the aid of Per^a ; and if the regular
military forces of the Czar were not sufficient, a large contingent
of Kussian police would be sent to reinforce them. There were
1857J EXCITEMENT IN DEHLI. 27
eager speculations, too, as to the course that would be adopted
by the French and Ottoman Governments. '« Most people," it
was declared in a Native newspaper, rejoicing in the name of
the " Authentic News," " say that the King of France and the
Emperor of Turkey will both side with the Persians." And it
was added that the Eussians were the real cause of the war ;
for, " using the Persians as a cloak, they intend to consummate
their own designs by the conquest of Hindustan." Other
writers affirmed that although Dost Muhammid, Amir of Kabul,
pretended to be the friend of the English, and took their
money and their arms, he was prepared to turn both against
the infidels and to cast in his lot with Persia. Alike in the
Bazaars and in the Lines — in the shops of the money-changers
and in the vestibules of the Palace — these stories excited vague
sensations of wonder and of awe, which were strengthened by
the circulation of the prophecy, which took different shapes,
but pointed in all to the same result, that when the English
had ruled in India for a hundred years they would be driven
out, and a Native dynasty restored.*
That the King was intriguing with the Shah of Persia was
reported in the month of March to the Lieutenant-
Governor of the North- Western Provinces by a a»»ng*»-
Native correspondent, who added : " In the Palace, but more
especially in the portion of it constituting the personal apart-
* See the following, written by Sir James Out ram in January, 185S :
" What amazing statements and opinions one hears both in India and in
England. What can be more ridiculous than the cry that the rebellion was
caused by the annexation of Oudh, or that it was solely a military mutiny?"
[This, it should be observed, is addressed to Mr. Mangles.] " Our soldiers
have deserted their standards and fought against us, but rebellion did not
originate with the Sipahis. The rebellion was set on foot by the Muham-
madans, and that long before we rescued Oudh from her oppressors. It has
been ascertained that prior to that Musalman fanatics traversed the land,
reminding the faithful that it had been foretold in prophecy that a foreign
nation would rule in India a hundred years, after which the true believers
would regain their ascendancy. When the century elapsed, the Musalmans
did their best to establish the truth of their prophet's declaration, and
induced the Hindu Sipahis, ever, as you know, the most credulous and silly
of mankind, to raise the green standard, and forswear their allegiance, on
the ground that we had determined to make the whole of India involuntary
converts to Christianity." As to the text of the prediction, a Native news-
paper, citing it as the prophecy of the " revered saint Shah Mamat-ullah,"
puts it in these words, the original of which are in verse: "After the fire-
worshippers and Christians shall have held sway over the whole of Hindustan
28 THE DEHLI HISTOKY. [1857.
ments of the King, the subject of conversation, night and day,
is the early arrival of the Persians,* Hasan Askarif has,
moreover, impressed the King with the belief that he has
learned, through a divine revelation, that the dominion of the
King of Persia will to a certainty extend to Dehli, or rather
over the whole of Hindustan, and that the splendour of the
sovereignty of Dehli will again revive, as the sovereign of
Persia will bestow the crown upon the King. Throughout the
Palace, but particularly to the King, this belief has been the
cause of great rejoicing, so much so, that prayers are offered
and vows are made, whilst, at the same time, Hasan Askari has
entered upon the dally performance, at an hour and a half
before sunset, of a course of propitiatory ceremonies to expedite
the arrival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians."
This warning was, of course, disregarded. A rooted confidence
in our own strength and security, and a haughty contempt for
the machinations of others, was at that time a condition of
English statesmanship. It was the rule — and I fear it is still
the rule- — in such a case to discern only the exaggerations and
absurdities with which such statements are crusted over. The
British officer to whom such revelations are made sees at a
glance all that is preposterous and impossible in them ; and he
dismisses them as mere follies. He will not suffer himself to
see that there may be grave and significant truths beneath the
outer crust of wild exaggeration. When, therefore, Lieutenant-
Governor Colvin received the letter announcing that the King
of Dehli was intriguing with the Shah of Persia, and that the
latter would ere long restore the monarchy of the Mughul,
he laughed the absurdity to scorn, and pigeon-holed it among*
the curiosities of his administration. He did not consider that
the simple fact of such a belief being rife in Dehli and the
for a hundred years, and when injustice and oppression shall prevail in their
Government, an Arab prince shall be born, who will ride forth triumphantly
to slay them."
* It was stated, however, in evidence on the King's trial, that the war
with Persia had excited very little interest in the Palace. Assan-ullah, the
King's physician, said, that the Native newspapers, coming into the Palace,
reported the progress of the war, but that k ' the King never seemed to evince
any marked interest one way or the other."
■f This man was a Muhammadan Priest of the Hereditary Priesthood, who
dwelt near the Dehli Gate of the Palace, and was ever active in encouraging
intrigues with Persia.
1857.] INTEIGUES WITH PERSIA. 29
neighbourhood was something not to be disregarded. It in
reality very little mattered whether the King of Dehli and the
Shah of Persia were or were not in communication with each
other, so long as the Muhammadans of Upper India believed
that they were. It is the state of feeling engendered by such
a belief, not the fact itself, that is really significant and
important. But there is nothing in which English statesman-
ship in India fails more egregiously than in this incapacity to
discern, or unwillingness to recognise, the prevailing sentiments
of the people b}*- whom our statesmen are surrounded. The
letter sent to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North- Western
Provinces was produced, at a later period, as strong evidence of
the guilt of the King of Dehli ; but the recorded history of
this document is, that it was " found among the papers of the
late Mr. Colvin."
The story of the correspondence between the King of Dehli
and the Shah of Persia was not a mere fable.
Authentic record of such transactions is rarely to intrigues with
be obtained, and history must, therefore, fall back
upon evidence which may not be altogether conclusive. The
facts, however, appear to be these.* The power of Muhamma-
danism is greatly weakened by sectarian divisions. A Suni
hates a Shiah, or a Shiah hates a Suni, almost as much as either
hates a Christian. The King of Dehli was a Suni, whilst the
King of Oudh and the Shah of Persia were Shiahs. Now it
happened that, whilst Bahadur Shah was in great tribulation
because he could not persuade the English Government to
gratify the cherished wishes of his favourite wife, he was
minded to become a Shiah. There were some members of his
family settled in Oudh, who were also of this persuasion.
Whether by invitation, or whether of his own motion, is not
very apparent ; but one of them, the King's nephew, Mirza
Haidar by name, accompanied by a brother, visited his majesty
at Dehli, and carried back on his return tidings that the great
change had been effected, and that the Mughul sought to be
admitted within the pale of the Shiah religion. This man was
known in the Dehli Palace as one rejoicing in intrigue. It
could not have been difficult to persuade the old King that the
* They are mainly derived from the evidence of Assan-ullah, the King's
physician, of all the witnesses on the trial of Bahadur Shah the most accurate
and trustworthy. I see no reason to question his statements.
30 THE DEHLI HISTORY. [1857.
fact of his conversion might "be turned to good account, and
that, if nothing else would come of it, it would make the Shah
of Persia and the King of Oudh more willing to assist him in
the troubles and perplexities by which he was surrounded. It
is probable that he had no very clear notion of what might
come of such an alliance — no very strong hope that it would
end in the overthrow of the English — but he was readily
persuaded to address letters to the King of Persia, and to
despatch them secretly by confidential agents. And this was
done before the emissaries from Lakhnao had taken their
departure. There is a suspicion also that he sent letters to
Paissia ; but, if he did, in all probability they never reached
their destination. There was, however, from that time a vague
belief in the Palace that both the Persians and the Russians
were coming to the deliverance of the King, and that ere long
he would again be surrounded by all the splendour that
irradiated the Mughul throne in the meridian of its glory.
These intrigues, Avhatever their importance, were well known
in Dehli in the early months of 1857 ; and the impression which
they produced on the minds of the people was strengthened
by the sight of a proclamation which was posted on the Jami
Masjid in the middle of the month of March. This proclamation
purporting to have been issued by the King of Persia, set forth
that a Persian army was coming to release India from the
grasp of the English, and that it behoved all true Muhammadans
to gird up their loins resolutely, and to fight against the un-
believers.* The name of Muhammad Sadik was attached to it;
but none knew who he was. In outward appearance it was
but an insignificant affair; though it bore rude illustrations
representing a sword and a shield, it does not appear to have
produced any great excitement in Dehli, and the attention
which it attracted was short-lived, for the paper, after a lapse
* It is well known that a copy of a proclamation addressed to Muham-
madans generally, urging a war of extermination against the English, was
found in the tent of the Persian prince at Mohamrah, after the engagement
which took place there in the spring of 1857. There was no special reference
in this document to the restoration of the Dehli sovereignty ; it called upon
" the old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant,
the ryot and the sipahi, all without exception to arise in defence of the
orthodox faith of the Prophet." Afterwards it was frankly acknowledged
by the Persian Government that they had attempted to create a diversion
against us in India — such expedients being all fair in war.
1857.] DISQUIETUDE IN DEHLI. 31
of a few hours, was torn down by order of the magistrate.*
But the Native newspapers published the substance of the
proclamation, accompanying it with vague and mysterious hints
or with obscure comments, obviously intended, in some instances,
to be read in a contrary sense. There was in these effusions
hostility to the British Government — but hostility driven by
fear to walk warily. Ambiguous, enigmatical language suited
the occasion. It was stated that a communication had been
addressed to the magistrate, informing him that in the course
of a few weeks Kashmir would be taken ; the intent being, it is
said, to signify that the Kashmir Gate of Dehli would be in the
hands of the enemies of the British Government. There was
plainly a very excited state of public feeling about Dehli. The
excitement was, doubtless fomented by some inmates of the
Palace; and the King's Guards conversed with the Sipahis of
the Company, and the talk was still of a something coming.
But Bahadur Shah, in the spring of 1857, was never roused
to energetic action. Much was done in his name of which he
knew nothing, and much besides which he weakly suffered.
And as, in that month of May, news came from Mirath that
there was great excitement among the soldiery, and some of
the Native officers at Dehli were summoned to take part in the
great on-coming trial, those who sat at the King's door talked
freely about the revolt of the Native army, and in the vestibules
of the Palace it was proclaimed that the dynasty of the Mughuls
would soon be restored, and that all the high offices of State
would be held by the people of the country.")"
* See evidence of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe. It was stated, however, in
the Native papers, that the proclamation was posted up in the streets and
lanes of the city.
f Mokand Lai, the King's secretary, said : " I don't know whether "any
direct proposals came to the prisoner, hut the King's personal attendants,
sitting about the entrance to his private apartments, used to converse among
themselves, and say that very soon, almost immediately, the army would
revolt and come to the palace, when the Government of the King would be
re-established, and all the old servants would be greatly promoted and
advanced in position and emoluments."
32 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. [1S5,
CHAPTER II.
THE OUTBREAK AT Ml RATH.
"Whilst the vague feeling of excitement above described was
gathering strength and consistency at Dehli, and the " some-
thing coming " appeared to be approaching nearer and nearer,
events were developing themselves in the great military station
of Mirath, thirty miles distant, which were destined to precipi-
tate a more momentous crisis in the imperial city than had been
anticipated by the inmates of the Palace. The Native troops at
that great Head-quarters station were smouldering into re-
bellion, and the Sipahi War was about to commence. The brief
telegraphic story already recorded,* when it expanded into
detailed proportions, took this disastrous shape.
The 3rd Regiment of Native Cavalry was commanded by
Colonel Carmichael Smyth. He had graduated in
Colonel Smyth the regiment, and had seen some service with it,
3rd Cavalry. but he had never earned the entire confidence
of officers or men. He was not wanting in in-
Apr i857. ay ' telligence or in zeal, but he lacked temper and
discretion, and the unquestionable honesty of
his nature was of that querulous, irritable cast which makes
a man often uncharitable and always unpopular. He had a
quick eye for blots of every kind ; and, being much addicted to
newspaper writing, seldom failed to make them known to the
public. Nobody knew better than Colonel Smyth that the
Bengal Army was hovering on the brink of mutiny. He had,
in the earlier part of the year, visited the great fair at Hard war,
where the disaffection of the 19 th Regiment had been freely
discussed. He had afterwards gone to Masuri, where he learnt
from day to day what was passing at Ambalah, and he was so
impressed by what he heard respecting the general state of the
Sipahi regiments and their readiness for revolt, that he had
* Aide, vol. i.
1857.] GENERAL HEWITT. 33
written to the Command er-in-Chief to inform him of the
dangerous state of the Army. But when the general order
went forth that the men were no longer to bite the cartridges,
Colonel Smyth thought that the opportunity was one of which
he should avail himself to allay the excitement in his own
regiment, and he therefore held the parade of the 24th of April,
with results which have been already described.*
Not so thought the officer commanding the Mirath division of
the Army. General Hewitt was an old Com-
pany's officer, who had risen to high rank by the general
r J ' . & J . Hewitt.
slow process ol regimental and army promotion,
and who in quiet times might have drowsed through the years
of his employment on the Staff without manifesting any
remarkable incapacity fur command. The burden of nearly
seventy years was aggravated by the obesity of his frame and
the inertness of his habits. But he was a kind-hearted,
hospitable man, liked by all, and by some respected. It was
his desire to keep things quiet, and, if possible, to make them
pleasant. He lamented, therefore, that Colonel Smyth had
made that crucial experiment ujDon the fidelity of his regiment
which had resulted in open mutiny. " Oh ! why did you have
a parade ? " he said to the Colonel. " My division has kept
quiet, and if you had only waited another month or so, all
would have blown over."
It was necessary, however, after what had occurred, in an
official point of view to do something. So he
ordered a Native Court of Inquiry to be assembled. T i n C u" r rt of
The Court was composed of six members, four of q ir
whom were Native officers of the Infantry, and two Native
officers of the Cavalry. The witnesses examined, including
those who had manufactured and served out the cartridges, said
that there was nothing objectionable in them — nothing that
could offend the religious scruples of Hindu or Muhammadan —
nothing that in any way differed from the composition of the
cartridges which the Sipahis had been using for years. The
oldest troopers in the regiment, Hindu and Muhammadan, were
examined ; but they could give no satisfactory account of the
causes of alarm and disaffection in the regiment. They could
only say that a general impression of impurity existed. One
* Ante, vol. i. p. 437.
VOL. II.
31 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATII. [1857.
Musalman trooper, with much insolence of manner, blustered
out, " I have doubts about the cartridges. They may look
exactly like the old ones, but how do I know that pig's fat has
not been smeared over them?" But the next witness who was
examined — a Hindu — took one of the cartridges into his hand
and handled it freely, to show that in his eyes there was nothing
offensive in the new ammunition. Altogether, the Court of
Inquiry elicited nothing. It dealt with material facts, which
were well known before. But it was not the palpable, but the
impalpable — a vague and voiceless idea — that had driven the
regiment to mutiny. That which the troopers dreaded was not
pollution, but opinion. They were troubled, not by any fear of
desecration to their faith or of injury to their caste, but by the
thought of what their comrades would say of them. In a
military sense, in an official sense, all this was unreasonable in
the extreme; but every man felt in his inmost heart more than
he could explain in intelligible words, and the shadow of a
great fear was upon him, more terrible for its indistinctness.
The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry were sent to Head-
Quarters ; and whilst the orders of the Commander-in-Chief
were awaited, the Eighty-five were dismissed from duty, and
ordered to abide in their Lines. There was, then, for a little
space, a fever of expectancy. What meetings, and conspiracies,
and oath-takings there may have been in the Sipahis' quarter
during that long week of waiting, can be only dimly con-
jectured ; but one form of expression, in which their feelings
declared themselves, was patent to all. It was written in
characters of fire, and blazed out of the darkness of the night.
From the verandahs of their houses the European officers saw
these significant illuminations, and knew what they portended.
The burnings had commenced on the evening preceding the fatal
parade of the 24th of April, when an empty hospital had been
fired.* Then followed a more expressive conflagration. The
house of a Sipahi named Brijmohan Singh, who had been the
first to practise the new mode of using the cartridges, was burnt
down. This man (the son of a pig-keeper), who had been dis-
missed from an Infantry regiment and imprisoned for theft, had
enlisted under a new name in the 3rd Cavalry, and had managed
so to ingratiate himself with the Commanding Officer, that he
* Colonel Smyth says it -was a hortc-hospital.
1857.] THE COURT-MARTIAL. 35
was seldom absent from the Colonel's bungalow. To the whole
regiment, and especially to its high-caste men, this was an
offence and an abomination, and nothing could more clearly
indicate the feeling in the Lines of the 3rd than the fact that
this man's house was burnt down by the troopers of his own
regiment.
In the bungalows also of the European residents, during this
first week of May, there was much excitement and discussion.
There was plainly a very disagreeable entanglement of events
out of which it was not easy to see the way, and people said
freely that it ought never to have arisen. But speculation with
respect to the Future was even more busy than censure with
respect to the Past. What, it was asked, would be the issue of
the reference to Head-Quarters ? The more general belief was,
that orders would come for the dismissal of the recusant
troopers; but even this, it was thought, would be a harsh
measure, that might drive others, by force of sympathy, to
rebellion. It was an interval which might have been turned by
our English officers to good account in soothing the feelings of
their men, and explaining everything that was of a doubtful or
suspicious character. Some, indeed, did strive, with a wise
foreknowledge of the coining danger, to accomplish this good
object ; but others believed that all was right, that there was
no likelihood of their regiments being driven either by their
fears or their resentments to revolt against the Law; and
they drowsed on placidly in the conviction that it was but
an accidental ebullition, provoked by the mismanagement
of an indiscreet Commanding Officer, and that the general
temper of the Native troops at Mirath was all that could be
desired.
In the first week of May the instructions so eagerly looked
for were received from the Head-Quarters of the
Army. The fiat of General Anson had gone forth T *V e c ° u , rt_
c- o • -i i 4 it , • /-. i /-^ & t. «- • ■. Martial.
irom Simian. A JSative General Court-Martial
was to be assembled at Mirath for the trial of the Eighty-five.
The prisoners were then confined in an empty hospital, and a
guard of their own regiment was placed over them. The
tribunal before which they were to be brought up for trial was
composed of fifteen Native officers, of whom six were Muham-
madans and nine were Hindus. Ten of these members were
furnished by the regiments at Mirath — Artillery, Cavalry, and
Infantry ; five came from the Infantry regiments at Dehli. On
d 2
36 THE OUTBKEAK AT MIRATH. [1857.
the 6th of May the Court commenced its sittings,* and
continued its proceedings on the two following days. The
examination of Colonel Smyth and the other witnesses for the
prosecution elicited no new facts, and, indeed, the whole case of
military disobedience was so clear, that the trial, though it was
protracted during three days, was little more than a grim
formality. Every man felt that his condemnation was certain,
and sullenly abided the issue. The prisoners could put forth
no defence which either Law or Discipline could accept. But
when the Havildar Mattadin Singh pleaded, on behalf of him-
self and comrades, that they suspected some foul design because
their Commandant took so much pains to convince them that it
was all right, and to induce them to fire the cartridges, there
was something not altogether irrational or illogical in the argu-
ment. If there was nothing in the ammunition different from
that which they had always used, why, it was asked, should
the proceedings of the Colonel have been so different?! But in
effect the defence of the prisoners was little more than a confes-
sion, and the Court, by a vote of fourteen members against one,
found the Eighty-five guilty, and sentenced them to imprison-
ment and hard labour for ten years. But with this there went
forth a recommendation to " favourable consideration on account
of the good character which the prisoners had hitherto borne,
as testified to by their Commanding Officer, and on account of
their having been misled by vague reports regarding the cart-
ridges."
* The charge was, "For having at Mirath, on the 24th of April, 1857,
severally and individually disobeyed the lawful command of their superior
officer, Brevet-Colonel G. M. C. Smyth, commanding the 3rd Regiment of
Light Cavalry, by not having taken the cartridges tendered to each of them
individually for use that day on parade, when ordered by Colonel Smyth to
take the said cartridges."
t The same difficulty suggested itself to the Court. Colonel Smyth was
asked, " Why did you tell the men that they would have to fire, instead of
merely ordering them to do so?" Colonel Smyth's answer was: "The
parade was in orders the day before, and entered in the order-book as usual,
and each man was ordered to receive three cartridges. I wished to show
them the new way of loading without putting the cartridges to the mouth,
and attended the parade for that purpose. When I came on parade, tho
Adjutant informed me that the men had not taken their cartridges, and it
was on that account I ordered the Havildar-Major to take a cartridge and
load and fire before them ; and it was then, also, that I said, that when the
whole Army heard of thb- wajr i£ loading they would be much pleased, and
exclaim, ' Wah ! wah 1 ' "
1857.] THE SENTENCE CONFIRMED. 3V
The proceedings went up, in due course, to the General
commanding the Division, and Hewitt approved
and confirmed the sentence. " I would willingly ^XmelT
attend," he remarked, " to the recommendation of
the Court, if I could find anything in the conduct of the
prisoners that would warrant me in so doing. Their former
good character has been blasted by present misbehaviour, and
their having allowed themselves to be influenced by vague
reports instead of attending to the advice and obeying the
orders of their European superiors, is the gist of the offence for
which they have been condemned. It appears from these pro-
ceedings that these misguided men, after consultation together
on the night of the 23rd of April, 1857, came to the resolution
of refusing their cartridges. Having so far forgotten their
duty as soldiers, their next step was to send word to their
troop captains that they would not take their cartridges unless
the whole of the troops in the station would do so likewise.
Some of them even had the insolence to desire that firing
parades might be deferred till the agitation about cartridges
among the Native troops had come to a close. In this state of
insubordination they appeared on parade on the morning of the
24th, and there consummated the crime for which they are now
about to suffer, by repeatedly refusing cartridges that had been
made as usual in their regimental magazine, when assured, too,
by Colonel Smyth that the cartridges had no grease on them
— that they were old ones, and exactly similar to what had been
in use in the regiment for thirty or forty years. Even now
they attempt to justify so gross an outrage upon discipline by
alleging that they had doubts of the cartridges. There has
been no acknowledgment of error — no expression of regret — no
pleading for mercy." " To the majority of the prisoners,"
therefore, it was added, " no portion of the sentence will be
remitted. I observe, however, that some of them are very
young, and I am willing to make allowance for their having
been misled by their more experienced comrades, and under
these circumstances I remit one-half of the sentence passed
upon the following men, who have not been more than five
years in the service." And then followed the names of eleven
young troopers, whose term of imprisonment was commuted to
five years. The sentence was to be carried into effect at
daybreak on the 9 th of May.
The morning dawned, lowering and gusty, and the troops of
n A a onrr^
38 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATII. [1857.
the Miratli Brigade were drawn up on the ground of the 60th
Rifles to see the prisoners formally dismissed to
May 9. their doom. The 3rd Cavalry had received their
the^entence. orders to attend unmounted. The European troops
and the Artillery, with their field-guns, were
so disposed as to threaten instant death to the Sipahis on the
first symptom of resistance. Under a guard of Bines and
Carabineers, the Eighty-five were then brought forward, clad
in their regimental uniforms — soldiers still; and then the
sentence was read aloud, which was to convert soldiers into
felons. Their accoutrements were taken from them, and their
uniforms were stripped from their backs. Then the armourers
and the smiths came forward with their shackles and their
tools, and soon, in the presence of that great concourse of their
old comrades, the Eighty-five stood, with the outward symbols
of their dire disgrace fastened upon them. It was a piteous
spectacle, and many there were moved with a great compassion,
when they saw the despairing gestures of those wretched men,
among whom were some of the very flower of the regiment —
soldiers who had served the British Government in trying
circumstances and iu strange places, and who had never before
wavered in their allegiance. Lifting up their hands and lifting
up their voices, the prisoners implored the General to have
mercy upon them, and not to consign them to so ignominious a
doom. Then, seeing that there was no other hope, they turned
to their comrades and reproached them for quietly suffering
this disgrace to descend upon them. There was not a Sipahi
present who did not feel the rising indignation in his throat.
But in the presence of those loaded field-guns and those
grooved rifles, and the glittering sabres of the Dragoons, there
could not be a thought of striking. The prisoners were
marched off to their cells, to be placed under the custody of a
guard of their own countrymen ; the parade was dismissed ;
and the Sipahis, Cavalry and Infantry, went, silent and stern,
to their work, to talk over the incidents of that mournful
morning parade.*
* Lord Canning's commentary on these proceedings may be given here:
" The riveting of the men's fetters on parade, occupying, as it did, several
hours, in the presence of many who were already ill-disposed, and many who
believed in the cartridge fable, must have stung the brigade to the quick.
The consigning the eighty-five prisoners, after such a ceremony, to the gaol,
with no other than a Native guard over them, was, considering the nature of
1857.] THE MIRATH CANTONMENT. 39
It was Saturday. So far as English eyes could see or English
Lrains could understand, the day passed quietly over. The
troop-captains of the 3rd Cavalry visited the prisoners in the
gaol, which was situated at a distance of about two miles from
the cantonment, to be for the last time the channel of com-
munication between them and the outer world. It was their
duty to adjust the balances of the Sipahis' pay, and they were
anxious, in the kindness of their hearts, to arrange the settle-
ments of the prisoners' debts, and to carry any messages which
the men might desire to send to the families from whom they
had been sundered. And whilst this was going on in the gaol
wild reports were flying about the Bazaars, and there was a
great fear in the Lines, for it was said that the Euixypeans were
about to take possession of the magazines, and that the two
thousand fetters, of which Eumour had spoken before, were
now ready, and that the work of the morning was only an
experiment and a beginning. But the shades of evening fell
upon Mirath, and the English residents, after their accustomed
ride, met each other at dinner, and talked cheerfully and con-
fidently of the Past and the Future. At one dinner-table,
where the Commissioner and his wife and the Colonel of the
11th Sipahis were present, a rumour was mentioned to the
effect that the walls had been placarded with a Muhammadan
proclamation calling upon the people to rise against the English.
But the general feeling was one of indignant disbelief, and each
man went to his home and laid his head upon his pillow as
tranquilly as though from one end of Mirath to another there
had been no bitter resentments to be gratified, in the breasts of
any but the manacled, harmless, helpless prisoners in the great
gaol.
I must pause here, a little space, for the better explanation
of what follows, to speak of the great Cantonment
of Mirath. This military station was one of the cant^mSS
most extensive in India. It covered an area of
some five miles in circumference, the space being divided by a
great mall or esplanade, along which ran a deep nala, or
ditch, cutting the station into two separate parallelograms, the
one containing the European and the other the Native force.
their offence, and tlie known temper of a part of the Army, a folly that is in-
conceivable.'' — Letter to Mr. Vernon Smith, June 5, 1857. MS.' Correspond-
40 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. [1857
The European Lines were on the northern quarter of Mirath,
the Artillery Barracks being to the right, the Dragoons to the
left, and the Rifles in the centre. Between the barracks of the
two last stood the station church ; a great plain or parade-
ground stretching out still further to the northward. The
Sipahi Lines lay to the south of the cantonment, and between
what may be called the European and Native quarters there
was an intervening space covered with shops and houses, sur-
rounded by gardens and trees. Still further to the southward
lay the city. The officers of the European regiments and
Artillery officers occupied bungalows along the northern line,
whilst the Sipahi officers dwelt chiefly near their own men.
The Brigadier's house was on the right, not far from the
Artillery Barracks and Mess-House. The General's residence
was nearer to the Native Lines. The most noticeable features
of the whole, and those which it is most important to bear in
mind in the perusal of what follows, are the division of the
great cantonment into two parts, the distance of the European
barracks from the Native Lines, and the probability therefore
of much that was passing in the latter being wholly unknown
to the occupants of the former.
The fierce May sun rose on the Sabbath morning, and the
English residents prepared themselves to attend
Mayio* *k e ministrations of their religion in the station
church. There was, indeed, a lull ; but the signs
of it, afterwards noted, clearly presaged that there was some-
thing in the air. In the European barracks it appeared that
there was a general desertion of the Native servants, whose
business it was to administer to the wants of the white soldiery,
and in the bungalows of the officers there was a disposition on
the part of their domestics, especially of those who had been
hired at Mirath, to absent themselves from their masters'
houses. But these things were observable at the time only as
accidental circumstances of little significance, and the morning
service was performed and the mid-day heats were lounged
through, as in times of ordinary security. Severed from the
great mass of the people, the English could see nothing of an
unwonted character on that Sunday afternoon; but in the
Lines of the Native soldiery, in the populous Bazaars, and even
in the surrounding villages there were signs of a great commo-
tion. The very children could see that something was about to
happen. Men of all kinds were arming themselves. The
^857.] SUNDAY EVENING AT MiKATH. 41
dangerous classes were in a state of unwonted excitement and
activity. Many people of bad character had come in from the
adjacent hamlets, and even from more remote places, as though
they discerned the prospect of a great harvest. Among the
mixed population of the Lines and the Bazaars were men
agitated by emotions of the most varied character. Hatred of
the English, desire for revenge, religious enthusiasm, thirst for
plunder, were all at work within them ; but paramount over all
was a nameless fear ; for, ever as the day advanced, the report
gained strength that the English soldiery, armed to the teeth,
would soon be let loose amongst them ; that every Sipahi before
nightfall would have fetters on his wrists ; that the People
would be given up to massacre, and the Bazaars to plunder.
The sun went clown and the time came for evening service,
and the English Chaplains prepared themselves for their minis-
trations. One has narrated how, when he was about to start
with his wife for the station church, the Native nurse warned
them that there was danger, and besought her mistress to
remain at home. The woman said that there would be a fight
with the Sipahis, but the Chaplain listened incredulously to
the statement, and taking his wife and children with him,
entered his carriage, and was driven to church.* In the
church-compound he met his colleague and other Christian
people with a look of anxious inquiry on their pale, scared faces.
It was plain that the warning by which it was endeavoured to
stay his progress was something more than an utterance of
vague suspicion or senseless fear. Sounds and sights had
greeted the church-goers on their way which could not be
misinterpreted. The unwonted rattling of musketry on that
JSabbath evening, the assembly-call of the buglers, the hurrying
to and fro of armed men on the road, the panic-struck looks of
the unarmed, the columns of smoke that were rising against the
fast-darkening sky, all told the same story. The Native troops
at Mirath had revolted.
It will never be known with certainty whence arose the first
promptings to that open and outrageous rebellion
of which these sounds and sights were the signs. S^aSSj?
What meetings and conspiracies there may have
been in the Lines — whether there was any organised scheme
* See the Chaplain's (Mr. Eotton's) Narrative. He left his wife and
children in a place of safety on the way to church.
42 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. [1857.
for the release of the prisoners, the burning of cantonments, and
the murder of all the Christian officers, can be only dimly con-
jectured. The probabilities are at variance with the assumption
that the Native troops at Mirath deliberately launched them-
selves into an enterprise of so apparently desperate a character.
With a large body of English troops — Horse, Foot, and Artillery
— to confront them in the hour of mutiny, what reasonable
hopes could there be of escape from swift and crushing retri-
bution ? They knew the temper and the power of English
soldiers too well to trust to a contingency of inaction of which
the Past afforded no example. There was not a station in
India at which an outbreak of Native troops could appear to be
so hopeless an experiment as in that great military cantonment
which had become the Head-Quarters of the finest Artillery
Eegiment in the world. But this very feeling of our over-
powering strength at Mirath may have driven the Sipahis into
the great panic of despair, out of which came the spasm of
madness which produced such unexpected results on that
Sabbath night. There had been for some days an ominous
report, of which I have already spoken, to the effect that the
Europeans were about to fall suddenly on the Sipahi regiments,
to disarm them, and to put every man of them in chains. In
fear and trembling they were looking for a confirmation of this
rumour in every movement of the English troops. When,
therefore, the 60th Eifles were assembling for church parade,
the Sipahis believed that the dreaded hour had arrived.
The 3rd Cavalry were naturally the most excited of all.
Eighty-five of their fellow-soldiers were groaning in prison.
Sorrow, shame, and indignation were strong within them for
their comrades' sake, and terror for their own. They had been
taunted by the courtesans of the Bazaar, who asked if they
were men to suffer their comrades to wear such anklets of iron ;*
and they believed that what they had seen on the day before
was but a foreshadowing of a greater cruelty to come. So,
* This is stated very distinctly by Mr. J. C. "Wilson (an excellent authority)
in his interesting Muradabad Report. "And now," he writes, "the frail
ones' taunts were heard far and wide, and the rest of the regiment was
assailed with words like these: 'Your brethren have been ornamented with
these anklets and incarcerated; and for what? Because they would not
swerve from their creed ; and you, cowards as you are, sit still indifferent to
your fate. If you have an atom of manhood in you, go and release them."
1857.] RESCUE OF THE PRISONERS. 43
whilst the European soldiers were preparing themselves for
church parade, the Native troopers were mounting their horses
and pricking forward towards the great gaol.
Then it became miserably apparent that a fatal error had
been committed. There were no European soldiers
posted to protect the prison-house in which were Kesc u e of the
the condemned malefactors of the Sipahi Army.
The prisoners had been given over to the " civil power," and an
additional guard, drawn from the 20th Sipahi Regiment, had
been placed over the gaol. The troopers knew what was the
temper of that regiment. They had no fear for the result, so
they pushed on, some in uniform, man and horse fully accoutred,
some in their stable dresses with only watering rein and horse-
cloth on their charges, but all armed with sabre and with
pistol. Soon under the walls of the gaol — soon busy at their
work — they met with, as they expected, no opposition. The
rescue began at once. Loosening the masonry around the
gratings of the cells in which their comrades were confined,
they wrenched out the iron bars and helped the prisoners
through the apertures. A Native smith struck off their chains,
and once again free men, the Eighty-five mounted behind their
deliverers, and rode back to the Lines. The troopers of the
3rd Cavalry at that time had no other work in hand but the
rescue of their comrades. The other prisoners in the gaol were
not released, the buildings were not fired, and the European
gaoler and his family were left unmolested.*
* There are conflicting statements on the subject of the release of the
prisoners in the new gaol. Dr. O'Callaghan (" Scattered Chapters on the
Indian Mutiny ") asserts that not only the eighty-five, but all the other
prisoners had been released by the infantry guard before the cavalry arrived.
When the troopers arrived, he says, " After their rapid and furious gallop at
the gaol, they found their comrades already released and emerging from
incarceration, and the general crowd of felons also rushing rapidly forth to
join in the fire, pillage, and slaughter." But Mr. Commissioner Williams,
in his very circumstantial official report, says that the troopers " dug out of
the wall the gratings of some of the windows of the ward in which the eighty-
five mutineers were confined, and took their comrades away, the guard of the
20th accompanying, and the armed guard of the »aol soon followed. None
of the other convicts, in number about eight hundred, were released by the
cavalry troopers, nor was any injury done by them to the buildings." But he
adds, "About three hundred or four hundred Sipahis released the convicts
from the old gaol, which is between the city and the Native lines, and which
contained about seven hundred and twenty prisoners altogether."
44 THE OUTBREAK AT MiRATH. [1857.
Meanwhile, the Infantry regiments had broken into open
revolt. The Sipahis of the 11th and the 20th
R iD°fantr tbe were in a state of wild excitement. Maddened
by their fears — expecting every moment that the
Europeans would be upon them — believing that there was one
great design in our hearts to manacle the whole of them, and,
perhaps, to send them as convicts across the black water, they
thought that the time had come for them to strike for their
liberties, for their lives, for their religions. So it happened
that when the excitement in the Lines was made known to
some of our English officers, and they went down, as duty bade
them, to endeavour to allay it, they found that the men whom
the}'' had once regarded as docile children had been suddenly
turned into furious assailants. Among those who, on that
Sunday evening, rode down to the Sipahis' Lines was Colonel
Finnis, who commanded the 11th. A good soldier, beloved by
officers and by men, he had the old traditionary faith in the
Sipahis which it became those, who had served with them and
knew their good qualities, to cherish. Strong in the belief of
the loyalty of his regiment, Finnis, with other officers of his
corps, went into the midst of them to remonstrate and to
dissuade. He was speaking to his men, when a
c i? e ei Finnis so ^ c ^ er °f tne -0 tn discharged his musket and
wounded the Colonel's horse. Presently another
musket was discharged into his body. The ball entered at his
back; he fell from his horse, and a volley was fired into
him. He died, " riddled with bullets." Thus the Sipahis of
the 20th had slain the Colonel of the 11th Eegiment, and the
bullets of the former had been scattered in the ranks of the
latter. For a little space the two regiments looked at each
other; but there was no doubt of the issue. The 11th broke
into open revolt, and fraternised with their comrades of
the 20th.
The whole of the Native Eegiments at Mirath had now
revolted. The Sipahis of the Infantry and the
Progress of troopers of the Cavalry had made common cause
the Itevolt. .-!■ __. n *^ t -»r i t
against us. Hindus and Muhammadans were
stirred by one impulse to slaughter the Faringhis, man, woman,
and child. So as the sun went down the massacre went on,
and our people, who were returning from the unaccomplished
evening service, or, ignorant of the excitement and the danger,
were starting for the wonted evening ride or drive, were
1857.] PEOGEESS OF THE EEVOLT. 45
fiercely assailed by the infuriated soldiery, and shot down or
sabred as they sate their horses or leaned back in their carriages
to enjoy the coolness of the air. Wheresoever a stray English
soldier was to be found, he was murdered without remorse.
The Bazaars and the neighbouring villages were pouring forth
their gangs of plunderers and incendiaries. From every street
and alley, and from the noisome suburbs, they streamed forth
like wild beasts from their lairs, scenting the prey.* The
prisoners in the gaols were let loose, and the police became
their comrades in crime. But so little concert and arrangement
was there, that some detachments on guard-duty, posted in the
European quarter of the great straggling cantonment, appear
to have remained faithful to their English masters after their
fellow-soldiers had broken out into open revolt. Indeed, whilst
in one part of the cantonment the Sipahis were butchering their
officers, in another they were saluting them as they passed, as
though nothing had happened-! Even at the Treasury, with
all its manifest temptations, the guard stood staunchly to its
duty, and at a later hour made over the charge in all its integrity
to the Europeans sent to defend it. Not a rupee had been
touched by the Sipahis. And when the rabble from the city
swarmed upon it, they found it covered by a guard of Eifle-
men.
But, in the midst of all this great tribulation, there was,
in the hearts of our Christian people, a strength of confidence
* " Cities, like forests, have their dens, in which everything that is most
wicked and formidable conceals itself. The only difference is that what hides
itself thus in cities is ferocious, unclean, and little — that is to say, ugly ; what
conceals itself in the forests is ferocious, savage, and grand — that is to say,
beautiful. Den for den, those of the beasts are preferable to those of men,
and caverns are better than hiding-places." — Victor Hugo. Mr. Commissioner
"Williams, in his official report above quoted, says that the towns-people had
armed themselves and were ready for the onslaught before the Sipahis had
commenced the carnage. " Before a shot had been fired, the inhabitants of
Sadr Bazaar went out armed with swords, spears, and clubs, any weapon they
could lay hands on, collected in crowds in every lane and alley, and at every
outlet of the Bazaars ; and the residents of the wretched hamlets, which had
been allowed to spring up all round it and between it and the city, were to be
seen similarly armed, pouring out to share in what they evidently knew was
going to happen."
f I do not mean to signify that the Sipahis in the European quarter of the
cantonment were uniformly quiescent at this time ; for 1 am informed that
the Guard at Brigadier Wilson's house fired at some officers who were passing
before they broke away. But there was obviously no general concert.
46 THE OUTBREAK AT MiKATH. [1857.
which calmed and comforted them ; for they said to each other,
or they said to themselves, " The Europeans will soon be upon
them." There were two regiments of Sipahi Infantry at
Mirath, and a regiment of Sipahi Cavalry. But the English
mustered a battalion of Eiflemen, a regiment of Dragoons armed
with carbines, and a large force of European Artillery, with all
the accessories of Head-Quarters.* There was not an English-
woman in the cantonment — the model cantonment of India —
who, remembering the presence of this splendid body of White
soldiers, had any other thought, at the first semblance of open
mutiny, than that there must be a sad massacre of the Native
troops. With a regiment of British Dragoons and a few Gal-
loper guns, Gillespie, half a century before, had crushed the
mutiny of Yellur, and saved the Southern Peninsula from
universal revolt and rebellion."]* He struck decisively because
he struck at once. And no one now doubted that a blow struck
with promptitude and vigour on this Sabbath evening would
save Mirath, and check the nascent activities of revolt in the
adjacent country. But by God's providence, for whatsoever
purpose designed, this first great revolt of the Sipahis was
suffered, unchecked, unpunished, to make headway in a clear
field, and to carry everything before it. The great confidence
of the Christian people was miserably misplaced. They looked
for a deliverance that never came. In some parts of the great
cantonment they were abandoned to fire and slaughter as hope-
lessly as though there had not been a single English soldier in
that great Head-Quarters of the Mirath Division.
The story of this great failure is not easily told, and the
attempt to tell it cannot be made without sadness.
inaction of Many narratives of the events of that night
the Europeans. J , . i -i • i
have been written ; and each writer has told, with
graphic distinctness of detail, what he himself saw and heard ;
but the confusion of those few critical hours is fully represented
* History, however, must not exaggerate the actual strength of this
European force. There were some deteriorating circumstances, of which
account must be taken. A considerable number of the Carabineers could not
ride, and there were no horses for them if they could. Not more than half
of the regiment (rive hundred strong) were mounted. Many of the European
.gunners, too, were young recruits, imperfectly acquainted with Artillery drill.
There were only two field-batteries fully equipped.
t See ante, vol. i. pp. 167-9.
1857.] THE COLONEL OF THE 3KD CAVALRY. 47
by the confusedness of the entire story ; and it is difficult to
impart unity and consistency to a scene, made up of scattered
effects, bewildering and distracting. What was wanted in that
conjuncture was the one man to impart to our British manhood
the promptitude and unity of action which would have crushed
the mutiny and saved the place — perhaps the country ; and
that one man did not rise in the hour of our tribulation.
There were three officers at Mirath whose bearing in that
critical hour the historian is specially bound to
investigate. They were, the officer commanding Co fon e d i u smyth
the 3rd Cavalry, the Brigadier commanding the
Station, and the General commanding the Division. All three
were resident in Mirath. It is not to be questioned that when
a regiment breaks into mutiny, the place of the commanding
officer, for life or for death, is in the midst of it. Not until all
hope has gone can there be any ex< u -e for his departure. As
the captain of a blazing vessel at sea is ever the last to leave
the quarter-deck and to let himself down the side of his ship,
so the commandant of a regiment in the fire of revolt should
cling to it as long as the semblance of a regiment remains, and
the safety of others can be aided by his presence. When,
therefore, intelligence reached Colonel Smyth that the troopers
of his regiment had broken into mutiny, it was his duty to
proceed at once to the Cavalry Lines. But he did not go near
the Lines.* He went to the Commissioner's house ; he went
to the General's ; and he went to the Brigadier's. He went
everywhere but to his Regiment. From the moment that the
troopers broke out into revolt they saw no more of their Colonel.
He spent the night with the Head-Quarters of the Division,
where the rifles and the carbines and the field-guns were
collected, and never had the least conception all the time of
* " Most of the officers of the 3rd Light Cavalry at once proceeded to the
lines of their regiment, arming hastily, and ordering their horses to follow ;
but I have never been able to discover that the officer commanding the corps
repaired to his post, or was seen in the lines amongst the men, during the
whole of that eventful evening and night; and it would appear that Colonel
Smyth was so fortunate as to make an early escape into the protection of the
European military quarter." — 0' Callaghan. Scattered Chapters on the Indian
Mutiny. It should be stated, however, that Colonel Smyth was Field-Officer
of the week — a fact upon which he himself has laid considerable stress, as
though, in his estimation, it exempted him from all special regard for his own
particular regiment.
48 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. [1857.
what had become of his men.* But they were not all past
hope. That something might have been done to save at least a
portion of the regiment we know. Captain
CrSSe 1 Craigie, at the first sound of the tumult, mustered
his troop, ordered them to accoutre themselves as
for a parade, and when they had mounted galloped down to the
gaol, accompanied by his subaltern, Melville Clarke. They
were too late to prevent the rescue of the prisoners ; but not to
set a grand example. Craigie and Clarke kept their men
together, and brought them back, with unbroken discipline, to
the parade-ground of the regiment. And during that night
many acts of heroic fidelity were written down to the honoui
of Craigie's troop. They had faith in their Captain. And it has
been truly recorded of Craigie and Clarke, that " these gallant
Englishmen handled the troop as if mutiny were a crime
unknown to their men." f
The station was commanded by Colonel Archdale Wilson,
Brigadier of Artillery. He was a man of a spare
^vfisoiT an( ^ wir y frame, of active athletic habits, who had
ever borne a good character in the splendid
regiment to the command of which he had then risen. For
some years, when the Head-Quarters of the Artillery had been
at Damdamah, in the vicinity of Calcutta, he had been
Adjutant-General of the regiment, and was thoroughly ac-
quainted with all its details. But he had not seen much active
service since his youth, and had never had any grave responsi-
bilities cast upon him. His training had been too purely of a
professional character to generate any great capacity for taking
in a situation of such magnitude as that which he was now
* Colonel Smyth has published his own account of his proceedings on the
evening of the 10th of May : " I went," he says, " first to Mr. Greathead's,
gave information to the servants, as Mr. G. was out. ... I then went on
to the General's, and heard that he had just left the house in his carriage ;
so I galloped on to the Brigadier's. ... I went on to the Artillery parade,
and found the Brigadier already on the ground ; and I accompanied him with
the troops to the other end of the cantonments, and remained with him all
night, and accompanied him again the next morning with Cavalry, Infantry,
and Artillery through the cantonments, and went with the Artillery and
Cavalry on the right of the Dehli road," &c, &c.
t Official Report of Mr. Commissioner Williams. The writer states that
" Lieutenant Clarke rode out from the head of the troop, and ran his sword
through a trooper of the regiment who was insulting an European lady, and
Captain Craigie gave the wretch his finishing stroke.''
1857.] BRIGADIER ARCHDALE WILSON. 49
suddenly called upon to confront. But he was not a man, in
such a crisis as had then arisen, to look idly on, or to shrink
from a forward movement. What he did at the outset was
what it became him to do. It was about half-past six when
Brigade-Major Whish drove into the Brigadier's compound, and
told hi in that the Native troops had broken into mutiny.
Instantly Wilson ordered his horse to be saddled and brought
round, and having sent orders to the Artillery and Carabineers
to join him there, he galloped to the parade-ground of the
Eifles, and finding them on the point of marching for church,
directed their Colonel to dismiss the parade, and to reassemble
them as quickly as possible with their arms. This was
promptly effected ; but there was some delay in supplying the
regiment with balled cartridge. The Dragoons had not yet
come up. It has been stated that the Colonel had suffered the
regiment to be mustered as for an ordinary parade ; * and the
slow process of roll-call had been going on whilst the last hour
of daylight was passing away, and the enemy were slaughtering
our people with impunity.
Meanwhile, General Hewitt had appeared on parade, and the
Artillery had been brought up to the ground.
When Colonel Jones reported that the Eifles were S e ™^ s an t
ready for action, Wilson, with the General's sanc-
tion, detached one company to the Collector's cutcherry to
protect the treasure, and another for the protection of the
barracks. Taking the other companies, with the Artillery, he
marched down upon the Native Infantry Lines, where he
expected to find the main body of the mutineers assembled.
* [This charge was made in error. Some correspondence ensued between
Sir John Kaye and Colonel distance, and the former admitted in a note which
was added as an appendix to his later editions, that the charge was incorrect,
and that he withdrew it. The fact is that the Carabineers turned out with
extreme rapidity ; but, as Colonel Le Champion wrote, " Colonel Custance
and his regiment had to await orders, and, if any delay took place, it was, I
imagine, owing to the very late arrival on the scene of General Hewitt
from his house, distant a long way off. . . . The Carabineers were in
broad daylight ordered, not to the mutineers' parade-ground close by, but to
the prison some miles off, and the services of Colonel Custance and his fine
regiment .... were lost pro tern. I myself saw the regiment drawn up
and ready for orders, and I do not believe that the slightest delay occurred
wh<-M those orders were received by Colonel Custance." I have thought it
due to the regiment that this unimpeachable testimony should be unearthed
from the Appendix, and recorded in a place where it would confront the
original statement. — G. B. M.]
VOL. If. E
50 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. [1857.
On or near the parade-ground he was joined by the Carabineers,
who had lost their way.* There was now a force ready for
action which might have destroyed all the Sipahis in Mirath,
if they could have been brought into action with the white
soldiers — if, indeed, our people could only have seen the enemy
for a little space of time. But the shades of night had now
fallen upon the scene. And when, near the Native Infantry
huts, the English troops were deployed into line and swept the
whole space where it was expected that the mutineers would
have been found, not a man was to be seen, either in the
Infantry Lines or on the parade-ground; and none knew
whither they were gone. But near the Cavalry Lines a few
troopers were seen, and the Bines opened fire upon them. The
mutineers fled into a wood or copse at the rear of their huts,
and the guns were then unlimbered, and a few harmless rounds
of grape fired into the obscurity of the night.
It was plain now that the mutineers were dispersed. The
question was, What were they doing ? To Wilson it seemed
that the mutineers had moved round to the European quarter
of the Cantonment ; and he therefore recommended the General
to move back the brigade for its protection. To this Hewitt,
glad to be advised, assented; and the troops set their faces
homewards. By this time the moon had risen, and the blazing
bungalows of the English officers lit up the scene with a lurid
glare. But our troops met only a few unarmed plunderers.
The mutineers were not to be seen. What, then, was to done ?
It has been often stated that one officer at least answered the
question as it ought to have been answered. Captain Rosser,
of the Carabineers (so the story runs), offered to lead a squadron
of his regiment and some Horse Artillery guns in pursuit of the
enemy along the Dehli road. But the statement has been
authoritatively contradicted.! It is only certain that the
* Brigadier Wilson did not see the Carabineers until the whole body of
troops were returning to the European Lines.
t As regards Captain Rosser's offer to take a detachment of Cavalry and
some Hors>± Artillery guns to Dehli, on the night of the 10th of May, I should
6tate that I have received a letter from Mrs. Rosser, enclosing one from her
husband, written shortly after the outbreak, most distinctly asserting that he
made the offer, which has been denied by the authorities ; and I must admit
that all I have heard, since the first edition of this work was published,
strengthens the conviction that the offer was made, though not, perhaps, in
accordance with those strict military rules which, though recognised in quiet
times, must be departed from in a great crisis.
1857.] TERRORS OF THE NIGHT. 51
enemy escaped ; and that, with the exception of some pickets
which were planted on the bridges across the nala which ran
between the European Cantonment and the Native Lines and
Sadr Bazaar, the whole of Hewitt's force bivouacked for the
night on the European parade-ground.
And the night was a night of horror such as History has
rarely recorded. The brief twilight of the Indian
summer had soon passed ; and the darkness which Ma y 10_11 -
fell upon the scene brought out, with terrible dis- Tm ^ht. the
tinctness, the blazing work of the incendiary.
Everywhere, from the European quarters, from the bungalows
of the English officers, from the mess-houses and other public
buildings, from the residences of the unofficial Christian com-
munity, the flames were seen to rise, many-shaped and many-
coloured, lighting up the heavy columns of smoke which were
suspended in the still sultry air. And ever, as the conflagration
spread, and the sight became more portentous, the sounds of
the great fiery destruction, the crackling and the crashing of
the burning and falling timbers, the roar of the flames, and the
shrieks of the horses scorched to death in their stables, mingled
with the shouts and yells of the mutineers and the rattling of
the musketry which proclaimed the great Christian carnage.
The scared inhabitants of the burning buildings — the women
and children and non-combatants — sought safety in the gardens
and out-houses, wmither they were often tracked by the insur-
gents, and shot down or cut to pieces. Some fled in the
darkness, and found asylums in such places as had escaped the
fury of the incendiaries. Some were rescued by Native
servants or soldiers, faithful among the faithless, who, in
memory of past kindnesses, strove to save the lives of their
white masters at the peril of their own.
Among those who w^ere thus saved were Hervey Greathed,
the Commissioner, and his wife. Warned of
the approaching danger, first by an officer of ^JJJf ^Jig 6
the 3rd Cavalry, and then by a pensioned Afghan
chief, he had taken his wife, and some other Englishwomen
who had sought safety with him, to the terraced roof of
his house ; but the insurgents, after driving off his guard,
applied the firebrand to the lower part of the building,
plundered the rooms, and then surrounded the place. With
the flames raging beneath him, and the enemy raging around
E 2
52 THE OUTBKEAK AT MIRATH. [1857.
him, his position was one of deadly peril. And GreatLel and
his companions must have perished miserably but for the
fidelity of one of those Native servants upon whom so much
depended in the crisis which was then threatening our people.
With rare presence of mind and fertility of resource he simu-
lated intense sympathy with the rebels. He told them that it
was bootless to search the house, as his master had escaped
from it, but that, if they would follow him to a little distance,
they would find the Faringhis hiding themselves behind a
haystack. Fully confiding in the truth of his story, they
suffered themselves to be led away from the house ; and its
inmates descended safely into an empty garden just as the
upper rooms were about to " fall in with a tremendous crash."*
There were others far less happy on that disastrous Sunday
evening. Wives, left without protection whilst
I th ide ° t h° f their husbands were striving to do their duty in
the Lines, were savagely cut to pieces in their
burning homes ; and little children were massacred beneath the
eyes of their mother. Then delicate English ladies, girt about
with fiery danger, death on every side, turned, with a large-
hearted sympathy, their thoughts towards their suffering fellow-
countrywomen, and tried to rescue them from the threatened
doom. In adjacent bungalows were two ladies, wives of officers
of the Brigade. One was under special protection, for her
husband had endeared himself to the men of his
raigie. ^ r00 p ^y ki g unfailing kindness and consideration
for them. The other, wife of the Adjutant of the 11th Regi-
ment, had but recently come from England, and
was strange to all the environments of her situa-
tion. The more experienced Englishwoman, seeing the danger
of her position, and hearing the shrieks which issued from her
house, was moved with a great compassion, and sent her
servants to rescue the affrighted creature from the fury of her
assailants. But when, after some delay, they entered her house,
they found her covered with wounds, lying dead upon the
floor. Then the insurgents, having done their bloody work,
raged furiously against the adjacent bungalow, and were only
driven from their purpose by the fidelity of some of Craigie's
* Mrs. Greathed'a Narrative. See also note in Appendix for somo
account of the gallant nnd devoted conduct of Saiud Mir Khan, an Afghan
pensioner resident at Mirath.
1857.] THE DAWN. 53
troopers, who were ready to save the wife of their Captain at
the risk of their own lives. In the course of the night, after
doing good service, Craigie returned, in fear and trembling,
to his household gods, thinking to find them shattered and
desecrated ; but, by the exceeding mercy of God, safe himself,
he found them safe, and soon had matured measures for their
escape. Wrapping up the ladies in dark-coloured horse-cloths
to conceal their white garments in the glare of the burning
station, he led them from the house, and hiding under trees, or
in a ruined temple, they passed the night in sleepless horror.
Often the voices of bands of mutineers or plunderers in the
compound smote upon their ears; but there were help and
protection in the presence of a few of Craigie's troopers, who
hovered about the place, and in some of his own body-servants,
who were equally true to their master. In the early morning
the enemy had cleared off, and there was a prospect of escape.
So they returned sadly to their dearly-loved home, collected a
few cherished articles and some necessary clothing, and went
forth from their Paradise with the naming sword behind them,
never again to return. And the leave-takings of that sorrow-
iaden night were the first of many cruel divulsions, which tore
happy families from their homes and sent them forth into the
wide world, houseless wanderers and fugitives, with a savage
and remorseless enemy yelling behind them in their track.
Many other episodes of pathetic interest might here be re-
lated illustrative of the horrors of that night, if historical
necessity did not forbid such amplitude of detailed recital.
The sweepings of the gaols and the scum of the Bazaars — all
the rogues and ruffians of Mirath, convicted and unconvicted,
and the robber tribes of the neighbouring villages — were loose
in the cantonment, plundering and destroying wherever an
English bungalow was to be gutted and burnt. The Sipahis
had left the work, which they had commenced, to men who
found it truly a congenial task. Day dawned; and those who
survived the night saw how thoroughly the work had been
done. As they crept from their hiding-places and sought safety
in the public buildings protected by the Europeans, they saw, in
the mangled corpses which lay by the wayside, in the blackened
ruins of the houses which skirted the roads, and in the masses
of immovable property, thrown out of the dwelling-places of
the English, and smashed into fragments apparently by blows
from heavy clubs, ghastly evidences of the fury of their
54 THE OUTBREAK AT MIRATH. 1.1857.
enemies.* But with the morning light a great quietude had
fallen upon the scene. The Sipahis had departed. The ruffians
of the gaols and the Bazaars and the Gujar villages had slunk
back into their homes. There was little more to be done —
nothing more that could be done in the face of the broad day —
by these desjncable marauders. So our people gathered new
heart ; and as the sun rose they thought that our time had come.
But the Mirath Brigade did nothing more in the clear
morning light than it had done in the shadow of
the darkness. The English troops, with the Eng-
lish leaders, rose from the bivouac ; and it dawned upon them
that more than two thousand mutineers had made their way
to Dehli. Even then, if the Carabineers and the Horse Artillery
had been let loose, they might, before noon, have reached the
imperial city and held mutiny in check. But contemporary
annals record only that the European troops, Horse, Foot, and
Artillery, went out for a reconnaissance " on the right of the
Dehli road." Not a man was despatched to the place which was
the great centre of political intrigue and political danger — which
was the great palatial home of the last representative of the
house of Taimur, and which held a large body of Native troops,
and the great magazine of Upper India, unprotected by even a de-
tachment of Europeans. Nor less surprising was it, that, with
all these shameful proofs of the great crimes which had been
committed, the rising indignation in the breasts of our English
leaders did not impel them to inflict terrible retribution upon
other criminals. The Bazaars on that Monday morning must
have been full of the plundered property of our people, and of
many dreadful proofs and signs of complicity in the great crime
of the preceding night. Retribution might have fallen on many
of the murderers red-handed ; but not a regiment was let loose
upon the guilty quarter. The murdered bodies were collected
and laid out in the Theatre, where a mimic tragedy was to have
been performed that evening ; and the slayers of women and
* " The inveterate animcsity with which the work of destruction was car-
ried out may be judged of by the fact that houses built entirely of masonry,
with nothing inflammable except the doors and the beams, which for a con-
siderable height from the ground supported the roofs, formed of cement, rest-
ing on kiln-burnt bricks, were as effectually destroyed as the thatched bunga-
lows Property which the miscreants could not carry off was thrown out and
smashed into fragments, evidently pounded with heavy clubs." — Report of
Commissioner Williams.
1857.] QUESTION OF RETKIBUTION. 55
children, and the desecrators of our homesteads, were suffered
to enjoy unmolested the fruits of their work ; * whilst the
Mirath Brigade, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, marched about
Cantonments, and looked at the Dehli road along which the
mutineers had made good their escape, j
What might have been done by our people to overtake the
guilty actors in the tragedy of that Sunday night, and to strike
awe into the hearts of all who were minded to follow in the
same track, may be gathered from an individual example, the
record of which lies before me. It has been narrated how
Mrs. Chambers, wife of the Adjutant of the 11th, was foully
murdered in her bungalow. One of her husband's friends,
Lieutenant Moller of the same regiment, obtained soon after-
wards what appeared to be good evidence that a certain butcher
of the Great Bazaar was the assassin. On this he started in
his buggy for the Bazaar, tracked out the guilty man, seized
him, and carried him back to Cantonments with a loaded pistol
at his head. A drum-head court-martial was assembled, and
whilst Chambers lay in convulsions in an adjoining room, the
wretch was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged.
And in a little while his lifeless body was swinging from the
branch of a mango-tree.J There may, at this time, have been
other examples of individual courage and resolution of the
same stern character, as there were afterwards in all parts of
the disturbed country ; but the arm of authority was not up-
lifted to strike, and the multitude of criminals escaped.
Indeed, wheresoever a number of Englishmen are gathered
together there will surely be deeds of gallantry, many and
great, though they may be obliterated by the hand of death
or lost in the confusion of the hour. And Mirath saw many
acts of personal bravery done by our people which will never
* " It is a marvellous thing that with the dreadful proof of the night's work
*ii every direction, though groups of savages were actually seen gloating over
the mangled and mutilated remains of the victims, the column did not take
immediate vengeance on the Sadr Bazaar and its environs, crowded as the
whole place was with wretches hardly concealing their fiendish satisfaction,
and when there were probably few houses from which plundered property
might not have been recovered. But the men Avere restrained ; the bodies were
collected and placed in the theatre, in which a dramatic tragedy would have
been enacted, but for the real and awful one which occurred the night before."
— Report of Commissioner Williams.
t See statement of Colonel Smyth, quoted ante, page 48, note.
% This was on the 14th of May.
56 THE OUTBKEAK AT MIItATH. [1857.
perhaps find sufficient record.* Nor should it be forgotten
that many noble instances of gratitude and generosity, or it
might perhaps have been only of common humanity, were
apparent in the conduct of the Natives, who, whilst their
brethren were striking, put forth their hands to save, and
risked their own lives to protect those of the people whose only
crime it was that they had white faces.f
* " The firm bearing of the Deputy- Assistant Commissary-General, who
stood by his office till his house was in flames, and a young officer rushed in
with his lower jaw shattered by a musket-ball, and it was evident that the
mutinous guard would abstain no longer; the gallant resistance of the
Executive Engineer, Grand Trunk Koad; the courage with which at least
one woman attacked and wounded her assailants — these and many other
instances of the fortitude with which our countrymen and countrywomen met
the unexpected onslaught, deserve notice, but cannot be detailed in such a
narrative." — Beport of Mr. Commissioner Williams. Unpublished Correspond-
ence.
t " Two Sipahis of the 11th Native Infantry most carefully escorted two
ladies, with children, to the Dragoon Barracks. A Muhammadan in the city
sheltered two Christian families, when the act was not only a singular devia-
tion from the general conduct of his sect, but one full of danger to himself.
A female servant and washerman succeeded in saving the young children of a
lady, whom also they were attempting to save veiled in Native clothes, when
a ruffian drew open the ved, saw the pale face, and cut the poor mother to
pieces." — Ibid.
1857.] THE KIDE TO DEHLL 57
CHAPTER III.
The Seizure of Dehli.
Whilst the Mirath Brigade were bivouacking on the great
parade-ground, the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry,
scarcely drawing rein on the way, were pricking The JSe'to'Dehii.
on, in hot haste, all through the moonlit night for
Dehli. And the foot regiments were toiling on laboriously
behind them, making rapid progress under the impulse of a grear,
fear. It is hard to believe that on that Sabbath evening a
single Native soldier had discharged his piece without a belief,
in his inmost heart, that he was going straight to martyrdom.
A paroxysm of suicidal insanity was upon them. They were
in a great passion of the Present, and were reckless of the
Future. But the sound of the carbines and the rifles and the
roar of the guns, with their deadly showers of grape and
canister, must have been ringing in their ears, and they must
have felt that they were lost hopelessly. And now, as the}'
speeded onwards in the broad moonlight, they must have
listened for the noise of the pursuing Dragoons, and must have
felt, in their panic flight, that the Europeans would soon be
upon them. But hour after hour passed, and there was no
sound of pursuit ; and soon after break of day they saw the
waters of the Jamnah glittering in the morning sun, and the
great City of Refuge rose encouragingly before them. Before
eight o'clock, the foremost troopers had crossed the river by the
bridge of boats, had cut down the toll-keeper, had fired the toll-
house, had slain a solitary Englishman who was returning to
Dehli across the bridge ; and under the windows of the King's
Palace they were now clamouring for admittance, calling upon
his Majesty for help, and declaring that they had killed the
English at Mirath and had come to light for the Faith.
58", THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
Hearing their cry, the King summoned to his presence
Captain Douglas, the Commandant of the Palace
£ ttbe Guards. In the Hall of Audience, supporting his
tottering limbs with a staff, the aged monarch met
the English Captain. Douglas said that he would descend and
speak to the troopers ; but the King implored him not to go,
lest his life should be sacrificed, and laying hold of one his
hands, whilst Assan-ullah, the King's physician, took the other,
imperatively forbade him to go down to the gate. Then
Douglas went out on a balcony and told the troopers to depart,
as their presence was an annoyance to the King. He might as
well have spoken to the winds. Baffled at one point, they made
good their entrance at another. It was in vain to tell them to
close the gates, there were so many ; and the guards were not
to be trusted. It happened that the 38th Sipahi Eegiment was
then on duty in the city — that regiment which had successfully
defied the Government when it had been designed to send it
across the Black Water.* Already they were prepared to cast
in their lot with the mutineers. The Calcutta Gate was the
nearest to the bridge of boats; but when this was closed the
troopers made their way along the road that runs between the
palace walls and the river to the Eajghat Gate, which was
opened to them by the Muhammadans of the Thauba-Bazaar,
and they clattered into the town.
Then ensued a scene of confusion which it is difficult to
describe. Cutting down every European they could
Progress find, and setting fire to their houses, they doubled
insurrection, back towards the Calcutta Gate, where they learnt
that Commissioner Fraser, Douglas of the Palace
Guards, and other leading Englishmen would be found. As
they rode on, with the cry of " Din-Din ! " they were followed
by an excited Muhammadan rabble. The citizens closed their
shops in amazement and terror, and from one end of Dehli to
the other, as the news ran along the streets, there was sore
bewilderment and perplexity, and everybody looked for the
coming of the pursuing Englishmen, and feared that they would
inflict a terrible retribution upon the city that had harboured
the guilty fugitives. But no English regiments were coming
to the rescue. And these maddened Native troopers, with such
vile followers as they could gather up in the streets of Dehli,
* See ante, vol. i.
1857.] THE TROOPERS IN THE CITY. 59
were now masters of the city. They knew that throughout all
the Sipahi regiments in Cantonments there was not a man who
would pull a trigger, or draw a sword, or light a port-fire in
defence of his English officer. Without a fear, therefore, they
rushed on, scenting the English blood, eager for the larger
game, and ever proclaiming as they went glory to the Padishah
and death to the Earinghis.
Whilst the Mirath mutineers were coming up from the
further end of the long line of palace buildings, Commissioner
Fraser at the other end was vainly endeavouring to secure the
loyalty of the Sipahi Guards. Captain Douglas also had gone
forth on the same vain errand. But it was soon clear that they
were powerless. The troopers came upon them, and the 38th,
heedless of Fraser's appeals, fraternised with the new-comers.
Words now were nothing ; authority was nothing. In the face
of that surging multitude, increasing in numbers and in fury
every moment, the English gentlemen felt that they carried
their lives in their hands. When the leading troopers galloped
up, Fraser and Douglas were in a buggy together ; but, seeing
the danger that beset them, they descended and made for the
gate of the civil guard-house, or police-station, where other
Englishmen joined them. Taking a musket fr<*:n one of the
guards, Fraser shot the foremost of the troopers dead, and those
who followed, seeing their comrade drop, fell back a little space ;
but the multitude behind pressed on, and it was soon apparent
that safety was to be found only in flight. Fraser then re-
entered his buggy and drove for the Lahor Gate of the Palace,
whilst Douglas flung himself into the ditch of the Fort, and
though severely injured by the fall, thus sheltered from the fire
of the enemy, crept towards the Palace Gate. Some Chaprasis of
the Palace Guard, who had followed him, lifted him up, almost
powerless from the injuries he had received, and one of them
took the Captain on his shoulders and carried him into the
Palace. Presently Fraser and Hutchinson, the Collector, who
had been wounded at the commencement of the affray, arrived
also at the Palace.*
* All this is necessarily given upon Native evidence, adduced at the trials
of the King of Dehli and* Mughul Beg. In some respects the statements are
contradictory. One witness says that Mr. Hutchinson accompanied Captain
Douglas ; another that he arrived with Mr. Fraser. A third says, that as
soon as Captain Douglas was able to speak, he ordered his Chaprasis to
search for Mr. Hutchinson and bring him into the Palace.
GO THE SEIZUEE OF DEHLI. [1857.
In the apartments occupied by Captain Douglas there were
then residing, as his guests, Mr. Jennings, the
Fraser. r ° fMr ' English Chaplain, Miss Jennings, his daughter,
and a young lady named Clifford, a friend of
the latter. Mr. Jennings had from an early hour of the
morning been watching through a telescope the advance of
the Mirath mutineers, and he knew that there was mischief in
the wind. Hearing a noise, he went below and found that
Captain Douglas had just been brought in and placed on a
stone seat in a lower court. Under his directions, Douglas and
Hutchinson were carried by some of the Palace Guards up the
staircase to the apartments over the gateway,* whilst Fraser
remained below, endeavouring to allay the excitement. Standing
at the foot of the stairs, with a sword in his hand, the last-
named was addressing a noisy crowd, when a man named
Mughul Beg, an orderly of the Palace Guards, rushed upon
him and clove his cheek to the bone.f The others followed up
the attack, cutting at him with their swords, and presently
Simon Fraser, Commissioner, lay a corpse at the foot of the
stairs.
Meanwhile, in the upper rooms, Douglas and Hutchinson
were lying in grievous pain, and the Jennings
Sn r gs°e f s tbe family were ministering to them. The excited
crowd, having murdered the Commissioner, now
rushed up the staircase eager for the blood of the other English
gentlemen. An attempt was made to close the doors at the
head of the staircases, but the murderous gang forced their way
upwards, streamed into the rooms where Douglas, Hutchinson,
Jennings, and the innocent young Englishwomen were listening
with dismay to the tumult below, and before a prayer could be
lifted up had massacred them with exultant ferocity. It
was quickly done. A brief and bloody murder, terrible to
* Some statements are to the effect that Mr. Jennings and Mr. Hutchinson
carried Douglas upstairs.
t Here, again, there is discordant evidence. On the trial of the King, it
■was more than once stated that the first blow was struck by one Haji, a
lapidary or seal-engraver, who (according to one witness) " inflicted a deep
and mortal wound on the right side of his neck." But at the trial of Mughul
Beg, five years afterwards (18G2), it was stated by one Bakhtawar Singh that
he "saw the prisoner inflict the first wound which was on Mr. Fraser's face."
Another witness, Kishan Singh, also stated, " I saw the prisoner strike the
first blow."
1857.] MASSACRE IN THE EUROPEAN QUARTET*. 61
contemplate, then stained the Dehli Palace; but no circum-
stances of shameful outrage aggravated the horror of the
deed.*
There was then a scene of fearful uproar and confusion, which
filled the old King with bewilderment and terror. The
murderers, with their blood-stained swords in their hands, went
about boasting of their crimes, and calling upon others to
follow their example. The courtyards and the corridors of the
Palace were swarming with the mutineers of the 3rd Cavalry
and of the 38th, and soon the Mirath Infantry Regiments t
began to swell the dangerous crowd, whilst an excited Muham-
madan rabble mingled with the Sipahis and the Palace Guards.
The troopers stabled their horses in the courts of the Palace.
The foot-men, weary with the long night march, turned the
Hall of Audience into a barrack, and littered down on the floor.
Guards were posted all about the Palace. And the wretched,
helpless King found that his royal dwelling-house was in
military occupation.
Whilst these events were passing within the precincts of the
Palace, in the quarter of the city most inhabited by the English
residents, the work of carnage and destruction was proceeding
apace. It is not easy to fix the precise hour at which each parti-
cular incident in the dreadful catalogue of crime and suffering
occurred. But it seems to have been under the meridian sun that
the principal unofficial Englishmen in Dehli fell victims to the
fury of the enemy. About noon the Dehli Bank was attacked and
plundered, and all its chief servants, after a brave Th DehliB nk
resistance, massacred. Mr. Beresford, the manager
of the Bank, took refuge with his wife and family on the roof
of one of the outbuildings. And there, for some time, they
stood at bay, he with a sword in his hand, ready to strike,
whilst his courageous helpmate was armed with a spear. Thus,
* It was stated, and for some time believed, that the English ladies had
been dragged before the King, and either murdered in his presence or by his
orders, and some highly dramatic incidents have been published illustrative
of this complicity of the Mughul in the first murders. But there is not the
least foundation for these stories. On the other hand, it is on evidence that
Captain Douglas, shortly before his death, sent a message to the King, re-
questing him to send palanquins to remove the ladies to the Queen's apart-
ments, and that he did so — but too late.
t There is considerable diversity of statement relating to the hour at which
the Mirath Infantry Kegiments arrived.
62 THE SEIZUEE OF DEHL1. L1857
with resolute bravery, they defended the gorge of the staircase,
until the assailants, seeing no hope of clearing the passage,
retired to scale the walls in the rear of the house. The attack
was then renewed, hut still the little party on the roof made
gallant resistance. It is related by an eye-witness that ono
man fell dead beneath the lady's spear. But to resist was but
to protract the pains of death. They were overpowered and
killed, and the Bank was gutted from floor to roof. The Dehli
Press establishment shared the same fate. The
Press. 6 Christian compositors had gathered there, in pur-
suance of their craft ; and never, perhaps, since the
first dawn of printing had work been done sadder and grimmer
than this — for it was theirs to record in type that the hand of
death was upon them. The telegraph had brought in the
early morning tidings that the Mirath mutineers were hasten-
ing to Dehli, and would soon be at the city gates. Some must
have felt then that they were composing their own death-
warrants. The little slips of printed paper — Dehli Gazette
" Extras" — went forth, and the printers remained to meet the
crisis which they had just announced. About midday a crowd
of insurgents rushed into the office, killed all the Christian
compositors who could not effect their escape, and with clubs
and poles destroyed the house and its contents, taking away
all the type that they could carry to turn to another and a
deadlier use. Everywhere the Christian people were butchered,
their property was plundered or destroyed, and then their
houses were fired.* The Church was an especial object of the
fury of the insurgents. They gloated over the desecration of
all that was held in reverence by our Christian people. They
tore down and shattered the monumental slabs on the walls ;
they seized the sacramental plate ; then they ascended to the
belfry, rang a peal in derision, and, loosening or cutting the
ropes, let the bells fall with a crash on the stones below.
Meanwhile there was great excitement in the British Canton-
* "Private houses were entered by troopers (their horses being held at the
gates of the gardens), who said that they did not come for loot but life, and
when they were disappointed in their greed for European life they let in the
budmashes of the city, who, in the space of half an hour, cleared out the best-
regulated houses from punkah to floorcloth. They then either set fire to the
house, or, if it were not of an inflammable nature, they pulled out the doors
and window-frames, &c, in some cases the beams from the roofs." — Mr.
Wagentreiber's Narrative.
1857.] EVENTS IN CANTONMENTS. 63
merits, where the Sipahi regiments of the Company were posted.
Our military force was cantoned on a ridge over-
looking the great city, at a distance of about two cantonments
miles from it. There had during the preceding week
been no symptoms of inquietude among them. Some Native
officers from the Dehli regiments had been sitting on the great
Mirath Court-Martial ; but how far they sympathised with the
prisoners cannot be confidently declared. It would have been
strange, however, if what had happened at Barrackpur and
Barhainpur had not been discussed at Mirath, and if the Native
officers had not carried back with them that uneasy feeling of
the something coming which was rapidly spreading from station
to station. It is certain, however, that on the afternoon of the
Christian Sabbath, which saw at Mirath the first great baptism
of blood, a carriage arrived in the Dehli Cantonments full of
Natives, who, though not in regimental uniform, were known
to be Sipahis from Mirath.* What was said or done in the
Lines on that evening and during the ensuing night can only
be conjectured. But the following morning found every regi-
ment ripe for revolt.
At the early sunrise parade of that day all the troops in the
Dehli Cantonments — the 38th, the 54th, and 74th Regiments,
with the Native Artillery — were assembled to hear the pro-
ceedings of the Court-Martial on Isri Pandi, the Barrackpur
Jamadar,* read aloud ; and as they were read, there arose
from the assembled Sipahis a murmur of disapprobation.
There was nothing beyond this ; but some officers in Canton-
ments, who had been eagerly watching the signs of the times,
felt that a crisis was approaching. At the early breakfast,
however, where our officers met each other, after morning parade,
at mess-houses or private bungalows, there was the wonted
amount of light-hearted conversation and careless laughter.
And when they separated, and each man went to his home to
bathe and dress, and prepare for the larger breakfast and the
business or the pleasure of the morning, it was not thought
that the day would differ from other days. But before the
work of the toilet was at an end our people were startled by
the tidings that the Native Cavalry from Mirath were forcing
■their way into the city. Native servants and Sipahi orderlies
carried the news to their officers, and every man hurried on his
* See evidence of Captain Tytler at the trial of the King of Dehli.
t Isri Pandi had been hanged on April 22nd. — Ante, vol. i. p. 429.
64 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
clothes, feeling that there was work before him. But even
then the prevailing idea was that there had been an escape
from gaol ; no more. No one thought that there was danger to
an Empire. If, it was said, the troops at Mirath had mutinied,
the strong body of Europeans there — the Rifles, the Carabineers,
and the white Artillery — would surety have been upon their
track. It was not possible that more than a few fugitives
could ever reach Dehli.
So argued our officers on the Dehli Eidge, as they listened
to the bugle-call and buckled on their swords.
Colonel The 54th were ordered out for service, and two
tile 54th. of De Tessier's guns were to accompany them
to the city. It was necessarily a work of time
to get the field-pieces ready for action ; so Ripley, leaving
two companies to escort the Artillery, marched down to the
nearest gate. This was the Kashmir Gate. A little way on
the other side of it was the Main-guard, at which some men
of the 38th were posted. They had already in their hearts
cast in their lot with the mutineers, and when Ripley appeared
with the 54th the time for action had come, and they threw off
then the last remnant of disguise. The troopers of the 3rd
Cavalry, with the insurgent rabble from the town, were
surging onwards towards the gate. The 54th, who had brought
down their pieces unloaded, now received the order to load ;
and meanwhile Captain Wallace, acting as field-officer of the
day, who had taken command of the Main-guard, ordered the
38th to fire upon the mutineers. To this they responded only
with insulting sneers. Not a man brought his musket to the
" present."
This was the turning-point of the great disaster. The 54th
were scarcely less faithless than their comrades. They fired in
the air, and some, perhaps, fired upon their officers.* After
shooting two of the insurgents, Ripley was cut down, and near
him fell also the lifeless bodies of Smith and Burrowes, Edwards
and Waterfield. When the two companies in the rear approached
the Kashmir Gate with the guns, they met Captain Wallace
riding in hot haste towards them ; he begged them, for mercy's
sake, to hurry on, as the troopers were shooting down our
officers. Soon they had ghastly evidence of this dismal truth,
* There seems to be some doubt about the conduct of the 54th in this first
collision. It is stated, however, that Colonel Ripley declared that his own
men had bayoneted him.
1857.] PROGRESS OF MUTINY. 65
for the mangled body of their Colonel was being brought out,
" literally hacked to pieces." Paterson then ordered his men to
load, and pushed on with all speed to the gate. But the report
of the approach of the guns had already awed the mutineers,
and when they passed the gate our officers found no trace of the
enemy whom they had come to attack, except in the recedino-
figures of a few troopers, who were scampering towards the city.
But they found most miserable traces of the preceding conflict,
in the dead bodies of their comrades, which were scattered
about the place. These were now brought in to the Main-
guard, before which the guns had been planted, and the two
companies of the 54th posted as a garrison. And there they
remained hour after hour, gaining no assured intelligence of
the movements of the rebels, and ever cheerful in the thought
that aid from Mirath, with its strong European force, must
certainly be close at hand.
Meanwhile, Captain Wallace had been directed by Major
Paterson to bring up the 74th Eegiment with two
more guns. Major Abbott, on gaining intelligence JJSS^S**
of the defection of the 38th, and the doubtful con-
duct of the 54th, mounted his horse, hastened to the Lines of his
regiment, and addressed his men. He told them that the time
had come for them to prove that they were true and loyal
soldiers ; and he called for volunteers to accompany him down
to the Kashmir Gate. There was not a man there who did not
come to the front ; and when the order was given to load, they
obeyed it with befitting alacrity. Then they marched down,
with two more guns, under Lieutenant Aislabie, and about mid-
day were welcomed by Paterson and his party at the Main-
guard. The force at this post had now been strengthened by
the return of some Sipahis of the 54th, who had gone off in the
confusion, and, having roamed about for some time in a state of
bewilderment and panic, had at last turned back to the point
from which they had started, hanging on to the skirts of circum-
stance, wondering what would be the result, and waiting to see
whether a retributive force from Mirath was sweeping into the
City of the Mughul.
Time passed, and the slant shadows thrown by the descending
sun were falling upon the Main-guard. Yet still
no authentic intelligence of what was passing At ^^J 1 * 111 "
in the city reached our expectant officers, except
that which was conveyed to them by European fugitives who
VOL. ir. f
66 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
sought safety there from other parts of the city. Scared and
bewildered they had come in, each with some story of an escape
from death, providential — almost miraculous. But there was
little room for rejoicing, as it seemed to them that they had
been saved from old dangers only to encounter new. At the
Main-guard they were surrounded by Sipahis, waiting only a
fitting opportunity, to disencumber themselves of the last
remnant of their outward fidelity. At any moment they might
break out into open revolt, and shoot down the Europeans of
both sexes congregated in the enclosure. It was a time of
intense anxiety. It was evident that the insurrection was
raging in the city. There was a confused roar, presaging a
great tumult, and smoke and fire were seen ascending from the
European quarter.
Then there was, at intervals, a sound of Artillery, the
meaning of which was not correctly known, and then a tre-
mendous explosion, which shook the Main-guard to its very
foundation. Looking to the quarter whence the noise pro-
ceeded, they saw a heavy column of smoke obscuring the sky ;
and there was no doubt in men's minds that the great Magazine
had exploded — whether by accident or design could only be
conjectured. But whilst the party in the Guard-house were
speculating on the event, two European officers joined them,
one of whom was so blackened with smoke that it was difficult
to discern his features. They were Artillery subalterns, who
had just escaped from the great explosion. The story which
it was theirs to tell is one which will never be forgotten.
The great Dehli Magazine, with all its vast supplies of
munitions of war, was in the city at no great
^P[° si °J°g the distance from the Palace. It was in charge of
Lieutenant George Willoughby, of the Bengal
Artillery, with whom were associated Lieutenants Forrest and
Raynor, officers of the Ordnance Commissariat Department,
and six European Conductors and Commissariat Sergeants.
All the rest of the establishment was Native. Early morning
work is a condition of Anglo-Indian life, and Willoughby was
at the Magazine superintending the accustomed duties of his
department, and little dreaming what the day would bring
forth, when Forrest came in accompanied by the magistrate,
Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, and informed him that the Mirath
mutineers were streaming across the river. It was Metcalfe's
1857.] DEFENCE OF THE MAGAZINE. 67
object to obtain from the Magazine a couple of guns where-
with to defend the Bridge. But it was soon apparent that the
time for such defence had passed. The troopers had crossed
the river, and had found ingress at the Palace Gate. A brave
and resolute man, who, ever in the midst of danger, seemed
almost to bear a charmed life, Metcalfe then went about other
work, and Willoughby braced himself up for the defence of
the Magazine. He knew how much depended on its safety.
He knew that not only the mutinous soldiery, but the dangerous
classes of Dehli, would pour down upon the Magazine, some
eager to seize its accumulated munitions of war, others greedy
only for plunder. If, he thought, he could hold out but a little
while, the white regiments at Mirath would soon come to his
aid, and a strong guard of English Eiflemen, with guns manned
by European artillerymen, would make the Magazine secure
against all comers. It was soon plain that the Native Establish-
ment of the Magazine was not to be trusted. But there were
nine resolute Englishmen who calmly prepared themselves to
face the tremendous odds which threatened them, and, if the
sacrifice were required, to die beneath the ruins of the Magazine.
Cheered by the thought of the approaching succour from Mirath,
these brave men began their work. The outer gates were closed
and barricaded. Guns were then brought out, loaded with double
charges of grape, and posted within the gates. One of the Nine,
with port-fire in hand, stood ready to discharge the contents of
the six-pounders full upon the advancing enemy if they should
find their way into the enclosure. These arrangements com-
pleted, a train was laid from the powder-magazine, and on a
given signal from Willoughby, if further defence should be
hopeless, a match was to be applied to it, and the Magazine
blown into the air.
Whilst in this attitude of defence, a summons to surrender
came to them in the name of the King. It was treated with
contemptuous silence. Again and again messengers came from
the Palace saying that his Majesty had ordered the gates to be
opened, and the stores given up to the Army. If not, ladders
would be sent, and the Magazine would be carried by escalade.
Unmoved by these menaces, Willoughby and Forrest answered
nothing, but looked to their defences ; and presently it was
plain that the scaling-ladders had arrived. The enemy were
swarming over the walls. At this point all the Natives in the
Magazine, the gun-lascars, the artificers and others whose defec-
F 2
68 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
tion liad been expected, threw off their disguise, and, ascending
some sloping sheds, joined the enemy on the other side.
The time for vigorous action had now arrived. As the enemy
streamed over the walls, round after round of murderous grape-
shot from our guns, delivered with all the coolness and steadi-
ness of a practice-parade, riddled the advancing multitudes ; but
still they poured on, keeping up a heavy fire of musketry from
the walls.* Yet hoping almost against hope to hear the longed-
for sound of the coming help from Mirath, the devoted English-
men held their ground until their available ammunition was
expended. Then further defence was impossible ; they could
not leave the guns to bring up shot from the Magazine, and
there were none to help them. Meanwhile, the mutineers were
forcing their way at other unprotected points into the great
enclosure, and it was plain that the Nine — two among them
wounded, though not disabled, for the strong will kept them at
their posts — could no longer hold the great storehouse from the
grasp of the enemy. So the signal was given. Conductor
Scully fired the train. In a few seconds there was a tremendous
explosion. The Magazine had been blown into the air.
Not one of that gallant band expected to escape with his life.
But four of the Nine, in the confusion which ensued, though at
first stunned and bewildered, shattered and bruised, made good
their retreat from the ruins. Willoughby and Forrest escaped
to the Main-guard. Eaynor and Buckley took a different direc-
tion, and eventually reached Mirath. Scully and his gallant
comrades were never seen alive again. But the lives thus
nobly sacrificed were dearly paid for by the enemy. Hundreds
perished in that great explosion ; and others at a distance were
struck down by the fragments of the building, or by bullets
flung from the cartridges ignited in store. But it was not
possible that by any such explosion as this the immense material
resources of the great Dehli Magazine should be so destroyed as
to be unserviceable to the enemy. The effect of the heroic
deed, which has given to those devoted Nine a cherished place
in History, can never be exactly computed. But the grandeur
of the conception is not to be measured by its results. From
one end of India to another it filled men's minds with enthu-
* The assailants appear to have been principally Sipahis of the 11th and
20th Eegiments from Mirath.
1857.] EVENTS IN THE CANTONMENT. 69
siastic admiration ; and when news reached England that a
young Artillery officer named Willoughby had blown up the
Dehli Magazine, there was a burst of applause that came from
the deep heart of the nation. It was the first of many intrepid
acts which have made us proud of our countrymen in India ;
but its brilliancy has never been eclipsed.
In the British Cantonment on the Ridge a column of white
smoke was seen to arise from the city, and pre-
sently the sound of the explosion was heard. It JJntET'in'
was then four o'clock. Brigadier Graves and the Cantonments.
officers under him had been exerting themselves
to keep together such of the troops as had not marched down
to the Dehli City, ever hoping that the Europeans from Mfrath
would soon come to their relief, and wondering why they were
so long in making their appearance. It seemed strange, but it
was possible, that the extent of the danger was not apprehended
by General Hewitt ; strange that it should be necessary to send
for succours to Mirath, and jet, as the day advanced and no
help came, it clearly had become necessary to appeal for the aid
which ought to have been freely and promptly sent. Then one
brave man stepped forward and offered to carry a letter to the
General at Mirath. This was Doctor Batson, the Surgeon of the
74th Eegiment. The gallant offer was accepted. The letter
was written, and placed in Batson's hands. He took leave of
his wife and children, whom he might never see again, disguised
himself as a Fakir, and set forth on his perilous journey. But
well as he played his part, and able as he was to speak the
language of the country as fluently as his own, he had not pro-
ceeded far before his disguise was penetrated ; the colour of his
eyes had betrayed him. He was fired upon by the Sipahis,
robbed and stripped by the villagers, and finally cast adrift, to
wander about naked and hungry, weary and footsore, passing
through every kind of peril, and enduring every kind of
pain.
All day long the Sipahis in the Cantonment had been hover-
ing upon the brink of open mutiny. They had committed no
acts of violence against their officers, but, like their comrades at
the Main-guard, though held back by the fear of the white
regiments that were expected from Mirath, they were festering
with the bitterness of national hatred, and eager to strike. The
ladies and children had been gathered up and sheltered in a
70 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
place known as the Flagstaff Tower.* There two of De Tessier's
guns were posted ; but the Native gunners were not to be
trusted, and besides the officers, there were only nineteen
Europeans, or Christians, in the Cantonment. It was felt that
at any moment a crisis might arrive, when nothing but a sudden
flight could save the lives of this little handful of our people.
The explosion of the Magazine seems to have brought on the
inevitable moment, when the last links that bound the Native
soldiery to their European officers were to be broken.
At the Main-guard in the City, as in the Cantonment on the
Eidge, the same process was going on in the light
Main-guaVd! 6 of the setting sun. The disaffection of the Dehli
regiments had ripened into general mutiny. The
last restraints were flung aside under an assumed conviction
that the Europeans from Mirath were not coming to avenge
their slaughtered brethren. The great national cause was
swelling into portentous external dimensions under the infla-
tions of the King and Princes, and others of stronger lungs than
their own. Everywhere it had been noised about from early
morning that the King was on the side of the mutineers, and
that to fight against the English was to fight for the King — to
fight for the restoration of the Mughul throne — to fight for the
religion of the Prophet. And as the day advanced there were
more unmistakable signs that this was neither an invention nor
a delusion. The inmates of the Palace, timid, feeble, effete as
they were, had plainly risen against the dominant Christian
power. The yoke of the Faringhis was to be cast off. The
time had come when all the great offices of state would again be
filled by the people of the East — by Muhammadans and Hindus,
* This Flagstaff Tower became afterwards very celebrated in the history
of the siege of Dehli. On the 11th of May it was little better than a " Black
Hole." The scene within the tower is thus de&eribed by an eye-witness :
" Here we found a large number of ladies and children collected in a round
room some eighteen feet in diameter. Servants, male and female, were
huddled together with them; many ladies were in a fainting condition from
extreme heat and nervous excitement, and all wore that expression of anxiety
so near akin to despair. Here were widows mourning their hiibbands' murder,
sisters weeping over the report of a brother's death, and borne there wero
whose husbands were still on duty in the midst of the disaffected Sipuhis, of
whose fate they were as yet ignorant. It was a Black Hole in miniature,
with all but the lust horrible features of that dreadful prison, and I was glad
even to stand in the sun to catch a breath of fresh air." — Mr. Wagentreiber's
Narrative.
1857.] ESCAPE FKOM THE MAIN-GUARD. 71
under the restored dynasty of the Mughuls. And whilst many
were inspired by these sentiments many also were moved by a
great lust of plunder ; and as the sun neared the horizon, and
still there were no signs of the avenging Englishmen on the
road from Mirath, massacre and spoliation were safe and easy,
and all the scum of Dehli, therefore, was seen upon the surface
of the rebellion.
To hold out any longer against such overwhelming odds was
now wholly impossible. At the Main-guard the massacre of
our people was commenced by a volley from the 38th, delivered
with terrible effect into the midst of them. Gordon, the field-
officer of the day, fell from his horse with a musket-ball in his
body, and died without a groan. Smith and Eeveley of the
74th were shot dead.* That any Christian person escaped
amidst the shower of musketry that was poured upon them
seemed to be a miraculous deliverance. There was now nothing
left to the survivors but to seek safety in flight. There was
but one means of escape, and that a perilous, almost a hopeless,
one. There was an embrasure in the bastion skirting the court-
yard of the Main-guard, through which egress might be obtained,
and by dropping down into a ditch — a fall of some thirty feet —
and ascending the opposite scarp, the slope of the glacis might
be gained, beyond which there was some jungle, which might
afford cover to the fugitives till nightfall. Young and active
officers, not crippled by wounds, might accomplish this ; but the
despairing cries of some Englishwomen from the inner rooms of
the Guard-house reminded them that they could not think
wholly of themselves. To remain in the Guard was to court
death. The mutineers were not only firing upon our people
with their muskets, but pointing their guns at us. The only
hope left was a descent into the ditch, but even that was more
like despair. So the women were brought to the embrasure,
and, whilst in terror and confusion they were discussing the
possibility of the descent, a round-shot passed over their heads,
and they felt that there was not a moment to be lost. The
officers then fastened their belts together, and thus aided, whilst
some dropped into the clitch to receive the women, others helped
them from above to descend. At last, not without much diffi-
* " The latter (Eeveley) had a loaded gun in his hand ; he quietly raised
himself up with a dying effort, and, discharging both barrels into a knot of
Sipahis below, the next moment expired." — Lieutenant VibarVs Narrative.
72 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
culty, aggravated by the terror of the poor creatures who were
being rescued, the whole were lowered into the ditch ; and then
came the still more difficult task of ascending the opposite bank.
The steepness of the ascent and the instability of the soil made
their footing so insecure, that again and again they were foiled
in the attempt to reach the summit. The earth gave way
beneath them, and helping men and helpless women rolled back
to the bottom of the ditch amidst a shower of crumbling earth.
Despair, however, gave them superhuman energy, and at last
the whole of our little party had surmounted the outer slope of
the ditch, and were safe upon the crest of the glacis. Then
they made their way into the jungle which skirted it, and
pushed on, some in the direction of the Cantonments, and some
in the direction of Metcalfe House.
Meanwhile, in the British Cantonment on the Eidge, our
people had been reduced to the same extremity of
CantonmSs. despair. The Sipahis had turned upon them and
now held possession of the guns. It was no longer
possible to defend the place or to keep together even the few
Native soldiers who were inclined to remain faithful, under the
influence of old habits and personal attachments. Two circum-
stances, however, were in favour of the English in Cantonments.
One was, that the Sipahis at a distance from the Palace and the
City were less acquainted with the extent to which the Koyal
Family and the Muhammadan citizens of Dehli were aiding and
supporting the mutineers. The other was, that our officers,
being at their homes, had facilities of conveyance — horses, and
carriages, and carts — wherewith to carry off their families to
Mirath or Kamal, with some provisions for the journey, and
perhaps some of the remnant of their household gods. When
first they moved off, there was a slight show or pretence of the
Sipahis going with them. They fell in to the word of command,
and, for a little space, accompanied the departing Englishmen ;
but soon the columns were broken up, the Sipahis streamed into
the Bazaars, and all semblance of discipline was abandoned.
Three or four officers, who had remained with them, tried to
rally their men in vain. The Sipahis implored them to escape
before the rabble from the city burst upon the Cantonment.
Already, indeed, the English carriages had been lighted upon
their way by the blaze of our burning bungalows. If the
officers who were the last to quit the Cantonment could rescue
1S57.J INCIDENTS OF THE FLIGHT. 73
the regimental colours, it was the most that they could hope to
accomplish.*
So, forth from the Cantonment and forth from the City went
our fugitive people. Many narratives of deep and
painful interest have been written, descriptive of Tbe 5ebiL fr ° m
the sufferings which they endured, and the dangers
which they encountered. It has been narrated how they hid
themselves now in the jungle, now in the ruins of uninhabited
buildings ; how they tore off their epaulettes or other bright
appendages of their uniform lest they should attract notice by
glittering in the moonlight or the sunshine ; how they crouched
like hares in form, or hid themselves in gaps and hollows ; how
they were tracked and despoiled by robbers; how they were
lured into seemingly friendly villages and then foully mal-
treated ; how they waded through or swam rivers, carrying the
women and children across as best they could ; how they were
beaten and stripped, and sent on their way under the fierce
unclouded sun of the Indian summer, without clothing and
without food ; how they often laid themselves down at night
weary, exhausted, and in sore pain, crouching close to each other
for warmth, expecting, almost hoping that death would come at
once to relieve them from their sufferings ; how delicate women
and young children struggled on, sometimes separated from
their husbands or fathers, but ever finding consolation and
support in the kindly and chivalrous ministrations of English
gentlemen.')' Some made good their way to Mirath, some to
Karnal, some to Ambalah. Others perished miserably on the
road, and a few, unable to proceed, were left behind by their
companions. This was the sorest trial of all that befell the
fugitives. It went to the hearts of these brave men to abandon
any of their fellow-sufferers who could not longer share their
flight. But there was no help for it. So once or twice, after
vain endeavours to carry the helpless ones to a place of safety,
it was found that, with the enemy on their track, death to the
Many must follow further efforts to save the One, and so the
wretched creature was left behind to die.J
* The last to quit the Cantonment were, apparently, Colonel Knyvett of
the 38th, Lieutenant Gambier, Captain Peile, and Captain Holland.
t And nobly the women played their parts, and not always as the weaker
vessels. One published narrative relates how two ladies — Mrs. Wood and
Mrs. Peile — saved a wounded officer, the husband of the former, who could
not have moved onward without their support.
X See Lieutenant Vibart's Narrative.
74 THE SEIZUKE OF DEHLI. [1857.
But truth would not "be satisfied if it were not narrated here
that many compassionate and kindly acts on the part of the
Natives of the country relieved the darkness of the great picture
of national crime. Many of the fugitives were succoured by
people in the rural districts through which they passed, and
sent on their way in safety. In this good work men of all
classes, from great landholders to humble sweepers, took part,
and endangered their own lives by saving those of the hapless
Christians.*
Whilst these remnants of our British officers, with their wives
and children, were thus miserably escaping from
May 11-16. Dehli, there were others of our country-people,
prisoners. or co-religionists, who were in pitiable captivity
there, awaiting death in a stifling dungeon.
These were, for the most part, European or Eurasian inhabit-
ants of the Darya-ganj, or English quarter of Dehli, engaged in
commerce or trade. On the morning of the 11th of May, many
of these people, hearing that the mutineers were crossing the
bridge, gathered themselves in one of the " largest and strongest
houses " occupied by our Christian people, and there barricaded
themselves. These, however, and others, burnt or dragged out
of their houses, escaped death only to be carried prisoners to the
Palace, where they were confined in an underground apartment,
without windows, and only one door, so that little either of air
or light ever entered the dreary dwelling. There nearly fifty
Christian people — men, women, and children — were huddled
together, scantily fed, constantly threatened and insulted by
the Sipahis and Palace-guards, but bearing up bravely beneath
the burden of their sorrows. After four or five days of this
suffering, a servant of the King asked one of the ladies in the
dungeon how, if they were restored to power, the English
would treat the Natives ; and the answer was, " Just as you
have treated our husbands and children." On the following
day they were led forth to die. The Palace-guards came to the
prison-door and told them to come forth, as they were to be
* Mr. Williams, in his official report, gives a list — but not a complete one —
of the Natives who succoured the Dehli fugitives. See also narrative of the
escape of Captain T. W. Holland : " There being no milk in the village, one
Paltii, sweeper, or others of his family, used daily to take the trouble to go to
procure some from adjacent villages." Again : "I remained with Jamnadass
(a Brahman) six days. He gave mo the best part of his house to live in, and
the best food he could," &c, &c.
1857.] MASSACKE OF PKISONERS. 75
taken to a better residence. Sorely mistrusting their guards,
they crowded out of the dungeon. A rope was thrown round
them, encircling the party so that none could escape. Then
they were taken to a courtyard — the appointed shambles —
where great crowds of people were gathered together to wit-
ness the massacre of the Christians. As they stood there
cursing the Faringhis and throwing up their jubilant cries, the
work of slaughter commenced. It is not easy to tell the story
with an assured belief in its truth. It seems, however, that
the Nemesis of the 3rd Cavalry was there ; that some of the
troopers fired with carbine or pistol at the prisoners, but by
mischance struck one of the King's retainers. Then there
began a carnage at the sabre's edge. It is hard to say how it
was done. "Whether many or whether few swordsmen fell
upon the Christians is uncertain.* But, in a brief space of
•time, fifty Christian people — men, women, and children — were
remorselessly slain.j A sweeper, who had helped to dispose of
the corpses, bore witness that there were only five or six men
among them. The bodies were heaped up on a cart, borne to
the banks of the Jamnah, and thrown into the river.
So there was not, after that 16th Of May, a single European
left in Dehli, either in the Cantonment or in the City. The
British had no longer any footing in the capital of the Mughul.
We had been swept out by the great besom of destruction, and
Bahadur Shah reigned in our place. Since the days of Siraju'd-
daulah and the Black Hole, no such calamity had ever over-
taken our people, and never since we first set foot on Indian
soil any such dire disgrace. That a number of Christian people
should be thus foully massacred was a great sorrow, but that
nothing should be done to avenge the blood of our slaughtered
countrymen was a far greater shame. The sorrow was at
Dehli ; the shame was at Mirath. The little band of English-
men suddenly brought face to face with mutiny in the Lines,
insurrection in the City, and revolution in the great teeming
Palace of Dehli; who found, as their enemies on that May
morning, six mutinous Sipahi Eegiments, a hostile Muham-
madan population, and the retainers of the old Mughul dynasty,
* One statement is to the effect that a hundred or a hundred and fifty men
fell upon them with their swords ; and another is, that two swordsmen did the
entire butchery by themselves.
f A woman (Mrs. Aldwell) with three children escaped by feigning
Muhammadanism.
76 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
with the King's name as the watchword, and the Princes as the
leaders of the many-sided revolt, could not have done much
more than they did to stem the tide that was rushing upon
them. It was not possible that they should hold out for more
than one dreadful day with such a power arrayed against them.
Their doom had been sealed in the early morning. When the
hoofs of the foremost troop-horse rung upon the bridge across
the Jamnah, the death-knell of the British was sounded. From
morn to noon, from noon to sunset, still our people were sus-
tained by a strong faith in the manhood of their countrymen,
who, at a little distance, had Horse and Foot, and a great
strength of Artillery to bring to their succour. But when the
sun went down, and there was no sign at Dehli of the approach
of the Dragoons or the Galloper guns, they saw that they were
deserted, and what could they do but fly ?
But did the responsibility of this grievous inaction rest with
General Hewitt or with Brigadier Wilson ? The
rSpoSiiity. General has asserted that, as the command of the
station was in the hands of the Brigadier, the
movement of the troops depended upon him. But when a
General Officer, commanding a division of the Army, thus
shifts the responsibility on to the shoulders of a subordinate,
he virtually seals his own condemnation. When, at a later
period, Wilson was called upon by the supreme military autho-
rities for a full explanation of the causes of the inaction of the
European troops on the night of the 10th of May, and reference
was made to what Hewitt had stated, the former wrote in reply,
" I would beg to refer to the Regulations of the Bengal Army,
Section XVII., which will show what little authority over the
troops is given to the Brigadier commanding a station which is
the Head-Quarters of a Division, and that I could not have
exercised any distinct command, the Major-General being
present on the occasion. As Brigadier, I only exercised the
executive command of the troops under the orders of the Major-
General." " I may or may not," he added, " have been wrong
in offering the opinion I did to the Major-General. I acted to
the best of my judgment at the time, and from the uncertainty
regarding the direction taken by the fugitives, I still believe I
was right. Had the Brigade blindly followed in the hope of
finding the fugitives, and the remaining portion of the Canton
ment been thereby sacrificed, with all our sick, women and
1857.] RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE. 77
children, and valuable stores, the outcry against those in com-
mand at Mirath would have been still greater than it has
been."
This, in part, is the explanation of that first great failure,
which so perplexed and astounded all who heard
of it, and which led to great and disastrous results FaUure? f
hereafter to be recorded. The military com-
manders at Mirath believed that it was their first duty to
protect life and property in the Cantonment. The mutinous
Sipahis, aided by the escaped convicts, and by ruffians and
robbers from the bazaars and villages, had butchered men,
women, and children, had burned and gutted the houses of the
white people in the Native quarter of the Cantonment, and it
was believed that, if due precautions were not taken, the other
great half of military Mirath would share the same fate, that
the Treasury would be plundered, and that the magazines would
fall into the enemy's hands. To Wilson it was natural that
the safety of the Cantonment should be his first care; but
Hewitt commanded the whole Mirath Division, including the
great station of Dehli, with its immense magazine, and not
a single European soldier to guard its profusion of military
stores. It needed no breadth of vision, no forecast to discern
the tremendous danger which lay at the distance only of a
night's march from Mirath — danger not local, but national;
danger no less portentous in its political than in its military
aspects. But not an effort was made to intercept the fatal flood
of mutiny that was streaming into Dehli. General Hewitt
ignored the fact that the whole of the Mirath Division was
under his military charge, and thinking only of the safety of
the place in which he himself resided, he stood upon the defen-
sive for many days, whilst the rebels of the Lines, of the Gaols,
and the Bazaars, were rejoicing in the work that they had done
with impunity equal to their success.
But the judgment of the historian would be but a partial —
an imperfect — judgment, if it were to stop here. There is
something more to be said. Beneath these personal errors,
there lay the errors of a vicious system and a false policy. To
bring this great charge against one Commander of a Division
or another Commander of a Division, against one Commander-in-
Chief or another Commander-in-Chief, against one Governor-
General or another Governor-General, against this Department
or against that Department, would be a mistake and an in-
78 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
justice. It was not this or that man that wanted wisdom. The
evil lay broad and deep in the national character. The ar-
rogance of the Englishman, which covered him ever with a
great delusion, forbidding him to see danger when danger was
surrounding him, and rendering it impossible in his eyes that
any disaster should overtake so great and powerful a country,
was the principal source of this great failure at Mirath. We
were ever lapping and lulling ourselves in a false security.
We had warnings, many and significant ; but we brushed them
away with a movement of impatience and contempt. There is
a cant phrase, which, because it is cant, it may be beneath the
dignity of History to cite ; but no other words in the English
language, counted by scores or by hundreds, can so express the
prevailing faith of the Englishman at that time, as those two
well-known words, " All serene." Whatever clouds might lower
— whatever tempests might threaten — still all was "All serene.''*
It was held to be unbecoming an Englishman to be prepared for
a storm. To speak of ugly signs or portents — to hint that
there might be coming perils which it would be well to arm
ourselves to encounter — was to be scouted as a feeble and
dangerous alarmist. What had happened at Barrackpur and
Barhampur might well have aroused our people to cautious
action. We had before seen storms burst suddenly ujDon us to
our utter discomfiture and destruction ; but we were not to be
warned or instructed by them. When Henry Lawrence wrote,
" How unmindful have we been that what occurred in the city of
Kabul may some day occur at Dehli, Mirath, or Bareli,"* no one
heeded the prophetic saying any more than if he had prophesied
the immediate coming of the Day of Judgment. Everything,
therefore, at Mirath, in spite of plain and patent symptoms of
an approaching outbreak, was in a state of utter unpreparedness
for action. There were troopers without horses, troopers that
could not ride — artillerymen without guns, and artillerymen
who did not know a mortar from a howitzer, or the difference
between round-shot and grape. This was not the fault of
General Hewitt or Brigadier Wilson; it was the fault of the
system — the policy. The prevailing idea, and one for which
there was good warrant, was, that the Government desired that
things should be kept quiet. Even to have a battery of artillery
equipped for immediate service was held to be a dangerous
* See ante, vol. i. p. 332.
1857.] NEVER READY. 79
movement that might excite alarm, and, perhaps, precipitate a
crisis, which otherwise might be indefinitely delayed. When
an officer of Artillery commanding one of the Mi rath batteries
sought permission, a few days before the outbreak, to load his
ammunition-waggons, that he might be ready, in case of acci-
dent, for prompt service, he was told that such a step would
excite suspicion among the Natives, and that therefore it could
not be sanctioned. And this may have been right. The wrono-
consisted in having allowed things to drift into such a state,
that what ought to have been the rule was regarded as some-
thing altogether abnormal and exceptional, and as such a cause
of special alarm. The policy was to believe, or to pretend to
believe, that our lines had been cast in pleasant places ; and
the system, therefore, was never to be prepared for an emer-
gency — never to be ready to move, and never to know what to
do. In pursuance of this system the Commander-in-Chief was
in the great playground of Simlah, and the Chiefs of Depart-
ments were encouraging him in the belief that the cloud
" would soon blow over." So officers of all ranks in the great
Divisions of the Army in the North- West — in the Sirhind, in
the Mirath, in the Kanhpur Divisions — did, according to the
pattern of Head-Quarters, and according to their instincts as
Englishmen ; and, therefore, when the storm burst, we were all
naked, defenceless, and forlorn, and knew not how to encounter
its fury.
It has been contended that a prompt movement in pursuit of
the mutineers might not have been successful. And it is right
that all circumstances of difficulty should be fully taken into
account. Eebellion developed itself under the cover of the
night. The mutineers dispersed themselves here and there,
and our people knew not whither to follow them. The
Cavalry, however, must have taken to the road,
and where the Native troopers could go our ^uTJSdeK"
Dragoons might have pursued them; but the
former had a long start, and it is said that, as they would
have been the first to enter Dehli, they would have destroyed
the bridge across the Jamnah; and that, even if our Cavalry
and Horse Artillery had made their way into the City, they
would have found themselves entangled in streets swarming
with an armed rabble, stimulating and aiding the hostile Sipahi
Regiments who had been prepared to welcome, and to cast in
their lot with their comrades from Mirath. But it is to be
80 THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. [1857.
observed, upon the other hand, that if the troopers of the 3rd
Cavalry, who were the first to enter Dehli, had cut oft' the
communication with Mirath, by destroying the bridge, they
would have shut out large numbers of their own people, who
were pouring, or rather dribbling, into Dehli all through the
day. If the Mirath troops had arrived on the banks of the
Jamnah in a serried mass under a capable commander, they
would, when the whole had passed over, have destroyed the
bridge, to cut off the pursuit of the enemy from Mirath. But
straggling in at intervals, under no recognised chiefs, this was
not to be expected ; and, if it had been done, a great part of the
Mirath Infantry Regiments must have fallen into the hands of
the pursuing Englishmen, and been destroyed by the grape-shot
or sabres within sight of the Palace windows.
But the mere military argument in such a case does not
dispose of the historical question ; for it was from the moral no
less than from the material effects of the pursuit that advantage
was to be derived. The sight of a single white face above the
crest of a parapet has ere now put a garrison to flight. And it
may not unreasonably be assumed that, if on that Monday
morning, a few English Dragoons had been seen approaching
the Jamnah, it would have been believed that a large body of
white troops were behind them, and rebellion, which was pre-
cipitated by our inactivity, would then have been suspended by
the fear of the coming retribution. Unless the Dragoons and
Horse Artillery had headed the Sipahis, which was not indeed to
be expected, the first sudden rush into Dehli must have occa-
sioned wild confusion, and many lives must have been sacrificed
to the fury of the troopers and the rabble of abettors. But the
disaster would have been but limited — the defeat but temporary.
It is doubtful whether, if the avenging Englishmen had, that
morning, appeared under the walls of Dehli, the Sipahi <Regi-
ments stationed there would have broken into rebellion ; and it is
well-nigh certain, that in the presence of the British troops the
Royal Family of Dehli would not have dared to proclaim them-
selves on the side of the mutineers. All through the hours of
the morning there was doubt and hesitation both in the Canton-
ments and in the Palace ; and it was not until the sun was
going down that it became manifest that Dehli was in the
throes of a great revolution. Emboldened and encouraged by
what seemed to be the sudden prostration of the English, our
enemies saw that their time had come, whilst our friends lost
1857.] MORAL EFFECTS OF PURS CUT. 81
confidence in our power and our fortune, and feared to declare
themselves on our side. Better in that case for the English
soldiers to come to Dehli to be beaten than not to come at all.
It was the want of effort at such a moment that did us such
grievous harm. For from one station to another the news
spread that the Sipahis had conquered the English at Mirath,
and proclaimed the Mughul Emperor at Dehli. The first great
blow had been struck at the Faringhis, and ever from place to
place the rumour ran that they had been paralysed by it.*
There is another question to which, fitly here, a few sentences
insij be devoted. It has been said that, in looking
at this great history of the Sipahi War as a whole, Alleged conspiracy
we shall not take just account of it, unless we rising? 6116
consider that, inasmuch as there had been a con-
spiracy throughout the Bengal Native Army for a general rising
of the Sipahis all over the country on a given day, the sudden
outbreak at Mirath, which caused a premature development of
the plot, and put the English on their guard before the appointed
hour, was the salvation of the British Empire in India. Colonel
Carmichael Smyth was ever assured in his own mind that, by
evolving the crisis in the 3rd Cavalry Eegiment, he had saved
the Empire. It was his boast, and he desired that it should be
made known to all men, that he might have the full credit of
the act. And I am bound to say that there is high testimony in
support of the belief thus confidently expressed. Mr. Cracroft
Wilson, who was selected by the Supreme Government to fill
the post of Special Commissioner, after the suppression of rebel-
lion, with a view to the punishment of the guilty and the reward
of the deserving, has placed upon record his full belief in this
story of a general conspiracy for a simultaneous rising. " Care-
fully collating," he has written, "oral information with facts as
they occurred, I am convinced that Sunday, 31st of May, 1857,
was the day fixed for mutiny to commence throughout the
Bengal Army ; that there were committees of about three
members in each regiment which conducted the duties, if I may
so speak, of the mutiny ; that the Sipahis, as a body, knew
nothing of the plans arranged ; and that the only compact
entered into by regiments, as a body, was, that their particular
* There is an expressive Hindustani word in very common currency among
both Europeans and Natives on the Bengal side of India — " lachdr," or help-
less. It was currently said that the English were lachdr.
VOL. II. G
82 THE SEIZEKE OF DEHLI. [1857.
regiments would do as the other regiments did. The committee
conducted the correspondence and arranged the plan of opera-
tions, viz., that on the 31st of May parties should be told off
to murder all European functionaries, most of whom would be
engaged at church ; seize the treasure, which would then be
augmented by the first instalment of the rubbie harvest; and
release the prisoners, of which an army existed in the North-
Western Provinces alone of upwards of twenty-five thousand
men. The regiments in Dehli and its immediate vicinity were
instructed to seize the magazine and fortifications. . . . From
this combined and simultaneous massacre on the 31st of May,
1857, we were, humanly speaking, saved by Lieutenant-Colonel
Smyth commanding the 3rd Eegiment of Bengal Light Cavalry,
and the frail ones of the Bazaar.* . . . The mine had been pre-
pared, and the train had been laid, but it was not intended to
light the slow match for another three weeks. The spark, which
fell from female lips, ignited it at once, and the night of the
10th of May, 1857, saw the commencement of a tragedy never
before witnessed since India passed under British sway." f
This is strong testimony, and from a strong man — one not
prone to violent assumptions or strange conjectures, who had
unusual opportunities of investigating the truth, and much
discernment and discrimination to turn those opportunities to
account. But the proofs of this general combination for a
simultaneous rising of the Native troops are not so numerous or
so convincing as to warrant the acceptance of the story as a
demonstrative fact. It is certain, however, that if this sudden
rising in all parts of the country had found the English unpre-
pared, but few of our people would have escaped the swift
destruction. It would then have been the hard task of the
British nation to reconquer India, or else to suffer our Eastern
Empire to pass into an ignominious tradition. But, whether
designed or not designed by man, God's mercy forbade its
accomplishment; and in a few hours after this first great ex-
plosion the Electric Telegraph was carrying the evil tidings to
all parts of the country. The note of warning was sounded
across the whole length and breadth of the land ; and wherever
an Englishman was stationed there was the stem preparation of
defence.
* Ante, Chapter II.
f Mr. J. C. Wilson's Muradabad Narrative (Official), Dec. 24, 1858.
1857.] FIRST EFFORTS AT RECOVERY. 83
CHAPTER IV.
CALCUTTA IN MAY.
Whilst little by little the details recited in the preceding
chapter were making themselves known to Lord Canning in
Calcutta, the Governor- General, calmly confronting the dangers
and difficulties before him, was straining every nerve to repair
the first great disaster, and to protect those defenceless tracts
of country in which new rebellions were most likely to assert
themselves. " The part of the country," he wrote to the Presi-
dent of the India Board, " which gives me most anxiety is the
line which stretches through the length of Bengal from Bar-
rackpur close by to Agra in the North -Western Provinces.
In that length of seven hundred and fifty miles, there is one
European Regiment at Danapur, and that is all. Banaras has a
Sikh Regiment, but no Europeans; Allahabad the same; not
reckoning a hundred European invalids, who were sent there a
few days ago. At one of these places the Native Regiment is a
suspected one, and at either the temptation to seize the Fort or
the Treasury will be very great, if they hear that Dehli con-
tinues in the hands of mutinous regiments. Therefore, the two
points to which I am straining are the hastening of the expulsion
of the rebels from Dehli, and the collection of the Europeans
here to be pushed up the country." What he did, in the early
part of May, for the gathering of troops from a distance, has
been told in the first volume of this History. The results of
those initial efforts rapidly developed themselves; but what
seems to be swift despatch, in tranquil times, is weary waiting,
when the issues of life or death may depend upon the loss or
gain of an hour.
Meanwhile, in the great vice-regal capital of India there
was much tribulation. For there were gathered
together large numbers of Christian people, monSTof aily!
men, women, and children. But numbers did not
seem to impart to them either strength or courage. A vast
majority of those Christian inhabitants were men who had
G 2
84 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
been habituated, through long years, to peace and security.
There was not in the ^hole world, perhaps, a more tranquil,
self-possessed city, than Calcutta had ever been during a period
of nearly a century. Even the local tumults, to which all great
towns are more or less periodically subject, had been absent
from the " City of Palaces." The worst disturbances had re-
sulted from the excitability of stray sailors from the merchant-
ships overmuch refreshed in the punch-houses of the Dharmtala
or the Chitpur Bazaar. And the Natives of the country gene-
rally had been regarded as a harmless, servile, obsequious race
of men, to be reviled, perhaps beaten at discretion, by the
haughty and intolerant Englishman. That Englishman, as seen
in Calcutta, was, for the most part, of the non-
Tbenon- official type ; experienced in the ways of commerce,
Englishman, active, enterprising, intelligent, but with little
knowledge of the Native character save in its
trading aspects, and little given to concern himself about in-
tricate questions of Indian policy. The name of " Ditcher " had
been given to him, as one who seldom or never passed beyond
the boundary of the Maratha ditch. The railway had done
something to diminish this inclusiveness ; but still many of the
European residents of Calcutta knew little of the great world
beyond, and were prone, therefore, to attach undue importance
to the busy commercial capital in which they were buying and
selling, and were holding their household gods. Their idea of
India much resembled the Chinese map-maker's idea of the
world. The City of Palaces, like the Celestial Empire, covered,
in their minds, nearly the whole of the sheet.
It was not strange that men of this class, unaccustomed to
great excitements, little used to strenuous action of any kind,
and in many instances, perhaps, wholly unskilled in the use of
offensive weapons, should have been stunned and bewildered by
the tidings from the North- West, and what seemed to them the
probabilities of a recurrence of similar tragedies in Bengal.
Nor was it strange that they should have looked eagerly to the
Government to put forth all its available resources to protect
them against the dangers which their excited imaginations
beheld rapidly approaching. The very confidence which they
had before felt in their security, and their general contempt for
the subject races, now rendered the reaction which had set in
all the more exaggerated and overwhelming. The panic in May
has, perhaps, been overstated in the recital. But stories are
1857.] ALARM IN CALCUTTA. 85
still current of Christian families betaking themselves for safety
to the ships in the river, or securing themselves within the
ramparts of the Fort, and of men staining their manhood by-
hiding themselves in dark places. But these manifestations of
unmanly fear were principally among the Eurasians and Por-
tuguese, or what are described as the " lower order of European
shopkeepers." That some people left their homes in the suburbs,
that some took their passages to England, that many bought
guns and revolvers, and lay down to rest full-dressed and full-
armed, is not to be questioned.* And it is certain that the
prevailing feeling was that the Governor-General failed to
appreciate the magnitude of the danger — that nothing could
rouse him from the lethargy indicated by his still face of marble
and his tranquil demeanour — and that, in a word, he was not
equal to the occasion.
It would be unjust to say that the apprehensions of the Calcutta
community were altogether unreasoning and unreasonable, for
there were many sources of alarm at this time. Foremost of all
there was the great dread of the Sipahis, who, a little while
before trusted guardians of our lives and properties, had sud-
denly grown into murderers and despoilers. There was but
little space between Barrackpur and Calcutta. A night's march
might have brought the whole brigade into the capital, to over-
power the European guards, to seize the Fort, and to massacre
the Christian inhabitants. Then there was in the immediate
suburbs of Calcutta, along the river-bank, the great, reeking,
overflowing sewer of the Oudh household — the exiled King,
his astute Prime Minister, and his multitude of dependants, all
restless in intrigue, and eager to inflict measureless retribution
upon the nation that had degraded and despoiled them. And
then again there was a vague fear, dominant over all, that the
vast and varied populations of the Native suburbs and bazaars
would rise against the white people, release the prisoners in the
* I wish it to be borne in mind that this refers entirely to the state of
things in May. A far more unmistakable panic, of which some account will
hereafter he given, arose in the middle of June. But even of the former
month a contemporary journalist wrote : " Men went about with revolvers in
their carriages, and trained their hearers to load quickly and fire low. The
ships and steamers in the rivers have been crowded with families seeking
refuge from the attack, which was nightly expected, and everywhere a sense
of insecurity prevailed, which was natural enough when the character of the
danger apprehended is taken into consideration."— Friend of India, May 28.
86 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
gaols, and gorge themselves with the plunder of the great com-
mercial capital of India. All these were at least possibilities.
What had been done at Mirath and Dehli might be acted over
again at Calcutta on a larger scale and with more terrible
effect.
After a lapse of years we may speak lightly of these dangers,
and say that Lord Canning discerned the true
Lo^CaimiiJg. state °f things, whilst others saw them darkly
through the glass of their fears. But the differ-
ence, perhaps, was rather that of outward bearing than of
inward appreciation of the position of affairs. It is hard to
say how much depends, in such a crisis, upon the calm and
confident demeanour of the head of the Government. Day after
day passed, and the Governor-General sat there, firm as a rock,
waiting for fresh tidings of disaster, and doing all that human
agency could do to succour our distressed people and to tread
down the insolence of the enemy. The great English com-
munity of Calcutta thought that he did not see the magnitude
of the danger, because he did not tremble for the fate of the
capital.* He did not know what it was to tremble, and some
said that he did not know what it was to feel. But though he
wore a calm face, in no man's mind was there a clearer sense of
tho magnitude of the crisis,")" and in no man's heart was there a
deeper pity. He pitied those at a distance, who were really
girt about with peril, and whose despairing cries for help, in
the shape of English troops, nearly broke his heart. But he
* [This is a complete mistake. I was one of the community of Calcutta,
and was in the confidence of those who mistrusted not Lord Canning, but
Lord Canning's measures. They mistrusted those measures because they
believed them to be inspired by the men about Lord Canning, men whose
knowledge of the country was of the slightest, and whose ability to deal with
the evil was of the most shadowy character. After events proved that the
community was right. — G. B. M.]
f Lord Canning's correspondence abounds with proofs of this. Take the
following from a characteristic letter to Bishop Wilson, which clearly shows
that he did not underrate the danger, although he was confident of the
national ability to surmount it : " The sky is very black, and as yet the signs
of a clearing are faint. But reason and common sense are on our side from
the very beginning. The course of the Government has been guided by jus-
tice and temper. I do not know that any one measure of precaution and
strength, which human foresight can indicate, has been neglected. There are
stout hearts and clear heads at the chief posts of danger — Agra, Lakkiiao, and.
Banaras. For the rest, the issue is in higher hands than ours. I am very
confident of complete success."
1357.] OFFERS OF SERVICE. 87
pitied most of all, with a contemptuous pity, those who exagge-
rated the dangers around them, who could not conceal their
fears, and who would fain have induced him to treat Calcutta
as though it were the whole Indian Empire. If there were any
impassiveness, any obduracy in him, it was simply that he could
not bring himself to think much about the place in which he
was living, whilst there were other places begirt with more
imminent peril. He forgot himself, with the self-negation of a
noble nature, and, forgetting himself, he may for a while have
forgotten those immediately around him. And so it happened
that the fears of many Englishmen in Calcutta were mixed
with strong resentments, and they began to hate the Governor-
General who could not bring himself to think that the Indian
Empire was included within the circuit of the Maratha
ditch.
As the month of May advanced, the panic increased. It has
been shown, in measured terms, what the Governor-General
thought of these manifestations of a great terror.*
In later letters he spoke out in more emphatic V off e n r s eer
language, and contemporary records of a less
exalted character seem to support his assertions. Perhaps his
eagerness to encourage others, by showing that he had no fear
for the Presidency, carried him into an excess of outward indif-
ference. Certainly, he did not seem to appreciate, in the first
iustance, an offer made by the British inhabitants to enrol
themselves into a volunteer corps for the protection of the great
City of Palaces. Many public bodies came forward at this
time with protestations of unswerving loyalty and free offers of
service. The Trades Association, the Masonic Lodges, the
Native Christian Community, and, side by side with our own
compatriots and fellow-subjects, the representatives of the great
French and American nations, sympathising with us in our
distress. Such offers were worthy and honourable, and entitled
to all gratitude from our rulers. Those communities desired to
be armed and disciplined and organised after the manner of
soldiers. Lord Canning told them in reply that they might
enrol themselves as special constables. And it was thought
that there was a touch of contempt in the very nature of the
answer.
But, although Lord Canning believed that there was a
* Ante, vol. i. pp. 438-9.
88 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
" groundless panic," * he had no design to reject contemptuously
those offers of assistance. His desire was to display no outward
symptom of alarm or mistrust. He was supreme ruler, not of a
class or of a community, but of all classes and communities. He
saw clearly that the great fear had possessed every quarter of
the city and its suburbs, and was agitating the breasts of all
the varied populations inhabiting them, and he knew that what
might tranquillize and subdue in one direction might alarm and
irritate in another. At no period of our history were the
Natives of India in so great a paroxysm of fear. They shud-
dered to think that they might lose their caste — shuddered to
think that they might lose their lives. All sorts of strange
reports were afloat among the people, and the English were
eager that Lord Cauning should contradict them by public
proclamation. " One of the last reports rife in the Bazaar," he
wrote on the 20th of May, " is, that I have ordered beef to be
thrown into the 1 tanks, to pollute the caste of all Hindus who
bathe there, and that on the Queen's birthday all the grain-
shops are to be closed, in order to drive the people to eat unclean
food. Men, who ought to have heads on their shoulders, are
gravely asking that each fable should be contradicted by pro-
clamation as it arises, and are arming themselves with revolvers
because this is not done. I have already taken the only step
that I considerable advisable, in the sense of a refutation of
these and like rumours, and patience, firmness, and I hope a
speedy return of the deluded to common sense, will do the rest."
And clearly recognising all these conflicting fears and suspicions,
he walked steadily but warily between them, assailed on all
sides by cries for special help, but knowing well that the safety
of all depended upon the strength and constancy of his resistance.
The Queen's birthday was celebrated in Calcutta after the
wonted fashion. A grand ball was given at
Celebration of the Government House.")" It was the desire of Lord
< * nee May ^25. d * y ' Canning, above all things, that nothing should be
done to betray any want of confidence in the general
loyalty of the people. He had been besought to exchange his
* [The words used by the Secretary to the Government were, " a passing
and groundless panic." There was no pauic. There existed simply a desire
to prepare to meet a real, and not a passing danger, the existence of which
the Government denied. — G. B. M.]
f The 24th of May fell on Sunday. The celebration was, therefore, on the
25th.
1857.] THE QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY. 89
own personal guard of Natives for one composed of Europeans,
but this he had refused to do. And the sweet face of Lady
Canning was to be seen, evening after evening, calm and smiling,
as she took her wonted drive on the Course or in the open
suburbs of Calcutta. And now that it was represented that it
might be expedient to omit the usual feu-de-jo'e fired in the
Queen's honour, the suggestion was rejected ; but in order that
there might be no misapprehension as to the ammunition used
on the occasion, a guard of Sipahis was sent to bring some of
the old unsuspected cartridges out of the regimental stores at
Barrackpur. The ball in the evening was well attended ; but
some absented themselves, believing that the congregation under
one roof of all the leading members of the English community
would suggest a fitting occasion for an attack on Government
House.* There was not, indeed, a ruffle even upon the surface ;
although the day was likely to be one of more than usual excite-
ment, for it was the great Muhammadan festival of the td, and it
was thought in many places besides Calcutta that a Musalman
rising might be anticipated. After this there was some little
return of confidence. But any accidental circumstance, such as
the explosion of a few festal fireworks, was sufficient to throw
many into a paroxysm of alarm.f
All this time, Lord Canning, aided by those immediately
around him, was doing all that could be done for
the successful attainment of the great ends to which The first
he had addressed himself from the commencement !m dSl*
— the recovery of Dehli and the protection of the
Gangetic provinces. But it was not easy in the existing dearth
of troops to accomplish both of these objects with the desired
despatch ; and it is not strange, therefore, that some difference
of opinion prevailed among the advisers of Lord Canning as to
the policy which, in these straitened circumstances, it was more
* " Two young ladies refused to go at the last moment, and sat up with a
small bag prepared for flight, till their father returned from the ball and re-
assured them." ..." Miss has hired two sailors to sit up in her house
of a night; but they got tipsy, and frightened her more than imaginary
enemies." — Journal of a Lady, MS.
f " A few nights ago wo*ke up at two o'clock by what sounded like guns
firing. Many thought the Alipur gaol had been broken open. Many gentle-
men armed themselves, and got carriages ready for the ladies to fly to the
Fort. On going into the verandah I was thankful to see a great display of
fireworks going up, which was the cause of all the noise. It was the marriage
of one of the Maiaur princes." — Ibid.
90 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
expedient to adopt. It is believed that the Civil members of
the Supreme Council, seeing how large a portion of our avail-
able military strength would be locked up under the walls of
Dehli, and how, in the meanwhile, large breadths of country
would be exposed to the fury of the enemy, advised that the
attack on the great city of the Mughul should be delayed for a
while, in order to employ the European troops in Upper India
upon the general defence of the country. Sir John Low was of
a different opinion ; and he drew up a minute on the subject,
full of sound arguments in favour of an immediate effort to
recover the lost position. But the Governor-General had already
come to that conclusion. Indeed, he had never doubted, for a
day, that let what might happen elsewhere, it was his first duty
to wrest the imperial city from the hands of the insurgents.
He saw plainly that the fall of Dehli had imparted a political,
a national significance to a movement, which otherwise might
have been regarded as little more than a local outbreak. It had,
indeed, converted for a while a mutiny into a revolution ; and
the Governor-General felt, therefore, that to strike at Dehli was
to strike at the very heart of the danger — that to deliver a
deadly blow at that point would be to cause an immediate
collapse of the vital powers of rebellion from one end of the
country to the other.
So he at once issued his orders for the striking of that blow ;
and day after day the telegraph wires carried to the Com-
mander-in-Chief briefly emphatic orders to make short work of
Dehli. Though the Lower Provinces were all but bare of
European troops, there was some wealth of English regiments
upon the slopes of the Northern Hills, where the Head-Quarters
of the Army were then planted ; and Lord Canning, with some-
thing of the impetuosity of the civilian, which is prone to over-
look military difficulties, believed that those regiments might be
o-athered up at once and poured down with resistless force upon
Dehli. Severed by nearly a thousand miles from the point of
attack, he felt that he himself could do but little. But he had
faith in the Commander-in-Chief — faith in the Lieutenant-
Governor of the North- West Provinces — faith in the great
Commissioner of the Panjab ; and in the first letter which he
wrote to England, after the outbreak at Mirath, he said : " As
to expediting the crushing of the Dehli rebels, I work at some
disadvantage at a distance of nine hundred miles; but the
forces are converging upon the point as rapidly as the season
1857.] CHAKGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. 91
will admit, and I am confident that, with Colviu's aid and
example, every man will be inspirited to do his utmost. I have
made the Commander-in-Chief aware of the vast importance to
the Lower Provinces that an end should be made of the work
quickly. Time is everything. Dehli once crushed, and a
terrible example made, we shall have no more difficulties." To
what extent the realized facts fulfilled his sanguine anticipa-
tions, will presently be made apparent.
Meanwhile, the Governor-General was anxiously turning
to good account the first-fruits of his initial mea-
sures for the collection of European troops, and Movement of
trying to succour those defenceless posts at which below. r ° m
the enemy were most likely to strike. The
difficulties and perplexities which beset him were great. He
had only two European regiments in the neighbourhood of the
capital — the 53rd Foot, whose Head-Quarters were in Fort
William, and the 84th, who had been brought round from Eangun
in March, and who had since been stationed at Chinsurah, on the
banks of the Hiigli, above Barrackptir. He would fain have
sent upwards a part of the little strength thus gathered at the
Presidency ; but those two regiments were all that belonged to
him for the defence of Lower Bengal. There was not another
English regiment nearer than Danapur, four hundred miles
distant from Calcutta. And there, in the immediate neighbour-
hood of the capital, were many points which it was of extreme
importance to defend. There was Fort William, with its great
Arsenal ; there was the Gun-manufactory at Kasipur, a few
miles higher up the river ; there was the Powder-manufactory
at Ishapiir, some twelve miles beyond ; and there was the Artil-
lery School of Instruction at Damdamah, with all its varied
appliances for the manufacture of ordnance stores. A little
way beyond Chauringhi, the fashionable suburb of the City of
Palaces, lay the great gaol of Alipur, crowded with malefactors,
many of the worst class ; and hard by were the Government
clothing godowns, or stores, from which the uniforms and ac-
coutrements of the army were drawn. Then in different parts
of the city were the Calcutta Mint and the Treasury and the
Banks, all groaning with coin — so that there was nothing want-
ing that could have supplied an insuigent army with all the
munitions and equipments of war, and enabled them to take the
field against us with the unfailing cement of high pay to keep
them together.
92 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
Wise after the event,* public writers have said that if Lord
Canning, in the third week of the month of May,
Conduct of had accepted the first offer of the European in-
crastdered?* habitan ts to enrol themselves into a volunteer corps
— that if he had disbanded the Sipahi regiments
at Barrackpur and ordered the disbandment of those at Danapur
— events which were subsequently rendered necessary — a large
portion of the European force in Bengal might have been set
free and pushed up by rail and road to the points which were
most beset with danger, and that great disasters which subse-
quently befell us might thus have been averted.t There are,
doubtless, many things which, in that month ^f May, would
have been done differently, and might have been done better, if
the future had been clearly revealed to those who had the
conduct of affairs. But we must judge men according to the
light of the day which shone upon them, not the light of the
morrow, which had not yet broken when they were called upon
to act. Illuminated by this morrow's light, we now know that
it might have been better if the Barrackpur and Danapur regi-
ments had been disarmed in the middle of May,J but the former
* [The words, " Wise after the event," are out of place. It was insisted
upon at the time. It was the argument upon which the recommendations
referred to in the text were based. — G. B. M.J
f The two ablest of the early writers, the author of the '-Red Pamphlet,"
and Mr. Meade in his " Sipahi Revolt," dwell very emphatically on this
point. The former says : " An enrolment on a large scale at this time would
nave enabled the Governor-General to dispense with the services of one
European regiment at least ; but so bent was he on ignoring the danger, that he
not only declined the offers of the Trades' Association, the Masonic Fraternity,
the Native converts, the Americans, and the French iuhabitants and others, but
he declined them in terms calculated to deaden rather than to excite a feeling
of loyalty." Mr. Meade says: " A thousand English volunteer infantry, four
hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred sailors were at the disposal of the
Government a week after the revolt became known. . . . Whilst the volun-
teers were learning how to load and fire, and the merchant seamen were being
instructed in the use of artillery, Government might have placed from the
terminus (at Raniganj) to Kanhpur a line of stations for horses and bullocks,
guarded, if necessary, by posts of armed men. . . . Had Government only
consented to do just a fortnight beforehand what they were coerced to do on
the 14th of June, they might have had on the first day of that month a force
of two thousand Europeans at Raniganj, fully equipped with guns and stores."
[The words of the author of the "Red Pamphlet" were written at the very
time, on the very spot, and represented the convictions of the European com-
munitv of Calcutta.— G. B. M.]
I [Yes ; but the author of the " Red Pamphlet " and the ablest of the Cal-
1857.] THE VOLUNTEER QUESTION. 93
were then protesting their loyalty, and offering to fight against
the rebels, and the latter were still believed in by General
Lloyd, who commanded the Division.* The temper of the
troops, in all parts of ihe country, seemed at that time to depend
upon the fate of Dehli, and more experienced Indian statesmen
than Lord Canning believed that Dehli would soon be crushed.
And, whilst it was deemed expedient to keep the Bengal Native
Army together so long as any hope survived, it was at that
time, in Bengal, held to be impossible to disarm all the Native
regiments. Disarming, said Lord Canning, is " a very effective
measure, where practicable, but in Bengal, where we have,
spread over from Barrackpiir to Kanhpur, fifteen Native regi-
ments to one European, simply impossible. A very different
game has to be played here."f
Moreover, in the neighbourhood both of Calcutta and of
Danapur, there were other dangers than those arising frcm the
armed Sipahi regiments. In the latter there was the excited
Muhammadan population of Patna, of which I shall speak here-
after; and in the former there were the many local perils, of
which I have already spoken. And it was at least doubtful
whether an undisciplined body of sailors and civilians, even
with a few staff officers to keep them together, would have sup-
plied the place of a regular regiment of Europeans. Lord
Canning, knowing well the constitution of the European com-
munity of Calcutta, did not think, from the very nature of their
interests and their occupations, that they could form a defensive
body on which any reliance could be placed. Where the
treasure of men is there will their hearts be also ; and, in many
instances, if possible, their hands. It was hardly to be expected
that, if there had been any sudden alarm — if the signal had been
sounded, and every man's services needed in a critical emer-
gency — many would not have thought rather of their wives and
children than of the public safety, and some, perhaps, more of
cutta merchants, judging from the light of the day, truly presaged the light of
the morrow, whilst the Government failed to do so. — G. B. M.]
* As late as the 2nd of June, General Lloyd wrote to Lord Canning, say-
ing : " Although no one can now feel full confidence in the loyalty of Native
troops generally, yet I helieve that the regiments here will remain quiet,
unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them, in which case
I fear they could not be relied upon. The thing required to keep them steady
is a blow quickly struck at Dehli." — MS. Correspondence.
t Lord Canning to Mr. Vernon Smith, June 5, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.
94 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
their own material property than of that of the State.* Doubt-
less there were brave and patriotic spirits among them who
would have gone gladly to the front ; but Lord Canning, perhaps,
did not err in thinking that the majority of members of the
non-military community were too much encumbered by their
worldly affairs to make efficient soldiers, either for the per-
formance of ordinary duties or the confronting of imminent
peril. f That they could have formed a substitute for regular
soldiers was improbable, though they would have been a ser-
viceable supplement to them.
If, then, the volunteers had been enrolled when the first offer
of service was made to Lord Canning, he could not have done
more than he did to send succours up the country. Nor did it,
at the time, seem to him that the danger was so imminent on
the Gangetic provinces as to demand that Bengal should be
stripped, even for a few weeks, of her only reliable defences.
It was just during that particular interval between the receipt
of intelligence of the Mirath outbreak and the arrival of the
first reinforcements from beyond the seas, that the accounts
from the upper country were least alarming. There was,
apparently, a suspension of rebellious activity. The telegra-
phic messages received from the principal stations were all of
an assuring character. On the 19th and 20th the report from
Banaras was, " All perfectly quiet," " troops steady." On the
19th Sir Henry Lawrence telegraphed from Lakhnao, " All veiy
well in the city, cantonments, and country." Sir Hugh Wheeler,
at Kanhpur, on the same day, sent a kindred message, "All
quiet here, the excitement somewhat less." From Allahabad,
on the same day, the tidings were, " Troops quiet and well be-
haved ; " and the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
* It is very vividly in my recollection that, on the famous 10th of April,
1848, when there was a vague expectation that London would be sacked by
the Chartists, and immense numbers of special constables had been sworn in,
I asked one of the most experienced men in the district in which I lived how
many of those sworn in would turn out on the given signal (it was to be the
ringing of the church bell), and I was told " not ten per cent.'" [The result
proved that the " experienced man " was wrong. — G. B. M.]
f [Lord Canning, if he did think in the manner the author suggests did
err most grievously. In the end a volunteer regiment was formed, and its
members, encumbered as they might have been by worldly affairs, made their
duties as volunteer soldiers their first thought. In the darkest hours they
patrolled efficiently the most dangerous parts of the city. — G. B. M.]
1857.] COLLECTION OF TROOPS. 95
Provinces at Agra assured the Governor-General that " Things
were looking cheerful." " There may," it was added, "be some
delay in the actual advance on Dehli. It is generally felt, how-
ever, that it must soon fall, and the flame has not spread." The
following days brought intelligence of the same satisfactory
complexion, the only evil tidings being those which spoke of
mutiny at Aligarh, and that was quickly followed by the
announcement from Agra that a strong expedition had been
organised for the recapture of the place.
There was little, therefore, that Lord Canning could do in the
earlier weeks of May to succour the North- Western Provinces,
and judged by the light of the day no pressing necessity to
incur, for that purpose, great risks in the neighbourhood of the
capital. What little he could do with safety he did. He
ordered up a detachment of the 84th to Banaras, and he sug-
gested to General Lloyd, at Danapur, that he might, perhaps,
send a company or two of the 10th to the same point. These
first movements might save a few lives, and might give a general
impression of action on our part, the importance of which was
great at such a time. But it was to the reinforcements coming
from beyond the seas that he eagerly looked for substantive aid.
He had written on the 19th to the Indian Minister in England,
saying : " Towards this object the steps taken are as follows —
The Madras Fusiliers are on their way, and will be here on the
21st or 22nd. A regiment has been sent for from Kan gun, and
will arrive in the course of next week. Two regiments at least
with some Artillery (perhaps three regiments) will come round
from Bombay as soon as they arrive from Persia. They are all
on their way. Another regiment from Karachi is ordered up
the Indus to Firuzpur, as a stand-by, if John Lawrence should
want help. An officer goes to-day to Ceylon to procure from
Sir Henry Ward every soldier he can spare. I have asked for
at least five hundred Europeans, but will accept Malays in place
of or besides them. The officer carries letters to Elgin and
Ashburnham, begging that the regiments destined for China
may be turned first to India This is all that I can do at
present to collect European strength, except the withdrawal of
one more regiment from Pegu, which when a steamer is avail-
able will take place." And now, before the end of the month,
he learnt that the Madras Fusiliers were in the river. Such
was his confidence, that when succours began to arrive, he felt,
however small they might be in proportion to his needs, that
96 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1557.
the tide was "beginning to turn in his favour. After a fortnight
of enforced inaction, there was something invigorating in the
thought that he was now beginning to hold palpably in his
hands the means of rendering substantial aid to his defenceless
countrymen. And he knew, moreover, that the moral effect of
the arrival of a single European regiment would be greater than
the material assistance, for it would soon be noised abroad that
the English were coming from beyond the seas to avenge their
slaughtered brethren, and Rumour would be sure to magnify
the extent of the arrival.*
Still, in itself the gain was very great ; for the vessels which
were working up the Hugli were bringing not
c / )lo ° el d Nei11 and only a well-seasoned, well-disciplined regiment,
Fusmers. in fine fighting order, but a chief who had within
him all the elements of a great soldier. The
1st Madras European Regiment was commanded by Colonel
James George Neil. It was one of those few English regiments
which, enlisted for the service of the East India Company,
and maintained exclusively on the Indian establishment, bore
on their banners the memorials of a series of victories from
the earliest days of our conquests in India. It had just
returned from the Persian Gulf, when Neil, fresh from Crimean
service,| found to his delight that he was to be appointed to
command the regiment with which he had served during the
greater part of his adult life. He had gone down to see the
regiment disembark, and he had written in his journal that
they were " a very fine healthy body of men, fully equal to any
regiment he had ever seen." This was on the 20th of April, and
* I am aware that a contrary statement has been made. It has been
asserted that the Government took pains rather to conceal than to make known
the arrival of reinforcements at Calcutta. Especially by disguising the names
of the ves.-els in which the troops were coming up the river. If the Alethea,
for example, were coming up, she was telegraphed, it was said, as the Sarah
Sands. Assuming the facts to be as stated, we may readily understand tho
object of the concealment. It might have been sound policy not to make
known the coming of the troops until they were landed and fit for service. If
there had been any combination for a rising, the moment seized would pro-
bably have been when it was known that our reinforcements were at tho
Sandtuads. But I am assured, on the highest authority, that the story is not
true. [I can state, on my own personal knowledge, that the story is true. I
made my inquiries on the spot, at the time, and the course pursued was not
only admitted, but justified. — G. B. M.]
t He had been Second-iu-Command, under Sir Robert Vivian, of the Anglo-
Turkish Contingent.
1857.] COLONEL NEILL. 97
he little then knew how soon he would be called upon to test
their efficiency in the field. Three or four weeks afterwards,
news came that Upper India was in a blaze, and the tidings
were quickly followed by a summons for the regiment to take
ship for Bengal. Then Neill rejoiced exceedingly to think of the
lessons he had learnt in the Crimea, and the experience he had
gained there ; and he felt, to use his own words, " fully equal to
any extent of professional employment or responsibility which
could ever devolve upon him."
Born in the month of May, 1810, at a short distance from the
chief town of Ayrshire, in Scotland, James Neill had entered the
Indian service in his seventeenth year, and was, therefore, when
summoned to take active part in the Sipahi War, a man of forty-
seven years of age, and a soldier of thirty years' standing. Of
a strong physical constitution, of active athletic habits, he
shrunk from no work, and he was overcome by no fatigue.
There were few men in the whole range of the Indian Army
better qualified by nature and by training to engage in the
stirring events of such a campaign as was opening out before
him. He was a God-fearing Scotchman, with something in him
of the old Covenanter type. He was gentle and tender as a
woman in his domestic relations, chivalrous and self-denying in
all the actions of his life, and so careful, as a commander, of all
under his charge, that he would have yielded his tent, or given
up his meals to any one more needing them than himself. But
towards the enemies of our nation and the persecutors of our
race he was as hard and as fiery as flint; and he was not one
to be tolerant of the shortcomings of our own people, wanting in
courage or capacity, or in any way failing in their manliness.
He knew, when he embarked for Bengal, that there was stern
work before him ; and he brooded over the future so intently,
that the earnestness and resolution within him spoke out ever
from his countenance, and it was plain to those around him
that, once in front of the enemy, he would smite them with an
unsparing hand, and never cease from his work until he should
witness its full completion, or be arrested by the stroke of
death.
On the 23rd of May Colonel Neill was off Calcutta with the
Ma 23 leading wing of his regiment, and soon the whole
corps had disembarked. But it was easier to bring
troops into port along the great highway of the ocean, than to
despatch them with the required rapidity into the interior of the
VOL. II. II
98 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
country. Every possible provision, however, had been made
and was still being made to push forward the reinforcements by
river and by road. Every available horse and bullock along the
line had been purchased by Government ; eveiy carriage and
rart secured for the conveyance of the troops up the country.*
The river steamers were carrying their precious freights of
humanity, but too slowly for our needs, in that dry season, and
the railway was to be brought into requisition to transport
others to the scene of action. It was by the latter route that
the bulk of NeiLTs regiment, in all nine hundred strong, were
to be despatched towards Banaras. f It might have been sup-
posed that, at such a time, every Christian man in Calcutta
would have put forth all his strength to perfect and to expedite
the appointed work, eager to contribute by all means within his
power to the rescue of imperilled Christendom. Especially was
it to be looked for that all holding such authority as might
enable them to accelerate the despatch of troops to our threat-
ened, perhaps beleagured posts, would strain every nerve to
accomplish effectually this good work. But on the platform of
the Calcutta terminus, on the river side, opposite to Haurah, all
such natural zeal as this seemed to be basely wanting. There
was no alacrity in helping the troops to start on their holy duty ;
and soon apathy and inaction grew into open opposition. When
the second party of a hundred men was to be despatched, stress
of weather delayed their arrival, from the flats in the river, at
the platform or landing-stage, near which the train was waiting
for them, under the orders of the Supreme Government. But as
the Fusiliers came alongside and were landing, in the darkness
of the early night, without an effort of help from the railway
. people, the station-master cried out that they were late, and
* " A steady stream of reinforcements is now being poured into Banaras.
Every horse and bullock that can be bought on the road is engaged, and the
dak establishments have been increased to the utmost. The men who go by
horse-dak reach Banaras in five days ; those by bullock in ten. The former
conveyance can take only from eighteen to twenty-four a day ; the latter a
hundred. Some are gone up by steamers. These will be sixteen days on the
journey." — Lord Canning to Sir H. Wheeler, May 26. MS.
t " I landed and saw the Military Secretary and the Deputy-Quartermaster-
General, and made all arrangements to start offthe men I had brought up by
sleamer.s to Banaras. However, next day there was a change. Only a hundred
and thirty men went up the country by steamer, and the rest I am starting off
by the train." — Private Letter of Col. Neill. The rail then only went as far as
Kamganj.
1857.] NEILL AND THE EAILWAY AUTHORITIES. 99
that the train would not wait for them a moment. Against this
Neill remonstrated, but the official, growing more peremptory in
his tone and insolent in his manner, threatened at once to start
the train. Other functionaries then came forward, and addressed
him in the same threatening strain. One said that the Colonel
might command his regiment, but that he did not command the
railway, and that the train should be despatched without him.
On this, Neill telling them that they were traitors and rebels,
and that it was fortunate for them that he had not to deal with
them, placed a guard over the engineer and stoker, and told
them to stir at their peril. A few weeks later, in parts of the
-country more distant from the central authority, such traitors as
these would, perhaps, have been hanged.
The train started, some ten minutes after its appointed time,
with its precious burden of Fusiliers ; and the tidings of what
Neill had done soon reached Lord Canning. It was not in the
brave heart of the Governor-General to refuse its meed of
admiration to such an act. Even official Calcutta, though a
little startled in its proprieties, commended, after a time, the
Madras Colonel, whilst at all the stations above, when the
story was known, people said that the right man was on his
way to help them, and looked eagerly for the coming succours.
And never, in a season of trouble, was there a more timelv
arrival ; for the lull of which I have spoken now
seemed to be at an end. As the month of May Enactment*
burnt itself out, the tidings which came from the
country above were more distressing and more alarming. It
was plain that the North- West Provinces, from one end to the
other, were fast blazing into rebellion — plain that we were
destined to see worse things than any we had yet witnessed —
and that the whole strength of the British nation must be put
forth to grapple with the gigantic datfger. If there had been
an} r hope before, that the rebellion would die out, or be
paralysed by the infliction of swift retribution on Dehli, it had
now ceased to animate the breasts of Lord Canning and his
colleagues. They now saw that it was necessary to the salva-
tion of the English power in India, not only that our people
should be everywhere let loose upon the enemy, but that they
should be armed with exceptional powers suited to, and justified
by the crisis. A reign of lawlessness had commenced ; but for
a while the avenging hand of the English Government had been
H 2
100 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
restrained by the trammels of the written law. It was time
now to cease from the "unequal conflict. The English were few ;
their enemies were many. The many had appealed to the law
of brute force; and the few were justified in accepting the
challenge. The time for the observance of municipal formalities
— of niceties of criminal procedure — of precise balancings of
evidence and detailed fulness of record — had clearly now passed
away. A terrible necessity had forced itself upon the rulers of
the land. In the great death-struggle which had come upon
us, the written law had been violated upon the one side, and it
was now to be suspended upon the other. The savage had
arisen against us, and it had become our work to fight the
savage with his own weapons. So the law-makers stood up and
shook themselves loose from the trammels of the law. On the
30th of May, the Legislative Council passed an Act which
swept away the old time-honoured seats of justice, wheresoever
Eebellion was disporting itself, and placed the power of life and
death in the hands of the executive officer, whatsoever his rank,
his age, or his wisdom. The Act, after declaring that all
persons owing allegiance to the British Government, who should
rebel or wage war, or attempt to do so, against the Queen or
Government of the East Indies, or instigate or abet such persons,
should be liable to the punishment of death, transportation or
imprisonment, gave the Executive Government of any Pre-
sidency or Place power to proclaim any district as in a state of
rebellion, and to issue a Commission forthwith for the trial of
all persons charged with offences against the State, or murder,
arson, robbery, or other heinous crime against person or pro-
perty — the Commissioner or Commissioners so appointed were
empowered to hold a Court in any part of the said district, and
without the attendance or fatwah of a law officer, or the assis-
tance of assessors, to pass upon every ^person convicted before
the Court of any of the above-mentioned crimes the punishment
of death, or transportation, or imprisonment; "and the judg-
ment of such Court," it was added, " shall be final and con-
clusive, and the said Court shall not be subordinate to the Sadr
Court." * This gave immense power to individual Englishmen.
But it armed only the civil authorities ; so an order was passed
by the Governor-General in Council authorising the senior
* The Act received the assent of the Governor-General, and thus passed
into law on the Sth of June.
1857.J ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS. 101
military officer, of whatsoever rank, at any military station in
the Bengal Presidency, to appoint General Courts-Martial,
either European or Native, or mixed, of not less than five
members, and " to confirm and carry into effect, immediately or
otherwise, any sentence of such Court-Martial."
With the new month came in further reinforcements from
beyond the seas, and something like confidence
was re-established in the Christian communities of June-
Calcutta; for although rebellion was spreading ° re ments OTce ~
itself all over Upper India, the continual stream
of English troops that was beginning to pour into the capital
seemed to give security to its inmates. The regiments released
from service in the Persian Gulf, were now making their
appearance on the banks of the Hugli. The 64th arrived on
the 3rd of June, and soon afterwards the 35th came in from
Moulmein. And then the kilted Highlanders of the 78th, also
from Persia, were seen ascending the ghauts of Calcutta, with
their red beards and their bare knees — an unaccustomed sight to
the natives of Bengal, in whose eyes they appeared to be half
women and half beasts. Others followed, and every effort was
made to expedite their despatch to the upper country. At
Ramganj, to which point the railway ran from the neighbour-
hood of Calcutta, an experienced officer was making arrange-
ments to send on detachments by horse-dak and bullock-dak
to Banaras ; but the resources of the State were miserably
inadequate to the necessities of the crisis, and prompt move-
ment by land, therefore, on a large scale was wholly impossible.
The journey to Banaras could be accomplished in five days; but
it was officially reported to Lord Canning that only from
eighteen to twenty-four men a day could thus be forwarded by
horsed carriages. By the 4th of June, it was computed that,
by these means of conveyance, ninety men with their officers
would have reached Banaras ; by the eighth, eighty-eight
more ; and by the 12th, another batch of eight-eight. The
bullock carriages, which afforded slower means of progression,
but which could carry larger numbers, might, it was calculated,
convey the troops onward at the rate of a hundred men a day.*
So, on the 10th of June, Lord Canning was able to write to
Mr. Colvin, saying : " The Europeans are still sent up steadily
* Mr. Cecil Beadon to Lord Canning, May 26. — MS. Correspondence.
102 CALCUTTA IN MAY. [1857.
at the rate of a hundred and twenty men a day, and hence-
forward they will not be stopped either at Banaras or Alla-
habad, but be passed on to Kanhpur. My object is to place at
Sir Hugh Wheeler's disposal a force with which he can leave
his intrenchments at Kanhpur, and show himself at Lakhnao or
elsewhere. He will best know where when the time arrives.
To this end, I call upon you to give your aid by furthering by
every means in your power the despatch southwards of a portion
of the European force which has marched upon Dehli." It had
not yet dawned upon the Government that Dehli was not to be
"made short work of" by the force that had come down from
the North to attack it. And there were many others of large
experience all over the country who believed that there was no
power of resistance in the place to withstand the first assaults
even of such an English army as Anson was gathering up and
equipping for service. What that force was, and what its efforts,
I have now to relate.
1857.] HEAD-QTJAKTERS. 103
CHAPTER Y.
LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON.
Disquieted by reports of the uneasy nervous state of the regi-
ments at Head-Quarters, but little apprehending
the approach of any gigantic danger, General ^y^-
Anson was recreating himself on the heights of Quarters"
Simlah, when, on the 12th of May, young Barnard
rode in from Ambalah bearing a letter from his father. It
informed the Commander-in-Chief that a strange incoherent
telegraphic message had been received at the latter place from
Dehli. But it was plain that the Mirath Sipahis had revolted.
An hour afterwards, another message was brought to Anson,
confirming the first tidings of revolt. Confused though it was,
it indicated still more clearly than its predecessor, that the
Native Cavalry prisoners at Mirath had escaped from gaol, that
the Sipahis thence had joined the Dehli mutineers, and that
there had been at both places a massacre of Europeans.*
When this intelligence reached the Commander-in-Chief,
he did not at once take in its full significance ; nor, indeed,
did men of far greater Indian experience — the Head-Quarters
Staff, by whom he was surrounded — perceive the dire purport
* The first telegram, as given in a letter from Anson to Lord Canning,
ran thus: "We must leave office. All the bungalows are on fire — burning
down by the Sipahis of Mirath. They came in this morning. We are oft*.
Mr. C. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning, and has not yet
returned. We learnt that nine Europeans are killed." This was received
at three p.m. The second message, received at four, said : " Cantonments in
a state of siege. Mutineers from Mirath— 3rd Light Cavalry — numbers not
known — said to be a hundred and fifty men. Cut off communication with
Mirath. Taken possession of the Bridge of Boats. 54th Native Infantry
sent against them, but would not act Several officers killed and wounded.
City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing-
known yet. Information will be forwarded."
104 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
of it. But he discerned at once that something must be
done. He saw that the city of Dehli and the lives of all
the Europeans were at the mercy of the insurgents, and
that it was incumbent upon him to send down all the white
troops that could be despatched from the Hills, to succour
our imperilled people, if the flames of rebellion should spread.
So he sent an Aide-de-camp to Kasaoli, on that day, with
orders for the 75th Foot to march to Ambalah ; * and, at the
same time, the Company's European regiments at Dagshai
and Sabathu were directed to hold themselves in readiness to
march at a moment's notice. But he did not put himself in
motion. He wrote to Lord Canning, saying that he anxiously
awaited further reports, and that if they were not favourable
he should "at once proceed down to Ambalah." He had
scarcely despatched this letter, when a third telegraphic
message was received, from which he learnt more distinctly
what had happened at Mirath on the preceding Sunday. Next
morning, he wrote again to Lord Canning, still saying that his
own movements would depend upon the infor-
mation he received. But he was beginning to
discern more clearly the magnitude of the danger, and he
ordered the two Fusilier regiments to move down to Ambalah, - )*
and the Sirmur battalion J to proceed from Dehra to Mirath.
From the first he appears to have perceived clearly that the
most pressing danger which threatened us was the loss of our
Magazines. He felt that the great Magazine at Dehli, with its
rich supplies of arms and ordnance stores, and implements of
all kinds, must already be in possession of the mutineers, and
he lost no time in taking measures to secure our other great
military store-houses, by sending European troops for their
defence. " I have sent express," he wrote to Lord Canning
on the 13th, " to desire that the Fort at Firuzpur may be
secured by the 61st Foot, and the Fort at Govindgarh by the
81st. Two companies of the 8th from Jalandhar to Philur."
The importance of securing the latter place could scarcely,
* Captain Barnard had, on his way to Simlah, warned the 75th to be
ready to march on the arrival of orders from Head-Quarters.
t i\Lijor G. O. Jacob, of the 1st European Regiment, who happened to be at
Simlah,' rode down to Dagshai during the night, and warned the regiment
early in the murning.
X A corps of brave and faitbful Gurkahs, whose good services will be
hereafter detailed.
1857.] FIRST MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. 105
indeed, be over-estimated.* * How it was accomplished by the
authorities of the Panjab will hereafter be told. In this place
it need only be recorded that thence was it that the siege-train
was to be drawn which was to open the way for our re-entrance
into Dehli, or to perform any other service that circumstances
might demand from it in the operations to be now undertaken.
An Artillery officer was despatched thither with all speed to
make the necessary arrangements ; f and the Gurkah Regiment,
known as the Nasiri Battalion, and then believed to be loyal to
the core, was ordered down from Jatogh, near Simlah, to form,
with a detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, an escort for
the train from Philur to Ambalah. This was not more than
any soldier of a few years' experience would have done ; but as
it waS an important, though an obvious movement, and tended
much to our subsequent success, it should be held in remem-
brance by all who say that in this conjuncture Anson did less. J
Before the day was spent, the Commander-in-Chief had made
up his mind that he must quit Simlah. " I am
just off for Ambalah," he wrote to Lord Canning, First move-
at eight o'clock on the morning of the 14th. ... ment * of
" This is a most disastrous business," he added,
" and it is not possible to see what will be the result. They
say the King of Dehli is at the bottom of it. I doubt it ; but
I have no doubt that he has taken advantage of the oppor-
tunity, and is assisting the insurgents. ... If the mutineers,
having possession of the city, make their stand behind the
walls, we shall want a good force and artillery. This must be
collected at Karnal, as it would not be wise, I think, to divide
* Mr. Cave-Browne says: "A report did float about the Panjab, the truth
of which we have never heard denied, that one member of the Staff suggested
that all European troops should concentrate on Philur, and, taking boat down
the Satlaj, make for England as fast as possible ; another, however — one who,
alas! fell among the earliest victims of the rebellion — suggested that the
Philur Fort, with its large magazine, might be made available for a very
different purpose. Hence the idea of a siege-train." This last was Colonel
Chester, Adjutant-General of the Army.
t Captain Worthington, who was on sick-leave at Simlah at the time.
% The author of the "History of the Siege of Dehli," says : " On the 16th
Sir John Lawrence telegraphed to Jalandhar to secure the Fort of Philur.
Two marches to the south, and commanding the bridge over the Satlaj, it
contained the only magazine that could now furnish us with a siege-train,"
&c, &c. But it is clear that General Anson had sent instructions to this
effect three days before.
106 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
the force we shall have and send part from Mirath on the
opposite side of the river. But I hope to hear something which
will enable me to decide what is best to be done when I get to
Ambalah."
He reached that place on the morning of the 15th, and many
sinister reports met him there. It was plain that
the Native regiments in the Panjab were in a
state of open or suppressed mutiny, and, therefore, that he
could not expect immediate assistance from that province.
" We are terribly short of artillery ammunition," he wrote.
" The two companies of Keserve Artillery I asked for from
Labor and Lodiana cannot, of course, now be given, and. we
have no means of using the siege-train. All the European
troops within reach will be here on the 17th. If we move upon
Dehli, I think it must be from Karnal. It is extraordinary
how little we know of what is going on in other parts of the
country — nothing whatever from Agra, Kanhpur, Oudh, &c."
On the following day, he wrote again to Lord Canning, saying :
" I have been doing my best to organise the Force here, ready
for a move ; but tents and carriages are not ready, and they
are indispensable. We are also deficient in ammunition, which
we are expecting from Philur. I hope we shall be in a state to
move shortly, if required. But we have no heavy guns for
Dehli, if we are to attack the mutineers there. We must not
fritter away or sacrifice the Europeans we have, unless for
some great necessity."
Many troubles and perplexities then beset him. It has been
already shown that the Native regiments at Am-
The Am- balah were in a state of smouldering mutiny, kept
ments Regl " only froin bursting into a blaze by the contiguity
of European troops.* The incendiary work,
which, in the preceding month, had so mystified the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the General of Division, had by this
time explained itself. It was clear that the Sipahis were ripe
for revolt. With the strong European force now gathered
at Ambalah, Anson might have reduced them to impotence in
an hour. To the vigorous understanding of Sir John Lawrence
nothing was clearer than that the true policy, in that con-
juncture, was to disarm the Native regiments at Ambalah
before advancing upon Dehli ; and he impressed this necessity
* Ante, book iii., chapter v r
1857.] AFFAIES AT AMBALAH. 107
upon Anson by telegraph and by post from Rawalpindi, but the
Commander-in-Chief refused to sanction the measure.* It
seemed to be an easy escape out of some difficulties which beset
his position at Ambalah. He had the wolf by the ears. He
could not with safety carry the regiments with him, and he
could not leave them behind. But he was met with remon-
strances from officers on the spot, who protested that some
pledges had been given to the Sipahis which could not honour-
ably be broken, though in truth the Sipahis themselves had
practically violated the compact, and there would have been no
breach of faith in turning their treachery against themselves.
It was, however, resolved to appeal only to their good feelings,
and so they were left with arms in their hands to use them
on a future day foully against us in return for our for-
bearance.f
Another source of anxiety was this. Before the week had
passed, news came to Ambalah that the Gurkahs
of the Nasiri Battalion, from no sympathy with Mutiny of the
the regular army, but from some personal causes Battalion.
of disaffection, had broken into revolt just when
their services were wanted, had refused to march to Philur, had
* See Panjab Eeport of May 25, 1858: "The Chief Commissioner con-
ceived that the first step was to disarm these regiments whom it was equally
dangerous either to leave at Ambalah or to take to Dehli. This course the
Chief Commissioner lost no time in iirging, but when the Commander-in-
Chief took the matter in hand, the local military authorities pointed out that
they had pledged themselves not to disarm the Sipahis. It was in vain urged
per contra that the compact had been no sooner made than it was broken by
the Sipahis themselves. There was not, indeed, the shadow of a reasonable
hope that these men would prove faithful."
f It should not be omitted altogether from the narrative that on the 19th
the Commander-in-Chief issued another address to the Native Army, in the
shape of a General Order, in which, after adverting to the general uneasiness
of the Sipahis and to his former efforts to allay it, he said : " His Excellencv
has determined that the new rifle cartridge, and every new cartridge, shall
be discontinued, and that in future balled" ammunition shall be made up by
each regiment for its own use by a proper establishment entertained for this
purpose. The Commander-in-Chief solemnly assures the Army that no
interference with their castes or religions was ever contemplated, and as
solemnly he pledges his word and honour that none shall ever be exercised.
He announces this to the Native Army in the full confidence that all will
now perform their duty free from anxiety and care, and be prepared to stand
and shed the last drop of their blood, as they have formerly done, bv the
side of the British troops, and in defence of the country." Such words in
season might be good, but the season had long since passed.
108 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
plundered the Commander-in-Chief s baggage, and threatened
to attack Simlah. Then there came a great cry of
T tL P Hnis! ra terror from the pleasant places which Anson had
just quitted, and in which, only a few days before,
the voice of joy and gladness had been resonant in a hundred
happy homes. It was the season when our English ladies,
some with their husbands, some without them, were escaping
from the hot winds of the Northern Provinces and disporting
themselves, in all the flush of renovated health and strength
and new-bom elasticity, under the cheering influence of the
mountain breezes on the slopes of the Himalayas. It might
well have been regarded, in the first instance, as a happy
circumstance that so many of our countrywomen were away
from the military cantonments, in which mutiny and murder
had so hideously displayed themselves ; but when it was known
that these joyous playgrounds were being stripped of their
defences, and that if danger were to threaten the homes of our
people there would be nothing but God's mercy to protect
them, a feeling of insecurity and alarm arose, which needed
but little to aggravate it into a great panic. When, there-
fore, tidings came that the Nasiri Battalion, at a distance of
some three or four miles from Simlah, had risen in rebellion,
there was general consternation. It was rumoured that the
officers and their families at Jatogh had been murdered, and
that the Gurkahs were marching on Simlah intent on slaughter
and spoliation. Then, for the greater part of two long days,
many tasted the bitterness of death. The agony of terror swept
our English families out of their holiday-homes, as with the
besom of coming destruction; and in wild confusion men,
women, and children streamed down towards the plains, or
huddled together at the point esteemed to be best capable
of defence.* Never, at any time or in any place, have the
consummate gallantry of Englishmen and the heroic endurance
of Englishwomen been more nobly — more beautifully — mani-
fested than in the great conflict for supremacy of which I am
writing. But the incidents of those two days on the Hills are
not to be regarded with national pride. The strong instinct
* This was the Bank. See Cave-Browne's " Panjab and Dehli in 18o7,"
which contains an animated account of the two days' panic on the Hills.
The writer says that at the Bank were congregated some lour hundred of our
Christian people, "of whom above a hundred were able-bodied men."
1857.] CONDUCT OF THE GURKAHS. 109
of self-preservation was dominant over all. Men forgot their
manhood in what seemed to be a struggle for life ;* and it is
not strange, therefore, that delicate ladies with little children
clinging to them, should have abandoned themselves uncon-
trolledly to their fears.
But the panic was a groundless panic. The Nasiri Battalion,
though grossly insubordinate, was not intent on the murder of
our people. The Gurkahs had grievances, real or supposed, to
be redressed, and when certain concessions had been made to
them, they returned to their allegiance, and afterwards became
good soldiers. | And not without some feeling of shame our
people went back to their deserted homes and found everything
just as it had been left. Those, whose excited imaginations
had seen blazing houses and household wrecks, re-entered their
dwelling-places to see with their fleshly eyes the unfinished
letter on the desk and the embroidery on the work-table un-
disturbed by marauding hands. Even the trinkets of the ladies
were as if they had never been out of the safest custody. But
confidence, which is ever " a plant of slow growth," is slowest
when once trampled or cut down ; and it was long before our
English families at the hill-stations recovered the serenity they
had lost. Every officer fit for service was called to join his
regiment, and the European soldiery were too much needed in
the field to allow any force to be left for the protection of the
tender congregation of women and children on the slopes of the
great hills. :£
The Commander-in-Chief had, indeed, other things to consider
than these social alarms. The defection of the
Nasiri Battalion was a source of perplexity upon Preparation
.n t •• i j jT r -l_ J xl. oftheSiege-
otner grounds, as it was hard to say how the Train.
siege-train could be escorted safely to Ambalah.
It was of the highest importance, at this time, that the European
* Mr. Cave-Browne describes "ladies toiling along'on foot, vainly trying
to persuade, entreat, threaten the bearers to hurry on with their jahpdns, on
which were their helpless children, while men were outbidding each other,
and outbidding ladies, to secure bearers for their baggage."
f It is said that one of their principal causes of complaint was the fact
that they had been ordered to march down to the plains, and that no arrange-
ments had been made for the protection of their families in their absence.
They were also in arrears of pay.
% Mr. Cave-Brown relates that as the Commander-in-Chief was riding out
of Simlah, Mr. Mayne, the Chaplain, informed him that the station was in
110 LAST DAYS OF GENEKAL ANSON. [1857.
troops should be exposed as little as possible to the blazing
heats of the summer sun. It was the sultriest season of the
year, and cholera was already threatening our camp. The
regiment of hardy Gurkahs, of whose loyalty there had been no
previous doubt, were just the men for the work ; and now their
services were lost to us for awhile. There was nothing, there-
fore, left but a resort to Hindustani troops of doubtful fidelity,
or to a contingent force supplied by a friendly Native chief.
Meanwhile there was great activity in the Magazine of Philur.
Day and night our troops, under Lieutenant Griffith,- Commissary
of Ordnance, toiled on incessantly to prepare the siege-train
and to supply ammunition of all kinds for the advancing army.
A day, even an hour, lost, might have been fatal ; for the
Satlaj was rising, and the bridge of boats, by which the train
was to cross the river, might have been swept away before our
preparations were complete.
But there were worse, perplexities even than these. The
elaborate organisation of the army which Anson
1 mentf art " commanded was found to be a burden and an
encumbrance. The Chiefs of all the Staff-Depart-
ments of the Army were at his elbow. They were necessarily
men of large experience, selected for their approved ability and
extensive knowledge ; and it was right that he should consult
them. But Departments are ever slow to move — ever en-
cumbered with a sense of responsibility, which presses upon
them with the destructive force of paralysis. These Indian
Military Departments were the best possible Departments in
time of peace. They had immense masses of correspondence
written up and endorsed with the most praiseworthy punctuality
and precision. They were always prepared with a precedent ;
always ready to check an irregularity, and to chastise an over-
zealous public servant not moving in the strictest grooves of
Eoutine. It was, indeed, their especial function to suppress
what they regarded as the superfluous activities of individual
men ; and individual men never did great things until they
got fairly out of the reach of the Departments. They were
nominally War Departments. There would have been no need
great danger from the number of " budmashes " in the Bizaars, and asked
that some Europeans might be sent up for its protection. The General said
that he could not spare any. " What,* then, are the ladies to do ? " asked
the Chaplain. " The best they can," wa3 the answer.
1857.J THE AEMY DEPARTMENTS. Ill
of such Departments if war had been abolished from off the face
of the land. But it was the speciality of these War Departments
that they were never prepared for war. Surrounded as we
were, within and without, with hostile populations, and living
in a chronic state of danger from a multiplicity of causes, we
yet were fully prepared for almost anything in the world but
fighting. Without long delay we could place ourselves in
neither a defensive nor an offensive attitude. We could "stand
fast " as well as any nation in the world, but there was never
any facility of moving. As soon as ever there came a neces-
sity for action, it was found that action was impossible. The
Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Commissary-
General, the Chief of the Army Medical Department, each had
his own special reason to give why the " thing " was " im-
possible." No ammunition — no carriages — no hospital stores —
no doolies for the sick and wounded. Each head of a Depart-
ment, indeed, had his own particular protest to fling in the face
of the Commander-in-Chief. Nunquam paratus was his motto.
It was the custom of Departments. It was the rule of the
Service. No one was at all ashamed of it. It had come down
by official inheritance from one to the other, and the Chief of
the Department merely walked in the pleasant paths which,
years before, as a Deputy Assistant, he had trodden under some
defunct Chief of pious memory. In a word, it was the system.
Every now and then some seer like Henry Lawrence rose up
to protest against it. And when, in the plain language of
common sense, the truth was laid bare to the public, some cried,
" How true ! " but the many smiled incredulously, and denounced
the writer as an alarmist. And so General Anson, having
found things in that normal state of unpreparedness in which
his predecessors had delighted, had followed in their footsteps,
nothing doubting, until suddenly brought face to face with a
dire necessity, he found that everything was in its wrong place.
The storm-signals were up, but the life-boat was in the church-
steeple, and no one could find the keys of the church.*
* On the ISth of May General Barnard wrote from Ambalah, saying :
" And now that they [the European regiments] are collected, without lent.-,
without ammunition, the men have not twenty rounds apiece. Two troops
of Horse Artillery, twelve guns, but no reserve ammunition, and their
waggons at Lodiana — seven days' off ! Commissariat without sufficient
transport at hand. This is the boasted Indian Army, and this is the force
112 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
It was not strange, therefore, that Anson felt it would not be
prudent, with the means then at his disposal, to risk " an
enterprise on Dehli." " It becomes now a matter for your
consideration," he wrote to Sir John Lawrence on the 17th,
" whether it would be prudent to risk the small European force
we have here in an enterprise on Dehli. I think not. It is
wholly, in my opinion, insufficient for the purpose. The walls
could, of course, be battered down with heavy guns. The
entrance might be opened, and little resistance offered. But
so few men in a great city, with such narrow streets, and an
immense armed population, who know every turn and corner
of them, would, it appears to me, be in a very dangerous
position, and if six or seven hundred were disabled, what
would remain ? Could we hold it with the whole country
around against us? Could we either stay in or out of it?
My own view of the state of things now is, that by carefully
collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad materials
which we cannot trust, and having supplied their places with
others of a better sort, it would not be very long before we
could proceed without a chance of failure, in whatever direction
we might please. Your telegraphic message informing me of
the measures which you have taken to raise fresh troops confirms
me in this opinion. I must add, also, that this is now the
opinion of all here whom I have consulted upon it — the Major-
General and Brigadier, the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-
General, and Commissary-General. The latter has, however,
offered a positive impediment to it, in the impossibility of
providing what would be necessary for such an advance under
from sixteen to twenty days. I thought it could have been
done in less ; but that was before I had seen Colonel Thomson.
Indeed, it is very little more than forty-eight hours since I
came here, and every turn produces something which may
alter a previous opinion." *
with which the civilians would have us go to Dehli." — Compare also letter
quoted in the text, page 123.
* The views of General Anson at this time are thus stated in an unpub-
lished memoir by Colonel Baird Smith, from which other quotations will be
niude: " It is generally understood that the course which recommended itself
most to his mind was one strongly opposed to the popular instinct at the
moment. Recognising, as all conversant with military affairs could not fail
to do, that strategically considered the position of a weak force at Dehli must
Ue, if not utterly false, yet of extreme danger, he is believed to have advocated
1857.] CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD CANNING. 113
But these doubts were but of brief duration. Let Adjutants-
General, and Quartermasters-General, and Com-
missaries-General suggest what difficulties they Correspondeno
might, there were other powers, to North and canning^
South, in whose sight all delay, in such a crisis,
was an offence and an abomination. Lord Canning, from
Calcutta, and Sir John Lawrence, from the Panjab, flashed
to the Head-Quarters of the Army emphatic messages, urging
Anson to move on Dehli, with such force as he could gather ;
and followed up their eager telegrams with letters scarcely less
eager. The Governor-General, to whom Anson had not com-
municated the views which he had expressed in the preceding
letter to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, was overjoyed
by the thought that there was so much activity at Head-
Quarters. Encouraged by the earlier letters of the Military
Chief, and still more by a message he had received from Mr.
Colvin, at Agra, Canning wrote on the 17th to Anson, saying
that he learnt the good news " with intense pleasure." " For,"
he added, " I doubted whether you would be able to collect so
strong a body of troops in the time. I cannot doubt that it
will now prove amply sufficient, and I am very grateful to you
for enabling me to feel confident on this point. An unsuccessful
demonstration against Dehli, or even any appearance of delay
in proceeding to act, when once our force is on the spot, would
have a most injurious effect — I mean in Bengal generally.
Every station and cantonment is in a state of excitement, and
anything in the nature of a check would give confidence to the
disaffected regiments, which might lead to something worse
than the horrors of Dehli. Allahabad, Banaras, Oudh (except
Lakhnao, which I believe to be safe), and a host of places
of less importance where Native troops are alone, will continue
to be a source of much anxiety until Dehli is disposed of. It is
for this that I have telegraphed to you to make as short work
as possible of the rebels, who have cooped themselves up there,
and whom you cannot crush too remorselessly. I should rejoice
the withdrawal of the small and isolated detachments on the Duab, and the
concentration of the whole available British force between the Satlaj and the
Jamnah, there to await the arrival of reinforcements by the line of the Indus,
and, while permitting the fire of revolt to burn as fiercely as it might within
the limits indicated, to check its spread beyond them on the northward, and
ultimately to proceed to quench it with means that would make the issue
certain." — Unpublished Memoir by Colonel Baird Smith. MS.
VOL. II. I
114 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
to hear that there had been no holding our men, and that the
vengeance had been terrible."
Whilst Lord Canning was thus expressing his gratitude to
Anson, Sir John Lawrence, who was nearer the
Correspondence scene of action, and in closer communication with
L^nce.° ha the Commander-in-Chief, knowing better what
were the prevailing counsels at Head-Quarters,
was urgent in his remonstrances against delay. He knew the
temper of the people well ; and nothing was clearer to the eye
of his experience than that, in the conjuncture which had
arisen, it was necessary above all things to maintain an appear-
ance of successful activity. Any semblance of paralysis at such
a time must, he knew, be fatal to us. At such periods the
Natives of India wait and watch. It is in conformity with the
genius of a people, equally timid and superstitious, to be
worshippers of success. John Lawrence knew well that if at
any time the English in India should betray symptoms of
irresolution in the face of danger, thousands and tens of
thousands, believing that the day of our supremacy is past,
would first fall away from, and then rise against their masters.
But we had reached an epoch in the History of our great Indian
Empire at which the impression of our coming fall was stronger
than it had ever been before, and there were those who, on the
first sign of weakness in our camp, would have pointed
exultingly to the beginning of the end. It was not a time,
indeed, to calculate military means and resources, or to regard
strategical principles in the conduct of our armies ; but simply
to move and strike — to move somewhere and to strike some one.
And it was to this necessity of prompt and vigorous action that
the counsels of John Lawrence ever pointed — not to any par-
ticular line of procedure to be dictated to the Military Chief.
"I do not myself," he wrote to Anson, on the 21st of May,
" think that the country anywhere is against us — certainly not
from here to within a few miles of Dehli. I served for nearly
thirteen years in Dehli, and know the people well. My belief
is, that with good management on the part of the Civil officers,
it would open its gates on the approach of our troops. It seems
incredible to conceive that the mutineers can hold and defend
it. Still, I admit that on military principles, in the present
state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Dehli ;
certainly not until the Mirath force is prepared to act, which it
can only be when set free. Onoe relieve Mirath, and give
1857.] VIEWS OF SIK JOHN LAWKENCE. 115
confidence to the country, no difficulty regarding carriage can
occur. By good arrangements the owners will come forward,
but in any case it can be collected. From Mirath you will be
able to form a sound judgment on the course to be followed.
If the country lower down be disturbed, and the Sipahis have
mutinied, I conceive it would a paramount duty to march that
way, relieve each place, and disarm or destroy the mutineers.
If, on the other hand, all were safe, it would be a question
whether you should consolidate your resources there, or march
on Dehli. I think it must be allowed that our European
troops are not placed at this or that station simply to hold it,
but to be ready to move wherever they may be required.
Salubrious and centrical points for their location were selected ;
but so long as we maintain our prestige and keep the country
quiet, it cannot signify how many cantonments we abandon.
But this we cannot do, if we allow two or three Native corps to
checkmate large bodies of Europeans. It will then be a mere
question of time, by slow degrees, but of a certainty the Native
troops must destroy us. We are doing all we can to strengthen
ourselves, and to reinforce you, either by direct or indirect
means.* But can your Excellency suppose for one moment
that the Irregular troops will remain staunch, if they see our
European soldiers cooped up in their cantonments, tamely
awaiting the progress of events. Your Excellency remarks
that we must carefully collect our resources ; but what are
these resources, but our European soldiers, our guns, and our
materiel : these are all ready at hand, and only require to be
handled wisely and vigorously to produce great results. We
have money also, and the control of the country. But if dis-
affection spread, insurrection will follow, and we shall then
neither be able to collect the revenue, nor procure supplies."
" Pray," he continued, " only reflect on the whole history of
India. Where have we failed, when we acted vigorously?
Where have we succeeded, when guided by timid counsels?
Clive, with twelve hundred, fought at Plassey in opposition to
the advice of his leading officers, beat forty thousand men, and
conquered Bengal. Monson retreated from the Chambal, and
before he gained Agra, his army was disorganised and partially
annihilated. Look at the Kabul catastrophe. It might have
* This is to be [understood as referring to the measures taken in the
Panjab.
I 2
116 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON [1857.
been averted by resolute and bold action. The Irregulars of
the Army, the Kizlbashis, in short our friends, of whom we
had many, only left us when they found we were not true to
ourselves! How can it be supposed that strangers and mer-
cenaries will sacrifice everything for us ? There is a point up
to which they will stand by us, for they know that we have
always been eventually successful, and that we are good
masters ; but go beyond this point, and every man will look to
his immediate benefit, his present safety. The Panjab Irregu-
lars are marching down in the highest spirits, proud to be
trusted, and eager to show their superiority over the Eegular
troops — ready to fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the Europeans.
But if, on their arrival, they find the Europeans behind breast-
works, they will begin to think that the game is up. Recollect
ihat all this time, while we are halting, the emissaries of the
mutineers are writing to, and visiting, every cantonment. . . .
I cannot comprehend what the Commissariat can mean by
requiring from sixteen to twenty days to procure provisions. I
am persuaded that all you can require to take with you must be
procurable in two or three. We have had an extraordinary
good harvest, and supplies must be abundant between Ambalah
^nd Mirath. The greater portion of the country is well culti-
vated. We are sending our troops in every direction without
difficulty, through tracts which are comparatively desert. Our
true policy is to trust the Maharajah of Patiala, and Rajah of
Jhind, and the country generally, for they have shown evidence
c-f being on our side, but utterly to distrust the regular Sipahis.
I would spare no expense to carry every European soldier — at
any rate, to carry every other one. By alternately marching
and riding, their strength and spirits will be maintained. We
are pushing on the Guides, the 4th Sikhs, the 1st and 4th
Panjab regiments of Infantry, from different parts of the
Panjab, in this way. If there is an officer in the Panjab whom
your Excellency would wish to have at your side, pray don't
hesitate to apply for him. There is a young officer now at
Head-Quarters, who, though young in years, has seen much
service, and proved himself an excellent soldier. I allude to
Captain Norman, of the Adjutant-General's office. Sir Colin
Campbell had the highest opinion of his judgment ; and when
he left Peshawar it was considered a public loss."
Of the exceeding force and cogency of this no doubt can be
entertained. It was the right language for the crisis — rough,
1857.] VIEWS OF SIR JOHN LAWRENCE. 117
ready, and straight to the point. The great Pan jab Commissioner,
with his loins girt about, eager for the encounter, impatient to
strike, was not in a mood to make gentle allowances or to weigh
nice phrases of courteous discourse. But, in what he wrote, he
intended to convey no reproaches to the Military Chief. It was
simply the irrepressible enthusiasm of a nature, impatient of
departmental dallyings and regulation restraints, and in its
own utter freedom from all fear of responsibility not quite
tolerant of the weakness of those who, held back by a fear of
failure, shrink from encountering heroic risks. It was not that
he mistrusted the man Anson, but that he mistrusted all the
cumbrous machinery of the Head-Quarters Departments, which
never had been found ripe for sudden action — never had im-
provised an expedition or precipitated an enterprise, ever since
Departments were created — though, in truth, he could not see
that in the machinery itself there was anything to unfit it for
prompt action. " I should greatly regret," he wrote two days
afterwards, " if any message or letter of mine should annoy you.
I have written warmly and strongly in favour of an advance,
because I felt assured that such was the true policy. However
much we may be taken by surprise, our military organisation
admits of prompt action. The country is almost sure to be
with us, if it were only that we save them from trouble ; and
this will more especially be the case in an affair like the pre-
sent, when we have really to contend only with our own troops,
with whom the people can have no* sympathy." The Com-
missariat, in such a case, is ever the chief stumbling-block ;
and the impediments thrown up are those of which military
men take the most, and civilians the least account. Anson was
told at Ambalah that they were insuperable. But John
Lawrence, at Eawalpindi, could not recognise the force of the
obstructive argument. " I cannot comprehend," he wrote to
Anson, " why Colonel Thomson requires so much supplies. To
carry so much food with the troops is to encumber the column
and waste our money. To guard against accidents, three or
four days' supplies should be taken, but no more. My belief is,
that ten thousand troops might march all over the North- West,
and, provided they paid for what they required, no difficulty in
obtaining supplies would be experienced." It is plain, too, that
at this time the Dehli difficulty was, in the Panjab, held to be a
light one, for Lawrence added : " 1 still think that no real
resistance at Dehli will be attempted ; but, of course, we must
118 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. 1.1857.
first get the Mirath force in order, and, in moving against Dehli,
go prepared to tight. My impression is, that, on the approach
of our troops, the mutineers will either disperse, or the people
of the city rise and open their gates." *
Whether General Anson ever recognised the fact that the
conjuncture was one in which all rules of warfare
Final Orders must bow their necks to stern political necessity,
GovermnZttt. is n °t verv apparent ; but if he still maintained
his opinions as a soldier, he knew well that it was
his duty to yield his judgment to the authority of the supreme
Civil power ; and when he received an emphatic enunciation of
the views of the Governor-General, he prepared to march down
upon Dehli. " I regret," he wrote to the Governor-General on
the 23rd of May, " that it has not been possible to move sooner
upon Dehli. The force is so small that it must not be frittered
away. You say in your telegraphic message that Dehli must
be recovered, 'but [the operations] to be undertaken by a
strong British, force.' There is not this in the country. We
have collected all within reach. I venture to say that not an
hour has been lost, and that the movement of the troops from
Ambalah will have been accomplished in a space of time which
was not considered possible on my arrival here." And he con-
cluded his letter by saying : " I should be glad to know whether
vou consider the Force with which I propose to attack Dehli
sufficient — and, namely, ' a strong British Force.' "
He had by this time clearly calculated his available
strength for the great enterprise before him — and it was this, as
detailed in a letter which he wrote to General Hewitt at Mirath :
" The force from Ambalah consists of the 9th Lancers, one
squadron of the 4th Lancers, Her Majesty's 75th Foot, 1st Euro-
pean Regiment, 2nd European Regiment, 60th Native Infantry,
two troops of Horse Artillery. They are formed into two small
brigades. Brigadier Halifax commands the first. . . . Brigadier
Jones the second brigade. Four companies of the 1st Fusiliers, one
squadron of 9 th Lancers, two guns, Horse Artillery, were moved
* In a previous letter (May 21) Lawrence bad written: "At Dehli the
Sipahia have murdered their officers and taken our guns, but even there they
did not stand. No number of them can face a moderate body of Europeans
fairly bandied. Of late years, even when fighting under our own banners
in a 'good cause, with European officers at their head, and English comrades
at their side, they have seldom done anything ; as mutineers they cannot
fight — they will burn, destroy, and massacre, bui not fight."
1857.] ORDERS OF GOVERNMENT. 119
to Karnal on the 17th, and arrived on the 20th. Six companies
of the 1st Fusiliers followed on the 21st. Her Majesty's 75th
Foot and 60th Eegiment of Native Infantry marched on the
22nd. One squadron 9th Lancers and four guns will march on
the 24th or 25th. The above will be at Karnal on the 28th.
The 2nd Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade of Horse Artillery
will probably follow on the 26th. The whole will be at Karnal
on the 30th. I propose then to advance with the column
towards Dehli on the 1st, and be opposite to Baghpat on the 5th.
At this place I should wish to be joined by the force from
Mirath. To reach it four days may be calculated on." "A
small siege-train," he added, " has left Lodiana, and is expected
here on the 25th. It will require eleven days to get it to Dehli.
It may join us at Baghpat on or about the 6th, the day after
that I have named for the junction of your force. I depend on
your supplying at least one hundred and twenty Artillerymen
to work it. You will bring, besides, according to statement
received, two squadrons of Carabineers, a wing of the 60th
Eifles, one light field battery, one trooj) of Horse Artillery, and
any Sappers you can depend upon, and of course the non-com-
missioned European officers belonging to them."
Whilst Anson was writing this from Ambalah, Lord Canning
was telegraphing a message to him, through the Lieutenant-
Governor of Agra, announcing the reinforcements which were
expected at Calcutta, and adding that everything depended
" upon disposing speedily of Dehli, and making a terrible
example. No amount of severity can be too great. I will sup-
port you in any degree of it." There was nothing uncertain
in this sound. But it is clear that the Governor-General, in
his eagerness to strike a sudden and a heavy blow at the enemy,
very much underrated the military difficulties with which Anson
was called upon to contend, and believed overmuch in the facile
execution of the impossible; for, on the 31st of May, he tele-
graphed again to the Commander-in-Chief, saying : " I have
heard to-day that you do not expect to be before Dehli till the
9th (June). In the mean time Kanhpur and Lakhnao are severely
pressed, and the country between Dehli and Kanhpur is passing
into the hands of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to
prevent this, and to relieve Kanhpur. But rapid action will do
it. Your force of Artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli
with certainty. I therefore beg that you will detach one
European Infantry regiment and a small force of European
120 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL AXSOX. [1857.
Cavalry to the fiouth of Dehli, without keeping them for opera-
tions there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur
relieved immediately. It is impossible to overrate the import-
ance of showing European troops between Dehli and Kanhpur,
Lakhnao and Allahabad, depend upon it."
It is easy to conceive what would have been the perplexity
in General Anson's mdnd, if he had received these instructions.
The recovery of Dehli seemed to be an enterprise beyond the
reach of the slender means at his disposal ; but he was expected
also to operate in the country beyond, and in the straits of his
weakness to display strength on an extensive field of action.
The Army was already on its way to Dehli.' For whilst the
Military Departments were protesting their inability to move
the Army, the Civilians at Ambalah — officially the Commis-
sioner of the Cis-Satlaj States, and the Deputy Commissioner of
the district, individually Mr. George Barnes and Mr. Douglas
Forsyth — were putting forth their strength, moving all the
agents beneath them, and employing the influence which their
position had given them among the people to accomplish
promptly and effectually the great object now to be attained.
It little mattered if, at such a time, the ordinary Civil business
were temporarily suspended. It behoved, at such a moment,
every man to be more or less a soldier. So the Civil officers,
not only at Ambalah, but all around it, in the important
country between the Jamnah and the Satlaj, went to work right
manfully in aid of the military authorities ; collected carts,
collected cattle, collected coolies, and brought together and
stored in Ambalah large supplies of grain for the army.* And
this, too, in the face of difficulties and impediments
which would have dismayed and obstructed less
earnest workmen ; for ever, after the fashion of their kind,
Natives of all classes stood aloof, waiting and watching the issue
* Mr. Barnes, in his official report, has recorded that, " As soon as it was
seen by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward movement should be made,
a sudden difficulty arose in the want of carriages. The Deputy Commissary-
General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army,
the Civil Authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Ambalah
there has ever been a difficulty to furnish cattle of any kind, the carts being
of a very inferior description ; however, such as they were, they had to be
pressed into service, and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions,
rive hundred carts, two thousand camels, and two thousand coolies were made
over to the Commissariat Department; thirty thousand maunds of grain were
likewise collected and stored for the Army in the town of Ambalah."
1857.] AID OF THE NATIVE CHIEFS. 121
of events ; from the capitalist to the coolie all shrunk alike from
rendering assistance to those whose power might be swept away
in a clay.
There were other important services, which at this time the
Civil officers rendered to their country; doing,
indeed, that without which all else would have sShcwef
been in vain. In the country between the Jamnah
and the Satlaj were the great chiefs of what were known as the
" Protected Sikh States." These states, at the commencement
of the century, we had rescued by our interference from the
grasp of Ranjit Singh, and ever since the time when the Rajah
of Patiala placed in the hands of young Charles Metcalfe the
keys of his fort, and said that all he possessed was at the service
of the British Government, those chiefs, secure in the possession
of their rights, had been true to the English alliance. They
had survived the ruin of the old Sikh Empire, and were grateful
to us for the protection which we had afforded and the inde-
pendence which we had preserved. There are seasons in the
lives of all nations, when faith is weak and temptation is strong,
and, for a little space, the Cis-Satlaj chiefs, when the clouds of
our first trouble were lowering over us, may have been beset
with doubts and perplexities and fears of siding with the weaker
party. Their hesitation, however, was short-lived. The excellent
tact of Douglas Forsyth, who took upon himself the responsibility
of calling upon the Maharajah of Patiala for assistance, smoothed
down the apprehensions of that chief, and he took his course
manfully and consistently, never swerving from the straight
path of his duty. The chiefs of Jhind and Nabha followed his
example, and were equally true to the British alliance.* It
* See Mr. Barnes's report. " The first object was to provide for the safety
of the Grand Trunk Road and the two stations of Thaneswar and Lodiana
which were without reliable troops. I accordingly directed the Rajah of
Jhind to proceed to Karnal with all his available force. The Maharajah
of Patiala, at my request, sent a detachment of all arms, and three guns
under his brother, to Thaneswar on the Grand Trunk Road between Ambtllah
and Karnal. The Rajah of Nabha and the Nawab of Maler Kotla were
requested to march with their men to Lodiana, and the Rajah of Faridpur
was desired to place himself under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner
of Firuzpur. Thus all points of the main line of road were secured, and the
Rajah of Jhind was also instructed to collect supplies and carriages for the
field force, to protect the station of Karnal," &c. It should be added that
Sir John Lawrence had telegraphed on the 13th to " get the Maharajah of
Patiala to send one regiment to Thaneswar and another to Lodiana." The
policy from the first was to trust the great Cis-Satlaj Chiefs.
122 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1857.
was of the utmost importance, at that time, that the road from
Anibalah to Karnal should be kept open ; for it was to the latter
place — once a nourishing military cantonment, but at the time
of which I am writing deserted and decayed — that the troops
from Anibalah were now marching ; and there the fugitives
from Dehli had mostly assembled, and something of an attempt
had been made to re-establish the shattered edifice of British
authority upon a fragment of the ruins of Dehli.* Above all,
to hold Karnal was to keep open the communications between
Anibalah and Mirath, and so to facilitate the junction of the
forces from those two points. Happily for us, in this juncture,
the Kawab of Karnal, a Muhammadan nobleman and land-owner
of large influence in that part of the country, threw the weight
of his personal power into the scales on our side.f This, doubt-
less, was great help to us ; and when the Jhind Rajah sent down
his troops to Karnal, the danger of a general rising of the mixed
population of that part of the country had passed away. The
Contingent arrived on the night of the 1 8th, and on the follow-
ing morning the first detachment of Europeans marched into
the cantonment.J Meanwhile, the Patiala Rajah was occupying
Thaneswar, on the great high road between Ambalah and
Karnal, and thus the communication between these two im-
portant points was fully secured.
At the distance of a few miles from the station of Karnal lies
the town of Panipat, a place famous in Indian annals ; for there,
on the neighbouring plain, had great armies contended, and thrice
with tremendous carnage the destinies of India had been decided
on its battle-fields. At this point the bulk of the Jhind Con-
tingent was now posted, and as fresh detachments of the army
from Ambalah marched into Karnal, the advanced guard pushed
on to Panipat, where it was presently joined by the rear companies
of the Fusiliers, two more squadrons of the Lancer regiment,
and four guns. The Europeans, weakened though they were by
* Brigadier Graves and Mr. Le Bas, who had effected their escape from
Dehli, were the representatives of the military and civil authority.
f Mr. Raikes states, in his " Notes on the Revolt," that " When we had
no military force near Karnal, and all men watched anxiously the conduct
of each local chief, the Nawah of Karnal went to Mr. Le Bas and addressed
him to the following effect : ' Sir, I have spent a sleepless night in meditating
on the state of affairs ; I have decided to throw in my lot with yours. My
gword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal.' "
X This advanced detachment consisted of four companies of the 1st Fusi-
liers, two Horse Artillery guns, and a squadron of the 9th Lancers.
1857.] DEATH OF GENERAL ANSON. 123
the burning heats of May, were eager for the conflict, and
already there had grown up amongst them that intense hatred
of the Native races which afterwards bore such bitter fruit, for
even then they were beginning to see before them evidences of
the destroying hand of the Insurgent.
With the last of the European regiments General Anson left
Ambalah, on the 25th of May ; and, on the 26th,
May 27. h e was lying at Karnal, helpless and hopeless,
Genemi Anson, on the bed of death, in the mortal agonies of the
great pest of the country. On the following day,
Sir Henry Barnard arrived in Camp, a little after midnight,
just in time, as he said, to receive the dying farewell of his
chief. Anson was all but gone ; but he recognised his friend,
and, in a faint voice, articulated : " Barnard, I leave you the
command. You will say how anxious I have been to do my
duty. I cannot recover. May success attend you. God bless
you. Good-bye."* And another hour had not spent itself
before General George Anson had passed beyond the reach of
all human praise or censure. The great responsibility thrown
upon the Chief-Commander had filled him with mental anxiety,
which had increased the depressing influences of over-fatigue and
exposure to the climate in the most trying season of the year.
He had evinced much tender consideration for the health of
his men, and he was one of the first to be struck down by the
fiery blasts of the Indian summer. He was a brave soldier and
an honest gentleman; and another brave soldier and honest
gentleman, whilst the corpse lay unburied in the next room,
wrote a letter, saying : " I solemnly declare to you on my
character as an officer, who, at all events, came to this country
with the prestige of recent service with him, that not an hour
has been lost in getting the small force now advanced as far
as Panipat, and I hope to keep pushing on, as fast as I can get
them up, on Dehli. The day I heard of the disaster at Dehli —
which at Ambalah preceded any account from Mirath — I imme-
diately despatched my son, who rode to Simlah during the
night to warn the Commander-in-Chief, and bring him down.
lie has himself detailed all his movements to you, and I cannot
but entertain hope, had he lived, you would have taken a dif-
ferent view of his conduct, and not attributed any want of
* Letter of Sir H. Barnard to Sir Charh s Yorke, May 27, 1857. " This,"
lie adds, "was at half-jiast one a.m. on the 27th; at 2.15 he breathed his
last." Cholera was the immediate cause of his death.
124 LAST DAYS OF GENERAL ANSON. [1S57.
energy to him. Whatever might have been accomplished by
an immediate rush from Mirath could not be expected from
Ambalah. The European troops were all in the Hills. Nothing
but three regiments of Native troops and some Artillery
Europeans were at the latter place ; and when the regiments
on the Hills were assembled, the General was met by protests
against his advance by the leading Staff and Medical Officers of
his Army. The Commissariat declared their utter inability to
move the troops ; the medical men represented theirs to provide
the requisite attendants and bearers. Still matters went on.
Troops were moved as fast as could be done, and arrangements
made to meet the difficulty of bearers, Ammunition had to be
procured from Philur, for the men had not twenty rounds in
their pouches, and none in store ; and the Artillery were
inefficient, as their reserve waggons were all at Lodiana. It is
only this day that I expect the necessary supply of ammunition
to arrive at Ambalah. I have determined (I say Z, for poor
Anson could only recognise me and hand me over the command
when I arrived last night) not to wait for the siege-train."*
Thus passed away from the scene one of its chief actors, just
as the curtain had risen on the great drama of
G iS e comm a a r nd rd British action. With what success Anson might
have played his distinguished part can now be
only conjectured. There are those who believe that alike in
wisdom and integrity he far outshone all his colleagues in the
Supreme Council, and that when the crisis arrived he took in
the situation and measured the work to be done with an
accuracy and precision which none beside, soldier or civilian,
brought to bear upon the opening incidents of the War.f
* Si' Henry Barnard to Sir John Lawrence, May 27, 1857. MS.
t See the statements of the author of the " Red Pamphlet :" " It was a
common practice to sneer at General Anson as a mere Horse-Guards' General,
as one who had gained his honours at Newmarket. But it is nevertheless
a fact that this Horse-Guards' General, by dint of application and persever-
ance, made himself so thoroughly a master of his profession. tVat, when the
mutiny broke out, he drew up a plan of operations, which a\s successor,
a Crimean General, carried out in all its details, rejecting as crude and
ridiculous the suggestions sent up by the collective wisdom of Calcutta."
History may not unwillingly accept this ; but when it is said that General
Anson, " when brought, in both the Councils '' — that is, the Executive and
Legislative Councils — " face to face with men who had made legislation for
India the study of their lives, distanced them all," one cannot help being
somewhat startled by the boldness of the assertion. [The judgment recorded
by the author of the "Hud Pamphlet" was based on opinions expressed at
1857.] JUDGMENT OF LORD CANNING. 125
Little time was allowed to him to recover from the first shock
of the storm before it overwhelmed and destroyed him. But it
would be unjust to estimate what he did, or what he was
capable of doing, by the measuring-rod of those who, during
that eventful fortnight, believed that the recovery of Dehli was
to be accomplished by the prompt movement of a small and im-
perfectly equipped British force. It is not in contemporary
utterances that we are to look for a just verdict. We must put
aside all thought, indeed, of what even the wisest and the
strongest said in the first paroxysm of perplexity, when all men
looked to the Chief of the Army to do what then seemed to be
easy, and found that it was not done. How difficult it really
was will presently appear. And though the result of a
sudden blow struck at Dehli might have been successful, it is
impossible, with our later knowledge of subsequent events to
guide us, not to believe that in the month of May the risk
of failure was greater than the fair prospect of success. And
we may be sure that if Anson had flung himself headlong upon
the stronghold of the enemy and failed, he would have been
stigmatised as a rash and incapable general, ignorant of the
first principles of war.
Perhaps the judgment of Lord Canning on these initial delays
and their causes may be accepted as sound and
iust. "The protracted delay," he wrote, "has Summing up of
J x J ,1 r -j Lord Canning.
been caused, as lar as 1 can gather trom private
letters from General Anson since I last wrote, by waiting for
the siege-train, and by want of carriage for the Europeans. As
regards the siege-train, I believe it to have been an unwise
delay. We shall crush Dehli more easily, of course ; but I do
not believe that we should have been exposed to any reverse for
want of a siege-train, and the time lost has cost us dear indeed.
As to the carriage and Commissariat, it is impossible, in the
absence of all information, to say how far the delay was avoid-
able and blamable. It would have been madness to move a
European force at this season with any deficiency of carriage
(with cholera, too, amongst them), but I greatly doubt whether
General Anson was well served in this matter of carriage.
the time, on the spot, by men who had excellent opportunities of form in <*
an opinion. The fact remains that it was only after Lord Canning had
emancipated himself from the thraldom of the advisers bequeathed to him
by Lord Dalhousie that he achieved the successes which will be recorded in
subsequent volumes. — G. B. M.]
126 LAST DAYS OP GENEEAL ANSON. [1857.
From many letters from Head-Quarters which have been before
me, I am satisfied that, with the exception of one young officer,
there was not a man on the Army Staff who gave due thought
to the political dangers of delay and to the perils which hung
over us elsewhere as long as no move was made upon Dehli.
With the Staff, the Medical Staff especially, arguing the
necessity of completeness, and none of them apparently con-
scious of the immense value of time, it is very probable
that time was lost. On this subject you will see a letter from
Sir John Lawrence to the Commander-in-Chief. It is very
earnest and practical, like all that comes from hiin, and I wish
with all my heart that he had been nearer to Head-Quarters,
His counsels and his thorough knowledge of the country would
have been invaluable. You must bear in mind, however, in
regard to his estimate of the time which should have been
sufficient to put the army in motion, that a great change was
made in the Commissariat three years ago, when the Transport
establishments were given up, and it was determined to trust
henceforward to hiring beasts for the occasion. We are now
making the first experiment of this change. Economically, it
was a prudent one, and in times of ordinary war might work
well; but I shall be surprised if General Anson were not
greatly impeded by it. Could it have been foreseen that our
next operations would be against our own regiments and
subjects, no sane man would have recommended it."
From the death-bed of General Anson Sir Henry Barnard
had received his instructions to take command of the Dehli
Field Force. And taking that command, he cast up at once the
difficulties of his position. He thought that if Anson's death
had not been accelerated, his last moments had been embittered,
by the reproaches of eager-minded civilians, who could not
measure military difficulties as they are measured by soldiers ;
and he felt that, in the execution of his duty to his country, he
might bring like censure upon himself. He was in a novel and
wholly unanticipated position,* and he felt that he was expected
* " It is a novel position," he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, " for an officer
to find himself placed in who comes to the country prepared to treat its army
as his own ; to mate eveiy allowance for the difference of constitution ; to
encourage its past good deeds and honourable name ; to have ' side blows of
reproof,' because he has not treated them with the utmost severity, and
rather sought occasion to disgrace than endeavour to support them. That
I have endeavoured to support them I fully admit, and, if a fault, I must
bear the blame." — MS. Correspondence.
1857.] MARCH UPON DEHLI. 127
to do what was impossible. But he went resolutely at the work
before hirn ; and flung himself into it with an amount of energy
and activity which excited the admiration and surprise of much
younger men. He determined, on the morning of the 27th, not
to wait for the siege-train, but after exchanging some six-
pounders for nine-pounders, to march on to Dehli, forming a
junction on the way with the Mirath force under Brigadier
Wilson. " So long as I exercise any power," he wrote to
Lawrence on the day after Anson's death, "you may rest
assured that every energy shall be devoted to the objects I have
now in view, viz., concentrating all the force I can collect at
Dehli, securing the bridge at Baghpat, and securing our com-
munication with Mirath. For those objects all is now in actual
motion. The last column left Ambalah last night, and the
siege-train will follow under escort, provided by Mr. Barnes. I
have noticed to the Commissariat that supplies will be required,
and hope that, when within two days' march of Dehli, our pre-
sence may have the influence you anticipate, and you may soon
hear of our being in possession of the place." On the 31st he
wrote from Garunda : " I am preparing with the Commanding
Engineer the plan of the position to take up when we reach
Dehli, and hope that no let or hindrance will prevent our being
ready to act upon the place by the 5th."
The force from Ambalah was now in full march upon Dehli.
The scorching heat of the summer, which was taking terrible
effect upon the health of the European soldiery, forbade much
marching in the daytime. The fierce sun beat down upon th^
closed tents of our people, and as they lay in weary sleep, or
vainly courting it, there was stillness, almost as of death, in our
camp. But with the coolness of evening Life returned. The
lassitude was gone. Men emerged from their tents and were
soon in all the bustle and preparation of the coming march. The
clear starlit nights are said to have been " delicious."* But as
the English soldier marched on beneath that great calm canopy
of heaven, there was within him the turmoil and the bitterness
of an avenging thirst for blood. It fared ill with those against
whom charges were brought of inflicting injury upon fugitives
from Dehli. Some villagers, believed to be thus guilty, were
seized, tried, condemned, and executed amidst every possible
* See the " History of the Siege of Dehli, by One who Served there," for
a very animated account of the march.
128 LAST DAYS OF GENEKAL ANSON. [1857.
indignity that could be put upon them by our soldiers under
the approving smiles of their officers.* And ever as they
marched on, there was an eager desire to find criminals and to
execute judgment upon them ; and it was not easy for the
hands of authority to restrain the retributive impulses of our
people.
The day of action was now not far distant ; and all believed
that it would be a da}' of signal retribution. " Most of the
men," it has been said, " believed that one battle would decide
the fate of the mutinous regiments. They would fight in
the morning ; they would drink their grog in Dehli at night." f
Even the sick, in the hospital tents, sat up, declared that they
were well, and with feeble voices implored to be discharged
that they might be led against the hated enemy. But
Barnard's force was weak, and impatient as were his troops to
push forward, it was necessary that they should form a junction
with Wilson's brigade, which was advancing from Mirath, on
the other side of the river. What that brigade had done since
the disastrous night of the 10th of May must now be briefly
related.
* " The fierceness of the men increased every day, often venting itself on
the camp-servants, many of whom ran away. The prisoners, during the few
hours between their trial and execution, were unceasingly tormented by the
soldiers. They pulled their hair, pricked them with their bayonets, and
forced them to eat cow's flesh, while officers stood by approving." — History
of the Siege of Dehli, by One who Served there.
f " The history of the siege of Dehli, by one who served there."
1857.] MfEATH AFTER THE OUTBREAK. 129
C1TAPTER VI.
THE MARCH UPON DEIILI.
On the day after that dreadful night at Mfrath, which wit-
nessed the first horrors of the revolt, it was the
effort of the authorities to concentrate all the sur- Mi'rath after
. . -r, ■. , . , , , the outbreak.
vivmg Europeans, and such property as could be May 12-27.
saved, within the English quarter of the great
Cantonment. All the outlying piquets and sentries were
therefore recalled ; and all who lived beyond the new line of
defence were brought in and lodged in a capacious public build-
ing used as the Artillery School of Instruction, and known as
the Damdainah. There also the treasure was brought from the
Collectorate, and safely guarded against the plunderers, who
were roaming about the place. For the predatory classes were
now making high festival, the escaped convicts from the gaols,
theGujars from the neighbouring villages, and all the vile scum
and refuse of the bazaars were glorying in the great paralysis
of authority which had made crime so easy and so profitable.
From the Cantonment the great harvest of rapine stretched out
into the surrounding district. There was no respect of persons,
races, or creeds. All who had anything to lose and lacked
strength to defend it, were ruthlessly despoiled by the
marauders. Travellers were stopped on the highway; the
mails were plundered ; houses were forcibly entered and sacked,
and sometimes all the inmates butchered.* And so entirely had
all semblance of British authority disappeared, that it was
* Take the following illustration from the Official Report of Mr. Com-
missioner "Williams : " Ramdial, a prisoner confined in the Civil Gaol under
a decree for arrears of rent, hastened to his village, Bhojpur, during the
night of the 10th, and the next day at daybreak collected a party and
attacked a niuney-lender who had a decree against him, and murdered, him
and six of his household."
VOL. II. K
130 THE MARCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
"believed that the English in Mirath had been slain to a
man.*
Meanwhile, with the proverbial rapidity of evil tidings, news
had travelled up from Dehli, which left no doubt of the total
defeat of the English, the Proclamation of the Padishah, and the
concentration of the rebel troops, who, it was believed, would
soon return to Mirath with all the immense resources of the
great Magazine at their command. And presently fugitives
came in with the sad details of mutiny and massacre, and
exciting narratives of their own providential escapes."]" All this
increased the general consternation. It was plain now that
there was wide- spread revolt. All Civil authority was
practically suspended ; so Martial Law was proclaimed in the
joint names of General Hewitt and Mr. Greathed ; and the first
who tasted the ready justice of the improvised gallows was the
butcher from the Bazaar, who had brutally murdered Mrs.
Chambers in her house. But this seems to have been an
isolated act of vigour, due rather to the energy of an individual
than to the joint authority from which the edict had pro-
ceeded.:):
On the 16th an incident occurred which increased the general
* See description of the state of Mirath after the outbreak given by Major
G. "W. Williams in his " Narrative of events " : "I found the whole of the
station south of the Nala and Begam's Bridge abandoned, for here the storm
that was to shake India to its basis first broke out, and the ravages there
visible were, strange to say, not accomplished by bands of soldiery formidable
from their arms and discipline, but by mobs of wretched rabble (hundreds of
whom would have been instantaneously scattered by a few rounds of grape),
and this in the face of an overwhelming European force. The General of
Division, with several officers, inhabited one of the Horse Artillery barracks,
whilst most of the residents occupied the Field Magazine, now universally
known as the far-famed Damdamah, an enclosed space of about two hundred
yards square, with walls eight feet high, a ditch and four bastions at each
corner. Thus strengthened, it was defensible against any number of rabble
insurgents unprovided with heavy guns or mortars. So completely were the
rest of the cantonments deserted, that many Natives believed that every
European had been exterminated, and their power being unseen, unfelt, was
readily supposed to have been subverted."
f Among those who escaped from Dehli, but perished on the way, was the
gallant leader of the little party that defended the great Dehli Magazine.
It is stated that Willoughby was murdered, with several companions, by the
inhabitants of a village near the Hindan river.
X Ante, page 55.
1857.] AFFAIRS AT KURKI. 131
consternation. Sixty miles from Mirath, on the Ganges Canal,
lies Eurki, the Head-Quarters of the Engineering
science of the country. There the great Thoinason JJe Sappers
College, with its famous workshops, was in all
the bustle and animation of its varied mechanical industry.
There was the centre of the Irrigation Department, whence
issued the directing authority that controlled the great system
of Canal Works which watered the thirsty land. There,
too, was posted the regiment of Sappers and Miners — trained
and educated Native military Engineers under European officers.
It was a great thriving bee-hive ; and that month of May found
the workers in all their wanted peaceful activity, with plans
and projects suited to the atmosphere of quiet times, and no
thought of coming danger to disturb the even tenor of dail}'
life. " No community in the world," wrote one, who may be
said to have been the chief of this prosperous
colony, " could have been living in greater security aird Smith -
of life and property," when Major Fraser, who commanded the
Sappers and Miners, received an express from the General at
Mirath, ordering him to proceed by forced marches to that
station, as the Sipahi regiments were in open revolt. When
intelligence of this summons reached Colonel Baird Smith, he
at once suggested that the regiment should be despatched by
the route of the Ganges Canal. To this Fraser readily agreed ;
and within six hours boats were prepared sufficient for the
conveyance of a thousand men. The regiment mustered only
seven hundred and thirteen, who were equipped and ready for
the journey, when another express came ordering two com-
panies to stand fast at Eurki, for the protection of that place.
So eventually some five hundred men set out, under Fraser, for
Mirath.
Then came to Eurki the news of the Dehli massacre. And
as the Sappers were moving down to Mirath,
Baird Smith was making admirable arrange- Th f?? f |J ce
ments for the defence of the great engineering
depot, in which he took such earnest and loving interest.
Officially, he was Superintendent-General of Irrigation in
the North- Western Provinces ; a most useful functionary,
great in all the arts of peace, and with a reputation which any
man might be proud to possess. But the man of much science
now grew at once into the man of war, and Eurki became a
K 2
132 THE MAECH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
garrison -under his command. Not an hour was lost.* Those
indeed were times when to lose an hour might be to lose
everything ; and Baird Smith knew that there was no emer-
gency against which he might not be called upon to provide.
Even the companies of Sappers, which had been left for the
defence of Rurki, might soon become a source of infinite danger.
It was soon settled that the workshops should become the
citadel, to which women and children might be removed ; and
there, on the 16th of May, all these helpless ones, little less
than a hundred j in number, were comfortably accommodated
in the several rooms, whilst to each of our male people some
fitting duty was assigned. Their number was not much
greater than that of the women and children ; and half of them
were non-combatants, clerks attached to the establishment, and
little accustomed to the use of arms. The trained soldiers were
but about fifty { in number, with eight or ten good officers ;
and of these Baird Smith took the command, telling them off
into different guards, and organising different departments, so
that nothing was omitted or neglected that could add to the
defence of the place.
The Sapper companies, suspected of disloyalty from the first,
were placed under their officers in charge of the College build-
ings. Baird Smith had talked to some of their leading men,
endeavouring to allay the obvious excitement among them by
friendly explanations and assurances ; and after that, he said,
" I could do no more." The wretched story of the bone-dust
flour was rife amongst them, and there was a vague fear, as in
* " It was at daybreak that I received the first intimation of the Mirath
mutiny and massacre. When I went to the porch of my house to mount my
horse for a morning ride, I found Medlicott, our geological professor, sitting
there, looking oppressed with some painful intelligence, and, on my asking
what the matter was, he then told me that about an hour before, Fraser, the
Commandant of the Sappers and Miners, had received an express from the
General at Mirath, ordering him to proceed by forced marches to that place.
I immediately suggested the Ganges Canal route instead of forced marches,
which would "have fatigued the men much, and made them unfit for service."
— MS. Correspondence of Colonel Baird Smith.
t There were on the 28th of May fifty women and forty-three children,
according to the Disposition List of the Rurki Garrison of that day.
X Baird Smith, in a letter dated May 30th, says that the trained soldiers
were only about thirty, but the number given in the text is on the authority
of the nominal roll of the garrison.
1857.] THE SIRMUR BATTALION. 133
other places, of a meditated attack by the British, taking them
by surprise, disarming, and then destroying them. In such a
state of feeling every circumstance of an exceptional character
is misinterpreted into an indication of offence, and when it was
known to the Sappers at Eurki that the Sirmur Battalion — a
regiment of Gurkahs commanded by Major Charles Reid — was
coming down from Dehra, on its way to Mirath,* a terrible
suspicion took possession of them ; they believed it was a hostile
movement against themselves. When this became known to
Baird Smith, he sent an express to Reid requesting him not to
march upon Riirki, but to make straight for the Canal, and at
once to embark in the boats that were waiting for him. Reid
grasped the position at once, and acted upon the suggestion.
Pretending that he had missed his way, he asked for a guide to
lead him straight to the banks of the Canal, and so they
marched on to the boats without increasing the general alarm.
And, said Eeid, Baird Smith "was right beyond doubt, and his
good judgment and forethought may have been — indeed, I feel
pretty sure it was — the means of saving the place and the lives
of the ladies and children."
Meanwhile, the main body of the Sappers, under Major
Eraser, had marched into Mirath. Not without .
some feelings of suspicion and alarm, they had theSappers.
moved down the great Canal ; but their behaviour May 15 -
had, on the whole, been orderly, and when, on the 15th, they
arrived at their destination, there was no reason to doubt their
fidelity. Brought, however, into the immediate presence of a
large body of European troops, who had the blood of their
slaughtered countrymen to avenge, they were in that excitable,
inflammable state, which needs only a single spark to draw
forth the latent fire. It soon fell. It seems that the Com-
mandant had promised them that they should retain charge of
their own ammunition. He had no intention of breaking faith
with them ; but he desired that, for greater security, it should
be stored in a bomb-proof building, which had been placed at
his disposal. If the object of this had been carefully explained
* Immediately on receiving intelligence of the state of atfairs at Mirath,
Baird Smith had written to Major Reid, warning him that his services
would most probably be required at that place, and offering to provide boats
for the regiment. A day or two afterwards the summons came from Head-
Quarters.
134 THE MAKCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
to the men, they would probably have assented without a
murmur. But when, on the day after their arrival, the ammu-
nition was being conveyed to its destination, the Sipahis sus-
pected treachery, resented the removal of the magazine, stopped
the laden carts, and broke into open mutiny. An Afghan
Sipahi fired his piece from behind the Commandant, and Fraser
fell, shot through the back. Others fired at Adjutant Mansell,
but missed him ; and the Native non-commissioned officer who
was in attendance on Fraser was killed in the affray. Having
done this, the mutineers broke and fied, but their victory was
but short-lived. A troop of the Carabineers and some Horse
Artillery guns were let loose upon them. The greater number
escaped ; but some fifty of the fugitives were overtaken outside
cantonments among the sand-hills, and were killed. And so
the Sappers and Miners, as a regiment, ceased to exist. Two
companies, however, which were at work in another part of
Mirath, were disarmed and set to work on the fortification of
the Danidaniah.
After this, there was, for a time, a lull at Mirath. The
Aia 15-24 destruction of the Sappers was, perhaps, regarded
inactivity at as a cause of congratulation and a source of con-
Mfrath. fidence, and as the advancing month brought with
it no new alarms, and it seemed that the mutineers were
resolved to concentrate their strength at Dehli, and not to
emerge thence — as people whose fighting powers were greater
behind walls — things began gradually to assume a cheerful
complexion, and the inmates of the Artillery School ceased to
tremble as they talked of what was to come. But there was
vexation in high places. The telegraph line between Mirath
and Agra was sometimes, if not always open ; and Lieutenant-
Governor Colvin, who never could lose sight of the fact that
there were a battalion of English Rifles, a regiment of English
Dragoons, and two batteries of English Artillery at Mirath,
was constantly urging them, for God's sake, to do something.
Thinking, after a while, that it was quite useless to exhort
General Hewitt to put forth any activity in such a case, Colvin
addressed himself to Brigadier Wilson, thus virtually setting
aside the General of Division. Nettled by this, Hewitt tele-
graphed to Agra respectfully to request that the Lieutenant-
Governor would transmit through him orders to his subordinates
when such a step could cause no delay. But the Lieutenant-
Governor still continued to telegraph to the Brigadier, beseeching
1857.] INACTIVITY AT MIRATH. 135
him to go out in force so as to keep open the main road and
to prevent dangerous combinations of revolted troops through-
out the Duab. " What plan," he had asked, " does Brigadier
Wilson propose for making the Mirath force actively useful in
checking an advance down the Duab ? If the mutineers leave
Dehli in force, it is plain that no wing of a corps, or even a
single corps, could stay their march. Therefore a move in
strength to Balandshahr seems to be the right one." And now
the Agra authorities continued to urge these movements, but
were met by protests that it would be inexpedient to divide the
force. " The only plan," said Wilson, " is to concentrate our
European force, and to attack Dehli. He had consulted," he
said, "with all the European officers in the force, and they
were unanimously of opinion that any movement of the force
from Mirath would be highly imprudent without the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, as it might counteract any movement that
he might be forming." " To move in full strength," he added,
" would involve the abandonment of all the sick, women and
children and [ ]." Then came the inevitable story that
" the Commissariat report that they cannot supply carriage for
a force of half the strength ; " and yet it was, numerically, but
a small force that would have taken the field.* So Colvin
yielded the point, and no longer looked to Mirath for assistance.
It has been shown that, as one result of the inactivity of this
beautiful force of all arms, a belief gained ground in the adjacent
country that the English at Mirath had all been killed to a
man. Although the surrounding villages were swarming with
robber-clans, who had murdered our people and sacked our
houses, it was not until the 24th of May, two weeks after the
great tragedy, that a small party of our Dragoons was sent out
to chastise the inmates of one of these nests of „ „.
jYI&Y 24.
plunderers. On that day, for the first time, the Death of
English magistrate, Mr. Johnston, obtained the Mr - Johuston -
assistance of troops to enable him to suppress the overflowing
crime of the district. The village of Iktiapur was then burnt,
and the people learnt that English soldiers were still alive in
* In this telegraphic message it is stated that the force consisted of —
Rifles, 700 ; Carabineers, mounted, 380 ; dismounted, 100 ; Artillery recruits,
undrilled, 364. As some portion of the efficient, and all the inefficient men
would have been left in Mirath, the number for field-service would not have
exceeded 1000.
136 THE MAKCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
Mirath. But the demonstration was an ill-fated one. For
Johnston, who had gone out with the troops, riding homewards
in hot haste, when the work was done, eager to be again actively
employed, was fearfully injured by the falling of his horse, and
three days afterwards expired.
But the Mirath Brigade had now done with inaction. The
" orders of the Commander-in-Chief," for which it
William ^^ k een waiting, had arrived.* It had been
Hodson. ° . , ,
supposed tor some time that the road between
Karnal and Mirath was closed ; but in the camp of the Com-
mander-in-Chief there was an officer, equal to any difficult work,
who volunteered to carry despatches to the latter place, and to
bring back the much-needed information of the state of Wilson's
Brigade. This was Lieutenant William Hodson, a man of rare
energy of character, who was then serving with the 1st (Com-
pany's) Fusiliers. He had been, years before, one of that little
band of pioneers who, under Henry Lawrence, had cleared the
way for the civilisation of the Panjab, and he had afterwards
risen to the command of that famous Guide Corps, the institution
of which had been one of the most cherished and the most
successful projects of his accomplished chief. But, amidst a
career of the brightest promise, a heavy cloud had gathered
over him, and he had rejoined his old regiment as a subaltern,
chafing under a sense of wrong, and eager to clear himself from
what he declared to be unmerited imputations upon his cha-
racter. This gloom was upon him when General Anson,
discerning his many fine Qualities, offered him a place in the
Department of the Quartermaster-General, and especially charged
him with the intelligence branch of its duties, in prosecution of
which he was to raise a body of a hundred horse and fifty foot.f
This was at Ambalah, to which place he had marched down
with his regiment from Dagshai. He was soon actively at
work. He hastened down to Karnal, and there picking up
some horsemen of the Jhind Rajah's Contingent, rode into
Mirath, a distance of seventy-six miles, delivered his despatches,
took a bath, a breakfast, and a little sleep, and then rode back
with papers for the Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile, the bulk
of the Mirath Brigade was in the bustle of preparation for an
* See ante, p. 118.
t This order was subsequently extended to the raising of " an entire new
regiment of Irregular Horse."
1857.] THE MARCH FROM MiRATH. 137
advance, under Wilson, to join the column which was moving
down from the hills to the attack of Dehli. Many then, who
had chafed under the restraints of the past fortnight, took
fresh heart, and panted with the excitement of coming action.
In high spirits, the troops marched out of cantonments on the
night of the 27th of May. The column consisted
of two squadrons of the Carabineers ; a wing of the May 27 "
light field battery; Tombs's troop of Horse Artillery; two
eighteen-pounder guns, all manned by Europeans ; with some
Native Sappers and Irregular Horse. Brigadier Archdale
Wilson commanded the force, and Mr. Hervey Greathed accom-
panied it as civil officer. And with them rode, at the head of
an improvised body of Horse, Jan Fishan Khan, the Afghan
chief, who, unlike most of his countrymen, thought that he was
bound to do something in return for the British pension, which
supported him and his house.*
The marches of the two first days were uneventful. No
enemy appeared, and Greathed believed that the
rebel force would not attempt to give us battle T^bauies
except before the walls of Dehli. But when, on on the
the 30th of May, Wilson's force reached Ghazi- HindaQ -
ud-din Nagar,f near the river Hindan, there were signs of a
coming struggle. Flushed with success, and confident in their
strength, the mutineers had left their stronghold, and had come
on to give battle to the Mirath Brigade before its junction with
the force from Ambalah. They had planted some heavy guns
* The feeling generally, at this time, and in some instances the conduct,
of the Afghan pensioners, of whom there was quite a colony in Lodiana,
denoted the ingratitude of the race. See Mr. Eicketts's interesting Lodiana
Report, " Papers relating to the Mutiny in the Panjab, 1857."
t The position is thus described by Baird Smith in the unpublished
fragment of history, to which I have above referred : " This town, of respect-
able size, and with some ancient traces of walls, stands on the left bank of
the Hindan, about a mile from that river. A long causeway carries the
Grand Trunk Road across the broad valley, within which the stream, shrunk
during the scorching heats of May to a mere rivulet, wanders in a channel of
extreme tortuosity, fordable both for infantry and artillery, though, from the
prevalence of quicksands, the process is not altogether free from risk of
mishap. A suspension bridge spans the stream, and on the right bank the
causeway is covered by a toll-house, capable, if need were, of some defence.
Villages, furnishing considerable means of resistance in their mud-walled
houses and narrow lanes, are scattered at intervals along the road, and the
ground in ridges of sensible magnitude on both banks, but especially on the
rip-ht."
138 THE MAKCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
on a ridge to the right of their position, and from this point
they opened fire upon our people. Then the eighteen-pounders,
under Light, and Scott's field battery, made vigorous answer,
and under their cover the British Eiflemen advanced, and
moving along the causeway, came to close quarters with the
enemy. For some time a stubborn conflict was maintained ;
but our Horse Artillery, under Henry Tombs, supported by the
Carabineers, dashed to the right, crossed the Hindan, making-
light of its rugged bank and dangerous bed, and successfully
turned the left flank of the enemy. Under the galling fire
then poured in upon them the mutineers reeled and staggered,
and presently broke. Some took refuge in a village, whence
they were driven by our Eiflemen, and soon the whole body of
the enemy were in ignominious flight towards the walls of
Dehli. Five of their guns fell into our hands, and they left
many of their fighting men behind them. Our own loss would
have been small, but for the explosion of an ammunition-
waggon; not by an accident of warfare, but by an act of
resolute and sacrificial courage on the part of one of the
mutineers. A Sipahi of the 11th Eegiment deliberately dis-
charged his musket into the midst of the combustibles just as a
party of the Eifles, under Captain Andrews, were gallantly
seizing the gun to which the cart belonged. The explosion
cost the man his life ; but Andrews and some of his followers
were killed by it, and others were carried wounded from the
scene.* It taught us that among the mutineers were some
brave and desperate men, who were ready to court instant
death for the sake of the national cause. Many acts of heroism
of this kind brighten up the history of the war, and many
more were, doubtless, performed, of which History has no
record.
The mutineers fled in hot haste to Dehli, where they were
reviled for their disgraceful failure, and sent back
reinforced, to try whether Fortune would help
them on another day. Stimulated by promises of large rewards
to achieve a great success in honour of the restored monarchy,
* " The officers that night drank in solemn silence to the memory of the
brave departed, and from the manner in which the toast was proposed by
Dr. Innes, the surgeon of the segiment, and received by every officer and
member of the mess, I am sure, from his gallantry and other estimable
qualities, that the memory of poor Andrews will be long and fondly cherished
by them." — The Cliaplairi's (Mr. Botton's) Narrative.
1857.] THE BATTLES ON THE HINDAN. 139
they again marched to the Hinclan. That clay was our Whit-
Sunday. There was no Church parade. But the morning was
ushered in by the most solemn and beautiful of all our Church
services— that of the Burial of the Dead. There was genuine
sorrow for those who had fallen as they were laid in un-
consecrated ground, " a babool tree and a milestone marking the
spot." * Little space was then left for mournful reflections.
It was soon known that the Sipahis were returning to the
attack. About noon our bugles sounded the alarm. The
enemy had taken up a position on the ridge to the right of the
Hinclan, about a mile from our advanced posts on the bridge.
Pushing forward his guns, he opened a heavy fire upon Wilson's
force. This was a signal for our advance. The Artillery were
sent forward to reply to the enemy's fire — the Rifles, with two
of Scott's guns, occupying the head of the bridge. The battle,
which then raged for some two hours, was almost wholly an Artil-
lery fight. f But Cavalry and Infantry were exposed both to the
fire of the enemy, and to the more irresistible assaults of the
sun. It was the last day of May, one of the hottest days of the
year. The fiery blasts of the summer were aggravated by the
heat thrown from the smouldering embers of the burnt villages.
The thirst of our people was intolerable. Some were smitten
down by sun-stroke ; others fell exhausted by the way ; and
there is a suspicion that some were destroyed by water poisoned
by the enemy .f But, in spite of all these depressing cir-
cumstances, Wilson's troops drove the enemy from their position.
When the fire of the mutineers had somewhat slackened, the
Brigadier ordered a general advance of his force, and the
Sipahis recoiled before it. But although they felt that they
could not hold their ground and continue the battle, they did
not fly, shattered and broken, as on the preceding day. Having
discharged into our advancing columns a tremendous shower of
* Chaplain's Narrative.
f "The conduct of Tombs' s troop yesterday was the admiration of every
one ; for a long time they were engaged on two sides with the enemy's
artillery. Light then got his two eighteen-pounders down to the river-bank
and drew off the fire upon himself, and paid it back with interest." — Hervey
GreathecVs Letters. Lieutenant Perkins, of the Horse Artillery, was killed
by a shot from one of the enemy's guns.
X This is stated by Mr. Eotton, who says : " Some were sun-stricken, some
slain, aud a few, whose cruel thirst induced them to slake it with water
provided by the enemy in vessels containing strong corrosive poison, were
thus deprived of life."
140 THE MARCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
grape-shot, they limbered up their guns before the smoke had
dispersed, and fell back in orderly array. Exhausted by the
cruel heat and suffering agonies of thirst, the English soldier
could not improve his victory by giving chase to the retiring
enemy. The mutineers carried off all their guns and stores,
and made good their retreat to Dehli. But they had been thus
twice beaten in fair fight by inferior numbers, and had nothing
but their disgrace to carry back with them and to lay at the
feet of their King.
In the English camp there was great rejoicing ; and as the
news spread, all men were gladdened by the thought that the
tide now seemed to have turned, and that retribution, which,
though delayed, was certain, was now overtaking the enemies
of our race and the murderers of our people. The old stern
courage had been again asserted, and with the old results.
Success had returned to our ranks; and there was special
cause for congratulation in the fact that Wilson, with a portion
only of the old Mirath Brigade, had been the first to inflict
punishment on the rebels, and among them upon some of the
very men who had prevailed against us so grievously a little
time before. But the situation of the little force on the Hindan
was not without its perils. It was doubtful whether our troops,
exhausted as they were by the work that they had done under
that fiery sky, could successfully sustain another attack, if, as
was probable, the enemy should come out again from Dehli,
and in increased numbers. But the month of June
came in, bringing with it no fresh assaults, but a
welcome reinforcement. The Gurkah regiment, nearly five
hundred strong, having moved up from Balandshahr, marched
into camp, under its gallant Commandant, Major Charles Reid.
At first they were taken for a body of the enemy marching
upon our rear. But no sooner were they identified than the
British troops turned out and welcomed them with lusty cheers.
Meanwhile the Dehli FieM Force, under Barnard, had
marched down to Alipur, which lies at a distance
Movements f twelve miles from Dehli. It arrived there on
faree. ' the 5th of June, and was halted until the Mirath
troops could come up from the Hindan. There
had been some want of understanding between the commanders
of the two forces as to the nature of the operations and the
point of junction. It had been thought, at one time, that it
\vould be strategically expedient to move upon Dehli from both
1857.] THE SIEGE-TRAIN. 141
banks of the Jamnah ; and after the battles of the Hindan,
Wilson's force had halted for orders from the chief. Those
orders were received on the 4th of June. That evening Wilson
commenced his march, and soon after midnight on the morning
of the 6th he crossed the Jamnah at Baghpat. The delay was
a source of bitterness to the Ambalah troops, who were furiously
eager to fall upon the enemy. Fresh tidings of mutiny and
murder had reached them, and the blood of officers and men
alike was at fever heat. The impatience, however, was but
short-lived. Wilson was now close at hand. And already the
waiting was bearing good fruit. On the 6th the
siege-train arrived. June 6 '
Orders for the equipment of the train had been received on
the 17th of May. On the morning of the 24th,
the gates of the Fort were opened. The guns Arrival of
siGETG-trfl-in.
and waggons and the labouring bullocks were all
ready. The Sipahis of the 3rd regiment at Philur had volun-
teered to escort the train ;* and, with some troopers of the 9th
Irregular cavalry, they now marched upon the Satlaj. The
bridge was still passable, and the train crossed over. Two
hours afterwards the boats, which spanned the river, had been
swept away by the flooding waters. But, although the Sipahis
of the 3rd regiment, who had then the game in their hands,
had suffered the train to cross the bridge, it was known that
they were mutinous to the core.f So when the whole line of
ordnance was secure on the other bank of the river, it was
quietly explained to the Sipahis of the 3rd that their services
were no longer needed. A contingent of Horse and Foot had
been furnished by the Eajah of Naoha, and it was now ready to
relieve the men of the suspected regiments. Under this guard
of auxiliaries, with which the detachment of Irregular Cavalry
* The train consisted of eight eighteen-pomiders, four eight-inch howitzers,
twelve five-and-a-half inch mortars, and four eight-inch mortars (Norman).
The officer in charge of the train was Lieutenant Griffith. Major Kaye
commanded the whole detachment.
t This is an instance of what has been called the "inexplicable incon-
sistency " of the Sipahis, who so often allowed their best opportunities to
escape ; but Mr. Ricketts sufficiently affords a clue to it when, in his interest-
ing Lodiana Eeport, he says that they were pledged in concert with others
to a certain course of procedure, and that no temptation of immediate
advantage could induce them to diverge from the programme. The later
history of this corps will be found in Book VI.
142 THE MARCH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
moved forward, the train laboured on to Ambalah, which it
reached on the 27th of May. But a new difficulty awaited it
there ; for, although the guns had arrived, they were useless
for want of gunners. A weak company was, therefore, despatched
from Firuzpiir by bullock-train, to be afterwards strengthened
by recruits from Mirath. Meanwhile, the position of the train
was not without its surrounding dangers. The Kasiri Battalion,
which had been guilty of such shameful defection in the hour of
our need, had come into Ambalah, and the Sipahis of the 5th
were striving to induce the Gurkahs to combine with them to
seize the guns and to march to Dehli.* The plot, however, was
frustrated, and the siege - train passed on safely to Head-
Quarters.!
On the 7th of June, amidst hearty welcomings and warm
congratulations, the Mirath contingent marched
junction with g a ity ^ n ^° Alipur. At one o'clock on the following
the Mirath morning they commenced the march on Dehli,
thirsting for the battle. Their scouts had told
them that the enemy were strongly posted in front of the
approaches to the city, resolute to contest the progress of the
British Force. Xever since the first English soldier loaded his
piece or unsheathed his sword to smite the dark- faced, white-
turbaned Moor or Gentu — not even when Clive's army, a
century before, landed in Bengal to inflict retribution on the
perpetrators of the great crime of the Black Hole — had our
people moved forward under the impulse of such an eager,
burning desire to be amongst the murderers of their race, as on
that early June morning, when Barnard's fighting men knew
that the mutineers of Mirath and Dehli were within their reach.
It had been ascertained that the enemy were strongly posted,
Infantry and Cavalry, with thirty guns, about six miles from
Dehli, at a place called Badli-ki-Sarai, where groups of old
houses and walled gardens, once the country residences of
some of the nobles of the Imperial Court, supplied positions
capable of powerful resistance.! On this place marched
Barnard, on the early morning of the 8th of June, along the
* The 5th was afterwards disarmed in the presence of two companies of
the Fusiliers.
t On a requisition from Major Kaye a detachment of Fusiliers was sent to
join the escort. The artillerymen from Firiizpur joined at Karnal.
X Baird Smith.
1857.] BATTLE OF BADLI-KI-SAEAI. 143
Grand Trunk Road, with the river on one side, and the
Western Jamnah Canal on the other, whilst Brigadier Hope
Grant, with Cavalry and Horse Artillery, crossed the canal and
moved down along its right bank with the object of taking the
enemy in flank.
Day was just dawning when Barnard's columns came within
fire of the Sipahis' guns. The dispositions which
he had made for the attack were excellent, and Battle of
they were not frustrated by any discovery of a Badif-M-
mistaken estimate of the enemy's movements. He
found the rebels where he expected to find them. Whilst
Showers, with the First Brigade, was to attack upon the right,
Graves, with the Second, was to lead his men against the
enemy's position on the left; and Grant, on the first sound of
the guns, was to recross the canal by the bridge in the rear of
the rebel camp, and to take them in flank. The strength of
the enemy was known to be in their Artillery. Four heavy
guns, Money's Horse Artillery troop, and part of Scott's Battery,
were sent in advance to silence their fire, but the guns of the
mutineers were of heavier metal than our own, and it was not
easy to make an impression on their batteries. For some time
the Artillery had the fighting to themselves.* Officers and
men were dropping at their guns, and for a little space it seemed
doubtful whether they could hold their own. But the British
Infantry now deployed into line ; and the inspiring mandate
to charge the guns went forth to the 75th. Then Herbert led
out his noble regiment with a ringing cheer, right up to the
enemy's batteries, and the 2nd Europeans followed in support.
Nothing could resist the impetuous rush of these English
soldiers ; but the rebels stood well to their guns, and showed
that there were some resolute spirits beneath those dusky skins,
and that the lessons they had learnt in our camps and canton-
ments had not been thrown away. Many fought with the
courage of desperation, and stood to be bayoneted at their guns.
It was not a time for mercy ; if it was sought it was sternly
refused.
Meanwhile the Second Brigade, under Graves, charged the
enemy's position on the left, and, about the same time, Hope
* "Light, Kaye, and Fagan, with four heavy guns, bore the brunt for
some time, until the brigade of infantry came up and got into line." — Hervey
Greathed's Letters. — Major Kaye was in command.
144 THE MAECH UPON DEHLI. [1857.
Grant, whose march had been delayed by the state of the roads
along which he had advanced, appeared in the enemy's rear
with his Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Thus the programme
of the preceding day was acted out in all its parts, and the
enemy, attacked on every side, had nothing left to them but
retreat. At first, they seem to have fallen back in orderly
array ; but the Lancers, under Yule, fell upon them so fiercely,
and "the Horse Artillery guns, though impeded by the water-
course?, opened so destructive a fire upon them, that they were
soon in panic flight, shattered and hopeless. All the guns, and
stores, and baggage which they had brought out from the great
city were abandoned ; and so our first fight before Dehli ended
in an assuring victory.
But the day's work was not done. Barnard saw clearly that
it was a great thing to make an impression on the enemy, not
easily to be effaced, on the first day of the appearance of the
Army of Eetribution before the walls of Dehli. The sun had
risen, and the fury of the June heats was at its height. Our
men had marched through the night, they had fought a battle,
they were worn and weary, and now the fierce sun was upon
them, and there had been but little time to snatch any sustain-
ing food, or to abate the thirst of the Indian summer ; but the
strong spirit within them overbore the weakness of the flesh, and
there was no demand to be made upon them by their leader to
which they were not prepared to respond. Barnard's soldierly
experiences had taught him that even a force so broken as the
advance of the enemy at Badli-ki-Sarai might rally, and that
they might have a strong reserve. He determined, therefore,
to push onward, and not to slacken until he had swept the
enemy back into Dehli, and had secured such a position for his
force as would be an advantageous base for future operations.
From Badli-ki-Sarai the road diverges into two branches, the
one a continuation of the Grand Trunk leading to the suburb of
Sabzimandi, and the other leading to the old British Canton-
ments. Stretching in front of these two positions, and forming,
as it were, the base of a triangle, of which the two roads were
the sides, was a long rocky ridge overlooking the city. At the
point of divergence, Barnard separated his force, and sending
Wilson with one division along the former road, led the other
himself down to the Eidge. There he found the enemy posted
in some strength with heavy guns ; but another dexterous
flank movement turned their position, and, before they could
1857.] RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 145
change their line, the 60th Eifles, the 2nd Europeans, and
Money's Troop were sweeping along the Ridge : and soon
Wilson, who had fought his way through the Sabzimandi, and
driven the enemy from their shelter there, appeared at the other
end, and rebels saw that all was lost. There was nothing left
for them now but to seek safety behind the walls of the city.
From those walls their comrades, looking out towards the scene
of action, could see the smoke and flame which pronounced that
the Sipahis' Lines, in our old cantonments, were on fire. That
day's fighting had deprived them of their shelter outside the
walls, and given us the finest possible base for the conduct of
our future operations against the city.*
So the victory of the 8th of June was complete, and it
remained for us only to count what we had gained
and what we had lost by that morning's fighting. fi^au;?
The loss of the enemy is computed at three hundred
and fifty men ; and they had left in our hands twenty-six guns,
with some serviceable ammunition, which we much wanted. f
* In these first operations, as in all others, as will subsequently appear, the
Sirrmir Battalion did excellent service. Major Keid thus describes their
conduct on the 8th : " About one o'clock p.m. we reached the Ridge, when I
was directed by General Barnard to occupy Hindu Rao's house, which is
within twelve hundred yards of the Mori Bastion. Had just made ourselves
comfortable, when the alarm was sounded. In ten minutes the mutineers
were seen coming up towards Hindu Rao's house in force. I went out with
my own regiment and two companies of Rifles, and drove them back into the
city. This, however, was not accomplished till five p.m., so that we were
under arms for sixteen hours. Heat fearful. My little fellows behaved
splendidly, and were cheered by every European regiment. It was the only
Native regiment with the force, and I may say every eye was upon it. The
General was anxious to see what the Guikahs could do, and if we were to be
trusted. They had (because it was a Native regiment) doubts about us;
but I think they are now satisfied." It is true, as stated, that the Sifmiir
Battalion was the only Native regiment engaged on our side ; but there
were other Native detachments. The Sappers from Mirath fought well, and
were commended in Sir H. Barnard's despatch, as was also the Contingent of
the Jhind Rajah. And Jan Fishan Khan, with his horsemen, did gallant
service. Flushed with the excitement of the battle, the Afghan chief is said
to have declared that another such day would make him a Christian.
f The statement in the text is given on the authority of Sir H. Barnard's
official despatch. But the number of guns captured on the 8th of June is
set down at thirteen in Major Norman's Narrative, Major Reid's Extracts
from Letters and Notes, and in the " History of the Siege of Delhi, by an
Officer who served there," &c. Norman has specified in detail the nature of
the captured ordnance, and he is notable for his accuracy.
VOL. H. L
146 THE MAECH UPOX DEHLI. [1857.
Our own loss was small, considering the dashing character of
the work that had been done. Four officers and forty-seven
men were killed in the encounters of that day, and a hundred
and thirty men were wounded or missing. Among those who
received their death-wounds at Badli-ki-Sarai was the chief of
Sir Henry Barnard's Staff. Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General
of the Army, was shot down, almost at the commencement of
the action. As he lay there, in agony, with young Barnard,
the General's son and aide-de-camp, vainly endeavouring to
help him, he asked the young officer to raise his head, so that
he might see the wound that was rending him ; and having
seen it, he knew that he was dying. Telling Barnard that
nothing could be done for him, he begged his young friend to
leave him to hip fate. Then presently the spirit passed away
from his body ; and, at sunset, all that was left of the Adjutant-
General of the Army was laid in the grave. To the Com-
mander of the Dehli Force this must have been a heavy loss,
for Chester possessed all the knowledge and experience which
Barnard lacked; and the Adjutant- General was a brave soldier
and a man of sound judgment, and his advice, in any difficult
conjuncture would have been wisely received with respect.* But
Chester had risen in the Department, and the time was coming
when departmental experience and traditionary knowledge were
to be stripped of their splendid vestments. And History, without
any injurious reflection upon his character, may declare that
the incident was not all evil that in due course brought Neville
Chamberlain and John Nicholson down to Dehli.
But it is not by lists of killed and wounded, or returns of
captured ordnance, that the value of the first victory before
Dehli is to be estimated. It had given us an admirable base of
operations — a commanding military position — open in the rear
to the lines along which thenceforth our reinforcements and
supplies, and all that we looked for to aid us in the coming
* "Among the slain was unhappily Colonel Charles Chester, Adjutant-
General of the Army, a brave and experienced soldier, whose loss thus early
in the campaign was a grave and lamentable misfortune; for his sound
judgment and ripe knowledge would have been precious in council as in
action." — Baircl Smith's unpublished Memoir. Two other officers of the Staff
were killed, Captain C. W. Russell and Captain J. W. Delamain. The
fourth officer who lost his life was Lieutenant Harrison of the 75th ; Colonel
Herbert of that regiment was among the wounded.
1857.] THE ENGLISH ON THE EIDGE. 147
struggle, were to be brought. And great as was this gain to
us, in a military sense, the moral effect was scarcely less ; for
behind this ridge lay our old cantonments, from which a month
before the English had fled for their lives. On the parade-
ground the Head-Quarters of Barnard's Force were now en-
camped, and the familiar flag of the Faringhis was again to be
seen from the houses of the Imperial City.
L 2
148 BANAEAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
BOOK V.— PEOGEESS OF EEBELLION IN UPPEE INDIA.
[May— July, 1857.]
CHAPTER I.
BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD.
It has "been seen that whilst Lord Canning was eagerly ex-
horting the chiefs of the Army to move with all
May * despatch upon Dehli, never doubting that a
crushing blow would soon descend upon the guilty city, he was
harassed by painful thoughts of the unprotected state of the
country, along the whole great line^of the Ganges to Allahabad
and thence through the Duab to Agra. There was one Eng-
lish regiment at Danapur ; there was one English regiment at
Agra; and besides these the whole strength of our fighting
men consisted of a handful of white artillerymen and a few
invalided soldiers of the Company's European Army. And,
resting upon the broad waters of the Ganges, there was the
great military cantonment of Kanhpur, with a large European
population, a number of Sipahi regiments, and few, if any,
white troops. To all these unprotected places on the banks of
the Ganges and the Jamnah, and the more inland stations
dependent upon them, the most anxious thoughts of the
Governor-General were now turned, and his most earnest
efforts directed. If the Native soldiery, who were thickly
strewn along these lines, not only in all the military canton-
ments, but in all the chief civil stations, guardians alike of the
property of our Government and the lives of our people, had
risen in that month of May, nothing short of the miraculous
interposition of Providence could have saved us from swift
destruction.
1357.] BANAKAS. 149
But in all that defenceless tract of country over which the
apprehensions of the Governor-General were then ranging, and
towards which he was then eagerly sending up reinforcements,
rebellion was for a time in a state of suspension. Whether it
was that a day had been fixed for a simultaneous rising of all
the Sipahi regiments, or whether, without any such concerted
arrangements, they were waiting to see what the English
would do to avenge their brethren slaughtered at Mirath and
Dehli, the Native soldiery at the stations below those places
suffered day after day to pass without striking a blow. No
tidings of fresh disaster from the great towns, or from the
military cantonments dotting the Gangetic provinces, followed
closely upon the news of the capture of the Imperial City.
But everywhere the excitement was spreading, alike in the
Lines and the Bazaars, and it was plain that many weeks would
not elapse without a fresh development of trouble, more dreadful,
perhaps, than the first growth, of which he already had before
him the record.
A little more than four hundred miles from Calcutta, in the
direction of the north-west, lies the city of
Banaras. Situated on a steep sloping bank of the
Ganges, which its buildings overhang, it is the most picturesque
of the river-cities of Hindustan. Its countless temples, now
beautiful and now grotesque, with the elaborate devices of
sculptors of different ages and different schools ; its spacious
mosques with their tall minarets grand against the sky ; * the
richly carved balconies of its houses ; its swarming marts and
market-places, wealthy with the produce of many countries and
the glories of its own looms; its noble ghauts, or flights of
landing-stairs leading from the great thoroughfares to the river-
brink, and ever crowded with bathers and drawers of the
sacred water; the many-shaped vessels moored against the
river-banks, and the stately stream flowing on for ever between
them, render this great Hindu city, even as seen by the fleshly
eye, a spectacle of unsurpassed interest. But the interest
deepens painfully in the mind of the Christian traveller, who
regards this swarming city, with all its slattenly beauty, as the
favoured home of the great Brahmanical superstition. It is a
* A recent writer states that it is computed that there are fourteen hundred
and fifty-four temples and two hundred and seventy-two mosques in the city,
of Banaras. — See Sherring's " Sacred City of the Hindus"
150 EANi.RAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
city given up to idolatry, with, in the estimation of millions of
people, an odour of sanctity about it which draws pilgrims from
all parts of India to worship at its shrines or to die at its ghauts.
Modern learning might throw doubt upon the traditional an-
tiquity of the place, but could not question the veneration in
which it is held as the sacred city of the Hindus, the cherished
residence of the Pandits and the Priests.
But neither sacerdotal nor scholastic influences had softened
the manners or tempered the feelings of the people of Banaras.*
There had always been something more than the average
amount of discontent and disaffection among the citizens ; and
now in the summer of 1857 this was increased by the high
price of provisions — always believed to be one of the curses of
British rule."]" And there was another source of special danger.
Some of the most disreputable members of the Dehli Family
had been long resident at Banaras, where they had assumed all
the airs of the Imperial Family, and persistently endeavoured
in secret to sow resentment in the city against the English.
These wretched Mughul Princes, it was not doubted, would be
well disposed in such a conjuncture, to foment rebellion among
the Sipahis ; and it was scarcely less probable that the State
prisoners — Sikhs, Marathas, Muhammadans, and others, who
had been made to find an asylum in Banaras, would find ample
means of gratifying their love of intrigue in dangerous efforts
against the power that had brought them to the dust.
* The population of Banaras is estimated at about two hundred thousand,
of which an unusually large proportion are Hindus. The author of the
"Red Pamphlet" computes the number at three hundred thousand, and
Maeaulay rhetorically amplifies it into " half a million." In May, 1857, Mr.
Tucker, the Commissioner, writing to Lord Canning, speaks of " the huge
bigoted city of Benares, with a hundred and eighty thousand of the worst
population in the country.'' This is probably rather under the number, but
it is to be remembered that there is in Banaras always an immense floating
population of pilgrims from other provinces. [In 1873, the population of the
Banaras division numbered 5,600,000 souls. That of the city varied greatly,
but, in 1856, it was roughly computed at 300,000 souls.— G. B. M.]
f " The city, always the most turbulent in India, was now the more
dangerous from the severity with which the high price of corn pressed upon
the poorer classes ; the Purbiah Sipahis, who had been more or less restless
since the beginning of March, now publicly called on their gods to deliver
them from the Faringhis, clubbed together to send messengers westward for
intelligence, and, finally, sent away their Guru (priest), lest, as they said, in
the troubles which were coming, he should sutler any hurt." — Report of
Mr. Taylor, Officiating Joint-Magistrate.
1857.] THE TEOOPS AT BANARAS. 151
At a distance of about three miles, inland, from the city of
Banaras, is the suburb of Sikroli. There was
the English military cantonment — there were the J d h n e t onSent
Courts of Law and the great Gaol — the English
Church and the English Cemetery — the Government College —
the several Missionary Institutes — the Hospitals and Asylums
— the Public Gardens, and the private residences of the Euro-
pean officers and their subordinates. The military force con-
sisted of half a company of European Artillery and three
Native regiments. These were the 37th Regiment of Native
Infantry, the Sikh Regiment of Lodiana, and the 13th Regi-
ment of Irregular Cavalry — in all, some two thousand men,
watched by some thirty English gunners. The force was com-
manded by Brigadier George Ponsonby.* He was an officer of
the Native Cavalry, who fifteen years before, in the affair of
Parwan-darah — that charge, which was no charge, and which
was at once so heroic and so dastardly — had covered himself
with glory. The names of Fraser and Ponsonby, who flung
themselves almost alone upon the horsemen of Dost Muhammad,
will live as long as that great war is remembered, and will be
enshrined in the calendar of our English heroes. In spite of
those fifteen years, the incident was still fresh in men's minds
in India, and there was confidence in the thought that Pon-
sonby commanded at Banaras.
There other good soldiers also were assembled ; and civilians
too, with the best courage of the soldier and more
than his wonted wisdom. Mr. Henry Carre ^ClST
Tucker — one of a family famous alike for courage
and for capacity — was Commissioner of Banaras. Mr. Frederick
Gubbins, who, some time before, as Magistrate, had acquired by
a grand display of energy in a local crisis an immense as-
cendency over the minds of the people, was now the Judge.
Mr. Lind was the Magistrate of Banaras. It is impossible to
over-rate their exertions. f As soon as the fatal news arrived
* In the early part of May, Ponsonby had not taken command. Colonel
Gordon then commanded the station.
t " The magistrate and judge (Messrs. Lind and Gubbins) exerted them-
selves with great skill to maintain the peace of the city ; now patrolling with
parties of Sowars, now persuading Ban yah s to lower the price of corn, now
listening to the tales of spies, who reported clearly the state of feeling in the
city, and told the minds of the Sipahis far more truly than the officers in
command." — Mr. Taylors Report.
152 BAXARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
from Mirath and Dehli, they saw clearly tlie clanger which
beset them, and the work which lay before them, to pre-
serve our old supremacy in such a place. The crisis was
one which demanded that the civil and military authorities
should take counsel together. Warned by the wholesale
butcheries of Mirath and Dehli, they deemed it a point of
essential urgency that there should be a common understanding
as to the place of resort for women and children and non-com-
batants in the event of a sudden surprise or alarm. A council,
therefore, was held ; but it would seem that no definite plan of
action was formed. On the following day two military officers
called upon Mr. Lind, with a proposal that greatly startled him.
One was Captain William Olpherts, commanding the Artillery,
an officer of good repute, brave as a lion, but of uncertain
temper, who had served under Williams of Kars, in the auxiliary
operations connected with the Crimean War. The other was
Captain Watson, of the Engineers. Their opinions were
entitled to be received with respect ; but when they suggested
the propriety of an immediate retreat to the strong fortress of
Chanar (eighteen miles distant from Banaras), Mr. Lind re-
sented the proposal, and said that nothing would induce him to
leave his post. When his visitors had taken their departure,
the Magistrate hastened to Mr. Gubbins, and, returning to his
his own house with the Judge, was presently joined by Mr.
Tucker and by Colonel Gordon, who temporarily commanded
the station. Olpherts and Watson had intimated that Gordon
had approved the plan of retreat to Chanar; but when in
answer to a question, which he put to Mr. Gubbins, the civilian
said, " I will go on my knees to you not to leave Banaras ! "
Gordon promptly answered, " I am glad to hear you say so. I
was persuaded against my will." Mr. Tucker had never doubted
that it was their duty to stand fast.* So it was resolved that
* Mr. Taylor, however, in his official narrative, says : " They both (Lind
and Gubbins) returned to Mr. Lind's house to discuss the best means of
operation, and were soon joined by Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner, and
Colonel Gordon. When the former alluded to the plan (the retreat to Chanar)
in terms which seemed to imply he approved it Mr. Lind condemned it most
strongly," &c., &c. It is possible that for " former " we should read " latter."
In a letter before me (May 19), addressed to Lord Canning, Mr. Tucker says :
" One officer of high rank and much experience recommended that we should
make a night march, and shut ourselves up in Chanar. Colonel Gordon,
commanding the station, Mr. Gubbins, the 1 judge, and Mr. Line 1 , the magis-
1857.] A QUIET INTEKVAL. 153
no sign of anxiety should be made manifest, either to the
soldiery or to the people ; that every one should remain in his
own home, as in quiet times, and that there should be no open
display of arming, or any other symptom of distrust. But in
the event of a sudden rising either of the soldiery or of the
people, all the Christian residents not engaged in suppressing
it were to seek refuge in the Mint.
And so the daily goings on of social life fell back again into
the old groove; and some even found, in the
prospect before them, causes of increased hopeful- A "f ^Set* 1
ness and bountiful anticipations of a pleasure-
laden future. Were there not European troops coming up
from Danapur and Calcutta, and would there not be gay doings
at Banaras? Those whose duty it was to know what was
going on in the surrounding country, heard this careless talk
with something of a shudder, but wisely refrained from saying
anything to dash the cheerfulness of the talkers. " My game,"
wrote the Commissioner to the Governor-General, " is to keep
people in good spirits ; so I keep my bad news to myself, and
circulate all the good." Meanwhile, he and his colleagues
were doing all that could be done, without noise or excitement,
to restore confidence alike to the soldiery and to the towns-
people. It was no small thing to supply an antidote to the
famine-prices which were then ruling in the markets of the
city, and this might be done, so far at least as the evil bore
upon the soldiery, without interfering with the privileges of
the sellers. So the Commissioner guaranteed, on the part of
Government, that for every rupee paid by the Sipahis for their
dtah, a certain number of pounds, as in ordinary times, should
be given, whilst the Judge and the Magistrate went about in
the city endeavouring (and with good success) to convince the
chief importers of grain that it would be sound policy in the
end to keep down their prices to the normal rates. * These
trate, unanimously agreed with me that to show any open distrust in this
manner would cause a panic, the bazaars would be closed, and both the troops
and the city would be up against us. We, therefore, determined to face the
danger without moving a muscle."
* " I guaranteed Ponsonby yesterday in issuing atah to the troops at six-
teen sirs, and trust you will bear me out. It is ill talking to a hungry man.
All the bazaars are open, but very naturally the grain-sellers are apprehensive,
and raising their prices. Gubbies and Lind have been in the city all the
morning trying to show the principal importers the good policy of* keeping
154 BAXAEAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
tilings had a good effect ; but the utter weakness of the
European force in Banaras stared these brave and sagacious
men in the face at every turn, and they felt that, under Provi-
dence, nothing could save them until the arrival of succour,
except the calmness and confidence of their demeanour in the
hour of danger. " So great is my confidence," wrote the Com-
missioner, "that I have not a single weapon, beyond a heavy-
handled riding-whip, in my pos-ession. In dealing with a
parcel of children, which Sipahis and all Natives are, moral
force goes a great way." And it should be noted here, as an
encouraging symptom, that about this time all the Sikh Sirdars,
then prisoners at Banaras, offered their services to Mr. Tucker
— and it was believed in good faith — to act as a body-guard to
him, and to protect his house.
And the confidence thus felt — which in the breasts of some,
M . . . at least, was a sustaining trust in the overflowing
X irst cLTTlVtll *-^ ^
of reinforce- niercy of God — was made manifest before all the
ments. people of Banaras, by a practical illustration of a
- ay 24# remarkable kind. On the 24th of May, a detach-
ment of forty-four men of the 84th Queen's, who had been
pushed up by the Governor- General by dawk, arrived from
Chinsurah, near Calcutta. This reinforcement would have
more than doubled the reliable military strength on which the
security of the English at Banaras was to depend. From every
station along the great line of country between Dehli and
Calcutta had come the despairing cry, " For God's sake send us
Europeans ! " And now that this help had come to the first of
the great undefended stations — small, it is true, in numbers,
but still at such a time an immense relief and reinforcement to
the little band of Christian men, who were trusting in God,
and maintaining a bold front before their fellows — the}^ be-
thought themselves of others who were in greater need than
themselves, and suffered the welcome detachment to pass on to
Kanhpur; and that too at a time when they seemed to be in
their greatest peril. For news had just come that the 17th
down prices as much as possible." — Mr. H. C. Tucker to Lord Canning, May
23, 1857. "Through the exertions of Mr. Gubbins, assisted by Mr. Lind, and
his influence with the wealthy merchants, the price of grain in the Bazaar
has fallen from twelve or thirteen sirs to fifteen sirs (for the rupee). This is
a great triumph of confidence, and has reassured the multitude wonderfully."
— The Same to the Same, May 26, 1S57.
1857.] BELIEF TO KANHPLIK. 155
Eegiment, at Azamgarh, some sixty miles distant, was on the
verge, if not in the full stream, of open mutiny, and the
Banaras regiments seemed only to be waiting for a signal from
their comrades in the neighbourhood. Still they thought more
of others than of themselves. Sir Henry Lawrence had written
earnestly to urge upon them the great need of Kanhpur, where
General Wheeler was threatened by a dangerous enemy; and
so Ponsonby and Tucker, taking council together, determined
to let the succour which had been sent to them pass on to the
relief of others. "Gordon," wrote the Commissioner, "thinks
that we have run too great a risk in sending on at once the
parties of the 84th, whom you sent on to us by dawk ; but Sir
Henry Lawrence wrote to me so urgently to send every man
who could be spared, that Ponsonby and I concurred in thinking
that it was our duty to run some risk here, and stretch a point
for the relief of Kanhpur. Besides, we argued that nothing
could show better to the suspected 37th Eegiment than that
when we had got Europeans from Calcutta, and placed our
guns in safety, we did not care to detain, but sent them on
straight to join the troops collecting above. This is a real
mark of confidence in the Sipahis and in ourselves.
Besides, it will do good at Allahabad, and along J ay
the road, to see Europeans moving up, party after party, so
fast. So if anything does happen to Banaras before other
Europeans join, your lordship must excuse the despatch of
these forty-four men as an error of judgment on the right side."
Other Europeans had been expected from Danapur, but scarcely
had the men of the 84th been pressed forward, when tidings
came that the detachment of the 10th from Danapur, which had
been proceeding upwards to the relief of Banaras, had " stuck
fast at Chapra." " So all hopes for the present," it was added,
" from that quarter are gone." " Brave Brigadier Ponsonby,"
continued the Commissioner, " calls the failure of the Danapur
relief ' a slight contretemps, somewhat unpleasant, but it cannot
be helped.' I am glad we did not know of it yesterday evening,
as it might have prevented the despatch of the forty-four men
to Kanhpur." But, next day, when further reinforcements
arrived, they were all hurried onward to Kanhpur. "I had
another telegram this morning," wrote Mr. Tucker to Lord
Canning on the 27th, " from Sir Henry Lawrence, begging me
to spare no expense in hurrying up European aid. We send
up all the men we get from Calcutta. Thirty-eight more will
156 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1S57.
go this evening. We do not keej) one for ourselves. 1 ' Even
the detachment of the 10th from Danapur was to be sent on
" the moment it arrives." " Your lordship may feel assured,"
added the Commissioner, " that nothing will be left undone to
insure the quickest possible relief to Kanhpur. I have let Sir
H. Wheeler know what we are doing to relieve him, as Hope is
half the battle."
Thus, already, was the great national courage of the English
beginning to take many shapes. Whilst some,
Diversities girding up their loins, were eager to anticipate
of English danger and to strike at once, smiting everywhere,
hip and thigh, like the grand remorseless heroes
of the Old Testament, others were fain to oppose to the mass
of rebellion that was surging upwards to the surface, the calm
impassive fortitude of patient resolution, born of an abiding
faith in God. Men of different temperaments and different
convictions then wrought or waited according to the faith that
was in them, with self-devotion beyond all praise. There was
need of strenuous action in those days; but there was need
also of that calm confidence which betrays no sign of misgiving,
and the very quietude of which indicates a consciousness of
strength. Eestricted sympathy and narrow toleration are
among the manifestations of our national character, not less
than the broad many-sided courage of which I have spoken ;
and therefore it has happened that sometimes rash judgments
have been passed by men incapable of understanding other
evidences of bravery than those which their own would put
forth in similar crises. But it may be easier to go out to battle
with death than quietly to await its coming. The energy that
stimulates the one is less rare than the patience that inspires
the other. But this quiet courage must be content to wait for
quiet times to be estimated at its true worth.*
* How utterly free the Commissioner was from the least leaven of official
jealousy, and how eager he was to do justice and to get justice done to his
colleagues, may be seen in the following extracts from letters written by him
to Lord Canning : "Mr. F. Gubbins is a very superior man, and will make a
model commissioner. I feel very thankful to have such a coadjutor here to
make up for my own great deficiencies." And in another letter the Commis-
sioner says : " Mr. Gubbins is carrying on the work in this district most ener-
getically! Under the blessing of Providence, he has been the means of
securing great peace and quiet in the city and neighbourhood." And a^ain :
f I hope your lordship will find time for a letter of hearty thanks to Mr. F.
1857.] BEAKING OF THE COMMISSIONED 157
Henry Tucker was a Christian gentleman, in whom the high
courage of our race took this latter form. He
went about, fearless and confident, saying to him- ^xSer"" 6
self, " The Lord is my rock, my fortress, and my
deliverer; the God of my rock, in Him will I trust. He is my
shield and the horn of my salvation ; my high tower, and my
refuge ; my Saviour." * And in this abundant, overflowing
confidence and resignation he seemed to despise all human
means of defence, and almost to regard defensive efforts —
" secondary means " — as a betrayal of want of faith in the
Almighty. " Rather against Ponsonby's and my wish," he
wrote to the Governor-General, " but by the advice of Messrs.
Gubbins and Lind, and at the entreaty of the European
residents, arms and ammunition have, this day, been issued out
to all who require them. I hope that it will make their minds
easy, and that they will rest quiet. I am so thankful we have
no place for defence here. We have nowhere to run to, so must
stand firm — and hitherto there has not been one particle of
panic and confusion." And he said that if the enemy came he
would go out to meet them with a bible in his hand, as David
had gone out to meet Goliath with a pebble and a sling. He
rode out in the most exposed places, evening after evening, with
his daughter, as in quiet times ; and when some one suggested
to him that the hat which he wore, being of a peculiar
character, would clearly indicate the Commissioner, and afford
a mark for a rebel shot, he said that he was as safe in one head-
dress as in another, and had no thought of a change.
Language and action of this kind might be regarded as mere
imbecility. It is not strange, indeed, that a man of Mr.
Tucker's character was described as an amiable enthusiast
quite unequal to the occasion ; for his courage was not of the
popular type, and his character not intelligible to the multi-
tude. But, even looked upon in the light of mere human
wisdom, the course which was favoured by the Banaras Com-
missioner had much, at that time, to recommend it. For as
the absolute weakness of the European community, with only
Gubbins for his beautiful police arrangements and general exertions, in which
Mr. Lind has aided greatly. [There is no doubt but that the strong charac-
ter of Mr. F. Gubbins dominated the situation and impressed itself upon all
with whom he came in contact. — G. B. M.]
* He wrote to Lord Canning that the 22nd chapter of Samuel II. (which
contains these words) had been " their stand-by."
158 BAXAEAS AXD ALLAHABAD. [1857.
thirty effective soldiers to defend them, forbade any successful
resort to arms, it was sound policy thus to preserve a quietude
of demeanour, significant of confidence — confidence both in our
own security and in the loyalty of those who surrounded and
who might have crushed us in an hour.* In continual com-
munication, not only with Lord Canning at Calcutta, but with
the chiefs of all the great stations, as Danapur, Kanhpur,
Lakhnao, and Agra, Henry Tucker knew what was being done
in some quarters, and what was needed in others, to meet the
difficulties of the crisis. He knew that help was coming from
below; and that if rebellion were smouldering either in the
Lines or in the City, the longer it could be left to smoulder,
before bursting into a blaze, the better. The confiding policy
was the temporising policy. Those who best knew the cha-
racter of the Bengal Sipahi, knew that a vague fear, more
impressive for its very vagueness, was driving thousands into
rebellion ; and that the best way to keep things quiet was to
do nothing to excite or to alarm. And so the month of May
wore on, and European reinforcements came from below; but,
in spite of the great temptation to retain them, Tucker and
Ponsonby had strength to send them onward to succour others.
They knew that they were exposing themselves to the re-
proaches of their comrades ; but they felt that they could bear
even this. " You and I," wrote Ponsonby to the Commissioner,
" can bear much in such a cause. To aid the distressed is not
so very wicked."
The high bearing of the chief officers at Banaras excited th6
admiration of the Governor-General. And in the
Encouragement midst of all his urgent duties — his pressing cares
Canning! and anxieties — Lord Canning found, or made,
time, to write letters of stirring encouragement to
all, of whose good deeds he had ample assurance. Whether
* I do not wish it to be inferred from this that I think the serving out of
arms and ammunition to the European residents was a mistake ; but I can
appreciate Mr. Tucker's motives, and understand his reasons for inscribing
"Thorough" on his policy of inaction. It will be seen presently that Lord
Canning, though he admired the calm confidence of Mr. Tucker, sided with
Mr. Gubbins in this matter, and I do not doubt that he was right [I can
only repeat, from knowledge acquired on the spot that in all that concerned
the policy pursued at Banares in those days Mr. F. Gubbins took the lead.
But for him there would have been no ruling mind to guide the crisis. No
one admitted this more frankly than Mr. Tucker himself. — G. B. M.]
1857.] COMMENDATIONS OF LORD CANNING. 159
the well-doer were a General Officer, a Civil or Political Com-
missioner, or a young regimental subaltern, Lord Canning
wrote to him, with his own hand, a letter of cordial thanks,
full of frank kindliness, which braced up the recipient to new
exertions and made him ever love the writer. He knew the
effect at such a time of prompt recognition of good service, and
he felt that such recognition, under the hand of secretaries,
public or private, would lose half its influence for good. He
had a wonderful grace of letter-writing ; and there are many
now who treasure up, as their most cherished possessions, the
few expressive lines, warm from the heart, in which, amidst
dangers and difficulties that might well have excused graver
omissions, the Governor-General poured forth his gratitude to
his subordinates for good aid of any kind — for wise counsel,
for fertility of resource, for active heroism, or for patient
courage.
Thus, on the 23rd of May, he wrote to Mr. Tucker : "Although
it represents a most critical state of things at Banaras, it satis-
fies me that the crisis is met with calm courage, based upon
that which alone is the foundation of true courage, and that
events as they arise will be dealt with temperately, firmly, and
with sound judgment. You have, indeed, a precious stake
upon the issue. I sympathise deeply with your family. If
they need to be assured of it, I beg you to tell them that not
an hour has been, or will be, lost in sending aid to Banaras,
and wherever else it may be most urgently required. . . .
Come what may, do not fear any aspersions or misrepresenta-
tions. No one shall be ignorant how nobly the authority of
our Government, and the honour and dignity of Englishmen,
has been upheld at Banaras." And to Mr. Gubbins he wrote,
a week afterwards, saying : " If I had more leisure
for writing letters, I should not have left you so
long without a word of thanks for your admirable and most
judicious exertions. I know from Mr. Tucker's letters and
messages, and also from other quarters, how much is due to
you and to Mr. Lind, and I beg you both to believe that I am
most grateful for it. You have all had a difficult game to play
— if ever there was one; and your success has been hitherto
complete. I pray that you may carry it through. You have
done really good service in the Bazaars, in obtaining a reduc-
tion of the price of grain." And he then added, with reference
to the difference of opinion which had prevailed respecting the
160 BAN ABAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
arming of the Europeans, " I think you quite right in recom-
mending that arms should not be refused to the Europeans,
who desired them. Your self-confidence has been made quite
plain by the calm front you have already shown to all danger;
and I do not believe that any of the advantages thereby gained
will be sacrificed by the adoption of a common-sense precaution,
which does not necessarily imply mistrust of those more imme-
diately around you, when, as is too surely the case, there is
abundance of danger at a little distance." *
But although outwardly there was fair promise of continued
tranquillity, as the month of May came to a close
June, 1857. a crisis was, indeed, approaching. The birth of
T1? ! T^ari! at J une was ushered in by the familiar work of the
incendiary. A line of Sipahis' huts recently
vacated was fired ; and it was found that the wretched scum of
Dehli royalty were in close communication with the incen-
diaries. Then news came that the Sipahi regiment at Azani-
garh, sixty miles off, had revolted. This was the 17th Eegi-
ment, under the command of Major Burroughs. It had been
believed all along to be tainted, for it had been brigaded with
the 19th and 34th, which had been ignominionsly disbanded,
and it was known that some of the men of the former were
harboured in its Lines. Its insolence had been manifested
unchecked, for Burroughs was not equal to the occasion ; and,
although the Magistrate, Home, had himself addressed the
Sipahis, and otherwise striven to keep them true
" a}_ to their salt, the evil influences had prevailed, so
that before the end of the month the men of the 17th were ripe
for revolt.*) - It happened that just at this critical moment they
scented the spoil. The rattle of the rupees was heard in the
distance. A treasure-escort was coming in from Gorakhpur,
under charge of a company of the 17th Sipahis and some
horsemen of the loth Irregular Cavalry, and this^was to have
been despatched, with the surplus treasure of Azamgarh, to
Banaras, under command of Lieutenant Palliser, who had been
sent from the latter place with a detachment of the 13th to
* MS. Correspondence of Lord Canning.
f On May 24, when some men impudently rejected extra cartridges which
were served out to them, and afterwards violently assaulted a Native officer,
Major Burroughs found himself too weak to punish.
1857.] THE MUTINY OF IZAMGARH. 161
escort it. Five lakhs of rupees had come from Gorakkpur, and
two lakhs were added to it at Azamgarh; seventy thousand
pounds in the hard bright coin of the country, and this was
now in the grasp of the Sipahis. The temptation was more
than they could resist. So they rose and loudly declared that
the treasure should not leave the station. This stern resolution,
however, seems to have been lulled for a time,
and on the evening of the 3rd of June, the
treasure-escort marched out from Azamgarh. It was felt,
however, that the danger had not been escaped, and that at
any moment the Sipahis might break into open rebellion. The
officers and their wives were dining at the mess of the 17th,
when all their anxieties were confirmed by the well-known
warning voice of the guns. It was plain that the firing was in
the direction of the parade-ground. A beating of drums was
soon heard ; and no words were needed to express the assurance
of all that the Sipahis had risen.* There was then a scene of
confusion, which it is not easy accurately to describe. The
ladies and non-combatants hurried off to the Kachahri, which
had been fortified by the Magistrate and his colleagues, and
there barricaded themselves. Meanwhile the Sipahis, having
shot their Quartermaster and their Quartermaster-Sergeant,|
but, with the strange inconsistency of conduct which distin-
guished all their movements, having spared and, indeed, pro-
tected the rest of their officers, hurried after the treasure-escort
to seize the coin on the road to Banaras. And with them went
the myrmidons of the Police-force, which Home had made vast
efforts . to strengthen for the protection of the gaol, but which
had displayed its zeal in the hour of our trouble by releasing
the prisoners, and giving up the houses of the English to
plunder and conflagration.
When they swarmed down upon him, all armed and accoutred
and eager for the spoil, Palliser found that he was helpless.
The troopers of the 13th Irregulars were wavering. They were
not so far gone in rebellion as to desire the death of their
officers, but a strong national sympathy restrained them from
acting against their countrymen. The officers, therefore, were
* There were two post guns stationed at Azamgarh. These the mutineers
seized at the commencement of the outbreak. They were afterwards taken
into Oiidli.
t Lieutenant Hutchinson and Quartermaster-Sergeant Lewis.
VOL. II. to'
162 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
saved. But the treasure was lost. The Sipahis of the 17th*
carried it "back to Azamgarh, whilst the Irregulars escorted
their officers on to Banaras. Meanwhile, the European residents
of the former place had fled to Ghazipur ; and when the Sipahis
returned to their old station, they found all European authority
gone, and the official functionaries, civil and military, swept
out of it to a man. So, flushed with success, they marched off
to Faizabad in military array, with all the pomp and panoply
of war.
When news of these events reached Banaras, crusted over in
the first instance with some exaggerations, it was
T BaSras at pl a i n that the hour was approaching when tran-
June4, 1857. quillity could no longer be maintained. But the
vigorous activity of Gubbins and the calm com-
posure of Tucker, holding rebellion in restraint whilst succours
were far off, had already saved Banaras ; for now fresh rein-
forcements were at hand, and with them one who knew well
how to turn them to account. After despatching his men, as
has been already told,f by the railway to Baniganj, Colonel
Keill had made his way, by train and horse-dak,
A \em l0f *° Banaras with the utmost possible despatch,
eager to avenge the blood of his slaughtered
countrymen. And with this Madras Colonel came the first
* It is stated on the authority of Lieutenant Constable of the 17th, that
the Sipahis "behaved with romantic courtesy." "They formed a square
round their officers, and said that they not only would not touch, but would
protect them, only that there were some of the mutineers who had sworn the
death of particular officers, and therefore they begged the whole party to take
to their carriages and be off at once. ' But how are we to get our carriages ? '
said they, 'seeing that they are scattered all through the station.' 'Ah, we
will fetch them,' said the Sipahis ; and so they did, and gave the party an
escort for ten miles out of the station on the road to Ghazipur. It has been
remarked that to complete the romance they ought to have offered the officers
a month's pay out of the treasure they were plundering." — Annals of the
Indian Rebellion, Part IV. This is somewhat inconsistent with the statement
(lied Pamphlet) that the Sipahis of the 17th implored the Irregulars to slay
their officers, " appealing to religion, nationality, love of money, even offering
£5,000 for each head." These inconsistencies, however, were fast becoming
common phenomena. [The author of the Red Pamphlet received his informa-
tion from an officer on the spot. It is possible that there were two parties
among the revolted Sipahis. — G. B. M.]
t Ante, p. 98.
1857.] NEILL AT BANARAS. 163
assertion of English manhood that had come from the South to
the rescue of our people in the Gangetic provinces. Leading the
way to future conquests, he came to strike and to destroy. He
was one of those who wisely thought from the first, that to
strike promptly and to strike vigorously would be
to strike mercifully; and he went to the work
before him with a stern resolution not to spare. Both from
the North and from the South, at this time, the first great
waves of the tide of conquest were beginning to set in towards
the centres of the threatened provinces. From one end of the
line of danger, Canning, and from the other, Lawrence, was
sending forth his succours — neither under-estimating the mag-
nitude of the peril, but both confident of the final result. It
was the work of the latter, as will be told hereafter, to rescue
Dehli, whilst the former was straining every effort to secure
the safety of Banaras, Allahabad, Agra, Kanhpur, Lakhnao, and
other lesser places dependent upon them. And now assistance
had really come to the first of these places. A detachment of
Madras Fusiliers was at Banaras, and the men of the 10th Foot,
from Danapur, whose arrival had been delayed by an accident,
had also made their appearance. It was determined, therefore,
that the Sipahis should be disarmed.
But a question then arose as to the hour of disarming. The
first idea was, that the regiment should be paraded
on the following morning, and that then the The question
, . & r , & ' . , of disarming.
several companies, alter an assuring explanation,
should be called upon to lay down their arms. But there were
those in Banaras, to whom the thought of even an hour's delay
was an offence and an abomination. When work of this kind
is to be done, it should be done, they thought, promptly.
Stimulated by the intelligence from Azamgarh, and suspecting
what was in store for them, the Sipahis might rise before
morning, and then all our councils and cautions would be vain.
The chief command was in Ponsonby's hands, and it was for
him to give the word for disarming. It appears that Colonel
Gordon, who had ascertained that the more turbulent spirits of
the city were in communication with the Sipahis, accompanied
the Brigadier to the house of the Commissioner to consult with
him. Tucker suggested that they should call on Gubbins ; so
they went to the Judge's residence, and there they received
ample confirmation of the reports which Gordon had heard.
Soon afterwards they met Colonel Neill, who was eager for
m 2
1C4 BANXBAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
immediate action ; * and, after some discussion, the Brigadier
consented to hold a parade at five o'clock, and at once to proceed
to the work of disarmament.
* The circumstances conducing to this change of plan have heen variously
stated. Mr. Taylor, in his official report, already quoted, says : " It appear*
that as Brigadier Ponsonby was returning home after the Council, he met
Colonel Neill, who recommended him to disarm the corps at once. Disre-
garding all other consideration, he hurried to the parade-ground." But in a
letter before me, written by Brigadier Ponsonby in July, that officer states
that, " On the 4th of June Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, commanding the
regiment of Lodiana, called and informed me that he had reason to believe
the men of the 37th Native Infantry were entering into a conspiracy with
some of the bad characters of the city, in view to the subversion of the
British power in Banaras. After some conversation on the subject, in which
I ascertained from the Lieutenant-Colonel that he considered that he could
rely on the fidelity of his own regiment we agreed to go together to the Com-
missioner, Mr. Tucker, and to acquaint him with what had been communi-
cated. We proceeded to Mr. Tucker, and on breaching the subject of our
visit, he proposed that we should go to Mr. F. Gubbins, who lived close at
hand, and we did so. Mr. Gubbins, it appeared, had heard from his spies
that which not only confirmed Colonel Gordon's report, but gave much more
detailed information as to the secret proceedings of the men of the 37th
Native Infantry. Colonel Neill came in while Mr. Gubbins was speaking,
and soon afterwards the Brigade-Major, Captain Dodgson, entered to report
that the treasure, which was on its way from Azamgarh to Banaras under a
guard of fifty men of the Irregular Cavalry, had been plundered by the 17th
Native Infantry — the guard of the Irregulars having connived at the deed.
It was immediately felt that this circumstance, occurring in such clote
proximity to Banaras, rendered the adoption at once of some strong measures
imperative, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon proposed the disarming of the
37th Native Infantry, to which I acceded. There was some discussion as to
whether this should be attempted at once, or at ten a.m. on the following day.
Mr, Gubbins having expressed his opinion that emissaries from the 17th
Native Infantry would soun be in Banaras, it was settled to disarm the 37th
at five o'clock, and it being now past four, it was also arranged to keep the
measure as quiet as possible in order that the regiment might not be on its
guard." Nothing can be more distinct than this. But Colonel Neill, with
equal distinctness, declares that Ponsonby and Gordon called upon him, and
that he (Neill) recommended the afternoon parade. In his official despatch
he says : " Brigadier Ponsonby consulted with me about taking the muskets
from the 37th, leaving them their side-arms. He proposed waiting until the
following morning to do this. I urged its being done at once, to which he
agreed, and left my quarters to make his arrangements." In his private
journal, too, he records that, "The Brigadier called on me at three p.m. with
Colonel Gordon of the Sikhs, informing me of the mutiny of the 17th at
Azamgarh . . . very undecided . . . would put off everything until to-
morrow. I speak out, and urge him to act at once, which he unwillingly
agrees to „ . . the Europeans to parade at five p.m. . . . the 37th to be
disarmed . , . the Irregulars and Sikhs said to be staunch to act with us."
1857.] THE DISAKMING PARADE. 165
Then Ponsonby and Gordon went together to the house of
the latter, where they found or were joined by Major Barrett
of the 37th. The Sipahi officer, after the manner of his kind,
with that fond and affectionate confidence in his men, which
was luring so many to destruction, solemnly protested against
the measure, as one which would break their hearts. To this
Ponsonby replied, that what he had learnt from Mr. Gubbins
had left him no alternative, and that, therefore, it was Barrett's
duty to warn the officers to be read}' for the five o'clock parade.
The Brigadier had ordered his horse to be brought to Gordon's
house, and now the two mounted and rode to the parade-ground,
to plan the best disposition of the troops. The horse whicli
Ponsonby rode had not been ridden for a month. It was fresh
and restive, and the motion of the animal, aided by the slant
rays of the afternoon sun, soon began to affect him. Enfeebled
as he was by previous illness, he became, in his own words,
" most anxious and uneasy in mind and body." But, whilst
Gordon was drawing up the Sikh regiment, he rode to the
European Barracks, where he found Neill mustering the
Europeans, and Olpherts getting ready his guns. The neces-
sary orders were given ; but the Brigadier felt that he was no
longer equal to the responsibility of the work that lay before
him.
And, in truth, it was difficult and dangerous work that then
lay before the English commanders. The iS'ative force was
some two thousand strong. The Europeans hardly mustered
two hundred and fifty.* Of the temper of the Sipahi regiment
there was no doubt. The Irregulars had been tried on the
road from Azamgarh, where they had betrayed the weakness
of their fidelity, if they had not manifested the strength of
We have, therefore, before us three conflicting statements. Mr. Taylor says
that Ponsonby met Neill as the former was going home from Gubbins's house.
Ponsonby says that Neill came into Gubbins's house, when he (the Brigadier)
and Gordon were there. And Neill says that the Brigadier and Gordon
visited him in his own quarters. The matter is of little importance in itself;
but the discrepancies cited afford an apt illustration of the difficulties which
beset the path of a conscientious historian. On the whole, I am disposed to
think that Neill, writing on the day of the events described, is more likely to
be correct than Ponsonby, writing a month afterwards, or Taylor, collecting
facts after the lapse of more than a year.
* The official returns state — H.M.'s 10th Kegiment, one hundred and fifty
men and three officers ; Madras Fusiliers, sixty men and three officers ;
Artillery, thirty men and two officers.
166 BANABAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
their discontent.* But the Sikh regiment was believed to be
faithful ; and, if it were faithful, there could be no doubt of
the result of that afternoon's parade. It is said that, as they
were assembling for parade, they were in high spirits, and
appeared to be eager to be led against the Hindustani of the
regular Army. Not merely in Banaras, but in all parts of
the country, was it of the highest moment that the Sikh
fiohting men should be on our side ; for it was believed that
the fame of their loyalty would spread, on all sides, to the
confines of our Empire, and that, throughout the Pan jab itself,
the renown of their achievements would stimulate others to do
likewise. But everywhere so great a sensitiveness thrilled
through the Native troops of all nationalities, that it was
always possible that the weight of a feather in the balance
might determine the out-turn of events on the side of loyalty
or rebellion.
When the order for disarming had gone forth, Colonel Spottis-
woode and his officers proceeded to the parade-
The disarming ground of the 37th, turned out the regiment, and
ordered them to lodge their muskets in the bells-
of-arms. There were about four hundred men on parade, the
remainder, with the exception of one company at Chanar, being
on detached duty in the station. To Spottiswoode it appeared
that the men were generally well-disposed. There were no im-
mediate signs of resistance. First the Grenadier company, and
then the other companies up to No. 6, quietly lodged their arms
in obedience to the word of command. At this point a murmur
arose, and some of the men were heard to say that they were
betrayed — that the Europeans were coming to shoot them down
when they were disarmed. Hearing this, Spottiswoode cried
out that it was false, and appealed to the Native officers, who
replied that he had always been a father to them. But a panic
was now upon them, for they saw the white troops advancing.
* These regiments of Irregular Cavalry were differently constituted from
those of the regular Sipahi Army. They had few European officers, and
those only picked men, who had the greatest pride in their several corps, and
seldom or never any desire to leave them. The troopers, who received high
pay and found their own horses, were generally men of a better class, and the
position of the Native officers was of a higher and more responsible character
than in the regular Army. All these things were at first supposed to be
favourable to the continuance of the fidelity of the Irregular Cavalry. But
it was soon found that they were as incurably tainted as the rest.
1857.] THE DISAKMING PARADE. l(j?
By word of command from Ponsonby the Europeans and the
guns were moving forward towards the Sipahis' Lines. Opposite
to the quarter- guard of the 37th the Brigadier ordered the
little force under Colonel Neill to be wheeled into line and
halted. He then went forward and spoke to the Sipahis of
the guard. He said that they were required to give up their
arms, and that if they obeyed as good soldiers, no harm of any
kind would befall them. As he spoke he laid his hand assuringly
on the shoulder of one of the Sipahis, who said that they had
committed no fault. To this Ponsonby replied in Hindustani :
"None; but it is necessary that you should do as you are
ordered, as so many of your brethren have broken their oaths
and murdered their officers, who never injured them." Whilst
he was still speaking, some of the men shouted to their comrades
on the right and left ; a stray shot or two was fired from the
second company, and presently the Sipahis rushed in a body to
the bells-of-arms, seized their muskets, loaded and fired upon
both their own officers and the Europeans. Going about the
work before them in a systematic, professional manner, they
sent some picked men and good marksmen to the front as
skirmishers, who, kneeling down, whilst others handed loaded
muskets to them, fired deliberately upon the Europeans from
a distance of eighty or a hundred yards. Seven or eight men
of the 10th were shot down, and then the rest fell back in line
with the rear of the guns. Meanwhile the officers of the 37th,
who had been providentially delivered from the fire of their
men, were seeking safety with the guns; but Major Barrett,
who had always protested against the disarming of the regiment,
and now believed that it was foully used, cast in his lot with
it, and would not move, until a party of Sipahis carried him off
to a place of safety.
To the fire of the Sipahi musketeers the British Infantry
now responded, and the guns were wheeled round to open upon
the mutineers with irresistible grape. The English gunners
were ready for immediate action. Anticipating resistance,
Olpherts had ordered his men, when they moved from their
Lines, to carry their cartridges and grape-shot in their hands.*
The word of command given, the guns were served with almost
magical rapidity ; and the 37th were in panic flight, with their
* Whether this was observed by the Sipahis I know not ; but if it were,
there can be no difficulty in accounting for their suspicion and alarm.
168 BANAKAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1837.
faces turned towards the Lines. But from behind the cover of
their huts they maintained a smart fire upon the Europeans ;
so Olpherts, loading his nine-pounders both with grape and
round shot, sent more messengers of death after them, and
drove them out of their sheltering homes. Throwing their
arms and accoutrements behind them, and many of them
huddling away clear out of Cantonments beyond the reach of
the avenging guns, they made their way to the city, or dis-
persed themselves about the country, ready for future mischief
and revenge.
Meanwhile, the detachment of Irregular Cavalry and Gordon's
Sikhs had come on to parade. It was soon obvious what was
the temper of the former. Their commander, Captain Guise,*
had been killed by a Sipahi of the 37th, and Dodgson, the
Brigade-Major, was ordered to take his place. He had scarce
taken command, when he was fired at by a trooper. Another
attempted to cut him down. But the Sikhs appear to have
had no foregone intention of turning against onr people.
Whether the object of the parade and the intentions of the
British officers were ever sufficiently explained to them is not
very apparent; but they seem to have been, in this juncture,
doubtful and suspicious, and it needed but a spark to excite
them into a blaze. The outburst of the Irregulars first caused
them to waver. They did not know what it all portended ;
they could not discern friends from foes. At this critical
moment, one of the Sikhs fired upon Colonel Gordon, whilst
another of his men moved forward to his protection. In an
instant the issue was determined. Olpherts was limbering up
his guns, when Crump, of the Madras Artillery, who had joined
him on parade and was acting as his subaltern, cried out that
the Sikh regiment had mutinied. At once the word was given
to unlimber, and at the same moment there was a cry that the
Sikhs were about to charge. At this time they were shouting
and yelling frantically, and firing in all directions — their bullets
passing over and through the English battery. They were
only eighty or a hundred yards from us on an open parade-
ground ; and at that time our Artillery were unsupported by
the British Infantry, who had followed the mutineers of the
* One writer says that Guise's head was afterwards split open by one of
his own troopers. He was shot on the rear of the Lines, as he was going to
parade.
1857.] PONSONBY AND NEILL. 169
37th Regiment into their Lines. It was not a moment for
hesitation. The sudden rush of a furious multitude upon our
guns, had we been unprepared for them, might have over-
whelmed that half-battery with its thirty English gunners;
and Banaras might have been lost to us. So Olpherts, having
ascertained that the officers of the Sikh corps had taken refuge
in his rear, brought round his guns and poured a shower of
grape into the regiment. Upon this they made a rush upon
the guns — a second and a third — but were driven back by the
deadly showers from our field-pieces, and were soon in confused
flight. And with them went the mutineers of the Irregular
Cavalry; so the work was thoroughly done, and Olpherts
remained in possession of the field.
Whilst these events were developing themselves on the
parade-ground, the little power of endurance still
left in the Brigadier was rapidly failing him, cSJand.
and before the afternoon's work was done he was
incapable of further exertion. The slant rays of the declining
sun, more trying than its meridian height, dazzled and sickened
the old soldier. The pain and discomfort which he endured
were so great that he was unable any longer to sit his horse.
Having previously given orders to Colonel Spottiswoode to fire
the Sipahis' Lines that none might find shelter in them, he made
over the command to Colonel Neill, who eagerly took over all
further military responsibility on himself.* The victory of the
Few over the Many was soon completed. Some who had sought
shelter in the Lines were driven out and destroyed, whilst a
few who succeeded in hiding themselves were burnt to death
in their huts.f
* It is not easy to determine the exact period at which Ponsonby gave
over the command to Neill. From the official report of the latter it would
appear to have been done before the Sikhs broke into mutiny, butPonsonby's
own statement would fix the time at a later period. The account in the text
is the official version of the transfer of command ; but the fact, I believe, is
that Neill, seeing Ponsonby on the ground, went up to him and said,
" General, I assume command." So Neill's journal, and oral information of
an officer who heard Lim say it.
t There is no passage in this history on which more care and labour have
been expended than on the above narrative of the disarmiug at Banaras on
the 4th of June. In compiling it I have had before me several detailed state-
ments made by officers present at the parade, including a full narrative
written by Brigadier Ponsonby, and furnished to me by his widow, and the
private journals and letters of Colonel Neill, as well as his official reports.
170 BANAKAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1S57.
All the circumstances of this parade of the 4th of June being
fairly reviewed and impartially considered, it is
The military not strange that some should think that it was
sidered." 1 C ° n " grievously mismanaged. That this was the
opinion of the highest authorities at the time is
certain. Writing on the 6th of June to the Governor-General,
the Banaras Commissioner said, " I fear the business of dis-
arming was very badly managed indeed. The Sipahis feel very
sore at what they consider an attack on men, many of whom
were unarmed at the time. This is not a point for a civilian to
discuss, but the general opinion seems to be that the affair was
much mismanaged." This opinion was shared by Lord Canning,
who wrote, a fortnight afterwards to the President of the
India Board, that the disarming " was done hurriedly and not
judiciously." " A portion of a regiment of Sikhs," he added,
" was drawn into resistance, who, had they been properly dealt
with, would, I fully believe, have remained faithful." And,
sixteen months afterwards, the civil functionary, on whom it
devolved to write an official account of these transactions,
deliberately recorded his belief, it may be assumed after full
investigation, that the Sikhs were brought out not knowing
what was to be done; that the whole affair was a surprise;
that, as a corps, they were loyal, and " would have stood any
test less rude."
The inference to be drawn from this is not so much that the
business was done badly as that it was done hastily ; or rather
that it was done badly because it was done hastily. The
sudden resolution to disarm the 37th on that Thursday after-
noon left no time for explanations. If the whole of the black
troops at Banaras had been known to be steeped in sedition to
the lips, and ready for an immediate outbreak, it would have
been sound policy to surprise them, for only by such a course
could our little handful of white soldiers hope to overthrow the
multitude of the enemy. But whilst the regular Sipahis were
Colonel Spottiswoode's statement is published in the Parliamentary Eeturn
relating to the regiments that have mutinied. There was also a very clearly
written narrative by Ensign Tweedie one of the young officers wounded by
the fire of the Sikh regiment), printed in the newspapers of the day. Besides
these, I have had the advantage of much personal conversation with one of
the chief surviving actors in the scene described, and have received from him
written answers to my questions on all doubtful points. I have a strong con-
viction, therefore, that the story cannot be more correctly told.
1857.] MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. 171
only suspected, in whole or in part, of treacherous designs, and
the intentions of the Irregulars were still doubtful, there had
been nothing in the conduct of the Sikh regiment to cast a
doubt upon its fidelity. It was an occasion, indeed, on which
kindly explanations and assurances might have had the best
effect. But there was no time for this. When it was tried
with the 37th, both by the Brigadier and by the Colonel, it
was too late ; for the Europeans were advancing, and the panic
had commenced. And with the Sikhs it seems not to have
been tried at all. It would, however, be scarcely just to cast
the burden of blame on any individual officer. What was evil
was the suddenness of the resolution to disarm and the haste
of its execution. But this is said to have been a necessary
evil. And whilst we know the worst that actually happened,
we do not know the something worse that might have resulted
from the postponement of the disarming parade. Even at the
best, it is contended, if the 37th had been quietly disarmed, it
would have been sore embarrassment to us to watch all those
disarmed Sipahis. It would, indeed, to a great extent have
shut up our little European force, and, thus crippling its
powers of action, have greatly diminished our strength. More-
over, it is contended that, in the crisis that had arisen, this
stern example, these bloody instructions, had great effect
throughout that part of the Gangetic provinces, and, indeed,
throughout the whole of the country. It was made manifest
that European military power was neither dead nor paralysed.
There was a beginning of retribution. The white troops were
coming up from beyond the seas. Though few in numbers at
first, there were thousands behind them, and Upper India
would soon be covered by our battalions. The moral effect of
this, it was said, would be prodigious. The mailed hand of
the English conqueror was coming down again crushingly upon
the black races.
And even as regards the Sikh corps, it was said that a large
proportion of the regiment — the regiment from Lodiana — were
not Sikhs but Hindustanis ; that they were the brethren of
the regular Sipahis, and that they had come on to parade with
their pieces loaded. This last fact is not conclusive against
them. It may have been the result wholly of uncertainty and
suspicion. But Olpherts, when he fired upon them, was fully
assured that they had broken into open mutiny, and nothing
ever afterwards tended to weaken his original conviction. That
172 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
there was mutiny in the regiment — and mutiny of the worst
kind — however limited it may have been, is certain ; and if
this were the first, it was far from being the last instance of a
whole regiment being irrevocably compromised by the miscon-
duct of a few Sipahis. An officer, with his guns loaded, in the
presence of an overwhelming number of Native soldiers, cannot
draw nice distinctions or disentangle the knot of conflicting
probabilities. He must act at once. The safety of a station,
perhaps of an Empire, may depend upon the prompt discharge
of a shower of grape. And the nation in such an emergency
will less readily forgive him for doing too little than for doing
too much.
Complete as was the military success, the danger was not
passed. The dispersion of a multitude of mutinous
June 4-5. Sipahis might have been small gain to us in the
Stewards, presence of a rebellious population. If the mal-
contents of the city had risen at this time and
made common cause with the dispersed soldiery and with their
comrades under arms at the different guards, they might have
overwhelmed our little gathering of Christian people. But the
bountiful Providence, in which Commissioner Tucker had
trusted, and which seemed to favour the brave efforts of Judge
Gubbins, raised up for us friends in this awful crisis, and the
fury of the many was mercifully restrained. It had been
arranged that in the event of an outburst, all the Christian
non-combatants should betake themselves to the Mint, which
lay between the Cantonment and the city, as the building best
suited to defensive purposes. The rattle of the musketry and
the roar of the guns from the parade-ground proclaimed that
the Sipahis had risen. There were then great alarm and con-
fusion. Numbers of our people made for the Mint. The
missionaries left Banaras behind them, and set their faces
towards Eamnagar on their way to Chanar.* The civilians,
some with their wives and families, sought refuge, in the first
instance, in the Collector's Kachahri, ascending to the roof of
* There were some exceptions to the general exodus of the missionaries.
Mr. Leupholt, of the Church Missionary Society, seems to have stood fast in
the mission premises with his flock of Native Christians. This excellent man
afterwards rendered good service to the British Government by exerting his
influence, which was considerable in the neighbourhood, to obtain supplies
for our European troops.
1857.] FKIENDS IN NEED. 173
the building, where at least they were safe from capture.*
But there was a great and reasonable fear that the Sikhs of the
Treasuiy-guard, rendered furious by the slaughter of their
countrymen, would seize the Government coin, and the crown
jewels of their own exiled Queen, which were stored with it,
and would then fire the building and attack our Christian
people wheresoever they could be found.
And that they would have struck heavily at us is not to be
doubted, if one of their nation, a Sikh chief of
good repute, had not come to our aid in the hour Goodser-
of our greatest need. This was the Sirdar Siirat srirat Singh.
Singh, who, after the second Sikh war, had been
sent to reside at Banaras, in honourable durance, and who had
fully appreciated the generous treatment he had received from
the English. He had unbounded confidence in Gubbins ; and
when the crisis arose, he manfully shouldered a double-barrelled
gun and accompanied his English friend to the Kachahri.
Promptly and energetically he came forward to aid us, and by
his explanations and persuasions softened down the anger of the
•Sikh soldiery, who might have been excused if they were
burning to avenge the blood of their slaughtered comrades.
Thus assured and admonished, they not only abstained from all
acts of personal violence, but they quietly gave up the Govern-
ment treasure and the Lahor jewels to the Europeans, to be
conveyed to a place of safety."]*
Nor was this noble-minded Sikh Sirdar the only friend who
rose up to aid us in this conjuncture. Even from
that great hot-bed of Hinduism, Brahmanism Pandit
itself sent forth a staunch ally and potent deliverer chand.
to be a present help to us in our trouble. Pandit
Gokul-Chand, a high-caste Brahman, known to all, respected by
all in Banaras, flung all the weight of his influence into the
scales in our favour. He was a servant of the Government —
* The Commissioner was not of this party. He had gone to the Mint.
t The place of safety was within the strong cells of the Artillery Kanji-
House, whither the treasure was taken, by the advice, I believe, of Captain
Olpherts, who had always protested against the notion of making the same
building available both as a refuge for the women and children and a store-
house for the treasure. Mr. Taylor, in his official narrative, says the treasure
was taken to the magazine. In reward for the fidelity and forbearance of the
Sikhs, the Commissioner next morning very properly distributed ten thousand
rupees among them.
174 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
Nazir of the Judge's Court — and as such in constant intercourse
with Gubbins. Had he been a Christian gentleman, he could
not have striven, day and night, more ceaselessly and more
successfully to succour our people. There was
D «°^h ain another, too, who put forth a protecting hand,
and was earnest in his endeavours to allay the
inquietude of the people. This was a wealthy and influential
Hindu noble — Rao Deonarain Singh — a loyal and devoted
subject of the British Government, a man of high intelligence
and enlightenment, liberal and humane. No words could
exaggerate the importance of his services. Nor was the titular
Eajah of Banaras himself wanting in good offices
The Rajah of to t ^ e English. On the night of that 4th of June,
he succoured the missionary fugitives, and, from
first to last, he placed all his resources at our disposal, and
seemed honestly to wish well to our cause. Truly, it would
have gone ill with our little handful of Christian people, if
God had not raised up for us in our sorest need these staunch
and powerful friends from among the multitude of the Heathen.
The prompt action of Surat Singh saved the civilians at the
Kachahri. For many hours tbey remained there, anxious and
uncertain, calculating the chances against them, but resolute to
sell their lives at the highest price. But two hours after mid-
night a little party of English gentlemen, headed by Gubbins,
went forth in the broad moonlight to obtain the assistance of an
European guard from the Mint to escort thither the fugitives at
the Kachahri. As they went they were fired at by some Sipahis ;
but they returned, unharmed, with the guard, and safely conveyed
their companions to the appointed place of refuge.* There the
hours of morning darkness passed away in drear discomfort,
and day dawned upon a scene of misery and confusion in the
Mint. Officers and ladies, masters and servants, huddled
together, for the most part on the roof, without much respect of
* This incident is made still brighter by an act of heroism which it is a
pleasure to record. It is thus officially narrated : "Messrs. Gubbins, Caul-
field, and Demomet went in a buggy to the Mint, and Mr. Jenkinson, C.S.,
accompanied them on horseback. As the party was crossing the bridge, Mr.
Jenkinson saw some ambushed Sipahis aiming at the party in the buggy.
There was no time for warning or for hesitation, and he at once reined back
his horse, covering with his own body his companions in danger. It were far
easier to praise such an act than to praise it worthily, and I praise it best by
not praising it at all." — Mr. Taylor's Official Narrative.
1857.] QUIETUDE OF THE CITY. 175
persons or regard for proprieties of costume. The Europeans
who had been sent for their protection bivouacked in the lower
rooms, many of them utterly worn out with the exhausting
labours of the day ; whilst outside in the compound, or enclosure 5
was a strange collection of carriages, buggies, palanquins'
horses, bullocks, sheep, goats, and packages of all sizes and all
kinds brought in for the provisioning of the garrison.
" The town is quite quiet," wrote Commissioner Tucker to
Lord Canning on the following morning, " in the
midst," as he said, "of the utmost noise and con- June 5-9.
fusion of this crowded building," which made it state of the
difficult to write at all, and was altogether so a y *
distracting, that though a man of grave speech, he described
it as " such a Pandemonium, that it was impossible to think
write, or do anything in it." There had been an alarm in the
course of the night of risings in the city ; for the Muhammadans
had hoisted the green flag, but nothing came of the demon-
stration. And days passed, but still there was quietude
throughout Banaras. All the circumstances of the "Sacred
City of the Hindus " being considered, it must be a source of
wonder, not only that so little Christian blood was shed, but
that there was so little resistance of any kind to the authority
of the British Government. " It is quite a miracle to me,"
wrote Commissioner Tucker to the Governor-General on the
9th of June, " how the city and station remain joerfectly quiet.
We all have to sleep at night in the Mint, but not a house or
bungalow has been touched, and during the day everything
goes on much as usual." Wisely and vigorously was Gubbins
now doing his work. He had sunk the judge in the magistrate.
His court was closed, and he had taken the weight of the
executive upon him. And now, partly by the fear, partly by
the love he had inspired in the hearts of the people, he held
them in restraint, and the great city lay hushed beneath his
hand.
But although there was extraordinary repose in the city in
the surrounding districts violence and anarchy
arose with a suddenness that was quite astounding. state of the
It was not merely that the mutinous Sipahis, tricts. dls "
hanging about the adjacent villages, were inciting
others to rebellion (this was to be expected), but a great move-
ment from within was beginning to make itself felt upon the
surface of rural society, and for a while all traces of British
176 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
rule were rapidly disappearing from the face of the land. Into
the real character and general significance of this movement I
do not purpose here to inquire. The investigation is an
extensive one, and must be deliberately undertaken. It is
enough, in this place, to speak of immediate results. The
dispersion of the Native soldiery on the 4th of June was
followed almost immediately by disorder and rapine in the
contiguous country. A few days sufficed to sweep away law
and order, and to produce a revolution of property, astonishing
.even to those who were best acquainted with the character and
temper of the people. " I could not," wrote Mr. Tucker on the
13th, " have believed that the moment the hand of Government
was removed there would have been so sudden a rising of land-
holders to plunder each other and people on the roads.* All
the large landholders and auction-purchasers are paralysed and
dispossessed, their agents being frequently murdered and their
property destroyed." f To arrest this new danger, which
threatened to become a gigantic one, overwhelming, irrepres-
sible, our people had now to put forth all their strength.
On the 9th the Government of India caused Martial Law
June 9 *° ^ e P roc l a i me( i i n the divisions of Banaras
Punitory' and Allahabad. On the same day Mr. Tucker,
enactments. nQ ^ k now i n g that already the Legislature had
provided the extraordinary powers which he sought J — nay,
even more than he sought — wrote to the Governor-General,
suggesting that he should place the Banaras division " beyond
the reach of Regulation Law, and give every civil officer,
having the full power of magistrate, the power of life and
death." " I would prefer this to Martial Law," he added, " as
I do not think the greater proportion of the military can be
intrusted with the power of life and death. The atrocious
murders which have taken place have roused the English blood,
and a very slight circumstance would cause Natives to be shot
or hung. I would, therefore, much prefer retaining the powers
in the hands of those who have been accustomed to weigh and
* " The Native idea now is," he added, " that British rule has slipped off,
and that it is every man for himself."
t See ante, vol. i. p. 125.
X The Act, of which a summary has heen given (Book iv. chap, iv.), though
passed on the 30th of May, did not receive the sanction of the Governor-
General hefore the 8th of June.
1857.] MAKTIAL LAW. 177
to value evidence. No civilian is likely to order a man to be
executed without really good cause." *
Time soon exploded the error contained in these last words.
But the Banaras Commissioner, though a little blinded by class
prejudice, was right when he wrote about the hot English blood,
which forbade the judgment of a cool brain. Already our
military officers were hunting down criminals of all kinds, and
hanging them up with as little compunction as though they
had been pariah-dogs, or jackals, or vermin of a baser kind.
One contemporary writer has recorded that, on the morning
after the disarming parade, the first thing he saw from the
Mint was a " row of gallowses." A few days afterwards mili-
tary courts or commissions were sitting daily, and sentencing
old and young to be hanged with indiscriminate ferocity.
These executions have been described as " Colonel Neill's hang-
ings." But Neill left Banaras four or five days after the out-
break, and it did not devolve on him to confirm the sentences, of
which I have heard the strongest reprobation. On one occasion,
some young boys, who, perhaps, in mere sport had flaunted
rebel colours and gone about beating tom-toms, were tried and
sentenced to death. One of the officers composing the court, a
man unsparing before an enemy under arms, but compassionate,
as all brave men are, towards the weak and helpless, went with
tears in his eyes to the commanding officer, imploring him to
remit the sentence passed against these juvenile offenders, but
with little effect on the side of mercy.f And what was done
with some show of formality, either of military or of criminal'
law, was as nothing, I fear, weighed against what was done
without any formality at all. Volunteer hanging parties went
out into the districts, and amateur executioners were not
wanting to the occasion. One gentleman boasted of the num-
bers he had finished off quite "in an artistic manner," with
mango-trees for gibbets and elephants for drops, the victims oi
this wild justice being strung up, as though for pastime, in
" the form of a figure of eight."
* MS. Correspondence.
t The general reader, however, must not calculate years in such a case as.
they would be calculated in Europe. What, estimated by years, is a boy in
England is a man in India — a husband, a father, with ail the full-grown
passions of maturity— and an equal sense of personal independence and
responsibility.
vol. ir. w
178 BANAKAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
This, it is to be presumed, was the Martial Law, of which such
graphic details have been given by contemporary writers,
without a prevision of publicity.* But the Acts of the Legis-
lative Council, under the strong hand of the Executive, fed the
gallows with equal prodigality, though, I believe, with greater
discrimination. It was a special immunity of this Banaras
mutiny that the prison-gates were not thrown open, and the
city deluged with a flood of convicted crime. The inmates of
the gaol remained in their appointed places. But even this had
its attendant evils. For as crime increased, as increase it
necessarily did, prison-room was wanted, and was not to be
found. The great receptacle of the criminal classes was gorged
to overflowing. The guilty could not be suffered wholly to
escape. So the Gibbet disposed of the higher class of male-
factors, and the Lash scored the backs of the lower, and sent
them afloat again on the waves of tumult and disorder. But,
severe as Gubbins was when the crisis was at its height, he
restrained his hand when the worst had passed, and it had
ceased to be an expedient of mercy to strike into the hearts of
the people that terror, which diminishes crime and all its
punitory consequences.
Meanwhile, other sources of anxiety were developing them-
themselves in more remote places. One incident
June 5. must "be narrated here as immediately connected
^ja'unpS at witn tne outbreak of the 4th of June. The story
of the Lodiana regiment of Sikhs has not yet
been fully told. There was a detachment of it at Jaunpur, a
civil station some forty miles from Banaras. When news
arrived on the 5th of June that the 37th had revolted, and
were pouring into the district, they made demonstrations of
fidelity to their British officers ; but when later tidings came
that the head-quarters of their own regiment had been fired on
by the Europeans, they rose at once in open mutiny. Lieu-
tenant Mara, the officer commanding fiein, was shot down.
Mr. Cuppage, joint-magistrate, on his way to the gaol, shared
the same fate. The Treasury was plundered. And all sur- ■
viving Europeans, after a humiliating surrender of their arms,
were driven to seek safety in flight. British government was
* See especially a letter, written by a private of the 78th Highlanders,
which was published in the Times, and quoted at some length by Mr. Mont-
gomery Martin.
1857.] DESPATCH OF TKOOPS. 179
expunged, as it had been at Azamgarh, and its chief repre-
presentatives were glad to find a hiding-place for themselves in
quarters which, a little time before, their fiat could have swept
away like summer dust. Then the station was given up to
plunder ; and the mutiny of a few Sikh mercenaries grew into
a general insurrection of the people. The houses of the English
were gutted and burnt. The soldiery, burdened with money-
bags, having gone oif towards Oudh, the plunder of " the
Treasury was completed by decrepit old women and wretched
little boys, who had never seen a rupee in their lives." * And
all over the district, the state of things, brought about by our
settlement operations and our law courts, disappeared like the
bursting of a bubble. The very presence of our fugitive people,
though powerless and forlorn, was an offence and an abomination
to the now-dominant class, who drove them from their sanctuary
in the house of a friendly Rajah to take refuge in an indigo
factory. And it became one of the Banaras Commissioner's
greatest cares to rescue Mr. Fane and his companions from the
dangers which then beset them. Having discovered their
abode, he sent out " a party of Europeans and volunteers to
bring them into Banaras." f
Troops were now coming up every day from below. Banaras
was safe. Other stations were to be saved.
The best service that could be rendered to the Despatch of
State was the prompt despatch of reinforcements ' upwards,
to the upper country — and most of all to Allah-
abad and Kanhpiir. This service was intrusted to Mr. Archi-
bald Pollock. { True to his great historical name, he threw
himself into the work with an amount of energy and activity
which bore the best fruits. Every kind of available convey-
ance was picked up and turned promptly to account in the
* Mr. Taylor's official narrative. The writer adds : " In the district not a
semblance of authority was left to any one. Those who had lost their estates
under our rule thought this a good time to regain them ; those who had not,
thought that they could make a little profit by plundering their weaker neigh-
bours ; the bolder spirits thought to secure more brilliant advantages by
intercourse with the rebel powers in Oudh." In no other district, Mr. Taylor
observes, were " auction purchasers more numerous, old Zemindars more
powerful, or the present landowners on worse terms among themselves."
t Mr. Tucker to Lord Canning, June 9th. In this letter the fugitives are
said to have consisted of sixteen men, five ladies, and eleven children.
* The youngest son of General Sir George Pollock. He was then joint-
magistrate of Banaras.
* 2
180 BANXrAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
furtherance of the eagerly-looked-for Europeans, whose appear-
ance was ever welcomed by our peril-girt people as a great
deliverance. Nor was want of sufficient conveyance the only
difficulty to be overcome. There was a want of provisions for
Europeans, especially of flour and rum ; and Mr. Tucker wrote
eagerly to Lord Canning to send up commissariat stores of
every kind for the soldiery, " as European necessaries are not to
be had here in any quantity." He was very eager at this time
to save the treasure in neighbouring civil stations along the
main line, as Mirzapur and Ghazipur, and he sent parties of
Europeans by steamer to bring it off in safety to Banaras. It
was, moreover, a great object to keep the white troops in motion,
and thus to display European strength, first at one point, then
at another, and by means of a few to make an appearance of
many, as in a mimic theatre of war. At once to have recovered
Azamgarh and Jaunpur, from which we had been so igno-
miniously expelled, would have been a great stroke ; and the
Commissioner wrote to Lord Canning, saying that if the
Government would allow him to divert two hundred Europeans
from the main line of operations, the magistrates and other
civil officers might return to their posts, and British authority
might be re-established. But troops could not be spared for
the purpose, and it was left to another day and to other means,
whereof due record will be made hereafter, to prove to the
people of those districts that the English had not been swept
out of the land. The narrative must now follow the upward
line of the Ganges to the next great city of note.
About seventy miles beyond Banaras, at the confluence of the
Ganges and the Jamnah, lies the city of Allah-
abad. It has none of that wealth of structural
beauty which renders Banaras so famous among the cities of
the East. Its attractions are derived chiefly from its position,
at the extreme point or promontory of the Duab, formed by the
meeting of the waters. The broad rivers rushing down towards
the sea, and mingling as they go their streams of varied
colour and varied motion — the one of yellow-brown, thick and
turbid, the other blue, clear, and sparkling * — the green banks
* Historians and poets alike'delight to describe the meeting of the waters.
"The half-modernised fortress," says Trotter, "looks grandly down on the
meeting of the clearer Jamnah with the yellow waters of the broad Ganges"
1857.] ALLAHABAD. 181
between which they flow, the rich cultivation of the inner
country dotted with groves and villages, make a landscape
pleasant to the eye. But the town itself, principally situated
on the Jamnah, has little to command admiration. It has been
called in derision by natives of Hindustan, " Fakirabad," or the
city of beggars; but the Fort, which towers above it, massive
and sublime, with the strength of many ages in its solid ma-
sonry, imparts peculiar dignity to the place. Instinct with the
historical traditions of the two elder dynasties, it had gathered
new power from the hands of the English conqueror, and,
garrisoned by English troops, might almost have defied the
world.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the military importance
of the situation at the junction of the two rivers, commanding,
as it does, the great fluvial thoroughfare of Hindustan, and also
the high road by land from the Upper to the Lower Provinces.
Both in a strategical and political sense, its security had ever
been of great moment ; but the recent acquisition of Oudh had
rendered it still more essential that it should be safely in hand.
In this powerful fortress of Allahabad was an arsenal stored
with all the munitions of war, and an array of guns in position
commanding the approaches from the country below. And
their possession by the enemy would have been a disaster
beyond compare. Some time before, Sir James Outram had
suggested to Lord Canning the expediency of adopting measures
for the greater security of Allahabad, and had warned him of
the, at least possible, danger of such a mischance befalling us.*
(History of the British Empire in India) ; Waterfield (Indian Ballads) sings
of " the sisters blue and brown ; " and again, " Where Yamuna leaps blue to
Ganga's arms." And Bholunath Chandr (Travels of a Hindu), writing in
prose, but scarcely less poetically, says : " The spot where the Sister Nadis
(Greek Nyades) meet makes a magnificent prospect. The Ganges has a tur-
bid, muddy current — the Jamnah, a sparkling stream. Each at first tries to
keep itself distinct, till, happy to meet after a long parting, they run into each
other's embrace, and, losing themselves in one, flow in a common stream. The
Ganges strikes the fancy as more matronly of the two — the Jamnah a gayer,
youthful sister."
* " I myself am more shocked than surprised." he wrote from Baghdad to
the Chairman of the East India Company, on first hearing of the outbreak,
" for I have long dreaded something of the sort ; and you may recollect I
told you of the'warning that I gave to Lord Canning when I was last at
Calcutta, and suggested that measures should be adopted for the better security
of Allahabad."— June 8, 1857. MS.
182 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
I do not know whether these warnings were remembered —
warnings afterwards repeated most emphatically by Sir Henry
Lawrence ; but there was no place to which Lord Canning
turned his thoughts with greater anxiety and alarm — no place
to which he was more eager to send relief in the shape of
European troops.
Tidings of the great disaster at Mirath reached Allahabad on
the 12th of May, and a few days afterwards came the story of
the progress of the rebellion, and the restoration of the Mughul
Emperors of Dehli. At the beginning of May, the force posted
at Allahabad consisted of a single iSipahi regiment, the 6th,
under the command of Colonel Simpson, which had marched in
from Jamalpur at the latter end of March, relieving the 11th,
under Colonel Finnes. But on the 9th, a wing of the Firuzpur
Eegiment of Sikhs had arrived from Mirzapur ; and ten days
later two troops of Oudh Irregular Horse came in, under orders
from Sir Henry Lawrence, to place themselves under the civil
authorities. Shortly afterwards sixty European invalids were
brought in from Chanar. The bulk of the Native troops
occupied their Lines in the Cantonment, which lay at a dis-
tance of two or three miles from the Fort between the two
great rivers. Detachments were posted in the Fort. The
principal civil officers were Mr. Chester, the commissioner, and
Mr. Court, the magistrate — both men of courage and resolution,
not easily shaken or disturbed. They and the other civilians,
as well as the military officers, dwelt in comfortable and pleasant
garden-houses in the European station, without an anxious
thought of the future to disturb them.
In the eyes of the commanding officer, and, indeed, of every
Englishman who held a commission under him,
Col <jnei Simpson the 6th was true to the core, and was thoroughly
to be trusted. It was one of those regiments in
which the officers looked lovingly on their soldiers as on their
children ; cared for their comforts, promoted their amuse-
ments, and lived amongst them as comrades. They had
done so much for their men, and seen so many indications of
what at least simulated gratitude and affection, that it would
have been to their discredit if they had mistrusted a regiment
which had such good reason to be faithful to the English
gentlemen who had treated them with the kindness of parents.
But the civil officers, who had none of the associations and
sympathies which made the centurions of the 6th Eegiment
1857.] THE 6TH KEGIMENT OF SIPAHIS. 183
ever willing to place their lives in the hands of the Native
soldiery, saw everywhere grounds of suspicion and causes of
alarm. There was evidently a wide-spread feeling
of mistrust both in the City and in the Canton- state of
ment.* All kinds of vague reports were in the feeling^
air. Whether the disturbing faith had grown up
spontaneously in the minds of the Natives, or whether the
great lie had been maliciously propagated by active emissaries
of evil, it was believed that a heavy blow was to be struck at
the religion of the people. f At one time it was reported that
the English had determined to serve out the greased cartridges
on a given day, and that the regiment would be paraded on the
glacis of the Fort, in a position commanded by our guns, and
blown into the air if they disobeyed orders. Then it was said
that the Sipahis had determined to prevent the treasure being
moved into the Fort ; J and again, that the Sikhs were con-
spiring with the Native Infantry for a joint attack upon the
English. At the .same time, the price of grain and of other kinds
of food rose in the market, and the common feeling of dis-
* Mr. Willock, joint magistrate, says in his official report, " As each day
passed some fresh rumour was circulated regarding the state of public feeling
in the city. Agents of the rebel leaders were evidently busy poisoning the
minds of the people. . . . The Bazaar was closed, and it was very evident
that an outbreak in the city would follow an e'meute of the soldiery. The
men of the city warned the magistrate against the infidelity of the Sipahis,
and the Sipahis cautioned their officers against the city people, protesting
against the tales that had been circulated of their lukewarmness towards
Government."
t I have remarked, and with much uniformity of observation, that these
monstrous reporls of " forcible conversion," or destruction of caste, were most
rife where the Muhammadan population w T as the densest. Allahabad con-
tained an unusual number of Musalmans, whilst in Banaras there was a great
preponderance of Hir/dus; but these reports appear to have been circulated
more freely in the former than in the latter city.
% It was said that this ought to have opened the eyes of Colonel Simpson
to the real state of his corps. But the fact is, that the circumstance referred
to in the text was nothing more than an alleged conversation between a
Native officer of the Irregular Cavalry and another of the 6th. The former
was said to have asked whether the 6th would allow the treasure to be
removed, and the latter to have answered, " Some of them would not until
they had received their arrears of pay." "This," says Colonel Simpson,
"was immediately reported to the Adjutant, who did not credit it. On the
23rd I made poor Plunkett and Stewart inquire into the business, and the
latter reported to me there was no truth in it, as the Native officer and men
of the 6th guard denied the accusation."
184 BAXABAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
quietude was enhanced by the discontent occasioned by the
dearness of provisions, which was always attributed to the
agency of the English.
In this state of uncertainty, Colonel Simpson proposed to
betake himself with his regiment to the Fort.
May 22. This movement was strenuously opposed by Mr.
°pmject£ 8 Court, the magistrate, and the project was aban-
doned. On the same evening a council of the
leading civil and military officers was held, and it was de-
termined that the women and children only should be removed
next morning into the Fort. But next morning, before day-
break, there was a change of }:>lan. The order, which had
decreed that " no (adult) male should be allowed to enter the
Fort," was cancelled, in spite of Court's remonstrances, and two
hours before noon " there was a regular flight to the Fort of
men, women, and children, carrying with them all the property
they could." * But later in the day the energy of the magis-
trate prevailed, and the non-military members of the community
were enrolled into a volunteer guard, to patrol the city and
station, accompanied by some mounted police.
As the month wore on to its close, appearances seemed rather
to improve. Some apprehensions had been en-
r *J ^" tertained lest the great Muhammadan festival
of Id, which was to be celebrated on the 25th,
should stir all the inflammatory materials gathered together in
Allahabad into a blaze. The day, however, passed over without
any disturbance ; and at a parade held in the evening, two
Sipahis, who, on the preceding day, had given up a couple of
Mewatis, charged with tampering with their fidelity, were
publicly promoted. - ) - But this spasm of energy seems to have
* Official Beport of Mr. Fendall Thompson, officiating magistrate. Colonel
Simpson, in a narrative of events with which he has furnished me, says, " On
the 23rd of May, the ladies, children, and non-military were ordered into the
Fort for security, in consequence of the various reports received by the magis-
trate regarding the unsettled state of the city of Allahabad, aggravated by the
high price of grain." It might be gathered from this that the magistrate had
approved of the removal to the Fort of the non-military males, whereas the
official report states that he had in reality protested against it. Colonel
Simpson, however, says, in another memorandum, that "a notice to this effect"
(i.e. the removal of "ladies, children, and non-military") "was circulated by
the magistrate throughout the station, and regimentally by two of his sowars."
Colonel Simpson says that it was signed both by himself and Court.
f Sir John Malcolm writes of the Mewatis, that, " although usually reckoned
1857.] OUTWARD LOYALTY OF THE SIPAHIS. 185
been designed only to throw dust into the eyes of the au-
thorities. It is stated that, at the very same time, they were
intriguing with the Oudh Cavalry. Perhaps the arrest was
designed to irritate the minds of the people of the city. If so,
it was a successful movement ; for it was soon noised abroad
that a rescue would be attempted, and so the prisoners were
removed to the Fort.
After this there were outward quietude and security, for
although with the new month there arose increased excitement
in the city, still more favourable appearances presented them-
selves in the cantonment. The Sipahis of the 6th, seemingly
not satisfied with the latent loyalty of quiescence, quickened
into energy and enthusiasm, and demanded to be led against
the rebels of Dehli. News of their noble offer was promptly
telegraphed to Calcutta, and Lord Canning sent back by the
wires a cordial expression of the thanks of Government. But
to the civilians at least it was apparent that the danger was
not passed, for every day the excitement became greater in the
city.
Affairs were in this state when news came from Banaras
that the Sipahis stationed there had risen in revolt,
and that they had been dispersed by Neill's News from
Europeans. The telegraph brought the first j une 4. '
tidings to Simpson, who, as an initial measure
of precaution, issued orders that the gates of the Fort should
be closed night and day, and no one, of whatsoever colour or
creed, admitted without a passport.* The next step was to
guard the approaches to Allahabad. The road from Banaras
ran on the other side of the Ganges, which was crossed by a
bridge of boats at a point nearly opposite to the Fort, to the
Muhammadan, it is difficult to say whether they are Muhammadans or Hindus ;
they partake of both religions, and are the most desperate rogues in India.
They are turbulent, vindictive, cunning, cruel, robbers, murderers, and
assassins — yet they are faithful, undaunted guards and servants to those whose
nimuk (salt) they eat." — Malwa Report, p. 578, note.
* " From this period (May 25) until the 4th of June more or less excite-
ment prevailed in the city of Allahabad, and on that date the mutiny at
Banaras took place, and was reported to me by telegraphic wire. On the
same evening I ordered the Fort Gates to be closed, day and night, and
neither European nor Native was allowed ingress or egress without a pass,
so as more particularly to guard against any tamperers from Banaras or from
the city of Allahabad." — Memorandum by Colonel Simpson. MS.
186 BANJlRAS AXD ALLAHABAD. [1857.
suburb of Daryaganj. It seemed to be so certain that the
Banaras mutineers would make for Allahabad, that, on a re-
quisition of the Magistrate, a Company of the 6th was sent,
with two guns, to defend the bridge by which the passage
of the river must have been made. At the same time, a
detachment of the Oudh Irregular Cavalry was posted on an
open space between the bridge-head and the cantonment, so
as to command all the approaches to the latter. And no one
then seemed to doubt that those Native guards would defend
the bridge and the station as staunchly and as truly as if
the insurgents had been people of other races and other
creeds.
It will, perhaps, never be known to the full satisfaction of
the historical inquirer whether the 6 th Eegiment was saturated
with, that deepest treachery which simulates fidelity for a time,
in order that it may fall with more destructive force on its un-
suspecting victim, or whether it had been, throughout the
month of May, in that uncertain, wavering condition which up
to the moment of the final outburst has no determined plan of
operations. The officers of the regiment believed that the men
were staunch to the core. Outwardly, there were no indica-
tions of hostility. But when news came that the Native
regiments at Banaras had risen, and that the
Europeans had fallen upon them, the long-abiding
vacillation rose into robust resolution, and the regiment
sprung, as it were, in a moment upon its prey. Whether
it was in a wild panic of fear, believing that Neill and the
Europeans would soon be upon them, or whether in the belief
that the time for action had now come, as they would pro-
bably soon be joined by the Sipahis from Banaras, the evening^
of the 6th of June found them ripe for any deed of violence.
But even as the sun was setting on that day — the last sun that
ever was to set upon this model regiment — there was unbroken
faith in its fidelity. The warning voice, however, was not
silent. The Adjutant of the 6th received a letter from a non-
commissioned officer of the regiment, telling him that the news
from Banaras had caused much excitement in the Lines. The
Adjutant took the letter to the Colonel. But Simpson could
not admit that anything was wrong. He added, however,
that at the sunset parade, which was to be held for the pro-
mulgation of the thanks of the Governor-General to the regi-
ment, the temper of the men would be clearly ascertained.
1857.] THE LAST MESS-DINNER. 187
The parade was held. The thanks of the Governor-General
were read. The Commissioner, who had attended
at the request of the Colonel, addressed the regi- The Thanks-
ment in Hindustani, praising them for the loyalty pSSe.
they had evinced. The Sipahis appeared to be
in the highest spirits ; and they sent up a ringing cheer in
response to the stirring words. When the parade was over, the
officers, for the most part, rode or walked to the Mess. With
Colonel Simpson rode Captain Plunkett — an officer of the 6th,
who had served for more than twenty years with the regiment.
He spoke with delight of the pride he felt in its noble conduct, and
his faith in its enduring fidelity. Thus conversing they rode
to the Mess-house, where other officers had assembled, and were
discussing the events of the day. Among them was Captain
Birch, the Fort-Adjutant, who besought the Colonel to recall
the guns posted at the Bridge of Boats and to post them in the
Fort, where they were more needed. To this, Simpson, es-
teeming the Fort to be his first charge, and having been
warned not to trust the Sikhs, of whom the garrison mainly
consisted, gave his consent ; and orders went forth for their
recall.*
There was a goodly gathering in the Mess-house, for the
number of officers had been recently increased by
the arrival of a party of young cadets, who had The last
been ordered to do duty with the 6th — mere ottheMb?
boys, with the roses of England on their cheeks
and the kisses of their mothers still fresh upon their lips.
Without any sense of ills to come, old and young took their
places at the dinner- table in perfect serenity of mind. There
was at least one faithful regiment in the service ! The civilians,
equally assured, went to their houses and dined; and did as
was their wont in the evening, wrapped themselves up in early
slumber, or kept themselves awake with the excitement of
cards. Some, indeed, who had slept in the Fort on the pre-
ceding night, were now again in their own homes. On no
evening, perhaps, since the first startling news had come from
Dehli and Mirath, had there been so little trepidation — so little
excitement. But about nine o'clock the whole European com-
* These warnings came from Sir Henry Lawrence at Lakhnao and Sir
Hugh Wheeler at Katihpur. Simpson was advised not to trust the Sikhs, and
to man the Fort with all the Europeans available at Allahabad.
188 BAXARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
m-unity of Allahabad were startled by the sound of a bugle-call
announcing the alarm. The Colonel had left the Mess, and was
walking homewards, when the unexpected sound smote upon
his ears and urged him onward to his house, where he called for
his horse, mounted, and rode for the quarter guard. Thither
many other officers had repaired on the first sound of the bugle-
notes. The truth was soon apparent to them. The faithful
Oth had revolted.
The story was this: The detachment sent to defend the
Bridge had been the first to rise, as it had been
R Re°gimen? tne first to leam n0W tlie S UDS ^ been tlirned
upon the Native troops at Banaras, and whilst
Simpson with his officers was dining comfortably at the Mess-
house, the orders, which he had despatched for the with-
drawal of the Artillery from Daryaganj, had been sternly
resisted. The Sipahi Guard, told off as an escort, rose against
the Artillery-officer, Lieutenant Harward, and declared that the
guns should be taken not to the Fort, but to the Cantonment ;
and the rest of the detachment turned out, armed and accoutred,
to enforce the demand. True to the noble regiment to which
he belonged, Harward hastened to the post of the Oudh Irregu-
lars, which lay between the Bridge-head and the Cantonment,
to bring up succours to overawe the Sipahis and to save the
guns. The Irregulars were commanded by Lieutenant Alexander
— a young officer of the highest promise — who at once responded
to Harward's call, and ordered out Lis men. Tardily and
sulkily they pretended to obey. Whilst they were forming, a
hastily-written note was despatched by Harward to the Fort.
The sound of the guns, grating along the road to Cantonments,
was distinctly heard ; and the Irregulars, headed by Alexander
and accompanied by Harward, whom the former had mounted
cm a spare horse, then rode out to intercept the mutineers.
They soon came upon the party, under the broad light of the
moon ; but when the order was given to charge the guns, and
the English officers dashed at them, only three troopers responded
to the stirring summons. The rest fraternised with the enemy.
Alexander, as he rode forward and was rising in his stirrups to
strike, was shot through the heart, and Harward narrowly
escaped with his life.* The mutineers, who had before sent
* " During the night, the few Irregulars who had remained staunch came
in, bringing with them the body of the officer, Lieutenant Alexander, who
had been shot, as before related. His body bore witness to the mad cruelty
1857.] REVOLT OF THE SIKHS. 189
out two of their party to warn their comrades, and had, it is
stated, sent up signal rockets, now marched with the guns to
the Lines, and when their colonel appeared on parade, the
whole regiment was in the throes of rebellion.
It was then too late for the voice of authority to overawe or
to persuade. Simpson saw that there was great
excitement on the parade-ground. Some of his Escape of
officers were commanding their men to fall in, Simpson.
but there was little appearance of obedience.
And when he rode up to inquire why the guns had been
brought on parade, two Sipahis of the Guard replied by
firing upon him. Expostulation was vain. A volley of
musketry responded to his words ; and he saw that every-
where on the parade-ground the Sipahis were shooting down
their officers. Seeing that there was no hope of saving the
colours, he then rode to the left of the Lines, where some men
of the Light Company, in whom there still seemed to be a
feeling of compunction, if not of regard for their chief, clustered,
unarmed and unaccoutred, round his horse, and besought him
to ride for his life to the Fort. Hoping still to save the
Treasury, he rode, accompanied by Lieutenant Currie, in the
direction of that building, but fired upon from all sides, he soon
saw that the case was hopeless.* He had now well nigh run
the gauntlet of danger, and though a ball had grazed his
helmet, he had providentially escaped ; but opposite the Mess-
house, as he galloped towards the Fort, the Guard formed in
line at the gate and fired upon him. A musket-ball took effect
on his horse ; but Simpson was still unhurt, save by a blow on
the arm from a spent shot ; and the last dying efforts of his
charger landed him safely within the walls of the Fort, covered
with the blood of the noble animal that had borne him.
Meanwhile, others less fortunate had fallen beneath the
musketry of the mutineers. Currie, who had
accompanied the Colonel to the Treasury, escaped JJJSSgui
the fire of the guards and sentries; Captain
Gordon and Lieutenant Hicks escaped also, as did two of the
of his enemies, for besides the shot in his breast, which hilled him, were sabre-
cuts all over his head and face." — Mr. Thompson's Report.
* "As my duty was to save the Treasury, if possible, I proceeded in that
direction, when I was immediately fired on by the whole guard of thirty-two
men on one flank, with a night picket of thirty men on the other. The de-
tachment of the 3rd Oudh Irregular Cavalry remained passive, and did not
fire." — Memorandum of Colonel Simpson. MS.
190 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
cadets, to the Fort ; * but Plunkett, with his score years of
good service in the 6th, Adjutant Steward, Quartermaster
Hawes, and Ensigns Pringle and Munro were shot down on
parade. Fort-Adjutant Birch and Lieutenant Innes of the
Engineers were also killed, and eight of the unposted boy-
ensigns were murdered in cold blood by the insurgent Sipahis.f
The poor boys were leaving the Mess- house, when the brutal
soldiery fell upon them. Seven were slaughtered on the
ground ; but one, a boy of sixteen, escaped with his wounds,
and hid himself in a ravine. Having supported himself for
some days, merely, it would seem, by water from a brook, he
was discovered in his hiding-place, dragged before one of the
insurgent leaders, and confined in a sarai with a Native cate-
chist. The faith of the convert was giving way to the suffer-
ings which he endured, when Arthur Cheek, who had been
scarcely a month in India, exhorted his companion to be steadfast
in the faith. " Oh, my friend," he is reported to have said,
" whatever may come to us, do not deny the Lord Jesus." He
was rescued, but he was not saved. On the 16 th of June the
poor boy died in the Fort from exposure, exhaustion, and
neglected wounds. J
It was fortunate that the bulk of our people were shut up in
the Fort, where no external perils could assail
them. But there was danger within the walls.
A company of the 6th formed part of the garrison, and the
temper of the Sikhs was doubtful. When the noise of firing
was first heard it was believed that the Banaras mutineers had
arrived, and that the Sipahis of Allahabad were giving them a
warm reception. But at a later hour the truth broke in upon
them ; and all doubt was removed by the appearance of the
* Hicks and the cadets (Pearson and Woodgate) were at the Daryagunj
■when the mutiny broke out. They were made prisoners and carried towards
Cantonments, but, in their eagerness to join in the plunder of the Treasury,
the Sipahis suffered them to depart, and afterwards they made good their
escape by twice swimming across the river.
f It has been commonly stated that these poor boys were killed whilst
sitting at the Mess-table. I am assured, however, on the best authority that
this is a mistake. Few incidents of the mutiny have excited greater horror
than this, which is familiarly spoken of as the massacre of the " poor little
griffins."
X See Mr. Owen's Journal. It has been erroneously stated elsewhere that
he died in the hands of the enemy, on the day of Neill'a arrival at Allahabad,
the 11th of June.
1857.] MURDER OF ENSIGNS. 191
Corainandant Simpson, smeared with the blood of his wounded
charger. His first care was to order the Sipahis of the 6th to
be disarmed. This duty was entrusted to a detachment of the
Sikh corps, under Lieutenant Brasyer — an officer who had won
for himself a commission by his gallantry in the great battles
of the Panjab, and who now proved his mastery over his men
by forcing them to do a distasteful service. With the news
that the Banaras Sipahis of the Regular Army had been mown
down by the white troops, came also tidings that Gordon's
regiment had been riddled by our grape-shot. It was, there-
fore, fearfully probable that the offended nationality of the
Sikhs at Allahabad would rise against their Christian masters,
partly in revenge and partly in fear. Happily the treasure was
outside the Fort. Had the design of bringing it within the
walls not been abandoned, the love of loot and the thirst of
blood would have prevailed together, and Allahabad might
have been lost.
It was, in truth, a most critical moment. Had the men of
the 6th Regiment and the Sikhs then in the Fort made common
cause with each other, the little Christian garrison could have
made but feeble resistance against such odds. The Sipahis, who
were posted, for purposes of defence, at the main-gate, had, on
the first sound of firing in Cantonments, been ordered to load
their pieces : so they were ready for immediate action. The
Sikhs were drawn up fronting the main-gate, and before them
were the guns, manned by the invalid Artillerymen from
Chanar, in whom the energy of earlier days was revived by this
unexpected demand upon them. And at a little distance, in
overawing position, were posted little knots of European volun-
teers, armed and loaded, ready on the first sign of resistance to
fire down from the ramparts upon the mutineers. There is
something very persuasive always in the lighting of port-fires,
held in the steady hands of English Artillerymen. The Sipahis,
charged to the brirn with sedition, would fain have resisted the
orders of the white men, but these arrangements thoroughly
overawed them. They sullenly piled arms at the word of
command, and were expelled from the Fort to join their com-
rades in rebellion.
The first danger was now surmounted. Those who knew
best what was passing in the minds of the Native soldiery of all
races, clearly saw the magnitude of the crisis. It is impossible
to over-estimate the disastrous consequences that would have
192 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
ensued from the seizure and occupation by the enemy of the
Fortress of Allahabad, with all its mighty munitions of war.
One officer, however, was prepared at any risk to prevent this
catastrophe by precipitating another. Stimulated, perhaps, by
the noble example set by Willoughby at Dehli, Russell, of the
Artillery, laid trains of gunpowder from the magazines to a
point, at which he stood during the disarming of the 6th, near
the loaded guns ; and if mutiny had then been successful, he
would have fired the trains and blown the magazines, with all
the surrounding buildings, into the air.* The expulsion of the
Hindustani Sipahis, effected by Brasyer's cool courage and
admirable management, averted for the moment this great
calamity ; and all that was left undone, did itself afterwards by
the help of the national character of the Sikhs.
Such was the mutiny of the 6th Regiment — in its purely
military aspects one of the most remarkable in
KiS dty in the ^ e wn °l e history of the war, and, memorable in
itself, still more memorable for its immediate
popular results. For the great city rose in an instant. The
suburbs caught the contagion of rebellion ; far into the rural
districts the pestilence spread, and order and authority lay
prostrate and moribund. If a general rising of the people had
been skilfully planned and deliberately matured, there could
not, to all outward appearance, have been a more simultaneous
or a more formidable insurrection. But, in truth, there was no
concert, no cohesion. Every man struck for himself. In not
one of the great cities of India was there a more varied popu-
lation than in Allahabad. But there was a greater preponder-
ance than is often seen of the Muhammadan element. And it
was a perilous kind of Muhammadanism ; for large numbers of the
ancient dependents of decayed Mughul families were cherishing
bitter memories of the past, and writhing under the universal
domination of the English. The dangerous classes, indeed,
were many, and they seem to have been ripe for revolt on the
first sign of the rising of the soldiery. So, whilst the events
above recorded were passing in the Fort, in the city and in the
station were such tumult and confusion as had never been
known before. All through the night of the 6th of June
* I first read this anecdote in Mr. Clive Bayley's Official Report. Mr. Bayley
has stated the fact on the authority of Mr. Court, the magistrate, whose testi-
mony is not to be questioned.
1857.J RISING IN THE CITY. 193
licence and rapine had full sway. The gaol was broken open,
and the prisoners released. Vast numbers of convicted
criminals, with the irons still rattling on their limbs, rushed
forth, to the consternation of the peaceful inhabitants, to turn
their newly-acquired liberty to account in the indulgence of all
the worst passions of humanity. To the English station they
made their way in large bodies, shouting and yelling as they
went ; and every European or Eurasian who crossed their path
was mercilessly butchered on the spot. The houses of the
Christian inhabitants were plundered ; and the flames from our
burning bungalows soon lit up the skies and proclaimed to
many in the Fort that their pleasant homes would soon be only
heaps of ashes. And there was a mighty pillage in the
quarters of the Christian shopkeepers and the wharfs and
warehouses of the steam companies. The railway-works were
destroyed.* The telegraphic wires were torn down. All our
people outside the Fort were ruthlessly put to death by the
insurgents, and it has been said with every possible aggravation
of cruelty. All the turbulent population of the great city
turned out to glut their vengeance against the Faringhis, or to
gratify their insatiate thirst for plunder. And with them went
not only the Sipahis, who, a da}* before, had licked our hands,
but the superannuated pensioners of the Company's Native
Army, who, though feeble for action, were blatant in council,
and were earnest in their efforts to stimulate others to deeds of
cowardice and cruelty. j Law and authority were, for a while,
prostrate in the dust ; whilst over the Kotwali, or head-quarters
* There seemed to be an especial rage against the Railway and the
Telegraph. How far it was the growth of the superstitious feelings glanced
at in the earlier portion of the first volume of this work, I do not venture to
declare. There was apparently a great fear of the engines, for the in-
surgents brought the guns to bear upon them and battered them to pieces,
some appearing to be afraid of approaching them as though they were living
monsters.
t See the Red Pamphlet. The author states that he gives facts " from an
undoubted source " — one who received them " from the lips of an eye-witness."
•'Houses were plundered and burnt," he says, "their inmates chopped to
pieces, some roasted, almost all cruelly tortured, the children tossed on
bayonets. Foremost in the commission of these atrocities were the pensioners.
.... These men, unable from their infirmities to fight, were not thereby
precluded from inflicting tortures of the most diabolical nature. They even
took the lead in these villanies, and encouraged the Sipahis and others to
follow their example."
VOL. II.
194 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1S57.
of the city police, the green flag of the Prophet declared the
supremacy of Muhammadan rule.
Nor was it only against the white-faced Europeans and the
Christian people of the half-blood that the fury of the dis-
affected was at this time levelled. In some quarters of
Allahabad were a large number of quiet settlers from the
plains of Bengal, and many others drawn thither by the exi-
gencies of their religion — peaceful pilgrims to the sacred
Prayaga.* If to be a Bengali were not at that time held in
the 'North-Western Provinces to be the next thing to a Christian,
it was at least known that he was an unwarlike, feeble
personage, likely to have money in his possession, and small
means of defending it. Upon these harmless people the " bud-
mashes " fell heavily, and established a reign of terror among
them. Their property was seized, their lives were threatened,
and only spared by abject promises to disgorge the savings of a
life, and to sware "allegiance to the restored Government of the
Mughul.t
To sack the Treasury was commonly the first thought of the
insurgents, alike of military mutineers and
criminals from the streets and bazaars. But the
coin lay untouched during the night under a Sipahi guard, and
the first impulses of personal greed were restrained by some
feeling of nationality which had found entrance into their
breasts, though only on the. briefest tenure. It was agreed
that the treasure should be carried in its integrity by the
regiment to Dehli, and laid, with their services, at the feet of
the King. The spasm of self-devotion seems to have ended
with the night. In the morning the Sipahis of the 6th are
said to have assembled on the parade-ground, and to have voted
for the repudiation of this patriotic scheme. Soon after noon
* [Prayaga, Anglice, confluence, i.e., of the Ganges, the Jamnah, and the
Saraswati (a river which, disappearing in the sands of Sirhind, is supposed to
unite with the two other streams below the ground). Prayaga was rebuilt by
the Emperor Akbar, and called Ilahbas. The name was subsequently
changed to Uahabad, and, later, to Allahabad. — G. B. RL]
t "The Bengalis cowered in fear, and awaited within closed doors to have
their throats cut. The women raised a dolorous cry at the near prospect of
death. From massacring their officers, and plundering the Treasury, and
letting open the gaol-birds, the Sipahis spread through the town to loot the
inhabitants. Our friend, as well as his other neighbours, were soon eased of
all their valuables, but were spared their lives on promise of allegiance to
their (the Native) Government." — Travels of a Hindu by Bholandth Chandr.
1857.] THE TKEASUEY SACKED. 195
they went to the Treasury, opened its doors, and began to serve
out the money-bags. Each Sipahi took as many rupees as he
could carry, and, when the whole had satisfied themselves, they
left what remained to the predatory classes, convicted and
unconvicted, of the city. Then there was very little more
thought of the national cause, of Dehli, or of Bahadur Shah.
As a regiment the 6th disbanded itself, and each soldier, carry-
ing his spoil, set out for his native village. But the spirit of
rapine had been roused in all the adjacent country ; and there
were many who, in the absence of white-faced fugitives, were
by no means reluctant to plunder the black. And it is suspected
that very few of the Sipahis, carrying off an ample provision
for the remainder of their lives, ever lived to spend the money
in the ease and dignity of their native homes.*
It is supposed that many, escaping towards Oudh, perished
in the Gangetic villages not far from the city. For Rebellion ia
as at Banaras, so at Allahabad, the peasantry rose the districts -
at once under their old Talukdars, who had been dispossessed by
the action of our law-courts ; and there was anarchy in the rural
districts. The auction purchasers — absentee proprietors — dwelt
principally in the city, and the ryots had no sympathy with
them. For their own sakes they were eager but feeble sup-
porters of Government ; all the muscle and sinew of the agri-
cultural races were arrayed against us. Indeed, it soon became
painfully apparent to the British authorities that the whole
country was slipping away from them. For not only in the
districts beyond the Ganges, but in those lying between the
two rivers, the rural population had risen. The landowners
there were principally Muhammadans, and ready to join any
movement which threatened to drive the English from the land.
It was there, too, in the Duab that Brahmanism was most
powerfully enthroned. The point where the Ganges and the
Jamnah meet, known as the Prayaga, is one of peculiar sanctity
in the estimation of Hindus, and the Priesthood, therefore,
were strong in numbers and in influence. The gathering of
the pilgrims was a source of wealth to them, and they believed
that if the supremacy of the English were overthrown their
gains would be greater and their powers on the ascendant. So
* It is said that ahout thirty lakhs of rupees (about £300,000) were in the
Allahabad Treasury, and that every Sipahi carried off three or four bags, each
containing a thousand rupees (£100).
o 2
196 BANAKAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857
these " Prayaga-walas " stirred up the Hindu population of the
Duab ; and soon there was scarcely a man of either faith who
was not arrayed against us. But on the further bank of the
Janinah affairs were more propitious. There were incidental
risings, plunderings and burnings of villages, but more on the
surface than on the Ganges or in the Duab. For
The Ri'gahs of it happened that some powerful Rajahs, whose
and BtoL interest it was to maintain order, either sided with
the English or maintained a discreet neutrality
whilst the tumult was at its worst, and rose up to aid us when
the star of our fortune again began to ascend.*
After the lapse of a few days, the first orgies of crime being
over, and there being nothing more to plunder
and little more to destroy, the universal rapine,
with all its distractions, and confusions, and internecine conflicts,
began to take a more consistent shape, and something like an
organised rebellion arose in its place. There was a man known
as the " Maulavi," around whom the insurgent population
gathered, as he proclaimed the restored rule of tbe Emperor of
Dehli. Whence he sprung few people at the time could say.
But it was known at a later period that he came from one of
the Muhammadan villages in the Duab, which had gone into
rebellion. Making great pretensions to sanctity, and investing
himself with the character of a prophet as well as of a ruler of
men, he stimulated the dormant fanaticism of the people, and
roused them to array themselves against the Faringhis.
Establishing his head-quarters in the Chasru Bagh — a spacious
walled garden, in which were some tombs, held in high venera-
tion — he simulated the possession of miraculous powers, by
some obvious trickeries, which deluded his excited followers,
and for a while he was recognised as Governor of Allahabad.
It little mattered who or what he was, so long as he was strong
in his hatred of the English, and could induce the Musalman
population to believe that the Muhammadan dynasty would
soon be restored. So for a little time he succeeded in setting
up the likeness of a provisional government, and the name of
the Maulavi was on the lips of all the followers of the Prophet.
Telling them that the Book of Fate declared the speedy extinc-
tion of the white race in India, he urged his people, day after
day, to attack the Fort; but, though they made sundry
* See Mr. Fendall Thompson's Official Narrative.
1857.] THE MAULAVI AND HIS FOLLOWERS. 197
demonstrations, they kept at a discreet distance from our
guns.*
But this state of things was not to be suffered much longer
to endure. The man, who, by his timely energy,
had saved Banaras, was now pushing on for the E fr"n ™*™£ nt8
rescue of Allahabad. The one true soldier that
was needed to put forth a stiong hand to smite down the
growing rebellion in the Gangetic Provinces was hurrying
upwards, with a little band of English fighting men, to show
that the national manhood of the country had lost nothing of
the might that had enabled it to establish the empire of the
Few in the vast territories of the Many. Having sent forward
an advanced party of the Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Arnold,
and made over the command of Banaras to Colonel Gordon,
Neill left that place with another party of his
regiment, and pressed on by horse-dawk to
Allahabad. Arnold had reached the Bridge of Boats on the
7th, but he had been unable at once to cross, as the passage was
held by the mutineers, and there had been some delay in send-
ing a steamer to bring them across the river to the Fort.
Their arrival did something to establish confidence in the
garrison, but the news that Neill was coming did still more.
The old high spirit of self-reliance had never waned; and it
was still felt that a handful of European soldiers under a
commander, with a clear head and a stout heart, might hold
Allahabad against the whole world of mutiny and rebellion.
On ihe 11th of June Neill arrived. As he entered the gates
of the Fort, the Sentry exclaimed, " Thank God,
sir, you'll save us yet ! " Lord Canning, who saw June "•
clearly that he had now at his disposal one of the Al 5d!i. of
men wanted in such a crisis, had commissioned
the electric wires to instruct the Colonel of the Madras Fusiliers
* Some of the cotemporary accounts state that it was difficult to trace
either the name or origin of the Maulavi, and my later investigations have
not thrown much light upon the subject. From a high civil authority, who
had the best opportunity of ascertaining the history of the man, I can learn
only that " he was not known in the district before the mutiny," and was
"said to be an emissary from Lakhnao." The best account that I can rind
is that given by Mr. Willock in his official report. " At this time," he says,
" the city and suburbs were held by a body of rebels under the now well-
known Maulavi Laisikat Ali. This man, a weaver by caste, and by trade a
schoolmaster, had gained some respect in his village by his excessive sanctity ;
198 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857
to take command at Allahabad; and Keill had hastened
upwards, under the burning heats of June, with a disregard
for self, which well-nigh cost hini his life.* He had obtained
entrance into the Fort, not without great personal risk ; and
only the indomitable will within him kept him from succumb-
ing to the fierce rays of the noon-day sun. For some time
after his arrival he could sustain himself only by continually
lying down and drinking large quantities of champagne and
water. But he never for a moment doubted his capacity to
grapple successfully with the difficulties before him ; whatso-
ever might be his physical prostration, he had no mental
shortcomings, no deterring sense of responsibility to enervate
and arrest him. "I had always the greatest confidence in
niyself," he wrote at this time to the partner of his life ; " and,
although I felt almost dying from complete exhaustion, yet I kept
up my heart." Whatever the conjuncture might be, it was the
nature of the man to rise to the height of the occasion — " to
scorn the consequence and to do the thing." He had long been
looking for an opportunity, and, now that it had come, he was
not one to succumb to the assaults of bodily weakness, and to
halt with the goal before him. He was not a " Sipahi officer,"
and he had neither any credulity nor any tenderness to deter
him from striking root-and-branch at the black soldiery who
had betrayed us, and the people who were rising into rebellion
on the ruins of the Native Army.
He took in the position of affairs at a glance. On his way
from Banaras, he had seen that the whole country on the banks
of the Ganges was in a state of anarchy and confusion, and he
knew that already the rising had become something more than
a military mutiny. | At Allahabad, his first thought Avas, that
and, on the first spread of the rebellion, the Muhammadan Zamindars of Par-
ganahs Chail, ready to follow any leader, placed this man at their head, and
marched to the city, proclaiming him Governor of the district in the name of
the King of Dehli."
* " 1 was quite done up by my dash from Banaras, and getting into the
Fort in that noonday heat. I was so exhausted for days, that I was obliged
to lie down constantly. I could only sit up for a few minutes at a time, and,
when our attacks were going on, I was obliged to sit down in the batteries
and give my orders and directions. . . . For several days I drank cham-
pagne and water to keep me up.'' — Letter from Colonel Neill to his Wife.
MS. Correspondence.
t " June 10. The tone and bearing of the Native officials bad — evidently a
good deal of plundering — villages burning in all directions — the country
1857.] NEILL AT ALLAHABAD. 199
it was a wonderful interposition of Providence that the Fortress
was still in our hands. " How the place has not fallen," he
wrote, " that is, not been taken by the Sikhs, is a wonder.
They appear to be petted and made much of. The enemy are
all around us ; we are kept within the Fort. I shall settle that
part of it ere long." And he did settle it. The Fort had been
invested and menaced by the enemy. Neill's first impulse was
to prove that the English could do more than defend themselves.
On the morning after his arrival, he opened fire
from the Fort guns on the village of Darya-ganj, June 12 -
which was held by a large body of insurgent operations
rabble, and then sent forward to the attack de-
tachments of Fusiliers and Sikhs, who cleared the village,
burnt it, and regained possession of the bridge, which Neill
afterwards repaired. A further detachment of a hundred men
of the Fusiliers came up on that day, under the command of
Major Stephenson, and passed over without interruption to the
Fort.
Neill now felt himself strong enough for any emergency.
The first suggestion of this increased strength was
the removal of the Sikhs from the Fort. In truth, R emova i of t ' he
they were fast demoralising our own people in the Sikh9 from
• rrn l j i • • ^ j. the Forts
garrison. I hey had been going in and out
revelling in the pillage, and the Volunteers had been by no
means behind them in predatory activity, especially in the
direction of the " six dozen cases" of strong drink. The stores
of the European merchants and the go-downs of the river steam-
companies, with all their undelivered consignments, had been
plundered ; and beer, wines, and spirits were as plentiful as
water in the Fort. The Sikhs brought in large supplies of
liquor of all kinds, drank what they could, and sold the rest to
the Europeans. The finest champagnes of Cliquot and Perrier-
Jouet, and the best brandies of Martell and Hennessey, were
selling for sixpence a bottle. So a reign of intoxication com-
menced which, for a while, subverted all military authority,
and made us as helpless as children. This was an enemy for
which Neill was not prepared ; but his clear brain soon dis-
almost deserted — plundered by the Zaraindars about. The revenues just
about to be collected — the toll-house on road to Saidabad plundered — nearly
destroyed — the body of the murdered man, an European, in the house; his
daughter said to be taken off by a neighbouring Zamindar." — Neill' s Journal.
MS.
200 BAXARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
cerned the means of meeting and subduing it. He directed the
Commissariat Officers to purchase, at the prices asked by the
Sikhs, all the liquor remaining in their hands, and to lodge it
securely in the Government stores. This done, the removal of
the Sikhs to quarters outside the Fort was comparatively easy ;
but it was not to be done by force. He had taken counsel with
Brasyer and with the energetic Magistrate Court, and it had
been determined that the characteristic greed of the Sikhs
should still be stimulated by thoughts of the plunder of some
of the rebel zemindarrees. So they were persuaded to take up a
position in some old Government buildings outside the Fort,
commanded by the guns on its ramparts.
Having thus overcome the difficulties which lay in his path,
Neill addressed himself earnestly to the work
Att;lc ^ o° ^ e before him — the dispersion of the rebels and the
restoration of order. On the 15th of June, having
sent off the Christian women and children in a river steamer to
Calcutta, he turned his available resources to the best account,
and made an impression on the enemy, which greatly dis-
heartened and enfeebled them. Having directed the guns of
the Fort to open upon the villages or suburbs of Kydganj and
Mulganj, he sent Harward, with a howitzer and a party of
volunteer riflemen on board a steamer, to operate from the
river, and marched a detachment of Fusiliers, Sikhs, and
Irregular Cavalry upon the villages, with orders to scour them
thoroughly and penetrate into the country beyond. The land
party met with stalwart opposition, but the rush of the Sikhs
was irresistible. They swept through the villages, and such
was the terror that our demonstration on that day inspired,
that, when night fell, the Insurgent leaders sought safety in
flight, and deserted the guns, which they had taken from us,
and the prisoners whom they had captured at the commence-
ment of the outbreak ; and among them was young Cheek, of
whose fate I have already spoken, and who was rescued only to
die.*
* The Allahabad volunteers showed great spirit and pluck, erring, how-
ever, on the side of exuberance. Neill complained bitterly that upon this
occasion they bad impeded his operations by " firing upon a herd of bullocks,
and other madness" — bullocks at that time being as valuable as European
soldiers. " These gentlemen volunteers," he characteristically added, " be-
have so lawlessly and insubordinately, that I have threatened to shoot or
hang a few if they do not improve. "'
1857.] ATTACKS OX INSURGENTS. 201
The aspect of affairs now began rapidly to improve. " On
the 17th the Magistrate proceeded to the Kotwali,
and there restored his own authority and installed
his own officers." " No resistance," it is added, " was offered, and
the whole place seemed deserted."* A terrible rumour had been
runDing through the streets of Allahabad. It had been reported
that the English in the Fort were about to bombard the city.
What was the origin of the story it is hard to say. It may
have grown up, as other rumours grew up, in the hotbed of a
people's fears ; or it may have been propagated by those whose
interest it was to sweep out the insurgents. f But, from whatever
source it sprung, it was almost magical in its effects. Nothing
that the Maulavi and his lieutenants could do to reassure the
minds of the people had availed to allay the panic and restrain
the flight, and before nightfall, on the day of Neill's victory,
according to the Maulavi's own story, " not a house was tenanted
and not a light was to be seen in the city." Laiakat Ali
himself had escaped towards Kanhpur.
On the 18th, Neill marched out again with his whole force.
Sending one detachment to attack the Pathan
village of Daryabad and the Mewati villages of
Saidarabad and Eusselpur, he led the main body into the city,
which he found deserted, and afterwards halted them in the
now-desolated cantonment on the old parade-ground of the 6th.
The fighting was now over. The work had been done. The
English were masters, not merely of the Fort, but of the
recovered city, and the European station from which they had
been driven scarcely two weeks before. And now there lay
before them the great question — the most difficult, perharjs,
* Report of Mr. Fendall Thompson.
f The following is the Maulavi's account of the evacuation. " Some evil-
minded men," he said, " who had sided with the " accursed ones,' urged that
for a time the Fort w^ould be a safe retreat, and that, if they would remain in
it a few days longer, they (the evil-minded Natives) would contrive to spread
abroad in the city fearful reports that the English were preparing the Artil-
lery of the Fort to destroy the city, and that before dawn they w r ould begin
bombarding it with shot and shell. To show the sincerity of their advice,
these men, with their followers, set off, giving out to all that they had left
their houses and property to God's protection, and were going to save them-
selves by flight. On hearing this fearful report, the people, notwithstanding
my repeated injunctions, commenced a precipitate flight, with their families
and goods." — Pemcannah addressed by the Maulavi Laiakat Ali, apparently to
the King of Dehli. — Supplement to Allahabad Official Narrative.
202 BANAKAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
which soldiers and statesmen ever have the responsibility of
solving — whether, after snch convulsions as we have illustrated
in these pages, true righteousness and true wisdom consisted in
extending the hand of mercy and aiming at conciliation, or in
dealing out a stern and terrible retribution. Our soldiers and
statesmen in June, 1857, at Allahabad, solved the question in
practice by adopting the latter course.
Over the whole history of the Sipahi War — over the whole
length and breadth of the country which witnessed
Retribution. its manifold horrors— there is no darker cloud
than that which gathered over Allahabad in this terrible
summer. It is an early chapter of the chronicle of the great
conflict of races which I am now writing; and, though foul
crimes had even then beeri committed by our enemies, they
were light in comparison with what were to come, and the
retribution also was light.* Perhaps, however, the English-
man had at this time a keener sense than afterwards possessed
* It is to be observed, that at this time an impression was abroad that acts
of barbarity had been committed, which were afterwards doubted, if not
wholly disproved. I find the following in Neill'a Journal, under date June
17, MS. : " A Sawar of Mr. Court's, named Sorad Isau Ali, brought in for
having joined the Maulavf and insurgents. Three witnesses saw him. He
had served about twenty years. Direct his immediate execution by hanging.
This is the sixth unfortunate wretch I have ordered for immediate death, a
duty I never contemplated having to perform. God grant I may have acted
with iustice. I know I have with severity, but under all the circumstances I
trust 'for forgiveness. I have done all for the good of my country, to re-estab-
lish its prestige and power, and to put down this most barbarous, inhuman
insurrection. The instances of refined cruelty, treachery, and the most
brutal barbarity are too numerous. One poor lady, Mrs. Macdonald, at
Mi rath, near her confinement, is brutally treated ; has her nose, ears, hands,
and breasts cut off, and at last has the child cut out of her. Mrs. Chambers,
a beautiful young girl, only just come out married from home, at the same
place, has her throat cut by a butcher. Miss Jennings and her father, a
clergyman at Dehli, are both" brutally murdered in the palace before the king,
she^poor creature, subjected to the most unheard-of indignities and torture
beforehand." I have already stated that Miss Jennings was murdered, not
in the presence of the king, and that she was not outraged (ante, page 61).
Mrs. Chambers was murdered, as is stated, by a butcher, and her murderer
was hung (ante, page 55). I can find no evidence of the mutilations said to
have been inflicted on Mrs. Macdonald. I have quoted this passage from
NeilPs Journal mainly to show that he had a strong religious sense of his
responsibility, and that his executions were not as numerous as has been
asserted.
1857.] RETKIBUTION. 203
3iim of the humiliation which had been put upon his conquering
race. Much of the anguish was in the novelty
of the thing. The sting, though it struck deeper, June 18 " 30 -
was afterwards less severely felt, because the flesh had become
indurated, and the nerves were more tensely strung. So it
happened that whilst the first bitterness of our degradation —
the degradation of fearing those whom we had taught to fear us
— was still fresh upon our people, there came a sudden accession
of stout English hearts and strong English hands, ready at
once to punish and to awe. Martial Law had been proclaimed ;
those terrible Acts passed by the Legislative Council in May
and June were in full operation; and soldiers and civilians
alike were holding Bloody Assize, or slaying Natives without
any assize at all, regardless of sex or age. Afterwards, the
thirst for blood grew stronger still. It is on the records of our
British Parliament, in papers sent home by the Governor-
General of India in Council, that "the aged, women, and
children, are sacrificed, as well as those guilty of rebellion.*
They were not deliberately hanged, but burnt to death in their
villages — perhaps now and then accidentally shot. Englishmen
did not hesitate to boast, or to record their boastings in writings,
that they had " spared no one," and that " peppering away at
niggers" was very pleasant pastime, "enjoyed amazingly. f
And it has been stated, in a book patronised by high official
authorities, that " for three months eight dead-carts daily went
their rounds from sunrise to sunset to take down the corpses
which hung at the cross-roads and market-places," and that "six
thousand beings " had been thus summarily disposed of and
launched into eternity. J
* Papers presented to Parliament, February 4, 1858, moved for by Mr.
Vernon Smith, formerly President of the Board of Control, and signed H. D.
Seymour.
t Ibid.
X " Travels of a Hindu " (Bholanath Chandr), edited by Mr. Talboys
Wheeler. I believe the statement in the text to be an exaggeration, but
such exaggerations are very significant. [The statements made by Bholanath
Chandr were admittedly based on hearsay, upon tittle-tattle repeated for
years, every time with fresh exaggerations, till he chose to publish them. But
even Bholanath Chandr does not give these romantic statements as facts.
They are all conveniently prefaced by a " They say," or a " They speak of
it." I not only concur with Sir John Kaye in regarding the statement in the
text as an exaggeration, but I can positively affirm that it is more than that :
204 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
I merely state these things. There are some questions so
stupendous that human weakness may well leave it to the
Almighty Wisdom to decide them. There is a dreadful story
to be told in another chapter. God only knows whether what
has been told in this contributed to the results to be presently
recorded. But there is one great lesson to be learnt from the
tragedies of Banaras and Allahabad. It is the great lesson of
Universal Toleration. An Englishman is almost suffocated
with indignation when he reads that Mrs. Chambers or Miss
Jennings was hacked to death by a dusky ruffian ; but in Native
histories, or, history being wanting, in Native legends and
traditions, it may be recorded against our people, that mothers
and wives and children, with less familiar names, fell miserable
victims to the first swoop of English vengeance; and these
stories may have as deep a pathos as any that rend our own
hearts. It may be, too, that the plea of provocation, which
invests the most sanguinary acts of the white man in this deadly
struggle with the attributes of righteous retribution is not
wholly to be rejected when urged in extenuation of the worst
deeds of those who have never known Christian teaching.
"Whilst Neill was thus re-establishing British authority at
Allahabad, he was depressed by the thought of
Preparations for ^ e danger surrounding his countrymen at Kanhpur
and Lakhnao, and eager to equip a force with the
utmost possible despatch for the relief of those important posts.
Men were available for the purpose, but means were wanting.
The scarcity of provisions suitable to the English soldier, con-
cerning which Mr. Tucker had written to Lord Canning, and
which the Governor-General was taking prompt measures to
rectify, was one great impediment to the desired movement.
There was, too, a want of carriage. Large numbers of Com-
missariat bullocks had been collected for the service of the
Army, but, on the first burst of the rebellion, the insurgents
had swept them away, and of all the losses we sustained this
was, perhaps, the most grievous. Then, too, there was a want
of tents. There was a want of well-nigh everything required
it is an invention. Bholamith Chandr is the sole authority for this retailed
gossip, and he, at the time of the alleged occurrence of the atrocities, was at
his ease in Bengal. — G. B. M.]
1857.] THE COMMISSARIAT. 205
by British troops in the worst part of the Indian summer, when
the intolerable heat might any clay be followed by deluging
rains, which would quickly turn the baked earth into a great
morass.
It was no fault of the Commissariat at this time that the
arrangements progressed so slowly. Captain Davidson, who was
at the head of the department, did all that could be done to
collect supplies and carriage ; but the convulsions of the pre-
ceding fortnight had dispersed the people upon whom he would
have relied for aid, and well-nigh destroyed the resources of
the place. Those who would have come forward as contractors
at such a time had fled in dismay — some from the violence of
the insurgents, and some, in ignorant terror, from the anticipated
retribution of the English — and many had returned to find
themselves ruined. Property was destroyed. Industry was
paralysed. The great incubus of fear pressed universally upon
the trading classes. Whether more might have been done, at
the commencement of the outbreak, to save the supplies then in
hand — both the property of the Government and of private
individuals — was not now the question. Davidson had to deal
with things as they were, and it was not his fault that in the
last week in June they did not wear a different complexion.
Eager as Neill was to push forwards, he could not discern in
this delayed departmental action any just ground of complaint.
It was clear to him that the evil lay in the circumstances of
his position, not in the incapacity of his agents.*
* It is right that Neill's opinion on this subject should be stated in his own
words. Great blame was cast on the Commissariat by cotemporary journal-
ists, especially by the editor of the Friend of India, who published an article
with the stinging title, " How Kanhpur was lost." Upon this Neill very
generously wrote to Captain Davidson, saying: "The editor has certainly
made a mistake in stating that your stores were outside. I understood that
all we had was inside the Fort ; and when I joined, and until the insurgents
were cleared out of the place, the Commissariat were confined to the Fort
entirely. The steamer godowns had been gutted, the bazaar up to the walls
of the Fort plundered, in the occupation of the enemy, your contractors
driven away, and their property either plundered or not available for the ser-
vice for some days after these insurgents had been driven away. It was no
fault whatever of the Commissariat that it should have been reduced to the
condition yours was, from being cut off from outside, aud the dispersion of
your people; but you had done all you could before the outbreak in storing
inside the Fort sufficient to make us independent for some time, had the
insurgents kept hold of the city. In consequence of your being cut off from
most of your people and resources outside, you were, in my opinion, at the
206 BANXRAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
And soon, a greater evil befell him ; for whilst he was waiting
for means to equip the relieving force, Cholera
T ofCho\eT& k swe Pt down upon his troops and struck them with
terrific suddenness. The intense heat of the
weather, the constant exposure, the want of wholesome food,
and the abundance of stimulating liquors, combined to facilitate
its pestilential approaches. On the 23rd of June the services of
seventy men had been lost to the British Commander. " We
buried twenty, three nights ago, at one funeral," wrote an
officer of the Fusiliers, " and the shrieks of the dying were
something awful. Two poor ladies who were living over the
hospital died, I believe from fright." Then other very grievous
wants afflicted our people. Whilst in this miserable condition,
it was discovered that nearly everything that could diminish
the miseries of the sick who were to be left behind, or enable
the convalescent to move forward, was wanting to the British
Commander. The reign of terror had done its sure work.
Camp-followers of all kinds were " almost unprocurable."
Whilst our invalids lay gasping in the stifling atmosphere
of the improvised hospital, there were few or none to pull
the pankah-ropes, or to water the tatties. There were few
dhoolies, and, as workmen were not to be obtained, none could
be made; and, if they had been made, there would have
been no bearers to carry them.* For everywhere the terror-
stricken Natives stood aloof from the chastising Englishmen.
It was as though we had dried up the wells and destroyed the
crops, from which we were to obtain our sustenance. Without
time I arrived, disorganised, in so far as unable to equip a force or detach-
ment to move. The exertions of yourself and officers, from my arrival until
my departure from Allahabad, could not have been surpassed, and it sur-
prised me you were so soon able to regain possession of the resources of t"he
place, and enable me to move Kenaud's detachment on the 30th." This was
written on the 22nd of August. It may be added, that, two months before,
Xeill had written in his journal that great efforts were made to get in
supplies, and he had added, " Captain Davidson seems to be a most energetic
man." — MS. Correspondence.
* Colonel Neill reported that "followers of all kinds are almost unpro-
curable ; there are but few punkahs and no tatties ; the men have, therefore,
not the proper advantages of barrack accommodation for this hot season." It
was discovered, too, that ' ; there were but sixteen dhoolies available (although
a considerable number of these was a primary requisite for the projected
expedition), and all materials for making others were wanting, as well as
workmen."
1857.] KENAUD'S ADVANCE. 207
the aid of the Natives we could do nothing ; and yet we were
doing our best to drive them far beyond the glimmer of our tents.
And so the last day of June found Neill still at Allahabad.
Not a single European soldier had been sent to
succour Kanhpiir. But on the afternoon of that Renaud ' s advar,ce -
day a detachment was to start under Major Renaud of the
Madras Fusiliers. It consisted of four hundred European
soldiers, three hundred Sikhs, one hundred troopers of Irregular
Cavalry, and two guns. Eenaucl, a fine soldier, with his heart
in his work, had received written instructions from Neill as
to his course of action ; and he had become the not unwilling
recipient of orders to inflict a terrible retribution upon all
suspected of guilty complicity in the foul designs of the enemy.
But indiscriminate slaughter was no part of the commission.
" Attack and destroy," wrote Neill, " all places en route close to
the road occupied by the enemy, but touch no others ; encourage
the inhabitants to return, and instil confidence into all of the
restoration of British authority." Certain guilty villages were
marked out for destruction, and all the men inhabiting them
were to be slaughtered. All Sipahis of mutinous regiments not
giving a good account of themselves were to be hanged. The
town of Fathpur, which had revolted, was to be attacked, and
the Pathan quarters destroyed, with all their inhabitants. " All
heads of insurgents, particularly at Fathpur, to be hanged. If
the Deputy-Collector is taken, hang him, and have his head cut
off and stuck up on one of the principal (Muhammadan)
buildings of the town."* And whilst Eenaud's column, with-
these terrible instructions, was to advance along the straight
road to Kanhpur, Captain Spurgin, with another detachment,
was to take a steamer up the (Janges to the same point, to
co-operate with Renaud on his march, to anchor as near as
possible to Wheeler's entrenchments, and to place the vessel
at Sir Hugh's disposal for the rescue of the women and children,
the sick and the wounded, of his distressed garrison.
* The significance of these instructions will be made more apparent in a
future chapter, wherein the story of Fathpur will be told.
*#* It should have been observed, at a previous page, with reference to the
statement that " those terrible Acts passed by the Legislative Council in May
and July were in full operation," that, in addition to the Act of May 30 (already
recited), another was passed on June 6, extending the powers given in the
208 BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD. [1857.
former : " By Act No. XIV. of 1857, passed on the Gth of June, provision was
made for the punishment of persons convicted of exciting mutiny or sedition
in the army, the offender was rendered liable to the punishment of death and
the forfeiture of all his property; and persons guilty of harbouring such
offenders were made liable to heavy punishment. Power wns also given to
general courts-martial to try all persons, whether amenable to the Articles of
War or not, charged with any offence punishable by this or the preceding
Act; and the Supreme and Local executive governments were authorised to
issue commissions in any district, for the trial by single commissioners, with-
out the assistance of law officers or assessors, and with absolute and final
power of judgment and execution, of any crime against the state, or any
'heinous offence ' whatever : the term 'heinous offence' being declared to
iuclude every crime attended with great personal violence, or committed with
the intention of forwarding the designs of those who ;ire waging war against
the State." — Despatch of Government of India to Com t of Directors, December
11, 1857.
1857.] K^NHPtJR. 209
CHAPTEE II.
KANHPUR.
On that 30th of June — a day rendered memorable in the his-
tory of the revolt by a great event to be hereafter lg57
narrated — a new actor appeared on the scene at
Allahabad. On that morning a soldier of high rank and high
reputation arrived from Calcutta. His arrival would have been
welcomed by all men, for good soldiers were sorely needed, rut
there was one adverse circumstance, which detracted from the
general delight. The officer who had come up by dak, with
a special commission from Government to take command of
the troops advancing to the relief of Kanhpur and Lakhnao,
thereby, in virtue of seniority, superseded Colonel Neill, in
whom all men had a steadfast faith. Three days before the
arrival of the officer who was to supersede him, he had written
to the Governor-General, saying, " We are getting on well here,
laying in grain and collecting carriage for Brigadier Havelock's
Brigade." There might seem to be some taint of bitterness in
these words. But Neill did not slacken in his exertions because
the brigade, which he had hoped himself to command, was to be
commanded by another. He had learnt some days before that
it would not devolve upon him to rescue Sir Hugh Wheeler and
his comrades, if already destruction had not descended upon
them ; but he had pushed forward his preparations for the
advance with the utmost possible despatch, as though there
had been no one coming, after he had borne so long the burden
and heat of the day, to gather up the fruits of his toil, and to
snatch from him the glory which he coveted. But recognising
the chances of the service, to which every soldier must submit,
he neither complained nor repined, but waited for his own time,
feeling sure that it would come.
He was no common man who had now arrived to command
the brigade. Colonel Henry Havelock was a Havelock
veteran officer of the Queen's Army; but during
his forty years of service he had done as much good Indian
VOL. II. p
210 KXNHPUR. [1S57
work, in camp and cantonment, as if he had been attached to
one of the regiments of the Company in the old days, when
officers did not live on furlough. He had fought in Burmah
and in Afghanistan, and was familiar with nearly every great
military station lying between those two extreme points. He
had tested the temper of Maratha armies in Central India, and
of the old Sikh battalions in the zenith of their warlike pride.
He was every inch a soldier. Military glory was the passion
of his life. But he was a man of the middle classes, without
powerful interest or wealthy connexions, having only his own
merit to recommend him ; and he had risen slowly from subal-
tern to captain, from captain to field-officer, and now, at the age
of sixty-two, he had never held an independent command ; he
had never been permitted to realise that great dream of his
youth, that great ambition of his manhood — to head an army
in the battle-field. For nearly half a century he had been
sedulously studying his profession, reading eveiy military
memoir that he could obtain, English or Continental, and
turning his matured knowledge to account by contributing
from the wealth of his own personal experiences to the military
history of his country. In a thorough, artistic knowledge of
the principles of European warfare, no solder in the country
surpassed him. There was no disinclination anywhere to
acknowledge this ; but some thought that he was a theorist
and a pedant, and doubted whether all his book-learning would
profit him much amidst the stern realities of active service.
This mistrust was, perhaps, in some measure engendered by
the fact that Henry Havelock was what in the light language
of the camp was called a " saint." A man of strong religious
convictions, he had married a daughter of the great Baptist
Apostle, Dr. Marshman of Srirampur. This alliance, which
was one of unmixed happiness to him, was followed by his
public acceptance of the tenets and formularies of the great and
enlightened sect of Protestant Christianity in which his wife
had been nurtured and reared. There was laughter and ridi-
cule from the profane, but, perhaps, little surprise anywhere ;
for Havelock had ever been a God-fearing, self-denying man ;
somewhat rigid and austere ; and having only Christian people
to deal with, he had not hesitated to teach them to be good
men as well as good soldiers. Even in his first campaign,
thirty years before the period to which this History relates,
the company which he commanded was known as " Havelock's
1857.] HENKY HAVELOCK. 211
saints" — men who were never drunk and always ready for
service. But the Christian zeal of Henry Havelock never
overlaid his martial instincts. He was thoroughly persuaded
in his own mind that war was righteous and carnage beautiful.
And ever as years went on, and his hair grew white, and his
features sharpened, and his small spare figure lost the elasti-
city, though never the erectness of his prime, he cherished the
same strong desire to command an army in the field. He has
often been likened to one of the Puritan warriors of the Great
Kebellion, and it has been said that " a more simple-minded,
upright, God-fearing soldier was not among Cromwell's Iron-
sides." *
He was Adjutant-General of Queen's troojDS in India, when r
in the cold weather of 1856-57, he was selected by Sir James
Outram to command a division of the Army then embarking
for Persia ; and, with the permission of the Commander-in-
Chief, he proceeded to Bombay to join the force with the rank
of Brigadier-General. Small opportunity of gaining distinction
was permitted to him, for the war speedily collapsed, and the
sword was returned to the scabbard. On the 5th of April,
when Havelock was mustering his division for church service,
Outram announced to him that a treaty of peace had been
signed. Of all the bountiful illustrations of God's providence
working in our behalf, which that eventful year witnessed, this
was perhaps the most signal. It was a merciful deliverance
beyond the power of words fully to express. Havelock did not
then know its full significance ; but in a little while he acknow-
ledged with thanksgiving the abundant goodness of God in thus
setting free so many European regiments. Quitting Mohamrah
on the 15th of May, he was at Bombay on the 29th. It had
been his first thought to rejoin the Head-Quarters of the Army
by a landward march, but, after consulting Lord Elphinstone
and his Military Secretary, it appeared to him that the journey
was not practicable ; so he took ship for Galle, hoping there to
catch a steamer for Calcutta. Off Kultura, in Ceylon, the
vessel went aground at night, and was in infinite danger of
going to pieces before assistance could come from shore. Mer-
cifully delivered from the waves, he made his way to Galle,
found a steamer there, which had been despatched for European
troops, and embarked for Madras. There he found that Sir
* Westminster Bevieic, quoted by Mr. Montgomery Martin.
™ o
212 KANHPUE. [1857.
Patrick Grant, the Commander-in-Chief of that Presidency, had
been summoned to Calcutta, and was waiting for they're Queen
to convey him to the Hugli.
It was of no small importance that Lord Canning should
receive the advice and assistance of an experi-
lrant! nck enced officer of the Bengal Army, acquainted
with the character and the temper of the Native
soldiery and versed in all military details. Sir Patrick
Grant had been Adjutant-General of the Army of the chief
Presidency ; he had seen hard service in the field ; and he
was held in esteem both as a good soldier and as a ripe military
administrator. When, therefore, tidings of General Anson's
death reached Lord Canning,* he placed himself at once in
communication with Grant. Having previously telegraphed
to Madras, on the 6th of June the Governor-General wrote to
him, saying, " My first impulse was to send for you to fill the
place of acting Commander-in-Chief, and every day's deliberate
consideration has confirmed it. I am satisfied that there is no
man who can so well serve the State at this crisis as yourself,
and I earnestly beg you to come to Calcutta as soon as you can.
Should this not reach you in time to allow of your coming by
the next packet, perhaps a sailing vessel could be taken up, by
which time would be saved. But you will judge of this. I
would have sent a steamer for you two days ago, but I have
none here but the Assaye, and she must go to Eangun for the
29th as soon as she is coaled. The storm has not begun to clear
yet, nor will it till Dehli falls." So Grant and Havelock,
embarking together, steamed up the Bay to Calcutta, and
arrived there on the 17th of June. It was a source of great
personal happiness to the latter that he was accompanied by
his son, then a subaltern of the 10th Foot, in whom already
were discernible all the instincts and capacities which combine
to make a good soldier.
* This was on the 3rd of June. The first intelligence came from Sir John
Lawrence at Kawalpindi. "Writing to England on the following day, Lord
Canning said : " It comes upon me as a sad and dispiriting blow i:i the midst
< f present troubles. But this is not a time to be depressed by any calamity,
when every effort must be made to keep up the hearts of those around us. I
assure you that they need it, though I am glad to say that the panic which
had seized the Calcutta world whea the last mail left is, in a measure, sup-
pressed. ... I have telegraphed to Sir Patrick Grant to come to Calcutta
immediately to assume the office of actiug Commander-in-Chief." — 2IS. Cor-
res2?ondence.
1857.] HENRY HAVELOCK. 21.3
For a man eager for military service on an extended field of
action, no time could be more propitious. Welcome, indeed, to
Lord Canning was the advent of so tried and capable a soldier
as Havelock ; and Patrick Grant, who well knew his worth, was
forward to recommend him for immediate employment. News
had come that Banaras had been saved ; but the fate of Alla-
habad was still doubtful, and Kanhpiir and Lakhnao were girt
around by deadly peril. It was the work of Government at this
time, not only to push forward every available European soldier,
but to take steps to turn those reinforcements to the best account
by wise and skilful organisation. Havelock had already mapped
out a plan of operations, the formation of a movable column,
acting upwards from the Lower Provinces, being a part of it ;
and this column he was commissioned to command, with the
rank of Brigadier-General. He was directed, "after quelling
all disturbances at Allahabad, not to lose a moment in support-
ing Sir Henry Lawrence at Lakhnao and Sir Hugh Wheeler at
Kanhpur," and to "take prompt measures for dispersing and
utterly destroying all mutineers and insurgents." The sovereign
importance of swift action was earnestly impressed upon him,
and it was added that the Commander-in-Chief, having " entire
confidence in his well-known and often-proved high ability,
vigour, and judgment," refrained from giving more definite in-
structions, and left him to shape his movements according to
the circumstances that might develop themselves.*
The ambitious hopes of a life were now on the point of
absolute fulfilment. He had an independent command ; no one
to control his movements in the field; no one to hamper his
individual judgment. But with all his self-reliance, he rested,
in his human weakness, more on the mighty arm of the God of
Battles. " May God," he said, " give me wisdom to fulfil the
expectations of Government, and to restore tranquillity in the
disturbed districts." There were some circumstances against
him. It was the worst season of the j-ear for military ©itera-
tions. The alternations of scorching heat and drenching rain,
which are the atmospherical necessities of an Indian July, were
trying in the extreme to the European soldier. His force was
to consist of four regiments of Infantry, with Cavalry and
Artillery. Two of these regiments, the 64th and the 78th High-
landers, bad belonged to his old Persian division ; and this was
* Marshmau's Life of Havelock.
214 KANHPUR. [1857.
a source of satisfaction to him. But he was sorely distressed
when he thought of the want of horse, the want of guns, and
the want of gunners, and the certain scarcity of carriage which
would perplex him at Allahabad, where his force was to be
formed, owing to the heavy loss of Commissariat cattle which
had been sustained by us during the disorders of that place.
Still, full of heart and hope, he took his leave of the Governor-
General and the Commander-in-Chief, and turned his back
on Calcutta, proceeding upwards by dak, on the 25th of
June.
And now, on the morning of the last day of the month, he was
breakfasting with Neill at Allahabad. Much had
HaT Xein and "these two fine soldiers to say to each other. Neill
had to report what had been recently done at
Allahabad. His instructions to Eenaud and Spurgin were
brought under review, and were cordially approved by Havelock.
Nothing could have been better than the arrangements which
had been made for the despatch of this vanguard of the reliev-
ing army, or more carefully considered than all the instructions
which had been issued.* It was agreed that Eenaud should
advance that evening, but that the steamer which was to carry
Spurgin and his detachment should not steam out at once, as its
progress would be more rapid than that of the marching column,
whose advance it was intended to cover.
So Eenaud, leading the van of the relieving force, that
\d-anceof after long delay was sent on to save our im-
itenaud's perilled people at Kanhpur, pressed on, proud
Column. Q f ki s commission, and eager to do the bidding
of his chief. It was a grand movement in advance — but, like
many of our grand movements, the heart-breaking words " Too
* These instructions, the substance of which is given in the preceding
chapters (and which were published verbatim in the Memoir of General
Neill, in the " Lives of Indian Officers "), were highly commended by Sir
Patrick Grant, who wrote : " Your instructions to Renaud and Spurgin are
admirable, and provide for every possible present circumstances as well as all
eventualities, and by them, and them only, Eenaud should have been guided.
I hope you were in time to prevent the withdrawing Spurgin's detachment
from the steamer, and that the vessel has proceeded up the river according to
your original intention. Sending her was an excellent measure, and I anti-
cipate most favourable results from it, and she will be of incalculable value
in collecting boats and assisting in making the passage of the river after the
work to be done at Kanhpur is finished." — MS. Correspondence.
1857.] HUMOURED LOSS OF KANHPUR. 215
Late" were written in characters of darkest night across it.
On they marched for three days, leaving everywhere behind
them as they went traces of the retributory power of the English
in desolated villages and corpses dangling from the branches of
trees.* But on the 2nd or 3rd' of July,f a Native spy, sent by
Sir Henry Lawrence from Lakhnao, came into Renaud's camp,
and announced that nothing could now be done for the relief
of Kanhpur. Wheeler had capitulated, and all his people had
been mercilessly destroyed.
This miserable intelligence was received with different emo-
tions by Neill and Havelock. The former was long unwilling
to believe that Kanhpur had fallen. He looked upon the story
as an invention of the enemy intended to arrest the forward
movement of the Force which the English were equipping for
its relief. His wish was father to the thought ; for, although
he could not reproach himself for the delay that had occurred
in the despatch of reinforcements to Wheeler's help — delays,
which had the full sanction of the highest military authority in
* I should be untrue to history if I not not record ray belief that these
retributory measures were distinguished by undue seventy. William Russell,
among whose many high qualities as a public writer truthfulness is con-
spicuous, records the following in his " Diary in India :" "In the course of a
conversation to-day, an officer, who was attached to Renaud's column when
it moved out in advance of Havelock's force, told me that the executions of
Natives were indiscriminate to the last degree. ... In two days forty-two
men were hanged on the roadside, and a batch of twelve men were executed
because their faces were ' turned the wrong way ' when they were met on the
march. All the villages in his front were burnt when he halted. These
" severities ' could not have been justified by the Kanhpur massacre, because
they took place before that diabolical act. The officer in question remon-
strated with Renaud, on the ground that, if he persisted in this course, he
w r ould empty the villages, and render it impossible to supply the army with
provisions." This is confirmed by the account of the signs of retribution
apparent to those who followed in the wake of Renaud's march. [It was
difficult in those days to discriminate. Renaud was not a cruel man, and it
is more than probable that he had better reasons for his action than those
suggested by the officer " attached to his column," who certainly was not in his
councils. It should not be forgotten that though the Kanhpur atrocity had
not then been perpetrated, the stories of the cruelties to which our country-
men had been subjected at Murath and Dehli, and, to Renaud's own know-
ledge, at Allahabad, had roused to white heat the indignation of our country-
men. There can be no doubt, moreover, but that the enormous majority of
the natives in the Duab were at that time our enemies. — G. B. M.]
f On the 3rd, Lieutenant Chalmers rode into Allahabad with the news.
216 KANHPUR. [1857.
the country* — lie could not, without reluctance, accept the fact
that those delays had shattered all his hopes of succouring our
distressed people, and had turned the relieving force into an
army of retribution. But Havelock had full faith in the dis-
astrous stoiy. Two spies came into Allahabad. They spoke of
what they had seen. Examined separately, they recited the
same details; there were no contradictions or discrepancies in
their evidence. They amply confirmed the reports which had
reached Eenaud's Camp, and had been sent in by him to Alla-
habad. Taking these different views of the actual position of
affairs in advance, the two soldiers differed with respect to the
course to be pursued. Havelock despatched orders to Eenaud
to stand fast. But Xeill was eager for him to push forward, and
telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief remonstrances against
delay. Havelock argued that if Kanhpur had fallen, the troops
that had besieged it would be released for action elsewhere, and
would assuredly move down in immense numbers to intercept
the advance of the column from Allahabad, and utterly to over-
whelm it. But Xeill, still thinking the report a ruse of the
enemy, eagerly contended that all would be lost if we faltered
at such a moment. Both were right in their several deductions
Time proved that Havelock was right as to the facts. Kanhpui
had fallen, and the garrison had been destroyed almost to a man.
How it happened — how for more than three weeks the little
band of heroic Englishmen had stood their ground against the
teeming multitude of the enemy, and how at last treachery had
accomplished what could not be done by honest fighting, is now
to be told. It is the saddest chapter in the whole history of the
war — "but, perhaps, the brightest. However feeble the recital,
no Englishman can ever read it without the profoundest emotions
both of pity and of pride.
* Sir Patrick Grant had written to Mm more than once to urge him to be
cautious, and not to strip Allahabad of troops or to send an insufficient force
to Kanhpur. " You talk of an early advance towards Kanhpur, and I shall be
right glad that you made a move in that direction ; but I pray you to bear in
mindtiiat Allahabad is a point of the very greatest importance, the perfect
t-ecurity of which ought not to be neglected on any account." And again, on
the following clay: "Far be it from me to hamper you in any way — your
energv, decision, and activity are admirable ; but I must warn you to be
cautious not to commit too small a force of Europeans towards Kanhpur. If
Dehli has fallen, as we believe it has. the fugitives from it will all make for
Kanhpur and Lakhnao, and there will certainly be an immense gathering of
scum of all sorts at those points."— MS. Correspondence.
1857.] ITS CITY AND CANTONMENT. 217
The city or town of Kanhpur had nothing in or about it to
make it famous in story. It had no venerable
traditions, no ancient historical remains, no archi- JSwI of
tectural attractions, to enable it to rank with
Banaras or Agra. Commercially it shone only as the city of
the workers-in-leather, It was a great emporium for harness
of all kinds, and for boots and shoes alike of the Asiatic and
the European types of civilisation. If not better, these
articles were cheaper than elsewhere, and few English officers
passed through the place without supplying themselves with
leather-ware. But life and motion were never wanting to
the place, especially on the river-side, where many stirring
signs of mercantile activity were ever to be seen. The broad
waters of the Ganges, near the great ghaut, floated vessels
of all sizes and all shapes, from the stately venetianed pinnace
to the rude open " dinghy," or wherry ; and there clustering
about the landing-steps, busy with or idly watching the de-
barkation of produce and goods of varied kinds, or waiting for
the ferry-boats that crossed and re-crossed the Ganges, were to
be seen a motley assemblage of people of different nations and
different callings and different costumes; whilst a continual
Babel of many voices rose from the excited crowd. In the
streets of the town itself there was little to evoke remark. But,
perhaps, among its sixty thousand inhabitants there may have
been, owing to its contiguity to the borders of Oudh, rather a
greater strength than common of the " dangerous classes."
The station of Kanhpur was a large, straggling place, six or
seven miles in extent. The British lines stretched The Cantonment
along the southern bank of the Ganges, which
about midway between the two extremities of the cantonment
was spanned by a bridge of boats, leading from a point opposite
the city to the Lakhnao road on the other bank. There was
nothing peculiar to Kanhpur in the fact that the private dwell-
ing-houses and public offices of the English were scattered
about in the most promiscuous manner, as though they had fallen
from the skies or been projected by an earthquake. At the
north-western extremity, lying between the road to Bithu and
the road to Dehli, were the principal houses of the civilians,
the Treasury, the Gaol, and the Mission premises. These
buildings lay beyond the lines of the military cantonment, in
the extreme north-western corner of which was the Magazine.
In the centre, between the city and the river, were the Church,
218 KANHPUR. [1857.
the Assembly rooms, the Theatre, the Telegraph office, and other
public edifices ; whilst scattered about here and there, without
any apparent system, were the principal military buildings,
European and Native ; the Native lines lying for the most part
in the rear towards the south-eastern point of the cantonment.
It was the essential condition of an English cantonment that it
should straggle, and there was not one more straggling than
Kanhpur. But, on the whole, it was not a disagreeable, nor,
indeed, an inconvenient place, although the distances to be
travelled were great and the heat of the summer months was
excessive. Even to the dust, which, except during the rainy
season, was prodigious, the residents became accustomed after a
little while ; or, if they did not, they reconciled themselves to
it by thinking that the station had many great social advan-
tages, that it was well provided with means of amusement upon
the most approved principles of western civilisation, and that
"Europe goods" of all kinds were almost as plentiful as in
Calcutta.
For during a long series of years Kanhpur had been one of
the most important military stations in India. There were few
officers either of the Queen's or the Company's Army who,
during the period of their Eastern service, had not, at some
time or other, done duty in that vast cantonment. But the
extension of our Empire towards the Afghan frontier had
greatly diminished its importance as a military position ; and
although the subsequent annexation of Oudh had done some-
thing to restore the faded pretentions of the Kanhpur division,
the station itself only suffered further decline. It was still the
Head Quarters of the Division, and the commanding General
resided there with the Division Staff. But there were no longer
European Regiments, or even an European Eegiment, in its
barracks. A great strength of Native soldiery garrisoned the
place, with some sixty European Artillerymen, and afterwards
sixty men of Her Majesty's 84th Eegiment and a few Madras
Eusiliers, whom Tucker and Ponsonby had sent on from
Banaras .* The 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th Sipahi Eegiments
* Ante, p. 155, Mowbray Thomson says that " the European force consisted
of the officers attached to the Sipahi regiments ; sixty men of the 84th Regi-
ment ; seventy-four men of the 32rd, who were invalided ; sixty-five men of
the Madras Fusiliers, and fifty-nine men of the Company's Artillery— about
three hundred combatants in all." Mr. Sh'erer, in his official narrative, com-
putes the invalids of the 32nd at thirty.
1857.] SIR HUGH WHEELER. 219
of Infantry were there, and the 2nd Regiment of Sipahi
Cavalry — in all, about three thousand men. And it was com-
puted that the aggregate population of the Cantonment, with
its vast assemblage of camp-followers, was nearly equal to that
of the Town.
The Kanhpur Division was then commanded by General Sir
Hugh Wheeler. He was an old and a distin-
guished officer of the Company's Army. He had whSer!
seen much good service in Afghanstan and in the
Panjab, and had won his spurs under Gough in the second Sikh
War, in command of a division of his army. No man knew the
Sipahis better, and no man was more respected by them. But
he had known them a little too long. Looking back through
more than half-a-century of good service, he could remember
how they fought in the good old days of Lake and Ochterlony.
There was nothing, indeed, to be said against him except that
he bore the burden of more than seventy years. He bore it
lightly, succumbing little to the pressure. Still it was there;
and it was a necessity that he should have lost beneath it some
measure at least of the vigour and energy of his prime. He was
of short stature and of light weight ; and to the last he was a
good and active horseman. Accompanied by his daughters, he
often went out in pursuit of a jackal, with a few imported
hounds, which he kept for the purpose;""' and there was still
enough of the fire of the sportsman in the ashes of the veteran
to suffer him, in the crisp air of the early morning, to enjoy the
excitement of the chase.
But General Wheeler, though far advanced in years, had lost
none of the clearness of his mental vision. He had not become
blind to the failings of the Sipahi ; he had not encased himself
in that hard incredulity which forbade many to believe it pos-
sible that the Native soldier could ever be " untrue to his salt."
Ever since the first symptoms of disquietude at Barrackpur and
Berhampur had been manifested, he had watched narrowly the
Sipahi regiments under his immediate command, looking for
indications of a like temper among them.f And when news
* See Mowbray Thomson's narrative. The blood which ran in the veins of
Wheeler's children was not that of the pure European race.
t "He had proved himself on so many occasions so fertile in resources, so
ready to overcome difficulties, so prompt, active, and energetic, that he was
thought the man of all others most competent to deal with an insurrection of
220 KANHP1JK. [1857.
came of the revolt of the Native Eegiments at Mirath and at
Dehli, he saw clearly that it would demand the exercise of all
his influence to prevent a similar explosion at Kanhpur. Then
he lamented that hard necessity had stripped the station of
European troops, in order that Oudh and other newly-acquired
territories might be defended. Annexation was doing its work.
We had extended our Empire without increasing our Army ;
and so it happened that many of the most important stations
between the new and the old capital of India were, saving a
few English gunners, utterly without European troops. It
would be difficult to conceive any position more dispiriting
than Wheeler's in that fatal month of May. Lakhnao had got
the regiment, which might otherwise have been stationed at
Kanhpur ; and not only was the latter negatively, but positively,
weakened by the arrangement, for all the human impedimenta,
the women, the children, and the invalids of the 32nd Queen's,
had been left at that place. And there were many besides
these. Kanhpur abounded in excellent house accommodation,
as well as in public buildings of all kinds ; and not merely the
wives and children of our civil and military functionaries, high
and low, but the families also of European or Eurasian mer-
chants and traders were gathered there in large numbers, and
the grievous responsibility of protecting all these herpless ones
then fell upon the aged General. His half-a-century of service
had brought him no such work as this.
There was much then going on in the Lines of which,
doubtless, the General knew nothing ; but now
sSdie?y! he anc l tnen > as tne month of May advanced, un-
pleasant revelations were made to him through
his officers. It did not appear that the Sipahis were dis-
affected or even discontented, but, as in other places of which
I have spoken, a great fear was settling down upon our Native
soldiery. The most extravagant stories were current among
them. The Hindu and Muhammadan troops on a given
this character — most fitted to unravel the web of mystery in which its origin
was then clouded, and to open the minds of the Sipahis to the insensate folly
of their proceedings. And if this bad been a mere military outbreak, as some
have imagined ; if the dispossessed princes and people of the land, farmers,
villagers, ryots, had not made common cause with the Sipahis, there is every
reason to believe that but a portion of the Force would have revolted." — Bed
Pamphlet.
1857.] THE INTRENCHED POSITION. 221
day were to be assembled upon an undermined parade-ground,
and the whole of them blown into the air. This and other
fables equally monstrous were freely circulated among the
Sipahis and readily believed. Nothing could be more alarming
to one well acquainted with the character of the Native soldier
than the free acceptance of stories of this kind, which showed
that the old bonds of confidence were utterly broken ; and Sir
Hugh Wheeler, therefore, plainly saw that the danger was one
which it would be most difficult to arrest, for nothing is so
intractable as a panic. For some days after the news from
Mirath and Dehli had reached Kanhpur, he had hope that the
public mind might be reassured; but this soon passed away.
It was plain to him, as time wore on, that the excitement rather
increased than diminished. And the peril which stared him in
the face was not merely the peril of mutinous soldiery ; he was
threatened also by an insurgent population, which might have
overwhelmed him. And it seemed to him in this emergency
that the best means of defending the lives of the Christian
communities and maintaining, though only on a narrow space,
the authority of the Christian Government, until succours
should arrive to enable him to act on the offensive, was by
throwing up some defensive works, within which the English
might gather themselves together, and with the aid of their
guns keep the enemy at a distance. Beyond this there was
nothing that he could do ; and it was not easy to determine
how even this little was to be done.
Of all the defensible points in the Cantonment, it was held,
in the first instance, that the Magazine in the
north-western corner of the military lines was The i§!nce . n of
that best adapted, in the exigency which had
arisen, for a defensive position. It almost rested on the river,
and it was surrounded by walls of substantial masonry. But
instead of this, Sir Hugh Wheeler selected a spot about six
miles lower down to the south-east, at some distance from
the river, and not far from the Sipahis' huts. There were
quarters of some kind for our people within two long hospital
barracks (one wholly of masonry, the other with a thatched
roof)— single-storied buildings with verandahs running round
them, and with the usual outhouses attached. This spot he
began to intrench, to fortify with artillery, and to provision
with supplies of different kinds. Orders went forth to the Com-
missariat, and their efforts were supplemented by the managers
222 kXNHPUK. [1857.
of the regimental messes, who freely sent in their stores of beer
and wine, hermetically - sealed dainties, and other creature-
comforts that might serve to mitigate the evils of the brief
detention which was believed to be the worst that could befall
us. But the aggregate amount of food was lamentably ill-
proportioned to the exigencies of the occasion. The Native
contractors failed, as they often do fail at such times, and the
stores which they sent in fell short of the figures in the paper-
indents. All else was of the same kind— weak, scanty, and
insufficient. As to the so-called fortifications, they were so
paltry that an English subaltern could have ridden over them
on a cast-horse from the Company's Stud. The earthworks
were little more than four feet high, and were not even bullet-
proof at the crest. The apertures for the artillery exposed both
our guns and our gunners, whilst an enemy in adjacent buildings
might find cover on all sides. Not, however, from ignorance
or negligence did this insufficiency arise. The last weeks of
the dry season were upon us, and the earth was so hard that it
was difficult to .dig it, and so friable when dug that the neces-
sary cohesion was almost unattainable.
It has often been said that Wheeler ought to have chosen the
Magazine as the centre of his lines of defence, and that all the
subsequent evil arose from the absence of this obvious pre-
caution. The considerations which suggested themselves to
the military critics were not absent from his own mind. But
there was one paramount thought which over-ruled them. The
first step towards the occupation of the Magazine would have
been the withdrawal of the Sipahi guard ; and to have attempted
this would certainly have given the signal for an immediate
rising. With the small European force at his disposal it would
have been manifestly unwise to provoke a collision. If the
first blow were to be struck by our own people, it would, he
believed, have immediate results of a far more disastrous
character than those which were likely to arise from a spon-
taneous revolt against British authority, detached from those
feelings of animosity and resentment which might have been
engendered by a first offensive movement on our part. It must
be admitted that the spot selected for our refuge was, indeed,
but a miserable place for the protection of a large body of
Christian people against the thousands and tens of thousands
that might surge up to destroy them. But it was not believed,
at that time, that Wheeler and his followers would be called
1857.] QUESTION OF DEFENCE. 223
upon to face more than the passing danger of a rising of the
" badmashes " of the city and the bazaars. All the information
that reached him confirmed the belief that if the regiments
should mutiny they would march off at once to Dehli. And he
was in almost daily expectation of being recruited from below
by reinforcements sent upwards from Calcutta. All that was
needed, it then appeared to the General and to others, was a
place of refuge, for a little space, during the confusion that
would arise on the first outbreak of the military revolt, when,
doubtless, there would be plunder and devastation. It was felt
that the Sipahis had at that time no craving after European
blood, and that their departure would enable Wheeler and his
Europeans to march to Allahabad, taking all the Christian
people with him.*
Whilst these precautions were being taken, the General sent
an express to Lakhnao requesting Sir Henry
Lawrence to lend him for a while a company or Lakhnao?
two of the 32nd Eegiment, as he had reason to
expect an immediate rising at Kanhpur.f Little could Lawrence
* However sound these reasons may have been, it is not to be questioned
that the selection was a great misfortune. The Magazine position is thus
described by General Neill, after visiting the place, on his first arrival at
Kanhpur : "It is a walled defence, walled enclosure, proof against musketry,
covering an area of three acres — ample room in it for all the garrison— close to
the bank of the river ; the houses close to it are all defensible, and they, with
the Magazine, could have been held against any Native force, as having the
large and [obscure] guns, with abundance of ammunition, neither the Nana
nor the Natives would have come near them. They could have moved out
and attacked them with the guns, and would have not only saved themselves
but the city, to say nothing of a large arsenal and many thousand stand of
arms, artillery tents, harness, &c, &c. General Wheeler ought to have gone
there at once; no one could have prevented him; they might have saved
everything they had almost, if they had. There is something awful in the
number of catastrophes, which could have been avoided by a common degree
of caution."— MS. Correspondence. It was not, however, want of caution, but
perhaps over-caution, that caused Wheeler not to resort to the Magazine
buildings. The distance between the Lines and the Magazine is to be taken
into account ; and some military authorities may differ from Neill's opinion,
that no one could have prevented Wheeler from betaking himself, with his
women, children, and invalids to the Magazine.
f It Bhould be observed that Lakhnao was within the Kanhpur Division
of the Army, and therefore, in the normal state of affairs, Wheeler might
have made any disposition of the troops under his command that seemed fit
to him. But when the crisis arose, Sir Henry Lawrence had telegraphed to
the Governor-General for "plenary military authority in Oudh," and Lord
224 kXnHPUR. [1857.
spare a single man from the troublous capital of Oudh; but
those were days when Christian gentlemen rose to noble heights
of generosity and self-sacrifice ; and Henry Lawrence, who at
any time, would have divided his cloak with another, or
snatched the helmet with the last drop of water from his own
lips, was not one to hesitate when such a demand was made upon
him. He sent all that he could send — eighty-four men of the
32nd, Queen's — packed closely in such wheeled carriages as
could be mustered. He sent also two detachments of the Oudh
Horse to keep open the road between Kanhpur and Agra, and
render such other assistance as Irregular Horse well commanded
can render, if only they be true to their leaders. A party of
Oudh Artillery accompanied them with two field guns, under
Lieutenant Ashe— a young officer of rare promise, which was
soon to ripen into heroic performance.*
With these detachments went Captain Fletcher Hayes,
Military Secretary to Sir Henry Lawrence — a
etc er ayes. man ^ great capacity and great courage ; in the
prime of his life and the height of his daring. He had
graduated in one of our great English universities, and was
an erudite scholar and an accomplished gentleman. He
was now sent to Kanhpur to ascertain the real state of
affairs there for the information of his Chief. So he mounted
his horse and started with the Cavalry, giving up his carriage,
in which he had at first intended to travel, to a party of Euro-
pean soldiers : — " For," he wrote, " as they represented three
hundred rounds of balled ammunition ready at any moment for
anybody, I thought that they were of far more importance than
any number of military secretaries." All through the day, from
dawn till some hours after sunset, they toiled on, suffering
severely from the intense heat and the parching thirst. But
they reached Kanhpur without disaster ; and in a little while
Hayes had taken in the situation and had flung himself into the
Canning had gladly given him the powers he had sought (vol. i. p. 616),
writing to Wheeler at the same time a kindly explanation of the circumstances
which had reconciled the General to the change.
* The number of Europeans sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to Kanhpur has
been variously stated. His Military Secretary, in a letter to Mr. Edmonstone,
sets it down at fifty men and two officers. The Cavalry detachments were
sent on by Sir Hugh Wheeler, and the officers were murdered ; but Ashe and
the guns remained, or returned, to take good part in the defence.
1857.] DIJNDtf PANT, NANA" SAHIB. 225
work that lay before him, as if he had been one of the garrison
himself.
And when the English authority at Kanhpur appealed to
Henry Lawrence for assistance, as though by
some strange fatality it were doomed that aid The N * n * s * hib -
should be sought, in the crisis which had arisen, from the two
extremes of humanity, an appeal was made to our neighbour,
the Kajah of Bithur.
Dundu Pant, Nana Sahib, after the visit to Lakhnao, recorded
in my first volume,* had returned to his home at Bithur. He
had, doubtless, clearly discerned the feeling in the Oudh capi-
tal — nay, throughout the whole province. He knew well that
there was a great excitement — it might be of danger, it might
be of fear — alive among the Sipahis all over Upper India. He
felt that he hated the English, and that his time had come.
But all that was passing in the mind of the disappointed Mara-
tha was as a sealed book to the English. Of course the whole
story of the disappointment was on record. Had it not gone
from Calcutta to London — from London back to Calcutta ; and
from Calcutta again to Kanhpur? And did it not cover many
sheets of foolscap ? Military men might know little of the story
which has been told in this book,f and to civilians a rejected
memorial was so common a thing, that even to the best-informed
of them there could have appeared to be no earthly reason why
Dundu Pant should not accept his position quietly, submissively,
resignedly, after the fashion of his kind, and to be ever after
loyal to the Government that had rejected his claims. So when
danger threatened them, it appeared to the authorities at
Kanhpur that assistance might be obtained from the Nana
Sahib. For although Lord Dalhousie and the Company had
refused to increase his store, he had abundance of money and all
that money could purchase, including horses and elephants and
a large body of retainers — almost, indeed, a little army of his
own. He had been in friendly intercourse with our officers up
to this very time, and no one doubted that as he had the power,
so also he had the will to be of substantial use to us in the hour
of our trouble. It was one of those strange revenges, with
which the stream of time is laden. The " arbiter of others' fate "
* Ante, vol. i. pp. 422-4.
f Ante, vol. i. p. 74, et seq.
VOL. II.
226 KlNHPUR. [1857.
had suddenly beeome " a suppliant for his own ; " and the
representatives of the British Government were suing to one
recently a suitor cast in our own high political courts. The
madness of this was seen at Lakhnao ; but it was not seen at
Kanhpur. So the alliance of the Nana Sahib was sought as an
element of strength in our hour of trouble.*
It was in this wise : To secure the safety of the Government
treasure was necessarily at such a time one of the main objects
of both the military and the civil authorities. If it could be
lodged within the intrenchments it would be out of the grasp
of the soldiery, who, as our officers well knew, on the first open
manifestation of revolt, would assuredly make for the Treasury
and gorge themselves with the spoil. But when there was
mention made of an intention to remove the coin, the Sipahis,
by whom it was guarded, were outwardly all loyalty and devo-
tion, and declared that it was safe in their hands. The reason
of this was manifest ; and VV heeler, anxious above all things not
to precipitate a collision, shrunk from insisting upon a measure
which would in all probability have been violently resisted.
To counteract any danger from this source, it was considered a
good stroke of policy to avail ourselves of the assistance of a
party of the armed followers of the Nana Sahib, who had been
in frequent intercourse with Mr. Hillersdon, the Collector, and
who had smilingly assured that officer of his sympathy and
friendship. The Treasury stood at a little distance from the
Bithur road, some miles away from the military lines ; and very
soon some two hundred of the retainers of the Nana, with a
couple of guns, were posted at Nawabganj { which commanded
both the Treasury and the Magazine.')'
* Mr. Martin Gubbins states tl at the General was distinctly warned not
to trust the Nana Sahib. " Sir H. Lawrence,'' he says, " concurred in my
suspicions, and by his authority I addressed Sir Hugh Wheeler, cautioning
him against tl.e Nana, and stating Sir Henry's belief that he was not to be
depended upon." — Mutinies in Oudh, p. 32.
t Some time afterwards, Tantia '1 opi gave the following account of Mr.
Hilkrsdon's Denotations with the Nana Sahib. I give it as the Native ver-
sion of the transaction: — "In the month of May, 1857, the Collector of
Kanhpur sent a note of tie following purport to the Nana Sahib at Bitl.iir,
viz., that he begged him >the Nana) to forward his wife and children to Eng-
land. The Nana consented to d" so, ami four days afterwards the Collector
wrote to him to bring his troops and guns with him from Bithur to Ka* hpiir.
I went with the Nana and about one hundred Sipahis and three hundred
matchlock-men and two guns to the Collector's house at Kanhpur. The Col-
1857.] MR. HILLERSDON AND THE NANA. 227
This was on the 22nd of May. On the preceding day the
reinforcements from Lakhnao had arrived; and The piaceof
about the same time, on the suggestion of the Refuge.
General, the women and children and non-comba- May 22 '
tants had betaken themselves to the place of refuge within the
improvised intrenchments. There was then a scene of frightful
confusion, which one, who had just arrived from Lakhnao, thus
graphically described. " The General," wrote Fletcher Hayes
in a private letter to Secretary Edmonstone, " was delighted
to hear of the arrival of the Europeans, and soon from all sides,
I heard of reports of all sorts and kinds which people kept
bringing to the General until nearly one a.m., on the 22nd, when
we retired to rest. At six a.m. I went out to have a look at the
various places, and since I have been in India never witnessed
so frightful a scene of confusion, fright, and bad arrangement
as the European barracks presented. Four guns were in posi-
tion loaded, with European artilleiwnien in night-caps and
wide-awakes and side-arms on, hanging to the guns in groups —
looking like melodramatic buccaneers. People of all kinds, of
every colour, sect, and profession, were crowding into the
barracks. Whilst I was there, buggies, palki- May 22-23.
gharrees, vehicles of all sorts, drove up and dis-
charged cargoes of writers, tradesmen, and a miscellaneous mob
of every complexion, from white to tawny — all in terror of the
imaginary foe ; ladies sitting down at the rough mess-tables in
the barracks, women suckling infants, ayahs and children in all
directions, and — officers too ! In short, as I have written to Sir
Henry, I saw quite enough to convince me that if any insurrec-
tion took or takes place, we shall have no one to thank but
ourselves, because we have now shown to the Natives how very
easily we can become frightened, and when frightened utterly
helpless. During that day (the 22nd) the shops in all the
bazaars were shut, four or five times, and all day the General
was worried to death by people running up to report impro-
lector was then in the intrenchments, and not in his house. He sent us word
to remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The Collector came
in the morning and told the Nana to occupy his own house, which was in
Kanhpiir. We accordingly did so. We remained there four days, and the
gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the Sipahis had
become disobedient; and that he wonld apply to the General in our behalf.
He did so, and the General wrote to Agra, whence a reply came that arrange-
ments would be made for the pay of our men." — MS. Records.
Q 2
228 KANHPUR. [1857.
bable stories, which in ten minutes more were contradicted by
others still more monstrous. All yesterday (23rd) the same
thing went on ; and I wish that you could see the European
barracks and the chapel close to it — and their occupants. I
believe that if anything will keep the Sipahis quiet, it will be,
next to Providence, the great respect which they all have for
General Wheeler, and for him alone. He has all his doors and
windows open all night, and has never thought of moving or of
allowing his family to move. Brigadier Jack, Parker, the can-
tonment magistrate, and Wiggins, the Judge Advocate-General,
are, I believe, the only people who sleep in their houses." *
The chief source of immediate danger at this time was the
temper of the 2nd Cavalry. The place in the Army
T 2nd P Cav°airy? List assigned to this regiment had, for some time,
been a blank. It was the number of the regiment
which had disgraced itself at Parwandarah, and had been igno-
miniously disbanded ; and it was not until 1850, that the number
had been restored to the List of the Bengal Army.f That the
troopers were ripe for revolt was certain, for already they were
quietly making arrangements to send away their families and
their property, and soon they had nothing in their huts but their
drin king-vessels. They stood, as it were, with their loins girt
about for action, and Wheeler had more than once credible in-
formation that they were about immediately to strike. It was
believed that, differing from the infantry regiments at Kanhpur,
these cavalry Sipahis included in their programme the murder of
their officers. There were many Muhammadans in the corps, and
Muhammadan feeling was then strong in the place. There had
been great gatherings at the mosques, in which the Musalman
Sipahis had taken a forward part, for the full discussion of the
crisis. And it was thought, as had before been thought, in
other places, that the festival of the Id, on the 24th of May,
would prove the appointed day for a great Muhammadan demon-
stration. But it passed over as quietly as any other day. There
was the usual interchange of courtesies and compliments, as in
quiet times, between the two races ; and on one side, at least,
* MS. Correspondence.
t Another regiment (the 11th Light Cavalry") had been raised in the place
of the 2nd ; and the officers of the latter had been transferred to it bodily.
Only one trooper of the 2nd had been re-enlisted — the Hawaldar-Major,
Bhowani Singh, of whom more hereafter. The 11th was renumbered the 2nd,
for its gallantry at Multan.
1857.] MISTRUST OF THE SIPi.HIS. 229
there was much self-congratulation that the anniversary was
well over.
But all this time, as the arrangements were proceeding apace
for the security of our place of refuge, the general
feeling of mistrust was fixing itself in the hearts P ££5t° f
of the soldiery. The principle of " trusting all in
all or not at all " was in those days the only one to be worked
out in action with any prospect of success. There was strength
in striking the first blow with a heavy mailed hand. There
was strength also in perfect quietude and composure. But in
any middle course there was weakness ; and whether in doing
or in suffering, " to be weak is to be miserable." When, there-
fore, Wheeler began to throw up defences which could not
defend him, and to betray his mistrust of the Sipahis, without
having it in his power effectually to arrest the danger, of which
such action indicated the dread, there was nothing but misery
before him. Indeed, when our people were seen wildly leaving
their homes and seeking safety either within our so-called
intrenchments or in some strongly-built edifices in the neigh-
bourhood, and the Sipahis beheld the English artillerymen
placing guns in position, the end was certain, and the beginning
of the end had come. Some regarded the movement as an in-
dication of fear ; some looked upon it as a menace. All regarded
it as a proof of mistrust. Confidence was at an end ; there was
a deadly breach between the officer and the soldier.
But during that last week of May, whatever plots and perils
might have been fermenting beneath the surface, Ma 2431
outwardly everything was calm and reassuring.
And the brave old General began to think that the worst was
over, and that he would soon be able to assist Junel
Lawrence at Lakhnao. On the 1st of June, he
wrote to Lord Canning, saying, " I have this day sent eighty
transport-train bullocks in relays at four stages for the purpose
of bringing up Europeans from Allahabad; and in a few— a
very few days, I shall consider Kanhpur safe — nay, that I may
aid Lakhnao, if need be." And he added, " I have left my
house and am residing day and night in my tent, pitched within
our intrenched position, and I purpose continuing to do so until
tranquillity is restored. The heat is dreadful. I think that
the fever has abated ; but the excitement and distrust are such
that every act, however simple or honestly intended, is open to
misapprehension and misrepresentation. My difficulties have (
230 KANHPUR. [1S57.
been as much from the necessity of making others act with
circumspection and prudence as from any disaifection on the
part of the troops. In their present state, a single injudicious
step might set the whole in a blaze. It is my good fortune in
the present crisis, that I am well knoAvn to the whole Native
Army as one who, although strict, has ever been, just and con-
siderate to them to the best of his ability, and that in a service
of fifty-two years I have ever respected their rights and their
prejudices. Pardon, my Lord, this apparent egotism. I state
the fact solely as accounting for my success in preserving tran-
quillity at a place like Kanhpur. Indeed, the men themselves
have said that my name amongst them had alone been the cause
of their not following the example so excitingly set them." *
And, indeed, this pleasurable anticipation of reciprocating
Henry Lawrence's chivalrous generosity was not
L^khnlo s0 mucn empty talk. Part of the detachment of
the 84th, which had been sent from Barbaras,! was
now passed on to Lakhnao. And as they crossed the Biidge of
Boats and set their faces towards the Oudh capital, there was
inward laughter and self-congratulation under many a dusky
skin at the thought of what the English were doing. It was
hard to say, in that conjuncture, at what particular point
European manhood was most needed, but it is certain that in
that intrenched position at Kanhpur it was weary work for
those who kept watch and ward, day and night, with loaded
guns, behind the low mud walls we had raised for our defence. t
* MS. Correspondence.
t See ante, page 155. They appear to have reached Kanhpur on the night
of the 26th, or morning of the 27th of May. They were sent to Lakhnao on
the 3rd of June.— See Wheeler's telegram to Government. 4> Sir H. Lawrence
having expressed some uneasiness, 1 have just sent him by post carriages, out
of my smali foice, two officers and fifty men of Her Majesty's S-±th Foot.
Conveyance for more not available. This leaves me weak, but I trust to
holding my own until more Europeans arrive."
% " L ist night I went the rounds of our positions with the General. The
battery is divided in half, and placed east and west, commanding the princi-
pal approaches; we came upon one half battery without any challenge or the
least exhibition of anv alarm on the part of the gunners. I walked up and
put my hand on one of thn guns, and could have spikt d all three with tho
greatest ease. . . . Some little time afterwards the ofhver in charge was found
asleep, and was immediately put under arrest. . . . Dempster, the Adjutant
of the Artillery, was so worn out with watching at night and performing other
duties, that, seeing he was so done up and could not look alter both batteries,
I said I would take one, and accordingly remained in charge till daybreak." —
Fletcher Hayes to Henry Lawrence. May 26. MS.
1857.] STATE OF OUR DEFENCES. 231
And bitter was the grief, a few clays later, that a single white
soldier had been suffered to leave Kanhpur.
For when the month of June came in, the revolt of the Native
Brigade was merely a question of time — a question
of precedence. It was to be; but it was not quite Worl jjnssofthe
settled how it was to be — how it was to begin.
There was not that perfect accord between the regiments out of
which simultaneous action could arise. Some were eager to
strike at once ; some counselled delay.* The Cavalry troopers,
always the most excitable and impetuous, were ready for the
affray before their more slowly-moving comrades of the Infantry.
But everywhere in the Lines and in the Bazaars the plot was
working. And the plotters were not only in the Lines and the
Bazaars. Out at Nawabganj, where the retainers of the Bithiir
Rajah were posted, and where the Rajah himself had fixed his
quarters for a little while to do the bidding of his friends the
Faringhis, were the germs of a cruel conspiiacy. To Dundu
Pant and to the ministers, Hindu and Muhammadan, who sur-
rounded him, there could be no more grateful tidings than those
which came from the Sipahis' quarters; and as they looked at
the Treasury, the Magazine, and the Gaol, which lay so tempt-
ingly at hand, it seemed to them that the work was easy. Some
of these retainers were in communication with the men of the
2nd Cavalry; and it is stated that arrangements were soon
made for an interview between one of the Cavalry subahdars,
an active agent of sedition, and the Nana Sahib xn^suvh
of Bithur. It is not easy to extract from the mass
of Native evidence — often second-hand reports derived from in-
terested or prejudiced sources — the true history of all the secret
meetings which have been described, and to feel in such a case
the confidence which should never be absent from historical
assertion.f But it is stated that during the first days of June
* '' The chief obstacle to a rise and insurrection of the Sipahis is, tliat they
are undecided as to who should commence it. They have been wrangling,
among themselves for some days. An attempt was made by a Native officer
to make the Cavalry seize their arms and turn out. He made a tiumpeter
take his trumpet and commence with the signal, but the trumpet was seized
and snatched away by another Native officer. Lust night there was au alarm,
and the gunners stood to their guns, but everything passed over quietly."—
The Same to the Same. May 26. #<
t The depositions t iken down by Colonel Williams, Commissioner of Police,
Noith West Provinces, are very full, and they are of a highly interesting, and
in some respects, valuable character ; but Colonel Williams himself admits
232 KANHPUR. [1857.
there were frequent interviews between the chiefs of the rebel-
lious Sipahis and the inmates of the Bithur Palace ; and that it
was known to the soldiery before they broke into rebellion that
the Nana was with them, and that all his resources would be
thrown into the scale on the side of the nascent rebellion.
On the night of the 4th of June, the 2nd Cavalry and the
1st Infantry Regiment were ready for immediate
June 4. action. The troopers had got to horse and the foot-
0utb g|p^°g the men were equipping themselves. As ever, the
former were the first to strike.* It was after the
wonted fashion. There was a firing of pistols, with perhaps no
definite object ; then a conflagration which lit up the sky and
told our people in the intrenchments that the game of destruc-
tion had commenced ; and then a mad nocturnal ride to Nawab-
ganj, scenting the treasure and the stores in the Magazine. The
ie n "^ Regiment soon followed them. In vain their
colonel, calling them his " babalog," his children,
had implored them, in affectionate, parental tones, not to
stain themselves by such wickedness. It was too late. The
Sipahis did not wish to harm their officers, but they were bent
on rebellion. They hurried after the Cavalry, setting their
faces towards the north-west, where lay the Treasury, the Gaol,
and the Magazine, with Dehli in the distance. Thither as they
went they burnt, and plundered, and spread devastation along
that much must be received with caution, as being only hearsay evidence.
Take, for example, the following from the evidence of Sheo Cham Das :
" Three or four days before the troops broke out, Tika Singh, Subahdar of
the 2nd Cavalry, bejran to have interviews with the Nana, and said to him on
one occasion, 'You have come to take charge of the Magaziue and Treasury
of the English. v We all, Hindus and Muhammadans, have united for our
religions, and the whole Bengal Army have become one in purpose. "What
do you say to it ? ' The Nana replied, ' I also am at the disposal of the Army.'
I heard this from the Sawdrs themselves."
* A casual circumstance, of no great importance in itself, seems just at
this time to have accelerated the crisis. It is thus summarised by Colonel
Williams, in his synopsis of the evidence collected by him : " Again the un-
fortunate incident of a cashiered officer named Cox firing on a patrol of the
2nd Cavalry on the night of the 2nd of June, and his acquittal after trial on
the following day, on the plea of being unconscious at the time from intoxica-
tion, caused much dissatisfaction, the mutinously-inclined Cavalry declaring
openly that perhaps their fire-arms might be discharged by accident some
day. The violent and insubordinate conduct of the troops, particularly of
the Cavalry, though they still ostensibly took duty, caused many to take
refuge in the intrenchments."
1857.] FIRST OUTBREAK OF MUTINY. 233
their line of march, but left the Christian people behind them as
though not lusting for their blood.
Arrived in the neighbourhood of Nawabganj, the Sipahis of
the two regiments fraternised with the retainers of the Nana.
The Treasury was sacked, the gates of the Gaol were thrown
open and the prisoners released. The public offices were fired
and the records burnt. The Magazine, with all its supplies of
ammunition, and the priceless wealth of heavy artillery, fell
into the hands of the mutineers.* The spoil was heaped upon
elephants and on carts, which the troopers had brought from
their Lines ; and the one thought of the soldiery was a hurried
march to the great imperial centre of the rebellion. But where
were the two other regiments ? The Sipahis at Nawabganj had
begun to doubt whether their comrades were coining to join
them.f All through the hours of darkness and of dawn the
53rd and the 56th gave no sign of comradeship. Their officers
had spent the night with them in their Lines, and from two in
the morning till after sunrise the regiments had been on parade,
every officer with his own company. Then they were dismissed ;
* It is stated, and on very high authority, that Sir Hugh Wheeler and
his Staff were ignorant of the contents of the Kanhpur Magazine. I find the
following in a letter from General Neill, in which he gives the results of his in-
quiry into the " Story of Kanhpur." He had, at that time, been in communica-
tion with the only two surviving officers of the siege. " General Wheeler was
then under the delusion that the Nana would assist him. All the mutineers
went one march to Dehli. The Nana got them to return, and General
Wheeler found himself surrounded, and guns firing upon him in every direction
from our own Arsenal, of the existence of which guns General Wheeler and
his staff were until then ignorant. It appears that a committee of officers,
some time before, were sent down to examine the Arsenal, and to report
what was in it. They came down in the usual easy-going style — only
thought of tents and other trifles — happened not to be shown the gun-sheds,
and did not enter the Magazine; in tact, forgot all about it, and reported
that there was nothing in the 'Magazine,' as it was styled." The authority
of such a man as General Neill must, in all cases, be respected, but it is
hardly credible that the contents of the Magazine were unknown to the
Artillery officers at Kanhpur, especially to the Ordnance Coiumissariat De-
partment. Moreover, it is to be observed that the supposed ignorance is not
consistent with the undoubted anxiety manifested by Wheeler and his chief
officers to blow up the Magazine at the commencement of the outbreak.
Arrangements had been made for this, but the feat could not be accomplished.
Colonel Williams says : " The Assistant-Commissary, Mr. Riley, had been
directed to blow up the Magazine, but was unfortunately prevented by the
Sipahis on guard there."
t It seems that the Cavalry had broken into the Treasury and begun the
work of appropriation before the Infantry arrived.
234 KANHPTJR. [1857.
the men took off their uniforms, and prepared for their morning
meal. The English officers went to the intrenchments or to
their own bungalows. Then the latent fire of mutiny began to
spread from man to man, from company to company. Some
emissaries from the 2nd Cavalry had come in to tempt them.
Their share of the spoil might be lost by delay. It might have
been that no presence, no influence of English officers could then
have kept the regiments true to their allegiance. The experi-
ment was not tried, but another was substituted for it. Wheeler's
intrenched position commanded the parade-ground, and a long
far-reaching gun was brought to bear upon the Sipahis' Lines.
They broke at the third discharge of the British cannon, and
made their way in wild confusion to Nawabganj. They broke,
but not all ; some, still true to their old masters, followed them
into the intrenchments, and were faithful to the end of their
lives.
It was still the game of the Kanhpur mutineers to make theii
way straight to Dehli, to join the regiments
Th t fi Sebii arch alrea( ty assembled there, and to serve the cause
of the King. And they gladly recognised the
Nana Sahib as their leader. They had money and munitions
of war and carriage for the march, and they expected great
things from the restored sovereignty of the Mngh.ul-. But
Dundu Pant, stimulated by those about him, and chiefly, it is
thought, by the wily Muhammadan, Azimullah, looked askance
at the proposed centralisation of rebellion, and urged upon the
Sipahi leaders that something better might be done. They had
made one march to the imperial city, but halted at Kalianpur,
whither the Nana had accompanied them. Then they began
to listen to the voice of the charmer, and to waver in their
resolution. The Bithur people might be right. It might be
better to march back to Kanhpur.*
* This is the received version of what took place between the Bithur people
and the Sipahis. It is not, however, given with any certainty of its correct-
ness. Tantia Topi afterwards endeavoured to make it appear that the Nana
had acted under compulsion. The following is his evidence: — "Two duys
afterwards, the three regiments of Infantry and the 2nd Light Cavalry
surrounded us, and imprisoned the Nana and myself in the Treasury, and
plundered the Magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, leaving
nothing in either. Of the treasure, the Sipahis made over two lacs and eleven
thousand rupees to the Nana, keeping their own sentries over it. The Nana
was also under charge of these sentries, and the Sipahis which were with us
also joined the rebels. After this the whole army marched from that place,
1857.] DESIGNS OF THE NANA SAHIB. 235
Wise in his generation, the Nana Sahib saw clearly the
danger of an eclipse. To march to Dehli would
be to place himself in a subordinate position vfi^jf-S 18
— perhaps to deprive him of all substantive
authority under the baneful influence of Muhammadan jeal-
ousy. The troops might desert him. The Emperor mio-ht
repudiate him. In the neighbourhood of Kanhpur he would
be supreme master of the situation. He knew well the weak-
ness of the English. He knew well that at Lakhnao the
danger which beset us was such that no assistance could be
looked for from that quarter, and that from none of th« laro-e
towns on the Ganges and the Jamnah — as Banaras, Allahabad,
and Agra — had Wheeler any prospect of immediate relief.
With four disciplined Native regiments and all his Bithur
retainers at his back — with guns and great stores of ammuni-
tion and treasure in abundance, what might he not do ? If the
range of his own imagination did not take in at once the grand
idea of the restoration of the Peshwaship, there were those at
his elbow to suggest the prospect of such a consummation. He
had been told by Azimullah that the power of the English in
Europe was declining. He knew that we were weak in India
— that vast breadths of country, over which Rebellion was
running riot, lay stripped of European troops. Now, he felt,
was the time to strike. The game was in his own hands. The
ambition and the malice of the Maratha might be gratified at
one blow.
At Kalianpur, therefore, the Nana arrested the march of the
mutineers to Dehli. It is not very clearly known what argu-
ments and persuasions were used by him or his ministers to
induce the mutinous regiments to turn back to Kanhpur. It is
probable that, infirm of purpose, ductile, unstable, and wanting
leaders with force of character to shape their plans, they were
induced by promises of large gain, to turn back to the place
which they had quitted, and which lay, still with much wealrh,
and the rebels took the Nana Sahib and myself and all our attendants along
with them, and said, 'Ome along to Dehli.' Having gone three kds from
Kanhpur, the Nana said that as the day was far spent it was far better
to halt there then, and to march on the following day. They agreed to this,
and halted. In the morning the whole army told him (the Nana) to go with
them towards Dt:hli. The Nana refused, and the army then said, 'Como
with us to Kanhpur and fight there.' The Nana objected to this, but they
would not attend to him. And so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they
weut towards Kanhpur, and fighting commenced there."
236 KANHPtfR. [1857.
at their mercy. Kanhpur had not been half gutted. And,
perhaps, there were ties, of a better, or at least a tenderer kind,
which lured some of the Sipahis who were still men, back to
their old haunts. In all such cases, it may be assumed that the
mass of the soldiery, huddle confusedly to their doom — object-
less, rudderless, perplexed, and bewildered, not knowing what
is to come. The blind impulse of the moment, perhaps a sud-
den contagion of fear, not the strength of a steadfast conviction,
or a settled purpose, swept them along, like a flock of scared
sheep on a dusty road.
But there was no such want of purpose among those who
swept the flock back to Kanhpur. There were teeming brains
and strong wills and resolute activities among the people of the
Bithur Palace. It commonly happens that we know but little
about the individual manhood which shapes events in the camps
of our Native enemies. The chief actor is not always of the
highest rank — he, in whose name the deeds, which make History,
are done. And, perhaps, we shall never know what foul prompt-
ino-s and instigations were the prologue of the great tragedy
then about to be enacted. But from this time Dundu Pant,
Nana Sahib, stood forth in the eyes of men as our arch enemy ;
and with him were Bala Ptao and Baba Bhat, his brothers;
the Rao Sahib, his nephew; and Tantia Topi, who had been
his playfellow in former days, and had grown into his counsel-
lor and his guide. And ever by his side, linked to him by
bonds of pitiless hatred for the English, the astute Muham-
madan, Azimullah, the sometime table-servant of an English
master, who had pleaded the Nana's cause in England and
made love to English ladies. He had played his game so well
that no one had suspected him. Only a few days before the
reo-iments had broken into rebellion, he had been in friendly and
familiar intercourse with English officers, veiling his hatred
under the suavity of his manners and the levity of his speech.
But as day dawned on Saturday, the 6th of June,* Wheeler
6 was startled by the receipt of a letter from the
The attack Nana Sahib, intimating that he was about to
threatened. a ttack the intrenchments. The supposed depar-
ture of the Sipahis to Dehli had inspired the General and his
* Captain Mowbray Thomson (" Story of Kanhpur ") says that it was on
Sunday the 7th, but Colonel Williams, who collated all the evidence on re-
cord, says it is proved that the mutineers returned to Kanhpur on the 6th.
1857.] THE FIRST ATTACK. 237
companions with new hopes. Tt would be easy for them, they
thought, in a little while, to drop down to Allahabad. But
this pleasant dream was now rudely broken. The rebellious
soldiery were returning to Kanhpur, strengthened in numbers
by the retainers of the Nana, and still more invigorated by the
identification with the rebel cause of men of influence and
energy, able to keep together the scattered atoms of revolt, and
to organise a great movement against the English. The blow
fell heavily upon the brave old General ; on soldiers and
civilians ; on officers and men ; heavily upon all who clung to
them for protection. There was not an hour to be lost. Forth
went the mandate for all the English to concentrate themselves
within the intienchments. The women and children and non-
combatants were already there — and those on duty in the gar-
rison ; but many of the Sipahi officers had slept or watched in
the Sipahis' lines, and had gone thence to their own bunga-
lows ; and now they were summoned without a moment's pause
or respite to the earthworks, with no time to snatch a hasty
mouthful of food, to collect a change of clothes for the morrow,
and scarcely to apparel themselves for the work of the day.
Leaving their household gods, which they had hoped still to
preserve, they obeyed, promptly, but regretfully, the orders of
their chief, and hurried into the intrenchments. Soon every
one was at his post. It was a miserable place for defensive
purposes, but such as it was, the best dispositions were made
for its defence. And every man braced himself up for the work
before him, with clenched teeth and a stern resolution to show
what English manhood could do to prevail against the fearful
odds to which it was opposed.
And whilst our people were thus manning the several posts
which had been marked out for the defence of our
feeble earthworks, the enemy were surging on- App J j °n e C my nhe
wards in confused numbers towards the intrench-
ments ; but eager rather for plunder than for battle, they turned
aside to gorge themselves whh the spoil, in city and canton-
ment, which lay profusely at their mercy, and to murder all the
defenceless Christian people who fell in their way.* The question
The Red Pamphlet gives the 6th as the date of the return of the troops to
Kanhpur, and the 7th as the date of the receipt of the Nana's letter. This
might explain the discrepancy ; but Captain Thomson speaks of the two inci-
dents as synchronous, and Mr. Trevelyan adopts this view.
* " An old gentleman, supposed to be a merchant, with his wife and two
238 KAXIIPUE. [1857.
of proprietorship disturbed them little. Not content with the
pillage of the Faringhis, many enriched themselves at the
expense of their own countrymen, and some at least straight-
way deserted the ranks of the rebel army and made their way
to their own homes. But enough remained, after all defections,
thoroughly to invest our position — and more, perhaps, than
could be brought under effectual command and control. Organ-
isation, however, was not wholly neglected. In the name of the
Nana Sahib, \ r unotions and appointments were made in the
army of the Peshwa. The Subahdar, Tika Singh, who had been
from the commencement the most active promoter of revolt,
received the command of the cavalry, with the rank of General ;
whilst Jamadar Dalganjan Singh and Subahdar Ganga Din
were appointed to the command, as Colonels of infantry regi-
ments. The names of these dignitaries will suggest the fact
that the chief commands were given to Hindus. But, whether,
as has been supposed, this proceeded from the belief that " the
boldest and most active of the mutineers were not Musalmans,
but Hindus,"* or whether it were that the prejudices and pre-
dilections of the Maratha Brahman, who was recognised as the
rebel leader, wrought strongly in favour of his co-religionists,
can only be conjectured.
Fur some hours after the first alarm, the little garrison waited
and waited ; and there was no sound of the
The Attack threatened attack. But about noon the booming
commenced. .. &
of the cannon told that the enemy had commenced
their operations. A round-shot from a nine-pounder came into
our intrenchments, scaring and scattering a large party of
ladies and children, who were gathered together outside the
barracks. Then the bugle sounded ; and our fighting men got
to their posts, and prepared themselves for the unequal conflict.
As the day advanced, shot after shot from the enemy's guns
was poured in with increasing rapidity and deadliness of aim,
and with the sound of every shot arose the screams of the
cMLlren, one a boy of s-ixte< n, the other a little girl, on being found secreted
in a house near "the dawk-bungalow, were shot in front of it. Four office-
writers, living in a house on the I auk of a canal . . . their house being set
on fire, w^re obliged to ab;<n 'on it, and were murdered as they fled. Another
European (unknown) was shot by the troopers, who were indefatigable in
their search after Christians."— Col. H illiams's Synojjsis.
* See Mr. Trevelyan's interesting volume, " Cawnpore." The suggestion
is contained in Colonel Williams's Synopsis of Evidence.
1857.] COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE. 239
women and the children. On that first day of the siege the un-
accustomed horror tore down all barriers of self-restraint. But
soon this human weakness, which vented itself in the shrill
utterances of fear, passed away from these helpless ones ; and in
its place there was an unnatural stillness, more pathetic than
the waitings of grief and the clamorous outbursts of terror.
Then commenced a siege, the miseries of which to the be-
sieged have never been exceeded in the history of
the world. All the wonted terrors of a multitu- Th ne s 6 ~2 7 *
dinous enemy without, of a feeble garrison and
scant shelter within, of the burden of women, and children, and
sick people, with little to appease their want or allay their
sufferings, were aggravated by the burning heat of the climate.
The June sky was little less than a great canopy of fire ; the
summer breeze was as the blast of a furnace. To touch the
barrel of a gun was to recoil as from red-hot iron. It was the
season when European strength and energy are ever at their
lowest point of depression ; when military duty in its mildest
form taxes the powers of Englishmen to the utmost, and English
women can do little more than sustain life in a state of languid
repose, in shaded apartments, with all appliances at command to
moderate the temperature and to mitigate the suffering. But now,
even under the fierce meridian sun, this little band of English
fighting men were ever straining to sustain the strenuous activity
of constant battle against fearful odds ; whilst delicate women
and fragile children were suddenly called to endure discomforts
and privations, with all the superadded miseries peculiar to the
country and the climate, which it would have been hard to
battle with, in strong health, under their native skies. The
morning and evening baths, the frequent changes of raiment,
the constant ministrations of assiduous servants in the smallest
things, which are the necessities of English life in India, were
now suddenly lost to these helpless ones ; and, to intensify the
wretchedness, the privacy and seclusion so dear to them became
only remembrances of the past. Even amidst the roar of the
cannon and the rattle of the musketry, with death around them
in many ghastly shapes, the loss of these privileges was amongst
the heaviest of their trials, for it violated all the decencies and
proprieties of life, and shocked the modesty of their womanly
natures.
To the English soldier in India to be outmatched in numbers
240 KlNHPtlR. [1857.
is scarcely a discouragement. Ever since, a century before,
( live had fought against heavy odds the great battle of Plassey,
c u l" English forces had ever been outnumbered in the field, and
je: they had fought their way to empire. The overwhelming
multitude of Sipahis which now encompassed our position at
Kanhpur, were kept at bay by the little handful of English
soldiers that now manned our feeble intrenchments. As men,
all the mighty host of Hindus and Muhammadans which the
Nana Sahib sent against us were utterly contemptible in our
eyes. Had the positions of the two nations been reversed, had
the English been outside these paltry earthworks, one rush
would have carried the place, and the whole garrison would
have been put to the sword in an hour. There was nothing to
keep the besiegers out of the intrenchments but the contrast
between the indomitable pluck of the Few and the flaccid
irresolution of the Many. The besiegers, who might have
relieved each other every hour, who might have bathed, and
eaten, \ and smoked, and slept whilst their comrades were on
duty, and sent any number of fresh troops to the assault, shrank
from a close encounter with our weary people, overworked and
underfed, ever labouring in the trenches, ever under fire, with
the clothes rotting on their backs, and the grime from the guns
caking on their hands and faces. But, poor and despicable as
the enemy were, they were rich and royal in their possessions.
They had an immense wealth of artillery. The Kanhpur Mag-
azine had sent forth vast supplies of guns and ammunition.*
And now the heavy ordnance of the Government was raking its
servants with a destructiveness which soon diminished our
numbers working in the trenches. The English artillerymen
dropped at their guns, until one after another the places of our
trained gunners were filled by volunteers and amateurs, with
stout hearts but untutored eyes, and the lighter metal of their
guns could make no adequate response to the heavy fire of their
twenty-four pounders. But when the enemy neared our para-
pets, and sought further to molest us at close quarters, they met
with such a reception as soon put them to panic flight.
In these encounters there was one man ever conspicuous —
ever in the front of the battle — inspiring and animating all
* And in addition to the guns and stores taken from the Magazine, were
other supplies of hoth found at the ghaut, which were about to be despatched
to Eiirki.
1857.] CAPTAIN MOORE. 241
who served under him by his lustrous example. This was
Captain Moore, of the 32nd — a soldier of a com-
manding presence, light-haired and blue-eyed, Captain Moore *
whom no toil could weary, no danger could daunt. Wounded
at the commencement of the siege, he went about with his
arm in a sling ; but the strong spirit within him defied pain.
Day and night he laboured on, now in the trenches, now
heading desperate sorties against the enemy, but, even when he
ceased to hope, he neither fainted nor failed. There was no
greater heroism than this English captain's in all the war from
first to last — no name more worthy than his to be recorded in
the rolls of our English chivalry.
But, though ever in the heroic annals of the siege this fair-
haired captain must hold the foremost place as the Agamemnon
of the defence, there were other heroic deeds than his worthy
of distinguished record — other brave men whose names should
find fitting mention in the page of history. There was Vibart,
Major of the 2nd Cavalry, who held the Redan, slackening not,
day or night, in his exertions, and, though ever under the
merciless fire of the enemy, active and robust to the last. There
was Whiting, Captain of the Bengal Engineers, who commanded
at the north-west point of the intrenchments, a man of stout
heart and clear brain. There was Jenkins, Captain of the 2nd
Cavalry, described as "one of the bravest and best of our
party," who held one of our outposts beyond the trenches with
unflinching gallantry, tilla bullet through the jaws, from the
musket of a Sipahi who was feigning death, brought his services
to an agonising end. There was Mowbray-Thomson, Subaltern
of the 56th, who " had the miserable satisfaction " of avenging,
on the spot, the death of his friend — a soldier ever to be found
where danger was hottest, of whose deeds the world would
have known more if any other pen than his had chronicled the
events of the siege ; now holding, with a few followers, a
perilous outpost, now heading a desperate sortie against merci-
less odds, he exposed himself to death in every shape, but he
seemed to bear a charmed life.* And there was his friend and
comrade to the last, Delafosse of the 53rd, a young hero, equal
* Mr. Trevelyan very felicitously says of him, " This officer did his best to
lose a life which destiny seemed determined to preserve, in order that England
might know how, in their exceeding distress, her sons had not been unmind-
ful of their ancient honour. "'
VOL. II. , -■ R
242 KANHPUR. [1857.
to any feat of heroic daring. One day a shot from the enemy's
battery had blown up a tumbril and set fire to the woodwork of
the carriage, in the place where our ammunition was stored.
It was clearly seen, both by the insurgents and by our own
people, that if the fire were not extinguished there would soon
be a most disastrous explosion. So the Sipahi batteries poured
in a deadly stream of eighteen and twenty-four pound shot.
But, unmoved by these messengers of death, Delafosse went
forth, threw himself down beneath the blazing carriage, tore
off the burning wood with his hand, and, throwing dry earth
upon the fire, stifled it before it could spread. Then there was
Sterling, the dead shot, who perched up in a sort of crow's-nest
on the barrack-wall, which Delafosse had improvised for him,
picked off single Sipahis with unerring aim, and became a
scourge to our assailants; and Jervis of the Engineers, who
with indomitable pride of race, refused to run from a black
fellow, and was shot through the heart whil-t walking across
the open in stern composure, with the pingings of the hostile
bullets, and the imploring cries of his comrades to save himself,
sounding in his ears. There was Ashe, too, the stout gunner
from Lakhnao, who served his nine-pounders, to the admiration
of the whole garrison and to the terror of the besiegers, with
unfailing courage and constancy from day to day, pouring in
round after round with astonishing rapidity, and after each
discharge leaping on to the heel of his gun, and, regardless of
the danger of exposure, taking a new sight, and dealing out
new death in the direction most disastrous to the enemy. And
there were many other soldiers so good and true in the hour
of our great national need, that History deplores its insufficiency
to do full justice to the individual heroism of all the mighty
defenders of those miserable works.
Nor were these great and glorious manifestations of the con-
summate bravery of our people confined to those
G clvUians° f who were combatants by profession. There were
many in the intrenchments, not bred to arms,
who started suddenly into stalwart soldiers. Among them
were some railway engineers, potent to do and strong to endure,
who flung themselves into the work of the defence with un-
stinting self-devotion, and made manifest to their assailants
that they were men of the warrior caste, although they wore no
uniforms on their backs. Conspicuous among them was Mr.
Heberden, who was riddled with grape-shot, and lay for many
1857.] WOMANLY ENDURANCE. 243
days, face downwards, in extreme agony, which lie bore with
unmurmuring fortitude until death came to his relief.* And
not the least heroic of that little band of heroes was the station-
chaplain, Mr. Moncrieff, who went about ministering to the
sick and the wounded, offering the consolations of religion to all
who were passing away from the scene, and with that " access
of unexpected strength " derived from prayer sustained the
toilers in the intrenchments, who turned aside for a little while
from their ghastly work to listen to the sweet promises of the
Gospel.
And never since war began, never "in the brave days of old,"
of which poets delight to sing, when women turned
their hair into bow-strings, has the world seen Womanly
nobler patience and fortitude than clothed the lives ndurance -
and shone forth in the deaths of the wives and daughters of the
fighting-men of Kanhpur. No bow-strings were used in this
defence ; our arrows were of another kind. They went forth
from the roaring mouths of our guns in the shape of round shot
and grape and canister. But when these missiles fell short, or,
by reason of the damage done to our pieces by the heavy
artillery of the enemy, could not be used in the form from which
they were issued from the expense-magazine, the gentlewomen
of Kanhpur gave up some of the cherished components of their
feminine attire to improvise the ammunition most needed.f It
would take long to tell in detail all the stories of womanly self-
devotion and patient endurance and calm courage waiting for
the end. Among these heroines was Mrs. Moore, the true-
hearted wife of the leader of the garrison. All the officers who
fought under him had for her a tenderness equal to his own, and
they " fitted up for her a little hut, made of bamboo and covered
with canvas," where "she would sit for hours, bravely bearing
the absence of her husband while he was gone on some perilous
enterprise." J Many others, perhaps, suffered more. The pangs
of child-birth came upon some in the midst of all this drear dis-
* Not until the close of the siege. " He was carried on a mattress down to
the boats, where lie died."
f "In consequence of the irregularity of the bore of the guns, through the
damage inflate 1 upon them by the enemy's shot, the canister could ***•*
driven home ; thu women gave us their stockings, and, having tar
canisters, we charged them with the contents of the shot-cases — a
cartridge probably never heard of before." — Moiobray-Thomson's 7
% Mowbray- Thomson's Narrative
244 kANHPTJK. [1857.
comfort and painful publicity. Some saw their children slowly
die in their arms ; some had them swept away from their breasts
by the desolating fire of the enemy. There was no misery
which humanity could endure that did not fall heavily upon
our English women. It was the lot of many only to suffer.
But those who were not prostrate, or in close attendance upon
their nearest and dearest, moved about as sisters of charity, and
were active in their ministrations. Nor was there wanting
altogether the stalwart courage of the Amazon. It is related
that the wife of a private of the 32nd, named Bridget Widdow-
son, stood sentry, sword in hand, for some time over a batch of
prisoners tied together by a rope ; and that the captives did not
escape until the feminine guard had been relieved by one of the
other sex.
After the siege had lasted about a week a great calamity befell
the garrison. In the two barracks of which I
The burning of nav e spoken were gathered together all the feeble
and infirm, the old and the sick, the women
and the children. One of the buildings, it has been said,
had a thatched roof, and, whilst all sorts of projectiles and
combustibles were flying about, its ignition could be only a
question of time. Every effort had been made to cover the
thatch with loose tiles or bricks, but the protection thus afforded
was insufficient, and one evening the whole building was in a
blaze. The scene that ensued was one of the most terrible in
the entire histoiy of the siege ; for the sick and wounded who
lay there, too feeble and helpless to save themselves, were in
peril of being burnt to death. To their comrades it was a work
of danger and difficulty to rescue them ; for the enemy, rejoicing
in their success, poured shot and shell in a continuous stream
upon the burning pile, which guided their fire through the
darkness of the night. Two artillerymen only perished in the
flames. But the destruction of the barrack was a heavy blow
to the besieged. It deprived numbers of women and children
of all shelter, and sent them out houseless to lay day after day
and night after night upon the bare ground, without more
shelter than could be afforded by strips of canvas and scraps of
wine-chests, feeble defences against the climate, which were
soon destroyed by the unceasing fire of the enemy. And there
was a worse result even than this. The conflagration destroyed
all the resources upon which our people had relied for the miti-
gation of the sufferings of the sick and wounded. All our
1857.] BURNING OF THE BARRACK. 245
hospital stores and surgical instruments were lost to ns ; and
from that time Death and Pain had their way without anything
to arrest the one or to soften the other.
There was another result of this conflagration, of which little
or no notice has been taken by the chroniclers of the Siege. It
has been narrated that a few faithful Sipahis cast in their lot
with their white officers, and accompanied them within the
intrenchments. It appears that they were told that they
might find shelter in this barrack, and we may assume that
they littered down in the verandahs. There was
one old Native officer, the Subahdar-Major of the BhowiIni Singh '
2nd Cavalry, who from the first had arrayed himself against the
mutineers of his regiment, and had received the reward of his
great loyalty to the English in the wounds which he carried off
with him to the intrenchments. And this reward was soon
supplemented by another. Death came to the brave old man
whilst still clinging to his former masters. He was killed in
the early part of the siege by a shell.* The 53rd Regiment is
stated to have sent ten Native officers, with Faithful Sipahis,
into General Wheeler's camp. All the other regiments contri-
buted their quota to the garrison, and there is evidence that
during the first week of the siege they rendered some service to
the English. But, when the barrack was destroyed, there was
no place for them. Provisions were already falling short, and,
although there was no reason to mistrust them, it was felt that
they were rather an incumbrance than an assistance. So they
were told that they might depart ; and as, although there was
danger beyond the intrenchments, there was greater danger
within them, they not reluctantly perhaps turned their faces
towards their homes. Some perished by the way ; some suc-
ceeded in reaching their native villages; a few returned, after
a time, to the British Camp, to detail their experiences of the
early days of the siege.f
* This is the man of whom previous mention has been made (page 228)
as the one Sipahi of the old disgraced 2nd Cavalry that had been re-enlisted.
It is to be hoped that good provision has been made for the family of so brave
a man and so faithful a servant.
f " The Major having gone to inquire of General Wheeler what we were to
do, the latter came out and ordered us to occupy the hospital barracks ; he
said, 'In such a barrack we shall not manage to save our lives, as the
round shot will reach us from all sides.' ... On the evening of the 9th or
10th, a hot round shot fell on our barrack and set it on fire. On this we
246 KlNHPtTR. [1857.
Day after day passed, and, ever as our little garrison waned
■weaker and weaker, the fire of the enemy grew
Morta^y in the hotter and hotter. With what terrible effect it
told upon our suffering people in the intrench-
ments, on brave fighting men, on patient women, and on poor
little children, has been narrated by one of the survivors with a
simplicity of pathos which goes straight to the heart. Incidents,
which in ordinary times would have been described with
graphic minuteness of detail, have been told in a few words as
events of such common occurrence, as scarcely to have excited
a sensation in the garrison. If the "bara sa .ib," or great lord
of the district, to whom a few weeks before all Natives would
have crouched, were shot dead in an instant, or the commandant
of a regiment, whose word had been law to a thousand armed
men, were disabled by agonising wounds, it was the talk of the
intrenchments for a quarter of an hour, and then a new tragedy
brushed it away. In truth it did not much matter at what
moment death came. Happiest those, perhaps, to whom it came
soonest. Hillersdon, the Collector, who had negotiated the
alliance with the Nana Sahib, fell a corpse at the feet of his
young wife, with his entrails torn out by a round shot. A few
days afterwards she was relieved from the ghastly memories of
her bereavement by a merciful fall of masonry, which killed her.
The General's son and aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wheeler, was
lying wounded in one of the barrack-rooms, when, in the pre-
sence of his whole family, father, mother, and sisters, a round
shot boomed into the apartment, and carried off the young
soldier's head. Another round shot struck up splinters into
Major Lindsay's face, gashing and blinding him. He lingered
on in darkness and in agony for some days, attended by his
left it, and concealed ourselves for the night in a nullah not far distant."
" We held the hospital barracks from the 5th to the 9th or 10th ; we left
because the house caught tire fiom the enemy's shot. I believe the shot
■was wrapped in some inflammable material, which, catching the thatched
roof, soon became a blaze." — (Deposition of JBhola Khan, Sipahi, 53rd Native
Infantry.) "The barrack* caught the about four o'clock p.m., on the 9th
or 10th. The Major then told us he could do nothing for us, there being
an order of General Wheeler prohibiting any Native from entering the in-
trenchment. He therefore recoiununied us to piovide for our own safety
... '1 he whole paity then l<ft the hospital barrack." — (Deposition of Bam
Balcsh, Pay-Haualdar, 53rd Native Infantry.) The number of these Sipahis
is supposed to have beeu about eighty or a hundred, with a considerable pro-
portion of Native officers.
1857.] SUFFERINGS OF OUR PEOPLE. 247
wife, when Death took him, and she soon followed. Colonel
Williams, of the 56th, being disabled by a wound early in the
siege, died of apoplexy from sunstroke, leaving his wife and
daughters in the intrenchments. The former, shot in the face
and frightfully disfigured, lay for some days, tended by her
wounded daughter, until death came to the suffering widow's
relief. Colonel Ewart of the 1st, who would have taken an
active part in the defence if he had been spared, was disabled
at an early period, but lingered through the siege, attended by
his admirable wife, only to be brutally murdered at the end
of it. Captain Halliday was shot dead carrying from the
barracks to the intrenchments a little horse-soup, which he
had begged for his famishing wife. Thus many of Wheeler's
chief officers were rendered powerless for good by the un-
ceasing fire of the enemy, whilst the old General himself
issued orders from the shelter of the barracks, but was seldom
capable of taking part in the active duties of the defence. In
bitterness of spirit he saw his garrison diminishing every day
before his eyes. There was a well a little way outside the
intrenchments, which served as the general cemetery of the
Christian people ; and night after night the carnage of the day
was carried to this universal mausoleum. And there were some
who died hopelessly, though not in the flesh ; for the horrors of
the siege were greater than they could bear, and madness fell
upon them, perhaps as a merciful dispensation.
It is iniposs bio to compute the aggregate of death which our
people dealt back to the enemy in return for these
visitations. It is known that in the space of three c Jjf^£ of
weeks the English consigned to the well two
hundred and fitty of their party. The number of bodies buried
by the insurgents, or devoured by the vultures and jackals, must
have been counted, if ever counted at all, at this amount many
times told. If hands were scarce in the intrenchments, muskets
were not; and every man stood to his work with some spare
pieces ready -loaded, which he fired with such rapidity that the
enemy marvelled when they thought of what was supposed to be
the number of our garrison. But it was not only from the
intrenchments that death went forth to greet our assailants.
Incidental allusion has been made to our outposts. _ There was
a row of unfinished barracks at one corner of our position, which
it was of immense importance to us to possess, in whole or in
part, lest the enemy should hold them against us, and make
248 KlNHPtTR. [1857.
sad havoc within our miserable earthworks. There were in all
eight of these buildings. Two the English contrived to occupy,
and between these two was a third, with the well attached in
which we buried our dead, and which we saved from the grasp
of the enemy. From the shelter which we thus held, and which
must have given good command over two sides of our intrenched
position, our people poured in a deadly fire on the insurgents,
whenever they approached our works. Conspicuous among the
defenders of these outposts, as has already been told, were
Jenkins and Mowbray -Thomson ; and to these good names should
be added that of Lieutenant Glanville, of the 2nd Bengal Euro-
peans, who held with sixteen men "Number Two" barrack,
described as the key of our position, until he was incapacitated
by a dangerous wound.* From the barracks, or carcasses of
barracks, thus gallantly held, such punishment was inflicted
upon the enemy, as, even after a lapse of years, could not be
remembered by any one living to look back upon it without a
shudder. Here was the hardest work, and hence came the
greatest carnage."]" Any adventurous Sipahi coming within the
reach of our rifles or muskets, paid the penalty of his audacity,
and never troubled us or disported himself any more. Some-
times, if a favourable opportunity presented itself, our little
garrisons made bold sallies into the opeu, spiking the enemy's
guns and cutting off all who fell in their way. It was not of
much use ; for, whether guns were spiked or men were killed,
there were so many of both in the background, that the loss was
scarcely felt for a moment. Indeed, the ranks of the besiegers
were recruited from time to /time, as the siege went on, amongst
others by the Sipahis from Azamgarh,J and the new hands were
often found to be better than the old. To us, on the other
hand, the loss of every man was a grievous calamity, for we
waited and waited for succours that never came ; and though
sometimes our people were stimulated by the belief that firing
* He was succeeded in the command by Mowbray-Thomson.
f " The orders given to us were not to surrender with our lives, and we did
our best to obey them, though it was only by an amount of fatigue that in
the retrospect now seems scarcely possible to have been a fact, and by the
perpetration of such wholesale carnage that nothing could have justified but
the instinct of self-preservation, and, I trust, the equally strong determina-
tion to shelter the women and children to the last moment." — Mowbray-
Thomson.
% The 17th Native Infantry.
1857.] CENTENARY OF PLASSEY. 249
was to be heard in the distance, intimating the approach of
reinforcements, they were soon driven back again upon dis-
appointment and despair.
The incidents of one day much resembled those of another,
both in what was done and what was suffered. Few landmarks
broke the uniformity of that great expanse of glorious disaster.
One day, however, at Kanhpur, as in other places where the
great struggle for empire was going on, differed from the rest ;
for it was the centenary of the battle of Plassey.
On the previous night there had been signs of June 23.
extraordinary activity in the enemy's ranks, and ^JjJjJ^ of
a meditated attack on our outposts had been
thwarted by Moore's fertility of resource ;* and as the morning
of the 23id dawned upon Kanhpur the insurgents, stimulated
to the utmost by the associations of the day, came out in
full force of Horse, Foot, and Artillery, flushed with the
thought of certain success, to attack both our outposts and our
intrenchments. If the whole strength of the Nana's force
was not brought forth to surround us on this memorable day,
all its components were fully represented. And there was a
stern resolution, in many cases strengthened by oaths on the
Ganges-water or the Koran, to destroy the English or to die in
the attempt. The excitement of all branches of the rebel-army
was at its highest pitch. The impetuosity of the Cavalry far
exceeded their discretion, for they galloped forward furiously
within reach of our guns, and met with such a reception, that
many horses were left riderless, and the troopers who escaped
wheeled round and fled in fearful confusion. The Infantry,
more cautious, improvised moving ramparts to shelter their
* The following illustrative anecdote, told by Mowbray-Thomson, claims
insertion in this place : " We saw the Pandis gathering to this position from
all parts, and, fearing that my little band would be altogether overpowered
by numbers, I sent to Captain Moore for more men. The answer was not
altogether unexpected. ' Not one could be spared ! ' Shortly afterwards,
however, the gallant captain came across to me in company with Lieutenant
Delafosse, and he said to me, ' Thomson, I think I shall try a new dodge ; we
are going out into the open, and I shall give the word of command as though
our party were about to commence an attack.' Forthwith they sallied out,
Moore with a sword, Delafosse with an empty musket. The captain vocife-
rated the words, ' Number one to the front.' And hundreds of ammunition
pouches rattled on the bayonet sheaths as our courageous foes vaulted out
from the cover afforded by heaps of rubbish, and rushed into the safer quarters
presented by the barrack walls."
250 KAXIirUH. [1857.
skirmishers, by rolling before tliem as they advanced hnge bales
of cotton ; but our guns were too well served to suffer this device
to be of much use to the enemy, for some well-directed shots
from our batteries set fire to these defences, and the meditated
assault was defeated before it had develoj)ed itself into action.
The attack on the outer barracks was equally unsuccessful.
The enemy swarmed beneath our walls, but were saluted with
so hot a fire from Mowbray-Thomson and his companions, that,
in a little time, the seventeen had laid one more than their
number dead at the doorway of the barrack. The great assault
of the Centenary of Plassey, which was to have humbled the
Faringhis to the dust, and to have revenged the victory of
Clive, was in the issue a disastrous failure. The enemy begged
to be permitted to bury their dead ; and the remains of their
cotton-bales served to stop the gaps in the earthworks of the
English. But there was a more deadly foe than this weak and
disordered crowd of Hindus and Muhammadans to be encountered
by our distressed people ; and the Nana Sahib saw another
source of victory than that which lay in the number of his
fighting men.
For hunger had begun to gnaw our little garrison. Food,
which in happier times would have been turned
Approaches of f rorn with disgust, was seized with avidity and
devoured with relish. To the flesh-pots of the
besieged no carrion was unwelcome. A stray dog was turned
into soup. An old horse, fit only for the knackers, was con-
verted into savoury meat. And when glorious good fortune
brought a Brahmani bull within the fire of our people, and
with difficulty the carcase of the animal was hauled into the
intrenchments, there was rejoicing as if a victory had been
gained. But in that fiery month of June the agonies of thirst
were even greater than the pangs of hunger. The well from
which our scant supplies of water were drawn was a favourite
mark for the Sipahi gunners. It was a service of death to go to
and fro with the bags and buckets which brought the priceless
moisture to the lips of our famished people. Strong men and
patient women thirsted in silence, but the moans of the wounded
and the wailings of the children it was pitiable to hear. The
bhee sties, or professional water-carriers, were soon slain in the
exercise of their calling, and then English soldiers addressed
themselves to the hazardous work of ministering at the well.
A brave-hearted civilian, John Mackillop, appointed himself
1857.] THE CAPITULATION. 251
captain of the well, and, after a week of this hazardous service,
was shot down at his post. As he lay dying, his care was still
for those in whose cause he had yielded up his life, and he
besought, almost with his last breath, a stander-by to carry the
precious fluid to the lady to whom it had been promised. And
so as day by day our people were wasting under these dire
penances of hunger and thirst, the hopes of the Nana grew
higher and higher, and he knew that the end was approaching.
Three weeks had now nearly passed away since the investment
had commenced — three weeks of such misery as
few, since sorrow entered the world, have ever been The Ca P ituktion -
condemned to suffer. No reinforcements had come
to their assistance. The looked-for aid from below seemed
now to be a grim delusion. Their numbers were fearfully
reduced. Their guns were becoming unserviceable. Their
ammunition was nearly expended ; and starvation was staring
them in the face. To hold their position much longer was
impossible. To cut their way out of it, with all those women
and children, was equally impossible. The shadow of a
great despair was over them. When thus, as it were, at the
last gasp, there came to them a message from the Nana Sahib,
brought by the hands of a Christian woman. It was on a slip
of paper in the handwriting of Azimullah, and it was addressed
" to the subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Vic-
toria." "All those who are in no way connected" — so the
document ran — "with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, and are
willing to lay down their arms, shall receive a safe passage to
Allahabad."*
There was not a soldier in garrison who did not recoil from
the thought of surrender — who would not have died with
sword or musket in hand rather than lay down his arms at the
feet of the treacherous Maratha. Sir Hugh Wheeler lifted up
his voice against capitulation. To the English General the
bitterness of death was as nothing to the dishonour of abandon-
ing his post, tie had not yet given up the hope of relief from
the lower country, and he mistrusted the Kana of Bithur. The
younger officers were all for fighting it out to the last; but
* There are contrary statements with respect to the identity of the mes-
senger. Some say that it was Mrs. Greenaway, some Mrs. Jacobi. Mr. Tre-
velyan speaks of it as an " important point." But I cannot say that I think
it is of much use to discuss, or of consequence to determine, the question.
252 KiNHPTJR. [1857.
Moore and Whiting, whom the General consulted in this con-
juncture, reluctantly declared themselves in favour of capitu-
lation. They had no thought for themselves. Had there been
only men in the intrenchments, they would have counselled
and clung to the nobler and the manlier course. But when they
thought of the women and children, and of what might befall
them in the hands of the enemy, they turned hopefully to
whatever promised deliverance from the horrors of the past
and the greater horrors that might be in the future. There
was, too, a great crowd of sick and wounded, who could not be
abandoned, and yet who could not be carried off in the face of
an opposing enemy. So the overtures of Nana Sahib were not
rejected ; and the messenger carried back to the enemy's Camp
an announcement that Wheeler and his chief officers were
deliberating upon the offer that had been made to them.
Next morning (there was then an armistice) Azimullah and
Jawala-Parshad presented themselves near our
intrenchments, and Captain Moore and Whiting,
accompanied by Mr. Eoche, the Postmaster, went out with full
powers to treat with the emissaries of the Nana. It was then
proposed that the British should surrender their fortified
position, their guns, and their treasure, and that they should
march out with their arms and sixty rounds of ammunition in
each man's pouch. On his part, the Nana was to afford them
safe conduct to the river side, and sufficient carriage for the
conveyance thither of the women and the children, the wounded
and the sick. Boats were to be in readiness at the ghat to
carry them down the Ganges, and supplies of flour (some added
" sheep and goats also ") were to be laid in lor the sustenance
of the party during the voyage to Allahabad. These proposals
were committed to paper and given to Azimullah, who laid
them before his chief, and that afternoon a horseman from the
rebel camp brought them back, saying that the Nana had
agreed to them, and that our people were to evacuate the in-
trenchments on that very night.
Against this Wheeler protested ; and the draft-treaty was
returned with an intimation that it was impossible to march
out until the morning. Then the enemy began to gasconade
and to endeavour to intimidate our people. They might as well
have threatened to move the Himalayahs. Diindii Pant, Nana
Sahib, sent word that he knew exactly the state of our defences,
the condition of our guns, and the scarcity of our provisions ;
1857.] THE CAPITULATION. 253
that he would open fire at once upon our wretched place of refuge,
and that in a few days not a man would be alive. Whiting
and Mowbray-Thomson went out to meet the Bithur emissaries,
and the former replied, as became a lion-hearted Englishman,
that they might carry our intrenchments, if they could ; that
their soldiers had generally shown greater alacrity in retiring
from than in advancing towards our fortifications, and that we
had, at all events, abundance of powder in our magazine to
blow up both armies together. This determined language had
its effect. The Nana consented to wait till the morrow. And
a gentleman named Todd, who had been his English tutor,
carried the treaty to the Kajah's quarters, at the Savada Koti,
and obtained his signature to it.
The Nana is represented to have been very courteous to his
old preceptor. It was the time, indeed, for serenity of manner
and suavity of demeanour — nay, indeed, for kindly and compas-
sionate utterances and mollifying assurances. So, also, when
Jawala-Parshad, with two others, went over as hostages to the
British intrenchments, be blandly condoled with the British
commander, expressed his sorrow that the old General should
have suffered so much — that after half a century of service with
the Sipahi Army of the Company they should turn against him
at the close of his life. But God be praised, it was now all
over — deliverance was at hand. Every care would be taken
that the English gentlemen and their families should not be
molested on their way to the river. And the companions of
Jawala-Parshad talked to others in the same polite and almost
obsequious strain. That night our guns were made over to the
enemy, and some of the old Golandaz of the Company were
placed in charge of them.
So forth from their intrenchments, in the early morning,
went the remnant of our garrison, with the
women and the children, who had outlived the Th t e h ^ s h s JS e at
horrors of the siege — gaunt and ghastly, in tat- June2 7.
tered garments, emaciated and enfeebled by want,
worn by long suffering, some wounded and scarred with the
indelible marks of the battle upon them. The river was distant
only a mile from our starting-point. But to them it was a
long and a wretched journey. The wounded were carried
mostly in palanquins. The women and children went in rough
native bullock-carriages or on the backs of elephants, whilst
the able-bodied marched out on foot with but little semblance
254 KAXHPCE. [1857.
of martial array, Moore as ever in the van, and Yibart bringing
up the rear of the funeral procession. The veteran Wheeler,
with his wife and daughters, is said to have walked down to
the boats.* With what faith and hope within him, the poor
old man turned his face towards the ghaut, He alone who reads
the secrets of all hearts ever knew. But there were many in
that woe-begone train who, although there was no sunshine on
their faces, had glimmerings in their hearts of a peaceful future,
and who were fain to carry with them as they went such of
their household gods as they had saved from the great wreck,
or little memorials of the past, relics, perhaps of departed
friends, to be treasured after long years in the old home beyond
the seas. Little was all they could take with them, weighed
against what they had left behind ; parents, husbands, wives,
brothers, sisters, children, friends. The beautiful had left their
beauty, the young had left their youth, in those battered
barracks; and even the children had old and wizened faces,
which told that they had lived long years in the last miserable
month.
The place of embarkation was known as the Sati Chaora Ghaut,
so called from a ruined village hard by which bore that name.
The road ran across a wooden bridge, painted white, which
reminded a traveller, who afterwards visited the spot, " of a bit
in a Surrey common."f Over this bridge they denied down into
* Tins is very distinctly stated by Mowbray-Thomson : " Poor old Sir
Hugh Wheeler, his lady, and daughters, walked down to the boats." Other
accounts, of a more circumstantial, but perhaps not more trustworthy character,
indicate that the ladies were conveyed to the ghaut on an elephant, and that
the General himself went in a palanquin. This is the statement of Mr. Tre-
velyan, who very carefully collated all the evidence that has been produced.
Colonel Williams, in his synopsis, says, " Hasim Khan, the rider of General
Wheeler's elephant, after taking Lady Whetler and her two daughters to the
first boat on the line, returned for the General, whom meeting on the way
mounted on a galloway, he likewise conveyed to the boats." The Christian
wife of a musician of the 56th regiment, named Bradshaw, says: "General
Wheeler came last in a palki (palanquin). They carried him into the water,
near the boat. He said, ' Carry me a little further towards the boat ;' but the
Sawar said, 'No, get out here*!' As the General got out of the palki. head
foremost, a Sawar gave him a cut with his sword in the neck, and he fell into
the water. . . . My son was killed near him. I saw it, alas! alas!" Another
statement is : " The General and some officers were on elephants — Mrs. Wheeler
was in a palki." Tiie further the investigation is pursued, the greater the
uncertainty that is left upon the mind. This is given as another instance of
the difficulty of extracting the truth fiom a mass of conflicting evidence.
f Mr. Trevelyan : " fctory of Cawnpore."
1857.] THE MASSACRE AT THE GHAUT. 255
a ravine, which led past the compounds of some of our English
residences to the ghaut on the river-side. Near the ghaut was
a Hindu temple,* known as the Temple of Hardeo, or the Fish-
erman's Temple, a structure of somewhat fanciful and not
unpicturescjue design. The incidents of this mile-march were
not many. The Sipahis, as our wretched people huddled on
towards the river, sometimes crowded round and talked to their
old officers, uttering words of admiration or of compassion,
which were not wholly feigned. But, as everywhere the Sipahi
stands out as a living inconsistency of the strangest kind, no
one can read with surprise any story illustrating the malignant
and cruel hatred that, at the same time, burned in the bosoms
of some who had once served in our ranks. Among those who
left the intrenchments on that June morning were Colonel and
Mrs. Ewart, a brave and good man, with a wife every way
worthy of him. He, sorely wounded, was carried on a bed or
litter, and the lady walked anxiously beside him. But their
progress was slow ; they fell in the rear before they had reached
the bridge, and some Sipahis of his own regiment— the 1st —
seeing his helpless condition, thus severed from his coun-
trymen, came up to him and taunted him. Ordering the litter
to be placed on the ground, they mocked and mimicked him,
saying, " Is not this a fine parade, Colonel? is not the regiment
well dressed up ? " Saying which, they fell upon him with their
swords and killed him ; and, though some made profession of
not slaying women, Mrs. Ewart was presently cut down, and
lay a corpse beside the body of her husband.
That the boats were ready on the river-side had been ascer-
tained by a Committee of our own people ; and, when the dreary
procession reached the appointed place of embarkation the
uncouth vessels were seen a little way in the stream in shallow
water ; for it was the close of the dry season, and the river was
at its lowest. The boats were the ordinary eight-oared budge-
rows of the country — ungainly structures with thatched roofs,
looking at a distance like floating hay -stacks, and into these
our people now began to crowd without order or method, even
the women with children in their arms, with but little help
from others, wading knee-deep in the water, and scrambling as
* " Small but in good repair, resembling nothing so much as those summer
houses of a century back, which at the corners of old houses overhang Dutch
canals and suburban English bye-ways."— Trevelyan.
256 KANHPUR. [1857.
they best could up the sides of the vessels. It was nine o'clock
before the whole were embarked, and some, Heaven only knows,
for their voices are sealed, may have breathed more freely as
they awaited the friendly order to push off and to drop down
the stream towards the great goal of their ultimate deliverance.
But there were those on the river banks — those even in the
boats themselves — who had far other thoughts, far other ex-
pectations. Every boat that had been prepared for our people
was intended to be a human slaughter-house. They had not
gone down to the banks of a friendly river that was to float
them to safety. They had been lured to the appointed shambles,
there to be given up to cruel death.
So foul an act of treachery the world had never seen. Dundu
Pant, Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last of the Peshwas,
had studied to some purpose the early history of his race. He
knew how the founder of the Maratha Empire — the head of
the great family who had been the masters of the Peshwas —
had, under false pretext of friendly embrace, dug his vaknak*
into the bowels of the Muhammadan envoy, and gained by
foulest treachery what he could not gain by force. The vaknak
was now ready — the vaknak of a thousand claws — in the hands
of the man who aspired to be the founder of a new or renovated
Maratha Empire. Day after day, week after week, the English,
with their little band of fighting men, had defied all the
strength of this new confederacy, aided by the moral and
material help of our lessons and our resources ; and now the
enemy, under the garb of a new-born friendship, was hiding
the cruel weapon that was to destroy them. Everything was
ready for the great carnage. Tantia Topi, who had been ap-
pointed master of the ceremonies, sat enthroned on a "chabiitra,"
or platform, of a Hindu temple, and issued his orders to his
dependants. Azimullah, also, was there, and the brethren of
the Nana, and Tika Singh, the new Cavalry General, and others
of the-leading men of the Bithur party. And many Zemindars
from the districts, and merchants and lesser people from the
city, are said to have gone forth and to have lined the river
banks to see the exodus of the English ; not knowing what was
[* A " vaknak," or " vagnak," is a weapon made of five rings, to each of
which is attached a steel claw, like that of a tiger. The rings fit the fingers
of the hand, and the claws lie concealed in the palm, till the moment for
striking arrives. — G. B. M.]
1857.] THE BURNING OF THE BOATS. 257
to command not all, perhaps, rejoicing in our humiliation. It
looked like a great holiday show. Scarcely is a more animated
scene to he witnessed on the banks of the Thames on the day
of our great national boat-race. And it was something even
more than this, for there was a great military display. The
soldiery had gone out in force — Horse, Foot, and Artillery ; and
the troopers sat their horses, with their faces turned towards
the river, as though anxious for the sport to begin. And their
patience was not long tried. The signal had been given, and
the butchery was to commence.*
No sooner were our people on board the boats, than the foul
design became apparent. The sound of a bugle was heard.
The Native boatmen clambered over the sides of the vessels and
sought the shore. Then a murderous fire of grapeshot and
musket-balls was opened upon the wretched passengers from
* As Tantia Topi is here stated to have been the foremost agent in this.
hellish work, it will interest the reader to see the master-butcher's own account
of the butchery : " The Nana," he declared, " got a female who had been cap-
tured before to write a letter to General Wheeler to this effect : that the
Sipahis would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Nana).
would get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as
far as Allahabad. An answer came from the General that he approved of
this arrangement, and the same evening the General sent the Nana, something
over one lac of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount. The follow-
ing day I went and got ready forty boats, and having caused all the gentle-
men, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off to Allahabad.
In the mean while, the whole army, artillery included, having got ready,
arrived at the river Ganges. The Sipahis jumped into the water, and com-
menced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, and set the boats on
fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats ; one, however, escaped as far as Kala
Kankar, but was there caught, and brought back to Kankpur, and all on
board of it destroyed. Four days after this the Nana said he was going to
Bithur, to keep the anniversary of his mother's death." This statement is at
least partially true, and it might be suggested that the signal which Tantia
Topi was seen to give was, according to his statement, a signal to start the
boats. On this point, however, witnesses were examined and cross-examined
with the same result. One said, " In my presence and hearing Tantia Topi
sent for Tika Singh, Subahdar of 2nd Cavalry, known as a General, and gave
him orders to rush into the water and spare none." Another said, "I was
standing concealed in a corner, close to where Tantia Topi was seated, and I
heard him tell Tika Singh, a Subahdar of the 2nd Cavalry, who was known
as the General, to order the Sawars to go into the water and put an end to the
Europeans, and accordingly they rushed into the river and murdered them.
Other witnesses spoke distinctly to the same effect; one man adding, "All
orders regarding the massacre, issued by the Nana, were carried into execution
by Tantia Topi." I do not think that there can be the least doubt of the
guilty activity of Tantia Topi in this foul deed.
VOL. II. " S
258 KANHPUR. [1857.
both banks of the river ; and presently the thatch of the budge-
rows, cunningly ignited by hot cinders, burst into a blaze.
There was then only a choice of cruel deaths for our dear
Christian people. The men, or the foremost amongst them,
strenuous in action to the last, leaped overboard, and strove,
with shoulders to the hulls of the boats, to push them into mid-
channel. But the bulk of the fleet remained immovable, and
the conflagration was spreading. The sick and wounded were
burnt to death, or more mercifully suffocated by the smoke ;
whilst the stronger women, with children in their arms, took to
the river, to be shot down in the water, to be sabred in the
stream by the mounted troopers, who rode in after them, to be
bayoneted on reaching land, or to be made captives, and reserved
for a later and more cruel immolation. The fewest words are
here the best. I should have little taste to tell the foul details
of this foul slaughter, even if authentic particulars were before
me. It is better that they should remain in the obscurity of an
uncertain whole ; enough that no aspect of Christian humanity,
not the sight of the old General, who had nearly numbered his
fourscore years, nor of the little babe still at its mother's breast,
raised any feeling of compunction or of pity in these butchers
on the river-side. It sufficed that there was Christian blood to
be shed.
Whilst this terrible scene was being acted at the ghaut, the
Nana Sahib, having full faith in the malevolent activity of his
lieutenants on the river-bank, was awaiting the issue in his
tent on the cantonment plain. It is related of him that, unquiet
in mind, he moved about, pacing hither and thither, in spite
of the indolence of his habits and the obesity of his frame.
After a while, tidings of the progress of the massacre were
brought to him by a mounted trooper. What had been passing
within him during those morning hours no human pen can
reveal. Perhaps some slight spasm of remorse may have come
upon him, or he may have thought that better use might be
made of some of our people alive than dead. But, whether
moved by pity or by craft, he sent orders back by the messenger
that no more women and children should be slain, but that not
an Englishman was to be left alive. So the murderers, after
butchering, or trying to butcher, the remnant of our fighting
men, stayed their hands and ceased from the slaughter; and a
number of weaker victims, computed with probable accuracy at
a hundred and twenty-five, some sorely wounded, some half
1857.] ESCAPE OF VIBART'S BOAT. 259
drowned, all dripping with the water of the Ganges and be-
grimed with its mud, were carried back in custody to Kanhpiir,
by the way they had come, envying, perhaps, those whose
destiny had been already accomplished.
But among the men — survivors of the Kanhpiir garrison —
were some who battled bravely for their lives,
and sold them dearly. Strong swimmers took to Escape of the
the river, but often sank in the reddened water
beneath the fire of their pursuers ; whilst others, making
towards the land lower down the stream, stood at bay on bank
or islet, and made vain but gallant use of the cherished
revolver in the last grim energies of death. There was no-
thing strange, perhaps, in the fact that the foremost heroes
of the defence were the last even now to yield up their
lives to the fury of the enemy. One boat held Moore and
Vibart, Whiting and Mowbray - Thomson, Ashe, Delafosse,
Bolton, and others, who had been conspicuous in the annals of
that heroic defence. By some accident or oversight the thatch
had escaped ignition. Lighter, too, than the rest, or perhaps
more vigorously propelled by the shoulders of these strong men,
it drifted down the stream ; but Moore was shot through the
heart in the act of propulsion, and Ashe and Bolton perished
whilst engaged in the same work. The grape and round-shot
from the Oudh bank of the river ere long began to complete the
massacre. The dying and the dead lay thickly together
entangled in the bottom, of the boat,* and for the living there
was not a mouthful of food.
As the day waned it was clear that the activity of the enemy
had not abated. That one drifting boat, on the dark waters of
the Ganges, without boatmen, without oars, without a rudder,
was not to be left alone with such sorry chance of escape ; so a
blazing budgerow was sent down the river after it, and burning
arrows were discharged at its roof. Still, however, the boat was
* " The horrors of the lingering hours of that day seemed as if they would
never cease. We had no food in the boat, and had taken nothing before
starting. The water of the Ganges was all that passed our lips, save prayers,
and shrieks, and groans. The wounded and the dead were often entmgled
together in the bottom of the boat ; to extricate the corpses was a work of
extreme difficulty, though imperatively necessary from the dreaded conse-
quences of the intense heat and the importance of lightening the boat as much
as possible." — Mowbratj-Tliomson.
260 KANHPUK. [1857.
true to its occupants ; and with the new day, now grounding on
sand-banks, now pushed off again into the stream,
it made weary progress between the two hostile
banks, every hour lighter, for every hour brought more mes-
sengers of death.* At sunset, a pursuing boat from Kanhpur
with fifty or sixty armed Natives on board, came after our people,
with orders to board and to destroy them. But the pursuers also
grounded on a sand-bank ; and then there was one of those last
grand spasms of courage even in death which are seldom absent
from the story of English heroism. Exhausted, famishing, sick
and wounded, as they were, they would not wait to be attacked.
A little party of officers and soldiers armed themselves to the
teeth, and fell heavily upon the people who had come down to
destroy them. Very few of the pursuers returned to tell the
story of their pursuit. This was the last victory of the hero-
martyrs of Kanhpiir.f They took the enemy's boat, and found
in it good stores of ammunition. They would rather have
found a little food. Victors as they were, they returned to the
cover of the boat only to wrestle with a more formidable enemy.
Eor starvation was staring them in the face.
Sleep fell upon the survivors ; and when they woke the wind
had risen, and the boat was drifting down the
stream — in the darkness they knew not whither ;
and some even then had waking dreams of a coming deliverance.
But with the first glimmer of the morning despair came upon
them. The boat had been carried out of the main channel of
the river into a creek or siding, where the enemy soon discerned
it, and poured a shower of musket- balls upon its miserable
inmates. Then Vibart, who lay helpless, with both arms shot
through, issued his last orders. It was a forlorn hope. But
whilst there was a sound arm among them, that could load and
* " At two p.m. we stranded off Nazafgarh, and they opened upon us with
musketry. Major Vibart had been shot through one arm on the preceding
day ; nevertheless, he got out. and, whilst helping to push off the boat, was
shot through the other arm. Captain Athill Turner had both his legs smashed.
Captain Whiting was killed. Lieutenant Quia was shot through the arm ;
Captain Seppings through the arm, and Mrs. Seppings through the thigh.
Lieutenant Harrison was shot dead. . . . Blenman, our bold spy, was shot in
the groin." — Mowhray-Thomson.
f Mowbray-Thomson was one of these. Nothing can be more modest than
this part of his narrative. " Instead of waiting for them to attack us,
eighteen or twenty of us charged them, and few of their number escaped to
tell the story."
1857.] THE LAST STAND. 261
fire, or thrust with a bayonet, still the great game of the English
was to go to the front and smite the enemy, as a race that
seldom waited to be smitten. So Mowbray-Thomson and Dela-
fosse, with a little band of European soldiers of the 32nd and the
84th, landed to attack their assailants. The fierce energy of
desperation drove them forward. Sipiihis and villagers, armed
and unarmed, surged around them, but they charged through
the astounded multitude, and made their way back again
through the crowd of blacks to the point from which they had
started. Then they saw that the boat was gone. The fourteen
were left upon the pitiless land, whilst their doomed companions
floated down the pitiless water.
There was one more stand to be made by Mowbray-Thomson
and his comrades. As they retreated along the
t_ , r, , t . r i tm ? The last Stand.
bank ot the river, seeing alter a while no chance
of overtaking the boat, they made for a Hindu temple, which
had caught the eye of their leader and defended the door-
way with fixed bayonets. After a little time they stood behind
a rampart of black and bloody corpses, and fired, with
comparative security, over this bulwark of human flesh. A
little putrid water found in the temple gave our people new
strength, and they held the doorway so gallantly, and so destruc-
tively to the enemy, that there seemed to be no hope of expelling
them by force of arms. So, whilst word went back to Diindu
Pant, Nana Sahib, that the remnant of the English Army was
not to be conquered, the assailants, huddling round the temple,
brought leaves and faggots, which they piled up beneath the
walls, and strove to burn out the little garrison. Then Provi-
dence came to their help in their sorest need. The wind blew
smoke and fire away from the temple. But the malice of the
enemy had a new device in store. They threw bags of powder
on the burning embers. There was now nothing left for our
people but flight. Precipitating themselves into the midst of
the raging multitude, they fired a volley and then charged with
the bayonet. Seven of the fourteen carried their lives with
them, and little else, to the bank of the river. There they took
to the stream ; but presently two of the swimmers were shot
through the head, whilst a third, well-nigh exhausted, making
for a sand-bank, had his skull battered in as soon as he landed.
But the surviving four, being strong swimmers, and with heroic
power in doing and in suffering, struck down the stream, and,
aided by the current, evaded their pursuers. Mowbray-Thomson
262 KANHPtiR. [1857.
and Delafosse, with Privates Murphy and Sullivan, reached
alive the territory of a friendly Oudh Elijah, and survived to
tell the story of Kanhpiir.
Teeming as it does with records of heroic exploits, this narra-
tive of the Sipahi War contains nothing that
Neglected surpasses — perhaps nothing that can justly be
compared with — this wonderful episode of the last
struggles of the martyrs of Kanhpiir. The grand national
courage, of the manifold developments of which it is impossible
to write without strong emotion, has no nobler illustration than
that of the last stand of the remnant of the Kanhpiir garrison.
A year before, England had made tardy reparation of past
neglect by instituting an Order of Valour. It bears a name
which renders it personally dear to the recipients of this genera-
tion, and will be cherished in historical ages yet to come. It
was right that of such an order there should be but one class.
But, if there had been many classes, Mowbray-Thomson and
Delafosse, Murphy and Sullivan, would have earned the highest
decoration of which the order could boast. But, I know not by
what strange omission, by whose neglect, or by what accident
for which no one is responsible, it happens that not one of these
heroes has borne on his breast the Victoria Cross. Doubtless,
they are the representatives of a gigantic disaster, not of a
glorious victory. But the heroism of failure is often greater
than the heroism of success. And since the time when, in the
days of early Rome, the Three kept the Bridge, there have been
none more worthy of all the honour that a sovereign or a nation
can bestow on the doers of brave deeds, than those who held the
temple on the banks of the Ganges, and fought their way through
an armed multitude thirsting for their blood, until from village
to village there ran the cry that Englishmen could not be beaten.
Whilst the gallant Eour, thus mercifully saved by what,
humanly regarded, had seemed to be a summons
Fate of the boat's to certain destruction, the companions from whom
ompany. i^qj ^^ been severed were losing all hope of
deliverance. What befell them after they drifted away, leaving
Mowbray-Thomson and his little band of resolute righting men
on the shore, can never be accurately known in detail. But the
boat was overtaken, and all its living cargo carried back to
Kanhpur, and turned out upon the well-known landing-place,
where a great assemblage of Sipahis was ready to receive them.
1857.] FATE OF THE BOAT'S COMPANY. 263
Some eighty Christian people in all had been brought back,
after three days of agony and terror on the dark waters of the
Ganges, too merciless to overwhelm them.* From the river bank
they were diven a miserable herd of men, women,
and children, to the old cantonment, to await the
execution of the orders of the Nana. He went out himself to
gloat upon their sufferings. The men were doomed to death at
once. The women and children, with greater refinement of
cruelty, were suffered to survive their husbands and their
fathers, and reserved for a second death. One English lady
clung to her husband, and perished. The rest were torn away,
whilst the muskets of the Sipahis were loaded for that fatal
fusillade. Then an English officer, who throughout all the
accidents of that river voyage had preserved a prayer-book of
the Church of England, sought permission to read to his doomed
comrades a few sentences of that beautiful liturgy, whose utter-
ances are never so touchingly appropriate as amidst the sorest
trials and troubles of life. Leave was granted. And with one
arm in a sling, whilst with the other he held the precious
volume before his eyes, Seppings proclaimed to that doomed
congregation the great message of salvation ; and even amidst
the roar and rattle of the musketry the glad tidings were still
ringing in their ears, as they passed away to another world.
Then the women and children were sent to swell the crowd
of captives, which these conquerors of the hour were holding
still in store as a final relish for their feast of slaughter. All
who had not been burnt, or bayoneted, or sabred, or drowned
in the great massacre of the boats on the 27th of June, had been
swept up from the ghaut and carried to the Savada House, a
building which had figured in the history of the siege as, for a
time, the head-quarters of the rebel leader. And now these
newly-made widows and orphans were added to the shuddering
herd of condemned innocents.
This done, Dundu Pant, Nana Sahib, carrying with him an
infinite satisfaction derived from the success of
his machinations, went off to his palace at Bithiir. Th J ^^* ro
Next day, in all the pride and pomp of power, he ciaime/pesKi.
was publicly proclaimed Peshwa. No formality,
* Eighty is the number given by Mr. Sherer after very careful inquiry and
collation of evidence. They were brought back on carts, and arrived at the
ghaut on the 30th of June.
264 KANHPUft. [1857.
no ceremony was omitted, that could give dignity to the occa-
sion. He took his seat upon the throne. The sacrament of the
forehead-mark was duly performed. The cannon roared out its
recognition of the new ruler. And when night fell the dark-
ness was dispersed by a general illumination, and showers of
fireworks lit up the sky. But it was not long before, even in
the first flush of triumph, heaviness fell upon the restored
sovereignty of the Peshwa. He was, after all, only a miserable
tool in the hands of others. And news soon reached him that,
in his absence from Kanhpur, his influence was declining. The
Muhammadan party was waxing strong. It had hitherto been
overborne by the Hindu power, probably more than all else for
want of an efficient leader. But there was a Muhammadan
nobleman, known as the Nani Nawab, who had taken a con-
spicuous, if not an active, part in the siege. At the commence-
ment of the outbreak he had been made prisoner by the Nana
Sahib, and his house had been plundered; but subsequently
they had entered into a covenant of friendship, and a command
had been given to the Nawab. He directed or presided over
one of the batteries planted at the Kacquet Court, driving down
to it in his carriage, and sitting on a chair, in costly attire, with
a sword at his side and a telescope in his hand ; and there was
no battery that wrought us greater mischief than the Nani
Nawab's. He had got together some cunning Native artificers,
who experimentalised on red-hot shot and other combustibles, not
without damage to the lives of those working in the batteries ;
and it was a projectile from one of his guns — described as a ball
of resin — which set fire to the barrack in the intrenchments.
The Nana was so delighted with this exploit that he sent the
Nawab a present of five thousand rupees, and the story ran,
that in the administrative arrangements which were to follow
the extermination of the English he was to be Governor of
Kanhpur. Among the Muhammadans of the neighbourhood
he was held in high estimation, and large numbers of
followers attended him as he went down every day to his
battery.
And now there was some talk of setting up the Nawab as
head of the new Government. If this had been done, there
would have been faction fights between Hindus and Muhamma-
dans, which would have weakened the power of the general
enmity to the Christian races, and hastened the day of retri-
bution. Then other disturbing rumours reached him. The
1857.] LYING ASSUEANCES OF THE NAnX. 265
English reinforcements were advancing from Allahabad — hot
for revenge, eager for blood. The story ran that the white
soldiers were hanging every Native who came in their way.
It was plain that the time for strenuous action had come. A
great fear was settling down upon the minds of the inhabitants
of Kanhpur, who were leaving their homes in the city and seek-
ing refuge in the villages ; and the military classes, as is ever
their wont at such times, were clamouring for donatives, and
declaiming against the parsimony of the Nana. To send forth
assuring and even boastful addresses alike to the citizen and to
the soldier, was his first care in this month of July; and it
was necessary, without delay, to issue largesses in money, and
in the alluring shape of those much-coveted gold bangles, the
thought of which, ever since the commencement of the siege,
had stimulated the activity of the Sipahis.
So the Peshwa of the hour was summoned back to Kanhpur
by the lieutenants whom he had left to govern in
his absence. He established himself in an edifice,
of goodly proportions, which had been built for an hotel by a
Muhammadan capitalist; and here he held high carnival. The
native gossips of the day related how, after the fashion of the
East, he strove to drown the cares and anxieties which gathered
round him with music, and dancing, and buffoonery in public ;
and that he solaced himself, in more retired hours, with strong
drink and the caresses of a famous courtesan. Day after day
his scouts brought exaggerated stories of the advance of the
English battalions ; and he issued instructions to his officers to
go out to meet them. He had put forth astounding proclama-
tions to assure the people that the pride of the English had been
humbled to the dust, and that their armies had been over-
whelmed by more powerful nations, or, by God's providence,
drowned in the sea. There was no lie which Diindii Pant and
his lieutenants had not put forth, in some shape or other, to
assure the minds of the people and to make men believe that
there was nothing now to be hoped or feared from the prostrate
Faringhis. But ever, as the month of July wore on, news came
from below that the English were advancing ; and the Peshwa
trembled as he heard, even in the midst of his revelries. There
was, however, one more victory to be gained before the collapse of
the new Maratha power on the banks of the Ganges. And the
Nana smiled, as he thought that the game was all in his own
• hands.
266 KANHPUK. [1857.
It was only a victory over a number of helpless women and
children — a victory safe and easy. The English
, The captives in prisoners had been removed from the Savada Koti
to a small house, which had been built by an
English officer for his native mistress (thence called the
" Bibigarh ") ; but had more recently been the residence of
a humble Eurasian clerk. There was scanty accommodation
in it for a single family. In this wretched building were
now penned, like sheep for the slaughter, more than two
hundred women and children. For the number of the captives
had by this time been increased by an addition from a distance.
Whilst our Christian people at Kanhpiir had been suffering
what has been but dimly portrayed in the preceding pages,
there had been a great crisis at Fathgarh, the British military
station adjacent to the city of Farrukhabad,* in the district of
that name. It lies on the right bank of the Ganges, eighty
miles above Kanhpiir. In the first week of June, after nearly a
month of extreme anxiety, it had become apparent that the lives
of all the Europeans, and they were many, would be sacrificed
if they continued to dwell at Fathgarh. So, not knowing in the
first week of June the true position of affairs at Kanhpiir, a
large number of our people took to their boats and drifted down
to the great British Cantonment, as to a place of refuge. The
story of Fathgarh must be told in another chapter of this nar-
rative. It is enough that it should be related here that those
who descended the river were attacked on the way, and that
when one boat reached the neighbourhood of Kanhpiir the Nana
Sahib's people captured it, dragged out its unhappy inmates,
and carried them, bound, to the feet of their master. Then
there was a slaughter, in his presence, of all the men, three
excepted ; and the women and children were carried off to swell
the miserable crowd in the " Bibigarh."
This new prison-house lay between the Native city and the
river, under the shadow of the improvised palace of the Peshwa,
within sound of the noisy music, and within sight of the torch-
glare which signalised his highness's nocturnal rejoicings."]"
* [Farrukhabad, anglice "the abode of the happy," so called after the
Emperor Farrukhseyar — G. B. M.]
t The following minute description of the " Bibigarh " is from a private
journal kept by Major Gordon of the 61st : " It was a dismal kind of bungalow
in a small compound near what used to be the Assembly Booms. There was
a narrow verandah running along nearly the whole of the front. At the two
1857.] SUFFERINGS OF THE CAPTIVES. 267
Thus huddled together fed upon the coarsest provender of the
country, doled out to them by sweepers, their sufferings were
intolerable. Cholera and diarrhoea broke out among them, and
some were mercifully suffered to die.* If, in the agony and
terror of this captivity, bereft of reason, any one of these
sufferers anticipated, by action of her own, the day of doom,
God will surely take merciful account of the offence. The
horror of a fouler shame than had yet come upon them may
have crazed more intellects than one. But there was in this no
more than a phantom of the imagination. Our women were
not dishonoured save that they were made to feel their servi-
tude. They were taken out, two at a time, to grind corn for
the Nana's household. An educated English gentlewoman
needed not even a week's residence in India to teach her the
meaning of this. As they sat there on the ground, these
Christian captives must have had some glimmering recollection
of their Biblical studies, and remembered how in the East the
grinding of corn was ever regarded as a symbol of subjection —
how, indeed, it was one of the crowning curses of the first great
captivity on record. When the wives of the English con-
querors were set to grind corn in the court-yards of the
Maratha, the national humiliation was then and there corn-
ends of it were bathing-rooms, opening both into the verandah and into side-
rooms. Then came an inner entrance room, and then one about sixteen by
sixteen, and then an open verandah as in front. At either side was a narrow
room. ... It was, in fact, two small houses, built on exactly the same plan,
facing each other, and having a space enclosed between them."
* Mr. Trevelyan, referring to a diary kept by a Native doctor who visited
the prisoners, says, " There is a touching little entry which deserves notice.
In the column headed ' names ' appears the words ' ek bibi ' (one baby), under
tbat marked 'disease' is written 'ap se,' of itself.'' As a "bibf'isnota
baby, but a lady or woman, I attributed this error to the writer's brief residence
in India, but I find the passage is taken from Mr. Sherer's official report, a
document of the highest value. I must still, however, hold to the opinion
that "ek bibi" means one lady, and I should have thought tbat the pathos of
the " ap se " lay in its meaning that she killed herself, if it were not for a sus-
picion that in Sherer's report "bibi" is a misprint for "baba." I have not
seen the original list, but it was translated by Major Gordon, who was on
General Neill's Staff. This officer wrote down in his journal, at the time,
most of the names. "From the 7th," he says, " to the morning of the 15th,
twenty-eight people died ; nine cholera ; nine diarrhoea ; one dysentery ; three
of wounds; one, an infant two days old; five, disease not mentioned. I could
not make out all the names, but those of which I am sure are "... and then
a list is given, including, under date July 10, " A baby of two days old — of
itself." This seems to be conclusive.
268 KANHPUR. [1857.
plete — then, but only for a little while ; there, but only on a
little space. And the pathos of the picture is perfected when
we see that these delicate ladies, with their faces to the grind-
stone, did not find the office so wholly distasteful, as it enabled
them to carry back a little flour to the " Bibigarh " to feed their
famishing children.
So here, just under the windows of the Nana Sahib, was a
very weak, defenceless enemy, which might be attacked with
impunity and vanquished with ease. But, with that other
enemy, which was now advancing from Allahabad, and, as the
story ran, destroying every one in their way, the issue of the
contest was more doubtful. A great body of Horse and Foot,
with a formidable array of guns, had gone down to dispute the
progress of the British ; but, before the month of July was
half spent, news came that they had been disastrously beaten.
Havelock had taken the field in earnest. The hopes of his
youth, the prayers of his manhood, had been accomplished ;
he had lived to command an army, to gain a victory, and to
write a despatch in his own good name.
*** At the close of this chapter, I must express my obligations to the
printed volumes of Captain Mowbray-Tkomson and Mr. Otto Trevelyan. The
reminiscences of the one writer and the investigations of the other have been
equally serviceable to me. But to no one am I more indebted than to Colonel
Williams for the invaluable mass of oral information which he has elicited and
placed on record, and the admirable synopsis which accompanies it. From an
immense pile of conflicting evidence, I believe that, guided by Colonel Wil-
liams, I have extracted the truth. There are still, however, some doubts and
uncertainties as regards points of detail, especially in respect of the numbers
both of the fighting men in the intrenchments and of the women and children
in the " Bibigarh. 1 ' The discrepancy with respect to the former may have
arisen from the circumstance that in some lists the sick were computed, but
not in others. Colonel Williams gives a nominal roll of European troops com-
posing the English portion of the Kanhpur garrison who were killed between
the 6th and 30th of June. In this we have the names of fifty-nine Artillerymen,
seventy -nine men of the 32nd, forty-nine of the 84th, and fifteen of the Madras
Fusileers — making in all two hundred and two, exclusive of officers. Mr
Sherer's numbers differ from these — his aggregate being a hundred and
sixty-four. With regard to the women and children in the " Bibigarh," I
think that Major Gordon's estimate is most probably correct. He says, after
studying the list of prisoners, " It appears from this that two hundred and
ten were left on the 11th, and, as twelve died between that and the 15th,
there must probably have been a hundred and ninety-seven when the massacre
took place."
1857.] HAVELOCK AT ALLAHABAD. 269
CHAPTEE III.
THE MARCH TO KANHPUR,
Assured of the miserable fact that Kanhpur had fallen, General
Havelock, having haulted Eenand's column at Lohanga, was
eager to advance to join him and to push on for the recovery
of the important position that we had lost, and the chastise-
ment of the insolent enemy. He telegraphed to Sir Patrick
Grant at Calcutta, saying : " We have lost Kanhpur, an important
point on the great line of communication, and the place from
which alone Lakhnao can be succoured ; for it would be hardly
possible, at this season of the year, to operate on the cross-
roads. My duty is, therefore, to endeavour to take Kanhpur,
to the accomplishment of which I will bend every effort. I
advance along the trunk-road as soon as I can unite fourteen
hundred British Infantry to a battery of six well-equipped guns.
Lieutenant-Colonel Neill, whose high qualities I cannot suf-
ficiently praise, will follow with another column as soon as it
is organised, and this fort is left in proper hands."*
Havelock had hoped to commence his march on the 4th ot
July, but the impediments in the way of the com-
plete equipment of his force were too numerous July 4-7.
and too serious to admit of so early a movement. Pr tKiarch. f ° r
All the old difficulties, of which I have already
spoken, were in his way, and [it was not until the sun was
dimly declining on the 7th that he could give the order to
march. It was but a small force for the work before it. A
thousand European Infantry soldiers, belonging to four different
regiments, composed the bulk of Havelock's army. Some of
these were seasoned soldiers, but some were raw recruits. Then
there were a hundred and thirty of Brazier's Sikhs, a battery
of six guns, and a little troop of Volunteer Cavalry, mustering
* Marshman's Life of Havelock.
270 THE MAECH TO KANHPUE. [1857.
only eighteen sabres, but in the hands of such men worth their
number five times told. Among them were young officers,
whose regiments had revolted,* and civilians whose kachheris
were closed ; and as they rode out, badly mounted (for Palliser's
Irregulars had taken the best horses), under their gallant
leader, Captain Barrow of the Madras Cavalry, there was a
large-hearted enthusiasm among them which made them feel
equal to the encounter of any number of Native horsemen that
could be brought against them. Nor should there be omission
from the record of the fact that, when Havelock marched forth
for the recovery of Kahnpur and the relief of Lakhnao, he was
accompanied by some of the best staff-officers with whom it has
ever been the good fortune of a general to be
associated. In Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler
and Captain Stuart Beatson he had a Quarter-Master General
and an Adjutant-General of his brigade, selected by himself,
not to be out-matched in efficiency by any officers of those
departments.
It was a dull, dreary afternoon when Havelock's Brigade
marched out of Allahabad, and very soon the rain
AnlSb?d. came down in torrents to damp the ardour of the
advancing force. Neither on that day nor on the
succeeding one was the progress rapid. Many of the men were
unused to Indian marching, and numbers fell in the rear, weary,
footsore, disabled. There was great discouragement in this ;
but, as Havelock advanced, it became more and more apparent
to him not only that Kanhpur had fallen, but that a large body
of the enemy were advancing to meet him, and this rendered
it not only expedient, but imperative, that no time should be
lost in joining the advanced column. Neill, doubtful, as it has
been seen, of the fall of Kanhpur, had telegraphed to Sir
Patrick Grant, urging him to push on Eenaud's column, and
Eenand was moving forward into the clutches of the Nana's
* " New to the country, new to the service, unaccustomed to roughing it,
"brought up in every luxury, and led to believe that on their arrival in India
they would have the same, these young officers (deprived of employment by
the mutiny of their regiments) willingly threw themselves into the thick of
the work, often without a tent or cover of any sort to shelter them from the
rain or sun, with bad provisions and hard work. Side by side with the
privates they took their turn of duty, and side by side with them they fought,
were wounded, and some died." — Quoted in Harshman's Life of Havelock,
Author not stated.
1857.] BATTLE OF FATHPUE. 271
force ; and though Havelock's knowledge of the inestimable
value at such a time of English life and English health rendered
him careful of his men, he now recognised a paramount emer-
gency overruling these considerations, and sped onwards by-
forced marches to overtake his Lieutenant. And an hour after
the midnight of the 11th — 12th of July, in the broad light of
an unclouded moon, his foremost details came up with Renaud's
detachment. Before dawn the junction was completed. Eenaud
drew up his men along the side of the road ; and, as the High-
landers struck up the stirring strain of the " Campbells are
coming," welcomed the new arrivals with ringing cheers. Then
they marched on together, and about seven o'clock the whole
force halted at Balindah, a spot some four miles from the city
of Fathpur.*
The troops were weary and footsore, and Havelock was eager
to give his men the rest and refreshment they so
much needed. So arms were piled, and our soldiery Jul y 12 -
were preparing for the morning meal, when their ^aJj^Sr ° f
hungry hopes were disappointed by the unex-
pected arrival of a twenty-four-pound shot, which well-nigh
reached the feet of the General. The truth was soon apparent.
Colonel Tytler had gone forward with an escort to reconnoitre,
and some spies, despatched by Lawrence from Lakhnao, had
brought him word that the enemy were at Fathpur, There
was no more thought of the breakfast. The battle was before
them. The men stood to their arms and fell in at the word of
command, and, forgetful of the long and weary night-march
just ended, set their faces towards the camp of the enemy, and
strode on, steady and stern, to meet them.
They soon met. For the enemy, thinking that they had
come up with the advanced column only, under Major Eenaud,
swept forward with an insolent front, confident of victory. Con-
spicuous before all were the troopers of the 2nd Cavalry, who
* Calcutta Revieio, vol. xxxii., Article, "Havelock's Indian Campaign,"
written by one who took part in it. This writer, a very able one, says, " We
shall not soon forget the scene. . . . We well recollect how anxious Major
Eenaud was to capture Fathpur before Havelock reached us, it having been
reported to us that it was defended only by a few matchlock men. This was
probably correct at the time, but the Nana, with his large force, was march-
ing down upon it, and had we advanced not a soul would have lived to tell
the tale; but Providence preserved us Irom a fate which at that time would
have been ruinous to our power in India."
272 THE MAECH TO KANHPUR. [1857.
came on menacingly in an extended line, as though eager to
enclose our little band in the toils of a swift destruction. So
Havelock, as he wrote, unwilling " to be bearded, determined
at once to bring on an action." Then the truth became miserably
apparent to the enemy ; and in an instant the light of proud
defiance paled beneath the astounding disclosure. The weak
detachment, that was to have been so easily overwhelmed,
had suddenly grown, as though under the hand of Shiva, the
Destroyer, into a strong, well-equipped, well-handled force of
all arms, advancing to the battle with a formidable line of guns
in the centre. Flushed with the savage memories of the past,
and eager for fresh slaughter, these bloodhounds of the Nana
Sahib had rushed upon their prey only to find themselves bought
face to face with death. Surprise, disappointment, fear, trod
down even the brutal instincts within them, and the paralysis
of a great reaction was upon them. The fight commenced. It
was scarcely a battle ; but it was a consummate victory. Our
Enfield rifles and our guns would not permit a conflict. The
service of the Artillery was superb. There had come upon the
scene a new warrior, of whom India had before known nothing,
but whose name from that day became terrible to our enemies.
The improvised battery of which Havelock made such splendid
use was commanded by Captain Maude of the Eoyal Artillery.
He had come round from Ceylon, with a few gunners, but
without guns ; and he had gone at once to the front as one of
the finest Artillerymen in the world. The best troops of the
Nana Sahib, with a strength of Artillery exceeding our own,
could make no stand against such a fire as was opened upon
them.* Falling back upon the town, with its many enclosures
* " The enemy's fire scarcely touched us," wrote Havelock ; " ours for four
hours allowed him no repose." " Twelve British soldiers were struck down
by the sun and never rose again. But our fight was fought neither with
musket nor bayonet or sabre, but with Enfield rifles and cannon : so we lost
no men." This probably means no Europeans ; for Havelock's biographer,
after quoting the General's despatch, says, with reference to the conduct of
the Irregular Cavalry at this time, that only twelve followed their com-
manding officer, Lieutenant Palliser, whose blind confidence in his men and
gallant spirit carried him headlong into the midst of the enemy (at Fathpiir),
without a glance behind to ascertain if he were supported. Here he was
overpowered and knocked off his horse, and would inevitably have been cut
to pieces had he not been rescued by the devoted gallantry of his Native
Kisaldar, who sacrificed his own life in endeavouring to save that of his
leader."
1857.] FATHPUK. 273
of walled gardens, they abandoned their guns one after another
to our exhausted battalions ; and after one vain rally of the
rebel Horse, which solved the vexed question of the unworthi-
ness of Palliser's Irregulars, gave up the contest in despair. Then
Havelock again lamented his want of Cavalry; for he could
not follow up, as he wished, his first brilliant success ; and more
of the rebel Sipahis escaped than was pleasing to the old soldier.
But he had clone his work well and was thankful ; thankful to
his troops for their gallant services ; thankful to the Almighty
Providence that had given him the victory; and proud of the
great national character which was now so nobly reasserting
itself.* It was the first heavy blow struck at the pride of the
enemy in that part of the country. The glad tidings were
received with exultant delight in every house and bungalow
in the country. In due time England caught up the pasan ;
and the name of Havelock was written at the corners of our
streets, on the sides of our public conveyances, and on the sign-
boards over our houses of public entertainment.")*
Fathpur was given up to plunder. It was a guilty — a blood-
stained city. A few weeks before it had risen in
rebellion. And now the mark of a just retribution T Faffir.° f
was to be set upon it. The story may be briefly
told in this place. The Treasury-guard consisted of some sixty
or seventy Sipahis of the 6th Eegiment. About the end of
* See Havelock's Order of Thanks issued next day to the troops under his
command, in which lie attributes the victory, with a sort of Cromwellian
many-sidedness, " to the fire of British Artillery, exceeding in rapidity and
precision all that the Brigadier has ever witnessed in his not short career; to
the power of the Enfield rifie in British hands ; to British pluck, that great
quality which has survived the vicissitudes of the hour and gained intensity
from the crisis ; and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous
cause — the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India."
f It appears from Tantia Topi's narrative, which on such a point as this
may be trusted, that the Sipahis were anxious that the Nana should
accompany them to Fathpur. " The Nana refused," he said : " I and the
Nana remained at Kanhpiir, and sent Jawala-Parshad, his agent, along with
them to Fathpur." Tfka Singh, the 2nd Cavalry General, accompanied him.
The Allahabad Maulavi, also appears to have been with the Nan£'s party at
this time. One of the witnesses, whose depositions have been published by
Colonel "Williams, when asked, " Who commanded at the battle of Fathpur ?"
answered, "I myself saw Tika Singh, the General, and the AllahabM
Maulavi and Jawala-Parshad, going off to command. Many others went —
email fry of leaders."
VOL. II. .-- T
274 THE MAECH TO KAXHPUK. [1857.
May, a large detachment of the 56th, with some sawars of the
2nd Cavalry — both of which regiments were then fast seething
into rebellion at Kanhpur — arrived at Fathpur with treasure
from Bandah, and passed on to Allahabad. What dark hints
and suggestions may have passed between them can never be
known. No great uneasiness was then felt by the European
residents. The temper of the people did not seem to differ
much from what it had been in more quiet times, and public
business went on from day to day in the old groove without
interruption.
The Chief Civil Officer at Fathpur was Mr. Eobert Tudor
Tucker, the Judge. He was a brother of the Commissioner of
Banaras. There were some strong resemblances between them.
Both were devout Christian men, earnestly and conscientiously
treading the appointed path of official duty. People spoke of
Henry Tucker as an enthusiast ; but the enthusiasm of Bobert
Tucker had been roused to a still higher pitch by the intensity
of his religious convictions, which, even from his schoolboy days
up to the prime of his mature manhood, had been striking
deeper and deeper root, in spite of all the discouragements and
distractions of Eastern life. At the entrance to Fathpur he
had erected four pillars of stone, on two of which were engraved
the Ten Commandments, in Persian and Hindi, and on the
others, in the same characters, scriptural texts containing the
essence of the Christian faith. There they stood, that he who
ran might read, proclaiming to Hindus and Muhammadans the
cherished creed of the Faringhis ; but no man defaced or insulted
them. And the good Judge made no disguise of his efforts to
convert the people ; but still no man molested him. His kind-
ness and liberality seem to have endeared him to all classes.
They saw that he was just and gentle ; merciful and self-
denying; and that he taught lessons of love by the practice of
his daily life. In very literal truth, he was what the Natives
of India, often in exaggerated language, call a "poor man's
provider." Wherever misery was to be found, his helping hand
was present. The destitute and the sick were his children, in
the absence of those endeared to him by the tenderest ties. For
he was a husband and a father ; but his family at this time
were in England ; and when the day of trouble came he rejoiced
that he stood alone.
The storm burst on the 9th of June. The two great waves
of rebellion, the one from Allahabad, the other from Kanhpur,
1857.] ROBERT TUCKER. 275
met here with overwhelming force. Hindus and Muham-
madans rose against us ; the latter, as ever, with
the more cruel violence. The roving hands of
Sipahis and Sawars and escaped gaol-birds, who were flooding
the surrounding districts, wholly disorganised our police ; and
what was said to be a Muhammadan conspiracy was hatched
in the very heart of the city. Then the dangerous classes
seem to have bubbled up, and there were the usual orgies of
crime. The Treasury was plundered. The prison-gates were
broken open. The Record-office was burnt down. Other public
offices were condemned to the same destruction. The Mission
premises were attacked. And when the European community
gathered together in a barricaded house resolved that it would
be utter madness to remain any longer at Fathpur, for all
authority was gone, all hope of maintaining any longer a
semblance of Government utterly departed, they left the station
by the light of blazing bungalows, and sallied forth to find
themselves " amidst a perfect Jacquerie of the surrounding
villages."* But they made their way across the Jamnah to
Bandah and were saved.
One Englishman stood fast. One Englishman could not be
induced to quit his post, whatever might be the perils which en-
vironed him. As long as there was a pulse of life in his body,
Robert Tucker believer) that it was his duty to give it to the Gov-
ernment which he served. Throughout the day he had been most
active in his endeavours bo suppress crime and to restore order.
Unlike his brother Henry, who had never fired a shot in his
life, or carried a more formidable weapon than a riding- whip,
the Fathpur Judge armed himself, mounted his horse, and went
out against the enemy, with a few horsemen at his back. He
left some rebels dead in the streets, and carried back with him
some wounds upon his person.f His countrymen, when they
turned their backs on Fathpur, left him in the Kachahri,
still hoping against hope that he might weather the storm ;
* Mr. Sherer to Mr. Chester, June 19, 1857. MS.
t Mr. Clive Bayley, in his Allahabad report, says : " It is impossible not to
admire, however much it might be regretted, the heroic devotion of the late
Mr. Tucker ; nor is it much a matter of wonder that his conduct and his
personal prowess (Mr. Tucker, was, I believe, more than once wounded early
in the day) actually succeeded in preserving, for a few hours longer, some show
of order."
x 2
276 THE MAECH TO KANHPUR. [1857.
and believing that, if this by God's Providence were denied
to him, it was his duty alike to God and Man to die at his
post.
The issue was soon determined. "What followed the departure
of his countrymen is but obscurely known. Of the one patent,
miserable fact, that Eobert Tucker was killed, there was never
a moment's doubt. The story ran that at the head of the
Muhammadan conspiracy, or if not at its very heart, was a
well-known Native functionary — Deputy -Magistrate by office —
Hikmat-iillah by name. He had received great benefits from
Mr. Tucker, who had full faith in the man ; and for some time
it was believed that Musalman treachery and ingratitude had
culminated in the crowning crime of this man's life. " Poor
Tucker," wrote Mr. Sherer, the Magistrate of Fathpur, to
Commissioner Chester, " was shot by Hikmat-ullah's orders, he
himself reading out the Koran whilst the guns were fired. A
Native Christian, Joseph Manuel, a servant of mine, was
present when this took place." But many still doubt, if they
do not wholly discredit, much that has been said of Hikmat-ullah
Khan. He might have saved his benefactor, but did not.
Perhaps he went with the stream, not having courage to oppose
it. The crime may have been but negative. But History does
not doubt that the Fathpur Judge sold his life dearly on the
roof of the Kachahri. Resolutely and fiercely he stood at bay,
loading and firing, loading and firing, until he had shot down
many of his assailants. It is said that he was not overcome at
last until the insurgents had fired the Kachahri. And so the
quiet Christian Judge, so meek and merciful in time of peace,
giving unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's, rose in the
hour of war to the noblest heights of heroic daring, and died fur
the Government that he had served.
There were some, however, even in that guilty city, who
viewed with horror and indignation the murder of the good
Judge. And as the ruffians were returning from the Kachahri,
rejoicing in their cruel work, two Hindus met them, and openly
reviled them for slaying so just and righteous a man. Had he
not always been the friend of the poor ? But the murderers
were in no mood to be rebuked. Furious before, they were
infuriated to a still higher pitch by these reproaches. So they
fell upon the witnesses and slew them.
In Havelock's camp there was at this time one of the civil
1857.] PUNISHMENT OF FATHPUR. 277
officers who had escaped, more than a month before, from
Fatkpur. Mr. Sherer, the Magistrate, after many adventures,
had made his way to Allahabad, and had thence
marched upwards with the avenging army.* For The punishment
five weeks anarchy and confusion had reigned July la _ 13 [
throughout the district. The authority of the
Nana Sahib had been nominally recognised, but in truth
there was scarcely any semblance of Government. Every
man stood up for himself, taking and keeping what he could.
Along the line of Havelock's inarch, Sherer observed the
significant symbols of a widespread desolation — telling after-
wards the story of what he saw in one of the best of those
admirable official narratives through which many of our fore-
most civilians have done so much for historical truth. " Many
of the villages," he wrote, " had been burnt by the wayside, and
human beings there were none to be seen. . . . The swamps on
either side of the road; the blackened ruins of huts, now
further defaced by weather stains and mould ; the utter absence
of all sound that could indicate the presence of human life, or
the employment of human industry, such sounds being usurped
by the croaking of frogs, the shrill pipe of the cicala, and the
under-hum of the thousand winged insects engendered by the
damp and heat ; the offensive smell of the neem-trees ; the
occasional taint in the air from suspended bodies, upon which,
before our very eyes, the loathsome pig of the country was
engaged in feasting; — all these things appealing to our different
senses, combined to call up such images of desolation, and black-
ness, and woe, as few, I should think, who were present would
ever forget." "f And now in the city itself were silence and
* Mr. Willock had gone on, as civil officer, with Renaud's detachment.
He had been very active during the crisis at Allahabad, and both then and
afterwards had proved himself, in conflict with the enemy, to be a gallant
soldier.
f The other side of the picture should, in fairness, also be given. In the
following we see some of the phenomena of the great revolt against civilisa-
tion which preceded the retribution whose manifestations are described in the
text: " Day by day," says a writer in the Calcutta Review, " as we marched
along, we had ample evidence of the certainty with which the Asiatic had
determined to tear us out of the land, root and branch; the untiring
malignity which had, not content with murder and mutilation, burned our
bungalows and desecrated our churches only as an Asiatic can desecrate, we
had "witnessed, but we scarcely expected what we saw in passing along the
road. There was satisfactory evidence that the genius of the revolt was to
278 THE MAKCH TO kANHPUR. [1857
solitude scarcely less impressive and significant. The streets
were deserted ; but there were signs of recent habitation. In
the shops and houses much wealth of plunder was left, which
could not be removed in time by the affrighted owners beyond
the reach of the despoilers. So now our soldiers, English and
Sikhs, were let loose upon the place, and before the day was
spent it had been sacked. Next morning, when the column
moved on, the Sikhs were left behind, flushed with delight at
the thought that to them had been entrusted the congenial
task of setting fire to the town.
On the 15th of July, Havelock, having on the preceding day
dismounted and disarmed the Irregular Cavalry,
Battle at whose treachery was undeniable, again came in
July is. front of the enemy. They had posted themselves
in strength at the village of Aong, with something
of an intrenchment in front, and on either flank some walled
gardens, thickly studded with trees, which afforded serviceable
shelter to their musketeers. But no superiority of numbers or of
position could enable them to sustain the resistless rush of the
English. Very soon they were seen in confused flight, strewing
the ground as they fled with all the abandoned impedimenta of
their camp— tents, stores, carriage, and munitions of war. But
the cost of that morning's success was indeed heavy. For one
of the best soldiers in the British camp was lost to it for ever.
Major Eenaud, who had charged at the head of the Madras
Fusiliers — his beloved " Lambs " — was carried mortally
wounded to the rear. Those who knew him best deplored him
most ; but the grief which arose when it was afterwards known
that he was dead was not confined to his old comrades of the
Coast Army. He had already earned an Indian reputation.
The day's work was not then over. A few miles beyond the
village of Aong was a river to be crossed, known
SdTxIdf e as tne Pandu Nadi. It was but a streamlet in com-
parison with the Ganges, into which it flowed.
But the July rains had already rendered it swollen and
turbid ; and if the bridge by which it was crossed had been
destroy everything that could possibly remind one of England or its civilisa-
tion. The telegraph wires were cut up, strewing the ground, and in some
instances carried off, the telegraph posts were dug out, the bungalows burnt,
and the poor unoffending milestones, so useful even to themselves, but still
English, were defaced, and in many instances destroyed."
1857.] MASSACRE OF THE PRISONERS. 279
destroyed by the enemy, Havelock's progress would have been
most disastrously retarded. So, when his scouts told him
that the enemy were rallying, and were about to blow up the
bridge, he roused his men, exhausted as they were, and called
upon them for a new effort. Nobly responding to the call, they
pushed forward with unexpected rapidity. It was a two hours'
march to the bridge-head under a fierce sun ; but our weary
people carried the energies of victory with them to the banks
of the Pandii Nadi. The enemy, strengthened by reinforce-
ments which had come in fresh from Kanhpur, under Bala
Rao, the brother of the Nana, were intrenched on the other
side with heavy guns, which raked the bridge. But Maude's
battery was soon brought into action ; and a favourable bend
of the river enabling him so to plant his guns as to take the
enemy in flank, he poured such a stream of Shrapnel into them
that they were bewildered and paralysed, and, some say, broke
their sponge-staffs in despair. They had undermined the
bridge-head, and had hoped to blow the whole structure into
the air before the English could cross the river. But there was
not a cool head or a steady hand among them to do this work.
And the Fusiliers, under Major Stephenson, with an expression
on their stern faces not to be misunderstood, swept across the
bridge, and put an end to all fear of its destruction. Then the
rest of Havelock's force accomplished the passage of the river,
and pushed on with their faces towards Kanhpur, weary and
exhausted in body, but sustained by the thought of the coming
retribution.
They did not then know the worst. The crowning horror of
the great tragedy of Kanhpur was yet to come.
On the afternoon of that 15th of July, Dundu ^ e 8 ^e.
Pant, Nana Sahib, learnt that Havelock's army
had crossed the Pandii Nadi, and was in full march upon his
capital. The messenger who brought the evil tidings was Bala
Rao himself, with a wound in his shoulder, as proof that he had
clone his best. It might be that there was a coming end to
the short-lived triumphs of the new Peshwa. What now was
to be done? The chief advisers of the Nana Sahib were divided
in opinion. They might make a stand at Bithur, or form a
junction with the rebel force at Fathgarh, or go out to meet
the enemy on the road to Kanhpur. The last course, after
much confused discussion, was adopted, and arrangements were
made to dispute Havelock's advance. The issue was very
280 THE MARCH TO KAXIIPUK. [1S57.
doubtful ; but, as already said, the mighty conquerors of Kahn-
pur had one more victory to gain. They could slaughter the
English prisoners. So, whether it were in rage, or in fear, or
in the wantonness of bestial cruelty ; whether it were believed
that the English were advancing only to rescue the prisoners,
and would turn back on hearing that they were dead ; whether
it were thought that as no tales can be told by the dead, the
total annihilation of the captives would prevent the identification
of the arch-offenders oh the day of retribution ; whether the
foul design had its birth in the depths of the Nana's black
heart, or was prompted, by one still blacker, the order went
forth for the massacre of the women and children in the
Bibigarh. The miserable herd of helpless victims huddled
together in those narrow rooms were to be killed. What fol-
lowed is best told in the fewest and simplest words. There
were four or five men among the captives. These were brought
forth and killed in the presence of the Nana Sahib. Then a
party of Sipahis was told off, and instructed to shoot the
women and children through the doors and windows of their
prison-house. Some soldierly instincts seem to have survived
in the breasts of these men. The task was too hideous for
their performance. They fired at the ceilings of the chambers.
The work of death, therefore, proceeded slowly, if at all. So
some butchers were summoned from the bazaars — stout Musal-
nians accustomed to slaughter ; and two or three others, Hindus,
from the villages or from the Kana's guard, were also appointed
executioners.* They went in, with swords or long knives,
* Some obscurity surrounds this terrible incident, and perhaps it is better
that it should be so. Colonel Williams, to whose investigations History
is so much indebted, says, with respect to the evidence before him, that,
" on approaching the last and most terrible scene, all seem instinctively to
shrink from confessing any knowledge of so foul and barbarous a crime as the
indiscriminate slaughter of helpless women and innocent children. Evidence
that seems clear and strong from the 15th of May to the 14th of July, suddenly
ceases on the fatal day of the loth of that month." The most reliable testimony was
that of some half-caste drummers or band-boys. But the principal witness, whose
narrative is the most detailed, and seemingly the most authentic of all (John
Fitchett, drummer of the 6th Native Infantry), who stated that he had been
a prisoner with our people, was clearly convicted of a direct falsehood in this
respect; and it is only where his evidence was supported by others that it is
to be entirely trusted. It should be stated here that the male prisoners, shot
to death on the 15th of July, were three of the principal fugitives from
Fathgarh, and two members of the Gieenaway family. The Sipahi-Guards
at the Bibigarh, who refused to slaughter the women and children, belonged
1857.] FATE OF THE CAPTIVES. 281
among the women and children, as among a flock of sheep, and
with no more compunction, slashed them to death with the
sharp steel.
And there the bodies lay, some only half dead, all through the
night. It was significantly related that the shrieks
ceased, but not the groans. Next morning the dead u y 15 ~ 16 '
and the dying were brought out, ghastly with their still gaping
wounds, and thrown into an adjacent well. Some of the children
were alive, almost unhurt ; saved, doubtless, by their low stature,
amidst the closely-packed masses of human flesh through which
the butchers had drawn their blades ; and now they were running
about scared and wonder-struck, beside the well. To toss these
infantile enemies, alive or dead, into the improvised cemetery,
already nearly choked-full, was a small matter that concerned
but little those who did the Nana's bidding. But beyond this
wholesale killing and burying, which sickened the whole Chris-
tian world, and roused English manhood in India to a pitch of
national hatred that took years to allay, the atrocity was not
pushed. The refinements of cruelty — the unutterable shame —
with which, in some of the chronicles of the day, this hideous
massacre was attended, were but fictions of an excited imagi-
nation, too readily believed without inquiry and circulated
without thought. None were mutilated — none were dis-
honoured. There was nothing needed to aggravate the naked
horror of the fact that some two hundred Christian women and
children were hacked to death in the course of a few hours.*
to the 6th Regiment from Allahabad. The Nana is stated to have been so
incensed by their conduct that he threatened to blow them from guns.
* This is stated, in the most unqualified manner, by the official function-
aries, who made the most diligent inquiries into all the circumstances of the
massacres of June and July. Mr. Sherer and Mr. Thornhill, in their official
reports, speak most distinctly in denial of the assertion that our women had
been mutilated and dishonoured. Colonel Williams, than whom there can be
no better authority, says that the most searching and earnest inquiries
totally disprove the unfounded assertion, which was at first so frequently
made and so currently believed, that personal indignity and dishonour had
been offered to our poor suffering countrywomen. To this it may be added,
that some of the administrators of the Mutiny Relief Fund in England took
great pains to investigate certain alleged cases of mutilation, said to have
been brought over from India, but failed to track down a single one. The
most authentic case of mutilation with which I am acquainted is one tha.t
comes to me from Ireland, whilst I am writing this chapter. Some wild
Irishmen went into the house of a Mr. Connor, and, taking him for another
man, against whom they had a grudge, deliberately cut off his nose.
282 THE MARCH TO KANHPUR. [1857.
Then, this feat accomplished, the Nana Sahib and his allies
prepared to make their last stand for the defence
b tti J <rf KSnh 'r °^ Kanhpur an( l the Peshwaship. On the morn-
' ing of the 16th, Dundu Pant went out himself
with some five thousand men — Horse, Foot, and Artillery — to
dispute Havelock's advance. The position — some little dis-
tance to the south of Kanhpur — -which he took up was well
selected; and all through that July morning his lieutenants
were disposing their troops and planting their guns. Mean-
while, Havelock and his men, unconscious of the great tragedy
that, a few hours before, had been acted out to its close, were
pushing on, under a burning sun, the fiercest that had yet
shone upon their march. Exhausted as he was by the mid-day
heats the English soldier toiled on, sustained by the thought
that he might still rescue from destruction the two hundred
women and children held in foul durance by the Nana. To
faint or fail at such a time would have been, he thought,
cowardice and crime. So, weary and foot-sore, dizzy beneath
the vertical rays of the meridian sun, and often tortured by
parching thirst, he plodded along the baked road and panted
for the coming encounter.
The hour of noon had passed before the English General
learnt the true position of the enemy. It was plain that there
was some military skill in the rebel camp, in whosesoever brain
it might reside ; for the troops of the Nana Sahib were disposed
in a manner which taxed all the power of the British Com-
mander, who had been studying the art of war all his life. To
Havelock's column advancing along the great high road from
Allahabad — to the point where it diverges into two broad
thoroughfares, on the right to the Kanhpur cantonment and on
the left, the " great trunk," to Dehli — the Sipahi forces pre-
sented a formidable front. It was drawn up in the form of an
arc, bisecting these two roads. Its left, almost resting on the
Ganges, had the advantage of some sloping ground, on which
heavy guns were posted ; whilst its right was strengthened by
a walled village with a great grove of mango-trees, which
afforded excellent shelter to the rebels. Here also heavy guns
were posted. And on both sides were large masses of Infantry,
with the 2nd Cavalry in the rear, towards the left centre, for it
was thought that Havelock would advance along the Great
Trunk Road. When all this was discerned, it was plain that
to advance upon the enemy's front would be to court a great
1857.] BATTLE OF KAHNPUK. 283
carnage of the troops, upon the care of which so much depended.
Havelock's former victories had been gained mainly by the far-
reaching power of the Enfield Eifles and the unerring precision
of Maude's guns. But now he had to summon to his aid those
lessons of warfare — both its rules and its exceptions — which he
had been learning from his youth upwards ; and they did not
fail him in the hour of his need. He remembered «' old Frederick
at Leuthen," and debouching to the right, advanced in open
column against the enemy's left flank. The movement had its
disadvantages, and had he been the paper-pedant, which some
thought him, he might not have resorted to such a manoeuvre.
But its success proved the efficacy of the exception. He had
fully explained the intended movement to his commanders.
Standing in the midst of them, he had traced in the dust, with
the point of his scabbard, the plan of operations, and had con-
vinced himself that they thoroughly understood it. Then the
order was given for the advance ; and primed with good liba
tions of malt liquor, they moved forward in column of sub-
divisions, the Fusiliers in front, along the high road, until they
reached the point of divergence. Then the Volunteer Cavalry
were ordered to move right on, so as to engage the attention of
the enemy and simulate the advance of the entire force, whilst
the Infantry and the guns, favoured by the well- wooded country,
moved off unseen to the right. The feint succeeded admirably
at first. The Cavalry drew upon themselves the enemy's fire.
But presently an open space between the trees revealed Have-
lock's designs, and the Nairn's guns opened upon our advancing
columns, raking the Highlanders and 64th, not without dis-
astrous effect. But nothing shook the steadiness of the advance.
That hardest lesson of all to the British soldier, to reserve his
fire, had been learnt to perfection by these brave fellows. The last
sub-division having emerged from the wood, they were rapidly
wheeled into line, and, to the consternation of the enemy, moved
forward with a resolute front and disconcerted the arrangements
on which the Nana had prided himself so much and so con-
fidently relied. But the native legions had strong faith in the
efficacy of their guns, which outmatched our own in number
and in weight of metal. At that time we could not make
fitting response, for Maude's battery was struggling through
ploughed fields, and his draft-cattle were sinking exhausted by
the way ; and even when they came up, these light field-pieces,
worked as well as guns were ever worked, could but make
284 THE MARCH TO KANHPUR. [1857
slight impression on the heavy ordnance from the Kanhpur
magazine.
For a little space, therefore, the Sipahis exulted in the pre-
ponderance of their Artillery-fire, and between the boomings of
the guns were heard the joyous sounds of military bands, strik-
ing up our stirring national tunes, as taught by English band-
masters, and, as though in mockery, selecting those with the
greatest depth of English sentiment in them. It was a dire
mistake. As he caught the familiar sounds of " Cheer, boys,
cheer ! " the face of the British soldier settled down into that
stern, compressed look, when the rigid jaw tells how the teeth
are clenched and the muscles strung, and the heart is hard as a
stone. The battle now was to be won by the pluck of the
English Infantry. It was not a number of " mere machines "
that Havelock was urging forward, but so many individual
men with great hearts in their bosoms, every one feeling as if
he had a personal wrong to redress. The awful work of charg-
ing heavy guns, well served by experienced gunners, was now
to be commenced ; and the Highlanders, led by Colonel Hamilton,
took the post of honour, and were the first to charge. The
shrill sounds of the pibroch from the bagpipes in the rear
seemed to send them all forward as with the force of a catapult.
The rush of the kilted soldiers, with their fixed bayonets,
cheering as they went, was what no Sipahi force could with-
stand. Strongly posted as the guns were in a walled village,
village and guns were soon carried, and there was an end to the
strength of the enemy's left.
The Sipahi troops fled in confusion — some along the Kanhpur
road, others towards the centre of their position, where a heavy
howitzer was posted, behind which for a while they rallied.
There was more work then for the British Infantry. A few
minutes after their first grand rush they had gathered breath,
and fallen again into orderly array. Then Havelock challenged
them a second time with a few of those spirit-stirring words
which, from the lips of a trusted general, are as strong drink to
the weary soldier, and every man felt invigorated, and equal
to any work before him. The Highlanders responded with
a cheer, and, followed by the 64th, flung themselves on the
trenchant howitzer and the village which enclosed it, and again
the burst was irresistible. The gun was captured, and the
village was cleared.
For, just at this critical moment, the little body of Volunteer
1857.] THE MARCH TO KANHPUR. 285
Cavalry, composed mainly of English officers, appeared upon
the scene, flushed with a noble enthusiasm, resolute and
dauntless, determined to show with their flashing sabres what
they could do against any odds. Never was there a more heroic
charge. It was the charge of but Eighteen. Captain Barrow
led it. And among those who went into action was Captain
Beatson, who had been struck down by cholera, and who was
powerless to sit his horse ; but, dying as he was, he could not
consent to lose his chance of taking his part in the great act of
retribution. So he placed himself upon a tumbril and was
carried into action, and as dear life was passing away from him,
his failing heart pulsed with great throbs of victorj-. The sabres
of the Eighteen were less bright and sharp after they had
encountered the enemy. When they drew rein, diminished in
numbers — for horses and riders had been shot down — the
Footmen of the British Army saluted them with a ringing
cheer ; and the General again and again cried, " Well done !
I am proud to command you!" It was this body of "Gentleman
Volunteers," in which the " Bayard of the Indian Army " —
James Outram — felt it, a month afterwards, a high privilege to
enlist, when he might have commanded the whole of the force.
Whilst the Cavalry were thus covering themselves with
glory, the Infantry swept on to the enemy's right, where two
more guns were posted, and carried them with the irresistible
ardour that takes no denial. But the enemy, having found
fresh shelter in a wooded village, rallied with some show of
vigour, and poured a heavy fire into our line. Weary and
exhausted as our people were, they had lost none of the grand
enthusiasm, which made every man a giant ; and when the calm
clear voice of the General was heard, inquiring who would take
that village, the Highlanders bounded forward, as if they had
newly come into action, and the rest responded with like alacrity
to the appeal. Again the Sipahi host were swept out of their
cover, and seemed to be in full retreat upon Kanhpur, as though
the day were quite lost. But there was yet one more stand to
be made. As gun after gun was captured by the rush of our
Infantry, still it seemed ever that more guns were in reserve,
far-reaching and well-served, to deal out death in our ranks.
Baffled and beaten as he was, the Nana Sahib was resolute to
make one more stand. He had a twenty-four pounder and two
smaller guns planted upon the road to the. Kanhpur cantonment,
from which fresh troops had come pouring in to give new
286 THE MARCH. TO KANHPUR. [1857.
strength to the defence. It was the very crisis of the Peshwa's
fate. Conscious of this, he threw all his individual energies
into the work before him, and tried what personal encourage-
ment could do to stimulate his troops. And he flashed his
gaudy presence on his people in a last convulsion of courage
and a last effort of resistance.
For there was at this moment a pause in our onward opera-
tions. The great tidal wave of British conquest seemed for
a moment to be receding. Our gun-bullocks were utterly
exhausted by the day's work, and could not bring our artillery
to the front. Our Infantry soldiers, not less physically ex-
hausted, though wonderfully sustained by the strong humanity
within them, were lying down, partly to rest, partly to escape
the tearing fire of the enemy. As they lay on the ground, they
heard exultant noises in the enemy's camp. The clanging of
the cymbals, the shrill blasts of the bugles, and the roll of the
drums heard between the intervals of the artillery fire, told
that there was unwonted excitement in the Sipahi ranks. It
sounded like a boast and a menace ; and it filled with fresh fury
the breasts of our weary troops. Sights followed sounds
rapidly. There was the bustle of a hostile advance. The
Infantry were moving forward. The Cavalry were spreading
themselves out as though to swoop down upon our little body of
fighting men and to encompass them with swift destruction,
whilst the guns continued to pour forth their round shot in an
almost unintermittent stream. To the quick eye of the General
it then appeared that there was not a moment to be lost. So he
called upon his men to rise ; and they leaped at once to their
feet, stirred almost to madness by the taunts of the enemy.
One more rush, and the victory, like those which had gone
before, would be complete.
Then Havelock's eyes were gladdened by a sight which
seemed to be a glorious response to all the dreams of his youth
and all the prayers of his manhood. The Infantry prepared to
advance right upon the death-dealing battery of the enemy,
the 64th Foot, led by Major Sterling, in front. At this moment
the General's aide-de-camp — " the boy Harry " — wheeled his
horse round to the centre of the leading regiment, and rode
straight upon the muzzle of the twenty-four pounder, whose
round shot had now been supplanted by grape, which was
making deadly gaps in our advancing column. It was a
moment of rapture to the white-haired veteran, compensating
1857.] HAVELOCK'S ORDEK OF THANKS. 287
him for all disappointments and delays, for all unjust super-
sessions, for all professional discouragement, when he saw that
last battery carried and knew that his son was safe. The work
was well nigh done, when four guns of Maude's battery came
up to complete it. A terrific fire was opened upon the beaten
enemy, who were soon in confused flight ; and, after such a
day's fighting as might have tried to the utmost the powers of
the best troops in the best of climates, they bivouacked at
nightfall two miles from Kanhpur, every man too weary to need
a pillow and too thirsty not to relish even a draught of dirty
water.
They were then two miles from the cantonment, and next
morning they marched on to occupy it. But ere
they were under arms a dreadful story ran like July 17.
a shudder along the line. They were too late to ^cxupied!, 6 "
save : they had come only to avenge. Havelock's
spies had brought in word that the captive women and children,
whom they had hoped to rescue, had passed beyond the reach
of human aid. The morning's news clouded the joy of
yesterday's victory ; and our men went on with heavy hearts
to the scene of our recent national sorrows. The enemy had
evacuated the place, leaving behind them only a body of horse
to announce the exodus of the rebel force by blowing up the
great magazine, the resources of which had constituted their
strength, and given them six weeks of victory. As our
advanced guard neared the Kanhpur cantonment, there was
seen to rise from the earth an immense balloon-shaped cloud,
and presently was heard a terrific explosion, which seemed to
rend the ground beneath one's feet with the force of a gigantic
earthquake. There was no mistaking such a proclamation ;
and as one man said to another, " There goes the magazine ! "
many, doubtless, thought how different it would have been if
this exploit had not been left to our successors. By this one
fatal omission all had been lost to us at Kanhpur.
But now the English flag was again hoisted, and Havelock,
profoundly thankful to the Almighty disposer of events, who
had given him the victory, put forth an eloquent, spirit-stirring
" Order," in which the just meed of hearty commendation was
given to the troops which had won his battles for him.
" Soldiers," he said, " your General is satisfied, and more than
satisfied, with you. He has never seen steadier or more devoted
troops. Between the 7th and the 16th you have, under the
288 THE MAKCH TO KAHNPUR. [1857.
Indian sun of July, marched a hundred and twenty-six miles
and fought four actions." Such troops and such a General
were worthy of each other. No troops fought better through-
out the war, and none were ever better commanded. The last
engagement, known as the battle of Kanhpur, stamped Have-
lock's character as a military commander. The battle, as he
wrote, " was won by God's blessing, non vi sed arte." It was
one of those triumphs of mind over matter, " by which man
conquers man." We had everything against us. Numbers
some five times told ; a far greater strength of artillery ; a
commanding position, with strong natural defences — all
favoured the enemy; whilst a climate more deadly to the
exotic soldier than grape and. canister, and heavy broken
ground, over which our exhausted cattle could not drag their
guns, so as to bring them into action when most wanted, fear-
fully diminished the fighting powers of our scanty force. Had
Havelock, after the fashion of some rash and inexperienced
commanders, attempted to carry the enemy's position in front,
he would probably have lost half his men ; but the dexterous
flank movement, which so disconcerted the plans of the Nana
Sahib, saved our own people from the wholesale carnage which
would otherwise have descended upon them. There was not a
life wasted. The indomitable pluck of the British Infantry
was husbanded to the best purpose, and every man felt that
confidence in his leader which makes each soldier worth a file.
But Havelock had only made a beginning, and he did well
in reminding his followers that their work was only begun.
Kanhpur was but the first stage of the career of victory which
lay before them. " Your comrades at Lakhnao," said the General
in his order of thanks, " are in peril. Agra is besieged ; Dehli
is still the focus of mutiny and rebellion. You must make
great sacrifices if you would obtain great results. Three cities
have to be saved, two strong places to be disblockaded. Your
General is confident that he can accomplish all these things,
and restore this part of India to tranquillity, if you only second
him with your efforts, and if your discipline is equal to your
valour."
It might be thought that these " ifs " were not needed ; that
the English soldiers who had followed Havelock from Allahabad
to Kanhpur, and had already so nobly seconded
uyi<-i8. kj s efforts, had placed themselves beyond the
reach of all such doubts and suspicions. But the General was
1857.] PREVENTION OF DRUNKENNESS. 289
a practised writer of despatches and general orders ; for years lie
had been doing for others what he was now doing for himself.
Few men knew better the use of words, and no man was less likely
to make a slip in any public manifesto. There was, in truth, no
ingratitude and no inadvertence in this language of misgiving.
There was only too much justice, and too deep a meaning in it.
For, scarcely had the Force reached Kanhpur, when it was seen
that the demoralisation of drunkenness was upon it. " Whilst
I was winning a victory," said Havelock, " on the 16th, some of
my men were plundering the Commissariat on the line of
march." And, once within reach of the streets and bazaars of
Kanhpur, strong drink of all kinds, the plunder chiefly of our
European shops and houses, was to be had in abundance by all
who were pleased to take it. And that they did take it was
not surprising. Even " Havelock's saints," if there had been a
re-birth of them, would have been sorely tempted and tried by
this upward march, by the heat, the hunger, the thirst, the
fatigue ; by the excitement of constant battle, by the thought
of the intolerable wrong that had been inflicted on our people,
and by the burden of the retribution which they carried with
them. They had seen death in many shapes ; and now they
had brought in for burial the bodies of their comrades slain in
the battle or stricken down by the pestilence. These evil
influences — still more evil in their alternations, now of excite-
ment, now of depression — drove the British soldiers to the brief
solace of strong drink ; and such a state of things arose, that
Havelock now did what Neill had before done at Allahabad —
he " ordered all the beer, wine, spirits, and every drinkable
thing at Kanhpur, to be purchased by the Commissariat." " If
it had remained," he said, reporting what he had done to the
Commander-in-Chief, " it would have required half my force to
keep it from being drunk up by the other half, and I should
not have had a soldier in camp."
VOL. II.
KE-OCCUrATION OF kAnHPUK. [1857/
CHAPTEE IT.
RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR.
The English soldier is never a model of forbearance. When
the blood is up and the drink is down, he is very
July 16-18. terrible to all -who come across his path. Even
Soldiery! 16 in fair % nt witn a Christian enemy, there are
times and seasons when the instincts of a brutal
nature are stronger than the conscience and the reason of the
man. The honourable resistance of brave men, fighting for
their hearths and altars, has often roused the passions of our
soldiery to such a height that they have spared neither sex nor
age, yielded to no pity, and abstained from no crime. But
never, since England had a standing army, have such provoca-
tions assailed our fighting men as those which hardened the
hearts of Havelock's battalions on their march to Kanhpur.
The rage within them was not wholly an unrighteous rage, for
at the bottom of it was an infinite compassion for the women
and children who had been so foully wronged, and a just hatred
and horror of the crime of the wrong-doers ; and they did well
to be angry. The tragedy of Kanhpur excited an intense
national hatred in the breasts of Englishmen in distant countries
and after a long lapse of time ; but here our soldiers were on
the very scene of the butchery, the butchers were still red-
handed, and the evidences of the slaughter were still fresh —
visible to the eye, clear to the understanding, with a horrible
suggestiveness even to the most obtuse. Our people went to
the Intrenchments, and there they wondered and admired.
They went to the Bibigarh, and there they shuddered and wept.
To think of so much consummate bravery, and of the end of it,
was enough to madden even sober-minded men, and to stimulate
them to acts of fearful retribution.
If, then, the first days of the re-occupation of Kanhpur had
been stained by excesses on the part of our soldiery — far
1857.] PKOVOCATIONS. 291
greater than any which are recorded against them — it would
be the duty of the historian to speak lightly of their offences.
Neither in the Cantonment nor in the Town was there any
enemy, in the military sense of the word ; for the once boastful
army of the Nana was broken and dispersed, and none clearly
knew whither it had gone. But those were days in which
whole races were looked upon as enemies, and whole cities were
declared to be guilty and blood-stained. And if Havelock's
fighting men, whilst the blood was still wet in the slaughter-
house, had looked upon every Native found in the neighbour-
hood of that accursed spot as an adherent of the Nana, and
struck at all with indiscriminate retribution, such sweeping
punishment might now be looked back upon with less feeling
of shame than upon much that was done, before and after, under
less terrible provocation. As the record runs, it does not seem
that the burden laid upon Kanhpur was heavy in relation to its
guilt.* Heaven knows what was in their hearts, or what
might have been done, but for the strong restraining hand laid
upon them by their Commander. That the citizens themselves
expected chastisement is certain. For whilst a few, on our
arrival at Kanhpur, came to our camp with propitiatory offerings-
of milk and vegetables, fruits and flowers, large numbers flocked
panic-struck out of the town to hide themselves in the adjacent
villages, or to seek safety on the Oude side of the river. Some
were propelled by the knowledge of their guilt ; some, scared
by the tidings that had come from below, fled under the instinct
of self-preservation. Meanwhile, our people were plundering
in all directions, the Sikhs, as ever, showing an activity of zeal
in this their favourite pursuit. It is probable that much of
the property then seized underwent only a process of restora-
tion, and came back to the nation at last to which it properly
belonged. But this did not hallow it in Havelock's eyes. He
set his face steadfastly against it, and issued an order in which
he said, " The marauding in this camp exceeds the disorders
which supervened on the short-lived triumph of the miscreant
Nana Sahib. A Provost-Marshal has been appointed, with
* Most exaggerated stories of this retributory carnage at Kanhpur were at
one time in circulation. It was stated both in Anglo-Indian and in Con-
tinental journals that ten thousand of the inhabitants had been killed. This
was a tremendous assertion, representing rather what might have been than
what was. Some wished that it had been so, for vengeance' sake ; others
that there might be a pretext for maligning the English.
U 2
292 RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
special instructions to hang np, in their uniform, all British
soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat. Com-
manding officers have received the most distinct warnings on
the subject."
This was not cheerful work, but there was other perhaps still
more depressing. The sick and wounded were to
"^nx^ties 111 ^e visited. Cholera and dysentery were in his
camp. Two of the finest soldiers in the army lay
dying — one stricken in the battle, the other by the pestilence.
Human aid could do nothing for them. Then there was great
doubt as to the position of the enemy. Strong
R Beate d on! ld as ** was ^ n courage, Havelock's column was very
weak in numbers, and tidings came that the army
of the Nana Sahib was at Bithur, mustering five thousand
muskets and sabres, and forty-five guns. It was probable
that the place had been strengthened by every possible means
which the wealth of material in his hands could supply, and it
was certain that our light artillery could make no impression
on a stronghold so fortified and defended. It was not strange,
therefore, that, in the lull which succeeded the re-occupation of
Kanhpur, all these discouragements caused a feeling of depres-
sion almost amounting to despondency to sink for a little space
into Havelock's mind.* But it presently passed away. For
the good Providence which had battled so often for us was still on
our side, and the dangers which he had dreaded were delusions.
In truth, he had already accomplished more than he had
ventured to hope. He had beaten the enemy
Fli ^ n °£ the more thoroughly on the 16th than he knew at the
time, and there was no present fear of the Nana
bringing his broken battalions into the field against us. After
the battle, the baffled Maratha had taken flight to Bithur,
attended by a few Sawars ; and as he rode through Kanhpur,
his horse flecked with foam, he might have met the public
criers proclaiming that the Faringhis had been well-nigh
* "As he sat at dinner with his son on the evening of the 17th, his mind
appeared, for the first and last time, 1o be affected with gloomy forebodings,
as it dwelt upon the possible annihilation of his brave men in a fruitless
attempt to accomplish what was beyond their strength. After remaining
long in deep thought, his strong sense of duty, and the confidence in the
justice of his cause, restored the buoyancy of his spirits, and he exclaimed,
* If the worst comes to the worst, we can but die with our swords in our
hands.' " — Marshman's Life of Havelock.
1857.] RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY. 293
exterminated, and offering rewards for the heads of the few who
were still left upon the face of the earth. But the lie had
exploded, and his one thought at that moment was escape from
the pursuing Englishman. Arrived at Bithur, he saw clearly
that the game was up. His followers were fast deserting him.
Many, it is said, reproached him for his failure. All, we may
be sure, clamoured for pay. His terror-stricken imagination
pictured a vast avenging Army on his track; and the great
instinct of self-preservation prompted him to gather up the
women of his family, to embark by night on a boat to ascend
the Ganges to Fathgarh, and to give out that he was preparing
himself for self-immolation. He was to consign himself to the
sacred waters of the Ganges, which had been the grave of so
many of his victims. There was to be a given signal, through
the darkness of the early night, which was to mark the moment
of the ex-Peshwa's suicidal immersion. But he had no thought
of dying. The signal light was extinguished, and a cry arose
from the religious mendicants who were assembled on the
Kanhpur bank of the river, and who believed that the Nana was
dead.* But, covered by the darkness, he emerged upon the
Oudh side of the Ganges, and his escape was safely accom-
plished, f
Meanwhile, Havelock, thinking that a strong force of the
enemy would probably soon march down upon his position, had
moved the bulk of his little army to the north-western point of
the cantonment, near Nawabganj, to defend the line of the
Great Trunk Road. Strategically, the movement was the result
of an error ; but, in another sense, it was grounded upon a too
substantial fact, and had a wisdom of its own, apart from the
manoeuvres of the enemy. It took the troops far away from
the temptations of the liquor-shops, and contributed greatly to
* Mr. Sherer, from whose report these particulars are taken, says : " The
Gangapiitras were waiting on the shore. About mid-stream the light was
extinguished, and, with a yell that must have reached the boat, the mendicant
Brahmans rushed up to the Palace, and commenced plundering all that they
could lay their hands on. The crafty Nana was disembarking in the darkness
on the other side."
t His last act before leaving Bithur was the murder of the only captive in
Ms hands. This was a woman, named Carter, who had been taken prisoner
and who had survived the pangs and perils of childbirth in the Nana's Palace.
The widows of the deceased ex-Peshwa had treated her with kindness ; but
when the Nana fled from Bithur he ordered the woman and her infant to be
put to death, and the guard faithfully obeyed him.
294: KE-OCCUPATION OF KAXHPUR. [1S57
the maintenance of that discipline which he had sorrowfully
seen fading away. And, whilst the military chief
uy was thus taking measures for the protection of
both races, the civil magistrate was proclaiming through the
City the re-assertion of the British power and the re-establish-
ment of the British law. At the Kotwali, the people flocked
around Sherer and his escort, and professed their delight at our
reappearance amongst them. And there was probably much
sincerity in these professions, on the part at least of the trading
classes, who commonly lost more than they gained by these
convulsions. Not cnly were the English and their followers
good customers in quiet times, but the peaceful citizens had an
interest in the maintenance of order and the upholding of the
law, for with the predatory classes, who thrive in times of
tumult and terror, there was little respect for colour or creed.
The wolfish propensities of humanity were, in all such con-
junctures, strongly developed, and, as at Allahabad so at Kanhpur,
innocent industry cowered beneath the rampant rapacity of
crime.
On the following day, it was determined that the actual
position of affairs at Bithur should be ascertained
July 19. beyond all doubt. So a detachment was sent out
Destruction of under Major Stephenson, of the Madras Fusiliers,
* Palace. * to beat up the quarters of the some-time Pretender
to the Peshwaship, and to set our mark upon the
place. The information which Havelock had received from his
spies caused him rightly to think that it would not need the
services of a strong force to do all that was required. The old
home of the Nana had been abandoned. There was no enemy
to be seen. So the Palace lay at the mercy of our soldiery —
and it was soon despoiled and destroyed. There was much of
the plunder of our dwelling-houses in its apartments — traces of
our English civilisation everywhere, in kid gloves and cham-
pagne, and books for hot-weather reading. But the Government
treasure, to which the Nana had helped himself in such pro-
fusion, was not to be found, and the family jewels had either
been carried off or hidden away, past all chance of immediate
discovery. It was reserved for a later domiciliary visit to
disclose some of the hiding-places of the abandoned property.*
* A Native witness, who kept a diary of the incidents of this eventful
summer — " a humble but loyal subject of the State, Nanak Chaud, by name "
1857.] NANA NARAIN RAO. 295
But a considerable wealth of artillery was carried off by Major
Stephenson on his return march to Kanhpur.
So, for the time at least, there was a clearance on that side of
the river. The local influence of the Nana was gone. The last
home of the Peshwas was a ruin. The only important member
of his household who remained was the Nana Narain Rao, son
of the Subahdar Kamchandr Pant. This man had been well
known to the English at Kanhpur, and had been by many of
our people, with only a hazy knowledge of native individuality,
mistaken for the other and greater Nana, the adopted son of
the Peshwa, of whom he was in truth only a retainer.*
Whether this man were one of those double-dyed traitors who
hang on to the skirts of success and are driven backwards and
forwards by every gust of fortune, or whether his sympathies
had all along been with the English, it is hard to say ; but it is
stated that he had been imprisoned by the Nana, and it is
certain that, after his master's flight, he made tenders of alle-
giance and offered his services to the British GeneraLf He had
— says that the treasure (coin) had been looted by the people before the
English arrived. Mr. Sherer says that, in his opinion, the destruction of the
Palace was a mistake, as it rendered more remote the prospect of discovering
concealed treasure.
* See note on this subject, vol. i. p. 422. I suspect that many who have
talked of their acquaintance with the Nana knew only Nana Narain Rao.
f The " humble but loyal subject of the State," whose evidence is cited
in a previous note, was very anxious to convict Narain Rao of double
treachery. He states, that " Nana Narain Rao conducted Nana Dundu Pant
to the other bank of the Ganges and returned to Bithiir. Those men went
to him and reminded him that his father, Ramchandr Pant, had been a
faithful servant and Subahdar of the Nana, and he (Narain Rao) was bound
to protect the property at Bithiir. But Narain Rao paid no attention. On
the contrary, he gave out that the Nana's boat had capsized, and then
presented himself at Bithiir. He declares that the Nana forcibly took him
away ; but lie ran away and came here. People say it is a great falsehood,
and if this Nana (the Subahdar's son) wished it, and was really attached to
the British cause, he could easily get Nana Dundu Pant captured." — In
another entry in his journey he says : " July 19. I was told to-day that,
owing to the treachery of Nana Dundu, the Bara, &c, of Bithur have been
set on fire, and that the Traitor, Nana Narain Rao, wishes to pass himself off
as a well-wisher of the Government." — " July 20. It is just as I anticipated.
Nana Narain Rao, son of the Subahdar, wishes to pass himself off as a well-
wisher of the Government; but there is a great crowd at this moment, and
1he Sahib-log have no time to spare. It is also very difficult to find witnesses
against him by summary inquiries, and I see no chance of filing a complaint
against him before any officer." This man's evidence is not very trust-
296 KE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
been the first to send word to Havelock that Bithur had been
evacuated by the Nana and his followers, and it was at least
probable that some useful information might, at a later period,
be derived from him. So he was kindly received, but not
without some cautionary words.
In the meanwhile Colonel Neill was making his way up to
Kanhpur. After the departure of Havelock, he
Neiii's depar- had been actively employed in maturing his
AU^hdtSd. arrangements for the defence of Allahabad, and
in endeavouring to collect troops from below.
In this last respect he had made no great progress ; for the
unsettled state of affairs at Banaras* made Colonel Gordon,
who thought that the latter place was of the two in the
greater danger, reluctant to diminish his military strength.
But he had pushed forward his defensive measures with
an elaborate completeness, which left nothing unconsidered,
scarcely anything undone. And when he found that his duty
summoned him to Kanhpur, to take a more active part in the
coming campaign, he drew up an elaborate paper of instructions
for the guidance of his successors, which he committed to the
care of Captain Drummond Hay.f On the important subject
of " Supplies " he wrote at some length. On the number and
disposition of the troops he next commented. "By order of
Government, this garrison is to be maintained at the strength
of six hundred and forty-five Europeans. Of these
u y ~ 15 ' I would not have more than three hundred and
forty -five inside the Fort, seventy in the Masjid, a Company
at the Railway Station near the Kushn Gardens, a Company at
Mr. Hodgson's house, and some in the Church in Cantonments.
worthy. He says that, on the 17th of July, he saw General Havelock and
General Neill near the Katwali at Kanhpur. But Neill did not arrive till
three days afterwards.
* " I look upon Banaras as much more exposed than Allahabad, inasmuch
as you have a regular fort, whereas our position as a military one is bad as
bad can be without fortifications. A few hundred Europeans separated from
the river by a city containing half a million of inhabitants, and the country
people already becoming more and more hostile every day, while we are at
any time exposed to an invasion from Oudh, via the unoccupied post of
Jaunpur." — Gordon to Neill. July 11.
t Of H.M.'s 78th. Colonel O'Brien had been appointed Neill's successor at
Allahabad, but he did not arrive in time to receive charge directly from
Neill.
1857.] KEILL AT ALLAHABAD. 297
. . . The church would be occupied by soldiers as a barrack."
Those were days when we could not afford to be nice in matters
of this kind, and such desecrations were of ordinary occurrence.
He wrote also of the state of the defences, pointing out all the
weak points ; of the Police ; of the Arsenal and the Ordnance
Stores ; of the Intelligence Department ; and, under the head
of " Hanging," he wrote, " I have always tried by general
court-martial any prisoners connected with the garrison, the
Provost hanging those so sentenced." Then, after precise
instructions relating to the families of officers and soldiers, to
the training of picked Infantry soldiers in the gun-drill, to
repair the distressing deficiency of Artillerymen, and to the
sanitary condition of barracks and other quarters for the soldiery,
he proceeded to speak of the operations to be undertaken in the
event of fresh manifestations of revolt. This section he headed
"Defensive Operations"; but he characteristically added, "I
prefer the offensive system." " If I had the power," he wrote,
" I should never permit an enemy to enter the City. With a
small force, in addition to a garrison sufficient to hold the
Fort, the City, Cantonment and all between the two rivers,
could be disputed for long against superior numbers. I would
hold Kydganj to the last, and if closely invested would cut
down the trees within fire and gunshot of the Fort, knock down
some garden walls near the Fort, and, if the enemy attempted
to assault from the Papamao or Banaras side, they could easily
be prevented crossing the river. I prefer the offensive system,
and always follow it when possible ; make frequent sharp
attacks, well planned and supported, using as much artillery,
nine-pounders if possible, as I could muster. The general
object is now to put down the parties moving about and
plundering villages ; Native troops (the Sikhs) answered well,
and did good service. When Europeans are en route, they
may be employed, but I would never send them out on pur-
pose, except in cases of emergency. Powcler-bags, to blow
in doors, &c, are useful things to have in this village. Also
rockets, when to be had, and persons who know the use of
them."
All this done for the continued security of the important
position which his energy had saved, Neill was
eager to go to the front. The opportunity was
before him. On the 15th of July he had received a telegraphic
message from the Commander-in-Chief, containing laudatory
298 RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
recognition of Havelock's victory before Fathpur, and of the
general conduct of the operations intrusted to him. With this
had come also an important addition : " But his (Havelock's)
health is not strong, and the season is very trying ; it is ur-
gently necessary, therefore, that provision should be made for
placing the command of the column in tried hands of known and
assured efficiency, in whom perfect confidence can be placed, in
case Havelock should become from any cause unfit for duty.
You have been selected for the post, and accordingly you will
proceed with every practicable expedition to join Havelock,
making over the command of Allahabad to the next senior
officer." The rank of Brigadier-General had been conferred on
Neill, and, thus stimulated by the feeling that he
had the full confidence of Government, he started
on the same evening for Kanhpur ; and on the morning of the
20th he arrived there and reported himself to the Commander
of the Force. " I had hardly seen General Havelock," he
wrote afterwards in a letter to a friend, " before he said to me :
* Now, General Neill, let us understand each other ; you have
no power or authority here whilst I am here, and you are not
to issue a single order. 5 " *
But it was arranged that whilst Havelock, being in chief
command, should mature his arrangements for
r j?nbpX. the crossing of the Ganges, Xeill should remain
in charge of Kanhpur. One of his first acts, after
hit? arrival, was to inquire into all the circumstances of the
recent massacres, and to do what he could to avenge them.
There are deeds which it is better to suffer the actor to chronicle
in his own words. In a letter before me, Colonel Neill, after
describing events already recorded in this narrative, says :
* It should be stated, however, that as Neill entered in his journal at the
time that he had been well received by Havelock, it may be assumed that
there was no discourtesy in the manner in which this intimation was
conveyed. See the following passage : " Got into Kanhpur about seven a.m.,
Monday 20th . . . and am well received by General Havelock. Poor
Captain Beatson, Adjutant-General, died of cholera, and Currie, of S4th,
died of his wound, a round shot in the side ; saw Benaud, his left leg taken
off, high up the thigh, looking very pale and ill. . . . Stephenson, with
remainder of Fusiliers, gone out to Bithiir with Cavalry and Sikhs to destroy
it. Cavalry with Barrow bring in gun in the forenoon. . . . General
Havelock informs me he will leave me at Kanhpur in command during his
absence. . . . Much plundering in the city by Sikhs, 64th, and 78th ; most
disgraceful."
1857.] NEILL AT KANHPtfR. 299
" The men were shot, the women and children were brought
up to a little bungalow near the Assembly-rooms. The Fath-
garh fugitives, such as were saved, were brought in there too.
I have sent a list of all and their fate. Upwards of two
hundred women and children were brought into
that house; many had been killed in the boats,
many killed and died in the intrenchments ; all who survived
fever, dysentery, and cholera, in the confinement in that house,
were barbarously murdered, after the receipt of the intelligence
of Havelock's first victory — this by the Nairn's order. They
were badly fed and treated at first, but afterwards got more
and clean clothing, and servants to wait on them. They were
sent their evening meal on that fatal day, and after it these
fiends rushed in and butchered them all ; they were shot and
hacked to pieces. The bodies of all who died there were
thrown into the well of the house, all the murdered also. I
saw that house when I first came in. Ladies' and children's
bloody torn dresses and shoes were lying about, and locks of
hair torn from their heads.* The floor of the one room they
were all dragged into and killed was saturated with blood.
One cannot control one's feelings. Who could be merciful to one
concerned ? Severity at the first is mercy in the end. I wish
to show the Natives of India that the punishment inflicted by
us for such deeds will be the heaviest, the most revolting to
their feelings, and what they must ever remeniber.f I issued
the following order, which, however objectionable in the
estimation of some of our Brahmanised infatuated elderly
gentlemen, I think suited to the occasion, or rather to the
present crisis . ' 25th July, 1857. The well in which are the
remains of the poor women and children so brutally murdered
* Other narrators have described the scene in similar language. Major
North says : " Tortured by the fierce thirst of revenge, and penetrated by
the sense of their sufferings, strange, wild feelings awoke within us. Vaunting,
eager, maddened, we sped onward to the dreary house of martyrdom, where,
their blood was outpoured like water : the clotted gore lay ankle deep on the
polluted floor, and also long tresses of silken hair, fragments of female
wearing apparel, hats, books-, children's toys, were scattered about in terrible
confusion." The alleged inscriptions on the walls were malicious or silly
forgeries.
f In another letter, Neill says : " My object is to inflict a fearful punish-
ment for a revolting, cowardly, barbarous deed, and to strike terror into these
rebels. . . . No one who has witnessed the scenes of murder, mutilation, and
massacre, can ever listen to the word « mercy ' as applied to these fiends."
300 RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
by this miscreant, the Nana, will be filled up, and neatly and
decently covered over to form their grave : a party of Euro-
pean soldiers will do so this evening, under the superintendence
of an officer. The house in which they were butchered, and
which is stained with their blood, will not be washed or cleaned
by their countrymen ; but Brigadier-General Neill has deter-
mined that every stain of that innocent blood shall be cleared
up and wiped out, previous to their execution, by such of the
miscreants as may be hereafter apprehended, who took an
active part in the mutiny, to be selected according to their
rank, caste, and degree of guilt. Each miscreant, after sentence
of death is pronounced upon him, will be taken down to the
house in question, under a guard, and will be forced into
cleaning up a small portion of the blood-stains ; the task will
be made as revolting to his feelings as possible, and the
Provost-Marshal will use the lash in forcing any one objecting
to complete his task. After properly clearing up his portion,
the culprit is to be immediately hanged, and for this purpose
a gallows will be erected close at hand.' — The first culprit was
a Subahdar of the 6th Native Infantry, a fat brute, a very-
high Brahman. The sweeper's brush was put into his hands
by a sweeper, and he was ordered to set to work. He had
about half a square foot to clean; he made some objection,
when down came the lash, and he yelled again ; he wiped it all
up clean, and was then hung, and his remains buried in the
public road. Some days after, others were brought in — one a
Muhammadan officer of our civil court, a great rascal, and one
of the leading men : he rather objected, was flogged, made to
lick part of the blood with his tongue. No doubt this is strange
law, but it suits the occasion well, and I hope I shall not be
interfered with until the room is thoroughly cleansed in this
way. ... I will hold my own, with the blessing and help of
God. I cannot help seeing that His finger is in all this — we
have been false to ourselves so often."
This story has been told before,* and with comments ol
various shades of opinion. It is very safe and easy in quiet
times, and in a Christian land, to condemn such acts as these
with placid judicial severity, for the sentence of condemnation
demands no thought, and is sure to evoke much sympathy.
But we must re-live that month of July, and transport our-
* It was first published, soon after the event, in an Ayrshire journal.
1857.] DEATH-PUNISHMENT WITH TORTURE. 301
selves to the threshold of the Bibigarh, rightly to estimate
them. If ever, in the history of human strife, it were righteous
to invest retribution with unknown terrors, it was whilst the
blood of our innocents was still red in the slaughter-house. It
was not that men, in ordinary conjunctures strong-headed and
tender-hearted, lost the power of discerning between right and
wrong in the face of the horrors that beset them, but that
many of the wisest and best amongst our people, sternly com-
posed in the midst of all excitements and bewilderments, de-
liberately harboured the conviction, that it was their duty to
put mercy far away from them, and to visit exceptional wicked-
ness with an exceptional severity of punishment. There was a
remorseless logic in the arguments on which they built up this
faith. It was contended that, as there were different degrees
of murder, there should also be different degrees of death-
punishment. Colonel John Nicholson, of whose heroic character
and illustrious career it will hereafter be my privilege to
write in detail, was eager to have a special Act passed, legalis-
ing in certain cases more cruel forms of execution — that is
to say, death with torture. " Let us," he wrote to Colonel
Edwardes, at the end of May, " propose a Bill for the flaying
alive, impalement, or burning of the murderers of the women
and children at Dehli. The idea of simply hanging the per-
petrators of such atrocities is maddening. I wish that I were
in that part of the world, that if necessary I might take the
law into my own hands." Again, a few days later, vehemently
urging this exceptional legislation : " You do not answer me
about the Bill for a new kind of death for the murderers and
dishonourers of our women.* I will propose it alone if you will
not help me. I will not, if I can help it, see fiends of that
stamp let off with simple hanging." Edwardes, it seems, was
naturally reluctant to argue the question with his energetic
friend; but Nicholson could not rid himself of the thought
that such acts of cruel retribution were justified in every sense,
and he appealed to Holy Writ in support of the logical argu-
ments which he adduced. Writing at a later period, he said,
" As regards torturing the murderers of the women and
children : If it be right otherwise, I do not think we should
refrain from it, because it is a Native custom. We are told in
* This was the mistake of the day. There had been no dishonouring of
our women, in the sense intended.
302 KE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPTJK. [1857.
the Bible that stripes shall be meted out according to faults,
and, if hanging is sufficient punishment for such wretches,
it is too severe for ordinary mutineers. If I had them in my
power to-day, and knew that I were to die to-morrow, I would
inflict the most excruciating tortures I could think of on them
with a perfectly easy conscience. Our English nature appears
to be always in extremes. A few years ago men (frequently
innocent) used to be tortured merely on suspicion. Now there
is no punishment worse than hanging, which is a very easy
death, for atrocities which could not be exceeded by fiends.
We have different scales of. punishment for different kinds of
theft, assault, forgery, and other crimes — why not for murder ? "
Kindred sentiments might be quoted from other sources.
Even the wisest and best in those days, though some might
. have shrunk from the open advocacy of torture, were prone to
think that instantaneous death to men, who perhaps gloried in
it as an anticipatory dismissal to eternal beatitude, was but an
inadequate requital for the enormous crimes that were com-
mitted against us. Christian piety, indeed, was not slow to
rebuke those who, in that conjuncture, had any bowels of com-
passion, making them reluctant to smite heavily at the perse-
cutors of our race. It was from one. of the purest hearts and
one of the soundest heads in all our Christian community that
the following remonstrance issued. It was addressed to Henry
Tucker, Commissioner of Banaras : " I fear in your case your
natural tenderness. But, consider that we have to crucify these
affections as well as our lusts. The magistrate bears not the
sword in vain. The Word of God gives no authority to the
modern tenderness for human life which would save even the
murderer. I believe that your duty now is to be firm and
resolute, to execute the law rigorously in its extreme penalties,
and to set your face as a flint against all concessions. It is
necessary in all Eastern lands to establish a fear and awe of
the Government. Then, and not till then, are its benefits
appreciated. Previously, they are ascribed to weakness. We
must be sternly, rigorously just against all treason, violence,
and treachery, and hand down a tradition of our severity.
Otherwise these troubles will recur." And even now, after
the lapse of many years, there are few righteous men who will
not readily accept this doctrine. What is dreadful in the
record of retribution is, that some of our people regarded it
not as a solemn duty or a terrible necessity, but as a devilish
1857.] PREPARATIONS FOR ADVANCE. 303
pastime, striking indiscriminately at the black races, and
slaying without proof of individual guilt. That Neill was
fully assured in his own mind that the men, on whom he had
inflicted the terrible punishment, thus described in his own
words, were among the actual perpetrators of the great crime
which he was called upon to punish, cannot be questioned ;
and we must all devoutly hope that he was right.
But the chastisement of the enemy was but a small part of
the work which then lay before the English
Generals. Their mission, indeed, was to save, not £SS£e!
to destroy. Havelock had reminded his followers
that the campaign was only begun — that Lakhnao was in peril,
Agra besieged, and Dehli still a focus of rebellion. And he had
written to Neill, saying, " The instant you join me, I will, by
the blessing of God, strike a blow that shall resound through
India." He uttered these words in the flush of victory, when
the excitement of battle had, perhaps, unhinged the habitual
caution of the sagacious commander. And, now that there was
a lull in the operations of the war, the difficulties which lay
before him presented themselves in their true proportions.
But, although less sanguine and confident than before, he was
not less determined to cross the river and to push on into Oudh
with the utmost possible despatch.
It was necessary, however, before all things, at that time to
secure the position of the detachment that was to
be left under the command of General Neill. ^Sj££ of
Havelock could ill spare a single man from the Ju i y i 9 _ 2 3.
little force with which he was to advance on
Lakhnao, and it was with reluctance that he consented to leave
so large a number as three hundred men for the defence of
Kanhpur. But, with the terrible experience of the past before
him, he felt that he could not do less. Uncertain as to^ the
position of his late antagonists — apprehending the probability
that, on his crossing the Ganges with the bulk of his force, a
large body of the Nana's troops would double back on Kanhpur
— Havelock had resolved from the first to select the most ad-
vantageous site for an intrenched camp, and before the arrival
of Neill the intrenchments had been commenced. "At a little
distance from the common ferry," says Havelock's biographer,*
* Marshman's Life of Havelock.
304 KE-OCCUPATION OF Ki.NHPtrR. [1857.
" there was an elevated plateau, about two hundred yards in
length and a hundred in breadth, situated on the bank of
the river. At the distance of about five hundred yards
from it there was an island on the river, partly submerged
in this season of the year. Between it and the Oudh Bank
were two smaller islands of alluvial land, thrown up by
the action of the river, but covered with water two or three
feet deep, and visible only from the reeds which spring up
upon them. The General was of opinion that these islands
might be turned to good account, if he was obliged to recross
the river, while the intrenchment on the right bank would
effectually cover that operation. On this mound, accordingly,
a field-work capable of accommodating and also of being defended
by three hundred men was commenced on the 19th, and pushed
on with extraordinary vigour." * The work was done by Native
day-labourers chiefly from the city. The offer of good wages,
paid regularly every evening, brought us the ready services of
hundreds — nay, thousands of men, careless of what government
or what race were in the ascendant, so long as they could eat,
and smoke, and sleep, with certainty and without molestation.
Disarmed and dismounted troopers of the Irregular Horse were
also set to work at the trenches ; and any skilled Europeans,
willing to help, were retained, and their assistance paid for by
the State.
So Neill found the works already in progress when he arrived,
and they grew beneath the hands of the great swarm of labourers
with surprising rapidity. His quick soldierly eye saw at once
that there were some defects in the position ; but he admitted
that none better could have been selected. Whilst the workmen
plied their shovels, our baggage was sent into the intrenchments,
and the two Generals went about collecting the guns which
were to defend the works in course of construction.! Then the
* Mr. Sherer, in his official report, says : " General Neill was left with a
garrison of less than two hundred men to hold Kauhptir." There can be
no doubt, bowever, tbat the number stated by Mr. Marsbman is tbe more
correct. General Neill himseif, writing on the 22nd, says: "I shall have
nearly tbree hundred men of all kinds."
t See tbe following extracts from General Neill's Journal, which illustrate
the narrative of these proceedings : " Wednesday, 22nd. — Heavy rain tbis
morning — ride out to see intrencbrnent — don't like tbe ground about it, but
suspect there is no better position. Have a long talk witb the General about
it. . . . Go with General to see the Arsenal ; it is entirely destroyed ; in a
bad position. There are some brass dismounted guns there, also three large
1857.] THE NEW INTRENCHMENTS. 305
sick were sent in, and every preparation made for sheltering
and providing for the effective garrison. And whilst this was
being done, arrangements were being made for
the conveyance of the bulk of Havelock's force Abridgements
across the waters of the Ganges. The old bridge for crossing
of boats had been, for all practical purposes, theRlver -
destroyed ; and now the steamer, which had brought Spurgin
and his party up from Allahabad, was employed in collecting
boats ; but it was a work of no small difficulty to obtain them.
Boatmen, too, were wanting, for men of this class, conscious
that they had aided and abetted the foul murder of our people,
had prudently dispersed on our reappearance on the scene. But,
after a while, some were induced to return to their craft, on a
promise of indemnity for past offences. A number of them were
enrolled into a corps, and organised on a fixed scale of payment.*
There were many, at that time, who, as they had believed
that it was easy " to make short work of Dehli,"
believed also that the relief of Lakhnao would be St Yn oudhf lrs
attended with no kind of difficulty. Even in
Havelock's camp it seemed to some to be an easy task to make
iron ones in carriages. These, with all the guns here, are being taken down
to the intrenched position. . . . There is great plundering going on by the
troops — most disgraceful — and on the part of Commandants, more par-
ticularly the 64th; a disinclination to prevent their men misconducting
themselves. I should have adopted very decided steps with all these
regiments, and this force at first, but this has been neglected. All have
taken to plundering, and the example set by officers has been very bad
indeed ; the plundering of the merchants and shopkeepers in the city by
bands of soldiers and Sikhs has been most outrageous, and there has been no
check to it. Orders here seem to be unattended to. Pistols and guns fired
off in camp. Colonel Tytler informs me the want of attention to orders by
Commandants of Corps and others is disgraceful, and I see it plainly. I
suppose no force ever marched with a set of so inferior commanding officers.
I fear General Havelock will not go off in time he expected; the difficulties
in crossing the Ganges are very great. Thursday, 23rd. — Agreeably to orders
of yesterday, send all sick down to intrenchment, get baggage down, and
start myself with Gordon and Bruce. . . . Governor-GeneraUs proclamation
giving rewards for capture of rebels and bringing back property, pub-
lished and promulgated in the bazaars, and all about— get copies printed off,
Heavy rain at night. The intrenched position has no strength— except with
three times the men— but I will hold it."
* " See Tytler— arrange about a corps of boatmen. He sends me part of
a note he has sent to General Havelock about my going with him So
I may be off soon— set my house in order, as it were. Arrange about what I
shall take and what leave behind, &c, &c."— General NeilVs Journal, July
25. MS.
VOL. II. 3C
306 RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857-
good the march to the Oudh capital. The distance was not
great, but it was not a question of distance. The whole of
Oudh was up in arms against us. It was no more than any-
sane man, acquainted with the circumstances that had attended
and the events which had followed the annexation of the king-
dom of Oudh, must have involuntarily predicted. The passions
of all the influential classes were roused, and their antagonism
stimulated to the utmost, against us. The remnant of the old
Court of Lakhnao, the Soldiery, the Landed Aristocracy, were
all arrayed against the power that had trodden them down into
the dust. It was not strange, therefore, that before the end of
June there had been mutiny and rebellion in nearly every station
throughout the province. Moreover, it was the great nursery
of the Sipahis of the Bengal Army. Every village held the
homes and families of men who were fighting against us ; and,
therefore, bristled with our enemies. Our regular regiments
had ripened rapidly in rebellion. For a little space Sir Henry
Lawrence had believed that he might play off the Irregulars
against the battalions of the Line.* But they were composed
of the same elements ; and in Oudh, as in other parts, this faith
was soon stripped of all that had sustained it, and stood out as
a naked delusion. The great "Ikbal" of the Company was
fast waning, and even our friends forsook us, believing us to be
weak. There was little hope, indeed, from any source but from
the wisdom of our leaders and from the courage of our English
fighting-men. Of all these conditions, so hostile to British
supremacy in Oudh, I shall write more fully in another part of
this narrative. It is sufficient in this place to give a brief
account of the results, which had developed themselves — re-
sults obstructive in the extreme to the advance of Havelock's
army.
These results, as apparent at the end of June, were thus
* At the end of May, Sir Henry Lawrence had written to Lord Canning,
saying: "Hitherto the country has been quiet, and we have played the
Irregulars against the Line regiments. But being constituted of the same
materials, the taint is fast pervading them, and, in a few weeks, if not days,
unless in the interim Dehli be captured, there will be one feeling throughout
the army — a feeling that our prestige is gone — and that feeling will be more
dangerous than any other. Religion, fear, hatred, one and all, have their
influences ; but there is still a reverence for the Company's Ikbal. When
it is gone, we shall have few friends, indeed." [Ikbal anglice, Prestige, Good
Fortune.— G. B. M.]
1857.] STATE OF OUDH. 307
described by Mr. Gubbins * in a letter to Lord Canning :
" Every corps at every station in the province has mutinied,
and the districts now are in a state of anarchy. Talukdars are
forcibly resuming their former villages, and burning and slaying
all who oppose them. Old feuds are again breaking out, and
fighting, both with guns, musketry, &c, is going on in every
quarter, more or less. The head Civil Authority having been
forced in each instance to abandon his Saclr Station ; his
Thanas and Tahsils have gone also, and there is no restraint
on violence and anarchy. Did the mutineers pass through and
away, civil officers might again go out, and order might again
be restored ; but they are not gone, and are hanging about the
province, looking for an opportunity of attacking Lakhnao.
This I believe they will never obtain, and they are meanwhile
melting daily away. The following is the present aspect of
the stations of mutineers in the province : Khairabad Division
(Sitapur, Mohamdi, and Malaon) — Entirely abandoned. There
was a terrible massacre of the Europeans of Shahjahanpur and
Mohamdi. Of the mutinous troops, the 41st Native Infantry
and 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry have gone towards Dehli ;
and eleven hundred men, the remains of the 9th Oudh Irregular
Infantry and Police Corps, are at Mahmudabad, forty miles
hence, trying to induce the Talukdars to join, and daily melting
away. — Lakhnao Division (Lakhnao, Onao, Daryabad) : Lakhnao,
and eight miles round it, is all that remains orderly in Oudh.
We hold two posts, the Residency and Machhi Bhawan, besides
a miserable European force in cantonment. The Machhi Bhawan
is imposing for the townspeople ; but the Natives know, and
our engineers have declared, it to be utterly untenable. Should,
therefore, a siege be attempted, it will be blown up. The
works at the Residency have been greatly strengthened,
including my residence and others, and really a prolonged
defence can be made. At Daryabad is the 5th Oudh Irregular
Infantry in mutiny, but with numbers diminished. They have
boen joined by Fisher's Horse (15th), and the 8th Oudh
Irregular Infantry from Sultanpur. — Bahrdiclt Division : the 2nd
and 3rd Oudh Irregular Infantry, and Tulloh's Battery, and a
hundred Horse, in mutiny, have not yet crossed the Ghughra ;
are waiting. — Faizdbdd Division : this was the most dangerous
* Martin Gubbins, Financial Commissioner of Oudh— brother of Frederick
Gubbins, of Banaras.
x 2
308 RE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
quarter; the 22nd Native Infantry, the 17th from Azamgarh :
the 6th Oudh Irregular Infantry, part of the 15th Oudb
Cavalry, and Mill's Battery making up the mutineers there.
This is dissipating somewhat — the 15th Oudh Horse having
turned towards (as we believe) Kanhpur. Sultanpur abandoned
and burnt ; many Europeans killed. Saloni : ditto ; Europeans
saved."
Such was the state of things that had grown up in Oudh,
whilst the English at Kanhpur had been engaged in that fatal
struggle for existence which has been narrated in the preceding
chapters. Notwithstanding all these reverses, there had been
great confidence in the final issue, and, from one end of the
country to the other, men felt that Sir Henry Lawrence was a
tower of strength. But the month of June had closed in darkly
and sadly upon the Lakhnao garrison. On the last day of the
month, the English had been disastrously defeated in battle at
Chinhat. July had dawned upon the siege of Lakhnao. And
Havelock's victorious entrance into KanhjDur had been saddened
by the news which met him — that one of the first victims of
that siege had been Henry Lawrence himself. The General
had known him well in old times. They had served together
in Afghanistan; and were associated by bonds of mutual
esteem and affection.* And none knew better than Havelock
the loss which the country had sustained. But little time was
left for the indulgence of personal or public sorrow. The first
thoughts of the General were to be given to the living, not to
the dead. It was plain to him that our beleaguered people in
Lakhnao were in deadly peril, and that all depended, under
Providence, upon the rapidity with which he could make good
his march to the Oudh capital. He felt, too, that the work
before him was not restricted to the relief of Lakhnao. He did
not, at first, appreciate the full extent of the difficulties which
beset his course, and, in the enthusiasm born of success, ho
thought that, having relieved Lakhnao, he might either march
to the reinforcement of the Army before Dehli, which was still
holding out with undiminished effrontery, or he might operate
* " Their acquaintance had commenced sixteen years before, amidst the
embarrassments in Af'ghnnistan, and it had gradually ripened into a sacred
friendship, under the influence of that mutual appreciation and esteem by
which great minds are attracted to each other." — Marshman's Life of
Havelock.
1357.] GENERAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY. 309
effectually in other parts of the country, for the suppression of
the mutiny and rebellion which in the North-Western Provinces
had now become almost universal.
For from many parts of Upper India evil tidings had reached
the Kanhpur commanders. Disaster had followed
disaster with astounding rapidity. Almost every General con-
day brought a new story of mutiny and massacre Country. 116
— a new list of murdered men, women, and chil-
dren. Some stories were more terrible, some lists were longer
than others ; but ever there was the same sad, but not inglorious,
record of chivalrous action and heroic endurance on the part of
the Few, and of cruelty and cowardice on the part of the Many.
The gigantic horror of Kanhpur dwarfed all other calamities
that had overtaken our people. But there were other crimes
committed in that month of June light only when weighed
against the burden of guilt borne by the butcher of Bithur.
In Jhansi — one of Lord Dalhousie's annexations by Kio-ht of
Lapse * — there had been an insurrection headed by the liani,
with a great destruction of English life. Nearly all Bunddel-
khand was bristling up in arms against us. 'The troops of
Sindhia and Ilolkar had mutinied and cast in their lot with the
Purbiahs of the Company's army ; and many of our people had
perished miserably in the territories of those princes, though as
yet there were no signs of the hostility of the Durbars. ' Hio-her
up in Bohilkhand not only were the Sipahis in mutiny,
murdering their officers, but the country was in rebellion, and
Muhammadan rule was proclaimed under the vice-royalty of
Khan Bahadur Khan. Hansi and Hisar had seen their own
tragedies ; and there had been other episodes of the most
painful interest to stir English hearts to their depths. In
the Pan jab, although it seemed that we were riding out the
storm, strained to the utmost but not yielding to its blows, it
was becoming plain that the Bengal regiments were breaking
into revolt, and streaming down to swell the tide of rebellion
at the great centre of Dehli. And ever as week followed week,
though false rumours, too readily accepted, of the capture of
the great imperial stronghold reached the lower country, only
to sow the seeds of future disappointment, the Mughul capital
was held by the mutinous troops that had proclaimed the
supremacy of Bahadur Shah.
* See vol. i., p. 66.
310 KE-OCCUPATION OF KAXHPUE. [1857.
From Agra — then the seat of the Government of the North-
Western Provinces — the tidings were not assuring. The great
provincial capital, which all through the month of May had
been held in security, though not without much doubt and
anxiety, had in June been beleaguered by an enemy, which, in
the shape of the mutinous regiments from Nimach and
Nasirabad, had marched down to attack the second city in
Hindustan. And whilst Lieutenant-Governor Colvin and all
his Chief Officers had been shut up at Agra, the districts under
his charge had been rolling away from him. That great
triumph of British administration, so vaunted, so believed —
the Settlement of the North- Western Provinces — had suddenly
collapsed. For a time there was a great revolution of landed
property, and almost all that the English had decreed had
been down-trodden with a remorseless heel, as though what we
had done and boasted had been purposely done in violent scorn
of the genius and instincts of the people. Even the Supreme
Government, in the first week of July, were constrained to
admit that" the North-Westem Provinces were for the moment
lost." * However humiliating the fact may have been, it was
a fact. Our latest administrative triumphs had crumbled
away at our feet.
There was some comfort in the thought that the main bodies
of the Madras and Bombay armies had not fallen away from their
allegiance. But it was hard to say what any hour might bring
forth. One Bombay regiment was rising ; there were threaten-
ing movements in the Southern Maratha Country, and more
than a suspicion that the old adherents of the Eajahs of Satarah
were in league with the representatives of the Peshwas. The
Bombay services in the persons of Brigadier Le-Grand Jacob
and Messrs. Bose and Seton-Karr were emulating the good
deeds of their brethren in Bengal, and Lord Elphinstone was
nobly vindicating the confidence which the British Government
had reposed in him, by placing him, for a second time, at the
head of an Indian presidency. It was not beyond the pale of
* " The Bengal Native Army wns in mutiny ; the North-Westem Provinces
were for the moment lost : the King of Dehli and our treacherous Sipahis
were proclaiming a new Empire ; small bodies of gallant Englishmen were
holding out in isolated stations against fearful odds; the revolt was still
extending ; and the hearts of all Englishmen in India were daily torn by
accounts of the massacre, and worse than massacre, of their women and
children." — Government of India to Court of Directors, July 4, 1857.
1857.] GENEKAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY. 311
probability that Western India would soon be in a blaze.
Then, in the Dakhin, there was the great Muhamuiadan State
of Haidarabad, where the Nizam, guided and supported by his
accomplished minister, Salar Jang, holding fast to the English
alliance, still doubted whether they could much longer restrain
their troops, if Dehli continued to defy the English Government
and to baffle all the efforts of its armies. The great chiefs of
Rajputana had as yet given no sign ; but if Western India were
to rise, the contagion might spread to them, and, in such cir-
cumstances, it would have been difficult to calculate the em-
barrassments of having a hostile country intersecting our
communications between our leading positions on the East and
on the West. Nipal professed fidelity to her alliance, and was
willing to lend us an auxiliary body of troops to operate upon
Oudh; but there were those who believed that on the first
symptom of disaster, they would be eager to turn against us ;
and that, in any case, the enlistment of such allies would be a
confession of weakness, which would inflict a severe moral
injury on our Government. In whatsoever direction we turned
our eyes there was not a gleam of comfort to be seen.
By the 25th of July, Havelock's little army had crossed the
Ganges. It had been a work beset with difficulties ;
but the practical energy of Colonel Tytler had Crossing the
surmounted them. The whole were now on the j u iy 25
Oudh side of the river. The entire force consisted
of about fifteen hundred men, with ten guns imperfectly
equipped and inefficiently manned. There was, as before, a
great dearth of Cavalry. Excellent as it was in all soldierly
qualities, this little band of volunteer Horse mustered only
sixty sabres. It was in truth a veiy weak Brigade, such as
only the glorious audacity of the English could have con-
ceived for a moment to be capable of accomplishing the work
before it. The hopes of the Lakhnao garrison had been raised by
something like a promise of relief in the little space of five or
six days.* But it was one that now seemed to
be beyond the reach of fulfilment. And the Jul r 25 - 28 -
wonder is not that the difficulties of the enterprise should have
* See the following extract from Mr. Martin Gubbins's 'Mutinies in
Oudh.' On the 22nd or 23rd of July, the trusty spy Angad arrived with
tidings of Havelock's arrival at Kanhpur. " We had, it will be remembered,"
312 KE-OCCUPATION OF KANHPUR. [1857.
forced themselves upon Havelock's mind, in all their real
magnitude, when he found himself across the Ganges, but
that he should for a moment have made light of them. The
week between the 21st and 28th of July had brought with it
an amount of knowledge of the circumstances which sur-
rounded him very fatal to the sanguine views which he had
•encouraged on his first arrival at Kanhpiir. On the 28th he
was at Mangalwar — it cannot be said encamped. That he
might move as lightly and rapidly as possible, he had advanced
without the impediment of tents, " Some," it has been
narrated by an officer of the force, " were fortunate enough to
get native huts ; some managed to get native vaults, in which
over-crowding was the rule ; while the Sikh soldiers ingeniously
rigged up thatched huts for themselves." * There was need,
for the rain fell, day after day, in torrents, after
July 23 ^ Q m anner of an Indian July, and cholera had
broken out in the force. There was nothing to cheer or to
animate the leader but the one hope of saving the garrison of
Lakhnao. " I have this morning," wrote Havelock to Sir Patrick
Grant, who had suggested that the enterprise was a hazardous
one, " received a plan of Lakhnao from Major Anderson, engineer
in that garrison, and much valuable information in two memo-
randa, which escaped the enemy's outpost troops, and were
partly written in Greek characters.! These communications,
and much information orally derived from spies, convince me of
the extreme delicacy and difficulty of any operation to relieve
says the Financial Commissioner, "received no single iota of intelligence
since the siege began ; and now Angad recounted to us the marvellous tale of
a handful of men under Havelock' having defeated the Nana in three
engagements, and being actually at the moment master of Kanhpiir. The
news was astounding. We had all along been expecting that the Nana
would cross the river and join the besieging force, if he had not actually done
so already. I examined Angad strictly, and came to the conclusion that the
joyful and wondrous news was true." — " Many perrons had entertained great
doubt of the truth of Angad's information. But their doubts were happily
removed by his reappearance at my post on the night of the 25th of July ;
and this time he brought a letter. It was a reply by Colonel Fraser Tytler
to the letter which Angad had carried from me, and confirmed the intelligence
which Angad had previously given me. Colonel Tytler wrote that the General's
force was sufficient to defeat the enemy, that the troops were then crossing
the river, and that we might hope to meet in five or six days."
* Calcutta Review, vol. xxxii., Article, " Havelock's Indian Campaign."
f These had been brought by Angad, the spy, of whom mention has been
made in a former note.
1857.] THE ADVANCE INTO OUDH. 313
Colonel Inglis, now commanding in Lakhnao. It shall be
attempted, however, at every risk, and the result faithfully-
reported. " *
So Havelock marched on — Kanhpur with its ghastly memories
behind him; before him, at Lakhnao, the great
horror of a catastrophe still more tragic and over- ^n^oudh 06
whelming; around him everywhere a multitude j u iy29.
of mutinous soldiers and an armed population,
hostile to the core ; and with him only the fearlessness of the
Englishman to make headway against these terrific odds.
* Marshman's Life of Havelock.
314 FIEST CONFLICTS IN THE PAN JAB. [1857.
BOOK VI.— THE PAN JAB AND DEHLI.
[May— July, 1857.]
t
CHAPTER I.
FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB.
Although to Lord Canning it had appeared that the most for-
midable dangers which threatened the security of
Ma y- the Anglo-Indian Empire took shape in the lower
St pan°lb the countries, because those countries were almost
wholly destitute of the defence of European troops,
he saw far off, at the furthest extremity of our British dominions,
other great perils scarcely less in degree, but of a widely dif-
ferent kind, and counteracted by more favourable conditions.
In the lower provinces he feared the malice of the Native
soldiery. In the Panjab he dreaded, most of all, the enmity of
the people. Sipahi regiments were scattered all over the Sikh
country ; but the province was, indeed, the great European
^arrison of British India. The strength of English manhood
may have been slight in relation to the actual defensive re-
quirements of our frontier-province abutting upon the Afghan
country, from which, even from remote periods, succeeding
dynasties had looked for the stream of foreign invasion — small,
too, in comparison with the numerical power of the Native
regiments, regular and irregular, which were posted in all
parts of the Panjab. But even with the mysterious failure of
Mirath before his eyes, the Governor-General was full of con-
fidence when he counted up the European regiments on the
frontier, and felt that they might overawe the Sipahis. Yet
he could not help regarding with some disquieting appre-
hensions the state of the general population of the province.
Little more than seven years had passed since the Empire of
1857.] FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. 315
Ranjit Singh had been brought under the yoke of the English.
The State had been overthrown by the soldiery. It was the
license of its military bands that had unintentionally opened to
us the gates of the country of the Five Rivers, and the same
power, revived or reawakened, might now cast us out, and
restore for a while the dynasty of the Singhs. Men of the
most sanguine temperament, inflated well-nigh to bursting
with national self-love, could hardly believe that the Sirdars of
the Panjab, who had lost so much by the conquest of their
country, had become wholly reconciled to British rule and
eager to perpetuate it. The truth embodied in a few pregnant
words by the greatest master of common sense that the world
has ever seen — " So many overthrown estates, so
many votes for troubles " — could not be ignored
at such a time. Then there was that other great fount of
danger — " disbanded soldiery " — which might send forth a
sudden torrent to swell the great stream of trouble.* " Walled
towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse,
chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like,"
wrote the same great master—" all this is but a sheep in lion's
skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and
warlike." The breed and disposition of the Sikhs were stout
and warlike. We could not regard with contempt the military
prowess of the nation which had sent forth the men who, in the
great battles of the Satlaj, had taxed to the utmost the skill
and valour of Hardinge and Gough, with the best troops of the
British Empire at their back, and had driven our Dragoons like
sheep before them on the plain of Chilianwala.
Nor was the only danger which threatened the position of
the British in our great frontier province, that which glared
upon us from the Panjab itself. Beyond the border were tur-
bulent tribes, occupying the Afghan passes, whom it had been
our policy now to bribe, now to awe, into submission. An
irruption of these predatory hordes into the plain of Peshawar
would have caused wide-spread confusion, in the midst of
which bodies of Afghan Horse, led, perhaps, by one of the
* The numbers, however, must not be exaggerated. The remains of the
Panjabi Army, after the second Sikh war, probably did not exceed 26,000
men. Of these about 10,000 were Sikhs, 7,000 Panjabi Muhammadans,
4,000 hill Kajputs, 4,000 Hindustanis, and 1,000 Gurkahs. About 4,000 of
these old soldiers were enlisted into the Panjab Irregular Force, and an
equal number into the Military Police.
316 FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PAN JAB. [1857.
chiefs of the Barukzai family of Kabul, might have streamed
down upon our position, and burying, as they had before done,
all jealousies and animosities in the grave of a common purpose,
might have allied themselves with the Sikhs, and swept the
English out of the country. But thinking of this, Lord Canning
thought also of the recent subsidiary treaty with Dost Mu-
hammad, of the friendship that had been outwardly established
between the two nations, and, above all, of the fact that the
strongest feelings of self-interest dictated to the Amir a course
of neutrality at such a time, and that love of English money
was stronger than hatred of the English race. Thankfully
and hopefully, he remembered the wise advice of Edwai des and
the admirable diplomacy of Lawrence ; * and he ceased to be
troubled by the thought of an Afghan invasion, tremendous as
would have been the disaster if it had come upon us at such a
time.
There were some other circumstances, too, in our favour.
The population of the Panjab was a mixed population. There
were national and religious diversities, which forbade the
union and concentration which gave force even to the feeble.
In other parts of our Empire there were diversities of faith,
but long contact had rubbed off the angularities which kept
them apart, and in the Hinduised Muhammadan, or the Muham-
madanised Hindu, might be seen something almost amounting
to fusion." But there was a gulf between the Sikhs and the
Muhammadans of the Panjab — between both and the people of
Hindustan. The Sikhs learnt with no feeling of joy or sym-
pathy that the King of Dehli had been proclaimed in his old
capital, and that Muhammadanism was likely again to be
dominant in Upper India. They called to mind exciting
national prophecies, which said that the Sikhs would some day
stream down to the sack of Dehli ; and the old greed of plun-
der was revived strenuously within them. It might be better
for them, at first, to cast in their lot with the Faringhis,
whose hour would come sooner or later; it was too soon to
strike then. There was some comfort in this thought. There
was comfort, too, in the remembrance that the Panjab had
been disarmed ;- that the warlike population of the conquered
country no longer went about with swords at their sides, or
had firelocks stored in their houses. In all such cases it is
* Ante, vol. i., p. 316, et seq.
1857] FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS. 317
probable that the disarmament is but partial ; for whilst the
searchings of authority are active, many implements of war are
buried in the ground, or hidden in stacks or thatches, ready to
be exhumed or extracted from their hiding-places, if necessity
for their use should arise. Still the danger from that source
of many arms in the hands of men knowing how to use them
though not, perhaps, wholly removed, had been greatly di-
minished ; and in numerous instances the sword had ' been
turned into the ploughshare or the reaping-hook, and soldiers
had settled down into the peaceful ways of agricultural life.
That they felt the benefits of a strong and a just Government
after the years of unrest which had followed the death of
Ranjit Singh is not to be doubted ; and their martial instincts
might have been dying out under the subduing influences of a
reign of order.
These circumstances were to be counted up in our favour;
and there was one more to be added to the account. As the
country below the Satlaj had been well-nigh swept of its
military strength to garrison the Panjab, so also might it be
said that the lower provinces had been drained of the best
energies of the political and civil branches of the service to
govern and to administer it. Lord Canning, ever hopeful and
sanguine ; and, manly himself, appreciating the power of indi-
vidual manhood in others, looked confidently towards the
country in which John Lawrence and his lieutenants stood
vigilant and ready for action. Resolute that the Panjab should
in all senses be a success, Lord Dalhousie had looked around
him for men of good performance and of good promise, and the
flower of the two services was planted there when he handed
over the Government of India to his successor. There Robert
Montgomery and Donald Macleod, afterwards Chief Rulers of
the Province, filled the places next in rank to the Chief
Commissionership. There Thornton and Roberts, Barnes and
Ricketts, of the one service — Edwardes and Nicholson, Becher
and Lake, Taylor and James, of the other, and many other
resolute and sagacious men, were teaching the people to respect
and love them. There, too, was that famous Panjab Irregular
Force raised by the Lawrences, and commanded by Neville
Chamberlain, with picked officers under him — men such as
Coke, Wilde, Daly, and others of the same stamp — a force of
horse and foot, trained alike to activity and to endurance
amidst the difficulties of a mountain frontier eight hundred
318 FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
miles in extent, and little likely, it was believed, to sympathise
with the Purbiah regiments of Hindustan. If anywhere
throughout our Indian dominions confidence could be placed
in the men whose lot it would be to grapple with the dangers
rising up before them, it was in the " pet province " of Lord
Dalhousie. No man knew better than Lord Canning how all
might be lost by individual feebleness, or all might be won by
individual strength. All had been lost at Mirath and Dehli ;
but he had abundant faith in Lawrence and in those who
worked under him in the Panjab ; and as days passed, and he
learnt, somewhat slowly by reason of postal and telegraphic
interruptions, the events which were developing themselves in
that province, he felt more and more assuredly that his con-
fidence was not misplaced. Of these events I now proceed to
speak.
The summer heats had driven Sir John Lawrence from
Labor. The ceaseless labour of years had weak-
EiwSpind? ene ^ a ro ^ ust frame and impaired a naturally
strong constitution. A visit to England had
been recommended to him ; but with that great love of his
work, which was shared by all who worked under him in the
Panjab, he was reluctant to leave the country so long as he
could do his duty with manifest advantage to the State. But
he had recognised the necessity of consenting to a compromise,
and going out half-way to meet the urgency of the case.*
There were cool and pleasant places within the range of the
great province which he administered — places in which he
might do his work, during the extreme heats of the summer
weather, without the waste of strength, which could not be
arrested at Lahor. So he had been wont, in the month of 3 [ay,
to repair to the refreshing slopes of the Marri Hills; and
thither he was this year bound, when the first tidings of the
disastrous events at Mirath and Dehli were brought by tele-
graph to the Panjab. Then he stood fast at Rawalpindi, a spot
from which he could observe well all that was passing in the
Panjab, and looking down, as it were, from an eminence on the
* On the 13th of May, Sir John Lawrence, in a letter to Colonel Edwardes,
wrote : " I have been very unwell and unable to write. The night before
last I put some aconite on my temple. It is a deadly poison. In the night
it worked into my eye, and I was nearly blinded."
1857.] EOBERT MONTGOMERY. 319
varied scene below, could issue mandates to his lieutenants all
over the country, and make his presiding genius felt beyond
the limits of the province he governed.
Next in authority to the Chief Commissioner was the Judicial
Commissioner. Mr. Eobert Montgomery was a
Bengal civilian of thirty years' standing in the Montgomery 'at
service. A member of a good Irish Protestant Lihor.
family, he had been taught and disciplined in early youth at
that school which had imparted the rudiments of education to
the Lawrences. There, on the banks of the Foyle, these young
contemporaries had become familiar with the stirring watch*
words of Derry : " No surrender ! " There, if they did not
acquire much classic lore, they laid broad and deep the foun-
dations of a manly character. Hardy, robust, and well-dis-
ciplined, they went forth into the world by different paths ; but
time brought the Derry boys again together to sit beside each
other on the same Bench, and to learn the same great lessons.
When the Labor Board of Administration was dissolved, Henry
and John Lawrence and Eobert Montgomery were its members.
On the institution of the new administrative system, under the
Chief Commissionership of John Lawrence, Mr. Montgomery
became Judicial Commissioner.* There were some character-
istic differences between him and his chief; but they lay
mainly on the surface. An unmistakable benevolence of
aspect, and a rare gentleness of manner, might have led some
to suppose that he was one made to shine only in quiet times
and in happy circumstances. But the genial smile and the
kindly voice, which won all hearts, denoted not the absence of
that resolute will and that stern courage which spoke out so
plainly in the look and bearing of the Chief Commissioner. It
only needed a great occasion to show that he could be hard
as a rock and cruel as steel to resist the oppressions of the
proud, and to smite the persecutors of our race. And those
who knew him best said of him that it was a fortunate cir-
* During the existence of the Labor Board of Administration, Mont-
gomery, who was a civilian of the Thomasonian school, who had graduated
in the North-Western Provinces, concurred in the opinions and supported
the views of John more frequently than those of Henry Lawrence ; but at a
later period, his measures both in Oudh and the Panjab indicated his mature
acceptance of the principles and policy of the latter. In no one have the
Native aristocracy found a more generous advocate than in Sir Eobert
Montgomery.
320 FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
cumstance that they had then at Lahor, as chief director of
affairs, one who was a man of impulse, with whom to think was
to act, and whose very defects, including a want of caution and
circumspection, were of a kind to be essentially serviceable in
such a conjuncture.
The hour of the great crisis found Mr. Montgomery at the
civil station of Anarkali, situated at the distance
state of the of a mile from the Panjabi capital. In the city of
mSm!t. Lahor itself there was a mixed population, num-
bering nearly a hundred thousand, the most
numerous classes being Sikhs and Muhammadans, many of
them born soldiers. The Fort, which was within the walls
of the city, was garrisoned by a company of an European
regiment, some details of European artillery, and half a regiment
of Sipahis. These detachments for garrison duty were relieved
at fixed intervals, and returned to the cantonment of Mian-Mir,
six miles from Lahor, where the great bulk of our military
force was posted. At that station were three regiments of
Native Infantry and a regiment of Native Cavalry, watched by
the 81st Foot and two troops of European Horse Artillery.
Two of the Sipahi regiments were among the most distinguished
in the service. The 16th Grenadiers was one of the "beautiful
regiments " which had fought under Nott against the Afghans
of Kandahar, and the 26th had done so well under Pollock,
that Lord Ellenborough had made it a Light Infantry corps.
The other Native regiments were the 49th Infantry and the
8th Cavalry. Eoughly computed, it may be said that the
Native troops outnumbered the Europeans as four to one.
On Monday, the 11th of May, it was known at Lahor that the
Mirath regiments had revolted. On the morning of
the 12th came the still more exciting intelligence
that Dehli was in the hands of the rebels. The
tremendous significance of these tidings was not likely to be
underrated by a man of Montgomery's intelligence and ex-
perience. But it did not bewilder him for a moment. He saw
clearly that the safety of India dopended at such a time on the
salvation of the Panjab. The Pan jab in the hands of the
enemy, and all Upper India must be lost. It was certain that
the great arsenal of Dehli had gone from us ; it was impossible
to exaggerate the helplessness of the English if the magazines
of the Panjab and the adjacent territories were also to be
wrested from them. Any success on the part of the Regular
1857.] SYMPTOMS OF SEDITION. 321
Sipahi regiments might stimulate all the Irregular battalions
in the Panjab to revolt, and this might be followed by a
rising of the people. But it was not equally clear how this
gigantic evil was to be arrested. Understanding well the
Native character, Montgomery knew that the Sipahi was not
less likely to be driven into hostility by his fears than by his
resentments. It might, therefore, be the safer course to keep
things quiet, and to betray no symptom of suspicion. But, on
the other hand, it was impossible to overrate the advantage of
striking the first blow. The party that is first to be the party
of action has a double chance of success.
But the general knowledge that there was a spirit of mutiny
in the Bengal Army might not have induced the authorities at
Lahor to take the initiative, and might not have justified them
in doing it, if there had been no particular knowledge of local
disaffection among the Tanjabi troops. This knowledge,
however, had been obtained. On a suggestion from Mr. Mont-
gomery, Captain Richard Lawrence, Chief of the Police and Thagi
Departments in the Panjab, had commissioned the head-writer
of the Thagi office, a Brahman of Oudh, to ascertain the feelings
and intentions of the Lahor troops. A fitter agent could not
have been employed, fur his were both the country and the caste
of the most influential of the Purbiah Sipahis. He did his work
loyally and well. Scrupulous as he was, on the score of caste,
as any Brahman in the service, he had no sympathy with the
treacherous machinations of men who were eating the salt of
the British Government, and were under the kindly care of its
officers ; and he brought back to Richard Lawrence, after brief
but satisfying inquiry, tidings that the regiments at Mian-Mir
were ripe for revolt. " Sahib," said the faithful Brahman, "they
are full offasdd* — they are up to this in it ;" and he laid his hand
upon his throat. It was plain that they were only waiting for
information from the countries below to break into open mutiny.
In this conjuncture Montgomery took counsel with his
colleagues — the chief civilians and staff- officers at
Anarkali, who assembled in the house of Mac- Th | £gg at
pherson, the Military Secretary. They were Mr.
Donald Macleod, Mr. Egerton, Colonel Ommaney, Mr. Roberts,
Captains Macpherson, Richard Lawrence, and Waterloo Hutchin-
son. There was an animated discussion. Macpherson had already
* Sedition.
VOL. II. Y
322 FIKST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJiB. [1857.
talked the matter over with Eoberfc Montgomery, and they had
agreed that it would be expedient to deprive the Sipahis of
their ammunition.* It was now suggested by the former that
this should be done — that the ammunition should be lodged in
store, and that the regiments should be told that, as they had
obviously much anxiety with respect to the greased cartridges,
it was the order of the Government that all ground of alarm
should be removed for the present by leaving them without
any ammunition at all. On this Eichard Lawrence said, " I
would disarm them altogether ;" to which Macpherson replied
that it was scarcely probable that the military authorities
would consent to such a measure. After some further discussion
Montgomery determined that he and Macpherson should drive
over to the military station and propose to the Brigadier, at
any rate, to deprive the Native regiments of their ammunition,
In ordinary course of affairs, the Chief Commissioner would
have been consulted. But there was an interruption of the
telegraphic communication between Labor and Bawalpindi ; so
the responsibility of deciding upon immediate action rested
with Montgomery, and he cheerfully undertook it.
The station of Mian-Mir was then in military charge of
Brigadier Stuart Corbett, an officer of the Indian
Brigadier Corbett. ^^ ^^ ^ ^.^ ^ ComDany f()r nearly
forty years, but had lost but little of the bodily and none of
the mental vigour of his prime ; and it was a happy circum-
stance that he had none of that incapacity to grasp strange
incidents and new situations — none of that timid shrinking from
responsibility — which is so often evinced by feeble minds,
trammelled by the associations of long years of convention and
routine. A happy circumstance, indeed, that to such a man
Montgomery now communicated the alarming tidings which
had been received from Mirath and Dehli. Corbett saw at once
that there was a pressing necessity for prompt and vigorous
action ; and though, at first, knowing well the feelings of the
officers under his command, he could not embrace the bold
project of disarming the troops, he did not hesitate to adopt
the proposal to render the Native regiments comparatively
harmless by the seizure of their ammunition. But, as the
day advanced, he began to doubt whether the precautionary
measures on which they had resolved in the morning would
* The original suggestion came from Eichard Lawrence. — G.B.M.
1857.] THE QUESTION OF DISARMING. 323
suffice for such an emergency. So he wrote to Macpherson in
brief decided language, more emphatic than official, saying that
he would " go the whole hog " and disarm the troops altogether
And Montgomery readily consented to the proposal.*
It was a bold measure and to be accomplished only by secrecy
and suddenness. But neither Montgomery nor
Corbett doubted for a moment that a single white The Station bal1 -
regiment, with a good complement of European May 12_13 '
Artillery, resolutely commanded and skilfully handled, could
overawe the Native Brigade, and force them to lay down their
arms. A general parade was, therefore, ordered for the following
morning. There was nothing in it to invite suspicion. Every-
thing went on as usual in Cantonments. A ball was that evening
to be given by the officers of the station to Colonel Eenny and
the officers of the 81st Foot. All suggestions as to its postpone-
* It has been stated, and upon authority commonly trustworthy — that of
Mr. Cave-Browne, in his very valuable work, " The Panjab and Dehli in
1857" — that it was the consideration of a more pressing local danger that
caused the extreme measure of disarming the troops to be agreed upon. It
is said that intelligence had been received to the effect that the Sipahi regi-
ments had conspired to seize the fort of Labor. It was garrisoned as above
related, by some European Infantry and Artillery, and a wing of a Native
regiment. During the first half of the month of May, the 26th were on garrison
duty; but on the 15th of the month they were to be relieved by the 49th.
And it was agreed that the wing marching out and the wing marching in —
more than a thousand men in all — should turn upon the Europeans and slay
them ; and then, at a given signal to be seen from a distance, the Sipahis at
Mian-Mir should rise, massacre their officers, seize the guns, fire the Canton-
ments, and release all the prisoners in the goal. Nor was the rising to be
confined to Mian-Mir. It was believed that at Amritsar, at Firuzpur, at
Philur, and Jalandhar, the Sipahi regiments were alike prepared to break
into rebellion, and that everywhere their first measure would be the seizure
of our magazines. The authority for this story was a Sikh police-officer —
said to be a man of more than ordinary intelligence, and of undoubted
loyalty to the British Government — who had communicated it to Richard
Lawrence. But after a very searching inquiry into the events of that morn-
ing at Mian-Mir, I have been compelled to discard the whole story, so far at
least as concerns its alleged effect upon the minds of Montgomery and
Corbett, and the consequent disarming of the troops. Mr. Browne says that
God's mercy in permitting the timely discovery of this plot " alone saved
hundreds from the snare laid for them." But there are grave doubts as to
the existence of the plot, and it was not even talked of until after the measure
of disarming the troops had been agreed upon. What Richard Lawrence,
Captain of Police, really ascertained, at Montgomery's suggestion, was that
-which is stated in the text. And it is the belief both of Montgomery and
Richard Lawrence, as now before • me under their own hands, that no new
Information of any kind caused Corbett to adopt the bolder course.
Y 2
324 FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. |_1857.
nient were wisely set aside. Nothing was to be done to excite
suspicion. The Sipahis of Mian-Mir, and their brethren of all
classes, were to see that the English were feasting and dancing
in total unconcern, as ever conscious of their strength and confident
in their security. So the rooms of the Artillery Mess-House
were lighted up at the appointed time ; and hosts and guests
assembled as though bent only on the enjoyment of the hour.
A few there knew what was coming in the morning, and others
had a vague impression of an impending danger — an approach-
ing crisis — that might turn that gaily decorated ball-room into
a grim battle-field. Some vague reports passed from one to
another about the muster of which they had read in the order-
book; and the more suspicious were well pleased to think that they
could lay their hands upon their swords in a moment. The
greater number neither knew nor suspected, but grumbled,
saying that it was an inconsiderate and unkindly thing at best
to order a general parade for the morning after a ball. And so
they danced on into the small hours of the morning, and saw
their wives and daughters home, as though there were nothing
to disturb the smooth surface of ordinary events. The Native
sentries posted here and there in Cantonments saw nothing in
the movements of the English to indicate anxiety or mistrust.
If the Sipahis had, as was alleged, really planned the destruc-
tion of the English at Mian-Mir, they must have rejoiced in the
thought that their victims, utterly regardless of their doom,
were going blindfold to the shambles.
But when the hours of morning-darkness were past, and day
Ma l3 had dawned upon Mian-Mir, other thoughts than
The disarming these took possession of the Sipahi mind. The
parade. Brigade assembled on the parade-ground. There
was nothing peculiar in the appearance of that assembly, except
that Montgomery, Roberts, and others of the chief civil officers
from Anarkali were to be seen mounted on the ground.* Every
soldier obeyed the orders that were issued to him. The
regiments were drawn up in lines of contiguous columns. The
Artillery and 81st (not numbering more than two hundred and
fifty men) were on the right, the Native Cavalry on the left,
and the Infantry regiments in the centre ; the white men
appearing as a mere dot beside the long line of the blacks. At
* They had ridden over from Anarkali in the morning. It appears that
they were not at the ball.
1857.] THE REGIMENTS DISARMED. 325
the head of each regiment was read aloud the Government order
disbanding the mutinous 34th at Barrackpur. These formal
proceedings over, the serious business of the morning com-
menced. The Native regiments were ordered to change front
to the rear, and at the same time the 81st also changed front,
so as to face the Sipahis; the Artillery then in the rear, loading
their guns unseen by the Native regiment. When this
manoeuvre, which seemed whilst in execution to be only a part
of the Brigade exercise of the morning, had been accomplished,
a staff officer, Lieutenant Mocatta, Adjutant of the 26th regiment,
who could speak the Native languages fluently and correctly,
was ordered forward by the Brigadier to read his address to the
the Sipahis. He did it well, in a clear loud voice, explaining
to them that now, a mutinous spirit having evinced itself in
other regiments, and brought many good soldiers to certain
destruction, it was better that the distinguished regiments at
Mian-Mir, which had done so much good service to the State,
should place themselves beyond the reach of temptation by
surrendering all means of offence ; so they were ordered to —
" Pile arms."
Whilst this address was being delivered to the Sipahis, the
81st fell back by subdivisions between the guns; and when the
word was given to pile arms, the Native regiments found
themselves face to face with a long line of Artillery, and a row
of lighted portfires in the hands of the English gunners. At
the same time the voice of Colonel Penny rung out clearly
with the command, " 81st, load ! " and then there was the rattle
of the ramrods, which told that there was death in every piece.
For a minute the Grenadiers had hesitated to obey the order ;
but thus confronted, they saw that to resist would be to court
instant destruction; so they sullenly resigned themselves to
their fate, and piled their muskets to the word of command,
whilst the Cavalry unclasped their belts and laid their sabres
on the ground. The 81st then came forward and removed the
arms, for which a large number of carts were waiting near the
parade-grounds, and the Sipahis went baffled and harmless to
their Lines.* It was a great design executed
with consummate skill ; and if by a first blow a * ay 13 *
battle was ever won, the battle of the Panjab was fought and
won that morning by Montgomery, Corbett, and Renny.
* The arms were taken under a guard of the 81st to the Lahor Fort.
326 FIEST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
But this bloodless victory at Mian-Mir was not the whole ot
that morning's work. Whilst the parade was
Seizure of "being held,, three companies of the 81st were
Laiior. rtat marching to Lahor to secure the Fort. Awing
of the 26th Sipahis was on garrison duty there.
It was yet wanting two days of the completion of their tour of
duty; and unless they wondered why none of their officers
were dancing at Mian-Mir, there was nothing to create sus-
picion that there was anything unwonted in the air. But
when suddenly, a little while after sunrise, news came that the
Europeans were marching on the Fort, they saw at once that
whatever plots were to have been acted out on the 15th, they
had been discovered, and that the game was altogether lost.
Colonel Smith, with his three companies, marched into the
Fort. The Sipahis were ordered to lay down their arms.
Eesistance was hopeless, and they obeyed to a man. The
companies of the 81st were then told off to their various duties,
and the Sipahis were marched to Mian-Mir, crestfallen and
dispirited, there to learn the history of the eventful parade of
the morning. They found the place bristling with the bayonets
only of the white men. European picquets and sentries were
posted everywhere. Arrangements were being made to secure
the safety of the women and children in the English barracks,
and messengers were speeding to different parts of the country
to warn our countrymen of the danger with which they were
threatened.
To secure the safety of one point, although that one point
were the great capital of the Pan jab, had not
May is. k een? on t h at 12 th of May, the sole object of
G °Amr!ts r ar? nd Montgomery's exertions. With a strong European
Brigade, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, the authori-
ties at Mirath had refused to divide their force, and had looked
only to the safety of the station. But at Lahor, with only one
regiment of English Infantry and a few English gunners, in
the face of a still larger body of Native troops, Montgomery
took a comprehensive view of all surrounding dangers, and
turned the scanty means at his disposal to larger account than
most men would have deemed possi ble. But it was his good
fortune to find in the military chief a kindred spirit, and to
meet with ready response to all his suggestions. If at that
time the v e had been, on the part of the military, any ominous
1857.] GOYENDGAKH. 327
shakings of heads and feeble wringings of hands, all would
have been lost. But to Corbett and Renny nothing seemed
impossible. With the perilous work before them of disarming
the Mian-Mir troops, they had sent off three companies of their
one white regiment to Lahor; but the crisis was one which
demanded even further sacrifice of immediate strength. It was
certain that there was much to be done with small means; but
it is in such daring and such doing that greatness consists.
Another company of the 81st was despatched in Native car-
riages, hastily collected, to aiford succour to another place
which seemed to be girt with danger.
The fortress of Govindgarh, which lies some thirty miles
from Lahor, is the military stronghold of the great city of
Amritsar, the spiritual capital of the Panjab — a city invested
in the minds of the Sikh people with the holiest associations.
In no place throughout the Panjab was the influence of the
priesthood so powerful ; in no place had the spirit
of nationality so largely survived the subjugation l ay llm
of the people. There the Sikh inhabitants were more likely to
rise than in any part of the country ; and to that centre, more
than to any other point, were the Sikhs likely to turn their
eyes for a given signal of general insurrection. From the first
moment, Montgomery had recognised the paramount import-
ance of securing the Fort and overawing the city. On the
morning of the 12th, with the Dehli telegrams before him, he
had written to Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner, advising
him of what had happened below, telling him that at Lahor
they might have to fight for their lives, and urging upon him
the immediate necessity of "caring for Govindgarh." "I
would advise," he said, " every precaution being adopted before-
hand, so as to be ready in case of a row. You shall have the
best information of all that is going on, and the more quietly
we move the better. Do not alarm the Sipahis by any previous
acts, but keep the strictest watch on them ; and the feelings of
the city should be ascertained by every source at your com-
mand. Open communication with Jalandhar, and find out
what is going on there. My advice is to be fully alive and
awake, and prepared for the worst, without creating any alarm
by any open act. If the troops should rise, you have the Fort
to go to, and can defend yourselves." And these stirring words
were addressed to a lieutenant worthy of his chief. Mr. Cooper
was not a man to be appalled by any danger ; and under him
328 FIEST CONFLICTS IX THE PANJAB. [1857.
again there was another civil officer, Mr. Macnaghten, Assistant
Commissioner, equally ripe for any hazardous enterprise that
might fall in the way of his duty.
Cool and collected, and fertile in resources and expedients,
these two now bethought themselves of turning to the best
account every possible circumstance that was in their favour.
The report at Amritsar was that the disarmed Sipahis from
Mian-Mir were coming in a body to help the regiments at the
former place to seize upon Govindgarh. The fortress was
garrisoned mainly by Sipahi troops. The only Europeans were
the gunners of a weak company of Artillery. There was, how-
ever, in the Cantonment a horse- battery, under Captain Waddy,
manned by white soldiers, and this was now removed into the
Fort. Cooper, with a party of Irregular horsemen and some
faithful Sikhs, took post opposite the Fort gates, whilst Mac-
naghten went out on the Lahor road to raise a body of villagers
to intercept the advance of the rebel Sipahis. The agricultural
communities were known to be on our side. They were in a
state of unexampled prosperity. There had been one of the
richest harvests known for years. Many of the peasantry were
hardy J at cultivators, with no sympathetic leanings towards
the bipahis from Hindustan. They promptly responded to the
call, and arming themselves with whatsoever weapons they
could seize — perhaps only the implements of their calling —
went forth to form a living barrier against the wave of insur-
rection which, it was believed, was pouring in from Lahor.
But safety, not danger, was on the road. About midnight,
a noise as of a coming multitude was heard. Macnaghten
mustered his villagers, and formed across the highway a sturdy
rampart of carts, behind which they awaited the approach of
the enemy. But they found themselves face to face with a
most welcome arrival of friends. It was the company of the
81st, under Chichester, that had been sent to the relief of
Govindgarh. Before daylight the relief had been accomplished,
and the fortress was safe.
So, for the time, by the exertions of Montgomery and Corbett,
and those who worked under them, the two great
Firuzpir. c ities of Lahor and Amritsar were placed beyond
the reach of immediate danger. By prompt and unexpected
movements on the part of British authority, the revolt of the
Sipahis had been paralysed in the very hour of its birth, and
1857.] FIRUZPUR AND PHILUR. 329
on the spots most favourable to its vigorous development. But
there were other places, at no great distance, which, although
of far less political importance, suggested grave doubts and
anxieties to our chiefs; and Montgomery, therefore, on the
same day sent expresses to all the principal civil officers in the
Panjab, bearing copies of a confidential circular letter, in which
they were informed of what had taken place, and warned to be
in readiness to act promptly and vigorously in the event of an
emergency, but to maintain outward calmness and quietude in
the face of danger — to be fully alive to the magnitude of the
crisis, but to betray no symptom of alarm or excitement.
Instructions were issued for the safe custody of the Treasuries,
for the strengthening of the Sikh Police, and for the detention
of all Sipahi letters ; and it ended with the assuring words :
" I have full reliance on your zeal and discretion."
There were two places, especially, which it was most im-
portant to secure, on account of the military resources they
contained. At Firuzpur and Philur were large quantities of
munitions of war, with but few European troops to defend the
magazines against the too probable assaults of the Sipahis. At
the former place were an arsenal and a magazine
of considerable dimensions — the largest in that May 13.
part of India. Two regiments of Native Infantry Th t ^ e 4 5 ^ nd
and a regiment of Native Cavalry were posted
there, and the temper at least of one of the regiments was more
than suspected. Appearances, however, were less formidable
than at Mian-Mir, for the European strength was greater in
proportion to the Sipahi force. The 61st Queen's was cantoned
at Firuzpur, and there also were two companies of European
Artillery. The station was commanded by Brigadier Innes, an
old Sipahi officer of good repute ; but he laboured at that time
under the disadvantage of being a stranger. He had arrived
to take command of the brigade only on the morning of the
1 1th. On the following night news came from Labor that the
Sipahis in Mirath and Dehli had risen, and the Brigadier was
informed tbat the Native troops at Lahor were to be disarmed
on the following day. On the 13th the Brigadier, anxious to
discern for himself the bearing of his men, held a morning
parade. Their demeanour was not encouraging. If there were
nothino- openly defiant in their manner, there was an absence
of that easy, careless, unoccupied look which characterises the
Sipahi in quiet times. It was plain that something was coming.
330 FIRST CONFLICTS IN THE PANjXB. [1857.
The parade dismissed, Brigadier Innes called a Council of
War. The members summoned were the principal political
officers, the Commandants of the several regiments, and the
Commissary of Ordnance. There was no attempt to obscure
the fact that the temper of the Sipahis was most suspicious,
and that the safety of the station depended on prompt and
vigorous action. Instantly to disarm the Native regiments in
a body was not held to be a measure that could be attempted
without danger ; why is not very clear. So it was determined
to divide them — a poor half-measure, which could scarcely be
crowned with success — and to disarm them separately on the
morrow. But the morrow of vigorous action never comes.
The man for a crisis is he who knows no morrow, but is
resolute to strike to-day. The regiments were paraded sepa-
rately, and marched off to different camping-grounds at a
distance from their Lines. The 57 th quietly obeyed orders,
and bivouacked on their allotted space for the night. The 45th,
who were marched through the great Bazaar, lost there the
little loyalty that was left in them ; for among the buyers and
the sellers were scatterers of sedition, and sparks flew about
everywhere to bring on a great explosion. It happened, too,
that as they went the Sipahis caught sight of the European
soldiery, and, believing that a hostile movement was intended,
raised a cry that there was treachery abroad, and numbers of
them fell out, loaded their muskets, and made a rush for the
magazine. The rest marched on to their camping-ground.
The outer defences of the magazine were in a state to favour
the ingress of the mutineers. The ditch was rilled up, and the
walls were in ruins; so the Sipahis of the 45th were soon
within the so-called intrenchments. But the magazine itself
was less assailable, for it was protected by a high wall, and the
only entrance was defended by a guard of Redmond's Europeans.
The Sipahis within did their best to assist their comrades with
scaling-ladders ; * but the English soldiery were more than
a match for the mutineers within and without,
ay 13-14. ^j^ former were seized and disarmed ; the latter
were driven back, but not before Redmond himself had been
wounded. The magazine was thus saved, and three more com-
* Brigadier Innes says that the Sipahis of the 45th " made a rush at the
intrenchments with scaling-ladders, which muat have been previously pre-
pared. '
1857.] EVENTS AT FIRUZPUR. 331
panies of the 61st having been thrown into it, its security was
established. But to save the magazine was in effect to sacrifice
the Cantonment. With so small a body of European troops, it
was impossible to defend one part without exposing another.
The very division of the Sipahis, which had been thought an
element of strength, was in result only a source of difficulty
and danger. The remaining companies of the 61st, menaced
on both sides, could do little or nothing to save the Canton-
ment. For the great Bazaar poured forth its multitudes to
plunder and destroy. The bungalows of the European officers,
the mess-houses, the churches, Protestant and Catholic, were
sacked and fired. The night was a night of terror; but the
families of the English officers were safe in the barracks of
the 61st, and the fury of the assailants did not fall on our
defenceless people.
Meanwhile the 57th had remained inactive on their camping-
ground, and when morning dawned it was found that there had
been but few deserters. The Brigadier, therefore, declared that
he would regard them as loyal soldiers, if they would lay down
their arms in the European Lines. The Light Company marched
in with apparent willingness; but as the others were following,
they saw a movement of the 61st, directed against some men of
the 45th, who had been tampering with their more loyal com-
rades, and believing that the Light Company had been trapped,
they broke in dismay and fled across the plain. After some
time the efforts of their officers to dispel the fear which had
seized them were successful, and they were brought back again
to their camping-ground. Little by little, as tha day advanced,
confidence was restored; and before nightfall they had been
marched to the European barracks, and had surrendered their
arms and the colours of their regiment. But the Sipahis of the
45th were still roaming about the station, defiant and ripe for
mischief; and in the morning there was a report that the
mutineers intended to seize the regimental magazines. To
remove the ammunition into the general magazine was im-
possible ; so the Brigadier determined to destroy it. Two loud
explosions were presently heard, and it was known that the
magazines of the 45th and 57th had been blown into the
air.
There was now nothing left for the 45th but flight. Their
comrades were disarmed. Their ammunition was destroyed.
The Europeans were now comparatively free to act, and the
332 FIRST CONFLICTS IX THE PAXJAB. [1857.
troopers of the I Oth Cavalry had not yet drawn a sabre against
their officers. The chances, therefore, were all against the
Sipahis ; so they took their colours, and turned their faces
towards Dehli. And then, for the first time, a spasm of energy
seized upon the Brigadier. Some companies of the 61st, with
two guns of the horse-battery, went in pursuit, and then two
squadrons of the 10th Cavalry took up the work of the tired
footmen, and with Major Marsden, the Deputy Commissioner —
a dashiDg officer and a bold rider — drove them some twelve
miles from Firuzpur, and scattered them over the country, till
they threw away their arms and colours, and hid themselves in
villages or crouched in the jungle. Some were taken prisoners
by their pursuers, some were given up by the villagers ; but it
is believed that some also succeeded in joining the Sipahi force
within the walls of Dehli.
The great magazine of Firuzpur had been saved ; but there
was no lustre in the achievement. The British had nothing on
which to congratulate themselves but the bare fact. The fact
was one of large proportions, for the loss of such supplies of
ordnance stores and their gain to the enemy would have
weakened our means of offence, and made the work of recon-
quest far slower and more difficult.* But when we think of
what Corbett had done with his one "weak regiment at Mian-
Mir against a far larger body of Sipahis, we marvel and are
mortified as we dwell upon the record of events at Firuzpur.
The 61st, supported by the Artillery, could have done what the
81st had been doing, and might have saved the Cantonment.
But Innes, shrinking from responsibility, resorted to half-
measures, and accomplished only a half-success. We must not,
however, judge him too severely. He did at least as much as
most Native Infantry officers, accustomed only to the routine of
quiet times, the harness of the regulations, and the supremacy
of the Adjutant-General's office, would have done, and indeed
afterwards did, when suddenly brought face to face with a
great and trying emergency. Perhaps it is less strange that
he only half succeeded, than that he did not fail outright.
* Mr. Cave-Browne says : " Thus, although the Cantonment had to some
extent been sacrificed, there was the consolation of knowing the magazine
was saved. Had it fallen into the hands of the mutineers, with its piles of
shot and shells, its pits of gunpowder, and its well-stored armoury, Dehli had
not been re-won under four times four months."
1857.] PHILUR. 333
There was yet another place of great military importance,
the seizure of which was supposed to form part of
the first great group of measures designed for the
subversion of British authority in the Panjab, and which it
was, therefore, of the utmost moment to secure. This was the
Fort of Philur, lying between Jalandhar and Lodiana, on the
great high road to Dehli. It had been described as the " key
of the Panjab ; " but, like other keys of the same kind, it was
by no means in safe keeping. A considerable arsenal was
planted there, but there were no European troops to protect it.
When the day's work was done, and the Ordnance Commissariat
officers had gone to their homes, there was not a white face to be
seen in the Fort. The Sipahis of the 3rd Infantry garrisoned
the place and occupied the adjacent Cantonment. At a distance
of some twenty-four miles was the military station of Jalandhar,
where the 8th Queen's were posted, with two Native Infantry
regiments, a regiment of Native Cavalry, and a proportionate
force of Artillery. The Infantry regiments — the 36th and the
61st — were known to be tainted. They had been in recent
contact with corps which had already broken into rebellion.
That these Jalandhar regiments had, in concert with the 3rd,
plotted the seizure of the Fort of Philur, with its guns and
stores, was believed, if it was not proved to be a fact ; and only-
prompt action could avert the threatened disaster. The work
to be done was very much the same work as had been so suc-
cessfully accomplished at Mian-Mir, and with the same means.
The European regiment and the Artillery might have disarmed
the Sipahis and secured the Fort of Philur.
The brigade was under the command of Brigadier Johnstone,
a Queen's officer of the regulation pattern. He was absent from
Jalandhar when news came of the great events at
Mirath and Dehli, and Colonel Hartley, of the
8th Queen's, was in temporary command of the force, On the
11th, the first vague tidings of disaster were passing along the
telegraph wires through Jalandhar to Labor. No action was
taken on that day ; the story might be exaggerated ; it might,
therefore, be better to " wait for further information." Next
day all doubt was removed, and Colonel Hartley took counsel
with the chief civil and military officers at the station. It was
plain to every one that, as an essential measure of security,
Philur must be occupied by European troops. It was agreed,
therefore, that a detachment of the 8th should be sent off
334 FIEST CONFLICTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
secretly under cover of the night. Other measures of precaution
were to be taken. The guns, duly covered by European
detachments, were to be posted so as to sweep the parade-
grounds of the Native troops, and the gunners were to be
always at their posts. Europeans from Olpherts' * troop of
Horse Artillery were to act as Cavalry and patrol the station.
The ladies and children were placed either in the Eoyal
Barracks or in the Artillery schoolroom and library. Every
officer in the Cantonment was constantly alert, day and night,
in case of the anticipated surprise ; and as it was expected that
the Native Cavalry troopers would make a rush upon the guns,
heaps of stones were scattered about so as to impede the advance
of the horsemen, and to throw them into confusion whilst our
grape-shot was acting upon them. But with these defensive
measures our action ceased. If there was any thought of
striking the arms from the hands of the Native soldiery it was
speedily abandoned. The reason given is, that in
the neighbourhood of Jalandhar were several
smaller stations occupied only by Sipahi troops, and that if the
regiments there had been disarmed, their comrades at Hoshiar-
pur, Kangrah, Nurpur, and Philur would have risen against
their defenceless officers at those places, and would have
streamed down upon Jalandhar, recovered the arms of the
regiments there, and set the whole country in a blaze.
Meanwhile, at Philur, on the 12th of May, the Artillery
Subaltern Griffith, who, as an Assistant Commissary of Ordnance,
was in charge of the magazine, was doing all that resolute
manhood could do to protect the precious charge confided to
him. Intelligence of the outbreak had been brought by an
officer of the Telegraph Department, who came laden with help
in the shape of the necessary apparatus to place the interior of
the Fort in direct communication with Jalandhar. In the
course of a few hours this was done, and a message came right
into Griffith's private office-room, informing him that succours
were on their way. Hopefully, cheerfully, the Artillery
Subaltern then, with a little handful of Europeans attached to
the magazine, addressed himself to the work of holding the
Fort during the critical hours of the darkness. At sunset the
gates were closed. A gun was brought down to the gateway,
* Henry Olpherts of the Bengal Artillery — cousin of William Olpherts of
the same corp?, then serving at Bauaras. — Ante, p. 152, et seq.
1857.] PHILUR. 335
and all through the night the little party of Englishmen kept
guard, relieving each other with ready portfire, and keeping
watch from the ramparts to catch the first sound of any com-
motion in Cantonments which might indicate that the Sipahis
had risen. But all was quiet in the station, and all was quiet
within the Fort. The Sipahis of the 3rd were not yet ready.
The appointed hour of revolt had not come. So the night
passed, and the day dawned ; but ere the dawn had come the
looked-for deliverance was at hand. A hundred and fifty men
of the 8th Foot, two Horse Artillery guns, and a party of
Panjabi Horse, appeared under the walls of the Fort. The
gate was thrown open. The relieving force marched in ; and,
to the dismay of the Sipahis, European sentries were posted
everywhere in their place, and the arsenal of Philur was saved.
It was truly a good night's work ; for the Fort might have
become the rallying-place of all the mutinous regiments in that
part of the country, and it was preserved, as has been already
shown, to be of immense importance to us in our subsequent
retributory operations.*
* See ante, pp. 141-2, for the story of the equipment of the siege tm'n
and its march from Philur.
336 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI. [1851
CHAPTER II.
PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI
But the place to which, of all the military stations in the
Panjab, the thoughts of men were turned at this
jH^iJw time with the deepest interest, was the frontier-
post of Peshawar. There, in May, 1857, was a
strong defensive force of all arms — the Native troops greatly
outnumbering the Europeans. There were two regiments of
Queen's troops, with Artillery, horse and foot, the whole, perhaps,
amounting to little more than two thousand men, whilst the
Native troops might be counted up at nearly four times the
number. In the neighbourhood, at Nausbahra and Hoti-Mardan,
were other components of the brigade, planted in the Peshawar
Valley. At the former place were the 27th Foot, nearly a
thousand strong, and at the latter was the famous Guide Corps,
under Captain Daly, which, though recruited in the country,
was believed to be as staunch as if every soldier were an
English yeoman. Counting up all the components of the
brigade in the valley, it may be said, in round numbers, that
there were two thousand five hundred Europeans and ten
thousand Natives, and that only a tithe of the latter could be
trusted by their English officers.
These were heavy odds against us ; but they did not con-
stitute the main sources of danger. If the British
dangers? troops were free to act against the mutinous
Sipahis, there could be little doubt that, well
handled, they could dispose of all comers. But beyond the
frontier, as I have already briefly said,* were other great and
imminent perils. If the Afghan tribes occupying the passes
beyond Peshawar — the Afridis, the Yusufzais, the Mahmands,
* Ante, p. 317, with reference to Lord Canning's previsions.
1857.] DOST MUHAMMAD. 337
and other wild clans, whom we had been endeavouring to
reclaim from their lawless habits, and not wholly without suc-
cess — had been incited, partly in the interests of the faith and
partly in the interests of plunder, to pour down upon us a great
mass of humanit3 r , predatory and fanatic, we might have been
simply overwhelmed by the irruption. Our English manhood
could not have sustained the burden of the double calamity, if
the internal and external enemy had risen against us at the
same time.
And the external enemy, which might in such a crisis have risen
against us, was not merely a gathering of these barbarous moun-
tain tribes. Beyond the passes were the Afghans of Kabul and
Kandahar. The friendship of Dost Muhammad had been pur-
chased by our British gold, but he had never ceased to deplore
the dismemberment of his empire by the Sikhs ; he had never
ceased to hanker after the recovery of the Peshawar Valley,
now part of a British province by the intelligible right of con-
quest. For this he had already risked much — for this he might
risk much more. This eager longing after Peshawar has been
described as the madness of a life. It might, at such a time as
this, be stronger than the teachings of experience — stronger
than the dictates of sagacity — stronger even than the great
national avarice which was burning within him. It was dif-
ficult to feel any confidence in his forbearance at such a time.
A well -developed mutiny of the Sipahi troops in the Peshawar
Valley would afford such an opportunity as might never arise
again in the history of the nation. The formidable British
force which guarded the frontier would then be as a chained
giant, powerless to resist a foreign invasion. If then the Amir
were to raise the green standard and to call upon the chiefs and
people of Afghanistan, in the name of the great prophet, to
pour down upon the Faringhis, who in days past had so
humiliated them — who had rooted up their vines and destroyed
their orchards, and set their mark upon the capital city of their
empire — all the great chiefs and the leading tribes would have
gathered around him, and a great flood of Muhammadanism
would have poured upon us, swollen, perhaps, by more distant
streams. It was difficult to say, at such a time, what might
not be written down in the great Book of the Future. A very
little thing might turn the tide against us and overwhelm us.
The natural feeling, therefore, amongst our people was one of
perilous insecurity ; and the Natives of India asked each other,
VOL. II. z
338 peshawar and Rawalpindi. [iso7.
then and afterwards, with significant earnestness of inquiry,
" What news from Peshawar?"*
At this time the political charge of Peshawar was in the
hands of two of the most remarkable men to be
Political found among the younger officers of the Indian
Peshlwar. Army. Both had been reared under the Law-
rences ; and in that mixed service known in India
as "political employment," which at one time demands the
exercise of the highest energies of the military officer, and, at
another, of the finest qualities of the civil administrator, had
ripened into soldier-statesmen of the best kind. Of Herbert
Edwardes I have already spoken.-f He was a Commissioner at
Peshawar. John Nicholson was his lieutenant, or deputy-com-
missioner. They were close friends, full of love and admiration
of each other. If either had greater love or admiration for
another friend at a distance, that other friend was Henry
Lawrence, whom both revered and strove to imitate, walking
not unworthily in the footsteps of their great exemplar.
The son of a physician in Dublin, who died at the commence-
ment of a professional career in which were the
John son. cho1 " germs of a great success, John Nicholson had
entered the Company's service as a cadet of
Infantry on the Bengal establishment at the age of sixteen.
He was still a boy when the chances of service sent him with
his regiment — the 27th — into Afghanistan ; and when in that
dreary, sorrow-laden winter of 1841 the national spirit of the
tribes rose against the intrusion of the English, young Nicholson,
after much good promise of the finest soldierly qualities, became
a prisoner at Ghazni, and afterwards a captive in the hands of
Akbar Khan. Eescued by General Pollock, he returned to the
* Mr. Cave-Browne gives the following suggestive anecdote in his narra-
tive. The incident occurred when he was at Auiritsar, in the middle of June :
" One of the most influential of the Sikh Sirdars was paying his usual visit of
courtesy to the head civilian of the station. In the course of conversation,
the latest news from camp (Dehli) was t xultingly mentioned, when the Sikh,
seeming to pay little heed to what was generally received with so much joy,
asked: 'What news from Peshawar ? ' 'Excellent; all quiet there,' he was
told. ' That,' said he, ' is the best news you can give me ! ' ' Why do you
always ask so anxiously about Peshawar?' the civilian said. The Sirdar did
not at once reply, but, with much significance of manner, took up the end of
his scarf and began rolling it up from the corner between his finger and
thumb. ' If Peshawar goes, the whole Panjab will be rolled up in rebellion
like this.'"
t Vol. i., p. 19, et seq. _
1857.] JOHN NICHOLSON. 339
provinces of India, and when again the peace of India was
broken by the incursion of the Sikh army, John Nicholson,
after a brief period of service in the Commissariat Department,
was, on the recommendation of Henry Lawrence, who had taken
note of his fine soldierly qualities, appointed by Lord Hardinge
to instruct and discipline the Infantry regiments of Gulab
Singh, the new ruler of Kashmir. He was afterwards appointed
an assistant to Lawrence, who was then Eesident at Lahor, and
became permanently attached to the Political Service. From
that time John Nicholson, independent of military rank, was
released from the trammels of his youth. He saw his oppor-
tunity before him, and he bided his time. His desires were
towards military action, and in due course that which he had
longed for came ; the Sikh chiefs were rising against the military
occupation and political interference of the English, and John
Nicholson soon found that he had work to do in the field. He
did it with a cool head and a stout heart, and, although his
freedom of speech sometimes gave offence to his seniors, he made
it clear to those under whom he served that he was a man to be
trusted. The great conflict for the supremacy of the Panjab
came; Nicholson was in the midst of it — at Chilianwala, at
Gujrat, and in the front of Gilbert's pursuit of the Afghan
auxiliaries. And when the country became a British province
Sir Henry Lawrence enlisted his services into the commission,
and, toiling on for years on the outskirts of civilisation, he
manifested an extraordinary aptitude for the coercion and the
government of barbarous tribes. After this service in Bannii,
where the wild people defied him, he had for a little space
thought of leaving the Panjab and serving under his old master
in Ouclh, or of taking part in the Persian war as commander of
Irregulars. But the cloud which seemed to overshadow his
prospects soon passed away, and in the spring of 1857 he was,
as I have before said, at Peshawar as the lieutenant of his
friend Herbert Edwardes, or in other and more official words,
Deputy Commissioner of the division. Only a little time before,
Edwardes, being on a brief visit to Calcutta, had said to Lord
Canning, " You may rely upon this — that if ever there is a
desperate deed to be done in India, John Nicholson is the man
to do it." And now the truth of these friendly but prophetic
words was about to be realised. The hour had come and the
man was present.
At this time Jnhn Nicholson was in his thirty-sixth year. Of
z 2
340 PESHAWAK AND RAWALPINDI [1857.
lofty statue, of a handsome oj)en countenance, with strong
decision of character stamped upon it, he carried with him a
noble presence, which commanded general observation, and
among the Natives excited awe. His manner was not genial.
Some said it was cold ; it was certainly reserved ; and the first
impressions which he made on men's minds were often un-
favourable. His words were few ; and there was a directness
and authoritativeness about them which made strangers think
that he was dogmatical : perhaps overbearing. But those mani-
festations were not the growth of an arrogant self-conceit, but
of great conscientiousness and self-reliance. For he thought
much before he spoke, and what he said was but the utterance of
a strong conviction which had taken shape, not hastily, in his
mind ; and he was not one to suppress what he felt to be the
truth, or to mince nice phrases of expression. Still it would
be flattery to deny, or to obscure the fact, that he had at one
time little control over a naturally fiery temper, and that, as he
grew older, he brought it with difficulty under subjection.
There could have been nothing better for one of Nicholson's
temperament than constant intercourse with such a man as
Herbert Edwardes ; and he now gratefully acknowledged in his
heart that his character was ripening under these good influ-
ences, and that, please God, much that was crude and imperfect
in it might soon disappear.*
It was another happy circumstance at that time that the
Brigade was commanded by an officer altogether
cSoZ °f ^ e r ig nt stamp. Brigadier Sydney Cotton —
a true soldier, and one of a family of soldiers —
commanded the troops in the Peshawar Valley. He had seen
service in many parts of the world. Owing no extraneous
advantages to his family connections, he had ever been one of
those hard-working, unshrinking, conscientious military officer 3,
who do not serve the State less ungrudgingly because it has
been ungrateful to them, but who, rising by slow gradation,
* In 1849, Sir Henry Lawrence wrote to him : " Let me advise you as
a friend to curb your temper, and bear and forbear with Natives and
Europeans, and you will soon be as distinguished a civilian as you are a
Sjldier. Don't think it is necessary to say all you think to every one. The
world would be one mass of tumult if we all gave candid opinions of each
other. I admire you sincerely as much as any man can do, but say thus
much as a general warning." In writing this, Lawrence wrote as one
conscious of the same natural infirmity in himself. He had manfully
struggled against, and in a great measure over.ome it.
1857.] SYDNEY COTTON. 341
never have an opportunity of going to the front and showing
of what staff they are made, until age has enfeebled their
powers. Of his forty-seven years of service in the Royal Army
the greater number had been passed in India. But he was of a
constitution well adapted to sustain the assaults of the climate,
and his threescore years had taken from him little of the vigour
and activity of his prime. Of good stature, but of a spare,
light frame, he had all the external attributes of a good soldier,
and there were few men in the whole range of the service who
were more familiar with the duties of his profession in all its
grades. Constant intercourse with the British soldier, in the
Barrack and in the Camp, had not only made him thoroughly
acquainted with his habits and feelings, but had developed
within him a tender and tolerant affection for, a generous
sympathy with, all who worked under him. Few commanding
officers had been more careful of the common soldier than Sydney
Cotton, or had more thoroughly earned his confidence. He
was known and acknowledged to be one of the best regimental
officers in the Army. No opportunity until now had been
afforded to him of testing the higher qualities which enable a
man to face large responsibilities, and to combat great diffi-
culties and dangers with a serene front. But the latent power
was in him ; the opportunity had now come, and he was equal
to it. Edwardes and Nicholson had confidence in the Brigadier ;
and although, like many of his class, he had an habitual con-
tempt for civilians and soldier civilians, he could not help
thanking God, in the depths of his heart, that circumstances
had now rendered him the fellow-labourer, in a great cause, of
two soldiers, of whom any army in the world might be proud
— two soldiers, though vested with civil authority, as eager to
take the field and to share its dangers, as though they had
never left the camp.
These three men were at Peshawar, when, on the 12th of
May, news reached them to the effect that one
of the greatest military stations in Upper India o/^foSSk.
was in a blaze, and that the European regiments May 12 .
were on the defensive. Edwardes, who had an
assured faith in the good results of the Afghan policy, which
he had so successfully advocated, had little apprehension
that Peshawar would be lost to the Empire. "As to this
place," he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, " it will be the last to
go ; and not go at all, if the intermediate country be occupied
342 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI. [1S57
by a good field-force engaged in making stern examples. The
celebrated 61th Native Infantry is here;* and the report in
the station is, that the Native regiments here are prepared to
follow whatever lead is set them by the 21st Native Infantry,
which, ceteris paribus, is a good one." But he did not, although
not fearing for Peshawar, under-estimate the magnitude of the
crisis. He knew that a great struggle was approaching, and
that the energies of the British nation must be strained to the
utmost. He knew that, in the Panjab, there would be much
strife and contention, and that every Englishman in the
province would have to put forth all his strength. He was a
man ever ripe for action, and he had in John Nicholson a meet
companion. " I have not heard yet," he wrote in the letter
above quoted to the Chief Commissioner, " whether you are at
Pindi or Mam ; but as we have received here telegraphic news
of the 10th of May from Mirath that the Native troops were in
open mutiny, and the Europeans on the defensive only, I write
a line to tell you that Nicholson and 1 are of opinion that a
strong movable column of reliable troops (Europeans and Ir-
regulars) should take the field in the Panjab at once — perhaps
at Lahor would be best, so as to get between the
stations which have mutinied and those that have
not ; and move on the first station that stirs next ; and bring the
matter, without further delay, to the bayonet. This disaffection
will never be talked down now. It must be put down — and the
sooner blood be let the less of it will suffice. Nicholson desires
me to tell you that he would be ready to take command of them,
and I need not add the pleasure it would give me to do the same.
We are both at your disposal, remember; and if this business goes,
as it soon will, to a question of personal influence and exertion,
either of us could raise a serviceable body out of the Derajat in
a short time." And he added in a postscript, " Whatever you
do about a movable force, do it at once. There is no time to be
lost in getting to the struggle which is to settle the matter."
There was then at no great distance from Peshawar another
man, whose counsel and assistance were eagerly
Chamwiaia. desired in this conjuncture. It was felt that the
presence of Neville Chamberlain was needed to
complete that little confederacy of heroes, on the wisdom and
* See, for an account of a previous mutiny of this regiment, ante, vol. i.,
pp. 203-12.
1857.] NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN. 343
courage of whom the safety of the frontier, under Providence,
mainly depended. Brigadier Chamberlain at this time com-
manded the Panjab Irregular Force. He was in the prime of
his life and the fulness of his active manhood. Of a fair stature,
of a light but sinewy frame, he had every physical qualification
that could make a dashing leader of Irregular Horse. And in
early youth, he had acquired a reputation as an intrepid and
eager soldier, who was ever in the front where danger was to
be faced and glory was to be gained. On the battle-fields of
Afghanistan and the Panjab, he had shown what was the
temper of his steel, and he had carried off more honourable
wounds in hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy than any of
his contemporaries in the service. It was said, indeed, that his
great fault as a soldier was, that he exposed himself too reck-
lessly to danger. But with this irrepressible military enthu-
siasm, which had well-nigh cost him his life, he had a large
fund of sound common sense, was wise in council, and had
military knowledge far beyond that of the bold swordsman who
heads against heavy odds a charge of Horse. And with all
these fine qualities he combined a charming modesty of
demeanour — a general quietude and simplicity of character,
which not only forbade all kinds of self-assertion, but even
shrunk from the commendations of others. He had been
selected, as the fittest man in the Army, to command the Panjab
Irregular Force, of which I have before spoken,* and which had
already won immense confidence in the Panjab, and no little
reputation in more distant parts of India. Next to the European
regiments, this was the most reliable portion of the military
force in the Panjab — indeed, the only other reliable part of the
great Army planted there for the defence of the frontier. It
was of extreme importance at this time that Chamberlain and
Cotton should be in communication as to the best means of co-
operating, especially with respect to the proposed Movable
Column ; and so Edwardes wrote to him, asking him to ride
over to Peshawar and to take counsel with him and the chief
military authorities — a measure of which they entirely approved.
Chamberlain at once responded to the summons, and hastened
over to Peshawar.
So, on the 13th of May, an hour or two after his arrival, a
* Ante, p. 317.
344 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI. [1857.
Council of "War was held at the house of General Eeed. The
members present were the General, the Brigadier,
Th Councii war Edwardes, Chamberlain, and Nicholson. Half
May 13] an hour before their assembling, Edwardes had
received a telegraphic message from John Law-
rence approving the formation of the Movable Column, and
announcing that the Native troops at Mian-Mir had that morn-
ing been disarmed. There was no division in the Council.
The military and political authorities at Peshawar were moved
by a common spirit, and acted as one man. It was agreed that
in the conjuncture which had arisen, all civil and military
power in the Pan jab should be concentrated on one spot; that
to this effect General Peed should assume the command of all
the troops in the province, that he should join the Chief Com-
missioner at Rawalpindi, or at such place as might be the seat
of the local government at the time, in order that he might be
in constant intercourse with the Chief Commissioner, and
harmonious action might thus be secured between the civil and
military authorities. The real object of this did not lie on the
surface. There was an occult meaning in it, which caused
Edwardes and Nicholson to smile complacently at the Council-
table, and to exchange many a joke in private. This concen-
tration of the military authority of the Panjab in the person of
General Eeed — a worthy old officer, without very strong
opinions of any kind — really transferred it to the hands of the
political officers. It was a great thing not to be checked — not
to be thwarted — not to be interferred with — not to have regula-
tion, and routine, and all sorts of nervous fears and anxieties
thrust upon them from a distance. It was desirable, however,
that the semblance of military authority should be maintained
throughout the land — that the rights of seniority should be
outwardly respected — that every man should be in his own
place, as upon parade, and that a General should at all times be
a General, even though for purposes of action he should be
merely a stock or a stone. The Natives of India watch these
things shrewdly and observingly, and estimate, with rare
sagacity, every indication of a failure of the wondrous union
and discipline, which they look upon as the very root of our
supremacy.* But, though it w r as at all times and in all places,
* In the first volume of this History I observed, with immediate reference
to the dissensions between Lord Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier, that these
1857.] GENERAL REED. 345
desirable to keep up this show of a wonderful machinery,
working wheel by wheel with perfect regularity of action, it
was not always expedient to maintain the reality of it. There
were times and conjunctures when the practical recognition of
the authority of rank, which in the Indian army was only
another name for age, might wisely be foregone ; and such a
crisis had now to be confronted. On the whole, it was a
fortunate circumstance that just such a man as General Reed
a man not obstinate, not wedded to any opinions or foregone
conclusions of his own, and yet not more cautious, irresolute, or
fearful of responsibility than the majority of old soldiers who
had never been called upon to face a momentous crisis was
then the senior officer in that part of the country; indeed,
under the Commander-in-Chief, the senior officer of the Bengal
Presidency. He had good sense of the most serviceable kincf—
the good sense to understand his own deficiencies, and to
appreciate the fact that there were abler men than himself
about him. So, whilst he was rising to the honourable position
of military dictator of the Panjab, he wisely ceased to dictate.
The time had come for the universal domination of Brains
John Lawrence, with Herbert Edwardes for his Wazir, then took
the supreme direction of affairs, always consulting the chief
military authorities, but quietly educating them, and flattering
them with the belief that they dictated when they only obeyed.
The next resolution was that a Movable Column of reliable
troops, as before suggested, should be organised,
to take the field at once, under a competent com- Th c ?imn ble
mander, and to operate upon any point where
rebellion might bristle up, or danger might threaten us in the
Panjab. A suspected Sipahi garrison was to be removed from
the Port of .Atak — an important position, which it was of
conflicts of authoiity were generally regarded, by the more intelligent Natives
of India, as proofs of weakness in the British Government, and that some
regarded them as precursors of our downfall. I have sinee read the lol lowing
confirmation of this opinion in the Correspondence of the Duke of Wellington:
" Of this I am certain," wrote the Duke to Lord Conibermere, '* that any
public and continued difference between the Governor-General and the
Commander-in-Chief is prejudicial to the public interests, and cannot be
allowed to exist. It is prejudicial for this reason. It shakes the authority
of Government to iU very foundation ; and while such differences continue,
every little man, who takes part with either one or the other, becomes of
importance. The interests of the party are the great object. Those of the
public are laid aside and forgotten, and even injured with impunity."
346 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI. [1857.
immense moment to secure ; and our communications were to
be placed beyond the reach of danger by posting at the Atak
ferry a Pathan guard under a tried and trusty Pathan leader.
At the same time other changes in the disposition of the troops
were to be made ; the Native regiments being drawn into the
posts at which they might least readily co-operate with each
other, and most easily be overawed by the Europeans. At the
same time, it was determined that Brigadier Chamberlain should
proceed at once to Kawalpindi to take counsel with the Chief
Commissioner ; and that John Nicholson, if his services were not
called for in a military capacity, should accompany the Movable
Column as its political officer. These proposals were telegraphed
to Sir John Lawrence, and all but the last were cordially ac-
cepted. The Chief Commissioner thought that Nicholson's
services were required at Peshawar, and in that particular
juncture it was believed that the public service would suffer
by his departure. Moreover, he had a faith, that had been
bravely earned, in the general efficiency of his assistants all
over the country. And he knew that it would not be wise to
supersede local authority by a delegate from Head-Quarters.
And never, perhaps, did John Lawrence exhibit his instinctive
sagacity more clearly than in this first resolution to place
every officer in the Pan jab on his own particular stand-point of
responsibility, and thus to evoke to the utmost all the power
within him.
The details of the Movable Column were soon jotted down,
but it was not so easy to settle the question of command. Cotton
and Edwardes, Chamberlain and Nicholson, were all equally
eager to place themselves at its head. It was to be determined
only by superior authority ; so General Eeed made a reference
to the Commander-in-Chief. Edwardes could not be spared
from the frontier, where he was a tower of strength : the names
of Cotton, Chamberlain and Nicholson, were submitted to Head-
Quarters. And the telegraph wires brought back the intima-
tion that General Anson had selected Neville Chamberlain as
the leader of the column.
On the 16th, General Eeed and Brigadier Chamberlain
joined the Chief Commissioner at Kawalpindi,
The coun?u indl anc ^ on *^at evening Colonel Edwardes received
May 16. a telegraphic message summoning him to join
the Head-Quarters Council. Making over his
own particular charge to Nicholson, he proceeded at once to
1857.] SIE JOHN LAWRENCE. 347
Pindi, and was soon in eager but confident discussion alike of
the present and the future. The stern resolution and un-
flinching courage of John Lawrence were then lighted up bv
the radiant aspect of Herbert Edwardes, whose cheerfulness
was so unfailing, and whose political wisdom so often glinted
out in bright flashes of wit, that the Councils of War which
were held during that gathering at Rawalpindi were said to be
" great fun." * Never, perhaps, in the face of such enormous
difficulty and danger, shaking the very foundations of a great
empire, did men meet each other with brighter faces or more
cheering words. It was an occasion on which the eventual
success of our resistance depended, more than all else, upon
the heart and hope of our great chiefs, on whose words all men
hung, and in whose faces they looked for the assurance and
encouragement which inspired and animated all beneath them.
It was said of John Lawrence, at that time, that he was as
calm and confident as if he had been contemplating only the
most common-place events, and that Herbert Edwardes was in
higher spirits, more natural and more unrestrained, than he
had ever been known to be by men who had served with him
in more quiet times. A great and ennobling faith was settling
down in the breasts of our Panjabi chiefs. It had dawned upon
them that it would be their work, not merely to save the
Province, but to save the Empire.
History will take the measure of men's minds in accordance
with the extent to which they looked upon this crisis, as a
local or an imperial one, and directed their efforts to the suppres-
* It may be mentioned here that the capital story, repeated in so many
contemporary memoirs, to the effect that Sir John Lawrence, being at the
whist-table, answered a telegraphic message from General Anson with the
words, "Clubs are trumps — not spades; when in doubt play a big one" —
originated in a joke of Herbert Edwardes. The story always was one of
doubtful authenticity, as it was has likely that Sir John Lawrence than that
General Anson would be caught at the whist-table. The fact is, that
Lawrence, Edwardes, Charles Nicholson, and one or two others were together,
when a telegram from Mr. Barnes was received, stating that there was some
talk at Ambalah of intrenching, and not marching. Edwardes humorously
suggested that a telegram should be despatched to "Major A. wherever he
may be found," saying, "When in doubt play a trump — act up to your own
principles " — the belief being that General Anson had written the well-known
work on whist by "Major A." Charles Nicholson then suggested as an
amendment the words, " Clubs are trumps, not spades." Lawrence consented,
and the pregnant sentence was despatched to Mr. Barnes, who, doubtless,
communicated it to General Anson.
348 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI. [1857.
sion of the one or the other. Physically, it is known rarely to
happen that men, who have a clear, steady sight to discern
distinctly near objects have that wide range of vision which
enables them to comprehend what is observable in the distance;
and the faculty which, either on a large or a small scale,
enables a man to grasp moral objects, both immediate and
remote, is equally rare. General Hewitt's small mind took in
nothing beyond the idea that, as he lived at Mirath, it was his
duty to save Mirath. But the great intellect of Sir John
Lawrence grasped all the circumstances of the imperial danger,
and held them in a vice. He had his own particular province
in hand — carefully and minutely ; no single post overlooked,
no single point neglected. He knew what every man under
him was doing, what every man was expected to do ; there was
nothing that happened, or that might happen, in the Panjab
over which he did not exercise the closest vigilance ; but the
struggle for supremacy at his own doors never obscured the
distant vision of the great imperial danger. He never domesti-
cated his policy ; he never localised his efforts. He never said
to himself, " The Panjab is my especial charge. I will defend
the Panjab. I have no responsibility beyond it." He would
have weakened the Panjab to strengthen the Empire. He
would, perhaps, have sacrificed the Panjab to save the Empire.
In this, indeed, the strength of his character — his capacity for
government on a grand scale — was evinced at the outset, and,
as time advanced, it manifested itself in every stage of the
great struggle more signally than before.*
It was felt in the Pindi Council that, " whatever gave rise to
the mutiny, it had settled down into a struggle for empire,
under Muhammad an guidance, with the Mughul capital for its
centre. j From that time, this great centre of the Mughul
capital w T as never beyond the range of John Lawrence's
thoughts — never beyond the reach of his endeavours. Seen, as
it were, through the telescope of long years of political ex-
perience, sweeping all intervening time and space, the great
city of Dehli, which he knew so well, was brought close to his
* A fuller account of Sir John Lawrence's internal policy is reserved for
another chapter.
t These are the words of Colonel Edwardcs in his Peshawar Military
Report — a document of great interest and ability, and one most serviceable
to the hiatoiian.
1857.] MARCH OF THE GUIDE COEPS. 349
eyes ; and lie felt that he had a double duty. Much as he might
think of Lahor, Amritsar, or Peshawar, he thought still more
of Dehli. He felt as lesser men would not have felt, that it
was his duty in that emergency to give back to the Empire, in
time of intestine war, all that he could give from that abundance
of military strength which had been planted in the province
at a time when the defence of the frontier against external
aggressions was held to be the first object of imperial im-
portance. Knowing well the terrible scarcity of reliable troops
in all the country below the Panjab, and the encouraging effect
of the occupation of Dehli by the rebel troops, he resolved to
pour down upon the imperial city every regiment that he
could send to its relief. From that time his was the directing
mind which influenced for good all that was done from Upper
India, working downwards to rescue our people from the toils
of the enemy, and to assert our dominion under the walls of
Dehli, where the great battle of supremacy was to be fought.
And the first succour which he sent was the famous Guide
Corps, which Henry Lawrence had designed ever
to be ready for service — ever to be the first for tm march
action. It was at that time stationed at Hoti- Corps.
Mardan, under the command of Captain Henry
Daly. On the morning of the 13th, two officers, who had gene
over to Naushahra to attend a ball which had been given at that
station, brought to Hoti-Mardan tidings that the 55th Kegi-
ment at the former place had received orders to relieve the
Guide Corps at the latter. All was then excitement and con-
jecture. No man knew the reason of the movement ; no man
knew what had happened or what was coming. " No uproar," it
was said, " along the line of frontier. No incursion to repress.
No expedition to join." The story told, at six in the morning,
was true ; and two hours afterwards its truth was confirmed
by the sight of the approaching regiment in the distance.
About the same time an express came in from Peshawar,
bringing orders for the Guide Corps to march at once to Nau-
shahra. With the official orders came a private letter from
Edwardes to Daly, which cast a terrible glare of light upon all
that had before been obscure. " That you may better^ know
how to act on the enclosed instruction to move to Naushahra, I
write privately to tell you that telegraphic news of opn
mutiny among the Native troops at Mirath having reachod
us here to-day, we think a movable column should be assembled
350 PESHAWAK AND RAWALPINDI [1857.
in the Panjab, and get between the stations that have gone
wrong and those that have not, and put down further dis-
affection by force. It is obviously necessary to constitute such
a column of reliable troops, and therefore it has been proposed
to get the Guides and Her Majesty's 27th Regiment together
without delay as a part of the scheme." So Daly at once
mustered his Guides, and before midnight they were at Nau-
shahra. He had not long laid himself down to rest, when he
was awakened by an express from Cotton ordering the Guides to
move upon Atak. At gun-fire they recommenced their journey,
and before noon, after a trying march, under a fierce sun, they
reached their destination, scorched and dried, but full of spirit
and ripe for action. " The Panjab," wrote the gallant leader
of the Guides on that day, " is paying back India all she cost
her, by sending back troops stout and firm to her aid."
From Atak, after securing the Fort, and holding it until the
arrival of a detachment sent from Kohat, Daly marched, two
hours after midnight, on the morning of the 16th, in the light
of the rising moon, which soon was obscured by a blinding
dust-storm. When it cleared away, the air was fresh and
pleasant, and the corps marched on, a distance of more than
twenty miles, until, at eight o'clock, it bivouacked in a grove
of peach and apricot trees, which enabled them to dispense
with tents. At midnight, after a few hours of early slumber,
the trumpet-call was again heard, and they resumed their march
in the cool morning air, through a beautiful country skirted by
a range of verdant hills; and on the morning of the 18th they
were at Rawalpindi.
There was nothing needed to stimulate a man of Daly's high
enthusiasm, but it was refreshing and invigorat-
Mav 18
ing to be, even for a little while, in close and
familiar intercourse with such men as Lawrence, Chamberlain,
and Edwardes — and a fourth, Hugh James, then acting as
secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who had a noble spirit
and a high intelligence worthy of the confidence of his great
master. There is nothing more delightful than this attrition
of ardent natures. Great men become greater by such sym-
pathetic contact. It was a source of infinite rejoicing to Daly
to learn that the Guides, which might have done great service
as a part of the Movable Column in the Panjab, were honoured
by being the first regiment selected to move down to the relief
of Dehli. " The Guides, I believe," wrote Daly in his journal
1857.] MARCH OF THE GUIDE CORPS. 351
on the 18th of May, "are to march down and to show to the
people Native troops willing and loyal. I shall rejoice at this,
and march down with all my heart." And so they marched
down — with a great enthusiasm stirring their gallant leader,
and through him, all who followed ; officers and men, moved
by one common heroism of the best kind. " I am making, and
mean to make," wrote Daly on the 1st of June, "the best
march that has been heard of in the land ! " And nobly he
fulfilled his promise.
At this time he had reached Lodiana. In the early morning
of the 4th the Guides were at Ambalah, and on
the 6th they were at Karnal. There they found
Mr. Le Bas and Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who had escaped from
Dehli, and were eager to punish some neighbouring villages,
which were believed to have harboured insurgents, and to be
full of people bent upon the plunder of the Faringhis. Eager
as Daly was to push on to Dehli, and reluctant to destroy
wholesale, in retaliation for what might only be an offence of
the few, he for some time resisted the retributory eagerness of
the civilians, but at length yielded to their wishes, and sent
the Guides forward to the attack. The villagers fled in dis-
may ; some were killed on the retreat ; others were made
prisoners ; and soon the blaze of their burning houses could be
seen for many a distant mile. But the mercy of the Christian
officer was shown towards the helpless and unoffending; Daly
saved the women and the children, and helped them to remove
the little property they possessed.
The delay was unfortunate. The unwelcome duty thus
forced upon the Guide Corps deprived it of the coveted honour
of taking part in the first attack upon the Dehli mutineers.
Had not the civilians, in that great zeal for the desolation of
villages, which distinguished many, perhaps too many of them,
before the year was at an end, arrested Daly's onward march,
he would have been present with his corps at the battle of
Badli-ki-sarai. As it was, he marched into camp a day too late.*
* " The morning after the battle the Guides entered camp under the
command of Captain Daly. They were already well known us one of the
finest regiments in India. They were almost all of Afghan or Persian race,
and consisted of three troops of cavalry, perhaps the best riders in our pay,
and six companies of infantry armed with the rifle. They had marched in
this, the hottest time of the jear, from near Peshawar to Dehli, a distance of
352 PESHAWAR AND RAWALPINDI [1857.
The battle had been fought, but the corps, by the march
alone, had covered itself with glory, and it was
June 9. received on its arrival by the Dehli Field Force
The a^ u i2hi?.° rps with ringing cheers. There were now two Native
regiments in the British camp whom all men
trusted — the Gurkahs under Beid, and the Panjabi Guide
Corps under Daly. And soon it will be seen how gallantly
they proved the fidelity that was in them. Indeed, on the
very day of their arrival, the Guides went out, fresh as if
they had slept a long sleep, and loitered through a cool
morning, to give the Dehli mutineers a taste of their temper.
The enemy were not prepared, on the day after the battle, to
risk another great engagement ; but, intent on not suifering
us to rest, they sent out parties of Horse and Foot to attack
our advanced position. The Guides went gallantly to the
front. The sabres of their horsemen were crossed with those
of the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry; but not long could the
rebels stand the onslaught. The failure of the attack would
have been comjDlete, if it had not cost us the life of one of our
finest officers. Daly was unharmed, though struck by a spent
shot, and his horse killed in the encounter; but his second in
command, young Quintin Battye, who had charged at the head
of the Guides' Cavalry, was carried mortally wounded from the
field. The gallantry of his bearing throughout this fierce
encounter had attracted the admiration of his chief; and Daly,
when last he saw his lieutenant in action, had cried out with
the irrepressible enthusiasm with which one brave man regards
the bravery of another, " Gallant Battye ! well done, brave
Battye ! " and soon afterwards a rebel came up within two yards
of the English officer, and, after vainly endeavouring to bayonet
him, discharged his piece into Battye's body. The deed was
amply revenged. A Subahdar of the Guide Corps cut the
Sipahi down as he fired.*
five hundred and eighty miles in twenty-two days. Their tta'ely height and
military bearing made all who saw them proud to have such aid. They came
in as firm and light as if they had marched only a mile.'' — History of the
Siege of Dehli, by One who Served there.
* Subahdar Marban Singb. This gallant soldier was a Gurkah, "one of
those sent down by Sir Henry Lawrence " to join the Guide Corps. He fell
in action, some days afterwards, at the head of the first company, which he
commanded. " The men," wrote Daly to John Lawrence, " speak of him
with tears and sobs." He had two brothers also killed in action.
1557.] DEATH OF BATTYE. 353
_ And as the young hero lay dying, in grievous pain, on that
night which was to be his last, a remembrance of
the pleasant Argos of his school days mingling Quin^^ye
with the pride of the soldier and the great love of
country which sustained our people, he said, with a smile on
his handsome face, to the chaplain who was ministering to him,
" Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori ; " and so ended his
brief and honourable career.*
* See Chaplain's " Narrative of the Siege of Dehli." [Quintin Battye was
the second of ten brothers, all soldiers. In later years two of them gave like-
wise their lives for their country ; one, Wigram, at Fathabad, in Afghanistan,
charging at the head of the Guides, the 2nd April, 1879; the other, Bichruond.
on the crests of the Black Mountain, 18 June, 1888.— G. B. M.]
VOL. II. _. 2 JL
354 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
CHAPTER III.
PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB.
"Whilst Daly's Guide Corps was making this splendid march,
and the Panjabwas contributing the first-fruits of
Ma y- its accumulated strength to the succour of the
johSwrenk English Army at Dehli, events were ripening in
the frontier province, and John Lawrence and
his associates were laying fast hold of the crisis with a
vigorous tenacity, as men knowing right well the sovereign
importance of promptitude of action. The Chief Commissioner,
in earnest council with Edwardes and Chamberlain, had clearly
marked out the policy which was now to be pursued for the
preservation of the Panjab. When intelligence of the events at
the capital, and especially of the disarming of the Native regi-
ments at Mian-Mir, reached him, he had been at first somewhat
startled by the boldness of the conception, and perhaps inclined
to question the wisdom of the achievement. For John
Lawrence, with all his immense energy and resolution, was a
man cautious and circumspect, who never acted upon impulse.
If he thought at the beginning that this open movement against
the Sipahis on the part of the Sirkar — this vehement declaration
of want of confidence in men who had as yet, within his own
circle of administration, done nothing disloyal — was hastily to
proclaim a war that it was not desirable to precipitate, there
was substantial reason for the doubt.* But he very soon felt
full assurance that what had been done had been done wisely
and well. And from that time, sternly recognising the fact
* See the following extract from a private letter addressed by Lawrence to
Edwardes, in which the position of affairs is most accurately stated in a few
words : " The misfortune of the present state of affairs is this, — Each step we
take for our own security is a blow against the regular Sipahi. He feels this,
and on his side takes a further step, and so we go on, until we disband or
destroy them, or they mutiny and kill their officers."
1857.] POLICY OF SIK JOHN LAWRENCE. 355
that the crisis had come, that there was nothing to be postponed,
or coqueted with, or smoothed down, he flung himself into the
work before him, full-brained and strong-armed, and grappled
with it as, perhaps, no other man could have done. Then he,
in his turn, startled others by the boldness of his conceptions.
There were men equally shrewd and courageous at Lahor, who
learnt with alarm that the Chief Commissioner was enlisting
Sikhs and Afghans into the service of the State. But this
policy was based upon a sound estimate of the antagonism
between the Purbiah Sipahis from Hindustan and the Panjabi
races, whether Sikhs or Muhammadans — a natural antagonism
fostered and increased by the conduct of the former.* To
replace these Hindustanis, among whom it every day became
more apparent that mutiny was spreading like a pestilence, by
the mixed races of the province and the frontier, might be to
substitute a new danger for the old ; but the one was certain,
the other merely conjectural. And there was good reason to
believe that so long as we were capable of asserting our
strength, the military classes of the Panjab would array them-
selves on our side, if only for the sake of gain. Among the
Sikhs, Dehli was both an offence and a temptation. Old
prophecies had foretold that the Imperial City of the Mughul
would some day be given up to the plunder of the Khalsa.
And it was not to be doubted that the destruction of the
Hindustani Army of the Company would tend, sooner or later,
to assist them to recover the ascendency they had lost. Sir
John Lawrence saw this clearly enough ; but he had to deal
with an immediate necessity, and he had no need at such a
time to take thought of the Future. So he asked the consent
of the Governor-General to the raising of local levies, and
this, sought and granted on a small scale, soon expanded into
larger proportions, and Sir John Lawrence held in his hand an
* On the parts of the Sikhs and Panjahis there happily existed a con-
siderable degree of antipathy, if not downright enmity, towards the Sipahis
of the Native Corps of the Line. The latter had rendered themselves insuf-
ferable by assuming airs of superiority, and regarding the former with disdain,
as being themselves more warlike and better soldiers. " We mar-ed (beat)
Kabul, we mar-ed the Panjab," was the every-day boast of the Purbiah
Sipahi to the Sikh, whom he further stigmatised as a man of low caste. The
bad feeling between the two races was still further fostered by the cold
shoulder usually turned by the Purbiahs to the Sikhs and Panjabis, whom
they could not openly prevent enlisting into regiments of the Line.
2 A 2
356 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
open commission to act according to his own judgment and
discretion.*
This policy met with general favour among the chief political
officers in the province, and there were few who did not press
for permission to recruit in their own districts. But it was soon
apparent that there was in some parts, especially on the
frontier, overmuch of hesitation, resulting from want of confi-
dence in our strength. Meanwhile other precautionary mea-
sures were being pressed forward with that promptitude and
energy which always distinguished such operations in the
Panjab. The Police were strengthened. The utmost vigilance
was enforced upon them. The different passages of the Panjab
Bivers — the fords and ferries — were watched and guarded ; and
every effort was to be made to intercept those emissaries of evil
who, in the guise of wandering fakeers or other religious
mendicants, were sowing the seeds of sedition broadcast over
the country.*] - Then, again, great endeavours were made — and
with wonderful success — to save the Government Treasure, the
loss of which was not to be calculated by the number of rupees
to be struck off our cash-balances. It was emphatically the
sinews of war to the enemy. Wherever it was held, under
Native guards, at outlying stations, it was removed to places of
security and stored under the protection of European soldiers.
And at the same time an order went forth — merciful in the end,
but terrible in the hour of our need — to punish all offenders
against the State with a deterring severity, which would strike
a great fear into the hearts of the people. " There was no room
then for mercy," it was said ; " the public safety was a
paramount consideration." The ordinary processes of the law
were set aside, and authority was given to any two civil officers
to erect themselves into a special commission to try criminals,
and to execute upon them, when needed, the sentence of death.
At the same time, seeing that it was better to remove the means
* I ought not to omit to state that, as many Sikhs had enlisted into the
Sipahi regiments, an order went out to excerpt these men from the Hindustani
corps, and form them into separate battalions.
f I have been told that the picture in the first volume of this History, of
the wandering emissaries of sedition, who, in one disguise or another, traversed
the country, was purely an effort of my imagination. As this opinion has
been made public througli an influent ial channel, I may note that the
statement in the text is from Sir John Lawrence's official report, laid before
Parliament.
1857.] RETURN OF EDWARDES TO PESHAWAR. 357
of offence than to punish its commission, he tried to clear the
province of all that mass of disaffected non-military humanity
from Hindustan,* which was either hanging on to the skirts of
the Piirbiah Army, or had followed the Faringhis in the hour
of success, moved by the great lust of gain to worship what they
now reviled. And all these measures for the internal security
of the province seemed to John Lawrence the more necessary,
as he was straining every nerve to send down troops to Dehli,
and thus was weakening his own defensive powers. For this
reason, too, it seemed to him that we should act vigorously, and
at once, against our declared enemies, taking the initiative
whenever opportunity presented itself, and establishing a repu-
tation for that confidence in our own resources, the belief in
which by our adversaries is always a tower of strength. And
already events were hurrying on to this desired point. One
great opportunity was close at hand, and others were pressing
on tumultuously behind.
On the 21st of May, Colonel Edwardes returned toPeshawar.f
Little sushine greeted him there. His colleagues,
Cotton and Nicholson, had no cheerful intelligence PeSwar
to offer him. A great cloud was over the place.
The Sipahi regiments had shown unmistakable signs of that
feverishness which presages revolt. Cotton had divided his
Hindustani troops in such a manner as to render joint action
more difficult ; and he had placed Europeans, with guns, in
their immediate vicinity, to be prepared for a sudden rising.
From many parts of the country tidings of fresh mutinies had
come in, and there was a general belief that the whole Native
Army was rotten to the core. Intercepted letters showed that
the excitement was not confined to those whose names were
* " The traitorous symptoms evinced and the intrigues set on foot by the
non-military Hindustanis in the Panjab territories, rendered it necessary to
remove large numbers of them. These people were employed to a consider-
able extent among the police and other subordinate civil establishments ; and
as camp-folio wt-rs they swarmed in every Cantonment, and in the adjacent
cities. Mo=t of the lower class of employes wero discharged, and numbers of
camp-followers deported out of the province." — Sir John Lawrence's Official
Report.
•f The regular Hindustani regiments at Peshawar consisted of the 5th
Cavalry and°the 21st, 21th, 27th, and 51st Infantry regiments.
358 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAb. [1857.
written on the muster-rolls of our regiments,* Nicholson, who,
with his wonted energy, had been pushing forward the work
of raising local levies, had found an uneasy feeling among the
chiefs of the principal tribes, and a general unwillingness to
enlist into the service of a Government which seemed to be in a
state of decrepitude, if not of decay. " Men remembered
Kabul," wrote Edwardes at a later period. " Not one hundred
could be found to join such a desperate cause." It was clear,
therefore, both to him and to Nicholson that it was necessary to
sweep away the doubts and uncertainties which were keeping
up this dangerous state of unrest, and to assert, vigorously
and undeniably, the power of the English on the frontier.
On the night of the 21st, they had gone to rest in their
clothes beneath the same roof, both assured that a
May 2i. £ ew more hours would ripen their plans, when an
express arrived informing them that the companies of the
55th had mutinied at Naushahra, some twenty-four miles
distant from Peshawar, and that there was no reliance to be
placed on the 10th Keginient of Irregular Cavalry at the same
place. The former regiment had been brigaded at Mirath and
other stations with the 3rd Cavalry, and was regarded as a
fugleman corps, whose every movement would be strictly fol-
lowed by the regiments in the Panjab. It needed not any long-
sustained conversation between Edwardes and Nicholson for
both to arrive at the conclusion that the Native troops at
Peshawar should be at once disarmed. So the Commissioner
and Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar went straightway to
the Quarters of the Brigadier, and woke him up in the dead of
the night. Starting from his sleep, Cotton saw beside him his
two political associates; and, wondering what had brought
them his bed-side, prepared himself to listen. He was not a
man in any emergency to be flustered, and he soon took in with
a cool brain the whole state of the case. It would be necessary
to send European troops from Peshawar to coerce the refractory
regiment at Naushahra and Hoti-Mardan, and the white troops
at Cotton's disposal, already weakened by the requirements of
* " Thanesur Brahmans and Patna Muhanimadans, Hindustani fanatics in
the Sawad Valley, and turbulent outlaws in Gitanah, were calling upon the
Sipahis to declare themselves The whole disclosed such a picture of
fanatic zeal and base treachery as made the very name of a Piirbiah Sipahi
suspected and loathed/' — Cave-Browne.
1857.] THE MIDNIGHT MEETING. 359
the Movable Column and by summer sickness, could little
afford a further draft from them, whilst the Hindustani regi-
ments were in armed force in the cantonment. Moreover, it
was plain that the tribes on the Frontier were eagerly watching
events, and the excitement was every day increasing. But
there were two aspects in which this might be regarded, for
thus to strip the Frontier of a large part of its defenders — to
reduce the available force at the disposal of the British Govern-
ment to a handful of European troops — might be to encourage
the Afghans to stream through the Khaibar Pass in an irre-
sistible spasm of energy for the recovery of Peshawar. The
risk of action was great ; the risk of quiescence seemed also to
be great. But to those three brave men, in midnight council
assembled, it appeared that the bolder would be the better
course ; and so it was resolved that they should be the first to
strike, and that four of the five Sipahi regiments should be
disarmed at break of day.* The responsibility of the blow
would rest with Cotton. He did not hesitate to accept it.
There was no time to be lost. So he at once summoned the
Commanding Officers of the Native regiments to
his Quarters. Day broke before they were as- Disarming of
sembled. There, in the presence of Edwardes segments.
and Nicholson, Cotton told them what he had
determined to do, and ordered them to parade their regiments
with all possible despatch. Then there arose a storm of remon-
strance. Protesting their entire confidence in the fidelity of
their men, these Sipahi Commandants clamoured vehemently
against the threatened disgrace of their regiments; and one
declared his conviction that his corps would never submit to
lay down its arms, but would rise against the order and re-
solutely attack the guns.f Cotton listened attentively to all
* The 21st Sipahi regiment was exempted from the operation of the dis-
arming order. It was the senior regiment in the Cantonment, and as such,
according to military etiquette and usage, the other battalions looked to it for
an example. It had certainly not given a signal for insurrection, and what-
ever may have been the feelings with which it regarded the supremacy of the
English, it had shown no active symptoms of disaffection. It was thought
advisable, therefore, to spare it, the more especially as it was held to be
M indispensable to keep one Native Infantry corps to carry on the duties of
the station."
f " It was impossible not to sympathise with the soldierly feelings of Colonel
Harrington and Major Shakespeare ; but when Colonel Plumbe has implicit
360 PEOGEESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1S57.
that was said, but the discussion proceeded after argument had
been exhausted, and, after a while, Edwardes, thinking that
time and words were being wasted, broke in with an emphatic
sentence, to the effect " that the matter rested entirely with
Brigadier Cotton." On this Cotton at once exclaimed : " Then
the troops as originally determined will be disarmed." This
silenced all further remonstrance. Not another word was said
by way of argument. The regimental Commandants received
their instructions and went forth to do the bidding of their
chief.
It has been stated that the Peshawar Force had been wisely
cut in two, as a precautionary measure, by Brigadier Cotton.
It was now arranged that Edwardes should accompany Cotton
to the right wing, whilst Nicholson went to the left with Colonel
Galloway of the 70th Queen's who stood next in seniority.*
"With the former were Her Majesty's 87th Fusiliers, with the
latter the 70th, both with detachments of Artillery to support
them. It was a moment of intense anxiety. The Sipahi Com-
mandants were parading their men, and the Queen's Regiments
were lying in wait to attack them on the first sign of resistance.
The suddenness of the movement took the Sipahis aback ; they
laid down their arms to the bidding of their own officers. And
as the piles grew and grew, under the mournful process of
humiliating surrender, a feeling of profound grief and shame
took possession of their officers, and it is recorded that some of
them cast their own swords and spurs upon the heaps of
abandoned musketry and sabres in token of the strength of
their sympathy with the Sipahis, and their detestation of the
authority which had degraded them.f
confidence in the 27tli Native Infantry to be unshaken by events in Hindustan,
and had nothing to recommend but conciliation, whilst the Colonel of the 51st,
on the other hand, predicted that his men would attack the guns if called on
to give up their muskets, hesitation was at an end." — Edwarchs 's Report.
* Brigadier Cotton at this time crtmmanded generally the Frontier force,
whilst Colonel Galloway was Brigadier commanding the station.
f Colonel Edwardes's official report. " As the muskets and sabres of the
once honoured corps were hurried unceremoniously into carts, it was said that
here and there the spurs and swords of English officers fell sympathisingly
upon the pile." General Cotton says that the conduct of some of the Sipahi
officers then, and afterwards, was of a highly insubordinate character, and
that serious consequences to them would have ensued, "hail it been prudent
to exhibit such a division in the European element in the eyes of the Native
troops and the people of the country.''
1857.] AKEEST OF FUGITIVES. 361
The arms surrendered, Brigadier Cotton addressed the regi-
ments, praising them for the readiness with which they had
obeyed orders ; and they went to their Lines. Thus was the
work done well and thoroughly — and without the shedding of
a drop of blood. The effect upon the minds of the people 'was
magical. They believed that we were strong because we were
daring. The old aphorism, that " nothing succeeds like success,"
was here triumphantly verified. The tribes, who had held
aloof whilst clanger threatened us, and the issue was doubtful,
now pressed forward eagerly to do homage to the audacity of
the English. Without another halt of doubt, or tremor of
hesitation, they came forward with their offers of service.
" As we rode down to the disarming," said Herbert Edwardes,
" a very few chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us, and
I remember, judging from their faces, that they came to see
which way the tide would turn. As we rode back friends were
as thick as summer flies, and levies began from that moment to
come in." Good reason, indeed, had Sir John Lawrence to
write to the Peshawar Commissioner, with hearty commendation,
saying : " I look on the disarming of the four corps at Peshawar
as a master-stroke— one which will do much good to keep the
peace throughout the Panjab. Commandants of Corps are
under a delusion, and whilst in this state their opinions are of
little value. . . . We are doing well in every district — Becher
famously." *
But although the Native regiments at Peshawar had been
disarmed, they had not been rendered altogether
innocuous. Arms on that frontier, though for Pu D ' e s S eSera ° f
the most part of a ruder kind than our own, were
abundant, and our disciplined Sipahis, fraternising with the
border tribes, might have returned to do us grievous injury.!
It was, perhaps, too much to expect that the entire body of
Sipahis would remain quietly in their Lines ; for if the active
principle of rebellion were within them, they would be eager to
cross the Frontier, and if they were under the pressure of a
great panic, confused and bewildered by the blow which had
fallen upon them, they would surely believe that it was the
design of the English to destroy the soldiers whom they had
* Major John Becher of the Engineers, Deputy-Commissioner of the
Hazarah Division of the Panjab.
f MS. Correspondence.
362 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
disarmed. It was scarcely, therefore, to be hoped that at such
a time there would be no desertions. But it was necessary at
once to arrest these natural impulses to leave the Lines.* It
was not a time for tenderness — for mercy — even for justice. A
stern example was to be made of the first offenders. So the
Police were put upon their track, and the tribes were encouraged
to arrest the fugitives. Many were brought back, in the firm
grip of their supposed friends and confederates — some of them
after falling among thieves and being despoiled of all they
possessed.
Those were the earl}' days of our great trouble, and Regu-
lation and Eoutine were still paramount amongst us. The
technicalities of the Judge-Advocate had not been dispensed
with, and the trial of these deserters, therefore, was conducted
with all due ceremony and formality.")" Colonel Galloway was
President of the Court-Martial assembled by order of General
Peed, and the first result was that the Subahdar Major of the
51st, found guilty of desertion, was sentenced to death ; whilst
a Hawaldar and a Sipahi were condemned to short terms of
imprisonment. The leniency of these latter sentences pro-
voked Cotton and Edwardes ; but the public execution af a
high Native officer might still have a good deterring effect.
So on the evening of the 28th of May, what was called, in
the demi-official language of the time, " an useful timber frame-
work " was erected on the parade-ground, and a general parade
was ordered for the following morning. "The Subahdar
Major of the 51st was hanged this morning," wrote Edwardes
to Nicholson on the 29th, "in presence of all the troops, who
behaved well. I occupied the road in rear of Cantonments
with Horse and Foot levies, in case the 51st should refuse to
attend the parade, as some people expected, in which case
General Cotton would have put them to the bayonet." | But
soon the " useful timber frame- work " thus called into requisition
for the first time at Peshawar was put to larger uses, until the
process of suspension became tedious, and convicted offenders
were blown from the guns.
* The desertions were principally from the 51st Regiment.
f The Judge-Advocate said that drum-head courts-martial -were "ob-
solete." It was not long before they were revivified into institutions of the
present.
X MS. Correspondence.
1857.] THE MARCH TO HOTI-MAKDAN. 363
In the meanwhile retribution was overtaking the 55th
Regiment at Mardan. "An hour hence," wrote
Edwardes on the day after the disarming at De struction of
Peshawar, " a small force of three hundred
European Infantry, about two hundred and fifty Cavalry
(Native Irregulars), and eight guns, six of which are howitzers,
will march from this Cantonment to the ferry at Dobandi, and
thence proceed to-morrow night in one long march to the Fort
of Mardan, for the purpose of disarming the 55th Native
Infantry, which is said to be in a state of mutiny." The
expedition was commanded by Colonel Chute of the 70th
Queen's,* and with it, as political officer, went Colonel John
Nicholson, ever eager to be in the thick of the action. It has
been already related that the 55th had been ordered to relieve
the Guide Corps at Hoti-Mardan, It had proceeded thither
from Naushahra, leaving two companies at the old station under
Captain Cameron. There the Queen's 27th (Enniskillens) had
been stationed with Brougham's battery ; but the former had
been ordered to Rawalpindi, and the latter to Peshawar. And
now, with the exception of a little handful of Europeans, who
had been placed in charge of the sick and the women and
children of the old European garrison, the place was left to the
mercy of mutinous native troops. f The situation was one of
extreme danger. But it was manfully confronted by Lieutenent
Davies of the Enniskillens, who, having placed his helpless
charge in a convenient barrack, drew up his little body of
staunch Englishmen, fully accoutred and ready for action, and
prepared to meet his assailants. These signs of resistance were
too much for the mutineers. Having fired a few random shots
from a distance, they made off towards the river, intending to
cross by the bridge of boats, and to join their comrades in Hoti-
Mardan. But Taylor, of the Engineers, with characteristic
readiness of resource, broke the bridge, by draw-
ing out the boats in mid-channel, and only a few ay
men made the passage of the river and joined their head-
quarters in the course of the night. The rest returned to their
* Brigadier Cotton wished himself to go in command, but Edwardes per-
suaded him to remain at Peshawar, where his services were more needed.
f It should be stated that there was a detachment of the regiment posted
on the Atak to guard the ferry at Kuairabad. These men were the first to
mutiny.
364 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
Lines, and for a while remained sullen and inactive. But a
summons came to them to march to Mardan, and on the night
of the 22nd they went thither peaceably under Cameron's
command.
They went to swell the tide of treason. There was no doubt
of the treachery of the main body of the regiment, although
with lip-loyalty it was still deceiving its officers, after the old
fashion ; and its Colonel, Henry Spottiswoode, who is described
as " a devoted soldier, who lived for his regiment," protested
that he had " implicit confidence " in his men, and implored
Cotton not to act against them. So strong, indeed, was his
trust, that even the warnings of some men of his own corps
could not shake it. Two hundred Sikhs had been enlisted into
the reo-iment since it had been stationed in the Panjab, and
these men now offered, if separated from the rest, to fight the
whole of the Hindustani Sipahis. But Spottiswoode shook his
head and declined the offer. He had faith in his children to
the last. He would " stake his life on their staunchness ; " and
he did. On the night of the 24th, the advance of the force
from Peshawar was suspected, if not known, by the Sipahis,
and the Native officers went to the Colonel for an explanation.
Spottiswoode knew the truth of the report but too well. He
could answer nothing of an assuring kind, and the deputies
went unsatisfied from his presence. Then his heart sunk within
him. It was all over. The mutual confidence on which he
had relied so much was gone for ever. He could not bear the
thought of the future, so left alone in his room he blew out his
brains.*
As day was breaking on the 25th, Chute's column, having
been strengthened by a body of Panjab Infantry
May 25. UI1 der Major Vaughan, came in sight of the Fort
of Hoti-Mardan. No sooner was their advance discerned from
the walls than the 55th rose in a body and rushed forth tumul-
tuously, turning their faces towards the hills of Sawad. Now
that their Colonel was gone, they felt that there was no hope
for them, oo they went, taking with them their arms, their
regimental colours, all the treasure they could seize, and all
the ammunition that they could carry with them. Chute sent
* See an interesting note in Mr. Cave-Browne's book, vol., i. p. 170. Colonel
Spottiswoode had served chiefly with the 21st, and had been only for a few
months in command of the 55th.
1857.] MUTINY OF THE 55TH. 365
on a detachment of all arms of his little force, whilst he occupied
the Tort with the remainder ; * but the mutineers had a long
start, and the country was such that our guns could not be
brought within range of the fugitives. These things were in
their favour. But there was one thing terribly against them.
Nicholson was there. His foot in the stirrup, his
sword by his side, and a few trusty horsemen H ^S^S. to
behind him, all his old martial instincts, of which
civil employment had long denied the gratification, grew strong
within him again, and he swept down upon the flying Sipahis
with a grand swoop, which nothing could escape or resist. It
was said afterwards that the tramp of his war-horse was heard
miles off. " Spottiswoode's light-hearted boys," he wrote to
Edwardes on the 24th, "swear that they will die righting.
Nous allons voir." And a day or two later he
wrote to the same beloved correspondent saying, ay
" The 55th fought determinately, as men, who have no chance
of escape but by their own exertions, always do." But the
pursuing party killed about a hundred and twenty of the
mutineers, captured about a hundred and fifty, with the regi-
mental colours, and more than two hundred stands of arms.j
The rest took refuge in the Lund-khur hills. And many of
those who fell on that day fell under Nicholson's own strong
arm. Of those under him, none fought so well as his own
Mounted Police. The men of the Irregular Cavalry only
"pretended to act." J "I did not get home till 7 p.m. yester-
* It should be stated that the officers of tKe 55th, with about one hundred
and twenty men, came out of the Fort and joined Chute's force. It was
doubted whether they were more faithful than the rest. Colonel Edwardes
(Official Eeport) says that they were brought over by the threats and per-
suasions of their officers.
f Colonel Chute to Brigadier Cotton, Mardan, May 26.
X " There were some Irregulars, but they only pretended to act. Captain
Law, who commanded a party of the 10th Irregular Cavalry, got wounded in
setting a vain example to his men, one of whom treacherously fired into the
5th Panjab Infantry. The 5th, under Major Vaughan, followed as close as
infantry could do, and showed an admirable spirit throughout the day." —
Edwardes' s Report. Nicholson wrote that " the casualties in the 10th
Irregular Cavalry the other day were an excellent index of the state and
value of the corps." — "These casualties were one European officer, wounded
whilst trying to get his men to advance, one Sawar killed, not by the 55th,
but by Vaughan's men, into whom he treacherously fired." — MS. Correspond-
ence.
366 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
day," he wrote to Edwardes on the 26th of May, " having been
just twenty hours in the saddle, and in the sun the whole day.
So you may fancy I was dead beat, and my horse too. He
carried me over seventy miles."
If there had been any doubt before as to the man of men — the
one, of all others, strong in action and swift in pursuit, by whom
desperate work, such as Edwardes had spoken of in Calcutta,
was to be done best, the question was now settled. All men
saw in this the first of Nicholson's great exploits in the mutiny-
war, the forerunner of many others of the same stamp. It was
a fine thing at that time — nothing finer in the whole history of
the war — to mark the enthusiasm with which men, all earnest
in the great work before them, rejoiced in the successes of their
brethren, and sent forth, one to another, pleasant pseans of
encouragement. The chief officers of the Panjab were bound
together not merely by the excitement of a common object ; the
bonds of a common affection were equally strong within them,
and each was eager to express his admiration of the good deeds
of another. There may have been good fellowship in other
provinces, but in none was there such fellowship as this. Men
of the stamp of Edwardes and Nicholson, Becher and Lake,
James and M'Pherson — all having equal zeal for the public,
but not all enjoying equal opportunities, or, perhaps, possessing
equal powers, free from all jealousies, all rivalries — were strong
in mutual admiration, and were as proud of the exploits of a
comrade as of their own. This great raid of John Nicholson
stirred the hearts of all men to their depth. Edwardes in
letter after letter, in brief but emphatic sentences, had sent
him those fine, frank, genial words of hearty commendation,
which no man ever uttered more becomingly or more accept-
ably, and afterwards recorded officially that his friend " with a
handful of horsemen hurled himself like a thunderbolt on the
route of a thousand mutineers." And John Becher, all a-glow
with admiration of the two Peshawar Commissioners, wrote to
Edwardes, saying, " I rejoice to see you thus riding on the
whirlwind and controlling the storm, and glad amidst the
thunder-clouds. Your letter sounds like a clarion-blast full of
vigour and self-reliance ; and I am proud to see you and
Nicholson in this grand storm, masters at your work; right
glad that Nicholson did not leave. There was work for his
war-horse, and he is in his element — the first who has struck a
1857.] PUNISHMENT OF THE MUTINEERS. 367
death-blow. And we may be proud of John Lawrence as a
master-spirit in these times." *
A terrible example was now to be made of the mutineers of
the 55th. A hundred and twenty Sipahi prisoners
were in the hands of the British. They were all
liable to the punishment of death. It was not to be doubted
that the time had come when the severity of the hour would be
the humanity of all time. But these rebels, though taken
fighting against their masters, and known to have had murder
in their hearts, had not shed the blood of their officers, and
there were some amongst them who in the tumult of the hour
had been carried away by the multitude without any guilty
intent. The voice of mercy, therefore, was lifted up. " I must
say a few words for some of the 55th prisoners," wrote
Nicholson to Edwardes. " The officers of that regiment all
concur in stating that the Sikhs were on their side to the last.
I would, therefore, temper stern justice with mercy, and spare
the Sikhs and young recruits. Blow away all the rest by all
means, but spare boys scarcely out of their childhood, and men
who were really loyal and respectful up to the moment when
they allowed themselves to be carried away in a panic by the
mass." And Sir John Lawrence wrote also in the same strain
to the Commissioner of Peshawar. " In respect to the mutineers
of the 55th, they were taken fighting against us, and so far
deserve little mercy. But, on full reflection, I would not put
them all to death. I do not think that we should be justified
in the eyes of the Almighty in doing so. A hundred and
twenty men are a large number to put to death. Our object is
to make an example to terrify others. I think this object
would be effectually gained by destroying from a quarter to a
third of them. I would select all those against whom anything
bad can be shown — such as general bad character, turbulence,
prominence in disaffection or in the fight, disrespectful de-
meanour to their officers during the few days before the 26th,
and the like. If these did not make up the required number,
* Nicholson himself was very anxious that too much credit should not be
given to him for this exploit. It was stated in the public prints that he had
commanded the expeditionary force from Peshawar, and that he had been
twenty hours in pursuit of the enemy ; and he requested that it might be
explained with equal publicity that Colonel Chute commanded the force, and
that he (Nicholson) had been twenty hours in the saddle, but not all that
time in pursuit.
368 PEOGEESS OF EVENTS IN THE PAN JAB. [1857.
I would then add to them the oldest soldiers. All these should
be shot or blown away from the guns, as may be most expedient.
The rest I would divide into batches : some to be imprisoned
ten years, some seven, some five, some three. I think that a
sufficient example will then be made, and that these distinctions
will do good, and not harm. The Sipahis will see that we
punish to deter, and not for vengeance. Public sympathy will
not be on the side of the sufferers. Otherwise, they will fight
desperately to the last, as feeling certain that they must die." *
And in these opinions, equally politic and merciful, the
military authorities concurred ; indeed, there was at one time
some talk of suffering those men of the 55th, who had not
actually committed themselves, to retain their arms, and even of
rewarding the best of them. But subsequent investigation
proved that the Hindustanis who had not left the Fort owed their
immunity from actual crime rather to accident than to loyal
design ; so they were discharged without pay, and sent beyond
the Indus, whilst the Sikhs, who had made gallant offer of service,
were left with their arms in their hands, and drafted into other
regiments.
Then came the stern work of retribution. On the 3rd of
June io J une > twelve deserters of 51st had been hanged ;
and now on the 10th, the parade-ground of the
87th Queen's, on which the gallows had been permanently
erected, witnessed another scene of execution still more ghastly
in its aspect. The fugitives from Hoti-Mardan had all been
sentenced to death. A hundred and twenty criminals had been
condemned to be blown away from our guns. But the recom-
mendations of the Chief Commissioner had tempered the
severity of the sentence, and only one-third of the number had
been marked for execution. Forty prisoners were brought out
manacled and miserable to that dreadful punishment-parade.
The whole garrison of Peshawar was drawn up, forming three
sides of a square, to witness the consummation of the sentence.
The fourth side was formed by a deadly array of guns. Thou-
sands of outsiders had poured in from the surrounding country
to be spectators of the tremendous ceremony — all curious,
many doubtful, some perhaps malignantly eager for an out-
break, to be followed by the collapse of British ascendency.
The pieces of the Europeans were loaded. The officers, in
* MS. Correspondence.
1857.] THE GREAT PUNISHMENT PARADE. 369
addition to their regulation arms, had for the most part ready
to their clutch what was now becoming an institution — the
many-barrelled revolver pistol. The issue was doubtful, and
our people were prepared for the worst.
Under a salute from one of the batteries, the Brigadier-
General appeared on parade. Having ridden along the fronts of
the great human square, he ordered the sentence to be read.
And this done, the grim ceremony commenced. The forty
selected malefactors were executed at the mouth of the guns.*
No man lifted a hand to save them. The Native troops on
parade bore themselves with steadiness, as under a great awe,
and when orders went forth for the whole to march past in
review order, armed and unarmed alike were obedient to the
word of command. To our newly-raised levies and to the
curious on-lookers from the country, the whole spectacle was
a marvel and a mystery. It was a wonderful display of moral
force, and it made a deep and abiding impression. There was
this great virtue in it, that however unintelligible the process
by which so great a result had been achieved, it was easy to
understand the fact itself. The English had conquered, and
were masters of the position. Perhaps some of the most
sagacious and astute of the spectators of that morning's work
said to each other, or to themselves, as they turned their faces
homeward, that the English had conquered because they were
not afraid. The strength, indeed, imparted to our cause by the
disarming-parade of the 24th of May had been multiplied
ten-fold by the punishment-parade of the 10th of June. And
it is hard to say how many lives — the lives of men of all races
— were saved by the seeming severity of this early execution.
Among the rude people of the border the audacity thus dis-
played by the English in the face of pressing danger excited
boundless admiration. They had no longer any misgivings
with respect to the superiority of a race that could do such
great things, calmly and coolly, and with all the formality of an
inspection-parade. The confidence in our power, which the
disbandment of the Native regiments had done so much to
* It is a significant fact that neither Sir Herbert Edwardes, in his Official
Peshawar Report, nor Sir Sydney Cotton in his published Narrative, says one
word about this punishment parade. And what these brave men, being eye-
witnesses of the horror, shrunk from describing, I may well abstain from
dwelling on in detail. There is no lack, however, of particulars, all ghastly
and some grotesque, in the cotemporary letters before me.
VOL. II. 2 B
370 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
revive, now struck deep root in the soil. Free offers of
allegiance continued to come in from the tribes. Feeling now
that the English were masters of the situation, their avarice
was kindled, and every man who had a matchlock or a tulwar,
or, "better still, a horse to bring to the muster, came forward
with his tender of service to the British officers at Peshawar.
The difficulties and perplexities of the crisis could not obscure
the humours of this strange recruiting. Herbert Edwardes,
who was the life and soul of every movement at that time,
has himself sketched its comic aspects with an almost
Hogarthian fidelity of detail.* But this passed, whilst every
week developed more strikingly its serious results. For,
as the month of June advanced, and news came that the
English had not retaken Dehli, and across the border went
from mouth to mouth the rumour of the fiery crescent, there
was increasing danger that Musaiman fanaticism might prevail
over all else, and that a religious war once proclaimed, it would
be impossible to control the great tide of Muhammadanism that
would pour itself down from the North. If in that hour the
English had been weak at Peshawar, they might have been
overwhelmed. But much as those wild Muslims loved
Muhammad, they loved money more, and when they saw that
we were strong, they clung to us, as the wiser policy.
The end of the 55th may be narrated here. Even more
deplorable than the fate of these men, thus suddenly brought
face to face with ignominious death, was the doom impending
over their comrades, who had escaped from Nicholson's pursuing
horsemen across the border into Sawad. There they found the
country rent by intestine feuds ; almost, indeed, in the throes
of a revolution. The temporal and spiritual chiefs — the
Padishah and the Akhimd — were at strife with one another.
The mutineers took themselves and their arms to the former,
but he had no money to pay them, and our sleek, well-fed
Hindustanis soon discovered that they had committed a grievous
blunder. In a little while the body of their leader — the self-
made shattered corpse of a white-bearded Subahdar — was
fl eating down the river under the walls of Naushahra, and his
followers, disappointed and destitute, were turning their faces
towards the country of the Eajah of Kashmir, sick of Musal-
* See the Peshawar Mutiny Report, especially paragraph 66, which will
be found entire in the Appendix.
1857.] THE LAST OF THE 55TH. 371
ruan fanaticism, and hoping to excite sympathy and obtain
service under a Rajput government. These poor deluded
Hindus, who had abandoned pay, pension, peace, everything
that was dear to them, under a blind besetting belief in the
bigotry of their Christian masters, now found themselves breast-
high in the bitter waters of Muhammadan persecution.* They
had escaped the chimera of a greased cartridge to be despoiled
of their sacred threads and circumcised. They had fled from a
xandom rumour to confront a revolting reality. And now they
were fain to go skulking along the border, taking their gaunt
bodies and tattered garments to any place of refuge open to
them, seeking rest, but finding none; for as they huddled along
the Hazarah border, stumbling through rocky defiles, more
inhospitable than their Muhammadan persecutors, John Becher
raised the friendly clans to hunt them out like vermin. Then
their misery was at its height. Hungry and naked and footsore,
it was death to them to move, it was death to them to remain
still. Another venerable Subahdar set an example of suicide
to his followers by shooting himself, declaring that it was
better to die at once than to perish slowly by starvation.
Becher himself has told with rare force of language how first
one detachment then another was assisted by friendly Kohistanis
and others, whose services he had most sagaciously enlisted,
until the whole were either destroyed or brought prisoners into
our camp.f Then came the last scene of all, in which the
* Mr. Cave-Browne says that " many a sleek Brahman was made a com-
pulsory Muhammadan, doomed to servile officers in their masjids ; others
were sold for slaves. Humour has it that one fat old Subahdar was sold for
four annas (sixpence)."
f See Major Becher's published report — Panjab Mutiny Papers. In a
private letter to Edwardes (July 1) he gives a graphic description of the flight
of the Sipahis and the raising of the border clans. " After making a march,"
he said, "in the direction of Khagan, they turned back and went by the
more difficult road through the Kohistan, along the Indus to Chilass, and
with faces towards Giljit, or some other portion of Kashmir, as to the promised
land of safety. One of their officers shot himself at the prospect ; one or two
have died already; several are very ill. They have no carriage and are
rather hungry The road is very difficult even for men of the country.
They have no shelter, and I believe that very few can escape ; besides which,
the Maharajah Gulab Singh has moved a regiment to his Giljit frontier, and
swears he will polish off every man he meets. He has also warned the Gujars
and people of i*he country to pay them off. I have had several messengers
who have seen them. They are mostly Hindus. Looking naked as they do,
the women and children throw stones at them and cry, ' Out on you, black
2 B 2
372 PEOGEESS OF EVENTS IX THE PANJAB. [1857.
Gibbet and the Guns were the chief act< rs. On the very
outskirts of civilisation, where only a few Englishmen were
gathered together, the last of " Spottiswoode's light-hearted
fellows " paid the penalty of their folly or their crime. One
party after another of the fugitives was brought in, tried by a
military court and sentenced to death ; and they were hung up,
or blown away, on some commanding ground, to be a warning
and a terror to others. Brave and sullen they went to their
doom, asking only to die like soldiers at the cannon's mouth,
not as dogs in the noose of the gibbet. Little less than two
hundred men were executed at that time in the Hazarah country.
"Thus, hunted down to the last like wild beasts, was con-
summated the miserable fate of the 55 th Begiment, and thus
they afforded a salutary example to other mutinous regiments,
by proving the far reach of our power, and that there was no
refuge even beyond our border." * If any had not been thus
hunted out, their fate was perhaps worse than that of the
executed malefactors, for they were sold into slavery, and com-
pelled to apostatise for their lives.
Elsewhere, however, were ominous symptoms upon the
Frontier. Nicholson, since his great raid against
M FvZiAer! he the fugitives of the 55th, had been still in the field,
and he had frequently written to Edwardes that
the Musalman chiefs on the border were eagerly watching
the progress of events, and encouraging the rebellion of our
Native soldiery; who, at the same time, had been making
overtures to them. There was, too, a notorious outlaw, named
Ajun Khan, who was believed to be intriguing with our troops
at Abazai, a fortress on the banks of the Sawad Eiver, and
Nicholson was eager to make a swoop upon him.f " The game
Kafars without decency ! ' And they were shocked by the habits which they
witnessed in the early morning. The people of Pakli and Hazarah have
come forth like spirits at my bidding. I have been deluged with clansmen,
and our camp is very picturesque. ... I have received satisfactory assurances
from all our border chiefs. If the Saiads of Khagan had not, like good men
and true, manned then front, I think the Sipahis would have tried an easier
route ; but then again they would have found men of Gulab Singh's ready at
Muzuffarabad." — MS. Correspondence.
* Major Becher's Eeport.
f This uneasy feeling on the frontier had been of long standing. See the
following significant passage in Mr. Forsyth's Mutiny Eeport : " Of the causes
which led to this rebellion it is not for me to speak, but I cannot refrain from
1857.J DISAKMING OF THE 64TH. 373
is becoming nicer and more complicated," he had written on
the 2Gth of May from Mardan, " Ajun Khan has
came down to Prangar, and. it is generally believed May 25 '
that he has done so at the instigation of our troops there. This
does not seem improbable. There is no doubt that for some
time past emissaries (mostly Mullahs) from the Hills had been
going backwards and forwards between the 55th Native Infantry
here and certain parties in their own country." Four days
afterwards, he wrote from Omarzai, saying : " We
are just starting for Abazai. I will let you know May 30,
this evening whether I recommend the disarming of the 64th
Native Infantry. I am strongly inclined to believe that we
should not merely disarm but disband that corps, and the 10th
Irregular Cavalry. There is no doubt that they have both
been in communication with the Akhund of Sawad. ... If the
disarming of both or either corps be determined upon, we can
do it very well from here, without troubling the Peshawar
troops. I believe we did not pitch into the 55th one day too
soon. That corps and the 64th were all planning to go over to
the Akhund together. I have got a man who taunted my
police on the line of march with siding with infidels in a
religious war. May I hang him ? "
On the following day Nicholson wrote from Abazai, saying:
"We arrived here all right yesterday, and found the 64th
looking very villainous, but of course perfectly quiet. They
have been talking very disloyally both to the Ghilzis " (men of
the Kalat-i-Ghilzi Eegiment) " and people of the country, and
the former have ceased to associate with them. The latter
have been rather hoping for a row, in the midst of which they
may escape paying revenue." What he saw was quite enough
to convince him that it would be well to do the work at once.
recording one fact, which was not without significance. In August, 1856 a
letter from the Akhund of Sawad, addressed to Fath Khan, of Pindi Ghe'b,
was brought to me at Kawalpindi. Among much other news, the writer
stated that the Muhammadaus of Lakhnao had written to Dost Muhammad,
informing him that Oudh had been taken by the British, and that as they
supposed that Haidarabad would follow, there would soon be no stronghold
of Islam left in Hindustan, and unless some effort were made the cause of true
believers would be lost. In the event of the Muhammadans of Lakhnao
entering on any plan, they wished to know what aid they might expect from
the Dost. The sagacious reply to his observation was stated by the writer
to be, ' What will be remains to be seen.' "
374 PKOGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PAN JAB. [1857.
Approval had come from Cotton, from Edwardes, and from
Lawrence. So a detachment of Europeans, with some Panjabi
details and some guns of Brougham's battery, the whole under
that officer, were sent to disarm the companies at Shabkhadr,
and afterwards those at Michni, whilst the force at Abazai was
being dealt with by other components of Chute's column. The
teeth of the 64th were drawn without difficulty. But the
annihilation of the 10th Irregular Cavalry was reserved for
another day. Nicholson recommended that no action should be
taken against the Irregulars until tidings of the fall of Dehli
should have reached the Pan jab. He little thought how remote
was this event at the beginning of June; that long months
were yet to wear away in unsuccessful efforts to accomplish
the great object for which the Panjab was pouring out so much
of its military strength. And others were of the same sanguine
temper all over the Province — fortunately, for this faith, strong
though delusive, sustained them, and they worked with better
heart and greater vigour for holding fast to the lie.
There was now no further service for Chute's column to
perform. So it marched back to Peshawar, and Nicholson rode
on in advance of it, to resume his political duties.
On the 10th of June, Edwardes welcomed his
friend and fellow-workman with warm congratulations on his
success. " Nicholson came in from Abazai this morning," he
wrote to Sir John Lawrence, "looking rather the worse for
exposure ; and we have been going over the batta question, &c,
with the General, and have decided to say nothing about it till
Dehli falls, and then to disarm the 10th Irregular Cavalry, and
exempt from the abolition of batta the 21st Native Infantry,
the Kilat-i-Ghilzi Eegiment, and the 17th and 18th Irregular
Cavalry, if they keep quiet." And in the same letter he wrote
to the Chief Commissioner, saying, " What a terrible job is the
going off of those three regiments from Jalandhar and Philur
towards Dehli ! " It was a source of sore distress and dire
aggravation to Edwardes and Nicholson that, whilst they had
been doing so much for the defence of the province and the
maintenance of the honour of the nation, others were throwing
away every chance that came in their way, and by their
weakness and indecision suffering the enemy to escape.
For in other parts of the province there was not always that
glorious audacity which secures success by never doubting its
1857.] THE OUTBREAK AT JALANDHAR. 375
attainment. In the first week of June, the Sipahi regiments
at Jalandhar, whom, as we have already seen,
Brigadier Johnstone had not disarmed in May, were ¥^ t]x £ at
it -n -i • / • t /» " -Z r Jalaudhar.
swelling with sedition and ripe for revolt. Major
Edward Lake, who, in early youth, had shared with Herbert
Edwardes the distinction of striking the first blow at the
Multani insurgents of '49, was Commissioner of the Jalandhar
division. He had been absent on circuit when the events
occurred which have been detailed in a previous chapter,* but
before the end of the month he had returned to Head-Quarters,
had closely observed the temper of the Sipahis, and had been
convinced that they were only waiting an opportunity to break
into open rebellion. He strongly counselled, therefore, the
disarming of the regiments. But there was no Cotton at
Jalandhar. The Sipahi commandants shook their heads after
their wonted fashion; and the Brigadier, tossed hither and
thither by wild conflicts of doubt, at last subsided into inaction.
Events were left to develope themselves, and they did so with
all possible advantage to the mutineers. On the night of the
7th of June, the Native battalions — two regiments
of Foot and one of Horse — inaugurated a general
rising by setting fire to the house of the Colonel of the Queen's
regiment. In a little while the Lines were all astir with the
sights and sounds of open mutiny ; and the officers were making
their way to the parade-grounds, whilst women and children,
in wild excitement, were hurrying to the appointed place of
refuge. It is not easy to describe the uproar and confusion
which made the midnight hideous, nor to explain the reason
why, in the presence of an European regiment and a troop of
European Artillery, the insurgents were allowed to run riot in
unrestrained revolt. The incidents of the rising were of the
common type. They were not distinguished by any peculiar
atrocities. It seems that there was a general understanding
among the Sipahis that on a given day they should set their
faces towards Dehli. As a body, they did not lust for the
blood of their officers ; but in the excitement of the moment,
murderous blows were dealt. Adjutant Bagshawe, of the 36th
Regiment — a gallant officer and a good man — was mortally
wounded whilst endeavouring to rally a party of his Sipahis.
The death-blow did not come from one of his own men, but
* Ante, pp. 333-4,
376 PROGKESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
from a trooper who " rode up and shot him." Other officers
were wounded in the confusion of the hour; houses were burnt,
and property was destroyed. But there were instances of
fidelity and attachment on the part of the Sipahis ; men came
forward staunchly and devotedly to save the lives of their
officers. And altogether there were the usual contradictions
and anomalies, which, more or less all over the country, seemed
to indicate the general half-heartedness of the Sipahi revolt.
It was obviously the intention of the Jalandhar Brigade to
pick up the long-wavering regiment at Philur, and then for
the whole to march on to Dehli.* A trooper of the Cavalry
galloped forward in advance of the rebel force to give the 3rd
the earliest tidings of their approach. The conduct of the
last-named corps appears to be inscrutable, except upon the
hypothesis of a long-cherished design, and that patient, sturdy
resistance of all immediate temptations, which
seems in many instances to have distinguished
the behaviour of men waiting for an appointed day and a given
signal. The 3rd, that might have done us such grievous
injury when the siege-train was in its grasp, now that the
time had come, cast in its lot with the Jalandhar mutineers,
and swept on towards the city of the King. It is one of the
worst disgraces of the war that these Jalandhar regiments were
ever suffered to reach Philur. There was no lack of men eager
to pursue the mutineers ; but the one word from the one
responsible authority was not spoken until all orders might as
well have been given to the winds. The mutineers had done
their work and marched out of cantonments by one o'clock in
the morning, and not until seven was the word given for the
advance of the pursuing column. The extreme consideration
* I find the following in the Punjab Mutiny Papers. It seems to leave
little doubt with respect to the foregone design : " These intentions were by
chance divulged by a wounded Hawaldar of the 3rd Native Infantry to an
officer, who found him concealed at Humayiin's tomb, after the capture of
Dehli. This information was given without any attempt at palliation or
reserve It was from the lips of a man who knew his end was near, and
conveyed the impression of truth to its hearer ; it is, moreover, borne out by
known facts and circumstances. It was, strictly, that all the troops in the
Jalandhar Duab had agreed to rise simultaneously; a detachment from
Jalandhar was to go over to Hoshiarpiir, to fetch away the 33rd Native
Infantry, failing which the 33rd were to remain (and they did so) ; then their
arrival at Philur was to be the signal for the 3rd to join, when all were to
proceed to Dehli, facing the river a^ best they could." — Report of Mr. Bicketts.
1857.] INACTIVITY IN PHILUR. 377
of Brigadier Johnstone for his European troops was such that
he waited until the fierce June sun had risen — waited until the
commissariat was not ready — waited until the enemy had
escaped.* The pursuers marched out and marched back again,
never having seen the enemy at all.
The history of the so-called pursuit appears to be this. In
the course of the day, there being a vague impression that
Philur might be in danger, Olpherts, with two of his guns,
carrying a small party of the 8th Queen's on their carriages,
and accompanied by the 2nd Panjab Cavalry, pushed on to that
place, where they found that the officers of the 3rd had escaped
into the Fort, and that the Sipahis were crossing the river at
a ferry some four miles distant. After a while, the main body
of the troops from Jalandhar came up, and then the question
arose as to whether anything could be done. Those who would
fain have done something, did not know what to do, and those
who knew what should be done, were not minded to do it. No
one from Jalandhar knew the way from Philur to the Satlaj,
and the Philur officers, shut up in the Fort, sent out no one to
guide them. So the result was that no one did anything, and
the pursuing column bivouacked bravely for the night. It is
understood that the highest military authorities were convinced
that Brigadier Johnstone had done his duty nobly — but History
and the Horse Guards are often at issue.
Such, however, are the alternations of light and shadow in
this narrative, that the narrator has never to
tarry long without an example of that activity of ^rSton^
British manliness which saved the Empire in this
great convulsion. Whilst the Jalandhar Brigadier was thus
earning the approbation of the highest military authorities,
two junior civilians, acting only on their own impulses, were
* I give this on the authority of Brigadier Johnstone, who himself says :
" The pursuit of the mutineers commenced before seven o'clock of the morning
following the night of the outbreak. It could not have been undertaken
earlier. The direction taken by the rebels was not ascertained till half-past
three o'clock. Preparations had to be made in obtaining carriage for the
infantry, providing rations, &c, perfecting the equipment for guns, horses,
&c, and these, after the utmost despatch of officers, as ready and zealous as
men could be, were found impossible to be completed at an earlier hour. The
complaint of one writer I understand is, that the haste of departure in pursuit
was so great, that the Infantry bad to march without rations and other
comforts, which is true," &c. &c— Letter to Ldhor Chronicle.
378 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PAXJAB. [1857.
doing their best to cut off the march of the mutineers. One of
these was a young gentleman named Thornton, who had been
one of the fiist to enter the service by the open door of general
competition, and who seemed to be bent on proving that the
reproach levelled at the new order of civilians — that they were
men of books, not men of action — was unfounded and unjust.
He had ridden over from Lodiana to Philur to pay the regiment
there, had learnt that the troops had risen, and had pushed on
with all haste to the river-bank and cut away the bridge of
boats. Hurrying then back to Lodiana, he found that Mr.
Eicketts, the Deputy-Commissioner, had received by telegraph
information of the rising at Jalandhar, and was already making
such preparations as he could for the security of that important
post. Lying on the great high road from the Panjab to Hin-
dustan, it was to be assumed that the mutineers would sweep
through it, carrying destruction with them, on their route to
the appointed goal of Dehli. Little was it that Eicketts could
have done in any case, but that little was made less by the
fact that the news of the Jalandhar rising reached the Sipahis
at Lodiana almost as soon as it had reached himself, and they
were not less prompt in action. Those Sipahis were a detach-
ment of the 3rd from Philur. They were waiting for the signal
and ready to strike. Their first movement was to seize the
Fort and the Treasury. There were no European troops, so
this was easily accomplished. The situation was one of infinite
peril. The mutineers from Jalandhar and Philur might be
expected at any hour. But the Satlaj was still between them,
and if Eicketts could guard the passages of the river only for
a little space, the pursuing column might come upon the fugi-
tives before they had crossed. Fortunately, the 4th (Eothney's)
Sikh Eegiment had reached Lodiana that morning after a long
and weary march. Three companies, under Lieutenant Wil-
liams, were now told off for service, and the Eajah of Nabha
was called upon for a Contingent. The chief sent detachments
of Horse and Foot, with two six-pounder guns, and with these
Eicketts went out to dispute the passage of the river.
The first thing was to ascertain the exact position of the
enemy. So Eicketts, crossing the river in a ferry-boat, walked
along the opposite bank to Philur, and there
June 8. l earn t that the insurgents, having been baulked
by Thornton's destruction of the bridge, had made for a ghaut,
some four miles higher up, at a narrow bend of the stream, and
1857.] THE PASSAGE OF THE EIVER. b79
were preparing for the passage of the Satlaj.* Possessed of
this important information, the gallant civilian recrossed the
river, rejoined the detachment, and, in concert with Lieutenant
Williams, made his arrangements to check the advance of the
mutinous regiments. Had Johnstone, with the Europeans,
"been in pursuit of the mutineers, the enemy would have been
between two fires, and the bulk of them would have been
destroyed. But the Brigadier made no sign ; and so Eicketts
and Williams had all the work and all the glory to themselves.
It was ten o'clock at night when they came within sight of the
Sipahi regiments. The road was bad, the sand deep, the ditches
numerous. Their guides had misled and deserted them, and
much good time had been lost. The main body of the enemy,
some sixteen hundred in nuniber,"j" had already crossed, and our
little handful of Sikh troops now came suddenly upon them.
Eicketts, who improvised himself into a Commandant of
Artillery, took charge of the guns, and Williams directed the
movements of the Cavalry and Infantry. The guns were at
once unlimbered, but the horses of one of them took fright and
fled, carrying the six-pounder with them. The other gun, a
nine-pounder, was well served, and before the enemy knew that
we were upon them, it delivered a round of grape with good
effect, whilst at the same time Williams's Sikhs poured in two
destructive volleys. The mutineers returned the fire, and then
the Nabha troops turned their backs upon the scene and fled
like a flock of sheep. For some time the unequal contest was
nobly maintained. Eound after round from the one gun was
poured in so rapidly and so steadily, that practised ears in
Johnstone's camp, on the other side of the river, thought that
they discerned the utterances of two or three field-pieces;
whilst at the same time the Sikhs, spreading themselves out so
as not to be outflanked by superior numbers, poured in volley
after volley with destructive effect. But gallant as were these
efforts, they could not last. During well-nigh two hours they
kept back the surging multitude of the enemy ; but then the
gun ammunition was expended. The cartridges of the Sikhs
* " At the Lusam Ferry, four miles above Philur, the advanced guard of
the mutineers managed to seize a boat that was on the Jalandhar side, and
crossing over in numbers, took possession of the other side also." — Mr.
Barnes's Report.
t " The greater part of three regiments of Infantry and one regiment of
Cavalry, but without guns."
380 PEOGEESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANJAB. [1857.
had been nearly fired away ; Williams had fallen, shot through
the lungs ; and the midnight moon revealed, with dangerous
distinctness, the position of our little band. There was nothing,
therefore, left for Eicketts but to draw off his force and return
to the British Cantonment.
Then the mutinous regiments, no longer obstructed or opposed,
swept on to Lodiana. About an hour before noon,
RisiD 5une L 9^ M ' on the 9th of June ' the y entered ? he cit y- The
company in the Fort fraternised with them. The
turbulent classes rose at once, scenting a rich harvest of rapine,
and for a little while disorder and destruction were rampant in
the place. There were some peculiar elements in the population
of Lodiana from which danger was ever likely to flash out in
seasons of general excitement.* Large numbers of aliens were
there. Foremost amongst these were the Kabul refugees — the
miserable incapables of the Saduzai Family, wdth their swarms
of dissolute retainers — all eating the bread of British compassion
but hating the hand that fed them. Then there was the great
colony of Kashmir shawl-weavers, who, sheltered and protected
as they never could have been elsewhere, followed their peaceful
calling unmolested, and held their gains in the most perfect
security. Both of these classes now rose against us with a
vehemence proportioned to the benefits they had received.
The Kabulis were " conspicuous in the outrages and plunder
committed in the city ;" and the Kashmiris were among the
foremost in " plundering the Government stores, in pillaging
the premises of the American Mission, in burning the churches
and buildings, in destroying the printing presses, and in
pointing out the residences of Government officials, or known
w^ell-wishers of Government, as objects of vengeance for the
mutinous troops." Besides these, there were large numbers of
Muhammadan Gujars, who had been wrought up to a high
state of fanaticism by the preachings of an energetic Maulavi,
and who were eager to declare a jaliad\ against us. All these
persons now welcomed the mutineers, and aided them in the
work of spoliation. The prisoners in the gaol were released.
* " It is filled with a dissolute, lawless, mixed population of Kabul
pensioners, Kashmir shawl-workers, Gujars, Bavriahs, and other predatory-
races. There is a fort without Europeans to guard it, a city without regular
troops to restrain, a district traversed by roads in every direction ... a river
which for months in the year is a mere net-work of fordable creeks."
f Holy war.
1857.] ESCAPE OF THE MUTINEEKS. 381
Whatsoever belonged to Government — whatsoever belonged to
Englishmen — was destroyed, if it could not be carried off; the
quiet, trading communities were compelled to contribute to the
wants of the mutineers in money or in kind ; grain and flour
were carried off from the bunniahs' shops; and, wherever a
horse or a mule could be found, the rebel hand was laid instantly
upon it. It was too much to expect that these traders, how
much soever they may have benefited by British rule and
profited by the maintenance of order, should take any active
steps to aid the authorities in such a crisis. The bankers
secreted their money-bags, and the merchants looked up their
wares, and every man did what he thought best for himself in
the face of the general confusion.
And what was Johnstone doing all this time? Johnstone
was playing out with admirable effect another act
of the great tragedy of " Too Late." The Euro- *%$£*£? <
peans had heard the firing of the preceding night,
and had waited eagerly for the order to move, but no order
came. Three hours after Eicketts's one gun had been silenced
by want of ammunition, Henry Olpherts, with his splendid
troop of Horse Artillery, and a party of the 8th Foot, was
suffered to go through the ceremony of taking command of the
" advance " of the force that was to march to the rescue of
Lodiana and to the extermination of the Jalandhar mutineers.
But no sooner were they ready to move than fresh misgivings
assailed the mind of the Brigadier. It would not be " safe " to
send forward such a force without adequate supports. In vain
Eicketts sent expresses to Johnstone's Camp, urging him to
send forward the Horse Artillery to his aid ; but the day Avoro
on, the succours never came, and the enemy rioted unchecked
in Lodiana until nightfall.* Then the insurgent regiments
made a forced march towards Dehli, and when at last our
Europeans made their appearance at Lodiana, pursuit was
hopeless. The Jalandhar insurgents had escaped.
The evil, which had been thus done or suffered by our inert-
* " In the mean time no troops arrived in pursuit. I sent twice, begging
the Horse Artillery might advance, and they might have caused them (the
mutineers) immense loss ; but they could not be trusted to the 4th Sikhs or
the small detachment of Panjab Cavalry, and had to wait for the European
Infantry ; and so this second great opportunity to destroy these mutineers
was lost, and as they had four miles' start of the European Infantry, of course
pursuit was hopeless that evening." — Riclcette.
382 PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN THE PANjAB. [1857.
ness, was small in comparison with the danger which had been
escaped. It was the trne policy of the enemy, at that time, to
occupy Lodiana. With the Fort in their possession — gnns
mounted and manned, the Government treasure in their hands,
and the bulk of the population on their side — they might, for a
while at least, have successfully defied us. To the British
cause, the loss of this important city, lying on the great high
road from the Panjab to Dehli, would, indeed, have been a
heavy blow. It would have affected disastrously, perhaps
ruinously, the future operations of the war, by deferring in-
definitely the capture of Dehli. But instead of this, the
mutinous regiments merely carried themselves off, by the least
frequented routes, to the Great Head-Quarters of Eebellion,
there to swell the already swollen numbers of the garrison,
without increasing its actual strength.*
It was now necessary to make a severe example of all who
had been guilty of aiding and abetting the mutinous Sipahis
or who had taken advantage of the confusion which they had
created. It was easy to bring the guilt home to the offenders,
for plundered property was found in their possession ; and now
that English authority had reasserted itself in all its strength,
witnesses flocked in from all sides, eager to give damnatory
evidence against their fellow-citizens. More than twenty
Kashmiris and others were promptly tried, and as promptly
executed. The telegraphic wires brought from higher official
quarters the necessary confirmation of the sentence of death,
and on the evening of their trial the prisoners were hanged.
Others detected in seditious correspondence shared the same
fate. "It was by such measures as these," wrote the Com-
a i
* " I imagine their plan was temporarily to hold the Fort and City of
Lodiana, where they could command the Grand Trunk Road from the Panjab
to Dehli, whence they could have spread disorganisation throughout Cis-
Satlaj, and have shaken the Sikh States, and by cutting off supplies and
placing troops in requisition to attack them, have made a most untoward
diversion for our small force before Dehli ; but their ammunition was
expended ; in their hurry in leaving Jalandhar they had carried off blank for
balled ammunition, and so they had to hurry on by forced marches, avoiding
any possibility of collision with our troops.' - — Mr. Bicketts's Report. The
writer admits that this is for the most part conjecture, but he thinks that it
is borne out by the fact that, if their ammunition had not failed them, the
mutineers had the game in their own hands. I have had no opportunity of
investigating the hypothesis that the Jalandhar regiments supplied them-
selves with blank cartridges by mistake.
1857.] PUNISHMENT OF THE REBELS. 383
missioner of the Cis-Satlaj States, " that the peace was preserved ;
any vacillation or tender-heartedness would have been fatal, for
rebellion would have spread in the province, and many valuable
lives would have been lost in recovering our authority. So
long as order was maintained here, our communications with
the Panjab on the one hand, and the Dehli force on the other,
were kept unimpaired ; as it was, with daily convoys of treasure,
ammunition, stores, and men passing down the road, I am happy
to say that not a single accident occurred."
The next step was to disarm the people of Lodiana. Taking
advantage of the presence of Coke's regiment, which afterwards
made good its march to Dehli, Ricketts disarmed the town of
Lodiana. And in other parts of the Cis-Satlaj States the same
process was carried on with the zeal, vigour, and success that
distinguished all the efforts of the officers of the Panjabi Com-
mission. But, doubtless, as on former occasions, of which I
have spoken, there were rnanv concealments, even
r \ ., . -, J ,1 June- Jul v.
in our own territories ; and, moreover, the con-
tiguity of the Protected Native States afforded opportunities of
evading the search, to which the people on the border eagerly
resorted. Mr. Barnes called upon the chiefs to adopt similar
measures, and they formally complied ; but he said that they
were slow to move and suspicious of our intentions.* There
was, in truth, a general feeling of mistrust ; and it was pre-
sently ascertained that the people were not only concealing arms,
but making large purchases of saltpetre and sulphur, and other
components of gunpowder, for use in a day of danger. It was
all in accordance with their genius and their temper, and it
could excite no surprise in any reasonable mind. But it was
necessary to grapple with these evils; so proclamation was
made, rendering the carrying of arms a misdemeanour, and
restrictions upon the sale and export of all kinds of ammunition
and their components.")"
* Mr. Barnes's Cis-Satlaj Report.
f At this time communication between Calcutta and the Panjab was very
slow and irregular, and tidings of tbe legislative enactments passed in
Oalcutta had not yet reached the Frontier Province. But Mr. Barnes,
writing at a later period, observed, " That in the measures adopted for the
trial and punishment of mutineers and heinous criminals, or for disarming the
population, or checking the importation of military stores, we only anticipated
the acts almost simultaneously passed at Calcutta by the wisdom of the
Legislative Council."
384 PROGKESS OF EVENTS IN THE PAXJaB. [1857.
Whilst preventive and precautionary measures of this kind
were being pushed forward throughout the Panjab, there were
unceasing efforts all along the great road to Dehli to furnish
the means of transporting stores for the service of Barnard's
army. In this most essential work civil and military officers
worked manfully together; and although there were many
difficulties to be overcome, the great thoroughfare was soon
alive with carts and carriages and beasts of burden conveying
downwards all that was most needed by the Army, and espe-
cially those vast supplies of ordnance ammunition which were
required to make an impression on the walls of the city which
we were besieging.* It is hard to say what might not have
befallen us if, at this time, the road had not been kept open ;
but the loyalty of the great chiefs of the Protected Sikh States,
and the energy and sagacity of Barnes and Ricketts, secured
our communications, and never was the Dehli Field Force in
any danger of the interception of its supplies."]*
Thus was the Panjab aiding in many ways the great work of
the recovery of Dehli and the suppression of the revolt. It was
sending down material, and it was sending down masses of
men. Nor was this all that it could do. The Panjab had become
the Nursery of Heroes. And it was from the Panjab that now
was to be drawn that wealth of individual energy upon which
the destinies of nations so greatly depend. Death had made its
* To the activity of Captain Briggs, who organised a militar}' transport
train, and worked it with admirable success, we are mainly indebted for these
good results. But we are a little too prone to forget such services as these,
or, perhaps, we undervalue the importance of feeding an army and loading
its guns.
t These services were afterwards becomingly acknowledged by General
"Wilson, who wrote to Sir John Lawrence, saying : " I beg to bring specially
to your notice the very important services rendered by the Commissioner of
the Cis-Satlaj State.-, Mr. G. C. Barnes, to whose good government, under
yourself, may be partly attributed the preservation of peace in these districts,
and to whose influence with the independent chiefs I am mainly indebted for
the valuable aid of the Patiala and Jhind Contingents, by means of which
our communication with our rear has been kept open, and the safe escort of
numerous convoys of stores and ammunition to the camp has been effected ;
and his most energetic assistant, Mr. G. H. Bicketts, the Deputy-Commis-
sioner of Lodiana, of whose unflagging exertions in procuring carriage, aiding
the movements of troops, and forwarding supplies, and of his hearty co-opera-
tion with the magazine officer in the despatch of ammunition, I am deeply
sensible, and cannot speak too highly."
1857.] AID TO THE DEIILI FORCE. 385
gaps in the Dehli Army. The death of General Anson sent
General Reed down to the Head Quarters of the Army as
Senior Officer in the Presidency, and, therefore, Provisional
Commander-in-Chief. Who then was to command the Frontier
Force ? For some little time there was a terror in the Peshawar
Council lest Brigadier Johnstone, who had smoothed the way
for the safe conduct of his Native troops to Dehli, should be
appointed to the command of the division. It could not he
permitted whilst Sydney Cotton was there. Little by little
regulation was giving way to the exigences of a great crisis ;
and when news came that the Adjutant- General of the Army
had been killed in the battle of Badli-ki-Sarai, there was a
demand for the services of Neville Chamberlain as the fittest
man in the country to be Chief of the Staff of the besieging
Force. So Nicholson was " instinctively selected to take
command of the Panjab Movable Column, with the rank of
Brigadier-General,"* whilst Chamberlain proceeded downwards
to join the Head-Quarters of the Army. What Barnard and his
troops were doing it is now my duty to narrate.
* These words are in Colonel Edwardes's Official Report. The writer
adds : "How common sense revenges itself on defective systems, when real
danger assails a state ! Had there been no struggle for life or death, when
would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in the prime of their lives,
with all their facilities of doing and enduring, have attained the rank of
Brigadier-General ? Why should we keep down in peace the men who must
be put up in War ? " [Yes ; but Nicholson voluntarily entered a service in
which promotion was regulated by seniority; and, again, voluntarily trans-
ferred himself from military to political employ. The excellence of the system
was proved by the fact that when danger arose, the system, well administered
in the Panjab, sent the best men, irrespective of actual rank, to the front. —
G. B. M.].
VOL IT. 2
386 FIEST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
CHAPTER IV.
FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI.
The Dehli Field Force having planted its Head-Quarters on
the old site of the British Cantonments on the
June. "Ridge," was now spreading itself out over the
T osi«onat g roun( i which it had conquered, in the manner
Dehn. best adapted to both offensive and defensive
operations. Seldom has a finer position been
occupied by a British Army ; seldom has a more magnificent
panorama turned for a while the soldier's thoughts from the
stern realities of the battle. It was difficult not to admire the
beauty of the scene even amidst the discomforts of the camp
and the labours of the first encamping. The great city, with
its stately mosques and minarets, lay grandly at our feet, one
side resting upon the Jamnah, and others forming a mighty
mass of red walls standing out threateningly towards the
position which we had occupied. And scattered all about
beneath us were picturesque suburbs, and stately houses, walled
gardens and verdant groves refreshing to the eye ; whilst the
blue waters of the flowing Jamnah glittered in the light of the
broad sun. It was not an hour for philosophical speculation or
for the indulgence of any romantic sentiments concerning the
decay of empires and the revolutions of dynasties; else was
there much food for thought in the strange circumstances which
had brought a British Army to besiege a city which, only a
month before, had been regarded as securely our own as London
or Liverpool, and to contend against a sovereign who, within
the same brief space of time, had been held in contempt as a
harmless puppet. There was no room in the minds of our
military chiefs for such thoughts as these. They contemplated
the position on which they had encamped our Army with the
keen eyes of practical soldiers, and looked around them from
their commanding position upon the ground that was to be the
1857.] THE GREAT CANALS. 387
scene of their future operations. And this was the result of the
survey.
Intersecting the old Cantonment towards the left-centre, and
then following its front towards the right, was a
road which joined the Grand Trunk from Karnal, ^anlis™ 1
beyond the extremity of the Eidge, and led down,
through a mass of suburban gardens and ancient edifices, to the
Kabul Gate of Dehli. Two other roads, also leading from
Karnal, diverged through the Cantonment to different gates of
the city. And scarcely less important to us than the roads
were the canals which were cut through the country in the
neighbourhood of our camp. In the rear of our encampment
was a branch canal, known as the Najafgarh Jhil aqueduct,
which carried the waters emptied into this lake to the stream
of the Jamnah. To the right rear of our position this great
drain was intersected by the Western Jamnah Canal, which,
passing through a bold excavation of the solid rock, flowed
through the great suburbs of Dehli, and entering the city by a
culvert under the walls, traversed the length of its main street
and emptied itself into the river near the walls of the Imperial
Palace. And it was a source of especial rejoicing to the British
chiefs, firstly, that our position was open to the rear, and that
there were good roads leading down to it, from which we could
keep up a constant communication with the Panjab, now become
our base of operations ; and, secondly, that there was an abun-
dant supply of water in the Najafgarh Canal. It was the
driest season of the year, and in common course the canal would
have been empty. But the excessive rains of 1856 had so
flooded and extended the area of the lake, that it had not ceased
even in the month of June to emit an unfailing supply of pure
good water to fill the aqueduct in the rear of our position * —
* See remarks of Colonel Baird Smitli on this subject (Unfinished Memoir) :
" By one of those remarkable coincidences of which so many occurred to favour
the English cause as to suggest the idea of a special Providence in them, the
rains of the year preceding the mutiny had been unprecedented in magni-
tude, and the whole basin had been gorged with water, the area covered
exceeding a hundred square miles From the enormous accumulation
of water in the Jhfl during 1856, this canal, ordinarily dry during the hot
season, was filled with a deep, rapid stream of pure and wholesome water
during the whole period of the siege. It is scarcely possible to over-estimate
the value of such a provision both to the health and comfort of the troops,
for without it the river, two miles distant, or the wells in Cantonment, all
2 C 2
388 FIE ST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
water in which not only our people could freely bathe, but
which they could drink with safety and with pleasure ; and it
is hard to say how much the salubrity of the camp was main-
tained by this providential dispensation. Nor was it merely in
a sanitary point of view that this flow of water was so advan-
tageous to the English, for in its military aspects it was equally
favourable to defensive purposes. And so there were comfort
and encouragement in the contemplation of our position.
And a nearer inspection of the Eidge, though there were
some countervailing circum>tances to detract from
the general satisfaction, had an assuring effect
upon the British Leader and the Staff by whom he was sur-
rounded. It had been, in part at least, the site of the oldDehli
Cantonment. The left of this rocky chain rested upon the
Jamnah some three or four miles above Dehli, whilst the right
extremity approached the Kabul Gate of the city at a distance
of about a thousand yards. " Formed of a hard, contact, semi-
crystalline quartz rock, disposed in layers, and presenting
occasional natural cliffs on the city side," * it extended along a
line of rather more than two miles, at an elevation of from fifty
to sixty feet above the general elevation of the city.j The
natural soil was so hostile to cultivation that the general aspect
of the Ridge was bare and rugged ; and the same gritty, friable
qualities of the earth rendered it especially ill-adapted to
defensive purposes, for where no cohesive properties existed the
•construction of earthworks was almost impossible. On the left
and centre of the Eidge, obliquely to the front of attack, the
tents of the English were pitched a little to the rear of the
rains of their old houses, which effectually concealed us from
the besieged. The extreme left of the Eidge was so far retired
from the main position of the enemy as to be in little danger
from his assaults, but our post on the extreme right " invited
•brackish and bad, must have been the. sole sources of water supply for man
and beast. Sanitary arrangements were facilitated, good drainage secured,
abundant means of ablution and healthy aquatic exercises were provided, and
the Jhil Canal was not merely a good defensible line for military operations,
but a precious addition to the comfort and salubrity of the camp."
* MS. Memoir by Colonel Baird Smith.
t Baird Smith says in the Memoir quoted above that " its utmost height
above the level of the city does not exceed eighty or ninety feet." In
another memorandum he says that " the average command may be taken for
practical purposes at about "forty feet."
1857.] OUR ADVANCED POSTS 38)
attack from the moment of occupation to the close of the
operations." *
This position on the extreme right was surmounted by a
somewhat extensive building of comparatively
modern construction, known as Hindu Rao's Hi J , I du Rdo ' 6
House. The former owner of this edifice was
a Maratha nobleman, who is said to have been nearly connected
with the family of Sindhia. Political necessities had compelled
his residence at a distance from Gwaliar, and he had settled
himself in the neighbourhood of Dehli, where he had earned a
good reputation among all classes of the community. Of a
robust manhood and a genial temperament, he was noted for
his hospitality. f The house had been built and fitted up much
after the fashion of an Anglo-Indian mansion of the better
class. But on his death it had been left without an occupant,
and on the arrival of Barnard's force it was found empty and
deserted. It was a roomy and convenient edifice, with good
approaches both from the Cantonment and the City ; and, apart
from the excellence of the situation, which strongly recom-
mended it as an advanced post, it afforded good shelter and
accommodation for a considerable body of troops.
Between the two extreme points of the Eidge were other
important posts, destined to occupy conspicuous
places in the history of the coming siege. Near Th Tower taff
the point at which the middle road of the three
crossed the Eidge, was the Flagstaff Tower, of which mention
has before been made ; for thence was it that our people, on the
fatal 11th of May, huddled together for transient safety, had
looked forth despairingly towards the city, from which the
signal for massacre was to come. J A double- storied, circular
building, it had a fine command of observation, comprehending
the country lying between the Eidge and the walls of the city,
and was sufficiently strong to afford good shelter to troops.
Further on to the right — about midway between
the Flagstaff and Hindu Eao's house — was a ruined e " osque '
mosque " of the old Pathan type," which had also good walls
* Baird Smith.
f " The old man was a well-known member of the local society — a keen
sportsman, a liberal and hospitable gentleman, of frank, bluff manner?, and
o-enial temperament." — Baird Smith's Unfinished Memoir.
% Ante, book iv., chap, iii. It is stated that a cart-load of dead bodies was
found in it, supposed to be the bodies of officers of the 54th.
390 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
of masonry, and was well suited for an outpost, as it afforded
both shelter and accommodation to our men ; and still further
along the Eidge road, at a distance of some two hundred yards
from our position on the extreme right, was an ancient Observa-
tory,* of somewhat irregular structure, ill-lighted
The tory erVa " an( ^ iH- ven tilated, but still a serviceable building,
as it afforded good support to the advanced
position on our right, which was so long to bear the brunt of
the affray. At these four points, Sir Henry Barnard, after the
battle of Badli-ki-Sarai, established strong picquets, each sup-
ported by guns.
The country around Dehli, which the roads and canal-cuttings
above described intersected after passing the
The Suburbs. j^g^ was a var i e d mass of ruined and habitable
houses, walled gardens, green woodlands, cultivated rice fields,
and unhealthy swamps. Beyond Hindu Bio's house to the rear
was the beautiful suburb of Sabzimandi (or the Green Market),
lying along the Grand Trunk Road — a cluster of good houses
and walled gardens, which afforded shelter to the enemy, and
were, indeed, the very key of our position. And beyond this
the plain was " covered with dense gardens and thick groves,
houses, and walled enclosures bordering upon the great canal."
Beyond the Sabzimandi, on this line of the Grand Trunk Eoad,
stretching towards the Kabul Gate of the city, were the villages
of Kishanganj, Trevelyanganj, Paharipur, and Taliwari. These
villages were amongst the worst of the local evils opposed to
us, for they were near enough to the walls of the city to cover
the enemy as they emerged from their stronghold, and afforded
them a sheltered approach as they advanced towards our
position on the Eidge ; whilst they were too far off from our
posts to admit of our occupying them in force, j Looking out
from the Eidge towards the centre and left of our encampment,
the space before the city appeared to be less crowded. There
were a few somewhat imposing buildings irregularly scattered
about this expanse of country, among which that known as
Metcalfe House was one of the most conspicuous. It stood on
the banks of the river, in the midst of an extensive park, and
* Built by the Rajput Astronomer, Rajah Jait Singh.
f " They were all strong positions, and Kishanganj pre-eminently so, from
its massive masonry enclosures ami commanding site on the slope of the
right flank of the Gorge."— Baird Smith.
1857.] THE METCALFE HOUSE. 391
was almost buried in thick foliage. Some substantial out-
buildings in the park, with a mound of some altitude in their
rear, seemed to recommend themselves as serviceable outposts
for future occupation. Between the Metcalfe House and the
city was an old summer-palace of the Dehli Emperors, known
as the Kusia Bagh. It was then little more than one of the
many memorials of the former grandeur of the Mughul sove-
reigns with which the new capital was surrounded ; but the
lofty gateways, the shaded cloisters and arcades, and the
spacious court-yards, of which it was composed, showed, even
in their decay, that it had once been a place of no common archi-
tectural beauty.* More remote from the river, and almost in a
line with the Kashmir Gate of the city, was Ludlow Castle — a
modern mansion of some importance, which had been the home
of the late Commissioner, Simon Fraser, slaughtered in the
Dehli Palace.f It was erected on the crest of a ridge sloping
down towards the city walls, with the dry bed of a drainage
canal at its base. And on the line of the Jamnah, between the
Kusia Bagh and the water-gate of the city, was a spacious
modern building of the English official type, but surrounded by
trees and shrubs, looking out from the windows of which it
almost seemed that the city walls were overhanging the place. {
These were the most noticeable edifices, which attracted the
attention of our people on the Eidge, as posts, which in the
coming operations might be turned to account, whilst in the
intervening spaces it was seen that there were gardens and
groves, sometimes intersected by deep ravines. These fine
breadths of luxuriant foliage, seen from the higher ground,
were pleasant to the eye of the English soldier ; but it was too
probable that they would prove to be as favourable to the
operations of the enemy as damaging to our own.§
* " Its interior was in ruins, but sufficient indications of its design and
structure remained to show it to have been one of the rich examples of florid
architecture of the later Mughuls, of which Dehli possesses so many beautiful
illustrations ; and the broad space, with its walls, was overgrown with orange-
trees, and limes, and rose-bushes, and other shrubs, all growing in the wildest
luxuriance." — Baird Smith, Unpublished Memoir.
t Mr. Eussell, in his " Diary in India," speaks of Ludlow Castle as a " fine
mansion, with turrets and clock-towers, something like a French chateau of
the last century."
X Baird Smith.
§ " They offered innumerable facilities for occupation by armed men of any
degree of discipline, and in truth so incompatible were its features generally
392 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
And over these tracts of country the British Commander now
looked at the great city itself, and surveyed the
May 12. character of its defences. The circuit of its walls
The City, ex tended to some seven miles, two of which were
covered by the side which ran parallel to the river, and
were completely defended by it. The rest formed an irregular
figure, partly facing obliquely the line of our position on the
Eidge, and partly turned towards the country on the left.
These landward walls, about twenty-four feet in height, con-
sisted of a series of curtains of red masonry, terminating in
small bastions, each capable of holding from nine to twelve
guns. Around them ran a dry ditch, some twenty- five feet in
breadth and somewhat less than twenty feet in depth, the
counterscarp being an earthen slope of very easy descent,
" much water-and-weather worn." There was something that
might be called a glacis, but to the eye of a skilled engineer it
was scarcely worthy of the name.* The entrances to the city
through these substantial walls of masonry were numerous. A
series of so-called gates — for the most part in the near neigh-
bourhood of the several bastions were to be seen
at irregular intervals along the walls. They were
abutments of heavy masonry, but not without some architectural
with the action in mass of disciplined troops that the many combats of which
it was the scene were rather trials of skill between small bodies or individuals
than operations by mass." — Baird Smith. " The luxuriant foliage, though
picturesque as a landscape-effect, concealed to a damaging extent the move-
ment of our enemies, who, creeping out of the Kashmir or Labor Gates,
would, under cover of trees and walls and houses, reach unperceived almost
the foot of our position on the Ridge. It was thus that our engineers found
it necessary to lop away branches and cut down trees and bushes, marring
the beauty of the scene, but adding to our security." — MS. Memorandum by
an Officer of Artillery.
* Baird Smith. The most recent writer on the subject of the material
aspects of Dehli, quoting a professional description of the fortifications, says,
" The ' original round towers formed into angular bastions,' the ' crenelated
curtains,' and the fine glacis covering three-fourths or more of the height of
the wall, are the additions and improvements of English engineers of the
present century." — Bholandth CJiandr. — Travels of a Hindu. I rely, however,
on Baird Smith's authority more confidently than on any other. [Since this
was written I have read in Major Norman's "Narrative" that there was
before Dehli " an admirable glacis covering the wall for a full third of its
height." As this is a high authority I think it right to quote Baird Smith's
words : " The glacis scarcely merits the name, as it is but a short slope,
seventy or eighty feet in breadth, springing from the crest of the counter-carp
and provided with no special means of obstruction."]
1857.] THE CITY 393
pretensions, comprising handsome arched gateways, which were
surmounted by towers, forming stations or look-out posts for
the city guards. These gates were ten in number— one was on
the river side of the city ; another led down to the Bridge of
Boats from the extreme corner of the King's Palace ; and the rest
were on the landward sides. The gates, known as the Kashmir
Gate, the Mori Gate, and the Kabul Gate, were those most
easily assailable from our position on the Bidge.* Indeed, it
was only on one side of the great walled city that the English
Commander, looking down from his newly-erected camp, could
hope to make an early impression To invest so extensive a
place with so small a force was an absolute impossibility. It
was as much as we could do to invest this front — about one-
seventh of the entire enceinte — leaving all tliD rest to the free
ingress and egress of the enemy.
The Palace, or, as it was sometimes called, the Fort of Dehli,
was situated about the centre of the river-front
of the city, one side almost overhanging the
waters of the Jamnah. The artist pronounced it to be a " noble
mass of building of truly beautiful design, vast magnitude,
and exquisite detail ; " but to the eye of the scientific soldier it
appeared to be capable of only very feeble resistance to the
appliances of modern warfare. Its defences consisted chiefly of
high walls and deep ditches, with " most imperfect arrange-
ments for flanking or even direct fire." j And on the north-
east side, partly resting on the main stream of the Jamnah, was
the ancient Pathan Fort of Selimgarh, separated from the
Talace by a narrow stream of the river, which was crossed by a
bridge of masonry. It was, for defensive purposes, an im-
portant out-work, which, manned with heavy guns, might
play along the river-side as far as the Metcalfe House, and
enfilade the approaches to the city in that direction. Such
were the principal material objects which presented themselves,
to Barnard and his Staff, when their telescopes on that June
morning swept the country which lay between the Eiver and
the Bidge. And as they estimated the worth of all these
several posts for offensive or defensive purposes, they en-
deavoured to calculate also the numerical strength of the
* These gates were known respectively as the Rajgliat and the Calcutta
Gates. By them the mutineers had entered on the 11th of May. .
f Band Smith.
394 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
enemy within the walls. But there was little more than dim
cenjecture to guide them. It was assumed that the bulk of the
Mirath and Dehli troops — five regiments of Infantry, one
regiment of Cavalry, and a company of Native Artillery — were
now within the walls of the city. And it was not less certain
that the Sappers and Miners from Mirath, the head- quarters of
the Aligarh Eegiment, the bulk of the regiments from
Firuzpur, large detachments of Native Infantry from Mathura,
and Irregulars from Hansi, Hisar, and Sirsa, had swollen the
stream of insurrection within the circuit of Dehli. To these
might be added the King's Guards, and, probably, large numbers
of Native soldiers of all branches absent from their regiments '
on furlough, according to custom at that season of the year. ■
And these trained soldiers, it was known, had at their command
immense supplies of ordnance, arms, ammunition, and equip-
ments, wanting none of the materials of warfare for a much
larger force. To the General, who had served at Sebastopol,
it appeared that the strength of Dehli thus garrisoned had
been greatly underrated by those who believed that it was to
be disposed of in a day.*
And against this great walled city thus garrisoned what had
Barnard brought? Collectively it may be said that he had
three thousand European soldiers and twenty-two field guns.
This European force consisted of —
Her Majesty's 9th Lancers. Two squadrons of the Carabi-
neers. Six companies of Her Majesty's 60th Eifles. Her
Majesty's 75th Foot. The 1st Bengal (Company's) Fusiliers.
Six Companies of 2nd Bengal (Company's) Fusiliers. Sixteen
Horse Artillery guns, manned by Europeans. Six Horse Battery
guns, also Europeans : with the Siege-train, the details of which
have been already given.
Besides these there were two other bodies of reliable troops,
as good as Europeans— the Gurkha battalion under Eeid, and
* I have endeavoured in this description of Dehli to represent merely the
appearances of the great city and the environs as they presented themselves to
General Barnard and his Staff at the time of their first encamping on the
Kido-e. Other details will, from time to time, be given as the narrative
proceeds. I have consulted a variety of authorities, but I am principally
indebted to Colonel Baird Smith's unfinished Memoir of the Siege of Dehli.
As this was written after he had been enabled to verify by subsequent inspec-
tion his impressions formed during the siege, I confidently accept the
accuracy of his descriptions.
1857.] THE QUESTION OF ASSAULT. 395
the Panjab Guide Corps under Daly. There were also a
hundred and fifty men of the old regiment of Sappers and
Miners, that had mutinied at Mirath, and who were still
believed to be staunch. In Barnard's camp, also, were a regi-
ment of Irregular Native Cavalry (the 9th), and a portion of
another (the 4th), but the fidelity of both was doubtful.
There were many then in all parts of India, especially among
the more eager-minded civilians, who believed
that to reach Dehli was to take it. Habituated to June 9 -
success, and ever prone to despise our enemies, it Gene fai Barnard
-, . ■*■■, . , i . x , , ' at Dehli.
seemed to our people, in this conjuncture, to be a
settled thing that the force moving on Dehli, by whomsoever
commanded, should, in the language of the day, " dispose of it,"
and then proceed to finish the mutineers in other parts of the
country. Even the cool brain of Lord Canning conceived this
idea of the facility of the enterprise. It was thought that the
Dehli Field Force might march into the city, make short work
of the rebels, the King and Royal Family included ; and then,
leaving there a small British garrison, proceed to the relief of
Lakhnao, Kanhpur, or any other beleaguered position in that
part of Hindustan. And this belief in the possible was so
common, that it soon began to take in men's minds the shape of
the actual ; and before the month of June was half spent, it
was said in all parts of the country that Dehli had been retaken,
and that the star of our fortune was again on the ascendant.
Whether, as was said at the time, and is still confidently main-
tained by some, if, after the victory of Badli-ki-Sarai, Barnard
had swept on and pursued the enemy into the city, he might have
driven them out, after great slaughter, with the loss of all their
munitions of war, must ever remain a mystery. It was not
attempted. But it was no part of the General's plan to sit down
before Dehli and to commence the tedious operations of a pro-
tracted siege. It was assuredly not his temper to magnify dangers
and difficulties or to shrink from any enterprise that promised
even a chance of success. It might be a hazardous undertaking ;
he felt, indeed, in his inmost heart, that it was. But he knew
that his countrymen expected him to do it. He
knew that anything like hesitation at such a une n-
moment would bring down upon him a storm of reproach. He
knew, also, that if he failed in the perilous enterprise, he would
be charged with rashness and incapacity. But this appeared to
396 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
the fine old soldier to be the lesser evil of the two. Eight or
wrong, he was prepared to risk it.
With such thoughts heavy within him, Barnard was by no
means slow to accept the counsel of the young
coup-de^mcdn Engineer officers, who urged upon him the expedi-
ency of an immediate attack upon the city.
Nothing was plainer, than that delay would weaken our chances
of success; for not only was the numerical strength of the
enemy increasing ly fresh accessions of mutineers, making the
city of the Mughul their central rallying-point, but there was
strong probability that the material defences of the place would
be strengthened — especially by the simple device of bricking
up the gateways. That this had not been done on the 11th,
the Engineers ascertained ; and on that day they were prepared
with the plan of a coup de-main, which they laid before the
General, urging him to attempt it on the following morning at
break of day. " We find," they said in the Memorandum placed
in Barnard's hands, " that the Kabul and Labor Gates are not
as yet bricked up — that the bridges in front of them are up to
this time perfect — and that troops can approach from camp
under cover to four hundred and nine hundred yards of these
gates respectively. An entrance can also be effected close to
the Kabul Gate by the channel through which the canal flows
into the city. We recommend a simultaneous attempt to blow in
theLahor Gate by powder-bags, and such one of the two obstacles
at the other point (namely, either the Kabul Gate or the Canal
grating close by it), as may be preferred on reconnaissance by
the officers in charge of the explosion party." ..." We are
impressed with the necessity," they added, "of driving the
enemy out of the City and into the Fort by the simultaneous
advance of several columns, of which two shall pass along the
ramparts right and left, taking possession of every bastion and
capturing every gun, whilst the remainder, advancing towards
the Palace by the principal streets of the city, will establish
posts on the margin of the esplanade, which surrounds the
Palace, communicating right and left with the heads of the
adjoining columns. To this end w^e believe it essential that the
attack should commence at the peep of dawn. We propose to
effect the explosions at half-past three a.m. ; intimation of
success to be immediately followed by the advance of the
columns detailed for each attack, which will be in readiness at
the points hereafter indicated, half an hour before that time."
1857.] A NIGHT ATTACK. 397
The report embody i ng this scheme was signed by four
subaltern officers — by Wilber force Greathed, by Maunsell and
Chesney, of the Engineers, and Hodson, of the Intelligence
Department, at a later period known as "Hodson, of Hodson's
Horse."* The scheme was accepted by Barnard,
and orders were issued for its execution. Soon June 12 '
after midnight everything was ready. The troops selected for
this enterprise were duly warned. Each Engineer officer had
his appointed work. They were to assemble, under cover of
the darkness of the night, between one and two
o'clock, and to proceed noiselessly to the gates, nigS^ttac^
which were to have been blown in with powder-
bags. But when the parade was held, an important part of the
destined force was missing. A body of three hundred men of
the 1st European Fusiliers was to have been brought up by
Brigadier Graves ; but at the appointed hour there was no sign
of his appearance ; and the column, thus weakened by their
defection, was not strong enough to do the work before it. It
was an intense disappointment to many eager spirits, who, on
that June morning, believed that the stronghold of the enemy
was within their grasp. But there seemed to be nothing left
but the postponement of the enterprise ; so, reluctantly, orders
were given for the return of the storming party to their quarters.
It is difficult not to believe that Brigadier Graves disobeyed
orders. The excuse was that he misunderstood them, and the
kind heart of Sir Henry Barnard inclined him to accept the
excuse.f
* Hodson himself has thus referred to the matter in one of the letters
published by his brother: "Yesterday I was ordered by the General to assist
Greathed, and one or two more Engineers, in forming a project of attack, and
liow we would do to take Dehli. We drew up our scheme and gave it to the
General, who highly approved, and will, I trust, carry it out : but how times
must be changed when four subalterns are called upon to suggest a means of
carrying so vitally important an enterprise as this, one on which the safety of
the Empire depends. Wilberforce Greatlied is the next Senior Engineer to
Laughton, Chesney is Major of the Engineer Brigade, and Maunsell com-
mands the Sappers. I was added because the General complimentarily told
me that he had the utmost value for my opinion ; and though I am known to
counsel vigourous measures, it is equally well known I do not urge others to
do what I would not be the first to do myself."
t Graves was Brigadier of the day on duty. The orders conveyed to him
were verbal orders, and he rode to Barnard's tent to ask for a confirmation of
them. The story is thus told, and with every appearance of authority by,
Mr. Cave-Browne: "Brigadier Graves was the field-officer of the dav.
398 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
But the project of a surprise, though, thus delayed, was not
abandoned. Wilberforce Greathed went hopefully
Re of S £sl2t eme to work, revising his scheme, and never ceasing to
urge at Head-Quarters the necessity of a night
attack. The brief delay had at least one advantage. The
moon was waning, and the cover of darkness was much
needed for such an enterprise. Every day had made Barnard
more and more sensible of the underrated strength of the great
city which lay before him. But he still clung to the idea of a
sudden rush, and either a grand success or a crippling failure.
" The place is so strong," he wrote to Lord Canning
on the 13th of June, " and my means so inadequate,
that assault or regular approach were equally difficult — I may
say impossible ; and I have nothing left but to place all on the
hazard of a die and attempt a coup-de-main, which I purpose to
do. If successful, all will be well. But reverse will be fatal,
for I can have no reserve on which to retire. But, assuredly,
you all greatly under-estimated the difficulties of Dehli. They
have twenty- four-pounders on every gate and flank bastion ;
About eleven o'clock that night he received verbal orders that the Europeans
on picquet along the heights were to move off without being relieved for
special duty ; with a vague hint that a night-assault was in contemplation.
On reaching the Flagstaff picquet we found the Native guards in the act of
relief, and unable to believe that it was intended to leave that important
position, with its two guns, in the charge of Natives only, he galloped down
to the General's tent for further instructions. Here he heard that they were
on the point of assaulting, and that every European infantry soldier was
required. Now the Brigadier probably knew more of the actual strength of
Dehli than any other soldier in the force ; — he had commanded the brigade at
the time of the outbreak ; and when asked his opinion as to the chance of
success, he replied, ' You may certainly take the city by surprise, but
whether you are strong enough to hold it is another matter.' This made the
General falter in his plans. Some of the young officers who were to take a
leading part now came in and found him wavering. The Brigadier's remark
had so shaken his purpose that, in spite of entreaty and remonstrance, he
withdrew the consent which, if truth be told, he had never very heartily given
to the project, and the assault was abandoned. The Eifies, already under the
walls, and the advancing columns were recalled into camp." Major Keid
expresses his opinion that the Brigadier was " perfectly justified in having
declined to allow his picquets to be withdrawn without written orders " (Reid
himself had received written orders, which he obeyed), and declares that the
mischance was a fortunate event. Major Norman says that " there are few
who do not now feel that the accident which hindered this attempt was one
of those happy interpositions in our behalf of which we had such numbers to
be thankful for."
1857.] COUNCIL OF WAR. 399
and their practice is excellent — beats ours jive to one. We have
got six heavy guns in position, but do not silence theirs, and I
really see nothing for it but a determined rush; and this,
please God, you will hear of as successful."
About this time, Barnard had under consideration the revised
scheme of Wilberforce Greathed for an attack on Dehli, "by
means of simultaneous explosions of powder-bags at the Kabul
and Lahor Gates, and of a charge against the Kashmir Gate,
to be fired at such time as the attention of the defenders of that
enclosure may be engaged by the first-mentioned operations."
Maunsell and Hodson were to conduct one explosion party, and
Greathed and M'Neill the other. On the sound of the bugle,
the appointed storming parties were to advance and stream
through the openings thus effected. Every precaution was
taken in the event of failure at any point, and precise instruc-
tions laid down as to the course to be pursued by each column
of attack on the occurrence of any possible contingency, and
nothing was wanted to show, not only by written description,
but also by plans and charts, what each detail of the force way
to do after entrance had been effected.
This project, signed by Wilberforce Greathed, was dated
June 14. On the following day a Council of War
was held, and the scheme was considered. It was n u ? e f "
' ?-ii Councils ot war.
summoned by General Keed, who on Anson s death
had come down from Rawalpindi to assume as senior officer in
the Presidency the Provisional Command in Chief of the Army,*
and it was held in his tent. Sir Henry Barnard, Brigadier
Wilson, Hervey Greathed, and the chief Engineer officers, were
present. The old adage that a Council of War never fights was
not falsified in this case. It was set forth very strongly that
the project of the Engineers involved the employment of nearly
the whole of the Dehli Field Force ; that there would be no
reserve to fall back upon in the event of failure ; and that, in
the event of success, the enemy, streaming out of Dehli, might
* He had joined the array ahout the time of its arrival at Dehli ; but he
was prostrated by sickness, unable to mount a horse, and quite incompetent
to take any active part in the prosecution of the siege. It was not before the
11th that he was enabled to sit up and write a letter to Sir John Lawrence.
But from that time his health began to improve, and he did good service by-
keeping the Chief Commissioner informed of the state of affairs at Dehli.
The letters which the General then wrote were full of interesting and
important details, and are distinguished by much clear good sense.
400 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
attack our camp, seize our guns, and otherwise inflict grievous
injury upon us. The military authorities were all in favour of
delay, until such time as a reinforcement of at least a thousand
men might arrive. The Civilian who appeared in Council as
the representative of the Government of the North-Western
Provinces was opposed to this delay. Very forcibly
iLrvTy G 8 re°a f thed. Hervey Greathed urged that " the delay of a
fortnight would disappoint expectations, protract
the disorders with which the country is afflicted, increase the
disaffection known to exist among the Muhammadan population
in the Bombay Presidency, and cause distrust on the part of
our Native allies ;" but he added that he could not take upon
himself to say that the delay would lead the Native States
actually to throw off their allegiance to the British Govern-
ment, or endanger the safety of Kanhpiir and Oudh, and of the
country to the eastward. He assumed that British relations
with the Native States were too close to be so easily dissolved,
and that the concentration of English troops at Kanhpiir would
insure the safety of the districts to which allusion had been
made. Wilberforce Greathed, ever ready for an immediate
attack on the blood-stained city, pleaded that it would be easy
to revise the scheme, so as to leave a larger reserve in camp.
And, finally, it was agreed to defer the decision to the following
day.
On the 16th of June, therefore, the Council again assembled.
The military leaders had thought over the grave
June 16. questions before them. The feeling at the first
reassembled! consultation had been that, on political grounds,
it would be desirable to attack the city immediately
on the arrival of the first reinforcements. But even this much
of forwardness waned on the evening of the loth, and the
Commandant of Artillery, who had been moved by Hervey
Greathed's arguments at the first Council, had fallen back upon
his military experience, and had recorded a Memorandum, which
had in no small measure influenced Barnard.* For the General
* Barnard recorded a note on the 15th, in which lie said that circumstances
were altered " by the fact that the Chief Officer of Artillery had represented
that the means at his command were inadequate to silencing the enemy's guns
on the walls, so necessary before any approach could be made," and that the
" Chief Engineer represented that, as he had not the means of undertaking
any necessary siege operations, the only practicable mode of attack rested on
a coup-de-main, to effect which, and to occupy so large an area as the city of
1857.] COUNCIL OF WAR 401
was a man too little self-reliant for his position— too prone to
be swayed hither and thither by the gusts of other men's
recorded or spoken opinions. When, therefore, on the 16th of
June, the Council of War again met, and all the military
members of Council, except Wilberforce Greathed, were opposed
to immediate operations, his resolution yielded to the array of
authority before him, and again he began to intrench himself
behind military principles and precedents.
At that Council, on the 10th of June, Archdale Wilson put
in, as the expression of his matured judgment on
the subject, the paper which he had written on Brig^Sie^vv^ison.
the day before, and which was now read aloud :
• 4 Taking into consideration the large extent of the town to be
attacked," it said, " a full mile in breadth, nearly two miles in
length from the Kashmir to the Dehli Gate, I must own that I
dread success, on entering the town, almost as much as failure.
Our small force, two thousand bayonets, will be lost in such an
extent of town ; and the insurgents have shown, by their con-
stant and determined attacks upon our position, how well they
can and will fight from behind cover, such as they will have in
street-fighting in the city, when every man will almost be on a
par with our Europeans. With the large number of heavy
ordnance they have mounted on the walls (from thirty to forty
pieces), we must also expect heavy loss during the assault of
the gateways, as their grape-shot will command the ground
from seven hundred or eight hundred yards round the walls. I
gave my vote for the assault, on the arrival of our first rein-
forcements, solely on the political grounds set forth by Mr.
Greathed, feeling, at the same time, that, as a military measure,
it was a most desperate and unsafe one. It has, however, since
struck me that, even in a political point of view, it would be
wiser to hold our own position and wait for the reinforcements
Dehli, required the employment of so much of the force under my command
as to prevent my leaving a sufficient number to guard my camp, and enable
me to sustain the position in the case of any reverse attending the attempt."
But he added that political considerations of moment had been so strongly
urged upon him, that, although reinforcements were shortly expected, and, in
a military point of view, there could be no doubt that it would be expedient
to wait for them, he must "submit to those intrusted with the political
interests to determine whether to wait is less hazardous than to incur the
risk of failure." He halted, indeed, between two opinions ; but, he added.
"I am ready to organise the attack to-night, if deemed desirable."
VOL. n. 2d
402 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
from Lahor, when we could insure success in our attack. So
long as we hold this position we keep the whole of the insur-
gents in and round Dehli. On taking the city, they will
naturally form into large bodies, and go through the country,
plundering in every direction. These bodies should be imme-
diately followed by movable brigades, and cut up whenever
come up with. It would be impossible, with the small force we
now have, to leave a sufficient force for the protection of Dehli,
and at the same time to send out such brigades as will be
required. It appears to me a question of time only. The
country all round, it is true, is in the 'hands of the insurgents
and other plunderers, and must remain so until we can clear
the country by our brigades. Mr. Greathed also contemplates
the probability of the Native chiefs, who are now favourable to
us, becoming lukewarm in our cause ; but what have they yet
done for us ? The Gwaliar and Bharatpur forces have long ago
left us to our resources ; and, from what I hear, little is to be
expected from the Jaipur Contingent, until they are quite
satisfied of our complete success over the insurgents."
General Reed then declared his opinion at some length.* He
said that " our success on the 8th had placed us
GerE°Eeed. * n a favourable position, and one which we could
hold for anj'- time. It, therefore, became a question
whether it would not be better to await the arrival of the strong
reinforcements that were on their way to join us — the rear
guard of which must have reached Lodiana, so that by ordinary
marches they ought all be assembled here in fifteen days — than
to risk an attack on the place at once, which would require
every available bayonet of our force to effect, leaving no reserve,
except Cavalry and heavy guns in position, thus risking the
safety of our camp, stores, and magazines, which would be
exposed to the incursion of many bodies of mutineers which we
knew were encamped outside the walls of Dehli, and would
take the opportunity of looting our camp, while our troops were
attacking the city. There can be no question," he continued,
" of the propriety of waiting, in a military point of view. In
that all agree. We have, then, to lo<>k upon it in a political
aspect, and to inquire whether, in that sense, so great a risk is
* The substance of what follows in the text was stated orally before the
Council of the loth. General Eeed afterwards embodied it in a letter to Sir
John Lawrence, and it was read out at the meeting on the following day.
1857.] OPINION OF GENERAL REED. 403
to be run as an immediate assault would entail. There can be
no doubt that expedition in terminating this state of affairs —
which it is to be hoped that the capture of Dehli would accom-
plish — is a great consideration; but the possibility of failure,
either total or partial, in that operation should be averted. This
can only be done by having in hand such a force as will insure
success. That force, it is believed, will be assembled here in
the course of fifteen days. In the mean time, by holding this
position, we keep the chief body of the mutineers concentrated
in and about Dehli. They know they cannot dislodge us, f and
that strong reinforcements are on their way to join us, while
they are prevented from dispersing and marauding the country,
which would be the effect of a successful attack upon Dehli at
any time. Now we have not the means of sending our detach-
ments to pursue them ; then we should have ample means, and
movable columns would be organised without delay to drive
out the mutineers, and re-establish order in the neighbouring
places which have suffered. It is not apparent, therefore, that
the delay contemplated can have an effect, politically, sufficiently
injurious to warrant the certainty of great loss and risk of
possible failure, than which nothing could be more disastrous
in its consequences. We have suffered no diminution of prestige
since we advanced on Delhi ; all our objects have been accom-
plished, in spite of great obstacles, by the well-known redoubt-
able bravery of our troops, the mutineers driven from their
strong positions, and their guns taken. Their sorties in force
have since been repulsed with great loss to them, and in no one
instance have they succeeded in gaining any, even the smallest,
advantage. Their only effective defence lies in their walls,
which, instead of being weak and unable to support the weight
and resist the concussion of guns, are strong (recently repaired
and strengthened by us), capable of sustaining a numerous and
heavy artillery, with which all their bastions are mounted. As
neither uur time nor material would admit of a regular siege,
an assault or storm can only be resorted to ; but the success of
this must be insured. A contrary event would endanger the
Empire. Another reason has been alleged for an immediate
attack — the approaching rains ; but they are seldom heavy till
the ensuing rnonth, and the sickness does not ensue till the
month after. Every precaution must, of course, be taken in
cutting drains in camp previously, to carry off the water ; for
the wounded (there are, I am happy to say, few sick), there
2d2
404 FIKST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
are good pucka buildings, Native hospitals, in the Lines which
we occupy, so that no inconvenience need be expected as far as
they are concerned, nor do I anticipate any for the Force. There
has been no ' Chhota Barsat ' yet, which generally precedes
the regular rains, and is succeeded by some fine weather before
these regularly set in. The necessity of having as large a force
as can be made available is also apparent in the size of Dehli,
the circumference of which is six or seven miles. Having
accomplished a lodgment, a strong force would be required to
clear the ramparts and occupy the town, in which they may
expect to be. opposed at every house and wall behind which an
insurgent can find room, under which it is known they can
defend themselves with vigour. All things considered," con-
cluded the General, " it is my opinion that the military reasons
for awaiting the arrival of a sufficient force to insure success
far outweigh any political inconvenience that might arise, and
which would all be remedied by certain success in the end."
The result of these decided expressions of opinion on the part
of the principal military officers at Dehli was that
Ab the d assauS ° f again the project of a coup-de-main was abandoned.
In the face of such opinions, Barnard did not con-
sider that he would be justified in incurring the serious risks so
emphatically dwelt upon by Wilson and Eeed. The expression
of his personal views is on record. Writing on
the 18th to Sir John Lawrence, he said : "I con-
fess that, urged on by the political adviser acting with me,
I had consented to a coup-de-main which would have entailed
all the above considerations ; accident alone prevented it ; it
may be the interposition of Providence. From what I can hear,
and from the opinion of others whom it became my duty to
consult, I am convinced that success would have been as fatal
as failure. A force of two thousand bayonets, spread over a
city of the magnitude of Dehli, would have been lost as a
military body, and, with the treachery that surrounds us, what
would have become of my materiel ? Be sure that I have been
guided by military rule, and that it required moral courage to
face the cry that will be raised against our inactivity before
Dehli; I can but act for the best, and wait any favourable
opportunity for striking the blow. The great point raised by
Mr. Greathed was the security of the Duab, and the desirable-
ness of sending troops to Aligarh from Dehli ; but were I in the
city now I could not do this. The Castle and Selimgarh yet
1857.] NEW PROJECTS OP ATTACK. 405
remain before me, and to hold the city and attack these with a
force under two thousand would prevent my detaching any
there. The fact is, Dehli, bristling with lances, and garrisoned
by men who, however contemptible in the open, have sagacity
behind stone walls and some knowledge of the use of heavy
ordnance — for hitherto they beat us in the precision of their
fire — is not to be taken by the force from Ambalah, with two
troops of six-pounders; and its present strength has been
greatly under-estimated. We have fought one action at Badli-
ki-Sarai, where, so long as their guns remained to them, they
appeared formidable. We have been subject to frequent attacks
ever since, each made with some spirit, but repulsed with heavy
loss, and having now the position taken up from which we
must eventually reduce the place. It strikes me the best policy
is to view it in its best light ; it is a difficult task, and not to
be accomplished without a sufficient force. Once in the town,
the game is over if we can hold it, and immediately a force will
be available for any purpose Mr. Colvin requires. Delay is
vexatious, and losing men daily in these attacks is heart-break-
ing. I am well, but much harassed. I do assure you, the more
I think of it, the more I rejoice in the hap-hazard experiment
failing. It is some comfort to see that you agree ; I hope others
will now see I had more to do than to walk into Dehli."*
But Wilberforce Greathed still did not despair of turning the
hearts of the military chiefs towards his schemes of energetic
action. Before a week had passed, he had submitted to Barnard
another memorandum, urging that since the date of the last
Council the mutineers had been reinforced by the Nasirabad
Brigade of two regiments and six guns, and the Jalandhar force
* To this letter Barnard added a postscript, saying : " We gave them a great
beating yesterday, with heavy loss. They had attempted to take up a position,
seize [ * ] and Kislianganj, and Trevelyau-ganj and Paharipur; with
two small columns under Major Tombs, B.A., and Major Reid, Sirmur
Battalion, we not only dislodged them, but drove them out of the serai above,
and, in fact, drove all before us on this side of the Force. It has had a very
chilling effect, we hear, and their spirits are much disturbed. But their fire
from the north is as true as ever; so hot is it, that, until we approach ours
nearer, we shall do no good ; and such is the slate of the service, that with
all the bother of getting the siege-train, my commanding Artillery Officer can
only man six guns, and my Engineer has not a sand-bag. It is really too
distressing. I never contemplated making regular approaches, but I did
expect my guns to silence those brought against me. But to do this they
must be got nearer. Delay concentrates the insurgents."
406 FIBST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
of three regiments with one gun; that information had been
received of the near approach to join the insurgents of the
revolted Bareli force, six regiments of Infantry with eight guns,
and a regiment of Cavalry ; and that, moreover, there were
tidings of the Gwaliar Contingent, of seven regiments of In-
fantry, three of Cavalry, and three batteries of Artillery, with
a siege-train and magazine, having declared for the King of
Dehli; and that in all human probability Agra would be
besieged by the latter force — perhaps, indeed, already was in
imminent peril. In such circumstances it had become a matter
of infinite importance that a portion of the Dehli force should
be detached to the relief of the former city. " But this is
possible," he added, " only after Dehli is in our possession, and
the mutineers' force dispersed. I respectfully submit, there-
fore, that a political necessity for pressing the attack of Dehli
at almost any risk has arisen, and upon this ground I venture
to submit a project of immediate attack concurred in by the
officers who were commissioned to prepare the first project."
But Barnard was not to be induced to swerve from the reso-
lution formed by the Council of War. So, again, the younger
and more eager spirits of the British camp were disappointed ;
and our troops fell back upon their old daily business of re-
pulsing the enemy's sorties.
There was, indeed, whilst this great design of the coup~de-
main was under consideration at Head-Quarters,
^cam in no ^ ac ^- °^ wor k in camp, and no lack of excite-
ment. There were real alarms and false alarms,
and officers and men on the Eidge were compelled to be con-
stantly on the alert. Greatly outmatched as we were in Ar-
tillery, we could make little or no impression upon the batteries
of the enemy or the walls of Dehli, and were, in truth, except
when our Horse Artillery guns were brought into close quar-
ters, only wasting our ammunition. The Sipahis, who knew
our habits but too well, were wont to come out against us in
the midst of the fiercest mid-day heats. In the climate they
had an ally, to which they felt that they could trust ; and many
of our best and bravest were struck down, or went about shiver-
ing with ague or confused by quinine. The days were very hot
and the nights were unwontedly cold ; and these severe alter-
nations are very trying in the extreme to the European con-
stitution. But nothing could abate the elastic cheerfulness and
hopeful spirit of our people. Some of our younger officers then
1857.] THE CAMP AND THE GARRISON. 407
ripened into heroism of the highest order, and all displayed a
constant courage in action, and an enduring fortitude in suffer-
ing, unsurpassed in the military annals of any country or any
time. Day by day sad tidings came in of new mutinies and
new massacres, and ever and anon fresh reinforcements of rebel
regiments marched into Dehli to the sound of band-instruments
playing our well-known English tunes. But the dominant
feeling ever was, as these regiments arrived, that it was better
for our countrymen and our country that they should be in the
doomed city of the Mughul than they should be scattered about
the provinces, assailing weak garrisons or defenceless canton-
ments, for, please God, the Dehli Field Force could not only
hold its own, but, on some not very remote day, make short
work of the Dehli rebels. How that was best to be done there
were eager discussions in camp, leading to small results and no
convictions. It must be admitted that there were many who
shook their heads at the project of the coup-de-main, of whicii
Greathed and Hodson had been the eager authors and the per-
sistent exponents. It was said that, although the Force might
have made its way into Dehli, only a small part of it would
have ever made its way out. And yet as weeks passed and no
change came over the position of the Army before Dehli, men
began to chafe under the restraints which had held them back.
They felt that, in all parts of India, Englishmen were askin<;
each other why Dehli was not taken ; and it was painful to
those gallant souls to think that their countrymen had expected
of them that which they had not done.
Ever active among the active was Sir Henry Barnard. There
was not an officer in camp, in the flower of his youth, who, all
through this fiery month of June, worked day and night with
such ceaseless energy as the Commander of the Dehli Field
Force. He was not inured to the climate by long acquaintance
with it. He had arrived in India at that very period of life at
which the constitution can least reconcile itself to such extreme
changes. But nothing could now induce him to spare himself.
All day long he was abroad in the great glare of the summer
sun, with the hot wind in his face ; and it was often observed
of him that he never slept. Men have ere now been carried
safely through the most trying conjunctures by the possession
of a power enjoyed by many of the world's greatest men — a
power of sleeping and waking at will. But sleep had forsaken
Barnard, and therefore the climate and the work were grievously
408 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
assailing him. Not only was there strong within him, amidst
all perplexities, an eager, dominant desire to do his dnty to the
country, for the sake of which he would at any moment have
gone gladly to his death, but a tender concern for the welfare of
all who were under his command, which kept him unceasingly
in a state of unrest, passing from post to post by day and by
night, now visiting a battery or directing a charge, and now
gliding into an officer's nut, and seeing that he was sufficiently
covered to resist the cold night air, as he lay asleep on his bed.
He impressed all men with the belief that he was a good and
gallant soldier, and the kindliest-hearted, truest -gentleman who
ever took a comrade by the hand.
But although he bore himself thus bravely before men, the
inward care was wearing out his life. Never since War began,
was General in command of an Army surrounded by so many
•discouragements and distresses. For in truth there was no
possibility of disguising the fact that instead of besieging
Dehli, he was himself the besieged. The inadequacy of his
means of regular attack became every day more apparent. He
had planted strong picquets with guns at some of the principal
outposts of which I have spoken ; and the enemy were continually
.streaming out to attack them. At Hindu Kao's house, at the
Flagstaff Tower, and at the Observatory, detachments of In-
fantry, supported by heavy guns, were planted from the com-
mencement of our operations. The Metcalfe House
Th House alfe would also have been garrisoned from the be-
ginning, but for its distance from our supports
and the paucity of troops at our disposal. The occupation of
these buildings by the enemy was among the first effects of
their offensive activity. It is believed that there was a peculiar
feeling of animosity against the Faringhis in connexion with
this edifice. It was said to have been erected on land formerly
the site of a Gujar village ; and that the Gujars had flown
upon it, eager for its demolition and resolute to recover their
ancient holdings, on the fir&t outbreak of the mutiny.* And
there is another story still more significant. The building was
originally the tomb of one of the foster-brothers of the Emperor
Akbar. It had been converted into a residence by an English
civilian, who was murdered, and the act of profanation had
been vainly appealed against to another civilian, who afterwards
* Cave-Browne's " Panjab and Dehli in 1857."
1857.] 1HE METCALFE HOUSE. 409
shared the same fate.* Whatsoever effect these circumstances
may have had upon the conduct of the insurgents, it is certain
that they gutted the building and did their best to destroy it.t
It was a wreck when we returned to Dehli. A
month had passed, and now the enemy were in June IL
force at the Metcalfe House, where they had established a for-
midable battery, which played upon the left of our position on
the Eiclge. On the morning of the 12th, the Sipahi mutineers
came out to attack us both in front and rear. The ground
between the Flagstaff Tower and the Metcalfe buildings fa-
voured, by its ravines and shrubberies, the unseen approach of
the enemy, who stole up within a short distance of our picqnet
at the former post, and before the English officer in command J
could realise the position of affairs, had opened fire upon him
- a range of some fifty yards. Our men replied promptly
tie Enfield rifie, but Knox was shot dead by a Sipahi
within
with the
* Sir William Sleeman says : " The magnificent tomb of freestone covering
the remains of a foster-brother of Akbar was long occupied as a dwelling-
house by the late Mr. Blake, of the Bengal Civil Service, who was lately
barbarously murdered at Jaipur. To make room for his dining-tables, he
removed the marble slab which covered the remains of the dead from the
centre of the building against the urgent remonstrances of the people, and
threw it carelessly on one side against the wall, where it now lies. The
people appealed in vain, it is said, to Mr. Eraser, the Governor-General's
representative, who was soon afterwards assassinated, and a good many
attribute the death of both to this outrage upon the dead foster-brother of
Akbar." Bholauath Chandr, in his " Travels of a Hindu," quotes this passage,
and adds, " Kooms are let in the Metcalfe House for a rupee a day for each
person."
f '• They stripped the roof of all its massive and valuable timber, carried
oft' all the doors and windows, everything which they could themselves bring
into use or convert into money ; they demolished the costly marble statues
and the unnumbered small articles of vertv, and then, with consistent Goth-
like ruthlessness, tore up and piled in the centres of the rooms the volumes of
that far-famed library, believed to be without its equal in India, and then
set fire to the building." — Cave-Browne.
X Captain Knox, of Her Majesty's 75th. Mr. Cave-Browne says that he
"seemed to imagine that the Sipahis were coming to lay down their arms,
and refused to let the men fire." Mr. Rotton (Chaplain's Narrative) says
that Captain Knox " only a moment before shot with his own hand one of the
enemy, when his eyes caught sight of a Sipahi levelling a musket at him :
' See,' said he to one of his men, ' that man pointing at me ; take him down.'
The words had hardly escaped his lips, when the fatal shot took effect on hi3
person. He was on one knee when singled out as a mark by the mutineer ;
and I am told, that as soon as he received the shot, he rose regularly to
'attention,' and. then fell and expired without word or groan."
410 FIKST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLL [1857.
musketeer, and many of his men fell- wounded beside him,
whilst our artillerymen dropped at their guns. Meanwhile a
party of mutineers had made their way to the rear of the
British camp, and were pushing onward with desperate audacity
into the very heart of it before our people were aroused. There
was danger, indeed, on both sides. But the English got to
their arms in time to repulse the attack and to carry victory
before them. The enemy turned and fled ; and after them
went swift retribution. Rifles, Fusiliers, and other infantry
detachments, aided by Daly's gallant Guide Corps, pushed
after them, and dealing death as they went, pursued the
fugitives through the Metcalfe grounds up to the walls of the
city. The lesson was not thrown away upon us. A strong
picquet was, from that time, planted at the Metcalfe House,
and communications with this advanced post were kept open
with the Flagstaff Tower on the Ridge.*
On the same day an attack was made on the right of our
position, on that famous post of Hindu Rao's
pufuet House, where Reid with his regiment of Gurkhas,
two companies of the Rifles, Daly's Guides, two
guns of Scott's Battery, and some heavy artillery, was destined
to bear the brunt of the affray through weeks and months of
incessant fighting. Exposed to the fire of the enemy's guns
planted on the Kashmir, Mori, and other bastions, this picquet
was seldom suffered to enjoy many hours of continuous rest.f
On the morning of the 12th, under cover of the guns, the muti-
neers came out in two bodies towards our right flank, the one
moving directly on the picquet at Hindu Rao's house, the
others pushing into the gardens of the Sabzimancli.i Both
* " Thus throwing up, as it were, the left flank of our defences, and render-
ing it almost impossible for the enemy to pass round on that side." — Norman.
f Major Reid commanded all the posts on the right of the Ridge. He
describes the disposition of his troops as follows : " My own regiment and one
company of Rifles occupied the House, and one company of Rifles the Obser-
vatory, where a battery for three heavy guns was constructed on the night of
the 9th to reply to the Kashmir bastion. The centre battery for three
eio-hteen-pounders was close to the House, and the guns were all laid for the
Mori bastion. The Guides I located in and behind the outhouses." When-
ever the alarm was sounded, two more companies of the Rifles were sent up
in support.
% " The first of these attacks was not serious, but the latter threatened the
Mound picquet, and supports of all arms had to be moved up. The 1st
Fusiliers, under Major Jacob, then advanced and drove the mutineers out of
the gardens, killing a considerable number of them." — Norman's Narrative.
1857.] ATTACK ON HINDU RXO'S HOUSE. 41 1
attacks were repulsed, and with heavy loss to the enemy. But
it was not without a disaster on our own side ; for a detachment
of Native Irregular Cavalry, on whose loyalty we had relied,
went over to the enemy. And so sudden was the retrograde
movement that the greater number of them escaped from the
fire of our guns, which were turned upon them as soon as their
treachery was disclosed.* Nor was this the only disheartening
circumstance which, about this time, showed how little the
Native soldiery generally believed that the Ikhbal of the Com-
pany was on the ascendant, even though we had recovered our
old position before Dehli, and had beaten the enemy in three
pitched battles. The officers of the 60th Sipahi
Eegiment had come into Dehli without their men. Muti ^ b of the
This corps was under the command of a dis-
tinguished soldier, Colonel Thomas Seaton, who had made a
name for himself, fifteen years before, as one of the illustrious
garrison of Jalalabad. He had believed, as other Sipahi. officers
had believed, in his men, but they had broken into rebellion at
Eohtak, and had now gone to swell the tide of rebellion within
the walls of Dehli. No sooner had they arrived than they went
out against us and were amongst the most vehement of our
assailants.
Again and again — day after day — the enemy came out to
attack our posts with an uniformity of failure of
which it would be tedious to recite the details. June 13-17.
On the 13th and 15th, they again flung them- ^ack?
selves upon our position at Hindu Eao's House,
and, as ever, the Gurkhas and the Guides distinguished them-
selves by their unflinching gallantry.")" On the afternoon of
the 17th, we began to act on the offensive. The enemy were
* Major Reid says that, " They went to the front just as if they were going
to charge, but no sooner had they closed than, to my horror, I saw them mix
up with the enemy and walk off with them. Immediately I saw this I ordered
the guns to open upon them, but the wretches were too far off, and I don't
think that more than half a dozen were killed."
t It is said that some regiments newly arrived from Oudh took part in
these attacks. The 60th was conspicuous in the action of the 13th. Major
Keid writes, that they " marched up the Grand Trunk Koad in columns of
sections right in front, and led the attack headed by the Sirdar Babadur of
the regiment, who made himself very conspicuous, calling out to the men to
keep their distance, as he intended to wheel to his left. They fought most
desperately. Tne Sirdar Bahadur was killed by his orderly, Lall Singh. I
took the riband of India from his breast and sent it to my wife."
412 FIEST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHL1. [1857.
strongly posted in the suburbs of Kishanganj and Trevelyan-
ganj, between our right and the city, and were erecting a
battery on rising ground, which would have completely enfi-
laded the Ridge. 80 two columns were sent out to destroy their
works. It was a dashing enter prise, and Barnard selected the
right men for it. One column was intrusted to Eeid, the other
to Henry Tombs. The former moved from Hindu Rao's House,
the latter from the camp. Both were completely successful.
After a gallant resistance by the Sappers and Miners of our old
Army, who, after firing their muskets, drew their swords and
flung themselves desperately upon us, the battery and maga-
zine were destroyed, and the village in which they were
planted was burnt. Large numbers of the enemy were killed
and wounded, and their rout was complete. Our own loss was
trifling. Tombs, always in the thick of the affray, had two
horses shot under him,* and was himself slightly wounded,
Captain Brown of the 1st Fusiliers, well-nigh received his
death-wound. That evening General Barnard walked into the
Artillery mess-tent, and with characteristic appreciation of gal-
lantry lavished his well-merited praises upon Tombs.
There was much, in all this, of the true type of English
soldiership. But it was weary and disheartening
Artillery work at the best. If we lost fewer men than the
ttaenemy. enemy, they had more to lose, more to spare, and
their gaps could be more readily filled. Every
victory cost us dearly. And we made no progress towards the
great consummation of the capt.re of Dehli. Every day it
became more apparent that we were grievously outmatched in
Artillery.* Their guns could take our distance, but ours could
not take theirs. They were of heavier metal and longer reach
than our own, and sometimes worked with destructive pre-
cision. On one occasion a round shot from a twenty-four
* "Making," at this early stage, writes Major Norman, "five horses that
from the commencement of the campaign up to tiiat date bad been shot
under him."
t At first our offensive operations were principally confined to shelling the
city. "We annoy them excessively with our shells, some of which reach
almost to the Palace.'' But atVrwards, perhaps because it was thought that
we thus afflicted the townspeople rather than the mutineers, this course was
abandoned. "I told you a little while ago that we were firing into the town,
but last night there was an order given to fire on the gateways only, not into
the town." — Journal of an Artillery Ojjicer. June 16.
1857.] FIRE OF THE ENEMY. 413
pounder was sent crashing into the portico of Hindu Rao's
House, and with such deadly effect that it killed an
English officer * and eight men and wounded four June 9 '
others, including a second English subaltern. We could not
silence these guns. A twenty-four pounder had been taken
from the enemy in battle, but we had no ammunition in store
for a gun of such calibre, and were fain to pick up the shot
which had been fired from the city walls. Whilst the ord-
nance stores at our command were dwindling down to scarcity-
point, so vast were the supplies in the city, that it little mat-
tered to our assailants how many rounds they fired every hour
of the day. The gallantry of the Artillery subaltern, Wil-
loughby, had done but little to diminish tho resources of the
enemy. There were vast supplies of material wealth that could
not be blown into the air.
The fire from the Mori bastion, especially, played always
annoyingly and sometimes destructively on the Ridge. The
Sipahi gunners seemed to lake a delight, which was a mixture
of humour and savagery, in watching the incidents of our
camp, and sending in their shots just at a critical moment to
disturb our operations, whether of a military or a social cha-
racter. If one detachment were marching to the relief of
another — if a solitary officer were proceeding to inspect a bat-
tery — if a line of cook-boys were toiling on with their cauldrons
on their heads for the sustenance of the Europeans on jricquet,
a round shot was sure to come booming towards them, and
perhaps with fatal precision of aim. In time our pei >ple became
accustomed to this exercise, and either avoided the exposure
altogether, or kept themselves on the alert so as to anticipate
the arrival of the deadly missile, and secure safety by throwing
themselves upon the ground. The cook-boys, whose journeys
— as men must eat — could not be arrested or postponed, became
adepts in this work. They went adroitly down on their knees
and deposited their burdens till the danger had passed. The
water-carriers, too, were greatly exposed. And it is charac-
teristic of the relations which at that time existed between the
two races, that although these servile classes did their duty
* Lieutenant Wheatly of the 54th Native Infantry, who was doing duty
witli the Sirmur Battalion. Among the Gurkhas killed was Taka Earn, "one
of the best shots in the regiment, who had killed twenty-two tigers in the
Dun."
414 FIEST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
with all fidelity — and it would have fared ill with us indeed if
they had failed us in the hour of need — not only was there
little kindliness and sympathy extended towards them, but by
some at least of the Englishmen in camp, these unarmed, harm-
less, miserable servitors were treated with most unmerited
severity. There is something grotesque, but not less terrible
for its grotesqueness, in the story that when the cook-boys thus
deftly saved themselves from swift death, and secured also
their precious burdens, the European soldiers would sometimes
say, " It is well for you, my boys, that you have not spilt our
dinners." *
On the 18th, two Sipahi regiments that had mutinied at
Nasirabad streamed into Dehli, bringing with
June 18-19. them six guns.f This welcome reinforcement
Atta ^ our raised the hopes of the mutineers, and they re-
solved, on the following day, to go out in force
against the besiegers. They had so often failed to make an
impression on our front, that this time it was their game to
attack our position in the rear. So, passing the Sabzimandi,
they entered the gardens on our right, and, disappearing for a
while, emerged by the side of the Najafgarh Canal, to the
dismay of the camel-drivers, whose animals were quietly brows-
ing on the plain. The day was then so far spent that the
expectation of an attack, which had been entertained in the
morning, had passed away from our camp, and we were but
ill-prepared to receive the enemy. Our artillery were the first
in action against them. Scott, Money, and Tombs brought
their guns into play with marvellous rapidity ; J but for a
while they were unsupported, and the enemy's fire, artillery
and musketry, was heavy and well directed. The
guns of the mutineers were the far-famed guns
of the illustrious garrison of Jalalabad, known in history as
Abbott's Battery — guns with the mural crown upon them in
* I am writing of this now only with reference to the practice of the enemy
in the city. I shall speak more fully hereafter of the treatment of the
Natives in camp.
t This reinforcement consisted of the loth and 30th Sipahi Regiments, the
2nd Company 7th Battalion (Golandaz) Artillery, with No. 6 Horse Battery
attached, and some men of the 1st Bombay Light Cavalry.
X The Field Artillery employed on this occasion consisted of three guns
each of four different batteries, under Turner, Money, Tomb3, and Scott. The
battle was fought by them.
1857.] BATTLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE. 415
honour of their great achievements. The Infantry, too, of the
Nasirabad Brigade were proving their title to be regarded as
the very flower of the rebel army. So fierce and well directed
was the fire of a party of mnsketeers under cover, that Tombs,
seeing his men dropping at their guns, and unable to reach the
sheltered enemy, doubted for a little space whether he could
maintain himself against them. But in this crisis up rode
Daly with a detachment of his Guides' Cavalry, and a word
from the heroic artilleryman sent him forward with a few fol-
lowers against the musketeers in the brushwood. The diversion
was successful ; but the gallant leader of the Guides returned
severely wounded, and for a while his services were lost to the
Force.*
Meanwhile the Cavalry had been getting to horse, and Yule's
Lancers were to be seen spurring into action. But the shades
of evening were now falling upon the battle, and ere long
it was difficult to distinguish friends from enemies. Yule's
saddle was soon empty ;f and Hope Grant, who commanded,
well-nigh fell into the hands of the enemy, for his charger
was shot under him, and it was sore trouble to rescue him
in the confusion and darkness of the moment. The engage-
ment, scattered and discursive as were its incidents, is not
one easily to be described. A confused narrative of that
evening's fighting must be most descriptive of the chaos of the
fight. Night fell upon a drawn battle, of which no one could
count the issues, and, as our officers met together in their mess-
tents, with not very cheerful countenances, they saw the camp-
fires of the enemy blazing up in their rear. We had sustained
some severe losses. That fine field-officer of the Lancers, Yule,
had been killed ; Daly, of the Guides, had been incapacitated
for active work ; Arthur Becher, Quartermaster General of the
Army, had been wounded ; and we had left many men upon
* The author of the "History of the Siege of Dehli" thus describes this
incident : " A portion of the Guide Cavalry came up. ' Daly, if you do not
charge,' said Tombs to their leader, ' my guns are taken.' Daly spurred into
the bushes — scarcely a dozen of bis men followed him. He returned with a
bullet in his shoulder ; but the momentary diversion saved the guns."
f The contemporary annalists of the siege do not relate in what manner
Yule met bis death, but his horse galloping riderless into camp seems to have
conveyed the first news of his fall, and Ins body lying all night on the field, it
may be assumed that he was killed in the confusion which arose when the
brief twilight bad closed upon the scene. It is distinctly stated that our own
Artillery fired upon the Lancers.
416 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLL [1857.
the field. The enemy hal increased in numbers, and with
numbers their daring had increased. It would have gone ill
with ns if the mutineers had succeeded in establishing them-
selves in our rear, and the strength of the rebel force within
the walls had enabled them to renew their attacks on our
front and on our flanks. They were welcoming fresh rein-
forcements every day, whilst our reinforcements, notwithstand-
ing the ceaseless energies of the authorities above and below
Dehli, were necessarily coming in but slowly. Perhaps at no
period of the siege were circumstances more dispiriting to the
besiegers.
There was little sound sleep in our camp that night, but
with the first dawn of the morning, and the first breath of the
morning air, there came a stern resolution upon our people not
to cease from the battle until they had driven the exulting
enemy from our rear. But it was scarcely needed that we
should brace ourselves up for the encounter. The vehemence
of the enemy was seldom of long duration. It expended itself
in fierce spasms, often, perhaps, the growth of vast druggings
of bang, and was generally exhausted in the course of a few
hours. On the morning of the 1 9th, therefore, our people saw-
but little of the desperate energy of the 18th. Soon after our
camp turned out there was another scene of wild confusion.
Nobody seemed to know what was the actual position of affairs,
and many were quite unable in their bewilderment to dis-
tinguish between enemies and friends. The former had nearly
all departed, and the few who remained were driven out with
little trouble. One last spasm of energy manifested itself in a
farewell discharge of round-shot from a Sipahi gun; but the
worst that befell us was an amazing panic among the camp-
followers beyond the canal, and a considerable expenditure of
ammunition upon an imaginary foe.
It always happened that after one of these storms of excite-
ment there was a season of calm. To the irresistible
June 20-21. voluptuousness of perfect repose the Sipahis ever
surrendered themselves on the day after a great
fight. The 20th and 2 1st were, therefore, days of rest to our Force.
The latter was our Sabbath, and early service was performed by
Mr. Eotton in the mess-tent of the 2nd Fusiliers, and afterwards
in other parts of the camp. There were many then amongst
our people instant in prayer, for they felt that a great crisis
was approaching. They may have laughed to scorn the old
1857.] THE CENTENAKY OF PLASSEY. 417
prophecy that on the centenary of the great battle of Plassey,
which had laid Bengal at our feet, and had laid, too, broad and
deep the foundations of our vast Anglo-Indian Empire, our
empire would be finally extinguished. The self-reliance of the
Englishman made light account of such vaticinations; but no
one doubted that the superstition was strong in
the minds of the Dehli garrison, and that the
23rd of June would be a great day, for good or for evil, in the
History of the War. It was certain, indeed, that then one of
those convulsive efforts, with which already our people were so
well acquainted, would be made on a larger scale than ever had
been made before. On such a day, warned by the thought of
the prophecy which designing people had freely circulated in
the Lines of all our rebel regiments, it could not be doubted
that Hindu and Muhammadans would unite with common con-
fidence and common enmity against us, and that an unwonted
amount of confidence and bang would hurl their regiments
against us with unexampled fury and self-devotion, in full
assurance of the re-establishment of Native rule from one end
of India to the other. Our force had been growing weaker and
weaker every day, whilst the rebel force had grown stronger
and stronger. It was not, therefore, a very cheerful prospect
which lay before the English when they thought of the issues
of the morrow.
Day had scarcely broken on the 23rd when our people learnt
that their expectations were not unfounded. The
enemy, in greater force than had ever menaced us June 23 -
before, streamed out of the Lahor Gate, and Th e f £'ey. ry
again moved by our right towards the rear of the
British camp. But they encountered an unexpected difficulty,
which disconcerted their plans. On the previous night our
Sappers had demolished the bridges over the Najafgarh Drain,
by which the enemy had intended to cross their guns ; and thus
checked, they were compelled to confine their attacks to the
right of our position. The effect of this was, that much of the
day's fighting was among the houses of the Sabzimandi, from
which the enemy poured in a deadly fire on our troops. Again
and again the British Infantry, with noble courage and resolu-
tion, bearing up against the heats of the fiercest sun that had
yet assailed them, drove the Sipahis from their cover, and fought
against heavy odds all through that long summer day. We
VOL. II, 2 E
418 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
had need of all our force in such a struggle, for never had we
been more outmatched in numbers, and never had the enemy-
shown a sterner, more enduring courage. Fresh troops had
joined us in the morning, but weary as they were after a long
night's march, they were called into service, and nobly responded
to the call.* The action of the 19th had been an Artillery
action ; this of the 23rd was fought by the Infantry, and it was
the fighting that least suits the taste and temper of the English
soldier. But the 60 th Bines went gallantly to the attack, and
the Gurkhas and Guides vied with them in sturdy, unflinching
courage to the last. At noonday the battle was raging furiously
in the Sabzimandi ; and such were the fearful odds against us,
that Eeid, cool and confident as he was in the face of difficulty
and danger, felt that, if not reinforced, it would strain him to
the utmost to hold his own.f But his men fought on ; and
after a while the reinforcements which he had sent for came up,
and then, though the contest was still an unequal one, the
chances of war were no longer desperately against us, and our
stubborn courage prevailed against the multitude of the enemy,
As the sun went down, the vigour of the enemy declined also,
and at sunset the mutineers had lost heart, and found that the
work was hopeless. Before nightfall the Sabzimandi was our
own, and the enemy had withdrawn their guns and retired to
the city. It had been a long weary day of hard fighting beneath
a destroying sun, and our troops were so spent and exhausted
that they could not charge the rebel guns, or follow the retreat-
ing masses of the mutineers. It was one of those victories of
which a few more repetitions would have turned our position
into a graveyard, on which the enemy might have quietly
encamped.
* These reinforcements consisted of a company of the 75th Foot, four
companies of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, four European Horse Artillery guns
and part of a Native troop, with some Panjabi Infantry and Cavalry — in all
about S50 men.
f " The mutineers, about twelve o'clock, made a most desperate attack on
the whole of my position. No men could have fought better. They charged
the Rifles, the Guides, and my own men again and again, and at one time I
thought I must have lost the day. The cannonade from the city, and the
heavy guns which they had brought out, raged fast and furious, and com-
pletely enfiladed the whole of my position. Thousands were brought against
my mere handful of men : but I knew the importance of my position, and was
determined to do my utmost to hold it till reinforcements arrived." — Bekl's
Letters and Notes.
1857.] ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS. 41 £
After this there was another lull, and there was again time
for our chief people to take account of the circum-
stances of their position and to look the future June 24.
in the face. The result of the fighting on the St -* e c ° a f ^p dirs
Centenary of Plassey was somewhat to abate the
confidence of the enemy. There were no signs of the descent
of that great Star of Fortune which had risen above us for
a hundred years. Little now was to be gained by them from
spiritual manifestations and encouragements. They had only
to look to their material resources; but these were steadily
increasing, as the stream of mutiny continued to swell and
roll down in full current towards the great ocean of the
imperial city. Kaserabad and Jalandhar had already dis-
charged their turbid waters, and now Iiohilkhand was about
to pour in its tributaries. All this was against us, for it
was the custom of the enemy upon every new accession of
strength to signalise the arrival of the reinforcements by
sending them out to attack us. Thus the brunt of the fighting
on the 19th had been borne by the Nasirabad force, and on the
23rd by the regiments from Jalandhar. It was felt, therefore,
that on the arrival of the Eohilkhand Brigade there would be
again a sharp conflict, which, although the issue of the da} T 's
fighting could not be doubtful, would tend to the diminution
of our strength, and to the exhaustion of our resources, and
would place us no nearer to the final consummation for which
our people so ardently longed,
On the other hand, however, it was a source of congratulation
that our reinforcements were also arriving. Sir
John Lawrence was doing his work well in the x^S^mits.
Panjab, and sending down both European and
Sikh troops, and every available gun, to strengthen Barnard in
his position before Dehli. The dimensions of the British camp
were visibly expanding. The newly arrived troops were at
first a little dispirited by the thought of the small progress that
had been made by their comrades before Dehli ; for the besiegers
were found to be the besieged. But they soon took heart a .ain,
for the good spirits of the Dehli Field Force were contagious,
and nothing finer had ever been seen than the buoyanc} 7 and
the cheerfulness which they manifested in the midst of all
sorts of trials and privations. Many old friends and comrades
then met together in the mess-tents to talk over old times, and
many new friendships were formed by men meeting as strangers,
2 E 2
420 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEIILI. [1857.
on that ever-memorable Ridge — friendships destined to last for
a life. Hospitality and good-fellowship abounded everywhere.
There was not an officer in camp who did not delight in the
opportunity of sharing his last bottle of beer with a friend or a
comrade. And from the old Crimean General down to the
youngest subaltern in camp, all were alike chivalrous, patient,
and self-denying.
There was never any despondency among them. Vast diver-
gencies of opinion prevailed in camp with respect to the great
something that was to be done. Some of the
Ge^eSSn/rd. younger, more eager, spirits panted for a rush upon
Dehli. The Engineer subalterns — Greathed and
his gallant brethren — never ceased to urge the expediency of a
coup-de-main, and as the month of June wore to a close, Barnard
again consented to the enterprise — doubtfully as to the issue,
and altogether reluctantly, but with a dominant sense that
there was nothing else to be done. He was very active at this
time. No subaltern, in the flower of his youth, was more regard-
less of exposure and fatigue. Under the fierce June sun, never
sparing himself, he was continually abroad, and night seldom
found his anxious head upon the pillow. Sometimes he and his
son laid themselves down together, with revolvers in their
hands, but still the general notion in camp was that he " never
slept," He was torn to pieces by conflicting counsels. But he
wore outwardly a cheerful aspect, and ever resolute to do his
best, he bore up manfully against the troubles which surrounded
him. Even the feeling that, do what he might, his reputation
would be assailed, did not, to outward appearance, very sorely
distress him. All men placed in difficult conjunctures must be
prepared to encounter reproach, and Barnard well knew it. But
ever as time went on he won upon the hearts of the officers
under his command by his kindliness and generosity. It was
said that he kept open tent ; he had a liberal table ; and never
had an officer in high command a keener sense of individual
merit or a more open-hearted desire to bestow his personal com-
mendations on all who had distinguished themselves by acts of
gallantry. So, before the month of June was at an end, Sir
Henry Barnard had securely established himself in the affections
of the Dehli Field Force.
But, as weeks passed away, and he saw that he was making
no impression upon Dehli, the inward care that was weighing
upon his very life grew heavier and heavier. He wrote many
1S57J SIR HENRY BARNARD. 421
letters at this time both to public functionaries in India and to
private friends in England, in which he set forth very clearly
his difficulties and perplexities, and suggested that he had
been, and was likely to be, misjudged. To Sir
John Lawrence he wrote, on the 28th of June, June2 8.
a letter, in which he reviewed the Past, and set forth the
circumstances of the Present. "You have, of course," he
said, "been well informed of our proceedings, which, from
the commencement, have been a series of difficulties overcome
by the determined courage and endurance of our troops, but
not leading us to the desired termination. When first I took
up this position, my Artillery were to silence the fire of the
town from the Mori and Kashmir Gates, at least, and our
heavy guns then brought into play to open our way into the
city. So far from this, however, we have not silenced a
single gun, and they return us to this day at least four to one.
The Chief Artillery Officer admits the distance to be too great ;
but to get nearer we must look to our Engineers, who are only
now commencing to collect some few materials, such as trenching
tools, sand-bags, &c, of which they were destitute, and even now
have not enough to aid me in strengthening any outpost. In
the mean time, my force is being worn out by the constant and
sanguinary combats they are exposed to — the attacks which
require every soul in my camp to repel — for it is never certain
where the enemy intend to strike their blow, and it is only by
vigilance I can ascertain it, and having done so, withdraw
troops from one place to strengthen the threatened one; and
thus the men are hastened here and there, and exjDosed to the
sun all day. To me it is wonderful how all have stood it. It
is heart-breaking to engage them in these affairs, which always
cost us some valuable lives. The Engineers had arranged a
plan of approach on the Kashmir side ; the difficulties that meet
one here are the constant interruptions the operations would
experience by the fire from the town, and more so by the more
frequent renewal of these dangerous attacks. But a greater one
was in store for me when, on inquiring into the means, the
amount of siege ammunition was found to be so totally inade-
quate, that the Chief Engineer declared the project must be
abandoned. There remains, therefore, but one alternative. My
whole force will be here in a day or two, when our entire project
will be matured. Disappointing as, I fear, our progress has
been to you, the results of our exertions have been great ; an
422 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
immensely superior force has been on all occasions defeated with
great loss, and I have reason to believe that the spirit of this
mutineering multitude — contemptible in the open, but as good,
if not better, than ourselves behind guns— is completely broken,
and that the game is in our hands ; for, by confining, or rather
centralising the evil on Dehli, the heart of it will be crushed
in that spot, and that ' delay,' so far from being detrimental,
has been of essential use ! But for the prestige, I would leave
Dehli to its fate. Anarchy and disorder would soon destroy it ;
and the force now before it — the only one of Europeans you
have in India set free — would be sufficient to re-establish the
greater part of the country. To get into Dehli will greatly
reduce this small force, and I feel much moral courage in even
hinting at an object which I have no intention of carrying out
— at all events, till after an attempt had been made. You may
say, why engage in these constant combats ? The reason simply
is that, when attacked, we must defend ourselves ; and that to
secure our camp, our hospitals, our stores, &c, every living
being has to be employed. The whole thing is too gigantic for
the force brought against it. The gates of Dehli once shut, with
the whole of your Native Army drilled, equipped, and organised
within the walls, a regularly prepared force should have been
employed, and the place invested. Much as I value the reduc-
tion of Dehli, and great as I see that the danger to my own repu-
tation will be if we fail, still I would rather retire from it than
risk this army ! But, by God's blessing, all may be saved yet. : '
And in this letter, having set forth the general state of the
great question before him, he proceeded to speak of some of its
personal bearing. "My position," he said, "is difficult; and
not the less so for its undefined responsibilities, which must
always be the case when a Commander-in-Chief is in the same
field. But the valuable assistance which you have given me,
in Brigadier-General Chamberlain, will henceforward greatly
lighten my anxieties."
A few days before — on the 24th of June — Brigadier Chamber-
lain had arrived in Camp to take the post of
June 24. Adjutant-General of the Army. His corning had
BrYgldier- been anticipated with the liveliest emotions of
General satisfaction. Some said that he would be worth a
thousand men. Those who had ever encouraged
the bolder and the more hazardous course of action rejoiced
most of all, for they believed that his voice would be lifted up
1857.] ARRIVAL OF BAIRD SMITH. 423
in favour of some dashing enterprise.* It was, doubtless, at that
time great gain to have such a man at the elbow of the Coin-
mander.f A few months before officialism would have stood
aghast at such a selection. Neville Chamberlain had little
departmental experience. But the Departments, in that great
crisis, were not in the highest honour. Not that they had
failed — not that they had done any worse or any better than
Departments are wont to do in great conjunctures; but that
the Dehli Field Force did not want Departments, but men.
There was no want of manliness in the general Staff, for already
within the space of three weeks one departmental chief had
been killed and another disabled. But it was felt that there
were men in the country, cast in the true heroic mould, with a
special genius for the work in hand. Some said, " Oh, if Henry
Lawrence were but here ! " others spoke of John Nicholson as
the man for the crisis ; and all rejoiced in the advent of Neville
Chamberlain. There was another, too, whose name at that
time was in the mouth of the general camp. It was known
that Baird Smith had been summoned to direct the engineering
department, which had been lamentably in want of an efficient
chief. All these things were cheering to the heart of the
Crimean General, for he mistrusted his own judgment, and he
looked eagerly for counsellors in whom he could confide.
Baird Smith was at Kurki, leading an active, busy life,
thinking much of the Army before Dehli, but Jul
never dreaming of taking part in the conflict, Coioaei Baird
when, in the last week of June, news reached him Smith,
that he was wanted there to take the place of the Chief En-
gineer, who had completely broken down. Having improvised,
with irregular despatch, a body of some six hundred Pioneers,
and loaded fifty or sixty carts with Engineer tools and stores,
* " Neville Chamberlain has arrived ; of this we are all glad, as well as the
General. Wilby's bold conceptions may now receive more consideration." —
Greathed's Letters.—" Everything will be right, they used to say, when
Chamberlain comes, and all took courage when they saw his stern pale face."
— History of the Siege of Dehli.
f " You have sent me a sound, good auxiliary in Brigadier Chamberlain,
who fully sees and admits the difficulties I have been placed in. He is
favourable to the trial of getting into the place, and a reasonable hope of
success may be entertained. I am willing to try, provided I can see my way
to honourably secure my sick and wounded, and keeping open my supplies."
— Sir H. Barnard to Sir John Lawrence, July 1. MS. Correspondence.
421: FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
he started on the 29th of Juno, accompanied by Captains
Kobertson and Spring.* Pushing on by forced marches, he
was within sixty miles of Dehli, when, on the morning of the
2nd of July, after a weary night-march, an express reached him
with the stirring news that an assault on Dehli had been
planned for the early dawn of the morrow, and that all were
anxious for his presence. After an hour or two of sleep, he
mounted again, and rode — or, as he said " scrambled " — en ;
getting what he could to carry him — now a fresh horse, now an
elephant, and again the coach-and-four of the Rajah of Jhfnd ;
and so, toiling all through the day and the night, he reached
Dehli by three o'clock on the morning of the 3rd. Weary and
worn out though he was, the prospect of the coming assault
braced him up for the work iu hand ; but he had made the
toilsome march for nothing. The projected attack was in
abeyance, if it had not wholly collapsed.
It was the old story : that fatal indecision, which had been
the bane of General Barnard, as leader of such an
Postponement of enterprise as this, had again, at the eleventh hour,
j^i a ' overthrown the bolder counsels which he had
been persuaded to adopt. All the expected re-
inforcements had arrived, and he was stronger than he had ever
been before.f The details of the assault had been arranged ;
the plans had been prepared ; the troops had been told off for
the attacking columns, though they had not yet been warned,
and the project was kept a secret in Camp — when information
reached him that the enemy were contemplating a grand
attack upon our position by the agency of the rebel regiments
recently arrived from Eohilkhand. The time of early morning
appointed for the assault — a little before daybreak — would have
* The latter was going to join his regiment in the Panjab. On the morning
of his arrival at Jhilam he was killed in an attack on the Native troops that
had broken into mutiny in that place.
f The reinforcements which had joined our Camp from the Panjab between
the 26th of June and 3rd of July were the Head-quarters of Her Majesty's
8th Foot, released by the defection of the Jalandhar Brigade, the Head-
quarters of Her Majesty's 61st Foot; the 1st Regiment of Panjab Infantry
(Coke s Rifles); a squadron of Panjab Cavalry ; with two guns of European
and two of Native Horse Artillery ; some European Reserve Artillery, and
some Sikh gunners. The want of artillerymen to work our guns had been
severely felt, and Sir John Lawrence had done his best to supply them from
all sources. The reinforcements detached ahove made up, according to
Norman, our effective force to six thousand six hundred men of all arms.
1857.] MOVEMENTS OF THE BARELI BRIGADE. 425
been propitious, for the hour before dawn was dark and cloudy,
and our troops could have advanced unseen to the City walls.
But now the opportunity was lost. The time was coming for
" the moon and day to meet," and so all hope of our creeping
up, unseen, beneath the shadow of the darkness, was passing
away. What Barnard and others called the " Gamester's
Throw," was not destined to be thrown by him.*
The threatened attack on our position, said to have been
fixed for the morning of the 3rd, was not then
developed into a fact ; but at night the Rohilkhand The b ™Jb
Brigade *'f — some four thousand or five thousand
strong, Horse, Foot, and Artillery — the Infantry in the scarlet
uniforms of their old masters — went out, under cover of the
darkness, and made their way towards Alipur, in rear of our
Camp, with some vague intention of cutting off our com-
munications by destroying a post we had established there,
and of intercepting some convoys on their way to or from the
Ridge. J A force under Major Coke, of the Panjab Irregular
Army, who had arrived in Camp on the last day of June, was
sent out to give battle to the mutineers. It was a compact,
well-appointed column of Cavalry and Infantry, with some
Horse Artillery guns ; and the leader was held in repute fur
* The causes of the abandonment of the enterprise were thus stated by-
Sir H. Barnard : " I had all prepared for the gamester's throw last night, when
the arrival of the reinforcements of Coke's gave me all the available means I
can expect. It was frustrated, first, by hearing that we were to be attacked
in great force this morning at dawn of day, when to a certainty our Camp
would be destroyed ; and, secondly, on account of serious disaffection in
(Charles) Nicholson's Regiment, all the Hindus of which I have disarmed —
and hung two of the Native officers. The 9th Irregulars evinced evident sign
of" shake,' and as they numbered some four hundred and fifty, it became a
serious question to leave all these natives in my Camp, when all my own
forces were employed elsewhere. Chamberlain admits that few men were
ever placed in a more painfully responsible position. If I lose this small
force, it will be felt all over the Panjab, and yet, if I do not take Dehli, the
result will be equally disastrous. It will be a good deed when done ! — and I
will take care and do it, with every chance in my favour, in good will." — Sir
Henry Barnard to Sir John Lawrence, July 3, 1857. 31S. Correspondence.
f The Rohilkhand, or Bare 1 1, Brigade marched in on the 1st and 2nd of
July. It consisted of the 18th, 28th, 29th, and 68th Infantry Regiments; the
8th Irregular Cavalry, No. 15 Horse Battery, and two 6-pounder post guns
from Shahjahanpur.
% The enemy expected to find a convoy of wounded men going from our
Camp to Ambalah, and another with treasure and ammunition coming from
Firuzpur. But he fortunately missed both of them.
426 FIEST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1857.
his achievements in border warfare. But the result was a
disappointment. The ground was marshy; the progress was
slow ; and we were too late to do the work. Soon after day-
break on the 4th, our column came in sight of the Sipahi Regi-
ments which were then returning from Alipur, and our guns
were brought into action. But Coke had not taken right
account of the distance ; our light field pieces made little ini-
pre^sion upon the enemy, and our Infantry had not come up in
time to take part in the engagement. The Sipahi General,
Bakht Khan, was, however, in no mood to come to closer quarters
with us, so he drew off his forces and set his face towards Dehli,
leaving behind him his baggage, consisting mainly of the
night's plunder — an ammunition waggon and some camel-
loads of small-arm cartridges. But they carried off all their
guns, and returned to garrison not much weaker than when
they started. " The distance we had come from Camp," wrote
General Eeed to Sir John Lawrence, ;' and the deep state of the
around, prevented our guns and cavalry from pursuing. In
fact, the horses were knocked up, and the guns could scarcely
be moved, while the enemy, being on higher ground, managed
to get away their guns.' 7 * But if we had gained no glory, the
enemy had added another to their long list of failures. They
had taken out some thousands of their best troops, and had only
burnt a village, plundered a small isolated British post, and
left the plunder behind them on the field. But, if our eyes had
not been opened before to the danger of some day having our
rearward communications with the Karnal and the Panjab — all
the upper country from which we drew our supplies and re-
inforcements — interrupted by a swarming enemy, who might
attack us at all points at the same time, so as to prevent us
from effectively protecting our rear, this expedition of the
Eohilkhand force dispersed all the films that still obscured our
vision. And our Engineer officers, therefore, were directed to
adopt every possible measure to render the establishment of the
* MS. Correspondence. — The author of the " History of the Siege of Dehli,"
who was obviously with Coke's force, adds : " Our men returned completely
exhausted by the heat. Indeed, many of the 61st sank down beneath trees,
and our elephants had to be sent from Camp to carry them in." — Hodson
says that " our loss was about thirty or forty Europeans, and three of my
Native officers temporarily disabled." Another writer (MS. Journal) says :
" Our loss was one Irregular, who came from the Panjab with Coke, and an
Artillery driver."
1857.] DEATH OF GENEEAL BARNARD. 427
enemy in our rear a feat of difficult, if not impossible accom-
plishment ; and the chief of these was the destruction of the
bridges across the Najafgarh Canal, except the one immediately
in our rear, which we could always command and protect.
Very soon Baird Smith and Barnard were in close con-
sultation. The General rejoiced greatly in the presence of his
new adviser, and gave him his unstinted confidence. The
arrival, indeed, of such a man as the accomplished Engineer,
who knew every nook and crevice in Dehli, and who, before he
had any expectation of being personally connected with the
siege, had devised a plan of attack, was great gain to the
besieging force; and Barnard, whose ignorance of Indian
warfare and mistrust of his own judgment drove him to seek
advice in all likeliest quarters, would gladly have leant most
trustingly on Smith. But it was not decreed that he should
trust in any one much longer. His life was now wearing to a
close.
On the second day after Baird Smith's arrival in Camp,
cholera fell heavily upon the General, and smote
him down with even more than its wonted sud- Gene^af Barnard
denness. General Eeed had seen Barnard in the
early morning, and observed nothing peculiar about him ;
but by ten o'clock on that Sunday morning a
whisper was running through the Camp that
the Commander of the Dehli Field Force was dying. He had
been missed from his accustomed place at church-service ;
and, before many hours had passed, his broken-hearted son,
who had ministered to him with all the tenderness of a woman,
was standing beside his lifeless body. " Tell them," said the
dying General, speaking of his family in England, almost
with his last breath — "tell them that I die happy." Next
day his remains were conveyed on a gun-carriage to their
last resting-place. " The only difference," wrote the Chaplain
who performed the burial-service, " between the General and
a private soldier consisted in the length of the mournful train,
which followed in solemn silence the mortal remains of the
brave warrior."
From his death-bed he had sent a message to Baird Smith,
saying that he trusted to him to give such an explanation of
the circumstances in which he was placed as would save his
reputation as a soldier. And, indeed, the same generosity of
feeling as he had evinced in all his endeavours to brighten th©
428 FIRST WEEKS OF THE SIEGE OF DEHLI. [1S57.
character of his dead friend Anson was now displayed by others
towards him ; for all men spoke and wrote gently and kindly
of Barnard, as of one against whom nothing was to be said
except that circumstances were averse to him. " I found him,"
wrote Baird Smith, " one of the most loveable men I had ever
met — rigidly conscientious in every duty, a perfect gentleman
in manner and feeling, a brave soldier, but unequal to the
present crisis from an apparent want of confidence in himself
and an inability to discriminate between the judgments of
others." — "In him," wrote General Eeed to Sir John Law-
rence, " the service has lost a most energetic and indefatigable
officer, and I fear his untimely end was in a great measure to be
attributed to his fearless exposure of himself, not only to the
fire of the enemy, but to the more deadly rays of the sun."—
"He was a high-minded, excellent officer," said Mr. Com-
missioner Greathed ; " and on European ground, in a European
war, would have done the State good service ; but he was too
suddenly thrust into the most difficult active service in India
that could be imagined, and found himself placed in command
of an Army which General Anson bad organised, and obliged
to carry out operations which he would not himself have under-
taken with the means at his command. With more knowledge
of the relative merits of his troops and of the enemy, he would,
I think, have achieved a great success." — " How he has carried
on so long," wrote Neville Chamberlain, " is wonderful. All
day in the sun, and the most part of the night either walking
up and down the main street of the camp or visiting the bat-
teries and posts. His constitution was such that he could not
command sleep at the moments when he might have rested, and
exhausted nature has given way. We all deeply lament his
loss, for a kinder or more noble-minded officer never lived."
I need add nothing to these tributes from the foremost officers
in the Camp. Only three months before Barnard had written
to Lord Canning, saying : " Cannot you find some tough job to
nut to me? I will serve you faithfully." * The "tough job"
had been found, and a single month of it had sufficed to lay him
in his grave. But he had redeemed his promise. He had served
the State faithfully to the last hour of his life.
* Ante, vol. i., page 413.
1857.] DEATH OF GENERAL BARNARD. 429
And here fitly closes the second part of this Story of the
Siege of Dehli. It is the story of a succession of profitless
episodes — desultory in narration as in fact; the story of a
month's fighting with no results but loss of life, waste of ma-
terial resources, and bitter disappointment in all the dwelling-
places of the English in India, as week after week passed away,
and every fresh report of the fall of Dehli was proved to be a
mockery and a lie.
430 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
CHAPTER Y.
PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE.
From the first hour of his appearance at Dehli, Baird Smith
had begun to examine thoroughly the means and
J ul y. resources at his disposal. He had no great ojDinion
Question of f the power of the place to stand a siege, if the
x a sVege. " besiegers had adequate material for its prosecu-
tion. But never was a besieging army in worse
plight for the conduct of great operations than the British
Army before Dehli. The Chief Engineer found that his siege
ordnance consisted of two 2-i-pounders, nine 18-pounders, six
8-inch mortars, and two or three 8-inch howitzers. The enemy
were much stronger in Artillery. They could bring to any
point open to attack from twenty-five to thirty guns, and ten
or twelve mortars — all as well served as our own. But there
was something even worse than this. If we had possessed more
guns we could not have used them, for there was a deplorable
want of ammunition. Baird Smith stood aghast at the dis-
covery that the shot in store for the heavy guns was scarcely
equal to the requirements of a day's siege, and there was no
immediate prospect of the receipt of further supplies ; whilst,
on the other hand, the enemy were furnished with the inex-
haustible resources of the great Dehli Magazine. It was plain,
therefore, that in this helpless state it would have been madness
to commence siege operations, which must have been speedily
abandoned from the exhaustion of our material supplies.
But the question still suggested itself: " Might not the place
be carried by assault? " It was easier to answer
Q !S£St.° f tnis in the affirmative. " Here," he argued, " the
relative forces are materially changed in value.
We have a highly disciplined body under a single head, com-
pleteby in hand, full of pluck, and anxious to attack, and with
1857.] GENERAL REED IN COMMAND. 431
almost -unlimited self-reliance. The enemy is without any
head, not in hand at all, so far broken in spirit that he has
never met us in battle — with any odds in his favour — without
being beaten. It is very true that his numbers much exceed
ours, and that in a town, in street-fighting, discipline is of less
value than in the open battle-field. It is true, also, that assaults
are proverbially precarious. Napoleon said of them, • a dog or
a goose may decide their issues.' The results of failure would
be as terrible and depressing as those of success would be
glorious and inspiriting.'* All these things he deliberately
considered ; but, weighing the chances on either side, he came
to the conclusion that " the probabilities of success were far
greater than those of failure, and the reasons justifying an
assault stronger than those which justified inaction." He
therefore urged upon the General, in an official letter, the
advantages of an assault by escalade, the gates which we
desired to force being blown in by powder-bags. " And," he
wrote, four months afterwards, "looking back now with the
full advantages of actual experience, and with, I believe, very
little disposition to maintain a foregone conclusion, because it
was foregone, I think at this moment, if we had assaulted any
time between the 4th and 14th of July, we should have carried
the place." j
When the Engineer's letter reached the Head- Quarters of the
Force, Sir Henry Barnard was dead, or dying. J
The command was then assumed by General Reed.
Since he had been in the Dehli Gamp, with no immediate
responsibility upon him, his health had improved ; and although
he still appeared to others, especially to men with the inex-
haustible energies of Baird Smith, a feeble invalid, he believed,
* MS. Correspondence of Colonel Baird Smith.
f Ibid.
X I have here again to notice the confusion of dates, of which I have
"ien in a former note. Baird Smith, in a letter before me, says, " My letter
recommending the measure went in on the 6th. I doubt if Sir Henry
Barnard ever saw it, as he died a day or two afterwards." But Mr. Greathed,
in a letter dated July 6, says that the remains of the General were buried at
ten o'clock on that day ; and Mr. Rotton {Chaplain's Narrative), who per-
formed the funeral service, says most distinctly that Barnard died at three
o'clock on Sunday afternoon, July 5. There is not the least doubt of the
fact. Baird Smith's letter, therefore, was not sent in until after Barnard's
death, unless he is wrong about the date of its despatch.
432 PEOGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
liimself to be equal to the work, and wrote that, " with the aid
of the Almighty, he trusted to carry it to a successful issue."
To this officer Baird Smith's plan of assault was submitted.
He did not immediately reject it. On the 9th, he wrote to Sir
John Lawrence, saying, " We still have the assault in contem-
plation, the details of which are not yet quite completed by the
Engineers' Department under Baird Smith." But the delay,
whether originating in the Engineers' Department, or in the
councils of the General, was fatal to the scheme ; and, as Baird
Smith afterwards Avrote, " the opportunity passed away, and
the question of assault or no assault finally resolved itself into
doing nothing by sheer force of circumstances." " Whatever
is," he added, "being best, I am content with things as they
are, and I am very far indeed from attaching the slightest
blame to those who differed from me on the question of assault-
ing. They, doubtless, examined the probabilities as conscien-
tiously as I did, but realised them differently, and came to a
contrary conclusion. The difficulties were great enough, and
the consequences grave enough, to require every man to form
and to hold his own opinion, and yet to promote toleration at
differences — at any rate, that was my view of the case, right or
wrong." And, truly, it was very right. For there is nothing,
perhaps, which calls for more toleration than the solution of
great military questions, when there are antagonistic arrays of
difficulties to be considered. It has been said of other places
than Dehli, which have stood protracted sieges, that they
might have been carried by assault within the first hour of
our appearance before them. It was said of Bharatpur ; it
was said of Sebastopol ; but neither Combermere nor Raglan
thought that it was his duty to risk the chance of a failure by
attempting it.
The circumstances, the force of which was said by the Chief
Engineer to have settled the momentous question
A juTy 9°. f °f assault or no assault, were these. "Whilst in
the English Camp our people were considering
the best means of attacking the enemy within the walls of
Dehli, the enemy were making renewed attacks on the British
Camp outside the walls; and every new attack reduced our
scanty numbers. On the 9th of July they came out in force
against us. Intelligence of their design reached General Reed
in the morning, and he was in some measure prepared for
them; but he scarcely expected a daring inroad of rebel
1857.] THE MOUND PICQUETS. 433
Cavalry into our Camp.* But about ten o'clock, t through a
mist of heavy rain, our English officers, on the "Mound" dis-
cerned their approach. Here, on a piece of elevated ground to
the right rear of our Camp, was planted a battery of three
heavy guns, with the usual Infantry Picquet. In addition to
this a Cavalry Picquet was thrown out, somewhat in advance
of the Mound ; and this now consisted of a party of Carabineers,
two Horse Artillery guns of Tombs's troop, and a detachment
of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, under a Native officer, which
occupied the extreme point in advance. J Perplexed by the
appearance of the familiar uniform of the Irregular Cavalry of
our own picquets, our people at first thought that they had
* " We had a sharp affair with the enemy yesterday. I had received a report
in 1he morning that they were coming out in force on the right, and Major
lieid applied for their usual reinforcement at Hindu Rao's house, which was
sent, and the rest of the troops held in readiness to turn out. About ten a.m. '
a party of insurgent Sawars made a most daring inroad to the rear of our
right by a road leading to the Grand Trunk. These men were dressed
exactly like the 9th Irregulars, which led to the supposition that part of that
i e^iment which was on picquet on that flank, had mutinied; but it turned
out that the greater part of them, at least, belonged to the 8th Irregulars from
Bareli. About a hundred men of their people actually swept through the
i ight of our camp, by the rear, by the bridge adjoining the burial-ground." —
General Reed to Sir John Lawrence, July 10, 1857. MS.
f It will have been seen that, in the preceding note, General Eeed says
that the enemy appeared about ton o'clock. Major Eeid says, " the action
commenced about seven o'clock." The latter may refer to the opening of the
enemy's guns. Major Tombs says that, to the best of his recollection, it was
about three p.m. when he first learnt that the troopers were entering our Camp.
Cotemporary accounts often differ greatly with respect to the time of day.
X " The Mound was about half-way between the Eidge and the Canal,
which protected the British rear. It was on the right rear flank of Camp,
and overlooked the Sabzimandi. Between the Mound and the Canal there
were several clumps of trees, and the Canal-bank being also fringed with
them, the view in that direction was confused and interrupted, and for this
reason a Cavalry picquet was thrown out on the Canal bank, somewhat in
advance of the Mound, from which, however, the videttes of the Cavalry
picquet were visible. . . . The guns and the Carabineers were not stationed
on the Mound, but at the foot of and on the right flank of it, so that facing to
their proper front — the Sabzimandi— the Mound was on their left hand and
the Canal on their right. The ground on the right of the picquet was some-
what elevated, and on this the tents of the men were pitched and the Cavalry
horses picqueted. The guns were, as it were, in a hollow, with the Mound
on their left and the elevated ground on the right. To their front was a
small breastwork, to which it was ordered that the guns should be run up
and fought behind in case of an attack, and until the picquet could be
rei nforced." — MS. Memorandum.
VOL. II. 2 F
434 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE [1857
been driven in by the advance of the enemy ; and so the guns,
which might have opened upon them, were pointed harmlessly
at the troopers.* But there was something much worse than
this. The mistake of the British Artillery was followed by the
disgrace of the British Cavalry. As the Irregulars of the 8th
from Dehli swept on, the detachment of Carabineers, which
formed a part of the picquet, turned and fled. Stillman, who
commanded them, remained alone at his post. The first error
was soon discovered. Hills, who was in charge of the artillery
— two horse-artillery guns — of the picquet, saw presently that
it was a hostile attack, and ordered out his guns for action.
But the enemy were upon him ; he had not time to open fire.
In this emergency the dashing Artillery subaltern — a man of
light weight and short stature, young in years, but with the
coolness of a veteran and the courage of a giant — set spurs to
his horse and rushed into the midst of the advancing troopers,
cutting right and left at them with good effect, until two of
them charged him at the same time, and by the shock of the
collision, both horse and rider were thrown violently to the
ground. Regaining his feet after his assailants had passed on,
he recovered his sword in time to renew the combat with three
Sawars, two mounted and one on foot. The two first he cut
down,j and then engaged the third, a young, active swordsman
* The actual assailants were troopers of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, who
had mutinied at Bare'li ; but it was more than suspected that the men of the
9th were cognisant of and favoured the attack. It has been seen (Xote, ante,
page 425) that General Barnard had been very doubtful of their fidelity.
There had been many desertions from their ranks, but no signs of open
mutiny. It may be stated here that after this affair of the 9th of July, the
regiment was quietly moved out of Camp, apparently on duty. "On the
11th of July the Head-Quarters of the Regiment proceeded to Alipur, for the
purpose of keeping open the communication with the rear. Large detach-
ments were sent into the divisions of Saharanpur, Sdnpat, and Panipat. On
the 21st of July, in consequence of a large desertion from the Sdnpat detach-
ment, it was deemed advisable to march the regiment back towards the
Panjab." — Parliamentary Return of Regiments that have mutinied, A wing
of the 9th Irregular had accompanied the first siege-train to Dehli (ante,
page 141), and the other (Head-Quarters) wing had joined our Camp on the
2nd of July. x
f "The first I wounded and dropped him from his horse; the second
charged me with a lance. I put it aside, and caught him an awful gash on
the head and face. I thought I had killed him ; apparently he must have
clung to his horse, for he disappeared. The wounded man then came up, but
got his skull split." — Hills' Narrative.
1857.] HILLS AND TOMBS. 435
of good courage, who came fresh to the encounter, whilst Hills,
scant of breath and shaken by his fall, had lost all his first
strength, but none of his first courage. The heavy cloak, too,
which he wore, as a protection against the rain, dragged at his
throat, and Avell-nigh choked hirn. The chances were now
fearfully against him. Twice he fired, but his pistol snapped,
and then he cut at his opponent's shoulder. The blow did not
take effect ; and the trooper, watching his opportunity, clutched
at the English subaltern's sword and wrested it from him. Hills
then closed with his enemy, grappled him so that he could not
strike out with his sabre, and smote him with clenched fist again
and again on the face, until the Englishman slipped and fell to
the ground.
The " Mound " was a favourite place ot gathering in Camp.
It commonly happened that many of our officers were to be seen
there, watching the progress of events below, or discussing the
operations of the siege. But the heavy rain of the 9 th of July
had driven our people to the shelter of their tents. Among
others, Major Tombs was in the Artillery mess-tent — one of the
cheeriest places in Camp — when a trooper of the 9th Irregular
Cavalry, in a state of high excitement, rode up and asked the
way to the General's quarters. In reply to a question from
Tombs, he said that the enemy were showing in front of our
picquets; but the man's words seemed but scantly to express
all that was in him, so Tombs hurried to his own tent, took his
sword and revolver, and ordering his horse to be brought after
him, walked down to the Mound Picquets. As he approached
the post, he saw the Carabineers drawn up in mounted array,
and our guns getting ready for action. In a minute there was
a tremendous rush of Irregular Horse, the troopers brandishing
their swords and vociferating lustily; and then there was to be
seen the sad spectacle of our Dragoons broken and flying to the
rear, whilst one of our guns went rightabout, some of the
horses mounted and some riderless, and galloped towards our
Camp. Tombs was now in the midst of the enemy, who were
striking at him from all sides, but with no effect. A man of a
noble presence, tall, strong, of robust frame and handsome
countenance, dark-haired, dark-bearded, and of swart com-
plexion, he was, in all outward semblance, the model of a
Faringhi warrior; and the heroic aspect truly expressed the
heroic qualities of the man. There was no finer soldier in the
Camp. Threading his way adroitly through the black horse-
2 f 2
436 PROGKESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
men, he ascended the Mound, and looking down into the hollow,
where his two guns had been posted, he saw the remaining one
overturned, the horses on the ground, struggling in their
harness or dead, with some slain or wounded gunners beside
them. Near the guns he saw the prostrate body of Hills,
apparently entangled in his cloak, with a dismounted Sawar
standing over him with drawn sword, about to administer the
death-stroke. At this time Tombs was some thirty paces from
his friend. He could not hope to reach the enemy in time to
•cut him down with the sabre, so resting his revolver on his left
arm, he took steady aim at the trooper, who was turned full-
breasted towards him, and shot him through the body. The
blood oozed out through the white tunic of the wounded rebel,
and, for a while at least, Hills was saved.
But the danger was not yet passed. Tombs helped his fallen
subaltern to rise, and together they ascended the slope of the
Mound. As they were watching the movements of the enemy,
they saw a little way beneath them another dismounted Sawar,
who was walking away with Hills' revolver in his hand. They
made at once towards him. He was a young, strong, active
trooper, who turned and attacked them with his sword, as one
well skilled in the use of the weapon. His first blow aimed at
Hills was parried. Then he struck at Tombs, who with like
address guarded the cut. But the third blow, struck with
despairing energy, as he sprung upon the younger of his
opponents, broke down Hills' guard, and clove the skull to the
brain. In a moment he had turned upon Tombs, who coolly
parried the blow and drove his sword right through the
trooper's body.*
* This narrative differs from some of the published versions of this incident,
and, in one respect at least, from the account (quoted above) written by
Hills himself, and printed at the time in the English journals. Hills says
that the Sawar with wh^m he and Tombs had the second encounter was the
very man who had attacked him in the first instance, and from whom his
/riend had saved him " When we got down," he says, •' I saw the very man
Tombs had saved me from moving off with my pistol (he had only been
wounded, and shammed dead). I told Tombs, and we went at him." But it
is the assured belief of Tombs, who saw the first trooper fall, and the blood
streaming from the man's chest over his white tunic, that their second
antagonist was " another dismounted Sawar." Ceteris paribus, there would
seem to be more reason to accept Tombs's version than that of his subaltern,
as the circumstances of the former were more favourable to cool and accurate
observation. And I would rather believe this version, as the one that best
1857.] KENNY AND FAGAN. 437
Meanwhile, the Sawars, flushed with their first success, were
sweeping onwards through our picquets, to the main street of
our Camp. What could account for the rout of the Carabineers
— what could explain the flight of the Horse Artillery ? * The
utmost confusion prevailed. Our people turned out in excited
haste, not knowing what it all portended. The road which the
rebel- troopers had taken led to the Artillery Lines. There was
a Native troop of Horse Artillery there under Major Renny ;
and the Sawars called upon them to fraternise with their party,
and to march back with them to Dehli. The loyal Natives
sternly replied that they obeyed only their own officers. Near
them was Henry Olpherts's European troop, unlimbered and
ready for immediate action. The black troop was between
them and the enemy ; but the Native gunners called upon the
white troopers to fire through their bodies. There was no need
for this. The whole Camp was now astir. For a little while
the Sawars had profited by the uncertainty and perplexity in
our Camp. But their triumph was soon turned to defeat, and
they fled back to Dehli, leaving many of these audacious rebels
behind them, including the originator of the perilous exploit, j
illustrates the splendour of the achievement. If the same Sawar were the
hero of both combats, he assuredly well earned by that morning's fighting
the Bahadur-Shah Cross for personal bravery. I should not omit to add that
it has been recorded that " Tombs's account of the affair of the 9th, when the
enemy's Horse rode through our Camp, was torn up by Colonel Mackenzie.
He had omitted to say a word about himself, so Mackenzie gave the General
the true version." — Greathed's Letters. Both Tombs and Hills were de-
servedly rewarded with the Victoria Cross.
* It seems to have been a question among earlier writers whether the
artillery or picquet duty did run away ; but there can be no doubt of the
fact. In a letter written from Camp on the same day, an artillery officer,
describing what he saw, says : " A gun of the Horse Artillery, that had been
on picquet on our right, had just retreated into Camp, into our main street,
close to my tent." The statement of Major (Sir Henry) Tombs, as embodied
in the text, is quite conclusive on the subject. With respect to the flight of
the Carabineers, General Heed writes: '' In the confusion, I am sorry to say a
detachment of the Carabineers, who were escorting the guns, gave way, in
spite of the endeavours of their officers to stop them. These men I propose
to dismount as a disgrace to them. It would appear that they are composed
mostly of recruits, and, being mounted on half-broken horses, do not know
how to manage them." — MS. Correspondence.
f " They were at first supposed to be the 9th, but, being discovered, were
charged by Brigadier Grant with hid Lancers, and Captain Hodson with the
Guides, who drove them out of Cantonments." — General Reed to Sir John
Laivrence. MS. Correspondence. This, however, as regards Hodson's part
438 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857
That so many of them escaped unscathed, returning by the
way they had come, is not to be accounted for, except on the
ground of surprise and confusion. Acts of individual gallantry
are recorded — none more lustrous than those scored up to the
honour of the brave artillerymen, Kenny and Fagan.* But
some dark clouds overshadowed the scene. It is related that
in the absence of tangible enemies, some of our soldiery, who
turned out on this occasion, butchered a number of unoffend-
ing camp-followers, servants, and others, who were huddling
together, in vague alarm, near the Christian churchyard. No
loyalty, no fidelity, no patient good service, on the part of
these poor people, could extinguish for a moment the fierce
hatred which possessed our white soldiers against all who wore
the dusky livery of the East.
This bold incursion of the Irregulars into our Camp did not
supply all the day's fighting. All through the
4abz7mandi e morning a brisk cannonade had been maintained
by the enemy, and answered by our guns on the
Eight. It was soon apparent, however, that the rebel musket-
eers were as active as their gunners. A body of Sipahis had
posted themselves in the suburb of the Sabzimandi, where,
screened and aided by houses and walled gardens, and other
enclosures, they kept up a galling fire on our picquets. This
could not be endured ; so a column was formed to attack and
dislodge them. It consisted of the Head-Quarters and two
companies of the 60th Eifles, detachments of the 8th and 61st
Foot, and the 4th Sikh Infantry, with the six guns of Major
Scott's battery; whilst Major Eeid was instructed to co-operate
with them with such men as could be spared from the Main
Picquet. Commanded by General Chamberlain, our column
swept through the Sabzimandi, and was soon in close conflict
with the insurgents. Posted as they were, and often firing
down upon us from some elevated structure, it was not easy to
in the expulsion of the enemy, is erroneous. Hodson started in pursuit with
the Guides, mistook the enemy for our own people, and. rode some three
miles parallel to them, until they suddenly crossed a bridge and "galloped
off to Dehli." — See GreatliecVs and Hodson s Letters.
* Renny is said to have shot several of the rebel troopers with his revolver.
Fagan rushed out of his tent with only a pen in his hand, got together a few
men, killed fifteen of the enemy, and returned with a sword and Minie rifle,
of which he had " eased " a Raealdar of the Irregulars. — Norman's Narrative.
— Greathed's Letters. — History of the Siege of Dthli.
1857.] ATTACK ON THE MAIN PICQUET. 439
dislodge them. The fighting was of the kind most distasteful
and most destructive to our British soldiery. But their stubborn
courage prevailed at last. The work was done thoroughly ; *
but such thorough work always was done by us, at heavy cost
to our ever-decreasing force. We could ill spare at that time a
single fighting man; but the cotemporary historians relate
that more than two hundred of our people were killed or disabled
on the 9th of July.f And so the chances of a successful assault
upon the city began to dwindle into a certainty of failure ; and
those who had urged it with the greatest confidence, now had
their misgivings.^ It is true that the carnage among the enemy
had been far greater than in our ranks; but they had never
been numerically stronger than at that time, and the heaps of
dead which they left behind them diminished but little the
vital resources of that enormous garrison.
And, a few days afterwards, this question of assault, as Baird
Smith wrote, had finally "resolved itself into
nothing by sheer force of circumstances ;" for j2y i 4 ° f
there was another hard fight, and another long
list of casualties. On the 14th the enemy again came out in
force to the attack of our position on the Eight. It was said
that they had vowed to carry our batteries, and destroy that
formidable picquet at Hindu Bao's house, which had sent the
message of death to so many of their comrades. Becher's spies
had gained intelligence of the movement, and Eeid had been
warned of the coming onslaught. He was quite ready for them,
and said, laughingly, that they had attacked him and been
beaten nineteen times, and that he did not expect to be worsted
on the twentieth. The attack commenced about eight o'clock
in the morning. For some time our people stood on the defensive,
keeping the mutineers at bay. Both forces were under cover,
and little execution was done. But when the sun was going
* " Eventually everything was effected that was desired, our success being
-"•reatly aided by the admirable and steady practice of Major Scott's battery
under a heavy fire — eleven men being put ' hors de combat ' out of its small
complement." — Norman.
f The. number stated is two hundred and twenty-three, including one
officer killed and eight wounded. The officer killed was Captain Mount-
steven, of the 8th. There was heavy carnage in the enemy's ranks.
X See letters of Harvey Greathed. Writing on the 10th, he says: "It
may now be prudent to defer the attack for a short time, for at this moment
they (the enemy) may be considered in the plentitude of their force," &c. &c.
440 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
down. Neville Chamberlain saw that the time had come to
resort to other measures. So despatching a letter to Eeid,
desiring him to be prepared to attack the enemy, and act in
concert with him, he sent Showers with another column, con-
sisting of detachments of the 1st European, the 75th Queen's,
Coke's Bines, and Hodson's Horse, with six Horse Artillery
guns under Turner and Money, to take them in flank. The
walled gardens, and other places of shelter, in which the
mutineers had posted themselves, were now to be cleared ; and
it was a fine thing to see our columns sweeping down upon the
enemy, Reid's little Gurkhas setting up a ringing cheer, and
every man panting eagerly for the affray. Then two of our
great Panjabi warriors were to be seen ever in the thickest of
the fight. Where danger threatened most, Chamberlain and
Hodson were sure to be seen. The enemy were driven from
point to point, in confused flight, clean out of their sheltering
walls ; and the more impetuous of their assailants pushed on
after them along the main road, within the fire from the walls
of Dehli. There was it that Chamberlain, fearlessly exposing
himself, according to his wont, well-nigh met his death- wound.
A party of the enemy, covered by a low wall, had made a standi
and were pouring in a destructive fire upon our advancing
soldiery, which made them for a moment recoil, when the
Adjutant-General, setting spurs to his horse, called upon the
men to follow him, and cleared the enclosure. He was gallantly
supported ; but a musket-ball took effect upon him, and broke
his left arm below the shoulder.* Our people were then so
near the city walls that the pursuit became disastrous. For
the enemy gathered fresh courage, and rallied before their
defences, whilst the hot haste with which we had pushed on
to chastise the mutineers was throwing confusion into our
ranks. The management of the pursuing force was not equal
to the gallantry of the pursuit. At one point we had driven
the mutineers from their guns, but we were not prepared to
take advantage of their desertion. Hodson's quick eye marked
* It was thought at first to he a gun-shot wound. A contemporary lette?
says : " Chamberlain was brought in with a sorely shattered arm. His im-
pression was that he bad been struck by grape, which was being showered on
them from the city walls. He bore his wound and his pain nobly, with a
hio-h clu erful courage, but getting out of the narrow dooley was too much for
him, and as he leant on two or three people he stumbled forward and fell,
almost on the shattered limb."
1857.] CHAMBERLAIN AND HODSON. 441
the opportunity, and he was eager to charge the battery. But
the men, upon whom he called to aid him, were exhausted, and
at the moment there was no response. It is always, in such
straits, a question of moments. Seeing that there was hesita-
tion, a Sipahi gunner applied the port-fire to a piece loaded
with grape ; and before the smoke had cleared away the guns
had been limbered up, and the opportunity was lost for ever.
Again the old story was repeated. We had gained a profit-
less, perhaps, indeed, a dubious, victory, at a loss of two hundred
men killed or disabled.* The finest soldier in the Camp, fore-
most in reputation, foremost ever in action, and all but first in
official position, had been carried maimed and helpless to his
tent. It was a sorry day's work that sent Neville Chamberlain,
Adjutant-General of the Army, to the Sick List. It was a
sorry week's work that had deprived our little force of the
services of twenty-five officers and four hundred men. It had
quite settled the question of the assault. With these diminished
numbers, how could a sufficient force be left for the protection
of our Camp? Even the most eager spirits now felt that it
must be a hopeless effort. *" There will be no assault on Dehli
yet," wrote Hodson on the 16th; "our rulers
will now less than ever decide on a bold course, u y 16 '
and, truth to tell, the numbers of the enemy have so rapidly
increased, and ours have been so little replenished in pro-
portion, and our losses for a small army have been so severe
that it becomes a question whether now we have numbers
sufficient to risk an assault. Would to Heaven it had been
tried when I first pressed it ! "
On the 17th of July General Eeed resigned the command oi
the Dehli Field Force. During his brief season
of responsibility his health had broken down Juiyi7.
under the exertions and anxieties of his position, Gen?t°f iiee?
and it was useless any longer to struggle against
his daily-increasing infirmities. So he made over the com-
mand of the Force to Brigadier Archdale Wilson, and betook
himself to the quietude of the Himalayas, j The selection of
* The author of the "History of the Siege of Dehli" says: "Seventeen
men killed, and sixteen officers and a hundred and seventy-seven men
wounded."
f Hodson says that Wilson succeeded by virtue of seniority. The author
of the " History of the Siege of Dehli" says, " he was not the senior General
442 PKOGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
an officer who had done so well in the actions on the Hindan
was the source of general satisfaction in the Camp.* There
were few who did not see in the change good promise of in-
creased energy and activity in the prosecution of the siege.
But, in truth, we had reached a period of its history at which
energy and activity could be displayed only in acts of defensive
warfare.
It is certain that when Brigadier-General Wilson took com-
mand of the Dehli Field Force, the circumstances
Brigadier which he was called upon to confront were of a
command. most discouraging character. Two Commanders
had been struck down by Death, and a third had
been driven from Camp by its approaches. The chiefs of the
Staff — the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General — lay
wounded in their tents. For more than five weeks the British
troops before Dehli had been standing upon the defensive.
Time after time, assaults upon the City had been projected, and
had been deferred ; and at last the bold experiment had been
finally abandoned. During those rive weeks the enemy had
attacked us a score of times, and it had long been acknowledged
that the British were the Besieged, not the Besiegers. It was
impossible that all this should not have had its effect upon the
discipline of the Dehli Field Force. It must be an eternal
honour to that force, that the deteriorating effects of such a
state of things were so slight ; but, nevertheless, they were
clearly discernible. The strength of the rebel garrison had
been continually increasing ; and though their loss was even
heavier than our own, our numbers were so inferior, that in
proportion to them our sufferings were greater. It was hard to
say how much longer the endurance of our people would be
proof against a constant succession of vexations attacks on the
part of the enemy, and profitless victories on our own. Our
troops had grown weary of beating the enemy, without appa-
i\\ Camp." The senior officer in Camp, according to substantive rank, was
Colonel Congreve, of H.M.'s 29th, Quartermaster-General of Queen's troops.
It is stated that he sent in a protest against his supersession and retired to
Simlah. General Keed had anticipated the difficulty on the score of rank by
making Wilson a Brigadier-General — an appointment afterwards confirmed
by Government.
* See Greathed's Letters and the " History of the Siege of Dehli.'
1857.] GENERAL WILSON IN COMMAND. 443
rently weakening their resources, or diminishing their con-
fidence, or lengthening the intervals between their attacks. It
is not strange, therefore, that in the middle of this month of
July the British Chief looked the difficulties of our position
very gravely in the face, and that there were some doubts as to
whether we could hold our own much longer with such fearful
odds against us. But no such doubts ought to have been
entertained for a moment. Our troops had been much harassed ;
they were diminished in numbers ; they had seen a constant
succession of stubborn encounters, which had conduced nothing
to the final issue ; and they were growing very weary of a state
of things of which they could not see the end. But, if they had
lost some of their discipline, they had lost none of their heart.
They were impatient, but not desponding. They were equal
to any demands that could have been made upon them, and
would have resented the idea of a retreat.
But ever since the commencement of the month the thought
of a retrograde movement had been fixing itself
in the minds even of men who had been at one retirement*
time eager for the bolder course, which had been
described as the " Gamester's Throw." Before the death of
General Barnard, Hervey Greathed — though he had thrown in
the weight of his authority as Chief Civil Officer at Dehli, into
the scales on the side of vigorous action — had begun to discern
the fact that there might be some advantages to the country
generally in liberating the troops now pent up before the walls
of the great city, and wasting their energies in the strenuous
idleness of a disastrous defence.* They were much needed at
other points where our people were girt around with danger,
and a great moral effect might be produced by a succession of
victories, such as the Dehli Field Force, under happier cir-
cumstances, might calculate on achieving. The time for
assaulting had passed. Neville Chamberlain and Baird Smith,
Avho were both by official position and native worth the moving
principles of the besieging force, had given up all hope of
succeeding in such an enterprise. Chamberlain, indeed, had
* " The determination to take Dthli by assault has been twice on the eve
of execution, and I no longer feel confident that it will again be so far
matured. And supposing I am right, the question will arise whether we
.viiould maintain our position, or raise the siege, and dispose our forces as mav
best serve the public interests, until a second campaign be opened.''—
Greathed to Laurence, July 4, MS. Correspondence.
444. PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
begun to apprehend that, in their existing state of discipline,
it might be hazardous in the extreme to entangle them in the
streets of Dehli. There was nothing left for us, therefore, but
to hold on until the arrival of reinforcements ; and the question
had arisen and had been freely discussed at Head-Quarters,
whether, until we could appear before Dehli in greater strength,
it would not, both on military and political grounds, be a wiser
course to relax our hold, and employ our eager troops in other
parts of the country. When Wilson assumed command, he
found matters in this state. He did not originate the question
of withdrawal.
What might have been his resolution, if left to his own
unaided counsels, History can never declare. But
B^5tfSmi°h ^ ne ea & er protests of Baird Smith soon swept
away any doubts that the General might have
entertained.* As soon as the Chief Engineer learnt that the
proposal was likely to be laid before him, he resolved to anti-
cipate the formal reference. On the first occasion of Wilson
consulting him professionally, he threw all the earnestness of
his nature into a great remonstrance against the project of
withdrawal. He told the General that to raise the siege would
be fatal to our national interests. " It is our duty," he said,
" to retain the grip which we now have upon Dehli, and to
hold on like grim Death until the place is our own." He
dwelt upon the many circumstances in our favour. Our com-
munications with the Panjab were open. There was still there
a considerable amount of available strength, which the in-
creasing security of that great province would soon place at the
disposal of the Dehli leader. The army was in good health,
and it was well supplied. It was true that little had been
* It was on the 17th of July, the first day ot Wilson's command, that Baird
Smith pressed upon him the duty of not relaxing his hold on Dehli. On the
18th the Brigadier-General wrote to Sir John Lawrence urging him to send
reinforcements immediately. The letter was in French, and it contained
these words : " Je retiendrai cette position jusqu' a la fin. Car il est de 3a
plus grande importance que l'ennemi soit empeche de quitter Dehli pour ra-
va°"er le pays. Pour fairececi il est absolument ne'cessaire queje sois renforce
de la plus "grande force et aussi vite qu'il est possible. J'entends que ce
renforcement ne peut venir du sud, et en consequence je prie que vous
m'enverrez du Panjab un Keginn nt Anglais complet et deux de Sikhs ou
Panjabis. Si je ne suis pas bien vite renforce' je serai force de retirer a Karnal.
Les conse'quences de ce mouvement seraient de'sastreuses.'' — MS. Corres.
1857.] WILSON AND BAIRD SMITH. 445
done to strengthen the position of our besieging army, or to
bring our guns to bear with more fatal effect upon the enemy's
works. But he pledged himself to do what as yet had been
undone. And then he urged the General to consider what
would be the result of the withdrawal of the Force. " All
India," he said, " would at once believe that we retreated
because we were beaten, and in such circumstances an adverse
impression of this kind was as disastrous as the severest defeat
we could sustain. We must abandon, in such a case, our com-
munications with the Panjab, and cease to act as a covering
force to that province, from which all the reinforcements we
could hope for must be drawn ; we must again fight our way to
Dehli against reinvigorated enemies, increased in numbers and
spirits, and we must cease to perform the incalculably im-
portant function of check-mating the entire strength of the
revolt, by drawing towards Dehli, as a great focus, all the
mutinous regiments of all arms, and so preventing them from
dispersing themselves over the country, and attacking and
overpowering our defenceless posts." These arguments pre-
vailed. Wilson listened, and was convinced. He thanked
Baird Smith for his frank statement of his views, said that he
would hold on, and then called upon him, as Chief Engineer, to
state what could be done to maintain our position before Dehli
with the least possible loss, until such time as the Dehli Field
Force could be so strengthened as to render the final assault
upon Dehli secure in its results. Then Baird Smith stated
what Wilson, as an experienced Artilleryman, had long felt,
that our great want was a want of far-reaching guns, that we
had been always beaten by the heavy metal and wide range of
the enemy's Artillery; but that as soon as we could bring
down a siege-train of sufficient magnitude and sufficient weight
to silence the guns on the walls of Dehli, success would be
certain. To all of this Wilson readily assented. He asked for
a statement of the strength of ordnance which would be
required for siege operations, which in due course was given ;
and at the same time the Chief Engineer undertook to have the
work of his own department in a sufficient state of forwardness
to give every possible advantage to the operations of the
Artillery. " And from that time forward," said Baird Smith, in
a letter written at a later period, " we were guided by these
plans, and prepared busity for the resumption of active work
on the arrival of the siege-train."
446 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
The first week of Wilson's command was enlivened by two
more attempts on the part of the enemy to drive
Further us from our advanced position ; firstly, on the
our position. Eight, and then on the Left. Our scouts in the
city had obtained intelligence that the^ enemy
purposed to proceed in force to the neighbourhood of Alipur,*
in our rear, to intercept an expected convoy on its way to our
camp, and when they had thus drawn out a considerable part
of our strength, to make a vehement attack upon our right.
The movement to Alipur was never made, but, on
uyl8 ' the 18th of July, the enemy again betook them-
selves to the old work of harassing us from the shelter of the
suburbs; so a detachment of Infantry and Artillery was sent
out, under Colonel Jones of the 60th Eifles, with the old result.
What had come to be called "rat-hunting" went on for a while,
and a number of British officers and men fell beneath the fire of
the enemy. f But there was this time no attempt of pursuit.
Colonel Jones, having driven the mutineers from their shelter,
withdrew his own men carefully and skilfully, covering their
retirement with his guns. It was the last of our many conflicts
in the Sabzimandi suburb. Our Engineer officers were already
at work clearing away the cover — the garden- walls, the ruined
houses, and the old serais, of which the enemy had made such
good use from the commencement of the siege, and were con-
necting our advanced posts in that direction with the Main
Picquet on the Kidge.
Perhaps it was in despair of making any impression upon our
Eight, that a few days afterwards, July 23rd, the
u y 2c enemy in considerable force streamed out of the
Kashmir Gate, and endeavoured to establish themselves at
Ludlow Castle, whence they opened a fire both on the Metcalfe
Picquet and the Eidge. A column of British and Sikh Infantry,
with guns from Turner's and Money's troops, was, therefore,
sent out, under Brigadier Showers, to dislodge them. The
work was soon accomplished. The enemy were in retreat to
the city walls, but again the fatal inclination to press on in
pursuit was irresistible, and our column was drawn on towards
* Reinforcements had entered Dehli — mutineeers from Jhansi, who,
according to custom, were to try their luck on first arrival against the
Faringhis.
t Our loss was one officer and twelve men killed, and three officers (one
mortally) and sixty-six men wounded.
1857.] EESOLUTION OF GENERAL WILSON. 447
the city walls, and many of our best officers were carried
wounded to the rear. Colonel Seaton, who had been appointed
to officiate as Adjutant-General, was shot through the body.
Turner and Money of the Artillery, and others were wounded ;*
and Captain Law, who was serving with Coke's Eifles, was
killed. The loss of the enemy was not heavy, and they carried
off all their guns. After this, orders went forth prohibiting
the forward movements, which had always been attended with
so much disaster. Our main losses had commonly been incurred
after we had driven back the enemy towards the walls of their
stronghold. This system of warfare had been too long per-
mitted. Had the enemy's numbers been more limited, it would
have been less necessary to restrain the natural impetuosity of
our people to push on and to punish in pursuit ; but scarcely
any amount of carnage that we could inflict upon the mutineers
was any substantive gain to ourselves.
And so the month of July came to an end and left Wilson in
good spirits ; for Sir John Lawrence, never slackening in his
great work, had responded to the General's appeal by fresh
promises of help, and he had cast away all thought of raising
the siege. Writing on the 30th of July to Mr. Colvin, who had
earnestly protested against the thought of withdrawing from
Dehli, he said : " It is my firm determination to hold my
present position and to resist every attack to the last. The
enemy are very numerous, and may possibly break through
our intrenchments and overwhelm us. But this force will die
at its post. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method,
and we hear dissensions are breaking out among them. Ee-
inforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold
on till they arrive, we shall be secure. I am making every
possible arrangement to secure the safe defence of our position."
And here I may fitly pause in this recital of military events
— of engagement after engagement with the
enemy, following each other in quick succession, herdsm? d
all of the same type and all leading to the same
results. The true story of the siege of Dehli is not to be found
* Mr. Cave-Browne says that Brigadier Showers was wounded, and com-
pelled to give over the command to Colonel Jones. His name is not in the
list given by Norman, and, therefore, it would seem that it was not officially
returned. The wound must have been a very slight one, if any, for Showers
was in action again on the 1 2th of August
448 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. 1857.
in the bare record of these exploits. Many as were those
gallant soldiers, whose active heroism it has been my privi-
lege to illustrate in these pages, there were many more
in the British Camp whose names have been unwritten, but
whose gallantry, in doing and in suffering, was not less con-
spicuous. It was the fortune of some to be continually called
to the front, to be specially thanked by commanding officers
and named in official despatches, whilst others, day after day,
week after week, month after month, laboured on, exposed to
the fire of the enemy and to all the evil influences of camp-life
in the worst season of the year, without praise, without en-
couragement, almost without notice. A signal instance of
this presents itself in the circumstances of the two branches of
the Artillery. The Light Batteries were always to the front,
and the names of Scott, Turner, Money, Tombs, and others of
the Horse Artillery or Horse Batteries have repeatedly claimed
admiring recognition ; but of the Heavy Batteries, which, in
their own way, were equally well served, scant mention has
yet been made in this narrative of the siege.* The time for
breaching operations had not yet come, and it was a dull and
weary season for the Siege Artillery thus expending themselves
in defensive efforts, outmatched in numbers, outmatched in
* The principal officers with the siege batteries were Colonel Garbett,
Major James Brind, Major Murray Mackenzie, and Major Kaye. The last-
named had come down to Dehli with the first siege-train. Major Brind
joined soon afterwards, and took a leading part in the siege operations up to
the hour of final success. Colonel Garbett, who arrived at a later period,
was appointed Brigadier of Artillery, on Wilson's nomination to the chief
•command ; but he was wounded on his way from one battery to another, and
though the wound was little more than a graze, of which he took no notice
at first, it became afterwards a most virulent sore, which compelled him to
take to his bed, and subsequently to leave the camp. He ultimately died of
fever. Major Mackenzie was struck by the splinter of a shell on the 30th of
June, and though in this case, also, the wound did not appear to be a severe
one, he was driven also to Simian, where he died. [Mackenzie and Kaye
had served together with the Native troop of Horse Artillery which attended
the Hindu Kush, and was engaged in the battle of Bamian]. Major Gaiskill,
who joined at a latter period of the siege, succeeded Colonel Garbett in
command of the Artillery. Among the younger officers distinguished during
the siege were Captain Johnson, Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery,
who came down with Wilson from Miruth, and as chief staff-officer did ex-
cellent service, and Lieutenant Light, an active and energetic officer, always
eager to go to the front, who was incapacitated by sickness about the middle
of July, and unable to return to his duties. Griffith, Commissary of Ordnance,
was driven from camp by cholera, and was succeeded by Captain Young.
1857.] SIEGE INCIDENTS. 449
weight of metal, outmatched in profuseness of ammunition.
There was a scarcity of officers for duty in the batteries ;
there was a scarcity of gunners. Both had to be improvised
and supplemented as best we could, so that men found them-
selves working at the guns who, a little while before, did not
know a portfire from a sponge-staff. Stray Lancers, for whom
there was not much cavalry-work in camp, were caught up and
set to learn the gun-drill, and right good gunners they often
made ; whilst old Sikhs, who had learnt artillery practice under
Ranjit Singh's French officers, and had served the guns of the
Khalsa at Sobraon and Chilian wala, were recruited by John
Lawrence, who never missed a chance of aiding the Dehli
warriors, and sent down to man Wilson's batteries. But the
time was now approaching when the real business of the Siege
would commence in earnest, and the officers of the heavy
batteries would contribute their share of good work towards
the capture of the great city.
Over and above the excitement o f the frequent actions with
the enemy, which always added the names of
many brave men to the list of killed aud wounded, ^slege?*
there were sometimes lesser sensations to stir the
heart of the Camp. On one occasion, an officer of good repute,
whilst reconnoitring as a field-engineer, failed to give the
parole with sufficient promptitude when challenged by one of
our sentries, and was shot dead in the darkness of the night.*
It often happened that officers on the look-out from exposed
positions, or passing from post to post, or showing their heads
above the breastworks of our batteries, became special marks
for the rebel artillery-men, and narrowly escaped, if at all,
with their lives. f Among the current Camp jokes was one to
the effect that a soldier had made it a matter of complaint that,
* Captain Greensill, Her Majesty's 24th Regiment.
f See following account of the bursting of a shell, which nearly deprived
the Force of one of the best officers in it— Major Scott of the Artillery : " Major
Scott had a very narrow escape from a shell yesterday ; he was standing by
his horse on the Ridge, looking through his glass, when a shell fell close by
him and burst as it touched the ground. I saw his horse running off, and
saw him on the ground, but he got up and walked on, and I saw him riding
by just now, so I suppose he is not hurt. I was on the ' General's Mound'
at the time, and the explosion drew my attention, and we heard afterwards
who it was, and that a man of the Fusiliers had been wounded by a piece of
the shell."— Letters of Eervey Greathed.
VOL. II. 2 G
450 PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
since the Engineers had built up the parapets so high, a fellow
at work in the batteries behind them could only get shot in
the head. One officer is stated by the contemporary chroniclers
of the Siege to have had such a fancy for exposing himself in
the embrasures, that, in spite of repeated warnings from his
comrades, he was killed one day at his dangerous post.
The general cheerfulness of our People, in spite of all dis-
piriting circumstances, was something upon which
Ch the f c 1 am^ ° f ** * s a pl easilre to comment. Day after day our
officers met each other with bright faces, laughed
and joked, reciprocated kindly offices, and exchanged the news
of the Camp or the tidings brought from a distance. There
was ever alive amongst them a warmth of good-fellowship,
which nothing could weaken or cool. To make a friendly visit
to the tent of a wounded or sick officer was a part of every
sound man's duty, which he was sure not to neglect. Such was
the overflowing kindness shown to every man who was down,
that if it had not been for the eager desire to be at work again
that animated all, it would have been a privilege to be upon the
sick-list. On fine evenings when the sun was going down, the
sick and wounded were brought out from their tents on their
beds and litters, thus to taste the fresh air, to be exhilarated by
the liveliness of the Camp, and to commune with their com-
rades. Officers and men alike enjoyed this change. There
was one, however, the noblest sufferer of all, who would not
permit himself to be thus brought out of the privacy of his
tent, lest it should appear that he was parading his wounds.
Meanwhile, those who were well, found great delight in the
comradeship of their several Messes, and seemed to enjoy the
rough Bohemianism which necessity had substituted for the
polite amenities of the peaceful Cantonment. The rougher the
menage, the better the cheer. It has been recorded that in one
notable instance, when tablecloths came into use, a good deal of
the special jollity of the gathering was scared away by their
introduction. It does not appear that at any time there was a
scarcity of provisions. But many things, which had become
almost necessities with our officers, fell short from time to time,
and were painfully missed. Some were more fortunate, or had
more forethought, than others; but what one Mess, or one man,
missed, another was able to lend him. Sometimes the supplies
of beer or wine were drunk out to the last bottle, and com-
monly each member of a Mess was put upon an allowance of
1857.] STATE OF THE SOLDIERY. 451
drink;* sometimes the last cigar was smoked, and the generosity
of a neighbour supplied the inconvenient want. There were no
Sybarites among them, and even those who had been wont to
fare sumptuously every day, were thankful for what they got,
and laughed at the privations they were compelled to endure.
Good clothes, too, after a while, became scarce in Camp. There
was little regard for proprieties of costume, and men who had
delighted to walk daintily in fine linen, went about in strange
costumes of flannel, half civil half military in their attire, and
were fain to possess themselves of the second-hand garments of
their departed brethren. Even the chief civil officer in Camp,
Hervey Greathed, was glad to get a pair of boots from his
brother in the Engineers, and to buy the leavings of young
Barnard's toilet when he quitted Camp after his father's death.
And the Chaplain of the Force has told us how he was com-
pelled to abandon all thought of ministering in appropriate
clerical vestments, and to go about clothed like a brigand.
And whilst our officers thus met each other with cheerful,
sometimes radiant faces, the English soldier was quite jubilant.
" I have been pleased," wrote one of the bravest and best of
the Dehli warriors, " to observe the cheerful tone displayed at
all times by our troops. I never saw British soldiers in camj)
so joyous. They walk and run about, in the afternoon and
evening, when the rain and Pandi are at rest, as though they
had nothing serious to do. Nor has it ever occurred to them
that there was anything doubtful in the conflict." When off
duty, the men amused themselves as in the most peaceful times,
playing cricket and quoits, getting up pony races, and invigorating
themselves with gymnastics. There was some talk of getting up
rackets ; but the old cantonment racket-court was in so exposed
a situation that it was thought by no means an improbable con-
tingency that the Enemy would take part in the sport, and with
balls of a larger diameter than those proper to the game.
That the excitement of strong drink was much coveted by
the soldiery in the English Camp need scarcely
be set down in the narrative ; but, on ihe whole, among the^Sery.
it may be recorded in their honour that few
outrages were committed under its influence. The wet season
* The greatest inconvenience of all was that no allowance was made for
guests, and this limited hospitality. Stray arrivals in Camp were sometime*
sore pressed for dinner, and compelled to fall back on Commissariat beef.
2 G 2
452 PROGKESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
had set in. The lowering skies, the drenching downfalls
of rain, the constant damps, and all the wonted accompani-
ments of such weather, at a time when the activities of
service rendered shelter impossible, not only had a depressing
influence upon men's spirits, which rendered stimulants ever
welcome to them, but had external results, in saturated clothes
and boots oozing with water, that justified, if they did not
demand, a resort to such supposed correctives. There were
some wise officers in Camp, who thought that still better pre-
cautions might be taken ; aud when fever and ague were
prevalent among our people, bethought themselves of the value
of quinine, as a prophylactic, and were minded to serve out a
•dose of it every morning to their men. An Artillery officer, of
whom frequent mention has been made in this story of the
Siege, when he found that his gunners demurred to imbibing
the bitter draught, as no part of their military duty, told them
that no one who refused to take it should ever have an extra
dram ; and so they swallowed the quinine for the sake of the
rum which followed in the course of the day. And the result
was, that scarcely a man of this Company was knocked over
by the fever of the season.
During seasons of comparative quietude in Camp, news
from the outer world was greedily sought and
T a ld diSance m eagerly discussed. There was little or no com-
munication with the country below, and so far as
the present safety or future success of the Dehli Force was
affected by operations in the lower country, there was little
reason to concern themselves about those-distant events, tidings
of which conmionly reached them crusted over with error, if
not in the shape of substantial lies. Of the doings of the
Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief they knew, and
indeed cared, little or nothing.* Sir John Lawrence was their
Governor-General — their Commander-in-Chief. They looked
to the great Panjab Commissioner for the means of taking
Dehli, and with these means he was furnishing them with an
energy of self-denial beyond all praise. But the great work
which lay before our people on the Eidge, with all its toil and
* I have a letter before me, written by the Military Secretary to Govern-
ment, from Council Chamber, Calcutta, from which it is plain that on the
th of July, three weeks after General Barnard's death, Government were
ignorant of that event.
1857.] CAMP NEWS. 453
anxieties, its dangers and sufferings, did not so engross men's
minds as to leave them no thought, no sympathy for their
brethren who were girt with peril elsewhere. Most of all thev
sought news from Kanhpur and Lakhnao, where Wheeler and
Henry Lawrence, threatened by an overwhelming enemy, were
looking anxiously for succours from below. False tidings of
the relief of Lakhnao were continually coming into Camp. It
was said, time after time, that .Wheeler was safe, sometimes
with the addition that he was marching upon Dehli, and at
others that the Sipahi regiments that had besieged him were
bound for that place. At a later period it was reported (long
before the first relief of Lakhnao) that Havel ock had fought a
great battle with Man Singh and defeated him, had entered the
Oudh capital, and that for three days the city had been given
up to plunder and slaughter. From Calcutta, through some
circuitous channel, there came a report that the French troops,
forming part of the China expedition, were coming to help us ;
and it was rumoured in Camp that so great had been the excite-
ment in London on the arrival there of the news of the revolt,
that the populace had burnt the India House, and hung the
Directors up to the lamp-posts.
But tidings came at last, only too fatally true, that the
garrison of Kanhpur, with all our women and children, had
been foully massacred, and that Sir Henry Lawrence was dead.
It is hard to say whether the indignation excited by the one
event or the sorrow born of the other were the stronger and
more abiding feeling. There was not a man in Camp who did
not grieve for the great and good commander of the Lakhnao
garrison ; and there were many who, loving him as a father or
a brother, shed such tears for him as they would have shed for
the nearest and dearest of their kin.* All felt that one of the
Pillars of the State had fallen — perhaps the stoutest and the
* One officer touchingly records in his journal now before me : " I do indeed
feel that I have lost a prop in the world." Tiie same writer, a day or two
afterwards says : " In these clays of battle and death there is so much to
excite the mind, that one is not long, by any possibility, in the same vein of
thought, but I felt beaten down when this sad tale reached me. Kefiection
brings home to one the sad public loss which his death occasions. At any
time India would mourn his fall, but now, when she so much needs his
guidance and his wisdom, the death of the soldier-statesman fills all with
grief, and this to the putting aside of personal feeling. He was a rare
specimen of God's handiwork." — MS. Journal.
454 PKOGEESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
grandest of all — and that such a master in Israel was little
likely to be seen again. In strong contrast to the tender feel-
ings 'and pathetic utterances which this calamity called forth
throughout the general camp, was the vehement exasperation
which the news of the Kanhpur massacre elicited — the bitter
hatred, the intense thirst of revenge. It was natural — it was
commendable. Those stern soldiers " did well to be angry."
No such foul act as this had ever stained the annals of British
connexion with the East. The foul tragedy of the " Black
Hole," which for a hundred years had been cited as the great
horror of horrors, now paled beside the massacre of Kanhpur ;
for the victims of Siraju'd daulah's cruelty had been strong
men. And ever as the atrocity was discussed in Camp, our
people longed for tidings of the onward march of Havelock and
KeUI; and yearned for the coming of the day when the order
would be given to them to set the mark of the avenger on the
guilty city which had so long resisted and defied them.
It was' not strange that, after this, the feeling of hatred
against the coloured races, already strong in the
ThTS5ves. f British Camp, should have become more vehement
and outspoken. It showed itself in many ways.
We were everywhere surrounded by Natives. The typical
Pandi, whose name was in every man's mouth, was the repre-
sentative only of one of many phases of Native humanity, which
were then ever present to us. It was one of the most curious
characteristics of this Mutiny-war, that although the English
were supposed to be fighting against the Native races, they
were in reality sustained and supported by the Natives of the
country, and could not have held their own for a day without
the aid of those whom we hated as our national enemies. Not
only were the coloured races fighting stoutly upon our side,*
but thousands of non-combatants were sharing the dangers,
without the glories, of the siege, and doing their appointed
work with fidelity and alacrity, as though there had never been
any rupture — any division of interests — any departure from
the normal state of things, as it existed in quiet times. How
utterly dependent upon Native Agency is the exotic European,
* " In camp," vrrote "Wilberforce Greatked to Mr. Colviu (August 23, 1857).
4 there is a feeling of confidence in our Native troops. Guides, Gurkhas,
Cokey's (Coke's Kifles), and Sikhs, are all popular, and, I think, all smart
and useful."
1857.] TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES. 455
though sprung from the working classes, and in his own country
accustomed to the performance of the most menial and laborious
duties, is known to all who have dwelt in India for a week. If
the labour of the people had been utterly lost to us, our power
must have suddenly collapsed. The last drop in the cup of
domestic bitterness was the desertion of our Native household
servants. But a Family could do better without this aid than
a company of Infantry, a troop of Horse, or a battery of Artil-
lery.* Without these Native attendants of various kinds, our
people would have had no food and no drink. They could not
have fed their horses, or served their guns, or removed their
sick. Both public and private servants, with but few excep-
tions, remained true to their employers throughout the siege,
and some displayed instances of rare personal devotion.f It
little matters what was the source of this fidelity. It may have
been that these people, accustomed to the domination of the
English, satisfied to move in the old groove, and sure of their
accustomed pay from month to month, never troubled them-
selves to regard the national aspects of the struggle, and, with
characteristic hatred of change, clung, therefore, to their old
employments. But, of whatsoever it was the growth, the fact
was there ; and I am afraid that it was not sufficiently appre-
ciated by those who profited so largely by it. It has been
shown how the cook-boys, cariying the coveted dinners to our
picquets, were exposed to the merciless fire of the enemy, and
how lightly their danger was regarded. This was but one of
many signs of the little gratitude that was felt towards these
* The author of the " History of the Siege of Dehli," says : " There were
ten Natives for every European in camp. In every troop of Artillery there
were four times as many Natives as Europeans ; in the Cavalry two men for
every horse ; without them the work could not go on."
f Take, for example, the following, illustrative of the good and gallant
conduct of some of our Native Artillery drivers. It is from a letter addressed
to the author : " When returning from this day's work, my guns brought up
the rear, and I had to hold the mutineers in check, picking up any of our
wounded and placing them on my limbers until they could be provided for.
One of my Native drivers was shot through the leg and the bone broken
below the knee. He was riding one of the leaders of the gun-team. I rode
up and told him to stop the gun until I could dismount him ; but he said,
4 Kuchh-parwa-nahin (never mind), Sahib. I would sooner remain on my
horse with my gun.' And he would have remained had I not insisted on dis-
mounting him and placing him in a dooly. This was the sort of spirit many
of my Natives showed throughout." — MS. Correspondence.
456 PKOGEESS OF THE SIEGE. [1857.
serviceable auxiliaries. But there was more than this negative
unkindliness. For many of our people in Camp, in return for
the good services ol the Natives, gave back only the words and
blows of contumely and insult more readily even than in quiet
times. Those times were changed, but we were not changed
with them. The sturdy iron of the national character was so
inflexible that the heat of the furnace through which we were
passing had not yet inclined it to bend. As arrogant, as in-
tolerant, and as fearless as ever, we still closed our eyes to the
fact that our lives lay in the hollow of the hand which we so
despised. Even in the midst of disasters and humiliations,
which would have softened and enfeebled others, our pride of
race still ujoheld us, stern, hard, and immovable. And in spite
of all human calculations, and in defiance of all reason, the
very obduracy and intolerance, which might have destroyed us
in this conjuncture, were in effect the safeguard of the nation.
That stubborn, unyielding self-reliance, that caused the noblest
of our enemies to say that the English never knew when they
were beaten, had caused the Indian races to believe that if a
single white man were left in the country, he would regain the
Empire for his race. And though it is impossible for those
who sit deliberately in judgment upon such conduct towards a
subject people not to condemn it, the fact remains that this
assertion, this appearance of strength, icas strength in the
midst of our weakness.
Meanwhile, within the walls of Dehli the national character
was shaping events with equal force and distinct-
Sty. ness. There were feebleness and irresolution and
divided councils in high places, and elsewhere a
great antagonism of interests, internecine strife, oppression,
and misery not to be counted. Whilst the English were cling-
ing together and moving as one man, the inmates of Dehli
were dislocated and distracted. The Court, the Soldiery, the
industrial inhabitants were in deadly feud the one with the
other, and as the numbers of our enemies increased, their diffi-
culties also increased. A state of things had indeed arisen very
fatal to the continued supremacy of the King, the circumstances
of which will be detailed in another chapter of this history.
1857.] THE LAST SUCCOUKS FROM THE PANJAB. 45?
CHAPTER VI.
THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB.
The hope of the Army before Dehli in the noble efforts of Sir
John Lawrence was not doomed to be disappointed.
It has been seen how he responded to every call May-July,
for reinforcements; how, as time went on, and Th e Question of
the pride of the Mughul was still unbroken, the
great Panjab Commissioner was little by little stripping his
province of its most reliable troops, until it appeared to others
that he was going too far in these sacrificial efforts. A great
conflict of opinion, indeed, had arisen among the leading intelli-
gences of the Panjab. To the chiefs of the great Peshawar
Council it seemed that the maintenance of the integrity of the
frontier was a paramount necessity, to which all other con-
siderations should yield. Before the end of May Edwardes had
written to the Chief Commissioner, saying : " Things seem to
be settling down in Hindustan, and to be pretty safe through-
out the Panjab, and I think that if you could in any way
manage, it would only be prudent to throw some more strength
upon this point. For Peshawar is a vital j>oint, as it were, and
if we conquer here we are safe everywhere, whereas disaster
here would roll down the Panjab. It was absolutely necessary
to disarm the regiments, and yet it recoils on us, for we want
Native troops We must husband our Europeans, and we
do so. We carry them about on elephants and carts like children.
If they w tnt a post-chaise per man they must have it. Can
you not think of any way to help us at this pinch ? . . . You
know on what a nest of devils we stand. Once let us take our
foot up, and we shall be stung to death." *
But the eyes of the Chief Commissioner were turned in
another direction, and far other thoughts Avere pressing on his
* Colonel Edwardes to Sir John Lawrence, May 27.— MS. Correspondence.
458 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PAN JAB. [1857.
mind. Peshawar seemed to him to be a source of infinite weak-
ness to the whole Empire. Sir John Lawrence had ever held
fast to the opinion that the recovery of Dehli was an object of
such magnitude, that all else was dwarfed beside it ; and in the
steadfast pursuit of this object he was prepared even to abandon
the Peshawar valley, leaving it in the hands of Dost Muhammad
of Kabul in free and friendly cession, and retiring within the
line of the Indus. For Peshawar was ever a great blister to
our European Army, drawing thither to the frontier regiment
upon regiment, and battery upon battery, whose presence could
not be dispensed with so long as we held those dangerous
breadths of country beyond the river. To release these regiments
from the necessity of keeping watch and ward upon the border
would have been immense gain to us at such a time. So
Lawrence proposed, in the event of the weakness of our
European Army threatening with failure the enterprise against
Dehli, to invite the Ameer of Kabul to Peshawar, to ask him,
in pursuance of his alliance with the British Government, to
occupy the valley with his troops, and finally to promise that,
if he should remain true to us, the British Government would
make over the coveted territory to him in perpetuity.
To this effect, therefore, Lawrence wrote to Edwardes, telling
him to consult Nicholson and Cotton on the ex-
pediency of the projected movement. The letter
was written on the 9 th of June. His Secretary — Captain Hugo
James, a man of great mental vigour, capable in action as in
council, but who seems to have shared the common fate of
Secretaries, of whom little more account is taken than of the
pens they wield, and to have received far less than the credit
which he deserved — was startled by the proposal, and recorded
a memorandum against it. With characteristic frankness and
candour John Lawrence sent it on to Peshawar, adding a note
to it in the following words : " Here is James's view of the
matter. All appears to depend upon the if in the third line.
If we can hold the Panjab, doubtless we should retain Peshawar.
But I do not think that we could do so. Troops from England
could not be in Calcutta before October, and up here before
December or January. A retreating army which has not been
beaten can command supplies. . . . One thing appears to be
most certain, which is, that if disaster occurs at Dehli, all the
Native Eegulars, and some of the Irregulars (perhaps many)
will abandon us. We should, then, take time by the forelock."
1857.] THE PESHAWAE QUESTION. 459
But there was nothing in this to convince the Peshawai
Council. Nicholson had just returned from his
first great raid, and he and Cotton concurred with c Potest of
Edwardes heartily in their opposition to the pro- ° °j u| , e J"
ject : " We (Edwardes, Nicholson, and Sydney
Cotton)," wrote Edwardes on June 11, "are unanimously of
opinion that with God's help we can and will hold Peshawar,
let the worst come to the worst, and it would be a fatal policy
to abandon it and to retire across the Indus. It is the anchor
of the Panjab, and if you take it up the whole ship will drift to
sea. For keeping the mastery of the Panjab, there are only
two obligatory points — the Peshawar valley and the Manjha ;
all the rest are mere dependencies. Multan is valuable as the
only practicable line of retreat to the sea ; but if we hold on
resolutely to Peshawar and the Manjha, we shall never need to
retreat. If you abandon Peshawar, you give up the Trans-
Indus ; and giving up the Trans-Indus, you give up the homes
of the only other troops besides Europeans from whom you
expect aid. . . . The loyalty of the Multani Pathan border is a
source of the greatest comfort to us now, but what a blow to
them if we let the Afghans overrun the Derajat. And as to a
friendly transfer of Peshawar to the Afghans, Dost Muhammad
would not be a mortal Afghan — he would be an angel — if he
did not assume our day to be gone to India, and follow after us
as an enemy. . . . Europeans cannot retreat — Kabul would
come again ! . . . We believe that at Peshawar and Labor we
can ride out the gale, if it blow big guns, till the cold weather
comes, and the English people send us a white army, in whom
(to use the slang of the day) ' implicit confidence ' can be
placed." And again on the following day : " The more I think
over your proposal to abandon Peshawar, the more fatal it seems,
and I am convinced that whatever doubt may hang over our
attempt to hold it, the attempt to give it up would be certain
ruin." Eight days afterwards he wrote again,
still more earnestly : " I don't know anything in
this war that has surprised me so much as the judgment you
have now formed on this subject. It is useless to re-discuss it;
but I earnestly hope you will never have cause to proj:>ose it to
Government, and that if you do, Government may not consent,
fur I believe that the move would be more damaging than any
other we could make. As to deliberately giving up the
Trans-Indus, by choice as a boundary, on the score of expanse,
460 THE LAST SUCCOUES FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
it surprises me more and more, for you and I have often con-
sidered this matter, and I always understood you to be con-
vinced that the Indus is not a practicable boundary, and that it
would take an army of twenty thousand men or more between
Atak and Multan, and never be secure."
To this the Chief Commissioner replied, earnestly setting
forth the advantages of concentrating the British
john P Lawrence f° rces in tne territories upon the hither side of
the Indus : " Here we are," he wrote, " with
three European regiments, a large artillery, and some of
our best Native troops locked up across the Indus — troops
who, if at Dehli, would decide the contest in a week. What
have we got for all the rest of the Panjab ? We have barely
two thousand Europeans. I doubt if we have so many holding
the posts of Philur, Govindgarh, and Firuzpur, Lahor, and
Multan. We have not a man more with a white face whom we
can spare. We cannot concentrate more than we have now
done, except by giving up Rawalpindi, and eventually
Peshawar. Should the Sikhs rise, our condition on this side
the Indus will be well-nigh desperate. With the Peshawar
force on this side we should be irresistibly strong. There was
no one thing which tended so much to the ruin of Napoleon in
1814 as the tenacity with which, after the disasters at Leipsic,
he clung to the line of the Elbe, instead of falling
June 22. back at once tQ that of the E ki ne> He tlms
compromised all his garrisons beyond the Elbe, and when he
was beaten in the field, these gradually had to surrender. But
these troops would have given him the victory had they been
at his side at Bautzen, and the other conflicts which preceded
Leipsic."
On the evening of June 25, the Peshawar Commissioner
received from Sir John Lawrence, at Rawalpindi,
June 25. a message in the following words : "A severe
action (at Dehli), apparently with little result, on the 23rd.
Bareli mutineers en route to Dehli. Gwaliar Contingent have
mutinied. Agent has left. If matters get worse, it is my
decided opinion that the Peshawar arrangements should take
effect. Our troops before Dehli must be reinforced, and that
largely. They must hold their ground." On the receipt of
this message, Edwardes, Cotton, and James * met together in
* Captain James had by this time been appointed to succeed Colonel
Nicholson as Deputy-Commissioner at Peshawar.
1857.] THE PESHAWAR QUESTION. 461
Council and determined on another remonstrance against the
project, which from the first hour of its enunciation had so
much disturbed and alarmed them. The letters of the Chief
Commissioner were sufficiently perplexing, but they suggested
rather proposal and discussion than immediate action, whilst
the brief, expressive sentences of the telegram indicated an
intention to do the thing and at once. The language, indeed,
was fast becoming the language of absolute instruction. There
was no time to be lost. The chief military and the chief civil
authority at Peshawar, therefore, put forth severally energetic
written protests against what they believed to be so fatal a
measure. " We have pushed our conquests," wrote
General Cotton, " up to the very mouths of the June 26 -
Afghanistan passes, and at this very moment, by GenS'cotton.
God's blessing, our strongest position in India is
at the mouth of the Khaibar. By our good rule we have engaged
the affections (I may say) to a considerable extent of the
border tribes, and in the hour of need they (who, not many
years since, were our most bitter enemies), relying on our great
name and power, have come forward to help us against the
disaffection of the very troops with whom we had conquered the
Sikhs, Panjabis, and others. A retrograde movement from
Peshawar, believe me, would turn all these parties, now our
friends, against us. The Panjab Irregular Force, Pathans,
Sikhs, Panjabis, and such like, no longer respecting our power,
will, in all likelihood, turn against us, and their most valuable
services be lost to us for ever. My dear Sir John, our removal
from Peshawar cannot fail to be disastrous, and cannot be
effected without immediate confusion throughout the whole of
this part of the country, and throughout the length and breadth
of British India. Hence the measure will seriously injure the
interests of our forces in all quarters, whilst the additional
strength to be gained would be small, and, indeed, we could
afford no timely aid. In handing over the Peshawar district
to the Dost (a measure which we may pretend to be a mere
matter of expediency and not of necessity), the Afghans will at
once see our weakness, and will duly profit by the same against
the common enemy. To this frontier, and to the present
strength of our position on it, as well as to Calcutta at the
opposite end of our territory, we must look for the recovery of
our power throughout the intermediate kingdoms of the Bengal
Presidency. Our great name is upheld on our frontier, whilst
462 THE LAST SUCCOUES FBOM THE PANJAB. [1857.
Calcutta and this seaboard, in the plenitude of power, with
European reinforcements continually arriving, will afford
eventually and more surely the necessary succour. At this
very moment six or eight regiments of Europeans must be
between Calcutta and Dehli, en route to the seat of war, and
treble that amount will be eventually thrown in from home
and elsewhere, and by such means must our sepremacy be
recovered. When could our troops reach the seat of war, and
in what numbers and condition ? These questions must be
duly considered, and by them the loss and gain of our removal
from hence be balanced and determined on. I earnestly
implore of you, my dear Sir John, to hold to our position on
this frontier. The required succour must indeed be thrown in
from Calcutta, not from this. When the reinforcements from
above and below, at present in progress towards Dehli, have
reached their destination, I feel confident that that city wall
again fall into our hands, and I am very much mistaken if
disaffection does not then cease in all quarters, and our power
being thus established, mutiny will gradually disappear
throughout the land."
On the same morning, Colonel Edwardes wrote, with like
decision : " General Cotton, James, and myself
Opinion of are all of opinion that you should not go throwing
Colonel L i . -i t, j- & r\ ^
Edwardes. away your means in detail by meeting General
Eeed's demands for reinforcements. Dehli is not
India, and if General Eeed cannot take it with eight thousand
men, he will not take it with nine thousand or ten thousand.
However important a point, it is only a point, and enough has
been done for it. You will serve the Empire better by holding
the Panjab than by sacrificing the Panjab and recovering Dehli.
You will sacrifice the Panjab, if you either withdraw General
Cotton's force from Peshawar, or fritter away Nicholson's
Movable Column, already too weak. Make a stand ! ' Anchor,
Hardy, anchor ! ' Tell General Eeed he can have no more men
from here, and must either get into Dehli with the men he has,
or get reinforcements from below, or abandon the siege and
fallback on the Satlaj, leaving Dehli and its dependencies to be
reorganised in the cold weather. There are two policies open
to you — to treat the Panjab as secondary to the North-West
Provinces and go on giving and giving troops to General Eeed
till you break down in the Panjab, or to maintain the Panjab
as your first duty and the most important point of the two, and
1857.] THE PESHAWAR QUESTION. 463
to refuse to give General Heed any more troops than you can
spare. We are decidedly and distinctly of the latter opinion.
. . . We consider that if you leave the Peshawar frontier, we
shall not hold together for a month, but be demoralised and
despised, and reduced to the condition of a flock of sheep. . . .
If you hold the Panjab, you will facilitate the reconquest of
India from the sea-board. We have only got to hold on three
months. Do not try too much. We are outnumbered. Stick
to what you can do. Let us hold the Panjab, coute qui coiite,
and not give up one European necessary to that duty. What-
ever takes place in Central India, we shall stand in a firm and
honourable attitude if we maintain the capitals on the sea and
the frontiers here. Between the two it is all a family quarrel
— an insurrection in our own house. If we let foreigners in
from the frontier, the Empire is invaded. We may pretend to
make friendly presents of provinces, but we cannot disguise
that we have lost them by weakness. India has not yet
recovered from our expulsion from Afghanistan. The world
ignores our voluntary cession of it after Pollock's expedition,
and knows well that we could not hold it. Do not repeat the
policy, and give up the Trans-Indus. No words of mine can
express my sense of the disgrace and ruin that it will bring
upon us. It is abandoning the cause of England in the East.
Don't yield an inch of frontier ; gather up your resources, and
restrict yourself to the defence of the Panjab. It is a practicable
and a definite policy, and we will support you to the last. . . .
If General Peed, with all the men you have sent him, cannot
get into Dehli, let Dehli go. Decide on it at once. . . . Don't
let yourself be sucked to death as General Eeed is doing. He
has his difficulties, and we have ours. You have made vast
efforts for him, and no one can blame you for now securing
your own province. . . . The Empire's reconquest hangs on
the Panjab."
Whilst Cotton and Edwardes were thus throwing all the
earnestness of their natures into their letters to
the Chief Commissioner, protesting against the Opinion of
abandonment of Peshawar, Nicholson, who was Nicholson,
proceeding to take command of the Movable
Column, visited Lawrence at Rawalpindi, and orally reiterated
the arguments on which the three friends based their opposition
to the retrograde movement. Lawrence, however, still clung to
his opinion. "Admitting," he said, "which I do, that there is
464 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857
much force in the arguments adduced in favour of the mainten-
ance of our hold on Peshawar, what are we to do when all the
British troops which we can scrape together, exclusively of
those at Peshawar, have been despatched to Dehli and still more
be required?" "Bather than abandon Peshawar," answered
Nicholson, "let us give up Marri and Bawalpindi. Give up
every place but Peshawar, Lahor, and Multan." To this Law-
rence replied " that such a measure would isolate those three
places, lock up a fine force in Peshawar, and expose us to
destruction in detail." But nothing that Lawrence could urge
shook Nicholson's deeply-grounded convictions. They parted.
The soldier passed on to his appointed work. The statesman
remained to ponder the eagerly enforced opinions of his chief
advisers in the Panjab, whilst awaiting the decision of the
Governor- General to watch the progress of events, and to do all
in his power to avert the necessity, the apprehension of which
had so much alarmed and perplexed him.
He had written to Lord Canning on the 10th of June, enclos-
ing the letter which on the day before he had sent to Edwardes ;
but communication with Calcutta was at that time slow and
uncertain in the extreme, and the brief telegraphic message
which he had asked for in reply had not arrived in the third
week of July. The momentous question was stiH unsolved.
Neither had come the order, " Hold on to Peshawar to the last,"
nor the permission. " You may act as may appear expedient re-
garding Peshawar " — in one or the other of which forms he had
requested that a telegraphic message might be sent to him.
Events, as they were then developing themselves, seemed rather
to strengthen the probability of the dreaded alternative being
presented to ns. He knew little of what was passing below
Dehli, but there and in the Panjab itself were awkward
symptoms of accumulated danger. The numbers of the enemy
were increasing, and with numbers there was increased confi-
dence within the great imperial stronghold. And regiment
after regiment was falling away from its allegiance in the
territories which John Lawrence governed ; so that we appeared
to be drifting closely and more closely upon the terrible alter-
native which he had so greatly dreaded. Still, therefore, he
felt convinced that the advice which he had given was wise and
salutary ; and again he wrote to Lord Canning on the 24th of
July, saying : " All these reinforcements ought to enable our
army to maintain itself in its present position, and allow the
1857.] THE PESHAWAR QUESTION. 465
mutineers to expend their power against our entrenchments.
But should further aid be required from this quarter, our only
resource would be to abandon Peshawar and Kohat, and to
send the troops thus relieved on to Dehli. It seems to me
vain to attempt to hold Lahor, and insanity to try to retain
Peshawar, &c, if we are driven from Dehli. The Pan jab will
prove short work to the mutineers, when the Dehli Army is
destroyed. . . . My policy would then be to bring the troops
from across the Indus and send them to Dehli ; in the mean
time to send all our women and children down the rivers to
Karachi, and then, accumulating every fighting man we have,
to join the Army before Dehli or hold Labor, as might appear
expedient. Colonel Edwardes, General Cotton, and Nicholson
are for maintaining our hold on Peshawar to the last. They
argue that we could not retire in safety, and that the instant
we attempted to make a retrograde movement all would be up
against us. This I do not believe ; but granting that insurrection
would immediately ensue, I maintain that the force at Peshawar
would make good its retreat. It contains more soldiers, more
guns, more power, than that with which Pollock recovered
Kabul after forcing the passage of the Khaibar. Between
Peshawar and the Indus are no defiles, but an open country ;
the only difficulty is the passage of the Indus, which, with Atak
in our hands, ought not to be a work of danger. It is for your
Lordship to decide what course we are to pursue. In the event
of misfortune at Dehli, are we to leave that Army to its fate and
endeavour to hold its own, or shall we, by a timely retirement
from beyond the Indus, consolidate our resources in the Panjab,
and maintain the struggle under the walls of Dehli ? I pray
that your Lordship will decide one way or the other. If we are
left to decide the matter ourselves, time will be lost in vain dis-
cussions ; and by the time we decide on the proper course to
follow, it will prove too late to act effectually."
Whilst this appeal was slowly making its way to its destina-
tion, an answer to Lawrence's letter of the 10th
of June was circuitously travelling up to the July is.
Panjab. It was dated July 15, and it said : " The jSaSSd^
outbreak at Indore on the 1st will no doubt
have interrupted the dawk as well as the telegraph to*
Bombay. I therefore send a steamer to Madras with this letter
and the despatches which accompany it ; and I shall request
Lord Harris to telegraph to Lord Elphinstone my answer to
VOL. II. 2 H
466 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
your question regarding Peshawar. It will be, ' Hold on to
Peshawar to the last.' I should look with great alarm to the
effect in Southern India of an abandonment of Peshawar at the
present time, or at any time until our condition becomes more
desperate or more secure." Thus, officially, was the momentous
question settled by the " highest authority ; " practically,
indeed, it had settled itself before Lord Canning's letter was
received. The contingency, which had been contemplated,
never arrived ; it was not left for the nation to discern the evil
effects of either the retreat from Dehli or the abandonment of
Peshawar. The question never went beyond the domain of dis-
cussion, and it is of little use now to speculate as to which
movement would have been attended with the more disastrous
results. But there would have been a grave omission from the
pages of this history if there had been no mention of this dis-
cussion. For nothing is more significant of the magnitude of
the dangers which threatened our Indian Empire in the
Summer and Autumn of 1857, than the fact that at a time when
the English held fast to the maxim, which Clive had enunciated
nearly a century before, that " to stand still is danger, to recede
is ruin," the strong spirit of Sir John Lawrence counselled the
abandonment of the frontier-station of Peshawar and the
adjacent territory to the Afghans, who, not long before had
been our enemies in the field. It must be admitted that, at the
time, the weight of authority bore heavily against the proposal ;
and no man was more willing than Lawrence himself to
acknowledge that a measure which met with strenuous opposi-
tion from such men as those who set their faces against it, was
certainly a doubtful measure.* But time and maturity of
* It ought always to be remembered that the strongest opponents of the
measure were the chief Teshawar officers, whose tendency it naturally was
to take a local view of the question. Lawrence, years afterwards, with
characteristic frankness, wrote that " certainly, in having Herbert Edwardes,
John Nicholson, and Sydney Cotton against me, it is clear that there was a
great deal to he said on the other side." Indeed, their arguments, as to the
danger of abandoning Peshawar, were altogether unanswerable. But so also
were the arguments as to the danger of withdrawing the Dehli Field Force.
And this danger Sir John Lawrence was more capable of estimating aright
than the little confederacy of military and political officers on the frontier.
On the other hand it is to be observed that Neville Chamberlain, who knew
well how nearly the siege of Dehli had been raised, confessed after the
capture of the place, that he concurred in the views which Lawrence had
1857.] THE PESHAWAR QUESTION. 467
reflection did not affect his original convictions. He remained
steadfast to his first opinion ; and years have rather increased
than diminished the number of adherents to the policy which
he enunciated when the crisis was upon us. Our larger and
more accurate knowledge of the state of affairs, that existed in
the Summer of 1857, has taught us better to understand the
arguments by which the Chief Commissioner justified a pro-
posal, by which alone he conceived that in the last resort he
could secure the salvation of the empire. Those arguments, as
more clearly discerned by the later light of history, may be thus
briefly summarised :
No one knew so well as John Lawrence what, in the months
of June and July, was stirring the hearts of the
English leaders at Dehli, for to no one did they ^^fj. 011
write so frequently, so fully and so freely, to
declare their wants and to describe their prospects. He knew
that the thought of raising the siege was present to them ; for
it was before him in letters, some of which are quoted in these
pages. He knew that all depended upon the support which he
could give the besieging force. He did not disguise from him-
self for a moment the fact that the abandonment of Peshawar
would be an immense evil ; but those were times in which there
was often only a choice of evils, and it seemed to Lawrence
declared some months before. It was his belief that to retreat from Dehli
would have been absolute ruin. " We should have lost all our heavy guns
and materiel ; our Native troops and our camp-followers would have deserted
us ; and our British force would have been worn down and destroyed. The
Dehli Force could not have made good its retreat on the Panjab, and, in such
circumstances, the Panjabi Force could not have maintained itself at Lahor.
It was doubtful whether, with all its available means, it could have retreated
on Multan." It must be remembered, too, that Lord Canning, who took a
very unfavourable view of Sir John Lawrence's proposal, and attributed this
policy to the failing health of the Chief Commissioner, had no accurate
knowledge of the state of affairs at Dehli— between which place and Calcutta
all communication was cut off, and the capture of which still seemed to be a
proximate event of no sort of difficulty to the besieging Force. It should be
added that the Lumsdens, who were at Kandahar at the time, looking at the
question from the stand-point of Afghan politics, sent an urgent missive in
cipher, urging him to hold on to the last. "If Peshawar and Kohat," they
said, " are given up at this moment, we shall have all Afghanistan down
upon our backs, besides throwing open the gate of Afghanistan, the Khaibar,
for ever. . . . Don't give an inch of ground ; but trust in Providence, fight it
out, and recall us sharp to help you."— MS. [The extracts preceding are from
unpublished letters.]
a H 2
468 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
that, in a large imperial sense, the retirement of the British
Army from Dehli would be the greater evil of the two. He
stood pledged to the policy of regaining that great centre of
Muhammadanism, and crushing the rebellion rampant there in
the name of the King ; for he had himself earnestly and
energetically, and with an overpowering force of argument,
urged upon General Anson, at the commencement of the crisis,
the paramount necessity of an immediate advance upon Dehli,
at a time when the chiefs of the Army Staff were representing
the thing to be impossible. He was bound, therefore, in honour
to do all that lay in his power to bring it to a successful issue.
The policy which he had so stoutly advocated in May seemed
still in June and July to be the policy which the national safety
imperatively demanded ; nay, every succeeding day had rendered
it more apparent to him that our inability to " dispose of" Dehli
was creating everywhere an impression of our weakness, which
was encouraging our enemies and enervating our friends. All
eyes were turned towards that great city, and as weeks passed,
and still it seemed that the English, who had gone to besiege,
had become the besieged, there was a growing mistrust as to the
wisdom of holding fast to the English alliance, which would
soon have rendered us a friendless and feeble few, to be easily
mastered and destroyed. With this knowledge pressing hourly
upon him, Sir John Lawrence, the more he thought, was the
more convinced that, in the last extremity, if the paucity of
British troops before Dehli should render its capture impossible,
and necessitate the withdrawal of our Army, he would release
the force posted in the Peshawar valley, and make over the
territory to the Amir of Kabul.
But it was never intended that this should be a precipitate
movement, or that we should prematurely anticipate an ex-
tremity which might never arise. It was his design, in the
first instance, to move all our women and children to the Lahor
side of the Indus, so that our troops might retain their grip of
the country unencumbered to the last moment, and then move
lightly and rapidly across the river. The cession, it was felt,
would be a source of unbounded delight to Dost Muhammad,
and it was believed that though it might not secure the per-
manent fidelity and friendship of the Afghans, it would, for a
time at least, hold them in the bonds of a flattered and self-
satisfied durance, and afford us the security of the forbearance
which we desired.
1857.] THE JHELAM MUTINY. 469
It lias been said that there were increasing signs of general
unrest in the Panjab. The most portentous of
these were the mutinies at Jhelam and Sialkot. T1 J52 n elam
The Jhelam cantonment lies on the bank of the
river which bears that name. That the 14th Sipahi Eegiment
posted there was on the brink of mutiny was well known. Sir
John Lawrence, therefore, despatched a force thither to disarm
them — a small compact force consisting of some companies of
the 24th Queen's, some Horse Artillery guns, under Lieutenant
Henry Cookes, and a party of Lind's Multani Horse, the whple
under the command of Colonel Ellice, of the 24th. The Chief
Commissioner had prepared a plan of operations for taking the
Sipahis by surprise ; but the Colonel, thinking that he knew
better than any civilian how to manage an affair
of this kind, departed from Lawrence's views, and July 7 '
sketched out a plan of his own. There was, therefore, no sur-
prise. When the Europeans were seen filing down the rising
ground opposite the cantonment, the Sipahis knew what was
coming.* Happening to be out on morning parade, they saw
the English column advancing. Eegardless of the orders and
entreaties of their officers, they began at once to load their
muskets. The officers saw that they had no longer any power
over their men, and sought safety with the European troops.
Then the Sipahis took up their main position in the quarter-
guard. It was a strong brick building, with a battlemented
roof, erected for purposes of defence by Sir Charles Napier, and
afforded good cover to the insurgents, who threw out a party
in advance to guard the approaches to it, whilst others took
shelter in their Lines, the mud-huts of which had been loop-
holed in expectation of the crisis. Our people were full of
courage and enthusiasm, and they flung themselves headlong
upon the enemy. Lind's Multanis charged gallantly, but were
met by a galling fire, which they could not resist. Cookes'
guns opened, but within too near a range, and the musketry
of the enemy did better execution than our own Artillery at so
short a distance. The Sipahis fired from behind the cover of
their mud-walls, and our grape was comparatively harmless.
But now the British Infantry came up with their intrepid
* Mr. Cooper (" Crisis in the Panjab ") says Colonel Gerrard, full of con-
fidence in liis men, had " informed them of the object of the European
arrival."
470 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PAN JAB. [1857.
commander at their head, and advanced full upon the quarter-
guard. The attack was a gallant and successful one ; the
quarter-guard was carried, and the Sipahis then vacated their
huts and fell back upon the empty lines of the 39th, from which
they were driven by the bursting of a well-directed shell to a
village on the left of the cantonment.
By this time the noon-day sun was beating fiercely down
upon our exhausted people. Colonel Ellice had been carried
from the field dangerously wounded. Captain Spring had been
shot dead,* and we had lost many men and many horses in the
encounter. Our troops had been marching from the hour of
midnight, and had been actively engaged since sunrise. Nature
demanded rest ; and it was sound discretion at such a time to
pause in our offensive operations. It would have been well,
perhaps, if the pause had been longer and the renewed opera-
tions more carefully matured. At four in the afternoon, when
the heat was still great, an attack on the village was ordered.
Colonel Gerrard, of the 14th, took command of the Force that
went out to destroy the mutinous regiment, in whose fidelity
he had once trusted. The result was disastrous. Again the
Sipahis had good cover, and we found ourselves entangled in
streets, in which we suffered much, but could do little. The
guns were brought up within too short a range, and the mus-
ketry of the enemy told with deadly effect upon the gunners.
The Europeans, partly from fatigue, and partly, perhaps, from
the stimulants which they had taken to reinvigorate themselves
and the effect of the slant rays of the afternoon sun, are said to
have " staggered " up to the village, and to have been easily
repulsed. The retreat was sounded, and our troops were with-
drawn. Two guns were carried back, but a third, in spite of
the gallant efforts of Lieutenant Battye, with a party of Mounted
Police, fell into the hands of the enemy, and was turned against
our retreating people.
Nothing more could be done on that evening. At dawn on
the morrow the conflict was to be renewed. Both
forces had bivouacked on the plain. But when
day broke it was found that the mutineers had evacuated their
position and fled. Many had been killed in the two engage-
* He had left Rurki, as previously stated, with Baird Smith, on the
29th of June (ante, page 424), and had only just joined his regiment when
his career was thus closed on the battle-field.
1857.] MUTINY AT SIALKOT. 471
rnents; some were drowned in the Jhelam ; others fell into the
hands of our Police, or were subsequently given up by the
Kashmir authorities, in whose country they had sought refuge,
and thus surrendered, they were blown away from our guns.
Very few of them ultimately escaped ; but the manner in which
the affair was managed greatly incensed the Chief Commis-
sioner. For, in plain words, with Horse, Foot, and Artillery,
we were beaten by part of a regiment of Sipahis. If we had
quietly surrounded the village and attacked it in the cool of
the evening, it is probable that not a man would ever have
escaped from Jhelam.
When tidings of the sharp resistance of the 14th reached
Sialkot, a still more disastrous state of things
arose at that place. The station was commanded ^sSikot^
by Brigadier Frederick Brind, an Artillery officer
of high repute — a man of lofty stature and large proportions,
who had done good service in his time, and who was still amply
endowed with physical and mental vigour. But seldom was
man left by hard circumstances in a position which afforded so
little scope for the display of his power. The cantonment
had been stripped of European troops for the formation
of the Movable Column, and there were nearly a thousand
Native soldiers — Horse and Foot — all armed and ready
for action.* In such circumstances a commanding officer
has no choice to make — no discretion to exercise. He must
appear to trust his men whether he does or not ; for to betray
suspicion is surely to precipitate the outbreak. So to all
outward appearance Brind had full confidence in his men, and
as time went on the quietude of their demeanour seemed to
justify more than the pretence. But when, on the 8th of
July, the Lines of Sialkot were all astir with the tidings that
the 14th at Jhelam had been in action with the white troops,
who had attempted to disarm them, it was felt by our people
that the beginning of the end had come. And there was another
source of excitement on that evening, for a messenger had come
from Dehli, bringing a summons from the King commanding
them to join the Koyal Army. The night was, therefore, one
* " Brigadier Brind protested against the European troops being entirely
removed, and desired that two hundred and fifty should remain. In reply,
he was requested to disarm. But, to the last, he shared in the belief (almost
grievous) in the honour of the Sipahi." — Cooper's Crisis in the Panjdb.
472 THE LAST SUCCOUKS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
of preparation. On the morning of the 9th everything was
ready.
Sialkot was a large, and had been an important military
station. In qniet times European troops had been stationed
there in large numbers, with the usual results. There were
good barracks and commodious houses and pleasant gardens,
and more than the wonted number of English gentlewomen
and young children. There were a church and a chapel, and
other indications of the progress of western civilisation. When,
therefore, the storm burst, there was much that lay at the mercy
of the enemy, and on our side no possible means of defence.
Before the sound of the morning gun had been
u y 6 ' heard throughout the cantonment, and our people,
according to their wont, had mounted their horses or entered
their carriages, to proceed to their wonted duties, or to take
the air before the sun was high above the horizon, the Sipahis
had planted picquets all round the place, to prevent the
escape of the Faringhis. And presently the din and uproar of
rebellion announced to our people, just waking from their
slumbers, that the Sipahis had risen. Our officers were soon
mounted and on their way to the parade-ground. The truth
was then only too apparent. The troopers of the 9th were
already in their saddles, and the 46th were under arms. Our
people were suddenly brought face to face with mutiny in its
worst form. All circumstances and conditions were in the last
degree unfavourable to the English. Sialkot was one of the
great stations at which there had been a gathering of detach-
ments from different regiments for the new rifle practice, and,
therefore, great opportunities of conspiracy. It lay in proximity
to the Jammu territory of the Maharajah of Kashmir, who the
Sipahis believed, and our authorities feared, would, in the hour
of danger, forsake his alliance ; and it was utterly without any
defence of European troops. So when the hour came to strike,
the confidence and audacity of the enemy had everything to
foster and encourage them.
As ever, the Cavalry were foremost in the work of mutiny —
foremost in their greed for blood. Mounted on good chargers,
they could ride with rapidity from place to place, and follow
the white men on horseback or in their carriages, and shoot them
down as they rode. For weeks the outburst had been expected,
and every English inhabitant of Sialkot had thought painfully
over the coming crisis, and had calculated the best means of
1857.] MUTINY AT SIALKOT. 473
escape. The only place of safety for which they could make
was the old Fort, once the stronghold of the Sikh
Chief, Tej Singh, and to this, when they saw July 9 "
that nothing could be done to arrest the tide of rebellion, which
was already at the flood, they endeavoured to make good their
retreat. Some happily reached the Fort. Others perished on
the way. A ball from the pistol of a mounted trooper entered
the broad back of the Brigadier, and he was carried to the Fort
only to die. The Superintending Surgeon, Graham, was shot
dead in his buggy, as his daughter sat by his side.* Another
medical officer of the same name was " killed in his carriage
among his children." A Scotch missionary, named Hunter, on
his way to the Fort in a carriage, with his wife and child, was
attacked by some chaprasis of the gaol-guard, and all three
were ruthlessly murdered. The Brigade-Major, Captain Bishop,
was killed, in the presence of his family, under the very walls
of the Fort. Some hid themselves during the day, and escaped
discovery and death almost by a miracle. Some were preserved
by their own men, and concealed till nightfall in the Lines.
The officers of the 46th, who had remained with their men
until the road between the Parade-ground and the Fort was
closed by the enemy, rode off towards Gogranwala, and reached
that place, scorched and weary — but not hungry and athirst,
for the villagers fed them on the way — after a mid-day journey
of some forty miles. The personal incidents of that 9th of July
at Sialkot would fill an interesting and exciting chapter. But
there is nothing stranger in the story than the fact that two of
our field officers — -one, Colonel of a regiment — were invited to
take command of the mutineers, and to lead them to Dehli,
* His daughter escaped. She was dragged to the Cavalry Guard, where
she " found Colonel and Mrs. Lome Campbell surrounded by a few faithful
troopers, who conducted them in safety to the Fort." — There is a significant
commentary on this incident in one iof Herbert Edwardes's letters to John
Lawrence : " These individual stories convey better notions than public
despatches. In ordinary times India would have shuddered over Dr. Graham
shot dead in his daughter's arms. Now, all we say is, * what a wonderful
escape Miss Graham has had ! ' " Habituated, after two months of mutiny
and massacre, to horrors of this kind, the recital of them had ceased to create
the intense sensations which they had once caused. And so, in this History, it
will be observed, as it proceeds, that whilst the earlier tragedies, then novel and
strange to the European mind, are dwelt upon in detail, some of the later
ones are dismissed with the brevity of a telegraphic message. In this the
narrative only reflects the varying temperature of the times.
474 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PAXJAB. [1857.
with a promise of high pay, and a significant pledge, not
perhaps without a touch of irony in it, that they might always
spend the hot weather on the Hills.
Whilst our people were seeking safety within the walls of
the old Fort, and securing their position by strengthening its
defences, the Sipahi mutineers were revelling in the work of
spoliation, with the congenial companionship of the criminal
classes. The old story, so often already told, and still to be
told again and again, was repeated here : the mutineers made
for the Gaol, released the prisoners, plundered the Treasury,
destroyed the Kachahri with all its records, blew up the maga-
zines, and gutted the houses of the Christian inhabitants. If
there were any special circumstance about the Sialkot insur-
rection, it was that the household servants of our English
officers, generally faithful, or at least neutral, on these occasions,
took an active part against their old masters. That they knew
what was coming seems to be proved by the fact that the
Brigadier's sirdar-bearer, or chief body servant, an "old and
favourite " domestic, took the caps off his master's pistols in the
night, as they lay beside him while he slept.* And how
thoroughly they cast in their lot with the soldiery is demon-
strated with equal distinctness by the fact that they afterwards
fought against us, the Brigadier's khansamah, or butler, taking
an active part in operations which will be presently described.
There seems to have been perfect cohesion between all classes
of our enemies — the mutineers, the criminals from the gaols,
* This miglit be supposed to have arisen merely from the instinct of self-
preservation if it had not been for the atter-conduct of these domestics. It is
certain that, in many parts of the country, the Native servants were in a state
of deadly fear lest their enraged masters, seeking objects for their revenge,
should turn upon them and kill them. There is an anecdote illustrative of
this, almost too good to be an invention. It is said that a gentleman in
Calcutta, observing one day a strange table-servant waiting at dinner, asked
him who he was and how he came there. His answer was, " Ham badli hain,
sahib" ("I am a substitute") ; and he explained that he had come to take
the place temporarily of a member of the establishment who was sick — a
common practice in Anglo-Indian domestic life. A few days afterwards the
old servant returned to his work, looking very sleek and well ; and when his
master questioned him as to the cause of his absence, he naively replied that
he had received secret information that, on a given day just pass 3d, the
saLib-ldg intended to shoot all their Native servants, in the middle of dinner,
and that, therefore, he had thought it prudent to send a " badli " to be shot
in his place.
1857.] NICHOLSON AND THE MOVABLE COLUMN. 475
the " Gujars " from the neighbouring villages, and the servants
from the houses and bungalows of the English. From sunrise
to sunset the work went on bravely. Everything that could
be carried off by our enemies was seized and appropriated;
even the old station-gun, which morning and evening had pro-
claimed the hours of uprising and down-setting. And nearly
everything belonging to us, that could not be carried off, was
destroyed and defaced, except — a strange and unaccountable
exception — the Church and Chapel, which the Christians had
reared for the worshipping of the Christian's God.
Before nightfall, all this rabble had made off for the Ravi
river, on their way to Dehli, rejoicing in and excited by their
day's work. It was a delightful relief to the
inmates of the decayed old Fort, who now thought
that if the danger were not wholly past, at least the worst of
it was over. It has been said that they " slept more soundly
and fearlessly than they had slept for weeks before. The mine
had exploded and they had escaped." * It is often so ; the
agony of suspense is greater than that of the dreaded reality.
But there was one there to whom no such relief was to be
given. The Brigadier lay dying. A true soldier to the last,
he had, whilst the death-pangs were upon him, issued his
orders for the defence of the Fort, and for what little else
could be done in that extremity. But the ball from the
trooper's pistol had done its work, and though Brind lingered
through the night, he died before the sun had risen ; and all
felt that a brave man and a capable officer was lost to the
country, which he had so well served.
The triumph of the Sialkot Mutineers was but brief. Retri-
bution followed closely on their victory. On the
22nd of June, Colonel John Nicholson, with the Njcnoison and
rank of Brigadier-General, had taken command column. e
of the Movable Column. That so young an officer
should be appointed to such a command, in defiance of what
were called the " claims " of many officers in the Division of
longer standing and higher rank, was an innovation by no
means grateful to the Departments or to the Seniority-mongers
in the service, but it startled many with a pleasurable surprise,
and to some it was a source of infinite rejoicing. Elderly men
with elderly wives, who had never heard of such a thing before,
* Cave-Browue'd "Panjab and Dehli."
476 THE LAST SUCCOUKS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
affected to think that there was no great wisdom in the
appointment, and showed their contempt by
j U ne-Juiy. talking of M i ster Nicholson. Of this the young
General could afford to speak tenderly. " I fear," he wrote to
Edwardes on the 17th of June, " that my nomination will give
great offence to the senior Queen's officers, hut I shall do all in
my power to get on well with them. I feel so sorry for the
disappointment they must experience, that I think I shall be
able to put up with a great deal of coldness without taking
offence." But among the younger officers of the Army, espe-
cially among those in the Movable Column, the selection was
most popular. The exigencies of the General Staff having
taken Chamberlain to Dehli, there was not a man in the Army
whose selection would have been more welcome to those who
meant work, and were resolute to do it. When Edwardes wrote
to John Lawrence, saying, " You have been very vigorous in
pushing down reinforcements, and those appointments of Cham-
berlain and Nicholson are worth armies in this crisis. . . .
Amid the ruins of the Regular Army these two Irregular
Pillars stand boldly up against the sky, and I hope the Tom-
noddies will admire their architecture," he expressed the senti-
ments of all the bolder spirits in the Army, eager to be led,
not by age and rank, but by lusty manhood in its prime, and
who could see better hope for a glorious deliverance even in
the rashness and audacity of youth than in the irresolution and
inactivity of senile command. It was truly a great day for
India, when it was decreed that Chamberlain should go down
to Dehli and Nicholson place himself at the head of the Movable
Column in the Panjab.
The force of which Brigadier-General Nicholson took com-
mand consisted of Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry ; a troop
of European Horse Artillery, under Major Dawes, an excellent
officer, who had done good service in the Afghan war ; a Horse
Battery, also European, under Major George Bourchier; the
33rd * and 35th Sipahi Regiments ; and a wing of the 9th
Cavalry. He joined the force at Jalandhar, and moved thence
to Philur, as though he had been marching down upon Dehli.
Then some people shook their heads and wondered what he
was doing in thus carrying down with him many hundreds of
* The 33rd, which had been stationed at Hoshiarpur, joined the column
near Philur.
1857.] NICHOLSON AND THE MOVABLE COLUMN. 477
Sipahis, with rebellion in their hearts, only to swell the host of
the enemy. What he was really doing was soon apparent.
He was intent on disarming the Native regiments. But as this
was to be best accomplished by secrecy and suddenness, he did
not blazon his design about the Camp. But in good time, the
necessary instructions were given. On the morn-
ing of the 25th of June, the Column was under Disarming of
the walls of the fort of Philur. The guns were the Sgimeatf h
drawn up on the road and unlimbered, the 52nd
taking post on both flanks. The Sipahi Regiments marched
on, little dreaming of what was to come. Nicholson had given
orders to the Police that, on the first sound of firing, the bridge
across the river should be cut away, so as to prevent all chance
of escape if the Sipahis should break and fly with their arms in
their hands. Leaning over one of Bourchier's guns, he said to
that officer, " If they bolt, you follow as hard as you can ; the
bridge will have been destroyed, and we shall have a second
Sobraon on a small scale." * But the Sipahis did not bolt. In
the presence of those guns they felt that it would be madness
to resist the order ; so they sullenly piled their arms at the
word of command.
Having disarmed the two Infantry regiments, Nicholson
determined to retrace his steps from Philur, and to pitch his
camp at Amritsar. On the 5th he was at that place, the central
position of which recommended itself to him, as it enabled him
to afford speedy aid, if required, either to Lahor or the Jaland-
har Duab, while at the same time it overawed the Manjha, and
rendered hopeless any attempt to mutiny on the part of the
59th Regiment stationed in the cantonment. f On the morning
of the 7th, the stirring news of the mutiny of the 14th at
Jhelam reached his Camp, and he hoped hour after hour to be
comforted by the tidings that Colonel Ellice had defeated and
destroyed them. But the day passed, and the night also was
spent, and still the wished -for intelligence did not come, but in
its place were ominous tidings of disaster ; so on the morning of
the 9th, Nicholson, with reluctance which he frankly expressed, J
* Bourchier's Eight Months' Campaign.
f Brigadier-General Nicholson to the Adjutant-General of the Army,
July 19, 1857.
X " 1 feel bound to place on record my belief that both in conduct and
feeling this regiment was quite an exceptional one. It had neither com-
478 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
proceeded to disarm the 59th. There was a punishment parade
that morning. A rebel or a deserter was to be
D tKsith. 0f executed, and all the troops, European and Native,
were ordered out to witness the ceremony. The
ground selected lay between the city and the fort, about a
mile from the cantonment, and there the regiments and the
guns were drawn up on parade, and the ghastly ceremony
was duly performed. This done, the Sipahis of the 59th,
who only the day before had been complimented on their
loyalty, were ordered to lay down their arms. Though sur-
prised and bewildered by the command, they obeyed without
a murmur ; and though many men of the Eegiment were not
present on parade, and, therefore, a quantity of arms were still
left in possession of the Sipahis, they testified the sincerity ot
their obedience by afterwards voluntarily surrendering them.
Thus were the teeth of another Native regiment quietly
drawn, and the danger glaring at us from the ranks of our own
Sipahis was greatly diminished. Elsewhere the same process,
as Nicholson now learnt, was going on with more or less success.
At Rawalpindi were the 58th Eegiment and two companies of
the 14th — the regiment which had fought so
Di the n 58?h. 0f desperately at Jhelani. A letter from Sir John
Lawrence announced that the business of disarm-
ing had been done, but in no very satisfactory manner. " We
have disarmed," the Chief Commissioner wrote to Nicholson on
the 7th, "the seven companies of the 58th and the two com-
panies of the 14th. We had three guns and two hundred and
forty Europeans, and were very nearly having a fight. The
main body broke and bolted to their lines, and we did not fire
on them. After about an hour's work, however, during which
a good many loaded, we got all but about thirty to lay down
their arms. The latter bolted, and about half were killed or
taken by the Police Saw r ars. Miller was badly wounded a little
above the right wrist; both bones were broken. He had a
narrow escape. A Sipahi gave him a dig in the chest with his
bayonet, but somehow or other the wound was slight." At the
same time Edwardes was reporting the entire success of his
mittecV itself in any way, nor do I believe that up to the day it was disarmed
it had any intention of committing itself ; and I very deeply regret that
even as a precautionary measure it should have become mv duty to disarm
it*— Ibid.
1857.] DISARMING OPERATIONS. 479
arrangement for the disarming of the Sipahis of the 24th at
Fort Mackeson.* By the help of Brougham's
mountain guns and some detachments of the Di t S he™«£ of
Pan jab Irregular Force this was accomplished
without a hindrance or a hitch ; and the disarmed Sipahis were
marched into Peshawar, escorted by Brougham's guns, whilst
the Fort was garrisoned by some Multani levies, horse and foot.
Nothing could have been more adroitly managed than the
whole affair.
But tidings more exciting than these were to reach the ears
of the Commander of the Movable Column. The
telegraph wires brought news from Labor that Movements^
the Sipahis at Sialkot had risen, and that rapine column" 8
and murder were abroad in the place; another
half-hour, and the story was confirmed by a musician of the
46th, who had ridden in with a few blurred lines from Assistant-
Commissioner M'Mahon, begging him to bring the Force to their
aid.f Nicholson could now no longer hesitate about disarming
the wing of the 9th Cavalry attached to his column. He had
hitherto abstained lest such an act should precipitate the rising
at Sialkot, and now the wing at that place was in the fulness
of rebellion. Their arms and horses, therefore, were now to be
taken from them. The troopers felt that resistance could only
bring destruction upon them, so they quietly gave up all that
made them soldiers ; and then Nicholson prepared himself to
* " As day dawned, the two parties from north and south closed in upon
the Fort, and threw a chain of horsemen round it, whilst Major Brougham
drew up his guns so as to command the gateway. Major Shakespear, com-
manding the 24th Regiment, and Lieutenant Hovenden, of the Engineers,
then rode into the Fort, and ordered the Sipahis to parade outside. They
were much surprised and confused, but made no resistance, and when ordered
by Major Shakespear, piled their arms and gave up their belts and pouches
in an orderly manner.' - — Edwardes to Cotton, July 8, 1857. MS. Cor-
respondence.
t The note, the original of which is before me, is significant in its brevity :
" The troops here are in open mutiny. Jail broke. Brigadier wounded.
Bishop killed. Many have escaped to the Fort. Bring the Movable
Column at once, if possible. 6£ a.m., 9th July." The name of the bearer
of this chit ought not to be omitted. Mr. Cave-Browne says, " A young
baud-boy, named M'Douglas, of the 46th, had galloped off from the Regi-
mental parade-ground on a little tat (pony), and by dint of borrowing and
seizing fresh ones in the villages as he passed through, he finished his ride of
some "eighty miles into Amritsar, and hastened to the General's quarters
just as the mail-cart brought in the message from Labor."
480 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
march. As the day wore on, fresh tidings of the movements of
the Sialkot mutineers reached him. It was obvious that they
were marching down on Gurdaspur, intent probably on stirring
np the 2nd Irregular Cavalry stationed there, and, joined by
them, on plundering the station. Thence Nicholson believed
that they would make their way, by the route of Nurpur and
Hoshiarpur — at which places they might reinforce themselves
with Horse and Foot *- — to Jalandhar, and thence inarch, a
strong body of mutineers, down to Dehli. To frustrate this
expected movement wa< now the desire of the
^urd^ispi. 10 Commander of the Movable Column, He was forty
miles from Gurdaspur, and theSipahis had two days'
start of him. But Nicholson was born to overcome difficulties
which would have beaten down other men. He determined on
a forced march to Gurdaspur, and went resolutely to work to
accomplish it. The July ^un blazed down upon
his camp with a ferocity more appalling than the
malice of the enemy. But even that was to be disregarded.
AVhatsoever the country could yield in the shape of carriages,
horses, and ponies was at once enlisted into the serviee of the
Column. f All possible advantage was taken of
the coolness of the night ; but when morning came
they were still some fifteen or sixteen miles from Gurdaspur,
with the prospect of a sultry march before them. J With all
his rare and labour, Nicholson had not, even with the aid of
The 4th Native Infantry was at Niirpur. The 16th Irregular Cavalry
at Hoshiarpur.
t Great praise is due to the civil authorities for their activity in this con-
juncture. Mr. Montgomery in his official report, says : " To the 'commercial
men of Amritsar and Labor the metalled road offers special advantages, for
it enabled hundreds of native gigs or ekkas to fly unceasingly between the
tw ) cities. On the day I allude to the district officers of both places were
ordered to seize every ekka, bylee, and pony that was to be seen, and to des-
patch them under police guards, to General Nicholson's camp at Amritsar,
on urgent public service. These vehicles, on their arrival there, were
promptly loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for
Gurdaspur, which is at a distance of forty-four miles frum Amritsar, reaching it
at three p.m. of July 11. It was joined at Battala by Mr. Koberts, Com-
missioner, and Captain Perkins, Assistant-Commissioner at Amritsar."
X Colonel Bourchier (' Eight Months' Campaign ") says that they made
twenty-six miles in the night, and had then eighteen miles before them.
But General Nicholson, in his official report, says that the entire distance
was " over forty-one miles," some three miles less than Bourchier's com-
putation.
1857.] THE MARCH TO GURDASPUR. 481
the troop-horses of the 9th, been able to mount the whole of his
force, and some weary foot-sore work was therefore a necessity
of the conjuncture. So, many were struck down by the heat ;
yet, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, they
pushed forward in excellent spirits, and even with a strong
enjoyable sense of the humorous side of the service they were
performing.* It was not until the evening of the 11th that
the whole of the force was assembled at Gurdaspur. There
intelligence was received that the mutineers from Sialkot were
then at Nurkot, some fifteen miles from the right hand of the
Ravi. There were two courses then open to Nicholson. He
might dispute the passage of the river, or he might draw them
on towards him, by remaining inactive and keep-
ing the enemy ignorant of his position. He u y 12 -
determined on the latter course, and, much to the perplexity of
some and the dissatisfaction of others, remained quiescent at
Gurdaspur till nine o'clock on the following morning. Then
he learnt that the enemy were crossing the river by a ford
about nine miles distant, at a place known as the Trimu Ghaut;
so he prepared at once to fling himself upon them.
At noon he was in sight of his prey, about a mile from the
river. The mutineers had crossed over with their
baggage, and the grey jackets of the videttes of Ghau^SS.
the 9th Cavalry were first seen flitting about in
our front, and then the Infantry were observed drawn up in
line, their right resting on a serai and a dismantled mud fort,
and their left on a small village and cluster of trees, with
parties of Cavalry on each flank. Nicholson now made his
dispositions for the attack. Eager to get his guns within short
* Colonel Bourchier, in his narrative, gives the following amusing account
of the humours of the march : " Yet, under these circumstances, trying as
they were, the spirit of fun was not extinct. The Artillery made extemporary
awnings of branches of trees over their gun-carriages and wagons, giving
them the appearance of carts 'got up' for a day at Hampstead ; officers,
crowned witli wreaths of green leaves, were ' chaffed ' by their comrades for
adopting head-dresses a la Norma. Here might be seen a soldier on a
rampant pony, desiring his companion, on a similar beast, to keep behind
and be his ' edge de camp ' ; there a hero, mindful perhaps of Epping on
Easter Monday, bellowing out Lis inquiries as to who had seen the fox
(stag ?). Privates, never intended for the mounted branch, here and there
came to grief, and lay sprawling on mother-earth, while, ever and anon, some
mighty Jehu in his ekka dashed to the front at a pace a Roman charioteer
would have envied."
VOL. II. 2 I
482 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
range of the enemy, he masked his advancing batteries with
bodies of mounted Police, and moved on to within six hundred
yards of the mutineers, when the Cavalry, excited to the utmost
by the artificial stimulant of bang, rushed furiously to the
encounter, some shouting, some gnashing their teeth. On this
Nicholson unmasked one of his batteries, and the maskers went
rapidly to the rear.* It was a moment of doubt and anxiety,
especially with the Artillery commanders, whose Native drivers
might have deserted them at a critical moment, for they had
been acquainted at Sialkot with the very Sipahis against whom
they had now been brought. One half of the old Brigade was,
indeed, fighting against the other. But the suspected men
were as true to their salt in the Panjab as they were at Dehli.f
The guns were brought into action without a hitch, and the
enemy, though they fought steadily and well, and sent in a
volley from the whole line with the precision of a parade, stag-
gered beneath the fire of our batteries, upon which some of the
men of the 46th flung themselves with heroic courage. The
grape and shrapnel from our nine guns scattered death among
the foremost of the mutineers ; and presently the Enfield rifles
of the 52nd began to give deadly proof that the smooth-bored
muskets of the Sipahis were as playthings contending against
them. Still there were some amongst them to be convinced
only by the thrust of the bayonet. In truth, the enemy were
terribly out-matched. With all their gallantry in doing and
their fortitude in enduring, what could " Brown Bess " and the
old station-gun do against our batteries and our rifles ? The
battle was soon over. The mutineers fell back upon the river,
and Nicholson, whose want of Cavalry was severely felt, did all
he could in pursuit ; but could not inflict much damage upon
them. It is said, however, that they had already left " between
three and four hundred killed and wounded on the field." And
all their baggage fell into our hands — arms, ammunition,
* Nicholson himself speaks very gently and forhearingly of this rearward
movement of the Police Bisalahs : "The Police," he says, "being no longer
useful as maskers, and seeming undesirous of engaging, were ordered to the
rear." Colonel Bourchier says that they ran away. "Away scampered the
mounted levies back to Gurdaspur."
f Colonel Bourchier says : " I took the precaution to warn my European
gunners to watch them. In the reply of my Farrier-Sergeant spoke the
whole company: 'If they only attempt to run, sir, we'll cut off their heads.'
But in this case, as in every other, my Native drivers nobly did their duty."
1857.] AFFAIR OF TEIMU GHAUT. 483
clothing, and other plundered property, public and private, the
spoil of the Sialkot cantonment.
There was nothing more to be done that day. The mid-day
heat had completely exhausted our European
fighting men, so, whilst a party of Panjab In- uyl2
fantry was left to guard the ford and protect the baggage, the
52nd and the Artillery were marched back to Gurdaspur. But
the day's fighting had resulted in a " conclusion where nothing
is concluded," so conclusions were to be tried again. The
Sipahi force was shattered, but not destroyed. Their fighting
power was not yet gone. Perhaps the energy that sustained
them was the energy of desperation ; for to fall back was as
perilous to them as to stand still. There was no security for
them in any direction. They had not more than half the
number that first marched down to the Ravi ; but they were
brave and resolute men, and, even with such fearful odds
against them, they did not shrink from another conflict. The
river had risen, and that which had been a ford had now become-
an island. The old station-gun which they had brought from
Sialkot was their sole piece of artillery, and they had no
gunners with their force; but the Brigadier's old "khansamah"
had lived for too many years at Artillery stations not to have a
shrewd conception of the manner of working a gun. And, thus
planted on the island in the middle of the Ravi, they thought
that, for a time at least, they might defy us. The river had
ceased to be fordable, and the civil authorities, as a precau-
tionary measure, had sunk all the boats in the immediate
neighbourhood. So, when Nicholson again advanced from
Gurdaspur, he could do little more in the first instance than
take up a position out of reach of the enemy's one gun and send
to a distance for some boats. At daybreak on the
morning of the 16th, the desired means of trans- July 1G '
port had been obtained, and he was prepared to attack the
enemy on their insular stronghold. The Infantry crossed over
one extremity of the island, a mile and a quarter from the
enemy's position, whilst the Artillery took post so as to cover
the advance of the column and to pla}^ upon the hostile gun.*
The Sipahis were taken by surprise. Not until a large part of
* Colonel Bourchier says that " to silence it at such a distance (twelve
hundred yards), whilst it was nearly concealed by grass and an earthern
breastwork, was almost impossible."
2 i 2
484 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
the 52nd had formed upon the island did the mutineers know
that we had even obtained a boat. The Assembly was then
sounded ; the black troops mustered in haste and moved round
their gun to sweep our advancing column. But the piece had
been elevated for service at a longer range, and in the hurry of
the moment the amateur artillerymen had failed to depress the
screw, which was old and rusty, and not easily to be worked ;
so the shot went harmlessly over the heads of our people. On
went the British Infantry, with Nicholson at their head ; and
though some, stern and steadfast to the last, stood to be shot
down or bayoneted at their gun, the rout soon became general.
Many were killed on the island ; many were drowned in the
river ; and a few who escaped were given up by the people of
the surrounding villages. These were afterwards tried by
Special Commissions, and paid the penalty of their crimes on
the gibbet.
The Movable Column then marched back to Amritsar ; and
Nicholson hastened to Lahore, whither Sir John
^Ldior? at Lawrence had already proceeded from Rawalpindi.
The General was there on the 21st of July ; on
the 22nd, the Chief Commissioner wrote, through his secretary,
to the Commander of the Dehli Force, that " the
July 22. following troops were on their way to Dehli, or
Eei for°i)e e nii' ntS would immediately march :" " The Kumaon Bat-
talion, about four hundred strong, which has passed
Lodiana, and ought to be at Dehli on the 4th or 5th of August ;
Her Majesty's 52nd from the Movable Column, now at Amritsar,
six hundred bayonets; Multani Horse, two hundred; and a
nine-pounder battery. All these troops should be at Dehli by
the 15th, and in an emergency might make double marches.
General Nicholson will command the force." And then it was
added : " The Chief Commissioner further proposes to despatch
the troops marginally noted as quickly as possible, and all can
be at Dehli by the end of August,
2nd Panjitb infantry ... 700 some of them a good deal earlier.
wSg 8 of 6 Buich^Lion: ! 2SS The 2nd Panjab Infantry and Wing
4th panjab infantry . . 600 of Her Majesty's 61st oimht to be
Two Companies of H.^I.'s 8th 200 ,, , ^ ^ , . ° „,,
Detachment of 4tt Sikhs . , ioo there by the loth proximo. Ine
Dawes's Troop of H. a. . .ioo f ormer is now on its way from
2500 Mul tan to Firuzpur, whence it will
march on the arrival of the detach-
ment of the Bombay Fusiliers, which left this place last night.
1857.] ADVANCE UPON DEHLL 485
The wing of the Biluch Battalion has not yet left Multan ; but
orders for its march have been despatched. The 4th Panjab
Eegiment is at Peshawar, and will march in two or three days.
It can hardly be at Dehli before the end of August. The-
Two Companies of Her Majesty's 8th are holding Jalandhar and
Philur, and cannot be spared until relieved by a detachment of
Her Majesty's 24th, now on its way from Eawalpindi. Kothney's-
Sikhs are at Lodiana, and will join Brigadier-General Nicholson
en route. Lieutenant -Colonel Dawes's troop will be sent or not,
as you may desire. It is believed that light guns are not required,
at Dehli. All these troops are of excellent quality, fully equal,
if not superior, to any that the Insurgents can bring against
them, and comprise a force of four thousand two hundred men."
Thus was Lawrence, who did all things on the grand Titanic
scale, still sending down his reinforcements by thousands to
Dehli — thousands of Europeans and trustworthy Sikhs, with a
young General, whose personal presence alone was worth a
Brigade of Horse, Foot, and Artillery.
On the 24th of July, Nicholson returned to Camp. His
arrival had been anxiously awaited, for doubt and
uncertaint}*' were in all men's minds. Speculation July 24 -
had been rife, and all sorts of rumours of the future or J e red C to U jjehii
movements of the force had been circulated among
them. Few had ventured to hope that the order would be
given to them to march down to Dehli ; for the general feeling
was that the Panjab had already been so stripped of European
troops that it could not aiford to divest itself of another regiment
or another battery. But Nicholson had returned to the column
with the joyous tidings that they were to set their faces towards
the scene of the great struggle. " Our only fear," wrote an
officer of the Force, " was that Dehli would fall before we could
possibly arrive there." But all felt that, if any one could take
them down in time to participate in the crowning operations of
the siege, Nicholson was the man to do it £ He was not one to
lose an hour. On the following day the column crossed the
Bias, moved down by forced marches to the Satlaj, and thence
pushing on with all speed to the Jamnah. At Bara, on the
3rd of August, Nicholson received a letter from General Wilson,
saying, " The enemy have re-established the bridge over the
Najafgarh Canal (which we had destroyed) and
have established themselves in force there, with ugust 6 ~ 7,
the intention of moving on Alipur and our communications to
486 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PAN JAB. [1857.
the rear. I, therefore, earnestly beg you to push forward with
the utmost expedition in your power, both to drive these fellows
from my rear, and to aid me in holding my position." On the
6th, Nicholson was at Ambalah, whence he wrote, "I am just
starting post for Dehli by General Wilson's desire. The column
should be at Karnal the day after to-morrow, and I shall,
perhaps, rejoin it at Panipat."
On the following day he stood upon the Dehli Ridge looking
down at the great city, taking in all the wonder -
^DehS 11 at ^ suggestiveness of the scene with that quiet,
thoughtful, self-contained solemnity of mien,
which distinguished him from all his cotemporaries. He had
much then to think of in this little breathing-space — much of
the past, much of the future. The time which had elapsed
since his first appointment to the command of the Movable
Column had not been without certain personal annoyances,
which even in the midst of the stirring work around him he
had not been wholly able to brush aside. It was scarcely
possible that, in the position in which he was placed, a man of
Nicholson's peculiar character should, on no occasion, give
offence to higher authority. It was his nature to steer straight
on to independent action ; to "scorn the consequence and to do
the thing." And so it happened that those above him thought
that he was taking too much upon himself, and that he was
grievously deficient in those references and explanations which
Officialism, in ordinary times, not improperly demands. Even
Sir John Lawrence, most emphatically a man of action, was
somewhat disturbed by the fact that Nicholson had disarmed
the 33rd and 3oth regiments without previously consulting the
Chief-Commissioner, or very promptly explaining
to him the " reason why." But afterwards, with
the unfailing frankness which relieved all that was outwardly
stern and harsh in his nature, he admitted that he " could not
expect Nicholson, after knocking about in the sun all day, to
write long yarns." " On such occasions," he added, " a line or
t wo semi-officially will satisfy me, until I get your formal report ;
all I want to know is, what is done and the reason." But no
sooner had this little difference with the Commissioner been
smoothed down, than another and more serious one arose between
the Commander of the Movable Column and the General com-
manding the Division. Nicholson had taken upon himself to
move troops, under the command of the latter, without consult-
1857.] NICHOLSON AT DEHLI. 487
ing him, and had been so severely rebuked, that he declared
that nothing but the thought of the public inconvenience, which
might result from such a step, restrained him from throwing
up his appointment. These wounds were still fresh, when he
reached Dehli and asked himself whether it were likely that, in
the work which lay before him, he would be able wholly to
avoid collisions with his fellow-workmen. He felt that much
had been done of which he could not approve, and that much
had been left undone which he would have earnestly counselled ;
and he knew that all this might come over again, and that his
resolute freedom of speech and independence of action might
bring forth much that would be painful to himself and em-
barrassing to others. But he had written a few days before to
Sir John Lawrence, saying : " I might have preserved silence,
but when in a great crisis an officer holds a strong opinion on
any matters of consequence, I think he fails in his duty if he
does not speak it out, at whatever risk of giving offence." *
And now he was determined that, cost him what it might, ho
would suffer his convictions to declare themselves without
restraint, regardless of everything but the good of the Empire.
His coming had been eagerly looked for in Camp. As day
after day tidings of the rapid approach of the Movable Column,
under Nicholson, were brought in, men began to see clearly
before them the consummation of the final assault, and their
hearts were gladdened by the prospect. The approach of this
column was, indeed, as the promise of a great deliverance ; and
* See the following extract from a letter written to Sir John Lawrence
from Ambalah, August 6. Lawrence had written to Nicholson, saying, half-
seriously, half-jestingly, that he was incorrigible, and suggesting that he
might do more good by carrying others with him than by running counter to
them. To this Nicholson had replied : " I am very sorry to hear that
General Cowan has taken offence again. I don't wish to ignore him or any
other superior; I dislike offending any one, and, except on principle, would
never have a disagreement. You write as if I were in the habit of giving
offence. Now I cannot call to mind that since my return to India, upwards
of five years and a half ago, I have had any misunderstandings, except with
and . The former, I believe, is conscious that he did me wrong,
and I trust the latter will eventually make the same admission. ... I fear
that I must have given offence to you, too, on the Rawalpindi question. I can
truly say that I opposed my opinion to yours with great reluctance, and, had
the matter been of less importance, I might have preserved silence ; but when
in a great crisis an officer holds a strong opinion on any matter of consequence,
I think he fails ill his duty if he does not speak it out, at whatever risk of
giving offence."
488 THE LAST SUCCOUKS FEOM THE PANJAB. [1857.
when it was whispered through the Camp that Nicholson had
already arrived, it was as a cordial to men's souls, for a great
reputation had preceded him, and it was felt among our people
that a mighty warrior had come among them, who was destined
to lead our troops into Dehli, and to crush the power of the
Mughul. His personal presence did much to generate in men's
minds the sublime idea of a Hero — a King of Men ; of the
Megistos who was to reign among them. He had come on in
advance, by Wilson's request, to take counsel with him ; and
he was soon passing from picquet to picquet, taking in with a
soldier's eye all the points of our position, and looking down
critically upon the defences of the enemy. He did not at once
make his way into the hearts of men, but he impressed all with
a sense of power. On the evening of the 7th of August, on
which day he arrived in Camp, he dined at the Head-Quarters
Mess, and the silent solemnity of his demeanour was unpleasantly
apparent to men whose habitual cheerfulness, when they met
together for the social meal, had been one of the sustaining
influences of Camp Life, during all that long dreary season of
waiting and watching. Next morning, accompanied by Norman,
he visited the great position at Hindu Rao's house, which for
two long months had borne the brunt of the enemy's attacks.
Baird Smith at that time was in consultation with Seid.* The
brave commander of the picquet, who had done such good service,
could not help inwardly resenting Nicholson's imperious manner.
But when, after the visitor had passed on, Eeid complained to
his companion of Nicholson's haughty, overbearing style of
address, the Chief Engineer answered, " Yes, but that wears
* The following description is from the "History of the Siege of Dtlili: "
"About this time a stranger of very striking appearance was remarked
visiting all our picquets, examining everything, and making most searching
inquiries about their strength and history. His attire gave no clue to his
rank : it evidently never cost the owner a thought. Moreover, in those
anxious times every one went as he pleased : perhaps no two officers were
dressed alike. It was soon made out that this was General Nicholson, whose
person was not yet known in Camp, and it was whispered, at the same time,
that he was possessed of the most brilliant military genius. He was a man
cast in a giant mould, with massive chest and powerful limbs, and an ex-
pression ardent and commanding, with a dash of roughness; features of stern
beauty, a long black beard, and deep sonorous voice. There was something
of immense strength, talent, and resolution in his whole gait and manner,
and a power of riding men on high occasions that no one could escape
noticing:."
1857.] NICHOLSO AT DEHLI. 489
off; you will like him better when you have seen more of him."
And never were words of good omen more surely verified, for
afterwards they became " the best friends " — bound together by
an equal desire to do their duty to their country, and, if God
willed it, to die the soldier's death.
Eager to be at his work, Nicholson made ready offer of his
column to perform any service that might be required on its
first arrival. He saw at once that there was something to be
done. The enemy had established themselves at a place on the
left of our position, known as Ludlow Castle, and had planted
a battery there, from which they contrived greatly to harass
our picquets, especially that known as the " Metcalfe Picquet ; "
and it was desirable in the extreme to dislodge them. This
attack upon the enemy's new position Nicholson would have
gladly undertaken. But the activity of the mutineers was so
great, and their fire was so annoying, that it was found to be
inexpedient to wait for the arrival of the Movable Column.
The work was to be done at once, and Brigadier Showers, a
right good soldier, always cool and collected in the midst of
danger and difficulty, was commissioned to do it.
Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Showers led
down his men, along the Flagstaff Eoad, upon
Ludlow Castle. Covered by the darkness, they August 12.
marched quietly on, and took the enemy com- Luc^vCastie
pletely by surprise. A rattling fire of musketry
roused them from their sleep, and numbers were shot
down, scared and bewildered, before they could realise
what was upon them. The Golandaz rushed confusedly to the
battery ; but our attack was so sudden and impetuous, that
they could hardly fire a shot before the 1st Fusiliers were
among them, bayoneting the brave fellows at their guns.
Many, unable to work their pieces, drew their swords, and, with
their backs against the wall, sold their lives as dearly as they
could. Masters of the battery, our men pushed on, in the grey
dawn of the morning, following the mutineers into the houses,
where they had endeavoured to find shelter, and shot them
down like beasts in a cage. Some cried for mercy, and were
answered with a laugh and a bayonet-thrust. By sunrise the
work had been done. The enemy had been driven from
Ludlow Castle, and four of their six guns had been taken. The
victory, however, had been dearly purchased. The intrepid
leader of the assailing party had fallen severely wounded ; and
490 THE LAST SUCCOUES FKOM THE PANJAB. [1857.
Coke, who had led the Panjabis to the attack, had shared the
same fate. It was in the confusion attending the fall of
Showers that two of the enemy's guns were suffered to escape ;
and when Colonel Edward Greathed was afterwards sent to
bring the force out of action, he did not know that these
trophies of victory were to be recovered, or we may be sure that
he would not have returned without them. Enough, however,
had been gained to make the return to Camp a triumphal one.
To secure the success of the surprise, the expedition had been
rendered as secret as possible. When, therefore, the sound of
the firing broke through the morning stillness the British
Camp was aroused, and men wondered what was the meaning
of it. The truth was soon apparent to them, and then numbers
went out to meet the returning force, and welcomed them, as
they came in with the captured guns, rejoicing exceedingly
that so good a day's work had been done before the breaking of
the morning's fast.*
It may with truth, I think, be said, that at this point of the
long and weary siege the great turning-point was
Arrival of the attained. The siege-train, which was to remedy
Co°iumn. our deplorable want of heavy ordnance, was
August u. labouring down from Firuzpur; and on the 14th
of August, Nicholson, who had ridden back to
meet his column, marched into the Dehli Camp at the head of
his men. It was a sight to stir the spirits of the whole Camp.
Our people turned out joyously to welcome the arrival of the
new comers; and the gladsome strains of our military bands
floated down to the rebel city with, a menace in every note.
Braced with action, flushed with victory, Nicholson was eager
for new exploits. And he did not wait long for an opportunity
to demonstrate to the Dehli Force that they had not over-
< stimated the great qualities of the Punjabi warrior. The
enemy had gained tidings of the approach of our siege-train
from Firuzpur, and they had determined to send out a strong
force to intercept it. No more welcome task could have been
assigned to Nicholson than that of cutting this force ro pieces.
A well-chosen, well- equipped force of all arms was told off for
* Hervey Greathed says, that on this occasion we lost nineteen men killed,
and ninety-four wounded. He adds: "Nobody would have supposed the
force had suffered at all, from the jolly way in which they marched bacl
except for seeing the litters."
1857.] ARKIVAL OF THE MOVABLE COLUMN. 491
this service, Tinder his command ; and, with full assurance of
victory, he prepared himself for the encounter. ,
In the early morning of the 25th of August, amidst heavy
rain, the force marched out of Camp, and took the
road to Najafgarh, in which direction it was August 25.
believed that the Bareli and Nimach Brigades J^f 6 *?
of the Rebel Force had moved on the preceding
day. It was a toilsome, and, for some time, a dispiriting
march ; for the road, little better than a bullock-track at best,
was sometimes lost altogether in swamps and floods. At many
points our gun-wheels sank in the mud up to their axles, and
needed all the strength of the Artillerymen to extricate them
from the slough. The Infantry, slipping and sliding on the
slimy soil, could scarcely make good their footing, and toiled on
laboriously, wet to the skin, and draggled with dirt ; whilst
the horses of the Cavalry struck up the mud blindingly into
the troopers' faces ; and the camels, ever so serviceably adroit
on arid soil, sprawled hopelessly in the mire, and often fell
with their burdens by the way. Many a lusty oath was sworn
on that morning; but, if temper was lost, hope and heart
remained; and when, after a halt, and some renovation of
exhausted nature, news came that they were upon the track of
the enemy, and would soon be amongst them, the difficulties of
the road diminished, or appeared to diminish, and they moved
on with cheerful eagerness. The sun was sinking when our
leading column espied the enemy, and at the same time came
upon a stream, which the rains had flooded into the depth and
dimension of a river. The mutineers were posted along the
line of Nicholson's advance, to the left. Divided into three
bodies, they occupied two villages and a serai in front of them
— all protected by guns. As our troops passed the ford — the
water even there breast-high — the enemy opened upon the
British column with a shower of shot and shell from the sarai.
But, advancing steadily under this fire, Nicholson took in the
situation with his quick soldier's eye, forecast the action in his
mind, and, when his force had crossed the water, at once made
his dispositions. The foremost point of attack, and the most
perilous, was the sarai. Against this Nicholson determined to
fling the strength of his European troops, whilst he provided
for the attack of the villages by other components of his force.
Then, having ordered the 61st and the Fusiliers to lie down, so
as to be clear of the enemy's lire, he drew himself up in his
492 THE LAST SUCCOUES FEOM THE PANJAB. [1857.
stirrups, and addressed his men. He told the 61st that they
knew well what Sir Colin Campbell had said at Chilianwala,
and what he had again told the Highland Brigade before the
battle of the Alma. " I have now," he said, " the same words
to say to you, and to you, my friends of the Fusiliers. Hold
your fire till you are within twenty or thirty yards of the
enemy, then pour your volleys into them, give them a bayonet-
charge, and the sarai is yours." Then Tombs and Remington
opened a smart fire on the sarai ; and up the Infantry sprang
with a ringing cheer, and, sinking ankle-deep in the swampy
ground, steadily advanced, Nicholson at their head, in the face
of a shower of grape and musketry. Then holding back their
fire — the hardest of all possible tasks — they carried the sarai,
and captured the guns.*
But the resistance was resolute, the conflict desperate. The
heroism which was displayed by our people was emulated by
the enemy. The Sipahis fought well, and sold their lives
dearly. There was a sanguinary hand-to-hand encounter. Many
of the gunners and the drivers were bayoneted, or cut down in
the battery, and those who escaped limbered up and made, in
hot haste, for the bridge crossing the Kajafgarh Canal. But
the attacking party pressed closely upon them. The swampy
state of the ground was fatal to the retreat. The leading gun
stuck fast in the morass, and impeded the advance of those in
the rear. Then our pursuing force fell upon them, and before
they had made good their retreat captured thirteen guns and
killed eight hundred of their fighting men.t
In the meanwhile, the Panjabis, having swept on to the
attack of the village on the right, and gallantly cleared it,
crossed over by the rear to do like service on the other village,
against which a brisk fire of artillery had been directed ; but
here they met with a stubborn resistance. Lumsden, who led
them to the attack, was shot down ; and, not until a party of
the 01st had been sent in support, were the despairing energies
* "Poor Gabbett of the 61st, a fine brave soldier, twenty yards in advance
of his men, made a rush on one of the guns ; his foot slipped, and he was
bayoneted by a gigantic Pandi : but Captain Trench, of the 35 th N.I., who
has A.D.C. to General Nicholso-i (that moment rising from tbe ground, his
worse having been shot under him), quickly avenged his death by bringing
down the rebel with his revolver." — Cave-Browne.
f The enemy had four guns at the serai, three at §ach of the villages, and
three at the bridge over the canal.
1857.] THE BATTLE OF NAJAFGAEH. 493
of tlie mutineers suppressed. Night had by this time fallen
upon the scene. Nicholson was master of the Field, and the
enemy were in panic-flight. But our circumstances were not
cheering. Our baggage had not come up, and our people were
compelled, hungry, weary, and soaked as they were, to bivouack
in a morass, without food, or anything to console and sustain
them, except the thought of the victory they had gained. Next
morning, having collected their spoil, and blown up the Najaf-
garh bridge, they commenced their march back to Dehli,
carrying their trophies with them. It was ascertained after-
wards that it was the Nimach Brigade which Nicholson had
thus routed. The Bareli Brigade had not come up to take part
in the action. It was a mortifying reflection to the British
leader that this information had not been communicated to him
at an earlier period. " I do not exaggerate," he wrote after-
wards to Sir John Lawrence, " when I say that had I had a
decent political officer with me to get me a little information, I
might have smashed the Bareli Brigade at Palam, the next day.
As it was, I had no in formation — not even a guide that I did
not pick up for myself on the road ; and had I obeyed my
instructions, and gone to Bahadurgarh, the expedition would
have been a fruitless one. I feel very thankful for my success ;
for, had these two brigades succeeded in getting into our rear,
they would undoubtedly have done much mischief."
The news of the victory, first conveyed to Dehli by young-
Low, Nicholson's aide-de-camp, who had ridden on in advance
of the returning force, caused great rejoicing in Camp, and
there was strong desire to give the victors an ovation as they
marched in with their trophies. But Nicholson's men were
weary and in sorry plight for any needless spectacular display,
so they made all haste to their quarters, and, as evening had
closed in upon them before the whole force had arrived, the
ovation would have been impossible, if they had been inclined
to receive it. But there were hearty congratulations next day
freely tendered to Nicholson, who had done his work right
well, and secured the safe advance of the siege-train. It was
believed, too, that he had weakened the enemy's force, not
merely to the number of those who were killed and wounded in
action, for the whole brigade was broken and dispersed, and
many never again showed their faces in Dehli.* Since the
* " According to all accounts, the Nimach Brigade (the one I dealt with
494 THE LAST SUCCOURS FROM THE PANJAB. [1857.
battle of Badli-ki-sarai on the 8th of June, the English at Dehli
had gained no such victory as that which crowned the action at
Najafgarh.
Congratulations upon this brilliant achievement poured in
from all sides ; but from none came they with greater hearti-
ness and sincerity than from Sir John Lawrence, who wrote to
him, saying : " Though sorely pressed with work, I write a line
to congratulate you on your success. I wish I had the power
of knighting you on the spot. It should be done. I hope you
destroyed no end of villainous Pandis." * To this Nicholson
replied, August 30, 1857 : " Many thanks for
your kind letter of the 27th. I would much
rather earn the good opinion of my friends than any kind of
honorary distinction. I enclose, for your perusal, and Edwardes's,
the rough draft of my report. The field was of such extent,
that it was not easy to estimate the mutineers' loss. I think,
moreover, that they suffered more severely from the fire of our
Artillery, after they had bolted across the bridge, than they did
on the actual battle-field Except where poor Lumsden
was killed, they made little attempt to stand. Most of the
killed were Kotah Contingent men. We took the Kimach troop
of artillery complete, three light field battery guns, and four
of the King's Own. I wish sincerely that they had had as
many more, as, after their flank was turned, they could not
have used them, and must have lost them all."
After this there was quiet for a little space in Camp. All
men were looking eagerly for the arrival of the siege-train, and
for those last reinforcements which Lawrence was sending
down from the Panjab. Reports were floating about to the effect
that the Bareli Brigade was going out again, under Bakht
Khan, to make another effort to intercept our convoys, but if
this design were ever entertained it was soon abandoned, for it
never developed into even the semblance of a fact; and all
only numbers six hundred men now. Many of those who fled would appear
never to have returned to Dehli. Most of the officers with me in the action
rated them at six, seven, and eight thousand men. My own idea is, that they
were between three thousand and four thousand." — Nicholson to Lawrence,
August 30, 1857.
* In this letter Lawrence writes : " Don't assault until you have given the
mutineers all the powder and shot which the siege-train can spare, and then
go in, and may God be with you all. I think, if all the troops were warned
not to disperse, it might have an effect upon them."
1857.] CONGRATULATIONS ON THE VICTORY. 495
again was composure. There was not a soldier in camp who
did not then feel that the time of waiting and watching had
well-nigh passed — that we should soon assume the offensive in
earnest, with ample means to secure success. Dehli now
seemed to be in our grasp, and the spirits of men rose with the
thought of the coining triumph. Then was it that the mess-
tents of our officers rang with the loudest laughter; then was
it that our military bands sent up their gayest music ; then
was it that the inactivity of a disheartened enemy gave un-
accustomed repose to the besieging force ; then the healthy
could enjoy their books or games, and the sick and wounded
could be brought to the doors of their tents to inhale the
pleasant evening air, or take in the marvellous beauty of the
" view from the Ridge." For nearly three months the great-
city, with its wealth of ordnance, had defied the best courage
and the best skill of the English nation. We had been beaten
by the material resources of an enemy, whom, without such
aids, we could have crushed in a day. But now, as our
Engineers brought all the appliances of their craft to bear upon
the strengthening and securing of our positions, as the space
between our siege-works and the city-walls was narrowed by
their efforts, and breaching-batteries were rising under their
hands, no man doubted that the coining month would see Dehli
prostrate at our feet, and the consummation of our hopes
gloriously accomplished. Again the supremacy of the English
race in India, obscured only for a little while, was to be re-
asserted and re-established ; and there was not a white man in
camp who did not long, with a great hunger of the heart, for
the day when the signal would be given, and it would be left
for our English manhood to decide for itself whether any
multitude of Natives of India, behind their walls of masonry,
could deter our legions from a victorious entrance into the
imperial city of the Mughul.
498 APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
Services of Saiad Mir Khan. — Page 52.
" The Sirdar Bahadur, Saiad Mir Khan Sahib, a pensioner receiving six
hundred rupees a month, for aid rendered to the Kabul prisoners and good
conduct in Afghanistan, who had, on hearing the disturbance,- immediately
joined the Commissioner, and offered to escort him to the European lines ;
but it was decided that there was no hope of the lady escaping through
the crowd. He then went out to hold back the mob, and was shot
through the thigh, and his horse mortally wounded. This fine Afghan
was obliged to retire to the city. He came to the Damdamah the next
morning in spite of his wound, and was at the battles of the Hindan.
When the mob attacked the house, the Commissioner and his wife, with
the wife of one of the residents of the station, retired to the roof; when
asked where their master and mistress were, the servants said that they
had gone to church : though drawn swords were put to his throat, the
Jamadar, Gulab Singh, persisted in this statement, and the other servants
were faithfully silent regarding their master's presence." — Beport of Mr.
Commissioner Williams.
The Murder of Mr. Fraser. — Page 60.
[The following is the evidence of Bakhtawass, or Bakhtawar Singh
Chaprasi, as given at the trial of the King of Dehli.]
" I was the servant on duty supervising the repairs of the Fort ditch,
and was going with the account book for Captain Douglas' inspection. I
was on my way, when a trooper came galloping up from the direction of
the Calcutta Gate. The trooper had not reached the Palace Gate when I
observed that Captain Douglas was standing there. I saw Captain Douglas
speaking to the man; but before I reached the Palace Gate myself the
trooper turned his horse and rode off. Captain Douglas told me to go up
to his apartments, and said that he was going to the interior of the Palace
and should return immediately. Captain Douglas did so, and I stayed at
the gate, Makhan, King Siahnsh and others accompanied him. Captain
Douglas had hardly gone when Mr. Fraser arrived in his buggy and
inquired for him. Mr. Fraser alighted and walked on through the covered
way up to the opening. He then said to me he was going to the Calcutta
Gate, and that I was to tell Captain Douglas so on his return. I then
APPENDIX. 497
myself proceeded in the direction of the King's apartments, and met
Captain Douglas returning in a state of excitement. I gave him Mr.
Fraser's message. Captain Douglas went to the Lahor Gate of the Palace,
and told the Native officer on guard there to close it, which was done.
Captain Douglas at the same time gave orders that no crowd was to be
allowed to assemble on the bridge leading into the Palace. Just about
this time an officer of the King's, styled a captain, also came there from
the direction of the main street of Dehli. The gate had been closed and
Captain Douglas' buggy was inside, so he directed me to ask this Native
officer for his buggy that he might go in it as far as the Calcutta Gate,
whither Captain Douglas proceeded in it, I occupying the seat behind.
At the Calcutta Gate we found Mr. Fraser, Mr. Nixon, head clerk, and
four or five other gentlemen. The gate was closed after a short time.
Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas got into the buggy together, and were
returning to the Palace accompanied by the other gentlemen on horseback,
but had not proceeded far when four or five troopers came galloping up at
full speed from the direction of the Ellenborough Tank. About this
time, there was a general cry that the troopers had come. On reaching
the party of gentlemen, one of the troopers wounded Mr. Hutchinson in
the arm with a pistol shot ; the others also fired, but without effect. On
this Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas both got out of the buggy and went
out of the way of the mutineers, and stood by the guard-room of the
Constabulary Force at the gate : two more gentlemen joined them there.
Mr. Fraser got a musket from the Constabulary Force, and shot one of
the troopers. This checked the others, and they turned and fled. A great
crowd had by this time collected, and Captain Douglas and another gentle-
man jumped into the Fort ditch, along which they came on to the Palace
Gate, Mr. Fraser and others coming by the road ; but there was such
confusion at the time, I can't say how. Captain Douglas was in a fainting
state from the injuries he had received from jumping into the ditch, and
we accordingly laid him on a bed in the Kalaiat Khana. In a short time
Mr. Jennings, the clergyman, came down, and at his suggestion Captain
Douglas was taken up to the apartments above the gate, where he was
placed on a bed, Mr. Jennings sending the servants away, and telling them
not to crowd about the place. We then received an order to go for the
King's physician, Abdulah Chaprasi fetched him accordingly. The phy-
sician, Ashan Ullah Khan, had just left, when we servants who were
sitting there saw some five Muhammadans, King's servants, coming along
the covered way calling out, * Diu, din P Just at this time Mr. Fraser
happened to come down to the foot of the stairs, and these men im-
mediately attacked him and killed him with their swords. While this
was hap i ening on the north side of the gate, a mixed crowd, armed with
swords, bludgeons, &c, ran up the stairs on the south side, and gained the
apartments above, those assembled on the north side joining them there."
VOL. II. 2 K
498 APPENDIX.
Removal of Captain Hodson feom the Guide Corps.— Page 136.
[The following passage from a letter written to Hodson's biographer by
the Military Secretary to the Panjab Commissioner, explains fully the
circumstances referred to in the text. After speaking of the question of
the regimental accounts and the action of the Court of Inquiry, the writer
proceeds to say :]
" Still, in so far as the inquiry was concerned, Major H., had he sur-
vived, might perhaps have commanded the Guides to this day. His
removal was entirely another affair. In addition to the command of the
Guides, Lieutenant H. held the office of Accountant Commissioner in
civil charge of Yusufzai. Lieutenant Godby, of the Guides, was severely
wounded by an assassin at Mardan, the Guide Corps station, in December,
1853. The assassin was cut to pieces upon the spot by some men of the
corps. His body was identified, but all efforts to discover the motives of
the miscreant or his abettors proved fruitless. Lieutenant Hodson's sus-
picions, however, fell upon Kadar Khan, the Malik of Turu (four miles
distant from Mardan), the most wealthy and influential chief in Yusufzai.
He even further entertained the hope of being able to convict this Kadar
Khan of having caused the murder of the late Colonel Mackeson ; but
finally, and after a lengthened imprisonment of seven months in the
Peshawar gaol, Kadar Khan was arraigned by him in the Commissioner's
Court on one charge only, viz., that of having instigated the attack upon
Lieutenant Godby. The case completely broke down, and the trial ended
in a full acquittal. Lieutenant Hodson's proceedings were strongly con-
demned by Lord Dalhousie, who directed his dismissal from civil employ,
and that he should not retain command of the Guides, it being incom-
patible with the public interests that he should ever again hold any
position of authority in the district of Yusufzai, and that his getting
another command thereafter should depend upon the result of the Military
Court of Inquiry. The inquiry had not, however, closed so far as to
produce any result, when the Court of Directors took notice of the trial of
Kadar Khan of Tu.ru, and in conveying their approval of the Governor-
General's decision upon it, they added their 'desire' that Lieutenant
Hodson should not * again be entrusted with any command whatever.' "
Proclamations and Correspondence of the Nana Sahib.
Page 256.
[The following extracts from the correspondence of Dundu Pant, Nana
Sahib, illustrate the means by which he endeavoured by a succession of
boastful lies to stimulate the animosity and to sustain the courage of his
followers. These papers were sent in by Nana Narain Rao, of whom
mention is made in the text, and placed in the hands of General Neill,
"who commissioned Major Gordon to translate them. The following is
from the journal of that officer :]
APPENDIX. 499
" A relative of the Nana sent in a quantity of the Nana's property and
ten of his horses from Bithur this morning, and came himself and called on
General Neill in the forenoon. He had been confined by the Nana. In
the evening two boxes were brought in containing the whole of the Nana's
correspondence, and his letter-book containing copies of all his orders,
written in the Persian language. They have been made over to me, which
is a rich treat ; and I sat poring over these letters until eleven o'clock at
night, and finished with the one in which he ordered the destruction of all
Europeans who left in boats."
Proclamation dated July 6th.
" A traveller just arrived at Kanhpur from Calcutta, had heard that,
previous to the distribution of the cartridges, a council had been held for
the purpose of depriving the Hindustanis of their faith and religion. The
members of the council came to the decision, since it was a matter affecting
religion, it would be right to have seven or eight thousand European
soldiers that fifty thousand Hindustanis might be destroyed, and all (the
rest) become Christians. This resolution was sent to Queen Victoria, and
received her approval. Again another council was held, at which the
English merchants assisted. It was here determined that the European
force should be made equal to the Hindustani army (in numbers) so that
when the contest took place there should be no fear of failure. When
this representation (from the council) was read in England, thirty-five
thousand soldiers were embarked in all haste and despatched to India, and
the news of their departure has reached Calcutta. The Sahibs of Calcutta
ordered the distribution of the cartridges with the especial object of
making Christians of the Native army, so that when the army became
Christians there would be no delay in making Christians of the ryots.
These cartridges were rubbed over with the fat of pigs and cows. This
fact has been asserted by Bangalis who were employed in the manufacture
of the cartridges, and of those who related this, one has been executed and
all the rest put into confinement. They (the Sahibs) made their arrange-
ments here. This is the news from thence (Europe). The Turkish
Ambassador wrote from London to the Sultan to inform him that thirty-
five thousand men had been despatched to Hindustan for the purpose of
making Christians of the Hindustanis. The Sultan of Bum — may God
perpetuate his sovereignty ! — despatched a Firman to the Pasha of Egypt
to this effect : ' You are an ally of Queen Victoria. But this is not the
season for amity, inasmuch as my Ambassador writes that thirty-five
thousand soldiers have been despatched to Hindustan for the purpose of
making Christians of the Native ryots and troops. Therefore, in this case,
whilst a remedy is in my power, if I should be negligent, how shall I show
my face to God? And this day {i.e. conjuncture) may some time or other
be my own [meaning this may some day be his own case] since, if the
English make the Hindustanis Christians, they will make an attempt
on my dominions.'
500 APPENDIX.
" When the Pasha of Egypt received this Firman, he, previous to the
arrival of the (English) force, assembled and organised his troops at
Alexandria, which is on the road to Hindustan. The moment the soldiers
(English) appeared, the Pasha's troops opened an artillery fire upon them
from all sides, and destroyed and sunk their ships, so that not a single
soldier escaped.
" When the English at Calcutta had issued their order for the dis-
tribution of the cartridges, and the disturbances had arisen, they anxiously
looked out for the troops from London to aid them. But the Almighty,
in his perfect omnipotence, had already disposed of these. When the
news of the slaughter of the army from London became known, the
Governor-General was greatly afflicted and distressed, and thumped his
head.
"Persian Quatrain. — In the beginning of the night he possessed the
power over life and property. — In the morning his body was without a
head, and his head without a crown. — In one revolution of the cserulean
sphere neither Nadir (Shah*) remained nor any sign of him.
" Issued from Painted Garden of the Peshwa."
"To Holas Sing, Kotwal of Kanhpub.
" You are hereby ordered to make known within your jurisdiction, that
whoever may have in his possession any property plundered from the
English, such as chairs and tables, china and metal dishes, arms, buggies,
medical apparatus, horses, and wood, or railway officers' property, such as
beams, iron, wire, jackets, coats and trousers, goats and sheep, must,
within four days, produce such property. Should any one secrete such
things, and they be found hereafter in his house when searched, he will
be visited with condign chastisement. Should any person have in his
house an Englishman or any children (babalog), he must produce them,
and will not be questioned ; but any person concealing the above will be
blown into the path of destruction from the cannon's mouth.
" Dated 4th Zikad, or 24th June."
[The following appears to have been written after the massacre at the
Ghaut.]
" To Ragunath Singh, Bhowani Singh, &c,
" Officers of the Regiment at Sitapur (Forty-first N. I.), and Wahid Ali
Khan, Naib Bisaldar, First Irregular Cavalry, at Sikandra.
"Greeting. — Your petition presented by Mir Punah Ali, has been
received. Its contents have become known to me. The report of your
* Play upon words — "Nadir," if I remember rightly, is the zenith. —
Translator.
APPENDIX. 501
bravery and gallantry has given me great pleasure, * much praise be yours,
thus should you ever act, thus let men act.' Here (Kanhpur) this day
4th Zikad (27th June), the white faces have fought with us. The whole
of them, by the grace of God, and the destroying fortune of the Jing,
have entered hell. A salute in honour of this event has been fired as
usual. It behoves you also to celebrate this victory with rejoicings and
peals of artillery. Moreover, your request for permission to fight with the
infidels has given me great satisfaction. In a few days, when order shall
have been restored in this district, the victorious force which has now
swelled to a large army, still daily increasing, will cross the Ganges, con-
tinue to hem in the infidels until the arrival of my camp. This event will
take place shortly ; and then display all your valour. Bear in mind that
the people pertain to both faiths. They must be neither molested nor
injured in any way. Have a care to protect them, collect supplies, and
keep them in readiness.
"Dated 4th Zikad St. 1273, 27th June, 1857."
" To Holas Singh, Kotwal.
" Whereas, by the grace of God and fortune of the king, all the English
at Puna and in Panna have been slain and sent to hell, and five thousand
English who were at Dehli have been put to the sword by the royal
troops. The Government is now everywhere victorious ; you are, there-
fore, ordered to proclaim these glad tidings in all cities and villages by
beat of drum, that all may rejoice on hearing them. All cause for appre-
hension is now removed.
" Dated 8th Zikad, 1st July, 1857."
"To Babu Rambaksh, Talukdar, Dhondia Khera, Oudh.
" Greeting. — Your petition dated 6th Zikad (29th June), reporting the
slaughter of the English, and the deaths in battle of your brother
Sudhainan Singh, with two officers, and also begging for my favour as a
reward for your self-devotion, has been perused. You are hereby in-
formed, that I also am grieved at your loss, but the will of God must be
submitted to. Moreover, this event (the death of his brother) has hap-
pened in the cause of Government, and you will ever remain the object of
my protection. Have no manner of fear, Government will certainly
befriend you.
" Dated 10th Zikad, or 3rd July, 1857."
502 APPENDIX.
"To Holas Singh, KotwIl.
"Whereas sundry persons of the town, on hearing the report of
European troops having marched from Allahabad, are abandoning their
homes and seeking shelter in villages, you are hereby ordered to have
proclaimed throughout the town that infantry, cavalry, and artillery have
marched to repel the English. Wherever they may be met, at Fathpiir,
Allahabad, or wherever they may be, the revenging force will thoroughly
punish them. Let all remain without fear in their homes, and pursue
their usual avocations.
"Dated 12th Zikad, or 5th July, 1857."
"To the Officers of the Army.
"I have been greatly pleased with your zeal, valour, and loyalty.
Your labours are deserving of the highest praise. The organisation and
scale of pay and rewards established here will have likewise to be
established for you. Let your minds be at rest, all promises made will
be fulfilled. Troops of all arms have this day crossed the Ganges en route
to Lakhnao; you will be aided in every possible way to slay the un-
believing Nazarenes, and despatch them to hell. The greatest reliance is
placed on your readiness and bravery to secure victory. On receipt of
this order, certify to me, under your hand and seal, that you have learned
its contents, and are ready to co-operate in the destruction of the infidels.
Have no fears as regards ordnance stores. Any amount of ammunition
and heavy guns is available. Sharfuddaulah and Ali Reza Beg, Katwal
of Lakhnao, have been ordered to supply provisions. They will do so ;
but should they fail in this duty inform me, and a conspicuous example
will be made of them. All of you display valour and fortitude. May
victory speedily crown your efforts, thus shall I myself be at liberty to
proceed towards Allahabad. There can be no hesitation on your part or
on mine. After this rapid success, march to Allahabad and conquer
there.
" Dated 14th Zikad, 7th July, 1857."
"To Kalkaparshad, Kanunga, Oudh.
" Greeting. — Your petition has been received, stating that seven boats
containing Europeans were going down the river from Kanhpur, and that
two parties of your men who were at the spot joined the Government
troops and fired on them so unremittingly that they proceeded, slaying
the English the whole way, as far as the villages of Abdul Aziz, when
the horse artillery and yourself in person joined the rest, and sank six of
the boats, the seventh escaping through the force of the wind. You have
APPENDIX. 503
performed a great deed, and I am highly pleased with your conduct.
Persevere in your devotion to the Government cause. This order is sent
you as a mark of favour. Your petition, with which a European was
sent in, has also reached me. The European has been sent to hell, thus
adding to my satisfaction.
'•Dated 16th Zikad, or 9th July, 1857."
"To THE THANADAR OF SlRSTJL.
" The victorious army of Government had marched towards Allahabad
to oppose the Europeans, and it has now been reported that the latter
have deceived the Government troops, attacked and scattered them.
Some troops are said to remain there ; you are, therefore, ordered to
instruct the landholders in your jurisdiction and in Fathptir, that every
brave man should join heart and hand to defend his faith, to put the
Europeans to the sword, and send them to hell. Conciliate all ancient
influential landholders, and persuade them to unite in the cause of their
religion to slay and send to hell all the infidels. Moreover, tell them that
Government will give every man his due, and that those who assist it
shall be rewarded.
"Dated 20th Zikad, 13th July, 1857."
"To the Bahadurs and Officers of Cavalry, Artillery, and
Infantry at Laknao.
" Greeting.— A force of one thousand British, with several guns, were
marching towards Kanhpur from Allahabad. To arrest and slay these
men an army was despatched. The British are advancing rapidly. On
both sides men fall wounded and killed. The Europeans are now 'within
seven koss of Kanhpur, and the field of battle is warmly contested. It is
reported that Europeans are coming up the river in steamers, and strong
defences have consequently been constructed without the town of Kanh-
pur. Here my troops are prepared, and at a distance the battle rages ;
you are, therefore, informed that the aforesaid British are opposite the
district of Baiswara, on this bank of the river. It is very probable that
they may attempt to cross the Ganges. You must, for this reason, send
some troops into the Baiswara country to shut them in on that side. My
force will press them from this direction, and by this combined action the
slaughter of the infidels may be achieved, as is most desirable.
" Should these people not be destroyed, there can be no doubt they will
press on to Dehli. Between Kanhpur and Dehli there is no one" that
could stand against them. We must without fail combine to destroy
them root and branch.
"It is also said that the British may cross the Ganges; some English
504: APPENDIX.
still remain in the Bailey Guard and maintain the fight, -whereas here
there is not a living; English person left. Send troops immediately across
the river, at She'orajpur, to surround and cut up the Europeans.
"Dated 23rd Zikad, or 16th July, 1857."
[This is the last of the series. On that same evening Havelock's force
encamped near Kanhpiir, and whilst victory was being proclaimed by the
Nana's order in the city, he himself was flying for his life, and his followers
were being dispersed in all directions.]
Eecruiting at Peshawar.— Page 371.
[The following is the paragraph in Colonel Edwardes's Mutiny Eeport,
to which reference is made in the text. There is no contribution to the
history of the great Crisis in the Panjab more valuable or more interesting
than the document from which this extract is made :]
"Dehli was not to be recovered by a coup de main. The Hindu
Sipahis, having mutinied about a cartridge, had nothing to propose for an
empire, and fell in of necessity with the only policy that was feasible at
the moment, a Muhammadan King of Dehli; and certainly no other
policy could have given such life to the coming struggle. Hitherto the
question had been purely domestic between the English and their Hindus-
tani army, a quarrel in which the Afghan tribes would merely desire to
be on the conquering side. But a war between the Muslim and the
Christian for empire must needs agitate every village in which there was a
mosque and a moolah ; and the city of Peshawar in particular, with its
sixty thousand inhabitants, had always been a hotbed of intrigue. Humanly
speaking, I consider that the border at this critical period was mainly kept
under by the levying of a militia. Afghans are fanatical, but avarice is
their ruling passion. Every idle vagrant, every professional robber, every
truculent student in the mosques, at whose finger-ends fanaticism was
beginning to tingle, found a market for his sword. The population of the
Peshawar Valley had never been disarmed. Being liable to raids from
their neighbours, they had been allowed to keep arms in their houses ;
though none but outside villagers might wear arms abroad. It was not
difficult, therefore, to collect any number of armed footmen at a short
notice. Good horses are not plentiful in this irrigated country ; but the
head men of every village have two or three hacks, and the enlistment of
their farm servants on these rips, attached all the hamlets, one by one, to
our cause, and got up quite a hearty feeling, such as certainly I never saw
before among them. One can smile now 7 at the scenes that took place
morning and evening at the hours of enlistment. It was necessary to
sustain the dignity of the Imperial Government even in our distress.
Long before the time crowds of candidates for employment thronged the
gateways and overflowed into the garden, the jockeys of unconquerably
vicious horses endeavouring to reduce them to a show of docility by gal-
APPENDIX. 505
loping them furiously about till the critical moment of inspection came.
At last, sick at heart from the receipt of a bad telegram from the provinces
but endeavouring to look happy, out I used to go, and face some hundreds
of the chiefs and yeomen of the country, all eager to gather from the Com-
missioner Sahib's countenance how the 'King of Dehli' was getting on.
Then the first horseman would be brought up. The beast perhaps would
not move. The rider, the owner, and all the neighbours would assail him
with whips, sticks, stones, and Pushtu reproaches that might have moved
a rock ; but nothing would do till the attempt was given up, and the
brute's head turned the other way, when he went off at a gallop amid
roars of laughter from the Pathans, who have the keenest perception of
both fun and vice. No. 2 would make a shift to come up, but every man
and boy in the crowd could see that he was lame on two or three legs.
Then the argument began, and leg by leg, blemish by blemish, the animal
was proved by a multitude of witnesses (who had known him for very
many years) to be perfectly sound ; and so the enlistment went on from
day to day, affording immense occupation, profit, and amusement to the
people, and answering a great many good ends. Now and then an orderly
of the Hindustani Irregular Cavalry, admirably armed and mounted,
would pas-s the spot, and mark his opinion of the 'levies' by a con-
temptuous smile. But, nevertheless, he told his comrades in the lines that
the country people were all with the English, and it was of no use to
desert or to intrigue."
Sir Henry Barnard's last Letter to the Governor-General. —
Page 421.
[The following letter was written to Lord Canning by Sir H. Barnard
three days before his death. He seems to have desired that, in the event
of his demise, its contents should be known to the world :]
" Camp above Delhi, July 2, 1857.
"My dear Lord Canning;— Ere this reaches you, the business here
will have been settled ; if successfully, well ; if a failure, I should like to
leave behind me a brief record of the service of the little force.
" The work of reduction or re-occupation of Dehli was evidently greatly
under-estimated. Dehli, when once its gates were shut, and its immense
arsenal and magazine in the hands of insurgent troops, became a formidable
operation to reduce. When added to this the passions of the people were
roused, and the cry raised of a new ' Mughul dynasty,' it became as im-
portant as formidable.
" With means totally inadequate, this force was sent against it, reinforced
by detachments from Mirath, who were to have provided sappers, gunners,
aud field implements; when all had formed a junction the force barely
arrived at three thousand eight 'hundred. Mirath sent no gunners, and
only a small number of sappers, and these unprovided. On the 8th June
we started from Alipur, met the enemy at Badli-ki-Sarai, and from thence
drove them from the height above Dehli. Here the Commanding-
VOL. II. 2 L
503 APPENDIX.
Artilleryman and Chief Engineer propuel to commence the attack;
batteries were planned and erected, but the distance was too great.
After eight days, I found the side of the town which must be silenced
before we got approaches quite as alive as ever. The Artilleryman
admitted the distance too great, and the Engineer his inability to make
batteries, having positively not a single sand-bag ! I was promised
reinforcements, and for their arrival I determined to wait. They have
arrived, and now comes the decisive moment, and I confess to you I never
was so puzzled. The force 1 have amounts to about five thousand, and
comprises almost all the Europeans in the Upper Provinces ; quite enough,
if free, to re-establish the couutry, but quite insufficient to storm Dehli,
guard the camp, and keep open my communications with the rear for
supplies, &c. If I succeed in the gambler's throw, well and good, but if I
fail the game is up, and all I can expect to be able to do would be to effect
an honourable retreat, carrying off sick, wounded, and guns. To add to my
distresses, dissatisfaction is proved to exist in the .Native trcops just
arrived, and some have been detected in trying to tamper with the men of
Coke's Corps. These fellows are to be hanged to-night ; but the 9th
Irregular Cavalry and some of the Sipahi Corps are known to be tainted,
and would like an opportunity of doing us any mischief they could. Thus
it is, with enemies without, traitors within, and a task before me I cannot
in reason feel my force competent to undertake, I am called upon to decide.
Much is said about the Native character and aptitude at turning tail, but
where the treasure is I fear the heart will be found also, for all these
miscreants are laden with plunder they will not abandon, and they know
full well that every man's hand is against them. They dare not fly.
" My men are very tired; we have had since the action of Badli-id-Sarai
no less than ten affairs, seven of which employed my whole force, cavalry
and infantry ; in each we experienced heavy loss, but inflicted greater.
The traitors are, or rather were, tired ; they openly said it was no use
fighting, and that unless assisted they would fly in four days. Yesterday
brought them the Bareli people, so we shall have our eleventh to-morrow.
After that I think the game is over. The Gwalias are not coming on,
and we shall have defeated them all in turn. But to be useful I must
enter the city, and this will, I am fearful, be a sanguinary affair, for it is
clear the Sipahi knows well how to fight behind stone walls.
" I hope to hear of the head of the European columns coming up from
Calcutta, and then matters will begin to look up again.
" Pray excuse this scrawl ; it is written in a gale of wind. The rain
has fallen for two days, but it is again fine.
« Very truly yours,
" H. Barnard."
END OF VOL. II.
e^. ,-r.^ Unjv ersity of California
40! hVlLrH^ REG, ? NAL L,B RARY FACILITY
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.
^«4
REC'O^
1 W1
Forn
UNIVERSITY OF CALrFOKNiA
AT
LOS ANGELES
LIBRARY
<±io ^aye's and Mal-
-%3£k — l€H*on^s-4iis4K>ry-
1889 of the Indian
"?v2 mutiny --q£
1857-8.
FACILITY,
irwiffi
J 000 224 287 3
DS
478
K18k
1889
v.2